Ukraine’s Nuclear History: A Non-Proliferation Perspective (Contributions to International Relations) 3030906604, 9783030906603

Table of contents :
Introduction
References
Contents
About the Authors
Abbreviations
Introduction
References
Ukraine´s Contribution to the Soviet Union´s Nuclear Programme
1 Nuclear Physics in Ukraine (1900s-1930s)
1.1 The Beginnings: Nuclear Physics in Ukraine (1900s-1920s)
1.2 The Heyday: Nuclear Physics at UIPT and the UkrSSR Academy of Sciences in the 1930s
1.3 UIPT Physicists in the Great Purge
2 Ukraine in the Soviet Atomic Project (1938-1956)
2.1 Ukraine and the Emergence of the Soviet Atomic Project (1938-1941)
2.2 Nuclear Physics in Ukraine under Occupation (1941-1943)
2.3 Ukraine´s Role in the Development of the Soviet Atomic Project in 1942-1945
2.4 Ukraine´s Role in the Third Phase of the Development of the Soviet Atomic Project (1945-1949)
2.5 Ukraine and the Creation of the Soviet Hydrogen Bomb (1945-1956)
3 Development of Infrastructure for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in UkrSSR in Pre-Chernobyl Period (1945-1986)
3.1 Nuclear Scientific Research in UkrSSR
3.2 Origins and Resolution of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Problems in UkrSSR (1950s-1960s)
3.3 Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes in Soviet Ukraine
3.4 Situation in the Atomic Industry Prior to Construction of First Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants
3.5 Construction of Nuclear Power Plants in Soviet Ukraine (1970s-1980s)
3.6 Chernobyl NPP
4 Conclusions
References
Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine
1 Legal Framework and Early Developments
2 Nuclear Legacy of Ukraine: Composition and Quantities
2.1 Strategic Nuclear Forces (Delivery Vehicles)
2.2 Sub-strategic Systems (Delivery Vehicles)
2.3 Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Delivery Vehicles and Platforms)
2.4 Nuclear Ammunitions Control: How and By Whom
2.5 Strategic Nuclear Weapons (Warheads)
2.6 Sub-strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Warheads)
3 Nuclear Disarmament: Decision-Making Logic
3.1 Political Interests
3.2 Missile Industry Lobby
3.3 Missile Plans Conversion
3.4 Pro-Nuclear Lobby that Never Materialized
4 External Pressure
4.1 The Russian Factor
4.2 Role of the USA and the EU in Ukraine´s Nuclear Disarmament
5 Non-Nuclear Choice
5.1 Accession to the NPT
5.2 The Budapest Memorandum and Security Assurances for Ukraine
6 Conclusions
References
Nuclear Energy in Independent Ukraine
1 Nuclear Energy Sector in Ukraine: Historic Perspective, Key Challenges, and Current Status
1.1 Strategic Vision to Develop Nuclear Energy Sector in the 1990s
1.2 Situation in Ukrainian Nuclear Energy Sector
2 Chernobyl Accident and Development of Nuclear Science and Industry in UkrSSR Afterwards
2.1 The Chernobyl Accident
2.2 Causes of the Accident
2.3 Punishment of the Guilty
2.4 Glasnost and the Chernobyl Accident
2.5 Situation Around the Liquidation Activities after Accident at Chernobyl NPP
2.6 Chernobyl Accident and Its Impact on How the IAEA Responded to This Crisis
3 Moratorium on the Construction of New Nuclear Power Plants in the UkrSSR and the Public Factor in Atomic Energy Development ...
3.1 End of the Moratorium
3.2 Public Dimension
4 Establishing an Organization to Administer National Nuclear Power: Discussions, Key Problems, and Milestones
4.1 Administration of Nuclear Sector in Independent Ukraine
5 History of Establishing the National Nuclear Regulation System
6 The Role of International Cooperation to Sustain the Nuclear Energy Complex of Ukraine, and Strengthen Nuclear Safety and Se...
6.1 Closure of Chernobyl NPP
6.2 Nuclear Safety Strengthening of Existing Reactors. Rivne NPP and Khmelnitsky NPP Reactors Completion
6.3 Bilateral Cooperation
7 Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine and its Impact on the Nuclear Industry Development
8 Nuclear Security in Ukraine
8.1 Ukraine and Nuclear Security Summits
8.2 Nuclear Security after 2014
8.3 Uncontrolled Territories
9 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Safeguards and Ukraine
9.1 Export Control System
10 Ukraine´s Participation in the International Nuclear and Radiation Safety Regime
11 Conclusions
Conclusion: Lessons to Be Learned

Citation preview

Contributions to International Relations

Polina Sinovets Editor

Ukraine’s Nuclear History A Non-Proliferation Perspective

Contributions to International Relations

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on all areas of international relations. Contributions to International Relations (CIR) welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as IR-theory, international security studies, foreign policy, peace and conflict studies, international organization, global governance, international political economy, the history of international relations and related fields.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/16658

Polina Sinovets Editor

Ukraine’s Nuclear History A Non-Proliferation Perspective

Editor Polina Sinovets Department of International Relations, Odessa Center for Nonproliferation Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University Odesa, Ukraine

ISSN 2731-5061 ISSN 2731-507X (electronic) Contributions to International Relations ISBN 978-3-030-90660-3 ISBN 978-3-030-90661-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90661-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Introduction

The introduction explains the uniqueness, the reasoning and the roots of the monograph, and the aim of the authors referring to the new sources in understanding the nuclear history of Ukraine. The key notions and expressions used in the monograph are explained. The authors evaluate the main documents and literature they are relying on in writing the monograph and also describe the structure of the book. There are several important reasons to read this book on the nuclear history of Ukraine. The first reason is that the well-known story of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament is but an episode in Ukraine’s nuclear history. Many important developments took place before and after. The second reason is that the well-known story of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament is not really well known. The received wisdom that Ukraine bargained to maximize compensation for a nuclear arsenal that did not properly belong to it, and ultimately surrendering it under international pressure is unacceptably simplistic. It disregards much important historical record about Ukraine’s motivations, its capabilities, and what it ultimately settled for. The third reason is that Ukraine is a rare example of nuclear rollback and, despite its uniqueness, can serve as a guide to understanding the possibility of nuclear renunciation in the future. The aim of this book is to sketch out the whole nuclear history of Ukraine, beginning from its experiences within the Russian Empire in the early twentieth century, through its Soviet period, and ending with Ukraine as an independent state that inherited the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. It is difficult to disentangle what was “Ukrainian” and what was “Soviet” in the nuclear history of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR). According to its constitution, the former USSR was a federation, constitutive parts of which had, at least on paper, the right to secede and establish independent statehood. Two of the constitutive republics—the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics, modern Belarus and Ukraine– were formally members of the UN, alongside the USSR. Yet, the Soviet political system rested on a stringent hierarchy and communist ideology, with lines of subordination often leading straight to Moscow. At the same time, even those

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institutions, organizations, and enterprises in Ukraine that were directly subordinated to Moscow often had local supervisors in Kyiv. Ukraine’s geographical borders and institutional outlines became suddenly significant when Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, inheriting from the USSR nuclear weapons and industrial capabilities, with all the attendant problems. To sidestep these challenges, we define Ukraine’s nuclear history as all developments in the nuclear sphere that transpired on the territory of Ukraine before and after its independence. A comprehensive nuclear history of Ukraine has not been written before. Separate episodes, such as the nuclear disarmament of the early 1990s, have gotten some scholarly attention. The events preceding and following it have largely remained neglected. Even Ukraine’s history of nuclear disarmament has so far gotten only cursory treatment. We tried to join in this study three big parts of Ukrainian nuclear history: first part outlines Ukraine’s participation in the Soviet nuclear program; second part is dedicated to the surrender of nuclear weapons and missile programs following Ukraine’s independence in 1991; and third part addresses the establishment of Ukraine’s modern civilian nuclear energy complex. This is the first historical account of such scope. Ukraine’s decision to surrender its nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in 1994 was controversial domestically at the time and has remained controversial since. The discussions of whether nuclear renunciation was the right choice for Ukraine returned with renewed force after Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent military aggression in Ukraine’s eastern provinces.1 Ukraine was deprived of some fundamental benefits it thought it had gained by rejecting nuclear weapons in 1994—its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nuclear power Russia violated its obligations toward non-nuclear Ukraine, including those pledged specifically in connection with Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. In the wake of 2014, Russia has also attempted to tamper with the supply of the nuclear fuel on which Ukraine’s civilian nuclear industry relies, threatening the country’s energy security. Many of these problems have their roots in the economic and political circumstances of the early 1990s when Ukraine accepted compensation for the fissile material contained in its nuclear weapons in the form of Russian nuclear fuel

1

In 2014, following the change of government in Ukraine from a pro-Russian to a pro-Western one, the Russian Federation challenged the legitimacy of Crimea as a part of Ukraine. Having supported the referendum on the territorial independence of Crimea by sending undeclared Russian troops there, Moscow officially recognized the right of the peninsula to join Russia, realized the same year. Ukraine and the international community have not recognized the results of the referendum defining Russian actions as annexation (EU resolution?). Russia used similar actions sending troops also to the Donbas region of Ukraine to support the separatist movement of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s republics in 2014. Neither of the self-proclaimed republics have been recognized by the Ukrainian government or the international community. To maintain security in the region, the Joint operation of the Ukrainian Forces (Antiterrorist operation 2014–2017) was started.

Introduction

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assemblies for its nuclear power plants. This short-term solution had a negative impact on the development of the whole of the Ukrainian nuclear industry. Was nuclear disarmament inevitable for Kyiv? What did Ukraine gain and lose by joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1994? There is no simple answer. In exchange for surrendering the inherited nuclear weapons and foregoing military uses of nuclear energy for the future, Ukraine tried to obtain legally binding international security guarantees. This condition was put into Ukraine’s legal instruments of accession to the NPT and START. Ukraine managed to get only political assurances, combined with some financial assistance and support, in exchange for joining the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Substantive and definitional differences between binding security guarantees and NPT-related assurances notwithstanding [1], Russia’s breach of its commitments pledged in connection with Ukraine’s disarmament is bound to have a negative impact on the entire NPT regime. Some part of the Ukrainian experience is universal, another—uniquely individual. The universal part relates to the exchange of guarantees that the possession of nuclear weapons can give for the elusive substance that non-nuclear status may promise. Ukraine was strenuously solving this question in the early 1990s. The way Ukraine found the solution is instructive for many other countries both non-nuclear and those nuclear ones who one day may decide to go non-nuclear in the spirit of Article 6 of the NPT. Ukraine’s nuclear predicament following the collapse of the Soviet Union was unique. The NPT nuclear weapon states tend to interpret the case of Ukraine’s disarmament as the withdrawal from its territory of a nuclear arsenal deposited there by a historical fluke. This withdrawal is regarded as the fulfillment by Ukraine of an essential condition for gaining international recognition as an independent sovereign state. The prevailing view in Ukraine, however, is that Ukraine was the rightful owner of the nuclear arms it chose to surrender, although this ownership did not quite amount to possession as defined by articles 1 and 2 of the NPT. The terminology denoting Ukraine’s relation to the nuclear arms on its territory, whether be it deployment, ownership, or possession, has significance beyond semantic nuances. It elucidates Ukraine’s motives in shaping its nuclear policy. In this regard, Ukraine’s nuclear history preceding the 1990s is vitally important for understanding the country’s claims and choices. One of the main tasks of our study was to gather as much empirical data as possible from the early years of nuclear physics research in Ukraine through to the development of the modern nuclear energy complex. It also includes materials that help reconstruct the development of Ukraine’s nuclear energy complex after the Soviet breakup. This process was accompanied by constant economic woes, political pressure, and supply risks as well as popular movements that led to the moratorium on the construction of new nuclear reactors in Ukraine. The international community grew deeply concerned regarding the safety and security of nuclear facilities, and the assistance in this domain from international partners became one of the main elements of the successful development of the nuclear energy complex in Ukraine.

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Introduction

Ukraine’s engagement in the Soviet Nuclear Project has its roots in the development of physics and technology still within the Russian Empire and then in the pre-WWII Soviet Union. In much of the literature, the contribution of the Ukrainian scientists and institutions is obscured and subsumed under general Soviet achievements. This has been the case with most Soviet sources. Only within the last three decades have select publications attempted to extricate the independent input of the Ukrainian scientists in nuclear research and the development of the Soviet bomb. Our conclusions are drawn from the evidence presented in this book, including the new archival records we engage with. At the same time, our research builds on a number of important earlier studies. We hope that our contribution will foster a better understanding of the Ukrainian case within the modern discourse on nuclear nonproliferation, safety, and security. Some of the most valuable archival records have become available due to the publication of the collection of declassified documents and materials on the Atomic Project of the USSR [2]. The research on Soviet nuclear history by historian David Holloway [3] and physicist Valeriy Pyatov [4] remains foundational. Several Sovietera publications proved instructive, including monographs by Viktor Frenkel [5], Igor Andryushin, Aleksandr Chernyshev, and Yuriy Yudin [6], although they do not parse the Ukrainian contribution to the overall Soviet nuclear project. Some of the first accounts to do so are the memoirs of Aleksandr Weissberg [7] and Aleksandr Leipunsky [8]. The role of the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) and the leading physicians affiliated with the Institute are explored in the essays of Yurii Ranyuk [9], Vladimir Tolok, and others [10]. Ukraine’s denuclearization has probably the largest number of sources. On the one hand, there is a growing set of primary documents, including statements, speeches by presidents, foreign ministries, other officials of Ukraine, Russia, and the USA. There are also memoirs of the key participants of the process, including Ukrainian presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, and Ukraine’s chief negotiator Yuri Kostenko. The memoirs of Russia’s main negotiator Yuri Dubinin, US Foreign Secretary James Baker and US Ambassador-at-Large for Russia, and the Newly Independent States Strobe Talbott paint Ukraine’s nuclear predicament as a challenge to the international nonproliferation regime amid the chaos of Soviet collapse. While participants’ memoirs tend to be rich in detail and nuance, they inevitably represent only one vantage point and are often rife with ex post facto justifications. Secondary literature, including contributions by political scientists and international relations scholars, normally limits the use of empirical data to make or test a theoretical point. Ukrainian researchers tended to analyze nuclear disarmament in the framework of wider security issues such as US policy (Volodymyr Chumak, Volodymyr Dubovyk, Mikhailo Pokas), the stability of the NPT regime (Sergii Galaka), or European security (Grygorii Perepelitsa). At best Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament was presented as an object of the consolidated international efforts or the effectiveness of the NPT regime (Lesya Gak, Mariana Budjeryn). Meanwhile, American researchers first perceived Ukraine either as a problem for the NPT regime (William Kincade, William Potter, Steven Miller, etc.) or as an interesting case for

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testing International Relations (IR) theories such as neorealism, which predicted that Ukraine would not surrender a nuclear deterrent (Waltz and Mearsheimer, Berkovitz, Rosen, Weltman). Later, when Ukraine ended up disarming it became a case to demonstrate the validity of liberal and constructivist IR theories (Sagan, Log & Grillot, Ogilvie-White) or the success of US diplomacy (Pifer, Goodby). The 1996 master’s thesis “Ukraine’s nuclear weapons era: 1923-1996” of Canadian researcher Roman Zyla came closest to providing a comprehensive account of Ukraine’s nuclear history, beginning in the early Soviet era. It focused primarily on the functioning of the Soviet state bureaucracy, however, missing important details of the nuclear program itself. Besides, the civilian aspects of the nuclear history of Ukraine and the process of nuclear disarmament remained outside the scope of the study. Our research, as well as political developments in the past decade, refutes some received wisdom regarding Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. Sherman Garnett’s conclusion that Ukraine’s nuclear deal could serve as “the model, relevant to other proliferation challenges” becomes less tenable in view of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The detailed exploration of Ukraine’s nuclear choices in the early 1990s leaves Long and Grillot’s “state’s beliefs-strategic choice” theory of key drivers of Ukraine’s disarmament wanting. Ukraine’s disarmament became possible due to the complex combination of internal interests and external pressures. First among existing accounts, our research explores in sufficient detail the role of the Ukrainian missile lobby in the state’s nuclear decision-making. In contrast to Christopher Stevens, we show that powerful domestic interest groups were capable of shaping Ukraine’s demand for a nuclear deterrent. Thus, we hope to augment existing accounts and reconstruct Ukraine’s nuclear history in all its complexity. Our research drew on recently declassified documents from US and Ukrainian archives, including the Central State Archive of Ukraine, the Archive of the KGB, National Security Archive in Washington DC, as well as collections of the US State and Defense Departments and the CIA. This book examines Ukraine’s nuclear history and present state from a nonproliferation perspective. It consists of three main parts, which highlight in detail Ukraine’s place in nuclear matters, beginning with the first nuclear research on its territory at the dawn of the USSR, up to its contribution to the present-day NPT regime. The first part “Ukraine’s Contribution to the Soviet Union’s Nuclear Programme Development” focuses on the analysis of the reasons for the founding of the Physics and Technological Institutions in the UkrSSR and examines their role in nuclear research and technology development in the Soviet Union. The part shows how scientists and researchers from UIPT contributed to the nuclear weapons program of the USSR by their work on nuclear fusion, fast reactors, and also centrifuges. The authors of the part also portray the main stages of the nuclear energy infrastructure’s development on the territory of the UkrSSR, arguing that Ukraine played a significant role in the evolution of UkrSSR nuclear science and industry. The second part “Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine” studies in detail the military nuclear heritage of Ukraine in its composition and numbers. We tried to figure out

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the most precise quantities possible of warheads and delivery systems on Ukrainian territory ranged by measure of control on behalf of Ukraine. Great attention was paid to the structure of interests toward nuclear weapons in Ukraine that influenced the decision-making process on nuclear disarmament in the early 1990s. The third part “Nuclear energy in independent Ukraine” looks into the nuclear energy sector of Ukraine formed from separate elements after gaining independence. It includes an outlook on the formation and analysis of the modern state of major subsystems of the Ukrainian energy sector: electricity generation, IAEA safeguards, nuclear security, radiologic safety, and export control. The impact of nuclear disarmament on the nuclear energy sector is also discussed. Therefore, this book is not only a historical reference book devoted to the nuclear history of Ukraine but also a worthy textbook for experts and politicians who are called upon to oversee national and international security. This gives rise to hope that the publication will be interesting and instructive for diplomats, scientists, specialists in international relations and international security, and a wide range of domestic and foreign readers. The group of contributing authors is formed around the Odessa Centre for Non-proliferation (OdCNP), which has assembled the leading Ukrainian experts on nuclear issues. The authors of the book would like to express their gratitude to Lars van Dassen and Sarmite Andersson from the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority for their contribution in inspiring and editing this research. We are grateful for their support and encouragement. The publication of the Ukrainian team’s research was generously supported by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority in the framework of the Ukrainian-Swedish bilateral cooperation agreement. The Nuclear History of Ukraine is one of a series of research projects supported by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) in the former Soviet Union. Nuclear histories of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were published in 2003 [11]. Another publication, Georgia’s Nuclear Odyssey, was published in Tbilisi in 2014 [12]. Together with these accounts, we hope to gain a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of Soviet nuclear history as one not reducible to a Russocentric view. The authors would also like to express special gratitude to David Holloway of Stanford University, USA; Thomas Jonter of Stockholm University, Sweden; Tamara Pataraia of the Civil Council on Defense and Security, Georgia; Joseph Pilats of Los Alamos National Laboratory, USA; and Sonja Schmid of Virginia Technical University, USA. Their suggestions and remarks in the process of reviewing and editing this book have been extremely helpful. We would also like to express special gratitude to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine for their support and contribution.

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References 1. Knopf, J. (2012). In J. Knopf (Ed.), Security assurances: Initial hypothesis/ security assurances and nuclear nonproliferation (p. 17). Stanford University Press. 2. Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы: [в 3 т.]/Под общей редакцией Л.Д. Рябева. - М., 1998–2010. 3. Holloway, D. (1994). Stalin and the bomb. Yale University Press. 4. Пятов В. Ядерные хроники: 1938–1963. Свидетельства непосредственных участников событий. – Харьков: Оптим, 2013 (Pyatov, V. Nuclear Chronicles: 1938–1963. Reports of Direct Participants. Kharkov: Optim, 2013). 5. Френкель В.Я. Профессор Фридрих Хоутерманс: работы, жизнь, судьба. – СПб.: Изд-воПИЯФРАН, 1997 (Frenkel, V. Professor Friedrich Houtermans: Works, Life, Destiny. – St. Petersburg: Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Physics, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1997). 6. Андрюшин И.А., Чернышев А.К., Юдин Ю.А. Укрощение ядра : страницы истории ядерного оружия и ядерной инфраструктуры СССР / [гл. ред. Р. И. Илькаев]. — Саров-Саранск, 2003 (Andryushin I.A., Chernyshev, A.K., Yudin Y.A. Taming the nucleus: pages of the history of nuclear weapons and nuclear infrastructure of the USSR.– Sarov – Saransk, 2003). 7. Weissberg, A. (1951). The Accused. Simon and Shuster. 8. Лейпунский А. И.: избранные труды : воспоминания. - Киев : Наукова думка, 1990. 9. Ранюк Ю. Історія Високовольтного корпуса УФТІ (до 75-річчя від часу розщеплення атомного ядра) // Світогляд. – 2007. – №3 (Ranyuk, Y. History of UIPT High Voltage Building (Dated to the 75th Anniversary of Nuclear Fission) // Svitoglyad. – 2007. –No. 3); РанюкЮ. Н. А. И. Лейпунский и ядерная физика на Украине//Известия вузов. Ядерная энергетика. – 2003. - № 4 (Ranyuk Y. A. Leipunsky and Nuclear Physics in Ukraine// IzvestiyaVuzov. Nuclear Energy. – 2003. – No. 4). 10. Толок, В., Коган, В., Власов, В. ФизикаиХарьков. – Харьков, 2009 (Tolok, V., Rjgan, V., Vlasov, D. Physics and Kharkov, 2009). 11. Ekmane I., Spare R., Zanda S., & Satrovska D. (2003, August). Historical survey of nuclear energy activities in Latvia (p. 52). 12. Akubardia, T., Lortkipanidze, Sh., Pataraia, T., & Mchedishvili, I. (Eds.). (2014). Georgia’s nuclear odyssey: the path from the Soviet atomic legacy to global nonproliferation regime (p. 36). Tbilisi.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Polina Sinovets

1

Ukraine’s Contribution to the Soviet Union’s Nuclear Programme . . . . . Iryna Maksymenko, Oleksandr Cheban, Denys Kuzmin, and Dmytro Chumak

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Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Polina Sinovets, Oleksii Izhak, Sergiy Galaka, Iryna Maksymenko, and Hryhorii Perepelytsa

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Nuclear Energy in Independent Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Dmytro Chumak and Oleksii Izhak Conclusion: Lessons to Be Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 Polina Sinovets

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About the Authors

Oleksandr Cheban holds a PhD in Political Science. During the period of 2014–2016, he was a Senior Research Fellow of the Center for International Studies and from September 2015 was a Senior Research Fellow of the Odessa Center for Nonproliferation. He also received several individual and institutional fellowships, including the Fulbright program and Woodrow Wilson Center (USA), NATO Defence College, and Roma III University (Italy). He has taken part in numerous international conferences and workshops on such issues as nonproliferation and nuclear security, the Iranian nuclear program, and problems of nuclear proliferation and nuclear security in the Middle East as well. Dmytro Chumak is a Research Consultant at the Odessa Center for Nonproliferation. Previously, he worked at the Technical Support Organization to the Ukrainian nuclear regulator. He is a PhD candidate at the Odessa National I.I. Mechnikov University. He has published a number of articles on nuclear issues, in particular on international cooperation in nuclear energy, the fight against nuclear terrorism, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear security, and information security. Dmytro held an internship at the UNODA (Vienna, Republic of Austria) in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. He has repeatedly presented his research at IAEA conferences. In 2015, he successfully accomplished the Science and Engineering for Nuclear Security module of the Certificate program by the World Institute for Nuclear Security. In 2012, Dmytro was a visiting fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Sergiy Galaka is professor and lecturer in international relations and international security at the Institute of International Relations, Taras Shevchenko University National University of Kyiv. He graduated from Taras Shevchenko University National University of Kyiv, Department of International Relations (MA), and has a PhD in international relations and in political sciences. His research interests involve problems of nuclear nonproliferation, US foreign policy, and wider security issues. He has a number of publications in Ukraine, Great xv

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About the Authors

Britain, France, Greece, and Russia, mostly devoted to nuclear nonproliferation. He is the author of the main monograph The Problem of Nuclear Nonproliferation in International Relations (Kyiv, 2001). He was a visiting fellow at Monterey Institute of International Relations (USA, 1993) and Maryland (College Park) University (USA, 1995) and is an alumnus of, among others, the Harvard security program, Salzburg seminar. Oleksii Izhak works at the National Institute for Strategic Studies as a head of department. Before starting his career at NISS, he worked in the defense industry. He is an alumnus of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. In his current position, his main responsibility is preparing analysis on security issues for state bodies of Ukraine, including contributions to reports used for preparing messages of the President of Ukraine to Parliament. Oleksii Izhak is co-author of several monographs and author of a number of articles on national and international security and relations in professional journals and periodicals. Denys Kuzmin is Assistant Professor of the International Relations Department, Odessa Mechnikov National University (ONU) in Ukraine. He is a senior research fellow and the European Studies Program Coordinator at the Center for International Studies at the Odessa I.I. Mechnikov National University (since 1996). Since 2015, he is Program Coordinator at the Odessa Center for Nonproliferation at the ONU. He has taken part in numerous conferences and experts’ meetings on security issues and has undergone internships at universities in the USA, Canada, and the EU. Iryna Maksymenko holds a PhD in Political Science and is Associate Professor of the International Relations Department, Odessa Mechnikov National University (ONU), Ukraine. Starting from 2001, she is a senior research fellow of the Center for International Studies. She has also working experience as a senior research fellow at the Odessa Regional Branch of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Department of Regional Studies (2004–2015). Since 2009, she has been participating in security and nonproliferation meetings carried out in the ONU in close cooperation with the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. She is an Administrative Coordinator for organizing and realization of different events and projects on nonproliferation, arms control, and nuclear security at the Odessa Center for Nonproliferation at the ONU (2015). Her research and teaching interests are Ukraine’s foreign and security policy, EU foreign and security policy, and conflict studies. She is the author of numerous academic and analytical papers and book chapters.

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Hryhorii Perepelytsa is a Doctor in Political Sciences and Professor. He graduated from the Senior Navy School (1976) and the Defense Academy (1984). From 1992 to 1995, he was chief of the analytical group at the Center for Strategic Studies of the General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine. Since 1995, he has been head of the military policy department at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and became Deputy Director of the National institute for Strategic Studies (2003) and the Professor of the Institute of International Relations at the Kiev National University (2006). He is known in Ukraine and abroad as an expert in the field of foreign and security policy and is the author of over 100 scientific publications and books. Polina Sinovets holds a PhD in Political Science and is Associate Professor of the International Relations Department, Odessa Mechnikov National University (ONU), Ukraine. She is also the Head of the Odessa Center for Nonproliferation, based at the Odessa I.I. Mechnikov University, Ukraine. In addition, Dr. Sinovets is Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations, Political Science and Sociology at ONU. She previously worked as a senior research associate at Ukraine's National Institute for Strategic Studies. In 2006, she was a research fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, in 2015 the research fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome, and in 2017/18 the Fulbright Scholar at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington DC. She is an expert in nuclear weapons policy and published articles in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Russia in Global Politics, NATO Defence College Research Papers, etc.

Abbreviations

ABB ABM ALCM AOS AOSIP AOSRI ARC BSF BSSR CC CP(B)U CC CPSU CFE CIS COM CPC ENSREG Euratom f. F. FA FE Gospromatom-nadzor HB HEU IAEA ICBM IL

Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. (Swedish-Swiss Company) anti-ballistic missile air-launched cruise missile Academy of Sciences Academy of Sciences Institute of Physics Academy of Sciences Radium Institute Autonomous Republic of Crimea Black Sea Fleet Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (hist.) Central Committee of the Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks) of Ukraine Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Commonwealth of Independent States USSR Council of Ministers (USSR) Council of People’s Commissars (USSR) European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group European Atomic Energy Community File Fund fuel assembly fuel element USSR State Oversight Committee for Industry and Nuclear Energy Safety heavy bomber highly enriched uranium International Atomic Energy Agency intercontinental ballistic missile Instrumentation Laboratory (USSR Academy of Sciences) xix

xx

inv. IPC IPS IPT IRM ISL ISRM JCIC KIPT kWh LIPT MD MENR MEPNSU MIA Minatomenergo-prom Minsredmash MIRV MMD MNRE MODCD MTCR NASU NDF NFC NHPP NPT NPP NPT NRS P&MS PCEI PCHE R&D RAW RBMK RFPA RR RRC KI

Abbreviations

inventory Institute of Physical Chemistry Institute of Physical Science (USSR Academy of Sciences) Institute of Physics Technology (UkrSSR Academy of Sciences) intermediate-range missile Impact Stress Laboratory intermediate and shorter-range missiles Joint Compliance and Inspections Commission (under the START) Kharkiv Institute of Physics Technology kilowatt-hour Leningrad Institute of Physics Technology maintenance depot Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Ministry of Environment Protection and Nuclear Safety of Ukraine Ministry of Internal Affairs USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry USSR Ministry of Intermediate Engineering multiple independent re-entry vehicle mobile maintenance depot Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Ministry of Defence, Chief Directorate Missile Technology Control Regime National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine US Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund Nuclear fuel cycle nuclear heat and power plant Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear power plant Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear and radiation safety Physics and Mathematics Section (USSR Academy of Sciences) People’s Commissariat of Power Plants and Electrical Industry (USSR) People’s Commissariat of Heavy Engineering (USSR) research and development radioactive waste high-power pressure-tube reactor Russian Federation Presidential Archive research reactor Russian Research Centre Kurchatov Institute

Abbreviations

s. SCD SCUNEU SIR SL SLBM SMF SNF SNRIU SNRSCU SNUNE&I SPE SSU START TPNW UAV UIPT Ukratomenergo-prom UkrSSR UN USSR USSR MOE VVER WENRA WMD

xxi

sheet State Committee of Defence State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear Energy Use source of ionizing radiation silo launcher submarine-launched ballistic missile strategic missile forces spent nuclear fuel State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine State Nuclear and Radiation Safety Committee of Ukraine Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry Scientific and Production Enterprise Security Service of Ukraine Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons unmanned aerial vehicles Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology Ukrainian State Concern for the Operation of Atomic Energy and Industry Facilities Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (hist.) United Nations Organization Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USSR Ministry of Energy and Electrification water moderated power reactor Western European Nuclear Regulators Association weapons of mass destruction

Introduction Polina Sinovets

The introduction explains the uniqueness, the reasoning, and the roots of the monograph as well as the aim of the authors referring to the new sources in understanding the nuclear history of Ukraine. The key notions and expressions, used in the monograph are explained. The authors evaluate main documents and literature they are relying on in writing the monograph and also describe the structure of the book. There are several important reasons to read this book on the nuclear history of Ukraine. The first reason is that the well-known story of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament is but an episode in Ukraine’s nuclear history. Many important developments took place before and after. The second reason is that the well-known story of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament is not really well-known. The received wisdom that Ukraine bargained to maximize compensation for a nuclear arsenal that did not properly belong to it, and ultimately surrendered it under international pressure is unacceptably simplistic. It disregards many important historical records about Ukraine’s motivations, its capabilities, and what it ultimately settled for. The third reason is that Ukraine is a rare example of nuclear roll-back and, despite its uniqueness, can serve as a guide to understanding the possibility of nuclear renunciation in the future. The aim of this book is to sketch out the whole nuclear history of Ukraine, beginning from its experiences within the Russian Empire in the early 20th century, through its Soviet period, and ending with Ukraine as an independent state that inherited the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. It is difficult to disentangle what was “Ukrainian” and what was “Soviet” in the nuclear history of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR). According to its constitution, the former USSR was a federation, constitutive parts of which had, at least on paper, the right to secede P. Sinovets (*) Department of International Relations, Odessa Center for Nonproliferation, Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University, Odesa, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. Sinovets (ed.), Ukraine’s Nuclear History, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90661-0_1

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and establish independent statehood. Two of the constitutive republics—the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics, modern Belarus and Ukraine– were formally members of the UN, alongside the USSR. Yet the Soviet political system rested on a stringent hierarchy and communist ideology, with lines of subordination often leading straight to Moscow. At the same time, even those institutions, organizations, and enterprises in Ukraine that were directly subordinated to Moscow often had local supervisors in Kyiv. Ukraine’s geographical borders and institutional outlines became suddenly significant when Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, inheriting from the USSR nuclear weapons and industrial capabilities, with all the attendant problems. To sidestep these challenges, we define Ukraine’s nuclear history as all developments in the nuclear sphere that transpired on the territory of Ukraine before and after its independence. A comprehensive nuclear history of Ukraine has not been written before. Separate episodes, such as the nuclear disarmament of the early 1990s have gotten some scholarly attention. The events preceding and following it have largely remained neglected. Even Ukraine’s history of nuclear disarmament has so far gotten only cursory treatment. We tried to join in this study three big chapters of Ukrainian nuclear history: Chapter “Ukraine’s Contribution to the Soviet Union’s Nuclear Programme” outlines Ukraine’s participation in the Soviet nuclear and missile program; Chapter “Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine” is dedicated to the surrender of nuclear weapons following Ukraine’s independence in 1991; and Chapter “Nuclear Energy in Independent Ukraine” addresses the establishment of Ukraine’s modern civilian nuclear energy complex. This is the first historical account of such scope. Ukraine’s decision to surrender its nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in 1994 was controversial domestically at the time and has remained controversial since. The discussions of whether nuclear renunciation was the right choice for Ukraine returned with renewed force after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent military aggression in Ukraine’s eastern provinces.1 Ukraine was deprived of some fundamental benefits it thought it had gained by rejecting nuclear weapons in 1994—its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nuclear power Russia violated its obligations toward nonnuclear Ukraine, including those pledged specifically in connection with Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. In the wake

1

In 2014, following the change of government in Ukraine from a pro-Russian to a pro-Western one, the Russian Federation challenged the legitimacy of Crimea as a part of Ukraine. Having supported the referendum on the territorial independence of Crimea by sending undeclared Russian troops there, Moscow officially recognized the right of the peninsula to join Russia, realized the same year. Ukraine and the international community have not recognized the results of the referendum defining Russian actions as annexation (EU resolution?). Russia used similar actions sending troops also to the Donbas region of Ukraine to support the separatist movement of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People republics in 2014. Neither of the self-proclaimed republics have been recognized by the Ukrainian government or the international community. To maintain security in the region the Joint operation of the Ukrainian Forces (Antiterrorist operation 2014–2017) was started.

Introduction

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of 2014, Russia has also attempted to tamper with supply of the nuclear fuel on which Ukraine’s civilian nuclear industry relies, threatening the country’s energy security. Many of these problems have their roots in the economic and political circumstances of the early 1990s when Ukraine accepted compensation for the fissile material contained in its nuclear weapons in the form of Russian nuclear fuel assemblies for its nuclear power plants. This short-term solution had a negative impact on the development of the whole of the Ukrainian nuclear industry. Was nuclear disarmament inevitable for Kyiv? What did Ukraine gain and lose by joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1994? There is no simple answer. In exchange for surrendering the inherited nuclear weapons and foregoing military uses of nuclear energy for the future, Ukraine tried to obtain legally binding international security guarantees. This condition was put into Ukraine’s legal instruments of accession to the NPT and START. Ukraine managed to get only political assurances, combined with some financial assistance and support, in exchange for joining the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Substantive and definitional differences between binding security guarantees and NPT-related assurances notwithstanding [1], Russia’s breach of its commitments pledged in connection with Ukraine’s disarmament is bound to have a negative impact on the entire NPT regime. Some part of the Ukrainian experience is universal, another—uniquely individual. The universal part relates to the exchange of guarantees that the possession of nuclear weapons can give for the elusive substance that nonnuclear status may promise. Ukraine was strenuously solving this question in the early 1990s. The way Ukraine found the solution is instructive for many other countries both nonnuclear and those nuclear ones who one day may decide to go nonnuclear in the spirit of Article 6 of the NPT. Ukraine’s nuclear predicament following the collapse of the Soviet Union was unique. The NPT nuclear weapon states tend to interpret the case of Ukraine’s disarmament as the withdrawal from its territory of a nuclear arsenal deposited there by a historical fluke. This withdrawal is regarded as the fulfillment by Ukraine of an essential condition for gaining international recognition as an independent sovereign state. The prevailing view in Ukraine, however, is that Ukraine was the rightful owner of the nuclear arms it chose to surrender, although this ownership did not quite amount to possession as defined by Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT. The terminology denoting Ukraine’s relation to the nuclear arms on its territory, whether deployment, ownership, or possession, has significance beyond semantic nuances. It elucidates Ukraine’s motives in shaping its nuclear policy. In this regard, Ukraine’s nuclear history preceding the 1990s is vitally important for understanding the country’s claims and choices. One of the main tasks of our study was to gather as much empirical data as possible from the early years of nuclear physics research in Ukraine through to the development of the modern nuclear energy complex. It also includes materials that help reconstruct the development of Ukraine’s nuclear energy complex after the Soviet breakup. This process was accompanied by constant economic woes, political pressure, and supply risks as well as popular movements that led to the moratorium

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on the construction of new nuclear reactors in Ukraine. The international community grew deeply concerned regarding the safety and security of nuclear facilities, and the assistance in this domain from international partners became one of the main elements of the successful development of the nuclear energy complex in Ukraine. Ukraine’s engagement in the Soviet Nuclear Project has its roots in the development of physics and technology still within the Russian Empire and then in the pre-WWII Soviet Union. In much of the literature, the contribution of the Ukrainian scientists and institutions is obscured and subsumed under general Soviet achievements. This has been the case with most Soviet sources. Only within the last three decades have select publications attempted to extricate the independent input of the Ukrainian scientists in nuclear research and the development of the Soviet bomb. Our conclusions are drawn from the evidence presented in this book, including the new archival records we engage with. At the same time, our research builds on a number of important earlier studies. We hope that our contribution will foster a better understanding of the Ukrainian case within the modern discourse on nuclear nonproliferation, safety, and security. Some of the most valuable archival records have become available due to publication of the collection of declassified documents and materials on the Atomic Project of the USSR.2 The research on Soviet nuclear history by historian David Holloway [2] and physicist Valeriy Pyatov3 remains foundational. Several Sovietera publications proved instructive, including monographs by Viktor Frenkel,4 Igor Andryushin, Aleksandr Chernyshev, and Yuriy Yudin,5 although they do not parse the Ukrainian contribution to the overall Soviet nuclear project. Some of the first accounts to do so are the memoirs of Aleksandr Weissberg [3] and Aleksandr Leipunsky.6 The role of the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT)

«Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы» : [в 3т.]/Под общей редакцией Л.Д. Рябева. - М., 1998-2010. 3 Пятов В. Ядерныехроники: 1938-1963. Свидетельства непосредственных участников событий. – Харьков: Оптим, 2013 (Pyatov, V. Nuclear Chronicles: 1938–1963. Reports of Direct Participants.Kharkov: Optim, 2013). 4 Френкель В.Я. Профессор Фридрих Хоутерманс: работы, жизнь, судьба. – СПб.: Изд-во ПИЯФРАН, 1997 (Frenkel, V.Professor Friedrich Houtermans: Works, Life, Destiny. – St. Petersburg: Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Physics, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1997). 5 Андрюшин И.А., Чернышев А.К., Юдин Ю.А. Укрощение ядра : страницы истории ядерного оружия и ядерной инфраструктуры СССР / [гл. ред. Р. И. Илькаев]. — Саров-Саранск, 2003 (Andryushin I.A., Chernyshev, A.K., Yudin Y.A. Taming the nucleus: pages of the history of nuclear weapons and nuclear infrastructure of the USSR.– Sarov – Saransk, 2003). 6 Лейпунский А. И.: избранные труды : воспоминания. - Киев : Наукова думка, 1990. 2

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and the leading physicians affiliated with the Institute are explored in the essays of Yurii Ranyuk,7 Vladimir Tolok, and others.8 Ukraine’s denuclearization has probably the largest number of sources. On the one hand, there is a growing set of primary documents, including statements, speeches by presidents, foreign ministries, other officials of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States. There are also memoirs of the key participants of the process, including Ukrainian presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, and Ukraine’s chief negotiator Yuri Kostenko. The memoirs of Russia’s main negotiator Yuri Dubinin, US Foreign Secretary James Baker, and US Ambassador-at-Large for Russia and the Newly Independent States Strobe Talbott paint Ukraine’s nuclear predicament as a challenge to the international nonproliferation regime amid the chaos of Soviet collapse. While participants’ memoirs tend to be rich in detail and nuance, they inevitably represent only one vantage point and are often rife with expostfacto justifications. Secondary literature, including contributions by political scientists and international relations scholars, normally limits the use of empirical data to make or test a theoretical point. Ukrainian researchers tended to analyze nuclear disarmament in the framework of wider security issues such as US policy (Volodymyr Chumak, Volodymyr Dubovyk, Mikhailo Pokas), the stability of the NPT regime (Sergii Galaka), or European security (Grygorii Perepelitsa). At best Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament was presented as an object of the consolidated international efforts or the effectiveness of the NPT regime (Lesya Gak, Mariana Budjeryn). Meanwhile, American researchers first perceived Ukraine either as a problem for the NPT regime (William Kincade, William Potter, Steven Miller, etc.) or as an interesting case for testing International Relations (IR) theories such as neorealism, which predicted that Ukraine would not surrender a nuclear deterrent (Waltz and Mearsheimer, Berkovitz, Rosen, Weltman). Later, when Ukraine ended up disarming it became a case to demonstrate the validity of liberal and constructivist IR theories (Sagan, Log & Grillot, Ogilvie-White) or the success of US diplomacy (Pifer, Goodby). The 1996 master’s thesis “Ukraine's nuclear weapons era: 1923–1996” of Canadian researcher Roman Zyla came closest to providing a comprehensive account of Ukraine’s nuclear history, beginning in the early Soviet era. It focused primarily on the functioning of the Soviet state bureaucracy, however, missing important details of the nuclear program itself. Besides, the civilian aspects of the nuclear history of Ukraine and the process of nuclear disarmament remained outside of the scope of the study.

Ранюк Ю. Історія високовольтного корпуса УФТІ (до 75-річчя від часу розщеплення атомного ядра) // Світогляд. – 2007. – №3 (Ranyuk, Y. History of UIPT High Voltage Building (Dated to the 75th Anniversary of Nuclear Fission) // Svitoglyad. – 2007. –No. 3); Ранюк Ю. Н. А. И. Лейпунский и ядерная физика на Украине// Известия вузов. Ядерная энергетика. – 2003. - № 4 (Ranyuk Y.A. Leipunsky and Nuclear Physicsin Ukraine // IzvestiyaVuzov. Nuclear Energy. – 2003. – No. 4). 8 Толок, В., Коган, В., Власов, В. Физика и Харьков. – Харьков, 2009 (Tolok, V., Rjgan, V., Vlasov D. Physics and Kharkov, 2009). 7

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Our research, as well as political developments in the past decade, refute some received wisdom regarding Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. Sherman Garnett’s conclusion that Ukraine’s nuclear deal could serve as “the model, relevant to other proliferation challenges” becomes less tenable in view of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The detailed exploration of Ukraine’s nuclear choices in the early 1990s leaves Long and Grillot’s “state’s beliefs-strategic choice” theory of key drivers of Ukraine’s disarmament wanting. Ukraine’s disarmament became possible due to the complex combination of internal interests and external pressures. First among existing accounts, our research explores in sufficient detail the role of the Ukrainian missile lobby in the state’s nuclear decision-making. Contra Christopher Stevens, we show that powerful domestic interest groups were capable of shaping Ukraine’s demand for a nuclear deterrent. Thus, we hope to augment existing accounts and reconstruct Ukraine’s nuclear history in all its complexity. Our research drew on recently declassified documents from the USA and Ukrainian archives, including the Central State Archive of Ukraine, the Archive of the KGB, National Security Archive in Washington D.C., as well as collections of the US State and Defense Departments and the CIA. The present book examines Ukraine’s nuclear history and present state from a nonproliferation perspective. It consists of three main chapters, which highlight in detail Ukraine’s place in nuclear matters, beginning with the first nuclear research on its territory at the dawn of the USSR, up to its contribution to the present day NPT regime. The first chapter “Ukraine’s Contribution to the Soviet Union’s Nuclear Programme Development” focuses on the analysis of the reasons for the founding of the Physics and Technological Institutions in the UkrSSR and examines their role in nuclear research and technology development in the Soviet Union. The chapter shows how scientists and researchers from UIPT contributed to the nuclear weapons program of the USSR by their work on nuclear fusion, fast reactors, and also centrifuges. The authors of the chapter also portray the main stages of the nuclear energy infrastructure’s development on the territory of the UkrSSR, arguing that Ukraine played a significant role in the evolution of UkrSSR nuclear science and industry. The second chapter “Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine” studies in detail the military nuclear heritage of Ukraine in its composition and numbers. We tried to figure out the most precise quantities possible of warheads and delivery systems on Ukrainian territory ranged by smeasure of control on behalf of Ukraine. Great attention was paid to the structure of interests toward nuclear weapons in Ukraine that influenced the decision-making process on nuclear disarmament in the early 1990s. The third chapter “Nuclear Energy in Independent Ukraine” looks into the nuclear energy sector of Ukraine formed from separate elements after gaining independence. It includes an outlook on the formation and analysis of the modern state of major sub-systems of the Ukrainian energy sector: electricity generation, IAEA safeguards, nuclear security, radiologic safety, and export control. The impact of nuclear disarmament on the nuclear energy sector is also discussed.

Introduction

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Therefore, this book is not only a historical reference book devoted to the nuclear history of Ukraine but also a worthy textbook for experts and politicians who are called upon to oversee national and international security. This gives rise to hope that the publication will be interesting and instructive for diplomats, scientists, specialists in international relations and international security, as well as for a wide range of domestic and foreign readers. The group of contributing authors is formed around the Odessa Centre for Non-proliferation (OdCNP), which has assembled the leading Ukrainian experts on nuclear issues. The authors of the book would like to express their gratitude to Lars van Dassen and Sarmite Andersson from the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority for their contribution in inspiring and editing this research. We are grateful for their support and encouragement. The publication of the Ukrainian team’s research was generously supported by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority in the framework of the Ukrainian–Swedish bilateral cooperation agreement. The Nuclear History of Ukraine is one of a series of research projects supported by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) in the former Soviet Union. Nuclear histories of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were published in 2003.9 Another publication, Georgia’s Nuclear Odyssey was published in Tbilisi in 2014.10 Together with these accounts, we hope to gain a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of Soviet nuclear history as one not reducible to a Russo-centric view. The authors would also like to express special gratitude to David Holloway of Stanford University, USA, Thomas Jonter of Stockholm University, Sweden, Tamara Pataraia of the Civil Council on Defense and Security, Georgia, Joseph Pilats of Los Alamos National Laboratory, USA, and Sonja Schmid of Virginia Technical University, USA. Their suggestions and remarks in the process of reviewing and editing this book have been extremely helpful. We would also like to express special gratitude to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine for their support and contribution.

References 1. Knopf, J. (2012). In J. Knopf (Ed.), Security assurances: Initial hypothesis. Security assurances and nuclear nonproliferation (p. 17). Stanford University Press. 2. Holloway, D. (1994). Stalin and the Bomb. Yale University Press. 3. Weissberg, A. (1951). The Accused. Simon and Shuster.

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Ekmane I., Spare R., Zanda S., Satrovska D. Historical Survey of Nuclear Energy Activities in Latvia. – August, 2003. p. 52. 10 Georgia’s Nuclear Odyssey: the Path from the Soviet Atomic legacy to Global Nonproliferation Regime/ed by Akubardia T., Lortkipanidze Sh., Pataraia T., Mchedishvili I. – Tbilisi, 2014. – P. 36.

Ukraine’s Contribution to the Soviet Union’s Nuclear Programme Iryna Maksymenko, Oleksandr Cheban, Denys Kuzmin, and Dmytro Chumak

The authors of the chapter try to explain in that way Ukraine contributed to the Soviet Union Nuclear Programme, both military and peaceful. The arguments are developed in three subchapters. The first section provides a retrospective analysis of nuclear physics development on the territory of Ukraine from the 1900s to the 1930s with a special focus on the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology in Kharkiv. The second demonstrates the role of the scientists of the UIPT in the early stage of the Soviet Atomic Project elaborating important discoveries enabling the construction of an atomic bomb. It also explains why Soviet Ukraine took a secondary role in terms of nuclear research and the creation of the hydrogen bomb in the Soviet Union. The third section covers the peaceful nuclear energy research and infrastructure development in Soviet Ukraine during 1945–1986. The authors pay special attention to the shortfalls of the Soviet policy regarding nuclear safety that all in all caused the Chernobyl accident, an international-scale tragedy.

I. Maksymenko (*) · D. Kuzmin Department of International Relations, Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University, Odesa, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] O. Cheban · D. Chumak Odessa Center for Nonproliferation Odessa I. I. Mechnykov National University, Odesa, Ukraine © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. Sinovets (ed.), Ukraine’s Nuclear History, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90661-0_2

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1 Nuclear Physics in Ukraine (1900s–1930s) 1.1

The Beginnings: Nuclear Physics in Ukraine (1900s– 1920s)

The twentieth century was the first nuclear century in the history of humankind—the century that not only gave birth to nuclear weapons but also saw the development of peaceful nuclear energy. The discovery of radioactivity by Maria Sklodowska-Curie galvanized academic research in nuclear physics everywhere, including in the Russian Empire and present-day Ukraine. Nuclear research at Odessa’s Novorossiya University, today Odessa Mechnikov National University, dates back to the 1900s. Kharkiv University had a theoretical and experimental physics department since the early nineteenth century. In 1899–1900 this University launched Ukraine’s first experimental and theoretical studies in radioactivity.1 It is Kharkiv that would later become a renowned centre of Soviet nuclear physics in the pre-World War II period. The Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology (UIPT) in Kharkiv (today “National Science Center Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology”, NSCKIPT) would attract leading academics from Austria and Germany, including Fritz Lange. UIPT’s pulse generator and Atomic Nucleus Department “became a worldwide monopoly” in 1937, according to Fritz Houtermans, another German physicist who worked there.2 With the start of the Soviet Atomic Project in 1942, UIPT became one of several institutions to conduct experiments with uranium. In the post-WWII period, UIPT was the ‘mother’ institution, which spawned physics and technology institutes and research centres in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Sumy and Kaluga (now in the Russian Federation). A 1977 declassified NATO document counted the Physics and Technical Institute of Low Temperature of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in Kharkiv, the largest low-temperature laboratory in the world established in 1960 and employing 2000 scientists, engineers and technicians, and the Cryogenic Laboratory of the Ukrainian Physics and Technical Institute, also in Kharkiv, among the main Soviet cryogenic laboratories.3 The UIPT was also one of the major Soviet establishments that were active in developing methods of achieving a controlled thermonuclear reaction, research work on electron-induced fission of uranium, electron beam-plasma interaction as well as plasma accelerators.4

Толок В.Т. Физика и Харьков // ФIП. – 2005. – Т.2, №4. – С. 229–243, с. 229. (Tolok, V. Physics and Kharkov // FIP. – 2005. – V.2, No. 4. – Pages 229–243, p. 229). 2 Протокол допроса Гаутерманса Фрица Оттовича от 29 марта 1938 г. // Дело А. Лейпунского. Архив УКГБ при СМ УССР 0–21,975 / Архів СБУ Харківської області, перелік 70/17–22,753, с. 28 (Interrogation record of Fritz Houtermans of 29 March 1938 // Leipunsky’s case. Archive of KGB Directorate under UkrSSR Council of Ministers, 0–21,975 / Archive of SSU in Kharkov oblast, inventory 70/17–22,753, p. 28). 3 Report by the North Atlantic Military Committee on Soviet Science and Technology MC 265/77, NATO Archive Science and Technology, 1977, p. II-4-2-3. 4 Ibid., P. II-4-8-11. 1

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Figure 1 depicts the network of “daughter” institutions and centres that sprung from the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology. The path for science in the Russian Empire was far from smooth. In Tsarist Russia support for science in general and physics in particular was rather meagre. Prior to World War I, Russian science was mostly confined to universities. This was especially true for disciplines such as physics that required expensive laboratories and equipment, investment in which was not forthcoming. Under these conditions, science in the Russian Empire developed an important distinction: its organisation largely depended on the efforts of outstanding individuals, including Ivan Borgman, Aleksandr Stoletov, Nikolay Umov, Boris Golitsyn and Pyotr Lebedev. This was also true of the launch of nuclear studies in pre-revolution Russia in 1910. That year, Vladimir Vernadsky gave a presentation entitled Current Tasks in the Field of Radium to the Academy of Sciences. “Now that humankind is entering the new age of radiation—atomic—energy, we, rather than anybody else, should know, should find out what the soil of our native country contains in these terms,” Vernadsky stated.5 Mining parties were dispatched to look for radioactive sources and discovered uranium. In 1913, the Russian parliament, the Duma, considered bills aimed at the exploration of the Empire’s radioactive deposits. This triggered research in the field of radioactive physics. These initial efforts in the study of radioactivity, which would ultimately give rise to nuclear physics, were interrupted, however, by World War I.6 The advent of Bolshevik rule in the wake of the October 1917 revolution had ambiguous consequences for the development of physics. On the one hand, Vladimir Lenin and his associates emphasized the progressive role of the sciences and their importance for the building of communist society. On the other hand, an abyss of mutual distrust and misunderstanding lay between the new government and the scientists under Bolshevik rule. Referring to scientists and engineers, Lenin said that “in most cases they are soaked through with bourgeois worldview and skills,”7 not being able to move from metaphysical materialism to dialectical materialism immediately seeing their idealism and pure empirical knowledge.8 The scientists, on their part, distrusted the Bolsheviks because of their low level of education and disrespect for the sciences. Nonetheless, in the early post-revolutionary years, the Soviet government did extend support to research in physics. Scientific research

5 Зыкин Д. ЦарскаяРоссия: рывок к мировому величию // http://www.km.ru/v-rossii/2014/0 5/11/istoriya-rossiiskoi-imperii/739577-tsarskaya-rossiya-ryvok-k-mirovomu-velichiyu (D. Zykin. Tsarist Russia: a Leap towards International Grandeur // http://www.km.ru/v-rossii/2014/05/11/ istoriya-rossiiskoi-imperii/739577-tsarskaya-rossiya-ryvok-k-mirovomu-velichiyu) 6 Очерки по истории развития советской физики. 1917–1967. М.: Наука, 1969. – С. 54. (Essays on the History of Soviet Physics. 1917–1967. M.: Nauka, 1969. – p. 54). 7 Ленин В.И. Полное собрание сочинений. – М.: Политическая литература. – Т. 38. Март– июнь 1919.–С.120.(V. Lenin, Collected Works. – M.: Politicheskaya Literatura. – V. 38.March– June 1919–p. 120). 8 Вавилов С.И. Ленин и физика // http://ritz-btr.narod.ru/vavilov.html#R01 (S. Vavilov. LeninandPhysics // http://ritz-btr.narod.ru/vavilov.html#R01).

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Kharkiv University 1805

LIPT

UIPT 1928

IPT AOS USSR 1939

IRE 1955

ILTPE 1960

SRI EEM 1964

DonIPE 1965

IRA 1985 CRPES KIPT 1970

IPCC 1972

NCA

STC EPP 1991 SCPT 1992

IAP, Sumy 1991 NSC “KIPT” 2005

Karazin KNU

CRPES – Centre for Radio Physical Earth Sensing DonIPE – Donetsk Institute of Physics and Engineering IAP – Institute of Applied Physics ILTPE – Institute for Low Temperature Physics and Engineering IPCC –Institute for Problems of Cryobiology and Cryomedicine IPT – Institute of Physics and Technology of Academy of Science of the Ukrainian Soviet Social Republic IRA –Institute of Radio Astronomy IRE –Institute for Radiophysics and Electronics Karazin KNU – V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University LIPT – Leningrad Institute of Physics Technology NCA – National Cosmic Agency NSC ‘KIPT’ – National Science Centre‘Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology’ SCPT – Scientific Centre of Physical Technologies SRI EEM – Scientific Research Institute of Electronic Engineering Materials STC EPP –Scientific and Technical Centre for Electrophysical Processing UIPT – Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology

Fig. 1 CRPES Centre for Radio Physical Earth Sensing, DonIPE Donetsk Institute of Physics and Engineering, IAP Institute of Applied Physics, ILTPE Institute for Low Temperature Physics and Engineering, IPCC Institute for Problems of Cryobiology and Cryomedicine, IPT Institute of Physics and Technology of Academy of Science of the Ukrainian Soviet Social Republic, IRA

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continued not only in old laboratories that existed before the revolution but also in a number of new institutes. In 1918, the Institutes of Optics and Roentgenology were founded in St. Petersburg, later Leningrad, the State Institute of Science and Technology was established in Moscow, and the Physics Institute of the First Moscow University renewed its work.9 Leningrad Institute of Physics Technology (LIPT) (widely known now as the Ioffe Institute) became the centre of nuclear physics, creating the premises for the rapid development of nuclear physics in Ukraine in the 1930s. LIPT director Abram Ioffe initiated the establishment of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology (UIPT, now the National Scientific Centre ‘Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology,’ KIPT) in Kharkiv in 1928. In February 1928, Ioffe sent a letter to the board of the Scientific and Technical Department of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR in which he outlined the following suggestions on the necessity to establish a branch of the LIPT in Kharkiv: (1) A significant group of physicists was already there, taking an active part in science and economic development; (2) LIPT had contacts with this group through Dmitriy Rozhanskiy, former professor of Kharkiv University and the founder of the radiophysics school, who actively supported Ioffe’s idea; (3) It was necessary to develop the Kharkiv Physical and Technical Centre to a level that would correspond to the industrial and cultural significance of this city.10 The latter point referred to Kharkiv’s status as the capital of Soviet Ukraine at that time. Another argument for the establishment of the UIPT, presented by Ioffe in May 1928, was diversification: scientific and technical research should not be concentrated in one centre, or it could perish, he argued, as the French

 ⁄ Fig. 1 (continued) Institute of Radio Astronomy, IRE Institute for Radiophysics and Electronics, Karazin KNU V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, LIPT Leningrad Institute of Physics Technology, NCA National Cosmic Agency, NSC “KIPT” National Science Centre “Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology”, SCPT Scientific Centre of Physical Technologies, SRI EEM Scientific Research Institute of Electronic Engineering Materials, STC EPP Scientific and Technical Centre for Electrophysical Processing, UIPT Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology

9 Тимирязев А.К. Успехи физики в СоветскойРоссии // http://sceptic-ratio.narod.ru/po/ timirjazev-3.htm (A. Timiriazyev.Successes of Physics in the Soviet Russia // http://sceptic-ratio. narod.ru/po/timirjazev-3.htm). 10 Толок В.Т., Коган В.С., Власов В.В. Физика и Харьков. – Харьков: Тимченко, 2009. – С. 20 (Tolok V.T., Kogan V.S., Vlasov V.V. Physics and Kharkov. – Kharkov, 2009. – P. 20).

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revolution perished, confined exclusively to Paris.11 This rationale underlay Ioffe’s efforts to create similar physics research institutions in different cities of the USSR: Physics Institute in Kyiv, Metal Physics Institute in Sverdlovsk, as well as research centres in other Soviet republics [1].

1.2

The Heyday: Nuclear Physics at UIPT and the UkrSSR Academy of Sciences in the 1930s

The UIPT was Ukraine’s first and the Soviet Union’s second physics institute to consolidate all Soviet theoretical and experimental research in nuclear physics. The UIPT was expected to work on nuclear physics research in parallel with academic support for electrical engineering and the iron and steel industries.12 In 1929, three main avenues of UIPT research work were defined: (1) crystals and X-rays; (2) dielectric physics; (3) electrical current in gaseous environments. In 1929, the faculty of the Institute included professors Andrey Zhelekhovsky, Abram Slutskin, Dmitriy Steinberg, and Nikolay Pomazanov, who worked there under the direction of Ivan Obreimov. Reputed scientists including Piotr Kapitsa, Dmitriy Rozhansky, Georgiy Gamov and Paul Erenfest were invited as consultants. The UIPT was engaged in the nuclear research program through involvement in specific research projects implemented under the guidance of 23 leading nuclear scientists who arrived from LIPT and included L. Shubnikov, a researcher in physics of low temperatures; Aleksandr Leipunsky focusing on nuclear physics, Abram Slutskin in radiophysics, and Lev Landau working in theoretical physics, as well as Kirill Sinelnikov, Aleksandr Walter and Dmitriy Ivanenko. Like most other areas of human activity, science was under firm state control in the Soviet Union. Middle-class intellectuals, including scientists, who were considered to have higher ethical standards and moral obligations, fell under a special onus

Неклюдов И.М., Волобуев А.В.. Физико-технический институту имени А.Ф. Иоффе и рожденный им Харьковский физико-техничсекий институт // Вопросы атомной науки и техники. – 2006. – № 1. – С. 199 (Nekliudov S., Volobuev A. Physics and Technical Institute named after A. Ioffe and founded by him Kharkiv Physics and Technical Institute // Issues of Nuclear Science and Technology. – 2006. - №1. – P. 199). 12 Збiрник узаконень та розпоряджень робітничо-селянського уряду України за 1928 рік.Офіційне видання народного комісаріату юстиції. 22 грудня 1928 р. Відділ перший. № 30 // Постанови Ради Народних комісарів УСРР. Стаття 261. Про Український Науково-дослідний Фізично-Технічний інститут при Вищій Раді Народного господарства УСРР. С. 931–936 / Оголошено в «Вістях ВУЦВК» 15 листопада 1928 р. № 266. (Collected Regulations and Directives of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government of Ukraine for 1928. Official Publication of the State Commissariat of Justice. 22 December 1928. Section One. No. 30 // Resolutions of the Council of People’s Commissars of UkrSSR. Article 261.On the Ukrainian Research Institute of Physics Technology under the UkrSSR Supreme Council of People’s Economy. Pages 931–936 / Published in the Herald of the All Ukrainian Central Executive Committee on 15 November 1928 under No. 266). 11

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[2]. Stalin’s rule soon brought the scientific community under a highly centralized system of planned science, where all decisions about scientific research and funding were made in Moscow. The ruling bodies of the Communist Party and the KGB had special divisions to oversee science. Loren R. Graham has argued that the planning of science became one of the priorities of the Soviet system’s rule [3, 4]. The main task was to make science serve the state’s interests in order to consolidate scientific investigation in the most important fields, such as industrial development, and to formulate a scientifically justified ideology upon which to build communism. The concept of science planning was presented in April 1931 by Nikolai Bukharin, head of the Scientific Research Centre of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR. He argued for the necessity of planning in science and proposed a geographical approach to placement of scientific-research institutes and organisation of the professional personnel movement.13 The goal of Bukharin’s plan was to create a system of research and educational institutions, laboratories, and factories to serve socialist construction. Soon the Communist Party of the USSR was the ultimate decision-making power of the country that set national goals, established priorities and formulated all national and foreign economic, social, and military policies. This led to the practice of transferring specialists arbitrarily around the Soviet Union. Many Ukrainian nuclear scientists after graduation were ‘distributed’ to research centres in Russia or other republics and scientists from those republics came to Ukraine. Though among those scientists working in Ukraine ethnic Ukrainians constituted a significant part (Abram Ioffe, Leonid Pyatigorsky, Vladimir Shpinel, Kirill Sinelnikov, Dmitriy Ivanenko, etc.), many others who arrived were of Russian, Jewish, and other origins. Among the outstanding Ukrainian-born scientists who worked in different Soviet physics institutions, including Leningrad and Moscow, were Abram Ioffe, the head of LIPT, Kirill Sinelnikov, the head of KIPT from 1944 and Laboratory №1, Vladimir Shpinel, the author of the first model of the Soviet atomic bomb, and many others. The famous Georgiy Gamov, who worked at LIPT on the theory of alpha decay and later, after emigrating to the United States, contributed to the Manhattan Project, was also born in Ukraine, in Odessa. Another important dynamic that underpinned Soviet nuclear science was the competition between schools of nuclear physics (Leningrad, Kharkiv, Moscow, etc). Academies of science of the republics played their role in organisation of research, but nuclear science remained under strict centralized control. While strictly speaking, the Soviet nuclear program was neither Russian nor Ukrainian, but rather Soviet, both in military and peaceful research, Ukrainian input nevertheless was very significant. In addition to the Institute in Kharkiv, another physics research laboratory was opened in 1921 in Kyiv. In 1929 it was reorganized into the Physics Scientific and Research Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Public Committee of Education. In 1936 this body became the Institute of Physics of the Academy of Science of the USSR.

13

Ibid., P. 58–59.

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By 1938 the Institute would come to focus on three main areas of research: physics of semiconductors, physics of electronic and electric processes, and x-ray and metal physics. In addition to academic research in different fields of theoretical and applied physics and academic support to the industrial sector, including physics technology research and tests, advice, and organisation of laboratories, physics institutions in the USSR in the 1930s were expected to publish the results of their work and achievements in theoretical and applied physics in the Soviet Union and abroad, as well as to train highly qualified scientists in various areas of applied physics. The shortage of qualified manpower for the advancement of science and continued research was catastrophic. At that time, the total number of academics at the leading physics institutes of the USSR was 1523, but only 426 of them had a university degree [5]. In these circumstances, the goal set by Stalin: “catch up with and surpass the advanced technology of the developed nations,”14 was hardly achievable. Firstly, Soviet science continued to rely extensively on scientific and industrial advancements achieved abroad, just as it had before the revolution. This was recognized and supported by the resolution of the 15th Congress of the Communist Party in 1927. Thus, during the 1920s–1930s Soviet physicists collaborated closely with their international colleagues. Many Soviet scientists, including Petr Kapitsa, Abram Ioffe, Georgi Gamov, Lev Landau, Dmitriy Ivanenko, Lev Shubnikov, and Kirill Sinelnikov, travelled abroad to study and work in the world’s leading physics centres, exchanged experience, studied methods and mechanisms of physical experiment, and built theories. Papers by Soviet physicists were published in international academic journals, discussed at seminars, and critiqued in international academic circles. Secondly, the training of homegrown physicists required a proper base. Ioffe, Obreimov, Sinelnikov and Walter established in 1930 the Department of Physical Mechanics at Kharkiv Institute of Mechanics and Engineering to train scientific cadres for the UIPT. This became the Soviet Union’s first department of physical mechanics and was further developed by UIPT scientists Aleksandr Leipunsky, Dmitriy Ivanenko, Lev Rozenkevich, Leonid Pyatigorsky and others. Its first dean was Ivan Obreimov.15

14 Сталин И.В. Об индустриализации страны и о правом уклоне в ВКП(б) // Сталин И.В. Сочинения. – М.: Госполитиздат, 1950. – Т.11. – С. 248 (Stalin, I. On Industrialisation of the Country and on the Rightist Bias in the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) // I. Stalin, Works. –M.: Gospolitizdat, 1950. –V.11. – Р. 248.) 15 Звонкова Г. Л. Харківський фізико-технічний інститут НАН України: короткий історичний нарис // Вісник НТУ «ХПІ». Серія: Історіянаукиітехніки. – Х.:НТУ «ХПІ», 2013. – № 10 (984). – С. 43 (Zvonkova, G. Kharkov Institute of Physics Technology of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences: A Brief Historical Outlook // Herald of NTU KIPT. Series: History of Science and Technology. – Kharkov: NTU KIPT, 2013. – No. 10 (984). – P. 43).

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Central fields of research for UIPT included research in the areas of propagation of energy, dielectric properties of various materials and others.16 In 1931, the research calendar included an experimental project aimed at achieving the splitting of the atom. The scientists were assigned the overarching goal: a very limited team of 15 people was to build an efficient high-voltage accelerator and split the atom in the shortest time. On October 10, 1932, the team at UIPT achieved an outstanding result: the nucleus of a lithium atom was split by artificially accelerated protons.17 Kharkiv physicists Sinelnikov, Leipunsky, Walter and Georgiy Latyshev were the first in the USSR to split the atom and only the second in the world after British physicists John Cockcroft and Ernest Walton. The fission of the atomic nucleus, first in Cambridge and then in Kharkiv, was destined to make history. It was made possible by the work of many scientists, including the Ukrainian-born physicist Georgiy Gamov and his theory of quantum alpha-decay, which had already earned him international renown in 1928.18 The results of the experiment to split the atom were announced in Pravda on October 221,932 under the title “Major Achievement of Soviet Scientists.” Accolades from other Soviet papers follow: Komsomolskaya Pravda, Izvestia, Vesti and others heralded a new epoch in physics precipitated by the victory of Soviet science. UIPT physicists themselves were more reserved in assessing their achievement. Lev Landau, for example, stated: “A repetition of the Cockcroft-Walton experiment, having no substantial results in the future, was passed off as some enormous scientific achievement, almost surpassing the results of the Cavendish laboratory led by Rutherford.”19 Still, the splitting the atom experiment in Kharkiv was a landmark for Soviet nuclear physics and the overall Soviet nuclear project. Professor of the National Technical University Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute Michail Baranov offered the following assessment of the successful fission experiment and its consequences in his study of the work of this academic team and gave the following outline of the consequences of their success. First, the experiment demonstrated the scientific and technological capabilities of UIPT and the academic excellence of the physicists working at UIPT. Second, it pushed the central and local authorities of the USSR to allocate more resources to science and, more specifically, to nuclear studies and the requisite equipment at UIPT. In its turn, UIPT immediately commenced the

16 Баранов М.И. Антология выдающихся достижений в науке и технике. Часть 28: портреты легендарных физиков «высоковольтной бригады» УФТИ //Електротехніка і Електромеханіка. – 2015. – № 5. – С. 3 (Baranov, M. Anthology of Outstanding Achievements in Science and Technology. Part 28: Portraits of Legendary Physicists of the UIPT “High Voltage Team.” // Elektrotechnika and Elektromekhanika. – 2015. – №5.– P. 3). 17 Ibid., p. 5. 18 Гаташ В. Физика с грифом «совершенно секретно» // «Зеркало недели». 7 февраля 2003 г. http://gazeta.zn.ua/SCIENCE/fizika_s_grifom_sovershenno_sekretno.html (Gatash, V..Physics Classified as Top Secret. // Zerkalo Nedeli. 7 February 2003 http://gazeta.zn.ua/SCIENCE/fizika_ s_grifom_sovershenno_sekretno.html). 19 Ibid.

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construction of the new high-voltage laboratory building, where Europe’s largest ultra-high-voltage electrostatic proton accelerator was built in 1936 to the design of renowned American physicist Robert van de Graaf (1901–1967). Van de Graaf visited the institute and the electrostatic generator construction site personally in summer 1935; the generator was then the world’s largest and remained unsurpassed in its class.20 Later, when the atom became weaponized, this accelerator, as well as the experience accumulated by UIPT, were of paramount importance as a source of special ‘nuclear constants’ data needed to create Soviet nuclear weapons.”21 Thus, nuclear physics was promoted to be a leading discipline at UIPT. Vladimir Shpinel, the would-be designer of the atomic bomb, recalled: “. . .Young theorist Evgeniy Lifshitz said on the day of my arrival in Kharkiv, ‘Until now there has been the Cambridge period in physics development; now the Kharkiv period has commenced’.”22 Many of the renowned scientists from the LIPT who visited the Kharkiv Institute on numerous occasions went to support Lifshitz’s proposition. For example, Igor Kurchatov, the future academic leader of the Soviet nuclear project, spent two to three months a year in Kharkiv in the 1930s.23 Erenfest, another well-known physicist, worked in Kharkiv for several months by invitation from Ioffe; Victor Weisskopf worked at UIPT for eight months in 1932 [6]. Kapitsa came to UIPT several times to give lectures and offer advice. Conferences hosted by the UIPT attracted such names as Niels Bohr, Paul Dirac, John Cockcroft, Wolfgang Pauli, Victor Weisskopf, George Placzek, Rudolf Peierls and others. Renowned Austrian and German physicists were involved with the lab in various capacities: Alexander Weissbergran the UIPT experimental low-temperature station, Martin Ruheman managed a low-temperature lab, and Friedrich Houtermans and Fritz Lange worked in Kharkiv on a full-time basis for several years. Here, on the initiative of Weissberg, the Physikalische Zeitschrift der Sowjetunion, the first Soviet journal of physics, was published in German and English.24 Interestingly, already in 1936 Houtermans, shortly after arriving in Kharkiv, became a co-author of a Ukrainian language publication on nuclear physics.25

Ранюк Ю. Історія Високовольтного корпуса УФТІ (до 75-річчя від часу розщеплення атомного ядра) // Світогляд. – 2007. – №3. – С. 66 (Ranyuk, Y. History of UIPT High Voltage Building (Dated to the 75th Anniversary of Nuclear Fission) // Svitoglyad. – 2007. – No. 3. – P. 66). 21 Баранов М.И. Антология выдающихся достижений. – С.6 (Baranov.Anthology of Outstanding Achievements.– Р. 6). 22 Ранюк Ю. Н. А. И. Лейпунский и ядерная физика на Украине// Известия вузов. Ядернаяэнергетика. – 2003. - № 4. – С. 48 (Ranyuk Y.A. Leipunsky and Nuclear Physicsin Ukraine // IzvestiyaVuzov. NuclearEnergy. – 2003. – No. 4.–P. 48). 23 Гринберг А.П., Френкель В.Я. Игорь Васильевич Курчатов в Физико-техническом институте. Л.: Наука, 1984. С. 63, 67–68 (Grinberg, A., Frenkel, V. Igor Kurchatov at the Institute of Physics Technology. L.: Nauka, 1984. Pages 63, 67–68). 24 Kaufman B., Prometheus in fetters: how Kharkov was the capital of technology http://forbes.net. ua/magazine/forbes/1366094-prometei-v-okovah-kak-harkov-byl-stolicej-tehnologij 25 Гауетерманс Ф., Лейпунський О.І., Фомін В., Шубніков Л. Утворення ядер важкого водню з протонів і нейтронів // Вісті АН УРСР. № 4 за 1936 рік. – С. 35–36 (Houtermans, 20

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In 1933, Aleksandr Leipunsky, a gifted scientist and expert of international renown, was appointed director of the Institute. However, immediately the following year he left on a long assignment for the U.K. and Germany. Working in 1934–1935 at the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge, run by Ernest Rutherford, Leipunsky was mastering experimental work in the nuclear field, studied the operation of an automatic Wilson chamber, and learned about methods of working with neutrons and gamma rays. There he pursued a series of experiments to prove the existence of neutrinos.26 Despite his immense effort, the experiments were inconclusive and Leipunsky had to limit himself to qualitative conclusions in favour of neutrino emission during β-decay.27 Leipunsky also visited physical laboratories in Berlin to study neutron and pulse generator research results.28 During this trip, Leipunsky carried out one more important assignment received before his departure from the People’s Commissar Sergey Ordzhonikidze: to persuade German physicists Fritz Lange and Friedrich Houtermans to come and work at UIPT. While in Cambridge, Leipunsky offered Houtermans, who had relocated to England due to Germany’s anti-Jewish laws, to go to Kharkiv to work for the Institute as research supervisor on the subject of experimental nuclear physics.29 Leipunsky succeeded in his mission and both scientists started their work at UIPT in 1935.30 Immediately on his arrival, Fritz Lange organised the Impact Stress Laboratory (ISL), which was transferred under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1936 as a special purpose laboratory oriented to the defence program.31 According to Professor Yurii Ranyuk, who was head of a laboratory at the National Science Centre Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology (NSC KIPT) of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (1980–2017), there is no exact information about the subjects of defence research carried out at the ISL; it is assumed that it was related to the development of anti-personnel beam weapons.32 According to Houtermans, Lange continued his work on the development of a pulse generator started back in Berlin. However, the scale of the task at UIPT was to implement a 4–6 million volt generator design. Houtermans explained in 1938 that the facility was unique, with Lange as a leading international expert in the area holding many decisive patents, adding:

F. A. Leipunsky, V. Fomin, L. Shubnikov. Generation of Heavy Hydrogen Nuclei from Protons and Neutrons // News of the UkrSSR AOS. No. 4 for 1936. – P. 35–36). 26 Ранюк Ю.Н., А.И. Лейпунский и ядернаяфизика на Украине. – С. 48 (Ranyuk Y. A. Leipunsky and Nuclear Physics in Ukraine. – Р. 48). 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Протокол допроса Гаутерманса Фрица Оттовича. – С. 22 (Interrogation record of Fritz Houtermans. – Р. 22). 30 Ранюк Ю.Н., А.И. Лейпунский и ядерная физика на Украине. – С. 48 (Ranyuk Y. A. Leipunsky and Nuclear Physics in Ukraine. – Р. 48). 31 Ранюк Ю. Історія Високовольтного корпуса УФТІ. – С. 66 (Ranyuk, Y. History of UIPT High Voltage Building.–Р. 67). 32 Ibid.

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“Super-high voltage pulse generators will have extensive technical applications, particularly in the military domain.” Military applications of beams that could be generated by pulse generators could be, according to Lange, a matter of particular interest for the German General Staff. Later Houtermans would point out that a pulse generator could have military uses as an X-ray cannon: high-energy X-rays could be used as a defensive weapon.33 Incidentally, the interest demonstrated by the top military command of Nazi Germany caused Lange to suspend this work in Berlin. At the same time, according to Houtermans, the Gestapo used all means to supervise Lange’s work on this subject at UIPT.34 In addition, the Gestapo was interested in Ukrainian physicists, their work plans, research subjects and even sentiments, as a basis for further recruitment and use in their interests. Specific emphasis was placed on such scientists as Leipunsky, Shubnikov, Obreimov, Sinelnikov, Walter, Ruheman, Weissberg, Kon-Peterson, and Gorsky of UIPT, as well as Finkelstein from Dnipropetrovsk. The USSR leadership was equally interested in Lange’s work. On February 27, 1939, the Nuclear Commission of the Physics and Mathematics Section of the Soviet Academy of Sciences resolved to engage the ISL as a central facility for the study of uranium. It was within the ISL that ideas concerning the application of uranium as an explosive and a poison, as well as concerning the centrifuge-based technology of preparation of the U-235 enriched uranium mixture were first developed. After the end of World War II, Lange was put in charge of Special Laboratory No. 4 established in Moscow as part of the Soviet nuclear weapons program to develop a uranium isotope fission centrifuge. On his return from Cambridge in 1935, Leipunsky was again appointed director of UIPT. At that time, Leipunsky’s academic interests lay in the domain of neutron physics. A substantial part of his research was experiments to study temperature dependencies in the interaction of thermal neutrons and verification of the theoretical law of Eugene Wigner describing the energy dependency of neutrons in their interaction with nuclei.35 Neutron data obtained by Leipunsky and his staff after the war were widely used by physicists around the world. Following the dismissal of Leipunsky from the post of director in 1937, he continued work at UIPT as an academic supervisor of the radioactive laboratory. In August 1939 he was invited to become the head of the Physics Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences Radium Institute (AOSRI) in Leningrad, a testimony to the role of Ukrainian scientists in the advancement of Soviet nuclear physics. Leipunsky decided against taking a full-time job in Leningrad, limited his role to consulting and membership in the AOSRI Academic Board, and stayed in Ukraine.

33 Протокол допроса Гаутерманса ФрицаОттовича. – С. 33. (Interrogation record of Fritz Houtermans. – Р. 33). 34 Протокол допроса Гаутерманса Фрица Оттовича. – С. 27–28. (Interrogation record of Fritz Houtermans. – Р. 27–28). 35 Ранюк Ю. Н. А. И. Лейпунский и ядерная физика на Украине. – С. 49 (Ranyuk Y. A. Leipunsky and Nuclear Physics in Ukraine. – Р.. 49).

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He was actively involved in the Nuclear and Uranium Commission under the USSR Academy of Sciences.36 As opposed to Lange and his associates, Leipunsky was only interested in civil uses of atomic energy and became an acknowledged leader in this area not only in the USRR but also worldwide. Other outstanding scientists working within the UIPT framework in the 1930s made important contributions towards the development of Soviet nuclear physics, for example, Dmitriy Ivanenko, who suggested the proton-neutron nucleus theory that very soon became generally accepted.37 Lev Shubnikov created the state-of-theart cryogenic facility at UIPT. However, already in 1936 Leipunsky maintained that the advancement of physics in the Soviet Union was lagging far behind Western countries and that the state lacked physics schools comparable with the schools of Bohr in Denmark or Rutherford in the UK, which prevented the USSR from becoming a leader in any particular area of physics.38 David Holloway quoted the more optimistic assessments of LIPT director Abram Ioffe, who believed the Soviet physics of the 1930s had risen from the bottom of the international science list to fourth place after Britain, the USA, and France, whereas in technical physics, in his opinion, it occupied third place.39 One way or the other, the Kharkiv Institute was a leading research establishment within the USSR, surpassing LIPT which stood at the origins of nuclear physics studies in the USSR in both budget and number of personnel by the mid-1930s. This was confirmed in the speech of President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sergey Vavilov at a visiting session of the Academy’s Physics Section in Kharkiv in 1937: “The Institute covers more than one-quarter of the total scope of physics in the USSR.”40 The following is the assessment of the UIPT’s potential by Alexander Weissberg: “. . .Our Institute is one of the most significant establishments of its kind in Europe. Indeed, there is clearly no similar institute that would have so many diverse and well-equipped laboratories [7].” So, during the first decade, there was a productive, liberal atmosphere and openness to international science which worked in favour of advancing Soviet physics. Outstanding physicists visited the UIPT for academic or research purposes, while UIPT fellows had an opportunity to attend the leading laboratories in Great Britain and Germany. Very soon UIPT became one of two leading research institutions in the entire USSR to carry out cutting-edge nuclear research. Other institutions in Ukraine contributed as well: the Dnipropetrovsk branch of the UkrSSR Academy 36

Ibid, p. 48. Феоктистов Л. Предисловие к первому тому сборника «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 5 (Feoktistov L., Foreword to Volume One of the Digest “The USSR Atomic Project.Documents and Materials.” V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. –P. 5). 38 Holloway, op. cit. in Ref. [6], p. 18. 39 ibid. 40 Неклюдов И.М., Волобуев А.В. Физико-технический институт имени А.Ф. Иоффе. – С. 199 (Nekludov, I., Volobuyev, A. A. Ioffe Institute of Physics Technology. -Р. 199). 37

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of Sciences headed by Aleksandr Brodskiy was the first in the USSR which managed to obtain heavy water, a critical component for the generation of weapons-grade plutonium in a reactor.41 The situation changed dramatically with the Great Terror.

