Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy 1945–1965 9783111558226, 9783111187723

Table of contents :
Acknowledgement
Contents
Introduction
Part I. Indonesia's foreign policy until the implementation of guided democracy
1. The basic principles of Indonesia's foreign policy
2. Indonesia's foreign relations before the transfer of power on December 27, 1949
3. Indonesian-Dutch relations after the transfer of power and the impact of the West Irian (West New Guinea) dispute on the relations between the two countries
4. The last Dutch-Indonesian negotiations toward a peaceful settlement of the West Irian dispute
5. Indonesia between two power blocs
6. Indonesia in relation with its neighbors and other Asian countries
7. The transition and the decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia toward guided democracy and personal rule
Part II. Indonesia's foreign policy since the implementation of guided democracy, the ascendancy of Soekarno to absolute power, and the return to the 1945 constitution
8. The end of the transition period and the reenactment of the 1945 constitution
9. The beginning of Soekarno's active and militant foreign policy: The confrontation with the Dutch to solve the West Irian problem
10. The West Irian issue and its solution under guided democracy
11. Indonesia and the nonaligned world: The shift from nonalignment to a foreign policy of confrontation
12. Indonesia's role in the Second Nonaligned Conference at Cairo
13. Decline of the influence of the nonaligned group and the creeping dissension among the nonaligned countries
14. The frustrations and limitations of American diplomacy in Indonesia
15. Indonesian-Chinese relations during the Soekarno regime
16. The Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia
17. Indonesian-Indian relations in connection with the waning significance of Asian-African solidarity
Epilogue
Appendices
List of bibliographical abbreviations
References and bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy 1945-1965

IDE ANAK A G U N G GDE AG UNG

Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy 1945-1965

M O U T O N · THE H A G U E · PARIS

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 72-93180 © MOUTON & CO, 1973 Jacket design by Helmut Salden Printed in the Netherlands

To my beloved wife and children who have always been a source of strength to me in the difficult years of my life.

Acknowledgement

The idea of writing about the implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy since its proclamation of independence in 1945 came to me during my imprisonment in the Madiun penitentiary at the time of Soekarno's regime. However, since pertaining documents and related sources were not available at that moment, I had to postpone my plan until my release. In May 1966, with the emergence of the new order in Indonesia under the leadership of General Suharto, the political prisoners detained under the Soekarno regime, among them myself, were released. Through the courtesy and kindness of my good friend Ambassador Howard P. Jones whom I had known very well when he was US Ambassador to Indonesia and who at the time of my release from detainment had occupied the post of Chancellor of the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii, I received an invitation to be Senior Specialist at the East-West Center for one academic year from September 1967 to July 1968. It was during my tenure as Senior Specialist at the East-West Center that I had the opportunity to collect valuable materials from its well-stocked library and was able to complete the greatest part of the manuscript of this book. I would like to thank the whole research and translation department of the East-West Center, in particular Mrs. Dr. E. Wittermans, who was at that time head of that department, for helping in editing the manuscript into its final form. I would also like to thank my research assistant, Mr. D. Burhans, who was working for his Ph.D. at the University of Hawaii for his assistance in collecting the necessary bibliography of this book. Furthermore, I am also indebted to the generosity of the government of the Netherlands for inviting me to spend three months in The Hague and Leyden on my way back to Indonesia from Honolulu to collect essential materials for the section in this book pertaining to the Dutch-Indonesian relations, in particular on the West-Irian issue.

8

Acknowledgement

Last but not least I would like to express my thanks to Mrs. R. Dorschner, my private secretary at the Indonesian Embassy in Vienna, for having assisted in typing the bulky manuscript.

Vienna, January 1973

Contents

Acknowledgement Introduction by Dr. Mohammed Hatta

7 11

Part I. Indonesia's foreign policy until the implementation of guided democracy 1. The basic principles of Indonesia's foreign policy

15

2. Indonesia's foreign relations before the transfer of power on December 27, 1949

29

3. Indonesian-Dutch relations after the transfer of power and the impact of the West Irian (West New Guinea) dispute on the relations between the two countries

79

4. The last Dutch-Indonesian negotiations toward a peaceful settlement of the West Irian dispute

109

5. Indonesia between two power blocs

178

6. Indonesia in relation with its neighbors and other Asian countries

193

7. The transition and the decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia toward guided democracy and personal rule

248

Part 11. Indonesia's foreign policy since the implementation of guided democracy, the ascendancy of Soekarno to absolute power, and the return to the 1945 constitution 8. The end of the transition period and the reenactment of the 1945 constitution

271

9. The beginning of Soekarno's active and militant foreign policy: The confrontation with the Dutch to solve the West Irian problem

282

10

Contents

10. The West Irian issue and its solution under guided democracy

288

11. Indonesia and the nonaligned world: The shift from nonalignment to a foreign policy of confrontation

313

12. Indonesia's role in the Second Nonaligned Conference at Cairo

343

13. Decline of the influence of the nonaligned group and the creeping dissension among the nonaligned countries

356

14. The frustrations and limitations of American diplomacy in Indonesia

367

15. Indonesian-Chinese relations during the Soekarno regime

408

16. The Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia

444

17. Indonesian-Indian relations in connection with the waning significance of Asian-African solidarity

507

Epilogue

542

Appendices

544

List of bibliographical abbreviations

625

References and bibliography

626

Index

635

Introduction Mohammad Hatta

In the history of the Republic of Indonesia to date, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung has devoted most of his career to the field of diplomacy — either, many times, as his country's Ambassador or as its Minister of Foreign Affairs. There have been two exceptions. The first occurred when he was Minister of the Interior in the cabinet which I led immediately after Indonesia was recognized as free and sovereign by the government of the Netherlands as a result of the Round Table Conference at The Hague. He served as Minister of the Interior for six months until the United States of Indonesia was officially proclaimed a Unitary State on August 17,1950. The other exception occurred when he was imprisoned for almost five years by former President Soekarno. He was neither charged nor brought to trial, his imprisonment being based only on Soekarno's authority as president-dictator. Not long after Soekarno was deposed for his complicity in the G.30 S/P.K.I. Affair, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung was deservedly reinstated by Foreign Minister Adam Malik as a high official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was followed by his appointment as Indonesia's Ambassador to Austria by President Suharto. Therefore, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung is well-equipped to write about the dynamics of Indonesian foreign policy, a policy based upon the principles of independence and action: Independent in that she determines her policies in line with her national interests, neither submitting to the pressures of other countries nor aligning herself with any power bloc; active in the sense of looking for friendship with all nations in her search for everlasting world peace. This book gives a good account of how such a policy should be conducted.

Part I Indonesia's foreign policy until the implementation of guided democracy

ι. The basic principles of Indonesia's foreign policy

On December 27, 1949, the instrument of the basic agreement concerning the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch government to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia was simultaneously signed at Djakarta and Amsterdam by the respective representatives of both governments. At Amsterdam the Indonesian delegation was headed by the vice-president and foreign minister, Dr. Mohammad Hatta, while the Dutch government was represented by Queen Juliana herself. The transfer of power at Djakarta took place at the old Dutch governorgeneral's palace. Here, Dr. Lovink, the last representative of the Dutch Crown in Indonesia — the belt of emerald, which winds itself round the equator, as the enlightened Dutch author Multatuli called the archipelago — signed the documents of the transfer of power in the presence of the Indonesian cabinet headed by Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, who occupied the post of minister for defense at that time. A last ceremony of lowering the Dutch colors and hoisting the Indonesian national flag from the roof of the governor-general's palace and the subsequent rushing of the last Dutch governor-general to the Kemajoran airport to board the waiting KLM carrier which took him and his family to Holland were the last manifestations of Dutch rule in Indonesia. Though the independence of the Republic of Indonesia had already been proclaimed on the seventeenth of August, 1945, at the end of the Pacific war, it had taken more than four years of hard struggle and physical clashes — among them, two military actions in 1947 and 1948 by the Dutch government — and endless negotiations assisted by representatives of the United Nations to persuade the Dutch government and Dutch public opinion that a military solution could not be reached in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, and that a return to a semi-colonial rule during which the prewar colonial relations between Holland and the colonies in the East Indies might be gradually transformed, as was envisaged in the speech of Queen Wilhelmina from London in 1942, was an impossibility and a contradiction of postwar political realities. This kind of wishful thinking had lived vividly only in the minds of

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colonial diehards who were still daydreaming of returning to Indonesia to continue the easy, pukka-sahib life of colonial days. The Round Table Conference at The Hague which was held from August to November, 1949, between the Dutch government and a delegation representing all Indonesia, ended in an agreement in which the Dutch government conceded an unconditional and irrevocable transfer of sovereignty to an independent and united Indonesian Republic. With this successful conference, which eventuated a couple of months later in the formal transfer of power from the Dutch colonial administration to the new independent government of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, Dutch colonial rule in that part of the world came to an end and a new sovereign and independent state emerged in Southeast Asia. After this formal transfer of power, Indonesia was recognized by the other independent countries of the world, and on September 28, 1950, she became the sixtieth member of the United Nations. The new Republic of the United States of Indonesia, which was later transformed (on August 17, 1950) into a unitary state, the Republic of Indonesia, was confronted with immense problems of nation-building upon her entry into the community of independent nations. The four years of physical struggle to safeguard her independence against the efforts for the return of Dutch colonialism had placed before her gigantic problems of rehabilitation and development in every field. The physical revolution and the military clashes with the Dutch forces had left many scars which had to be healed, and independence presented the Indonesian leaders with complex problems of great magnitude, both domestic and international. As Edmund Burke wrote in his essay Reflections on the Revolution in France the most nagging problem after freedom has been gained is simply to find the answer to the question of what to do with freedom. Such responsible and prominent Indonesian leaders as the late Dr. Sjahrir and Dr. Mohammad Hatta warned their compatriots that independence was not the end of the struggle of the Indonsian people. It was just a means to provide for the Indonesian people a new way of life, progress, prosperity, and equality, in contrast to the hallmarks of the old colonial society-feudalism, destitution, and oppression. In an article entitled 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy' published in Foreign Affairs in 1953, Dr. Hatta wrote: 'Even when Indonesians were struggling to free themselves from the control of the Netherlands, freedom was not their only objective. Leaders of the national movement always insisted that an independent and sovereign Indonesia was simply a prequisite to the achievement of a pattern of living that would guarantee the prosperity of the people. Their slogan was "A sovereign, independent, just and prosperous Indonesia." ' (Hatta, 1953: p. 440.)

The basic principles of Indonesians foreign policy

17

It is not the intention here to explore or make a study of the political, economic, and social problems which have confronted the Indonesian leaders since independence. This study will restrict itself to the particular problems of the international relations of independent Indonesia and to the conduct of her foreign policy, in particular with regard to her neighbors in Asia.

A RETROSPECT

Owing to the fact that Indonesia gained her independence not through peaceful negotiations alone and that the Dutch were forced to abandon their colonial position in that country after a bitter and bloody revolution against the return of Dutch colonial power, the Republic of Indonesia had relations with foreign powers prior to the formal transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch in December, 1949, and the de jure recognition which followed. She entered into these relations in order to secure goodwill and sympathy in her struggle for independence. The first contact Indonesia had with a foreign country was made through a representative of the British government. British forces under General Christison and Rear Admiral Patterson of the Southeast Asia Command of Admiral Mountbatten headquartered at Singapore arrived in Indonesia in October 1945, with the prime task of disarming the Japanese occupying forces there. But later it appeared evident that among the units of the English forces were Dutch army and naval units, a fact which was interpreted by the Indonesian government and national leaders as an effort on the part of the Dutch to restore colonial rule in Indonesia. Fighting broke out between the revolutionary Indonesian army and the disembarked English forces. The Dutch government, and in particular the old Dutch East Indian colonial administrators who fled to Australia after the landing of the Japanese on Java in the beginning of March 1942, had been badly informed about the current political developments in Indonesia. They had heard by radio of the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Indonesia, but they did not grasp the magnitude of that most important political event, which had its impact on the whole territory of Indonesia. Those old colonial administrators who had succeeded in escaping to Australia under the leadership of the then Lt. Governor-General, Dr. H. J. van Mook, were impatient to return as soon as possible to Batavia (now Djakarta) in order to restore the Dutch administration in the colony, ignoring the political changes since the Japanese occupation. With Queen Wilhelmina's vague declaration of intention of 1942, they thought that the Dutch government had gone far enough in meeting the political aspirations of the Indonesian people.

18 Indonesiens foreign policy until the implementation of guided democracy According to the journal Dr. Schermerhorn, Chairman of the Dutch Commission General in charge to negotiate with the Indonesian leaders, published under the title Ηet Accoord van Linggadjati (The Lmggadjati Agreement) by Dr. Smit, 'the Dutch Indian administration in Brisbane (Australia) was of the opinion that the proclamation of the Republic was nothing (else) but a political trick conceived by Japan, in order to create more political difficulties for the allied forces who had the task to occupy that territory after Japan's defeat. They were of the opinion that when the Dutch administration with enough troops and means of communications could be in Indonesia in the shortest time possible, the Dutch rule could be easily reestablished.' (Smit, 1959: p. 8.) This point of view appeared to be a flagrant miscalculation and proof of a lack of knowledge on the part of the Dutch about what was going on in Indonesia. The English government and the Southeast Asia Command of Admiral Mountbatten appeared to be better informed on the political developments in Indonesia at that time. When the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, Netherlands East Indies, Lt. General Sir Philip Christison, landed at Batavia (Djakarta) in October, 1945, he declared 'that he would request the leaders of the Republic of Indonesia to assist him in the exercise of his duty, and that the authorities of the government of the Republic of Indonesia are fully responsible for the administration and the law and order for those territories under their control.' (Smit, 1959: p. 10.) With this declaration, Gen. Christison had in fact recognized the de facto authority of the government of the Republic of Indonesia. It is not clear whether Gen. Christison made his statement with the knowledge of the British government, but with this personal declaration of the British general the first contact was made between the independent Indonesian government and a foreign power since the proclamation of her independence on August 17, 1945. Dr. H. J. van Mook arrived at Batavia (Djakarta) on October 2, 1945 to head the Dutch Indian administration, and with him came the first contingent of Dutch troops and naval forces under cover of the British forces. The return of Dutch forces and administrators to Indonesia was considered by the Indonesian government as an effort to restore the Dutch colonial administration in Indonesia. Consequently, fighting broke out to repel the Dutch forces and the British forces who had the unpleasant duty of covering them. The initial and most famous battles were at Surabaja and in the vicinity of Semarang; these resulted in many casualties, among them General Mallabay, who was killed in the battle at Surabaja. With the violent resistance of the Indonesian forces, the Dutch government became aware that the proclamation of the independence of the

The basic principles of Indonesiens foreign policy

19

Republic of Indonesia had had a very deep impact and a wide appeal among the Indonesian people. The government was convinced that they had underestimated the political impact of that proclamation, and it became evident to them that the political constellation in Indonesia had changed substantially from the prewar days so that it was now an impossibility to use military force alone to reestablish colonial rule in Indonesia. On December 27, 1945, negotiations took place at Chequers (the weekend hideout of British prime ministers) between the English prime minister and representatives of the Dutch government, and it was agreed that the Dutch government had to acknowledge the right of the Indonesian people to become an independent nation and that ways and means should be explored for them to exercise their right of self-determination, so that the Indonesian problem could be solved in a peaceful way and friendly cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands be achieved. The English government promised to lend a helping hand in this with the provision that the Dutch government be willing to enter into negotiation with the authorities of the newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia. For this purpose the British government made available one of its outstanding diplomats of high stature, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr (later Lord Inverchapel), who had just left his post as ambassador to Russia. With this decision of the British government, the Indonesian question was referred to the negotiation table. In Djakarta, the Indonesian authorities correctly assessed this move of the British government. Soekarno, who according to the 1945 Constitution was also prime minister (chief of government), was not the person to lead the negotiations with the Dutch and the allied powers concerning the future of Indonesia because of his previous very close collaboration with the Japanese armed forces. His propaganda speeches about the Co-prosperity Sphere in Asia in which Dai Nippon (Great Japan) would play the dominant role could hardly give him any kind of prestige in the eyes of the allied forces; neither could his too subservient role towards the Japanese occupying authorities in recruiting thousands and thousands of romushas (forced-labor forces) who were sent to labor camps as far away as Burma and Thailand, where many died from malnutrition and starvation. Soekarno's foreign minister in the first cabinet, Achmad Subardjo, was no more acceptable, for during the occupation years he was the ubiquitous and close advisor of Admiral Maeda, the intelligent political officer of the imperial navy who charted the political strategy of the Japanese government in Southeast Asia, particularly as far as Indonesia was concerned. Probably aware of this kind of incrimination, President Soekarno was obsessed during that time by the constant fear that the allied forces would arrest him under the indictment of war criminal for his collaboration and

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Indonesiens foreign policy until the implementation

of guided democracy

in particular for the recruitment of the forced-labor forces, which had cost thousands of human lives. Under these conditions it could not be expected that he, as head of the government according to the 1945 constitution, face the allied representatives at the negotiation table. Moreover, for most of the Dutch authorities it was impossible at that time to stomach Soekarno or to sit with him around the same conference table. Meanwhile, there was heavy domestic political pressure to change the political structure of the government. The majority of the political forces — in particular those who had worked underground with Sjahrir during the Japanese occupation — opposed those people who had collaborated closely with the Japanese administration in order to remain in power. In a widely circulated pamphlet Sjahrir stated: 'Our revolution must be led by revolutionary, democratic groups and not by nationalist groups, which have let themselves be used as servants of the Fascists, whether Dutch-colonial Fascists, or Japanese military Fascists. The revolutionary-democratic struggle must begin by purifying itself of all Japanese fascist stain and opposing all those whose spirit is still under the influence of Japanese propaganda and education.' (Quoted in Kahin, 1952: p. 165.) In addition, Sjahrir had always feared that the Indonesian revolution would be abused by the nationalist leaders and the democratic revolutionary trend turned to the establishment of a neofeudalistic society. Sjahrir's appeal received wide response, and moves were initiated among the members of the Central Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, KNIP, the temporary national representative body) to change the presidential-parliamentary system into a political structure with a cabinet under a prime minister responsible entirely to the above-mentioned KNIP. President Soekarno, for the reasons described above, consented to this idea; he was willing to dissolve his own cabinet and to appoint Sjahrir as the first prime minister of the Republic of Indonesia. Sjahrir accepted this offer on condition that he would be given a free hand to choose his own ministers and that the KNIP would be convened to approve the change and to express its confidence in the cabinet. The KNIP met at Djakarta from November 25 to 27, 1945, and with an overwhelming majority endorsed Sjahrir's cabinet and gave it a vote of confidence. Sjahrir became prime minister, also holding the positions of foreign minister and minister of the interior. He was to remain at the post of Prime Minister/Foreign Minister till his resignation in June, 1947. In the following years till the transfer of power on December 27, 1949, the whole attention of the government of the Republic was concentrated on ending the Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. Since the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Indone-

