UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate 9781685854898

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Map of Cambodia
1 INTRODUCTION
2 MAKING A PEACE
3 THE PARIS AGREEMENTS
3 UNTAC’s RECORD
5 SOURCES OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE
6 THE AFTERMATH IN CAMBODIA
7 LESSONS
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTERVIEWS
UN DOCUMENTS
ABOUT THIS OCCASIONAL PAPER
THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY
INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

Citation preview

U N PEACEKEEPING IN CAMBODIA

INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

President of the Academy

Olara A. Otunnu Editorial

Board

M i c h a e l W. D o y l e , Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University F. T. L i u , Special Adviser, International Peace Academy / former Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, United Nations G e o r g e L . S h e r r y , Professor o f Diplomacy and World Affairs, Occidental College / former Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, United Nations

U N PEACEKEEPING IN CAMBODIA U N T A C ' S CIVIL MANDATE

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

LYN NE R I E N N E R PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1995 by the International Peace Institute, Inc. All rights reserved by the publisher ISBN 978-1-55587-497-1 (pbk.: alk. paper) Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Map of Cambodia

7 9 12

1

Introduction

13

2

Making a Peace T h e Conflict Regional Peace Negotiations Global Peace Negotiations

16 16 18 22

3

T h e Paris Agreements T h e SNC UNTAC Mandate

25 26 27

4

UNTAC's Record Successes and Failures UNTAC's Civil Mandate Civil Administration Human Rights Civilian Police Rehabilitation T h e Election

32 32 36 37 45 47 49 51

5

Sources of Success and Failure Contributing Factors Determinants Accounting for Variance

59 59 64 66

5

6

CONTENTS

6

The Aftermath in Cambodia

72

7

Lessons Generations of Peace Operations Strategies of Enhanced Consent

75 76 80

Notes Bibliography Interviews UN Documents About This Occasional Paper The International Peace Academy The International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series

89 101 107 112 115 116 117

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wrote this study while serving as vice president of the International Peace Academy, on a public service leave from Princeton University. T h e IPA gave me an extraordinary opportunity to meet the participants in United Nations peacekeeping, both in New York and in the field. I will long cherish the fellowship of IPA, a vital link in the construction of a wider United Nations community. This study has benefited from numerous interviews with UN officials, diplomats, and Cambodia specialists who generously gave of their time and insight. T h e vast preponderance of the interviews were on a "not for attribution" basis; I list the interviewees at the back of the book. I am also grateful for the advice I received from the International Peace Academy's Research Program Steering Committee, to whom I presented a preliminary version of these findings: Ambassador Richard Butler, Ambassador Nabil Elaraby, Professor Robert Keohane, Ambassador Razali Ismail, Professor J o h n Ruggie, and Sir Brian Urquhart. My colleagues at the International Peace Academy, IPA President Olara Otunnu, F. T. Liu, Ian J o h n s t o n e , Mark Metrikas, Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, George Sherry, Nishkala Suntharalingam, and Tim Wilkins were constant sources of inspiration and improvement. Florence Musaffi assisted me throughout and saved me from many mistakes. I would like to thank Marisa Angell, Larry Borowsky, Jarat Chopra, Laurence Pearl, Steven Ratner, Ayaka Suzuki, and Elisabeth Uphoff for their valuable contributions and suggestions. Parts of this book draw on my "Lessons from Cambodia," in The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and U.S. Policy in the Post-Cold War World (Aspen Institute, 1994); other parts draw on M. Doyle and Nishkala Suntharalingam, "The UN in Cambodia," International Peacekeeping 1, 2 (Summer 1994) 7

8

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

and M. Doyle and Ayaka Suzuki, "Transitional Authority in Cambodia," in Tom Weiss, ed., The United Nations and Civil Wars (forthcoming). T h e map of Cambodia is reprinted with the permission of the UN Publications Board. T h e Ford Foundation has been a generous source of support for this study, a part of its support for IPA's Issues in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Program.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN BLDP CGDK CIVADMIN CIVPOL CPAF CPP DK DPKO EAS FUNCINPEC

ICORC JIM KPNLF KR NGO ONUC ONUSAL P5 PDK PRC

Association o f Southeast Asian Nations Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (associated with KPNLF) Coalition G o v e r n m e n t of Democratic K a m p u c h e a (1982-1990) UN Civil Administrative C o m p o n e n t UN Civilian Police Cambodian People's Armed Forces (the S O C army) Cambodian People's Party ( S O C party) Democratic K a m p u c h e a ( K h m e r Rouge regime, 1975-1978) UN D e p a r t m e n t o f P e a c e k e e p i n g O p e r a t i o n s Existing Administrative Structure (each of the four factions of Cambodia) National United Front for an I n d e p e n d e n t , Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative C a m b o d i a (Sihanoukist party) International Committee on the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Cambodia J a k a r t a Informal Meeting K h m e r People's National Liberation Front K h m e r Rouge N o n g o v e r n m e n t a l Organization United Nations Operation in the C o n g o (Zaire) United Nations Observer G r o u p in El Salvador Five P e r m a n e n t Members o f the UN Security Council Party o f Democratic K a m p u c h e a (Khmer R o u g e ) People's Republic o f China

9

10 PRK RCAF SNC SOC UNAMIC UNDP UNHCR UNITAF UNMO UNOSOM UNPROFOR UNTAC UNTAG UNV

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

P e o p l e ' s Republic of K a m p u c h e a (1979-1989, later SOC) Royal C a m b o d i a n A r m e d Forces S u p r e m e N a t i o n a l Council State of C a m b o d i a ( f r o m 1989, b e f o r e PRK) U n i t e d N a t i o n s Advance Mission in C a m b o d i a United Nations Development Program U n i t e d Nations High C o m m i s s i o n e r f o r R e f u g e e s U n i f i e d Task Force (Somalia) U n i t e d N a t i o n s Military O b s e r v e r U n i t e d N a t i o n s O p e r a t i o n in Somalia U n i t e d N a t i o n s P r o t e c t i o n Force ( F o r m e r Yugoslavia) U n i t e d N a t i o n s T r a n s i t i o n a l Authority in C a m b o d i a U n i t e d N a t i o n s T r a n s i t i o n Assistance G r o u p for Namibia United Nations Volunteer

U N PEACEKEEPING IN CAMBODIA

1

INTRODUCTION

Between May 23 and 28, 1993, the citizens o f Cambodia, a devastated land that has seen invasion, civil war, and g e n o c i d e in the last generation, voted in a long-awaited e l e c t i o n run by the U n i t e d Nations. T h e election was the culmination o f years o f peace talks as well as fifteen months o f peacekeeping by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). T h e news from C a m b o d i a over the p r e c e d i n g m o n t h s s e e m e d uniformly bleak—massacres of ethnic Vietnamese, attacks on UN soldiers and civilians, harassment o f opposition political parties, and incidents o f renewed fighting. J o u r n a l i s t s , following leaks from some Monday-morning q u a r t e r b a c k s within UNTAC, had b e e n drawn to the setbacks, and many had written o f f UNTAC as a failure. O n c e the election was successfully c o m p l e t e d , an opposite p a t t e r n m a r k e d the reporting. All the p r o b l e m s that plagued the c o n d u c t o f the peace operation were swept aside in the glow o f a successful week of elections. UNTAC assumed an u n p r e c e d e n t e d d e g r e e o f "transitional authority" over C a m b o d i a . Not since the colonial era and the p o s t World War II Allied occupations o f Germany and J a p a n had a foreign p r e s e n c e held so m u c h formal administrative j u r i s d i c t i o n over the civilian functions o f an i n d e p e n d e n t country. In C a m b o d i a , unlike the UN's subsequent e x p e r i e n c e in Somalia, this authority was exercised with the formal consent o f the four parties to Cambodia's long civil strife u n d e r terms n e g o t i a t e d in a c o m p r e h e n s i v e framework and e m b o d i e d in the Paris A g r e e m e n t s o f 1991. B u t this c o n s e n t proved to be fluid; all the parties resisted, and o n e , the K h m e r Rouge, withdrew altogether and attacked UNTAC itself. It is time to e x p l o r e the significance o f UNTAC's civil m a n d a t e for o t h e r c o m p l e x , multidimensional p e a c e o p e r a t i o n s the U n i t e d

13

14

MICHAEL W . DOYI.E

Nations may u n d e r t a k e in the future. T h e p o s t - C o l d War working consensus on the Security Council and a global sense o f interdependence—weak as it is—will put collapsing states, destructive civil wars, and humanitarian e m e r g e n c i e s on the international agenda o f conc e r n . But nation-states have demonstrated that they are extremely reluctant to take casualties to rescue foreign peoples in faraway emerg e n c i e s , however deserving the cause may be. P e a c e a g r e e m e n t s a m o n g warring factions, even when achieved, leave the parties far from reconciled. In these difficult circumstances, with the likelihood o f c o n t i n u i n g civil strife, can the international c o m m u n i t y c o n d u c t an effective p e a c e o p e r a t i o n ? W h e n the parties do n o t reliably imp l e m e n t the peace a g r e e m e n t s they have signed and when the international c o m m u n i t y is n o t p r e p a r e d to c o e r c e t h e m with f o r c e , should the effort be a b a n d o n e d ? In this book I seek to begin to answer those questions by drawing out the lessons o f the C a m b o d i a n p e a c e o p e r a t i o n and developing the strategic categories e m b e d d e d in S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace: p e a c e m a k i n g , p e a c e k e e p i n g , and peacebuilding. I will e x p l o r e how coalitions o f especially interested states (the " E x t e n d e d P 5 " for C a m b o d i a ) h e l p e d the local parties and regional states make a peace agreement; how the p e a c e k e e p i n g process employed ad h o c semisovereign entities (the C a m b o d i a n S u p r e m e National C o u n c i l ) to legitimate U N T A C ' s direct implementation o f its striking civil mandate to reconstruct the Cambodian polity as a democracy; and how, in the process, k e e p i n g the p e a c e c a m e to d e p e n d on building new institutions and empowering new actors with a stake in a peaceful and democratic Cambodia. T h e b o o k is organized as follows: • C h a p t e r 2 traces the history o f the p e a c e m a k i n g process. • C h a p t e r 3 describes the Paris P e a c e A g r e e m e n t s o f 1 9 9 1 , u n d e r which the Security Council organized UNTAC. • C h a p t e r 4 assesses U N T A C ' s r e c o r d , what worked and what didn't. T h o u g h I c o n s i d e r human rights, civilian police, and rehabilitation, the focus is on the central e l e m e n t s o f UNTAC's civil mandate: the Civil Administration and Electoral c o m p o n e n t s . T h e e l e c t i o n , with the vital support o f all o f UNTAC, b e c a m e the successful c e n t e r p i e c e o f the Cambodian peace; civil administration, by and large a failure, revealed the limitations o f multidimensional p e a c e k e e p i n g in the midst o f continuing civil strife. • Chapter 5 assesses the factors that produce success and failure in c o m p l e x multidimensional peacekeeping operations, focus-

INTRODUCTION

15

ing on what appear, j u d g i n g f r o m the Cambodian experience, to be both the contributory and the determining roots of such outcomes. I emphasize the crucial i m p o r t a n c e of direct imp l e m e n t a t i o n as a means of mitigating the incentives parties may d e v e l o p to stymie aspects o f the peace process that can disadvantage them. •

Chapter 6 brings the story of the Cambodian peace operation up through the summer of 1994. I reflect on the m e a n i n g of success, asking what the e i g h t e e n - m o n t h - l o n g o p e r a t i o n has left in its wake.

•

Chapter 7 draws the wider lessons of the Cambodia operation f o r other c o m p l e x multidimensional U N efforts to achieve a peace f r o m what was o n c e civil war. Reacting to the weaknesses of attempts in Somalia and Bosnia to e n f o r c e outcomes and the consequent unwillingness o f m e m b e r states to engage in military action, I highlight the possible efficacy of strategies o f e n h a n c e d consent in p e a c e m a k i n g , p e a c e k e e p i n g , and peacebuilding.

MAKING A PEACE

Settling the C a m b o d i a n conflict would necessitate a "comprehensive" p e a c e in which a cease-fire d e p e n d e d on an a g r e e m e n t to reconstruct the C a m b o d i a n state. Negotiating such an a g r e e m e n t r e q u i r e d the participation of local, regional, a n d global actors and the assignm e n t to the UN of a crucial i m p l e m e n t i n g role. Following years of Cold War deadlock, it took t h r e e years of negotiation a n d a n u m b e r of false starts b e f o r e the Paris A g r e e m e n t s of 1991 finally i n c o r p o rated j u s t such a c o m p r e h e n s i v e peace.

THE CONFLICT T h e c h a l l e n g e lay in t h e c o m p l e x c h a r a c t e r of the C a m b o d i a n conflict. Following the devastating b o m b i n g C a m b o d i a s u f f e r e d d u r i n g the Vietnam War and the killing of as many as a million C a m b o d i a n s by the K h m e r Rouge, the conflict e n t e r e d a new stage in D e c e m b e r 1978 when, r e s p o n d i n g to r e p e a t e d provocations, Vietnam invaded C a m b o d i a . V i e t n a m ' s installation of the H e n g S a m r i n - H u n Sen regime in 1978-1979 gave rise to a guerrilla m o v e m e n t of the t h r e e m a j o r resistance g r o u p s : P r i n c e N o r o d o m S i h a n o u k ' s party—National U n i t e d F r o n t for an I n d e p e n d e n t , Neutral, Peaceful a n d Cooperative C a m b o d i a ( F U N C I N P E C ) — S o n S a n n ' s K h m e r P e o p l e ' s National Liberation F r o n t (KPNLF), a n d the Party of D e m o c r a t i c K a m p u c h e a (PDK, or the K h m e r R o u g e ) . Each of the four, including the H u n Sen r e g i m e itself (later called State of C a m b o d i a , SOC), c o n t e s t e d the claims of t h e o t h e r to legitimate authority over Cambodia. In 1982, at the u r g i n g of t h e Association of S o u t h e a s t Asian N a t i o n s (ASEAN), the U n i t e d States, a n d C h i n a , the t h r e e g r o u p s o p p o s i n g the H u n Sen r e g i m e f o r m e d the Coalition G o v e r n m e n t of Democratic K a m p u c h e a (CGDK), h e a d e d by Prince Sihanouk. 16

17

MAKING A PEACE

THE FOUR

FACTIONS

FUNCINPEC, t h e National U n i t e d F r o n t f o r an I n d e p e n d e n t , Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia. F o u n d e d in support of Prince N o r o d o m Sihanouk and drawing u p o n the forces that supported his g o v e r n m e n t between 1954 and 1970. Currently led by his son, Prince R a n a r i d d h . Allied with KPNLF and the KR in CGDK, 1982-1990. Controlled a small area a r o u n d Ampil in the northwest d u r i n g the peace process a n d had a rapidly shrinking army, once a b o u t 10,000 soldiers. Won 45 p e r c e n t of the vote in the May elections and 58 out of 120 seats in the Assembly. Ran a r i d d h is the first p r i m e minister of the coalition g o v e r n m e n t (with the Cambodian People's Party, CPP) of the new Kingdom of Cambodia, over which King Sihanouk now reigns. KPNLF: Khmer People's National Liberation Front. Conservative, middle class movement, heir to the 1960s republican opposition to Sihanouk. Allied with KR and FUNCINPEC in CGDK, 1982-1990. Controlled a small zone in the northwest a r o u n d T h m a r Pouk; had a disappearing army. Split d u r i n g the peace process, a faction (Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, BLDP) following Son Sann; won 4 percent of the vote and 10 seats in the Assembly. Khmer Rouge (KR), or Party of Democratic K a m p u c h e a . An ext r e m e , Maoist-style c o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t that seized p o w e r in 1975 a n d p r o c e e d e d to ruralize the c o u n t r y , in the process inflicting an "auto-genocide" with an e s t i m a t e d 1 million victims. Led by Pol Pot a n d Khieu S a m p h a n . . C o n t r o l l e d areas on the Thai-Cambodian b o r d e r with a military force of almost 30,000 in 1990 but only approximately 10,000-15,000 disciplined troops in 1993. It signed the peace a g r e e m e n t b u t later refused to particip a t e in the UN p e a c e plan. As of the s u m m e r of 1994, it controlled a b o u t 10 p e r c e n t of the t e r r i t o r y a n d c o n t i n u e d an a r m e d insurgency against the royal g o v e r n m e n t . State of Cambodia: C o m m u n i s t regime installed in 1979 by Vietn a m and led first, by H e n g Samrin, later by H u n Sen. Called the P e o p l e ' s Republic of K a m p u c h e a b e f o r e 1989. C o n t r o l l e d 90 p e r c e n t of the c o u n t r y at the time of the Paris Agreements, with a military force of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 40,000 regulars a n d 100,000 militia. Its party, the CPP, won 38 p e r c e n t of the vote in the May 1993 elections a n d 51 seats in the Assembly. H u n Sen b e c a m e s e c o n d p r i m e minister in the c u r r e n t coalition g o v e r n m e n t of the Kingdom of Cambodia. 1

18

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

T h e conflict was shaped by the collapse of the legitimacy of the Cambodian state following the "auto-genocide" inflicted by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979 and the ensuing installation of the H e n g S a m r i n - H u n Sen regime by the Vietnamese. Unlike Somalia, whose factions lack both legitimacy and effectiveness on a national scale, or Bosnia, whose internationally recognized government lacks effective control, Cambodia's H u n Sen regime developed out of the devastation inherited from the Khmer Rouge an effective (albeit dictatorial) authority over m o r e than 80 p e r c e n t of the territory. 2 What it lacked was legitimacy, international recognition outside the Soviet bloc, and freely given support at home. Denied since the Vietnamese invasion, recognized sovereignty was in the hands of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. For the H u n Sen regime and its Vietnamese and Soviet backers, the conflict was a counterinsurgency waged against a genocidal opp o n e n t (the Khmer Rouge). For the CGDK and its ASEAN, UN, and US supporters, the conflict was an armed international intervention and occupation of a sovereign country by Vietnam. Conflicting claims to authority between CGDK and the H u n Sen g o v e r n m e n t created problems of recognition for the international community. T h o u g h the UN seated the CGDK delegation as the representative of the legal government of Cambodia, the H u n Sen faction controlled the country. Cambodia's internal conflicts were c o m p o u n d e d by each faction's external allegiances. Each sought out foreign patrons. Far f r o m being an unusual syndrome of postcolonial politics, international d e p e n d e n c e reflected incomplete national integration—despite an ancient and powerful sense of national identity—and, of course, the readiness of foreign powers to fish in troubled waters. T h e United States supported the Lon Nol coup of 1970, the Chinese backstopped the Khmer Rouge, and the Vietnamese installed the H u n Sen regime in 1979 (finally withdrawing their military forces in 1989). Last, the complex conflict left a residue of social dislocation, n o n e more clear than the serious plight of more than 370,000 Cambodian refugees subsisting on the Thai border.

REGIONAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

T h e UN was involved in the search for peace f r o m the very beginning. 3 Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar instructed UN official Rafeeuddin Ahmed to make contacts with the H u n Sen regime

19

MAKING A PEACE

CAMBODIA CHRONOLOGY

1941 French colonial authorities install Prince N o r o d o m Sihanouk as Cambodian king. 1954 Cambodia obtains i n d e p e n d e n c e from France. 1955 King Sihanouk abdicates in favor of his father and, as Prince Sihanouk, f o u n d s the People's Socialist Communist Party, which wins all the seats in the national assembly. Sihanouk becomes premier in 1957. 1970 Civilian and military officials overthrow the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and turn over power to Prime Minister Lon Nol a US-backed general. T h e Cambodian monarchy is abolished. 1975 Communist guerrillas of the Khmer Rouge seize the capital and oust Lon Nol's g o v e r n m e n t after victories in provincial cities. The Khmer Rouge imposes a brutal reorganization of society; more than a million people die in t h r e e years. Prince Sihanouk, a virtual captive, is declared titular head of state. 1976 Prince Sihanouk resigns and goes to Beijing. T h e shadowy leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, becomes prime minister. 1978 Vietnamese troops invade in December. 1979 Vietnam installs a new government in P h n o m Penh led by H e n g Samrin. 1982 With e n c o u r a g e m e n t from China and the United States, the three C a m b o d i a n rebel factions f o r m the CGDK, a government in exile with Prince Sihanouk as president, Khieu Samphan of the Khmer Rouge as vice president, and Son Sann of the conservative Khmer People's Liberation Front as prime minister. 1988-1989 T h e JIM I and JIM II regional peace negotiations are held u n d e r the sponsorship of Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas. 1989 Vietnam a n n o u n c e s that all its troops will leave Cambodia by the end of September. Sponsored by France and Indonesia, First Paris Peace C o n f e r e n c e meets in July 1989 and deadlocks on the issue of power-sharing. 1990 T h e United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom—the five p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s of the Security Council—draft a peace plan calling for an interim administration

20

MICHAEL W . DOYI.

made up of the four factions to run the country under UN supervision until free elections can be organized. T h e factions form the Supreme National Council and agree in principle to accept the plan, which also calls for mutual disarmament and a UN buffer force. June 1991 The Supreme National Council agrees to an indefinite cease-fire. October 1991 Second Paris Peace Conference. Cambodia's warring factions and eighteen nations sign a peace treaty in Paris, ending the civil war. November 1991 T h e UN advance mission (UNAMIC) deploys in Cambodia. March 1992 The United Nations starts deploying a peacekeeping force of 22,000 soldiers and civilians to oversee the elections. Yasushi Akashi is named special representative, Lt. Gen. J o h n Sanderson, force commander. J u n e 1992 Cantonment and demobilization scheduled to begin, but the Khmer Rouge refuses to yield weapons. December 1992 UNTAC Electoral Component completes the registration of 4.7 million potential Cambodian voters, approximately 90 percent of those eligible. After months of sporadic attacks, the Khmer Rouge begin taking United Nations troops hostage for brief periods. Over the next six months, they kill thirteen peacekeepers and wound at least fifty. January 1993 T h e Khmer Rouge says it will boycott the vote. UNTAC establishes Control Teams to probe SOC violence and intimidation. April 1993 T h e Khmer Rouge pulls out of the capital and regroups in strongholds. Clashes escalate. Electoral campaign begins; Radio UNTAC broadcasts human rights and electoral information directly to the Cambodian people. Japanese UNV Atsuhito Nakata is killed in Kompong Thom; UNTAC undergoes a crisis of confidence. May 2 3 - 2 8 , 1993 National elections for a Constituent Assembly are surprisingly nonviolent, with 90 percent voter turnout. June 1893 FUNCINPEC wins a plurality of fifty-eight seats (45 percent of the popular vote) in the Assembly; CPP (SOC), fiftyone (38 percent of the popular vote); BLDP (KPNLF), ten (3.8

MAKING A PEACE

21

percent of the popular vote). T h e Constituent Assembly begins its work, following a brief secession by the eastern provinces led by SOC hard-liners. A provisional national g o v e r n m e n t is f o r m e d , with Ranariddh and H u n Sen as c o - p r i m e ministers. The Committee of Assembly begins drafting a constitution. September 1993 Sihanouk signs the constitution and accepts his restoration as king, creating a parliamentary democracy. UNTAC departs P h n o m Penh. Prince Ranariddh becomes first prime minister, H u n Sen, second prime minister. CPP continues to exercise d o m i n a n t influence over the bureaucracy and army. January 1994 Following the failure of negotiations with the Khmer Rouge, the Royal Cambodian Army begins an offensive. March-April 1994 T h e royal g o v e r n m e n t at first seizes, then loses Pailin, a Khmer Rouge stronghold. T h e civil war stalemate continues.

and offer the UN's good offices. Ahmed appears successfully to have drawn sufficient distinction between his role as a representative of the Secretary-General in Southeast Asia on the o n e h a n d , and the UN General Assembly's condemnation of the H u n Sen regime, on the other, to explore potentially promising avenues for negotiation. Between 1982 and 1985, in consultations with the Cambodian parties and regional states, Ahmed developed the outlines of a comprehensive solution that engaged all four factions, established a cease-fire, supervised the withdrawal of all foreign forces, guaranteed Cambodia's independence and neutrality, repatriated refugees, demobilized military forces, provided for genuine national self-determination through free and fair elections, and instituted a human rights education program to help insure a "non-return of the policies and practices of a recent past" (the diplomatically polite code for Cambodia's genocide). 4 By this point, however, the UN had moved far ahead of the parties. It was not until December 1987 that Prince Sihanouk and H u n Sen informally met, in Paris, to discuss the possibility of a peace. With Sihanouk's advancing age, H u n Sen's desire to obtain international recognition for his regime, and military exhaustion as spurs to action, the Cambodian factions began to d e m o n s t r a t e a willingness to discuss peace. Following the e n c o u r a g e m e n t of the SecretaryGeneral, regional actors—and particularly Indonesia's foreign minister, Ali Alatas—began to take the lead, organizing two Jakarta Informal

22

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

Meetings (JIM I and J I M II) in July 1988 and February 1989. For the first time, all four C a m b o d i a n factions were b o u g h t together, a n d they were j o i n e d by Vietnam, Laos, a n d the states of ASEAN. After nine years of front-line o p p o s i t i o n to the perceived Vietn a m e s e threat, ASEAN states were now ready for the right kind of reconciliation. T h a i l a n d ' s b o o m i n g economy and its search for markets and investments m a d e C a m b o d i a , Laos, and even Vietnam look m o r e like business opportunities and less like strategic threats. Vietnam, for its part, seems to have b e c o m e eager to shed its C a m b o d i a n burden. The occupation had imposed heavy costs, both financial and human. 5 It had barred Vietnam's full access to the world market, extended a d a n g e r o u s strategic confrontation with China, and necessitated an e m b a r r a s s i n g level of d e p e n d e n c e on the U S S R . Together, these precluded Vietnam's normalization within Southeast Asia and limited its access to international investments and markets desperately needed- to provide employment for its rapidly growing population. Indonesia was eager to display its capacities for regional leadership by brokering a regional peace. J I M I and J I M II s u c c e e d e d in identifying the n e e d for an international control m e c h a n i s m to supervise the transition to a peace, but they could not reach an agreement on how such a mechanism would operate.

GLOBAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS Perceiving an opportunity to break the deadlock that had e m e r g e d at the regional level and c o n c e r n e d that Vietnam's prospective (September 1989) withdrawal of its forces from C a m b o d i a would harden H u n Sen and Vietnam against a c o m p r e h e n s i v e solution, 6 French Foreign Minister R o l a n d D u m a s j o i n e d Ali Alatas to c o s p o n s o r the first Paris C o n f e r e n c e on C a m b o d i a in July 1989. Eighteen countries a t t e n d e d , including the five p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s of the Security Council (the P5: United States, United Kingdom, France, USSR, and C h i n a ) , and the Secretary-General participated as well. Progress was m a d e in d e f i n i n g a g r e e m e n t s on the withdrawal of f o r e i g n forces, neutralization, the return of r e f u g e e s , and other matters, but again the crucial sticking point proved to be the interim control mechanism. Negotiators identified five crucial ministries that would be subj e c t to power-sharing. At the suggestion of China, the areas specified for the strictest level of scrutiny and control over each of the four factions were defense, public security, finance, information, and foreign affairs. Disappointing the expectations of the cochairs, the Hun Sen regime rejected K h m e r R o u g e participation in an interim quadripartite government. 7

MAKING A PEACE

23

Regional talks among the four factions resumed (but continued to fail) in Jakarta in February and March 1990 and in Tokyo in J u n e . What progress there was at this level was conceptual. As an alternative to "power-sharing," Prince Sihanouk, in consultation with US Representative Stephen Solarz, p r o p o s e d that, because the parties could not trust each o t h e r e n o u g h to rule together, the UN should take over the administration of Cambodia during the period between a political settlement and the installment of freely, democratically elected leaders. Solarz briefed the Secretary-General, laying out a revolutionary, trusteelike authority for the UN in Cambodia. 8 Sih a n o u k tried to sell a related "Sihanouk Plan" to the four factions, but, unlike Solarz's trusteeship, it cast the UN in a purely logistical and technical role. 9 Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans contributed an extensive exploration of the implications of various UN transitional roles. 10 With the withdrawal in S e p t e m b e r 1989 of Vietnamese forces and the failure of the peace process, war resumed in Cambodia. T h e CGDK tested H u n Sen's i n d e p e n d e n t staying power, and H u n Sen demonstrated that his regime, t h o u g h losing some territory, could hold on to the vast bulk of Cambodia. Reacting to both the resumption of hostilities and the stalemate in negotiations at the regional level, the P5 now took the initiative, beginning with a meeting in Paris in J a n u a r y 1990 and then alternating monthly between Paris and New York.11 The end of the Cold War had at last made possible the active, cooperative involvement of the three key global powers: Russia, China, and the United States. • Russia: Even before Gorbachev took power, the former Soviet Union had strenuously advocated a peace a g r e e m e n t for Cambodia. T h e existing conflict (together with Soviet support of Vietnam and H u n Sen) was a continuing bar to a rapp r o c h e m e n t with China, and it e n h a n c e d the influence of both China and the United States in Southeast Asia. Despite the advent of Gorbachev, the Cambodian problem kept the USSR in a tiny minority in the UN; the USSR, however, was not prepared to a b a n d o n H u n Sen.1'2 T h r o u g h o u t the negotiations, it sought to maximize H u n Sen's room for maneuver by minimizing the control the UN placed over the SOC. • China: China's decision to curtail its support for the Khmer Rouge must have been especially difficult, given the length of their relationship, the contest with Vietnam, and the KR's deep d e p e n d e n c e on the PRC. But with the end of the Cold War and China's d e t e r m i n a t i o n to achieve rapid e c o n o m i c development, the KR began to appear an unwelcome burden.

24

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

Seeking access to the world market, appreciating the emergence of a less threatening, indeed exhausted, Vietnam, and building a close relationship with Thailand, China was prepared to settle for peace, provided that it permitted KR participation. T h r o u g h o u t the negotiations, as a way to open political space for the KR, it sought to increase the UN's control over the SOC. • United States: T h e United States had long sought to encourage a market-oriented Southeast Asia free f r o m the hegemony of either China or Vietnam. But by the late 1980s US policy responded m o r e directly to domestic concerns. T h e Bush administration was eager to take Cambodia off its foreign policy agenda, and a comprehensive peace seemed the only way to do so. Democrats had criticized the administration for its "indifference to genocide," r e f e r r i n g to US supp o r t for and f u n d i n g of the CGDK (which contained the Khmer Rouge). Secretary of State J a m e s Baker, moreover, feared that the fighting would inevitably escalate, forcing the United States into the dilemma of having to s u p p o r t either a Vietnamese "surrogate" (Hun Sen's State of Cambodia) or a genocidal Khmer Rouge. Perhaps most i m p o r t a n t , if the war escalated, Southeast Asia would again b e c o m e a US domestic problem, stirring up all the dissension of the Vietnam War period. T h e administration, t h e r e f o r e , sought a comprehensive solution as an alternative to the KR and the Vietnamese surrogate. It was p r e p a r e d to gamble that Sihanouk, if he had sufficient UN backing in a transitional regime, would find a way to establish a "pluralist democracy" presided over by himself. 1 3 Working with drafts from Gareth Evans and the papers of the UN Secretariat, the P5 steadily crafted the outlines of a comprehensive peace featuring a strong controlling role for UNTAC. By August 27, 1990, at their sixth meeting, the P5 a n n o u n c e d that they had reached a consensus on a framework. They asked the cosponsors of the Paris C o n f e r e n c e (France and Indonesia) to convene an informal meeting of the four factions in Jakarta. There, on September 10, 1990, the f o u r accepted the framework and a n n o u n c e d the formation of the Supreme National Council, consisting of all four factions and embodying Cambodian sovereignty d u r i n g the transition process. It took eleven more m o n t h s for the P5 to persuade the four factions to turn the framework into a workable peace agreement.

T H E PARIS A G R E E M E N T S

The Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict,14 m o r e commonly referred to as the Paris Agreements, provided a revolutionary blueprint for a comprehensive settlement to the conflict in C a m b o d i a . T h e a g r e e m e n t s also gave the U n i t e d Nations a u n i q u e role in the settlement and m a n a g e m e n t of such conflicts. T h e notable aspects of the Paris Agreements include: first, the comprehensiveness of the settlement plan; second, the identification of the S u p r e m e National Council as the "unique legitimate body a n d source of authority in which t h r o u g h o u t the transitional period the sovereignty, i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d unity of Cambodia are enshrined"; and, third, the u n p r e c e d e n t e d civilian role of the UN in the settlement process. In t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s the parties a g r e e d no-t only to the t e r m s of a cease-fire a n d the d i s a r m i n g of t h e f a c t i o n s b u t also to the m a i n t e n a n c e of law a n d o r d e r , t h e r e p a t r i a t i o n of r e f u g e e s , t h e p r o m o tion of h u m a n rights a n d p r i n c i p l e s f o r a new c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e sup e r v i s i o n a n d c o n t r o l of c e r t a i n aspects of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a c h i n e r y by a UN body, a n d , m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , c o n d u c t , a n d m o n i t o r i n g of elections by t h e UN. T r a d i t i o n a l , or " f i r s t - g e n e r a t i o n , " UN p e a c e k e e p i n g r e s t e d o n the c o n s e n t of t h e parties, strove f o r impartiality, a n d avoided t h e use of f o r c e . Acting as a n o n v i o l e n t a n d i m p a r t i a l p r e s e n c e , the UN m o n i t o r e d cease-fires, s u p e r v i s e d withdrawals, a n d m a n n e d b u f f e r zones. It did n o t resolve conflicts b u t i n s t e a d l e n t stability, h e l p i n g , to c r e a t e c o n d i t i o n s c o n d u c i v e to a n e g o t i a t e d political settlement. 1 "' By c o n t r a s t , " t h i r d - g e n e r a t i o n " p e a c e e n f o r c e m e n t , r e p r e s e n t e d by the o p e r a t i o n s in Somalia a n d Bosnia, is n o t based o n the c o n s e n t of the parties, is a u t h o r i z e d u n d e r C h a p t e r VII of t h e Charter, a n d involves the coercive use of force, w h e r e necessary, to i m p o s e a p e a c e o n w a r r i n g parties or p r o t e c t h u m a n i t a r i a n relief efforts. 25

26

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

UN o p e r a t i o n s in C a m b o d i a , like t h o s e in N a m i b i a (UNTAG) a n d El Salvador ( O N U S A L ) , c o n s t i t u t e d a " s e c o n d - g e n e r a t i o n " mult i d i m e n s i o n a l o p e r a t i o n . 1 6 It too was based o n c o n s e n t , 1 7 impartiality, a n d the n o n - u s e of f o r c e . But t h e striking quality of t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s lies in the focus on what UN Secretary-General B o u t r o s Boutros-Ghali r e f e r s to in the Agenda for Peace as " p e a c e - b u i l d i n g " 1 8 in a d d i t i o n to p e a c e m a k i n g a n d traditional p e a c e k e e p i n g . G o i n g bey o n d t h e m o n i t o r i n g of a cease-fire or t h e i n t e r p o s i t i o n of a f o r c e , U N T A C u n d e r t o o k a m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l set of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in h u m a n rights, civilian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , election o r g a n i z a t i o n , r e f u g e e r e p a t r i a t i o n , a n d e c o n o m i c r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . T h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l comm u n i t y c h a r g e d the U N — f o r t h e first t i m e in its h i s t o r y — w i t h the political a n d e c o n o m i c r e s t r u c t u r i n g of a m e m b e r state as p a r t of the b u i l d i n g of p e a c e u n d e r which t h e p a r t i e s w e r e to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e t h e i r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . T h e r o o t s of t h e C a m b o d i a n conflict lay in the collapse of b o t h t h e d o m e s t i c a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l legitimacy of the C a m b o d i a n state. T h e m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l strategy of p e a c e e m b o d i e d in t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s lay in the U N ' s s t e p p i n g in to h e l p r e b u i l d that legitimacy a f t e r the parties h a d failed to achieve a reconciliation of t h e i r own. T h e parties to the a g r e e m e n t s c r e a t e d two i n s t i t u t i o n s in o r d e r to i m p l e m e n t t h e p e a c e : the S u p r e m e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l a n d U N T A C . l y A transitional p e r i o d was d e f i n e d , r u n n i n g f r o m the e n t r y i n t o f o r c e of the a g r e e m e n t s o n O c t o b e r 23, 1991, to the time w h e n an e l e c t e d C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly e s t a b l i s h e d a new sovereign gove r n m e n t of C a m b o d i a ( a n t i c i p a t e d to o c c u r a r o u n d t h e e n d of August 1993). 2 0 D u r i n g that p e r i o d , the S u p r e m e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l (SNC), a c o m m i t t e e c o m p o s e d of the f o u r factions, was to " e n s h r i n e " the legal sovereignty of C a m b o d i a , a n d UNTAC, an a u t h o r i t y established by the Security C o u n c i l in F e b r u a r y 1992, was to i m p l e m e n t the a g r e e d - u p o n p e a c e .