1.3

UIPT Physicists in the Great Purge

Like many of their colleagues across the Soviet Union, Ukrainian physicists fell victim to Stalin’s purges. As mentioned above, the appointment of Semen Davydovich to the post of UIPT Director marked the beginning of a wave of repressions, billed as a struggle against class enemies and counterrevolutionary elements. These were related to the first technical projects of a defence nature assigned to the Institute in early 1935 by the Council of Labour and Defence of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry: powerful short-wave generators, oxygen systems for high-altitude flights, liquid hydrogen-powered aircraft engines, etc. The research and development of these projects required stringent secrecy which was to be achieved through a range of measures, including vetting of Institute personnel and the introduction of a number of restrictions. Kharkiv Oblast Party Committee and Oblast NKVD Directorate were given the instructions to oversee these measures.42 On October 14, 1935, the Oblast Party Committee held a closed meeting to review the issue of significant ‘infestation’ of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics Technology with class enemies and counterrevolutionary elements. It was decided to subject the Institute to a purge and thus to move before the CP(B)U Central Committee and the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry to allow their special representative to participate in the cleansing of the Institute from “class enemies.” The “infestation” referred primarily to the foreign scientists who had only recently been invited to work at the Institute and soon became its pride, and who, in the eyes of the NKVD, quickly came under suspicion of espionage and sabotage. The campaign against the foreign scientists became the harbinger of the wave of terror that would grip the entire UIPT. Kharkiv NKVD Directorate and the Oblast Party Committee embarked on arrangements to institute the strict security regime. The Institute was surrounded

Андрюшин И. А. и др. Укрощение ядра: страницы истории ядерного оружия и ядерной инфраструктуры СССР / И. А. Андрюшин, А. К. Чернышев, Ю. А. Юдин; [гл. ред. Р. И. Илькаев]. — Саров; Саранск: тип. «Красный Октябрь», 2003. – С. 14 (Andryushin I., et al. The Taming of the Nucleus: Pages of History of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Infrastructure in the USSR / I. Andryushin, A. Chernyshev, Y. Yudin; [chief editor R. Ilkaev]. – Sarov; Saransk: Krasnyi Oktyabr, 2003. – Р. 14). 42 Ранюк Ю. Дело УФТИ. Исторические комментарии к книге Александра Вайсберга «Обвиняемый» http://www.sunround.com/club/22/ufti.htm (RanyukY. UIPT Case. Historical comments to Aleksander Weissberg’s book “The Accused” http://www.sunround.com/club/22/ ufti.htm). 41

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by a wall; a checkpoint with a guard installed; passes issued for the Institute personnel, and an internal security department formed, with a steel-lined door and a window for communicating with outside employees. This, however, was only the beginning. Arrests of UIPT personnel followed. In November 1935, the first person was arrested, a scientist of Landau’s department Moisey Korets, who was accused of misleading the Institute about his social descent. Investigators concluded that Korets had acted as a “class enemy who penetrated our Institute to exercise corrupt influence.”43 Such kinds of accusations meant anti-Soviet activity and espionage in favour of foreign states, so-called “enemies.” It is also worth mentioning that these charges were mostly caused by fear or jealousy and had no real basis. Soon, Leipunsky and Weissberg were also caught in the middle of this wave. In his book The Accused, Weissberg wrote that in 1935 he found himself in a difficult situation when Davydovich assumed the reins at the Institute and branded him the leader of an anti-Soviet group. The scale of repression grew to massive proportions in 1937–1938 and became known as the ‘UIPT Case.’ Among the arrested were the visiting foreign physicists Alexander Weissberg, Conrad Weiselberg and Fritz Houtermans. They were accused of obstruction and espionage and imprisoned in March 1937. Conrad Weiselberg, who had also hastily adopted Soviet citizenship, was executed in November 1937.44 Weissberg, as a foreign national, was not executed but spent a long time in an NKVD prison. Houtermans was arrested on the charges of “espionage, sabotage and obstruction in the territory of the USSR, which he carried out as a Gestapo agent [8].” Four Nobel Prize winners, including Albert Einstein, Frederic Joliot-Curie and Jean B. Perrin, advocated for the release of Houtermans and Weissberg. Einstein wrote to the Soviet Ambassador in the United States Oleg Troyanovsky in January 1938 asking to apply all possible efforts to help Doctor Houtermans to leave Russia. Einstein mentioned in this letter that professor James Frank from John Hopkins University in Baltimore and Professor Niels Bohr from Copenhagen who worked with Houtermans before expressed readiness to move in his favour.45 As seen from this letter by Einstein, many people in the West were aware of the inhuman treatment of the physicist by the Soviet government. Yet even the threat of Протокол расширенного заседания МК УФТИ от 28.11.35 г. совместно с членами СНР, ИТР и актива // Павленко Ю.В., Ранюк Ю.Н., Храмов Ю.А.. «Дело» УФТИ. 1935–1938. – Киев: “Феникс”, 1998. – C. 176–179 (Minutes of the Extended Meeting of UIPT MC of 28/11/35 Jointly with Special Staff Scientists, Engineering Personnel and Party Activists // Y. Pavlenko, Y. Ranyuk, Y. Khramov. The UIPT “Case.” 1935–1938. – Kyiv: Fenix, 1998. – Р. 176–179). 44 Павленко Ю.В., РанюкЮ.Н., Храмов Ю.А. «Дело»УФТИ.– С.199 (Pavlenko, Y., Ranyuk, Y, Khramov, Y.The UIPT “Case.” – P. 199). 45 Письма Альберта Эйнштейна Сталину и советским дипломатам в защиту Ф. Хоутерманса, А. Вайссберга и Ф. Нетера. 1938. Публ. ипред. В.Я. Френкеля. Пер. Л.В. СлавгородскойиВ.Я. Френкеля // Звезда. – 1994. –№12. – С. 187–193 (Letters by Albert Einste into Stalin and Soviet Diplomats in Support of F. Houtermans, A. Weissberg and F. Neter.1938. Publication and Foreword by V. Frenkel. Translated by L. Slavgorodsky and V. Frenkel. // Zvezda. – 1994. – No. 12. – Pages 187–193). 43

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international scandal and reputational losses could not stop Stalin’s terror machine. Houtermans remained in the Soviet prisons until he was turned over to the Gestapo from whom this committed antifascist had earlier fled to the USSR. He spent some time at a Gestapo prison and then was released on July 16, 1940 due to the intervention of the Nobel Prize winner Max von Laue. Houtermans was hired by a private institute, the von Ardenne laboratory, where he soon became involved in the “Uranium Project,” in fact Nazi Germany’s nuclear weapons program.46 Many prominent Ukrainian scientists were affected by the wave of repressions: Leipunsky, Landau, Shubnikov, Rozenkevich, Gorsky, Fomin and Korets, among others. Many of them, including Weiselberg, Rozenkevich, Gorsky and Fomin, were executed within a month. Ruheman, Weissberg and Houtermans were turned over to the Gestapo. Thus, out of eight department managers, seven were arrested; the only one that remained free was Abram Slutskin, subsequently a participant in the Soviet atomic project. Landau and Liepunsky narrowly escaped the fate that befell their less fortunate colleagues: owing to the intervention of prominent physicists such as Bohr, Einstein and Kapitsa, they were released. This, however, did not save the UIPT, Soviet nuclear physics or the Soviet atomic project from disastrous consequences. That the UIPT suffered more than any other Soviet physics institute from Stalinist repressions was most likely due to its reputation as an “oasis of freedom in the desert of Stalinist despotism,” in Weissberg’s words.47 Valeriy Pyatov wrote in his Nuclear Chronicles that “19% of scientists were subjected to repression as a result of the Great Terror. . . Work to create nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons in the UK, Germany, and France commenced. . . simultaneously with the unprecedented elimination of scientists in the Soviet Union. . . The Soviet science of that time received an injury that significantly impeded the advancement of the state’s atomic project,”48 an injury made all the more damaging by the fact that the repression occurred on the eve of the historical discovery of nuclear fission. Weissberg, a direct participant in these events, gave a similar account, showing the absurdity of USSR domestic policy at that time. He wrote: We are the most expensive workforce. . . It took the Soviet government two decades and immense investment in human and other resources to train serious physicists. What should Shubnikov do at the construction of a canal? He is the country’s best specialist in deep cooling physics. . . How costly will such ground breakers as Obreimov and Shubnikov be for the country?. . . And what will happen to the Institute? It will continue working, consume vast amounts of funds but will produce no result. . . If you arrest eight leading scientists from our Institute you may as well close it down. There are no replacements... [If UIPT] scientists had been left alone at the proper time they would have produced an outstanding result.49

46 Френкель В.Я. Новое о Фридрихе Хоутермансе // Природа. – 1992. – №8. – С. 92–93 (Frenkel, V. New about Friedrich Houtermans // Priroda. – 1992. – No. 8. – P. 92–93). 47 Weissberg, A. The Accused.– P.158. 48 Пятов В. Ядерные хроники, с. 66 (Pyatov V.Nuclear Chronicles. – P. 66). 49 Weissberg A. - P. 158.

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The same was the opinion of Vyacheslav Shpinel, another prominent UIPT scientist: if Kharkiv scientists had been supported at the government level instead of being thrown into jail and had been assigned the task to create a nuclear weapon, the USSR could have had an atomic bomb already in 1945.50 One of the pretexts for the elimination of many nuclear physicists was their alleged ‘servility’ before Western science, although previously Soviet authorities themselves motivated their academics to engage with Western science and to visit Western institutes. Now the scientists who had visited the West were accused of espionage and obstruction. As a result, the UIPT was decimated and essentially ceased to exist as a world-class centre of theoretical and experimental physics. Only after World War II were the surviving physicists who had been subjected to repressions rehabilitated and put to work on the crash Soviet nuclear weapons program.

2 Ukraine in the Soviet Atomic Project (1938–1956) The Soviet Atomic Project was officially launched only in 1942, although it was not until 1945, after the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that it unfolded in its full scope. Many historians, however, including the authors of the multivolume publication The USSR Atomic Project,51 published in Russia in the 1990s–2000s, put the beginning of the Soviet atomic project at 1938. The early stage of the Soviet Atomic Project, 1938–1941 was the early development stage, including important discoveries enabling the construction of an atomic bomb. At this stage, however, most scientists were still doubtful about the reality of a nuclear weapons perspective. Several young scientists from Ukraine, who for the first time in the USSR, already in 1940, came up with reasoned arguments in favour of nuclear weapons but were not listened to, were the exception. Phase two, 1942–1945: advancement of the Ukrainian nuclear physics in evacuation. On the one hand, the decree of the Council of People’s Commissars (the Government) of 28 September 1942 prescribed the specific scope of work for the creation of a nuclear weapon. On the other, practical research moved at a slow pace because of the war with Germany and because Soviet leaders were sceptical about the available intelligence on the achievements made in the UK and the USA, which proved that the atomic bomb could be created and could indeed be a super-powerful weapon. The events of 1941–1943 in Kharkiv during the period of the Nazi German occupation of Ukraine deserve a special section.

Ранюк Ю. Н. Лаборатория № 1. Ядерная физика в Украине. – Харьков: Акта, 2007. – С. 67 (Ranyuk Y. Laboratory No. 1. Nuclear Physics in Ukraine. – Kharkov: Akta, 2007.–P. 67). 51 «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы»: [в 3т.]/ Под общей редакцией Л.Д. Рябева. –М., 1998–2010. 50

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Phase three, 1945–1949: the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 changed the attitude of the USSR leaders to the possibility of an atomic bomb, so the directives were given to create a nuclear weapon within the shortest time possible. Phase four, 1945–1956: creation and testing of thermonuclear weapons. Soviet Ukraine played an important part in the advancement of all four phases of the Soviet Atomic Project. This part was most visible in the first phase. Subsequently, the focus of Soviet nuclear studies was shifted from the UkrSSR to the Russian Soviet Socialist Federative Republic, in large part due to the war which necessitated the evacuation of research centres in the east and south-east of the Soviet Union. Ukrainian institutes and scientists, however, continued to play a prominent role in the construction of Soviet nuclear weapons.

2.1

Ukraine and the Emergence of the Soviet Atomic Project (1938–1941)

In late 1938, German scientists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman discovered the fission of uranium nuclei. This achievement raised nuclear studies in the United States, the UK and Germany to a new qualitative level. By that time many Western scientists came to the conclusion that practical use of atomic energy was a perspective for the coming years, rather than for a remote future. Soon any scientific texts on the nuclear subject vanished from Western publications and the studies became classified: it was clear now that they could be useful for military developments. The discovery of nuclear fission was followed by the inception of atomic projects in the UK, Germany and the USA. Each of these three countries started their work on the construction of nuclear weapons, although with different intensities. The Soviet Union in fact started its own active research in the nuclear sphere several months before the German nuclear physicists’ breakthrough. It also began to establish an organisational structure, shortly to be used as the framework for the Soviet Atomic Project. It bears repeating, however, that most Soviet scientists and officials involved in the nuclear issue at that time did not even suspect that their activity was a prologue to the emerging Atomic Project, i.e. for a nuclear weapon. This is why only some Soviet documents related to nuclear research were classified in the late 1930s. Even though the Soviet scientific and intelligence communities noticed that such publications had stopped abroad, Soviet physicists continued to publicize their work on uranium nuclear fission freely.52 Neither themselves nor the state made any attempts whatsoever to restrict such publications: the need for these restrictions was not immediately apparent to either Soviet scientists or administrators. Physicists Viktor Maslov and Vladimir Shpinel, who worked in Ukraine, were

52

Holloway D. Stalin and the Bomb.–P. 56.

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among the first ones to appreciate this need: their proposal regarding the construction of a nuclear weapon, sent to the Soviet government in 1940, was classified as secret. Maslov and Shpinel worked for UIPT, still in operation and, even though much weakened by the repressions, playing an important role in the Soviet Atomic Project. On March 5, 1938, staff of LIPT referred to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (the Soviet Government) Vyacheslav Molotov with a letter in which LIPT scientists asked the Soviet Premier to support the continuation of nuclear structure studies, providing a rundown of past success as substantiation for this request. Inter alia, the letter mentioned UIPT which, according to LIPT employees, housed one of the USSR’s nuclear laboratories. The letter pointed out that UIPT had a sophisticated and expensive equipment base for nuclear research (including the high-voltage generator and one gram of radium).53 It should be noted that the amount of radium present at UIPT was a serious inventory, considering that the whole of the Soviet Union could produce no more than 10–15 grams of radium per year at that time.54 In fact, the starting point in the implementation of the Soviet Atomic Project was marked by the Memorandum of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Physics to the Academy Presidium On Organisation of Nuclear Studies under the USSR Academy of Sciences.55 In this document, AOSIP representatives proposed to their management at the Academy Presidium to request the Soviet government to integrate all institutes involved in nuclear research under the auspices of the USSR AOS or, more precisely, under AOSIP. At the end of 1938, when this document was written, the nuclear laboratories of the Soviet Union were not an integrated system. The Institute of Physics in Moscow (AOSIP) and Radium Institute in Leningrad (AOSRI) were subordinated to the Academy of Sciences; LIPT was within the framework of the People’s Commissariat (Ministry) of Engineering, and UIPT in Kharkiv worked under the auspices of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Письмо сотрудников ЛФТИ НКМ СССР председателю СНК СССР В.М.Молотову об экспериментальной базе ядерных исследований. 5 марта 1938 г.// ГА РФ. Ф.Р-5446, оп. 23, д.1636, л. 4–9. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – 432 с. – С. 17, документ № 1 (Letter of LIPT Staff to Chairman of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars V. Molotov on Experimental Base for Nuclear Research. 5 March 1938// State Archive of the Russian Federation. F. Р-5446, inv. 23, f. 1636, s. 4–9. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – 432 pages. – P. 17, Document No. 1) 54 Ibid. 55 Записка ФИАН СССР в Президиум АН «Об организации работ по исследованию атомного ядра при Академии наук СССР». Не позднее 15 ноября 1938 г. // Архив РАН. Ф. 2, оп. 1а (38), д.127, л. 9–17. Незаверенная копия // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 42, документ № 10 (Memorandum of USSR AOSRI to AOS Presidium On Organisation of Nuclear Studies under the USSR Academy of Sciences. No later than 15 November 1938 // Archives of the Russian AOS. F. 2, inv. 1а (38), f. 127, s. 9–17. Uncertified copy. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – P. 42, Document No. 10). 53

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This departmental subordination of the major Soviet nuclear institutes was the result of historical developments and nothing else.56 However, subordination of UIPT and other physics institutes to industrial agencies prevented scientists from doing science, specifically, nuclear physics and created more prerequisites and reasons to put academic personnel under pressure and repressions. The suggestion of AOSIP helped correct the situation and normalize nuclear research. Inter alia, effective 1939, UIPT was officially named the Institute of Physics Technology (IPT) under the Academy of Sciences of the UkrSSR, although the previous name, UIPT, continued to appear in official documents for some time. Importantly, the Memorandum stressed the significant role of UIPT in the USSR system of nuclear studies and suggested retaining this role for the future. Specifically, it pointed out that “it must be seen as rational that the UIPT laboratory, already having an extensive and sizeable equipment base, will continue to operate in Kharkov in the future.”57 This was the reason Ukrainian scientists were able to quickly respond to the Hahn-Strassman discovery whose results were published in their joint article sent to the press on 16 January 1939.58 UIPT under the leadership of Aleksandr Leipunsky continued studies of uranium fission by thermal neutrons; it was the first to get data on resonance capture of neutrons on uranium-238 in the epithermal region.59 Apart from them, only two other institutes worked on the uranium fission problem. AOSRI carried out the work on the chemical composition of fragments and production of transuranium elements under the supervision of Vitaly Khlopin; at LIPT, Abram

56 Письмо Президиума АН СССР в СНК СССР «Об организации работ по изучению атомного ядра в Союзе». 28 января 1939 г. // ГА РФ. Ф.Р-5446, оп.23, д.1636, л. 17–19. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 53, документ № 16 (Letter of AOS Presidium to the USSR Council of People’s Commissars On Organisation of Nuclear Studies in the Soviet Union. 28 January 1939 // State Archive of the Russian Federation. F. Р-5446, inv. 23, f. 1636, s. 17–19. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – P. 53, Document No. 16). 57 Записка ФИАН СССР в Президиум АН «Об организации работ по исследованию атомного ядра при Академии наук СССР». Не позднее 15 ноября 1938 г. // Архив РАН. Ф. 2, оп. 1а (38), д.127, л. 9–17. Незаверенная копия // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 42, документ № 10. (Memorandum of USSR AOSRI to AOS Presidium On Organisation of Nuclear Studies under the USSR Academy of Sciences. No later than 15 November 1938 // Archives of the Russian AOS. F. 2, inv. 1а (38), f. 127, s. 9–17. Uncertified copy. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – P. 42, Document No. 10). 58 The Discovery of Fission: Hahn and Strassmann // F. G. Gosling, The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb. – P. 6. Available at http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/mp/p1s4. shtml 59 Феоктистов Л. Предисловие к первому тому сборника. – С.6 (Feoktistov L., Foreword to Volume One of the Digest. – P. 6).

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Ioffe and Igor Kurchatov were working on accumulation of quantitative data and separation of 100 kilos of metallic uranium.60 In November 1939, at the fourth All-Union Conference on Nuclear Physics hosted by UIPT, the renowned Soviet physicist Yuliy Khariton, shortly to be one of the Atomic Project’s leaders, made a report on the important theoretical studies of uranium nucleus fission he carried out jointly with Yakov Zeldevich soon after the fission phenomenon was discovered. Among other things, Khariton correctly stated at this Conference in Kharkiv that a chain reaction of fission would require an increase of concentration of the uranium-235 isotope and “application of deuterium instead of hydrogen as a moderator.” Of course, Khariton admitted immediately that a chain reaction would be “fantastical” in the foreseeable future, since “such a reaction would require tons of uranium.” Interestingly, Khariton remained sceptical about the practical use of atomic energy and did not believe it could be achievable in the near future, sharing this scepticism with most other Soviet nuclear scientists (including those present at the conference in Kharkiv).61 At the same time, Khariton emphasised that “the possibility to use nuclear energy has been discovered in principle;”62 this statement, so important for further advancement of Soviet nuclear science, was made in Kharkiv, on Ukrainian territory. It is interesting to point out the views of other Ukrainian nuclear physicists who, obviously, also participated in this Kharkiv Conference in November 1939. Note, for example, the presentation by Aleksandr Leipunsky who stated that separation of isotopes would not be achievable for a long time to come.63 At the early stage, nuclear fission studies in Ukraine were undertaken also by the Impact Stress Laboratory (ISL) established in Kharkiv within the UIPT framework but in 1936 transferred to the USSR AOS “as a special purpose laboratory working on defence studies.”64 Notably, the ISL area of research was not very apparent immediately after the laboratory was established.65 By 1939, however, the Nuclear Commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences: Physics and Mathematics Section (P&MS, USSR AOS) had tasked the ISL with research into the uranium and thorium fission processes.66

60

Ibid. Presentation by I. Golovin “The First Steps in the Atomic Problem in the USSR,” made to the conference: Fifty Years With Nuclear Fission (Washington, DC April 1989. P.5.) Cit. ex op. cit. in Ref. [6], p. 81. 62 Frank-Kamenetsky, G. On Some Issues of Nuclear Physics // Priroda. 1940. No. 5.Page 28. 63 Leipunsky, A. Nuclear Fission // News of the USSR AOS. Physics Section. 1940. No. 2. Page 298. 64 Archives of the Russian AOS. F. 530с, inv. 1с, f. 13, s. 103. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – 432 pages. – Pages 36–44. – Page 55, note 2 to Document No. 17. 65 Ibid. 66 Постановление Комиссии по атомному ядру ОФМН АН СССР по докладу руководителя ЛУН АН СССР М.И. Корсунского о плане Лаборатории на 1939 г. 27 февраля 1939 // Архив РАН. Ф.471, оп. 1 (38–41), д.35, л.1. Зав. Копия // Атомныйпроект СССР. 61

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This task was aggravated by the fact that ISL, at that time subordinated to USSR AOS, was working on the design of new experimental equipment but was unable to organise its full-scale application for specific research, among other things due to a lack of qualified nuclear physicists.67 This required mobilisation of the resources of UIPT subordinated to the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Therefore, the Nuclear Commission of P&MS, USSR AOS recommended in its memorandum of 27 February 1939 “to establish close contact between the ISL and laboratories of A. Leipunsky, K. Sinelnikov and I. Kurchatov.”68 As a result, some work of the ISL, for example, design of a compact facility to generate fast electrons and hard gamma rays for medical and technological applications, was only completed after ISL became part of UIPT once again.69 After the merger of UIPT and ISL, Kharkiv became a centre where huge nuclear research capabilities were concentrated under common leadership, so the role of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics Technology became generally more important. At the beginning of 1939, the significance of UIPT was well appreciated by a member of the Soviet government, People’s Commissar of Power Plants and Electrical Industry Mikhael Pervukhin, who in one of his letters to the USSR CPC proposed to construct “a new modern cyclotron for UIPT and concentrate there a cadre of qualified researchers from the Leningrad Institute of Physics Technology.”70 In this case, according to Pervukhin, “a concentration of equipment and personnel will be achieved, and the USSR Academy of Sciences will get a powerful nuclear research

Документы и материалы. – Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Подобщ.ред. Л. Рябева. – М.:Наука, 1998. – С. 55, документ 17 (Resolution of the Nuclear Commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences Physics and Mathematics Section on the Report of Head of USSR AOS ISL M. Korsunsky on the Laboratory Plan for 1939. 27 February 1939 // Archives of the Russian AOS. F.471, inv. 1 (38–41), f. 35, s. 1. Certified copy // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. –P. 55, Document No. 17). 67 Ibid, p. 56. 68 Ibid, p. 55. 69 Ланге Ф.Ф., Пивовар Л.И. Компактный агрегат на 1 млн. Вольт // Изв. АН СССР: Сер.физ. 1940. Т. 4, № 2. С. 376–381. // Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы. Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.: Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 56 (Lange F., Pivovar S.Compact 1 Million Volt Unit // News of the USSR AOS: Physics Section. 1940. V. 4, No. 2. Pages 376–381.// The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – P. 56.). 70 Письмо НКЭП СССР в СНК СССР «Об организации исследовательских работ по атомному ядру». 7 марта 1939 г. // ГА РФ. Ф.Р.-5446, оп. 23, д.1636, л. 12–13. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 57, документ № 18 (Letter of the USSR People’s Commissariat of Electric Industry to the USSR Council of People’s Commissars on Organisation of Nuclear Research. 7 March 1939 // State Archive of the Russian Federation. F. Р.5446, inv. 23, f. 1636, pages 12–13. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. P. 57, Document No. 18).

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center. This will save additional large expense for establishment of such a centre in Moscow.”71 As we can see, the Soviet minister, later one of the organizers of the Atomic Project, proposed Kharkiv, rather than Moscow (a traditional centre of core research), as a capital of Soviet nuclear science. To a degree, Kharkiv already was the chief scientific centre of USSR nuclear physics. It hosted all-Union nuclear conferences and housed the best laboratories. In other words, it had all the prerequisites that Ukraine would eventually become one of the core centres of the Soviet Atomic Project together with LIPT under Kurchatov, and Khariton’s Institute of Chemical Physics. However, making UIPT a key base of the emerging Soviet Atomic Project was not in the interest of Moscow institutes who blocked the suggestion of People’s Commissar Pervukhin to construct a modern cyclotron at UIPT. Personnel from UIPT directly referred to the Soviet government to get the funding for such a cyclotron and sent the appropriate request to the UkrSSR Gosplan (state planning authority). The latter, in its turn, forwarded it to the USSR AOS and to physics institutes to receive their qualified expert assessment to justify a cyclotron for UIPT.72 The response was prepared by the Academy fellow Piotr Kapitsa, one of the most authoritative nuclear experts of the time, who was forced to stay in the USSR during one of his brief visits to the Soviet Union, from which he was not allowed to return to his permanent workplace at Cambridge. In the USSR Kapitsa was put in charge of his own new Institute of Physical Problems, under USSR AOS named after him after he had died. In his letter to deputy head of the UkrSSR Gosplan V. Skulsky, Kapitsa advised against the funding of the UIPT cyclotron pending the results of the deployment of the then country’s only cyclotron in Leningrad. Kapitsa gave an overtly negative characteristic to UIPT, writing at the end of his letter “that the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology in recent years constructed a number of installations but never completed them and, leaving them unused, hurried to undertake new ones. This course of work at the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology cannot be considered healthy.”73 It seems that

71

Ibid. Письмо Госплана УССР в АН СССР и физические институты о целесообразности строительства циклотрона в УФТИ. 22 февраля 1940 г. // Архив ИФП РАН. Личный фонд П.Л.Капицы. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / ПодобщейредакциейЛ.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 95, документ № 36 (Letter from the UkrSSR Gosplan to USSR AOS and Physics Institutes on Justification of Construction of a Cyclotron at UIPT. 22 February 1940 // Archive of Russian AOS Institute of Physics. Personal Fund of P. Kapitsa. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – P. 95, Document No. 36). 73 Письмо директора ИФП АН СССР П.Л.Капицы в Госплан УССР о циклотроне УФТИ. 28 февраля 1940 г. // Архив ИФР РАН. Личный фонд П.Л.Капицы. Незаверенная копия // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 107, документ № 39 (Letter of Director of USSR AOS Institute of Physics P. Kapitsa to UkrSSR Gosplan on UIPT Cyclotron. 72

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he forgot that UIPT physicists had no right to determine their research tasks but received all instructions from Moscow. By the end of the 1930s Soviet physicists realised that the discovery of nuclear fission could have practical applications. It had not yet gone so far as to think about the creation of a nuclear weapon—there were only preliminary ideas on the construction of a nuclear reactor for peaceful energy generation. Yakov Zeldovich and Yuliy Khariton managed even to make a correct calculation showing that an industrial reactor should use uranium enriched to 3.5–5% or, with non-enriched uranium, heavy water should be used as a moderator. At that time neither Soviet nor Western physicists had a clear idea of how to enrich uranium. On the other hand, there were samples of heavy water in several places in the world, including the Soviet Ukraine where it was produced for the first time by Aleksandr Brodsky in 1934. However, the 2–3 kg of heavy water available in Dnipropetrovsk was entirely insufficient for nuclear research.74 This required at least 100 kg and it was not clear in the pre-war period how to get this much heavy water. Natural uranium was also extremely scarce, and there were only several micrograms of uranium-235, which was needed on the scale of kilograms.75 Already at that time there was a clear understanding of the challenges related to the separation of uranium isotopes and production of uranium-235, i.e. to enrichment. Soviet physicist A. Vinogradov referred to gaseous uranium hexafluoride, later to be extensively used in the uranium isotopes separation process, back in 1940.76 However, UIPT physicists tested another method. In October 1940, Maslov, Shpinel and Lange claimed the discovery of the centrifuge isotope separation method.77 Note that the uranium enrichment method based on multi-chamber centrifuges turned out to be the most effective one and is predominantly used in the nuclear industry worldwide. The idea of the Kharkiv scientists was much more productive than the principle of gas diffusion used in the US Manhattan Project. In fact, the Soviet Union ultimately chose to take the complex and costly American enrichment method, as the Soviet leadership traditionally mistrusted domestic scientists and opted to take the way approbated by the Americans. Notably, after the 28 February 1940 // Archive of Russian AOS Institute of Physics. Personal Fund of P. Kapitsa. Uncertified copy // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – P. 107, Document No. 39). 74 Феоктистов Л. – C. 7 (Feoktistov L. – P. 7). 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Техническое предложение Ф. Ланге, В.А.Маслова, В.С.Шпинеля «Разделение изотопов урана путем использования кориолисова ускорения». Не позднее 1 октября 1940 г. // Архив РАН. Ф.530с, оп.1с, д.71, л.16 – 17об. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 167–168, документ № 69 (Technical Proposal of F. Lange, V. Maslov and V. Shpinel: Separation of Uranium Isotopes by Method of Complementary Acceleration. No later than 1 October 1940 // Archives of the Russian AOS. F.530с, inv.1с, f. 71, s. 16–17. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998..–P. 167–168, Document No. 69).

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end of World War II Lange continued the development of centrifuges for uranium enrichment in Moscow; however, it was not until much later that this advanced method of uranium isotope separation was applied on an industrial scale in the USSR. The development by Maslov and Shpinel was treated similarly, although its timely implementation could have changed the course of world history at least for the second half of the twentieth century. Maslov and Shpinel became UIPT research fellows at the Impact Stress Laboratory which was marked as a “special purpose laboratory dedicated to defence issues.” And both dreamed of creating a nuclear bomb.78 The main impetus for them as for all Soviet physicists was a fear that Hitler could get this weapon first. In his note to the USSR Academy of Sciences regarding the measures for work on the problem of uranium Maslov spoke for the first time about the possibility of using uranium in the defence sphere.79 And although Abram Ioffe and most other Soviet scientists did not consider the practical use of atomic energy possible in the short term, Maslov argued that the use of nuclear energy “to a large extent has become a technical problem.” He pointed out two main aspects of the problem: the production of a sufficient amount of the uranium-235 isotope to fabricate the core of the atomic bomb and the development of an engineering scheme for reaching the critical mass at the time of the explosion of ammunition.80 On October 17, 1940, these two gifted physicists from Kharkiv filed the claim for the invention of a nuclear bomb titled “On Use of Uranium as an Explosive and a Poison.”81 They noted that “the problem of creating an explosion in uranium is the need to create a mass of uranium in an amount much greater than the critical one in a

Константинова С. Урановая бомба Шпинеля и Маслова // Изобретатель и рационализатор. – 2008. – 7(703). http://viperson.ru/articles/uranovaya-bomba-shpinelya-imaslova (Konstantinova, S. Uranium bomb of Shpinel and Maslov // Inventor and innovator (Izobretatel I ratsionalizator). – 2008. – 7(703). http://viperson.ru/articles/uranovaya-bombashpinelya-i-maslova). 79 Записка сотрудника ЛУН УФТИ АН УССР В.А. Маслова о мерах, необходимых для организации работ по проблеме урана. 22 августа 1940 г. // Архив РАН. Ф.2, оп.1а (40), д.216, л.35–36. Автограф // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 132–133, документ № 56 (Note of ISL UIPT AoS UkrSSR fellow V.Maslova to AoS USSR on the measures for work on the problem of uranium. August 22, 1940 // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. Р. 132–133, Document No. 56). 80 Фейгин О. Цепнаяреакция. – М., 2013 (Feygin, O. Chain reaction. Unknown history of atomic bomb creation.–Moscow, 2013). 81 Заявка на изобретение В.А. Маслова и В.С. Шпинеля «Об использовании урана в качестве взрывчатого и отравляющего вещества». 17 октября 1940 г. // АП РФ. Ф.93, д.21 (46), л.293–296. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 193–196, документ № 75 (Claim of Invention by V. Maslov and V. Shpinel: On Use of Uranium as an Explosive and a Poison. 17 October 1940 // Russian Federation President’s Archive. F. 93, f. 21 (46), s. 293–296. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 78

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short period of time.”82 To realize this, the authors proposed filling with uranium a vessel that is separated by neutron-impermeable partitions in such a way that in each separate isolated volume section—the amount of uranium can be less than the critical amount. After the walls are removed with the help of the explosion and as a consequence, the mass of uranium is much larger than the critical one, which will lead to the instantaneous appearance of a uranium explosion. They even described the construction of a uranium bomb: it can be a sphere, divided internally into pyramidal sectors. These sector cameras can contain a quantity of uranium, only slightly less than the critical one. The walls of the chambers must be hollow and contain water or some other water-containing substance (for example, paraffin, etc.). The surface of the walls must be covered with an explosive substance containing cadmium, mercury or boron, i.e. elements that strongly absorb the water-retarded neutrons (for example, cadmium acetylene). The presence of these agents makes it absolutely impossible for neutrons to penetrate from one chamber to another and the appearance of a chain reaction in the sphere as a result of this. At the desired time, with the help of some mechanism in the centre of the sphere, an explosion of intermediate layers can be made.83 Also, in this note Shpinel and Maslov underscored the colossal destructive power of a uranium bomb that could destroy cities like London or Berlin, and also indicated that the products of the uranium bomb explosion were radioactive substances with an extremely high degree of toxic properties. Therefore, taking into account that they exist for a while after the explosion in a gaseous state and fly to a colossal area, retaining their properties for a relatively long time (about an hour, and some of them even days and weeks), it is difficult to say which of the features (the colossal destructive force or the poisoning properties) of uranium explosions is most attractive militarily. In order to appreciate the tremendous importance of this event, one should keep in mind several considerations. Firstly, nuclear physicists from other USSR institutes at that time remained at the stage of theoretical studies in nuclear fission and had no clear understanding of its potential military applications. Secondly, Maslov and Shpinel developed a design of an atomic bomb only six months after British scientists Rudolf Peierls and Otto Frisch from the University of Birmingham. These two were the first ones to propose a scheme of a nuclear weapon in their memorandum On the Construction of a ‘Super-bomb’ based on a Nuclear Chain Reaction in Uranium.84 Of course, Maslov and Shpinel had no idea of this memorandum since nuclear research in the UK was classified by that time. Furthermore, unlike in the early 1930s, any contacts between scientists were prohibited. Maslov and Shpinel also took care that their work remained a state secret for a long time, as

(1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – P. 193–196, Document No. 75). 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Holloway D. - P. 59.

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their claim was submitted with the ‘secret’ classification. Thus, Maslov and Shpinel arrived at their model of atomic weapon entirely independently from their Western colleagues. However, their proposal was not appreciated in the USSR; the claim for the invention of the USSR’s first atomic bomb was discarded by Soviet government authorities.85 Goncharov and Ryabev pointed out in the book “On the Creation of the First National Atomic Bomb” that the opinion of the Head of the Uranium Commission Vitaly Khlopin (April 17, 1941) on the application of Viktor Maslov and Vladimir Shpinel contained rather expressions of the pre-war position of many Soviet scientists and no analysis of the constructions. It is important to note that the idea of young Ukrainian physicists was not even considered theoretically in the future. Responding to a letter of Aleksey Panfilov, Deputy Head of the second Directorate of the General Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the Red Army, about the possibility of using nuclear energy for military purposes, in June 1942 Khlopin wrote that the Academy of Sciences did not have any data on the progress work in foreign laboratories on the use of intra-atomic energy obtained in the fission of uranium. He admitted that the relevant work was given importance and they were secret. However, he added: “In our opinion, the possibility of using intraatomic energy for military purposes is very unlikely in the near future (during a real war).”86 Maslov could not bear that and sent a letter to the People’s Commissar Marshal Timoshenko.87 He wrote that the scientific part of the issue was at such a stage that it Заключение НИХИ НКО СССР на заявки на изобретения сотрудников УФТИ, направленное в Управление военно-химической защиты. Не ранее 24 января 1941 г. Секретно // АП РФ. Ф.93, д.21(46), л.280–281. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 220, документ № 89 (Opinion of the Chemical Research Institute of the USSR People’s Commissarial of Defence regarding Claim of Invention by UIPT Staff Filed to the Defence Chemical Protection Directorate. Not before 24 January 1941. Secret // Russian Federation President’s Archive. F. 93, f. 21(46), s. 280–281. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – P. 220, Document No. 89). 86 Письмо В.Г. Хлопина заместителю начальника 2-го Управления ГРУ Генштаба Красной армии А.П, Панфилову об использовании ядерной энергии в военных целях. 10 июня 1942 г. № 979с. / Архив РАН. Ф.530с, оп.1с, д.199, л.128. Отпуск // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 265, документ 124 (Letter of V. Khlopin to Deputy Head of the second Directorate of the General Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the Red Army A. Panfilov. June 10, 1942. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. –Pages 265, Document No. 124). 87 Письмо В.А.Маслова наркому обороны СССР о необходимости организации работ по использованию атомной энергии в военных целях. Не ранее 3 февраля 1941 г. // АП РФ. Ф.93, д.21(46), л.297 – 297об. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 224–225, документ № 92 (Letter of V. Maslov to the USSR People’s Commissar of Defence on the Need to Organise Work for the Military Application of Atomic 85

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allowed us to proceed to the forced work in the direction of the practical use of uranium energy. In it, he referred to the need to organise work to enable military use of atomic energy: research results achieved in the preceding years suggested the conclusion that a chain reaction was achievable. Thus, a small quantity of substance would release a huge amount of energy that could be regulated. This energy source could be used in airplanes, making their operational range practically unlimited. This equally applied to sea ships and tanks. He requested support for his work towards the practical application of uranium energy. Timoshenko got the letter with the postscript: “It is not confirmed by experimental data. Present results, experimental data.” However, no attempts by Maslov and Shpinel to obtain funding for large-scale research and technological work were successful. It is interesting that the stages of these works were already carefully thought out by them, albeit the records were not preserved: the general atmosphere of spy mania led to the fact that Maslov and Shpinel discussed their ideas in parks, and sketched all the drawings and sketches on pieces of tissue paper.88 This letter, as well as the earlier materials concerning multi-chamber and thermocirculation centrifuges, was forwarded to academic institutes who found the ideas of the Kharkiv physicists on the launch of a military atomic program unrealistic, with a reserved welcome of their uranium enrichment centrifuge design.89 The arguments laid out in AOSRI opinions strike with their weird logic: The situation with the uranium problem . . . is a more or less remote goal to be pursued, rather than an urgent issue. . . . So far such a chain reaction of fission has been achieved experimentally nowhere in the world; however . . . intense work on this task is carried out in the USA and Germany. We also work on this problem and it is extremely desirable to make any possible arrangements for such work. Based on this situation with the uranium problem it should be concluded in respect of the first claim (by Maslov and Shpinel on the use of uranium as an explosive and a poison—Author) that at present it does not have a real basis.90

This response was anticipated, since almost nobody in the USSR believed that the construction of an atomic bomb was realistic. One of the reasons could be the unresolved problem of the separation of uranium isotopes in the required large

Energy. Not before 3 February 1941. // Russian Federation President’s Archive. F. 93, f. 21(46), s. 297–297. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. –P. 224–225, Document No. 92). 88 Konstantinova S. – P. 98. 89 Заключение РИАНа на заявки сотрудников УФТИ, направленное в Управление военно-химической защиты НКО СССР. 17 апреля 1941. № 93с / АП РФ. Ф.93, д.21(46), л.282283об. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д. Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 229, документ № 96 (AOSRI Opinion Regarding Claim of Invention by UIPT Staff Filed to the Defence Chemical Protection Directorate of the USSR People’s Commissariat of Defence. 17 April 1941 // Russian Federation President’s Archive. F. 93, f. 21(46), pp. 282–283. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – P. 229, Document No. 96). 90 Ibid.

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quantities, as described in the notes of Khlopin and Vernadsky. In 2002 Shpinel pointed out that the mistake was to consider the application for the use of uranium as an explosive and poisonous substance as an independent claim, and not in the package with the applications of Lange, Maslov and Shpinel “Method of preparing the mixture enriched with uranium with a mass number of 235. Multi-chamber centrifuge” and “Thermocirculation centrifuge.” The implementation of these claims, according to Shpinel, opened the way for an experienced test of the possibility of creating an atomic bomb of one design.91 Anatoly Dovbnya, a corresponding fellow of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, noted much later that Maslov should have referred his letter to Lavrentiy Beria rather than Marshal Timoshenko; in that case, the response could have been very different.92 The significance of the Maslov-Shpinel proposal was further depreciated by the lack of accuracy in their explanations, which were much less precise than those offered by Flerov later. For example, they wrongly believed that “artificial radioactive elements generated by uranium fission would be very good as toxic agents since they are odourless and therefore hard to detect.”93 In fact, as specified in the opinion of the Radium Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (AOSRI), these elements were “easily detectable by odour” in quantities which could make them a slow operating poison in contact with skin.94 This inaccuracy in the proposal of Maslov and Shpinel was a reason for AOSRI director Academy fellow Vitaly Khlopin to accuse the inventors of “never having dealt with large quantities of radioactive substances.”95 Another example was the proposed principle for creating a nuclear

Шпинель В. Кстатье Г.А. Гончарова, Л.Д. Рябева «О создании первой отечественной атомной бомбы» // Успехи физических наук. – Февраль 2002. – Т. 172, №2. – С. 235 (Shpinel, V. To the article of G. A. Goncharov, L. D. Ryabev “On the creation of the first domestic atomic bomb” / / Successes of Physical sciences. - February 2002. - Т. 172, No. 2. - P. 235). 92 Довбня А. Н. Предисловие к сборнику «Лаборатория № 1 и Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы. 1938–1956 гг. // Под ред. А.Н. Довбни. – Харьков: Национальный научный центр «Харьковский физико-технический институт», 2011. – С. 4 (Dovbnya, A. Foreword to the Digest “Laboratory No. 1 and the USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials.1938–1956.” // Edited by A. Dovbnya. – Kharkov: National Scientific Centre Kharkov Institute of Physics Technology, 2011. –P. 4). 93 Заявка на изобретение В.А. Маслова и В. Шпинеля «Об использовании урана в качестве взрывчатого и отравляющего вещества», 17 октябре 1940 / АП РФ. Ф.93, д.21(46), л.293–296. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 193–196, документ № 75 (Claim of Invention by V. Maslov and V. Shpinel: On Use of Uranium as an Explosive and a Poison. 17 October 1940 // Russian Federation President’s Archive. F. 93, f. 21 (46), s. 293–296. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – P. 193–196, Document No. 75). 94 Заключение РИАНа на заявки сотрудников УФТИ. – С. 229 (AOSRI Opinion Regarding Claim of Invention by UIPT Staff. – Р. 229). 95 Ibid. 91

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explosion. According to German Goncharov and Lev Ryabev it was not operational, since there were no substances with which it would be possible to create complete impermeability to neutrons and sufficiently compact partitions. Vladimir Shpinel acknowledged the incorrectness with regard to the completely impermeable partitions. The matter in question was the necessary volume of partitions for the complete absorption of neutrons, but at that time this volume was not possible to specify, since it depended on the magnitude of the critical mass, which was not known at that time. Therefore, it would be possible to judge the correctness of the proposed principle after carrying out appropriate experiments, concluded Shpinel.96 Although the technical adequacy of the Maslov-Shpinel proposal became obvious at a later stage and their idea was developed in 1942 by the Russian physicist Georgy Flerov in his proposal for gun-type nuclear ammunition—a simpler uranium bomb design—UIPT physicists still remain undeservedly unacknowledged. Invention certificates issued to Shpinel in 1946 for the atomic bomb and the isotope separation centrifuge (his co-author Maslov was killed during the war) was the only recognition of their work. Many years later (in 2001), Shpinel said in one of his interviews that if the physicists from Kharkiv had been provided the same resources as Kurchatov subsequently was the USSR would have already had an atomic bomb in 1945.97 Also, according to Shpinel, this did not happen because the Soviet leader ignored letters from Maslov, and also because of repressions against Kharkiv’s leading physicists.98 Other scientists, however, do not share this opinion. For instance, it is said in the book The Taming of the Nucleus that even if “the decision to speed up the work on the atomic problem had been made before August 1945 this would hardly have reduced the timeframe for the bomb’s construction. The USSR at that time simply lacked base material, i.e. natural uranium, and it was impossible to obtain it from Czechoslovakia (which became its basic source) during the war. Acceleration of uranium production by domestic enterprises in the wartime environment appears very doubtful.”99 The fact that the Soviet Union experienced a catastrophic shortage of uranium on the eve of the war with Germany and, moreover, during this war is evidenced by many other sources. Vladimir Vernadsky, in his diary as of early June Шпинель В. Кстатье Г.А. Гончарова, Л.Д. Рябева. – С. 236 (Shpinel, V. To the article of G. A. Goncharov, L.D. Ryabev.– Р. 236). 97 Звонкова Г. Л. Харківський фізико-технічний інститут НАН України: короткий історичний нарис // Вісник НТУ «ХПІ». Серія: Історіянаукиітехніки. – Х.:НТУ «ХПІ», 2013. – № 10 (984). – С. 44 (Zvonkova, G. Kharkov Institute of Physics Technology of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences: A Brief Historical Outlook // Herald of NTU KIPT. Series: History of Science and Technology. – Kharkov: NTU KIPT, 2013. – No. 10 (984). –P. 44). 98 Довбня А. Н. Предисловие к сборнику. – С. 5 (Dovbnya A. Foreword to the Digest.–Р. 5). 99 Андрюшин И. А. и др. Укрощение ядра: страницы истории ядерного оружия и ядерной инфраструктуры СССР / И. А. Андрюшин, А.К. Чернышев, Ю.А. Юдин; [гл. ред. Р. И. Илькаев]. – Саров; Саранск: тип. «Красный Октябрь», 2003. – 481 с. – С. 37 (Andryushin I., et al. The Tamingof the Nucleus: Pages of History of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Infrastructure in the USSR / I. Andryushin, A. Chernyshev, Y. Yudin; [chief editor R. Ilkaev]. – Sarov; Saransk: Krasnyi Oktyabr, 2003. – Р. 37). 96

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1941, emphasised the problem related to exploration and production of uranium ore, the reserves of which at that time were developed in Central Asia.100 The fact that Maslov and Shpinel managed to offer a generally correct model of an atomic bomb already in 1940 apparently proves that, albeit under terrible repression, UIPT still had world-class scientists. Indeed, no one except FrischPeierls and Maslov-Shpinel had been able to approach this close to the description of future atomic bombs in 1940. Margaret Gowing, who most likely knew nothing about Maslov and Shpinel at the time of publication of her work quoted below, wrote about the unique atomic bomb model proposal formulated by Frisch and Peierls saying that issues raised in their Memorandum “could seem very obvious today but they were not at that time. In the US they were not raised even many months later, until the British work became available to Americans. German physicists, including the brilliant theoretician Heisenberg, likely never raised them at all [9].” Ironically, the authors of the atomic bomb’s invention never had any substantial impact on the Soviet Atomic Project. Viktor Maslov soon went to war as a volunteer and was killed in 1942 at the age of just 29. Vladimir Shpinel, together with other UIPT personnel, was evacuated to Alma-Ata during the war and there had to give up nuclear research. After the war, he was engaged in the Soviet Atomic Project but never rose to a leading role like that of Kurchatov, Khariton, Zeldovich and others. An imaginative line was drawn under the Soviet Atomic Project’s pre-war development on May 17, 1941 at a scheduled meeting of the Uranium Commission. Records of this meeting have not survived; the archives only have a note signed by Vitaly Khlopin that the meeting would take place on the date mentioned above. This note also specified that Leipunsky was supposed to make a presentation on the achievements of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology101 which, again, demonstrates that before the war Ukraine was a self-sustaining and important part of the emerging Soviet Atomic Project.

Из дневника В.И. Вернадского за май – октябрь 1941 г. // Архив РАН. Ф. 518, оп.2. Опубликовано: В.И. Вернадский. «Коренные изменения неизбежны. . .» Дневник 1941 года. Публикация И.Мочалова // Новый мир. 1995. № 5. С. 188–211. // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д. Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 231, документ № 97 (From the Diary of V. Vernadsky for May– October 1941. // Archives of the Russian AOS. F. 518, inv. 2. Published in: V. Vernadsky. “Root Transformations are Unavoidable. . .” 1941 Diary. Published by I. Mochalov. // Novy Mir. 1995. No. 5.Pages 188–211. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998.– P. 231, Document No. 97). 101 Сообщение Комиссии по проблеме урана об очередном заседании. Не позднее 17 мая 1941 г. // Архив РАН. Ф.518, оп.4, д.68, л.39. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д. Рябева. – М.: Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 232–233, документ № 98 (Notice on the Scheduled Meeting of the Uranium Commission. No later than 17 May 1941. // Archives of the Russian AOS.F. 518, inv. 4, f. 68, s. 39. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998.– P. 232–233, Document No. 98). 100

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Nuclear Physics in Ukraine under Occupation (1941–1943)

Following the occupation of the Ukrainian territory by German troops in 1941, the nuclear history of Ukraine, figuratively speaking, was split into two branches for a short period of time (less than 2 years). Research in nuclear physics continued on the home front, far beyond Ukraine, but in the institutes of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, where the Ukrainian scientists continued performing their activities. At the same time, some interesting nuclear history-related developments occurred in the Ukrainian territory occupied by the Germans. Kharkiv was captured by the Germans on October 24, 1941. One part of the equipment located at Kharkiv’s UIPT that dealt with nuclear physics was evacuated. However, another part of it was left, since under the conditions of hasty retreat it was not possible to take out bulky installations. The Soviet troops tried to explode the equipment left in Kharkiv by planting an explosive device under the UIPT main building and a high-voltage laboratory building. However, the troops needed to retreat from Kharkiv in such a hurry that they could not execute even these demolition works successfully. Therefore, in the UIPT main building, the explosion only destroyed a staircase landing, while the building wings remained unaffected. An explosive device in the UIPT high-voltage laboratory building did not go off at all. Finally, an undamaged unique installation fell into German hands: a 2.5-millionVolt van der Graaf electrostatic generator with a discharge tube and another generator of smaller capacity.102 Immediately after occupation the Germans sent to Ukraine experts to identify what equipment and what personnel could be taken to Germany for the development of German science and industry. It is an interesting fact that Friedrich Houtermans, an outstanding nuclear physicist who had voluntarily joined UIPT in the 1930s but was arrested and handed over to the Gestapo, later participated in that mission. In Germany, Houtermans was involved in the ‘Uranium for Germany’ project. Upon the occupation of Kharkiv he, as a former UIPT employee, was sent for inspection to Kyiv and Kharkiv in October and November 1941 [10]. Houtermans was tasked by general-admiral Karl Witzell, the head of the Naval Artillery Department of the German Naval Ministry, to conduct an inspection of the facilities in the occupied Ukrainian territory and find ways of using the remaining equipment and experts for the needs of German industry [11]. The activity of Houtermans and other participants of the mission in occupied Ukraine covered various branches of physics and technology; it was not focused just on nuclear physics. However, the fact that Houtermans visited the USSR’s leading nuclear physics institute and his former place of work, the UIPT in Kharkiv, demonstrates that he also collected information that might facilitate the development of the German military nuclear program. Houtermans even became an acting director Ранюк Ю. Історія високовольтного корпуса УФТІ, с. 68 (Ranyuk, Y. History of UIPT High Voltage Building.– Р. 68).

102

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of UIPT for a short period of time (October–November 1941).103 Houtermans described the results of his activity in the special report Assessment of Qualification, Political Stance and Today’s Position of Physicists, Engineers and Technical Personnel in Soviet Russia, which he sent to Witzell.104 Upon his arrival in Kharkiv, Houtermans found there a small staff of UIPT employees who were not evacuated far inland of the USSR for different reasons. Before Houtermans’ arrival in Kharkiv and upon his return to Germany, the UIPT was headed by Ebert, a chemist from Riga where he graduated from the Polytechnic Institute. There is no information on the Institute’s activities at that time, and according to Yurii Ranyuk, “most probably, the institute performed no activity, not even talking about science.”105 The Institute pertained to the domain of the Luftwaffe. At the same time, attempts were made to resume the work at the Institute, which also was part of Houtermans’ mission. At Houtermans’ rough estimate, only 10% of the scientific workers from the Soviet institutes of physics stayed in occupied Ukraine. Out of those who stayed, only 80–90% of highly-qualified technical assistants could be useful to Germany.106 Some of those scientists and technical assistants dealt with nuclear physics, for example, Borisov, Brailovsky, Polushkina and Danilenko. All those nuclear physicists, as well as foreman-mechanical engineer Korolev, worked at the Ukrainian Institute of Physics Technology in Kharkiv and, according to Houtermans, stayed in Ukraine during the German occupation.107 Houtermans also mentioned several scientists from the Institute of Physics of the Academy of Sciences in Kyiv: Doctor Borsyak and Doctor Shtrashkevich, electronic emission expert. Moreover, Houtermans noted that 20–30 technical assistants stayed in occupied Kyiv, and some of them were employees of the Radiological Institute. Houtermans also mentioned Doctor Lelyakov, a specialist in construction of high-capacity magnetrons, and Mr. Terletsky, a foreman-mechanical engineer: they both worked at the aforementioned Kyiv AOS Institute of Physics.108 At the same time, Houtermans stressed that he was not able to evaluate the degree of their readiness to collaborate with the Germans and he did not propose to use anybody for the purposes of the

Френкель В.Я. Профессор Фридрих Хоутерманс: работы, жизнь, судьба. – Спб: Издатеьство «ПИЯФРАН», 1997. – С. 128 (Frenkel, V. Professor Friedrich Houtermans: Works, Life, Destiny. – St. Petersburg: Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Physics, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1997.– P. 128). 104 Evaluation of the Quality, Political Institution and Present Situation of Physicists, Engineers and Technically Trained Helpers in Soviet Russia. Report of Prof. Dr. F.G. Houtermans // Niels Bohr Library & Archives. Box 27, Folder 35. P. 1. 105 Ранюк Ю. Історія високовольтного корпуса УФТІ, с. 68 (Ranyuk, Y. History of UIPT High Voltage Building.– Р. 68). 106 Evaluation of the Quality, op. cit. in Ref. 104, p. 1. 107 Appendix. List of Persons Added to the Evaluation Report on Russian Physicists and Technicians. By F.G. Houtermans // Niels Bohr Library & Archives. Box 27, Folder 35. P. 7. 108 Appendix. List of Persons Added to the Evaluation Report on Russian Physicists and Technicians. By F.G. Houtermans // Niels Bohr Library & Archives. Box 27, Folder 35. P. 7. 103

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German Uranium Project. Houtermans only noted that the scientists and technical assistants, whom he mentioned “could be considered as those serving in the German army or performing future rehabilitation activities in the occupied territories using their scientific and technical qualification.” Furthermore, Houtermans stressed that prior to using those people “their political ideas should be checked in each case.”109 On review of Houtermans’ report, Rudolf Mentzel, the Ministerial-Director of the Imperial Research Council, came to the conclusion that “using Russian personnel would be very uncertain,” since “the current situation in the scientific sector in Germany is such that all research activities almost exclusively focus on the facilities important for the government and war, and all such work should be kept secret.”110 Thus, Mentzel believed that one should not trust physicists from Ukraine in critically secret matters. Moreover, according to Mentzel, there was a logistical problem that created obstacles for involving Ukrainian physicists in research activities in Germany, “because only in very rare cases would they be found at the locations where they used to work.”111 Therefore, Mentzel decided in 1942 that it was impossible to use Ukrainian or Russian scientists in German scientific research or development activities. Besides personnel from the Ukrainian institutes, Houtermans also needed to assess the possibility of using the equipment which remained in Ukraine. First of all, Germany was interested in the van der Graaf installation in the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, which was used for nuclear physics research. The point was that at that time the Germans tried to build their own van der Graaf accelerator with a capacity of one million Volts. Therefore, Houtermans needed to assess the possibility of bringing to Germany the Kharkiv-based generator, which was unaffected and extremely valuable. However, this never happened. According to Viktor Frenkel, Russian nuclear historian, the installation was not dispatched to Germany because of the reports and assessments of Houtermans, who despite being a Luftwaffe representative in Ukraine, remained an anti-fascist at heart and tried to impede the development of the Nazi regime’s nuclear program.112 To a certain extent, an assumption could be made that the decision against transporting the installation was made in view of its massive dimensions—this was exactly the reason why the Soviets failed to evacuate it far inland in the USSR or to move it to Moscow. During his stay in Kharkiv, Houtermans did his best to help nuclear physicists who had stayed in occupied Ukraine; for example, he issued references for them

109

Evaluation of the Quality, op. cit. in Ref. 104, p. 4. Letter of Ministerial-Director Mentzel to General Admiral Witzell. March 31, 1942. // Niels Bohr Library & Archives. Box 27, Folder 35. P. 1. This letter was a reply to aforementioned Witzell’s letter to Mentzel dated by March 13, 1942. 111 Ibid. 112 Френкель В.Я. Профессор Фридрих Хоутерманс. – С. 128 (Frenkel, V. Professor Friedrich Houtermans.– P. 130). 110

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certifying that they were working for the Luftwaffe. Such references helped protect those physicists from persecution by the occupation administration.113 As for Houtermans’ short stay in occupied Kyiv in 1941, there is no information available to prove that his activity there related to nuclear issues. It is known that in 1941 in Kyiv Houtermans met Konstantin Shteppa, a well-known historian, who was Houtermans’ cell mate in the times of Stalinist repressions and the head of Kyiv University during the occupation (1941–1942).114 After Houtermans left for Germany, UIPT continued its operation under the direction of the aforementioned Ebert. Prior to retreating from Kharkiv in 1943, the Germans managed to transport to Germany just a few pieces of UIPT equipment. They tried to blow up the remaining instruments, but their attempts were not quite successful, and the Institute buildings mainly survived.

2.3

Ukraine’s Role in the Development of the Soviet Atomic Project in 1942–1945

On 28 September 1942, the State Committee of Defence (SCD) of the USSR issued a landmark document: Instruction No. 2352сс On Organization of Works on Uranium signed by Joseph Stalin, SCD Chairman.115 The document officially triggered the activities on the creation of the Soviet nuclear weapon. Such work had been carried out before, but it was organised in a chaotic manner because of the general scepticism in relation to the possibility of creating a nuclear weapon. For this reason, the period of 1942 through 1945 is mainly known for scientific and theoretical developments. The task of establishing a full-scale nuclear industry would not exist for a while, and the main argument was the USSR’s involvement in the exhausting war. Nevertheless, it was in September 1942 that the USSR purposefully embarked on its thorny path towards the creation of a nuclear weapon. A landmark decision for the development of such a weapon was made in exactly that period, and the nuclear choice was made. For reasons beyond its control, Ukraine at that stage was unable to fully support the USSR in its progression towards the creation of a nuclear weapon, since all Ukrainian territory was occupied by the Germans. With the German troops’

113

Ibid. Amaldi [10], p. 79. 115 Распоряжение ГКО № 2352сс «Об организации работ по урану». 28 сентября 1942 г. Совершенно секретно // АП РФ. Ф.22, оп.1, д.95, л.99–101. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 269, документ № 128 (Instruction of the SCD No. 2352ss On Organization of Works on Uranium. September 28, 1942 Top secret // RFPA. F.22, inv.1, d.95, s.99–101. Original Copy // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998. – P. 269, document No. 128). 114

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advancement in autumn 1941, UIPT was evacuated from Kharkiv to Alma-Ata, where the institute was to be involved mainly in activities that were quite remote from the nuclear agenda: fabrication of lighter flints and development of pyrophoric alloys. It was the time when Kurchatov commenced vigorous activity on the creation of the USSR’s nuclear weapon. In spite of the actual exclusion of UIPT from the process, Kurchatov actively engaged other Ukrainian institutes in the development of the Soviet nuclear program. According to the landmark SCD instruction of 28 September 1942 only four organisations were supposed to comprise the core of the Soviet atomic project, and the USSR Academy of Sciences Physics and Mathematics Section116 was one of those organisations. Lange worked in this institute during the war, when the institute was stationed in Ufa. Two out of eight paragraphs of the SCD instruction of 28 September 1942 referred to Ukrainian institutes. In particular, the second paragraph of the instruction prescribed academician Bogomolets, UkrSSR Academy of Science to “organise, under the leadership of Professor Lange, the development of a laboratory facility for uranium-235 separation by centrifugation and hand over the detailed design to the Kazan Serp i Molot Plant, People’s Commissariat of Heavy Engineering, by 20 October 1942.”117 Paragraph three of the aforementioned instruction prescribed the Commissariat of Heavy Engineering to fabricate at the Kazan Serp i Molot Plant “a laboratory centrifuge facility for the USSR Academy of Science as per Professor Lange’s design developed at the UkrSSR Academy of Science, by 1 January 1943.”118 Thus, within a very limited period of time (by 20 October 1942, i.e. in just three weeks on the issuance of the SCD instruction), Lange had to provide the detailed design to the Kazan plant. Lange nearly managed to meet the deadline, as could be seen from the archived telegrams from the UkrSSR AOS dated 1942, addressed to Аbram Ioffe who worked in Kazan during the war. Those telegrams reflected the progress of the centrifuge design activities performed by Fritz Lange. The telegram of 22 October 1942 (two days after expiry of the deadline set for Lange for centrifuge design completion) reads, “. . .Detailed design is completed and sent to the Kazan Plant by courier mail. Bogomolets.” It was in November 1942 that Lange personally delivered the centrifuge drawings from Ufa to Kazan.119 Thus, despite an extreme

116 Андрюшин И.А. идр. Укрощение ядра. – С. 37 (Andryushin I., et al. The Taming of the Nucleus.– Р. 39). 117 Распоряжение ГКО № 2352cc «Об организации работ по урану» (Instruction of the SCD No. 2352ss On Organization of Works on Uranium). 118 Ibid. 119 Архив РАН. Ф.2, оп. 1а (41), д.236, л. 48–51. // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д. Рябева. – М.: Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 270, комментарий № 6 к документу № 128 (RAOS Archive.F.2, inv. 1а (41), d.236, s. 48–51. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials.V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998.–P. 270, Comment No. 6 to the document No. 128).

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rush, the accomplishment of the task assigned to the UkrSSR Academy of Science to design the centrifuge faced a certain delay. Understandably, under those hard conditions, the story might have ended tragically for Lange and his colleagues. The unrealistic timeframe allowed to the scientists meant that they could be persecuted, in the manner traditional for those years, for industrial obstruction and failure to meet the schedule, incidentally prescribed by Stalin himself. It was in early 1943 that the Secretariat of the Council of People’s Commissars prepared a memorandum for Vyacheslav Molotov On the Unsatisfactory Status of Works on the Uranium Agenda.120 The document stated that the decision of the SCD of 28 September 1942 “was executed in a very poor manner.”121 Attached to this document was a reference justifying this opinion.122 The reference contained a table with a comparative analysis of the tasks assigned by the instruction of 28 September 1942 and the results actually achieved. A separate paragraph contained a reminder that the instruction prescribed to “the USSR Academy of Science (academician Bogomolets) to organise, under the leadership of Professor Lange, the development of a laboratory facility for uranium-235 separation by centrifugation and hand over the detailed design to the Kazan Serp i Molot Plant, People’s Commissariat of Heavy Engineering, by 20 October 1942.” The paragraph also described the actual achievements: The facility design was developed and handed over to the Serp i Molot Plant as late as mid-December instead of 20 October. At present, preparatory activities are performed at the plant to fabricate this facility. The Serp i Molot Plant will complete fabrication of the facility not earlier than March instead of 1 January (as prescribed by the SCD).123

However, such failure to meet the deadlines of centrifuge fabrication and other tasks124 set in the SCD resolution had no serious consequences. The above

120 Записка секретариата СНК СССР В.М.Молотову о неудовлетворительном состоянии работы по урановой проблеме. Не позднее 11 февраля 1943 г.» // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 308, документ № 146 (Memorandum of the USSR CPC Secretariat Addressed to V. Molotov On Unsatisfactory Status of Works on the Uranium Agenda. Dated not later than February 11, 1943 // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998– P. 308, document No. 146). 121 Ibid. 122 Справка секретариата СНК СССР В.М.Молотову «О ходе выполнения Распоряжения ГКО от 28 сентября 1942 г.». Не позднее 11 февраля 1943 г. // АП РФ. Ф.56, оп.1, д.941, л.30. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 309, документ № 147 (Reference of the USSR CPC Secretariat Addressed to V. Molotov On the Progress of Implementation of the SCD Instruction dated September 28, 1942. Dated not later than February 11, 1943 // RFPA. F.56, inv.1, d.941, s.30. Original // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998.– P. 309, document No. 147). 123 Ibid. 124 These tasks concerning the works in the nuclear area included several paragraphs as follows:

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memorandum On Unsatisfactory Status of Work on the Uranium Agenda put the blame for the failure to meet the deadlines mainly on the senior bureaucrats (including Mikhail Pervukhin and Sergey Kaftanov who worked for SCD) and on the leadership of the USSR Academy of Science, but not on the scientists involved in the atomic project. It is true that attempts were made in a manner typical for those times to shift the blame to others. For example, Kaftanov who was the SCD science officer in 1941–1945, in his memorandum addressed to Molotov of February 1943, blamed academician Ioffe and PCHE representative Kazakov for the failure to meet the deadline.125 In the memorandum of the USSR the CPC Secretariat addressed to 1. Organise a specialised atomic nucleus laboratory under the Academy of Sciences (by February of 1943, the laboratory was established by Academician Ioffe in Kazan on the basis of LIPT, and I. Kurchatov became its head) 2. By 1 January 1943, develop and fabricate a facility for thermal-diffusion separation of uranium235 (by February of 1943, only the facility design was completed) 3. By 1 March 1943, produce uranium-235 by centrifugation and thermal-diffusion methods in the quantity required for physical research (as of 1 March this task was not accomplished) 4. By 1 April 1943, research practicability of uranium-235 nuclear fission at the Atomic Nucleus Laboratory (completion of this task was postponed due to delays in implementing paragraphs 2 and 3) 5. By 20 October 1942, professor Fritz Lange was supposed to develop the centrifuge design, which, as we already noted, was completed only by mid-December of 1942 6. By 1 November 1942, the People’s Commissariat of Iron and Steel Industry and the People’s Commissariat of Non-Ferrous Metal Industry were supposed to allocate and dispatch a number of materials for the Academy of Sciences, while the People’s Commissariat of Machine Tool Industry was supposed to allocate two turning machines. However, those tasks were not accomplished in a timely manner because the Academy of Sciences failed to submit a specification in due time. 7. 7. The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade was supposed to purchase abroad equipment and chemical substances for the Atomic Nucleus Laboratory worth a total of 30 thousand roubles, and on 15 January 1943 the Academy of Sciences submitted a corresponding request to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade who was preparing to place an order in February of 1943. See the Reference: Справка секретариата СНК СССР В.М.Молотову «О ходе выполнения Распоряжения ГКО от 28 сентября 1942 г.». Не позднее 11 февраля 1943 г. // АП РФ. Ф.56, оп.1, д.941, л.30. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 309, документ № 147(Тhe USSR CPC Secretariat Addressed to V. Molotov On the Progress of Implementation of the SCD Instruction dated September 28, 1942. No later than February 11, 1943 // RFPA. F.56, inv.1, d.941, s.30. Original Copy // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998.– P. 309, document No. 147). Thus, the SCD instruction of 28 September 1942 put forward several important tasks, and one of those tasks was accomplished by F. Lange within the UkrSSR Academy of Sciences. This demonstrates an important contribution of Ukraine to the Soviet Atomic Project at that stage of its development. 125 Записка С.В. Кафтанова В.М, Молотову к проекту распоряжения ГКО о дополнительных мерах в организации работ по урану. Не позднее 11 февраля 1943 г. / АП РФ. Ф. 56, оп. 1, д.941, л. 26. Подлинник. // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Наука, Физматлит, 1998. – С. 307–308, документ № 145 (Note of S.V. Kaftanov to V.M., Molotov on the draft order of GKO on

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Molotov On the Unsatisfactory Status of Work on the Uranium Agenda,126 it was proposed not to prosecute persons responsible for the failure to meet the deadlines, but just to “make one of the deputies of the USSR CPC Chairman (maybe Comrade Pervukhin) and Comrade Kaftanov responsible for daily monitoring and management of uranium-related activities.”127 It will be interesting to track further progress made by Fritz Lange in the centrifuge development project,128 particularly since these activities are directly related to Ukrainian nuclear history as performed under the leadership of the UkrSSR AOS. In 1943, Lange managed to achieve certain progress in centrifuge development. Though the centrifugal uranium enrichment method (on an industrial scale) was developed in the USSR only in the 1960s, this was still a decade ahead of the UK, the Netherlands and Germany,129 due to Lange and his colleagues who worked for Ukrainian institutes. In spring 1943, the first tests of the centrifuge designed by Fritz Lange commenced at engine plant no. 26 in Ufa. However, some complications and delays occurred with those tests, as reported by Igor Kurchatov in his top-secret memorandum addressed to SCD affiliated member Mikhail Pervukhin on 13 April 1943.130 In late April of 1943, Professor Isaak Kikoin was sent to Ufa with a special assignment to identify the reasons for those complications and delays. Kikoin visited the UkrSSR Academy of Science stationed in Ufa and then went to engine plant no. 26 where the centrifuge was tested. According to Kikoin’s report, the centrifuge was able to accelerate to a considerably high speed (up to 10 thousand RPM) in

additional measures in the organization of work on uranium. Not later than February 11, 1943 / RFPA. F. 56, inv. 1, d.941, s. 26. Original. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – M.: Nauka, Fizmatlit, 1998.–P. 307–308, document No. 145). 126 Записка секретариата СНК СССР В. М. Молотову о неудовлетворительном состоянии работы по урановой проблеме (Memorandum of the USSRCPC Secretariat Addressed to V. Molotov On Unsatisfactory Status of Works on the Uranium Agenda). 127 Ibid. 128 For more details on the works with the centrifuge see: СимоненкоД.Л. Краткое описание первых экспериментальных работ по разделению изотопов урана в СССР нтальных работ по разделению изотопов урана в СССР (1942–1948 гг.) // История советского атомного проекта. – 1998. – Вып. 1. – С. 135–185 (D. Simonenko. Brief Description of the First Experimental Works on Uranium Isotope Separation in the USSR (1942–1948) // History of the Soviet Atomic Project. – 1998. – Issue 1. – P. 135–185). 129 КругловА.К. Как создавалась атомная промышленность в СССР. – М.:ЦНИИ АТОМИНФОРМ, 1995. – С. 19 (Kruglov, A.How the USSR Atomic Industry Was Established. – Moscow: ATOMINFORM of Central Scientific Research Institute, 1995. – P. 19). 130 Записка И.В. Курчатова М.Г. Первухину о задержках в изготовлении центрифуги и в обеспечении Лаборатории № 2. 13 апреля 1943 г. Совершенно секретно. // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. – С. 333, документ № 162 (Memorandum of I. Kurchatov addressed to M. Pervukhin On Delay in Centrifuge Production and Technical Support for Laboratory No. 2. April 13, 1943. Top secret. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. – P. 333, document No. 162).

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continuous operation for 1.5 hours, which in itself was a considerable achievement.131 However, according to Kikoin, in the course of further improvement of the centrifuge technical difficulties occurred because of regular failures of bearings, lack of balance, etc. All that prevented the centrifuge from being used for practical purposes and forced the scientists to continue the tests. Furthermore, in his report, Isaak Kikoin spoke rather harshly about Lange, the centrifuge model designer. Kikoin stated that Lange “quite carelessly informed us on the progress achieved. No experiments were performed on any model. Calculations performed were completely tentative.”132 From 17 July 1943 onwards, Lange stayed in Sverdlovsk where he continued work on the centrifuge. Sverdlovsk, indeed, was the place where professor Kikoin travelled in September 1943 to evaluate the results of Lange’s activity. According to Kikoin, Lange made several mistakes when working on the centrifuge and unreasonably used resources made available to him.133 However, just a few days later, in his new report of 30 September 1943, Kikoin admitted that Fritz Lange had “worked quite successfully” and that the centrifuge testing activity was in progress.134 In the same document, Kikoin mentioned135 that in Sverdlovsk, in parallel with the centrifuge-related activities, work continued on diffusion separation of uranium. In spite of the slow-paced development of the diffusion method, according to Kikoin, this particular uranium enrichment method became the basis for the Soviet atomic project, rather than the centrifugal one. Work done by Lange and his colleagues on the centrifuge in the 1940s never exceeded the level of prospective developments. Nevertheless, Lange still played an active role in the Soviet Atomic Project, though his life might have gone a different way. According to instruction

131 Отчет заведующего сектором Лаборатории № 2 И.К. Кикоина И.В. Курчатову о результатах командировки в Уфу и Свердловск и состоянии работ по центрифуге и диффузионной установке. 17 мая 1943 г. Архив РНЦ КИ. Ф. 2, оп. 1, д.130/8, л. 1–6 об. Автограф. // «АтомныйпроектСССР.Документыиматериалы».Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. – С. 341–345, документ № 164а (Report of I. Kikoin, Sector Head of Laboratory No. 2 to I. Kurchatov On the Results of Assignment to Ufa and Sverdlovsk and Progress of Works on Centrifuge and Diffusion Installation. May 17, 1943. RRC KI Archive. F. 2, inv. 1, d.130/8, s. 1–6. Autograph note. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. – P. 341–345, document No. 164а). 132 Ibid. 133 Отчет И.К. Кикоина И.В. Курчатову о результатах командировки в Свердловск и состоянии работ по центрифуге и диффузионной установке. 21 сентября 1943 г. Свердловск. Архив РНЦ КИ. Ф.2, оп. 1, д. 130/8, л. 7 – 8об. Автограф. Цит. по «АтомныйпроектСССР. Документыиматериалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. – С. 391–393, документ № 186а (Report of I. Kikoin to I. Kurchatov On the Results of Assignment to Sverdlovsk and Progress of Works on Centrifuge and Diffusion Installation. September 21, 1943 Sverdlovsk. RRC KI Archive. F. 2, inv. 1, d. 130/8, s. 7–8. Autograph note. Cited from The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. – P. 391–393, document No. 186а). 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid.

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no. 149 of Laboratory No. 2 dated 15 August 1945, Lange was appointed the senior scientific officer at the Ural Section of the Academy of Science (USAS).136 Thus, Lange continued working in Sverdlovsk, while the centrifuge development team with whom he used to work in this city during the war was transferred to Moscow under the leadership of Professor Kikoin. The reason might be that during the war there were restrictions on travel for ethnic Germans. But it is also probable that Isaak Kikoin prevented Fritz Lange’s transfer to Moscow because Kikoin, as seen from the aforementioned documents, was not well in tune with Lange. Nevertheless, by the end of 1945 Lange was transferred to Moscow due to his good rating by the NKVD, and he continued to work there in the scope of the Soviet atomic project. In 1943, in parallel with the efforts towards the production of highly enriched uranium, the USSR began to consider seriously the production of weapons-grade plutonium in a heavy water reactor. High expectations in this regard were again set for the Ukrainian institutes. Based on the analysis of intelligence received from the USA on the progress of the Manhattan project, Kurchatov noted that it would make sense to start the development of such a reactor in the USSR (at that time he referred to it as a “uranium heavy water boiler”) “through the involvement of the personnel and resources of the UkrSSR Academy of Sciences (Academician Brodsky), whose laboratories could resume their pre-war activities on exploration of the methods for and production of heavy water.”137 However, at the same time, Kurchatov made a remark that the pre-war method of heavy water production by Brodsky, UkrSSR AOS’s fellow, was not adequate. Its shortfall was that Brodsky spent too much energy to produce heavy water. Therefore, Kurchatov came to the conclusion that Soviet intelligence should be tasked to find out the method used to produce heavy water in the USA.138 Thus, in addressing this issue, as well as many other nuclear agenda-related issues, the Soviet scientists had to rely upon information stolen from abroad, rather than on domestic developments. In the war environment lack of personnel was a serious obstacle for Kurchatov. Those talented nuclear physicists who had not been repressed in the 1930s were either sent to the frontline or continued to serve their sentences in prisons, or were forced to work far outside the nuclear agenda. Thus, Kurchatov needed to retrieve 136 Распоряжение № 149 по Лаборатории № 2 «О назначении Ф.Ланге». 15 августа 1945 г. // Архив РНЦ КИ. Ф.1, оп. 1/лс, д.5, л. 177. Подлинник // Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 2. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – М.:Издательство МФТИ, 2002. – С. 352, документ № 379 (Instruction No. 149 within Laboratory No. 2 On F.Lange’s Appointment. August 15, 1945 // RRC KI Archive. F. 1, inv. 1/ls, d.5, s. 177. Original Copy // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 2. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – Moscow: MIPT Publishing House, 2002. – P. 352, document No. 379). 137 Из отзыва И.В. Курчатова на «Перечень американских работ по проблеме урана». 4 июля 1943 г. Сов. Секретно. // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы».Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. – С. 357, документ № 169 (I. Kurchatov’s Comments on the List of US Activities on Uranium Agenda. July 4, 1943. Top Secret. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. – P. 357, document No. 169). 138 Ibid.

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such scientists from military service, concentration camps and rear-based enterprises in order to engage them in atomic project activities. Kurchatov sought to solve this task through extensive correspondence with the top Soviet government bodies in which he insisted that the required scientists should be put at his disposal. A fair number of such scientists included Ukrainians or those who used to work at Ukrainian scientific institutes for a long while. For example, Kurchatov managed to get Lev Landau, who had been subject to the repressions, back on the atomic project.139 Kurchatov moved for the release of Landau even in his reports to Lavrentiy Beria.140 In April 1943, Igor Kurchatov prepared a top-secret memorandum addressed to Pervukhin concerning the need to demobilize Veniamin Kelman who also worked at UIPT before the war.141 In November of 1944, Kurchatov prepared a similar document addressed to Beria requesting that a number of scientists including those who used to work at UIPT join the atomic project.142 Among this latter group, a special emphasis should be placed on Professor Kirill Sinelnikov, UkrSSR AOS corresponding fellow and UIPT director, and his assistant, professor Aleksandr Walter.143 Eventually, Kurchatov managed to put together a team of gifted nuclear physicists, many of whom had a Ukrainian scientific background. The important role of the staff coming from Ukrainian institutes in the implementation of the Soviet Atomic Project is proven by the unclassified letter144 from Pervukhin, deputy head of the Council of People’s Commissars and one of the

139 Андрюшин И.А. идр. Укрощение ядра. – C. 45 (Andryushin I.,et al. The Taming of the Nucleus.–P. 45). 140 Записка И.В. Курчатова Л.П. Берии об ученых, привлечение кторых необходимо для работ по проблеме. 24 ноября 1944 г. Сов.секретно // АП РФ. Ф.93, д.2(44), л. 141–143. Автограф. // Цит. по «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 2. – С. 163, документ № 282 (Memorandum of I. Kurchatov addressed to L. Beria On the Scientists Who Should Be Involved in the Activities on the Uranium Agenda. November 24, 1944. Top secret // RFPA. F.93, d.2(44), s. 141–143. Autograph note. // Cited from The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 2. – P. 163, document No. 282). 141 Записка И.В. Курчатова М.Г. Первухину “О необходимости демобилизации В. М. Кельмана”. 1 апреля 1943 г. Совершенно секретно // АП РФ. Ф.93, д3 (43), л.8. Автограф // Цит. по «Атомный проект СССР. Документыиматериалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 1. – С. 328–329, документ № 158 (Memorandum of I. Kurchatov addressed to M. Pervukhin On the Need to Demobilize V.M. Kelman. April 1, 1943. Top secret // RFPA. F.93, д3 (43), s.8. Autograph note // Cited from The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 1. – P. 328–329, document No. 158). 142 Записка И.В. Курчатова Л.П.Берии (Memorandum of I. Kurchatov addressed to L. Beria). 143 Ibid. 144 Письмо М. Г. Первухина Президенту АН УССР А.А.Богомольцу «О привлечении сотрудников институтов Академии к работе Лаборатории № 2». 29 апреля 1944 г. Секретно. // Архив РНЦ КИ. Ф.2, оп. 1, д364/1, л.1. Подлинник // Цит. по «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 2. – С. 64 - 65, документ № 229 (Letter of M. Pervukhin to А. Bogomolets, UkrSSR AOS President, On Involving the Employees of the Academy’s Institutes in Operation of Laboratory No. 2. April 29, 1944. Confidential. // RRC KI Archive. F. 2, inv. 1, d364/1, s.1. Original Copy // Cited from The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 2. – P. 64–65, document No. 229).

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Soviet Atomic Project’s leaders, to the UkrSSR AOS President Аleksandr Bogomolets On Involving the Employees of the Academy’s Institutes in Operation of Laboratory No. 2 dated 29 April 1944. In this letter, this top-ranking official requested the Ukrainian scientist to allow Аleksandr Brodskyand Аleksandr Leipunsky, UkrSSR AOS fellows, to have a side job in the secret Laboratory No. 2, the central Soviet organisation for atomic weapons development. As could be seen from the letter, by that date Laboratory No. 2 already had on its staff such employees of the UkrSSR AOS institutes as Dmitriy Timoschuk and Aleksey Chubakov from the UkrSSR AOS Institute of Physics located in Kyiv in peace time and stationed in Ufa along with other institutes of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine during the war. Pervukhin requested Bogomolets to issue an instruction to put Timoschuk and Chubakov, as well as O. Skarre, staff scientist for the UkrSSR AOS Institute of Physical Chemistry, at the disposal of Laboratory No. 2 by 1 July 1945. Aleksander Akhiyezer and other staff of the UkrSSR AOS institutes also joined the work of Laboratory No. 2 after this letter by Pervukhin.145 Thus, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences supplied a number of talented academics for the implementation of the Soviet Atomic Project. The liberation of Kharkiv from German occupation put the resumption of UIPT operations on the agenda again. In February of 1944, Pervukhin sent a special message to the management of the Kharkiv CP(B)U Regional Committee requesting to assist the Ukrainian Institute of Physics Technology in resuming its activity.146 However, at that moment, the comprehensive operation of UIPT was not possible due to a lack of proper funding and necessary equipment. The Soviet leadership did not respond to multiple requests on allocation of funds for cyclotron construction in Ukraine (note that Leipunsky even addressed Stalin personally on this cyclotron in his letter immediately upon explosion of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima).147 Some of those requests were simply unachievable, even with the best will in the world. For example, in one of the written requests148 to construct the cyclotron in Kharkiv the

145

Ibid. Письмо М. Г. Первухина 2-мусекретарю Харьковского обкома КП(б)У М. Д. Максимову о помощи УФТИ в возобновлении его работы. 9 февраля 1944 г. // ГА РФ. Ф.5446, оп.67, д.9, л.4. Отпуск // «Атомный проект СССР. Документыиматериалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 2. – С. 34, документ № 212 (Letter of M.G. Pervukhin to M.D. Maksimov, the Second Secretary of Kharkov CP(B)U Regional Committee On Assisting the UIPT in Resuming Its Activity. February 9, 1944 // SA RF. F.5446, inv.67, d.9, s.4. Release // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 2. – P. 34, document No. 212). 147 Письмо директора Институтафизики АН УССР А.И. Лейпунского И.В. Сталину «О строительстве циклотрон а вКиеве». 8 августа 1945 г. Секретно // АП РФ. Ф.93, д. 7 (45), л. 76–79. Подлинник // Атомный проект СССР. Документыиматериалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 2. – С. 343–345, документ № 374 (Letter by А. Leypunsky, the Director of the Institute of Physics, UkrSSR AOS to J. Stalin On Cyclotron Construction in Kyiv. August 8, 1945. Confidential // RFPA. F.93, d. 7 (45), s. 76–79. Original Copy // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials.V. 1 (1938–1945), part 2. –P. 343–345, document No. 374). 148 “Из письма АН УССР Председателю СНК УССР Н.С. Хрущеву о необходимости закупки циклотронной лаборатории в США”. 31 января 1944 г. Секретно // Архив РАН. Ф. 146

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UkrSSR AOS President Aleksandr Bogomolets appealed to Nikita Khrushchev (the then Chairman of Soviet Ukraine’s Government) to move before the superior authorities to purchase a complete cyclotron laboratory from the USA for 500 thousand dollars. Apparently, this request was not realistic from the standpoint of either high cost or willingness of the USA to allow the USSR an opportunity to produce a nuclear weapon. However, it is true that the USA in the course of the Second World War provided limited assistance in the scope of the Lend-Lease Program aimed at implementation of the Soviet Atomic Project by providing the Soviet Union a small quantity of uranium. The USA did this in an attempt to conceal from the USSR their own works in the nuclear field and the military purpose and secrecy of such work (the USA did not suspect at that time that Soviet intelligence was aware of all those aspects anyway).149 But it was very unlikely that the USA would wish to sell a complete cyclotron laboratory to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it could be assumed that it was just an attempt by Bogomolets to draw attention to domestic developments and to the much lower cost of construction of this by UIPT personnel.

2.4

Ukraine’s Role in the Third Phase of the Development of the Soviet Atomic Project (1945–1949)

In 1945, for the first time in history, the USA tested a nuclear weapon, which was followed by its use against Japan’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki, one after the other. Those nuclear bombardments deeply impressed the Soviet leadership. First of all, any doubts as to the practicability of an atomic bomb vanished straight away. Secondly, it became clear how huge was the destructive force and power of an atomic bomb. Thirdly, this triggered serious concern in the Moscow leadership regarding the readiness of the USA to apply the nuclear weapon against the USSR, after having done this to Japan. In this context, the USSR’s lagging behind the USA in terms of the nuclear program looked especially depressing. Despite the massive amount of detailed intelligence on the American nuclear program obtained by the Soviet intelligence service, the USSR nuclear industry was still in its infancy in 1945. In the wartime environment, the nuclear activities survived on leftovers, and therefore by 1945the USSR still had neither a reactor, nor a stock of enriched uranium, nor a clear picture of how to construct a nuclear explosive device. The only serious breakthrough that the Soviet Union managed to achieve by the time of 530с, оп. 1с, д.260, л. 9–10. Заверенная копия. //Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 1 (1938–1945), ч. 2. – С. 30–31, документ № 209 (From the letter of the UkrSSR AOS to N. Khrushchev, the Chairman of UkrSSR CPC, On the Need to Purchase a Cyclotron Laboratory from the USA. January 31, 1944. Confidential // RAOS Archive. F. 530с, inv. 1с, d.260, p. 9–10.Certified copy.//The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 1 (1938–1945), part 2. – P. 30–31, document No. 209). 149 Андрюшин И.А. идр. Укрощение ядра. – C. 25 (Andryushin I., et al. The Taming of the Nucleus.–P. 25).

