Ukrainian Nationalism 9780231898911

Table of contents :
Note on Transliteration
Preface to the Second Edition
Preface to the First Edition
Contents
Maps
I. The Emergence of Nationalism
II. The Ukrainians and the Polish Catastrophe
III. Retrenchment and Revolt
IV. The Opening of the Ukraine
V. Repression and Reichskommissariat
VI. From Underground to Resistance
VII. Salvage Efforts
VIII. Nationalism and the Church
IX. Channels of Nationalist Activity
X. Nationalism and the East Ukrainian Social Structure
XI. Geographical Variations of Nationalism
XII. Perspectives of Wartime Nationalism
XIII. After the War
Appendix: Populations of Ukrainian Cities
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

STUDIES

OF THE RUSSIAN COLUMBIA

INSTITUTE

UNIVERSITY

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

SECOND

EDITION

HE*

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS N E W Y O R K AND LONDON

IÇÔJ

COPYRIGHT FIRST

©

1955,

EDITION

Ukrainian

1963 1955

COLUMBIA PUBLISHED

Nationalism,

SECOND E D I T I O N LIBRARY

UNIVERSITY UNDER

TITLE

1939-1945 1963

O F CONGRESS CATALOG CARD N U M B E R :

MANUFACTURED

IN T H E

PRESS

U N I T E D STATES O F

62-18367 AMERICA

THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY was established by Columbia University in 1946 to serve two major objectives: the training of a limited number of well-qualified Americans for scholarly and professional careers in the field of Russian studies, and the development of research in the social sciences and the humanities as they relate to Russia and the Soviet Union. The research program of the Russian Institute is conducted through the efforts of its faculty members, of scholars invited to participate as Senior Fellows in its program, and of candidates for the Certificate of the Institute and for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Some of the results of the research program are presented in the Studies of the Russian Institute of Columbia University. T h e faculty of the Institute, without necessarily agreeing with the conclusions reached in the Studies, believe that their publication advances the difficult task of promoting systematic research on Russia and the Soviet Union and public understanding of the problems involved. T H E RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

The faculty of the Russian Institute are grateful to the Rockefeller Foundation for the financial assistance which it has given to the program of research and publication.

STUDIES OF T H E R U S S I A N

INSTITUTE

SOVIET NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT IN 1 9 3 7

Abram

Bergson

THROUGH THE GLASS OF SOVIET LITERATURE: VIEWS OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY

Edited, by Ernest J. Simmons 1928-1932 Edward J. Brown

THE PROLETARIAN EPISODE IN RUSSIAN LITERATURE,

MANAGEMENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL FIRM IN THE USSR: A STUDY IN SOVIET

ECONOMIC PLANNING SOVIET POLICIES IN CHINA, UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM,

David

1917-1924 1939-1945

Granick

Allen S. Whiting John A. Armstrong

POLISH POSTWAR ECONOMY

Thad

Paul

Alton

1917-1934 George S. N. Luckyj T H E EMERGENCE OF RUSSIAN PANSLAV1SM, 1856-1870 Michael Boro Petrovich BOLSHEVISM IN TURKESTAN, 1917-1927 Alexander G. Park T H E LAST YEARS OF THE GEORGIAN MONARCHY, 1658-1832 David Marshall Lang LENIN ON TRADE UNIONS AND REVOLUTION, 1893-1917 Thomas Taylor Hammond LITERARY POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE,

THE JAPANESE THRUST INTO SIBERIA, 1918

James

SOVIET MARXISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS THE

AGRARIAN

FOES OF

BOLSHEVISM:

William

Morley

Herbert PROMISE

AND

Marcuse

DEFAULT

RUSSIAN SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES, FEBRUARY TO OCTOBER, SOVIET POLICY AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS,

OF

THE

1917

Oliver H. Radkey 1931-1946 Charles B. McLane

PATTERN FOR SOVIET YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE CONGRESSES OF THE KOMSOMOL,

1918-1954

Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr.

THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN LITHUANIA

Alfred

THE SOVIET DESIGN FOR A WORLD STATE

Elliot

Erich R.

Senn

Goodman

SETTLING DISPUTES IN SOVIET SOCIETY: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF

INSTITUTIONS SOVIET MARXISM AND NATURAL SCIENCE,

1917-1932

RUSSIAN CLASSICS IN SOVIET JACKETS STALIN AND THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY, UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM, SECOND EDITION

LEGAL

John N. Hazard David Joravsky Maurice

Friedberg

1941-1947 Alfred J. Riebcr John

A.

Armstrong

For Annette and Janet

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION used in this study for the transliteration of Ukrainian and Russian words is that employed by the Library of Congress, except that the diacritical marks used there to indicate the substitution of two English letters to represent one Ukrainian or Russian letter have been omitted. For ease in reading, Russian and Ukrainian words appearing in the text have been given English plurals (i.e., they end in "s"). Consequently, an exception to the usual scheme of transliteration has been made in the case of the word oblast (a major territorial administrative unit in the Soviet Union). T h e apostrophe which would ordinarily be used to indicate the "soft sign" following the " t " in Russian, has been omitted altogether, because the "s" in the plural preceded by an apostrophe could easily be confused with the English genitive. T H E SYSTEM

When common English equivalents of Ukrainian and Russian first names exist, these equivalents have been used in the text. T h e monastic names of members of the Ukrainian ecclesiastical hierarchies have been given in the Latin or Greek forms familiar to Western readers, except in the case of names derived from Slavic saints. In the case of both lay and ecclesiastical authors, the Russian and Ukrainian forms of the first, or monastic, names have been given when referring to their works; but when an author so cited has been mentioned in the text as well, the English equivalent of his name is placed in parentheses after the first citation of each of his works.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION T h e first edition of this book was completed just eight years ago. Even in this short time, however, many developments calling for revision of the original text have occurred. When the latter was written, there was only one major scholarly work in English on the modern Ukraine, John S. Reshetar, Jr.'s The Ukrainian Revolution, though there were several important personal accounts and surveys. In subsequent years, an impressive number of books on the Ukraine in the twentieth century have appeared. In addition, new materials of many other kinds have become available. Participants in various phases of recent Ukrainian history have written their memoirs, and some who have not published their accounts have been willing to discuss their experiences orally. Some accounts of this kind have appeared in the Soviet Union itself, and it has been possible to visit the Ukraine and even to talk to Soviet citizens about events there. Finally, I have been greatly aided by the criticisms and factual emendations (in print or expressed privately) of those who read the first edition. Two of the main potential sources for the examination of the last twenty years of Ukrainian history remain unavailable, however. The Soviet authorities have not opened their archives. German official documents on the occupation of the Ukraine during World War II, in the hands of the United States government or elsewhere, are generally not available for scholarly use. Under these circumstances, the considerable expenditure of time and money required for a complete rewriting of this book does not yet appear warranted. The present revision, therefore, is ari effort to take account, within the general framework of the original work, of the large body of new material now available. Chapter I, " T h e Emergence of Nationalism," was always intended as a brief survey of the background of my topic. If I were

χ

Preface to Second Edition

required to begin such an introduction today, I should probably base it entirely upon the excellent secondary sources which have appeared in recent years. When I wrote the first edition, however, the scarcity of secondary sources forced me to base a large part of the introduction upon memoirs and other original sources. On the whole, I believe that the specific evidence I cite continues to have some interest, and my generalizations some validity. Under these circumstances, I have thought it best to leave the body of the chapter essentially untouched, while indicating important new secondary sources in the footnotes. Subsequent chapters deal with Ukrainian nationalism during World War II. Here the publication of new scholarly studies and personal accounts has not been so extensive. For the most part, these works—and minor substantive changes—have been indicated in the footnotes, with only factual errors corrected in the text. However, the discussion (at the end of Chapter VI) of changes in OUN ideology as a result of contact with the East Ukrainians has been considerably revised and expanded on the basis of contemporary documents which Lev Shankovs'kyi and his associates kindly made available to me. T h e final chapter (XII) of the original work presented my conclusions concerning Ukrainian nationalism during World War II. After reviewing these conclusions, I see no reason to alter them. Consequently, I have merely changed the title of the chapter from "Perspectives" to "Perspectives of Wartime Nationalism." T h e greatest change in the second edition is the addition of a thirteenth chapter, "After the War." Compared to the detailed examination of the war period, this chapter is only a survey, but (together with the introductory chapter) it rounds out the general picture of Ukrainian nationalism. When the first edition was written, the events of the war seemed still very close; after even eight years, a new generation of readers might well feel at a loss if the story of Ukrainian nationalism stopped with 1945. It is now relatively easy to trace the postwar development of the various nationalist parties. It is still extremely difficult to obtain accurate information on developments within the Soviet Union itself. However, the lapse of time has provided perspective for assaying some of the most important of these developments, particularly nationalist

Preface to Second Edition

xi

guerrilla activity against the Soviet regime. Today, when concern with the lessons of unconventional warfare is constantly increasing, it seems highly relevant to trace the postwar history of this unusual episode. In preparing the first edition I was very fortunate in obtaining oral accounts from many of the major actors in the history of wartime Ukrainian nationalism. In the relatively short time since I concluded my study, death has taken Stephen Baran, Elie Borschak, Diomid Gulai, Hans Koch, Andrew Livyts'kyi, Ivan Mirtschuk, Constantine Shtepa, Michael Vetukhiv, and Archbishop Polykarp Sikors'kyi. My friend and mentor Professor Franz L. Neumann died shortly before the first edition was published. These were men of sharply differing views; but they were united in the courage with which they upheld their convictions. Many persons have aided me in revising this book. I am especially grateful to the staff of the Russian Institute (in particular Louise Luke) and to the editors of Columbia University Press who have patiently helped in the necessarily tedious details of revision. As always, my wife, Annette Taylor Armstrong, has borne a major portion of the burden of my essays at scholarship. Madison, Wisconsin June, 1962

JOHN A .

ARMSTRONG

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION this study is based primarily on widely scattered and little known sources, it would have been impossible for me to have undertaken it without the advice and assistance of many persons and institutions. At the same time, of course, I alone must take full responsibility for all conclusions and opinions expressed. Foremost among those to whom I am indebted is Philip E. Mosely, Director of the Rusian Institute, Columbia University. From the beginning of my-study until its completion, Professor Mosely was my constant guide and counselor. Without his encouragement I would scarcely have undertaken this study, and his assistance was indispensable at every stage of its development. T o the other faculty and staff members of the Russian Institute I am also most grateful, not only for specific assistance but for a background of training which in some measure fitted me to cope with my chosen topic. Professors John N. Hazard and Geroid T . Robinson were especially helpful. I am also grateful to Professor Franz L. Neumann of the Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University; Dr. John S. Reshetar, Department of Politics, Princeton University; and Dr. Fritz T . Epstein of the Slavic Division, Library of Congress, for frequent and invaluable advice. For the financial assistance which made it possible for me to undertake the travel necessary in connection with my research and to devote an uninterrupted year to the project, I am indebted to the Social Science Research Council, which granted me an Area Research Training Fellowship for 1952-53. It is impossible within the compass of this preface to mention all those who in some way aided me. Consequently the following listing is an effort to name those persons and institutions which were most helpful in providing advice, written materials, or personal recollections. BECAUSE

Preface to First Edition

xiii

T h e Library of Congress; the National Archives of the United States; the New York Public Library; the Columbia University Libraries; the Yiddish Scientific Institute, New York; the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States, New York; the Ukrainian Congress Committee, New York; the United Nations Secretariat; the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, New York; the University of Chicago Library; the Mid-West Interlibrary Center, Chicago. T h e School of Slavonic Studies, University of London; the British Museum; the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Paris; the Centre de Documentation Internationale, Paris; the Ost-Europa Institut, Munich; the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich; the Ukrainian Free University, Munich; the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich; the United States General Consulate, Munich; the Amt für Landeskunde, Remagen. T h e Staatsarchiv, Marburg; the Westdeutsche Bibliothek, Marburg; the Herder Institut, Marburg; the Bibliothek des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. Dmytro Andriievs'kyi, Fritz Arlt, John Bahrianii, Stephen Baran, Theodore Bohatyrchuk, Alexander Boikiv, George Boiko, Simeon Bolan, Taras Borovets', Elie Borschak, Nicholas Chubatii, Martin Cremer, Alexander Dallin, Jane Degras, Ludwig Dehio, Volodymyr Dolenko, Leo Dudin, Alfred Eduard Frauenfeld, Muriel Grinrod, Diomid Gulai, Iaroslav Haivaz, Ludwig von Hammerstein-Equard, Hans von Herwarth, Raul Hilberg, Gustav Hilger, Ihor Hordiievs'kyi, Richard Iarii, Roman Il'nyts'kyi, Arthur Just. Mykola Kapustians'kyi, Hans Joachim Kausch, Hans Koch, Joseph Korbel, Bohdan Kravtsiv, Volodymyr Kubiiovych, Jean Laloy, Mykola Lebed', Georg Leibbrandt, Borys Levits'kyi, Andrew Livyts'kyi, Katerina Logush, Omelian Logush, Ludwig Lossacker, George Luckyj, Michael Luther, John Maistrenko, Liubomyr Makarushka, Werner Markert, Andre Mazon, Andrew Mel'nyk, Gerhard von Mende, Vadym Miakovs'kyi, Ivan Mirtschuk, Hanna Nakonechna, Alexander Ohloblyn, Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, Eugene Ostrovskyi. Constantine Pankivs'kyi, Zenon Pelens'kyi, Werner Philipp,

xiv

Preface to First Edition

John Popovych, Myroslav Prokop, Mykola Prykhod'ko, Victor Prykhod'ko, Vasyl' Rivak, Ivan Rudnyts'kyi, Peter Sahaidachnii, Ulas Samchuk, Gertrud Savelsberg, Walther Schenck, Otto Schiller, Paul Seabury, George Semenko, Hans Joachim Seraphim, Paul Shandruk, Consumine Shtepa, Dmytro Shtikalo, Oleh Shtul', Alexander Shul'hyn, Roman Smal-Stots'kyi, Jean-Marie Soutou, Eugene Stakhiv, Volodymyr Stakhiv, Volodymyr Starits'kyi, Iaroslav Stets'ko, George Tarkovych, Eberhardt Taubert. Arkadii Valiis'kyi, Constantine Varvariv, Michael Vetukhiv, Stephen Vitvits'kyi, John Vlasovs'kyi, Vsevolod Volkonovych, Michael Voskobiinyk, Eric Waldmann, Gerhard L. Weinberg, Sergius Yakobson, Vasyl Zavitnevych. Archbishop Polykarp Sikors'kyi, the Very Reverend Leo Veselovs'kyi, the Very Reverend Volodymyr Vychnevs'kyi, the Reverend John Hryn'ok. T h e maps accompanying this volume were prepared by Anthony J. Sucher, Jr., Arlington, Virginia. His excellent contribution will, I hope, add considerably to the clarity of my presentation. I am most grateful to the staff of Columbia University Press for its patience and thoroughness in editing the manuscript of this study and in assisting me in numerous aspects of its preparation. Henry Holt and Company, New York, kindly gave permission for the quotation from Donald Mackenzie Wallace. In concluding these acknowledgments, I must express my deep gratitude to my wife, who helped me in all phases of my study, and was an unfailing source of encouragement throughout. Alexandria, Virginia June, 1954

JOHN A . ARMSTRONG

CONTENTS I. T H E EMERGENCE O F NATIONALISM II. T H E UKRAINIANS AND T H E POLISH CATASTROPHE

3 26

III. R E T R E N C H M E N T AND REVOLT

46

IV. T H E OPENING O F T H E UKRAINE

73

V. REPRESSION AND REICHSKOMMISSARIAT VI. F R O M UNDERGROUND T O RESISTANCE VII. SALVAGE EFFORTS VIII. NATIONALISM AND T H E CHURCH IX. CHANNELS O F NATIONALIST ACTIVITY

101 130 166 188 211

X. NATIONALISM AND T H E EAST UKRAINIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE XI. GEOGRAPHICAL VARIATIONS O F NATIONALISM XII. PERSPECTIVES O F W A R T I M E NATIONALISM XIII. A F T E R T H E WAR

237 255 278 290

APPENDIX P O P U L A T I O N S O F UKRAINIAN CITIES

324

BIBLIOGRAPHY ABBREVIATIONS

328

NOTE ON SOURCES

329

BIBLIOGRAPHY

334

INDEX

349

MAPS P E N E T R A T I O N O F NATIONALIST GROUPS INTO T H E UKRAINE, S U M M E R AND A U T U M N ,

1941

PARTISAN ACTIVITY IN T H E NORTHERN UKRAINE JULY,

1941—JUNE,

JULY

DECEMBER,

JANUARY—MAY, JUNE

1942 1942

REGIONS O F T H E EAST UKRAINE

133

135 136

1943

PLACES HAVING UKRAINIAN NEWSPAPERS,

78

134

1943

DECEMBER,

EAST

137

1941-43

231 260

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

I. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM DURING the summer and autumn of 1941 the German armies rolled across the plains of the Ukraine; by November the entire Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was in their hands. Observers everywhere were aware of the significance of the conquest of

this huge area with its forty million inhabitants. The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine, famous as the "granary of the USSR," the gigantic industrial complex of the Donets basin, and the rich mineral deposits were weighed in appraising the loss of the Soviet Union and the gain of Germany. While the political effects of the conquest received less attention at the time, in some ways they were even more important than the economic effects. While there is a tradition of separate political development in the Ukraine, 1 modern nationalism—the doctrine that persons of a distinctive culture should constitute an independent state— came late to the area. T o a close observer, the first stirrings of nationalism among educated groups in the Ukraine would have been apparent early in the nineteenth century, and by the middle of that century Taras Shevchenko, the greatest name in Ukrainian literature, was giving poetic expression to nationalist aspirations. It was considerably later, however, that definitely political organizations were formed to establish the claim of the Ukraine to nationhood. 2 For the student of contemporary politics, it is precisely this late emergence of Ukrainian nationalism which i T h e term "Ukraine" is used throughout this study (except in cases when another meaning is clearly implied) to refer to the territory comprised in the Ukrainian SSR in 1946. Essentially the same area

(with the exception of the

Carpatho-Ukraine, which is discussed briefly at several points in this study) was included in the Ukrainian SSR in 1941. This territory corresponds fairly closely— except, as noted in Chapter XI, in the east—to the Ukrainian "ethnographical" territory, the area in which the indigenous population speaks Ukrainian. a John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: Λ Study in Nationalism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 12; cf. Jurij Borys, The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine: A Study

4

Emergence of Nationalism

endows it with peculiar interest. Few subjects are of greater importance for the understanding of the political forces shaping contemporary society than the interaction of nationalism, in its numerous manifestations, and socialism, in its divergent branches. Ukrainian nationalism is especially significant in this regard because it took form at the same time that Marxian socialism became influential as an ideology in the Russian Empire. As Ukrainian nationalism acquired definitely political aims and the dominant element of Russian Marxism took on the political form of Soviet Communism, the interrelationship between these two forces became increasingly complex. This circumstance, together with the intrinsic importance of Ukrainian nationalism as a force directed toward securing the support of one fifm of the population of the Soviet Union, appears to justify a detailed study of Ukrainian nationalism, even though it has never attained its primary aim, the establishment of a truly independent state. Moreover, the importance of the interaction of nationalism and Communism suggests that the study be focused upon that part of Ukrainian ethnographical territory which between 1920 and 1941 was under Soviet control. This region, commonly known as the "East Ukraine," was subjected to the full impact of the Soviet system prior to the period covered in the present study, while the "West Ukraine" was divided among non-Communist Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia during most of the period between the two world wars. While the East Ukraine is emphasized, the West Ukraine is also considered at some length as the region in which nationalism was most vigorous and as that which served as a base for nationalist activities. T h e present study is primarily political in theme, being directed to nationalism as a movement aiming at the establishment of an independent state. It is not limited to the political aspect in the narrow sense of the term, however. 3 Since the Ukrainian in the Communist 1960), p. 68.

Doctrine

of the

Self-Determination

of Nations

(Stockholm,

» N o effort, however, has been made to consider the primarily cultural aspects of nationalism (such as literary works) except insofar as they are directly related to nationalism as an organized political movement.

Emergence of Nationalism

5

nationalists did not succeed in organizing a state apparatus, there is little scope for the study of constitutional or legal structures. As will become apparent shortly, the nature of the various nationalist ideologies makes intensive study of Ukrainian political philosophy of limited value. Consequently, an effort has been made to follow the approach sometimes described as the "sociology of politics." The history of the nationalist parties has been traced and, insofar as possible, the diverse social elements of the nationalist movement have been described. Many efforts have been made to analyze the nature of nationalism and to determine the sources of its vitality. None have been entirely successful, for, like all dynamic movements which spread far beyond their original habitats, nationalism has been colored and transmuted by the varied milieus in which it has become established. It is a problem of peculiar difficulty to determine what has caused the movement to take root at all in many countries; this is especially true of the Ukraine. One of the most frequent stimuli of the nationalist spirit is religion, but the establishment of a separate Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy was the result of growing nationalist feeling rather than its cause.4 Another stimulus of nationalism is the existence of distinctive customs and ways of living. In addition to distinctive popular art forms, which will be referred to later, there was a marked difference between the pre-1917 social organization of most Ukrainian peasant communities and their Russian counterparts. The people of the Ukraine, for example, did not usually follow the predominant Russian system of "repartition," or periodic redistribution of farmlands, with all its implications of subordination of the individual peasant to the community.5 In 1905, before this people was generally recognized as a distinct nation, that shrewd observer of the tsar's dominions, Mackenzie Wallace, made these remarks: 4 See Chapter VIII. 5 Cf. Geroid Tanquary Robinson, Rural Russia under the Old Regime: A History of the Landlord-Peasant World and a Prologue to the Peasant Revolution of 1917 (New York: T h e Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 35, on the comparative absence of the practice of repartition.

6

Emergence of Nationalism

The city [Kiev—Kyïv] 6 and the surrounding country are, in fact. Little Russian rather than Great Russian, and between these two sections of the population there are profound differences—differences of language, costume, traditions, popular songs, proverbs, folk-lore, domestic arrangements, mode of life, and Communal organization. In these and other respects the Little Russians, South Russians, Ruthenes, or Khokhly, as they are variously designated, differ from the Great Russians of the North, who form the predominant factor in the Empire, and who have g**en to that wonderful structure its essential characteristics. Indeed, if I did not fear to ruffle unnecessarily the patriotic susceptibilities of my Great Russian friends who have a pet theory on this subject, I should say that we have here two distinct nationalities, further apart from each other than the English and the Scotch. T h e differences are due, I believe, partly to ethnographical peculiarities and partly to historical conditions.7 As Wallace observed, linguistic differences between the Ukrainians and Russians were significant. T h e factor of language has indeed been used very frequently as the decisive criterion for distinguishing the two ethnic groups. 8 During the nineteenth century a distinctive, though still evolving, Ukrainian literary language arose based on the speech prevalent among the peasantry. T h i s speech is a member of the East Slavic linguistic group and therefore is closer to Russian than to any other major language, although Russian is not readily understood by most of the peasants. Russian was already established as the literary language of the East Ukraine before literary Ukrainian became prominent, however, and it continued to be familiar to nearly all educated Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. 11 The second form is the Ukrainian. Usually the place names cited in this study are given in the forms generally used by the power which since 1945 has controlled the area in which they are located. This means that places now in the USSR are designated by the Russian forms, and the few now in Poland by Polish forms. Where the Ukrainian name is different, it is given in parentheses after the first citation. In a few cases (especially rivers) where another form is already familiar to the English reader, this practice has not been followed, and in the case of the city of Mariupol' (Mariiupil'), which has recently been renamed Zhdanov, the old name has been used. 'Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, Russia (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1905), p. 347. "In this study this general usage of referring to those who speak Ukrainian as their native tongue as "Ukrainians" has been followed, although it should be constantly kept in mind that use of the language in childhood does not necessarily imply a belief in Ukrainian independence, or even a consciousness of national distinctiveness.

Emergence of Nationalism

7

Fundamentally, though, it is not to the criteria of religion, folkways, or language that the adherents of Ukrainian nationalism have appealed; more basic has been the evocation of a common historical tradition, the claim that the Ukrainian people, once great and independent, had lost its heritage. In the Europe of the turn of the century there were, to the superficial observer, two classes of nations, those which were embodied in independent states and those which were not. 9 Actually, the second group was almost as sharply subdivided into the "historic" nations, which had the memory of having possessed within modern times a stable state form, and those which were not so fortunate. Among the former may be mentioned the Poles, whose republic had vanished only a century previously, and the Czechs, who still preserved a vestige of their ancient state in the Crown of Bohemia. For groups like the Latvians, the Slovenes, and the inhabitants of the Ukraine, however, no such obvious rallying points of statehood existed; hence, the pages of history had to be searched to provide a comparable symbol of unity. Since it was vital to the emerging nation that its language and its history be embodied in works which could inspire loyalty, it was only natural that the leaders of the nationalist movement should have been writers. T h e national poet Shevchenko has already been mentioned, and he was but one of many writers, such as Nicholas Kostomarov and John Franko. Historians, headed by Michael Hrushevs'kyi, who perhaps more than any other deserves the title of father of Ukrainian nationalism, were equally important. 10 The early leaders of the movement were almost without exception intellectuals—men more at home with words than deeds—a fact which was to have great significance for the future development of Ukrainian nationalism. Part of the effort to stimulate the historical sense of the people of the Ukraine centers around an endeavor to demonstrate that their ethnic and spiritual ancestor was the people of Kievan "Rus" and to deny that the Russians were descended from the medieval state of Kiev. Much greater energy is devoted, however, ,J This concept is expressed in Hugh Seton-Watson's Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), pp. 26S-69. E.g., on December 14, 1940, Nastup devoted the entire first page to Mel'nyk on the occasion of his birthday; again, on December 21, almost all of page 1 was devoted to him. Nastup, October 5, 1940, p. 1. «Nastup, October 12, 1940, p. 1. «Nastup, May 24, 1941, p. 4.

62

Retrenchment and Revolt

fluential older members rejected the proposals of the Bandera group for alliance. There was one exception—Iarii. T h e adopted Ukrainian had for some time been at odds with Mel'nyk concerning, it is said, financial accounting and his own desire for freedom from Mel'nyk's control in negotiating with the Germans. 49 In the emergence of a new center Iarii evidently saw an opportunity to escape distasteful subordination to what he considered an émigré clique which was hopelessly confused as to its real aims. Consequently, he broke completely with the old Provid and brought his valuable contacts to the krai group, in whose youthful energy he saw the only hope for developing a liberation force. 50 In so doing, however, he helped turn many Ukrainian elements against the new movement, for it appeared strange that among members of the Provid the foreigner alone should have joined Bandera's group. Almost from the beginning this circumstance appears to have given rise to the suspicion that foreign powers—the Soviet Union as well as Germany—had inspired the rebellion to weaken the Nationalist movement. 81 Just what Iarii's relationship to the Germans was is hard to determine, but it appears fairly certain that rumors that he was connected with the Communists are unfounded. Such suspicions did not, however, prevent the krai group from proceeding with its organization. As will be shown, a strong network of underground workers was maintained in Soviet-occupied Galicia under authority of the insurgent Provid. In the Generalgouvernement, too, considerable progress was registered. In March, 1941, a general conference of the "OUN-B[andera]" was held in Cracow, called, in rejection of the Rome conference, the "Second Congress of the OUN." 52 By this time, a large part of the younger generation was included in the new movement, and already sub-factions were beginning to appear. On the one hand, the "activists," Bandera and his first lieutenant, Stets'ko, remained •f'J Interview 67. so According to a letter which Iarii wrote to me, dated Easter, 1953. si Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk, September 10, 1940, p. 2. ·">-'Mykola (Nicholas) Lebed', UPA: Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia (UPA: T h e Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) (Presove Biuro UHVR, 1946), p. 14; Petro Mirchuk, Akt vidnovlennia ukraïns koï derzhavnosty, SO chervnia 1941 roku (The Act of Renewal of Ukrainian Statehood, June 30, 1941) (New York: Holovna Uprava Organizatsi'i Oborony Chotyr'okh Svobid Ukra'iny, 1952), p. 17.

Retrenchment and Revolt

63

in complete control of the organizational framework. They were powerfully aided by Nicholas Lebed', one of the original group of krai leaders, who was now confirmed as third in command. More important, Lebed' began the organization of the Sluzhba Bezpeky, the security service. Like all organizations, be they underground or in full power, which demand monolithic conformity to a leader and a casting aside of scruples in the choice of means, the OUN-B was obliged to have its secret police. In Lebed'—small in stature, quiet, yet determined, hard—the S.B. found a wellqualified leader, but one who was to acquire for himself and his organization an unenviable reputation for ruthlessness. Apparently somewhat apart from the leading group stood a number of young men whose chief interest in the organization was military. They were not yet very important, but their most typical representative, Roman Shukhevych, was later to rise rapidly. Still farther from the guiding nucleus was a group whose aims tended to include social as well as national aspects of the hoped-for revolution. T h e i r leader was John Mitrynga, son of Galician peasants, who had been designated by Konovalets' as a special "referent" for social questions. He and his companions were too obscure to secure a place of power in the organization, but it is claimed that they exerted a certain influence on the formulation of its platform. This program, indeed, while it reiterated the "voluntarist" elements of will, action, discipline, contempt of reason and the "nationalist" element of supremacy of the nation (the decalogue of the movement is said to have required its members to place the interests of the Ukrainian nation above all else), gave some room to consideration of social matters. While the Communist system was denounced, liberal capitalism was condemned and an ill-defined socialism advocated. 53 While the strongest Ukrainian party was being torn by factional conflict, its members, along with those of less authoritarian groupings, were trying to maintain a vestige of independent life in the á«Borys Levits'kyi, "Istorychne znachennia rozlamu ν O U N " (The Historical Significance of the Split in the OUN), Vpered, No. 2 (11) (1950), pp. 5-6. T h e discussion of the trends and personalities in the newly formed O U N - B has been based primarily on interviews (24, 31, 75, 76) with several of its most active members. Lebed's associates deny that he played a major part in the S.B., however.

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areas acquired by the Soviet Union. Galicia, the real base of organized Ukrainian nationalism, had passed under Communist control in September, 1939. At first the leaders of the legal parties appeared not to realize the full implications of this transfer. Most of them had been brought u p under the relatively tolerant Austrian regime, and even under Poland they had been able to maintain a position of strained association with the sovereign power. A considerable number of them felt, or at least hoped, that this might also be possible under the Soviet regime. It must be emphasized that they were thoroughly anti-Communist; most of them had fought Communism when it was a strong force in Galicia in the twenties. T h e party they knew then, however, with its emphasis on Ukrainian nationalism and its still incomplete totalitarianism, represented an entirely different opponent from the Communist Party which ruled the Soviet state in 1939. On September 22, as the Soviet troops approached L'vov, the octogenarian Constantine Levits'kyi, once a major leader of the West Ukrainian Republic, began the formation of a Ukrainian nonpartisan committee to deal with the occupier. With the help of Dr. Stephen Baran, a prominent leader of the UNDO, whose account furnishes most of the details of this episode, some twenty community leaders were brought together. This group chose a seven-man delegation to deal with the Red army. It was two days before they could obtain an audience with General Ivanov, the Soviet commander, who received them courteously but referred them to one Mishchenko, "director of civil affairs on the western front." 54 T h e latter spoke fair words in fluent Ukrainian; he promised that there would be no repression, that all that had taken place before the Soviet occupation would be left in oblivion. When it came to detailed requests, however—the emissaries were especially concerned to secure the safety of the cultural society Prosvita and the Greek Catholic Church—Mishchenko referred them to the specialized officials charged with these "details." T h e aged Dr. Levits'kyi returned home, evidently satisfied that There were at least three high-ranking officials of this name in the Ukrainian Communist Party at that time. T h e most valuable work on Soviet rule in the West Ukraine in 1939-41 is a very extensive collection of eyewitness accounts assembled during the German occupation by Milena Rudnyts'ka, Zakhidnia Ukraina pid Bol'shevykamy (The West Ukraine under the Bolsheviks) (New York: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka ν Amerytsi, 1958).

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his mission to the new Okkupant had been successful. His more cautious aide, Dr. Baran, however, in his capacity as a director of the largest Ukrainian newspaper, Dilo, went with the editor of Novyi Chas, Zenon Pelens'kyi, to confer with A. T . Chekaniuk, head of the newly installed press affairs office, concerning continuation of Ukrainian journalistic activities.65 Then the true nature of the Soviet conquest began to reveal itself. Chekaniuk was already installed in the editorial offices of Dilo and evidently perfectly acquainted with the views and backgrounds of his petitioners. He showed them a staff of twenty newly arrived Soviet journalists who were already preparing the publication of Dilo's successor, the Communist Vil'na Ukraina. Then he made it perfectly clear to his "guests" that while some use might be found for their talents if they were properly directed, the direction itself was already, and would remain, completely in the hands of the Communists.56 Within a week, several leading figures in the Ukrainian community, including Constantine Levits'kyi and the secretary of the representative committee, John Nymchuk, had been arrested. For the time being, however, the actual members of the delegation to Soviet headquarters were spared, and several managed to escape to German-occupied territory.57 The leaders of the UNDO were also arrested; Dr. Dmytro Levits'kyi, the head of the party and of the Ukrainian delegation in the Polish parliament, was arrested on September 28 and so were his most important colleagues about the same time. The arrested leaders were sent to Moscow—it is said to the infamous Lubianka prison—and with rare exceptions have not been heard of since.58 The Communists, after getting rid of the principal nationalist politicians, quickly proceeded with their own political organization of Galicia and Volhynia. Even the official Soviet version indicates that a minimum 5 5 Chekaniuk, a specialist in political journalism, was editor of the major Kiev newspaper Komunist, and in 1940 became a candidate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. 5(>The preceding paragraphs are based largely on Stepan Baran's article, "Zustrich ζ bol'shevykamy" (Encounter with the Bolsheviks), Krakivs'ki Visti, April 12, 1942, p. 2, and April 14, 1942, p. 2, confirmed in all essential aspects by Interviews 41, 78. 37 Baran, "Zustrich," Krakivs'ki Visti, April 12, 1942, p. 2. 58 Krakivs'ki Visti, March 22, 1942, p. 4. In one town at least, participants in the revolutionary struggle for Ukrainian independence also seem to have been singled out for arrest or execution (Krakivs'ki Visti, August 3, 1941, p. 2).

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time was allotted to the process of registering "popular approval" for incorporation of the occupied lands in the Soviet Union. A "Ukrainian National Congress," "elected" immediately after the Soviet invasion, met on October 26; on November 1 the head of its plenary committee, M. I. Panchyshyn, sent a request for admission to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; on November 15, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet) of the latter division of the Soviet state approved the request; thus East and West Ukraine were "united." 59 In spite of the complete replacement of independent press and political organizations by Communist agencies, however, a strong effort was made in the early months to attract support for the new regime. Perhaps one reason for this attempt was the desire to influence Ukrainians still outside the enlarged Soviet Ukrainian Republic, especially in the Generalgouvernement. In a protocol to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which had defined the frontier between the parts of Poland annexed by the two totalitarian powers, it was provided that the government of the USSR should place no obstacles in the way of migration of ethnic Germans from eastern Poland to Germany. This secured for the Nazis the right to "bring home" the tens of thousands of German-speaking Volhynians. In return, Germany acknowledged an equal right of Belorussians and Ukrainians to migrate to the Soviet Union. 60 In accordance with a further provision of the protocol, a Soviet "repatriation" commission was allowed to travel through the Lemko region in early 1940;®1 by the end of June, it had induced only thirty-five hundred Ukrainians to cross the border into the Soviet Union, however. 62 S. M. Belousov and O. P. Ohloblyn, Zakhidna Ukraina (The West Ukraine) (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk TJRSR, Instytut Istoriï Ukraïny, 1940), pp. 108 ft. Panchyshyn was apparently selected by the Soviet authorities because he was a respected L'vov physician, rather than as a Communist sympathizer. See Kost' Pan'kivs'kyi, Vid derzhavy do komitetu (From State to Committee) (New York: Zhyttia i Mysli, 1957), p. 23. from i>» Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 19)9-1941: Documents the Archives of the German Foreign Office, eds. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington: Department of State, 1948), pp. 104-5. (n Krakauer Zeitung, February 18-19, 1940, p. 6, reports the departure of one thousand Ukrainians from this area after a visit of the Soviet commissioners. ''-According to Nastup, June 29, 1940, pp. 2-3. In an article which was remarkably hostile to the Soviet regime, in view of the latter's publicly cordial relations

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T h e campaign to win friends in Galicia and Volhynia was in part negative; measures which were most likely to inflame antiSoviet sentiments were avoided. T h e church was not entirely suppressed, though it was sharply criticized.®3 Its real property was confiscated and the religious orders disbanded.64 The Soviet authorities weakened the influence of the church on the youth by liquidating the Catholic school system and forcibly inducting the children into Communist organizations.86 However, the person of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was respected. 68 T h e part of the intelligentsia which was not prominent in politics was allowed to remain at large, although persons in callings such as the law sometimes found it necessary to turn to nonprofessional work.67 On the more positive side, the Ukrainian language was given a far greater scope than it had enjoyed under Polish rule. In particular, the University of L'vov was formally Ukrainized in language and personnel, although it is said that the resistance of remaining Polish professors to lecturing in Ukrainian was not harshly dealt with. 68 Students from the East Ukrainian univerwith Germany at that time, the Nationalist paper stated that the "intensive propaganda" of the Soviet commission, aided by "the pro-Russian intelligentsia" but combatted by "healthy Ukrainian elements," had resulted in the meager migration cited. Either this is one of the not too infrequent examples of ability of the Prague publication to print items contrary to German policy, or someone in authority gave the signal for an anti-Soviet attitude even at that early date. In the latter case it may have been a subtle riposte in the hidden conflict over Soviet demands for Bukovina. On the other hand, as early as March the Krakauer Zeitung printed a report by a German who had visited the villages of the Lemko area. He praised the young Ukrainians, noting that they wore the national blue and yellow colors and greeted him with "Heil Hitler!" and "Slava Ukraïna!" (Glory to the Ukraine) (Krakauer Zeitung, March 7, 1940, p. 5). 3See F. Iastrebov, "Uniats'ke dukhovenstvo na sluzhbi u polskoho panstva" (The Uniate Clergy in the Service of the Polish Aristocracy), Komunist, October 9, 1939, p. 2. M "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-katholischen Kirche," Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, January, 1952, p. 14. esKrakivs'ki Visti, March 18, 1942, p. 4; Stepan (Stephen) Baran, Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukra'ins'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), p. 112 eo/fcid. «7 Interview 36. For the official Soviet version see M. Marchenko (the new rector of the University of L'vov), "L'vivs'kyi Universytet na novykh shliakhakh" (L'vov University on New Paths), Kommunist, December 16, 1939, p. 2. But Polish Communists (including Wtadyslaw Gomulka) carried on active propaganda in L'vov. Pavlo Kalenychenko, Pol'ska prohresyvna emigratsiia ν SRSR ν roky Druhoï Svitovoï Viiny (The Polish Progressive Emigration in the USSR in the Years of the Second World War) (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo Akademiï Nauk Ukraïns'koï RSR, 1957), p. 28.

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sities were brought on tours to the West Ukraine, and L'vov students made Communist-sponsored trips to Kiev. w Other elements of the Galician population—teachers, physicians, artists— were brought to Kiev to participate in Ukrainian cultural activities. 70 After a comparatively short time, however, the Soviet administration appears to have become convinced that this "generous" treatment of Ukrainian national aspirations was unrewarding. About the middle of 1940, the Ukrainian occupation troops, which had evidently been on too friendly terms with the local population, were withdrawn and replaced by units recruited in Central Asia.71 A strip along the border with the Generalgouvernement was cleared of its population to a depth of several miles, and crossing was made almost impossible. 72 A start was made in the collectivization of agriculture. 73 No less important than these deliberate measures perhaps was the sending of tens of thousands of "carpetbagger" Soviet state, party, and army officials to the West Ukraine, where by their alien aspect (many were Russian) and their sheer numbers they severely irritated the local population. 74 While it is impossible to know what the Soviet motives for introducing a harsher policy were, one may guess that the negative reaction of the population to the "tolerant" epoch played a part.

Fisti, September 17, 1943, on a trip of about forty «'•ι Interview 51; Krakivs'ki studenti of the L'vov veterinary school to Kiev in the spring of 1940. ""Arthur W. Just, in Krakauer Zeitung, August 12, 1941, p. 5. Mykhailo Kohut, "Iak zhylo halyts'ke selo pid bol'shevykamy" (How a Galician Village Lived under the Bolsheviks), Krakivs'ki Visti, March 1, 1942, p. 6; Report of interview with Dr. H. J. Beyer (a German official who had been active in Galicia), Ukra'ins'kyi t'isnyk, July 16, 1941, p. 3. "i'-Nastup, June 29, 1940, p. 3; Krakivs'ki Fisti, November 10, 1940, p. 3, based on an article in the Frankfurter Zeitung. "t Kohut in Krakivs'ki Visti, March 1, 1942, p. 6; Krakivs'ki Fisti, November 25, 1941, p. 2, and May 17, 1942. p. 4. See especially Rudnyls'ka, pp. 333 ff. 74 Krakivs'ki Visti, January 13, 1942, p. 4, states that, due to the influx of Polish refugees from the German military campaign and the arrival of Soviet officials, the population of L'vov increased from 318,000 to 450,000 under Soviet occupation. On August 14, 1941, it printed a letter from L'vov stating that Soviet officials and their families in L'vov had numbered 100,000. Just (Krakauer Zeitung, August 12, 1941, p. 5) concludes from the number of votes cast in the Soviet election in Stanislav in the summer of 1940 that the population of that city must have increased by over 40.000, 1,000 of whom, he says, « e i e NKVD olficers. Rudnvts'ka, p. 94, estimates the total iiiHux at 200,000.

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The Soviet authorities probably discovered soon that the student exchanges had an effect opposite to that intended, for the West Ukrainian students were disagreeably surprised by the material poverty of the East Ukraine and the predominance in many nominally Ukrainian places of the Russian language and culture.7® East Ukrainian students coming to L'vov, on the other hand, had their first opportunity to become infected with the "virus" of "bourgeois nationalism." 76 Aside from producing these undesired ideological results, the earlier policy failed to prevent underground work by the Nationalist youth of Galicia. Most of the members of the OUN were not able, of course, to leave the Soviet-occupied area. It is impossible to secure reliable evidence concerning the exact extent to which those who remained could carry on their activities, but it is certain that they carefully refrained from open opposition. Nevertheless, late in 1940 the NKVD succeeded in tracking down a large number of Nationalists; they were sentenced to death or prison after a proceeding in L'vov known in the OUN accounts as the "trial of the fifty-nine." Among those sentenced to death was Krymins'kyi, the chief of the OUN movement in Soviet-occupied territories. 77 In all likelihood, he and his companions had sided with Bandera in the dispute with Mel'nyk. Certainly, the remaining members who, in spite of severe losses, were able to continue as an organized underground, were firm adherents of the new leader. The new underground director, John Klymiv, was in fact one of the most fanatical supporters which this fanatical movement of the younger generation could boast.78 While there were undoubtedly many supporters of Colonel Mel'nyk in Galicia, it is doubtful whether they were active—or rash—enough to form what could be called an underground, although apparently agents kept up sporadic contacts with headquarters in the Generalgouvernement. The situation in Volhynia was less favorable to Nationalist activity than that in Galicia, since the OUN had never enrolled such a high proportion of the youth there. Throughout most if not all of the area, Mel'nyk and Bandera apparently had no 73 Krakivs'ki Visti, September 17, 1943, p. 3. 7« Interview 51. 77 See, for example, Mykhailiuk, p. 4. Cf. Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk, August 17, 1941, p. 4, reprinting an article from Ukraïns'ki Shchodenni Visti (L'vov). 78 Interview 43.

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organizations, though agents were probably present. 79 The UNR, on the other hand, as will be described, was able to establish loose connections with a group which had been formed by nationalist youths in the remote Kostopol' (Kostopir)-Liudvipol' (Liudvypil') area near the former border between Polish and Soviet Volhynia. T h e situation in Bukovina prior to June, 1940, had in many respects closely paralleled that which existed in Galicia before September, 1939. T h e small Ukrainian population (about one quarter of a million persons) was subjected to a denationalizing policy by the Rumanian government, which included severe limitations on the use of Ukrainian in education and restriction of the press and of cultural activities. As in Galicia, there was a legal press and party, however, which endeavored to work within the scope permitted by the Rumanian authorities. There was also a fairly large section of the OUN, working underground. Corresponding —less closely—to Volhynia, was a considerable area of Ukrainian settlement in southern Bessarabia. This section of the Ukrainian ethnic group, however, was so backward culturally and so cut off geographically from contact with districts in which nationalism was strong that it appears to have played almost no role in the nationalist movements of the war period. In June, 1940, while Germany was still occupied with the final phases of the French campaign, the Soviet Union began to press claims for territorial cessions from Rumania. It had long been recognized that Moscow would seize the first favorable moment to secure the retrocession of Bessarabia, the annexation of which by Rumania it had never recognized. Demands for Bukovina, however, apparently came as something of a shock to the German negotiators who were preparing a settlement of the Russian demands. They objected on the grounds that Bukovina had never been a part of the Russian Empire and that it contained a large 7!>MeI'nyk adherents have since claimed that their organizers who had been in Volhynia for a considerable time were killed by Bandera followers shortly before or after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war; see Mykhailiuk, p. 88; O. Shuliak, V im'ia pravdy: Do istori'i povstanoho rukhu ν Ukraini (In the Name of T r u t h : On the Hi story of the Insurrectionary Movement in the Ukraine) (Rotterdam, 1947), p. 10.

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German colony. Molotov countered that it was the last "missing piece" of the Ukraine, though he agreed to limit his demands to the northern, predominantly Ukrainian part and offered to permit the repatriation of the ethnic German minority. 80 Germany was not ready for a break with the USSR; consequently Rumania was forced to give way. On J u n e 28, her forces evacuated Chernovtsy (Chernivtsi), 81 the Bukovinian capital, and the Red Army took over. T h e sequence of events was similar to that which had occurred nine months previously in L'vov, but the tempo was quicker. T h e leading newspaper, Chas, was Sovietized and a new Communist organ, Nova Rada, founded, though a number of Ukrainian books forbidden under Rumanian rule were authorized. 82 T h e Ukrainian People's House and other national cultural societies were closed. At the same time, the Soviet press assailed the repressive measures which the Rumanians had taken against Ukrainian cultural life. Soviet writers were indignant at the difficulties experienced by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Chernovtsy, although they denounced the Petliurist elements among them. 88 Numerous leading Ukrainians were not allowed to enjoy their new "intellectual freedom," but were arrested or shot as nationalist "counterrevolutionaries." It is said, however, that the German consul and the commission for evacuating the ethnic Germans succeeded in taking out numerous Ukrainian political leaders and priests of the Orthodox Church. 84 In any case, many thousands of refugees, mostly young people, found their way to Germany, where a large proportion provided an invigorating element for the segment of the O U N which had remained under Mel'nyk. 85 The subjection of the West Ukraine to Soviet rule brought death or imprisonment to a considerable number of prominent Ukrainians; the entire population was oppressed by a heavy «υ Ambassador von der Schulenburg in Moscow to Auswärtiges Amt, J u n e 26, 1940, Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 159. M R u m a n i a n C e r n i u t i ; German Chernowitz. s - Nastup, August 3, 1940, p. 3. "Besarabiia i pivnichna chastyna Bukovyny" (Bessarabia a n d the N o r t h e r n Part of Bukovina), Komunist, J u n e 30, 1940, p. 2; S. Zhurakovych a n d Ie. P a t n e r , "Misto pod P r u t o m " (City on the Pruth), Komunist, July 5, 1940, p. 3. M Krakivs'ki Visti, September 7, 1941, p. 3. s • '· See Chapter IV.

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weight of fear and by severe limitations on its freedom. These factors were to be of great importance, for they created a state of mind in which the Ukrainians of the area would at least initially welcome any force which opposed the Soviet Union, without close examination of its nature. Soviet occupation covered a relatively short period of time, however, and the policies prescribed by Moscow were tempered in the first months by a desire to avoid alienating the inhabitants. Consequently, the severity of the Communist rule was not sufficient to destroy the material or psychological base for future revival of nationalist strength. In this respect, the severe factional strife which had arisen during the same period in the areas subject to German control was more important, for it meant that at a decisive moment in their history the Ukrainian nationalists could not speak with a single voice.

IV. THE OPENING OF THE UKRAINE L O N G BEFORE the Western world guessed his intentions Hitler had begun preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union. As early as 1940 the Germans surreptitiously formed military training units for Ukrainians. T h e i r enlistment was concealed by official statements that the units were for Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) only, and the purpose of the units was disguised by designating the Reichsarbeitdienst (Reich Labor Service) to be the supervising agency in the Generalgouvernement. Under this camouflage large numbers of Ukrainians were trained for police duty. More advanced training was carried out in Germany under direction of the Wehrmacht. I n a n u m b e r of camps instructors for f u t u r e Ukrainian police units and interpreters for liaison with the German army were prepared. 1 At first, the chief Ukrainian organizer of this work was Colonel Sushko, and the training units were under the influence of the Mel'nyk group. After the split had fully developed, however, Bandera elements secured the upper hand in many of the groups, which were predominantly composed of young men fitted for active field service. 2 Either because they were naturally interested in employing the young and physically qualified Ukrainians in the Bandera party for the forthcoming campaign, or because they were dissatisfied with the previous efforts of the O U N - M (Mel'nyk group) to pursue a somewhat independent course, the Germans turned more and more to the insurgent faction. T h i s was especially the case when, in the early spring of 1941, the comparatively unconcealed development of Ukrainian units was begun by the Wehrmacht. 1 Stepan (Stephen) Huliak, "Polk im. Kholodnoho Iaru ν Rivnomu" Kholodnyi lar Regiment in Rovno), Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv I. UD (August-September, 1952), p. 7. -MS D.