The basic principles of Indonesiens foreign policy

21

sia in 1945, the Indonesian people and their consecutive governments in power had considered themselves the lawful government in the old Dutch Indies colonial territories. So when negotiations took place with representatives of the Dutch government, the first requisite was the demand that the Dutch government recognized the sovereignty of the Republic. Following this line of thought, the negotiations with the Dutch were considered to be bilateral negotiations between two sovereign powers, carried on through the mediation of a third power. In the first months of these negotiations, the two parties were assisted by a representative of the United Kingdom in the person of Sir Archibald Clark Kerr; he was later succeeded by Lord Killearn who was simultaneously appointed by the British government as its commissioner-general for Southeast Asia. When, later on, it appeared that the relations between the Republic and the Dutch government were deteriorating, particularly after the first military action of the Dutch in 1947, the United Nations stepped in after the Indonesian question was brought before it by India and Australia. It appointed a three-power commission consisting of the representatives of Australia, Belgium and the United States to mediate in the dispute between the Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia, in order to assist in the pacific settlement of their dispute in accordance with paragraph 'B' of the council of August 1st 1947. The council expresses its readiness if the parties so request to assist in the settlement through a committee of the council consisting of three members of the council, each party selecting one, and a third to be designated by the two so selected. (Taylor, I960: p. 450.) From that time on the United Nations played the predominant role in the solution of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute until the official transfer of power on December 27, 1949. All the negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesian representatives were assisted by the United Nations commission mentioned above, which later became known as the United Nations Commission for Good Offices for Indonesia (GOC) and all agreements which resulted from these negotiations were countersigned by this commission. As it appeared later, this United Nations commission was not a mere spectator in the discussion between the Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch government; in many cases it took an active part and a helpful initiative in bringing together the parties concerned, and by doing this it contributed substantially to the avoidance of many intricate deadlocks during the negotiations. This was true particularly during the last year of the struggle for Indonesia's independence, from the dismal second Dutch military action in December 1948 till the Round Table Conference at The Hague (August 23 - November 2, 1949) which ended in an agreement between the Dutch

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Indonesiens foreign policy until the implementation of guided democracy

and Indonesian delegations laying the juridical foundation for the official transfer of power on December 27, 1949. It must be noted here that in the history of the United Nations it has never been more successful in solving a dispute between two nations and in bringing it to a fruitful end, and its assistance in mediating was crowned by the recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty and independence by the Dutch government, in which other nations followed suit. In the short exposition given above it is dear that the Republic of Indonesia had considered herself to be sovereign and independent since the proclamation of her independence. She therefore felt herself to have the right to have relations with other countries according to international law and to seek recognition of her existence as an independent nation. This point of view had been strengthened with the intervention of the United Nations in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, which brought the Indonesian question before a world forum and world public opinion so that it no longer remained solely a Dutch-Indonesian domestic issue in which no foreign power, nor even the United Nations, had the right to intervene, as the Dutch government had always claimed it to be. This Dutch policy was repudiated by the United Nations itself, as proven by the overwhelming vote in the Security Council to put the Indonesian question on its agenda for discussion. It was denied also by world public opinion, which considered the Indonesian proclamation of independence to be a true expression of self-determination in line with their desire to be free and to be rid of the Dutch colonial yoke. Thus the Indonesian question had become, from the very beginning of Indonesia's struggle for independence, an international problem, whose solution was of interest not only to the Dutch and the Indonesian people but to the whole community of nations and the United Nations. Consequently, from the early days of her independence the Indonesian government had maintained international relations of a sort. Besides the contact with the representatives of the British government described earlier, the Indonesian government's first political contact was made with the leaders of the Indian National Congress, who had been negotiating with the British government for the establishment of a free and independent Republic of India. This contact had a more formal character, and India's support of the Indonesian struggle for independence against the Dutch colonial rule became even more formal and open once it became clear that Great Brittain would grant India her independence and after the first provisional government of India had been formed under the leadership of Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, with Admiral Louis Mountbatten coming to India as the last viceroy to liquidate the British raj in India. In that transitional

Τ be basic principles of Indonesia's foreign policy

23

period Mr. Nehru was in fact both prime minister and minister for foreign affairs of India, which functions became formally effective when India, on August 14, 1947, became an independent republic within the Commonwealth. Besides this formal contact there had been also a personal relationship between the Indonesian leaders and Mr. Nehru. During the years when Mr. Nehru was still in Europe and led the Indian League, he met Dr. Mohammad Hatta who was then studying in Holland and was chairman of the Indonesian Student's Association (Perhimpunan Indonesia) which championed the idea of a free Indonesia and the right of self-determination for the Indonesian people. Mr. Nehru and Dr. Hatta met at one of the conferences of the League of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels in February, 1927 (Jansen, 1966: p. 29), and since then a close relationship between the two leaders had existed. Because of this personal relationship and the identity of goals in the struggles of the Indian and Indonesian peoples against colonial rule and to be free, it was understandable that the sympathy of Mr. Nehru and the Indian people was on the side of Indonesia in her defense of her independence and sovereignty against the return of the Dutch colonial administration. This sympathy and support was to be manifested in manifold ways during the following years. Since the Republic of Indonesia, from the proclamation of her independence, had considered herself a sovereign state, it was evident that the government had to formulate a certain basic principle on which to base her policy vis-ä-vis her relations with foreign countries. This basic foreignpolicy creed was to be first made public some time after Mr. Sjahrir assumed the office of minister of foreign affairs on November 14,1945. The occasion came when Indonesia was invited to attend the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, which took place from March 23 - April 2, 1947, and was attended by representatives of twenty-five Asian nations. The Indonesian delegation consisted of twenty-five members with six observers. This conference was convened by the Indian Council of World Affairs but was, in fact, sponsored by the new provisional government of India under the leadership of Mr. Nehru, who could not himself extend the invitation owing to the fact that India had not yet gained her independence. Although the conference was labeled a meeting place for all Asian nations to 'deal mainly with cultural, economic, and like subjects' which were of common interest to them, it became obvious from the opening day that the main topics of the speeches of the respective delegates were political. For instance, Mr. Nehru spoke about 'the countries of Asia co-operating together for a larger ideal,' and Mr. Bandaranaike from Ceylon hoped that the confercence would lead to a confederation of free and equal Asian

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Indonesia's foreign policy until the implementation of guided democracy

countries.' (Jansen, 1966: pp. 54—55.) Even Mahatma Gandhi spoke at the closure of the conference saying, 'Hence, I would say to you, gentlemen from different parts of Asia, having come here and with eagerness, that you should meet yearly or once in two or three years,' (Jansen, 1966: p. 70), thus sponsoring and inspiring, in fact, the idea of Asian solidarity and an Asian sentiment, which later was developed in the caucuses of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Group in the United Nations and, more dramatically, at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Indian public opinion was on the side of the Indonesian cause for freedom and so, indeed, was the whole conference. Sjahrir arrived on the last day of the conference by a special plane made available to him by the Indian government. In eloquent words Mrs. Naidu, chairman of the conference introduced Mr. Sjahrir as the 'bomb' of Asia* and after a rousing ovation Sjahrir made his speech, which was, in fact, the first foreign-policy statement of the Republic of Indonesia before an international audience. Sjahrir said: W e are now living in troubled times, in a world which is very much in a state of flux. When changes of farreaching consequences take place in the relationship between nations, there is bound to rise an atmosphere filled with doubt and difficulties and sometimes tensions too. Yet this is the time for action — for firm definite action which will have as its objectives the betterment of the world in which we live. But even while we initiate measures or execute plans aimed at improving our countries and common lot, it is incumbent on us to act in such a manner that the consequences of our measures will be palatable to other people and will serve to strengthen the bonds which exist between the various races and nations of the world. May I remind you that we must exercise the greatest care that the Asian sentiment which has brought us here together is preserved as a holy flame which will spur us on to greater endeavours towards justice, truth, idealism and humanitarianism. We have cultivated that Asian sentiment with such fervor that it is now a powerful force — and a powerful force for good I believe — which wisely used should help us realize not only the vision of ONE WORLD we have been striving for, but also the dream of the oneness of mankind. I am of the opinion what has impelled the nations of Asia to struggle for independence is not only based on truth but also in keeping with the dictates of humanity. (Asian Relations, 1948.)

A careful reading of Sjahrir's statement would lead to the following conclusions: 1. Sjahrir recognized the political realities of postwar Asia and the inevitable emergence of independent Asian national states. 2. He emphasized that in achieving those political objectives the Asian nations should never abandon the ideal of establishing independent states based upon humanitarianism, justice, and truth, which are the hallmarks * Dawn, April 3, 1947.

The basic principles of Indonesians foreign policy

25

of true democratic societies. In fact, he would say that the disappearance of colonialism must not open up any possibility for the return of neofeudalism or fascism. 3. The emergence of new independent states must not increase the existing world tension through the adoption by these states of a foreign policy that would not be acceptable to other nations. On the contrary, the new emerging states should make every effort to bridge the existing differences between the powers in order to 'realise... the vision of One World.' With these polished words Sjahrir condemned the polarization of the world into two conflicting blocs, and he advised his fellow Asians not to follow that pattern and to abstain from joining these blocs, for to do so would mean an increase in world tension and would be contrary to the interests of the Asian people themselves. 4. The struggle of the Asian people for independence is not the end but a means to establish a society based upon humanity, i.e., a democratic society of progress and equality. To sum up, it can be said that Sjahrir's words appealed to the Asian nations, united by their common interests, to seek friendship with other nations, so that the vision of One World might be realized. This could be achieved only by peaceful coexistence and the efforts of all nations to preserve peace by strengthening 'the bonds which exist between the various races and nations of the world.' From this statement can be drawn the first indications of the basic principles of Indonesia's foreign policy, which later, formulated in a more positive form, was to be known as nonalignment and a positive search for peace. The Sjahrir cabinet fell in June, 1947. It was succeeded by a leftist cabinet under the leadership of the far-left political group, the People's Democratic Front (Front Demokrasi Rakjat, FDR), with Amir Sjarifuddin, a member of the Indonesian Communist Party since 1935, as prime minister. The leftist People's Democratic Front could not accept the Linggadjati Agreement, which Sjahrir had signed with representatives of the Dutch government and which provided for a transitional period during which Indonesia would move towards full independence and an eventual formal transfer of power from the Dutch. The Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet did not hold office for long. In January, 1948, as the friction between the rightist and leftist political groups became more and more hostile and heated, Prime Minister Sjarifuddin was forced to resign, owing to the fact that the centrist political parties which had so far supported his cabinet had withdrawn their ministers from the cabinet. As a result of the very high political tension in the country, a presidential cabinet under Vice-President Hatta was formed.

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Indonesiens foreign policy until the implementation of guided

democracy

During the tenure of office of the Hatta cabinet a clearer picture could be obtained concerning the basic principles, aims, and objectives of the foreign policy of the Republic of Indonesia. In that tense atmosphere of domestic political strife between the leftist/communist and rightist/centrist political groups, Vice-President/Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta made a foreign-policy statement before the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP) on September 2, 1948, in a speech entitled 'Mendajung dianatra dua karang' (Between Two Cliffs). He said, in part: Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals? The Indonesian government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in the area of international politics but that it should be an active agent entitled to decide its own standpoint... The policy of the Republic of Indonesia must be resolved in the light of its own interests and should be executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face... The lines of Indonesia's policy cannot be determined by the bent of the policy of some other country which has its own interests to service. (Hatta, 1953: p. 466.) In the article entitled 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy' cited earlier, Dr. Mohammad Hatta elucidates his point of view, giving the reasons why the Indonesian government had chosen to remain nonaligned between Russia and America, yet not as a passive party in the area of international politics but as an active agent entitled to decide on its own standpoint. He affirms that: The [foreign] policy of the Republic of Indonesia is not one of neutrality, because it is not constructed in reference to belligerent states but for the purpose of strengthening and upholding peace. Indonesia plays no favorites between the two opposed blocs and follows its own path through the various international problems. It terms this policy 'independent,' and further characterizes it by describing it as independent and 'active.' By active is meant the effort to work energetically for the preservation of peace and the relaxation of tension generated by two blocs, through endeavors supported if possible by the majority of the members of the United Nations. (Hatta, 1953: p. 444.) He says also: This explains why the Republic of Indonesia has not aligned itself with either the American bloc or the Russian bloc in the existing conflict, and why it is not prepared to participate in any third bloc designed to act as a counterpoise to the two giant blocs. To do that would merely create new suspicions and new enmities. (Hatta, 1953: p. 443.) The foreign-policy statement made by Dr. Hatta on September 2, 1948 and the further explanation given in the article quoted above made it crystal clear that what Dr. Hatta had in mind and gave expression to were

The basic principles of Indonesia's foreign policy

27

the basic tenets of what is known at this moment as the principle of nonalignment in foreign policy, a principle which has now become the common base for most of the Afro-Asian countries in the conduct of their foreign policies. When we read carefully the proceedings and documents of the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, we find that the specific terms 'neutralism' and 'nonalignment' are not used by the delegates, who for the first time in their history of nation-building had met together in a formal conference. But, as mentioned above, the foreign-policy statement of Sjahrir could be taken as an expression of the principle of remaining outside the spheres of the two blocs and of bridging the differences between the conflicting blocs by conducting a policy of peace to bring about One World'. Even Nehru, who emerged later as the champion of the policy of nonalignment, did not use that word, although in September, 1946, 'he had made it clear that freedom from entangling blocs was to be a principle element in free India's foreign policy.' (Jansen, 1966: p. 14.) In seeking a solution to the Korean War in the early fifties, Nehru used for the first time the term 'positive neutrality', while thinking of himself as the chief spokesman for a fluid, ad hoc, neutral grouping which he deliberately wanted to keep vague. He opposed the structure of any formal third force or bloc of neutral countries, saying: 'If a neutral nation joins a neutral bloc, it ceases to be neutral.' (Martin, 1962.) If we compare Indonesia's foreign-policy principles, as clearly expounded by Dr. Mohammad Hatta on September 2, 1948, with the conduct of India's foreign policy under Nehru and his consecutive statements in this field, we can see a similar and parallel point of view. In a speech before the Indian Constituent Assembly on December 4, 1947, Nehru outlined the basic principles of Indian foreign policy. W e have proclaimed this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else... W e have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other... (Nehru, 1961 a.)

Hatta's basic statement of foreign policy, which was approved on September 2, 1948, by the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP), became the guideline for the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy. Dr. Hatta, who held the office of prime minister till the transfer of power by the Dutch government on December 27, 1949, and who continued to hold that post after independence, held fast to that basic principle. The successive cabinets never deviated from this principle of an 'independent and active foreign policy' until the decline of constitutional democracy in

28 Indonesiens foreign policy until the implementation of guided democracy Indonesia that accompanied President Soekarno's introduction of his political conception, the so-called 'guided democracy.' At that early period the intervention of President Soekarno in the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy could be considered incipient, but this interference gradually became more apparent with the increase of presidential power. Finally, when President Soekarno emerged as the sole, arbitrary, and unchallenged power on the Indonesian political scene, it was he who conceived the formula for Indonesia's foreign policy and caused it to deviate gradually but basically from the substantial and original principle of the 'independent and active foreign policy' later known in the field of international relations as the nonalignment policy. In the following chapters we will make an effort to scrutinize the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy after independence under the above mentioned credo of the 'independent and active foreign policy,' and the injuries done to those basic principles by President Soekarno, which finally led to the abandonment of the foreign policy of nonalignment during the last years of Soekarno's tenure of office.

2. Indonesia's foreign relations before the transfer of power on December 27, 1949

During the period of the physical revolution of the Indonesian people to safeguard their country's newly won independence and freedom from the Dutch, the successive governments of the Republic of Indonesia concentrated their attention in the conduct of foreign policy on the following three objectives: 1. to seek international recognition of Indonesia's independence as proclaimed by Soekarno and Hatta on the eventful day of August 17, 1945; 2. to defend Indonesia's freedom against the encroachment of the Dutch government, which was trying even by the use of military force, to impose a new style of colonial rule in Indonesia based on the 'Queen Wilhelmina Declaration' of December 7, 1942; 3. to conceive a course of diplomacy for settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute by negotiation and accommodation, by applying to a third power to render her good offices as mediator, or by submitting the dispute to the jurisdiction of the United Nations for its assistance in reaching a solution. Only after the ascendancy of Sutan Sjahrir as prime minister and minister of foreign affairs on November 14, 1945, were efforts made by the new administration to establish its political representatives in the neighboring countries, in order to arouse interest in those countries concerning the political developments in Indonesia and the birth of the new free and independent Indonesian republic. In doing this the government was seeking sympathy for the struggle for freedom of the Indonesian people and at least a de facto recognition by the neighboring governments. The winds of political change were prevailing during those postwar years in Asia. After the labor government under Prime Minister Attlee assumed power in London, it became clear that the prime objective of this new government was the search for a formula to liquidate the British colonial rule in South Asia. The British colonies on the Asian continent were sure to be granted independence in the very near future, and the negotiations between the British government and the national leaders from each country were bound to lead successfully to a smooth transfer of power,

30

Indonesia's foreign policy until the implementation of guided democracy

so that the emergence of an independent and free India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon was only a matter of time. The British government established in these countries, after peaceful negotiations with the national leaders, provisional governments which succeeded the old colonial administration. Later, on a day fixed by mutual consent, the British Raj was to terminate its power over those territories. Thus a smooth transfer of power could be guaranteed, while in that short transitional period each national provisional government could operate under the aegis of the British government and prepare itself to take over as an independent administration on the very day that the British government transferred power officially to those governments. Mr. Nehru headed the provisional government of India pending the transfer of power on August 5, 1947. Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah assumed the same position in Karachi, and on the same eventful August 15 became the governor general of a free Pakistan. In Rangoon U Saw, who later on was tragically assassinated during a cabinet session, headed the provisional Burmese government, which, in 1948, was to become the first independent government of the Republic of Burma. In these political circumstances the Indonesian struggle to safeguard her proclaimed independence against Dutch attempts to reinstate colonial rule received a wide response of sympathy and goodwill from emerging Asian countries in particular and from other nations who understood that the political winds of change of the postwar period had rendered colonialism in any form obsolete and anathema to the rising tide of nationalism. Sjahrir, in his capacity as the first Indonesian foreign minister, endeavored to build up the nucleus of an Indonesian foreign service. He recruited bright young people to join the foreign ministry and to be sent to the neighboring countries to represent Indonesia's position in those countries. For instance, Dr. Sudarsono was sent to New Delhi, Dr. Usman Sastroamidjojo to Canberra, Idham to Karachi, and Hadji Rashidi to Egypt to represent Indonesia in the Arab countries. It can be understood that in the first year of Indonesia's independence it was not possible to require de jure recognition, but most of those countries had extended a de facto recognition to the Republic, allowing its representatives to carry out their respective assignments as political representatives abroad. In particular, the relations between Indonesia and India were very amicable and friendly, and the new Indian government manifested in many ways her support and very close relationship with the fledgling Indonesian republic. Though India had an officially accredited consulate general at Djakarta, this fact did not prevent Mr. Nehru from appointing to Djokja-