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the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombardments was the Soviet Union’s substantial reserves of uranium removed from Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany upon their occupation by Soviet troops. The Second World War was not over yet, but the USSR was already facing a new, very complicated challenge. This challenge required the creation of a Soviet nuclear weapon as soon as possible, followed by catching up with the USA in terms of the quantity of its nuclear arsenal. The implementation of these tasks in a country ruined by war at short notice was an outstanding historical phenomenon. The intelligence on the progress of work in the US nuclear field considerably facilitated progression of the USSR towards the creation of the atomic bomb. However, the Soviet scientists needed to clarify many important details through their own efforts in the course of thorough experimental and analytical activities. At the same time, following the course already tested by the USA did not mean spending less funds on establishing a huge-scale nuclear industry than the USA did. Possibly the USSR could have saved more valuable resources if it had not blindly copied the USA experience in some areas but relied more upon domestic developments, for example, the results obtained by Fritz Lange in the centrifuge technology development under the UkrSSR AOS. On the other hand, centrifuge tests faced certain problems, whereas the situation in the aftermath of the atomic bombardments of Hiroshima and Nagasaki allowed no time for experiments or tests. Therefore, it was decided to take a path more expensive but proven by the Americans towards the production of weapons-grade uranium by the diffusion method, and to simultaneously progress towards the creation of a plutonium bomb (it was the plutonium bomb that became the first nuclear explosive device tested in the USSR in 1949). On 20 August 1945, the State Committee of Defence (SCD) issued a special resolution to establish a new governmental agency with a broad scope of authority for the supervision of the implementation of the Soviet Atomic Project, in order to solve the nuclear weapon problem. This new agency was called the Special Committee, to be headed by Lavrentiy Beria, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars. Upon dissolution of the SCD in September 1945, the Special Committee began to function as a body of the USSR CPC. After the latter was transformed into the Council of Ministers in March 1946, the Special Committee became a body of the USSR Council of Ministers.150 The Special Committee was entrusted to organize all works related to nuclear energy use in the USSR, including research and development activities, uranium exploration and production in the USSR and abroad, the establishment of an atomic industry, nuclear power generating facilities, development, and construction of atomic bombs. Naturally, the latter was the key task in that period, and the solution

150 “Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы”. Т. 2 (1945–1954), Кн. 1. / Под общей редакцией Л.Д.Рябева. – Москва - Саров: Наука – Физматлит, 1999. – С. 3 (The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 2 (1945–1954), Book 1. / Under general edition of L. Ryabev. – Moscow - Sarov: Nauka – Fizmatlit, 1999. – P. 3).

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to all other tasks served the accomplishment of that key task. Thus, the Special Committee became a sort of Soviet Atomic Project’s headquarters to address all the most important organisational issues arising in the course of the development of the Soviet nuclear program.151 The documents that regulated the Special Committee’s activity demonstrate a special (though not leading) role of the Ukrainian scientific institutes and enterprises in the implementation of the Soviet Atomic Project. However, no Ukrainian institutes were mentioned in any other instruction on establishing the Special Committee within the SCD dated 20 August 1945. Among the members of the Special Committee and its Technical Council that were appointed by that resolution, there were no Ukrainians or persons who worked in Ukraine previously, for a long while. The Ukrainian territory was used as an appendix to the huge atomic industry being established in the USSR. The atomic industry enterprises that were formed in Ukraine were mainly used for uranium material reprocessing like, for example, plant no. 906 (presently SE Pridneprovsky Chemical Plant), which was built in Ukraine on the instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers (COM) of 14 August 1947 for reprocessing the uranium ore produced from the Pervomayskoye and Zheltorechenskoye deposits.152 According to experts, the plant was one of the originators of the Soviet Atomic Industry.153 A considerable sum—about 80 million rubles—was spent on its construction.154 Thus, despite the achievements made towards the development of the USSR’s nuclear industry by Ukrainian scientists representing the institutes of physics technology, a decision was made to locate the atomic project’s key assets outside Ukraine after the war was over. Apparently, that decision was based on the fact that Ukraine suffered substantial losses and devastation during the war and it was more expensive to build a defence nuclear industry there. Also, the Soviet leadership probably wanted to place the top-secret nuclear facilities either closer to Moscow or rather far off from civilisation and the Soviet borders (in Siberia). Probably another factor that caused such a decision was a traditional lack of trust of Russians towards Ukrainians. In the Soviet times, such a lack of confidence was enforced by the events of the forced famine and activities of UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army). In general, due to a number of reasons, Ukraine lost its leading position in the USSR nuclear field after the war, in spite of its huge potential, and failed to become the centre of the Soviet Atomic Project, though it still held its special role in that project. The advancement of KIPT to the leading positions in the Soviet Atomic Project was hindered by the fact that, as the archive documents demonstrate, in 1948, i.e. just one year prior to the first Soviet nuclear test, the KIPT was still busy recovering the

151

Ibid. Андрюшин И.А. и др. Укрощение ядра. – C. 14 (Andryushin I.,et al. The Taming of the Nucleus.–P. 14). 153 Андрюшин И.А. идр. Укрощение ядра. – C. 301 (Andryushin I., et al. The Taming of the Nucleus.–P. 301). 154 Ibid. 152

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infrastructure destroyed during the war. Nevertheless, leading scientific organisations still remained in Ukraine and were involved in the implementation of the critical theoretical and calculation activities required for the successful development of the Soviet Atomic Project. Thus, as far back as 1945, the Special Committee adopted the resolution on additional involvement of a number of USSR AOS institutes and other scientific institutions in the atomic project’s implementation. Those additionally involved organisations included two Ukrainian scientific institutes: the Institute of Physics, UkrSSR AOS, Kyiv headed by the already rehabilitated Аleksandr Leipunsky, the former UIPT director, and the Institute of Physics Technology, UkrSSR AOS, Kharkiv (i.e. the former UIPT later renamed KIPT) headed by Kirill Sinelnikov. The former institute, according to the aforementioned resolution of the Special Committee, was assigned to develop a powerful uranium ion source, while KIPT was supposed to investigate the interaction between the monochromatic neutrons and nuclei of uranium, plutonium, and thorium.155 A bit later, in August 1948, KIPT received another important task from the USSR Council of Ministers: to conduct research on countermeasures against nuclear weapon effects. KIPT carried out this study jointly with authoritative Russia-based organisations such as the Institute of Chemical Physics (ICP) and the Institute of Physics, USSR AOS.156 In 1946, KIPT commenced operation of the secret Laboratory No. 1, which performed various tasks of the leaders of the Soviet Atomic Project, and which was established under the secret resolution of the Special Committee157 and the Council of People’s Commissars158 dated 19 February and 2 March 1946, respectively. The nomenclature applied to the key laboratories involved in the Soviet Atomic Project causes certain confusion. Laboratory No. 2 located near Moscow was the one where professor Kurchatov worked, and which was later named the Russian Research Centre Kurchatov Institute (RRC KI). From the fact that the Kharkiv-based laboratory was assigned number one, it could be derived that it played a more important role in the Soviet Atomic Project than that of the Kurchatov Laboratory No. 2 near Moscow. This, of course, is not true. Laboratory No. 2 not only was established earlier than Laboratory No. 1 but performed more important functions directly related to the construction of nuclear weapons. The number two

Андрюшин И.А. идр. Укрощение ядра. – C. 73–74 (Andryushin I., et al. The Taming of the Nucleus.–P. 73–74). 156 Андрюшин И.А. идр. Укрощение ядра. – C. 73 (Andryushin I., et al. The Taming of the Nucleus.–P. 73). 157 Протокол № 14 заседания Специального комитета при Совнаркоме СССР. Москва, Кремль. 19 февраля 1946 г. Строго секретно (Особая папка) // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 2. Атомная бомба. 1945–1954 гг. Кн. 1. – С. 70–71, документ № 15 (Minutes of the Meeting No. 14 of the Session of the Special Committee with the USSR CPC. Moscow, Kremlin. February 19, 1946. Strictly confidential (Special file) // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 2. Atomic Bomb.1945–1954 Book 1.– P. 70–71, document No. 15). 158 Довбня А.Н. Предисловие к сборнику. – C. 3 (Dovbnya, A. Foreword to the Digest. – P. 3). 155

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for Kurchatov laboratory and number one for the Kharkiv lab were intended to deceive foreign spies (in case they were able to find out about the laboratories themselves), so that they could not guess correctly which of them was more important for the Soviet Atomic Project. Nevertheless, according to The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials the idea to include KIPT scientists Kirill Sinelnikov and Anton Walter159 and facilities was discussed during 1944–1945. In May 1945 it was decided to charge Kharkiv Institute to execute research according to the Laboratory №2 Plan for 1945. The core of the Soviet Union system of science planning was to make a unified national science plan through the National Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology (SCST). The Academy was responsible for planning and co-coordinating all basic research in the Soviet Union in the natural and social sciences. The SCST bore the responsibility for the development of unapplied science/technological plan and for the introduction of new technology into industry. A 1971 NATO document highlights the structure of organisation of the Soviet Union science administration. It shows the close links between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, the Commission for Education and Science, Government that formulated and sent the research and development priorities to the USSR AOS, Industrial Ministries and the Ministry for Higher and Secondary Specialised Education (Fig. 2).160 The priorities of the 1945 Plan were to conduct the engineering design workings on isotope separation installation, heavy water and gas reactors, as well as to advance the project of so-called BS-1 and BS-2 products (“bomb-shell”—a project of A-bomb).161 That allowed the head of UIPT Sinelnikov to raise the question of the necessity to reorganise the Nuclear Physics Department of the UIPT in a special laboratory, concentrating its work on the uranium problem.162 And in the late 1940s

Записка И.В. Курчатова Л.П. Берии об ученых, привлечение которых необходимо для работ по проблеме. 24 ноября 1944 г. / АП РФ. Ф. 93, д.2(44), л. 141–143. Автограф // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 2. Атомная бомба. 1945–1954 гг. Кн. 1. – С. 162–164, документ 282 (Memos of I.V. Kurchatov to L.P. Berii on scientists to be involved to the work on the problem. Moscow, Novemner 24, 1944. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 2. Atomic Bomb.1945–1954 Book 1.– P. 162–164, document 282). 160 Report by the North Atlantic Military Committee on Soviet Science and Technology MC 265/71, Volume 1, NATO Archive Science and Technology, 1971, p. 11. 161 Из Постановления ГКО № 8579сс/ов об утверждении плана научно-исследовательских работ по проблеме на 1945 г. 15 мая 1945 г. РГАСПИ. Ф. 644, оп. 1, д.494, л. 1–5. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 2. Атомная бомба. 1945–1954 гг. Кн. 2. С. 293–296, документ 349 (Resolution of the State Defense Committee № 8579 ss / ov3 on approval of the research plan on the problem for 1945, Moscow, May 15, 1945 // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials.V.1. Atomic Bomb. 1945–1954 Book 2. – P. 293–296, document 349. 162 Протокол №9 заседания Технического совета Специального комитета при Совнаркоме СССР. 19 ноября 1945 г. / АПРФ. Ф. 93, д. 3/45, л. 131, 133–138. Протокол – подлинник. // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 2. Атомная бомба. 1945–1954 гг. Кн. 159

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Fig. 2 Organization of the Soviet science administration

a secret department for training experts for the newly created industry—atomic— was created at the Physics and Mathematics Department of Kharkiv State University. The majority of courses at this department were delivered by UIPT staff. 4. – С. 44, документ 9 (The protocol № 9 meeting of the Technical Council of Special Committee at the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, November 19, 1945 // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 2. Atomic Bomb.1945–1954 Book 4.– P. 44, document 9).

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Subsequently, this department became a formally open, but still semi-secret Physics and Technology Faculty of Kharkiv State University.163

2.5

Ukraine and the Creation of the Soviet Hydrogen Bomb (1945–1956)

In 1949, the USSR performed the first test of nuclear weapon and, as officially recognised, some Ukrainians contributed towards this achievement. The Ukrainian academician Leipunsky was awarded the Order of Lenin and his closest colleague Dmitriy Timoschuk the Order of the Red Banner of Labour.164 The successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb did not mean the completion of the intense work of the parties to the Soviet Atomic Project. They were supposed to create another type of nuclear weapon, the hydrogen bomb. In this regard, the secret Laboratory No. 1 at KIPT was assigned a number of tasks. Back in 1947, the Kharkiv laboratory was obliged to investigate the nuclear reactions of light elements, in particular, of deuterium.165 These studies were opening the path to research into thermonuclear fusion and the possibilities of the creation of a hydrogen bomb on the basis of this phenomenon. The continuation of these studies was a task for Laboratory No. 1 and a part of its plan166 for 1948 approved by Walter, deputy head of Laboratory № 1.167 The superior authorities in their individual resolutions also obliged KIPT to perform in 1948 preliminary

Таньшина А.В. Харьков. 45-й. Атомный проект СССР – Лаборатория №1 // Вісник НАН України. – 2015. - №3. – С. 107(Tanshina A.V. Kharkov. 45th. USSR Atomic Project – Laboratory № 1 // Herald of National Academy of Science of Ukraine. – 2015. - №3. – P. 107). 164 Ранюк Ю.Н.А. И.Лейпунский и ядерная физика наУкраине. – C. 50 (Ranyuk Y. A. Leipunsky and Nuclear Physics in Ukraine. – Р.50). 165 Из протокола № 91 заседания Научно-технического совета Первого главного управления при Совете Министров СССР. 8 сентября 1947 г. / АП РФ. Ф. 93, д. 18/47, л. 133–144. Подлинник // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 3. Атомная бомба. 1945–1954 гг. Кн. 1. – С. 69–71, документ 22 (From the Minutes of the Meeting No. 91 of the Session of the Scientific and Technical Council of the First Central Directorate with the USSR Council of Ministers. 8 September 1947. // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 3. Hydrogen Bomb. 1945–1956. Book 1.–P. 69–71, document No. 22). 166 Из плана Лаборатории № 1 Физико-технического института Академии наук Украинской ССР на 1948 год. 23 декабря 1947 г. Сов.секретно (особая папка). // Цит. по «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 3. Водородная бомба. 1945–1956. Кн. 1. – С.82–83 (From the Plan of the Laboratory No. 1, Institute of Physics Technology, UkrSSR Academy of Sciences for 1948. December 23, 1947. Top secret (special file). // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 3. Hydrogen Bomb. 1945–1956. Book 1.–P. 82–83, document No. 26). 167 Ibid. 163

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calculations regarding the prospective hydrogen bomb, which was named ‘Item S’ in the Soviet classified documents of that time.168 Calculations of the thermonuclear reaction section were performed by KIPT in 1949–1950 jointly with two other scientific organisations located in Moscow: the Kurchatov Laboratory No. 2, also known as the Instrumentation Laboratory, USSR Academy of Sciences (IL, USSR AOS), and the Institute of Chemical Physics (ICP, USSR AOS).169 Moreover, the research of light nuclei fusion reaction was also included in the draft Task Schedule of Laboratory No. 1 for 1949.170 The first results of KIPT’s work on the thermonuclear agenda were reflected in the Minutes of Meeting No. Т-13 of the Session of the Scientific and Technical Council of the First Central Directorate with the USSR Council of Ministers.171 At that session, the report on the KIPT’s activity for 1948 was presented to cover, among other things, the investigation of the possibility of thermonuclear reactions. The report was accepted positively, although it was noted that there was a certain delay from the schedule in performing the work on the study of nuclear reactions of such light elements as lithium and beryllium. It was remarkable that even Sinelnikov, the head of Laboratory No. 1, admitted in the report that it made sense

168 Из постановления СМ СССР № 1127-402сс/оп «О плане специальных научно-исследовательских работ на 1948 год». Москва, Кремль. 6 апреля 1948 г. Сов.секретно (Особая папка) // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 3. Водородная бомба. 1945–1956. Кн. 1. – С.91–93, документ № 30 (From the Resolution of USSR COM No. 1127–402 ss/op On the Plan of Special-Purpose Scientific Research Works for 1948. Moscow, Kremlin. April 6, 1948. Top secret (Special file) // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 3. Hydrogen Bomb. 1945–1956. Book 1. – P. 91–93, document No. 30) 169 План научно-исследовательских работ по РДС-6 на 1949–1950 гг. Не позднее 9 июня 1949 г. Сов.секретно (особая папка) // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 3. Водородная бомба. 1945–1956. Кн. 1. – С.218–221, документ № 77 (Plan of Scientific Research Work on RDS-6 Bomb for 1949–1950. No later than June 9, 1949.Top secret (special file) // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 3. Hydrogen Bomb. 1945–1956. Book 1.–P. 218–221, document No. 77). 170 Проект тематического плана Лаборатории № 1 ФТИ АН УССР на 1949 г. // Архив ННЦ ХФТИ. Ф.1, оп. 1/С, д. 30, с. 59–64 // «Лаборатория № 1 и Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы. 1938–1956 гг. // Под ред. А.Н.Довбни. – Харьков: Национальный научный центр «Харьковский физико-технический институт», 2011. – С. 147 (Draft Task Schedule of Laboratory No. 1, UIPT, UkrSSRAOS for 1949. // Archive of NSCKIPT.F.1, inv. 1/С, d. 30, pages. 59–64 // Laboratory No. 1 and The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. 1938–1956 // Under editorship of A. Dovbnya. – Kharkov: National Scientific Center Kharkov Institute of Physics Technology, 2011. – P. 147). 171 Из протокола № Т-13 заседания Научно-технического совета Первого главного управления при Совете министров СССР. Понедельник, 20 июня 1949 г. Сов.секретно (Особая папка) // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 3. Водородная бомба. 1945–1956. Кн. 1. – С.229–233, документ № 84 (From the Minutes of the Meeting No. Т-13 of the Session of the Scientific and Technical Council of the First Central Directorate with the USSR Council of Ministers. Monday, June 20, 1949. Top secret (Special file) // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 3. Hydrogen Bomb. 1945–1956. Book 1.– P. 229–233, document No. 84).

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to concentrate all further research efforts for the light element reactions in Moscow, at the Institute of Chemical Physics, since this Institute had a necessary mass spectrograph that was absent in Kharkiv at that moment. Sinelnikov even regretted that research into the light element reactions was commenced outside of Moscow, since originally there were concerns about their practicability. Therefore, KIPT continued to be involved in research, but ultimately it proved to have less capability than Moscow. Another document signed by Flerov—the report172 on completion of the scheduled hydrogen bomb research activities—gave an approving reference to the works performed by UIPT. In particular, the report mentioned that at UIPT its employees Walter and Klyucharev completed the work on the specification of the cross-section of the deuterium and tritium fusion reaction. However, it also noted that the UIPT calculations were not sufficiently accurate. Also, this report again confirmed the deficiency of equipment available at the UIPT, since the high-voltage laboratory generator located at the institute generated only a low-intensity neutron flux.173 The studies into the thermonuclear reaction cross-section continued at UIPT in 1952, which is seen from the work plan of the Design Bureau No. 11 (DB-11, today known as nuclear center Arzamas-16) approved by the Soviet Government. That Design Bureau was responsible for the assignment of relevant tasks to the Kharkiv Institute.174 Lev Landau also played an important role in the creation of the thermonuclear weapon. It is interesting to note that until recently (2011), a person who knew the hydrogen bomb secrets used to live in Kharkiv and work at the KIPT. His name was Oleg Lavrentiev, a doctor of physics and mathematics. Long before joining the KIPT, where he began his more than 50-year career, Lavrentiev, an ordinary Soviet Army sergeant, managed to develop a design for a hydrogen bomb in his service-free time and even sent it in a letter to Stalin in 1949. However, according to Lavrentiev,

172 Отчет по выполнению плана исследовательских работ по РДС-6с привлеченных организаций, работающих по заданиям КБ-11 (по состоянию на 25.11.1951 г.). 23 декабря 1951. Сов.секретно (Особая папка) // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 3. Водородная бомба. 1945–1956. Кн. 1. – С. 439–441, документ № 168 (Report on Completion of the Schedule of RDS-6 s Bomb Research Activities Performed by Outside Organizations Fulfilling the Assignments of DB-11 (as of 25/11/1951). December 23, 1951. Top secret (Special file) // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 3. Hydrogen Bomb. 1945–1956. Book 1.–P. 439–441, document No. 168). 173 Ibid. 174 Из постановления СМ СССР № 5373-2333сс/оп «О плане работ КБ-11 на 1952 год». Москва, Кремль. 29 декабря 1951 г. Сов.секретно (Особая папка) // «Атомный проект СССР. Документы и материалы». Т. 3. Водородная бомба. 1945–1956. Кн. 1. – С. 442–444, документ № 169 (From the Resolution of the USSRCOM No. 5373-2333сс/inv.On the Work Plan of DB-11 for 1952. Moscow, Kremlin. December 29, 1951 Top secret (Special file) // The USSR Atomic Project. Documents and Materials. V. 3. Hydrogen Bomb. 1945–1956. Book 1.– P. 442–444, document No. 169).

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his letter most probably “drowned in the flood of greetings on Stalin’s 70th birthday.”175 In 1950–1956, Lavrentiev studied in Moscow and met there leading Soviet nuclear physicists. However, because of his challenging temper, he was unable to stay in Moscow to play a part in the Soviet Atomic Project, so he was forced to move to KIPT in 1956.

3 Development of Infrastructure for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in UkrSSR in Pre-Chernobyl Period (1945–1986) 3.1

Nuclear Scientific Research in UkrSSR

Research in the area of nuclear energy was conducted on the territory of Ukraine in addition to the activities immediately related to the development of nuclear weapons. Thus, Aleksandr Leipunsky, who moved to Kyiv from Kharkiv and was appointed Director of the Kyiv-based UkrSSR AOS Institute of Physics, organised the work intended to obtain the data pertaining to neutron and nuclear interactions necessary for the development of technology and equipment to be used in the nuclear industry, including nuclear reactors. A number of neutron generators were built to support this work.176 A designated section was established in this institute in 1944 to focus on a number of tasks related to nuclear physics and the use of atomic energy. The U-120 cyclotron was put into operation in the Kyiv Institute of Physics; the VVR-M research reactor was commissioned in 1960; the EGP-5 electrostatic generator was operated from 1964. Important results were obtained using all of the above facilities confirming that it was of immediate interest to conduct research into nuclear processes at the institute.177 Given the growing need for the further development of nuclear and physics research, the Presidium of the UkrSSR AOS issued resolution No. 105 of 26 March 1970, to establish the Institute of Nuclear Research (INR) of the UkrSSR AOS on the basis of a number of nuclear research-related sections of the Institute of Physics of UkrSSR AOS. The establishment of the Institute of Nuclear Research (INR) in Kyiv was a momentous event in the history of the development of nuclear science in Soviet Ukraine as it became a milestone indicating the advance of nuclear physics research in Ukraine to a new and higher level.

Лаврентьев О.А. К истории термоядерного синтеза в СССР. – Одесса: ИздательствоСПДБарановский, 2008. – 96 с. – С. 9 (Lavrentiev, O. On the History of Thermonuclear Fusion in the USSR. – Odessa: Publishing House SPD Baranovsky, 2008. – 96 p. – P. 9). 176 Ranyuk, op. cit. in Ref. 22, pp. 54–56. 177 Ivanyuk, F. Short History and Main Achievements of Institute of Nuclear Research of NASU/ Materials for Annual Publication-2008 // Official site of Institute of Nuclear Research of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine// http://www.kinr.Kyiv.ua/ 175

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The main directions of the INR activities included fundamental and applied research in the areas of nuclear physics of low and medium energies, reactor physics, the study of atomic energy industry prospects, as well as research with regards to the use of isotopes and radiation for economic purposes.178 Mitrofan Pasechnik, the fellow of the UkrSSR AOS, was the founder and the first director of the INR. Oleg Nemets, another fellow of the UkrSSR AOS, became his successor in the position of Institute Director (1974–1983). At the present time, the INR is headed by Ivan Vishnevskiy, a fellow of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU), since 1983.179 In the initial years of its history, the INR consisted of the departments of nuclear physics, nuclear reactions, theory of nucleus, nuclear spectroscopy, nuclear electronics, radiation physics and the Uzhgorod branch, a separate structural section focusing on photonuclear processes research. Experimental work was supported by the use of modern nuclear physics installations; the VVR-M research reactor with hot cells for handling highly radioactive materials, U-120 cyclotron, EGP-10 K tandem-generator and neutron generators were the main research facilities. The U-240 isochronal cyclotron was put into operation in 1975, which was a unique installation of its kind in Europe at the time. The range of the INR’s experimental activities comprises comprehensive research into the interactions of neutrons, protons, deuterons, alpha-particles and heavy nuclei including those of almost all the elements of the periodic system.180 Among the most remarkable results of the Institute’s activities are the findings of the neutron physics research. In particular, the membranous effects associated with nuclei-caused neutron scattering were discovered by Pasechnik (NASU fellow). In addition, the relative inputs of the direct and compound mechanisms into cross-sections of elastic and non-elastic nuclei-caused neutron scattering in the wide range of energy values have been determined (by Ivan Korzh). Theoretical studies of the physics of the atomic nucleus conducted by Vilen Strutinskiy, the NASU corresponding fellow and followers of his scientific school, have been recognized around the world. A series of Strutinskiy’s studies entitled “The Phenomenon of Formation of Substantially-Deformed Heavy Nuclei in QuasiStationary State” was registered as a scientific discovery with the relevant State Committee of the USSR in 1978. Significant success has been achieved in the field of nuclear spectroscopy. Relevant activities were initiated by G. Latyshev, a corresponding fellow of the USSR AOS, by constructing a magnetic beta-spectrometer with characteristics equal to those of the world-best spectrometric equipment. A large mass of precision-type data was obtained with the use of this spectrometer pertaining to the inner conversion factors, the multi-field capacity of gamma-transformations along with detection of the versatile anomalies of the nuclear processes. The intensive application of

178

Ibid. Ibid. 180 Ibid. 179

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gamma-spectroscopy in radioactive decay and charged particle beam research led to the discovery of new excitation states in nuclei structure; new nuclei structure data was obtained and a new phenomenon was discovered (nuclei excitation caused by positron and electron annihilation, by Ivan Vishnevskiy, a NASU fellow).181 The previously mentioned Oleg Lavrentiev made a significant contribution to the history of nuclear physics development in Soviet Ukraine. He lived and worked in Kharkiv in the period 1956–2011. As a researcher of KIPT, since the late 1950s, Lavrentiev focused his activities on exploring the possibilities for the conduct of controlled thermonuclear reaction inside a reactor facility, a “top-of-the-agenda” direction in contemporary scientific research. However, in order to make progress with these studies, Lavrientiev and his colleagues desperately needed the very expensive research equipment to enable them to perform the relevant experiments. Regretfully, the Soviet Government did not provide funding to install such equipment at the KIPT, thus Lavrentiev’s work did not progress much further than theoretical concepts from the late 1950s until the disintegration of the USSR.182

3.2

Origins and Resolution of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Problems in UkrSSR (1950s–1960s)

The Soviet Union had initiated activities focusing on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy at almost the same time that the nuclear weapons development project ended. The nuclear industry for peaceful purposes also began to evolve in Ukraine. However, the nuclear power plants there were not constructed immediately but were built only in the 1970s–1980s. Instead, the scientific and research institutes of Soviet Ukraine had begun to use nuclear materials and other radioactive sources for medical, industrial and agricultural purposes since the 1950s. With this said, it should be noted, though, that already back in the 1950s–1960s, meaning long before the Chernobyl accident, the bad faith attitude towards the management of the sources of radiation gave rise to the first problems in the field of nuclear and radiation safety (NRS) in Ukraine, owing to the lack of experience and negligence pertinent to the Soviet mindset. The term NRS originated later. The fact that such problems existed is proven by the information contained in many of the now declassified documents; some of them will be described below. To a certain extent, the experience gained in the resolution of these nuclear and radiation safety problems in Soviet Ukraine can be used in the contemporary era as well, therefore, the subject deserves to be explored in detail. The problems were acknowledged officially even as far back as April 5, 1958, in Resolution No. 373–047 of the Council of Ministers of the UkrSSR. The Resolution states that “there are serious shortcomings with regards to storage, accounting, 181 182

Ibid. Лаврентьев op. cit. – p. 29–39. (Lavrentiev)

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labour protection and shipment involving radioactive substances in Ukraine.”183 The general characteristic of the situation with the use of radioactive sources in the academic institutes of Soviet Ukraine in the 1950s was given in the secret letter of Bukhalo, the Head of Department for Organisation of Scientific Activities of the Presidium of UkrSSR AOS, addressed to Sagizliy, the Deputy Administrator of Affairs of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers.184 Bukhalo provided the overall character of the situation quoted below: work involving the use of radioactive isotopes and radiation is performed in the following 10 institutes of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine: Institute of Biochemistry, Bogomolets Institute of Physiology, Institute of General Non-Organic Chemistry, Institute of Geological Studies, Institute of Physics, Institute of Metal Physics, Institute of Industrial Metal Casting, Institute of Metal Ceramics and Special Alloys, Institute of Microbiology and Institute of Zoology. The work involving the use of isotopes was conducted earlier in the Institute of Botanical Studies, where the relevant activities were discontinued at the time of sending the letter due to the prohibition of the State Sanitary Inspection. Furthermore, Bukhalo emphasized that the special inspections were performed in June and December of 1958 revealing that “conditions for conduct of work involving use of isotopes have been substantially improved recently.”185 In accordance with the document, the reason for such improvement was “the increased attention to the issue of creating relevant conditions for work involving use of isotopes both on the part of the Presidium and administrations of the institutes involved.”186 Nevertheless, a number of shortcomings were also mentioned along with these achievements, providing evidence of the fact that a few challenges in the field of nuclear and radiation safety began to originate in the territory of Ukraine as early as the end of the 1950s. According to Bukhalo “the generic issue for all the institutes involved is the absence of a radioactive waste disposal facility for all the city-based institutes.” Thus, due to this fact “a number of institutes (Biochemistry, Bogomolets Physiology, Physics, Industrial Metal Casting) had to dispose of radioactive waste at their own sites.”187 The second shortcoming, according to Bukhalo, was the absence of a special laundry facility for the isotope-contaminated clothes that would be the one for all the city-based institutes. In addition to that, the institutes had an insufficient supply of “chlorine-treated vinyl special clothing, batteries for dosimeters and neutron 183 Memorandum of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of UkrSSR to comrade M. Grechukha, Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, Kyiv, March 1959, “Secret” // Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv. F. R-12, op. 12, case No. 2648, P. 43–45. 184 Letter No.180 to comrade Sagizliy, Deputy Administrator of Affairs of Council of Ministers of UkrSSR from S. Bukhalo, Head of Department of Organization of Scientific Activities of UkrSSR AOS.“Secret”0.1959. // Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv. F. R-12, op. 12, case No. 2648, P. 1–2. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid.

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dosimeters.”188 Irregular medical checks of workers who were using isotopes in their work were indicated as yet another shortcoming. Moreover, besides these generic shortcomings, Bukhalo listed the nuclear and radiation safety drawbacks specific to the individual Ukrainian institutes involved. Thus, there was no ventilation in the premises of the Institute of Biochemistry. Apart from that, other deficiencies were pointed out, such as the trivial absence of the uninterrupted supply of hot water which was acutely in need to support the operation of laboratories where work involving nuclear isotopes was performed (this was typical for the Soviet (and post-Soviet) realities). The same problem, though with local specifics, was also pertinent to the Bogomolets Physiology Institute. In addition to hot water supply problems, the Institute of Geological Studies was found incompliant with the safety regulations, as work [involving radioactive substances] was performed there in general-purpose premises, not in a stand-alone specially equipped room. According to Bukhalo, violations of the safety rules with regards to irregular dose monitoring at workplaces were also found in the Institute of Physics, on top of the problems with ventilation, too slow progress in the fabrication of interim storage containers and setting up of a remote control ‘button’ capability for the radioactive waste disposal facility. The most frequently generally encountered problem with the ventilation system removing the radioactive gases from laboratories into the atmosphere also existed in the Institute of Metal Physics (such contamination of the environment had to be tolerated, especially given the fact that even more flagrant ecological violations were quite common in the Soviet Union). In conclusion, Bukhalo stated that the Presidium of the UkrSSR AOS “has adopted the decision to obligate directors of the above-mentioned institutes to resolve the shortcomings existing in the work of their organisations” in December 1958.189 Furthermore, Bukhalo reported on the specific measures taken by the Presidium of the UkrSSR AOS to improve nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine. Thus, UkrSSR AOS conducted a specialized seminar focusing on issues of occupational safety even back in 1957, during which workers performing activities involving the use of radioactive isotopes received the relevant training.190 Problems were encountered in the process of trying to resolve the issue of the construction of the radioactive waste disposal facilities mentioned in the letter. So, for example, Kharkiv Oblast Council forwarded a request to Kyiv on January 21, 1959, soliciting for designation of a land lot within the forest area in Kharkiv Oblast to be used for construction of the radioactive isotope-related waste extermination and disposal facility. However, having reviewed the solicitation, N. Profatilov, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture of UkrSSR, sent a secret conclusion to his bosses in the Ukrainian Government whereby it was recommended to

188

Ibid. Ibid. 190 Ibid. 189

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decline such a request by Kharkiv Oblast Council. The refusal was based on the grounds that the requested land lot was covered with a valuable type of trees and, besides, “is a popular recreation area of the working people of the city of Kharkov.” So, the conclusion contained a recommendation to find a site to be used for construction of the disposal facility “within the area of unused land beyond the ‘green zone’.”191 The further development of this controversial situation can be followed using the secret letter of 3 March 1959 of Y. Sirchenko, the Administrator of Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the UkrSSR to S. Spivak, the Minister of Agriculture of the UkrSSR. The letter states that the Executive Committee of Kharkiv Oblast Council repeatedly reviewed the issue of designating a plot for the purpose of construction of the radioactive waste disposal facility upon receipt of objections on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture of Ukraine. In the outcome, Kharkiv Oblast Executive Committee concluded that no possibility existed to designate a land lot for such a disposal facility in any place other than that in the previously identified forest area located in Kharkiv Oblast. In view of the above, Sirchenko urged that the Minister of Agriculture of Ukraine review the request filed by Kharkiv Oblast Executive Council again. The impression is that, in so doing, Sirchenko alludes that it would be best for Spivak and his Ministry colleagues to refrain from voicing their objections against the proposals of Kharkiv Council. Along with that, Sirchenko asked Spivak to come up with more specific proposals and coordinate those with the Ministry of Agriculture in Moscow first, and only then forward the proposals for the review of the Ukrainian Government.192 This example demonstrates that, as a rule, issues of this kind were resolved for the benefit of neither environmental protection nor the ordinary citizens of Soviet Ukraine and the USSR in general. Radioactive substances were applied in the national economy in very different places in Ukraine at the end of 1950. For instance, such materials were in use at one of the state enterprises of the Lviv Sovnarkhoz (Council for National Economy), namely, Lviv Power Lift Truck Plant, where GUP-SO-5-1 gamma-spectrometer with a radioactive cobalt 60 source was installed. 5 grams of this radioactive substance was in the inventory of the Plant in 1959. According to the report of A. Dubina, the Deputy Chairman of Lviv Sovnarhoz, to Sagizliy, the Deputy Administrator of Affairs of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers, the conditions for the safe-keeping of the unit containing radioactive material “comply with the standard requirements; the equipment has been tested and found safe to use by the sanitary inspection”.193

191 Ministry of Agriculture of UkrSSR to Council of Ministers of UkrSSR, Conclusion. February 7, 1959. “Classified”// Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv. F. R-12, op. 12, case No. 2648, p. 12. 192 Letter from Y. Sirchenko, Administrator of Affairs of Council of Ministers of UkrSSR, to comrade M. Spivak, Minister of Agriculture of UkrSSR, April 31,959. // Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv. F. R-12, op. 12, case No. 2648, p. 13. 193 Letter of A. Dubina, Chairman of National Economy Council of Lviv Economic Administrative District to comrade Sagizliy, Deputy Administrator of Affairs of Council of Ministers of UkrSSR.

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Problems with the construction of the radioactive waste disposal facility also occurred in Lviv Oblast at the end of the 1950s due to the lack of funding. Thus, Lviv local authorities sent a letter to the Chairman of the Government of Soviet Ukraine in February 1959, requesting allocation of 562 thousand rubles for the construction of a centralized radioactive substances disposal facility for the city of Lviv.194 It should also be noted that, as S. Stefanik reported, construction of the radioactive waste disposal facility was very much in demand in Lviv Oblast as “the amount of radioactive materials used in the national economy has grown so much that . . . the construction of a centralized waste disposal facility is now extremely necessary and cannot be delayed.”195 Stefanik, the Chairman of Lviv Oblast Executive Committee, received a secret response to his request from Kyiv as early as the beginning of March 1959. In this letter of response the Lviv Oblast Executive Committee was informed that it was not practicable to allocate the solicited amount of money, therefore, “the construction of the radioactive substances disposal facility shall be funded on the account of investment of the out-of-limit funds that have been disbursed to the Oblast Executive Committee.”196 In 1959, agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) of the UkrSSR were also involved in the monitoring of the operational safety status of the safe-keeping of radioactive isotopes, in addition to the UkrSSR AOS. The aforementioned Sirchenko, Administrator of Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the UkrSSR, informed V. Chistyakov, Head of the fourth Department of the Ministry of Health (MoH) of the UkrSSR about that fact. The relevant letter is dated February 25, 1959. As is stated in the letter, the inspection conducted by the MIA found that the radioactive substances used for medical applications were kept in premises unsuitable for the purpose in a number of medical institutions. Sirchenko requests Chistyakov to conduct an internal ministerial inspection of the sanatoria.197 As we can see, the UkrSSR AOS directive documents alone were not sufficient to bring the nuclear and radiation safety-related problems in Soviet Ukraine to a complete resolution, as such problems were not encountered solely by the academic institutes.

February 20, 1959. Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv. F. R-12, op. 12, case No. 2648, p. 17. 194 Letter of S. Stefanik, Head of Executive Committee of Lviv Oblast to comrade Kalchenko, Chairman of Council of Ministers of UkrSSR.“Secret”. February 12, 1959. // Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv. F. R-12, op. 12, case No. 2648, P. 29–30. 195 Ibid. 196 Letter of G. Tretyakov, Head of Residential and Communal Department of UkrSSR State Planning Committee to comrade Stefanik, Head of Executive Committee of Lvov Oblast. “Secret”, March 5, 1959 // Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv. F. R-12, op. 12, case No. 2648, p. 28. 197 Letter of Y. Sirchenko, Administrator of Affairs of Council of Ministers of UkrSSR to comrade V. Chistyakov, Head of fourth Department of Ministry of Health of UkrSSR. February 25, 1959 // Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv. F. R-12, op. 12, case No. 2648, p. 18

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Therefore, with the advance of time, apart from the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, more and more Ukrainian government agencies were getting involved in the efforts to resolve such problems. The UkrSSR punitive agencies got themselves heavily involved in identifying the problems in the field of nuclear and radiation safety in the late 1950s; the extent of such involvement is demonstrated by the memorandum, dated March 1959, sent by the UkrSSR MIA to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers. The memorandum states that MIA agencies conducted a “far and wide” inspection in the period of November–December 1958 to monitor implementation of the above-mentioned Resolution of the Council of Ministers. The inspection found certain progress regarding improvements in the area of nuclear and radiation safety. However, the inspection findings ‘have also shown that the violations of the radioactive isotope safe-keeping rules still existed at some of the state enterprises and organisations just as before, and effective measures to resolve that are not being taken.” Thus, the isotopes were stored in premises unequipped for that purpose at some of the Kyivbased health-improvement facilities; isotopes were even “kept unattended in the garden area exposed to the open air” at the ‘Dnepr’ sanatorium in the Crimean Oblast.198 In addition, it was noted that oftentimes isotopes were stored and shipped “without the relevant permission granted by the MIA, which was leading to theft and loss of materials.”199 However, due to the Union-wide secrecy regime, such incidents as well as the cases of accidental irradiation remained unknown facts to the public. On the other hand, there was no evidence of any attempt to use the missing radioactive sources against the population or authorities. Other illustrations of Soviet negligence with regards to the management of radioactive materials can be found by revisiting the same MIA memorandum. For instance, Leschenko, the Head of the Lugansk Geophysical Expedition, brought with him a container with two ampoules with radioactive Cobalt-60 on July 28, 1958, to be used for production field research at a drilling site. Leschneko left this container with the material totally unattended at a distance of 30 metres from the derrick. Later on, when cobalt became needed for the geophysical research, Leschenko found that one of the two ampoules containing cobalt was missing and was since never found.200 Furthermore, there were instances of lost radioactive isotopes at Plant No. 21 in Stalino Oblast (modern-day Donetsk Oblast), Mirgorod geophysical facility in Poltava Oblast and so forth. Finally, the memorandum contains critical comments in respect of the Odessa, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk and Stalino Oblast Executive Committees, as well as the Kyiv City Executive Committee, as those “are very slow in resolving issues pertaining to the construction of the centralized radioactive waste disposal facilities and special laundries.”201

198

Memorandum, op. cit. in Ref. 184. Ibid. 200 Ibid. 201 Ibid. 199

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In this memorandum, UkrSSR MIA recommended to obligate the executive committees mentioned in the previous paragraph to “expedite construction of the special laundries for treatment (decontamination) of the clothes contaminated with radioactive substances and centralized radioactive waste disposal facilities.” Along with that, the MIA proposed to “strengthen control of the safe-keeping and use of radioactive substances.202 The UkrSSR Council of Ministers responded to the above memorandum and sent a secret directive to the ministries and oblast executive committees. This document assigned responsibility to the ministries, government agencies and councils for the national economy of the UkrSSR to “take urgent measures to resolve violations of the rules of shipment, safe-keeping, accounting and use of radioactive substances in the relevant subordinated organizations.”203 Kyiv City Executive Committee and Kharkiv, Odessa, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk and Stalino Oblast Executive Committees, which were found to have committed the most violations, had to “define and approve activities intended to enable construction of the centralized radioactive waste disposal facilities and special laundries in 1959.”204 This Resolution did not end the Council of Ministers’ efforts to intervene in order to improve the sad state of the NRS regime. In addition to the message just mentioned communicated to all of the subordinated organisations, the Ukrainian Government also began to forward letters to the heads of the oblasts where the most flagrant NRS violations were identified. For instance, such a letter from the Kyiv bosses was received by D. Pisnyachevskiy, the Chairman of Kharkiv Oblast Executive Committee. The letter signed by M. Grechukha, Deputy Chairman of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers, reprimands Pisnyachevskiy for being slow to resolve “the issue of construction of special laundries for treatment/decontamination of special clothing contaminated by radioactive substances and centralized radioactive waste disposal facilities.”205 Also, Grechukha refers to the MIA information according to which “arrangements for the disposal of radioactive waste and corpses of animals used for laboratory tests are not satisfactory.”206 This document concludes with yet another directive issued on behalf of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers “to define and approve the relevant measures to expedite construction of a special laundry and centralized radioactive waste disposal facility.”207

202

Ibid. Directive of UkrSSR Council of Ministers to Ministers, Executive Agencies of UkrSSR, Executive Committees of Oblasts and Kyiv City, Councils for National Economy, 1959. “Secret” // Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv, F. R-12, op 12, case No. 2648, P. 46–47. 204 Ibid. 205 Letter of M. Grechukha, Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers of UkrSSR to D. Pisnyachevskiy, Head of Executive Committee of Kharkov Oblast, 1959. “Secret” // Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv. F. R-12, op 12, case No. 2648, p. 48. 206 Ibid. 207 Ibid. 203

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In addition, the issue of nuclear security began to show in some of the archive documents originating before the end of 1950. An example of such a document is the now declassified letter of N. Korolev, the Deputy Chairman of Zaporizhia Oblast Sovnarhoz addressed to comrade N. Kalchenko, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.208 The author of the letter expressed his deep concern in relation to the decrease in the number of the guard force at the protected facilities in Zaporizhia Oblast that have nuclear and other radioactive inventories. Korolev requests Kalchenko to find a possibility to increase the number of persons involved in the protection of nuclear facilities.209 Requirements and standards of the radiation safety regime were still violated notwithstanding the fact that the UkrSSR supreme executive authorities had gotten heavily involved in the monitoring of compliance with the regime requirements since the spring of 1959. The evidence of that is contained, for example, in the letter from the Council of Ministers to P. Shupik, the Minister of Health of the UkrSSR, where it is stated that continued violations linger on in the medical institutions. Thus, radioactive substances were still kept in the garden in the open at the ‘Dnepr’ sanatorium in the Crimean Oblast,210 despite the fact that the authorities in Kyiv were already informed about this flagrant situation, as the above-mentioned document states. Another precedent took place in the oncology dispensary in Stalino (now Donetsk), where over 100 ampoules containing radioactive cobalt were kept in the medical manipulations room resulting in 10–15 times excess of the maximum permissible level of radiation in the patient wards and hallway. A similar situation was also in Zaporizhia city hospital, as well as in Kherson, Vinnitsa, Stanislav (now Ivano-Frankivsk) and Chernihiv oncology dispensaries.211 Thus, in reality, the patients who were trying to get cancer treatment in the Soviet Union were risking the aggravation of that terrible disease and were instead being continually exposed to the adverse impact of radiation. Naturally, yet again the Cabinet of Ministers demanded from the UkrSSR MOH to take measures to resolve such shortcomings and report about the relevant actions taken.212 Platon Shupik, the Minister of Health of UkrSSR, quite promptly responded to this demand of his superior, Mykhailo Grechukha, and replied to him already on May 5, 1959. The response letter informs of the measures taken in the medical

208 Letter No. 85 s N. Korolev, Deputy Chairman of Zaporizhia Council for National Economy to comrade N. Kalchenko, Chairman of Council of Ministers of UkrSSR, Zaporizhia, “Secret 1959. // Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv, F. R-12, op 12, case No. 2648, p 8. 209 Ibid. 210 Directive of Council of Ministers of UkrSSR to comrade P. Shupik, Minister of Health of UkrSSR, April 8, 1959.“Secret” // Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv, F. R-12, op 12, case No. 2648, p. 51. 211 Ibid. 212 Ibid.

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institutions of Ukraine intended to improve the safe-keeping of radioactive substances. These measures are listed below. Chief Doctors of the Sanitary and Epidemiological Stations received directions on March 30, 1959, to enhance the oversight of the state enterprises and institutions using the radioactive isotopes. It was proposed to the state enterprises and institutions where the conduct of work with sources of ionizing radiation (SIR) failed to comply with the sanitary requirements to discontinue activities involving the use of radioactive isotopes: • On April 14, 1959, all medical organisations using radioactive sources were ordered to perform an in-depth internal check of the current status of safekeeping, accounting and work with radioactive isotopes. • Oblast Sanitary and Epidemiological Stations were ordered to monitor the progress of construction of the centralised radioactive waste disposal facilities, special laundries and dosimeter repair workshops.213 Similar reports about the measures taken in order to improve radiation safety were sent to Grechukha in 1959 by other organisations in the UkrSSR. For example, Petr Nadezhin, the Head of the Chief Geological Committee of UkrSSR sent a letter to Grechukha to inform him about the improvements and comments taken into account. Heads of the Councils for the National Economy provided similar information in their letters.214

3.3

Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes in Soviet Ukraine

It is interesting to note that Ukraine played a role in the nuclear history of the USSR also because of the two so-called “peaceful” nuclear explosions that happened on its territory.215 A nuclear device was detonated underground for industrial purposes (nuclear explosion referred to as “Fakel” [“Torch”]) on July 9, 1972, in the vicinity of Hrestischi village of the Krasnograd District. The purpose of it was to cover a

213 Response of P. Shupik, Minister of Health of UkrSSR to comrade M. Grechukha, Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers of UkrSSR to Letter No.S-228 of April 81,959. May 5, 1959. “Secret”// Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv, F. R-12, op 12, case No. 2648, p. 81. 214 Response of P. Nadezhdin, Head of Chief Geological Committee of UkrSSR to M. Grechukha, Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers of UkrSSR to Letter No. S-229 of April 8, 1959. “Secret”//Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv, F. R-12, op 12, case No. 2648, p. 66. 215 USSR Nuclear Tests. Volume 1/Edited by V. Mikhaylov. – Sarov: RFNC VNIIEF, 1997. – 298 P. – p. 103.

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borehole that had accidentally released natural gas. Due to safety considerations, the yield of this explosion was reduced to 3.6 kilotons.216 There are quite dramatic facts to the background of this nuclear explosion. It was precisely near the village of Hrestischi in Kharkiv Oblast that quite an abundant natural gas field was discovered in 1970. The overall amount of deposits there was estimated at around 300 billion cubic metres (for comparison: Ukraine was importing around 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually in the pre-crisis period). In 1971, 17 boreholes were drilled in Kharkiv Oblast to produce gas from the deposit.217 However, the future held no prospects for using this gas field since it was overly difficult to get the gas out, as extremely high pressure (around 300 atmospheres) occurred in the depth. Later on, a major fire happened at one of the boreholes. It was impossible to extinguish it using regular fire fighting means for several months. A whole set of drilling installation and equipment fell down into the crater that appeared in place of the borehole. Such strong fires are usually extinguished by the employment of the well-proven, although not safe method of the “borehole siege,” when it is “circularly” excavated during many months. However, this time the people in Moscow decided to stage an experiment and attempted to extinguish the fire relying on an unusual method: underground nuclear explosion (actually, this rarely employed method was used for the same purposes in Uzbekistan).218 The Resolution to use the method involving a nuclear explosion was signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksey Kosygin, the leaders of the Soviet state.219 In addition, domestic animals and bees were engaged in this dubious experiment for test purposes; these were deployed in the vicinity of the epicentre of the explosion to observe their response. Most of the animals and bees died. The most distressful consequence of this first nuclear explosion on the territory of Ukraine was that the explosion not only did not extinguish the fire at the borehole but rather aggravated the problem. According to witnesses, a column of fire several hundred metres high burst up after the detonation, and then a nuclear “mushroom cloud” appeared from underground which covered the sun. Another dramatic element of the situation was that the site of the nuclear explosion was only 8 kilometres away from a busy main road Moscow—Simferopol, where, apparently, the traffic towards Crimea and back was intensive, given the summer season. Some of the centres of population were located even closer to the explosion site; however, people were evacuated from them ahead of time.220

216

Andryushin et al., op. cit. in Ref. 41, p. 248. Nuclear Explosions in Ukraine: How it was // Pripyat town web-site http://pripyat.com/articles/ yadernye-vzryvy-v-ukraine-kak-eto-bylo.html 218 Fedosenko, Pavel. Our Own ‘Chernobyl’ Was Found Near Kharkiv. Own Chernobyl was found; it was decided to bring tourists there. Vesti [News], June 3, 2013 г. http://vesti-ukr.com/harkov/43 70-v-chernobyl-pod-harkovom-hotjat-vodit-jekskursii 219 Nuclear Explosions, op. cit. in Ref. 218. 220 Fedosenko, op. cit. in Ref. 219. 217

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Thus, this nuclear explosion produced no effect apart from radioactive contamination. Eventually, the fire had to be extinguished using the well-proven method of “circular” excavation during yet another whole year. Relevant negative environmental effects of the explosion lingered on for many years. Acid rain fell for a long time after that in Eastern Ukraine; some of the agricultural species failed to produce. According to the assessment of Leonid Chernegora, a physicist from Kharkiv Karazin University, the radioactive fall-out resulting from this explosion reached Western Europe.221 It is remarkable that the Ukrainian Communist Party leaders received advice from the Kremlin on the day of the explosion not to eat the locallygrown vegetables and those were then shipped from Moscow. Nevertheless, the general public was not informed about this nuclear explosion at all (relevant information remained classified until the 1990s), so “rank-and-file” Ukrainians were consuming food that was most probably contaminated, without even knowing it.222 The second and last nuclear explosion (referred to as “Klivage” [“Cleavage”], a mining term) on the territory of Ukraine was also made underground and for industrial purposes. This was done with the participation of VNIIPROMTECHNOLOGII institute [All-Union Institute for Production-Related Technologies]. The explosion happened on September 16, 1979, near the town of Yunnokommunarovsk of the Yenakiyevo Town Council District (Industrial Association Ordzhonikidze Coal) of Donetsk Oblast, at the Yunkom mine at a depth of 903 metres. The explosion yield of this one was only 0.3 kilotons.223 The immediate purpose of the detonation was to ease tension inside the mass of rock; this was supposed to increase the safety level of mining of the coal beds. Until 1979 the Yunkom mine was very unsafe as coal and rock bursting occurrence there was the most frequent in the whole of the Central Donbas region due to the fact that the mine is situated in an area of tectonic dislocation. As a result of that peaceful underground nuclear explosion, a void with a radius of 5–6 metres was formed in the mine along with crush and cleavage area around it with a radius of 20–25 metres. As a consequence, the frequency of occurrence of coal and rock bursting decreased, thus, after the nuclear explosion the mine became safer. Radiation did not affect the safety of work in the mine as the level of radioactivity there after the explosion remained at the background value within the monitoring period of 1979–2000.224 This notwithstanding, the negative effects of this underground explosion still remain. At present, ecologists are concerned with the danger of the possible flooding of the Yunkom mine that might lead to the radioactive contamination of the groundwater.225 The complicating factor is that the mine is located in an area not

221

Ibid. Ibid. 223 Nuclear Weapons Tests and Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes in USSR. 1949–1990 / Edited by V. Mikhailov. – Sarov: RFNC VNIIIEF, 1996. – 64 P. – p. 36. 224 Nuclear Explosions, op. cit. in Ref. 219. 225 Ibid. 222

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controlled by Ukraine, in the territory of the so-called “DNR” [“the Donetsk People’s Republic”]. The authorities of the latter are not taking much care of the protection of this hazardous facility that in September 2015 already resulted in the theft of a pump taking water out from the mine. This has increased the risk of the mine flooding even higher along with that of the transfer of radioactive elements into the basin of the Severskiy Donets river, which may have catastrophic implications for the environmental situation in the whole of the Donbas region.226

3.4

Situation in the Atomic Industry Prior to Construction of First Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants

In his report at the XXVI Congress of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, set out the Party’s future tasks and in this context stressed the importance of improving the structure of the country’s fuel and energy balance. He emphasized the need to reduce the share of oil in the fuels, replace oil with natural gas and coal and also accelerate the development of nuclear power.227 According to the CPSU plans for 1981–1985 and for a further period ending in 1990, the development of nuclear power was to be expedited and efforts were to be exerted to ensure that the share of atomic energy accounted for one-tenth of the overall national electricity output.228 The rationale for the decision of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU in respect of the development of the nuclear industry was that 55% of the world’s deposits of fossil fuels were located predominantly in the hardto-get-to and scarcely populated areas of Western Siberia. This entailed an increased amount of transportation resulting in substantial growth in the cost of electricity. Deployment of nuclear power plants in the areas with the biggest amounts of energy consumption along with the insignificant cost of nuclear fuel shipment would have led to the decreased cost of electricity generation.229 According to the opinions of a number of experts who were directly involved in the development of the Soviet nuclear energy sector, another reason for the intended intensive replacement of natural gas and oil with uranium for the purposes of power generation was that this strategy would have made it possible to export substantial amounts of oil and gas

226

Krushilin. Situation at the Mine Flooded After Nuclear Explosion Located in Occupied Donets Region Threatens Catastrophe // ‘Facty’, Donetsk, 8.09.2015 http://fakty.ua/205661-situaciya-nazatoplennoj-posle-yadernogo-vzryva-shahte-v-okkupirovannoj-donetchine-grozit-katastrofoj 227 26th Congress of CPSU (February 23–March 3, 1981) Verbatim Report. Volume 1. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981). 228 Newspaper ‘Soviet Hakassiya’ http://www.nbdrx.ru/pdf/Hakasia/1986/g011986060-061.pdf 229 Sklyarov, V. (Minister of Energy and Electrification), Atomic Energy of Ukrainian SSR, Znaniye Society of Ukrainian SSR, series ХI ‘Science, Technology, Production’, No.8. Kyiv, 1983.

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and, thus, “earn the ‘valuta’ [‘hard currency’] which was so high in demand to purchase modern technologies, equipment and food products.”230 These circumstances necessitated the expeditious construction of nuclear power plants. However, the relevant available production capabilities needed to fabricate the necessary equipment for the water-cooled and water-moderated reactors (VVER) (reactor vessels, in the first place) were limited in the late 1970s–early 1980s. Thus, another way to approach the issue of nuclear reactor construction needed to be found. In the light of this situation in the USSR, it was decided to focus on the development of the RBMK reactors (graphite-moderated, water-cooled, boiling-, channel-, thermal neutrons-type). RBMK’s design had a number of economic and technological advantages over other existing types. It did not require a high-pressure reactor vessel and it could be refuelled online. The RBMK reactors could be assembled on site: components could be installed on site, used local concrete and the core of the plant could be assembled on site as well. In addition, the RBMK’s design allowed for expanding the reactor’s output without significant modifications [12]. These technological features could potentially result in a great economic advantage for the Soviets to meet the aforementioned plan and to overcome the constraint of a lack of production capabilities. However, some of the reactor experts spoke quite negatively about the RBMK reactors’ safety as well as its economics. As academician Valery Legasov pointed out in his notes, the RBMK “was considered a bad type because of the economic factors: high fuel spending, big capital costs and ‘non-industrial’ construction basis. The concern was that the RBMK design was some kind of a stand-alone, a Sovietonly line of development [of reactor technology].”231 The interests of the ‘clan’ that included the Minsredmash (the USSR Ministry of Intermediate Engineering) and the USSR Committee for Use of Atomic Energy, along with the fact that Academician A. Aleksandrov, the President of the USSR AOS, was appointed the scientific lead of the RBMK reactor design development project, led to the situation that this particular reactor type was chosen for the purposes of intensified development of the national nuclear power industry notwithstanding all the relevant technical process-related problems. According to N. Karpan, who was in 1986 the Deputy Chief Engineer for Science and Nuclear Safety of the Chernobyl NPP, the RBMK reactor was designed by the Scientific Research and Engineering Institute of Energy Technology jointly with the Atomic Energy Institute, and “an enormous amount of deviations from the standard mandatory requirements of the regulatory documents in force in 1973–1974 were found in the RBMK prior to commissioning of Unit 1 of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant (1974).”232 In this context, the alluded to documents are, first of all, the “General Safety Provisions for Design, Construction

Kopchinsliy, G., Skaletskiy, Y., Steinberg N. Chernobyl. 30 years. What’s next? ‘Nuclear and Radiation Safety’ 1(69)0.2016. 231 Notes of Valery Legasov, Transcript of 5 magnetic tapes; text dictated by Academician V. Legasov. 232 Karpan, N. Chernobyl. Revenge of the Peaceful Atom, 2005. 230

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and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants” (OPB-73) and “Rules of Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Power Plants” (PBY-04-74). The RBMK design was not brought in line with the new requirements of the “General Safety Provisions” (OPB-82) adopted in 1982. Karpan is of the opinion that “the scandal was looming among the reactor designers representing different directions of engineering. It was not permissible to operate the RBMK reactor given such a big amount of deviations from the standard safety requirements.”233 Taking into account all the advantages of the RBMK and its role in the expanding nuclear industry of the Soviet Union, existing technical disadvantages should be more seriously considered. It was manageable at that time because nuclear governance—Gosatomnadzor (the USSR State Nuclear Oversight Committee) and the USSR State Committee for Use of Atomic Energy, supervising the power plant design, construction and operation processes, were parts of Minsredmash. The Ministry was the designer of the nuclear power plants as well. Thus, the relevant control on its part was far from being objective.

3.5

Construction of Nuclear Power Plants in Soviet Ukraine (1970s–1980s)

The RBMK reactors in Ukraine were built only at Chernobyl NPP in 1977 (this will be addressed in the next subsection in detail). All the rest of the currently active Ukrainian power plants (Zaporizhia, Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South-Ukraine) operate water-cooled, water-moderated reactors (VVER design). Construction of the first NPP of the VVER type on the territory of Ukraine began on 25 May 1973 in Rivne region. The reactor compartment construction began on 8 August 1976; the reactor facility was installed at the designed position in the plant on 1 October 1976. The first reactor of the Rivne NPP was commissioned in December of 1980. The second reactor was put into operation exactly one year later, on 22 December 1981. Unit 3 of the Rivne NPP became operational on 21 December 1986, just after the Chernobyl Accident that became the “destinymaking” event for Ukrainian and the world’s nuclear energy.234 The decision to build the next NPP in the Zaporizhia region was made by the USSR Council of Ministers in 1977; from 1979 onwards this effort became the lead project in the construction of a series of nuclear power plants built per the uniform design. The technical design of the first series of the Zaporizhia NPP power units (4 units, VVER-1000 reactor type, with a total capacity of 4000 MW) was approved in 1980. On April 1, 1981, the first cubic metre of concrete was poured into the foundation of the Unit 1 reactor compartment; installation of the reactor commenced at the end of 233 234

Ibid. Rivne NPP official web-site. History http://www.rnpp.rv.ua/history-build.html

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1982. Zaporizhia NPP Unit 1 (1,000,000 kWh capacity) began to generate electric power on November 9, 1984. The other two units were commissioned subsequently every year: Unit 2 (1985), Unit 3 (1986), Unit 4 (1987), Unit 5 (1989).235 South-Ukraine NPP, the third Ukrainian power plant, was constructed in parallel with the expansion of the Zaporizhia NPP. South-Ukraine NPP Unit 1 was commissioned in 1982, Unit 2 in 1985.236 In connection with the commissioning of the Khmelnitsky and South Ukraine NPPs, 750 kV transmission lines at the Chernobyl NPP—Western Ukraine and Dnieper—Vinnitsa sections were cut, and then reloaded to the 750 kV open switchgear of the Khmelnitsky (1984) and South-Ukraine (1987) NPPs.237 During this period, the communication of the energy system of the South with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries was consistently enhanced by the introduction of 750 kV Ukraine-Poland power lines (Khmelnitsky NPP-Rzeszow, 1984) and Ukraine-Romania (South-Ukrainian NPP-Issachar, 1987). Because of cooperation within CMEA in 1982, 1984, and 1987, the first jointly financed nuclear reactors started operation in Ukraine. Half of the electricity produced by these reactors was earmarked for a new set of high-voltage transmission lines.238 In 1984, the Rivne NPP was connected to the substation of the West-Ukrainian electricity transmission, built to the dimensions for 750 kV. Temporarily, this power transmission was turned on for 330 kV.

3.6

Chernobyl NPP

Aleksei Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in his report at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU, regarding the 5-year plan national economy development of the USSR for the period 1971–1975 stated that “in the new 5-year period we will begin implementation of a wide program for construction of nuclear power plants, first of all in the European part of the country, on the territory of Soviet Ukraine, with the intention to put nuclear power plants into operation with a total capacity of 30 million kW within the next 10–12 years.” It was also noted in the report that the planned targets could not have been reached in the previous 5 year period due to the fact that the machine-building industry was not ready for the effort

235

Ibid. SUNPP official web-site/Nuclear Energy of Ukraine. http://www.sunpp.mk.ua/ru/nuclear/ ukraine_power_engineering 237 Energy: history, current and future, 2013: http://energetika.in.ua/ru/books/book-4/section-2/ section-3 238 Sonja D. Schmid, Nuclear Colonization?: Soviet Technopolitics in the Second World, Entangled geographies: empire and technologies in the global Cold War/edited by Gabrielle Hecht, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 236

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[the issue here is the previously mentioned problem with the absent capabilities for reactor vessel fabrication].239 An information memorandum of 19 September 1971, issued by the Office of the KGB with the UkrSSR Council of Ministers, says that the Chernobyl NPP, the first nuclear power plant in Ukraine, is currently under construction in accordance with the directives of the XXIV Congress of the CPSU near the village of Kopachi in the Chernobyl District of Kyiv Oblast; the memorandum also mentions that the NPP capacity will be two million kW.240 The development program for the RBMK reactors was also envisaged in the USSR Nuclear Energy Development Plan. It was intended to put into operation the RBMK-based energy capabilities to the sum of eight million kW prior to 1977.241 Thus, a number of other nuclear power plants with RBMK reactors began to be built along with the Chernobyl NPP: Leningrad NPP (Unit 1 was commissioned in 1973) and Kursk NPP (Unit 1 was commissioned in 1976). In addition, the decision was made to build Smolensk NPP (Unit 1 commissioned in 1982) and Ignalina NPP (Unit 1 commissioned in 1984) in order to translate the resolutions of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU into reality. Forced acceleration of the pace of events related to the development of the country’s nuclear potential, as well as the increase in labour productivity targets in the nuclear industry, resulted in a decrease in work quality and a number of other problems. The memorandum of December 191,978 from Klochko, Head of the Chernobyl District Office of the UkrSSR KGB addressed to General-Major N. Vakulenklo, Head of the USSR KGB Office for the City of Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast, acknowledges the fact that certain members of managerial personnel deliberately violated the process-related standard requirements during construction of the Chernobyl NPP “thinking only about how to deliver the facilities faster, being careless about the future and possible tragic consequences.”242 In another memorandum, written by V. Fedorchuk, the Chairman of the State Security Committee [KGB] of Ukraine, it was noted that, as at the end of the 1970s, “there are facts pointing at deviations from the design requirements and breaches of the technical procedures for conduct of the construction and installation works that might lead to accidents and incidents.”243 The documents of the UkrSSR law-enforcement agencies indicate yet another problem: low engineering training of middle-level

Verbatim Report. XXIV Congress of Communist Party of Soviet Union. March 9 – April 30, 1971. 240 Memorandum of Office of KGB with UkrSSR Council of Ministers, September 19, 1971 SSU SA – f. 65. – Ref. 1. – Т. 5. – P 2–9 (http://tsdea.archives.gov.ua/ua/index_ch.php?page¼ch_doc). 241 Accident at Chernobyl NPP: Surmounting Experience. Lessons Learned, А. Nosovskiy, V. Vasilchenko, А. Kluchnikov, B. Pristerр; Edited by A. Nosovskiyо. – К.: Technika, 2006. – 264 с. +color insertions at p 32. – (Nuclear power safety). ISBN 966-575-113-1. 242 Memorandum addressed to General Major N. Vakulenko, Head of KGB Office for Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast on violations during construction of Chernobyl NPP dated November 19, 1978 http:// back-in-ussr.com/2016/07/rassekrechennye-dokumenty-po-chernobylyu.html 243 Memorandum of UkrSSR KGB addressed to Central Committee of Communist Party of Ukraine on systematic violations of technical procedures for conduct of construction and installation works 239

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management personnel resulting in “degraded quality of the construction and installation works and increase of the costs of such works due to the need to correct the defects.”244 29 accident shutdowns happened at Chernobyl NPP in the period of operation 1977–1981 as a consequence of such problems (8 owing to support personnel faults, and the rest due to various technical reasons).245 Such a situation was not unique to the Chernobyl NPP; other USSR NPPs had a number of accidents due to a lack of safety culture and proper regulation. Problems related to the work organization system in the USSR, and UkrSSR in particular, also existed in addition to the above challenges encountered during the construction of the new power units. This was mentioned in the Resolution of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers No. 113 of April 2, 1986. The document states that the construction of NPPs in the territory of Ukraine “is conducted in an unsatisfactory manner,” pointing to the low level of work organisation, inferior quality of technical documentation development and also the fact that NPP power units “are put into operation without adhering to the deadlines.”246 However, instead of demands to focus efforts on improvement of work quality, the same document contains UkrSSR Council of Ministers orders to the responsible structural units to intensify the implementation of activities related to all projects aimed at the development of nuclear energy. Events that occurred in the 1980s became the quintessence of the development of nuclear energy in the USSR. This period was a time of great expectations in respect of the prospects for the nuclear industry’s development that was triumphantly declared at the XXVI Congress of the CPSU in 1981. However, this was also a time of disappointment caused by the catastrophic consequences of the Chernobyl accident in 1986. Detailed information regarding the accident and further development in the nuclear energy sector is presented in the third chapter of this research. The period was also marked by large-scale institutional changes involving the establishment of a dedicated authority to supervise the development of nuclear power in the USSR in 1983 and formation of a specialised industry-specific Ministry in 1987. Key systematic problems pertinent to the state approach to nuclear energy development came to the fore at that time, along with the deficiency of the Soviet political system concerning the nuclear industry. As a result, necessary lessons were

at certain sections of construction of ChNPP. January 17, 1979. http://tsdea.archives.gov.ua/ua/ index_ch.php?page¼ch_doc 244 Special information memorandum of Office of KGB with UkrSSR with Council of Ministers for Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast on systematic violations of technical procedures for conduct of construction and installation works at certain sections of construction of ChNPP. August 17, 1976 http://tsdea. archives.gov.ua/ua/index_ch.php?page¼ch_doc 245 Memorandum of Office of KGB UkrSSR for Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast addressed to UkrSSR KGB on not sufficient reliability of ChNPP emergency protection systems instrumentation equipment. October 16, 1981. // http://tsdea.archives.gov.ua/ua/index_ch.php?page¼ch_doc 246 Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies of Ukraine in Kyiv, F 2, op15, case No.18, pg. 1 of 22. http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Chornobyl_20/4/index.php?1No.photo

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learned and significant system-level changes were introduced even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union that shaped the modern approaches to the safe and responsible operation of nuclear facilities. Events linked to the Chernobyl Catastrophe had a significant effect on the political situation in the USSR as they triggered the practical implementation of ‘Glasnost’ [late Soviet proclaimed policy of openness and freedom of speech].

4 Conclusions Since the early days of nuclear physics research in the Russian Empire, Ukraine has actively participated in the development of physics and technology. However, in Tsarist Russia, this research remained sporadic and insignificant. The situation changed only towards the end of the 1920s with the ambitions of the Soviet leaders to industrialise the state. One of the prior sciences was physics and nuclear physics with the core centres based in the Leningrad, Moscow and Kharkiv Institutes. In the 1930s, the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology in Kharkiv was raised to the leading roles in nuclear physics studies in the Soviet Union. Moreover, it was quite well-known as a great platform for scientific and practical research and meeting even in Europe. Worldwide famous scientists took part in the conferences hosted by the UIPT and some of them worked in Kharkiv on a full-time basis for a short-term period. The activities of outstanding physicists such as Aleksandr Leipunsky, Lev Landau, Alexander Weissberg and Friedrich Houtermans led to the development of advanced technology that eventually helped to build nuclear weapons. Thoughtless repressions against Ukrainian nuclear physicists in 1937–1938 drastically diminished the UIPT’s human resource potential. However, even after these repressions Kharkiv still retained gifted nuclear scientists able to already undertake the construction of Soviet nuclear weapons before the USSR’s war with Germany. War with Germany and forced partial evacuation were yet another bitter blow to the potential of the UIPT and other Ukrainian physics institutes which had demonstrated their capability to join the nuclear weapon design work in pre-war time. Albeit the decision to concentrate all research on nuclear power in Moscow placed Ukraine in a secondary role in terms of nuclear research. Here it is worth mentioning that an important part in nuclear weapons development was played by the physicists whose professional evolution occurred in Ukraine before the war. Furthermore, the Ukrainian institutes in Kharkiv and Kyiv themselves addressed important tasks as part of the Soviet Atomic Project. Therefore, Ukraine’s involvement in the nuclear matters of the Soviet Union is determined by the rapid growth of nuclear physics studies at the UIPT during the 1930s–1940s and by the fact that many Ukrainians and Ukrainian institutions contributed significant, albeit secondary work to the development of one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals.

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Further to the above two aspects of the Soviet-era nuclear history of Ukraine, there was the third one: the measure of creation and expansion of peaceful nuclear energy that still makes our country one of the leaders in this field. On the other hand, Ukraine’s Soviet nuclear history was also notable for an international-scale tragedy. The Chernobyl accident demonstrated the shortfalls of the Soviet system and the negligent attitude of the Party leaders to nuclear safety issues. As could be seen from this chapter, this sort of negligence was demonstrated long before the construction of the CNPP and other Ukrainian NPPs by the very heedless approach of Soviet leaders and bureaucrats to radioactive sources on the territory of Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine was always a participant and even an innovator in the development of nuclear matters in the USSR. It also occupied an important place in peaceful nuclear energy. Despite this, Ukraine had no right to determine by itself the priority with regard to the development or uses of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy technology.

References 1. Shpolskiy, E. V. (1967). 50 years of soviet physics. Success of Physics, 93(2), 210. (Шпольский Е.В. 50 лет советской физике // Успехи физических наук. – 1967. – Т. 93, вып. 2. – С. 210). 2. Birstein, V. J. (2001). The perversion of knowledge: The true story of soviet science (p. 1). Westview Press. 3. Graham, L. R. (1967). The soviet academy of sciences and the communist party, 1927–1932, Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University. Princeton University Press. 4. Graham, L. R. (1993). Science in Russia and the soviet union. A short history (p. 63). Cambridge University Press. p. 174. 5. Pyatov, V. (2013). Nuclear Chronicles: 1938–1963. Reports of direct participants (р. 58). Optim. (ПятовВ. Ядерныехроники: 1938-1963. Свидетельства непосредственных участников событий. – Харьков: Оптим, 2013. – С. 58). 6. Holloway, D. (1994). Stalin and the Bomb (p. 464). Yale University Press. p. 66. 7. Weissberg, A. (1951). The accused (p. 364). Simon and Shuster. 8. Frenkel, V. (1997). Professor Friedrich Houtermans: Works, Life, Destiny (p. 65). Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Physics, Russian Academy of Sciences. (Френкель В.Я. Профессор Фридрих Хоутерманс: работы, жизнь, судьба.– СПб.: Изд-воПИЯФРАН, 1997. –С. 65). 9. Gowing, M. (1964). Britain and atomic energy, 1939–1945 (p. 42). Macmillan. 10. Amaldi, E. (2012). The adventurous life of Friedrich Georg Houtermans, Physicist (1903–1966) (p. 152). Springer: Springer Brief in Physics. p. 79. 11. Kramish, A. (1986). The Griffin (p. 294). Houghton Mifflin Со. p. 123. 12. Sonja, D. (2015). Schmid, producing power. The pre-Chornobyl history of the soviet nuclear industry. The MIT Press.

Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine Polina Sinovets, Oleksii Izhak, Sergiy Galaka, Iryna Maksymenko, and Hryhorii Perepelytsa

The authors of the chapter try to answer the question to what extent nuclear choice of Ukraine was real after the break-up of the USSR and what forcers in Ukraine drove to the decision to get rid of all nuclear weapons. The authors suggest evaluating the process of nuclear disarmament of Ukraine from the different dimensions. First is the legal framework, in particular, basic treaties defining the role of Ukraine regarding Soviet nuclear heritage and its future. Second is the technical side, giving the picture of the nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, deployed in Ukraine: strategic, sub-strategic and tactical. Most accurate available information is given regarding exact numbers, composition and final destiny of different types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery once based in Ukraine. Third dimension covers the political and industrial groups, involved in the decision-making process regarding disarmament. Special attention is paid to the influence of the external actors on the disarmament decision of Ukraine: in particular, Russia, the United States and the EU. And finally, the authors give a coverage of the Budapest memorandum as a document having special political influence on the further Ukrainian policy.

P. Sinovets (*) Department of International Relations, Odessa Center for Nonproliferation, Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University, Odesa, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] O. Izhak Head of Department, National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine S. Galaka · H. Perepelytsa International Relations and Foreign Policy Chair, Institute of International Relations, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine I. Maksymenko Department of International Relations, Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University, Odesa, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. Sinovets (ed.), Ukraine’s Nuclear History, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90661-0_3

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1 Legal Framework and Early Developments The idea of the non-nuclear-weapon status for Ukraine originally appeared in the Declaration of National Sovereignty approved by the Ukrainian Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) on 16 July 1990. According to Leonid Kravchuk, Ivan Drach was the author of this idea.1 The Declaration announced the intention of Ukraine to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, not to manufacture and not to buy nuclear weapons.2 Note that this provision was included in the Declaration without any preceding expert assessments or public discussions. On the wave of the post-Chernobyl sentiments in Ukrainian society, aiming to affirm the sovereign right of the Ukrainian Parliament to make landmark decisions, this document became the first step towards independence and a manifestation of the will to get away from the nuclear Soviet empire. At the time Ukraine gained its national independence on August 24, 1991 its policy in respect of nuclear weapons was driven by obvious factors at the time, also influencing many other aspects of Ukraine’s policy. The ruling class was consumed with the conditions of Ukraine’s secession from the Soviet Union and international recognition of its independence while pursuing the private interests of its members. Society sill suffered from the environmental consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. The nation as a whole tried to formulate geopolitical interests and ways to protect Ukrainian statehood from the threat incoming from Russia. Those related to nuclear weapons calculated economic costs and technical possibilities for maintaining nuclear forces. The threat of war was believed to be receding thus emergence of a military conflict was deemed improbable. Firstly, any such conflict imaginable would be domestic, caused by local separatism, with possible indirect external intervention. Secondly, relevant threats were believed to be of a civilian, rather than military, nature such as man-induced or environmental consequences caused by accidents similar to the Chernobyl disaster. In both cases use of nuclear weapons would have been out of place. Thus, the nuclear weapon factor was seen as irrelevant for the current needs of Ukrainian national security. The factor of the general worldview expressed by most scientists and public officers, who lacking a sovereign outlook and following a Soviet habit were governed predominantly by Russian interests, was no less influential. Yuriy Kostenko, the head of the parliamentary workgroup for enhancement of the national security of Ukraine, recalls that various technical estimates the group was receiving

1 Кравчук Л. Маємо, що маємо. Спогади і роздуми. – К.: Століття, 2002. С. 137–138. (Kravchuk, Leonid. We Have What We Have. Memories and Reflections. – K: Stolittya, 2002. – P. 137–138). 2 Декларація національного суверенітету України//Голос України. – 1990. (Declaration of the National Sovereignty of Ukraine//Holos Ukrayiny. – 1990).

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from scientists and officers contained a lot of unnecessary details that “only drove the state decisions of Ukraine in the tide of Russian interests”.3 When looking into Ukraine’s decisions concerning nuclear weapons on its territory one should keep in mind the historical context of its emerging sovereignty. At the early stage of its evolution the main task of the Ukrainian sovereign state was to gain independence from Moscow, who argued that the nuclear infrastructure of the Soviet Union was not divisible. Leonid Kravchuk recalls that after the adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty in summer of 1990 Ukraine announced its intention to accede to the NPT. That attempt was blocked by the Soviet Foreign Ministry.4 This situation repeated the conflict of 1968: the NPT then was opened for signature for all UN members including Ukraine and Belarus as Soviet Socialist Republics (UkrSSR and BSSR).5 Delegations of both republics together with the Soviet delegation (which represented the whole of the USSR) voted in favour of the NPT at the UN General Assembly. However, the issue of signature and ratification came up next. Roland Timerbayev, an active participant in the NPT negotiations on behalf of the USSR, recalls that these republics enquired about the opinion of the Soviet leaders concerning the expediency of their participation in the Treaty and received a negative answer: The Soviet leadership specially provided in the decree concerning the signature of the NPT by the Soviet Union that it made no sense for the governments of the UkrSSR and BSSR to accede to the Treaty since, if they had done so as nuclear weapon states this would have increased the number of nuclear weapon states leading to proliferation of nuclear arms. On the other hand, if they had signed the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states their entire nuclear activity would have been subject to international control.6

Mr. Timerbayev also referred to a document evidencing that the USA had an intent to refuse to accept the signatures of Ukraine and Belarus had they decided to sign the NPT as Soviet republics.7 Thus, Ukraine had to face the nuclear weapons dilemma even before its independence in 1991. By the existing Soviet practice any conflicts were addressed outside a

Костенко Ю. Історія ядерного роззброєння України. – К.: Ярославів Вал, 2015. – С. 134. (Kostenko, Yuriy. The History of Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine. – K.: Yaroslaviv Val, 2015. – P. 134.) 4 Kravchuk, op. cit. in Ref. 2, p. 139. 5 During negotiations on establishing UN the USSR managed to include in the list of founders besides itself also two of its republics, namely, Ukraine and Belarus. Demanding such an augmentation of soviet participation in the UN system USSR pointed to British India, New Zealand and the Philippines which were not sovereign on the moment of establishing UN. Yet, these countries became sovereign almost simultaneously with establishing UN, while Ukraine and Belarus became sovereign only after breakup of the former USSR in 1991. 6 Тимербаев Р. Россия и ядерное нераспространение. 1945–1968. – М.:Наука, 1999. – С.326–327. (Timerbayev, R. M. Russia and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation. 1945–1968. – M.: Nauka, 1999. – pp. 326–327). 7 Ibid., p. 327. 3

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public discussion. Nonetheless, they raised understanding among part of the Ukrainian elite involved in the nuclear problems that there was a connection between (non)nuclear status and national independence. As the Declaration on State Sovereignty was being prepared for adoption in July 1990, some of its authors who believed the nuclear weapons hindered independence managed to push forward their approach. It was then that the decision was made to embark on the non-nuclear course (not to accept, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons), in order to strip the central government in Moscow of its key argument in favour of the continuing Soviet Union: the indivisibility of the nuclear infrastructure. Adoption by the Ukrainian Parliament of the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine on 24 August 1991, against the backdrop of the aftermath of the rapid dissolution of the USSR the coup d’état attempt in Moscow on 19 August 1991 brought the issue concerning the portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal stationed in Ukraine onto a practical track. Aiming to mitigate the Western concern over the future of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and gain maximum support for the newly independent state the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Statement On the Non-Nuclear-Weapon Status of Ukraine on 24 October 1991. Parliament declared that the ex-Soviet nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory remained there on a temporary basis and were “under control of the appropriate actors of the ex-USSR”, whereas Ukraine “insisted on its right to control the non-use of nuclear weapons deployed in its territory”. The declared strategic goal of the nuclear weapon policy was the “full elimination of nuclear weapons and their stationing of components located in the territory of the Ukrainian state”, with the intent to achieve this “within the minimum timeframe practicable given legal, technical, financial and administrative capabilities and with due care for environmental safety”.8 The Parliamentary Statement declared that Ukraine, as one of the successors of the former Soviet Union, would observe the provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) “in the part related to nuclear weapons deployed in its territory” and expressed readiness to negotiate the elimination of strategic nuclear arms subject to this Treaty. As for other types of nuclear weapons, not subject to START, the Statement expressed the readiness of Ukraine to “eliminate all other types of nuclear weapons in its territory” and to launch negotiations on this subject. Parliament declared that “Ukraine intended to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear weapon state, to enter into the appropriate safeguards agreement with the IAEA” and ensure the “physical safety of nuclear weapons in its territory until full elimination of these weapons”.9 These provisions of the Statement substantiated the intent of Ukraine to become a non-nuclear weapon state in the future, referred to in the Declaration of National Заява Верховної Ради України «Про без ядерний статус України» // Ядерне законодавство. Збірник нормативно-правових актів / Ред. Ю.С. Шемшученко. К.:Ін Юре, 1998. – С. 365. (Statement of the Parliament of Ukraine On the Non-Nuclear Weapon Status of Ukraine // Nuclear Law. Collected Regulations / Editor Y. Shemshuchenko. K.: In Jure, 1998. – P. 365.) 9 Ibid. P/365-366. П// e Parliament of Ukraine On the Non-Nuclear Weapon Status of Ukraine // 8

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Sovereignty, while shaping it into an internationally legal form. Obviously, the Statement was a response to the demands of Russia and the USA. For the leaders of newly independent Ukraine, the adherence to the non-nuclear weapon status was one of the decisive factors enabling its diplomatic recognition by the Western states. The Agreement on the Foundation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), aka Belavezha Accords, signed on 8 December 1991, was the first international treaty with Ukrainian participation that contemplated the future of nuclear weapons. Its article 6 specified that the CIS member states would “keep and maintain under integrated command the common military and strategic space, including joint control of nuclear weapons”.10 The Statement of the Heads of States of the Republic of Belarus, Russian Federation, Ukraine, issued concurrently, stated that the CIS states “shall ensure compliance with international obligations arising for them from the treaties and agreements of the former USSR, shall provide for joint control of nuclear weapons and their non-proliferation”.11 At the time of dissolution of the USSR four ex-Soviet republics—the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan—had nuclear weapons in their territories; they were the ones to sign the Agreement on the Joint Measures Concerning Nuclear Weapons on 22 December 1991 in Alma-Ata. Under this Agreement (Article 4), “until complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the territories of the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine, the decision on a necessity to use them shall be made by the President of the Russian Federation subject to endorsement by leaders of the states-parties to the Agreement”.12 This meant, in the then-existing military strategy reality, that the actual control of nuclear weapons was transferred to the Russian Federation. Pursuant to Article 5 of the above Agreement, “the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine committed to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 as non-nuclear weapon states and to enter into appropriate safeguards agreements with the IAEA”.13 Of paramount importance was Article 6 of the Agreement providing for the obligation of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to ensure before 1 July 1992 “the

Угода про створення Співдружності Незалежних Держав // Голос України. – 1991. 10 грудня. С. 2. (Accords to establish the Commonwealth of Independent States // Holos Ukrayiny – 1991. 10 December. P. 2.) 11 Заява глав держав Республіки Білорусь, РРФСР, України. // Голос України– 1991. – 10 грудня. – С. 2. (Declaration of Leaders of the Republic of Belarus, RSFSR, and Ukraine. // Holos Ukrayiny – 1991. – 10 December. – P. 2.) 12 Соглашение о совместных мерах в отношении ядерного оружия // Известия. – 1991. – 23 декабря. – С. 1. (Treaty on the Joint Measures Concerning Nuclear Weapons // Izvestiya. – 1991. – 23 December. – P. 1.) 13 Ibid. 10

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transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to centralized offsite bases for the dismantling under integrated control”. Compliance with this article had a decisive effect on the Ukraine nuclear disarmament process since tactical weapons were easier to bring under national control. Obviously, at that time such arrangements made political sense, otherwise Ukraine risked losing not only tactical weapons but independence itself. An attempt to nationalize tactical weapons would have given Moscow a reason to begin military intervention against Ukraine, which most likely would have been sustained by the West. According to Borys Tarasyuk, at that time Deputy Foreign Minister, the intent to become non-nuclear was “in a sense, a pass into the international community of civilized nations”.14 The decision of the CIS nations, recorded in the Alma-Ata Declaration of 22 December 1991, to “preserve integrated command of strategic military forces and joint control over nuclear weapons in order to maintain international strategic stability and security”, based on respect for “mutual aspirations to a non-nuclearweapon and/or neutral status”,15 was another important act appealing to the West— mainly, the USA. This stance was backed by Article 3 of the Agreement among Participant States of the Commonwealth of Independent States, signed on 30 December 1991 in Minsk, which recognized “the need for an integrated command of Strategic Forces and a joint control over nuclear weapons of the former USSR”. Article 4 of the agreement confirmed and specified previous stipulations regarding control and elimination of nuclear weapons: . . . a decision on their use shall be made by President of the Russian Federation subject to endorsement by the heads of states of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine and in consultation with heads of other states participant to the Commonwealth. Pending full elimination nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine shall remain under control of the joint command of Strategic Forces to the aim of their non-use and dismantling by the end of 1994, including for tactical nuclear weapons by 1 July 1992.16

The execution on 23 May 1992 of the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) of 31 July 1991 was another critical milestone en route to the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. According to its Article 1 “The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Treaty, shall assume the obligations of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty”.17

Независимая Газета – 1993.- 11 Января. (Nezavisimaya Gazeta. – 1993. – 11 January.) Алма-атинская декларация //Известия. – 1991. – 23 декабря. – С. 1. (The Alma-Ata Declaration //Izvestiya. – 1991. – 23 December. – P. 1.) 16 Ibid. 17 Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms // Arms Control Today. – June 1992. – Vol. 22. – No. 5. – P. 34. 14 15

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The key provision of the Protocol was Article 5 under which “the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 as non-nuclear weapon states parties in the shortest possible time, and shall begin immediately to take all necessary action to this end in accordance with their constitutional practices”. The execution of the Lisbon Protocol made Ukraine a party to START-1, allowed it to embark on the nuclear disarmament course as a sovereign state and, on ratification and entry into force, obliged it to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. As a follow-up step, Ukraine signed on 6 July 1992 the Resolution on Participation of the States Participant to the Commonwealth in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Article 1 of the Resolution stated that Ukraine and a number of other Soviet republics, “as successor states of the USSR, supported the Russian Federation in its continuation of participation of the former USSR in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a nuclear weapon state”. Article 2 obliged all other signatories, except the Russian Federation, to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.18 The signatories of the Resolution included Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Thus, the Russian Federation reserved for itself the status of the nuclear weapon successor state of the former USSR, according to the NPT. No wonder this document was signed after all tactical nuclear warheads had been removed from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to Russian territory: it was the tactical warheads that were the easiest to be brought under national control. As for the aggregate nuclear arsenal of Ukraine at the time of dissolution of the USSR, this subject still causes a lively academic discussion. Therefore, the basic agreements of the CIS have formed the primary ground and the mechanism of nuclear disarmament for the three post-Soviet states, including Ukraine. In spite of the fact that Ukraine has never become a member of the Commonwealth it mainly adhered to the set of rules as a road map towards disarmament. Even though later when the Ukrainian army brought the oath of allegiance to Kyiv, the key control over nuclear weapons remained in the hands of the CIS command structures, based in Moscow.

