Äußerungen des Inneren: Beiträge zur Problemgeschichte des Ausdrucks 9783110666120, 9783110662733

Table of contents :
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1. Einleitung
2. „Effectus expressivus et repraesentativus semper est et verbum sui principii“. Eckhart’s Metaphysics of the Expression
3. Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374): Expression und Expressivität als Seins-Modus
4. Expression and Analogy in Leibniz’s Philosophy
5. Similarity, Form and Beauty: The Idea of Expressivity in G. W. Leibniz
6. Expression and Semiotic Representation: Metaphysical Foundations of Leibniz’s Theory of the Sign
7. Dimensionen des Leibniz’schen Expressionsbegriffs. Ein interpretativer Dialog mit E. Cassirer, D. Mahnke und G. Deleuze
8. Leibniz-Rezeption in der Strukturontologie Heinrich Rombachs
9. Die Bedeutung des Ausdrucksgedankens in der Philosophie Ernst Cassirers
10. Ausdrucksfunktion und Fremdpsychisches bei Cassirer und Warburg
11. Whitehead über Ausdruck
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Äußerungen des Inneren

Äußerungen des Inneren Beiträge zur Problemgeschichte des Ausdrucks Herausgegeben von Laura E. Herrera Castillo

Diese Publikation wurde mit einer Druckkostenbeihilfe der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung realisiert.

ISBN 978-3-11-066273-3 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-066612-0 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-066353-2 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019938387 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Satz: Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd. Druck und Bindung: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Inhaltsverzeichnis Laura E. Herrera Castillo 1 Einleitung 1 Alessandro Palazzo 2 „Effectus expressivus et repraesentativus semper est et verbum sui principii“. Eckhart’s Metaphysics of the Expression 11 Thomas Leinkauf 3 Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374): Expression und Expressivität als Seins-Modus 39 Valérie Debuiche 4 Expression and Analogy in Leibniz’s Philosophy

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Sofia Araújo 5 Similarity, Form and Beauty: The Idea of Expressivity in G. W. Leibniz 85 Oscar M. Esquisabel 6 Expression and Semiotic Representation: Metaphysical Foundations of Leibniz’s Theory of the Sign 107 Laura E. Herrera Castillo 7 Dimensionen des Leibniz’schen Expressionsbegriffs. Ein interpretativer Dialog mit E. Cassirer, D. Mahnke und G. Deleuze Kiyoshi Sakai 8 Leibniz-Rezeption in der Strukturontologie Heinrich Rombachs Christian Möckel 9 Die Bedeutung des Ausdrucksgedankens in der Philosophie Ernst Cassirers 177 Carmen Metta 10 Ausdrucksfunktion und Fremdpsychisches bei Cassirer und Warburg 189

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Christoph Sebastian Widdau 11 Whitehead über Ausdruck Autorinnen und Autoren Personenregister Sachregister

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1 Einleitung Im Allgemeinen betrachtet, bezeichnet das Wort Ausdruck gleichermaßen den Prozess wie das Resultat der Artikulation eines Sachverhalts durch einen anderen. Der ausgedrückte Sachverhalt fungiert hierbei als Repräsentation des ausdrückenden Sachverhalts, dessen innerem Gehalt er eine spezifische äußere Gestalt verleiht. Diese Äußerung eines Inneren kann eine Bedeutungsbeziehung zum Gegenstand haben, insofern eine gewisse Äquivalenz zwischen den involvierten Sachverhalten besteht, wie in Falle einer Analogie, eines Symbols, einer Verkörperung oder auch einer Nachahmung. Als sprachlicher bzw. logischer Terminus ist der Ausdruck Träger einer Bedeutung: Wörter drücken beispielsweise Wahrheiten, Urteile oder Sachverhalte aus. Aber auch jenseits der Semantik, im Bereich des menschlichen Inneren, des subjektiven Erlebens und seiner Beziehungen zur Welt, spielen Ausdrucksrelationen eine wichtige Rolle. Gestik, Mimik und körperliche Äußerungen, wie Lachen, Weinen und Gefühlsbekundungen jeglicher Art werden ebenso als Formen des Ausdrucks aufgefasst wie Tanzen, Musizieren und andere künstlerische Betätigungen. In der europäischen Geistesgeschichte ist der Ausdrucksgedanke in vielfältigen Formen präsent, erlangt jedoch nur selten den Status eines systematischen philosophischen Begriffs. Dieser Umstand dürfte mit erklären, weshalb bislang – von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen – keine expliziten Untersuchungen dieser Thematik aus philosophischer Perspektive erfolgt sind.1 Wie Gilles Deleuze überzeugend dargelegt hat, ist der Expressionsbegriff in verborgener Gestalt bereits in der Emanationslehre Plotins enthalten (vgl. Deleuze 1968, Kap. XI). In dieser lässt

1 Unter dem Titel Philosophie des Ausdrucks hat G. Colli eine Diskussion klassischer ontologischer und epistemologischer Positionen unternommen, mit der er eine auf dessen Verabschiedung zielende Kritik des neuzeitlichen Subjektbegriffs verknüpft (vgl. Colli 1969). Hiervon abgesehen, finden sich die ausführlichsten Erörterungen dieser Thematik unter den Kommentaren zu den Werken von Leibniz und Spinoza (vgl. Debuiche 2009; De Risi 2007; Duffy 2006; Homan 2011; Herrera Castillo 2015; Kulstad 1977; Leinkauf 2012; Swoyer 1995). Herauszustellen sind insbesondere die umfassenden Studien von G. Deleuze (Spinoza oder das Problem des Ausdrucks, 1968) und M. Ghio über den Ausdrucksbegriff bei Leibniz (Il concetto di espressione in Leibniz, 1979). Deleuze verfolgt die ontologischen und epistemologischen Dimensionen des Ausdrucksproblems innerhalb des Denkens Spinozas mit wiederkehrenden Bezügen zu Leibniz, wobei er auch auf die neuplatonische und christliche Tradition dieses Problems eingeht. Hieran anknüpfend entwirft Ghio eine Entwicklungsgeschichte des Ausdrucksgedankens, die ausgehend vom (Neu-)Platonismus einen geistesgeschichtlichen Rahmen für ein besseres Verständnis des Leibniz’schen Ausdrucksbegriffs bereitstellt. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666120-001

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sich sowohl der Gedanke einer eminenten, als auch der einer immanenten Ursache identifizieren, welche trotz ihrer prinzipiellen Unvereinbarkeit im Rahmen der neuplatonischen Metaphysik zusammengeführt werden (vgl. Ghio 1979, Kap. III). Grundlage des Bilddenkens bei Plotin ist die ontologische Priorität des Urbildes, der zufolge das Bild selbst mit Notwendigkeit etwas Sekundäres und Defizitäres darstellt. Gleichzeitig beschränkt sich das Bild nicht auf die passive Abbildung dessen, von dem es Bild ist, sondern konstituiert eine aktive Widerspiegelung im Sinne eines Ausdruck des Urbilds: „Es ist vielmehr Ausdruck der Entfaltung des Einen in die vielheitliche Wirklichkeit, und zwar als Ausdruck der konstitutiven, Sein-schaffenden und -bewahrenden Funktion dieses Einen.“ (Leinkauf 2010, S. 106–107). Die Ursachenlehre des Neuplatonismus sowie das von diesem geprägte Bilddenken werden in der daran anschließenden christlichen Philosophie in gewandelter Form weitergeführt. In dieser Traditionslinie lässt sich eine fortschreitende Differenzierung der eminenten und der immanenten Ursachen verzeichnen, die schließlich in einer unversöhnlichen Entgegensetzung mündet (vgl. Ghio 1979, S. 28–29 und Kap. III). Einen wichtigen Schritt im Prozess dieser Verwandlung stellt das Denken Nicolaus Cusanus’ dar, welcher mittels seiner Begriffe der explicatio und complicatio (Ent- bzw. Einfaltung) die Grundzüge der neuplatonischen Emanationslehre mit der christlichen Schöpfungsvorstellung harmonisiert. In Cusanus’ Auffassung vom Menschen findet sich die Figur einer Umwandlung der Bild-Natur des menschlichen Geistes wieder, wie sie in der christlichen Tradition insbesondere durch Augustinus geprägt wurde (vgl. Leinkauf 2010, S. 108–113). Vor dem Hintergrund dieser geistesgeschichtlichen Zusammenhänge, die als der historisch-systematische Ursprung des philosophischen Ausdrucksdenkens gedeutet werden können, vereint der vorliegende Sammelband zehn Beiträge, die den Ausdruck als philosophisches Problem bei Autoren mehrerer Epochen in den Blick nehmen. Neben G. W. Leibniz, in dessen Denken der Begriff der Expression eine zentrale Stellung einnimmt, werden die Schriften Meister Eckharts, Francesco Petrarcas, Ernst Cassirers, Heinrich Rombachs und Alfred N. Whiteheads auf ihre jeweiligen Bezüge zu dieser Thematik untersucht. An die neuplatonisch-christliche Tradition anknüpfend, bildet das Denken Meister Eckharts eine wichtige Station in der historischen Konturierung des Ausdrucksgedankens.2 Wie Alessandro Palazzo in seinem Beitrag ‚Effectus expressivus 2 Die Frage, inwiefern Eckharts Fassung des Ausdrucksbegriffs tatsächlich als ‚neuplatonisches Erbe‘ gelesen werden kann und inwiefern sie zugleich mit dieser Tradition bricht, problematisiert Susanne Köbele in einem programmatischen Beitrag von 2007. Sie weist auf die Eigenständigkeit des Eckhart’schen Ausdrucksgedankens hin, wonach sich dieser nicht auf eine Ähnlichkeits- oder Ursprungsbeziehung reduzieren lässt, sondern vielmehr Raum für

1 Einleitung

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et repraesentativus semper est et verbum sui principii‘. Eckhart’s Metaphysics of the expression zeigt, nimmt der Ausdrucksgedanke darin so viele und so vielfältige Gestalten an, dass er nicht als isoliertes Merkmal der Philosophie Eckharts missverstanden werden darf, sondern vielmehr als eines ihrer wesentlichen Motive zu verstehen ist. So beschreibt Eckhart unter Rückgriff auf die neuplatonische Tradition die vermittelnde Rolle des Wortes Gottes als dessen Ausdruck und Emmanation und damit als göttliches Abbild. Dabei konstituiert das Wort (d. h.: der Sohn Gottes) sowohl das Paradigma, aus welchem die Schöpfung hervorgeht, als auch das Bild, das letztere wiedergibt. In diesem Sinne liegt hier in doppelter Hinsicht ein Ausdrucksverhältnis vor: Einerseits ist das Wort der Selbst-Ausdruck Gottes als Schöpfer und andererseits ist die Schöpfung der Ausdruck Gottes insofern, als diese ihrerseits der Ausdruck des göttlichen Wortes ist. Für diese sowie für weitere Formen von Expressivität im Denken Eckharts gilt der grundlegende Zusammenhang, dass etwas sich in etwas anderem ausdrückt, dass also ein Sachverhalt durch den Akt seines Selbst-Ausdrucks einen anderen Sachverhalt hervorbringt. Das Ausgedrückte ist zwar ein Anderes, ein vom Sich-Ausdrückenden Verschiedenes, teilt jedoch zugleich dadurch, dass es aus diesem hervorgeht, wesentliche Merkmale mit ihm. Während in der neuplatonischen Tradition und noch bei Meister Eckhart der expressive Prozess mit Blick auf das erzeugende Prinzip gefasst wird, d. h. dahingehend, dass ein sich-auszudrückendes Prinzip einen Ausdruck seiner selbst erzeugt, so erfolgt in der Renaissance eine folgenreiche Wendung der theoretischen Perspektive hin zu einem Standpunkt innerhalb der menschlichen Welt. Diese Wendung impliziert zwar noch keinen radikalen Bruch mit der Ordnung des mittelalterlichen Kosmos, sie eröffnet jedoch neue philosophische Wege zur Überschreitung von dessen metaphysisch gesetzten Grenzen. Den damit einhergehenden neuen Fragen widmet sich Thomas Leinkauf in seinem Aufsatz Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374): Expression und Expressivität als Seins-Modus. So wird einerseits die vernünftige Seele weiterhin in ihrer Abhängigkeit von Gott gedacht, andererseits jedoch wird die prinzipielle Möglichkeit ihrer Autarkie als Selbststand gegenüber Gott herausgestellt. Das Sich-Ausdrückende bildet hier ein einmaliges, unwiederholbares Individuum, ein Ich. In diesem Sinne lassen sich bei Petrarca zwei verschiedene Momente ausmachen, die im Vermögen der Sprache zum Tragen kommen: Zum einen schafft Sprache einen Raum für individuell-private Befindlichkeiten, indem Affekte, Intentionen, Gedanken und

einen ‚unmittelbaren Selbstausdruck‘ eröffnet. Damit, so Köbele, gibt Eckhart der Problematik eine Wendung, die für deren weitere Entwicklung von großer Bedeutung ist (vgl. insbesondere Köbele 2007, S. 77 f.).

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weitere Momente des seelischen Lebens die Individualität des reflektierenden und erfahrenden Selbst zum Ausdruck bringen. Zum anderen ermöglicht sie dem Individuum zugleich, den Bereich der Intimität nach außen hin zu überschreiten und sich gegenüber einem Publikum auszudrücken, womit sie die Sphäre der Öffentlichkeit begründet. Das Private und das Öffentliche, das Poetische und das Politische bezeichnen bei Petrarca somit zwei unterschiedliche, jedoch wechselseitig aufeinander verweisende Felder des Ausdrucks. Die Sprache ist das Instrument, das als verbum interior die Synthese dieser beiden Felder herbeizuführen vermag. Eine ausführlichere Thematisierung in Form von mehreren Einzelbeiträgen erfahren im vorliegenden Band die Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Im Werk des an der Schwelle zur philosophischen Neuzeit stehenden Universalgelehrten findet sich nicht nur eine explizite Definition des Begriffs der Expression, sondern der Ausdrucksgedanke charakterisiert dieses Werk in grundlegender und vielfältiger Art und Weise. Er durchzieht gleichermaßen die Felder der Mathematik, der Sprache und der Logik wie der Metaphysik. Allgemeine Merkmale des Ausdrucks bei Leibniz sind (strukturale) Relationalität, Wechselseitigkeit, Individualität, Perspektivität, Entfaltung und Widerspiegelung. In metaphysischer Hinsicht bezeichnet Expression die Tätigkeit der Substanz, der Monade, als solcher. Unter Monade versteht Leibniz ein zur Tätigkeit fähiges Wesen. Jede Monade verfügt über einen vollständigen Begriff, welcher die Gesamtheit ihrer Eigenschaften bzw. sämtliche Ereignisse umfasst, die wesentlich mit ihr verknüpft sind. Expression bezeichnet den Akt, in dessen Vollzug die Monade ihre Inhalte entfaltet und damit zugleich das gesamte Universum perzipiert. Dieses Verständnis von Ausdruck lässt sich mit demjenigen der christlichen Tradition in Verbindung bringen, welcher Leibniz die Metapher des Spiegels entnimmt. Die Spiegelmetapher entstammt ursprünglich dem Korintherbrief und ist u. a. in den Schriften von Augustinus und Cusanus zu finden.3 In Leibniz’ Rezeption werden die Monaden als lebendige Spiegel des Universums charakterisiert, was nichts anderes besagt, als dass sie im Akt der Perzeption des Universums dieses zugleich zum Ausdruck bringen. Berühmt geworden ist aber auch eine weitere Metapher, mit der Leibniz der Ausdrucksproblematik einen entscheidenden Aspekt hinzufügt: Die Perspektive. Das von den verschiedenen Monaden perzipierte Universum gleicht einer Stadt, die von verschiedenen Standpunkten aus betrachtet wird und daher wie eine Vielzahl von Städten erscheint. Während die Metapher

3 Vgl. Augustinus 2003, XV.10.19 und XV.8.14: „Quale sit et quod sit hoc speculum si quaeramus, profecto illud occurrit quod in speculo nisi imago non cernitur“ (dazu: vgl. Leinkauf 2010, S. 107–110 und Pfeiffer 2016). Siehe auch: Cusanus 1964, Bd. 2, S. 623.

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des Spiegels den Akzent auf die metaphysischen Dimensionen der expressiven Beziehung legt, wird mit der Metapher der Perspektive die Ebene der Phänomene in den Fokus gerückt. Darüber hinaus findet sich in den Schriften von Leibniz eine weitere, explizite Definition des Expressionsbegriffs, die dessen konstitutive formale Relationalität herausstellt. In dieser Hinsicht bezeichnet Expression eine wechselseitige Beziehung zwischen Sachverhalten, bei der diese mittels einer strukturellen Zuordnung in ein Verhältnis zueinander gesetzt werden. Entscheidend ist hierbei, dass diese Beziehung keine direkte Ähnlichkeit der Merkmale erfordert, sondern dass eine gewisse Analogie als regelndes Kriterium ausreicht (vgl. A VI, 4, 1370 und C 15). Diese explizite Definition des Expressionsbegriffs bewegt sich in großer Nähe zum logisch-mathematischen Denken, womit eine Interpretation der Ausdrucksbeziehung als Analogie, Morphismus oder Isomorphismus naheliegt. In diesem Sinne geht Valérie Debuiche in ihrem Beitrag Expression and Analogy in Leibniz’s Philosophy der Frage nach, was eine expressive Beziehung ausmacht und inwiefern sie sich als eine analogische Beziehung beschreiben lässt. In ihrer Lesart ist es jedoch unerlässlich, auch die metaphysischen Bedingungen und Konsequenzen des Leibniz’schen Expressionsgedankens umfassend mit einzubeziehen. Gleichsam in Ergänzung hierzu fokussiert Sofia Araújo ihren Beitrag Similarity, Form and Beauty: The idea of expressivity in G. W. Leibniz auf die erkenntnistheoretischen und ästhetischen Aspekte der Ausdrucksthematik. Araújo versteht unter Expressivität die allen lebendigen Substanzen zugrundeliegende Fähigkeit zur Perzeption im Sinne einer Aufdeckung von formalen Verknüpfungen zwischen sich selbst und dem Universum. Sie zeigt, wie aus dieser Analyse der Expressivität, welche wiederum eine Untersuchung des Begriffs der Ähnlichkeit erfordert, die qualitative Instanz der Form eindeutig als Grundlage des Ausdrucks hervorgeht. Damit führt die epistemologische Lesart des Ausdrucksproblems zugleich hin zu den ästhetischen Bedeutungsdimensionen von Expressivität: Der Ausdruck ermöglicht die Wahrnehmung der harmonischen Einheit in der strukturellen Verbundenheit aller Substanzen miteinander und damit die Wahrnehmung der Schönheit des Universums. Oscar Esquisabel wiederum arbeitet in seinem Aufsatz Expression and Semiotic Representation: Metaphysical Foundations of Leibniz’s Theory of the Sign das Potential des Ausdrucksgedankens im Kontext der Semiotik heraus. Ausgehend vom strukturellen Charakter des Ausdrucks argumentiert Esquisabel für eine expressive Natur der semiotischen Formen oder Gestaltungen im Sinne einer Projektion der formellen Struktur des denotierten Objektes in die Struktur der semiotischen Gestaltung. Begriffe und Zeichen sind Entfaltungen der Gedanken (ideas) und ihrer virtuellen Einheiten und bilden als solche deren sinnlich wahrnehmbare Ausdrücke. Da die semiotische Form mittels der Projektion

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eine Veranschaulichungsfunktion ausübt, wird die strukturelle Gestaltung des Objekts in deren Vollzug auch dann wahrnehmbar, wenn diese für sich genommen nur begrifflich erkennbar sind. Dementsprechend lassen sich drei Ebenen der Ausdrucksbeziehung im semiotischen Veranschaulichungsprozess unterscheiden: ein Gedanke drückt ein Objekt aus, ein Zeichen drückt den Gedanken aus und damit wird zugleich durch dieses Zeichen das Objekt ausgedrückt. Da auf jeder dieser Ebenen etwas von der vorherigen Ebene erhalten bleibt, ermöglichen auch Zeichen eine Form der begrifflichen Erkenntnis. Auf diese Weise lässt sich laut Esquisabel ein Anfangspunkt bestimmen, mit dem die komplexe Beziehung zwischen Wirklichkeit, Denken und den vielfältigen Systemen der semiotischen Repräsentationen nach Leibniz erschlossen werden kann. Wenngleich die Leibniz-Interpretationen, die die formellen Aspekte des Ausdrucksbegriffs und der expressiven Beziehung hervorheben, in den letzten Jahren zahlreicher geworden sind, so handelt es sich hierbei doch keineswegs ausschließlich um Lesarten jüngeren Datums. Bereits Cassirer unternimmt eine systematische Analyse des Leibniz’schen Expressionsgedankens als Funktion, wobei er die historische Verlagerung vom Substanzbegriff zum Funktionsbegriff als ein wesentliches Kennzeichen der Neuzeit versteht. Dieser Prozess führt laut Cassirer dazu, dass sich der epistemische Fokus weg von den Elementen und hin zu deren strukturellen Verknüpfungsmöglichkeiten verschiebt. Damit weist Cassirer zwar das grundsätzliche relationale Potential des Leibniz’schen Ausdrucksdenkens nach, lässt jedoch zugleich dessen metaphysisch-realistische Dimension außer Acht, wie bereits sein Zeitgenosse Dietrich Mahnke kritisch anmerkt (vgl. Mahnke 1925, S. 362–364). Mit Blick auf diese Kritik formuliert Laura Herrera Castillo in ihrem Beitrag Dimensionen des Leibniz’schen Expressionsbegriffs. Ein interpretativer Dialog mit E. Cassirer, D. Mahnke und G. Deleuze einen Vorschlag, wie der Gefahr einer interpretativen Engführung durch die Einbeziehung des Aspekts der Körperlichkeit entgangen werden kann. So bildet der Körper eine unverzichtbare Bedingung der Möglichkeit des phänomenalen, effektiven In-Erscheinung-Tretens der Monade als Ausdruck des Universums aus ihrer individuellen Perspektive. Die Rolle der Körperwelt sowie der strukturelle Charakter des Ausdrucks sind in einer anderen Hinsicht auch Gegenstand von Kiyoshi Sakais Beitrag LeibnizRezeption in der Strukturontologie Heinrich Rombachs. Wie Sakai demonstriert, deutet der Phänomenologe Rombach den historischen Schritt vom Substanzbegriff zum Funktionsbegriff nicht wie Cassirers als Ersetzung des ersteren, sondern als dessen Transformation, in deren Folge sich die Probleme des Substanzdenkens im Horizont der Funktionalität völlig neu stellen. Für die Herausbildung des darauf gründenden Strukturdenkens, welches Rombach als das epistemische Spezifikum der Neuzeit ansieht, spielt das Ausdrucksmoment in der Monadenlehre von Leibniz eine herausragende Rolle. Die Rekonstruktion dieser geistesgeschichtlichen

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Zusammenhänge dient Sakai zugleich dazu, die prinzipielle Tragfähigkeit des Ausdrucksmotivs für phänomenologische Forschungsansätze aufzuzeigen. Für die Problemgeschichte des Ausdruckbegriffs ist der Neukantianer Ernst Cassirer jedoch nicht nur als wirkmächtiger Leibniz-Interpret von Bedeutung. Mit seiner Philosophie der symbolischen Formen gibt er dem Ausdrucksproblem eine systematische Fassung, in der sowohl dessen erkenntnistheoretische Dimension, als auch seine komplexen Bezüge zum Feld der Emotionalität herausgearbeitet werden. Diese Verknüpfung führt in anthropologischer Hinsicht zur Bestimmung des Menschen als einem animal symbolicum. Wie der Beitrag von Christian Möckel Die Bedeutung des Ausdrucksgedankens in der Philosophie Ernst Cassirers darlegt, nimmt der Ausdrucksbegriff in diesem Kontext zwei unterschiedliche Bedeutungen an: Einerseits spricht Cassirer dem menschlichen Geist eine allgemeine geistige Ausdrucksfunktion zu, d. h. eine aktive, objektivierende Energie, welche die passiven sinnlichen Eindrücke – symbolisch oder begrifflich – funktional in geistige Ausdrücke umbildet. Zu diesem Zweck erfordert die allgemeine Ausdrucksfunktion Zeichen oder Symbole, mittels derer die jeweiligen kulturellen Sinn- oder Bedeutungsganzen in einem konkreten Kontext repräsentiert werden können. Diese gestaltenden Symbolfunktionen operieren selbständig in spezifischen geistigen Grundfunktionen, welche als mythisches, sprachliches und logisch-theoretisches Denken jeweils eine ihnen entsprechende Ausdrucksform annehmen. Dabei korrespondiert dem mythischen Denken der personifizierten, emotionalen Welt des unmittelbaren Ausdruckswahrnehmens eine spezifische, emotionale Ausdrucksfunktion, welche das begrifflich vermittelte Äußere einem inneren Zustand zuordnet. Gleichzeitig lässt sich eine Beziehung zwischen der allgemeinen und der spezifischen Ausdrucksfunktion dahingehend feststellen, dass die äußeren, objektiven Ausdrucksformen des Geistes den inneren, emotionalen Inhalten des subjektiven Erlebens entsprechen. Wie Möckel argumentiert, stellt Cassirer mit der unmittelbaren Emotionalität der Ausdruckswahrnehmung einen natürlichen, objektiven Boden für das mythische Denken und seine symbolischen Gestaltungen bereit. Doch erzeugt gerade diese Unmittelbarkeit der Ausdruckswahrnehmung eine neue Problemstellung: nämlich die Frage nach der Begründung der Objektivität der Ausdrucksfunktion, welche durch das Phänomen des Fremdpsychischen auf den Plan gerufen wird. Diesem Zusammenhang geht Carmen Metta in ihrem Aufsatz Ausdrucksfunktion und Fremdpsychisches bei Cassirer und Warburg nach. In der Affektion erfährt das Subjekt eine Materialität, die auf einen unerkennbaren Rest jeder Erkenntnis verweist und damit zugleich die Rede von der Einheit des Erkenntnissubjekts problematisch werden lässt. Wenn die Erkenntniskritik durch das Phänomen des Fremdpsychischen gezwungen wird, ihre eigenen Grundannahmen zu überprüfen, und die phänomenologische Frage nach der

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Entäußerung des Ichs mit der metaphysischen Theorie der Urphänomene konfrontiert wird, lässt sich möglicherweise in der Kunst ein Ausweg aus dieser Schwierigkeit finden. Für Metta bedeutet dies, dass das Warburg’sche Problem erneut ins Blickfeld gerückt werden muss und Eindruck und Ausdruck einer neuen Form der In-Beziehung-Setzung bedürfen. Eine grundlegende, anthropologisch-kulturphilosophische Annäherung an das Feld des Ausdrucks findet sich auch bei einem weiteren bedeutenden Denker des 20. Jahrhunderts. In seinem Beitrag Whitehead über Ausdruck formuliert Christoph Sebastian Widdau eine systematisierende Darstellung der entsprechenden Gedankengänge im Werk Alfred N. Whiteheads. Whitehead bezieht sich hierbei nicht namentlich auf Vordenker aus der Philosophiegeschichte, sondern verortet seine Überlegungen im Rahmen eines eigenständigen kulturphilosophischen Zugangs. Den Ausdruck analysiert er als Teil der begrifflichen Trilogie Verstehen – Bedeutung – Ausdruck, womit er die kulturtranszendentalen Bedingungen bezeichnet, die jedem kulturellen System zugrunde liegen und ohne die keine Form von Kultur gedacht werden kann. Darüber hinaus identifiziert Widdau eine weitere Fassung des Ausdrucksgedankens bei Whitehead, die dieser als Aktivität eines Lebewesens innerhalb seiner Umgebung versteht. In dieser Fassung sind drei wesentliche Merkmale enthalten: Neben dem Moment der Aktivität sind dies die Aspekte des Endlichen und der Einprägung in die Umgebung. So betrachtet, bedeutet Ausdruck die Tätigkeit eines Lebewesens, die sich im Rahmen der relationalen Struktur des Endlichen vollzieht, d. h. in einer präzisen, zeitlich und örtlich bestimmten Konstellation, die dieses Lebewesen in seiner Individualität markiert. Whitehead stellt hierbei heraus, dass Sich-ausdrücken keine exklusiv tierisch-menschliche Tätigkeit ist, sondern von unterschiedlichsten Wirklichkeitskonfigurationen in Abhängigkeit von deren jeweiligem Komplexitätsgrad ausgeübt wird. Indem folglich auch unorganische, pflanzliche und tierische Existenzen zu Ausdrucksaktivitäten fähig sind, wird der Ausdruck zu einem entscheidenden Merkmal von Leben schlechthin. Mit diesen vielfältigen Zugängen möchte der vorliegende Sammelband einen Überblick über zentrale Aspekte der Ausdrucksthematik innerhalb der europäischen Geistesgeschichte bieten. Zugleich versteht er sich als Einladung, dem Ausdruck in seiner gesamten philosophischen Breite weiter nachzuforschen. Die in dem Band vereinten Beiträge gehen im Wesentlichen auf eine Fachtagung zurück, die die Herausgeberin im September 2016 an der Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover veranstaltet hat. Ermöglicht wurde ihr dies durch ein zweijähriges Postdoc-Stipendium der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung sowie durch die Unterstützung der Leibniz-Stiftungsprofessur unter Leitung von Prof. Dr. Wenchao Li. Die Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung hat darüber hinaus die Publikation des Bandes durch die Gewährung einer Druckkostenbeihilfe

1 Einleitung

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unterstützt. Ihnen beiden, der Stiftung und Herrn Prof. Dr. Li mit seinem Team, gilt ihr ausdrücklicher Dank.

Literaturverzeichnis Verwendete Abkürzungen A: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Hrsg. von der Preußischen (später: Berlin-Brandenburgischen und Göttinger) Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Darmstadt (später: Leipzig und Berlin): Akademie Verlag, 1923 ff. C: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz. Extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque royale de Hanovre. Hrsg. von Louis Couturat. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1903.

Literatur Augustinus (2003): De trinitate. Lateinisch–deutsch. Neu übersetzt und mit einer Einleitung herausgegeben von Johann Kreuzer. Hamburg: Meiner (= Philosophische Bibliothek 523). Colli, Giorgio (1969): Filosofia dell’espressione. Mailand: Adelphi Edizioni. Cusanus, Nicolaus (1964): Philosophisch-theologische Schriften. Hrsg. und eingeführt von Leo Gabriel. Übersetzt und kommentiert von Dietlind und Wilhelm Dupré. 3 Bände. Wien: Herder (2. Nachdruck). Debuiche, Valérie (2009): „La notion d’expression et ses origines mathématiques“. In: Studia Leibnitiana 41/1, pp. 88–117. Deleuze, Gilles (1968): Spinoza et le problème de l’expression. Paris: Les éditions de minuit. De Risi, Vicenzo (2007): Geometry and Monadology. Leibniz’s Analysis Situs and Philosophy of Space. Basel/Boston/Berlin: Birkhäuser. Duffy, Simon (2006): The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze. Aldershot: Ashgate. Ghio, Michelangelo (1979): Il concetto di espressione in Leibniz e nella tradizione platonicocristiana. Torino: Filosofia (= Studi e ricerche di storia della filosofia 115). Homan, Matthew (2011): „Leibniz’s appropriation of Spinoza’s concept of expression“. In: Breger, Herbert/Herbst, Jürgen/Erdner, Sven (Hrsg.): Natur und Subjekt. IX. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress. Hannover: Druckerei Hartmann GmbH, S. 486–493. Herrera Castillo, Laura (2015): Curvas y espejos. El carácter funcional de la actividad monádica en G. W. Leibniz. Granada: Comares. Köbele, Susanne (2007): „‚Ausdruck‘ im Mittelalter? Zur Geschichte eines übersehenen Begriffs“. In: Braun, Manuel/Young, Christopher John (Hrsg.): Das fremde Schöne. Dimensionen des Ästhetischen in der Literatur des Mittelalters. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, S. 61–90. Kulstad, Mark (1977): „Leibniz’s conception of expression“. In: Studia Leibnitiana 9/1, pp. 55–76.

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Leinkauf, Thomas (2010): „Der Bild-Begriff bei Cusanus“. In: Grave, Johannes/Schubbach, Arno (Hrsg.): Denken mit dem Bild. Philosophische Einsätze des Bildbegriffs von Platon bis Hegel. München: Fink, S. 99–129. Leinkauf, Thomas (2012): „Philosophische Implikationen des Begriffs ‚Grund‘ am Beispiel der Vorstellung eines ‚propre fonds‘ bei Leibniz“. In: Boehm, Gottfried/Burioni, Matteo (Hrsg.): Der Grund. Das Feld des Sichtbaren. München: Fink, S. 279–298. Mahnke, Dietrich (1925): „Leibnizens Synthese von Universalmathematik und Individualmetaphysik“. In: Jahrbuch für phänomenologische Forschung 7, S. 305–609. Pfeiffer, Jens (2016): „‚Enigmata‘: Überlegungen zur Vielsinnigkeit der Allegorese. Kommentar zu Augustinus’ Kommentar von Korinther 13,12“. In: Haselstein, Ulla (Hrsg.): Allegorie: DFG-Symposion 2014. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, S. 136–157. Swoyer, Chris (1995): „Leibnizian expression“. In: Journal of the History of Philosophy, 33/1, S. 65–99.

Alessandro Palazzo

2 „Effectus expressivus et repraesentativus semper est et verbum sui principii“. Eckhart’s Metaphysics of the Expression Abstract: So far, no attempt has been made to give an overall analysis of Eckhart’s views on expression. The present paper explores the doctrinal richness of this notion as a cornerstone of Eckhart’s thought. Expression plays a pivotal role in his theology of the Trinity and creation: it is key to understanding the Word (Verbum) as the Image of the Father, as well as the relation between created beings and the Creator. Furthermore: human activities, natural events, the dialectic “just manJustice” and the connection between exemplar and image, all of this constitutes instances of expression. It will be shown here how a full understanding of expression allows for a thorough insight into Eckhart’s philosophy, to which it is appropriate to refer also as the metaphysics of expression.

According to a famous definition given by Leibniz: “something is expressed by that thing in which there are relations which correspond to the relations of the thing expressed”. The German philosopher instances this definition with several examples: “the model of a machine expresses the machine itself, the projective delineation on a plane expresses a solid; speech expresses thoughts and truths, characters express numbers, an algebraic equation expresses a circle or another figure”. According to Leibniz’s view, therefore, expression is based on a correspondence of relations. To put it in other words, expression is a relationship of analogy between two things, so that one thing expresses the structural features of the thing expressed. This analogy does not necessarily imply a similarity between the two terms of the expression.1

1 G. W. Leibniz: “Quid sit idea”, A VI, 4, 1370: “Exprimere aliquam rem dicitur illud in quo habentur habitudines, quae habitudines rei exprimandae respondent. Sed eae expressiones variae sunt; exempli causa, modulus Machinae exprimit machinam ipsam, schenographica rei in plano delineatio exprimit solidum, oratio exprimit cogitationes et veritates, characteres exprimunt numeros, equatio Algebraica exprimit circulum aliamve figuram: et quod expressionibus istis commune est, ex sola contemplatione habitudinum exprimentis possumus venire in cognitionem proprietatum respondentium rei exprimendae. Unde patet non esse necessarium, ut id quod exprimit simile sit rei expressae, modo habitudinum quaedam analogia servetur”. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666120-002

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“Analogical expression” can also be found in Eckhart’s work. In the Liber parabolarum Genesis, for instance, Eckhart theorizes a type of allegory which requires each word in its literal meaning to signify and express a corresponding symbol.2 Another example of this kind of expression is provided by the correspondences between the properties of spiritual beings and natural processes. Based on this isomorphism Eckhart feels himself legitimized to use astrological doctrines in order to illustrate and express the notion of humility.3 Yet, an analysis of Eckhart’s views on expression limited to such cases would end up being rather disappointing. This is not where Eckhart’s original contribution to philosophy of expression must be searched for, nor “analogical expression” is the prevailing conception of expression in Eckhart’s writings.

2.1 Expression in Eckhart: Introductory Remarks The late 13th – early 14th – century German cultural milieu debates on topics such as the image, the perfection of the intellect, the beatific vision, the ‘grunt’ of the soul; Eckhart’s adherence to the philosophical tradition going back to Albert the Great4; his exchanges with intellectuals of the Dominican order and other provenance5; all of this leads Eckhart6 to develop a strong conception of expression with a prominent Platonic character. Eckhart mainly perceives expression as a relationship of derivation of a proceeding thing from its origin. In this way, the former keeps a strong essential connection with the latter to the extent that the thing that flows is able to express its source’s essence.

2 See Eckhart: Liber parabolarum Genesis, LW I/1, n. 5, 454, 11–455, 10. Also the second kind of allegory mentioned by Eckhart in this passage instantiates expression. In this case, however, it is the figurative story as a whole (parabola se tota) that expresses the allegorical content (rei totius cuius est parabola), whereas many words of the story have no expressive function, because they are introduced as embellishment and protection of the hidden signification of the allegory. 3 I have recently dealt with the relationship between naturalia and spiritualia in Palazzo 2016a and Palazzo 2016b. 4 The traditional concept of a “German Dominican school” is no longer accepted in current scholarship: see Largier 2000. 5 On these German debates originated by Albert the Great’s legacy, see at least Libera 1994; Sturlese 2007; Saccon 2012. 6 On Eckhart’s biography, see Senner 2013. All the documents pertaining to Eckhart’s life have been collected by Loris Sturlese: Acta et regesta vitam magistri Echardi illustrantia, LW V, 153–193.

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If expression is taken as referring to this dialectic, then it is central to Eckhart’s thought and easily traceable in his work, even apart from the occurrences of the Latin term ‘expression’ and the middle-high German ‘ûzdruc’ or ‘ûtdruc’ and their cognates. As we shall see, in addition to these explicit references, Eckhart’s texts provide a wide range of words covering, more or less directly, the semantic area of the meaning of expression: e.g., the Latin terms ‘verbum’, ‘loquela’, ‘loqui’, ‘generatio’, ‘manifestare’, ‘enunciare’, ‘pandere’, ‘emanare’, ‘procedure’, etc. belong to the sphere of the expression. Therefore, it is on the basis of the numerous textual and doctrinal contexts in which the concept appears, and not of the explicit occurrences of the term, that Eckhart’s theory of expression must be reconstructed. The various topics and discussions forming Eckhart’s doctrine of language (e.g. hermeneutics, preaching,7 the names of God, apophatism, symbolism, metaphor,8 analogy vs. univocity, the power of the word,9 semantics of propositions, and so on10) are chief fields of his reflection on expression. Expression also plays a pivotal role in the theology of the Trinity and creation. The Word (‘Verbum’), the only-begotten Son of God the Father, is Image and expression of the Father; the Word of God the Creator is also the Paradigm according to Which every creature is made, and thus the Word unfolds himself in the exemplary ideas in relation to creatures. Expression is also fundamental to detachment, which is the experience man goes through when he becomes aware of his coessential intimacy with God. Unique among other creatures, man is endowed with an uncreated spark. Only insofar as man removes all the creatural images from his soul and rediscovers the image that he was given by nature in the deepest self (‘grunt’) by God,

7 See Sturlese 2014. It must be noted that three of the last Meister-Eckhart-Jahrbücher contain many contributions regarding preaching: vol. 7 = Löser/Mieth 2013; vol. 6 = Gottschall/Mieth 2012; vol. 2 = Quero-Sánchez/Steer 2008. 8 It must be noted that, besides books, articles and essays on mysticism and related topics, there is an annual journal explicitly devoted to the subject: Medieval Mystical Theology. Journal of The Eckhart Society. 9 See Gottschall 2005. The increasing interest in this topic in relation not only to Eckhart but also to the entire medieval tradition is testified to by a few books published in the last few years: Rosier-Catach 2004; Delaurenti 2007; Bériou/Boudet/Rosier-Catach (Eds.) 2014. 10 The extensive literature on language is listed in Eckhart bibliographies: Largier 1989, from 1800 to 1989; Largier 1998, from 1990 to 1997; Triebel/Witte 2018. Recently two conferences related to the issue of language in Eckhart took place: Erfurt, 14–15.11.2013, Thomas of Erfurt and Meister Eckhart; Mainz, 19–21.04.2013, Sprachbilder und Bildersprache bei Meister Eckhart und in seiner Zeit. Strategien des Sprechens über das Unsagbare: papers delivered on this occasion are now published in Dietl/Mieth/Schiewer (Eds.) 2015.

