Trust in Early Modern International Political Thought, 1598-1713 1107175461, 9781107175464

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Introduction

To breed an animal which is able to make promises – is that not precisely the paradoxical task which nature has set herself with regard to humankind? Is it not the real problem of humankind? (Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality)

This study explores the role of trust within the development of international political thought in the seventeenth century. It will focus on the period from the Peace of Vervins in 1598, through the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) and the various wars waged by Louis XIV up to the War of the Spanish Succession concluded with the Peace of Utrecht in 1713.1 The underlying problems of these conflicts generated a rich literature within seventeenth-century political thought. As distinct from a political and diplomatic history of this period2 , the present study proposes a close 1

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The Peace of Vervins, concluded between Spain and France on 2 May 1598, was the prime reference point for political thinkers until it was superseded by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. See notably the anonymous seventeenth-century tract: Les Affaires qui sont aujourd’huy entre les Maisons de France et d’Austriche (1649) and A. E. Imhof, Der Friede von Vervins 1598 (Aarau 1966). For European states, the first half of the seventeenth century was marked by Spanish and – to a much lesser extent – Austrian Habsburg attempts to dominate the emerging European state system. This struggle spilled over into the Thirty Years War. Despite its shortcomings, the Peace of Westphalia created greater stability in Europe. The war between France and Spain was only ended by a peace treaty in 1659. See H. Duchhardt (ed.), Der Pyren¨aenfriede 1659: Vorgeschichte, Widerhall, Rezeptionsgeschichte (G¨ottingen 2010) and L. B´ely, B. Haan and S. Jettot (eds.), La Paix des Pyr´en´ees (1659) ou le triomphe de la raison politique (Paris 2015). But the second half of the century saw Louis XIV attempt to appropriate the Habsburgs’ dominant role in Europe, undermining the Westphalian settlement. Where necessary the historical context will be referred to and further scrutinised, but only in support of a better understanding of the theories studied in the volume. For a classical account of this period see J. Engel, “Von der sp¨atmittelalterlichen respublica christiana zum M¨achte-Europa der Neuzeit” in Die Entstehung des neuzeitlichen Europa. Handbuch der europ¨aischen Geschichte vol. 3, ed. by J. Engel (Stuttgart 1971), p. 1–384, W. Platzhoff, Geschichte des Europ¨aischen Staatensystems 1559–1660 (Munich, Berlin 1928) and M. Immich, Geschichte des Europ¨aischen Staatensystems 1660–1789 (Munich, Berlin 1905). See also J. Ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung 1300–1800 (The Hague 1917). More recent relevant literature will be referred to throughout this study. In the late eighteenth century, awareness of the importance of the historical context as interpretament increased. See, for instance, J. G. Herder, “Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit” in Werke vol. I, ed. by W. Pross (Munich 1984), p. 589–686.

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analysis of seventeenth-century theorising of interstate relations. An enduring discussion of trust can be identified in this period, making it possible to use it as the structuring principle for this study. What was the conceptual status of trust? Was it seen as foundational in theorising interstate relations? Is it possible to discern a progressive development within the seventeenthcentury discussion of trust? Were the relations between sovereign states inherently antagonistic, making it unreasonable to trust other states? What were the necessary conditions for trust between states? The thinkers considered in this study were less concerned with drawing diagrams of particular political situations than with drawing up general programmes to address the conflictual situation within Europe. A range of different concepts was employed by these practitioners of programmatic thought. They proposed – more or less lucidly – conditions for future peace between European states. A focus on trust enables a better understanding of their different uses of more explicit political and juridical concepts. Trust was not a free-standing political doctrine, but a concept employed in different political theories. ‘Trust ( . . . ) can be considered an “actor’s category”, that is, a problem about which seventeenth-century people consciously thought rather than a concept imposed on the past by later historians’.3 The concept of trust was fluid in its use. A perspective on trust will shed light on the various ways classical political or juridical concepts of international political thought – interest, balance of power, natural law or plans for institutionalising an international federal structure – differed in their foundational assumptions. Trust serves as an innovative interpretament to analyse the complex and often competing doctrines of interstate relations. The endeavours of the writers discussed in this study are central to understanding the theory and formation of the modern state and the emerging state system.4 Indeed, the very term system, so 3 4

R. Weil, A Plague of Informers. Conspiracy and Political Trust in William III’s England (New Haven 2013), p. 5. A historical overview is provided in H. Schilling, “Formung und Gestalt des internationalen Systems in der werdenden Neuzeit – Phasen und bewegende Kr¨afte” in Kontinuit¨at und Wandel in der Staatenordnung der Neuzeit. Beitr¨age zur Geschichte des internationalen Systems, ed. by P. Kr¨uger (Marburg 1991), p. 19–46. See also H. Schilling, “Konfessionalisierung und Formierung eines internationalen Systems w¨ahrend der Fr¨uhen Neuzeit” in Die Reformation in Deutschland und Europa: Interpretationen und Debatten, ed. by H. Guiggisberg, G. Krodel (Heidelberg 1993), p. 591–613. On the foundations of the legal system, see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford 1997), p. 100–123. R. Aron, Peace & War. A Theory of International Relations (New Brunswick 2003), p. 94–149 has an insightful discussion on the international system. The classic work on the theory of systems is N. Luhmannn, Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie (Frankfurt am Main 1987), p. 599: ‘Der Systembegriff steht ( . . . ) immer f¨ur einen realen Sachverhalt. Wir meinen mit “System” also nie ein nur analytisches System, eine bloße gedankliche Konstruktion, ein bloßes Modell’. See also N. Luhmannn, Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalit¨at (Frankfurt am Main 1973), p. 55–86.

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familiar to modern parlance, received its first conceptualisation at exactly this moment in the development of interstate relations.5 The treaties of M¨unster and Osnabr¨uck, collectively known as the Peace of Westphalia, brought the Thirty Years War to an end in 1648.6 The peace settlement marked if not the end of an era of confessional wars, then at least a shift away from them and towards new structures and institutions that re–ordered international relations by means of modern state power.7 While 1648 was primarily a peace settlement for the Holy Roman Empire rather than for Europe as a whole8 , seventeenth-century thinkers who wrote after the Peace repeatedly referred to Westphalia as the pre-eminent point of reference for organising interstate relations.9 Though not the decisive watershed which introduced state sovereignty with the stroke of a pen as claimed by some students of international relations10 , for seventeenth-century thinkers the Peace recognised state sovereignty as a 5 6

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See discussion in Chapter 3.3. Cf. H. Duchhardt (ed.), Der Westf¨alische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Z¨asur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte (Munich 1998), M. Schr¨oder (ed.), 350 Jahre Westf¨alischer Friede. Verfassungsgeschichte, Staatskirchenrecht, V¨olkerrechtsgeschichte (Berlin 1999), O. M. van Kappen and D. Wyduckel (eds.), Der Westf¨alische Frieden in rechts- und staatstheoretischer Perspektive (Berlin 1999), H. Duchhardt (ed.), La Paix de Westphalie: de l’´ev´enement europ´een au lieu europ´een de m´emoire? (Sigmaringen 1999), J. A. Caporaso (ed.), Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order (Oxford 2000). See H. Schilling, “Der Westf¨alische Friede und das neuzeitliche Profil Europas” in Der Westf¨alische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Z¨asur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte, ed. by H. Duchhardt (Munich 1998), p. 3–32. I have already argued this in P. Schr¨oder, “The Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire after 1648: Samuel Pufendorf’s Assessment in his Monzambano” in Historical Journal 42 (1999), p. 961– 983. It would be wrong to deny the value the Peace of Westphalia had for seventeenth-century writers such as Pufendorf, Leibniz and a whole range of pamphleteers to whom I will refer further in the relevant chapters. See, as only one prominent example outside the scope of this study, Rousseau’s remark in 1758, according to which ‘the Treaty of Westphalia will perhaps always be the basis of the political system [of Europe]. Thus, public Right, which the Germans study with such care, is ( . . . ) in certain regards, that of the whole of Europe’. J. J. Rousseau, The Plan for Perpetual Peace, On the Government of Poland, and Other Writings on History and Politics, ed. by C. Kelly (Dartmouth 2005), p. 35. As just one of many examples, see T. L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory (Manchester 1997), p. 91f.: ‘The Treaty of Westphalia laid the legal basis for the modern territorial state. Upon its foundation was erected a new system of international interaction and a new system of concepts and theories by which this interaction could be understood. The Treaty’s recognition of the principle of external sovereignty represents the formal recognition and the legal consolidation of the modern interstate system’. Today, controversy and confusion about the status of the Peace of Westphalia loom large. See against such positions the arguments in Schr¨oder, “The Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire after 1648”, p. 982 and, with many more references to those misguided judgements regarding the issue of sovereignty in relation to the Peace of Westphalia, A. Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth” in International Organization 55 (2001), p. 261.

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guiding principle for a new international system11 that conceded states alone to be the legitimate actors in the declaration, conduct and ending of wars.12 With war and the rules of war becoming exclusively an affair of the sovereign state, a new system of international relations could emerge.13 However, the result of this process was ambivalent: the opportunity for civilising and 11

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This point is now convincingly made by D. Boucher, “Resurrecting Pufendorf and Capturing the Westphalian Moment” in Review of International Studies 27 (2001), p. 560–562. Stephen Krasner’s claim misleadingly attributes an uncorroborated significance to the Peace of Westphalia when he asserts that it ‘was a break point with the past, but not the one understood by most students of international law. Westphalia did mark the transition from Christendom to reason of state and balance of power as the basic cognitive conceptualization informing the actual behavior of European rulers’. S. D. Krasner, Sovereignty Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton 1999), p. 82. Cf., for instance, O. Kimminich, “Die Entstehung des neuzeitlichen V¨olkerrechts” in I. Fetscher and H. M¨unkler (eds.), Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen, Bd. 3: Neuzeit: Von den Konfessionskriegen bis zur Aufkl¨arung (Munich 1985), p. 93, C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, translated by G. L. Ulmen (New York 2004), p. 140–151, W. Janssen, “Krieg” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland vol. 3, ed. by O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Koselleck (Stuttgart 1982), p. 576–583, W. G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Berlin, New York 2000), p. 203–221. Anglophone scholars in particular summarise these developments under the term Westphalian order. The Peace of Westphalia is a symbol for a specific set of new political actors and institutions, as well as for the legal, political and philosophical forms in which they are to be conceived. For example J. Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society. A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations (London, New York 1994), p. 138 claimed that ‘an absolutist states-system was initialled at Westphalia’. This so-called Westphalian order thus became a focal point of political, historical and philosophical scrutiny and debate. Another pertinent example is the view put forward by Michael Sheehan in The Balance of Power: History & Theory. He asserted that ‘the Treaty of Westphalia ( . . . ) can be seen as a crucial watershed in the long process by which the balance of power became the central guiding principle of European international relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In order to work effectively, a complex balance of power requires the existence of a functioning international system in which the sovereign independence of states is the central goal of national policy and in which there is comparative moderation in foreign policy objectives and an absence of ideologically based interstate bitterness. The Peace of Westphalia can be said to have formalised these conditions in Europe and thereby provided the foundation for the acceptance of balance of power logic as a determinant of foreign policy behaviour. It brought an end to the century-long Christian wars of religion in Europe [and] it formally recognised the concept of state sovereignty’. Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History & Theory (London 1996), p. 37f. Although the settlement of the Westphalian treaties had, to a remarkable degree, established a new modus vivendi among the European states, assertions such as Sheehan’s seem too easily to forget that the confessional antagonism between the Christian creeds continued to influence the forging of alliances along confessional lines on the one hand and, on the other, continued to disrupt the settling of conflicts because of its divisive power. Given that the value system and the preoccupations of the seventeenth century are mostly alien to us, the historian of ideas needs to engage in the important task of situating accurately the contemporary debates and their underlying ideas to allow for an appropriate understanding of their intellectual currency. The temptation and pitfalls of anachronistic statements should be resisted. For a critical discussion and refutation of different variants of these anachronistic positions, see M. Zimmer, Moderne, Staat und Internationale Politik (Wiesbaden 2008), p. 37–53 and Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”. See also the very different criticism by B. Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations (London 2003), p. 1–4. Teschke, too, perceives these assumptions as ‘a constituting founding myth within International Relations’.

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juridifying war14 equally entailed the potential for an intensification and enhancement of the war effort.15 Territorial states confronted one another with the claim to absolute sovereignty and consequently no longer acknowledged an extra-territorial legal authority and superior normative institution, whether that of emperor or Pope. This radically departed from the theory and the practice of the prior international order. Reason of state demanded calculation of the state’s interest, to be pursued by all available political, military and economic means. Thus, as a correlate of reason of state in foreign policy, the concepts of a balance of power and of a politics informed by state interests increasingly dominated international political thought. Parallel to this development, a new kind of international law emerged as the law of states, as understood by Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius. Together, these tendencies provided new approaches to political thought and international action in the new system.16 The programmatic seventeenth-century approaches to relations between European states generated three great currents of political thought. Firstly, theories informed by reason of state and state interest, leading to the concept of a competitive balance of power as a response to the threat of 14

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Among the wealth of literature see, in particular, Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth and recently M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870– 1960 (Cambridge 2001), M. Koskenniemi, “International Law and raison d’´etat: Rethinking the Prehistory of International Law” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. by B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (Oxford 2010), p. 297–339. Cf. E. Krippendorff, Staat und Krieg. Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft (Frankfurt am Main 1985), p. 277–282. See also Johannes Burkhardt’s thesis that bellicosity ensued not because of the existence of early modern states, ‘but rather from the state’s imperfections, failings and shortcomings’. J. Burkhardt, “Wars of States or Wars of State-Formation?” in War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe, ed. by O. Asbach and P. Schr¨oder (Farnham 2010), p. 34. For further discussion, see also J. Burkhardt “Der Dreißigj¨ahrige Krieg als fr¨uhmoderner Staatsbildungskrieg” in Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 45 (1994), p. 487–499, J. Burkhardt, “Die Friedlosigkeit der Fr¨uhen Neuzeit. Grundlegung einer Theorie der Bellizit¨at Europas” in Zeitschrift f¨ur Historische Forschung 24 (1997), p. 509–574 and critically B. Teschke, “Revisiting the ‘War-Makes-States’ Thesis: War, Taxation and Social Property Relations in Early Modern Europe” in War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe, ed. by O. Asbach and P. Schr¨oder (Farnham 2010), p. 35–59. Cf. R. Axtmann, “The State of the State: The Model of the Modern Nation State and its Contemporary Transformation” in International Political Science Review 25 (2004), p. 264–281. Of the vast literature on the theory and practice of political and legal operations in the modern state system, see, for example, H. Duchhardt, Gleichgewicht der Kr¨afte, Convenance, Europ¨aisches Konzert. Friedenskongresse und Friedensschl¨usse vom Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV. bis zum Wiener Kongreß (Darmstadt 1976), Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, A. Strohmeyer, Theorie der Interaktion. Das europ¨aische Gleichgewicht der Kr¨afte in der fr¨uhen Neuzeit (Wien, K¨oln, Weimar 1994), Sheehan, The Balance of Power; L. B´ely (ed.), L’Europe des trait´es de Westphalie. Esprit de la diplomatie et diplomatie de l’esprit (Paris 2000), A. Blin, 1648 – La Paix de Westphalie ou la naissance de l’Europe moderne (Paris 2006).

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universal monarchy. Secondly, juridical and philosophical theories which applied natural law to interstate relations and proposed a jus publicum Europaeum as a reliable juridical framework. And thirdly, projects which aimed for perpetual peace on the basis of federal structures for organising the state system. To distinguish between these different approaches, we need to contextualise them both in comparison with rival positions and in relation to concrete political controversies and the prevailing interested parties. But all three approaches confronted the central problem: the sovereignty of the state.17 This is why those who deemed it necessary to implement institutions above the sovereign state so as to enforce an international order likened the sphere of interstate relations to the state of nature. Political advisers, on the other hand, frequently understood the concepts for organising interstate relations in a less sophisticated way as either the struggle for universal monarchy or the various facets of a balance of power. The Duke of Sully argued forcefully against the Habsburg claim to universal monarchy. The alternative he offered was to be seen in a balance of the European powers, which he perceived as being formed around the two antagonistic blocs of the Habsburgs and their allies on the one side, and the French crown and its allies on the other.18 The concept of universal monarchy can be seen primarily as a rhetorical device in those theories which advocated a balance of power as the only reliable alternative to what they saw as an undesirable hegemony.19 Writing at the dawn of the eighteenth century in the context of the War of the Spanish Succession, Charles D’Avenant displayed how perceptions of the threat of universal monarchy had shifted during the previous century:‘’Tis a 17 18

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That is not to say that these arguments were anti-statist. On the contrary, the state was seen as a crucial part of any solution to the inherent antagonistic relations between states. We will see, however, that a balance of power was conceptualised in different and more complex ways than those suggested by Sully. It has been claimed that ‘the chief attractive power of this balance-of-power doctrine, then as now, was its apparent inescapability, the absence of a practical alternative’. P. W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848 (Oxford 1994), p. 10. One exception is Campanella’s writing in defence of Spanish universal monarchy, since this text provides an illuminating contrast to the bulk of the writings studied here. The classical study on the concept of universal monarchy is still F. Bosbach, Monarchia Universalis. Ein politischer Leitbegriff der Fr¨uhen Neuzeit (G¨ottingen 1988). See also A. Strohmeyer, “Ideas of Peace in Early Modern Models of International Order: Universal Monarchy and Balance of Power in Comparison” in J. D¨ulffer and R. Frank (eds.), Peace, War and Gender from Antiquity to the Present. Cross-cultural Perspectives (Essen 2009), p. 65–80 and M. van Gelderen, “Universal Monarchy, the Rights of War and Peace and the Balance of Power: Europe’s Quest for Civil Order” in Reflections on Europe: ˚ Persson and B. Str˚ath (Brussels 2007), Defining a Political Order in Time and Space, ed. by H.-A. p. 49–71.

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melancholy Consideration that we can no longer say the House of Austria, the two Branches of which preserved the balance of Power, and weighed in the Scale against France: We must now say the House of Bourbon. With what Mischiefs does not the Conjunction of such mighty Kingdoms threaten the World? If the French have it not in their Will, is it not in their Power to oppress the whole, especially if both Scepters fall into one Hand? In short ( . . . ) they seem the People most likely to invade the Liberties of Europe’.20 This historical shift is remarkable and D’Avenant’s views were shared by other observers. Alongside the political theories of balance of power or universal monarchy, and the juridical writings of natural law, a third genre can be identified: schemes for peace.21 One should not dismiss too quickly the efforts of early modern thinkers to formulate alternatives to the balance of power. They were aware of the dilemmas inherent in the attempts to conceptualise an organising principle for interstate relations. Plans for peace between sovereign states were often disregarded as naive. In order to establish an international assembly with the requisite rights and powers, a real transformation of power had to occur, but privileged sovereigns are reluctant to give up rights. Immanuel Kant would make this point: ‘it will be said, states will never submit to coercive laws of this kind; and a proposal for a universal state of nations to whose power all individual states should voluntarily accommodate themselves so as to obey its laws – however good it may sound in the theory of an Abb´e St Pierre – still does not hold in practice’.22 With state sovereignty in place to guarantee internal security, sovereigns resisted endangering the domestic status quo. Seen in this light, any programme to organise the European state system on the basis of some kind of federal structure directly confronted the exclusivity of absolute state sovereignty. In this complex set of circumstances, what was the political role of trust? The positive notion of trust and trustworthiness immediately found its negative counterweight in fraud and untrustworthiness. However, it

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C. D’Avenant, An Essay upon Universal Monarchy. Written in the Year 1701 (London 1756), p. 59f. An excellent overview is now available in the study by B. Arcidiacono, Cinq types de paix. Une histoire des plans de pacification perp´etuelle (Paris 2011). I. Kant, “On the Common Saying: That Might be Correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice” in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, ed. by M. J. Gregor (Cambridge 1996), p. 309. However, this does not mean that Kant advocated the balance of power. On the contrary, he claimed that ‘an enduring universal peace by means of the so-called balance of power in Europe is a mere fantasy, like Swift’s house that the builder had constructed in such perfect accord with all the laws of equilibrium that it collapsed as soon as a sparrow alighted upon it’.

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is fear – crucial in Hobbes’s political theory23 but also of considerable relevance in early modern international thought24 – that should be seen as the prime conceptual counter to trust. Given their mutual fear, trust remained precarious between European states, even as a system of interstate relations emerged. Looking at trust as a principle underpinning the seventeenth-century discourses of interstate relations shows that references to trust – or to fides25 , good faith, Vertrauen and confiance26 – were deployed as a tool in political conflicts. The claim to faithfulness for one’s own side was as much a part of the strategic deployment of trust as the denial of the trustworthiness of an adversary. There are thus two very different levels to be assessed regarding the conceptualisation of trust. The first is a more abstract concept of trust as a fundamental and philosophical value that might provide a basis for organising relations between states. The second is a more cynical strategic use in the polemics that accompanied various interstate conflicts. An almost universal starting point for seventeenthcentury political thinkers was Machiavelli. He pointed, like nobody else, to the elusiveness of trust when the circumstances of politics changed: ‘Rulers ( . . . ) have often found that men whom they had regarded with suspicion in the early stages of their rule prove more reliable and useful than those whom they had trusted at first. ( . . . ) But it is very difficult to generalise 23 24

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See Chapter 3.2. One of the key references is T. Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. by R. Tuck (Cambridge 1997), p. 37. See, for example, A. Oschmann, “Der metus justus in der deutschen Kriegsrechtslehre des 17. Jahrhunderts” in Angst und Politik in der europ¨aischen Geschichte, ed. by F. Bosbach (Dettelbach 2000), p. 101–131. Fides in the Roman sense has a twofold meaning. Cicero argued that ‘the keeping of faith is fundamental to justice’. Cicero, On Duties, ed. by M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (Cambridge 1991), (I-23), p. 10. However, in addition to the Ciceronian connotation, fides also bore a very different meaning in Roman thought, as coercion and power were necessary components. The stronger, victorious Romans would absorb the vanquished into their fides and it would be the Romans who dictated the terms of inclusion. Grotius draws attention to this different usage. H. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. by R. Tuck (Indianapolis 2006), p. 1587: ‘We often meet in Roman Histories with these Expressions, Tradere se in fidem, To yield themselves to the Faith, Tradere in fidem & clementiam, To yield to the Faith and Clemency. ( . . . ) But it must be understood, that by these Words is meant an absolute Surrender: And that the Word Fides in these Places signifies nothing but the Probity of the Conqueror, to which the Conquered yields himself’. Hobbes shared Grotius’s perception of the Roman fides. T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by R. Tuck (Cambridge 1992), p. 485. See the discussion in R. Heinze, “Fides” in R. Heinze, Vom Geist des R¨omertums (Darmstadt 1960), p. 59–81, D. N¨orr, Die Fides im r¨omischen V¨olkerrecht (Heidelberg 1991) and M. Hartmann, Die Praxis des Vertrauens (Berlin 2011), p. 375–405. Note that trust figures quite prominently as a key concept not only in different learned academic works such as those by Gentili, Grotius and others, but also in pamphlets, polemics and peace treaties themselves. Apart from the Roman notion of fides, all these terms are unproblematic and interchangeable.

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about this, since men and circumstances vary’.27 Following Machiavelli, we can conceptualise trust: the moment an actor trusts another, he or she embraces a hypothesis that seems secure enough to predict the other’s action. Trust thus corresponds with the assumption of future behaviour on the part of others. Though always prone to exploitation, trust is a crucial component of political conduct.28 Trust has attracted the attention of modern scholars. In the field of sociology, Niklas Luhmann’s study Vertrauen. Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexit¨at is an early and important contribution. Luhmann analyses ‘trust as a form of security’ and is in this respect relevant to the present study.29 Political philosophers have also taken up the theme of trust.30 John Dunn is eminent among the scholars who have worked on trust within the field of the history of political thought.31 Peter Johnson’s Frames of Deceit addresses ‘trust as a conditional disposition’ within the political community of a state, though not within the field of international relations.32 Trust also plays a considerable role within the scholarship of (political) economy, although it is rarely related to the specific concerns 27 28

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N. Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. by Q. Skinner and R. Price (Cambridge 2008), p. 74. Cf. G. Simmel, Soziologie. Untersuchungen u¨ ber die Formen der Vergesellschaftung (Berlin 1908), p. 263: ‘Vertrauen, als Hypothese k¨unftigen Verhaltens, die sicher genug ist, um praktisches Handeln darauf zu gr¨unden, ist als Hypothese ein mittlerer Zustand zwischen Wissen und Nichtwissen um den Menschen’. N. Luhmann, Vertrauen. Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexit¨at (Stuttgart 1973), p. 12. See also P. Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (Cambridge 1999). ´ See, in particular, A. Boyer, Chose promise. Etudes sur la promesse a` partir de Hobbes et de quelques autres (Paris 2014) and Hartmann, Die Praxis. See J. Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge 1969), esp. p. 120–187, J. Dunn, “Trust in the Politics of John Locke” in J. Dunn, Rethinking Modern Political Theory (Cambridge 1985), p. 34–54, J. Dunn, “Trust and Political Agency” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. by D. Gambetta (Oxford 1988), p. 73–93. See also H. W. Blom, “Patriots, Contracts and Other Patterns of Trust in a Polyarchic Society: The Dutch 17th Century” in ‘Patria’ und ‘Patrioten’ vor dem Patriotismus: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europ¨aischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert, ed. by R. v. Friedeburg (Wiesbaden 2005), p. 193–213. Hobbes scholars have also noticed the importance of trust in Hobbes’s political philosophy, though not in relation to international political thought. See, in particular, D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford 1969), J. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge 1986) and D. Baumgold, “‘Trust’ in Hobbes’s Political Thought” in Political Theory 41 (2013), p. 838–855. P. Johnson, Frames of Deceit. A Study of the Loss and Recovery of Public and Private Trust (Cambridge 1993), p. 19. Among the other studies on trust within moral and political theory, see the collection of essays in D. Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford 1988), A. B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton 2000), M. Hollis, Trust within Reason (Cambridge 1998), E. Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (Cambridge 2002), C. Tilly, Trust and Rule (Cambridge 2005) and M. Kohn, Trust. Self-Interest and the Common Good (Oxford 2008). A fairly descriptive historical account, though regrettably not dealing with the seventeenth century, is now found in U. Frevert, Vertrauensfragen. Eine Obsession der Moderne (Munich 2013).