18 Содружество. Информационный вестник Совета глав государств и Совета глав правительств СНГ.- Минск, 1992. – Выпуск шестой. – С. 32. (Sodruzhestvo. Information Herald of the Council of Chiefs of States and the Council of Heads of Governments of the CIS. – Minsk, 1992. – Sixth Issue. – P. 32.)

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2 Nuclear Legacy of Ukraine: Composition and Quantities The exact composition of the nuclear arsenal inherited by Ukraine is still unknown. Numbers, often inconsistent, quoted in numerous publications with reference to this subject reflect different calculation methods, fragmentary or incomplete knowledge of facts, or a desire to conceal the truth. Data uncovered in recent years and memories of the participants to the nuclear disarmament process present a much more complete and coherent picture of a nuclear arsenal which Ukraine had or could have owned. At the end of the 1980s, stationed in Soviet Ukraine, were strategic nuclear forces including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and heavy bombers (HBs), sub-strategic forces including intermediate-range missiles (IRMs) and intermediate-range bombers, and tactical nuclear weapons designed to strengthen the capabilities of the army, tactical air force and the navy. ICBMs were targeted at the USA. This component of the strategic nuclear forces was kept on continuous alert to enable a strike within minutes after the command is received. From Ukrainian territory the missiles were supposed to head north. Their trajectories would cross the Norwegian Sea and the Greenland. Heavy bombers were also predominantly intended as a threat to the USA, but could also have been used to deliver a strike on Western and Northern Europe. Their flight paths headed northeast, towards the northern part of the Atlantic. Although the combat load of such heavy bombers was mainly nuclear, their state of alert was not as high as that of the ICBMs. Long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) (able to cover several thousand kilometres) were stored separately from the bombers most of the time; their nuclear warheads were removed. All intermediate-range missiles together with their combat use infrastructure were eliminated under the 1987 INF Treaty by the time of dissolution of the USSR (the Treaty was declared fulfilled in summer 1991). To make the picture complete it will be mentioned that they had been primarily targeted against Western Europe. These forces were part of integrated into the strategic missile forces (SMF), also controlling the ICBMs, but these former were kept on a lower alert. Nuclear warheads were kept separately from the missiles, although close to their launch sites. Intermediate-range bombers were dual use platforms and could have been used to carry both nuclear and conventional weapons. Their intended combat use was very extensive, covering Northern and Western Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean. In terms of military organization these bombers were assigned to long-range air force armies, similarly to strategic nuclear force heavy bombers. Tactical nuclear weapons did not pertain to a single organization as part of a certain military branch or service arm. Tactical warheads enhanced the capabilities of the strike tactical air force, artillery, army missile battalions, as well as air defence forces and the Black Sea Fleet. The tactical air force was intended to impact on NATO air defence and deliver strikes on rear echelons. Artillery and army shortrange and tactical missiles could, where required, enhance the firepower through nuclear strikes against NATO troops. The Black Sea Fleet could use nuclear

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weapons against NATO warships in case they entered the Black Sea and could carry out strikes against the Turkish straits using Fleet air force and cruise missiles. However, tactical nuclear weapons, albeit their numbers and diversity, were not generally considered as the principal combat tool for either the army, the tactical air force, or the navy. It was rather the legacy of the military doctrines of the 1960s– 1970s. Towards the end of the 1980s the need for a deep reduction in tactical nuclear arsenals was apparent. The well-known presidential nuclear initiatives (PNI) of Autumn 1991 drastically reduced the tactical nuclear arsenals of the former USSR and USA. This did not necessarily mean the reduction of the delivery systems, which in most cases were an important element of conventional warfare (artillery, tactical missiles, combat aircraft).

2.1

Strategic Nuclear Forces (Delivery Vehicles)

Most frequently quoted are the numbers referred to in the Memorandum of Understanding regarding START-1.19 These data reflect the situation as of 1 September 1990. It should be remembered that START-1 used the data that acceptably reflected potential, rather than provided exact up-to-date numbers of delivery systems and warheads. For intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the count was carried out based on the number of operating silo launchers. The assumption was made that each silo launcher had an ICBM carrying the number of warheads declared for this ICBM type. Each operational heavy bomber was also assumed to have the number of warheads agreed upon for the given type, however substantially different from the real number. Ukraine did not have deployed on its territory the sea-launched component of the strategic nuclear triad. According to the START-1 count rules, Ukraine had 130 SS-19 ICBMs with 780 warheads (6 per ICBM), 46 SS-24 ICBMs with 460 warheads (10 per ICBM) and 36 heavy bombers with 274 warheads, including 13 Tu-160 s with 104 warheads (8 per heavy bomber), 21 Tu-95 MCs with 168 warheads (8 per heavy bomber), one Tu-95 M with a single warhead, and one Тu-95 K with a single warhead as of 1 September 1990. In aggregate this made 212 delivery vehicles with 1514

19 Приложения А, В и С к Меморандуму о договоренности об установлении исходных данных в связи с Договором между Соединенными Штатами Америки и Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик о сокращении и ограничении стратегических наступательных вооружений. (Приложения не публиковались, в открытом доступе можно найти только сам меморандум, например https://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/start1/ ishdan.txt). (Addenda А, В and С to the Memorandum of Understanding in Connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. (The Addenda were never published; only the Memorandum itself is openly available, e. g. at https://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/start1/ ishdan.txt)

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warheads, including 176 ICBMs with 1240 warheads and 36 heavy bombers with 274 warheads. These were the verifiable “counted” data (using the START-1 terminology). The real picture was different. Some silo launchers were empty, ICBMs could have been undergoing scheduled maintenance, liquid-propellant ICBMs inside silo launchers could have remained without fuel, and some warheads on deployed ICBMs could have been replaced with their electric equivalents. The situation becomes even more confusing when it comes to heavy bombers. A Tu-160 may actually carry 12 long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) (Kh-55 s/AS-15 s in different variants) falling under START-1 restrictions or up to 24 short-range attack missiles not under these restrictions. Both potentially could carry nuclear warheads. A Tu-95 MC may carry up to 16 ALCMs, and each of Tu-95 M and Tu-95 K nuclear bombs and more than one short-range missile. Warheads, except in very seldom cases of exercises or high alerts, were stored separately from the bombers. Actual numbers of ICBMs, heavy bombers and ALCMs stationed on Ukrainian territory at the time of gaining independence could be determined fairly accurately based on their quantities eliminated within the framework of the Nunn-Lugar Program20 and quantities transferred to Russia under bilateral treaties in discharge of Ukraine’s debt to Russia. These calculations21 show that the Ukrainian arsenal of ICBMs, heavy bombers and ALCMs included: • 142 SS-19 ICBMs, including 111 deployed ones (fuelled and on station) plus 31 non-deployed missiles (not fuelled but available for combat use). 29 or 30 (based on different sources)22 non-deployed missiles were later sold to Russia. Deployed missiles were destroyed. These were supported by 130 silo launchers plus two training silos and 13 control centres (all eliminated); • 46 deployed SS-24 ICBMs with the equal number of silo launchers and five control centres (all silos eliminated and all missiles dismantled, but destruction of separated stages without nozzles not completed due to solid-fuel missile disposal process constraints);

20

Cooperative Threat Reduction. Annual Report to Congress. Fiscal Year 2004. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. January 2003. http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity-archive.org/Docu ments/03–01-01ctr.pdf 21 Ижак, А. (2014). Вспоминая о совместном уменьшении угрозы и потраченных деньгах. Зеркало недели №25 (12–18 июля 2014). –С. 1, 5. (Izhak, Oleksii. Remembering Mutual Threat Reduction and Wasted Money. Zerkalo Nedeli. Ukraine No. 25, 11 July 2014, P. 1,5.) http://gazeta. zn.ua/international/vspominaya-o-sovmestnom-umenshenii-ugrozy-i-potrachennyh-dengah-_.html 22 Since this type of missile is not available in Ukrainian museums, the discrepancy between the available non-deployed missiles and those sold to Russia could be explained by the fact that not all missiles were operational, so the number of ‘sets’ sold was counted based on the total number available for combat duty. The Russian sources use the term ‘sets’ instead of missiles (http://www. kommersant.ru/doc/400154)

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• “eight and a half” dismantled SS-24 ICBMs (possibly a part or even all of them were the rail-mobile-launched version used only in Russia; the silo-launched and mobile-launched versions of SS-24 s were not identical), some number of components for the SS-17 missile (deployed only in Russia), four assembled SS-18 s (manufactured in Ukraine but deployed only in Russia or Kazakhstan), and an assembled “Universal” ICBM for flight tests (later redesigned in Russia as SS-27). Destruction of SS-24 components is not completed due to the abovementioned problems of utilization technology. Assembled SS-17 s, SS-18 s and “Universal” (SS-27) and their individual components were sold to Russia under intergovernmental agreements; • 44 heavy bombers including 1923 Tu-160 s, 23 Tu-95 MCs, one Tu-95 K and one Tu-95 M. Only a part of them were flight worthy and were counted for the purposes of START-1.24 Out of this number 8 Tu-160 s and 3 Tu-95 MCs were transferred to Russia as compensation for the natural gas debt,25 two Tu-95 MCs were converted for civilian use and at present are not operational (in 2015, there was a malicious attempt to sell them as scrap metal),26 one of each of Tu-160 and Tu-95 MC were converted into museum showpieces and the balance have been destroyed within the Nunn-Lugar Program framework; • five heavy bombers, including three Tu-95 MCs and two Tu-95 K22s, under maintenance in Ukraine at the time of the USSR dissolution but with home bases in Russia. These were not claimed by Ukraine. All of them were destroyed on 23

There is a popular, although unconfirmed, version among the researchers of the history of the Ukrainian and Russian nuclear forces, that there were 21 Tu-160 s deployed in Ukraine. Allegedly two of them were illegally jacked by their crews and moved to Russia, to an air base in Engels after an exercise in late 1991, after the Soviet Union had been formally dissolved. Another story that sounds more credible is that one or two of Tu-160 s earlier intended for the 184th heavy bomber regiment in Priluki and ready for dispatch from the producer’s site in Kazan (Russia) were transferred directly to Engels by their crews without entering Ukrainian airspace at the end of 1991 – beginning of 1992. 24 Tu-142 bombers stationed in Ukraine where not subject to control under the START-1 provisions and are not calculated here. This aircraft was a variant of Tu-95 designed for conventional antisubmarine warfare. It was not a component of nuclear forces. Ukraine had 9 Tu-142 pertained to the Black Sea Fleet. They were disposed of under the Nunn-Lugar Programme: six destroyed, two made museum showpieces and another one was dismantled and remains in Mykolaiv at its duty station. Reason for disposal was closeness or Tu-142 to Tu-95 (in several cases Tu-142 s were converted into Tu-95MCs in Russia). 25 Соглашение между Правительством Российской Федерации и Кабинетом Министров Украины о передаче из Украины в Российскую Федерацию тяжелых бомбардировщиков Ту-160, Ту-95МС, крылатых ракет воздушного базирования большой дальности и оборудования, подписанное в Ялте 8 октября 1999 года. (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Transfer from Ukraine to the Russian Federation of Heavy Bombers Tu-160, Tu-95MC, Long-Range Air Launched Cruise Missiles and Equipment, signed in Yalta on 8 October 1999.) http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ 643_116 26 «Хочешь украинский бомбардировщик Ту-95МС? Отправляйся на eBay» // РИА Новости Украина, 23 августа 2015 года (“WantaUkrainianTu-95 MCBomber?GotoeBay” // RIANovostiUkraine, 23 August 2015) http://rian.com.ua/inquiry/20150823/372553686.html

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Ukrainian territory under a separate intergovernmental agreement with Russia27 using the funds of the Nunn-Lugar Program; • 1068 Kh-55 and Kh-55СМ ALCMs for heavy bombers. Out of them, 487 were destroyed under the Nunn-Lugar Program and 581 transferred to Russia. These are the government data of Ukraine for 1996–1999.28 Other sources refer to 483 destroyed and 575 sold missiles, which gives a total of 1058 ALCMs.29 The discrepancy may reflect the calculations made in different limited time periods or the fact that 12 or so ALCMs out of those officially sold to Russia were trafficked to China and Iran (6 missiles to each country).30 A significant part of ALCMs stationed in Ukraine were intended for nuclear missions (with a single nuclear warhead per missile), but not necessarily all of them. The ALCMs, as well as carrying heavy bombers, are dual use systems. Most of the time the ALCMs were stored separately from their nuclear warheads. Transfer of nuclear warheads and sale of ALCMs to Russia were two independent processes. Only missiles without warheads ended up in China and Iran. Tu-95 Ks could carry also Kh-22 (AS-4) short-range missiles with nuclear warheads. Their numbers remained practically unregulated by START-1 (any number of these missiles on a Тu-95 counted as one nuclear warhead). Their quantities will be analysed below in the discussion of sub-strategic bombers. As regards the strategic bomber armaments, there is a noticeable lack of information concerning the Kh-15 (AS-16) short-range aeroballistics31 missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads. Quite possibly, they were not deployed in Ukraine at all (adopted for service in 1988 only, they may have not sufficiently entered the field before the dissolution of the USSR). START-1 does not govern the numbers of Kh-15 s. These missiles were designed for the use on Tu-160 s. A single bomber could carry no more than 24 such missiles; however, only the 12-missile arrangement (consistent with the number of Kh-55 ALCM mounts) was 27 Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України і Урядом Російської Федерації про ліквідацію та порядок повернення авіаційної техніки, що знаходиться на ремонтних підприємствах Міністерства оборони України і Міністерства оборони Російської Федерації від 01.07.2003 р. (Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federationon Elimination and Transfer of Air Materielat Maintenance Facilities of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, dated 01 July 2003.) http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_270 28 «27 января в Полтаве состоится завершающий этап Программы ликвидации тяжелых бомбардировщиков типа Ту-22М3 и авиационных ракет типа Х-22». Правительственныйпортал. 26 января 2006 года. (“The final stage of the programme to eliminate Tu-22 M3 type heavy bombers and Kh-22 type air-launched cruise missiles to run in Poltava on 27 January”. Government Portal. 26 January 2006.) http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/ article?art_id¼28002887 29 Izhak, Op. cit. (2014) 30 Ukraine Admits Exporting Missiles to Iran and China, by Tom Warner in Kyiv. Financial Times, March 18, 2005. www.ft.com/cms/s/0/abf8cc64–9753-11d9-9f01-00000e2511c8.html 31 This term in the former USSR and modern Russia designates a ballistic missile which uses engines for propulsion in the atmosphere usually until hitting the target.

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technically approbated. Apart from a Tu-160, the Kh-15 missile may be launched from the Тu-22 M3 sub-strategic bomber (see below). Allegedly, Kh-15 s may also be deployed on Tu-95 MCs instead of Kh-55 s, as well as on certain variants of Su-24 tactical bombers and, possibly, on the new Russian Su-34 s. Kh-15 is only usable on specially outfitted aircraft. Russia is the only country that currently possesses any possible type of such aircraft. Since no problems concerning the fate of the Kh-15 s are known to have occurred, it may be assumed that they have been transferred or sold to Russia, if they ever existed in Ukraine at all at the time of the USSR’s dissolution.32 The aggregate count yields 188 assembled ICBMs for 176 silo launchers (no silo launchers were available in Ukraine for several SS-18 s assembled at the Yuzhmash Machine-Building Plant) and 44 heavy bombers, 36 of them in a good technical shape, with a total of 1068 ALCMs, out of which no more than 598 could have been deployed on the bombers simultaneously, including 368 on Tu-95 MCs and 228 on Tu-160 s (two more, a Tu-95 M and a Tu-95 K, were not designed to carry ALCMs). If it came to the bombers that were operational at that time, the maximum number of deployed ALCMs would be 492: 336 on Tu-95 MCs and 156 on Tu-160 s, respectively. The aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles may be represented as several different numbers, each being accurate based on its own logic (see Table 1 below). Under START-1, 212 delivery vehicles were counted, including 176 ICBMs and 36 heavy bombers. 193 delivery vehicles were technically fit: 157 ICBMs and 36 heavy bombers including the two unable to carry ALCMs. The aggregate number of ICBMs and heavy bombers physically stationed in Ukraine at the time of independence was 237, including 188 ICBMs and 49 heavy bombers. It would not be right to count the assembled SS-18 s and the “Universal” (SS-27) without combat use infrastructure, as well as the dismantled SS-24 s. These, like the separate parts for SS-17 s and SS-24 s, were valuable from a material and political standpoint, but not from a military one.

2.2

Sub-strategic Systems (Delivery Vehicles)

Apart from strategic nuclear weapon systems stationed in Ukraine there were numerous sub-strategic ones—intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (ISRMs), all having been eliminated by the time Ukraine gained independence, and intermediate-range bombers. They had a common organizational structure with the strategic systems but differed by the strategy and tactics of combat use. On the

32

There are doubts that Kh-15 is at all usable on heavy bombers. In 2015–2016, Russia used Tu-160 s, Tu-95MCs and Tu-22M3s for its strikes in Syria. The former two bombers launched longrange cruise missiles with conventional warheads (new versions of Kh-55 s and new missiles of this type) but not Kh-15 s. Tu-22M3s could have fired Kh-15 s, considering their intended combat use, but there is no direct evidence.

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Table 1 Numbers of nuclear weapon vehicles based on different counting logics Delivery systems Carriers ICBMs SS-19 22–24 SS-18 “Universal” (SS-27) HBs Tu-160 Tu-95 MC Tu-95 M Tu-95 K Tu-95 K22 ALCMs

Based on START-1 212 176 130 46 – –

Available for use 193 157 111 46 – –

On military inventories 232 188 142 46 – –

Temporary stationed 5 – – – – –

Total in the territory 237 188 142 46

36 13 21 1 1 – 274

36 13 21 1 1 – 492

44 19 23 1 1 – 1068

5 – 3 – – 2 –

49 19 26 1 1 2 1068

Noncomissioned 13 13 – 8 4 1 – – – – – – –

contrary, sub-strategic and tactical systems were organizationally different from each other but close from the strategy and tactics standpoint. The strategic missile forces (SMF) of the former USSR used not only ICBMs, but also intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (ISRMs). Various versions of the Tu-16 and Tu-22 bombers were deployed in the long-range air force divisions and regiments of the strategic nuclear forces. Thus, nuclear warhead operation procedures were organizationally similar for strategic and sub-strategic systems. This was very important as far as the count of warheads inherited by Ukraine in 1991 was concerned. All ISRMs with their combat use infrastructure were eliminated under the INF Treaty of 1987.33 For Ukraine, this process was completed by 1 June 1991, i.e. still during the Soviet times and two months prior to the signing of START-1. For this reason, Ukraine did not accede separately to the INF Treaty, as was the case with START-1, although actually observed its provisions (or, more exactly, confirmed full performance under the Treaty within the framework of its Special Verification Commission that remained active until 2003). This is worth mentioning in the context of the dynamics of the SMF 43rd army nuclear warhead quantities on Ukrainian territory to verify some of the numbers of the Ukrainian nuclear arms legacy.

33

Short-range missiles SS-23 (Oka) were also eliminated. They were operated by missile and artillery units of the army and neared the range threshold prohibited under the INF Treaty. This was done as part of mutual concessions between the USSR and the USA. Ukraine had no such missiles.

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As for sub-strategic bombers, the situation was as follows: a comparative analysis of the findings of sufficiently authoritative recent studies,34 discussions at various expert forums35 and data on systems eliminated within the Nunn-Lugar program36 shows that nearly 70 Tu-16Ks and 97 Tu-22 M2/3s had been deployed in Ukraine immediately before the dissolution of the USSR. There were also some Tu-16 s and Tu-22 s used for reconnaissance missions and radio-electronic warfare, however, these were unable to carry nuclear weapons. All Tu-16 s, both for nuclear and conventional warfare, were mothballed in the early years of Ukraine’s independence and then disposed of. This process ran outside the Nunn-Lugar Program, therefore there is no independent counting data. Still, it could be argued that none of them remained in Ukraine or in any other ex-Soviet republic where they were previously deployed (Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, or Armenia). Theoretically they could have been exported. However, there are a number of considerations against this assumption. China, as a main importer of Soviet armaments, created its own clone of a Tu-16, known as the H-6, back in the years of the Cold War. This aircraft is still in operation; its newly modified H-6 K appeared in 2011. Egypt, Indonesia and Iraq were receiving Soviet Tu-16 s during the Cold War, however none of those remained active by the 1990s (one of them is used as a museum showpiece in Indonesia). Furthermore, the latest aircraft of this type in Egypt and Iraq were Chinese, rather than Soviet. Out of the 97 Тu-22 M2/3 bombers on Ukrainian territory at the time of the USSR’s dissolution, 18 were the Тu-22 M2 version and 79 the Тu-22 M3 version. They were in service in long-range air force regiments (36 Тu-22 M3s) and in the navy (18 Тu-22 M2s and 43 Тu-22 M3s). In continental Ukraine, there were 54 Тu22 M2/3s including 18 Тu-22 M2s in the navy and 36 Тu-22 M3s in the long-range air force. 43 naval Тu-22 M3s were deployed in Crimea. There is a possibility that several Tu-22 M2s were in fact rebranded or refitted earlier versions Tu-22 M0/1 used for training and tests. It is possible also that some non-operational Tu-22 M0/1 were stationed in Ukraine on the moment of breakup of the USSR.37 Independent Ukraine did not gain full control of Тu-22 M2/3s at once. Unlike SMF where military oath was given to the CIS until all elimination arrangements were settled in 1994, the policy in the air force since the beginning of 1992 was to administer oath to Ukraine in a speedy manner, which caused conflicts and the need to institute control on the spot. The actual situation as developed in the early 1990s was legitimized by the 1997 Black Sea Fleet Partition Agreement between Ukraine and 34 Ленский А.Г., Цыбин М.М. «Военная авиация отечества. Организация, вооружение, дислокация (1991/2000 гг.).Справочник», Санкт-Петербург, 2004 г. (Lensky, A.; Tsybin, M. Military Air Force of the Homeland. Organisation, Armaments, and Deployment (1991/ 2000). Reference Book, St. Petersburg, 2004.) 35 For one of the examples see http://forums.airforce.ru/matchast/printfriendly4390–12/ 36 Cooperative Threat Reduction, op. cit. in Ref. 21. 37 Tu-22M2s and training aircraft of various types were deployed near Mykolaiv within the Navy Combat Use and Retraining Centre 333. One Tu-22M0s was made a museum showpiece after the elimination programme was over. If other Tu-22 M0/1 existed they were eliminated.

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Russia.38 The parties received 20 Тu-22 M3 bombers each39 as a result of a 50/50 split of the existing fleet of 40 Тu-22 M3s. There is no convincing data to explain why this number differs from the 43 aircraft registered in Crimea at the time of the USSR dissolution.40 However, the discrepancy was not material considering that no Тu-22 s remained in Ukraine before the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 (after the annexation, plans were announced to return Тu-22 M3s to Crimea). Thus, Ukraine had in its control a total of 74 Тu-22 M2/3 bombers, including 18 Тu22 M2s and 56 Тu-22 M3s. In fact, there may have been 75 since it is likely that one aircraft might have been transferred to continental Ukraine before the formal partition of the fleet. At the same time, 60 Тu-22 M2/3s altogether were destroyed in Ukraine under the Nunn-Lugar Program before the early 2000s, including 17 Тu-22 M2s and 43 Тu22 M3Вs. Another Тu-22 M2 and two more Тu-22 M3s were transferred to aviation museums after deactivation. On disposal of these 63 aircraft Ukraine had no more Тu22 M2/3s (by that time, Russia had removed its Тu-22 M3s from Crimea). The difference in the calculated above numbers of controlled aircraft on break-up of the former USSR (74 or 75) and aircraft known to be disposed of (63) is significant, being no less than 10 aircraft. There may be several explanations. The 46th air force army, including the long-range air force regiments deployed in Ukraine, had a transborder (in terms of borders between former soviet republics) organization structure, enabling flights uncontrolled by Ukraine following independence. The army command was located in Smolensk (Russia) and divisional commands in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Estonia.41 It is an established fact that a wing of six Тu-22 M3s landed at the air base of the same air force division in Bobruisk (Belarus) instead of their home base in Stryi (Lviv oblast, Ukraine) after a training flight in 1992, on the pretext of bad weather.42 The aircraft never returned, which was explained by the lack of fuel. This leaves the question open concerning the maximum of five Тu-22 M2/3s. Unsanctioned flights similar to that described above could have taken place also. Some aircraft might have been disposed of before the start of the Nunn-Lugar Program, which is another possible explanation. Finally, “grey” export schemes may

38 Приложение 6 к Соглашению между Российской Федерацией и Украиной о параметрах раздела Черноморского флота от 28 мая 1997 г. (Annex 6 to the Black Sea Fleet Partition Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine of 28 May 1997.) http://flot2017.com/file/show/ normativeDocuments/577 39 The Russian quota included one aircraft that crashed in 1992 so in fact Russia received only 19. 40 It is believed that one of the Ukrainian quota aircraft was moved to another Ukrainian airfield before the Agreement was signed. It should not be excluded that not all of the Tu-22M3s in Crimea, referred to in open sources, were indeed this type. 41 e.g. the 260th regiment in Stryi, Lviv oblast, pertained to the 22nd division with the headquarters in Bobruisk (Belarus). Administrative control by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence was not too strict. The regiment fell out of the Ukrainian chain of command and was dissolved in the mid-1990s. 42 Дальняя авиация: век в боевом полете. Книга 2. – М.: Русское авиационное общество (РУСАВИА), 2014 (Long-Range Air Force: a Century in a Combat Flight.Book 2.– M.: Russian Aviation Society (RUSAVIA), 2014.)

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be considered, although this possibility appears highly unlikely. During the Soviet times, Тu-22 s were supplied to Libya and Iraq, but these, despite their name, were in fact a different, older model having nothing in common with Тu-22 M2/3s except the shape and some of the performance. At the time of independence Ukraine had no Тu-22 s. Libyan Тu-22 s had been long deactivated by the time the Arab Spring began and were eliminated after the international military operation. Iraqi Тu-22 s were destroyed after the US Desert Storm operation. No Тu-22 M2/3s were discovered in either of these countries, and there would be no possibility to conceal the presence of these aircraft in any other country. Sub-strategic bombers could carry the following missiles able to deliver nuclear warheads: KSN-5 (AS-6) and K-10 (AS-2) for Tu-15Ks (maximum two missiles per bomber); Kh-22 (AS-4) for Тu-22 M2/3s (maximum three missiles per bomber, but typically two missiles plus the bomb load); and Kh-15 (AS-16) for Тu-22 M3s only (maximum ten missiles per bomber). Thus, based on the number of bombers available, Ukraine may have had at least 140 KSN-5 s and K-10s (up to 300 considering the battle reserve) and at least 220 Kh-22 s for Тu-22 M2/3s (or an estimated total of 440 missiles considering battle reserve). Kh-22 s theoretically could have been used on Tu-95 K strategic bombers in case of modernization into Tu-95 K-22 but Ukraine only had one active aircraft of that type and there were no plans of this kind (the excess battle reserve of Kh-22 s was likely removed and destroyed in the 1990s, as these aircraft were being retired). 423 Kh-22В missiles were eliminated within the Nunn-Lugar Program framework. This is in line with their estimated maximum deployment in Ukraine. The whole battle reserve was most likely destroyed.43 As for KSN-5 s and K-10s, information is not available. It should be noted that these missiles had already become obsolete in the early 1980s and had no applications except on the globally eliminated Tu-16 s. Elimination was their only reasonable future. The situation regarding the Kh-15 s, designed primarily for Tu-160 s, was as described above in relation to the heavy bombers. Elimination of Тu-22М2/3 s and the cruise missiles associated with them in the 1990s and early 2000s was caused by political rather than legal considerations. It was not required under international treaties to which Ukraine was a party. However, the US was certain that the Ukrainian Тu-22М2/3 s had no other logic of use than to enhance Russia’s strike potential. Joint Russian-Ukrainian military exercises using these bombers, a contractual framework that existed within the CIS, and pro-Russian attitudes within a section of the Ukrainian officers worked in favour of such views. Since the 1970s, when the discussions on strategic arms limitation within the framework of SALT-2 began, the USA treated each Tu-22 M2/3 as a strategic unit if there was an air refuelling system. For this reason restrictions were applied to this

43 Hypothetically, considering the story around the export of X-55 s to China and Iran, a similar grey export scheme was also likely for X-22 s. However, even in this hypothetical case (there has been no actual information) this could not have been a major problem: the estimated reserve corresponds to the number disposed of.

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Table 2 Estimated numbers of dual use sub-strategic bombers and short-range cruise missiles in early 1990s Delivery systems Total Long-range air force Navy, including: Continental Ukraine Crimea including: Under Ukrainian control Under Russian control Kh-15 aeroballistic missiles Kh-22 cruise missiles

Tu-22 M2 18 – 18 18 – – –

Tu-22 M3 79 36 43 – 43 23 20

Total 97 36 61 18 43 23 20 no data 423

aircraft (refuelling system removed44 and production rate reduced). This concern persisted as the Nunn-Lugar Program unfolded in independent Ukraine. Тu-22М2/ 3 s were entirely eliminated under strong pressure from the USA and for US money. Ukraine still feels a lot of pain about this disarmament episode. These aircraft were perceived to be an important tool of legitimate deterrence of threats in a non-nuclear posture. Russia actively used this aircraft in Syria and could use it against Ukraine in case of large-scale aggression. An assessment of the numbers of dual use sub-strategic bombers and cruise missiles used with them that were present in Ukraine in the early 1990s is provided in Table 2.

2.3

Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Delivery Vehicles and Platforms)

Several remarks should be made about the nuclear weapons of the Black Sea Fleet in addition to the sub-strategic bomber considerations reviewed above. Little is known other than the fact that they existed. Composition of nuclear weapons was diverse, as in any other Soviet fleet, including nuclear anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles of various ranges,45 torpedoes, mines, missile systems and coast defence artillery. There were certainly no submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), restricted under START-1, within the Black Sea Fleet. The variety of tactical nuclear warheads remaining in the Soviet Black Sea Fleet towards the end of the 1980s was, most

44

It was possible to hear stories in Soviet times from servicemen maintaining Tu-22Ms that the refuelling systems were not in fact removed, just that outlets were covered with a welded lid which could be pretty easily removed. 45 Likely including the long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), which, unlike ALCMs, were not regulated by START-1 and, unlike ground-launched cruise missiles, were not regulated under the INF Treaty.

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likely, very limited as there were no assignments for their use within Black Sea waters. Strike functions in the direction of the NATO southern flank (Turkey, the Mediterranean) in naval operations were assigned to the navy’s sub-strategic aviation (Тu-22М2/3 s). The Black Sea fleet could have possessed nuclear depth bombs aimed for deployment from seaborne helicopters of class 1134B large antisubmarine ships the Kerch and the Ochakov. As a result of the Black Sea Fleet partition Ukraine received only those ships and coast-based systems that were not intended for nuclear warfare. Ukraine had never had even administrative control of naval nuclear weapons, unlike the SMF and longrange air force. All those weapons were removed in the first half of 1992. Under the conditions of the 1997 Agreement between Russia and Ukraine on the status of the Black Sea Fleet46 Russia was not allowed to have nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine (Article 5). After the annexation of Crimea Russia denounced this agreement and stated that it did not consider itself bound by the ban on deployment of nuclear weapons on the peninsula47 which, however, does not mean they will actually be deployed. Tactical systems of the army, air force, air defence and engineer troops are complex to account for due to their diversity and difficulty to distinguish between their nuclear and non-nuclear versions. The USSR had 152 mm and 203 mm nuclear shells for cannons and 240 mm shells for mortars, short-range and tactical missiles including FROG-7 Luna, SS-1 Scud, SS-21 Tochka and SS-23 Oka. It is credibly known that the Su-24 frontline bomber was capable of using nuclear ammunitions. Nuclear armament of MIG-29 s and Su-27 s, as well as of some other aircraft, was likely. Nuclear payload might have been available for C-300B anti-aircraft missile systems and, possibly, for other systems. There was information about nuclear ammunition for T-64 tanks.48 Engineer troops had nuclear mines.

46 Угода між Україною і Російською Федерацією про статус та умови перебуванняЧорноморського флоту Російської Федерації на території України, підписана 28 травня 1997 року(The Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Status and Conditions of Presence of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the Territory of Ukraine signed on 28 May 1997) http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_076 47 In December 2014, the Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov stated, “Crimea has become a part of the state which, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is an owner of such weapons. The Russian state thus has all the grounds, based on the international law, to control its legitimate nuclear arsenal in accordance with its interests and with its international legal commitments” (quoted from http://www.interfax.ru/russia/413164) 48 This was mentioned in a discussion at one of the professional forums (http://forum.guns.ru/ forummessage/51/1748945-2.html) with a reference to technical documentation which could serve as a proof. On the one hand, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union could have developed a 125 mm nuclear charge in the 1960s–1970s, even though it is easier to make such ammunition for a smoothbore tank gun than for large calibre rifled artillery (due to lower stress). On the other hand, the version in favour of nuclear ammunitions was indirectly evidenced by the particular secrecy of the T-64 tank. It had never been exported, unlike newer models with better performance, even when it started to become obsolete.

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SS-23 s have never been stationed in Ukraine. SS-1 systems were eliminated on request of the USA in 2009–2011, including over 185 missile frames, 50 launchers, as well as fuel components.49 All systems and components, which even theoretically could have been used for military purposes, were eliminated.50 There is no reliable data on the number of SS-1 systems present in Ukraine at the time of the USSR’s dissolution. However, since there were no announcements of export,51 it is likely that, even though there could have been more systems eliminated they were in a poor shape and had been eliminated before the execution of the memorandum with the USA. Elimination occurred outside the Nunn-Lugar Program with financing from the US Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF). The US insistence on elimination of SS-1 s was not out of fear of their nuclear use, which was not possible after the removal of tactical nuclear ammunitions from Ukraine in the first half of 1992, but because these systems were highly popular among arms traders and because of the associated missile technology proliferation risks. Elimination of SS-1 s enabled accession of Ukraine to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a full member in 1998. Ukraine had nearly fifty FROG-7 launchers52 with a stock of several missiles per launcher. The following assessment seems to be credible: at the time of the USSR’s dissolution, six army missile brigades on the territory of Ukraine had in their inventories 90 launchers of various modifications able to launch either 114 Tochka missiles or 336 Tochka-U missiles.53 530 conventional warheads for these missiles were in stock. This gives an idea of potential numbers of nuclear warheads.

49 U.S. State Department Helps Ukraine Eliminate Scud Missile System. Office of the Spokesman. U.S. Department of State. Washington, DC. Media Note. April 13, 2011. https:// www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/160711.htm 50 Меморандум про взаєморозуміння між Міністерством оборони України та Державним департаментом Сполучених Штатів Америки про допомогу в ліквідації та демілітаризації ракетних комплексів 9К72 (SCUD) та обладнання, матеріалів і компонентів ракетного палива, які входять до їх складу (Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the Department of State of the United States of America on Assistance in the Elimination and Demilitarisation of 9 K72 (Scud) Missile Systems, Materials and Nuclear Fuel Components Included Therein. Date of execution: 30.11.2009. Date of entry into effect for Ukraine: 30.11.2009. http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/840_147/print1478440212549401) 51 A scanned copy of a document was presented in Russian blogs, allegedly evidencing export of five Scud missile frames to the US (http://bastion-karpenko.ru/VVT/R-17_UKR_memor_16102 9_01.jpg). It could not be excluded that the US indeed purchased several missiles for tests, exercises and museums. However, there is no independent evidence. 52 Соколов Б. Войско для евроинтеграции или содружества. Непредвзято о военной организации участника СНГ с особым статусом / Военно-промышленный курьер, №7 (475), 20 февраля 2013 года. (Sokolov, Boris. An Army for European Integration or for the Commonwealth. An Unbiased View of the Military Organisation of the CIS Member State with a Special Status / Defence Industry Courier, No. 7 (475), 20 February 2013.) http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14 541 53 Михайлова Д. Статус ракетной системы 9К79 Точка-У в украинских вооружённых силах к началу АТО. (Mihailova, Diana. Status of 9 K79–1 Tochka-U Tactical Missile Systems in the Ukrainian Armed Forces by the Beginning of the ATO. Live journal. 8 November 2016. http:// diana-mihailova.livejournal.com/85062.html)

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These systems were not eliminated and were kept conventionally armed until recently,54 being eventually removed from service as they aged. FROG-7 systems were fully decommissioned and, most likely, eliminated. By the beginning of the Russian military aggression in 2014 Ukrainian armed forces still had 12 launchers with 96 Tochka and Tochka-U missiles in commission plus 28 launchers with 347 missiles in storage.55 Soviet artillery definitely fit for nuclear applications included 152 mm 2S5 Giatsint and 203 mm 2S7 Pion self-propelled artillery systems, as well as 240 mm 2S4 Tyulpan mortars. The Tyulpan systems were not deployed in Ukraine. Technically all Soviet 152 mm gun barrels could fire nuclear ammunitions of the same calibre. However, the issue was about military planning and drilling to conduct operations with nuclear weapons. Missions involving any other 152 mm artillery systems, except 2S5 Giatsint, would hardly have been envisaged for army troops on the territory of Ukraine. There was no sense in retaining obsolete Giatsints if their nuclear missions had been transferred to other 152 mm artillery systems. The official data concerning the number of 152 mm 2S5 Giatsint systems— 24 pieces—remained unchanged ever since Ukrainian independence.56 This number includes all specimens in operation, under maintenance, in storage, as well as used for the training purposes. The most widespread estimate of the number of 203 mm 2S7 Pion systems is 99 pieces at the time of the USSR’s dissolution.57 One more piece was on display at an open-air museum. Conventional 2S7s are not very effective, despite the high mass of the shell (100 kg) and the long range (50 km), due to low accuracy. Therefore, these systems had been kept mothballed for a considerable period of time. In the early 2000s five systems were sold to Georgia and three more to Azerbaijan (possibly under Russian contracts). Thus, Ukraine currently owns 91 systems. Because of the Russian aggression they were partly de-mothballed for conventional use.58 A judgement on the numbers of nuclear ammunitions for the 152 mm 2S5 Giatsint and 203 mm 2S7 Pion systems could be based on the following considerations: the 203 mm systems pertained to the Supreme Command reserve and as such were all intended for nuclear use, if required. Accordingly, their crews were trained

54

Specifically, they were successfully used to counter the Russian aggression in the East of Ukraine. Mihailova, op. cit. in Ref. 54. 56 САУ 2С19 Мста-С и 2С5 Гиацинт-С в Вооруженных Силах Украины. 5 октября 2014 года. (Self-Propelled Guns 2S19 Msta-S and 2S5 Giatsint-S in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 5 October 2014.) http://altyn73.livejournal.com/622418.html 57 “Пионы” взонеАТО. WarFiles.ru. 21 ноября 2014. (PionsinATOZone.WarFiles.ru. 21 November 2014.) http://warfiles.ru/show-73,948-piony-na-vooruzhenii-ukrainskoy-26-yartilleriyskoy-brigady.html 58 Украина возвращает на вооружение “бога ядерной войны” – сверхмощную гаубицу 2С7 “Пион”. Сегодня.UA, 11 ноября 2014. (Ukraine Returns the “God of Nuclear Warfare” – SuperPowerful Howitzer 2S7 Pion – into Service. Segodnya. UA. 11 November 2014.) http://www. segodnya.ua/ukraine/ukraina-vozvrashchaet-na-vooruzhenie-boga-yadernoy-voynysverhmoshchnuyu-gaubicu-2s7-pion-568355.html 55

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to work with nuclear weapons. Each system, used autonomously, could carry an allowance of four rounds. The 152 mm 2S5 Giatsint systems, as well as all other 152 mm artillery systems, pertained to army divisions. Use of nuclear rounds was possible, but rather as an auxiliary projectile. The chain of custody of nuclear (so-called special) ammunition for artillery battalions was much more complicated than for the Supreme Command reserve. Their availability to the army was important not from the quantity standpoint but rather as a factor of uncertainty: in a large war every Soviet 152 mm barrel could potentially fire a nuclear round. In reality, it is unlikely that each combat crew would be certified to use nuclear weapons. However, there is a possibility that crews for at least part of the 152 mm 2S3 Akatsia and 2S19 Msta-S systems were trained to effect nuclear strikes. At the time of independence Ukraine had 501 2S3 Akatsia systems59 and 40 2S19 Msta-S systems.60 The normal ammunition capacity for autonomous use was 70 rounds for 2S3 Akatsia systems and 50 rounds for 2S19 Msta-S systems. The Soviet tactics of nuclear artillery warfare assumed delivery of several rather than many special rounds from centralized storage depots for a limited number of artillery systems. At the time of independence Ukraine had five fighter and bomber regiments with 150 pieces of Su-24/24 M in combat version.61 60 more Su-24 s were at training centres and could hardly have been used in combat missions without extra outfitting. There were also Su-24 s designed for electronic reconnaissance and unable to carry out strikes. Initially all Soviet Su-24 s were specifically designed for nuclear applications. Practically every combat version of the Su-24/24 M was supposed to be capable of delivering one tactical nuclear bomb to a target deep in enemy defense lines flying at a supersonic speed at low altitude.62 Alternatively, it could deliver two Kh-28/Kh-58 supersonic anti-radar missiles, also available in nuclear version, to crash into the NATO air defense system. At the same time, the combat training program assumed specialized use of Su-24/ 24 M wings. Each regiment had only one wing (out of a total of two or three) that was specially prepared for nuclear missions.63 This means that only nearly 50 aircraft

Жирохов, Михайло. САУ 2С3 “Акація” ЗСУ в ході війни на Донбасі (2014–2015).). Ukrainian Military Pages. 5 січня2016. (Zhirokhov, Mykhailo. Self-Propelled Guns 2S3 Akatsia of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Donbas War (2014–2015). Ukrainian Military Pages. 5 January 2016.) http://www.ukrmilitary.com/2016/01/2s3-akacija.html 60 Pions, op. cit. in Ref. 58. 61 Жирохов, Михаил. Военно-воздушные силы Украины: трудный путь в будущее. Art of War. 17 августа 2014. (The Ukrainian Air Force: a Challenging Path into the Future. Art of War. 17 August 2014.) http://artofwar.ru/z/zhirohow_m_a/text_0390-1.shtml 62 Practically all these aircraft, except those intended for export, had a special white colour enhancing protection against the nuclear explosion affecting factors. 63 Су-24. Уголок неба: авиационная энциклопедия. AirWar.ru. 2009. (Su-24. A Corner of the Sky: an Aviation Encyclopaedia. AirWar.ru. 2009.) http://www.airwar.ru/enc/bomber/su24. html 59

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Table 3 main delivery systems for tactical nuclear weapons under Ukraine’s control in 1991 and at present Delivery systems Short range missiles (launchers/missiles) FROG-7 Luna SS-1 Scud SS-21 Tochka and Tochka-U Artillery 203 mm 2S7 Pion 152 mm 2S5 Giatsint Aircraft Su-24 and Su-24 M

Year 1991 190/about 800 50/100–200 50/185 90/450 123 99 24 50 50

Year 2016 40/443 Decommissioned Eliminated 40/443 115 91 24 10 10

(five wings) out of 150 combat Su-24 s/24Ms in five regiments (15 wings) present on Ukrainian territory in 1991 were specially prepared for nuclear missions. The stock of nuclear ammunition could have been two or three times that number, depending on the configuration (tactical nuclear bombs—possibly, in different types—and nuclear anti-radar missiles). Since 1991, the fleet of Su-24 s/24Ms had been rapidly diminishing (ageing, crashes and, possibly, export). Unlike the Tu-22 M2/M3 bombers and Scud missiles, the disposition of the Su-24/24Ms did not apparently bother the USA. Ukraine even exposed its intent to get away from these aircraft entirely. By the beginning of the Russian aggression in 2014, nearly 20 aircraft were available for use in combat for strikes and reconnaissance. During the 2014–2015 war, Russian air defence downed one Ukrainian Su-24 M and damaged another reconnaissance Su-24MR. At least ten Su-24Ms remain fit for combat.64 The information above is summarized in Table 3. The fate of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine was largely predetermined by the so-called presidential nuclear initiatives (PNI) of George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev dated late September–early October 1991,65 endorsed and extended by Russia in late January 1992. After independence Ukraine had no responsibilities for those whatsoever. However, the USA and Russia acted as though such responsibilities were universal. These were an example of political declarations implemented outside a legally binding contractual framework. The USSR promised to eliminate all nuclear artillery ammunitions, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles and nuclear mines; to remove all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and move them to centralized storage

Су-24. ВПС України станом на травень 2016. WarTime. 17 May 2016. (Su-24. The Ukrainian Air Force as of May 2016. WarTime. 17 May 2016). http://wartime.org.ua/26109-su-24-vpsukrayini-stanom-na-traven-2016-go.html 65 Copies of the PNI speeches are available in Larsen, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds., Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, Washington, USAF/ INSS Publications, July 2001. 64

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depots; to dismantle nuclear warheads from anti-aircraft missiles and move them to centralized storage depots; and to eliminate a part of these warheads. Boris Yeltsin additionally promised to eliminate a third of tactical ammunitions for ships and submarines, half of all warheads for surface-to-air missiles, and half of all air force tactical warheads with the potential relocation of the other half to centralized storage depots, in exchange for a similar decision from the USA. These measures under the PNI reinforced by Russia concerned the entire Soviet arsenal—not just the Russian one. The stationing location notwithstanding, Russia, with political support from the US, had a clear intent to pursue Soviet initiatives for tactical weapons even after the dissolution of the USSR, which meant their removal for destruction from other post-Soviet states including Ukraine.

2.4

Nuclear Ammunitions Control: How and By Whom

In the Soviet military, the responsibility for all types of nuclear warheads was borne by the Ministry of Defense Chief Directorate 12 (MODCD 12). This was a practically independent branch of the armed forces ensuring the operation of nuclear ammunitions beginning from their shipment from the producer’s site and until installation on delivery systems and supply to military combat units and, further, until their return for dismantling and disposal. At the time of its dissolution, the USSR had a three-tier storage system. Centralized storage depots—known as “Objects S”—were used for the long-term storage and the full cycle of operations practicable outside the manufacturer’s site. Objects S were directly accountable to MODCD 12. Two more storage tiers existed in the field: the so-called maintenance depots (MDs) and mobile maintenance depots (MMDs).66 MDs were used for ongoing maintenance and storage and MMDs for preparation for combat duty or delivery for combat use. These depots were in dual subordination: to MODCD 12 (administrative control) and to special departments of service arms (operations), always numbered 6 in all military branches. Originally SMF, long-range air force and the navy had both MDs and their subordinate MMDs (MDs and MMDs were the most staffed units in SMF deployment areas). This system was used for old type ISRMs and sub-strategic bombers. However, ICBMs and heavy (strategic) bombers, considering the specific nature of their combat duty, were armed directly from MD arsenals by their crews. As a result of elimination of ISRMs and due to the above-mentioned 1991 US-Soviet presidential initiatives MMDs of the SMF, long-range air force and the navy were also subject to elimination. It is likely that in the Black Sea Fleet MDs were deactivated even before that, and thus all ammunitions were stored at the

66

MDs in the SNF and long-range air force were in divisional and MMDs in regimental subordination.

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closest Object S. The army and the air defence only used MMDs that received ammunition directly from an Objects S if required. There were four Objects S on Ukrainian territory.67,68 The Object in Crimea, usually referred to as Feodosia-10 in open sources, was the first one of its kind in the Soviet Union. Towards the end of the Soviet period it was used to store nuclear ammunitions intended for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, including naval air force. The Object Ivano-Frankovsk-16 was among the earliest ever created. Presumably, it was used as storage of ammunitions for ISRMs, Tu-16 s and Тu-22 bombers of various types, tactical aircraft (Su-24 s) and the army. The Object Kirovograd-25, likely, catered to the SMF, strategic, sub-strategic and tactical air force (Tu-160 s, Tu-95 s, Tu-16 s, Тu-22 s and Su-24 s). The Object Makarov-1 in Kyiv oblast stored the reserves for ISRM systems, sub-strategic air force (Tu-16 s and Тu-22 s) and the army. It may be assumed that Makarov-1 continues to remain in a caretaker status. This conclusion is suggested by a fairly recent scandal around this object, resulting in the demonstration of its external part to journalists.69 As for Feodosia-10, it would be safe to say that it is no longer fit for its designated purpose.70 The other two objects are probably not usable either. The Nunn-Lugar Program envisaged elimination of the Ukrainian Objects S. Relevant works commenced at two of them,71 but the project did not go any further. Any potential designated use in the future was out of question. On the other hand, these objects could be used to relieve the overloaded Ukrainian conventional ammunition depots. However, the main factor was the concern expressed by Russia who feared disclosure of nuclear weapons storage technology at similar objects on its territory. Thus, maintenance of Makarov-1 by Ukraine could be seen as its contribution towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons related technology. SMF mobile maintenance depots (MMDs) were eliminated within the framework of the INF Treaty before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. All MMDs for the longrange air force were also eliminated (disabled), although it is unclear when exactly this happened—likely, it was connected with the elimination of Tu-16 s. By the 67 Хранилища спецзарядов и РТБ. Русский фортификационный сайт. 2009–2011. (Stores of special charges and MDs. Russian fortification site. 2009–2011.) http://fortification.ru/forum/index. php?topic¼179.10 68 Базы хранения (арсеналы) ядерного оружия. (Store bases (arsenals) of nuclear weapons.) http://rocketpolk44.narod.ru/yas/arsenal.htm 69 In 2006, Russian government-controlled media accused Ukraine of having a secret CIA prison at this facility. Anatoliy Gritsenko, then the Minister of Defence of Ukraine, invited reporters of leading media to have a tour of this facility (see http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/ru/publish/article? art_id¼31974015&cat_id¼33695). The essence of this situation was in that Russia, which possesses nuclear storage facilities of the same design, was concerned over compromise of secrecy of this facility so it provoked a scandal to pre-empt any such attempts, if any. 70 The facility was built at the site of the former monastery whose buildings had been torn down. After independence the monastery was restored and the remaining Feodosia-10 installations were guarded by a unit of the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior until the annexation for the reason that it accommodated a burial of radioactive components of the first Soviet nuclear ammunitions. 71 Cooperative Threat Reduction, op. cit. in Ref. 21.

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beginning of 1992 they, most probably, had been deactivated already and definitely had no nuclear ammunitions in storage. The above-referenced presidential initiatives reflected the reality rather than the determined future actions. Tactical nuclear weapons for military and technical reasons started to withdraw from troops to centralized storage, including for reductions before the PNIs were proclaimed. The Black Sea Fleet MD in Balaklava was deactivated back in the 1980s. It was designed for covert armament of small submarines with nuclear torpedoes, by that time removed from service. This MD could have served no other purpose. It was kept mothballed until the early 1990s but later was practically destroyed by scrap metal scavengers and later converted into a navy museum. At the time of the USSR’s dissolution there was hardly any nuclear ammunition there at all. Divisional MDs of the SMF (two objects) and long-range air force (two more objects) served their intended purpose at the time of the dissolution of the USSR, i.e. contained nuclear ammunitions. Their deactivation and elimination occurred at the same time as the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. Thus, at the time of independence Ukraine inherited nuclear ammunition permanently installed on ICBMs, kept at MDs of the SMF and long-range air force, and stored at Objects S. The levels of actual physical control varied. ICBM warheads could not be dismantled or removed without an appropriate decision of Ukraine just because of Ukrainian administrative control of missile troops, including silos and ICBMs. The same concerned the MDs. Removal of such warheads required the involvement of SMF troops and the long-range air force deployed within Ukrainian territory, under Ukraine’s administrative control, which was established very quickly. Figuratively speaking, Ukraine was in physical “ownership” of this part of the nuclear arsenal. As for the Objects S, Ukraine had very little control of them—if any at all. As mentioned previously, they were actually controlled by a separate military arm, centrally subordinated and governed directly from Moscow without any interim levels of command that would be accountable to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, at least administratively. Considering its tasks and functional logic, MODCD 12 had nuclear weapon operation plans for various situations, including for periods of public disruption, war or loss of territories. These plans were among the top secrets of the Soviet, and then Russian war machine. It is no wonder, therefore, that the story of nuclear ammunition removal from the Ukrainian Objects S is still enveloped in mystery. In describing the history of the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons the well-known Ukrainian politician Yuriy Kostenko, who was a key player in the nuclear disarmament programs in 1992–1993, quoted the documents demonstrating there was practically no control on the Ukrainian part.72 Ukraine gave its formal permit, then lifted it, and then again permitted the removal. Yet, these decisions looked like declarations for the media and had nothing to do with real leverage.

72

Kostenko, op. cit. in Ref. 4, pp. 72–75.

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Evgeniy Shaposhnikov, the last Soviet Defence Minister, appointed commanderin-chief of the CIS armed forces after the dissolution and in charge of all ex-Soviet nuclear forces until summer 1993, first de-facto and then nominally, recalled: Leonid Kravchuk . . . began blocking the dispatch of the last trains with tactical nuclear weapons. Then we started transferring ammunitions under my command, with a degree of ruse of war and at a certain risk. For instance, transport of nuclear weapons by air had never been practiced before, but we did it together with Yefanov, the commander of military transport aviation. The last train was transferred as Kravchuk was crossing the ocean on his way to the US for negotiations with the US president. This was very complicated, serious and delicate work.73

These euphemisms (“complicated, serious and delicate work”) were typically used by the Soviet school military to describe clandestine special operations.74 In assessing the quantities of nuclear ammunitions controlled and uncontrolled by Ukraine their location (in the field, at maintenance depots, or at Objects S) plays a more important role than their type (strategic, sub-strategic or tactical). These criteria do correlate to a certain degree, but do not fully concur. All warheads installed on ICBMs or at maintenance depots of the SMF or long-range air force as of the end of 1991 belonged to strategic forces. However, it would not be correct to say that all ammunitions at Objects S were tactical.

2.5

Strategic Nuclear Weapons (Warheads)

Due to the specific character of operation of nuclear ammunition Ukraine faced the situation where it could physically control a large part of the arsenals whose composition was a Russian secret. Only a very limited number of people in Ukraine knew the exact numbers; it is likely that the full picture was known to no one, or it might be the collective knowledge of a limited group of people. Experts and politicians mostly used estimates, often borrowed from Western experts. This is why there are so many inconsistent numbers. These figures may now be compared, checked and explained with common wisdom, new data from open sources and some knowledge of how Soviet nuclear forces were organized. The number of ICBM nuclear warheads counted based on START-1, 1240 units, is believed to be the most robust—practically axiomatic—estimate. Yet, even this estimate does not give full assurance at on closer inspection. As could be seen from the estimate of actually deployed ICBMs presented above in the section concerning strategic carriers, the strategic missile forces had 1126 warheads on combat alert (666 warheads on 111 SS-19 s and 460 warheads on 46 SS-24 s). These could have

Маршал Империи / Итоги, №11 (822), 12 марта 2012 года. (Marshal of the Empire/Itogi, No. 11 (822), 12 March 2012.) http://www.itogi.ru/nashe/2012/11/175570.html 74 Removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the Southern Caucasus amid escalating conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia was another special operation of MODCD 12. 73

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been even less if some of the missiles or warheads were under maintenance. However, all warheads temporarily dismantled and replaced with electrical equivalents75 should have been located at their divisional MDs. The number of warheads actually deployed was substantially fewer than the number counted by START-1 rules, i.e. 1240. This may have the following explanation: before 1990, SS-19 regiments were in the process of rapid rearmament based on the modern SS-24 ICBMs with a larger number of warheads. This explains the significant number of non-deployed SS-19 s: they were taken off combat duty to allow further outfitting of the silo launchers to be able to accept the new missiles. That was the rearmament routine in 1988–1989. However, in 1990, due to a profound change of the Soviet military doctrine in favour of reasonable defence sufficiency, the decision was made to stop this process. Missiles taken off duty remained at the disposal of the 43rd army pending further decision. This was the status at the time of the break-up of the USSR. This is one such possibility. However, there is still no credible open narrative to explain the actual situation. The main doubt is raised by the fact that the large number of warheads (114 units for 19 empty silo launchers) was kept at the divisional MD76 instead of being moved to an Object S or to the manufacturer. It is known that warheads for SS-24 s replacing SS-19 s were custom designed for, and were tested together with, that missile, i.e. interoperability was out of question. However, considering that the reserve of warheads for 19 new SS-24 s was already delivered, the number of non-deployed warheads could have been more—up to 190—although without deployment prospects due to lack of finished missiles. In this case the total number of warheads intended for the 43rd army could have reached 1316 (1126 actually deployed and 190 non-deployed). On the other hand, the number of warheads could not have been significantly more than required for a single salvo of fully deployed ICBMs. 46 silo launchers for SS-24 ICBMs technically provided the reload capability and the second salvo of missiles carried 460 warheads. However, neither the troops nor the manufacturer in Pavlograd (Ukraine) had a sufficient battle reserve of assembled missiles in transporter/launcher containers.77 The excess number of warheads could only be useful for scheduled maintenance or in case of emergency. One can talk about several, rather than several dozen, warheads as a battle reserve. Nikolay Filatov, the commander of the 46th division, SMF 43rd army in 1990–1994, who had started service in this army in 1972, provided charts showing the flow of the number of missiles and warheads on Ukrainian territory (see Fig. 1) in 75

A device imitating electrical behaviour of a warhead to ICBM control system. It was technically impossible to dismantle warheads from ICBMs in silos without installing their electrical equivalents. 76 In this case, the 46th division of the SNF 43rd army. 77 Creators of this missile from the Design Bureau Yuzhnoye and officers of the SNF 43rd army were sceptical about the possibility of the second salvo in the conditions of a nuclear war. Obviously, the SNF command shared this view. Thus, the industry was not allocated the budgets required to build the ICBM battle reserve sufficient for the second salvo.

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Fig. 1 Variation in the number of delivery vehicles and warheads at the disposal of the smf 43rd army on the territory of ukraine. Source: http://svrwsnu.at.ua/_si/0/99539542.jpg

his recent memoirs.78 The picture looks convincing. The maximum number of deployed delivery vehicles (ISRMs and ICBMs) was achieved by 1970. The first half of the 1990s saw a surge in the number of deployed warheads due to replacement of single-warhead ISRMs with SS-19 ICBMs with six warheads each in the missile regiments. Elimination of all ISRMs was underway in 1987–1991, which resulted in an almost simultaneous cut in the number of delivery vehicles and deployed warheads. The number of ICBMs did not change during that period (SS-19 s were being replaced with SS-24 s at the same stations). Although the number of warheads deployed on ICBMs was expected to increase by 184 units (460 warheads on 46 SS-24 s versus 276 warheads on the same number of SS-19 s), this did not compensate the intensive reduction in the number of deployed ISRM warheads. According to Nikolay Filatov, the SMF 43rd army had 1242 warheads at the time of independence. This number occasionally appears in Ukrainian journalism without any further reference. There is only one likely source: ex-officers of the SMF 43rd army. It may be accepted that START-1 data are accurate to a unit. It should be remembered, however, that there remains some ambiguity concerning the number of non-deployed ICBM warheads.

Филатов, Николай. Утраченный ракетно-ядерный щит Украины. (Filatov, Nikolay. The Lost Nuclear Missile Shield of Ukraine). http://svrwsnu.at.ua/index/iz_knigi_nikolaja_ filatova_utrachennyj_raketno_jadernyj_shhit_ukrainy_prodolzhenie/0-80

78

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In 2011, Steven Pifer wrote in his article on Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament,79 with reference to a closed discussion organized under Chatham House rules at the Moscow Carnegie Center in December 2008 involving Russian and Ukrainian stakeholders that at the time of the USSR’s dissolution Ukraine had 1272 warheads for SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs.80 This number is not in conflict with the above information. If it is credible, which is quite likely, then it remains unclear where the undeployed warheads out of this number were kept: at missile division MDs or at Objects S. The former option seems more likely, otherwise there would have been aired no precise figure considering the extreme secrecy of information on Objects S and their contents. There were numerous judgements concerning the number of warheads for longrange air force (Tu-95 MCs and Tu-160 s). Considering the generally accepted constant of 1240 ICBM warheads the inconsistency of data on aggregate numbers of strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine is associated with differences in the estimates of their air force component. Reconciled source data for START-1 included the number of 274 warheads. However, as shown above, it was a product of a military political compromise achieved in the Treaty preparation process, rather than the result of an actual count.81 It makes no sense to analyse all numbers declared in the past 25 years. However, several of the most popular ones should be mentioned for better understanding of achievable accuracy and credibility of the assessments. The known US political scientist John Mearsheimer in his sensational 1993 article for Foreign Affairs, in which he advocated a nuclear weapon status for Ukraine, quoted the number of 1656 strategic ammunitions [1]. At that time this figure appeared in various documents, including those prepared by the Ukrainian foreign ministry.82 The story behind this “magic” figure was tracked by one of the officers of the US Naval Postgraduate School.83 It first appeared in late 1991 in a publication by the Arms Control Association, an American think tank.84 Subsequently, at the beginning of 1993, it was repeated in a New York Times publication.85 There is no insider information in it. The number of 1656 is a sum of the constant of 1240 ICBM warheads and the variable number of warheads on heavy bombers. This variable was calculated based on the 14 Tu-95 MCs deployed in Ukraine, able to carry 16 ALCMs each, and the 16 deployed Tu-160 s, able to carry 12 ALCMs each. This yields 79

Pifer, Steven. The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons. Brookings. Arms Control Series. Paper 6. May 2011. 48 p. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/05_trilateral_process_pifer.pdf 80 Ibid., note 3 on p. 39. 81 See the subsection on strategic carriers, page 101. 82 Kostenko, Op.cit.(2015), p. 111. 83 Martin J. DeWing. Ukraine: Independent Nuclear Weapons Capability Rising. Naval Postgraduate School, June 1993. http://ia902702.us.archive.org/29/items/ukraineindepende00dewi/ ukraineindepende00dewi.pdf 84 Factfile, Arms Control Today, 21, no. 10 (December 1991). 85 Ukraine: Barrier to Nuclear Peace, New York Times, 11 January 1993, A18.

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416 ALCMs on bombers. Source data for this calculation mysteriously differ from the START-1 data. Likely, they reflected an attempt to identify the “actual”, rather than the “counted” number of warheads in the strategic air force. There was another popular figure: 1612 strategic warheads. It is now very difficult to trace its origins. Most likely, it was found as a sum of the ICBM constant and the aviation variable calculated based on some other—lower—estimates of the number of combat ready heavy bombers. Theoretically, sources of all figures based on different aviation variable calculations could be traced. “Source data” that could reflect actual combat readiness of heavy bombers were regularly updated within the framework of the START-1 Joint Compliance and Inspections Commission (JCIC). However, all estimates of the warhead number based on this data had an intrinsic methodological error resulting from summation of numbers with different “physical meanings”. Indeed, one should not add the number of ICBM warheads, countable for the purposes of START-1 (which was notably different from the number of actually deployed warheads), and the number of ALCMs, which could be used on heavy bombers actually deployed but were stored separately from both the bombers and the nuclear warheads.86 Furthermore, calculation of the aviation variable itself gives a very tentative reflection of the actual warhead number. It is using the number of ALCMs that may have been used on technically fit heavy bombers, based on their maximum payload. However, the real combat situation assumed the combined use of ALCMs, shorterrange missiles, and bombs. It will be noted that numerous high-profile assessments of the early 1990s used overtly inaccurate source data; calculations often contained errors and publications had misprints. Ironically, they became popular in absence of credible data due to numerous citations in well-quoted media and even found their way into governmental documents. If this methodological error were corrected and the number of strategic warheads that could have been delivered form Ukrainian territory in case of a nuclear war were recalculated, a totally different array of numbers might be obtained, as yet quoted in no open source and, likely, not even assessed. Possibly, at some point, when all Ukraine nuclear disarmament archives in Ukraine, Russia and USA are opened and digitized, these numbers will be obtained by data mining methods. They will be interesting from the military history standpoint. Yet, it is now premature to begin this work due to the lack of information. Right now, identification of the number of warheads in the SMF and long-range air force arsenals constitutes a more robust approach. The balance of strategic warheads, even if they had been stored at Objects S, was removed in the first half of 1992 together with tactical warheads. As demonstrated above, the number of warheads in the SMF (both deployed on ICBMs and in storage at maintenance depots) may have been in line with the

86

It was normal procedure for the former USSR. ALCMs with nuclear warheads attached were installed on bombers only in a state of high alert, including during exercises.

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START-1 countable number, i.e. 1240 or 1242, but the probability is high that in fact they were 1272, both deployed on ICBMs and non-deployed, kept in storage locations. As for the number of heavy bomber warheads at Ukrainian long-range air force MDs, several correlating estimates deserve attention. In spring 1993, Boris Gromov, the then first deputy commander of the CIS general purpose forces and the Russian deputy Defence Minister,87 stated88 that nearly 670 warheads for heavy bombers remained in Ukraine. In that matter, Russian sources happened to be more authoritative than the US ones. The above-cited Nikolay Fomenko refers to 672 warheads.89 Steven Pifer, referring to the above-mentioned discussion at the Moscow Carnegie Centre in December 2008, named the same number of nuclear warheads for heavy bombers in Ukraine: 672.90 An anonymous ex-officer of a long-range air force MD, stationed near an airfield in Priluki that was used as a base for Tu-160 s, has offered the following story to an authoritative military forum91: On 18 April 1992, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk signed the Agreement on the order of transfer of nuclear ammunition from the territory of Ukraine to bases in the Russian Federation. In spring the same year tactical nuclear warheads were removed from Ukraine, but TK-66 nuclear warheads for Kh-55 cruise missiles still remained: over 600 units at MDs in Priluki and Uzin. After that Ukraine continued to maintain nuclear weapons for Tu-160s operational (in combat capable state) for another two years [this is a technical inaccuracy: these airfields served as the basis for both Tu-160s and Tu-95MCs – O. I.]. Preparations for the transfer of the nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation began in March 1995. In the course of three nights (to evade American satellites) on 14, 15 and 16 March 1995 officers of the military unit No. 39205 together with their Russian colleagues were loading containers with nuclear warheads onto special railway cars (designed for the shipment of nuclear ammunition). The work was stopped at dawn. It should be mentioned that in the beginning the interference of numerous personnel from the Russian Federal Security Service hampered this work. They could be distinguished by brand new and clean coveralls even at night time. They treated the Ukrainian military with distrust and controlled all their activities with suspicion. Having no idea of the nature of the work their guards were stopping all “unauthorized” persons (in their understanding) at a distance from the loading area. However, subsequently they realized that Ukrainian officers were doing their job professionally and properly, so by the second night a full understanding was achieved. After the loading was completed the military train loaded with the last Ukrainian nuclear warheads stayed in a field near Priluki air base for several weeks awaiting a shipping permit

87

In 1989, he was the commander of the Kyiv Military District and a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Ukraine; in 1990–1991, the USSR deputy Minister of Interior. 88 Олег Владыкин. Не создавать опасных прецедентов. Вопрос размещения ядерного оружия на украинской территории / Красная Звезда, 7 апреля 1993 года. (Vladykin, Oleg. Not to Create Dangerous Precedents. The Matter of Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in the Ukrainian Territory / Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 April 1993. 89 Филатов. p. 79. 90 Pifer, op. cit. p. 39. 91 184 ГвТБАП-Прилуки (184 Guardian Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment in Priluki) http:// www.forumavia.ru/forum/9/2/865006824778315997371329655092_2.shtml

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because of the lack of coordination and synchronization between the military departments of the two countries. On the third day the Russian military guard detail could no longer keep continuous duty. Our Ukrainian soldiers came to the rescue. When additional subsistence allowance was needed Ukrainians also stepped in. After an extended waiting time the train with its cargo finally left the Ukrainian territory. The last entry in the attendance log of the subsurface storage facility where nuclear warheads were kept, made on 15 March 1995, said, “Farewell to Arms!” This log is treasured by the last commander of military unit No. 39205 (the nuclear storage) retired colonel Sergei Sherstobitov. As of November 2010, he was living in Priluki.

This narrative generally correlates with the events of that time and may be viewed as credible. It suggests that the long-range air force MDs had only various modifications of Kh-55 ALCM warheads in storage after the tactical weapons had been removed. Furthermore, from the context of this story it may be deduced that warheads were separated from ALCMs. All nuclear bombs, warheads for Kh-15 smaller-range missiles (if any) and for Kh-22 s that could theoretically also be used on heavy bombers were removed in the first half of 1992. The reference to “over 600” is generally in line with the data quoted by Boris Gromov, Steven Pifer and Nikolay Filatov. Thus, there are four apparently independent sources of information associated with the Ukraine nuclear disarmament process. Their assessments are consistent. Summation of the warheads in the Ukrainian arsenals of the SMF (1240–1272) and long-range air force (over 600, possibly, 672) yields the aggregate of 1850–1944 “clean” strategic warheads (usable with START-1 controlled delivery vehicles only). More of those could have been in storage at Objects S, but there is no information about this presently. Thus, substantially different data on the strategic arsenal transferred from Ukraine may emerge in the future. The number of strategic nuclear warheads removed from Ukraine quoted by Yuriy Dubinin, a key Russian negotiator on Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament,92 was “about two thousand”.93 A joint study of the Monterey Institute and the Carnegie Endowment refers to 1820 warheads.94 Another study by the Carnegie Endowment uses the number of 1900 warheads [2]. Steven Pifer also mentioned nearly 1900 strategic nuclear warheads.95

92

Special envoy in 1990–1994 and the deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation in 1994–1996. 93 Дубинин Ю. Ядерный дрейф Украины// Россия в глобальной политке, 7 апреля, 2004 (YuriyDubinin.Nuclear Drift of Ukraine / Russia in Global Politics, 7 April 2004) http://www. globalaffairs.ru/number/n_2860 94 Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union: Status Report on Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls, No. 5/March 1998, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, in cooperation with the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA. P. 20. 95 Pifer, op. cit. in Ref. 80, p. 4.

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At the celebration of the 15th anniversary of Ukraine’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in late 2009 President Viktor Yushchenko said that “1950 units of strategic nuclear weapons had been deployed in Ukraine”.96 Leaving the ambiguous terminology aside and taking into account the above analysis, this estimate could be seen as the most authoritative so far.

2.6

Sub-strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Warheads)

As for the tactical nuclear warheads, political declarations and expert assessments are the only available references, with due account for their hypothetical knowledge ability. Their logical validation against the number of platforms and delivery vehicles can only give a very general outcome reduced to “likely” or “unlikely”. In practical terms, the question on the number of tactical nuclear warheads stationed in Ukraine is equivalent to the question on the number of them transferred. But this number was never verifiably disclosed either in Ukraine or in Russia. It pertains to one of the most opaque periods of Ukraine’s nuclear history, namely, expedient and secretive removal and transfer to Russia by its loyal troops of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in the first half of 1992. In some instances, the credibility of figures quoted in different sources could be tested versus the available delivery systems number of which was assessed above. But any such assessment would unavoidably suffer from methodological error, irreparable until all the archives in Ukraine, Russia and the USA are disclosed. It is difficult even to figure out the locations of those archives. Implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 by the time Ukraine gained independence had led to a situation where all air force, army and the navy tactical weapons were located inside Objects S. But Objects S could contain also warheads for recently eliminated ISRMs, some warheads for ICBMs and heavy bombers. Furthermore, the process of removal of the Soviet nuclear weapons from the Eastern Europe was underway in the late 1980s. Part of those—possibly, a significant part—could have been moved to the Ukrainian Objects S. This part of the nuclear arsenal was not connected to delivery systems on Ukrainian territory at all. What is certainly known, including from the fact that it was never rejected, is that all the contents of Objects S in Ukraine were transferred to Russia in 1992. The runner of these objects, namely Soviet/Russian Ministry of Defense Chief Directorate 12, would have equally transferred any nuclear devices, be they 155 mm artillery shells, nuclear bombs for Su-24, nuclear torpedoes, warheads for SS-4 and SS-5, recently eliminated under the INF Treaty, and strategic warheads. All these could

96 Ющенко хоче переговорів щодо посилення гарантій безпеки Україні / УНІАН, 5 грудня 2009 року (Yushchenko Wants Talks to Enhance Security Assurances for Ukraine / UNIAN, 5 December 2009) http://www.unian.ua/politics/297485-yuschenko-hoche-peregovoriv-schodoposilennya-ganrantiy-bezpeki-ukrajini.html

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have been simultaneously stationed on any of the four Objects S that existed on Ukrainian territory. Possibly no one outside the top management of Chief Directorate 12 could have known what was inside them for certain. Intensive deactivation of SMF warheads for eliminated ISRMs occurred in 1987–1990. Their flow may be estimated based on the number of eliminated delivery means (nearly 200). As shown in Fig. 1 above, their battle reserve of warheads was approximately 600 units (plans of operations may have assumed choice of appropriate nuclear warhead types in case of alert). This number could have settled at Objects S. Based on the estimated number of delivery vehicles referenced above, Ukraine may have deployed up to 200 warheads for SS-1 s and up to 600 warheads for FROG-7 s and SS-21 s. Additionally it may have had several hundred warheads for KSN-5 and K-10 air-launched missiles, in excess of 440 warheads for Kh-22 s and, possibly, another several hundred for Kh-15 s (although their actual deployment was unlikely). A hundred or two nuclear aviation bombs may have been deployed for Su-24 s and up to 400 nuclear artillery shells for 2С5 Giatsint and 2С7 Pion systems. There might have been some mines for engineer troops. It is practically impossible to estimate the number of naval systems (except air-launched missiles). Furthermore, Ukraine never controlled ships having nuclear capabilities. The Crimean Object S may have stored several hundred nuclear warheads. Thus, based on the military developments of the late 1980s and the delivery capabilities, the number of nuclear warheads at Objects S may be very conservatively estimated as 2.5 thousand units. They may be tentatively deemed to have been tactical. Yuriy Dubinin97 argued that nearly five thousand nuclear warheads were transferred from Ukraine, out of which two thousand were strategic warheads. This means that approximately three thousand warheads transferred were tactical. One of the studies by the Carnegie Endowment refers to a range between 2650 and 4200 tactical warheads [2]. In his reference to a White House press release of June 1996, Steven Pifer estimated their number to be approximately 250098 but mentioned that one of the publications by the Woodrow Wilson Center stated the number of up to 4000 [3]. The most authoritative and accurate estimate was provided in the abovementioned 2009 statement of President Viktor Yushchenko: “2883 tactical warheads”.99 Table 4 below summarizes the above estimates of the numbers of nuclear warheads inherited by Ukraine. In some cases they are mutually quoted but we could assume that the choice of an open quotation source by another informed source is of significance.

97

Dubinin (2004), op. cit. 94. Pifer (2011) Op. cit., p. 4. 99 Dubinin (2004) Po.cit p. 94. 98

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Table 4 Estimate of the number of nuclear warheads on ukrainian territory as of 1991 Source START-1 Viktor Yushchenko Nikolay Filatov Yuriy Dubinin Boris Gromov Steven Pifer Carnegie Endowment Monterey Institute Woodrow Wilson Centre

Strategic warheads ICBMs HBs Total (Sum) 1240 274 1514 – – 1950 1242 672 (1914) – – some 2000 – 670 – 1272 672 some 1900 (1944) some 1900

Tactical warheads (Difference) – 2883 – (3000) – some 2500

Grand total (Sum) – (4833) – some 5000 – (4400)

2650–4200

(4550–6100)

– –

– up to 4000

– –

– –

some 1820 –

3 Nuclear Disarmament: Decision-Making Logic 3.1

Political Interests

On dissolution of the USSR Ukraine became the owner of the world’s third largest nuclear potential after the US and Russia. However, the events so developed that the Ukrainian state was forced to abandon the nuclear arsenal deployed in its territory. Whether or not Ukraine needed to give up or could have kept nuclear weapons and the right way to ascertain non-nuclear weapon status and obtain security guarantees are the points for discussion continuing even today. In assessing Ukraine’s attitude to nuclear weapons deployed on its territory one would notice a certain degree of incoherence of statements made by the leaders of the state and by individual political bodies involved in decision making with regard to the future of the nuclear weapons. In this situation at the beginning of the 1990s Ukraine looked rather ambiguous. On the one hand, there was a resolve to achieve a non-nuclear status expressed in the Declaration of National Sovereignty of 1990 and confirmed in the Belavezha Accords and the Alma-Ata Agreements of 1991 whereby Ukraine, together with Belarus and Kazakhstan, promised to achieve non-nuclear weapon status within a very short timeframe (just under 3 years). On the other hand, Ukraine took a number of steps beginning from 1992 that raised doubts as to the consistency of its intentions. Inter alia, President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk issued a decree to suspend the previously consented removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia in February 1992, and the Parliament of Ukraine passed a resolution imposing administrative control of Ukraine over all nuclear weapons on its territory. Subsequently, in 1993, the Lisbon Protocol to

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START was ratified by Ukraine with the exception of its article 5 requiring that it acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. These events indicated that Kyiv still considered retaining nuclear weapons as an element of its national security. Nevertheless, the number of actors and their conflicting approaches to this issue creates a wide field for historical speculation on the subject of whether or not Ukraine ever considered its own nuclear deterrence forces as a possible political-military alternative to non-nuclear weapon status. In 1992, the US Department of State concluded that, “unlike Kazakhstan, Ukraine is going to be a real problem”. In connection with this, particularly in view of the complications concerning the removal of the tactical weapons, the Department suggested using “all possible means to persuade the Ukrainians, possibly with NATO involvement”.100 Interestingly, the United States connected the denuclearization of Ukraine directly with the strengthening of the Russian political regime. Specifically, the information memorandum of the Department of State of 28 April 1992 pointed out, “while working towards the achieving of a non-nuclear status for Ukraine and Kazakhstan we further . . .the strengthening of the position of Yeltsin and the democrats against extreme nationalists and create an additional incentive for implementation of the Russian reforms”.101 In winter 1993, after the first meeting with Ukrainian partners on the future of the Soviet nuclear weapons, the leader of the Russian delegation Yuriy Dubinin wrote, “escalation of the nuclear ambitions in Kyiv becomes more and more apparent”.102 It should be generally noticed that while the US believed that the stubbornness of Ukraine’s opposition to immediate disarmament was influenced by caution and security considerations the Russians clearly construed it as a serious nuclear ambition of Ukraine. Specifically, Russians evaluated the 1992/1993 events as an attempt of Ukraine to consider establishment of its own nuclear deterrence. In a later interview, Sergei Rogov, Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada (who was actually the principal expert consultant to the government of the Russian Federation on strategic armaments), said there was obvious scepticism even as regards the Trilateral Statement with Ukraine. Inter alia, referring to the statement of the Ukrainian Parliament on the right of Ukraine to own nuclear weapons Rogov pointed out that execution of these Treaties was for Ukraine just an element of the double play aimed at winning more time for “creeping nuclearization”. “I know no example of a state who would publicly declare its right to possess nuclear weapons and then would abandon them”. Rogov insistently warned the Americans not to rely on any treaties

US National Security Archives, Nann-Lugar Collection, Case № F-2014-1192, Doc.№ CO581552. 101 US National Security Archive, Case № F-2014-12,575, Doc.№ CO6027622. 102 Дубинин Ю. Дипломатичекий марафон. –М.: Авиа-Русь XXI, 2005.- С.57. (Dubinin, Diplomatic Marathon. – M.: Avia-Rus-ХХІ, 2005. – P. 57.) 100

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signed by Russia or Ukraine since “the political culture of either state did not envisage the concept of compliance”.103 An attempt of Russia to implant its vision that Ukraine sought an actual nuclear weapon status was also pointed out by Ian Brzezinski who acted as a security consultant to the Ukrainian Parliament and the National Security and Defense Council in 1993/1994. In his interview to an American delegation in 1994 Brzezinski stated that the Americans toed the line of Russia too closely in applying pressure to Ukraine on nuclear disarmament matters, while Ukraine never regarded nuclear weapons as a potential basis for a nuclear deterrence doctrine of its own. Rather, nuclear weapons were considered by Ukrainians as an assurance that the US would interfere and prevent a wide-scale conflict in case of a Russian invasion (this thesis of Brzezinski correlates with some of Kostenko’s ideas). The author quoted the then popular analogy saying that had Yugoslavia had nuclear weapons the USA would not have allowed its split and the chaos.104 Indeed, albeit the statements of President Kravchuk that the course towards nuclear disarmament remained unchanged, actual events suggested the opposite. In April of the same year 162 members of the Ukrainian Parliament signed an open letter On the Nuclear Status of Ukraine, declaring Ukraine a nuclear successor of the Soviet Union [4]. During the debate on the ratification of START-1 at a closed parliamentary session on 3 June Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma emphasized in his speech that “the guaranteed deterrence and non-offensive defense could become the only real and stable doctrine” for Ukraine.105 The Premier believed that the retention of SS-24 ICBMs with conventional warheads could be the basis for such deterrence. These missiles were qualified as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and were supposed to be eliminated within the framework of START-1, according to the Russian and US plans. Kuchma went beyond the idea of conventional deterrence adding that Ukraine, as an owner of nuclear weapons, should have declared itself a nuclear weapon state at least for some period; 46 SS-24 s (manufactured in Pavlograd) should have stayed in Ukraine.106 This speech gave rise to numerous speculations not only in the Western mass media but in academic literature as well. In addition to the known articles by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Miller, debating in the pages of Foreign Affairs on the possibilities and usefulness/fatality of the Ukrainian nuclear deterrence for the international security order as a whole, William Kincade made a harsh comment

103 Trip Report, CISAC Delegation Plutonium Discussion in Moscow, March 14–19, 1994/US National Security Archives, 111 Nuclear Control Institute Collection, p. 9. 104 US National Security Archives, 111 Nuclear Control Institute Collection Trip Report, CISAC Delegation Plutonium Discussion in Moscow, March 14–19, 1994/US National Security Archives, 111 Nuclear Control Institute Collection, p. 15. 105 Kostenko (2015) op. cit. p. 263. 106 Ibid., p. 264.