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God the Father gives birth to the only-begotten Son in his soul uninterruptedly and eternally, showing him His Image.11 According to Eckhart every natural operation or artificial production must be understood in terms of a Neoplatonic emanation of a principiate from its source, an emanation that in fact reproduces the generation of the Word from God the Father. Since something expresses the origin from which it flows, expression is taken as a universal process and divine generation as the most perfect model of expression. Other examples may be adduced, but these few are enough to show that expression is crucial to Eckhart’s whole metaphysics. Nonetheless, to my knowledge, nobody has so far conducted a systematic treatment of Eckhart’s thought in relation to this concept. On one hand, those scholars that have dedicated specific studies on the notion of expression, though recognizing Eckhart’s importance for this topic, have usually devoted few pages to him, not fully appreciating the richness of meanings, uses, and implications of expression in Eckhart’s works. In this respect Michelangelo Ghio’s attitude is revealing, for the Italian scholar holds that in Eckhart’s thought expression explains the relationship between God, His Word and the Universe: God expresses Himself in the Word, and the Word, in his turn, in the Universe.12 In particular, God unfolds Himself in the creatures, especially in the spiritual one. It is the noble soul that is able to grasp God when He first shows Himself.13 Ghio is right in emphasizing the mediating role of the Word and in interpreting the relationship “God – human soul” in terms of expression. However, these are only two aspects of Eckhart’s analysis of expression, which is actually much more complex and abundant in concepts, themes, topics and sources. Of all of this doctrinal richness there is no trace in Ghio’s account.14

11 Eckhart connects several times “image” with “detachment”, insisting that only if man gets rid of the creatural images can he detect the Image he was given by God. This is the birth of the Word in the soul: see e.g., Pr. 40, DW II, 275, 3–278, 7. 12 See: Ghio 1979a, pp. 50–52, esp. 52. The small section devoted to Eckhart is also present, without changes, in Ghio 1979b, pp. 380–382. Ghio also deals with expression in Ghio 1980. 13 See Ghio 1979a, p. 52; Ghio 1979b, p. 382. 14 Among other scholars that include Eckhart in their studies on expression see e.g. Deleuze 1968, who insists on twofold expression: “Dieu s’exprime dans le Verbe [. . .], le Verbe s’exprime dans le monde” (p. 160) and refers to Eckhart’s two models of the mirror and the branch (p. 300); Nieraad (1970, pp. 45–47) points out that the “Logos-Begriff” of the Gospel of John leads Eckhart to regard creation as an expression of the divine intellect.

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On the other hand, even though there are several studies on Eckhart’s thought which focus on topics such as the philosophy of image,15 the metaphysics of the Word,16 or the concept of univocity,17 topics that are strictly connected with the concept of expression, this notion has remained nonetheless on the background of these contributions. Moreover, no attempt has been made so far to give an overall analysis of expression as a main concept of Eckhart’s philosophy. In this paper, without ambition of completeness and exhaustiveness, I intend to focus my attention on the role played by this notion in a few different areas of Eckhart’s thought, by exploring expression as a conceptual model applied to several philosophical and theological issues. My main purpose is showing that expression is a cornerstone of Eckhart’s thought. Consequently, a full understanding of it must allow for a thorough insight into his philosophy.

2.2 The Procession of the Principiate from the Principle The Commentary on the first five verses of the Gospel of John, which form the first section of the so-called ‘Prologue to the Gospel of John’, provides one of the most appropriate texts in order to reconstruct Eckhart’s theory of expression.18 Eckhart associates these verses with the beginning of Genesis,19 15 See e.g. Haas: “Meister Eckharts mystische Bildlehre”, in: Haas 1979, pp. 209–237; Sturlese: “Mystik und Philosophie in der Bildlehre Meister Eckharts. Eine Lektüre von Pred. 16a Quint”, in: Sturlese 2007, pp. 47–60. 16 See Zum Brunn/Libera 1984. 17 See Mojsisch 1983. 18 On the prologue to the Commentary of the Gospel of John, see Meister Eckhart 1989 (concerning LW III, nn. 1–198); Meister Eckhart 1993, pp. 835–867 (concerning LW III, nn. 1–51). On Eckhart’s Commentary of the Gospel of John, see Flasch 2010, pp. 199–225. A stimulating collective volume on the philosophical and theological interpretations of the Gospel of John from Late Antiquity to Late Middle Ages was published few years ago: Amerini 2013. 19 I will quote Eckhart’s texts from the following translations (to them I made slight changes in very few cases): Meister Eckhart 1981 and Meister Eckhart 1986. Eckhart 1981, p. 123 (= Expositio evangelii secundum Iohannem, LW III, n. 4, 5,2–6): “The interpretation of ‘In the beginning was the Word’ should be in accord with this intention. First note that ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God’, as well as much that it follows, are contained in the words ‘And God said, Let there be light, and light was made; and God saw the light was good, and he divided the light from the darkness (Gen. 1)’ ”.

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thereby following a longstanding tradition – a tradition which he innovates through his conception of the metaphysics of the Word. In the exposition of the initial verses of the Gospel of John (Exp. in Ioh. 4–84), Eckhart raises some of the most crucial themes of his metaphysics: the procession of the thing produced from its principle, the relationship just-Justice, the notion of image, ratio as a principle of the operation of an agent, ratio as quiditas, the Word, the Son of God and His generation, the image as a model in the agent’s mind, the essential cause, etc. The exegesis of John 1,1–5 constitutes the core of Eckhart’s metaphysics. The first topic with which Eckhart deals is the emanation of a thing produced from its origin (nn. 4–12). He lays down fifteen rules which have a very general value (‘generaliter’), for they apply both to the divine realities and to natural and man-made things. Not surprisingly the first example adduced – the fig and fig-tree – is taken from the natural world. To clarify the text ‘In the beginning was the Word’ down to ‘There was a man sent from God’, mark first of all that what is produced or proceeds from anything is precontained in it. This is universally and naturally true, both in the divine domain (the topic here) as well as in natural and artificial things. A fig could as easily come from a vine or a pear tree as a fig tree, if it were not precontained and preexistent in the fig tree.20

The general validity of these principles is due to the peculiar conception of hermeneutics expounded in the proem, according to which the Sacred Scriptures, if adequately interpreted –namely, if illustrated through the natural reasons of philosophers– reveal truths regarding nature.21 It is this very conception of exegesis that allows Eckhart to extract from John 1,1–5 the fifteen principles underlying the procession of a thing produced, whatever its nature may be, from its origin.

20 Eckhart 1981, p. 123 (= Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 4, 5,7–6,2). 21 See Exp. in Ioh., LW III, nn. 2–3, 4,4–17. Eckhart 1981, p. 126 (= Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 13, 12, 11–15): “It is evident how the Prologue ‘In the beginning was the Word’ down to ‘There was a man sent from God’ is to be interpreted by means of the ideas [rationes] and properties of natural beings. It is also clear that these words of the Evangelist, if correctly investigated, teach us the natures and properties of things both in their existence and their operation, and so while they build up our faith, they also instruct us about the natures of things”. On this point see the interesting remarks contained in Hödl 1966, e.g. 642: “Eckharts Anliegen ist vielmehr, die naturphilosophische Bewandtnis der biblischen Botschaft zu verdeutlichen. [. . .] Das vom Vater gezeugte und gesprochene ewige Wort wird in seinem Geheimnis von allen natürlichen Wesen, deren Sein und Werden, angezeigt”.

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“In principio erat verbum” means: (i) that the thing which is produced is before in its origin, in the thing from which it proceeds; (ii) that the proceeding thing pre-exists in its cause as the seed in its principle; (iii) that the proceeding thing is a word, for it says, announces and shows its producer; and (iv) that the proceeding thing is in its producer as a ratio or similitude in which and after which the producer produces what proceeds from itself.22 Since procession always requires the proceeding thing to express its principle, as is clear from the third rule,23 and since procession, as has been said, is the general pattern of all the events in the world –that is, the generation of the Son from the Father, human productions and natural operations–, expression appears to be at stake whenever something is done, independently of its divine or creatural kind. This is the meaning of John 1,1–2. Because the effect is always an expression and a representation (‘expressivus et repraesentativus’), and is the word of its principle, the preceding words–“In the principle was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God; this Word was in the principle with God”–can be explained in a sixth way applying to every work of nature and of art.24

Obviously –so reads the ninth rule– procession or production and emanation takes place properly, primarily and especially in generation. In this case, Eckhart means by ‘generation’ the divine generation of the Son, which is the most perfect model of generation: “In the ninth place, note that procession, or production and emanation (our subject here) in the proper, prior and preeminent sense takes place in generation [. . .].”25 Notwithstanding, Eckhart is mainly concerned with explaining how this perfect model of procession also applies to the production of artifacts and to natural events. I will only analyse some more rules. Eckhart interprets ‘verbum erat apud deum’ as signifying –fifth rule– that the thing which proceeds from something else is different from its origin due to the very act of proceeding. Eckhart, however, clarifies that this general rule must be considered in two different situations, depending on the nature of the cause –whether analogical or

22 See Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 4, 5,10, 6,3–11. 23 Eckhart 1981, p. 123 (= Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 4, 6,5–7): “Third, note that what is produced from something is universally its word. It speaks, announces and discloses whence it proceeds–hence he says, ‘In the beginning was the Word’”. 24 Eckhart 1981, p. 134 (= Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 36, 30,12–15). 25 Eckhart 1981, p. 124 (= Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 8, 8,10–11).

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univocal– from which a thing proceeds. In the first case the proceeding thing is always inferior and more imperfect than its cause. By contrast, if the cause is univocal, the principiate is somehow the same as its principle. Instead of only taking part in its principle, the proceeding thing receives the nature of the cause in a simple way, wholly and in an equal form.26 By univocal cause here Eckhart means the procession in divinis, namely the divine generation of the Word. This type of univocal causality provides the model for human and natural agents when their projectual power is still considered in principle (‘in principio’), that is, before producing their effect outside. By contrast the material object made and shaped by a craftsman after the image in his mind belongs to the sphere of analogical causality. This empirical thing expresses the paradigm according to which the craftsman made it. The following articles add further details that specify to which extent the model of God’s inner life can be transferred to human productions and natural processes. According to the seventh principle, the verse “deus era verbum” means that the Son, or Word, is the same as God the Father or Principle. This holds true also for an artifact when it is taken not in an analogical context, namely as an empirical thing, but before materialization. In the craftsman’s mind, the artifact is still one with the craftsman’s mental life, his thinking, the actual apprehension of his intellect. From this follows the seventh point: That the Son or Word is the same as what the Father or Principle is. This is what follows, ‘The Word was God’. Here it must be noted that in analogical relations what is produced derives from the source, but is nevertheless beneath the principle and not with it. It is of another nature and thus is not the principle itself. Still, insofar as it is in the principle, it is not other in nature or other in supposit. A chest in its maker’s mind is not a chest, but is the life and understanding of the maker, his living conception.27

Only if considered inside the mind of the craftsman, the artifact does not fall under its principle (‘sub principio’), but keeps its identity with it (‘in principio’) in a relationship of coessential univocity with it. Therefore, the dialectic of distinction in identity, of emanation in immanence, which characterizes the inner life of the triune God, may be also transferred to the natural processes and artificial productions: “On this account I would say that what it says here about

26 See Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 5, 7,1–7. 27 Eckhart 1981, p. 124 (= Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 6, 7,10–8,2).

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the procession of the divine Persons holds true and is found in the procession and production of every being of nature and art.”28

2.3 The Just and the Justice Having interpreted the first part of the Prologue to the Gospel of John as referring to every procession in the world, Eckhart provides a second exegesis according to which the first five verses of John signify the relationship between the just and Justice (nn. 14–22). Eckhart lays down another fifteen rules corresponding to those underlying the emanation of a principiate from its principle. These rules describe the relationship between the just man and Justice in terms of a dialectic of identity in the distinction: the just man is in Justice; the just man preexists in Justice; Justice forms and informs every just man –and just thing or action– in and according to a paradigm (‘exemplar’) or model (‘ratio’) that It has in itself; the just man is generated by Justice, from Which he is not different in nature; the just man is one and the same with Justice; Justice does not cease to be Justice when generates the just man, etc.29 It is the third of the fifteen rules –as it was also in the case of procession– that qualifies the relationship “just man-Justice” as expression: the just man is the word of Justice, word through which Justice says and shows Itself, and without the just man Justice would be known only to Itself. According to Eckhart, this principle is the meaning of a few biblical passages, among which is also John 1,18 (“Deum nemo vidit umquam: unigenitus, qui est in sinu patris, ipse enarravit”), a verse that, more than others, gives the doctrine of expression a firm and explicit foundation: Third. The just man is the word of justice, that by which justice expresses and manifests itself. If justice did not justify, no one would have knowledge of it, but it would be known to itself alone, as in the text: ‘No one has ever seen God; the Only-Begotten who is in the Father’s heart has made him known’ (John 1,18), or ‘No one knows the Father except the Son’ (Matth. 11,27), or ‘No one knows who does not receive’ (Rev. 2,17).30

28 Eckhart 1981, p. 124 (= Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 6, 8,2–5). On the distinction between the material object made outside and the artifact conceived by the craftsman’s mind (ars ipsa in mente artificis), see also rules 8, 11 and 12. 29 See Exp. in Ioh., LW III, nn. 14–22, 13,1–19,2. 30 Eckhart 1981, pp. 126–127 (= Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 15, 13,8–12). See also Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 23, 19,3–4.

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In several other loci of Eckhart’s works, John 1,18 also plays a decisive role, for it enables the German theologian to understand the metaphysical paradigm “just man-Justice”31 in theological terms by identifying the only-Born Son with the just and God the Father with Justice.32 Eckhart goes so far as to describe accurately how the Son, who is the just generated by Justice, expresses the Father both in His unity and indistinct nature, and in His singular person. John 1,18 refers indeed to the generative power, which includes the only two categories proper to God: substance and relation. On one hand, the Son who is ‘in sinu’ expresses all the perfections and all that is one and indistinct in Himself and the Father. On the other, the Son also reveals the Father as a person distinct from Himself. Father and Son are opposed and distinguished in their relationship, but, at the same time, they posit each other, so neither the Son can be thought without the Father, nor the Father without the Son. Accordingly, the Son says that the Father is the Father. Therefore, ‘in sinu’ is predicated of ‘patris’ and this phrase encompasses both essence and relation. Ubi et hoc notandum quod filius, qui in sinu est, enarrat omne quod est patris, scilicet esse, vivere, intelligere, operari, noscere, amare, essentiam, potentiam et omne quod unum est et indistinctum, quod unitatis est et indistinctionis in filio et patre, hoc, inquam, totum enarrat filius, in quantum est in sinu, id est in intimis. Et quia non est aliud impersonaliter a patre, enarrat patrem, ut quid est, ut unum est, et ut sic non enarrat patrem, ut quis est, nec quidquam enarrat, quod est distinctionis aut quod distinctionem sapit a patre; sed quia filius, utpote genitus a patre, iustus a iustitia, est alius personaliter a patre, ut sic enarrat patrem, ut quis est, ut distinctus est, et omne quod distinctionem sapit patre, nihil autem eorum quae unitatis sunt. Pater enim et filius opponuntur relative: in quantum opponuntur, distinguuntur, sed in quantum relative, mutuo se ponunt; nec est nec intelligitur pater sine filio et e converso, et per consequens filius non excludit nec tacet, sed enarrat patrem esse patrem. Si enim filius est, pater est; si pater est, filius est. Si semper pater fuit et est, semper filius fuit et est: semper natus, semper nascitur, Psalmus: ‘filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te’; ‘genui’, quia natus, ‘hodie’, quia nascitur. Propter quod et sinus dictus est et patris, id est in sinu patris inquit, utrumque complectens, essentiam et relationem. Et hoc est quod potentia generativa utrumque concernit, unitatem et distinctionem, unitatem tamen et essentiam in recto, distinctionem et relationem in obliquo.33

31 As Eckhart (1981, p. 186) declares on his own (= Predigt 6, DW I, 105,2–3: “Anyone who has discernment in justice and in just men, he understands everything I am saying”), the connection “just man-Justice” is the key to understanding his entire work. Not suprisingly, therefore, it is one of the chief topics of Eckhart scholarship: see, e.g., B. Mojsisch 1983, pp. 65–74; Flasch 1998a, pp. 391–398; Kroll 2003. 32 See e.g. Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 196, 165,4–16. 33 Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 197, 166,1–167,5. Somewhere else, in relation to John 10,30 (“Ego et pater unum sumus”), which is another verse often quoted with regard to the theological interpretation of the relationship “just man-Justice”, Eckhart writes: “in divinis est invenire patrem

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Just as the Son expresses and stands in relation to the Father, so man, in his noblest self, is linked to God. One of the most peculiar and controversial aspects of Eckhart’s thought consists indeed in admitting an uncreated and uncreatable dimension in the ground of the soul. In other words, on account of a natural familiarity, of a coessential univocity with God, man is a privileged creature. He can achieve a perfect unity with God, as long as he rediscovers in his soul the divine spark that was originally given to him, but whose presence and dignity tend to be forgotten through the creatural worries, self-concerns or distractions of everyday life. Eckhart describes the process of spiritual, anthropological, ethical and cognitive perfection (“detachment”), whereby a detached man gets rid of all these limitations, by means of a few conceptual models, among which there is the “just man-Justice” paradigm. The just man is just inasmuch as he is generated by Justice and forms a one with It, just as the Word is generated by and is one with the Father. God gives birth to the Word uninterruptedly in the soul of the just man, who goes through the inner transformation of detachment. Therefore, the relationship “just man-Justice” provides Eckhart with a conceptual key to understanding the generation of the Word –and His expressive function–, whether this refers to the inner life of the triune God or to the birth of the Word in the ground of the soul. In doing so, Eckhart suggests an innovative interpretation of the traditional Patristic doctrine of the birth of the Word in the soul.34

2.4 The Image Eckhart appeals to a venerable and longstanding exegetical tradition, which, based on several scriptural passages, attributes the status of “image” to both the Son of God and the human soul.35 Eckhart played a crucial role within a lively debate on the concept of image which was at that time taking place in the German lands by introducing a radical innovation to the traditional Augustinian theory that the soul is only in God’s image (‘ad imaginem’) due to the analogy between the three superior

et filium unum in essentia, distinctos tamen eo solo quod ille gignens, iste genitus. Exemplum in iustitia et iusto”: Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 516, 446,14–15. 34 For a reconstruction of the Patristic views on this topic, see Rahner 1935. 35 See e.g. II Cor. 4,4: “imago Dei”; Col. 1,15: “imago dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae”; Sap. 7,26: “Imago bonitatis illius”; Gen. 1,26: “Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostrum”.

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functions (memory, intelligence and will) and the Trinity. By contrast, Eckhart contended that the soul is not only in God’s image, but it is also the very image (‘imago’) of God. As such, the soul shares the same features with the Word as something which is generated by the Father and, at the same time, as that which emanates from and expresses Him. Obviously, if taken in its whole – namely if considered as something which includes the faculties and functions related to body and temporality– the soul is not Image; it is Image only if considered in its incorporeal and eternal dimension, that is, in its ground.36 The relevance of this doctrine and its doctrinal dangerousness did not go unnoticed by the censors of Eckhart’s process, as they targeted several of its aspects.37 In the Commentary on the Gospel of John (nn. 23–26), Eckhart analyzes the concept of image systematically, identifying nine features: (i–ii) the image receives its being completely and solely from its exemplar and not from the subject in which it is38; (iii) the image receives all the being of the exemplar according to all its aspects which make it an exemplar39; (iv) the image, being one in itself, is of only one thing40; (v) there is a relationship of mutual immanence between the image and its exemplar, for the former is in the latter where it receives its being, as the exemplar is also in its image41; (vi) therefore, image and exemplar are one and the same42; (viii) both of them are simultaneous (‘coeva’), for it is impossible to know one without knowing the other one43; (ix) being identical, image and exemplar have a mutual perfect knowledge.44 Like the procession of a principiate from the principle and the paradigm “just man-Justice”, the dialectic “image-exemplar” illustrates in its own way a paradoxical situation of identity in the distinction, of emanation in the immanence, which is typical of the phenomena belonging to the sphere of univocity. In this case, the scriptural passage which plays a crucial role is John 10,30 ‘ego et

36 A large body of literature has been dedicated to the notion of image: see e.g. Lossky 1960, ch. 6; Wackernagel 1991; Haas 1979, pp. 209–237; Wilde 2000; Sturlese 2007, pp. 47–60; Saccon 2012, pp. 241–288, that reconstructs Dietrich’s and Eckhart’s views in the context of the 14th-century debate that took place in the German region; Schwaetzer/Vannier 2015. 37 See especially Processus contra Magistrum Echardum, LW V, n. 62, 220,7–221,6: the article n. 8 contains texts taken from German sermon 16a. For Eckhart’s reply, see Responsio ad articulos sibi impositos I, LW V, nn. 141–142, 300,14–301,3; nn. 62–63, 315,24–316,3. 38 See Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 23, 19,5–7: first two features. 39 See Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 23, 19,8–10: third feature. 40 See Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 23, 19,11–12: fourth feature. 41 See Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 24, 19,13–16: fifth feature. 42 See Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 24, 20,1–2: sixth feature. 43 See Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 25, 20,11–14: eight feature. 44 See Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 26, 21,1–5: ninth feature.

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pater unum sumus’, where ‘unum’ indicates the essential identity of the image with the paradigm, while ‘sumus’ refers to the generation process in which the image is expressed and the model is expressing itself. He says “we are” insofar as there is an exemplar that is expressive and begets and an image that is expressed or begotten; he says “one” insofar as the whole existence of the one is in the other and there is nothing alien to it there.45

The exemplar generates its image not as an efficient cause, but as a formal principle. The distinction is relevant, for efficient and final causality regards something which is in the physical world, while form in this case concerns something taken in its virtual constitution. Since the exemplar expresses itself in the image, the image emanates from its exemplar formally (vii), remaining substantially inside its origin: “Seventh. Such an expression or begetting of the image is a kind of formal emanation.”46 In other words, image, whether it is the only begotten Son or the Word in the soul, follows the laws of the dynamic of procession from and return to the Principle. The Neoplatonic character of this conception can be fully appreciated in the Latin sermon XLIX (“Whose are this image and inscription?”).47 After a first section, in which Eckhart assigns to the intellectual and superior part of the soul the image where we are changed into God,48 in the second one he lists eight features of the image, partly analogous with those of the Commentary on the Gospel of John,49 with a few statements which clarify the link between image, generation and expression.

45 Eckhart 1981, p. 129 (= Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 24, 20,2–4). 46 Eckhart 1981, p. 129 (= Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 25, 20,5–6). The same idea is rehearsed in other texts: see Expositio libri Genesis, LW I/1, n. 115, 272,1–2: “De ratione enim imaginis est quod sit expressiva totius eius plene, cuius imago est, non expressiva alicuius determinati in illo”; Expositio libri Sapientiae, LW II, n. 143, 481,1–2: “Tertium est quod sit formalis expressio illius, non tamen effectus”. 47 The pericope on which the sermon is built is Matth. 22,20 (“Cuius est imago haec est superscriptio”). Due to its conceptual relevance the sermon has aroused keen interest among scholars: for an overall analysis see Duclow 1989; McGinn 2008; Brachtendorf 2009; Fröhling 2012. Vladimir Lossky was the first to insist on bullitio and ebullitio, which are at the core of Eckhart’s treatment in the sermon: see Lossky 1960, in several passages. On these two processes, see also Beierwaltes 2004, pp. 47–64; Reynolds 1989; McGinn 2001, pp. 71–113; Palazzo 2013, esp. 267–271. 48 See Sermo XLIX, LW IV, nn. 505–508, 421,1–423,15. 49 See Sermo XLIX, LW IV, nn. 509–510, 424,1–425,12.

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In particular, Eckhart repeats that the image has been emanated and expressed by the exemplar: “Fourth, there ought to be the expression and emanation (‘expressa et effluxa’) of its source.”50 Moreover, due to the fact that the image is only present in an intellectual nature, Eckhart credits it with the circular movement typical of the intellect. In the intellect the same thing returns to itself with a complete reversion. The thing generating is one and the same with the thing generated finding oneself in the other and the other in oneself. Seventh, it is consequently necessary that the image be found only in intellectual nature where the same reality returns to itself ‘in a perfect return’ [reditione completa], and where the one that gives birth is one and the same with the child or offspring, finding oneself in the other and the other in oneself.51

Thus, the image which is generated though remaining in its origin, the image which is identical with its exemplar though being different, ends up coinciding with the self-reflective activity of the intellect. Interestingly, as has been observed, Eckhart’s theory of image shares its foremost features with the views on the same topic of his Dominican colleague Dietrich of Freiberg. Both of them regarded image as a formal emanation; related it to intellectual activity; insisted on the essential identity between image and paradigm; underlined the radical difference of image from the efficient and final causality; and emphasized the Neoplatonic background of their discourse.52 In the third section, Eckhart considers the image from a theological perspective, exploring the dynamic related to image as the link between the inner life of God and His activity ad extra. Image is first defined as a simple and formal emanation which communicates all the nude and pure essence with exclusion of any kind of efficient and final causality: “Note that an image properly speaking is a simple formal emanation that transmits the whole pure naked essence. The metaphysician considers it in abstraction from the efficient and final causes [. . .].”53 Formal emanation takes place according to the laws of essential causality, investigated by the metaphysician. Efficient and final causalities belong to the world of creatures, whose laws, by contrast, are explored by the natural philosopher.

50 Eckhart 1986, p. 236 (= Sermo XLIX, LW IV, n. 509, 424,9–10). 51 Eckhart 1986, p. 236 (= Sermo XLIX, LW IV, n. 510, 425,5–8). 52 See Thedoricus de Vrieberg: De visione beatifica, in: Dietrich von Freiberg 1977 (CPTMA, I.1), 1,2, 36–53, esp. 43–44; and De intellectu et intellegibili, in: Dietrich von Freiberg 1977, II 32–38, 170–176. Flasch 1986; Flasch 1998b; Sturlese 2007, pp. 58–59. 53 Eckhart 1986, p. 236 (= Sermo XLIX, LW IV, n. 511, 425,14–426,1).

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In order to better illustrate the nature of this formal emanation, Eckhart devises the metaphor of ‘bullitio’, which is the process whereby a thing swells up and boils from itself without boiling over.54 Therefore bullitio designates the inner activity of God, Who produces from, out of, and within Himself a naked nature, which is His Image and the Son equal to Him. Bullitio means the formal emanation of the divine persons in the Trinity.55 In other texts Eckhart adduces other examples in order to clarify the nature of the emanation of the image. In this respect, the German sermon Quint n. 16a – as a matter of fact, not exactly a sermon, but a fragment–, largely quoted by the censors of Eckhart’s process, seems to be extremely significant. Two of the three examples contained in the sermon help to understand how the image flows from its exemplar. In accordance with the Latin sermon XLIX, the second example – that of the mirror– shows that the image, since it does not depend on will and knowledge, is a necessary and natural expression. When I am in front of a mirror, Eckhart explains, it reflects me, whether I want that or not. This happens because the image does not come forth from the mirror, nor from itself, but from the model; therefore, if the mirror is removed, also the image disappears, for I am myself –as a model– the image. In other words, the image is the expression of itself without will and knowledge.56 The image necessarily expresses its model, being identical with it and conversely, and neither efficient nor final causality may change this situation.

54 Eckhart 1986, p. 236 (= Sermo XLIX, LW IV, n. 511, 426,2–4): “The image then is an emanation from the depths in silence, excluding everything that comes from without. It is a form of life, as if you were to imagine something swelling up from itself and in itself and then inwardly boiling (bullire) without any ‘boiling over’ (ebullitione) yet understood”. 55 Eckhart adds seven further features of the image, which mainly refer to the Word, Son of God: the Image is in the uncreated intellect considered in abstraction from efficient and final causes; the Image has the essence (ratio) of birth and the Son, because He emanates in the same nature and is identical with His Principle; Son and Father are mutually in each other; the Son is not made nor created; the Son is not produced voluntarily, but naturally; the Son, Who is a perfect likeness, breathes love, that is, the Holy Spirit, Who is in the Image, and the Image is in the Holy Spirit; the Image, along with the Father and the Holy Spirit, is the only Principle of every creature. See Sermo XLIX, LW IV, n. 512, 427,1–10. 56 See Pr. 16a, DW I, 259,1–13. On the sermon see Sturlese 2007, pp. 51–55. With the first of the three examples Eckhart intends to make clear the difference between the causality and logic of the world of immaterial beings and the physical laws proper to the empirical world: if I eliminate every medium interposed between me and a wall, I still remain on the wall and cannot get in the wall; on the contrary, in the sphere of spiritual beings everything is in another one and what receives is one and the same with what is received because it receives itself: see Pr. 16a, DW I, 258,1–8. Therefore, the image receives itself, being identical with its exemplar, from which it receives all its being.

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With the second example –that of a branch– Eckhart suggests the mutual inhabitance of an image and its exemplar, i. e. their essential identity. When a branch sprouts from a trunk it has the name and the essence of the tree. What comes forth is what remains inside and what remains inside is what comes worth. Therefore, the branch is an expression of itself.57

2.5 The Word and Creation The theology of the creation is a central part of Eckhart’s theory of expression. In this section of his theological reflection, Eckhart focuses on the Word that God pronounces in order to create the world. The Word unfolds what is precontained in God’s mind and is identical with the ideas (‘rationes’) according to which all creatures are made. As have been said, reflections on the creation are also found in the Latin sermon XLIX. In this writing, the Image –the Firstborn Son– is said to be the only Principle of every creature, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit: “Seventh, it is clear how the Image, the Son, the ‘Firstborn’, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, is the one Principle of ‘every creature’”.58 The Image has thus a twofold nature, for, as an image, the Word emanates from and expresses the Begetter –the Father– while being at the same time the paradigm according to which creatures are made and from which they derive. The mediating role of God’s Word explains the link between bullitio and ebullitio, which are the two ways in which God expresses Himself, either in the inner Trinitarian procession, or in the external creation. Ebullitio describes precisely the outward causality of God, Who produces something from Himself (a se ipso) –but not out of Himself (de se ipso), namely not out of His own substance–, according to the modalities of efficient and final causes. This boiling over is either the production of something out of nothing, namely creation (creatio), or the making of something from another thing, namely artificial production (factio).59 57 See Pr. 16a, DW I, 259,14–21. Both examples are also recounted in the German sermon Quint n. 16b, where, however, emphasis is laid only on the idea that emanation is a completely natural process without any cooperation of will: see Pr. 16b, DW I, 265,9–267,1. On this sermon see Köbele 1998; Milem 2002; Meesen 2015. 58 Eckhart 1986, p. 237 (= Sermo XLIX, LW IV, n. 512, 427,10–428,1). 59 Eckhart 1986, pp. 236–237 (= Sermo XLIX, LW IV, n. 511, 426,5–12): “There are three stages in the production of existence. The first, the one just mentioned, is that by which something from itself, out of itself, and in itself produces a pure nature, pouring it forth formally without the cooperation of the will, but rather with its concomitant activity. This is the way the Good diffuses itself. This is also how the power of willing can be a principle even if the end is not yet

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Bullitio, which has been described above, is therefore the source for ebullitio. God must first boil in Himself, giving birth to His image, and eventually boil over, so that He can be perfect (perfectum) in all of Himself, overflowing (exuberans), and above perfection (plus quam perfectum). Once more, Eckhart emphasizes the Neoplatonic tone of his discourse, setting the explanation of creation within an Avicennian framework.60 The two different modalities of production, bullitio and ebullitio, give rise to two distinct types of products. Indeed, as Eckhart points out at the beginning of the Book of the parable of Genesis, the perfect One, insofar as it is perfect, always brings about only one thing. This is the production «in divinis», where the Son and the Spirit are not outside the One, but are the same with the One: they are produced by the Father, but are not drawn by Him outside (extraducitur) the unity because they are not His effects. By contrast, what goes out of the One falls in plurality and division and, due to the very fact that it is outside the unity, is produced as an effect (effectus). “Effectus sive extrafactus” means “made outside”. In other terms, what falls short from the simplicity of the One belongs to creation.61 In light of this distinction it becomes clear that when it comes to creation, effect (effectus) must be regarded as a technical concept referring to the product of God’s act of creation. In a text of the Book of the parable of Genesis, Eckhart initially considers effect, generally, as the result of every kind of operation. In particular, he points out (i) that the effect is the word in which the agent says what he is and what the things that are in him are; (ii) it is the word through which the agent announces and shows himself and the things that are in him. As such, (iii) the effect is the word spoken in an impersonal way. Moreover, (iv) the effect shows its cause: Notandum in principio quod universaliter effectus est verbum, quo agens se dicit et ea quae in ipso sunt. Secundo verbum est, quo loquitur et dicit, nuntiat sive manifestat se

grasped. The second stage is like the “boiling over” in the manner of an efficient cause and with a view toward an end by which something produces something else that is from itself, but not out of itself. This production is either out of some other thing (and then it is called ‘making’), or it is out of nothing (and then it is the third stage of production which is called ‘creating’)”. On ebullitio as discussed by the authors of the German Dominican tradition, see Pagnoni-Sturlese 1980, esp. 644 ff.; Libera 1994, pp. 196–199, 348–373. 60 Eckhart 1986, p. 237 (= Sermo XLIX, LW IV, n. 512, 428,1–3): “For it is necessary for something first to boil itself totally and then finally to boil over so that it can be completely perfected in itself while overflowing that is more than perfection. See Avicenna, Metaphysics 8,6 at the beginning”. 61 Lib. par. Gen., LW I/1, nn. 11–12, 482,6–483,14.

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et ea quae in ipso sunt. Rursus tertio effectus est verbum quod loquitur impersonaliter, id est dicitur. Item quarto est manifestans seu manifestatio suae causae [. . .].62

In other words, the effect expresses its cause and whatever is contained in its cause. These general principles can be found in the Scriptures, in particular in John 1,18 (“unigenitus qui est in sinu patris, ipse enarravit”), whose relevance to Eckhart’s theory of expression has already been highlighted, and in Ps. 32,9 and 148,5 (“dixit et facta sunt”).63 But what was still a general discourse about the unspecified concept of agent becomes now a precise treatment of the Word spoken by the Creator. Only the divine Word has the power of creating because, since God is the First Cause of all things, nothing is outside Him and made without Him. As a consequence, dicere is for Him tantamount to facere. God is a perfect agent, and whatever is conceived of by his Word is immediately made and produced. Different from this is the condition of a human craftsman, whose word, or mental image, is not sufficient to produce the artifact. For instance, a builder is imperfect because he needs the parts of the house and the matter that are outside him and whose existence is given from another agent, namely God.64 Eckhart condenses the relationship between God –in this case the causa essentialis65–, Word and effect in these few but very effective lines: Consequently, every essential cause universally expresses [dicit] its effect and all itself, as a cause, in the effect; and the effect itself is the word by which the one that is speaking speaks, and it is the word itself which is spoken and by which only the one that is speaking is made known, John 1 (18): ‘No one has ever seen God; the Only-Begotten made Him known’. Therefore, it was said that the Word ‘was the true light’, John 1 (9). ‘Everything which is made known is light’, Eph. 5 (13). Thus, the cause is made clear by and in the

62 Lib. par. Gen., LW I,1, n. 47, 514,3–7. 63 Lib. par. Gen., LW I,1, n. 47, 514,7–8. 64 Lib. par. Gen. LW I,1, n. 47, 514,8–515,4: “[. . .] quia dicere est facere, et ipsum facere, ipsum producere est dicere, non aliud. Si quominus, ex insufficientia est agentis. Exemplum Avicennae est in domificatore, cuius dicere sive concipere practice domum non est producere domum ex imperfectione, qua partes domus et materia sunt extra artificem et habent esse ab alio. Deus autem, utpote prima causa et omnium – extra ipsum nihil est, ‘et sine ipso factum est nihil’ – in ipso necessario dicere sive concipere quippiam est illud producere sive facere”. This notion also appears without reference to Avicenna. This is the case of a text in the Commentary on the Gospel of John, where Eckhart holds that if a builder built the house with his substance of man as a man, then the house outside would be his word: see Exp. lib. Ioh., LW III, n. 30, 23,14–24,6. 65 The notion of essential causality is of Neoplatonic origin: see Proclus 1987, 65 et comm. 35, 4–6; Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita 1990, 7, 2, 196,17–197,2; Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita 1937, pp. 397–398. For Eckhart’s treatment of this concept see: Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 38, 32,3–33,5. On this concept see also Sturlese 1978, pp. 210–217; Libera 2005, pp. 200–209.

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effect, John 1 (3): ‘All things were made through him’. And this is what follows: light was made. For a thing is hidden in its cause, it is not made clear, it does not shine. [. . .] Thus, Let there be light in the effect, and it shines already either as it is made [effecta] or as an effect. Indeed it shines through that by which it is made or produced and it is an effect: He said light was made. Before being made in the nature of things, it does not shine, but rather it is closed ‘as under a seal’, Job 9 (7); and Is. 45 (15): ‘Truly you are a hidden God’.66

In general, Eckhart maintains, every essential cause expresses (dicit) its effect and all of itself in its effect. Accordingly, the effect is the word through which the one who is speaking –i. e., the essential cause, God– speaks and becomes known. These first lines add nothing to what had been already said with regard to the “effect”, with the only difference that the concept of essential cause replaces that of “agent”. In the following text, however, Eckhart focuses on the divine Word, who is said to be “the true light” (John 1,9) because he shows the divine Cause through and in creatural effects, being That through Whom “all things were made” (John 1,3). A thing is hidden in the divine Cause, but becomes light (fiat lux) when it is produced outside as an effect, when it is created through the Word. Before being made and existing as a creature, as an effect in the natural world (in natura rerum), each thing exists closed and hidden in the divine Cause.67 In the very last sentence of the abovementioned text, Eckhart alludes to the theory of the duplex esse, which he expounds more accurately in other passages in his works. Each thing has a twofold ontological condition: a virtual existence (esse virtuale) and a formal existence (esse formale), the former being its mode of existence in the divine Word, and the latter being the way of existing which each reality as a creature has in its form in the natural world.68 The double

66 Lib. par. Gen., LW I/1, n. 47, 515,5–516,3. 67 With regard to the essential cause in the Commentary on the Gospel of John, Eckhart also remarks that the ratio, namely the verbum, precontains more eminently, namely virtually (virtute), what the effect has only formally (formaliter). This is an allusion to the “duplex esse theory”: Eckhart 1981, p. 135 (= Exp. lib. Ioh., LW III, n. 38, 32,16–33,2): “The Idea (ratio) not only has, but also has in a prior and more eminent way, what the effect has in a formal way, because the Idea has it virtually”. 68 Exp. lib. Gen., LW I/1, n. 77, 238,2–7: “Nota quod omnis creatura duplex habet esse. Unum in causis suis originalibus, saltem in verbo dei; et hoc est esse firmum et stabile. Propter quod scientia corruptibilum est incorruptibilis, firma et stabilis; scitur enim res in suis causis. Aliud est esse rerum extra in rerum natura, quod habent res in forma propria. Primum est esse virtuale, secundum est esse formale, quod plerumque infirmum et variabile”. For the theory of the duplex esse and related issues, it is fundamental to consult Lossky 1960, esp. 120–174,

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level corresponds to the Platonic distinction between the intelligible world and the sensible world; a distinction which is also borne out by the Gospel of John (1,3–4), where it is said that “what was made, was life in Him” (“quod factum est, in ipso vita erat”). According to Eckhart, this verse means that each thing, taken in itself, is in the outer world, for it is created and made. However, taken as contained in the divine Word, each thing is life.69 The ontological condition of a thing, considered in its original causes, is more perfect than its existence, taken as in its own form in nature. Whereas the esse virtuale is firm and stable, the esse formale or esse extra is weak and changeable.70 In other words, the virtual existence of things is their being a paradigm in God’s mind, that is, their being the living science of the Divine Maker’s mind. As such, the esse virtuale is the truest and most authentic way of existence. Consequently, as is clear from what has been said before, a thing is imperfect when it is at the level of the esse formale, because it is outside of the divine inner life. It has fallen short of the divine unity in the creatural division and multiplicity. Therefore, the existence of things in nature is named as a staying outside (extrastantia).71 Each thing –Eckhart adduces the examples of the light– when produced outside in matter and nature is divided and mixed with something else.72 The duplex esse theory also has an important logical-cognitive side. A thing is perfect, true and undivided, for it is exactly what it is. It is a quiddity.73 The paradigm of a thing in God’s mind coincides with the quiddity of that thing, with its definition, namely with its logical constitution in terms of genus and species. Metaphysical knowledge consists in grasping the quiddity of something,

220–249, 275–286 and 345–350. I embark on a more detailed analysis of this doctrine in relation to Eckhart’s views on language in “Eckhart and Language”, forthcoming. 69 Exp. lib. Gen., LW I/1, n. 78, 239,8–240,7: “ Praemissis alludit quod dicit Augustinus Contra academicos ‘Platonem sensisse duos esse mundos: unum intelligibilem, in quo ipsa veritas habitat, alium sensibilem, quem manifestum est nos visu tactuque sentire; illum verum, hunc verisimilem et ad illius imaginem factum’. Ad insinuandum autem hoc duplex esse rerum apte dicitur prius: ‘dixit deus: fiat lux, et facta est lux’; et iterum: ‘dixit’: fiat firmamentum, et post additur: ‘fecit deus firmamentum’. ‘Fiat’, inquam, quantum ad primum esse; ‘facta est’ et ‘fecit’ quantum ad esse secundum, extra scilicet. Hinc est illud Ioh. 1: ‘quod factum est, in ipso vita erat’. Ipsum enim quod in se est extra, utpote factum sive creatum, in ipso verbo est vita, quantum ad primum esse, sicut arca in materia extra est facta, in mente autem artificis non est facta, sed vita quaedam sive quoddam vivere. Cognoscere siquidem proprie et vere vivere est cognoscentibus, et vivere esse”. 70 Exp. lib. Gen., LW I/1, n. 83, 242,4–6. 71 Lib. par. Gen., LW I/1, n. 52, 520,10–11. 72 Lib. par. Gen., LW I/1, n. 56, 524,12–525,6. 73 Lib. par. Gen., LW I/1, n. 53, 521,1–5.