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10

Introduction

of this study.33 Scholars of international political thought have drawn attention to the importance of trust, if only in passing. Stawell’s assertion that ‘mutual distrust among European states, ( . . . ) has been the curse of Europe’34 is an early reference to the importance of trust – and the lack of it – within the international sphere. The discussion of trust from the perspective of international political thought faces particular problems, doubtless reflecting the volatility of interstate relations when sovereign states confront each other. Trust gains in urgency when ‘the virtues of a watchful distrust, and of judicious untrustworthiness’35 become the leading principles of political conduct. Within the state, trust depends on more than the integrity of the person in whom we vest trust. As seventeenth-century states were increasingly rationalised, political or public offices became more independent of individual personal relationships. The office and the officeholder differ in accountability. Although their dealings might not be transparent to all, trust is placed in the abstract office and the officeholder, rather than in the moral or political integrity of individuals.36 If we look at the social contract tradition that legitimised sovereign state power, we see that the instruments of the state included not only the rule of law, but also the means of its enforcement. Punishment, along with taxation, was an essential sovereign power of the state. The concept of the ‘contract shifts the focus of trust on to the efficacy of sanctions, and either our or a third party’s ability to enforce them if a contract is broken’.37 This domestic notion of punishment triggered a controversy when its application was considered in relation to the international political sphere. A simultaneous discussion about reputation38 33

34 35 36

37 38

Notable exceptions are F. Fukuyama, Trust: The New Foundations of Global Prosperity (New York 1996) and C. Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation. The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England (Houndmills 1998). F. M. Stawell, The Growth of International Thought (London 1936), p. 212. See also D. Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations (Oxford 1998), p. 233. A. Baier, “Trust and Antitrust” in Ethics 96 (1986), p. 253. See notably Dunn, “Trust and Political Agency”, p. 85: ‘human beings need, as far as they can, to economise on trust in persons and confide instead in well-designed political, social and economic institutions’. This should, however, not be idealised. See the insightful historical account in L. ´ et pouvoir absolu (Paris 2013). Johnson, Frames of B´ely, Les secrets de Louis XIV: Myst`eres d’Etat Deceit, p. 53 has a superb discussion of why the issue is not the moral character of a politician, and why accordingly the focus of analysis should shift ‘from the moral character of the officeholder to the nature of the office’. For a different view see B. Stollberg-Rilinger, The Emperor’s Old Clothes. Constitutional History and the Symbolic Language of the Holy Roman Empire (Oxford 2015), p. 225. D. Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. by D. Gambetta (Oxford 1988), p. 221. Reputation has manifold connotations. A positive reputation establishes and at the same time relies on communicative practices and helps to create trust. See in particular the important essay by M. Rohrschneider, “Reputation als Leitfaktor in den internationalen Beziehungen der Fr¨uhen

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Introduction

11

is closely related to the question of trustworthiness. As Peter Johnson argues, ‘a significant feature of trust is its logical complexity. It is a disposition of character and a valuable public good, a policy available in competitive circumstances and a condition of human exchange. Credulity and deceit are predictable hazards ( . . . ). Trust may be misplaced or abused’.39 An ongoing debate about trust was entertained within seventeenthcentury international political thought, intensified by religious and political conflicts that seemed to confirm the difficulty – if not the error – of actually trusting an adversary. Confessional differences undermined political stability and impeded trust-building.40 Yet it was recognised that a solution to these conflicts depended ultimately on trust. In various ways, programmes were developed to provide a framework in which mutual trust was both plausible and possible. While searching for a basis for mutual trust, all parties nonetheless sought to protect and preserve their particular confessional identity, thereby emphasising existing differences and blocking the search for trust and agreements built on it. Religion remained a divisive factor in European interstate relations even after the Peace of Westphalia.41 Seventeenth-century discussion of trust was also prevalent in economic discourses. To what extent has the emerging discourse on trade and economic relations influenced the discourse of trust regarding interstate relations? Trust is not something that can simply be demanded or enforced by another. A risky advance needs to be made by one side in order to gain the trust of the other.42 It is on that basis alone that trust – and, therefore, political stability – can be gained. As a consequence, trust remains a precarious concept for the organisation of interstate relations. But ‘once trust becomes possible, it sustains interactions that would otherwise collapse, [and] enhances the quality of cooperation’.43 At the same time, as seventeenth-century thinkers recognised, trust was seldom entirely ‘innocent’ due to the interplay of vested state interests. The tension between

39

40 41 42 43

Neuzeit” in Historische Zeitschrift 291 (2010), p. 331–352. The importance of – often ritualised – communication for trust-building is stressed by Frevert, Vertrauensfragen, p. 214: ‘Zum Aufbau von Vertrauen geh¨oren verl¨aßliche, auf Wiederholung angelegte kommunikative Praktiken’. Johnson, Frames of Deceit, p. 76. Most seventeenth-century thinkers agreed that ‘distrust creates even larger transaction costs’. Blom, “Patriots, Contracts and Other Patterns of Trust”, p. 195. See also Kohn, Trust, p. 85, who makes the same point in view of contemporary discussions on trust: ‘Trust has an intuitively obvious role in cutting what are known as “transaction costs”’. See the important discussion in R.-P. Fuchs, Ein “Medium zum Frieden”. Die Normaljahrsregel und die Beendigung des Dreißigj¨ahrigen Krieges (Munich 2010), p. 40f. See, for instance, D. Onnekink (ed.), War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713 (Farnham 2009). See the discussion in Simmel, Soziologie, p. 284 and Luhmann, Vertrauen, p. 46 and p. 94f. Kohn, Trust, p. 38.

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Introduction

trust and interest is a key feature of their discourses because – as argued by Machiavelli and others44 – interest can supersede the keeping of agreements, thereby undermining the fundamental notion of trust, which relies on the concept of pacta sunt servanda. However, the notion of interest can often be oversimplified and misrepresented. Hobbes pointed to this problem and implicitly attacked Machiavelli, when he argued that the ‘Foole’ was ‘seriously alleaging’ that to ‘make or not make; keep or not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit’.45 For Hobbes, such short-sighted interest led to the deplorable situation that ‘successfull wickedness hath obtained the name of Vertue: and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have allowed it, when it was for the getting of a Kingdome’.46 Maintaining that it would be reasonable to keep one’s covenants within the state regardless of other interests which might suggest the contrary, Hobbes concluded that the fool who denied the keeping of promises within the state was nothing more than a rebel.47 However, when considering interstate relations, he was more sceptical as to the extent to which trust was both possible and reasonable. But was his judgement totally negative on the issue? At the other end of the spectrum, Grotius argued that without good faith, peace between states would be impossible. Thus, ‘the Faith given’ should be observed under all circumstances: ‘the Obligation of which [to keep faith] I have proved to be sacred and indispensable. And we ought to be very careful to avoid ( . . . ) Perfidiousness’.48 However, as Martin Hartmann argues, in practice, trust is far from self-evident, but relies itself on trust to uphold the praxis that might engender it.49 Arguably trust is a universal concept50 , but at the same time ‘the history of universalistic (or even all) concepts depends on how rival human actors choose to deploy 44

45 47

48

49 50

Cf. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 61f., P. de B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, ou, Recueil des plus g´en´erales Consid´erations servant au maniment des Affaires publiques (Paris 1641) and H. Rohan, De l’Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestient´e (Paris 1641). 46 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 101. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 101. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 102f. On the fool in Hobbes’s Leviathan, see the excellent discussion by K. Hoekstra, “Hobbes and the Foole” in Political Theory 25 (1997), p. 620–654. On the fool and the issue of trust, see Boyer, Chose Promise, p. 31–69. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 1643. See also W. Fikentscher, De fide et perfidia. Der Treuegedanke in den “Staatsparallelen” des Hugo Grotius aus heutiger Sicht (Munich 1979), p. 79: ‘Grotius konnte den Treugedanken als eine Grundlage des V¨olkerrechts ( . . . ) nehmen’. Hartmann, Die Praxis, p. 515. See, as just one important example, the Crown of all Kings, where trust is also discussed in an early seventeenth-century South-Asian political treatise. Bokhari de Djohˆore, Makˆota Radja-Rˆadja ou la Couronne des Rois, translated from Malais by A. Marre (Paris 1878). I am very grateful to Arthur Weststeijn for pointing out this text to me.

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Introduction

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them, for good or for ill, and requires frameworks in which concepts have local and time bound implications that may make them appealing in specific and concrete historical situations’.51 Multi-faceted arguments concerning trust in interstate relations developed within Europe during the seventeenth century – a historical situation where war and conflict were rife and trust between states was anything but inevitable. If the relations between sovereign states were inherently antagonistic, could there ever be trust between states? 51

S. Moyn, “On the Nonglobalization of Ideas” in Global Intellectual History, ed. by S. Moyn and A. Sartori (New York 2013), p. 194. See also C. Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, translated by J. Seitzer (Durham, London 2004), p. 54: ‘For no norm ( . . . .) interprets and applies, protects or guards itself; nothing that is normatively valid enforces itself; and if one does not intend to trade in metaphors and allegories, there is also no hierarchy of norms, but rather only a hierarchy of concrete persons and organs’.

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c h a p ter 1

Alberico Gentili (1552–1608) New Ways of Posing the Problem of War and Interstate Relations

After the Council of Trent (1545–1563) failed to reunify Christianity,1 any pacification of interstate relations had to take into account the existence of antagonistic theologies and mutually exclusive confessions. Any basis of universally accepted religious principles, even among Christian states, seemed impossible. The Italian jurist Alberico Gentili2 was among those who challenged the justifications of religious strife, and one aim of his De Iure Belli (1598) was to banish religion as a reason for going to war. Already in his De Legationibus (1585) he had warned: ‘let sovereigns be careful of their actions when they use the pretext of religion in dealing with embassies’.3 There was more needed than such an appeal to the political rulers. 1

2

3

The emperor Charles V had aimed at uniting Christianity by means of a council, but when he eventually managed to bring it into existence, the Protestants refused to participate. The council met in three different sessions which were interrupted because of conflicting European politics. It was crucial for reforming and regenerating the Catholic Church and inaugurated the counterreformation. See J. Bossy, “The Counter Reformation and the People of Catholic Europe” in Past and Present 47 (1970), p. 51–70, M. Luebke, The Counter-Reformation (Oxford 1999). M. Mullet, The Catholic Reformation (London 1999). A. D. Wright, The Early Modern Papacy (Harlow 2000). Gentili was born on 14 January 1552 in San Genesio in the Marche d’Ancona region of Italy. In 1569 he entered the law faculty of the University of Perugia where he received his doctoral degree in law on 23 September 1572. His father Matteo Gentili was increasingly under threat from the Catholic authorities and left Italy in 1574. The Roman Inquisition rightly suspected the Gentili family of having Protestant leanings and Alberico was imprisoned in 1578 in Padua. After his escape he travelled to London where he arrived in 1580. His younger brother Scipio stayed in T¨ubingen in Germany to study law. In 1581 Alberico Gentili was appointed professor of Roman law at St John’s College at the University of Oxford. According to Richard Tuck he was ‘one of the most important and interesting figures ever to teach at that university’. R. Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace. Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford 1999), p. 9. For further biographical details see in particular the older studies by G. van der Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law (Leiden 1968), A. de Giorgio, Della Vita e delle Opere di Alberico Gentili (Parma 1876) and E. Nys, “Introduction” in A. Gentili, De Legationibus Libri Tres, ed. by J. B. Scott (New York 1924), p. 11a–38a. On the religious persecution of the Gentili family and its wider implications see now also V. Lavenia, “Alberico Gentili: i processi, le fedi, la guerra” in Ius gentium, Ius communicationis, Ius belli. Alberico Gentili e gli orizzonti della modernit`a, Atti del Convegno di Macerata in occasione del Quarto Centenario della morte di Alberico Gentili (Milan 2009), p. 165–196. A. Gentili, Three Books on Embassies, ed. by G. J. Laing (New York 1924), p. 91.

14

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Alberico Gentili (1552–1608)

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It was truly a huge task to deny religion the prominence it commanded as a reason for conflict in the late sixteenth century, given that among Christian states all major conflicts were fuelled by religious controversies. The Dutch revolt against the Spanish crown, the French and German wars of religion and the antagonism between Elizabeth and Philip II are just the most prominent examples at the time Gentili wrote his major work. The first part of this chapter will situate Gentili’s international political thought within the wider context of early modern political thought. Above all he was, by training and profession, a humanist jurist. His role within the natural law tradition is complex and interpretations as to where to position him vary considerably. Anthony Pagden rightly claimed that ‘although Gentili nowhere provides a fully developed or entirely consistent definition of the natural law and is evidently unconcerned with the metaphysical niceties which so troubled the theologians [Vitoria and his successors at Salamanca], it is evident from what he does say, that both he and they would have been on broad agreement as to the basic principles on which it had to be based’.4 At the time Gentili was writing, the natural law doctrine was still largely dominated by the Spanish theologians, who followed the Thomist tradition. Gentili rather meagrely embraced the natural law doctrine; unlike Grotius, he did little to reshape the Thomist natural law doctrine.5 If we understand natural law in a scholastic sense, and not in its seventeenthcentury use, we can discern ‘two rival political moralities’ which ‘were now confronting each other in every commonwealth of late sixteenth-century 4

5

A. Pagden, “Gentili, Vitoria, and the Fabrication of a ‘Natural Law of Nations’” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. by B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (Oxford 2010), p. 348. See notably J. Sauter, Die philosophischen Grundlagen des Naturrechts. Untersuchungen zur Rechtsund Staatslehre (Frankfurt am Main 1966) and F. Grunert, Normbegr¨undung und politische Legitimit¨at. Zur Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie der deutschen Fr¨uhaufkl¨arung (T¨ubingen 2000). Despite the obvious similarities between Grotius and Gentili, Richard Tuck does not appreciate the fundamental differences on which both men based their argument. It seems problematic to downplay the influence of previous natural law theorists such as Vitoria, Vazques and Su´arez on Grotius, which in turn blurs the understanding of Gentili’s specific approach, which relies much more on the tradition of the politiques than on the natural law tradition. Cf. R. Tuck, War and Peace, esp. p. 108. But see Tuck’s earlier work, R. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories. Their Origin and Development (Cambridge 1979), p. 59f. Quite a number of scholars have recently argued that Gentili’s position was actually much closer to, or even part of, the natural law tradition. See B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (eds.), “Introduction” in A. Gentili, De armis Romanis, ed. by B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (Oxford 2011), p. XV: ‘As in Cicero, there is a strong sense in The Wars of the Romans that the specifically Roman institution of fetial law, with its just-war procedure, has the source of its validity in natural law’ and A. Wagner, “Francisco de Vitoria and Alberico Gentili on the Legal Character of the Global Commonwealth” in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2011), p. 575: ‘For Gentili, natural law is the foundation of international law’.

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Europe. One was the natural law theory ( . . . ) the other was the theory of “Machiavelli and the politiques”’.6 But despite this intellectual divide within the natural law tradition as well as among the politiques, there existed not just one homogeneous doctrine but competing strands of political thought. Gentili was part of these different currents, as is particularly clear in his position towards Machiavelli, as well as his engagement with prominent contemporary criticism of the Florentine.7 Well-versed in the different currents of political philosophy, Gentili was a prominent jurist of his time.8 He was equally acquainted with the literature on reason of state and notably Machiavelli and Guicciardini. Furthermore, he was well-versed in French political thought, particularly that of Jean Bodin, as this had emerged in the context of the Huguenots’ struggle for recognition of their reformed faith. After the massacres of Saint Bartholomew’s Day in 1572, this literature changed in tone and strategy: the argument now explored whether and to what extent resistance was legitimate even against the monarch. The most notorious argument along these monarchomach lines was advocated in the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos (1579). Despite the similarity with his own religious and political affiliations, the Huguenot arguments for political resistance posed a threat to Gentili’s thinking on interstate relations. He saw the political theories put forward by his fellow Protestants, as much as those of the Catholics, as menacing an interstate order of peaceful relations. This order, according to Gentili, could only be established among sovereign states able to trust each other at a minimum level. Whereas Machiavelli’s name and works were regularly used in these polemics to denounce any political and confessional enemy 6

7

8

Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought vol. 2 (Cambridge 1978), p. 172. The same point was made by L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago 1971), p. 190. Quentin Skinner discusses this with specific reference to Pedro Ribadeneyra’s Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince against Machiavelli. In substance he follows Leo Strauss’s argument. See also H. H¨opfl, Jesuit Political Thought. The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540–1630 (Cambridge 2004), esp. p. 164–167. Andreas Wagner convincingly argued that Richard Tuck’s dichotomy of ‘the “humanist” and “scholastic” views’ (R. Tuck, War and Peace, p. 9) ‘masks the diversity of (at least) the humanist camp’. A. Wagner, “Lessons of Imperialism and of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili’s Early Modern Appeal to Roman Law” in The European Journal of International Law 23 (2012), p. 876. See also B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (eds.), “Introduction”, p. XXIII: ‘Gentili ( . . . ) cannot be situated in any simple way in a “humanist” camp’ and, from the perspective of the Spanish scholastics, Pagden, “Gentili, Vitoria, and the Fabrication of a ‘Natural Law of Nations’”, p. 345: ‘the more one examines the humanist/scholastic or humanist/theologian distinction the more fuzzy it becomes. The various members of the “School of Salamanca” were by no means consistent in their opposition to humanism’. He was Regius professor of civil law at Oxford.

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Confessional Strife and the Question of Trustworthiness

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as treacherous, Gentili’s reading of Machiavelli revealed a less biased viewpoint, enabling him to discuss the provocative and divisive issue of trust exposed in the Principe without denouncing Machiavelli. Gentili’s discussion of interstate trust was closely related to his understanding of state sovereignty. He endeavoured to extend Jean Bodin’s concept of sovereignty to the sphere of interstate relations, and, in doing so, he challenged the existing natural law doctrine and the theory of a just war9 , the terms of which were still dominated by Catholic thinkers. At the end of the sixteenth century, Alberico Gentili was perhaps the first political thinker to recognise the fundamental problem of the relationship between sovereign states: the very nature of their sovereignty precluded pacification of what was in effect an anarchical society. Despite this, he advocated that any solution to this problem had to be founded on the concept of sovereign states. For Gentili’s discussion of international political order, sovereignty is both the problem and the solution.

1.1 Confessional Strife and the Question of Trustworthiness among European States As Diego Panizza has shown, Gentili argued against, among others, the Dutch Protestant Justus Lipsius, who was involved in one of the principal religious–political struggles.10 Gentili rejected Lipsius’s argument, because in his view, it culminated in the assertion that religious unity was essential for social cohesion and civil stability. For Gentili, on the contrary, to enforce religious unity was more a reason for sedition and a cause of strife than a factor of stability. What of Huguenot resistance theory? Despite some drastic rhetoric and the repeated outbreak of open civil war, the Huguenots’ position had always been that they needed to address a wrong which had been committed by zealous advisers of the Crown, not by the Crown itself. The Saint Bartholomew’s Day massacres marked a significant shift in attitude. It is important to note that the massacres were followed by gleeful 9

10

Gentili uses the term just war, but from the outset of his main work he makes clear that he employs it with a very different meaning. See A. Gentili, The Three Books on the Law of War, ed. by J. C. Rolfe (Oxford 1933), p. 14. See notably D. Panizza, “Il pensiero politico di Alberico Gentili. Religione, virt`u e ragion di stato” in D. Panizza (ed.), Alberico Gentili Politica e religione nell’Et`a delle Guerre die Religione (Milan 2002), p. 57–213, esp. p. 75 and p. 88–89. On Lipsius’s political thought, see E. de Bom, M. Janssens, T. Van Houdt and J. Papy (eds.), (Un)masking the Realities of Power. Justus Lipsius and the Dynamics of Political Writing in Early Modern Europe (Leiden 2011). His main political theory is now available in an excellent translation: J. Lipsius, Politica. Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction, ed. and translated by J. Waszink (Amsterdam 2002).

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anti-Huguenot Catholic propaganda, for instance, the anonymously published Allegresse chrestienne, or Discours contre les Huguenotz. These aggressive anti-Huguenot writings were seconded by semi-official pamphlets by Legier du Chesne or Claude Nouvelle, to name only two.11 Gentili perceived the threat to political stability posed by Huguenot responses such as Vindiciae contra Tyrannos that openly endorsed armed resistance against the monarchy.12 Confessional antagonism within a single state undermined legitimate sovereignty. Nevertheless, Gentili proposed a framework to restrict the wars which threatened to tear Europe apart. It was based on the concept of sovereign states, that is to say the order and stability of princely or republican government. While it is true to say that ‘Gentili did not completely possess the modern concept of sovereignty’13 , he nonetheless saw the state as the decisive agent in the international sphere.14 Sovereign states might be both a challenge and a solution to the problem of organising interstate relations, 11

12

13

14

Anonymous, Allegresse chrestienne de l’heureux succes des guerres de ce royaume (Paris 1772), Anonymous, Discours contre les Huguenotz, auquel est contenue et d´eclar´ee la source de leur damnable religion (Lyon 1573), L. du Chesne, Exhortation au Roy, pour vertueusement poursuivre ce que sagement il a commenc´e contre les Huguenots, avec les Epitaphes de Gaspar de Colligny (Paris 1572), C. Nouvell, Ode trionfale au roy, sus l’equitable justice que sa majest´e feit des rebelles, la veille et jour de sainct Loys (Paris 1572). See F. J. Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries: The Political Thought of the French Catholic League (Geneva 1975) and R. Birely, The Counter-Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellism or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modern Europe (London 1990). Cf., for example, Anonymous, Remonstrance d’un bon Catholique franc¸ois aux trois estats de France (n.p. 1576). This good Catholic is, of course, everything but a good Catholic. The main thrust of the argument claims, similarly to the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, that Machiavelli’s odious teachings are to blame for the massacre. The anonymously published De furoribus Gallicis, horrenda et indigna amirallij Castillionei, nobilium atque illustrium virorum caede . . . (Basle 1573), which is now attributed to Hotman, argued in a similar vein. See also F. de La Noue, Discours politiques et militaires (Basle 1687). Particularly instructive on the St Bartholomew’s Day massacres are R. M. Kingdon, Myths about the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacres 1572–1576 (Cambridge Mass. 1988), A. Soman (ed.), The Massacre of St Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents (The Hague 1974). On the French Wars of Religion more generally, see M. Yardeni, La conscience nationale en France pendant les guerres de religion, 1559–1598 (Paris 1971), M. P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562– 1629 (Cambridge 1995) and J. H. M. Salmon, The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought (Oxford 1959). Panizza, “Il pensiero politico di Alberico Gentili”, p. 158: ‘Gentili ( . . . ) non possedeva compiutamente il concetto moderni sovranit`a, ma monstrava un chiaro senso della distinzione dei due ordini di realt`a, quella di interna e quella di internazionale’. See also B. Kingsbury, “Confronting Difference: The Puzzling Durability of Gentili’s Combination of Pragmatic Pluralism and Normative Judgement” in The American Journal of International Law 92 (1998), p. 714f.: ‘Gentili does not have a very precise concept of the state – he discusses many different types of political entities without much distinction. ( . . . ) the whole concept of sovereignty is not clearly developed’. More generally on this subject see L. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 (Cambridge 2010). P. Haggenmacher, “Grotius and Gentili: A Reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s Inaugural Lecture” in Hugo Grotius and International Relations, ed. by H. Bull, B. Kingsbury and A. Roberts (Oxford 1990), p. 172.

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but the idea of a single universal sovereign as potential arbiter, such as the Pope – who had indeed claimed and assumed such a role, most famously in the Treatise of Tordesillas in 149415 – was not a feasible option for Gentili.16 We begin to recognise why Huguenot political writings such as the anonymous Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, were particularly unsettling for Gentili’s own position. In the preface to the Vindiciae, the rhetorical ploy was to accuse the advisers of the French Crown of plotting against the Huguenots: ‘You princes of men, I consider that these investigations [undertaken in the Vindiciae] are able to contradict both the Machiavellians and their books, by whose wicked counsels the commonwealth is divided by so many civil dissensions, factions, and disturbances’.17 To what extent the Vindiciae engaged with Machiavelli’s Principe is still debated.18 Despite the ardent rhetoric of the preface, there is only one explicit mention of Machiavelli in the main body of the text. However, there are many allusions to the Florentine which would have been clearly identifiable to contemporary readers. Gentili’s engagement with the Principe and the Vindiciae draws into focus an unsettling core issue of sixteenth-century, political and moral theory. He was a close reader, indeed a great admirer, of Machiavelli. When combined with his own intellectual engagement with Machiavelli’s theory19 , Gentili’s study of the anti-Machiavellian rhetoric in the Vindiciae led him to an illuminating understanding of Machiavelli that would provide a crucial starting point for tackling the problems of interstate relations and the role of trust.20 15

16

17 18

19

20

See F. de Vitoria, “On the American Indies” in Vitoria, Political Writings, ed. by A. Pagden and J. Lawrence (Cambridge 2003), p. 285, who endorses this authority of arbitration of the Pope. For the Treaty of Tordesillas and its wider context, see M. E. Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, 1450–1789 (Cambridge 2006), p. 229–231. See, for example, Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 16 where he dismisses the Pope as arbiter between sovereign states, as well as A. Gentili, Hispanicae Advocatio Libri Duo, translated by F. Frost Abbott (Oxford 1921), p. 95. S. J. Brutus, Vindiciae contra Tyrannos or, Concerning the Legitimate Power of a Prince over the People, and of the People over a Prince, ed. and translated by G. Garnett (Cambridge 1994), p. 10. Cf. E. Barker, Church, State and Study (London 1930), esp. p. 72–108. Pertinent and most comprehensive is G. Garnett, “Editor’s Introduction” in S. J. Brutus, Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, esp. p. XXI-XXII. S. Mastellone, Venalit`a e Machiavellismo in Francia (1572–1610) (Florence 1972), p. 58– 60 suggests that Innocent Gentillet might be the author of the preface. But this seems merely an interesting speculation without any substantial proof. Panizza, “Il pensiero politico di Alberico Gentili”, p. 126 characterises ‘Machiavelli [next to Aristotle as] l’altra autorit`a paradigmatica dell’universo teorico-politico di Gentili’. See also D. Panizza, “Political Theory and Jurisprudence in Gentili’s De Iure Belli. The Great Debate between ‘theological’ and ‘humanist’ Perspectives from Vitoria to Grotius” in The Roots of International Law, ed. by P.-M. Dupuy and V. Chetail (Leiden 2014), who rightly stresses that ‘the “Machiavellian Moment” ( . . . ) certainly defines the “theoretical-political” dimension of his [Gentili’s] De Iure Belli’, p. 214. This is not to suggest that this explicitly political aspect of Gentili’s theory should be perceived as replacing his juridical argument. However, it certainly complemented it. Given that modern

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Machiavelli’s legacy to Gentili concerned the question of trust in interstate relations specifically and in politics as a whole. In Chapter XVIII of the Principe, Machiavelli asked if princes should keep their word. The chapter opens by posing the problem in unambiguous terms: ‘Everyone knows how praiseworthy it is for a ruler to keep his promises, and live uprightly and not by trickery. Nevertheless, experience shows that in our times rulers who have done great things are those who have set little store by keeping their word, being skilful rather in cunningly confusing men; they have got the better of those who have relied on being trustworthy. ( . . . ) Therefore, a prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, when such fidelity would damage him, and when reasons that made him promise are no longer relevant. This advice would not be sound if all men were upright; but because they are treacherous and would not keep their promises to you, you should not consider yourself bound to keep your promises to them’.21 It was this kind of advice that caused Catholics and Protestants alike to react against Machiavelli with such vehemence.22 It was also in this context that Gentili had to position himself.23 Machiavelli discussed trust

21

22

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interpretation of Gentili’s thought – aside from a few exceptions – is largely dominated by legal historians and their discussion about his juridical argument, my interpretation hopes to shed light on a less studied, but no less important, aspect of his thought. N. Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. by Q. Skinner and R. Price (Cambridge 2008), p. 61–62. M. Jay, The Virtues of Mendacity. On Lying in Politics (Charlottesville 2010), p. 48: ‘Lying, it seems, impedes the basic trust’. Around the time that Gentili published his major writings, his countryman Giovanni Botero, who had left the Jesuit order in 1581, published his critique of Machiavelli, Della ragion di stato, in 1589, four years after Gentili’s De Legationibus of 1585 and nine years before his De Iure Belli of 1598. The Spanish Jesuit Pedro Ribadeneyra published his Tratado de la religion y Virtudes que deve tener el Principe Christiano, para governar y conservar sus Estados. This explicit attack on Machiavelli and the politiques first appeared in 1595, was widely circulated, and reprinted in several editions. These writings, together with Justus Lipsius’s Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex (1589) and Jean Bodin’s Six Livres de la R´epublique (1576), as well as the polemical writings which dominated the immediate aftermath of the St Bartholomew’s Day massacres, provide the context for Gentili’s own theory. This is still a very limited selection of a much more complex ongoing debate. For the Jesuit’s engagement with Machiavelli, see the masterful study by H¨opfl, Jesuit Political Thought, esp. p. 84– 90. See also C. Benoist, Le Machiavellisme (Paris 1936), A. M. Battista, “Sull’antimachiavellismo francese del secolo XVI” in Storia e Politica 1 (1962), p. 412–447, G. Procacci, Machiavelli nella cultura Europea dell’et`a moderna (Rome 1995). S. Anglo, Machiavelli. The first Century (Oxford 2005), esp. p. 229–414 is, despite its focus on Gentillet, helpful on the wider Catholic and Huguenot context, but adds hardly anything on Gentili. R. W. Truman, Spanish Treatises on Government, Society and Religion in the Time of Philip II (Leiden 1999), esp. p. 277–314, Birely, The Counter-Reformation Prince, esp. p. 111–135 and the excellent essay by A. Merle, “Un aspect de l’antimachiav´elisme des J´esuites: Le Prince Chr´etien de Pedro de Ribadeneyra entre simulation et dissimulation” in Les J´esuites en Espagne et en Am´erique, ed. by A. Molini´e, A. Merle and A. Guillaume-Alonso (Paris 2007), p. 111–140. The most notable attacks on Machiavelli were Innocent Gentillet’s Anti-Machiavel and the notorious Vindiciae contra Tyrannos. Gentili makes his own position on the Anti-Machiavel abundantly clear:

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and faithfulness as an option a prince or a politician was able to choose or reject. They could keep their word and trust others to do the same. Or they could break their word and would have to expect that others would not trust them that easily in the future. Machiavelli stressed a dynamic understanding of trust that opened up the scope of human action. Only on this basis was it meaningful to carry out a political or prudential calculation of whether or not to trust others.24 The ideological and political agenda Gentili pursued in his interpretation of Machiavelli reveals his view of the relationship between politics and religion. He explored the scope and, in his view, the political necessity of confessional coexistence, in concurrence with discussions of sovereign state power. Or, in other words, he addressed the issue of sovereignty and resistance, which had profound implications for regulating the relationship between states of differing confessions.25 His legal and political theory is based on the cardinal assumption that there is still scope for mutual trust between such states. But how could he establish a basis for trust? This question had been contested in antiquity26 , and Gentili had to demonstrate

24

25

26

‘The fact that some claim that he was a man of no learning and of criminal tendencies makes no difference to me. It is his remarkable insight that I praise; I do not defend his impiety or his lack of integrity, if actually he had such faults. And yet if I, reviewing the book issued against him [my emphasis], take into consideration his position, if I give a just estimate of his purpose in writing, and if I choose to reinforce his words by sounder interpretation, I do not see why I can not free from such charges the reputation of this man who has now passed away. He was not understood by the person who wrote against him and he has been calumniated in many ways. There is no doubt that Machiavelli is a man who deserves our commiseration in the highest degree’. Gentili, Three Books on Embassies, p. 156. Given that Gentili was one of the few writers who dismissed Gentillet’s criticism of Machiavelli and defended the latter against the charges issued against him in the anonymously published Anti-Machiavel, I will focus on the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos rather than on the Anti-Machiavel when assessing Gentili’s take on the Huguenot writings on religion, state and resistance. This is important to note, as Christian religion worked with a static concept of trust and faith. There was no alternative than to trust in God, unless you were prepared to be damned. See the entry on Vertrauen (trust) in J. H. Zedler (ed.), Großes vollst¨andiges Universal-Lexikon aller Wissenschaften und K¨unste vol. 48 (Leipzig, Halle 1746), p. 19–29. The parallel with modern conceptualisations of trust is striking. Hartmann criticised modern scholarship on trust and argued that trust should not be seen as ‘an apriori stance to be treated as [a] psychological or ontological default position’. M. Hartmann, “On the Concept of Basic Trust” in Behemoth. A Journal on Civilisation 8 (2015), p. 13. For the crucial controversy between Gentili and the orthodox theologians at Oxford University see D. Panizza, Alberico Gentili giurista ideologo nell’Inghilterra elisabettiana (Padua 1981), p. 55–87 and Panizza, “Il pensiero politico di Alberico Gentili”, p. 116. Most famously by Carneades. Neither in De Iure Belli nor in De Legationibus did Gentili mention Carneades, and he mentioned him only once in De armis Romanis (cf. Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 69), but the whole structure of this book reflects the famous debate which he would have known about via Lactantius’s Divine institutions. Cicero’s De republica or On the Commonwealth was only rediscovered in 1819. ‘Book 3 [of On the Commonwealth] contains what was undoubtedly the most famous section of the dialogue in antiquity, a reformulation of the pair of speeches delivered by the Academic Carneades in Rome 155 BCE in which he had argued on successive days that justice is

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how the challenge could be answered, and how the values of justice, legal order and trust could be achieved and preserved between antagonistic states. In addition to De Iure Belli and De Legationibus, we need to consider Gentili’s De armis Romanis to appreciate how he developed his argument.27 The interpretation of the latter is not straightforward, as the work is divided into two books which argue for opposing positions.28 The first is entitled Indictment of the Injustice of the Romans in Warfare, while the second answers the accusation of the first and undertakes, as the title of the second book makes clear, a Defence of the Justice of the Romans in Warfare. Depending on whether one takes the first or the second book as Gentili’s more authentic position, the resulting conclusions will necessarily be very different. In their introduction, the editors of De armis Romanis advance the argument that Book 1 aims to demonstrate the injustice of Rome’s expansion, and not to show that there is no such thing as justice or injustice in international relations. In order to show that Rome’s imperialism is unjust, they argue, there has to be criteria of justice in the first place. For them, both books make for a coherent argument, because ‘both the indictment of Roman imperialism in Book 1 of The Wars of the Romans and its defense in Book 2 are predicated on the assumption that it is apposite to judge the expansion of the Roman empire by way of warfare according to certain moral normative criteria – indeed, denying or affirming the justice of the Roman empire is precisely what The Wars of the Romans is all about’.29 However, this overstates what these two books are arguing for. Alternatively, De armis Romanis can be read as a reconsideration of the problems formulated by Carneades and Machiavelli. This is not necessarily a difference in substance, but rather a difference in emphasis and nuance.

27 28 29

essential to civic life and, conversely, that injustice is essential’. J. E. G. Zetzel, “Introduction” in Cicero, On the Commonwealth, ed. by J. E. G. Zetzel (Cambridge 2008), p. XVI. Carneades will play an even greater role for Grotius. See Chapter 3.1. This crucial text is now available in an excellent new edition. Gentili, De armis Romanis. Like Carneades in Rome. B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (eds.), “Introduction”, p. XI. See also D. Panizza, “Alberico Gentili’s De armis Romanis: The Roman Model of Just Empire” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. by B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (Oxford 2010), p. 53–84 and D. Lupher, “The De armis Romanis and the Exemplum of Roman Imperialism” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. by B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (Oxford 2010), p. 85–100. Wagner, “Lessons of Imperialism and of the Law of Nations” advances a different position. Cicero argued that ‘the whole of our fetial code is about such an enemy [who is just and legitimate] and we have many other laws that are shared’. Cicero, On Duties, III-107, p. 149.

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My interpretation of how Gentili constructively engaged with Machiavelli will focus on the aspect already conceded by Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann that ‘there are indications in The Wars of the Romans that mere unconstrained imperial self-interest could amount to a justifying principle. Such a prudential principle, devoid of any moral constraint of natural law, would situate that work quite obviously in a prudential, Machiavellian tradition of ragion di stato’.30 Nevertheless, it is in his De Iure Belli and to a lesser extent De Legationibus that Gentili discusses most fully the challenges for a political order between sovereign states of his own time. Above all, for Gentili the differences of Christian confessions must not stand in the way of an emerging European state system. If his argument was to work, he had to show that, despite Machiavelli’s advice in the Principe, trust and good faith in the domain of interstate politics were possible. The explosive amalgam of simplified Machiavellian concepts and the actuality of religious strife was the obstacle to overcome. Although it may seem that Pedro Ribadeneyra argued in a similar vein when he advised the Christian Princes not to follow Machiavelli’s advice, there are fundamental differences to Gentili’s position: ‘because Machiavelli teaches that sometimes the Prince should break his word and his faith, ( . . . ) it is very fitting that the Christian Prince be very attentive and greatly consider first what he says, promises, and swears; but afterwards that he be constant and firm in fulfilling what before God he has promised and sworn. And let him know for certain that the keeping of his faith and word is very important for the conservation of his State and for being better thought of, richer, better obeyed, and feared’.31 The underlying issue concerns the reasonable expectation of mutual trust and faith. Ribadeneyra argues that Machiavelli’s theory undermines all possibility of trusting in the promises and declarations of others, notably due to the lack of fundamental moral values in the absence of religion. But unlike Ribadeneyra, Gentili was well aware of the probl´ematique Machiavelli had set out in his political writings. In the second book of his De armis Romanis, Gentili endorsed the reason of state argument, which allowed the state to make use of all available means in the case of necessity. Machiavelli and Gentili referred to the existing discussion of Roman writers on the question of whether and to what extent necessity allowed moral and legal standards to be overridden 30 31

B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (eds.), “Introduction”, p. XXIV. P. Ribadeneyra, Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince – against Machiavelli, ed. by G. A. Moore (Washington 1949), p. 303.

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in the name of the states’ self-interest.32 The issue of trustworthiness is very much part of this discussion and Gentili formulated this in provocative terms in line with Machiavelli’s position: ‘I say again: “He who resists deceit with deceit is not himself deceitful. Thus craftiness is deceived by craftiness” [this is a reference to Baldus]. One is allowed to pursue what is one’s right through deception, through violence, through theft. ( . . . ) no one denies that wars are necessary – and deception of this sort is allowable – with foreigners, with those who are not constrained by legal proceedings. ( . . . ) That what is not allowable according to the law necessity makes allowable. Necessity has no law, but it itself makes a law. Necessity makes that acceptable which would otherwise be unacceptable. And because of necessity one justly departs from customary measures. And there are many other maxims of that sort’.33 Politics, and as far as Gentili was concerned, law, depend on the particular circumstances. Gentili’s ‘method is essentially casuistic and topical’.34 Gentili put forward a whole range of questions here, as radical and challenging as those posed by Machiavelli. Indeed, he seems to have gone almost a step further than Machiavelli, at least in De armis Romanis, since Machiavelli, when discussing the acquisition of princely power by wicked means, had insisted that ‘it cannot be called virtue to kill one’s fellowcitizen, to betray one’s friends, to be treacherous, merciless and irreligious; power may be gained by acting in such a way, but not glory’.35 In the Discorsi he complemented the advice given in the Principe and substantially qualified it in the following way: ‘Although to use fraud in any action is detestable, yet in the conduct of war it is praiseworthy and glorious. And a man who uses fraud to overcome his enemy is praised, just as much as is he who overcomes his enemy by force. ( . . . ) I do not mean that a fraud which involves breaking your word or the contracts you have made, is glorious; for although on occasion it may win for you a state or a kingdom ( . . . ), it will never bring you glory’.36 Regarding the conduct of war, Gentili advanced 32

33 34 35 36

Among others, Seneca is one of the obvious points of reference. For a succinct discussion of the early modern period, see also the study by M. Behnen, “Der gerechte und notwendige Krieg. ‘Necessitas’ und ‘Utilitas reipublicae’ in der Kriegstheorie des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts” in Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung in der europ¨aischen Geschichte der fr¨uhen Neuzeit, ed. by J. Kunisch and B. Stollberg-Rilinger (Berlin 1986), p. 43–106. Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 149f. Haggenmacher, “Grotius and Gentili”, p. 160. According to Peter Haggenmacher this is another crucial difference to Grotius. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 31. Cf. Cicero’s discussion of glory: On Duties, II-31, p. 74. N. Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. by B. Crick (London 2003), III-40, p. 513. Cf. Cicero, On Duties, I-62, p. 26.

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a very similar argument. Indeed, the fifth chapter of the second book of De Iure Belli deals with the issue of ‘whether it is lawful to deceive the enemy with any kind of falsehood’.37 Gentili provided many historic examples to discuss this issue, eventually siding with the argument of necessity: ‘if it is not unjust to feign flight, to pretend fear, to seem to depart, and to do other things of that kind, why should it be unjust to deceive the enemy by words?’38 For both Machiavelli and Gentili, necessity or more specifically the need to succeed in war is an important though potentially ambiguous criterion. Machiavelli was concerned with the problem he had presented in such radical terms, when he had attacked Cicero – the authority of humanist moral and political thought – and maintained that ‘a ruler must know how to act like a beast’.39 Cicero famously claimed in De Officiis that ‘injustice may be done, either through force or through deceit; and deceit seems to belong to a little fox, force to a lion. Both of them seem most alien to a human being; but deceit deserves the greater hatred. And out of all injustice, nothing deserves punishment more than that of a man who, just in a time when they are most betraying trust, act in such a way that they might appear [my emphasis] to be good’.40 Machiavelli turned this assertion on its head when he gave his advice to princes. A ruler ‘should imitate both the fox and the lion ( . . . ) one could give countless modern examples ( . . . ), and show how many peace treaties and promises have been rendered null and void by the faithlessness of rulers; and those best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But foxiness should be well concealed: one must be a great feigner and dissembler’.41 37 39 40

41

38 Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 153. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 149. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 61. Cicero, On Duties, I-41, p. 19. See also the discussion about justice and injustice in Plato, Republic, ed. by G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis 1992), p. 36; 361a: ‘the extreme of injustice is to be believed to be just without being just’. This will be taken up by Leibniz. See Chapter 4.1. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 61–62. Cicero was not the first classical author who used this famous dictum about the fox and the lion. Since Machiavelli’s notorious inversion, many polemicists and political thinkers referred in one way or another to this dictum. Cf., besides the references below, for instance, the Jesuit Ribadeneyra, Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince, p. 259 and p. 279 and the Huguenot La Noue, Discours politiques et militaires, p. 77, who both refer to the image of the fox to denounce Machiavellian treachery. La Noue explicity refers to Plutarch as the ancient source of this dictum. Anglo, Machiavelli, provides more references to contemporary sources not considered in this chapter with a similar anti-Machiavellian thrust, and Lysander as yet another ancient source: p. 251, 267, 280, 291, 347, 349, 387. See also M. Stolleis, “L¨owe und Fuchs. Eine politische Maxime im Fr¨uhabsolutismus” in M. Stolleis, Staat und Staatsr¨ason in der fr¨uhen Neuzeit (Frankfurt am Main 1990), p. 21–36, J. Barlow, “The Fox and the Lion: Machiavelli replies to Cicero” in History of Political Thought 20 (1999), p. 627–645, M. Colish, “Cicero’s De Officiis and Machiavelli’s Prince” in Sixteenth Century Journal 9 (1978), p. 80–93.

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Machiavelli knew that many rulers preferred political success to faithful and honourable conduct. This made the question of trustworthiness even more intricate. As quoted previously, Machiavelli said his ‘advice would not be sound if all men were upright; but because they are treacherous and would not keep their promises to you, you should not consider yourself bound to keep your promises to them’.42 Gentili took Machiavelli as the thinker who had highlighted the problem, not the one who had created it, in the advice given apparently against Cicero in the Principe. Cicero’s discussion of justice in De Officiis raised the question of good faith, most prominently in the context of war. Underlying this discussion was his concern for the Roman Republic, which had crumbled under the civil war and Caesar’s rise to dictatorial power. ‘In my opinion, our concern should always be for a peace that will have nothing to do with treachery. If I had been followed in this we would still have some republican government (if perhaps not the best); whereas now we have none’.43 An equally significant aspect of Cicero’s political advice, which Machiavelli turns on its head, asserts that ‘there is nothing at all more suited to protecting and retaining influence than to be loved, and nothing is less suited than to be feared’.44 For Cicero, if there can be no trust, there can be no reliable intercourse between the differing parties: ‘For those who wish to be feared cannot but themselves be afraid of the very men who fear them’.45 As is well known, Machiavelli infamously claimed ‘that it is desirable [for a Prince] to be both loved and feared; but it is difficult to achieve both and, if one of them is lacking, it is much safer to be feared than loved’.46 The ruler should not depend on other people’s sentiments or promises, but ‘only rely on what is under his own control’.47 In contrast to the concept of the republic shared by both Cicero and Machiavelli in which every citizen has a stake and interest in the common good, it is in the nature of princely rule that it is isolated, always precarious and under potential threat. Cicero had already suggested the nexus between a well-ordered republican government and the appreciation of love, and dictatorial rule and the appreciation of fear, as the leading and motivating principles in society. ‘The republic we have lost. And we have 42 44 45

46

43 Cicero, On Duties, I-35, p. 15. See also I-57, p. 23–24. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 61–62. Cicero, On Duties, II-23, p. 70–71. Cicero, On Duties, II-24, p. 71. Apart from military superiority, the success of Roman imperialism was based on their specific concept of fides, which also entailed an aspect of coercion as the victorious Romans would receive the vanquished as inferior allies into their fides. See Heinze, “Fides”, N¨orr, Die Fides and Hartmann, Die Praxis. 47 Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 61. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 59.

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fallen into this disaster ( . . . ) because we prefer to be feared than to be held dear and loved’.48 It seems that Machiavelli is taking Cicero’s thought further – despite his rhetoric against him – spelling out even more clearly the autocratic ruler’s dependence on fear, in contrast to a less inimical and more virtuous republican government. Fear is a critical component for autocratic rule as trust is not possible with any other party. Accordingly, ‘rulers should have two main worries: one is internal, and concerns the subjects; the other is external, and concerns foreign powers’.49 Owing to the fickleness of rulers, alliances with foreign powers must remain unstable, and so too the internal tranquility of the commonwealth which is only possible through permanent princely vigilance and potential threat to the subjects. Where there is no scope for mutual trust there will be the attempt to coerce people into submission. Machiavelli argued that autocratic rule required a princely fortress to dominate over a city to maintain power: although inadequate against external enemies, ‘if a ruler is more afraid of his own subjects than of foreigners, he should build fortresses’.50 The fortress is the signum of the prince’s fear of his own subjects.51 Conversely, Machiavelli also argued at length that in a well-constituted republic, fortresses are politically and militarily superfluous, while coercion and force are not only unnecessary but counterproductive. Republics can utilise trust where autocratic rulers cannot. A well-governed republic can sustain trust in its institutions and hence its citizens, in a well-constituted republic, without needing recourse to coercion or force. Similarly, such a republic should, and could, rely on its citizen militia for its protection. According to the republican Machiavelli, ‘so long as Rome enjoyed freedom and was loyal to her ( . . . ) constitution she never held either cities or provinces by means of fortresses’.52 Here Cicero and Machiavelli share common ground again. According to both, a republican government relies on the citizen’s love, while the prince relies on fear. 48 50

51

52

49 Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 64. Cicero, On Duties, II-29, p. 74. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 75. Giovanni Botero reiterates Machiavelli’s view of the usefulness of fortresses for the ruler in subduing his subjects, but he also accords them a place in the defence against external enemies. Cf. the English translation of his Della Ragion di Stato: G. Botero, Practical Politics, ed. and translated by G. A. Moore (Washington 1949), p. 131. It has not been sufficiently recognised how Machiavelli’s discussion of fortresses underscores his argument regarding the issue of trust. On the general issue of fortresses in Machiavelli’s political thought, see H. M¨unkler, Machiavelli. Die Begr¨undung des politischen Denkens aus der Krise der Republik Florenz (Frankfurt am Main 1982), M. E. Mallett, Warfare in Renaissance Italy (London 1974) and M. E. Mallett, “The Theory and Practice of Warfare in Machiavelli’s Republic” in G. Bock and Q. Skinner (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambridge 1990), p. 173–180. Machiavelli, The Discourses, II-24, p. 352.

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Gentili regarded both Cicero and Machiavelli as republicans who gave general political advice, but were also both involved in a concrete struggle to re-establish the republican constitution of their commonwealth. Well before Rousseau’s famous dictum about Machiavelli’s Principe, Gentili hailed Machiavelli as a ‘eulogist of democracy, and its most spirited champion. ( . . . ) It was not his purpose to instruct the tyrant, but by revealing his secret counsels to strip him bare, and expose him to the suffering nation’.53 Gentili implied that the crucial question about trustworthiness had already been, for Machiavelli, how to tame the fox and the lion in the realm of politics.54 However, a world of republics would not be a world without conflicts. When Gentili appropriated Machiavelli, he accepted that republics could be, and in the case of Rome certainly had been, expansionist.55 This point was not the focus of De Iure Belli or De Legationibus, but was fully developed in his De armis Romanis. As noted earlier, the interpretation of this text needs to take into account that Gentili provides two arguments almost in the form of a dispute56 , or at the very least, two distinct deliberations on the subject concerning the justice of Roman warfare and imperialism. The assumption that ‘when writing in the voice of the Roman defender of imperialism of Book 2, Gentili dismisses ironically the stance of the prosecutor in Book 1 as that of a narrow-minded provincial from 53

54

55

56

Gentili, On Embassies, p. 156. Cf. J.-J. Rousseau, “Of the Social Contract” in Political Writings, ed. by V. Gourevitch (Cambridge 2003), III-6, p. 95: ‘While pretending to teach lessons to Kings, he [Machiavelli] taught great lessons to peoples. Machiavelli’s Prince is the book of republicans’. A similar, though less ardent and certainly lesser known argument in defence of Machiavelli had already been made before Gentili in Florence. Cf. M. Toscano, Peplus Italiae (Paris 1578) and R. Pole, Apologia Reginaldi poli ad Carolum V., ed. by A. M. Quirini (Brescia 1744), p. 151. I owe these references to S. Anglo, Machiavelli, p. 409. The image of the fox in particular had ambivalent connotations in early modern political thought. See Stolleis, “L¨owe und Fuchs. Eine politische Maxime im Fr¨uhabsolutismus” and Barlow, “The Fox and the Lion: Machiavelli replies to Cicero”. Generally speaking Machiavelli seems to have suggested that republics should strive to expand, even by means of war. However, his quite remarkable discussion of the German free cities also suggests that expansion is driven by necessity. Machiavelli, The Discourses, II-19, p. 337: ‘These communities [the German free cities], therefore, are able to live, content with their small dominions, since with respect to the Imperial authority they have no cause to desire more. Within their walls they live united because in the offing there is an enemy who, should there be internal disorder, would take the opportunity to subjugate them. Were conditions in Germany other than these, they would have to seek expansion and disrupt their present tranquillity. And since elsewhere such conditions are not present, other states cannot adopt this type of polity, but must needs expand either by means of confederations or in the way the Romans did’. For further discussion of Machiavelli’s arguments regarding expansion, see P. Schr¨oder, Niccol`o Machiavelli (Frankfurt am Main 2004), p. 23–32. On the importance of disputatio for Gentili’s style and method, see Haggenmacher, “Grotius and Gentili” and Panizza, “Political Theory and Jurisprudence”, p. 212.

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San Ginesio’57 seems to dismiss too swiftly the criticism Gentili advances in the first book. In the first book he repeatedly and forcefully states the point that although ‘the Romans were victors’, they were ‘also betrayers, perfidious treaty-breakers’.58 Only because of this ‘cheating, perfidy, avarice, audacity, cruelty’59 had they been able to establish their empire. Gentili used the Discorsi and the Principe in order to re-orient the Machiavellian arguments to the sphere of interstate relations. Had not Machiavelli himself raised the issue of trust in interstate relations? He asserted in the Principe that ‘it must be understood that a ruler, and especially a new ruler, cannot always act in ways that are considered good because, in order to maintain his power, he is often forced to act treacherously, ruthlessly or inhumanely, and disregard the precepts of religion. Hence he must be prepared to vary his conduct as the winds of fortune and changing circumstances constrain him and ( . . . ) not deviate from the right conduct if possible, but be capable of entering upon the path of wrongdoing when this becomes necessary’.60 The common ground identified in Gentili’s reading of Cicero and Machiavelli should not obscure the differences in their moral and political theories. When Cicero insists that a wise man should always follow what is honourable and his view should not be distorted by expediency, he makes a profoundly un-Machiavellian point. Although he concedes that ‘it happens that one thing seems beneficial and another honourable’, he is quite clear ‘that is a mistake: for the rule of what is beneficial and of what is honourable is one and the same. If someone has not grasped that, no type of deceit or crime will be beyond him’.61 In Gentili’s interpretation, Machiavelli is saying exactly the same, only that he shows more clearly that political rulers deliberately have recourse to these methods, and that, horribile dictu, one has to reckon with such ruthless behaviour and conduct in the realm of politics. In De armis Romanis, both the accuser of Roman conquest and the defender of the Roman Empire make this point. In Book 1 we can read that Rome repeatedly ‘bestowed upon deception some appearance of justice ( . . . ) for the sake of deceiving trust’.62 Whereas in Book 2 exactly the opposite argument is advanced, claiming that it would have been ‘foolish’ if the Romans had put ‘faith in the enemy’. And that it was, therefore, 57 58 60

61

Kingsbury and Straumann (eds.), “Introduction”, p. XI. 59 Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 17. Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 45. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 62. Part of the strength of the republican constitution for Machiavelli was that a republic was less dependent on any one person and thus less exposed to chance and the whims of the goddess fortuna. Cf. Schr¨oder, Niccol`o Machiavelli, p. 83–86, M. Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford 1998), p. 121 and D. Hoeges, Niccol`o Machiavelli. Die Macht und der Schein (Munich 2000), p. 198. 62 Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 53. Cicero, On Duties, III-74, p. 128.

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‘from the standpoint of justice ( . . . ) certainly allowable for the Romans to make use of ( . . . ) deception’.63 Gentili faced the fundamental question of when and whether it was reasonable to mistrust the other actors in the competitive and volatile context of interstate relations. The interpretative and conceptual range of trust and mistrust is at the heart of the daily conduct of politics as it is at the heart of theorising interstate relations. Gentili’s attempt to draw lessons from this kind of political realism, and to use the positive foundations he found in Cicero and Machiavelli alike, is set out in his De Iure Belli. The concepts of justice, as well as trustworthiness, are thus contested. They can serve to regulate interstate relations only to a limited extent, and are permanently in danger of being exploited for political ends, thus sliding into the sphere of contest and polemics rather than resolving conflict. This limits the efficacy of trustworthiness and justice as a regulatory force between sovereign states. Gentili had to face the challenge that most political actors would presumably follow Machiavelli’s reasoning. It was more likely that they would mistrust rather than trust each other. Gentili endeavoured to transfer the probl´ematique of trust64 to the sphere of interstate relations in a period when confessional strife made establishing a universally accepted basis for mutual trust even more elusive. Gentili must have been aware that an answer to the problem of trust in interstate relations remained precarious after he introduced Machiavelli’s realism into his argument. In the end he was unable to provide more than tentative grounds for the binding force of the laws and customs he unearthed and systematised in his works. Towards the end of his De Iure Belli, a makeshift argument concerning the issue of hostages is presented at some length, designed to support the attempt to provide a basis for mutual trust in interstate relations. ‘Hostages’, he argued with reference to Baldus 63 64

Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 159. Gentili also discussed the Ciceronian notion of giving everybody his due, but he does so in a somewhat ironic way when he asserts in the second book of De armis Romanis as a principle that ‘such methods of warfare ought to be maintained and considered customary as correspond to the nature of the enemy: gentle methods with gentle enemies, savage with the savage, open with the noble, cunning with the deceitful. This is the precept of the law of nature and of all peoples and states: to render to each his own. But this is really enough about all this’. Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 193. Although it is only anecdotal evidence, one can perceive how problematic this principle is in the witty and cynical way it was employed by the Prince Elector of Brandenburg William the Great, who had suum cuique tribuere engraved on his canons. A good discussion of the shortcomings of this principle is to be found in D. H¨uning, “Von der Tugend der Gerechtigkeit zum Begriff der Rechtsordnung: Zur rechtsphilosophischen Bedeutung des suum cuique tribuere bei Hobbes und Kant” in Recht, Staat und V¨olkerrecht bei Immanuel Kant, ed. by D. H¨uning and B. Tuschling (Berlin 1998), p. 53–84.