(The UNA

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T h e first such unit was known by the code name "Nachtigall" and was organized in the Generalgouvernement. Nominally, only its enlisted personnel were Ukrainian, while all officers were German. Actually, as the Germans well knew, there was a whole staff of "unofficial" Ukrainian officers, headed by the leader of the "military tendency" in the OUN-B, Roman shukhevych. At first "Nachtigall" had only about one hundred and fifty men, b u t at the outbreak of war it was expanded to battalion strength. 3 A second unit, larger b u t of less political significance, was formed in Austria. Ukrainians were allowed a greater degree of formal authority than in "Nachtigall." I n de facto command was Colonel Iarii, the dissident member of the old Provid, who was at once highly esteemed by his young subordinates and on the closest personal terms with the Abwehr officers charged with the formation of the units. J o h n Gavrusevych, one of the top leaders of the Bandera group, was in charge of recruitment; his source of manpower lay in the large Ukrainian colony in Austria. U p to 1940, the chief Ukrainian organization in the latter territory was the student Sich in Vienna, which was dominated by the O U N . T h i s association continued loyal to Mel'nyk, b u t most of the numerous Ukrainian factory workers turned to the new movement. It was among the latter that Gavrusevych secured the majority of his recruits, although about one quarter were secured from among the students, particularly those in the medical school in Graz. Care was taken to keep the force—which was called by the organizers Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists)—in the hands of the Bandera group, although only half of the members actually belonged to the new party. Unlike "Nachtigall," which was clad in Wehrmacht feldgrau, "Roland," as the military unit composed of the Druzhyny was called, wore uniforms similar to those of the Galician section of the Ukrainian army of revolutionary days. 4 As is apparent from the above description, the Wehrmacht Nykon Nalyvaiko, "Legiony ν natsional'nykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), Narod'na Volia (October 27, 1949), p. 2. Ι Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv I. UD UNA (June-July, 1952), p. 4; MS A. R o m a n Il'nyts'kyi, Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1934-1945: Tatsachen europäischer Ostpolitik, ein Vorbericht, II ( M u n i c h : O s t e u r o p a I n s t i t u t , 1956), 140-42, m a i n t a i n s t h a t Shukhevych held t h e r a n k of l i e u t e n a n t in the G e r m a n army. Il'nyts'kyi also asserts t h a t a large p o r t i o n of

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units were prepared on a rather ad hoc basis, with the active cooperation of several important leaders of the O U N - B but without the utilization of the organizational framework of this group. However, Bandera and his principal lieutenants were well aware of what has going on; they approved of the formation of the units as a means for enhancing the power of their movement. 5 Moreover, it appears that in the spring of 1941 an understanding was reached between the directors of the O U N - B and certain Wehrmacht officers especially concerned with the utilization of Ukrainians in the coming war. T h i s agreement was extremely vague and informal. As far as can be determined from cursory mention in a contemporary German document and from the accounts of Ukrainians and German officers involved in the arrangement, it provided that the Germans would allow the Bandera party to carry on political activities in the Ukrainian areas which were to be conquered, while the Reich would be left completely free to organize the economy of the region in accordance with the needs of its war production.® Aside from the difficulty of defining economic and political spheres, this rudimentary agreement was vitiated by several misunderstandings. Bandera's followers, untutored in legal formulas, and indeed lacking experience in precise formulation of any kind, assumed that they had been granted a free hand in the political realm. T h e Wehrmacht representatives evidently believed that Germany really would support Ukrainian independence, but the Nazi leadership which controlled them never envisaged such a course. On the other hand, the army officers felt that they could control the new Ukrainian party at least as long as hostilities lasted, and saw political activity by the Bandera party as occurring only in a local, auxiliary fashion until the fighting ended. both units consisted of former members of the Carpathian Sich, and that nonOUN-B members were admitted only in exceptional cases 'Interviews 24, 76. υ T h e whole question of an "agreement" between the Germans and the Bandera group is hotly disputed, with some O U N leaders denying that any real agreement took place and the Germans insisting that the Ukrainians broke their word by proclaiming their "government" in L'vov (Interview 62). A contemporary German police report, which may be judged to be comparatively disinterested in making such an assertion, maintained that an agreement embodying the conditions cited in the text had been m«ide (Activity 2nd Situation Report of the SP and the SD in the USSR, January-March, 1942, PS 3876; hereafter referred to as PS 3876).

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When war broke out, the fragility of these arrangements was quickly demonstrated. The news of the outbreak of hostilities had scarcely reached Cracow when the Bandera followers organized a Ukrainian National Committee to serve, according to their proclamation, as an instrument for organizing all Ukrainian national forces for the liberation of the homeland. A highly respected former officer of the UNR army, General Vsevolod Petriv, was designated president; prominent members of most of the Ukrainian parties were secured as members, along with representatives of the OUN-B itself, headed by Dr. Horbovyi. 7 This startling emergence of the new party as the leader in consolidating Ukrainian forces in the Generalgouvernement was due to two factors: its unhesitating determination to take command, implemented by speedy action; and the widespread impression that the Germans were supporting it. T h e real plans of the directing group were not disclosed, however, to the more prominent Ukrainians who trusted to its guidance. 8 Having secured a semblance of broad backing in the emigration, the Bandera group rapidly advanced toward its goal of "organizing" the territories being conquered by the German armies. Meanwhile, however, fearful events were taking place beyond the Soviet border. In the first hours after war broke out, the underground rose in a number of places and secured distinct successes against Soviet forces in some of the more remote districts where the difficult terrain made it possible for lightly armed guerrillas to act effectively against Soviet security units. Such uprisings took place in the Sambor (Sambir) area within fortyeight hours after the war started,® and farther east, in the Podgaitsi (Pidhaitsi) and Monastyris'ka districts, Ukrainian militia took over police functions and dissolved the kolkhozes before the " P e t r o Mirchuk, Akt vidnovlennia ukraïns'ko'i derihavnosty, 30 chervnia 1941 roku ( T h e Act of Renewal of Ukrainian Statehood, June 30, 1941) (New York: Holovna Uprava Organizatsiï Oboror.y Chotyr'okh Svobid Ukra'iny, 1952), p p . 1820. It is claimed, however, that Petriv did not even know about his a p p o i n t m e n t as he was in the Protectorate at the time; cf. G. Polykarpenko, Organiiatsiia Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv pidchas Druhoi Svitovoi Γι ini ( T h e Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists d u r i n g the Second World War) (4th revised ed. of OVN u l'Uni, ed. Β. Mykhailiuk) (Canada, 1951), p. 69. Il nyts'kyi, II, 145, describes how the OUN-B began to organize the Committee in April, though the formal foundation was on J u n e 22, 1941. * Interview 24. •'Nastup, August 30, 1941, p. 2, quoting Sambirs'ki

fisti,

August 10, 1941.

Opening of the Ukraine

77

German arrival. In the less sheltered districts, however, Soviet repression was horrible. According to German secret reports, four thousand Ukrainian political prisoners were butchered in the NKVD cellars of L'vov alone, and several times as many were deported eastward. Many of the latter were killed later when their captors could no longer hurry them on ahead of the German advance. 11 Meanwhile tens of thousands of Soviet officials and their dependents, along with a considerable portion of the large Jewish population of Galicia, streamed eastward to escape a similar fate at the hands of the German totalitarians. On J u n e 30, in the midst of the disorganization caused by these events, the advance units of the Wehrmacht reached L'vov. With them came the first groups of Bandera's followers. Some of these came legally in "Nachtigall"; others, including Iaroslav Stets'ko, came illegally, though with the incidental assistance of some German front-line units. 12 Having arrived in the Galician capital, the O U N - B was in a favorable position. T h e months of isolation from the world outside the Soviet Union had prevented most of the citizens of L'vov from hearing of the internal conflict of the O U N . Moreover, the horror of the last days of Soviet occupation made the Germans seem like providential deliverers; the close contact enjoyed by the Bandera leaders with uniformed Wehrmacht soldiers greatly enhanced their prestige in their compatriots' eyes. Just what assurances the Bandera adherents gave of their 10

1,1 Krakivs'ki fisti, August 6, 1941, p. 3. See also Il'nyts'kyi, II, 167-73. Recently a Soviet account, N. K. Popel', V tiazhkuiu poru (A Troublesome T i m e ) (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1959), pp. 6, 47-48, has admitted that there were strong " B a n d e r i s t " rebellions in L'vov and elsewhere in Calicia both immediately before and after the outbreak of war with Germany.

11 Report of the SP and the SD Einsatzgruppen, (hereafter referred to as NO 2151).

July SI, 1941, p. 13, NO 2151

i - I n t e r v i e w 24. Raul Hilberg, in his exhaustive study The Destruction of the Europe/in Jeus (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961). p. 330. shows that Ukrainians were involved in violence against the Jews of Galicia (sec also p. 173 below). It is probable that some Ukrainians assisted the Germans in the massacre of Jews in L'vov soon after the outbreak of the war. Recently, Polish writers have described "eyewitness accounts" of " N a c h t i g a l l " members' participation in these atrocities (Aleksander Drozd/iiski and J a n /.aborowski, Oberländer: A Study in German Kast Policies [Poznan: Wydawnictwo Zachodnie, I960]). I have not, however, been able to find any evidence (other than the alleged Polish witnesses) indicating involvement of "Nachtigall" members in anti-Semitic atrocities.

«

!

ζ


a üí

ζ

h cs Cf. Iurii (George) Boiko, Ievhen Konovalets" i oseredno-skhidni íernli (Eugene Konovaleu' and the Central-Eastern Lands) (1947), pp. 34-50. •¡ 'Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 15, July 7, 1941, NO 5154 (hereafter referred to as NO 5154).

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Opening of the Ukraine

T h e willingness to hitch on to the Nazi chariot expressed in this appeal was fruitless, however, for the confident Nazi leaders were in no mood to accept allies which might prove troublesome later. Less than a month after Mel'nyk's appeal, the U N O was forced to announce that the Germans were allowing Ukrainians who had been Soviet citizens, but not those (constituting the great bulk of the emigration) who had never lived under the Soviet regime, to enter police units to serve in the east. It warned its members that some of their number who had attempted to go to the East Ukraine had been "interned" and released only by intervention of the Berlin headquarters of the UNO. 4 0 Mel'nyk himself reacted to the new situation in a characteristic fashion, which revealed once more the moderate nature of his policy and the doubtful effectiveness of his approach. Shortly after war began, he addressed all "nationalists," calling for unity for the great new tasks ahead, and asking for the end of activities of "partisan factionalists." He continued by urging all to "be true to the tasks of nationalism so that a satisfactory account may be made to the T h i r d Great Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists." 4 1 T h e last statement was an obvious hint that, however much the Bandera followers might be dissatisfied with the Second Congress, they would have another chance to carry out their program in a new meeting, if only they returned to the fold. In view of the reckless yet energetic way in which the krai group was pushing ahead during the first week of war, such an appeal was almost certain to be taken as a sign of weakness, rather than as the genuine expression of a desire for reconciliation which it probably was. Very likely the situation was not helped by Mel'nyk's issuing, a few weeks later, a further call to "all Ukrainians," declaring his readiness to forget all that had taken place if all would return to the O U N and demonstrate their good will. 42 Even if such sentiments could have influenced men of the insurgents' temperament, their effect was nullified by the way in which the Mel'nyk supporters reacted to the German measures against the Stets'ko coup. It is probably true that any direct cooperation given the German police was furnished by individuals Ukra'ins'kyi Visnyh, July 24, 1941, p. 4. iiNastup, June 28, 1941. i'-Nastup, July 19, 1941.

Opening of the Ukraine

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like Chuchkevych, without the assent or even the knowledge of the Provid. It is understandable, however, that the presence of such men with the Einsatzgruppe led Bandera's adherents to conclude that their opponents were in league with the occupying power. Moreover, if the Mel'nyk group as such did not collaborate with the Germans against the other OUN faction, it certainly rejoiced in the latter's discomfiture. On July 16, the O U N organ reprinted an account of an interview of Beyer with a Krakivs'ki Visti correspondent in which the German official, who had just returned from L'vov, denied reports circulated by the Ukrainian National Committee that a "West Ukrainian regional government" under Stets'ko had been formed there, and that the Wehrmacht officer, Dr. Hans Koch, had recognized "a Ukrainian administration" at a "gathering" in L'vov. 43 OUN-M supporters also hurried to east Galicia to secure a share in the control of the area. T h e Bandera party, of course, rapidly lost its power in L'vov, although, as has been pointed out, the impetus of their coup was felt for some time in areas distant from the Galician capital. When it became apparent that the Germans were not really backing Stets'ko, his Ukrainian support rapidly diminished. At the end of July the Council of Seniors which he had set up was expanded by the addition of seventeen new members and renamed the National Council. 44 Apparently German influence played a part in this; along with the change of name, a certain amount of change in composition took place, Mel'nyk adherents being permitted to replace OUN-B sympathizers. 45 Constantine Levits'kyi sank into obscurity; with considerable reluctance, Dr. Constantine Pan'kivs'kyi, who had been MUkraïns'kyi Visnyh, J u l y 16, 1941, p. 3. •·Entsyklopediia Ukra'inoznavstva, p. 587; Nastup, November 1, 194Í, p. 3; Interview 36. Interview 36. is OUN u l'Uni ( T h e O U N in the War), Information Section of the O U N (UNR), April, 1946, pp. 52-54.

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nyk enterprise, however, they received an unplanned but extremely valuable reinforcement in the form of over five hundred Bukovinians, mostly young and energetic men. T h e O U N underground in Bukovina had become active as soon as war broke out, and, after the Rumanian and Hungarian forces freed the province, it was able to maintain an open organization until the middle of July. Then the Rumanian authorities, anxious lest their recovery of the area be threatened by a Ukrainian independence movement, repressed the Nationalists with great severity. In some districts actual fighting took place between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Rumanian gendarmerie. T h e latter proved to be much too strong for the OUN-led forces. Many of the young men among the Ukrainian resistance groups fled to the north. Some went directly to the East Ukraine, others through Galicia to Vinnitsa. 49 Here, with the help of OUN-M members working with the Germans, a large number were recruited for the auxiliary police force; still others went on to Kiev and Zhitomir where they formed a large part of the cadres for pro-Mel'nyk police organizations. Another group, a much smaller one, succeeded in crossing the southwestern Ukraine to Nikolaev, where it established an OUN-M center. T h e great base of the Mel'nyk party's activity in the East Ukraine in the late summer of 1941, however, was Zhitomir. The situation in Zhitomir was especially significant. T h e first base of OUN-M activity in the eastern Ukraine, it was also the first important city east of the pre-1939 Soviet border open to nationalist activity. T h e developments in Zhitomir help to explain the role of the Nationalist movement in the East Ukraine in its "honeymoon" stage. The embryonic OUN-B "administration" was quickly set aside; apparently the Nationalist sympathizers among the townspeople who had greeted the Bandera organizers now passed over to the OUN-M without much knowledge or concern about the differences between the factions. Although Mel'nyk organizers served as the stimulating force, by far the greater part of the work of building the new administration was performed by local people, wlbid., p. 51; Report No. 10 of the Representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Süd, Captain Dr. [Hans] Koch, October 5, 1941, PS 053 (hereafter referred to as PS 053); Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, July 1, 1941, pp. 21-22, NO 2950 (hereafter re ferred to as NO 2950).

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such as the head of the oblast (district) administration, Alexander Iatseniuk, the chief of the city administration, Pavlovs'kyi, and nearly all of his department heads. 50 A wide variety of nationalist organizations sprang up, including Prosvita, churches, and an active theater. Local artists appeared on Ukrainian programs permitted by the German-controlled broadcasting station. Schools, including two gimnaziias and a pedagogical institute, were reopened, and a local school administration was established. 51 T h e population of the city sank to forty-two thousand (including seven thousand Poles and two thousand Russians) after the deportation of the Jews. However, economic life was stimulated by the reopening of a sugar refinery and other industries; markets were reopened and private trade was encouraged. 6 2 One hundred and seventy-nine physicians were present, a very high n u m b e r in proportion to the population. 5 3 An extremely active youth organization, known, like its counterparts in the West Ukraine, as the Sich, was formed; its activities included sports, choral singing, theatricals, and development of an orchestra. 54 All of these organizations were under the control of nationalist Ukrainians, although the emphasis appeared to be on the formation of a Ukrainian territorial state which would include all persons, of whatever ethnic origin, living on Ukrainian soil. T h u s one of the chief administrative officials, the head of the raion administration (i.e., the rural area outside the city) was a Pole, and the director of the economic section of the city administration was a Russian. 55 There appears to have been a large measure of cordiality between the local groups a n d the O U N representa·">" Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in Krakivs'ki Visti, November 1, 1941, p. 2; 454th Sicherungsdivision, Section VII, Report of October 4, 1941, N O K W 2129 (hereafter referred to as N O K W 2129). •"'i Ukrains'ka Diisnist', October 1, 1941, p. 1; I e f r e m e n k o in Krakivs'ki Visti, October 24 and 26, 1941, pp. 2 and 3; Krakivs'ki fisti, August 25, 1942, p. 5; Nastup, September 6, 1941, p. 5. ">-Ukrains'ka Diisnist', September 15, 1941, p. 1, based on Ukrains'ke Slovo (Zhitomir), August 3, 1941; Iefremenko in Krakivs'ki Visti, October 26, 1941, p. 3. >1 " Krakivs'ki Visti, October 24, 1941, p. 2; many, however, were apparently Jews who were temporarily spared because of their usefulness (Krakivs'ki Visti, November 1, 1941. p. 2). Krakivs'ki Visti, October 26, 1941, p. 3. 55 Ibid., p. 2, and Krakivs'ki Visti, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

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lives coming from the west. Numerous local citizens, mostly young men but including also several administrative officials, joined the Nationalist organization. Support was so strong, in fact, that a new district organization (Kraieva Ekzekutyva) of the Mel'nyk party could be formed, headed by the son of the chief of the oblast administration and another local leader. 56 Generally speaking, OUN-M influence was predominant in the civic life of Zhitomir as the summer of 1941 drew to a close. T h e first OUN-M organizers appear to have arrived with the Wehrmacht. Foremost among them was Bohdan Konyk, a Galician, who was especially concerned with police organization. At the end of July, with the help of a young Carpatho-Ukrainian journalist, George Tarkovych, whose numerous articles are a major source for this period, he went with German authorization to a nearby camp of Soviet war prisoners and selected volunteers for the police force. 57 Zakhvalins'kyi, an East Ukrainian by origin who had once been a member of the Ukrainian Republican Army but who had lived for many years as a common worker in France, was made commander. He was an adherent of Mel'nyk. As his deputy, a local nonparty man, Kalenda, was chosen, while the commander's adjutant was a Bukovinian member of the Mel'nyk party. 58 A major task of the police force was to prepare an organization for installation in Kiev, as soon as the capital should fall into German hands. T h e same purpose was evident in the formation of a newspaper, Uhrains'ke Slovo; this organ was destined for transfer to Kiev as soon as possible. Consequently, the chief propaganda workers of the eastern group of the OUN-M were active in its creation. Among them were John Rohach, a CarpathoUkrainian, Iaroslav Chemeryns'kyi, one of the leading émigré writers, and Peter Oliïnyk. Under their direction, a number of able local journalists were recruited, though not all of them were adherents of the Mel'nyk party.59 All of these preparations served as a backdrop for the most ••'¡Interviews 12. 65; cf. V. Druzhynnyk in Krakivs'ki Visti, October 10, 1941, p. 2; OVN u l'Uni, p. 53. •""Cf. Tarkovych in Krakivs'ki Visti, January 21, 1942, p. 2; Interview 35. •"•-Druzhynnyk in Krakivs'ki Visti, October 10, 1941, p. 2; Interview 65. ·"'•'Nastup, November 8, 1941, p p . 3-5; Interviews 3, 65.

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Opening of the Ukraine

important event in the development of the Zhitomir base—the arrival there of the major leaders of the party, who t a m e to take personal direction of the campaign to win the east. Mel'nyk himself remained behind, perhaps because his departure would have aroused German mistrust, but the top level of the Provid was represented by both Senyk and Stsibors'kyi. W i t h them came Dr. Kandyba, the son of a famous East Ukrainian poet, then still living in emigration. Kandyba, best known as "Ol'zhych," was a young man, still in his thirties. T h o u g h trained as an archeologist, for several years he had been very prominent in the ranks of O U N leadership just below the level of the Provid. H e was now placed in direct charge of all the advance groups in the East Ukraine.* 0 T h e three leaders had crossed Galicia in the middle of August, stopping briefly in L'vov. T h e y were careful not to advertise their journey; apparently neither here nor in crossing the border into Volhynia—where a special pass was officially required—were they molested by the Germans. T h e O U N - M has always denied that there was any agreement with the latter concerning this expedition, but it is highly probable that the W e h r m a c h t officials in control knew about it, at least unofficially. At any rate, once they had reached Zhitomir, in the last days of August, the O U N leaders acted quite openly. However, their mission came to an abrupt end. At seven thirty on the warm summer evening of August 30, as Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, returning from a gathering of the regional police, were approaching the main street intersection of Zhitomir, a young man approached them from behind and fired two or three pistol shots. One penetrated the back of Senyk's neck; he died instantly. Stsibors'kyi was shot through both cheeks and bled to death a few hours later. 81 T h e assassin was shot down by Ukrainian and German policemen as he attempted to flee; a vehicle from the German police command came up immediately afterwards and removed the body. Consequently it was difficult to determine who had instiIbid., p. 68. •-•'¡PS S876. -·ϊ Krakivs'ki Visti, March 15, 1942, p. 5.

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casionally a monopolistic part in municipal activities. As was inevitable, they sometimes exhibited an attitude of superiority; even when they behaved more tactfully, many local inhabitants nevertheless were inclined to suspect that they harbored such an attitude. Their presence in municipal offices, even when they were on a plane of equality with local officeholders, was bound to lead to some friction. Moreover, emphasis on the principle of integral nationalism meant the neglect of social welfare and civil rights questions which were of great concern to the local population after twenty years of Soviet rule. The "leader principle," which was expressed in the East Ukraine in as extreme terms as Mel'nyk ever permitted it in the emigration, was alien to the native inhabitants. The slogan "Petliura, Konovalets', Mel'nyk— three names, one idea" was at first meaningless to the average East Ukrainian, since the second and third of these names were unknown to him. When their meaning was explained, the phrase signified to many that after Petliura's death the nationalist movement had fallen into the hands of leaders from the half-alien West Ukraine.28 All of these irritations might have been accepted, however, had it not been for an ideological theme which resulted in more practical discomfort. The Nationalist creed required emphasis on the "purity" of the Ukrainian people. According to the O U N leaders' belief, this "purity" had been endangered by the intrusion of Russian elements—the physical immigration of Russians, who had become especially numerous in Kiev bureaucratic and intellectual circles, and the penetration of Russian influences into Ukrainian culture and speech. The extent of this penetration will be disss surviving OUN-M publications of this period are rare, many existing only in private collections. Ukrains'kyi Visnyk of September 28, 1941, p. 3 contains a reprint of a leaflet distributed in the East Ukraine describing Mel'nyk as the successor of Konovalets', who in turn was a successor of Petliura, "killed by the Jew Shvartsvart." For a criticism of O U N propaganda in the East Ukraine during this period, and notes on the reaction of the local population, see the account of the East Ukrainian émigré Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in Krakivs'ki Visti, November 1, 1941, p. 2. Iuryi (George) Boiko, U siaivi nashoho Kyeva: "Ukrains'ke Slovo" u Kyevi ν 1941 rotsi (in the Radiance of our Kiev: Ukrains'ke Slovo in Kiev in 1941) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1955) is a substantial collection of articles reprinted from the major OUN-M organ in the East Ukraine during 1941. Probably it has been edited considerably, but some articles (for example, "In the Ukraine—Speak Ukrainian," pp. 111-12) are revealing.

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cussed in a later chapter; it is necessary to point out its importance here, however, in order to understand the Kiev reaction to OUN policy. T h e Nationalists set about radically "purging" alien aspects of life in the city. A certain number of local Ukrainians accepted this campaign enthusiastically, sometimes carrying it further than the newcomers themselves. Others, although Ukrainian by background, had long been used to employing the Russian language and associating freely with persons of Russian ethnic origin. Consequently, the "purifying" process meant in many cases serious disruption of their accepted way of living and social relationships. Because of the extreme importance of this factor it is worth describing in some detail a case which provides a striking illustration of the Nationalist psychology during this period. It is contained in the diary of a prominent Kiev author, Arkadii Liubchenko, who was evacuated by the Soviet forces but managed to remain in Kharkov until the German arrival. He then made contact with the Mel'nyk groups (which, as was previously pointed out, pursued the same policy there as in Kiev). Always nationalist, he soon became an enthusiastic convert to the creed of integral nationalism. In December, through his association with the Nationalists, he obtained a post on the Kharkov newspaper, Nova Ukraina. Shortly afterwards, a Kharkov writer named Filipov appeared in the editorial offices; he told Liubchenko that he had prepared an article on the evils of the Communist regime which he wished to publish. When Liubchenko turned it down because it was written in Russian, Filipov protested that his mother had been Ukrainian and that he would submit the article in Ukrainian, as the question of language was indifferent to him. This brought the sneering reply that real Ukrainians, such as those dominating Nova Ukraina, could have nothing to do with one who could not make up his mind whether he was a Ukrainian or a Russian, since such a person was an "internationalist" just like the Bolsheviks.29 It may easily be imagined what effect such ideas had upon the rebuffed applicant. This is especially the case, since work for an organ like the newspaper was for many not merely a matter of prestige, or even of expression of opinion, but of life Arkadii Liubchenko, Shchodennyk Novi Dni, 1951), p. 25.

(Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko

(Toronto:

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and death. With the rapidly deteriorating food situation in Kiev and Kharkov, employment by an agency which was recognized by the Germans, and hence able to issue ration cards and provide a small income, was indispensable for most intellectuals. 30 In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the German enemies of the Nationalist movement felt that the time was ripe to destroy its prestige by an attack on its principal organ. On December 12, 1941, the SP force seized Ukraïns'ke Slovo and arrested all the leading editorial workers, including Rohach, Chemeryns'kyi and Oliïnyk. 31 Kandyba, too, was arrested, but by native police in a city raion (ward) controlled by the OUN-M; this circumstance allowed him to escape.32 Two days later the newspaper reappeared, as Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo, but with a quite different editorial policy. The new editor was Constantine Shtepa, acting rector of the University of Kiev. Of Ukrainian origin, he had been an officer in the tsarist army and, although strongly anti-Soviet, remained a pronounced Russian patriot, desiring the acceptance of the Russian culture and language throughout the Ukraine and the maintenance of governmental ties with Moscow. Consequently, he was a bitter enemy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. 33 The first issue of his paper contained an article, inspired by the Germans, but acceptable to Shtepa, in which the Nationalists were vigorously attacked for turning what "should have been an informational journal into an organ of their group." T h e Nationalists, it explained, had refused to heed German warnings that the paper must serve the whole community; consequently Shtepa had taken charge to "popularize" it. What this meant, was clarified by an article on the second page which demanded "work instead of politics." 34 Under Shtepa's administration, Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo became extremely subservient to the Germans. In part this was due to the 30lnterview 59. Liubchenko himself (Liubchenko, pp. 60 ff.), when the shoe was on the other foot and he was compelled to seek work in Kiev, found this to be the case. 3 1 O U N u Viini, p. 73. 32 L. Dniprova in Ukraïns'ke Slovo (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3. 3» Record of interrogation of an editor in Kiev, early 1943, who was a specialist in ancient history, the author of Die Völkerwanderung and Das römische Recht (CXLVa 78, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine) (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 78). T h e only person fitting this description is Constantine Shtepa. These articles are reprinted in Ukrains'ka Diisnist', January 5, 1942, p. 2.

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extreme severity and alertness of the German censorship; the editor himself was compelled to publish over his own signature articles composed by the German propaganda section, although German records show that he vigorously and courageously criticized Nazi policy in private discussions with German officials.*8 T h e nationalists were deeply antagonized by these articles which attacked the foundations of their movement by denying the historical equality of Ukrainian culture with the Russian. Shtepa apparently went far beyond even the Communist newspapers in this respect, reverting to the "Little Russian" tradition which was so abhorrent to all nationalist Ukrainians.3® However sincere his Russian nationalism may have been, for a man of Ukrainian origin, writing in the Ukrainian language, in the Ukrainian capital, to denounce the Ukrainian nationalist movement could only be regarded in nationalist circles as an act of high treason. During the late autumn, while the Einsatzgruppen were crushing the OUN-M groups, the administration of the Reichskommissariat was being established throughout the "Right Bank" Ukraine, while the area east of the Dnieper remained under Wehrmacht control. According to the plans laid in the Ostministerium, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was eventually to include all of the pre-1941 Soviet Ukraine except Transnistria, Galicia, and the areas acquired by the USSR from Rumania in 1940. In addition, it was to have its boundary extended roughly due east in a line passing south of Kursk to the Volga, where it was to embrace the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. 87 In the northwest the Reichskommissariat was to embrace approximately two tiers of raions in the southern part of the pre-1941 Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, including Brest, Pinsk, and the greater part of the railroad connecting these towns with Gomel. 38 By the end of August, the process of pacifying the western 1" CXLVa 78. 'i OUN u Viini, p. 74; T . Iak, Hryb (The Mushroom), p. 43, a clandestine OUN-M brochure, probably published at the end of German occupation in the East Ukraine. ·"- Iak, p. 43.

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58

Sich. In addition, several of the principal agencies of national life in Kiev were forced to cease operation, including the Ukrainian National Council. Even Prosvita was suspect and was closed for a while." These arrests did not completely stamp out the efforts to develop nationalism in Kiev. T h e underground OUN-M (as well as remnants of an OUN-B conspiratorial group) did what they could to stimulate nationalist feeling. Likewise, the city administration was by no means so drastically altered as had been the editorial staff of the newspaper. T h e Germans were probably not anxious to destroy all outlets for Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. Rosenberg, in spite of his minor influence, exercised some restraint in this respect, and Koch himself denied being antiUkrainian. 85 Undoubtedly his contempt for all Slavs led him to place the Ukrainians and the Russians on an even plane; his favoring of the Russophile element in the journalistic field had very possibly been accidental, or at least merely an effort to establish between the groups a balance which could be manipulated by the Germans. T h e drop in prestige of the OUN-M was both sharp and sustained, however, since repression of its groups continued throughout the Reichskommissariat. Moreover, as will be discussed at length later, strong Ukrainian nationalist groups opposed to the OUN ideology appeared in several places; these forces kept up the fight for development of nationalism, thus inhibiting a growth in influence by the O U N . In other areas, news of the suppression of the Kiev group—the dissolution of the National Council appears to have been especially important—caused the cautious to refrain from endeavoring to build up nationalist organizations. Consequently, after February, 1942, the work of the two OUNs was only a relatively small part of the total stream of nationalist and antinationalist forces which must be studied in their geographical, social, and ideological context rather than as parts of a developing narrative. Iurko

S t e p o v y i , Syn

Zakarpattia:

Uhrains'ke

revoliutsiine

pidpillia

ν

Kyievi,

1941-1942 τ. (A Son of T r a n s c a r p a t h i a : T h e Ukrainian Revolutionary U n d e r g r o u n d in Kiev, 1941-42) (Munich, 1947), p. 19. •-tPS 192. M

Ibid.

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In order to understand the development of nationalism during the remaining twenty months of German occupation of the East Ukraine, it is necessary to give some attention to the effects of German policy on aspects of life not directly connected with nationalist feeling. A number of volumes of extremely unpleasant reading could be devoted to the misery which the blind actions of the German rulers inflicted on the long-suffering peoples of the Soviet Union. Here only an extremely brief description of four ill-conceived policies which did most to disrupt the lives of the people of the area, and in particular to affect indirectly the character of the nationalist movements, can be attempted. T h e first, and in many respects the most horrible failure of German policy, resulted in the death of innumerable Soviet prisoners of war. In the summer and fall of 1941, hundreds of thousands of Red army soldiers fell into German hands. Most captures took place because of the swift German advance and the great ascendancy of German arms; but at least in part they resulted from a lack of will to fight for the Communist system and the hope that German imprisonment would soon be followed by a freer life for the Soviet peoples. T h e German army was quite unprepared for the extent of the surrenders. However, no amount of difficulty in caring for the prisoners can excuse the horrible consequences of their neglect which, unlike most other atrocities committed in the east, was primarily the fault of the Wehrmacht. Inefficiency or brutality of subordinate Etappentruppen [rear area troops] was partly to blame, but the basic ruthlessness of many higher officers also played a major role, for it placed a premium on calloused inhumanity on the part of subordinates.5® Countless thousands of prisoners were shut in barbed-wire enclosures in the open plains. Food was so insufficient that the captives were rapidly reduced to living skeletons; by fall cannibalism had made its appearance. 67 "Gaunt yellow faces protruding from the collars of greatcoats—unabashed human misery," as a Ukrainian visitor to one of tne camps put it.68 As colder weather approached, typhus ÔI; Cf. the views of h i g h W e h r m a c h t commanders cited in C h a p t e r VI in connection with suppression of partisans. s· Report of A r m a m e n t Inspector for the Ukraine to A r m a m e n t Division Oberk o m m a n d o d e r W e h r m a c h t , Zur Lage im Reichskommissariat Ukraine, November 29, 1941, PS 2174 (hereafter referred to as PS 2174). ·"· lurii Tarkovych in ¡vrakivs'ki Visti, J a n u a r y 21

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combined with starvation to bring about hundreds of thousands of deaths. Since many of these camps were located in the Ukraine the population soon became aware of the conditions in them, even though a substantial portion of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were separated out and released by the Germans. 5 · Moreover, the inhabitants could scarcely avoid noticing the corpses of prisoners of war shot (perhaps as "kommissars" or Communists) and left lying in the villages.80 Consequently, a belief that the Germans intended to destroy the Slavic peoples soon became widespread. A second German failure was less shocking than the treatment of the prisoners of war, but in the long run it had an even more deleterious effect on relations with the Ukrainian population. This was the policy in relation to agriculture. As was noted previously, the major objective of the Nazi leadership in its occupation of the Ukraine was the acquisition of food and raw materials to increase Germany's war potential. This objective involved the necessity of dealing with the question of the kolkhoz, which was tne main form of agricultural organization in the Soviet Union. The problem posed for the German occupiers was not an easy one by any standards. It will be recalled that the chief reason for the introduction of the kolkhoz by Moscow was the prevalence of the "scissor« crisis" during the late twenties; this emergency arose primarily because the Soviet rulers were unable or unwilling to supply enough consumer goods to induce individual peasants to deliver large quantities of agricultural products.61 The Germans were faced with the same dilemma, because the needs of their 59 interview 51; Directive of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Abteilung Kriegsgefangene, J u n e 16. 1941, PS 888 (hereafter referred to as PS 888); Naitup, July 12, 1941, p. 2; Amt Ausland Abwehr to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Annex, September 15, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 338 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 338). 1111 Memorandum by First Lieutenant Oberländer, Abwehr II, Heeresgruppe Süd, November 28. 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 278 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 278). Oberländer significantly points o u t that pro-German sentiment in the population had greatly diminished within a few weeks of conquest—i.e., while the Wehrmacht was still the occupying authority. » ' S i n c e this s t a t e m e n t was written a study by H e r b e r t J . Ellison, " T h e Decision to Collectivize A g r i c u l t u r e , " Americaη Slavic and East European Review, XX (April, 1961), 189-202, has presented strong evidence t h a t t h e "scissors crisis" was not the p r i n c i p a l Soviet reason for collectivization.

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fighting forces required that very little production be diverted to consumer goods. Moreover, their situation was in many respects more difficult than that of the Kremlin in 1929, for the material basis for the reconstruction of individual farms—buildings, equipment, livestock—was often lacking. Under these circumstances, a r e t u r n to individual operation of agriculture would probably have meant a sharp net decline in productivity and a still greater decline in surpluses available for delivery. O n the other hand, the Germans had strong reasons for favoring the dissolution of the collective-farm system, as a salient feature of the Soviet system which they affected to despise. More than any other aspect of the Soviet system, the kolkhoz appears to have been hated by large numbers of the peasants. W h i l e it is questionable whether this hatred was universally felt, it was undoubtedly a very strong sentiment among the older groups of the population, those most ready on other grounds to cooperate with the Germans. 62 Faced with this dilemma, the German rulers followed a tactic of compromise and deceit. T h e y promised to dissolve the kolkhoz, stipulating reasonably enough, b u t in opposition to the desire of the peasant for immediate acquisition of land, that the process be gradual. First, the kolkhoz was to be transformed into a Gemeinwirtschaft (hromads'kehospodarstvo) or community enterprise; the only signficant immediate effect was the increase in the dvor or garden allotment permitted each household. In a second stage, to follow in the near future, the Gemeinwirtschaft was to be transformed into a Landbaugenossenschaft (khliborobs'ka spilka) or agricultural association. At this stage each household was to receive a definite section of land, and be rewarded in proportion to the harvest from this land, although many of the m a j o r agricultural operations were to be performed in common to overcome the extreme dearth of draft animals, tractors, tractor fuel, and implements. 6 3 W h e r e the program was carried out without proscrastination, «2 PS 3876. 113 Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung, February 28, 1942, p. 3. A final stage, the Einielhof, or ihdividual farm, was envisaged by the planners, but very rarely, if ever, instituted.

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most of the peasantry seem to have responded favorably. Frustrating delays ensued throughout a large part of the Ukraine, however, especially in the Reichskommissariat. In part they were due to misplaced German thoroughness in requiring exact surveys of the land before proceeding to its division among the households in the Landbaugenossenschaft. More serious was the deliberate obstruction of Koch and others who, feeling that the program would leave some small segment of life free of their control, argued that it would result in reduced deliveries. As a result, only 10 percent instead of the planned 20 percent of Gemeinwirtschaften were converted to Landbaugenossenschaften,β5 In spite of the meager practical results, the de-collectivization program was a favorite theme of Koch's propaganda, doubtless because he allowed so little else of a positive nature even to be discussed. In the end, however, the constantly broken pledges unquestionably caused a loss of faith in the Germans, even a willingness to return to the known evils of the Soviet system. T h e peasant's saying, "A bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises," indicated his judgment of the German agricultural policy.66 T h e problem of securing agricultural supplies was closely connected with that of supplying the Ukrainian urban population with food. One way in which the Germans sought to obtain most of the farm products for their own use was to make practically no provision for feeding the city dwellers. This was especially true during the first winter. T h e concept was simple: the starving urban population would find some means, through barter or otherwise, of inducing the peasants to part with an extra, hidden supply of food beyond that which the Germans had been able to G4Cf. for example Report of Ortskommandantur Melitopol', July 8, 1942, PS 1693 (hereafter referred to as PS 1693); Report No. 7 of Representative of Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte and Stab des Befehlshabers des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte Captain Müller, March 24, 1942, to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, PS 1686 (hereafter referred to as PS 1686). C5 Memorandum by Bräutigam, October 25, 1942, PS 294 (hereafter referred to as PS 294). ecSituation report, Wirtschaftinspektorat Süd le, April, 1942, NG 1089 (hereafter referred to as NG 1089); Memorandum of Generalkommissar for the Crimea, Alfred Frauenfeld, to Himmler, February 10, 1944, NO 5394 (hereafter referred to as NO 5394).

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extract from them. 67 T o a certain extent, of course, this was true. Private individuals, as in the days after the Revolution, traveled about the countryside endeavoring to get something to eat in return for whatever they had to give the peasant. T h e city administrations and welfare committees did what they could to secure food for their clients; indeed this was one reason the Germans allowed these suspect organizations to function at all, for they were thereby relieved of the necessity of attending to such matters. T h e resources at the hands of these organs were, however, infinitesimal compared to the needs. This was especially true since the most valuable materials left in the cities were requisitioned by the Germans.· 8 T h e peasants in turn had little to sell. They had lived under the regimented planned economy of the Soviets, which prevented the individual from accumulating a private stock of agricultural products, rather than the loose system of tsarist days, when the more prosperous peasants could usually find a little more to sell if the price was attractive enough. Extremely heavy requisitions by the Wehrmacht, especially in the form of unauthorized seizures, had also depleted the supplies available. The result was a severe shortage of food in the cities, especially in the larger ones such as Kiev and Kharkov, which brought famine and the pestilences associated with it in the winter and spring of 1942.ββ Like the agricultural policy and the starvation of the cities, the Ostarbeiter program was the result of ruthless efforts to increase the German war potential. Unlike the former policies, however, its evils do not even have the excuse of short-run expediency. The concept of bringing foreign workers to the armaments factories was, in itself, reasonable enough. Moreover, properly handled, it might very well have resulted in an increase rather than a «T PS 2174. ,ls D u r i n g t h e t e r r i b l e w i n t e r of 1941-42, the social welfare d e p a r t m e n t of t h e Kiev municipal administration dispensed only a b o u t 100,000 karbovontsi (i.e., rubles; nominally the equivalent of 10,000 rm or about $4,000) per month; at the time, milk was 2 0 k. a liter, potatoes about 250 k. a h u n d r e d w e i g h t (Ukra'ins'ka Diimist', May 10, 1942, p. 1). T h i s monetary outlay may, of course, have been s u p p l e m e n t e d by food o b t a i n e d bv b a r t e r . For e x a m p l e , a charge b r o u g h t a g a i n s t t h e Bahazii a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was t h a t it h a d used n e w s p r i n t to b a r t e r for food with t h e small towns ( i n t e r v i e w 59). Cf. also p. 116 above. According to Oberländer (USSR Exhibit No. 278).

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decrease of popular support for Germany in the Ukraine. There is good evidence that the population was at first sympathetic to the German efforts to recruit labor voluntarily. 70 Moreover, a large number of nationalist Ukrainians supported the measure; they not only wanted to help Germany win the war against the Soviet Union, but believed that it would be a valuable cultural experience for young Ukrainians to come into contact with advanced German technology and with Western European culture in general. T o them it was means of drawing the Ukrainian nation away from its too-close association with the Russians and the "Asiatics" of their empire and of establishing a European orientation for their country. 71 Unhappily for these visions, the methods used by the Germans in dealing with the volunteer workers soon dried up the supply. They were frequently given miserable transportation and poor accommodations on. arrival in Germany. Highly trained workers and professional men who had volunteered in order to increase their technical ability by experience in Germany were assigned to common labor. 72 Most important, however, the Ukrainians, like other Ostarbeiter, were forced to wear a humiliating badge distinguishing them from Western Europeans; they were forbidden social contacts with the latter and, in order to implement this decree, were excluded from motion-picture theaters, restaurants, and other public places. T h e erstwhile willing worker felt that the Germans regarded him (as many did) as nothing but a Bolshevik prisoner. 73 When this policy of segregation resulted in lack of volunteers, force was used; mandatory labor service for young men and women was officially introduced in the Reichskommissariat on September 21, 1942,74 but in practice compulsion had long been employed. In reply to the inevitable evasion of this order, the most demoralizing of tricks—such as seizure of worshippers at ""Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete in Heeresgebiet Β, First Lieutennant Theurer, October 7, 1942, PS 054 (hereafter referred to as PS 054). "•E.g., Krakivs'ki Visti, February 6. 1942, p. 2. T-:PS 054. 7:1 Opinion report for period June 12-July 14, 1942, Auslandbriefpriifstelle, Gruppe Vili, PS 302 (hereafter referred to as PS 502). "' Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung, September 22, 1942, p. 3.

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church services and invitations by German authorities to theatrical performances at which all were arrested—were utilized. Force and brutal retaliation, such as burning of villages from which the potential workers ran away, were frequently applied. 75 T h e conscripts were sent a thousand miles to Germany in un· heated cattle cars, sealed with barbed wire. Still worse, there was no just selection of those most suited for departure, no systematic registration.7® Mothers of small children were sometimes taken; sons and husbands who were the only support of their families were conscripted without adequate provision for the families' maintenance. 77 T h e horror of such treatment was perhaps the single most important cause of popular revulsion against the Germans. In addition to all its material hardships, the mere idea of forced transportation to a distant and unknown land recalled the generationsold terror of banishment to Siberia. 78 The extent of the program was so enormous that every family was touched; it became a universal evil. Of the total population of Kiev, thirty-eight thousand persons (over 10 percent) were delivered to the Ostarbeiter program within the first ten months of German occupation. 79 In the southern Generalbezirke somewhat smaller numbers appear to have been involved 80 but in the crucial Bezirk of Zhitomir, one hundred and seventy thousand (about 6 percent of the population) were taken by mid-1943, and thirty thousand more were to follow. 81 In all, as early as August, 1943, one out of every forty inhabitants of the Ukraine had been deported to Germany as forced laborers, 82 and by the end of the occupation the number of "> Auslandbriefprüfstelle, report for September 11-November 11, 1942, PS 018 (hereafter referred to as PS 018). Landesbauemführer Körner, Die neue deutsche Ukraine-Politik, PS 1198 (hereafter referred to as PS 1198). " Occ E-4 (1); PS 054. " s O r a l report of Generalkommissar Leyser (Zhitomir) to Rosenberg, June 17, 1943. PS 265 (hereafter referred to as PS 265). Τ" Commander of the SP and the SS, Kiev, to Commander of the SP and the SS, Ukraine, July 20, 1942, NO 1603 (hereafter referred to as NO 1603). M, Only about 1 percent from Generalbezirk Nikolaev by mid-1942 (Conference of Sauckel and Reichskommissariat officials in Kiev, August 12, 1942, NO 1606; hereafter referred to as NO 1606). M PS 265. According to Sauckel, director of the Ostarbeiter program, at a Führer Conference, August 20, 1943, NO 1831 (hereafter referred to as NO 1831).

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Ukrainian workers in Germany totaled one and one-half million. 83 T h e suffering caused by the actions of the Germans described above did not directly affect the activity of the nationalist elements, as did their repressive attitude toward education, religion, culture, and local administration. Indirectly, however, it played an enormous part in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine during the German occupation. One effect was a general subordination of all thought, all activity, to the demands of self-preservation. T h e constant struggle to keep alive resulted in a reduction of the energy and attention which could be devoted to all political questions, including nationalism. On the other hand, the sheer impossibility of coming to terms with the German authority, regardless of how ready one might be to sacrifice all independence to do so, led many to seek a political movement which promised deliverance. A vast number, of course, turned back to Communism, hoping that the experience of near-defeat would lead to a modification of Moscow's policies. For others, however, the only rational solution appeared to be the nationalist parties. Weak as they were after the waves of suppressions during the six months from September, 1941, to February, 1942, the two O U N groups endeavored to meet this challenge. Of the two factions, the Bandera group appears to have made the easiest, but not the most thorough going adjustment. Its ability to adjust at a rather shallow level was due to several factors. T h e members of the OUN-B were nearly all young, and their movement placed little emphasis on systematic ideology. When they went to the East Ukraine, they carried a large number of slogans and romantic pledges as baggage.84 These either attracted or antagonized -:tPS 1198. * 4 One of these oaths, as discovered by the German police, reads: "On my honor, for the fame of the fallen heroes, for the holy blood spilled, for my Ukrainian earth and the majesty of my Ukrainian homeland, I swear that I will struggle with all my strength and with my life for a free and Ukrainian state. With my heart, my soul, and my whole being I confess that only the Ukrainian revolution can give power to the Ukrainian state and the people. Unto death I will stand on (he battlefield in order to build a national Ukrainian State. No one and nothing at all can hold me back from the path of the Ukrainian national revolution, neither difficulties nor death. I will carry out every command of my leader. I swear on the Ukraine, that I will loyally and honestly carry out

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the local population. In the latter case, the Bandera organizers frequently resorted to violent denunciations, or even force. By these tactics they alienated a large part of the intelligentsia. T h e latter group, moreover, tended either to form groupings of its own or to adhere to the Mel'nyk party. Hence the Bandera adherents, if they found support at all, were forced to go to the less educated classes, the workers and the peasants. 85 T h u s they were b r o u g h t into contact with the aspirations of the masses of the people. Since they were led by destruction of their n o r t h e r n forces to concentrate on the southern Ukraine, where the potentially nationalist intelligentsia was weak, this tendency was reinforced. T h r o u g h o u t this period, from the end of 1941 to the retreat of the Germans from the East Ukraine in the fall of 1943, the emphasis of the leadership of the O U N - B remained on the "voluntarist" elements of the program (underground publications of this period are filled with discussions of the role of u n d e r g r o u n d movements, the nature of terrorism as a political tactic, and the role of the f u t u r e Ukrainian army). At the same time, as early as April, 1942, the slogan of the akt—"Hail to the Ukraine, Hail to the Heroes"—was accompanied by the slogan advocated by the left g r o u p in the Bandera "Second Congress"—"Freedom for the Peoples and for the Individual." 88 Moreover, a conference of leaders in the same m o n t h decided to oppose the newly proclaimed "land reform" of the Germans. 8 7 Correspondingly, the u n d e r g r o u n d press pointed out that the dissolution of the kolkhozes, while in line with Ukrainian nationalist aspirations, had u p to then been carried out on paper only, not in reality. T h e r e f o r e , it warned, with considerable perspicacity, that the whole program might be merely a device for getting more work out of the peasant. T h e same article advised the Nationalists to all duties to the Ukrainian government which the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stephen Bandera lays on me. I will strive with my whole strength and my life for a Ukrainian government dependent on no one, and strive for its strength and honor. Hail to the Ukraine, Hail to the Heroes!" (PS 3943.) "•"•Interviews 18, 66. "'•Muteten' (Bulletin), No. 4 (April, 1942), a clandestine publication made available to me by Nicholas Lebed'. s "Lebed\ p. 18.

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extend their work to all spheres of life, thus not falling into the error of clinging, as had the U V O , to purely military means of struggle. Significantly, a comparison from the development of the Communist Party was used; the "correct" line was likened to that of the Bolsheviks, who took a universal approach to the problem of revolution, while that of the Narodnaia Volia (of late nineteenth-century Russia) failed because it relied on terrorism alone.88 In the final analysis, however, the main stream of O U N - B ideology could not be diverted at this time. T h e leaders (those out of prison, that is) were in Galicia and Volhynia, in an environment comparatively unaffected by the Soviet stimulation to consideration of social and economic questions. T h e members who were in the underground in the east, and their new recruits, had rapidly changed, but they were too uninfluential and isolated to alter the body of the party. Such a change could only come about when the West Ukrainians, too, were thrown into intimate contact with reinforcements from the Soviet world. For the O U N - M organizers in the East Ukraine, the initial process of adjustment was much more difficult because of the age of the members and the comparative depth of their ideology. Moreover, most of their recruits in the East Ukraine were intellectuals. While affected by Soviet conditions, the latter by no means represented a cross section of the Soviet world, but rather a special group which placed national above social consciousness. Eventually they did bring about a measure of change in the ideology of the party. Some new members, as was noted in the case of Liubchenko, became more violently and exclusively nationalist than their tutors. Of these, a few retained their "purity" until the end of the period under consideration, and beyond. Thus one pamphlet by an East Ukrainian professor in the O U N - M underground, printed at the close of the German occupation of the East Ukraine, stressed the racial "unity of 88Biuleten', N o . 4, pp. 5-7. Other O U N - B publications of late 1942 and early 1943 (Visnyk Ukrains'koï Informatsiinoï Sluzhby [Messenger of the Ukrainian Information Service], N o . 7-8, and Ideia y Chyn [Idea and Deed], N o . 1, 1942) show considerable concern for agricultural matters, desperate living conditions, and the limitations of Ukrainian cultural and educational activities. Dontsov's "natsiokratiia" is still stressed, however, while sharp attacks are directed against "Moscophiles" and the O U N - M .