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apart from its actual existence in outside reality. In fact, the quiddity can only be grasped by intellectual understanding.74 The doctrine of twofold being has a relevant impact on Eckhart’s views on language. The quiddities of created things end up being the link between the Divine Word and human language. If God’s dicere is facere, for God creates through his Word, the quiddities are the divine Word unfolded in relation to creatures. On the other hand, the quiddities are expressed by logical definitions and signified by human names imposed to things according to their respective natures. It is because men partake in the intellectual dimension, becoming thereby coessential with God, that they can share with Him the language of the quiddities.75

2.6 Conclusion In his study of the concept of expression in Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze, in the attempt to explore the historical background of what he calls the “immanence expressive”, distinguishes between the features of immanence and those of emanation. A cause is immanent if its effect remains inside it, while emanation takes place when the effect comes forth from the cause, though keeping its roots in it. The immanent cause shares the same being with its effect, even though it has a different essence. In the case of emanation, the existence of the effect consists in the conversion to the origin, which is a transcendent superior Good. Immanence implies a relationship of univocity between the cause and the effect, while emanation takes place in a hierarchical universe.76 These conflictual characters lead Deleuze to raise the question of how immanence and emanation have become historically compatible in the concept of Spinozian «immanence expressive». Whereas in Neoplatonism the expressive immanence of the Being is still subordinate to the emanative cause, to the One, the extreme evolution of the Neoplatonic tradition during the Christian era, namely in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Reformation, sees the immanent cause acquire an increasing importance and expression compete with and sometimes prevail over emanation.77

74 Lib. par. Gen., LW I/1, n. 54, 521,10–522,1: “Ad hoc facit quod communiter dicitur, quod verum est in solo intellectu, cuius obiectum est rerum quiditas, quae consistit in generibus et speciebus, quae, ut innuit Porphyrius, ‘in solis puris nudisque intellectibus’ consistunt”. 75 Exp. in Ioh., LW III, n. 31, 24,16–25,1. 76 See Deleuze 1968, pp. 155–157. 77 See Deleuze 1968, pp. 160–161.

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In this context Meister Eckhart plays a decisive and original role. His understanding of expression combines the characters of both immanence and emanation. By reworking emanationist theories, which he assimilates from the chief works of the Neoplatonic tradition (Pseudo-Dionysius’ Corpus, the Liber de Causis, Proclus), Greek and Latin Patristic sources (esp. Origen, the Cappadocians Fathers and Augustine), as well as Hebrew (Avicebron and Maimonides) and Arabic thinkers (esp. Avicenna), Eckhart comes to a complex dialectic of immanence and emanation, identity and distinction, procession and conversion. This is the dialectic of expression. As said above, expression is a crucial concept in Eckhart’s thought. Trinitarian relationships, human activities, natural events, the dialectic “just man-Justice” and the connection between exemplar and image, all of this constitutes an instance of expression. In all these cases, there is a term which expresses itself in something else, in its product. This means that expression is always a self-expression: something emanates from its source and thus is distinct from it; nonetheless, what emanates remains in its source from which it flows, for it shares one and the same being with this. The metaphor of the tree sprouting the branch or, which is the same, of the branch springing from the tree, clearly illustrates the essential connection, the identity in the difference, which characterizes the two terms in a dialectical relationship of expression. Moreover, the thing expressed always returns to its origin, in a process of conversion which is one and the same with emanation. Expression is a dynamic relationship that connects beings belonging to the sphere of univocity, to the spiritual field ruled by the laws of essential causality: e.g. the Begetter with the begotten Son, the mind of a craftsman with the idea of a thing to be made, God with His image in the soul. Another fundamental aspect of expression is the theory of the divine Word, which Deleuze claims to be the main contribution of the Christian thought to the “tendance expressioniste”.78 Eckhart’s treatment of this issue is also of extremely great relevance. He is one of the most original theorizers of the doctrine of the double expression. God generates the Word and by saying the Word creates the world. The Word, Son of the Father, is the self-expression of God the Creator and creatures are the expression of God. Understood as an overflow (ebullitio) of the inner divine life (bullitio), creation is based thus on the mediating role of the Word. However, the Word is not a mere instrument of God’s act of creation, rather It is the Platonic intelligible world. By rethinking the tradional Christian exemplarism, Eckhart posits a double ontological level, the virtual being, which is the condition of things in the Word, and the formal being, their creatural existence outside the divine Trinity in the world of efficient and final

78 See Deleuze 1968, p. 161.

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causes. Put in other terms, each creature as such is transitory, but its essence is permanent. Its quiddity is intemporal and is expressed by a generic-specific definition applying to all things sharing the same nature. The unique and simple Word is unfolded in a plurality of quiddities constituting the permanent ontological foundation of creatures. Creatures resemble and express God because the forms of all created things are in God, otherwise He could not have made them. Notwithstanding, God does not possess things as creatures but as quiddities, since whatever has been made by God was made through the Word, which means that creatures are different from God. Therefore, creatures are dissimilar likenesses, that is, the imperfect expression of God.79 The last word on Eckhart’s theology of the Word regards man. By grasping the essence of a thing and defining its quiddity, man brings to act the creatures’ potency of mirroring God, thus ascending to the superior ontological level of things (esse virtuale), reactivating the conversion to the Word, which is the process contrary to creation. Many labels have been applied to Eckhart’s philosophy: metaphysics of the Word 80 metaphysics of the Unity,81 theory of transcendentals,82 philosophy of Christianity,83 Lebenskunst,84 etc. However, it would be also appropriate to refer to it as the “metaphysics of expression”.

Bibliography Abbreviated References A: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Edited by the Preußische (later: Berlin-Brandenburgische and Göttinger) Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Darmstadt (later: Leipzig and Berlin): Akademie Verlag, 1923 ff.

79 Eckhart 1986, pp. 83–84 (= Expositio libri Exodi, LW II, n. 122, 115,3–7): “Yet the forms of things would not be produced by God unless they were in him. Everything that comes to be comes to be from something similar. [. . .] It is necessary then that the forms of things which grant species and give name be in God. And so every creature is similar to God”; Eckhart 1986, p. 84 (= LW II, n. 126, 117,9–10): “Thus in the proposition under discussion the creature is similar to God because the same thing is in God and the creature, but it is dissimilar because it is under different aspects here and there”. 80 See Zum Brunn/Libera 1984. 81 See Goris 1997. 82 See Aertsen 2012a; Aertsen 2012b. 83 See Flasch 2010. 84 See Mieth 2004.

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DW: Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und die lateinischen Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe. Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft: Die deutschen Werke. Edited by Josef Quint and Georg Steer. 5 vols. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1936 ff. LW: Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und die lateinischen Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe. Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft: Die lateinischen Werke. Edited by Ernst Benz, Karl Christ, Bruno Decker, Heribert Fischer, Bernhard Geyer, Josef Koch, Erich Seeberg, Loris Sturlese, Konrad Weiß and Albert Zimmermann. 5 vols. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1936 ff.

Other Works Aertsen, Jan Adrianus (2012a): “Die Bedeutung der Transzendentalbegriffe für das Denken Meister Eckharts”. In: Schönberger, Rolf/Grotz, Stephan (Eds.): Wie denkt der Meister? Philosophische Zugänge zu Meister Eckhart. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer (= Meister-EckhartJahrbuch 5), pp. 27–41. Aertsen, Jan Adrianus (2012b): “La doctrine des transcendantaux de Maître Eckhart”. In: Casteigt, Julie (Ed.): Maître Eckhart. Paris: Cerf, pp. 21–40. Amerini, Fabrizio (Ed.) (2013): “In principio erat Verbum”. Philosophy and Theology in the Commmentaries of the Gospel of John (II–XIV Century). Münster: Aschendorff (= Archa Verbi. Yearbook for the Study of Medieval Theology. Subsidia 10) Beierwaltes, Werner (2004): Platonismus und Idealismus. Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann (= Philosophische Abhandlungen 40) (first edition: 1972). Bériou, Nicole/ Boudet, Jean-Patrice/Rosier-Catach, Irène (Eds.) (2014): Le pouvoir des mots au Moyen Âge. Turnhout: Brepols. Brachtendorf, Johannes (2009): “Meister Eckhart (1260–1328) und die neuplatonische Transformation Augustins”. In: Fischer, Norbert (Ed.): Augustinus. Spuren und Spiegelungen seines Denkens. Hamburg: Meiner, Vol. 1, pp. 157–175. Deleuze, Gilles (1968): Spinoza et le problème de l’expression. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit. Delaurenti, Béatrice (2007): La puissance des mots “Virtus verborum”. Débats doctrinaux sur le pouvoir des incantations au Moyen Âge. Paris: Éditions du Cerf. Dietl, Cora/Mieth, Dietmar (Eds.) (2015): Sprachbilder und Bildersprache bei Meister Eckhart und in seiner Zeit. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer (= Meister-Eckhart-Jahrbuch 9). Dietrich von Freiberg (1977): Opera omnia. Vol. 1: Schriften zur Intellekttheorie. Critical edition by Burkhard Mojsisch. Introduction by Kurt Flasch. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita (1937): De divinis nominibus. In: Dionysiaca. recueil donnant l’ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l’Aréopage, vol. 1. Edited by Philippe Chevallier. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer. Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita (1990): Corpus Dionysiacum. Part I: De divinis nominibus. Edited by Beate Regina Suchla. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter (= Patristische Texte und Studien 33). Duclow, Donald F. (1989): “‘Whose Image Is This?’ in Eckhart’s Sermones”. In: Mystics Quarterly 15, pp. 29–40. Flasch, Kurt (1986): “Procedere ut imago. Das Hervorgehen des Intellekts aus seinem göttlichen Grund bei Meister Dietrich, Meister Eckhart und Berthold von Moosburg”. In:

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Ruh, Kurt (Ed.): Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, pp. 125–134. Flasch, Kurt (1998a): “Meister Eckhart: Expositio sancti Evangelii secundum Ioannem”. In: Flasch, Kurt (Ed.): Interpretationen. Hauptwerke der Philosophie. Mittelalter. Stuttgart: Reclam, pp. 381–401. Flasch, Kurt (1998b): “Converti ut imago – Rückkehr als Bild. Eine Studie zur Theorie des Intellekts bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart”. In: Cheneval, Francis/ Imbach, Ruedi/Ricklin, Thomas (Eds.): Albert le Grand et sa reception au Moyen Âge. Hommage à Zénon Kaluza. Freiburg: Paulusverlag/Universitätsverlag (= Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 45), pp. 130–150. Flasch, Kurt (2010): Meister Eckhart. Philosoph des Christentums. München: Beck. Fröhling, Christian (2012): “Das eine Bild und die gewirkten Bilder. Die Mystagogie des Bildes bei Meister Eckhart”. In: Gottschall, Dagmar/Mieth, Dietmar (Eds.) (2012): Meister Eckharts Erfurter „Reden“ in ihrem Kontext. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer (= Meister-EckhartJahrbuch 6), pp. 257–290. Ghio, Michelangelo (1979a): Il concetto di espressione in Leibniz e nella tradizione platonicocristiana. Torino: Filosofia (= Studi e ricerche di storia della filosofia 115). Ghio, Michelangelo (1979b): “Leibniz e l’espressione”. In: Filosofia 30. No. 3, pp. 333–392. Ghio, Michelangelo (1980): “La dottrina dell’espressione in Leibniz”. In: Filosofia 31. No. 1, pp. 2–36. Goris, Wouter (1997): Einheit als Prinzip und Ziel. Versuch über die Einheitsmetaphysik des Opus tripartitum Meister Eckharts. Leiden/New York/Köln: Brill ( = Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 59). Gottschall, Dagmar (2005): “Man möhte wunder tuon mit worten (Predigt 18). Zum Umgang Meister Eckharts mit Wörtern in seinen deutschen Predigten”. In: Speer, Andreas/Wegener, Lydia (Eds.): Meister Eckhart in Erfurt. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter (= Miscellanea Mediaevalia 32), pp. 427–449. Gottschall, Dagmar/ Mieth,Dietmar (Eds.) (2012): Meister Eckharts Erfurter “Reden” in ihrem Kontext. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer (= Meister-Eckhart-Jahrbuch 6). Haas, Alois M. (1979): Sermo mysticus. Studien zu Theologie und Sprache der deutschen Mystik. Freiburg (Switzerland): Universitätsverlag (= Dokimion. Neue Schriftenreihe zur Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 4). Hackett, Jeremiah (Ed.) (2013): A Companion to Meister Eckhart. Leiden/Boston: Brill (= Brill’s Companion to the Christian Tradition 36). Hödl, Ludwig (1966): “Naturphilosophie und Heilsbotschaft in Meister Eckharts Auslegung des Johannes-Evangelium”. In: La filosofia della natura nel Medioevo. Atti del terzo congresso internazionale di filosofia medioevale. Passo della Mendola (Trento), 31 agosto – 5 settembre 1964. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, pp. 641–651. Köbele, Susanne (1998): “Pred. 16b: Quasi vas auri solidum”. In: Steer, Georg/Sturlese, Loris (Eds.) (1998): Lectura Eckhardi I. Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, pp. 43–74. Kroll, Susanne (2003): Die Gerechten werden leben ewiglich bei Gott. Eine Studie zur Dialektik des Gerechtigkeitsbegriffs bei Meister Eckhart unter Berücksichtigung formal-methodischer Fragestellungen. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang. Largier, Niklaus (1989): Bibliographie zu Meister Eckhart. Freiburg (Switzerland): Universitätsverlag (= Dokimion. Neue Schriftenreihe zur Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 9)

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Largier, Niklaus (1998): “Recent Work on Meister Eckhart. Positions, Problems, New Perspectives, 1990–1997”. In: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 65, pp. 147–167. Largier, Niklaus (2000): “Die ‘Deutsche Dominikanerschule’. Zur Problematik eines historiographischen Konzepts”. In: Aertsen, Jan Adrianus/Speer, Andreas (Eds.) (2000): Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter (= Miscellanea Mediaevalia 27), pp. 202–213. Libera, Alain de (1994): La mystique rhénane d’Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Libera, Alain de (2005): Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand. Paris: Vrin. Lossky, Vladimir (1960): Théologie négative et connaissance de Dieu chez Maître Eckhart. Paris: Vrin. Löser, Freimut/Mieth, Dietmar (Eds.) (2013): Meister Eckhart in Original. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer (= Meister-Eckhart-Jahrbuch 7). McGinn, Bernard (2001): The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart. The Man from Whom God Hid Nothing. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company. McGinn, Bernard (2008): “Sermo XLIX ‘Cuius est imago haec est superscriptio’”. In: Steer, Georg/Sturlese, Loris (Eds.) (2008): Lectura Eckhardi III. Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, pp. 209–37. Meesen, Yves (2015): “Parallele Studie zweier Passagen Eckharts zum Bild: der Kommentar zum Prolog des Johannesevangeliums (§ 23–27) und der Anfang der Predigt 16b”. In: Schwaetzer, Harald/Vannier, Marie-Anne (Eds.) (2015): Der Bildbegriff bei Meister Eckhart und Nikolaus von Kues. Münster: Aschendorff, pp. 19–35 Meister Eckhart (1981): The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defence. Translated and introduced by Edmund Colledge and Bernard McGinn. London: SPCK. Meister Eckhart (1986): Meister Eckhart Teacher and Preacher. Edited by Bernard McGinn. With the collaboration of Frank Tobin and Elvira Borgstadt. New Jersey: Paulist Press. Meister Eckhart (1989): L’Oeuvre latine de Maître Eckhart. Volume 6: Le commentaire de l’Évangile selon Jean. Le Prologue (chap. 1, 1–18). Introduction, translation, comments and edition by Alain de Libera, Edouard-Henri Wéber, Émilie Zum Brunn. Paris: Editions du Cerf. Meister Eckhart (1993): Werke II. Sämtliche deutsche Predigten und Traktate sowie eine Auswahl aus den lateinischen Werken. Edited and commented by Niklaus Largier. Text and translation by Ernst Benz et alii. Frankfurt a.M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag. Meister Eckhart (2014): Le 64 prediche sul tempo liturgico. Testo altotedesco medio a fronte. Introduction, translation, comments and edition by Loris Sturlese. Milano: Bompiani. Mieth, Dietmar (2004): Meister Eckhart. Mystik und Lebenskunst. Düsseldorf: Patmos. Milem, Bruce (2002): “Eckhart’s Understanding of the Image: Sermon 16B”. In: Milem, Bruce: The Unspoken Word. Negative Theology in Meister Eckhart’s German Sermons. Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, pp. 86–111. Mojsisch, Burkhard (1983): Meister Eckhart. Analogie, Univozität und Einheit. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Nieraad, Jürgen (1970): Standpunktbewusstsein und Weltzusammenhang. Das Bild vom lebendigen Spiegel bei Leibniz und seine Bedeutung für das Alterswerk Goethes. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag ( = Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 8). Pagnoni-Sturlese, Maria Rita (1980): “À propos du Néoplatonisme d’Albert le Grand. Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d’Albert le Grand dans le Commentaire sur Proclus de Berthold de Moosburg”. In: Archives de Philosophie 43, pp. 635–654.

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Palazzo, Alessandro (2013): “Eckhart’s Islamic and Jewish Sources: Avicenna, Avicebron, and Averroes”. In: Hackett, Jeremiah M. (Ed.) (2013): A Companion to Meister Eckhart. Leiden/ Boston: Brill, pp. 253–298. Palazzo, Alessandro (2016a): “Predigt 54a: Unser herre underhuop und huop von unden ûf sîniu ougen’. Predigt 54b ‘Haec est vita aeterna”. In: Steer, Georg/Sturlese, Loris (Eds.) (2016): Lectura Eckhardi IV. Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, pp. 29–61. Palazzo, Alessandro (2016b): “De sonne antwert gode: umiltà e naturalia in Meister Eckhart”. In: Palazzo, Alessandro/ Bonini, Francesca/Colli, Andrea (Eds.) (2016): La nobiltà nel pensiero medievale. Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, pp. 181–200. Proclus (1987): Elementatio theologica translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca. Edited by Helmut Boese. Leuven: Leuven University Press. Quero-Sánchez, Andrés/Steer, Georg (Eds.) (2008): Meister Eckharts Straßburger Jahrzehnt. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer (= Meister-Eckhart-Jahrbuch 2). Rahner, Hugo (1935): “Die Gottesgeburt. Die Lehre der Kirchenväter von der Geburt Christi im Herzen des Gläubigen”. In: Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 59, pp. 333–418. Reynolds, Philip Lyndon (1989): “Bullitio and the God beyond God: Meister Eckhart’s Trinitarian Theology. Part I: The Inner Life of God”. In: New Blackfriars vol. 70, n. 826, pp. 169–181. Rosier-Catach, Irène (2004): La parole efficace. Signe, rituel, sacré. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Saccon, Alessandra (2012): Intelletto e beatitudine. La cultura filosofica tedesca del XIV secolo. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. Schwaetzer, Harald/Vannier, Marie-Anne (Eds.) (2015): Der Bildbegriff bei Meister Eckhart und Nikolaus von Kues. Münster: Aschendorff (= Texte und Studien zur Europäischen Geistesgeschichte B–9). Senner, Walter (2013): “Meister Eckhart’s Life, Training, Career, and Trial”. In: Hackett, Jeremiah M. (Ed.) (2013): A Companion to Meister Eckhart. Leiden/Boston: Brill, pp. 7–84. Steer, Georg/Sturlese, Loris (Eds.) (1998): Lectura Eckhardi I. Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet. Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln: W. Kohlhammer Verlag. Steer, Georg/Sturlese, Loris (Eds.) (2008): Lectura Eckhardi III. Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag. Steer, Georg/Sturlese, Loris (Eds.) (2016): Lectura Eckhardi IV. Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag. Sturlese, Loris (1978): “Il ‘De animatione caeli’ di Teodorico di Freiberg”. In: Creytens, Raymond/Künzle, Pius: Xenia medii aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppeli O. P. Roma: Storia e Letteratura, vol. I, pp. 175–247. Sturlese, Loris (2007): Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag. Sturlese, Loris (2014): “Introduzione”. In: Meister Eckhart (2014): Le 64 prediche sul tempo liturgico. Testo altotedesco medio a fronte. Introduction, translation, comments and edition by Loris Sturlese. Milano: Bompiani, pp. IX–LXXIII. Triebel, Eckhart/Witte, Karl Heinz (2018): Bibliographie 1995–2018 zu Meister Eckhart. http://www.meister-eckhart-gesellschaft.de/download/MEG-Bibliographie.pdf, last visited on 27.12.2018. Wackernagel, Wolfgang (1991): Ymagine denudari. Éthique de l’imagine et métaphysique de l’abstract chez Maître Eckhart. Paris: Vrin (= Études de philosophie médiévale 68).

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Thomas Leinkauf

3 Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374): Expression und Expressivität als Seins-Modus Abstract: Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374): Expression and Expressivity as Mode of Being. This paper investigates the subject of expression and linguistic expressivity of the ‘self-expressing I’ by Petrarca. Leibniz’ concept of expression – taken as the spontaneous activity of substantial unities – will function here as a hermeneutical starting point, although the idea of a soul conducting its specific activities solely by following its own nature or substantial unity can be already found by Petrarca. This is especially clear within the realm of language, as it carries out the synthesis of the fields of the private and the public. For language makes possible the expression of the reflecting and experiencing self’s inner life, as well as it enables the latter to cross the boundaries of inner intimacy in order to express itself before the public.

3.1 Einleitung: Leibniz Die Begriffe ‚Expression‘ (Ausdruck) und ‚Expressivität‘ (Ausdrücklichkeit), wie ich sie hier im Titel des Beitrages verwende und dann vor allem für das Verständnis von Francesco Petrarcas Denkansatz hermeneutisch einsetzen will, sollen verstanden werden vor dem Hintergrund dessen, was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in einem Brief an Antoine Arnauld vom Juli 1686, der selbst wiederum Teil eines umfangreichen, langjährigen Briefwechsels im Rahmen der Entstehung des ersten systematischen Gesamtansatzes, des Discours de métphysique, gewesen ist, mit Blick auf die System-relevante Bedeutung des französischen Ausdrucks „exprimer“ ausgeführt hat.1 Es heißt dort zu der spezifischen Form der Aktivität oder Produktivität

1 Zu einer aus anthropologischen, pragmatistischen und sprachphilosophischen Prämissen abgeleiteten Theorie des Ausdrucks, siehe etwa Jung (2009), der jedoch zwischen der Skylla eines Ich-Nominalismus und der Charybdis eines ‚naturalismus larvatus‘ mit dessen materialistischen Implikationen hindurch zu segeln versucht. Nirgendwo wird wirklich gezeigt, wie die zentralen Begriffe des wissenschaftlichen Diskurses wie Form, Idee, Zahlen, etc., aus der rein materiell getragenen Induktion resultieren können, noch wie ein stabiles, sich zuverlässig auf sich beziehen könne sollendes ‚Ich‘ aus dem materiellen Teilchenstrom herauskommen können soll, ohne gleich wie ein kontingenter Staubhaufen zu zerstieben. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666120-003

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substantieller Einheiten (dem, was Leibniz als ‚unitates per se‘ oder ‚unités substantielles‘ bezeichnet und im Kern als Seelen/âmes und Intellekte/esprits versteht), dass diese spontane Aktivität ein Sich- oder Etwas-Ausdrücken sei und dass die Struktur dieses Ausdrückens als ein „geordnetes, konstantes Verhältnis“ (rapport constant reglé) zu denken sei, „zwischen dem, was man von der Seele sagen (sc. insofern die Seele eine Einheit für sich und als solche aktiv ist), und dem, was man von dem Anderen sagen kann (sc. das die Seele ausdrückt)“.2 Wenn die Seele = x ist und das durch sie Ausgedrückte = xʹ, dann steht das, was ich über x sagen kann, etwa ‚x ist A’ (z. B. die Seele ist eine in sich einheitliche Substanz, die in einem Verhältnis der Kopräsenz zu ihrem körperlichen Substrat steht), in einem festen, proportionalen (reglé) Verhältnis zu dem, was ich über xʹ sagen kann, etwa ‚xʹ ist B’ (z. B. das durch die Seele Ausgedrückte ist ein Vieles, das aber dennoch Bild der seelischen Einheit ist, also ein in eine Einheit gebundenes Vieles). Dies heißt aber eben auch, dass sowohl das Verhältnis von x und xʹ als auch dasjenige ihrer Prädikate, Attribute oder Modi, also von A und B, letztlich mithin dasjenige von Substanz und Substantiiertem „geregelt“ ist. Drücken die Seelen als substantielle Einheiten im Systemansatz, den Leibniz um 1686 konzipiert, die Welt aus als eine abgeschlossene Vielheit (Totalität) aus Einheiten, die selbst wiederum entweder substantielle (z. B. esprits) oder nur nominelle (aggregathafte) Einheiten sind (z. B. Körper), so muss es dem Grundsatz der ‚expression‘ folgend ein nicht-beliebiges, notwendiges Verhältnis zwischen Ausdrückendem und Ausgedrücktem geben, das man etwa als ein ‚(Ab-)Bild‘-Verhältnis verstehen kann, das den Kriterien der Ähnlichkeit (similitudo), Affinität (affinitas) oder Verwandtschaft (cognatio) entspricht. Geht man zu dem mathematisch-geometrischen Verhältnis, das Leibniz selbst zur Verdeutlichung des „rapport constant reglé“ einführt, nämlich zu demjenigen zwischen Kreis und Ellipse, dann kann man zeigen, dass die genannten Kriterien tatsächlich Interpretamente des Bild-Begriffs sein können, der hier im Hintergrund steht. Natürlich ist die Ellipse kein triviales Bild des Kreises im Sinne eines spiegelnden Abbildes, aber sie ist eben – zumindest als geometrische „figura“ und als durch geometrische Konstruktion abgeleitet – ein nicht-trivialer, auf einer ganz bestimmten Ableitung basierender ‚Ausdruck‘ eines Potentiales, das in der geometrischen Struktur des Kreises subsistiert.3 Die hier festgehaltene Relation

2 „Leibniz an Arnauld“, 14.07.1686, GP II, 58: „rapport constant reglé entre ce qui se peut dire de l’une (sc. ame) et de l’autre (sc. monde, dieu)“. 3 In diesen Kontext gehören auch die Anamorphosen und deren ‚geregeltes‘ Verhältnis zu demjenigen, dessen Morphose sie darstellen. Hierzu siehe etwa die Ausführungen von Gurwitsch 1974, im Kapitel 6.

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Ausdrückendes/r (x) und Ausgedrücktes (xʹ) können wir, im Vorblick, auf Petrarcas Verständnis der Situation des Ich applizieren: Das Ich (x) drückt sich für Petrarca vornehmlich in der Sprache (xʹ) aus und zwischen dem, was ich von x sagen kann, z. B. das Ich ist einsam (solus), zerbrechlich (fragilis) oder angstvoll (anxiosus), und dem, was ich von xʹ sagen kann, dieser Brief oder dieses Gedicht ist elegisch oder melancholisch, besteht ein Verhältnis, das z. B. bestimmten – psychologischen – Gesetzen der Dependenz gehorcht. Zum besseren Verständnis dieses ‚geregelten Verhältnisses‘, das zwischen dem statthat, was das Sich-Ausdrückende und was dessen Ausdruck ist, ist ein kurzer Rekurs auf weitere Aspekte unausweichlich, die Leibniz mit Blick auf diese per se tätigen Einheiten, die er vor allem als Seelen versteht, einführen muss. In dem schon erwähnten ausführlichen Briefwechsel mit Antoine Arnauld aus den Jahren 1686–1690 führt Leibniz den Gedanken des „eigenen“ oder „eigentümlichen“ Grundes ein (propre fonds, fundus animae), den er ontologisch allem substantiell Seiendem, d. h. allem Sein, das aus sich und für sich ein Eines ist, zuschreibt.4 Der Gedanke des ‚Grundes’ ist unmittelbar mit dem der Einheit verbunden, das „propre“ in „propre fonds“ versteht sich hier als Hermeneutikum zu Einheit in dem spezifischen Sinn, den Leibniz gegenüber Arnauld aber auch gegenüber allen anderen seiner Zeitgenossen behaupten möchte: diese Einheit ist nicht nur in einem quantitativ-ontischen Sinne strikt zu verstehen als nichtaggregathafte, nicht-teilbare Einheit, sondern auch in einem davon nicht abtrennbaren Sinne als in sich differenzierte Komplexion aller möglichen Zustände eines solchen einheitlichen Seins. Eine solche substantielle Einheit, so Leibniz, ist ein x, das alle seine präteritalen und futurischen Zustände in jedem von ihm durchmessenen Ist-Zustand (seinem Präsens) in sich schließt (renferme). Zugleich jedoch ist diese scheinbar in sich geschlossene, später von Leibniz auch als Monas/Monade bezeichnete Einheit ein offener, nichts verfehlender „Spiegel“ der Allheit aller anderen Seienden, also dessen, was als Welt oder Universum bezeichnet wird: jede dieser substantiellen Einheiten ist in Eins ausschließlich sie selbst und sie ist auch, weil sie dies in radikaler ontologischer Konsequenz ist,

4 Ich beziehe mich im Folgenden auf Ausführungen in Leinkauf 2012a. Zum Gedanken des „Grundes“ bzw. des „Seelengrundes“ bei Leibniz gibt sich die Forschung einigermaßen wortkarg. Zu verweisen ist auf Kaulbach 1966; Gueroult 1967, S. 187 ff; Gurwitsch 1974, S. 352–429; Leinkauf 2012a. Zu Recht spricht Gurwitsch, im Anschluß an Gueroult, von einem „Verhältnis der Fundiertheit der autonomen und in sich geschlossenen mechanischen Naturerklärung als ganzer auf der Metaphysik der Substanzen“ (S. 362). Vor allem aber ist auf Deleuze 1995, S. 49–67, 90 f., zu verweisen, der auch, allerdings anders als hier, einen Zusammenhang mit der Kunst herstellt.

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alles andere Sein dadurch, dass sie dies andere Sein in sich durch sich zum Ausdruck bringt (exprimer). Der Ausdruck „propre fonds“ und damit die Verwendung von ‚Grund’ bezieht sich genau auf diese beiden Verben, die inverse relationale Tätigkeitsmodi dieses x zum Ausdruck bringen: einmal auf das „In-sich -einschließen“ – renferme dans son estat – wodurch die Substanz x ihre vergangenen und zukünftigen Zustände in sich einfaltet, zum anderen auf das „ZumAusdruck-Bringen“ – exprimer – wodurch x, gerade indem es ‚sich‘ ausdrückt, die Allheit aller anderen Substanzen/Einheiten und deren gesetzmäßigen Zusammenhang mit zum Ausdruck bringt. In-sich-schließen und Aus-sich-ausdrücken: das sind die dynamischen Bestimmungen jeden Seins und, da Sein oder das Ist von Etwas für Leibniz an das Ein-Eines-Sein gebunden ist, jeder strikten Einheit (in der Tradition das esse individuale). ‚Grund’ verweist also darauf, dass eine Vielheit – alle Zustände von x und die in diesen X-Zuständen zum Ausdruck gebrachten Zustände aller anderen Seienden als Welt – in einer Einheit gebunden ist und wie sie gebunden ist, nämlich in der Weise eines Verhältnisses des Begründens aus einem Grunde. Dies jedoch verweist auf zwei Modi und Strukturen: die horizontal-lineare Verursachungsstruktur und die vertikal-dimensionale Verortungsstruktur. Im eigenen/eigentümlichen Grund der Einheit der Substanzen liegt also zum einen die sequentielle Entfaltungsdimension aller zeitlichen Instantiierungen der Substanzen x, y, z. . . als jederzeit aktiv in einer je bestimmten Entfaltung realisierte Folge aller vorhergehenden und zukünftigen Zustände (estats) – dem gegenwärtigen Ist-Zustand von x, y, z. . . – zum anderen liegt in diesem selben Grunde auch jeder dieser Zustände in seiner noch-nicht oder nicht-mehr aktuellen Form, also potentiell, sozusagen in der Tiefe des Vermögens der einzelnen Substanz. Dem Modus der Sequenzialität wird von Leibniz sachlich und terminologisch entsprechend der Gedanke des „Gesetzes“ zugeordnet: immer wieder tauchen im Kontext der Verweisungen auf den „propre fonds“ die einschlägigen, letztlich auf stoische Wurzeln zurückgehenden Gedanken zur „lex continuitatis“ und überhaupt zur durchgehend gesetzmäßig verfassten Natur des Seienden (series rerum) auf.5 Leibniz baut seine neue Ontologie wesentlich auf dynamischen Faktoren auf: was tatsächlich als Sein oder Seiendes bezeichnet werden kann – durchaus im

5 Vgl. GP II, S. 58: „suivant ses loix“; S. 111 f.: loix, univers; S. 126: „en vertu de ses propres loix“, S. 136: „lex continuationis seriei suarum operationum“; S. 172: lex; S. 275: „certa suae naturae lege“; GP III, S. 122 f.: „en vertu de leur propres loix“; S. 545: „ex suis legibus omnia derivare“ u.ö. Zur Stoa, wo die series rerum vor allem mit dem Gedanken des fatum verbunden worden ist, also der lex seriei oder, präziser, series causarum, vgl. Cicero: De divinatione 1, S. 125–127 (= SVF II, 921, 944; Long/Sedley 1989, S. 337, 339); De natura deorum II, S. 31, 78. Zur Sache: s. Forschner 1995, S. 98–104.

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Sinne dessen, was Platon durch seine Absetzung des „wirklichen“ oder „tatsächlichen“ Seins vom „scheinbaren“ meinte –, ist wesentlich Tätigkeit, Entfaltungsund Einfaltungs-Dynamik auf Basis strikter ontologischer Einheit, wobei das sich entfaltende oder anderes in sich einfaltende Eine in dem Vielen als Eines erhalten ist. Diese allgemeine ontologische Struktur, die für alle Substanzen (chaque substance) oder auch für „alle Dinge“ (chaque chose) Geltung hat, wird aber von Leibniz noch einmal spezifiziert und auf eine andere Ebene gehoben: auf die Ebene der geistigen Substanzen oder der „esprits“. Hier tritt mit Blick auf die Grund-Dynamik noch ein entscheidendes Moment hinzu: es ist das Moment der Possibilität oder der Möglichkeit, nicht im Sinne des bloß oder rein formal und zeitlich Möglichen, sondern im Sinne des real oder substantiell Möglichen. Leibniz unterscheidet radikal zwischen einfachen, beseelten und geistigen Substanzen: die beiden ersten Modi vollziehen ihre dynamischen Einfaltungs- und Expressionsakte unwillkürlich, naturaliter und vollständig in die wirkursächliche (in die neustoische, lückenlose) Kausalitätsreihe eingebunden. Sie bringen dabei, zumindest sofern sie beseelt sind, wie Leibniz sagt, die Welt oder das Universum zum Ausdruck, aber eben nur als das, was es jeweils Ist (seine Faktizität).6 Mentale oder geistige Substanzen hingegen, die ebenso wesentlich dynamische Einheit sind, stellen jedoch nicht nur die Welt oder das Universum dar, sondern insbesondere auch Gott – und damit strukturell eine geistige Potenz, der sie selbst ähnlich sind – als den Ursprung oder Grund dieser Welt.7 In diesem Mit-Ausdrücken Gottes als des Prinzips von Welt drücken geistige Einheiten (Seelen, Intellekte, esprits) aber eben auch das Mögliche an einer Welt aus, das Sur-Plus zum bloß Faktischen.8 Damit sind wir – zugegeben in einer radikal beschleunigten Weise – bei dem Punkt angekommen, der neben dem Gedanken der Einheit des Individuellen und der Expressivität dieser Einheiten, Leibniz’ Ansatz zusätzlich mit Grundintentionen Petrarcas und überhaupt der

6 Was die einfachen, unbeseelten Monaden betrifft, so ist die Frage, (a) ob diese, wenn es sie gibt, überhaupt ‚expressiv‘ sein können, da dies aus der Sicht von Leibniz und der Tradition, auf die er sich stützt, eine Prärogative des Seelisch-Lebendigen ist, oder (b), verschärft, ob es überhaupt strikte Einheiten im Sinne von Leibniz geben kann, die nicht zugleich auch beseelt sind, denn, wenn (b) der Fall ist, drückt alles substantielle Sein sich selbst und dadurch zugleich auch anderes Sein in und durch sich selbst aus. 7 Vgl. GP II, S. 111 f.: jede „substance brute“, d. h. jede tierische, beseelte Substanz, drückt die Welt (monde) aus, jede „Seele“ (ame, hier als Rationalseele verstanden) oder jeder „esprit“ hingegen drückt im wesentlich Gott (dieu) aus. 8 Zu den komplizierten Bedingungen dieses ‚Möglichen‘ oder dieser ‚Möglichkeiten‘ im Kontext von Leibniz’ System, bei denen vor allem die sogenannte Kompossibilität – das Mit- oder Zusammen-Möglichsein von x, y, z – eine zentrale Rolle spielt vgl. Leinkauf 2012b.

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humanistischen, frühneuzeitlichen Weltdeutung in wesentlichen Sachfragen verbindet: der Bedeutung des Poetischen als des genuinen Horizontes des Fiktiven und des Möglichen.