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on the plans of Ukraine “to steal the CIS nuclear weapons” and become the world’s third nuclear nation.107 Headlines such as Nationalist Ukraine is Seeking a Nuclear Mace, A Savage with a Nuclear Mace, Malorussia is Ready to Fight, etc. were typical of the Western press in 1992–1993. The intention of Ukraine was perceived as a desire to independently exploit the Soviet nuclear weapons, which was one of the largest problems for the US presidential administration of that time. In fact, the contradictory signals the Ukrainian government sent to the international community reflected the varying interests of different departments and groups directly involved in the political process. Note first of all that out of the four Ukrainian government actors with a responsibility for the future of nuclear weapons the Parliament was overtly pro-nuclear (in its own way), the President was changing his attitude depending on the dominating factors, while the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence remained anti-nuclear. The so-called pro-nuclear stance will be explained in more detail. As of the early 1990s, the Ukrainian Parliament was a cosmopolitan community of freely elected members. They included ex-dissidents, the ones who were never members of the Communist Party and, accordingly, were not driven by the inertia of loyalty to Moscow. As a result, the idea of unconditional transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia (contemplated in the Belavezha and Alma-Ata agreements) was opposed by many in Parliament. This attitude was heated up by the sceptical views of Ukrainian independence in Moscow at the beginning of the 1990s, which Russians did not hide in their public statements. In that period Russian officials often characterized Ukrainian independence as a “transitional” state, going as far as to overtly recommend European states to hold back opening their embassies in Kyiv.108 Strobe Talbott who was in charge of the Ukraine nuclear disarmament negotiations on the American side in 1993 recalled that the Russian Ambassador to the USA Vladimir Lukin once compared the relations of Russia and Ukraine with the relations between New York and New Jersey, while Russian deputy Defense Minister Georgiy Mamedov numerously reminded the Americans that “everything between us and the Ukrainians was a family business”, meaning that Moscow barely tolerated the interference of Washington “in the family”.109 Such undisguised disregard for recognition of Ukraine as an independent state occurred against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying claims on Crimea and disputes over rights of Ukraine to the Black Sea Fleet. In 1994, Ian Brzezinski, one of the US advisors to the Ukrainian Parliament, noted in an interview to a delegation of his compatriots that the intense concern of the USA over the NPT should, however, consider the geopolitical stability which,

William H. Kincade, ‘Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: Hollow Threat, Wasting Asset’// Arms Control Today, (July/August 1993), p. 14. 108 William J. Long, Suzette L. Grillot, “Ideas, Beliefs and Nuclear Policies: Cases of South Africa and Ukraine”, Nonproliferation Review, Spring, 2000, p. 33. 109 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, p. 80. 107

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given the Russian factor, was absent in the case of Ukraine. According to Brzezinski, economic stagnation only aggravated the security problems faced by Ukraine, which could ultimately deplete the state in case of continued pressure on Kyiv. In that case “Russia would get what it wanted: a weak and demilitarized Ukraine that would be immensely vulnerable economically”. Brzezinski also commented on views popular among the Parliament members pointing out that these latter “did not want to give up nuclear weapons, in particular to a potential enemy”.110 At the same time, assessments of Parliament’s position show a lack of integrity among the pro-nuclear lobby. Furthermore, the nuclear deterrence concept itself was appealing only to a section of the proponents of nuclear ambitions. The dominant position was that known as “constructive disarmament”, expressed by the Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine. Their main idea was described by Yuriy Kostenko in his article Nuclear Weapons: Good or Evil? Political, Legal and Economic Analysis of Disarmament.111 The concept advocated by Kostenko was nuclear disarmament but within the spirit of the national interest. Today’s reader of Kostenko’s memoirs may get an impression that the author also treated nuclear weapons as an element of “passive deterrence” having political, rather than military value: By their nature nuclear weapons exercise a protective function even not being controlled by the state where it is deployed. Thus, the elimination of nuclear weapons without their adequate replacement with other deterrence mechanisms means a loss of an effective tool of the national security system and threatens the existence of the Ukrainian state.112

The author likely meant that in the case of a crisis around a “nuclear” Ukraine all international actors would have applied maximum effort to avoid a military conflict. In his article above Kostenko brought forward a number of conditions he deemed imperative for a successful disarmament process: 1. The right of Ukraine to all nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. Under the Vienna Convention on Succession of 1983, Ukraine was a successor to the Soviet Union and was entitled to all movable and immovable property of the USSR then on its territory; 2. A need to receive external financial compensation for the disarmament process which, by assessments of the Foreign Ministry, would cost Ukraine nearly 3 billion dollars113; 3. Compensation for the cost of nuclear material recovered from nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine;

110

US National Security Archives, 111 Nuclear Control Institute Collection, Trip Report. Discussions of CISAC Plutonium Study. Kyiv, Ukraine – May, 30–June 3, 1994// US National Security Archives, Folder 111. 111 Kostenko, op. cit. p. 258. 112 Ibid., p. 260. 113 Ibid., p. 104.

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4. Security assurances to be provided to Ukraine in exchange for its nuclear disarmament. In this context Kostenko insisted that the last ICBM deployed in Ukraine should only be eliminated after Ukraine had become a full member of the European community.114 Practically this must have been a hint towards the integration of Ukraine into NATO, which did not seem realistic at the time. Many analysts who realized this believed that by posing unrealistic disarmament conditions the Parliamentary Working Group were pursuing a hidden agenda aimed at the retention of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and making it officially a nuclear weapon state after a time. Indeed, the proponents of this approach thought it would be most reasonable for Ukraine to accede to the NPT with the status of a “transit nuclear weapon state”. At the same time, the assessments of some American researchers of the time expressed appreciation of Kyiv’s aspirations to secure itself in the future and to send a signal to Washington that a document more comprehensive than START-1 was needed to stir up the Ukrainian disarmament process.115 On the other hand, Parliament was not particularly keen on the nuclear deterrence idea that in principle should have been at the head of any debate on nuclear weapon state status. The only Parliament member advocating the deterrence concept was Major General Volodymyr Tolubko, member of the Security and Defence Committee. Head of Kharkiv Military School for Missile Forces and a son of the famous SMF commander who played an important role in the force’s evolution, Tolubko was openly pro-nuclear. But opposite to views of other pro-nuclear Ukrainian politicians he believed that a (temporally) nuclear Ukraine should cooperate with the nuclear Russia. In summer 1993, when Ukraine came very close to the declaration of a nuclear weapon status in the opinion of many outside observers (but in fact just moved the farthest from a hasty declaration of non-nuclear weapon status), Volodymyr Tolubko in his article for the Parliamentary bulletin Holos Ukrayiny116 presented an integrated system of arguments in favour of the nuclear choice—apparently, being the result of an in-depth teamwork analysis. By this concept, nuclear weapons were the cheapest and most reliable security assurance within the framework of nuclear partnership (technical cooperation with political guarantees) with Russia in a hard economic situation. Ukraine could not afford to maintain the nuclear weapon status independently. In Tolubko’s opinion, Russia was as much dependent on Ukraine as

114

Ibid., p. 258. Garnett, S.W. The Sources and Conduct of the Ukrainian Nuclear Policy// The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia/ ed. by G. Quester. - M.E. Sahre, Armong, NY 1995., p. 137. 116 Володимир Толубко. Ядерна зброя, космос, флот: вирішення питань не терпить зволікання / ГолосУкраїни №128 (628), 9 липня 1993 року(Tolubko, Volodymyr. Nuclear Arms, Space, and Navy: the Issues are Pressing / Holos Ukrayiny No. 128 (628), 9 July 1993.) 115

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Ukraine on Russia, and this could be the basis for a nuclear compromise in which Russia would have to agree to nearly equal relations with Ukraine in the nuclear and missile sphere.117 Volodymyr Tolubko did not see the nuclear weapon status as a permanent status for Ukraine—only as a solution for the transition period after which the emphasis should have been shifted to conventional precision weapons of deterrence. The time could be extended somewhat but would be limited by the safe service life of SS-24 ICBMs on combat duty since 1987–1989 and having new custom designed warheads. These could have remained in service until the end of the 1990s or, after a relatively inexpensive life extension routine, even until the end of the 2000s and beyond. Tolubko also argued that Ukraine should have ratified START-1 on condition of a pro-rata reduction in strategic nuclear forces and without accession to the NPT, or alternatively should have implemented its policy outside the framework of START-1 or the NPT, based on bilateral arrangements only.118 The response of other Parliament members to the nuclear deterrence idea is noteworthy. Markiyan Belinsky, the director of the Pylyp Orlyk Democracy Institute, recalled that his Institute distributed copies of articles by Mearsheimer and Miller, debating the expediency of and possibilities for nuclear deterrence for Ukraine. The next day Parliament requested an additional 70 copies of Mearsheimer’s article in favour of nuclear deterrence for Ukraine and not a single additional copy of the one by Miller who advocated the non-nuclear weapon status.119 Furthermore, the actions of Parliament in fact indicated its quiet solidarity with the Working Group. START-1 was ratified on 18 November 1993 with account for the recommendations of the “hawks”. Inter alia, Ukraine undertook obligation to reduce 36% of ICBMs deployed in its territory and 42% of warheads, as required by the Treaty. However, it was officially declared that Ukraine did not “consider Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol [prescribing that the country acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state] to be binding upon it”.120

117

Ideas of Volodymyr Tolubko could be conceptually compared with other forms of military integration such as smart defence in NATO or pooling & sharing in the EU. 2010 agreements between the UK and France on joint use of nuclear aircraft carriers with nuclear weapon battle aircraft are a close analogy. 118 Bujeryn M. The Power of NPT: International Norms and Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament”. – Nonproliferation Review. – 22/2.-2015. 119 US National Security Archives, 111 Nuclear Control Institute Collection, Trip Report. Discussions of CISAC Plutonium Study. Kyiv, Ukraine – May, 30–June 3, 1994// US National Security Archives, Folder 111. 120 Постанова Верховної Ради України “Про ратифікацію Договору між Союзом Радянських Соціалістични Республік і Сполученими Штатами Америки про скорочення і обмеження стратегічних наступальних озброєнь, підписаного у Москві 31 липня 1991 року, і Протоколу до нього, підписаного у Лісабоні від імені України 23 травня 1992 року”, Офіційний портал Верховної Ради України, rada.gov.ua; (The Decree of the Parliament of Ukraine On Ratification of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of

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It appears that Tolubko’s ideas were not his alone and likely represented a consolidated stance of some military circles in both Ukraine and Russia. Specifically, according to the Ukrainian General Chief of Staff Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata, the Ukrainian General Staff received an offer formulated by the Russian Deputy Defence Minister Boris Gromov in 1995. Mr. Gromov proposed to Lopata the idea of keeping nuclear forces on Ukrainian territory—on the condition that Moscow retained operational control over the strategic nuclear forces. In this arrangement Ukraine would have had administrative control of the nuclear arsenal stationed on its territory and the possibility to approve/block missile launches from Ukrainian territory for Moscow, while Russia would have exercised monitoring of missile nuclear security. The idea that the Ukrainian strategic forces would be manned by Ukrainian citizens was also on the agenda. All these ideas were approved by the Ukrainian generals who preferred to address problems as and when they arose and saw the retention of nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine as a key task. These plans never materialized. A draft document to this effect was developed and formally submitted to the respective foreign ministries of Russia and Ukraine. On arrival in Kyiv the Russian delegation was welcomed by the representative of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Kostyantyn Gryshchenko who stated that the Ukrainian General Staff had no right to initiate instruments of that kind. In response Boris Gromov, the Russian representative, who likely realized that the arrangement would not be accepted by the Ukrainians, asked for the draft document, which he then stroke through ostentatiously and, signing the last page, said, “Ukraine does not have nuclear forces anymore”.121 This was the end of the hopes of the Ukrainian military who wished to see nuclear weapons in Ukraine yet never thought of it as a self-sustained nuclear weapon state. The stance of President Leonid Kravchuk was generally the most difficult to interpret. He sought to satisfy both the international partners (USA, Russia) and the domestic political actors (Parliament, the Foreign Ministry). In particular, the beginning of 1992 saw several attempts to formalize Ukraine’s control over the nuclear weapons. It is known that Kravchuk officially declared the intention of Ukraine to be involved in the centralized decision-making process regarding use of nuclear weapons and to have the right to block central orders.122 Later, when it became obvious that Moscow was not going to share its strategic military authority, Kravchuk issued a decree on the suspension of transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Interestingly, this decree made the US military

Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 and the Protocol Thereto Signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on 23 May 1992, the Official Portal of the Parliament of Ukraine, rada. gov.ua) 121 Лопата А. Час і свідомість. Записки начальника генерального штабу ЗС України. К.: Військова розвідка, 2015.- С.375. Lopata, A. V. Time and Conscience. A Note by the General Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.-K.: Military Intelligence, 2015, p. 375. 122 US National Security Archives, Folder 111, Nuclear Control Institute Collection, Philip Zelikov, Harvard Discussion with Kravchuk on Nuclear weapons/Memorandum, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, September 30th, 1991//US National Security Archives.

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department assume that “Kravchuk possibly seriously intended to preserve nuclear weapons for Ukraine as the only way to assure Ukrainian security”.123 As for Kravchuk’s motives, there may be several assumptions. What was on the surface was his irritation over Russian President Yeltsin’s unilateral initiatives (namely, the presidential nuclear initiative to reduce tactical nuclear weapons and to retarget ICBMs stationed in Ukraine) without any consultations with the Ukrainian leadership. Everyone understood, though, that tactical weapons could become operational in the hands of Ukraine as there was no central blocking mechanism, which theoretically made them available for use even by the field commanders. The gravity of the situation was evidenced by a rather harsh statement by the deputy head of the CIS Executive Committee: “If the situation deteriorates the weapons may be destroyed at their current locations”, meaning the territory of Ukraine.124 A suggestion to dismantle the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory rather than to remove them to Russia was another initiative of Kravchuk suggesting the President’s nuclear ambitions. The Ukrainian President proposed that American partners build an appropriate facility in Ukraine for dismantling warheads from all three states. Apart from considerable financial investment in such a facility, the dismantling function would in fact provide Ukraine with the information and capabilities required to produce nuclear weapons. This situation was well appreciated by the Americans who would not have allowed it to happen.125 There is a general impression that for some time the President was nourishing the idea of a “nuclear Ukraine”. However, a number of failures on this track persuaded him that this idea was futile. Summing up this part our conclusion is that in spite of the wide understanding of the peacefulness of Ukrainian politics there were certainly some ideas about the establishment of nuclear deterrence in one or the other way. One of the most probable variants was the option of retaining tactical nuclear weapons, easy to be operational in the hands of the Ukrainian military and even be used as a deterrent for Russia. Meanwhile this plan had two significant weak points. First was the fact that operationalization of nuclear deterrence would inevitably lead to the attempt of Russians to pre-empt Ukraine from becoming an effective nuclear state, probably by the means of military operation. This operation could be executed before Ukraine would de-facto operationalize its nuclear deterrence. The success of this plan could even be aggravated by another vulnerability: the fact that most of the

123

US National Security Archives, Folder 111, Nuclear Control Institute Collection, Defense Intelligence report ODB 27–92, p. 120. 124 US National Security Archives, Folder 111, Nuclear Control Institute Collection, Defense Intelligence Report ODB 27–92, Ukraine-Nuclear Withdrawal Suspension, March 1992//NunnLugar documents, P.122//US National Security Archives. 125 US National Security Archives, Folder 111, Nuclear Control Institute Collection/A Trip Report: A Visit to the Commonwealth of Independent States by Senator Sam Nunn, Senator Richard Lugar, Sanatro John Warner, and Senator Jeff Bighaman, March 6–10, 1992//Nunn-Lugar Documents, US National Security Archives, p. 112.

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Ukrainian military still did not regard Ukraine as a state separate from Russia. The experience of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine with no legislative or executive authority order just by the mutual initiative of the Russian and Ukrainian defense ministries shows that this situation was the case. As a result, the reliance of pro-nuclear politicians on the Ukrainian military of that time could have led to the opposite consequences. In particular, the Russians could be provided with the easiest access to these weapons, performed during a special military operation against Ukraine. Moreover, the conditions of transferring to the nuclear deterrence demanded from Ukraine to produce its own nuclear warheads, as in a decade the existing warheads would have expired. This option of building up its own nuclear arsenal was also at least explored by the Ukrainian presidents. In particular, Kravchuk was interested in attracting American investors for constructing a nuclear disarmament facility in Ukraine while Kuchma initially insisted on proclaiming Ukraine “a transitional nuclear state” relying on some of its own capabilities. In spite of the fact that Ukraine did not have a full fuel nuclear cycle, Kyiv possessed the second largest Uranium storage in Europe and also produced its own ICBMs. This version was theoretically more credible, but still didn’t look plausible for Ukraine with its drained economy of the 1990s. Moreover, at that time it didn’t appear necessary for Ukraine, which always perceived Russia as “a brotherly nation” and also didn’t define serious security threats to itself.126 In the meantime the strong diplomatic pressure on Ukraine coming from the US and Russia made this option too difficult and outside the inherent state priorities. Also, considering the positions of the military, the most probable was the option of creating common nuclear deterrence with Russia, who looked in favour on this option. There were all the conditions for this: the will of some concerned military, the appropriate common infrastructure, the experienced personal as well as many years of nuclear weapons cooperation, which could make this common deterrence as stable and reliable as the Soviet one. The main obstacle here was the fact that common nuclear deterrence would keep Kyiv in close military and political alliance with Moscow, which could not be accepted by the majority of the Ukrainian Verhovna Rada looking to build up a sovereign state. Here it is necessary to recall that Ukraine initially refused even to join the CIS, let alone not joining the Tashkent treaty of 1992, which created a military alliance among the CIS states. For most advocates of the European choice of Ukraine the alliance with Russia looked incompatible with this foreign policy goal, therefore this idea failed as well. And finally the least probable was that of taking control over the existing Soviet strategic nuclear weapons as it demanded breaking into the Russian command and control system which was hardly possible at that time and would never have stood without an appropriate Russian response. The ecological consequences of this option

Кучма Л. Украина не Россия. – М.: Время, 2003 (Kuchma L. Ukraine is not Russia. – M.: Vremya, 2003); Stevens C. Identity Politics and Nuclear Disarmament. The Case of Ukraine// Nonproliferation Review. 2008. N.15.

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were also quite dangerous: the lack of service, which Russian maternal industries would never provide to a “Ukrainian” nuclear arsenal, would inevitably influence the nuclear safety situation such as the leakage of radiation and therefore serious problems dealing with the warheads. The same situation would also have emerged if Ukraine had preferred just to retain warheads as a catalytic tool to raise the stakes in a potential conflict with Russia in order to draw the attention of outside powers. It would rather more likely attract attention for the potential of a radiation-involving accident in the middle of Europe, the perspective of which would also increase the pressure on Ukraine from the outside. Summing up all these options we can come to a pretty interesting picture. It shows that the option Ukraine has often been blamed for was always perceived as the most unrealistic and unnecessary by Ukrainians. After summer 1992 when tactical nuclear weapons were transferred to Russia no one in Ukraine seriously perceived the nuclear arsenal as anything other than a bargaining chip in the negotiations with great powers. Moreover, the positions of the influential internal actors significantly influenced the destiny of the nuclear arsenal.

3.2

Missile Industry Lobby

One of the first interest groups to formulate an integral position on nuclear weapons and the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine included the manufacturers of strategic missile systems from the Soviet era. One of the three Soviet industrial centres producing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and space vehicles was located in Ukraine.127 It deserves a brief overview. Scientific and Production Enterprise (SPE) Yuzhnoye, including Design Bureau Yuzhnoye and Production Complex Yuzhmash, itself comprising several production sites, including the Pavlograd Mechanical Factory, covered a huge protected territory in the city of Dnipro (Dnepropetrovsk at the time of the USSR’s dissolution). Its working population at the peak of prosperity of the Soviet defense industry reached 80 thousand people.128 The Enterprise also had auxiliary institutions, affiliates within the system of academic institutes, associated enterprises (established with its active involvement)129 and, most importantly, extensive cooperation with other defense industry facilities interested in joint production although independent. The nature of the production required the availability of sophisticated interfaces with Scientific and Production Enterprise (SPC) Yuzhnoye (the “Yangel Firm”), SPE of Machine Building (the “Chelomey Firm”) and Moscow Institute for Thermal Engineering, or MIT (the “Nadiradze Firm”). 128 For the sake of comparison, the total number of employees of all institutions under the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences neared 90 thousand persons in early 1990; the total personnel of the armed forces on Ukrainian territory was about 700 thousand. 129 These would include Khartron in Kharkiv and the company in Krasnoyarsk currently known as Satellite Information Systems in Russia. 127

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manufacturers of nuclear warheads and space satellites,130 the military and foreign policy establishment, the intelligence community and the state security service. In today’s terms one could describe this as an extensive industrial alliance run by a concern. By the Soviet defence industry tradition this was named the “Southern Cluster”.131 This cluster for many years successfully competed for Soviet defence procurement orders with two other ICBM production clusters housed in Russia. As well as any other similar entities the Southern Cluster had analysis divisions who elaborated its industrial strategy within the available vision of military, political and economic patterns.132 This vision included good understanding of the contractual basis, including ABMT, SALT-1 and -2, the INF Treaty, and START-1.133 There has never been a survey of the distribution of votes of SPE Yuzhnoye employees in the referendum on Ukrainian independence of 1 December 1991. However, based on the feelings of the insider, the views varied and any suspicion as to pro-Soviet opposition to Ukrainian statehood would be groundless. On the other hand, dominating attitudes hardly at all correlated with the views of the Ukrainian Rukh.134 In the context of the re-emerging Ukrainian state the Southern Cluster was fully prepared to develop an integrated attitude to nuclear disarmament. Initially this attitude had a strong influence on official views, however, as the state-building process progressed, it was eventually reduced to corporate interests. There was a strong belief in the Ukrainian missile industry that everything that was good for the industry was also good for the state—be it the Soviet empire or Ukrainian democracy. This stance, although well elaborated and comprehensive, was only the mimicking of a pro-state position. In fact it came down to a hunt for long-term corporate survival. SPE Yuzhnoye had only an indirect interest in the nuclear sphere per se: it had never produced nuclear warheads. However, since its core activity was genetically

130

Some military satellites were assembled at the SPE Yuzhnoye’s own satellite production line using locally designed platforms. However, nuclear warheads were produced separately. There was an interface which required knowledge of mass, dimensions and electrical parameters but not the design details. 131 Ukraine also had other major defence industry clusters with a similar organisation but not related to the nuclear sphere. 132 Due to sophisticated interfaces with the state machine this vision was sufficiently complete; at the time of the dissolution of the USSR, the forecast horizon was until 2010. 133 In the process of negotiation of START-1, all interim versions were available for the ‘corporation’ to formulate its approach. At the time of the USSR’s dissolution SPE Yuzhnoye was probably the only entity in Ukraine who possessed and understood several hundred pages of the Treaty documentation, including the Treaty per se, as well as protocols, memorandums, addenda and approved statements. 134 No particular obstacles existed for Rukh to campaign within the ‘restricted territory’ on the eve of the referendum. Limitations, if any, concerned the policy in general rather than any specific political actor.

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related to the assurance of “nuclear parity with a potential enemy” (using the Cold War language),135 SPE Yuzhnoye was one of the important players in the process of Ukraine’s transition to non-nuclear weapon status. This role was backed by an important legal consideration: the main track of nuclear disarmament, from SALT1 in the first half of the 1970s to the New START in 2010, involved limitation and reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles rather than elimination of nuclear warheads proper.136 In the chapter on the composition and structure of the nuclear arsenal inherited by Ukraine it was shown that a certain disarmament inertia was developed by the decisions already made at the high political level. Any dramatic alteration would have caused severe consequences for Ukraine; yet, meaningful tactical adjustments were achievable. These were exactly what the missile industry struggled for. Other interest groups—both corporate and governmental—in fact did the same. The Southern Cluster expressed no particular concern over the declaration by Ukraine of its intent to become non-nuclear in 1990, although it was considered to be a potential problem rather than an opportunity. More attention at that time was paid to changes in the ICBM market in the context of the preparation for START-1. Its text signed on 31 July 1991 in Moscow was favourable for the Ukrainian missile industry. The planned changes to the strategic missile force (SMF) missile grouping in response to the Treaty requirements even increased the relative share of Ukrainian missiles in the missile grouping structure (see Table 5 below), albeit the reduction of the scale of the weapons program in absolute terms. One of the competing Russian clusters was removed from the market and reconciliation with the other one was marked by the joint involvement in production of a new missile.137 Considering that Ukrainian ICBMs had multiple warheads they had even better advantage based on the number of warheads deployed. Table 5 below reflects the plans that failed due to the dissolution of the USSR. They, however, were kept in mind by the leaders of the nuclear industry when making a stance on the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. It is important to understand that the “battlefield” originally encompassed the entire area of ICBM deployment, including Russia. And it was missiles rather than nuclear warheads that were in focus. The nuclear problem remained topical inasmuch as ICBMs lost most of their sense without nuclear warheads. The momentum for a position on the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine emerged before the formal dissolution of the USSR. Autumn of 1991 was saturated with Soviet-American strategic arms reduction initiatives, much more intense than in 135 Even the production of space carriers was aimed to support an intense escalation of a military satellite constellation in a threatened period preceding a nuclear war, although these carriers also had purely civilian applications. 136 A change of this paradigm never occurred, although if a new treaty is made between the USA and Russia it will likely cover a verifiable reduction of nuclear warheads. 137 ‘Chelomey missiles’ were removed from duty without replacement, ‘Nadiradze missiles’ remained with the troops to be replaced with new missiles, jointly developed by SPE Yuzhnoye and MIT, after some time.

Missile system SS-11 SS-13 ICBM sites Number of ICBMs (by 1991/by 1998) 299/0 40/0 Russia Bershet 60/0 Teykovo Krasnoyarsk 39/0 Drovyanaya 50/0 Yasnaya 90/0 Svobodnyi 60/0 Yoshkar-Ola 40/0 Vypolzovo Dombrovsky Kartaly Aleysk Uzhur Tatishchevo Kozelsk Kostroma Kansk Yurya Nizhniy Tagil Novosibirsk Irkutsk 64/54 46/46 30/0 64/54

308/154

44/0

44/0

SS-18

SS-17b

110/0 60/0

300/0

SS-19

10/10

56/56

SS-24c

12/12

12/12

12/12

36/36

SS-24d

27/27 45/45 45/45 27/27 36/36

18/18

36/36 27/27

315/315

SS-25

0/106

0/50 0/90 0/39

0/60

0/405

“Universal” (SS-27)e

(continued)

1398/966 1064/806

Total

Table 5 Planned changes to SMF missile grouping in the context of START-1 (numbers in bold relate to ICBM types manufactured in Ukraine, numbers in bold-italic relate to ICBM types with a substantial share of Ukrainian involvement)a

Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine 131

Missile system SS-11 SS-13

SS-17b 52/0 52/0

SS-18

90/0 40/0

SS-19

46/46

SS-24c

SS-24d

27/27 27/27

SS-25

0/60

“Universal” (SS-27)e

54/54

176/106

Total 104/0

The table from the joint analytical paper of Design Bureau Yuzhnoye and the Regional Branch of NISS in Dnipro dated 1992 On Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in the Territory of Ukraine. Data for 1991 correlate with the source data of START-1; 1998 data reflect plans of the Soviet Ministry of Defence regarding development of the SNF missile grouping at the final stage of START-1 preparation in the first half of 1991. Document from the author’s archive b Including the regiment of the so-called command missiles. Their function was to fly over the USSR territory during the response strike to relay the launch command. Under START-1, four nuclear warheads were counted for each SS-17, including the command missile c The silo launcher based variant d The rail-mobile launcher based variant e For the original “Universal” version that later was redesigned in Russia as SS-27 Ukraine was supposed to produce first stages of all missiles and assemble silolaunched missiles. The remaining stages and assembly of missiles for mobile ground missile systems were left for Russia. The first missile for flight tests had been assembled in Ukraine by the time START-1 was signed. Because of the subsequent events the tests were frozen. Subsequently that missile was sold to Russia, so Ukraine took no part in SS-27 deployment

a

ICBM sites Kazakhstan Derzhavinsk Zhanghiz-Tobe Ukraine Khmelnitsky Pervomaysk Belarus Lida Mozyr

Table 5 (continued)

132 P. Sinovets et al.

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START-1. The management of SPE Yuzhnoye, no doubt, were reading newspapers and getting information from partners in Moscow. However, the provincial belief that politics cannot crush hardware and that the plans of the Soviet General Staff were proof against drastic changes no matter what the Soviet Union transformed into continued to dominate for some time. The freezing of a number of new programs and prospective developments was unavoidable considering rapid economic decline. However, the dramatic redistribution of the market seemed unlikely. A stroke of insight occurred in November 1991 when the management of SPE Yuzhnoye received a document prepared by the immediate circle of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin,138 rapidly taking over power from the still existing Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Based on a good level of elaboration this document was prepared with the involvement of the military and representatives of the Russian defense industry. It was distributed to many meaningful addressees in Moscow, both the still existing Soviet and the new Russian. The document analysed two scenarios of radical reduction of strategic nuclear forces. The first one could be named “START-1 Plus”. The second one in fact resulted in START-2 in 1993. A remark on the document stated that Boris Yeltsin believed the second option to be more expedient as the basis for the 1992 budget. The document began with a substantiation of more profound reductions using a unique chance offered by American proposals to the USSR for Russia to be able “to address problems of removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other republics”.139 Not only tactical but also strategic nuclear weapons were at stake. The proposal was to remove them from Ukraine by 1993. It was also proposed to immediately cease the funding of any research and development (R&D) activities outside Russia and, as required, in potentially separatist territories inside Russia (the reference was to Tatarstan where heavy bombers were produced). The proposed scenario of a radical reduction of the nuclear force missile grouping assumed a rapid waiver of multiple warhead ICBMs manufactured in Ukraine. There could be no precise forecast of the results of the Ukrainian independence referendum announced for 1 December 1991 at the time these proposals were prepared. In other words, they referred to a profound redistribution of the market of strategic arms—in fact, its monopolization by several Russian companies within the USSR framework. It became clear that the process was underway and had

138

The document On Proposals of Presidents of the USSR and the USA and Possibilities for More Radical Reductions of Strategic Offensive Arms signed on 27 October 1991 by the Head of the Russian Presidential Administration Yuriy Petrov, Secretary of the Council for Federation Affairs under Russian President Yuriy Skokov, and the Chairman of the Science Committee of the Council of the Union of the Soviet Parliament Yuriy Ryzhov. Document from the author’s archive. 139 Ibid.

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progressed much farther than its initiator could foresee140 and that the Ukrainian missile industry had every chance of losing the procurement orders from Moscow, whatever the future of the Soviet empire was. This neutralized the motive to hold on to the USSR for the sake of governmental procurement orders and gave a chance to have a closer look at perspectives offered to Ukraine by independence. The first thing to do was to formulate an attitude in respect of the intent of Ukraine to become non-nuclear, declared in summer 1990 and confirmed in autumn 1991. The analysis of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the NPT), previously not undertaken as pointless, as well as of a broader array of international instruments relevant to nuclear weapons141 yielded the idea of separate performance under START-1 and the NPT. The justification was in that the term “nuclear weapons” could not be applied to their delivery vehicles alone.142 This term should have been interpreted exclusively as “nuclear explosive devices” that could be used in warfare. Certainly it was not an official legal position. It was an industrial vision for possible means of survival. Several more important conclusions were made that influenced the development of Ukraine’s formal stance on nuclear weapons. The intent of Ukraine to gain non-nuclear weapon status in the future implied that it was actually a nuclear weapon state at that time.143 Any other position would have signified that the aspirations to non-nuclear weapon status would be reduced to removal of somebody else’s nuclear weapons from its territory. In that case Ukraine would have had no chance to claim an international premium144 for the free-will abandonment of nuclear arms—due to the lack of a free-will abandonment. Another conclusion made was that the non-nuclear weapon status might and should have been used to obtain international security guarantees. Interestingly enough, the idea—short-lived but radical in its sense—to create a nuclear weapons

“Process in underway” is a known meme (although the term “meme” did not exist then) from the time of the Soviet Perestroika, whose author was Mikhail Gorbachev. It meant that some profound and often unconscious changes with far-reaching consequences were going on and could not be stopped. 141 The Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlateloco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Rarotonga), and the “Rapacki Plan”. 142 The preamble to the NPT, article 5 of the Treaty of Tlateloco and article 1 of the Treaty of Rarotonga treat separately the nuclear weapons (nuclear explosive devices) and their delivery means. The NPT preamble, however, also mentions complete elimination of delivery means but only with reference to a future “Treaty on general and complete disarmament under the strict and effective international control”. 143 That is, Ukraine’s own understanding partially confirmed by the first treaties within the CIS framework. 144 The premium was understood in a broad sense: not only material and financial bonuses but also international recognition, removal of trade and technology restrictions, and access to international markets of high technology. 140

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free regional zone including Ukraine remained in circulation for some time, to a large extent by the influence of Ukrainian participants of the international Pugwash Movement. From the security assurances standpoint it was perceived as a possible replacement for a “nuclear umbrella” lost by Ukraine after it would gain non-nuclear weapon status.145 The principle of legal segregation of approaches to nuclear warheads and their means of delivery reflected the technical understanding of the available limits regarding nuclear weapons. As was mentioned, the missile industry had an interface with the nuclear warhead manufacturers. However, it was not sufficiently transparent to know and understand the warheads’ design to the point that would allow their use—let alone their potential replication at some other production facility. Unlike nuclear warheads, long-term operational control of the ICBMs was quite achievable, especially as regards ICBMs of Ukrainian design. The capabilities of the SMF 43rd army on the territory of Ukraine, as well as of Design Bureau Yuzhnoye, Yuzhmash and Pavlograd Mechanical Factory were sufficient to organize a complete cycle of ICBM operation and maintenance—given available funding, of course, which at that time was catastrophically scarce. As of the first half of 1992 the missile industry had the following position on nuclear disarmament. The strategic goal was to perform START-1 within the parameters close to those presented in Table 5. This required that Ukraine acceded to the Treaty as an equal party having its own ICBM quota along with Russia and other heirs to the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The other task was to prevent the new START-2 that would have banned multiple independent re-entry vehicle (MIRVed) ICBMs. From the perspective of the corporate interests of the missile industry the accession of Ukraine to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state was a secondary aggravating circumstance, although there was no direct interest in control of the nuclear warheads. Russia’s insistence that Ukraine favoured its promise to gain non-nuclear status soon was backed not only by the Russian national interest but also by the clear voice of Russian lobbyists seeking a ban on MIRVed ICBMs. A non-nuclear Ukraine bound by the obligation not to accept, manufacture or buy nuclear weapons—covering delivery vehicles in a broad interpretation—was automatically ousted from the process of development of strategic nuclear forces. As far as banning MIRVed missiles was one of the US priorities during the Treaty negotiations, the signing of START-2 (which restricted MIRVed ICBMs) would be a logical step for Russia. Hence the “Ukrainian industrial factor” was among the important drivers defining the structure of START-2. There were several antidotes against this “poison”. The segregated approach to START-1 and the NPT created an opportunity for several acceptable options. Fast accession to START-1 based on the quota distribution principle allowed either postponing accession to the NPT pending more radical reduction of the collective

145

On Deployment, op. cit. in Ref. 138.

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strategic forces of the CIS146 or, alternatively, accession to the NPT on condition of temporary stationing of nuclear warheads or of reconfiguration of the Ukrainian ICBM “quota” for non-nuclear applications. Preservation of the CIS Strategic Forces until achievement of the START-1 levels (7 years) was an ideal solution. After that Ukraine would have acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. ICBMs on its territory would have been converted for non-nuclear use within the framework of the national conventional deterrence forces and in the future they would have been supplemented or replaced with new shorter-range missiles of Ukrainian origin subject to no restrictions under either START-1 or the INF Treaty. The plan envisaged technical cooperation between Russia and Ukraine. This required an intergovernmental treaty on the designer’s and warranty supervision over strategic forces. It was lobbied from the very beginning. The other task was to use all available means to oppose the signature of START-2. In addition to moral and informational support of opponents to this Treaty in Russia there were various ideas of political influence. One of the suggestions was to wedge the CIS or Ukraine, as a part of the CIS Strategic Forces, in negotiations between Russia and the USA. Another option was to declare START-2 an entirely Russian undertaking having no effect on the whole of the CIS Strategic Forces, which would be subject to START-1 levels.

3.3

Missile Plans Conversion

It is clear from today’s perspective that such an ultimate scenario was not achievable. Ukraine simply didn’t have enough money for it. But mainly the US and Russia had a completely different vision of the parameters, timelines and speed of the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. Accession of Ukraine to START-1 and the NPT were seen as interrelated processes having a common goal: full and ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons, including delivery vehicles, on the territory of Ukraine. Legal gaps used by Ukraine, trying every time to expand them, were viewed as mere misunderstandings to be eliminated by unambiguous political obligations of Ukraine concerning nuclear disarmament. The signing on 23 May 1992 of the Lisbon Protocol147 to START-1, becoming its integral part, generally correlated with the original plan of the pro-missile lobby.

Established by the Соглашениеммеждугосударствами-участникамиСодружестваНез ависимыхГосударствпоСтратегическимсиламот 30 декабря 1991 года (Agreement Among Participant States of the Common wealth of Independent States of 30 December 1991) (http:// zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/997_082). The fact of creation of the Collective Forces with a centralised command and control (instead of their transfer to Russia with exterritorial stationing) was in itself an argument in favour of the quota based sharing of nuclear carriers means under START-1 and a factual, although temporary, nuclear weapons status for Ukraine. 147 Protocol to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on 23 May 1992 in 146

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Languages were complementary to the proposals made by Design Bureau Yuzhnoye. Ukraine became an equal party to the Treaty. Furthermore, article 2 of the Protocol stated that “The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall make such arrangements among themselves as are required to implement the Treaty’s limits and restrictions”. This could have been a step to set up quotas within the START-1 limits, similar to those agreed upon within the limits of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty). Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol required that Ukraine acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state “in the shortest possible time”. However, this requirement was initially seen by the missile lobby as not critical if the NPT could be construed as not relevant to nuclear weapon delivery systems. Potential non-nuclear deterrence forces of Ukraine could have been counted within the START-1 limits along with literal performance of the NPT provisions. There was a barrier to such a bright perspective, though, in the form of letters from the Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the US President regarding the execution of the Lisbon Protocol. Their contents were obliging politically, if not legally, otherwise the Protocol would not have been countersigned by the USA. The Lisbon Protocol itself and the letters by three Presidents are kept in the archives of the US Department of State in a single file. The Ukrainian President assured on behalf of Ukraine that all nuclear weapons would be eliminated “including strategic offensive arms, located in its territory in accordance with the relevant arrangements and during the seven-year year period as provided by the START Treaty”.148 The reference to the 7-year term was positive in the sense that in earlier agreements within the CIS framework Ukraine undertook obligation so as to eliminate strategic forces on its territory by the end of 1994.149 Practically, however, the longer term was just more realistic from the elimination procedure standpoint. It was never related to any military programs. There was another aspect to the assurances provided by the Ukrainian President, conflicting with the missile industry plans. Strategic offensive arms were treated as nuclear weapons and thus should have been fully eliminated in line with the non-nuclear obligations of Ukraine. Any plans to retain conventional versions of

Lisbon at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, USA, and Ukraine. https://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/start1/lisb-agr.txt 148 Letter by the President of Ukraine to the President of the USA, Kyiv, 7 May, 1992. http://www. state.gov/documents/organization/27389.pdf 149 This timeline was specified in article 4 of the Agreement Among Participant States of the Commonwealth of Independent States signed by leaders of CIS states on 30 December 1991 (http:// zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/997_082), which did not require ratification, as well as in Ukraine’s amendments to article 10 of the Treaty among Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the Status of Strategic Forces of 14 February 1992 (http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ 997_104), which was signed but was never ratified by Ukraine.

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Ukrainian ICBMs became ambiguous. Nonetheless they continued to exist, warmed up by the missile industry, politicians, military and diplomats. The thesis was brought forward that START-1 provided for a 36% reduction of strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems so, since article 2 of the Lisbon Protocol assumed mutual application of restrictions, Ukraine was obliged to eliminate just this number and could retain non-nuclear versions of new SS-24 ICBMs, manufactured domestically, and possibly some number of strategic bombers.150 In 1992–1993, Design Bureau Yuzhnoye worked on a research project in the interest of the Defence Ministry regarding use of conventional ammunition on SS-24 s. Although originally there was a lot of enthusiasm, the research findings were negative. The project turned out to be much more complex than initially assumed.151 The realization that there would be no money for this project was killing any enthusiasm. There was another factor that determined how keen the Ukrainian pro-missile lobby was on the ICBM market. Design Bureau Yuzhnoye and Production Complex Yuzhmash had in their portfolio space carriers Zenith and Cyclone. There were no resources domestically that allowed the space rocket production lines to keep busy. Russian procurement orders within the framework of industrial cooperation remained the only chance. International companies started expressing interest in Ukrainian space rockets already in the last years of the former USSR, however none of the projects went beyond initial expressions of interest. The reason was obvious: zero experience Ukraine had with international space launch projects. The main problem, though, was that Ukraine was not a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This factor remained in the shadow of the nuclear disarmament process. There was legally no connection between START-1, the NPT and MTCR. Yet, in practice there was a connection, which had a noticeable influence on the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament process—at least as regards the behaviour of the Ukrainian pro-missile lobby.

Document “Relation of Ukraine to START-1 (Assessment of Design Bureau Yuzhnoye)” in the author’s archive. The document was made after the signing of the Lisbon Protocol but before the ratification (with reservations) of START-1 and the Lisbon Protocol by Ukraine in November 1993. In general it repeated the original “missile industry plan” assuming retention by Ukraine of a part of ICBMs with conventional warheads. 151 The findings were as follows. Tests of ICBMs from the Ukrainian territory, even on southern routes, would have been very complicated. Due to specific features of SS-24 replacement of nuclear warheads with conventional kinetic projectile would have required either fundamental change of the control system (that was designed by a Russian company rather than by the Ukrainian Khartron) or exact replication of mass specifications of nuclear projectile in new conventional ones, which would reduce their effectiveness. Due to relatively low accuracy of ICBMs an economically viable option of conventional warhead could have been used, inter alia, against large infrastructure objects of the enemy including environmentally hazardous ones. This type of ICBM use would have been hard to justify at the political level. All this overlapped with an unclear military doctrine (why to launch these missiles and at whom), uncertainty about the producers of conventional projectiles (not available in Ukraine) and very limited budget that would be available to support such a project. 150

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Without membership in MTCR the participation of Ukraine in international space rocket programs (outside the cooperation with Russia inherited from the USSR) would be practically out of question. It was insistently disrupted by the USA. Space rocket discussions with the USA, including on membership of MTCR, began in October 1992. In late September 1993 the US President issued a directive that defined the US policy on new MTCR members, imposing strict membership criteria [5, 6]. Apart from general requirements (availability of academic and industrial potential, responsible policy in missile technology non-proliferation, a sophisticated export control system) there were two specific terms turning MTCR from a control regime into a form of arms reduction and elimination regime. The USA required that new members participated in the main international arrangements for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including the NPT, and “waived forever” production of any military missiles (except Russia and the USA for whom an exception was made). For Ukraine this meant the “waiver forever” of production for its defence needs of any ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) able to carry payloads in excess of 500 kg to a distance more than 300 km. This restriction was much severer than those under START-1 and the INF Treaty put together. These criteria were formulated almost at the same time as the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian nuclear disarmament negotiations became trilateral with the involvement of the USA. Time coincidence was probably accidental. However, from then on a new systemic component was added to the motivation of the Ukrainian pro-missile lobby: Ukraine had a chance to enter the international market of space service only subject to accession to the NPT, START-1 and performance of a number of other obligations. The terms were rather tough but the US was following a stimulation formula where each next step was rewarded with a new window of opportunity. The story of Ukraine’s accession to the MTCR deserves special study. It will be noted here that the topic of the right of Ukraine to a share of conventional ICBMs gradually vanished from public discussions and faded away from the statements of politicians and government officials. It was becoming more important for the missile industry to comply with the MTCR membership criteria. Looking ahead it may be said that one of the key criteria was met on ratification of START-1 and the NPT, but the process of accession to MTCR took longer. Ukraine was fighting desperately for the right to produce its own battle missiles permitted under the signed international treaties, surprising the USA with its persistence. The USA was making the window of opportunity for space cooperation increasingly wide but Ukraine continued to insist that it had the right to produce battle missiles. Finally it got what it wanted in 1998 when it achieved MTCR membership with rights equal to those of the leading nations.152 After that it could implement a series of high-profile space launch projects previously stuck at the preparation stage.

152 Ukraine had to make important concessions but for other reasons, not related to the right to produce missiles. They concerned the elimination of two types of short-range missiles in military

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The developments around START-2 were yet another factor that influenced the original “missile plan”. The capabilities of lobby groups in general and of the promissile lobby in particular were limited. Their influence could not have been decisive. As decisions were being prepared at the level of Russian executive authorities there still was a chance that these steps would have the required effect. The corporate tradition of SPE Yuzhnoye was not to ask for the funding but to fight for it. Thus, the Ukrainian missile industry was not associated with pro-Russian groups in Ukrainian politics, quite abundant at that time. The actions undertaken demonstrated independence and openness for cooperation at the same time. The non-nuclear ICBM project assuming that missile operation would be funded from the Ukrainian budget was a declaration of independence and of the capability for autonomous survival. At the same time, the lobby pursued an arrangement with Russia on warranty and designer’s supervision,153 which ensured continued presence in the Russian strategic force market and scaled down the arguments in favour of START-2. Just to give away to Russia everything it wanted and then count on its goodwill in expecting the procurement orders was a bad idea from the “fight for the funding” logic standpoint. It is hard to say to what extent this policy influenced START-2 decisions—it probably did to some extent. Yet in general the situation around this Treaty followed Russia’s internal logic. Funding Ukrainian developments of MIRVed ICMBs from the Russian budget, able to overcome the prospective American anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, stopped in spring 1992. A number of Ukrainian enterprises were excluded from the Russian cooperation program. In the meantime, a Framework Agreement signed by the US and Russian Presidents in summer 1992 defined the main parameters of the new Treaty. In January 1993 START-2, banning MIRVed ICMBs, was signed. From then on the battle over it shifted to the Russian Parliament and entered a long ratification phase. The attitudes to START-2 in Russia were very clear. The Russian military, and the SMF command in particular, were in opposition believing that the Ukrainian involvement in the maintenance of strategic forces was solvable; this stance was inspired by the Ukrainian missile industry.154 The Russian missile industry, on the contrary was in favour, believing the ban on MIRVed ICMBs to be a warrant for

arsenals, particularly prone to proliferation, and withdrawal from the Iranian NPP construction project. 153 Соглашение между Российской Федерацией и Украиной о порядке осуществления гарантийного и авторского надзора за за эксплуатацией стратегических ракетных комплексов стратегических сил, расположенных на их территориях, подписанное на уровне премьер-министров 3 сентября 1993 года в Ялте (Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Warranty and Designer’s Supervision over Operation of Strategic Missile Systems in Their Territories signed at the level of Prime Ministers on 3 September 1993 in Yalta) http:// www.lawrussia.ru/texts/legal_383/doc383a803x441.htm 154 In addition to the lobby of the warranty and designer’s supervision agreement they used the factor of negotiations on the future of four assembled SS-18 ICBMs and the ‘Universal’ (SS-27 prototype).

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increased funding. Russian executive authorities also supported the Treaty on the wave of rapprochement with the USA. Parliament was divided but the opponents prevailed. The Ukrainian factor influenced the START-2 ratification in several ways. Firstly, based on its language, the implementation could have commenced only after the entry into force of START-1. The Russian Parliament made the ratification of the NPT by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine an additional condition. Secondly, the sentiments in the Russian Parliament were under the influence of the state of relations with Ukraine. Thirdly, the state of technical cooperation with the Ukrainian missile industry influenced the stance of the Russian military and their lobby in Parliament. By autumn 1993 all bets were off so the only thing external parties could do was observe and wait. The progress of ratification of START-1 and the NPT by Ukraine influenced the discussions of START-2 in the Russian Parliament. However, this circumstance itself remained in the context of Russia’s internal opposition to the Treaty. It would have been too risky for the Ukrainian pro-missile lobby to obstruct the ratification of START-1 and the NPT in the Ukrainian parliament, and the gain would have been too insignificant. As was mentioned, this would have hampered the negotiations on Ukraine’s membership in MTCR, plus the ratification of START-2 faced opposition in the Russian Parliament anyway for other reasons. Without changing their conceptual stance the Ukrainian pro-missile lobby began to shift priorities getting away from a fight for politically sensitive goals. That fight started in 1991 with a desire to warrant ICBM procurement orders from the entire ex-Soviet area, continued with an attempt to retain ICBMs for Ukraine and to at least service ICBMs in Russia and finally ended up with the accession in 1998 to MTCR for the sake of participation in the international space launch market. Along this track they supported the “quota” based interpretation of START-1, undertook steps to resist START-2 and defended equal participation in the MTCR. The vision of the NPT was pragmatic: they posed conditions but only insofar as the non-nuclear status involved elimination of strategic arms. There were never plans to stick to a nuclear option. Thus the pro-missile lobby received whatever they could, given the military, political and economic reality of the moment. The Russian ICBM market was lost save for its warranty and designer’s supervision component. START-2 played a secondary role in this: it never entered into force. However, Ukraine was challenged by other factors that ultimately minimized its rocket cooperation with Russia. The fight for quotas ended as soon as commercial futility of this idea became obvious, so the ratification of START-1 for the sake of international civilian projects appeared on the agenda. On the other hand, the struggle for MTCR membership was won allowing the Ukrainian missile industry to unlock its potential in the international space launch market.

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Pro-Nuclear Lobby that Never Materialized

A pro-nuclear lobby could be discussed only virtually. It has never materialized. The interests of different groups directly or indirectly concerned with nuclear aspects were too far apart. Some specialists of SPE Yuzhnoye understood nuclear explosion physics since they had the experience in modelling combat use of strategic nuclear forces for the development of industrial strategies. The effects of nuclear explosions for missile structural elements were studied at nuclear test sites. However, knowledge of explosion physics did not mean knowledge of its technology. Only the need-toknow information was available of the warheads used with ICBMs by SPE Yuzhnoye: their yield, mass, dimensions, interface circuits with the missile control system and, possibly, general design since warhead outer shells might have been designed jointly. All that was top secret since even mass and yield could give to enemies more insights into internal design and level of technology of Soviet nuclear warheads. On the other hand, this information was almost useless for the hypothetical nuclear choice for Ukraine. At any rate, none of those who had at least some knowledge of nuclear problems at SPE Yuzhnoye would ever seriously consider operational control (or possession in the NPT categories) of strategic nuclear warheads. Tactical weapons were of even less interest for the Ukrainian missile industry. Yuriy Kostenko argued in his memoirs that the Designer General of Design Bureau Yuzhnoye Mr. Stanislav Konyukhov, speaking at the Ukrainian Defence Council meeting on 2 April 1992, dwelled on the possibility of organizing the disassembly of nuclear warheads in Ukraine, the only obstacle being the inevitable opposition of Russia who would look at it as the disclosure of its nuclear secrets.155 Unfortunately, Stanislav Konyukhov died in 2011 and his first deputy Yuriy Smetanin, in charge, among other things, nuclear warheads, back in 1999. Thus, it is no longer possible to get first-hand information about the meaning of these words. Most likely discussion referred to a theoretical possibility rather than any practical plan. In any event, being able to disassemble a warhead does not mean being able to get it ready for combat use. Hardly unsanctioned detonation of warhead nuclear pits was physically possible in the latest models of the Soviet ICBMs. The stance of the SMF 43rd army was a fairly important factor. By their inner conviction the officer cadre of this army were probably the most pro-nuclear. However, due to discipline and traditional political loyalty to the government this stance never developed into a political lobby. This is evidenced by the observations of the US advisors in Ukraine. Specifically, Markiyan Belinsky and Ian Brzezinski characterized the Ukrainian military as “mostly having no nuclear ambition” at a meeting with an American delegation. Brzezinski associated this with a high level of awareness of the dynamics of nuclear instability and the difficulties involved in

155

Kostenko, p. 66.

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operative use of nuclear weapons by the military.156 This position, however, requires additional comment. The situation in the Ukrainian long-range air force was similar and even less pronounced in terms of influence on the decision-making process. Air force stations with heavy bombers were not combined in a single structure such as the SMF 43rd army. The discussions on the sale of the operational part of the heavy bombers to Russia began in the early 1990s and ended up successful by the end of that decade. The remaining bombers were doomed to cannibalization. It is important that nuclear warheads for cruise missiles launched from heavy bombers were always stored separately at maintenance depots near airfields. Unlike ICBMs permanently ready to launch, there was no urgency factor connected to the future of these missiles. Recollections of ex-43rd army officers published recently157 are full of pride for the accomplishments of the Soviet period and pain for the period of strategic arms reduction and elimination in Ukraine. That was a human, rather than political, position. Many commanders had to face a period of uncertainty in the 1990s and then had to destroy what they had personally built and what made their lives full of sense. Administrative control by Ukraine over the SMF 43rd army was established rather smoothly in spring 1992. The Ukrainian government demonstrated proper understanding of the correlation between what is called social guarantees and military duty. There were attempts to enforce the Ukrainian oath but they had been neutralized by 1993. The oath to the CIS was in effect instead of the Ukrainian one. However, the funding began coming from the Ukrainian budget at the beginning of 1992. In 1993, the officers were offered a free choice: to take a Ukrainian oath and stay in Ukraine or to continue service in Russia. Most of them stayed. Note also that despite the exceptional military and political significance of the SMF 43rd army its social impact was comparatively insignificant due to the lack of its own channels for the expression of political attitudes. Thus, the military in fact ceded the initiative to the “better informed actors”. It is known that a meeting between officers of the 43rd missile army and representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence took place not long before the independence of Ukraine. The discussion of possibilities for the development of nuclear deterrence capabilities gave an understanding that Ukraine would not be able to maintain deterrence forces without its own production of nuclear weapons. Such prospects would cost the state millions—if not billions—of dollars, which was a fantastic sum for the Ukrainian budget in the face of the forthcoming economic crisis.158 On the other hand, it was likely that the nuclear choice, if made by Ukraine, would intensify serious international pressure on the state, not only political but

156

CISAC Trip Report to Kyiv//Folder 111, US National Security Archives. Vinnitsa Red Banner Missile Army: Historical Essay, / [under general editing of A. P. Volkov]. – M.: Voentekhininzdat, 2010. – 456 p. http://rvsn.ruzhany.info/43ra_00.html 158 Pifer, p. 8. 157

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military as well. Inter alia, as we already mentioned earlier, the Russians threatened a preventive military operation to destroy Ukrainian nuclear weapons. These considerations were backed by environmental factors. These included not only the “Chernobyl syndrome”, still strong among the Ukrainian public in the early 1990s, but also the threat posed by nuclear warheads stationed in Ukraine whose service was stopped by their mother companies from Russia. Based on the analysis performed by Vitaly Kataev, general director of the Russian Defense Industry Complex Business Centre, the main difficulty was in the time limit on the lifecycle of each warhead: 12 years due to the need to replace tritium and separate americium from plutonium to maintain normal warhead radioactivity level. For warheads stationed in Ukraine the lifecycle ended in 1998; after that, according to Kataev, Ukraine “would beg us to do this [take warheads away] and even would have to pay us for this transfer”.159 Most likely, these assessments reflected the averaged situation. Warheads in the arsenal of Ukraine varied in age. In addition, the position of the military was influenced by other factors that prevented them from establishing an integrated political lobby. Among other things, three attitudes as follows may be considered. The first one was borne by the ex-Soviet officers who took oath of allegiance to Ukraine (at the time of separation of Ukrainian armed forces and those of the CIS) but, being a typical product of Soviet party propaganda, were not certain that independent Ukraine had control over nuclear weapons. They feared that nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of nationalists. Another opinion typical for this group was that retention of nuclear weapons by Ukraine would hamper normal evolution of the conventional deterrence by causing substantial outflow of funds from the conventional weapons sector. They believed that getting rid of the nuclear weapons in the interest of development of conventional arms was the most logical thing to do. Furthermore, having good understanding of the low operational efficiency of nuclear weapons many of them thought it was just “a political issue for discussion by the civilians”.160 The second group of the military combined those who remained loyal to Moscow and thus always complied with its will. Most such officers served in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence which was manned in the beginning of the 1990s with a certain amount of Russian effort. For example, two generals—Ivan Bizhan and Georgiy Zhivitsa—sent over by Moscow in the early 1991 (when the USSR was still there) to be appointed, respectively, the first deputy Minister and the head of the General Staff and remained on the ruling positions in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense during the time of nuclear disarmament, and Bizhan even later. This example shows that Russia, seeking to strengthen its

159 US National Security Archives, Nunn Lugar documents, Hoover Institution Archive Box 13, Folder 26, Vitaly Kataev, About Strategic Nuclear Missiles and Other Weapons in Ukraine/ Vitaly Kataev Collection, Hoover Institution Archive Box 13, Folder 26// US National Security Archives, Nunn Lugar documents, p. 323. 160 Garnett, p. 142.

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influence, often used the lack of national self-identification in the Ukrainian ruling elite. This had important consequences for the future of the nuclear weapons. In connection with this President Kravchuk recalled a situation related to the transfer of tactical weapons to Russia. In spring 1992, all nuclear warheads were moved to Russia immediately after the leaders of Russia and Ukraine had signed the Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Procedure for the Transfer of Warheads from the Territory of Ukraine to Centralized Offsite Bases and Their Elimination, without an appropriate decree of the Parliament of Ukraine (who previously blocked the transfers of nuclear weapons by a special resolution) or the President himself. The explanation offered by Kravchuk today is that the decision of the Ukrainian Parliament to impose administrative control over nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine was preceded by the Belavezha Accords attributing these weapons to the jurisdiction of the CIS Joint Armed Forces acting on orders of their commander-in-chief. In fact, the transfer of tactical weapons was conducted on direct orders from Moscow executed by the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and by loyal officers locally. As a result, Kravchuk had an unhappy surprise in May 1992 during an official visit to Washington when he was informed that all tactical nuclear weapons had been successfully transferred to Russia. It was a surprise indeed since he had no idea in principle that the transports of nuclear weapons had been renewed. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Ukrainian Defence Minister Kostyantyn Morozov was not aware of the fact.161 The third attitude in military circles was related to the above-mentioned Volodymyr Tolubko and his support for the concept of nuclear deterrence. This idea was cultivated by some Ukrainian military. Specifically, the Parliament of Ukraine received a telegram from the Union of Officers of Ukraine in July 1993, just before the planned ratification of START-1 and the NPT, saying, “Ratification of the NPT will be the last tragic mistake making the independence experiment dishonest before the Ukrainian nation”.162 There were neither external nor domestic protests of the pro-nuclear lobby against ratification of START-1 and the NPT. The factor of social assurances worked. US assistance programs assumed provision of housing for the officer community and their retraining for work in the civilian sector and business. Many officers were promoted, awarded and given opportunity to continue service in other troops or in the central command. The impact the 43rd army had on the nuclear disarmament process was technical rather than political. In general, if this process were to be viewed from the frontline perspective the timeline of key events would differ from the dates of key government decisions. Preparation of plans for the implementation of START-1 began as early as 1992 before ratification, driven by technical imperatives. In 1993, reduction programs were largely reconciled. In the first half of 1994, deactivation and elimination

Round table discussion “Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine: Outcomes and Lessons Learned”, Odessa Non-Proliferation Centre, ONU, 25 April 2016. 162 Telegram, no. 02–3/874 dd. 03 June 93, Kostenko, op. cit. in Ref. 4, p. 239. 161

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procedures commenced even before the ratification process was completed and ratification instruments exchanged. The last batch of warheads removed from ICBMs was transferred to Russia in 1996 and the last silo launcher was eliminated in 2001. This was the technical chronology of the 43rd army, departing from the political chronology in some key points. A notable role was played by the company Khartron from Kharkiv at the early stage of the decision making on the non-nuclear weapon status for Ukraine. It can hardly be seen as an independent stakeholder. Rather, it was a source of information and expertise for military and political decision makers. Khartron’s specialization was ICBM control systems. Its control systems were installed, inter alia, on SS-18 s of Ukrainian design and manufacture. In this respect the SS-18 is probably the most Ukrainian of the Soviet missiles. However, control systems for SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs deployed in Ukraine were manufactured in Russia. Khartron, similarly to Design Bureau Yuzhnoye, had some information on the design of warheads whose control systems had interfaces with those of ICBMs. From the other side, ICBMs’ control systems interacted with what was called in the former USSR a system of combat control of nuclear forces. It was (and remains in modern Russia) an integrated system connecting the so-called nuclear briefcases and nuclear buttons with nuclear missiles and bombs. To possess nuclear weapons the way Russia and other nuclear countries do, Ukraine would have needed not only to take physical control of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, but also over the Ukrainian part of the integrated Soviet system of combat control of nuclear forces. Khartron and Design Bureau Yuzhnoye had some knowledge of general architecture and some separate elements of this system. But their main field of expertise was how missiles were maintained, launched and delivered payloads to calculated points on the Earth. Knowledge on how command and permission links were organized was subsidiary. Khartron was assigned in 1992 to study the technical capabilities for negative control (ban for the use) of strategic forces on Ukrainian territory, as contemplated in agreements within the CIS framework.163 In other words, Khartron was asked whether it was technically possible and at what cost to switch or to modernize the Ukrainian part of the system of combat control to physically block if necessary delivery from Moscow of a nuclear strike with forces on Ukrainian soil. Russia interpreted this work as an attempt by Ukraine to gain operational control over nuclear weapons. In fact, the internal resources of Ukraine for achieving control of the SNF were much exaggerated by Russian and Western media. For example, some Russian experts gave Ukraine 9 months to solve this task while Western experts gave somewhere from 12 to 18 months [7].

This right was provided by article 4 of Соглашение междугосударствамеждугосударствами-участникамиСодружестваНезависимыхГосударствпоСтратегическимси лам (the Agreement Among Participant States of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Strategic Forces), signed by leaders of CIS states on 30 December 1991 (http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/997_082) 163

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Any interpretations notwithstanding, the fact of the matter is that Khartron gave a generally negative answer to the question on possible technical interference in the system of combat control: this would have been too complicated and risky. Yet, it was not beyond understanding how to do it if political will would have been decisive and money and time available. This “too complicated and risky” answer stopped at an early stage political attempts if any to seek combat control of administratively controlled nuclear weapons. In his memoirs, Yuriy Kostenko described a meeting dated 2 April 1992 where President Kravchuk raised the issue on the possibility for Ukraine to block a launch of ICBMs from its territory should Russia give such an order. Yakov Aizenberg, Khartron chief engineer, replied that no interference in the nuclear arms command and control system was possible without a sanction from Moscow. According to Kostenko, Ukraine had never seriously considered achievement of operational control over nuclear weapons.164 Practical involvement of Ukraine in control of non-use of nuclear weapons in its territory came down to the variation of the procedure for dissemination of orders to combat crews. The following narrative belongs to the ex-deputy commander of one of the 43rd army’s missile regiments Viktor Chernysh who was interviewed by a well-known blogger researching the history of this army165: As concerns combat management: we at the command center received an additional envelope to those we always had. We believed the envelope was from Kyiv. I can guess what it said but I will not comment on this anymore. (Question: Speaking about combat management, did a launch always require a command from Moscow? Could Kyiv do it?) I don’t think it could. Although we may not have all the information. The envelope had a code phrase written on it; we should have opened it on the code phrase received through a communication channel. I am sure, though, that nothing in this envelope could have actually caused the launch of the missile and use of nuclear weapons. We were not at the top but we did understand that combat management was effected from Moscow, from the Central Command Post of the SMF. . . (Question: Could Kyiv disrupt a launch technically? Or only administratively?) I don’t think it could. Even if there was a desire—the system had multiple redundancy. Plus there still was mutual trust. (Question: Thus, even if officers wanted they would not be able technically?) No, they would not. Technical arrangements were made to prevent an unauthorized launch. Besides, the Ukrainian leaders obviously had agreements with the Russian Federation.

Finally, a meaningful opinion in the process of nuclear disarmament of Ukraine was expressed by a number of nuclear physics institutes and research centres. They were not combined into a single organization structure, although most of them pertained to the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. In addition to profound theoretical knowledge at that time this group had at its disposal two research reactors with a stock of

164 165

Kostenko, p. 64. For the text of this interview, see http://komariv.livejournal.com/75382.html

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weapon-grade uranium and a large inventory of highly enriched uranium used for research.166 During the whole course of nuclear disarmament nuclear scientists were retained for due diligence of government decisions: first to develop fundamental judgments on the achievable level of possession of nuclear weapons, then for the discussion of compensation for fissile material in the nuclear warheads transferred. This was the stakeholder group typically referred to by politicians and journalists when speculating on a potential nuclear weapon choice for Ukraine. This is correct from the technical standpoint: the Ukrainian research potential in the nuclear sphere has been and remains high. However, it is often omitted that ownership of inherited nuclear weapons and creation of own nuclear weapons are issues pertaining to different domains. It has been many times declared and confirmed by analyses that Ukraine, like other leading non-nuclear weapon countries such as Germany or Japan, was a threshold nation based on its nuclear expertise. Given a political decision, funding and permissive international environment Ukraine could have created nuclear explosive devices—all the more so while it still possessed weapons-grade uranium. However, no such decision was ever made, nor even considered as a possibility; no funding was allocated and no practical steps were taken. No interest was demonstrated by Ukrainian nuclear physicists in respect of the nuclear weapons inherited from the USSR. They knew nuclear explosion physics and the general schemes of explosive devices but not their specific design. They were prepared to provide expertise regarding the possibility (or, rather, impossibility) of independent reliable operation of the inherited warheads and the prospects (or, rather, lack of prospects due to high cost and complexity) for the creation of domestic nuclear arms manufacturing capabilities. Available inventories of weapons-grade and highly enriched uranium gave a theoretical opportunity to build at least one nuclear explosive device quickly but it could not qualify as a nuclear weapon deliverable to the target in combat use. In any case, nuclear physicists would not have promoted producing nuclear devices without the clear will of the political leadership and positive interest on the military side that would generate the necessary resources (money, doctrines, strategies, plans) on a never implemented nuclear program. That time nuclear institutes and centres were avoiding the military subject in discussions on nuclear disarmament: they were more interested in research aimed at civilian applications. They were not prepared to bear responsibility for military security.

166

The most valuable resource was 75 kilos of weapons-grade uranium sufficient for quick construction of a simple nuclear explosive device similar to that developed in South Africa out of approximately 60 kg of weapons-grade uranium. There were also substantial quantities of ‘weaponusable’ uranium (enriched in uranium-235 to more than 20%). Estimates of uranium quantities at that time could be found, say, in William C. Potter and Robert Nurick. The Hard Cases. Eliminating Civilian HEU in Ukraine and Belarus. The Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, July 2008, pp. 241, 260. http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/npr_15-2_potter_nurick.pdf

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The study shows that the pro-nuclear groups obviously available in Ukraine could have formed a real opposition to the non-nuclear choice if their will and ambitions had been consolidated into a coordinated stance. However, nobody wished to bother. Nothing real materialized that would go beyond idle talk. The nuclear choice had no lobby. Industrial, military and academic stakeholders had different views and interests as regards nuclear weapons. Despite all the peculiarities of the decisions finally made, all these stakeholders were consistent in their lack of interest in full control over the Soviet strategic nuclear warheads legacy; they did not want it and did not lobby for it at the political level. At the same time, they all were unanimous when it came down to the right of limited ownership of nuclear weapons as a resource that could be exchanged for something more practical, such as assurances, rights, funds, economic opportunities or simply time for the transformation of the armed forces based on the new tasks. It is important, as a lesson learned from nuclear disarmament history, to realize what it was for Ukraine: a waiver of the inherited nuclear arms per se or simply of an attempt to possess them. Based on the context of declarations and statements made in the USA, Russia and most of other countries in any way concerned, the world viewed the Ukraine nuclear disarmament process as an attempt to push the nation to the recognition that it would not be possible for it—if only by virtue of its own promises—to possess the nuclear legacy, which was ultimately recorded in the legally binding instruments within the NPT framework. Decision-makers and all involved in the process of the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine represented a mix of very different views and interests. Those who were closer to nuclear weapons and could better understand the technical aspects suggested from the beginning that it was enough to have physical control of warheads and delivery systems without trying to obtain combat control, which would have meant ability to use them. On the other side there were politicians who tried to exploit the nuclear issue for state building. The latter had to rely on technical expertise from the military, industrial and academic side. A lot of people between those poles tried to convert the nuclear arsenal into something more practical: conventional military potential, civilian nuclear energy, money, investments or international recognition. The common uniting feeling was that nuclear weapons on Ukraine’s soil were not just something foreign and accidentally placed. They symbolized a native yet hypothetical nuclear option. It was too complicated, too risky and too expensive. So it was rejected as a desirable choice from the beginning. The rest of the story was selling Ukraine’s rejection of the nuclear option to obtain international support and protection for building a modern sovereign state. The USA and Russia thought it was just selling of an accidentally placed part of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and were irritated with Ukraine’s trading-off. Ukraine for its part was irritated with the simplification of Ukraine’s options. If compensation and guarantees for denuclearization had been zero, as Russia initially suggested, then a too complicated, too risky, and too expensive nuclear option might have become the only possible one for Ukraine. In Ukraine, the “voluntary waiver of nuclear weapons” as a universal stereotype is interpreted literally: it did own them and did waive them. Neither Russia nor

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the USA appreciated Ukraine’s motivation in its tough fight for the future of the nuclear arsenal: they still believe it was an attempt on behalf of some part of ruling class and society to declare a nuclear weapon status. In fact, Ukraine claimed the ownership without possession as it was coined by the Ukrainian leadership. The prospects of full control that would have opened up a combat use opportunity or the chance to develop their own nuclear weapons was declined by all major influence groups at the early stage of decision making in late 1991–early 1992. All that followed was simply a fight for such terms of waiver that would be the most favourable to the national interest.

4 External Pressure 4.1

The Russian Factor

The politics pursued by Russia and the USA stand out for their significance among the external factors that influenced the nuclear weapons strategy for Ukraine. The Russian policy was not limited to a desire to secure the status of the sole nuclear weapon state succeeding the USSR. Moscow was looking to achieve long-term control over the pieces of the Soviet nuclear arsenal located outside its territory, including in Ukraine. According to Vadim Grechaninov, military assistant to President Leonid Kravchuk, this would have given Russia an opportunity to make a reduction in strategic delivery vehicles required under START largely at the cost of ones deployed in Ukraine, while keeping those in the status of the first strike targets until elimination, thus reducing the number of targets on Russian territory. By his evidence, a team of high-ranked civilian and military experts from Russia demanded in early January 1992 that all nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine be placed under Russian control, citing Ukraine’s inability to maintain and use nuclear weapons. Grechaninov believes that Russia’s political goal was “to keep Ukraine within its influence and in its dependence and to prevent US interference in the process of full nuclear disarmament of Ukraine”.167 The Russian control over nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine would require the country to remain in the wake of Russia’s course and would make Ukraine a hostage of the Russian policy in a crisis situation, since the decision to use strategic nuclear weapons, located in Ukraine and aimed at the US, would be made in the Russian Federation. This would have resulted in substantial restriction of Ukraine’s sovereignty in existential matters. There would be no alternative to a military political alliance with Russia, which would conflict with the intended rapprochement with the

167 Гречанінов, Вадим. Україна – країна нездійснених надій: незалежний погляд на вибір політичного курсу України. – К. Атлантична Рада України, 1999. – сс. 12–13. (Grechaninov, Vadim. Ukraine: a Nation of Delusive Hopes. An Independent View of the Choice of a Political Course for Ukraine. – K.: Atlantic Council of Ukraine, 1999. – P. 12–13.)

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West declared by Ukraine. As a motivation for its policy Russia referred to the threat to the NPT created by Ukraine aiming to warrant its membership in the “nuclear club” and a privileged status in the global system. Implementation of political decisions on the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine and agreements reached within the CIS required an appropriate contractual framework. The Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Procedure for the Transfer of Warheads from the Territory of Ukraine to Centralized Offsite Bases and Their Elimination, the Protocol and the Addendum thereto were among the earliest documents. The Agreement, signed in Moscow on 11 April 1992, charged Ukraine to “control the transfers of nuclear warheads from its territory”. Furthermore, Ukraine “jointly with the Russian Federation shall transfer the same to the centralized offsite bases in the Russian Federation for dismantling and elimination” (Article 2).168 Article 2 of the Protocol to the Agreement specified that Ukraine “shall exercise control of the dismantling and elimination of nuclear warheads removed from its territory at industrial enterprises of the Russian Federation with the involvement of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan, subject to their agreement”.169 The Addendum to the Protocol governed the procedures and activities for the control of the elimination of nuclear warheads and defined the status of observers monitoring “the dismantling of nuclear warheads into components and their elimi-

Соглашение между Российской Федерацией и Украиной “О порядке перемещения ядерных боеприпасов с территории Украины на центральные предзаводские базы Российской Федерации с целью их разукомплектации и уничтожения” // Россия и Украина. 1990–1993. Сборникдокументов /Отв. Ред. А.Загорский. – М.: МГИМО, 1996. – С. 196. Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Procedure for the Transfer of Warheads from the Territory of Ukraine to Centralised Offsite Bases and Their Elimination // Russia and Ukraine. 1990–1993. Collected Documents / Publishing editor A. Zagorsky. –M.: MGIMO, 1996. – P. 196. 169 Протокол к соглашению между Российской Федерацией и Украиной “О порядке перемещения ядерных боеприпасов с территории Украины на центральные предзаводские базы Российской Федерации с целью их разукомплектации и уничтожения» о порядке контроля за уничтожением ядерных боеприпасов, вывозимых с территории Украины, на предприятиях промышленности Российской Федерации” // Россия-Украина. – 1990-1993. Сборникдокументов. – С. 201. (Protocol to the Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Procedure for the Transfer of Warheads from the Territory of Ukraine to Centralised Offsite Bases and Their Elimination concerning the Monitoring of Elimination at Industrial Sites of the Russian Federation of Nuclear Ammunition Transferred from the Territory of Ukraine // Russia and Ukraine. 1990–1993. Collected Documents – P. 201). 168

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nation and the removal and dismantling of the payload”.170,171 These issues had a political dimension. Ukraine was involved in the control processes and mechanisms and thus gained additional opportunities to influence the attitudes of its partners— mainly Russia. The problem of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament, that largely shaped the relationships between the two countries, was in the focus of attention during the high-level meetings and discussions, including summits. Some key issues were successfully addressed in the bilateral format. The negotiations between the leaders of Ukraine and Russia in Dagomys resulted in the Agreement Betweenthe Russian Federation and Ukraine on Further Development of Interstate Relationships signed on 23 June 1992. Article 11 of this Agreement obliged both states to comply with Strategic Nuclear Force Treaties and included their consent to continue consultations to achieve accord on the performance of START, the Lisbon Protocol and Strategic Nuclear Force Treaties.172 The Joint Communiqué signed as the result of negotiations between state delegations of Ukraine and Russia on 15 January 1993 in Moscow confirmed “the intention of Russia and Ukraine to continue efforts towards reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons”.173 Under the Communiqué Leonid Kravchuk, while welcoming the ratification of START by the Russian Parliament, “confirmed the resolve of Ukraine also to ratify these documents”. The Presidents of Russia and Ukraine instructed their governments to begin negotiations on implementation of START, “specifically the conditions for the dismantling, transport and elimination of nuclear warheads and components of strategic nuclear missile systems deployed in Ukraine including the

170 Приложение к Протоколу между Российской Федерацией и Украиной “О порядке контроля за уничтожением ядерных боеприпасов, вывозимых с территории Украины, на предприятиях промышленности Российской Федерации” о процедурах и деятельности по контролю за уничтожением ядерных боеприпасов на предприятиях промышленности Российской Федерации // Россия-Украина. – 1990-1993. Сборникдокументов. – С. 204–205 (Addendum on Procedures and Activities to Monitor Elimination at Industrial Sites of the Russian Federation of Nuclear Ammunition to the Protocol between the Russian Federation and Ukraine concerning the Monitoring of Elimination at Industrial Sites of the Russian Federation of Nuclear Ammunition Transferred from the Territory of Ukraine // Russia and Ukraine. 1990–1993.Collected Documents.– P. 204–205) 171 Соглашение между Российской Федерацией и Украиной о дальнейшем развитиии межгосударственных отношений // Россия-Украина. 1990–1993. Сборникдокументов. – С. 38. (Agreement between Russian Federation and Ukraine on Further Development of Interstate Relations. Russia and Ukraine.1990–1993. Collected Documents. –P. 38). 172 Ibid. 173 Совместное коммюнике о встрече государственных делегаций Российской Федерации и Украины, возглавляемых президентом Российской Федерации Б.Н.Ельциным и президентом Украины Л.М.Кравчуком // Россия-Украина. 1990–1993. – Сборникдокументов. – С. 42. (Joint Communique of the Meeting of State Delegations of the Russian Federation and Ukraine Lead by President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin and President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk // Russia and Ukraine. 1990–1993. Collected Documents.–P. 42.)

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matters pertaining to the reprocessing of nuclear components for use as fuel for Ukrainian NPPs”.174 Negotiations in September 1993 ended up with a number of bilateral instruments on disposal of nuclear warheads and compensation to Ukraine for nuclear material recovered from the warheads, including the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on Disposal of Nuclear Warheads. Per Article 2 of the Agreement the Russian Federation “shall provide for the disposal of nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine” and “shall ensure the reprocessing of highly enriched uranium recovered from nuclear warheads disposal into low enriched uranium to be used in fuel assemblies for Ukrainian nuclear power plants or for other peaceful purposes”.175 Nuclear fuel supply was made conditional upon implementation of IAEA safeguards for Ukrainian nuclear activity. General Principles for the Disposal of Nuclear Warheads of Strategic Nuclear Forces Deployed in Ukraine were signed at the same time as the mentioned Agreement. In accordance with the General Principles, 50 metric tons of highly enriched uranium recovered from nuclear warheads stationed in Ukraine were to be reprocessed into low enriched uranium on Russian territory. The project implementation mechanism assumed that Russia would supply “fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants”.176 The issue of weapons-grade plutonium recovered from strategic nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine was viewed separately. The General Principles specified that it would be “stored in the Russian Federation until the parties decide on its disposal”, while Ukraine would be compensated for the cost of weapons-grade plutonium based on its implementation. Fuel was supposed to be supplied to Ukrainian NPPs “based on annual contracts between executive authorities of the Parties”. It was more difficult to address Russia’s compensation to Ukraine for the cost of fissile material recovered from tactical nuclear warheads transferred from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. This only happened after the execution of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation signed in Kyiv on 31 May 1997. The agreement between the two governments

174

Ibid. P. 43. Соглашение между правительством Российской Федерации и правительством Украины об утилизации ядерных боезарядов // Россия-Украина. 1990–1993. Сборникдокументов. – С. 208. (Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on Disposal of Nuclear Warheads // Russia and Ukraine. 1990–1993. Collected Documents.–P. 208.) 176 Основные принципы утилизации ядерных боезарядов стратегических ядерных сил, дислоцированных в Украине // Россия-Украина. 1990–1993. – Сборникдокументов. – С. 210. (Main Principles of Disposal of Nuclear Warheads of Strategic Forces Stationed in Ukraine // Russia and Ukraine. 1990–1993.Collected Documents.–P. 210.) 175

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on the offset of the debt for energy resources against material supplied was signed on 30 October 1997. Under this agreement, the cost of fissile material from tactical nuclear warheads removed from Ukraine to the Russian Federation throughout 1991–1992 was 450 million US dollars. The cost of the fissile material to be compensated by Russia was to be offset against the 250.170 million US dollars of Ukrainian debt to Russia for the supplies of oil, petroleum products and other resources in 1993–1994. Based on the agreement, Russia was supposed to write off additionally US$199.82 million of Ukraine’s sovereign debt on government loans issued by Russia to Ukraine in 1992–1993, accrued as of 1 January 1998, as compensation for fissile material from tactical nuclear warheads transferred from Ukraine to Russia throughout 1991–1992.177 There is no doubt that compensation received by Ukraine for fissile material from nuclear warheads transferred to Russia was the result of a compromise and only partly reflected its full market value. Supply of nuclear fuel for Ukrainian NPPs in compensation for nuclear material transferred from Ukraine to Russia continued until 1999 and played an important role in the successful operation of the Ukrainian power sector in the period of hardships.178 The share of NPPs in Ukrainian power generation was growing to reach 43.9% by 1998. Secure supplies of NPP fuel were important for the Ukrainian industry and social sector since Ukraine, being technologically bound to the Russian fuel cycle ever since the Soviet era, could not convert quickly to other types of fuel assemblies, while lack of funding created a barrier for either procurement of fuel from Russia or establishing a domestic fuel cycle (this would also have raised objections of the partners from the nuclear proliferation risk perspective). Russia, in its turn, successfully hampered the attempts of Ukraine to diversify power supplies or to create its own fuel cycle based on Western technologies, and thus had strong leverage over Kyiv. On 3 September 1993, Russia and Ukraine entered into the agreement on warranty and designer’s supervision over operation of strategic missile systems in their respective territories, which was signed in Yalta and was a response to problems with the safe operation and maintenance of such systems that occurred after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.179 This mutually beneficial agreement 177 Угода між Урядом Російської Федерації та Урядом України про взаємний залік заборгованості за поставлені енергетичні ресурси та за матеріали, що розщеплюються / Україна-Росія 1990-2000рр. Документи та матеріали. МЗС України. МЗС Російської Федерації. - К., 2001. - С.514–515. (The Agreement between the Government of Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on the mutual accountion of the supplied energy resources and the fissile materials/Ukraine-Russia 1990–2000.Documents and materials of the MFA of Ukraine. MFA of Russian Federation. –Kyiv, 2001. –P.514–515) 178 Den. – 1999.– 12 March. –P.4. 179 Соглашение между Российской Федерацией и Украиной о порядке осуществления гарантийного и авторского надзора за эксплуатацией стратегических ракетных комплексов стратегических сил, расположенных на их территориях / Россия-Украина. 1990–1993. Сборникдокументов. – С.212–214. (Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Warranty and Designer’s Supervision over Operation of Strategic Missile Systems in Their Territories / Russia and Ukraine. 1990–1993. Collected Documents. – P.212–214.0

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facilitated safe dismantling of missile systems located in Ukraine; furthermore, it ensured combat effectiveness and safety of systems deployed in Russia since many of the designers and manufacturers of these systems remained in Ukraine (inter alia, the Southern Machine-Building Plant of Dnepropetrovsk who manufactured the world’s largest ballistic missiles SS-18, or Satan in the Western classification). The foreign policy concept approved by the Parliament of Ukraine on 2 July 1993 declared Ukraine to be “the owner of nuclear weapons inherited form the ex-USSR”, emphasizing that “Ukraine will never sanction its use” and “confirms its intent to become a non-nuclear weapon state in the future”. Elimination of nuclear arms on Ukrainian territory was made conditional upon “reliable national security guarantees” issued by nuclear weapon states and the international community.180 In his comment on the concept President Leonid Kravchuk stressed that it did not name Ukraine a nuclear weapon state but just treated nuclear weapons in its territory as Ukrainian property and that Ukraine should become a non-nuclear weapon state.181 The unilateral decision of Russia to dissolve the CIS Joint Strategic Force Command was one of the factors that escalated the Ukraine nuclear disarmament situation. This was done in violation of the Minsk Accords on the CIS Strategic Forces of 30 December 1991 which could “be terminated by resolution of member states or the Council of Commonwealth States”.182 In its statement of 19 August 1993 the Ukrainian government criticized Russia for violation of the Minsk Accords by dissolving the CIS Joint Strategic Force Command which made the Accords void for Ukraine and Russia.183 The Ukrainian government stressed that Russia was seeking to establish control over special storage facilities with nuclear warheads on the territory of Ukraine and that it had stopped the supply of spare parts for the maintenance of these warheads.184 The origins of this conflict were in the vision of Ukraine by the Russian elite, magnified through a glass of the nuclear weapons problem. The Russian elite saw the Russian Federation to be the only legal heir of the USSR as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. As the first shock over the dissolution of the USSR settled down the Russian expert community, military elite and Foreign Ministry made one step after the other towards their goal: to ensure the nuclear weapon status for the Russian Federation. In this context Ukraine was treated as a key to achieving this goal, due to its economic potential, strong nuclear sector, and a fair portion of the Soviet nuclear potential deployed on its territory.