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blood" in Stsibors'kyi's doctrine. Even this pamphlet insisted on the opposition of this doctrine to Fascism, and stated that Stsibors'kyi's theory is democratic in that it gives the maximum opportunity to each while demanding the maximum from him. On the social side, however, while a mixed economy of state capitalism, cooperatives, and private capital was advocated, the concept of the class struggle was denounced and the abolition of the kolkhoz demanded. 89 Some of the OUN-M members who had first seen the East Ukraine in 1941 were inclined to go much further in forming an amalgam between their concept of nationalism and the socialistic system to which the masses of the East Ukrainians had become accustomed. On May 24-25, 1942, a conference of OUN-M leaders near Kremenets resolved to attack the German policy of colonialism. An All-Ukrainian Congress of Ukrainian Independentists was held by the organization in Kiev on August 14-15, 1942. It brought together not only OUN members from many parts of the East Ukraine, but members of many other nationalist organizations, whether or not in tune with the old ideology of the OUN. Thus the circle of experience constantly broadened.* 0 Leaders like Kandyba found that their converts who had joined in the first wave of enthusiasm were essentially realists who wanted deeds not words.®1 When the Mel'nyk group could no longer present itself as the delegate of German power, its strength had to be revived by a program which contrasted with the reality of German oppression. Kandyba became convinced of the necessity of advocating the maintenance of state control of industry and commerce. Moreover, the Mel'nyk followers decided, contrary to all their preconceptions, that the only way to avoid alienating much of the East Ukrainian youth was to abandon denunciation of the kolkhoz in favor of a program which left to its members the decision to retain or abolish the collective.92 T h a t such a sweeping revision of ideology was necessary for the OUN factions if they were to make converts in the East Ukraine is an indication of the great psychological differences Mll

See the clandestine booklet by Iak previously cited. "" OUN u Viini, p. 78. !l > Interview 65. ^ Ibid.

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which had developed between that region and the West Ukraine during the preceding twenty years. On the other hand, the fact that such a large segment of the party organizers, including even the older men in the OUN-M, could make the adjustment leads one to conclude that the integral nationalist ideology was not so deeply rooted in the thinking of the West Ukrainians and émigrés but that it underwent a rapid broadening of content once its adherents were brought into contact with the real conditions of the East Ukraine, and even the limited opportunities for action presented by these conditions. This does not mean, of course, that the nationalist goal was cast aside by those who modified their propaganda themes; the attainment of Ukrainian independence remained their central value. They realized that for the bulk of the East Ukrainian population independence could be presented as a means to the attainment of other values, but not as the ultimate value in itself. This acceptance of independence as a part rather than the whole of the nation's life was in itself the negation of the basic dogma of integral nationalism. T h e inherent flexibility of the Ukrainian nationalist outlook was demonstrated by the fact that it underwent a similar change at a somewhat later date under the impact of changing circumstances in the West Ukraine. T o understand these circumstances, it is necessary to examine one of the most interesting aspects of Ukrainian nationalism in the Second World War—the nationalist partisan movement.

VI. FROM UNDERGROUND TO RESISTANCE carrying on open resistance to an occupying power, the Ukraine as a whole is a highly inhospitable region; throughout most of its extent it is an open plain without natural places of concealment. Aside from the mountainous areas of the Carpathians in Galicia, the Carpatho-Ukrainc, and Bukovina, which remained for a long time outside the scope of open resistance activities, sheltered retreats for bands of any considerable size are difficult to find. T h e y are limited almost entirely to the belt of woods and swamp on the northern border. Originally, forest vegetation prevailed north of a line reaching from a point on the Polish border not far to the southwest of Kremenets almost due east, through Zhitomir and Kiev, to the boundary of the Ukraine and the Russian Soviet Republic some fifty miles northwest of Sumy. 1 In the course of the centuries, a large part of this region has been cleared for cultivation; the presence of numerous swampy areas prevented all the forest from being cut down, however, so that there are frequent wooded areas, which become more common and less separated by open spaces the farther north one goes. In the Ukraine, as it was administratively defined prior to 1941, this wooded strip rarely exceeds one hundred miles in width, although it is almost four hundred miles long. T h e Reichskommissariat Ukraine, however, included an additional strip annexed from Belorussia, averaging about forty miles in width, and containing still more impenetrable swamps than the more southerly wooded area. Of the forested region, the southern part, which has been partly cleared, is valuable agriculturally and is thickly settled; it forms an integral part of the FOR GROUPS

ι Cf. Entsyklopediia Ukra'inoxnastva (Encyclopedia of T h i n g s U k r a i n i a n ) , eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych a n d Zenon Kuzelia ( M u n i c h : Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka. 1949), p . 106.

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historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The northern part, appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine. As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoiding the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the develop ment of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority. Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.2 In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' - Oleksii Fedorov, Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet (The Underground Oblast Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministersva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12-14. I am now inclined to believe that some plans for partisan operations had indeed been made before the war began. See my The Politics of Totalitarianism: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 159-60.

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(Nikopil'). This group was destroyed by the German forces in October, but a group of similar size and composition in the Novo Moskovsk-Pavlograd (Novomoskovs'k-Pavlohrad) forest east of Dniepropetrovsk was able to hold out until January, 1942.4 While the partisan bands in isolated shelters in the southern steppe Ukraine could not survive the first determined German attacks, those in Polessia were more fortunate. The chief areas of operation were the northern sections of the Chernigov and the Sumy oblasts. In the Chernigov oblast the partisans were led by the first secretary of the oblast committee of the Party, Oleksii Fedorov, a veteran of the revolutionary period. Though a hardened Communist, Fedorov had been born in the Dniepropetrovsk area and considered himself a Ukrainian. 5 He, like many other Party leaders, was temporarily swept from his territory by the rapidity of the German advance but returned in the late summer of 1941 and gathered the scattered remnants of his Party apparatus for a struggle against the Germans.® In the Sumy oblast the underground Party machinery was completely disrupted, but some raion officials succeeded in forming small partisan groups.7 It is clear from the preceding summary that the initial organization of the Red partisans of the Ukraine was carried out by members of the Communist Party and the Soviet state apparatus. These men were impelled both by their interest in maintaining the status quo and by the fear of violent death should they fall into German hands, since all "kommissars" and Communist officials were destined for execution by Hitler. Since the war, Soviet authors have admitted, and even exaggerated the role of the Party in the partisan movement, apparently because they wish to emphasize its "guiding role" in all spheres of Soviet life. 8 During the war, however, and especially in its early stages, while some attention was given to the activity of the Communist Party, an 8

:< Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, N O K W 1519 (hereafter referred to as N O K W 1519). 4 War Diary No. 2 of 213. Sicherungsdivision, Abteilung la, January 1-March 31, 1942, N O K W 2872 (hereafter referred to as N O K W 2872): Report of Feldpolizeidirektor to Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets 103, January 9, 1942, N O K W 2911 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2911). ·'· Fedorov, p. 31. ''¡bid., pp. 40 ft. ' Sidor Kovpak, Vid Putivlia do Karpat (From Putivi' to the Carpathians), literary ed. le. Henisimov (Kiev: Ukrains'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1946), pp. 3 ff. s E.g., in Fedorov'· work cited earlier in this chapter.

PARTISAN ACTIVITY IN T H E N O R T H E R N

UKRAINE

T h e following set of maps is intended to present schematically the development of partisan activity in the northern Ukraine from the beginning of the German-Soviet war until the reconquest of the major part of the area by the Red Army at the end of 1943. Territorial divisions indicated, from west to east, are the Generalbezirke Volhynia-Podolia, Zhitomir, and Kiev, and the Chernigov oblast of the army rear area. T h e following symbols are used throughout: j Q ίΐιιιι

Major centers of Red Partisan groups Area in which Red partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control Direction of major drives of Red partisans

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Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Borovets' or Mel'nyk

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Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Bandera

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Area in which nationalist partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control

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effort was made to give the impression that the partisans represented a spontaneous popular uprising against the foreign invader; the "common m a n " of the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was pictured as a patriot voluntarily assisting the Red Army to overthrow German rule.® It is this aspect of the Soviet partisan movement which makes it of particular interest to this study. T h e partisans in the Ukraine were pictured as motivated by local patriotism, while their leaders were described as successors of Khmel'nyts'kyi and other legendary heroes. T h e primary effort in this direction centered about the person of Sidor Kovpak, who became the chieftain of the partisans of the Sumy oblast. Kovpak claimed to be a descendant of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. While his enemies declared he was a gypsy—the disarray of his bivouac led even admirers to compare it to a gypsy camp—it appears likely that he was of native Ukrainian origin. H e was an old Communist, a veteran of the civil war of 1918-20, b u t was quite uneducated, and had occupied only minor posts in the Soviet hierarchy. Apparently, however, his rough and earthy manner endeared him to considerable elements of the Ukrainian population, while his evident skill in conducting his partisan operations won him respect. 10 Kovpak's personal qualities and the fact that his band was formed on Ukrainian soil, made it possible for Soviet propagandists to give some color to their assertion that his partisan organization was a manifestation of Ukrainian patriotism. Closer examination of the groups operating in the northeastern oblasts casts considerable doubt on this contention. In the first place, whatever the origins of its members, Kovpak's band was almost certainly formed initially, as were the other partisan groups in 1941, of members of the ruling machine. T h e commissar Rudnev, said to be the real "brains" of Kovpak's band, for example, was '·' See, for example, Timofei (Timothy) Strokach, Partyzany Ukrainy (The Partisans of the Ukraine) (Moscow: Ukrvydav Ts. Κ. KP[b]U, 1943). T h e title sheet of this work describes Strokach as a "deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR." «'On Kovpak cf. his memoir previously cited; P. Vershigora, Liudi s chistoi sovest'iu (People with Clean Consciences) (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1951), pp. 39, 49, 181, 412; Krakivs'ki Visti, October 23, 1943, p. 3 (for the nature of this source see n. 15 below); V. Andreev, Narodnaia voina: Zapiski partiwna (The People's War: Sketches of a Partisan) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952), p. 228.

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a professional army political officer, who had been engaged in Party work in the Sumy oblast.11 Moreover, it is at least a peculiar coincidence that its nucleus was formed in the Putivi' raion which, with parts of the neighboring districts, forms the only enclave of Russian-speaking peasantry in the northern Ukraine. 12 Although Party and governmental functionaries formed the original nucleus of the partisan movement, they were soon joined by large numbers of Red Army soldiers who had been cut off from the main body of Soviet troops by the German advance. Such soldiers were, of course, drawn from all parts of the USSR, and were not specifically Ukrainian. Moreover, those soldiers who, in the first stages of the war, cared to take the desperate course of joining partisans were frequently adherents of the regime, led by officers of the political section of the army (commissars and politruks) or by NKVD men. Such, for example, was Alexander Saburov, who was to be exceeded in fame only by Kovpak among the partisans in the Ukraine. Saburov had, to be sure, been an NKVD official in Kiev at the outbreak of the war, but he was a native of the Ural region. 13 Soviet sources are much more reticent concerning the nature of the group directing the Red partisans from outside the occupied areas. Nikita Khrushchev (then first secretary of the Party in the Ukraine, although born in the Kursk oblast, probably of Russian origin) is said to have played a major part, while Demian Korotchenko, a Ukrainian (then second secretary) even visited the partisan bands on German-occupied soil.14 T h e chief direc11

Vershigora, p. 39. i-Putivi' is the only town in the Ukraine, with the exception of the Donbas and Kiev, in which the Germans allowed the publication of a Russian-language newspaper. Since the Wehrmacht made a practice of maintaining newspapers in other Ukrainian areas where there was a danger of disaffection (e.g., in Polessia in the autumn of 1941), it appears that they felt the need for propaganda to Russians in the Putivi' area. 11 Anatolii Shyian, Partyzans'kyi Krai (Partisan Territory) (Kiev: Ukra'ins'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo 1946), pp. 19, 32. A recent Soviet writer (criticizing the earlier edition of my book) has contended that Soviet partisans in the Ukraine were for the most part native Ukrainians and Beloroussians, not Russians. T h e figures he gives are for late 1943 and 1944, however, when the influx of local peasants diluted the earlier partisan force. Colonel S. Doroshenko, "O fal'sifikatsii istorii partisanskogo dvizheniia ν burzhauznoi pechati" (Falsification of the History of the Partisan Movement in the Bourgeois Press), Voenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 7 (1960), p. 'OS. H Fedorov, p. 475; Vershigora, p. 397.

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tion of the movement was, however, in the hands of the Ukrainian Staff of the Partisan Movement. Little can be gathered from Soviet sources concerning this body. It is known, however, that its chief was Timothy A. Strokach, a high-ranking veteran of years of service in the NKVD frontier troops. In 1943, Strokach's adjutant, Alexander Ruzanov, was captured by the Germans, and according to articles published in the press of the occupied territories, described the channels through which the NKVD controlled the partisan movement. 15 While such a propaganda story must be viewed with considerable suspicion, the numerous details of the account attributed to Ruzanov lend it plausibility, and many can be checked against independent evidence. For example, he is said to have revealed that M. S. Spivak, "a typical civilian Chekist," was second in command of the partisan movement. This seems plausible, since Spivak's post as secretary for cadres of the Communist Party of the Ukraine was closely associated with NKVD work, and Spivak is described by a recent Soviet partisan memoir as one of a group of leading officials who greeted the Ukrainian partisan leaders when they arrived in Moscow in late 1942.1® While the above evidence concerning the composition of the central directing body of the partisans of the Ukraine is not entirely conclusive, taken together with other evidence from Soviet memoirs and German documents concerning the role of NKVD officers in the partisan movement," it suggests very strongly that the NKVD played a major role in the development of the Red partisans. This suggestion supports the view previously expressed that the partisan movement was an artificial creation of the Soviet regime and that its leaders were tested adherents of the regime, drawn from all the geographic regions and ethnic areas of the Ukraine. It appears safe to conclude that the formation of the Red partisan movement offers no proof ι·"· Krakivs'ki Visti, October 23, 1943, p. 3, contains one of these articles, which Dobrovolets' and Nova Doba. states that it is based on accounts in Ukraïns'kyi A German-language version was published in Der Deutsche in Transnistrien, November 28, 1943, p. 2. Strokach was a candidate of the Central Committee of the C o m m u n i s t Party of the Ukraine, and is said (by Ruzanov) to have been deputy People's Commissar of the Interior of the Ukraine, After the war Strokach became D e p u t y Minister of the Interior of the Ukraine, a n d later (1953) Minister. ι '· Fedorov, p. 474. IT Cf. N O K W 1519.

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of a "rallying" of Ukrainian patriots to the side of the Soviet system. This does not, however, imply that in its later stages, after it had been organized and developed by the Party cadres, the partisan movement was unable to obtain some support among the Ukrainian people. The partisans were frequently much weaker than the total forces which the Germans could employ against them; consequently, it was essential that they secure the aid of local men for scouting, concealment, and sabotage of German offensives. While some of their arms and ammunition, as well as medical supplies, could be flown in, they had to rely on the inhabitants of the area in which they operated for food and for replacements for men lost in action. Moreover, a primary function of the units was political as well as military: they were intended to maintain a vestige of Soviet authority in areas far away from the direct control of the rulers in the Kremlin. In order to secure local support both compulsion and persuasion were employed. Compulsion was used to requisition food and equipment needed, to draft men into the guerrilla units, and to inhibit collaboration with the Germans. Methods employed frequently included killing the families of those who entered the German police or administrative organs, as well as the collaborators themselves.18 The mere fact that the partisans could move about in force induced the cautious peasants to believe that Soviet victory was possible and that, consequently, it would be dangerous to side with the regime's enemies. Persuasion, however, would probably have been ineffective had it not been for the atrocities practiced by the Germans, especially the Ostarbeiter agencies, which led thousands of persons, mostly young and fit for partisan service, to flee to the woods.19 T h e German failure to carry out the land reform, by depriving the peasants of a motive for resisting the return of the Soviet forces, was also a major cause of partisan success. T h e partisans made strong efforts to win over the peasants, in some cases even paying for requisi' s Report of Gebietskommissar Steudel in Kazatin, November 8-December 28, 1943, PS 1702 (hereafter referred to as PS 1702); PS 3943. February 12, 1943. '11 Those who obeyed the order to report for the Ostarbeiter program were threatened by the partisans, while the order itself often served as a pass to join a partisan unit (Occ E-4 [1]).

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tioned food supplies. According to a German report, one Red partisan band even distributed land to the peasants in the area it controlled. 20 T h e early development and continued strength of the Red partisans, arising in part from reinforcements sent them from the chief power base of the Soviets in the unconquered areas, enabled them to dominate the only regions suitable for guerrilla warfare east of the Dnieper. Therefore the nationalists could not have established partisan forces there unless they had possessed overwhelming popular support. 21 T h e possibility of such support was decreased by the fact that many elements opposed to the Germans were drawn into the Communist underground and partisan units before the nationalists could develop their organizations. Moreover, the nationalist groups were too small, too harried by the Germans, and too remote from their base in Galicia to constitute cadres for a large-scale partisan movement. It took months of struggle to maintain a bare existence underground and to find a program which appealed to the masses before the nationalists were ready for activity of any importance. By then the Germans were in full retreat; guerrilla warfare against them would have had little value. 22 Volhynia, close to the main base in Galicia, and more penetrated by nationalist ideology, offered a more favorable field for Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups. T h e people of Volhynia suffered almost as much as did those in the Germanoccupied East Ukraine. However, the Bandera organizers, who -u PS 1685; PS 051. 21 There were a few small groups. See, for example, the description of a band supposed to have been wiped out by Red partisans in the Chernigov region in early 1943, in "Persha Ukraïns'ka Partyzanka" (The First Ukrainian Partisan Group), Vpered (January, 1950), pp. 13-14. Istorila Ukraïns'koï RSR (History of the Ukrainian SSR), II (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo Akademiï Nauk R S R , 1958), 553, admits that there were nationalist "pseudo-partisan" bands in the Chernigov and Kirovograd regions. -- Most of these deficiencies were not present in Galicia. T o the majority of the people of Galicia, however, the release from Soviet tyranny was so welcome that the thought of conflict with the "liberators" appeared ridiculous; see Mykola (Nicholas) Lebed', UPA: Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia (UPA: T h e Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) (Presove Biuro U H V R , 1946), p. 17, which hints at this lack of support. Moreover, the tranquility of the area and the comparative freedom of movement of nationalist elements made Galicia a valuable base of organization and recruitment for the nationalist forces, which they long hesitated to disturb by violent action.

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were predominantly Galician, needed much preparation to acquire real strength in the area. Consequently, for more than a year they confined themselves to surreptitious propaganda, penetration of the police units, and preparation of secret arms caches.23 What the Bandera organization was unwilling to risk, in spite of the large number of its youthful adherents and the proximity of its Galician base, the Mel'nyk faction obviously could not attempt, even when its break with the Germans might have made resistance desirable. Consequently, the only Ukrainian nationalist organization which could remotely be described as a partisan group during the first year of the Reichskommissariat's administration of Volhynia was the Polis'ka Sich (Polessian stronghold) under Borovets'. It is extremely difficult to ascertain just what activities the UPA carried out during 1942. That it fought sporadically with small groups of Red partisans in the winter and spring appears certain.24 It is also certain that it existed illegally, in defiance of a German order for its dissolution,25 and that it gathered arms surreptitiously, and it is reasonably sure that some of its members from time to time had armed encounters with German security forces. It is, however, by no means certain that the group carried out open attacks against the Germans, or that the latter were entirely dissatisfied with the state of affairs in which the illegal band kept a region of difficult terrain and low economic potential from serving as a Red base behind the German lines. Moreover, as Borovets' himself has pointed out, it was never the intention of his movement to engage in a large-scale military campaign, but rather to retain a small staff which could draw support and recruits from the sympathetic Polessian peasantry.26 That the group was of some importance within these limits is indicated by the fact that in the late summer of 1942 the Soviet partisans in Polessia felt it worth while to send an emissary, AlexPS 3943, May 22, 1942. T h e "Second Conference" ot the OUN-B April, 1942) rejected "dispersion of energy" in partisan activity. Ideia y Chyn, No. 1, 1942. Another contemporary OUN-B source ascribes efforts to disrupt the Ukraine by partisan warfare to Stalin and the Polish émigré leader Sikorski. Visnyh Ukraïns'koï Informatsiinoï Sluzhby, No. 7-8, 1942. 24 At least an its critics, as well as its adherents, agree on this point. 2SPS 3943, May 22, 1942. 20 Taras Borovets', Zboroina borot'ba Ukrainy (1917-1950) (The Armed Struggle of the Ukraine |Ί917-501), 1951, pp. 10-11.

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ander Lukin, to negotiate for common action against the Germans. 27 T h e mere fact, however, that such negotiations could be undertaken is an indication of the uncertainty of the ideology and objectives of the little group. "Bul'ba" Borovets' himself, a m a n of little schooling, apparently was not sure what direction the movement should take, although he had a deep-rooted love for his native country. H e continued to maintain ties with the U N R ; there were U N R officers with the group much of the time, advising on military matters on which few of the younger members had had experience. Borovets' kept u p a precarious line of communication with Andrew Livyts'kyi himself through an old U N R member, Captain Raievs'kyi, who ostensibly carried on the functions of raionchef in the Rovno district. 28 These connections were too discontinuous to provide much guidance, however, even if the enfeebled Warsaw headquarters had had a clear line to offer. At the same time, the group under Borovets' was acting as a refuge for extremely diverse elements seeking an escape from German suppression. As was previously described, Borovets' had made an agreement with the O U N - M by which he was to be sent a n u m b e r of officers. Apparently this help was slow in arriving. By summer, 1942, however, a few men had appeared; one was the Zhitomir journalist Anthony Baranivs'kyi, who became the Mel'nyk representative at the headquarters of Borovets'. 29 He, of course, adhered to the O U N - M line. A quite different group consisted of the former "left wing" of the Bandera party. Its leaders, Mitrynga, Turchmanovych, Ryvak, and Boris Levits'kyi, were with the task forces destined to proclaim the akt in Kiev. W h e n these groups were broken up by the Germans before reaching their goal, the young men escaped arrest b u t were forced to go into hiding. T h e n , since the whole tendency of the O U N - B indicated to them that they could no longer hope to secure the adoption of their left-wing program, all except Levits'kyi (who went into hiding in Galicia) fled to - 7 Dmitrii Medvedev, Sil'nye duKhom (The Strong in Spirit) (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Soiuza SSSR, 1951), p. 8$; Taras Borovets', "Dva Khresty" (Two Crosses), Ukraïns'ki Visti, Christmas issue, January 7, 1949, - s Oleksander (Alexander) Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy" (An Army without a State), Ukraïru'ki Visti, December 28, 1950, p. 2. '-"•'Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," Ukraïns'ki Visti, January 1, 1951, p. 4; OUN u Viini (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 92.

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Volhynia, where they found a protector in the Polis'ka Sich.30 There, apparently, they attracted to their ideology a young assistant of Borovets', Leonidas Shcherbatiuk, son of one of the generals of the Republican army. With his support they founded in the midst of the untutored woodland peasants yet another Ukrainian party. Known as the Ukrainian Popular Democratic Party (Ukrains'ka Narodna Demokratychna Partita—UNDP), it advocated a program centering on maintenance of ownership of industry, means of transportation, and other large-scale enterprises by the state, with operation in the hands of the workers. At the same time, it condemned authoritarian control and violation of the rights of individuals.81 It was this motley group which carried on negotiations with the Soviet partisan Lukin in the autumn of 1942. While differing in details, the Soviet and the nationalist accounts of these discussions agree that the Red emissary demanded formal submission of the nationalist band to Soviet control, while Borovets' and his advisers were united in insisting on limiting an agreement to cooperation against the Germans.32 Moreover, the Soviet sources frankly admit that the Red partisans were very weak in Volhynia at this time. They were confined almost entirely to the extreme nothern part of the region, where they received support from the powerful Soviet bands in Belorussia. There was one band near Kovel', but it was under the command of a Pole, and apparently was composed of Poles rather than Ukrainians.83 It is therefore quite understandable that the Soviet leadership may have wished to gain the support of the group under Borovets' until more "reliable" Soviet forces could be formed in Volhynia. It is significant that one of the alleged Communist demands was for an open campaign against the Germans, including particularly the assassination of the Reichskommissar. It is likely that the reason Borovets' gives for rejection of these demands is acInterview 43. 11

Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," Ukraïns'ki Visti, January 14, 1951, p. 2, maintains that the "proclamation" of the UNDP was made in June, 1943; other sources set the founding of the party in 1942, however, and it is certain that the group had a developed ideology before 1943; see Borys Levits'kyi, "Istorychne znachennia rozlamu ν OUN" (The Historical Significance of the Split in the OUN), Vpered, No. 2 (11) (1950), p. 6. Medvedev, pp. 83-86; Borovets', "Dva khresty". 33 G. Lin'kov, Voina ν tyht vraga (The War in the Rear of the Enemy) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1951), p. 384.

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curate, for it is in line with the whole tactical policy of his movement. He maintains that such action at that time would have been suicidal for the group and that it would have brought extreme suffering on the Volhynian people." When Borovets' could protract the negotiations no longer, Lukin flew back to Moscow; then the Red partisans began to move against the band they had hoped to use as an ally. In the late summer of 1942 the number of Soviet partisans sent in by air to northern Volhynia, or crossing the Pripet swamps from Belorussia, increased to the point where they became a real threat both to the nationalist group and to the German administration. By autumn the entire forest area west of the Dnieper was within their field of operation. The unrest was soon increased by the arrival of the archguerrilla, Kovpak. In August he had flown from his Briansk hideout to Moscow, to confer (by his own account) with Stalin himself. The Soviet dictator asked him—according to his memoirs and those of other Red partisans—whether it would be possible to make a raid in force on the "Right Bank" region, west of the Dnieper. Apparently the small, scattered partisan forces there were not contributing enough to the Soviet war effort; moreover, Stalin felt the need of convincing his former subjects of the reality of Red power by sending in a force of real strength. Kovpak agreed to make the expedition, and set off late in October. ω His passage across the Chernigov oblast was easy because of the strength of Fedorov's partisan forces there; on November 10 the mobile force crossed the Dnieper into the Reichskommissariat. The point at which the crossing was made was in the extreme north of Erich Koch's domain, above the confluence of the Pripet and the Dnieper," in what had formed part of the Belorussian Soviet Republic. Throughout the first half of the winter, Kovpak was careful to keep within this extreme northern strip, which had the advantage of containing the most inaccessible terrain. His activities at this time could scarcely include showing the Soviet flag to a real Ukrainian population, though in late Borovets", "Dva khrestv."

^"Kovpak, pp. 78-82.

'•'•Ibid., number of Red partisans were sent about the same time by air to the western area.

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November the group penetrated southern Polessia near Olevsk, the former headquarters of the Polis'ka Sich.37 The greatest single victory of Kovpak's group in this period was the temporary capture of the Kreisgebiet capital, Lelchitsi, on November 26.88 After that, German counterattacks became extremely heavy, and Kovpak's men appear to have spent a miserable two months evading the Germans in the frozen swamps along the middle course of the Pripet River.39 In February, however, he headed south, cutting across a corner of "Bul'ba's" territory, then striking eastward through Generalbezirk Zhitomir. While Red forces were pushing down from the northeast, the Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement was beginning to acquire real significance, although the nationalists were compelled to give some ground in northeastern Volhynia to the stronger Red partisans.40 The SS and the Wehrmacht were agreed on the necessity of harsh measures to combat the Communist partisan threat. From the beginning, even those Wehrmacht generals who generally took a reasonable attitude toward the peoples of the east advocated the harshest measures toward partisans. For example, Field-Marshal von Reichenau based his policy on the concept that the Germans must be more feared than the partisans; he ordered that all who did not aid the fight against the latter be regarded as enemies, and that men who did not hinder or report partisan activities be "draconically" treated. 41 This policy was 3TIbid., p. 89; this corresponds with reports of a shift of Red partisan activity to the Stolin-Sarny-Olevsk triangle in PS 3943, February 12, 1943. Reichskommissar Ukraine to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, December 10, 1942, CXLV 488, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLV 488). 3(J Report of Höherer SS und Polizeiführer Russland-Süd, Ukraine, und Nordost, December 26, 1942, NO 1128 (hereafter referred to as NO 1128); PS 3943, February 12, 1943. According to one of the leaders of the Soviet partisans in Belorussia, Kovpak established an airport on one of the frozen lakes of the region. With the help of the Soviet Belorussian partisans he was able to defend it until German bombing finally broke the ice (Lin'kov, p. 386). w Cf. Lin'kov, p. 375. 41 Directive Verhalten der Truppe im Ostraum, October 10, 1941, USSR Exhibit 12 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit 12). See also a memorandum by Chef des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Field-Marshal Keitel, which stated that security troops in the rear areas would suffice only if they were allowed to proceed "draconically" without the requirement of juridical process, to convince the population that resistance would have terrible consequences (PS 459, July 23, 1941, hereafter referred to as PS 459).

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rigorously carried out in the fall of 1942.42 T h e drastic reprisals carried out in western Volhynia and Polessia injured the patriotic Ukrainian peasantry as frequently as they did Communist sympathizers. Consequently, the Ukrainian police were reluctant to take part in such suppression of their own compatriots, and especially in the brutal conscription for the Ostarbeiter program. T h e only alternative was desertion; in the fall thousands joined the forest refugees from burned villages and forced labor drives. 43 Unlike the latter, however, the police deserters were trained and frequently already organized by nationalists for opposition to the Germans. T h e command of the OUN-B in Galicia was reluctant to destroy its grip on the legal forces and risk a campaign of open resistance to the Germans at this time; but when they saw that the police units they dominated were breaking up anyway, and were in danger of passing over to the Communist guerrillas, they decided to begin a large-scale partisan movement. This step was taken in late November; by the early part of 1943 the activity of the Bandera groups was already considerable. 44 There were two major centers of OUN-B activity. T h e first comprised the western part of the area which had been most ravaged by fighting between Red partisans and Germans, especially after Kovpak's passage to the southeast. Its extent may be defined by the quadrilateral formed by the towns of Kovel', Vladimirets (Volodimirets'), Kostopol', and Lutsk, although the chief operations were evidently carried out in the eastern section of this area. 45 A poor, woodland area, where the peasant popula4 - H o w drastic these measures could be in practice is shown by the reprisal burning of nine villages in the Petrikov area, leaving the peasants to shift for themselves in the dead of winter, although the Gebietskommissar himself asserted they were innocent of aiding the partisans (Occ E-4 [1]). T h e main "pacifying" campaign was carried out in Volhynia in September and early October, 1942 (NO 1128); cf. Lebed', p. 24, on the slaughter of nationalist adherents due to Communist provocation. « Lebed', p. 26. 4i Ibid., p. 24; the extent of German repression and Communist activity, which threatened to serve as an outlet for popular indignation, led the OUN-B to start operations before it really wished to do so (Interview 76). « Lebed', pp. 24-25; PS 3943, March 19, 1943, ascribes (probably incorrectly, since the Germans were not fully informed of the nature of the nationalist bands) the attacks east of the Rovno-Lutsk road to a "Bul'bist" group. T h e western section of this area was partly controlled by large Polish police forces reCTuited to take the deserting Ukrainians' place. A savage struggle between them and the nationalists (especially the Bandera partisans), indicting fearful hardships on the civilian population, was carried on all through 1943.

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tion, while not extremely nationalist, appears to have viewed the nationalists with favor after the brutalities inflicted by the Communists and Germans, it made an ideal base for the nationalist activity. A second base was established in Volhynia proper, southwest of Rovno. T h e activities there, however, were much more circumscribed than those farther north, because the wooded areas were smaller and the possibility of counterattack by the Germans greater. T h e nucleus of the Bandera forces in this area appears to have been a group of about one hundred men under a leader whose pseudonym was "Kruk." Evidently a small police unit which had broken away from its German command, it was encamped in the forest near Kremenets. Living near it on amicable terms, was a group under the command of a Mel'nyk officer known as "Khrin." 46 Both groups were really underground rather than partisan bands; they carried on such activities as raids on German convoys, "jail deliveries," and attacks on small German detachments to secure arms. It appears that they endeavored to maintain an appearance of subordination to German orders, or at least lack of hostility, for their position was too exposed to permit the luxury of open warfare. 47 They were of some importance, however, because they were in a section where the peasantry was very sympathetic to the nationalist cause, and because they formed a natural link between the headquarters in Galicia and the zones of rrlore intense activity farther north. In addition to the OUN-B centers just described, and the Mel'nyk group under "Khrin," there were several other small groups scattered over the area southwest of a line extending from Rovno through Lutsk to Kovel'. Little bands of Mel'nyk supporters hid in the woods near Dubno, Lutsk, and Vladimir Volynsk (Volodymyr Volyns'k); a group of dissidents who had been members M T h e most detailed account is in MS D, which gives the strength of "Khrin's" group (with which the author of the manuscript served) as 140 in the spring of 1943, 500 in early June, and 200 a month later when Kovpak arrived. Apparently "Kruk's" group was weaker until June, when it began to forge ahead. 4 ? T h e nature of these groups is of course a highly controversial subject. Cf. especially O. Shuliak, V im'ia pravdy: Do istoriï povstanoho rukhu ν Ukraini (In the Name of Truth: On the History of the Insurrectionary Movement in the Ukraine) (Rotterdam, 1947), p. 18; Oleh Lysiak, "Volyns'kyi Ba talion" (The Volhynian Battalion), Visti Bratstva hoi. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA (March, 1951), p. 2; Vershigora, p. 400.

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of the OUN-B, known as the Front of Ukrainian Revolutionists (Front Ukraïns'kykh Revolutsionistsiv), was allied to them, while an Otaman, Voloshyn-Berchak, led a group of Free Cossacks in the Kremenets region. 48 By far the most important detachment, aside from the Bandera group, however, was that of Borovets', which had automatically (somewhat against the desires of its leader) swelled in numbers as the fugitives and police not affiliated with the Bandera forces sought a rallying point. Moreover, as the general confusion in Volhynia led the Mel'nyk OUN to take more open action, support from this quarter increased. One of the chief Mel'nyk leaders in Volhynia, Oleh Shtul', had for a long time been carrying on surreptitious resistance activities while ostensibly acting as an agent for a Ukrainian newspaper; now he permanently attached himself to the "Bul'ba" headquarters as representative of the OUN-M. 49 Moreover, young Iatseniuk, who had lived in Volhynia illegally for more than a year after his escape from Zhitomir, took the name "Volynets" " and formed a group operating southeast of Borovets', with a base a short distance inside the frontier east of Korets. It was the only nationalist partisan group based within the frontier of the pre1939 Soviet Ukraine; as it was led by a man familiar with Soviet conditions who had wide connections in the Zhitomir area, it was useful for carrying out "propaganda raids" in the Generalbezirk Zhitomir. 50 It was only natural that the dispersion and lack of unitary direction of the nationalist partisan forces aroused concern; the first proposal for a single command was evidently made by Borovets'. T h e Bandera forces sent negotiators to him. Both parties were agreed that some higher center was necessary, for the lack of such authority might lead to the degeneration of the nationalist partisan movement into mere banditry. "Bul'ba" wanted the creation of an all-party front comprising UNDP, UNR, OUN-M, and OUN-B. The Mel'nyk followers agreed to his proposals, no doubt feeling that they already had the "inside track" with the partisan commander. The Bandera group, on the other hand, in 4!

· S h u l i a k , p . 25; MS D; I n t e r v i e w 60. Interview 12. " Ibid.; S h u l i a k . p. 27.

41

From Underground to Resistance

151

accord with the guiding principle of their movement, demanded political direction by their Provid, although in return they were willing to recognize Borovets' as over-all commander of military operations. They offered as ground for rejecting the proposal the obvious impracticability of associating the UNR, whose leadership in Warsaw could be reached only infrequently, in a political directorate which had to control so shifting a force as the partisans. Of equal importance—at least according to Borovets' and his supporters—was the latter's insistence on maintaining the "conspiratorial" nature of the movement, i.e., the use of a nucleus staff with most of the followers carrying on their normal activities. The Bandera group, on the other hand, unquestionably desired a large-scale movement of open resistance, which would have meant "deconspiration," the revelation of the identity of the adherents of the nationalist partisan movement. In May, when no agreement could be reached, the negotiations were broken off.81 This severance of contacts, however, had no immediately serious consequences, for shortly afterwards a dramatic change in the situation in the whole western area took place with the arrival of the major Red partisan force. After he turned away from former Polish Volhynia, Kovpak pushed across the northern parts of the Zhitomir and Kiev Generalbezirke. Although German attacks forced him to keep on the move, the whole area north of the Zhitomir-Kiev line was so infested by Red partisans that it never again came under effective German control.52 By May, however, Kovpak's own band was back in the northern swamp area. Then came orders from Moscow for a still more extensive operation, a penetration of Galicia. The shortest route for Kovpak's forces lay directly across western Polessia and Volhynia, passing slightly north of Rovno. At a point in the neighborhood of Liudvipol', in the heart of "Bul'ba's" territory, however, the Kovpak group turned sharply to the northeast, traversing the Tsuman' area, which was a section dominated by the Bandera group.®8 Having reached the si Cf. Lebed', pp. 41-43; Shuliak, pp. 20 ff.; Borovets', Zboroina borot'ba, p. 12. 52 PS 265. 53 Kovpak, map; MS D.

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Tsuman' area, Kovpak turned south. His route from that point would have taken him directly through the Kremenets centers of the Mel'nyk and Bandera bands, but again he made a detour, this time to the east, skirting the Kremenets area and entering Galicia south of Ternopol' (Tarnopil'). 54 The entire march across the area of operations of the nationalist partisans—over 250 miles —took the Red force about three weeks.5® When Kovpak's force entered Galicia in early July, it was only partially successful in achieving its primary objective, disruption of the Drohobych petroleum production. 56 It did, however, cause a severe disturbance of the peace of Galicia. For a long time the OUN-B had been preparing an underground armed force there. When Kovpak's arrival turned the extreme eastern part of the province into a battlefield, this organization (Ukra'ins'ka Narodna Samooborona—Ukrainian Popular Self-Defense, a name chosen to conceal its identity with the Volhynian forces) came into the open to fight the Communists." As they had long had numerous scores to settle with the occupation authorities, the young warriors also began sporadic fighting with the Germans. 58 What is most interesting as an indication of the state of feeling in Galicia, however, is the speed with which Kovpak's group melted away 54 MS D; Kovpak, m a p . I t will b e noted t h a t , a l t h o u g h a distinct shift in r o u t e was m a d e , t h e deviation was not very g r e a t — p e r h a p s twenty miles. O n e source m a i n t a i n s t h a t Kovpak sent emissaries to t h e g r o u p s at K r e m e n e t s to p r o p o s e cooperation or at least n e u t r a l i t y , b u t t h a t w h i l e they refused, t h e largest ("Khrin's " ) n u m b e r e d only two h u n d r e d , a n d so was q u i t e incapable of a t t a c k i n g Kovpak's m o r e t h a n two t h o u s a n d m e n (MS D ) . 55 W h i l e the force left its s w a m p h e a d q u a r t e r s o n J u n e 12, it evidently did not e n t e r western Polessia until a b o u t t h e twentieth a n d was d e e p in Galicia by J u l y 9 (Kovpak, p. 109, a n d m a p ) . 5,1 According to Kovpak t h e a i m was the d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e oil fields a r o u n d Drohobych, the second largest p e t r o l e u m p r o d u c t i o n center u n d e r G e r m a n control (Kovpak, p. 107). W h i l e this is plausible e n o u g h , U k r a i n i a n sources have alwavs claimed t h a t the aim of the e x p e d i t i o n was d i s r u p t i o n of t h e t r a n q u i l i t y of Galicia, a n d especially interference with r e c r u i t m e n t of Galician y o u t h s for t h e G e r m a n a r m e d forces. Probably t h e latter p u r p o s e occupied at least a secondary place in the m i n d s of the Soviet leaders, since they w o u l d scarcely b e willing to a d m i t t h a t it was necessary to send a p a r t i s a n g r o u p which h a d been f o u n d e d five h u n d r e d miles away in o r d e r to prevent t h e i r f o r m e r subjects in Galicia f r o m j o i n i n g the "Fascist" forces. 5 ' Lebed', p. 49. stIbid.; R e p o r t of " D r . F r é d é r i c " to Auswärtiges A m t , S e p t e m b e r 19, 194J, CXLVa 60, in C e n t r e de D o c u m e n t a t i o n J u i v e C o n t e m p o r a i n e (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 60); cf. C h a p t e r VII, η . 25.

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in the unfavorable environment. When the raid on the oil fields failed, the group headed for the Carpathians. It is apparent even from Kovpak's own account that the powerful force disintegrated within a few weeks of its arrival there. In the latter part of August, Kovpak himself, with part of the band, headed north, reaching the swamp region on September 1 with about three hundred men. His second in command remained behind and was killed, apparently with the majority of the band. 59 Since the Carpathians contain at least as favorable terrain for guerrilla operations as does the Polessian area, where Kovpak's group maintained itself and even grew during months of heavy German attacks, it appears that a decisive factor in the rapid destruction of the band was the hostile attitude of the Galician population. Kovpak's force had scarcely left Volhynia before the Bandera partisans began to seize control of the nationalist resistance movement. T h e failure of negotiations with Borovets' induced their commander, Dmytro Kliachkevs'kyi, to adopt the title UPA in an apparent effort to secure the prestige attached to it by "Bul·ba's" earlier start. 60 At the same time, the Bandera partisans regained the services of the most experienced of their commanders, Roman Shukhevych, who had been the chief Ukrainian organizer in "Nachtigall." After the dissolution of Stets'ko's government, thii unit had been withdrawn from the front, together with "Roland." Both detachments were thoroughly reorganized, certain nationalist members were arrested and the remainder sent as a detachment to fight Red partisans in White Russia. 61 When it appeared likely that the Germans would also suppress this antipartisan unit, Shukhevych escaped to Galicia, arriving in L'vov in the spring of 1943. There the Provid appointed him commander of all OUN-B partisan forces.62 Moreover, the leaders decided that the refusal of Borovets' and the Mel'nyk forces to accept their proposals for union required forceful action to see that the nationalist partisan struggle did not degenerate into the private j'j Kovpak, p. 124. «0 See Chapter IV. n. 79. «'Liubomyr Ortyns'kvi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), fisti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD USA (June-July, 1952), p. 6; Lebed', p. 22. '·- Interview 76.

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enterprises of numerous otamans or war lords, as had the Ukrainian movement in the last days of Petliura's regime. 63 Consequently, on July 6, shortly after Kovpak had passed through the area, "Kruk's" force suddenly appeared fully armed before the Mel'nyk detachment of "Khrin" and demanded that it submit to Bandera command. Lack of preparation made resistance impossible; apparently, too, OUN-B propaganda had prepared the ground for the coup. At any rate, the majority of the Mel'nyk group accepted the ultimatum and enrolled in the Bandera force.®4 Shortly afterwards, Iatseniuk's group was similarly compelled to join the rival forces.·® After these incidents, the remaining Mel'nyk and independent groups rapidly melted away; they were destroyed by Communists or Bandera partisans, or joined the latter. In mid-August, "Bul'ba's" main force, which had also been seriously weakened, in part because of continued fights with Red partisans, was attacked by an OUN-B group. Two of his principal advisers from the U N R were captured and forced to join the OUN-B group; his wife was also taken prisoner. 69 He himself, together with Shtul', Mitrynga, Raievs'kyi, and other leaders, but with only a handful of fighting men, was driven eastward into Communist-infested territory. Here in November the group encountered a stronger Red force. In the resulting fight, Mitrynga and Raievs'kyi were killed, but Borovets' and Shtul' again managed to escape.67 This time they took the only course which they felt remained open: they left Volhynia altogether, going to Warsaw to seek German assistance to rebuild their scattered forces.68 Shcherbatiuk remained as commander of the tiny, demoralized group in Volhynia (which had been renamed the Ukraïns'ka Narodna Revoliutsiina Armiia—Ukrainian People's 3 Lebed', pp. 41-Í3. uShuliak, p. 25; MS D; I. Hirniak, "Tse bulo 6. lypnia 1943. roku" (This was July 6, 1943), Ukraïns'ke Slavo (Paris), July 1, 1951, p. 3. AU three sources assert that numerous Mel'nyk adherents were executed by the OUN-B. esShuliak. p. 27. Mlbid.; Hrytsenko in Ukraïns'ki Fisti, January 14, 1951, p. 4. 67 Interviews 50, 72. Lebed', pp. 41-43, confirms the general nature of these attacks on the "Bul"bist" groups, although he emphasizes their lack of organization and the "bloodless" nature of the OUN-B compulsion.

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155

Revolutionary Army—UNRA, to distinguish it from the Bandera usurpers of the original title).69 The rapid loss of strength of the Mel'nyk-Borovets' forces presents something of a puzzle. The explanation offered by the representatives of the latter is that they deliberately decided to refrain from entering into a fratricidal struggle. In part this appears to be correct. A major objective of both Borovets' and the Mel'nyk chiefs was to avoid creating a large-scale partisan organization, yet this is what would have been necessary to counter the Bandera group, which was bent on forming just such a powerful force. On the other hand, the assertion of adherents of the defeated party that the first attacks came unexpectedly, yet resulted in a complete surrender, itself implies that it was not calculated avoidance of an internecine struggle which alone led to the defeat. While the Bandera adherents were tightly organized, capable of sudden, prepared action, the other nationalist forces suffered from lack of central organization and competent leadership, since Borovets* was himself inadequately trained to conduct a campaign which required political as well as military experience and yet was unable to secure advice from a single, unified advisory body. Moreover, the very dynamism and élan of the Bandera party appear ta have attracted popular support; in spite of the comparative lack of military ability of "Kruk," for example, he is said to have been more popular than "Khrin." No doubt, too, their program of mass uprising, while of doubtful wisdom, was, like all forthright action, appealing to active spirits. It is noteworthy that nearly all of the members of the other partisan groups, when compelled to join the OUN-B movement, did so without taking a favorable opportunity to desert. Ukrainians in general have frequently been in the unhappy position of having to choose the lesser evil, which was unquestionably the Bandera movement, ruthless as many of its adherents were. The main concern was to fight on against the alien occupiers.70 A third factor was the geographical location of the opposing forces. The group under Borovets' occupied excellent terrain, but an 69 Borovets', Zboroina borot'ba, p. 12. το This feeling was expressed in a letter from Iatseniuk to Borovets' explaining that he accepted the OUN-B coercion only so that he could continue to fight against the Soviet and German forces (Interview 50).

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extremely exposed position, subjected to constant pressure by the Red partisans coming down from the northeast. Probably "Bul'ba" suffered as much altogether from attacks from them as he did at the hands of the Bandera partisans. T h e latter, on the other hand, occupied a somewhat more sheltered position in northern Volhynia and had a fairly clear line of communication to their large base in Galicia. Finally, the possession of the Galician source of manpower and leadership, very much larger than any outside source available to the rival groups, gave the O U N - B a decisive advantage, which had been consolidated by the early infiltration of the Volhynian police forces by Bandera organizers. By fall of 1943 the Bandera group was in substantial control of the country districts of Volhynia and southwestern Polessia. 71 T h e Germans, of course, held the towns and with difficulty maintained movement on the principal roads, but such a large area east of Rovno was under full control of the insurgents that they set about constructing a "state" apparatus, including military training camps, hospitals, and a school system. 72 T h e total n u m b e r of persons involved in the movement—including medical, administrative, and instructional personnel, as well as fighting men— was tens of thousands. Looked at in this fashion, the nationalist claim of a hundred thousand members of the UPA is perhaps not incredible, since a fairly trustworthy source describes one village in which the total personnel reached two thousand. Probably a German estimate of forty thousand (at the end of 1943) is more nearly accurate, however. 73 Included in the forces, according to nationalist accounts, were a n u m b e r of non-Ukrainian elements —Jewish physicians and deserters from German police units recruited from prisoners of war representing many of the nations of the Soviet Union. 7 4 T h e great weakness of the movement, however, was lack of trained officers. For a long time the Bandera partisans had been forced to use as chief of staff an elderly U N R τ» Occ F.-4 (1) . L e b e d ' , p p . 29-30. F o r c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e existence V e r s h i g o r a , Reíd na San ι l'islu ( R a i d on t h e San a n d V o e n n o e I z d a t e l s t v o Ministerstva O b o r o n y Soiuza SSR), 7:l O c r E - 4 (1). 1* F o r c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e presence of n o n - l ' k r a i n i a n s forces, see V e r s h i g o r a , Heid, p p . 162 ff.

of this school see Pavlo t h e Vistula) (Moscow: p. 163. in

the O U N - B

partisan

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157 75

officer ostensibly in command of a Rovno police regiment. Each additional U N R officer from the "Bul'ba" forces, aging though he was, was a treasure who was given a post of great importance by his new masters.76 Similarly, Soviet officers who escaped from prisoner camps or deserted from Red forces were eagerly welcomed. T h e lack of trained military personnel greatly limited the partisan organization's value as a fighting force. T h e weakness of the insurgent structure became apparent in February, 1944, when the Red Army advanced into Volhynia and reached the Lutsk-Rovno line. Since there was no question of the inadequately led and lightly armed partisans' offering resistance to a force which the Wehrmacht had been unable to stop, the UPA was forced to go underground until the wave of fighting had passed. Its plan was to avoid fighting with Red Army units, but to attack NKVD units and other Soviet repressive forces after most regular Soviet military formations had left the area.77 T h e UPA attempts to resume activity were severely hampered, however, by the fact that the Soviet security forces were far more capable than the Germans of organizing a network of informers which revealed the identity of the opposition group. Now "Bul'ba's" warning against "deconspiration" was proved accurate, for the organization and the individuals who had worked openly in the autumn could no longer conceal from the Communists' local agents their own affiliations.78 T h e presence of many men who had lived under the Soviet system at first acted as a disturbing influence in the organization. The Bandera leadership, having carried the policy of one-party direction to a temporarily successful conclusion, was determined to maintain this position and to prevent the development of an 73 MS D. 7« E.g., Colonel Treiko and Colonel Lytvynenko, chief adviser from Andrew Livyts'kyi to Borovets'; MS D. 77Lebed', p. 59. For an interesting Soviet confirmation of this UPA account, see Vasyl' Behma, "Zakliatye vragi ukrainskogo naroda" (The Mortal Enemies of the Ukrainian People), Pravda Ukrainy, November 15, 1944, p. 2. Behma, who was first secretary of the Rovno oblast committee of the Communist Party at the time, quoted an order of "Enei" (the pseudonym of the commander of one of the major forces of the UPA) providing that his partisans should let the Red Army units pass, then attack isolated groups of military personnel, NKVD, and police. 78ShuIiak, p. 32.