Indonesians foreign relations before the transfer of power

31

karta (the official residence of the government of the Republic of Indonesia) a political representative who acted as a direct link between the government of India and the Republic of Indonesia, through whom much advice and material help was channeled to assist the Republic of Indonesia during the gravest hour of her existence. This help became very valuable after the Dutch launched their military actions in Indonesia and imposed a naval blockade in order to force the Indonesian government to accept the Dutch terms concerning the political structure of Indonesia in relation to the Netherlands. With the assistance of the Indian government, it was possible to maintain an air corridor from Djokjakarta to New Delhi, making use of Indian planes to carry food, medicines, and clothing. The office of the Indian political representative at Djokjakarta became, in fact, the 'postoffice' through which the Indonesian foreign ministry could relay its messages to its representatives abroad. All-India Radio not only carried special programs on Indonesia's struggle for independence, thus making the Indonesian case better known abroad, but it functioned also as the official 'freedom radio' of the Republic in the first years of its existence. (Jansen, 1966: pp. 84-85.) Owing to the growing 'Asian sentiment', as Mr. Nehru called this awareness of belonging to one group, Indonesia, with twenty-four other Asian nations, was invited to attend the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March-April, 1947, with the objective to 'promote the study of and understanding of Asian problems and relations in their Asian and world aspects.' (Jansen, 1966: pp. 53-54.) As mentioned in the first chapter, it was on that occasion that Mr. Sjahrir stated for the first time the principles of Indonesia's foreign policy. Meanwhile the relations between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch government had become more and more tense. A preliminary effort to solve the Dutch-Indonesian dispute by negotiation under the auspices of the British government, which assigned the veteran ambassador Lord Killearn to assist both parties and if requested to render his good offices, had resulted in an agreement signed at a mountain resort in West Java called Linggadjati. This Linggadjati Agreement, signed on March 25, 1947, by the Indonesian delegation headed by Sjahrir and the Dutch representatives, aimed at the settlement of the Indonesian-Dutch dispute through providing for a transitional period lasting up to January 1, 1949, at which moment the Dutch government would transfer power to an independent Indonesian government. The Linggadjati Agreement was for many Dutch colonial diehards too progressive a step, granting independence to Indonesia in such a short time, and they did not find the Dutch interests well enough protected. So they were obstructive and found many trivial

32

Indonesiens foreign policy until the implementation

of guided democracy

ways to oppose the sincere application of the spirit and principles of that agreement. In the leftist group on the Indonesian political scene and particularly in the Indonesian Communist Party, opinion was very quick to condemn that agreement because it was felt that Sjahrir went too far in conceding to Dutch demands. Owing to the strong pressure of this opposition, Sjahrir resigned as prime minister on July 3, 1947. He was succeeded by Amir Sjarifuddin, who represented the leftist group and who, in fact, admitted later that he had been a member of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partei Kommunis Indonesia, PKl) since 1935. Meanwhile the relations between the Dutch and Indonesian governments were deteriorating rapidly, and finally in an attempt to enforce their own will in a unilateral solution of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, the government of the Netherlands authorized the launching of a military action against the Republic of Indonesia. This military action took place on July 17,1947. This Dutch aggression against the Republic of Indonesia had international consequences and significance. On July 22, 1947, Sjahrir flew to New Delhi and counseled with Nehru, who, two days later, came out with a strong condemnation of the Dutch military action in Indonesia saying, W h a t has become of the United Nations Charter? The spirit of New Asia will not tolerate such things. N o European country, whatever it may be, has any business to set its army in Asia against the people of Asia. When it does so, Asia will not tolerate it. (Kahin, 1952: p. 2 1 5 . )

On July 28, Nehru announced India's plan to refer the Indonesian situation to the United Nations. India's step was followed two days later by Australia's, and both countries brought the dispute before the world body (Security Council), referring to articles 34 and 39 of the United Nation's Charter. The Indonesian question came into discussion at the Security Council on August 1, 1947 and the Indonesian government could find no better or more eloquent a candidate to represent her case before the United Nations than Sutan Sjahrir. The Dutch government was represented by her ambassador to Washington, Dr. N. Van Kleffens. Describing the fighting in Indonesia as 'a breach of the peace under Article 39' (Taylor, I960: p. 48.) (which empowers the Council to act when peace is threatened or ruptured), Col. Hodgson, the Australian representative, entered a motion calling for swift action by the Security Council to stop the fighting. The Dutch representative Van Kleffens denied the right of the United Nations to intervene in the dispute between the Dutch and Indonesian governments, belittling the authority of the Republic of Indo-

Indonesia's foreign relations before the transfer of power

33

nesia by saying that . .It is pure illusion to think that the Government of the Republic represents anything but itself.' (Taylor, I960: p. 47.) Despite this, the Australian resolution asking for a cease fire was accepted. It called upon the parties: 'a) to cease hostilities forthwith, and b) to settle their dispute by arbitration or by other peaceful means and keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement.' (Taylor, 1960: p. 449.) This was a very great victory for the Republic of Indonesia, for the resolution of the United Nations changed the whole character of the DutchIndonesian dispute. From now on it was no longer a conflict that concerned the Dutch and the Indonesian governments alone; it had become the concern of the highest international body, the United Nations, and thus had become internationalized. Although the Dutch government, through its representative in Djakarta, Lt. Governor-General H. J. van Mook, gave the cease-fire order on August 5, 1947, it was not entirely effective. It seemed that the Dutch military command, and therefore Lt. Governor-General Van Mook, was not satisfied with the result of this military action because it had not achieved its primary objective, the occupation of the capital of the Republic, Djokjakarta. As Dr. W. Schermerhorn, the chief Dutch negotiator at that time, wrote in his diary (later published by Dr. Smit under the title, Ηet Linggadjati Accoord), it appeared that Dr. Van Mook after the acceptance by the Dutch government of the Security Council's resolution of August 1, 1947, pleaded in the most persuasive and strongest terms that the Dutch forces in Indonesia be allowed to proceed to Djokjakarta and to occupy the capital of the republic. But this request was not granted, and Dr. Van Kleffens cabled the following message to his government at The Hague, in relation to Dr. Van Mook's request to occupy Djokjakarta: 'When despite our acceptance of the truce we resume military actions against the republic, these [sanctions! will certainly be applied to us. We can't defy the United Nations' sanctions and besides losing face we'll lose our battle at the United Nations. Moreover the world will make a success story of this United Nations and it will avail of any opportunity to apply sanctions if necessary.' (Smit, 1959: p. 191.) Owing to the confusing situation in Indonesia after the issuance of the cease-fire order, the Security Council reconvened on August 14, 1947. Sjahrir was allowed to speak before the Council as the representative of the Republic of Indonesia and urged the Council 'for direct action because we have no faith in the honesty of the Netherlands Government.' (Quoted in Taylor, I960: p. 47.) Moreover 'he emphasized that the only way to end the fighting was for the Council to dispatch a commission to supervise obe-

34

Indonesiens foreign policy until the implementation of guided democracy

dience to its cease-fire order.' (Kahin, 1952: p. 216.) Sjahrir called upon the Council also to accept the original Australian resolution for arbitration by the council itself and to order the Dutch government to withdraw its troops to the lines they held before the military actions. After long deliberations and behind-the-scene maneuvering, the Security Council adopted on August 25, 1947, two resolutions. The first of these, submitted jointly by China and Australia, while noting 'with satisfaction the statement by the Netherlands Government issued on August 11, in which it affirms its intention to organize a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia in accordance with the purpose of the Linggadjati Agreement,..(Quoted in Taylor, I960: p. 450), requested that the member governments having career consular representatives at Djakarta (US, France, Belgium, Great Britain, and China) supervise the carrying out of the cease-fire orders and report their findings to the Security Council. The second, submitted by the US, expressed the Security Council's resolve 'to tender its good offices to the parties in order to assist in the pacific settlement of their dispute in accordance with paragraph (b) of the resolution of the Council on August 1, 1947. The Council expresses its readiness, if the parties so request, to assist in the settlement through a committee of the Council consisting of three members of the Council, each party selecting one, and the third to be designated by the two so selected.' (Taylor, I960: p. 450.) With the acceptance of these two resolutions the Committee of Good Offices of the United Nations (Security Council) was born. It consisted of a representative of the government of Australia (selected by the Republic of Indonesia), of Belgium (appointed by the Dutch government), and of the USA (selected by the two other members of the commitee). This Committee of Good Offices (GOC) which later was transformed into the United Nations Commission for Indonesian (UNCI) played a dominant role in the further settlement of the Indonesian-Dutch dispute right up to the Round Table Conference at which the Dutch government showed itself finally willing to transfer power to the Indonesian republic. It must be noted here that the USSR had always backed the Republic in all her deliberations at the Security Council and had even proffered a resolution that a commission be formed consisting of all the members of the Security Council to supervise the cease-fire order of the United Nations and to see that it be implemented according to the letter and spirit of the resolution of August 1, 1947. But the USSR resolution was vetoed by France. The intervention of the United Nations (through the Security Council) in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute had far-reaching consequences. From that

Indonesians foreign relations before the transfer of power

35

moment the Dutch-Indonesian question became an international matter, and all efforts of the Dutch government to characterize that dispute as a matter of concern only to the Dutch and the government of the Republic of Indonesia were a dismal failure. This was a great political victory for the Republic, and since then her international standing and prestige increased considerably. As Dr. Schermerhorn stated in his journal, it is an undeniable fact that 'the Security Council had improved the international prestige of the republic. The republic had become a political reality and could overcome the Dutch political and military pressure. The world public opinion had condemned the Dutch actions very strongly indeed.' (Smit, 1959: p. 196.) Meanwhile Hadji Agus Salim, a well-known figure of the Islam political group, made a goodwill trip to the Middle East in March 1947, and on March 25 he concluded with the Egyptian government a formal treaty of friendship, which, in fact, meant the de jure recognition of the Republic of Indonesia by the Egyptian government. Recognition by the other Arab states followed. The political situation in Indonesia had by no means cleared up after the acceptance of the Security Council resolution and the cease-fire order. The new cabinet, under Amir Sjarifuddin, made its complaints to the Security Council over the Dutch breach of the cease fire by instigating socalled 'mopping-up' operations by Dutch military units to clear the pockets of resistance of Indonesian guerillas in Dutch-occupied territories. The United Nations Committee of Good Offices, which met in Sydney before arriving at Djakarta, consisted of three top-level personalities. Apparently the three countries participating in that committee were fully aware of the responsibility entrusted to them by the Security Council to make a success of this first attempt by the United Nations to solve such an important problem, one involving the matter of colonialism and the struggle of an emerging country trying to get rid of her colonial bondage. The government of the United States had appointed Dr. Frank Graham, a well-known educationalist and president of the University of North Carolina, as its member. A former premier and minister of foreign affairs of Belgium, Mr. Van Zeeland, was the Belgian representative, while Australia appointed Judge Kirby as her member. The GOC set up an office at the Hotel des Indes at Djakarta which had a permanent staff and secretary. The first concern of the GOC was to apply as soon as possible the resolution of the Security Council, in particular the part concerning the cease-fire order, and once this had become effective to bring the contesting parties to the negotiation table by rendering her good offices in seeking a peaceful solution to the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. After long deliberation it was decided that the discussions between the

36

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of guided democracy

two parties under the auspices of the GOC should take place at a neutral site. For this purpose the US government made available the troopship 'Renville', which was stationed in the bay of Djakarta, to become the official meeting place of the Dutch and Indonesian delegations. The Republican delegation was chaired by the prime minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, while Dr. Leimena was appointed deputy chairman. A veteran Dutch diplomat, Jhr. van Vredenburg, was head of the Dutch delegation, while his deputy was Colonel Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo, an Indonesian civil service official who had followed the Dutch Indies colonial administration to Australia and London while Indonesia was under Japanese occupation and who after the war had collaborated with the returned Dutch administration and was appointed a senior official on the staff of Lt. Governor-General Van Mook. W i t h the appointment of these two gentlemen as leaders of the Dutch delegation, it became abundantly clear that despite their long colonial experience in Indonesia, the Dutch were, in fact, ignorant about the psychology of the Indonesian people. Jhr. van Vredenburg was a diplomat of the old style who came from an old Dutch noble family. H e was a very able diplomat. Colonel Abdulkadir, owing to his political background and close collaboration with the Dutch, was not respected by the leaders of the Republic. With these as leaders of the Dutch delegation and the existing suspicion on the part of Indonesia towards the intentions of the Dutch government, based on the bitter experience of the Linggadjati Agreement which was followed by a military action, it was very difficult indeed for the GOC to find a meeting ground for the Republican and Dutch points of view. When the first official meeting between the respective delegations took place on the foredeck of the 'Renville' on December 8, 1947, under the aegis of the GOC, the atmosphere was laden with suspicion and mistrust despite the eloquent opening speech of Dr. Graham. Dr. Graham said in part: ' W e meet on the good ship Renville, which carried ashore the gallant men of war, who, on Okinawa, broke through the last stubborn gateway to Japan, and helped to end the Second World War. Today this ship carries at sea the gallant men of peace, representing the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, who, this afternoon, formally opened the hopeful gateway to a truce of peace and freedom, national independence, and mutual co-operation of two great peoples of our times.' (Quoted in Taylor, I960: p. 66.) It is not the intention here to elaborate in detail on the course of the negotiations and the proposals and counterproposals made by the two contesting parties. From the first it was clear that the standpoint of the

Indonesias foreign relations before the transfer of power

37

Dutch delegation was to accept the 'observation of the GOC's team concerning the application of the Security Council's cease-fire order. However, it stuck to its determination not to withdraw the Dutch military forces to the lines from which it had started the military actions on July 21, 1947! It also maintained that it possessed the lawful right to eliminate the pockets of resistance in the territories occupied by its forces by launching so-called 'mopping-up operations.' So the Dutch delegation, through a speech by Colonel Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo, which angered the Republican delegation to a very great extent, insisted that the cease-fire order must first be implemented and the so-called 'Van Mook line' (the position held after the military action) be accepted before they would enter into discussions concerning Indonesia's political future. The Republican delegation was diametrically opposed to this Dutch proposal and requested the GOC that the Dutch first withdraw their forces to behind the lines held before the twenty-first of July. The Republican delegation stated formally that without a political solution no cease-fire order could be effective for long. (Taylor, I960: p. 78.) The political tension became graver when the Dutch prime minister visited Indonesia and made a political statement at Medan (Sumatra) on December 19, 1947, saying that the Indonesian question must be solved quickly because the issues were too vital to allow for delay. 'It would be most regrettable if this appeal, this last appeal were not understood (italics added).' (Quoted in Taylor, I960: p. 79.) This utterance of the Dutch prime minister was considered to be a disguised ultimatum, and it soon became clear that these misgivings were justified. Paul van Zeeland, the Belgian representative in the delegation, left Indonesia for a short visit to Belgium and The Hague for a top-level discussion in order to explore the intentions of the Dutch government. When he returned to Indonesia, the GOC was alarmed by the gravity of the situation. Believing that a tremendous political crisis was at hand and that the Dutch government would make an effort to solve the Indonesian problem unilaterally, he urged his colleagues in the GOC to make a 'last vigorous effort' to avoid a disaster. He said: 'In other words, it means this: either we fail in our task with all the grave consequences to be considered, or we succeed in our efforts and get an armistice, provided the parties accept to stay where they are, at the present time, for purely armistice purpose, without any political or other consequences being derived from that line.' (Taylor, I960: p. 81.) In fact, Van Zeeland recommended very strongly that the GOC take the initiative in bringing the parties together by pressuring the Republican delegation to accept the so-called Van Mook line, but without prejudicing their political future by that acceptance.

38 Indonesiens foreign policy until the implementation

of guided

democracy

Graham supported this idea because, according to his own statement to the author of Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, '...to continue the disagreement over the Van Mook line for more weeks would simply be a part of the programme of delay and attrition which worked to the unfair disadvantage of the Republic. It was more equitable in the long run to accept the Van Mook line on a temporary basis as a part of an integrated programme which would include democratic principles of selfdetermination.' (Taylor, I960: p. 82.) What Dr. Graham meant by his phrase about the 'unfair disadvantage of the Republic' which would result from a delay in the acceptance of the Van Mook line was the fact that the Dutch military forces had been continuing to exterminate the Indonesian guerillas in the pockets of resistance in territories occupied by the Dutch. The Australian representative was reluctant to accept this Van Mook line principle. Finally it was decided that the GOC submit to both parties its note to recommend the implementation of the cease-fire order as a necessary prelude to a political solution of the problem. There followed many painstaking and heated discussions with, in particular, strong opposition from the Dutch delegation to the introduction by the GOC of any proposals for solving the political dispute between the Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch delegation on many occasions issued ultimatums and adopted a 'take it or leave it' position in regard to its own proposals concerning the political issues. Finally on January 14, 1948, the Dutch and the Republican delegations came to an accord. They accepted a military truce based on the Van Mook line and on twelve political principles conceived by the Dutch delegation but amended and modified by six additional articles formulated by the GOC. The formal signing of these agreements took place on the foredeck of the 'good ship Renville' on January 17, 1948. Hence this accord became known in history as the Renville Agreements. The Republican delegation had accepted these agreements under very strong pressure from Dr. Graham, who without doubt had himself acted under pressure from the U.S. State Department. The acceptance of a truce agreement which included the 'Van Mook line' (the line of position held by the Dutch as a result of their military actions of July 21, 1947) meant that the Dutch would not evacuate the territories administratively occupied by them since then and that the Indonesian forces and guerilla units would be removed from the pockets of resistance. This part of the agreement was strongly resented by the Republic's military commanders, because by deserting their positions in Dutch occupied territories they would lose bases of guerilla warfare.

Indonesians foreign relations before the transfer of power

39

Amir Sjarifuddin had weighed this disadvantage against the political gains he thought were to be found in the proposals of the GOC, which guaranteed that in no less than six months and no longer than one year plebiscites would be held in those occupied territories, under the supervision of the GOC to give the people full opportunity to express their right of self-determination. Furthermore the GOC was to remain in Indonesia to supervise the implementation of these agreements by both parties. Sjarifuddin was convinced that in such plebiscites the people would overwhelmingly choose the side of the Republic. His willingness to yield to the US pressure was increased by a statement of Dr. Graham in which he said concerning the actual position of the Republic of Indonesia in relation to the forming of an independent nation which would encompass the other parts of Indonesia in an independent Republic of the United States of Indonesia: 'You are what you are? (italics added).* In the government circles of the Republic of Indonesia this was considered as an acknowledgement that the Republic could continue to maintain her diplomatic and foreign relation with other countries. This point of view was violently contested by the Dutch, later becoming one of the reasons for the rapid deterioration of the already bad relations between the Dutch and Indonesian governments which made application of the Renville Agreements almost impossible. Dr. Graham, thinking that a milestone in Indonesian-Dutch relations had been reached, was satisfied that the time had now come when the parties would turn from 'bullets to ballots', and he even made it clear to Amir Sjarifuddin that he had been authorized by his government to propose substantial American aid for the rehabilitation of a free Indonesia. But the Indonesian side of the line was not too happy with this agreement. Soekarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir opposed the agreement and saw its dangers, in particular as it would affect the military position of the Republic. Without doubt it was the strategy of the Dutch military command, under the ambitious General Spoor, to encircle the Republic and by putting up a tight blockade the Dutch could starve the population in Republican territories, thus arousing political discontent and unrest. On January 16, 1948, the Masjumi (the biggest Islam party) withdrew its backing from the Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet and so did the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia — Indonesian National Party). Without the cooperation of the two largest parties the Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet could no longer

Graham's information to the government of the Republic of Indonesia as told to author by Dr. Mohammad Hatta, former vice president of the Republic of Indonesia.