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and other earlier jurists, ‘are those who are given to a sovereign or to the leader of an army for the purpose of binding public faith [my emphasis]’.65 The difference with Cicero is crucial here. Contrary to Gentili, he argued that hostages should only be exchanged if the war was just and legitimate. Cicero, therefore, assumed that there existed a basis for agreements with the enemy, ‘if that were not so, the senate would never have delivered notable men in chains to the enemy’.66 For Gentili this issue was more problematic. He did not believe that the Roman fetial law and its regulations could be applied so easily to the interstate relations of the late sixteenth century. Kingsbury and Straumann argue though, that ‘the Roman Law ( . . . ) is the pivotal legacy of Roman imperialism. ( . . . ) Roman law is also a source for the operational norms of the law of nations and the law of nature. And this in turn means that it is a source for norms that hold ( . . . ) even between sovereign states’.67 For Gentili this grounding force of Roman law was uncertain precisely because trustworthiness and thus the very possibility of agreements between European sovereign states remained problematic. The new historical situation called for a new theory of interstate relations and a framework in which mutual trust among individual states was reasonable in their political calculation of the state’s self-interest.

1.2 A New Concept of the Enemy and War – Trust among Equals Gentili broke new ground through a juridical and political approach which eliminates the medieval notion of bellum iustum and instead introduces the concept of an iustus hostis. Arguably this concept aimed to address the ‘confessionalised’ world of the late sixteenth century. Despite the fact that international conflicts continued to be considerably determined by confessional patterns of thought68 , Gentili’s political theory of war and interstate 65

66 67 68

Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 241. See also Giovanni Botero’s discussion of hostages in his Della Ragion di Stato and the way hostages can be used to assure the observance of good faith by those who are asked to deliver hostages, because one would normally not trust them at all. Botero, Practical Politics, p. 121. Cicero, On Duties, III-107, p. 142. Kingsbury and Straumann (eds.), “Introduction”, p. XIX. Heinz Schilling argued that the ‘Formierung eines internationalen Systems erfolgte zeitlich parallel zu und in enger sachlich-struktureller Verbindung mit der Konfessionalisierung der europ¨aischen Gesellschaften’. H. Schilling, “Johannes Althusius und die Konfessionalisierung der Außenpolitik – oder: Warum gibt es in der Politica keine Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen?” in F. S. Carney, H. Schilling and D. Wyduckel (eds.), Jurisprudenz, Politische Theorie und Politische Theologie (Berlin 2004), p. 62. See also the illuminating study by M. Pohling, “Konfessionelle Deutungsmuster internationaler Konflikte um 1600 – Kreuzzug, Antichrist, Tausendj¨ahriges Reich” in Archiv f¨ur Reformationsgeschichte 93 (2002), p. 278–316.

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relations envisaged a change of international law from a universalist Christian (Catholic) system to an increasingly multi-polar interstate relationship in which states are perceived as juridically equal even if they face each other as confessional enemies. Neither the Emperor nor the Pope – even in purely theological matters – are granted pre-eminence in Gentili’s concept of interstate relations. Bodin claimed that previously the Pope’s prerogative as arbiter among Christian states had been symbolised in the Treaty of Tordesillas, but this was no longer the case.69 Confessional strife meant the time of Tordesillas was over. Making a similar point regarding the claims to universal leadership and arbitration by the Emperor, Gentili attacked imperial predominance over other sovereign states in his Regales Disputationes tres. De potestate Regis absoluta: ‘The deliberation that the emperor is lord of the whole world and that the remaining princes are subjects of the emperor by law, even if not de facto, is absolutely unfounded’.70 Bodin’s concept of the state and his distinctive understanding of sovereignty enabled a clear attribution of agency in interstate relations.71 Gentili applied this concept of agency and alleged to be the first to write on the laws of war. Book 1 of De Iure Belli opens with this assertion: ‘Great and difficult is the task in undertaking to write on the Law of War, a subject which is hidden in Nature’s inmost heart, which has manifold aspects, and is widely diffused. For this form of law is not assembled and given expression in the books of Justinian; otherwise we could readily refer to those works, or masters wiser than ourselves could direct us to them with no great difficulty. But those books do not discuss that variety of law, nor do any others in existence. ( . . . ) In fact, it does not appear to be 69

70

71

J. Bodin, Six Livres de la R´epublique (Paris 1583), p. 799: ‘ceste prerogative [as arbiter] fut gardee aux Papes entre les Princes Chrestiens’. See also H. Quaritsch, “Bodins Souver¨anit¨at und das V¨olkerrecht” in Archiv des V¨olkerrechts 17 (1977, 1978), p. 257–273. A. Gentili, Regales Disputationes tres. De potestate Regis absoluta (London 1605), p. 7: ‘illa disputatio est vanissima de imperatore domino totius mundi & princibus reliquis, qui imperatori per ius subsint, etsi de facto non subsint’. Stressing the importance of the influence of Bodin (who is not mentioned by Panizza in his significant essay cited above) complements rather than questions the impact of Machiavelli on Gentili’s thought. See also Panizza, “Il pensiero politico di Alberico Gentili”. Despite the importance of Machiavelli we identified for Gentili’s thought, it is remarkable that Gentili refers much less openly to Machiavelli than to Bodin in his works considered here. Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law, p. 239 had already drawn attention, albeit overstated, to the importance of Bodin for Gentili and claimed that ‘just as Bodin in France, he [Gentili] was the theoretical founder of absolutism in England’. Bodin also refers to Machiavelli in his work. He is critical and even dismissive of Machiavelli in his preface, but clearly changes his tone and appreciation of the Florentine in the later parts of his R´epublique. For an instructive essay on this relationship, see G. Cardascia, “Machiavell et Jean Bodin” in Biblioth`eque d’Humanisme et Renaissance III (1943), p. 129–167.

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the function either of the moral or of the political philosopher to give an account of the laws which we have in common with our enemies and with foreigners’.72 Gentili’s main focus from the outset was to explore and make readily available the laws which could regulate relations between different states, even when facing each other as enemies. What is evident from Gentili’s work is that – despite his admiration for Baldus and the Corpus iuris civilis – he envisioned a distinctive approach to interstate relations, one that is informed by Bodin’s Six livres de la R´epublique. The main aspect is that the sovereign states may well agree to observe certain laws, even stemming from the corpus iuris, but they do so of their own sovereign will and autonomy. It was the supreme prerogative of a sovereign to make laws for their territory and to be bound neither by their own laws nor by external constraints such as the ius gentium. Gentili draws on Bodin in the De Legationibus and the De Iure Belli and in some of his lesser known works. This is illustrated by his praise for the Frenchman in his Regales Disputationes tres. In the first disputation, De potestate Regis absoluta, he asserts that an absolute prince does not acknowledge any foreign jurisdiction over himself, citing Bodin more often in this work than even Bartolus or Baldus73 as one of the leading authorities on sovereignty.74 He calls Bodin ‘most learned’ or ‘knowledgeable’ and refers to him as the most relevant authority in defining the sovereignty of a prince.75 De potestate Regis absoluta is less concerned with interstate 72

73

74

75

Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 3. See also Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 351, where he claimed that the Roman ‘law code ( . . . ) persists to the present day even now that the empire has been extinguished and penetrates into all parts of the world, even those parts to which Roman arms did not reach’. In light of the discussion earlier, I do not believe that one can read this as evidence that Gentili wanted to make the point that Roman law provided the essential stipulations for the law of nations. Bartolus de Sassoferrato (approx. 1314–1357) taught law in Pisa and Perugia and was one of the best known commentators on the Corpus iuris civilis. Baldus de Ubaldis (1327–1400) was a pupil of Bartolus and himself an equally important postglossator, who taught at Bologna, Perugia and Pavia. Baldus is the most frequently cited legal authority for Gentili in his main work De Iure Belli libri tres. Cf. J. Dove Wilson, “Baldus de Ubaldis” in The Yale Law Journal 12 (1902), p. 8–20. See Gentili, De potestate Regis absoluta, p. 8f. Given the abundance of the sources cited in Gentili’s works, I do not intend to suggest that Bodin was one of the more dominant authorities to whom Gentili referred. Gentili’s use and treatment of earlier writers is complex and not always coherent. However, it is not only legitimate, but also a productive interpretation of Gentili’s argument, to single out a particular author, especially if we agree with Kinch Hoekstra’s assertion that ‘Gentili’s text is both his own creation and a web composed almost entirely of the thoughts of others, and an assessment of what belongs to Gentili will get nowhere if it starts from the assumption that nothing is his that he takes from others’. K. Hoekstra, “Gentili, Thucydides, and the Justification of Pre-emption” in Alberico Gentili. La salvaguardia dei beni culturali nel diretto internazionale (Milan 2008), p. 116. Gentili, De potestate Regis absoluta, p. 18: ‘Bodin´u peritissimum’.

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relations than with the issue of the regal prerogative power or sovereignty, along the Bodinian lines, perceiving the prince as legibus solutus.76 Despite the fact that the Corpus iuris civilis was the foundation of Gentili’s legal training,77 he makes it clear from the beginning of De Iure Belli that the Corpus iuris civilis is insufficient for elaborating on international law. What is more, he cites Bodin as the authority who highlighted this in the first place: ‘What ( . . . ) shall I say of the modern interpreters of Justinian’s law, whom Jean Bodin justly declares to be wholly ignorant of this law of war. ( . . . ) So unsuitable are they and so lacking in clearness, to say nothing of the fact that these books contain a great deal which relates not to war and the laws of war with reference to an enemy, but to military science and the laws relating to our own citizens and soldiers. I find no fault in those learned men for that reason; but I repeat the statement, that hardly any knowledge of military law can be gained from the law of Justinian alone. For the greatest students of Justinian, although thoroughly acquainted with all his law, were utterly ignorant of that subject’.78 Gentili grasped the importance of the Bodinian concept of sovereignty and employed it accordingly, but he also recognised its negative implications for achieving ordered relations between sovereign states. Gentili’s use of Bodin to analyse the emerging order of sovereign states is not without criticism: ‘I have no patience with the modern commentators, who in this particular criticize their predecessors, while they offer themselves as guides to be followed. I mean the above mentioned Bodin and Peter Faber, most distinguished jurists of the land of France. For if the earlier interpreters have gone astray in introducing into this subject a bald and often inappropriate discussion of civil law, surely these more modern commentators have likewise erred in giving us a bare recital of history. For because of the diversity and the contradictory nature of the examples, and also because of the weakness of the form of argument, which seems for the most part based on examples, one could not easily derive from this treatment any 76

77

78

See Gentili, De potestate Regis absoluta, esp. p. 8 and 10 and Bodin, R´epublique, p. 142. See also H. Quaritsch, Souver¨anit¨at: Entstehung und Entwicklung des Begriffs in Frankreich und in Deutschland vom 13. Jahrhundert bis 1806 (Berlin 1986), esp. p. 32–38 and D. Wyduckel, Princeps Legibus Solutus. Eine Untersuchung zur fr¨uhmodernen Rechts- und Staatslehre (Berlin 1979), esp. p. 13. B. P. Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England 1603–1641 a Political Study (Oxford 1973), esp. p. 97ff. and A. Sharp, “Alberico Gentili’s Obscure Resurrection as a Royalist in 1644” in Alberico Gentili l’ordine internazionale in un mondo a pi`u civilit`a (Milan 2004), p. 285–313, esp. 290. Also importantly and with different emphasis B. Straumann, “The Corpus iuris as a Source of Law between Sovereigns in Gentili’s Thought” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. by B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (Oxford 2010), p. 101–123. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 4.

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system of law, and certainly not one which is regarded as natural and definite’.79 In criticising the politiques, Gentili sets out an agenda for a system of law appropriate for dealing with interstate relations. Bodin’s concept of sovereignty is crucial, as it enables Gentili to exclude those who do not qualify as a sovereign state from consideration. The priority was to reassure sovereign states of the realistic and feasible potential for order and a law common to them all, even as enemies in war.

1.3 Pirates and Other Enemies Hors La Loi – The Untrustworthy Foes Following Bodin, Gentili asserts that ‘neither brigands nor pirates are entitled to the privileges of international law, since they themselves have utterly spurned all intercourse with their fellowmen and, so far as in them lies, endeavour to drag back the world to the savagery of primitive times. In that age, as you know, men passed their lives in the manner of wild beasts, and each one carried off what fortune offered to him as prey, trained to use his strength in accordance with his own impulses and to live for himself alone’.80 Gentili presents a state of nature scenario, antecedent to the notorious state of nature expounded by Hobbes: ‘a war with pirates has never been terminated by agreement or brought to an end by a treaty or peace, but the pirates have either saved their lives by victory, or have been conquered and compelled to die’.81 Bodin, Gentili and later Grotius82 all contend that states – despite being subject to no worldly authority – have an established framework of engaging with one another and of settling their conflicts. The first page of Bodin’s Six livres de la R´epublique asserts that ‘a Commonwealth may be defined as the rightly ordered government of a number of families; and of those things which are their common concern, by a sovereign power. ( . . . ) We say in the first place right ordering to distinguish a commonwealth from a band of thieves or pirates. With them one should have neither intercourse, commerce, nor alliance. Care has always been taken in well-ordered commonwealths not to include robber chiefs and their followers in any agreements in which honour is pledged, peace treated, war declared, frontiers defined, or the disputes of princes and sovereign 79 81 82

80 Gentili, On Embassies, p. 79. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 4. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 22. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, II–XVII–19, p. 893. Grotius refers explicitly to Cicero.

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lords submitted to arbitration’.83 Based on Bodin’s concept of sovereignty, Gentili identifies the legal status of the agents as all important in the sphere of international relations. Pirates and brigands – non-states – are excluded from international law as they do not hold the requisite legal, moral and political status as sovereign equals. They fall outside this framework and therefore do not enjoy the same privileged legal status. Gentili reiterated this position in his posthumously published Hispanicae Advocatio: ‘At this point I add that the question about pirates ( . . . ) ought to be considered different from our question about legal enemies. The practice, too, in the case of wounded wild beasts, a practice contrary to law, ought not to be extended to enemies. ( . . . ) To pirates and wild beasts no territory offers safety. Pirates are the enemies of all men and are attacked by all men with impunity’.84 Pirates pose a threat to the civilised world which has organised itself in states and thus lives under the rule of law. Moreover, as stated in De Iure Belli, ‘a state of war cannot exist with pirates and robbers. ( . . . ) There is also another reason why such men do not come under the law of war; namely, because that law is derived from the law of nations, and malefactors do not enjoy the privileges of a law to which they are foes. How can the law, which is nothing but an agreement and a compact, extend to those who have withdrawn from the agreement and broken the treaty of the human race. ( . . . ) Pirates are the common enemy of all mankind’.85 Gentili’s enemies of state therefore fall into two categories: first, there are sovereign states who engage in conflicts within the boundaries of international law. As such, they have the capacity to engage in international treaties and customs with their counterparts. Second, there are those who have set themselves outside society and laws, who are effectively out-laws and are perceived as an enemy to all humanity. No legal or political solution 83

84

Bodin, R´epublique, p. 1f.: ‘Republique est un droit gouvernement de plusieurs mesnages, et de ce qui eut est commun, avec puissance souveraine. ( . . . ) Nous avons dit en premier lieu, droit governement, pour la difference qu’il y a entre les Republiques, & les troupes de voleurs & pirates, avec lesquels on ne doit avoir part, ni commerce, ni alliance: comme il a est´e en toute Republique bien ordonner, quand il a est´e question de donner la foy, traitter la paix, denoncer la guerre, accorder ligues offensives ou defensives, borner les frontiers & decider les differences entre les Princes & Seigneurs souverains, on a y a iamais comprins les voleurs, ny leur suite’. For the English translation see J. Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, translated and selected by M. J. Tooley (Oxford 1967), p. 1. Where this selection provides a translation I have used it, otherwise the translations are my own. See also the English translation by Richard Knolles which first appeared in 1606. Bodin does not refer to Cicero here, but it seems clear that this argument stems from antiquity and Cicero was one of the leading authorities who held this view. Cf. Cicero, On Duties, p. 141: ‘For a pirate is not counted as an enemy proper, but is the common foe of all [sed communis hostis omnium]. There ought to be no faith with him, nor sharing of any sworn oath’. 85 Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 22. Gentili, Hispanicae Advocatio, p. 18.

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Pirates and Other Enemies Hors La Loi – The Untrustworthy Foes 37 was envisaged against an out-law enemy. They were denied recognition as a just enemy and war was waged until the ultimate destruction of those who had by their very nature of being pirates relinquished human society. The moral and juridical consequences of such exclusion are immediately felt in concrete political terms. For Gentili, the foundation of international law remained precarious, because it proved extremely challenging, if not impossible, to assert how transgressions of international law could be sanctioned. Within the tradition of the just war theory ‘the conception of just war as an act of punishment is very old, though neither the procedures nor the forms of punishment have ever been firmly established in customary or positive international law’.86 The attempt to justify the concept of punishment between sovereign states at war encountered fundamental problems.87 For the editors of Gentili’s De armis Romanis ‘Gentili’s relatively rich natural legal order is not exclusively based on prudential norms of utility but depends on a more substantive moral vision [. This] is further attested by his arguments for subjective natural rights, including a natural right to punish. Gentili’s treatment of punishment as a just cause for war – present in De iure belli and further affirmed in The Wars of the Romans – necessarily presupposes an objective natural-law framework of norms against which the claims of punishment can be measured and justified’.88 However, would Gentili’s concept of the sovereign state not preclude such a notion of punishment? His assertion that ‘there cannot be judicial processes between supreme sovereigns or free peoples unless they themselves consent, since they acknowledge no judge or superior’89 seems to suggest this.

86 87

88 89

M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York 1977), p. 62. Gentili already provided a theoretical discussion and conceptualisation of the notion of punishment among sovereign states. Hobbes was the early modern philosopher who forcefully reformulated this problem. But as we will see in Chapter 3.2, Hobbes’s discussion of punishment also turned out to be problematic, though for very different reasons. For an important study on the relationship between Gentili and Hobbes, see C. Galli, “Alberico Gentili e Thomas Hobbes. Crisi dell’umanesimo e piena modernit`a” in Filosofia Politica XXI (2007), p. 213–227. Interestingly, Kant argued with regard to the issue of punishment among sovereign states, clearly following Hobbes’s insights, that ‘a punitive war ( . . . ) between states is not thinkable (since there is no relation of superior to an inferior between them)’. I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace” in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, ed. by M. J. Gregor (Cambridge 1996), p. 320. See also P. Schr¨oder, “‘Irgend ein Vertrauen . . . muss . . . u¨ brig bleiben’ – The Idea of Trust in Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy” in Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, ed. by S. R. Palmquist (Berlin 2010), p. 391–398. Kingsbury and Straumann (eds.), “Introduction”, p. XXIVf. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 15.

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If the ‘sovereign has no earthly judge’90 , it is problematic that Gentili used a notion of punishment in his international political thought.91 However, his concept of punishment is not based on natural law92 , but on the contingent outcome of war. When punishment is employed, it becomes instrumental to maintaining security for the victorious party. As a matter of fact, Gentili did not believe that war could be abandoned; on the contrary, for him – as for Machiavelli – war was an integral part of human history. His concept of sovereignty entails that without a superior authority to act as judge ‘it was inevitable that the decision between sovereigns should be made by arms’.93 The outcome of this decision puts the victor in the position to punish the vanquished. This is a peculiar use of punishment. In both books of De armis Romanis the notion of punishment remained problematic for Gentili.94 On the rare occasion when Gentili refers to punishment in De armis Romanis, he uses irony, rather than advancing a developed argument: ‘We are not at fault when we exact punishment from the wicked and the harmful. ( . . . ) Moreover, we are also the judge in the cases; while in other situations it does sometimes happen that we play these 90 91 92

93 94

Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 15. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 305. Cf. Panizza, “Political Theory and Jurisprudence”, p. 238f. Gentili maintained, as Cicero, that there exists a law of nations ‘which is in use among all the nations of men, which native reason has established among all human beings, and which is equally observed by all mankind. Such a law is natural law’. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 8. Although Gentili mentions right reason and natural law as means to support interstate relations, these concepts do not hold the same status in his argument as with Grotius and earlier natural law theorists such as Vitoria. As argued throughout this chapter, the status of Gentili’s use of natural law is ambivalent. Tuck, War and Peace, p. 108 seems to be misled by his own hypothesis. Despite the obvious similarities between Grotius and Gentili, Tuck does not appreciate the fundamental differences on which both men base their argument, nor does he accept the influence on Grotius of Vitoria and Su´arez. See Chapter 3.1. Among those who put a much stronger emphasis on Gentili’s reliance on natural law, see in particular J. Waldron, “Ius gentium: A Defence of Gentili’s Equation of the Law of Nations and the Law of Nature” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. by B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (Oxford 2010), p. 283–296. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 15. The defence of the Roman conquest and imperialism in Book 2 should be read not as an attempt to show that justice prevails in interstate relations, as argued by Kingsbury and Straumann, but as questioning the expansionist wars of the Romans, if one is willing to perceive the ironic undertone of these claims. ‘The world was defeated by us [the Romans] in such a manner that it was to its advantage to have been defeated, so that it could be ruled by the scepter of ours. ( . . . ) The virtue of this city is the good luck of the world’. Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 349. See also A. Blane and B. Kingsbury, “Punishment and the ius post bellum” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. by B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (Oxford 2010), p. 241–265. This article advances a slightly more cautious argument and poses several fundamental questions. Most important to our discussion is the almost Hobbesian point, p. 244, that ‘if law is conceptualized as defining the circumstances for legitimate exercise of public coercive power, is it coherent to have a concept of international law without some account of judgement and punishment?’

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Pirates and Other Enemies Hors La Loi – The Untrustworthy Foes 39 two roles, in war we always do so. And a judge is said to have punished justly when he has brought it about that the one who has done wrong would not afterwards dare anything else of the sort and others might be slower to injury’.95 If we take this argument at face value, a punitive war would be justified because it acts as a deterrent. The victorious party of the conflict would legitimately act as judge in its own case. This includes a moral judgement of the wickedness of the enemy as well as dispensation of appropriate punishment. Such ideas are difficult to reconcile with a conception of the legal equality of sovereign states and the theory of a just enemy derived from it. Not only is a concept of punishment between sovereign states at odds with Gentili’s core conception of political order among states, it also ignores the character of dialogue of De armis Romanis. The second book has to be seen as an immediate response to the first. The second book challenges the criticism of Roman expansion in the first book and only out of this overarching structure is it possible to arrive at Gentili’s final position. To take isolated parts at face value is problematic. Gentili refers to Carneades, though not by name, in his criticism of Roman claims of having waged a just war: ‘The city’s good luck is the world’s bad luck. ( . . . ) The just might of arms and just rule are for warding off slavery and injury and for the advantage of subjects. From this justice derives true good fortune. This justice (I am still speaking here of true, not simulated justice) the Roman state has never come to know ( . . . ). Cicero96 , you will say and contend that civil – that is cunning – justice existed in your state, but you will not persuade us that it was true, genuine justice, as Lactantius97 learnedly argues against you’.98 Punishment, it seems, is justified not only by virtue of the victor’s de facto power, but by the naive assumption that the just side always wins. But what if the unjust side were to win a war?99 The issue of punishment relates to the question of the enforceability of a law of nations. Gentili held ‘the firm belief that questions of war ought to be settled in accordance with the law of nations, which is the law of nature’100 , but did not develop a coherent natural law theory, simply asserting: ‘I regard 95 96 97 98 99

100

Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 267. Cf. Cicero, On the Commonwealth, Book III, esp. p. 59–68. As mentioned earlier, Lactantius’s Divine Institutions were the source for Gentili which taught him about parts of Cicero’s De republica and Carneades’s two speeches. Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 117f. Gentili’s discussion of punishment recognises that there are limits to the notion of justice within the international sphere of sovereign states. See also Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 81 where he specifically questions the justification of punishment as being unjust. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 5.

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it as established that some law of nature exists and that in accordance with it this subject of war should be discussed’.101 The problem is less to show that natural law exists, than to ensure agreement concerning how such law can be applied to interstate relations, and how it can bind princes and states. The ‘different and conflicting views’102 and interpretations of natural law make its application problematic in the international sphere. Could natural law arbitrate interstate conflict?103 Despite his commitment to an international law based on the laws of nature, Gentili was enough of a realist to recognise its precarious condition. Arbitration could only take place by mutual agreement of the contracting sovereign parties.104 Only if a balance of power between states was in place would there be an incentive to observe international laws.105 However, Gentili does not develop a full-fledged theory regarding the balance of power: rather, his concept of sovereignty suggests that states have to strive for some kind of equilibrium in order to avoid hegemony of a single power.106 Nor does he believe that all conflicts between states may be solved politically: if war among states cannot be avoided, such a war must be conducted under the framework of a law of war endorsed by rival sovereign states, where both states recognise each other as a just enemy with certain rights under this legal framework. ‘War is a just and public contest of arms’, where the warring parties are recognised as being on an equal legal footing. Chapter 2 of De Iure Belli opens with this definition: ‘hostis is a person with whom war is waged and who is the equal of his 101 102

103

104

105

106

Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 5. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 5. Interestingly, in the context of this discussion Gentili referred to the first book of his De armis Romanis, because he had also discussed these conflicting views there. This self-reference seems to suggest that the argument of Book 1 should not be dismissed too quickly. Cf. the translation of the 1612 edition which I use throughout – Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 6. De armis Romanis – was first published in 1599, by the same German publisher in the small town of Hanau who had published De Iure Belli in 1598. The prospect of a world sovereign was ruled out by Gentili. Indeed he warns explicitly that the Turks and the Spanish ‘are planning and plotting universal dominion’ over the rest of the European sovereign states. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 64. This is a concept discussed by Bodin, who perceived it as one of the greatest honours for a prince to be asked to act as arbiter among other contracting princes: ‘Qui est le plus baut poinct d’honeur qu’un Prince peut gainer, a` sc¸avoir d’estre esleu arbitre de paix entre les autres’. Bodin, R´epublique, p. 799. This concept was also discussed by Bodin: ‘En quoy il fut iug´e des plus sages, qu’il n’i a rien meilleur pour la seuret´e des estats, que la puissance des plus grands soit e´gal autant qu’il sera possible’. Bodin, R´epublique, p. 797. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 65: ‘Is not this even to-day our problem, that one man may not have supreme power and that all Europe may not submit to the dominion of a single man? Unless there is something which can resist Spain, Europe will surely fall. ( . . . ) No one’s sovereignty must ever on any account be allowed to grow so great, that it is not permitted to call in question even his manifest injustice’.