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East U k r a i n i a n

o p p o s i t i o n , which

they suspected was

infected

with C o m m u n i s t attitudes. T h e i r i n s t r u m e n t was the S B or Security Service, forged by L e b e d ' years previously. T h o u g h the e x t e n t of the " p u r g e s " of " u n r e l i a b l e e l e m e n t s " ians,

but

including

apparently

n o old

some f o r m e r UNR

(primarily East U k r a i n -

Mel'nyk

émigrés)

partisans,

is u n c e r t a i n ,

although

there

is little

q u e s t i o n that it was sufficiently great to arouse e x t r e m e disaffection a m o n g the n o n - O U N - B e l e m e n t s in the enlarged movement.7"

At

the same

time,

however,

the East

partisan

Ukrainian

e l e m e n t s a p p a r e n t l y had sufficient i n f l u e n c e — o r c o m p e l l i n g arguments—to

secure

t h e adoption

of a program

secure support f r o m f o r m e r Soviet citizens.

calculated

to

80

As was p o i n t e d o u t in the last chapter, the ideology of the B a n d e r a faction of the O U N

began to change as early as the

spring of 1942. T h e m a j o r force f o r c h a n g e at that time was the i m p a c t of East U k r a i n i a n c o n d i t i o n s and attitudes upon m e m b e r s of the O U N - B "task forces." W h i l e this portion of the B a n d e r a g r o u p was too small a n d u n i n f l u e n t i a l to b r i n g a b o u t a fundam e n t a l c h a n g e in the group's program, some new c u r r e n t s are clearly a p p a r e n t in u n d e r g r o u n d p u b l i c a t i o n s as early as 1942. 8 1 One publication

(apparently issued very early in 1943) devoted

m u c h a t t e n t i o n to the deceits and failures of the G e r m a n p r o g r a m , a n d b i t t e r l y o b j e c t e d to the restriction of

land

Ukrainian

e d u c a t i o n to the four-year school. 8 - E x a l t a t i o n of " h e r o i s m " and emphasis kratiia)

on

Dmytro

Dontsov's

integral

nationalism

(natsio-

r e m a i n e d , however. 8 3 E x p e d i e n c e counseled some réduc-

tion of the e x t r e m e e t h n o c e n t r i s m which had characterized Bandera

faction,

b u t , as the following

passage

indicates,

the true

t o l e r a n c e was r e m o t e : Regardless of the negative attitude toward the Jews as a weapon of Moscovite-Bolshevik imperialism, we regard it as inexpedient at the present stage of the international situation to take part in anti-Jewish tu Ibid.. p. 30; M S D . sllSee report of a press conference of the I ' H V R by M. Sliranka in I'kra'ins'ki fisti, O c t o b e r 11, 1947, p. 3. s ' Most of these p u b l i c a t i o n s (made available to nie through the courtesv of I.ev Shankovs'kyi) could not be used in the first edition of this work I must point out that Shankovs'kyi, in his book Pokhidni hrupy OL'X (March Groups of the O l ' N ) ( M u n i c h : l ' k r a ï n s ' k y i Samostiinyk, 1958), using the same tvpe of material, asciibe«, considerably more influence to the " t a s k forces." st'isnyk, No. 9, pp. 4 - 5 . s-t Ideia y Chyn, Y e a r I, No. 1, November 1, 1942.

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159

actions, in order not to become a blind tool in foreign hands and not to divert the attention of the masses from the principal enemies.84 A little later another underground publication condemned "German racism, which has carried anthropological nonsense to the absurd." 85 In the spring of 1943 another OUN-B leaflet made the admission, strikingly novel for that period, that some Russians did not oppose an independent Ukraine, for they were born in the Ukraine and felt more bound to it than to Moscow. 86 But the same article stressed the need for upholding purity of the Ukrainian language, objecting to the "Ukrainian-Russian jargon" spoken in Kharkov, and regretting that only the "intelligentsia" there was nationally conscious. These "conscious elements" were said to strive to "establish the Ukrainian language exclusively in the press, schools, and theater." 87 From the summer of 1943 on, the experiences of the partisans became more and more important. T h e OUN-B effort to dominate the nationalist partisan groups and to secure the more or less willing cooperation of non-Galicians forced the leadership to pay more attention to the wishes of these elements. A little later, the East Ukrainians incorporated into the OUN-B-dominated UPA achieved sufficient influence to inject their views directly into the stream of ideological revision. T h e predominantly military orientation of the OUN-B leadership in the UPA, exemplified especially by Shukhevych, was probably more open to new ideological themes than had been the fanatical Galician underground represented by men like J o h n Klymiv (killed by the Gestapo in late 1942 or early 1943). At the same time, Shukhevych and his lieutenants possessed far greater influence than the "task force" leaders who had been in touch with the East Ukrainians in the earlier period. By the time of the " T h i r d Extraordinary Great Congress of the O U N " in August, 1943, new ideological influences were clearly in the ascendant. Great attention was devoted to economic matters. Apparently influenced by the reluctance of many younger 84 Ibid, (from "incomplete" decisions of the second conference of the OUN-B held earlier in 1942) . Sôldeia y Chyn, Year II, No. 2, p. 23. se Visnyk, No. 11 (Spring, 1943). H7Ibid.

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East Ukrainians to see the land revert completely to private ownership, the Congress made n o commitment on this point. Large-scale commerce and industry, on the other hand, were to remain nationalized, but with worker participation in management. T h e intensive Soviet emphasis on piece-work (Stakhanovism) was rejected in favor of voluntary overtime work, while freedom in choice of jobs, profit-sharing, and free trade unions were guaranteed. Women were promised equality, but were to be relieved of unhealthy tasks such as work in mines. Assurances of free health services, old age pensions, family allowances, and free education at all levels indicated the concern of the OUN-B with social security measures which strongly appealed to the East Ukrainians. Political rights were by no means so clearly defined. Some points of the program referred to the rights of national minorities, generally guaranteed freedom of religion, speech, and the press, and rejected official status for any doctrine. On the other hand, the ethnocentric and authoritarian elements of earlier OUN-B doctrines seemed to be reflected in the insistence on an "heroic spirit," "social solidarity, friendship, and discipline." 88 OUN-B underground publications during late 1943 and early 1944 continued to portray the glories of Ukrainian history, to stress the need for extending the use of the Ukrainian language, and to demand rigid discipline. T h e mixture of social egalitarianism and romantic authoritarianism which characterized the new OUN-B ideology is most clearly apparent in the record of the last major conference (aside from those held by émigrés) for which reliable information is available. T h e conference was held in eastern Galicia in early J u n e or July, 1944, a few weeks before the area was reconquered by the Soviet armies. 89 Although it is highly probable that the leaders of the OUN-B, KS Za Sainostiinu Ukraïnu, Year I I I , N o . 8 (1943). •s;) T h e record of t h i s c o n f e r e n c e is especially i m p o r t a n t not only because it represents a c u l m i n a t i n g stage of N a t i o n a l i s t ideological d e v e l o p m e n t , b u t because it is t h e m o s t c o m p l e t e a n d most i n d i s p u t a b l y a u t h e n t i c of t h e O L ' N - B c o n f e r e n c e records. T h e d o c u m e n t s r e l a t i n g to it. e n t i t l e d s i m p l y U H V R , are a m o n g t h e u n c a t a l o g u e d G e r m a n m a t e r i a l s in t h e H o o v e r L i b r a r y on W a r , R e v o l u t i o n , a n d Peace. I a m i n d e b t e d to A l e x a n d e r D a l l i n for t h e use of a microfilm r e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e m . Since t h e c h a n g e in p r o g r a m was in t h e d i r e c t i o n of g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s o n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s , social progress, a n d d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s , one w o u l d b e

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who were at this time in de facto control of the UPA, were responsible for calling the conference, the previous claim of this faction to monolithic control of all Ukrainian nationalists was at least overtly abandoned. A considerable number of East Ukrainians in the partisan bands attended the conference and apparently were able to express views diverging from those of the Bandera faction. Moreover, a new body, known as the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukraïns'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada— UHVR) was formed and was declared open to all parties which accepted the aim of Ukrainian national independence. The "Universal," as the proclamation issued by the new body was entitled, emphasized the following points: Representatives of the Ukrainian revolutionary liberation forces, and various political groups from all the Ukrainian lands, which have acknowledged the independence platform to be the only correct one in the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people for an independent Ukrainian state embracing all the Ukrainian lands, have united in the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council is the supreme and only guiding organ of the Ukrainian people for the period of its revolutionary struggle, until the formation of the government of an independent Ukrainian state embracing all the Ukrainian lands. An accompanying resolution entitled " T h e Provisional Structure of the U H V R " provides interesting clues to the background and outlook of the founders of the new organization, although the complex apparatus which it envisaged could scarcely have had any real existence under conditions of partisan resistance. The resolution declared the supreme legislative authority of the Ukrainian liberation movement to be the Great Assembly of the UHVR. This body was to have twenty-five members, comprising inclined to suspect the authenticity of the documents, except for the fact that they were evidently obtained by German agents whom the Ukrainians could scarcely have hoped to please by such expressions. It seems highly improbable that an enemy of the UPA forged the documents to arouse German enmity for the Ukrainian partisans. For many months the groups associated with the UPA had not only printed bitter denunciations of the Germans, but had carried out physical attacks on their officials. Such denunciations are repeated in the documents in question; consequently, it would scarcely have been worth while to insert points contrary to Nazi ideology to indicate the hostility of the nationalists toward the German regime.

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a p p a r e n t l y the representatives of the "various political groups" who had created the U H V R . 8 0 T h e executive power was assigned to a G e n e r a l Secretariat consisting of a C h a i r m a n and General Secretaries, for internal affairs, external affairs, military affairs (the c o m m a n d e r of the a r m e d forces), a n d financial and economic affairs. Additional secretaries could be n a m e d in the f u t u r e . W h i l e the G e n e r a l Secretariat was to act in a "collégial" fashion, deciding questions by vote, the C h a i r m a n was actually given a d o m i n a n t position. H e was elected by the G r e a t Assembly, and could be dismissed by it alone. T h e C h a i r m a n , however, was given broad a p p o i n t i v e powers, subject only to confirmation by higher authority. H e n o m i n a t e d all o t h e r m e m b e r s of the Secretariat and proposed their dismissal; he nomin a t e d the diplomatic representatives of the U H V R . Significantly, his powers extended to the legislative b r a n c h , for he could nominate new m e m b e r s of the Great Assembly. N o m i n a l l y an eight-man Presidium and its president occupied positions above the General Secretariat. T h e P r e s i d i u m was an i n t e r i m legislative council, the organ which "acts between sessions of the Great Assembly." It was to "advise on the political strategy, the tactics, and practical activity of all the organs of the U H V R a n d i n f o r m them of its s u p p l e m e n t a l decrees and proposals." Otherwise, its f u n c t i o n s were p r i m a r i l y ceremonial and procedural; for example, the President was declared to "stand at the head of the U H V R and to represent it externally." T h e President was also to confirm officials n o m i n a t e d by the C h a i r m a n , except for the new members of the G r e a t Assembly, who were to be elected by the Presidium as a whole u p o n the proposal of the C h a i r m a n . In m a n y of its functions, as well as in its title, the P r e s i d i u m recalls the Presidium of the S u p r e m e Soviet of the USSR established by the constitution of 1936. Very probably this f e a t u r e of the U H V R framework was i n t r o d u c e d by the East U k r a i n i a n representatives at the conference who d r e w on their knowledge of the Soviet system. T h e provision of a C o n t r o l Collegium to '•'"The i n i t i a l m e m b e r s h i p was n o t s p e c i f i e d , very l i k e l v to RIOSS o v e r t h e fact that t h e Great A s s e m b l y was s e l f - a p p o i n t e d . T h i s is o n e of n u m e r o u s p o i n t s w h e r e t h e I ' H V R p r o c l a m a t i o n s are a p p a r e n t l y i n t e n t i o n a l l y o b s c u r e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e p e a t e d c o n f u s i o n in r e f e r e n c e to t h e " I ' H V R " a n d t h e "Great A s s e m b l y of t h e L ; H V R " e v i d e n t l y reflects p o o r d r a f t i n g of the d o c u m e n t s .

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supervise the "financial-economic activity of all the organs of the U H V R , in particular . . . the financial-economic policy of the General Secretariat" also suggests the influence of the Soviet constitutional structure, which until 1940 included a Commission of Soviet Control. 9 1 In contrast to the Soviet constitutional provisions, though not to Soviet practice, individual officials were assigned positions of great power, however. T h e scope of the Chairman's authority has already been outlined. T h e other heads of branches of the government were given comparable, though lesser, powers. T h e President was given a more important position than the Soviet President, who is confined to ceremonial duties. Similarly, the Comptroller General was permitted to nominate the two other members of the Control Collegium, while the General Justice of the General Court nominated the two remaining justices. These provisions suggest that the Führerprinzip, the "organizational pattern that operates from the top to the bottom," 9 2 had not been wholly forgotten by the nationalist leaders. If the structure of the U H V R reflected the constitutional principles with which its members had become familiar through their association with the Nazi and the Soviet systems, the social-political principles proclaimed at the same time represented in considerable measure a reaction to these regimes. Because these principles represent a culmination of the development of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology toward greater emphasis on economic and social welfare, and upon the securing of individual rights, it is worth quoting them at some length: (a) Assurance of popular-democratic procedures in the accomplishment of the political development of the Ukrainian State by the general assembly of the people (b) Assurance of freedom of thought, of Weltanschauung, and of belief (c) Assurance of the development of the Ukrainian national culture (d) Assurance of a just social order in the Ukrainian State, free of exploitation of classes and suppression (e) Assurance of the rule of law in practice, and of the equality of all citizens before the law in the Ukrainian State «1 On the features of the Soviet system mentioned in this paragraph see Julian Towster, Political Power in the USSR (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 172-73, 263-72. «¡¡Franz Neumann, Behemoth (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1943), p. 74.

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(f) Assurance of civil rights for all national minorities in the Ukraine (g) Assurance of the right of equal educational opportunities for all citizens (h) Assurance of free initiative in creative economic activity, regulated by the requirements and needs of the entire Nation (i) Assurance of a free form of creative use of the soil, with specification of the minimum and the maximum limits for individual use of the soil (j) Socialization of the principal natural resources of the country: soil, forests, water, mineral deposits; at the same time, the arable land is to be turned over to the creative peasant economy in permanent usufruct (k) State ownership of heavy industry and transport; turning over the right of free extensive cooperative activities by small producers to the cooperative associations in light industry and food industry (1) Assurance of free trade within the limits set by law (m) Assurance of the free development of artisanry and the right to the formation of individual artisan establishments and undertakings (n) Assurance of the right to free work for physical and mental workers and assurance of the protection of the interests of the workers by social legislation. A l t h o u g h the above q u o t a t i o n indicates considerable attention to concrete problems, it must be emphasized that many practical deficiencies c o n t i n u e d to obstruct the development of a coherent nationalist political theory. A m u c h greater portion of the " U n i versal" was devoted to romanticized history a n d emotional appeals for action than to the proposal of clearly defined steps to be taken. T h e f o r m u l a t i o n of the other U H V R resolutions is freq u e n t l y unclear, and the provisions are often inconsistent. T h e s e obscurities may sometimes have been inserted for deliberate tactical purposes, b u t in many cases, especially in the provisions for the g o v e r n m e n t a l structure, they appear to have resulted f r o m insufficient training in law and logic and f r o m lack of real interest in constitutional questions. Moreover, it is evident that U H V R m e m b e r s had not u n d e r t a k e n the careful study on which to base real solutions to m a j o r problems, such as the agrarian question. In place of carefully worked-out programs, broad principles were proclaimed which indeed p o i n t e d the way to new systems b u t failed to indicate how they would be i m p l e m e n t e d . Most i m p o r t a n t , nationalism r e m a i n e d the central point of the

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ideology, about which all else revolved. As the introductory paragraph of the "ideo-programmatic principles" put it: The protection of the life of the nation, of national unity, and culture is the first and highest goal of every healthy national organism. The national sovereign state is the chief guarantee of the preservation of the life and the normal development of the nation and the well-being of its citizens. Therefore the Ukrainian nation must at the present time devote all its forces to obtaining and strengthening its own state. It seems quite clear that a great many, at least of the leaders of the U H V R , like the leaders of the OUN in the East Ukraine many months earlier, were only partly convinced of the value of the new program of political, social, and economic gains. T h e y had, however, come to see that vast numbers of East Ukrainians, by this time heavily represented in the partisan movement, would accept no ideology which failed to embrace such a program. Consequently, nationalist leaders were determined to win popular support for nationalism by presenting it as the surest road to political liberty and social welfare. Regardless of the motivations of the West Ukrainian leaders, however, it is clear that by 1944 contact with East Ukrainians had resulted in a sweeping change in the ideological position of the dominant nationalist group. From the strictly military viewpoint, the activities of the Ukrainian nationalist partisans were of slight significance. Even from the immediate political standpoint, it is questionable whether they achieved anything of importance, for by the time the Germans were inclined to make concessions, their authority was already on the verge of being overthrown by the Red Army. T h e "deconspiration" of the UPA undoubtedly inflicted considerable suffering upon the people of Volhynia, since it exposed the nationalist elements to the Soviet authorities. On the other side of the ledger must be placed the facts that the nationalist partisan movement undoubtedly prevented the spread of Red partisans to Volhynia and demonstrated that neither in that province nor in Galicia was there widespread sympathy for the Soviet guerrilla groups. Moreover, the fact that the Ukrainians, almost alone among east European nations, were able to carry on an armed struggle, even to a limited extent and for a comparatively short time, against both the German and the Soviet forces was an important psychological stimulus to nationalist feeling.

VII. SALVAGE EFFORTS when partisan activity was reaching its peak in Volhynia, Ukrainian nationalist elements began the last chapter of their collaboration with the Germans. Strange as it may appear, in this final period, cooperation between these disparate forces was closer than during the abortive "honeymoon" of 1941. T h e key to this apparent paradox lies in the Ukrainian psychology—a better term than attitude in this case—toward the creation of a national military force and in the German policy toward securing the military collaboration of Eastern Europe. Few political movements in this century have been as thoroughly obsessed as the Ukrainian nationalist movement with the idea of building military strength. This obsession is readily understandable as far as the OUN parties were concerned, for their ideology emphasized will, force, action. While there was a persistent trend in the senior branch of the OUN toward shaping the movement in a military mold with an emphasis on order and discipline, the younger group was inclined to cast aside all inhibitions to secure the immediate application of violence. T o both, however, the army—insofar as it represented sheer power—was a high ideal. Non-Nationalist circles, such as the U N R and the legal parties in Galicia, also placed enormous emphasis upon military organization. When one reflects that in 1919-21 the nationalist movement in both the East and the West Ukraine had been bloodily suppressed by superior organized force, the roots of this concern become discernible. During the revolutionary period the lack of a substantial nucleus of trained military units, similar to those of the Poles, the Bolsheviks, and the White Russian forces had been a terrible handicap to the Ukrainian cause. In the Second World War nationalist leaders were willing to exact great material sacrifices of their people in order to overcome this critical lack. T h e Ukrainian hopes for the formation in 1941 of a military A T THE VERY TIME

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force under German aegis were frustrated by the Nazi contempt for the peoples of the East. Somewhat later, even as the organized nationalist forces were being suppressed, renewed hope arose that the Wehrmacht would insist on the building of a Ukrainian army. These Ukrainian expectations were not wholly unfounded, for the bitter experiences of the winter battles around Moscow and Kharkov and the growing Red partisan threat convinced many high army commanders that if the Soviet system was to be defeated help must be secured from the Kremlin's former subjects. A leader in this group was General von Schenkendorff, who proposed as early as March, 1942, that a national "Russian government" dependent on Germany should be formed to act as a rallying point for native armed forces.1 With the aid of officers moved less by sympathy for the aspirations of the East European peoples than by a willingness to grasp for promising expedients, Hilfswillige ("Hiwis," auxiliary) units and Ostlegionen were recruited by the Wehrmacht from among prisoners of war to carry on service operations for the army and to combat partisans. In the late winter of 1941-42, some of these units were used as independent detachments in the front line. T h e success of this experiment induced Wehrmacht circles to plan extensive employment of former Soviet troops.2 Men from the Caucasus and Central Asia were preferred as recruits by the Germans, but Slavs were also enlisted. T h e chief Slavic detachments seem to have been the "Cossack hundreds." These groups were linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous, for the name appealed at once to the traditions of the Ukrainians and to the Russian-speaking Cossacks of the Don and the Kuban. News of their employment spread quickly, and by May Ukrainian circles as far away as L'vov were convinced that the Germans had employed "Ukrainian" forces in the front line on the Isthmus of Kerch and that they would soon use Ukrainian troops in large numbers. 3 Closer to the zone of operation the stories were more ι PS 1685. •-•PS 1686. Report from L'vov for week of May 22, 1942, contained in summary of H a u p tabteilung Propaganda, Cracow, May 30, 1942, Occ E-2 (2), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-2 [2]). Cf. also a citation f r o m Vil'ne Slovo (Drogobych), January 15, 1942, in Nastup, February 15, 1942, p. 4.

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precise; the Ukrainian newspapers in Kiev and Mariupol* reported that several Ukrainian detachments were fighting on the Crimean front, and even mentioned the name of a commander, while they observed that preparations were being made for training 150,000 Ukrainian soldiers. 4 T h e ambitious plans of the Wehrmacht group soon encountered a most formidable obstacle. Hitler had a deep-seated antipathy toward granting the "inferior" and "untrustworthy" Slavs the right to bear arms. In August, 1942, he intervened personally to limit military utilization of volunteers from the Soviet nationalities to small anti-partisan formations. 5 T h e Wehrmacht officers did not abandon their long-range intentions of forming an army of former Soviet soldiers to help fight Stalin, b u t these leaders were forced to move cautiously. In the fall of 1942, their efforts became centered around Andrew Vlasov, an officer well known among the second echelon of Soviet generals, who had been captured a few months previously. T h e German officers envisaged him as the spokesman of all the anti-Communist elements from the Soviet Union. For a time they were successful in securing some support for Vlasov even in the Ostministerium, although Rosenberg never fully trusted him, since he knew Vlasov, a Russian, would not endorse the Rosenberg plan of partitioning the Soviet state.® During the winter of 1942-43 Rosenberg and the army felt, though mistakenly, that there was a chance of gradually winning Hitler's sanction for a limited program of quasi-autonomy for the peoples of the occupied USSR, a step which would secure their active support for the war against their former rulers. At the same time that he was bolstering his shaky prestige by collaboration F e b r u a r y 15. 1942, p. 4, q u o t i n g Nove Ukraïns'ke Slavo for J a n u a r y * Nastup, 14, 1942; Krakivs'ki fisti, A p r i l 30, 1942, p . 3, q u o t i n g Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta, No. 32.. •"' Directive No. 46 to O b e r k o m m a n d o d e r W e h r m a c h t o n p a r t i s a n fighting, f r o m F ü h r e r h a u p t q u a r t i e r , A u g u s t 18, 1942, PS 477 ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as PS 477). 11 V a r i o u s aspects of t h e Vlasov m o v e m e n t h a v e b e e n t h o r o u g h l y discussed in J ü r g e n T h o r w a l d ' s IV en sie verderben wollen ( S t u t t g a r t : S t e i n g r ü b e n Verlag, 1952), G e o r g e Fischer's The Soviet Opposition to Stalin (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard l'ili \ t i si I y Press, 1952). a n d in A l e x a n d e r Dallin's (¡erman Hule in Russia, / « • / / - / " / . V A study of Occupation Policies ι L o n d o n . M a c m i l l a n & Co.. Ltd., 1957). C o n s e q u e n t h , ιιο effort has been m a d e to discuss this m o v e m e n t e x c e p t i n s o f a r as it c a m e i n t o direct c o n t a c t with t h e U k r a i n i a n nationalists.

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with the Wehrmacht, Rosenberg also sought allies in the SS. His contacts there were utilized in March, 1943, in a scheme to form a "Ukrainian national representation" which, as envisaged by Rosenberg, would evidently have the dual purpose of securing greater Ukrainian support for the German war effort and preventing Vlasov's obtaining too important a role. Probably with the help of SS Brigadeführer Ohlendorf, Dr. Kinkelin, one of the higher officials of the Ostministerium, composed a list of four Kiev officials. A special effort was made to secure "pure Ukrainians" who were in close contact with the peasant. Remarkably enough, however, all four appear to have favored the Russophile element in Kiev municipal life. 7 T h e question of how such a "national committee" would have been received by nationalist Ukrainians went unanswered, for it remained a paper scheme. Whether its lack of reality was due to obstruction of the SS, which desired an instrument to reduce the partisan danger but continued to despise all Slavs, or whether it arose from Hitler's direct intervention is difficult to say.8 At any rate, by the summer of 1943 the project had been dropped, along with the more grandiose plans for Vlasov's political activity. T h e Ukrainians, however, who had looked with deep suspicion on the rise of Vlasov, now found in an unexpected quarter new encouragement in their hopes for a national army. 9 Although the SS continued to oppose the larger plans for arousing the Slavs against Communism, SS officers, extremely powerful in the Generalgouvernement, persuaded Himmler's coterie to authorize the large-scale recruitment of Galician Ukrainians for the Waffen SS. T h e continued outward loyalty of the population of Galicia, which made the province, prior to Kovpak's incursion, one of the most peaceful of Germany's conquests, was a powerful argument in favor of concessions to the West Ukrainians. Europeans classified as "Nordics" were already enrolled in special military τ They were Vadym Maikovs'kyi, Theodore Babak, Volodymyr Labuts'kyi, and George Kandiïv. Temporary list of members for a Ukrainian National Committee, by Dr. Kinkelin, CXLVa 77, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 77). - T h e latter's decision to restrict Vlasov operations was made about this time. See George Fischer, "Vlasov and Hitler," Journal of Modern History, XXIII (March, 1951), 64. »Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk, May 30, 1943, p. 3.

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formations u n d e r H i m m l e r . T h i s new departure in SS policy, made at a time when the higher SS officials were toying with the idea of backing a Ukrainian national representation, enabled the "inferior" Slavs to secure a footing in tne ranks ot the elite troops. T h e creation of SS Division Galicia, as the unit was called, was hedged about with restrictions. T h e word " U k r a i n i a n " was excluded from the designation. Overt reference to "political" implications of the formation was rigorously forbidden. 1 0 Nevertheless, the creation of the division was supported by most of the leading elements in Galicia. Formation of the division was officially announced on May 4, 1943, when the president of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Kubiiovych, issued a proclamation urging its support. 1 1 While Colonel Sushko was not active in the new project, 1 2 General Kurmanovych spoke in favor of the division on the L'vov radio. 1 3 O t h e r Mel'nyk supporters like Michael Khronoviat played leading roles in its development, and pro O U N - M organs gave it great publicity. 14 T h e position of the rival nationalist g r o u p was less clear. Being illegal, the OUN-B could not take part openly in the drive to establish the military unit even had it desired to do so. Since the war, Bandera supporters have used this circumstance to maintain that they always opposed this form of collaboration with the Germans, and have denounced the other nationalist groups for supporting it. It is fairly clear, however, that while the OUN-B did not officially countenance the project, or lend extensive support, it did not really work against the creation of the division. Shukhevych is said to have felt that it offered a valuable opportunity for Ukrainian ' " I n t e r v i e w 70. A l e t t e r (in t h e possession of D r . L i u b o m y r M a k a r u s h k a ) f r o m B a u e r to Schenk a n d Bisantz (all officials in t h e G e n e r a l g o u v e r n e m e n t ) , d a t e d A u g u s t 18. 1943, states t h a t M a k a r u s h k a s h o u l d b e w a r n e d a g a i n s t ascribing political i m p o r t a n c e to t h e " m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l " f o r m e d in c o n n e c t i o n with t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e division. 11 T h i s p r o c l a m a t i o n was p r i n t e d in Krakivs'ki Visti, May 6, 1943, p. 1. I t recalled t h e h e r o i c f e a t s of t h e U k r a i n i a n G a l i c i a n A r m y a n d t h e s t u d e n t s w h o d e f e n d e d Kiev at K n i t s ; at t h e s a m e t i m e it a p p e a l e d to r e a l i s m a n d n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t a n d e m p h a s i z e d t h e Bolshevik d a n g e r . It w a r n e d t h a t t h e m a t t e r was a case of " n o w o r n e v e r . " ' - E v i d e n t l y o u t of p i q u e b e c a u s e h e was n o t given a l e a d i n g role ( I n t e r v i e w 36). '•'Nastup, May 16, 1943, p. 2. a ¡bid.; Nastup, May 23, 1943, p. 6, a n d May 30, 1943, p . 3.

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youths to secure military training. 15 This would be in accord with his well-known proclivity for emphasizing the technical military needs of the nationalist movement, and it is the more plausible because just at that time his efforts to build up the UPA were being severely hampered by a dearth of young officers. In order to obtain cadres for future operations, and in order to prevent the new unit from falling into the hands of those opposed to OUN-B aims, he ordered a considerable number of his followers to enter its ranks, where they occupied prominent positions; 16 other Bandera adherents, attracted by the opportunity for active service, joined without such authorization. 17 T h e Galician Division, however, never came under the control of either O U N party to the same extent as had the earlier German-organized Ukrainian formations. T h e prime organizer and highest ranking Ukrainian officer in it (the commanding staff was German) was Dmytro Pali'iv, formerly a leader of one of the smaller legal parties in Poland. 18 With him were associated a large number of UNDO members like Liubomyr Makarushka, 1 * while numerous old U N R officers like Generals Petriv 20 and Omelianovych-Pavlenko 21 lent their moral support. T h e almost universal support given to a creation of the SS, the very organization which had done most to suppress Ukrainian nationalism, was reinforced in the spring of 1943 by the view which most Ukrainian nationalists took of the future course of events. Much as they hated the Nazis, and little as they hoped for real help from them, they hated and feared the Communists still more. T h a t the prospects of German victory, never very high i-'>Bohdan Pidhainyi, "Uva shliakhy—odna meta" ( T w o R o u t e s — O n e Goal), in. O l e h Lysiak (ed.), Brody: Zbirnyk stattet i narysiv (Brody: A Collection of Articles and Sketches) ( M u n i c h : Bratstvo kol. Voiakiv Pershoi U D U N A , 1951), p. 59. ι11 Ibid. ' " I n t e r v i e w 58. U n d e r g r o u n d O U N - B p u b l i c a t i o n s of t h i s p e r i o d a r e very d e f i n i t e in their o p p o s i t i o n to t h e G a l i c i a n Division, h o w e v e r . See Ideia y Chyn, II, N o . 3 ( a b o u t April, 1943) a n d Biuleten', III, N o . I I (1943). T h e s e sources (which w e r e not a v a i l a b l e t o m e w h e n t h e first e d i t i o n of this book was w r i t t e n ) a p p e a r to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t at least t h e G a l i c i a n h e a d q u a r t e r s of t h e O L ' N - B f o u g h t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e division in its e a r l y stage; as n o t e d below (note 22) this overt o p p o s i t i o n e v i d e n t l y ceased b e f o r e t h e e n d of 1943. "-Interviews 36, 58. '»Interview 70; Nastup, May 16, 1943, p. 2. -"Krakivs'ki Visti, J u n e 9, 1943, p . 1. - ' M y r o s l a v Martynets', "Gen.-Polk. M. O m e l i a n o v y c h - P a v l e n k o " (Colonel-General Omelianovych-Pavlenko), Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA (AugustSeptember, 1952), p. 1.

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after the failure to take Moscow, were extremely remote was apparent to all after the winter of Stalingrad. Many Ukrainian leaders hoped for a protracted struggle in which both of the totalitarian powers would be so weakened that they would be forced to surrender their domination of Eastern Europe. T h e y thought that Great Britain and the United States, in accordance with either the plain meaning of the Atlantic Charter or elementary principles of the balance of power, would prevent the complete subjugation of this area by the Soviet Union. What they anticipated was a period of anarchy in the area between Russia and Germany, like that of 1918, in which the nation which possessed organized military forces would be able to assert itself. Some felt that the UPA could fill this need, but many felt that in view of the UPA's low military value the nationalist movement must seize the chance to form a real army under German auspices which could later be used independently, even against its sponsors.22 T h e nationalist leaders were also encouraged to support the Galician Division by certain favorable conditions which they exacted from the Germans. According to Nationalist accounts, the unit was to be used only against the Soviet forces and never against the Western Allies; thus it would be in a position, they thought, to come to terms with the latter when the opportunity arose. Whether or not the Germans officially agreed to this stipulation, it is certain that the condition was observed. More significantly, the political training and indoctrination of the soldiers, - - S e e especially Nykon Nalyvaiko, "Legiony ν natsionalnykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), Narodna Volia, October 27, 1949, p. 2, and November 3, 1949. p. 3; Ivan Hryn'okh, "Dyviziia Halychyna i ukraïns'ke pidpillia" ( T h e Galician Division a n d the Ukrainian Underground), in Brody, pp. 52 ff.; and the clandestine publication, Za Samostünu Ukrainu, No. 9, December 10, 1943, which gives the official position of the " T h i r d Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN [B]" on the role of Ukrainian forces in the event of German collapse. T h e Bandera followers stated that t h e Western Allies (especially Britain) wanted a prolongation of the war on the eastern front with m u t u a l weakening of Germany and the Soviet Union, so that they could have a free h a n d on the continent. They continued that Moscow, being discredited in the eyes of the eastern nations, could not maintain its imperialism, a circumstance which gave the Ukraine an opportunity to become the natural leader of these peoples. It is significant that, while the report of this conference called for struggle against Germany and glorified the UPA, in other places it emphasized repeatedly t h e need for a r m e d forces without specifying that they be insurgent. T h e r e was no condemnation of the Galician Division.

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instead of being in the hands of Nazi ideologists, was left to the nationalist leadership. Moreover, in contrast to tne usual Waffen SS practice, each detachment was allowed its chaplain. 23 T h e considerations just discussed played a considerable part in securing the support of both the Autocephalous Orthodox Church 24 and the Greek Catholic Church for the formation of the Galician Division. Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi had originally greeted the German army as a liberator from Communist tyranny. He soon discovered that the Wehrmacht officers, with whom he at first established cordial relations, were not the real representatives of German power. The horrible excesses of the SP, especially its massacre of thousands of Jews, caused a sharp change in Sheptyts'kyi's attitude. He was especially alarmed by the SP use of Ukrainian police for their murders, and is said to have sent a direct demand to Himmler that this practice be stopped. At any rate, a secret report to the German foreign office provides almost conclusive evidence that the Metropolitan was adamantly opposed to the Nazi anti-Semitic outrages and that by late 1943 he had come to regard Nazism as even a greater evil than Communism. 25 Nevertheless, he personally favored the creation of the Galician Division, and sent one of his clergy, Dr. Laba, to act as chief chaplain. 26 Bishop Joseph Slipyi conducted a service in St. George Interviews 46, 58, 63. -J T h e son of Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), the vicarial bishop of Kiev, joined the division; see Report by an unidentified official of the Ostministerium to Rosenberg, J u n e 30, 1944, CXLVa 66. in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 66). -•"'CXLVa 60. T h i s document was submitted as a secret report, under the pseudonym "Dr. Frédéric," to the German foreign office by a fairly well-known French s t u d e n t of East Europe, who had become an active collaborator with the Germans. On a visit to L'vov in the late summer of 1943 this man talked with a n u m b e r of Ukrainians, including the Metropolitan. T h e report appears to reflect the Metropolitan's attitudes accurately, and in large measure substantiates accounts such as those of Stepan (Stephen) Baran, Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernvhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), pp. 114-115, and Father Mykhailo Sopuliak, "Pam'iati velykoho Mytropolyta" (Memories of the Great Metropolitan;, Chas, December 14, 1947, p. 3. T h i s , a n d the following paragraph, is also based on Il'ko (Elie) Borshchak, Un Prélat Ukrainien: Le Metropolite Cheptyskyj (1865-1941) (Paris: Editions FrancoUkrainiennes, 1946), pp. 55-56; and on Interview 63. - " S S O b e r g r u p p e n f ü h r e r Berger to Himmler, July 26, 1943, H H 263, in Hoover Library. T h e same file contains a sermon delivered by Father Laba in which h e calls u p o n the Galicians to help "Hitler and the German people" destroy Bolshevism. An accompanying letter from Berger to another SS official, Brandt (July 22, 1943), notes that Laba's sermons contain "dangerous expressions," b u t that "we will soon pull this tooth." Himmler's own attitude is indicated by Brandt's

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Cathedral in L'vov, celebrating the inauguration of the division. 27 German permission to provide chaplains and the absence of Nazi indoctrination among the soldiers helped make the unit acceptable to the church. T h e chief reason which induced the Metropolitan to sanction the project, however, was similar to that which motivated other nationalist leaders. He felt that German defeat was only a matter of time and that the small military support which the division could provide for the faltering Wehrmacht could not be decisive. At the same time, he thought the existence of a nationalist military force of some strength would be invaluable in the chaos which would succeed a German collapse and might even be necessary to preserve the lives of a considerable portion of the Ukrainian population of Galicia. Sheptyts'kyi's chief concern in this connection was aroused by extremist elements among the Poles who were killing their opponents among the Ukrainians, just as the OUN-B was slaughtering Poles in Volhynia. More than twelve months were spent in recruiting and organizing the division. T h e response of the young men to the call for enlistment was so great that the quota set for the unit was overfilled many times, and tens of thousands had to be rejected. 28 Nevertheless, the SS officers in control appear to have been suspicious of the loyalty of their command and hesitant to use it. Meanwhile, the Nazis' vast conquests in the Ukraine were falling into the hands of the Red Army. In March, 1943, the Soviet forces took Kharkov, only to lose it in May. They captured Kharkov once again, and September, 1943, brought them from Kharkov to the gates of Kiev. T h e r e they halted a month, b u t the remaining fall and winter of 1943-44 ended with the reconquest of "practically all of the pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine, plus most of Volhynia. It was not until the summer of 1944 that the real battle for Galicia was joined. At this point, the SS command finally decided to commit the new Ukrainian division to battle. T h e front s t a t e m e n t t h a t h i s chief was willing to use t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e clergv in division, b u t t h a t if they b e g a n to a g i t a t e they w o u l d be t h r o w n o u t , a n d M e t r o p o l i t a n himself w o u l d have to b e a r p a r t of t h e consequences. Nastup, May 16, 1943, p . 2. - s I n t e r v i e w 44.

the the

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ran from just east of Kovel to a point in the Carpathians south of T e r n o p o l ' ; a key point was the little town of Brody, on the main highway from Rovno to L v o v . Here, in late J u n e , the SS division was put into the line to assist in covering the Galician capital. For three weeks it maintained its position, in the face of fierce Soviet attacks and encircling operations, but by July 20 was no longer effective as a fighting unit. Perhaps 20 percent of its complement fell back with the German armies toward the Carpathians, and half of the remainder escaped to join the UPA or to filter back to the German lines. 28 After the victory of Brody, the Red Army rapidly conquered east Galicia, Bukovina, and the Carpatho-Ukraine. By fall, substantially all of the Ukrainian lands were again under the dominion of Moscow. T h i s time the repression exercised by the Communist rulers was harsher and less disguised than it had been five years before. T h e Greek Catholic Church was attacked ruthlessly. Bishop Slipyi, who had succeeded Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi after the latter's death in late 1944, was arrested and deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. Most of the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church, as well as hundreds of its clergy, were likewise banished. Orthodox priests subservient to the Patriarch of Moscow enlisted the aid of a minority of the Greek Catholic clergy, who renounced their allegiance to Rome and joined in constructing a new hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Galicia. T h e same tactics were pursued in the Carpatho-Ukraine. 3 0 According to reports of refugees from the area, very severe measures were taken against the population at large. Men from the ages of eighteen to fifty are said to have been drafted into the Red Army in a mass, without regard for their state of health. 31 Once enlisted, they were said to be watched over by special politruks, given inferior arms, and sent into battle after eight -"'See numerous contributions to Brody, and Fisti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA, for detailed descriptions of military operations of this battle and of the other Ukrainian forces serving with the Wehrmacht. •'»•Cf. Baran, Mytropolyt, pp. 137 ff.; Mykola D. Chubatyi, "Russian Church j'olicv in the Ukraine,'' Ukrainian Quarterly, I (Autumn, 1945), 51-53. See also Chapter XIII below·. 11 SS war reporter O l e h Lysiak in Krakivs'ki

fisti,

D e c e m b e r 2, 1944, p. 3.

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days' training. 3 2 In addition, there was a renewed collectivization of agriculture and Sovietization of all phases of life. A strong effort appears also to have been made to overcome the nationalism of the West Ukrainians, which the Communists recognized as a danger to their regime. Several months before the Red Army reconquered Galicia, Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, addressing the sixth session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, denounced the nationalists in vitriolic terms. H e concentrated his attack upon the nationalist partisans: If one asks the Ukrainian-German nationalists how many of the German occupiers they destroyed, how many German formations they wiped out, how many bridges they blew up, in order to prevent the aggressors from transporting arms for subjugating and annihilating the Ukrainian people, they can make no reply.33 His remarks served to set the theme for Soviet propagandists, who condemned the adherents of Bandera, Mel'nyk, and "Bul'ba" as agents of the Germans, in contrast to the "true patriots of the Soviet fatherland." 34 An obvious effort to split the peasantry and the laboring class from the intellectuals was made. T h e former were declared deceived, while the latter were said to be the chief propagators of the dangerous doctrine. 35 Soviet propagandists promised that "special attention" would be given to the West Ukrainian intelligentsia, who did not have the "advantage" of having been brought u p in Soviet schools, but had been, rather, in "bourgeois" schools, which inculcated "bourgeois ideology," and who, as a result, had aided the "Ukrainian-German nationalist bandits." 36 In view of the usual fate of social elements so ; - 0 1 e h Lysiak in Krakauer Zeitung, November 30, 1944, p. 6. • t : l Dmytro Manuïls'kyi, Ukrains'ko-nimels'ki natsionalisty η a sluzhbi u fashysts'koi Nimechchyny: Dopovid' 6-ho sichnia 1945 roku na naradi uchyteliv lakhadnykh oblastei Ukrainy ( T h e Ukrainian-German Nationalists in the Service of Fascist Germany: R e p o r t of January 6, 1945, to the Conference of Teachers of the Western Oblasts of the Ukraine) (Kiev: l'kraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1945), p. 21. •n Ol. Kasimenko, "Ukra'ins'ko-nimets'ki natsionalisty—nailiutishi vorohy ukrains'· koho n a r o d u " ( T h e Ukrainian-German Nationalists—the Fiercest Enemies of the Ukrainian People), Radiam'ka Ukraïna, December 10, 1944, p. 2. '-'Ibid. : "'"Ideino-politychne vykhovannia inteligentsii" (Idea-Political Education of the Intelligentsia), Radians'ka Ukraïna, December 12, 1944, p. 1.

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violently denounced by the Soviet rulers, it is likely that a large part of the intelligentsia was "liquidated as a class." At the same time, a certain outlet was offered to nationalist feeling, with a class-conscious twist, by emphasizing the heroic feats of certain Ukrainian leaders of Red partisan units in the L'vov area.37 This theme was relatively subdued, however, probably because there were not enough Ukrainian subjects suitable for glorification. In the Carpatho-Ukraine, where the Red partisans had evidently attracted genuine support as liberators from the de-nationalizing Hungarian regime, the tactic was employed much more extensively. Whole lists of partisan leaders, including at least one priest, were published. Moreover, one partisan was explicitly declared to speak "pure Ukrainian," and apparently all bore Ukrainian names.38 This propaganda was followed up by the customary practice of forming a People's Committee which requested union of the province with the Soviet Union. 39 Even after the war was ended and the new acquisition securely incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine, however, an article was published which, had it been written by a non-Communist, would have been denounced as "racist." It was stated that some villages in the Carpatho-Ukraine spoke only Magyar, but that their "purely Ukrainian" character was shown by the family names of the inhabitants and their "Slavic appearance." 40 Fortunately for them, the majority of the West Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia did not stay behind to enjoy the benefits of Soviet "re-education." It is one of the strange paradoxes of German-Ukrainian relations during the war, however, that at the very period when Germany was most in need of securing Ukrainian support, and when a minimal amount of such assistance was being developed in the form of the Galician Division, a new wave of repression fell upon the nationalist leaders. This occurred in the fall of 1943; its immediate causes cannot be determined, but it appears that it was basically a result of that tendency to strive for large results by employing force and trickery which marred •nPravda Ukrainy, July 26, 1945, p. 3. Radians'ka Ukraïna, December 14, 1944, p. 2. M Radians'ka Ukraïna, December 23, 1944, p. 2. I"Pravda Ukrainy, July 28, 1945, p. 3.

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so much of German relations with the eastern peoples. One of the first Ukrainian leaders to fall a victim to these methods was Borovets'. About a month before he started on his forlorn trip to Warsaw to obtain help in rebuilding his guerrilla force, German officials interested in the matter had decided that it was necessary to negotiate with the partisan leaders, so that they might discover who they were and arrest them during the course of the negotiations if this appeared to be desirable. 41 W h e t h e r there was any direct connection between this plan and the fate which overtook Borovets' is unknown; the procedure used toward him, however, closely paralleled that outlined. After the Wehrmacht had started conversations with "Bul'ba," the police suddenly intervened, arrested him and his assistant Oleh Shtul', and incarcerated them in Sachsenhausen concentration camp along with Bandera and his deputies. 42 T h e group was soon joined by the most prominent members of the O U N - M . After Mussolini's overthrow, Eugene Onats'kyi, spokesman of the Ukrainian nationalists in Italy, had written an article criticizing Fascism as a form of government, stating that it sheltered a privileged class. T h i s essay was indiscreetly printed by Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk and thus came to the attention of the German police, which arrested Onats'kyi on September 29, 1943, but did not transfer him to Sachsenhausen from Regina Coeli prison in R o m e until December 12.43 T h r o u g h o u t his period of confinement, he was closely questioned concerning connections of Mel'nyk and Konovalets' with Ukrainians in Allied countries. 44 Apparently these connections, at least in the forms of inspiring anti-German material in the Allied press and contacts with Ukrainian organizations outside the German orbit, were one reason for the arrest on January 26, 1944, of Mel'nyk himself, together with the Provid foreign affairs specialist, Dymtro Andriievs'kyi. 4 5 Apparently the chief grounds for the arrest of the " M e m o r a n d u m by T a u b e r t , Occ E-4 (1). ··- Interviews 12, 29, 72; Taras Borovets', Zboroina borofba Ukraïny (¡917-1950) ( T h e Armed Struggle of the Ukraine [1917-50]) (1951), p. 12. ^ : l Ievhen (Eugene) Onats'kyi, U babylons'komu poloni (spomyny) (In Babylonian Captivity [Memoirs]) (Buenos Aires, 1948), p. 15. « Ibid., p. 59 « Interviews 52, 67; OUN u Viini ( T h e O U N in the War), I n f o r m a t i o n Section of the O U N (UNR), April, 1946, p. 101.

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OUN-M leaders was the discovery of anti-German clandestine publications of the OUN-M in the East Ukraine and in Kandyba's quarters in L'vov.4® Kandyba and numerous other members were arrested about the same time, and Nastup was suppressed. Three members of the Provid had been killed within the preceding fourteen months, so that of the directorate only the aged generals Kapustians'kyi and Kurmanovych were left at large.47 Most of the O U N leaders were kept in close confinement throughout the crucial months when the West Ukraine was slipping under Communist domination. By October, when they were released,48 virtually all of the Ukrainian lands had passed out of German control. There remained, however, some two million persons of Ukrainian origin in the hands of the Germans—thousands of refugees, over a million Ostarbeiter, several hundred thousand prisoners of war, and about a quarter of a million auxiliary troops.49 A few thousand of the last category constituted a remnant of the Galician division, but most of them were scattered throughout various small units of Osttruppen, totaling about seven hundred thousand. 60 « OUN u Viini, p. 103. •n Kandyba and Chemeryns'kyi had replaced the murdered Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, but Chemeryns'kyi was killed by the Germans in the execution of the Vkrains'ke Slovo group in Kiev. Baranovs'kyi had been killed by the OUN-B in Galicia in May, 1943, while Sushko was assassinated, probably by Bandera followers, or possibly by Communists or German police agents who were dissatisfied with his conduct, just thirteen days before the arrest of the other leaders. Bandera, Mel'nyk, Borovets', and all of their principal adherents were set free, except Kandyba and Gavrusevych, who had died in prison. 49 Rosenberg wrote Bormann on September 7, 1944 (NO 2997), that there were then one million "legionnaires and volunteers," one million prisoners of war, and two million Ostarbeiter drawn from the eastern peoples. It is safe to assume that at least one third of the prisoners of war were Ukrainian (see n. 64, this chapter, below). The figure of two million Ostarbeiter appears to be rather low, in view of the total of one and one-half million given for the Ukraine alone (see Chapter V), but it is certain that a considerable majority of the workers from the Soviet Union were drawn from the Ukraine, for it had the bulk of the population which was under German control for a long period, and was, moreover, more completely exploited in this regard than were the army areas and the Reichskommissariat Ostland. Taubert, in a memorandum printed in B. Dvinov, Vlasovs'koe dvizhenie ν svete dokumentov (The Vlasov Movement in the Light of Documents) (New York, 1950), p. 110, estimated the proportion of Ukrainian Ostarbeiter as 60 percent. The figure for military personnel appears a bit high, but it is fairly clear that the Ukrainians totaled at least one quarter of this group (Interview 22 referred to a total of 220,000 Ukrainians in the German forces). Refugees not enrolled in any of these categories were not numerous. Cf. Dallin, p. 452. "'«NO 1068.

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T h e Nazi leaders wished to use this considerable reserve of manpower to bolster their collapsing defenses. T h e major part of their efforts centered around Vlasov, who at last was given a comparatively free hand to organize an anti-Soviet political center and military units of division size. Vlasov was backed by Himmler and a number of the other high officials of the SS, who were by now ready to seize any possibility of staving off defeat. At the same time, other Nazi circles, including SS officers as well as the Ostministerium officials, endeavored to form a central Ukrainian political body. A major motive, after the evacuation of the West Ukraine in the summer of 1944, was to establish liaison with the nationalist partisans.®1 Dr. Fritz Arlt, the Waffen SS officer who had played a prominent part in dealing with the Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement in 1939-41, was a central figure in the efforts to form a Ukrainian national committee. Apparently both Mel'nyk and Bandera refused to discuss such proposals while they were in prison. 52 Soon after his release on September 27, 1944, however, Bandera suggested to Arlt that he approach Dr. Horbovyi, an O U N - B member who had played a leading role in organizing the Ukrainian National Committee in Cracow in June, 1941. Arlt could reach no agreement with Horbovyi, however, and turned to Mel'nyk, who had been released on October 17. Mel'nyk was apparently able to secure an agreement among all important nationalist leaders, including Bandera, Livyts'kyi, and Skoropads'kyi, on the stand to be taken in relation to the German proposals, but Arlt and his collaborators could not accept the demands the nationalists made. 53 Unable to induce the major Ukrainian nationalist leaders to take the lead in forming a national committee under conditions acceptable to the Nazi rulers, Arlt turned to elements which had so far been less active in politics during the war. T h e first two •"'iThe intentions of Arlt and the Ostministerium are outlined by Berger in the memorandum in Dvinov (pp. 109-11). Although Dvinov's work is highly tendentious, this document appears to be authentic. '•-OUN u f'iini, p. 106; Interview 51. T h e Mel'nyk and Bandera accounts agree —except that each side says that it persuaded the other not to form a committee to cooperate with the Germans. •"•'Arlt to Rosenberg, November 21, 1944, NO 3039 (hereafter referred to as NO 3039); apparently the demands correspond to those contained in the petition quoted below on p. 182. For more details on this affair see Dallin, pp. 020-25.