THE SNC As d e s c r i b e d above, d u r i n g the early stages of the p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n process, the C a m b o d i a n factions flatly r e j e c t e d the p r o p o s a l that national r e c o n c i l i a t i o n b e a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h an i n t e r i m q u a d r i p a r t i t e g o v e r n m e n t . However, the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of U N a d m i n i s t r a t i o n req u i r e d the c r e a t i o n of a l e g i t i m a t e s o v e r e i g n entity to d e l e g a t e t h e r e q u i r e d authority, as the UN is p r e c l u d e d by Article 78 2 1 f r o m a d o p t i n g a " t r u s t e e s h i p " role over a m e m b e r state. T h e C a m b o d i a n parties a n d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y t h e r e f o r e devised t h e conc e p t of the S u p r e m e National C o u n c i l , c o m p o s e d of representatives

27

THE PARIS AGREEMENTS

of the four main factions, to serve as the u n i q u e and legitimate source of authority for Cambodia. Thè SNC had twelve members in addition to Prince Sihanouk: six from the State of Cambodia faction and the o t h e r six divided a m o n g the CGDK factions. Prince Sihanouk was declared president of SNC in recognition of his role as f o r m e r king and prime minister and as the only leading figure acceptable to all Cambodian parties and the five p e r m a n e n t members of the UN Security Council. T h e Security Council endorsed the formation of the SNC, giving it a d e g r e e of international recognition and legitimacy that f u r t h e r s u p p o r t e d its primary p u r p o s e of delegating all necessary authority to UNTAC. The actual status of the SNC as the legitimate sovereign authority of Cambodia during the transition period was problematic, both in design and practice. On the one hand, the SNC, in its capacity as a sovereign entity, signed two international h u m a n rights conventions, which will bind successor governments.- 2 T h e Paris Agreements, moreover, authorized the SNC to act as an "advisory" body to UNTAC. UNTAC thus had to abide by any unanimous decision of the SNC that was in keeping with the objectives of the Agreements. Whenever the SNC reached an impasse, Prince Sihanouk had the authority to advise UNTAC. On the other hand, the special representative of the Secretary-General was the final arbiter of whether a decision of the SNC a d h e r e d to the intent and m e a n i n g of the Paris Agreements. T h e Agreements also gave UNTAC and the special representative wide discretion to act independently where necessary and to make major binding decisions whenever the SNC reached a deadlock. In practice, the p e r m a n e n t members of the UN Security Council and other interested states exerted much influence over SNC decisionmaking t h r o u g h their P h n o m Penh s u p p o r t g r o u p of local diplomatic representatives accredited to the SNC. T h e SNC was a part—indeed, the symbolically vital Cambodian part 2 3 —of the circle of authority in Cambodia; it simply lacked the resources and coherence it needed to have a decided effect.

UNTAC MANDATE

T h e Paris Agreements granted extraordinary power to the UN during the transition period. 2 4 UNTAC was r e q u i r e d to assume traditional peacekeeping responsibilities: • to m o n i t o r the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces and to supervise the c a n t o n m e n t and demobilization of Cambodian military forces,

28

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

T h e objectives of the security a r r a n g e m e n t s d u r i n g the transitional period were the traditional ones: to stabilize the military situation, build c o n f i d e n c e a m o n g parties to the conflict, and prevent the risks of a r e t u r n to warfare. The signatories of the Paris Agreements agreed to the withdrawal and n o n r e t u r n of foreign forces, advisors, and military personnel; the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a cease-fire; the termination of external military assistance to all factions; the reg r o u p m e n t , c a n t o n m e n t , and demobilization of a r m e d forces; and the release of all prisoners of war and civilian internees. UNTAC, in short, was required to supervise a military stand-down including verification of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the cessation of external arms supply. It also u n d e r t o o k to supervise demining and to canton the forces of the four parties, which then would be followed by the demobilization of 70 p e r c e n t of the factions' troops. But the true complexities of the security mission arose later, when the military c o m p o n e n t had to step in to support a faltering civilian effort to organize the national elections. UNTAC also was required to add two key new civilian duties: • To control and supervise crucial aspects of civil administration, • To organize and monitor the elections as a first step toward a "system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism," and, f u r t h e r m o r e : • To coordinate with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the repatriation of more than 370,000 refugees living in camps on the Thai side of the border, • To foster an e n v i r o n m e n t ensuring respect for h u m a n rights and fundamental freedoms, and • To help plan and raise f u n d s for the social and economic rehabilitation of Cambodia. O n the civilian side, the Paris Agreements focused on two key issues. First, they specified five areas of UNTAC control in the sphere of civil administration necessary to achieve the "neutral political environment" that would be conducive to the holding of "free and fair" elections. T h e areas specified for the strictest level of scrutiny and control over each of the four factions were defense, public security, finance, information, and foreign affairs. Lesser degrees of scrutiny was required over other governmental functions, such as education, public health, agriculture, fisheries, energy, transportation, and communications. These levels of scrutiny and control were considered

T H E PARIS A G R E E M E N T S

29

n e c e s s a r y to e n s u r e a politically n e u t r a l e n v i r o n m e n t in which n o faction (especially the State of C a m b o d i a ) w o u l d b e able to e m p l o y state r e s o u r c e s to tilt the electoral contest in its favor. T h e SecretaryG e n e r a l ' s special r e p r e s e n t a t i v e also h a d t h e a p p a r e n t a u t h o r i t y to a p p o i n t UNTAC officials within the factional a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s a n d to remove officials w h o did n o t r e s p o n d to his directives. S e c o n d , o n e of the Paris a c c o r d ' s most striking civilian f e a t u r e s was that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y a n d all f o u r factions a g r e e d to "a system of liberal democracy, o n the basis of pluralism," as the basis f o r the C a m b o d i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n . A l t h o u g h it r e m a i n s to b e seen w h e t h e r the C a m b o d i a n s will e m b r a c e the p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r a c t i c e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y , t h e p a r t i e s to t h e n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s (with t h e e n c o u r a g e m e n t of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y in general) explicitly a g r e e d to a p e a c e p l a n t h a t r e q u i r e d t h e m to establish c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y in C a m b o d i a . W h a t was u n i q u e a b o u t this p r o c e s s was t h e U N ' s r o l e in g u a r a n t e e i n g d e m o c r a c y . T h e a g r e e m e n t s specified all the e l e m e n t s necessary f o r a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy: periodic a n d g e n u i n e elections; f r e e d o m of assembly a n d association f o r all, i n c l u d i n g political parties; d u e process a n d equality b e f o r e t h e law; a n d a n i n d e p e n d e n t j u d i c i a r y : I n d e e d , t h e Camb o d i a n p e o p l e ' s r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h f r e e a n d fair elections b e c a m e the h a l l m a r k a n d linchpin of t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s . For the first time, a U N o p e r a t i o n ( u n l i k e t h o s e in N a m i b i a , Nicaragua, Haiti, a n d A n g o l a ) , was in c h a r g e of t h e e n t i r e organization a n d supervision of elections. UNTAC's responsibilities i n c l u d e d establishing electoral laws a n d p r o c e d u r e s , invalidating existing laws t h a t w o u l d n o t f u r t h e r the s e t t l e m e n t , s e t t i n g u p t h e polling, res p o n d i n g to c o m p l a i n t s , a r r a n g i n g f o r f o r e i g n o b s e r v a t i o n , a n d certifying t h e elections as f r e e a n d fair. T h e c r e a t i o n of laws a n d proced u r e s r e g a r d i n g elections was a critical f u n c t i o n g r a n t e d to UNTAC. T h e a u t h o r i t y to d r a f t legislation was n o t p r o v i d e d to U N T A C in o t h e r areas of civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d signified an innovative a n d intrusive role f o r the UN in the i n t e r n a l affairs of a m e m b e r state. T h e Secretary-General divided UNTAC into seven " c o m p o n e n t s , " each with a role in the m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l m a n d a t e . 2 5 Yasushi Akashi served as the special r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in overall c o m m a n d . T h e official b u d g e t c a m e to $1.5 billion; unofficially, with t h e i n c l u s i o n of p l e d g e d r e h a b i l i t a t i o n a n d r e p a t r i a t i o n assistance a n d o f f - b u d g e t costs, the a m o u n t would c o m e to $2.5-$2.8 billion. T h e Military C o m p o n e n t h a d f o u r f u n c t i o n s : verifying t h e withdrawal of all f o r e i g n (Vietnamese) forces; s u p e r v i s i n g the cease-fire, c a n t o n m e n t , a n d d e m o b i l i z a t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s of t h e f o u r factions; c o n f i s c a t i n g the c a c h e s of w e a p o n s a n d m o n i t o r i n g t h e

30

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

cessation of all o u t s i d e military assistance; a n d t r a i n i n g in m i n e c l e a r a n c e . C o m m a n d e d by Australian Lt. G e n . J o h n S a n d e r s o n , the f o r c e i n c l u d e d twelve i n f a n t r y battalions o n p e a c e k e e p i n g duty f r o m eleven c o u n t r i e s , as well as e n g i n e e r i n g a n d u n a r m e d military observers a n d o t h e r units, f o r a total of a b o u t 16,000 military p e r s o n n e l . Originally d e p l o y e d to s u p e r v i s e t h e c a n t o n m e n t a n d d e m o b i lization of the factional armies, the Military C o m p o n e n t r e d e p l o y e d in s u p p o r t of the election in N o v e m b e r 1992. T h e Civilian Police C o m p o n e n t (CIVPOL) was m a n d a t e d to m o n i t o r a n d c o n t r o l local o f f i c e r s in o r d e r to e n s u r e t h a t law a n d o r d e r were i m p l e m e n t e d fairly a n d t h a t basic h u m a n rights were prot e c t e d . With 21 provincial a n d 200 district-level units a n d a total of 3,600 observers, UNTAC m a n a g e d eventually to field 1 m o n i t o r for e a c h 15 local civil police. T h e R e p a t r i a t i o n C o m p o n e n t , led by U N H C R , was to facilitate t h e r e t u r n of m o r e t h a n 370,000 p e r s o n s f r o m T h a i l a n d a n d o t h e r areas. It was c h a r g e d with verifying t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s c h o s e r e p a t r i a tion voluntarily, o v e r s e e i n g t h e i r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f r o m t h e r e f u g e e c a m p s to t h e d e s i r e d l o c a t i o n , a n d p r o v i d i n g i m m e d i a t e f o o d a n d r e i n t e g r a t i o n assistance. T h e work of t h e Rehabilitation C o m p o n e n t was eventually a s s u m e d by t h e e c o n o m i c advisor to t h e special representative. H e f o c u s e d o n the assessment a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n of rehabilitation efforts in f o o d security, h e a l t h , training, h o u s i n g , a n d educ a t i o n as well as o n raising f u n d s f o r C a m b o d i a n d e v e l o p m e n t . In Tokyo in J u n e 1992, the Ministerial C o n f e r e n c e o n R e h a b i l i t a t i o n a n d R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of C a m b o d i a p l e d g e d $880 million a n d established the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e o n t h e R e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Camb o d i a ( I C O R C ) . But only $200 million h a d b e e n d i s b u r s e d by t h e e n d of August 1993, a n d t h e bulk of t h a t was n o t issued until a f t e r t h e May election. 2 6 T h e H u m a n Rights C o m p o n e n t h a d t h e responsibility to f o s t e r an e n v i r o n m e n t in w h i c h h u m a n rights w o u l d be r e s p e c t e d a n d in which a f r e e a n d fair election could take place. It a t t e m p t e d to m e e t this responsibility by i n s t i t u t i n g an e d u c a t i o n c a m p a i g n , o v e r s e e i n g g e n e r a l h u m a n r i g h t s c o n d i t i o n s , a n d investigating a l l e g e d h u m a n rights abuses. With a m i n u s c u l e staff ( o n e o f f i c e r in each of C a m b o dia's provinces), this c o m p o n e n t faced an e n o r m o u s c h a l l e n g e . T h e I n f o r m a t i o n / E d u c a t i o n Division ( I n f o / E d ) played a crucial r o l e in a p p r i s i n g C a m b o d i a n s of t h e c o n t e n t of t h e Paris Agreem e n t s , h u m a n rights c o n d i t i o n s , UNTAC's role, a n d t h e i r own r i g h t to a f r e e a n d fair election. Having established Radio UNTAC, the division p r o m u l g a t e d this i n f o r m a t i o n t h r o u g h o u t the c o u n t r y a n d s u p p l e m e n t e d its b r o a d c a s t s with a variety of videos, billboards, a n d

T H E PARIS A G R E E M E N T S

31

posters. It s o u g h t to e d u c a t e C a m b o d i a n s a b o u t the voting process and the parties seeking their votes and to e n c o u r a g e the active participation of the electorate. T h e last two c o m p o n e n t s will form the center of this study. T h e Civil Administration C o m p o n e n t (CIVADMIN) u n d e r t o o k to exercise direct control over the "existing administrative s t r u c t u r e s " of C a m b o d i a in order to ensure a "neutral political environment" conducive to a fair election. T h e Electoral C o m p o n e n t constituted the focal point of the C a m b o d i a operation. For the first time, the United Nations assumed the task of organizing and conducting (not merely monitoring or observing) a national election. Although the U N had gained e x p e r i e n c e in some of these areas through past p e a c e k e e p i n g operations, the c o m b i n a t i o n of these tasks m a d e U N T A C larger than any previous U N p e a c e k e e p i n g operation. It required in excess of 15,000 troops and 7,000 civilian personnel and cost ( e x c l u d i n g repatriation and rehabilitation) m o r e than an estimated $1.5 billion during the span of eighteen months, the calculated transition period. T h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s provided U N T A C with b r o a d legal authority to e n f o r c e its m a n d a t e ; i n d e e d , they specifically gave the UN "all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of the A g r e e m e n t s . " UN sensitivity to charges of colonialism may have h i n d e r e d the U N T A C mission f r o m interpreting the agreements aggressively. But the determinants of the success and failure of U N T A C lay elsewhere—in the fierce political contest a m o n g the factions, the weariness and will to p e a c e of the mass of C a m b o d i a n s , and the ability of U N T A C to tread a narrow path through civil war to a legitimizing election.

UNTAC's

RECORD

SUCCESSES AND FAILURES Measuring success in c o m p l e x UN p e a c e o p e r a t i o n s d o e s n o t lend itself to simple indicators. F u l f i l l m e n t of p e a c e treaties n e g o t i a t e d a m o n g the parties and of m a n d a t e s designed by t h e Secretariat are the two obvious indicators of success, but they are n e i t h e r necessary n o r sufficient. Treaties o f t e n are contradictory; m a n d a t e s , o f t e n confused. Leaders in the field n e e d to take into a c c o u n t c h a n g i n g local circumstances and be guided by the basic principles of peace, h u m a n rights, a n d s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n e m b o d i e d in the UN C h a r t e r a n d by the wishes of the t r o o p - c o n t r i b u t i n g countries. L e a d e r s h i p involves an a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r the overall picture. T h e picture of the UNTAC o p e r a t i o n as it c o n c l u d e d its mission was highly c o m p l e x a n d , d e s p i t e t h e many difficulties, far f r o m all bad. C o n s i d e r i n g that the m a i n antagonists in C a m b o d i a — t h e Vietnamese-installed g o v e r n m e n t a n d the radical K h m e r Rouge—signed the 1991 Paris Peace A g r e e m e n t s only u n d e r heavy p r e s s u r e f r o m their big-power sponsors a n d did n o t c o o p e r a t e fully with the UN, UNTAC's a c h i e v e m e n t s b e f o r e a n d after t h e May elections were remarkable.' 2 7 Successes First, a l t h o u g h the c o u n t r y was temporarily subject to the UN's "transitional authority," it also e n j o y e d for p e r h a p s the first time the p r o s p e c t of t r u e i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m the c o n t r o l of any foreign power. Having e n d u r e d French a n d J a p a n e s e colonialism b e f o r e 1954 a n d US, Chinese, a n d V i e t n a m e s e c o m p e t i t i o n for i n f l u e n c e thereafter, Cambodia in the 1990s e x p e r i e n c e d national self-determination 32

UNTAC's

RECORD

33

( a n d S o u t h e a s t Asia, r e g i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ) . T h e U n i t e d States s u p p o r t e d t h e L o n Nol c o u p of 1970, t h e C h i n e s e b a c k s t o p p e d t h e K h m e r R o u g e , w h o seized p o w e r in 1975, a n d t h e V i e t n a m e s e installed t h e H u n S e n r e g i m e in 1979 (finally w i t h d r a w i n g t h e i r military f o r c e s in 1989). D i s t u r b i n g f o r e i g n p r e s e n c e s c o n t i n u e d to c o m plicate C a m b o d i a ' s f u t u r e . T h a i g e n e r a l s in t h e west a n d V i e t n a m e s e i n t e r e s t s in t h e east a l l e g e d l y p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e illegal e x p o r t of C a m b o d i a ' s logs a n d g e m s . M a n y t h o u s a n d s of V i e t n a m e s e e n t e r e d t h e c o u n t r y to t a k e a d v a n t a g e of t h e e c o n o m i c b o o m c r e a t e d by t h e U N T A C p r e s e n c e . B u t as of S e p t e m b e r 1993, f o r b e t t e r o r w o r s e , C a m b o d i a was in t h e h a n d s of t h e C a m b o d i a n s . ( T h i s is w h a t t h e U N T A C " t r a n s i t i o n " was s u p p o s e d to t r a n s i t i o n to.) S e c o n d , t h e m e r e p r e s e n c e of U N T A C h a d a n i m p a c t : It s i g n a l e d t h e e n d of full-scale civil war. T h e c o u n t r y b e c a m e f o r t h e m o s t p a r t p e a c e f u l . T r u e , s o m e p r o v i n c e s w e r e very t e n s e , b u t s k i r m i s h e s w e r e l i m i t e d in d u r a t i o n , a n d t h e p i t c h e d b a t t l e s of 1990 a n d e a r l i e r e n d e d . T h e U N T A C p r e s e n c e also o p e n e d u p t h e p o l i t i c a l system, h e l p i n g o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s to c o m p e t e a g a i n s t t h e i n c u m b e n t r e g i m e . T h e y a c q u i r e d o f f i c e s , h e l d m e e t i n g s , a n d h a d access to t h e m e d i a . H a r a s s m e n t c o n t i n u e d , b u t n o t s e r i o u s l y e n o u g h to u n d e r m i n e t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s . T h e jails, o n c e c r a m m e d with p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s , h e l d a vastly r e d u c e d p o p u l a t i o n of i n m a t e s , all of w h o m s e e m to have h a d s p e c i f i c (if s o m e t i m e s t r u m p e d u p ) c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s laid a g a i n s t t h e m . A l t h o u g h U N T A C d i d n o t e x e r c i s e t h e c o n t r o l over t h e P h n o m P e n h r e g i m e e n v i s a g e d in t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s , it m a d e a d e n t in t h e m o s t b l a t a n t c o r r u p t i o n . Third, m o r e than 370,000 refugees were peacefully repatriated f r o m c a m p s in T h a i l a n d , d e s p i t e d i r e p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s f r o m e x p e r t s a year earlier. In w h a t b e c a m e U N H C R ' s "most c o m p l e x , best f u n d e d a n d m o s t visible r e f u g e e r e p a t r i a t i o n , " t h e R e p a t r i a t i o n C o m p o n e n t of U N T A C ( s t a f f e d by U N H C R ) o r g a n i z e d a massive u n d e r t a k i n g with t h e c o o p e r a t i o n a n d s u p p o r t of t h e M i l i t a r y C o m p o n e n t , t h e C a m b o d i a n Red Cross, a n d o t h e r h u m a n i t a r i a n a n d relief o r g a n i z a tions. In a d d i t i o n to o v e r c o m i n g t h e f o r m i d a b l e logistical d i f f i c u l t i e s of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d s u p p l y i n g a s t a r t - u p r e s e t t l e m e n t p a c k a g e , U N T A C e n s u r e d t h a t r e f u g e e s w e r e r e p a t r i a t e d v o l u n t a r i l y to locat i o n s they f o u n d a c c e p t a b l e . 2 8 F o u r t h , U N T A C o r g a n i z e d a n e l e c t i o n in a c o u n t r y with a shatt e r e d physical i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . T h e U N has m o n i t o r e d a n d s u p e r v i s e d m a n y e l e c t i o n s , b u t , as I will e x p l a i n , C a m b o d i a ' s was t h e first election that the UN directly o r g a n i z e d f r o m the p l a n n i n g stages t h r o u g h t h e w r i t i n g of an e l e c t o r a l law to r e g i s t r a t i o n a n d t h e c o n d u c t i n g of t h e poll. H u n d r e d s of f o r e i g n v o l u n t e e r s in n e a r l y every

34

MICHAKL W. DOYLL

village registered voters and spread information. Voters walked considerable distances and braved threats to hold on to their registration cards. UNTAC passed a comprehensive electoral law (over the initial opposition o f the Supreme National Council). It began to educate Cambodians about human rights and elections, employing an imaginative range o f techniques that included traveling acting troops performing skits, Khmer videos, public rallies organized by UNTAC, debates among candidates, and extensive radio coverage. 2 9 Nearly all eligible Cambodians—almost 5 million—registered to vote. T h e May election rewarded their efforts and, most of all, affirmed the determination of the Cambodian people to have a voice in their future. Despite months of attempted intimidation by some o f the parties, 90 p e r c e n t o f the electorate turned out to vote. T h e Khmer Rouge had vowed to stop the election altogether. S O C waged a pitched battle against its main rival, FUNCINPEC, going so far as to assassinate F U N C I N P E C party officials. According to the Human Rights Component o f UNTAC, more than 200 died during the campaigning period between April 7 and May 19, many o f them in a major attack launched by about 400 Khmer Rouge and 300 hastily recruited youths on Siem Reap on May 3 and 4. Despite threats from the government that people's votes would not be cast in secret, UNTAC ensured they would be and, in ways that I will describe in the following section, apparently convinced Cambodians of that. UNTAC's Military C o m p o n e n t took the measures necessary to guarantee the security of the polling and counting process. Failures If we look at UNTAC's official, initial mandate, we can see two major areas of failure. T h e first lies in the failure to achieve a cease-fire and then canton, demobilize, and disarm the military forces (70 percent) o f the four factions, the second in the failure to achieve control over civil administration and to prevent breakdowns in law and order and political neutrality. UNTAC's inability to achieve a cease-fire (Phase 1) and then to canton, demobilize, and disarm 70 percent, of the military forces of the four factions (Phase 2) had devastating effects. As initially planned, the May elections were supposed to take place in a s e c u r e — i.e., cantoned and disarmed—political environment in which the relative military weight o f the factions would play little direct role in either the electoral campaign or the voters' choice. T h e Khmer Rouge, however, refused to canton in J u n e 1992, saying that UNTAC had failed to control SOC (which was true—but neither

UNTAC's

RECORD

35

h a d it c o n t r o l l e d t h e K h m e r R o u g e in its m u c h s m a l l e r z o n e s ) ; t h a t t h e SNC was n o t in c o n t r o l ( w h i c h it was s u p p o s e d to b e , s u b j e c t to t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s a n d t h e s p e c i a l a u t h o r i t y t h o s e a c c o r d s c e d e d to t h e s p e c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ) ; a n d t h a t Vietn a m e s e "forces" r e m a i n e d in C a m b o d i a ( V i e t n a m e s e m i l i t a r y f o r m a tions h a d w i t h d r a w n in 1 9 8 9 ) . 3 0 W h e n t h e K h m e r R o u g e r e f u s e d to c a n t o n , SOC a n d o t h e r factions that h a d partially c a n t o n e d almost 55,000 s o l d i e r s r e f u s e d to d e m o b i l i z e a n d d i s a r m , a n d t h e n m o s t of t h e c a n t o n e d s o l d i e r s w e n t o n " a g r i c u l t u r a l leave." 3 1 T h e Military C o m p o n e n t p l a y e d a vital r o l e in p r o v i d i n g t h e security a n d logistics r e q u i r e d f o r t h e C a m b o d i a n e l e c t i o n . It also, t h r o u g h the Mixed Military Working G r o u p s , b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r the military l e a d e r s of t h e f a c t i o n s c o o p e r a t i n g with t h e p e a c e o p e r a t i o n , s m o o t h i n g over m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a n d establishing the trust and p l a n n i n g t h a t led to t h e p a r t i a l s e p a r a t i o n of t h e a r m i e s f r o m their, political p a r t i e s a n d t h u s to t h e e v e n t u a l u n i f i c a t i o n of t h e C a m b o d i a n a r m e d f o r c e s f o l l o w i n g t h e n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s . 3 - But d u r i n g t h e e l e c t o r a l c a m p a i g n , f a c t i o n a l a r m i e s tilted all t h e e l e c t o r a l c o n t e s t s . I n d e e d , S O C ' s p o p u l a r i t y s e e m e d to i n c r e a s e in d i r e c t r a t i o to t h e esc a l a t i o n in v i o l e n c e , partly b e c a u s e it c o e r c e d t h e o p p o s i t i o n a n d t h e v o t e r s a n d partly b e c a u s e , in an a t m o s p h e r e of instability, it h a d t h e only military f o r c e c a p a b l e of c o n t a i n i n g t h e K h m e r R o u g e . U N T A C also failed to establish e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l over C a m b o d i a n civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h e P a r i s A g r e e m e n t s s p e c i f i e d t h a t U N T A C w o u l d c o n t r o l five e s s e n t i a l a r e a s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d d o so o v e r e a c h of t h e f o u r f a c t i o n s . T h e a r e a s s p e c i f i e d w e r e d e f e n s e , p u b l i c security, f i n a n c e , i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . By c o n t r o l l i n g t h e m , it was a n t i c i p a t e d , U N T A C w o u l d b e a b l e to e n s u r e t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t was n e u t r a l , t h a t n o f a c t i o n ( e s p e c i a l l y t h e p r e d o m i n a n t S t a t e of C a m b o d i a ) w o u l d b e a b l e to e m p l o y s o v e r e i g n r e s o u r c e s to tilt t h e e l e c t o r a l c o n t e s t in its favor. B u t in p r a c t i c e , as I will r e c o u n t n e x t , U N T A C was n o t a b l e to f u l f i l l t h e s e a m b i t i o u s a n d p r e c e d e n t - s e t t i n g goals. W h a t U N T A C s u p p o s e d l y c o n t r o l l e d , it d i d n o t . T h e S t a t e of C a m b o d i a s i m p l y a d m i n i s t e r e d a r o u n d UNTAC. T h e f a i l u r e of c o n t r o l may h a v e e r o d e d t h e possibility of d e m o bilization, b u t t h e f a i l u r e of d e m o b i l i z a t i o n clearly u n d e r m i n e d t h e o t h e r aspects of t h e UN civilian m a n d a t e — a l l of w h i c h m a k e s it even m o r e s t r i k i n g t h a t U N T A C s u c c e e d e d in o r g a n i z i n g a f r e e a n d f a i r e l e c t i o n a n d p e r s u a d i n g t h e p e o p l e of C a m b o d i a t h a t t h e i r v o t e s would count. P e r h a p s the single most m o m e n t o u s action Special R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Akashi t o o k was to r e c o m m e n d m o v i n g a h e a d t o w a r d t h e e l e c t i o n , k n o w i n g t h a t t h o s e two key a s p e c t s of t h e m a n d a t e

36

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

would n o t be fulfilled a n d that the balloting would n o t take place in the "neutral political e n v i r o n m e n t " envisaged by the Paris Agreements.

UNTAC'S CIVIL

MANDATE

U N T A C was a l a n d m a r k mission t h a t clearly symbolized a new gene r a t i o n of p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s in its scope of m a n d a t e a n d size of d e p l o y m e n t . T h e civilian c o m p o n e n t s of UNTAC took on very amb i t i o u s f u n c t i o n s of s t a t e - b u i l d i n g u n p r e c e d e n t e d in t h e h i s t o r y of U N p e a c e k e e p i n g . T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s O p e r a t i o n in t h e C o n g o (Zaire) ( O N U C ) , a p e a c e k e e p i n g mission in the 1960s, was the first to involve a large civilian c o m p o n e n t , b u t t h a t s i t u a t i o n was d i f f e r e n t . T h e C o n g o l e s e a u t h o r i t i e s were n o t p r e p a r e d to a d m i n i s t e r the c o u n t r y w h e n the Belgians, t h e n the colonial p o w e r of the C o n g o , a b r u p t l y d e p a r t e d amidst the chaos of e m e r g i n g i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e C o n g o was a tabula rasa r e q u i r i n g substantial technical administrative assistance. C a m b o d i a posed quite d i f f e r e n t political challenges. 3 3 A f t e r the ravages of civil war, the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of C a m b o d i a was c o m p l e t e l y devastated to t h e e x t e n t that the d e p l o y m e n t of civilian p e a c e k e e p e r s was delayed. Beyond t h e e f f e c t s of delay lay u n p r e c e d e n t e d c o n c e p t u a l challenges. T h e r e simply was n o p r i o r equivalent in w h i c h t h e UN took over an existing g o v e r n m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e as p a r t of t h e p e a c e s e t t l e m e n t p r o c e s s . T h e civilian c o m p o n e n t of O N U C was p r e d o m i n a n t l y t e c h n i c a l assistance ( t h o u g h laced with political implications), whereas the civilian f u n c t i o n s of UNTAC were directly political ( t h o u g h r e q u i r i n g special t e c h n i c a l skills). To establish a "neutral e n v i r o n m e n t " c o n d u c i v e to f r e e a n d fair elections, U N T A C h a d to a s s u m e c o n t r o l over a c o u n t r y t h a t h a d b e e n r u n (consecutively) by f o u r bitter political rivals. U N T A C ' s civil m a n d a t e i n c l u d e d n o t only civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d t h e n a t i o n a l election b u t also h u m a n rights, civilian police, reh a b i l i t a t i o n , a n d i n f o r m a t i o n . Each c o m p o n e n t was a f f e c t e d by t h e c o n t i n u i n g civil war a n d the d e f e c t i o n of the K h m e r R o u g e f r o m the p e a c e , b u t their e x p e r i e n c e s in a t t e m p t i n g to m e e t the m a n d a t e diff e r e d . In t h e two key a r e a s of civil a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l a n d t h e e l e c t i o n , o n e was overall a f a i l u r e , t h e o t h e r overall a success. T h e m o n i t o r i n g of civil police a n d r e h a b i l i t a t i o n also by a n d large failed, w h e r e a s t h e H u m a n Rights C o m p o n e n t c a m e closer to achieving its m a n d a t e a n d i n f o r m a t i o n e x c e e d e d the m a n d a t e . N o n e of t h e s e c o n s t i t u t e individual f a i l u r e s or successes of t h e specific U N T A C c o m p o n e n t s p e r se, t h o u g h s o m e c o m p o n e n t s o p e r a t e d m u c h m o r e effectively t h a n o t h e r s (as I will n o t e ) . T h e mand a t e s were too i n t e r d e p e n d e n t — o n e a c h of t h e o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s

UNTAC's

37

RECORD

a n d o n t h e C a m b o d i a n s a n d t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y — t o allow analysis of o u t c o m e s in a s i m p l e b u r e a u c r a t i c t e m p l a t e . I will assess t h e two key m a n d a t e s , c o n t r o l a n d t h e e l e c t i o n — g r o u p i n g h u m a n rights, civil p o l i c e , a n d r e h a b i l i t a t i o n with c o n t r o l a n d i n f o r m a t i o n with t h e e l e c t i o n — b e f o r e t u r n i n g to s o m e of t h e g e n e r a l f a c t o r s t h a t can s e r v e to a c c o u n t f o r t h e v a r y i n g o u t c o m e s of the components.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION T h e Security C o u n c i l a u t h o r i z e d U N T A C to c o n t r o l five a r e a s of civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n vis-à-vis e a c h of t h e f o u r f a c t i o n s : d e f e n s e , p u b l i c security, f i n a n c e , i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d f o r e i g n affairs. By c o n t r o l l i n g t h e m , it was a n t i c i p a t e d , U N T A C w o u l d b e a b l e to " e n s u r e a n e u t r a l political e n v i r o n m e n t c o n d u c i v e to f r e e a n d f a i r g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s , " t h e p r o v i s i o n of Article 6 of t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s . 3 4 If successful, n o fact i o n ( p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e S t a t e of C a m b o d i a ) w o u l d b e a b l e to use gove r n m e n t r e s o u r c e s to a f f e c t t h e e l e c t i o n ' s o u t c o m e . T h o u g h a m b i g u o u s in p a r t s , U N T A C ' s c e n t r a l m a n d a t e was n o t to g o v e r n C a m b o d i a , simply to " c o n t r o l " it. 3 5 In o r d e r to a c h i e v e this, U N T A C ' s Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m p o n e n t ( C I V A D M I N ) , h e a d e d by G e r a r d P o r c e l l , h a d t h e a u t h o r i t y to issue " b i n d i n g directives," b u t it was u r g e d to rely o n " c o d e s of c o n d u c t a n d g u i d e l i n e s f o r m a n a g e m e n t . " 3 6 In his S e c o n d P r o g r e s s Report on UNTAC, the Secretary-General stated that he envisaged U N T A C n o t as t h e " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b u r e a u c r a c y " b u t r a t h e r as t h e m o n i t o r a n d s u p e r v i s o r of existing a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s (EAS) at b o t h t h e n a t i o n a l a n d p r o v i n c i a l levels. 3 7 T h e Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m p o n e n t a t t e m p t e d to e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l via t h r e e o p e r a t i o n a l m e a n s : a p o s t e r i o r i , a p r i o r i , a n d by a p p r a i s a l . C o n t r o l a p o s t e r i o r i involved o b t a i n i n g all t h e d o c u m e n t a t i o n d e a l i n g with t h e activities of t h e EAS 3 8 in a r e a s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , p e r s o n n e l policies, a n d "materiel." C o n t r o l a p r i o r i p r e s u p p o s e d t h a t t h e c o m p o n e n t w o u l d obtain p r i o r k n o w l e d g e of all d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g m a t t e r s s u c h as p e r s o n n e l a n d f i n a n c e a n d e x e r c i s e t h e a u t h o r i t y to c h a n g e t h e d e c i s i o n if d e e m e d n e c e s s a r y . Finally, c o n t r o l by a p p r a i s a l was e x e r c i s e d by p r o p o s i n g i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e activities of EAS. Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n also a t t e m p t e d to e x e r c i s e d i r e c t c o n t r o l t h r o u g h t h e physical p r e s e n c e of its p e r s o n n e l , weekly m e e t i n g s b e t w e e n U N T A C staff a n d EAS d e c i s i o n m a k e r s , a n d o t h e r m e a s u r e s . C I V A D M I N was o r g a n i z e d i n t o several s p e c i a l i z e d s u b c o m p o n e n t s (see F i g u r e 4.1). Five services w e r e to c o n t r o l t h e P h n o m P e n h authority ( t h e SOC's existing administrative s t r u c t u r e ) . T h e C o m p l a i n t s

38

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

a n d I n v e s t i g a t i o n Service was to h a n d l e civilian c o m p l a i n t s vis-a-vis the P h n o m P e n h r e g i m e ' s EAS, a n d provincial offices, located in all 21 provinces, were to cover the EAS in the rest of C a m b o d i a . By August 1992, a total of 818 civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n staff m e m b e r s had b e e n d e p l o y e d : 157 p r o f e s s i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l staff m e m b e r s , 62 g e n e r a l service i n t e r n a t i o n a l staff, a n d 599 local staff m e m b e r s . 3 9 O n July 1, 1992, the c o m p o n e n t b e g a n to exercise "full c o n t r o l " over five key a r e a s of the P h n o m P e n h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . CIVADMIN p e r s o n n e l were d e p l o y e d in the ministries of d e f e n s e , n a t i o n a l security, f o r e i g n affairs, c o n s u l a r affairs, a n d f i n a n c e ( i n c l u d i n g the national b a n k ) . By July 15, 1993, Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d established provincial offices in all 21 provinces, e m p l o y i n g 95 i n t e r n a t i o n a l staff in P h n o m P e n h a n d 123 in the provinces. A typical provincial office c o n s i s t e d of f o u r to six officers, t h e n u m b e r v a r y i n g b e c a u s e s o m e positions (such as h u m a n rights o f f i c e r o r financial c o n t r o l l e r ) were n o t filled in all provincial offices. District c o n t r o l l e r s w e r e only pres e n t in the S O C - c o n t r o l l e d areas. T h e C o n t r o l T e a m , established in J a n u a r y 1993, s u p p l e m e n t e d the c o m p o n e n t ' s r e g u l a r s u p e r v i s i o n over t h e EAS o u t s i d e P h n o m P e n h ; m o n i t o r i n g " o t h e r w i s e would t e n d to be i n a d e q u a t e b e c a u s e of t h e relatively small n u m b e r of UNTAC p e r s o n n e l devoted to each province." H e a d e d by an inspector, the t e a m was c o m p o s e d of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Military a n d Civilian Police c o m p o n e n t s , staff f r o m the F i n a n c e a n d Public Security services of CIVADMIN, a n d analysts a n d i n t e r p r e t e r s f r o m the Inf o r m a t i o n a n d E d u c a t i o n Division. T h i s m o b i l e team was to verify if t h e local a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was b e i n g c o n d u c t e d in a politically n e u t r a l m a n n e r d u r i n g the electoral process at local a n d district levels. It was to enjoy u n r e s t r i c t e d access to EAS d o c u m e n t s . T h e Foreign Affairs Service took o n t h r e e m a j o r responsibilities: o v e r h a u l i n g the visa a n d p a s s p o r t system, s t r e a m l i n i n g i m m i g r a t i o n processes, a n d m o n i t o r i n g the distribution of f o r e i g n aid. 4 0 This u n i t j o i n e d the B o r d e r C o n t r o l U n i t in collecting i n f o r m a t i o n o n b o r d e r practices a n d s e c u r i n g the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the SNC m o r a t o r i a on the illegal e x p o r t of logs a n d p e t r o l e u m . 4 1 T h e D e f e n s e Service's prim a r y task was to "depoliticize" t h e S O C d e f e n s e s t r u c t u r e by elimin a t i n g political u n i t s within t h e a r m e d forces. A p r i o r i c o n t r o l was exercised over t h e decisions of t h e "Ministry of D e f e n s e " in respect to issues such as sale, lease, a n d e x c h a n g e of land. 4 ' 2 T h e Public Security Service t r a i n e d m a g i s t r a t e s a n d p o l i c e o f f i c e r s of the EAS, d r a f t e d the p e n a l code, a n d visited prisons in b o t h P h n o m P e n h a n d t h e provinces. T h i s service also o r g a n i z e d a biweekly w o r k i n g g r o u p o n p u b l i c security a t t e n d e d by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of all f o u r parties to discuss issues such as banditry (a m a j o r security c o n c e r n in C a m b o d i a ) ,

UNTAC's

s 1) e o Q.