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Pirates and Other Enemies Hors La Loi – The Untrustworthy Foes

41

opponent’.107 This accords fully with Gentili’s assertion that ‘it is the nature of wars for both sides to maintain that they are supporting a just cause’.108 It is easy to say ‘just cause’, but as Gentili well knew ‘princes always allege some plausible reason for beginning their wars; although frequently they have no reason at all’.109 However, it remained to determine the status of the states which find themselves enemies. In the second book of De armis Romanis Gentili excluded enemies of Rome as just enemies on the grounds that they were rebels or pirates. It is here that the concept of trustworthiness returns as the critical element of the argument: ‘if we had given our word to these rebellious and criminal men, would we have kept it? Word is kept with legitimate enemies, not brigands’.110 As he argued in De Iure Belli, it is crucial to ‘distinguish that which ought always be distinguished: the law concerning a proper [videlicet a just] enemy [ius hostis iusti], and that concerning a rebel’.111 The distinction between those who are included in and those who are excluded from the framework of interstate relations raises the essential question: who is in the position to decide these matters? The particular insight of De armis Romanis – reflected in its dichotomous structure – is that, although contested, judgements must be made. One way forward consisted in assessing who could be trusted to belong to this framework. However, trustworthiness not only determines inclusion or exclusion, in Gentili’s theory it also constitutes a potentiality for political exploitation. The two books of De armis Romanis demonstrate the conflicting claims. In Book 1 the accuser of the Romans asks: ‘If the legal testimonies of the Greeks are so unreliable, are not their histories unreliable as well?’112 De armis Romanis asks who can provide the more trustworthy references of history and who has the better arguments for deciding about these conflicting interpretations. ‘Woe to you, Picenus [i.e. the accuser of the Romans in Book I]. Woe to your witnesses, those disgraces among historians, if the trustworthiness and authority of actual witnesses can be diminished by carpings like these of yours: “He’s a Roman citizen, therefore he’s flattering the Romans”’.113 This debate about the authority of differing 107 109 110 111 112 113

108 Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 31. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 12. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 34. Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 285. See also Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 277: ‘Jugurtha was a disloyal rebel, to whom the laws pertaining to a just war and a legitimate enemy were not owed’. Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 285. Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 11. See also ibid., p. 13: ‘Are we, forsooth, to trust Romans who speak out against the enemies of the Romans’. Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 127. In a similar vein history is disputed in Gentili, De armis Romanis, p. 121, 147, 157, 201, 269 and again p. 239: ‘Your case is a desperate one, Picenus, and your method

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interpretations of history not only seeks to ascertain the trustworthiness of the Romans, but ultimately whether their wars and conquests were justifiable. Taking up the idea he had found in Bodin, Gentili developed it for his own theory: ‘For the word hostis, “enemy”, while it implies equality, like the word “war” ( . . . ) is sometimes extended to those who are not equal, namely to pirates, proscribed persons and rebels; nevertheless it cannot confer the rights due to enemies, properly so called, and the privileges of regular warfare’.114 The argument would seem uncomplicated if the only group considered as out-laws were those robbing others in absolute defiance of the law, customs and property. However, Gentili’s argument becomes problematic in his applications of the concept. Firstly, against Indians, where ‘the Spaniards [waged a war] against violators of the law of nature and of common law, against cannibals, and monsters of lewdness. It is right to make war against pirates’.115 Secondly, against atheists, because ‘some kind of religion is natural, and therefore if there should be any who are atheists, destitute of any religious belief, either good or bad, it would seem just to war upon them as we would upon brutes. For they do not deserve to be called men, who divest themselves of human nature, and themselves do not desire the name of men. And such a war is a war of vengeance, to avenge our common nature’.116 Finally, against the Turks117 – the threat to Europe at the time118 – Gentili argued that the central issue was not to distinguish between the truths of Muslim and Christian beliefs, but rather to determine whether the Ottomans qualified as a trustworthy and just enemy – that is, an

114 115

116 117 118

of accusing is desperate. ( . . . ) Nor are you so stupid as to imagine that there will ever be anyone who will be converted to your position by these foolish histories’. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 25. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 124. Contrast this with Vitoria’s view, or with B. De Las Casas, A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies (London 2004), p. 70. See also A. Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man. The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge 1982), p. 67–108. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 125. It is here that Gentili makes the same point as Ribadeneyra as discussed earlier. Cf. Ribadeneyra, Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince, p. 251. Cf. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 332. See below for further discussion. An interesting discussion of the Turks in the early modern period is to be found in P. Piirim¨ae, “Russia, the Turks and Europe: Legitimations of War and the Formation of European Identity in the Early Modern Period” in Journal of Early Modern History 11 (2007), p. 63–86. See also M. D. Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam. Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe (Oxford 2008), W. Schulze, Reich und T¨urkengefahr im sp¨aten 16. Jahrhundert. Studien zu den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer a¨ ußeren Bedrohung (Munich 1978), V. Aksan and D. Goffman (eds.), The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire (Cambridge 2007), D. Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge 2002).

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Pirates and Other Enemies Hors La Loi – The Untrustworthy Foes 43 enemy who will observe certain rules and who will thus remain calculable to a certain degree: ‘War is not waged on account of religion, and war is not natural either with others or even with the Turks. But we have war with the Turks because they act as our enemies, plot against us, and threaten us. With the greatest treachery [my emphasis] they always seize our possessions, whenever they can. Thus we constantly have a legitimate reason for war against the Turks. We ought not break with them; no! We ought not to make war upon them when they are quiet and keeping the peace, and have no designs upon us; no! But when do the Turks act thus? Let the theologians keep silence about matters which is [sic] outside of their province’.119 With the Turks the issue was whether one could trust them, not whether their religious faith was true or false. Indeed, Turkish rule demonstrated a toleration of different religious faiths: ‘Are not’, as Gentili wrote in De Iure Belli, ‘Jews and Christians officially tolerated to-day under Turkish rule?’120 Gentili argued that Indians, atheists and Turks may not be considered just enemies; as all fall outside the established customs of states, there could be no basis for trust and mutual good faith. Gentili restricted the scope of his effort to establishing procedures to be upheld in the case of two states facing each other in war. Even when facing one another as enemies, states will – as long as they recognise each other as sovereign states – retain traces of understanding and trust, which help to uphold the rules of war. This is why one should not deal with the enemy too harshly, because one cannot anticipate ‘what becomes of good faith, which is the essence of the law of nations and of embassies’.121 Even if actual fighting has already ensued, such rules provide a means of curbing the worst effects of war. If there were no scope for good faith, all would be lost.122 Gentili’s legal and political theory rests on this cardinal assumption. All those who potentially undermine it, because they do not share in the fundamental values of the European states, are to be excluded from this system of equality between states. Gentili was unable to envisage more than a precarious binding force for the laws and customs he unearthed and systematised in his works. The 119

120 122

Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 56f. The reconstruction of Gentili’s argument developed here does therefore suggest at least the possibility of a different reading of his famous silete theologi. See the discussion regarding Diego Panizza’s argument above. 121 Gentili, On Embassies, p. 87. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 45. For the crucial importance of trustworthiness, see also P. Delholm, “Das Wagnis des Vertrauens” in A. Hirsch and P. Delhom (eds.), Denkwege des Friedens. Aporien und Perspektiven (Freiburg, Munich 2007), p. 334–361.

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all-important condition was to ensure as far as possible that ‘faithfulness, the most precious of possessions’123 was upheld in interstate relations. The laws of war could only be observed by both parties if there were reasonable grounds for mutual good faith. If one of them failed to do so, they would have no justifiable recourse to these laws, because ‘the laws of war are not observed towards one who does not himself observe them; one vainly implores the aid of the law who offends the law’.124 This explains why Gentili ‘when it comes to the Turks, [ . . . took] a one-sided, pro-Christian stance’ despite the fact that he was, of course, ‘well aware that there is often right on both sides in wars’.125 Although he realised that the Ottoman Empire could not be overlooked in any international ordering of states, he remained insistent that only states sharing a certain set of values were ultimately trustworthy enough to conduct their conflicts along the lines he proposed. Gentili’s analysis of existing theories such as reason of state, state sovereignty, self-interest of states, natural law and just war enabled him to reformulate the main features of early modern international political thought. He employed trust as a key concept in the process of organising interstate relations and mitigating conflict. 123 125

124 Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 272. Gentili, On the Law of War, p. 243. Kingsbury, “Confronting Difference”, p. 721.

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ch a p ter 2

Plans For Universal Peace in Europe – The Limits of a Balance of Power

By the time the famous Complaint of Peace by Erasmus was published in 1517, a new genre addressing utopian ideas for peace in Europe had emerged.1 These plans, or Grand Designs, were very different in character and intellectual quality to those which had dealt with this issue before.2 By the end of the sixteenth century – not least as a result of internal religious strife and war3 , as well as in reaction to the external threat posed by the Turks4 – political thinkers returned to the idea of a unified Europe.5 However, the idea of universal monarchy had lost its political currency.6 1

2

3 4

5

6

See D. Erasmus, The Complaint of Peace: To which is Added Antipolemus; or The Plea of Reason, Religion, and Humanity against War (Burlington 1813). I will not analyse this text here, but see J. Hutton, “Erasmus and France: The Propaganda for Peace” in Studies in the Renaissance 8 (1961), p. 103–127 and generally C. Augustijn, Erasmus: His Life, Works and Influence (Toronto 1995). For an overview see, for instance, M. Eliav-Feldon, “Grand Designs. The Peace Plans of the Late Renaissance” in Vivarium XXVII (1989), p. 51–76, E. Kaeber, Die Idee des europ¨aischen Gleichgewichts in der publizistischen Literatur vom 16. bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin 1907), S. GoyardFabre, La Construction de la paix ou Le travail de Sisyphe (Paris 1994) and N. Brieskorn and M. Riedenauer (eds.), Suche nach Frieden: Politische Ethik in der Fr¨uhen Neuzeit II (Stuttgart 2002). H. Schilling (ed.), Konfessioneller Fundamentalismus. Religion als politischer Faktor im europ¨aischen M¨achtesystem um 1600 (Munich 2007). Schulze, Reich und T¨urkengefahr, Aksan and Goffman (eds.), The Early Modern Ottomans, Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, A. C ¸ irakman, From the Terror of the World to the Sick Man of Europe. European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth (Oxford 2002) and A.C.S. Peacock (ed.), The Frontiers of the Ottoman World (Oxford 2009). See W. Janssen, “Friede” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland vol. 2, ed. by O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Koselleck (Stuttgart 1975), p. 563, W. D. Gruner (ed.), Deutschland und das Europ¨aische Gleichgewicht seit dem 18. Jahrhundert (Hamburg 1989), p. 11, J. B. Duroselle, L’id´ee de l’Europe dans l’histoire (Paris 1965), A Pagden (ed.), The Idea of Europe (Cambridge 2002). See Strohmeyer, “Ideas of Peace in Early Modern Models of International Order”, p. 65–80. The classic study on the concept of universal monarchy is still Bosbach, Monarchia Universalis. In contrast to Strohmeyer’s assertion, Bosbach shows how the concept of universal monarchy was still used up until the age of Louis XIV in political pamphlets. His study is, however, less concerned with the history of political thought. See Bosbach, p. 13. The question of a reunited Christendom was a very different one, and will only be explored in this study where it concerns the subject of political ideas of interstate relations.

45

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Theories which attempted to found interstate relations and peace in Europe upon the concepts of universal monarchy or the universal supremacy of the Catholic Church played a minor part in these new developments. Instead the idea of a balance of power as the best means to organise the European state system gained traction among political thinkers.7 One remarkable exception to this increasingly dominant mindset was Tomasso Campanella’s A Discourse Touching the Spanish Monarchy: Laying Down Directions and Practices Whereby the King of Spain May Attain to an Universal Monarchy, first composed in Latin around 1600 and published in English in 1654. Campanella (1568–1639) gave the most accomplished account of universal monarchy in the service of the Spanish Habsburgs. He draws as much on Botero’s reason of state arguments as on the idea of a Catholic universal Church. With no sign of modesty, he claims that he will have to keep certain arcana for himself as it would be wrong to relate these in writing and which he ‘shall reserve for the Kings own Ear’.8 Universal monarchy aimed for political power and dominion. To achieve it the king of Spain ought to make use of the Catholic faith so that ‘the Kingdom of Spain may be the more firmly incorporated into the Church, by having both Cardinals, and Popes themselves always true to their [Spain’s] Faction’.9 The Catholic Church was thus to be used to achieve the ambitious aim of universal monarchy. Indeed the ultimate aim was even loftier: ‘it is not sufficient that we have the Clergy on our side; but we are further to labour that at length we may get a Spaniard to be elected Pope, or rather, one of the house of Austria’.10 But Campanella’s aspirations did not end there. Just as Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar had used legislation on religious matters for their own political ends, the Spanish King should ‘make a Law, to be observed by all Christians; ( . . . ) that whensoever any People or Country shall forsake the Roman Religion, all Princes shall be bound, upon pain of forfeiting their Estates, to root out, and extirpate the same’.11 Dynastic and religious politics should go hand in hand in order 7 8

9 11

Apart from the literature mentioned further throughout this chapter, see also the overview discussion in Gelderen, “Universal Monarchy, the Rights of War and Peace and the Balance of Power”, p. 49–71. I quote from the 1660 English translation by Edmund Chilmead, which was published for polemical purposes by William Prynne under the title Thomas Campanella, an Italian Friar and Second Machiavel, His Advice to the King of Spain for Attaining the Universal Monarchy of the World (London 1660), p. 69. This edition will be considered again in the context of the polemics during the wars of Louis XIV, since it was clearly issued with the purpose of influencing the debates of the 1660s. See also Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 30: ‘the most secret Arcana, and Mysteries of State are not ( . . . ) to be made Publick’ and ibid., p. 10 and p. 141. 10 Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 25. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 42. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 46.

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to achieve the objective, universal monarchy, and all means necessary for this endeavour ought to be employed. Thus, ultimately, the Spanish king would also be in a position to defend and promote the Catholic faith. Campanella left no doubt that, for him, Catholicism and universality were aspects of the same enterprise. The Catholic faith must therefore be promoted by the Spanish monarch within Europe against the heretical Protestants, at Europe’s frontiers against the infidel Turks12 and beyond the old confines of the known world towards the New World.13 Thus, Catholicism at the same time reinforced the Spanish claim to universal monarchy and would profit if the Spanish were to succeed in attaining this claim. The Spanish king would not only rule over the world, but he would also be ‘dignified with the Title of the Catholick or Universal King’, which according to Campanella showed ‘plainly, that this is the will of the Holy Spirit’.14 Campanella’s vision for Spanish monarchy could hardly claim to be a serious attempt to pacify warring Europe. Universal monarchy had to be imposed against the resistance of other powers both within and beyond Europe. The time had passed for the assertion that peace could be achieved through some universal monarchy.15 The new attempts to reconceptualise an order of states in Europe mostly entailed juridical concepts formulated by Protestant jurisprudence that recognised the competing claims of sovereign states. Nevertheless, as natural law concepts were reworked, this emerging pattern of thought claimed its own universal validity (see Chapter 3).16 It is notably in France that we find a distinctive genre of contributions to discussions of European state order that accorded a particular role to trust, firstly by the Duke of Sully (1559–1641) in his Grand Design and secondly ´ eric de Cruc´e (1590–1648) in his Nouveau Cyn´ee. Whereas Sully by Em´ 12

13

14 15

16

Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 22: ‘He [the King of Spain] is the Chief Defender of Christian Religion, ( . . . ); calling together also the Christian Princes, to consult about the recovery of those Countreys they have lost, and are at this day in the hands of Hereticks, and Turks”. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 27: ‘the Indians had violated the Law of Nature, the King of Spain invading them upon the Interest of the Christian Religion, (whose Handmaid the Law of Nature is) their Country is his lawful possession’. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 25. To the best of my knowledge, a study which situates and analyses Campanella’s ideas about universal monarchy in the context of the seventeenth century or indeed the ensuing debates during the Thirty Years War is still lacking. It seems for this reason that Ernest Nys, one of the great scholars on this subject, asserts that the French contribution to the theories of international law is negligible and insignificant. E. Nys, Les Th´eories Politiques et le Droit International en France jusqu’au XVIIIe Si`ecle (Paris 1899), p. 111, see also p. 141.

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employed trust strategically as part of the register of political persuasion and a means to gain influence, Cruc´e was more concerned with authentic trust-building. While Sully was prepared to sow mistrust and make misleading promises in the name of a balance of power that would advance French interests, Cruc´e was concerned with establishing the political and institutional conditions necessary for a framework in which trust between sovereign states would be sustained.

2.1 Sully (1559–1641) and the Grand Dessein The Grand Design17 is known as the plan of the French King Henry IV, though it is only through the writings of the Duke of Sully that we know about this proposal to organise Europe into a new state system.18 Despite the fact that Sully’s plan is often compared to that presented later by the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, there are fundamental differences between them. Sully’s work is less important in terms of the theoretical analysis of the inherent problems of interstate relations. It does not have the intellectual rigour and theoretical depth of Saint-Pierre’s Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe (see Chapter 4.3). The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, however, fostered the impression that he was only reiterating what he had found in Sully. Indeed, in the third volume of his Projet, which was published in 1717, four years after the publication of the first two volumes, Saint-Pierre adds a headline throughout which reads Projet de Paix perp´etuelle d’Henri le Grand. This strategy, which aimed to encourage a positive response from the new rulers after Louis XIV’s death in 1715 towards the Projet, sustains the common belief that there is little difference between Sully’s Grand Design and the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s Projet.19 Given the prominence of the Grand Design in the intellectual landscape of seventeenth-century Europe, as well as in modern specialised scholarship, Sully’s writings are an appropriate starting point for discussing the emerging 17

18

19

I will quote from The Memoirs of the Duke of Sully during his Residence at the English Court; to which he was sent Ambassador from Henry IV of France, upon the Accession of King James the First. Containing An Account of his Negotiations ( . . . ) Also A Relation of the Political Scheme, commonly called the Great Design of Henry IV ( . . . ) (Dublin 1751); cited in the following as: Sully, Memoirs. Moreover to this edition, references will also be made to Sully, M´emoires de Maximilien de B´ethune, Duc de Sully, Ministre de Henri IV ( . . . ), 10 vols. (London 1778) where the relevant material is not found in the English edition. M. Ritter, “Die Memoiren Sullys und der grosse Plan Heinrichs IV.” in Abhandlungen der Historischen Klasse der K¨oniglichen Bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 11 (1870), p. 1–53 and A. V. Hartmann, Rˆeveurs de Paix? Friedenspl¨ane bei Cruc´e, Richelieu und Sully (Hamburg 1995). A comparative analysis of the plans of Sully and the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre does not exist. Further consideration to such a comparison will be given in Chapter 4.3.

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concern to provide plans for peace in Europe. Importantly, starting here will also allow us to examine the differences between this work and that of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre. In contrast with the latter, Sully did not engage with the existing political thought of his time. It seems, therefore, misleading to view those later authors who endeavoured to construct a European peace on the basis of a European federation as having failed to go beyond the fundamental proposals already put forward by Sully.20 On the contrary, what is striking about the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre is his grasp of the contemporary political-philosophical and juridical difficulties at hand. Rather than political philosophy, what Sully had to offer was political advice. In his Memoirs, the Grand Design of Henry IV played a much less important part than might be assumed, given its later prominence.21 The oft-reiterated assumption that the work concerns ‘a proposal for establishing a European federation of states with supranational institutions’22 is simply not corroborated by the textual evidence of the Memoirs. Mostly French and German scholars in the second half of the twentieth century, having their own political agenda, attempted to trace those early modern plans for European peace and union. One does not have to be a Eurosceptic to be wary of those ill-constructed – though understandable – intellectual endeavours to ground an emerging European Union in an early modern European consciousness. But this supposed pedigree of a ‘European conscience’23 is – despite the ways in which the terms Europe 20

21

22

23

For instance, K. Malettke, “Europabewußtsein und Europ¨aische Friedenspl¨ane im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert” in Francia 21 (1994), p. 88f. makes exactly such a claim and singles out the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre as one of those who did not reach beyond Sully’s concept. See, for instance, K. v. Raumer, Ewiger Friede. Friedensrufe und Friedenspl¨ane seit der Renaissance (Freiburg, Munich 1953), p. 61–88, Ritter, “Die Memoiren Sullys und der grosse Plan Heinrichs IV.”, p. 1–53, K. Malettke, Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Beitr¨age zum Einfluß franz¨osischer politischer Theorie, Verfassung und Außenpolitik in der Fr¨uhen Neuzeit (Marburg 1994), p. 263–275 and Hartmann, Rˆeveurs de Paix?, p. 95. Malettke, “Europabewußtsein und Europ¨aische Friedenspl¨ane”, p. 88: ‘Vorschl¨age zur Errichtung eines Bundes der Staaten Europas mit supranationalen Organen’. See also Raumer, Ewiger Friede, p. 75. See, for instance, as early examples A. Saitta, Dalla Res Publica Christiana agli Stati uniti di Europa. Sviluppo dell’idea pacifista in Francia nei Secoli XVII-XIX (Rome 1948), Raumer, Ewiger Friede, B. Voyenne, Histoire de l’id´ee europ´eenne (Paris 1952), H. Gollwitzer, Europabild und Europagedanke: Beitr¨age zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts (Munich 1951) and F. Cardot, “La conscience europ´eenne au XVe et au XVIe si`ecle” in Francia 8 (1980), p. 553–555. See also the essays in A. Buck (ed.), Der Europagedanke (T¨ubingen 1992) or recently J. Elvert and J. Nielsen-Sikora (eds.), Leitbild Europa? Europabilder und ihre Wirkungen in der Neuzeit (Stuttgart 2009). Among the few studies in English on the subject, see in particular D. Hay, Europe, the Emergence of an Idea (Edinburgh 1957) and H. D. Schmidt, “The Establishment of Europe as a Political Expression” in The Historical Journal IX (1966), p. 172–178.

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and European were put to political use in seventeenth-century writings – at best anachronistic.24 What Sully narrates in his Memoirs is a plan for how best to conduct French foreign policy with the aim of forming an alliance against the Habsburgs.25 Campanella’s advice to the Spanish monarchy serves as an interesting counterpart to Sully’s political plans, as the latter’s perception of the potential threats posed by the Habsburgs and his political ambitions are mirrored in Campanella’s text. The wider context in which Sully’s proposal could be better situated can be seen in other, earlier, tracts which offered advice to the French crown on foreign policies. One particular writer might be singled out here, as he was not only, like Sully, a Huguenot, but also proposed strikingly similar ideas. Philippe de Mornay, Seigneur du Plessis (1549–1603), was one of the influential leaders of the Huguenot cause. He was so renowned in France that he was known as the ‘Pope of the Calvinists’, and the infamous Vindicae contra Tyrannos are still to this day attributed to his pen.26 Most remarkable in our context is the advice he provided to King Henry III in his 1584 Discours au Roy Henry III sur les moyens de diminuer l’Espagnol. For Mornay it was either mutual fear or esteem that maintained peace between the Habsburgs and the French monarchs. Whether there was peace or war among the Christian states depended on these two great powers. If this equilibrium was unsettled to France’s disadvantage, she would no longer be in a position to defend her legitimate interests. Mornay used the word ‘balance’ here to describe the 24

25

26

Instructive and at the same time conveniently summarising the differences between British and continental European scholarly approaches in this area is P. Burke, “Did Europe Exist before 1700?” in History of European Ideas 1 (1980), p. 21–29. Also critical of these endeavours to help create a European conscience (Europabewußtsein) by historical studies is O. Asbach, Europa – Vom Mythos zur Imagined Community? Zur historischen Semantik ‘Europas’ von der Antike bis ins 17. Jahrhundert (Hanover 2010). See E. Thuau, Raison d’Etat et pens´ee politique a` l’´epoque de Richelieu (Paris 2000), p. 287: ‘Henri IV semble avoir un instant envisag´e de faire valoir ses droits sur le trˆone imp´erial [i.e. of the German Holy Roman Empire]. Ce projet, Sully en nie l’existence ( . . . ). Or Sully avait e´t´e en 1600 partisan de la candidature royale. Mais l’opinion n’´etait pas favorable et il semble avoir voulu dans ces M´emoires effacer ce souvenir’. See also G. Zeller, “Les rois de France candidats a` l’Empire” in Revue historique 173 (1934), p. 237–311 and p. 457–534. Interestingly this aspect features already in Philippe de Mornay’s proposal, which is further discussed. Mornay, when giving his advice on how to weaken the Habsburgs, clearly states that these preparations will one day re-establish the imperial dignity of the French crown. P. de Mornay, “Discours au Roy Henry III sur les moyens de diminuer l’Espagnol” in Memoires de Messire Philippes de Mornay (Paris 1624), p. 275: ‘Ce seroit un preparatif pour remettre un jour l’Empire en la Maison de France’. See R. Darricau, “Duplessis-Mornay” in Dictionnaire du Grand Si`ecle, ed. by F. Bluche (Paris 1990), p. 509. As discussed in Chapter 1, the authorship of the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos remains problematic and controversial.

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desirable political equilibrium.27 This might be one of the first political texts to use the idea of a balance of power in the context of European interstate relations. Since France was weakened by its civil wars, Mornay suggested that the ‘health, tranquillity and union of our State’ must be re-established in order to achieve the necessary ‘concord and discipline’.28 He was more concerned with the civil strife in France than with the foreign relations of the kingdom. However, the political pressures engendered by the international context allowed this Huguenot to urge his Catholic king to strive for peace and unity within the realm.29 Once this has been achieved, he argued that two main strategies ought to be pursued to counter ‘the limitless ambitions of the House of Habsburg’.30 Firstly, the French crown ought ‘to form a powerful league against this grandeur of Spain’.31 Elizabeth of England was the most important and obvious ally for such a scheme, but Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands were also mentioned. Secondly, France should attempt to exploit the internal struggles and difficulties of the Habsburg Empire. It is especially within the German Holy Roman Empire, he argued, that France would find allies among the Protestant Princes. France should therefore immediately take advantage of these internal conflicts and support those in opposition to the Habsburgs.32 These central features of Mornay’s proposal would be reiterated by Sully. Given the parallels between the two authors’ approaches, Sully’s motivations for writing the Grand Design should be re-evaluated. Because the Grand Design triggered interest among Sully’s contemporaries and modern scholars alike, it was often assumed that the ideas contained within it also played a prominent role in his Memoirs. The latter was written after Sully had retired from public life in January 1611, following his loss of political office and influence after the assassination of Henry IV by the Catholic radical Franc¸ois Ravaillac on 14 May 1610. This was a year in which the threat of a Europe-wide war became extremely serious, with the volatile situation of tension between the militarised power blocs of the Habsburgs and their allies on the one side, and the French and English crowns and their allies – notably the United Provinces and the Protestant Union of 27 29 30 31 32

28 Mornay, “Discours au Roy”, p. 271. Cf. Mornay, “Discours au Roy”, p. 271. See H. Daussy, Les Huguenots et le Roi. Le combat politique de Philippe Duplessis-Mornay (1572–1600) (Geneva 2002). Mornay, “Discours au Roy”, p. 272: ‘l’ambition disreglee de la Maison d’Autriche’. Mornay, “Discours au Roy”, p. 272: ‘faire une puissante ligue contre cette grandeur d’Espagne’. See Mornay, “Discours au Roy”, p. 274f.