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Ukrainian leaders offered the post of chairman of a national committee, General Petriv and Professor Mazepa, declined, in view of the risks which, with German defeat almost certain, such a position involved. Finally, however, General Paul Shandruk, a UNR officer and a close associate of Andrew Livyts'kyi, accepted, with the blessing of the latter, Bandera, and Mel'nyk. 54 As Shandruk and his associates saw the matter, it was absolutely necessary to have a Ukrainian committee recognized by the Germans, not only to avoid subordination of all Ukrainians in Germany to Vlasov, which would prevent their seizing an opportunity for independent negotiations with the Allies, but because the sheer existence of the Ostarbeiter and prisoners required that their compatriots be in a position to exercise influence in their behalf. T o them, the loss of prestige involved in collaboration with an infamous and moribund power was not sufficient to outweigh these considerations.®5 At the same time, Vlasov and his associates were busily endeavoring to secure a Ukrainian representation which would accept their claim to leadership and would agree to postpone any decision on independence for the Ukraine until after the Soviet rulers had been overthrown. Most Ukrainians whom they approached refused to cooperate, being convinced that if a predominantly Russian group such as Vlasov's ever succeeded in replacing the Communists in the Kremlin, it would create conditions whi¿h would make impossible a free expression of the wishes of the Ukrainian people on the question of union with Russia. Nevertheless, Vlasov succeeded in securing the support of a certain number of prominent Ukrainians for a Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Komitet Osvobozhdeniia Narodov Rossii—KONR), which met in Prague on November 14, 1944. It is remarkable that practically all of these were from the single city of Kiev.56 In part this appears to be due to the fact that " ·>•* Interviews 9, 22. One informant (Interview 24) states that while the Bandera followers would not give their approval officially, they felt that Shandruk performed a highly useful and patriotic function. According to Shandruk, Arms of Valor (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1959), pp. 200, 231, Mel'nyk later withdrew his approval. 55 Interview 22. 5G These included Theodore Bohatyrchuk and George Muzichenko, who signed the Manifesto of Prague; Constantine Shtepa and Eugene Arkypenko, chief editor

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certain highly respected Kiev leaders, like Professor T h e o d o r e Bohatyrchuk, were convinced of the need of continued u n i o n with Russia, and through their influence secured the adherence of their friends to the new body. 57 Unquestionably, however, the reaction in Kiev to the mistakes of the Nationalists and the somewhat unusual social and cultural background of the capital played their part. T h e Ukrainian nationalist groups immediately reacted violently against the K O N R proclamation, which claimed to express the aspirations of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. Four days after the Manifesto was issued, ten of the non-Russian national groups addressed a vigorous appeal to Rosenberg for help against this u n d e r m i n i n g of their position. Perhaps because there was no officially recognized committee for the Ukraine, Mel'nyk signed the petition "for the Ukrainian national political groups." 58 After reciting the history of the struggles of their nations for independence from Moscow, and asserting that the Russians alone had not shown any zeal in combatting Bolshevism, the nationalist leaders stressed their claim to German gratitude: It is therefore not astounding that these [non-Russian] peoples greeted the outbreak of the German-Russian war with the greatest joy. They placed themselves at the side of the German army from the first day on, helped where they could, welcomed the troops with open arms, and with cordial friendship. Standing shoulder to shoulder with the German soldiers in battle, they proved their loyalty to the national idea. 69 At the same time, the signers of the protest did not hesitate to criticize German policy. T h e y asserted that the failure to recognize the striving of the peoples of the Soviet Union for independence had presented Stalin with an opportunity which he had utilized by granting independent diplomatic representation to the "so-called Soviet republics" the previous spring, thus preof the peasants' paper, Ukratns'kyi Khliborob; and the f o u r officials of the Kiev administration whom Kinkelin had proposed in 1943 as members of a Ukrainian National Committee. Apparently Forostivs'kyi, the mayor, collaborated with the g r o u p for a time at least. •"·" Interview 19. '"· T h e text of the protest is contained in N O 2998. •->" Ibid.

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tending to offer more scope to national aspirations than did the Germans. Rejecting all claims of Vlasov to speak for their nations, they demanded in categorical terms, backed up by the threat that otherwise they could not "accept responsibility for the consequences which may result among our compatriots from the Vlasov action," that the Germans make the following concessions: 1. Forbid any claim of General Vlasov to the leadership of our peoples; 2. Recognize the right, to take effect immediately, of our peoples to independent states and to pronounce a definite recognition of our national representative bodies; 3. Organize our national military formations under unified command of their own leaders, subject to the German Wehrmacht in operative matters, for the fight against Bolshevism, and turn over the political leadership within these formations to our national representative bodies.60 Whether Rosenberg turned over this document to Hitler is questionable, in view of its uncompromising terms, but it is certain that on the same day it was presented he himself sent a very strong protest to his Führer against Vlasov's committee. 61 Either because neither faction among the German leadership could secure Hitler's unequivocal approval, or because the most powerful Nazi leaders still desired, at the eleventh hour, to pursue their customary tactic of divide et impera, no definite choice was ever made between Vlasov and the Ukrainian leaders. The latter were allowed to continue with their efforts to organize their compatriots. At the same time, Vlasov was free to attract those Ukrainians whom he could prevail upon to join his movement. The Ukrainian-language press was left under nationalist control. T h e principal paper for the Ostarbeiter and other workers in Germany, Holos, remained under the editorship of Bohdan Kravtsiv, a determined nationalist, while a leading East Ukrainian journalist, George Muzichenko, left its staff shortly after he joined the Vlasov information bureau. 62 Two other papers, Ukraïns'kyi Dobrovolets' (the journal of the military units) and eo Ibid. i NO 1815. 02 Krakivs'ki Visti, December 8, 1944, p. 3. A few weeks earlier the Vlasov group had made a strong effort to secure control of these and other Ukrainian papers in Germany. Cf. NO 3039.

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Za Ukrdinu, were kept in the hands of nationalist editors, who were able to direct oblique attacks on Vlasov.®3 Nevertheless, it is certain that Vlasov was given some advantages, and secured considerable success, in his efforts to recruit prisoners of war of all Soviet nationalities for his Russian Liberation Army (Rossiskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia—ROA). Even according to Ukrainian nationalist sources, only half of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were fully "nationally conscious," and many could not even speak the Ukrainian language.®4 Moreover, Vlasov was able to secure a number of high-ranking ex-Soviet officers of Ukrainian origin for his staff, including the commander of the first ROA division, General Buniachenko. Altogether, units, in various stages of integration in the ROA, totaled three hundred thousand by January, 1945, and of this number perhaps 35 to 40 percent were of Ukrainian ethnic stock.65 Apparently no direct threats or compulsion were used to secure adherence of civilians to the KONR. e e On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalist sources maintain that the apparent German favor enjoyed by Vlasov was a powerful inducement to the de·* For example, the latter newspaper published the translation of an article from Das Schwartze Korps (an SS organ) harshly criticizing Russian émigrés, on January 18, 1945, p. 2. e< M. Les', " C h o m u ia buv 'Vlasovtsem'?" (Why was I a "Vlasovite"?), l'isti Bratstva kol. I'oiakiv 1. UD UNA (October-November, 1952), p. 3, states that 50 percent of the Ukrainian prisoners were "nationally conscious," 40 percent somewhat so, a n d 10 percent not at all. A contemporary account (Krakivs'ki Visti, October 23, 1941, p. 2) states that many of the letters addressed by Ukrainian prisoners to the newspaper which the Germans had established for them (\'ova Doba) were in Russian, but notes that they were sent to the Ukrainian rather than the Russian paper, Klich. T h e latter also carried material evidently intended for a Ukrainian audience. Other contemporary accounts of the prisoners differ as to w h e t h e r they could speak the Ukrainian language. One insists that 80 percent were "nationally conscious," and that the Russian prisoners accepted the fact that the Ukrainians were "separatists" without anger, for while the latter wanted an independent state they had always lived peacefully with the Russians a n d other minorities in the Ukraine (Krakivs'ki Visti, December 5, 1941, p. 2). ""> Unsigned list of units from the eastern peoples, J a n u a r y , 1945, N O 5800 (herea f t e r referred to as N O 5800). For the percentage of Ukrainians see Les', p. 3, a n d MS H , which states that Vlasov told Shandruk that 70 percent of the first R O A division were Ukrainians. If so, this figure must have been reached by including persons with very little Ukrainian nationalist feeling whom the Russian National Socialist leader, Bronislav Kaminskii, recruited in the Lokot' area on t h e border of t h e Ukrainian and Russian Soviet Republics, since (according to T h o r w a l d . p. 44) Kaminskii's brigade alone formed more than a third of this division. '"•Interview 45.

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moralized and physically worn-out prisoners to accept his invitation as a way out of confinement. They assert that a n u m b e r of the units formed from prisoners or from the auxiliary units brought back by the Wehrmacht in its retreat abandoned the ROA, even without German permission, to join nationalist Ukrainian forces. 87 T o a certain degree, this assertion is supported by one of the German officers most closely associated with the eastern military units, who states that difficulties were experienced in subordinating Ukrainian or mixed Ukrainian-Russian units which had been under German commanders to Russian officers from the ROA, although there was generally n o objection to attachment to Vlasov's over-all command. 6 8 In addition to this struggle for influence within groups which were subordinated to General Vlasov, there was an entirely separate military organization for the Ukrainians. T h e Galician division was reformed as the First Ukrainian Division, and organization of a second division to be composed of East Ukrainians was begun. 68 These and a number of other units, totaling seventyfive thousand men, were classified as the Ukrainian Liberation Army (Ukraïns'ke Vyzvol'ne V o i s k o — U W ) under command of General Shandruk, though each unit was actually commanded by a German officer. 70 In contradistinction to the R O A units, which wore the St. Andrew's cross, a centuries-old Russian symbol, the Ukrainian units were permitted the trizub [trident] as their national emblem. Borovets', who had been released from prison after a few months, was commissioned to form a parachute detachment to land behind the Soviet lines to aid the partisan struggle. 71 T h e final days of the war brought no substantial change in '»τ A. Kovach, Ukrains'ka vyivol'na borot'ba i "Vlasovshchyna" ( T h e Ukrainian Liberation Struggle and the "Vlasov Affair") ("Germany," 1948), p. 51, states that 65 percent of the trainees in the Dabensdorf officers' school of the ROA were of Ukrainian origin. "" Interview 15; MS C. «»A'raftiw'fci l'isti, December 8, 1944, p. 3. 7'J General Shandruk has in his possession a mimeographed copy of an order from the German general, Freitag, t u r n i n g over command of the First (Galician) Ukrainian Division to him, but only on April 27, 1945. See also Oleh Lysiak, "Volyns'kyi Batalion" ( T h e Volhynian Battalion), Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UXA (March, 1951), p. 2. T h e most detailed account of this final stage of Ukrainian military activity under German aegis is in Shandruk's book cited above. 71 Borovets', Zboroma borot'ba, p. 15; Interview 37.

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this situation, in which the Ukrainian nationalists were able to maintain their independence of the Vlasov movement, although without being able to gain control of even a majority of the m e n of Ukrainian ethnic origin in German military service. While there were some efforts, such as a personal meeting between Vlasov and Shandruk, to find a modus vivendi between the two groups, these came to nothing. On the contrary, the Ukrainians went ahead with the setting u p of their own national committee. Shandruk became president and the vice-presidents were Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Alexander Semenenko, mayor of Kharkov under the occupation. T h u s the "old emigration" (Shandruk was born in Lubny), the West Ukraine, and the Soviet Ukraine were represented. 72 Aside from a certain moderation in German treatment of the Ukrainian Ostarbeiter, however, the group was able to accomplish little. In the last weeks of Germany's hopeless struggle the organization was officially recognized and allowed to issue a proclamation in Weimar on March 17, 1945, as the Ukrainian National Committee. T h e deterioration of German power enabled the Committee to take a strong stand for an independent Ukrainian state, without giving even lip service to alliance with the Germans. However, the document made it clear that the main practical objective was care for the interests of the Ukrainian refugees, workers, and soldiers in Germany. 7 3 T h e proclamation also announced that the Ukrainian soldiers were henceforth to be united in the Ukrainian National Army. Under the circumstances, this could mean little. Nevertheless, in the final days of the war General Shandruk was able to go to the First Division of his forces, and the German general in command formally surrendered his powers to him. 74 Of more practical importance was the fact that Shandruk and other Ukrainian leaders had been able to get in touch with Allied military quarters even before the surrender of the division. While its personnel were of course treated as prisoners of war, their commanders were able to convince the Western authorities that the unit was composed wholly of Galicians. As West Ukrainians, they had thus never 72 Interviews 9, 22. 7:) From a printed copy furnished me by General S h a n d r u k . ι* Interview 22, and order by General Freitag already cited.

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been de jure citizens of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Western powers. Consequently, they were spared the disastrous fate, which overtook so many who had resisted the Soviet regime, of being turned over to the Soviet repatriation authorities.76 It is difficult to appraise the value to the Ukrainian nationalist movements of their military collaboration with the Germans. As in the case of the nationalist partisan activity, the ends sought were not attained, for the calculations of the Ukrainians in regard to the international situation were not fulfilled. Instead of a balance of power in the East which would have enabled even feeble military forces to assume importance, there ensued complete Soviet victory. The Ukrainian contingents were unable to prevent the conquest of Ukrainian ethnographic territory by the Soviet Union. They were, however, of some value in enabling a number of young men to escape to the West. More significant, perhaps, for the future of the nationalist movement, the military units and their political committee offered a rallying point for Ukrainians who might otherwise have attached themselves to the Vlasov movement as the only available anti-Soviet organization. 75Interview 22. See also Chapter X I I I below.

VIII. NATIONALISM AND THE CHURCH propagators of Ukrainian nationalism in the occupied Ukraine were political groups. They were, however, not the only bearers of the concept of Ukrainian distinctiveness. Religious organizations also played an important role. T h e relation of the Greek Catholic Church to the nationalist parties has already been discussed. Unlike the political parties, most of which at least claimed to represent the entire Ukrainian nation, however, the Greek Catholic Church was almost wholly confined to Galicia, since the great mass of the East Ukrainian Christians were members of the Orthodox faith. T H E PRINCIPAL

In the Orthodox lands, religion and national affiliation have always been closely related. Most of the East and South Slavic peoples identify their church with their national existence. Some of the same characteristics which have enhanced the distinctiveness of these peoples have also formed the basis of divisions among the Orthodox Slavs. One such feature is the lack of a supreme authority within the Orthodox Church. Each body of the church, existing in a given territory in a given period, has a welldefined hierarchy, usually governed by a council of bishops and frequently headed by a patriarch or metropolitan. T h e r e is, however, no pope at the head of all Orthodoxy. It is true that the Orthodox Church, like the Roman Catholic Church, recognizes the authority of an ecumenical council, but such a council has not been held in the East for a millennium. A difficult question arises at this point: how is the "body of the faithful" or "territory" of each group to be defined? T h i s problem has, in fact, been an extremely troublesome one in the history of the Orthodox Church, for in the absence of a central ecclesiastical authority there can be no final solution. In practice an answer has been provided by another characteristic feature

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of the Orthodox Church—its close dependence on the secular authority. Historically, the Orthodox Church has been the official church par excellence; union of church and state is not only a legal expression but a vital reality in the history of Eastern Europe. Consequently, the actual extent of authority of each body of the church has usually coincided with the boundaries of the state in which it exists. A corollary of this coincidence of state and ecclesiastical authority has been the establishment of, or the endeavor to establish, a new hierarchical authority whenever a major change in state sovereignty has taken place. Moreover, as nationalist movements became powerful in the Orthodox lands in the nineteenth century, they often demanded a separate church organization as a consequence of their growing sense of national distinctiveness, and as a preparation for their separate statehood. Until 1917, almost all Orthodox East Slavs were united in a single state, the Russian Empire, with a single church, the Russian Orthodox Church. Since the seventeenth century this church had lacked the customary patriarch or primate, and was connected to the secular power, and to a considerable degree controlled by it through an imperial official, the Procurator of the Holy Synod. T h e October Revolution destroyed the formal links between these historically intertwined institutions. At this point, the growing strength of Ukrainian national consciousness gave rise to a demand for state independence. It was in accord with the history of Orthodoxy that this demand should have been accompanied by a parallel movement for the establishment of a church organization independent of Moscow, for that seat of ecclesiastical authority had lost its preeminent prestige through the disestablishment of the Russian Orthodox Church, while its role as a symbol of East Slav unity was necessarily repudiated by those who saw the Ukrainian future as distinct from that of Russia. Had the group desiring continuation of the Russian state (whether as an empire or a constitutional democracy) won out, it is probable that ecclesiastical unity would have been restored, since the Russian church, while it lost many of its privileges after the February Revolution, stood to gain in prestige through the reconstitution of the office of Patriarch of Moscow. Had, on the contrary, an independent Ukrainian state been able to maintain

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itself for a few years, very likely a separate Ukrainian hierarchy would have been generally recognized. In the situation which followed from the Bolshevik triumph, neither clear-cut solution was achieved. Instead, a large body of the lower clergy and the faithful split off from the Russian hierarchy in the Ukraine. When no member of the episcopacy could be found to consecrate a new bishop for the dissident group, the Ukrainian church body resorted to the "laying on of hands" by priests as a method for consecrating Father Lypkivs'kyi as prelate of their organization. Thus a new Orthodox Church was formed, which rapidly came to embrace the great majority of organized Orthodox believers in the Ukraine; by 1923 it had no less than three thousand parishes and thirty-five bishops, headed by Lypkivs'kyi, then known as Metropolitan Basil.1 In spite of this apparent prosperity, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, as it was called, lay under the shadow of two great weaknesses. In the first place, it was not recognized by any other body of the Orthodox Church, for the method of consecration of the new bishops was regarded throughout the Orthodox world as uncanonical, a violation of the essential principle of apostolic succession. From the point of view of the traditional believer, the bishops of the new church were illegitimate; consequently, priests ordained by them (but not those who had joined the Autocephalous Church after ordination by a validly consecrated bishop) were not truly endowed with sacerdotal functions. Secondly, and of more immediate significance, the phenomenal growth of the new church was possible only because of the comparatively indulgent attitude shown by the Communist authorities who, at that time, were more antagonistic to the Russian church than to dissident bodies. When the Soviet

1

John S. Reshetar, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox C h n r r h . " American Slavic and East European Review, X (February, 1951) , 43—15. T h e basic work on the Ukrainian religious background is Friedlich Heyer, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von ¡917 bis ¡W> (Köln-Braunsfcld: Verlagsgesellschaft Rudolf Müller, 1953). While in the Wehrmacht during World War II, Heyer had numerous personal contacts with church leaders, and apparently acquired notes or documents dealing with ecclesiastical affairs. His account is similar to that given below, but he ascribes somewhat greater importance to the Autonomous Criurch. While Heyer devotes much attention to purely ecclesiastical affairs which 1 do

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power turned to restriction of Ukrainian national activity, as a potential threat to the unity of the USSR, the Autocephalous Church also came under attack. Its entire hierarchy and the great bulk of its clergy were executed or banished in 1929-30.2 In view of the close connection between church and state in the Orthodox world, it was only natural that, when the Russian Empire collapsed and a considerable body of Orthodox believers came under Polish dominion, an effort was made to establish a separate hierarchy in Poland. T h e leader in this effort was Dionysius, a Russian bishop who, with recognition from the Patriarch of Constantinople, became Metropolitan of Warsaw and head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland. 3 In addition to the Belorussian archbishop of Pinsk, there were four bishops in Volhynia: Archbishop Alexius, with his residence in the famous Pochaïvs'ka Lavra (monastery), and his vicars Polykarp, bishop of Lutsk; Anthony (Martsenko), bishop of Kamen Kashirsk (Kamin Koshyrs'k); and Simon, bishop of Ostriz. These bishops were Ukrainian but subject to Dionysius. 4 When the Soviet Union acquired Volhynia in September, 1939, its efforts to convert the Russian Orthodox Church into an auxiliary of the Soviet government were already well under way. A special deputy of Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, Nicholas, Exarch of the West Ukraine, was sent to coordinate the church of the newly occupied area with the government-approved ecclesiastica! organization. The existing bishops were not deposed, with the exception of Alexander of Pinsk. T h e latter was not molested physically, but his ecclesiastical jurisdiction, now in the Belorussian Soviet Republic, was divided between a bishop of Brest and not a t t e m p i to cover in d e t a i l , his a b u n d a n t d e t a i l s o n (he e x t e n t of r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of religious life and t h e r e s p o n s e of t h e p o p u l a t i o n arc very v a l u a b l e . n Ibid., p. 46. :t

Ibid., p. 48; Stepan Baran in Krakivs'ki Fisti, October 28, 1941, p. 1. 4 UAPTs (Ukrainskaia Avlokefalnaia Pravoslaimaia Tserkoif) ( U A P T s [Ukrainian Autocephalous O r t h o d o x Church]), by "Α. V." (Pravoslavnyi Beloruss. 1951; mimeographed), p. 2; cf. Baran in Krakivs'ki Visti, October 28, 1941, p. 1. T h e r e was also a Bishop T i m o t h y (Shreter) in a monastery in the Generalgouvernement, b u t he p l a c e d n o role in t h e c o n t r o v e r s i e s w h i c h followed (Occ E-4 [1]).

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a bishop of Pinsk sent from Moscow.® While it is not likely that Alexius or his adherents (including Polykarp) were pleased with the subjugation of their province by Moscow, they appear to have conformed to the Orthodox tradition of submission to the secular power, even when the latter is not basically sympathetic to the Orthodox religion. Although it did not suppress the Orthodox Church, the Soviet government imposed severe restrictions and onerous financial obligations upon it, as well as upon the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. As a result, many of the priests fled, or took up secular occupations. In order to satisfy the resulting need for clergymen, Alexius is said to have consecrated a large number of new priests, many of them persons unfitted by background or training for the performance of clerical duties.® T h u s the fabric of the church was to some extent weakened and demoralized. At the same time, however, the Soviet-allied church in Moscow endeavored to extend its influence into an area which had had few Orthodox communicants since the seventeenth century, by consecrating as bishop of L'vov, under the name of Panteleimon, a priest, Rudyk, who was a native Galician but had always favored a union of the province with Russia. 7 That there was nothing inherently agreeable in their enforced submission to Soviet control is indicated by the fact that the Orthodox bishops in the West Ukraine, both those who had exercised episcopal functions in Volhynia prior to 1939 and those who owed their status to the Moscow-inspired endeavors to reorganize the Ukrainian church, failed to evacuate with the Red Army when the Germans invaded the region. The sole exception was the Exarch Nicholas, who soon assumed an active role in appealing to the patriotic and religious sentiments of the peoples of the USSR to secure support of the Soviet regime. Under the O C C E 4 (1); Krakivs'ki l isti, D e c e m b e r 27, 1941. p. 3. T h e B i s h o p of Brest ( B e n j a m i n ) h a d been a m o n k of t h e Pochai'vs'ka L a v r a ( H c ) c r , p. 108). A l e x a n d e r h a d p l e a d e d r e t i r e m e n t as a reason for not g o i n g to Moscow to see Sergius; Anthony « a s also a p p a r e n t l y in r e t i r e m e n t . For m o r e details on the c o m p l i c a t e d controversies c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s of t h e various ecclesiastics w i t h Moscow c h u r c h a u t h o i i t i e s see especially H o v e r . '•Krakivs'ki Visti, August 12. 1941, p. 2; Baran in Krakivs'ki Visti, Octobei 28, 1941, p. 1. • UAPTs, p. 2; Krakivs'ki Visti. August 12, 1941, p. 2.

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title of Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, he issued numerous statements against the Germans and the Ukrainian nationalists.8 As the German armies drove on beyond the pre-1939 Polish border into areas which had been under Soviet control for twenty years, they discovered that there remained considerable numbers of Orthodox clergymen. For example, there were one hundred in the Zhitomir area alone, and two small churches had remained open in Kiev under Soviet rule.9 There were also Archbishops Anthony (Abashidze) in Kiev, who was, however, too old and crippled to exercise any considerable degree of influence; Anatole in Odessa; Theophilus in Kharkov; and Bishop Damaskin in Kamenets-Podols'k.10 As soon as conditions had become somewhat stabilized in the West Ukrainian lands, Alexius and his associates proceeded to call a meeting of all Ukrainian bishops in areas liberated from the Soviet regime. This gathering, known as the Sobor of Volhynian Bishops, met in the Pochaiïvs'ka Lavra in mid-August, 1941, and on August 18 proclaimed the reorganization of the Autonomous Orthodox Church in the Ukraine. 11 Subordination to the Patriarch of Moscow was declared to be in abeyance so long as the Communists maintained control over him, but a nominal canonical adherence of the Ukrainian church to the Patriarch was recognized. At the same time, two new bishops were consecrated to carry out the task of reorganizing church life.12 s Nicholas h a p p e n e d to be in Moscow w h e n war b e g a n (Heyer, p. 169). F o r a r e p o n on c l a n d e s t i n e p r o p a g a n d a against t h e G e r m a n s in t h e U k r a i n e issued over Nicholas's s i g n a t u r e , see I'S 051. T h e r e a r e a n u m b e r of r e p o r t s of O r t h o d o x priests, especially in Kiev, w h o acted as Soviet agents (cf. Occ E-4 [I]). O n e of Nicholas's w a r t i m e w r i t i n g s was e \ e n d i s t r i b u t e d a b r o a d bv t h e Soviet t.'nion—i.e., Nikolai (Nicholas). M e t r o p o l i t a n of Kiev a n d Galicia (ed.), The Russian Orthodox Church and the War against Fascism (Moscow: T h e P a t r i a r c h a t e of Moscow, 1943). At a later p e r i o d , N i k o l a i f r e q u e n t l y e m p l o y e d the title M i t r o p o l i t K r u t i t s k i i , p e r t a i n i n g to t h e Moscow monastery of w h i c h he was t i t u l a r h e a d . N i c h o l a s ostensibly r e t i r e d in 1901, b u t it was n i i i i o i c d that even lie was insufficiently p l i a b l e for t h e Soviet r e g i m e . H e d i e d in 1961.

·•· i>s oyó.

"'I'krains'ka Diisnist'. O c t o b e r 15, 1941. p . t. F.rich K o c h evidently r e j e c t e d a suggestion t h a t A n t h o n y h e a d t h e U k r a i n i a n c h u r c h ( H e y e r , p . 172). i'Vkrains'ka Diisnist', N o v e m b e r 15, 1941, p. 3. i -UAPTs, p. 3, n a m e s e i g h t a p p o i n t e d at this time. C o n t e m p o r a r y sources r e f e r to two only, a n d it a p p e a r s likely t h a t t h e o t h e r s yvere c o n s e c r a t e d s o m e w h a t l a t e r , p r o b a b l y for t h e most p a r t a t t h e sobor in D e c e m b e r . Cf. Krakivs'ki Visti, D e c e m b e r 27, 1911, p. 3, a n d Vkraïns'ku Diisnist', J a n u a r y 20, 1941, p. 1. H e y e r (p. 176)

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This task was already under way, at least in the Zhitomir area. All surviving priests were registered and their status examined by two archimandrites (monastic archpriests), one sent by Alexius and one from the famous Monastery of the Caves in Kiev.18 The great majority of the surviving clergy had been consecrated in the old canonically recognized Russian church, since Soviet persecution had greatly reduced the Autocephalous ranks. Some of the latter remained, however, and had to accept reconsecration at the hands of the bishops of the Volhynian Sobor before receiving appointments to parishes. Understandably, this demand for repudiation of the position on the validity of the Autocephalous consecration taken by their deceased leader, Lypkivs'kyi, was deeply resented, especially since many of the priests previously consecrated by Alexius were not, as has been pointed out, models of devotion to the sacerdotal vocation. 14 Whether the greatly weakened "Lypkivites," as the Autocephalous adherents were known, could have made any effective objections by themselves is doubtful. There was, however, a powerful ally at hand. During the time when the Soviet authorities were bringing the Volhynian church under their control, Ukrainian influence in Orthodox ecclesiastical life in the Generalgouvernement was greatly increasing, particularly in the Chelm area. As part of the restoration of the Orthodox Church to a position of strength, Dionysius, in October, 1940, consecrated Professor John Ohiienko, who had long been active in religious affairs as a church historian and philologist, as Hilarión, Archbishop of Chelm. 15 Two months later he consecrated a bishop, Palladius, for the small Orthodox population in the Lemko region.1® Both of these men were strong nationalists. Hilarión in particular had long desired to see the separation of the Ukrainian church from n a m e s onlv t h r e e new bishops chosen in this p e r i o d . H \ i d e n t l y t h e r e were sixteen A u t o n o m o u s b i s h o p s (ibid., p. 1K21 11 Fedii S. I e t r e m e n k o in Krukivs'ki Visti, O c t o b c r 24, 1941, p. 4; t h e a r c h i m a n d r i t e f r o m Kiev, L e o n t i u s F i l l i p p o v y c h , was consecrated b i s h o p (as I.eontius) at the August sobor. ' ι ¡bid. i · ' K r a k i v s ' k i Visti, N o v e m b e r 24, 1940, p . 1. K'Krakivs'ki Visti, F e b r u a r y 12, 1941, p . 3. P a l l a d i u s b e c a m e b i s h o p of Cracow; t h i s m o v e was viewed by s o m e as a n u n w a r r a n t e d i n v a s i o n by t h e O r t h o d o x C h u r c h of a p r e d o m i n a n t l y G r e e k C a t h o l i c section of t h e U k r a i n i a n t e r r i t o r y . Cf. Mykola A n d r u s i a k in Xtistu¡>, O c t o b e r 12, 1940. p. 4. But it is possible t h a t G r e e k C a t h o l i c circles i n f l u e n c e d bv M e t r o p o l i t a n Sheptits'kyi favored t h e m o v e isce Heyer. p p .

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17

Moscow. When the Volhynian Sobor was called, Alexander, the archbishop of Pinsk, was not invited, for, it was explained, he was a Belorussian. 18 Nevertheless, his Moscow-appointed successor, Benjamin, was not only present but acted as secretary of the conference. In view of the fact that Alexander's opposition to the Communists had been the cause for Benjamin's appointment, it is understandable that this arrangement excited discontent. Moreover, the position of Dionysius, who had been the superior of all the Volhynian bishops before the Soviet occupation, was unclear. 19 If Soviet occupation of Volhynia had been illegitimate, presumably his authority had only been suspended by physical barrier of the frontier which had separated German-controlled Warsaw from Soviet-occupied territory. Nevertheless, after Soviet evacuation, Alexius had proceeded to reorganize the whole Ukrainian church on the assumption that a reunion with Moscow had been legally constituted, although publicly holding the position that this union was inoperative because of continued Soviet control of the church in Moscow. Doubtless influenced by these considerations, Polykarp, the bishop of Lutsk, declined to attend the sobor, presenting the excuse of "difficult conditions of communication," although his episcopal see was less than fifty miles from the Pochaïvs'ka Lavra. 20 Shortly afterwards Dionysius appointed Polykarp "vicar" of the Vladimir Volynsk and adjacent Gorukhov (Horukhiv) areas; at the time, apparently neither explicitly rejected Alexius as head of the Orthodox hierarchy in Volhynia. 21 During the fall of 1941, opposition to Alexius's predominance gradually mounted. In addition to the friction over the investiture of the Lypkivite priests, great resentment arose from the fact that the bishops of Alexius's group were either predomi163-64, w h o gives P a l l a d i u s ' s c o n s e c r a t i o n d a l e as F e b r u a r v 9, 1941). i ' S t e p a n Baran in Krakivs'ki Visti, January 17, 1942, p. 3. ·•- UAPTs, p. 3; Ukraîns'ka DiisnisC, N o v e m b e r 15, 1941, p. 3. Ì» Krakivs'ki Visti, D e c e m b e r 27, 1941, p. 3, expresses the indignation felt at the exclusion of t h e A u t o c e p h a l o u s b i s h o p s in t h e G e n e r a l g o u v e r n e m e n t . It is not clear w h e t h e r A l e x a n d e r h a d a c t u a l l v o p p o s e d t h e C o m m u n i s t s , o r h a d m e r e l y e v a d e d c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h e m ( H e y e r , p. 168). -"UAPTs, p. 3; Ukraîns'ka Diisnisf, N o v e m b e r 15, 1941, p. 3. - i Ukraîns'ka Diisnist, N o v e m b e r 15, 1941, p. 3. In a move evidently designed to conciliate Polykarp, the sobor had n a m e d h i m bishop of Kamenets-Podolsk (ibid.).

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nantly of Russian origin or were known for past adherence to the church of Moscow. T h e acceptance of continued subordination to Moscow, however theoretical the tie might be under the prevailing conditions, was of course resented by the Ukrainian nationalist elements. Moreover, many among the latter, especially the intelligentsia, strongly desired the replacement of the Old Slavonic liturgy by services in the living Ukrainian language, while the Volhynian sobor had merely provided for certain prayers in the latter speech. 22 As these points of friction accumulated, prominent Orthodox laymen like Stephen Skrypnyk, the publisher of the newspaper Volyri in Rovno, rallied to the side of the Autocephalous group. 23 On November 28, Polykarp definitely broke with Alexius, declaring the Archbishop's group "anarchical," and repudiated him as ecclesiastical superior. 2 4 Shortly afterwards, Alexius replied by proclaiming himself Metropolitan of the Ukraine, in accordance with a decision of a second sobor of Volhynian bishops. 25 While the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine was splitting into two antagonistic factions, the leader of the Greek Catholic Church was endeavoring to effect an ecclesiastical union of all Ukrainians. T h e separate development of the Greek Catholic Church has been sketched already. It may be pointed out, however, that what had originally been regarded as an instrument of the Poles for consolidating their dominion in the western Ukrainian lands had long since developed into a truly national church, in the sense of being independent of any foreign secular power, although it was largely confined to one province of the Ukraine. Since the Greek Catholic Church of the Ukraine possessed a rite and a body of ecclesiastical regulations quite different from that of the churches of the neighboring Catholic nations, which were of the Latin rite, the mere fact of adherence to it tended to set the Galicians apart as a national entity. As was pointed out, Metro'-- Ukrains'ka Diisnist', November 15, 1941, p. 3 - ' C f . Skrypnyk's article in Voiyn', reproduced in L'vivs'ki Visti, J a n u a r y 11-12, 1942, p. 5, and an article from the Kremenets Kremianels'kyi Visnyk, cited in Ukrains'ka Diisnist', October 15, 1941, p. 4. L'vivs'ki Visti, January 11-12, 1942, p. b (Skrypnyk's article cited). -r'Krakivs'ki fisti, December 27, 1941, p. 3. T h e r e had been additional synods under Alexius's direction (Heyer, pp. 176-77).

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politan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi had long been a vigorous supporter of the Ukrainian nationalist movements, although he had tried to turn them away from an extreme nationalism incompatible with Christianity. His influence was naturally greatest among his own coreligionists, but extended also to Ukrainians of the Orthodox faith. Hence Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi felt that the Soviet retreat offered an opportunity for bringing about the union of all Ukrainians in a single national church within the framework of the universal church in which he believed. The immediate opportunity for advancing this desire was a letter, October 21, 1941, to Archbishop Hilarión, congratulating him on his elevation to the episcopacy; Sheptyts'kyi explained that he could not do so before because of the severance of communications between the Sovietand the German-dominated areas. Together with cordial felicitations, the Metropolitan expressed his hope that Hilarión would play a leading role in cleansing the Ukrainian church of "uncanonical" "Muscovite" influences introduced by Peter the Great, and hoped that this process would prepare the way for union of all the Ukrainian churches. 28 Two months later he addressed a letter of similar import to all "Orthodox archpriests in the Ukraine and in the Ukrainian lands." 27 T h e replies were courteous, but not encouraging. Hilarión answered in a cordial, even humble fashion, but he did not fail to point out that, while the liturgy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had indeed suffered from Russian infiltration, that of the Greek Catholic Church had been permeated with Latin elements, and he suggested that the latter body also needed purification from foreign influences. 28 Alexius likewise replied tp the second letter in a friendly fashion, but said that unification could come about only through a change in human nature, perhaps at the end of the world, and expressed the view that, after all, diversity had its advantages in promoting the search for the good.29 Still not giving up hope, Sheptyts'kyi appealed in an open letter of -1' T h e text of the letter is printed in Stepan (Stephen) Baran, Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukrainske Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), pp. 125-24. ^ Ibid., pp. 127-28. Ibid., pp. 124-27. - 'Ibid., pp. 128-80; Krakivs'ki Visti, February 15, 1942, p. 3.

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March 3, 1942, for the support of the Ukrainian Orthodox intelligentsia, who, he said, exerted great influence in their church. 3 0 This effort was also fruitless. Probably its only result was to play a part in inducing the Autocephalous Church in the Generalgouvernement to present a final reply to his overtures by an uncompromising resolution of the sobor of bishops in Warsaw, in May, 1942, to the effect that his wishes could easily be fulfilled, if only all Greek Catholics would join the Autocephalous Church. 3 1 T h e failure of the Metropolitan's efforts was doubtless due fundamentally to the deep cleavage which separates Orthodox from Catholic, the former viewing submission to the authority of the Pope as a renunciation of the valid tradition of the Christian church, which they believe that their body has maintained. An additional compelling reason for the rejection of Sheptyts'kyi's overtures in the winter and spring of 1942 was the incontestable fact that gestures of reconciliation with Rome would have been regarded by many of the Orthodox laity as treason, and would therefore very probably have weakened the church which participated in such measures. T h i s was a vital consideration, for by midwinter the conflict between the two tendencies in the Orthodox Church represented by Alexius and Polykarp had turned into an active struggle for supremacy. On December 24, 1941, after the second sobor of Volhynian bishops had endowed Alexius with the title of metropolitan, Dionysius appointed Polykarp administrator of all Volhynia. Six weeks later, Archbishop Alexander who, it will be recalled, had been left out of the Autonomous Church conference, joined with the Autocephalous Church in Poland in calling a new sobor in Pinsk. 32 While Alexander was not a Ukrainian by origin, he now had a fairly clear title according to Orthodox usage to participate in Ukrainian church affairs, since his archiépiscopal see had been included in the territorial limits of the Ukraine, as defined by the boundaries of the Reichskommissariat. H e was a welcome supXrakivs'ki Visti, April 5, 1942, p. 3; Baran, Mytropolyt, pp. 130-31. Baran, Mytropolyt, p. 132. •i-Krakii's'ki l'isti, M a r d i 22, 1942. p. 4. H c y c r ' s a c c o u n t ( p p . 174 ff.). based to a greater e x t e n t on sources s y m p a t h e t i c to t h e A u t o n o m o u s position, a p p e a r s to a t t r i b u t e g r e a t e r responsibility for t h e initial b r e a k to t h e A u t o c e p h a l o u s g r o u p . 11

Nationalism and the Church

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port to the group opposed to Alexius, and they made no difficulty about recognizing his authority to call the sobor. Since, however, the other authority for calling the conference was Dionysius, the constitutive assembly of the new Ukrainian church was established by non-Ukrainian prelates. T h e moving spirits, however, were the strongly nationalist Ukrainians, Polykarp and Hilarión. With them went Palladius, the third Ukrainian bishop of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland. Together they decided to form a new ecclesiastical body to be known as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Ukraïns'ka Avtokefal'na Pravoslavna Tserkva—UAPTs), which was to unite as quickly as possible with the remnants of the church of the same name founded by Lypkivs'kyi.33 Somewhat later Damaskin of Kamenets-Podolsk rejected Alexius and adhered to the new group.34 Their ranks were also augmented by the consecration as bishops in February of two Volhynian priests, Abramovych and Huba, who became members of the hierarchy as Nikanor and Ihor. 35 While the basic reason for the foundation of a new church, and its rapid growth at the expense of the body under Alexius, was the nationalist feeling of the Ukrainians, which demanded a fully national church divorced from any connection, however theoretical, with Russia, German policy had also played a role in division of the Orthodox communion. Fundamentally, Nazi policy was permeated with violent hatred of all religion. The guiding principle for selection of German officials for the east ensured that this basic theme would persist in the application of policy: " T h e whole Christian outlook makes one incapable of carrying on work in the east, for the community of the hymnbook is put ahead of the needs of the Reich." 39 Within this blanket opposition to the church, however, even the fanatical anticlericalism of Rosenberg and his staff permitted compromises to secure tactical advantages. In their eyes, Catholic Christianity :» T h e r e is considerably more information available on newspaper activity than on other politically significant aspects of the East Ukraine. Since many of the observers who have written accounts of the war period were themselves journalists, they naturally paid considerable attention to this field of activity. Moreover, the West Ukrainian newspapers published d u r i n g the same period, which furnish the principal source of material on the East Ukraine, were also especially interested in journalistic enterprises. Consequently, o n e must guard against the assumption that the real importance of these newspapers was as gTeat as the a t t e n t i o n devoted to t h e m indicates. Nevertheless, they were unquestionably very significant as means of transmitting nationalism and reflecting national feeling. ·'>» PS 053. oo USSR E x h i b i t 278.

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Channels of Nationalist Activity

liberality was a desire to carry propaganda to the numerous deserters who, if they were afraid to submit to German authority, might join the Red partisans. Consequently, papers were fostered in the swamp and wooded regions, even in small towns such as Ovruch, Olevsk, and Shchors. Indeed, the propaganda section of the army itself played a major role in founding newspapers, and even provided for the journalistic staffs in Zhitomir, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov the services of a competent and comparatively neutral Galician journalist, Peter Sahaidachnyi. However, as was previously noted, the OUN-M took a leading role in establishing the papers in Zhitomir and Kiev. Its importance was also considerable in a number of the smaller cities. In Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, and Krivoi Rog, on the other hand, the initiative was taken by persons who had been journalists under the Soviet regime. In Krivoi Rog, Michael Pronchenko, a writer and poet who had been imprisoned by the Soviet regime, but later worked for the local Communist paper, upon Red army evacuation, took over the Communist press and, with the aid of other young men, began publishing a paper called Dzvin (The Bell).61 In Kharkov, it was a former member of the staff of the defunct Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna who proposed immediately after the German arrival to start a newspaper under the name of Novyi Chas (The New Times). 62 It was some weeks before the paper could actually be started; the name then became Nova Ukraïna, and a large number of Mel'nyk adherents were on the staff. T h e chief editor and a majority of his subordinates, however, were local persons unaffiliated with the OUN. In a number of places Bandera organizers, too, assisted local men to establish papers. When the Reichskommissariat took over the bulk of the East Ukraine, a quite different policy was pursued; the outspokenly nationalist organs were suppressed, their staffs executed. Even the official policy of the Reichskommissariat, presumably approved by the Ostministerium, provided that all matters concerning newspapers in the native language should be submitted to the Press and Enlightenment Division of the Reichskommissariat. R. Sutor in Krakivs'ki Visti, August 12, 1942, p. 3. 3« Iurii Tarkovych in Krakivs'ki Visti, July 12, 1942, p. 3. Krakivs'ki Visti, January 22, 1942, p. 2.

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the peasants were rather meager. Most important, undoubtedly, was the church. Within a few months after the Communists were driven out, many hundreds of parishes had been reestablished. 38 Undoubtedly the older people who had received some religious training welcomed the reappearance of the clergy. Baptisms and marriages took place in large numbers, and the churches were well attended. Since the Germans forbade the use of public funds for payment of the salaries of the clergy, the latter had to depend on the generosity of their flocks or the produce of their own land. Apparently the parishioners responded by furnishing their pastors with sufficient income in kind. 39 In most areas, there developed a conflict between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous clergy. At first, the latter (or, in the "Left Bank" region, simply the clergy consecrated in the orthodox fashion who used the Slavonic liturgy) predominated in the villages, but as more Autocephalous priests were consecrated, and more of the older priests came to accept the Ukrainian language service, they evidently won the support of the peasantry. Strange as it may seem in view of reputed village conservatism, the living language was apparently more popular as a religious vehicle in the country than in the town, 40 and cases are recorded in which the peasants actually drove out the priest who persisted in the use of Slavonic.41 Religion as a stimulus to nationalist feeling was, however, subject to severe limitations. One was the inadequate background of the clergy. Many were simple peasants up to the time of their consecration, although an effort was made to train them in short courses. Where such a man was of sound character and good common sense, as was the case in one Podolian village, he could accomplish a good deal. There, according to the report, the priest, one of the local peasants until his recent consecration, was highly respected for his good example. His sermons stressed brotherly love, the importance of industriousness, mutual assistance, proper • ls See Chapter XI. •I'·' PS 1693. teacher in Poltava {Krakivs'ki Visti, April 12, 1942. -i" Report f r o m a gimnaiiia p. 3); Kastup, April 26, 1942, p. 2; Iurii Tarkovych in Krakivs'ki Visti, J u n e 25, 1942. p. 2. ' ι luri Tarkovych in Krakivs'ki Visti, J u n e 25, 1942, p. 2. For a differing interpretation of the relative success of the Autocephalous group (in the Poltava area), see Friedrich Heyer, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945 (Köln Braunsfeld: Verlagsgesellschaft Rudolf Müller, 1953), p. 209.

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Nationalism and Social Structure

education of children, and self-control. 42 Generally, however, the clergy was u n a b l e to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to r e t u r n i n g the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs. 48 O n e of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. H o w effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, b u t in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material a n d some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. T h e r e is considerable difference of o p i n i o n as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent j o b u n d e r difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were i m b u e d with C o m m u n i s t ideas. 44 T h e great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a U N R officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. H e was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village feldsher (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. T h e s e constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, w h o were described as having " n o unified outlook," b e i n g still " u n d e r the influence of Bolshevik ideology." 45 T h i s criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not u n c o m m o n in nationalist J- Ukra'ins'kyi Visnyk, April 4, " I u r i i Tarkovych in Krakivs'ki •n Cf. Ukra'ins'kyi Visnyk, April 1941, for favorable reports; and Southern Task Force) (Munich: of the rural teachers. 4Λ Ukra'ins'kyi Visnyk, April 4,

1943, pp. 6-7. Visti, January 18-19, 1942. p. 3. 4, 1943, pp. 6-7; Krakivs'ki Visti, November 18, Zvnovii Matla, Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa (The Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28-29, for some criticisms 1943, pp. 6-7.

Nationalism and Social Structure

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writers. 48 T o a certain extent it may be due to resentment against the clerical workers' unresponsiveness to nationalist propaganda, or even to simple snobbery toward those aspiring to the title of "intelligentsia" without a formal education. In part it appears, however, to correspond to a real lack of breadth of mind among this lowest group of the Soviet intelligentsia, a deficiency which would have made it difficult to use them for any political or social movement not tied immediately to their customary frame of thinking. On the other hand, there were often elements in the villages which were available for some sort of political activity. The memory of Petliura was still present; some refused to believe that he was dead, thinking the story to be Communist propaganda. 47 In another area, both the president of the village soviet and the head of one of the collective farms remained behind and organized life in cooperation with nationalist elements. 48 Yet, in another case, a man of some education in one ofr the villages, who was related to an émigré minister of the UNR, after expressing fervently nationalist sentiments, recoiled with horror at the idea that his auditor might recommend him to the Germans for an official post, fearing the vengeance of Communist agents.49 The presence of the latter was, indeed, a great handicap to nationalist organization in the rural areas, where the protection of the police force was not so great (especially in partisan-infested areas) as in the towns, and where the naturally cautious peasant hesitated to commit himself until assured the Soviet administration would never return. 5 0 Since the organized nationalist forces were so few in members, they could not undertake any direct or continuous indoctrination of the rural population, unless they abandoned their efforts to win the cities. They had to rely primarily on the Prosvita branches, the country schools, and the village administrations. Printed material was also used whenever it could be controlled Krakivs'ki Visti. ^ R. Sutor •ι* R. Sutor R. Sutor ·"'" R. Sutor

l'isti,

September 23, 1941, p. 2, reprinting an article from

in Krakivs'ki in Krakivs'ki in Krakivs'ki in Krakivs'ki

Visti, June 13, 1942, p. 4. Visti, July 31, 1942, p. 3. Visti, June 13, 1942, p. 4. Visti, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

L'vivs'ki

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Nationalism and Social Structure

by nationalist Ukrainians. As a matter of fact, a large proportion of the newspapers in the smaller towns were directed principally at rural readers; the extreme shortage of papers 51 in many areas prevented their being of great influence even when they had some nationalist content. Moreover, the central periodical for farmers, Ukrdins'kyi Khliborob, with a weekly printing of seventy thousand, was edited by Eugene Arkypenko, who later joined the Vlasov movement. 5 2 While this publication was not used against the nationalist cause, it was devoid of positive nationalist material, being confined entirely to technical agricultural articles. T h e less-than-lukewarm supporters of the nationalist movements who constituted the bulk of the personnel in positions which provided access to the rural population apparently did not do a great deal to convert the dormant cultural nationality of the peasants into active nationalism. T h e r e is no question that the cities inevitably constituted a prime target for nationalist efforts. Probably, in view of the severe limitations imposed by lack of time and nationalist personnel, by Red partisans and German restrictions, the enormous task of overcoming village inertia toward a purely political movement could not have been carried out in any case. Nevertheless, the initial failure of the nationalist groups (at least the O U N and others coming from the west) to grasp the overriding importance of the land question, and the necessity of making this a prime means by which the rural population could be won to the nationalist cause, must certainly be ranked as one of the great lost opportunities of this period. If the nationalists had from the beginning used all their energies to present a positive program of agrarian reform as the heart of their message, they might not have left any tangible organization to withstand renewed Soviet occupation, but they might have left behind a concept of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a defender of the interests of the peasantry. This, along with the vaguer memories of the Republican era, might have left an enduring imprint on the peasantry. ·">' D. Myronovych in Krakivs'ki Visti, July 9, 1942, p. 4. ·'•- Volyn', J u n e 17, 1942, p. 4; Interview 45.