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remain in power, and on January 23, 1948, the cabinet resigned. To avoid political confusion Soekarno appointed the vice-president, Dr. Mohammad Hatta, as prime minister. A presidential cabinet was formed January 29, 1948, but this did not mean that it would be a replica of the first cabinet of the Republic under Soekarno. This presidential cabinet under Hatta remained responsible to the KNIP (Central Indonesian National Committee). In fact, Hatta's cabinet was a national cabinet with a very broad base of participating parties, with the exception of the Sajap Kiri (the leftwing groups under Amir Sjarifuddin). The dominant parties in the Hatta cabinet were the nationalist party (PNI) and the Masjumi (Islam party). Hatta held the portfolio of defense in addition to his prime ministership, while Hadji Agus Salim, 'the grand old man', was appointed minister for foreign affairs. For people with a certain amount of common sense and with knowledge of the Indonesian political background of those days, it did not seem an exaggeration to conclude that a solution of the Indonesian question was now in sight for the very near future, for the following reasons: 1. The new Indonesian cabinet, with the backing of all political parties save the leftist group (Sajap Kiri) and under the leadership of Dr. Mohammad Hatta — one of the proclamators of Indonesia's independence on August 17, 1945, whose tremendous prestige in the national movement was equal to Soekarno's himself — could be credited with enough prestige and power to carry out its program and to bring about a peaceful solution to the Dutch-Indonesian dispute by negotiation with the Dutch under the auspices of the GOC of the Security Council, according to the terms of reference and guidelines of the Renville Agreements, which had been accepted by both parties in the dispute. 2. The Security Council (and therefore the United Nations) had implicitly recognized the government of the Republic of Indonesia as the de facto government with which the Dutch government should negotiate to solve this Indonesian problem. Thus the Republic of Indonesia was a recognized party in the dispute before the Council. Its position was strengthened by the consent of the Council to the accreditation of a sort of permanent representative of the government of the Republic of Indonesia at the United Nations. The resultant Indonesian Observation Commission was headed by Ambassador L. N. Palar. 3. Furthermore, the Renville Agreements, in addition to the truce and cease-fire arrangements, had annex articles with provisions for a political settlement of the Indonesian question. These articles called for the setting up of an interim federal government in due time, to which the power of sovereignty would be transferred by the Dutch government once the inde-

Indonesia's foreign relations before the transfer of power

41

pendent Republic of the United States of Indonesia came into existence. 4. If both parties were to adhere to these principles and to the spirit of the Renville Agreements with the assistance and mediation of the GOC, a solution could be not far out of sight. That the government of the Republic of Indonesia was seriously committed to the implementation of the Renville Agreements was made evident in the program of the Hatta cabinet. In presenting his cabinet to the K N I P (Central Indonesian National Committee), Dr. Hatta expounded the fourpart program of his cabinet: Ί ) Implementation of the Renville truce agreements and political principles and continuation of negotiations with the Dutch through the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices; 2) acceleration of the formation of a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia; 3) rationalization of the Republic's army and economy; 4) reconstruction of damage caused by the war and the Japanese occupation.' (Kahin, 1952: p. 234.) That Dr. Hatta kept his word and implemented his program was proven by the facts. In the months following the signing of the Renville Agreements thousands of militia and Indonesian troops had been removed from the pockets of resistance to the Republican territories behind the so-called Van Mook line (the status quo line). Kahin, in his book Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia describes the resentments of the army commanders and their reluctance to execute that order. (1952: p. 234.) Moreover, Dr. Hatta in his capacity as minister of defense had taken the first steps to rationalize the Republican army, and its ranks were reduced. Of the dozens of generals and admirals only a few retained their rank, among them, for instance, the commander-in-chief, General Sudirman, who was considered the father and founder of the National Indonesian Army. Army units which were not effective and lasjkars (people's army) which lacked the discipline of the regular army were dissolved. Despite this manifestation of goodwill on the part of the Indonesian government and the evidences of serious intent to implement the Renville Agreements, the tension between the Dutch and the Republic grew steadily. It appeared that on the Dutch side there was not as much goodwill and willingness to implement the Renville Agreements, in particular, the political principles. The Linggadjati Agreement, whose principles were recognized by the Renville Agreements, had recognized the de facto authority of the Republic of Sumatra and Java. In the other islands of the archipelago, in fact, the Republic had not succeeded in establishing its authority, and in December,

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1946, in a constituent assembly of representatives from all the regions of East Indonesia — Bali, Celebes, the Moluccas, and the Lesser Sunda islands — convened at Denpasar, it was decided to establish an autonomous state (negara) called Negara Indonesia Timur, with Macassar as capital, which would become an integral part of the future independent Republic of the United States of Indonesia as an equal partner of the Republic. According to this same pattern an autonomous region (daerah), West Kalimantan, with Pontianak as capital, came into being. The Negara Indonesia Timur became a viable state, which included in its program the maintenance of a friendly and close relationship with the government of the Republic of Indonesia at Djokjakarta. Its policy of 'synthesis' vis-ä-vis the Republic meant that in the field of national issues it cooperated fully with the government at Djokjakarta. A proof that the government of the Negara Indonesia Timur was not just a Dutch puppet state, as Kahin seems to feel (section on East Indonesia, 1952: pp. 355-368), was the fact that on January 19, 1948, the government of the Republic under Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin recognized the government of the Negara Indonesia Timur as an equal partner and an administrative and political unit which later would become a constituent part of the independent United States of Indonesia. The Republican government's letter of recognition, signed by Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin, was transmitted at an official ceremony in Hotel des Indes, Djakarta, by two envoys of the Republic, the late Dr. Latuharhary and Dr. Hermani to the writer of this book, who held at that time the post of chief minister of the Negara Indonesia Timur. The Negara Indonesia Timur came into existence before the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement, and it is unthinkable that Prime Minister Sjarifuddin, acting on behalf of the government of the Republic, would have officially recognized the government of the Negara Indonesia Timur if that autonomous region were a Dutch puppet state or had been conducting a policy which was in violation of the Indonesian national interest in general or the interest of the Republic in particular. But the Dutch government had indeed violated the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements by creating, after the signing of these agreements, autonomous regions (daerahs) and states (negaras) in Java, Madura, and Sumatra, recognized in the agreements as territories over which the Republic had de facto authority. In these territories, which were occupied by the Dutch after the first military actions, the Dutch government created daerahs and negaras, as for instance, the state of Pasundan in West Java, the states of Madura and East Java, and the autonomous regions in East and South Sumatra. When this policy was continued even after the signing of the Renville Agreements, the Republic entered protest to the GOC, pointing

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out correctly that the Dutch government was violating the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements. This policy of the Dutch government had aggravated the political situation and was the cause of the mounting political tension. The Republic considered this Dutch policy as an encroachment on her territories and an effort to encircle the Republic with Dutch-created political entities, whose ruling governments were friendly to the Dutch and could be expected to align themselves with the Dutch policies against the Republic. Moreover the consular commission which was charged with the supervision of the cease fire reported to the GOC that there were many violations of the truce agreements by the Dutch military forces at several places. Months of inactivity on the part of the GOC passed, and this passive attitude of the GOC was very welcome to the Dutch government. Meanwhile there were changes in the membership of the GOC. The Belgian government appointed a new member in the person of the senior diplomat, Mr. Herremans; Australia appointed Mr. T. Critchley; and the u s government appointed Mr. Dubois, who was later replaced by a career diplomat Mr. Merle Cochran. To break this political stalemate and diminish the growing political tension, two members of the GOC, Critchley and Dubois, conceived a note with a proposal for an acceleration of the political solution in the spirit of the Renville Agreements, which was presented to the Republican and Dutch governments. The Dutch refused the note and accused the GOC of surpassing its authority and going beyond its terms of reference as outlined by the Security Council. When Dubois was replaced by Merle Cochran, the latter was of the same opinion that the GOC had to do something to break through this dangerous political impasse; therefore he took the initiative and proposed to both contesting parties some ideas for solving this conflict, which later were to be known as the Cochran Plan. Cochran included many elements of the Critchley-Dubois proposal in his proposal. His idea was to submit a Draft Agreement for an Overall Political Settlement and by doing this to bring the contesting parties to the negotiation table and to arrest the growing bitterness and political tension which could have grave consequences. The most important features of this plan were its proposals concerning the structure and powers of the interim government and its provision for a step-by-step transfer of power by the Dutch government to the independent United States of Indonesia. The intent of this plan was to thwart the Dutch scheme to establish unilaterally an interim federal government consisting of people of its own choice, regardless of the unwillingness of the Republic to join in such a Dutch conception. In following this policy the Dutch government had been viola-

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ting the principles of the Renville Agreements, in which it was clearly stated that the establishment of the interim organs must be carried out in conjunction with the Republic, which should have a fair representation therein. This Cochran Plan was favorably received by the Republic, which was willing to negotiate the further implementation of that plan. But the Dutch government refused the Cochran Plan and offered a counterproposal which, in fact, was a new conception and represented the Dutch point of view alone. Owing to the fact that the basic principles of the Dutch counterproposals and of the Cochran Plan differed so greatly, the GOC did not think it opportune at that juncture to bring the parties to the negotiation table. As A. M. Taylor wrote in Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, the Dutch government was willing to negotiate only on its own terms and was resolutely conducting a policy of nullifying the power of the Republic in the future independent United States of Indonesia. Taylor concludes his evaluation of the Dutch counterproposals in the following words: '...the [Dutch] Counter-Proposals called for the progressive liquidation of the Republic of Indonesia as a constitutional entity during the existence of the interim government and its replacement by some eleven federal territories in the usi.' (Taylor, I960: p. 153.) During this time of deterioration in the Dutch-Indonesian relations, the Hatta cabinet encountered very severe domestic political problems, which later became so acute that they led finally to the communist rebellion in Madiun on September 18, 1948. As stated above, the Hatta cabinet was formed without the participation of the left-wing parties (Sajap Kiri). The Sajap Kiri group, which later was transformed into the People's Democratic Front (Front Demokrasi Rakjat, F D R ) , strongly opposed the Hatta cabinet in the K N I P . It accused Hatta of being too lenient towards the Dutch and too willing to heed American pressures during the negotiations with the Dutch. The FDR proposed an immediate end to the negotiation with the Dutch and the confiscation of all foreign properties in Indonesia. The gulf between the Hatta cabinet and the FDR widened when Hatta refused to accept the proposal of the FDR to reshuffle the cabinet so as to include the former prime minister Amir Sjarifuddin as minister of defense in a new cabinet which would operate under a new national program. The Indonesian Communist Party formed the backbone of the new political fusion that was the FDR and Amir Sjarifuddin admittedly had belonged since 1935 to that party. In these circumstances it was understandable that the Islam Masjumi Party and the national party refused to reshuffle the cabinet in order to include Amir Sjarifuddin, though they did not

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oppose the principles of the national program proposed by the FDR. Moreover, the non-leftist political parties accused Amir Sjarifuddin of forming, during his previous tenure as prime minister and minister of defense, an illegal private army composed of the leftist youth organization (Pesindo), of allotting the arms and weaponry of the national Indonesian army to this para-military organization by depositing those arms in hidden places in the mountainous areas of Java, and of doing this to prepare for guerilla warfare and a forcible seizure of power by the FDR. In this context it is interesting to explore the role of the government of the USSR in the developments of the Indonesian political scene and the consequences of their policy in the future relations of both countries. The USSR had so far supported the struggle for independence of the Indonesian people against the Dutch colonial rule, as was manifested in the attitude and vote of the Russian representatives in the Security Council when the Indonesian question was under discussion in the period after the Linggadjati Agreement. When the Sjahrir cabinet resigned at the end of June 1947, it was due to the withdrawal of the Sajap Kiri (left-wing) parties because of Sjahrir's policy of signing the Linggadjati Agreement with the Dutch. On the day of the resignation of the Sjahrir cabinet, a young Indonesian communist, Setiyadjit, who had lived for a long time in Holland and had wandered over the whole of Europe and in particular the East European countries, returned to Indonesia. He immediately contacted the Sajap Kiri leadership and reprimanded them for creating political difficulties by rejecting the Linggadjati Agreement and thus causing the resignation of the Sjahrir cabinet. Upon the advice of Setiyadjit the Sajap Kiri reversed its position, but Sjahrir refused to reconsider his decision to resign. It is obvious that Setiyadjit came back to Indonesia upon the instruction of the Soviet government, which did not approve of the political move of the Sajap Kiri in withdrawing its support from the Sjahrir cabinet because, by doing this, it caused a split in the socialist movement in Indonesia. According to the Zhadanov doctrine, which was the official line of the Soviet Communist Party, Indonesia belonged to the anti-imperialist camp in the so-called 'two-camp doctrine' of division between the imperialist powers and the emerging countries. Following this line of thought, the national democratic elements of the country and the Communist group must be welded into a united front, within which the Communist group could extend its influence and at a later propitious stage of development seize power from within. According to this doctrine it was a grave mistake for the Sajap Kiri to have withdrawn its support from Sjahrir's cabinet, and so an attempt must be made to redress this error. According to the American

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scholar Ruth McVey 'This was the first instance of direct Soviet intervention into post-war Ρ ΚI (Indonesian communist party) affairs, and its purpose was to encourage that party's policy of compromise and self-effacement. Zhadanov applied to Indonesia his so-called 'two-camp doctrine' and Indonesia belonged to the 'anti-imperialist camp' which was formed by a people's anti-imperialist camp representing a coalition of parties basing themselves on a platform of struggle for the liberation under the leadership of the sympathizers of the communist party.' (McVey, 1954: p. 48.) Such an opportunity to cooperate with the nationalist bourgeoisie in the struggle for liberation as envisioned in the Zhadanov doctrine never returned, and that the mistake could not be remedied was evidenced by the continued exclusion of the Sajap Kiri (later the f d r ) from the Hatta cabinet. The alienation between the Hatta cabinet and the f d r grew steadily, and their relationship worsened sharply when Hatta finally rebuked the government of the USSR for another effort towards rapprochement. Earlier, when Amir Sjarifuddin was still in power, Suripno, the Indonesian political representative at Prague, had been given a green light to approach the USSR government to initiate a consular treaty between the two countries. But when the Hatta cabinet came to office Hatta had refused to follow this through, for in this time of the emergence of the cold war and the thrust of the USSR into the East European countries, Hatta was reluctant to adopt a policy of alignment with the USSR. He was afraid that to do this would alienate the United States and draw that country closer to the Netherlands, making the bargaining position of the Republic in the negotiations with the Dutch more difficult. In this situation the USSR made a grave mistake. Unilaterally, she notified Soeripno and made it public that she had ratified the initiated consular treaty on May 22, 1948, although she knew that by doing so she risked being rebuffed by the Republican government, which she had always supported. As anticipated, Hatta promptly recalled Soeripno from Prague, thus bringing the Indonesian-Soviet negotiation to an end. (McVey, 1954: p. 57.) This open rebuff by Hatta of the USSR caused an uproar among the FDR. Suripno came back to Indonesia accompanied by a personal secretary, who later was revealed to be the well-known Muso, who had been exiled in Moscow since the Dutch colonial government had quelled the revolt of the p k i in 1926. Muso's intention, as instructed by the Soviet Communist Party, was to rescue and rebuild the FDR from the debris of the mistakes made by its leaders in the past. Muso tried hard to pick up the pieces, and he approached the political leaders from the center to the right to suggest that the Hatta cabinet be reshuffled on the basis of a national program

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which would serve the objectives of a truly national cabinet, as Hatta claimed his cabinet to be. He put forward the view that in the first place the war for national liberation to achieve independence must be brought to a successful end, and that for this goal all progressive democratic nationalist elements must be united into one front. In his opinion the Indonesian revolution was a bourgeois democratic national revolution and not a socialist revolution. In the back of his mind, as the pattern to be applied in Indonesia, Muso had the Gottwald Plan — the pattern by which the Czechoslovakian Communist Party had seized power at that time. Therefore he did not envisage the overthrow of the government but rather the establishment of a national cabinet made up of progressive national democratic personalities, welded into a united front and operating under a national program. Hatta accepted the national program as conceived by Muso, but the parties represented in the Hatta cabinet violently opposed the participation of the FDR in the cabinet, particularly when it became known that the FDR had proposed that the former premier Amir Sjarifuddin be appointed minister of defense. Ever since Amir Sjarifuddin had acknowledged that he had been a secret member of the PK I since 1935, center-rightist parties had been increasingly suspicious that Sjarifuddin, during his tenure of office as minister of defense, had made efforts to arm the Communist leftist youth organizations with the intention of forming a sort of private army to be used in the future if the opportunity arose to seize power, by force if necessary. It was allegedly for this purpose that huge stores of arms which should have been distributed to the national army had been held back and hidden in remote places in mountain areas. The refusal to reshuffle the cabinet so as to include FDR members in it had so increased the existing tensions between the FDR and the Hatta cabinet that it accelerated the explosion of the PKI rebellion in Madiun on September 19, 1948. Another factor contributing to this untimely rebellion was the influence of the Student and Youth Conference on Independence and Freedom had at Calcutta from February 19 to 26, 1948. This conference had urged the application of the Zhadanov doctrine in the Republic of Indonesia since the conference was of the opinion that the ruling cabinet led by Hatta was a lackey of Western imperialism, and that therefore the leftist (progressive) elements in Indonesia should overthrow that cabinet. This line was in contradiction to the tactic of Muso, who seemed to bring to Indonesia the latest USSR instruction which preferred a gradual achievement, by way of cooperation with the democratic national elements, to insurrection and the seizure of power by force. In these confusing political circumstances the Hatta cabinet applied its

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of guided

democracy

program to rationalize the army. The Communist-infiltrated army units were disbanded, and this created resentment and provoked suspicion on the part of the leftist groups (FDR). As a result of this combination of reasons and factors an army regiment in Solo revolted and went over to Madiun where a Communist government was proclaimed. Muso and his friends were on a speaking tour to gain support for his united national front and his political program when he was confronted with a fait accompli and could not do otherwise than to join the rebellion. The fate of this PKI rebellion is well known. Hatta acted quickly and resolutely, ordering the crack Siliwangi division to quell the rebellion, and in one month the Republic recaptured Madiun and its environs, while the PKI leaders were captured or executed. Muso, Setiyadjit, Amir Sjarifuddin, and other Communist leaders were killed. This Communist rebellion, suppressed so successfully in such a short time by the Republican government even while it was engaged in a mortal struggle for independence against the Dutch, enhanced the prestige of the Republic in the international world and, in particular, among the Western powers. That the government of the Republic could succeed in putting down a full-scale Communist rebellion in such difficult circumstances was considered proof that the Republic could exercise its power effectively and that its leaders could remain nonaligned in the power-bloc struggle that had emerged as the cold war. It was while the Communist rebellion was approaching that Premier Hatta made his well-known foreign-policy statement before the KNIP on September 2, 1948, in which he emphasized clearly the position of Indonesia as a nonaligned country (as explained more fully in the first chapter of this book). The quelling of the Communist rebellion was proof that the Republic would remain nonaligned and that it did not hesitate to use force against those domestic elements that tried to disrupt her position of nonalignment and to drag her into the Communist orbit. Understandably, the quelling of the Communist rebellion and the resultant thwarting of the USSR's political scheme for Indonesia had brought a great chill to the Indonesian-USSR relations. But despite this success story of the Republic of Indonesia which impressed the international world and enhanced its prestige considerably, the Dutch government did not understand the writing on the wall. Instead of changing its position and trying to reach a kind of agreement with the Republic, the Dutch government wrongly concluded that the Republic had weakened its position by internal strife and should be exhausted militarily as a result of using its best military forces and reserves to suppress the Communist rebellion. The Dutch were therefore of the opinion that time had