3.2 Intermedium Dass hier von Leibniz sozusagen zu Petrarca im Folgenden ‚zurückgesprungen‘ wird über einen Zeitraum von gut 300 Jahren, darf nicht über die Kontinuität in der Entwicklung der hier diskutieren Fragestellungen hinwegtäuschen. Hierzu, zum Zusammenhang zwischen Individualität-Ich und Expressivität, könnte durchaus eine ‚Geschichte‘ geschrieben werden, deren Faktoren zu den wesentlichen Faktoren der Philosophie- und Geistesgeschichte zwischen Spätmittelalter und Frühmoderne gehören. Hier nur knappe Hinweise: Die „tätige Vervielfältigung“ (multiplicatio operativa), die etwa Tommaso Campanella in seiner Anthropologie dem menschlichen Geist (mens) zuschreibt,9 und in der er zusätzlich unserem Intellekt ein ursprüngliches, ‚natürliches‘ Streben zur unendlichen Selbst-Ausdehnung (infinitari extensive esse proprium) zuschreibt, ist, zusammen mit der Bestimmung des Geistes (mens) als einer „unendlichen Kraft“ (vis infinita), wie wir sie seit den Vorgaben bei Cusanus immer wieder finden, insbesondere in der zentralen Abhandlung Idiota de mente von 1450, eine der großen Signaturen der Epoche von Humanismus und Renaissance. Beide Momente – unendliche geistige Kraft und tätige, unbegrenzte Vervielfältigung – bringen den Grundgedanken der aktiven Selbstexpression des Geistigen als einen an sich unendlichen, nicht abschließbaren Vorgang zum Ausdruck, dessen komplexeste philosophische Theorieform im Idealismus zu sehen ist. Zunächst, wir haben es im Eingangspassus kurz angedeutet, in Leibniz’ Dynamik- und Monadentheorie, dann in deren Weiterentwicklung unter anderen Bedingungen in Kants Spontaneitäts-Gedanken der Kritik der reinen Vernunft oder, darauf wiederum kritisch aufbauend, in den Setzungs- und Reflexionsakten idealistischer Subjektivität. Das Ich des Petrarca hat in dieser Perspektive strukturell etwas mit dem Ich etwa Schellings zu tun, letzteres, um es überspitzt zu sagen, könnte, vermittelt über

9 Vgl. Campanella: De homine; Campanella 1960, c. 3, art. 2; S. 80 f.: „Animae autem potestas, sapientia et amor sunt acitivi: propterea ex una re sibi cognita ad infinitas procedit mens non retenta illius receptione, ut corpus, sed multiplicatione operativa“ (m. H.); art. 3, S. 90 f.: „mens est infinita in intelligendo et appetendo (. . .) praeterea non solum intelligit mens sempiternum esse et communissimum absque hic et nunc positive et negative, sed etiam appetit, non appetito ficto illato, sicut appetit etiam habere alas, sed innato, sicut appetit esse proprium infinitari extensive“ (m. H.); S. 120 f.

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Positionen wie diejenigen des Cusanus, des Ficino, Giordano Brunos oder auch Tommaso Campanellas (alles Autoren, die Leibniz nachweislich gut kannte und die selbst wiederum Petrarca kannten), als geschichtlicher „Ausdruck“ des ersteren gesehen werden. Campanellas „infinitari extensive esse proprium“ steht in einer Linie mit Dantes Begriff der „amplificatio“, der „Vergrößerung“ oder „Erweiterung“ (ampliare) des Seins des Handelnden/Tätigen durch sein Handeln und während seines Handelns: „in agendo agentis esse quodammodo amplietur“.10 Grundgedanke vieler Autoren der Zeit zwischen Petrarca und Leibniz – es seien nur genannt Petrarca selbst natürlich, Cusanus, Charles de Bovelles, Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico, Juan Luis Vives, Montaigne, Julius Caesar Scaliger, Francesco Patrizi oder Giordano Bruno – ist es, dass die Seele (d. h. die Rationaloder Intellekt-Seele) ihre spezifischen Tätigkeiten (sua officia) ausschließlich aus ihrer eigenen Wesensnatur oder substantiellen Einheit herausvollzieht – und sie dadurch, obgleich sie schöpfungslogisch von Gott abhängig ist, doch Seinslogisch, sofern ihr Sein (nicht das der untergeordneten biologisch-sensitiven Seele) ihr spontanes geistiges Tätig-Sein ist (Tätigkeit ist ihr Seinsmodus), einen Selbststand gegenüber Gott besitzt, ein Autark-Sein, das sachlich dem authypostatischen Sein des Intellektes oder der Seele im Denken der Neuplatoniker gleicht.11 Die so einprägsame These des Descartes, dass noch nicht einmal die Macht Gottes die Selbstevidenz des im aktualen Denk-Akt sich habenden und wissenden Ich aufheben könne,12 hat, sieht man von Augustinus ab, durchaus Vorläufer, die, wir nähern uns Petrarca, bis in das späte 14. Jahrhundert zurückgehen. Man lese etwa einmal folgenden Passus aus den Quaestiones de anima des Biagio da Pelacani, die wohl um 1385 entstanden sind: Dieser Satz etwa ist durch sich klar [per se nota]: ‚Du bist kein anderer als Du selbst‘, weil er, in Dein Bewusstsein [Geist, mens] gesetzt, zur Zustimmung nötigt, und dieser Satz

10 Dante Aligheri: Monarchia I, 13, 2; Dante 2008, S. 194 f. 11 Scaliger: Exotericarum Exercitationes; Scaliger 1557, fol. 399v: „Decet enim animam propter suam dignitatem fungi suis officiis: suasque exercere potestates, absque ullius accidentis, aut inhaerentis, vel praesidio, vel adminiculo: sed sine ullo medio statim per essentiam suam. Quae essentia sine reali potestatum disiunctione, est principium sbiipsi autarkês: id est quod sit satis sibi, ad producendas effectiones suas“. Hierzu siehe die Analyse bei Blank 2010, S. 100 f., der Scaligers Position mit derjenigen des für die protestantische Schulmetaphysik und vor allem für die Entwicklung des Gedankens eines universalen Transcendentale so wichtigen Rudolph Goclenius in einen Kontext stellt. Entscheidend ist hier die strikte Zuordnung von Substanz-Sein, Einheit-Sein und Spontaneität, die klar und deutlich auf Leibniz vorausweist. 12 Descartes: Meditationes de prima philosophia, meditatio 3, n. 4, AT VII, S. 35–36.

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kann, weil sein Gegenteil einen formalen Widerspruch einschließt, durch keinerlei Macht, sei diese endlich oder unendlich, widerlegt werden.13

Schon hier also kann die unendliche Macht Gottes nichts ausrichten gegen die Richtigkeit und Wahrheit dieser Gewissheit, dass man ‚man selbst ist‘. Hier bringt sich ein Denken zum Ausdruck, das „an den Grenzen des Atheismus“ steht14 und das später in die Fundamente der libertinistischen und atheistischen Ansätze Eingang finden wird, ein Denken, das die Verankerung der intellektuellen Kontinentalmasse im Grundstock des Theologischen und auch des Metaphysischen zunächst lockern und dann gänzlich aushebeln wird.15 Ein Moment dieses Prozesses kann in dem Gedanken gesehen werden, dass das Ich als durch nichts anderes zu substituierendes, spontanes Agens sich in Akten genuiner Selbst-Expression in vielfältiger Weise zum Ausdruck bringt, d. h. durch Akte des einfachen Existierens (vegetative, perzeptive Akte), durch Akte des Herstellens (artifizielle Akte), durch Akte der Sprachlichkeit und der Kommunikation (verbale, semantische Akte) und durch Akte seelischer Natur, die vor allem im Denken und in der künstlerischen Produktivität sich äußern. Von Dante bis hin zu Leibniz und zum Idealismus wird dem Ich oder der intellektuellen Substanz des Einzelnen als Seins-Modus diese Tätigkeit und Produktivität zugeschrieben, deren immediate Konsequenz eine Art ‚Erweiterung‘ (ampliatio), ‚Ausdehnung‘ (extensio) oder ‚Entfaltung‘ (explicatio) des Agens ist. Diese Erweiterung-Ausdehnung-Entfaltung möchte ich durch den Begriff der Expression/Expressivität interpretieren, ihr Ziel ist das, was man als „Selbstrealisierung“ bezeichnen könnte.16

13 Pelacani: Quaestiones de anima; Pelacani 1974, S. 75: „Haec [sc. propositio] enim est per se nota ‚tu non es alius a te‘, quia ista posita in mente tua necessitat ad assensum, nec per aliquam potentiam finitam vel infinitam potest haec propositio falsificari, eo quod oppositum formaliter contradictionem includit“ (m. H.). Es bedarf keiner weiteren Begründung, dass der Ausdruck „potentia infinita“ für den Nominalisten Pelacani (und auch für seine Zuhörer/ Leser) unmittelbar auf nur eine Instanz verweist, nämlich auf Gott, und zwar auf einen unendlich mächtigen und durch den Willen bestimmten Gott, der auch derjenige noch des Descartes gewesen ist. 14 Federici Vescovini 1979, S. 370: „In altri termini questo libero pensiero [sc. di Biagio Pelacani] si configure come negazione dell’autonomia razionale della fede che si muove sul piano della rivelazione divina: non esiste un piano diverso da quello natural; la religion può, quindi, anche essere concepita come un fenomeno ‚naturale‘, spiegabile (. . .) con i ritmi e le rivoluzioni astrali. SI oscilla, così, ai limiti dell’ateismo (. . .)“. 15 Hierzu Febvre 1942; Cantimori 1992; Schröder 2012. 16 Dies habe ich mit Blick auf Marsilio Ficino und andere Autoren des 15./16. Jahrhunderts versucht in Leinkauf 2005.

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Schon für Dante, das ist signifikant für unser Thema der Expressivität, intendiert jede Aktivität eines Individuums die Explikation oder Entfaltung/ Ausfaltung von etwas, das ihm „ähnlich“ ist oder das „seine eigene Ähnlichkeit“ (diejenige des Agens mit sich selbst) artikuliert (eine „similitudo“ aufweist; ich hatte oben auf die Faktoren similitudo, affinitas, cognatio schon hingewiesen).17 Paolo Veneto etwa, das wichtige Schulhaupt der Paduaner Naturphilosophie des ausgehenden Mittelalters, ich überspringe hier Petrarca, zu dem ich dann später ausführlicher kommen werde, wird, etwas später zu Beginn des 15. Jahrhunderts, sagen: „der Hausbauer/Architekt ist von sich aus (per se) Ursache seiner Wirkung oder des Hauses: weil er die Struktur der Baukunst zum Ausdruck bringt (exprimit), die wiederum Ursache dieser seiner Wirkung ist“.18 Der Ficino-Schüler Francesco Diacceto wird die spontan-produktive Bewegung der Seele als „actum vivificum substantificumque“ bezeichnen,19 Pietro Pomponazzi wird den „intellectus operativus“ als den

17 Dante: Monarchia I, 13, 1 = Dante 2008, S. 194: „nam in omni actione principaliter intenditur ab agente, sive necessitate nature [dies die ontologische Fundierung] sive voluntarie [dies die ethisch-praktische] agat, propriam similitudinem explicare“. 18 Paolo Veneto: Summa I, c. 13 = Veneto 1503, fol. 7rb: „domificator est per se causa sui effectus sive domus: quia exprimit [!] rationem artis, secundum quam est causa sui effectus“. Das Haus-Beispiel, differenziert in Baumeister, Hausbaukunst (oikodomikê), Akt des Bauens und das Haus selbst, geht natürlich auf Aristoteles: Metaphysica VII, 7, 1032b–1033a, 9, 1034a, VIII, 2, 1043a–b, IX 7, 1049a zurück. Hier gilt aber zunächst der Grundsatz ‚Ein Haus entsteht aus einem Haus‘ (wie: Der Mensch entsteht aus einem Menschen), weil es um die Eidoskonstanz geht, c. 15, 1039a: Nicht das Haus-Sein entsteht (beim Hausbauen), sondern dieses bestimmte Haus. Es ist eher von „Entstehen“ (gignesthai, z. B. 1040a9–10) die Rede als von Hervorbringen im Sinne des Selbstausdrucks des Vermögens des Menschen. Wichtig ist die These des Aristoteles, dass in der Kunst, etwa der Baukunst, die Kunst oder „die wirkliche Tätigkeit“ (hê energeia), also hier das Bauen, in demjenigen ist, was hervorgebracht wird, nämlich im Haus (8, 1049b). Hier ist der Gedanke der Sache nach vorbereitet, dass Kunst eine ‚expressio‘ sei, nämlich die aktuale Einführung der Wirklichkeit des Herzustellenden aus dem Intellekt des Herstellenden in das Hergestellte. In De partibus animalium II, 1, 646a30–b4 bringt Aristoteles das nicht umkehrbare finalursächliche Verhältnis der Ziegel und Steine zum Haus (das diesen daher als deren Finalursache physei vorausgeht) als Beispiel für den universal gültigen Sachverhalt, dass in der Ordnung der Dinge (Natur) dasjenige, was im Entstehungsprozess „später“ oder am Ende kommt, „früher“ ist oder bestimmend vorausgeht, De partibus animalium II, 1, 646a25–28. 19 Diacceto: De pulchro II, c. 2 = Diacceto 1986, S. 89: Alles aus dem Einen Entstandene hat Teil an dessen „potestas“ und „actus“, in den göttlichen Seienden, wie etwa dem Seelischen (c. 3; S. 104: „est anima e genere divinorum“), zeigt sich dies als „facultas ad agendum“: „non enim illic meram potestatem invenias – actus est enim – sed quae sit habitus, cuius quidem perfectio secundus est actus, quasi geometra in theorematum contemplationem prorumpens“.

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dem Menschen eigentümlichen (gegenüber dem speculativus und factivus) herausheben,20 Jacopo Mazzoni in seinen Praeludia zum Vergleich Platons und des Aristoteles sogar den universalen Charakter des Operativ-Expressiven zum anthropologischen Interpretament der Wirklichkeit erheben und diese damit vor allem unter einen anthropologischen Index stellen: Alle Dinge sind entstanden wegen einer Tätigkeit, woraus folgt, dass der Mensch, der unter allen Dingen die auf der sublunaren Welt existieren das edlere ist, keineswegs wegen der Muße geschaffen ist, sondern wegen seiner ihm eigentümlichen Tätigkeit [actio propria] [. . .] weil er in Ähnlichkeit und nach dem Bilde Gottes geformt ist, strebt er danach mittels bewundernswerter und unbeschreiblicher Tätigkeiten nach seinen Kräften und Möglichkeiten ein Bild [effigies] Gottes zum Ausdruck zu bringen [exprimere].21

Die hier herausgestellte expressive Dynamik des Selbst-Ausdrucks eines Agens bringt deutlich die später von Leibniz eingeführte Relation zum Ausdruck, indem hier der Mensch (das x) ein Bild Gottes zum Ausdruck bringt als Resultat (xʹ) seiner Aktivitäten (actiones als exprimere), wobei eben auch hier ein „geregeltes Verhältnis“ gilt zwischen dem, was ich von x sagen kann – x ist similitudo et imago Dei – und dem, was ich von xʹ sagen kann – xʹ ist effigies Dei: die „actio propria“ von x ist es, xʹ zum Ausdruck zu bringen, der Modus des Zum-Ausdruck -Bringens ist derjenige der Herstellung von Ähnlichkeit, Affinität und Bildhaftigkeit zum eigenen Sein, das selbst schon Bild von etwas anderem ist.22 Dieses ‚Ausdrücken‘ (exprimere), das, indem es Anderes herstellt, bildet, gestaltet, zugleich ein Selbst-Ausdruck des Ausdrückenden ist, ist daher bei all den hier angeführten Autoren zwar immer wieder mit dem Paradigma der Hände (manus) – als dem organischen Würde-Merkmal der Renaissance-Anthropologie schlechthin – verbunden worden,23 vor allem aber jedoch mit dem Vernunft- und Geistbegriff, der aus einer ungebrochenen Kontinuität platonischer und vor allem aristoteli-

20 Pomponazzi: De immortalitate animae, c. 14 = Pomponazzi 1990, S. 174 f. 21 Mazzoni: Comparatio, lib. I, propositum = Mazzoni 2010, S. 13–14: „omnia nata esse ob actionem, unde sequetur hominem in sublunari mundo omnibus nobiliorem ob ocium minime factum, sed ob actionem propriam (. . .) quia nempe ad eius [sc. Dei] similitudinem et imaginem efformatus admirandis et inenarrabilibus quibusdam actionibus Dei effigiem exprimere [!] pro virili captuque suo nititur“; lib. II, prima sectio; S. 22, u. ö. 22 Ich habe an anderer Stelle versucht, diesen Zusammenhängen am Beispiel des ‚Spiegelns‘ nachzugehen, siehe Leinkauf 2010. 23 Hierzu ausführlicher Leinkauf 2017, I, S. 148–153. Ein Beispiel für künstlerisches ExpressivWerden habe ich zu geben versucht mit Blick auf den Maler und Theoretiker Federico Zuccari, siehe Leinkauf 2011, S. 7–9.

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scher Tradition stammt.24 Einmal geht hier die Einheit des Geistes oder Intellektes aus sich und seiner Individualität heraus, erweitert sich – wie wir schon gehört haben – und vervielfältigt sich auf „unendliche“ Weise in diesen Expressionsakten – so sagt etwa Marsilio Ficino in seiner in den 70er Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts verfassten Theologia Platonica: „die Seele drückt sich nämlich so in diesen Werken (d. h. in Gemälden und Architektur) selbst aus und gestaltet sich, wie sich das Antlitz eines sich im Spiegel betrachtenden Menschen selbst im Spiegel formt“.25 Für Ficino sind also die Produkte künstlerischer Tätigkeit Spiegelungen der Seele im Spiegel der Materie, auf deren Oberfläche sie diese Spiegelungen als Selbstausdrücke ihrer selbst, wie ein Antlitz ihre selbst, und d. h. als Kunstwerke gestaltet. Dieses sich sozusagen von sich aus vervielfältigende (multiplicari) SelbstAusdrücken (begriffliche Konstante ist fast durchgehend: exprimere), ist aber, wenn auch auf je verschiedene Weise, im Denken von Dante-Petrarca bis hin zu Leibniz, immer noch eingebunden in eine übergreifende Einheitserfahrung. In der Multiplikation, in der Dilatation oder Amplifikation geht das ursprüngliche Agens nicht verloren, es erhält sich irgendwie als Einheit, die alles fundiert. Das Wesen (essentia), die Substanz (substantia), die Einheit (unitas) oder eben das Ich (ego) sind grundsätzlich ihren Explikationen noch vorgeordnet, selbst wenn sie in sich als dynamisch, aktiv, produktiv gedacht werden.26 Es ist gerade Petrarca gewesen,

24 Campanella: De homine c. 3, art. 2 = Campanella 1960, S. 80–82: „ad infinitas procedit mens (. . .) multiplicatione operativa“; c. 3; S. 92: „infinitari“, u. ö. 25 Ficino: Theologia Platonica X, c. 4; 2, S. 69–70 Marcel: „ita enim seipsum animus in operibus istis [sc. in picturis aedificiisque] exprimit et figurat, ut vultus hominis intuentis in speculum seipsum figurat in speculo“. 26 Siehe Guillaume Postel, der „explicatio“ in unserem Sinne mehrfach verwendet, so De orbis terrae concordia; 1544, Lib. I, c. 11; f. 86: „Quicquid enim a nostro procedit arbitrio, animo primo concipitur, & agitatur: demum (. . ..) in quandam explicationem [!] venit, & veluti ichnographian orthographianve, atque demum inn opus surgit: postremo usum praebet, & finem“; IV, f. 329–331, f. 330: „Est ergo Deus trinus & unus. Nam eadem divinitas est in potentia, eadem in sapientia, eadem in amore: et tamen non sunt tres divinitates, sed una divinitas. Ut quum cogito, exprimo [!], facio, sunt differentes actiones: et tamen non sunt tres res, sed una tantum. Cogita formam aedificii, explico [!] eandem verbis, aut scriptis, aut ichnographia, demum illud fieri curo. Sunt itaque tres aedificii considerationes, prima ut in mente, altera ut in explicatione, tertia ut in opere: & tamen non sunt tria, sed unum. (. . ...) Quemadmodum enim in potentia artificis est tota ars, ita etiam in eius scientia est tota ars, & in eius voluntate atque effectu est tota ars: nec tamen sunt tres res, aut artes, sed una ars. Et item: Nil agi ab arte aut natura potest, quin sit in actione copia, processus, voluntas: aut, ut dixi, foecunditas, partus, amor. Nam si ab ea potentia artis, quam quis habet, non posset esse progressio, & generatio procedere, nil plane ageret.“ Postel hat also ein klares Schema des Tätig-Seins unter den Bedingungen hylêmorhischer Existenz: conceptio/cogitatio (in animo, intellectu) – explicatio als Vorentwurf/Grundriss (verba, ichnographia) –

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der unter dem Einfluss des Augustinus sein Ich als ein verzweifelt Mit-sich-seinWollendes und, um Selbstverlust auszuschließen, Mit-sich-sein-Müssendes herausgestellt hat, als ein Ich, das sich im „secum esse“ in sich zu verkriechen scheint, der dieses Ich aber zugleich sozusagen entblößt hat im Blick auf seine innersten mentalen und psychischen Bewegungen, der es im sprachlichen Expressions-Akt ungeschminkt vor die Augen dieser (lesenden) Welt gestellt hat – waren es bei Dante die sprachlich ebenso intensiv und bewundernswert herausgestellten Leiden des Inneren der Anderen, die in den verschiedenen Höllen-Kreisen ebenso erbarmungslos vors Auge gestellt werden, so ist es bei Petrarca doch eben das Ich selbst – dieses wird zum Spiegel der Welt und die Welt zu seinem Index, denn auch der Rückzug ins Innere muss noch sprachlich materialisiert werden, auch die Intimität der Liebe in die Extremitäten natürlicher Vorgänge projiziert werden.27 Wie lassen sich diese Spiegelungs-, Projektions- und Darstellungsverhältnisse mit den zuvor als für den ganzen Zeitraum wichtigen Gedankens der Expression in Zusammenhang bringen?

3.3 Francesco Petrarca Für Petrarca geht die intentionale Grundausrichtung des menschlichen Geistes (der Geistseele) unerschütterlich, apriori und naturaliter auf genau ein Ziel, die Glückseligkeit, die Tugend und die „wahre Weisheit“, und nicht auf viele, widerstreitende, partikulare Interessen zum Ausdruck bringende Einzelziele. Das entspricht auch der Ontologie des Ich oder der Seele, die sich, obgleich Petrarca ein emphatischer Verfechter der Pluralität und des Pluralen ist (wie Karlheinz Stierle zu Recht hervorgehoben hat), dennoch davor scheut, das Ich selbst oder die Substanz des Individuums als an sich vielfältig zu sehen, sondern die

operatio/fieri (Werk, Nutzen); er faßt es selbst (f. 86) als Ternar aus cogitatio, explicatio, opus zusammen. Mit diesem Begriff von Explikation, die nicht schon dem Werk oder Produkt gleichgesetzt ist, führt Postel eine interessante Zwischenstufe ein, die, wie er ja selbst durch die Verwendung von ‚ichnographia‘ betont, eine Art Grundriss, Schema oder Zeichen-Sprachstruktur darstellt. Für diesen Zusammenhang ist auch der spätantike und dann in Mittelalter und Renaissance rezipierte Ternar essentia-virtus-operatio (aus usia-dynamis-energeia) von zentraler Bedeutung, hierzu Leinkauf 2009. Eriugena hat, im Rückgriff auf Dionysius Areopagita, diesen Ternar ontologisch universalisiert und vor allem darauf insistiert, dass die „artes liberales“ zum Bereich der ‚operatio‘, d. h. der Expression gehören, vgl. De divisione naturae I, 486 B–D (ed. SheldonWilliams p. 136): „omnes liberales disciplinas in e aparte quae ENERGEIA, id est operatio, animae dicitur aestimari“. 27 Siehe unten Anm. 58.

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mit Augustinus die Einheit des Seelengrundes der Absorption durch das Viele systematisch vorschaltet, so dass das Ich immer, wenn auch unter großen Nöten, Schmerzen und Kämpfen, zu einer „Wiederherstellung“ der Einheit gelangen kann und soll.28 Das gemeinsame oder allgemeine Ziel – ethisch das „bene vivere“ und die Realisierung der „virtus“, psychologisch das Secum-esse und theologisch der Bezug auf Gott – differenziert sich durch die faktische Realisierung im Einzelnen wie das Licht in seinen Spektralfarben unendlich aus, ohne dass der Bezug auf das Gemeinsame verlorengeht (wie jeder Stoiker individuell sein Auf-dem-Weg-Sein zum sophos realisiert).29 Das ist der Hintergrund für die durchgängig positive Aufnahme der stoischen Position zur Ethik und zur Tugendfrage. Hier fand Petrarca in zudem auch sprachlich-poetisch für ihn zentralen Autoren (vor allem Cicero, aber auch Poseidonios oder Seneca) eine klare, teils rigide Position, die auch, wie dann natürlich Augustinus, den Widerstreit der Seele mit sich selbst kannte.30 Zur gleichen Zeit jedoch moniert er als aufmerksamer Beobachter seiner Zeit, des „schrecklichen Jahrhunderts“, die faktische Diversität, Widersprüchlichkeit und Gegensätzlichkeit aller menschlichen Bestrebungen.31 Diese verschütteten oder überdeckten sozusagen die Grundorientierung der Seele, wie im Ansatz der Platoniker die dem Körperlichen zugeneigte Seele die Geistseele verdecke und dadurch das Viele vor dem Einen

28 Petrarca: Secretum meum III = Petrarca 1977, S 192 f.: „adero michi ipse quantum potero, et sparsa anime fragmenta (= das dichterische Werk als Ausdruck des Ich) recolligam, moraborque mecum sedulo“. Siehe meine Kritik an Stierles Emphase für die Pluralität, die ich ansonsten teile, in: Leinkauf 2017, I, S. 258–260, S. 259, Anm. 29. Die Selbstwiederherstellung (der Einheit) des Ich ist von Petrarca als ihm idealer Weise durch Augustinus suggerierter Imperativ aufgefasst worden, sein Zeitgenosse Giovanni Conversini greift dies direkt in seinem Rationarium Vitae (1393/1401) auf: mache nicht viel Aufhebens von dir, rede nicht zu viel über dich, „gib dich dir selbst zurück“ (redde te tibi), Conversini 1986, S. 51–52. Wichtig hierzu die Arbeit von Enenkel 2008. 29 Petrarca: De vita solitaria, c. IV = Petrarca 1990, Z. 133–138 zu bene vivere und den virtutes; c. V, Z. 62 zum Gottesbezug: „divini vultus aspectum (ubi totius sacre concupiscentiae et desideriorum omnium est finis)“; Z. 81: „semper enim presens est, qui ubique semper est“, vgl. Ps. 138, 8–9. Hierzu den Kommentar Enenkel 1990, S. 477–479. Zu meiner Sicht auf Petrarca siehe Leinkauf 2017, I, S. 251–313. 30 Petrarca internalisiert daher nach stoischem Vorbild und dem Vorbild antiker Psychomachien (Prudentius) den Kampf der Tugend mit den Übeln, vgl. Familiares XII, 2 (n. 6): „nulla homini pertinacior lis est quam cum animo moribusque suis; nusquam minus indutiarum; intra murum pugna est (!); hoc genus hostium bello languidum pace fervidum experimur et sub toga plus ausurum quam sub galea“; XX, 1 (n. 15): „hostes intra muros sunt“; Africa VIII, 807 f.: „nulla est victoria maior / quam vicisse animum“. Zu Petrarca-Cicero, siehe Seigel 1968, S. 31–62. 31 Familiares X, 5 (n. 5–13) = Petrarca 2005, 1, S. 550–552.

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dominant werden lasse. Die auf ein Ziel ausgehende Basisintention verfolgt ihr Ziel jedoch legitimer Weise auf verschiedenen Wegen. Sie kann unter dem Index der conditio humana, also dem raumzeitlichen Wechsel, den Endlichkeitsbedingungen, dem Zufälligen etc., nicht anders als im Tätig-Sein (agere, facere) als Einheit zugleich vielfältig werden und damit ihre substantielle Einheit hinter dem Schleier des Vielen, Verschiedenen und auch Widersprüchlichen verbergen. Die Anstrengung des Ich besteht dann darin, in der Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit der Wiederherstellung der verlorenen Einheit (unitas amissa) die Rückbeugung in sich, das In-sich-Zurückgehen und die vernünftige Reflexion gegen die sich aufdrängende Macht der „distractio“ und der „distentio animi“ sowie auch der immer wieder sich zeigenden Lebensangst, die für Petrarca anscheinend mit dem Verlust der Ich-Konsistenz konnotiert gewesen ist, durchzusetzen.32 Das Ich muss sich in dieser Anstrengung also vornehmlich mit sich selbst auseinandersetzen und unausweichlich in einen Selbst-Widerspruch eintreten: „Ich bitte nämlich“, schreibt Petrarca im Mai 1352 an Giovanni Barrili, „Du möchtest Deinen Willen der Vernunft, oder um mit anderen Worten dasselbe zu sagen, Dich Dir unterwerfen und das weniger Gute in Dir zwingen, dem Besseren zu gehorchen“. Sofern die platonische Gleichung (und die des Aristoteles, vgl. Fr. 6 [Rose]; EN X 7, 1177 a–1178a) Geltung hat, dass unser ‚eigentliches‘ Selbst unsere Vernunft ist (EN IX 9, 1169b–1170a), ist der Willensakt der Selbstüberwindung in eins Ausdruck einer noetischen Grundbewegung, nämlich der Einsicht in das Richtige, Wahre und Gute, der immediat, durch Macht der Einsicht, zu folgen ist, und einer Willensbewegung, die unvorgreiflich sich selbst, d. h. den Ursprungsort der Willensintention, das Ich bzw. den Geist (Intellekt), will.33 Zur conditio humana gehört es auch, dass der Mensch mit sich selbst

32 Petrarca: Canzoniere CCLII, 12–13: „in tal paura e ’n sì perpetua guerra/vivo, ch’ i’ non so più quel che già fui“, „in solcher Angst und in solch einem andauernden Krieg/ lebe ich, dass ich nicht mehr weiss, wer ich gerade eben noch gewesen bin“ – mit Übergang vom Präsens (‚so‘, ich weiss) zu Präteritum (‚fui‘, ich bin gewesen), vermittelt in genialem poetischen Zugriff durch das „gerade eben/noch“ (già); siehe zur Angst auch etwa Vergil: Ekloge X, vv. 385–93, 385: „quibus anxius umbris“. Zur Angst als eine der Grundirritationen dieser Zeit siehe Leinkauf 2017, I, S. 29–65, vor allem S. 58 f.; Santagata 1992, S. 10 sieht im Akt des Schreibens, vor allem in der komplexen Entstehung des Canzoniere, das Mittel der Kanalisierung dieser Grundangst. 33 Vgl. Familiares XII, 14 (n. 1–2) = Petrarca 2005, 1, S. 657; direkt im Anschluss an den zitierten Passus rekurriert Petrarca konsequent auf Platon (durch Cicero: Tusculanes disputationes I, 10, 20) und dessen Dreiteilung der Seele mit der Auszeichnung der Vernunft; den inneren Widerstreit der Seele oder des Ich mit sich selbst, den Petrarca mehrfach anführt, kann er auf einen seiner Haupttexte beziehen, auf Augustinus: Confessiones VIII, 8, 20; diesen Text zitiert er 2 Jahre später ausführlich, um seinem Adressaten das unübertreffbare Paradigma für seine

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nicht darüber einig werden kann, was er will. Das Frustriert-Werden des Wollenden durch die Differenz zwischen Intention und Realisation ist unausweichlich, nicht weil der Wollende seinen Willen nicht kennte, sondern weil dem Willen und der Willensintention „sich vieles widersetzt“: äußerlich die Widerstände der nicht berechenbaren Umstände (circumstantiae), der Kontingenz und der Fortuna, innerlich und wohl eigentlich dramatisch die Widerstände der eigenen Seele mit ihren Begehrlichkeiten, Abhängigkeiten und (vorstellenden, einschätzenden, urteilenden) Fehlleistungen.34 Das Individuum erfährt direkt, dass es das praktisch nicht kann, was es doch denken kann: ein „vollkommenes Wollen“. Dieses vollkommene Wollen ist allein Gott vorbehalten (Familiares XVI, 4, n. 20: Was also vermag Gott? Alles, was er will!), das endliche menschliche Individuum hingegen ist gezwungen, einzugestehen, was Petrarca in aller Drastik ausspricht: „Was ich wollte, kann ich nicht, was ich könnte, will ich nicht, und was ich sowohl konnte wie wollte, ja das suche ich und finde es nicht“.35 Auch der Rekurs auf Augustinus’ Einsicht (Confessiones VIII, 8, 19–20), dass es zwei Willen gebe, die im Menschen widerstreiten, einen, der als Ganzer will – bei dem also Wille, Gewolltes und Willensakt identisch sind –, und einen, der nicht als Ganzer will – bei dem also der Wille nicht das Gewollte ist, Letzteres zum Willen und Willensakt in Differenz treten kann und schließlich, etwa als Gewohnheit, in Opposition hierzu –, löst diese Spannung nicht auf.36 Es ist signifikant für Petrarcas ‚pragmatische‘ Einstellung, dass solchen radikalen ScheiternsBedingungen eine Haltung des ‚Dennoch‘ und ‚Trotzdem‘ entgegengestellt wird (die er etwa auch seinen Briefpartnern empfiehlt): Wie wir theologisch das höchste Seiende nicht adäquat erfassen können oder philosophisch nicht ‚die‘ Wahrheit denken können, deswegen aber aus Gründen des Existieren-Könnens

eigenen Seelennöte nicht vorzuenthalten, vgl. Familiares XVII, 10 (n. 15–18) = Petrarca 2009, 2, S. 254. 34 Hierzu einprägsam Familiares XVI, 14 (n. 15) = Petrarca 2009, 2, S. 204: „Wirklich ist für eine von Leidenschaften besetzte Seele nichts verderblicher als die Muße und nichts schädlicher als die Freiheit des Einsiedlers. Schmutzige Gedanken tauchen auf, Unmäßigkeit schleicht sich ein und mit ihr als schmeichlerisches Übel die den müßigen Gedanken vertraute Seuche der Liebe“. 35 Familiares XV, 11 (n. 2) = Petrarca 2009, 2, S. 141, hierzu ist direkt XVII, 10 (n. 16–17) = Augustinus: Confessiones VIII, 8, 20 zu vergleichen. Dass Gott „alles kann, was er will“, ist auch im Zusammenhang mit dem Theologumenon der absoluten Macht (potentia absoluta) zu sehen, siehe Leinkauf 2017, I, S. 304–310 zur Theologie. 36 Sofern der Wille aber ethisch etwas will (velle) oder das Individuum ethisch etwas begehrt (cupere), kann das bloße Wollen/Begehren schon für die Sache selbst stehen, zumindest auf der negativen Seite: „qui malus esse cupit, utique iam malus ac pessimus est“, Familiares XX, 1 (n. 10).

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und der Selbsterhaltung dennoch die ganze Breite und Weite des Seins mit Gewinn reflektieren und den Wert des vielfältigen Wahren anerkennen können, so ist es auch beim höchsten Gut und der höchsten Tugend (virtus): Obgleich wir sie als solche vielleicht nicht realisieren können, nicht den Willen haben, der sich selbst vollständig durchsichtig ist, vollziehen wir dennoch mit voller Legitimität begrenzte, relative, auch scheiternde Willensakte, um immerhin einzelnes Gutes und vor allem das Richtig-Denken bzw. -Handeln (recte sentire, recte agere) zu realisieren. Für Petrarca ist das Sich-Ausdrücken, welches wir hier bewusst im Vorgriff auf Leibniz’ am Ausgang der Frühen Neuzeit entwickeltes Konzept der „expression“ bzw. des „esprimer“ als ‚expressio‘ bezeichnen wollen, ein grundsätzlich innerseelisch fundierter, durch den Willen (voluntas) und das Streben der Seele (intentio animi) inaugurierter und gesteuerter, dann aber vor allem – für ihn selbst – ein mentaler37 und, diesem folgend, als eigentlich raum-zeitlicher Niederschlag des Sich-Ausdrückens, ein sprachlicher Vorgang, „die schmerzlichen Reime, die Begleiter (oder: Folge) des angegangenen Bewusstseins sind“ – „le dogliose rime, che son seguaci de la mente aflicta“.38 Sprache allein kann, wenn überhaupt (denn auch hier konstatiert Petrarca immer wieder Insuffizienzen) zum Ausdruck bringen, was im Inneren des Ich, was in der Seele und der Geistseele (la mente) erfahren wird: in den „rime“ und in der Prosa Petrarcas finden daher die inneren Abgründe des Ausgesetzt-Seins der Seele gegenüber den Bedingungen der Endlichkeit (Zeitlichkeit; Canzoniere I, 14: breve sogno; CCLXII, 1: la vita fugge), der Kontingenz sowie des Selbstbetrugs („De remediis“, „De vindicta“, in Petrarca 1988, S. 106–8; Secretum 1, n. 11) konsequent und mit einer oftmals über das Wollen des Subjekts hinausgehenden Notwendigkeit Ausdruck.39 Vor allem aber artikuliert sich hier auch die innere Liebeslandschaft des Individuums Petrarca, die für das Ganze der fundamentalen menschlichen Erfahrungen beispielhaft und mit Macht einsteht und die sich als vielfältig durch Leidenschaften (passiones) geprägtes Gefühls- und Denkszenario unwiderstehlich dem ‚Subjekt‘ einzeichnet,40 eine Liebeslandschaft, die daher auch durchgehend in Parallele,

37 Petrarca: Canzoniere XXIX, 36: „da me son fatt’i miei pensier diversi“ – Es sind verschiedene Übersetzungen möglich: „von mir selbst (oder: durch mich) sind meine Gedanken zu verschiedenen (oder: unterschiedenen) geworden“ oder „ich selbst habe mein Denken zu verschiedenen Gedanken ausgeprägt“. 38 Petrarca: Canzoniere CXXVII, 2–3. 39 Zur Artikulation von Zeit und Selbstverhältnis im Canzoniere, vgl. Zak 2010, S. 23–53. 40 Im Canzoniere vor allem die Verwundungen durch Amor in Gestalt der Augen Lauras, im Secretum die weitergehenden, die Person und Figur Petrarca in toto betreffenden Wunden der Hinwendung zu den „cupiditates“; vgl. Enenkel 2008, S. 130–131.

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Konformität und Analogie zur Natur- und Reise-Landschaft gesehen wird.41 So wundert es nicht, wenn Petrarca in den Familiares, wohl im Rückgriff auf Seneca,42 auf die untrennbare Verbindung von Seele und Sprache hinweist, wobei die Seele „Bildnerin der Rede“, die Rede hingegen „Verkünderin der Seele“ ist, die „in die Öffentlichkeit hinaustritt“.43 Expression und Expressivität finden für Petrarca, wir hatte schon darauf hingewiesen, vornehmlich in der Sprache statt und zwar insofern diese nicht Instrument einer logisch-propositionalen SeinsAnalyse in den Disziplinen der ‚artes liberales‘ ist, sondern insofern sie selbst der vorgreifend synthetische – Seelen-Ich und Sprach-/Ausdrucks-Ich vereinigende – poetische Ausdruck eines eigenständigen poetischen Seins ist. Auch in einem Brief an Francesco de Carrara (vom November 1379) wird diese allem vorgreifende Synthese herausgestellt: „Es ist notwendig, dass die glimmende Asche im Inneren sei, welche du blasend aufregst und zur Flamme aufrichtest. Ansonsten wirst du, erloschen in Asche, niemals gelb-golden sein“ (Seniles XIV, 1: „favilla interior sit oportet, quam flando excites et in flammam erigas. Alioquin extinctum in cinerem nequiquam flaveris“).44 Sprache bzw. Sprechen, inneres Seelenfeuer und die – letztlich aus der mittelalterlichen Mystik stammende – Vorstellung der unvorgreiflichen Präsenz eines lebendigen „Funkens“ (scintilla), der das symbolische Nadelöhr ist, durch das hier eine Verbindung zwischen Gott und Seele statthat, deren ‚äußerer‘ Ausdruck ja das Ingenium des Sprachlichen ist, sind untrennbar im Inneren des Ich verbunden. Petrarca ist durch seine Orientierung an Ciceros Rhetorik- und Sprachmodell zu dem Autor geworden, der neben der Normativität seiner faktischen sprachlichen Produktivität (Dichtung), die später zum Phänomen des Petrarcismus führen wird, auch allgemein

41 Besonders beeindruckend zeigt sich dieser Zusammenhang von Expressivität und Affiziert-Sein des Ich (mens aflicta) durch die Schönheit in Canzoniere CXVI („Pien di quella ineffabile dolcezza“), wo die imaginative Arbeit des Denkens als figurare/figuratio angesprochen wird (ein für das Denken des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts zentral werdender Begriff), vgl. vv. 12–14: „Ivi non donne, ma fontane et sassi,/et l’imagine trovo di quel girono/ che ‘l pensier mio figura ovunque io sguardo“. Gemäß der Leibniz-Relation x–xʹ kann gesagt werden: x drückt xʹ aus (exprimit), und das, was ich von x sagen kann – z. B. ‚x ist voll mit wechselnden Emotionen‘ – steht in einem geregelten Verhältnis zu dem, was ich von xʹ sagen kann – z. B. ‚xʹ ist ein Gedicht, das eine Reise mit wechselnden Orten thematisiert‘. Das Gehen/Wandern zu den verschiedenen Orten in B spiegelt den Wechsel der Gefühle in A oder die Reise-Sequenz und –Dynamik in B spiegelt die dynamische Sequenzialität eines sich der Zeit ausgesetzt fühlenden Ich, o. ä. In allen diesen Fällen ist es die Sprache, die für Petraca intimster und zugleich öffentlichster Selbst-Ausdruck der Seele ist. 42 Seneca: Epistolae ad Lucilium, Ep. 115, 1 f. 43 Petrarca: Familiares I, 9, n. 2 = Petrarca 2005, 1, S. 48. 44 Petrarca 1978, S. 768.