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the German estates – on the other, provoking an intense pamphlet war between the blocs. The conflict over the heritage of J¨ulich-Cleve, right at the Dutch border, became the pretext for Henry IV and his allies to go to war. Only the king’s untimely death caused this project to be aborted and allowed the Austrian Habsburgs to confine this conflict regionally and resolve it in a way beneficial to their interests. Under the reign of Henry’s widow, Maria di Medici, France once again experienced internal strife and as a result returned to holding a minor position in the European struggle for power.33 It was only once Richelieu took office again in April 1624 that French politics challenged Habsburg Spain.34 The guiding principles of French politics were not determined by confessional interests, but by reason of state and by France’s well-calculated self-interest. Following the Peace of Prague, the French crown’s secret support of the Protestant Swedish army evolved into the open declaration of war against Philip IV in May 1635.35 Consequently, the propaganda and pamphlet war intensified once more.36 With the declaration of war, France now had to formulate its war aims. Richelieu sought not only an advantageous peace for France, but was also interested in establishing a new and lasting order for Europe in which France would play a decisive part.37 It is argued that it was in this context that Sully tried to regain some of the influence he had enjoyed as advisor to Henry IV.38 And indeed, he could draw on the experience and first-hand knowledge he had 33 34 35

36

37

38

See also H. Schilling, Aufbruch und Krise. Deutschland 1517–1648 (Berlin 1988), p. 412. During the short reign of Maria di Medici, France had pursued a different policy, trying to emphasise the common interests of the two Catholic crowns. See H. Weber, “Vom verdeckten zum offenen Krieg. Richelieus Kriegsgr¨unde und Kriegsziele 1634/35” in K. Repgen (ed.), Krieg und Politik 1618–1648 (Munich 1988), p. 203–217 and D. Parrott, Richelieu’s Army. War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642 (Cambridge 2001), p. 110–163. See B. Klesmann, Bellum Solemne. Formen und Funktionen europ¨aischer Kriegserkl¨arungen des 17. Jahrhunderts (Mainz 2007), p. 232–235, who has an important discussion of the intensified propaganda in the context of the declaration of war. Klesmann also lists here a wide range of contemporary sources which document this phenomenon. On Richelieu’s foreign policy and his plans for a European peace settlement, see in particular H. Weber, “Une paix sˆure et prompte. Die Friedenspolitik Richelieus” in H. Duchhardt (ed.), Zwischenstaatliche Friedenswahrung in Mittelalter und Fr¨uher Neuzeit (K¨oln 1991), p. 111–129, K. Malettke, “Richelieus Außenpolitik und sein Projekt kollektiver Sicherheit” in P. Kr¨uger (ed.), Kontinuit¨at und Wandel in der Staatenordnung der Neuzeit. Beitr¨age zur Geschichte des internationalen Systems (Marburg 1991), p. 47–68, Hartmann, Rˆeveurs de Paix?, esp. p. 104f., J. Wollenberg, Richelieu. Staatsr¨ason und Kircheninteresse. Zur Legitimation der Politik des Kardinalpremier (Bielefeld 1977), p. 60 and W. F. Church, Richelieu and Reason of State (Princeton 1972), p. 287–297. Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 162 challenges to a certain extent, if only implicitly, the interpretation – as put forward by Malettke and Weber – of Richelieu’s foreign policy as an attempt to create a system of collective security in Europe. Thus, for instance, already Raumer, Ewiger Friede, p. 74f. and following him Hartmann, Rˆeveurs de Paix?, p. 33 and Malettke, Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, p. 265.

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gained during those years. It also made sense that he would have presented his ideas as original and unique insights.39 The majority of the Memoirs was written in 1617, but it seems more than likely that the parts containing the Grand Design were not written until the 1630s.40 What Sully presented as Henry IV’s plan to reorganise and pacify Europe was a response to the political context of that period. An alternative reading to the dominant interpretation of Sully’s motivations and intentions is thus appropriate. Despite his repeated claims in the Memoirs that Henry IV is the author of the Grand Design, there can be no doubt that Sully was behind the scheme as it was presented there and hence as it is now known. The Grand Design could hope for a more favourable reception if it had been conceived by the monarch and not by one of his advisors, which might explain why Sully carefully crafted the image that Henry IV had approached him to disclose his plan.41 At the same time, this posture allows Sully to adopt an initial stance of scepticism towards the Grand Design, arguing that only the strength of the argument and the subtlety of the plan convinced him to change his mind. This could be a further strategy to pre-empt any criticism that such a plan was a mere chimera, patently utopian and unrealistic. As Sully begins by approaching this plan critically, raising all possible objections, he can avert the charge that it was wishful thinking. ‘I had been very far from thinking seriously about it’, he claims. ‘If by Accident it came into my Thoughts for a Moment, the first Aspect of the Design, which supposed a Reunion of all the different States of Europe; immense Expences, at a time when France, could scarce supply her own Necessities; a Concatenation of Events, which to me appeared infinite: These were Considerations which had always made me reject the Thought, as vain. I even apprehended there was some Illusion in it’.42 Sully’s stance of harbouring reservations about Henry IV’s plan thus operates on two levels to foster a positive response to the Grand Design. Firstly, it gives the plan itself royal dignity and clout, and secondly, it allows 39 40

41

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Ritter, “Die Memoiren Sullys und der grosse Plan Heinrichs IV.”, p. 32f. claims that parts of the Memoirs are obviously fraudulent and have no more value than literary fiction. For discussion of the authorship and dating of the Grand Design one has still to rely on older studies. See in particular Ritter, “Die Memoiren Sullys und der grosse Plan Heinrichs IV.”, p. 36, C. Pfister, “Les ‘Economies Royales’ de Sully et le Grand Dessein de Henri IV” in Revue historique LIV (1894), p. 300–324 and notably T. K¨ukelhaus, Der Ursprung des Planes vom ewigen Frieden in den Memoiren des Herzogs von Sully (Berlin 1893). Sully, Memoirs, p. 23: ‘I remember, the first Time the King spoke to me of a political System, by which all Europe might be regulated and governed as one great Family, I scarce paid any Attention to what he said’. Sully, Memoirs, p. 23.

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Sully to pre-empt potential criticism while nurturing the notion that he was only prepared to explore realistic ideas which would be in France’s self-interest.43 This ploy appears when he relates how Henry IV managed to convince him of the Grand Design. ‘Strongly prejudiced in this Opinion, I used my utmost Efforts to undeceive Henry; who, on his side, surprised not to find me in his Sentiment in any one Point, immediately undertook and readily succeeded in convincing me, that my thus indiscriminately condemning all Parts of his Project ( . . . ) could proceed from nothing but strong Prejudices. I could not refuse, at his Sollicitations, to use my Endeavours to gain a thorough Comprehension of it. I formed a clearer Plan of it in my Mind; ( . . . ) I studied all its Proportions and Dimensions ( . . . ), and I discovered in them a Regularity and mutual Dependence, of which ( . . . ) I had not been at all sensible. The benefit which would manifestly arise from it to all Europe, was what most immediately struck me, as being, in effect, the plainest and most evident’.44 All of the passages in the Memoirs in which it is claimed that Henry is the author of the Grand Design and that he tried to convince Sully of its merits are purely fictional, motivated by Sully’s underlying need to bolster acceptance of the Grand Design, as it was offered for the first time to the leading French political class.45 This allowed Sully to create the fiction that he ‘was the first to recall the King to his Engagements, and sometimes to convince him by those very Arguments which he himself had taught’ him.46 Henry never intended to go as far in his foreign policy as the Grand Design suggests.47 The credibility of Sully’s Memoirs was doubted on different grounds by Moritz Ritter48 , who questioned whether they can be read as a reliable source for an understanding of the foreign policy of Henry IV. As the aim of the present study is to scrutinise the role of trust in the different approaches in the conceptualisation of a new order among European states, 43

44 45 46 47

48

Malettke, Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, esp. p. 263–275 does not attempt to analyse the underlying strategies of Sully’s plan. He only perceives and discusses the Grand Design as an early manifestation of ‘a system of collective security’ (p. 275). Such an interpretation tends to be equally anachronistic as his argument about the ‘European conscience’ discussed earlier. Sully, Memoirs, p. 24. The first publication of two volumes appeared in 1638 under the title M´emoires des sages et royales Oeconomie d’Estat, domestique, politiques et militaires de Henry le Grand ( . . . ). Sully, Memoirs, p. 25. These questions were already sufficiently dealt with in the older literature. See notably Pfister, “Les ‘Economies Royales’ de Sully et le Grand Dessein de Henri IV” and K¨ukelhaus, Der Ursprung des Planes vom ewigen Frieden. M. M. Martin, “Sully, Henri IV et l’organisation de l’Europe” in Revue des Deux Mondes 20 (1958), p. 677–689 rather unconvincingly challenges this view. Ritter, “Die Memoiren Sullys und der grosse Plan Heinrichs IV.”, p. 7.

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it is not essential here to analyse to what extent Sully indeed reflected his king’s plans and intentions. However, even if Sully used the Memoirs to present himself in the best possible light – his self-aggrandisement does not avoid some pretentious and embarrassing formulations49 – the Grand Design is taken here as a political text which addressed European interstate relations. As Sully states himself, ‘the Hatred against Spain, ( . . . ) is the great and common Motive by which these Powers [i.e. the monarchies of France, England, Denmark and Sweden] are animated. Where is the Prince, in the least jealous of his Glory, who would refuse to enter into an Association, wherein would be seen four such Kings, as those of France, England, Sweden, and Denmark, closely united? It was a Saying of Elizabeth’s, that nothing could resist these four united Powers. These Truths being supposed, it only remains to examine, by what Means the House of Austria [i.e. Habsburg] may be reduced to the sole Monarchy of Spain; and the Monarchy of Spain to Spain only. These Means consist either in Address or Force’.50 From the textual evidence of the Memoirs, the motive for Sully’s plan was not to create some kind of European federation, inspired by a ‘European conscience’51 , but to secure French power which in turn would ensure security and peace in Europe. These plans for a powerful alliance, which would allow the French to match Spain’s superior military might, depended, Sully felt, largely on the English crown. His analysis appears to be re-enforced by the fact that Campanella believed that the greatest threat to the Spanish claim to universal monarchy would come from France and Henry IV. For Campanella there could be no doubt ‘that there is no Christian Kingdome, that is more able to oppose, and put a stop to the growing of the Spanish Monarchy, then France’.52 It was for this reason that an alliance between the French and the English needed to be avoided at all costs. Indeed, using Henry IV’s conversion to Catholicism53 , Campanella was able to use religious politics to further his goals of Spanish dominance, suggesting 49

50 51 52 53

See, for example, Sully, Memoirs, p. 36: ‘Would any one believe, that Henry, in his whole Council, could not find one Person besides myself, to whom he could, without Danger, disclose the whole of his Designs? and that all the Respect due to him, could scarce restrain those who appeared most devoted to his Service, from treating what, with the greatest Circumspection, he did entrust them with, as wild and extravagant Chimeras?’ Sully, Memoirs, p. 182. See again Malettke, “Europabewußtsein und Europ¨aische Friedenspl¨ane”, p. 92 and following him with a more descriptive attitude Hartmann, Rˆeveurs de Paix?, p. 90–96. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 144. Campanella urges the Spanish king to ‘perswade the Pope, that the King of France hath a purpose of Assisting the Hereticks’. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 151.

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that the Pope should be persuaded to ‘interdict the King of France the contracting of any League, or Friendship, either with the Queen of England, or with any other Hereticks’.54 Plans for a French alliance with England were thus, unsurprisingly, perceived by the Habsburg camp as the greatest threat to their political ambitions and claims. In this context, James I’s succession to the English throne was of the utmost importance, as ‘the Death of Elizabeth ( . . . ) gave so violent a Shock to Henry’s grand Design, as had like to have made him abandon all Hopes of its Success. He nevertheless attempted to remedy the fatal Effects apprehended from it, by endeavouring to inspire her successor, King James, with all her Sentiments in regard to it. And for this Purpose he resolved to send me Ambassador to the English Court’.55 Sully relates in great detail the precautions taken in deciding how to proceed so as not to raise the suspicions of the newly crowned English king. And he makes it unambiguously clear that ‘the principal Object of these Instructions [given to Sully by Henry IV for his ambassadorship to England] had always been a close Alliance between France and England, against Spain’.56 Again, the contrast with Campanella is illuminating. The latter was writing at a time when Elizabeth was still alive and the succession of James to the English throne was still only an event to be anticipated upon the queen’s death. Campanella argues that the Spanish should endeavour to sow discord between the English and Scots, as well as among the English nobility and between the parliament and the court: ‘the time now draweth on, that after the death of the said Queen Elizabeth, who is now very old, the Kingdom of England must fall into the hand of their Ancient and continual Rivals, the Scots’.57 The Spanish monarch should promise the different interested parties in England ‘(no one of them knowing anything what is said to the other) all the possible aids that can be from Spain, for the restoring of them to their Inheritances, Legally descending down to them from their Ancestours; and undertake to effect this for them, if not as to the whole 54 55

56

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Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 151. Sully, Memoirs, p. 74. See notably G. E. Aylmer, The Struggle for the Constitution 1603–1689 (London 1963), p. 11: ‘The most important fact about the succession of King James I on the death of Queen Elizabeth in the spring of 1603 is that it was peaceful’. Sully, Memoirs, p. 87. As mentioned in the introduction, I will not pursue the diplomatic and political history in this study other than where the context demands some clarification. On Henry IV see notably M. M. L. Saint-Ren´e Taillandier, Henri IV avant la messe (Paris 1934) and M. M. L. Saint-Ren´e Taillandier, Le cœur du roi. Henri IV apr`es la messe (Paris 1934). A new comparative study on Henry IV and Elizabeth is still a desideratum – E. Paranque is preparing a PhD thesis on The Rhetoric of Monarchy: A Comparison of France and England (1567–1603). But see also J. B. Black, Elizabeth and Henry IV (Oxford 1914). Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 158.

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Kingdome, yet at least to some part of it’.58 The aim, Campanella does not fail to stress over and over again, ought to be ‘that the seeds of a continual War betwixt England and Scotland will be sown; in so much that neither Kingdome shall have any leisure to work any disturbance to the Spanish Affaires’.59 Campanella suggests pursuing an opposite path in order to achieve Spanish aims: counteracting French and English plans against Spain. He urges the Spanish king to ‘send privately to King James of Scotland, and promise him, that He [the Spanish king] will assist him to the utmost of his Power in his getting possession of the Kingdome of England, upon this condition; viz, that he shall either restore there again the Catholick Religion60 ; ( . . . ) or at least, that he shall not annoy, or in anyway disturbe the said Spanish Fleet’.61 The competitive courting of the English as part of the struggle for hegemony between the French and the Habsburgs becomes clear in Campanella, advocating the Spanish interest, as much as in Sully, advocating the French interest. False promises played as large a role in these endeavours as straightforward bribery did. Sully’s frustration with France’s inability to make headway in forming an alliance with the English against the Habsburgs under the reign of King James is made clear on several occasions in his Memoirs. He relates, for instance, how he had to find his way through the labyrinth of competing interests pursued by the various factions at the English court, which ‘was full of Suspicion, Mistrust, Jealousy, secret and even public Discontent’.62 He does not shy away from employing contemporary French prejudices against the English: ‘It is certain the English hate us; and this Hatred is so general and inveterate, that one would almost be tempted to number it among their natural Dispositions. It is undoubtedly an Effect of their Arrogance and Pride; for no Nation in Europe is more haughty and disdainful, nor more conceited in an Opinion of its superior Excellence’.63 One result of such English stubbornness is that it is, according to Sully, in the French interest to achieve a position of independent power and thus avoid the necessity of relying on an ally who ‘if we examine what they call Maxims of State, we shall discover in them only the Laws of Pride itself, adopted by Arrogance and Indolence’.64 What he advocates most prominently is not a proposal for some kind of European federation, but a policy informed by France’s proper self-interest.65 58 60 61 63 65

59 Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 160. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 159. On the religious conflicts in England, see Aylmer, The Struggle for the Constitution, p. 40–48. 62 Sully, Memoirs, p. 110. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 159. 64 Sully, Memoirs, p. 108. Sully, Memoirs, p. 107. See also H. Carr´e, Sully. Sa vie et son oeuvre 1559–1641 (Paris 1932).

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For Sully, reason of state suggests that France try to gain the trust of other rulers of states, but from an unequivocal position of power: ‘France, therefore, can no more depend on the English, than on any of her other Neighbours: her true Interest and best Policy, is, to render her own interior State and Condition such, as may make her not only entirely independent, but also able to compel all Europe to feel its want of her. ( . . . ) let the Sovereign [Henry IV] shew himself a Lover of Repose; disinterested in what regards himself, and strictly impartial in respect to others: he will then be certain to preserve all his Neighbours in that Dependence, which is durable, only because it gains the Hearts, instead of subjecting the Persons’.66 According to Sully, Spanish political conduct contrasted starkly with Henry’s integrity and trustworthiness, because Spain always engaged with her neighbours ‘only with the premeditated Intention of deceiving them, even by that Security which Treaties ought to give’.67 Repeatedly, Sully employs trustworthiness as an important political asset in interstate relations. He does so again when he contrasts the ‘difficulties and suspicions’ he encountered among the ministers and politicians at the English court, whose ‘conduct was odious, and the absolute Opposite to that of Henry, who in all his Actions manifested nothing but Honesty and Good Faith, and laboured only for Publick Good’.68 The Grand Design was part of a diplomatic and political struggle for influence and power. England seemed to be in an advantageous position, because she had not yet committed herself formally to an alliance in the struggle between the Habsburg branches of Austria and Spain on the one hand and France, some German estates, such as the Prince Elector of the Palatinate, and the Low Countries on the other. As dynastic alliances still formed one essential part of European interstate policy, Sully considered the merits of various marriage projects.69 He also made clear how Barnevelt, one of the leaders of the Dutch revolt against the Spanish,70 tried to push the French into a formal alliance with the Dutch: ‘Barnevelt, like his 66 69

70

67 Sully, Memoirs, p. 131. 68 Sully, Memoirs, p. 169. Sully, Memoirs, p. 109. Cf. Sully, Memoirs, p. 121. Campanella also stresses the importance of dynastic politics. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 139. For the importance of marriage and dynastic politics in interstate relations, see R. Bonney, The European Dynastic States 1494–1660 (Oxford 1991), p. 79–301, W. Doyle, The Old European Order 1660–1800 (Oxford 1992), p. 73–80, H. Weber, “Die Bedeutung der Dynastien f¨ur die europ¨aische Geschichte in der fr¨uhen Neuzeit” in Zeitschrift f¨ur bayerische Landesgeschichte 44 (1981), p. 5–32 and J. Kunisch and H. Neuhaus (eds.), Der dynastische F¨urstenstaat. Zur Bedeutung der Sukzessionsordnungen f¨ur die Entstehung des fr¨uhmodernen Staates (Berlin 1982). See J. L. Motley, The Life and Death of John of Barneveld, Advocate of Holland: with a View of the Primary Causes and Movements of the Thirty Years’ War (London 1874).

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Collegues, began by magnifying the Misery to which the United Provinces were reduced; the Expences they had been at since the Peace of Vervins; ( . . . ) After all these Complaints, he concluded ( . . . ) that Henry ought to declare himself their Protector, and enter into an Offensive and Defensive Alliance with them’.71 The Peace of Vervins was concluded between Spain and France on 2 May 1598, and as a result Henry IV was recognised by Philip II as French king. All previously made conquests by Spain were reinstated to the French; French independence with regard to Spain was thus reaffirmed and the status quo of 1559 was re-established.72 In May 1596 though, Henry IV and Elizabeth had concluded a defensive and offensive alliance against Spain, expressly stating that no separate peace with Spain should be concluded by any of the parties to the alliance. The Peace of Vervins was thus in breach of the stipulations of this earlier partnership. Despite Henry IV’s attempts to include Holland and England in the Peace of Vervins, these powers refused participation. Henry IV’s conversion to Catholicism had also alienated his previous allies. Catholicism remained the state religion of France, but in the same year, 1598, Henry IV issued the Edict of Nantes, which guaranteed the Huguenots a fairly extensive degree of temporary religious coexistence, including the independence of their synods and access to state offices. However, ‘the edict was also a product of Henry’s commitment to the Gallican monarchy of his predecessors. Rather than religious toleration or modern reason of state, the underlying principle of the edict of Nantes was the restoration of “one king, one faith, one law”’.73 Together, the Peace of Vervins and the Edict of Nantes became the two crucial points of reference for political thinkers until the Peace of Vervins was superseded by the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Edict of Nantes was revoked by Louis XIV.74 Given this context, it is somewhat hypocritical that Sully explains to Barnevelt and his readers ‘in plain Terms’75 that any 71

72 73 74

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Sully, Memoirs, p. 120. For the struggle of the Dutch, see J. Israel, The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806 (Oxford 1995), p. 169–230, Bonney, The European Dynastic States, p. 203–212, G. Parker, The Dutch Revolt (Harmondsworth 1990), p. 225–240; and for the history of political thought of the Dutch revolt in the second half of the sixteenth century, the excellent study by M. van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555–1590 (Cambridge 1992). See notably the seventeenth-century anonymous tract: Les Affaires qui sont and Imhof, Der Friede. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, p. 163. The Edict of Nantes was only a compromise and from the outset only intended as a temporary measure, not an attempt to establish two confessions in the French kingdom. For further discussion see Chapter 4.2. Sully, Memoirs, p. 120.

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such alliance is inconceivable as long as France cannot be sure to have England on its side against the Habsburgs’ military might. Barnevelt tried to convince Sully ‘that if nothing could be obtained from the King of England, good Policy required that France should openly and alone espouse the Cause of the United Provinces, before their Strength and Spirits were entirely spent and exhausted’.76 As the Spanish were also lobbying strongly for the English to either join an alliance with them or, at the very least, grant assurances of their neutrality, and the Northern powers and several German princes were also seeking English assistance, Sully summarised this situation in unambiguous terms: ‘Upon the whole; it appeared as though all the Princes of Europe considered the gaining of England in their Interest, as of the utmost Consequence’.77 This suggests that Sully’s concerns as expressed in his writing were influenced by contemporary diplomatic and political manoeuvring and various endeavours to form alliances in interstate politics. The broad underlying principle of the Grand Design was the assumption that ‘peace is the great and common Interest in Europe. Its petty Princes ought to be continually employed in preserving it between the greater Powers ( . . . ) and the greater Powers should force the lesser into it, if necessary, by assisting the weak and oppressed’.78 The implication was that the Habsburgs threatened peace in Europe and were oppressing the smaller states. In order to counter this aggressive Habsburg attitude and their alleged claim to universal monarchy, a balance of power had to be established in Europe, which would guarantee the peace and security of all European states. Sully’s employment of the idea of an equilibrium or balance of power is original in many ways – though, as we have seen, he could have found this idea in Mornay’s Discours – and he uses it as a decisive tool to achieve a new, peaceful European order.79 ‘The Steps taken by the House of Austria to arrive at Universal Monarchy, which evidently appears from the whole Conduct of Charles Quint and his Son’, Sully asserts, ‘have rendered this Severity as just as it is necessary’.80 Political pamphleteers increasingly employed the idea of a balance of power for rhetorical ends, 76 79

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77 Sully, Memoirs, p. 116. 78 Sully, Memoirs, p. 109f. Sully, Memoirs, p. 164. As far as I can see, Sully’s contribution to the development of the idea of a balance of power in Europe has not been noted by those who studied its history. See notably Sheehan, The Balance of Power and M. Wright (ed.), Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power 1486–1914 (London 1974). Both mention briefly only the younger brother of Sully, Philippe de B´ethune. Nor is the balance of power analysed in any detail in the few existing studies on Sully already mentioned. The best study on the balance of power is Arcidiacono, Cinq types de paix, p. 75–200. Sully, Memoirs, p. 45.

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especially when it could be connected to the potential threat on the horizon of a universal monarchy.81 The balance of power was thus envisaged as providing peace and security while at the same time advancing France’s power and influence within a system of equilibrium. The aim was to present self-interested power politics under a less aggressive label. France’s self-styled national image as defender of a European equilibrium was more acceptable to the other European powers than French pretensions to hegemony.82 This remained a somewhat unspecific claim, but given French power, the image of balance meant that France was seen to be the counterweight to the Habsburgs on the other side of the scale. For the English historian William Camden, writing in his History of Elizabeth, it was England which could tip the balance on either side, depending on which side of the scales she put her weight: ‘Thus sate she [Queen Elizabeth] as an heroical Princess and Umpire betwixt the Spaniards, the French and the Estates; so as she might well have used that Saying of her Father, Cui adhaero, praest, that is, The Party to which I adhere getteth the upper hand. And true it was which one hath written, that France and Spain are as it were the Scales in the Balance of Europe, and England the Tongue or the Holder of the Balance’.83 When Sully relates the negotiations he held with King James in London during his ambassadorship, he writes that ‘the King of England ( . . . ) described the present political Affairs of Europe: In which, he said, it was necessary to preserve an Equilibrium between three of its Powers. ( . . . ) of these three Powers [the Habsburgs, Bourbons and Stuarts], the House of Austria in Spain, from the Spirit of Dominion with which she was possessed, was the only one who sought to make the Balance incline in her favour’.84 Presented by Sully as part of Henry IV’s foreign policy, the Grand Design amounted to a piece of propaganda aimed against the dominance of the House of Habsburg. The belief that ‘a universal Cry from all Parts of Christendom would have been raised against the House of Austria’ 81

82

83 84

Kaeber, Die Idee des europ¨aischen Gleichgewichts is still invaluable, but unfortunately he does not consider Sully’s Grand Design in his study. See his dismissive remarks on p. 30 of his study. (In a different context the Grand Design is again mentioned on p. 150). Interesting, though beyond the scope of this study, is the shift of argument among the great European powers. English semi-official writers styled Great Britain in the eighteenth century as defender of the balance of power, whereas French and Habsburg polemicists accused Britain of ambitions for universal monarchy. A good overview of these changes can be found in Kaeber, Die Idee des europ¨aischen Gleichgewichts, p. 124–137 and Sheehan, The Balance of Power, p. 97–120. W. Camden, The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth Late Queen of England (London 1688), p. 223. Sully, Memoirs, p. 148.

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is reiterated.85 The Habsburg dynasty is depicted as the only obstacle to European peace and security, because its aspirations to universal monarchy undermine the equilibrium of the European state system. Not surprisingly, Tommaso Campanella – apologist of Spanish universal monarchy – had perceived the French as the main threat to peace and stability in Europe: ‘He [the Spanish king] hath no body to stand to fear of, but only the King of France, and the King of England; which two Princes, by reason of being of different Religions, can never agree together’.86 Campanella’s assertion that the different religious confessions of the two crowns would rule out any potential alliance between them proved a serious miscalculation.87 Their political interests were not determined by religious allegiance alone. Interestingly, Campanella also employed, in a rare example, the concept of the balance of power when he considered the French challenge to the Spanish position in Italy. The French ‘cannot overcome them [the Spanish]: for, in this case, the very Princes, and States of Italy, who have to this day alwaies held with the French, would go over to the Spaniard: for it is their Design, to keep the balance alwaies so even betwixt these two Nations, as that neither of them may preponderate, and bear down the Scales, and so make a Prey of the Other’.88 The balance of power is a political tool employed by the Italians. Unlike Sully, Campanella can rely on the dominating central powers. His argument is easily summarised in the claim that the Spanish king and the Pope should together strive for universal monarchy. Sully is forced to argue from a weaker position: ‘the Purport of the Design may be perceived ( . . . ) to divide Europe equally among a certain Number of Powers, in such a Manner, that none of them might have Cause, either of Envy or Fear, from the Possessions or Power of others. The Number of them was reduced to Fifteen; and they were of three Kinds: viz. six great hereditary Monarchies; five elective Monarchies; and four sovereign Republicks’.89 But Sully was less neutral in his design than he presents himself to his readers. His proposal to counterbalance Habsburg power in Europe and beyond took a straightforward form. It seemed ‘difficult for French writers to move beyond a simple bipolar image of the balance. Since France clearly was one of the two “poles”, she could seek support to balance Spain or Austria, but was unconvincing when she aspired to 85 87

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86 Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 119. Sully, Memoirs, p. 68. This might be explained by the fact that, for the Habsburgs, alliances were determined by religious confession. Campanella stresses that ‘we are to understand, that the house of Austria is in league with none, save only Catholick Princes’. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 139. 89 Sully, Memoirs, p. 52. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, p. 119.