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now come to put strong political and military pressure on the Republic; they reasoned that, from sheer exhaustion and political fatigue, the Republic would now be willing to reach a compromise with the Dutch which would be advantageous to the Dutch position. But as in many times in the past the Dutch government made a wrong judgment. Meanwhile, pertaining to an amendment of the Dutch constitution concerning its new relations with the former colonies, the Dutch Queen Juliana on January 6, 1949 declared in a speech concerning the future relations of the Dutch with Indonesia 'that a federal Government would be created within a few weeks to prepare for the establishment of a new Commonwealth.' (Taylor, I960: p. 176.) Consequently, the office of Lt. GovernorGeneral was abolished, and in place of Dr. H. J. van Mook, Dr. Beel was appointed as the High Representative of the Crown on November 3, 1948. This constitutional change was considered by the Dutch government not only as an impetus to the formation of political entities in regions within the territories considered by the Linggadjati Agreement to be 'de facto territories' of the Republic but as a further effort to isolate the Republic from any discussion on the setup of the interim government. This policy created resentment and dissatisfaction among the Republican leaders, and the GOC was notified of the violation by the Dutch of the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements. With this growing political tension the new Dutch foreign minister, Dr. Stikker, visited Djakarta at the beginning of October to have a direct talk with Dr. Hatta, and through the GOC (Merle Cochran) a meeting was arranged between the two statesmen at Kaliurang, a mountain resort near Djokjakarta. It appeared that the bilateral talk between Dr. Hatta and Dr. Stikker had a favorable ending. They agreed that: 1. The interim government at the outset would be formed by 'selection' so that it would be national in character, and would have specified authority. 2. Its ministers would be well-known to the whole Indonesian population. 3. It would be based on democratic principles. 4. It would be responsible to a constituent assembly, to be elected democratically by the whole Indonesian population and constituted from the component states of the United States of Indonesie. 5. The assembly would also have the responsibility of drafting a constitution. 6. As a part of this 'package deal', there would be provisional acceptance of the

negaras (the

autonomous political entities created by the Dutch in the former Repu-

blican territories after the first military action). 7. Dutch sovereignty in the transition period would be recognized and the High Representative of the Crown would have 'powers for emergency cases and the right of veto and of promulgation in certain cases to be specified later.' 8. The 'supreme authority' of the Netherlands over foreign relations would be recognized and Republican representations abroad would be incorporated in those

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of the interim government, which would in turn form a special part of the Netherland's foreign representation. 9. The Republic would also cooperate in the forming of the federal armed forces. The Republican land, sea, and air forces would be 'partly incorporate' in the federal armed forces in accordance with directives determined by the interim government in consultation with the Republic and those parts not incorporated would be transferred to the role of special police, given alternative employment, or demobilized, with the process to be completed within seven months after the inauguration of the interim government. (Taylor, I960: pp. 154—155.)

In accepting these points as a basis for discussions Hatta had made a number of concessions, and everybody was convinced that only a man of his prestige and high standing could impose on the Indonesian cabinet such far-reaching commitments. Apparently Dr. Hatta was eager to find a quick but honorable solution to this Dutch-Indonesian dispute because of the rapid deterioration of the economic situation in the Republic-held territories as a result of the tight blockade imposed by the Dutch. Moreover, the international political situation had changed. The thrust of Russia to the west and the creation of satellite states such as Czechoslovakia in eastern Europe, and the emergence of the cold war, with the stiffening of the relations between the Eastern bloc and the West which resulted in N A T O , had caused Hatta's apprehension that the US government, as a close ally of the Dutch in this Western alliance, would become alienated from the Republic. In the past US position toward the Indonesian question had always been equivocal and ambiguous, but at least she had not been hostile. A change in the US policy towards Indonesia from benevolent neutralism towards hostility could also influence Australia's position, which had been to support Indonesia squarely and staunchly against the Dutch. By accepting these reasonable proposals Dr. Hatta would show his goodwill and good intentions to resume the negotiations with the Dutch in the hope of reaching a peaceful settlement in the dispute and would thereby avoid a diplomatic collision with the US government in relation to the changed international political situation. Dr. Stikker went back to Holland with a favorable impression, assuming that the negotiations with the Republic could have a fresh start. But this optimism was to be quickly quenched by the following events. The Dutch government under the socialist prime minister Dr. Willem Drees, who headed a coalition cabinet consisting chiefly of Catholic and socialist ministers, sent a new delegation to Indonesia under the reactionary Catholic minister for overseas territories, Dr. M. Sassen. From the very beginning it was more than obvious that the new Dutch special delegation was making a serious effort to keep the negotiation from going through. The Dutch tactic was to emphasize the truce agreements and by doing so

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to safeguard its position against the operations of the Indonesian guerillas, while complaining to the GOC that the Republic was undermining the authority of the government in the autonomous regions created by the Dutch. The Republic, as was stated to Dr. Stikker, could comply with the truce agreements only when they were considered as one component of an overall political settlement in the spirit of the Renville Agreements and the Cochran Plan. But the Dutch delegation refused to share that standpoint. The talks between Dr. Sassen and Dr. Hatta reached a dangerous deadlock, with the latter accused of going back on his previous agreement with Dr. Stikker. The deadlock centered around the position of the High Representative of the Crown during the interim period prior to the transfer of power. According to the interpretation of Dr. Sassen which was transmitted to the GOC, the Republican stand was for the achievement of a sort of a gentlemen's agreement with the Dutch government, in which it was understood that the right of veto would never be applied nor an emergency situation proclaimed by the High Representative of the Crown during the interim period. Dr. Sassen, following this line of thought, concluded that the Republic would recognize the Netherlands' sovereignty during the interim period only in name, and he stated that 'this refusal to recognize the sovereignty of the Netherlands... nullifies the acceptance by the Republic' of the Cochran Plan as a basis for continuing negotiation. (Taylor, I960: p. 157.) As a matter of fact, the Dutch government had itself completely nullified the Cochran Plan by its previously mentioned counterproposal. Moreover, according to the Cochran Plan the power of the High Representative of the Crown would have been curtailed as soon as the interim government was established. In fact, the Hatta line was more in harmony with the spirit of the Cochran Plan than was the rigid standpoint of the Dutch delegation under Minister Sassen. The deadlock in the negotiations and the return of the Dutch delegation to Holland on December 5, 1949, was received with grave misgivings about the build-up of political tension in the days to come. Internationally, also, the breakdown of negotiations was received with the greatest concern, not the least in Washington. American public opinion as channeled by such newspapers as the New York Times expressed its concern and urged the United Nations (casu quo the Security Council) to take action forthwith to avoid a disaster and to bring the parties to the negotiation table. Aware of the gravity of the situation, Cochran, a GOC member, flew to Djokjakarta on December 13, 1948, to meet Hatta and discuss the situation. He succeeded in getting from Dr. Hatta a written explanation of the Republican standpoint in which Hatta once more stated his point of view on the

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position of the Dutch crown in the interim period, to avoid any misunderstanding. Hatta made these points: 1. Netherlands sovereignty would be recognized 'not only in principle but in practice' during the interim period. 2. It was asked of the Netherlands in return that it 'impose upon itself certain limitations on the exercise of its sovereign power of its own volition as a contribution to the mutual advantage of our two peoples.' The details of this self-limitation — 'in accord with the manner in which sovereignty finds expression in the modern democratic States of Europe and America' — would be worked out and made a part of the political agreement. 3. The Republic was 'fully prepared to recognize' the power of the High Representative of the Crown to use his veto and to promulgate his emergency powers. But the Republic asked that 'definite standards be laid down' to guide his in the exercise of these powers. 4. The Republic agreed that in case of emergency the High Representative of the Crown could use Dutch troops as well as federal troops for public protection. (Taylor, I960: p. 160.)

In stating these principles Dr. Hatta had reached the political limits of his ability to maneuver and to meet the Dutch proposals without being denounced by his own forces. Merle Cochran delivered this Hatta letter to the Dutch delegation that same day, and four days later (December 17, 1948) the Dutch delegation answered. Their letter contained a flat refusal of Hatta's proposal and, in fact, an ultimatum, for the G O C was notified by the Dutch government that a reply from the Republican government must be received not later than 10 a.m. Djakarta time on December 18 for relay to the Dutch government in Holland. This disguised ultimatum of the Dutch government provoked a letter from Merle Cochran, who alone was at Djakarta while the rest of the members of the G O C were in Djokjakarta. Cochran wrote: I feel constrained to express my regrets that it was thought necessary to impose a time limit which allows, if taken literally, a total of less than 18 hours, including the hours of night, for the making of copies; the delivery of the note to Mr. Hatta by the United States representative; consideration by Mr. Hatta; the necessary consultations with members of his Government; the preparation of a considered reply; the trip from Kaliurang to Jogjakarta and then the flight to Batavia. I cannot help but recall, by way of comparison, that I gave Mr. Hatta's letter to you at 5:30 p.m. on Monday, December 13. That letter was answered only today, five days later, despite the fact that it asked only for a decision to resume negotiations... (Quoted in Taylor, I 9 6 0 : pp. 164-165.)

This rebuke by the G O C representative concerning the conduct of diplomacy in such a rude way by the Dutch delegation, which amounted to submitting an ultimatum with a fixed time of expiration to the Republic, foretold the dramatic events to come. The timing of the Dutch in demanding an answer from the Republic in

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less than eighteen hours from the delivery of their note was calculated and a prelude to the launching of the second Dutch military action. By following this tactic the Dutch were preventing the representation of any new proposals of the Republic which might disrupt their military plans to move the army against the remaining territories of the Republic according to a plan de Campagne conceived by the Dutch military commander-in-chief, the reactionary, aggressive, and ambitious general, S. Spoor. Just thirteen-and-ahalf hours after the ten o'clock deadline, i.e., at 23.30 on December 18, 1948, Cochran received a note from the Dutch government informing him that the Netherlands was terminating the truce agreement as conceived in the Renville Agreements 'as from Sunday, December 19, 1948, 00:00, Batavia time.' This was thirty minutes after Cochran received the information from the Dutch. The meaning of this message was abundantly clear: the Dutch government would attempt to solve the Indonesian problem unilaterally by the use of force. The second military action was launched. Looking back over the policy, strategy, and tactics of the Dutch government in handling the Indonesian question so far, one can see the great difference between its methods and the way in which, for instance, the British government had liquidated its colonial power in India. The labor government in London had come to the conclusion that, in the changing world of the postwar period and with the rising emergence of nationalism in Asia, there was no longer a place for a colonial British Raj. So Britain had begun to withdraw gracefully, convinced that this rising tide of nationalism could not be dammed by any military force. Moreover, England was not in a position to deploy military forces for such a purpose. Therefore, the transfer of power in India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon could take place smoothly, for once the decision had been made to follow that policy the British government and its representatives acted fairly to put it into force. This was not the case in Indonesia. The Dutch government did not understand the change in the times. It did not keep up with the facts and its moves were always too late and too little to satisfy the nationalist aspirations of the Indonesian people. Moreover, the colonial officials who represented the Dutch government in Indonesia during that crucial time had been obstructing the Dutch policy in the matter of bringing the Indonesian problem to a peaceful settlement by negotiation with the Republic. These colonial diehards, motivated by selfinterest, had tried to prolong the time during which they could exercise executive power, and when it appeared that this was no longer possible they had had the idea of helping to bring to power a government which they considered to be friendly and lenient to them and to back it, while looking for every means to isolate the Republic or to make it powerless. A proof of

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this policy could be seen in the pressure of Lt. General Van Mook, as mentioned above, that the Dutch Indies military forces push on to the Republican capital city of Djokjakarta after the Dutch government had accepted the cease-fire order of the Security Council at the end of the first military action. That the Dutch government at The Hague could then resist this pressure which Van Mook exerted despite the Security Council's ceasefire order had been widely resented by the military clique and the colonial diehards at Djakarta. For these people the Republican capital of Djokjakarta had to be captured, thereby exterminating the 'pest-haard' (source of all evil) and allowing the Dutch government to establish a federal Indonesian government on terms prescribed by the Dutch, securing by doing so a political base of influence in Indonesia. As Kahin correctly stated in his book, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, the policy of the Dutch government in Indonesia had a threefold goal: 'First, it called for the application of sufficient military force to destroy the Republic and administer a decisive defeat to its armed forces. Second, it called for an over-all program of divide-and-rule, maintained through a skillfully operated form of indirect rule of the fifteen to twenty states into which Indonesia was to be divided and which together were to be known as the United States of Indonesia. Third, it called for obtaining international sanction of this program through granting of sovereignty to this indirectly Dutch-controlled federal Indonesia.' (Kahin, 1952: p. 349.) This policy backfired, in the first place because of the brutal rejection of the Renville Agreements and the unilateral abrogation of the pertaining truce agreements which were evidenced in the second military action of the Dutch against the Republic. Secondly, not all the states or regions which were later to become components of the United States of Indonesia were willing to support this divide-and-rule policy of the Dutch government and condemned in the most emphatic way the Dutch military aggression against the Republic, as was the case with the states of East-Indonesia and Pasundan. Purely militarily speaking, the Dutch operation must be considered a success. With superior weapons and air support, it was not too difficult for the Dutch military forces to capture in a short time Djokjakarta and the other cities in Java and Sumatra still in Republican hands. Most of the eminent Republican authorites — Soekarno, Hatta, Hadji Agus Salim, Rum, and others — were captured. Soekarno, Sjahrir, and Hadji Agus Salim were imprisoned in a resthouse on the shore of Lake Toba in Sumatra, while Hatta and the others were kept in prison in a guesthouse of the Dutchowned tin-mining company at Muntok on the island of Bangka. The Dutch military campaign, as appeared later, resulted in a Pyrrhic

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victory for the Dutch. Though the cities were occupied by Dutch troops, by the abrogation of the truce agreements the Indonesian guerillas could now act at will. The Dutch troops were harangued at night, and Dutchowned estates and factories went up in flames under the scorched-earth policy of the roaming guerillas. Before Soekarno and Hatta were captured by the Dutch troops, they had been able to issue proclamations to the Indonesian people to continue their struggle against the Dutch invaders. In particular, Hatta's proclamation was broadcast through All-India Radio to inform the outside world of the Dutch aggression and the determination of the Indonesian people to defend their territories and to continue the struggle. A temporary government of the Republic was set up in Sumatra under the leadership of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who had occupied the post of minister of finance in the Hatta cabinet. There was, of course, much question as to why President Soekarno and Prime Minister Hatta could have been so easily captured by the Dutch troops occupying Djokjakarta, particularly since President Soekarno, in several speeches before the military clash, had said many times that in case of a Dutch aggression he himself would assume leadership of the guerilla warfare from the inaccessible mountains of Java or Sumatra. Undoubtedly, days before the invasion of its territories, the Republican government had sensed that the Dutch had some kind of military solution in mind, and the military leadership of the Republic had made some preparations. There had been some argument that President Soekarno and a part of the government should go into temporary exile in India, where Mr. Nehru was willing to give them shelter and assistance. Some days before the Dutch aggression an Indian plane had been sighted at the airfield at Djokjakarta, probably sent there by the Indian government to be ready in case of emergency to bring the government to safety. But on the eve of the Dutch military action that Indian plane left Djokjakarta without President Soekarno or the Indonesian government. Later Dr. Hatta stated to the GOC, when its members visited the Republican leaders in Bangka, that 'the Government had known of the impending action well in advance and had made plans to move to Sumatra. "However, in view of the Committee's presence in Kaliurang, the Government could not have left Jogjakarta."' (Quoted in Taylor, I960: p. 184.) It is not yet clear if this is the whole truth concerning the motivation of the Republican government in not leaving Djokjakarta even though it had known in advance of the coming Dutch military actions. It is more plausible to believe that the Republican government had made a miscalculation in assuming that the Dutch government would not have the temerity to launch

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a military attack on Djokjakarta and to occupy Republican territories while the GOC (at least two of its members, Critchley and Herremans, and a complete secretarial staff) was at Kaliurang near Djokjakarta. As long as the GOC was in Republican territory and in residence so close to the capital, the Republican government felt itself safe, considering its presence a sufficient deterrent against any Dutch military operation. The Dutch military aggression generated a wave of shock and disgust over the whole world, in particular among circles of the United Nations and in the Asian countries. In international relations this Dutch policy dealt a devastating blow to the Netherlands' prestige. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities many Asian and Arab countries closed their ports and airfields to Dutch ships and planes. Egypt, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma all followed this line, while Australian dock workers repeated the anti-Dutch action undertaken during the first Dutch military action, boycotting every Dutch ship which called at Australian ports. But the most important political events happened in the Security Council and at New Delhi, where Mr. Nehru, urged by the Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, convened a special conference of independent Asian and African states to discuss the Indonesian question. This Asian-African conference was the first official meeting of Asian and African states; it had a legal international status (independent) and could be considered as the embryo of the nascent Afro-Asian solidarity. Its resolution influenced the final decision of the Security Council in voicing a strong condemnation of the Dutch military actions in Indonesia. When the Security Council received the report from the GOC, it convened on December 20, 1948, at Paris. On December 22 the Dutch representative, Dr. J. H. van Royen, gave a detailed account of the motivation of the Dutch actions in Indonesia. It was obvious that the Dutch position did not receive much sympathy at the United Nations. Delegates who usually backed the Netherlands' position detached themselves from the Dutch. Dr. Jessup, the US representative, said bluntly that 'The simple, massive fact is that the Council's own (cease-fire) order of August 1, 1947, has been contravened,' and he called the Dutch military action 'a blatant violation of the UN Charter.' (Quoted in Taylor, I960: pp. 172-176.) Sir Alexander Cadogan, the UK representative, who had always sided with the Dutch point of view in the previous debates of the Council, was of the opinion that the Dutch action went beyond all proportions and said that, judging by the way the Dutch government had acted, the Security Council's resolutions 'appeared to have been ignored or treated with less than the respect due to them.' (Quoted in Taylor, I960: p. 194.) The French delegation remained mute, and in the following voting on the several resolutions it constantly abstained,