XI. GEOGRAPHICAL VARIATIONS OF NATIONALISM I N COMPARISON with the contrasts in nationalist feeling and nationalist activity disclosed by an examination of city and countryside in the occupied East Ukraine, variations by geographical areas are minor. Nevertheless, even when not highly pronounced, these variations help to identify some of the features of Ukrainian nationalism in the recent past which illuminate its role in the complex history of the country. Since, to a certain degree, class structure varies from district to district, examination of differences in nationalist feeling in relation to these variations is useful. By indicating the complexity of the factors involved in nationalism, it helps avoid leaving an impression of the East Ukraine as a uniform entity. T h e northernmost region, Polessia, is the forest belt described in connection with the discussion of partisan warfare. In the section east of the Dnieper nationalist activity was scanty, for the rapid growth of the Red partisans made the rural areas which comprise the great bulk of the region unsafe for anti-Soviet elements. T h a t there was some nationalist penetration, apparently by Mel'nyk supporters working in close collaboration with the Germans, is attested both by Soviet sources, which denounce "West Ukrainian nationalists" in the rural administration, and by OUN-M sources, which claim contacts with the editors in Konotop and Chernigov, the largest cities of the area. 1 West of the Dnieper, nationalism was somewhat more evident. The short-lived "Olevsk Republic" established in 1941 by Borovets' introduced a local administration composed for the most part of West Volhynian nationalists. 2 T h e Bazar section farther east was temporarily controlled by Mel'nyk sympathizers, as was 1

Interview 50. - Interview 54; see Chapter IV.

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previously described. 3 Under the conditions of German repression the nationalist parties could not afford to devote their limited strength to maintaining the initial advantage gained in these comparatively unimportant areas. By 1943, under the impact of rapidly growing Soviet partisan operations, nationalist activity seems to have ceased in Polessia west of the Dnieper. South of Polessia runs a broad band of territory which falls into the natural vegetation region of the wooded steppe, i.e., a region of mixed prairie and woods. In contrast to the rather poor gray soil of most of Polessia, it is a land well suited for intensive agriculture, and as a result has supported for centuries the densest agricultural population of the East Ukraine. As in the case of Polessia, the principal dividing line within the wooded steppe region is the Dnieper River. T h e area west of the river forms the heart of what have been known in Ukrainian history as the " R i g h t B a n k " lands. Kiev and the surrounding district had been acquired by the Russian tsar in the eighteenth century, but most of the area west of the Dnieper remained under Polish rule until 1792. T h e section closest to the river had had a considerable share in the Cossack tradition, but the more westerly sections, which were included in the historic provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, were deeply affected by the independent Cossack movement only during the height of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's career. T h i s meant that serfdom had a longer and more oppressive history there than in the regions to the south and the east. While the peasants were thoroughly Ukrainian in language and customs, the cities included many Poles and Russians and an especially high percentage of Jews, who comprised from one third to one half of the urban population. This concentration of Jews, too, was a result of the historical background of the region; Poland had tolerated them, while the tsars had forbidden them to leave the Pale formed by the lands acquired in 1793 and later. 4 Since the " R i g h t Bank" was immediately contiguous to the nationalist bases in the West Ukraine, it was natural that the nai See Chapter V. Actually, the Pale included all the Ukraine Jews were less numerous on the " L e f t B a n k . " 4

in the nineteenth century, but

Geographical Variations of Nationalism

257

tionalists made a strong effort to extend their influence to the region. A large part of these efforts were concentrated on Kiev and Zhitomir. In Vinnitsa, the largest city of Podolia, on the other hand, the situation developed unfavorably for the nationalists soon after the German arrival. When the Germans captured the city, they were impressed by the activity of the director of the medical institute and his ability to speak German, learned while a student in Germany. Consequently, they appointed him mayor. Of mixed Russian and Ukrainian descent, the new mayor considered himself Ukrainian, but favored the continuance of ties with Russia. His administration contained other pro-Russian elements, while the Vinnitsa oblast administration was headed by an ethnic German said to have had Russophile tendencies. T h e police, on the other hand, and the newspaper were controlled by OUN-M adherents, although both were men of exceeding caution. 5 Vinnitsa played only an indirect role in stimulating Ukrainian nationalism; the unearthing in June, 1943, of enormous mass graves of victims of NKVD executions in 1937-38 and during the retreat of 1941, including, it is said, a number imprisoned for nationalist activities, served to increase the dread felt of the rapidly materializing prospect of Soviet reconquest. If Vinnitsa was the chief anti-nationalist stronghold, Proskurov, a smaller city to the northwest, was the headquarters for the OUN-M in Podolia. There the Mel'nyk group counted the mayor and the police chief (a Carpatho-Ukrainian trained in the Czechoslovak army) among its members.® It also controlled the newspaper, Ukrains'kyi Holos, which had a circulation of thirteen thousand, said to have been more than double that of the Soviet paper which had been published in Proskurov.7 Farther east, the districts west and southwest of Kiev were under strong nationalist influence. While the OUN-M was establishing its headquarters in Kiev, newspapers and local administrations were being formed in a number of small cities such as Vasilkov, Belaia Tserkov', Tarasbcha, Korsun', Smela (Smila), Cherkasy, and Uman'. T h e formation of the National Rada by the Mel'nyk group made a great Interview

1.

'•Interviews 1, 50. τ Nastup, December 25, 1941, p. 4, citing UkTains'kyi

Holos.

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Geographical Variations of Nationalism

impression on the intellectuals of the smaller towns. OUN-M writers and propagandists appear to have maintained regular contact with them for several months in 1941, and it is apparent that the Kiev Ukrains'ke Slovo served as a model for many of the new editors. 8 Schools were opened under the direction of nationalist educators, Prosvita and theatrical groups were formed, cooperatives linked with Vukospilka were active. Apparently, too, the town administrations were largely in Ukrainian hands; the municipal authorities in Uman' issued a sweeping order forbidding the use of the Russian language in any office, school, or enterprise under their jurisdiction. 9 T h e influence of the nationalists in the towns penetrated to some degree to the countryside in the area west of the Dnieper. For example, nationalist papers like Nova Doba, published in Berdichev, seem to have had a moderately large circulation in the villages. There also seem to have been nationalist influences of a purely local character in some places, aside from those brought in by the nationalist parties. Zvenigorodka, a small town about a hundred miles due south of Kiev had been the home of the Free Cossacks, a nationalist organization of the wealthier peasants during the revolutionary period. T h e group was revived by some of the villagers under the German occupation, and, together with a mimeographed newspaper, served as a focal point for local nationalism. 10 T h e influence of the church, especially in the rural areas, was not entirely on the side of Ukrainian nationalism. T h e Autonomous clergy under Alexius made an early start in reorganizing religious life in this region. They established a diocese of Vinnitsa and Zhitomir, and during most of the period of occupation were supported by the influential Bishop Damaskin (Maliuti) of Kamenets-Podolsk. Damaskin's diocese included nearly five hundred churches, with a hundred and sixty priests.11 Apparently most of this large organization, which was overwhelmingly concentrated in the rural districts, had no objection to Damaskin's allegiance to the Russophile church. T h e Autocephalous Church s

Interview 30. Nastup, May 3, 1942, p. 2. R. Sutor in Krakivs'ki Visti, July 31, 1942. p. 3. π Krakivs'ki Visti, October 13, 1942, p. 2.

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established its own organization, installing a bishop in Zhitomir, as well as the energetic Ihor in Belaia Tserkov'. Ihor was replaced for a time by Emmanuel, but when the latter passed over to the Autonomous Church, he took a new post in western Volhynia, perhaps because he found the rather strong nationalist atmosphere in Belaia Tserkov' unpleasant. The fact that the Autonomous Church was able to maintain such a strong organization indicates that sentiment in the rural areas was not always ardently nationalist, even in the most "pure" of Ukrainian lands. T h e wooded steppe region east of the Dnieper, the "Left Bank," constituted the second half of the traditional Ukrainian heartland. T h e western part had been for centuries under Polish and Lithuanian rule, coming under Moscow in the late seventeenth century, together with Kiev. T h e eastern part, roughly equivalent to the Kharkov oblast, had never been under Polish rule, but had owed allegiance to the tsars. It served as a refuge for serfs escaping from their Polono-Lithuanian masters, and hence was known as the "Slobozhanshchyna" or "Free Land." Since even the western part of the "Left Bank" had been annexed by the Russian Empire long before the partitions of Poland, however, its history diverged considerably from that of the "Right Bank." T h e most interesting nationalist developments in this region during 1941-43 took place in Kharkov. While Kharkov was always claimed as the second city of the Ukraine, it never occupied the place in nationalist thinking which Kiev held, and the fact that the Russian ethnic and linguistic element there was strong aroused less indignation. Some account of the differences in the nationalist movements in Kiev and Kharkov has already been given. T h e essential divergence arose from the fact that the OUN-M organizers reached the latter city only in November, when their period of grace was already running out. Enthusiasm was great enough for them to secure powerful support from local people. A strong ekzekutyva was formed with a mayor of one of the city raions, an ardently nationalist professor, George Boiko, and several other local people, in addition to Kononenko, the chief West Ukrainian organizer, as members. 12 The adherence of i- OUN u Viim (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75; Interview 57.

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Arkadii Liubchenko (really a citizen of Kiev, but known throughout the Ukraine) to the OUN-M added considerable prestige. T h e raion mayor, Semenenko, who was later to become city mayor, was also sympathetic to the Mel'nyk group, as were a number of journalists, including the brother of the editor of Nova Ukraina, the daily newspaper. 13 At the same time, or even before the Mel'nyk group's arrival, however, a local organization, comprised primarily of old adherents of the Republic who had managed to survive the Soviet regime, was formed under the leadership of V. V. Dubrovs'kyi and Volodymyr Dolenko. 14 The background of these men and their group and the instrumentalities through which they exerted influence have been described. It should be stressed here that the group was formed independently; although there were certain sympathies for the old UNR, there were no contacts with Andrew Livyts'kyi's émigré regime. 15 While the movement was never able to attain power at all comparable with that exercised by the Mel'nyk group in Kiev during its period of predominance, it was able to exert steady influence of a moderate nature. Affected perhaps by the fact that Kharkov was less Ukrainian than Kiev, as well as by the different background and tactics of the nationalist movements there (its late start and quick loss of prestige after the Kiev debacle forced the Mel'nyk group also to use restrained tactics, although some of its adherents were every bit as extreme as those in Kiev), a quite different situation developed in the eastern center. There was no sudden reversal of fortune; no prominent Ukrainian aligned himself then or later with Russophile movements. Perhaps, too, the famine, which was probably worse there than in any other Ukrainian city in the winter of 1941-42, and the comparatively tolerant regime of the army combined to conciliate the ethnic groups or at least to divert their energies from open conflict. The nature of the nationalist movement in Kharkov was important, not so much because the city was representative of the '·' Interviews 47, 73. u Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoinavstva (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 584. 'r> Interview 73.

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surrounding areas, as because it exerted influence upon them. T h e chief channels by which it did so were the Prosvita organizations, the newspaper, and the church. A leader of the independent nationalist group estimates that its influence, exercised primarily through the Prosvita, reached as far west as Lubny and Poltava, 16 and there is evidence that it also played a part in organization as far south as the northern Donbas. 17 Nova Ukrdina was also widely known, serving as a model for nationalist editors in the "Left Bank" region who wanted to pursue as independent a line as possible and hence rejected the guidance of Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo. T h e special role played by the church of Kharkov merits more than passing mention. W h e n the Germans arrived, they found that an elderly prelate, Archbishop Theophilus, had survived the Soviet period. Seventy-six years old, a native of a village of the Khoral (Khorol) region in the heart of the "Left Bank" Ukraine, he had become a priest in 1885.18 W i t h the aid of local clergymen, he reassumed control of ecclesiastical life in Kharkov in late 1941 and claimed to be in charge of the entire "Left Bank" as Metropolitan of the Ukraine. 16 Many—especially in the Autocephalous Church—criticized him because he was consecrated bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church (in 1923) and because he continued to use Old Slavonic in the liturgy. 20 Others, however, saw him as a Ukrainian patriot, since he was Ukrainian by birth, spoke pure Ukrainian, celebrated a service in commemoration of Kruty, and praised the Ukrainian newspaper. 21 At any rate the dissidents were able to make little progress against him; only two Lypkivite priests had survived, while Theophilus's clergy numbered more than one hundred. 2 2 However, the latter appear to "'•¡bid. i" Interview 68. Krakivs'ki Visti, May 15, 1943, p. 3. ·» Krakivs'ki Visti, March 5, 1943, p. 2; March 6, 1942, p. 3. -"Interview 69. A letter to Archbishop Hilarión from one of his former pupils in the Kharkov area, asking his advice on reorganization of the church, suggests that all were not satisfied with T h e o p h i l u s ' ascendancy, even at an early date (Ukra'ins'ka Diisnist', February 10, 1942, p. 1). T h e OL'N-B underground (Visnyh, No. 11 [1943], p. 15) denounced him as an "old regimisi" and an "indivisibilist" (i.e., a proponent of "indivisible" Russia). -i Krakivs'ki Vjsti, May 5, 1942, p. 4; J a n u a r y 24, 1943, p. 2; May 15, 1943, p. 3. Ukra'ins'ka Diisnist', February 10, 1942, p. 4; Krakivs'ki Visti, March 5, 1943, p. 2. Eventually Theophilus adhered to the Autoccphalous C h u r c h . Friedrich Heyer, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1915 (Köln-Braunsfeld: Verlagsgesellschaft Rudolf Müller, 1953), p. 178.

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263

have been subjected to very loose control by the archbishop and to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services according to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority. It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.23 Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.24 On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.28 The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.26 Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance. Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor were shot by German police; the city passed under the control of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control. 27 Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.28 Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the -! O UN u Viini, p. 76; Interview 42. - ' D. Myronovych in Krakivs'ki Visti, July 9, 1942, p. 4. ¡¡a Nastup, April 26, 1942, p. 2; Krakivs'ki Visti, April 12, 1942, p. 3. L'vivs'ki Visti, September 6-7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov". - 7 Interviews 1, 42; OUN u Viini, p. 76. Interview 47.

264

Geographical Variations of Nationalism

German authorities; in a few other places, including the important towns of Lubny and Akhtyrka (Okhtyrka), editors continued their endeavors to stimulate national feeling. 29 Remarkably, the editor in the former town was a Russian who, after his proUkrainian work brought him to the verge of arrest, was able to secure a new post as editor of a Russian-language paper in the Kursk oblast.30 Most active of all this group, however, was the young editor of the Mirgorod paper, Michael Voskobiinyk, who pursued a line independent of the Nationalists yet modeled on the work of the Nova Ukrdina group. 31 In general, nationalism in the "Left Bank" region under German occupation can be said to have been characterized by more influence of locally led and organized ecclesiastical and political bodies than the area to the west of the Dnieper. Moreover, it was marked by somewhat less friction between the Ukrainian and Russian elements and a willingness of some of the latter group to cooperate with the effort for Ukrainian nationalist revival. Probably the basic reason for this difference is the fact that both OUN groups were suppressed in this area before they could become very influential, and the nationalist structure which was built up afterwards was formed of persons who feared the extremist program of the integral nationalists. It may be also that the history of the region, with its lack of comparatively recent memories of oppression by Polish lords and the relative independence with which nationalist life could develop, created an atmosphere of self-confidence which militated against the more violent aspects of nationalist egoism. T o the south of the wooded steppe belt just discussed lies a broad region of more open steppe; in general the agricultural population of the area is considerably less dense than that of the region just described. T h e open plain with its very rich black soil and somewhat lesser rainfall lends itself to the cultivation of cereal crops which require smaller amounts of manpower, in contrast to the mixed sugar beet, dairy, potato, and grain agriInterviews 47. 50. •'"'Interview 47.

ai Ibid.

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265

culture of the more northern region. T h e reasons for the smaller farm population are historical rather than purely economic, however. Most of the area was fully settled many generations later than the more northern regions, for it was the principal area of conflict of the Slavic settlers moving down from the north and the Tatar warriors based on the Crimea. T h e major instrument of colonization was the Cossack fortress settlement or sich. In the mid-seventeenth century the Cossacks accepted the suzerainty of the Orthodox tsar, but it was only in the late eighteenth century, after the Russian conquest of the Crimean Tatars, that the steppe was fully opened to peaceful development. These new lands, frequently called "Southern Russia," came to include considerable bodies of non-Ukrainian settlers, mostly Russians, but also large numbers of Germans and Serbs. In 1917 the Provisional Government in Petrograd strongly rejected demands of the Ukrainian Rada for the extension of its authority to the guberniias of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida, the last three corresponding roughly to the southern steppe region, since it felt they were not Ukrainian in character. 32 T h e northern section of the steppe region, comprising the northern halves of the Generalbezirke Nikolaev and Dnepropetrovsk, did contain a preponderantly Ukrainian peasantry. T h e presence of two very important natural resources—the iron mines of Krivoi Rog and the water power of the Dnieper rapids—had led to rapid industrialization of this area during the period of the Soviet Five Year Plans, with a consequent large increase in the urban population. According to the census of 1939 five of the fifteen Ukrainian cities of over one hundred thousand population lay in this region. 33 At the start of the period of industrialization, in 1926, the city population was very largely non-Ukrainian. For example, Ukrainians formed less than half the total in Kirovograd (then Zinovevsk), Jews being the next largest ethnic group, closely followed by Russians. 34 In Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'e the t-John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 72-73. :!:1 Frank Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 250-53. a·Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Recensement de la Population de l'URSS, XIII (Moscow, 1929), 13-14.

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proportion of Jews was somewhat lower, but the Ukrainians were even fewer, being scarcely more than one third of the population. 3 5 T h e figures for Kirovograd in 1942 are hardly enough upon which to base generalizations. 39 Apparently, however, a great shift to Ukrainian national affiliation, much larger than that which took place in the average northern city, had occurred. As in the case of the other figures, it is not certain that this represents a real change, although it is probable that a large part of the interwar growth was composed of Ukrainian peasants. A n u m b e r of circumstances suggest, however, that part of the difference arose from a real shift in allegiance of numerous elements of Russian origin, i.e., a shift induced not so much by expectation that persons classing themselves as Ukrainians would have a favored position in a new Ukrainian state, as by a sincere feeling of belonging to a "Ukraine" defined on a geographic rather than an ethnic basis. T h e readiness of technical specialists, who took the lead in Krivoi Rog, to adopt with enthusiasm Ukrainian symbols, while devoting their major attention to economic reconstruction, suggests that this acceptance of a territorial basis of national identity may have played a role, while the support of Russian cultural and political tendencies by a similar group in D n e p r o p e trovsk indicates the instability of this choice. Apparently the situation was something like this: as long as the Ukrainian state which the Germans seemed to favor appeared to be an instrument for the overthrow of Communism and the rebuilding of new life, it was readily acceptable; when it became a romantic creed of Ibid. See A p p e n d i x . T h e necessity for c a u t i o n in i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e e x t r e m e l y gTeat s h i f t in K i r o v o g r a d is i n d i c a t e d by t h e fact t h a t t h e only o t h e r l a r g e city in t h e area f o r w h i c h d a t a a r e a v a i l a b l e , D n e p r o p e t r o v s k , s h o w e d a c o m p a r a t i v e l y small s h i f t . It will be recalled, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e l a t t e r city was u n d e r a R t i s s o p h i l e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e r e is n o i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e c o n c e r n i n g t h e t e n d e n c i e s of t h e city a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in Kirovograd for t h e t i m e t h e census was t a k e n . I t is m a t h e m a t i c a l l y d e m o n s t r a b l e , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e d e c l i n e of t h e R u s s i a n g r o u p can be a c c o u n t e d for in K i r o v o g r a d only o n t h e basis of a s h i f t of persons f o r m e r l y classed as R u s s i a n s to t h e U k r a i n i a n g r o u p , unless o n e of two r a t h e r u n l i k e l y a s s u m p t i o n s is m a d e , n a m e l y t h a t (1) t h e R u s s i a n p o p u l a t i o n actually d e c l i n e d b e t w e e n 1926 a n d 1941, or (2) n u m e r o u s Jews l a t e r e x t e r m i n a t e d listed themselves as R u s s i a n s in 1926. Some i n f o r m a t i o n on c o n d i t i o n s in K i r o v o g r a d is p r e s e n t e d bv S t c p a n H l i d , an O l ' N - B u n d e r g r o u n d worker, in Fragment γ zhyttia ι muk (Spohadi ζ chasiv nimets'koi okupntsiï Vhuiiny) ( F r a g m e n t s f r o m Life a n d Struggle [ R e m e m b r a n c e s of t h e P e r i o d of ( . c i m a l i O c c u p a t i o n of t h e U k r a i n e ] ) ( L o n d o n : Y ) d a v n y t s t v o Soiu/a U k r a i n t s c v ν V'elykii B r i t a n i i , 1955). ::,1

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ethnocentrism it was repugnant as an obstacle to the satisfaction of down-to-earth needs and the development of smooth human relations. There were, however, many variations on this theme. Both the initial stimulation and the ensuing withdrawal from nationalist ideology on the part of many persons in the area was due, according to numerous and consistent reports of eyewitnesses, to the activities of Bandera organizers. The great predominance of Mel'nyk adherents in the northern Ukraine was matched by the ascendancy of the younger faction in the south. In part this circumstance was accidental. Both OUN parties had planned to send organizing groups into all areas of the Ukraine. The Mel'nyk group destined for the south, however, was evidently weakened intentionally to permit a concentration on the northern area, where historical tradition and experience in the revolutionary period led the older men to expect greater success.87 For the most part, the Bandera groups in the north were wiped out by the SP, while their emissaries in the south got off to an early start and were well entrenched by the time the slower acting Mel'nyk group arrived there. 38 Although a certain amount of rivalry persisted in the largest city in each of the two main areas—Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk—after the Mel'nyk group was also proscribed by the Germans, there was for the most part a tacit acceptance of the territorial division of activity which had developed in the early months. 89 This circumstance renders the investigation of the southern region more difficult. While the Bandera followers have been active since the war in describing their exploits, the fact that at no time, even in the early months, could they engage in largescale open activities makes it difficult to check their accounts with contemporary journalistic reports. For example, German police reports state that in early October, 1941, a group of fifteen West Ukrainians, all or most of whom were Bandera adherents, tried to secure control of the administration and newspaper in Interview 61. ' T h e headquarters of the Bandera group remained in Kiev, where Myron, the director of its work in the entire East Ukraine, resided until he was killed (evidently by a German police agent) in the summer of 1942; after that OUN-B headquarters were in Dniepropetrovsk. •f·1 Interview 1. : s

268

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Zaporozh'e. 40 Apparently these m e n were executed by the Germans; no further reports on nationalist activity in Zaporozh'e are available. T h i s obscurity surrounding O U N - B activities makes itself felt especially in any effort to trace the relationships between O U N - B organizers and locally active groups. In Krivoi Rog, the mayor, Sherstiuk, the editors, Pronchenko and Potapenko, and a number of other local figures were strongly nationalist in sentiment, but whether they were ever adherents of the Bandera movement, or were brought into its organization, is a matter of dispute between the survivors of the Krivoi Rog group and O U N - B members familiar with the area. 41 What appears most likely is that an initial "honeymoon" of cooperation was succeeded by strife arising from the uncompromising demands of the O U N - B for adherence to the integral nationalist line. 4 2 In the case of Dnepropetrovsk, some corroboration of postwar accounts is furnished by a German police report. A n O U N - B group arrived soon after the German army entered the city. Under the Galician organizer Rehei, who was helped by the Wehrmacht commander, a new oblast administration was established to offset the locally formed city administration. 43 Apparently the local group was at first neutral o n the Russo-Ukrainian question, •»U Chief ot the SP a n d the SD, Report on Eventi in the USSR, No. 143, December 8, 1941, p. 5, NO 2827 (hereafter referred to as NO 2827). Lev Shankovs'kyi, Pohidni hrupy OL'S' (March Groups of the OUN) (Munich: Yydavnytstvo "Ukraïns'kyi Samostiinyk," 1958), pp. 162-63, gives details on later O U N - B activities in the Zaporozh'e area. 41 Zynovii Matla, Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa ( T h e Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 29-31; Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukra'ins'kykh zemliakh, 1941-1944: Spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" ( T h e Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941-44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in Κalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukrains'kikh Katolykiv ν Amerytsi (Calendar for 1947 of t h e Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), pp. 39, 41, 45, 53; Iuryi Semenko, "Pam'iati Mykhaila Pronchenka" (Memories of Michael Pronchenko), Savi Dni, April, 1953, pp. 10-13: Interviews 7 fifi ^ - T h a t this was the case is indicated by an article in Krakivs'ki Visti, November 15, 1941, p. 2. evidently based on discussions with Pronchenko and Potapenko. It contained the complaint that the newspaper Dzvin would have little space left for the news of the day if it was necessary to p r i n t "catechisms on the trizub or the national name," essays on the development of National Socialism, the New Europe, etc. Cf. Semenko, and Shankovs' kyi, pp. 145 ft. " C h i e f of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 132, November 12, 1941, pp. 10-11, N O 3830 (hereafter referred to as NO 3830). Cf. Shankovs'kyi, pp. 32-33, 150-51, who describes continued underground activity of the OUN-B group.

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but the fanatic demands of the OUN-B and its efforts at counterorganization drove the local group completely into the Russian alignment, which was tolerated by the German police authorities after they dispersed the Bandera group. At least one prominent member actually joined the Natsional'no-Trudovoi Soiuz (NTS— National Workers' Union), the Russian counterpart to the OUN. When the OUN parties, including a relatively important Mel'nyk group which was especially active in educational circles, continued their work underground, they gained or regained some support, partly as a reaction to the lengths to which the Russophile element, especially the Autonomous Church, went, and partly because of an increasing moderation in their own ideology.44 No simple conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of these complex situations. T h e picture is further complicated by a tendency, illustrated in a number of instances, for Russians living in the Ukraine to accept a moderate Ukrainian nationalist position when not exposed to the pressure of an extreme Nationalist and strongly anti-Russian ideology. One strong adherent of the Ukrainian ethnic nationalist position was much impressed on finding in Novomirgorod (Novomyrhorod), near Kirovograd, a young teacher and his wife who both felt themselves to be Ukrainian, although born in Russia, and who "hated the Bolsheviks just as much as we do." 45 In another small town in the area (Novo Ukrainka) a nationalist organizer found most of the teachers to be "still under the influence of Communist ideology," which probably meant among other things that they did not consider the "purity" of Ukrainian culture of the greatest importance.46 There seems to have been a fairly widespread tendency on the part of many Ukrainians and of many Russians living in the Ukraine, to reject any ethnic national creed in favor of some ideology based on territorial identity. It would not do to overemphasize this factor, however, for there was considerable support, especially in the northwestern area around the see of Kirovograd, for the Autocephalous Church, 47 which stressed the Ukrainian language, and isolated smaller places like Pavlograd 44 Interview 1. -ι·*1 R. Sutor in Krakivs'ki Visti, August 2, 1942, p. 3. 4« Matla, p. 28. 47 On the question of language to be used in church service, cf. Chapter VIII.

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were real centers of devotion to all things Ukrainian. Even such a large center as Dnieprodzerzhinsk had a nationalist mayor and a nationalist editor. 4 8 T h e extreme south, the coastal strip along the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, from Odessa to Osipenko (Berdianka), had had a still shorter history of settlement than the area immediately to the north. Best suited of all Ukrainian lands to large-scale wheat farming with a small agricultural working force, it had a relatively sparse rural population, very mixed ethnically, with many German villages and some districts of Russian majority. T h e cities were still more heterogeneous, with Ukrainians forming a small minority in the larger ones, according to the census of 1926. T h e study of conditions in this area is seriously hampered by the fact that the western third fell to R u m a n i a n occupied Transnistria. T o prepare the way for the annexation of Transnistria, and, in addition, to gratify the desire of high officials for loot and profiteering, the R u m a n i a n s sent in a large n u m b e r of their own administrators. 4 9 Since the rather backward Moldavians comprised only a small proportion of the total population, one of the Slavic elements had to be tolerated. Believing that German victory would lead eventually to the creation of an independent Ukraine, which would inevitably demand the land west of the Dniester as an irredenta, the Rumanians favored the Russians; the position of Russian nationalist elements in Odessa resembled that of the Mel'nyk g r o u p in Kiev and Zhitomir before their suppression by the Germans. Russian was an official language, along with R u m a n i a n and German; a Russian theater was opened; several Russian publications were started. 50 T h e guiding organization of the Russians was a g r o u p called the Union of Russian Officers, which had the St. George cross as its emblem and evidently was strongly tsarist in its ideology. 51 It is said to have maintained contacts with émigré groups in Serbia and elsewhere and to have refused cooperation with the Vlasov movement. 5 2 At any ^Interview 10; Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk, June 14, 1942, p. 7. ^Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk, February 7, 194S, p. 1, based on a Zentraleuropa agency report. Krakivs'ki t'isti, April 17, 1943, p. 3; Interview 18; Arkadii Liubchenko, Shchodennyk (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951). p. 122. "Ί Clandestine publication from Odessa region previously cited. : 9). p p . 108-10. • ' S e e p . 152 a b o v e . ι "Istorila t'krains'koho I'iis'ka. p p . 8()(>-IO. 11 I n a d d i t i o n t o b e i n g c i t e d b \ n a t i o n a l i s t s o n r í e s , t h i s o f f e r is m e n t i o n e d by a S o v i e t s t u d e n t , P a v l o ?.. K o z i k , in a n u n p u b l i s h e d d i s s e r t a t i o n e n t i t l e d " V i d b u d o v a ta rozvitok hospodarstva i kul'turnoho /hutia D r o h o b \ ts'koi oblasti pislia v y t a n a n n i a n i m e t s ' k o f a s h i s t s ' k i k h z a h a r b n y k i v (6 V I I I . 1 9 4 4 - 1 . 1 . 1 9 4 7 ) " ( R e s t o r a t i o n

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297

commanders surrendered during the summer of 1945. At the same time, the hard core of nationalists realized that a mass resistance movement was no longer feasible. As a result many men—including some Red Army deserters—seeking to enter the l T PA were rejected. Exposed areas which were relatively unsuited to guerrilla operations, like the upper Dniester valley, were evacuated (when Soviet blockading lines could be evaded), and the main force of UPA partisans was concentrated in the Carpathians. T h e winter of 1945-46 was very hard for the UPA. T h e leafless trees provided little shelter from MGB troops equipped with planes, while the snow cover made tracking easy.1- Many of the partisans were forced to spend most of the winter in underground dugouts or "bunkers." But the determination of the nationalists to continue to resist was intensified by the Soviet regime's harsh persecution of the Greek Catholic Church during 1945 and 1946.13 Archbishop Joseph Slipyi and other members of the hierarchy were arrested in April, 1945. According to a Soviet source, they were tried by a military tribunal which accused them of collaboration *vith the O U N . Apparently one charge was that Archbishop Slipyi and his predecessor, Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, had organized a "school of deacons" in 1943 as a cover for preparing cadres to resist the eventual Soviet reoccupation. 14 After the arrest of the bishops, Soviet police, in an intensive effort to compel the Greek Catholic priests and their congregations to adhere to Orthodoxy, seized church property and arrested many of the priests. As noted earlier, the O U N had contained a tinge of anticlericalism, b u t this had faded during the war. T h e Soviet persecution of the Greek Catholic Church was intimately linked to arid D e v e l o p m e n t of t h e E c o n o m y a n d t h e C u l t u r a l L i f e of D r o h o b i c h O b l a s t a f t e r t h e E x p u l s i o n of t h e G e r m a n - F a s c i s t O c c u p i e r s [August 6, 1 9 4 4 - J a n u a r v 1. 1947]) . ' - ' I n e a r l y 1946 t h e P e o p l e ' s C o m m i s s a r i a t of Slate Security (NKGB), t h e n in c h a r g e of Soviet police troops, was r e n a m e d t h e Ministry of State Security ( M G B ) . l:i O n t h e p e r s e c u t i o n of t h e C h u r c h see especially Bilinsky's d i s s e r t a t i o n , p p . 157-85, a n d W a l t e r D u s h n y c k , Martyrdom in Ukraine: Russia Denies Religious Freedom (New York: T h e A m e r i c a Press, n.d.). h P a n t e l e i D. I n d i c h e n k o , " P r o v a i a g r a r n o ï polilyky n i m e t s ' k y k h fashystiv n a t y m c h a s o v o o k u p o v a n i i R a d i a n s ' k i i Ukra'ini, 1941-1944" ( T h e Collapse of t h e A g r a r i a n Policy of t h e G e r m a n Fascists in t h e T e m p o r a r i l y O c c u p i e d Soviet U k r a i n e , 1941-1944) ( u n p u b l i s h e d d i s s e r t a t i o n , Kiev University, 1949), p p . 242-43.

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suppression of U k r a i n i a n national traditions, particularly since the O r t h o d o x priests who profited f r o m the persecution were largely i m p o r t e d f r o m Russia. Consequently, the U P A assumed the role of c h a m p i o n of religious as well as national f r e e d o m . U P A countermeasures were directed especially against Galicians w h o assisted the Soviet drive against the G r e e k Catholic C h u r c h . F a t h e r Gabriel Kostelnyk, a Greek Catholic priest who a f t e r his own acceptance of O r t h o d o x y had played a p r o m i n e n t role in securing f u r t h e r conversions, was assassinated in September, 1948. Nationalist sources have never a d m i t t e d that the U P A was responsible for this assassination, b u t they freely accept responsibility for killing Iaroslav H a l a n . H a l a n was a fairly p r o m i n e n t Galician writer w h o had long been sympathetic to C o m m u n i s m . A f t e r the Soviet reoccupation he specialized in anti-clerical propaganda, i n c l u d i n g such publications as With the Cross or with the Knife and The Twilight of the Strange Gods, which assailed the G r e e k Catholic C h u r c h , i n c l u d i n g the revered M e t r o p o l i t a n Sheptyts'kyi, a n d the nationalist organizations. 1 5 W h i l e H a l a n himself was an atheist (and eventually a C o m m u n i s t ) he evidently collaborated with defectors to O r t h o d o x y like Kostelnyk. 1 ® O n O c t o b e r 24, 1949, a U P A u n d e r g r o u n d agent succeeded in assassinating Halan. 1 7 His death was the signal for a still m o r e intensive effort to link the nationalist u n d e r g r o u n d a n d the Catholic C h u r c h . According to a Soviet i n f o r m a n t , a m o t i o n pict u r e based on this theme was shown in the East Ukraine. 1 8 By the time of Halan's assassination, however, the U P A had been reduced essentially to an u n d e r g r o u n d organization. A m a j o r factor in its gradual suppression was the drastic repressive measures carried o u t by the Soviet police in the countryside. At first the principal measure was the q u a r t e r i n g of police units in the villages. Later, according to nationalist sources, e n t i r e populations of villages were deported. In place of the natives came settlers f r o m distant parts of the USSR. In this way the solid r u r a l i"> Istoriia uhraïns'koi literatury (History of U k r a i n i a n L i t e r a t u r e ) . II iKicv: Vydavnvtstvo A k a d e m i i N a u k I ' k r a i n s ' k o i R S R , 1957). 804. i« Ibid. Ibid., p. 794. Cf. Istoriia Ukraïns'hoho Viis'ka, p . 81S, w h i c h gives t h e d a t e of H a l a n ' s assassination as O c t o b e r 23, 1949. i" Cf. Istoriia ukrains'koi literatury, p. 794, o n this c h a i g e .

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support upon which the partisans depended was broken. Even where Ukrainian peasantry remained, the introduction of the Soviet administrative apparatus provided sources of information on nationalist activities. T h i s was especially the case when the kolkhoz (collective farm) system became widespread. Collectivization was a slow process, for the peasants resisted passively while the U P A made imported collective farm chairmen its special targets. As late as October, 1949, Nikita Khrushchev reported that 61 percent of the peasants in the West Ukraine were in kolkhozes. 19 Since relatively high proportions were attained in Carpatho-Ukraine, Volhynia, Chernovtsy, and even the less mountainous part of Galicia, it is apparent that most peasants in the principal area of UPA operations were not collectivized by that date. But the Soviet penetration of the countryside, accompanied by large-scale police operations, was inexorable. UPA groups operating in the small Ukrainian settlements in territory which remained Polish (under Communist rule) after 1945 were in an especially exposed position. At the end of 1947 they were ordered by the UPA command to endeavor to escape either by posing as workers being resettled in the Donbas or by fighting their way to the American occupation zones in Germany and Austria. Apparently a considerable n u m b e r of the Galician insurgents also took the latter desperate road. 20 D u r i n g 1947 several hundred UPA partisans succeeded in finding asylum after traversing the length of Czechoslovakia. By that time the remainder of the UPA had gone underground. In the winter months, at least, this frequently meant literal self-entombment in the bunkers. T h e hardships experienced in these damp, poorly lighted, ill-ventilated holes (according to survivors) were almost indescribable. After the MGB began using police dogs on a large scale, even the smell of a burning candle could betray the location of a bunker. Aside from the physical suffering, inactivity and lack of information tended to induce severe psychological depression. Still the hardier members of the 19 Pravda Ukrainy, October 30, 1949, p. 2. -«See New Yoik Herald Tribune, September 22, 1947, p. 6, which mentions the influx into the western zones b u t (in a thoroughly garbled account of the backg r o u n d of the nationalist movement) says that "Allied sources" suspected the UPA of collaboration with the Soviet regime.

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nationalist force persisted in preparing propaganda materials for distribution after the winter had passed, and in planning smallscale attacks on police agents, "renegade" intellectuals, and collective farm officials. Gradually, however, the Soviet police brought the U P A leaders to bay. On March 5, 1950, the supreme commander, Shukhevych, was killed in a village near L'vov. His death did not mean the end of U P A activities, but by late 1950 the remaining members of the organization were so few and harried that little news concerning their activities could reach the outside world. In recent years articles on Shukhevych's successor, Vasyl' Koval, have appeared in the Soviet press, asserting that he has surrendered and recognized the errors of the nationalists. 2 1 Some reports suggest that small nationalist groups may still be operating in the West Ukraine, but no conclusive evidence is available. If one takes into account duration, geographical extent, and intensity of activity, the U P A very probably is the most important example of forceful resistance to Communist rule. By the midtwenties the Soviet regime had established an effective monopoly of force throughout nearly all of the territory then in the U S S R . In the e x t r e m e reaches of Central Asia the T u r k i c Basmachi groups offered sporadic resistance until about 1930. In the European U S S R , however, serious forceful resistance to the Soviet regime was not revived even by the extreme popular antipathy aroused by collectivization. Desperate peasants driven to banditry lurked in the forests of Belorussia and \vestern Russia. Mass uprisings occurred in the Ukraine and elsewhere, but they were suppressed before they could become organized rebellions. Somewhat more sustained opposition to Soviet rule occurred in the early stages of W o r l d W a r I I . Aside from the fighting against R e d partisans which the Ukrainian groups and a few Russian groups like that of Bronislav Kaminskii carried on, there was the independent and widespread rebellion of the Moslem mountaineers in the North Caucasus in the autumn of 1941. T h o u g h relatively little is known about this rebellion, its careful clandestine organization, synchronized outbreak, and effective character ap- 1 See article by P. Svmonenko in A o m u n i s t Ukrainy, No. 2. February, 1961, pp. 82-88, excelptcri in Digest of the Soviet fkrainian Press. V, No. 4 (April, 1961), 8.

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pear to place it among the most important anti-Soviet uprisings. T h e size of the populations involved—a few hundred thousand— limited the importance of the North Caucasus uprisings, however. T o go farther afield, the same limitation of size has applied to other instances of vigorous and sustained rebellion against Communist regimes, such as the Tibetan and Turkestani rebellions against the Peking Chinese government or the riots in East Germany (1953) and Poland (1956). T h e Hungarian revolution of 1956 was, of course, far more important, involving to some degree a population of nine million, and rapidly developing a complex organization. T h e Hungarian revolution, however, lasted only a few weeks. In contrast, the more or less effective anti-Communist activity of the Ukrainian resistance forces lasted from mid1944 until 1950. It is impossible to provide a complete analysis of the factors which made protracted resistance by the UPA possible. In summary, however, they appear to have been the following: (1) favorable terrain—relatively impenetrable to large bodies of regular troops, yet close to sources of food; (2) nearly unanimous support of the rural population; (3) a fairly large nationality group (about 3,500,000, considering the Greek Catholics alone) as a supporting base: (4) a very powerful—indeed fanatic—nationalist ideology; (5) a highly integrated, authoritarian organizational structure; (6) a considerable period of preparation under favorable conditions; (7) a moderate degree of outside arms supply at the outset. Quite possibly one or more of these factors could have been absent without lessening the effectiveness of the resistance movement; but it would appear that the majority, at least, were necessary conditions. Granting the effectiveness of the U P A in terms of extent of resistance, what did it really accomplish? Obviously the Soviet regime won, for its rule in the West Ukraine is now firm. At the close of World War II the disparity of force between the Soviet and German armies was too great for the U P A even to come near playing a decisive role. Since then, the Soviet Union has not been at war; hence the value of the UPA as a military diversion remains problematical. Undoubtedly the UPA was a drain on Soviet resources for a few years, b u t it is equally clear that this drain did

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n o t e n d a n g e r the Soviet system or seriously impede its material progress. T h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of the U P A must, then, be m e a s u r e d in political a n d psychological terms. Even in this regard, the record is s o m e w h a t m i x e d . It can be argued that U P A activities, especially the large-scale partisan warfare between 1944 and 1947, indirectly w e a k e n e d Galician ability to withstand the pressure of the Soviet system. M a n y thousands of the most vigorous Galician youths were killed ( t h o u g h the U P A saved some prospective R e d A r m y d r a f t e e s f r o m d e a t h at the front) and a considerable p o r t i o n of the Galician p o p u l a t i o n was exiled. T h e chaotic conditions caused by the partisan m o v e m e n t disrupted the social fabric, thereby h e l p i n g to break d o w n institutional and family patterns which elsewhere have been i m p e d i m e n t s to complete Soviet control. O n the o t h e r h a n d , it can be argued that the Soviet regime w o u l d in any case have imposed absolute control u p o n the Galician p o p u l a t i o n , as evidenced by the rigor of the collectivization drive a n d the harsh persecution of the C h u r c h . T h a t being the case, the U P A , p e r h a p s at the cost of somewhat greater h u m a n suffering, p r o v i d e d an i n t a n g i b l e b u t nonetheless extremely i m p o r t a n t psychological s u p p o r t for the oppressed p o p u l a t i o n . It showed that t h e r e was an alternative, however desperate, to submission to totalitarian control. In the e n d the West U k r a i n i a n p o p u l a t i o n saw this a l t e r n a t i v e fail; b u t m a n y must realize that in altered i n t e r n a t i o n a l circumstances the o u t c o m e would have been diff e r e n t . O n e can safely p r e d i c t that the m e m o r y of sustained a r m e d resistance will n o t die o u t a m o n g the West U k r a i n i a n s for m a n y years. As a result they are in a sense a people apart f r o m most of those u n d e r C o m m u n i s t rule. Since this is the case, no outsider can r e n d e r a final j u d g m e n t as to w h e t h e r U P A resistance was w o r t h its t e r r i b l e cost. F r o m the s t a n d p o i n t of this study, the d e v e l o p m e n t of U k r a i n i a n nationalism in the East U k r a i n e d u r i n g the postwar period is considerably m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n even the dramatic aspects of West U k r a i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m . But it is almost impossible to trace the o p e r a t i o n of an organized nationalist m o v e m e n t in the East U k r a i n e a f t e r 1944. If such a m o v e m e n t (or movements) existed at all, it was so carefully concealed f r o m Soviet surveillance as to

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be quite invisible to the outside observer. This does not mean that diffuse nationalist feeling did not exist. T h e manifestations of such feeling can be traced, but they are so numerous and complex that another volume would be required to analyze them. Here, then, one can only present the most important trends in broad outline. 22 T h e most obvious postwar reflections of Ukrainian national sentiment, and those which have received the most attention outside the USSR, have been in the cultural field. Very frequently the Soviet press attacks "bourgeois nationalist" elements in the work of Ukrainian writers. In general, any effort by a Ukrainian literary figure to emphasize the Ukraine without linking it to the Soviet Union (or, for the pre-Revolutionary period, to Russia) is suspect. T h e most extreme instance, perhaps, of this suspicion of "Ukrainian patriotism" divorced from "Russian patriotism" was the bitter attack (in 1951) on a well-known poet, Volodymyr Sosiura, because of his poem "Love the Ukraine." T h e verses, an expression of patriotic enthusiasm during the war, were wholly devoid of any anti-Soviet or anti-Russian element. This, however, was not enough to satisfy Soviet critics, who maintained that by failing to distinguish between the pre-Soviet and the Soviet regime the poem played into the hands of bourgeois nationalists. 23 Another prominent poet, Maksym Ryls'kyi, chairman of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine immediately after the war, was saved, according to Khrushchev, only because - - T h e m o s t c o n c e n t r a t e d effort to a n a l y z e the g e n e r a l d e v e l o p m e n t of n a t i o n a l i s m i n t h e U k r a i n e is B i l i n s k y ' s d i s s e r t a t i o n cited a b o v e . B a s i l D m y t r y s h y n ' s Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918-1933: A Study of Russian Bolshevik Nationality Policy ( N e w Y o r k : B o o k m a n Associates, 1956) d e v o t e s c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n to the p o s t w a r p e r i o d , as does R o b e r t S. S u l l i v a n t ' s Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-1957 ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962). T h e p r e s e n t w r i t e r h a s discussed o n e a s p e c t of the r e l a t i o n of c o n t e m p o r a r y U k r a i n i a n C o m m u n i s m to U k r a i n i a n n a t i o n a l i t y in The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite, a n d h a s d i s c u s s e d the p r o b l e m of R u s s i a n - U k r a i n i a n r e l a t i o n s in a b r o a d e r c o n t e x t in The Politics of Totalitarianism: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present (New York: R a n d o m H o u s e , 1961). T h e s t u d e n t ' s task is very g r e a t l y f a c i l i t a t e d by the m o n t h l y p u b l i c a t i o n (since 1957) of the Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press ( " P r o l o g " R e s e a r c h a n d P u b l i s h i n g A s s o c i a t i o n , Inc., N e w York). M u c h t h e b e s t a n a l y s i s of p o s t w a r Soviet controls of l i t e r a t u r e is E r n e s t H . Swayze, " S o v i e t L i t e r a r y Politics, 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 6 " ( u n p u b l i s h e d d i s s e r t a t i o n , H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1958). S e e especially p p . 139 ff. C f . Istorila Ukraïns'koï Literatury, II, 527.

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he interceded with Stalin on the poet's behalf. 24 Even stalwart Party writers like Aleksandr Korneichuk were criticized. After Stalin's death it is true that Sosiura and other Ukrainian writers were restored to favor (some posthumously), but Soviet critics continued to find some faults of a nationalist nature in their work.-"' These criticisms do not mean that Ukrainian writers were deliberately fostering nationalism. In all likelihood most, if not all, of those attacked were loyal to the Soviet system. But they were also deeply imbued with an emotional loyalty to the Ukraine. Under favorable conditions, this emotional attachment might evolve into a systematic ideology of particularistic patriotism, if not nationalism in the strictest sense of the word. Consequently, the Soviet press harshly attacked the work of consistent exponents of a national Ukrainian standpoint like the great historian Michael Hrushevs'kyi. Even "national Communists," like Nicholas Skrypnyk, though after 1956 they might be mentioned favorably in some circumstances, were sharply criticized for their nationalist tendencies. Aside from these negative steps to curb Ukrainian national feeling, the Soviet regime (especially since Stalin's death) has devoted great effort to fostering the concept of mutual interdependence of the Ukraine and Russia—with Russia in the senior position. T h e greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, is portrayed both as an early proponent of the "working masses" in conflict with the Tsarist upper classes and as a firm friend of Russian culture. In 1954 enormous emphasis was devoted to the celebration of the tricentennial of the "unification" of Russia and the Ukraine in the Treaty of Pereiaslav between the H e t m á n Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and Tsar Alexis. As a symbol of Russian friendship, the Crimea was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. Probably a more basic element in the effort to bring Ukrainian and Russian cultures closer to one another has been the emphasis on the teaching and - 4 "Za t e s n u i u svaiz' l i t e r a t u r y i iskusstva s z h i z n ' i u n a r o d a " (For a Close Conn e c t i o n of L i t e r a t u r e a n d A r t w i t h t h e L i f e of t h e People). Kommunist, No. 12, 1957, p. 26. '-¿Istorila L'kraïns'koi Literatury, I I . 527.

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use of the Russian language in the Ukraine. During Stalin's lifetime this effort was especially marked in the West Ukraine. In a rather mysterious series of maneuvers shortly before the head of the Soviet police system, Lavrenti Beria, was arrested, Party officials in the West Ukrainian oblasts were denounced for overemphasizing the Russian language in educational institutions, and L. G. Mel'nikov was removed as Ukrainian first secretary.-" When Beria was overthrown such criticism ceased, but Mel'nikov was not restored. Since then emphasis on the use of Russian has been less pronounced, b u t probably no less effective. More attention is devoted to the Ukrainian language, and occasionally writers even criticize those who indiscriminately mix Russian locutions in their Ukrainian speech. 27 But mastery of Russian is still proclaimed as a requirement for Ukrainians, and it is implied that Ukrainians do well to send their children to schools in which Russian is the language of instruction. 2 8 T h e results of this process of linguistic Russification are suggested by the 1959 census. Only 76.8 percent of the population of the Ukrainian SSR is listed as Ukrainian, as compared to 16.9 percent Russian. 29 Soviet sources indicate that at least as late as 1933 eighty percent of the population of the East Ukraine was Ukrainian, as compared to only 9.2 percent Russian. 30 T h e decrease in the proportion of Ukrainians is partially explained by severe war losses, deportations, and voluntary emigration. However, when one considers that a very large population (almost wholly Ukrainian after population exchanges) was added by the annexations of 1939-46, it is clear that there has been a very considerable absolute loss of Ukrainians and a huge numerical in-0 See Armstrong, The Politics of Totalitarianism, pp. 245-46. 2T L. I. Batiuk, " T h e C u l t u r e of the Teacher's Language," Radians'ka Shkola, No. 6 (June, 1959), pp. 32-37 (partially translated in Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, III, No. 8 [August. 1959], 12-14). I. Kravtsev, "V. I. Lenin on the Russian and the National Languages of O u r Country," Radians'ka Ukraina, April 13, 1960, p p . $-4 (partially translated in Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, IV, No. 5 [May, 1960], 6-9). -"J USSR, T s e n t r a l ' n o e Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR ν 1959 Godu: Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik (National Economy of the USSR in 1959: A Statistical Annual) (Moscow: Gosstatizdat TsSU SSSR. 1960), p. 17. »» Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 1st ed.. Vol. "SSSR" (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi N a u c h n y i Institut "Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia." 1948), column 62; cf. column 1810.