E

o U e o

w> e

•m •M

E

< '>

U v J5 H

v s W5

RECORD

40

MICHAEL. W .

DOYLE

traffic, a n d penal p r o c e d u r e s . 4 3 From the Finance Service, financial c o n t r o l l e r s were d i s p a t c h e d to each of the ministries, the N a t i o n a l Bank of C a m b o d i a , a n d most of provincial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s to regulate b u d g e t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s . They audited the o p e r a t i n g costs of the c o m m u n i t y d e v e l o p m e n t a n d h e a l t h p r o g r a m s of the KPNLF a n d FUNCINPEC. T h e service also was directed to oversee taxation a n d customs revenues. 4 4 T h e I n f o r m a t i o n Control Unit m o n i t o r e d m o r e t h a n twenty C a m b o d i a n m e d i a institutions and i n f o r m a t i o n activities in the provinces; it also p r e p a r e d the "Media Guidelines," signed by all f o u r parties. T h e Specialized C o n t r o l Service had the authority to supervise areas d e e m e d "optional," which i n c l u d e d public h e a l t h , e d u c a t i o n , agriculture, maritime a n d riverine fisheries, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d posts, energy p r o d u c t i o n a n d distribution, navigable waters and public transport, tourism and historical m o n u m e n t s , mines, and general administration. 4 5 T h e objectives envisaged for the Complaints and Investigations Service were twofold. Its i m m e d i a t e f u n c t i o n was to resolve particular grievances, but its second and wider objective was to obtain a countrywide profile of the n a t u r e and extent of discontent. By J a n u a r y 1993 m o r e than 140 complaints had b e e n lodged, most of t h e m c o n c e r n i n g land a n d p r o p e r t y disputes, i n c l u d i n g those over evictions f r o m land. 4 6 T h e Office of Provincial C o o r d i n a t i o n was established at the h e a d q u a r t e r s of the Civil Administration C o m p o n e n t to h a r m o n i z e the o p e r a t i o n of the twenty-one provincial offices. T h e office dispensed i n f o r m a t i o n and provided assistance, training, logistical aid, and o t h e r s u p p o r t to the provincial offices. 4 7 Exasperated by SOC's resistance to UNTAC control and c o n c e r n e d a b o u t the m o u n t ing political violence, in J a n u a r y 1993 UNTAC established C o n t r o l Teams, r e p o r t i n g directly to Deputy Special Representative Behrooz Sadry, in o r d e r to investigate possible abuses of the Paris Agreements. F r o m the outset, the Civilian A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m p o n e n t was p l a g u e d with various a i l m e n t s s h a r e d by all of UNTAC: delays in staffing, the collapse of the C a m b o d i a n bureaucracy, and C a m b o d i a ' s lack of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . 4 t i More serious however, was the c o m m o n t h r e a d r u n n i n g t h r o u g h all of these p r o b l e m s : the c h a l l e n g e enc o u n t e r e d when a foreign entity a t t e m p t s to exercise intrusive control over an existing set of authorities a n d , a fortiori, a centralized, c o m m u n i s t bureaucracy. T h e bureaucracy resisted to the d e g r e e that it could in those areas it d e e m e d most vital to its survival. Accomplishments and Limitations T h e Civil Administration C o m p o n e n t ' s overall p e r f o r m a n c e was far f r o m a success, b u t n e i t h e r was it a c o m p l e t e failure. T h e r e were

UNTAC's

RECORD

41

s o m e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s , t o g e t h e r with m a n y serious setbacks. B e f o r e assessing the overall i m p a c t of the e f f o r t to i n d u c e political n e u t r a l ity t h r o u g h civil c o n t r o l , it is u s e f u l to b r e a k d o w n the f u n c t i o n s of the c o m p o n e n t to micro-objectives (such as c o n t r o l l i n g the c o u n t r y ' s e x c h a n g e rates) to gain insight as to what w o r k e d a n d what did n o t . T h e F i n a n c e Service, for e x a m p l e , s u c c e e d e d in c o n t r o l l i n g the issuance of currency, as well as legal b o r d e r t r a d e (customs activity) a n d t h e e x p e n d i t u r e s a n d r e v e n u e s of t h e state b u d g e t . 4 9 In F e b r u ary a n d March 1993, it s t e m m e d the d e p r e c i a t i o n of the riel by reining in t h e m o n e y supply a n d b o o s t i n g rice s u p p l i e s o n t h e P h n o m P e n h m a r k e t . 5 0 In s p e a k i n g of the f u n c t i o n s of the Civil Administration C o m p o n e n t , an o f f i c e r f r o m the "Ministry of F i n a n c e " stated: "If UNTAC t h o u g h t t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l by the State of C a m b o d i a was n o t a p p r o p r i a t e a c c o r d i n g to UNTAC's s t a n d a r d s , they would n o t allow t h e e x p e n d i t u r e by t h e n a t i o n a l b a n k , city b a n k , or overseas banks." 5 1 But only a few believe that UNTAC successfully s e p a r a t e d the f i n a n c e s of the CPP f r o m those of t h e SOC. 5 2 (UNTAC C o n t r o l T e a m investigations d i s c o v e r e d , f o r e x a m p l e , " w i d e s p r e a d a n d persistent use of S O C state a p p a r a t u s to c o n d u c t political c a m p a i g n activities of the C a m b o d i a n P e o p l e ' s Party [CPP] in which state employees—police, a r m e d forces, a n d civil s e r v a n t s — a r e mobilized for CPP e l e c t i o n e e r i n g . " ) 5 3 In the a r e a of f o r e i g n affairs, t h e c o m p o n e n t was successful in overseeing t h e abolition of e n t r y a n d exit visas a n d e n s u r i n g that t h e S O C r e c o g n i z e d S N C - e n d o r s e d passports a n d visas, p e r m i t t i n g officials of the o t h e r factions to travel t h r o u g h the P h n o m P e n h a i r p o r t without having to o b t a i n the direct c o n s e n t of a hostile rival. Having full access to files at t h e S O C ' s "Ministry of F o r e i g n Affairs" conc e r n i n g passport applications, the c o n t r o l l e r s m a i n t a i n e d t h e i r prese n c e six days a week. Between late J a n u a r y a n d March 1993, t h e SNC e n d o r s e m e n t was o b t a i n e d f o r m o r e t h a n 5,000 p a s s p o r t s . 5 4 T h e c o m p o n e n t tended to be most successful in activities such as e n d o r s i n g p a s s p o r t s a n d m o n i t o r i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of f o r e i g n aid, in w h i c h the objectives were relatively limited a n d UNTAC could draw o n int e r n a t i o n a l b a r g a i n i n g chips. 5 5 But in m o r e d e m a n d i n g responsibilities, such as p r e v e n t i n g s m u g g l i n g or avoiding c o r r u p t i o n in the iss u a n c e of passports, it was n o t as successful. 5 6 A C a m b o d i a n official n o t e d t h a t t h e b o r d e r is "long a n d t h e c o m m i t t e e walks only o n paper, so they c a n n o t see everything." 5 7 T h e Public Security Service h a d little impact, b u t o n e of its prog r a m s — r e g u l a r visits to prisons—did have s o m e positive effect. In acc o r d a n c e with Article 9 of t h e T r a n s i t i o n a l P e n a l C o d e , officials of the service, along with officials f r o m the H u m a n Rights a n d Civil Police c o m p o n e n t s , w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c h e c k i n g p r i s o n c o n d i t i o n s

42

M I C H A E L W . DOYI.E

a n d e n s u r i n g t h a t the c o d e was i m p l e m e n t e d correctly. As a d i r e c t result of t h o s e visits, some prison a m e n i t i e s , such as water a n d sanit a t i o n services, i m p r o v e d . Prison c o n d i t i o n s n o n e t h e l e s s r e m a i n e d poor, a n d the use of shackles persisted in several provincial facilities d e s p i t e U N T A C ' s c o m p l a i n t s . 5 8 U N T A C also t r a i n e d a b o u t 200 j u d g e s , p r o s e c u t o r s , a n d police officials in the P e n a l C o d e , which the S u p r e m e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l a d o p t e d at U N T A C ' s initiative in Sept e m b e r 1992. Still, UNTAC c a m e n o w h e r e n e a r o v e r c o m i n g the usual f e a t u r e s of a police state a p p a r a t u s . Many a b u s e s persisted at t h e provincial level. 5 9 In t h e s p r i n g of 1993 U N T A C h a d j u s t b e g u n a p r o g r a m to investigate t h e security f o r c e s ' d e t e n t i o n of p r i s o n e r s w i t h o u t trial, a p r o g r a m h a m p e r e d by the lack of a p p e l l a t e courts. 6 0 Beyond these specific a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s a n d failures, o p e r a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s e m e r g e d in f o u r areas: c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , lack of c o o r d i n a tion, logistics, a n d staffing. In the early stages of UNTAC's o p e r a t i o n , as n o t e d in t h e F o u r t h Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n S e m i n a r (held in Decemb e r 1992), provincial d i r e c t o r s c o m p l a i n e d of b e i n g u n i n f o r m e d a b o u t activities of o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s , whereas the O f f i c e of Provincial C o o r d i n a t i o n c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t receiving c o n f l i c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m d i f f e r e n t c o m p o n e n t s at its h e a d q u a r t e r s . 6 1 T h e difficulties of staffing ( t h e lack t h e r e o f or h i g h t u r n o v e r ) , in c o m b i n a t i o n with serious logistical p r o b l e m s , s e e m e d to h a m p e r activities of all the services, a l t h o u g h the provincial offices were hit h a r d e s t . In a c o u n t r y as devastated as C a m b o d i a was in 1992, civilians d e p e n d o n t h e logistics only a fully deployed military c o m p o n e n t can offer. With 170 UN officers assigned to control 21 provinces a n d a total S O C civil service estimated at 200,000 m e m b e r s , the p r o b l e m of staffing stood out as o n e of the most serious faced by UNTAC. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali a c k n o w l e d g e d that the r e c r u i t m e n t process for civilian p e a c e k e e p e r s p r o c e e d e d slowly, attributing this to "the high d e g r e e of specialization in the f u n c t i o n s r e q u i r e d to be p e r f o r m e d . " 6 2 A s h o r t a g e of Khmerspeaking individuals in CIVADMIN was an obvious difficulty in any att e m p t to c o n t r o l a K h m e r b u r e a u c r a c y . In a d d i t i o n , n o t e n o u g h int e r n a t i o n a l civil servants, whose typical b a c k g r o u n d was d i p l o m a t i c , h a d e x p e r i e n c e in customs, public f i n a n c e , a n d public security. Each of those o p e r a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s was serious e n o u g h to h a m p e r the activities of the Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m p o n e n t ; o t h e r issues c h a l l e n g e d t h e f u n d a m e n t a l objectives of t h e mission the c o m p o nent pursued: The other factions. O n e of t h e m o s t c o n s i s t e n t c o m p l a i n t s f r o m t h e S O C P h n o m P e n h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was t h a t U N T A C t r e a t e d it m o r e harshly t h a n it t r e a t e d F U N C I N P E C a n d the KPNLF, which h a d n o

UNTAC's

RECORD

43

existing administrations to control, and the K h m e r Rouge, which did not allow UNTAC access to its territory. B e c a u s e o f a shortage o f staff, the Civil Administration C o m p o n e n t had very limited functions outside o f P h n o m Penh. More important, UNTAC's c o m p l e t e lack o f control over the K h m e r R o u g e — w h i c h b a r r e d UNTAC staff at gunp o i n t — u n d e r m i n e d the credibility o f UNTAC's claim to impartiality. UNTAC had to try to control S O C in order to establish a neutral environment, but its negligible control o f the o t h e r factions made this effort a p p e a r inherently biased. As the director o f CIVADMIN, Gerard Porcell, r e m a r k e d , UNTAC was r e d u c e d to n e g o t i a t i n g with rather than controlling S O C because it negotiated with rather than controlled the Khmer R o u g e . 6 3 "Cosmetic" vs. "real" control. UNTAC had the a p p a r e n t authority to control the factions, including the right to insert its officials within the factional administrations and to remove factional officials who did n o t respond to its directive. Yet what UNTAC s e e m e d to control, it usually did not. O n e provincial director in a difficult province described the control mandate in his region as a "joke from the beginn i n g . " 6 4 As o n e instance o f c o s m e t i c c o n t r o l , a Public Security Service official n o t e d the e x a m p l e o f UNTAC's p r o h i b i t i n g the S O C police and army from wearing C a m b o d i a n P e o p l e ' s Party badges in o r d e r to "depoliticize" t h e m . T h e y were "probably glad to yield on c o s m e t i c issues," he added, "because they knew it wouldn't affect their real control. And the police were very involved in politics as we knew from the Control T e a m . " 6 5 Central "shells" and provincial autonomy. T h e breakdown o f P h n o m P e n h ' s own control o f the provinces and o f the lower-level bureaucracy made it very difficult for UNTAC; it could n o t control officials the S O C itself could not c o n t r o l . T h e activities UNTAC s e e m e d to c o n t r o l — e . g . , e x p e n d i t u r e s in the ministry o f f i n a n c e o f S O C — o n closer examination were m e r e "fronts" for decisions taken elsewhere. Much o f the S O C administration had collapsed; the "Ministry of Def e n s e " was a "shell," a c c o r d i n g to a senior UNTAC CIVADMIN official. W h e n real salaries stopped b e i n g paid, the S O C "Ministry o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n " disappeared and was replaced by ad h o c private contractors, noted a n o t h e r senior UNTAC official. 6 6 Effective authority had slipped to provincial governors and generals; ministries that did not control their nominal areas of responsibility m e a n t very little. Concealed parallel structures. Even in Phnom Penh, in the areas of policymaking where a central administrative apparatus was still functioning,

44

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

the S O C administered around U N T A C . W h e n the factions wished to be " c o n t r o l l e d , " they allowed themselves to be. But usually the actual chain o f policy bypassed U N T A C , whose o f f i c e r was kept busy watching an o f f i c i a l without f u n c t i o n while the real decisions were made elsewhere, out o f U N T A C ' s sight. A high-ranking S O C official in P h n o m P e n h instructed the ministries in O c t o b e r 1992 in how not to c o o p e r a t e with U N T A C . H e d e r i d e d the Minister of Finance f o r b e i n g "so pliant that he virtually gave in to e v e r y t h i n g they [ U N T A C ] wanted." "What d e t e r m i n e s , " he c o n t i n u e d , " the point at which U N T A C dies is w h e t h e r we c o o p e r a t e with it or not." 6 7 In these parallel structures, o r d e r s w e r e passed by w o r d o f mouth. A S O C d o c u m e n t of March 1993 captured by U N T A C in Sihanoukville instructed local officials in "maintaining the initiative with regard to the storage o f documents to prevent control o f them by U N T A C . " 6 8 T h e C a m b o d i a n P e o p l e ' s Party ( t h e o f f i c i a l state party) thus enj o y e d the service o f officials on the public payroll, access to public assets, and revenue f r o m sales o f those assets. A t a m e e t i n g on January 19, 1993, U N T A C came to a full realization of the p r o b l e m and d e c i d e d to set up C o n t r o l T e a m s in o r d e r to gain i n f o r m a t i o n on S O C activities:

It was a g r e e d at the 12 January m e e t i n g that the central f o r c e beh i n d the r e c e n t outbreak o f incidents o f political intimidation was not necessarily the P h n o m P e n h o f f i c e s o f the "Ministry of N a t i o n a l Security" or "Ministry o f I n t e r i o r " o f the S O C administrative structure, but most likely the C o u n c i l o f Ministers and the C P P [ N . B . , the e x e c u t i v e and the party, two " n o n c o n t r o l l e d " e n t i t i e s ] . T h i s source o f authority is e x e r c i s e d at the p r o v i n c i a l and local level largely t h r o u g h familial and p e r s o n a l ties with the " P r o v i n c i a l Governors."69

T h e Civil Administration C o m p o n e n t did not b e c o m e idle. It trained g o v e r n m e n t bureaucrats in uncontroversial administrative skills. Responding, moreover, to the failure o f the control mandate, Civil Administration unofficially (as did the Military C o m p o n e n t officially) adjusted its mandate by concentrating on m o n i t o r i n g the electoral activities of the factions by means of Control Teams and by encouraging the parties to organize f o r legitimate campaigning. 7 0 T h e head of the Human Rights C o m p o n e n t , Dennis McNamara, o f f e r e d an i n f o r m e d assessment o f U N T A C ' s e f f o r t s in civil control: " T h e exercise of ' c o n t r o l ' in o r d e r to secure a neutral political envir o n m e n t and end human rights abuses would have been a daunting task even if the peace process had g o n e exactly as planned, given the time-frame involved and the resources available to U N T A C . With the

45

U N T A C ' s RECORD

r e f u s a l of t h e P a r t y of D e m o c r a t i c K a m p u c h e a to d e m o b i l i z e its t r o o p s a n d c o n t i n u e to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e p r o c e s s ( w h i c h led to all f a c t i o n s n o t d e m o b i l i z i n g ) a n d r e l a t e d r e s i s t a n c e to close U N T A C sup e r v i s i o n of t h e State of C a m b o d i a ' s security a p p a r a t u s , U N T A C was h a r d p r e s s e d to p r e v e n t m o u n t i n g political c r i m e s . " 7 1 C o n t r o l c a n n o t s t a n d o n its o w n . In t h e C o n g o , t h e UN s t e p p e d in to r e p l a c e t h e c o l l a p s e d Belgian c o l o n i a l b u r e a u c r a c y a n d p r o v i d e a t e m p o r a r y s o u r c e of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; in N a m i b i a a n d El Salvador, with t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s , it s u c c e e d e d in m o n i t o r i n g t h e activities of g o v e r n m e n t s a n d r e b e l s in a way t h a t e n h a n c e d c o n f i d e n c e in t h e t r a n s p a r e n c y of t h e p e a c e p r o c e s s . In C a m b o d i a , t h e U N a g r e e d to d o m u c h m o r e t h a n m o n i t o r a n d m u c h less t h a n rep l a c e . But w i t h o u t t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s , it c o u l d n o t e f f e c tively c o n t r o l . Yet h a d t h e p a r t i e s b e e n p r e p a r e d to c o o p e r a t e , c o n trol w o u l d n o t have b e e n n e e d e d . U n l e s s t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y c a n m o n o p o l i z e t h e relev a n t r e s o u r c e s (as in F o r e i g n Affairs's c o n t r o l over t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of p a s s p o r t s ) , t h e best it will a c h i e v e is i n f l u e n c e o v e r a (likely to b e rec a l c i t r a n t ) f a c t i o n . In a p e a c e o p e r a t i o n s e n v i r o n m e n t , it a p p e a r s , inf l u e n c e is b e s t e x e r t e d t h r o u g h r e t r a i n i n g , w h i c h c a n e s t a b l i s h t h e n e c e s s a r y ties of m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e s p e c t . W i t h o u t t h o s e a d d i t i o n a l s o u r c e s of i n f l u e n c e , t h e U N s h o u l d n o t a c c e p t a r e s p o n sibility to e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l .

HUMAN

RIGHTS

T h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e a c t u a l p l a n n i n g f o r UNTAC, on the other, i n c o r p o r a t e d an e x t r a o r d i n a r y disjunction. Never b e f o r e h a d a UN p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n a s s u m e d so i n t r u s i v e a n d a u t h o r i t a t i v e a m a n d a t e to i m p l e m e n t u n i v e r s a l h u m a n r i g h t s . Articles 15 a n d 16 c h a r g e d U N T A C with " f o s t e r i n g an e n v i r o n m e n t in w h i c h r e s p e c t f o r h u m a n r i g h t s w o u l d b e e n s u r e d " a n d p r e v e n t i n g a r e t u r n to " t h e p o l i c i e s a n d p r a c t i c e s of t h e p a s t " (i.e., t h e g e n o c i d e ) . S e c t i o n E of A n n e x 1 ( t h e " U N T A C M a n d a t e " ) f u r t h e r a u t h o rized t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a p r o g r a m of h u m a n r i g h t s e d u c a t i o n , i n c l u d e d a p r o v i s i o n f o r g e n e r a l o v e r s i g h t of h u m a n r i g h t s , a n d gave U N T A C t h e d u t y to e n g a g e in i n v e s t i g a t i o n s a n d , " w h e r e a p p r o p r i a t e , c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n . " N o n e t h e l e s s , in t h e initial p l a n n i n g f o r U N T A C t h e H u m a n R i g h t s C o m p o n e n t was ass i g n e d o n l y t e n officers. It was a s s u m e d t h a t all of U N T A C would strive to p r o t e c t h u m a n rights a n d t h a t the H u m a n Rights C o m p o n e n t t h u s would serve as a

46

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

central coordinating agency. But the local political e n v i r o n m e n t ( n o n e of the f o u r factions had a record of respect for h u m a n rights), the many compromises already e m b o d i e d in the Paris Agreements (especially the decision not to prosecute leaders of the K h m e r Rouge for genocide), 7 2 a n d the lack of experience in m o n i t o r i n g h u m a n rights a m o n g the bulk of the UNTAC staff m a d e a rapid revision necessary, resulting in the sending of o n e h u m a n rights officer to each of Cambodia's twenty-one provinces and a later addition of ten m o r e in P h n o m Penh. 7 3 Still radically u n d e r s t a f f e d a n d s u f f e r i n g f r o m a c o n s t a n t shortage of vehicles in a mission n o t o r i o u s f o r its v e h i c u l a r c o r n u c o p i a , the H u m a n Rights C o m p o n e n t f o u n d the mitigation of h u m a n rights violations to be a c o n s t a n t c h a l l e n g e . N o n e t h e l e s s , in its m o n i t o r i n g role, the c o m p o n e n t s u c c e e d e d in having t h e SNC a d o p t all t h e m a j o r h u m a n r i g h t s c o v e n a n t s a n d in c o r r e c t i n g s o m e of t h e worst a b u s e s in the p r i s o n s . In its e d u c a t i o n a l role, t h e c o m p o n e n t orie n t e d U N T A C ' s o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s to t h e h u m a n r i g h t s m a n d a t e . Moreover, relying o n the trust f u n d i n d e p e n d e n t l y established in Oct o b e r 1992 a n d w o r k i n g t h r o u g h schools a n d universities, it organized an extensive i n f o r m a t i o n p r o g r a m f o r the C a m b o d i a n s t h e m selves, all f o r t h e p u r p o s e of raising an a w a r e n e s s of basic h u m a n rights. As i m p o r t a n t f o r t h e l o n g r u n , the c o m p o n e n t was instrum e n t a l in t h e f o u n d i n g of C a m b o d i a n h u m a n rights g r o u p s , which t o g e t h e r m o b i l i z e d a m e m b e r s h i p of over 100,000. T h e s e , t o g e t h e r with the e m e r g e n c e of the freest press in S o u t h e a s t Asia a n d radically new f r e e d o m s of m o v e m e n t a n d association, were t h e key legacies of UNTAC in h u m a n rights. In a d d i t i o n , the c o m p o n e n t left b e h i n d an i m p o r t a n t institutional legacy, the UN H u m a n Rights Center, h e a d e d by a special envoy with a c o n t i n u i n g responsibility to m o n i t o r Camb o d i a ' s progress in i m p l e m e n t i n g "liberal democracy." Yet s e r i o u s violations of h u m a n r i g h t s c o n t i n u e d . Far f r o m ens u r i n g a n e n v i r o n m e n t of r e s p e c t f o r h u m a n rights, U N T A C m e t little success in its c o r r e c t i v e role. V i e t n a m e s e i m m i g r a n t s in Camb o d i a w e r e a t t a c k e d , a n d political p a r t i e s were t a r g e t e d f o r violent i n t i m i d a t i o n . O n D e c e m b e r 28, 1992, a b o u t twenty K h m e r R o u g e soldiers a t t a c k e d t h e V i e t n a m e s e village of T a c h e s o n t h e s h o r e of t h e T o n l e Sap; s i x t e e n villagers d i e d . A KR s o l d i e r later c o n f e s s e d a n d was placed in custody by UNTAC. O n March 10 an even worse attack o c c u r r e d o n t h e village of C h o n g Kneas o n the T o n l e Sap; eighteen died, a n d again the KR was i d e n t i f i e d as p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the attack. 7 4 Political v i o l e n c e d i r e c t e d against citizens a n d rival p a r t i e s increased as the election a p p r o a c h e d . Party workers were m u r d e r e d , as was F U N C I N P E C m e m b e r S u e r n Sour, allegedly by a S O C policem a n a n d two m i l i t i a m e n . And U N T A C itself was a t t a c k e d . T h e KR

47

U N T A C ' s RECORD

e n g a g e d in the vast p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f e t h n i c killings (of Vietn a m e s e ) , 104 out of 111. But U N T A C a s s i g n e d S O C responsibility for 46 d e a t h s o f political o p p o n e n t s , the KR 37; r e f l e c t i n g the g e n e r a l lawlessness of the country, 76 were u n a t t r i b u t e d . 7 5 R e s p o n d i n g to the m o u n t i n g political v i o l e n c e a n d a b u s e of h u m a n rights in the fall of 1992 a n d the u n w i l l i n g n e s s of the S O C a n d o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s to p r o s e c u t e s u s p e c t s , U N T A C took a revolutionary step: It a p p o i n t e d its own special p r o s e c u t o r , Australian barrister Mark Plunkett. Established in J a n u a r y 1993, the special prosecutor's o f f i c e p r o c e e d e d to issue warrants a g a i n s t s u s p e c t e d violators o f h u m a n rights. Difficulties immediately a r o s e : U N T A C l a c k e d a j a i l ( s o o n r e m e d i e d with e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the first U N " d e t e n t i o n facility"), C I V P O L was not a r m e d , a n d the U N T A C military f o r c e , by its own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , h a d no authority to e x e r c i s e f o r c e f o r this purp o s e . But the largest difficulty was that S O C was n o t p r e p a r e d to p r o s e c u t e a c c u s e d S O C m e m b e r s , a n d the quality o f the S O C courts d i d n o t allow f o r reliable j u s t i c e f o r the o t h e r f a c t i o n s . Ironically, t h e r e f o r e , the U N ' s first two p r i s o n e r s ever were h e l d without h a b e a s c o r p u s a n d without trial. T h e f a i l u r e h e r e is n o t primarily a t t r i b u t a b l e to the H u m a n Rights C o m p o n e n t , which lacked the m i n i m u m r e s o u r c e s to m e e t its m a n d a t e . Like o t h e r U N T A C units, H u m a n Rights s h a r e d responsibility with a n o t h e r c o m p o n e n t , the very d i f f e r e n t Civilian Police C o m p o n e n t , which s u f f e r e d f r o m the s a m e p r o b l e m s as H u m a n Rights a n d o t h e r s m o r e particularly its own.

CIVILIAN

POLICE

T h e s e c o n d largest c o m p o n e n t of U N T A C , Civilian Police had 3,600 p e r s o n n e l , o r g a n i z e d u n d e r the direction o f U N T A C Police Commissioner Klaas Roos. T h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s gave U N T A C the a m b i t i o u s m a n d a t e n o t merely to m o n i t o r b u t also to " s u p e r v i s e a n d c o n t r o l " the p o l i c e o f the existing a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s . Given the nonc o o p e r a t i o n of the KR a n d the lack of g o v e r n m e n t a l structure o f the two other factions, C I V P O L ' s e f f o r t s c o n c e n t r a t e d on the S O C . C I V P O L d i d provide useful b r i e f i n g s on h u m a n rights a n d basic p r i n c i p l e s o f p o l i c i n g to a b o u t 9 , 0 0 0 C a m b o d i a n p o l i c e officers. In T h m a r P o u k , Banteay M e a n c h e y Province, C I V P O L training actually had a substantial i m p a c t a n d u n i t e d all f o u r f a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the K h m e r R o u g e , albeit in small n u m b e r s . 7 6 J u d g i n g f r o m these experiences, it a p p e a r s that training o f f e r e d many a d v a n t a g e s to C I V P O L . It provided rapport with the local police as well as better communication,

48

M I C H A E L W . DOYLE

both of which enhanced the prospect f o r effective m o n i t o r i n g (perhaps even c o n t r o l ) . If successful, moreover, training w o u l d leave an institutional and educational legacy. C I V P O L also played a useful role in m o n i t o r i n g election rallies and in p r o v i d i n g vital logistical support f o r the elections in May 1993. T h e i r local presence seems to have contributed to a general reduction in the most blatant forms of state intimidation. But with its mandate "to ensure that law and o r d e r are maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and f u n d a m e n t a l f r e e d o m s are fully p r o t e c t e d , " 7 7 C I V P O L faced an immense task, o n e f o r which it was very poorly prepared. In part, this failure resulted f r o m the i n h e r e n t challenge of cross-national police cooperation. Policing requires local knowledge, community trust, and expertise. T h e p o l i c e rely on community coo p e r a t i o n . T h e y rely on citizens and see themselves as serving the local public. Consequently, police styles d i f f e r markedly a m o n g nations. Military forces, by contrast, typically face a f o r e i g n enemy, and their national styles are consequently much m o r e similar. A l t h o u g h p e a c e k e e p i n g typically blurs these distinctions, the U N has a long record of reorienting the military in peacekeeping to b e c o m e more like "police." But it had little e x p e r i e n c e in the use of "peacekeeping p o l i c e " ( C I V P O L ) to uphold law and order in the midst o f an ongoing civil war. 78 N o matter how well prepared C I V P O L had been, it is difficult to see how any f o r e i g n police force assigned to take on these responsibilities over a local police like that of the SOC, n u m b e r i n g in excess of 45,000, with only 18 months to carry out its mandate, could have effectively established adequate control. W h e n o n e adds an appreciation f o r the specifically political r o l e played by the S O C police as the m a j o r agent o f state control in the country, on the o n e hand, and C I V P O L ' s c o m p l e t e lack of e x p e r i e n c e and training in international supervision (not to mention inability to speak K h m e r ) , on the other hand, the nature of the task assumed became nothing short of quixotic. 7 9 Unfortunately, these p r o b l e m s were c o m p o u n d e d by organizational weaknesses over which the U N should have had m o r e control. T h e late appointment of the police commissioner precluded advance planning. ( H e was a p p o i n t e d after the mission was supposed to be operational.) T o o many members of C I V P O L spoke neither French nor English (the two working languages of the mission). Some (according to widespread charges) could not drive. Inadequacies of this sort may have contributed to the morale problems C I V P O L allegedly endured. 8 0 T h e high cost ($250 m i l l i o n ) and discipline problems that o c c u r r e d f u r t h e r e r o d e d the unit's effectiveness. 8 1 All these

49

UNTAC's RECORD

difficulties, CIVPOL officers suggested, might have b e e n c o r r e c t e d by b e t t e r t r a i n i n g C I V P O L staff b e f o r e t h e mission a n d by g i v i n g t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r a u t h o r i t y to r e p a t r i a t e u n q u a l i f i e d o f f i c e r s . T h e s i n g l e l a r g e s t c a u s e of t h e f a i l u r e s U N T A C e x p e r i e n c e d in p u b l i c security, i n c l u d i n g b o t h H u m a n R i g h t s a n d C I V P O L , lay in t h e a b s e n c e of an i n d e p e n d e n t j u d i c i a l f r a m e w o r k . U n a b l e to rely o n t h e S O C f r a m e w o r k of c o u r t s , p r i s o n s , a n d p o l i c e f o r r e a s o n s of n e u trality a n d h u m a n r i g h t s , H u m a n R i g h t s a n d C I V P O L w e r e a s k e d to p r o t e c t h u m a n r i g h t s a n d s e c u r e law a n d o r d e r w i t h o u t a j u d i c i a l syst e m . C I V P O L , a f t e r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of t h e special p r o s e c u t o r , h a d t h e a u t h o r i t y to a r r e s t . It e v e n a c q u i r e d a U N p r i s o n . B u t it h a d n o way to p r o s e c u t e . 8 2 T h e inability to p r o s e c u t e in C a m b o d i a n c o u r t s , U N T A C c o u r t s e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e , o r a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l trib u n a l m e a n t t h a t n o c o m p l e t e system of legal o r d e r e x i s t e d . 8 3 T h i s p r o d u c e d a striking irony: U N T A C , s e n t to p r o t e c t h u m a n r i g h t s a n d s e c u r e law a n d o r d e r , b e g a n h o l d i n g p r i s o n e r s in violation of h a b e a s c o r p u s . M a r k P l u n k e t t , U N T A C special p r o s e c u t o r , c o n c l u d e d t h a t U N p e a c e b u i l d i n g r e q u i r e d a "justice p a c k a g e " — a s y s t e m a t i c , p r e p a r e d c o m b i n a t i o n of p r o s e c u t o r i a l , p o l i c e , a n d j u d i c i a l c a p a c i t i e s , t o g e t h e r with a m a n d a t e to train. 8 4 T r a i n i n g can establish t h e b o n d s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , r e s p e c t , a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t g e n e r a t e a p p r o p r i a t e i n f l u e n c e . It also c a n e n s u r e t h a t a U N o p e r a t i o n leaves instit u t i o n s b e h i n d t h a t , with t h e p r o p e r d o m e s t i c a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l support, help carry f o r w a r d a c o m m i t m e n t to impartial justice and h u m a n rights. T h e f a i l u r e of U N civilian p o l i c e in C a m b o d i a d o e s n o t m e a n t h e U N s h o u l d a b a n d o n t h e r o l e of p o l i c e r e f o r m , w h i c h is o f t e n a crucial s t e p in r e s t o r i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y of s t a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s in t h e wake of civil war. But U N T A C ' s e x p e r i e n c e suggests t h a t , given t h e n e c e s sity of b r i d g i n g l a r g e c u l t u r a l gaps, a s s u m i n g a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to control a n d r e f o r m w i t h o u t t h e assistance of e i t h e r a "judicial p a c k a g e " o r a well-planned p r o g r a m of police r e t r a i n i n g is simply i m p r a c t i c a l .