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whereas in the previous debates following the first Dutch military action it had even used its first veto against a Russian resolution in order to protect the Dutch position. By these examples it became evident that the Dutch position in the Security Council had deteriorated gravely, and that it had no support save from the Belgian delegation. Nevertheless at its session on December 22, 1948, the Security Council could not succeed in producing a strong resolution condemning the Dutch as aggressor and directing them accordingly to withdraw their troops behind the status-quo line, as the USSR delegate Malik had proposed. The resolution that was approved called only for a cease fire and the release of the Republican leaders by the Dutch government. But there were other forces outside the United Nations which altered the attitude of the Security Council and compelled it to take stronger measures against the blatant act of aggression of the Dutch. The first of these was the conference of Asian states in New Delhi, especially convened to discuss the Indonesian problem. Second were the political developments in Indonesia themselves which had gone from bad to worse because of the intransigence of the Dutch in their determination to form an interim government excluding the leaders of the Republic and in keeping those leaders under detention despite the Security Council resolution calling for their immediate release. It could be understood that this Dutch military action had stirred the national emotions and indignation of the Asian nations, who themselves had just emerged from colonial bondage as free nations, and of the Arab countries which by virtue of their common religion felt themselves closely related to Indonesia. As mentioned above, their first reaction was to forbid Dutch ships and airlines to call at Asian ports and airfields, and now the Asian-African countries wanted to show their solidarity in opposing the blatant return of colonialism to Asian territory in complete disregard of the rising nationalism and the emergence of new independent nations in the postwar period. While the migthy British Empire had liquidated its power in South Asia by granting independence to India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon, a small country without any significance in the international world of power politics had the audacity to set the clock back and with impudence had been challenging the authority of the Security Council by ignoring its resolutions. This Dutch attitude had raised the temper of the Asian leaders to the boiling point. Nehru called the Dutch action 'the most naked and unabashed aggression,' (Jansen, 1966, 1966: p. 85), and many of the Asian leaders interpreted this military adventure as a sort of test case for what the Asian leaders in a less official conference two years earlier in New Delhi,

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the Asian Relations Conference, had called 'Asian sentiment and solidarity.' To make this idea a reality and not just a hollow phrase, the time for action had now come. The Burmese prime minister U Nu approached Mr. Nehru on this matter. In the beginning of January the newly independent government of India sent her invitation to the Asian and Arab countries as well as Australia and New Zealand to attend a conference held in New Delhi to discuss the Indonesian question and, owing to the failure of the Security Council 'to take firm steps to condemn the Dutch military actions, to make proposals to the Security Council; to suggest to the council what action it should take if either party failed to act according to its recommendation and to devise a machinery and procedure by which the governments presented here today can keep in touch with one another for purposes of mutual consultation and concerted actions for the achievement of the purpose for which the conference has met.' (Jansen, 1966: p. 89.) Because this conference was being convened by a sovereign country, the invitations were sent to those countries which had a legal international status. It must be observed here that Australia and New Zealand were invited. This was the first time that these two countries joined in a conference in which the participants represented African and Asian nations, showing by this the changed attitude of both governments towards the old conception that they were merely antipodal European countries. An awareness of belonging in the Asian sphere was clearly manifested by the participation of both countries in that conference. Moreover, Australia had from the very beginning solidly backed the Indonesian cause against the Dutch, and, in fact, it was Australia who brought the Indonesian question before the Security Council for the first time when the Dutch government took its first military action against the Republic. In total, twenty countries were invited. Some countries sent observers — as, for instance, Thailand and Nepal — but most of them took parts as participating members. Only one country turned down the invitation. Turkey did not join in the conference, as she considered herself a part of Europe, to which her interests were closely related. The conference must be considered a great success as far as the solution of the Indonesian question was concerned. After the head of the Indonesian delegation, Mr. Maramis, had elaborated in great detail on the Indonesian position, the conference debated for two days (January 21 and 22, 1949) the steps and proposals to be taken to induce the Security Council to issue a definite mandate to both disputing parties to settle the Indonesian question. The conference urged a cease fire, the withdrawal of the Dutch troops to their position before the commencement of the hostilities, and the im-

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mediate release of the Republican leaders kept in confinement. Moreover, the conference set up a timetable for the creation of an interim government and the further resumption of negotiations which would lead at a fixed date to the transfer of sovereign power from the Dutch government to an independent government of the United States of Indonesia. Moreover the conference advised the Dutch government not to create a puppet government pending the emergence of a free and independent Indonesian government. The resolution adopted by the Second New Delhi Conference did not go unnoticed among the members of the Security Council and world public opinion. The Security Council came together again on January 28, 1949, to discuss the Indonesian situation after preliminary discussions had been held on the report of the GOC concerning their findings and impressions after a visit to the Republican leaders at Bangka. The GOC had reported that the Republican leaders were not, in fact, free as had been stated by the Netherlands' representative, Dr. J. H. van Royen before the Security Council. Moreover, the GOC reported to the Security Council that Dr. Hatta had stated emphatically that no resumption of negotiations with the Dutch government could take place before the Republican authorities should be restored to their old positions. Moreover, Nehru had officially transmitted the resolution of the Second New Delhi Conference to the Security Council, with a strong recommendation that the Security Council act forthwith. It was proved to be not without reason that Dr. Hatta had notified the GOC, when they visited the imprisoned Republican leaders on December 15, 1948, that the resumption of negotiations with the Dutch could take place only after the restoration of the Republic to its original authority. On January 10, 1949, two emissaries of the High Representative of the Crown at Djakarta, a certain Mr. Gieben and a Mr. Brouwer, visited the Republican leaders to convey the message from the Dutch government that: '.. .on the part of the Netherlands Government, the Republic of Indonesia has ceased to exist as a political organization, and consequently the Vice-President, Ministers, and other Republican officials no longer were being recognized in their respective qualities. Responsibility over the Republican territories had been taken over by the Netherlands government.' * Thus the Netherlands government had unilaterally abrogated the Linggadjati Agreement, in which it had accorded a de facto recognition to the Republic. This intransigent attitude of the Dutch government, determined to destroy the Republic and to form an interim government on its own without the participation of the Republic despite the resolution of the Security Council on December 31, 1948, created much resentment in United Nations circles and * Report of Mr. Rum to the GOC, January 24, 1 9 4 9 (as quoted in Taylor, I 9 6 0 : p. 181.)

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in particular among the members of the Security Council. Therefore, when the resolution of January 28, 1949, was accepted, it was a clear condemnation of the Dutch action and a call for the restoration of the Republican government, with the strong recommendation of the Security Council that negotiations should be resumed forthwith in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Indonesian problem. To ensure that the Dutch would not implement a kind of delay tactic in this matter, it set up a sort of timetable within which some political targets should be reached, as, for instance, the creation of the interim government and the transfer of power. The GOC was transformed into the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) and given wide powers, with the authority to act on behalf of the Security Council, so that it could take the initiative in forwarding recommendations to both parties if it deemed it necessary. Furthermore some provisions of the resolution of the Second New Delhi Conference were included, as, for instance, the immediate withdrawal of the Dutch troops from the Residency of Djokjakarta and their progressive withdrawal from other Republican territories, so that this withdrawal should be finished by the day the interim government was established and the complete transfer of power to the United States of Indonesia not later than January 1, 1950. With these powers in hand, the UNCI participated actively in the further exploration of possibilities to bring the parties together and to look for a formula to bring the Indonesian problem to a peaceful settlement. This active role of the UNCI in the coming negotiations contributed to a great extent in finding that formula. The Dutch government also encountered many political setbacks in conducting its policy vis-ä-vis the other parts of Indonesia. As mentioned above, it was clear that the aim of the Dutch policy was to destroy the Republic and to continue in its effort to set up an interim government without the participation of the Republic; hence the quick notification of the leaders of the Republic that the Netherlands government considered that the Republic had ceased to exist. But as usual the Netherlands government, and in particular its representatives in Indonesia who were for the most part old Dutch colonial administrators, did not understand the psychology of the Indonesian people and therefore misjudged the political developments and current thought in the Indonesian political world. When Dr. Beel, the High Representative of the Crown at Djakarta, made his radio broadcast on the morning of December 19, 1948, to announce the military action of the Dutch while explaining and justifying its purpose, he certainly did not anticipate that something important was to happen at

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Macassar, the capital of the state of East Indonesia. Immediately after that broadcast, the cabinet of the state government was convened by the writer of this book, who occupied at that time the function of chief minister of the state. The session lasted only a couple of minutes, and the decision was unanimous that the cabinet would resign immediately as a protest against the Dutch military action. Moreover, the resignation of the cabinet was also a sign of solidarity with the Republic as a consequence of the policy of synthesis between the governments of the Republic of Indonesia and the state government of East Indonesia which had resulted in a close relationship between the governments and the recognition on January 19, 1948 of the state government of East Indonesia by the Republic. So, within a couple of hours of the announcement of the Dutch invasion of Republican territory, the state government of East Indonesia resigned. In the evening the writer of this book made a radio broadcast in which it was clearly stated that the state government could not accept a solution of the Indonesian problem by force since during the discussions held between the Dutch High Representative of the Crown and the state government of East Indonesia this government had repeatedly received strong assurances from the Dutch government that it would never resort to force in solving this Indonesian question but would continue to seek a peaceful settlement. Since this promise had been violated by the Dutch government, the cabinet resigned to allow the parliament of the state of East Indonesia to express its opinion and to look for a new government which could conduct the affairs of state in the changing political situation. The cabinet of the other large state, Pasundan (West Java), resigned that same evening, thus condemning the Dutch military action. Meanwhile the Dutch Prime Minister, Dr. Drees, arrived in Indonesia, having probably been misinformed that after 'liquidating' the Republic by occupying Djokjakarta and imprisoning its leaders, an interim government could be formed forthwith. Dr. Drees had the strong impression that during his sojourn in Djakarta an interim government without the Republic could be formed. But his frustration was great when he was informed that neither in Macassar nor in Bandung was there a government in power with which he could have discussions concerning the forming of such an interim government. It was unthinkable and a political impossibility that an acceptable interim government for the Indonesian people could be formed without the participation of the two biggest states. The state of East Indonesia made it abundantly clear that it could not meet or receive Dr. Beel until a new cabinet was formed which would have the support and confidence of the parliament. The writer of this book was appointed by the chief of the state of East Indonesia to form a new cabinet

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in consultation with the parliament. After the program of the cabinet was accepted by the political factions in the parliament, the forming of the new cabinet took its normal course, and on January 12, 1949, the new cabinet took office. The most important aspect of its program was the search for a peaceful solution of the Indonesian question by negotiations between the government of the Republic of Indonesia, the governments of the component states of the future independent Republic of the United States of Indonesia, and the Dutch government under the auspices of the representatives of the United Nations. Therefore, the restoration of authority to the government of the Republic of Indonesia and its participation in the interim government was a sine qua non, an absolute necessity. With this parliament-approved program of the cabinet, the writer went to Djakarta to inform Dr. Drees that the government of the state of East Indonesia could not agree to the formation of the interim government without the participation of the Republic. The writer urged Dr. Drees to look for a modus vivendi so that President Soekarno and Dr. Hatta, with the other leaders of the Republic, could be returned as soon as possible to Djokjakarta and restored to their original functions in order that negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the Indonesian question could take place. When the Federal Consultative Assembly, a cooperative body consisting of representatives of all the territories not under the jurisdiction of the Republic, convened, the writer with the strong support of the representative from Pasundan proposed acceptance of a resolution urging the Dutch government to bring about the return of Djokjakarta of the government of the Republic. It must be recognized that among the representatives to the Federal Consultative Assembly were some state and regional governments of negara and daerah who just echoed the voice of the Dutch government. This is true, for example, of the representatives from the negaras of Sumatra Timur (East Sumatra), and some others. With the strong opposition of the government of East Indonesia and Pasundan to any effort of the Dutch government to form an interim government without the Republic and the clear and positive declaration by both governments that the governments of East Indonesia and Pasundan would not cooperate in any such Dutch action, the Dutch government was compelled to retreat and to abandon its scheme. In view of this it is rather strange to find in Dr. Kahin's book, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, a distorted story pertaining to this particular chapter of Indonesia's history, as if all governments of the states and regions beyond the boundaries of the Republic were mere puppets of the Dutch government. In his book Dr. Kahin does not mention the recognition given by the Republic to the government of the state of East Indonesia, and

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his story of that critical stage when Dr. Drees came to Djakarta after the second military action with the intention of going ahead with the forming of an interim government without the Republic — an intention which finally had to be abondoned — differs from reality. It was the refusal of the state governments of Pasundan and East Indonesia which thwarted the Dutch policy to exclude the Republic from the interim government. If those state governments were merely puppets, the Dutch government would have succeeded in forming the interim government without the Republic and the international body would have been faced with a fait accompli. The history of Indonesia would probably have taken another course. This second military action of the Dutch, violating the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements, had very wide repercussions beyond the circles of the United Nations. As has already been stated, the Asian nations and the Arab states had expressed their condemnation in the resolution of the second Asian conference at New Delhi specially convened to discuss the Indonesian question, and this had influenced the resolution of the United Nations to a great extent. In the United States public opinion was also strongly stirred by this act of aggression of the Dutch. The influential New York Times expressed its dismay over the Dutch policy of using force to settle the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. In the American senate voices of dissent against the official American standpoint not to alienate the Dutch and to maintain a neutral attitude in this matter became more and more audible. Finally the Senate put strong pressure on the Truman administration to suspend and cut off Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands. According to the point of view of certain senators, the US government could not afford to extend economic assistance through the Marshall Plan to a country which had been using that money to carry on a colonial war and to suppress a national movement which sought freedom from colonial bondage. In order to get a clearer picture of the political situation, the US government invited the American representative in the UNCI to come to Washington for consultation before drawing up a definite outline of policy in this matter. Merle Cochran must have given to his government a true picture of the political situation, of the stubborn insistence of the Dutch government on solving the Indonesian question according to its own political conception, disregarding the reality of the existence of the Republic, and of the mistake the Dutch government had made thereby. Merle Cochran advised his government to change its policy substantially and to put the Dutch government under pressure to adhere to the principles of the resolutions approved by the Security Council. When the Dutch foreign minister, Dr. Stikker, visited Washington, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, told him that in these political circum-

64 Indonesia's foreign policy until the implementation of guided democracy stances the US Government could not continue to extend to the Dutch government the Marshall Plan aid which that country so badly needed for its economic recovery. First, the funds allocated to the Dutch for Indonesia were withheld; further, under strong pressure from the Senate, all Marshall Plan aid for the Netherlands was suspended. From the lessons of the Dutch military actions the following conclusions must be drawn: 1. Although the Dutch had achieved the military purposes of the action and the Dutch commander-in-chief had occupied Djokjakarta and all cities in the Republican territories, this appeared to be a Pyrrhic victory. 2. This action, aimed at destroying the Republic, had dealt Dutch prestige a devastating blow and had enhanced the political stature of the Republic in the international world. 3. The imprisoned Republican leaders in Bangka had a stronger political bargaining position. 4. The Republic, proclaimed by the Dutch government as having ceased to exist, was politically alive and had never been in a stronger position than after this military aggression of the Dutch. By virtue of the Security Council's resolution and as a result of the pressure of international public opinion and of the US on which the Dutch government was economically dependent, it was placed in the very embarrassing position of having to swallow its pride and resume negotiations with the Republic it had declared nonexistent. 5. Furthermore, to form an interim government without the participation of the Republic appeared to be an impossibility because of the strong opposition on the part of the governments of the states of East Indonesia and Pasundan and their refusal to join in any such venture. 6. So the Dutch government faced a dilemma and was forced to look for a face-saving formula to escape from this predicament, after having learned by bitter experience that the Indonesian question could not be solved by the use of military force and the strategy of divide et impera. Some leaders of the negara and daerah governments had allowed themselves to be used as pawns by the Dutch government in the application of its policy of divide et impera, but most of the states and in particular the most influential and important ones, the states of East Indonesia and Pasundan, had flatly denounced this Dutch political scheme. The national conscience was not only a living reality among the leaders of the Republic; it was widely spread over the whole of Indonesia, and most Indonesian leaders, even those who lived beyond the Republic's boundaries, were not willing to be treated as puppets by the Dutch government in dealing with national issues or matters pertaining to the struggle for Indonesia's independence. Backed by the Security Council's strong resolution of January 28, 1949,

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and by the new instructions of the US government to its representative the U N C I took the initiative in bringing the parties in dispute, even if heavy pressure on the Dutch government were necessary, to the negotiation table. As a preliminary step it was decided that fact-finding talks would begin forthwith to explore any possibility for a resumption of fullfledged negotiations between the parties concerned. While the Republican government was still in exile in Bangka it appointed Dr. Mohamad Rum as its representative to have contact through the U N C I with a representative of the Dutch government. The latter appointed Dr. J. H. van Royen, the brilliant Dutch chief delegate at the United Nations who had defended the hopeless Dutch position at the Security Council debates after the second military action with such adroitness and sincerity that he earned the admiration of many delegates. The appointment of Dr. Van Royen could be considered as a new starting-point in the Dutch approach to this Indonesian question and a significant gesture indicating their willingness to adhere to the last resolution of the Security Council. With the strong leadership of the U N C I , the bilateral discussion between Dr. Van Royen and Dr. Rum held at Djakarta was crowned with success. Their agreement, which later came to be known in history as the Van RoyenRum Statement, was concluded on May 7, 1949, and was, in fact, a complete endorsement by the Republic and the Dutch government of the Security Council's resolution of January 28, 1949. For his part, Dr. Rum stated that he was authorized by President Soekarno and Dr. Hatta to express their approval, in line with the Security Council's resolution and directive, of: Ί . Issuance of an order to the Republican armed adherents to cease guerilla warfare; 2. Co-operation in restoring peace and maintaining law and order; and 3. Participation in the R(ound) T(able) C(onference) with a view to accelerating the unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to the U(nited) S(tates of) I(ndonesia).' (Quoted in Taylor, I960: p. 217.) He also expressed their intention to work for the adoption of this policy by the Republican government as soon as possible after it was restored to Djokjakarta. After the statement by Dr. Rum, Dr. Van Royen announced that: 1. In view of this undertaking, the Netherlands agreed to the return of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta, and to the establishment of joint committees, under the UNCI'S auspices, to make necessary preliminary arrangements and to advise on measures for ending guerrilla warfare and for maintaining law and order; 2. The Republican Government should be 'free and facilitated to exercise its appropriate functions' in the Residency of Jogjakarta;

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3. The Netherlands would discontinue immediately all military operations and release all political prisoners arrested since December 17, 1948; 4. The Netherlands was to refrain from establishing or recognizing negaras

or

daerahs in territory controlled by the Republic prior to December 19, 1948, and from expanding negaras or daerahs affecting this territory; 5. The Netherlands favoured the existence of the Republic as a State to take its place in the u s I, with one-third of the total membership in the federal representative body; 6. The R(ound T(able) C(onference) — which the Netherlands would 'do its utmost' to call immediately after the Republic's return to Jogjakarta — would discuss how to accelerate 'the unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty' to the υ Si in accordance with the Renville principles; 7. The Netherlands agreed that in alle areas outside the Residency of Jogjakarta where Republican civil, police and other officials were still operating, these would remain in function. (Taylor, I 9 6 0 : p. 2 1 7 . )

If we examine carefully the statement of Dr. Van Royen, we see that it means, in fact, a complete volte-face by the Dutch government in accepting the spirit and the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of January 28, 1949. On the part of the Republic there was a compromise. Pending the convocation of the Round Table Conference the Republic accepted the limitation of its territory to within the boundaries of the residency of Djokjakarta, and it did not insist upon the withdrawal of the Dutch forces to behind the so-called Van Mook line as she had stipulated at the Renville conference, nor did she opposed the existence of states and autonomous regions which had been created by the Dutch government after the Linggadjati Agreement. These concessions were made in view of the commitment of the Dutch government to hold as soon as possible a Round Table Conference which would have the task of accelerating 'the unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to the USl' in accordance with the principles of the Renville Agreements. With the cooperation of the U N C I , the government of the Republic, after having been in exile in Bangka for more than six months, returned to Djokjakarta on July 6, 1949; thus it was restored in line with the principles of the Security Council's resolution and the statements of Dr. Rum and Dr. Van Royen. Now the Round Table Conference was to become a reality. Here representatives of all the future components of the free and independent US I would sit together with the Dutch government to discuss the procedures of the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the government of the Republic of the US I. It was of the greatest importance that the Indonesian policy be clearly formulated, that differences between the various Indonesian standpoints be reconciled and every effort made to converge the diverse point of views into one Indonesian standpoint. By doing this any possibility