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any more subtle balance role’.90 However, the Grand Design addressed exactly this difficulty, playing its part in the propaganda efforts to convince the European Protestant powers of France’s disinterest in a hegemonic position in this envisaged system. Part of what the Grand Design had to achieve was thus to demonstrate that France did not harbour self-interested desires for a hegemonic role: ‘Among all these different Dismemberings, we may observe, that France reserved nothing for itself but the Glory of distributing them with Equity. Henry had declared this to be his Intention long before’.91 To what extent this strategy would be able to convince those invited to join the alliance is difficult to assess. More likely, it rather displayed ‘Sully’s scarcely disguised intention of confirming the primacy of France’92 , an impression he tried to mask by stressing the fact ‘that though England, and the United Provinces, should use their utmost Efforts of which they are capable against the House of Austria, unless they were assisted even by the whole Force of the French Monarchy, on whom the chief Management of such a War must fall for many Reasons; the House of Austria by uniting the Forces of its two Branches, would with ease ( . . . ) sustain itself against them’.93 What is interesting in this case is that the arguments of de facto power and necessity, displayed by French military might, are accompanied by an appeal to trust and good faith in the sphere of interstate relations: ‘The Edict of Nantz had been published with this in View, and every other Means was used which might gain the Respect and Confidence [my emphasis] of the Princes of Europe’.94 That confidence among European leaders that Henry IV had managed to gain in the early seventeenth century was – as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 – gambled away by Louis XIV at the end of the seventeenth century. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes played as much a part in this loss of confidence as did Louis’s contempt for keeping his international engagements and treaties. This comparison should be kept in mind, as it underscores the emerging significance of trustworthiness in interstate relations. The widely held belief in its reliability had endowed France political credibility and thus concrete political influence, assets that were lost under the reign of Louis XIV. Sully summarises the Grand Design in five principal points, the first of which ‘was, to restore Germany to its antient Liberty, in respect to the 90 92 93

91 Sully, Memoirs, p. 50. Sheehan, The Balance of Power, p. 39. F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace. Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge 1963), p. 28. 94 Sully, Memoirs, p. 36. Sully, Memoirs, p. 32.

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Election of its Emperors, and the Nomination of a King of the Romans’.95 French political strategy concerning Germany aimed to exploit the inherent contradictions of the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire to their advantage, and the emphasis it placed upon German liberty was a central part of this policy.96 Arguably, Sully is only reiterating a well-established element of French policy. As to the other four principal points enumerated by him, it is puzzling that they were deemed of such importance. ‘The second, to render the United Provinces absolutely independent of Spain; and to form them into a Republic, by annexing them, if necessary, some Provinces dismembered from Germany. The third, to do the same in regard to Switzerland, by incorporating with it some of the adjacent Provinces, particularly Alsace and Franche-Compt´e. The fourth, to divide all Christendom into a certain Number of Powers, as nearly equal as could be. The fifth, to reduce all the various Religions in them, under those three which should appear to be most numerous and considerable in Europe’.97 Given this summary, it is difficult to understand how the Grand Design could gain its reputation as one of the first plans for a new European order for peace and stability. There is, however, one other occasion where the Grand Design is related in more detail in the Memoirs98 , and it is certainly to this expanded version99 that Sully owes his fame as one of the earliest political thinkers to envisage some kind of federative structure to maintain peace and order in Europe. The first third of the Grand Design is concerned with the confessional divide in Europe. Sully claims that Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists should be granted equal footing within the European state 95 96

97 98

99

Sully, Memoirs, p. 34. A detailed study on this issue is still a desideratum. In an entry on the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire it was prominently claimed that France had defended the German liberty in the Thirty Years War. This liberty, it was argued further, had then been confirmed in the Peace of Westphalia. D. Diderot (ed.), Encyclop´edie, ou Dictionnaire raisonn´e des sciences, des arts et des m´etiers vol. 4 (Paris 1754), p. 71f. See also J. Savage, The antient and present State of the Empire of Germany (London 1702), F. Dickmann, Der Westf¨alische Frieden (M¨unster 1998), p. 118f. and G. Hanotaux, Histoire de la nation franc¸aise (Paris 1929), p. 80. Sully, Memoirs, p. 34f. This is equally true for the French original. One could, however, add those passages Sully relates as part of the negotiations he held with King James I in England during the time in 1603 when he had been sent to the English court as special envoy to re-evaluate the English position after Elizabeth’s death. But these parts skirt around the disclosure of the actual Grand Design. Only once more does he relate the Grand Design in some detail in connection with his account of his negotiations in England. See Sully, Memoirs, p. 177–184. Cf. also Ritter, “Die Memoiren Sullys und der grosse Plan Heinrichs IV.”, p. 12. Not at all substantiated is the somewhat surprising and certainly misleading claim by Hartmann that Sully’s negotiations are purely fictional and that he had never been sent to England in 1603. Hartmann, Rˆeveurs de Paix?, p. 93. The actual plan or Grand Design is related in sixteen pages, cf. Sully, Memoirs, p. 39–55.

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system. This crucial point has so far not been discussed in the literature. The argument that Sully wanted to regain influence over the conduct of French foreign politics under Richelieu is difficult to sustain if we consider the fundamental differences between these two men with regard to religion. Whereas the Huguenot Sully advocated religious liberty and toleration, Cardinal Richelieu’s aggressive policy against the French Huguenots culminated in the seizure of the Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle in October 1628 and the peace edict of Alais in June 1629, which effectively ‘totally destroyed the corporative existence of the Huguenots, leaving them as heretics in a Catholic world’.100 The confessional differences between these two men were irreconcilable. This antagonism must have meant that Sully stood little chance of influencing Richelieu and his vision of how to conduct French foreign policy. It is reasonable to further assume that Sully must have been aware of this. Despite the fact that France’s foreign policy was not directly determined by confessional calculations but by reason of state arguments and the desire to weaken the Habsburgs, the domestic situation inevitably influenced France’s foreign politics.101 It is thus difficult to see how Sully could have harboured hopes of submitting his Memoirs as a contribution to Richelieu’s strategic planning of France’s war aims and his plans to establish a new international order after the war.102 On the contrary, given the precarious situation the Huguenots found themselves in after 1629, it seems likely that Sully wanted to advocate religious coexistence in the wider context of French foreign policy interests. Richelieu had successfully dismantled the position the Huguenots had enjoyed in France since Henry IV had issued the Edict of Nantes. The constant reference to the former French king is also designed to act as a reminder of this very different confessional policy. When discussing the issue of religion in his Grand Design, Sully states that ‘the Reformed Religion subsists in France with the Roman, only under Favor of the Edicts, and is the weakest’.103 He continues: ‘in such States as that of France, ( . . . ) no new Regulations would be necessary ( . . . ): No violence, on this account, but Liberty unrestrained’.104 Richelieu’s aggressive domestic policy against the 100 101

102

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Holt, The French Wars of Religion, p. 187. See notably R. Mousnier, “Les crises int´erieures franc¸aises de 1610 a` 1659 et leur influence sur la politique ext´erieure franc¸aise, surtout de 1618 a` 1648” in K. Repgen (ed.), Krieg und Politik 1618–1648 (Munich 1988), p. 169–183. Malettke, Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, p. 267: ‘Mit seinem Grand Dessein wollte Sully offenbar ein Konzept zur Verwirklichung dieses großen Zieles Richelieu ¨ und der franz¨osischen Offentlichkeit vorlegen’. 104 Sully, Memoirs, p. 41. Sully, Memoirs, p. 39.

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Huguenots is in question here. The underlying motivation for the revision and second edition of the Memoirs should be seen as a response to these internal events in France and their devastating effect on the Huguenots. France, according to Sully’s argument, depends on its Protestant allies against the Catholic Habsburgs and would therefore be well advised to conduct a policy of religious coexistence in the spirit of the Edict of Nantes to reassure them.105 As to a new European order in view of the existing confessional cleavages, Sully’s proposals remained fairly superficial. However, he retained the conviction that Europe was divided not by confessional differences, but by the political interests of the Habsburgs and their allies on the one hand, and the counterweight formed around France and her allies on the other. He made this explicit in a later part of the Memoirs, where he again presented the Grand Design in some detail: ‘Europe’, he asserts here, ‘is divided into two Factions, which are not so justly distinguished by their different Religions, because the Catholicks and Protestants are confounded together in almost all Places, as they are by their Political Interests’.106 From here, Sully quickly moves to an outline of his envisaged plan. Despite the fact that Russia, the Armenians and the Greeks are ‘ranked ( . . . ) among the Christian Powers’107 , he excludes them from further consideration on the grounds that their cultural and religious differences with the European states are too great to consider them as potential elements of his proposed European federation. For him these countries ‘belong to Asia at least as much as to Europe. We indeed may almost consider them as a barbarous Country, and place them in the same Class with Turkey”.108 This exclusion was fairly conventional in the early seventeenth century. The figure of the other, perceived as alien, served to reinforce a European identity.109 This move allowed Sully not to overburden his plan 105

106 108 109

This alternative reading seems to correspond much better with Sully’s intentions, as it accommodates the current situation in France at the time of publication. There can be little doubt, however, that the Grand Design was also perceived as a contribution to the difficult questions regarding a stable interstate order. 107 Sully, Memoirs, p. 40. Sully, Memoirs, p. 178. Sully, Memoirs, p. 40. This point is almost expressis verbis reiterated in Sully, Memoirs, p. 179. See G. Delanty, “The Frontier and Identities of Exclusion in European History” in History of European Ideas 22 (1996), p. 93–103 and, of course, the classic study by Said, who describes this kind of process as a ‘view that divides the world into large general divisions, entities that coexist in a state of tension produced by what is believed to be radically different’. E. W. Said, Orientalism (London 1978), p. 45. O. Asbach, Europa, p. 100–108 is also very pertinent. Burke, “Did Europe Exist before 1700?”, p. 23: ‘The advance of the Turkish forces ( . . . ) seems to have made westerners more conscious of their collective identity’.

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and to concentrate on the heartland of Europe and the rearrangements he considered necessary for establishing a new and lasting order.110 The key to the Grand Design was a ‘general Council, representing all the States of Europe’.111 Envisaged as a body representative of all European states, this council should have the competence to moderate and, if necessary, arbitrate conflicts within the state system. However, the originality of this project, with an arbiter formed on a representative basis, should not be overemphasised, as it was in many ways simply a reformulation of contemporary ideas about the institution of arbitration.112 Nevertheless, Sully claimed that its ‘Establishment ( . . . ) was certainly the happiest Invention that could have been conceived’.113 In order to establish this type of representative body, sweeping territorial changes were envisaged, with the establishment of the council marking the ultimate stage in these radical alterations of the European map. Sully was aware that ‘to divest the House of Austria of the Empire; and all its Possessions in Germany, Italy and all the Low Countries; in a Word, to reduce it to the sole Kingdom of Spain’ 114 posed a fundamental challenge. It was not conceivable that the Habsburg monarchy could be persuaded to agree to such revolutionary and disadvantageous measures, even if the aim was an equilibrium of the European powers where the Habsburg branches would remain ‘nevertheless ( . . . ) equally powerful with the other Sovereignties of Europe’.115 Sully had no doubt himself that such a dramatic change could only be achieved by war. War thus represented not the ultima ratio but the necessary means to break Habsburg hegemony. Sully was clear from the outset of his Memoirs that conquest was a perfectly acceptable way to acquire rights of dominion in the international sphere.116 But his assessment of war is at times contradictory, as he also asserts that he is ‘from repeated Experience, convinced, that the Happiness of Mankind can never arise from War’.117 Nevertheless, the changes necessary for the establishment of the representative body of the European states were a preliminary step which posed the greatest 110 111 112

113 116

This was a rather typical attitude among European political writers. See Kaeber, Die Idee des europ¨aischen Gleichgewichts, p. 78. Sully, Memoirs, p. 53. See notably the ideas about arbitration developed by Bodin and Gentili as discussed in Chapter 1. Malettke, Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, p. 273f. stresses the federal character of the council and its underlying idea of a system of collective security. For a slightly more cautious judgement regarding such a system, see also Hartmann, Rˆeveurs de paix?, p. 90f. 114 Sully, Memoirs, p. 44. 115 Sully, Memoirs, p. 44. Sully, Memoirs, p. 53. 117 Sully, Memoirs, p. 16. Cf., for instance, Sully, Memoirs, p. 9.

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obstacle to the realisation of the Grand Design. Given that at the time of this work Europe had already been at war for almost two decades, the prospect of using war to reorganise the European state system at the end of the current war may have appeared more acceptable, as it meant that a new war need not be launched to achieve the goals of the Grand Design. War aims, after all, could be formulated in the context of the ongoing war. The constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, with its contradictory division of sovereign rights and obligations, meant that France would find allies in Germany against the Habsburgs. With the Emperor’s edict of restitution of 1629 and again, after the Swedish intervention, with the Peace of Prague of 1635, the Habsburgs had managed to impose their claims on the German estates.118 Sully suggested, therefore, that ‘France would ( . . . ) endeavour to gain the neighbouring Princes and States to join with them in their Design; especially the Princes of Germany, who were most immediately and dangerously menaced with being subjected to the Tyranny of the House of Austria’.119 In the context of the period 1629–1635, Sully’s suggestion can thus be read as a reaction both to the unfolding scenes of the theatre of the Thirty Years War and to Richelieu’s aggressive domestic policies against the Huguenots. Read in this way, it would be misleading to treat Sully’s plans as a mere fantasy or thought experiment. It was a question of how to proceed with the Catholic Habsburgs once a successful war had forced them to accept the changes he envisaged. These far-reaching war aims could become more acceptable for the other states at war with the Habsburgs, as the underlying aim was reformulated as a balance of power established at the expense of Habsburg territories and to the benefit of the smaller states. With these changes in place, the representative council could be established. Sully considered the possible need for sub-councils to streamline the working process and overcome the difficulties of long communication routes.120 A further important element was the raising of a European army, to which all states would contribute according to their rank. The supreme command of such an army remained unspecified. But Sully argued that once such a European union was established, it needed the capacity of executing the decisions taken by the council. The lack of detail and, perhaps even more 118

119 120

See A. Wandruszka, Reichspatriotismus und Reichspolitik zur Zeit des Prager Friedens von 1635 (K¨oln 1955) and M. Espenhorst, “The Peace of Prague – A Failed Settlement?” in The Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years War, ed. by O. Asbach and P. Schr¨oder (Farnham 2014), p. 285–295. Sully, Memoirs, p. 32. He even suggests possible places for these sub-councils, such as Danzig, Nuremberg or Bologna. See Sully, Memoirs, p. 54.

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importantly, the lack of appreciation of the difficulties inherent in the realisation of such a scheme suggest that in the end Sully’s Grand Design was effectively not much more sophisticated than that which was generally offered by political writers and pamphleteers engaged in the emerging discussion of a European balance of power designed to counter a Habsburg drive for universal monarchy. Sully’s position can be summarised in the call for a European balance of power, in which France would have to play the decisive counterpart to Habsburg weight. This was, of course, only one of the possible images of a European balance.121 Sully repeatedly argued ‘what seems proper and necessary to be done, is to support them all [i.e. the monarchies of Europe] in a kind of Equilibrium: And whatever Prince thinks, and, in Consequence, acts otherwise, may indeed cause Torrents of Blood to flow throughout Europe, but he will never be able to change her Form’.122 The Grand Design appealed to trust not primarily to enhance a plan for European peace but to advance French interests in the European concert of powers. Trust could be a political asset and, accordingly, Sully endeavoured to build alliances where possible. His suggestive rhetoric tried to win others for the French cause, but there was no substantial commitment to trust-building. Trust was one among other registers politicians needed to master when conducting their business.

2.2 Cruc´e (1590–1648) and the Nouveau Cyn´ee ´ eric Cruc´e123 was very difThe plan for European peace proposed by Em´ ferent from Sully’s. His Nouveau Cyn´ee or new Cyneas124 , published with royal privilege in 1623, two years before Grotius’s illustrious De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, ‘is undoubtedly the first known truly universalist peace plan 121

122 123

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The balance of power could consist in a more or less static situation where two powers or power blocs equal each other. But it could also consist in two powers or power blocs, whose equilibrium is arbitrated by a third power. And thirdly a balance could consist in multiple powers who try to attain an equilibrium among themselves. See also H. Duchhardt, Balance of Power und Pentarchie: Internationale Beziehungen 1700–1785 (Paderborn 1996), p. 7–19 and A. Strohmeyer, “Ideas of Peace in Early Modern Models of International Order”, p. 69f. Sully, Memoirs, p. 17. ´ eric Cruc´e” in M. Eliav-Feldon, “Universal Peace for the Benefit of Trade: The Vision of Em´ Religion, Ideology and Nationalism in Europe and America; Essays presented in Honor of Yehoshua Arieli (Jerusalem 1986), p. 29–44 suggests in her conclusion, p. 42, that Cruc´e was much more likely to have been born around 1580. Cineas is a historical person. He studied rhetoric under Demosthenes and was a famous Thessalian orator. After his victory over the Romans in the battle of Heraclea in 280 BC, Pyrrhus sent Cineas to Rome to negotiate peace. Plutarch provides a detailed account of this in his Lives vol. 3, translated by J. and W. Langhorne (London 1883), p. 161ff.

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which calmly accepts the plurality of political entities, religions, beliefs and customs, and offers a blueprint for peaceful coexistence and harmonious relations between all of them without an attempt to impose any form of unity’.125 But does trust play a role in this scheme? Cruc´e addresses his work to all ‘the Monarchs and Sovereign Princes of the present time’126 ; he is thus writing with the aim not just of a European peace, but of a truly universal project. As his subtitle suggests, he offers a ‘Discourse of the Occasions and Means to establish a general Peace, and the Liberty of Commerce throughout the whole World’.127 From the outset therefore, a range of innovative features are introduced in this remarkable and, certainly for its time, daring work.128 Hardly anything is known about the contemporary reception of the Nouveau Cyn´ee.129 Given that only a handful of copies have survived130 , it is safe to assume that the dissemination of this treatise was limited. Presumably Cruc´e’s work had only a minor impact on the republic of letters of his time. Not until the end of the nineteenth century was the Nouveau Cyn´ee rediscovered and the identity of Cruc´e as the author established by Ernest Nys.131 Indeed, it still holds true that Cruc´e’s plan for peace as presented in the Nouveau Cyn´ee ‘has not received the recognition it deserves’.132 In fact, neither Sully nor Cruc´e are taken into consideration

125 126

127 128

129 130

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Eliav-Feldon, “Grand Designs. The Peace Plans of the Late Renaissance”, p. 67. E. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas or Discourse of the Occasions and Means to Establish a General Peace, and the Liberty of Commerce throughout the whole World, translated and edited by T. Balch (Philadelphia 1909), p. 18. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 17. In her introduction to the Italian translation of the Nouveau Cyn´ee, A. M. Lazzarino del Grosso, ´ eric Cruc´e. Il nuovo Cinea (Naples 1979), p. 75 asserts that Cruc´e’s intentions for writing the Em´ Nouveau Cyn´ee were mainly guided by the interest of the French crown and the mercantile interests of the third estate. For her the dominant preoccupation of Cruc´e has to be seen in the internal order and prosperity of France, ibid., p. 76: ‘la preoccupazione dominante di Cruc´e sia stata quella dell’ordine e dell prosperit´a interni’. ´ E. Nys, Etudes de Droit International et de Droit Politique (Paris 1896), p. 316: ‘Nous ignorons l’accueil qui fut fait aux th´eories humanitaires du Nouveau Cyn´ee par ses contemporains’. ´ eric Cruc´e Hartmann, Rˆeveurs de Paix?, p. 24 lists twelve known copies. In 1900 T. W. Balch, Em´ (Philadelphia 1900), p. 24 speaks of only one known copy which is located in the Biblioth`eque Nationale in Paris. E. Nys, “Histoire du droit international. A propos de la paix perp´etuelle de l’abb´e de Saint-Pierre, ´ eric Cruc´e et Ernest Landgrave de Hesse-Rheinfels” in Revue de droit internationale et de Em´ ´ l´egislation compar´ee XXII (1890), p. 371–384. Cf. also Nys, Etudes de Droit International, p. 308f., ´ eric Cruc´e, p. 26f. and T. W. Balch, Introduction to The New Cyneas of Em´ ´ eric Cruc´e Balch, Em´ (Philadelphia 1909), p. III–XXXI. Eliav-Feldon, “Grand Designs. The Peace Plans of the Late Renaissance”, p. 67. It is remarkable that there are even fewer studies on Cruc´e than on Sully.

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in recent studies on the history of political thought in the fields of international law and interstate relations.133 Nevertheless, the Nouveau Cyn´ee did not pass entirely unnoticed in the seventeenth century. The fact that – despite its clearly limited dissemination – the Nouveau Cyn´ee was discussed in the republic of letters is testified by, for instance, Gabriel Naud´e. He mentions Cruc´e’s Nouveau Cyn´ee and his proposal to establish ‘universal peace’ in his Bibliographia politica, first ´ eric published in 1633.134 This seems to be the only known source where Em´ Cruc´e is mentioned by name, before Nys’s rediscovery. A good thirty years later, Charles Sorel mentions the Nouveau Cyn´ee but not its author, in his La biblioth`eque franc¸oise, ou le choix et l’examen des livres franc¸ois qui traitent de l’´eloquence, de la philosophie, de la d´evotion et de la conduite des moeurs. This text is an unsystematic enumeration of works on society and politics in the widest sense. Interestingly, the Nouveau Cyn´ee is referred to in the same passage as Sorel discusses work by Thomas Hobbes, which makes for somewhat surprising company. He summarises the Nouveau Cyn´ee as ‘a book which gives advice on how to establish general peace and free trade in the whole world’.135 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz also bears witness to the reception of the Nouveau Cyn´ee. In a letter to the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre,136 Leibniz wrote in February 1715: ‘when I was quite young, I became acquainted with a book entitled Nouveau Cyn´ee, whose unknown author advised sovereigns to govern their states in peace, and to let their disputes be judged by an established tribunal; but I no longer know how to find this book, and I 133

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None of the following leading studies in the field of international thought even mentions Sully or Cruc´e: Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations, p. 302. This is all the more astonishing as Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace does briefly mention the two thinkers. Among the very few modern studies dealing with Cruc´e, see notably ´ eric Cruc´e, p. 7–77. As Hartmann, Rˆeveurs de Paix?, esp. p. 73–84 and Lazzarino del Grosso, Em´ far as I can see there is, quite surprisingly, no recent study in English. One has to refer to the few writings from the 1980s, that is to say the two articles by Eliav-Feldon and the important study by P. van den Dungen, The Hidden History of a Peace “classic”, Emeric Cruc´e’s Le nouveau Cyn´ee (London 1980). G. Naud´e, Bibliographia Politica (Frankfurt 1663), p. 61: ‘pacem universalem stabilire’. For the wider context of Naud´e’s Bibliographia Politica, see C. Bissel, Die Bibliographia Politica des Gabriel Naud´e (Erlangen 1966). C. Sorel, La biblioth`eque franc¸oise, ou le choix et l’examen des livres franc¸ois qui traitent de l’´eloquence, de la philosophie, de la d´evotion et de la conduite des moeurs (Paris 1667), p. 74: ‘Il y a un Livre appell´e le Nouveau Cyn´ee, qui donne des avis pour e´tablir une Paix g´en´erale et la libert´e du Commerce par tout le monde’. Leibniz attached to his letter to the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre his Observations on the Abb´e de SaintPierre’s Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe in which he actually mentions the Nouveau Cyn´ee. On Leibniz and the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, see Chapters 4.1 and 4.3.

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no longer recall the details of it’.137 That Leibniz talks of the author as unknown is not surprising, since the book had been published without listing the author’s full name; the title page shows only the initials of ‘Em. Cr. P.’138 Ernest Nys, and following Nys Thomas Balch, also suggest that Grotius knew about the Nouveau Cyn´ee and may well have met Cruc´e in Paris in the mid-1620s. They argue further that it is more than likely that his arguments for international arbitration – as they are found in his De jure belli ac pacis libri tres – actually stem from Cruc´e.139 There are, however, fundamental differences in Grotius’s approach and it seems much more plausible that Gentili influenced Grotius, including on the question of international arbitration. Most importantly, however, Cruc´e’s plan for universal peace is intended as political advice and is not based on philosophical or juridical reasoning. In particular, he makes no reference to natural law as a grounding principle for the envisaged new order. On the contrary, he is dismissive of jurists140 and not at all interested in academic juridical arguments: ‘I would be a Philosopher, if I brought forward the notable teachings on this subject: but it is not necessary to repeat a discourse with which books are filled’.141 Well-understood self-interest, according to Cruc´e’s argument, should be the guiding principle of any political theory. This, in turn, provides the underlying incentive with which he hopes to convince princes and leaders of states to adopt his proposals. However, the way he defines self-interest is very different from the way it is commonly presented in political advice of the time, of which Sully is perhaps the most prominent example as far as the conduct of foreign policy is concerned.142 Sully is in this respect 137 138

139 140 142

G. W. Leibniz, “Observations on the Abb´e de St Pierre’s Project for Perpetual Peace” in G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, ed. by P. Riley (Cambridge 1988), p. 178. Cf. the title page of the original edition of the Nouveau Cyn´ee (Paris 1623). ‘Em. Cr. P.’ stands ´ eric Cruc´e [of ] Paris’. The references to the Nouveau Cyn´ee by Naud´e, Sorel and Leibniz for ‘Em´ ´ have all been established by Nys, Etudes de Droit International, p. 305–317. Later studies sometimes reiterate some of these, but obviously rather following Balch’s study, who in turn closely followed Nys. I conducted some unsystematic research to establish further proof of the reception of the Nouveau Cyn´ee, but was unable to add anything to Nys’s findings. ´ ´ eric Cruc´e, p. 41f. This intriguing thought Nys, Etudes de Droit International, p. 316 and Balch, Em´ has, as far as I can see, not been substantiated. 141 Cruc´ See Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 250f. e, The New Cyneas, p. 142. Jeremy Bentham asserted that ‘it is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of the individual. ( . . . ) Interest is one of those words, which not having any superior genus, cannot in the ordinary way be defined’. J. Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York 1988), p. 3. See also the entry “Interesse” in J. H. Zedler (ed.), Großes vollst¨andiges Universal-Lexikon aller Wissenschaften und K¨unste vol. 14 (Leipzig, Halle 1739), p. 776f. For a critical discussion of the changing and ambivalent connotation of interest in the political discourse of the early modern period, see E. W. Orth, “Interesse” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland vol. 3, ed. by

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not dissimilar to his younger brother, Philippe de B´ethune (1565–1649), and Henri duc de Rohan (1579–1638), both of whom also endeavoured to provide political advice in the name of French self-interest.143 Rohan was also related to Sully, having married Sully’s daughter, Marguerite de B´ethune, in 1605. All three men served under Henry IV, but only Rohan and Sully remained loyal to the Huguenot cause. Philippe de B´ethune adhered to the Catholic faith, going as far as to become a cardinal at the Roman Curia. He did, however, argue for the confessional coexistence of the two Christian confessions as long as the Huguenots did not stir up civil strife and provoke disobedience towards the monarch.144 All three also attempted in different ways, and with varying degrees of success, to regain the favour of Louis XIII and Richelieu. After Henry IV’s death, the Huguenot assembly in Saumur entrusted the military and political leadership of their cause to Henri de Rohan in 1611.145 He was a renowned military leader of the Huguenots and following the fall of La Rochelle was forced to leave France. Despite this, he managed to regain the favour of Richelieu and served with great success from 1635 as lieutenant g´en´eral in the French campaigns of the Thirty Years War until he suffered a fatal wound in the Battle of Rheinfelden. Philippe de B´ethune was a highly skilled and successful diplomat. Like Sully, B´ethune and Rohan had firsthand experience of interstate politics. To fully appreciate the fundamental difference in approach represented by Cruc´e’s specific formulation of selfinterest, it seems appropriate to first briefly scrutinise the central works by Rohan and B´ethune, in addition to what has already been said about Sully. It is noteworthy that Sully’s Memoirs as well as Rohan’s De l’Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestient´e, first published in 1639, and Philippe de B´ethune’s Le Conseiller d’Estat, ou, Recueil des plus g´en´erales Consid´erations servant au maniment des Affaires publiques, first published in 1632, were all published after Cruc´e’s Nouveau Cyn´ee, a text which they felt no need to address in their own work. Rohan dedicated his work to Cardinal Richelieu, claiming that, although princes commanded people, ‘interest’ commands princes regarding how to

143

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O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Koselleck (Stuttgart 1975), p. 305–365, A. O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton 1977), esp. p. 32 and J. A. W. Gunn, Politics and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth Century (London 1969). Richelieu himself declared public interest to be the guiding principle of French politics. Although this claim was rather unspecific, it shows nevertheless to what extent this term dominated political doctrines. Cardinal Duc de Richelieu, Testament Politique (Amsterdam 1689), p. 253: ‘Les interests public doivent estre l’unique fin du Prince & de ses Conseillers’. 145 Holt, The French Wars of Religion, p. 174. Cf. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 46.