Holos Ukrayiny. – 1993. – 24 July. – P.3. Kyiv Leader Backs Parliament on A-Arms // Washington Post. – 1993. – July 7. – P.A-11; Ukraine Today. – 1993. – July 30. – P. 13. 182 Соглашение между государствами-участниками Содружества независимых государств по Стратегическим силам / Нераспространение ядерного оружия. Сборникдокументов. – М.:Международные отношения, 1993. – С. 228.(Agreement between Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the Status of Strategic Forces / Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Collected Documents. – M.: International Relations, 1993. – P. 228.) 183 Ukraine Today. – 1993. – August 11. – P. 3. 184 RFЕ-RL-Daily Report. – 1993. – August 20. 180 181

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Beginning with the earliest decisions made within the CIS framework the Russian Federation demonstrated proactive behaviour, offering its drafts for the crucial documents based on the national interests of Russia whose conceptualization occurred in parallel. To this end Russia played on the concerns of the global community—mainly the USA—over potential loss of centralized control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and emergence of new nuclear weapon states. This special treatment of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in the area of nuclear non-proliferation unavoidably brought this problem into the focus of bilateral relations.

4.2

Role of the USA and the EU in Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament

The United States was the second key player influencing the Ukrainian nuclear weapons policy. In the context of where strategic systems deployed in Ukraine were targeted predominantly at the USA, loss of control of these weapons or emergence of another (apart from Moscow) nuclear weapons decision-making centre in the ex-USSR would have much complicated the overall strategic situation and potentially created new challenges and threats for the USA. Another nuclear weapon state could become a precedent for Kazakhstan and other potential nuclear proliferators, which was a threat for the existing non-proliferation regime and the NPT as its fundamental instrument. On dissolution of the USSR the United States remained the only superpower, but besides the advantages Washington received a new level of responsibility and new problems. In realization that the crash of the bipolar system and disintegration of the USSR would cause escalation of proliferation threats the USA assumed an active role as a guarantor of control over the ex-Soviet nuclear arsenal. The prevention of emergence of new nuclear weapon states became a new imperative for the White House’s foreign policy. In the opinion of Washington, the collapse of the Soviet Union both undermined the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime and created a potential threat of a conflict between the newly independent states. James Baker, the US Secretary of State in the administration of George Bush (Sr.) recalled that in a meeting with the President on 4 September 1991, prior to a visit to the USSR, it was obvious that “the nuclear weapons issue was much more important for the President than politics or economy” [8]. This was the main issue during his visit to the Soviet Union. In the course of negotiations, James Baker stated that Washington “did not wish an increase of the number of nuclear weapon states”. According to Mr. Baker, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin and the Soviet Defence Minister Evgeniy Shaposhnikov assured him that single control over all nuclear weapons would be retained.185 On the other hand, James Baker also mentioned that the Western concern over the future of the Soviet 185

Ibid., pp. 527, 533.

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nuclear weapons was actively exploited by regional leaders seeking to get US support.186 During his trip to the decaying Soviet Union in December 1991, James Baker had meetings with the leaders of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan and pointed out their “strong desire to satisfy the United States”.187 Leaders of the three republics wished to gain Washington’s support for their national independence and to counterbalance the immense influence of Russia. At that time, however, the USA was not prepared to expand constructive relations with all potential actors. The prevailing trend was to approach the relations with the new states through the prism of relations with Russia that was seen to be the only possible successor to the USSR as a nuclear weapon state and the “guarantor of democratic reforms”. The Russian expert on America Anatoliy Utkin believed that “in 1992–1993 the US administration assisted Russia in the takeover of strategic weapons”. He believed that was “a matter of life instinct: the US and Russia approached the CIS along parallel tracks wishing not to become hostage to immature political actors”.188 It was cooperation between these states that predetermined the final result: denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The ultimate dissolution of the USSR at the end of December 1991 stirred up the US efforts towards the retention of centralized control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. During James Baker’s visit to Moscow on 29 January 1992 Boris Yeltsin stated that he considered the feasibility of disabling strategic missiles stationed in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan during their maintenance.189 The interests of Russia and the USA were close, so James Baker wrote unequivocally that from the US perspective “Russia became the successor state to the USSR”, whereas the US “had a vital interest in guaranteeing that there was only one nuclear weapon state remaining after the split of the Soviet Union”. Furthermore, the US saw a potential for conflict in the relationships between Russia and other ex-Soviet republics and it “did not want states having such conflicts to be in the state of nuclear confrontation with each other”.190 After the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine and the associated independence referendum in Ukraine on 1 December 1991 the United States monitored nuclear weapons in the dissolving Soviet Union even closer, making their policy for Ukraine contingent upon the attitude of Ukrainian leaders to nuclear weapons. After the Belavezha and Alma-Ata accords these efforts became more focused and insistent. According to Ukrainian General Vadim Grechaninov, already in late December 1991 Washington initiated a number of meetings between Ukraine, Russia and

186

Ibid., p. 537. Ibid., p.583. 188 Уткин А.И. Американская стратегия для ХХI века. – М.: Логос, 2000. – С.103. (Utkin, A. American Strategy for the twenty-first Century. – M.: Logos, 2000. – P.103.) 189 Baker, J.A., Frank D. & Thomas M. ( 1995) The Politics of Diplomacy. Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992. G.P. Putman’s Sons. J.A., p. 621. 190 Ibid., p. 658. 187

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the USA where the United States offered financial aid for the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine.191 In a series of contacts Ukrainian leaders assured the USA of their firm intent to get rid of nuclear weapons. During a meeting between the US Secretary of State James Baker and the newly elected President of Ukraine in Kyiv on 18 December 1991 Leonid Kravchuk stated that Ukraine was ready to accede to the NPT and would welcome American technical assistance for safe storage, transport and elimination of nuclear weapons located in its territory, and that in the meantime the weapons would be removed from combat duty.192 A special team known as the “Un-Group” (a group that does not exist), including representatives of the Department of State, NSC, law enforcements and the Department of Energy, was created in the George Bush (Sr.) administration to address the legal succession problem for START. An option offered by the Group, called by James Baker “an elegant solution”, assumed signing of a protocol to START between the USA and four ex-Soviet states having nuclear weapons on their territories. By this protocol they would become parties to the Treaty. Apart from an implementation mechanism for the Treaty the protocol should have reserved the nuclear weapon status for Russia and triggered the accession of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. James Baker proposed the idea of the protocol to the President of Ukraine and received Leonid Kravchuk’s consent on 17 April 1992.193 James Baker pointed out that the United States had been looking to demonstrate political support for Ukraine and Kazakhstan during the visits of their Presidents to Washington in May 1992. He treated the position of Ukraine as a key to addressing the nuclear weapons problem in the hope that Kazakhstan would follow its example. President Leonid Kravchuk was reluctant to make legally binding commitments regarding the nuclear weapons elimination timeline referring to the prerogative of the Parliament and demanded security guarantees. James Baker had 8 telephone conversations with the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko between 28 April and 4 May 1992 discussing the protocol and the letter of Leonid Kravchuk to President George Bush. The Secretary sought to persuade Kyiv to waive the demand for “international control” over the elimination of nuclear weapons located in Ukraine. Anatoliy Zlenko referred to the position of President Kravchuk and the Parliament as an excuse. After James Baker hinted that Ukraine was running the risk of losing US support Zlenko said he had failed to contact the Ukrainian President. Finally Ukraine gave the consent sought for, which, by Baker’s estimate, “isolated Nazarbayev”, so the Kazakh President “had nowhere to go” and consented to the signature of the Lisbon Protocol.194

Гречанінов В. Україна - країна нездійсненних надій. С. Baker, J.A., Frank D. & Thomas M. ( 1995) The Politics of Diplomacy. Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992. G.P. Putman's Sons. -F, p. 583. 193 Ibid., p. 660–661. 194 Ibid., p. 662–664. 191 192

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The following episode preceding the signing of the Lisbon Protocol serves to illustrate the leading role of the USA in the Ukraine nuclear disarmament process. Before the Protocol signing ceremony James Baker urged the Ukrainian foreign minister Anatoliy Zlenko and the Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev to settle their discrepancies. Under the Secretary’s pressure agreement was finally achieved, but the signature ceremony continued “in a quiet and harsh atmosphere”. Yet, the main thing, according to James Baker, was that the US “achieved their goal: there would be only one nuclear weapon state in the ex-Soviet Union territory”.195 Such activity of Washington in determining the future of the Soviet nuclear arsenal outside the Russian Federation triggered a sharp reaction from the Kremlin. This could be evidenced by the written statement of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev during the execution of the Lisbon Protocol on 23 May 1992. In his comment on the letters of the Belarusian, Ukrainian and Kazakh leaders to the US President the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry stressed that the Russian Federation acted on the assumption that the same commitments were made in respect of “all other parties to START”.196 The signature of the Lisbon Protocol was just the first step towards addressing the problem of ex-USSR nuclear weapons. Ukraine’s accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state turned out to be a more difficult task for US diplomacy. Besides, the US administration changed as a result of the 1992 presidential elections and it took the team of President Bill Clinton some time to enter the negotiation process and develop their own, more flexible, policy with respect to Ukraine. The systematic stance of Ukraine regarding nuclear weapons was first declared by President Kravchuk in his speech before the Davos International Forum at the beginning of 1993. He stressed that Ukraine as a successor state to the USSR had the right to become nuclear but that “it chose the course leading to the non-nuclear weapon status”, and therefore “Ukraine had a moral right to request guarantees of its national security from nuclear states” given in the form of a “legally binding political instrument” that would include commitments of these states not to use nuclear or conventional weapons against Ukraine, not to apply the threat of force, to refrain from economic coercion in addressing disputes and to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine”.197 These conditions, being quite moderate and reasonable, did not find support in the West. A pressure campaign applied subsequently by both the West and Russia was counterproductive and only caused the hardening of the attitude of the Ukrainian Parliament and the draggingout of the issue. The West in general and the USA in particular did not believe Ukraine was ready to make a pro-nuclear choice and interpreted the conditions presented by Kravchuk as preparation for a trade-off. Accordingly, the steps of the West towards the

195

Ibid., p. 665. Written Statement by the Russian side at the signing of the Protocol to the START Treaty on 23 May 1992 in Lisbon // Arms Control Today. – June 1992. – Vol.22. – No. 5. – P.36. 197 Holos Ukrayiny. – 1993. – 4 February. – P.3. 196

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Ukrainian expectations were often formal. Western leaders were looking for actual measures that would guarantee the rapid and controlled disarmament of Ukraine. Real US resources were channelled to Ukraine through the Nunn-Lugar Program, while the demand for guarantees received a nominal response in the form of the Budapest Memorandum, a non-legally binding assurance by nuclear states, which did not go beyond the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolutions. The motives referred to by the West when rejecting large-scale economic aid or legally binding security guarantees for Ukraine was reluctance to turn nuclear weapons into a “recognized barter instrument”, which, according to Western experts, would allow using the Ukrainian precedent in the future to blackmail the international community and to seek a high price for the waiver of nuclear weapons [9]. However, based on this logic, the states challenged with a choice would rather decide they would not be secure without nuclear weapons. The Democratic administration of Bill Clinton continuously rated the problem of the USSR nuclear legacy as a top priority. According to Robert Gallucci, US Deputy Secretary of State for political issues, the primary task for the United States regarding the non-proliferation was the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine “to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, their performance of START and safe transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia” [10]. During the first months of 1993 the politics of the Clinton administration regarding Ukraine was driven by inertia in approaches to goals and methods inherited from the previous administration. Making no allowance for the national interests of Ukraine, Washington was seeking to make Kyiv perform its declared intentions to get rid of nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Seeing the counter-productivity of the pressure policy the Democratic administration entered into an active dialogue with Ukraine in late 1993 and engaged in addressing a number of key issues as a party to a series of arrangements of which the most important was the Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the United States, Russia and Ukraine, adopted on 14 January 1994 in Moscow198 that unlocked the process of nuclear arms transfer from Ukraine. The ratification of START-1199 by the Ukrainian Parliament on 18 November 1993 with reservations caused an abnormally harsh response of Russia and the West who accused Ukraine of non-performance of obligations, which, however, rested on no legal grounds. In its decree the Parliament referred to domestic laws and the Vienna Convention on Succession. Pressure and threats of isolation of and sanctions against Ukraine appealed against individual statements of Ukrainian politicians rather than official contractual instruments. The only provision in which Kyiv stepped away from its previous declaration was the refusal to immediately submit

Тристороння заява Президентів Ураїни, США та Росії 15 січня 1994 року // Украна і Росія. 1999–2000 (Trilateral Statement of Presidents of Ukraine, the USA and Russia of 14 January 1994 // Ukraine and Russia. 1990–2000. – P. 242–243.) http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ 998_300 199 With all the protocols and addenda, including the Lisbon Protocol. 198

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to article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol contemplating the speedy accession of Ukraine to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. The remaining conditions of the Parliament should be viewed as an attempt to protect the national interests of Ukraine, including through security guarantees from nuclear weapon states.200 There is an interesting assessment of these events given by the Kazakh researcher Marat Laumulin. He believed that the attempts of Russia and the USA to strike a deal over the head of other states “smelled a dictatorship so, naturally, they caused opposition”, whereas Ukraine “openly confronted this policy;” continuous intimidation of ex-Soviet republics “made an impression that Russia was getting back on the track of the former imperial policy” [11]. Some democratically minded experts in Russia admitted that the pressure campaign against Ukraine was an obviously inadequate response of the nuclear weapon states to Ukraine’s waiver of nuclear weapons. Alexey Arbatov, a known Russian expert on nuclear armaments, criticized Russia, the USA and other nuclear weapon states saying they had to provide with Ukraine the assurances against nuclear or conventional aggression, should have guaranteed its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and should have waived economic coercion.201 The European Union played an important role at this stage, interpreting the refusal of the Ukrainian Parliament to fully ratify the Lisbon Protocol as a “nonproliferation crisis in Ukraine”202 and thus taking a hard line over nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. The stance of the EU nuclear weapon states—the UK and France— largely defined the EU policy in respect of the emerging nuclear states not being part to the NPT: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The factors that influenced the EU approach for the Ukrainian nuclear legacy included the following. First of all, the partition of the Soviet nuclear arsenal between four states enhanced the potential for broad proliferation of nuclear weapons and endangered the nuclear non-proliferation regime; secondly, the geographical proximity of Belarusian and Ukrainian states aggravated concerns over the presence of nuclear material in these countries. These concerns were stirred, on the one hand, by a lack of understanding of how the responsibilities for the security of the storage and transport of this material would be allocated, what the destiny of the decaying Soviet nuclear submarine fleet would be, and how to prevent the uncontrolled proliferation of Постанова Верховної Ради України Про ратифікацію Договору між Союзом Радянських Соціалістичних Республік і Сполученими Штатами Америки про скорочення і обмеження стратегічних наступальних озброєнь, підписаного уМоскві 31 липня 1991 року, і Протоколу до нього, підписаного у Лісабоні 23 травня 1992 року. 18 листопада 1993 року / УкраїнаРосія. 1990–2000 рр. – С. 217–219. (The Decree of the Parliament of Ukraine On Ratification of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 and the Protocol Thereto Signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992. 18 November 1993 / Ukraine and Russia. 1990–2000. – P. 217–219.) 201 Moscow News. – 1995. – P. А4. 202 Portela, C. The EU’s Evolving Responses to Nuclear Proliferation Crises: From Incentives to Sanctions // Non-Proliferation Papers. – 2015. – July, No. 46 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/ files/EUNPC_no-46.pdf 200

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technology, special knowledge and nuclear material. On the other hand, there was concern over a potential catastrophic accident of Soviet nuclear reactors in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Ukraine [12]. Lastly, there were assumptions regarding potential local military conflicts within these countries or even between them. The fact that the proponents of nuclear weapons in Ukraine were the patriotic—nationalist, in the EU interpretation—political forces only aggravated the negative sentiments about the suspension of arms transfer by Ukraine pending economic assistance and security assurances. The EU was entirely supportive of the US efforts and also applied strong pressure on the Ukrainian leaders.203 On the other hand, the European Union was interested in preservation of an independent, economically and politically stable Ukraine as a buffer between Western Europe and Russia. According to European experts, the nuclear issue was only part of a problem, as far as this strategy was concerned.204 In order to address the host of associated issues the EU developed a special document, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine, signed on 14 June 1994 and entering into force on 1 March 1998,205 that covered the full range of economic and political relations with Ukraine, either emerging or evolving. The desire of Kyiv to join the European integration processes, as was declared in the fundamental documents of the independent Ukrainian state, gave the Union good leverage against Ukraine and its leaders. For example, the execution and ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement per se was used as a trading tool. On the one hand, the EU was propping up the process of rapprochement between Ukraine and the Western world and creating a system for “Ukraine’s return to Europe”. Although this document was not the main incentive for Ukraine to sign the Lisbon Protocol it complemented the US efforts and played an important role in achieving success. The Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the United States, Russia and Ukraine adopted following their meeting in Moscow on 14 January 1994206 was a breakthrough towards the resolution of the Ukraine nuclear arms problem. It was preceded by the US–Ukraine talks in Boryspil on 12 January 1994, during a brief visit of US President Bill Clinton to Ukraine. These talks unlocked the situation with Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. The document indicated that Kyiv had succeeded in making Washington a party to the dispute between Ukraine and Russia concerning the future of the part of the Soviet nuclear arsenal stationed in Ukraine. This

From a speech at the round table discussion “Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine: Outcomes and Lessons Learned” in Odessa Non-Proliferation Centre on 27 April 2016. 204 Boyer Y., Carle C., Krause J., Müller H., Van Orden G. Europe and the Challenge of Proliferation // Chaillot Paper. – 1996. – No. 24, May. – Р. 34 http://www.iss.europa.eu/de/publikationen/ detail/article/europe-and-the-challenge-of-proliferation/ 205 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine. http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText¼yes& treatyTransId¼659 206 Тристороння Заява Президентів України, США та Росії від 14 січня 1994 року // Україна-Росія. 1990–2000 рр. – С.242–243. Trilateral Statement, Op. cit. In Ref. 202. 203

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document, political by its essence, gave non-legally binding security assurances for Ukraine. The Statement referred to the provision of “fair and timely compensation to Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus as the nuclear warheads on their territory are transferred to Russia for dismantling”.207 Implementation of the tasks specified in the Statement was governed by the Addendum. It defined that Russia would supply nuclear fuel for Ukrainian NPPs, containing 100 tons of low enriched uranium, within 10 months in exchange for 200 nuclear warheads transferred to Russia for dismantling. The US would allocate US$60 million as an advance payment against future sale of highly enriched uranium. Ukraine promised by that time to deactivate all RS-22 (SS-24) missiles by the Pavlograd plant deployed in its territory.208 In assessing the Statement it should be noted that it was the result of a compromise requiring significant concessions on the part of Kyiv. The leaders of the state and top Ukrainian diplomats managed to break away from the artificial insulation created by most influential nuclear states, to make the USA a party to the Ukrainian-Russian rivalry over nuclear weapons located in Ukraine, and to make prerequisites for the final stage of this process to occur. The Trilateral Statement removed the reservations of the Parliament concerning ratification of START dated 18 November 1993, and inter alia the qualifications regarding Article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol obliging Ukraine to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.209 The parliamentary resolution signified the broader consensus between the executive and the legislative branches. President Leonid Kravchuk assured the Parliament that in case the signatory states failed to favour the terms of the Trilateral Statement Ukraine would cease the actions provided for in that document.210 The signing of the Statement opened the avenues for comprehensive resolution of the problem, although at that time Ukraine was challenged by political differences occurring domestically in an attempt to find an optimum approach to the problem—

207

Ibid. Додаток до Тристоронньої Заяви Президентів України, США та Росії від 14 січня 1994 року //Україна-Росія. 1990–2000 рр.. – С. 244. (Addendum to the Trilateral Statement, op. cit. in Ref. 202, p. 244.) 209 Постанова Верховної Ради України “Про виконання Президентом України та Урядом України рекомендацій, що містяться в пункті 11 Постанови Верховної Ради України “Про ратифікацію Договору між Союзом Радянських Соціалістичних Республік і Сполученими Штатами Америки про скорочення і обмеження стратегічних наступальних озброєнь, підписаного у Москві 31 липня 1991 року, і Протоколу до нього, підписаного у Лісабоні від імені України 23 травня 1992 року”. 3 лютого 1994 року // Україна-Росія. 1990–2000 рр. – С. 245–246. (The Decree of the Parliament of Ukraine On Implementation by President of Ukraine and the Government of Ukraine of Recommendations in Paragraph 11 of the Decree of the Parliament of Ukraine “On Ratification of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 and the Protocol Thereto Signed on Behalf of Ukraine in Lisbon on 23 May 199200 . 3 February 1994 // Ukraine and Russia. 1990–2000. – P. 245–246.) 210 Holos Ukrayiny. – 1994. – 6 February. – P. 2. 208

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this has been discussed previously. The internal discussion on nuclear arms in Ukraine was construed by the West as an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate after all important arguments in the dispute were lost (particularly after the tactical nuclear weapons were removed from the country). Russia was only irritated by the discussion since Kyiv was not seen as an independent player in the game between Moscow and Washington. Kyiv used this discussion to manoeuvre and to find more arguments in favour of additional compensation and enhanced security guarantees in exchange for the waiver of nuclear weapons.

5 Non-Nuclear Choice 5.1

Accession to the NPT

By postponing the decision to accede to the NPT Kyiv pushed itself into a timesensitive situation. The resolution was passed by the Parliament of Ukraine on the eve of the OSCE Budapest Meeting and a few months before the New York Conference of 1995 to decide on the final destiny of the NPT. The executive authorities headed by President Leonid Kuchma tried hard to persuade the Parliament that any further delay would cause severe consequences for Ukraine. In his speech before the Parliament on 16 November 1994 in the session called to discuss the accession of Ukraine to the NPT President Leonid Kuchma said, “Today, Ukraine does not have a choice between the nuclear or the non-nuclear status”. Having enumerated the steps undertaken by the legislative authorities (beginning with the Declaration of National Sovereignty) and efforts of the executive authorities towards the non-nuclear weapon status the Ukrainian President spoke about the material expense of Ukraine’s attempt to retain nuclear weapons. He argued that safe storage of nuclear weapons would cost US$30 billion and another US$160–200 billion within 10 years to set up a closed nuclear warhead production cycle.211 It is not exactly clear how these numbers were derived. The President’s arguments regarding the difficulty of creating a nuclear test pit looked more reasonable; use of test pits of other states and maintenance of nuclear weapons would make Ukraine, according to its President, “so much dependent on other nuclear states—Russia in the first place—that any independence or sovereignty will be ruled out”. Leonid Kuchma emphasized that the timing for the decision was very poor since contextually Ukraine’s decision determined the progress of nuclear disarmament at the international scale. “If we decide to negotiate with the international community this is the most inappropriate time and the most inappropriate Про приєднання України до Договору про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї від 1968 року. Виступ президента Леоніда Кучми на сесії Верховної Ради 16 листопада 1994 року // Голос України. – 1994. – 18 листопада. – С. 3.(On the Accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968. Speech of President Leonid Kuchmaat the Parliamentary Session on 16 November 1994 // HolosUkrayiny. – 1994. – 18 November. – P. 3.) 211

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subject of negotiations”.212 The Ukrainian President implied that given the situation the rejection by Ukraine of accession to the NPT on the eve of the 1995 NewYork Conference would threaten to disrupt its prolongation and to undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime and, thus, could provoke even harsher treatment of Ukraine by the international community. On 16 November 1994, the Parliament of Ukraine passed the Law On Accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968. The Law contained a number of reservations. The first of them specified that the provisions of the NPT “did not fully cover the unique situation resulting from the dissolution of the nuclear weapon state: the USSR”. Seeking to protect the financial interests of Ukraine the Law provided that “Ukraine was the owner of the nuclear weapons it inherited from the ex-USSR” and that “after dismantling and elimination of these weapons under control of Ukraine” it would be using them “solely for peaceful purposes”.213 Paragraph 4 contained an essential reservation. It provided that “any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity, inviolability of borders or political independence of Ukraine by any nuclear weapon state or use of economic coercion... will be treated by Ukraine as an exceptional circumstance endangering its best interests”.214 Note that this language refers to the NPT Article Х, which defines terms and conditions for withdrawal from the Treaty. “Exceptional circumstances” included not only threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine but also use of economic coercion designed to restrict its sovereignty. Russia was the chief intended recipient of this reservation: a large degree of economic dependence on this country made Ukraine vulnerable to economic coercion. In the light of post-2014 events this document gains new significance. Submission by Ukraine of ratification instruments both for NPT and START-1 took place on 5 December 1994 during the OSCE (then CSCE) Summit in Budapest. From that date both the Treaties entered into force for Ukraine. Ukraine obtained in exchange international recognition as a responsible actor and, as described above, some economic and financial compensation. During the Summit Ukraine also got written security assurances from nuclear weapon states known as the Budapest Memorandum.

212

Ibid. Закон України “Про приєднання України до Договору про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї від 1 липня 1968 року” // Ядерне законодавство. Збірник нормативно-правових актів. / Ред. Ю.С.Шемшученко. – Київ: Ін Юре, 1998. – С.366–367.The Law of Ukraine On Accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 // Nuclear Law. Collected Regulations. / Editor Y. Shemshuchenko. – Kyiv: In Jure, 1998. – P. 366–367. 214 Ibid. 213

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The Budapest Memorandum and Security Assurances for Ukraine

In discussing security assurance options available to Ukraine in the early 1990s the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Anatoliy Zlenko writes in his memoirs that the basic position of the Ukrainian side was to receive the binding guarantees of the US and other P5 states in signing the disarmament agreement. The main concern was that Russia would attempt at the parts of Ukrainian territory, such as Crimea, so the Ukrainian MFA was very fond of idea to obtain certain defense promises (or non-use of weapons promises) from all P5 states. However, the Americans firmly rejected the project of the binding guarantees treaty, having substituted it with the political security assurances which didn’t have to pass the ratification in the US Senate.215 The Budapest Memorandum, underpinning the appropriate assurances of further security for Ukraine, was signed on 5 December 1994. Apart from Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, the text of the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons216 was signed in Budapest by the presidents of three nuclear weapon nations: the USA, the UK and the Russian Federation. It is therefore only these nations that have provided written security assurances to Ukraine. On 19 December 1994 the Memorandum was sent by a joint letter of the representatives of four countries to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Thus, the Memorandum was registered as a legal UN document. At that time the USA, the UK, the Russian Federation and Ukraine were represented in the UN accordingly by Madeleine Albright, David Hannay, Sergey Lavrov and Anatoliy Zlenko, who signed the joint letter.217 Similar memoranda were signed the same day with Kazakhstan and Belarus. These two, unlike the Ukrainian one, have never been registered in the United Nations. The Budapest Memorandum does not have signatures of leaders of the other two nuclear weapon nations: France and China, who thus are not parties to the Memorandum. France and China made verbal statement and provided Ukraine with diplomatic notes expressing in general terms support for the language of the Budapest Memorandum. The Budapest Memorandum repeated and extended the wording of the preamble of the NPT. Concerning non-nuclear weapon states, there are only security

215 Зленко А.М. Дипломаттія і політика. Україна в процесі динамічних геополітичних змін. – Харків: Фоліо, 2003.- P.359. (Zlenko A.M. Diplomacy and Politics. Ukraine in the process of dynamic geopolitical changes. – Kharjiv, Folio, 2003.-P.369. 216 Меморандум про гарантії безпеки у зв’язку з приєднанням України до Договору про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї. (Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations document A/49/765 and S/1994/1399.) http://undocs.org/S/1994/1399 217 Ibid.

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assurances in the Treaty from the nuclear powers sides that can be defined as promises of compliance with the provisions of the UN Charter [13]. Concerning this interpretation, in practice and in international law, there are positive and negative assurances. That is why, based on the title and content of the Memorandum, one of its researchers, PhD in Law Ruslana Kotsiuba, is convinced that the contents of paragraphs 4–6 of the Memorandum above all, . . . concerns the security assurances given by nuclear states for the non-nuclear weapon zones and non-nuclear weapon states. Such assurances are usually aimed at defense against nuclear threats or the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime established under the NPT. Therefore, the signing of an international legal instrument in terms of security assurances is a logical consequence of nuclear deterrence.218

This blurriness of the concept has led to a mutually exclusive interpretation of it: as a legally binding document, as diplomatically non-mandatory statement, or as an intermediate document. The question that has to be answered in this regard is whether security assurances provided by the Budapest Memorandum were any more meaningful that those stipulated in the NPT for nuclear states in respect of non-nuclear ones. The connection of assurances under the Budapest Memorandum to the NPT could not have been productive since the NPT deals with nuclear non-proliferation rather than security assurances to non-nuclear weapon countries. It is no surprise, therefore, that the association of the Budapest Memorandum with the NPT made security assurances for Ukraine declaratory and depending on the goodwill of Memorandum signatories. The only Memorandum achievement based on the NPT in terms of enforcement of obligations of the assuring nations were its paragraphs 4 and 6. Paragraph 4 says: The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

Paragraph 6 adds that the signatories of the Memorandum “will consult in the event a situation arises that raises a question concerning these commitments”.219 Other clauses of the Budapest Memorandum concerning security assurances for Ukraine are based on the provisions of the UN Charter and the CSCE Final Act. Inter

Коцюба, Р. Конститційно-правові аспекти змісту понять “гарантії безпеки” та “запевнення безпеки” у тексті Меморандуму про гарантії безпеки у зв’язку з приєднанням України до Договору про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї від 5 грудня 1995 року. Порівняльно-аналітичн право. 2006. №6, с. 49. (Kotsiuba R.O. Constitutional and legal aspects of ‘security guarantees’ and ‘security assurance’ in the text up the Memorandum of security assurance in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on December 5, 1995. Comparative and analytical law. 2016, No. 6, P. 49.) 219 Memorandum, Op. cit. 217. 218

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alia, in accordance with the Charter, the assuring states reaffirm in the Memorandum paragraph 2 their commitment to abide by the UN Charter in relations with Ukraine and namely “to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense”.220 By paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Memorandum the assuring nations guarantee to abide by the principles of the CSCE Final Act under which they would respect “the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” (Paragraph 1) and intend to “refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind” (Paragraph 3). In other words, legal analysis of the Memorandum shows that the assurances it provides are political in nature and that in fact it only confirms the assurances already contemplated in the UN Charter, the CSCE Final Act, and the NPT. The provision on the commitment of assuring nations “not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack of themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon State”, provided in Paragraph 5,221 was the only progressive innovation in the Memorandum referring to the assurances not only for the national security of Ukraine but also for the non-proliferation regime per se. This provision refreshes the issue of the so-called negative security guarantees for non-nuclear weapon states. “Positive” assurances are those relating to assurance of assistance by nuclear weapon states in case of an aggression against a non-nuclear weapon state; they exist in the form of the UNSC Resolution 225 (1968) and assume immediate action of the UNSC, primarily its permanent members, in accordance with the UN Charter in case a non-nuclear weapon state is under nuclear attack or threat of such an attack.222 That is to say, nuclear weapon countries do not commit to interfere in a conflict independently and directly, but only to take joint action within the UN auspices. The issue of positive guarantees was further developed in 1995 at the Fifth Review Conference on Performance of the NPT and written down in the UNSC Resolution 984 (1995).223 To draw a parallel, it may be said that assurances under the Budapest Memorandum pre-empted the assurances of 1995. Thus, these assurances, as well as the Budapest assurances, are nothing more than political statements binding nuclear weapon states by no actual legal commitments. 220

Ibid. Ibid. 222 UNSC Resolution 225 (1968) of 19 June 1968 “Question relating to measures to safeguard nonnuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” adopted at the 1433rd meeting by 10 votes to none, with 5 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, France, India and Pakistan). Para. 1. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/255 223 Resolution 984 (1995) adopted by the Security Council at its 3514th meeting on 11 April 1995, S/RES/984 (1995). http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/984 221

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This situation is unacceptable, in particular for the nonaligned countries and states being under the umbrella of military political blocks or collective security and defence systems. Therefore, such states become persistent in their requirement for the nuclear weapons club to develop more precise and legally binding recommendations concerning security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states.224 The Budapest Memorandum became a reflection of all the shortfalls and deficiencies of the NPT, the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the existing international security system as a whole. It builds on the reluctance of nuclear weapon states to lose their monopoly on nuclear weapons and their unwillingness to give effective security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. In the meantime, the outstanding problem of security assurances for the NPT parties entails a nuclear non-proliferation crisis that has never been solved by the NPT Review Conferences. The final Declaration of the Eighth Review Conference for the Performance of the NPT, being a good example, states the Conference once again confirms and acknowledges that only full elimination of nuclear weapons will be the absolute guarantee against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,225 so it is in the lawful interests of nations who do not own nuclear weapons to get unambiguous and legally binding guarantees from nuclear weapon states that would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Considering the above it may be argued that the existing international format of security guarantees is not sufficient in the contemporary environment and requires further elaboration. In its turn, Ukraine viewed the assurances in the Budapest Memorandum as the most effective international law instrument to sustain its national security. Where did the confidence that such assurances would be effective come from? Was it just wishful thinking? Hypothetically, a range of answers could include, first of all, a desire to find the easiest and the most conflict-free way to assert the national sovereignty of Ukraine. Secondly, there was no political will or vision of specific mechanisms to achieve reliable international assurances. Thirdly, no similar assurances had ever existed in international practice or generally under international law. In fourth place, such international assurances may have been replaced with domestic instruments for the guarantee of security and defence. All these hypothetical considerations were credible to one degree or the other and they had a direct influence on the signing of the Budapest Memorandum. The proponents of “nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees” argued that that was the easiest way to avoid international isolation and at the same time to strengthen state sovereignty and national security. They, however, were unable to formulate the content of such guarantees. Some of them quite reasonably believed that such guarantees were only achievable through the accession of Ukraine to the 224

Results of the Eighth Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Prospects of Legal Security Assurances for Ukraine. Analytical Paper. http://www. niss.gov.ua/articles/290 225 Results of the Eighth Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Prospects of Legal Security Assurances for Ukraine. Analytical Paper. http://www. niss.gov.ua/articles/290

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European and Euro-Atlantic security structures, which at that time were not on the agenda, save for NATO, and which were basically non-existent. Others gravitated towards “security guarantees” in the form of a multilateral international treaty. Both groups, obviously, only relied on international security guarantees. It is quite apparent that the advocates of the diplomatic solution—the firm believers in the idol of diplomacy—took advantage. This was the reason why the task to establish such “security guarantees” for Ukraine was assigned to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry who only had international instruments—and nothing else—in its toolkit. However, according to Yuriy Kostenko, the course of events “demonstrated that Ukrainian diplomacy failed to design any unique draft for discussion with potential signatories and insistently delegated this mission to other countries”.226 This was exactly what Russia needed. Already on 23 February 1993 Moscow provided a draft Statement on Security Assurances compiled of various provisions from different international instruments, already acceded to by Ukraine, Russia and other nuclear weapon states.227 In fact, Russia was never going to favour those, which was evidenced by territorial claims in respect of Crimea and Sevastopol and energy coercion Moscow applied even before the Budapest Memorandum was signed. The foreign ministries of France and China proposed their similar drafts to Ukraine’s in May 1993, after they had become certain that such “security assurances” would not impose any new and more binding commitments on nuclear weapon states. Thus, such an approach to assurances was the easiest and the most painless one for everyone including Ukraine. This is why the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, despite his full appreciation of the political pattern of these documents, also agreed to the easy scenario of assurances in understanding that the draft Budapest Memorandum simply replicated the provisions of existing international documents. Yuriy Kostenko is convinced that the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry should have presented a note referring to the Parliamentary Decree dated 16 November 1993 On Ratification of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, stating that “the provisions of the Treaty do not reflect the Ukrainian reality and therefore Ukraine accedes as a state who inherited nuclear weapons”, to the CSCE Budapest Summit. Yet, the worst possible option was chosen for Ukraine in Budapest.228

6 Conclusions The nuclear disarmament of Ukraine was one of the most important steps of the emerging independent state in the global arena and at the same time one of the main factors of its acceptance in the global community. Ukraine never insisted it should retain nuclear weapon state status as a successor of the USSR or that it should be able

226

Kostenko, op. cit. p. 401. Ibid. 228 Kostenko, op. cit. p. 406. 227

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to maintain control over nuclear weapons during the transition period. This determined its inherently weak position in future attempts to use the nuclear disarmament problem to strengthen the economic, political stance and security of the emerging nation in the world. Russia was irritated with these attempts, while the West did not believe the Ukrainian political leaders would dare to take decisive action in the game they pursued. Ukraine chose to accommodate the US and other nuclear weapon states and agreed to nuclear disarmament in exchange for compensation and declarations of security assurances having no legal effect. This act opened an opportunity for prolongation of the NPT on a continuing basis and was supposed to enhance the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, subsequent events, particularly nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 and the events in DPRK, actually undermined this regime. Ukraine gave up the world’s third most powerful nuclear weapons potential in exchange for predominantly declarative security assurances and financial aid in the dismantling, transfer and elimination of this potential. This may not be seen as adequate compensation for the step, which was of great importance to the preservation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Ukraine viewed the assurances in the Budapest Memorandum as the most effective international law instrument to sustain its national security. The fetishizing of diplomacy seen as the only option to sustain national security and defence for Ukraine is characteristic not only of the Memorandum but of other regulatory documents as well. This idealistic approach had dramatic consequences for Ukraine’s national security, adding one more destructive element to the NPT regime. Thus, it should be noted that Ukraine covered the controversial path from the holder of the world’s third largest nuclear potential by size and power to an official non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT within the period between 1991 and 1996. This path was not a logical and easy one. On the one hand, the state leaders had a clear belief that nuclear weapons were of substantial value (political, economic and military) and were not to be given up to Russia for nothing. This belief was backed by the ambitions of the Ukrainian state which saw itself as an equal heir to the USSR and claimed equality with Russia in this matter. Already at that point the Ukrainian elites entered into a disagreement concerning the role of nuclear weapons in the national policy. While the Ukrainian military commanders saw their task in preserving the operational role of the nuclear missiles on Ukrainian territory, politicians in Parliament and diplomats saw this option as unacceptable—primarily because maintaining nuclear weapons under Russian operational control in Ukraine automatically made Ukraine a dependent minor ally of the Russian Federation, i e. returned it to the status only recently rejected. In its turn, the Parliament, being fairly pro-nuclear and advocating a “transit nuclear state” status for Ukraine, did not care about the primary and natural function of nuclear weapons as a military deterrence tool. Rather, Ukrainian Parliament members associated nuclear weapons with some valuable asset needed for successful political trade with the West and Russia for security guarantees and successful

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economic development. This potentially explains the absolute lack of assignments for analysis of the possibilities for Ukraine’s own nuclear deterrence or of potential tasks to gain operational control over nuclear weapons already in administrative control. The Ukrainian foreign ministry was under heavy pressure from Russia and the USA who requested Ukraine to disarm as soon and as completely as possible and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. It is interesting that the stance of the military industrial complex who, seemingly, should have been in favour of nuclear weapons, turned out to be quite indifferent. In fact, the world’s largest missile manufacturers were mostly interested in good orders, while the future of Ukraine as an independent state was seen as the responsibility of the “politicians in Kyiv”. Nuclear research facilities sought to find their niche in the system of international nuclear cooperation without encumbering themselves with the responsibility for military nuclear arsenals. The nuclear legacy of Ukraine was not an integral asset easily subjected to an integral government policy. Nuclear warheads of different types, their sub-strategic and strategic carriers, and dual use tactical systems had different tasks and pertained to different military branches or service arms, not always fully controlled by Ukraine. International obligations, domestic interests and the capabilities of various influence groups in respect of diverse fragments of the nuclear legacy were a very tricky mosaic hard to put together into a coherent picture of political decisions. Strategic and sub-strategic nuclear warheads permanently stored at special warehouses (“Objects S”) were not much in Ukraine’s control at the time of independence, when they were transferred to Russia. In the course of history Ukraine, allowed no time to balance all pros and contras, was forced by the international community to comply with the Soviet-American presidential initiatives of the autumn of 1991 in respect of a drastic reduction in operational nuclear arsenals. Thus, already in the first year of its independent existence Ukraine was deprived of those types of weapons that could have been fairly easily integrated into its own armed forces as part of a balanced military doctrine. Strategic nuclear forces including nuclear warheads and means of their delivery—ICBMs and heavy bombers—were too big to be made part of the domestic armed forces. Yet they were the ones to be subjected to reliable administrative control, with an industrial, scientific and military infrastructure inherited from the USSR available to keep them functional. Ukraine had an informed vision of the strategic nuclear arms elimination process. Stakeholders in this process—lobbyists of the (non)nuclear and the “missile-owning” status (which is not the same), diplomats, the military and politicians—had a good understanding of all the relevant aspects. Interests and views did not match, however it took several years for them to develop into a compromise leading to the elimination of all nuclear arsenals and to the non-nuclear status of Ukraine. The compromise achieved in the early 1990s may be criticized from today’s perspective—particularly the part related to international security “assurances” given to Ukraine. In 2014 they failed disastrously. Nonetheless, 20 years before in

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1994, when Ukraine ratified START-1 and the NPT, the decisions played in its favour. It should be noted also that the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine had a number of important consequences for both Ukraine itself and the international security system. Firstly, the disarmament of Ukraine created prerequisites for its ultimate departure from the common strategic space with Russia. On the one hand, such prerequisites furthered the formation of a vulnerability complex in Moscow and caused growth of revenge-seeking attitudes that ended up in the “Ukrainian crisis” of 2014. On the other hand, Ukraine obtained a chance to accelerate the processes of integration into Europe and NATO and to fall into the orbit of the international democracy club. This chance was not fully exploited by Kyiv, which was also one of the reasons for the events of 2014. In its turn, the experience of Ukraine, although quite inspiring for the indefinite renewal of the NPT, in no way restrained the Treaty erosion process: the nuclear club was joined by India and Pakistan in the late 1990s and by North Korea in the following decade.

References 1. Mearsheimer, J. J. (1993, Summer). The case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent. Foreign Affairs, 72, 52. 2. Cirincione, J., Wolfsthal, J. B., & Rajkumar, M. (2005). Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, biological, and chemical threats (p. 373). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 3. Riess, M. (1995). Bridled ambitions: Why countries constrain their nuclear capabilities (p. 94). The Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 4. Garnett, S. W. (1995). In G. Quester (Ed.), The sources and conduct of the ukrainian nuclear policy. The nuclear challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (p. 131). M.E. Sahre. 5. Baker, J. C. (1997). Non-proliferation incentives for Russia and Ukraine. Adelphi Paper 309 (pp. 36–40). IlSS/Oxford University Press. 6. Bertch, G., & Zaborsky, V. (1997, April). Bringing Ukraine into the MTCR: Can U.S. policy succeed? Arms Control Today. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_04/ukraine 7. Gak, L. (2004). Denuclearization and Ukraine’s lessons for the future. The Nonproliferation Review, 11(1), 106–135. 8. Baker, J. A., Frank, D., & Thomas, M. (1995). The politics of diplomacy. Revolution, war and peace, 1989–1992 (p. 526). G.P. Putnam’s Sons. 9. Bailey, K. C. (1993). Strengthening nuclear nonproliferation (p. 41). Westview Press. 10. Gallucci, R. L. (1994, April). Non-proliferation and national security. Arms Control Today, 24(3), 13. 11. Laumulin, M. (1995). Kazakhstan’s nuclear policy. In G. Quester (Ed.), The nuclear challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (p. 196). M.E.Sharpe. 12. Sperling, J. (2015). EU -US management of nuclear proliferation in the 21st century: How strategic is a strategic partnership? In S. Blavoukos, D. Bourantonis, & C. Portela (Eds.), The EU and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Strategies, policies, actions (p. 166). Palgrave Macmillan. 13. Jeffrey, K. (Ed.). (2012). Security assurance and non-proliferation (pp. 1–13). Stanford University Press.

Nuclear Energy in Independent Ukraine Dmytro Chumak and Oleksii Izhak

This chapter presents retrospective of the nuclear energy development in Ukraine from its independence until 2018. It demonstrates the role of nuclear energy for Ukraine’s economy, turning points within the observed period, and development of the key sector’s elements. In particular, first part establishes the ground for further analysis by presenting historic perspective, key challenges, and current status of nuclear energy in Ukraine. Then, the authors look at Chernobyl accident and development of nuclear science and industry in UkrSSR afterwards. Following this, the chapter provides analysis of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident towards energy sector, in particular, describes moratorium on the construction of new NPPs in the UkrSSR and the public factor in nuclear energy development. The chapter covers various approached tested by the Ukrainian authority in order to establish an organization to administer NPPs and institution to perform regulatory function. The authors also describe the role of international cooperation to sustain the nuclear energy complex of Ukraine, and strengthen nuclear safety and security. It presents analysis of the nuclear security regime in Ukraine, as well as safeguards. The authors paid special attention towards nuclear disarmament of Ukraine and its impact on the nuclear power sector. The chapter also presents historical perspective on Ukraine’s participation in the international nuclear and radiation safety regimes. Development of the peaceful atom in independent Ukraine went in parallel with nuclear disarmament—the process that directly influenced the nuclear energy sector by building the reputation of Ukraine as a responsible participant in the non-proliferation regime and a Member-State of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This latter factor furthered the development of nuclear power

D. Chumak (*) Odessa Center for Nonproliferation Odessa I. I. Mechnykov National University, Odesa, Ukraine O. Izhak Head of Department, National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. Sinovets (ed.), Ukraine’s Nuclear History, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90661-0_4

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through enhancement of Ukraine’s international cooperation and implementation of best international practices in nuclear and radiation safety and security. From a historical retrospective, it could be seen that the Chernobyl NPP accident marked the beginning of an entirely new phase of nuclear sector development not for the Soviet Union alone, but for the entire world. Since then, the “peaceful atom” has been placed under tight scrutiny from the public, politicians, diplomats, engineers, and other stakeholders who sought to assure prevention of any similar accidents in the future. 26 April 1986 was the starting point of irreversible political, economic and social transformations in the nuclear industries of the Soviet Union and, following its dissolution, of the new independent states. Safe operation of nuclear facilities became a priority for nuclear power development. Lack of attention to safety and political and technical light-mindedness in the sector demonstrated vulnerabilities not only in the nuclear industry but generally in the Soviet system of handling the strategic industrial facilities. Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in his emoirs that “this drama [the Chernobyl accident—Authors] combined everything that had been building up for years: concealment of (ignoring) emergency events and negative processes, irresponsible and complacent behavior, negligent work and excessive drinking. This was just another argument in favour of radical reform”1 After 1986, the underestimated role and importance of safety of nuclear facilities and absence of a state system of emergency response were addressed at various meetings of the USSR Party elites on multiple occasions. In a 1990 Pravda newspaper article it was pointed out that responsible government (Soviet) organizations “failed to timely appreciate the scale of the disaster, its potential consequences and to take decisive action to develop and implement a state concept for safe inhabitancy within territories contaminated with radiation.”2 This state policy resulted in a complete betrayal of public confidence in nuclear energy in the affected areas as well as in the areas where new nuclear facilities were under construction. Amid massive social tension, the young independent state of Ukraine was challenged to define a policy for further nuclear sector development. This came against the backdrop of emerging financial, economic, political, and systemic problems. Following the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine had to develop a national structure to control atomic power, take care of nuclear fuel supply and spent fuel and radioactive waste handling, organize qualified labor, etc. Even before the Belavezha Accords (December 21, 1991) which had legally dissolved the Soviet Union, Russia released itself from the responsibility to provide for and operate Ukrainian NPPs; thus, the new independent state faced the need to address the emerging problems at short notice. In the beginning of the 1990s, Ukraine lacked

Мемуары Горбачева Михаила «Жизнь и реформы», 1995 г., Издательство “Новости,” Москва. 2 Газета «Правда», 14.07.1990, архив ГНТЦ ЯРБ, папка 7.25 (Pravda Newspaper, 14/07/1990, archive of SSTCNRS, file 7.25). 1

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an organization to administer nuclear power and ensure required material supply,3 but this was not the only difficulty: the state had no politicians sufficiently qualified to appreciate the complexity of the nuclear sector, who would understand the subject and would be able to pursue an effective policy in this area. At that time, industrialists, engineers, and the workforce generated all the initiatives. It was their proactive stance, experience, and professionalism that ultimately created the contemporary nuclear industry. From the beginning of its independence Ukraine has been taking advantage of intensive international assistance and cooperation. International organizations and donor countries have actively contributed to the development of the nuclear energy complex, but mainly to strengthen nuclear safety and security regimes in Ukraine. It resulted in overcoming the emerging difficulties after 1986 and establishing a robust and safe civilian nuclear energy program that provides Ukraine with more than half of its electricity today and plays a crucial role in present day energy security. The nuclear energy industry sector with its 15 reactors operating at 4 NPPs, research reactors, uranium mining, and other facilities supporting reliable operation of the nuclear energy generating industry is one of the most developed among European countries. However, its history was full of challenges and difficulties which emerged due to external and internal circumstances in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless Ukraine, with enormous international support and assistance, has successfully overcome them.

1 Nuclear Energy Sector in Ukraine: Historic Perspective, Key Challenges, and Current Status At the beginning of the 1990s, Ukraine faced a number of economic difficulties, inter alia, in 1991 Ukraine’s GDP was at just USD1307 per capita, hyperinflation (390% in 1991), budget deficit and others. Such circumstances have influenced the situation in the energy sector. From the beginning of the 1990s, there was a steady decline in energy consumption: in 1991, it dropped to 2.2%, and, in 1992, it dropped even

Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис 15, справа №2354 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласними орган ізаціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР. Письмо от 11.10.1991 №19,867/92 от Бронникова В.К. (ЗАЭС), Коровкина В.А. (РАЭС), Уманца М.П. (ПО ЧАЭС), Фукса В.П. (ПО ЮУАЭС), Сапронова В.Г. (ХАЭС) премьер-министру Украины Фокину В.П (Fund No. Р-2, inventory 15, file No. 2354, Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR. Letter of 11/10/ 1991 No. 19867/92 from V. Bronnikov (ZNPP), V. Korovkin (RNPP), M. Umanets (CNPP), V. Fuks (SUNPP), and V. Sapronov (KhNPP) to Ukrainian Prime Minister V. Fokin.).

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further to 6.4%.4 Shrinking of industry was among the main causes of the consumption decrease; e.g. the strongest drop in energy consumption—approximately 40%— took place from 1993 to 1998 in particular due to this reason. There was also changes in the energy consumption balance based on the sources from the 1990s; e.g. from 1993 to 2004, the supply of coal to Ukrainian industry grew from 12% to 20%, while at the same time consumption of natural gas oil products and heat strongly decreased in absolute terms.5 During the early 1990s, Ukraine imported nearly 78% of natural gas and nearly 87% of oil from Russia. Energy supply monopoly often drove the prices up, which resulted in reduced oil and gas procurements and increased consumption of domestic coal and peaceful atomic energy. This problem was characteristic of the entire post-Soviet space—not only Ukraine. In the 1990s, most ex-Soviet nations as well as countries of Eastern Europe were in the situation that required them to sustain or even increase the existing share of nuclear power. According to David Fischer, the energy sector at that time faced a number of serious challenges, such as shortage of coal, oil, natural gas, hydroelectric resources, logistical problems, limited funds, and so forth.6 Extraction of energy resources in Ukraine significantly dropped, inter alia, coal by almost 50% and natural gas by 35%. In order to cover its energy needs, Ukraine had to search for the possibilities to import energy resources. Oil and gas demand was covered primarily by Russia, which used such dominance as a means for political and strategic manipulations as well as control over Ukraine. The Russian approach towards cooperation with the former Soviet republics was based on market relations and significant discounting; e.g. in early 1992, the Russian government announced that the price of fuels exported would be raised to world market prices. Moving on to power generation, Ukraine inherited from the Soviets a welldeveloped electricity system with 18,000 kilometres of high-voltage lines (220 kilovolts and higher), and 50,000 kilometres of low-voltage lines. In 1990, the power industry provided 296 terawatt-hours of electricity. In 1992, the total installed capacity of electricity generation was 53.569 MWt; 12.880 MWt was generated by NPPs, 33.789 MWt from thermal PPs, and 4.700 MWt from hydro PPs.7 Since the 1990s, nuclear generation played, among others, one of the key roles for the stable functioning of the electricity system. Since the mid-1990s, NPP became

4

The Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. R-2, inventory No.15, file 3901—Correspondence with the Ministries regarding the development of energy sector in Ukraine/23 Executive report on alternative electricity sources. 5 Ukraine’s Gas Sector [www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NG21UkrainesGasSector-SimonPirani-2007.pdf]. 6 Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Safeguards in the CIS and East Central Europe: the Case for “EURASIATOM” by David Fischer The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1994. 7 The Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. R-2, inventory No.15, file 3901—Correspondence with the Ministries regarding the development of energy sector in Ukraine/23 Executive report on alternative electricity sources.

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the backbone of the power grid covering around 40% of electricity load in terms of capacity and about 50% in terms of generation. The average unit load factor for Ukrainian NPPs was more than 60%.8 It required proper maintenance, reduction of units’ failure, necessary safety measures, and a financial backstop to cover respective expenses. However, at that time Ukraine experienced a total lack of funds for the nuclear sector; economic links were broken and the nuclear sector management faced never-ending reshuffle.9 For example, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Ukrainian budget did not foresee the necessary financial resources for the nuclear power industry’s development. However, at the same time the Government pushed NPPs to deliver maximum electricity generation and commission new units.10 Another example happened in 1994, when Zaporizhzhia NPP was close to shutdown of all five power units which were in commercial operation. The situation with planned and unplanned outages led to only one power unit in the grid by August 10. The unit supplied to the network around 8% of the installed capacity of the nuclear power plants. Fortunately, a few days later another power unit was connected to the network and helped to overcome the complete shutdown of the NPP.11 Despite the described circumstances, the nuclear sector continued to be a reliable source of electricity and even demonstrated further development. For example, on 13 October 1995, the State Acceptance Commission confirmed that Unit 6 at Zaporizhzhia NPP was ready for hot start-up and operation at 40% of rated capacity.12 In addition to the aforementioned economic circumstances, Ukraine faced a strong necessity to restructure the power facility management systems.13 During that period, state power facilities were actively transferred to corporate or private ownership and an electricity market was being constructed outside Russia’s domain. The transition to market relationships was a course declared for Ukraine in general, and the power industry was not an exception.14 Detailed information of organizational changes is presented further in this chapter.

8 О. Gudyma. Prospects of the Development and Organisation of Nuclear Power Industry in Ukraine. – Kyiv: RVPS of Ukraine, NAS of Ukraine. – 2000. – 48 p. (Parliament Library Archive). 9 Виктор Якомаскин, Ядерная отрасль в закононепослушном обществе, 14 марта 1997 (ZerkaloNedeli, 14 March 1997) [https://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/yadernaya_otrasl_v_ zakononeposlushnom_obschestve.html]. 10 ZerkaloNedeli, 15 March 1997 (Parliament Library Archive). 11 Виктор Якомаскин, Ядерная отрасль в закононепослушном обществе, 14 марта 1997 (ZerkaloNedeli, 14 March 1997) [https://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/yadernaya_otrasl_v_ zakononeposlushnom_obschestve.html]. 12 Energiya, 23 October 1995 (Parliament Library Archive). 13 L. Keysevich. Global Nuclear Industrial Complex (1896–2010). – K.: Ekmo, 2010. – 684 pages. (Parliament Library Archive). 14 The Directives to the Ukrainian Delegation for the 46th Session of the UN General Assembly. Economic and Environmental Issues on Chernobyl NPP. 13 August 1991. The Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. 2, inventory No. 15, file No. 2144, pages 53; 57–61; 63.

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Strategic Vision to Develop Nuclear Energy Sector in the 1990s

The key policy vectors aimed at addressing the existing problems in the energy sector, including nuclear, were addressed in the National Energy Program until 2010, developed in 1994 by the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine and adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament on 15 May 1996 after long discussions and internal debates. The cost of this program for the Ukrainian budget was assumed to be USD50 billion. This program was also aimed at reducing imports of oil and gas. Aleksandr Kozhushko, chairperson of the Committee on Fuel and Energy Sector, Transport and Communications, said in an interview “by 2010, according to the National Energy Program, we were planning to reduce energy imports by 69 million tons of fuel equivalent (or by 39%) versus 1990.”15 This strategic document identified the development of coal-fired and nuclear power generation, as a priority in the energy mix. According to the Program of 1996, the installed capacity of nuclear power had to be increased from 13.8 million kW in 1996, up to 15.8 million kW in 2010. This number was assumed to be achieved through commissioning of units whose construction had started before the Moratorium on the Construction of New Nuclear Power Plants in the Ukrainian SSR and the Public Factor in Atomic Energy Development (more information is available in the next part of this chapter). Before this Program was introduced, in October 1993, during the discussion at the Presidium of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dedicated to the situation regarding dependence on Russia in terms of nuclear fuel supply, research and development support for the nuclear power industry, a concept for the development of the nuclear power industry and nuclear fuel cycle was presented to Leonid Kravchuk (President of Ukraine at that time). Based on this concept, it was planned to establish a national nuclear fuel cycle. Since know-how and nuclear fuel supply diversification was crucially important for Ukrainian NPPs and Ukraine itself did not have the necessary experience and technological capabilities, efforts were made to engage foreign companies for such a process (inter alia, ABB or Westinghouse).16 In turn, the Nuclear Policy Committee under the President of Ukraine, at its session held on 14 January 1994, supported the decision to invite foreign companies and recommended choosing an alternative nuclear fuel fabrication technology. The Ukrainian government authorities considered that the establishment of a nuclear fuel factory with participation of three parties—Ukraine, ABB, or Westinghouse—and 15

Finansovaya Ukraina newspaper, 28 May 1996, No. 21 (131) (Parliament Library Archive). Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис №15, справа 4745 Листування з міністерствами та установами з питань атомної енергетики/ 23.01.1995 №2-ДСП від заступника голови держкоматома А.П.Чернова, кому: Кабінету Міністрів України (ДСК) (The Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. R-2, inventory No.15, file 4745 - Correspondence with the Ministries and Agencies on the Issues of Nuclear Power Industry /23.01.1995 No.2-DSP from А. Chernov, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear Energy Use to Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Restricted)). 16

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with the involvement of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, was the optimum option. The Committee was also concerned with the need to construct such a factory in the shortest time, since any delay in the launch of the local fuel fabrication facility would cost the state nearly USD120–150 million per year.17 This project remains unrealized even today. The discussion concerning the nuclear fuel cycle in Ukraine occasionally popped up. For example, in April 1996, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted the Decree On Establishing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. According to that Decree, SCUNEU developed the Comprehensive Nuclear Fuel Cycle Establishment Program until 2010. The expenses related to the program’s implementation (around USD993 million) were supposed to be reimbursed from a special sectoral fund. However, such a mechanism did not demonstrate its efficiency and was not capable of compensating for the emerging needs (according to “Energoatom,” in the course of 1994–1999, it generated USD2.5 billion worth of electrical power due to compensatory supplies, but the fund has never received this money).

1.2

Situation in Ukrainian Nuclear Energy Sector

Ukraine has four NPPs with 15 power units, including 13 VVER-1000 and 2 VVER440 reactors with a total installed capacity of 13,835 MW(e) (Table 1). The Zaporizhzhia NPP is one of the biggest NPPs in Europe and located in the south-eastern part of Ukraine on the bank of the Kakhovka reservoir in KamenkoDneprovsky district. The satellite city of this NPP is Enerhodar. The construction of the NPP was commenced in 1979. Zaporizhzhia NPP consists of six units with VVER-1000 units and 1000 MW of electrical capacity. The service water supply is used with cooling pond and cooling towers. The South-Ukraine NPP is located in the south of Ukraine on the river Yuzhny Bug in Mykolayiv region. The satellite city of this NPP is Yuzhnoukrainsk. The construction of the South-Ukraine NPP began in 1976. At present, the plant has 3 nuclear power VVER-1000 units and 1000 MW of electrical capacity. The service water supply with cooling tower and cooling pond is used. The Khmelnitsky NPP is located in the Slavuta area of Khmelnitsky region. The satellite city of this NPP is Netishyn. The construction of the NPP was started in 1981. At present, the plant has 2 nuclear power VVER-1000 units and 1000 MW of

Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис №15, справа 4745 Листування з міністерствами та установами з питань атомної енергетики/23.01.1995 №2-ДСП від заступника голови держкоматома А.П.Чернова, кому: Кабінету Міністрів України (ДСК) (The Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. R-2, inventory No.15, case 4745 Correspondence with the Ministries and Agencies on the Issues of Nuclear Power Industry/ 23.01.1995 No.2-DSP from А. Chernov, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear Energy Use, to Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Restricted)). 17

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Table 1 Ukraine power reactors operatinga Unit № Type reactor SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP” 1 VVER 1000/ 320

Installed power capacity (MW)

Start date

1000

10.12.1984

2

VVER 1000/ 320

1000

22.07.1985

3

VVER 1000/ 320

1000

10.12.1986

4

VVER 1000/ 320

1000

18.12.1987

VVER 1000/ 320 6 VVER 1000/ 320 SS “RIVNE NPP” 1 VVER 440/213

1000

14.08.1989

23.12.2015 (extended till 23.12.2025) 19.02.2016 (extended till 19.02.2026) 05.03.2017 (extended till 05.03.2027) 04.04.2018 (extended till 04.04.2028) 27.05.2020

1000

19.10.1995

21.10.2026

420

22.12.1980

2

VVER 440/213

415

22.12.1981

3

VVER 1000/ 320

1000

21.12.1986

VVER 1000/ 1000 320 SS “SOUTH-UKRAINE NPP” 1 VVER 1000/ 1000 302

10.10.2004

22.12.2010 (extended till 22.12.2030) 22.12.2011 (extended till 22.12.2031) 11.12.2017 (extended till 11.12.2037) 07.06.2035

2

1000

06.01.1985

VVER 1000/ 1000 320 SS “KHMELNYTSKA NPP” 1 VVER 1000/ 1000 320 2 VVER 1000/ 1000 320

20.09.1989

02.12.2013 (extended till 02.12.2023) 12.05.2015 (extended till 31.12.2025) 10.02.2020

22.12.1987

13.12.2028

08.08.2004

07.09.2035

5

4

3

a

VVER 1000/ 338

31.12.1982

Operating NPPs [https://uatom.org/index.php/en/general-information/]

End of the project lifetime

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electrical capacity. However, the total design capacity of the NPP is 4000 MW. The service water supply (reverse flow) with a cooling pond is used. Because of the moratorium, the construction of the 3 and 4 power units was halted and has remained uncompleted until today. On 12 January 2011, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified the Agreement between the Ukrainian and Russian Governments on cooperation in construction of Khmelnitsky power units 3 and 4, which was signed on June 9, 2010. On 6 September 2012, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine On Location, Design and Construction of Khmelnitsky NPP Units No. 3 and 4. After Russia militarily occupied and annexed parts of Ukrainian territory in 2014, on 3 October 2015, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko signed the Laws On Termination of the Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Construction of KhNPP-3,4 (correspondent Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Construction of KhNPP-3,4 was signed on 9 June 2010 in Kyiv and ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 12 January 2011) and On Recognizing Invalidity of the Law of Ukraine On Location, Design and Construction of Khmelnitsky NPP Units No. 3 and 4 of 16 September 2015. The Rivne NPP is located in Rivne region on the bank of the river Styr. The satellite city of this NPP is Varash. The construction of NPP began in 1973. At present the NPP comprises three nuclear power units in operation: power units 1 and 2 include VVER-440 reactors and power unit 3 consists of a VVER-1000 reactor. Service water supply with cooling towers is used. In 2017, the share of electricity generated by the Ukrainian NPPs accounted for 56.6%.18 Therefore, Ukraine receives more than half of its electricity from nuclear energy, which makes it a crucial element of energy security. In 2017, Ukraine generated 85785.1 million kWh of electricity; the utilization rate of installed capacity for 2017 amounted to 70.6%, which is one of the highest rates in the history of nuclear energy.19 Ukraine has two research reactors and other scientific capabilities in the nuclear sphere. These include research reactors—VVR-M at the Kyiv Nuclear Research Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and DR-100, which is operated by the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry (currently under Russian occupation). In addition to research reactors, Ukraine has a Neutron Source facility, which is based at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, and includes a subcritical assembly driven by a linear electron accelerator. This facility was constructed based on an agreement with the USA on technical and financial assistance to Ukraine, signed during the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, in April 2010. The USA made a USD73 million

18 19

Energoatom [www.energoatom.Kyiv.ua/files/file/pidsumki_12_2017_balans.pdf]. Ibid.

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investment in the realization of this project, in exchange for Ukraine’s decision to dispose of its entire stockpile of highly enriched uranium.20 Storage and handling of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) elements is another crucial component of the nuclear sector’s operation. Most scientific personnel and hi-tech nuclear facilities, including for handling, disposal, and storage of SNF, were concentrated in Russia. Therefore, based on the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on Scientific, Technical and Economic Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Energy, since 1993, SNF from Ukrainian NPPs was exported to the Russian Federation to the FSUE “PO Mayak” for the purpose of technological storage and subsequent processing.21 Every year Ukraine delivered its spent nuclear fuel to Russia for its further processing. Annually it costs about USD200 million.22 However, such a decision was of a temporary character, because according to the agreement and related contracts scrapped highlevel radioactive waste from the processing of SNF had to be returned back to Ukraine from 2018. Under such circumstances, Ukraine had to develop a longterm policy and specific program of activities in the field of SNF disposal and safe storage of high activity waste as well as to introduce respective technological decisions to tackle this problem.23 A new technology for dry storage of SNF coming from VVER-1000 reactors was introduced in 2001 at Zaporizhzhia NPP. This made it possible to save money on SNF storage from Zaporizhzhia NPP—savings that assessments said added up to USD10 million.24 To solve the problem with SNF from the rest of the Ukrainian NPPs, in 2005 “Energoatom” signed a contract with US firm Holtec International to build a centralized storage facility for spent nuclear fuel reactors of the VVER type of domestic nuclear power plants (CSNFP) within the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (established in the area polluted as the result of the disaster at the Chernobyl NPP in

20

Dmytro Chumak, The implications of the Ukraine conflict for national nuclear security policy, EU Non-proliferation Paper no. 53, November 2016. 21 Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on Scientific, Technical and Economic Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Energy [zakon.rada.gov. ua/laws/show/643_033]. 22 Energoatom [www.energoatom.Kyiv.ua/ua/actvts/stroitelstvo/cssnf/media/46845-shovische_ mayibutnogo_ukrana_pochne_samostyino_zbergati_vdpratcovane_yaderne_palivo/]. 23 Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис №15, справа 2831 Листування з міністерствами та іншими органі заціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Україні /2 0.01.1992 № 01–08/36 від голови Держатомнагляду України М.Штейнберга, кому: Президентові України Кравчукові Л.М. (The Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file 2831 - Correspondence with the Ministries and Other Organizations on NPPs Designing and Constructing in Ukraine/20 January 1992 No. 01–08/36 from N. Shteinberg, Chairman of the State Nuclear and Radiation Safety Committee of Ukraine to President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk.) 24 Dmytro Chumak, Economics of Ukrainian nuclear power, The Ukrainian Nuclear Industry: Expert review [//network.bellona.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/12/ATOM_UKR_ENGL_05. pdf].

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1986). After years of discussion, on 6 July 2017, “Energoatom” obtained a license from the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine to carry on activities within all stages of the life cycle of construction and putting into operation of the CSNFP. According to current plans, the centralized depository will consist of 458 containers to store 16,530 spent fuel assemblies for 100 years. The term of delivery is planned to last 16.5 years and will consist of 15 stages. During each of these, 33–34 containers will be installed. The first 94 were planned to be delivered to the storage facility in early 2019.25 It should be noted that, annually, 42 spent fuel assemblies are extracted from VVER-1000 reactors and 78 are extracted from VVER-440 reactors,26 thus it is expected that the repository will fulfill Ukraine’s needs within the planned timeframe.

2 Chernobyl Accident and Development of Nuclear Science and Industry in UkrSSR Afterwards Development of the nuclear sector in Ukraine at the beginning of the 1990s was complicated by the consequences of the dramatic events of April 26, 1986, when the accident at Chernobyl NPP occurred. This day influenced not only the nuclear energy of Ukraine, but worldwide; it actually changed human logic towards nuclear; it changed the nature of safety; it changed people’s attitude completely. Taking into account the importance of this accident, below will be presented careful consideration of various aspects related to this accident.

2.1

The Chernobyl Accident

In the memorandum of Ivan Gladush, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the UkrSSR, addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine it was stated that at 1.25 a.m. “an explosion occurred at Unit 4 of the Chernobyl NPP during preparations for the planned maintenance activities causing collapse of the roof and walls of the upper part of the reactor compartment and partial collapse of the turbine hall roof.”27

25

Energoatom [www.energoatom.Kyiv.ua/ua/actvts/stroitelstvo/cssnf/media/46845-shovische_ mayibutnogo_ukrana_pochne_samostyino_zbergati_vdpratcovane_yaderne_palivo/]. 26 Energoatom [www.slideshare.net/energoatom/2016-60851689]. 27 Доповідна записка міністра внутрішніх справ УРСР І. Д. Гладуша ЦК КПУ про заходи з ліквідації наслідків аварії на Чорнобильській АЕС. 27 квітня 1986 р.ЦДАГО України, ф. 1, оп. 25, спр. 2996, арк. 1–2. (Memorandum of I. Gladush, Minister of Internal Affairs of UkrSSR to Central Committee of Communist Party of Ukraine on activities intended to eliminate effects of accident at Chernobyl NPP. April 27, 1986.Central State Archive of Supreme and Executive Bodies

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The first impression of what Arkady Uskov saw in the early morning of April 261,986 was: On our way to the Plant (we had been driving on the road passing the open electric distribution yard) we saw the ruins at the location of the Unit 4 reactor building. A non-natural yellow glowing and “raspberry” shade of colour was illuminating the ruins somewhere from beneath, and this was something eerie. . . We did not trust our eyes.” At the time of the accident Uskov’s position was Senior Reactor Hall No. 1 (RH1) Operation Engineer at the first series of ChNPP units.28

A number of wrong conclusions were made because the adequate situation assessment was not performed; that later became the foundation for making detrimental decisions. After the accident, Alexei Makukhin, First Deputy Minister of Energy and Electrification of the USSR in charge of the operation of power plants, informed the Communist Party elite in his urgent report that, according to the third Chief Department of the USSR Ministry of Health “taking special measures, including evacuation of people from the town, is not required.” On August 14, 1989, Makukhin received a strict punitive reprimand, although without dismissal from his position, “for the failure to take proper measures in order to improve reliable operation of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.”29 The statement that evacuation was not necessary was not carried into effect as the decision to relocate people was taken by the USSR’s State Commission 37 hours after the accident happened. Efforts to evacuate all residents of the future exclusion zone continued from April 27 to August 16, 1986. Tremendous numbers of personnel were engaged in the elimination of effects in the first days of the accident. The previously quoted memorandum written by Gladush says that, as at April 27, 1986, present in the area of accident were around 2900 personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, students of the USSR MIA officer training schools and Kyiv Oblast MIA units. According to the same document, reconnaissance platoons, a chemical hazard protection company, a sanitary military unit, and non-military units of the UkrSSR civil defense, totaling around 2, 000 people, were also engaged in the operation.30 Specialists of the operational investigation team of the USSR KGB studied the nature of the explosion that happened at ChNPP as well as its consequences. As stated in the conclusions of the study of 16 May 1986, the epicenter of the explosion was in the area of the reactor facility at a height of 20–30 metres from “Mark Zero.”

of Ukraine in Kyiv, F 1, op. 2512, case No. 2996, p. 1) [http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/ Chornobyl_30/CDAGO/index.php?4]. 28 Vyacheslav Orlov and ArkadiyUskov, Eliminators of Accident Effects at Chernobyl NPP, [http:// uatom.org/index.php/uk/2016/04/20/intervyu-redaktsii-uatom-org-s-uchastnikami-likvidatsiiavarii-na-chernobylskoj-aes-orlovym-vyacheslavom-i-uskovym-arkadiem/]. 29 Reference Book on History of Communist Party of Soviet Union 1898–1991. 30 Memorandum, op. cit., pp. 1–2.

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Based on the calculation results, the TNT equivalent of the explosion at Unit 4 of ChNPP was around 30 tons.31 The fact that the explosion had a very high yield that caused massive destruction was confirmed in an interview with V. Orlov, whose position at the time of the accident was Deputy Manager of the Reactor Hall No.1 in Charge of Operation, at the first series of ChNPP units; later he worked in the regulatory authorities of the USSR and Ukraine. Orlov said: I came to BCR (Back-up Control Room). Inside it was empty. The windows had no panes. The back-up Control Room is located at Mark 9. The area around the building of the fourth reactor could be seen from there. Assessing the situation I saw the LOSC (liquid oxygen shipping container); the plate had collapsed on it. I also saw the side wall of the reactor building, insulation destroyed by the tube, AC units hanging on cables. Apparently, down there were fragments of graphite blocks from the reactor. I asked V. Smagin [shift manager of ChNPP Unit 4, who started his work at 8 a. m.] a question, jokingly: “So, you had these graphite blocks sitting around unattended before the accident”? He responded: “Well, of course not. We had this labour donation collective clean-up [Subbotnik] dedicated to the 1st May Holiday.” I really did not want to believe my eyes. It turns out that the elements of reactor core had been scattered around the reactor building! Then I understood that we are now standing in the centre of the scene of the phenomenon which radius should be already measured in dozens of kilometres.32

The USSR Government was trying very hard to conceal the information about the accident not only from their own citizens but also from the international community. Moreover, public demonstrations celebrating the 1 May [Day of Solidarity of Workers] in Kyiv and Minsk were not canceled. In his interview, Mikael Gorbachev said: . . . the public demonstrations were not cancelled because by May 1 there was no complete picture available of what had happened. It is true that we feared panic; you can imagine yourself what the possible consequences of a massive panic can be in a city of several million! Now it is evident that that was a mistake.33

The first information about the tragedy was published in the Pravda newspaper on 28 April 1986. Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated:

Висновок спеціалістів КДБ СРСР про характер вибуху 4-го реактора ЧАЕС. 16 травня 1986 р. (ГДАСБУкраїни) (Conclusion of USSR KGB specialists about the nature of explosion at ChNPPUnit 4. May 16, 1986. (SSU Ukraine)) [http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/ publish/article?art_id¼49046]. 32 Vyacheslav Orlov and ArkadiyUskov, Eliminators of Accident Effects at Chernobyl NPP, [http:// uatom.org/index.php/uk/2016/04/20/intervyu-redaktsii-uatom-org-s-uchastnikami-likvidatsiiavarii-na-chernobylskoj-aes-orlovym-vyacheslavom-i-uskovym-arkadiem/]. 33 Интервью с Горбачевым М.С., Журнал Международного Зеленого Креста «Оптимист» № 8., 2006 (Interview with M. Gorbachev, “Optimist,” Organization of International Green Cross Magazine No. 8., 2006). 31

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I needed more exact and comprehensive information for a substantive, well-contemplated address to the people. That is why I waited for almost three weeks before I spoke to the people about it.34

The letter of Yuri Dubinin, the USSR’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, addressed to the UN Secretary-General, contained the complete text of Gorbachev’s public address on Soviet television on 14 May 1986.35 An important element of the Gorbachev address was his statement that “thanks to the effective measures taken, it is possible to say that the worst things are now behind us. It was possible to prevent the most severe consequences.” It is understood that this was said for the wider public audience, in order to reassure people and stabilize the situation in the country. However, the actual situation was much worse and the effectiveness of the measures taken then still remains questionable. The same address expressed quite strict criticism towards the representatives of the United States and other industrially developed countries and governments of the European community. The fact is that on 5 May 1986, state and government leaders of the seven industrially developed countries of the European community made an official statement on the consequences of the Chernobyl NPP accident during the Tokyo Economic Summit held from 4 to 6 May 1986. In the statement, they voiced sympathy to those who were affected by the accident and expressed readiness to provide medical and technical assistance.36 The Soviet Government took this statement extremely negatively. Gorbachev stressed that the leaders of the seven countries used the Chernobyl accident to “distract the attention of the international community” from the issues of nuclear disarmament. In particular, he noted that on their part there was no reaction during the summit towards the Soviet initiatives in respect of the stopping of nuclear tests as well as nuclear and chemical disarmament.37 The response to these accusations was immediate. On the same day of 14 May 1986, Ronald Reagan’s administration responded with a statement about the situation around the accident at the Chernobyl NPP.38 The document confirmed the readiness to render assistance to the USSR in elimination of the accident’s effects, but however stated that Gorbachev had completely misinterpreted the statement of the group of countries made during the Tokyo Economic Summit. The document, furthermore, stated that neither the United States nor its partners that were in Tokyo

34

Ibid. Выступление Генерального секретаря Центрального Комитета Коммунистической партии Советского Союза по советскому телевидению 14 мая 1986 года [http://chernobyl. undp.org/english/docs/a_41_339_r.pdf]. 36 Tokyo Economic Summit Conference Statement on the Soviet Nuclear Reactor Accident at Chernobyl (May 5, 1986) [https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/search/speeches/speech_srch.html]. 37 Резолюция ООН (Генеральная Ассамблея) А 41/339 [http://chernobyl.undp.org/english/ docs/a_41_339_r.pdf]. 38 Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speaking on Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev’s Address on the Nuclear Reactor Accident at Chernobyl (May 14, 1986) [https:// www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1986/51486c.htm]. 35

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at the time “intended to score political points in connection with the Chernobyl tragedy.”39

2.2

Causes of the Accident

A single shared view of the causes of the accident at ChNPP does not exist even now. The fact is that the USSR KGB issued the secret document in July of 1986 containing the list of elements of the accident-related information to be classified. The first item of this document stated that “information revealing the actual causes of the accident at ChNPP Unit 4 should be made secret.”40 N. Karpan, V. Melnikov, V. Orlov, and V. Tarasenko, who participated in the elimination of the accident’s effects, revealed these causes in their article in an objective and complete manner. The article was published in 1990 in just one periodical, Vestnik Chernobylya, due to the specifics of that period of history. They addressed in detail all the doubtful elements of the official Soviet reasoning of what had actually happened at the Plant on April 26. However, the intention now is to focus on the most important thing which is the wording used to formulate the official version of the accident’s causes. The following is the language used to officially define the cause of the accident at ChNPP presented at the IAEA expert meeting in Vienna during August 25–29, 1986, and adopted by the Government Commission for Investigation of the Causes of the Chernobyl Accident (A. Meshkov Group): “the primary cause of the accident was the extremely improbable combination of violations of the operational mode and procedures made by the power unit personnel.”41 In the above-mentioned article this wording is compared with the language used in the report of the Institute of Atomic Energy entitled “The Study of Causes of the Chernobyl NPP Accident,” approved by Y. Ryazantsev, PhD in Technical Sciences, the Deputy Director of the Institute in October 1986. This wording is: . . . the primary cause of the accident was the extremely improbable combination of violations of the operational mode and procedures made by the power unit personnel, revealing the design deficiencies of the reactor and reactor control and safety rods.”42

Thus, it is evident that only the abridged official version was presented to the international community. The Soviet Union was unwilling to acknowledge the faulty choice of the reactor design type, which had major engineering problems. The article

39

Ibid. An archive document. List of Elements of Information Related to Accident at Unit 4 of Chernobyl NPP to be Classified (“Secret”) [http://back-in-ussr.com/2016/07/rassekrechennye-dokumenty-pochernobylyu.html]. 41 Information about Accident at Chernobyl NPP and Relevant Consequences Prepared for IAEA, August 1986, Atomic Energy Magazine, Volume 61, issue No. 51986. 42 SPA Pripyat, “VestnikChernobylya” in 1990) (Parliament Library Archive). 40

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also says that “such concealment of the “meaningless” analysis findings made it possible for the RBMK designers and/or the Government Commission to “turn everything upside down,” so to say, and put the whole burden of responsibility on other people.”43 The point is that, according to the requirements of the Nuclear Safety Rules (item 3.3.26) pertaining to the reactor control and emergency protection systems, “the reactor emergency protection system shall provide for suppression of a chain reaction in an expeditious and reliable manner.”44 Let us again revisit the Vesnik Chernobylya journal, quoting an interesting fact indicating the real problems with the RBMK reactor protection system. “At 1:23.04 a.m. ChNPP Unit 4 personnel began tests at the time when the reactor parameters were the closest to stability (based on the information provided to the IAEA).” Then, after 36 seconds, the personnel pressed the reactor shut down button (the EP button), remaining calm and without panic (as there were no reasons for that), having seen that the tests were practically over and turbine generator No. 8 run out parameters were registered by all sensors in a timely and synchronized manner (non-standard equipment was also engaged in the tests: oscilloscopes, second meters, recording equipment). Suddenly, contrary to any logic and common sense “built into” the mandatory Nuclear Safety Rules for reactor emergency protection systems, the reactor capacity first decreased a little bit (~25 MW) and then began to abruptly grow and gain speed leading to the uncontrolled reactor capacity acceleration and, then, ending with explosion.” This illustrates the key problem of the RBMK reactor design: the deficiency of the reactor emergency protection system. It was stated in the report of the Gosatomnadzor commission on the analysis of the causes and circumstances of the accident at ChNPP Unit 4, that the deficiencies in the design of control rods (positive run out) led to the situations when the reactor emergency protection system not only failed to perform the relevant functions but was initiating reactor capacity acceleration by itself in certain reactor operational modes.45 This is the evidence of the fact that the reactor designers were not able to assess the effectiveness of the reactor emergency protection system performance in different operational circumstances. At the same time, the operational personnel and representatives of the scientific and design organizations engaged themselves in a discussion involving mutual accusations. Academic Anatoly Aleksandrov, the President of the USSR AOS, the Director of Institute of Atomic Energy and scientific leader of the RBMK reactor design project, gave the following answer to the question about the existing drawbacks of the design of the ChNPP reactor in his interview with Ogonyok magazine:

43

Ibid. Правила ядерной безопасности атомных электростанций, ПБЯ-04-74 (31 декабря 1974) [http://accidont.ru/NREG74.html]. 45 Доклад Комиссии Госатомнадзора СССР «О причинах и обстоятельствах аварии на 4 блоке Чернобыльской АЭС 26 апреля 1986 год» (Киев 1991 г.) (ReportofUSSRGosatomnadzorOnCausesandCircumstancesofAccidentatChNPPUnit 4 on April 26, 1986 (Kyiv 1991)). 44

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Please understand, the reactor design has drawbacks; now the scope of those have been reduced, deficiencies have been compensated for. The issue is not in the reactor design. When you are driving a car and turn the steering wheel in the wrong direction, this ends with an accident. Is the car engine to blame for it or, maybe, the car designer? Everyone would say: this accident is the fault of the unqualified driver.46

In his turn, Valery Legasov, whom Aleksandrov called his successor, thought that the primary cause of the accident at ChNPP was the fact that the construction of the reactor facilities that did not comply with the nuclear safety requirements and was approved despite the warnings of nuclear industry experts. Legasov said: Well, let us look at this in retrospect. Viktor Sidorenko, the corresponding fellow of the USSR AOS, used to work at our Institute. Now he is in the position of Deputy Chairman of the State Atomic Energy Supervision Committee. Around the same time [of the RBMK approval] he completed his PhD thesis, and then wrote a book where he proves the point that power plants without safe containment should not exist, regardless of the design type, be that VVER or RBMK, as this is dangerous and criminal by nature. However, as the saying goes, “they spat on him from a tall bell tower” [turned a deaf ear to him] because the addition of safe containment to the design would have increased the cost of construction of every power plant by 25–30%. Thus, since the Gosplan [the USSR State Planning Committee] allocates a strictly defined amount of funds for the development of nuclear energy, that means that 25–30% less nuclear plants would then be built in the targeted timeframe.47

Legasov’s attitude towards the USSR leadership policy in the area of nuclear power was quite critical in general. In his interview Legasov supported the statement made by Nikolay Ryzhkov at the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on July 14, when he said: “I have an impression that the country was slowly and steadily heading towards “Chernobyl” while developing its nuclear energy.” “We were heading towards “Chernobyl”,” confirmed Legasov.48 Anatoly Dyatlov, who worked as ChNPP Chief Engineer, believed that the RBMK design deficiencies in particular were the cause of the accident: . . .there was nothing alarming, no signs of accident, at the moment the EP-5 button was pressed. Apart from the [recorded] control system data, there is available witnesses’ evidence of that too. However, in such conditions the emergency protection system had not shut the reactor down, but accelerated its capacity instead. You can say that this could have not happened! But it did! That’s exactly what happened.” He also stated that “the different commissions [conclusions] pointed at certain drawbacks. However, they look right through the fact that the reactor was not compliant with the Nuclear Safety Rules. . .acknowledgment of the finding of the Nuclear Safety Rules violation in the design directly entails criminal prosecution of the guilty; this is stipulated in the Rules.49

Журнал «Огонек» №35, август 1990. Интервью с А.П. Александровым. Корреспонд ентВандаБелецкая (Ogonyok Magazine No.35, August 1990. Interview with A. Aleksandrov, Correspondent Vanda Beletskaya) (Parliament Library Archive). 47 Расшифровка аудиозаписи с голоса академика Валерия Алексеевича Легасова (Verbatim notes of audio record of Academician Valeriy Legasov’s narration) [http://scepsis.net/library/ id_3203.html]. 48 Ibid. 49 Письмо Дятлова. Архив ГНТЦЯРБ (Letter of A. Dyatlov. Archives of SSTC NRS). 46

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Dyatlov disagreed completely with the findings of the Government Commission’s study. In his book he wrote that. . . . at the time no other conclusion could have been made, since the investigation from the very beginning was entrusted with the reactor designers; it was not natural as those where potentially guilty. No commission included a member who would be interested in calling the reactor and its properties the cause of the accident. On the contrary, directly, indirectly, or collectively in the extreme case, all of them were happy to accuse the operational personnel. Most importantly, it rendered everything simple and understandable.50

2.3

Punishment of the Guilty

A. Yakimenko, the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, in his memorandum of 30 July 1987, addressed to V. Scherbitskiy, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, brought to attention the successful completion of the lawsuit in relation to the accident at Chernobyl Power Plant. As it was stated in the document “the litigation process has been performed in an organised manner, without any disruptions.” In the result. . . . all the accused individuals have been found guilty in violation of the technical processrelated discipline, standard requirements and rules of safety at the potentially explosionhazardous facility, leading to an accident with the loss of human life.51

Viktor Brukhanov, the Director of ChNPP, was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, Nikolai Fomin, the ChNPP Chief Engineer, and Anatoly Dyatlov, were sentenced to 10 years each; Boris Rogozhkin and A. Kovalenko had to spend three years in prison each. Y. Lavushin, the State Inspector of Gosatomnadzor had to serve a two-year sentence for “negligence in the form of lessened control of compliance with the occupational safety requirements at a nuclear power plant.” In the extract from the court ruling related to sentences of the above-mentioned individuals, Lavushkin’s attitude to the performance of his service duties was characterized as “criminally negligent”; it was also stated that he conducted inspections in a “superficial” manner. Thus, the “guilty” were found and punished. However, many people believed that the circle of those guilty in the accident was much wider, and included, predominantly, the representatives of the Communist Party nomenclature who made much more serious strategic mistakes leading to formation of the weak system of control of the safe use of nuclear power in the USSR.