REHABILITATION

T h e n e g o t i a t o r s of t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s a n d t h e i r U N i m p l e m e n t e r s k n e w very well t h a t , as S e r g i o Vieira d e Mello, U N T A C r e p a t r i a t i o n d i r e c t o r , p r o c l a i m e d , " T h e r e will b e n o p e a c e w i t h o u t d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d n o d e v e l o p m e n t w i t h o u t peace."85 But UNTAC's own m a n d a t e was l i m i t e d to " r e h a b i l i t a t i o n " — s h o r t - t e r m a s s i s t a n c e to r e t u r n i n g r e f u g e e s a n d t h e s e t t l e d p o p u l a t i o n . R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e f u l l reb u i l d i n g of C a m b o d i a a f t e r twenty years of d e v a s t a t i o n , a n d f o r t h e

50

MICHAEL W. D O M E

d e v e l o p m e n t of a dynamic economy, would lay in the hands of Cambodia's next government. Nonetheless, the importance of rehabilitation was fully recognized in the separate "Declaration on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia" attached to Paris Agreements and in the establishment of an i n d e p e n d e n t Rehabilitation C o m p o n e n t in UNTAC. 86 Despite the emphasis placed on rehabilitation in both the agreements and the mandate, rehabilitation proved to be one of the least effective aspects of the peacebuilding operation. Exceptionally poor planning and administrative confusion were part of the problem, but the d e e p e r snags were political: the dilemma of how to rehabilitate in a neutral fashion in the midst of civil war. In February 1992, the Secretary-General placed Cambodia's "urgent needs" in three categories. T h e first was h u m a n i t a r i a n aid (food, health, housing), focusing on the disadvantaged and handicapped; the second, resettlement and demobilization; and the third, essential restoration of roads, rail, and basic infrastructure. 8 7 Given the devastated state of the Cambodian economy and society, 88 UNTAC's efforts, late t h o u g h they were, m a d e a positive impact. T h e five engineering battalions and the engineering platoons in each of UNTAC's infantry battalions improved roads and rebuilt destroyed bridges. T h e Mine Clearing Training Unit also m a d e a contribution, training 2,000 Cambodians and clearing more than 1.6 million acres. 89 UNTAC provided significant assistance through the Repatriation C o m p o n e n t to r e t u r n i n g refugees. T h e international community raised m o r e than the $600 million UNTAC sought for aid, pledging a total of $880 million at the J u n e 1992 Tokyo Conference. The Rehabilitation C o m p o n e n t effectively monitored aid flows and successfully i n t r o d u c e d i m p o r t a n t financial r e f o r m s (with CIVADMIN) c o n c e r n i n g the control of the currency. It headed off hyperinflation and possible food riots in March 1993 by placing rice on the market with the assistance of the World Food Program, and it helped establish a border patrol to restrict the flow of illegal shipments of logs and gems. Yet, j u d g e d against its original m a n d a t e to "benefit all areas of Cambodia, especially the more disadvantaged and reach all levels of society," the c o m p o n e n t fell far short of its goals. Less than $100 million of the $880 million pledged was disbursed before the elections, and most of that was directed to the resettled refugees. The vast majority of the rest of the aid flowed into major projects, not program assistance that could reach villages and stimulate local employment. T h e presence of UNTAC, moreover, distorted the economy in favor of the cities and may have exacerbated ethnic tensions by seeming to

UNTAC's Record

51

b e n e f i t i m m i g r a n t V i e t n a m e s e , w h o w e r e g r e a t l y d i s t r u s t e d by t h e Khmer. T h e i n c o m e disparity between UNTAC officials, whose p e r d i e m ( o n t o p of salary) was $ 1 4 0 a day, a n d t h e a v e r a g e C a m b o d i a n ( p e r c a p i t a G N P was $ 2 0 0 p e r year) c r e a t e d a n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r corr u p t i o n a n d d i s a f f e c t i o n . T h e s e p r o b l e m s w e r e c o m p o u n d e d by t h e o u t b r e a k of AIDS a n d o t h e r sexually t r a n s m i t t e d diseases. 9 0 In any a s s e s s m e n t of w h a t w e n t w r o n g , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n f u sion of t h e c o m p o n e n t d e s e r v e s m e n t i o n . A f t e r l o s i n g two d i r e c t o r s w i t h i n m o n t h s t h r o u g h r e s i g n a t i o n o r dismissal, t h e c o m p o n e n t was p l a c e d u n d e r t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e e c o n o m i c a d v i s o r to t h e s p e c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . B u t e v e n with a m o r e e f f e c t i v e c o m p o n e n t , t h e task of i m p l e m e n t i n g a massive r e h a b i l i t a t i o n p r o g r a m in a d e v a s t a t e d e c o n o m y w o u l d h a v e b e e n f r a u g h t with difficulty. C a m b o d i a l a c k e d t h e t e c h n i c a l l y skilled e c o n o m i c p l a n n e r s , local N G O s , a n d grassr o o t s o r g a n i z a t i o n s so i m p o r t a n t f o r c o o p e r a t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t . Ano t h e r c r u c i a l f a c t o r was t h e i n h e r e n t l y p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r of develo p m e n t a s s i s t a n c e in t h e m i d s t of a n o n g o i n g civil c o n f l i c t . F U N C I N P E C e v e n w e n t so f a r as to v e t o in t h e S N C a $ 7 5 m i l l i o n e m e r g e n c y l o a n f r o m t h e W o r l d B a n k , c h a r g i n g t h a t it w o u l d b e n e f i t S O C ( w h i c h c o n t r o l l e d 80 p e r c e n t of C a m b o d i a ) , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t that the loan would not take effect until after the elections. Foreign d o n o r s s h i e d away f r o m t h e political c o n t r o v e r s y w h e n e v e n C a m b o dia's n o n - K h m e r R o u g e f a c t i o n s failed to a g r e e . U N T A C a g a i n lacked t h e political will to p r e s s u r e t h e SNC i n t o a m o r e " n a t i o n a l " p o s t u r e . 9 1

THE ELECTION UNTAC and the ordinary C a m b o d i a n e n t e r e d into a u n i q u e partn e r s h i p . It is n o e x a g g e r a t i o n to say t h a t t h e c o u r a g e of C a m b o d i a ' s voters r e s c u e d U N T A C f r o m w h a t , with t h e m o u n t i n g v i o l e n c e in t h e s p r i n g of 1993, a p p e a r e d to b e a l o o m i n g d i s a s t e r . B u t equally, U N T A C gave o r d i n a r y C a m b o d i a n s , f o r t h e first t i m e in t h e i r history, a n a u t h e n t i c voice in t h e i r f u t u r e . T h e e l e c t i o n b e t w e e n May 23 a n d May 28 r e p r e s e n t e d n o t o n l y C a m b o d i a ' s best b u t s e e m i n g l y its o n l y h o p e . T h e f a m o u s C h u r c h i l l i a n d i c t u m t h a t d e m o c r a c y is t h e worst of all possible f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t — e x c e p t all t h e rest—was b o r n e o u t a l m o s t as a labor a t o r y test case in C a m b o d i a ' s t r o u b l e d history. C a m b o d i a h a s e x p e r i e n c e d t h e q u a s i - f e u d a l i s t p a r l i a m e n t a r y yet p r i n c e l y r e i g n of P r i n c e S i h a n o u k ; a v i o l e n t m i l i t a r y c o u p in 1970 u n d e r r e p u b l i c a n auspices, o r g a n i z e d by L o n Nol with t h e s u p p o r t of t h e U n i t e d States; t h e terr o r s of K h m e r R o u g e M a o i s m b e g i n n i n g in 1975; a n d t h e o p p r e s s i o n

52

MICHAEL W. DOYLE

of the b u r e a u c r a t i c , c o m m u n i s t r e g i m e installed by the Vietnamese in 1979. T h e election also r e p r e s e n t e d an historic d e p a r t u r e for t h e U n i t e d Nations. Having m o n i t o r e d a n d supervised many elections, for the first time the UN was a u t h o r i z e d in the Paris Agreements, to "organize and c o n d u c t " from the g r o u n d u p a national election in an i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n t r y . 9 2 T h e Electoral C o m p o n e n t was well aware that it would be establishing a record that could d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the UN would ever again be e n t r u s t e d with so f u n d a m e n t a l a responsibility. UNTAC as a whole realized that by D e c e m b e r 1992 its m u l t i f u n c t i o n a l m a n d a t e , which i n c l u d e d demobilization of warring factions and c o n t r o l of their civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , h a d b e e n effectively r e d u c e d to the single task of h o l d i n g "free and fair" elections. In his I m p l e m e n t a t i o n Plan, the Secretary-General specifically identified the election as the "focal p o i n t of the c o m p r e h e n s i v e sett l e m e n t " — t h e p o i n t that would g o v e r n the e n t i r e s c h e d u l e of the peace o p e r a t i o n . T h e Electoral C o m p o n e n t was given five tasks: first, to establish, in consultation with the SNC, the framework of laws and r e g u l a t i o n s g o v e r n i n g a n a t i o n a l election for a 120-member Constituent Assembly that, following its approval of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , would b e c o m e the National Assembly; second, to develop an extensive i n f o r m a t i o n / e d u c a t i o n c a m p a i g n d i r e c t e d toward the g e n e r a l public in o r d e r to p e r s u a d e t h e m of the i m p o r t a n c e and the integrity (secrecy and, h e n c e , safety) of the ballot; third, to organize a n d conduct a national registration of all voters on a provincial basis to determ i n e both who is allowed to vote and how many seats should be allocated to each province; f o u r t h , to organize and supervise the registration of political parties; and, fifth, to conduct a general election in 1,400 polling stations and c o u n t the ballots—all before the beginning of the 1993 rainy season (that is, before the middle of May 1993). A l t h o u g h the Electoral C o m p o n e n t b o r e p r i m a r y responsibility for the registration a n d election, h e r e , as in o t h e r aspects of the UNTAC o p e r a t i o n , effective responsibility lay in a p a r t n e r s h i p a m o n g UNTAC units, in this case the Electoral, Military, and Inform a t i o n / E d u c a t i o n units. The Electoral Component T h e c o m p o n e n t was h e a d e d by Dr. Reginald Austin, who had previously supervised the election in Namibia. Electoral had f o u r branches: O p e r a t i o n s and C o m p u t e r i z a t i o n , Administration and Coordination, I n f o r m a t i o n / C o m m u n i c a t i o n s / T r a i n i n g , and Complaints/ C o m p l i a n c e / E n f o r c e m e n t . Each was h e a d e d by a d e p u t y director,

UNTAC's

RECORD

53

with C o m p u t e r i z a t i o n i d e n t i f i e d as t h e s e n i o r division, r e f l e c t i n g its c r u c i a l role. E a c h of C a m b o d i a ' s t w e n t y - o n e p r o v i n c e s also r e c e i v e d a small staff h e a d e d by a p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t o r a l o f f i c e r . B u t t h e " a r m s , legs a n d h e a r t s " of t h e e l e c t i o n w e r e to b e f o u n d in t h e 460 U N Volu n t e e r s (UNV) w h o s t a f f e d t h e district-level o p e r a t i o n s . 9 3 P e r h a p s t h e m o s t r e m a r k a b l e f e a t u r e of t h e e l e c t o r a l e f f o r t was t h e d e g r e e of a d v a n c e d p l a n n i n g it i n c o r p o r a t e d . T h e p l a n n i n g f o r an e l e c t i o n b e g a n with t h e A u s t r a l i a n g o v e r n m e n t study of t h e p e a c e ( t h e " R e d b o o k " ) in 1990. It c o n t i n u e d with t h e E l e c t o r a l P l a n n i n g Mission in N o v e m b e r 1991 a n d t h e d r a f t t e a m f o r t h e E l e c t o r a l Law f o r C a m b o d i a , w h i c h i n c l u d e d A u s t i n , a n d m e t in New York in J a n u ary 1992. It c o n c l u d e d with t h e A d v a n c e d P l a n n i n g U n i t , w h i c h was d e p l o y e d with t h e U N A d v a n c e Mission in C a m b o d i a ( U N A M I C ) a n d p e r f o r m e d v a l u a b l e statistical e s t i m a t e s of t h e eligible v o t e r p o p u l a t i o n p r o v i n c e by p r o v i n c e in t h e r e p o r t t h e y c o m p l e t e d in A u g u s t 1992. T h e E l e c t o r a l C o m p o n e n t itself, s t a r t i n g with its a r r i v a l in M a r c h 1992, n o n e t h e l e s s e n c o u n t e r e d t h e typical U N T A C delays, inc l u d i n g i n a p p r o p r i a t e e q u i p m e n t , m i s s i n g f u r n i t u r e , a n d l a t e staff ( m a n y r e p o r t e d l y d e l a y e d by slow m e d i c a l c l e a r a n c e in New York). 9 4 T h e c o m p o n e n t ' s first m a j o r c h a l l e n g e was t h e n e e d to r e g i s t e r C a m b o d i a ' s voters. In t h e fall of 1992 t h e logistical a n d political e n v i r o n m e n t c o u l d n o t have b e e n m o r e t r y i n g . T h e c o u n t r y was totally u n f a m i l i a r with n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s , a n d it l a c k e d t h e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t h a t w o u l d h a v e m a d e r e g i s t r a t i o n s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . W i t h t h e assist a n c e of t h e Military C o m p o n e n t , E l e c t o r a l was n o n e t h e l e s s a b l e to r e a c h a n d r e g i s t e r 4.76 m i l l i o n voters, a r o u n d 90 p e r c e n t of t h e estim a t e d p o t e n t i a l v o t e r s . T h e p r o c e s s was assisted by t h e o b v i o u s att r a c t i o n of l a m i n a t e d p h o t o i d e n t i t y c a r d s to C a m b o d i a n s , w h o app e a r e d to relish t h e s y m b o l of c i t i z e n s h i p ( a n d security?) t h e y conveyed. P l a n n i n g f o r t h e May 2 3 - 2 8 e l e c t i o n involved e v e n g r e a t e r efforts. D e s i g n e d to i n c l u d e a c o m b i n a t i o n of fixed p o l l i n g a n d m o b i l e polling, the process required identifying (but keeping confidential u n t i l j u s t b e f o r e t h e e l e c t i o n ) 1,400 p o l l i n g sites a n d r e c r u i t i n g a n d t r a i n i n g 48,000 C a m b o d i a n e l e c t i o n w o r k e r s a n d 1,000 i n t e r n a t i o n a l poll s u p e r v i s i n g o f f i c e r s ( I P S O s ) . T h e Electoral C o m p o n e n t e x p e r i e n c e d p l a n n i n g and technical p r o b l e m s as well as successes. C o n t r a c t i n g o u t t h e c o m p u t e r system o n a t u r n k e y basis p r o v e d to b e a n e f f i c i e n t s o l u t i o n to a c h i e v i n g timely o u t p u t a n d c l e a r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . But t h e r e w e r e t e c h n i c a l g l i t c h e s e l s e w h e r e . N o t o r i o u s w e r e t h e failed plastic seals o n t h e ballot b o x e s t h a t b r o k e in t r a n s i t o n C a m b o d i a ' s b u m p y r o a d s , giving rise to ( u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d ) S O C c h a r g e s of U N T A C t a m p e r i n g . T h e

54

MICHAEL W .

DOYLE

greatest difficulties were in policy choices. D u r i n g the registration process, they arose in c o n n e c t i o n with UNTAC's slow decision on how to d e t e r m i n e C a m b o d i a n citizenship, an issue negotiated in detail with the C a m b o d i a n factions in the S u p r e m e National Council. T h e result was a standard that, t h o u g h n o t formally ethnic, e x c l u d e d C a m b o d i a ' s Vietnamese immigrants a n d p e r m i t t e d overseas Cambodians to r e t u r n h o m e to register. T h e election itself was complicated by the controversy over w h e t h e r to hold a s e p a r a t e and prior presid e n t i a l election, d e s i g n e d to install Prince S i h a n o u k as the comm a n d i n g figure of the p e a c e process. Manifestly n o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , in the sense that it was n o t included in the Paris Agreements, this initiative nonetheless could n o t be dismissed because of the s u p p o r t of F r a n c e a n d the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s , who were skeptical of the prospects (and desirability?) of "pluralist democracy" in Cambodia. 9 5 The Military Component N o n e of the electoral successes would have b e e n possible without the active assistance of UNTAC's military. In the fall of 1992, a f t e r the failure of c a n t o n m e n t a n d demobilization b e c a m e evident, the UN r e d e f i n e d the Military C o m p o n e n t ' s role, moving f r o m a zonal dep l o y m e n t designed to a c c o m m o d a t e c a n t o n m e n t of the factions' military forces to a provincial d e p l o y m e n t d e s i g n e d to s u p p o r t the organization of the election. W h e n this r e d e p l o y m e n t was c o m p l e t e d o n D e c e m b e r 31, 1992, UNTAC's Military C o m p o n e n t b e c a m e an election protection a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n force. With 15,500 soldiers in 270 locations a r o u n d the country, it o f f e r e d the most widely dist r i b u t e d organization, o n e capable of b o t h p r o t e c t i n g the electoral process and providing the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d logistics essential to c o n d u c t the election. 9 6 Information/Education Division Widely recognized as o n e of t h e stars of UNTAC, this division, h e a d e d by US d i p l o m a t a n d "old C a m b o d i a h a n d " Tim Carney, enjoyed the sort of i n d e p e n d e n c e characteristic of the full-fledged comp o n e n t s . It played a central role in fulfilling t h r e e of UNTAC's mandates. It s u p p l e m e n t e d the e d u c a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s of H u m a n Rights by p r o d u c i n g videos, posters, leaflets, and large b a n n e r s that publicized the h u m a n rights provisions of the Paris Agreements. T h e division ( I n f o / E d for short) also s u p p l e m e n t e d t h e control f u n c t i o n of Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , establishing "Media G u i d e l i n e s " in O c t o b e r 1992 designed to meet UNTAC's m a n d a t e to o f f e r fair media access

UNTAC's

RECORD

55

to all C a m b o d i a ' s political p a r t i e s . 9 7 H e r e t h e division e x p e r i e n c e d l i m i t e d s u c c e s s , as n o t only the K h m e r R o u g e b u t a l s o the S O C m e d i a r e f u s e d to c o o p e r a t e with U N T A C . T h e S O C r e j e c t e d U N T A C s a t t e m p t to e x e r c i s e a priori e d i t o r i a l c o n t r o l of T V K a m p u c h e a a n d state n e w s p a p e r s . T h e division a c h i e v e d its real s u c c e s s in directly c o m m u n i c a t i n g the m e a n i n g a n d i m p o r t a n c e of the e l e c t i o n to the C a m b o d i a n people. It was the key f a c t o r that allowed U N T A C , in the w o r d s of Lieut e n a n t G e n e r a l S a n d e r s o n , U N T A C f o r c e c o m m a n d e r , to "bypass the p r o p a g a n d a of the C a m b o d i a n f a c t i o n s " a n d f o r g e "the alliance with the C a m b o d i a n p e o p l e " that b e c a m e the e s s e n c e of U N T A C strategy. 9 8 T h e division, w o r k i n g in its own a u d i o - v i d e o s t u d i o in P h n o m P e n h , p r o d u c e d n i n e half-hour p r o g r a m s e a c h week for R a d i o U N T A C . T h e s e p r o g r a m s r e a c h e d m o s t of C a m b o d i a , thanks to private J a p a n ese d o n o r s who p r o v i d e d 143,000 r a d i o s to the C a m b o d i a n p e o p l e . 9 9 As the electoral c a m p a i g n b e g a n , R a d i o U N T A C b r o a d c a s t daily electoral p r o g r a m s a n d o f f e r e d time for e a c h r e g i s t e r e d political party, allowing c a n d i d a t e s or parties to r e s p o n d to u n f a i r attacks. 1 0 0 T h e division's central a c c o m p l i s h m e n t lay in p e r s u a d i n g o r d i n a r y C a m b o d i a n s that their votes, despite all the threats of the factions, would be cast in secret. ( B e c a u s e district votes would n o t b e tallied e x c e p t at the provincial level, villages, too, c o u l d be p r o t e c t e d f r o m retaliation.) T h o u g h n o t widely r e c o g n i z e d o u t s i d e U N T A C , the division p l a y e d o n e m o r e r o l e , o n e sensitive yet i m p o r t a n t in m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s . In a s s e s s i n g how well its own mess a g e was b e i n g received by the C a m b o d i a n s , I n f o / E d d e v e l o p e d what may have b e e n the U N ' s first political i n t e l l i g e n c e d e p a r t m e n t . Bene f i t i n g f r o m its r e c r u i t m e n t o f an o u t s t a n d i n g g r o u p o f y o u n g K h m e r - s p e a k i n g s c h o l a r s , the division w r o t e systematic political rep o r t s o n the activities of the v a r i o u s f a c t i o n s in e a c h of C a m b o d i a ' s key provinces.

The Election: Free and Fair? S p e c i a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Akashi d e f i n e d " f r e e a n d f a i r " in a s t a t e m e n t b e f o r e the S u p r e m e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l o n April 21, 1993: "A victory m a r r e d by v i o l e n c e a n d i n t i m i d a t i o n is n o t w o r t h having. U N T A C a n d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y will j u d g e the f r e e n e s s a n d f a i r n e s s of t h e e l e c t i o n by t h r e e c r i t e r i a : the t e c h n i c a l c o n d u c t of the p o l l ; the e x t e n t to which the c a m p a i g n is m a r r e d by v i o l e n c e , i n t i m i d a tion, a n d h a r a s s m e n t ; a n d the e x t e n t to which the i n c u m b e n t party enjoys u n f a i r a d v a n t a g e s , w h e t h e r by u s i n g the a p p a r a t u s of state f o r

56

MICHAEL W .

DOYI.K

its own political ends or by denying opposition parties access to public m e d i a . " T h e last two c o n d i t i o n s seem to have b e e n very much unfulfilled. 1 0 1 T h e State o f C a m b o d i a clearly e n j o y e d unfair advantages with its ownership of the Cambodian media and mobilization o f public officials for CPP c a m p a i g n i n g . A highly e x p e r t I n f o / E d officer, for e x a m p l e , reported on March 29, 1993: "In Seam Reap, as observed elsewhere, CPP and S O C structures are inseparable, and there seems to have been no attempt whatsoever to at least make them look even formally separate. It appears that, on the contrary, CPP's control over S O C structures has b e e n reinforced to the point o f total fusion, S O C ' s structures being CPP's instrument to implement its policies and achieve its objectives." 1 0 2 In early 1993, moreover, opposition political offices were attacked, ransacked, and b u r n e d , and party m e m b e r s were beaten, kidn a p p e d , and killed. J u d y T h o m p s o n , a s e n i o r Manitoba Elections Commission official volunteering as deputy c h i e f electoral officer, acknowledged, "Voter intimidation is widespread." 1 0 3 In Prey Veng, the S O C pursued an o r c h e s t r a t e d policy o f violent intimidation. An internal S O C d o c u m e n t captured by the UNTAC Control Team noted: "However, c o n f r o n t i n g all such m o v e m e n t s with counterattacks; the District Party Committee has c o n d u c t e d constant and regular activities in every locality, thereby progressively reducing the influence o f these political parties. T h e y are therefore so frightened that they no longer have the courage to engage in any political activities." 104 Right up to the eve of elections, security conditions were precarious at best. T h e town o f Stoung in the central province o f Kompong T h o m was shelled by K h m e r R o u g e artillery t h r o u g h o u t the night before balloting began until 6 : 0 0 A.M. on May 23. T h r e e days earlier, the K h m e r Rouge had overrun the town and attempted to assassinate a UN civilian electoral worker and several military observers. 1 0 5 A c c o r d i n g to a conservative r e p o r t issued by UNTAC's H u m a n Rights C o m p o n e n t , there were over 100 violent incidents during the campaigning period between March 1 and May 14 for which responsibility could be imputed. Casualties included 2 0 0 deaths, 3 3 8 inj u r i e s , and 114 abductions, c u l m i n a t i n g in a large-scale attack on Siem R e a p on May 3 - 4 by 4 0 0 K h m e r R o u g e . Following f u r t h e r attacks on May 19, h u n d r e d s took refuge in the temple c o m p l e x o f Angkor Wat. UN officials in P h n o m P e n h and New York prepared an observant i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y for e l e c t o r a l disruptions. SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued on May 3 a fourth progress report on the situation, stating: "It may well be, in the light o f the

U N T A C ' s RECORD

57

s o b e r i n g e x p e r i e n c e s o f the last 13 m o n t h s , that the e x p e c t a t i o n s o r i g i n a l l y e n t e r t a i n e d f o r e n s u r i n g that the e l e c t i o n is f r e e a n d fair and f o r the success o f n a t i o n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w e r e overly o p t i m i s t i c . " H e f u r t h e r d e c l a r e d that the " f r e e n e s s a n d f a i r n e s s " o f the e l e c t i o n s w o u l d b e m e a s u r e d a c c o r d i n g to " a c c e p t a b l e m i n i m u m s t a n d a r d s " — e f f e c t i v e l y , U N T A C ' s ability to e n s u r e a s e c r e t b a l l o t . 1 0 6 Days b e f o r e the e l e c t i o n , d e p e n d e n t s o f U N a g e n c y o f f i c i a l s w e r e o r d e r e d o u t o f the c o u n t r y by U N h e a d q u a r t e r s in N e w Y o r k . Security

concerns

c l o s e d 300 p o l l i n g sites in the t r o u b l e spots o f S i e m R e a p a n d K o m p o n g T h o m . T h e Security C o u n c i l issued a f i n a l w a r n i n g to the parties that it w o u l d " r e s p o n d a p p r o p r i a t e l y " s h o u l d they fail to h o n o r their o b l i g a t i o n s . 1 0 7 T h e U N a n d its m e m b e r states thus f a c e d a p a i n f u l d i l e m m a by h a v i n g to h o l d e l e c t i o n s in a c o u n t r y n o t yet at p e a c e , with possible d i s r u p t i o n s d u r i n g the p o l l i n g a n d a p o l i t i c a l p l a y i n g field that was f a r f r o m c o m p l e t e l y level. T h e e l e c t i o n s c o u l d n o t b e as f r e e a n d fair as t h o s e in e s t a b l i s h e d d e m o c r a c i e s o r e v e n t h o s e in o t h e r states (such as N i c a r a g u a o r N a m i b i a ) w h e r e the U N h a d o v e r s e e n e l e c tions. But the o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s , the c o n d u c t a n d c o u n t o f the p o l l by U N T A C itself, a p p e a r to have b e e n t e c h n i c a l l y f r e e a n d fair. D e s p i t e m o n s o o n rains, 42 p e r c e n t o f 4.7 m i l l i o n r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s cast their b a l l o t s o n the first day; by the e n d o f the p r o c e s s 90 p e r c e n t h a d v o t e d . T h e E l e c t o r a l C o m p o n e n t , d e s p i t e t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d disputes o v e r the b r o k e n plastic seals, p e r f o r m e d with impressive d e d i c a t i o n , c o m p l e t i n g a n o n s t o p c o u n t in f u l l s i g h t o f o b s e r v e r s f r o m the parties. I n the f a c e o f m o n t h s - l o n g i n t i m i d a t i o n a n d v i o l e n t threats, voti n g b e c a m e a h e r o i c act. C a m b o d i a ' s v o t e r s s h o w e d they w e r e m o r e than p r e p a r e d to f a c e the risk. Even in the areas o f bitter f i g h t i n g in K o m p o n g T h o m , w h e r e v o t e r s w e r e s h e l l e d o n t h e i r way to p o l l i n g sites, the t u r n o u t was a b o u t 80 p e r c e n t . U N T A C ' s E l e c t o r a l C o m p o n e n t o r g a n i z e d a nearly flawless p o l l a n d c o u n t ; the M i l i t a r y C o m p o n e n t m o v e d the b a l l o t b o x e s a n d p r o t e c t e d the p o l l i n g sites; a n d I n f o / E d s u c c e e d e d in p e r s u a d i n g the C a m b o d i a n v o t e r that d e s p i t e all threats t h e i r v o t e w o u l d be k e p t secret. P e r h a p s U N T A C ' s g r e a t e s t a c h i e v e m e n t was e n a b l i n g a p o p u l a tion to p a r t i c i p a t e in the struggles f o r p o w e r f o r the first time in its e n t i r e history. T h e m o s t lasting e f f e c t o f U N T A C will likely b e the p o p u l a t i o n ' s sense that it can d e m a n d a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f r o m those w h o govern. T h e fragility o f the process was also r e m a r k a b l e . A f t e r m o n t h s o f i n t i m i d a t i o n against C a m b o d i a n s a n d attacks o n U N T A C , why d i d n ' t the K h m e r R o u g e disrupt the poll? Was it u n d e r d i p l o m a t i c pressure,

58

MlCHAEl. W . DOYLE

particularly f r o m China? Did local c o m m a n d e r s lacking t h e m e a n s to attack simply r e f u s e o r d e r s f r o m t h e l e a d e r s h i p to d o so? Did KR l e a d e r s d e c i d e it was n o t in t h e i r interest to destroy t h e elections, as they would have a b e t t e r h a n d to play in the new g o v e r n m e n t if they d i d n o t alienate irrevocably t h e p o p u l a t i o n or the o t h e r parties with which they would have to c o o p e r a t e in a coalition? Did they strike a d e a l with P r i n c e S i h a n o u k , f a v o r i n g F U N C I N P E C in r e t u r n f o r a p r o m i s e of t h e i r b e i n g invited to j o i n a coalition g o v e r n m e n t ? Inf o r m e d speculation a n d some e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s e a c h of these. O n April 8, Atsuhito Nakata, a twenty-five-year-old J a p a n e s e electoral UNV, a n d Lay Sok P h i e p , his C a m b o d i a n i n t e r p r e t e r , were killed in R o m p o n g T h o m . 1 0 8 In a n interview with U N T A C ' s own m e d i a services b e f o r e the e l e c t i o n , Yasushi Akashi said t h a t if o n e m o r e electoral worker was killed, t h e UN V o l u n t e e r s — t h e p r i n c i p a l e l e c t o r a l o r g a n i z e r s in the f i e l d — w o u l d b e w i t h d r a w n , r a i s i n g the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e e l e c t i o n s c o u l d have b e e n c a r r i e d o u t . In May, in s e p a r a t e i n c i d e n t s in S t o u n g a n d Siem R e a p , this nearly happened.109

SOURCES OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS M a r r a c k G o u l d i n g , f o r m e r chief of the UN's p e a c e k e e p i n g d e p a r t m e n t , has described the roots of success in p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s as follows: "1. the m a n d a t e or task of the p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n must be clear, practicable and accepted by the parties; 2. t h e parties m u s t p l e d g e themselves to c o o p e r a t e with the p e a c e k e e p e r s a n d those pledges must be credible; 3. the Member-States of the U n i t e d Nations must be ready to provide the h u m a n and material resources n e e d e d to d o the j o b . " He a d d e d that only a minority of conflicts in the world would potentially fulfill all t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s . 1 1 0 Very few UN o p e r a t i o n s did or d o either. B e g i n n i n g with his third p o i n t , resources, and taking u p the m o r e political items of i n t e r n a t i o n a l supp o r t and reconciliation later, we can see that each of G o u l d i n g ' s factors, as well as others, c o n t r i b u t e d to the o u t c o m e of the C a m b o d i a effort. Timely Impact It is difficult to overemphasize the i m p o r t a n c e of rapid d e p l o y m e n t . T h e t e m p o r a l gap between signature of the peace a g r e e m e n t s (October 23, 1991) a n d the full d e p l o y m e n t of UNTAC was n i n e m o n t h s , and even then some i m p o r t a n t units of the civil police were n o t fully deployed. T h e p e a c e o p e r a t i o n was n o t officially i n a u g u r a t e d until March 15, 1992, five m o n t h s after the peace a g r e e m e n t s were signed. (Secretariat p l a n n i n g , the m a n d a t e , was n o t officially a p p r o v e d until F e b r u a r y 1992.) A small i n t e r i m advance mission (UNAMIC) was sent to C a m b o d i a in November 1991 b u t was limited to establishing liaison ("good offices") between the parties, monitoring the anticipated

59

60

MICHAEL W .

DOYI.E

cease-fire, and conducting mine clearance training. It lacked both the mandate and the wherewithal to impress the parties. Lt. Gen. J o h n Sanderson, force c o m m a n d e r of UNTAC, has stressed the i m p o r t a n c e of timely impact, stating in March of 1993: "Delays in the implementation of conditions acceptable at one point in time can allow the situation to change. While conditions for all parties to a negotiation may be considered suitable at the time of their c o m m i t m e n t , the longer the delay between signature and imp l e m e n t a t i o n , the more the margin for changes on the g r o u n d , which may in turn cause them to change their position." 1 1 1 Late deployment decreases the m o m e n t u m derived f r o m p o p u l a r support, f r o m the c o m m i t m e n t of the parties, and f r o m the psychological weight associated with a large operation moving rapidly toward an agreed-upon goal. In the first progress report, the Secretary-General warned about the adverse effect of delayed deployment (paragraph 48), saying, "The slower than expected pace of arrival of military contingents, and in particular the considerable difficulty experienced in securing and placing the e q u i p m e n t they n e e d to bring with them, could also have an adverse impact on UNTAC's ability to maintain its tight schedule of operations. This would be the more regrettable in that m u c h progress has been m a d e in securing the cooperation of the parties." Insufficient Planning T h e Civilian Police C o m p o n e n t (CIVPOL) should, as n o t e d , have had a crucial impact on the neutralization of factional intimidation, but the director was not appointed until March 1992, and then there was no clear doctrine.of operations. 1 1 2 Advance planners for the Civil Administration C o m p o n e n t did not identify the real sources of authority in P h n o m Penh. Special Representative Akashi himself was not a p p o i n t e d until J a n u a r y 1992, more than two m o n t h s after the Paris Agreements had been signed and five m o n t h s after the substance of the peace had been achieved. Some military units did not arrive soon enough; others were not adequately equipped or trained (with enough French or English speakers, qualified drivers, etc.). Effective p l a n n i n g requires a dialogue between the Secretariat, which sets standards and identifies resources, and the "field," which is charged with i m p l e m e n t i n g those standards after defining local conditions. UNTAC planning seemed at times to have suffered from a dialogue of the deaf. New York was in the midst of what SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali has called a crisis of "overcredibility," with Security Council m e m b e r s foisting new and m o r e complex

SOURCES OF SUCCESS &

FAILURE

61

missions on the U N in seeming disregard of their own budget arrears. T h e U N , long accustomed to providing occasional offers of mediation and managing o n e or two truce supervision missions, now f o u n d its responsibilities increasing geometrically as trusteeshiplike "transitional authority" was thrust upon it. N o sooner was the Namibia mission wrapped up than those in both the f o r m e r Yugoslavia and Cambodia began to c o m p e t e f o r scarce resources and scarcer senior attention—while the Secretariat adjusted to a new Secretary-General. In the field, the two survey missions sent to examine Cambodia met with minimal c o o p e r a t i o n , the first because the peace was yet to be agreed to (and the Hun Sen g o v e r n m e n t suspected international observation) and the second because Cambodia's devastation made any reliable observation problematic. Failure to coordinate the two simply multiplied the problems each e n c o u n t e r e d separately. All the while, Sihanouk insisted on the importance of quick action. Interestingly, the elections unit did have e f f e c t i v e advance plann i n g — t h e A d v a n c e Electoral Planning U n i t — t h a t i d e n t i f i e d the challenges an election would face in Cambodia and so helped avert future crises. But so did the military c o m p o n e n t , whose planning team surveyed Cambodia in D e c e m b e r 1991 and alerted New York to the special problems presented by effective operation in Cambodian conditions. However, g o o d planning was not sufficient to o v e r c o m e slow action and the K h m e r R o u g e ' s and SOC's reluctance to cease fire, canton, and disarm.

Discontinuity Lying behind both of the above was a lack of continuity between the d e v e l o p m e n t of the peace plan and its implementation in Cambodia. Rafeeuddin A h m e d represented the U N in the lengthy negotiations leading f r o m i n f o r m a l contacts through Paris I (1989) to Paris II (the 1991 Peace A g r e e m e n t s ) . In the course of these talks he acquired a familiarity with the players and issues unrivaled a m o n g U N diplomats, together with an expert staff. Whatever the advantages of a fresh approach and a clean slate (and some observers think there were advantages), a great deal of institutional k n o w l e d g e was lost when the Secretary-General replaced A h m e d and his team in January 1992 with Yasushi Akashi. Few disagree that both the force comm a n d e r and the special representative should be a p p o i n t e d at the time negotiations m o v e toward an a g r e e m e n t (as they were f o r the successful Namibia o p e r a t i o n ) . T h e y will know much better the m e a n i n g o f what was a g r e e d to and by w h o m , earn the trust of the parties, contribute to an assessment of what is feasible b e f o r e the

62

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

u n f e a s i b l e can be d e c l a r e d to be p a r t of an a g r e e d m a n d a t e , a n d have an i n t e r e s t in p l a n n i n g a h e a d to i m p l e m e n t the p e a c e as s o o n as possible.