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Maßstäbe für die theoretische Auseinandersetzung mit der antiken Sprachauffassung gesetzt hat. Die Verbindung von eloquentia und sapientia (und virtus), die wir später bei Salutati, Bruni, Erasmus und anderen finden, hat er aus Cicero für den Humanismus zurückgewonnen.45 Andererseits ist die ‚expressio‘ ein durchaus immer wieder durch rationales Kalkül gesteuerter, stilisierender Vorgang, der sich vor allem in autobiographischen, das Selbst vielfältig präsentierenden Texten zeigt.46 Die Präsentation des Selbst als eines Akt-Zentrums bewusster „expressio“, des selben Selbst, das ansonsten sein Mit-sich- und sein In-sich-Sein immer wieder betont, ist zugleich eine die Demarkationslinie des ‚Mittelalterlichen‘ überschreitende, Neues zulassende Präsentation: diejenige nämlich von individuell-privaten Befindlichkeiten, die jetzt jenseits der ausmerzenden, zurückstutzenden Kraft der Sch(n)eidemesser Eitelkeit (vanitas) und Hochmut (superbia) dadurch eigene Würde als Fakta der Seele erhalten, dass sie zugleich Träger allgemeiner Affekte, Intentionen und Gedanken und Ausdruck der Einzigkeit des sie erfahrenden, reflektierenden Selbst sind.47 Ebenfalls zum Topos ‚expressio‘ gehört aber auch das andere bedeutende Faktum, dass Petrarca immer wieder gebildeten Personen, die ein öffentliches Amt bekleiden, dringlich empfiehlt, die Ebene des Privaten, Verborgenen, Verschwiegenen aktiv zu verlassen und ihr Tun jederzeit im Licht der Öffentlichkeit zu vollziehen. Unter Berufung auf altrömische, republikanisch-stoische Tugenddiskussionen und den Gedanken des ‚bonum commune‘ will Petrarca diesen Bereich menschlich-sozialer Aktivität von vornherein als etwas Nicht-Privates markieren, als diejenige Expressionsebene des Ich, die die nicht-eigentümliche, nicht-singuläre, nichtegoistische Seite des Ich, also seine allgemeine, universelle und altruistische Seite, als verantwortlich für die Gestaltung des öffentlichen Raumes ausweist. Hier arbeitet Petrarca deutlich den Vorstellungen voraus, die dann später Autoren von Coluccio Salutati bis hin zu Matteo Plamieri hinsichtlich dessen entwickeln werden, was ich an anderer Stelle als ‚bonum commune‘-Ethik bezeichnet habe. Das Expressions-Feld des Individuums ist hier eben nicht das Poetische,

45 Hierzu Seigel 1968, S. 31–62. Vgl. De remediis I, c. 9: „De eloquentia“. 46 S. Familiares I, 1; Epistola posteritati; De vita solitaria, c. III, Z. 95–99. Hierzu Enenkel 2008, S. 108–145 (weiterführende Literatur). 47 Vgl. die aufschlussreichen Analysen von Enenkel 2008, S. 114–118 zum Unterschied des Begriffs „expressio“ in Epistola posteritati Familiares. So etwa an den Bischof von Albano, Kardinal Talleyrand (September 1352): „Fortwährend so zu leben, als wär’s in der Öffentlichkeit, so zu handeln, als sähen Dich alle, so zu denken, als wären die Gedanken sichtbare Strahlen, dabei Dein Haus als Volksbühne und Deine Brust als Tempel Gottes zu betrachten“; Familiares XIV, 1 (n. 9) = Petrarca 2009, 2, S. 58.

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sondern das nicht minder wichtige – für die Frühhumanisten (mit Ausnahme von Petrarca und Boccaccio) sogar wichtigere – Feld des Politischen.48 Die Sprache jedoch ist für Petrarca das Instrument, das allein diese Synthese aus Intimität und Öffentlichkeit – aus Ich und Stadtkörper, aus Ich und Reiselandschaft, aus Ich und Politik – leisten kann, und sie allein weist auch die Fähigkeit auf, die subsumierende Kraft des Denkens, den Zeitfluss, die permanente Varietät des Status des Ich, die Offenheit des Existierens ausdrücklich werden lassen zu können. Dies ist möglich, weil Petrarca sowohl Denken als auch Sprechen noch vor dem Hintergrund der antik-christlichen Theorie des verbum interior sieht. So gibt es für ihn signifikanter Weise eine Sprache, die „im Geist geschrieben ist“ (Canzoniere XXIII, 92: „ne la mente scritte“). Das Sich-zurSprache-bringen-Wollen Petrarcas ist eine nicht-fixierende, nicht propositionaldefinitorische Operation, sondern eine aktiv-probierende, flexibel-deskriptive Realisation, die einer permanenten Revision unterliegt49 – auch hier können wir sagen, dass die Sprache (xʹ) als Ausdruck des Ich dessen Inneres (x), die Dynamik und Flexibilität (= A), in ihrer verbalen Faktur (=B) spiegeln oder zum Ausruckbringen kann. Die von Petrarca mehrfach hervorgehobene, positiv gesehene Vielfalt der Intellekte50 erfordert eine ebensolche Vielfalt des sprachlichen Ausdrucks, die sich nicht durch einlinige Normativität einschränken lassen darf. Es gibt eine unendliche Varietät von Ich-Instanzen, die sich alle wiederum, als „mundus minor“, der die große Welt abbildet, in unendliche Refraktionsstrahlen auffächern. Jeder dieser Strahlen, der aus dem Grunde des Ich kommt, der dessen „ars vitae“ entfaltet,51 ist potentieller Ausdruck des Sprachlichen. Petrarca perspektiviert die innere und äußere Welt durch die prismatische Brechung seines Ich – seiner Sinnlichkeit, seiner Gefühle, seiner Denk-Akte – in den verschiedenen Modi dichterischer Expression. Vor allem die Gedichte des Canzoniere

48 Hierzu siehe Leinkauf 2017, I, S. 693–706, siehe dort auch den Abschnitt zur „nobilitas“ in dem Kapitel „Minima politica“, S. 854–891. 49 Stierle 2003, S. 351: „Petrarca will sich zur Sprache bringen, um so erst ganz er selbst zu werden, aber alle Zeugnisse und Spuren dieses zur Sprache gekommenen Selbst lassen sich immer weiter bearbeiten, erweitern, umformen“. 50 Petrarca: Seniles VI, 6; Opera II, f. 895: „ut rerum sic intellectuum infinita varietas est“; gemeint sein können die einzelnen Geistseelen und, vermittelt hierüber, auch deren Intellektionsakte und ihre Produkte, aber auch, im christlichen Kontext, die reinen engelischen Intellekte. Im Mittelalter gab es eine lange Debatte zur Frage der Anzahl der Intelligenzen oder der Einzelintellekte. 51 Die Expressionsdynamik des Ich lässt sich systematisch-sachlich mit dem verbinden, was Eckhard Kessler als Petrarcas Antidot gegen die von ihm selbst als conditio humana herausgestellte „meditatio mortis“ ausgemacht hat: die nicht-resignative, nicht-skeptische Dimension der „ars vitae“. Vgl. Kessler 1978, S. 138–141.

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werden so Dokument der fragmentierten, aber ebenso auch in jedem Bruchstück ganzheitlichen Entfaltung eines sich mental als überreich und hochsensibel selbst erfahrenden ‚Subjekts‘, das sein Sich-Entfalten immer wieder auch als einen dialogischen, wechselseitigen Prozess inszeniert. Das hierbei durch Petrarca in immer neuen, findungsreichen Anläufen in großer Sprachmacht vor Augen gestellte ‚Ich‘ (io, me, mio . . .) und seine Gegenparts, das Du (tu, te, tuo . . .), die Dinge der Natur (res, cose), die ganze Natur selbst (natura, universo, mondo), die Geliebte Laura, bilden letztlich eine komplexe, sich teilweise überlagernde, gegenseitig beeinflussende und erläuternde Verhältnismannigfaltigkeit ab, die doch nur Selbstausdruck dieses einen dichterisch-philosophischen Ich bleibt.52 Das Schreiben als ‚expressio‘ ist für Petrarca absolute Notwendigkeit, deren Realisierung ins Verhältnis zur Kürze der Lebenszeit, zur Geschwindigkeit des Zeitflusses und zur permanenten Veränderung gestellt wird: im Schreiben wird sozusagen die Zeit zeitlos thematisch, wird das temporale Sich-Verbrauchen sistiert durch die Exposition der unvergänglichen Grunderfahrungen des Menschen in einer sprachlichen Form – dennoch: Petrarca ist sich gerade hierbei, im dichterischen Herstellen des Sprachschönen, bewusst, dass auch in dieser Form nur Teilmomente (sol d’alcune parlo) und äußere Wirkungen (effetti) einer vorgreifenden Erfahrungseinheit artikuliert werden können, der vorgreifenden Synthesis von Sprache und Sein, von Ich und Sprache, die wir schon weiter oben im Blick hatten.53

52 Vgl. Canzoniere CCCLIII, 5–8: „se, come i tuoi gravosi affanni sai, / così sapessi il mio simile stato“ – „wenn, so wie Du Deinen eigenen schweren Kummer kennst, so auch um meinen vergleichbaren Zustand wüsstest“ oder, als Vergleich des eigenen Inneren mit den Absonderlichkeiten der äußeren Welt, CXXXV, 1–4: „qual più diversa et nova / cosa fu mai in qual che stranio clima, / quella, se ben s’estima, / più mi rasembra“ – „was auch immer an unterschiedlicher und neuer Sache unter irgendeinem fremden Himmel gewesen ist, dies, wenn ich es recht bedenke, gleicht mir am meisten“, oder als Selbstidentifikation mit den Dingen selbst CXXIX, 51–52: „me freddo, pietra morta in pietra viva, / in guisa d’uom che pensi et pianga et scriva“ – „ich kalt, toter Stein auf lebendem Stein, in Gestalt eines Menschen, der denkt, weint und schreibt“. 53 Canzoniere XIII, 90–94: „Ma, perché ‘l tempo è corto/la penna al buon voler non po’ gir presso; / onde più cose ne la mente scritte / vo trapassando, et sol d’alcune parlo“. Vgl. zu Schreiben und Zeit, Canzoniere XX, 12–14; XXIX, 50–56; LXXI, 91–96: „L’amoroso pensero / ch’alberga dentro, in voi mi si discopre/tal che mi tra’ del cor ogni altra gioia; / onde parole et opre / escon di me sì fatte allor ch’i’spero / farmi immortal, perché la carne moia“ – hier haben wir die Grundspannung innen (dentro, cor, me) und außen (discopre, escon); LXXIII, 62: „narrar gli effetti (del cor)“; CLVII, 1–4; De vita solitaria, c. III, passim. Vgl. Zak 2010 passim, besonders S. 96–109, S. 97: „Petrarch used writing as a technology of the self, a means to cultivate his inner virtue“. Weitergehend würde man sagen müssen: Schreiben ist nicht nur ein notwendiges Mittel (technology) zur Stabilisierung der Existenz, sondern ist selbst direkter Ausdruck (expressio) des sensibilisierten, reflektierten, leidenden Existierens.

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Zusätzlich aber ist die ratio scribendi, sofern sie sich nicht mehr ausschließlich als Ausdruck des Ich versteht, sondern als eingebunden in eine Tradition poetischer Reflexion und Realisation – vor allem sicherlich mit Blick auf die antiken Heroen Vergil, Cicero und Seneca (hier wäre vor allem die Aufnahme des Genus der consolatio-Traktate zu nennen54), aber auch auf Dante und dann Zeitgenossen wie Boccaccio –, auch theoretisch zu legitimieren. Petrarca tut auch dies auf eine innovative Weise, indem er die mittelalterliche Bindung an die Schriftsinn-Exegese und die heilsgeschichtliche Basisstruktur aufgibt, ohne jedoch zugleich jede theologische Fundierung aufzugeben.55 In der Poetik realisiert Petrarca dasselbe, was er auch in der Ethik zugestanden hatte: die Akzeptanz des vielheitlichen Wahren, der vera und des verosimile, neben der groß geschriebenen, einen, absoluten Wahrheit (veritas). Dichtung sieht sich, wie das Ich und als dessen genuinster Ausdruck, der Vielheit der Welt und den vielschichtigen Erscheinungsweisen des Wahren, in Geschichte, Natur, Moralität, als einem legitimen, wenn auch eben fiktionalen Gestaltungsraum gegenübergestellt: jedoch schaut der Dichter, indem er dichtet und ‚fingiert‘, nicht wie derjenige des Aristoteles „auf den Handelnden“ (eis ton prattonta), sondern „auf die Natur“ (ad nature tamen ordinem respexit ille, dum fingeret).56 Das für den Menschen mögliche Wahre muss im Blick auf das Zeitlose und Ewige, die veritas ipsa, in der Zeit und im Horizont des Vielen, in der „Schule des Lebens“ (scola vite), gewonnen werden: Ich weise nicht die Worte zurück, die im Arbeitszimmer ausgearbeitet und durch Kunstfertigkeit zum Wohle Vieler zusammengefügt sind und ich nehme sie, wer immer auch der Urheber sein mag, als nützliches Werk auf; für uns (mich) aber ist dies nicht Sache rhetorischer Schulen, sondern des Lebens selbst, noch erstreben wir (ich) den Glanz leerer Worte, sondern die feste Ruhe des Geistes/der Seele.57

Dem äußeren, scheinbar unendlichen Raum des Landschaftlichen und Lebensweltlichen, der „großen Ferne“ des Ventoux-Blickes (Familiares IV, 1, n. 18) 54 Vgl. Seneca: De consolatione ad Helviam; Petrarca: Familiares II, 2 (n. 3–4); Seniles X, 4. 55 Siehe meine Analysen zu Petrarca und seinem Welt- und Gottesbezug in Leinkauf 2017, I, S. 288–310. 56 Petrarca: Collatio laureationis (1341) = Petrarca 1975, II, S. 1255–1283; Familiares II, 4; Küpper 2006, S. 67 f. Zur Fiktionalität vgl. Secretum III = Petrarca 1977, S. 132: „que (sc. poetica) quamvis, ut nosti optime, fabulosa narratio tota sit, ad nature tamen ordinem respexit ille, dum fingeret“. Zur Sach-Relationalität von Fiktion und Natur vgl. Stierle 2003, S. 410. 57 Petrarca: De vita solitaria, c. III = Petrarca 1990, Z. 95–99: „Verba studio elaborata atque arte composita pro multorum salute non respuo et, quicunque sit opifex, utile opus amplector; verum hec nobis non rhetorice scola, sed vite est, nec inane lingue gloriam, sed solidam quietem mentis intendimus“.

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und der urbanen Größe der Städte, die sich allzu schnell mit dem „Ruhm leerer Sprache“ und abgedroschener Rhetorik verbinden, tritt ein innerer Raum der Seele (Familiares IV, 1, n. 28) gegenüber, der seine augustinische Faktur auch sprachlich bekundet.58 Hierzu gehört, dass auch Gott einen Raum einnimmt bzw. einen Raum für die Seele bietet, nämlich den „locus solitudinis animi“ (De vita solitaria, c. III; 1990, Z. 111–121). Beide Räume, der äußere welthafte und der innere seelische Raum, sind Gegenstand der sprachlichen Expression, sie sind dabei so ineinander verschränkt, dass der eine nicht ohne den anderen existiert: Der äußere Raum wird durch seelische Kategorien aufgeschlossen, der Seelenraum durch raumzeitliche Vektoren abgesteckt – was als Natur und Außen erfahrbar wird, ist schon unter den Index des Seelischen gestellt, was als Moment des Seelischen aus dem Inneren nach außen treten kann, kann dies nur unter dem Index der natura rerum.59 Eine Normativität gewinnt das Latein als Sprache der ‚Alten‘, als sprachliches Brennglas und auch als eine Art Beryll, durch das unsere Augen sehen: So heißt es im Triumphus fame (III, 21) mit Blick auf die Sprache der alten Latinität eines Cicero, eines Ovid, eines Vergil, diese Autoren seien „die Augen unserer Sprache“ oder auch unseres Sprechens („gli occhi de la lingua nostra“).60 Diese Normativität, die quer steht zu der späteren Konjunktur der volgare-Texte Petrarcas, lässt das Volgare als Derivat und Verfallsprodukt erscheinen.61 Der Dichter

58 Vgl. Augustinus: Confessiones X, 8: „magna ista vis est memoriae, magna nimis, deus meus, penetrale amplum et infinitum“. Stierle (2003, S. 337) sieht in dem hier aufgeschlossenen „Abgrund des menschlichen Bewusstseins“, dem ‚abyssus humanae conscientiae‘, keinen Gegensatz gegen die sinnliche Erfahrung und das Existieren der sinnlichen Welt! Trotz der ‚Erfahrung‘ der durch Augustinus evozierten inneren Unendlichkeit (und Transzendenz) muss Petrarca feststellen, dass er die äußere Unendlichkeit und Schönheit dennoch nicht deswegen negieren kann, Familiares IV,1 (n. 28): „iratus michimet quod nunc etiam terrestria mirarer“. 59 Hier zeigt sich unsere Expressions-Relation x→xʹ als eine wechselseitige, das, was ich von x sagen kann, kann ich auch von xʹ sagen, und umgekehrt: z. B. ‚x ist sehnsüchtig‘ = A steht in einem geregelten (Bild-Verhältnis) zu ‚xʹ ist ausgedehnt, wie ein Blick aus der Anhöhe in die Tiefe einer Ebene‘ = B. B kann A zum Ausdruck bringen, d. h. das Seelische Sehnen kann durch die Weite und Tiefe des poetischen Blickraums „ausgedrückt“ werden; A kann aber auch B zum Ausdruck bringen, d. h. die Raumstruktur kann durch die seelische Empfindungsspannung dynamisiert werden. 60 Petrarca 1996, S. 440. Vgl. Dante: Purgatorio VII, 16–17. 61 Seniles V, 2, in: Opera omnia II, S. 878–881; Stierle (2003, S. 34 f.) sieht hier eine aufschlussreiche Parallelität zu Petrarcas Sicht auf den Verfall des Imperiums und auf das Exil der Päpste: Die negativ besetzten translationes – translatio imperii (Rom-Aachen), translatio ecclesiae (Rom-Avignon), translatio studii (Bologna-Paris, Oxford) – erführen hier eine zusätzlich negativ gesehene translatio, die translatio linguae (Latein-Volgare). Zur Sache siehe auch Leinkauf 2017, I, S. 315–329, bes. S. 323 f.

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leistet, das hat Petrarca schon in der Rede anlässlich seiner Krönung zum poeta laureatus festgehalten, einen Akt der ‚imitatio‘, in dem sich der absolute Akt souveräner göttlicher Welt-/Seins-Setzung sowie der daraus im mittelalterlichen Denken abgeleitete absolute Akt innerweltlicher Macht (souveräne Rechtsschöpfung, politische Setzungen) dadurch spiegeln, dass eine „figura veritatis“ entsteht, dass die Eine Wahrheit in verschiedenen Figurationen ihrer selbst poetisch manifest wird.62 Dieses Manifest-Werden ist Moment der ‚expressio‘ des Ich der Poetik, der Modus dieser sprachlichen Expressivität ist – im Rahmen von Petrarcas Verständnis des imitatio- und fictio-Begriffs – als eine „Umwandlung“ (versio, conversio, transformatio), eine „imitatio“ durch „variatio“, zu denken.63 Sieht man diese, an stoischen Denkmustern orientierte Grundform poetischen Ausdrucks mit dem wenig später entstandenen Strukturmuster der Perspektivität zusammen, so kann doch gesagt werden, dass Petrarca auch hier ein entwicklungsgeschichtlich ‚nach vorne‘ orientiertes, innovatives Poetik-Konzept vertritt, das die spätere Konjunktur des Ingenium-Begriffs, der Perspektivität und des point de vue, der Künstler-Autonomie wie auch des ‚alter-Deus‘-Konzeptes vorbereitet.

Bibliographie Verwendete Abkürzungen AT: Descartes, René: Oeuvres de Descartes. Hrsg. von Charles Adam und Paul Tannery. Paris: Léopold Cerf Imprimeur-Éditeur, 1897 f. GP: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Die philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz. Hrsg. von Carl Immanuel Gerhardt. Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–1890 (Reprint: Hildesheim: Olms, 1960–1961). SVF: Arnim, Hans Friedrich August von (Hrsg.): Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–1905 und 1924.

Primärtexte Campanella, Tommaso (1960): De Homine. Hrsg. von Romano Amerio (Einleitung und Text). Rom: Centro internazionale di studi umanistici (= Theologicorum libri Bd. IV).

62 Petrarca, „Oratio“, in: Petrarca 1874, S. 319–323; „Invective contra medicum“, in: Petrarca 1950, 1978.Vgl. Kantorowicz 1961, S. 267–279; Reckermann 1993, S. 111–118. 63 Familiares I, 8 (n. 23); XXIII, 19 (n. 13); Vita solitaria, Petrarca 1955, S. 540 und die Nachweise Anm. 70. Zur Sache Gmelin 1932; Stackelberg 1956 (Bienengleichnis); Reckermann 1993.

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Conversini, Giovanni (1986): Rationarium vitae. Hrsg. von Vittore Nason (Einleitung und Text). Florenz: Olschki. Cusanus, Nicolaus (1983): „Idiota de mente“. In: Nicolai Cusani Opera omnia iussu et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis. Hrsg. von Ludwig Baur und Renate Steiger. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, Vol. V (2. Aufl.), S. 81–218. Dante Aligheri (2008): Monarchia. Hrsg. von Maurizio Pizzica, Einleitung vonGiorgio Petrocchi. Milano: Rizzoli (1. Fassung: 1988). Diacetto, Francesco (1986): De pulchro libri III. Accedunt opuscula inedita et dispersa necnon testimonia quaedam ad eumdem pertinentia (1. Fassung ca. 1499). Hrsg. von Sylvain Matton. Pisa: Scuola normale superiore di Pisa. Mazzoni, Jacopo (2010): In universam Platonis et Aristotelis philosophiam praeludia, sive de comparatione Platonis et Aristotelis. Hrsg. von Sara Matteoli, Einleitung von Anna Pace. Neapel: M. D’Auria (1. Fassung: Venedig, 1597) Pelacani, Biagio (1974): Quaestiones de anima. Hrsg. von Graziella Federici Vescovini. Florenz: Olschki. Petrarca, Francesco (1950): Invective contra medicum. Hrsg. von Pier Giorgio Ricci, lateinischer Text von Domenico Silvestri. Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura (= Storia e letteratura 32). Petrarca, Francesco (1955): Prose. Hrsg. von Guido Martellotti, Pier Giorgio Ricci, Enrico Carrara und Enrico Bianchi. Milano/Napoli: Ricciardi ( = La letteratura italiana 7). Petrarca, Francesco (1975): Opere latine di Francesco Petrarca. Hrsg. von Antonietta Bufano unter Mitarbeit von Basile Aracri e Clara Kraus Reggiani. Einleitung von Manlio Pastore Stocchi. Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 2 Bd. Petrarca, Francesco (1977): Secretum meum. Hrsg. von Enrico Carrara. Einleitung von Guido Martellotti. Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore. Petrarca, Francesco (1978): Epistolae. Hrsg. von Ugo Dotti. Turin: UTET. Petrarca, Francesco (1988): Heilmittel gegen Glück und Unglück. Lateinisch-deutsche Ausgabe (Auswahl): De remediis utriusque fortunae. Übers. und kommentiert von Rudolf Schottlaender. Hrsg. von Eckhard Kessler. München: Fink. Petrarca, Francesco (1990): De vita solitaria. Buch I. Hrsg. von Karl E. Enenkel . Leiden/ New York/København/Köln: E.J. Brill/Universitaire Pers Leiden. Petrarca, Francesco (1996): Trionfi, rime estravaganti, codice degli abbozzi. Hrsg. von Vincenzio Pacca e Laura Paolino. Milano: Mondadori. Petraca, Francesco (2004): Secretum meum. Hrsg. von Gerhard Regn und Bernhard Huss (Text, Anmerkungen und Nachwort). Mainz: DVB. Petrarca, Francesco (2005): Familiaria. Bücher der Vertraulichkeiten. Hrsg. von Berthe Widmer. Bd. 1, Buch 1–12. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. Petrarca, Francesco (2009): Familiaria. Bücher der Vertraulichkeiten. Hrsg. von Berthe Widmer. Bd. 2, Buch 13–24. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. Pomponazzi, Pietro (1990): Tractatus de immortalitate animae/Abhandlung über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Hrsg. von Burkhard Mojsisch. Hamburg: Meiner. Postel, Guglielmus (1544): De orbis terrae concordia. Basileae. Scaliger, Julius Caesar (1557): Exotericarum exercitationes. Paris. Veneto, Paolo (1503): Summa philosophiae naturalis. Hildesheim/New York: Olms, 1974 (Nachdruck der 1. Ausgabe: Venedig 1503).

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Forschungsliteratur Blank, Andreas (2010): Biochemical Ontology and the Metaphysics of Composite Substances 1540–1670. München: Philosophia Verlag GmbH. Cantimori, Delio (1992): Eretici italiani del Cinquecento e altri scritti. Hrsg. von Adriano Prosperi. Turin: Einaudi. Deleuze, Gilles (1995): Die Falte. Leibniz und der Barock. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp (= Le pli. Leibniz et le baroque, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1988). Enenkel, Karl E. (1990): „Kommentar zum 5. Kapitel“. In: Petrarca 1990, S. 442–479. Enenkel, Karl E. (2008): Die Erfindung des Menschen. Die Autobiographik des frühneuzeitlichen Humanismus von Petrarca bis Lipsius. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. Febvre, Lucien (1942): Le problème de l’incroyence au XVIe siècle. La religion de Rabelais, Paris: Michel. Federici Vescovini, Graziella (1979): Astronomia e scienza. La crisi dell’Aristotelismo sul cadere del trecento e Biagio Pelacani di Parma, Firenze: Olschki. Forschner, Maximilian (1995): Die stoische Ethik. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Gmelin, Herrman (1932): „Das Problem der Imitatio in den romanischen Literaturen der Renaissance“. In: Romanische Forschungen 46, S. 83–360. Gueroult, Martial (1967): Leibniz. Dynamique et métaphysique. Paris: Aubier (1. Auflage: 1934). Gurwitsch, A. (1974): Leibniz. Philosophie des Panlogismus. Berlin: De Gruyter. Haug, Walter/Wachinger, Burghart (Hrsg.) (1993): Innovation und Originalität. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Herrera Castillo, Laura E. (2015): Curvas y espejos. El carácter funcional de la actividad monádica. Granada: Comares. Jung, Matthias (2009): Der bewusste Ausdruck. Anthropologie der Artikulation. Berlin/ New York: De Gruyter. Kantorowicz, Ernst H. (1961): „The Souvereignity of the Artist. A Note on Legal Maxims and Renaissance Theories of Art“. In: Meiss, Millard (Hrsg.) (1961): De artibus opuscula. Essays in Honour of Erwin Panofsky. New York: University Press, S. 267–279. Kaulbach, Friedrich (1966): „Subjektivität, Fundament der Erkenntnis und lebendiger Spiegel bei Leibniz“. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 20, S. 471–480. Kessler, Eckhard (1978): Petrarca und die Geschichte. Geschichtsschreibung, Rhetorik, Philosophie im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit. München: Fink. Küpper, Joachim (2006): „Zu einigen Aspekten der Dichtungstheorie in der Frührenaissance“. In: Kablitz, Andreas/Regn, Gerhard (Hrsg.) (2006): Renaissance – Episteme und Agon. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, S. 47–71. Leinkauf, Thomas (2005): „Selbstrealisierung. Anthropologische Konstanten in der Frühen Neuzeit“. In: Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 10, S. 129–161. Leinkauf, Thomas (2009): „Der Ternar essentia-virtus-operatio und die Essentialisierung der Akzidentien. Ein Beispiel für die produktive Funktion antiker Philosopheme in der Entwicklung frühneuzeitlicher Philosophie“. In: Schmitt, Arbogast/Radke, Gyburg (Hrsg.) (2009): Philosophie im Umbruch. Der Bruch mit dem Aristotelismus im Hellenismus und im Späten Mittelalter. Stuttgart: Steiner, S. 131–153.

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Leinkauf, Thomas (2010): „Der Bild-Begriff bei Cusanus“. In: Grave, Johannes/Schubbach, Arno (Hrsg.) (2010): Denken mit dem Bild. Philosophische Einsätze des Bildbegriffs von Platon bis Hegel. München: Fink, S. 99–129. Leinkauf, Thomas (2011):„Federico Zuccari. L’idea de pittori, scultori et architteti. Vorschläge zu einer historisch-systematischen Analyse“. In: kunsttexte.de 3, 19 S. DOI: 10.18452/ 7640, zuletzt abgerufen am 19.12.2018. Leinkauf, Thomas (2012a): „Philosophische Implikationen des Begriffs ‚Grund‘ am Beispiel der Vorstellung eines ‚propre fonds‘ bei Leibniz“. In: Boehm, Gottfried/Burioni, Matteo (Hrsg.) (2012): Der Grund. Das Feld des Sichtbaren. München: Fink, S. 279–298. Leinkauf, Thomas (2012b): „Ästhetik bei Leibniz? Einige Anmerkungen zum Syndrom von Erkenntnistheorie und Theorie des Schönen“. In: Leinkauf, Thomas: Einheit, Natur, Geist. Beiträge zu metaphysischen Grundproblemen im Denken von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Berlin: Trafo, S. 213–230. Leinkauf, Thomas (2017): Philosophie des Humanismus und der Renaissance (1350–1600). Hamburg: Meiner, 2 Bd. Long, Anthony/Sedley, David (1987): The Hellenistic Philosophers. Bd. 1: Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Long, Anthony/Sedley, David (1989): The Hellenistic Philosophers. Bd. 2: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reckermann, Alfons (1993): „Das Konzept kreativer imitatio im Kontext der RenaissanceKunsttheorie“. In: Haug/Wachinger (1993), S. 98–132. Santagata, Marco (1992): I frammenti dell’anima. Storia e racconto nel Canzoniere di Petrarca. Bologna: Mulino. Schröder, Winfried (2012): Die Ursprünge des Atheismus. Untersuchungen zur Metaphysikund Religionskritik im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: FrommannHolzboog (1. Auflage: 1998). Seigel, Jerrold (1968): Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism. The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, Petrarch to Valla. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stackelberg, Jürgen von (1956): „Das Bienengleichnis: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der literarischen Imitatio“. In: Romanische Forschungen: Vierteljahrsschrift für romanische Sprachen und Literaturen 68, 3/4, S. 271–293. Stierle, Karlheinz (1998): Petrarca. Fragmente eines Selbstentwurfs. Essay. München/Wien: Carl Hanser Verlag. Stierle, Karlheinz (2003): Francesco Petrarca. Ein Intellektueller im Europa des 14. Jahrhunderts. München/Wien: Carl Hanser Verlag. Zak, Gur (2010): Petrarch’s Humanism and the Care of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Valérie Debuiche

4 Expression and Analogy in Leibniz’s Philosophy Abstract: Expression is one of the most famous concepts used by Leibniz throughout his life. But this concept is as frequently employed as it is rarely explained, even if it is often illustrated by the metaphor of geometrical perspective or conical projection. This text presents expression as an analogy between the relations of two things, one said ‘expressing’ and the other ‘expressed.’ It addresses the subsequent questions about what kind of analogy expression is supposed to be, which relations are involved and what is the nature of their analogy. It will be defended here that the expressive analogy pertains to a kind of (imperfect) identity rather than to the more classical idea of similarity illustrated by the geometrical example of perspective.

Introduction The doctrine of expression is undoubtedly at the core of Leibniz’s philosophy of substances1: a substance expresses the universe, its own body, all other bodies, and all other substances. It also expresses its cause: God. However, quite surprisingly, Leibniz has not frequently exposed what expression is. In the famous Quid sit idea from c. 1677–1678 he explicitly described for the first time how he was considering expression: That is said to express a thing in which there are relations which correspond to the relations of the thing expressed. But there are various kinds of expression; for example, the model of a machine expresses the machine itself, the projective delineation on a plane expresses a solid, speech expresses thoughts and truths, characters express numbers, and an algebraic equation expresses a circle or some other figure. What is common to all these expressions is

1 See: “Leibniz to De Volder”, 20.06.1703 (GP II, 253): “Doctrinam meam quomodo quodlibet corpus omnia alia exprimat, et quomodo quaelibet anima vel Entelechia exprimat et suum corpus et per ipsum alia omnia, videris pulchre perspexisse. Sed ubi ejus vim expenderis, nihil aliud a me videbis, quod non inde consequatur.” Translation in Loemker, p. 531: “You seem to have rightly grasped my doctrine of how every body expresses all other things, and how every soul or Entlelechy whatever expresses its own body and through it all other things. But when you have uncovered the full force of this doctrine, you will find that I have said nothing else which does not follow from it.” https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666120-004

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that we can pass from a consideration of the relations in the expression to a knowledge of the corresponding properties of the thing expressed. Hence it is clearly not necessary for that which expresses to be similar to the thing expressed, if only a certain analogy is maintained between the relations.2

This text is traditionally considered as offering a constant and general definition of Leibnizian expression. Four elements are essential: A. Expression is defined as the analogy or correspondence between relations of two things, one expressing and the other expressed. B. The perspective example is a model – as revealed by the rest of the Quid sit idea and some other sources. C. The knowledge of the expressing thing enables the knowledge of the expressed thing. D. The expressed and the expressing things have not to be similar. In this paper, I will elaborate on the relation between expression and analogy (point A), which implies the issues of model (point B) and similarity (point D), and sometimes the consideration of knowledge (point C). The fact is that the conception of expression by means of analogy between relations is almost undiscussed in secondary literature, even often used, although the concept of analogy is not as obvious as it seems. Indeed, some questions have to be addressed. First, what are the relations between which there is some analogy? Second, what is the nature of such an analogy? To be more precise, let us distinguish several meanings of the term ‘analogy:’ 1) Analogy as preservation of properties: this conception is very close to the geometrical similarity or homology – as it is embodied in the example of perspective representation, which is the most frequent example for expression and, even, some kind of paradigmatic model (See Kulstad 1977; Swoyer 1995; Debuiche 2009; Debuiche 2013). It also calls for the modern conception of isomorphism, conceived of as the preservation of structures.

2 Quid sit idea, c. 1677–1678 (my emphasis). In: Loemker, p. 207. Original: A VI 4, 1370: “Exprimere aliquam rem dicitur illud in quo habentur habitudines, quae habitudinibus rei exprimendae respondent. Sed eae expressiones variae sunt; exempli causa modulus Machinae exprimit machinam ipsam, scenographica rei in plano delineatio exprimit solidum, oratio exprimit cogitationes et veritates; characteres exprimunt numeros, aequatio Algebraica exprimit circulum aliamve figuram: et, quod expressionibus istis commune est, ex sola contemplatione habitudinum exprimentis, possumus venire in cognitionem proprietatum respondentium rei exprimendae. Unde patet non esse necessarium ut id quod exprimit simile sit rei expressae, modo habitudinum quaedam analogia servetur.”

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Analogy as convenience between relations: this refers to the classical meaning of proportion, which designates correspondence, harmony, as we already know. Besides, proportion also refers to the idea of common measure or of ratio of ratios – what can be found in some texts of Leibniz as we are going to see.

The question then becomes: How to understand substantial expression in terms of analogy? How to account for the nature of substance, its unicity and unity, its activity, and its harmonic relation to its own body and to all other substances? To answer, I will first examine the model of perspective conceived of as the geometric perspective or conical projection. I will argue for the insufficiency of the model of geometrical similarity and isomorphism. I will then present Leibniz’s use of proportion, from harmony to quantitative ratio. Finally, I will object against this proportional model, come back to isomorphism, and show its unexpected vanishing into identity.