Дятлов А. С. Чернобыль. Как это было. — М.: Научтехлитиздат, 2003. — 191 с. Докладная записка от 30 июля 1987 года председателя Верховного Суда Украины Якименко А.Н. первому секретарю ЦК КПУ Щербицкого В.В. об успешном проведении судебного процесса по делу об аварии на Чернобыльской АЭС. 50 51

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193

Glasnost and the Chernobyl Accident

From the very onset of the accident, the CPSU Central Committee introduced a very strict policy to control the information presented to the public. According to the Protocol of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo meeting of 29 April 1986, entitled “On Government Information Messages,” the Party retained the right to prior approval of texts intended for publication in the press, as well as information to be provided to the leaders of a number of capitalist and socialist countries with regard to the accident at the Chernobyl Power Plant, or measures taken to eliminate its effects.52 Furthermore, in accordance with the Annex to Protocol No. 21 of 4 June 1986, when informing about the progress of the elimination of the accident’s consequences, it was necessary to. . . .point out the groundless nature of the claims and assessments expressed both by individuals and the press of Western countries, alleging that significant environmental and economic damage was inflicted due to the spread of a small quantity of radioactive substances transferred by the air particles from the area of the Chernobyl NPP.53

This notwithstanding, the environmental problems did exist as mentioned in the memorandum of 25 September 1987, of the first Department of the fifth Office of the KGB. One of the relevant examples is the ecological problem with small rivers caused by the destruction of certain dams that. . . .have led to the wash-out of the surface layer of the flooded radionuclide contaminated soil and silt. As a result, the radioactivity level increased up to 210–8 Ci/l in the river Braginka (it was 2 times higher than the admissible normal value) and up to 4510–9 Ci/l in the rivers Sakhan, Ilya and others.54

Moreover, the environmental situation also degraded not only because of the natural factors but also due to the lack of administrative control of technical processrelated discipline at the site of ChNPP. Special report of Colonel P. Dolot, Acting Head of the UkrSSR KGB Office for the city of Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast of 28 August 1987, showed certain instances of major negligence leading to the negative environmental effects. For example, “On August 19, the fuel assembly plug was dropped down into the channel 15–33 due to the negligence of personnel while performing maintenance work at the plateau of the 3rd reactor.”55 The Communist Party’s elite was unwilling to reveal the existing problems and challenges encountered in the process of eliminating the accident’s effects. Only Yaroshinska, A; Deputy of the Congress of People Deputies of the USSR (1989–1991). “Chernobyl, The Big Lie” 2011, Vremya. 53 Ibid. 54 Information on Radiological Situation in Area of Chernobyl NPP, October 25, 1987, SSU SA. – F. 65. – Ref. 1 – Т. 43. – P. 13–13. 55 Начальнику 6 Управления КГБ УССР подполковнику тов. Слободенюку В.Н. гор. Киев, ОбобстановкенаЧернобыльскойАЭС, ДАСБУ. — Ф. 65. — Спр. 1. — Т. 42. — Арк. 296–297 (Memorandum to ComradeV. Slobodenyuk, Head of sixth Department of UkrSSR KGB, Kyiv, On Situation at Chornobyl NPP, SSUSA. – F 65. – Ref. 1. – Т. 42. – P. 296–297). 52

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some of the facts of this kind were mentioned above; in reality such problems and challenges were much more numerous, and linked to, in particular, medical treatment and prophylaxis of the people affected by the accident, accommodation of the evacuees, and so forth. However, let us look back at the primary source of these problems: the excessive secrecy that, in fact, was the determining factor of significance both in the context of the Chernobyl Accident and the further development of the nuclear industry. An interesting fact is that for Gorbachev the situation with and around secrecy in connection with the accident was absolutely unacceptable in the light of his program of “Perestroika” [Reconstruction], democratic outlooks of the prospects for the further development of the Soviet Union and policy of openness pursued with regard to society and government authorities. Based on his beliefs, he stated the following at the Politburo meeting on July 3: In no way will we agree to hide the truth neither when we resolve practical matters, nor when we explain things to the public. We bear responsibility for the assessment of what is now happening and the correctness of the relevant conclusions. Our work now is being done out in the open for the people and for the whole world. It is not acceptable to think that one can do this with only half-measures, or use tricks. A cowardly policy is an indecent policy.56

For Mikhail Sergeyevich [Gorbachev] the Chernobyl tragedy was a real kick-start for launching his Glasnost program, a concept that was devised long ago and first articulated back in 1985. In his book of memoirs, he writes that. . . . the Chernobyl Accident and the attitude to it was, in fact, the test for Glasnost. In general, this accident opened my eyes on many things such as the processes taking place in our science, actual status of safety in respect of nuclear matters, and level of expertise of NPP workers.”57

Based on such impressions, he declared the beginning of the “Era of Glasnost” one year after the accident at the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on January 27, 1987. Since then, Gorbachev was most active in his attempts to translate this concept into reality.58 Boris Kachura, a politician in the Ukrainian SSR, stated in his interview that “the Chernobyl Accident was the breakthrough in the system of Glasnost . . . It was the first precedent when the Government told the truth that we have this ordeal.”59 Михаил Горбачев. “Наедине с собой”, М.: “Гринстрит”, 2012. - 688 с. (Gorbachev, Mikhail. Life and Reforms, Memoirs, 1995, Novosti Publishers, Moscow). 57 Gorbachev, Mikhail. In the Privacy of Own Mind. М.: “Grin strit”, 2012. - 688 P. 58 Verbatim Report of the CPSU Central Committee Meeting, October 1987. 59 Усна Історія Незалежної України 1988–1991 (Маргарита Гевко та Сара Сіверс) інтерв’ю з Борисом Качурою (радянський та українськи йполітичнийдіяч. Член Політбюро ЦК КПУ (1980–1990), секретар ЦК КПУ (1982–1990). Народний депутат України (1990–1994), заступник голови комісії ВР України з питань розвитку базових галузей народного господарства) від 19 липня 1996 (2 касети) (Oral History of Independent Ukraine, 1988–1991 (Margarita Gevko and Sara Sivers). Interview with Boris Kachura (Soviet and Ukrainian political activist, member of Politburo of Central Committee of Communist Party of Ukraine (1980–1990), Secretary of Central Committee of UkrSSR Communist Party (1982–1990). People’s Deputy of 56

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The part of the international community that was pursuing anti-Communist ideas used the Chernobyl tragedy to demonstrate the deceitfulness of the Soviets as well as their unwillingness to be open, particularly, in the context of the active talks about nuclear disarmament. In his memoirs Gorbachev mentions that “everything was done to discredit our initiatives and portray them as some sort of utopia and not the honest invitation to disarmament.”60 The issue of disarmament appeared very high on the agenda in the light of the events linked with the Chernobyl Accident. In a documentary Gorbachev stated that. . . . the Chernobyl Accident demonstrated what it means to be keeping nuclear energy in our hands. Most importantly, we made a comparison analysis that showed that 100 “Chernobyls” were contained in just one of our most powerful missiles, SS-18, with the individually targetable and self-controlled warhead elements, the one that the Americans feared the most. I think that we had 2700 of such missiles at the time. So, imagine what could have happened if this had been used.61

As a result of this, Gorbachev focused the attention of the adversary alliance on something that was supposed to convince it to agree to begin disarmament. “Although the Soviet and American leadership understood even before, better than anybody else, on what kind of . . . volcanoes both countries had been sitting, well, not just the two countries, the whole world. . .the whole world,”62 said Gorbachev describing the actual situation at that time. Hans Blix, IAEA Director General (1981–1997) stated in the same documentary that “Mr. Gorbachev has rightly said that the Chernobyl Accident had demonstrated what happens when nuclear energy gets out of control. It was a very dramatic demonstration to all the people that we must get rid of nuclear weapons.”63

2.5

Situation Around the Liquidation Activities after Accident at Chernobyl NPP

Overcoming the consequences after the accident at the Chernobyl NPP remained also among the key challenges for Ukraine in general and in particular for the industry. According to a National report64 within the period 1986–1989, the total

Ukraine (1990–1994), Deputy Head of Parliamentary Commission of Ukraine for the development of the basic industries of national economy) of July 19, 1996 (2 tapes)). 60 Gorbachev, op. cit. 61 Battle for Chornobyl, a documentary, 2006, United States [https://www.youtube.com/watch? v¼02SCFubKUC8]. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Національна доповідь «Двадцять п’ять років Чорнобильської катастрофи. Безпека майбутнього». – К. КІМ, 2011. – 356 с. (National Report: Twenty Five Years after the Chernobyl Accident. Safety for the Future. – K. KIM, 2011. – 356 pages).

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Table 2 Structure of the Total Losses of Ukraine from the CNPP Accident as at 2010a No. 1 1.1 1.2 2 2.1 2.2

3 Total

Loss Item Direct loss of material and economy assets –inside the exclusion zone –outside the exclusion zone Direct expenditure for works and arrangements to clean up accident aftereffects –Ukraine’s share in the expenditure side of the State Budget of the USSR (1986–1991) –expenses of independent Ukraine (1992–2010) including expenditure related to the decommissioning of CNPP and conversion of the Object Shelter into an environmentally safe system Indirect expenses (for 30-year period after the accident—Until 2015) and losses from premature decommissioning of CNPP

USD MM 1385 840

5732.5 12,194.94

178,250 198,402.44

Національнадоповідь «Двадцятьп’ятьроківЧорнобильськоїкатастрофи. Безпекамайбутнь ого». – К. КІМ, 2011. – 356 с. (National Report: Twenty Five Years after the Chernobyl Accident. Safety for the Future. – K. KIM, 2011. – 356 pages) a

amount of direct losses and expenses from all sources of financial support in the USSR was 9200 million roubles (approximately USD15.18 billion65). At the same time, if we look further and include the time after the independent of Ukraine, the total sum of direct expenses in 1986–2010 amounted to USD30500 million. In accordance with the presented calculation pattern the total economic loss of Ukraine caused by the Chernobyl NPP accident amounts to USD198 million (Table 2). On 25 April 1990, USSR with its Resolution aimed to introduce unified and centralized measures on the consequences of the liquidation of the catastrophe and proposals pertaining to their elimination in future approved “The State Soviet and Republican Program of Urgent Measures on the Consequences of the Liquidation of the Chernobyl NPP Accident for 1990–1992.”66 The USSR allocated 10,300 million roubles (approximately USD14.1 billion) for activities within this Program. However, after the USSR collapsed, the newly independent states became responsible for the liquidation activities by themselves. Therefore, the rest of the necessary financing was covered by the state budgets of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation.67

65

According to the currency exchange rate from 1989 [https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A0% D1%83%D0%B1%D0%BB%D1%8C_%D0%A1%D0%A1%D0%A1%D0%A0]. 66 USSR Supreme Soviet, Resolution. On a Unified Program to Eliminate the Results of the Accident at the Chernobyl NPP and the Situation Connected with that Accident. April 25, 1990. 67 Національна доповідь «Двадцять п’ять років Чорнобильської катастрофи. Безпека майбутн ього». – К. КІМ, 2011. – 356 с. (National Report: Twenty Five Years after the Chernobyl Accident. Safety for the Future. – K. KIM, 2011. – 356 pages).

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After 1991, Ukraine remained face to face with the problems of the accident’s aftermath. The safety of the “sarcophagus,” disposal of radioactive waste in the Exclusion Zone, and assistance to re-settlers lay as a heavy burden on the budget of the newly emerged state. Throughout the 1990s, Ukraine was spending nearly USD700 million annually to address the Chernobyl problems.68 Independent Ukraine, in order to define its national approach towards elimination of the Chernobyl catastrophe, adopted the Laws of Ukraine On the legal regime of territories affected by radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe69 and On the status and social protection of citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe.70 It created a legal framework for definition of the radioactive contamination zones and introduction of the criteria of resettlement, system of monitoring, etc.71 In parallel with the liquidation process, Ukraine had to solve the problem with shutting down the Chernobyl reactors, which were under operation at that time. The international community as well as Ukrainian society demanded to do it as soon as possible, the problem with shortage of electricity generation in case Chernobyl NPP was shut down required particular consideration. However, Ukraine stopped Unit 2 of the Chernobyl NPP in 1991 after an accident occurred in the reactor. Unit 1 and 3 were shut down later. President Leonid Kuchma promised to the European Union and the G-7 to close down the Chernobyl NPP by the year 2000. Such a commitment was announced in the letter addressed on 19 May 1995 to President Jacques Santer.72 In exchange for this step, the European Commission confirmed its intention to “disburse immediately ECU 85 million in macro-financial assistance to Ukraine and to proceed rapidly with the implementation of the additional balance of payments support of up to ECU 200 million agreed in principle by the Council of the European Union.”73 More details on this situation are presented further in this chapter. Following such commitments, on 20 December 1995, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ukraine and the Governments of the G-7 and the Commission of the European Community on the closure of the

В.І. Шевченко, Л.З. Півень, Енергетика України: який шлях обрати, щоб вижити?; К.: “Просвіта,” 1999 р (Парламентська бібліотека) (Shevchenko V., Piven L. Power Sector of Ukraine: Where Is a Way to Survival?; K.: Prosvita, 1999 (Parliamentary Library)). 69 Law of Ukraine “On legal regime of territories affected by radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe” [zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/791а-12, 27 February 1991 року No791а-XIІ.] 70 Law of Ukraine “On status and social protection of citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe” [http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/791-12, 27February 1991 No 791-XII]. 71 Національна доповідь «Двадцять п’ять років Чорнобильської катастрофи. Безпека майбут нього». – К. КІМ, 2011. – 356 с. (National Report: Twenty Five Years after the Chernobyl Accident. Safety for the Future. – K. KIM, 2011. – 356 pages). 72 European Commission press release [europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-95-553_en.htm]. 73 Ibid. 68

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Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant was signed. Therefore, based on the aforementioned agreements, Unit 1 was finally stopped on 30 November 1996 and Unit 3 was stopped on 15 December 2000 by the respective decision of the Cabinet of Ministers on the premature termination of the block’s operation and the complete closure of the nuclear power plant.74

2.6

Chernobyl Accident and Its Impact on How the IAEA Responded to This Crisis

The Chernobyl accident had a great influence on worldwide nuclear energy development and IAEA’s approach towards nuclear safety in general. It stipulated strengthening international legal frameworks, through adoption of a number of international instruments aimed at mitigating potential accidents in the future. The IAEA, right after the accident, convened a Board of Governors meeting where the preparation of two international conventions on early notification of nuclear accidents and on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident were approved.75 A few months later on 26 September 1986, the IAEA General Conference approved both conventions—Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. Both Conventions set up crucial provision of activities which should be pursued by member states in case of accidents. For example, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident Article 2 defines that Parties to the Convention in case of accidents (defined in Article 1) should notify directly or through IAEA those states which may be physically affected. Additionally, the Convention foresaw that information regarding the accident should be available to minimize the radiological consequences there.76 In 1986, the IAEA initiated the International Chernobyl Project to understand the causes of the accident and to identify what should be done at an international level to overcome nuclear accidents in the future. Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA provided great leadership in this process. The IAEA involved in this project international experts from the Commission of the European Communities, FAO, ILO, UNSCEAR, WHO, and WMO.77

Law of Ukraine “On pre-term decommissioning of the power unit N 1 of the Chornobyl NPP” [http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1445-97-п]. 75 History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: the first forty years/by David Fischer. — Vienna: The Agency, 1997 [www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1032_web.pdf]. 76 International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period, Learning the hard way: did the lessons taught by the Chernobyl nuclear accident contribute to improving nuclear law, Norbert Pelzer [https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/chernobyl/PELZER.pdf]. 77 History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: the first forty years/by David Fischer. — Vienna: The Agency, 1997 [www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1032_web.pdf]. 74

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The accident demonstrated that nuclear safety is not only a national responsibility and concern, but requires broad international cooperation and assistance. The IAEA actively contributed to strengthening nuclear safety through its assistance programs, such as the Operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs); Assessment of Safety Significant Events Teams (ASSETs); Engineering Safety Review Services (ESRS); The International Peer Review Service for Probabilistic Safety Assessment (IPERSPSA), and others.78 The IAEA became a platform for elaboration and adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1994. The Convention was further developed based on the work of the IAEA Director General’s International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG). They analyzed the results of the post-accident review meeting between the USSR and the IAEA in August 1986 and issued a respective report which was reviewed several times. It was valuable during INSAG’s work over the Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants (INSAG-3) and Nuclear Safety Fundamentals. Based on these materials the Convention was prepared. The IAEA convened a number of crucially important events for improving dialog and concentrating international efforts to tackle nuclear safety challenges after the Chernobyl accident. For example, among others, the crucial role played by the International Conference One Decade after Chernobyl: Summing up the Consequences of the Accident, which was held in Vienna on 8–12 April 1996.79 Prior to the Conference, an International Forum on One Decade after Chernobyl: Nuclear Safety Aspects, jointly sponsored by the IAEA and UNDHA, was held also in Vienna on 1–3 April 1996. The Forum addressed nuclear safety issues, including, e.g., (1) measures to improve the safety of RBMK reactors and (2) safety of the construction built around the destroyed reactor.80 The Conference incorporated the results of the Forum and other elaborations existing at that time. Blix, in his opening address, mentioned that “. . .the causes of the Chernobyl accident are by now rather well traced and identified.” However, he also noted that “the errors in technology, organization and management, which caused the accident, must be identified to prevent any repetition and the damages caused by the accident must be accurately assessed and diagnosed so that rational remedies may be applied.”81 This practicality in the IAEA’s approach was crucial to further strengthen safety as well as improve/ modernize the technology used for nuclear power generation. Since Chernobyl, the IAEA has actively developed and improved the “safety culture.” This term firstly appeared after the accident and referred to “assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals which establishes that, 78

International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period, Learning the hard way: did the lessons taught by the Chernobyl nuclear accident contribute to improving nuclear law, Norbert Pelzer [https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/chernobyl/PELZER.pdf]. 79 Proceedings series. The International Conference on One Decade after Chernobyl: Summing up the Consequences of the Accident was held at the Austria Center, Vienna, on 8–12 April 1996 [https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1001_web.pdf]. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid.

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as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.”82 The post-Chernobyl development of industry was under the umbrella of the application of a safety culture. The IAEA incorporated the lessons learnt after the Chernobyl accident to its General Safety Requirements series, Specific Safety Guides, and other standards related to safety culture.

3 Moratorium on the Construction of New Nuclear Power Plants in the UkrSSR and the Public Factor in Atomic Energy Development in the Early 1990s One of the most challenging parts in the history of nuclear energy during the early 1990s in Ukraine was the time of moratorium on the construction of new NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR. In the wake of the Chernobyl accident, as well as due to the bitter social tensions, the Supreme Council (Parliament) of the Ukrainian SSR passed the Decree No. 134-XII On the Moratorium on the Construction of New Nuclear Power Plants in the Ukrainian SSR on 02 September 1990. The moratorium covered not only construction of new NPPs but also suspension of further “expansion of existing NPPs above the capacities installed as of 1 August 1990 for a period of five years.”83 At the time the moratorium was introduced, Ukraine had on its territory 5 power plants with a total of 15 nuclear units in operation. Zaporizhzhia NPP had 5 VVER1000 reactors in operation and another VVER-1000 under construction; at Rivne NPP, there were 3 reactors: 2 VVER-440 s and 1 VVER-1000 plus 1 VVER-1000 under construction; South-Ukraine NPP had 3 VVER-1000 reactors (construction of South-Ukraine NPP Unit 4 was suspended by a USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 16 August 1989); Khmelnitsky NPP had 1 VVER-1000 in operation plus 1 VVER-1000 under construction; Chernobyl NPP had 3 operating RBMK-1000 reactors. The moratorium caused stoppage of the construction work on Khmelnitsky NPP Unit 2, Rivne NPP Unit 4, and Zaporizhzhia NPP Unit 6. Furthermore, additional projects were suspended, never to be renewed again. These included the Crimean NPP, the Odessa NHPP, the Kharkov NHPP, and the Chigirin NPP. There were ideas for the conversion of these sites. For example, by the resolution of the USSR Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy and Industry E. Reshetnikov, the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry (Minatomenergoprom) was directed to use the site of 82

International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period, Learning the hard way: did the lessons taught by the Chernobyl nuclear accident contribute to improving nuclear law, Norbert Pelzer [https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/chernobyl/PELZER.pdf]. 83 Про мораторій на будівництво нових атомних електростанці й на території Української РСР Верховна Рада УРСР; Постановавід 02.08.1990 № 134-XII (On the Moratorium on the Construction of New Nuclear Power Plants in the Ukrainian SSR. UkrSSR Supreme Council, Decree of 02/08/1990 No. 134-XII) [http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/134-12].

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the Crimean NPP construction for the establishment of a scientific and engineering center.84 This resolution never came true, albeit even with the high level of the NPPs completion: 80% for Unit 1 and 18% for Unit 2. The moratorium unleashed acute trouble with the workforce, particularly the people involved in the nuclear plants’ construction. These workers found themselves in a very hard socioeconomic situation due to massive shrinkage of public contracts. Social upheaval became impending. Nuclear construction teams from the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, South-Ukraine, Zaporizhzhia, and Crimean NPPs sought a decision from the government, their requirements being. . . . to provide the nuclear civil and construction personnel with guaranteed public contracts for the scope equal to the curtailed works at each of the projects in 1991 and at least 75–80% in subsequent years; to secure public funding of production infrastructure of plant satellite towns; to provide profit and payroll tax benefits for civil and construction organisations in view of the need for staff conversion and retraining as well as for potential relocation of parts of the construction teams for the retraining period.85

The Ukrainian government tried to resolve the situation. At the beginning of 1991, the Committee for Heavy Industry Sectors under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR) Council of Ministers announced that centralized funds were to be allocated for 1991, “equal to the scope of the civil and construction works scheduled for 1990, ensuring nearly all of the scheduled workload.”86 These

Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис №15, справа 1868 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласними організа ціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР / 19.06.1990 № 04–442 от заместителя министра атомной энергетики и промышленности СССР Решетникова Е.А., кому: Совет Министров УССР, Министерство энер етикии электрификации СССР и Крымский Облиспоком (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file 1868: Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR/19 June 1990 No. 04–442. From Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy and Industry E. Reshetnikov to the Council of Ministers of UkrSSR, the USSR Ministry of Energy and Electrification, and Crimean Oblast Executive Committee.) 85 Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис 15, справа №1871 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласними рганізаціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР/ 30.11.1990 №03–03/195 От Украинского республиканского комитета профсоюза рабочих электростанций и электротехничесткою промышленности. Кому – заместителю главы Министров Украинской РСР товарищу Гладушу В.Д. Тема: требования трудовых колективовэнергостроителей АЭС Украины в связи с принятием моратория на строительство АЭС. (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file 1871: Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR/30 November 1990 No. 03–03/195. From the Ukrainian Republican Union of Workers of Power Plants and Power Industry to Deputy Chairman of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers V. Gladush. Subject: Requirements of Power Plant Construction Teams in Relation to the NPP Construction Moratorium.) 86 Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис 15, справа №1871 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласнимиорга нізаціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР/21.01.1991 №15/42 от 84

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measures were piecemeal and did not offer a comprehensive solution. The financial and economic conditions of personnel and inhabitants at the plants and in their satellite towns remained difficult. Local authorities and plant administrations were forced to seek their own ways out of the situation. For example, in Zaporizhzhia NPP construction of nuclear unit 6 had already started in 1995 using only their own resources. Under the moratorium, the aforementioned unit was not supposed to be commissioned, and construction work should not even have continued. However, plant management were able to persuade the republican leaders that “the construction and completion works would continue as planned, so that after the unit is commissioned it could be used as a simulator, without fuel in the core.”87 The activities over Unit 6 were in conflict with the moratorium. In addition, the operation of the plant itself stirred a sharp response of environmentalists and other anti-nuclear groups. Any method seemed to be good for keeping the situation under control and effectively counter any potential provocations. Zaporizhzhia NPP worked closely with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) in Zaporizhzhia region to interdict extremists at a distant approach, particularly near such localities as Marganets and Nikopol. Zaporizhzhia NPP received special assistance from the SSU in Dnipropetrovsk region who informed on the advancing anti-nuclear groups and retained MIA forces and SSU who were stationed near Energodar to keep the situation under control. Obviously, the Party leadership was not immune from public pressure either. Thus, when representatives of “green” movement reported to the party leadership that the moratorium was being violated, and that works continued at Zaporizhzhia NPP, this entailed consequences. As a result Zaporizhzhia NPP had a large visiting team, about 20 people strong, of Parliament members and politicians from Kyiv. NPP showed them the level of complexity of the operating units and convinced them that the Unit 6 would not be charged with fuel. Perception that the Unit 6 was developed as a real nuclear facility, subject to all existing standards of operational and radiation safety, rather than a training facility, was the key factor that enabled its further operation. By the time the decision to lift the moratorium was made everything was finished so it only remained to submit the prepared documentation to the regulator to demonstrate that the plant was ready for the start-up; by that time fuel was already in storage at Zaporizhzhia NPP.

Комитета по отраслям тяжелой промышленности при Совете Министров УССР, кому: главе ЦК профсоюз аработников энергетики электротехничесткой промышленности Украины тов. ШишовуС.С (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 1871: Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR/21 January 1991 No. 15/42. From the Committee for Heavy Industry Sectors under the UkrSSR Council of Ministers to the Head of the Central Committee of the Union of Workers of Power Plants and Power Industry of Ukraine S. Shishov.) 87 Энергия”, 1990, 8 августа, сархиваЗАЭС (Energia, 1990, 8 August; from ZNPP archives).

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At Khmelnitsky NPP, Unit 2 was 95% complete at the time the moratorium was introduced. Due to the high level of construction readiness some civil and construction works at the site went on. This fact, as well as the continued operation of Unit 1 caused acute socio-political tensions in Neteshin, the NPP satellite town. A number of informal organizations, established on this wave, arranged rallies, protests, processions, hunger strikes and maintained a massive outreach campaign against the plant construction. The activities of these groups were aimed to “make the town citizens believe that plant operation would inevitably result in unpredictable consequences and death of people.”88 The counter-propaganda efforts launched by political elites with the support from nuclear experts failed to yield a sufficient result: the public did not wish to calm down. Secretary of the Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine P. Prishchepa and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Oblast Council of People’s Deputies A. Yershov pointed out in their letter that public opinion had been stirred up so much that it was no longer possible to stabilize the situation. Their proposed solution was to invite a mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), because they believed, that “the established public opinion could only be influenced by an IAEA mission to the NPP.”89 Assurances to the public that an accident similar to the one in Chernobyl would not be allowed to occur at Khmelnitsky was another solution contemplated by the political leadership. Secretary of the Oblast Party Committee V. Kupratyi issued an instruction “to make radiation meters available for sale to the public and allow the public to participate in the environment monitoring.”90 Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління країни, Фонд №Р-2, опис №15, справа 1868 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласними організаціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР/23 января 1990 №4/20 от Секретаря обкома компартии Украины П.Прищепы и Председателя исполкома обласного совета народных депутатов А.Ершова. Кому: председателю совета министров СССР товарищу Рыжкову Николаю Ивановичу о проведении миссии МАГАТЭ по строительству и эксплуатации ХАЭС (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 1868, Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR/23 January 1990 No. 4/20. From Secretary of Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine P. Prishchepa and Chairman of Oblast Executive Committee of People’s Deputies A. Yershov to Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Comrade Nikolai Ryzhkov. On an IAEA Mission to Review Construction and Operation of the KNPP). 89 Ibid. 90 Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управлінняУкраїни, Фонд №Р-2, опис 15, справа №1871 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласнимиор ганізаціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР/26 февраля 1990 года от Секретаря Обкома компартии Украины В. Купратый, кому: Совет Министров СССР тов. Рыжкову Н.И. постановление пленума Хмельницкого обласного комитета Компартии Украины (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. №1871, Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR/26 February 1990. From Secretary of Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine V. Kupratyi to the USSR Council of Ministers, Comrade N. Ryzhkov. Resolution of the Plenum of Khmelnitsky Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine). 88

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The commissioning of Unit 4 at Rivne NPP was scheduled for 1991, since it also was practically completed at the time of the moratorium. Works at the site continued; the plans were even to complete the construction, given the high construction readiness. However, as it was noted in the letter to the Deputy Chairman of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers: . . . considering the consequences of the negative situation around these plans that are picketed by the public, civil and construction works at Unit 6 of Zaporizhzhia NPP and Unit 4 of Rivne NPP were substantially slowed down, whereas work at Unit 2 of Khmelnitsky NPP was entirely suspended.”91

While, as mentioned before, Unit 6 of Zaporizhzhia NPP was commissioned in 1995, Rivne NPP Unit 4 and Khmelnitsky NPP Unit 2 were ultimately put into operation only in 2004. The moratorium had a negative impact on power supply arrangements for the Ukrainian population. Over the period of the moratorium, the whole country experienced major problems with power supply. There were regular interruptions and frequent blackouts. Losses from the moratorium on the commissioning of new capacity at existing nuclear power facilities at the time amounted to nearly USD32 billion (67.32 billion roubles). The overall funding shortage experienced by the NPPs was nearly USD3 million (682,778 thousand karbovanets) in 1991.92 The negative impacts of the moratorium manifested itself in the areas of the economy and operational safety alike. This was the outcome arrived at by the members of the Commission of the Supreme Council of UkrSSR on the Development of Key Economy Sectors. Their analysis demonstrated that the Ukrainian NPPs

Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис 15, справа №1871 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласними організаціями пропроектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР/лис тзаступник уголови Радимін істрів УРСР тов. Гладушу В.Д. Про виконання постанови ВР УРСР “про мораторій на будівництво нових АЕС на території Української РСР” (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 1871, Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR/Letter to Deputy Chairman of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers Comrade V. Gladush on Implementation of the Resolution of the UkrSSR Supreme Council on the Moratorium on the Construction of New NPPs in Ukrainian SSR). 92 Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис 15, справа №2353 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласним и організаціями пропроектувння і будівництво АЕС вУкраїнськійРСР/19 червня 1991 року №06–4/12–161 від голови комісії з питань розвику базових галузей народного господарства ВР УРСР В. Євтухов, кому: кабінету міністрів Української РСР тов. ФокінуВ.П. (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 2353, Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR/19 June 1991 No. 06–4/12–161. From Head of the Commission of the Supreme Council of UkrSSR on the Development of Key Economy Sectors V. Yevtukhov to the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, Comrade V. Fokin). 91

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found themselves in a particularly grave position from the operation safety standpoint. The reason for this problem was seen in the “relaxed attention of the USSR Minatomenergoprom to the Ukrainian NPPs due to the moratorium and the expected transfer into Ukraine’s ownership.”93

3.1

End of the Moratorium

Parliament passed Resolution No. 3538-XII On Certain Measures for the Assurance of Power Supply for the Needs of the Economy on 21 November 1993, canceling the Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR of 2 August 1990 On the Moratorium on the Construction of New Nuclear Power Plants in the Ukrainian SSR.94 After the moratorium was lifted, the President of Ukraine passed Decree No. 64/94 On Urgent Measures for the Development of Atomic Energy and Establishment of a Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Ukraine on 23 February 1994. This document, which defined the main objectives, near-term plans, and responsible agencies, gave an impetus for further development of the Ukrainian nuclear sector. The document emphasized the need for a program to improve NPP operational safety, commission new nuclear units, create fresh fuel fabrication facilities, make arrangements for the storage of SNF, and provide research and development support for nuclear energy and industry. Furthermore, it set target dates for the commissioning of nuclear units with a medium or high level of readiness: Q3 of 1994 for Zaporizhzhia NPP Unit 6; 1995 for Chernobyl NPP Unit 2; 1995 for Khmelnitsky NPP Unit 2; 1996 for Rivne NPP Unit 4; 1998 for Khmelnitsky NPP Unit 3; and 1999 for Khmelnitsky NPP Unit 4.95 The political decision to support and enhance the development of the Ukrainian nuclear industry as one of the principal engines that would drive the country out of the energy crisis was not, however, backed by sufficient funding. Viktor Baryakhtar, Vice President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and chairman of the Nuclear Policy Commission under the President of Ukraine, said in 1994:“Amid the serious economic crisis faced by our country and all of us the government cannot allocate sufficient funding for the support of nuclear energy.”96 He emphasized also that

93

Ibid. On Certain Measures for the Assurance of Power Supply for the Needs of the Economy. Parliament of Ukraine; Resolution of 21/10/1993 No. 3538-XII. 95 Указ Президент України від 23.02.1994 № 64/94, “Про невідкладні заходи щодо розвитку атомної енергетики та формування ядерно-паливного циклу в Україні” (Decree of President of Ukraine of 23/02/1994 No. 64/94 On Urgent Measures for the Development of Atomic Energy and Establishment of a Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Ukraine) [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ru/ 64/94]. 96 Газета органов государственной исполнительной власти «Урядовый курьер», 3 февраля 1994 год (№19–20) (Uryadovy Kurier, the Executive Government Bulletin, 3 February 1994 (No. 19–20)) (The National Parliamentary Library of Ukraine). 94

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considering the possession of nuclear power and the plans for its further expansion the nation must find financial resources for its support. The drain of professional manpower deserved particular attention in this context. Due to unacceptable compensation many specialists moved to work at nuclear facilities in Russia. At industry level, over 150 persons left Ukrainian NPPs in 1990 alone; overall staff shortages at nuclear power plants were 3268 people97 (for example, the total number of employees in Khmelnitsky NPP (in 2017) was around 5000).98 The same problem was articulated by Mikhail Umanets, head of the State Committee of Ukraine for the Use of Atomic Energy: “If we fail to retain specialists, we will have no idea later what to do with the nuclear and radiation hazardous technology we still possess here.”99 He also raised another problem: the need to develop a scientific and technical base for nuclear facility maintenance. As he emphasized: 70% of nuclear energy equipment was manufactured in Russia and another 30% in Ukraine. We have developed a program jointly with Minatomenergoprom to establish production in Ukraine of the Russian equipment component. Unfortunately, this program is very expensive. However, we have to do this work as part of the conversion process, because this means both lower dependence and lower foreign currency expenditure.100

Financial hardships in the Ukrainian economy made the heavy power engineering industry almost entirely idle. For example, the world’s largest manufacturer of steam hydraulic power turbines for power plants, whose total portfolio included 164 turbines of different capacities for 24 nuclear power plants, had practically no orders in the mid1990s.101

3.2

Public Dimension

Members of the public, becoming increasingly concerned about nuclear safety, played an important role in the evolution of the nuclear power sector in independent Ukraine. The Interagency Council for Information and Public Relations in the Nuclear Power Sector was established to analyze public opinion related to the safety

97

Central State Archive, op. cit. Перспектива (інформаційний портал м. Нетішина), Профспiлковi лiдери позицiй не здають(09 Лютого 2017) [https://perspekt.org.ua/news/profspilkovi-lideri-pozicij-ne-zdayut]. 99 Газета органов государственной исполнительной власти «Урядовый курьер», 3 ноября 1994 год (№170–171) (UryadovyKurier, the Executive Government Bulletin, 3 November 1994 (No. 170–171)) (The National Parliamentary Library of Ukraine). 100 Ibid. 101 Газета «ФинансоваяУкраина» (раздел «Рынки»), №6, 6 февраля 1996 год (Finansovaya Ukraina newspaper (Markets section), No. 6, 6 February 1996) (The National Parliamentary Library of Ukraine). 98

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of Ukrainian NPPs. This Council published a special information bulletin covering important aspects of nuclear safety. However, it only reached a limited audience.102 Nur Nigmatullin, twice “Energoatom” President—from September 1997 to February 1999 and from January to September 2001—said in his interview, “It is very difficult for us to calm down the public after the Chernobyl [accident]. We need money to build public relations. Yet, this money we still cannot find.”103 Because of inefficient counter-propaganda, Ukraine saw the rapid expansion of organizations advocating closure of existing nuclear power plants and conversion to “renewable energy.” Public protests against nuclear power development put the sector in a dire situation. Under their influence, independent Ukraine’s government was forced to apply radical measures, such as the moratorium on the construction of new nuclear units, which was discussed above. Some members of the public used openness and democratic transformations in the nuclear sector to enhance their personal status through populist statements against nuclear power, backed by no alternative proposals. In this situation, the level of public awareness concerning the use of atomic power needed substantial improvement. Thus, the decision was made on 3 September 1992 to create an independent public organization called the Ukrainian Nuclear Society (UNS). Viktor Sapronov, then general manager of Khmelnitsky NPP, was the first president of UNS. The statute of the Society emphasized that its key task was “to promote the achievement of the required level of objective awareness on nuclear science and technology of UNS members, broad public circles, mass media, stakeholder organisations and individuals.”104 In spite of the activity aimed at raising public awareness and active communication with the pubic, socioeconomic problems in the energy sector, as well as generally in the economy always remained the priority in any discussions concerning the future of the nuclear sector. The situation in the nuclear energy sector was aggravated also by the absence of a national organization to administer this sector in the early 1990s. Following the dissolution of the USSR independent Ukraine lacked qualified politicians who would have been able to address this matter in a prompt and effective manner. Financial and economic hardships in Ukraine were another critical problem affecting the nuclear industry. These circumstances developed against the backdrop of domestic political rivalry for spheres of interest and cash flows.

Атомная энергетика: ответсвенность перед общественностью, Общество «Знание» Украинской ССР, Киев, 1991. (Atomic Energy: Responsibility before the Public, UkrainianSSR Znanie Society, Kyiv, 1991) (The National Parliamentary Library of Ukraine). 103 Специальный выпуск «Вестник Украинского Ядерного Общества». 1998 год, №2 (31–32) (Herald of the Ukrainian Nuclear Society, special release. 1998, No. 2 (31–32)) (The National Parliamentary Library of Ukraine). 104 Ukrainian Nuclear Society website. 102

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4 Establishing an Organization to Administer National Nuclear Power: Discussions, Key Problems, and Milestones The Chernobyl accident as well as follow-up liquidation process revealed weaknesses in the administration system of the nuclear sector in the USSR. The political control over NPPs was strengthened and was manifested in the appointment of Party organization leaders to each of the plants, in a setting similar to large defense sector enterprises. Party organization leaders at Ukrainian power plants reported directly to the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow, rather than to Kyiv. However, their cooperation with the regional Party offices was not ruled out, either. At the same time, NPP managements were accountable to their regional party organizations. After 1986, the USSR had a clear understanding that lack of a safety culture in both operational and R&D areas had been one of the key problems. It resulted in the decision to establish Minatomenergoprom which would take on the responsibility over the operational division only. On 8 April 1987, the USSR Council of Ministers passed the resolution On Approval of the Provision on the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the USSR, No. 419. Under this Resolution, the said Ministry was supposed to run the operations of nuclear power plants, nuclear heat and power plants, nuclear district heating plants, and other facilities aimed at generation of electricity and heat using nuclear fuel. The Ministry coordinated its activity with the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy (MOE), the USSR State Committee for Nuclear Energy Use (SCNEU), and Councils of Ministers of Soviet Republics.105 The USSR Minatomenergoprom did not last long since it proved unable to address the issues of safe and reliable operation of NPPs in a comprehensive manner. Lack of control over construction and procurement created a strong administrative barrier between R&D institutions and lead designers—the latter remained under the USSR MOE. The situation involving new and unfamiliar nuclear units required close coordination with scientists, engineers, and reactor designers, which was not the case during the lifetime of the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy. In view of low effectiveness of the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy all NPPs were transferred under the auspices of the USSR Ministry of Intermediate Engineering (Minsredmash) in 1989; after that the Ministry was renamed as the USSR Minatomenergoprom. This latter became a comprehensive authority extending its control to both NPPs and the military industrial complex of the USSR. This development immediately facilitated both equipment procurement and quality control (defense acceptance procedure was applied). All R&D and design organizations were brought together in a result-oriented model.

Постановление Совмина СССР от 08.04.1987 N 419 об утверждении Положения о Министерстве Атомной Энергетики СССР (Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of 08/04/1987 No. 419 on Approval of the Provision on the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the USSR) [http://www.economics.kiev.ua/download/ZakonySSSR/data02/tex12070.htm].

105

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Additionally, the rates at which new facilities were commissioned in the 1980s required a sufficient number of competent and qualified work force. For example, in average, at that time NPP in fact needed to hire 1000 persons per year who were to be trained to work at the plant, to operate the reactor, and to do maintenance work. It should be understood that the candidates either had no experience with complex technologies whatsoever or had a very rudimentary understanding of what quality was about and what type of systems existed. Under the new USSR Minatomenergoprom, NPPs experienced a much higher level of reliability. The quality assurance program and serious approach of the Ministry to sector development resulted in improved safety and better familiarity with NPPs, training that was more efficient and a higher level of awareness of the required NPP operation quality among the stakeholders.

4.1

Administration of Nuclear Sector in Independent Ukraine

On dissolution of the USSR Ukraine inherited a number of nuclear industry enterprises that formerly pertained to the aforementioned USSR Minatomenergoprom. This brought up an urgent issue on the further sector administration structure. Control of safe operations of the NPPs remaining on Ukrainian territory was the main priority. In this context, it was deemed expedient to establish a Ukrainian supervisory body for safe operations in the nuclear sector on the basis of the SouthWestern Circuit of the USSR State Oversight Committee for Industry and Nuclear Energy Safety (Gospromatomnadzor). This will be discussed in more detail below, in the section concerning nuclear regulation. This body was to be subordinated to the Commission on Emergencies of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers—until the Law On Nuclear Energy would be passed.106 Towards the end of 1990, Minatomenergoprom contemplated creation of “Energoatom” Concern to incorporate all Ukrainian NPPs, which would be a response to the reduced number of ministries and would create a framework for joint investment, financial and international economic activity and for assurance of a Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис 15, справа №1871 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласними організаціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР/ a.13.11.1990 №01–04/826 от Государственного комитета СССР по надзору за безопасным ведением работ в промышленности и атомной энергетике – Юго-Западный округ. Кому: Заместителю Председателя Совета Министров УССР т. Гладушу В.Д. о проекте решения организации Украинского надзорного органа (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 1871. Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR.13 November 1990 No. 01–04/826. From the USSR State Oversight Committee for Industry and Nuclear Energy Safety – South-Western Circuit to Deputy Chairman of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers V. Gladush on Draft Resolution on Organisation of a Ukrainian Supervisory Body). 106

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NPPs safety throughout its lifecycle.107 However, the Decree of the UkrSSR Supreme Council On Protection of Sovereign Property Titles of the Soviet Socialist Republic of 29 November 1990 imposed a moratorium on any changes of ownership forms and owners of state property in the territory of Ukraine pending enactment of the law of the Ukrainian SSR on denationalization of property.108 As for NPP operation, it was a challenging task for the politicians of independent Ukraine. Therefore, it was taken over by experienced nuclear sector professionals who knew both the bitterness of the Chernobyl accident and the benefits offered by nuclear energy. At the end of 1991, directors of all Ukrainian NPPs addressed Prime Minister of Ukraine Vitold Fokin seeking a resolution of existing problems that arose out of the partition of national nuclear sectors following the dissolution of the USSR. They wrote, “In the context of the Union’s disintegration and break-up of traditional economic ties enterprises of the former Minatomenergoprom remain practically ownerless.”109 In the meantime, the central authorities in Moscow notified officially that they waived any responsibility for the provision and operation of Ukrainian NPPs effective in 1991. At that time there was no Ukrainian organization to undertake responsibility for the nuclear energy sector and for its material supplies. Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис 15, справа №1871 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласними організаціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР/ 10.12.1990 г №06–802 от Заместителя министра атомной промышленности СССР – Э. Поздышева. Кому: Совет Министров УССР т. Гладашу В.Д. о создании Энергоатома (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 1871. Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR/10 December 1990 No. 06–802. From USSR Deputy Minister of Nuclear Industry E. Pozdyshev to UkrSSR Council of Ministers, Comrade V. Gladash on Establishment of Energoatom). 108 Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади тауправління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис 15, справа №1871 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласними організаціями пропроектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР/(нет номера и даты, не подписано) от заместителя предстедателя Совета Министров УССР т. Гладаш В.Д., кому: Заместителю министра атомной промышленности СССР – Э. Поздышеву (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 1871. Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR/(no number or date, no signature). From Deputy Chairman of UkrSSR Council of Ministers V. Gladash to USSR Deputy Minister of Nuclear Industry E. Pozdyshev). 109 Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис 15, справа №2354 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласними організаціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР/11.10.1991 №19,867/92 (Кабмін) от Бронникова В.К. (ЗАЭС), Коровкина В.А. (РАЭС), Уманца М.П. (ПОЧАЭС), Фукса В.П. (ПОЮУАЭС), СапроноваВ.Г. (ХАЭС). Кому: премьер-министру Укрины Фокину В.П. (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 2354. Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR/11 October 1991 No. 19867/92 (Cabinet of Ministers). From V. Bronnikov (ZNPP), V. Korovkin (RNPP), M. Umanets (CNPP), V. Fuks (SUNPP), V. Sapronov (KNPP) to Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Fokin). 107

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“In this situation NPP managers came forward with the initiative to integrate ex-Minatomenergoprom enterprises into a Ukrainian concern.”110 There were also some other ideas of how to address the partition of the nuclear power industry following the split of the Soviet Union. There was a proposal to create a branch of Minatomenergoprom in Ukraine to control all Ukrainian nuclear enterprises. However, Minatomenergoprom rejected such a scheme since their leaders believed that the political disagreements at that time were only temporary. Another idea that was in discussion was to assign the functions of an operator, who would be fully in charge of NPP safe operation, to the plants themselves.111 Under these circumstances, and understanding the seriousness of developments in the country and in the nuclear industry and of the need to sustain professional capability at the sites, the decision was made to integrate the nuclear sector enterprises into the Ukratomenergoprom Concern in December 1991. Pursuant to the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 2 December 1991 No. 354 On Establishment of the Ukrainian State Concern for the Operation of Atomic Energy and Industry Facilities (full name Ukratomenergoprom), this Concern was a selfsustaining and self-supporting operating entity carrying out all functions of an operator and bearing the full scope of responsibility for the safety of nuclear power plants.112 In reality, however, the Concern failed to perform the assigned functions. Each nuclear plant in Ukraine was a separate enterprise, having selfsustained business. To say, Zaporizhzhia NPP became the first one to achieve the operator status on 19 January 1993; no other nuclear plant or organization in Ukraine or the CIS had a similar experience in obtaining such a formal legal document.113 At the beginning of the 1990s, the state regulatory framework was undergoing rapid change. New tax legislation made effective finance management under the

110

Ibid. Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис 15, справа №2354 Листування з союзними, республіканськими та обласними організаціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Українській РСР/ 11.10.1991 р № ЭС/18–137 від Міністра енергетики та електрифікації УССР В.Ф. Склярова, кому: премєр-міністру України тов. Фокіну В.П. про функціонування АЕС України (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, FundNo. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 2354. Correspondence with Central, Republican and Regional Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR/11 October 1991 No. ЭС/ 18–137. From UkrSSR Minister of Energy and Electrification V. Sklyarov to Prime Minister of Ukraine Comrade V. Fokin on Operation of Ukrainian NPPs). 112 Простворення Українського державного концерну поекс плуатації об ’єктів атомноїенергетикиі промисловості, Кабінет Міністрів України; Постанова від 02.12.1991 № 354 (On Establishment of the Ukrainian State Concern for the Operation of Atomic Energy and Industry Facilities, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; Decree of 02 December1991 No. 354) [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/354-91-%D0%BF]. 113 Энергия”, 1993, 27 января (Energia, 1993, 27 January) (The National Parliamentary Library of Ukraine). 111

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Ukratomenergoprom organization problematic.114 The Law On Enterprises in Ukraine released on 27 March 1991 established a number of types of company associations, including a concern. This type envisaged strict management and control of association members, which seemed fit for the association of the Ukrainian atomic enterprises. However, after a time this Law came into conflict with the Law of the Ukrainian SSR On Taxation System of 25 June 91, which made the concern as a resource pool financially ineffective for NPPs: this, as well as potential investment activity would create additional tax burden. Against the backdrop of the general financial decline, particularly dire in the nuclear sector, additional expenses were out of question. Thus, the concern, although formally established, was very hard to sustain. The President of Ukratomenergoprom Mikhail Umanets and his staff were receiving salaries at the same level as NPP personnel. The situation around Ukratomenergoprom raised concerns at the level of the State Nuclear and Radiation Safety Committee of Ukraine (SNRSCU). Nikolai Steinberg in his letter to President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma pointed out that. Ukratomenergoprom underwent the organizational phase and was unable at the time to function as an operator in accordance with standards and regulations applicable in the nuclear energy sector. The SNRSCU believed that the Cabinet Decree of 25 October 1991 No. 283 On Operation of Ukrainian NPPs should be upheld to the effect that NPP administrations should bear responsibility for the safety of their plants.115

In order to be involved in discussions on disarmament and compensation, therefore, in the form of nuclear fuel for Ukrainian NPPs the Concern needed—but lacked—the status of a state enterprise, which determined its ultimate destiny. In the light of this discussion the State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear Energy Use (SCUNEU), established by decree in November 1992, soon became the key government authority responsible for the use of nuclear power and radiation technology in Ukraine.116 The Government Decree of 29 May 1993 No. 386 On Approval of the Provision on the State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear Energy Use defined the main roles of this body. It was supposed to function as an operator at all lifecycle phases of nuclear power and industry facilities; it was assigned

«Энергоатом Украины», издание НАЭК «Энергоатом», июнь-октябрь 2016 (Energoatom of Ukraine, periodical of Energoatom, June–October 2016). 115 Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис №15, справа 2831 Листування з міністерствами та іншими організаціями про проектувння і будівництво АЕС в Україні/21.04.1992 р № 01–08/362 от председателя Госатомнадзора Н.А. Штейнберга, кому: Первому вице-премьер-министру Украины т Масику К.И. (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, FundNo. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 2831. Correspondence with Ministries and Other Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in Ukraine/21 April 1992 No. 01–08/362. From Chairman of SNRIU N. Shteinberg to First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine K. Masik). 116 Материалы форума «Укрепление инфраструктур в области радиационной и ядерной безопасности в странах бывшего СССР», Вена, 4–7 мая 1993 года, архив ДНТЦ ЯРБ (Reinforcement of Radiation and Nuclear Safety Infrastructures in the Counties of the Formers USSR, Forum Materials, Vienna, 4–7 May 1993, SSTC NRS archives). 114

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responsibility for repair and maintenance, the handling of radioactive waste, and transport of nuclear material between nuclear power plant sites.117 On 13 May 1991, the institutional platform for dealing with solving the Chernobyl problems was created—the Ministry for the Protection of the Public from the Consequences of the Chernobyl NPP Accident on the basis of the State Committee on the Issues of the Chernobyl Catastrophe.118 However, the respective regulation was adopted only after the President’s Decree as of 28 October 1996 No. 1005/96 On the Ministry of Ukraine for Emergencies and the Protection of the Public from the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident. The regulation specified that the Ministry. . . . assures implementation of government policy in the area of civil defence, protection of the public and territories from emergency situations, protection of and response to such situations, elimination of their consequences and the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, govern the assigned sphere of administration and bear responsibility for its state and development.119

Meanwhile, the issue of a strategic vision of the national policy relevant to the establishment of the nuclear power administration structure and the determination of sector key development vectors required further consideration. The state itself lacked clear understanding on “whether nuclear energy is to be developed or if it should be first curtailed and then terminated.”120 This key issue remained crucial, because the circumstances required prompt actions, as tensions within the sector were building up. The reasons included abrupt deterioration of regularity of supplies, particularly

117 Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України від 29 травня 1993 р. N 386 «Про затвердження Положення про Державний комітет України по використанню ядерної енергії (Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 29 May 1993 No. 386 On Approval of the Provision on the State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear Energy Use) [http://www.uazakon.com/documents/date_61/pg_ gegwxx.htm]. 118 Проперелік міністерств та інші центральні органи державного управління Української РСР (Law “On the list of ministries and other central bodies of state administration of the Ukrainian SSR”) [//zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1030б-12]. 119 Указ Президента України «Про Міністерство України з питаньнадзвичайних ситуацій та у справах захисту населення від наслідків Чорнобильської катастрофи», Президент України; Указ від 28.10.1996 № 1005/96 (Decree of the President of Ukraine On the Ministry of Ukraine for Emergencies and the Protection of the Public from Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident, President of Ukraine; Decree of 28/10/1996 No. 1005/96) [https://zakon.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/1005/96]. 120 Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управлінняУкраїни, Фонд №Р-2, опис №15, справа 2831 Листування з міністерствами та іншими організаціями пропроектувнняі будівництво АЕС в Україні/10.04. 1992 року №47–66/695–10 від заступника Міністра економіки України Л.І. Россильний, кому: Кабінет Міністрів Україн итов. Масику К.І. про державну структуру управління атомною енергетикою і промисловістю на Україні (Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 2831. Correspondence with Ministries and Other Organisations on Design and Construction of NPPs in Ukraine/10 April 1992 No. 47–66/695–10. From Deputy Minister of Economy of Ukraine L. Rossylny to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Comrade K. Masik on the National Structure of Administration of Nuclear Energy and Industry in Ukraine).

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of materials critical for safe operation; there were difficulties with payment of plant personnel—“people were losing confidence in the future.”121 Due to these circumstances, SCUNEU, at the time the key government actor in the administration of the nuclear sector, lacked the authority to manage the material resources of the plants since each NPP, as mentioned earlier, was an independent operator. As a result, it was decided to get away from the idea of integrating all power plants under a single legal entity and to withdraw their legal status as independent enterprises. Instead, it was suggested to create a company to be joined by each NPP on a voluntary basis with the status of an affiliate in accordance with the applicable law. This company would be responsible for the centralized sale of electricity and for distribution of material resources among the affiliate plants, thus avoiding double taxation, which had been an issue previously. This idea was practically implemented in 1996. On 17 October 1996, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine by its Decree No. 1268 On Establishment of National Energy Generating Company Energoatom created the state company who took the operator function over from the State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear Energy Use. The Decree also stipulated that nuclear power plants could continue enjoying some rights as a legal entity.122 Thus, each Ukrainian NPP even today has the status of a separated division of “Energoatom.” In its policy statement, “Energoatom” emphasized its commitment to “assure NPP safety as a priority operational task.”123 “Energoatom” integrated Zaporizhzhia, Rivne, South-Ukraine, and Khmelnitsky NPPs as well as Chernobyl NPP which was separated from “Energoatom” in 2001 (granted the status of a state-owned specialized enterprise) and assigned to the Ministry of Energy. Establishment of the company was not without difficulties. One of the problems was that the company was created in Kyiv while the professionals were scattered across NPP sites around Ukraine. There was no nuclear unit construction or nuclear plant operation management specialists in Kyiv.124 Although the company was established in 1996, it only managed to get operator status in 2004, when it received a license as an operator of all operating Ukrainian NPPs.125 The evolution of Ukrainian independence went in parallel with the improvement of the government system of administration of the power industry. On 6 May 1997, Leonid Kuchma, then President of Ukraine, signed the Decree to establish the 121

Central State Archive, op. cit. ВестникУкраинскогоЯдерногоОбщества, №4 (19–20), декабрь 1996 (Herald of the Ukrainian Nuclear Society, No. 4 (19–20), December 1996) (The National Parliamentary Library of Ukraine). 123 Вестник Украинского Ядерного Общества, №2 (23–24), июнь 1997 (Herald of the Ukrainian Nuclear Society, No. 2 (23–24), June 1997) (The National Parliamentary Library of Ukraine). 124 «Энергоатом Украины», издание НАЭК «Энергоатом», июнь-октябрь 2016 (Energoatom of Ukraine, periodical of Energoatom, June–October 2016). 125 Ibid. 122

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Ministry of Energy of Ukraine. This new Ministry replaced the former Ministry of Power and Electrification of Ukraine and SCUNEU. The newly formed Ministry was assigned the “functions of public administration in the area of formation of the nuclear fuel cycle and the handling of radioactive waste.”126 This new Ministry included the State department for Nuclear Energy that was entrusted with the functions of the state authority responsible for nuclear power sector administration. On 14 April 2000, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy Industry of Ukraine (Mintopenergo) was established by the Decree of the President of Ukraine №598/ 2000 on the basis of the Ministry of Coal Industry of Ukraine; Ministry of Power Industry of Ukraine; State Department of Ukraine on Electric Power Issues; State Department of Ukraine on Oil, Gas and Oil-refining Industry; State Department of Ukraine on Nuclear Power. The main task of Mintopenergo was the state management of the fuel energy complex (Fig. 1).127 New changes in the organizational structure of the nuclear energy sector were initiated in 2006. The Cabinet of Ministers created an integrated state nuclear company—“State Concern Ukratomprom.”128 The main purpose of this institution was. . . . to ensure the protection of the interests of the state in the process of reforming and improving the management of the nuclear-industrial complex by combining its participants with the centralization of the functions of scientific and technical and industrial development, investment, financial, foreign economic and other activities; to combine the production, scientific and commercial interests of participants; to fulfill common economic and social tasks; ensuring the development of the nuclear-industrial complex, concentration of intellectual, technological, economic potential, human resources, increasing the efficiency of their use; reaching the world level of industry development.129

It was foreseen to unite the following organizations under the Concern: “Energoatom”; uranium mining company VostGOK; the company created to mine the Novokonstantinovskiy uranium deposit; Turboatom, the Smoly state enterprise; the Research Institute of Industrial Technologies; the Dnipropetrovsk zirconium tube production plant.130 “Energoatom” should act as the “representative of the new Ukratomprom in matters of the contractual agreements between its component parts and external affairs with government, industrial partners, investors and other stakeholders.”131

126

Herald, op. cit. IAEA Country report 2018 [https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/cnpp2018/ countryprofiles/Ukraine/Ukraine.htm]. 128 Постанова КМУ від 29 грудня 2006 р. N 1854 «Про вдосконалення управління атомно-промисловим комплексом» [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1854-2006-%D0%BF]. 129 Постанова КМУ від 14 березня 2007 р. N 456 «Деякі питання державного концерну “Укратомпром”» [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/456-2007-%D0%BF]. 130 Ibid. 131 Ukraine consolidates its nuclear industry (22 March 2007) [http://world-nuclear-news.org/ Articles/Ukraine-consolidates-its-nuclear-industry]. 127

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Fig. 1 Organizational structure as it was in 2002. IAEA country profile (IAEA country profile (2002) [https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/ countryprofiles/Ukraine/Ukraine2003.htm])

The general aim of the creation of such an institution was to combine existing elements of the fuel cycle in Ukraine and to further develop and modernize it. In 2007, Ukratomprom and the Federal Atomic Energy Agency of the Russian Federation (Rosatom) signed a protocol on intentions for cooperation between the enterprises of the nuclear power industry complex of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.132 These companies were aimed at developing cooperation in the field of scientific and technical support of the nuclear industry, the increase of safety and extension of lifetime of nuclear power units, design and construction of new nuclear power plants, development of enterprises of the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as joint access to third-country markets. Based on this document both sides also agreed to explore the possibility of establishing joint ventures in the field of uranium mining and enrichment and the production of nuclear fuel.133 However, these plans were not realized. Viktor Yushchenko, who was the President of Ukraine at that time, perceived a big threat in the developments which occurred around the Concern, and, therefore, he issued the respective order to decline the regulation which established Ukratomprom.134 The main problem was the legal status of nuclear ГК «Укратомпром» и Федеральное Агентство по Атомной Энергии (Росатом) подписали протокол о сотрудничестве в атомной отрасли (04.06.2007) [http://archive.energoatom.kiev.ua/ en/press/nngc/34685-gk_ukratomprom_i_federalnoe_agentstvo_po_atomnoyi_energii_rosatom__ podpisali_protokol_o_sotrudnichestve_v_atomnoyi_otrasli/]. 133 Ibid. 134 Про зупинення дії постанов Кабінету Міністрів України від 29 грудня 2006 року N 1854 та від 14 березня 2007 року N 456[https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/706/2007]. 132

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companies who would enter the consortium. On the initiative of the management of Ukratomprom, under the pretext of attracting investment in the nuclear industry, the Government proposed to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to allow the corporatization of the four state-owned enterprises (including “Energoatom”) that were parts of Ukratomprom. Such possibilities were open for Ukratomprom by the aforementioned Cabinet of Ministers’ orders which established the Concern. Yushchenko declared that the creation of Ukratomprom would contradict the Constitution and the law On national security.135 Another case of non-compliance with current legislation was with appointment of Andriy Derkach, who was the President of “Energoatom” at that time, and was also appointed head of Ukratomprom. Following the liquidation of Ukratomprom, the Cabinet of Ministers created the State concern “Nuclear fuel,”136 This Concern united the uranium mining company VostGOK; the Smoly state enterprise; the Research Institute of Industrial Technologies, excluding “Energoatom” and Turboatom.137 The main aim of their activities was to improve the management of the nuclear-industrial complex, the development of uranium and zirconium production, the creation of its own production of nuclear fuel elements, and capacities for the fabrication of heat-generating assemblies for national NPPs and other business activities. Continuing analysis of the broader organizational structure on the energy sector in Ukraine and the nuclear sector positioning there, it should be noted that since 2010, the central organ of executive power, which is in charge of forming and securing the state policy implementation in the electric power sector, nuclear industrial complex, coal industrial complex, peat extracting, and oil & gas extracting complexes is the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine. The respective Decree No. 1085/2010 was issued by the President on 9 December 2010.138 The creation of this Ministry was based on restructuring the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine and the Ministry of the Coal Industry of Ukraine. This Ministry, among other tasks, is responsible for state control in the field of nuclear power utilization. In the structure of this Ministry the Department of Nuclear Energy and NuclearIndustrial Complex was established. As for the regulation of safety of Ukrainian NPPs, the process of establishment of a competent authority went in parallel with the above developments and is described in detail in the next section.

В.Ющенко зупинив дію постанов Кабміну про створення “Укратомпрому” (повтор) 14.08.2007 [https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/v_yushchenko_priostanovil_deystvie_postanovleniy_ kabmina_o_sozdanii_ukratomproma_povtor__1187069651/amp]. 136 Деякі питання ліквідації та утворення державних господарських об’єднань в атомній промисловості від 17 квітня 2008 р. N 650-р [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ 650-2008-%D1%80]. 137 Ukraine – HoNESt, History of Nuclear Energy and Society (2018) [http://www.honest2020.eu/ sites/default/files/deliverables_24/UA.pdf]. 138 Указ Президента України Про оптимізацію системи центральних органів виконавчої влади (Order of President On optimization of the system of central executive authorities) [//zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1085/2010]. 135

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5 History of Establishing the National Nuclear Regulation System The history of establishing the National Nuclear Regulation System is closely related to the Chernobyl NPP. In the early 1970s, thousands of top-ranked specialists from the leading Russian “atomic” towns such as Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, Sverdlovsk, Dimitrovgrad, and others came to the town of Pripyat to build the Chernobyl NPP. Those specialists had profound knowledge in their specific field and were ready to solve the most complicated tasks. Therefore, when it became necessary a lot of them settled in the Ukrainian nuclear regulatory system and in the nuclear sector administration system.139 The issue of the nuclear industry’s safe operation became an important component of the industry’s further development. Most of the highly-qualified nuclear experts had a clear understanding that the industry was unable to survive without establishing a powerful and competent regulatory body in Ukraine, while the political leadership did not pay sufficient attention to this problem. Nikolai Steinberg, chairperson of the State Nuclear and Radiation Safety Committee of Ukraine in 1991–1995, noted that politicians “do not understand or pretend to not understand what is going on. But people responsible for nuclear safety cannot afford passivism.”140 Thus, in February 1992, according to the decision of the Government of Ukraine, the SNRSCU was established based on the South-Western Circuit of the USSR State Oversight Committee for Industry and Nuclear Energy Safety (Gospromatomnadzor), and Steinberg became its chairman. At that time, the establishment of its own nuclear power complex was of critical importance for Ukraine which was evolving as an independent state. The point was that amidst the disintegration of the former-USSR structures the nuclear power complex enterprises and organizations in Ukrainian territory faced the risk of absence of management or research and development support. That is why it was necessary not only to establish their own state authorities to control the complex, but also to clearly differentiate their activities between the administrative, regulatory, and economic functions. It did not take long to staff the committee because there were no problems with workforce available. The South-Western Circuit certainly had the best-qualified specialists in the Soviet Union. This was predetermined historically: many pro-

139 Валерий Николаевич Глыгало, к.т.н. первый директор ГНТЦ ЯРБ (Valery Glygalo, PhD Technology, the first SSTC NRS director). 140 Николай Штейнберг – Председатель Государственного комитета Украины по надзору за ядерной и радиационной безопасностью в 1991–1995 г.г. – Воспоминания (Nikolay Steinberg, Chairman of the State Nuclear and Radiation Safety Committee of Ukraine in 1991–1995 – Memoir).

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fessionals stayed here after the Chernobyl disaster and, of course, the decisive factor was the qualification and business-like approach of Anatoliy Demyanenko, the head of the Circuit. There was an intention to align with the structure of Gospromatomnadzor in establishing the Committee’s structure. Unfortunately, the Circuit personnel gave a hostile reception to an attempt to use the example of the Western European and US regulatory bodies. People who had been working in the oversight system for years just refused to accept a new ideology. It was easier to reach understanding with those former NPP employees who joined the Committee. In order to achieve success, the SNRSCU needed research and development support (it was demonstrated by the operating experience of Gospromatomnadzor), thus the research and development directorate was established in the framework of the Ukrainian regulatory body. Vadim Grishchenko became the directorate head; later he was appointed as Chairman of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine. Moreover, the Scientific and Technical Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety was established within the SNRSCU based on the Kyiv office of the Scientific and Technical Centre of Gospromatomnadzor.141 Valeriy Glygalo became its first director. The cooperation with foreign colleagues helped a lot in developing the Committee, including the formation of its resource base. It was the purposeful policy of the West to assist in establishing an authoritative nuclear regulatory body in Ukraine, which should be highly professional and have the necessary resource base. One should understand the Western attitude to Ukraine, which gave birth to Chernobyl and had 5 Soviet NPPs in operation closest to Europe, with all their problems that were already well-known by that time and with no experience of nuclear power industry control. The cooperation was set up, for example, with Adolph Birkhofer, Director of Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS Germany), P. Tangi, Chief Nuclear Safety Inspector of Electricite De France, Klaus Töpfer, German Minister of Environment Protection and Nuclear Safety, Antti Vuorinen, head of the Finnish regulator, Lars Högberg, head of the Swedish regulator, and Ivan Selin, Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Most of the training of Ukrainian specialists, their internships and foreign assignments to share best practices were funded and supported by the international donors. The establishment and development of the Ukrainian nuclear regulatory authority was one of the most important priorities of the G7 in the 1990s. According to the expert community including IAEA experts, the SNRSCU was considered the most

Николай Штейнберг: «Вообще говоря, правильное название Комитета в этовремя было Госпроматомэнергонадзор СССР, поскольку в 1989 или в начале 1990 года был создан единый надзорны й орган страны при объединении Госгортехнадзора и Госатомэнергонадзора СССР» (Nikolay Shteinberg: “In fact, the correct name of the Committee at that time was Gospromatomenergonadzor (USSR State Oversight Committee for Power Industry and Nuclear Energy Safety) because in 1989 or in early 1990 an integrated oversight body of the USSR was established by merging Gosgortekhnadzor (USSR State Committee for Industrial and Mining Safety Supervision) and Gospromatomnadzor (USSR State Oversight Committee for Industry and Nuclear Energy Safety)). 141

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progressive and fast-paced nuclear regulator among all similar agencies in the former USSR countries. The Committee received recognition and support, gained international repute, and became an authorized representative of Ukraine at the IAEA. Unfortunately, the Committee did not receive any real government support at that time. Moreover, there were several attempts to impede and degrade the Committee’s activity; there were proposals to restructure and even dissolve this regulatory body. Some nuclear power plant directors and management of the Ukratomenergoprom concern were not comfortable with the firm and independent position of the Committee towards NPP safety and its stricter requirements for operators. Any proposals to close down or reassign control of SNRSCU were not based on essential need; such proposals were of a subjective nature. For example, the head of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Ukraine put forward an initiative to close down SNRSCU and to assign the nuclear power industry management functions to his agency. All proposals on restructuring the Committee demonstrated a lack of understanding of nuclear power sector specifics or NPP process complexity; they were in contradiction with the international experience and IAEA recommendations. This, along with a complicated and alarming situation in the Ukrainian nuclear sector was reported to the Cabinet of Ministers, National Security and Defence Council, and President’s Administration; relevant information hit the media and Greenpeace Ukraine. It was obvious that the issues of nuclear sector and industry administration required individual and detailed consideration at the highest governmental level. In October 1994, the chairperson of the Committee made a strong statement in his report at the Government session. His speech was dedicated to the unprecedented deterioration of safety at Ukrainian nuclear power plants and to the responsibility of management of NPPs and the Ukratomenergoprom concern and, subsequently, of SCUNEU. This report probably signed the verdict for the Committee. Of course, there should not be any compromise in nuclear and radiation safety. In December 1994, President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma issued a decree on the dissolution of the Committee. Supervision over the nuclear safety in 1995–2000 was ensured by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, which transferred to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety of Ukraine (MEPNSU). In 2000, it switched back to its current name and from 2003 to 2010, it was the Ministry of Environmental Protection of Ukraine. Within 6 years (1994 through 2000) while the MEPNSU was responsible for state regulation new nuclear legislation for Ukraine was developed and implemented. This legislation clearly and unambiguously specified the nuclear and radiation safety principles, advanced the concept of operation and development of the Ukrainian nuclear power industry, which could be summed up as follows:

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Nuclear power plants can be built, commissioned and operated provided that their safety is proven by up-to-date methods, confirmed by an independent expert assessment and is in compliance with international standards, principles and requirements. Nuclear power plants that do not meet these requirements should be shut down.142

MEPNSU took a committed position in respect of the safety of Ukrainian nuclear power plants. In accordance with the legislation of Ukraine and requirements of international standards, for the first time ever in independent Ukraine the construction of Unit 6 was completed and the Unit was commissioned at Zaporizhzhia NPP in 1995. The Unit’s safety was substantiated by the operator and verified by independent expert assessments of the research and development organizations of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety of Ukraine. Starting from 1995, Yuriy Kostenko, Minister of MEPNSU, was in charge of the Ukrainian delegation at the negotiations with the G7 regarding the shutting down of the Chernobyl NPP. As a result of those negotiations, a one billion dollar grant was obtained for the Chernobyl NPPs decommissioning and conversion of the Shelter into an environmentally safe system. In the course of the negotiations, review of Ukraine’s compliance with its commitments in the scope of the international conventions on nuclear safety and on radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, IAEA and European Commission missions to Ukraine, the Western partners always emphasized the absence of an independent state nuclear and radiation safety regulator. In addressing nuclear and radiation safety issues the state should pay special attention to the independence, competence, and professionalism of a regulatory agency, since an independent assessment and verification of safety of a nuclear facility, a source of ionizing radiation or a radioactive waste storage or disposal facility is a key element of nuclear and radiation safety, and only such an assessment can guarantee to society that nuclear energy will be used safely for peaceful purposes. The independence of a state nuclear safety regulator is defined in the Convention on Nuclear Safety143 as independence from the operator and agencies involved in the development of the nuclear power industry. In this regard, a number of aspects should be taken into account including proper funding and fair wages, availability of appropriate office premises, equipment, transport, as well as other matters that may deteriorate or compromise independence. The actual status of the Nuclear Regulatory Administration and the Central State Oversight Inspectorate for Nuclear Safety did not meet these requirements at all, which, to a degree, hindered the implementation of our international nuclear sector projects.

Вадим Васильевич Грищенко. – Заслуженный энергетик Украины, Председатель Государственно госкомитета ядерного регулирования с 2000 по 2005 год. – Воспоминания (Vadim Grischenko, Honoured Power Engineer of Ukraine, Chairman of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine in 2000–2005. – Memoirs). 143 Convention on Nuclear Safety [www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf449. shtml]. 142

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In 1999, the Nuclear Regulatory Administration was transformed into the State Nuclear Regulatory Administration, a governmental agency within the MEPNSU. Yet, it existed only for one year and was dissolved in 2000. Considering the circumstances, Aleksandr Smyshlyaev, the First Deputy Minister, proposed to establish the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine as an independent centralized executive authority; he was supported by Minister V. Shevchuk and his successor I. Zayats. Thus, on 5 December 2000, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) was established by a decree of the President of Ukraine on the basis of the Nuclear Regulatory Administration and the Central State Oversight Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Ukraine which was transferred back from MEPNSU. V. Grischenko became the Inspectorate’s chairperson. Immediately upon the establishment of the SNRIU it was necessary to identify the scope and priority of the tasks to be accomplished in the near future. This was important in terms of distribution of the scarce resources available to the Inspectorate. NPPs, no doubt, have the first priority in terms of potential threat, critical importance as public infrastructure for rates of electricity generation, thus 70% of the resources were allocated towards the enhancement of nuclear unit safety. This covered inspections and routine supervision at NPP sites, independent safety assessments, implementation monitoring of safety enhancement measures, NPP personnel qualification and behavior control, and so on. By the year 2000, the work on nuclear legislation was completed. In particular, this legislation established mandatory nuclear facility operator licensing and determined the requirements for the content of the licenses, conditions and procedure of their issuance. The existing practice of annual operation permits did not satisfy the legislation so it was necessary to remedy such non-compliance on the basis of the safety assessment reports and expert assessments of the State Scientific and Technical Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC NRS). In 2002, as the nuclear power plant operator licenses were issued, they were subjected to criticism since safety assessment reports were not completed for each unit and the required set of measures for safety enhancement was not implemented fully. Safety assessments and re-assessments, as well as safety enhancements and operational improvements should be implemented as long as the NPP remains operational. Continuous safety assessment and enhancement is the common strategy in the industry and the nuclear regulatory system, which provides for compensatory measures against deterioration processes caused by aging. This particular concept was used as the basis for the operator licenses. Nuclear power plants always face internal and external factors to respond to. SNRIU activity is not limited to nuclear power plants and Chernobyl projects alone. The state nuclear material accounting and control system is of vital importance for the state and for the international non-proliferation regime. Control of the

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use of sources of ionizing radiation in healthcare, industry, science and agriculture, as well as keeping records of these sources is a priority for public safety. The regulation and control of radioactive waste management and nuclear and radioactive material transport have been important parts of SNRIU activity from its establishment until the present time.

6 The Role of International Cooperation to Sustain the Nuclear Energy Complex of Ukraine, and Strengthen Nuclear Safety and Security In the early 1990s, international assistance played a crucial role for the Ukrainian energy complex, especially in the sphere of nuclear safety and security. International organizations and donor countries provided Ukraine with financial and technical contributions, as well as expertise. A combination of these components brought the country through the most challenging times in the nuclear energy history of Ukraine, which has already been mentioned in the previous section or will be presented further. After the accident at the Chernobyl NPP, the nuclear safety of the remaining NPPs in Ukraine became one of the most critical concerns for the international community. They wanted to make all efforts possible to overcome any problems that might cause similar consequences to the 1986 catastrophe. Western partners particularly stressed nuclear safety and especially the closure of the Chernobyl NPP at the earliest possible opportunity. The European Union had been putting political pressure on the Ukrainian government in order to close the Chernobyl NPP. The economic aspects bothered the European Union less than safety. The European partners were ready to make immediate financial contribution to strengthen the nuclear safety of operating power plants. In the Resolution No C 94/260 from 13 March 1992, the European Parliament emphasized “inadequacy of safety measures at nuclear plants in the CIS Republics.”144 CIS Republics (including Ukraine) demonstrated the absence of advanced warning systems for the civilian population, and of adequately trained and equipped fire emergency services. For the European Union such a situation with nuclear safety was completely unacceptable. Therefore, in July 1992, during the Munich Summit the Council of the European Union together with the G7 endorsed an urgent action program for nuclear safety in the Central and Eastern European Countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The European Commission intended to implement it in the framework of its TACIS assistance program. The urgent measures, such as to improve the safety of

144

European Parliament, Resolution on urgent medical, technical, and food aid to the victims of Chernobyl in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, Official Journal of the European Communities, No C 94/260, 13.03.1992 // European Parliament Archives.

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NPPs, to strengthen regulatory regimes, and to promote regional cooperation were evaluated at USD700 million.145 The European Union foresaw on-site assistance as the most appropriate approach in order to advance all nuclear safety as recommended by the G7. However, Russia and Ukraine were reluctant to allow such activities at their facilities, due to the legacy of Soviet secrecy. Negotiations were tough and difficult and, in the end, Ukrainian authorities agreed in spring 1993 to on-site assistance in some of the NPPs (inter alia Rivne NPP, Zaporizhzhia NPP, and South-Ukraine NPP). At the first stage, the on-site assistance was successfully implemented and it resulted in improvement in operational safety and the general safety culture. As part of the second stage, new safety equipment was supplied, such as information systems, diagnostic systems, corrosion monitoring, simulators, control valves, etc.146

6.1

Closure of Chernobyl NPP

The G7 and the international community continued to stress the importance of closure of the Chernobyl NPP for safety reasons. They demonstrated their complete readiness to allocate additional funding for this purpose. Continuing its consistent policy, at the 1994 G7 Naples Summit a decision was made to contribute up to USD200 million in the form of grants for the early closure and decommissioning of the Chernobyl NPP.147 However, the follow-up process regarding signing the respective Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) caused an active discussion both within the country and with the European partners. At some point in these discussions signals were made that the necessary document would not be signed. At the time of negotiation around the MOU, Ukraine did not have a clear position towards closure of the Chernobyl NPP. Such concerns were expressed by the Agency on international cooperation and investments, which requested to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to postpone the process of signing the MOU until Ukraine had decided on its future policy towards the Chernobyl NPP question.148 The State Committee of Ukraine on Nuclear Energy Usage foresaw in the closure of

145

European Commission. Press releases database. 1992 // europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO95-18_en.htm. 146 Ibid. 147 European Parliament, Official Journal of the European Communities, Answer of Sir Leon Brittan on behalf of the European Commission to the written question E-2063/94 by Hiltrud Breyer (3 October 1994 (95/C 36/61))// European Parliament Archives. 148 Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 4563. Correspondence with the European Union, UN and other international organisations and countries regarding international, intergovernmental cooperation and providing Ukraine with technical assistance/29 March 1995 No. 6–6-245. From the First

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the Chernobyl NPP not only financial problems, but also projected high electricity demand.149 Therefore, under such an uncertain political position, the G7’s intention was accepted by the State Committee of Ukraine on Nuclear Energy Usage as a veiled attempt by the international community to demand the closure of the Chernobyl NPP by not later than 1997.150 The situation around the MOU negatively impacted on realization of another initiative from the European side. The European Commission in a letter raised concern over the possibility of not signing a contract for the first tranche of the grant from the EU in the framework of the Action Plan for the energy sector in Ukraine. The European Commission stated, “It would be rather difficult for us to understand that this contract could not be signed in time because of non-acceptance by the Ukrainian government.”151 Such a situation required strong political will to make a final decision on the Chernobyl issue. Thus, it was finally made on 10 April 1995, at the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which resulted in a positive decision on grants regarding the Chernobyl project and of signing the MOU with the G7. After such intense communication, on 1995, the G7 signed a MOU with Ukraine to implement a comprehensive program to support the closure of the remaining units of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and revitalize Ukraine’s power sector. According to the memorandum, cooperation was to cover the following elements: power sector reforms to create a national electricity market; least-cost power supply and efficiency investments to meet national power demand; nuclear safety issues associated with Chernobyl; and the social impact of closing the plant.152 Among other financial instruments to strengthen nuclear safety was the Nuclear Safety Account (initiative of the G7) in order to provide safety assistance to CIS countries with Soviet-type reactors. To manage this fund the EBRD was chosen. The Nuclear Safety Account extended its activities to Ukraine in 1995 for strengthening nuclear safety and security at unit 3 of the Chernobyl NPP. Following this in 1998,

Deputy of the Agency on international cooperation and investments to Cabinet of Ministry of Ukraine. 149 Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 4563. Correspondence with the European Union, UN and other international organisations and countries regarding international, intergovernmental cooperation and providing Ukraine with technical assistance/24 March 1995 No. 574/02. From Head of the State Committee of Ukraine on nuclear energy usage M.P. Umanets to First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine V.M Pensenyk. 150 Ibid. 151 Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 4563. Correspondence with the European Union, UN and other international organisations and countries regarding international, intergovernmental cooperation and providing Ukraine with technical assistance/6 April 1995 No. 28263. From Head of the Deputy director General of the External political relations of European Commission R.Verrue to Deputy Prime Minister Mityukov. 152 Memorandum of understanding between the governments of the G-7 countries and the commission of the European communities and the government of Ukraine on the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant [http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~meshkati/G7.html].