The Role of NGOs A n o t h e r vital aspect of the p e a c e process in C a m b o d i a was the active p r e s e n c e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d i n d i g e n o u s n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations ( N G O s ) , which b o t h s u p p l e m e n t e d the work of UNTAC a n d w o r k e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y . T h e y m a d e a key c o n t r i b u t i o n in the repatriation of r e f u g e e s , the p r o m o t i o n of h u m a n rights e d u c a t i o n , a n d the provision of p r o s t h e t i c devices to the m a n y C a m b o d i a n s i n j u r e d by m i n e s . By 1993 t h e r e were m o r e t h a n 90 N G O s w o r k i n g in C a m b o dia, m o s t of t h e m well-known i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s such as CARE I n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d OXFAM. By J a n u a r y 1994 t h e r e were m o r e t h a n 120 N G O s , an e n c o u r a g i n g sign (especially with an a p p a r e n t increase of i n d i g e n o u s N G O s . ) 1 1 3 Local h u m a n i t a r i a n a n d d e v e l o p m e n t - o r i e n t e d N G O s c a r r i e d o u t activities in close c o l l a b o r a t i o n with UNTAC a n d the specialized agencies a n d p r o g r a m s of the UN, such as UNICEF. T h e C a m b o d i a n Red Cross, f o r e x a m p l e , was the vital p a r t n e r in t h e r e p a t r i a t i o n of r e f u g e e s . But m a n y i n t e r n a t i o n a l N G O s b e c a m e U N T A C ' s not-soloyal o p p o s i t i o n . L a r g e d e v e l o p m e n t - o r i e n t e d N G O s , which h a d b e e n o p e r a t i n g in C a m b o d i a u n d e r d i f f i c u l t c o n d i t i o n s b e f o r e U N T A C d e p l o y e d , b e c a m e critical of w h a t they saw as negative impacts of UNTAC's p r e s e n c e . At times, a clear division of labor was difficult to establish, a n d UNTAC was b l a m e d by several N G O s f o r b e i n g insensitive to local m o r a l s t a n d a r d s a n d f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g to inf l a t i o n . T e n s i o n s also a r o s e w h e r e N G O s with 1 i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s felt UNTAC was o v e r s h a d o w i n g t h e m a n d wasting r e s o u r c e s without significantly i m p r o v i n g the lives of C a m b o d i a n s . Nonetheless, local a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l N G O s in the field of h u m a n rights b e c a m e a distinctive f e a t u r e of t h e C a m b o d i a n peace process, a c c o r d i n g to Dr. S t e p h e n Marks, who was chief of h u m a n rights educ a t i o n , t r a i n i n g , a n d i n f o r m a t i o n in UNTAC. T h e i r special role was d e f i n e d in the m a n d a t e given to UNTAC to collaborate with international h u m a n rights N G O s a n d to foster local o n e s (Article 15 of the Paris A g r e e m e n t s ) . UNTAC, moreover, s u p p o r t e d i n d i g e n o u s N G O s t h r o u g h the T r u s t F u n d f o r a H u m a n Rights E d u c a t i o n P r o g r a m in C a m b o d i a . Reflecting o n the UNTAC legacy, Marks f o u n d it e n c o u r aging for the long-run transition to a pluralist d e m o c r a c y that "many of these N G O s c o n t i n u e to act i n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d openly o n the basis of knowledge a n d skills a c q u i r e d d u r i n g the transitional period." 1 1 ' 4

SOURCES OF SUCCESS & FAILURE

63

Quality of Staff UNTAC workers displayed d e t e r m i n a t i o n in sticking out a difficult assignment in a trying climate c o m p o u n d e d by unanticipated levels of violence. Some also displayed extraordinary courage, dedication, and ingenuity in meeting their m a n d a t e . Nonetheless, observers have noted a n u m b e r of deficiencies. Some units (CIVPOL is frequently m e n t i o n e d ) suffered f r o m serious language incompatibilities, with officers occasionally unable to speak either French or English (UNTAC's two working languages). Very few could speak Khmer (a casualty of Cambodia's long isolation and small size). Some battalions were ineffective, and one seems to have d o n e m o r e h a r m than good. Most, however, were very good, and they and the military observers stepped in to p r o p up the civilians when proceeding with UNTAC's "make or break" election became very dangerous in April and May 1993.' 1 5 T h e UN Volunteers, most of whom worked in the Electoral C o m p o n e n t , e n g e n d e r e d widespread praise, even after a few decided to withdraw in the face of extreme violence in one or two provinces. T h e frequently repeated charge that UNTAC suffered f r o m too many diplomats and too few managers u n d o u b t e d l y has some merit. T h e r e may have been a professional tendency to negotiate rather than to direct. But it is easy to imagine the opposite error—a UN version of "Mothercountrying"—igniting anticolonial resistance. T h e diplomats at least understood that they were dealing with a foreign nation in a "transition" rather than a c o n q u e r e d territory u n d e r occupation. Moreover, there appear to have been considerable r e t u r n s to experience: Veterans of previous comprehensive peacekeeping operations capitalized on their experience, as did those who were able to draw u p o n their similar experiences of preUNTAC employment. O t h e r s were "at sea" in the world of complex peacebuilding. 1 1 6

Administration and Coordination Of course, there were also simple administrative problems. Prince Sihanouk was scathing (and typically wild) in his c o n d e m n a t i o n : "When UNTAC arrived it was loved. People looked up to UNTAC as the savior, as Jesus Christ, as the Buddha. But now UNTAC is very unpopular. It is a hideous comedy. I've had enough. UNTAC is a terrible cocktail of races, who do not even u n d e r s t a n d each other, who cannot even agree with each other. There is jealousy within UNTAC. T h e r e is anarchy. Now UNTAC is detested." 1 1 7 UNTAC, like the UN as a whole, often a t t e m p t e d too much, which partly reflected a

64

MICHAEL W .

DOYLE

long-standing commitment to ensuring strictly impartial universality. Some functions p e r f o r m e d by the UN staff, apolitical now in an era o f Security Council unanimity, could have been contracted out to private m a n a g e m e n t teams when the security situation permitted. Food service, mail, and travel arrangements seem to be appropriate candidates in most peacekeeping operations. And, on a wider scale, UNTAC officials have c o m p l a i n e d about a lack of timely guidance from the Secretariat and the Security Council.

DETERMINANTS T h e preceding sources contributed to the success and failure of aspects o f the UNTAC mandate, but they, even considered together, were not decisive. They lead to, rather than resolve, the central questions: Why, overall, was UNTAC a success? Why, conversely, did seemingly essential parts of the original mandate fail? Local Support Given Cambodia's tragic history of war, genocide, and devastation, it is difficult to describe the country as fortunate. But in certain aspects crucial to the success of the peace operation, it was. Prince Sihanouk's behavior was decidedly erratic. He alternated between praising and d e n o u n c i n g Akashi, UNTAC, and the election. He played his son, Prince Ranariddh, against Hun Sen, departed for long stays in Beijing and Pyongyang, and sought and then abandoned the presidency. Nonetheless, he embodied the hopes of Cambodians for a return to a normal life. His last-minute decision to return to Cambodia just in time for the May elections appeared to steel the people's commitment to take the risk to vote. Paradoxically, the fact that S O C controlled the vast bulk o f the country, including the capital, was an asset. S O C ' s support for the peace process (contingent and partial as that was) ensured that minimal conditions of UNTAC access were maintained throughout most of the country. Anarchy such as that plaguing Somalia was avoided. (Imagine if the Khmer Rouge had controlled half of Phnom Penh, as General Aideed controlled half o f Mogadishu.) International Support International support is vital. T h e "Extended P 5 " in Phnom Penh and the Core Group in New York included the five p e r m a n e n t members of the Security Council and leading troop contributors. T h e first

SOURCES OF SUCCESS & FAILURE

65

played a key role in advising Special Representative Akashi in Phnom Penh and the second in supporting UNTAC with additional finance, materiel, and diplomatic clout. UNTAC enjoyed particularly extensive support from a n u m b e r of countries, including Japan, Indonesia, France, Australia, the United States, Thailand, and Malaysia—as well as the patient acquiescence of Vietnam and China in a considerable loss of regional clout. Without their support and the participation of dozens of o t h e r UN members, the Paris Agreements could never have been implemented. But some members of the international community let UNTAC, the UN, and the Cambodians down. Most observers agree that the unofficial support the Khmer Rouge received from various Thai generals on the western b o r d e r u n d e r m i n e d the peace accords by circumventing a key UN aid strategy to e n h a n c e the compliance of the four factions. In July 1992, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon explained the strategy of the aid package in testimony before Congress: "Let me say that the very resources that the international community pledged in Tokyo provide a basis for strengthening, for hopefully, the whole c o u n t r y if it opens up, but as Deputy Secretary Eagleburger said in Tokyo, those resources should go to those factions who cooperate in the settlement plan, just as one form of influence." 1 1 8 However, on the western border, in violation of SNC embargoes, logs, gems, arms, and a m m u n i t i o n flowed freely, filling the Khmer Rouge's coffers and bunkers. 1 1 9 In 1991 and 1992, in the course of the negotiations and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the "cease-fire," the KR acquired control of the forests of the western zones and the gem fields around Pailin. The ensuing trade with Thailand permitted the KR to escape dependence on the PRC and to disdain the carrots of economic aid and ward off the sticks of an embargo that the UN had counted upon to encourage their cooperation with the peace plan. 1 2 0 On the eastern border, a similar but much less extensive trade in logs allegedly occurred, and widespread (though unsubstantiated) rumors floated through P h n o m Penh of continuing ties between the SOC's secret police and the Vietnamese intelligence service. O t h e r powers, such as the United States, occasionally m e d d l e d with inappropriate publicity in the internal politics of Cambodia; in J u n e 1993, for example, US diplomats publicly t h r e a t e n e d the tottering interim government with a loss of US aid if it brought leaders of the Khmer Rouge into an association with the government. 1 - 1 A Multidimensional Mandate UNTAC's overall success can in large part be credited to the multidimensional character of the m a n d a t e . With Security C o u n c i l -

66

MICHAEL W. DOYLE

a p p r o v e d a d j u s t m e n t s in t h e m a n d a t e , r e c o n c i l i a t i o n a n d p e a c e c o u l d have b e e n achieved by d i s a r m a m e n t , c o n t r o l , e d u c a t i o n , a n d r e n e g o t i a t i o n . R e c o n c i l i a t i o n t h r o u g h n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s was available if a n d w h e n t h e o t h e r d i m e n s i o n s failed. Multidimensionality— distributing eggs across baskets—thus k e p t isolated failures f r o m prev e n t i n g overall success. 1 2 2 A C C O U N T I N G FOR VARIANCE

Various p a r t s of the m a n d a t e w e r e m o r e or less successful. Between April 7 a n d May 19, 1993, a f r e e a n d fair election c a m p a i g n was supp o s e d to take place in a d i s a r m e d , d e m o b i l i z e d (70 p e r c e n t ) political e n v i r o n m e n t c o n t r o l l e d a n d m a d e n e u t r a l ( f r e e access) to all. Instead, we saw a p a r t i t i o n e d C a m b o d i a , a r m e d to the teeth, a n d a viol e n t c a m p a i g n of civil t e r r o r w a g e d a m o n g t h e f a c t i o n s a n d against UNTAC (by the K h m e r R o u g e a n d various b a n d i t g a n g s ) . In o r d e r to draw useful lessons f o r o t h e r c o m p l e x p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s , we n e e d to e x p l a i n how s o m e specific p a r t s s u c c e e d e d a n d o t h e r s failed. Why did d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , civil administrative control, h u m a n rights, p u b l i c security, a n d r e h a b i l i t a t i o n by a n d large fail? Why did i n t e r n a t i o n a l n e u t r a l i z a t i o n , repatriation, registration, a n d election succeed? Within the Civil Administration C o m p o n e n t , why were Foreign Affairs a n d F i n a n c e relatively m o r e successful controllers than the o t h e r units? Within H u m a n Rights a n d Civilian Police, why was training m o r e effective a n d "corrective action" ineffective? T h e r e are m a n y causes of t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l success of the c o m p o n e n t s of UNTAC's c o m p l e x m a n d a t e . But the simplest a n d seemingly m o s t p o w e r f u l e x p l a n a t i o n f o c u s e s o n t h e unwillingness of the parties to c o o p e r a t e a n d U N T A C ' s d e c i s i o n n o t to a t t e m p t to e n f o r c e t h e m a n d a t e . Bargaining, a n d h e n c e b o t h will a n d capacity, are crucial aspects of a p e a c e k e e p i n g a g r e e m e n t . A peace treaty is a b i n d i n g legal c o n t r a c t , g r a n t i n g rights, specifying duties, a n d — w h e n it mand a t e s a p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n — e s t a b l i s h i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l capacities. But signing it d o e s n o t e n d t h e political b a r g a i n i n g . A f t e r the parties agree to the c r e a t i o n of a p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n , they cont i n u e to c o m p e t e f o r a d v a n t a g e . T h e a g r e e m e n t b e c o m e s , as d o so many o t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l texts, a n invitation to struggle. Moreover, it adds o n e m o r e p a r t i c i p a n t to the b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p — t h e UN a n d its o p e r a t i o n in the field. T h e UN o p e r a t i o n serves the parties to an a g r e e m e n t b u t inevitably has i n t e r e s t s a n d responsibilities (to New York a n d to itself) that are n o t identical to those of the parties. C o m p l e x p e a c e k e e p i n g soon b e c o m e s c o m p l e x b a r g a i n i n g . 1 2 3

S O U R C E S OF S U C C E S S & F A I L U R E

67

The Non-use of Force UNTAC s e e m e d to have the legal a u t h o r i t y u n d e r t h e Paris Agreem e n t s to e n f o r c e the m a n d a t e over t h e o p p o s i t i o n of o n e or m o r e of t h e factions. ( U n d e r the a g r e e m e n t s , t h e SNC specifically d e l e g a t e d to the UN "all powers necessary to e n s u r e the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of this a g r e e m e n t . " ) A l t h o u g h this provision seemingly e n d o r s e d the use of f o r c e in i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e UNTAC m a n d a t e , b o t h Special R e p r e s e n tative Akashi a n d L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l S a n d e r s o n took a m o r e cautious a p p r o a c h . W h e n in May 1992 t h e K h m e r R o u g e lowered a thin b a m b o o p o l e to p r e v e n t Akashi a n d S a n d e r s o n f r o m crossing a K h m e r Rouge a r e a n e a r Pailin, t h e UNTAC leaders r e f u s e d to call in military f o r c e s to b r e a k t h r o u g h t h e very lightly d e f e n d e d b a r r i e r , d e s p i t e U N T A C ' s clear r i g h t of u n i m p e d e d access t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y . T h e i n a c t i o n by U N T A C d r e w heavy criticism f r o m n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l actors, w h o cited it as a m a j o r failing of Akashi's l e a d e r s h i p . Even within UNTAC the policy of non-use of force drew fire, a c o n s e q u e n c e b e i n g t h e resi g n a t i o n / d i s m i s s a l of F r e n c h G e n . Michel L o r i d o n , S a n d e r s o n ' s deputy. In J a n u a r y 1993, G e r a r d Porcell, chief of UNTAC's own Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m p o n e n t , also saw this as a crucial f a i l u r e of UNTAC will. H e e x p l a i n e d : "We d o n ' t have the will to apply t h e p e a c e accords. This a b s e n c e of f i r m n e s s with the K h m e r R o u g e was a sort of signal f o r t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s w h o saw t h e r e t h e p r o o f of UNTAC's weakness towards t h e g r o u p t h a t f r o m t h e start e s c h e w e d all c o o p e r a t i o n . " 1 2 4 A n d Asia Watch, o n e of UNTAC's m o s t vocifero u s critics, a t t r i b u t e d UNTAC's inability to p r o t e c t h u m a n rights to its excessive d e s i r e to c o n c i l i a t e t h e f a c t i o n s : " S t a n d i n g u p to t h e K h m e r R o u g e , " Asia Watch c l a i m e d , "and t h e P h n o m P e n h governm e n t early o n , in particular, m i g h t have p r e v e n t e d the escalation of violence t h a t c a m e later. A clear d e t e r m i n a t i o n to act firmly, decisively, publicly a n d quickly against abusive officials a n d party cadres m i g h t have acted as a d e t e r r e n t to f u r t h e r killings, d i s a p p e a r a n c e s , a r b i t r a r y arrests, abusive d e t e n t i o n p r a c t i c e s , i n t i m i d a t i o n a n d harassment." 1 2 5 UNTAC's b a r g a i n i n g power did n o t , it a p p e a r s , i n c l u d e t h e military capacity to e n f o r c e the m a n d a t e a n d still m a i n t a i n the security of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s e n c e — b o t h g o v e r n m e n t a l a n d n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l — i n C a m b o d i a . UNTAC c o u l d have p u s h e d t h r o u g h t h e K h m e r R o u g e ' s flimsy lines ( t h o u g h we s h o u l d recall t h e m i g h t y V i e t n a m e s e Army was i n c a p a b l e of d e f e a t i n g the KR a f t e r m o r e t h a n ten years of w a r f a r e ) , b u t it c o u l d n o t p r o t e c t the t h o u s a n d s of civilians, who were vital to the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e UNTAC m a n d a t e ,

68

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

f r o m KR reprisal. 126 Later, in dealings with SOC after the defection of t h e K h m e r Rouge f r o m the p e a c e plan, UNTAC d e p e n d e d too m u c h on the c o o p e r a t i o n of SOC, which r u l e d 80 p e r c e n t of the country, n o t to negotiate with it. UNTAC, it seems, also lacked the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t to enforce the m a n d a t e . N e i t h e r the majority of the P5 n o r t h e UNTAC troop-contributing countries favored a forceful use of the military capacity UNTAC did have. A n u m b e r of the c o u n t r i e s c o n t r i b u t i n g troops to the mission were unwilling to engage in e n f o r c e m e n t , and they let their views be known to Mr. Akashi a n d General Sanderson. Reasons f o r this constraint are, of course, speculative. Some of these c o u n t r i e s simply a g r e e d with Akashi's a n d S a n d e r s o n ' s assessment. O t h e r s were (naturally) r e l u c t a n t to suffer the casualties a m o r e intrusive role would have p r o d u c e d . They may also have p r e f e r r e d a coalition g o v e r n m e n t in C a m b o d i a to o n e c o n s t r u c t e d after a m o r e radical d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . And some of the Southeast Asian states expressed an e a g e r n e s s to a c c o m m o d a t e the K h m e r Rouge that was n o t shared by the o t h e r contributors. Incomplete Reconciliation T h e c o n t i n u i n g strife raises a s e c o n d issue: Why, if the parties were n o t willing to abide by the peace treaty, did they sign it? In part, welli n f o r m e d participants at the Paris negotiations speculate, the parties h a d n o real o p t i o n . T h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p a t r o n s h a d cut t h e m off. Vietnam a n d the PRC, p a t r o n s , respectively, of t h e SOC a n d the K h m e r Rouge, had normalized their relations in 1991, e n d i n g a bitter rivalry that had provoked a war between t h e m in 1978 a n d Vietn a m ' s invasion of C a m b o d i a in 1979. Both c o m m u n i s t states, now "flocking" together, may have felt somewhat isolated and t h r e a t e n e d in the a f t e r m a t h of the Cold War a n d the global " t r i u m p h " of democratic capitalism. Both sought Western contacts and trade as well as m o r e n o r m a l i z e d relations with the world market, which the strife in Cambodia only h i n d e r e d . T h e collapse of the USSR, f u r t h e r m o r e , removed a n o t h e r powerful p a t r o n of the SOC; Russia, with its massive d o m e s t i c challenges, a p p a r e n t l y h a d little interest in sustaining Southeast Asian clients. A n o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n suggests that p e r h a p s the parties did want the Paris A g r e e m e n t s — b u t only to t h e e x t e n t that they were able to exploit it. All were e x h a u s t e d by war, falling a p a r t internally; each may have r e g a r d e d Paris as the final nail in the coffin of their rivals. T h e K h m e r Rouge may have wanted to use the provisions of civil control over the five areas in the Paris A g r e e m e n t s as the m e a n s

S O U R C E S OF SUCCESS & FAILURE

69

to destroy t h e SOC. T h e KR m i g h t have d e m o b i l i z e d ( a n d it did, it a p p e a r s , draw u p d e m o b i l i z a t i o n lists) if it c o u l d have b e e n assured that t h e S O C would have b e e n c o n t r o l l e d f r o m above by a revival of effective q u a d r i p a r t i t e r u l e t h r o u g h an i n v i g o r a t e d SNC a n d f r o m below by UNTAC controllers. 1 ' 2 7 F u n c t i o n i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i o n over almost t h e e n t i r e c o u n t r y was the g r e a t a d v a n t a g e the S O C possessed over the o t h e r factions. O b s e r v e r s a r g u e that t h e K h m e r Rouge probably j u d g e d that n o centralized Leninist b u r e a u c r a c y could sustain itself u n d e r a r e g i m e of effective, even t h o u g h partially e x t e r n a l , control. (Significantly, p e r h a p s , it h a d b e e n the PRC, the K h m e r Rouge's o n e - t i m e p a t r o n , that h a d written these provisions of the Paris Agreements.) T h e SOC, for its part, may have s o u g h t the c a n t o n m e n t a n d d e m o b i l i z a t i o n provisions of t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s as t h e vehicle t h r o u g h which to destroy the K h m e r R o u g e ' s single most vital asset— its d i s c i p l i n e d a r m y of 10,000. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e K h m e r R o u g e was d e t e r m i n e d n o t to d i s a r m b u t h o p e d U N T A C w o u l d s u c c e e d in controlling and thus gutting the SOC's administrative apparatus. T h e S O C was p r e p a r e d to c o o p e r a t e in c a n t o n m e n t a n d d i s a r m a m e n t in h o p e s t h a t a d i s a r m e d K h m e r R o u g e w o u l d dissolve b u t was d e t e r m i n e d to p r e v e n t any e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of its a d m i n i s t r a tive assets. 1 2 8 F U N C I N P E C a n d KPNLF—the two very lightly a r m e d factions at t h e b o r d e r — w a n t e d t h e a c c o r d s , p r i n c i p a l l y in o r d e r to have t h e elections; they h a d n o asset a p a r t f r o m their p o p u l a r i t y with the mass of t h e C a m b o d i a n p o p u l a t i o n . We c a n n o t e l i m i n a t e t h e possibility that t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s r e p r e s e n t e d a t r u e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n a n d an a c c e p t a n c e of p e a c e t h r o u g h pluralist d e m o c r a c y by t h e f o u r factions; however, it is very difficult to f i n d e v i d e n c e in t h e i r previous or later actions to s u p p o r t this c o n c l u s i o n . 1 2 9 I n c o m p l e t e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , t o g e t h e r with t h e w i d e s p r e a d d e a r t h of i n f o r m a t i o n on the f o u r factions a n d the incentives of e a c h of the f a c t i o n s to h i d e it, led to t h e a d o p t i o n of an u n r e a l i s t i c strategy in C a m b o d i a . UNTAC a s s u m e d excessive g o o d faith a n d substantial reco n c i l i a t i o n (that, a f t e r all, was what t h e p a r t i e s h a d "signed" in the Paris A g r e e m e n t s ) . In particular, they a s s u m e d that what was lacking was c o o r d i n a t i o n . With effective c o o r d i n a t i o n , UNTAC would mobilize the resources of all the parties in o r d e r to achieve the c o m m o n p u r p o s e of peace. 1 3 0 H e n c e t h e institutional m e c h a n i s m of t h e SNC a n d t h e l i m i t e d c o n c e p t i o n of " c o n t r o l , " w h i c h w o u l d have w o r k e d if all t h a t was called f o r was t r a n s p a r e n c y . T h e s e two m e c h a n i s m s w e r e n e s t e d in t h e $800 million r e h a b i l i t a t i o n p l a n , a r e w a r d f o r C a m b o d i a n c o o p e r a t i o n , d e s i g n e d to r e i n f o r c e the i n c e n t i v e s of t h e f a c t i o n s to c o o p e r a t e . Ironically, n o s u c h incentives c o u l d b e

70

M I C H A E L W . DOYI.E

m a d e available. D o n o r s a n d UNTAC itself would n o t d i s t r i b u t e the rehabilitation aid for fear that it would violate UNTAC's impartiality. This strategy failed: T h e p a r t i e s were n o t r e c o n c i l e d to p e a c e (and UNTAC fell short of efficient i m p l e m e n t a t i o n — l a t e n e s s , etc.). Instead, UNTAC w o u n d u p relying on a second strategy also e m b e d ded in the Paris A g r e e m e n t s — d i r e c t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . Direct Implementation How t h e n d o we a c c o u n t f o r the successes? T h e p r o g r a m s that succ e e d e d enjoyed at least the passive s u p p o r t of the factions; the parlies were n o t p r e p a r e d to organize an active opposition to these operations. But, m o r e strikingly, they all had o n e a d d i t i o n a l crucial c h a r a c t e r i s t i c in c o m m o n — t h e y were actions taken by or directly organized by UNTAC that did not require the positive cooperation of the four factions to

be effective. T h e U N H C R c o n d u c t e d repatriation with the assistance of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e of the Red Cross, the C a m b o d i a n Red Cross, and various i n d e p e n d e n t n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations. T h e H u m a n Rights and I n f o r m a t i o n c o m p o n e n t s c o n d u c t e d h u m a n rights education with the h e l p of i n t e r n a t i o n a l and local n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations. And, most i m p o r t a n t , UNTAC's Electoral C o m p o n e n t registered C a m b o d i a ' s voters (with the help of the military), r e c r u i t e d a n d t r a i n e d a 48,000-person C a m b o d i a n electoral staff of poll workers, established 1,400 polling sites, a n d c o n d u c t e d the poll (again with the crucial help of UNTAC's military forces) between May 23 and May 28. UNTAC's g u a r a n t e e of a secret ballot rescued the peace process in C a m b o d i a . W i t h o u t UNTAC's direct c o n d u c t of the election, it probably would have had to declare d e f e a t and retreat from Cambodia. T h e K h m e r Rouge prevented the c o n d u c t of the election in the villages it controlled. T h e SOC was p r e p a r e d to tolerate an election, expecting to win f r o m it i n t e r n a t i o n a l legitimacy. But, recalling the SOC's r e c o r d of violent i n t i m i d a t i o n , what sort of election would have b e e n c o n d u c t e d if the UN had acted merely as a m o n i t o r i n g force? T h e UN would have h a d to withdraw f r o m C a m b o d i a altogether, citing SOC's intimidation d u r i n g the campaign, or to tolerate the additional m a n i p u l a t i o n that likely would have o c c u r r e d had the SOC actually c o n d u c t e d the poll. T h e r e are some e x c e p t i o n s . W h e r e UNTAC had the b a r g a i n i n g chips firmly in its own hands, there, too, it could impose its will when it came into conflict with the parties. UNTAC c o n t r o l l e d c u r r e n c y because it could control access to the technically crucial prerequisite, international printing. Civil Administration, for example, a p p e a r s to

SOURCES OF SUCCESS & FAILURE

71

have successfully g a i n e d c o n t r o l over visas a n d passports ( F o r e i g n Affairs's a r e a ) largely b e c a u s e p a s s p o r t s gain t h e i r utility t h r o u g h int e r n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t a l r e c o g n i t i o n . T h e U N , as t h e universal int e r g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , c o u l d rely on its m e m b e r s to e n f o r c e its d e c r e e against any C a m b o d i a n faction that defied its will. So the S O C a c c e p t e d the S N C - e n d o r s e d passport to avoid having all its passp o r t s d e c e r t i f i e d . U N T A C did n o t have e q u i v a l e n t s u c c e s s in c o n trolling C a m b o d i a ' s b o r d e r s o r its b o r d e r t r a d e for the simple reasons that these f u n c t i o n s were i m p o r t a n t to t h e factions a n d s o m e o f Cambodia's international neighbors obtained great advantages t h r o u g h their complicity with s m u g g l i n g . 1 3 1

6 T H E AFTERMATH IN CAMBODIA

Election results shifted the balance of bargaining chips between the factions, empowering the princely party, FUNCINPEC, but it was the overall military-political balance that would d e t e r m i n e the new authority in Cambodia, not the results of the May 1993 election poll. FUNCINPEC won fifty-eight seats (45.5 percent of the vote), the CPP fifty-one (38.2 percent), and two small parties, the BLDP (associated with the KPNLF) and Molinaka won ten and one, respectively. More significant than the CPP's votes, however, was that H u n Sen's State of Cambodia retained its control of the sub-cabinet-level bureaucracy and influence in the Royal Army (the f o r m e r SOC forces were its core strength, the only barrier to the Khmer Rouge). Also, SOC owned the existing police force (itself organized in paramilitary fashion). The Khmer Rouge planned to hold out for a negotiated seat on a f u t u r e Cambodian coalition. 1 3 Therefore, the J u n e negotiations regarding an interim coalition a r r a n g e m e n t were as significant as the elections themselves. T h e decision to share the prime ministership between FUNCINPEC (Prince Ranariddh) and CPP (Hun Sen) and divide the ministries, with Prince Sihanouk (now King Sihanouk) taking charge as head of state, well reflected Cambodian realities. 1 3 3 In no small part the a r r a n g e m e n t was m e a n t to lessen the threat the SOC posed to the stability of the regime, a threat driven h o m e by the brief secession in the first week of J u n e of the eastern provinces u n d e r the leadership of Sihanouk's son, SOC radical Prince C h a k r a p o n g . Equally practical was the particular logic of giving finance and foreign affairs to FUNCINPEC, because FUNCINPEC was more acceptable to international donors, who would be relied u p o n to make the coalition coalesce with desperately needed aid. As the government pursued its policy of interdiction against the Khmer Rouge in summer 1994, the western border of Cambodia was 72

T H E A F T E R M A T H IN C A M B O D I A

73

again the scene of violent battles between the KR and the Royal Army, and r e f u g e e s were fleeing toward safety. Significantly, the political strength of the CPP (controlling owner of the police) was rising, as were tensions between the soldiers formerly in S O C and the soldiers formerly in F U N C I N P E C , erstwhile allies of the K h m e r R o u g e . 1 3 4 These tensions came to a head with the reported attempted c o u p of July 2, 1994. Apparently organized by hard-line CPP g r o u p s centered around Prince C h a k r a p o n g a n d f o r m e r security minister Sin S o n g , the c o u p attempt revealed the weakness of the state. But, together with the National Assembly's decision to at last outlaw the K h m e r Rouge, the c o u p attempt also solidified the alliance between moderates within the CPP (Hun Sen) and F U N C I N P E C ( R a n a r i d d h ) . 1 ^ T h e Khmer R o u g e openly acknowledged its strategy of victory: to hold on to its zones in the j u n g l e and wait for g o v e r n m e n t corruption and neglect to turn the small f a r m e r s and u r b a n intellectuals back in its direction. Given the weakness of the Royal Army, the gove r n m e n t n e e d s to a d o p t a c o m p l e m e n t a r y strategy: to contain the KR in its j u n g l e zone while developing the countryside, introducing irrigation, health care, and public order, relying on the attractions of rural d e v e l o p m e n t to draw d e f e c t o r s from the KR zones. But so far the government has been playing into the KR's hands. It has bungled its counterinsurgency c a m p a i g n , neglected the countryside, and tolerated increasing corruption and waste. T h e p o s t g a m e in C a m b o d i a , therefore, can still u n d e r m i n e the gains m a d e by the U N in the o p e n i n g of the political system. T h e UN's failure to solidify the rule of law by controlling the factions and demobilizing their armies may c o m e back to haunt its electoral success. T h e new C a m b o d i a n state lacks a truly national army, police force, and bureaucracy. Continuing factionalism prevented progress on desperately n e e d e d e c o n o m i c rehabilitation and demining. U N T A C well illustrates the a m b i g u o u s character of what we mean by success and failure. Civil administrative control and military cantonment—two major aspects of the mandate—were not achieved. T h e r e were also clear instances of waste. Apart from c o m m i t t i n g petty waste (e.g., vehicles e m p l o y e d for private p u r p o s e s ) , s o m e of the c o m p o n e n t s were so ineffective as to raise questions of whether their presence made a d i f f e r e n c e in the operation. U N T A C cost $1.5 billion, excluding repatriation and rehabilitation costs, according to the official UN b u d g e t . Many observers suggest that the real costs were higher. Clearly, with hindsight, U N T A C could have been managed more efficiently Nonetheless, the essential question is whether the results were worth the cost and whether they could have b e e n achieved without

74

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

the UN o p e r a t i o n . S o m e have argued that " m o n a r c h y " could have b e e n restored in Cambodia in 1989 at no financial cost. It is indeed possible that S i h a n o u k might have b e e n persuaded to b e c o m e the figurehead of a S O C regime. But the K h m e r Rouge would have b e e n outside the peace. Because this result would have b e e n unacceptable to China, the KR guerrillas would have c o n t i n u e d to enjoy the PRC's overt support in their b o r d e r insurgency. More significant, all o f the UN's o t h e r a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s , which r e q u i r e d Security C o u n c i l approval ( i n c l u d i n g , t h e r e f o r e , the approval of C h i n a ) , would have b e e n lost. In the international dimension, we see interstate p e a c e in Southeast Asia; the c o n s e q u e n t normalization o f C a m b o d i a ' s , V i e t n a m ' s , Laos's, and C h i n a ' s relations with their n e i g h b o r s ; and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l marginalization o f the K h m e r Rouge. Domestically, we see a relatively free and fair election; a coalition g o v e r n m e n t j o i n i n g the two p r e d o m i n a n t factions o f Cambodian politics; the o p e n i n g up o f "political space" in which civil society can grow; the birth o f what is arguably now the freest press in S o u t h e a s t Asia; and the b e g i n n i n g o f e c o n o m i c rehabilitation drawing on the more than $ 8 0 0 million pledged by the international community as part o f the peace process. All these are significant accomplishments directly attributable to the UN peace operation. T h e K h m e r Rouge continues to threaten Cambodian stability, but now it threatens, not a single faction but the recognized sovereign governm e n t of Cambodia. T h e UN may have b o u g h t more in o t h e r UN operations, but in the t r o u b l e s o m e cases o f Somalia and Bosnia m o r e has produced much less. All these gains are c o n t i n g e n t , o f course, but some have b e e n codified in the new Constitution for the Kingdom o f Cambodia, written during the summer o f 1993. T h e constitution specifies that "the K i n g d o m o f C a m b o d i a shall adopt a multi-party free d e m o c r a t i c r e g i m e . " 1 3 6 A series o f institutions g u a r a n t e e this " d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s . " T h e s e include: the National Assembly, elected by proportional representation with a direct and secret ballot; an i n d e p e n d e n t judiciary; a limited monarchy, in which the king reigns but does not r u l e ; 1 3 7 and an extensive series o f civil rights, including personal f r e e d o m s and rights to property and free expression. C a m b o d i a n s have (in the s u m m e r o f 1 9 9 4 ) the b e g i n n i n g s o f a constitutional democracy. Can they develop it?

7 LESSONS

T h e United Nations and the international community desperately n e e d to l e a r n f r o m t h e e x p e r i e n c e of c o m p r e h e n s i v e p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s . Lives a n d f i n a n c e s are at stake. In early 1993, t h e intern a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y was in d a n g e r of f o r g e t t i n g all U N T A C ' s successes in t h e g l o o m t h a t s u r r o u n d e d the m o u n t i n g violence in t h a t t r o u b l e d c o u n t r y . Now the d a n g e r is d i f f e r e n t , b u t n o less pressing. T h e e u p h o r i a flowing f r o m the successful e l e c t i o n may e n c o u r a g e us to dismiss all UNTAC's p r o b l e m s . B e f o r e , t h e m a n y critics failed to ask a basic q u e s t i o n — w h a t w o u l d C a m b o d i a have b e e n like w i t h o u t UNTAC? T h e civil war w o u l d still have prevailed; C a m b o d i a n s w o u l d have s u f f e r e d . T h e Paris P e a c e A g r e e m e n t s were n o t b o r n in a v a c u u m ; they w e r e t h e last h o p e for C a m b o d i a a f t e r every o t h e r m e t h o d to get the factions t o g e t h e r failed. T h o s e w h o wanted to send U N p e a c e k e e p e r s to "def e a t " t h e K h m e r R o u g e s h o u l d have asked w h e t h e r they w e r e prep a r e d to see their soldiers die in C a m b o d i a against a force that h a d survived ten years of o n s l a u g h t by t h e m i g h t y V i e t n a m e s e army. As f o r d i p l o m a t i c pressure on the K h m e r R o u g e ' s f r i e n d s — w h o h a d less i n f l u e n c e o n c e they n o l o n g e r s e n t it a r m s — w h a t c o u n t r y w o u l d have p u t C a m b o d i a above t r a d e or h u m a n rights o n the a g e n d a with C h i n a or w o u l d have p l a c e d t h e fragile d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t in T h a i l a n d at o d d s with its p o w e r f u l military? Now the c e l e b r a t o r s of the successful e l e c t i o n risk are f o r g e t t i n g t h e lessons to be l e a r n e d f r o m U N T A C ' s m a n y p r o b l e m s . T h e U N , like any large o r g a n i z a t i o n , h a r b o r s an allergy to critical h i n d s i g h t . In N a m i b i a in 1989, a late d e p l o y m e n t nearly d e r a i l e d t h e p e a c e process on April 1, w h e n the South West African P e o p l e ' s Organization (SWAPO) units crossed the A n g o l a n b o r d e r a n d m o r e t h a n 350 were killed; yet i n s t i t u t i o n a l e u p h o r i a following e l e c t i o n s that

75

76

MICHAEL W. DOYLE

November marginalized the event, as well as the fragility of the operation and the luck and political will that u n d e r w r o t e the process. In Cambodia, as we have seen, large c o m p o n e n t s of the original m a n d a t e fell by the wayside before the UN finally managed to emerge with a credible election.