4.1 Expressive Analogy as Similarity and Isomorphism 4.1.1 The Geometrical Model of Perspective: Homology and Similarity The main example of Leibniz’s perspective model is the central projection of a circle on a plane. Such a projection gives different images of the circle which are all sections of a cone by the plane. This cone is constituted by the surface delineated by an infinite straight line passing by a fixed point (called ‘vertex’) and running along the circumference of the original circle (called ‘basic circle’). The plane of projection intersects the surface of the cone. This intersection gives an image of the basic circle, analogous to the optical representation of the circle on a picture from a certain point of view (the eye at the vertex of the cone). The projected image of the circle is sometimes an ellipse, sometimes a parabola, or a hyperbola. In some particular cases, it is another circle, a straight line, a rectilinear angle, or a point. According to Leibniz’s Quid sit idea, that an ellipse expresses a circle entails the existence of a correspondence between relations, that is to say between some properties of the basic circle and some properties of the ellipse. In the case of conics, these properties are the same. For instance, the property for a straight line of being a tangent of the circle is preserved by projection: the

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projected straight line is also a tangent of the conic. In short, between the original and its perspective expressions, a certain common geometrical order is preserved as the same. Besides, the basic circle being expressed by each conic, it might be considered as the common thing from which conics are derived: conics are all images of the same original object. Such a model brings to light the concept of analogy in the sense of homology. A circle, an ellipse, a parabola, or a hyperbola are similar or homological figures. They ‘resemble’ one another despite they are not exactly the same, for they have some (but not all) common properties. Furthermore, as has to be in homology, it is possible to pass from one conic to any other by means of the same determined law, that is, by means of the law of central and punctual projection – which is a law of transformation. Each point of one conic can be projected in one point of any other conic. The projection is total although the geometrical properties of conics are not all identical. By specifying “it is clearly not necessary for that which expresses to be similar to the thing expressed, if only a certain analogy is maintained between the relations,” Leibniz is identifying expression to analogy and distinguishing it from identity. At this point, it is important to have in mind the different meanings of the Latin adjective ‘similis’ or of the French term ‘semblable’ which refer to both ‘likeness’ (‘ressemblance’) and ‘similarity’ (‘similitude’). Analogy is similarity but not likeness: analogical things are similar but not alike. Hence, if conics express the basic circle, expression seems to be related both to the existence of an invariant, a certain original and common order, and to a law of passing from the original to a new thing, that means a law of transformation. Even if expression relates each conic to all others, it also permits to distinguish conics by means of the way each one represents the basic circle. The original is one, but its images are infinite, just as substances expressing God. Conics are different but they correspond to each other, just as substances expressing one another. In consequence, the perspective geometrical model is helpful to imagine how one substance can be at the same time different from the others and concordant with them. But it also entails some difficulties. There are indeed several reasons to doubt that expression is a mere analogy conceived of as a geometrical kind of similarity. The term ‘analogy’ is not frequent and Leibniz preferred the terms ‘harmony,’ ‘concordance,’ ‘perfect accord.’ Those are certainly more enigmatic but they also better reveal the etymology of the term ‘expression’ as what ‘ex-hibits,’ makes something appear ‘outside:’ the idea of expression also contains the idea of ‘unveiling’ something (but not necessary everything). The ‘unveiled’ thing might be very deep and very dissimilar to what is exposing it, even if it cannot be without

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relation with it. It is then likely that the very mathematical analogy between homological properties does not embrace all what expression seems to be. Indeed, mathematical analogy seems to be too restrictive. In mathematics, it is possible to pass from the knowledge of the expressed thing by means of the knowledge of the expression, since the law of transformation is easily knowable. And this law is easily knowable since expression occurs between similar things. Indeed, it is possible to know conics by means of a circle because the law of projection is known and, most of all, reciprocal: a circle and a conic are transformable in one another. Besides, this law is knowable, because a circle and conics are quite similar. The transformation from one to the other is slight: even different from a circle, a hyperbola remains close to it. Around 1705, Leibniz explained expression once again by means of the model of perspective projection: It is sufficient for the expression of one thing into another that a certain constant law of relations does exist, by which the singulars [singula] of the one [first] might be related to the corresponding singulars in the other. Just as in a perspective projection a circle can be represented by an ellipse, that is to say by an oval curve, and even by a hyperbola which is more dissimilar to it and does not turn back to itself, since to any point of the hyperbola a corresponding point of the circle, from which the hyperbola is being projected, can be assigned by the same constant law.3

It then appears that, it is sufficient for expression to have a certain law by which one can pass from the expressed thing to its expression: Nonetheless, a sufficient condition is not a necessary one and does not imply that such a “constant law of relations” does necessary exist or, at least, is always knowable. For instance, it is uneasy, even impossible, to know the law for passing from an idea to a thing, from a speech to a thought, from a soul to a body. However, there is a relation of expression between those things. It then seems that expression is relative to transformation mostly in the cases of already very similar things, just as are conic sections and circles. That logically implies that an uneasily knowable law of transformation suggests dissimilar things – and so are ideas and things, speech and thoughts, soul and body. In short, expressing and expressed things do not need to be homological, even if it is sufficient for them to be. Homology is both a too strong condition and a too weak

3 Untitled, c. 1705 (my translation and emphasis). Original: C 15: “Sufficit enim ad expressionem unius in alio, ut constans quaedam sit lex relationum, qua singula in uno ad singula respondentia in alio referri possint. Uti circulus per ellipsin seu curvam ovalem repraesentari potest in perspectiva projectione, imo per hyperbolam etsi dissimillimam, ac ne quidem in se redeuntem, quia cuilibet puncto hyperbolae respondens eadem constante lege punctum circuli hyperbolam projicientis assignari potest.”

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model for Leibniz’s diversified kinds of expression. Nonetheless, there is a difference between not being able to know a law and claiming that such a law does not exist. To pursue our reflection, let us consider the case of the expression of thoughts in speeches, which is the main topic of Leibniz’s project of characteristic and deals with unlike things.

4.1.2 Characteristic and The Ideal of Isomorphism It could seem that what I just said might be wrong in the case of Leibniz’s attempts at elaborating a rational calculus and a universal language (or a universal characteristics). Indeed, the main postulate of Leibniz’s characteristic project claims that it is possible to create a language by which any thought and any truth might be expressed and known. Such an invention would be based on the knowledge of the law by which one can transform thoughts into speeches or, more precisely, ideas into sentences, truths into signs. This would be the exact case of homological expression. However, a careful look at Leibniz’s writings on characteristic reveals something quite different. In 1686, Leibniz wrote his Generales inquisitiones de analysi notionum et veritatum (A VI 4, 739–788). In this long text, he described his invention of a rational calculus by which it might be possible to calculate instead of think, argue, reflect and, so, to end all disputes and controversies: Let me come back to the expression of thoughts by characters (. . .). Once this done, when controversies appear, two philosophers will need to discuss no more than two calculators. Indeed, they will just have to take quills in their hand, to seat at abacus, and to say to each other (if it pleases the invited friends): Let us calculate!4

Thoughts belong to the realm of reason. Characters are invented by mankind: they are artificial and used to express thoughts by denoting and abbreviating them. How then is it possible to reduce controversies to calculus? Does not reason exceed language? Leibniz certainly did not think that the art of language invented by mankind might exhaust the production of reason which is created by God. Nonetheless he firmly believed in the achievement of his project. But this was not an unconditional achievement.

4 De arte characteristica ad perficiendas scientias ratione nitentes, c. 1988 (my translation). Original: A VI 4, 912–913: “Sed ut redeam ad expressionem cogitationum per characters (. . .) Quo facto, quando orientur controversiae, non magis disputatione opus erit inter duos philosophos, quam inter duos Computistas. Sufficiet enim calamos in manus sumere sedereque ad abacos, et sibi mutuo (: accito si placet amico:) dicere: calculemus.”

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As a matter of fact, such a correspondence between thought and language is only possible thanks to a previous reduction. The “praedicatum inest subjecto” is one of the most crucial principles of Leibniz’s epistemology: in any true proposition or thought, the predicate notion is contained in the subject notion. This led Leibniz to a mereological conception of truth: “(. . .) so that a subject and a predicate are to one another, as whole and part, or as coincident wholes, or still as part and whole.”5 As such, it allows the project of rational calculus: At the same time, it came to my mind that, if they were properly resolved [analysed] and ordered, notions might be represented by numbers, and in consequence that truths might be examined by calculation, as I was seeing they could be treated [considered], insofar as they depend on reason. This arose my curiosity even more. Indeed I was observing that a notion was contained in the notion of which it was predicated in the same way a factor is in the product.6

A (not simple) notion is composed of other notions which can be considered as contained in it, just as primary numbers are contained in a number of which they are factors. In Elementa calculi, Leibniz gave an example (see A VI 4, 196). Considering the proposition human is rational animal, animal can be considered 2, rational considered 3, and human considered 6=2×3. The relation of notional composition is related to the relation of numerical multiplication and the law of the passage from one to the other is known. In consequence, the correspondence between thought and speech is totally determined and analogy seems perfect. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Leibniz reduced any proposition to a predicative one. For instance, already in 1676, he claimed that a proposition is a predicative sentence: “I call proposition: A is B, or A is not B. We call A the subject, B the predicate, est the copula. One can consider any noun in the nominative case as A and B.”7 Almost 30 years later, in Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, considering syllogisms as the model of good reasoning, he consequently promoted the

5 Elementa calculi, 1679, (my translation). Original: A VI 4, 197: “(. . .) ac proinde ut subjectum et praedicatum sese habeant invicem, vel ut totum et pars, vel ut totum et totum coincidens, vel ut pars ad totum.” 6 Elementa rationis, 1686 (my translation). Original: A VI 4, 727−728: “Eadem occasione venit in mentem notiones si recte resolutae atque ordinatae haberentur numeris posse repraesentari, ac proinde veritates, ita ut fieri posse videbam, tractatas, in quantum a ratione pendent, calculando examinabiles fore. Quod meam curiositatem adhuc magis accendit. Observabam enim notionem quae de notione pradicatur ita ei inesse, ut numerus productor producto.” 7 De elementis cogitandi, 1676 (my translation). Original: A VI 3, 505: “Propositionem voco: A est B, vel A non est B. A vocamus subjectum, B praedicatum, est copulam. Per A autem et B quodlibet nomen nominativi casus intelligi poest.”

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predicative form of proposition (1704; A VI 6, 361–375; 475–495). In-between, in his Generales Inquisitiones from 1686 (A VI 4, 739–788), he exclusively worked on predicative propositions. The main advantage of predicative form for propositions entirely lies in the possibility of reducing truths to mereological relations and, by this way, to make them coincide with some kind of numeric or algebraic calculus. By reducing thoughts to predications, Leibniz gives them a logical form which is consistent with a certain form of calculus. These forms are neither alike, nor even similar – as are those of a circle and an ellipse, but they are isomorphic: their internal relations, although different, have the same combinatorial structure. In consequence, in characteristic expression, analogy is the relation of correspondence between non-similar but isomorphic forms, as far as speech is pre-modelled in order to be consistent with logical forms. Hence, analogy does not mean homology, he does neither refer to a total similarity, but only to a partial one, which were possible only if thoughts and reasoning are transformed to be expressible in characters and calculus. So is the main thesis of Chris Swoyer in his nowadays classic paper on Leibnizian expression (Swoyer 1995). According to him, the doctrine of expression consists in an enlarged theory of similarity which is also a theory of substituability. The existence of an isomorphism allows any substitution in respect with what is preserved. What is preserved is the structure of a relation, and not the relation itself. For instance, there is an expressive isomorphism between the geographical relations of real places and the geometrical relations of the situations of points on a map. One can replace the expressed thing by its expression and still have something to know: the geographical position by the map situation, the figure by its algebraic equation, an ellipsis by a circle, a thought by a formula. Not each element of the expressed thing is preserved, but thanks to isomorphism, some relations inside it can be related to some different but corresponding relations inside the expressing thing. In consequence, the isomorphism between expressing and expressed things is never complete: as such, it appears much more like an ideal for universal language than as the deep and natural nature of characteristic expression. To conclude, expression is related to similarity insofar as similarity consists in a partial isomorphism. Besides, if isomorphism seems suitable for mathematical or characteristic expressions, it is not obvious that it fits with the singular way a substance expresses the entire universe. In metaphysics, there is no substitutability: no substance can be replaced by anything else. A geometric point can be replaced by any other, there is an infinity of formulas to replace a truth, but there is no substance to replace another one, or no two different substances

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to express the same body. If universal characteristic is the science of similarity, metaphysics is on the contrary the science of singularity. There is however a correspondence between all the irreducibly singular substances. How can it be? Can isomorphism be the model for the universal expression of substances? To try to answer, let us examine the nature of the universal expression of substances. Unexpectedly, we will confront the notion of analogy conceived of as proportion.

4.2 Proportion in Substantial Expression 4.2.1 Universal Expression and Proportion Some textual evidences establish a relation between expression and proportion. For instance, in § 14 from his Discours de métaphysique, Leibniz wrote: Nevertheless, it is true that the perceptions or expressions of all substances inter-correspond, (. . .). But although all express the same phenomena, it does not follow from this that their expressions are exactly alike; it suffices that they are proportional. So a number of spectators believe that they see the same thing and are in fact in agreement about it, although each one sees and speaks according to the measure of his own point of view.8

The correspondence between substances can only be between their perceptions and between the modifications of them, since a substance, as an immaterial being, is nothing more than what it feels, thinks, is aware of, knows, and so on. In the quoted text, Leibniz explicitly rejected similarity to illustrate the expression between substances by using the concept of proportion. There is nonetheless an ambiguity concerning the nature of “proportion.” On one hand, it simply refers to a kind of accord. In French language, it suffices that spectators “s’entrentendent” what means that they agree with and understand each other about what they are perceiving. There is harmony between their perceptions. On the other hand, Leibniz referred to “la mesure de sa veue” which means, of course, its own way to perceive the universe: each substance

8 Discours de métaphysique, 1686. In: Loemker, p. 313 (my emphasis). Original: A VI 4, 1550: “Cependant il est tres vray que les perceptions ou expressions de toutes les substances s’entrerepondent (. . .) Or quoyque tous expriment les mêmes phenomenes, ce n’est pas pour cela que leur expressions soyent parfaitement semblables, mais il suffit qu’elles soyent proportionelles, comme plusieurs spectateurs croyent voir la même chose, et s’entrentendent en effect, quoyque chacun voye et parle selon la mesure de sa veue.”

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expresses, perceives, represents the universe in itself from a certain viewpoint. The measure designates the relation to the substance itself: in a certain way, its subjectivity or, at least, its singularity. In other words, each substance expresses the same thing as the others, but it never expresses it as distinctly or confusedly as the others: it always has its own “measure.” Finally, “measure” also means a kind of valuation (estime). In that case, the measure of a view might be the relation of comparison between it and the others’ views, just as the measure of a magnitude is always in comparison with other magnitudes. What does that mean that each expression is a “measure” and that this measure is “proportional” to the one of each other substance? According to Leibniz, because of the universal correspondence between all substances, it is as if they were interacting or communicating, although they are totally independent, except from God: God produces diverse substances according to the different views he has of the world, and through the intervention of God the nature proper to each substance involves that what happens to one corresponds to what happens to all the others, without their acting upon one another directly.9

Universal harmony then gives some clues for explaining the idea of a proportion between substances, since it involves Leibniz’s conception of action and passion. Indeed, action and passion are related to the degrees of the distinction of perception: The action of one finite substance upon another consists in nothing but the increase of degree of its expression together with the diminution of the expression of the other, insofar as God has formed them in advance in such a way they are adapted to each other.10

The apparent interaction or communication of substances can be explained by the limitation of their expressions: is ‘active’ the substance whose expression is more distinct than the expression of the other which is said ‘passive.’ Is ‘acting’ the one with an increasing distinction of its expression and ‘enduring’ or ‘suffering’ the one with a decreasing distinction of expression:

9 Discours de métaphysique, 1686. In: Loemker, p. 311. Original: A VI 4, 1549: “Dieu produit diverses substances selon les differentes veues qu’il a de l’univers. Et par la mediation de Dieu la nature propre de chaque substance porte que ce qui arrive à l’une répond à ce qui arrive à toutes les autres, sans qu’elles agissent immediatement l’une sur l’autre.” 10 Discours de métaphysique, 1686. In: Loemker, p. 312. Original: A VI 4, 1553: “L’action d’une substance finie sur l’autre ne consiste que dans l’accroissement du degré de son expression, jointe à la diminution de celle de l’autre, entant que Dieu les oblige de s’accommoder ensemble.”

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And whenever anything exercises its virtue or power, that is to say when it acts, it improves and enlarges itself in proportion to its action. Therefore, when a change takes place by which a number of substances are affected (as a matter of fact, every change affects them all), I believe it can be said that any substance which thereby passes immediately to a greater degree of perfection or to a more perfect expression exercises its power and acts, while any substance which passes to a lesser degree of perfection shows its weakness and suffers.11

According to universal harmony or “inter-expression” (entr’expression), any change in one substance’s expression corresponds to a change in every other substance, since universe is nothing else than substances themselves, their perceptions, and their aggregates. If a substance changes, universe changes too, and so do all substances by perceiving this changing world. Besides, because of inter-expression, one substance can realise its “appetition” (tendency) for a new perceptive state only if the “appetitions” of the others for the same state are prevented. It can increase the distinction of its perception only if others’ expressions become less distinct. In that sense, a certain relation of proportion can be conceived of as the correlated and inversed variations of the degrees of the distinction of expression. In such a proportional model, the idea of isomorphism is not explicit. Maybe the reason is the strong unicity of substances: substances are singular and, as such, they might resist isomorphism considered as grounding relations of substitutability. Nonetheless, because of inter-expression, there is a kind of correlation (between their degrees of expressive perfection and between the variations of these degrees) which can be considered as a related and universal inversed proportion of distinction. Nevertheless, one issue remains. Which model did Leibniz use to explain the mutual expression of the simple soul and the divisible body? Indeed, strictly speaking, body is no individual, whereas soul absolutely is. Does some kind of proportion occur between bodies and souls, like between substances? Or is it some isomorphism, just like between things of different natures?

11 Discours de métaphysique, 1686. In: Loemker, p. 313. Original: A VI 4, 1554: “Et chaque chose quand elle exerce sa vertu ou puissance, c’est à dire quand elle agit, change en mieux, et s’etend, entant qu’elle agit, lors donc qu’il arrive un changement dont plusieurs substances sont affectées (comme en effect tout changement les touche toutes). Je croy qu’on peut dire que celle qui immediatement par là passe à un plus grand degré de perfection ou à une expression plus parfaite, exerce sa puissance, et agit, et celle qui passe à un moindre degré, fait connoistre sa foiblesse, et patit.”

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4.2.2 Proportion and The Relation Between Body and Soul In the dynamical texts from the 90s, Leibniz presented an analogy between the intra-substantial “effort” which makes the substantial activity and the corporeal “motion” which realises the physical activity of the universe: “There is action everywhere, and I establish this more than the accepted philosophy, since I believe there is no body without motion, and no substance without effort.”12 By comparing the motions of bodies and the affections of souls, Leibniz seems to relate body and soul. Is that relation an analogy? A proportion? And does it explain how a soul can express its body? This answer is not evident since such a relation from bodies to souls, and from souls to bodies would consist in passing from the discrete infinity of immaterial substances to the continuous (or contiguous) materiality of bodies, or from the doctrine of (substantial) expression to a doctrine of (corporeal) impression. Indeed, bodies interact and hinder one another just as substances communicate and limit one another. They impress their changes on each other, since the action of one body onto another one can be observed in their mutual changes. For instance, one net is deformed by the motion of a ball, but so is also the ball, and the air around them, and anything materially connected to them. Since Leibniz claims that there is no void in matter, no leap in nature, what happens in one body is caused by or causing what happens in other bodies. So is the mechanism in natural, material, and corporeal phenomena: each body is causally related to all others, they all ‘impress’ one another. Then, unlike the relation between substances in inter-expression or between bodies in inter-impression, the relation between body and soul is a relation between two heterogeneous beings. Nonetheless, Leibniz also claimed that bodies do “impress” something on soul, for instance a needle does impress pain in an arm.13 Even if, the changes in body are sometimes too small, too subtle, too tiny (infime) to be distinctly perceived by mind, they are always felt, even only confusedly. So a mind feels the corporeal circulation of blood, even if it cannot be perfectly perceived.14 How is that possible?

12 Eclaircissement des difficultés que Monsieur Bayle a trouvées dans le systeme nouveau de l’union de l’ame et du corps, 1698 (my translation). Original: GP IV, 495: “Il y a de l’action par tout, et je l’etablis plus que la Philosophie receue, parceque je crois qu’il n’y a point de corps sans movement, ny de substance sans effort.” 13 See, for instance, “Leibniz an Antoine Arnauld”, 30.04.1687 (A II 2, 244). 14 See, for instance, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, 1704 (A VI 6, 116); see also, “Leibniz an Antoine Arnauld”, 9.10.1687 (A II 2, 241).

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Leibniz solved this problem, nowadays called ‘mind-body problem,’ by means of the system of pre-established harmony between the realms of efficient causes in corporeal bodies and of final causes in immaterial souls. In that context, it is noteworthy that Leibniz used the model of proportion between the degrees of intra-substantial expression and of inter-corporeal impression: The perceptions of the soul always naturally correspond to the constitution of the body, and when there are an amount of confused and little distinguished motions in brain, as happens to those who have not much experience, the thoughts of the soul (following the order of things) cannot be more distinct. However the soul is never deprived of the recourse of sensation, since it always expresses its body, and this body is always impressed by its surroundings in an infinity of ways, which often give only a confused impression.15

The small impressions of a body, and even the infinitesimal ones, are in a simple relation of proportion with the non-sensible perceptions that a soul always has. Non-sensible or infinitesimal perceptions explain both the variations of substantial perception and the fact that a soul can perceive, even very confusedly, what happens in each body of the universe. The motion of its own body is more distinct to a soul than those of all further bodies. When the impression of another body (for instance, a needle on an arm) on its own body becomes stronger, its infinitesimal perceptions of it also change and become more distinct (it becomes pain). And just as from rest cannot come motion, distinct perception can only come from an already present but non-sensible perception. In conclusion, both inter-substantial expression and the expression of a body by a soul are realised through a proportional relation between the variations of the degrees of expression or impression. As such it is like a ratio between some kind of magnitude: the ratio is either proportional, or inversely proportional, but it occurs between degrees conceived of as the compared magnitudes of distinction. But several objections can be presented against this proportional model since, without being totally false, it is too simple if so explained. Let us come to our last point devoted to the critique of the proportional model and to the return of the isomorphic solution.

15 Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, 1704 (my translation). Original: A VI 6, 117: “Les perceptions de l’ame répondent tousjours naturellement à la constitution du corps, et lors qu’il y a quantité de mouvemens confus et peu distingués dans le cerveau, comme il arrive à ceux qui ont peu d’experience, les pensées de l’ame (suivant l’ordre des choses) ne sauroient estre non plus distinctes. Cependant l’ame n’est jamais privée du secours de la sensation, parce qu’elle exprime tousjours son corps, et ce corps est tousjours frappé par les ambians d’une infinité de manieres, mais qui souvent ne donnent qu’une impression confuse.”

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4.3 From Proportion to Isomorphism 4.3.1 Difficulties of The Proportional Model as Ratio In inter-expression, the ratio between the variations of intra-substantial perceptions is inversed: one substance’s degree of distinction of its perception increases as much as the degrees of distinction of others’ perception decrease. On the contrary, the ratio between the variations of substantial perception and the variations of corporeal impression is simply proportional. Then, if expression were a ratio, it would not be always the same kind of proportion, or at least the same direction in proportion. But this is not the most problematic point. Indeed, Leibniz claimed that the strength of the impression of a needle is proportional to the degree of distinction of the perception of pain. It then seems possible to proportionally correlate the quantity of motion or of force in a body to the degree of distinction of perception in a soul. But, there are several difficulties. First, such a simple proportion does not account for the state of a man paying no longer attention to a familiar noise, even if this noise remains always the same. The soul of this man is then in a confused perception of a noise impressing his body exactly in the same way as it did when the man was aware of it. The variation of the mental state is not determined by any variation in the physical body. This difficulty might be solved by considering that the impression of a body being constant, it can be identified with a state of rest and, consequently, proportional to a non-sensible perception. The issue is now the following: when is the motion of a body too constant to be distinctly perceived by a soul? To answer this question, we should find a fixed ratio between the variations of the motion of a body and the variations of the affection of a soul. Second, concerning such a ratio, Leibniz himself asserted that there is “no proportion between a soul and a body.”16 There is none since it is not possible to know the rule by which quantitatively relating the acceleration of a motion or the strengthening of a corporeal impression to the variation of the distinction of mental perception. And this is impossible because of their heterogeneity making inconsistent any attempt at reducing the material motions to mental modifications. Most of all, because of the continuity and infinitesimality of

16 “Leibniz an Antoine Arnauld”, 30.04.1687 (A II 2, 180). See also: Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, 1704: “There is no proportion between a corporeal substance and such and such modification of matter.” My translation. Original: A VI 6, 116: “Il n’y a point de proportion entre une substance incorporelle et une telle ou telle modification de la matiere.”

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corporeal phenomena and mental perceptions, they have no common measure, no common order of magnitude. The non-sensible perceptions are “inassignable,” not assignable, incommensurable. And so are infinitesimal motions and accelerations. The infinite accuracy of the pre-established harmony is inconsistent with any assignation of magnitude. And there is no proportion without magnitude. In consequence, any relation of proportionality between a soul and a body is impossible, even if there is a correspondence between the variations of their states. And so it is between substances. We then have to admit that the model of proportion, despite his use by Leibniz, is not helpful for understanding expression. Indeed, analogy cannot simply be conceived of as a ratio, even between variations, since it has to integrate the reality of continuity and infinity. As such, the correspondence between two series of variations, either substantial or corporeal, resembles the differentials in mathematics. There is no proportional relation between the relation of x and y and the relation of dx and dy. Nonetheless, the relation of x and y is contained, enveloped in the relation of dx and dy, as it is, for instance, between the ordinates (x, y) of the points of a curve, and their differentials (dx, dy). In the same way, each substance contains, envelops the entire universe, all other substances, all bodies, and all intra-substantial, inter-substantial, and intercorporeal relations. Substance is like a differential related to all other differentials. Every one contains what all others are without being proportional to them. Here comes the final issue of our consideration of the relation between expression and analogy. Expression is not only preservation of similar properties, since dissimilar things can express one another. It is not only the isomorphic correspondence of structures since such a correspondence allows substitutability, what substances forbid. Finally, it cannot be quantitative proportion, unless we consider quantity as in differentials, that means infinitesimal and continuous – which is quite contradictory. How then, in the light of all these elements, can we understand what expression is, at least for a substance? As I am going to conclude: we have to come back to isomorphism, but in a new conception of it, between harmony and identity.

4.3.2 Isomorphism, Identity, and Harmony If we only consider substantial expression, we can notice that, besides its body, a substance can be said expressing two other things: God and the universe. A substance expresses God just as an effect expresses its cause, according to the general principle of the equivalence of the entire effect with the full cause. But a substance does not express the universe as it expresses God, since the

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universe is not the cause of any substance. Hence the ontological status of expression is not the same: concerning the expression of God by a substance, it is relative to causality, but in the case of the expression of the universe by a substance, it is relative to perception. In this second case, substance is considered as expressing the entire universe, that means as representing the totality of phenomena and material bodies in its simple unity. Essentially active, a substance is the total and variable reflect of the whole world. Leibniz called it a “living mirror of the entire universe.”17 In the interiority of its perception can be found the totality of universe, not totally distinctly represented, but at least confusedly, according to a certain “point of view”.18 The scenographical19 representation of the universe by a substance is complete albeit imperfect. In the first case, any substance expresses its divine cause and Leibniz claimed that a substance has perception and appetition,20 that means the capacity to have representations and the tendency to spontaneously change them. God’s absolutely infinite attributes correspond to the substantial qualities: There is in God the power which is the source of everything, there is also the knowledge which contains the variety [detail] of the ideas, and finally, there is the will which makes changes or products in accordance with the principle of the best. This corresponds to what is in created monads the subject or basis, the perceptive faculty, and the appetitive faculty.21

The quality of subjectivity, as the principle of its action, corresponds to God’s power; the one of perception corresponds to God’s knowledge; the one of appetition corresponds to God’s will. It is remarkable that the expressive correspondence of substances and God is close to a kind of identity, quite different from the analogy of relations. Being a living mirror and having qualities corresponding to God’s attributes are

17 See, amongst others, Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, fondés en raison, 1714 (GP VI, 599; 603–604). 18 See, for instance, “Leibniz an Antoine Arnauld”, 14.07.1686 (A II 2, 80); Principia logicometaphysica, c. 1689 (A VI 4, 1646–1647); Monadologie, 1714 (GP VI, 616). 19 See Principia logico-metaphysica, c. 1689 (A VI 4, 1646–1647); “Leibniz an Des Bosses, Beilage”, 1712 (GP II, 438). 20 See Monadologie, 1714 (GP VI, 615). 21 Monadologie, 1714. In: Loemker, p. 646. Original: GP VI, 615: “Il y a en Dieu la Puissance, qui est la source de tout, puis la Connoissance, qui contient le detail des Idées, et enfin la Volonté, qui fait les changemens ou productions selon le principe du Meilleur. Et c’est ce qui répond à ce qui dans les Monades creées fait le sujet ou la Base, la Faculté perceptive et la Faculté Appetitive.”

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connected since a substance expresses the universe for it expresses its own cause which is also the cause of the universe. In other words, by expressing the universe, each substance also repeats God’s creation, since every substance is both a divine creation and a reflect of this creation itself: “And the real substances are as many expressions of the entire universe taken in a certain way, and as many replications of the divine works.”22 So is Leibniz’s kaleidoscopic conception of creation: each substance duplicates a world composed by substances themselves, by their perceptions and their appetitions. But, even if each substance corresponds to God, and expresses Its creation, amongst the infinite variety of substances, that means amongst the infinite variety of their degrees of perfection, some of them are specific. They are called “spirits” and a “spirit not only has a perception of the works of God but is even capable of producing something which resembles them, though in miniature.”23 Spirits are images of God as they are endowed with the faculty of reason. They “better express divinity”24 because they are able to bring some further perfection into the world. Each spirit is “like a little divinity within its own sphere [département]”.25 Leibniz hesitated between a difference of nature and a difference of degree for spirits and other substances. Yet, from an ontological point of view, it seems unproblematic to consider spirits like substances endowed with a higher degree of perfection – even if they also have a specific nature from an ethical point of view. In consequence, we may consider that substantial expression is mostly an activity whose degree of perfection is determined by the degree of its resemblance to God’s being. Here comes my final point: expression now consists in resemblance, which is a strong version of isomorphism and, finally, analogy.

Conclusion Expression is a mimetic activity copying God’s activity, which succeeds only in spirits while other substances only tend to it by at least representing Gods’

22 “Leibniz an Antoine Arnauld”, 30.04.1687 (my translation). Original: A II 2, 187: “Et les substances veritables [sont] autant d’expressions de tout l’univers pris dans un certain sens, et autant de replications des oeuvres divines.” 23 Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison, 1714. In: Loemker, p. 640. Original: GP VI, 604: “L’Esprit n’a pas seulement une perception des ouvrages de Dieu, mais il est même capable de produire quelque chose qui leur ressemble, quoyqu’en petit.” 24 See Discours de métaphysique, 1686 (A VI 4, 1585). 25 See Monadologie, 1714 (GP VI, 621).

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works. The lesser degree of the reality of expression then consists in the life of the substantial mirror, whose image reintroduces the paradigm of isomorphism, but in a new way. Indeed, the world is composed by an infinity of images of it which all are previously accorded. The universal harmony of substances links the microcosm of each one to the macrocosm of the universe. It also links the infinitesimality of a dimensionless substance to the infinity of the over-dimensioned universe. Even the simplest substance is “like a small world expressing the big one”,26 “a small world where the distinct ideas are a representation of God and the confused ones a representation of the universe”27 or “the exact expression of the biggest in the smallest”.28 The substantial expression is then a total isomorphism, not only in the mathematical sense of preservation of structures, but also in the more etymological sense of ‘what has the same form’ and even as ‘what is alike.’ Each substance is nothing else than the world itself, a reduced world, sometimes so much enveloped that it is unrecognizable. All is in each substance and each substance is all what it is, totally but limitedly. Nonetheless, without limitation, that is to say, without inter-expression or universal harmony, isomorphism would not resist identity and the plurality of substances would vanish in the sole perfect unity of God. But it is not. And expression surprisingly appears as something deeper, stronger, and closer to identity than to analogy, that means closer to the similarity between conics than presumed, since, as previously said, conic sections resemble one another without being totally alike.

Bibliography Abbreviated References A: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Edited by the Preußische (later: Berlin-Brandenburgische and Göttinger) Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Darmstadt (later: Leipzig and Berlin): Akademie Verlag, 1923 ff. C: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz. Extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque royale de Hanovre. Translated and edited by Louis Couturat. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1903.

26 See Discours de métaphysique, 1686 (A VI 4, 1554). 27 See Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, 1704 (A VI 6, 109). 28 See Eclaircissement des difficultés que Monsieur Bayle a trouvées dans le systeme nouveau de l’union de l’ame et du corps, 1698 (GP IV, 524).

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GP: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Die philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz. Translated and edited by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt. Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–1890 (Reprint: Hildesheim: Olms, 1960–1961). Loemker: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Leibniz. Philosophical Papers and Letters. Translated and edited by Leroy Loemker. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluver Academic Publishers, 1989.

Other Works Debuiche, Valérie (2009): “La notion d’expression et ses origines mathématiques”. In: Studia Leibnitiana 41/1, pp. 88−117. Debuiche, Valérie (2013): “L’expression leibnizienne et ses modèles mathématiques”. In: Journal of the History of Philosophy 51/3 pp. 409−439. Kulstad, Mark (1977): “Leibniz’s conception of expression”. In: Studia Leibnitiana 9/1, pp. 55−76. Swoyer, Chris (1995): “Leibnizian expression”. In: Journal of the History of Philosophy 33/1, pp. 65−99.

Sofia Araújo

5 Similarity, Form and Beauty: The Idea of Expressivity in G. W. Leibniz Abstract: Leibniz’s doctrine of expression is one of the core ideas of his philosophical thought. Nevertheless, a systematic treatment of this precise doctrine and its implications for the several realms of its application is lacking in the works of Leibniz. The present text aims to understand the concept and value of the idea of expressivity, which we derive from the general concept of expression. Thus, after presenting an analysis of what we suggest to be the main elements of expression – namely discernibility, similarity and formativity –, we will identify an aesthetical dimension of expressivity which, consequently, will lead us to the aesthetical significance of expression.

It is widely understood that one of the most important features of the Leibnizian concept of expression lies in its epistemic value. It is held that it plays a major role in human reasoning, since it enables us, by means of reasoning, to draw conclusions about the thing which is expressed, thus establishing the very condition for knowledge itself.1 Nonetheless, neither knowledge, nor expression, may be exempted of the existence of a perceiving subject who is the very condition for their existence. In fact, taking into account that expression comprises all kinds of perceptions, and given that where there is a substance there must be some kind of perception (see: Leibniz to Arnauld, 9.10.1687, A II 2, 240), one may say that, more than paving the way for knowledge, expression constitutes one of the main

1 Although this point may seem a bit bold, it is nonetheless an idea corroborated by Leibniz’s own words. According to him, what is common to all expressions is that “we can pass from a consideration of the relations in the expression to a knowledge of the corresponding properties of the thing expressed”. (Quid sit idea? L 207 = A VI 4, 1370). Given the all-encompassing character of expression, spanning from natural perception to intellectual knowledge (see, Letter to Arnauld, 9.10.1687, A II 2, 240), it seems clear to us that expression must constitute the very foundation of all knowledge. For a further analysis on this issue see Swoyer 1995, especially p. 67. Note: The Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (SFRH/BD/130812/2017) has supported the research leading to the preparation of this paper. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666120-005

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properties of being.2 Therefore, since the universe is said to be ultimately composed by an infinity of substances, being a part of the universe must amount to being able to express it. However, what does an expression express when it expresses? How can we explain that a particular subject’s expression of the same universe may vary in expressivity? What conditions are necessary in order for something to be expressible? Is there something inexpressible? In order to answer to those questions, the main object of this analysis will be the idea of expressivity, understood as ‘degree of expression’. Even though Leibniz never referred to this idea directly, one may consider it to be implied in his general doctrine on expression. Thus, a careful investigation on this idea may prove helpful towards a better understanding of the very concept of expression and its complexities. That is the aim of this work. Through an analysis of the basic requirements for the existence of expression (section one), we will move to a consideration of the metaphysical implications of the concept of similarity (section two). Those steps will allow us to consider the importance of a formal understanding of expressive relations, outlining a general theory of form as the fundament of expression and its expressive criterion (section three). From this general overview of the concept of expression, we will finally focus on the concept of expressivity and its connection with beauty (section four). Our main hypothesis is that besides its epistemic value – and owing to it –, expression must also be valued for its aesthetical significance.

5.1 The Requirements of Expression ‘Expressivity’ is commonly defined as the property or quality of being expressive, or as a degree of expression; whereas ‘expressive’ is usually defined as something which expresses; something where there is expression; something which is clear, manifest or meaningful; or something which indicates, shows or communicates feeling or meaning.3 Notwithstanding, what is common to all 2 As Leibniz remarks to De Volder, one could say that “there is nothing in the world besides simple substances and, in them, perception and appetite”. See: Leibniz to De Volder, 30.6.1704, L 537 = GP II, 270. 3 Both definitions – “expressivity” and “expressive” – were taken from their respective entries in common dictionaries (both in English and in Portuguese language). For instance: “Expressividade (. . .) O que tem ou denota vivacidade, cor, expressão; qualidade do que é expressivo” (Casteleiro 2001, p. 1655); “Expressivo (. . .) Que reflete claramente, de forma viva, o que se pretende exteriorizar ou dar a entender, conhecer; que tem expressividade (. . .) Que tem ou denota vivacidade, expressão (. . .) Que tem significado ou apresenta um conteúdo relevante; que convence ≅ CONVINCENTE, PERSUASIVO, SIGNIFICATIVO” (Casteleiro 2001, p. 1655); “Expressivity (. . .) The quality of

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those definitions is that expressivity only takes place when something like an expression occurs. Therefore, insofar as expressivity is dependent on the actuality of expression, our inquiry will start with an analysis to the basic requirements for the very existence of expression. Although Leibniz puts it differently throughout several of his writings, most of his references to the idea of expression are very similar to one another. According to the reply given to Arnauld’s specific request for a clarification of this term: “[o]ne thing expresses another [. . .] when there is a constant and regulated relation between what can be said of the one and of the other”.4 As several authors already noticed, it is not clear what Leibniz understands here by “regulation” or even by “constancy” (see, for instance, Kulstad 1977). Nonetheless, it is clear that for something like an expression to happen, one must have at least two things engaged in some kind of relation with each other. Regardless of what this relation may be, a first requirement of expression seems to be the existence of two different terms, which consequently rules out the possibility for one thing to express itself relating solely to itself. Let’s call this first requirement, a ‘requirement for discernibility’. It implies that, in order to express – and, thus, to be expressive – one thing must be related to something other than itself or to something other in itself. In fact, with this first requirement of expression, one is able to have a glimpse of the idea of inexpressiveness. Whenever something relates only to itself, it might be regarded as inexpressive. Tautologies are inexpressive. An undifferentiated world is inexpressive. Although we are used to see expression as something demanding for some kind of correspondence, one must acknowledge that discernibility is a necessary condition for the very recognition of correspondence. Leibniz also seems to acknowledge this idea in the above mentioned letter to Arnauld. According to him: “Our soul [. . .] does not think distinctly of any ‘phenomena’ when it thinks equally of all”.5 Nevertheless, if we take differentiation to be a first requirement of expression, we will have to debate ourselves with a fundamental epistemological problem:

being expressive” (Simpson/Weiner 1989, p. 586); “Expressive (. . .) Tending to press out or expel (. . .) Of or pertaining to, or concerned with, expression; having the function of expressing (. . .) Serving to express, indicate or represent (. . .) Full of expression: a. Of a word, phrase, or symbol: Expressing its meaning with striking accuracy or force. Formerly also of a statement: Explicit; b. Of the countenance, voice, actions, works of art: Characterized by expression” (Simpson/ Weiner 1989, p. 585). 4 Leibniz to Arnauld, 9.10.1687, L 339 = A II 2, 240. For other examples, see GP VII, 263, and C 15. 5 L 341 = A II 2, 244. A deeper analysis on the idea of inexpressiveness will be given in the fourth section of this work.

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since all things must differ in something, how can we provide an intelligible account of the relation between the thing which expresses and the thing which is expressed? Given their difference, how are they related? Similarity seems to be the answer. Two different things can be related with each other whenever they present some similarity or correspondence with each other. As Leibniz states in Quid sit idea: Those expressions which are founded in nature either require some similarity, such as that between a large and a small circle or that between a geographic region and a map of the region, or require some connection such as that between a circle and the ellipse which represents it optically, since any point whatever on the ellipse corresponds to some point on the circle according to a definite law.6

In short, one thing can be said to express another whenever both things present some sort of similar features. However, what are we to understand by the word ‘similar’?

5.2 The problem of Similarity Before analyzing the particular intricacies of similarity, two remarks must be done. First, one could argue that similarity is not a central point regarding expression. As Leibniz remarks: “it is clearly not necessary for that which expresses to be similar to the thing expressed” (Quid sit idea? L 207 = A VI 4, 1370). Nonetheless, one must also take into consideration that Leibniz only refuses the necessity of similarity as long as, according to his own words, “if only a certain analogy is maintained between the relations”.7 Therefore, even though similarity may not be necessary, at least some kind of analogy is required. However, if we are to understand analogy as the resembling features of dissimilar things, then, we must also concede that this very concept cannot be defined without resorting to the idea of – at least – a partial similarity. Hence, either partial or total, similarity must be accounted as a crucial point in the analysis of expression. Second, one may also claim that similarity only applies to expressions founded in nature, confining its importance to a particular kind of expression and not to expression in general. In fact, this could be the case since, as Leibniz asserts, “[i]t is [. . .] clear that some expressions have a basis in nature, while others 6 Quid sit idea? L 208 = A VI 4, 1371. 7 Quid sit idea? L 207 = A VI 4, 1370. One should observe the entire passage here at stake: “it is clearly not necessary for that which expresses to be similar to the thing expressed, if only a certain analogy is maintained between the relations”.