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crease of Russians. In all likelihood only part of this change can be ascribed to physical movement of population; it seems almost certain that several million persons who were considered Ukrainian before the war, or whose parents were, are now listed as Russian. W h i l e some of this transfer may be the result of official manipulation of statistics, it appears that most of it reflects the adoption of Russian nationality, following the adoption of the Russian language, by persons of Ukrainian heritage. Among the most strictly political developments, one of the most important has been increased emphasis upon the Ukrainian Soviet R e p u b l i c as a legal entity. As mentioned in earlier chapters, integration of all contiguous Ukrainian-inhabited territories in the R e p u b l i c was a major justification for Soviet annexations during the war period. However hypocritical this claim may have been, it did appear even to some nationalist Ukrainians to provide formal satisfaction of the generations-old aim of sobornost'—the unification of all Ukrainian lands in a single state. Consequently, one may speculate that this emphasis on the Ukrainian state heightened the sense of national identity among broader elements of the East Ukrainian population. Similarly, constitutional provisions (1944) for a Ukrainian foreign ministry, followed by admission of the Ukrainian S S R to the U n i t e d Nations in 1945, focused attention upon the separate identity of the Ukraine. Since then speeches by Ukrainian S S R representatives in U N bodies have frequently been featured in the Soviet press. T h e regime's purpose, of course, is to reinforce Soviet propaganda. " U k r a i n i a n " delegates constantly stress their identity of interest with the U S S R . T h e foreign ministry in Kiev remains for the most part a paper organization, staffed by propaganda officials and a few prominent cultural figures. T h e ministry serves only as a home staff for the delegations in international organizations and as a reception agency to impress foreign visitors to Kiev, for the U S S R has rebuffed foreign (non-Communist) efforts to establish direct diplomatic ties with the Ukraine. Nevertheless, even a purely formal stress on the position of the Ukraine as a m e m b e r of the international community may strengthen the feeling of being citizens of a distinct state which some inhabitants of the East U k r a i n e —

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Russian as well as Ukrainian by origin—seemed to cherish during the war. T h e rise in prominence of the Ukrainian Communist Party since Stalin's death is less clearly related to national identification. T h e great numerical expansion of Party membership is probably designed to make Ukrainians feel that they are better treated. Actually, a very large proportion of the membership continues to consist of Russians. There has been only a slight increase in the proportion of Ukrainians among delegates to the Ukrainian Party congresses. This situation doubtless reflects the continued disproportionate representation of Russians in the Ukrainian Party apparatus. Indeed, a high proportion of the members of this apparatus who have achieved prominence under Khrushchev are Russian in origin. Aleksei Kirichenko, the most powerful Communist leader who definitely appeared to be Ukrainian was dismissed in disgrace in 1960. Khrushchev himself has repeatedly indicated that he considers himself Russian rather than Ukrainian. It is probable that the Soviet regime will continue to emphasize the attainments of prominent Ukrainians, and to open doors to the advancement of those who are wholeheartedly devouted to Communism. In practice such devotion by members of the various official bureaucracies means adoption of a very large measure of Russian culture and customs. Consequently, it is hard to see how increased prominence of officials from the Ukraine can lead to increased Ukrainian national feeling. It is more likely to have the opposite effect: the individual beneficiaries of advancement will be Russified while the Ukrainian population in general, somewhat less inclined to feel discriminated against, will be less concerned with preserving national distinctiveness. Certainly Khrushchev's policy in this regard is far wiser than Stalin's obdurate suspicion of Ukrainians. It is a delicate policy to implement, however, for rebuffs to identifiable Ukrainians like Kirichenko may arouse popular Ukrainian suspicion that their nation is being treated as a very much "younger brother" than the Russians, indeed. At the opening of this study, it was suggested that economic circumstances, especially in agriculture, may have formed one significant basis for Ukrainian national identity. In this regard,

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little has changed since the war. T h e first two years following the end of hostilities were marked by extremely severe economic conditions, culminating in the famine of 1946—47. T h e hardships of this period, followed by a tightening of agricultural controls, very probably renewed the peasants' antipathy to collectivization. According to nationalist sources, many thousand East Ukrainian peasants wandered into the West Ukraine (less severely affected by the drought of 1946) in search of food. As a result they came into close contact with West Ukrainians. Nationalist sympathizers used the occasion to argue that the remedy for Soviet-imposed collectivization was Ukrainian independence. Since 1947 extreme material deprivation has not recurred. Unquestionably Ukrainian living standards, along with those of the Soviet Union in general, improved rapidly in the late fifties and early sixties. Aside from the provision of much larger quantities of consumer goods such as clothing and appliances the progress in rebuilding the principal Ukrainian cities has been spectacular. It is possible that some Ukrainians may resent the relatively greater emphasis on industrial construction in the RSFSR, b u t there is no real evidence on this point. But the farms, where most Ukrainians still live, have not made comparable progress. Despite high-pitched campaigns to increase agricultural production, quantitative gains have been small, especially in relation to the increasing population. T h e peasants' continued distaste for the collective farm system is suggested by the high proportion of foodstuffs which is still produced on private garden plots. Communications and amenities in the rural districts continue to be inferior. R u r a l conditions are not significantly different from those in other parts of the USSR. But, as was discussed earlier, the Ukrainian peasant has a tradition of more pronounced individualism than most of the Russian peasants. His loss during collectivization was relatively greater than that of most Russians. T h e memory of the horrors of collectivization is doubtless dimmer than it was during the war, b u t there is some evidence that it has not died out. Hence, one may fairly assume that the persistent lag in rural conditions is considered by some Ukrainian peasants, at least, as a continuing proof of the evils of a Moscow-centered regime. Some Ukrainians indicate an aware-

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ness that, given the relatively favorable natural resources and climate of the Ukraine, the population might be considerably better off if its economy were at least partially divorced from Russia's. Evidence just reviewed concerning the persistence of national feeling in the East Ukraine does not permit any firm conclusions. In a large-scale examination of the attitudes of wartime émigrés (and a small number of postwar defectors) Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer have argued persuasively that time is on the side of the Soviet regime in dealing with Ukrainian nationalism. Insofar as Inkeles and Bauer base their argument upon the general ability of the Soviet regime to undermine traditional loyalties transmitted through such institutions as the family, their contention is convincing. Unquestionably any positive loyalty other than that promoted by the official ideology tends to decline when faced with the regime's monopoly of indoctrination. As Inkeles and Bauer recognize, however, Ukrainian nationalism has been to a considerable extent a channel for expressing grievances. As noted above, these negative attitudes directed at "Moscow's" rule persist.31 On the whole, however, one would be inclined to accept Inkeles and Bauer's forecast of the declining strength of East Ukrainian nationalism but for one factor—the injection of the fervently nationalist West Ukrainians into the social body of the Ukraine. Several points of contact between East and West Ukrainians, or ways in which East Ukrainians are made aware of West Ukrainian nationalism, have already been noted. Many thousands of West Ukrainians have gone to work in the East Ukrainian mines or factories, or have been resettled on farms in thinly settled Kherson oblast. Many East Ukrainians have lived or traveled in the West Ukraine as soldiers, officials, or technicians in the numerous new factories there. Recently even East Ukrainian tourist trips to the Carpathians have been fostered, while West Ukrainians go to the Black Sea resorts. Probably the most important kind of interchange, from the point of view of fostering nationalist sentiments, 31 This is the case with the collective system, as noted in the preceding paragraphs, though it is true, as Inkeles and Bauer point out (The Soviet Citizen [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959], p. 372) that collectivization as an event is non-recurrent.

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is that of students and instructors, whether for short-term study or for enrollment in educational institutions in the other part of the country. It is by no means a one-way flow, for West Ukrainian institutions like L'vov University enroll a major portion of the students in higher education in the Ukraine. For many of these contacts, the regime no doubt tries to select ideologically reliable persons. In any case, the West Ukrainians are watched as closely as possible, and occasional instances which come to light indicate that they must be exceedingly cautious in discussing nationality questions. Considering how fervently nationalist very many West Ukrainians are, one can hardly doubt, however, that given protracted and extensive contact of the type described above many will manage to convey their ideas to the East Ukrainians. Some of the latter may, of course, be alienated by memories of wartime excesses by the Galicians, or even by West Ukrainian differences in custom and pronunciation. If, however, there is some latent tendency to national distinctiveness among the East Ukrainians, it can hardly fail to be stimulated by contact with the West Ukrainians. Given the extreme limitations upon direct observation, no one can really tell whether or not this stimulus will offset the factors which tend to diminish the importance of nationalism in the East Ukraine. In the i n t e r n a r period Ukrainian nationalist political life, while partially conducted in exile, to a considerable extent remained anchored to reality through its close contact with the large Ukrainian populations of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. In the postwar period, impermeability of the Iron Curtain has prevented such invigorating contact. At first some contact with the UPA and expectations of ejection of the Soviet regime maintained the hopes of the émigrés, but these factors did not make émigré politics any more tranquil. 3 2 :i -Very few systematic descriptions of the Ukrainian postwar emigration have appeared. Stanislaw Paprocki (a former director of the Polish Research Institute for Problems of Nationalities who was none too sympathetic to Ukrainian nationalism) wrote "Political Organization of the Ukrainian Exiles after the Second W o r l d W a r " in The Eastern Quarterly, V (January-April, 1952), 41-50. Ivan Rudnyts'kyi ("Kedryn"), a Ukrainian, published "Ukrainian Political Scene Today" in Ukrainian Quarterly, V, No. 4 (Autumn, 1949), 300-309.

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T o a considerable degree this was not the fault of the Ukrainian émigrés themselves. At the close of World War II, an enormous number of Ukrainians was in the Western zones of occupation in Germany and Austria. No one will ever know the precise number, but it probably exceeded one million if one included Ostarbeiter, Soviet prisoners of war, and other Ukrainians involuntarily in Hitler's "Greater Reich" as well as political refugees from Soviet rule and Ukrainians enrolled in German military units. Whether or not the Ukrainians in western Germany and Austria had arrived there voluntarily, a very large proportion was strongly opposed to returning to Soviet control. Even those who did not regard any life under Communist totalitarianism as worse than exile often feared that the Soviet regime would classify them personally as traitors because of their surrender to or contact with the Germans. Consequently, the forced repatriation (along with many other Soviet citizens) of many thousand Ukrainians was one of the most tragic episodes marking the end of World War II. Just how the policy of repatriation was established, and who gave the orders to implement it, remain unclear. There was one loophole: persons who had been resident in the areas annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939 or later were allowed to remain in the Western zones. In other words, all West Ukrainians (or those who could pass themselves off as such) were beyond Soviet power. Unless they could evade the repatriation screening, all East Ukrainians were returned to Soviet control, for Under terms of Yalta agreement US policy is to repatriate to Soviet Union all claimants of Soviet citizenship whose claims are accepted by Soviet authorities. In practice this means . . . that Soviet citizens originating from within 1939 boundaries of Soviet Union are repatriated irrespective of individual wishes. . . . It is contrary to US policy to facilitate the involuntary repatriation of Baltic nationals . . . Poles, Croats, and Slovenes . . . and Slovaks. . . .S3 Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew to the Assistant to the President's Personal Representative at Vatican City, Harold H. Tittman, Jr.. July 11, 1945, in United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 194!, I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), 801. See also the Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 102, Part I I B (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. H1884. Some additional information on (his question is given in George Fischer, The Soviet Opposition to Stalin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952),

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Apart f r o m the personal tragedies arising from repatriation, it had far-reaching effects on the f u t u r e of the nationalist emigration. Since the vast majority of the East Ukrainians were returned to the USSR, West Ukrainians became the numerically dominant element in the Displaced Persons (DP) camps where most émigrés lived for three or four years after the close of the war. 34 Moreover, East Ukrainians in the camps had remained only because they had told the camp authorities that they were from the West Ukraine. Even when the repatriations ceased, the fugitives understandably lacked confidence in the Allied authorities' intentions. As a result, the East Ukrainians felt themselves to be at the mercy of their West Ukrainian compatriots, who could easily report their true status. According to widespread and circumstantial rumors, West Ukrainian nationalists used the threat of such revelations to compel East Ukrainians to adhere to the nationalist cause. In some cases, it is said, nationalists also resorted to violence to control the camp administrations and maintain a monopoly of propaganda. 35 Much the most active nationalist group in this regard, according to many reports, was the OUN-B, or, as Stephen Bandera's followers became known after the war, the OUN-r (revolutionary). T h i s group continued to attract most of the young Galician nationalists, including many who had had considerable experience in fighting in the U P A or in German-organized units like the Alexander Dallin, (ierman Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1957), p. 659; and Jürgen Thorwald, vollen: Bericht des grossen Verrats (Stuttgart: Steingruben H'en sie verderben Verlag, 1952), pp. 570 ff. Interesting details from the Soviet side appear in Pravda Ukrainy, September 9, 1945, p. 2, and in A. Briukhanov, fot kah eto bxlo: O rabote missii po repatriatsii sovetskikh grazhdan, xtospominaniia wetskoi ofitsera (That's How It Was: O n the Work of t h e Mission for Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, the Memoirs of a Soviet Officer) (Moscow: Gosudarstvcnnoc Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1958), pp. 62-63, 83. For a poignant I'krainian nationalist account see V. Rovai', My Ukraintsi! (We Are Ukrainians!) ("Germany," 1948), pp. 70, 88-89. T h e r e were over one h u n d r e d thousand Ukrainians in Germany and Austria two years a f t e r the war ended. Cf. Paprocki, p. 45, and Michael Pap, "Die Probleme der ukrainischen Staatlichkeit und der Emigration," Inaugural Dissertation zur E r l a n g u n g der Doktorwürde vorgelegt der H o h e n Philosophischen Fakultät der Ruperts-Carola Universität zu Heidelberg. 1948. p. 141. '•"•See especially Stephen Baran, " T s P U E i U N D O " ( T h e Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration and the Ukrainian National Democratic Union), Uhra'ins'ki fisti, May 15, 1949, p. 2, and the attack on Baran (for his earlier criticism of the Bandera group) by R o m a n U'riits'kyi in Chas, October 19 1947.

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Galician Division. In vigor, organizational ability, and readiness for desperate action, the Bandera group far outmatched the Mel'nyk followers (known after the war as the OUN-s, solidarist) in the camps. T h e latter, however, had some centers of support in Western Europe, especially in France, where the newspaper Ukratns'ke Slovo (edited by Oleh Shtul', who had once advised Borovets' partisans) was the main OUN-s organ. In 1946, after the initial fear of repatriation had passed and the deepening antagonism between the Western Allies and the USSR had become manifest, the situation in the DP camps changed somewhat. Two forces worked for moderating the internecine struggle among the émigrés. One was the large population of Ukrainian descent outside Europe. While statistics relating to groups like the Ukrainians, who were not usually classed as such when they immigrated into foreign countries, are notoriously inaccurate, it appears that there were one-half to one million persons of Ukrainian descent in the United States at the close of World War II; somewhat more than half as many in Canada; and smaller numbers in Australia and South America. 36 Most of the Ukrainian immigrants in these countries had been West Ukrainian peasants seeking before World War I to escape poverty and conscription in what was then Austria-Hungary. A large number (or their descendants) broke all ties with their ethnic group, seeking only assimilation in their new homes. Many retained vestigial links with Ukrainian associations of a fraternal nature for the sake of social contacts and insurance protection without having a deep interest in nationalist politics. A small proportion, especially in Canada, was attracted by Communist organizations. Led apparently by veterans of the Communist-dominated International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War, these organizations exerted some propaganda influence during World War II. 37 •i'> T h e number (especially in Canada) has been considerably swollen by postwar immigrants. 37 Luka Palamarchuk, "Ukra'intsi ν Kanadi" (Ukrainians in Canada), Ukraïna (a Soviet journal published in Moscow during the German occupation of the Ukraine), April-May, 1943, pp. 49-51. On more recent Soviet attention to Communist-led Ukrainians in Canada see A. M. Kolchuk, " T h e Past and Present of Ukrainians in Canada as Presented by a Canadian Encyclopedia," Ukraïns'kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal, No. 4 (July-August, 1959), pp. 3S-140 (partially translated in Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, III, No. 10 [October, 1959], 24-26); Ivan

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Another, though probably considerably larger, minority consisted of strong nationalists influenced by Dmytro Dontsov, who spent the war years in Canada. T h i s group was closely related to the O U N ; by the end of the war most (including Dontsov, who, however, apparently never became an O U N member) sympathized with the Bandera faction. Early in World War II most Canadian Ukrainian organizations had united in the Committee of Ukrainians in Canada, while the Ukrainian Congress Committee (formed in 1940) played a similar role in the United Sutes. Both organizations favored a Ukraine independent of the USSR, and to many of their leaders the onset of the "cold war" in 1946 seemed to make this a practical political objective. Presenting the case for Ukrainian independence to the British and American publics and officials was greatly hampered by the factional divisions of the emigration. Consequently, the Canadian and American Ukrainians favored émigré unity. T h e émigré political leaders in Western Europe, dependent on the Canadian and American Ukrainians for influence with the Western governments, for funds, and for assistance in relocating part of their followers in the overseas countries, could not completely ignore the pressure to compose their differences. A second force working to moderate émigré divisions consisted of the churches. Because of the weak position of East Ukrainians in the DP camps and the relatively small number of Orthodox among the Ukrainians outside Europe, the nationalist-oriented Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church had slight influence at first. By 1946, however, under the Metropolitan Polykarp, it had substantially completed its reorganization in emigration. T h e Greek Catholic Church (after the war officially re-entitled the Ukrainian Catholic Church) was more influential from the start of the postwar period. While members of its clergy were aligned with various nationalist groups, the Apostolic Visitator for émigrés in Europe, Bishop John Buchko, exerted a moderating influence. Late in 1946 a Co-ordinating Committee, including all groups Vir, " W i d e Field for W o r k of Slavicisls," I.iteraturna Haieta, May 5, 1959, p. 4 ( p a r t i a l l y t r a n s l a t e d in Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, III, No. 6 ( J u n e , 1959], p p . 23-24); " 8 t h C o n v e n t i o n of t h e Society of U n i t e d U k r a i n i a n s of C a n a d a , " Pravda Vkrainy, J a n u a r y 28, 1958, p. 4 ( t r a n s l a t e d in Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, II, No. 5 [ M a r c h , 1958], 22-23).

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in Germany and Austria except the OUN-r and the Het'man party, was formed. In April, 1947, a Preparatory Committee for an overall directing body was constituted. In November, 1947, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO), the principal legal political group in Galicia, closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, was revived. Simultaneously various predominantly East Ukrainian political groups were emerging. While some were not formally organized until somewhat later, it is most convenient to describe briefly the principal ones at this point. T h e U R D P (Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party) was formed in 1947. Its leader was an East Ukrainian writer, J o h n Bahrianyi, b u t at first it also included the Ukrainian Popular Democratic Party (UNDP), the successor of the party formed by O U N - B dissidents in Borovets' partisan group in 1942. After a short time, however, the U N D P became an independent party. Its leaders were Borys Levits'kyi and an East Ukrainian, Ivan Maistrenko. While insisting on individual liberties and democratic control of government, the U N D P (in its newspaper Vpered [Forward] in Munich) advocated sweeping nationalization of the economy, including agriculture. T h e remaining part of the U R D P under Bahrianyi was almost wholly East Ukrainian. It rejected nationalization of agriculture. Its organ was the newspaper Ukrains'ki Visti (in Neu Ulm). T h e Ukrainian Peasant Party emphasized abolition of the kolkhoz still more strongly; its leadership derived largely from the Kharkov cooperative group discussed earlier. A second peasant party under Eugene Arkypenko was less completely East Ukrainian in background. T h e Preparatory Committee, headed by Isaac Mazepa, was transformed (June, 1948) into the Ukrainian National Rada. T h e Rada (Council) was regarded as a provisional parliament for the Ukrainian National Republic formed in 1917. In this way all the major émigré groups (except the Het'man monarchists) based the ultimate claim to legitimacy of their government upon the Ukrainian state formed during the Revolutionary period. A consequence of this position was the recognition of Andrew Livyts'kyi as the head of· state in exile. Six parties were each represented by six delegates in the Rada: both wings of the O U N , the U N D O , the U R D P (which at that time included the UNDP), the Ukrain-

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ian National State U n i o n (the party of the old U X R group), and the (West) Ukrainian Socialist Party. On the surface this arrangement meant unity on the basic issue of national independence, diversity on the means for attaining independence and the programs to be pursued once independence was obtained. F r o m the start, however, difficulties arose in the relation of the O U N - r to the Rada. In the first place, the O U N - r (with some reason, in view of its great strength) demanded more than one sixth of the representatives on the Executive Committee, the permanent organ of the Rada. W h e n this was refused the O U N - r refused to participate in the Executive Committee. At the same time, the O U N - r insisted that the Rada (in which it was still represented) act only as the foreign representation of the U H V R , while the latter functioned as the supreme authority within Ukrainian territory. Apparently the sharpest insistence on this principle came from the more moderate wing of the O U N - r , which claimed to be in closest contact with Shukhevych, rather than from Stephen Bandera himself. Nicholas Lebed' and Father J o h n Hryn'okh regarded themselves as heading the "foreign representation" of the U H V R ; in addition they, and many other O U N - r members, objected to Bandera's continued insistence on the " F ü h r e r p r i n c i p . " Beginning in 1948 these dissident members left the O U N - r , but maintained and developed the U H V R "representation in Western E u r o p e " as a second supra-party body. After breaking off from the U R D P , the U N D P joined the U H V R , thus providing it with an ideological left wing. W h i l e the main body of the O U N - r remained in the Rada, the relations between the two groups cooled steadily. T h e O U N - r cooperated more or less unofficially with the Het'man group, which, as monarchists, opposed the legitimacy of the Rada. 3 8 T h e Rada was weakened by the illness of Mazepa (the chairman of the Executive Committee) and his deputy (and eventual successor) T h e H e t ' m a n P a u l Skoropads'kyi was killed in an air raid in G e r m a n y shortly b e f o r e the war e n d e d . His son D a n i l o assumed the title u n t i l his d e a t h in F e b r u a r y , 1957. T h e t i t u l a r head of t h e m o v e m e n t is now P a u l Skoropads'kyi's d a u g h t e r E l i z a b e t h — a r a t h e r awkward situation for a m o v e m e n t t h e o r e t i c a l l y deriving f r o m t h e Z a p o r o i h i a n Sich, which rigorously e x c l u d e d w o m e n f r o m its headquarters.

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Stephen Vitvits'kyi, while President Andrew Livyts'kyi was in his declining years. Probably the strongest supporters of the Rada came from the U N D O , b u t the latter's president, Vasyl' Mudryi, sympathized with the Bandera group. Even the OUN-s under Mel'nyk withdrew from the Rada for a time. In mid-1950, after failing to secure satisfaction for its demands, the OUN-r finally withdrew from the Rada. Like the other groups which had left the Rada, Bandera's organization was not satisfied to operate solely as an isolated political party. T h e "supra-party" group in this case was "supra-national" as well: the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). According to its followers, the ABN was formed in Volhynia d u r i n g the war by representatives of various nationalities in the UPA. It was reconstituted in emigration at an early date; material bearing its imprint appeared at least by the beginning of 1946. It seems clear that the Bandera group was the dominant force in the ABN from the start, but it assumed a much more important place in the OUN-r's maneuvers after the split with the Rada. In 1951 Iaroslav Stets'ko became chairman of the ABN Central Committee. Other groups and individuals (both from nationalities included in the Soviet Union and from various national groups in East Europe) in the ABN tended to represent extreme right-wing positions or minority ethnic groups like the Slovaks. Ironically, it was just at the time that the first major effort to unify the Ukrainian émigrés was failing that Ukrainian nationalists as a whole confronted what they regarded as a most serious challenge to their position. In 1950 the American Committee for Liberation of the Peoples of Russia began planning the organization of a general center in Munich for émigrés from the USSR. Eventually the Committee (an unofficial organization) was to set u p a radio station for broadcasts to the USSR and a research organization known as the Institute for the Study of the LISSR. Obviously émigré groups cooperating with the Committee would enjoy considerable advantage. But the very name of the organization recalled Vlasov's hated "Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia." Moreover, Ukrainians regarded some emissaries of the Committee as strongly pro-Russian. As a result all major Ukrainian political groups refused to

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cooperate with the American Committee, even after it had changed its name to the "American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism." 39 T w o new Ukrainian organizations did work with the Committee, however. T h e Ukrainian Liberation Movement appears to have been formed in 1951, when the controversy between the American Committee and the principal Ukrainian organizations was at its height. T h e leaders of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement asserted, however, that it was essentially a continuation of the Free Ukrainian Cossack movement formed in 1917. Similarly, the Union of Ukrainian Federalist Democrats (led by Volodymyr Bohatyrchuk, who had been associated with Vlasov) was newly formed, but claimed older roots. Both organizations based their programs on continued association between the Ukraine and Russia after the overthrow of Communism, and both advocated moderate political and social programs. Most of the leaders, many of whom had long records of opposition to extreme Ukrainian nationalism, apparently sincerely welcomed the opportunity to present their views through organized parties with outside support. It is easy to understand why the nationalist Ukrainian leadership regarded the sudden emergence of these parties as maneuvers by the American Committee and its Russian émigré advisers to divide the Ukrainian emigration. Sharp verbal attacks on the groups collaborating with the American Committee were followed by more drastic action. In early 1952 a young Ukrainian who maintained that he had been a UPA member until 1951 was charged with attempted murder as a result of an unsuccessful attack on General Diomid Culai, the head of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement. 4 0 Eventually various changes in the American Committee's policy and personnel in Munich, plus the deletion of the term "Peoples of Russia" from its name, made collaboration with it (and particularly the Institute for the Study of the USSR) acceptable to •',!l L a t e r t h e " f r o m Bolshevism" was d r o p p e d T h e s i t u a t i o n (in 1950-51) was c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e H a r v a r d R e f u g e e I n t e r v i e w Project in M u n i c h ; w h i l e it was o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y w h o l l y d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e A m e r i c a n C o m mittee, certain personal relations between the two groups, and the Harvard g r o u p ' s use of t h e I n s t i t u t e for t h e S t u d y of t h e USSR, a r o u s e d t h e U k r a i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s t s ' suspicions. Xew York Times, F e b r u a r y 29, 1952, p. 4.

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the gToups in the Rada. T h e U H V R and the ABN remained aloof f r o m the American Committee-sponsored organizations, however, a n d even some Rada participants like the OUN-s opposed the collaboration. Eventually the R a d a (after Andrew Livyts'kyi's death headed by Vytvits'kyi, with Andrew's son Nicholas as chairm a n of the Executive Committee) broke off relations with the Institute for the Study of the USSR. In the meantime, the more flexible Soviet policy after Stalin's death posed a n o t h e r challenge to the Ukrainian emigration. T h e C o m m i t t e e for R e t u r n to the Motherland, formed in East Berlin in March, 1955, scored several m i n o r successes by inducing Ukrainian émigrés to r e t u r n to the USSR. T h e r e t u r n of V. P. Vasliakyi, a m e m b e r of the executive committee of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement, provided some ironic satisfaction for nationalists; b u t o t h e r "redefections," such as that (in 1954) of Joseph Krutyi, a p r o m i n e n t m e m b e r of the Ukrainian Peasant Party, were dismaying.* 1 T h e y were, however, only symptomatic of a disillusionment which was evident a m o n g many of the nationalist émigrés. T h e d e a t h of Stalin in March, 1953, following so closely on the victory of the Republicans in the United States (who had spoken of " l i b e r a t i n g " East Europe) had seemed to offer renewed possibility for far-reaching changes which might lead to U k r a i n i a n independence. T h e stabilization of the Soviet political situation, combined with comparatively cordial Soviet-American relations d u r i n g 1955 a n d 1957-59, ended any immediate prospect of such changes. Most émigré groups continued to strive to convince opinion in the Western countries that an independent U k r a i n e was desirable. Probably the most vigorous group was the O U N - r and its related organizations, particularly the Union of U k r a i n i a n Youth (SUM). 4 2 R e l u c t a n t to alienate the activist youth, the older generation d o m i n a n t in the m a j o r Ukrainian organizations in the U n i t e d States and Canada tended to go along with the O U N - r , · O TT 00 " -O \o m (N cs CS CS

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABBREVIATIONS THE CODE LETTERS preceding the documents in the various collections listed in this bibliography have the following significance: CXL

EC NO NOKW Occ E

PS

USSR Exhibit

( T h e numerical designation of the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine documentary series on Eastern Europe) Economic (referring to Nuremberg collection on cases arising in connection with economic matters) Nuremberg, Organizations (referring to documents collected for proceedings against Nazi organizations) Nuremberg, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (referring to documents collected for trial of German army officers) Occupation, East (referring to documents in the Yiddish Scientific Institute pertaining to the German occupation in Eastern Europe) Paris—Storey (referring to documents -collected at Paris for the Nuremberg T r i a l s by Colonel Robert G. Storey, an American officer) (Referring to documents presented by the Soviet prosecution staff at Nuremberg)

NOTE ON SOURCES SOURCES for the study of Ukrainian nationalism during the Second World W a r are extremely varied. Published personal narratives are important. Ukrainian memoirs, like most others, however, have serious defects as sources for the history of political events. On the nationalist side, memoirs are usually highly colored by the views or prejudices of the authors, since the tempestuous Ukrainian nationalist politics have rarely been conducive to impartial reflection. Moreover, the flight of the nationalists from Eastern Europe as the Soviet armies advanced resulted in the loss of many of the documents which might have enhanced the reliability of their memoirs. I n many cases the personal circumstances of the writers have made it impossible for them to check their narratives against documents available since the war. Soviet memoirs of wartime events, on the other hand, suffer from the distortions resulting from adherence to the official line. Fortunately, it is in many cases possible to check postwar narratives against contemporary records. In this respect documents from German archives made available to the public in connection with the Nuremberg trials are extremely valuable. Some of these documents, composed by Ukrainian nationalist leaders themselves, provide direct evidence of nationalist activity. Most of the documents concerning aspects of Ukrainian nationalism are reports by German political, military or police officials; they are of course subject to error due to misinformation or negligence of the authors. Occasionally the desire of an official of the Nazi dictatorship to put himself in a better light before his superiors, or to advance a policy he preferred, led to intentional distortion. Since the reports were for official use only, and as a rule were written by officials who were personally not deeply involved in Ukrainian affairs, the element of intentional coloring is comparatively minor, however. A second very important body of contemporary sources consists of published material. Some publications were issued clandestinely; while the authors may have had numerous reasons for distortion, they were at least not subject to German censorship. By far the larger amount of available contemporary published material, however, was published under German censorship. Consequently, numerous facts had to be omitted and many views colored to make them acceptable to the Germans. German censorship was not iron-clad, however; the numerous ways in which publications in territories occupied by the Germans

330

Bibliography

could express real views and present facts have been touched upon throughout this study. Because of censorship contemporary published sources present comparatively little material of direct political relevance. They do, however, present valuable information on the closely related topics of religious, cultural, and economic activity. Moreover, they describe the overt activities of individuals in specific places at specific times; it is often possible to check such facts in postwar descriptions of covert political activities against the framework obtained from contemporary sources. T h e extent to which facts cited by the postwar informant conform to the contemporary sources permits one to make a partial evaluation of the reliability of the informant. Contemporary Soviet sources on nationalist activities are much sparser, but for some events they provide valuable information which shifts in Soviet policy have caused to be deleted from postwar publications. Important as are the contemporary sources, a rounded picture of the wartime nationalist movements could not have been obtained without the aid of unpublished accounts of the participants. Some of these are in the form of manuscripts made available to the author of this study, but most were obtained through oral interviews. For reasons which should be clear to the reader of this study, it has been necessary to preserve the anonymity of the informants. T h e code system adopted makes it possible for the author to determine the source of each statement, however, and in many cases it will be possible for him to suggest persons whom an inquirer might approach for further information on a given topic. T h e interviews were conducted during 1952-53 in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Before beginning the interviews, the author made a thorough examination of the greater part of the German documents and the published materials, contemporary and memoir. He was also fortunate enough to secure advice and information from a number of scholars who had worked on related studies of the Ukraine and of wartime Eastern Europe. These preliminary investigations enabled him to form an over-all picture of the topic. For many sections of the study, he could establish a reliable account lacking only a limited number of details. This approach was essential for the success of the interviews. Prospective informants were more inclined to furnish information when they learned that the author had acquired the background knowledge of subjects which were of intense personal interest to them. T h e preliminary investigation also enabled the author to determine some of the key questions, or at least to know which areas of his topic needed probing. An equally useful result of this investigation was that the knowledge acquired enabled the author to assess the validity of many statements while the informant was still available, so that dubious statements could be questioned or further information elicited.

Note on Sources

331

Before the stage of interviewing was reached, however, prospective informants had to be selected and located. If a number of interviewers with ample time had been engaged in the study, it might have been desirable to interview all or a considerable portion of émigrés from the East Ukraine and large numbers from the West Ukraine. Such an approach might have yielded valuable information of a statistical nature. Since the émigrés are in many respects an atypical selection from the entire population, and since it is difficult if not impossible to evaluate present-day responses of a large number of interviewees on such matters as wartime attitudes, such an approach would at best have been a most delicate one. It would have been quite impossible for an individual investigator with a limited number of months at his disposal. Under the circumstances, the only practical approach was to concentrate on interviewing persons who had had key roles in the events studied. As described above, the preliminary investigation enabled the author to determine the principal areas on which information was needed. It also enabled him in many cases to determine who had held a position which enabled him to acquire such information. T h e postwar Ukrainian press frequently indicated whether such persons were still alive and gave some hint concerning their present whereabouts. W i t h this information, exact addresses could usually be obtained. Worth-while informants, whose value the author had not previously recognized, were provided directly by interested organizations and individuals. It is felt, however, that it would have been most unwise to have relied exclusively or predominantly upon such second-hand channels for obtaining a list of informants. Few persons, even among active nationalists, were familiar with all or most of the aspects of the study and were rarely acquainted with a very large proportion of the possible informants. Reliance on interested organizations and individuals for contacts would also, at least to some degree, have resulted in a slanting of the approach, since such channels consciously or unconsciously select informants sympathetic to them. In addition to a number of Germans, Russians who had lived in the Ukraine and Ukrainians who desired continued union of the Ukraine and Russia (both categories are referred to in subsequent paragraphs as "Russophiles") were interviewed. Both Germans and Russophiles were chosen and located in a manner similar to that employed in the case of Ukrainian nationalists, although of course German and Russian individuals and organizations, rather than Ukrainian nationalist ones, usually served as intermediaries. Because informants had been selected on the basis of their probable ability to provide information on specific aspects of the study, no generalized questionnaire was employed. Where possible a "non-directive" approach, designed to induce the interviewee to volunteer information

332

Bibliography

he thought important, was used during the first stage of the interview. When specific information desired was not furnished spontaneously, however, detailed questions were put, and if necessary cross-examination employed. If the initial discussion had convinced the informant that the author was engaged in an impartial effort to establish the truth, and that his investigation made it necessary for him to be detailed and persistent in his inquiries, such "detective" methods were not usually resented, although of course some informants avoided revealing desired information. T h e informants were frequently busy persons who could not spare an indefinite amount of time. This was especially the case since all rendered their assistance without financial compensation. In some cases an informant could give only a half-hour to answer a few especially important questions, in others several meetings totaling many hours could be arranged. It would be impossible to give the total number of informants, since frequently at a gathering or in an organizational office a very large number of persons were encountered who furnished a useful hint or an impression of the wartime scene. In the case of seventy-three informants, however, it was felt worth while to conduct more or less systematic interviews and to prepare summary records of the information furnished, classified under the names of the interviewees. A large majority of these records are cited by code number in the footnotes of this study; since one informant frequently furnished more than one interview, the total number of code numbers exceeds seventy-three. Of the seventy-three informants referred to above, fourteen were former German officials who had been involved in Ukrainian affairs during the war. Of these eleven had been active in the East Ukraine (and in some cases in the West Ukraine as well, and frequently in Berlin in connection with policy toward the Ukraine); three had significant experience in the West Ukraine only. Nine Russophiles were interviewed. T w o were pre-1939 émigrés who did not visit the East Ukraine during the war but were active in politics concerning it. T h e other seven were residents of the Soviet East Ukraine until 1941 or later. Twenty-nine of the interviewees were West Ukrainian nationalists. Of these nineteen were not active in the East Ukraine; their information concerned the background of political activity in the West Ukraine and among the emigration. T h e remaining ten had extensive experience in the East Ukraine during the war. Seven of the interviewees were East Ukrainian nationalists who had emigrated before 1939. Of these only one was active in the East Ukraine during the war, but the others had important information on nationalist political developments in the emigration or in the West Ukraine, and several were able, through extensive contacts, to gather much information on the wartime East Ukraine. Finally, there were fourteen East

Note on Sources

333

Ukrainian interviewees who had remained in the East Ukraine until 1941 or later. Information obtained from interviews and unpublished manuscripts constitutes an essential, although not a predominant part of the material used in this study. Among the informants were a considerable proportion of the leading personalities mentioned in the text. Moreover, in a very large number of cases information could be obtained from all or several of the conflicting groups concerning events in which they participated. A special effort was made to obtain all sides of a controversial issue, when adequate published sources were not available for one or more groups of participants, and as a rule this effort was successful. It is regrettable that the names of the informants cannot be given in connection with specific items of information which they provided. In many cases, even indication of the point of view represented by the anonymous informant would have provided a clue to his identity because the number of possible witnesses is frequently very limited. While the use of oral informants for the study of recent political situations involves the disadvantage of inability to cite sources, there are numerous compensating advantages. Subjects, like the present one, which involve widespread clandestine activities, can scarcely be analyzed unless the participants themselves furnish information. Moreover, even when a published memoir exists, it cannot be called to account for discrepancies or asked for additional information as can the living witness. Beyond these advantages, there is the intangible but very real asset of contact with the actors of the drama studied, a contact which gives the author a "feel" for the situation and insights into the psychology of his subjects which would be difficult to achieve in any other fashion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTARY

SOURCES

the documentary material listed below has been published in International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals (42 vols.; Nuremberg, 1947-49), and Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (14 vols.; Nuremberg, 1946-49); and in United States, Office of United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (8 vols, and supplementary volumes; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946-48). A large majority of the documents concerning Ukrainian affairs were not printed in these series, however. T h e sections dealing with Ukrainian nationalism were frequently omitted even from the documents printed, because these passages were not considered relevant to the judicial proceedings. Consequently, the documents listed below, and cited in the body of this study, are originals, or photostat or mimeographed copies, with the exception of a few cases in which only the English translation was available in mimeographed form.

S O M E OF

Declaration of Ukrainian National Committee, March 17, 1945. Printed text in possession of General Paul Shandruk. Documents and depositions collected for the trial of the major Axis war criminals by the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg. PS, EC, and USSR Exhibit series, of which photostats are available in the National Archives of the United States, Washington. Documents and depositions collected for the trials of war criminals conducted by the United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, of which photostats, mimeographed reproductions, translations, or summaries (Staff Evidence Analyses) are available in various major libraries. T h e documents and depositions in this category used for this study are in the NO or NOKW series. Collections in the Library of Congress, Washington; the Columbia University Libraries, New York; and the Mid-West Interlibrary Center, Chicago, have been utilized. Documents in the archives of the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Paris, in the C X L series. Documents in the archives of the Yiddish Scientific Institute, New York, in the Occ E series.

Bibliography

335

Documents in the Himmler File, Manuscript Room, Library of Congress, Washington, and one document ( H H 263) from the section of the Himmler collection at the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace, Palo Alto, California. Letter from Bauer to Schenck and Bizantz (all officials in the Generalgouvernement), dated August 18, 1943. In the possession of Liubomyr Makarushka. Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptits'kyi, July, 1941. Single printed sheet in the possession of Volodymyr Stakhiv. Proclamation of leading citizens of Kiev recognizing Ukrainian state proclaimed in L'vov, J u n e 30, 1941, dated July 6, 1941. Typescript in the possession of Volodymyr Stakhiv. Proclamation of the Ukrainian state in L'vov, June 30, 1941. Typewritten copy in the possession of Volodymyr Stakhiv. U H V R , document among uncatalogued captured materials in the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace, Palo Alto, California. CONTEMPORARY NEWSPAPER OR PERIODICAL FILES

Deutsche Bug-Zeitung. Amtsblatt des Generalkommissars für den Generalbezirk Nikolajew. Nikolaev, semiweekly. March, 1942— November, 1943, in Library of Congress. Der Deutsche in Transnistrien. Odessa, weekly. July, 1942-January, 1944, in Library of Congress. Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung. Lutsk, daily. January, 1942-January, 1944, in Library of Congress. Klich (The Call). Berlin, weekly. August-December, 1942, in Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. Komunist (The Communist). Kiev, daily.* October, 1939-November, 1941 (numerous gaps), in New York Public Library and Library of Congress. Krakauer Zeitung. Cracow, daily. November, 1939-February, 1945, in Library of Congress. Krakivs'ki Visti (Cracow News). Cracow, daily. January-August, 1942, in Library of Congress; January, 1940-0ctober, 1943, and July, 1944-April, 1945, in Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. L'vivs'ki Fisti (L'vov News). L'vov, daily. January, 1942-March, 1944, and May-June, 1944, in Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. Nastup (Attack). Prague, weekly. January, 1940-December, 1943, in Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. • A f t e r t h e fall .of Kiev to t h e G e r m a n s in September 1941, Komunist was p u b lished f o r a time in Saratov, t h e n in Moscow (see K. Litvin, "Slavnyi s h l i a k h " [Glorious P a t h ] , Radians'ka Ukrdina, J u l y 15, 1945, p. 3). Sovetskaia Ukraina (see below) also c o n t i n u e d as a Soviet p u b l i c a t i o n , b u t I have n o t been able to d e t e r m i n e its place of p u b l i c a t i o n .

336

Bibliography

Natsionalist ( T h e Nationalist). Prague, m o n t h l y s u p p l e m e n t to Nastup. January, 1940-December, 1943, in Institut f ü r Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. Nova Doba ( T h e New Era). Berlin, weekly. February 15, 1942, Christmas, 1943, a n d M a r c h - D e c e m b e r , 1943, in I n s t i t u t f ü r Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo ( T h e New U k r a i n i a n W o r d ) . Kiev, daily. August 31, September 3, 11, 14-21, 1943, in Library of Congress. Pravda Ukrainy ( T r u t h of the Ukraine). Kiev, daily. August, 1944December, 1946 (numerous gaps), in Library of Congress. Radians'ka Ukraina ( T h e Soviet Ukraine). Kiev, daily. August, 1944December, 1946 ( n u m e r o u s gaps), in Library of Congress. Sovetskaia Ukraina ( T h e Soviet Ukraine), liiev, daily. A u g u s t November, 1941 ( n u m e r o u s gaps), in New York P u b l i c Library. Ukrains'ka Diisnist' ( U k r a i n i a n Reality). ' P r a g u e , semimonthly. November, 1940-March, 1944, a n d J u n e , 1944-April, 1945, in Institut f ü r Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. Ukra'ins'kyi Visnyk ( T h e U k r a i n i a n Messenger). Berlin, irregular (monthly, semimonthly, a n d weekly at different times). J a n u a r y , 1940-April, 1945, in I n s t i t u t f ü r Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. Volyri (Volhynia). R o v n o , semiweekly. J a n u a r y 1, 1943-November 18, 1943, in Library of Congress. Za Ukraïnu (For the Ukraine). Berlin, semiweekly. J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y , 1945, in Institut f ü r Weltwirtschaft, Kiel.

OTHER SOURCES

Works cited in the footnotes which deal only incidentally with U k r a i n i a n nationalism have not been listed below, unless they contain documents or firsthand accounts of value to this study. Abshagen, Karl. Canaris, Patriot u n d W e l t b ü r g e r . Stuttgart: U n i o n Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1949. Andreev, V. Narodnaia voina: Zapiski partizana ( T h e People's W a r : Sketches of a Partisan). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952. Andrievs'kyi, Dmytro. "Soviets and the Emigration," Ukrainian Quarterly, X I (Spring, 1955), 127-33. Andriievs'kyi, A. M. Katekhyzys abo nastavlennia ν derzhavnii nautsi dlia ukrains'koho Het'mantsia-Derzhavnyka (A Catechism or Position on State Science for the U k r a i n i a n A d h e r e n t of the H e t ' m a n State). Berlin, August 15, 1940. Andrusiak, Mykola. " D e r westukrainische Stamm der L e m k i n , " SüdostForschungen, VI (1941), 536-75.

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Anuchin, V. A. Geografiia Sovetskogo Zakarpat'ia (Geography of Soviet Transcarpathia). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Geograficheskoi Literatury, 1956. Armstrong, John A. T h e Politics of Totalitarianism: T h e Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present. New York: R a n d o m House, 1961. T h e Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. Bandera, Stepan (Stephen). "V desiatu richnytsiu stvorennia Revoliutsiinoho Provodu O U N " (On the T e n t h Anniversary of the Creation of the Revolutionary Directorate of the OUN), Surma (The Trumpet), February-March, 1950, pp. 1-8. Baran, Stepan (Stephen). Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi). Munich: Vernyhora, Ukrai'ns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947. " T s P U E i U N D O (The Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration and the Ukrainian National Democratic Union), Ukrains'ki Visti, May 15, 1949, p. 2. Belousov, S. M„ and O. P. Ohloblyn. Zakhidna Ukraïna (The West Ukraine). Kiev: Akademiia Nauk URSR, Instytut Istoriï Ukraïny, 1940. Berezhans'ki Visti (Berezhany News). Berezhany, September 14, 1941. In the possession of Volodymyr Stakhiv. Bilinsky, Yaroslav. "Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet Nationality Policy after World W a r II." Unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1959. Biuleten' (Bulletin). No. 4 (April, 1942), No. 9-10 (late 1942), and No. 11 (1943). Clandestine publication in the possession of Nicholas Lebed' and Lev Shan'kovs'kyi. Boiars'kyi, P. K. Ukraïns'ka vnutrishnia polityka Organizatsii Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv (The Internal Ukrainian Policy of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). Geneva, 1947. Boiko, Iurii (George). Ievhen Konovalets' i oseredno-skhidni zemli (Eugene Konovalets' and the Central-Eastern Lands). 1947. U siaivi nashoho Kyeva: "Ukraïns'ke Slovo" u Kyevi ν 1941 rotsi (In the Radiance of our Kiev: Ukrains'ke Slovo in Kiev in 1941). Munich: Tsitsero, 1955. Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (Great Soviet Encyclopedia). 1st ed. Vol. "SSSR". Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi Nauchnyi Institut "Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia," 1948. Borovets', Taras. "Dva khresty" (Two Crosses), Ukrains'ki Visti (Ukrainian News), Christmas issue, January 7, 1949. Kredo revoliutsiï: Korotkyi narys istoriï, ideologichno-moral'ni osnovy ta politychna platforma uk. nar. rev. armii (The Creed of the Revolution: A Short Sketch of the History, Ideological-Moral

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Dniprova, L. Article in Ukraïns'ke Slovo ( T h e U k r a i n i a n W o r d ) (Paris), J u n e 11 and J u n e 18, 1950, p. 3. Dolenko, Volodymyr ("V. Makedonivs'kyi"). "Kudy my idemo?" (Where Are W e Going?), Ukrains'ka Zemlia ( T h e Ukrainian Land), No. 2-3, 1953. Doroshenko, Dmytro. History of the Ukraine. Translated by H a n n a Keller. Edmonton, Alberta: T h e Institute Press, Ltd., 1939. Drozdzynski, Aleksander, and J a n Zaborowski. Oberländer: A Study in German East Policies. Poznañ: Wydawnictwo Zachodnie, 1960. Dub, P. "V rokovyny demonstratsiï ν Bazari (spomyn)" (On the Anniversary of the Demonstration in Bazar [In Memoriam]), Za Samostiinist' (For Independence), November, 1946, pp. 8-11. Dushnyck, Walter. Martyrdom in Ukraine: Russia Denies Religious Freedom. New York: T h e America Press, n.d. Dvinov, B. Vlasovskoe dvizhenie ν svete dokumentov ( T h e Vlasov Movement in the Light of Documents). New York, 1950. Ellison, Herbert J. " T h e Decision to Collectivize Agriculture," American Slavic and East European Review, X X (April, 1961), 189— 202. Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva (Encyclopedia of T h i n g s Ukrainian). Edited by Zenon Kuzelia and Volodymyr Kubiiovych. M u n i c h : Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949. Evseev, I. F. Narodnye komitety zakarpatskoi Ukrainy: Organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti (1944-1945) ( T h e People's Committees of Transcarpathian Ukraine: Organs of State Power [1944-1945]). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Iuridicheskoi Literatury, 1955. Fedorov, Oleksii. Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet ( T h e U n d e r g r o u n d Oblast Committee in Action). Literary editor, Evg. Bosniatskii. Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950. Fischer, George. T h e Soviet Opposition to Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. "Vlasov and Hitler," Journal of Modern History, X X I I I (March, 1951), 58-71. Forostivs'kyi, Leontii. Kyïv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy (Kiev u n d e r Enemy Occupations). Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952. Germany, Auswärtiges Amt. Documents on G e r m a n Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Edited by Raymond J. Sontag et al. Series D, Vol. IV. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953. Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office. Edited by R a y m o n d J . Sontag and James Stuart Beddie. Washington: Department of State, 1948. Germany, Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Verordnungsblatt des Reichskommissars f ü r die Ukraine (1942-1943). Gniedash, Τ . Ζ partyzanamy Fedorova (With Fedorov's Partisans).