GENERATIONS OF PEACE OPERATIONS

T h e lessons of every p e a c e k e e p i n g operation are different, simply because the countries are different, but some are m o r e d i f f e r e n t than others. T h r e e broad categories of operations encompass contemporary peace operations. In traditional peacekeeping, sometimes called "first-generation peacekeeping," u n a r m e d or lightly a r m e d UN forces are stationed between hostile parties to m o n i t o r a truce, troop withdrawal, a n d / o r buffer zone while political negotiations go forward. 1 3 8 They provide transparency—an impartial assurance that the other party is not violating the truce. T h e threat of exposure, the potential resistance of the peacekeeping force, and the legitimacy of UN mandates raise the costs of defecting f r o m and the benefits of abiding by the agreement. 1 3 9 Where the p e a c e k e e p e r s are in "preventive d e p l o y m e n t " (i.e., deployed with the intention of deterring a possible attack), as in Macedonia today, the d e t e r r i n g force must be credible to ensure that potential aggressors can achieve no easy victory. 140 In the event of an a r m e d challenge, the result will be an international war with costs so grave as to outweigh the temptations of conquest. T h e new "peace enforcing" missions constitute another category, o n e called "third-generation peacekeeping" by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. (I come to "second-generation" later.) They include low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance, enforce cease-fires, and, when necessary, assist in the rebuilding of so-called failed states. Like Chapter VII UN enf o r c e m e n t actions to roll back aggression, as in Korea in 1950 and against Iraq in the Gulf War, they are characterized by a state's lack of consent to some or all of the UN mandate. 1 4 1 Militarily they seek to deter, dissuade, and deny. 14 - By using collective force to preclude an o u t c o m e based on the use of force by the parties, the UN persuades the parties to settle the conflict by negotiation. This terrain is murky. The objective of forcing a peace requires achieving a complicated p r e p o n d e r a n c e in which the forces (UN and local) supporting a settlement acceptable to the international community hold both a military predominance and a predominance of popular support,

which t o g e t h e r p e r m i t t h e m to i m p o s e a p e a c e o n t h e r e c a l c i t r a n t military forces a n d t h e i r p o p u l a r s u p p o r t e r s . In m a j o r o p e r a t i o n s , such as those in Somalia or Bosnia, aspects of which r e q u i r e e n f o r c e m e n t u n d e r C h a p t e r VII of t h e UN C h a r ter, 1 4 3 t h e c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n s b e c o m e w h e n a n d w h e r e to i n t e r v e n e . Freed f r o m t h e ideology of t h e Cold War, n a t i o n s ' willingness to int e r v e n e collectively i n c r e a s e d f o r a time. A new r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e universality of h u m a n values c r e a t e d a global sense of duty (albeit weak a n d i n c h o a t e ) to a d d r e s s h u m a n i t a r i a n e m e r g e n c i e s w h e r e v e r they occur. A n o t h e r sense ( p r o b a b l y e x a g g e r a t e d ) t h a t d o m e s t i c crises will spill over n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s t h r o u g h , f o r e x a m p l e , flows of r e f u g e e s m a d e t h e world a p p e a r m o r e i n t e r d e p e n d e n t . A n d a newf o u n d sense of vigorous capacity in i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions ( f r e e d f r o m t h e g r i d l o c k of t h e C o l d War) m a d e it a p p e a r that t h e global capacity to i n t e r v e n e c o u l d m e e t the new d e m a n d s f o r the rescue of "failed states." 1 4 4 But t h e s e new c o m m i t m e n t s c a m e to grief in t h e streets of M o g a d i s h u a n d the not-so-safe havens of Bosnia. T h e J u n e 1993 crisis in M o g a d i s h u , in which the UN O p e r a t i o n in Somalia ( U N O S O M ) d e m o l i s h e d the h e a d q u a r t e r s of G e n e r a l Aideed, killing in the p r o c e s s a large n u m b e r of clan elders, t u r n e d A i d e e d ' s backers against t h e UN mission a n d severely c o m p r o m i s e d t h e political neutrality t h a t has l o n g b e e n the h a l l m a r k of UN peacek e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s . Success in these o p e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e s dividing enemies, discovering f r i e n d s , a n d e n s u r i n g that local r e s o u r c e s can be effectively m o b i l i z e d to c o n s t r a i n e n e m i e s a n d establish law a n d o r d e r . In M o g a d i s h u , U N O S O M a l m o s t s e e m e d to b e p u r s u i n g a n o p p o s i t e set of strategies. T h e o p e r a t i o n also, with equally d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t s , e x p o s e d a serious weakness in c o m m a n d a n d control. In t h e J u n e 1993 b r e a c h between the Italian a n d o t h e r units of the U N O S O M f o r c e , c h a r g e s of d e s e r t i o n a n d betrayal m a d e against the Italian b a t t a l i o n e c h o e d c h a r g e s t h a t t h e US l e a d e r s h i p of U N O S O M u s e d excessive f o r c e . But it was the chaotic lack of c o o r d i n a t i o n between the U n i t e d States a n d U N O S O M in t h e O c t o b e r 1993 disaster, in which e i g h t e e n US soldiers a n d h u n d r e d s of Somalis lost their lives, that led to the eventual US withdrawal in March 1994 a n d b a n k r u p t e d t h e UN c o m m i t m e n t to n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g in Somalia. An a l m o s t o p p o s i t e d i l e m m a e m e r g e d in t h e C h a p t e r VII, enf o r c e m e n t - b a s e d UN P r o t e c t i o n Force ( U N P R O F O R ) in t h e f o r m e r Yugoslavia. T h e failure to provide p r o t e c t i o n to the Bosnian Muslims, the relief convoys, a n d even t h e p e a c e k e e p e r s themselves left the UN force in a most equivocal position. (The press charges of "chocolate soldiering," as the UN forces supposedly melted in the face of o p p o s i t i o n ,

78

M I C H A E L W . DOYLE

were p a r t i c u l a r l y p a i n f u l . ) But t h e p r o t e c t i o n d i l e m m a t h e r e was ( a n d , as of s u m m e r 1994, still is) real. With almost half t h e p o p u l a tion u n d e r U N P R O F O R directly d e p e n d e n t o n UN convoys for vital supplies of f o o d a n d m e d i c i n e , military action against t h e p r e d o m i nantly S e r b aggressors would be m e t by a c o m p l e t e cutoff of h u m a n itarian assistance by those s a m e S e r b i a n forces, which c o n t r o l the vital access r o u t e s . And n o n e of U N P R O F O R ' s military f o r c e s w e r e p r e p a r e d to u n d e r t a k e a massive military c a m p a i g n . T h e U n i t e d States limited its c o n t r i b u t i o n to N A T O air s u p p o r t . T h e o f f e r of radical Muslim forces f r o m Iran a n d t h e P L O was r e j e c t e d by Russia a n d would, it seems to m a n y observers, merely have w i d e n e d t h e f i g h t i n g to Kosovo, M a c e d o n i a , a n d even b e y o n d . An effective h u m a n i t a r i a n relief o p e r a t i o n must win the s u p p o r t of the p o p u l a c e (especially if the o r g a n i z e d political factions are unwilling to c o o p e r a t e ) . Civic action, d i r e c t involvement in h u m a n i t a r ian relief, is t h u s m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n d o m i n a t i n g the strategic terr a i n . A UN o p e r a t i o n , if given s u f f i c i e n t r e s o u r c e s , can e n f o r c e c o m p l i a n c e o n w a r l o r d s a n d t h e i r g a n g s t e r s ; it c a n n o t a n d s h o u l d n o t e n f o r c e against the s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g will of t h e p e o p l e . Even if it succeeds in w i n n i n g p o p u l a r s u p p o r t , can—will—the UN invest the a m o u n t of time it takes to n u r t u r e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ? In o n c e failed states, these roots seem to take at least a g e n e r a t i o n or so of indigen o u s o r d e r a n d political success b e f o r e they take h o l d . Moreover, they o f t e n arise in r e a c t i o n against f o r e i g n , i m p e r i a l law a n d order. Can even t h e most well-meaning o u t s i d e body, the UN, h e l p e n g e n d e r a u t h e n t i c n a t i o n a l solidarity, bypassing t h e usual b i r t h p a i n s of nations? As Bosnia a n d Somalia d e m o n s t r a t e d , states are rarely willing to invest t h e i r r e s o u r c e s or t h e lives of t h e i r soldiers in c o m b a t o t h e r t h a n f o r a vital interest (such as oil in the Gulf War). 1 4 5 But if states have a vital n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t in a d i s p u t e , can they b e fit participants in a UN p e a c e b u i l d i n g o p e r a t i o n ? T h e s e u n a n s w e r e d questions h a u n t the crises in Somalia a n d Bosnia. Old lessons, painfully l e a r n e d , f r o m the early days of UN peacek e e p i n g s e e m newly relevant. N e i t h e r the UN n o r any o t h e r outside body is in a g o o d p o s i t i o n to coercively r e c o n s t r u c t t h e legitimacy a n d effectiveness of states that have failed. Failed polities have o f t e n b e e n t h e victims of i m p e r i a l c o n q u e s t . 1 4 6 U n l i k e i m p e r i a l r u l e , UN p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s have as their goal reconciliation a n d , where possible, rapid s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . But s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n must have i n d i g e n o u s roots if it is to be truly s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g . T h u s , r a t h e r t h a n resolving h a r d choices, UN i n t e r v e n t i o n s multiply t h e m . W h i c h of t h e m a n y political a n d h u m a n i t a r i a n disasters now s u f f e r i n g in the wings of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n s h o u l d actually

b e c o m e the object of UN correction? Which, on the other h a n d , should be left to be sorted out—roughly and n o t so readily—on a national basis. And how m u c h force should be used when the UN does intervene? T h e last category, " s e c o n d - g e n e r a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s , " is o n e in which t h e UN seeks o u t a c o n s e n s u a l basis f o r a r e s t o r a t i o n of law a n d o r d e r in d o m e s t i c crises a n d tries to i m p l e m e n t its g l o b a l h u m a n i t a r i a n a g e n d a in a way t h a t p r o d u c e s less friction a n d m o r e supp o r t . T h e y a r e a substantial step b e y o n d f i r s t - g e n e r a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s a n d a significant step s h o r t of third g e n e r a t i o n "peace e n f o r c e m e n t . " S e c o n d - g e n e r a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s are b a s e d o n t h e c o n s e n t of t h e parties. But the n a t u r e of a n d p u r p o s e s for which c o n s e n t is g r a n t e d are qualitatively d i f f e r e n t f r o m those of t r a d i t i o n a l p e a c e k e e p i n g . In t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s , t h e UN is typically involved in m o n i t o r i n g p e a c e a g r e e m e n t s that g o to t h e roots of the conflict. As S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l Boutros-Ghali o b s e r v e d in An Agenda for Peace, " p e a c e - m a k i n g a n d p e a c e - k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s , to be truly successful, m u s t c o m e to inc l u d e c o m p r e h e n s i v e efforts to identify a n d s u p p o r t s t r u c t u r e s which will t e n d to c o n s o l i d a t e p e a c e . . . . [ T ] h e s e may i n c l u d e d i s a r m i n g the previously w a r r i n g p a r t i e s a n d the r e s t o r a t i o n of o r d e r , the custody a n d possible d e s t r u c t i o n of w e a p o n s , r e p a t r i a t i n g r e f u g e e s , advisory a n d t r a i n i n g s u p p o r t f o r security p e r s o n n e l , m o n i t o r i n g elections, a d v a n c i n g e f f o r t s to p r o t e c t h u m a n rights, r e f o r m i n g or s t r e n g t h e n i n g g o v e r n m e n t a l institutions a n d p r o m o t i n g f o r m a l a n d i n f o r m a l processes of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n . " UNTAC was b a s e d o n the c o n s e n t of the parties, as e x p r e s s e d in t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s , b u t it moved b e y o n d m o n i t o r i n g t h e actions of the parties to t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a transitional a u t h o r i t y t h a t actually i m p l e m e n t e d directly crucial c o m p o n e n t s of the m a n d a t e . Moreover, its scale was vastly l a r g e r t h a n t h e m o n i t o r i n g o p e r a t i o n s a n d n e a r the size of the e n f o r c e m e n t o p e r a t i o n s ( U N O S O M a n d U N P R O F O R ) . Moreover, for a variety of reasons, it f o u n d itself operating without the c o n t i n u o u s (in t h e case of the K h m e r R o u g e ) or c o m p l e t e (in the case of the o t h e r parties) c o o p e r a t i o n of the factions. T h e UN has a c o m m e n d a b l e r e c o r d of success in m u l t i d i m e n sional p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s as diverse as t h o s e in N a m i b i a ( U N T A G ) , El Salvador ( O N U S A L ) , a n d C a m b o d i a ( U N T A C ) . T h e U N ' s role in h e l p i n g settle t h o s e conflicts has b e e n t h r e e f o l d . It served as a peacemaker facilitating a p e a c e treaty a m o n g the parties; as a peacekeeper m o n i t o r i n g the c a n t o n m e n t a n d d e m o b i l i z a t i o n of military forces, r e s e t t l i n g r e f u g e e s , a n d s u p e r v i s i n g t r a n s i t i o n a l civilian authorities; a n d as a peacebuilder m o n i t o r i n g a n d in some cases organizing t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n rights, n a t i o n a l d e m o c r a t i c elections, a n d e c o n o m i c r e h a b i l i t a t i o n .

80

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

T h o u g h n o n e n f o r c i n g and consent-based, these operations are far from harmonious. Consent is not a simple "bright line" demarcating the safe and acceptable from the dangerous and illegitimate. Each function will require an e n h a n c e d form of consent if the UN is to help make a peace in the contentious environment of civil strife. We need, therefore, to design new peace operations if the UN, in the face of likely resistance, is to avoid having to choose between either force or withdrawal.

STRATEGIES OF ENHANCED CONSENT Peacemaking Achieving the peace treaty itself will often require heavy persuasion by outside actors. In Cambodia, the USSR and China are said to have let their respective clients, the SOC and the Khmer Rouge, know that ongoing levels of financial and military support would not be forthcoming if they resisted the terms of a peace treaty the patrons found acceptable. Peace treaties may themselves depend on prior sanctions, threats of sanctions, or loss of aid imposed by the international community. 1 4 7 T h e construction o f an agreed peace, however, is m o r e than worth the effort. T h e process of negotiation among the contending factions can discover the acceptable parameters o f a peace that are particular to the conflict. An agreed peace treaty, moreover, can mobilize the support o f the factions and of the international community in support o f i m p l e m e n t i n g the peace, and it can establish new institutions designed to further peacekeeping and peacebuilding. T h e UN has developed a set o f crucially important innovations to help manage the building o f peace on a consensual basis. First among them is the diplomatic device that has come to be called the "Friends o f the Secretary-General." It creates multinational leverage to back up UN diplomatic efforts to help make and manage peace. Composed of ad hoc, informal diplomatic mechanisms that j o i n states in support of initiatives of the Secretary-General, it legitimates with the stamp o f UN approval and supervision the pressures interested states can exert to further peace and the purposes of the UN. T h e Core Group and Extended P5, for Cambodia played a Friends role in the negotiation and management o f the peace. Composed o f the Security Council P e r m a n e n t Five—the United States, France, USSR, China, and the UK—plus Australia, Indonesia, J a p a n , and other c o n c e r n e d states, it took the lead in constructing the Paris Agreements. It provided key support to UNTAC, both political and

financial, helping organize ICORC aid (almost $1 billion) and providing special funds for various projects. But the Extended P5 lacked a fixed composition. It always included the P5 but included or excluded others on an ad hoc basis, d e p e n d i n g on the issue and topic covered and the message the group wished to send. For example, the g r o u p excluded Thailand f r o m certain meetings in o r d e r to signal concern about its lack of support for the restrictions imposed on the Khmer Rouge. In Cambodia, moreover, t h e r e was not a sovereign g o v e r n m e n t to m o n i t o r or support. Much of the Extended P5's diplomacy was therefore directed at UNTAC itself, protecting, for example, the interests of national battalions. It also served as a back channel through which Special Representative Akashi could communicate directly with the Security Council. 1 4 8 In El Salvador, the four Friends of the Secretary-General were Venezuela, Mexico, Spain, and Colombia. Frequently joined by a fifth Friend—the United States—they together played a crucial role in negotiating and i m p l e m e n t i n g the peace accords. 1 4 9 So, too, did the Core G r o u p in Mozambique. In the f o r m e r Yugoslavia, hopes now center on the "Contact Group," including Russia, the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Informal diplomatic s u p p o r t groups have also been active in Namibia, Nicaragua, Georgia, Afghanistan, and Guatemala. Playing a crucial role in the Secretary-General's peacemaking and preventive diplomacy functions, these groupings serve four key functions. First, the limited influence of the Secretary-General can be leveraged, multiplied, and c o m p l e m e n t e d by the "Friends." T h e UN's scarce attention and even scarcer resources can be supplem e n t e d by the diplomacy and clout of powerful, interested actors. T h e second value is legitimization. T h e very act of constituting themselves as a group, with the formal support of the Secretary-General, lends interested states the wider i n t e r n a t i o n a l approval they might not otherwise have had. It allows for constructive diplomacy, whereas accusations of special and particular national interest could taint bilateral efforts. T h e third value is coordination. T h e Friends mechanism provides transparency a m o n g the interested external parties, ensuring that all are working for the same purposes and allowing them to pursue a division of labor that enhances their j o i n t effort. It prevents diplomats f r o m working at cross-purposes; they regularly meet and inform each o t h e r of their activities and e n c o u r a g e each other to undertake special tasks. Fourth, the Friends mechanism provides a politically balanced approach to the resolution of civil wars t h r o u g h negotiation. It often turns out that one particular Friend can associate with one faction just as another associates with a second.

82

MICHAEI. W .

DOYI.E

In the C a m b o d i a n p e a c e process, China backstopped the K h m e r R o u g e , j u s t as F r a n c e did P r i n c e S i h a n o u k and V i e t n a m and the U S S R did the State o f C a m b o d i a . T h e Friends o p e n m o r e flexible c h a n n e l s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n than a single UN m e d i a t o r can. T h e y also advise and guide the UN i n t e r m e d i a r i e s , although the process tends to work best when they support rather than move out in front o f the UN.

Multidimensional Peacekeeping Even consent-based p e a c e a g r e e m e n t s fall apart. In the circumstances faced by "failed states" (often including partisan v i o l e n c e ) , agreements tend to be fluid. In the new civil conflicts, parties c a n n o t force policy on their followers and often lack the capacity or will to maintain a difficult process o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n leading to establishm e n t o f national sovereignty. 1 5 0 Peace treaties and their p e a c e k e e p i n g mandates thus tend to be affected by two sets o f c o n t r a d i c t o r y tensions. First, in o r d e r to get an a g r e e m e n t , diplomats assume all parties are acting in good faith; they c a n n o t question the intentions o f their diplomatic partners. But to implement a peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation, planners must assume the opposite—that the parties will not or c a n n o t fulfill the a g r e e m e n t m a d e . Moreover, diplomats, who design the p e a c e treaty, tend to think in legal (authority, p r e c e d e n t ) and not strategic (power, incentives) categories. Treaties thus describe obligations; they tend to be unclear about incentives and capacities. All these factors militate against clear and i m p l e m e n t a b l e mandates. Diplomats seek to incorporate in the treaty the most definitive peace to which the parties will agree. UN officials seek to clarify the UN's obligations. Knowing that much o f what was a g r e e d to in the peace treaty will not be i m p l e m e n t a b l e in the field, the officials who write the Secretary-General's r e p o r t (which outlines the implementation o f the a g r e e m e n t ) c o n t r a c t or expand the peace operation. 1 5 1 Confused mandates are an inevitable result o f this tension. A second tension also shapes the peacekeeping mandate. A mandate, like a natural-resource c o n t r a c t , is an obsolescing bargain. When a country begins a negotiation with an oil company for the exploration o f its territory, the company holds all the advantages. T h e costs of exploration are large, the possibility o f finding oil uncertain. T h e c o u n t r y must t h e r e f o r e c e d e g e n e r o u s terms. As soon as oil is discovered, the bargain shifts, as discovered oil is easy to pump and any oil c o m p a n y can do it. T h e old bargain has suddenly obsolesced. 1 5 2 So it goes with a UN p e a c e k e e p i n g operation. T h e spirit of

LESSONS

83

a g r e e m e n t is never m o r e exalted t h a n at the m o m e n t of the signing of t h e p e a c e treaty; t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s is n e v e r again g r e a t e r . At t h a t m o m e n t , t h e p a r t i e s assume t h a t t h e a g r e e m e n t will be a c h i e v e d a n d t h a t all are c o o p e r a t i n g in g o o d f a i t h . T h e y d e p e n d u p o n the UN to achieve t h e i r various h o p e s . T h e UN as yet has n o i n v e s t m e n t in r e s o u r c e s or political prestige; in s h o r t , it h o l d s all the cards. But as soon as the UN begins its i n v e s t m e n t of money, p e r s o n n e l , a n d prestige, t h e n the b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p alters in b a l a n c e . T h e l a r g e r t h e U N i n v e s t m e n t — t h e s e m u l t i d i m e n sional o p e r a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t m u l t i b i l l i o n d o l l a r e x p e n d i t u r e s — t h e g r e a t e r the U N ' s own i n t e r e s t in success a n d the g r e a t e r t h e influe n c e of the parties. Because t h e parties essentially d e t e r m i n e the success of the m a n d a t e , t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g power rapidly rises. In the late s p r i n g of 1993, as t h e c r u c i a l e l e c t i o n s a p p r o a c h e d , Special R e p r e sentative Akashi a c k n o w l e d g e d , "I c a n n o t a f f o r d n o t to s u c c e e d . " 1 5 3 Because of this d u a l t e n s i o n in d e s i g n i n g p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a tions, t i m e is critical. T h e U N s h o u l d b e ready to i m p l e m e n t t h e m a n d a t e as s o o n a f t e r t h e p e a c e treaty is signed as is p r a c t i c a b l e . UNTAC s u f f e r e d a large d e c r e a s e in a u t h o r i t y in early 1992 as t i m e passed a n d the e x p e c t a t i o n s of t h e factions a n d the C a m b o d i a n people were d i s a p p o i n t e d . T h e s e t e n s i o n s also e x p l a i n how t h e f r a m e work of a treaty can dissolve in days or m o n t h s , as the C a m b o d i a n p e a c e a g r e e m e n t s d i d , a n d how t h e provisions of p e a c e a c c o r d s bec o m e so g e n e r a l , a m b i g u o u s , or u n w o r k a b l e that m a n y of t h e details have to b e w o r k e d o u t in t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n process. To b e minimally effective u n d e r those c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the U N m u s t i n n o v a t e . O n e clear i m p l i c a t i o n is t h e i m p o r t a n c e of s p r e a d i n g risk multidimensionally. T h e UN s h o u l d build in as m a n y r o u t e s to p e a c e — i n stitutional r e f o r m , elections, i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o n i t o r i n g , e c o n o m i c rehabilitation—as the parties will tolerate. T h e UN also n e e d s a political strategy to win a n d k e e p p o p u l a r s u p p o r t a n d c r e a t e ( n o t j u s t e n j o y ) t h e s u p p o r t of local f o r c e s of o r d e r . In a failed state, as in a society subject to colonial r u l e , what is most o f t e n missing is m o d e r n o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s is what c o l o n i a l m e t r o p o l e s s u p p l i e d as they m o b i l i z e d local r e s o u r c e s to c o m b a t local o p p o s i t i o n . L e a r n i n g f r o m t h e history of i m p e r i a l i n s t i t u t i o n b u i l d i n g (yet a v o i d i n g i m p e r i a l e x p l o i t a t i o n a n d c o e r c i o n ) , UN p e a c e o p e r a t i o n s n e e d to discover an effective a n d a f f o r d a b l e strategy to g e n e r a t e active c o o p e r a t i o n f r o m divided local political actors a n d mobilize local r e s o u r c e s f o r collective purposes. 1 5 4 R e c e n t p e a c e k e e p i n g e x p e r i e n c e has suggested a s e c o n d peacek e e p i n g i n n o v a t i o n : an ad h o c , semisovereign m e c h a n i s m d e s i g n e d to m a n a g e a p e a c e process. It has o f t e n b e e n r e m a r k e d that C h a p t e r

84

MICHAEL. W .

DOYI.E

VI presents the United Nations with too little authority and Chapter VII, too much, that Chapter VI is associated with too little use of force and Chapter VII, too much. T h e value of these ad hoc, semisovereign artificial bodies is that they can e n c o u r a g e and influence the shape of consent. Indeed, they can help contain the erosion of consent and even m a n u f a c t u r e it where it is missing. Created by a peace treaty, they permit the temporary consensus of the parties to be formally incorporated in an institution with regular consultation and even, as in the Cambodian S u p r e m e National Council, a semia u t o n o m o u s sovereign will. These mechanisms have proved crucial in adjusting recent UN missions. They can r e p r e s e n t the once warring parties and act in the name of a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of the "nation" without the continuous or complete consent of all the factions. In Cambodia, the Supreme National Council (SNC), constructed by the Paris Peace Agreements, "enshrined" Cambodian sovereignty. Composed of the four factions and chaired by Prince Sihanouk, the SNC offered a chance for these parties to consult together on a regular basis and e n d o r s e the peace process. It also lent special influence to Prince Sihanouk, who was authorized to act if the SNC failed to achieve a consensus. Beyond that, it e m p o w e r e d the United Nations, represented by Special Representative Akashi, to act in the interests of the peace process if Sihanouk failed to do so. T h e artificially created SNC thus established a semisovereign legal personality designed to be responsive to the general interests of Cambodia (even when a complete consensus was lacking a m o n g all the factions) and to the authority of the United Nations Special Representative. Acting in the n a m e of Cambodia—as a step in the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the Paris Agreements—the SNC adopted all the major h u m a n rights conventions (including the first and second Covenants on H u m a n Rights) and authorized the trade embargo against illegal exports of logs and gems. It was the f o r u m that e n d o r s e d the p r o t r a c t e d and sensitive negotiations over the franchise. It legitimated the enforcement of certain elements of the peace without the u n a n i m o u s consent of the parties or a contentious debate at the Security Council. It could have exercised greater authority, perhaps even have designed an acceptable scheme for rehabilitation, if Prince Sihanouk or Mr. Akashi had been both willing and able to lead it in that direction. T h e Commission on the Peace (COPAZ) in El Salvador played a similar, although m u c h less authoritative, role in the Salvadoran peace process, serving as a forum for consultation a m o n g the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN), the government, and the other political parties. Designed to m o n i t o r and establish a f o r u m for the participation of civilian society in the peace process,

it was the only political institution that e m b o d i e d the full scope of Salvadoran politics, the only institution that could legitimately speak for "El Salvador." Its minimal role in the peace process was u n f o r t u nate. And in Somalia, t h e Transitional National C o u n c i l was designed to p e r f o r m a similar f u n c t i o n , b u t its failure to get off t h e g r o u n d was p e r h a p s the single most disturbing p r o b l e m in the peacem a k i n g process, o n e that seriously e r o d e d the a t t e m p t to c r e a t e a peace. In designing these semisovereign, artificial bodies, p e a c e m a k e r s should try (to the e x t e n t that their f r e e d o m of negotiation allows) to "preview" the p e a c e t h e parties a n d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y seek. For the Paris Peace A g r e e m e n t s , seeking a "pluralist d e m o c racy" should have m e a n t e x p a n d i n g the S u p r e m e National Council to include o t h e r chambers, such as o n e for civil society. It might have i n c l u d e d , for example, Buddhist monks, n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations, a n d o t h e r representatives of society o u t s i d e the state. T h e s e s u p p l e m e n t a r y bodies, it should be noted, n e e d n o t p e r f o r m executive or legislative f u n c t i o n s . T h e i m p o r t a n t point is that civil society s h o u l d participate in the d e c i s i o n m a k i n g process, at a m i n i m u m t h r o u g h formally recognized consultative c h a n n e l s . T h e UN must avoid the trade-offs between using too m u c h force and too little. Given the d a n g e r s of C h a p t e r VII e n f o r c e m e n t operations, w h e t h e r in Somalia a n d Bosnia, many o b s e r v e r s think it extremely unlikely that troop-contributing countries will actually allow t h e i r t r o o p s to show u p . T h e potential costs are m u c h h i g h e r t h a n the m e m b e r states are willing to bear for h u m a n i t a r i a n purposes. But in C h a p t e r VI o p e r a t i o n s , c o n s e n t by parties easily dissolves u n d e r difficult processes of peace. UN operations in the midst of civil strife have o f t e n b e e n r e s c u e d by the timely use of force, as o c c u r r e d in the C o n g o , w h e r e Katanga's secession was forcibly h a l t e d , a n d Namibia, w h e r e SWAPO's violation of the p e a c e a g r e e m e n t was c o u n t e r e d with the aid of South African forces. But in both cases, the use of force resulted in grave political costs. Given those options, the semisovereign artificial b o d i e s offer the possibility of m i d c o u r s e adj u s t m e n t s a n d "nationally" legitimated e n f o r c e m e n t . They artificially b u t usefully e n h a n c e t h e process of c o n s e n t in t h e p r o m o t i o n of peace and avoid the d a n g e r s associated with a t t e m p t s to i m p l e m e n t a forced peace. Peacebuilding Multidimensional, second-generation p e a c e k e e p i n g pierces the shell of national a u t o n o m y by bringing international involvement to areas

86

MICHAEL W .

DOYLE

long t h o u g h t to be t h e exclusive d o m a i n of d o m e s t i c j u r i s d i c t i o n . If a p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n is to leave b e h i n d a l e g i t i m a t e a n d indep e n d e n t l y viable political sovereign, it must h e l p t r a n s f o r m t h e political l a n d s c a p e by b u i l d i n g a new basis f o r d o m e s t i c peace. T r a d i t i o n a l strategies of c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n , w h e n successful, were d e s i g n e d to resolve a d i s p u t e between c o n f l i c t i n g parties. Successful r e s o l u t i o n could b e m e a s u r e d by 1) the stated reconciliation of the parties; 2) the d u r a t i o n of the reconciliation; a n d 3) c h a n g e s in the way parties b e h a v e d toward each other. 1 5 5 But successful contemporary peacebuilding does not merely change behavior: m o r e i m p o r t a n t , it t r a n s f o r m s i d e n t i t i e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t e x t s . M o r e t h a n r e f o r m i n g play in an old g a m e , it c h a n g e s the g a m e . This is the g r a n d strategy L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l S a n d e r s o n invoked w h e n h e s p o k e of f o r g i n g an a l l i a n c e with t h e C a m b o d i a n p e o p l e , bypassing t h e factions. R e g i n a l d Austin, e l e c t o r a l chief of U N T A C , p r o b e d t h e s a m e issue w h e n h e asked what are the "true objectives [of UNTAC]: Is it a political o p e r a t i o n seeking a solution to the imm e d i a t e p r o b l e m of an a r m e d conflict by all m e a n s possible? O r d o e s it have a wider objective: to i m p l a n t democracy, c h a n g e values a n d establish a new p a t t e r n of g o v e r n a n c e based o n m u l t i - p a r t i s m a n d f r e e a n d fair elections?" 1 5 6 UNTAC h e l p e d c r e a t e new a c t o r s o n the C a m b o d i a n political scene: the electors, a f l e d g l i n g civil society, a f r e e press, a n d a continuing international and transnational presence. Prince Ranariddh was institutionally e m p o w e r e d , H u n S e n ' s b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n against t h e party c a d r e s was e n h a n c e d , a n d t h e K h m e r R o u g e was t r a n s f o r m e d f r o m an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y r e c o g n i z e d c l a i m a n t o n Camb o d i a n sovereignty to a d o m e s t i c g u e r r i l l a insurgency. T h e peaceb u i l d i n g process, particularly t h e election, b e c a m e the politically tole r a b l e s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e inability of the f a c t i o n s to r e c o n c i l e t h e i r conflicts. T h e U N ' s role, m a n d a t e d by t h e s e c o m p l e x a g r e e m e n t s r a t h e r than by C h a p t e r VII, entails m o n i t o r i n g , substituting for, renovating, a n d in s o m e cases h e l p i n g to b u i l d the basic s t r u c t u r e s of the state. T h e UN is called in to d e m o b i l i z e a n d s o m e t i m e s to r e s t r u c t u r e a n d r e f o r m o n c e w a r r i n g armies; to m o n i t o r or to organize national elections; to p r o m o t e h u m a n rights; to supervise public security a n d h e l p create a new civilian police force; to c o n t r o l civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d establish a transitional politically n e u t r a l e n v i r o n m e n t ; to begin the e c o n o m i c r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of devastated countries; a n d , as in the case of C a m b o d i a , to a d d r e s s directly the values of the citizens, with a view toward p r o m o t i n g d e m o c r a t i c e d u c a t i o n . T h e parties to these a g r e e m e n t s , in effect, c o n s e n t to limitation of t h e i r sovereignty f o r t h e life of the U N - s p o n s o r e d p e a c e process.

They do so because they need the help of the international community to achieve peace. But acceptance of UN involvement in implementing these agreements is less straightforward than, for example, consenting to observance of a cease-fire. Even when genuine consent is achieved, it is impossible to provide for every contingency in complex peace accords. Problems of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n arise, u n f o r e s e e n gaps in the accords materialize, and circumstances change. The original consent, as the Salvadoran peace process suggests, can become open-ended and in part a gesture of faith that later problems can be worked out on a consensual basis. 157 But authentic and firm consent in the a f t e r m a t h of severe civil strife such as that Cambodia e n d u r e d is rare. T h e international negotiators of a peace treaty and the UN designers of a mandate theref o r e should attempt to include as many advantages for the UN authority as the parties will tolerate. Even seemingly extraneous bargaining chips will b e c o m e useful as the spirit of cooperation erodes u n d e r the pressure of misunderstandings and separating interests. The UN counted upon the financial needs of the Cambodian factions to ensure their cooperation and designed an extensive rehabilitation c o m p o n e n t to guarantee steady rewards for cooperative behavior. 1 5 8 But the Khmer Rouge's access to illicit trade (with the apparent connivance of elements of the Thai military along the western border) eliminated this bargaining chip. And the suspicion of SOC's rivals prevented a full implementation of rehabilitation in the 80 percent of the country controlled by the SOC. Passport and visa control succeeded simply because the UN, as a representative of the international community, had the leverage to persuade the SOC to comply. The architects of the UN operation should therefore also design into the m a n d a t e as much i n d e p e n d e n t implementation as the parties will agree to in the peace treaty. T h e Electoral and Repatriation c o m p o n e n t s seem to have succeeded simply because they did not d e p e n d on the steady and c o n t i n u o u s positive s u p p o r t of the four factions. Each had an i n d e p e n d e n t sphere of authority and organizational capacity that allowed it to proceed against everything short of active military opposition to the factions. Civil administrative control and the c a n t o n m e n t of the factions failed because they relied on the continuous direct and active cooperation of each of the factions. Each of the factions, at one time or another, had reason to expect that the balance of advantages was tilting against it and so refused to cooperate. A significant source of the success of the election was Radio UNTAC's ability to speak directly to the potential Cambodian voters, bypassing the propaganda of the four factions and invoking a new Cambodian actor, the voting citizen. But voters are only powerful

88

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

for the five minutes it takes them to vote unless there is an institutional mechanism to translate democratic authority into bureaucratic practice. Now, lacking such a mechanism in C a m b o d i a , the voters are vulnerable to the armies, police, and c o r r u p t i o n that have dominated since the votes were tallied. In these circumstances, U N T A C should have created new institutions in order to make sure the votes would "count" more. Gaining control in the contentious circumstances of the C a m b o d i a n civil war was a nearly futile task. T h e UN would have had more controlling inf l u e n c e and would have left a larger institutional legacy if it had drawn u p o n the existing personnel of the factions, a d d e d authentic independents, and trained a new army, a new civil service, a new police force, and a new judiciary. U N T A C still would have been economizing on UN resources. It would have b e e n dividing potential enemies a n d mobilizing potential friends. It would have b e e n using C a m b o d i a n resources, including those of the factions themselves, in o r d e r to create a new structure for C a m b o d i a n politics. Although well-informed officials have c a u t i o n e d that the parties might not have a c c e p t e d this d e g r e e of intrusion in O c t o b e r 1991, when the Paris Agreements were signed, perhaps the Security Council, with the s u p p o r t of the S u p r e m e National Council, should have altered the U N T A C m a n d a t e in mid-1992, establishing a m o r e robust training component.159 In the event, ordinary C a m b o d i a n s have cause to regret that the UN did not acquire a m a n d a t e for U N T A C to train a national Camb o d i a n army, bureaucracy, and police force. T h e s e are the institutions that could have been decisive in ensuring that the voice of the p e o p l e , as represented by their elected representatives, would shape the future of C a m b o d i a . Success on the institutional and political transformation of C a m b o d i a would also have allowed U N T A C to proceed with rather than p o s t p o n e its m a n d a t e to launch economic rehabilitation and demining. T h e international community needs to learn from UNTAC's failures as well as from its successes. None of these lessons will substitute for d e d i c a t e d implementation by an e x p e r t a n d c o u r a g e o u s contingent of peacekeepers, both civilian and military, or for inspired leadership from a well-chosen g r o u p of UN officials enjoying the full support of the entire UN and the international community. But the challenges today's peacekeepers face will be lessened if the diplomats and officials give them politically well-designed m a n d a t e s to implement in the very trying circumstances the p e a c e k e e p e r s will discover in those parts of the world most in n e e d of their services.