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are arbitrary”, and if “[t]hose ‘expressions’ which are founded in nature either require some similarity, [. . .] or [. . .] some connection” (Quid sit idea? L 208 = A VI 4, 1371), arbitrary expressions seem to not require any similarity at all. Notwithstanding, one must not forget that arbitrary expressions are just partially arbitrary.8 Thus, if there are no completely arbitrary expressions, one must concede that even arbitrary expressions may also have some fundament in nature. Now, considering that expressions founded in nature seem to require some similarity – either total or partial –, and admitting that “arbitrary” expressions may also be grounded in nature, then, it follows that similarity may work as the relational basis for each and every kind of expression. Consequently, since similarity seems to underlie and legitimate every expressive relation, we cannot neglect its importance as one of the core issues of expression. Given its centrality, our question is: how shall we understand the idea of similarity in accordance with Leibniz’s doctrine of expression? According to Quid sit idea, we may understand similarity as a correspondence between certain features of two different things. But, what are we exactly supposed to understand by the term “feature”? Assuming that features may be deemed as properties, two things may be considered as similar whenever they present certain common properties. But which properties are those? Should the two terms involved in an expressive relation share all their properties or just some of them9?

8 According to Leibniz, “some expressions have a basis in nature, while others are arbitrary, at least in part”. Quid sit idea? L 208 = A VI 4, 1371. 9 Leibniz’s commentary has been divided precisely over this question. On one hand, as Mark Kulstad suggests, expression may be understood as a function, where each element of the thing which expresses should correspond to one, and only one, element of the thing which is expressed (Kulstad 1977, p. 74). This interpretation is usually designated as a ‘functional’ reading of expression. On the other hand – and against the former view –, there is the interpretation of Chris Swoyer, who suggests that expression is based on a “structure-preserving mapping”, where there is no need for a total correspondence between all the elements of the thing which expresses and the thing which is expressed. According to the author, expression only requires the preservation – in the thing which expresses – of the structural elements of the thing which is expressed (Swoyer 1995, p. 82). This interpretation is commonly referred as a ‘structuralist” account of expression. More recently, Leibniz’s interpreters have been reanalyzing both accounts of expression. It is worth noting the work of Laura Herrera Castillo and Valérie Debuiche, who arrive at the conclusion that no mathematical model is fully able to give an accurate explanation of expression, given that none is able to explain the ultimate reality of things, namely the principle of spontaneity of the substance – a primarily metaphysical issue which resists, as it were, to any kind of mathematical explanation. See, respectively, Herrera Castillo 2018, especially last section; Debuiche 2013, esp. 437. Although we agree with this latter position, we also think that only by clarifying the questions mentioned above can

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Clearly, Leibniz seems to allow for both cases. As we have seen, it is not necessary for the two expressive terms to be totally similar, if only a certain analogy can be maintained between them. Taken at its face value, the question on what kind of similarity must be applied to an expressive relation – whether a partial or a total one – doesn’t seem to present a problem. Nonetheless, if we consider this issue under the light of Leibniz’s metaphysics, most significant problems arise. First, if we restrain expression to bijective, one-to-one, relations of correspondence,10 we would ultimately be unable to grasp the very existence of two different things, let alone the existence of a relation between them. Notwithstanding, the major problem implied by this kind of relations is the fact they jeopardize Leibniz’s own principle of the identity of indiscernibles. As Leibniz claims: [T]here cannot be two individual things in nature which differ only numerically. For surely it must be possible to give a reason why they are different, and this must be sought in some differences within themselves. Thus the observation of Thomas Aquinas about separate intelligences, which he declared never differ in number alone, must be applied to other things also. Never are two eggs, two leaves, or two blades of grass in a garden to be found exactly similar to each other. So perfect similarity occurs only in incomplete and abstract concepts, where matters are conceived, not in their totality but according to a certain single viewpoint, as when we consider only figures and neglect the figured matter.11

we arrive at a better understanding of what expression might be, as well as to a better comprehension of the ‘metaphysical’ problems posed by a functionalist or a structuralist conception of expression. Such is the aim of the present section. 10 This would be the case, as we mentioned above, of a ‘functional’ reading of expression. On this account, expression would be restrained to a kind of functional relation where there is an exact match between each element of one set and each element of the other. In other words, let A and B be the two sets in relation: each element of A must correspond to, at least, one element of B; no element of A may correspond to more than one element of B; each element of B must correspond to, at least, one element of A (surjective relation); and, no element of B may correspond to more than one element of A (injective relation). As we have referred in the previous note, the closest interpretation of expression as a bijective functional relation may be found in Mark Kulstad’s definition of expression as a “mapping” of each point or element of the thing expressed into each point or element of the thing which expresses (Kulstad 1977). For one of the most famous replies to Kulstad, see Swoyer 1995, p. 85–86). 11 Primae Veritates, L 268 = A VI 4, 1645, Leibniz’s emphasis. On this issue, see also, Discourse on Metaphysics, § 9: “it is not true that two substances can resemble each other completely and differ only in number”, L 308 = A VI 4, 1541; Leibniz to de Volder (20.06.1703): “if you assume two bodies A and B to be equal and with the same figure and motion, it will follow from such a concept of body, [. . .] that these bodies will have no intrinsic marks at all by which to be distinguished. Does this mean that A and B are not diverse individuals? Or is it possible for two things to be diverse which can in no way be distinguished? [. . .] Things which are different must differ in something or must have within themselves some diversity that can

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In the entire universe there cannot be two distinct but absolutely equal things. Therefore, the two terms involved in an expressive relation cannot share all their properties. Such a possibility would, ultimately, nullify their individuality. Consequently, we are led to conclude that a complete similarity – an equality, as it were, that is, a complete sharing of all properties leading to identity –, cannot be accounted as the ground of expressive relations. Second, however, if we assume that only a ‘partial similarity’ – understood as analogy, that is, as a partial sharing or correspondence of some (and only some) of the properties of each element involved in an expressive relation – may be applied to expressive relations, then, we could compromise Leibniz’s idea of inter-expression. As Leibniz refers in the Discourse on Metaphysics: [E]very substance is like an entire world, and like a mirror of God or of the whole universe which it expresses, each in its own manner, about as the same city is represented differently depending on the different positions from which it is regarded. Thus the universe is in a certain sense multiplied as many times as there are substances, and the glory of God is likewise redoubled by as many wholly different representations of his work. It can even be said that every substance in some way bears the character of God’s infinite wisdom and omnipotence and imitates him as much as it is capable. For it expresses, however confusedly, everything that takes place in the universe, past, present, or future; this resembles somewhat an infinite perception or an infinite knowledge. And since all other substances in their turn express this one in their own way, and adapt themselves to it, it can be said that each extends its power over all the rest in imitation of the omnipotence of the creator.12

In other words, given that each and every individual substance expresses the universe, containing in itself everything that exists, existed or will exist, not only each substance must express the same universe, but also, and consequently, all of them must mutually express each other – or rather, inter-express each other. Although Leibniz allows for some kind of difference – a difference derived from the singularity intrinsic to each perspective over the same universe –, it

be noted. [. . .] [I]t cannot happen in nature that two bodies are at once perfectly similar and equal”, L 528–529 = GP II, 249–250; Leibniz’s fifth paper to Clarke: “[t]his supposition of two indiscernibles, such as two pieces of matter perfectly alike, indeed seems to be possible in abstract terms, but it is not consistent with the order of things, nor with the divine wisdom by which nothing is admitted without a reason. The vulgar fancy such things because they content themselves with incomplete notions”, L 699 = GP VII, 394. Many other examples could be added here. 12 Discourse on Metaphysics § 9, L 308 = A VI 4, 1542. On this issue, see, Primae Veritates: “[all] individual created substances, indeed, are different expressions of the same universe and of the same universal cause, God. But these expressions vary in perfection as do different representations or perspectives of the same city seen from different points”, L 269 = A VI 4, 1646. See, also, A VI 4, 1647.

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seems that this difference is only apparent, otherwise there would be as many universes as there are perspectives. Thus, precisely because each substance expresses the same universe, it follows that, virtually, all expressions must share all their properties. Hence, in expressive terms, this rules out the possibility of a partial similarity or analogy between the thing which expresses and the expressed thing. Such hypothesis would risk the very idea of a pre-established harmony. Consequently, not even analogy seems to properly accommodate the specificities inherent to expressive relations. Our problem grows deeper. If, on one hand, the terms involved in an expressive relation cannot contain the same properties, at the risk of compromising the individuality of each term, on the other hand, both terms cannot contain different properties, since such a possibility could nullify the pre-established harmony, which is precisely the cause of the mutual agreement between substances and the ground of all intersubjectivity. The main difficulty here is to find a concept of similarity which may be plastic enough to not confine expression to identity-relations, but not so wide that renders inter-expression impossible. In our view, the beginning of an answer to this problem may be found in Leibniz’s writings on geometry. In those writings, Leibniz sustains that he has found a new definition of similarity not only capable of suppressing the vagueness given to this concept until then, but also a definition more able to fit mathematical research and geometrical demonstrations.13 This new conceptualization is relevant to our research for three reasons. First, because in the closest years to the first formulation of the concept of expression (in the writing of 1678, Quid sit idea, A VI 4, 1370), Leibniz devoted much of his time researching geometrical problems. Second, because one of Leibniz’s favorite examples to illustrate the idea of expression was taken precisely from geometry, that is, the perspective projection of a conic section onto a plane.14 And, third, because this formulation of similarity seems to be the

13 See, for instance, De Analysi Situs: “[t]he theory of similarities or of forms lies beyond mathematics and must be sought in metaphysics. Yet it has many uses in mathematics also, being of use even in the algebraic calculus itself. But similarity is seen best of all in the situations or figures of geometry. Thus a true geometric analysis ought not only to consider equalities and proportions which are truly reducible to equalities but also similarities [. . .] The true reason why geometricians have not made enough use of a theory of similarity is, I think, this. They did not have any general concept of it which was sufficiently distinct or adapted to mathematical investigation; this is a fault of philosophers, who usually are content, especially in metaphysics, with vague definitions which are fully as obscure as the thing defined”. L 254–255 = GM V, 179–180. 14 According to Chris Swoyer, there are reasons to believe that Leibniz may have regarded this example as the very paradigm of expression, not only because this is the most frequent illustration of expression and an example which is more developed than any other, but also

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only formulation capable of fitting the peculiarities of the expressive relation, preserving, at the same time, some of the most fundamental principles of Leibniz’s metaphysics. Generally speaking, Leibniz will define similarity as that which cannot be distinguished if seen separately, but distinguishable if seen together. In other words, similarity will be regarded as ‘discernibility by compresence’. As Leibniz claims: After having searched carefully, I have found that two things are perfectly similar, once we cannot but discern them by per compraesentiam, for instance, two unequal circles of the same material could only be discerned by seeing them conjointly, since in this way one can see that one is bigger than the other.15

It should be remarked here the difference in detail between the idea of similarity and the idea of congruence. Both similarity and congruence presuppose discernibility by compresence. However, whereas congruence applies to figures both formally and dimensionally equal, the same cannot be said of similarity, since the latter seems to only require the preservation of formal properties.16 In other words, both similarity and congruence presuppose indiscernibility of figures when seen in isolation. However, if seen conjointly, either we conclude that they only present a numerical difference – congruence –, or we understand that both present actually different properties, even though the same formal properties are maintained – similarity. Leibniz seems to refer to this very idea when he states that: Quantity or magnitude is that in things which can be known only through their simultaneous compresence – or by their simultaneous perception. [. . .] Quality, on the other hand, is what can be known in things when they are observed singly, without requiring any compresence. [. . .] Equals are things having the same quantity. Similars are things having the same quality. Hence, if two similar things are different, they can be distinguished only when they are co-present (Initia Rerum Mathematicarum Metaphysica, L 667 = GM VII, 18–19).

because Leibniz repeats its use over a period of almost forty years, leading us to conclude that perspective projection would be exactly the idea that Leibniz had in mind in his several reflections on expression. For a further analysis of this topic, see Swoyer 1995, p. 68–79. 15 Leibniz to Gallois, ca. 1677, our translation, Leibniz’s emphasis, A III, 2, 227. Like many other concepts in Leibniz’s philosophy, the concept of similarity also has its own particular history of reformulations and developments. Even though we cannot carry on here a historical analysis of this concept, such an analysis may be found in Risi 2007, esp. pp. 132–148; and in Esquisabel 2008. 16 According to De Analysi Situs, Leibniz defines congruence as that which is at the same time equal and similar, being equal the figures “whose magnitude is the same”, and similar the ones “whose form is the same” (see L 254 = GM V, 179). We may conclude, therefore, that congruence supposes not only a qualitative equality, but also a quantitative one. On the contrary, similarity seems to imply only a qualitative equality.

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Given this formulation of similarity, we may now consider its adequacy to expressive relations. Is this definition of similarity enough to accommodate the relation between the thing which expresses and the expressed thing without falling in the problems mentioned above? First, having in mind that this concept defines as similar those things which cannot be distinguished if seen separately, but nonetheless can be distinguishable if seen together, then, from the application of this concept to expressive relations, it follows that the thing which expresses and the expressed thing cannot be totally similar or equal to each other. The fact that each expressive term would be more than numerically distinguishable if seen together implies that both terms do not share all their properties. In this sense, it is clear that, depending on the point of view, we may avoid the problem of an ‘all-encompassing identity’. Given that, if seen together, the thing which expresses and the expressed thing would present some properties by which they could be distinguished, it follows that both terms in the expressive relation would remain as distinct elements of the same relation, thus excluding the hypothesis of a complete correspondence – which, as we have seen, could eliminate each term’s individuality. Second, given that this concept appears to be eminently related to the adoption of a certain point of view, a clear interpretation of it seems to be equally able to avoid the problem of heteromorphism and the possibility of nullifying Leibniz’s idea of inter-expression. Considering that each individual substance is committed to the expression of the same universe, the preservation of the formal properties of each expressive term seems to be the final guarantee of Leibniz’s idea of inter-expression. Even though the particular properties of each expression are ensured by the singularity proper to each substance’s point of view – a point of which cannot be shared with any other substance, and which is nothing but a difference in position towards the perception of the same thing –, the fact that each expression is able to preserve the formal properties of the thing expressed seems to finally ensure Leibniz’s idea that all expressions must coincide as expressions of the same universe.17 Accordingly, it seems that this concept of similarity is capable of encompassing all the details of the expressive relation, without compromising some of the most basic principles of Leibniz’s metaphysics, such as the principle of

17 This conclusion is somewhat sympathetic with the above-mentioned ‘structuralist’ account of expression, in the way Chris Swoyer puts it: “one thing expresses a second just in case there is a structure-preserving mapping from either to the other” (Swoyer 1995, p. 82). Nonetheless, as we will see in the next section, which kind of properties can really be accounted for as properties belonging to a ‘structure’?

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individuation or the idea of inter-monadic expression. Thus, one may consider similarity as a second requirement of expression and expressivity. However, may we really claim that similarity is enough to solve all the problems related to Leibniz’s concept of expression? With what limitations will we have to debate ourselves if we are to accept its application to expression?

5.3 The Need of Form and its Connection to Expressivity Unlike the concept of congruence, which implies the combination of equality and similarity (see: De Analysi Situs, L 255 = GM V, 180) – and, therefore, a total communion of the properties of each expressive term –, the particular concept of similarity mentioned above suggests a greater specificity regarding the shared properties of both terms in the expressive relation. We would only need to know which properties would have to be shared, and which properties would have to be maintained in each term’s individuality, in order to obtain such a relation that the thing which expresses and the expressed thing would seem the same if contemplated in isolation, but different if regarded conjointly. However, if we don’t know this particular detail, how can we ever be sure that we stand before true relations of similarity? Furthermore, given that similarity requires a change in perspective towards the same objects – so they can be brought to compresence –, what kind of point of view should we have to adopt in order to be able to recognize such relations? Shall this concept be really considered as a solution for our problems, or are we just giving another name to them? The answer to these questions seems to lie in Leibniz’s own words. According to De Analysi Situs: [I]t is not enough to designate objects as similar whose form is the same, unless a general concept is further given of form. In undertaking an explanation of quality or form, I have learned that the matter reduces to this: things are similar which cannot be distinguished when observed in isolation from each other. Quantity can be grasped only when the things are actually present together or when some intervening thing can be applied to both. But quality presents something to the mind which can be known in a thing separately and can then be applied to the comparison of two things without actually bringing the two together either immediately or through the mediation of a third object as a measure (L 255 = GM V, 180).

Through this formulation of similarity it becomes clear that the properties which have to be shared are the ones regarding quality or form, and the properties which have to be maintained in each term’s individuality are the ones

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concerning quantity or magnitude.18 What seems important to underline here is the fact that those properties which are shared – the ones regarding quality or form – do not need to be perceived conjointly in order to be recognized. As we have seen, “[q]uantity or magnitude is that in things which can be known only through their simultaneous compresence – or by their simultaneous perception”,19 while quality “is what can be known in things when they are observed singly, without requiring any compresence”.20 From this it follows that while quantity is dependent on each singular perception, quality may be recognized by itself alone.21 But, what does ‘quality’ refer to? In the text mentioned above, Initia Rerum Mathematicarum Metaphysica, Leibniz defines quality as “the attributes which can be explained by a definition or through the various modes which they involve” (L 667 = GM VII, 19), in opposition to quantity which cannot be explained accurately through a definition (L 667 = GM VII, 18–19). In other words, while quality seems to refer to the intrinsic properties of a thing, quantity seems to refer to its extrinsic properties – i. e. properties which do not depend on the thing itself, but on our perception of it.22 Clearly, the concept of quality, as Leibniz presents it, doesn’t seem to be too far away from the scholastic idea of quidditas, the essence of a thing.23 In fact, it seems that both concepts – the idea of quality, as well as the idea of

18 In fact, taking into consideration that each and every individual substance expresses the same universe, a difference in perspective seems to be better understood as a quantitative difference (a difference in quantity, shape or size). It is not a formal difference, but a difference in the way that each perspective ‘distorts’, so to speak, the form in its own singular way. On this issue, see the interesting interpretation of Laura Herrera Castillo on the concept of ‘anamorphosis’ and Leibniz’s idea of ‘point of view’, Herrera Castillo 2016, pp. 134–135. 19 Initia Rerum Mathematicarum Metaphysica, L 667 = GM VII, 18, Leibniz’s emphasis. 20 L 667 = GM VII, 19, Leibniz’s emphasis. For a similar formulation, see: Characteristica Geometrica, GM V, 154. 21 As Oscar Esquisabel points out, “[i]t is pertinent to point out that there is a remarkable difference between form and magnitude. Magnitude pertains to perception, so that it can be established and discriminated only by perceptive comparison. On the contrary, form can be known by itself, without comparison” (Esquisabel 2008, p. 5). 22 This distinction is made clear in the Discourse on Metaphysics, § 12: “[i]t can even be demonstrated that the concepts of size, figure, and motion are not so distinct as has been imagined and that they include something imaginary and relative to our perceptions”. L 309 = A VI 4, 1545. 23 It must be remarked, though, that the essence of a thing is different from its particular and individual mode of being – something akin to the scholastic concept of haecceitas. For a further discussion on Leibniz’s rehabilitation of scholastic philosophy, mainly on his recuperation of the scholastic notions of quidditas and species, see: Mercer 2004 and Spruit 1995, esp. 523 ff.

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quantity – not only provide a preservation of Leibniz’s principles of individuation and inter-expression within the theory of similarity, but also uncover the metaphysical character of similarity. According to Leibniz: Besides quantity, figure in general includes also quality or form. And as those figures are equal whose magnitude is the same, so those are similar whose form is the same. The theory of similarities or of forms lies beyond mathematics and must be sought in metaphysics (De Analysi Situs, L 254 = GM V, 179, Leibniz’s emphasis).

As we may see, a full explanation of quality, form and similarity is to be sought in metaphysics. But, from this passage, it also becomes quite clear that Leibniz seems to indentify quality with form, and form as the foundation of similarity. Thus, moving back to our discussion on expression, this means that if we are to understand expressive relations as relations of similarity – a special kind of similarity though –, we must conclude that expression requires the presence of a form – understood as quidditas – as its very fundament. Therefore, it seems that a third requirement of expression – and expressivity – is its formativity. This requirement implies that among the terms of an expressive relation there must always be a shared form.24 Consequently, one may conclude that expression is not only a relation between the thing expressed and the thing which expresses, but a relation between these two terms plus a ‘middle term’ in which both expressive terms participate – a term which mediates the transition between the two expressive terms, being the ground for the very existence of an expressive relation. Conceived in this way, the concept of form enables not only a horizontal consideration of expression, one that allows us to move between distinct ontological realms, but also a vertical interpretation of it, one that grants us the possibility to move from the discreteness of things to the harmonic continuity of the whole. This point is of particular importance, since it will enable us to consider the epistemic value of expression. Since expressive relations lead to the recognition of forms – and conversely, forms lead to the recognition of expressive relations –, the degree of expressivity of a certain expressive relation seems to be directly implied by the kind of perception, or degree of knowledge, that one possesses of such forms. Given that quality refers to the intrinsic properties of a form, while quantity refers to extrinsic properties dependent on each single perception, recognizing the difference between these two kinds of properties seems to be subordinated

24 Form should be here understood in its widest sense, that is, as something closer to structure or idea and not exclusively as a substantial form.

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to the kind of knowledge that we possess of such forms and their respective properties.25 According to Leibniz, knowledge may be obscure or clear. It is obscure when it “does not suffice for recognizing the thing represented” (Meditations on knowledge, truth and ideas, L 291 = A VI 4, 586), and it is clear “when it makes it possible for me to recognize the thing represented” (L 291 = A VI 4, 586). In turn, clear knowledge is either confuse or distinct. It is confuse “when I cannot enumerate one by one the marks which are sufficient to distinguish the thing from others, even though the thing may in truth have such marks and constituents into which its concept can be resolved” (L 291 = A VI 4, 586), and it is distinct when it enables the enumeration of the sufficient marks which allow the distinction of one thing from all the others (see L 292 = A VI 4, 587). Furthermore, distinct knowledge can be either inadequate or adequate. It is inadequate when the single component marks of a concept are known clearly but confusedly (see L 292 = A VI 4, 587), and adequate “when every ingredient that enters into a distinct concept is itself known distinctly” (L 292 = A VI 4, 587), or when its “analysis is carried through to the end”.26 Adequate knowledge, on the other hand, can be either symbolic or intuitive. It is symbolic when “we do not intuit the entire nature of the subject matter at once but make use of signs instead of things” (L 292 = A VI 4, 587–588), and intuitive when the intuition of the entire nature of the subject, all at once, is possible.27 The most perfect knowledge is the one which is both adequate and intuitive, and such knowledge is said to belong only to God.28 From this description of different possible kinds of knowledge, it seems clear that expressivity increases in the same way that our knowledge approaches, as much as possible, an intuitive understanding of forms, moving away from confusion and obscurity. Nonetheless, what is also implied by this depiction of expressivity is the fact that it applies to each and every perception, thus providing an account of the continuity between sense-perception and cognition. As Leibniz asserts: “Expression [. . .] is a genus of which natural perception, animal feeling, and intellectual knowledge are species” (Letter to Arnauld, 9.10.1687, L 339 = A II 2, 240). In this sense, all cognitive activity, both in its

25 Or marks, as we will see in the text mentioned below. 26 L 292 = A VI 4, 587. Leibniz adds to this passage that he is “not sure that a perfect example of this can be given by man, but our concept of numbers approaches it closely”. 27 L 292 = A VI 4, 588. To this explanation of knowledge Leibniz also refers that, “[t]here is no other knowledge than intuitive of a distinct primitive concept, while for the most part we have only symbolic thought of composites”. 28 For a similar interpretation of the degrees of knowledge, see: New Essays on Human Understanding, Book II, chap. XXIX, A VI, 6, 254–263.

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highest and lowest degrees, seems to be grounded on the apprehension – either conscious or not – of a form. In fact, only a careful investigation of recognized forms is likely to enable us to move towards higher degrees of knowledge. It was not arbitrarily but deliberately that Leibniz defined knowledge as the possibility of carrying out a complete analysis to definitions until we arrive at the first truths.29 Therefore, the knowledge of the most fundamental forms – taken as simple primitive qualities or perfections – must be the most expressive one. As Leibniz asserts, a simple quality – or perfection – is one “which is positive and absolute or which expresses whatever it expresses without any limits” (Quod Ens Perfectissimum existit, L 167 = A VI, 3, 577). Nonetheless, although it is the most expressive, it is also the most ineffable, since when the form is primitive, or the mark of itself, it becomes irreducible to any other form and it may only be understood through itself, without the possibility of being subsumed to any kind of definition.30 Consequently, we are led to conclude that the higher our comprehension of a form is, the harder it becomes for us to make manifest a full account of it. But is it accurate to say that the value of expressivity lies solely on its epistemic significance? In fact, besides its epistemic dimension, expressivity seems to be grounded on a very particular relationship between beauty and truth.31

5.4 Expressivity and Beauty From the analysis we have carried in the previous section, it becomes clear that there is a strong connection between expressivity and knowledge. Accordingly, ‘obscure’ and ‘intuitive’ knowledge correspond, respectively, to the lowest and highest degrees of expressivity. However, the admission of a kind of ‘obscure’ knowledge – a knowledge which is not sufficient to recognize the thing represented – seems to compromise what we have suggested to be the first requirement of expression: the

29 See, for instance: Letter to Foucher, 1675, GP I, 369–374; On the General Characteristic, GP VII, 299–231; Meditations on knowledge, truth and ideas, A VI 4, 585–592; or, Primae Veritates, C 518–523 = A VI 4, 1644–1679. 30 On this issue, see: Meditations on knowledge, truth and ideas, A VI 4, 585–592. 31 Fernando Gil also suggests this idea in the lectures he gave at Johns Hopkins University during the years of 2002–2004 (a Portuguese translation of this unpublished lectures can be found in the annex of Araújo 2013). Unfortunately, due to his death in 2006, the author never got to present a full systematization on the concept of expression. For a further reading on Fernando Gil’s interpretation of the connection between beauty and truth, see Gil 1998.

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‘requirement for discernibility’. Given that all perceptions must be accounted as a species of expression (see: Letter to Arnauld, 9.10.1687, L 339 = A II 2, 240), it follows that obscure perceptions must also be accounted as expressions. Therefore, even when a perception doesn’t involve any kind of differentiation, expression still holds. In this regard, it should be remarked that the requirement for discernibility, as we have defined it in our first section, doesn’t necessarily imply the conscious perception of a difference. Discernibility only requires that one thing must be related to something other than itself, or to something other in itself, in order to express and to be expressive. Even though the perception of a difference is an important step towards the development of knowledge, expression must also embrace the incapability of discerning a difference. Notwithstanding, a major consequence derives from this understanding of expression. If we admit that each and every perception that doesn’t involve any kind of differentiation is nonetheless an expression, it follows that ‘inexpressiveness’ cannot be derived from obscurity. In other words, even when an obscure perception takes place, there is always some degree of expressivity. A very low degree though, but still, a degree of expressivity. As such, one may conclude that in Leibniz’s doctrine of expression there is no legitimate place for a concept such as inexpressiveness.32 From its smallest details, to its highest constitution as whole, everything in the universe is potentially expressible. Expression, whatever it expresses, always holds a certain degree of expressivity. Expressivity, thus, seems to be entirely dependent on each subject’s perceptive and cognitive capabilities. In human souls – or spirits, according to Leibniz’s lexicon – the apprehension of a form enables not only the discrimination of the local, but also the comprehension of the global. The potential knowledge that a subject may possess of a certain form reveals an interpretative activity which enables the extension of the parts between themselves and the constitution of a unifying whole. The clearer and the more distinct our perception of a form is, the more it unveils the underlying structure of the perceived. In this sense,

32 In fact, taking into account the double meaning of expression – either in its specificity, as representation, or in its generality, as “making something manifest” –, the idea of “inexpressibility” seems to belong more accurately to a theory of language, or communication, rather than to a theory of representation. Indeed, only through the consideration of the transmissible character of a given expression, can we give a proper account of inexpressive as something undifferentiated or tautological – as we have seen in section one –, or even as ineffable – as we have referred to in section three. According to this latter view, inexpressiveness – as the incapability of making something manifest – would belong not only to the lowest degrees of knowledge, but also to its highest ones.

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expressivity increases proportionally to the way in which a subject is able to rise above the particular objects of experience towards the universal apprehension of the whole. Nonetheless, insofar as expression has the power to conduct us to perceive ever simpler forms – which, as we have mentioned, can be taken as simple primitive qualities or perfections –, one may conclude that expressivity is related not only to our perception and to the degree of knowledge of such forms, but also, and because of them, to the degree of perfection implied in each form. Considering that Leibniz equates perfection to power, order and harmony, each form perceived, the more perfect it is, the more it unveils ‘unity in plurality’, something which for Leibniz “is nothing but harmony” (On Wisdom, L 426 = DS 422). Accordingly, forms are not all the same. Their degree of perfection may vary. As Leibniz observes, “perfection [. . .] is the degree of positive reality, or [. . .] the degree of affirmative intelligibility, so that something more perfect is something in which more things worthy of note are found” (Leibniz to Wolff, winter 1714–1715, AG 230 = GLW 161). In short, there are forms which are more perfect than others. But since perfection can be accounted as a degree, all forms must hold some kind of perfection. As a consequence, given that Leibniz equates perfection with harmony, each form in itself must be a manifestation of harmony. In this regard, expressivity results not only from each subject’s perceptions and cognitive capabilities, but also from forms themselves. For this reason, expressivity cannot properly fit either the scope of subjectivity, or the realm of objectivity. Strictly speaking, expressivity seems to be better understood as a ‘relational’ property of expression – namely, a property which concomitantly refers to the particular way in which a subject perceives a certain form, and the way in which this particular form affects the subject.33 As such, expressivity entwines objective and subjective properties in a harmonious continuum. Its outcome has a name: beauty. We are thus confronted with the aesthetical value of expressivity. As Leibniz reminds us, “happiness, pleasure, love, perfection, [. . .] harmony, order, and beauty are all tied to each other, a truth which is rightly perceived

33 As Leibniz remarks, “the image of [. . .] perfection in others, impressed upon us, causes some of this perfection to be implanted and aroused within ourselves”. On Wisdom, L 425 = DS, 420. We must remark that the idea of a ‘relational’ account of expressivity is largely due to Frederick C. Beiser’s interpretation of Leibniz’s concept of beauty. See: Beiser 2009, p. 36. Although we agree that Leibniz’s conception of beauty seems to be fundamentally relational, given the analysis we have made so far, we also believe that the very same idea can be accurately applied to the notion of expressivity.

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by few” (L 426 = DS 423). Since harmony and beauty are intimately interconnected, it follows that each form, as a manifestation of harmony, must also be understood as a manifestation of beauty.34 To the extent that forms are endowed with beauty, expressivity must also be related to the degree of beauty implied and perceived in each form. However, besides the degree of beauty of a particular form, harmony and beauty must potentially be contained in every expression. If, as we have seen in section two, the entire universe is given in each perception, then its harmony and beauty – independently from our awareness of them – must equally be present in each and every perception. In fact, this simultaneous apprehension of the whole constitutes a degree of confusion latent to all perceptive activity.35 The coefficient of confusion of a certain perception corresponds primarily to the harmonic unity of the structure. The whole is imposed upon each perception, even if the latter only focuses a part of it.36 Yet, despite its immanence to all perceptive activity, confusion does not constitute an inexpugnable unintelligibility. On the contrary. What in each perception is clearly perceived – although confusedly –, operates as a first step towards the perception of harmony. Through the perception of forms, aided by knowledge, we are led to an increasing – although, not absolute – depuration of confusion and a further comprehension of harmony. In this context, beauty appears originally as a primal ‘feeling’ of harmony. Just like expressivity, beauty is a mark of the interconnection between the expressive subject and the underlying harmonic structure of the universe. But, even though beauty primarily corresponds to what Leibniz defines as a ‘Je ne sais quoi’ – that is, something which pleases us but which, due to confusion, we cannot distinctly perceive (see: Discourse on Metaphysics § 24, GP

34 It is worth noting that when Leibniz defines pleasure, he explicitly associates it with perfection. According to him, “[p]leasure is the feeling of a perfection or an excellence, whether in ourselves or in something else” (L 425 = DS 420). 35 The immanence of confusion to all perceptive activity is clearly stated in the Discourse on Metaphysics, § 9. We shall recall the passage already quoted in section two: “every substance is like an entire world, and like a mirror of God or of the whole universe which it expresses, each in its own manner [. . .] For it expresses, however confusedly, everything that takes place in the universe, past, present, or future; this resembles somewhat an infinite perception or an infinite knowledge” (L 308 = GP IV, 434). 36 In fact, this latency of confusion to every perception somehow blurs the precise boundaries of each degree of knowledge as we have described them above. Although Leibniz allows for a clear but confuse knowledge, distinct knowledge can also be confused (or inadequate, according to Leibniz’s words), and so on. Actually, the only kind of knowledge which would be free from the permanent immanence of confusion would be the knowledge of God.

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IV, 449 = L 318–319) –, a higher degree of knowledge doesn’t really erase the ‘feeling of beauty’ – converting it into pure intellection –, but rather intensifies it.37 Adelino Cardoso observes it quite clearly, [I]n its highest degree of intensity, feeling is the perception of harmony. (. . .) The philosophical meaning of feeling seems to lie in the mediation between singularity and universality: the singular form appears as a mediator of the universal order; it is the accentuation of its singularity that makes it a prominent form of the world, a mirror of the universe’s perfection. It is revealing, regarding the nature of feeling, that it comes closer to the true point of view of things than general science. Leibniz’s recognition of feeling as such seems to be grounded here, both by demarcating it from intellective activity and by conferring it a privileged place regarding the latter. (Cardoso 1992, p. 100–101, our translation).

Beauty as ‘feeling’ not only belongs to the lowest degrees of knowledge, but also, and more intensely to its highest degrees. As Leibniz often observes, the ‘feeling’ of beauty is proportional to the degree of knowledge of the perceiver. According to him, the universe is a “cosmos, full of ornament” (Résumé de métaphysique, § 17, P 146 = C 535), made in such a way that it shall satisfy the ones endowed with intelligence. In fact, “[a]n intelligent being’s pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection” (§ 18, Leibniz’s emphasis, P 146 = C 535). An increase in the degree of knowledge doesn’t mean a loss on feeling, but quite the contrary. The more we approach the unitary perfection of the whole, the greater the feeling of beauty. Consequently, given that harmony is the ultimate reality of things, the beauty implied in each expressive relation must be accounted as a sign of truth. Expressivity, therefore, as the combination between knowledge, perfection and beauty, shall fundamentally be regarded as an index of truth. More than being accounted as the presentation of each subject’s cognitive capabilities, expressivity must be taken as an indicator of the accuracy of our knowledge.

37 As Leibniz remarks, “[w]e do not always observe wherein the perfection of pleasing things consists, or what kind of perfection within ourselves they serve, yet our feelings perceive it, even though our understanding does not. We commonly say, ‘There is something, I know not what, that pleases me in the matter.’ [. . .] But those who seek the causes of things will usually find a ground for this and understand that there is something at the bottom of the matter which, though unnoticed, really appeals to us” (L 425 = DS 421).

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Conclusion According to Leibniz, there are two general absolute truths, which assure us of the actual existence of things. In his own words: [O]ne is that we think, the other is that there is a great variety in our thoughts. From the former it follows that we are; from the latter it follows that there is something other than us, that is, something other than that which thinks, which is the cause of the variety of our experiences. (Leibniz to Foucher, L 152 = GP I, 370).

He further adds: “one of these truths is just as incontestable and as independent as the other”. As such, expressivity must arise from both. From our previous analysis, we were able to see that expressivity only takes place when something like an expression occurs. In turn, for expression to happen there must always exist, at least, two distinct things engaged in some kind of relation with each other. However, the nature of this relation is not a trivial one. Considered under the light of similarity, expressive relations have proven to not allow either a total similarity – at the risk of compromising the individuality of each expressive term –, or a sheer analogy – at the risk of jeopardizing Leibniz’s idea of inter-expression. Notwithstanding, we have also seen that by the word ‘similar’ Leibniz understands something quite different from the ideas of equality or analogy. In accordance with Leibniz’s writings on geometry, ‘similar’ are those things which have the same quality, and whose discernibility is only possible if they are perceived together. Grounded on the idea of form, similar things are defined as the ones which participate in the same form, appearing as the same thing if contemplated in isolation, or as distinct things if perceived conjointly. From this conception of similarity, we could see how it may be applied to expressive relations without compromising Leibniz’s most fundamental metaphysical principles, and how its account is dependent on the concept of form. Underlying expressive relations – and its particular kind of similarity – there must always be a form in which both expressive terms participate, and which grounds the very existence of a relation. In fact, only through the consideration of form were we able to give a deeper account of the concept of expressivity. Arising from the apprehension of forms – either conscious or not –, expressivity is related to the kind of perception, or degree of knowledge, that one possesses of such forms. In this sense, expressivity presents itself both on the highest degrees of cognitive activity, and in its lowest ones. But if, on one hand, expressivity seems to be entirely subjective – that is, entirely dependent on a subject’s cognitive capabilities –, on the other, it is also based on the objective properties of forms. Insofar as forms are endowed with different degrees

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of perfection, expressivity is also the outcome of the perfection they hold. And, since perfection, beauty and truth are all bonded to each other, expressivity must also be accounted as a degree of beauty and as an index of truth. Expressivity is thus the result of the simultaneous attraction between the universe and the one who contemplates it. Following from the truth of our existence, it is also a consequence of the truth underlying all things outside of us. As such, expressivity cannot deceive. A sign of truth, expressivity is ‘well founded’ on the harmonic structure of the whole.

Bibliography Abbreviated References A: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Edited by the Preußische (later: Berlin-Brandenburgische and Göttinger) Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Darmstadt (later: Leipzig and Berlin): Akademie Verlag, 1923 ff. AG: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Philosophical Essays. Translated and edited by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989. C: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz. Extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque royale de Hanovre. Translated and edited by Louis Couturat. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1903. DS: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Deutsche Schriften. Edited by Gottschalk Eduard Guhrauer. Hildesheim: Olms, 1966 (First: 1840). GM: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Leibnizens mathematische Schriften. Edited by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt. Hildesheim: Olms, 1961 (First: 1855). GLW: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolff. Edited by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt. Halle: H. W. Schmidt, 1860. GP: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Die philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz. Edited by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt. Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–1890 (Reprint: Hildesheim: Olms, 1960–1961). L: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Philosophical Papers and Letters. Translated and edited by Leroy E. Loemker. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989 (2nd edition). P: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Philosophical Writings. Edited by George H. R. Parkinson, London: Everyman, 1995.

Other Works Araújo, Sofia (2013): Uma Teoria da Expressão em Fernando Gil, seguida da Tradução e Edição dos Cursos Lecionados por Fernando Gil na Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore (2002–2004). Porto: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto. Beiser, Frederick (2009): Diotima’s Children. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Cardoso, Adelino (1992): Leibniz Segundo a Expressão. Lisbon: Colibri. Casteleiro, João Malaca (Ed). (2001): Dicionário da Língua Portuguesa Contemporânea. Vol. I. Lisbon: Academia das Ciências de Lisboa e Editorial Verbo. Debuiche, Valérie (2013). “L’expression leibnizienne et ses modèles mathématiques”. In: Journal of the History of Philosophy, 51/3, pp. 409–439. Esquisabel, Oscar Miguel (2008): “Leibniz’s Science of Forms as a Structural Science and Similarity as its Central Concept”. In: CLE e-Prints (Journal of the Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science, State University of Campinas, Brazil) Vol. 8, No. 6. https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/CLE_e-Prints/article/view/925. Visited on 28. 12.2018 Gil, Fernando (1998): “O Belo como excesso do existir”. In: Gil, Fernando: Modos da Evidência. Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda, pp. 429–438. Herrera Castillo, Laura (2016): “G. W. Leibniz y el surgimiento de la perspectiva”. In: Dissertatio. Revista de Filosofia. Volume Suplementar 3: Dossiê Leibniz, pp. 109–149. Herrera Castillo, Laura (2018): “Expressión y fuerza: formas de la funcionalidad desnuda en G. W. Leibniz”. In: Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía 44/2, pp. 225–245. Kulstad, Mark (1977): “Leibniz’s conception of expression”. In: Studia Leibnitiana 9/1, pp. 55–76. Mercer, Christa (2004): Leibniz’s Metaphysiscs: Its Origins and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Risi, Vicenzo de (2007): Geometry and Monadology. Basel/Boston/Berlin: Birkhäuser. Simpson, John Andrew/Weiner, Edmund S. C. (Eds.) (1989): The Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. V, Oxford: Clarendon Press (2nd Edition). Spruit, Leen (1995): Species intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge. Leiden/New York/ Köln: E. J. Brill. Swoyer, Chris (1995): “Leibnizian expression”. In: Journal of the History of Philosophy 33/1, pp. 65–99.