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INDEX Abramovych (Nikanor), see Nikanor, Bishop Abwehr, contacts with nationalists, 24, 35, 74-75; see also Canaris, Admiral Action Française, 20 Administrators as nationalists, 244-46 Agrarian question, attitudes of U R D P and U N D P on nationalization, 315; nationalism and, 17, 125, 128, 156, 16364, 249-50, 283; postwar collectivization, 299; in postwar Ukrainian SSR, 308-9 Agricultural policy of Germany, 121-22 "Akt" (OUN-B proclamation in L'vov, J u n e 30, 1941), 79-80, 79n, 82, 83, 85, 126 Alexander, Archbishop, 191, 195, 198, 201, 203 Alexius, Archbishop, 191, 193, 194, 195, 198, 200, 202, 203, 205-6, 258 All-Ukrainian Aid Committee (Vseukraïns'kyi Komitet Dopomohy), 219-20 All-Ukrainian Congress of Ukrainian Independentists, 128 All-Ukrainian Cooperative Bank, 221 All-Ukrainian Cooperative Society (Vseukraïns'ka Kooperatyvna Spilka), 220 American Committee for Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (later American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism and American Committee for Liberation), 317-19 Anatole, Archbishop, 193 Andriievs'kyi, Dmytro, 178; background of, 34-35 Anthony (Abashidze), Archbishop, 193 Anthony (Martsenko), Archbishop, 191 Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations (ABN), 317, 319 Arkypenko, Eugene, 181n-82n, 254, 315 Arlt, Fritz, 49, 180-81 Austro-Hungarian Empire, influence of, on Ukrainian nationalism, 8 - 9 Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland, 191 Autocephalous O r t h o d o x Church in Ukraine, see U A P T s

Autonomous Orthodox Ukraine, see Ukrainian Orthodox Church

Church in Autonomous

Bahazii, Volodymyr, 102, 115-16, 215 Bahrianyi, John, 315 Bandera, Stephen, 55, 56, 58, 62, 83, 178, 179n, 180, 181, 316, 320 Bandera faction, see O U N - B Baran, Stephen, 64, 65 Baranivs'kyi, Anthony, 107, 144 Baranovs'kyi, Iaroslav, 39, 44, 56, 179n; background of, 34 Basil, Metropolitan, see Lypyns'kyi, Viacheslav Bauer, Raymond, 309 Bazar, O U N - M activity in, 107, 255 Benjamin, Archbishop, 192«, 195 Berger, Gottlob (SS O b e r g r u p p e n f ü h r e r ) , 173n-74n Beria, Lavrenti, 305 Bessarabia: nationalism in, 70; Soviet Union in, 70 Beyer, Hans Joachim, 89 Bidar, R o m a n , 102, 103 Bohatyrchuk, Theodore, I81n-82n, 182, 203, 219 Bohatyrchuk, Volodymyr, 318 Boiko, George, 259 Bormann, Martin, 179n Borovets', Taras, 98, 143, 144, 145-46, 150, 154, 178, 179n, 185, 255 Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists, 74 Buchko, Bishop J o h n , 60, 314 Bukovina: nationalism in, 279; O U N in, 70; Soviet Union in, 70-71, 175 Bul'ba, Taras, see Borovets', Taras " B u l ' b a " bands, 136-37 (maps), 150-51; Germany and, 178 Buniachenko, General, 183 Canaris, Admiral, 32, 42, 43 C a r p a t h i a n Sich, 24-25, 33 Carpatho-Ukraine: autonomy of, 24-25; Communist Party in, 295-96; Hungary

350

Index

Carpatho-Ukraine ( C o n t i n u e d ) and, 24-25; Kovpak's b a n d in, 137 (map); nationalism in, 279, 294-95; O U N M and, 295; Soviet Union in, 175, 177; U N R and, 33; UPA and, 294 Catholic Church, Germany and, 199-200 Chas, 71 Chekaniuk, A. T., 65 Chelm district: denationalization of, 4647; Greek Catholic Church in, 46-47; Orthodox Church in, 46-47 Chemeryns'kyi, Iaroslav, 93, 111, 179n Chernigov oblast: destruction of O U N - M g r o u p in, 107; Kovpak's partisan band in, 146; partisan activity in, 132, 13337 (maps), 294; population of, 324-25 Chernovtsy, 71, 294 Chuchkevych, Ostap, 82, 89 Church: in Kharkov, 262-63; in Mariupol', 274; nationalism and, 188-210, 284-85; Soviet Union and, 175; SS Division Galicia and, 173-74; in villages, 251-52; see also u n d e r specific church, e.g., O r t h o d o x Church Cities: intelligentsia of, 239; middle class of, 237-39; populations of, 324-25; starvation in, 121-22; see also under specific names, e.g., Kharkov Coastal area: nationalism in, 270-72; O U N Β in, 271; UAC in, 271-72; U A P T s in, 272 Collective farm system: Germany and, 119-21; see also Agrarian question; Agricultural policy Collectivization, see Agrarian question Committee for R e t u r n to the Motherland, 319 Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, see K O N R Committee of Ukrainians in Canada, 314 Communism: nationalism and, 4, 10-11; O U N and, 280-81; students and, 21; in West Ukraine, 19 Communist Party: in Carpatho-Ukraine, 295-96; partisan activity in Ukraine and, 131-164; partisan direction by, 139-41; tactics of, and O U N , 280-82; Ukrainian cultural life and, 14-16; Ukrainian nationalism and, 15-18; in Ukrainian SSR, 307; u n d e r g r o u n d agents, 102, 218, 253; UPA and, 14546 Cooperatives: nationalists in, 221; u n d e r Soviet Union, 220 "Cossack h u n d r e d s , " 167

Cracow News, 52 Crimea, nationalism in, 275-76 Culture: Communist Party and, 15-16; under Germany, 224—28; nationalists and, 5, 224-28; postwar organizations, 318, 320; see also Education; Press; Students; Writers Damaskin, Bishop, 193, 199, 209», 258 Danilevskii, N. T., 9 D'Annunzio, Gabriele, 22 Deniken, A. I., General, 12 Diatchenko, Colonel, U N R leader, 87 Dilo, 65 Dimitrius, Bishop, 205 Dionysius, Metropolitan, 191, 194, 198 Directory, 12 Displaced persons (DPs), Ukrainians as, 312 Djilas, Milovan, 293n Dnieprodzerhinsk, 270 Dniepropetrovsk: nationalism in, 265-66, 267-69; OUN-B in, 268-69; population of, 324-25; R u s s o p h i l e s in, 205, 218, 220, 235, 268; UAC in, 205; UAPTs in, 205 Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta, 214n, 234 Dolenko, Volodymyr, 243, 261 Donbas: nationalism in, 272-75; O U N in, 273-74; Russians in, 273; UPA in, 299 Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv, Dontsov, Dmytro, 21-22, 314 Doroshenko, Dmytro, 27 Drohobych oil fields, 152« 74 Dubrovs'kyi, V. V., 227, 243, 261 D U N (Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists)—Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv, 74 Divin ( T h e Bell), 230, 235n East Ukraine, 4; geographical variations of nationalism in, 255-57; German occupation and nationalism in, 101-29; German policy failure in, 118-25; language of, 6; nationalism in, 14-18, 3023; O U N in, 78; O U N - B in, 84-86, 9798, 125-27; O U N - M in, 86-87, 90-96, 127-29; partisan activities in, 294; population in census of 1959, 305; postwar economic conditions in, 308; postwar nationalism in, 309-10; postwar political groups, 315-19; postwar relationship with West Ukraine, 308-10;

Index regions of, 260 (map); repatriation after W o r l d W a r II, 312; and Soviet state, 306; U R D P and, 315 Education: émigré activities, 309-10, 320; u n d e r Germany, 222-24; nationalists and, 222, 223-28; see also Students Educators as nationalists, 239—41 Émigrés, nationalist activities of, 310-20 Emmanuel, Iiishop, 207, 259 Fascism, O U N and, 280 Federov, Oleksii, 132 Fichte, J o h a n n , 22 Filipov (Kharkov writer), 110 Finland, U N R and, 33 First Ukrainian Division, 185 Forostivs'kyi, Leontii, 183n, 205, 215 France, U N R and, 31 Frank, Hans, 4 8 ^ 9 , 51 Franko, John, 7 Free Cossacks, 150, 258 Front of Ukrainian Revolutionists (Front Ukraïns'kykh Revolutsionistiv), 149-50 Galicia: flight of Jews from, 77; Generalgouvernement and, 62, 105, 105n-6n; Greek Catholic Church in, 9, 36-37, 67, 175, 192, 297-98, 302; influence of, on Ukrainian nationalism, 22; integral nationalism in, 22; Kovpak's band in, 137 (map), 151-53; nationalism in, 279; O U N in, 40-41, 69; O U N Β in, 62; O U N - B partisan activity in, 148; O U N - M in, 89-90; partisan activity in, 296-97; partisan support in, 142; Poland and, 8, 14; R u m a n i a and, 105; Soviet Union and, 46, 64-69, 174-76; UPA postwar activities in, 302; W e h r m a c h t in, 292 Galician Division, see SS Division Galicia Gavrusevych, J o h n , 53, 74, 83, 179n Genadius, Bishop, 205 Generalgouvernement Polen: anti-Polish feeling of Ukrainians in, 48-49; composition of, 46-47; Galicia in, 62, 105, 105n-6n; German military training and, 73-74; nationalism in, 46-49; O r t h o d o x C h u r c h in, 208-9; O U N - B and, 76; O U N conflict and, 53-59; Poles in, 49, 53; Ukrainian Central Committee formation in, 50-51; Ukrainian community organizations in, 49-50; Ukrainian culture and, 51-53 Geographical variations in nationalism, 255-57

351

George (Korenistov), Bishop, 201n German army, see W e h r m a c h t German Intelligence Service, see Abwehr German police, see SP German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship T r e a t y (1939), 66 Germany: agricultural policy of, 121-22; " B u l ' b a " forces and, 178; CarpathoUkraine and, 24; Catholic Church and, 199; collective farm system and, 119— 21; culture under, 224-28; education under, 222-24; Het'manites and, 2829, 104; K O N R and, 182-87; labor policy of, 179«, 212-13; limitations on power of, 212-13; national committee formation by, 181; nationalism and, 2627, 47-48, 177-87, 286-87; nationalism and occupation of East Ukraine by, 101-29; nationalism in, and Ukrainian nationalism, 8; nationalism in East Ukraine and policy of, 125-29; nationalists and, 186-87; nationalists in Ukrainian municipal administrations established by, 213-36; Orthodox Church and, 192-93, 199-203, 208-9; Ostarbeiter program of, 122-25, 148, 183, 186, 209n, 234, 249; O U N and, 4244, 286; OUN-B and, 59-60, 73-75, 103-4, 178; O U N - B in East Ukraine and, 97-98; O U N - B in Galicia and, 81-84; O U N - B repression by, 125-27; O U N - M and, 73, 87-89, 101-4, 17879; O U N - M repression by, 106-8, 111-12, 114-17, 127-29; partisan activity and, 131-32, 133-37 (maps); policy of, in East Ukraine, 118-25; press under, 229-36; reprisals of, against partisans, 147^48; Soviet Union and, 24, 26, 32, 43, 47, 66, 71-72, 73-74; SS Division Galicia and, 170-75, 184, 292, 313; Ukrainian policy of, 104-6; U N R and, 31-33, 104; UPA and, 291-93; use of former Soviet troops by, 167-71; see also Generalgouvernement Polen Göring, H e r m a n n , 28 Governments, in Ukraine (1917-20), 1113 Greek Catholic Church: in Chelm district, 46-47; in Galicia, 9, 36-37, 67, 175, 192; nationalism and, 9, 196-97; nationalist parties and, 36-38, 80-81, 188; O U N and, 36-38; postwar influence as Ukrainian Catholic Church, 314; Soviet postwar persecution of, 297-98; Soviet Union and, 175; SS Di-

352

Index

Greek Catholic Church (Continued) vision Galicia and, 172-73; UAC and, 196-98; UAPTs and, 196-98; UPA and, 297-98, 302 Gulai, General Diomid, 318 Haievs'kyi (Kiev professor, later UAPTs bishop), 201, 219, 240 Haivaz, Iaroslav, 102 Halan, Iaroslav, 298 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 22 Het'manites, 11, 315; Germany and, 2829, 104; ideology of, 28; importance of, 27, 29n; leaders of, 27-28; location of, 42 Hilarión,'Archbishop, 186, 194, 199,201, 208 Himmler, Heinrich, 106, 173n-74n Hitler, Adolf, 51; attitude of, toward Ukrainians, 48-49 Holos, 183 Horbovyi, Dr. (OUN-B leader in Cracow), 76, 180 Horbovyi, Iaroslav, 53 Hrushevs'kyi, Michael, 7, 16, 304 Hrynenko, George, 236n Hryn'okh, John, 80, 81, 86, 316 Huba (Ihor), see Ihor, Bishop Hungary: Carpatho-Ukraine and, 24-25; revolution of 1956, 300 Hupalo, Constantine, 226 Iarii, Richard, 42, 74; background of, 35; OUN-B and, 62 Iatseniuk, Alexander, 92, 107n, 150, 154, 247 Iatseniuk (the younger), 93, 150, 154, 247 Iavors'kyi, Matvii, 16-17 Ihor, Bishop, 199, 259, 263 Ilnits'kyi, Roman, 83 Inkeles, Alex, 309 Institute for the Study of the USSR, 318, 319 Integral nationalism: background of, 280-82; origin of, 19-20; policies of, 20, 37-38; in West Ukraine, 20-22 Intellectuals as nationalists, 239-41, 28587 Irliavs'kyi, John, 116 Ivanov, General, 64 Jews: deportation from Zhitomir, 92; effect of annihilation of, on handicrafts and professions, 222; flight from Galicia

to escape Germans, 77; intellectuals in service of Communists, 17; as lawyers in Kharkov, 243; nationalist press on, 234; physicians in UPA, 156; in Soviet trading system, 238; SP massacres of, 173; in Ukrainian cities before 1917, 10; in Volhynia and Podolia, 256 Kalenda (deputy chief of Kiev police), 93 Kamenets-Podolsk: destruction of OUNM group in, 107; partisan activity in, 294; population of, 324-25 Kaminskii, Bronislav, 184n, 300 Kandyba, Dr. (OUN-M leader), 94, 103, 108, 111, 128, 179, 179n, 218 Kapustians'kyi, General Mykola, 34, 87, 179 Karlovtsi Synod, 209 Kharkov: church in, 262-63; cooperatives in, 220, 221; Germany in, 103; lawyers in, 243; nationalism in, 259, 261-62; nationalists in administration of, 215; OUN-M in, 103, 110-11; population of, 324-25; Soviet Union in, 174 Kherson: nationalism in, 271-72; population of, 324-25; UAC in, 271-72; West Ukrainians in, 308 Khmel'nyts'kyi, Bohdan, 8, 138, 256, 304 Khoroshyi, see Michael (Khoroshyi), Bishop "Khrin," 149, 152n, 154, 155 Khronoviat, Michael, 87, 170 Khrushchev, Nikita, 139, 299, 303-4, 307; quoted, 176 Kiev: cooperatives in, 221; deportation of workers from, 124; German capture of, 101-3; German repression of OUN-M in, 107-8, 111-12, 114-17; nationalism in, 257; nationalists in administration of, 215-16; OUN-M in, 101-3, 107-8, 211, 239, 241-42, 257; partisan activity in, 133-37 (maps), 294; population of, 324—25; Russians in, 109-10, 219; Russophiles in, 244; Soviet Union in, 174, 256; students as nationalists in, 117; UAC. in, 20-1-5; UAPTs in, 205 Kinkelin, Dr. (official in Ostministerium), 169, 182n Kirichenko, Aleksei, 307 Kirovograd: ethnic composition, 265-66; OUN-B in, 97; population of, 324-25; UAPTs in area of, 269 Kliachkevs'kyi, Dmytro, 153

Index Klich, 184n Klymishyn, Nicholas, 84 Klymiv, J o h n , 69, 81 Koch, Erich, 105, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 121, 146, 193η, 201,202, 213, 222, 227η Koch, Hans, 89 Kolkhoz, see Agrarian question Komitet Osvobozhdeniia Narodov Rossii, see K O N R "Kommissars," German order to shoot, 106, 132, 244 Kononenko (OUN-M organizer in Kharkov), 259 Konovalets, Eugene, 21, 23, 33, 36, 41, 42, 56, 87, 96, 115, 178 K O N R (Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia)—Komitet Osvobozhdeniia Narodov Rossii: civilians and, 184-85; formation of, 181-82; Germany and, 182-87, 209; protests against, 182-83; ROA and, 184; Russians in, 181 Konyk, Bohdan, 93, 102, 103 Korneichuk, Aleksandr, 304 Korotchenko, Demian, 139 Koshyk, J o h n , 116 Kostelnyk, Gabriel, 298 Kostomarov, Nicholas, 7 Kostopol' area, as partisan center, 100 Koval, Vasyl', 300 Kovel', Red partisan band near, 145 Kovpak, Sidor, 138, 138n Kovpak's Red partisan band, 134, 136— 37 (maps); activity of, 146-47; formation of, 138-39; in Galicia, 151-53, 296; O U N - B and, 152 Kozyi, Stephen, 95 Krakivs'ki Visti, 52, 184 Kravtsiv, Bohdan, 183 Krivoi Rog, O U N - B in, 97, 268 "Kruk," 149, 154, 155 Krutyi, Joseph, 319 Krymins'kyi (OUN leader in Galicia), 69 Kuban', nationalism in, 276; Russians in, 276 Kubiiovych, Volodymyr, 50, 51, 170, 186 Kurmanovych, General, 34, 170, 179 Kursk oblast, nationalism in, 275 Kuts, Alexander, 96

Laba, Dr., 173, 173n-74n Labor policy of Germany in East Ukraine, 122-25, 179, 179n; nationalism and, 6

353

Lawyers as nationalists, 242-44, 245-46 League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, 17 Lebed', Nicholas, 63, 81, 83, 85, 157, 316 " L e f t Bank" area, nationalism in, 259, 261-64 Lelchitsi, captured by Kovpak's Red partisan band, 147 Lemko area, Poland in, 46 Levits'kyi, Boris, 144, 315 Levits'kyi, Constantine, 64-65, 81, 89 Levits'kyi, Dmytro, 65 Litavry, 108 Liubchenko, Arkadii, 110, 127, 235n, 240, 261 Liudvipol district, as partisan center, 99100 Livyts'kyi, Andrew, 29, 30, 32, 98, 144, 180, 315, 317, 319 Livyts'kyi, Nicholas, 319 Lopatyns'kyi, Volodymyr, 53, 55, 57n, 58, 86 Lukin, Alexander, 143^4, 145, 146 Lypkivs'kyi, Metropolitan Basil, 190 Lypyns'kyi, Viacheslav, 27 Lytvynenko, Colonel, 99

Magunia (Generalkommissar in Kiev), 115 "Magyarophiles," 295 Maistrenko, Ivan, 315 Makarushka, Liubomyr, 171 Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta, 232, 236, 274 Mariupol': church in, 274; nationalism in, 274-75 Maurras, Charles, 20, 22 Mayors, nationalists as, 215-16 Mazepa, Professor Isaac, 181, 315, 316 Mel'nikov, L. G., 305 Mel'nyk, Andrew, 33, 42, 54, 87, 106, 115, 178, 179n, 180, 181, 182; background of, 36-37; Bandera faction and, 57n, 58; church and, 36-38; power of, 3839; problems of, 40-42 Mel'nyk faction, see O U N - M Michael (Khoroshyi), Bishop, 272 Middle class of cities, 237-39 Mirgorod, 235, 264 Mishchenko (Communist Party official in L'vov), 64 Mitrynga, J o h n , 63, 144, 154 Mitsyk, J o h n , 96 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact: German attitude toward Ukrainian nationalism

354

Index

Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (Cont.) and, 47-48; O U N and, 43; U N R and, 32 Monastery of the Caves (Kiev), 194 Monastyris'ka uprising, 76-77 Mstyslav, Bishop, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208; see also Skrypnyk, Stephen Municipal administrations: departments under, 216-17; nationalists in, 213-36 Muzichenko, George, 181ra-82n, 183 Myron, Dmytro, 54, 267n Myronovych, D., 254n

"Nachtigall," 74, 77, 81, 86, 153 Narodnaia Volia, 22, 127, 281 Nastup, 43, 96-97, 179 Nationalism, 18-25; agriculture as a factor in postwar Ukrainian SSR, 307-8; in Bessarabia, 70; in Bukovina, 70-71, 91, 279, 294; in Carpatho-Ukraine, 2425, 279, 294-95; channels of activity for, 211-36; church and, 188-210; in coastal areas, 270-72; Communist Party and, 10-11, 15-18; in Crimea, 275-76; deficiencies of, 287-89; described, 4-5; in Donbas, 272-75; émigré politics after World W a r II, 310-14; foreign nationalisms and, 8-9; in Generalbezirk T a u r i e n , 272; geographical variations in, 255-77; German control and, 4 7 ^ 8 , 101-29, 177-87, 286-87; Greek Catholic Church and, 9, 196-97, 298; intellectuals and, 239-41, 285-87; in Kharkov, 220, 243, 259, 261-62; in Kherson, 271-72; K O N R and, 182-87; in Kuban', 276; in Kursk oblast, 275; leaders of, 7-8, 12; in Mariupol', 27475; in Odessa, 270-71; organizations and activities after World W a r II, 31020; peasants and, 13, 17, 250-54, 287; in Podolia, 256-59; in Polessia, 25556; Polish W a r and, 44-45; political aspect of, political thought of, 279-82; in Poltava, 263; postwar, 290321; in postwar Ukrainian SSR, 30911; present status of movement, 32021; relative importance of, 278, 283; in " R i g h t Bank" area, 256-59; in Rostov district, 275; Russian, 112; Russian Empire and, 9-10; Russian revolutionary tradition and, 22-23; social structure and, 10, 237-54; Soviet Union and, 176-77; Stalin and, 16-17; in steppe area, 264-70; stimuli to, 5-7;

students and, 12-13; summary of activities in East Ukraine, 3 0 3 ^ ; support for, 278-80, 282-83; U A P T s and, 203-5, 209, 284-85; urban-rural differences in, 249; in villages, 249-54; in Volhynia, 279 integral, see Integral nationalism Nationalists: administrators as, 244-46; contacts with Abwehr, 24, 35, 74-75; in cooperatives, 221; culture and, 22428; education and, 222, 223-28; Germany and, 26-27, 186-87; groups outside postwar Ukraine, 313-14; intellectuals as, 239-41 ; lawyers as, 242^14, 245^16; as mayors, 215-16; military ideals of, 166-67; in municipal administrations, 213-36; in police departments, 217-18; press and, 228-36; propaganda and, 228-36; in public institutions, 211-12; SS Division Galicia and, 170-73; technical specialists as, 241-42; UAC and, 203-5; U A P T s and, 203-5; and Wehrmacht, 50, 77, 81-82, 102-4, 227η, 261; in welfare departments, 219-20; women as, 246; youth and,246-48 National Workers' Union, 269 Natsional'no T r u d o v o i Soiuz (NTS), 269 Nazi Germany, see Germany Nicholas, Exarch of West Ukraine, 191, 192 Nikanor, Bishop, 199,203 Nikolaev: deportation of workers from, 124n; nationalism in, 271; O U N - B in, 97, 271; O U N - M in, 91, 271; UAC in, 271-72; UAPTs in, 272 Nikopol', partisans in, 131-32 NKVD: executions in Vinnitsa, 257; German orders to shoot officials of, 106; partisans and, 131, 139-41; plan of UPA to attack, 157; repression of OUN in Galicia, 69 North Caucasus, rebellion in, 300-1 N o r t h e r n Ukraine, partisan activity in, 133-37 (maps); see also names of cities, e.g., Kiev Nova Doba, 184n, 258 Nova Rada, 71 Nova Ukraina, 110, 230, 232, 261, 262, 274 Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo, 111-12, 115, 233n, 234, 235 n, 262 Novo Moskovsk-Pavlograd forest, partisans in, 132

Index Novyi Chas, 65, 230 N T S (National Workers' Union)—Natsional'no-Trudovoi Soiuz, 269 Odessa: nationalism in, 270-71; Russians in, 270-71 Ohiienko, J o h n , see Hilarión, Archbishop Ohloblyn, Alexander, 102 "Olevsk Republic," 100, 134, 255 Oliïnyk, Peter, 93, 111 Omel'chenko, Tymosh, 59 Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Michael, 12, 87, 171 Onats'kyi, Eugene, 178 Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, see O U N Organizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv, see O U N Orlo, 36-37 O r t h o d o x Church: in Chelm district, 4647; Germany and, 192-93, 199-203; nationalists and, 209-10; organization of, 188-89; O U N a n d , 204; in P o l a n d , 191-92;; Russian Revolution and, 18990; Soviet Union and, 191-92, 208; state and, 189; in Ukraine, 189-90; in Volhynia, 191-92, 193-95; in Zhitomir, 193-94; see also UAPTs; Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church Ostarbeiter program, 122-25, 141, 148, 179, 181, 183, 186, 209n, 234, 249 O U N (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists)—Organizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv: Bandera faction split from, 58; in Bukovina, 70; CarpathoUkraine and, 24-25, 33; church and, 36-38, 203-4, 205-8; Communist tactics and, 280-82; congress of partisan forces of, 159-60; courage of, 283-84; defects of, 282-83; distribution of, 42; in Donbas, 273-74; extremist activities of, 282; Fascism and, 280; formation of, 23; in Galicia, 40-41, 69; Germany and, 42-44, 286; ideology of, 37-38; intellectuals in, 239-40; internal conflict in, 53-58; lawyers in, 245; leadership of, 33-40; m e m b e r s h i p of, 211; members of, in police, 216-17; members of, in public institutions, 211-12; military ideals of, 166-67; Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and, 43; nationalism in Generalgouvernement and, 60; Polish W a r and, 43-44; press and, 234-35; problems of, 40-42; Provid and members

355

of, 39-41; representation in Rada, 315; in Soviet-occupied territories, 69; UAC and, 205-8; U A P T s and, 205-8; in Volhynia, 69-70; World W a r II and, 43-44; youth in, 246-47, 248; see also OUN-B; OUN-M; OUN-r; OUN-s; Bandera; Mel'nyk; Nationalism OUN-B (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—Bandera faction): arguments of, 60; in Carpatho-Ukraine, 295; in coastal area, 271; demands of, 55-57; in Dniepropetrovsk, 268-69; in East Ukraine, 78, 84-86, 97-98; formation of, 58; in Galicia, 62, 77-84; Galician conference of, 160-65; Generalgouvernement and, 76; German repression in East Ukraine and, 125-27; Germany and, 73-75, 103-4, 178; in Greater Germany, 59-60; Iarii and, 62; ideology of, 126-27; in Kirovograd, 97; Kovpak's Red partisan band and, 152; in Krivoi Rog, 97, 268; Mel'nyk and, 58; Mel'nyk forces and partisan activity, 154; military units of, 86; O U N - M and, 95-97; partisan activity of, 133-37 (maps), 142-43, 148-50, 15051, 153-54; postwar change to OUN-r, 312; purges of, in UPA, 158; SenykStsibors'kyi m u r d e r and, 95-96; slogan of, 125n-26n, 126; SS Division Galicia and, 170-71; in steppe area, 267-69; strength of, 155-57; sub-factions in, 62-63; in U H V R , 292; Ukrainian Central Committee and, 58-59; U N O and, 59; UPA and, 153-55; World W a r II and, 76-77; youth and, 248; see also Bandera, Stephen; OUN-r O U N - M (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—Mel'nyk faction): arguments of, 60-61; in Bazar, 107, 255; Bukovina and, 71; in Carpatho-Ukraine, 295; in Chernigov, 107; in East Ukraine, 78, 86-87, 90-96; in Galicia, 89-90; German repression of, 106-8, 111-12, 114— 17, 127-29; Germany and, 73, 87-89, 101^1, 178-79; ideology of, 128-29; in Kamenets-Podolsk, 107; in Kharkov, 103, 110-11, 259, 261-62; in Kiev, 1013, 107-8, 211, 239, 241-42, 257; League of Ukrainian Writers, 116; O U N - B and, 88, 95-97; partisan activity of, 133-37 (maps), 149-51, 154; partisan activity in Volhynia, 150-51, 154; in Podolia, 257-58; in Polessia, 255; postwar change to OUN-s, 313; press and,

356

Index

OUN-M (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—Mel'nyk iaction) (Coni.) 230; prestige of, 117; in Proskurov, 235, 257; SS Division Galicia in, 170; strength of, 155-56; UNR and, 99-100; UPA and, 144-45; in Vinnitsa, 235, 257; in Zhitomir, 107; see also OUN-s OUN-r (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—revolutionary), 312; activities in western countries, 319-20; and Rada, 317; representation in Rada, 316 OUN-s (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—solidarist), postwar activities of, 313 Paliïv, Dmytro, 171 Palladius, Bishop, 194, 199 Panchyshyn, M. I., 66 Pan'kivs'kyi, Constantine, 89-90, 89n Panteleimon (Rudyk), Bishop, 116, 192, 203, 204, 209 Pareto, Vilfredo, 22 Partisans: activity of, in Ukraine, 13164, 133-37 (maps)·, in CarpathoUkraine, 295-96; Communist Party and, 131-64; German reprisals against, 147^8; local support of, 141-42; in Nikopol', 131-32; in Novo MoskovskPavlograd forest, 132; OUN-B members as, 53-54, 133-37 (maps), 142-43, 148-50, 150-51; OUN-M members as, 133-37 (maps), 149-50, 150-51; Red Army soldiers and, 139; rural support lost, 299; tactics of Wehrmacht against, 146-47; UNDP members as, 150-51; unity of nationalists as, 150-51; UNR and, 150-51; UPA and, 143-47, 29194 Pavlograd, population of, 324-25 Pavlovs'kyi (chief of Zhitomir city administration), 92 Peasants: nationalism and, 248, 287; in postwar Ukrainian SSR, 308-9; Soviet Union and, 17, 293; Ukrainian Peasant Party, 315 Peasants-Workers Association (Selians'koRobitnycha Partiia—Sel-Rob), 19 Pelens'kyi, Zenon, 65 Perevertun, Professor (director of AllUkrainian Cooperative Society), 221 Petliura, Simon, 12, 14, 18, 29, 96, 154, 247 Petriv, General Vsevolod, 12, 76, 171, 181

Platonius, Bishop, 208 Pochaïvs'ka Lavra (monastery), 191, 193, 195, 206 Podgaitsi uprising, 76 Podolia: Jewish population of, 256; nationalism in, 256-59; OUN-M in, 25758; partisan activity in, 133-37 (maps)·, UAC in, 258-59; UAPTs in, 258-59 Pohidny hrupy (task forces), 84-86 Poland: Chelm district and, 46-47; Galicia and, 14; in Lemko area, 46; Orthodox Church in, 190-91; UNDO and, 18-19; UNR and, 14, 18, 30-31; UPA and, 299; UVO and, 21; West Ukraine and, 18-19; see also Generalgouvernement Polen Polans'kyi, George, 79 Polessia: German reprisals against partisans in, 147-48; nationalism in, 25556; OUN-B partisans in, 156; partisan activity in, 143-47 Polessian Stronghold, see Polis'ka Sich Police departments, nationalists in, 21718

Police detachments, in Generalgouvernement, 53, 59, 73 Polish war: OUN and, 43-44; Ukraine and, 26-45; UNR and, 31-33 Polis'ka Sich (Polessian Stronghold), 99, 134; partisan activity of, 143-47 Poltava: destruction of OUN-M group in, 107; nationalism in, 263; population of, 324-25 Polykarp, Bishop, 191, 195, 198, 200, 201, 203, 208,314 Potapenko, I., 268 Press: in Generalgouvernement, 51-52; under Germany, 229-36; nationalist, on Jews, 234; nationalists and, 228-36; OUN and, 234-35; OUN-M and, 230; Russophiles in, 117, 234-35; Soviet Union and, 234-35; Ukrainian newspapers, 231 (map)·, of Ukrainian SSR, 306; in villages, 254; and Wehrmacht, 229-36, 276 Prokopovych, Viacheslav, 30, 32, 33 Promethean movement, 31 n; escape of members from Soviet forces, 32; Poland and, 30-31 Pronchenko, Michael, 230, 235n, 240, 268 Propaganda: nationalists and, 228-36; in villages, 253-54 Proskurov, OUN-M in, 235, 257 Prosvita societies, 92, 117, 224-28, 262; in villages, 252, 253

Index Provisional Government in Petrograd, R a d a and, 11 Prykhod'ko, Victor, 12-13 Public institutions, nationalism in, 21112 Putivi' area, Russians in, 189 Rada, see Ukrainian Central R a d a ; Ukrainian National R a d a Raievs'kyi, Captain (UNR leader), 144, 154 Rebet, Leo, 53, 82, 83 Red Army soldiers, partisans and, 139 Rehei, Vasyl', 268 Reichenau, Field-Marshal von, 147 Reich Labor Service, 73 Reichskommissariat Ukraine, 104-5; administrative structure of, 113-14; German policy in, 101-29; Kovpak's partisan band in, 146; nationalist repression in, 114—17; organization of, 11213; physiography of, 130-31 Reichsministerium f ü r die besetzen Ostgebiete (Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories), 104 Religion, see Church and also under names of specific churches Repatriation after World W a r II, 310-13 " R i g h t Bank" area, Kovpak's partisan band in, 146; nationalism in, 256-59 R O A (Russian Liberation Army)—Rossiskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia, 184, 184);; Russians as officers in, 185 Rohack, J o h n , 93, 103, 111 " R o l a n d , " 74, 86, 153 Rosenberg, Alfred, 104-5, 113, 117, 168, 169, 179n, 182, 183, 200, 227η Rossiskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia (ROA), 184, 184n Rostov district, nationalism in, 275 Rudnev, Simon, 138-39 Rudyk, see Panteleimon (Rudyk), Bishop R u m a n i a : Ukraine and, 105, 270-71; U N R and, 31 Russia, Communist, see Soviet Union Russian Empire, Ukrainian nationalism and, 9-10 Russian language, in Ukraine, 6, 214, 237-38, 304 Russian Liberation Army (Rossiskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia), 184, 184n Russian Orthodox Church: Revolution and, 189-90; UAC and, 209 Russians: in Carpatho-Ukraine, 295-96; charges of Ukrainian nationalists

357

against, 182; dominance in K O N R , 181; d o m i n a n t position in pre-RevoIutionary Ukraine, 15, 17; in Donbas, 273; in German administrations in the Ukraine, 113n; in Kuban', 276; in Odessa, 270-71; as officers in ROA, 185; population in Ukraine, 306; predominance among workers, 10; as prisoners of war, attitude toward Ukrainians, 184n; in Putivi' area, 139; UPA and, 291-94; in Zhitomir, 92, 244; see also K O N R ; NTS; ROA; Russian language; Russophiles; Soviet Union; UAC; Vlasov Russophiles, 286-87, 332; defined, 331; in D n e p r o p e t r o v s k , 205, 218, 220, 235, 268; in Kiev, 244; in the press, 117, 234-35; replacement in nationalists in administrations, 214; and UAC, 202, 205, 208-9; in Vinnitsa, 218, 257; see also KONR; NTS; ROA; Russian language; UAC; Vlasov Ruzanov, Alexander, 140 Ryls'kyi, Maksym, 303-4 Ryvak, Vasyl', 144

Saburov, Alexander, 139 Sadovs'kyi, Colonel (UNR leader), 99 Sahaidachnyi, Peter, 104, 230 St. Vladimir's Cathedral (Kiev), 202 Sal's'kyi, Volodymyr, 30 Sambor uprising, 76 SB (Security Service)—Sluzhba Bezpeky, 63, 158, 281, 292 Schenkendorff, General von, 167 Security Service, see SB Selians'ko-Robitnycha Partiia—Sel-Rob, 19 Semenenko, Alexander, 186, 243, 261 Senishyn, Nicholas, 85 Senyk, Omelian, 37, 94, 99-100, 179n; background of, 35-36; Bandera faction's charges against, 56-57 Sergius, Patriarch, 191 Shandruk, General Paul, 181, 185, 186 Shcherbatiuk, Leonidas, 145, 154 Sheptyts'kyi, Metropolitan Andrew, 9, 37, 60, 67, 194n, 197, 297, 298; Galician division and, 173-74; quoted, 81; and SP massacre of Jews, 173 Sherstiuk, mayor of Krivoi Rog, 268 Shevchenko, Taras, 3, 7, 304 Shevchenko Society, 320 Shreter, see T i m o t h y (Shreter), Bishop

358

Index

Shtepa, Constantine, 111, 181η-82π, 205, 235η Shtul', Oleh, 99, 150, 154, 178, 313 Shukhevych, R o m a n , 63, 74η, 81, 86, 153, 170-71, 292, 300, 316 Shul'gin, see Shul'hyn, Alexander Shul'ha (OUN-M leader), 96 Shul'hyn, Alexander, 30, 32, 33 Shums'kyi, Alexander, 15, 96, 222, 240 Sicherheitspolizei, see SP Sichovi Stril'tsi (Sich Sharpshooters), 21, 23, 33, 36 Simon, Bishop, 191, 203 Skoropads'kyi, Danilo, 316n Skoropads'kyi, Elizabeth, 316n Skoropads'kyi, Paul, 11, 12, 27, 29, 180, 316n Skrypnyk, Nicholas, 15, 204, 208, 222, 240-41, 304 Skrypnyk, Stephen, 196, 201, 202; see also Mstyslav, Bishop Slipyi, Bishop Joseph, 173-74, 175, 297 Sluzhba Bezpeky, see SB Smal'-Stots'kyi or Smal-Stocki, R o m a n , 30, 31, 32 Sobor of Volhynian Bishops, 193-95 Social Revolutionaries, U N R and, 29 Social structure, nationalism and, 237-54 Soiuz Ukraïns'koï Natsionalistychnoï Molodi, see SUNM Sosiura, Volodymyr, 303, 304 Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna, 230 Soviet Ukraine, see East Ukraine Soviet Union; in Bessarabia, 70; in Bukovina, 70-71, 175; in CarpathoUkraine, 175, 177; in Galicia, 46, 6469, 174-76; Germany and, 24, 26, 32, 43, 47, 66, 71-72, 73-74; Greek Catholic Church in Galicia and, 67, 192; Greek Catholic Church, postwar persecution of, 297-98, 302; in Kharkov, 174, 220, 225, 243; in Kiev, 101-2, 174, 256; O r t h o d o x C h u r c h and, 190-93, 208; O r t h o d o x C h u r c h in Volhynia and, 191-92; partisan activity in Ukraine and, 131-64, 255; partisan resistance to, 300-1; peasants and, 17, 119-20, 141, 149; postwar concept of interdependence of, with Ukraine, 304-5; press and, 234-35; reconquest of Ukraine by, 174-75; repatriation of Ukrainians after World W a r II, 31013; self-determination of Communist parties and, 14-15; support for, in Ukraine, 13-14; T r e a t y of Pereiaslav,

304; UPA repression by, 157, 299-300; in Volhynia, 66-67, 157, 174, 191-92; in West Ukraine, 64-72 S1» (Sicherheitspolizei), 106, 115, 173, 217, 225,263,271 Spivak, M. S., 140 SS Division Galicia, 185, 292, 313; in battle, 174-75; church and, 173-74; Germany and, 170-75; organization of, 174; support of, 170-74 SS Einsatzgruppen, 82, 98, 106-8, 244 Stakhiv, Eugene, 274 Stakhiv, Volodymyr, 83 Stalin, Joseph, 305; and Kovpak, 146; Ukrainian nationalism and, 16-17 Stariukh (OUN-B leader), 83 Stasiuk, Nicholas, 236, 274 Stefaniv, Colonel, 87 Steppe area: nationalism in, 264-70; O U N - B in, 267-69 Stets'ko, Iaroslav, 56, 62, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 89, 153, 317, 320; background of, 54; O U N policy and, 54-55 Strokach, T i m o t h y Α., 140 Stsibors'kyi, Nicholas, 40, 54, 56, 94, 99100, 128, 179n; Bandera faction's charges against, 57 Students: Communism and, 21; exchange visits of East and West Ukrainian, 6768, 68-69; nationalism and, 12-13; nationalist activities of, in Kiev, 117; postwar exchange of, 309-10; SUNM and, 21-22; see also Education Suliatits'kyi, Captain (OUN-M leader), 102 Sumy oblast, partisan activity in, 132, 138, 139 SUNM (Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth)—Soiuz Ukraïns'koï Natsionalistychnoï Molodi): students and, 21-22; UVO and, 23 Sushko, Roman, 42, 43, 73, 87, 170, 179n; background of, 35; Bandera faction and, 58-59; Generalgouvernement organizations and, 50 Sylvester, Bishop, 201, 219, 240 Tarkovych, George, 93 T a u r i e n , Generalbezirk, nationalism in, 272 Technical specialists, as nationalists, 24142 Teliha, Olena, 108, 116, 246 Theophilus, Archbishop, 193, 262 T h i r d Congress of Soviets, 14

Index T h i r d Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN (August 21-25, 1943), 15960, 172 Timothy (Shreter), Bishop, 191n Tiutiunnyk, George, 14, 33, 107 Transcarpathian ablast, see CarpathoUkraine Transnistria, Ukraine and, 270 Tsuman' area, as center of OUN-B partisans, 151 Turchmanovych (OUN-B leader), 144 UAC, see Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church UAPTs (Ukrainian Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church)—Ukrains'ka Avtokefal'na Pravoslavna Tserkva: in coastal area, 272; in Dniepropetrovsk, 205; f o r m a t i o n of, 199; G e r m a n y and, 200-3, 208-9; influence among émigrés, 314; in Kiev, 204; in Kirovograd area, 269; nationalists and, 2035, 209-10, 284-85; in Nikolaev, 272; organization of, 200-1; OUN and, 2058; in Podolia, 258-59; in Poltava, 263; in steppe area, 269; UAC and, 2023; UPA and, 207; in villages, 251; in Zhitomir, 258 Ufa, Soviet evacuation of Ukrainians to, 101 UHVR (Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council)—Ukrains'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada, 319; administrative structure of, 161-63; formation of, 161; ideology of, 163-65; political elements in, 292; representation in Rada, 316 Ukraïna, 16 Ukraïnbank (All-Ukrainian Cooperative Bank), 221 Ukraine: admission to UN, 306; culture of, and Communist Party, 15-16; defined, 3n; émigré nationalism after World War II, 310-14; Germany in, 3, 46-47 (see also Generalgouvernement Polen); governments in (1917-20), 1113; Orthodox Church in, 189-90; partisan activity in, 131-64, 133-37 (maps)·, physiography of, 130-31; Polish war and, 26-45; population in 1959 census, 305-6; postwar concept of interdependence with USSR, 3045; postwar economic conditions, 307-8; postwar nationalism in, 290-321; postwar political changes in, 306; postwar relationships of East and West

359

Ukraine, 308-10; repatriation after World War II, 310-13; Rumania and, 270-71; Russian language in, 6, 214, 237-38; social structure of, 10; Soviet Republic as a political entity, 306; Soviet Union in, 46; Treaty of Pereislav, 304; see also East Ukraine; Northern Ukraine; West Ukraine Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 320 Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Ukrains'ka Avtokefal'na Pravoslavna Tserkva), see UAPTs Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church: in coastal area, 271-72; in Dniepropetrovsk, 205; f o r m a t i o n of, 190; Germany and, 199-203, 208-9; Greek Catholic Church and, 196-98; in Kherson, 271-72; in Kiev, 204; nationalists and, 203-5; in Nikolaev, 27172; opposition to, 195; in Podolia, 258-59; reorganization of, 193-95; Russian Orthodox Church and, 209; and Russophiles, 202, 205, 208-9; split in, 198; UAPTs and, 202-3; UPA and, 207-8; in villages, 251 Ukrainian Central Committee, 49; cultural accomplishments of, 51-53; OUN-B and, 58-59; support for, 279 Ukrainian Central Rada, 11, 16, 265, 274; see also Ukrainian National Rada Ukrainian Communist Party, 307 Ukrainian Community, 27 Ukrainian Congress Committee (U.S.), 314 Ukrainian Free University, 321 Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army, see UPA Ukrainian Liberation Army (Ukraïns'ke Vyzvol'ne Voisko), 185 Ukrainian Liberation Movement, 318, 319 Ukrainian Military Organization, 21, 23 Ukrainian National Committee, 49, 76 Ukrainian National Council, 49, 117 Ukrainian National Democratic Union, see UNDO Ukrainian National Rada, 314-17 Ukrainian National Rebirth, 98-99 Ukrainian National Republic, 315 Ukrainian National State Union, 315-16 Ukrainian National Union, see UNO Ukrainian Party of Labor (Ukrains'ka Partiia Pratsi), 19 Ukrainian Peasant Party, 315, 319

360

Index

Ukrainian People's Republic, see U N R Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army (UN RA), 154-55 Ukrainian P o p u l a r Democratic Party, see U N D P Ukrainian Popular Self-Defense, 152 Ukrainian Red Cioss, 246 Ukrainian Republic Army, Polish Army and, 30 Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party, see U R D P Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, U N R and, 29 Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, see Ukraine Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, see U H V R Ukraïns'ka Avtokefal'na Tserkva, see UAPTs Ukraïns'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada, see UHVR Ukraïns'ka H r o m a d a , 27 Ukraïns'ka Narodna Demokratychna Partiia, see U N D P Ukraïns'ka N a r o d n a Respublika, see UNR Ukraïns'ka Narodna Revoliutsiina Armiia, see U N R A Ukraïns'ka Narodna Samooborona (Ukrainian Popular Self-Defense), 152 Ukraïns'ka National'na Vidrodzhennia (Ukrainian National Rebirth), 89-99 Ukraïns'ka National'ne Demokratychne Ob"iednannia, see U N D O Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia, see UPA Ukraïns'ka Viis'kova Organizatsiia, 21, 23 Ukrai'ns'ke National'ne Ob"iednannia, 59-60 Ukraïns'ke Slovo, 93, 103, 108, 111, 214n, 229, 233n, 258, 313 Ukrai'ns'ke Vzyvol'ne Voisko, 185 Ukraïns'ki Visti, 315 Ukraïns'kyi Dobrovolets', 183-84 Ukraïns'kyi Hotos, 257 Ukraïns'kyi Khliborob, 182η, 254 Ukraïns'kyi Kraievyi Komitet (Ukrainian Regional Committee), 90 Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk, 105n, 235n Uman', population of, 324-25 U N D O (Ukrainian National Democratic Union)—Ukrai'ns'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob"iednannia: nationalism in Generalgouvernement and, 50; Poland and, 18-19; postwar

revival of, 315; representation in Rada, 315, 317; Soviet control of Galicia and, 65 U N D P (Ukrainian Popular Democratic Party)—Ukraïns'ka N a r o d n a Demokratychna Partiia: formation of, 145, 315; members as partisans, 150-51; representation in Rada, 315 Union of Russian Officers, 270 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, see Soviet Union Union of Soviet Writers in the Ukraine, 303 Union of Ukrainian Federalist Democrats, 318 Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth, 21-22, 23 Union of Ukrainian Youth, 319 United Nations, admission of Ukrainian SSR to, 306 United States, postwar nationalist organizations in, 314, 317-18 U N O (Ukrainian National Union)— Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Ob"iednannia, 59-60 U N R (Ukrainian People's Republic)— Ukraïns'ka N a r o d n a Respublika, 1112, 315; distribution of members of, 30; failure of, 14; Finland and, 33; France and, 31; Germany and, 31-33, 104; members as partisans, 150-51; military ideals of, 166-67; MolotovR i b b e n t r o p pact and, 32; origin of, 29; Poland and, 14, 18, 30-31; Polish war and, 31-33; R u m a n i a and, 31; UPA and, 144; Volhynia, active underground operations in, 70, 98-100; West Ukraine and, 18; World W a r II and, 31-33 U N R A (Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army)—Ukraïns'ka Narodna Revoliutsiina Armiia, 154-55 UPA (Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) —Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia, 99; Congress of, 160-65; decline in activities of, 299-301; Galician conference of, 160-65; d u r i n g German occupation, 291-92; and Greek Catholic Church, 298, 302; Jewish physicians as, 257; membership of, 156-57, 269-97; OUN-B and, 153-55, 158; OUN-M and, 144-45; partisan activity of, 14347; postwar activities of, 294-300; postwar underground activities, 299300; Soviet repression of, 157; strength

Index of, 155-56; summary of accomplishments, 301-2; UAC and, 207-8; U A P T s and, 206-7; U N R and, 144 U R D P (Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party); formation of, 315; representation in Rada, 315 USSR, see Soviet Union UVO (Ukrainian Military Organization) —Ukraïns'ka Viis'kova Organizatsiia; Poland and, 21; SUNM and, 23 UVV (Ukrainian Liberation Army)— Ukraïns'ke Vyzvol'ne Voisko, 185 Valiis'kyi, Colonel, 99 Vaslia'kyi, V. P., 319 Vatutin, Marshal M. F., 293 Villages: church in, 251-52; nationalism in, 249-54; political activity in, 25254; press in, 254; propaganda in, 25354; Prosvita in, 252, 253 Vil'na Ukraina, 65, 214n Vinnitsa: nationalism in, 257; NKVD executions in, 257; O U N - M in, 235, 257; population of, 324-25; Russophiles in, 218, 257 Vitvits'kyi, Stephen, 317 Vlasov, Andrew, 168, 169, 180, 181, 318; K O N R and, 181-87; Shandruk and, 186 Volhynia: German reprisals against partisans in, 147-48; Jewish population, 256; nationalism in, 279; Orthodox Church, 191-92, 193-95; O U N in, 69-70; OUN-B in, 174; O U N - B partisan activity in, 149-50, 156; partisan activity in, 133-37 (maps); partisan support in, 142-47, 293; Soviet Union and, 66-67, 157, 174, 191-92; U N R in, 70, 98-100; UPA operations in, 294; W e h r m a c h t in, 292 Voloshyn, Augustin, 25, 38, 61 Voloshyn-Berchak (Free Cossack leader), 150 Volyn', 196 "Volynets'," see Iatseniuk (the younger) Voskobiinyk, Michael, 235, 236n, 264 Vpered (Forward), 315 Vseukraïns'ka Kooperatyvna Spilka, 221 Vseukraïns'kyi Komitet Dopomohy, 219— 20 Vytvits'kyi, head of Rada, 319

361

Wallace, Donald Mackenzie, quoted, 5-6 W e h r m a c h t : and nationalists, 50, 77, 8182, 1 0 2 ^ , 227n, 261, 292; and press, 229-36, 276; tactics used against partisans, 146^17; treatment of Soviet prisoners, 118-19; use of Ukrainian troops, 167-69, 185; see also Abwehr; Canaris, Admiral Welfare departments, nationalists in, 219-20 West Ukraine, 4; Communism in, 19; inhabitants as displaced persons after World W a r II, 312; integral nationalism in, 20-22; nationalism in, 18-25; peasants in, 299; Poland and, 18-19; postwar economic conditions in, 308; postwar relationship with East Ukraine, 308-10; problems in, 19; Socialist Party in, 316; Soviet control of, 64-72, 175-77, 301-2; U N R and, 18; UPA partisan activities in, 302; see also Bukovina; Carpatho-Ukraine; Galicia; Generalgouvernement Polen; Volhynia Wilhelm, German emperor, 28 W o m e n as nationalists, 246 World W a r II: nationalism after, 290321; O U N and, 4 3 ^ 4 ; OUN-B and, 76-79; U N R and, 31-33 Wrangel, General P. N„ 12 Writers as nationalists, 239-41, 303-4

Yalta agreement, 311 Youth, nationalists and, 204, 246-48, 252 Zakhvalins'kyi (OUN-M police chief in Kiev), 93, 103 Zaporozh'e, O U N - B in, 268 Zaporozhian Cossacks, 11, 33 Zaporozhian Sich, 224 Zatons'kyi, Volodymyr, 13 7.a Ukraïnu, 184 Zhitomir: deportation of Jews from, 92; deportation of workers from, 124; Kovpak's partisan band in, 147; nationalism in, 257; Orthodox Church in, 193-94; O U N - B in, 91-96; O U N - M in, 107; partisan activity in, 133-37 (maps), 294; population of, 324-25; Russians in, 92, 244; U A P T s in, 258