NOTES

1. For a good sketch of the parties, see Frederick Z. Brown, Cambodia in Crisis: The 1993 Elections and the United Nations (New York: Asia Society, 1993). 2. For background on these issues, see Ben Kiernan and Chantou Boua, eds., Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea 1942-1981 (London, Zed Press, 1982) and Michael Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986). 3. T h e UN's direct role in the peace process is effectively summarized in the "Background Note on the Negotiating Process," pp. ii-viii in Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict: Paris, 23 October, 1991 (UN: DPI, 1992). My views on the negotiating process have also benefited from a conversation with Ambassador Richard Solomon and interviews with diplomats and UN officials (the latter on a "not for attribution" basis). 4. See the Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Cambodia," UN Document A/40/759, October 17, 1985, paragraph 13. Ahmed's informal negotiations leading to the 1985 report came to be called the "Cocktail Party" talks. 5. It is worth noting, for example, that Hanoi acknowledged sustaining 60,000 casualties in Cambodia. For a valuable analysis of some of these developments, see Mohammed Noordin Sopiee, " T h e Cambodian Conflict," ISIS Research Note (Malaysia, 1989), pp. 1-27. Sihanouk's own perspective on these years is important and interesting; see his Prisonnier des Khmer Rouges (Paris: Hachette, 1986). 6. T h e view was that if Hun Sen survived the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and held on to 80 percent or more of Cambodian territory, he would strengthen his claim that there was nothing to negotiate; Cambodia's conflicts would be a matter for domestic Cambodian jurisdiction. 7. These were the five areas later designated for control by UNTAC. In the end, Hun Sen refused to accept Sihanouk as the executive of the transition and refused to have the Khmer Rouge on the executive committee. Sihanouk refused to allow a condemnation of "genocide," sticking by his KR allies. China and the United States pressured against a Sihanouk-Hun Sen separate accommodation. See Tommy T.B. Koh, " T h e Paris Conference on Cambodia: A Multilateral Negotiation that 'Failed,'" Negotiation Journal^, 1 (January 1990), pp. 8 1 - 8 7 .

89

90

NOTES

8. S t e p h e n Solarz, " C a m b o d i a a n d t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m u n i t y , " Foreign Affairs 69, 2 ( S p r i n g 1990), p p . 9 9 - 1 1 5 . 9. A b d u l g a f f a r P e a n g - M e t h , " T h e F u t u r e of C a m b o d i a , " Contemporary Southeast Asia, 14, 1 (June 1992), p p . 3 3 - 4 7 . 10. D e p a r t m e n t of F o r e i g n Affairs a n d T r a d e , Australia, Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal ( C a n b e r r a , 1990). See F o r e i g n Minister G a r e t h Evans, " T h e C o m p r e h e n s i v e Political S e t t l e m e n t to t h e C a m b o d i a Conflict: An Exercise in C o o p e r a t i n g f o r Peace," I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e k e e p i n g Seminar, Australian D e f e n c e Force Academy, C a n b e r r a May 2 - 4 , 1994. 11. In a late S e p t e m b e r 1989 m e e t i n g with t h e ASEAN a m b a s s a d o r s in W a s h i n g t o n (an a n n u a l b r e a k f a s t ) , US S e c r e t a r y of State J a m e s Baker tried o u t t h e i d e a of a m o r e active P5 p r e s e n c e in t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s ; h e m e t with ASEAN's full assent. 12. For an insightful a c c o u n t of t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n Soviet interests in C a m b o d i a a n d in A f g h a n i s t a n , see William Maley, " R e g i o n a l Conflicts: A f g h a n i s t a n a n d C a m b o d i a , " in Reshaping Regional Relations, ed. by R a m e s h T h a k u r a n d Carlyle T h a y e r ( B o u l d e r : Westview, 1993), p p . 184-200. 13. P e t e r R o d m a n , " S u p p i n g with Devils," The National Interest 25 (Fall 1991), p p . 4 4 - 5 0 . T h e U n i t e d States n o n e t h e l e s s s u f f e r e d a n u m b e r of ins t a n c e s of w h a t c a m e to b e called "Snooky S h o c k " as t h e ever m e r c u r i a l Sih a n o u k d a n c e d b e t w e e n t h e K h m e r R o u g e a n d t h e H u n Sen f o r c e s . T h e British a n d t h e F r e n c h played a s u p p o r t i v e r o l e at this stage. T h e F r e n c h s e e m e d e a g e r to establish a close r e l a t i o n s h i p with a P h n o m P e n h r e g i m e as a way p e r h a p s to f u r t h e r a s p r e a d of t h e f r a n c o p h o n e c o m m o n w e a l t h . Britain s e e m e d m o s t c o n c e r n e d with l i m i t i n g t h e U N ' s ever i n c r e a s i n g financial overextension. 14. Paris A g r e e m e n t s , O c t o b e r 23, 1991—UN D o c u m e n t A / 4 6 / 6 0 8 - S / 23177; 31 I.L.M. 183 (1992). 15. F. T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force, IPA Occasional P a p e r ( B o u l d e r : L y n n e R i e n n e r , 1992). 16. I am using S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l Boutros-Ghali's t h r e e - g e n e r a t i o n a l terminology. For a valuable discussion of t h e new p e a c e k e e p i n g t h a t c o m b i n e s s e c o n d - a n d t h i r d - g e n e r a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t s , see J o h n Mackinlay a n d J a r a t C h o p r a , A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993 ( P r o v i d e n c e : Watson Institute, 1993). 17. P e a c e m a k i n g , g o o d o f f i c e s , a n d m e d i a t i o n fall u n d e r C h a p t e r VI r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of t h e UN C h a r t e r . M a n d a t o r y e n f o r c e m e n t a c t i o n can only be a u t h o r i z e d u n d e r C h a p t e r VII of t h e U N C h a r t e r , b u t n o t all C h a p ter VII a u t h o r i z a t i o n s r e q u i r e e n f o r c e m e n t o r t h e use of f o r c e . Articles 40 a n d 41 of C h a p t e r VII may b e t h e m o s t p e r t i n e n t a u t h o r i z a t i o n s of p e a c e making and peacekeeping operations, but peacekeeping operations are o f t e n , following f o r m e r S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l Dag H a m m a r s k j o l d ' s terminology, called " C h a p t e r VI 1 / 2 " o p e r a t i o n s . 18. B o u t r o s B o u t r o s - G h a l i , An Agenda for Peace (New York: U N DPI, 1992), p a r a g r a p h s 5 5 - 6 0 . 19. See Steven Ratner, "The C a m b o d i a S e t t l e m e n t A g r e e m e n t s , "American Journal of International Law 87 (1993) a n d his " T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ' Role in C a m b o d i a : A M o d e l f o r R e s o l u t i o n of I n t e r n a l Conflicts?" in Enforcing Restraint, ed. by Lori D a m r o s c h (New York: Council o n Foreign Relations, 1993). 20. T h e new C a m b o d i a n g o v e r n m e n t would b e c r e a t e d w h e n t h e C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly e l e c t e d in c o n f o r m i t y with t h e a g r e e m e n t s a p p r o v e d t h e

NOTES

91

new C a m b o d i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d t r a n s f o r m e d itself i n t o a legislative assembly. 21. Article 78 of t h e C h a r t e r provides: "The t r u s t e e s h i p system shall n o t apply to t e r r i t o r i e s which have b e c o m e M e m b e r s of t h e U n i t e d Nations, rel a t i o n s h i p a m o n g which shall b e b a s e d o n respect f o r t h e p r i n c i p l e of sovereign equality." 22. T h e SNC signed i n s t r u m e n t s of accession to t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conv e n t i o n o n Civil a n d Political Rights a n d t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n o n E c o n o m i c , Social a n d C u l t u r a l Rights on April 20, 1992. 23. T h e lack of even this m i n i m a l l y f o r m a l a u t h o r i t y in S o m a l i a leaves U N O S O M w i t h o u t a symbolic i n t e r l o c u t o r t h a t could serve to legitimate its actions. See t h e l e t t e r to t h e New York Times of S e p t e m b e r 15, 1993, by Issa A h m e d Nour. 24. F o r t h e c o m p l e t e U N T A C m a n d a t e , see A p p e n d i x 1, p p . 17-22, of t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s . 25. See United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: Information Notes (New York: UN DPI, 1993), p p . 5 5 - 6 9 , a n d The Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation Plan of the Agreements, F e b r u a r y 19, 1992, S / 2 3 6 1 3 , which constituted t h e U N ' s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p l a n of t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s . T h e Rehabilitation C o m p o n e n t never a c q u i r e d t h e p e r s o n n e l or institutional c h a r a c t e r of the o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s ; its limited f u n c t i o n s were a b s o r b e d by t h e O f f i c e of t h e E c o n o m i c Advisor to t h e Special Representative. T h e I n f o r m a t i o n / E d u cation Division did, however, b e c o m e a nearly i n d e p e n d e n t " c o m p o n e n t . " 26. In Paris in S e p t e m b e r 1993, a s e c o n d m e e t i n g a d d e d a f u r t h e r p l e d g e of S120 m i l l i o n . In M a r c h 1994, an a d d i t i o n a l $ 7 7 3 m i l l i o n was pledged for Cambodia's development. 27. For insightful a c c o u n t s of C a m b o d i a ' s r e c e n t tragic history, see Eliza b e t h Becker, When the War Was Over (New York: S i m o n a n d Schuster, 1986), Ben K i e r n a n , How Pol Pol Came to Power ( L o n d o n : Verso, 1985), M i c h a e l Haas, Genocide by Proxy (New York: P r a e g e r , 1991), especially p p . 2 1 1 - 2 8 2 , a n d David C h a n d l e r , The Tragedy of Cambodian History (New H a v e n : Yale, 1991). 28. U N H C R , The Slate of the World's Refugees: The Challenge of Protection 1993 ( H a r m o n d s w o r t h : P e n g u i n , 1993), p p . ' 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 . U N H C R r e p a t r i a t e d 362,000 on a v o l u n t a r y basis; 22,000 r e p a t r i a t e d themselves. T h a i l a n d repat r i a t e d t h e r e m a i n i n g 800. See U N H C R , Cambodia Repatriation Operation (Geneva: U N H C R , A u g u s t 31, 1993), a n d C o u r t R o b i n s o n , "Something Like Home Again": The Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees ( W a s h i n g t o n , DC: US C o m m i t t e e f o r R e f u g e e s , 1994). T h e q u o t e is f r o m t h e US C o m m i t t e e f o r Refugees. 29. S a l m a n A h m e d , assistant p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t o r a l o f f i c e r in K o m p o n g T h o m , e s t i m a t e d t h a t m o r e t h a n half t h e adults h e e n c o u n t e r e d o n his m a n y visits to towns a n d villages followed R a d i o UNTAC on a r e g u l a r basis (Doyle interview, New York, August 23, 1993). 30. Akashi's d e f i n i t i o n of "foreign forces" brilliantly p a r s e d t h e a m b i g u ities built i n t o t h e Paris accords, g o i n g b e y o n d p u r e l y military f o r c e s to include those acting as p a r t of a f o r e i g n - d i r e c t e d conspiracy. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , it would take a m a j o r investigation in e a c h case to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e accused party was in fact a m e m b e r of such a conspiracy. N o such investigation a p p e a r e d to have b e e n c o n d u c t e d in t h e case of t h e t h r e e n a m e d "forces." A l t h o u g h e a c h of t h e m h a d at o n e t i m e b e e n m e m b e r s of V i e t n a m e s e

92

NOTES

military units, they had apparently resigned, settled in Cambodia, and married Klimer women, with whom they had children. 31. As of July 1992, the CPAF had c a n t o n e d 9,003, ANKI, 3,187, and KPNLAF, 1,322. NADKhad cantoned none. See UN Document S/24286,July 14, 1992. 32. UNTAC Military C o m p o n e n t , "Strategic Lessons: Part I," paragraph 58. 33. For a valuable recent reflection on the significance of the Congo operation, see Alan James, "The Congo Controversies," International Peacekeeping!, 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 44-58. 34. See Report of the Secretary-General, February 19, 1992, S/23613, paragraphs 92-111. Civil Administration drew its specific framework of activities f r o m Annex 1 of the Paris Agreements as well as f r o m the Proposal for Discussion ("nonpaper") drafted by participants at the Tokyo Ministerial Conf e r e n c e on the Rehabilitation a n d Reconstruction of Cambodia (S/24286, a n n e x ) . Although the elections seem to have limited the five areas of the control mandate, foreign affairs had little potential effect on the elections. T h e five areas also reflected the five areas introduced by China at the behest of the Khmer Rouge into the failed 1989 negotiations, when the object was quadripartite sovereignty, not elections. This, together with the fact that the UN m a n d a t e , the SG's r e p o r t of February 19, was never translated into Khmer, occasioned some confusion. 35. For a good analysis of the CIVADMIN role, see Lyndall McLean, "Civil Administration in Transition," in H u g h Smith, ed., International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre/AFDA, 1994), a n d UNTAC, "Final R e p o r t of the Civil Administrative C o m p o n e n t , " P h n o m Penh, September 16, 1993, pp. 1-37. 36. Report of the Secretary-General, February 19, 1992, paragraph 95. 37. UN Document S/24578, September 21, 1992, pp. 47-58. 38. Existing administrative structures (EAS) refer to Cambodia's de facto administrations. T h e main four EAS were t h e H u n Sen g o v e r n m e n t and its three major opposition groups: FUNCINPEC, PDK (Khmer Rouge), and KPNLF. 39. UNTAC Document, "Note sur le controle de l'administration civile," August 19, 1992, p. 5. 40. UNTAC Document, "Note sur le controle"; Activity Reports of Civil Administration— S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r , November, December 1992 and January 1993; "Report on UNTAC's Activities: Civil Administration Component," September 7, 1992. 41. UNTAC Document, "Border Control Unit Final Report, " September 1993. 42. UNTAC D o c u m e n t , "Activity Report of Civil Administration, S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r , 1992," November 27, 1992, p. 4. 43. UN Document, S/25719, Fourth. Progress Report of the Secretary General on UNTAC, May 3, 1993, p. 15. 44. UN Document, S/24578, September 21, 1992, p. 8. 45. Ibid., p. 9. 46. UN Document, S/25124, Third Progress Report of the Secretary General on UNTAC.January 25, 1993, p. 16. 47. UNTAC D o c u m e n t , "Report on UNTAC's Activities: T h e First Six Months," March 15-September 15, 1992, p. 24.

NOTCS

93

48. U N T A C D o c u m e n t , " R e p o r t o n U N T A C activities," p. 3. 49. E l i s a b e t h U p h o f f (IPA R e s e a r c h F e l l o w ) , i n t e r v i e w , P h n o m P e n h , S e p t e m b e r 1993. 50. Fourth Progress Report, p a r a g r a p h 71. 51. U p h o f f , i n t e r v i e w with a s e n i o r o f f i c i a l at t h e M i n i s t r y of F i n a n c e . 52. J a m e s S c h e a r , a U N T A C c o n s u l t a n t , a r g u e s t h a t U N T A C d i d s u c c e e d in c o n t r o l l i n g this a r e a . But t h e r u n a w a y i n f l a t i o n of M a r c h a n d A p r i l 1 9 9 3 q u e s t i o n s t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e c u r r e n c y c o n t r o l t h a t was a c h i e v e d , a n d p e r s i s t i n g c h a r g e s of C P P e m p l o y m e n t of S O C r e s o u r c e s , b u i l d i n g s , p e r s o n n e l , a n d so f o r t h r a i s e s o m e d o u b t s w i t h r e s p e c t to t h e d e g r e e of f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l a c h i e v e d o u t s i d e P h n o m P e n h . S e e J a m e s A. S c h e a r , " T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s O p e r a t i o n in C a m b o d i a : A S t a t u s R e p o r t , " infra f o o t n o t e 7, p p . 21-26. 53. Fourth Progress Report, p. 14. 54. " C o n t r o l E x e r c i s e d over Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n " M a r c h 9, 1993. 55. W h e r e U N T A C h a d t h e b a r g a i n i n g c h i p s f i r m l y in its o w n h a n d s , it was a b l e t o i m p o s e its will w h e n it c a m e i n t o c o n f l i c t with t h e p a r t i e s . U N T A C c o n t r o l l e d c u r r e n c y b e c a u s e it c o u l d c o n t r o l a c c e s s to t h e t e c h n i cally c r u c i a l p r e r e q u i s i t e , i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i n t i n g . Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n app e a r s to h a v e s u c c e s s f u l l y g a i n e d c o n t r o l over visas a n d p a s s p o r t s largely bec a u s e p a s s p o r t s g a i n t h e i r utility t h r o u g h i n t e r n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t a l recognition. 56. "Final R e p o r t of t h e Civil A d m i n s t r a t i o n C o m p o n e n t , " p a r a g r a p h 82. 57. U p h o f f , i n t e r v i e w with a h i g h - l e v e l o f f i c i a l of M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n Affairs. 58. Fourth Progress Report, p. 15. 59. A c c o r d i n g to a P u b l i c S e c u r i t y o f f i c i a l , t h e C o n t r o l T e a m , d e s i g n e d to i m p r o v e t h e c o n t r o l m e c h a n i s m of p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e s , p r o v e d t o b e q u i t e e f f e c t i v e in p u t t i n g s o m e p r e s s u r e o n S O C , " j u d g i n g by t h e c o m p l a i n t s f r o m S O C . " A c c o r d i n g to h i m , t h e C o n t r o l T e a m "just w e n t in with p o r t a b l e p h o t o c o p i e r s a n d p h o t o c o p i e d every d o c u m e n t we c o u l d g e t o u r h a n d s o n . . . . It was an e f f e c t i v e way t o k e e p t h e p r e s s u r e u p . " ( U N T A C D o c u m e n t , " U N T A C R e p o r t of t h e F o u r t h Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n S e m i n a r , " D e c e m b e r 1 0 - 1 2 , 1992.) In d e s c r i b i n g t h e s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e of t h e C o n t r o l T e a m , t h e Civilian A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m p o n e n t s t a t e d t h a t t h e t e a m "will use t h e tactic of s u r p r i s e in its i n t e r v e n t i o n with t h e C a m b o d i a n p r o v i n c i a l aut h o r i t i e s . . . . N o p r i o r a u t h o r i z a t i o n o r o t h e r f o r m of p u b l i c w a r n i n g is t h e r e f o r e w a r r a n t e d . " T h i s c a p a b i l i t y of U N T A C , its u n r e s t r i c t e d a c c e s s to any i n f o r m a t i o n , i l l u s t r a t e s t h e p o t e n t i a l , b u t u n f u l f i l l e d , i m p a c t it was given by t h e Paris A g r e e m e n t s . 60. Fourth Progress Report, p p . 1 5 - 1 6 . M a r k P l u n k e t t , t h e f o r m e r s p e c i a l prosecutor for UNTAC, c o n c l u d e d , "UNTAC could n o t even establish the r u l e of law." Canberra Times, A u g u s t 20, 1993, p.11. 61. U N T A C D o c u m e n t , " U N T A C R e p o r t of t h e F o u r t h Civil A d m i n i s t r a tion S e m i n a r , " D e c e m b e r 1 0 - 1 2 , 1992. 62. U N D o c u m e n t S / 2 3 8 7 0 , May 1, 1993, p. 7. 63. Doyle, i n t e r v i e w , P h n o m P e n h , M a r c h 1993. 64. Doyle, i n t e r v i e w , M a r c h - A p r i l 1993, in C a m b o d i a . 65. U p h o f f , i n t e r v i e w with o f f i c i a l i n v o l v e d with P u b l i c Security. 66. Doyle, i n t e r v i e w s in P h n o m P e n h , M a r c h 1993. C o r r u p t i o n b e c a m e e n d e m i c in these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , as state officials regularly sold "state" p r o p e r t y

94

NOTES

for personal profit. See the striking accounts in Stan Sesser, "Report From Cambodia," The New Yorker, May 18, 1992, pp. 4 3 - 7 4 . 67. Quoted in "Final Report of the Civil Adminstration C o m p o n e n t , " p. 16. 68. Ibid. 69. "Briefing Note: Terms of Reference of the Proposed UNTAC Control Mechanism at the Provincial Level", January 19, 1993, unpublished UNTAC Document. 70. Interviews with Gerard Porcell (Phnom Penh, March 1993) and various members of CIVADMIN. I observed a political meeting among Cambodian parties organized by the provincial director in Sissophon, Banteay Meanchey Province, in April 1993. T h e Control Teams had a useful effect. They conducted Eliot Ness-style raids on local offices suspected of engaging in violent intimidation against Cambodian citizens. Operating without warning, they exposed several instances of SOC intimidation and may have served to deter even more efforts to undermine the freeness and fairness of the election. See Uphoff interviews with officials involved with Public Security. 71. Dennis McNamara and T h a n t Myint-U, "Human Rights in Cambodia: What it Means?" Phnom Penh Post, May 2 1 - J u n e 3, 1993, p. 13. And for a valuable survey of these issues in the early stages of the operation, see Jarat Chopra, J o h n Mackinlay, and Larry Minear, An Interim Report on the Cambodian Peace Process (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, December 1992). 72. See Stephen Marks, "Forgetting 'the Policies and Practices of the Past': Impunity in Cambodia," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 18, 2 (Summer/Fall 1994), pp. 17-43. 73. UNTAC, "Human Rights Component Final Report," September 1993, p. 8. 74. Ibid., pp. 3 2 - 3 3 . And see Sidney J o n e s and Dinah Pokempner, "Human Rights in Cambodia," in Frederick Brown, ed., Rebuilding Cambodia (Baltimore: J o h n s Hopkins, 1993). 75. "Human Rights Final Report," Appendix 3. 76. UNTAC, "Evaluation Report: UN CIVPOL," August 1993, pp. 3 5 - 3 6 . This success was achieved without any budgetary provision. Individual CIVPOL units persuaded national governments to make voluntary contributions to this activity. T h e successful units of Australian CIVPOL in Banteay Meanchey were better prepared logistically than their colleagues in CIVPOL, bringing their own supplies for the first ninety days. They established a presence over their 2,500-square-kilometer zone in July 1992 and by August 1993 had investigated 205 cases. They trained 438 police, 42.9 percent of the police in Thmar Pouk district. See also "The Role of Australian Civilian Police in Support Operations," paper presented at the AFDC Conference, Canberra, May 1994, p. 5. 77. Report of the Secretary-General, February 19, 1992, S / 2 3 6 1 3 , paragraph 124. 78. UNTAC, 'Evaluation Report: UN CIVPOL," August 1993, pp. 5 - 1 2 . 79. Lt. Gen. J o h n Sanderson, "UNTAC: Successes and Failures," International Peacekeeping Seminar at the Australian Forces Defence College, May 2, 1994, pp. 7 - 8 . 80. Other difficulties lay in confusions of rank and uniform. Police grades appeared to be less comparable across national polices, leading to

NOTES

95

some resentments over status. Some UNTAC CIVPOL thought a common ranking system and even a common CIVPOL uniform would have alleviated these confusions and better identified the special police as a unit distinct from the UNTAC military. 81. Judy Ledgerwood, "UN Peacekeeping Missions: T h e Lessons from Cambodia," Asia Pacific Issues 11 (March 1994). In addition to salaries, CIVPOL (unlike the soldiers in the Military Component) received $130 a day per diem. They also received five compensatory time-off days per month. With posts across the entire country, they were also the most visible UNTAC component. When they misbehaved, they did so in public. They also suffered in comparison with the exemplary conduct of the equally visible and vastly less well-paid UN Volunteers, who organized the election. 82. Mark Plunkett, the UNTAC special prosecutor, described the result as "lawless. . . . T h e judges here are a bunch of party hacks and flunkies and they simply refuse to even issue warrants if the accused is of their ilk or connected to any of the dangerous politicians." In Canberra Times, May 25, 1993, p. 6 . 83. J Basil Fernando, The InabiliLy & Prosecute: Courts and. Human Rights in Cambodia and Sri Lanka (Hong Kong: Future Asia Link, 1993). 84. Mark Plunkett, "Law and Order; Institution Building: T h e Establishment of the Rule of Law in Post Conflict Peacebuilding," ADF/DFAT Seminar: International Peacekeeping—A Regional Perspective (Canberra, May 3, 1994), and in Smith, ed., International Peacekeeping, pp. 6 5 - 7 8 . 85. As quoted in Elisabeth Uphoff, "Rehabilitation in Cambodia Under the UNTAC Mandate," forthcoming in Michael Doyle and Ian J o h n s t o n e , eds., Multidimensional Peacekeeping. This section draws on her excellent chapter. 86. Report of the Secretary General, February 19, 1992, paragraphs 150-157. 87. Ibid., paragraph 153. 88. Although SOC made considerable progress in restoring Cambodia following the devastations inflicted by the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia had still not yet reached 1960 levels of agricultural and manufacturing production and social indicators by 1992. See Robert Muscat et al., Rebuilding Cambodia (Washington, DC: SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, 1993) and Uphoff, "Rehabilitation in Cambodia." 89. Fourth Progress Report, paragraphs 5 0 - 5 6 . 90. UNTAC suffered fifty-eight deaths from hostile fire, accidents, and disease during the eighteen-month operation. Medical doctors now estimate that 150 former UNTAC workers will eventually die of AIDs. They also estimate that, if Cambodia follows Thailand's trajectory, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians will die from AIDS, introduced, it appears, by UNTAC from the sex parlors of Bangkok. See Uphoff, ""Rehabilitation in Cambodia," for data. 91. Fourth Progress Report, paragraph 97. 92. Section D of Annex 1, the "UNTAC Mandate," Paris Agreements. 93. Michael Maley, "Reflections on the Electoral Process in Cambodia," in Hugh Smith, ed., Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993), pp. 8 8 - 9 9 . For a comprehensive account of the UNV role, see Giles Whitcomb and Kanni Wignaraja, Collaboration Between United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and United Nations Volunteers: Evaluation (Geneva: UNV/UNDP, 1994).

96

NOTES

94. Maley, "Reflections," p. 90. 95. Sihanouk himself clearly favored this enhanced role for himself, as he still does today; he is attempting to establish himself as a constitutional dictator ("like in ancient Rome"!) with the support of the Assembly. See Nate Thayer, "King Talks of Taking Power," Phnom Penh Post, J u n e 17-30, 1994, p. 1. Sihanouk abandoned the earlier effort at presidential democracy (said to be Gaullist in inspiration) after he realized that he would be president before presidential duties had been defined by the soon-to-be-elected Constituent Assembly's formulation of a constitution, scheduled for the summer of 1993. 96. Report of the Secretary General, November 15, 1992, and Third Progress Report, paragraphs 3 9 - 4 3 . 97. Third Progress Report, paragraphs 7 0 - 7 1 . 98. Unfortunately, Radio UNTAC was also very late because of UN bureaucratic obstacles and did not become operational until November 1992. See Sanderson, "UNTAC: Successes and Failures," p. 9. 99. Third Progress Report, paragraph 91. 100. See Fourth Progress Report. Radio UNTAC also challenged the KR propaganda that Cambodia was occupied by Vietnam and SOC propaganda that the KR was about to take over again. 101. T h e UN nonetheless declared each separate stage of the elections—the polling, counting of ballots, and campaign—free and fair. See Report of the Secretary-General, July 16, 1993, paragraph 3. 102. UNTAC information officer (not for attribution), Report on the Political Environment in Siem Reap Province: Discussions with Political Parlies (UNTAC Memorandum, March 29, 1993). 103. Peter Goodspeed, "UN Flirting with Disaster," Toronto Star, February 28, 1993, p. 13. 104. Quoted in "Final Report of the Civil Administration Component," p. 13. 105. Jarat Chopra and 1 served as international observers in Stoung on May 28, the last day of the poll, and interviewed the individuals involved. 106. Third Progress Report. 107. UN Document S / R e s . / 8 2 6 , May 20, 1993. 108. T h e official account of the investigation, implicating disgruntled Cambodians turned down as electoral workers, is in Free Choice, Electoral Component newsletter, April 30, 1993, p. 27. 109. Yasushi Akashi, "The Challenge of Peace-keeping in Cambodia: Lessons to be Learned," lecture, Columbia University, November 29, 1993, p. 6. 110. Marrack Goulding, "Current Rapid Expansion Unsustainable Without Major Changes," in Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1993), p. 101. 111. Lt. Gen. J o h n Sanderson, "Preparation for, Deployment and Conduct of Peacekeeping Operations: A Cambodia Snapshot," paper presented UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, ADFA seminar, Canberra, March, 2 1 - 2 4 , 1993, pp. 4 - 5 . 112. Nick Warner, of the Australian Mission to Cambodia, makes this argument in "Cambodia: Lessons o f UNTAC for Peacekeeping Operations," paper prepared for UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, AFDA seminar, Canberra, March 2 1 - 2 4 , 1993, p. 5.

NOTES

97

113. Humanitarian Assistance in Cambodia ( P h n o m P e n h : C o o p e r a t i o n Committee for Cambodia, 1993 and 1 9 9 4 ) . Also see Ian Pennell, "Non-Governmental Organisations in Humanitarian Operations," in Smith, ed., International Peacekeeping, pp. 1 3 1 - 1 3 6 . 114. Dr. Stephen Marks, t e l e p h o n e interview, J u n e 3, 1994. 115. UN military observers played a crucial role in providing logistic support and even stepping in as district electoral officers and international poll supervising officers in two o f the m o r e disturbed provinces (Kratie and K o m p o n g T h o m ) , which I visited as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l observer during the May elections. 116. Reginald Austin, for o n e e x a m p l e , had participated in the implementation o f the Commonwealth-sponsored election in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe as early as 1979. UNTAC c o n t a i n e d a n u m b e r o f "graduates" from UNTAG (Namibia). C I V P O L was particularly disadvantaged. Effective policing is essentially a matter o f local knowledge, trust, and small-unit c o h e r e n c e . Foreign police d r o p p e d into a r e m o t e C a m b o d i a n town with n o knowledge o f Khmer, no c o m m o n standards, and no e x p e r i e n c e working t o g e t h e r faced formidable hurdles. 117. Cited in Peter Goodspeed, "UN Flirting with Disaster," Toronto Star, February 28, 1993. p. 13. 118. Testimony o f Richard S o l o m o n , assistant secretary o f state, b e f o r e the House Foreign Affairs S u b c o m m i t t e e on Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 8, 1992. 119. In Security Council Resolution 792 (November 30, 1 9 9 2 ) , the UN officially supported the SNC e m b a r g o and asked all states, "especially neighboring states," to respect it. 120. Philip S h e n o n , "Cambodia Arms Flow Back to T h a i l a n d , " New York Times, March 7, 1993. See also the account by R a o u l j e n n a r , "Thailand's Double Standards Must be S t o p p e d , " Phnom Penh Post, O c t o b e r 8 - 2 1 , 1993, p. 8. J e n n a r alleges not only financial but also military cooperation between the generals and the K h m e r R o u g e , claiming that it c o n t i n u e d after the May elections. 121. T h e United States said it would refuse to provide aid to a government including the KR (Philip S h e n o n , New York Times, July 14, 1 9 9 3 ) . 122. My views on this point b e n e f i t e d from an interview with Miss Hisako Shimura, DPKO, O c t o b e r 2, 1993. 123. For a valuable discussion o f the politics o f p e a c e k e e p i n g in this sense as applied to the C o n g o case, see Alan J a m e s , " T h e C o n g o Controversies," International Peacekeeping 1, 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 4 4 - 5 8 . 124. Q u o t e d in Ben Kiernan, " T h e Failures o f the Paris Agreements on Cambodia, 1 9 9 1 - 9 3 , " p. 14, in The Challenge of Indochina: An Examination of the U.S. Role, from the Conference Report o f the Congressional Staff Conference, April 30-May 2, 1993, Dick Clark, director, Aspen Institute 8, 4, pp. 7 - 1 9 . 125. Asia Watch, Cambodia: Human Rights Before and After the. Elections, May 1993, 5, 10. p. 37. 126. Interview with Lieutenant G e n e r a l Sanderson, Canberra, Australia, March 28, 1993. 127. Doyle, interview in P h n o m Penh with a Khmer-speaking e x p e r t in UNTAC. 128. Making different arguments, Nayan Chanda, an e x p e r i e n c e d commentator on Cambodia, is also skeptical o f whether a willingness to reconcile

98

NOTES

ever existed between SOC and the KR. See "The UN's Failure in Cambodia," Wall Street Journal, March 11, 1993, p. A14. 129. An internal KR memo of February 6, 1992, stated: "The contents of the Paris Agreements are to our advantage. . . . If the Agreements are incorrectly implemented we are dead (disarmed), but if they are correctly implemented then we will win." 130. In a discussion with Robert Keohane, he referred to this as a "jujitsu" strategy, one especially suited to weak organizations such as the UN. For more on peace operations strategy, see "Lessons," chapter 7. 131. O n e surprising case of foreign affairs "out of control" was an aviation treaty negotiated and signed by SOC with Malaysia in defiance of the Paris Agreements, which allocated sovereign rights to the SNC during the transitional period 132. For an extensive discussion of post-UNTAC Cambodia, see William Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal, Contemporary Issues Paper No.l (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1994). 133. T h e coalition of two prime ministers may have been formed against the wishes of the United States and UNTAC, but a coalition was necessary in order to approve a constitution, which required a two-thirds vote in the Assembly. See Shenon, New York Times, J u n e 17, 1993. 134. For a well-informed assessment of the negotiations d u r i n g j u n e and July 1993, see William Shawcross, "A New Cambodia," New York Review of Books, August 12, 1993, pp. 3 7 - 4 1 . A useful continuation appears in William Branigin, "Cambodia Leans to Monarchy," Sydney Morning Herald, August 27, 1993, p. 7. On tensions in the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, see Nate Thayer, "RCAF Infighting," Phnom Penh Post, March 11-24, 1994. 135. Nate Thayer, "Coup Plot Thickens," Phnom Penh Post, July 1 5 - 2 8 , 1994. 136. Kingdom of Cambodia Constitution (adopted September 21, 1993). For a thorough analysis of the Cambodian constitution as a liberal democracy (weakly liberal and weakly democratic), see Stephen Marks, "The New Cambodian Constitution: From Civil War to a Fragile Democracy," Columbia Human Rights Law Revieiu (Fall 1994). 137. T h e monarchy is therefore of a symbolic nature, its purpose being to preserve the "unity and eternity of the nation." In addition, succession to the monarchy is not hereditary; rather, it is subject to election by the Royal Council of the Throne. 138. "Traditional peacekeeping" is a shorthand term that describes many but by no means all Cold War peacekeeping missions—the most notable exception being the Congo operation of 1960-1964. For a cogent analysis of different types of peacekeeping, see Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping" International Affairs 69, 3 (July 1993). 139. In game theoretic terms, they solved variable sum, "coordination" problems, in which both parties have the same best outcome and will reach it if they can trust each other to be rational, and "prisoner's dilemma" problems, in which the parties have a rational incentive to cheat. T h e peacekeepers provide the missing transparency in the first and alter the payoffs in the second, making the prisoner's dilemma into a coordination game. First-generation operations include both sorts of games. 140. This corresponds to the game of "chicken." T h e traditional reference is two teenagers, driving toward each other at high speeds, seeking to

NOTES

99

scare the other off the center of the road. T h e very danger that neither of the two parties is bluffing should produce accommodation. 141. Categories of action are comprehensively set forth in J o h n Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993 (Providence: Watson Institute), and J o h n Ruggie, "The United Nations: Stuck in a Fog Between Peacekeeping and Enforcement," in Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? McNair Paper 25, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington: National Defense University, 1993), pp. 1-11. Also see J o h n Mackinlay's update,"Problems for US Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping," in McNair Paper 25, pp. 2 9 - 5 0 . 142. See Ruggie, "Stuck in a Fog," and Chopra and Mackinlay, A Draft Concept, for further discussion. 143. UN Charter, Article 42: "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for Article 41 (e.g., economic sanctions) would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." 144. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 ) , pp. 3 - 2 0 . 145. This is the essence of Senator Byrd's objection to the US role in Somalia under UNOSOM II. "I find it difficult," he recently said, "to believe it is possible to muster a consensus here [the U.S. Senate], or in the country at large, that such an effort ["forcible political reconciliation"] is worth any price in American blood." New York Times, September 10, 1993, p. A9. 146. Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986). 147. T h e Governor's Island Accord, which p r o d u c e d the first (ineffective) settlement of the Haitian conflict, resulted from e c o n o m i c sanctions on arms and oil imposed by the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS). Sanctions targeted on the perpetrators (the military elite and their supporters) would have been (it now appears) much more effective. Restrictions on the overseas private bank accounts and air travel of the ruling elite are more just and perhaps more effective than general e c o n o m i c sanctions, whose impact is most severe on the most vulnerable and from which the elite may actually benefit, as they reportedly did in Haiti. 148. Yasushi Akashi, "UNTAC in Cambodia: Lessons for UN Peace-keeping," the Charles Rostow Annual Lecture (Washington, DC: SAIS, O c t o b e r 1993), and Doyle interviews in Phnom Penh, March 1993, and New York, November 1993. 149. Ian J o h n s t o n e and Mark LeVine, "Lessons From El Salvador," Christian Science Monitor, August 10, 1993. 150. These issues are effectively explored in J o h n Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," Washington Quarterly 15, 2 (Spring 1992); Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," Survival 35, 2 (Summer 1993); William Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martins, 1993); Mats Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper 281 (London: IISS, 1993); and T h o m a s Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations," The Washington Quarterly 16, 1 (Winter 1993). 151.1 first heard a variation on this'point from Edward Luck.