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the Account was narrowing down its activities to construction of the Interim Spent Fuel Facility and the Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant.153 In addition to the Nuclear Safety Account, the EBRD, G7 governments, the European Commission and Ukraine in 1997 established the Chernobyl Shelter Fund, which was announced at the 1997 G7 summit in Denver. The main aim of this fund was to cover the Chernobyl’s destroyed reactor 4 with the necessary shelter in order to have the possibility of eventual dismantling and decommissioning. According to the EBRD, as of today the fund has received more than EUR 1.5 billion.154 The Chernobyl Shelter Fund was also responsible for financing a multidisciplinary construction management program—the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP). It was launched in May 1997 and “intended for: • • • • • •

reduction of the risk of the building structure collapsing; minimization of the consequences of potential accident-induced breakdown; improvement of nuclear safety; enhancement of personnel working conditions; improvement of ecological safety; development of a strategy for transforming the “Shelter” object into an ecologically safe system, including a strategy for fuel-containing material removal.”155

After almost 8 years of political pressure, technical assistance and a substantive number of different initiatives, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma permanently shut down the Chernobyl NPP in 2000. That was a great relief for the whole international community. After 16 years of enormous efforts, in November 2016, the New Safe Confinement covered reactor 4 of the Chernobyl NPP, which has a design service life of 100 years and cost EUR 1.5 billion. These two milestones were of crucial importance in terms of the final solution of the consequences after the Chernobyl catastrophe.

6.2

Nuclear Safety Strengthening of Existing Reactors. Rivne NPP and Khmelnitsky NPP Reactors Completion

As mentioned earlier, the situation around the closure of the Chernobyl NPP was a source of concern for Ukraine not just in terms of safety, but also electricity demand. Therefore, the Ukrainian government relied heavily on the European Commission,

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Nuclear Safety Account [www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c¼Content&cid¼1395236547283& d¼Mobile&pagename¼EBRD%2FContent%2FHublet]. 154 The Chernobyl Shelter Fund [www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/sectors/nuclear-safety/chernobylshelter-fund.html]. 155 IAEA Publications, 2001 [www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/cnpp2003/cnpp_webpage/ PDF/2001/Documents/Documents/Ukraine%202001.pdf].

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EBRD, IMF, and other financial institutions in terms of financial support to complete additional power capacity before the Chernobyl NPP was permanently shut down. The European partners’ aim was to support Ukraine in this matter and they wanted the process of the completion of two Ukrainian type VVER 1000 reactors to be done based on the highest international safety standards. The G7/European Commission Ukraine Action Plan also included assistance for completion of the Rivne NPP and Khmelnitsky NPP reactors. However, the negotiations over these questions were followed by a number of difficulties and challenges from both sides, therefore the initial idea was transformed into a different result in comparison with the one planned. According to the Special Study of the EBRD’s experience with policy dialog in Ukraine, the EBRD in 1999 was ready to invest in completion of the construction of the new block 4 at Rivne NPP and block 2 at Khmelnitsky NPP. Their aim was to help Ukraine with additional electricity generation. On 23 June 2000, Charles Frank, first vice-president of the EBRD sent a letter156 to the second president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma with a clear emphasis on the EBRDS’s intentions to make its contribution towards energy reforms in Ukraine, especially in the context of completion of the aforementioned blocks. However due to the Bank’s strict internal regulations it proved to be impossible to approve this loan as at the stage the sector was struggling to collect payments for generated energy. Without reforms in the distribution segment, ban of barter operations and improvement of fee collection, which at the time was only around six percent of total costs, the sector wasn’t “bankable.”157

Another matter of concern from the EBRD side was related to the creation of vertical regional fuel and energy companies which might potentially undermine the results of reforms and thus the economic attractiveness of the investment project in the nuclear sphere, in particular the construction of new blocks at Rivne and Khmelnitsky NPPs.158 Ukraine had strongly relied on the EBRD’s loan to complete construction of the aforementioned reactors. However, there were some internal uncertainties on this matter. The Security Service of Ukraine in its letter to Prime Minister Viktor

Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 8502. Project on completion Rivnenska and Khmelnitska NPPs/EBRD Investment projects, which requires state guarantees/23 June 2000, Letter form Charles Frank, First vice-president of EBRD to the president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma. 157 Special Study: The EBRD’s experience with policy dialogue in Ukraine [https://www.google. com/ url ?s a¼t & rct ¼j&q ¼&esr c ¼s & so u r c e ¼web&cd ¼1 & c a d¼rja & ua ct¼8&v ed ¼0 ahUKEwih9bP-teTbAhXCuRQKHZl_CcIQFggnMAA&url¼https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ebrd.com %2Fdocuments%2Fevaluation%2Fpolicy-dialogue-in-ukraine-energy-efficiency.pdf& usg¼AOvVaw2ZDtfWnCaDydTu1lCvS-2i]. 158 Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 8502. Project on completion Rivnenska and Khmelnitska NPPs/EBRD Investment projects, which requires state guarantees/23 June 2000, Letter form Charles Frank, First vice-president of EBRD to the president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma. 156

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Yushchenko159 presented some evidences on why the deal would not happen. First of all, according to the findings, after the changes in the EBRD’s management, the bank’s policy towards projects modernized: “the EBRD would consider not only economic results, but ecological consequences after realization of the project.”160 Additionally, the EBRD retains its authority to make conclusions towards financial issues concerning Ukrainian nuclear projects. And the last point was that based on international experts’ opinion, the situation within the G7 regarding completion of the nuclear reactors had become less favorable, because in addition to the EBRD’s aforementioned position, Germany had a strong opinion against Ukrainian projects and did not agree to finance them.161 Under such circumstances, the Ukrainian government made the decision to complete the construction of the new block 4 at Rivne NPP and block 2 at Khmelnitsky NPP as self-sustaining. The respective decree was issued on 17 March 2003162 and the following year block 4 at Rivne NPP was completed followed by block 2 at Khmelnitsky NPP. At the same time, the EBRD project dedication to the nuclear reactors was reshaped and the target was not construction but enhancement of the nuclear safety standards at Rivne and Khmelnitsky NPPs after the construction of power blocks was completed.163 The EBRD approved a EUR 34.36 million loan for this updated version of the project and in parallel the European Commission provided a loan of USD83 million for the same purpose. Another challenge for the European Union for successful implementation of the planned activities to strengthen nuclear safety was nuclear liability. Sir Leon Brittan, on behalf of the European Commission in 1993, noted that nuclear liability was the crucial condition to enjoy all the advantages from the European Union’s assistance. He said that the European Commission was actively working with recipient countries, but as of 1993, this problem had not been solved.164 The respective law which would govern relations in respect of civil liability for nuclear damage, establishing the rules and procedures for compensation for damage caused by a nuclear incident,

Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 8502. Project on completion Rivnenska and Khmelnitska NPPs/EBRD Investment projects, which requires state guarantees/17 July 2000, №1/4/11028-p, Letter form Derkach L. head of the Security Service of Ukraine to the prime minister Yushchenko V (for internal use only). 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid. 162 Про забезпечення фінансування добудови та введення в експлуатацію енергоблоків N 2 ХмельницькоїіN 4 РівненськоїАЕС, розпорядження від 17 вересня 2003 р. N 572-р (CMU decree “On providing financing for the completion and commissioning of power units 2 of Khmelnitsky and 4 Rivne NPP” [zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/572-2003-р]. 163 Special Study, op. cit. 164 European Parliament, op. cit. 159

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defining the methods of ensuring financial security of civil liability and establishing its limits was adopted on 13 December 2001.165 The European Commission also provided support to the Ukrainian nuclear regulator. Within the TACIS projects a number of programs aimed to develop a strong legal and technical basis for licensing, training, inspection, etc., were also implemented. In 1992, a group was created within the European Commission for approval of nuclear regulation tasks in Europe—the name of the group was CONCERT. Ukraine participated in the work of this group from the very outset of its creation. The main aim of this group was to conduct exchange of experience in the nuclear regulation in Europe.166 In 2006, the TACIS Program was transformed into a new initiative—the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation. The main difference of the new program was to focus on projects that have an impact on the work of all operating NPPs in Ukraine, not certain NPPs as it was defined by TACIS.167 The new program’s main objectives were the strengthening of regulatory authorities, the promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture, and the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste in non-EU countries.168 Ukraine, since the beginning of its independence, has taken advantage of comprehensive cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Cooperation was framed in the following directions: safeguards regimes, participation in technical cooperation programs, training and advisory support. In 1994, all Ukrainian nuclear facilities and material were put under IAEA control. In addition, one of the points of pride in cooperation at that time was the recognition of Ukraine’s input towards global nuclear safety, because of the approval the candidacy of Nikolai Steinberg to the position of deputy head at the IAEA Board of Governors in 1993.169 Within the program of technical cooperation in the period between 1995 until 1996, Ukraine received USD1,881,185.170 Active technical cooperation with the IAEA greatly resulted in implementation of crucial project in the nuclear sphere. Ukraine signed the Country Program Frameworks (CPF) for the period of Про цивільну відповідальність за ядерну шкоду та її фінансове забезпечення (Law on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and its Financial Security) [http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/2893-14]. 166 Annual Report on nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine in 1999 (Parliament Library Archive). 167 Energoatom [www.energoatom.Kyiv.ua/ua/actvts/international/international_technical_assis tance/44155-spvrobtnitctvo_z_vropeyiskoyu_komsyu_u_ramkah_programi_tehnchno_ dopomogi_tacis_ta_programi_spvrobtnitctva_syab/]. 168 Information from the Joint Support Office (JSO), which was established for the Management of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation in Ukraine by the European Commission at Kyiv in January 2005 [www.jso.Kyiv.ua/en/#]. 169 Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. Р-2, inventory No. 15, file No. 4563. Correspondence with the European Union, UN and other international organisations and countries regarding international, intergovernmental cooperation and providing Ukraine with technical assistance/11 May 1995 No. 20/21–3325. From the first deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine B. Tarasuk to the Cabinet of Ministry. 170 Ibid. 165

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2005–2010 (considered valid for 2012–2013) then 2013–2017.171 These frameworks identify the main areas and priorities for the transfer of nuclear technology and technical cooperation resources to support national development goals. In 2007, the EC-IAEA-Ukraine Project “Safety Evaluation of Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants” was launched.172 The main objective of this project was to conduct an overall safety assessment of all Ukrainian NPPs, especially concerning design safety, operational safety, waste management and decommissioning, and regulatory issues. This project was conducted through the existing format of the IAEA Safety Review Services: Engineering Safety Review Services (ESRS), Operational Safety Review Team (OSART), Integrated Regulatory Review Services (IRRS), and Radioactive Waste Review Services (RWRS). Following this comprehensive review and after addressing all recommendations into the national safety system, Ukraine complied with most IAEA Safety Standards.

6.3

Bilateral Cooperation

Ukraine was able to maintain and further strengthen nuclear safety through active bilateral cooperation with those countries which had robust experience in the field. In 1993, Ukraine signed an agreement with the USA on the matter of nuclear safety assistance activities,173 the Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.174 On 5 June 2000, Ukraine signed an executive agreement with the United States on the Nuclear Fuel Qualification Project for Ukraine. The ultimate goal of the successful implementation of this project was the strategic task of destruction of the Russian monopoly and to establish competitiveness in the Ukrainian market. The implementation of this project took place in two stages. The first stage began with the study of the technical possibilities of fuel usage and its interchangeability, which was held at the Centre for the design of active zones, which was created in 1999 based on the National Science Centre “Kharkiv Physical Technical Institute.” The second step was transferring to Ukraine technologies for the design of nuclear fuel, active reactor zones, security analysis, licensing, and respective training for Ukrainian specialists. The result of the first stage was the safety assessment by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspection of Ukraine, after which a technical solution was agreed on the operation of 6 pilot test vessels manufactured by Westinghouse at the 3 units of 171

Ukraine signs its third Country Programme Framework (CPF) for 2013–2017 [http://www.iaea. org/newscenter/news/ukraine-signs-its-third-country-programme-framework-cpf-for-2013-2017]. 172 IAEA Project Interim Report “EC-IAEA-Ukraine Joint Project: “Safety Evaluation of Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants Supporting the Implementation of the Roadmap for Nuclear Safety of the Memorandum of Understanding on Co-Operation in the Field of Energy between the EU and Ukraine” (2009). 173 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ukraine Concerning Operational Safety Enhancements, Risk Reduction Measures, and Nuclear Safety Regulation for Civil Nuclear Facilities in Ukraine, Kyiv, October 23, 1993. 174 Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy [www.state.gov/documents/organization/122068.pdf].

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the South Ukrainian NPP. Thus, in 2005, in the mode of experimental and industrial exploitation, the fuel assemblies began operation. After this in March 2008, an agreement between “Energoatom” and Westinghouse on supply of nuclear fuel for the national nuclear power plants for 2011–2015 was signed. The contract provided for the supply during the planned period of about 630 fuel assemblies, and, if necessary, the volumes of supplies could be increased. However, the Russian Federation was making efforts with the use of all the tools and methods that it has developed, including openly “dirty” ones in order to preserve the nuclear fuel market and Ukraine’s dependence on Russian technologies in the nuclear industry.175 Therefore, despite all the efforts up to 2014, Ukraine was 100% dependent on Russian fuel. This dependence was stipulated by both technical and political reasons. The technical ones were the result of the VVER-1000 type reactors and their fuel, which were only produced by Russia. In terms of political reasons, it was due to historical agreements. Since 2013, the situation has drastically changed within both groups of reasons: political—Russian aggression; technical—Westinghouse developed its technological capabilities to produce fuel for VVER-1000 type reactors. In 2013, Ukraine purchased nuclear fuel only from Russia, and spent USD600 mln on it. Nevertheless, on April 11, 2014, an earlier signed agreement between “Energoatom” and Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB was prolonged until 2020. Therefore, in 2014, total Ukrainian spending on nuclear fuel reached USD628 mln (USD39 mln was paid to Westinghouse and USD588 mln to a Russian company). As of 2017, the share of Westinghouse fuel by total consumption is 49% and, in 2016, it was 39%. According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, in the period from January to July 2017, the total cost of nuclear fuel imports amounted to USD275 mln (cost of Russian TVEL fuel was USD164 mln; the cost of Swedish Westinghouse fuel was USD110 mln). In 2016, the total cost of nuclear fuel imports amounted to USD549 mln (USD387 mln paid for Russian fuel and USD162 mln to the Swedish arm of Westinghouse). The diversification of nuclear fuel supplies positively influenced the economic indexes of the nuclear power sector: despite the increase in imported fuel, total costs have been decreasing. In 2013, Ukrainian paid USD600 mln for 369,359 kg of imported nuclear fuel, and in 2016, it paid USD549 mln for 450,489 kg.176 Therefore, because of such assistance from the USA, within three years Ukraine decreased dependence from 100% to around 50% from Russia. Ukraine has in-depth cooperation with Sweden, based on respective agreements between the Government of Sweden and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on nuclear safety cooperation. On 7 September 1993, the Ukrainian regulatory body and the Swedish signed an agreement on activity, related to the non-proliferation of

175

Kosharna, Olga (PR-Director, Ukrainian nuclear forum). Lecture TVEL & Westinghouse. Hybrid war for nuclear fuel market, April 2018. 176 Chumak, Dmytro. The Ukrainian Nuclear Industry: Expert review, 2017 [http://network.bellona. org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/12/ATOM_UKR_ENGL_05.pdf].

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nuclear weapons. This agreement established bilateral cooperation between the regulatory authorities of Ukraine and Sweden.177 Intergovernmental cooperation in the nuclear sphere was formed on 23 March 1999 with an Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of Sweden on cooperation in nuclear safety, aiming to promote cooperation in the sphere of nuclear safety, radiation protection, system of guarantees, including the accounting of materials, physical protection, control over export and import, and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and equipment during peaceful use of nuclear energy.178 On 14 January 2010, Ukraine and Sweden signed an Agreement between the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine and the Swedish Authority on Radiation Safety on cooperation in all aspects of nuclear safety and radiation protection.179 In addition to nuclear safety, Sweden provided Ukraine with such important assistance as building capacity for nuclear non-proliferation, security and disarmament programs. In 2014, at the Odessa National University Sweden sponsored the establishment of a Center for non-proliferation studies.180 The mission of the center is to provide a platform for education, training, research, and outreach of the new generation of experts on nuclear security, nuclear and WMD non-proliferation in Ukraine. During the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in 2014, there was an important initiative from Swedish and Norwegian authorities to strengthen nuclear safety and security in Ukraine.181 Due to the emerging challenges in 2014 after the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the breaking out of war in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions such assistance was extremely important in order to tackle the emerging threats and challenges in 2014. Further discussion of the aforementioned issues relating to the situation in the nuclear security sphere after 2014 is presented in Sect. 7. Other donor countries of bilateral aid, which played a crucial role in the nuclear energy history of Ukraine, were Germany, France, Finland, Norway, and Japan. Technical and experts’ assistance within bilateral cooperation from those countries 177 Agreement on cooperation between the State Committee of Ukraine on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Ukrderzhkomyaderbezpeky) and the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) on activities related to the proliferation number 752_019, International Document of 17.08.1993, signed on 08/17/1993 [http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/752_019] (in Ukrainian). 178 Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Sweden on cooperation in nuclear safety №752_005, International Document of 23.03.1999, the ratification of 23.03.2000 [http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/752_005] (in Ukrainian). 179 Agreement between the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority on cooperation in nuclear safety and radiation protection number 752_053, International Document of 14.01.2010, signed on 14.01.2010 [http://zakon2.rada.gov. ua/laws/show/752_053] (in Ukrainian). 180 Odessa Center for Nonproliferation [//odcnp.com.ua/33-the-opening-ceremony-of-odessacenter-for-nonproliferation-took-place-on-august-28]. 181 Nuclear security safety and non-proliferation 2016 [www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/ contentassets/44ebbd6e5d7d4274bdac47681bef5409/nuclear-security-safety-and-non-prolifera tion-2016.pdf].

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helped Ukraine to make the nuclear energy complex safe and secure. Active cooperation with all the aforementioned sides remains at the highest level.

7 Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine and its Impact on the Nuclear Industry Development The nuclear sector always managed to find a successful way out of difficult situations by attracting international assistance, expertise, or support. Under the conditions of economic recession and total lack of funds in the nuclear sector, the negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the early nineties were very important. In January 1994, the well-known trilateral official statement by the Presidents of the USA, Russia, and Ukraine was made, becoming a tool for settling the outstanding issues regarding a nuclear-weapon-free status for Ukraine. Viktor Baryakhtar, Vice President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and chairperson of the Nuclear Policy Commission under the President of Ukraine, in an interview highly appreciated the importance of the agreement and stressed that “as soon as Ukraine starts dismantling nuclear weapons and nuclear warheads, they would immediately start supplying nuclear power plant fuel to us.”182 Note that in January 1994, the US-Russia contract for conversion of Russian highly enriched uranium into nuclear fuel was also signed. These two events are interrelated. The contract implementation envisaged a US loan to Russia totaling USD160 million for the purpose of nuclear fuel supply to Ukraine for its nuclear power plants. In May 1994, the Russian-Ukrainian Intergovernmental Agreement was signed for the supply of 1800 plus/minus 100 fuel assemblies (FA). This Agreement was intended to ensure supply of fuel assemblies to Ukraine for its NPPs as compensation for the fissionable materials contained in the strategic nuclear weapons whose dismantling was right about to start. From the financial standpoint, the amount of this compensation can be offset against the USD160 million of the US loans to Russia. Nevertheless, the material outcome was more substantial. 1800 FAs allowed all Ukrainian nuclear power plants to operate for three years (four to five years given certain power loss and some technical risks). It means that in the second half of the nineties, Ukraine could count on generation of half of its electricity balance (NPP share in generation) at a very low cost with the relevant network effect for the economy. According to modern standards, with the annual nuclear fuel import into Ukraine at the level of USD600 million the compensation mentioned above could easily count as USD2 billion

Газета органов государственной исполнительной власти «Урядовый курьер», 3 февраля 1994 год, 19–20 (№314–315) (UryadovyKurier, the Executive Government Bulletin, 3 February 1994, 19–20 (No. 314–315)) (The National Parliamentary Library of Ukraine). 182

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(nuclear fuel price grew by an order of magnitude versus the early 1990s, similarly to hydrocarbons). According to recently unclassified documents regarding the meeting of the Ukrainian delegation with representatives of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences, one of the main topics of the discussion was the plutonium agenda.183 Plutonium is an artificial material obtained by the irradiation of uranium. There are many theoretical methods of its disposal but most of them in the end require burial of nuclear waste. Thus, it suggests the logical question on whether or not it would be easier to bury weapons-grade plutonium in a hard-to-re-extract form. Mr. Nur Nigmatullin, who was the first vice chairperson of the State Committee of Ukraine for Use of Nuclear Energy in the early nineties, emphasized at that meeting that despite the readiness to send nuclear warheads to Russia and receive nuclear fuel for Ukrainian NPPs as compensation, the issue of plutonium storage remained unanswered. “Plutonium will be sent to Russia but it will remain the property of Ukraine on Russian territory.”184 He also stressed that for Ukraine, which had just become independent, the solution to such a problem was quite a challenging task. Nevertheless, for Ukraine, the plutonium issue remained part of the national economic interest and it was very important to come to a solution with maximum financial effect. According to Mr. Nigmatullin, the optimum solution was reprocessing of weapons-grade plutonium-239 in Russia with subsequent compensation to Ukraine in the form of uranium fuel elements (FE) based on its energy potential, i.e. 1 kilogram of U-235 per kilogram of plutonium.185 In this context, it is worth mentioning that in the nineties certain circles in Russia placed high expectations on the civilian use of weapons-grade plutonium-239. Since plutonium is fabricated by irradiation of natural uranium consisting of the isotope 238, a mixture of plutonium-239 with natural uranium, a so-called MOX-fuel, it can theoretically release heat in nuclear power plants as a result of fission of plutonium239 until all the natural uranium is converted under irradiation. Thus, the weaponsgrade plutonium can be theoretically disposed of through electricity generation at NPPs by adding it to natural uranium and burning without consequent isotope separation, just by isolation and disposal of the reactor-grade plutonium. The conversion of the weapons-grade plutonium-239 into the so-called reactorgrade plutonium (mixture of isotopes, mostly Pu-239 and Pu-240) in nuclear power plants was chosen with pressure from Russia as a disposal method under the US-Russia plutonium agreement. The parties agreed that the presence of the isotope 240 in the amount exceeding 10% is a sufficient barrier for military use (the so-called spent fuel standard). In fact, reactor plutonium may be detonated in a nuclear chain

183

Trip Report, CISAC Delegation Plutonium Discussion in Moscow, March 14–19, 1994/ US National Security Archives, 111 Nuclear Control Institute Collection. CISAC here stands for Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid.

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reaction with military application. But the USA initially believed that reprocessing of irradiated MOX-fuel to extract reactor-grade plutonium would be difficult enough to preclude the possibility of immediate military usage. The USA viewed it as a prompt reaction to Soviet surplus weapon-grade plutonium problem. In the end the USA rejected the idea as too costly and dangerous while Russia continues to believe it is innovative. Continuing the discussion on the compensation for fissionable materials, it should be noted that in 1997, the issue of the material contained in the tactical nuclear weapons, transferred back in 1992, was resolved. The amount was finally agreed upon along with determination of the compensation for the ships handed over to Russia in the framework of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) negotiations. The BSF mutual settlement indicated the amount of USD200 million as the compensation for fissionable materials to be written off from the Ukrainian national debt to Russia. The separate agreement on this issue concluded several months later indicated the amount of USD199.829 million, which was a strangely precise number, given that it was impossible to calculate the cost of fissionable material to a thousand.186 In addition, it is worth mentioning that this compensation, in spite of being a short-term solution for nuclear fuel supply to Ukraine in the nineties, subsequently led to the absolute dependence of the Ukrainian nuclear sector on Russia. The idea to establish an industrial nuclear fuel fabrication facility, which emerged in the early nineties, never materialized.187 Thence on, Ukraine was forced to purchase all of its nuclear fuel for all NPP units only from the Russian Federation, which considerably undermined the energy security of Ukraine. The nuclear fuel supply diversification issue received a practical dimension in early May 1998, when the Agreement on Cooperation between Ukraine and the USA on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy was concluded. This document clearly specified the role of the USA in further diversification of nuclear fuel supply for the Ukrainian NPPs. This particular agreement resulted in the involvement of the Westinghouse transnational company in

Соглашение между Правительством Российской Федерациии и Правительством Украины о взаиморасчетах, связанных с разделом Черноморского флота и пребываниемЧерноморского флота Российской Федерации на территории Украины (The Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine on the Mutual Settlements Related to the Partition of the Black Sea Fleet and Presence of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the Territory of Ukraine) [www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/ international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/page-255/47330]. 187 Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Фонд №Р-2, опис №15, справа 4745 Листування з міністерствами та установами з питань атомної енергетики/ 23.01.1995 №2-ДСП від заступника голови держкоматома А.П. Чернова, кому: КабінетуМініс трівУкраїни (ДСК) (The Central State Archive of Supreme Government and Executive Bodies of Ukraine, Fund No. R-2, inventory No. 15, file 4745 Correspondence with the Ministries and Agencies on the Issues of Nuclear Power Industry /23.01.1995 No.2-DSP from А.P. Chernov, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear Energy Use to Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Restricted)). 186

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nuclear fuel supply diversification for Ukraine with the aim of eliminating Russia’s monopoly in the Ukrainian nuclear sector. Going back to disarmament again, the main driver for elimination of the nuclear weapons and solution of the relevant issues both in Ukraine and, most importantly, in Russia was the USA’s Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, as discussed earlier in this document. Another program important for Ukraine, in which the country did not actually participate directly, was the contract between the USA and Russia for conversion of 500 tons of Russian weapons-grade uranium into nuclear fuel. Finally, over the last few years, a part of activities that had certain relation to nuclear disarmament received funding from the US Non-proliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), which has the same goals as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, however the Fund has no organizational relation to the Program. The logic of emergence and development of the above programs is a separate topic. The following facts should be taken into consideration when discussing the assistance provided to Ukraine. Firstly, the money allocated in the framework of the Nunn-Lugar Program was not charity; it was spent in accordance with the American way of understanding of “mutual threat reduction,” which did not necessarily coincide with the Ukrainian view. Secondly, the Nunn-Lugar Program management was quite complicated, the assistance was never provided in the form of grants or loans—it was always comprised of services, equipment, logistics, and subcontracts. Thirdly, Ukraine received from Russia substantial compensation for the fissionable materials, which seemed impossible without the US-Russia contract for highly enriched uranium conversion. According to the assessments made by US military specialists, never issued as official information but expressed in an unofficial way, the defense planning countermeasures against the threat posed by the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal to the USA required from USD10 to USD30 billion.188 Russia, according to some statements made in the early nineties, was ready to eliminate the Ukrainian arsenal for USD2–3 billion of the US-sponsored funds, to mutual American-Russian satisfaction. Ukrainian experts said that USD1.5 billion was sufficient to do it using own country’s efforts. The USA managed to spend a much smaller amount using mainly its own resources.

Алексей Ижак. Вспоминая о совместном уменьшении угрозы и потраченных деньгах. «Зеркало недели. Украина» №25, 11 июля 2014 [gazeta.zn.ua/international/vspominaya-osovmestnom-umenshenii-ugrozy-i-potrachennyh-dengah-_.html]. 188

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8 Nuclear Security in Ukraine Upon dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine inherited a considerable number of institutions, industrial enterprises and organizations who used sources of ionizing radiation in their activities; a number of enterprises using radioisotope instruments; and several uranium ore production and processing enterprises. At the same time, there was practically no relevant regulatory and legal framework to govern the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of the parties in the area of use of nuclear energy. That was the reason why in the early years of the independence active work was launched to advance national nuclear legislation for Ukraine. In this direction, among the first steps was accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980) on 5 May 1993 after the Parliament of Ukraine issued the respective decree.189 Ukraine has strongly relied on international partners throughout establishment of national physical protection system. The United States of America provided some of the biggest support at the early stage. Inter alia, on 25 October 1993, the treaty between Ukraine and the United States of America on the provision of assistance to Ukraine for elimination of strategic nuclear weapons and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was signed. Along with other USA commitments, this treaty envisaged the development of the state nuclear material control, accounting and physical protection system.190 Following the aforementioned treaty, on 18 December 1993, the agreement was signed between the State Nuclear and Radiation Safety Committee of Ukraine and the US Department of Defense concerning the development of the state nuclear material control, accounting and physical protection system aimed at prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons from Ukraine. Against the backdrop of increased concern regarding security of nuclear and radioactive material, as well as of all nuclear assets within the unstable period at the beginning of 1990s, Leonid Kravchuk (the President of Ukraine at that time) issued the Decree On the Measures of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities in Ukraine191 on 28 December 1993. This Decree introduced to the Ukrainian regulatory framework the definition of designated authorities for physical protection that include the contemporary State Nuclear and Radiation Safety Committee of Ukraine, State Security Service of Ukraine, and Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and also introduced the concept of responsibilities of legal entities

189 Про участь України у Конвенції про фізичний захист ядерного матеріалу 1980 року (Decree of the Parliament of Ukraine regarding participation at the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 05 May 1993) [//zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3182-12]. 190 Trilateral Statement, op. cit. in Ref. 202, in “Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine”. 191 Указ Президента України “Про заходи щодо фізичног озахисту ядерного матеріалу та ядерних установок вУкраїні”, від 28.12.1993 № 608/93 (On Measures of Physical Protection for Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities in Ukraine, dated 28.12.1993 No. 608/93) [zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/608/93].

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involved in the construction and operation of nuclear facilities, as well as in nuclear material use, storage, and transportation. One of the first acts to specify the requirements for physical protection at the legislative level was done with the Law of Ukraine On Utilization of Nuclear Energy and Radiological Safety dated 8 February 1995.192 This document identified in addition to the competence of government authorities and executive bodies in the area of use of nuclear energy and radiation safety, the state regulation for physical protection, its main objectives and responsibilities. A new stage in the development of the physical protection system was the adoption of the Law of Ukraine On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste, and Other Sources of Ionizing Radiation193 dated 19 October 2000. According to that law, the system of physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste, and other sources of ionizing radiation is the aggregate of organizational, legal, engineering, and technical measures implemented in order to establish the conditions aimed at minimization of opportunity to commit sabotage, theft, or any other unlawful removal of radioactive material and at enhancement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

8.1

Ukraine and Nuclear Security Summits

Ukraine made its great contribution to the process of improving the efficiency of the international nuclear security regime throughout its participation at the Nuclear Security Summits. During the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington held on 13–14 April 2010, Ukraine pledged to remove HEU from its territory. “. . .By renouncing HEU, Ukraine regained the role of one of the moral leaders of the nuclear disarmament process. . .”.194 For the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, since the date of Kyiv’s decision to abandon nuclear weapons, the global community’s attention was attracted to our country. After the Summit was over, President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich approved the National Plan for the Implementation of the Working Plan of the Washington

192 Закон України “Про використання ядерної енергії та радіаційну безпеку”, від 08.02.1995 № 39/95-ВР (On Utilization of Nuclear Energy and Radiological Safety, dated 08.02.1995 No. 39/95-ВР) [http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/rada/show/39/95-%D0%B2%D1%80]. 193 Закон України “Про фізичний захист ядерних установок, ядерних матеріалів, радіоактивних відходів, інших джерел іонізуючого випромінювання” від 19.10.2000 № 2064-III(On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste, Other Sources of Ionizing Radiation dated 19.10.2000 No. 2064-III) [http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/2064-14]. 194 Горбулин В., Кондратов С. Страсти по урану. К некоторым итогам вашингтонского Саммита по ядерной безопасности //Зеркало недели - №17–30 апреля 2010 (GorbulinV., KondratovR. Passions for Uranium. On Some Results of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington // ZerkaloNedeli– No.17 – April 30, 2010).

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Nuclear Security Summit in 2010–2012.195 The main objective of the plan was to implement agreements reached at the Summit. The key task was to take the necessary measures in the area of nuclear security to enhance the national security of Ukraine and to participate in the international processes of elaboration of efficient measures of responding to modern nuclear security challenges. Following the event, in December 2010, three shipments of fresh HEU were removed from Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research, the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, and the Sevastopol National University for Nuclear Energy and Industry and sent to the Russian Federation for disposition. These three shipments totaled approximately 50 kilograms of HEU. Two years after the final shipments of HEU spent fuel from Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research and fresh HEU from Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology were also removed to Russia. These shipments completed the removal of all HEU from Ukraine before the next Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul (2012).196 The Hague Nuclear Security Summit in 2014 was followed by the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and outbreak of the conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine. Discussion within the event was also dedicated to emerging challenges for nuclear security and emphasized that the current crisis increases risks of terrorism and illicit trafficking of radioactive materials from Ukrainian facilities and through the countries’ territory. Sweden and Norway stated that they were going to initiate trilateral cooperation with Ukraine in the field of nuclear safety and security as a response to new challenges faced by not only Ukraine but also the global community.197 Within the context of this cooperation upgrade of the physical protection system and other NPP infrastructure, enhancement of regulatory supervision and control of nuclear safety and security, enhancement of inspection capabilities and improvement of legislation will be conducted. Ukraine used the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington for not only delivering the results achieved by Ukraine in nuclear security in different domains, but also to raise concerns and to condemn armed the Russian aggression, which refused to participate in the Summit. Among a number of concerns, the following is the most crucial: “At present Ukraine cannot guarantee physical protection of the [Sevastopil] research reactor, nuclear material, and sources of ionizing radiation on the territory of Crimea, city of Sevastopil and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.”198

195 Национальный план по реализации Рабочего плана Вашингтонского саммита по ядерной безопасности (The National Plan on Implementation of the Working Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington) [http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/documents/12471.html]. 196 The U.S. State Department [2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/186808.htm]. 197 SNRIU Report on nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine for 2014 [http://www.snrc.gov.ua/ nuclear/doccatalog/document?id¼293323]. 198 National Progress Report: Ukraine, presented during 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington [http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/3/31/national-progress-reportukraine].

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Nuclear Security after 2014

In 2014, global security was challenged by the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the breakout of war in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk districts. Both of these cases caused a number of issues, which led to emergence of scabrous and interconnected problems in different domains, including nuclear security. The legal regime of the particular Donetsk and Luhansk regions is defined by the Law of Ukraine from January 18, 2018 On the peculiarities of State policy on ensuring Ukraine’s State sovereignty over the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.199 In particular, this Law establishes the state policy over these territories; it also defines the provision of national security and defense as well as means of realization and protection of the rights of Ukrainian citizens residing there. The Law determines certain territories of Donetsk and Luhansk districts, which are beyond control of Ukraine, as “temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.” The International Security Advisory Board200 in its report identified such territories as a “gray zone.” According to the document “gray zone challenges are defined as competitive interaction among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality. They are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.”201 Emerging circumstances have resulted in the establishment of the new security reality that demands a new paradigm of respective risks and threats in order to be capable of mitigating or tackling them. Traditional approaches to deterrence are increasingly inadequate/inappropriate. It is also complicated by the emergence of the so-called hybrid threats that may combine subversion, destabilizing social media influence, disruptive cyber-attacks, etc. The annexation of Crimea brings another set of problems for the security environment concerning the uncontrolled territory, but from slightly another perspective. Ukraine has lost political and physical control over the Crimean Peninsula due to the illegitimate actions of the Russian Federation. The international community does not recognize annexation and is strongly against any action against the sovereignty of Ukrainian territory. The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution

Закон України Про особливості державної політики із забезпечення державного суверенітетуУкраїни на тимчасово окупованих територіях у Донецькій та Луганській областях [http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2268-19]. 200 The International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) is Federal Advisory Committee established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of independent insight, advice, and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation. 201 US Department of State [https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/266849.pdf]. 199

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68/262 “On territorial integrity of Ukraine” which affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.202 However, Ukraine is not able to maintain safety and security of people in Crimea and all industrial entities under current circumstances, which brings uncertainties with regard to their security conditions. To the same extent war in Donetsk and Luhansk districts as well as annexation of Crimea are critical issues to global security because of the radioactive sources of category 1–5 and facilities using radioactive sources allocation in the aforementioned territories. Combination of such sources and facilities along with uncontrolled and criminal activities by non-state (and at some case state) actors places these cases in the nuclear security domain. According to the analyses of the SNRIU the main threats from temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions are illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and radioactive sources from the aforementioned territories. This can result in exposure to the population and radioactive contamination of the environment due to depressurization of the HASS or usage in the creation of RDD (“dirty” bombs).203 After 2014, Ukraine has comprehensively reviewed its security agenda and incorporated the emerged changes into the respective strategic documents of national security and defense planning. The national assessment of nuclear security threats was conducted by the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, Security Service of Ukraine, and other involved authorities. The new security environment which influenced the risk and threats assessments for nuclear security was framed at the new revision of the Design Basis Threat (DBT)204 for Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste and Other Radiation Sources in Ukraine (introduced on 27 September 2015). Therefore, all respective laws and regulatory acts were synchronized with defined threats and risks at the updated DBT. The new DBT takes into account significant changes in the security environment after the beginning of Russian aggression. At the moment there is a discussion over updated DBT in order to address hybrid threats, including those posed by cyber space. President of “Energoatom” Mr. Nedashkovskiy announced that during 2014, at all NPPs’ vulnerability assessments had been completed.”205 Based on the obtained results, corresponding reports and recommendations were prepared for bringing the

202

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014, 68/262. Territorial integrity of Ukraine [https://guam-organization.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/N1345517.pdf]. 203 Доповідь про стан ядерної та радіаційноїбезпеки в Україні у 2015 році [http://www.snrc. gov.ua/nuclear/doccatalog/document?id¼324059]. 204 A DBT describes the capabilities of potential insider and external adversaries who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear and other radioactive material or sabotage. The operator’s physical protection system is designed and evaluated on the basis of the DBT [https://www.iaea.org/topics/ security-of-nuclear-and-other-radioactive-material/design-basis-threat]. 205 Energoatom’sweb site [http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/ua/press/nngc/41140-energoatom_v__ godu_dostig_samogo_vysokogo_pokazatelya_proizvodstva_elektroenergii_za_desyatiletie/].

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system of physical protection in line with the requirements of the current legislation and security environment.206 The country’s legal and regulatory framework concerning nuclear security has changed dramatically in view of the general security condition in Ukraine. The situation with the annexation of Crimea by Russia and war in the eastern part of Ukraine in 2014 has exerted a strong influence towards the national security strategy. It resulted in the necessity to adjust the nuclear security measures and efforts to a new reality and current internal and geopolitical transformations. In response to the military conflict in the eastern part of the country in 2014, a new military formation was established in Ukraine—National Guard of Ukraine (the Law of Ukraine from 13 March 2014 № 876-VII On the National Guard of Ukraine207), which became responsible for protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste, and other sources of ionizing radiation. Therefore, it resulted in respective changes to the Law of Ukraine On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionizing Radiation on the part of responsibilities. According to the previous version of the Law, these functions were under the responsibility of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and forces of assistance from the outside. The Law of Ukraine On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionizing Radiation identifies the list of offenses related to nuclear security. The full list of respective offenses and penalties is available in Annex 3 to this document. Because of the reforms conducted in Ukraine to strengthen the law enforcement branch, the national police were formed in place of the “militsia” (the name of national police service of Ukraine until 2015). They became responsible for taking necessary measures to ensure individual and public security in case of detection of illegal possession of radioactive, chemical, and nuclear materials. The proper instructions on the procedures of action of the police divisions in the case of detection of radioactive, chemical, and nuclear materials or received information about violation of rules or illegal use of them is presented in respective order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine from 6 September 2017 № 754.208 However, 206 Доповідь про стан ядерної та радіаційної безпеки в Україні у 2015 році [http://www.snrc. gov.ua/nuclear/doccatalog/document?id¼324059]. 207 Закон України “Про фізичний захист ядерних установок, ядерних матеріалів, радіоактивних відходів, інших джерел іонізуючого випромінювання” від 19.10.2000 № 2064-III (On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste, Other Sources of Ionizing Radiation dated 19.10.2000 No. 2064-III) [http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/2064-14]. 208 Наказ Міністерства Внутрішніх Справ України 06.09.2017 № 754 “Про затвердження Інструкції про порядок дій органів (підр озділів) поліції в разі виявлення радіоа ктивних, хімі чних та ядерних матеріалів або отримання інформації про порушення правил чи незаконне поводження з ними” (Decree” On approval of the Instruction on the procedure of action of the bodies (units) of the police in the case of detection of radioactive, chemical and nuclear materials, or to receive information on violation of rules or illegal use of them”) [zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z1240-17/print1519590173108783].

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the biggest challenge in this domain is lack of experience in the nuclear security sphere of the newly established institution. Newly appointed staff does not have enough understanding of the features of detection in illegal possession of radioactive, chemical, and nuclear materials. Additionally, the system of interrelations with other authorities does not function in the most efficient way due to lack of institutional memory. The legal and regulatory framework concerning nuclear security was also influenced by the changes in security strategies. On 6 May 2015, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine209 was approved, and a few months later on 24 September 2015, the new Military Doctrine210 were adopted. These documents defined threats to national security, which were also related to nuclear security, mostly in the part of terrorists’ activities. Foundation for these documents is established by the Law of Ukraine On the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine from 19 June 2003 № 964-IV.211 This law defines the basic principles of state policy aimed at protecting national interests and ensuring the security of individuals, societies, and states from external and internal threats in all aspects of life. Based on this law, the President of Ukraine develops and approves the Strategy of National Security of Ukraine and the Military Doctrine of Ukraine. Both of these documents are legally binding and play the role of framework for the development of specific programs within the national security policy. Additionally, according to the Military Doctrine, terrorist acts within the territory of Ukraine or against the citizens of Ukraine—sabotage as well as bombings, kidnapping, and hostage taking—is one of the main threats to Ukraine’s military security. In addition, the document makes reference to the existence on the territory of Ukraine and neighboring countries of environmentally hazardous objects. Therefore, the security forces and the population of Ukraine are preparing for action in the conditions of radiation contamination, chemical pollution, and bacteriological contamination, etc. Coordinated efforts to mitigate emerging challenges in the security domain resulted in the respective response plans. For example, the SNRIU after the occupation of Crimea and the beginning of Russian aggression in the east of Ukraine immediately initiated establishment of a temporary working group to search for and implement timely and coordinated solutions of any problems in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, physical protection of nuclear materials and installations, nuclear

209 Указ Президента України “Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 6 травня 2015 року “Про Стратегію національної безпеки України” (Presidential Decree no.287/2015 On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on 6 May 2015 “On the Strategy of National Security of Ukraine,” 26 May 2015) [http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/287/2015]. 210 Указ Президента України Про рішення Радинаціональної безпеки і оборони Українивід 2 вересня 2015 року “Про новуредакцію Воєнної доктриниУкраїни” (The Military Doctrine of Ukraine, 24 Sep.2015) [http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/555/2015/paran8#n8]. 211 Закон України “Про основи національної безпекиУкраїниЄ” (Law of Ukraine “OntheFundamentalsofNationalSecurityofUkraine”) [zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/964-15].

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and radiation safety (order from 24 April 2014 №50 and order dated 3 October 2014 №144). After the new DBT was adopted, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted a comprehensive plan of measures to implement the provisions of the DBT for nuclear installations, nuclear materials, radioactive waste, other sources of ionizing radiation in Ukraine with its order from 22 July 2016 № 501-р,212 The document envisages the following: to review the object design threats against the relevant radiation-hazardous objects, to conduct an assessment of the state systems of physical protection of nuclear installations, nuclear materials, radioactive waste, and other sources of ionizing radiation; nuclear facilities’ air defense systems; development of cooperation plans in case of emerging threats. According to the Law of Ukraine On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionizing Radiation, development and implementation of physical protection plans and plans for interaction of licensees, state authorities, and external forces in case of sabotage are one of the main requirements for physical protection. Therefore, all respective facilities develop and implement their own plans of interaction in case of subversion of nuclear facilities (sabotage) and nuclear materials. It is the so-called Contingency Plan and the requirements of these plans are defined in the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine’s order from 22 November2010 № 163.213 The SNRIU controls the provision of these plans in accordance with the existing legislation and current DBT. In order to examine the practical efficiency of such plans and their validity, nuclear facilities conduct exercises with involvement of all respective parties. After the new DBT was introduced on 27 September 2015, the “Contingency Plans” of all nuclear facilities were updated and put into effect, additionally, the Procedure of action of the object interaction plans participants located on the nuclear power plant’s site in case of a crisis situation. “Energoatom” has developed the Action plan of Energoatom on the realization of the concept of combating terrorism in NPPs for the period of 2014–2020. This plan consists of a set of measures aimed at revealing and mitigating terrorist threats, protecting the population and state against terrorism, concentrating main efforts towards anti-terrorist activities and strengthening communication with the respective national authorities. In the case of a crisis situation emerging at a nuclear power plant its director activates an object plan of interaction. At the initial stage of the event at an NPP, the

Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України від 22 липня 2016 р. № 501-р “Про затвердження комплексного плану заходів щодо реалізації положень Проектної загрози для ядерних установок, ядерних матеріалів, радіоактивних відходів, інших джерел іонізуючого випромінювання в Україні” [http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/501-2016-р]. 213 Наказ Державного Комітету Ядерного Регулювання України від 22.11.2010 N 163 “Про затвердження Вимог до об’єктового плану взаємодії у разі вчинення диверсії” [http:// zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z1264-10]. 212

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main decision-makers of the crisis management are the Director General of the NPP and the commander of the military unit. Since 2014, at each of the NPPs special training and exercises in various forms and with different scenarios were conducted, based on object interaction plans, DBT and regions’ features. For example, in October 2017, command-and-staff training was held on protecting critical energy infrastructure and responding to the threats undermining sustainability of its functioning at the national level. The event was organized by the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry, the National Institute for Strategic Studies, and NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (Vilnius).214 Procedures of interaction of different systems of responding to combined threats and crisis situations were checked during the training. It should also be noted that, on December 6, 2017, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree adopted The concept of the creation of a state system for the protection of critical infrastructure with it decree No. 1009-p.215

8.3

Uncontrolled Territories

After some territories of Donetsk and Luhansk districts were occupied, Ukraine has temporarily lost full legal and physical control over them. On 7 November 2014, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the list of settlements where government authorities are temporarily not available. The list includes 24 regional centers and 136 settlements of Donetsk and Luhansk regions including regional centers Donetsk and Luhansk. Additionally, there are 114 settlements located on the confrontation line.216 A vast number of different industrial coal, metal, and chemical entities are located in the Donetsk and Luhansk districts. Before 2014, the contribution of Donbas to the GDP of Ukraine was about 16% and it covered around 27% of Ukraine’s total exports, (which is approximately USD68 billion). After 2014, almost all coal mining enterprises of Donbas (including the Donetsk Coal Energy Company and Luganskvugillia) and half of all iron and steel companies of South-Eastern Ukraine were under control of terrorists. As of today, 73 facilities using radioactive

214 Доповідь про стан ядерної та радіаційної безпеки в Україніу 2017 році [http://www.snrc. gov.ua/nuclear/doccatalog/document?id¼389980]. 215 Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України від 6 грудня 2017 р. № 1009-р “Про схвалення Концепції створення державної системи захисту критичної інфраструктури” [http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1009-2017-р]. 216 Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України від 7 листопада 2014 р. № 1085-р “Про затвердження переліку населених пунктів, на територі їяких органи державної влади тимчасово не здійснюють свої повноваження, та переліку населених пунктів, що розташовані на лінії зіткнення” (Cabinet of Ministers’ Order “On approval of the list of settlements in the territory of which the state authorities temporarily fail to exercise their powers, and the list of settlements located on the line of collision») [//zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/10 85-2014-р].

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sources, including 8 institutions with high activity sealed radioactive sources (HASS) are beyond the regulatory control of Ukraine. State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate (SNRIU) possesses no official information on radiation safety at two large Donbas coal mining enterprises (Donetsk Coal Energy Company and Luhanskvugillia) bringing together 15 coal mines located in the territory beyond the control of Ukraine. The total number of radioactive sources used by these companies is 114 (maximum rated activity of single source reaches 2.35  1011 Bq). In the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk districts two storage facilities of Donetsk (Special Center Vugleisotop and PJSC Donetskstal’— Metallurgical Plant) have also remained with about 500 HASS. Overall, Ukraine lost regulatory control over more than 1200 radioactive sources of category 1–5 located in the uncontrolled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Crimean Peninsula was annexed by the Russian Federation after military intervention and the illegal referendum on the status of Crimea on 16 March 2014. The international community does not recognize the annexation and is strongly against any action against the sovereignty of Ukrainian territory. The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/262 On territorial integrity of Ukraine which affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.217 However, Ukraine is not able to maintain the safety and security of the people in Crimea and all industrial entities under current circumstances, which brings uncertainties concerning their security conditions. The nuclear assets located in the territory of Crimea are as follows: IR-100 research reactor at the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry (SNUNE&I) and two subcritical assemblies operated using low-enriched uranium and natural uranium. During the annexation, the reactor was shut down. A unit of the MIA of Ukraine provided asset security consisting of the local residents who gradually turned over to the Russian side under the pressing circumstances. The control of these assets was totally lost in May 2014. In addition, in the territory of the Crimea there are several enterprises and health care institutions using instruments and containers with depleted uranium shielding, as well as high activity sources of ionizing radiation. SNRIU tried to maintain control over the situation in Crimea and to fulfill its obligations in the area of nuclear security and non-proliferation safeguards in the temporarily occupied territory for several more months. First, the territorial units of the State Inspectorate were ordered to perform an urgent unscheduled inspection of the condition of physical protection, nuclear material accounting and control systems at the assets mentioned above, as well as inspection of the physical protection system condition at the facilities where the sources of ionizing radiation were used. The connection with the Crimean State Nuclear and Radiation Safety Inspectorate was actually lost in May or June of 2014, and in September, the Crimean Inspectorate officially became subordinate to the Russian Federal Service for Ecological,

217 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014 [guam-organization.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/N1345517.pdf].

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Technical, and Atomic Supervision (Rostekhnadzor). The licensees located in the territory of Crimea did not submit their reports on the results of nuclear material physical inventory for 2014. The South-Eastern State Nuclear and Radiation Safety Inspectorate in Donetsk continued to operate and moved to Zaporizhzhia in December 2014. According to Article 5 of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities ratified by the Decree of the Parliament of Ukraine of 5 May 1993, in case of receipt of information on any movement, use or modification of nuclear material or in case of a real threat of such an act Ukraine should notify the IAEA and the Member States. Such information was submitted to the IAEA. However, in reality we experienced the situation with the annexation of a part of Ukrainian territory, which was not legally regulated in the international instruments on nuclear security, physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, and nuclear non-proliferation safeguards. Therefore, the priority tasks of the state security policy in the area of use of nuclear energy aimed at execution by Ukraine of its international obligation to accomplish basic physical protection goals include as follows: minimization of risks of nuclear terrorist acts, theft of nuclear material, radioactive waste, and other sources of ionizing radiation, as well as enhancement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

9 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Safeguards and Ukraine Issues related to the use of nuclear power became the most popular topic in the discussions held in the course of elaboration and adoption of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) dated 1 July 1968. The challenge was in the dual nature of technologies related to this source of energy. Such technologies as uranium enrichment and SNF reprocessing are the basis for operation of the civilian nuclear power industry; however, these technologies may also be used for fabricating nuclear weapon components. This dilemma urged the international community to take active steps towards its regulation. At the same time, any restrictions of the state’s rights to the development of its own civil nuclear power industry substantially undermine the attractiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, because such restrictions may potentially become a threat to their energy security. Thus, with the purpose of opposing nuclear weapons proliferation and, at the same time, to comply with the provisions of Article 4 of the NPT, which establishes the “. . .inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. . .” and facilitates the “. . .exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. . .,” a “system of safeguards” was established. The IAEA is the body responsible for this system functioning. According to Item 5, Article 3 of the IAEA Statute, the Agency is authorized.

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. . .to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy.

On 14 January 1994, the presidents of Ukraine, the USA, and Russia at their meeting in Moscow signed the Trilateral Statement, which declared that Ukraine had finally decided to start nuclear disarmament. Right after this event, the specialists of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SNRSCU immediately commenced their activities on preparation for signing an agreement with the IAEA. It was an unprecedented case when a state having nuclear weapons on its territory put forward an initiative to accept full control by the IAEA of its nuclear material and facilities.218 On 28 September 1994, while attending the IAEA General Conference in Vienna, SNRSCU Chairman Nikolai Steinberg, under instructions from the Ukrainian Government, signed the Agreement with the IAEA. The Agreement was entitled verbatim Agreement for the Application of Safeguards to All Nuclear Material in All Peaceful Nuclear Activities of Ukraine. According to the terminology used by the international law experts, this agreement with Ukraine was the so-called sui generis, i.e. unique, caused by unique unprecedented circumstances when a state dismantled its own nuclear arsenal voluntarily. Note that it all occurred at the time when Pakistan was actively developing its military nuclear program to equalize its position in confrontation with India. In its turn, India declared that the NPT provisions are of a discriminative nature and refused to accede to the Treaty and created its own nuclear weapon, while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not allow IAEA inspectors to visit its nuclear facilities and declared its withdrawal from the NPT.219 The Agreement signed between Ukraine and the IAEA at that time was considered a temporary measure, and its content was compliant with standard textual comprehensive safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/153), which the IAEA concludes with states that do not possess nuclear weapons. There was one exception: an article that envisaged execution of a permanent agreement to replace the temporary one upon accession of Ukraine to the NPT.220 By that time, tactical nuclear weapons were already transported from Ukraine to Russia for demounting and destruction, but strategic weapons were left, and negotiations on Ukraine’s joining the NPT had not been held. Unfortunately, the governing entities did not fully recognized issues on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is referenced by the fact that in October 1994, the State Committee on

218 Chernaya, Nadezhda, a former Deputy Head of Safeguards Department of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine. Application of the IAEA Safeguards in Ukraine: How It All Started, 30/01/2014 [http://uatom.org/index.php/ru/2015/09/24/prymenenye-garantyj-magate-vukrayne-kak-vse-nachynalos/]. 219 Ibid. 220 Ibid.

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Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ukraine was liquidated as an independent regulatory authority, which should have performed the Agreement with the IAEA, and its merging with the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Though the Agreement with the IAEA envisaged ratification by the Ukrainian Parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, taking into account the domestic NPP situation and in an attempt to avoid battles in Parliament that could delay enforcement of this document for an indefinite period, approved the Agreement with the IAEA by its Decree. Thus, Russia did not have any more arguments to reject nuclear fuel supply to Ukraine, which was declared in a corresponding note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.221 Upon execution of the Agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA on Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and this Agreement’s ratification by the Parliament of Ukraine in 1997, the system of the safeguards began to function in Ukraine. The principle of this system’s operation is that the state, of its own will, declares the locations and quantity of nuclear material under its jurisdiction. After that, all nuclear material is subject to safeguards and must be verified by IAEA inspectors. Ukraine signed the Additional Protocol on 15 August 2000 and ratified it on 16 November 2005, thus confirming its intentions regarding the use of nuclear material exclusively for peaceful purposes. It became another step in the policy of consistent support for the non-proliferation regime and confirmed its exemplary behavior in fulfilling the commitments in accordance with the agreements signed. The IAEA safeguards system is continuously developing and improving, in response to the expanded use of nuclear power resulting in increasing amounts of nuclear material and technologies. This caused the development of an “Integrated safeguards system.” It is based on an optimum combination of the traditional safeguards (INFCIRC/153) and the requirements of the enhanced safeguards as per Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540). Ukraine maintained active cooperation with the IAEA in order to meet requirements for an integrated safeguards system. For example, after comprehensive technical and communication modernizations, since 2010, IAEA experts reduced considerably inspection efforts and increased the efficiency of their work in Ukraine to verify fulfillment of international agreements by Ukraine. It moved Ukraine closer to getting a comprehensive conclusion on the possibility to apply the integrated safeguards in Ukraine.222 Starting from 1 May 2012, the IAEA began applying the integrated safeguards to Ukraine, which allowed the Agency to ensure absence of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared nuclear activity in Ukraine.

221

Ibid. Report on Radiation and Nuclear Safety in Ukraine 2010 [http://www.snrc.gov.ua/nuclear/ doccatalog/document?id¼174137]. 222

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The integrated safeguards system is described as the highest degree of trust in a state who excellently executes the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. Ukraine overcame many difficulties on its way to using the integrated safeguards. During the entire period, our country fulfilled all obligations on safeguards in good faith and did not have any serious problems. Therefore, application of the integrated safeguards is proof that Ukraine deserved the trust of the international community in the area of use of nuclear energy. However, after the Crimean annexation in 2014, for Ukraine, it was difficult to fulfill its obligation within the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol with respect to the nuclear material and facilities located in Crimea. Therefore, on 26 March 2014, a special report on execution of the Safeguards Agreement in Connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was sent to the IAEA Secretariat. This report contained information on the fact that the Ukrainian party had lost its control over nuclear material and facilities located in the territory of the Crimea, which meant the impossibility of performance by Ukraine of its international obligations in full scope due to occupation of a part of Ukrainian territory by the Russian Federation. As a response to these actions, as well as taking into account the UN General Assembly Resolution dated from 27 March 2014 “Territorial integrity of Ukraine,”223 the IAEA informed Ukraine of the continuation of safeguards in accordance with its Charter and international law. Therefore, the IAEA applies safeguards to nuclear materials and facilities located in Crimea in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.224 On 7 April 2014, Ihor Prokopchuk, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine, had a meeting with Yukiya Amano, IAEA Director General to discuss Ukraine’s initiative on sending a special IAEA inspection to Crimea. Mr. Amano stressed during the meeting that Ukraine, even though it had lost control over nuclear material in the peninsula, had not breached its international commitments. He also confirmed that the IAEA would continue application of the non-proliferation safeguards to Ukraine because Crimea was an integral part of Ukraine. Despite such circumstances, the IAEA also confirmed the “broad conclusion” for Ukraine,225 which proves the exclusively peaceful nature of all nuclear activities in Ukraine during the reported timeframe. Yuriy Sergeyev, permanent Representative of Ukraine at the UNGA, in his statement of 2015 emphasized, that “. . .by confirming the “broad conclusion” for 223

Prevention of armed conflict: strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp? symbol¼A/68/L.39]. 224 Report on the Situation over the Radiation and Nuclear Safety in Ukraine in 2015 [http://www. snrc.gov.ua/nuclear/doccatalog/document?id¼324059]. 225 Statement by the Permanent Representative Yuriy Sergeyev at the UNGA meeting on the a.i. 87 “Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency”, 17 November, 2015 [https://mfa.gov.ua/en/ news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/42152-vistup-postijnogo-predstavnika-jurija-sergejeva-nazasidanni-genasambleji-oon-shhodo-shhorichnoji-dopovidi-magate].

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Ukraine, the IAEA Secretariat once again stressed that the IAEA safeguards apply to all nuclear material located on the whole territory of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in accordance with Ukraine’s Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto.”226

9.1

Export Control System

Creation of an export control system was among the key tasks for Ukraine during the 1990s, because it influenced not only national security, but also willingness of international partners to conduct export/import operations. Taking into account the strong need to have a proper legal framework for cooperation as well as the nuclear legacy of Ukraine and its strong support for the existing non-proliferation regimes and international standards, establishment of an export control system received considerable emphasis. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 1991 with the Law of Ukraine On Foreign Economic Activity defined that the export and import of nuclear materials, technologies, equipment, and other products and services should be exclusively provided by the entities authorized by Ukraine at the state level. It was the first step Ukraine took towards export control introduction in national legislation.227 Following this step, in 1992, the state system was almost established after the creation of a Government expert technical commission based on the President’s Decree (No 45 dated 20 January 1992)228 and the Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (No 153 dated 25 March 1992). This institution was responsible for creation of an export control system and to promote the international cooperation of Ukraine with other countries in this field. However, the Commission did not demonstrate its efficiency in terms of execution assigned tasks, and it was transformed into a Government Commission on Export Control (GCEC).229 The main task of the newly established authority was to ensure control over export and/or import of respective goods as well as compliance with international legal norms of non-proliferation.

226 Statement by the Permanent Representative Yuriy Sergeyev at the UNGA meeting on the a.i. 87 “Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency” from 17 November 2015 [https://mfa.gov.ua/ en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/42152-vistup-postijnogo-predstavnika-jurija-sergejeva-nazasidanni-genasambleji-oon-shhodo-shhorichnoji-dopovidi-magate]. 227 State service of export control of Ukraine [http://www.dsecu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article; jsessionid¼83190F622EE8BCDE7C091879284E3196?art_id¼35787&cat_id¼35542]. 228 Указ Президента України від 20 січня 1992 року N 45 (The President’s Decree (No 45 dated 20.01.1992)) [http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/45/92/ed19920120/conv]. 229 The Decree of President of Ukraine (No 3/93 dated 03.01.1993) “On the improvement of national export control” [http://www.iom.org.ua/en/legislation/migration-related-legislation/onoptimization-of-the-central-executive-bodies.html].

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After the creation of the basis for an institutional framework, Ukraine shifted towards the next stage—on March 41,993, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the list of commodities, materials, equipment, and technologies that require a special permit to be exported from Ukraine. Further improvements to the export control system in Ukraine were made in 1993, when Ukraine joined the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Chemical Weapons. The following year, Ukraine signed the Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine and the United States on the transfer of missile equipment and technology, individual documents of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The fulfillment of the requirements of this memorandum allowed Ukraine to solve the issue of preserving the civilian direction of the national missile and space industry and gave Ukraine the opportunity to enter the circle of states that provide launches of civilian spacecraft. Due to the implementation of its commitments on missile technology control, Ukraine received the appropriate “quotas” for launching foreign spacecraft using its own missile technology.230 In 1996, the export control system was restructured in order to strengthen its institutional capacity. According to the Decree of the President of Ukraine,231 the Government Commission on Export Control was turned into a Government Commission on Export Control Policy, and Expert Technical Committee under the Cabinet of Ministers—on the State Service for Export Control of Ukraine. Another wave of administrative reforms in the export control sector occurred in 1999—the State Export Control Service of Ukraine was eliminated and its functions transferred to the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. However, understanding of having a dedicated and separate authority for better management of the export control system resulted in creation again of the State Export Control Service of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine.232 According to the Decree, this authority became the central executive body with special status for realizing government policy on export controls. In addition to creation of a national system, Ukraine participated in the international regimes. Ukraine joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Zangger Committee and Wassenaar Arrangement in 1996, the Missile Technology Control Regimein 1998, and Australia Group in 2005. What is important to emphasize is that accession to the aforementioned regimes stipulated drafting and adoption of relevant legislation to meet the requirements foreseen by these regimes. For example, after Ukraine

Галака С.П., Гришуткін О.М., Перепелиця Г.М., Сівер О.І. Н-Експортний контроль в системі міжнародної безпеки/За ред. О.М. Гришуткіна. Київ:, 2012. 336 с. 231 Указ Президента України Про дальше вдосконалення державного експортного контролю (Decree of President of Ukraine (No 1279/96 dated 28.12.1996) “On further improvement of national export controls”) [//zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1279/96]. 232 Закон України “Про державний контроль за міжнародними передачами товарів в ійськово гопризначення та подвійного використання” (The Law of Ukraine “On the State Control over the International Transfer of the Military and the Dual use goods”) [//zakon2.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/549-15]. 230

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joined the Wassenaar Arrangement, in 1996, the Cabinet of Ministry of Ukraine adopted a decree,233 which established procedures for state control of dual products covered by this regime and approved the list of such goods. Although Ukraine joined the Australia Group in 2005, in 1997, Ukraine adopted a decree234 which established procedures for state control of dual goods of chemical and biological directions, and approved the corresponding lists of such goods. Thus, the control of the full volume of sensitive goods of chemical and biological direction began in practice in April 1997. Further improvement of the legal framework in the export control domain occurred from 1998 to 2003. Within this timeframe the law On state control over international transfers of military and dual-use items,235 which basically established the “hard” system of state export control was developed and approved in Ukraine.236 Other legal and regulatory acts were further adopted, as well as existing legislation improved in order to modernize the export control system. Hence, as of today Ukraine has a robust and well-developed legislation system, which is in full compliance with the European Union regulations and standards. Since 19 October 2018, Ukraine uses a single national list of dual-use items that meets EU standards.237 The implemented single list consolidates five lists currently in force in the State Export Control System of the list of goods that can be used in the creation of conventional weapons, military or special equipment, as well as rocket, nuclear, chemical, bacteriological (biological), and toxin weapons.

Про порядок контролю за експортом, імпортом і транзитом окремих видів виробів, обладнання, матеріалів, программного забезпечення і технологій, що можуть викор истовуватися для створення озброєння, військової чи спеціальної техніки від 22 серпня 1996 р. N 1005 [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/rada/show/1005-96-%D0%BF/ed19980818]. 234 Про затвердження Положення про порядок контролю за експортом, імпортом та транзитом товарів, що можуть бути використані у створенні хімічної, бактеріологічної (біологічної) татоксинної зброї від 22 квітня 1997 р. N 384 [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/384-97-%D0%BF]. 235 Закон України “Про державний контроль за міжнародними передачами товаріввійськово гопризначення та подвійноговикористання” [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/549-15]. 236 Галака С.П., Гришуткін О.М., Перепелиця Г.М., Сівер О.І. Н-Експортний контроль в системіміжнародноїбезпеки/За ред. О.М. Гришуткіна. Київ:2012. 145 с. 237 Про внесення змін до Порядку здійснення державного контролю за міжнародними передачами товарів подвійного використання від 11 січня 2018 р. № 1 [https://zakon.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/1-2018-%D0%BF]. 233

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Ukraine’s Participation in the International Nuclear and Radiation Safety Regime

International cooperation is an integral part of the development of the national nuclear and radiation safety regulation system. It is aimed at reaching the global standard of assuring nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine. The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine assures implementation of a number of intergovernmental and interdepartmental international agreements in the field of nuclear and radiation safety regulation. Within many years of operation, the Ukrainian regulatory body has established partnership relations with the regulatory authorities of the USA, Germany, France, Spain, the Russian Federation, Finland, Sweden, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while expanding cooperation with Turkey, India, Brazil, China, etc. The multilateral convention-based mechanisms and tools, to which Ukraine acceded, play an important role in the diverse areas of international cooperation, including membership in international organizations. The IAEA is a key international organization whose activity is aimed at assuring the wide use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by different countries of the world. Ukraine has participated in the Agency’s activities from the date of its foundation in 1957. Ukraine shares the goals stated in the IAEA Statute and supports the IAEA’s activity aimed at assuring that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes. Ukraine is also a party to such important international IAEA tools as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, etc. In April 2011, Vienna (Austria) hosted a meeting of the states parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety dedicated to reviewing the national reports on fulfillment of commitments in accordance with the Convention’s requirements. In the course of that meeting, the Ukrainian party represented by SNRIU Chairman Y. Mikolaychuk presented the National Report on fulfillment of commitments of Ukraine arising from the Convention on Nuclear Safety in accordance with the agenda, period, current rules, and procedures of the review taking into account the recommendations from previous meetings. Presentation of Ukraine’s National Report was focused on the issues of administrative reform, which resulted in enhancement of the regulatory body’s institutional capacity, expansion of authority, and accountability directly to the Prime Minister of Ukraine. The report also addressed the results of implementation of the Joint ECIAEA-Ukraine project on assessment of nuclear safety at Ukrainian NPPs, aimed at implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine and the European Union on Cooperation in the Energy Sector dated 1 December 2005. It

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was also stressed in the presentation that Ukraine received positive conclusions by international experts based on assessment of nuclear safety at Ukrainian NPPs for all 4 areas of operation: design safety, operational safety, RAW management, decommissioning and regulatory issues. This meeting was important because it addressed in a comprehensive manner and at a high level the events occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP as a result of the large-scale earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011. The state parties to the Convention unanimously approved a corresponding statement on those events. The countries also agreed that the next national reports should contain the countries’ response to the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, as well as additional measures, which might assist in preventing such accidents or mitigate the effects if such a situation is unavoidable. The development of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management under the auspices of the IAEA was an important step in the field of international nuclear safety oversight. It was the first international legal document directly addressing the issues of safe management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. The Joint Convention was adopted on 5 September 1997 and came into force on 18 June 2011. Ukraine signed the Convention on 27 September 1997 and enacted it on 18 June 2001. Today, 60 countries and Euratom are the states parties to the Convention. From the date of the Convention’s enactment Ukraine has been an active participant in processes and events held in the framework of the Convention. The first, second, and third National Reports by Ukraine were presented to the state parties to the Joint Convention at the corresponding review meetings to demonstrate Ukraine’s full compliance with its commitments in accordance with the Convention provisions. International non-governmental organizations and associations played a particular role in international cooperation in the area of nuclear and radiation safety regulation. The Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) is among the leading European non-governmental associations. WENRA was founded in 1999 on a voluntary basis by the regulatory bodies of the EU member states and Switzerland with the purpose of elaboration of integrated standards of nuclear and radiation safety regulation within the EU and the development of criteria for assessment of the regulatory component in the countries that are planning to accede to the EU. At the time of its foundation, WENRA included regulatory bodies from 10 countries. Today, the number of the Association members is 17; Ukraine acquired the status of associate member of WENRA in 2009. Starting from 1999, the goals and tasks of WENRA substantially expanded: the Association became a network of leading European regulatory bodies dealing with exchange of best practice and discussion of key safety issues. In June 2011, at the First European Conference of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), a statement was made regarding the events at Fukushima Daiichi NPP in Japan and regarding commencement of stress tests in the EU. Being an active party to the international community, Ukraine joined the EU’s initiative as a partner country.

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Thus, based on the results of the stress tests performed at Ukrainian NPPs, Ukraine prepared and presented the National Report, which was issued for public discussion. One of the oldest consultative associations in which Ukraine has been participating since its foundation in the 1990s is the Forum of the countries who operate WWER-type reactors (WWER Regulators Forum). The Forum was established in 1993. Its main objective is to foster enhancement of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the countries concerned through utilization of the collective experience, information exchange, and consolidation of efforts of the national nuclear safety authorities to study safety problems and improve regulatory policies and practices. The Forum acts under the Memorandum signed by the Member Countries in 1998 in Armenia.238 The WWER Regulators Forum unites the heads of the nuclear regulatory bodies of Iran, India, Armenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Russia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Finland, and Ukraine.

11

Conclusions

In the beginning of the 1990s, the situation in the nuclear sector of independent Ukraine was critical due to the post-Chernobyl syndrome, active anti-nuclear protests, complicated financial and economic situation in the wake of the dissolution of the USSR, and absence of a domestic organization for nuclear sector administration. Furthermore, this all went against the backdrop of an indefinite national position regarding future destiny of the sector itself, which affected the choice of the required approaches to effective response to the problems. In the socioeconomic setting that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and amid the catastrophic consequences of the Chernobyl NPP accident the attitude to nuclear power became strongly politically motivated. Many political parties vocally protested against further NPP development in Ukraine seeking a political dividend and exploiting negative public opinion over nuclear energy. Thus, it was imperative that the expert community was involved in the nuclear sector development in the independent Ukrainian state, which later furthered a professional and educated dialog between all stakeholders and resulted in an effective model of administration of this sector. The split with the Russian Federation, which concentrated all key production nodes in its territory, was a threat to the energy security of Ukraine. Compensation received for nuclear weapons in the form of nuclear fuel was only a short-term solution for the Ukrainian NPP fuel problem but had a very negative impact on the further development of the Ukrainian nuclear industry. As a result the Russian Federation from the one side was the main partner in terms of solving the emerging

238

WWER Regulators Forum [gnssn.iaea.org/regnet/Pages/WWER-Forum.aspx].

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challenges in the nuclear energy sphere, but from the other side it became a monopoly source of nuclear fuel making Ukraine its absolute dependent. This was a critical situation for the nuclear sector of Ukraine and pushed the country to seek new suppliers for NPPs—an approach that had a degree of success in the next decade. Having abandoned its nuclear weapons, Ukraine attracted widespread support for the development of its nuclear power from the international community. The involvement of Kyiv in extensive international cooperation on a number of programs assured not only the strengthening of the technology part of the Ukrainian nuclear industry but also growth of a positive image of Ukraine in this area. Ukraine acceded to the international regimes for nuclear security, nuclear and radiation safety and is an active actor in their reinforcement, using a historic experience of its own.

Conclusion: Lessons to Be Learned Polina Sinovets

The ambitions of this research have been to analyze in detail Ukraine’s specific role in the nuclear history from the early Soviet years up to recent times as well as the impact of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament and security assurances issue on the NPT regime. The broad aims of this publication required extensive research that we believe will provide the readers with a better understanding of the exclusive role of Ukraine in global nuclear history. The development of nuclear physics and the study of radioactivity started on Ukrainian territory from the beginning of the last century, firstly when it was part of the Russian Empire and later already in the USSR. Initially, all studies in this field were concentrated in Odessa, then it moved to Kharkiv having gained a very special place in the whole Soviet nuclear program. In the 1930s, Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology was considered the leading center of Soviet nuclear physics. The situation changed gravely with Stalin’s policy of terror against Ukrainian nuclear physicists including the world-famous Lev Landau, Aleksandr Leipunsky, Alexander Weissberg, and Fritz Houtermans, who worked at Kharkiv at that time. Nevertheless, the research in the nuclear sphere was continued at the laboratories of the KIPT that still had an advanced equipment base. During the German occupation of the 1940s Ukrainian nuclear physicists as well as the Institute’s devices were held by Germany for its nuclear programs. After World War II, one of the three major Soviet centers of missile production was created on the territory of Ukraine, which gave the former USSR a number of the most staggering systems of strategic nuclear weapons. The dispute on whether Ukrainian nuclear and missile programs really existed or were mere Soviet programs on Ukrainian territory should not be reduced to subjective assessments and metaphors. The view of Ukrainian nuclear history tends to see Soviet programs as just executed on Ukrainian territory separately from Ukraine per P. Sinovets (*) Department of International Relations, Odessa Center for Nonproliferation, Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University, Odesa, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 P. Sinovets (ed.), Ukraine’s Nuclear History, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90661-0_5

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se. The domestic Ukrainian point of view on the same issue underlines the autonomy of Ukraine, regardless of which empire or federation it belonged to. Without Ukraine, it was impossible to declare the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 18th century and establish the USSR in the 1920s with substantial autonomy of its national components up to the constitutional right to total separation. Russia in different forms of its existence from the mid-17th century up to 1991 shared with Ukraine its statehood and international identity, while Ukraine shared with Russia its natural resources and human capital. The supposition to think that culture, science, and technology were given to Ukraine by Russia is very common for many Russian as well as foreign authors. However, it is erroneous. During the many years, Russia and Ukraine were the product of mutual efforts, which benefited both countries. The nuclear history of Ukraine is not only part of the common Soviet history, but also it is a Ukrainian story spread over the years before and after gaining state sovereignty. The notion of Russian occupation in Ukraine differs from that of, for example, the Baltic States. The latter were literally occupied by the USSR at the beginning of World War II with military troops’ deployment, repression, and forced change of political system. On the contrary, Ukraine was occupied, being deprived of its historical perspective within the so-called joint enterprise having the forms of both the Russian Empire and the USSR. Ukraine was gradually diluting in this joint enterprise, while Russia was shifting power to itself. In fact the collapse of the USSR has cancelled this joint investment agreement between Russia and Ukraine while each party came out with its share. Therefore, Ukraine naturally insisted that some part of the nuclear and missile arsenals on its territory was a Ukrainian, not a Russian asset. For several years after gaining its independence the Ukrainian vision of nuclear and missile heritage was, at first glance, at odds with the interests of global regimes of nuclear arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. As our study has shown, this view is too superficial. During the first years of nation-building in Ukraine no unified pro-nuclear lobby emerged. Nobody was ready to take responsibility for the nuclear choice. At the same time nobody, barring some overtly pro-Russian influence groups, believed that the nuclear arsenal should be given up just for nothing. All of this was about the conditions and terms of attaining nonnuclear status, not about the intention to go nuclear. It is difficult to give a clear answer to the question of what Ukraine’s status was regarding nuclear weapons from the moment of gaining its independence in 1991 to the moment of the NPT ratification as a nonnuclear-weapon state in 1994. It was a unique status that up to now existed and for the foreseeable future will exist only for this case. There is no definition of it in international law. We have shown that this status was ownership of nuclear weapons without possession of it. It was not that possession was absolutely impossible due to extremely limited economic and political resources. Ukraine simply did not want such possession. From 1991 to 1996, Ukraine got rid of at least 1 800 strategic and at least 2 500 tactical warheads. At the moment of gaining independence, they were controlled by Ukraine (each to a different degree) with a considerable part under almost full

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Russian control. But Ukraine believed that it had ownership rights to this arsenal. To give up this right Ukraine demanded from the nuclear-weapon states (primarily from the USA and Russia) legally binding security guarantees and financial compensation. The amount of international compensation to Ukraine connected with the elimination of nuclear warheads may be estimated at one billion dollars. Now, it is a rhetorical question whether it was large or small. Ukraine agreed under pressure of circumstances with the sum and thus admitted that the deal was fair even if it was just convenience money. On the other side, the USA and Russia, providing Ukraine with that money, agreed with the Ukrainian ownership rights on the nuclear weapons inherited. This fact is more important in the historic perspective than the exact sum of international assistance. Closely linked with the destiny of nuclear weapons was the elimination of means of its delivery in Ukraine. All strategic delivery vehicles—that is about two hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles and approximately fifty strategic bombers—were either dismantled in Ukraine or sold to Russia implementing Ukraine’s obligations under the START, ensured by the Lisbon protocol. The substrategic and most of the tactical delivery means were also dismantled—that is, more than 60 bombers and several hundred missiles—though there were no judicial obligations for this. The United States was concerned with the threat these systems presented to American interests and the international nonproliferation regimes even in their non-nuclear version. Ukraine chose not to balk at this elimination too strongly. Nowadays, when Ukraine has suffered from Russian military aggression the prudence of this decision has become not so obvious. Ukraine received American assistance for the elimination of its delivery means that may be estimated at half a billion dollars. It was not compensation for giving up its ownership rights as it was for nuclear warheads, but the reimbursement of expenses on dismantling and utilization. Nobody contested Ukraine’s right to produce aircraft as far as they were not strategic or substrategic bombers (Ukraine produced only civilian and military transport airplanes). In the meantime, Ukraine had to withstand an intensive struggle for its right to produce missiles (the ones not prohibited by international treaties). This struggle has been won. In 1998, Ukraine became a full-fledged member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a state possessing missile technology. The price of the victory for the missile lobby in Ukraine was its support for joining the NPT and the START with zero levels for Ukraine. As to obtaining legally binding security guarantees Ukraine failed. For Ukrainians, this became apparent only in 2014, when Russia began a war against Ukraine, occupied and annexed parts of Ukrainian territory. In 1994 Ukraine had to make do with assurances. There were enough people in Ukraine, both among experts and in the state establishment, who understood that the so-called positive international guarantees that Ukraine tried to obtain were possible only through a military alliance with one or more official nuclear-weapon states, the rest being assurances. Yet, at that time NATO membership was not considered by Ukraine.

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Moreover, by protraction with getting rid of nuclear weapons Ukraine only distanced itself from this perspective. The military alliance with Russia could reintegrate Ukraine into a “new USSR” while Ukraine needed security guarantees precisely for preclusion of such a perspective. In 1994, Ukraine turned a blind eye to the fact that assurances were in no way guarantees, and in 2014 it faced Russian military aggression. Ukraine’s experience makes it clear that moving toward a nuclear-weapon-free world demands solving the problem of positive security guarantees, not just assurances. In parallel to the active negotiation process and discussion over the nuclear arsenal, at the beginning of its independence Ukraine faced the challenge of establishment of a national nuclear energy program. Nuclear generation played a crucial role for the national energy complex—14 operating power units (including two at Chernobyl NPP), inherited by independent Ukraine, generated 30% of electricity (75.1 TWh). Under the intricate economic situation back then, to ensure energy security, which was highly dependent on the nuclear sphere, was a matter of national existence. However, due to the technical peculiarities of the Soviet nuclear technologies, Ukraine was in the position of limited options which were mostly connected to Russia. It was especially related to spent fuel storage and processing, as well as a fresh fuel supply. The established Russian monopoly at these complexes undermined energy security principles, created unfavorable market conditions, and put Ukraine in a position of full dependence. The nuclear energy industry of the USSR was an integrated complex that was under full control of Moscow on any technical and political aspects, including regulation, licensing, design, construction, scientific, and engineering (technical) support. Therefore, once the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine was in a bind, due to neither the government nor the expert community’s readiness to take responsibility for the nuclear industry in Ukraine and establish a self-sufficient system for its operation and further development. Nuclear safety and nuclear security had to be properly ensured, regulated, and strengthened. The circumstances of the Ukrainian nuclear energy programs’ development at the early stage were also complicated by the repercussion of the devastating catastrophe at the Chernobyl NPP, which occurred in 1986. It triggered antinuclear movements in society, which became a stumbling block in the development of the nuclear energy industry in Ukraine and caused a moratorium on the construction of new NPPs in the Ukrainian SSR. It had negative effect not only for industry, but for the economy in general. Until 2014, when Russia started war in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and annexed Crimea, Russia actively utilized nuclear energy as powerful leverage to manipulate Ukraine’s nuclear energy policy. It resulted in a continuous problem for an alternative fuel supplier, such as Westinghouse, to enter the Ukrainian market, and created favorable conditions for Russian companies to have an advantage in other nuclear projects, such as construction of 2 reactors at the Khmelnitsky NPP and construction of a fuel fabrication plant. The situation changed in 2014. Ukraine started an active phase of nuclear fuel diversification by using Westinghouse fuel. As of 2017, the share of Westinghouse fuel by total consumption

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is 49% from 39% in 2016. Ukraine and Holtec (the United States) have started building a centralized spent nuclear fuel storage facility in the Chernobyl zone. These steps aim to eliminate the existing dependence on Russia in the nuclear sphere and will create the necessary conditions to tackle the problems which emerged in the 1990s. The international community, having a comprehensive understanding of that time’s circumstances in Ukraine, provided financial and expert assistance in order to keep safe and secure operation of the Ukrainian NPPs. The European Commission launched the TACIS project, the IFC and EBRD provided donor assistance, and the USA, Sweden, Canada, Japan, and other countries through bilateral ties helped Ukraine to keep safety and security regimes according to IAEA requirements and best international practices. Ukraine became an active member of the nuclear safety and security regimes after joining the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, etc. Moreover, Ukraine signed with the IAEA the Agreement on Application of the Safeguards in Connection with the NPT. Following this Ukraine signed the Additional Protocol to this Agreement. These arrangements are the basic documents for cooperation between the states and the IAEA in terms of nonproliferation safeguards. Establishment of the Ukrainian nuclear energy complex was a story of success. It was born in difficult circumstances of severe economic crisis and political turmoil. Despite that it was integrated into a stable and safe system under proven international safeguards. At present NPPs give Ukraine roughly half of its electricity.

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Ukraine could not be born as a “nuclear-clear” nation. Its contributions to Soviet nuclear and missile programs, both military and civilian, were too heavy for such a development. It was impossible to cut out the nuclear component from the heritage of Ukrainian statehood with just a proclamation of nonnuclear intentions. The nuclear component was engrained in Ukrainian politics, economy, and security. This is why the path toward a nonnuclear-weapon status was so difficult. Eventually Ukraine established its own civilian nuclear energy complex under international safeguards and got rid of nuclear weapons together with their means of delivery in compliance with the NPT. It was a success. Yet, this success was put into question in 2014 by the Russian military aggression against Ukraine. The Ukrainian policy, aimed at renunciation of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, and the Ukrainian stance on nuclear nonproliferation played a key role in recognition of its independence and largely facilitated its integration into the international community. Ukraine’s denuclearization meant a decisive leap out of the common strategic space with Russia, and potentially opened a way to European and Еuro-Atlantic integration. Given the set of circumstances (internal as well as

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international), we can draw the conclusion that the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine was inevitable. Ukraine’s decision to denuclearize turned out to be crucial in resolving the problem of nuclear status succession after the break-up of the USSR. In the end, it eased the 1995 NPT extension and strengthened the NPT regime in general. In terms of the future of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, Ukrainian nuclear disarmament produced mixed results. On one hand, it contributed to the preservation of the NPT regime. On the other—security assurances, provided in the Budapest memorandum, proved to be ineffective. The Ukrainian case revealed the fact that the NPT-given assurances are functional regarding nuclear weapons nonuse only, whereas the Budapest memorandum included a number of other provisions that failed to be fulfilled by the guarantors. Through its nuclear disarmament, Ukraine has made a significant contribution to the strengthening of international security by donating its own national security. The Budapest Memorandum significantly influenced the Ukrainian defense posture for decades in the way it put diplomacy as the primary tool of ensuring national security and substituting adequate deterrence and defense. Consequently, the overrated expectations from the security assurances have demonstrated the weakness of the NPT—given assurances to confront hard security challenges other than nuclear ones.