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of a Dutch intrigue to return to a strategy of divide et impera could be quashed. In view of this, the writer of this book, in his capacity as chief minister of the state of East Indonesia, took the initiative in inviting all government authorities of the future US I to hold an Inter-Indonesian Conference to discuss the strategy and tactics to be applied at the coming Round Table Conference, to deliberate on matters concerning the future setup of the government, and in particular to formulate the basic principles of the new Constitution of the US I. This proposal was approved by the Federal Consultative Assembly (the permanent body of cooperation among the negara and daerab governments outside the territory of the Republic). An emissary was sent to Djokjakarta to approach the government of the Republic (President Soekarno and Dr. Hatta) on this idea and it was finally given the approval of the Republic. In the second half of July, 1949, the Inter-Indonesian Conference was opened at Djokjakarta; a second, and concluding session was held from July 31 to August 2 at Djakarta. It was a great success in that all parties concerned reached agreement on basic principles, and a framework for the new Constitution of the US I was accepted, thus ensuring that the Indonesian representatives at the coming Round Table Conference would remain united in defending the principles in issue with regard to the transfer of power. After some preliminary negotiations at Djakarta under auspices of the UNCI, it was decided that the Round Table Conference would be held at The Hague, and that during all the deliberations the UNCI would be present to assist the parties concerned if it were deemed necessary. The Conference opened on August 23, 1949; ten weeks later, after painstaking discussions and near deadlock, it ended officially on November 2. The particular point which had brought the conference to a near deadlock was the subject of the territory to be comprised in the United States of Indonesia. With this topic under discussion, the matter of the position of West Irian (West New Guinea) came to the fore. The whole Indonesian delegation was of the opinion that the transfer of power should include the whole territory of the former Dutch East Indies including West Irian. But at the last moment, when agreement had been reached on all other points, the Dutch government was adamant on the exclusion of the territory of West Irian in that transfer of sovereignty. The Dutch government based its objectives on irrelevant arguments, for instance, that West Irian, ethnologically speaking, did not belong to Indonesia. Since the Round Table Conference was a political conference held for the purpose of arranging the

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transfer of power over the former Dutch colonies in the East Indies, it was rather absurd that the Dutch government should suddenly switch to ethnological and anthropological considerations in refusing to include West Irian in the transfer of sovereignty, a purely political matter. It was more than obvious that the reason advanced by the Dutch government was purely a pretext to cover the true reason for that intransigent attitude. It appeared that the Catholic party, one of the big parties in the Dutch coalition government, was of the opinion that West Irian should be preserved as a Dutch colony in order, first, to maintain a sort of a 'Dutch presence' in Asia and in particular in the Pacific area, and second, to safeguard the position of the Catholic missionary in that area, who had been active during the last decades in an attempt to convert the indigenous population to Christianity. This sudden stiff and unyielding Dutch stand concerning Irian Barat came as a surprise to the Indonesian delegation, particularly when agreement had been reached on almost all other points. This matter was of particular concern to the delegation from the state of East Indonesia, of which the writer was chairman. Irian Barat was in the sphere of East Indonesia and had indeed been included in the former Dutch province of 'The Greater East', which covered almost the same territory as the state of East Indonesia. During the Denpasar Conference which culminated in the institution of the state of East Indonesia on December 24, 1946, there had been heated discussions between the constituent assembly and Lt. Governor-General Van Mook concerning the position of West Irian, and although it was agreed then that West Irian was to be excluded from the territory of the state of East Indonesia, the Lt. Governor-General, on behalf of the Dutch government, declared that West Irian would become an integral part of the territory of the future United States of Indonesia. (Proceedings of the 'Denpasar Conference', 1947.) Only with that declaration by Van Mook could a deadlock at the Denpasar Conference have been avoided. At the Round Table Conference this Dutch stubborness concerning Irian Barat recurred. It is worthy of note here that the Australian standpoint, as conveyed by its representative to the UNCI and expressed in the discussions, had changed, and yet the U N C I member for Australia was the same Mr. Critchley who had represented Australia on the GOC. Without doubt he acted upon the instruction of his government, now conservative after the defeat of the labor party at the last election, and this conservative government had pledged its support without reservations to the Dutch government in this Irian Barat issue. As the representative of the US government, Merle Cochran maintained a so-called neutral standpoint, which meant that he would not exert any kind of pressure on the Dutch government in support

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of the Indonesian standpoint in this case. In the matter of Irian Barat the Belgian representative was of course on the Dutch side. The two U N C I members (representing the US and Australia) did not favor the Indonesian standpoint. The delegation of the state of East Indonesia had received specific instructions from its government to stand firm on the question of Irian Barat because the majority of the members of the East Indonesian parliament would never accept a transfer of power with the territory of Irian Barat excluded. The Irian Barat issue had become a very sensitive political subject in East Indonesia. Other delegations had shown themselves more or less indifferent on this matter. They would have liked to support the East Indonesian delegation and to have Irian Barat included in the transfer of sovereignty, but they felt it was too great a risk to bring the conference to a deadlock solely On this issue. So the East Indonesian delegation stood almost alone. It found itself in a very embarrassing position, faced with a difficult choice: it could refuse to sign the agreements and thereby wreck the conference, or it could capitulate and incur the wrath of the parliament of East Indonesia and be censured. On the eve of the final day of the Round Table Conference, it seemed a deadlock had been reached, and every possible effort was made to bridge the differences. But the Dutch delegation stood firm and, having sensed the difference of opinion among the Indonesian delegations and knowing that it was supported by at least two members of the U N C I , it refused any significant compromise. So the last session of the conference lasted until two o'clock in the morning while all effort and every power of persuasion were used to achieve a last-minute compromise. Finally, in the early morning of November 1, 1949, a compromise resolution was accepted at the final debate of the Round Table Conference. The text reads as follows: W i t h regard to the Residency of New Guinea it is decided: a) In view of the fact that it has not been possible to reconcile the views of the parties on New Guinea, which remain, therefore, in dispute; b) In view of the desirability of the R T C concluding successfully on November 2, 1949; c) In view of the important factors which should be taken into account in settling the question of New Guinea; d) In view of the limited research that has been undertaken and completed with respect to the problems involved in the question of New Guinea; e) In view of the heavy tasks with which the Union Partners will initially be confronted; and f) In view of the dedication of the parties to the principle of resolving by peaceful and reasonable means any differences that may hereafter exist or arise between them; that the status quo of the Residency of New Guinea shall be maintained with the

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stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the US I the question of the political status of New Guinea be determined through negotiations between the Republic of the USI and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. (Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty, Art. II, quoted in Taylor, I960: p. 239·)

The delegation of East Indonesia was not satisfied with this compromise, but in the political circumstances existing at that time it was the best it could hope to achieve; otherwise, by refusing the compromise it would have borne the responsibility for wrecking the conference and jeopardizing the future transfer of sovereignty. So, with the greatest reluctance and full of misgivings about the future relations between the Republic of the USI and the Netherlands due to the exclusion of New Guinea from that transfer, the East Indonesian delegation accepted the compromise. It had interpreted the resolution to mean, by its very wording, that the New Guinea question remained in dispute, and that within a year from the date of the transfer of sovereignty New Guinea's political status would be determined by negotiations between the governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of the USI. The final discussions of the Round Table Conference took place on November 2, 1949. The documents of agreement were combined into an overall agreement consisting of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty, the political agreement or the Statute of Union, an economic agreement giving provisions for the economic relations between the Netherlands and the Republic of the USI, and agreements on social matters and military affairs. Finally, on November 2, 1949, in an official plenary session, the Round Table Conference was closed in the historic Ridderzaal, the Dutch parliament building at The Hague. In the final solution of the Dutch-Indonesian question the Dutch government had committed the same error as in the past. By withholding the territory of Irian Barat from the transfer of sovereignty, it could not create enough goodwill among the Indonesian people and leaders to establish the friendly relationship between the two nations required so badly to heal the wounds and ill feeling of the past. On the contrary, this total misjudgment of the Indonesian psychology, this always being too late to grasp the meaning of a psychological mood or offering too little in answer to Indonesian political demands, was to cost the Netherlands very dearly. It was therefore not without reason that the writer of this book, in his capacity as chief minister of the State of East Indonesia and leader of the East Indonesian delegation, upon arrival at the Kemajoran airport at Djakarta stated to the press, that 'by the exclusion of Irian Barat (Western New Guinea) from the transfer of sovereignty, in fact, the projected Dutch-Indonesian Union is a stillborn child.' * This forecast has been justified by the

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developments in the years after Indonesia's independence during which the Irian Barat issue became the stumbling block in the development of a good relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands which led finally to the unilateral abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union by the Indonesian government in 1956 and, with the further deterioration of this relationship, to the severance of diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia in I960, and the grave political tensions between the two countries in the early sixties which brought Indonesia and the Netherlands to the brink of war. This particular chapter of Indonesian and Netherlands relations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III. With the West Irian dispute still unresolved, the Dutch government transferred its sovereignty to Indonesia on December 27, 1949, thus ending its colonial rule over the East Indies, and the free and independent United States of Indonesia emerged in the community of nations. With the transfer of power the de jure recognition of other nations followed, but the USSR and China waited for months before they recognized Indonesia's independence. During the following plenary session of the United Nations, Indonesia was admitted as the sixtieth member of the United Nations on September 28, 1950. As we have seen in the previous pages, it is clear that in the period between the proclamation of Indonesia's independence and the moment the Dutch transferred their sovereignty to Indonesia on December 27, 1949, Indonesia's foreign policy had been directed toward obtaining international recognition of her independence. Her independent status was disputed by the Dutch government which had tried to re-introduce Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. In the efforts to solve this Indonesian-Dutch dispute, the Indonesian government had always avoided considering that issue as a matter which concerned only the two countries. It had tried and later succeeded in internationalizing the Indonesian question, thanks to the support of such friendly countries as Australia and India who had submitted the Indonesian question to the jurisdiction of the Security Council as a result of the Dutch military action begun on July 22, 1947. By launching that action the Dutch government had created an opportunity for the suggestion that the Indonesian question be placed under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, although in fact it had always tried to keep that question out of the United Nations. Since Indonesian foreign policy during that time was centered on winning that political battle, her international relations were very close with those • Statement by author, currently Chief Minister of East Indonesia, upon arrival at Kemajoran Airport, November, 1949.

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countries which had played a role at the Security Council and those which had supported her ever since her proclamation of independence in the struggle to safeguard that independence. The GOC (later known as the U N C I ) in which three countries were represented (Australia, Belgium and the USA) was the international body with which the Republic for the first time had relations, and without doubt as a consequence of the functioning of that body in the solution of the Indonesian question, its members maintained close contact with the Republican leaders. But besides this, the members of the Security Council through their several discussions concerning the Indonesian question greatly influenced in an indirect way the solution of this Indonesian question, and in doing this had contact with the representatives of the Republic at the United Nations, who formed what was called the Observation Commission of the Republic. As stated in the previous pages the Arab states had since 1947 recognized the Republic as a de jure power. India had given the Republic support in many ways. The Second New Delhi Conference, convened by Mr. Nehru especially to contribute toward a speedy solution of the Indonesian question, had conceived very important resolutions which in turn had influenced to a very great extent the Security Council's own strong resolution of January 28, 1949, condemning the Dutch for their military action against the Republic and urging a quick political solution according to a timetable and procedure outlined by the Security Council itself. Australia had from the first shown a very sympathetic attitude concerning the struggle for independence of the Indonesian people. The labor government in Australia had always supported the Republic of Indonesia despite the fact that the United Kingdom government was on the side of the Dutch in many issues. Australian dock workers boycotted Dutch ships calling at Australian ports, and the government of Australia sponsored the first resolution at the Security Council calling for a cease-fire order and a solution of the Indonesian question by arbitration of the Council at the time that the Dutch government launched its first military action against the Republic. Thanks to this Australian initiative, the Indonesian question became an item for discussion by the Security Council and thus became internationalized in spite of the objections of the Dutch and their efforts to localize the solution of that problem by keeping the negotiation bilateral between the Dutch and the Republic without the good offices of a third or an international body. It is no wonder that, as a consequence of the Australian government's sympathetic attitude and understanding of the national aspirations of the Asian people in general, Mr. Nehru included Australia in the list of countries to be invited to the Second New Delhi Conference.

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When the GOC was first constituted according to the terms and references of the Security Council's resolution of August 25, 1947, the government of the Republic elected Australia, as a champion of the Indonesian cause, to become a member. And it was a good move on the part of the Australian government to appoint as its representative on the GOC the very outstanding young and able foreign-service career officer, Mr. Τ. K. Critchley, who later became the chief representative of Australia to the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. Mr. Critchley performed his job wonderfully well; his ability to be always on the spot and his limitless diligence in gathering the right information and in making inquiries were priceless contributions to the GOC and to his own government, which was always supplied with firsthand and correct information concerning the developments in the Indonesian question, thus enabling its representatives at the Security Council to play an influential and dominant role in the debates on the Indonesian question. But when in Australia the conservative government under Mr. Robert Menzies came to power, the Australian position began to change. That government's decision to join the US government in establishing the ANZUS Pact — a defense agreement between Australia, New Zealand, and the u s which had been concluded on September 1, 1951, as a consequence of the cold war and the bipolarization of the two power blocs — put Australia again into its old mold as an antipodal member of the Western bloc, a move which inevitably brought a drastic change in her Asian policy. This change was reflected in Australia's altered attitude during the last stages of reaching a solution to the Indonesian problem when, at the Round Table Conference at The Hague, she supported the Dutch government squarely in the issue of Irian Barat (Western New Guinea). In the following years, when this Irian Barat issue became a tinderbox in Dutch-Indonesian relations which brought the two countries to the brink of war, Australia was completely on the side of the Dutch. This policy had destroyed Australia's reservoir of goodwill in Indonesia, which had been built up over so many years by Critchley and other eminent diplomats. Belgium, as another member of the GOC (later the UNCI), was the member elected by the Dutch, and this country had always supported the Dutch government in the Indonesian problem. Belgium was a member, with Holland and Luxemburg, of the Coal and Steel Community, which later was extended into a broader economic and political cooperative venture known as Benelux. As a member of this West European regional cooperative, Belgium could hardly be expected to dissociate itself from its ally in order to side with the Republic. The four big powers having permanent seats on the Security Council

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(France, China, USSR, and U S ) had adopted diverse standpoints concerning the Indonesian problem. France, as a typical colonial power with a similar problem in Indochina, first sided with the Dutch. It had used its first veto to block a Russian resolution which proposed, after the first military action of the Dutch, to send representatives of the whole Security Council to supervise the cease-fire order and to seek a solution to the Indonesian question. But later on when the Dutch launched their second military action, denouncing all Security Council resolutions by following their own policy in Indonesia, France did not hesitate to condemn the Dutch action as 'brutal and shocking.' (Security Council Official Records, quoted in Taylor, I960: p. 381.) China had always favored the Indonesian position and was one of the cosponsors of the important resolution of January 28, 1949. Dr. Tsiang, the Chinese representative, told the Security Council: 'my Government wishes me to use whatever influence I have here to promote the cause of Indonesian independence.' (Taylor, I960: p. 379.) Furthermore, after the second Dutch military action, Dr. Tsiang felt that the good-offices policy of the Security Council should be abandoned and demanded of the Security Council 'a more positive role' without which it would be 'entirely out of the question that the two parties could work out a peaceful solution.' (Taylor, I960: p. 379.) The USSR government had always supported the Indonesian position as an expression of the struggle for national liberation from colonial rule. There was a slight modification in the Russian attitude after the ascendancy of the Hatta cabinet in January, 1948, and Dr. Hatta's rebuff of the USSR proposal to ratify the consular treaty that had been initiated previously by the representative of the Republican government at Prague, with the consent of the leftist prime minister, Amir Sjarifuddin. The Russian-Indonesian relationship became much chillier after the suppression by the Hatta cabinet of the Madiun Communist rebellion. This altered attitude was manifested when the U S S R delegation abstained from voting on the January 28, 1949, resolution at the Security Council, under the pretext that the resolution was not strong enough nor as far-reaching in its consequences for the solution of the Indonesian problem as the Russian delegation had envisioned. This alienation in the Indonesian-Russian relationship came more to the surface when the U S S R delegation vetoed a resolution at the Security Council, which had the purpose of offering congratulations to both parties Holland and the representatives of the future Republic of the u s ι - on the closure of the Round Table Conference, for having reached an overall agreement on the transfer of power. Malik, the U S S R representative at the

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Security Council, was aware however that the transfer of Indonesian independence would not be affected by this veto and the USSR action seemed to be only an expression of displeasure towards the Hatta cabinet and Soekarno, who following the Madiun Communist rebellion and its consequent suppression by the Hatta cabinet, became in the eyes of the Russian government agents of the imperialist powers and in particular of America. Malik condemned the Round Table Conference as "not bestowing even a vestige of sovereignty upon Indonesia" and as providing for retention of Dutch rule over Indonesia "for many generations."' (Taylor, I960: p. 389·) The U S S R government had it in mind to discredit Soekarno and Hatta in the eyes of the leftist groups in Indonesia by vetoing that resolution, but on the other hand it would not take any action which could disrupt the program of the planned transfer of independence as agreed upon by the parties concerned at The Hague. To express its disapproval of the new Indonesian government which came to power after the day of independence under the leadership of Dr. Hatta, the Russian government waited for more than one month before granting recognition to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. But when on September 28, 1950, Indonesia applied for the membership in the United Nations the Russian government did not veto the application, so that on that day Indonesia became the sixtieth member of the United Nations. The attitude of the government of the United States of America in the matter of the Indonesian question was very equivocal and wavering. It gradually changed into a more positive backing of the Indonesian position when it appeared abundantly clear that the Dutch had flagrantly defied the resolutions of the United Nations in their pursuit, even by force, of a policy in Indonesia which was in violation of the nationalist aspirations of the Indonesian people. But although the Indonesian nationalist movement was widely backed by American public opinion because of the traditional sympathy of the American people for the struggle of oppressed people against colonial rule, the official standpoint of the Truman administration was to not antagonize the Dutch government in this Indonesian question. The attention of the State Department at that time was directed more to West European problems than to Asian issues because of the containment policy against the thrust of Communist influence to the west immediately after the war. In this concept of containment, western Europe was considered the primary bastion against the communist extension of influence to the west. The Berlin blockade, the issuance of the Truman doctrine for Turkey and Greece, and the negotiations to set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were evidences of American foreign policy and the decision to stand firm in western Europe.