100

NOTES

152. See Raymond Vernon, "Long-Run Trends in Concession Contracts," Proceedings of the Sixty-First Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., 1967). 153. Yasushi Akashi, interview in "Peace in the Killing Fields," part 3 of T h e Thin Blue Line, BBC Radio 4, released May 9, 1993. 154. It is interesting in this light to note that some key early UN experts in peacekeeping were eminent decolonization experts deeply familiar with the politics of colonial rule, as was Ralph Bunche from the UN Trusteeship Division. See Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, An American Life (New York: Norton, 1993), chapter 5, and, for a discussion of imperial strategy, Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), chapter 12. But there are key differences. Empires were governed primarily in the interests of the metropole; UN peace operations explicitly promote the interests of the host country. And what made imperial strategy work was the possibility of coercive violence, the over-the-horizon gunboats that could be and often were offshore. That, for good and bad, is what the UN lacks. Rehabilitation assistance is sometimes an effective carrot, but it is not the equivalent of the Royal Navy. 155. For a good account of traditional views of reconciliation, see A. B. Fetherston,"Putting the Peace Back Into Peacekeeping," International Peacekeeping 1, 1 (Spring 1994), p. 11, discussing a paper by Marc Ross. 156. Dr. Reginald Austin, Chief Electoral Officer's Electoral Evaluation: Summary Report (UNTAC, 1993) p. 14. 157. See Michael Doyle and Ian J o h n s t o n e , "United Nations Globalism and State Sovereignty," (draft paper) where these issues are considered at more length. For a discussion of the Salvadoran peacebuilding process, see J o h n s t o n e , Human Rights and Reconciliation in El Salvador (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming). 158. This link was drawn explicitly by Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger at the Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia, J u n e 22, 1992, in Tokyo, where he proposed that assistance to Cambodia be "through the SNC—to areas controlled by those Cambodian parties cooperating with UNTAC in implementing the peace accords—and only to those parties which are so cooperating" (Press Release U S U N - 4 4 - 9 2 , J u n e 23, 1992). Working through the SNC, however, gave the Khmer Rouge a voice, as a member of the SNC, in the potential disbursement of the aid. 159. Would China have eschewed using its veto? China had permitted various measures that condemned the KR for obstruction of the peace operation. If the KR had been invited to join in the training, it is not at all clear that the PRC would have opposed the measure. We can also note that the KR did participate in the modest efforts toward police training organized in Banteay Meanchey.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acharaya, Amitav, et al. Cambodia—1989 Paris Peace Conference: Background. Analysis and Documents. Milwood, N.Y.: Kraus International, 1989. Akashi, Yasushi. "The Challenge of Peace-keeping in Cambodia: Lessons to Be Learned." Lecture, School of Internationa! and Public Affairs, Columbia University, November 29, 1993. Alagappa, Muthiah. "The Cambodian Conflict: Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement. "Disarmament: A Periodic Review 13, 3 ( 1 9 9 0 ) : 5 9 - 9 0 . Asia Watch. Khmer Rouge Abuses Along the Thai-Cambodian Border. Washington, D.C.: Asia Watch, 1989. . Cambodia: Human Rights Before and After the Elections. Washington, D.C.: Asia Watch, May 1993. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal. Canberra, 1990. Basu, Sanglanitra. Kampuchea as a Factor in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1975-1984. Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1987. Becker, Elizabeth. When the War Was Over. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. Berdal, Mats. Whither UN Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper 281, IISS, London (October 1993). Brown, Frederick Z. Cambodia and the Dilemmas of U.S. Policy. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991. . Cambodia in Crisis: The 1993 Elections and the United Nations. NY: T h e Asia Society (May 1993). Brown, Fredrick Z., ed. Rebuilding Cambodia. Baltimore: J o h n s Hopkins University Press, 1993. Bull, David. The Poverty of Diplomacy: Kampuchea and the Outside World. Oxford: OXFAM, 1983. Buszynski, Leszek. "Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security." Asia Survey 32, 9 (September 1992). Cambodia, Kingdom of. Constitution. Adopted September 21, 1993. Chanda, Nayan. "Cambodia: In Search of an Elusive P e a c e . " The AmericanVietnamese Dialogue. Conference Report, February 8-11, 1993. T h e Aspen Institute 8, 2 : 2 1 - 2 7 . Chandler, David. The Tragedy of Cambodian History. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991.

101

102

BIBLIOGRAPHY

C h e n g , Pao-min. Kampuchea: Between China and Vietnam. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985. C h o p r a , Jarat, Larry Minear, a n d J o h n Mackinlay. An Interim Report on the Cambodian Peace Process. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 1992. C o o p e r a t i o n Committee for Cambodia, P h n o m P e n h . Humanitarian Assistance in Cambodia, 1993 and 1994. D o m m e n , Arthur J. "UN Bias in Cambodian Peace." Global Affairs 7, 4 (Fall 1992). Doyle, Michael W. Empires. Ithaca and L o n d o n : Cornell University Press, 1986. . "Lessons from Cambodia." The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and U.S. Policy in the Post-Cold War World. T h e Aspen Institute C o n f e r e n c e , April 4-9, 1994. Doyle, Michael W., and Nishkala Suntharalingam. "The UN in Cambodia." International Peacekeeping 1, 2 (Summer 1994). Doyle, Michael W., and Ayaka Suzuki. "Transitional Authority in Cambodia." In T h o m a s Weiss, ed. The United Nations and Civil Wars. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming 1995. Durch, William J., ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis. Washington, D.C.: H e n r y L. Stimson Center, 1993. Evans, Gareth. "The Comprehensive Political Settlement to the Cambodia Conflict: An Exercise in Cooperating for Peace." International Peacekeeping Seminar, Australian Defence Force Academy, May 2-4, 1994, Canberra, in H u g h Smith, ed. International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre/ADFA, 1994. F e r n a n d o , J. Basil. The Inability to Prosecute: Courts and Human Rights in Cambodia and Sri Lanka. H o n g Kong: Future Asia Link, 1993. F e t h e r s t o n , A.B. "Putting the Peace Back Into Peacekeeping." International Peacekeeping1, 1 (Spring 1994). Frost, Frank. "The Cambodia Conflict: T h e Path Towards Peace." Contemporary Southeast Asia 13, 2 (September 1991) :119-163. Fuesser, Ulrich. "Cambodia: No Peace in Sight." German Foreign Affairs Review 42, 2 (1991):200-208. G o r d o n , Bernard K. "The T h i r d I n d o c h i n a Conflict." Foreign Affairs 65, 1 (Spring 1988). Goulding, Marrack. "Current Rapid Expansion Unsustainable Without Major Changes." Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping. New York: Trilateral Commission, 1993. . "The Evolution of U n i t e d Nations Peacekeeping." International Affairs 69, 3 (July 1993). Haas, Michael. Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Paxvn on a Superpower Chessboard. New York: Praeger, 1991. H a n g Vong, B o u n c h h a t . "L'ONU et le r e g l e m e n t du conflit Cambodgien." Association des Diplomeles de I'Inslilul D'etudes Poliliques de Toulouse, 1992. H e l m a n , Gerald B., and Steven R. Ratner. "Saving Failed States." Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-1993) :3-20. In, T h a d d e e . "Cambodge, an I." Politique Internationale 54 (Hiver 1991/ 1992):273-289. Issacs, Arnold. Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1987.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

103

ackson, Karl D, ed. Cambodia, 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. ames, Alan. "The Congo Controversies." International Peacekeeping 1, 1 (Spring 1 9 9 4 ) : 4 4 - 5 8 . ennar, Raoul. "Cambodia: Which Way to Peace?" Indochina Issues9\ (October 1990). ohnstone, Ian. Human Rights and Reconciliation in El Salvador. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming 1995. ones, Sidney, and Dinah Pokempner. "Human Rights in Cambodia." In Frederick Z. Brown, ed. Rebuilding Cambodia. Baltimore: J o h n s Hopkins University Press, 1993. Keeley, Edmund. A Wilderness Called Peace. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. Kiernan, Ben. How Pol Pot Came to Power. London: Verso, 1985. . "The Failures of the Paris Agreements on Cambodia, 1 9 9 1 - 9 3 . " The Challenge of Indochina: An Examination of the U.S. Role. Congressional Staff Conference Report, April 30-May 2, 1993. T h e Aspen Institute 8, 4 : 7 - 1 9 . , ed. Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the UN, and the International Community. New Haven: Monograph Series 41/Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993. Kiernan, Ben, and Chantou Boua, eds. Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea 1942-1981. London, Zed Press, 1982. Klintworth, Gregory. Vietnam's Withdrawal from Cambodia. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1987. Koh, Tommy T.B. "The Paris Conference on Cambodia: A Multilateral Negotiation that Failed." Negotiation Journal 6, 1 (January 1 9 9 0 ) : 8 1 - 8 7 . Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Seeking Shelter. Cambodians in Thailand: A Report on Human Rights. New York, 1987. Ledgerwood, Judy. "UN Peacekeeping Missions: T h e Lessons from Cambodia. " Asia Pacific Issues 11 (East-West Center) (March 1994). Leifer, Michael. "Power Sharing and Peacemaking in Cambodia." SAIS Review 12, 1 (Winter/Spring 1 9 9 2 ) : 1 3 9 - 1 5 3 . Liu, F.T. United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force. International Peace Academy Occasional Paper. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992. Mackinlay, J o h n . "A Role for the Peacekeeper in Cambodia." RUSI 135, 3 (Autumn 1990):26-30. Mackinlay, J o h n . "Problems for U.S. Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping." McNair Paper 25 ( 1 9 9 3 ) : 2 9 - 5 0 (Institute for National Strategic Studies [INSSJ, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.). . "Second Generation Multinational Operations." Washington Quarterly 15, 2 (Spring 1992). . A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993. Providence: Watson Institute, 1993. Mahbubani, Kishore. "The Kampuchean Problem: A Southeast Asian Perception." Foreign Affairs 62, 2 (Winter 1 9 8 3 / 1 9 8 4 ) . Maley, Michael. "Reflections on the Electoral Process in Cambodia." In Hugh Smith, ed. Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1993. Maley, William. "Regional Conflicts: Afghanistan and Cambodia." In Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, eds. Reshaping Regional Relations. Boulder: Westview, 1993.

104

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Marks, Stephen. "Forgetting 'the Policies and Practices of the Past': Impunity in Cambodia." The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 18, 2 ( S u m m e r / Fall 1994): 17-43. McAuliff, J o h n , and Mary Byrne McDonnell. "The Diplomatic Dance: Cambodia on the International Stage." Cultural Survival Quarterly 14, 3 (1990): 28-34. McLean, Lyndall. "Civil Administration in Transition." International Peacekeeping Seminar, May 2 - 4 , 1994, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, in Hugh Smith, ed. International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre/ADFA, 1994, 4 7 - 5 8 . Muscat, Robert, et al. Rebuilding Cambodia. Washington: SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, 1993. Myslisiec, Eva. Punishing the Poor: The International Isolation of Kampuchea. Oxford: OXFAM, 1988. Nguyen-Vo, Thu-Huong. Khmer Viet Relations and the Third World Indochina Conflict. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1992. Osborn, Milton. Before Kampuchea: Preludes to Tragedy. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1979. Pavlial, Om Parakash. Cambodia, Past and Present. New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991. Peang-Meth, Abdulgaffar. "The UN Peace Plan, the Cambodian Conflict and the Future of Cambodia." Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, 1 (June 1992): 33-47. Porter, Careth. "Cambodia: Sihanouk's Initiative." Foreign Affairs 66, 2 (Spring 1988). Pradhan, P.C. Foreign Policy of Kampuchea. London: Sagan Books, 1987. Ratner, Steven R. "The Cambodia Settlement Agreements." American Journal of International Law 87 (1993). . "The United Nations' Role in Cambodia: A Model for Resolution of Internal Conflicts?" In Lori Damrosch, ed. Enforcing Restraint. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993. Roberts, Adam. "The United Nations and International Security." Survival 35, 2 (Summer 1993). Robinson, Court. "Something Like Home Again": The Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1994. Rodman, Peter W. "Supping with Devils." National Interest 25 (Fall 1991): 44-50. Ruggie, J o h n G. "The United Nations: Stuck in a Fog Between Peacekeeping and Enforcement: T h e Way Ahead?" McNair Paper 25 ( 1 9 9 3 ) : 1-11.

Sanderson, J o h n . "Preparation for, Deployment and Conduct of Peacekeeping Operations: A Cambodia Snapshot." UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, March 2 1 - 2 4 , 1993, Australian Defence Force Academy Seminar, Canberra. . "UNTAC: Successes and Failures." In Hugh Smith, ed. International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre/ADFA, 1994. Scalabrino, Camile. Affaires Cambodigiennes: 1979-1989. Paris: Harmattan, 1989.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

105

Schear, James A. "The United Nations Operation in Cambodia: A Status Report." The Challenge of Indochina: An Examination of Ihe U.S. Role. Congressional Staff Conference Report, April 30-May 2, 1993. T h e Aspen Institute 8, 4 : 2 1 26.

Sesser, Stan. "Report from Cambodia." The New Yorker. May 18, 1992. Shawcross, William. Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. . The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and the Modern Conscience. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. . "A New Cambodia." New York Review of Books. August 12, 1993. . Cambodia's New Deal. Contemporary Issues Paper No. 1. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1994. Sihanouk, Prince Norodom. War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia. New York: Pantheon, 1980. . Prince Sihanouk on Cambodia: Interviews and Talks with Norodom Sihanouk. Hamburg: Institut fur Asienkunde, 1985. . Prisonnier des Khmer Rouges. Paris: Hachette, 1986. Smith, Hugh, ed. International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre/ADFA, 1994. Solarz, Stephen. "Cambodia and International Community." Foreign Affairs 69, 2 (Spring 1990) : 9 9 - l 15. Sopiee, Mohammed Noordin. "The Cambodian Conflict." ISIS Research Note (Malaysia 1989): 1-27. Stern, Lewis M. "Cambodia: Diplomatic Falters." Current History 89, 545 (March 1990): 109-112 and 135-138. Sutter, Robert G. The Cambodian Crisis and U.S. Policy Dilemmas. Boulder: Westview, 1991. Than, Sina. "Cambodia 1990: Towards a Peaceful Solution." Southeast Asian Affairs (1991) :83—104. Thomas, Trisha. "Into the Unknown: Can the UN Bring Peace to Cambodia?" Journal of International Affairs 44, 2 (Winter 1 9 9 1 ) : 4 9 5 - 5 1 5 . Tomoda, Seki. "Japan's Search for a Political Role in Asia: T h e Cambodian Peace Settlement." Japan Review of International Affairs 6, 1 (Spring 1992). Uphoff, Elisabeth. "Rehabilitation in Cambodia under the UNTAC Mandate." In Michael Doyle and Ian J o h n s t o n e , eds. Multidimensional Peacekeeping. Forthcoming 1995. Urquhart, Brian. Ralph Bunche, An American Life. New York: Norton, 1993. Van der Kroef, Justus Maria. "Cambodia in 1990: T h e Elusive Peace." Asian Surwi)>31, 1 (January 1991) : 9 4 - 1 0 2 . Van Phac, Tran. "For Peace, National Concord and Reconciliation in Cambodia. " The American-Vietnamese Dialogue. Conference Report, February 8-11, 1993. T h e Aspen Institute 8, 2 : 2 9 - 3 1 . Vernon, Raymond. "Long-Run Trends in Concession Contracts." Proceedings of the Sixty-First Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 1967, Washington, D.C. Vickery, Michael. Kampuchea: Politics, Econoviics and Society. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986. . "Notes on the Political Economy of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. "Journal of Contemporary Asia 20, 4 (1990) : 4 3 5 - 4 6 5 .

106

BlBl.IOCR.APHY

Warner, Nick. " C a m b o d i a : L e s s o n s o f U N T A C for P e a c e k e e p i n g O p e r a tions. " UN P e a c e k e e p i n g at t h e Crossroads, M a r c h 2 1 - 2 4 , 1993, Australian D e f e n c e F o r c e Academy S e m i n a r , C a n b e r r a . Weiss, T h o m a s . "New Challenges for U N Military O p e r a t i o n s . " The Washingion Quarterly 16, 1 (Winter 1 9 9 3 ) .

INTERVIEWS

INTERVIEWS BY MICHAEL DOYLE AND NISHKALA SUNTHARALINGAM N e w York

Mr. J o h n Griffin, Col. Bruce Osborn, Australian Mission to the United Nations, 2 / 2 / 9 3 Mr. Gian Luca Burci, UN Legal Office, 2 / 3 / 9 3 Mr. Hedi Annabi, Lt. Col. Matyusof, UN D e p a r t m e n t of Peacekeeping Operations, 2 / 3 / 9 3 Colonel Kearney, US Mission, 2 / 4 / 9 3 Mr. William Wallace, US Mission, 2 / 4 / 9 3 Ms. Leila Benkirane, UN Legal Office, 2 / 4 / 9 3 Mr. Mohammad Jusuf, Mr. D. Rondipuro, Indonesian Mission, 2/5/93 Ms. Sylvie Berman, French Mission, 2 / 9 / 9 3 Mr. Takashi Ashiki, Japanese Mission, 2 / 1 1 / 9 3 Mr. Zhang Yan, Chinese Mission, 2 / 1 2 / 9 3 Ms. Hisako Shimura, UN D e p a r t m e n t of Peacekeeping Operations, 2/17/93 Mr. Thakur Phanit, Mr. Manopchai Vongphakdi, Thailand Mission, 2/22/93 Mr. James Ross, Lawyers Committee for H u m a n Rights, 2 / 2 4 / 9 3 Ambassador Eng Rolland, FUNCINPEC Representative, Cambodian Mission, 2 / 2 6 / 9 3 Ms. Sidney Jones, Asia Watch, 3 / 4 / 9 3 Mr. Mark H o n g , Singapore Mission, 3 / 4 / 9 3 Ambassador T h i o u n n Prasith, Khmer Rouge Representative, Cambodian Mission, 3 / 8 / 9 3 Ambassador Peter Hohenfellner, Austrian Mission, 3 / 9 / 9 3 107

108

M I C H A E L W . DOYLE

Mr. Andrew Clapham, Amnesty International, 3 / 1 0 / 9 3 Mr. Robert Pierce, British Mission, 3 / 1 2 / 9 3 Mr. David Hawke, Cambodian Documentation Commission, 3 / 1 7 / 9 3 Ms. E. Kimball, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 3/17/93 Washington Panel Discussion sponsored by the US General Accounting Office, Congressional Research Service, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies on United Nations Peacekeeping with Special Reference to Cambodia, Washington, D.C., Feb. 10, 1993: Mr. Tek Miyabara, GAO; Professor Michael Haas, University of Hawaii; Professor Fred Brown, SAIS; Mr. Chris LaFleur, State Department—South East Asia Desk; Mr. Ken Roth, H u m a n Rights Watch; Mr. Michael Swaine, Rand Corporation. Providence, Rhode Island Meetings at the Watson Institute with J o h n Mackinlay, Thomas Weiss, and Jarat Chopra concerning UNTAC and "Second Generation Peacekeeping," Brown University, Providence.

INTERVIEWS BY MICHAEL DOYLE

Canberra Lt. Gen. J o h n Sanderson, Force Commander UNTAC, 3 / 2 3 / 9 3 Mr. Ken Berry, Adviser to Foreign Minister Evans, 3 / 2 4 / 9 3 Dr. Richard Rigby, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 3 / 2 4 / 9 3 Gen. Long SoPheap, CPAF, 3 / 2 5 / 9 3

INTERVIEWS BY MICHAEL DOYLE AND (VARIOUSLY) F.T. LIU A N D / O R MARK METRIKAS

Bangkok Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed, UN Special Representative, ESCAP, 3 / 2 6 / 9 3 Officials, Thai Foreign Ministry, 3 / 2 6 / 9 3 Mr. Mark Sidel, Program Officer, Ford Foundation, 3 / 2 6 / 9 3 Phnom Penh Mr. Yasushi Akashi, UN Special Representative, UNTAC, 3 / 3 0 / 9 3 , 5/30/93

INTERVIEWS

109

Mr. Medilli, Director, Administration, UNTAC, 3 / 2 9 / 9 3 General Rideau, Deputy Force Commander, UNTAC, 3 / 2 9 / 9 3 M. Gerard Porcell, Director, CIVADMIN, UNTAC, 3 / 3 0 / 9 3 Lt. Col. Russell Stuart, Plans and Operations Office, UNTAC, 3/30/93,5/24/93 Gen. Klaas Roos, Commander, CIVPOL, 3 / 3 0 / 9 3 Mr. Kazuo Tateishi, Specialized Control Division, CIVADMIN, UNTAC, 4 / 3 / 9 3 Mr. Roger Lawrence, Economic Adviser, UNTAC, 4 / 2 / 9 3 Mr. Dennis McNamara, Director, H u m a n Rights C o m p o n e n t , UNTAC, 4 / 2 / 9 3 Dr. Stephen Marks, Deputy Director, H u m a n Rights C o m p o n e n t , UNTAC, 4 / 2 / 9 3 Mr. Eduardo Vetere, Provincial Director, P h n o m P e n h Province, 4/4/93 Mr. Tim Carney, Division Head, I n f o r m a t i o n / E d u c a t i o n Division, 4/8/93 M. Dominique-Pierre Gueret, Chief Defense Division, CIVADMIN, UNTAC, 4 / 8 / 9 3 Mr. Steve Heder, Khmer expert, I n f o r m a t i o n / E d u c a t i o n Division, 4/8/93 M. Laval and Mr. Steichen, Financial Control Division, CIVADMIN, UNTAC, 4 / 8 / 9 3 Mr. David Biggs, Assistant to the Director, CIVADMIN, 4 / 8 / 9 3 Mr. Jamal Ben Yahmed, Provincial Coordination Chief, CIVADMIN, UNTAC, 4 / 8 / 9 3 Mr. Behrooz Sadry, Deputy Special Representative, UNTAC, 4 / 9 / 9 3 Ambassador Tran Huy Chuong, Vietnamese Ambassador, 4 / 9 / 9 3 Mr. Ataul Karim, Political Adviser to UNTAC, 4 / 9 / 9 3 Dr. Chem Widya, SOC Member, SNC Secretariat, 4 / 9 / 9 3 Mr. Penn Thol, KPNLF Member, SNC Secretariat, 4 / 9 / 9 3 Ms. Cowan, Investigations Division, CIVADMIN, UNTAC, 4 / 9 / 9 3 Mr. Wojtech Kaluza, Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, CIVADMIN, UNTAC, 4 / 9 / 9 3 Ambassador Charles Twining, US Ambassador, 4 / 1 0 / 9 3 Mr. Nick Warner, Australian Mission to P h n o m Penh, 4 / 1 0 / 9 3 Mr. Michael Maley, Electoral Division, UNTAC, 5 / 2 9 / 9 3 Mr. William Maley, Electoral Division, 5 / 2 9 / 9 3 Lt. Gen. J o h n Sanderson, Force Commander, UNTAC, 5 / 2 9 / 9 3 Siem Reap Mr. Benny Widyono, Provincial Director, 3 / 3 1 / 9 3 Liaison Officers, ANKI and KPNLF, Siem Reap MMWG, 3 / 3 1 / 9 3

110

MICHAEL W . DOYLE

Lt. Col. O'Toole, U N M O , Siem Reap, 3 / 3 1 / 9 3 Capt. Sahel, Bangladesh Battalion, Siem Reap H e a d q u a r t e r s , 3 / 3 1 / 9 3 Mr. Dowling and Mr. P e t e r Williams, Electoral Officers, 4 / 1 / 9 3 Mr. Michael Ferguson, Electoral Officer, Siem Reap District Office, 4/1/93 Battambang Col. Arshad, C o m m a n d e r Malaysian Battalion, 4 / 5 / 9 3 Mr. G e n n a d i Gantschev, Provincial Director, 4 / 5 / 9 3 Mr. A n d r e B o u c h a r d , Provincial Electoral Officer, 4 / 5 / 9 3 Bavel Major J o h n s o n and Major Findlay, UNMOs, 4 / 6 / 9 3 Mr. E a m o n O ' M o r t h a g e n , Electoral Officer, 4 / 6 / 9 3 Sisophon Briefings, Royal Dutch Marine Battalion, 4 / 6 / 9 3 Mr. A n d e r s Roejkjaer, Provincial Director, UNTAC, 4 / 7 / 9 3 Ampil (Liberated Zone, Banteay Meanchey) Mr. Pou Sothirak, Minister for D e v e l o p m e n t , FUNCINPEC, 4 / 7 / 9 3 Mr. Sann, Chief of Police, FUNCINPEC, 4 / 7 / 9 3

INTERVIEWS BY MICHAEL DOYLE Kratie Electoral Officers, 5 / 2 6 / 9 3 Kompong Thom Mr. Salman A h m e d , Assistant Provincial Election Supervisor, UNTAC, 5 / 2 7 / 9 3 Officers, I n d o n e s i a n Battalion, 5 / 2 7 / 9 3 Stoung (Kompong Thom Province) Ms. Jill Davidson, Electoral Officer, Stoung, 5 / 2 8 / 9 3

INTERVIEWS BY ELISABETH UPHOFF Phnom Penh Mr. Men Ses, Deputy Director, D e p a r t m e n t of National Budget, Ministry of Finance, 9 / 1 4 / 9 3

INTERVIEWS

111

Mr. Ky V a n d e t h , B u r e a u Chief, D e p a r t m e n t of N a t i o n a l Budget, Ministry of F i n a n c e , 9 / 1 4 / 9 3 Ms. O m S o t h i a n , B u r e a u Chief, D e p a r t m e n t of A c c o u n t i n g , Ministry of Finance, 9 / 1 4 / 9 3 Mr. L o n g Visalo, F o r m e r D e p u t y Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9/22/93 Ms. D e b o r a h Brodie, C a m b o d i a n C o o r d i n a t i n g C o m m i t t e e (for NGOs) S u p e r i n t e n d e n t William Kirk, C o m m a n d e r of the Special Investigations Task Force, CIVPOL, 9 / 6 / 9 3 S u p e r i n t e n d e n t J o h n n y Tay, D e p u t y Chief of O p e r a t i o n s , CIVPOL, 9/8/93 Mr. H. E. Sam Raimsey, Minister of Finance, t r a n s l a t e d f r o m p r i n t e d interview in The Voice of Cambodia, Vol. 3, August 1993 Mr. Prak L e n g , Chief of C a b i n e t , Ministry of F i n a n c e , 9 / 1 4 / 9 3 Brig. Savrong, D e p a r t m e n t H e a d f o r N a t i o n a l Security, Ministry of N a t i o n a l Security, 9 / 2 3 / 9 3 Col. Mao C h a n d a r a , D e p a r t m e n t H e a d f o r C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e s , D e p a r t m e n t of N a t i o n a l Security, 9 / 2 3 / 9 3 Mr. O u k P r a n e t h , H e a d of Legislation Office, Ministry f o r N a t i o n a l Security, 9 / 2 3 / 9 3 Mr. Sok S a m o u e n , t r a n s l a t o r / i n t e r p r e t e r f o r William Kirk, 9 / 2 5 / 9 3 Lt. Col. Guy Laval, Chief of Liaison a n d T r a i n i n g , CIVPOL, 9/21/93 Mr. Bill T o w n s e n d , UNTAC Civil A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Liaison for Public Security, 9 / 9 / 9 3 Mr. Wojtech Kaluza, Chief, Foreign Affairs Service, CIVADMIN, UNTAC, 1 1 / 1 9 / 9 3 Mr. Vann S e n g Ly, Chief of N a t i o n a l Radio, Minister of I n f o r m a tion, 1 0 / 2 6 / 9 3 Assistant C o m m i s s i o n e r of Police, 1 0 / 2 6 / 9 3 Senior K h m e r Staff, Radio UNTAC, 1 1 / 2 6 / 9 3 G e n e r a l Tea B a h n , Vice Minister of D e f e n s e , Ministry of D e f e n s e , 11/4/93 Maj. Gen. P r o c h B u n t h o l , ANKI Liaison, UNTAC Mixed Military Working G r o u p , 1 1 / 1 2 / 9 3 S O C Police C a p t a i n , 1 1 / 6 / 9 3 U N H C R P r o t e c t i o n Staff, 1 1 / 2 - 5 / 9 3

Battambang M. Mok Dara, Police C o m m i s s i o n e r , 1 1 / 1 5 / 9 3 Mr. Teas H e a n g , Deputy Governor, 1 1 / 1 6 / 9 3

U N DOCUMENTS

General: United Nations. D e p a r t m e n t o f Public I n f o r m a t i o n . Towards Peace in Cambodia, 1990. . Boutros-Ghali, B o u t r o s . An Agenda for Peace, UN D P I / 1 2 4 7 , J u n e 1992. . "First Prime Minister o f C a m b o d i a Calls for K h m e r Rouge to J o i n a Unified G o v e r n m e n t . " O c t o b e r 4, 1993. . United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: Information Notes. 1306/2,1993. U n i t e d Nations High C o m m i s s i o n e r for R e f u g e e s ( U N H C R ) . The State of the World's Refugees: The Challenge of Protection 1993. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993. . Cambodia Repatriation Operation, August 31, 1993. U n i t e d Nations Institute for T r a i n i n g and Research ( U N I T A R ) . Nishikawa, J u n . ASEAN and the United Nations System, 1983.

General Assembly: United Nations. G e n e r a l Assembly. Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, October 23, 1991. More c o m m o n l y r e f e r r e d to as the Paris A g r e e m e n t s . A / 4 6 / 6 0 8 - S / 2 3 1 7 7 ; 31 I.L.M. 183 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . . General Assembly. Security Council. An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. A/47/277 and S / 2 4 1 1 1 , J u n e 17, 1992.

General Assembly, Secretary-General Reports: United Nations. Report of the Secretary General. " T h e Situation in Cambodia." A / 4 0 / 7 5 9 , O c t o b e r 17, 1985.

112

UN

DOCUMENTS

113

. Report of the Secretary General. "The Situation in Cambodia." A/45/605, October 10, 1990. General Assembly Resolutions: United Nations. General Assembly. A/RES/45/3, 15 October 1990. Security Council: United Nations. Security Council. S/21149, 15 February 1990. . S/21196, 16 March 1990. . S/21318, 29 May 1990. . S / 2 1 3 6 4 , 21 J u n e 1990. — S/22733, 25 J u n e 1991. . S/22808, 18 July 1991. . S/22580, 29 July 1991. . S/23011, 4 September 1991. . S/23870, 1 May 1992. . S/24090. 12 J u n e 1992. . S/24183. 25 J u n e 1992. . S/24286, 14 July 1992. . S/24578, 21 September 1992. . S/25658, 23 April 1993. . S/25879, 2 J u n e 1993. Security Council Resolutions: United Nations. Security Council. S/RES/668, 20 September 1990. . S/RES/717, 16 October 1991. . S/RES/718, 31 October 1991. . S/RES/728, 8 January 1992. . S/RES/745, 28 February 1992. . S/RES/766, 12 J u n e 1992. . S/RES/783, 21 July 1992. . S/RES/792, 30 November 1992. . S/RES/810, 8 March 1993. . S/RES/826, 20 May 1993. . S/RES/840, 15 J u n e 1993. . S/RES/860, 27 August 1993. Security Council, Secretary-General Reports: United Nations. Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia Concerning the Recommendation for the Establishment of a UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). S/23097, September 30, 1991. . Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation Plan of the Agreements. S/23613, February 19, 1992.

114

U N DOCUMENTS

. Report of the Secretary-General. S / 2 4 8 0 0 , November 15, 1992. . Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, S / 2 5 1 2 4 , J a n u a r y 25, 1993. . Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of SC Resolution 792. S / 2 5 2 8 9 , February 1 3 , 1 9 9 3 . . Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC. S / 2 5 7 1 9 , May 3 , ' l 9 9 3 . . Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 810. S / 2 5 7 8 4 , May 15, 1993. . Report of the Secretary-General on the Conduct and Results of the Elections in Cambodia. S / 2 5 9 1 3 , J u n e 10, 1993. . Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 840. S / 2 6 0 9 0 , July 16, 1993. . Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 840. S / 2 6 3 6 0 , August 26, 1993. . Further Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 745. S / 2 6 5 2 9 , O c t o b e r 5, 1993. Documents: UNTAC Doc. "Note sur le controle de l'administration civile." August 1992. . "UNTAC's Activities: Civil Administration C o m p o n e n t . " September 7, 1992. . "Report on UNTAC's Activities: T h e First Six Months." March 1 5 - S e p t e m b e r 15, 1992. . "Activity Reports o f Civil Administration—September, October, November, D e c e m b e r 1992 and J a n u a r y 1993." . "UNTAC R e p o r t o f the Fourth Civil Administration Seminar." D e c e m b e r 1 0 - 1 2 , 1992. . "Control Exercised over Civil Administration." March 9, 1993. . "Evaluation Report: UN C I V P O L . " Phnom P e n h , August 1993. . "Border Control Unit Final Report." September 1993. . "Final R e p o r t of the Civil Administrative C o m p o n e n t . " Phnom Penh, September 16, 1993. . "Human Rights C o m p o n e n t Final R e p o r t . " P h n o m Penh, September 1993. . Austin, Reginald. "Chief Electoral Officer's Electoral Evaluation: Summary Report, 1993. Military C o m p o n e n t . "Strategic Lessons: Part I." Unpublished Doc. "Briefing Note: Terms of Reference of the Proposed UNTAC Control Mechanism at the Provincial Level, 19 J a n u a r y 1993."

U N T A C

A B O U T T H I S OCCASIONAL PAPER

Involving m o r e than 1 5 , 0 0 0 military p e r s o n n e l , 3 , 5 0 0 civil police, and 2 , 0 0 0 other officials, the United Nations Transitional Authority in C a m b o d i a (UNTAC) was o n e o f the most ambitious UN peacekeeping missions yet u n d e r t a k e n . Going beyond the usual monitoring tasks, UNTAC p e a c e k e e p i n g also involved a crucial civilian comp o n e n t focused on building peace. T h i s study explores the r e c o r d o f the UN's e x p e r i e n c e in Camb o d i a as it attempted to create a neutral political e n v i r o n m e n t that would lead ultimately to d e m o c r a t i c e l e c t i o n s . Doyle traces and assesses the course o f UNTAC's civilian mandate, c o n c e n t r a t i n g on its successes and failures in m o n i t o r i n g h u m a n rights, supervising Camb o d i a ' s civilian police, " c o n t r o l l i n g " five essential areas o f C a m b o dian sovereignty, and registering voters and conducting (for the first time) an election organized by the U n i t e d Nations. His conclusions p o i n t to the lessons, for the UN and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, that can be drawn from this crucial effort at civil peacekeeping.

is professor o f politics and i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs at Princeton University. His previous publications include Alternatives to Monetary Disorder and Empires.

MICHAEL DOYLE

115

T H E INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY

T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace Academy is an i n d e p e n d e n t , n o n p a r t i s a n , international institution devoted to the p r o m o t i o n of peaceful and multilateral approaches to the resolution of international as well as internal conflicts. IPA plays a facilitating role in efforts to settle conflicts, providing a middle ground where the options for settling particular conflicts are explored and p r o m o t e d in an informal setting. O t h e r activities of the organization include public forums; training seminars on conflict resolution and peacekeeping; and research and workshops on collective security, regional and internal conflicts, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and nonmilitary aspects of security. In fulfilling its mission, IPA works closely with the United Nations, regional and o t h e r international organizations, governments, and parties to conflicts. T h e work of IPA is f u r t h e r e n h a n c e d by its ability to draw on a worldwide network of e m i n e n t persons comprising government leaders, statesmen, business leaders, diplomats, military officers, and scholars. In the aftermath of the Cold War, there is a general awakening to e n o r m o u s potential of peaceful and multilateral approaches to resolving conflicts. This has given renewed impetus to the role of IPA. IPA is governed by an international board of directors. Financial s u p p o r t for the work of the organization is provided primarily by philanthropic foundations, as well as individual donors.

116

INTERNATIONAL P E A C E ACADEMY OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

Available from the International Peace Academy, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York 10017 (212-949-8480): The Future of Peacekeeping, Indar J i t Rikhye Paths to Peace in Afghanistan: The Geneva Accords and After, Selig S. Harrison The Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Need for a Sound Financial Basis, Susan R. Mills United Nations Peacekeeping: Management and Operations, F. T Liu Negotiations Before Peacekeeping, Cameron R. Hume Available from Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 (303-444-6684): The United Nations in a Turbulent World, James N. Rousenau United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force, F. T. Liu The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping, Robert Stephens Staley II Political Order in Post-Communist Afghanistan, William Maley and Fazel Haq Saikal Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, Samuel M. Makinda. Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action, Ian Johnstone Presiding Over a Divided World: Changing UN Roles, 1945-1993, Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, Michael W. Doyle

117