Oscar M. Esquisabel

6 Expression and Semiotic Representation: Metaphysical Foundations of Leibniz’s Theory of the Sign Abstract: This paper argues that Leibniz’s concept of expression serves as a foundation of his approach to semiotics. With this aim, first we evaluate critically the constructivist interpretation of Leibniz’s semiotics and develop an alternative interpretation funded on the concept of exposition or exhibition. Next, we show the strong interconnectedness between the concepts of expression and representation and give an account of expression as the ground for the possibility of semiotic representation, which we interpret in terms of surrogative reasoning. Finally, we analyze the semiotic relationship between sign and thought as being grounded on (the metaphysical sense of) expression.

Introduction In this paper we will consider Leibniz’s theory of the sign based on the concepts of expression and representation. From this perspective we will propose that, according to Leibniz, the semiotic systems can carry out a representational function, since they have an expressive constitution on which the representational function is founded. Thus, basing ourselves on a structural conception of the concept of expression, we will sustain the thesis that the expressive nature of semiotic forms consists, in short, in a projection of the formal structure of the denoted object onto the structure of the semiotic formation.1 This kind of “projection”, in which important aspects of the Leibinizian concept of expression are condensed, has some methodological, epistemological and ontological consequences, which are extremely important for Leibniz’s semiotic conceptions. First, it makes possible the instrumental function of the semiotic systems, which, at the limit, leads to the

1 We will employ the term “object” in the general sense of what can be considered by the human intellect. Thus, for example, a concept can be an object. We will also clarify that we employ expressions such as “semiotic form”, “semiotic formation” or “semiotic configuration” as equivalent, in order to highlight the fact that signs, according to Leibniz, are organized in systems. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110666120-006

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idea of a “perfect” representation system. What is more, over and above the instrumental function, the possibility of an expositive function of semiotic systems is outlined. In other words, a semiotic form (such as a formula, for example) exhibits or “shows” in a perceptible way the structural organization of an object or state of affairs, even when the thing exhibited through it is conceptual and non-perceptible. Thus, through the expositive function, the signs and the systems to which they belong reveal its constitutive function for the objects of human reason in general, to the extent that, according to Leibniz, every knowable thing must be semiotically mediated.2 From this perspective, against a “constructive” interpretation of Leibniz’s semiotic conceptions, such as that of S. Krämer, we propose a “constitutive” vision, in which the notion of expression has a central role, to the extent that it makes it possible to conceive a sign as an “exposition”. In the first part we will briefly explain Kramer’s thesis regarding the constructive nature of the sign in Leibniz. Secondly, we will expound the instrumental conception of the sign, which Leibniz presents in terms of a “pictorial” conception, and we will compare it with the other Leibnizian thesis, namely, that signs are essential for human reason; then in the fourth section we will analyze the Leibnizian notion of expression and its relation to the concept of representation, in order to finally deal with the relation between expression and signs in the fifth section.

6.1 Krämer: A Constructivist Interpretation of Leibniz’s Semiotics In an influential work on the origins of formal thought (Krämer 1991, pp. 224–225), Sybille Krämer presents four hypotheses regarding the Leibnizian conception of symbolic knowledge: 1. For Leibniz, signs are things with which it is possible to operate according to certain rules. Signs are manipulable objects. 2. This manipulability implies a certain autonomy of the sign as regards that which it designates. This autonomy allows signs to be organized as calculations (formal systems), whose internal structure is independent of the interpretation that can be given to them. At the same time, the manipulability of

2 Leibniz maintains that an immediate knowledge of simple ideas is possible, and he names it ‘intuitive’ (for example, A VI 4, 586). The question whether for Leibniz this kind of knowledge can disregard any semiotic mediation, cannot be categorically answered, although he seems inclined toward a negative answer (A VI 4, 587). Be it as it may, in this paper we will not deal with this question.

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signs enables the creation of a kind of writing which is independent of the spoken language. 3. The construction of formal systems in terms of writings makes it possible for systems of signs to become symbolic machines. 4. Every scientific knowledge requires signs, that is, it is symbolically mediated knowledge. Symbolically mediated objects are generated in a subtle way, rather than reproduced. We will focus on the fourth hypothesis, since it is opposed to the way in which Leibniz’s understanding of the relation between signs and things is commonly interpreted. According to the most widespread interpretation, there is a relation of isomorphism between the semiotic structure and the state of affairs.3 According to Krämer, this interpretation cannot be sustained without problems, since 1. if such a relation existed, the state of affairs would have a paradigmatic role as regards the symbolic structure; however, 2. since there is no thought without signs, the thing or idea cannot assume a paradigmatic role, and thus 3. the symbolic construction does not find a paradigmatic model in the idea, concept or object, but in a certain way it generates it. As an answer to Krämer’s proposal, we will defend the thesis, according to which the symbolic construction is an “exposition” of the object. In this sense, our interpretation propounds an overcoming of extreme positions: Leibniz’s semiotic is neither purely constructivist, in the sense that the semiotic system “imposes” or “creates” an object, nor does it defend a pictorial representationalism, in the sense that the semiotic construction is a mere copy or “reproduction” of the object. In order to jump ahead to some conclusions, the concept of exposition, which we will apply as an interpretative key, characterizes the semiotic formation as displaying or exhibiting an aspect of the object according to a certain point of view or perspective, without expecting to entirely exhaust it. Thus, we could metaphorically speak of a semiotic “collapse” (in the quantic sense of “wave function collapse”),4 which concretizes a semiotic presentation of the object amongst many others possible semiotic manners. That is why we can claim without exaggeration that in the semiotic construction there is an intrinsic connection with the designated object, in the sense that, in some way, it participates in it.

3 We will analyze this concept later. 4 For the concept of ‘exposition’ or ‘exhibition’, see: Toulmin 1972, pp. 192–199.

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6.2 Are Signs a Dispensable Instrument or are They a Conditio Sine Qua non for Thought? According to Leibniz, the possibility of formal languages in general, such as those of the mathematical sciences, is based on the employment of signs or characters, especially those which lead to an algorithmic writing. However, the fact that signs appear as a means for the construction of formal systems or calculi raises the question of whether signs as such constitute a mere instrument of thought, which could be disregarded, or whether, on the contrary, they are an essential constituent of the operation of the human intellect. If the sign is an indispensable support, in such a way essential to human nature that no intellection or knowledge could exist without it, it follows that human reason must in some way become perceptible itself, and thus the sign and especially the character will acquire a central metaphysical and epistemological value. Thus, signs and especially the characters which compose formulas will constitute a perceptible scheme for what is intelligible, and hence, for reason. However, at least initially Leibniz seems to understand the nature of signs from a purely instrumental point of view. In other words, signs or characters will constitute marks or perceptible forms employed to designate or nominate things or thoughts which represent them, that is, ideas, once they have been perceived or comprehended independently of the use of signs. If that were the case, the sign would constitute an accessory widget or support of thought. Thus, we could use it in order to abbreviate thought, to facilitate reasoning, and to lighten the work of the memory, although we could disregard it whenever we want to, in order to consider things or their ideas in themselves. Therefore, the better designed the symbolic system is, the better it will carry out these functions. For now we will use the words ‘idea’, ‘notion’, or ‘concept’ in an interchangeable way, although later we will introduce conceptual distinctions between such terms. Now, the usual way in which Leibniz presents the concept of exact semiotic representation –which receives the denomination of ‘symbolic’ (A VI 4, 587)– is grounded on the one-to-one correspondence between ideas or concepts and characters, in such a way that the structure of the character maintains some sort of correspondence with the composition of the concept. Thus, the relation between signs or characters, which are perceptible notes or marks, will be analogous to that which exists between notions. Hence, Leibniz seems to defend the existence of a pictorial relation between signs and ideas. This pictorial relation seems to be confirmed in the following fragment, which concerns the fundamental requisite for the construction of a perfect artificial notational system:

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I call ‘character’ a visible mark that represents thoughts. The art of characters is an art for building and ordering characters to the extent that they refer to thoughts, that is, to the extent that they hold to each other a relation that corresponds to the relation that thoughts hold to each other. An expression is an aggregate of characters representing the thing that is expressed. This is the law for expressions: just as an idea of a thing that has to be expressed is composed for the ideas of other things, so too the expression of a thing is composed for the characters corresponding to these other things.5

As in other texts, the starting point of Leibniz’s brief reflection is the notion of character or perceptible mark, in which its visibility, a fundamental property of a perfect semiotic system, stands out. Now, based on the notion of character, the fundamental rule of characteristic art, namely, the discipline which deals with the construction of semiotic systems for the various sciences, is stated. Such a rule, schematically sketched, obeys the rule of preservation of the order of relations: there must be a preservative correspondence of order between characters and thoughts, in such a way that the order of characters within the semiotic constructions corresponds to the order of concepts. Hence, a complex character must be compounded in such a way that its parts, which are other characters, correspond to the parts of the compounded object, preserving at the same time its order of composition. In thinking of a relation of strict correspondence, it seems that Leibniz thinks of a one-to-one correspondence, in such a way that there is one and only one character for each denoted object. Without going into technical details, in this case we can say that Leibniz seems to defend the existence of an isomorphism between the semiotic expression and what it denotes. It is remarkable that in this text Leibniz appeals in an ambiguous way to the concept of expression. On the one hand, he seems to refer to the fact that we are simply dealing with a kind of semiotic construction, an ‘expression’ in the linguistic sense of the word. However, Leibniz refers to what is denoted by the characteristic construction in terms of “what is expressed”, while the fundamental rule for semiotic construction receives the denomination of “law of expression”. Now, the “law of expression” has a close connection with the Leibnizian attempts to clarify the concept of expression in a technical sense, as a preservative transformation of structures, as we will see in depth later. Moreover, we can say that the

5 De characteribus et de arte characteristica (my translation). Original: A VI 4, 916: “Characterem voco, notam visibilem cogitationes repraesentantem. / Ars characteristica est ars ita formandi atque ordinandi caracteres, ut referant cogitationes, seu ut eam inter se habeant relationem, quam cogitationes inter se habent. / Expressio est aggregatum characterum rem quae exprimitur repraesentantium. / Lex expressionum haec est: ut ex quarum rerum ideis componitur rei exprimendae idea, ex illarum rerum characteribus componantur rei expression.”

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“law of expression” is an application of the general concept of expression to the case of the perfect semiotic constructions. Since –according to the dating of the Academy Edition– this text was written in 1688, it is possible that the use of the term ‘expression’ refer to semiotic constructions combines its usual meaning (‘term’, ‘linguistic sign’, or ‘word’) with the Leibnizian technical meaning. However, it seems natural to conclude that we are dealing with a pictorial theory of the semiotic representation, in the sense that “expression” reproduces an order of ideas which has been given and constituted beforehand. If that is the case, there is a certain primacy of the pure concept with respect to the sign or character: first, the thoughts taken by themselves are considered, their structure and composition are analyzed, and then appropriate characters are assigned to them, in order to form semiotic constructions, “expressions”, according to the fundamental law of the construction of characters. In order to anticipate some of our main proposals, the relation of preservative correspondence of order is precisely what grounds the fact that the sign, or better said, the semiotic construction can strictly represent something, understanding that “to represent” means the legitimate surrogation of one thing by another, in such a way that what represents can be worth just as much as what is represented. However, although the character or the semiotic construction constitutes the key element for the design of semiotic systems that are suited to the sciences, there still prevails the conclusion that the appeal to signs is to some extent accessory and dispensable for the operations of the human intellect, since, if we want to, we could contemplate the ideas in themselves. According to the passage quoted above, Leibniz seems to suggest the possibility of correlating characters and ideas, in a kind of tabular presentation, in such a way that it is possible to confront them and to establish correspondences between both sides. Thus, the interpretation of the sign being instrumental in an essentially autonomous thought seems to be based on Leibniz’s claims, mainly expressed in the metaphor of the universal characteristic as an organon for reason. As Marcelo Dascal pointed out, Leibniz certainly recognized the psychotechnical value of signs, and especially of characters, as a mnemonic resource which lightens the work of memory and, through an abridged presentation, shortens the work of our thinking (Dascal 1978, pp. 173–174 and 209–210). Thus, it is clear that symbolic formations aid reasoning since they improve its operation and extend its scope. The sign, externalizing thoughts in a fixed and orderly way, shows its communicative power. These ‘instrumental’ functions of signs appear clearly stated in Leibniz’s letter to Tschirnhaus of May 1678: Moreover, there is no doubt that the very combinatorics, that is, the general characteristics contains much more than what is done by algebra. In fact, by its means, all our thoughts can be not only depicted but also fixed, shortened and ordered: to be depicted for showing

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to others, to be fixed for not forgetting them, to be shortened in order to consider few things, and to be ordered, so that a thinking man can consider all things in a synoptical way.6

In the same way, in a letter to Gallois written a year before, Leibniz refers to the fixation of thoughts due to characters which affix them in imagination: In fact, if we had (a characteristics) such as I conceive of it, we could reason in Metaphysics and in Ethics like in Geometry and in Analysis, since the characters would fix our thoughts that are very unstable in these topics, where imagination gives us no help, except by means of characters.7

However, the very fact that characters are useful for fixing our thoughts in order to avoid forgetting them, can lead to an interpretation which goes beyond its psycho-technical function. A character, and in general a sign, by means of this capability of fixing or stabilizing, can acquire a constitutive value with respect to an objective content. In this sense, a sign not only fixes a thought in order to allow us to remember it (this will be its subsidiary function), but also anchors and delimitates an objective content, that is, it establishes a sense or meaning (Dascal 1978, pp. 204–205). But, if this is so, the relations between thought and signs must be altered. In fact, if signs in general, and characters in particular, have a constitutive value for the emergence of concepts as meanings or senses, it will not be so easy to distinguish the semiotic function from the faculty of thought. Thus, the sign itself is revealed as a co-essential factor of human reason, a finite reasoning. Indeed, the human mind resorts to signs not only because with them its operation is perfected or improved, but also because it cannot do without them. There is no pure human intellectual act, but a semiotic, and hence a perceptible, substratum, is always required.8 If this is so, the possibility of a table of correlations between signs and

6 “Leibniz to Tschirnhaus”, 05.1678 (my translation). Original: GM IV, 460–461: “Ipsam autem Combinatoriam seu Characteristicam generalem longe majora continere, quam Algebra dedit, dubitari non debet; ejus enim ope omnes cogitationes nostrae velut pingi et figi et contrahi atque ordinari possunt: pingi aliis ut doceantur; figi nobis ne obliviscamur; contrahi ut paucis, ordinari ut omnia in conspectu meditantibus habeantur.” 7 “Leibniz to Gallois”, 1677 (my translation). Original: GM I, 181: “ Car si nous l’avions telle que je la concois, nous pourrions raisonner en metaphysique et en morale à peu pres comme en Geometrie et en Analyse; parce que les Caracteres fixeroient nos pensées trop vagues et trop volatiles en ces matieres, ou l’imagination ne nous aide point, si ce ne seroit par le moyen de caracteres.” 8 Dascal (1978) analysed Leibniz’s duality on that subject and tried to show that, in his considerations about signs, there is a duality with respect to the dependence of thought regarding signs. He distinguished between a way of legitimation of the sign through ideas and a way if

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thoughts or ideas will be somewhat chimerical. We only have signs; there are different kinds of them, but they all are signs in the end. So these questions arise: in what sense way are signs and ideas correlated? How do signs represent ideas, according to Leibniz’s wording? Certainly not by means of a mere substitution, since there are no ideas to substitute before the emergence of the corresponding signs.

6.3 Representation and Expression Since thought is connected with the constitutive function of signs, it is not strange to find statements of Leibniz’s explicitly suggesting or just claiming this radical dependence. For example, in De Modis Combinandi he points out: “All our reasonings are but connections and substitutions of characters, whether these characters were words, marks or finally pictures. Moreover, every substitution results from some equivalence.”9 The connection between thought and sign is more clearly stated in a letter to Jacquelot of February 9, 1704: “In our imagination, there is always something that corresponds to ideas, even for unmaterial things, namely, the characters like that of the arithmetics and of the algebra, as well as the names.”10 However, how does this conversion of thought into something perceptible become possible? This raises the question about the metaphysical foundation of the possibility that signs, as perceptible species, are in themselves manifestations of something interior and intangible. An analysis of the concepts of representation and expression, which are at the basis of the relation between sign and thought, provides us with the guiding thread to finding this foundation. Indeed, if reason, conceived as intellection, is essentially destined to understanding through signs, then the relation between a sign and what is understood cannot be extrinsic and accessory, but it must show a deeper nexus; and this leads us to

legitimation of ideas from the sign. In the first case, the idea would have pre-eminence over the sign, and in the second one there would be the inverse relation. Perhaps the duality could be suppressed if the relation between sign and thought were conceived, in the case of man, as two faces of the same coin. 9 De modis combinandi characteres, ca. 1688–1699 (my translation). Original: A VI 4, 922: “Omnis Ratiocinatio nostra nihil aliud est quam characterum connexio, et substitutio. Sive illi charcteres sint verba, sive notae, sive denique imagines. Omnis autem substitutio nascitur ex aequipollentia quadam.” 10 “Leibniz to Jaquelot”, 09.02.1704 (my translation). Original: GP III, 466: “Il y a tousjours quelque chose dans nostre imagination qui réponde aux idées, même des choses immaterielles, savoir les caracteres comme sont ceux de l’arithmetique et de l’Algebre, et les noms.”

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inquire not only into the epistemological, but also into the metaphysical dimension of the semiotic function. Now, signs, and in particular characters, represent, that is, we find them in place of other things which are not present in themselves, in such a way that signs or characters substitute or subrogate them, based on a certain relation which they maintain to the subrogated things. According to Leibniz, one of the fundamental conditions which every semiotic system, of whatever nature, must accomplish in order to achieve its representational function, is that, through its application, substitutive or surrogative inferences can be carried out. The concept of surrogative reasoning comes from the structural conception of representation and it has been formulated by Chris Swoyer (1991) as a central concept for the evaluation of the epistemic efficacy of semiotic representations. We can say with Swoyer that surrogative reasoning consists in an inference which allows us to deduce conclusions regarding the properties or behaviors of the represented object from handling a representational system (Swoyer 1991, p. 449). As such, the surrogative inference consists in at least three fundamental steps: firstly, a translation or, so to speak, a transfer, from structural aspects of the represented object to the representational system is required; secondly, a series of operations and transformations within the representational system is carried out, and thirdly, such results are again transferred to the object. The efficiency of the representational system consists in that, in handling with it and on it, it is possible to obtain, as a final result, properties or behaviors of the object which are not part of the properties initially considered.11 In the domain of the semiotic systems, the Leibnizian concept of representation perfectly adapts to the requisites of surrogative reasoning. Moreover, it is not difficult to find statements of Leibniz’s which reveal a clear anticipatory nature regarding the concept suggested by Swoyer in the work we previously mentioned. Indeed, in a remarkable text dated between May of 1679 and April of 1680, which deals with universal mathematics in its relation to characteristic art,12 Leibniz proposes in these terms a characterization of the representational relation:

11 It is worth clarifying that this surrogative function of representation, which implies different kinds of functional transformation, was initially suggested by the physicist Heinrich Herz in his Prinzipien der Mechanik (Hertz 1894). In Herz’s case, the concept of image (Bild) is the fundamental one and has the role of structural representation. 12 De arte characteristica inventoriaque analytica combinatoriave in mathesi universali, ca. 05. 1679–04.1680 (A VI 4, 315–331).

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I call character everything that represents another thing for a thinking person. Moreover, that a thing represents another means that there is such a correspondence between them that one thing can be known from the other, although they are not similar, whenever all what obtains in one thing could be referred to some aspects in the other, corresponding to that of the former according to a certain rule or relationship. In fact, for representing, a similarity is not necessary. That is evident from the consideration of an ellipse whose projection in a canvas is a circle. That circle represents it with enough distinctness to an observer, and in all its parts, although there is no, and is not necessary to be, similarity between them. Moreover, what kind of similarity can be understood there to be between arithmetical characters and numbers or repetitions of unities? However, the characters that we use represent numbers so exactly that properties of numbers are found by means of characters.13

Leibniz clearly undertakes the task of providing a contextual definition of the concept of semiotic representation. First, he provides a conceptual elucidation of the concept of character, which is so general that it is virtually equivalent in its application to the concept of sign. Thus, a thing constitutes a character (or sign) when it enters in the triadic relation of representation, that is, when it represents something to someone (the “thinker”). Furthermore, like Swoyer, the fundamental condition of the relation of representation consists in that, from the representing thing, what is represented can be known, as occurs, for example, in the determination of numerical properties through manipulation of the systems of numerical representation. On the other hand, the possibility of the surrogative reasoning is based on the fact that the relation of representation has a structural or formal nature, since the semiotic system requires that its construction must allow it to transfer the formal relation of the object to the formal relation between characters and vice versa, “according to a certain rule or relation”. Thus, we find here a clear reference to the “law of expression” outlined in the text de De characteribus et de arte characteristica to which we have previously referred. In a text written some years before entitled Dialogus (1677), in which he discusses Hobbes’ thesis regarding the conventional nature of truth, Leibniz clearly exhibits the structural base of this concept of representation, namely: the order

13 My translation and emphasis. Original: A VI 4, 324: “Characterem voco quicquid rem aliam cogitanti repraesentant. Repraesentare autem dicitur quo ita respondet, ut ex uno aliud cognosci possit, etsi similia non sint, dummodo certa quadam regula sive relatione omnia quae fiunt in uno referantur ad quaedam respondentia illis in alio. Nam ad repraesentandum non esse opus similitudine, patet ex Ellipsi quae circuli projectio es in tabella, eumque repraesentant spectatori distincte satis, et per partes, cum tamen similis ei nec sit nec esse debeat. Et quae potest intelligi similitudo inter caracteres Arithmeticos, et numeros sive unitatum repretitiones? Nihilominus Characteres quibus utimur, numeros ita exacte repraesentant, ut proprietates numerorum inveniantur per characteres.”

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and connection of the characters has to maintain a relation of convenience or proportionality with the represented things, in such a way that a correlation between the order and connection of characters, on the one hand, and the order and connection of things, on the other, can be found. In connection with the surrogative reasoning, the proportionality between characters and their corresponding objects allows us to argue about them reliable way. Moreover, it constitutes the formal condition of truth, in such a way that, regardless of the differences between the various systems of semiotic representation, the truth can be conserved, as occurs in the application of different numerical systems for representing numbers. Indeed, regardless of the notational differences, whether we use the decadic or the duodenary numbering, the results of the operations are equivalent, in such a way that we can pass from one numbering system to another without losing information (see: A VI 4, 24). As we have seen, the elucidation of the notion of semiotic representations leads us to a concept of order, connection, relation and proportionality, which is nothing but a relation of relations. The relation of representation in particular postulates the demand of being able to establish a certain kind of regulated correspondence between what is represented and the representation. Additionally, such a correspondence between the representation and what is represented implies both a transformation and a conservation: a transformation, since the “rule of correspondence” allows us to transform what is represented into the representation (and vice versa) and a conservation, because, in spite of the transformation, a certain order and connection common to both things is conserved. Now, these properties of the semiotic representation, namely, the idea of a transformation with conservation of order, connects it directly with the Leibnizian concept of expression. In this sense, we propound that the concept of semiotic representation constitutes a particularization or semiotic application of the concept of expression, which, due to its generality, constitutes one of the architectonic keys of Leibniz’s philosophy. Thus, we can say that expression is at the basis of the relation of semiotic representation (and of representation in general) which makes surrogative reasoning possible. At the same time, the concept of expression provides us with a key regarding the problem we initially considered, namely, the question about the semiotic constitution of human thought. In this sense, we maintain that, by virtue of the relation of expression, ideas, understood in Leibniz’s sense, are semiotically exhibited or “expounded”. The concept of expression allows the Leibnizian representation to be freed from the requisite of pictorial similarity, while emphasizing the “entitled” (legitimated) substitutive or surrogative function. As we have seen in previous quotations, for a thing to represent another one, it is not necessary for the first one to constitute a pictorial copy of the second one, although this possibility is not

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excluded. As an example, we have seen that a numerical system represents numbers, although there is no similarity between the characters and numbers as such. In the same way, an ellipse can represent a circle, in accordance to certain conditions, although it is clear that there are no coincidences between both curves.14 In this sense, from our point of view, the function of semiotic representation, understood as a “valid and justified” substitution, is grounded on the notion of expression. The concepts of representation and of expression in general in Leibniz’s use are so closely connected that in some contexts they are almost interchangeable. According to our interpretation, there is a relation of subordination between them, to the extent that representation constitutes the epistemic and semiotic aspect of expression. Thus, the surrogation of a thing through the presence of another different thing, based on the relations between these two things, is justified precisely in that the representing thing expresses what is represented. And this is so since the ontological constitution of the very things is of an expressive nature, to the extent that expression constitutes a general ontological category, in the sense that “to be is to be expressive”. Thus the scope of expression goes far beyond the semiotic domain, since it is at the metaphysical core of Leibniz’s thought. By the way, as Michelangelo Ghio tried to show, the Leibnizian expression, as a metaphysical problem, is part of a venerable tradition which he received through the Christian Neoplatonism and more directly through authors such as Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno.15 This tradition maintains an internal tension between the concept of emanative cause and of immanent cause, which in some way is mirrored in the Leibnizian concept of expression. From this perspective, he preserves the basic features of the solution which Neoplatonic emanantism provides to the relation between the one and the multiple, and which influences the theory of creation of Nicholas of Cusa, based on the relation between explicatio and complicatio, understanding this respectively as an unfolding (explicatio) and a concentration (complicatio) of the divine nature through creation (Ghio 1979a, p. 384). In turn, Giordano Bruno continues the conception of the Cusanus, providing it with a clearly immanentistic and pantheistic meaning (Ghio 1979b, p. 540, 546 ff.). The pantheistic and immanentistic conceptions of Bruno have a positive reception in Spinoza’s doctrine of expression,16 while Leibniz tries to avoid its pantheistic and monistic

14 Besides A VI, 324, which was already quoted, see, for instance, A II 2, 90–91; A VI 4, 1370; C 15 and GP VI, 327, § 357. 15 Ghio 1979a, pp. 338, 340–341. For the history of the concept: Ghio 1979b and 1980. 16 Ghio 1980, p. 6. Regarding the reception of the concepts of complicatio and explicatio in Leibniz, see Deleuze 1988, chapter II, part 2, notes 22 and 23. Ghio seems to be inspired in Deleuze’s suggestions.

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consequences, following the Thomistic tradition in which the distinction between God and his creatures through the relation of analogy is upheld, and creation is considered to be a relation of emanation (Ghio 1979b, pp. 529–540, esp. 533). Thus, although expression can be understood as an unfolding or development of what is expressed, Leibniz tries to elucidate such an unfolding through the application of an analogical relation, in which certain proportionality between the involved terms is verified. Not a relation of coincidence or identity between that which expresses and what is expressed, but the existence of a correspondence of formal relations is required. In turn, in order to clarify these analogical relations and thus to provide a formal regulation of the concept of expression, Leibniz translates a traditionally metaphysical concern, that is, the relation between the one and the multiple, in terms which are mainly inspired in projective geometry and which possess a clear contemporary bias due to its structuralist nuances. As regards the concept of expression, except in the text of 1677 entitled Quid sit idea, Leibniz provides no systematic treatment of the question, so that we have to be content only with rather circumstantial clarifications. In any case, we can find three different formulations of the mentioned concept: That is said to express a thing in which there are relations which correspond to the relations of the thing expressed. But there are various kinds of expression; for example, the model of a machine expresses the machine itself, the projective delineation on a plane expresses a solid, speech expresses thoughts and truths, characters express numbers, and an algebraic equation expresses a circle or some other figure. What is common to all these expressions is that we can pass from a consideration of the relations in the expression to a knowledge of the corresponding properties of the thing expressed. Hence it is clearly not necessary for that which expresses to be similar to the thing expressed, if only a certain analogy is maintained between the relations.17 [. . .] I am going to apply it to the difficulty that you have proposed. A thing expresses another thing (in my words) when there is a constant and regulated relation between what can be said of one thing on the one side and of the other thing on the other side. In this way, a projection in perspective expresses its object. The expression is common to

17 Quid sit Idea, In: Loemker, p. 207. Original: A VI 4, 1370: “Exprimere aliquam rem dicitur illus in quo habentur habitudines, quae habitudinibus rei exprimendae respondent. Sed eae expresiones variae sunt: exempli causa modulus Machinae exprimit machinam ipsam, scenographica rei in plano delineatio exprimit solidum, oratio exprimit cogitationes et veritates; caracteres exprimunt numeros, aequatio Algebraica exprimit circulum aliamve figuram; et, quod expressionibus istis commune est, ex sola contemplatione habitudinum exprimentis, possumus venire in cognitionem proprietatum respondentium rei exprimendae. Unde patet non esse necessarium ut id quod exprimit simile sit rei expresase, modo habitudinum quaedam analogia servetur.”

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every form and it is a genus whose species are the natural perception, the animal sense, and intellectual knowledge.18 When I talk of a mirror, one should not think that I conceive an external thing to be always depicted onto the organs and the very soul. For expressing one thing into another, it is sufficient there to be some standing relation law, according to which each aspect in one thing can be related to each aspect that corresponds to it in the other thing. In this way, one can represent a circle using an ellipse, that is, an oval curve, in a projection in perspective; even more, one can do it using a hyperbola, although it is very dissimilar to the circle. . . since a point of the circle projecting the hyperbola can be assigned to any hyperbola point corresponding to it according to the same standing law.19

First of all, as we have said, the fact that expression is a general, ontological in nature, category, is highlighted, and thus it has a universal scope and application, amongst other things, in the epistemic and cognitive domain. In effect, the “[. . .] expression est commune à toutes les formes, et c’est un genre dont la perception naturelle, et le sentiment animal, et la connoissance intellectuel sont des especes.”20 Expression is also characterized by consisting in a certain correspondence between elements or properties of different kinds of objects. Thus, it is a concept with a relational nature, in the sense that an expression of the kind ‘x expresses y’ in terms of ‘x maintains a certain correspondence with y’ must be elucidated. In any case, the three texts differ in the way that such a correspondence is stated. While the first one maintains that in the relation of expression there is a correspondence between relations or respects (habitudines) of the objects, the second one maintains the correspondence between predicates or properties (in any case, between statements: “ce qui se peut dire”), and the third one demands that the correspondence be between elements or components (singula) of the intervenient objects. On the other hand,

18 “Leibniz to Arnauld”, 09.10.1687 (my translation). Original: A II 2, 240: “[. . .] je l’appliqueray [=ce terme] à la difficulté que vous avés faite. Une chose exprime une autre (dans mon langage) lorsqu’il y a un rapport constant et reglé entre ce qui se peut dire de l’une et de l’autre. C’est ainsi qu’une projection de perspective exprime son Geometral. L’expression est commune à toutes les formes, et c’est un genre dont la perception naturelle, le sentiment animal, et la connoissance intellectuelle sont des especes.” See also: A II 2, 230; 2331. 19 My translation. Original: C 15: “Non autem putandum est, cum speculum dico, me concipere quasi res externae in organis et in ipsa anima semper depingantur. Sufficit enim ad expressionem unius in alio, ut constans quaedam sit lex relationum, quae singula in uno ad singula respondentia in alio referri possint. Uti circulus per ellipsin seu curvam ovalem repraesentari potest in perspectiva projectione, imo per hyperbolam etsi dissimillimam [. . .] quia cuilibet puncto hyperbolae respondens eadem constante lege punctum circuli hyperbolam projiciens assignari potest.” See also: “Leibniz to Foucher”, 08.1686 (A II 2, 90–91). 20 A II 2, 240. See note 21.

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while the first passage maintain the necessity of a simple correspondence, the two other ones add the condition of a law or general rule of correspondence, that is, of a transformation procedure which allows one to pass from the items (relations, predicates, or elements) of an object to that of the other one. In the quoted texts it is clear that the concept of expression is close to that of representation, and in particular, to that of semiotic representation, as we have said in the previous paragraphs. Firstly, the examples provided by Leibniz in Quid sit Idea mostly have a semiotic nature (models, drawings, sentences, equations, amongst others). Secondly, when applied to such examples, expression makes the surrogative reasoning possible, which is a keynote of the semiotic representation in the Leibnizian sense.21 The fundamental feature of expression consists in that “[. . .] we can pass from a consideration of the relations in the expression to a knowledge of the corresponding properties of the thing expressed” (Loemker, p. 207 = A VI 4, 1370), that is, precisely the same requisite as the relation of representation has.22 On the other hand, in the text edited by Couturat (C 15), the relation of expression which exists amongst the conic sections, the circle, and the ellipse, is directly connected with the relation of representation, as if it were its foundation: both the hyperbola and the ellipse are projective representations of the circle, or, otherwise stated, the ellipse and the hyperbola can be considered as signs of the circle. Moreover, in a paragraph of the Theodicy, the concept of representation clearly appears in direct connection with one of the fundamental properties of expression, namely, the exact correspondence between elements of different objects: It is true that the same thing may be represented in different ways; but there must always be an exact relation between the representation and the thing, and consequently between the different representations of one and the same thing. The projections in perspective of the conic sections of the circle show that one and the same circle may be represented by an ellipse, a parabola and a hyperbola, and even by another circle, a straight line and a point. Nothing appears so different nor so dissimilar as these figures; and yet there is an exact relation between each point and every other point.23

Thus, it is not strange that Leibniz occasionally refers to both concepts as being almost equivalent or at least interchangeable, as occurs in the Dialogue entre Theophile et Polidore: “Certainly, the universe as without spirits is only one time.

21 Swoyer considers that, according to Leibniz, expression, understood as morphism, lays the foundations of the surrogative reasoning (1995, p. 79 ff.). 22 A VI 4, 324. Cf. Swoyer 1991, p. 449. 23 Huggard, p. 343. Original in: GP VI, 327.

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However, each spirit is a new way of expressing or representing the universe according to the way God looks at it from a certain side, so to say.”24 Briefly, the relations of representation and of expression maintain with each other a deep connection, although they are not identical. Strictly speaking, every relation of representation must be grounded in the relation of expression, even those forms of representation which are based on certain conventionality, as occurs in the symbolic representations of the language and of mathematics.25 We can say that the general relation of representation contains the semiotic and cognitive aspects of expression. Let us briefly go back to the analysis of the concept of expression as such. It is not completely clear how the correspondence established between the expressed object and what express it must be understood. As V. Debuiche showed, it is clear that Leibniz appeals to different mathematical paradigms to elucidate or “regiment” the concept of expression. Projective geometry in particular plays a key role in this attempt to “regiment” the expression, although it is not enough to explain its deeper aspects (Debuiche 2009). Be it as it may, from the point of view of its formal elucidation, two interpretations of the relation of correspondence have been proposed. In a very important paper for this question, M. Kulstad provided a detailed analysis of the expression in terms of the concept of function. The second interpretation is due to C. Swoyer, who suggested a structural version of this concept, based on the concept of preserving structure ‘morphism’ or ‘mapping’.26 Although Kulstad does not fully explain what concept of function he is applying, the context shows that its starting point is an extensional and set theoretic notion of function, in such a way that the relation of expression takes place amongst objects, understanding them as sets of elements. Thus, a function consists in a one-to-one relation established amongst the terms of a relation which pertain to an object (that which expresses) and the terms of a relation of the other object (what is expressed). Thus, Kulstad elucidates the concept of expression, understanding it as a one-to-one function which maps the relation between one set and another one (Kulstad 1977). However, this reformulation of the concept of expression in term of the set theory does not seem to explain some important features. Firstly, in emphasizing the

24 A VI 4, 2237. For this reason, I consider that the employment of the concept of expression (“lex expressionis”) in A VI 4, 916 is polysemous enough as to consider that Leibniz is also employing it in a technical way. My translation. 25 A VI 4, 24; A VI 4, 324; VI 4, 1370. See: Swoyer 1991. For the “grounded” relation of representation, in connection with expression, see GP V, 118 and GP VI, 326. 26 Swoyer 1995, p. 79 ff. See footnote 24.

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one-to-one correspondence, it does not consider some distinctive properties of Leibnizian expression. Regardless of other questions with which we will later deal, the elucidation in terms of the set theory removes to some extent the necessity for the “law of correspondence”, which is central to the concept of expression. Moreover, there is an aspect of Kulstad’s reconstruction that clearly shows its insufficiency. Expression is indeed a transformation which preserves formal or structural properties. This note guarantees precisely the possibility of the surrogative inference, which, as we have seen, is one of the central pieces of the relation of representation. Leibniz himself emphasizes in some passages that an analogic relation between what is expressed and that which expresses must be given, as, for example, in Quid sit Idea. Let us consider this text, which we previously quoted: “Hence it is clearly not necessary for that which expresses to be similar to the thing expressed, if only a certain analogy is maintained between the relations.” (Loemker, p. 207 = A VI 4, 1370). The requirement that an analogic relation or certain proportionality must exist is not accidental. It appears in contexts in which in some way the relation of representation is implied, as in the case of the semiotic representation.27 Now, the analogy is not exhausted by a mere correspondence of elements, since it consists in a relation of relations, especially when considering an analogy of proportionality (see: Poser 1989, p. 147, 153). Precisely, in the reasoning by analogy, the conservation of a certain kind of structure allows us to pass from known to unknown terms (Esquisabel 2008a). The Leibnizian concept of expression is nothing but a generalization of this property, which is demonstrated by the fact that the law of correspondence must conserve a certain order. Thus, in a text about universal mathematics, in which Leibniz develops his formal concept of similarity,28 he clearly presents the requirement that the correspondence must conserve structural properties, in the sense that, in passing from one object to another, the relations which the elements of the first one maintain between them must be of the same kind as that which the elements of the second object maintain between them (see: A VI 4, 515 and GP V, 118). According to this line of argumentation, the concept of function is insufficient to capture the formal features of Leibnizian expression, to the extent that not every one-to-one correspondence preserves in itself the order and the connection of elements, despite being governed by a law of correspondence in the intentional version. For example, if we consider the set of natural numbers, a one-to-one 27 A VI 4, 1370. See: Swoyer 1991. 28 In order to avoid confusion, it must be clarified that in this case the concept of similarity has a structural nature, and hence, it does not depend on the concept of ‘copy’ or ‘pictorial similarity’. See: Esquisabel 2008b.

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correspondence with the set of positive even numbers can be established, in assigning to each one of them, starting from 1, an even number, according to the function 2n. Even though there are certain relations which are preserved such as, for example, the relation ‘smaller than’, since for every pair of consecutive natural numbers, if m and n, m < n, then 2m < 2n, the same does not occur with divisibility, since if the result of an integer division of n into m is another natural number p, the integer division of 2n into 2m is not 2p, but p, as can easily be seen. For this reason Swoyer suggests that the concept of isomorphism, as a mathematical-structural concept, suits the Leibnizian expression better than a one-to-one function, although he recognizes that isomorphism does not provide a completely satisfactory elucidation of the concept in question, and because of this he finally proposes the more general concept of homomorphism. Even though we refer to Swoyer’s work for further details, however, it is worthwhile briefly describing the concept of isomorphism. Indeed, it is a relation that is established between structures, which are characterized in set theoretic terms. For example, let us take two structures: one, A, which is composed of the set of segments S, the relation of ‘shorter than’ (‘