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In this foreign-policy concept, the role of the Netherlands as a faithful ally of the U S and its position in the N A T O strategic-defense blueprint made it a matter of deep concern to the policy planners in the State Department to not antagonize the Netherlands government by adopting too pro-Indonesian a posture in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. In the first contacts between the Dutch and the Republican government under the auspices of representatives of the United Kingdom, the US did not intervene. She considered it the prerogative of the British government to assist the disputing parties in finding a solution, owing to the fact that by virtue of the allied agreements the Southeast Asia Command under Admiral Mountbatten was responsible for the liquidation of the Japanese occupying forces in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, and for finding the political solutions pertinent to this problem. But when the Dutch government launched its first military action against the Republic and by doing this defied the Linggadjati Agreements, and when the Indonesian question was then brought under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, the US government became involved and began to play a role in finding a solution in this matter. The US standpoint seemed to be directed to finding as soon as possible a convenient, peaceful solution which would satisfy the national aspirations of Indonesia but would not antagonize the Dutch government too much. Therefore the u s supported the cease-fire resolution sponsored by Australia but opposed the idea of solving the Indonesian question by a sort of arbitration as proposed by Australia and strongly rejected by the Netherlands. Therefore the u s representative sponsored another resolution to set up a Committee of Good Offices consisting of three members of the Council, each party selecting one and the third to be designated by the two so selected. This resolution, which was accepted on August 25, 1947, had two purposes. It opened the possibility that the US might be elected as the third member of the Committee and so become involved in the solution of the Indonesian question. Secondly, it prevented a Security Council resolution which would have been more in line with the wishes of the Dutch government. At the following negotiations between the Dutch and the Republican government under auspices of the United Nations which finally led to the Renville Agreements, it was as a result of strong pressure on the part of the US representative Frank Graham under instruction from the State Department, that the Republic accepted the so-called Van Mook line - that is, the status quo line of military boundaries which had evolved after the Dutch military aggression — and agreed to remove the armed forces and guerilla troops from the 'pockets of resistance' in the Republican territories occupied by the Dutch. This was a very bitter pill to swallow for the Re-

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publican government. Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, and the political parties opposed Amir Sjarifuddin for having signed that agreement, and this caused his fall. Amir Sjarifuddin had succumbed to the strong American pressure and the assurance of the GOC that this cease-fire order was part of a package deal which included the political solution of the Indonesian problem as outlined by the six points of the GOC included in the Renville Agreements. Later the Dutch government had violated the Renville Agreements. In defiance of the principles of these agreements and of the resolutions of the Security Council, the Dutch government launched the second military action to impose a unilateral solution of the Indonesian problem. In a last-minute intervention to prevent a disaster, the US representative, Merle Cochran, presented his so-called 'counterproposals,' but these were rejected by the High Representative of the Crown and the Dutch appeared to continue their buildup for a military venture. The way in which the Dutch representative at Djakarta presented his ultimatum to the Republican government a couple of hours before launching the military action and terminated the cease-fire order unilaterally thirty minutes before the zero hour of the beginning of the military action shocked even the staunchest supporter of the Dutch cause in the State Department. The ensuing intransigence of the Dutch government in defying the resolutions of the Security Council pertaining to this military action developed in Washington a certain aversion to the Dutch policy in Indonesia. Meanwhile a great section of public opinion, including the famous columnist Walter Lipmann. turned against the Dutch; there followed an outcry among influential senators against the policy of the US government to support the Dutch, who had shown themselves unable to abide by the resolutions of the Security Council. This was the start of a change in the American policy towards Indonesia. Meanwhile the pressure on the US government to change its policy drastically had been developing quickly in Washington, and some senators were urging the government to cut off the Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands (which amounted about $ 350 million) as long as the Netherlands government continued its policy of ignoring the Security Council's resolutions. Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed Dr. Stikker, the Netherlands minister for foreign affairs who visited Washington at that time, that the US government would be forced to take those drastic steps if the Dutch government persisted in its disregard of the Security Council's resolutions. To avoid further embarrassment Dean Acheson called Merle Cochran back to Washington for consultation and instructed him, as the US representative in the UNCI, to take the initiative in working out a compromise agreement between the Dutch and the parties concerned in Indonesia which would be based on the principles of the resolutions of the Security Council. This was

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the prelude to the so-called Rum-Van Royen Statement in which Merle Cochran played an important role by bringing the parties together as well as in persuading them to accept the principles outlined in that statement. Cochran put strong pressure on both disputing parties to accept a basic agreement for further negotiations towards a political settlement of the Indonesian question in line with the principles of the Security Council's resolutions. The threat that the US would cut off Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands in case of its noncompliance caused the Dutch government to yield. On the other side, the Republic had to accept the status quo as it existed after the second military action, with these added stipulations: that the Dutch were to withdraw forthwith from the Residency of Djokjakarta so that the government of the Republic could be restored in its own capital, and that the US government would insist on the adherence of the Dutch government to the resolutions of the Security Council calling for a round table conference at The Hague at the earliest convenience, at which the matter of the transfer of sovereignty to the independent Republic of the US I should be discussed. Moreover, the government of the US committed itself to grant economic and financial assistance to the US I after the transfer of power. To sum up, the foreign policy of the Republic in this era prior to the transfer of power was directed solely to mustering support, sympathy, and goodwill in its struggle for independence against the Dutch. It succeeded in gaining that support, sympathy, and goodwill from the United Nations (casu quo The Security Council), the Asian and Arab countries( as proven by the resolutions of the Second New Delhi Conference), and such other countries as the US, Australia and the USSR.

3· Indonesian-Dutch relations after the transfer of power and the impact of the West Irian (West New Guinea) dispute on the relations between the two countries Dutch-Indonesian relations after the transfer of power by the Dutch government on December 27, 1949, were clouded by the problem of West New Guinea, which the Round Table Conference had not succeeded in solving. This problem remained a dispute between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia which, according to Article 2 of the charter of the transfer of Independence, was to be settled by negotiation within one year from the transfer of sovereignty. Owing to the sensitivity of this issue for Indonesian public opinion and the strong reactions of the majority of the Indonesian public against the compromise in the matter of West Irian that the Indonesian delegation had been compelled to accept during the Round Table Conference, it was clear that no cabinet which came to power after the transfer of sovereignty had the courage to omit from its program a paragraph which pointed out a way to solve this problem and to bring West Irian into the fold of the republic. It was clear also that as long as this dispute remained unresolved IndonesianDutch relations would remain strained, contrary to the expectations of the Dutch government which had anticipated a close and most friendly relationship with her former colony through cooperation based on the free will and equality of the parties concerned. By withholding West Irian in the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the US I the Dutch government had itself created the dispute that prevented the fulfillment of their hopes for close cooperation between Indonesia and Holland within the framework of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union Statute. This West Irian problem was to become the stumbling block in Indonesian-Dutch relations that finally was the main reason for the disruption of that Union. When the Hatta cabinet came to power on December 17, 1949, and announced its program, it stated that Indonesia would follow an independent and active foreign policy and that, in regard to the Netherlands, it would respect the terms of the Round Table Conference; it stipulated most emphatically that the government would seek all means to implement the pertaining article of the chapter of the transfer of sovereignty, inviting the Dutch government to participate in speedy negotiation to obtain a solution

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to the West Irian problem. The Hatta cabinet expected that within one year West Irian should be taken into the fold of the USI. But this hope appeared to be illusory. When in March, 1950, the Dutch ministerial delegation arrived at Djakarta to take part in the so-called Conference of Ministers of the Union Partners as called for in Ariticle 7 of the Union Statute, the West Irian problem had become one of the main issues. It appeared from the beginning that the Dutch government had not the slightest intention to adhere to Article 2 of the charter of the transfer of the sovereignty; it stuck to the principle that West Irian should be excluded in the transfer of power, repeating again the reasons expounded during the Round Table Conference. To save the situation, a joint commission of experts was instituted to present to the respective governments a joint report on the subject. But it had become obvious that the standpoints of the Indonesian and Dutch members were far apart and irreconcilable, so that in fact two reports were submitted representing the points of view of the Indonesian and Dutch members of the commission. While the Dutch government had tried to lay a new foundation for its relation with the new independent republic by doing its utmost to make the Union a viable institution manifesting a new form of cooperation, its intransigence in the matter of the West Irian issue as demonstrated at the conference of ministers had, in fact, made the Union a 'paper' Union without any meaning and significance. This first meeting of the ministers was a complete failure and foreshadowed the deteriorating relationship between the Dutch and the republic of Indonesia. W i t h regard to the matter of West Irian the final communique of the conference pointed out the wide divergence of opinion between the two countries. The pamphlet issued by the Union secretariat concerning the results of this first ministers' conference of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union includes the following lines: 'With regard to the Irian problem (New Guinea) both parties were agreed that a final solution still could not be found during the course of this first conference. In preparation for further and definitive treatment of this question at a second and special Ministers' Conference to be convened for that purpose, it was decided to appoint a mixed commission to which each of the partners will appoint three members...' (Resultaten, 1950: p. 89.) This joint commission toured the territory of West Irian but the findings of the Indonesian and Dutch members differed so widely that it had not succeeded to formulating a joint report. Owing to this great discrepancy in opinion, the Indonesian and Dutch members of the commission each seperately formulated their conclusions and presented them to their respective governments. A suggestion on the part of the Indonesian government to

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send a parliamentary mission to West Irian was refused by the Dutch government, while the Indonesian government declined a Dutch offer to send to West Irian an Indonesian commissioner. Prime Minister Hatta had not yet given up all hope that the Dutch government would abide by the decision of the Round Table Conference and cede the territory of West New Guinea to Indonesia by the end of 1950. In view of this, Hatta had not abandoned his policy of reconciliation with the Dutch and had been trying to put the relations between the two countries on a friendly footing. So he accepted the Dutch offer to assist Indonesia in the training of its army, inviting a Dutch military mission to come to Djakarta, and a loan agreement amounting to 45 million guilders was concluded with the Netherlands. According to Hatta's information to the writer his optimism that in due time West Irian would be transferred to Indonesia was based on the result of his conversation held with the Dutch Minister of Overseas Territories, Van Maarseveen, and the finance minister Lieftinck during the conference of ministers of the republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands in March 1950 at Djakarta. Mr. Van Maarseveen told Hatta at that occasion that he (Van Maarseveen) was of the opinion that Indonesia could achieve her objective to include West Irian in her territory in due course provided that both sides would not give much publicity to this matter and keep quiet for a while. By doing this the sentiments of those who harbored an emotional view concerning this matter would befading away. Moreover the finance minister Lieftinck expressed his great apprehension about the large expenditure of 75 million guilders a year the Dutch government had to spend to cover the expenses for the Dutch administration in West Irian, which according to him was too heavy a burden for the Dutch treasury. Many political circles at Djakarta, in particular the leftist political parties, had been doubtful of the intention of the Netherlands government to return West Irian at the end of the year. Even foreign observers shared this opinion. The New York Times published a news dispatch from its correspondent in Djakarta, Sydney Gruson, who in covering the ministers' conference indicated that there were no indications that the Dutch would cede West Irian to Indonesia in due time. He wrote in part: 'The Dutch have not been acting like people who expect to be out of New Guinea by the end of the year... The Dutch administration of the island has been steadily built up in the last few months. Garrison forces have been strengthened and commercial undertakings financed from the Netherlands have been started.' (NYT, March 6, 1950.) Another factor had influenced to a great extent the Dutch decision to stand firm on the question of West Irian. In November 1949 the socialist

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labor government which had been in power in Australia since the end of the war was defeated in the election by the Liberal-Country Party coalition and a conservative government under Prime Minister Robert Menzies came to power. This government had changed Australia's position vis-a-vis Indonesia, and when this West Irian issue came up for discussion at the end of the Round Table Conference at The Hague, the Australian representative on the U N C I had shown an attitude of full support for the Dutch government in contradiction with its former policy of siding with Indonesia against the Dutch. This changed Australian point of view came into full light during the visit of the Australian foreign minister, Mr. Percy Spender, to Djakarta in August 1950. In his conversations with Indonesian government officials at Djakarta, Spender made it clear that Australia's stand in the West Irian issue was completely on the side of the Netherlands. Spender's visit, during which he expounded his government's position concerning the problems of West Irian, destroyed to a great extent the goodwill Australia had built up in Indonesia during the past years, having supported Indonesia in its struggle against the efforts of the Dutch government to reestablish colonial rule in Indonesia. A UPI correspondent and well-known figure in Indonesian affairs wrote at that time that 'Spender within two days had drained the store of good will that Australia had accumulated during the Indonesian revolution.' (Quoted in Grant, 1964a: p. 168.) The Australian point of view supporting the Dutch position in the matter of West Irian became more obvious and explicit when Spender made a public statement at The Hague after his visit to Djakarta, on which occasion he told the press: The Australian government does not consider that Indonesia has any valid claim to Dutch New Guinea, the future of which is of vital importance to the Australian people.... Australia has a deep attachment to the people of Australian New Guinea... If the claim of Indonesia to Dutch New Guinea were conceded to any degree at all, it would be a matter of time, no matter how genuine may be assurances to the countrary, when the claim will be pushed further so as to include the trust territory of Australian N e w Guinea and its people. Experience has shown to the Australians how strategically vital to Australian defense is the mainland of N e w Guinea. I have pointed out before that we cannot alter our geography which for all times makes this area of supreme consequence to Australia. Quite apart from its military and strategic significance, one cannot disregard the everincreasing Communist pressure in Asia. Communism has not got any foothold yet in Australian New Guinea. Australia is determined insofar as it can to ensure that it will not. (Quoted in Bone, 1962: p. 78.)

Four years later this same Mr. Spender, speaking before the political committee of the Ninth General Assembly of the United Nations, declared, 'Events in any part of the world are viewed with interest in Australia. But

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when the island of New Guinea is mentioned in an international context, then that interest becomes of an intense nature... New Guinea has been shown to represent the very key to Australia's defense... We feel that the destiny of Australia is closely bound up with this island which stands so close to us...' (Bone, 1962: p. 78.) With these official policy statements of the Australian government under Menzies, the Dutch had felt themselves strongly backed to maintain an intransigent attitude concerning the West Irian problems, as can be seen from later developments. Australia and the Netherlands were thrown together against Indonesia to block any effort of Indonesia to get a solution of this problem according to the terms of the Round Table Conference. The US government had made it public that it would follow a neutral policy in this matter. A neutral policy, of course, favored the maintenance of the status quo in that area and so played into the hands of the Australian and Dutch. Apparently the US government, bound by the NATO treaty with Holland and the A N Z U S agreement with Australia, was not in a position to conceive an active policy to assist in bringing about a solution to the West Irian problem, afraid of antagonizing its two allies, particularly in view of the growing tension in the cold war caused by the thrust of Russia into Europe in the west and the Chinese Communist victory on China's mainland and the collapse of the pro-American nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek. The United Kingdom and France could not be expected to support Indonesia in its claim for West New Guinea. The unfriendly or indifferent attitudes of the Western countries towards Indonesia's national claim did not go unnoticed among the people and political circles of Indonesia. On August 17, 1950, the Hatta cabinet resigned as a consequence of a constitutional change. As a result of the pressure of most of the political parties and mass organizations it had been decided that Indonesia should abandon the federal system of government adopted by common consent at the Round Table Conference. Instead the constitution was changed and Indonesia became a unitary state, as was proclaimed by President Soekarno on the fifth anniversary of Indonesia's independence, August 17, 1950. On that occasion President Soekarno expressed the worries and apprehension of the Indonesian government and people concerning the developments in the West Irian problem, which had been moving towards a kind of stalemate. In his Independence Day address before government officials, the diplomatic corps, and a crowd of several hundred thousands of people who thronged the palace compound, President Soekarno expressed the feeling of the Indonesian people in the following words:

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This [West Irian problem] is not a trifling question; this is a major issue. I am afraid that the Dutch don't understand that the Irian issue is a very major problem for us. The Irian issue is not an ethnological problem, neither a question of mature or not. This problem of being mature though not a right reason has always been used by the imperialists. The Irian issue is a colonial problem, a matter of being colonialized or free. A part of our country is still colonialized by the Dutch and this we will not accept. W e like that our whole country will be free without exception from Sabang as far as Merauke. . . .This is a national task which cannot be evaded. Because we have pledged that we will fight till the end of time as long as one part of our Country — however small that part may be — is not yet free! W e still hope that West Irian will be returned to us within this year. W e still observe the provision in the RTC agreements that the question of West Irian shall be settled peaceably within this year. After this year, neither of the parties will be bound by the RTC provision... If a settlement by negotiation cannot be arrived at within this year, a major conflict will arise on the issue of who will be in power in that island from then onward. For, once again I declare: W e will not stop fighting, we will continue fighting, we will keep on fighting whatever may come, until West Irian has been returned to our fold. (Soekarno, 1950: p. 24.)

After this first public statement of President Soekarno with regard to the West Irian issue, it became a habit with the president to state his opinion at every available opportunity and by so doing to arouse the people's sentiment to fight for the return of that disputed territory to Indonesia. The Irian Barat issue became a national problem of the first magnitude and the consecutive cabinets put this item high on the priority list of their programs. When, after 1950, it appeared obvious that the Dutch government, with the support of Australia, was determined to retain West Irian, the result of this intransigence was the rapid deterioration of the Dutch-Indonesian relationship which became completely dominated by this issue, making a dead letter of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The Natsir cabinet which came to power on September 6, 1950, appointed Mr. Mohammad Rum as its foreign minister. Rum was well known to the Dutch as a moderate nationalist figure, and he had made a name for himself through the achievement of the Rum—Van Royen statement, which had made a breakthrough in the political stalemate after the second military action and opened the way for the further negotiation at the Round Table Conference which led to the final agreement for the transfer of sovereignty. Moreover, during the tenure of the Hatta cabinet Rum held the office of Indonesian High Commissioner at The Hague, and it was known that the Dutch government had much confidence in him and that he was liked and respected by the Dutch people. It was the intention of Prime Minister Natsir in appointing Rum as foreign minister to give him the primary task of normalizing the Dutch-Indonesian relations by looking for ways and means to solve this West Irian issue.

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In his address before the parliament on the occasion of the presentation of his cabinet, Premier Natsir stated that the most important part of the program of his cabinet was to 'continue the struggle for the settlement of the Irian issue within this year' and that therefore: The Government has decided it will send a delegation to a Special Conference in the Netherlands in connection with the W e s t Irian question. The composition of this delegation will be complete within a few days and will be announced... The Government will try to settle the W e s t Irian question as quickly as possible in connection with our national objectives and this effort will be carried out with all our strength. W e hope that the Dutch will comprehend that the prompt settlement of this problem will only improve relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, while, on the other side, the postponement of this settlement will only worsen these relations. The Government is convinced that in these efforts it will get full support f r o m Parliament and the whole Indonesian people. Proceedings of the Dutch-Indonesian Negotiations, in Bone, 1 9 6 2 : p. 89.)

Finally, on December 4, 1950, the formal special conference was opened at The Hague. Foreign Minister Mohammad Rum was chairman of the Indonesian delegation, and Mr. Van Maarseveen, the Dutch minister of overseas territories, was chairman of the Dutch delegation, seconded by the Dutch foreign minister, Dr. Stikker. Prime Minister Natsir was fully aware of the importance of the result of this coming negotiation with the Dutch, particularly in relation to domestic political developments. President Soekarno had increased his speeches exciting the Indonesian mass over the West Irian issue; he declared repeatedly that 'Irian Barat (West Irian) will return to our fold before the cock's crow on January 1, 1951.' (R