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conduct their policies.146 As the title suggests, the work’s leading principle is the identification of the true interest of the state, which the prince and his ministers must pursue. Discerning what this interest was is the task Rohan set for himself in his book.147 Whereas the emphasis of B´ethune’s work is on internal affairs and good governance, Rohan describes the interest of the various European states in relation to each other. The underlying principle he introduces is the connection made between interest and the idea of the balance of power, thus the underlying structure of interstate relations consists in the existence of ‘two powers in Christendom, the houses of Spain and France, which are like the two poles, from which descend the influences of peace and war upon the other states’.148 Spain, Rohan continues his argument, managed to rise quickly to a position of unparalleled power and pursued designs of universal monarchy which she was unable to conceal. France’s interest was to provide a counterweight to these designs. ‘The other princes attached themselves, according to their interests, to one of these two powers’.149 For Rohan, interstate relations were dominated by this fundamental antagonism between France and Spain. He provided a simple model which, according to him, would guide the interests and consequently the behaviour of all states.150 The rest of the work is largely taken up by a descriptive account of the various individual interests of the different European states, and is less pertinent for the development of a political philosophy of interstate relations. Thus, although Philippe de B´ethune is less concerned with interstate relations in his Conseiller d’Estat than Rohan, his work nevertheless provides a more detailed theoretical discussion about a range of specific aspects related to international politics than the latter’s l’Interest des Princes.151 Particularly significant are chapters 49 to 56. Similarly to Rohan, B´ethune asserts that ‘essentially reason of state is nothing other than the reason 146 147

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149 150 151

Rohan, De l’Interest des Princes, p. 1: ‘Les Princes commandent aux peuples, et l’interest commande aux Princes’. See R. Tuck, Philosophy and Government (Cambridge 1993), p. 91, F. Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsr¨ason (Munich 1960), p. 192–231 and J. H. H. Salmon, “Rohan and Interest of State” in R. Schnur (ed.), Staatsr¨ason. Studien zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs (Berlin 1975), p. 121– 140. Rohan, De l’Interest des Princes, p. 2f.: ‘il y a deux Puissances dans la Chrestienit´e, qui sont comme les deux Poles, desquels descendent les influences de paix et de guerre sur les autres Estates, a` sc¸avoir les Maisons de France et d’Espagne’. Rohan, De l’Interest des Princes, p. 3: ‘Les autres Princes se sont attachez a` l’une, ou a` l’autre selon leur interest’. See Salmon, “Rohan and Interest of State”, p. 133. Rohan has attracted considerably more attention from scholars than B´ethune. Indeed, the literature on B´ethune is surprisingly thin. But see notably Thuau, Raison d’Etat et pens´ee politique, esp. p. 278–280.

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of interest’.152 By making interest the leading principle for the conduct of politics, he necessarily acknowledges that interest can shift with time and changing circumstances.153 But this is not a problem for B´ethune, as long as the prince knows how to adapt to such changes. The pursuit of interest means that a constant shift in interstate relations must take place and that, consequently, no stable situation can ever be reached. The implication is that even treaties and alliances have to change with the changing perception of interest. Hence, interstate relations fluctuate a great deal and any agreement is liable to be broken in the name of interest. ‘The most common reasons for the rupture of leagues are suspicion and jealousy’.154 For B´ethune, therefore, trustworthiness is of importance, if only as a political tool, because ‘it is a great advantage to gain the confidence of one’s neighbours, in order to penetrate their [secret] designs’.155 The concept of interest as understood by B´ethune distorts the notion of confidence, as this turns into yet another political instrument. Echoing Machiavelli’s position, developed in the notorious Chapter 18 of the Principe, B´ethune dedicates a whole chapter to this issue. Chapter 53 is ‘on the rupture of treaties: and of the constancy and reliability of the word of a prince’.156 Unlike Machiavelli, however, B´ethune does not fully grasp the underlying danger of such a situation, content with the observation that if there are no conditions given allowing for mutual trust, ‘all ways of dealing among the princes are full of suspicion and dangerous’.157 Ultimately, interest as understood by B´ethune necessarily leads to an unstable situation among states. B´ethune does not envisage a means of overcoming this structural problem. His response to it consists simply in advising prudential calculation, which he sees as being itself enshrined in the notion of interest.158 This reasoning is, therefore, incapable of overcoming, or even appropriately perceiving the issue at stake. Political advice which advocates pursuing the interest of the state reinforces suspicion and hence contributes to a lack of trust and thus a lack of stability. The safeguarding of the state’s interest results in perpetual mistrust towards other states. B´ethune singles 152 153 154 155 156 157 158

B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 319: ‘en effet Raison d’Estat n’est autre chose, que raison d’interest’. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 303: ‘l’interest des Princes ou Estates( . . . ) se peuvent changer avec le temps’. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 303: ‘Les plus ordinaires causes de la rupture des Ligues sont la defiance et la jalousie’. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 329: ‘C’est un grand avantage, pour penetrer les desseins de ses voisins, d’avoir gaign´e avec eux quelques confiance’. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 316: ‘De la rupture des Traictez: Et de la constance et fermet´e de la parole d’un Prince’. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 330: ‘toutes ( . . . ) voyes sont pleines de soupc¸on entre les Princes, et ( . . . ) dangereuses’. See also B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 320.

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out the Spanish who, more than any other nation, used treaties as little more than a ruse to deceive others, and ‘have no difficulty breaking their word’.159 Given this conceptualisation of interstate relations, treaties and princely declarations are seen by B´ethune as susceptible to constant change. ‘Treaties are founded on the interests of the princes, which change with time; it is thus necessary to change them [the treaties] after some time, or to break them entirely’.160 For B´ethune, such a volatile situation is exactly what needs to be constantly reassessed and recalculated in interstate politics. Secret treaties161 are as much part of these interstate relations as those which are made public, as are acts of espionage undertaken by ambassadors.162 B´ethune goes as far as to claim that ultimately truces are more reliable than peace treaties, as the former is only meant to last a limited time, whereas the latter is intended to last perpetually. He maintains that it is conceivable, and actually in the state’s interest, that they maintain the appearance of being faithful163 to their truce obligations until it expires, at which point they may choose to resume their hostilities. But it is unrealistic that a perpetual peace might be possible.164 This is the reason why, according to B´ethune, the prevailing lack of trust demanded that a different instrument be used in relations between sovereign states. He briefly considers attempts that are made to introduce more reliable treaties by exchanging hostages, but concludes that the impact of such actions is negligible.165 He discusses whether treaties become more reliable when they are ratified by a marriage between the two parties, but again, he does not believe that much is gained through such schemes.166 Ultimately, it is only if the interests of the different parties coincide that it becomes

159

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B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 281: ‘Les Espagnols, lesquels en matiere d’Estat ne font guere grande difficult´e de rompre leur foy, sont plus ordinaires a` pratiquer ceste ruse qu’aucune autre nation’. Nevertheless B´ethune is clear that it is a common practice among princes. See p. 279: ‘C’est une des plus ordinaires ruses entre les Princes, et de laquelle les plus advisez aucunefois se laissent abuser, que de mettre en avant quelque Traict´e, pour tromper son compagnon’. He also stresses, however, that one does not find many princes who do not search first for a pretext, before they break a signed treaty. See B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 317. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 291: ‘les Traictez estans fondez sur l’interest des Princes qui changent avec le temps, il est besoin des les changer au bout d’un temps, ou de rompre entierement’. Cf. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 293. Cf. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 277 and p. 331. This is also a Machiavellian theme, which is taken up by B´ethune on several other occasions. Notably on p. 318f. of his Le Conseiller d’Estat, he argues that the greatest advantage for a prince consists in being seen to keep his word. Cf. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 286f. and p. 290f. 166 See B´ Cf. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 309f. ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 312.

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reasonable to assume that both sides will keep their word.167 But this is a rare, if not impossible eventuality ‘since there exist no treaties, which ( . . . ) are not concluded with arms in hand’.168 According to B´ethune, not even international arbitrage is a way out of this dilemma, as it remains uncertain to what extent one should trust the arbiter.169 Almost quoting Bodin verbatim170 , though not referring to him here, B´ethune holds that it is desirable for a prince to serve in the role as arbiter, as it would considerably add to the prestige of a prince to be chosen for such a honourable role.171 Given these arguments, it comes as no surprise that any alliance or treaty with the Turks ‘is hardly profitable for Christian princes’.172 The differences between the Turks and the Christian sovereigns meant that there could be ‘no confidence between them’.173 On the Turks, B´ethune’s only advice is to mistrust them even more than the Spanish. As for Sully and Rohan, for B´ethune the only realistic remedy to the instability of interstate relations was thus the balance of power. This concept allowed him to introduce a degree of calculable stability that preserves ‘the security of the states, and maintains an equal counterweight between the biggest states’.174 Consequently, he denounced any pursuit of universal peace as being just a pretext employed to further the interests of those powers in a position to pursue such an ambitious aim. B´ethune equated universal peace and universal monarchy.175 Security, he concluded, can only be achieved if the different sovereigns pursue their interests, which in turn consists in the balancing act of the different powers.176 Cruc´e is different. In contrast to this rather mainstream presentation of self-interest and the maintenance of the state, he proposes ‘the means to assure your state by the establishment of a universal peace’.177 It is in the creation of such a peace that the true self-interest of every state is 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177

B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 312. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 318: ‘car il n’y a pas un Traict´e qui ne se face ( . . . ) les armes en la main’. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 315. Cf. Bodin, Six Livres de la R´epublique: ‘Qui est le plus baut poinct d’honeur qu’un Prince peut gainer, a` sc¸avoir d’estre esleu arbitre de paix entre les autres’. See also the discussion in Chapter 1.2. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 321: ‘estant le plus haut degr´e d’honneur qu’un Prince puisse gaigner entre ses voisins, que d’estre arbitre de leurs differens’. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 297: ‘est peu profitable au Prince Chrestien’. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 297: ‘la confidance ne se peut mettre entr’eux’. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 316: ‘la suret´e de leurs Estats, que pour entretenir les plus Grands en contrepoids egal’. And again very similarly p. 295: ‘pour balancer les forces du plus puissant’. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 275: ‘le pretexte de la Paix universelle’. B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 322: ‘La suret´e des Estats consistant principalement en un contrepoid egal de puissance des uns et des autres’. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 16.

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to be found. The only reason why it is so difficult to establish such a peace ‘lies in the pretensions of a few sovereigns’.178 His proposal of how to overcome these difficulties emphasises two significant aspects: firstly, he underscores the essential role trade and commerce ought to play in interstate relations.179 And secondly, he stresses the need for international arbitration, institutionalised and provided for by an international court, which should be established in Venice.180 Cruc´e begins by arguing that any potential justifications for going to war are in fact ill conceived.181 In the long term, the cost of war would always exceed the hopes of new conquests, honours or any other profits.182 Furthermore, ‘princes who already have command and authority all acquired, should not expose themselves to the inconstance of fortune’.183 This reasoning is inspired by Machiavelli.184 Throughout the Nouveau Cyn´ee, Cruc´e reiterates this Machiavellian advice, insisting that prudence suggests ‘not to risk the fortune of war, which can rather diminish the Empire than aggrandize it’.185 The only valid reason to go to war lies in self-defence and the need to remedy a wrong. But as he will show, it is here that the idea of arbitration provides a substitute for the need to wage war in self-defence. Indeed, princes ‘should take another course and before resorting to arms, resort to the arbitration of the sovereign Potentates and Lords’.186 Once Cruc´e has shown that there are no valid reasons for going to war187 , he moves on to consider what he calls the true interest of sovereigns. He is clear that ‘in case it may be possible that we may obtain a universal peace, ( . . . ) the best result [of such a peace] is the establishment of commerce’.188 It would thus be in each monarch’s interest to sign up 178 179 180

181 183 184

185 187 188

Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 36. For a more comprehensive discussion of this aspect, see Chapter 5. Cruc´e contends that ‘the most commodious place for such an assembly is the territory of Venice, because it is practically neutral and indifferent to all Princes: added thereto that it is near the most important monarchies of the earth’. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 104. On Cruc´e’s role for the development of international arbitration, see also H.-G. Justenhoven, Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit. Ethische Norm und Rechtswirklichkeit (Stuttgart 2006), p. 114f. 182 Cf. Cruc´ Cf. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 18. e, The New Cyneas, p. 32. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 28. Note that Machiavelli’s Principe gives mostly advice to princes who have recently acquired their power. See also Machiavelli’s discussion of fortune in Chapter 25 of his Principe. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 6 and p. 84f. For a discussion of fortune in Machiavelli, see also Schr¨oder, Niccol`o Machiavelli, p. 108–120. 186 Cruc´ Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 140. e, The New Cyneas, p. 40. On Cruc´e’s discussion of the reasons for going to war, see also Hartmann, Rˆeveurs de Paix? p. 39f. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 60.

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to the proposed peace and to support the establishment of appropriate international institutions. The moral duty monarchs have as heads of state to provide the optimal conditions for commerce corresponds to their proper interest. Hence, ‘the monarchs must see to it that their subjects can traffic without fear as well by sea as by land’.189 At a time when mercantilism was the guiding principle for conducting commerce and defending commercial interests190 , Cruc´e’s insistence on the importance of free trade is remarkable. Despite an emphasis on European affairs, he also considers at some length the advantages of trade and communication in other parts of the world. He suggests, for example, how trade between Muscovy and the Indies could be improved.191 The role played by free trade in his theory results in an almost cosmopolitan image of the whole of humanity being presented in his proposal, although he does not have this vocabulary at his disposal: ‘What a pleasure it would be, to see men go here and there freely, and mix together without any hindrance of country, ceremonies, or other such like differences, as if the earth were as it really is, a city common to all’.192 Cruc´e was sensitive to the role free trade could play in interstate relations on several levels. He goes as far as to assert that ‘there is no occupation to compare in utility with that of the merchant who legitimately increases his resources by the expenditure of his labor and often at the peril of his life, without injuring or offending anyone: in which he is more worthy of praise than the soldier whose advancement depends upon the spoil and destruction of others’.193 But the positive connotations connected with the figure of the soldier had to be changed if this figure was to be replaced by that of the less attractive merchant, offering an alternative more congenial to his claim for peace.194 The argument about trade thus works on several levels. Most obviously, peace is the condition for trade, which in turn provides prosperity for both states and individuals. In addition, the different mentality of the merchant sets the scene for peaceful 189 190

191 193

194

Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 62. D. C. Coleman (ed.), Revisions in Mercantilism (London 1969) and I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750 (New York 1980). 192 Cruc´ Cf. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 66. e, The New Cyneas, p. 66. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 58. Many writers concerned with international trade and commerce also praised the dignity and qualities of merchants. See, for example, T. Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade [London 1664] in A Select Collection of Early English Tracts on Commerce (London 1856), p. 124: ‘I briefly showed ( . . . ) the Merchant in his qualities; which in truth are such and so many, that I find no other profession which leadeth into more worldy knowledge’. See also further discussion in Chapter 5. On the negative connotation of the merchant, see P. Rosanvallon, Le capitalisme utopique. Histoire de l’id´ee de march´e (Paris 1999), p. 63f.

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competition, rather than the devastating contest of war which is the prerogative of the soldier.195 If the self-interest of the prince lies in economic prosperity, he should subscribe to the institutions necessary to achieve peace.196 In order to attain such a universal peace, the main objective is to found a general council capable of arbitration among states. Cruc´e holds that ‘never was a council so august ( . . . ) as that of which we speak, which would be composed of ambassadors of all the monarchs and sovereign republics, who will be trustees and hostages of public peace’.197 To safeguard the decisions made by the council, he envisages the creation of an executive authority with the right to use coercive power in case individual sovereigns do not respect the council and its decisions: ‘the better to authorize it, all the said Princes will swear to hold as inviolable law what would be ordained by the majority of votes in the said assembly, and to pursue with arms those who would wish to oppose it’.198 On the one hand, Cruc´e remains rather conservative, in his reliance on the sovereigns of his time, but on the other hand he provides a whole set of new institutions to counterbalance the presumed short-sighted and self-interested comportment of these monarchs. If a prince ‘has some things to complain of, let him address himself to this great assembly, as to the most competent judge that can be imagined. This is the principal way of establishing universal peace ( . . . ). It is in this way that a beginning must be made’.199 On the basis of this textual evidence it has been argued ´ eric Cruc´e ( . . . ) was the first to propose an International Court that ‘Em´ of Arbitration’.200 However, this does not represent the advancement of a juridical argument. What Cruc´e proposes is a political calculation, which he feels is straightforward since ‘for so long as the Sovereigns remain separated, that they have no communication with one another by means of their ambassadors, they will try to aggrandize themselves at any cost, whatsoever and will find sufficient pretexts to encroach the ones upon the others’.201 But the particular political advice he offers is remarkably different from the political writings of Rohan, B´ethune and Sully. In stark contrast to the 195

196 197 199 201

This argument is put forward repeatedly by Cruc´e. See in particular Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 270: ‘It is folly to think that commerce degrades nobility. ( . . . ) also many Princes to-day mock at such scruples, recognizing that there is no gain more legitimate than that of trade’. See also Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 300. See also P. Louis-Luca, Un plan de paix g´en´erale et de libert´e du commerce au XVIIe si`ecle. Le Nouveau ´ eric Cruc´e (Paris 1919) and Eliav-Feldon, “Universal Peace for the Benefit of Trade”. Cyn´ee d’Em´ 198 Cruc´ Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 122. e, The New Cyneas, p. 122. 200 Balch, Em´ ´ eric Cruc´e, p. 63. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 130. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 130.

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sweeping changes envisaged in the Grand Design by Sully202 , Cruc´e holds ‘that nothing can save an empire, except a universal peace, of which the principal means consists in the limitation of the monarchies, so that each Prince remains within the limits of the lands which he possesses at present, and that he does not pass beyond them for any pretences’.203 Cruc´e knew that in order to establish an international assembly with the rights and powers he envisaged and believed necessary, a real transformation of power had to occur. That is to say, something very similar to a social contract effectively needed to be signed between the different states. It was thus not enough to legitimise power by the fiction of a contract, as such an agreement had to occur in the realm of politics with the de facto transfer of power from the sovereign states to the newly established international tribunal. Cruc´e identified the problem that privileged sovereigns would be reluctant to give up any of their sovereign rights.204 His task is thus to persuade the sovereigns of the advantages such a transfer of power would entail for them. He rather cunningly employs the idea of monarchical authority to serve the advancement of peace, through the establishment of international institutions.205 When Cruc´e addresses this key problem, his prose at times achieves true lyricism. When he deliberates on ways to provide the reliability and continuity necessary for the envisaged peace, he employs the allegory of foul weather, for ‘it seems that calm weather cannot last long in the ocean of our affairs, where the impetuous winds of ambition excite so many storms. Suppose for instance that peace is signed to-day, that it is published to the whole world: how do we know that posterity will ratify the articles. Opinions are changeable, and the actions of the men of the present time do not bind their successors’.206 The issue of trustworthiness is an underlying theme in Cruc´e’s reasoning. If reliability cannot be guaranteed by the declaration of a prince, only the 202 203 204

205 206

Burke, “Did Europe Exist before 1700?”, p. 26 does not differentiate at all between the proposals put forward by Sully and Cruc´e respectively. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 128f. The proponents of the reason of state theory were aware of the inherent structural problem of not having a judge or arbiter above the sovereign states. This predicament was, however, willingly accepted as a price to pay in interstate relations, as it also meant that the princes enjoyed – at least in theory – absolute sovereignty in the state. See as a very pertinent example B´ethune, Le Conseiller d’Estat, p. 304: ‘Car ils [the states] n’ont parmy eux aucune autorit´e, soit Conseil, ou autre qui puisse commander a` tous, & les accorder en cas de diversit´e d’advis, ou de division; pource que s’estimans tous Souverains ils ne veulent rien establir par dessus eux’. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 134: ‘Only let peace be published By the orders of the King. These words will make their arms drop from their hands’. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 102.

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establishment of enduring institutions will provide necessary stability. The only remedy available is to establish a general assembly with the necessary powers and competence to intervene whenever the assembly deems it necessary.207 Cruc´e goes into detail expounding the practical aspects of how to organise these international institutions. By including all monarchies and states of the world in his project for peace, he is committed to providing an adequate and acceptable hierarchy of these different powers for the envisaged distribution of seats in the international assembly. The first in rank, though not the first in de facto power, is the Pope. ‘As for the second, if honor must be attributed to Princes according to the majesty, power, and happiness of their monarchy, these qualities are found so marked in the Emperor of the Turks, that this seat cannot be denied him, especially as he also holds the city of Constantinople, seat of the Eastern Empire, which is the twin equal of Rome’.208 This is another striking difference to Sully’s Grand Design.209 Not only are the Turks included in Cruc´e’s peace plan, but they are given a station above the European crowns, including the Emperor, who should ‘be content with the third place’.210 The issue of ceremony and rank was of the utmost importance to European and nonEuropean monarchs alike.211 Cruc´e’s suggestion that the Turkish Sultan, or Eastern Emperor as he did not hesitate to call him, should be considered second in rank among all rulers of the world could scarcely have been acceptable to European monarchs. Nevertheless, given the importance of Christians and Turks agreeing on the roadmap for universal peace, only the allocation of such a prestigious rank within the framework of the envisaged peace would convince the 207

208 209

210 211

Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 102: ‘It would be necessary to choose a city, where all sovereigns should have perpetually their ambassadors, in order that the differences that might arise should be settled by the judgement of the whole assembly’. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 108. Ever since Erasmus, European peace plans worked on the assumption and used the rhetoric that Europe ought to be united against the infidels. These plans thus drew to a certain extent on the tradition of the crusades of the Middle Ages. Cf., for instance, Burke, “Did Europe Exist before 1700?”, p. 24 and Eliav-Feldon, “Grand Designs. The Peace Plans of the Late Renaissance”, p. 61: ‘The one major motivation for Europeans to cease infighting and to unite forces was the fear of the Turk’. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 108. Our understanding of the importance of ceremony and its impact on the exercise of political power has greatly improved thanks to recent research in this area. See notably P. Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640 (Cambridge 1995), M. H. Cole, The Portable Queen: Elizabeth I and the Politics of Ceremony (Amherst 1999), L. M. Bryant, The King and the City in the Parisian Royal Entry Ceremony: Politics, Ritual and Art in the Renaissance (Geneva 1986), Stollberg-Rilinger, The Emperor’s Old Clothes, B. Stollberg-Rilinger (ed.), Spektakel der Macht: Rituale im alten Europa, 800–1800 (Darmstadt 2008).

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Turks to join such an enterprise. Indeed, almost from the outset of his Nouveau Cyn´ee, Cruc´e maintains that the Turks and Christians ‘are so to speak natural enemies, and have divided almost all the world into two parts, because of the diversity of their religion, so much so that if they could agree, it would be a great step forward to universal peace’.212 A prerequisite for universal peace is, therefore, an understanding between the Christian and Ottoman powers. This explains the prominent rank Cruc´e accorded to the Sultan; but does not in itself imply that Cruc´e holds the Turks in particularly high regard. Towards the end of his Nouveau Cyn´ee, Cruc´e makes it clear that the initiative has to come from the European powers: ‘There will be perhaps a little difficulty to bring back to a peaceful life the Turks and the Tatars, who do not voluntarily do any other work except war: but those people show such obedience to their Princes, that seeing them resolved to peace, they will not dare to contradict them’.213 He relates in detail that ‘as regards the Mehometans, who form a notable part of the world, the King of France, on account of the credit and reputation that he has among them, will more easily make them condescend to peace’.214 To avoid creating the impression among the Turks that peace was sought by the European monarchs only due to their fear of the Muslim power, Cruc´e suggests that the Habsburgs should not propose the peace plan directly to the Turks, but the king of France should take this first step, ‘since he has no reason to fear the Emperor of the Turks: that is why he can honourably undertake this affair’.215 It is in this context that Cruc´e charged the European heads of state with a moral and political obligation to make progress towards international peace. For this to happen two things needed to be achieved at more or less the same time. Firstly, the Christian princes ought to put their animosities and conflicts aside. Secondly, a move towards the Turks had to be undertaken to persuade them to join in the project for universal peace. Once these two strategic aims are achieved, Cruc´e does not doubt that the whole world can be pacified: ‘it is very fitting that the Christians should speak peace first, if it were only to have the freedom of going to the holy sepulchre, and they being in accord with the Turk will also be able without difficulty to obtain peace from the other monarchs, who are not strong enough to resist two such powerful parties’.216 Apart from the king of France, the Pope is singled out, because ‘in order to begin this affair 212 214 216

Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 34. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 342. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 344.

213 215

Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 134. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 344.

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properly, it would be necessary that a powerful Prince should exhort all the others to follow the regulation described ( . . . ), in order that the passages being free and commerce being open by means of peace, one can trade everywhere without damage. There is no one more capable of that than the Pope. It is his duty to bring about a general peace concord between the Christian Princes’.217 Despite the existing confessional differences in Europe, the Pope is proposed as the best person to unite the European heads of state. At the time of the publication of the Nouveau Cyn´ee, Urban VIII had just been elected new Pope after Gregor XV’s short pontificate from 1621 to 1623. It is, therefore, unlikely that Cruc´e invested any specific hope in the person of any particular Pope.218 Even more astonishing is that he entrusts the Papacy with such a crucial role for the realisation of his peace plan. Perhaps it was more likely that such a design would be supported by the Papacy than by any of the European monarchs, who were all in different ways preoccupied in the pursuit of their particular interests.219 For Cruc´e at least, the office of Pope still possessed sufficient political and moral authority to initiate a coming together of Catholic and Protestant princes alike. Protestants would have greeted such a move with hesitation and suspicion, especially in those parts of Europe where civil strife or even war among different countries was fuelled by confessional disputes. Cruc´e’s assertion that ‘the differences of religion cannot prevent universal peace’220 might therefore not have been sufficient to overcome the obvious existing obstacles. Where Cruc´e does discuss differences in religious belief, he is careful not to use the term heretic when discussing the rival confessions. Only by instruction and good example should one try to convince those of a different confession to change their religious practice and belief. Interestingly, the existence of different confessions among the Christians, and the differences between the various religions, in particular those between Muslims and Christians, are not of major concern for Cruc´e. He appears to be keen to play down religion as a divisive factor in interstate 217 218 219

220

Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 342. See L. Pastor, Geschichte der P¨apste seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters, vol. XIII.1.: Gregor XV. (1621–1623); Urban VIII. (1623–1644) (Freiburg 1939) and Wright, The Early Modern Papacy. This is particularly true for the two Habsburg branches, which are by now both at war with their Protestant adversaries. The battle at the white mountain on 8 November 1620 had brought the first victory for the imperial forces in what was to become the Thirty Years War. In 1621 and 1622 Tilly was also victorious against Count Mansfeld, who was supported by Dutch subsidies. The truce between Spain and the Netherlands expired in 1621 and Spain began its campaign against the Netherlands. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 102.

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relations. Thus, religion is not listed as itself a valid reason for going to war, experience having shown that it ‘serves most often as a pretext’.221 Within this treatment of religion considerably more space is given to a discussion of the various distinct religions than to the question of interconfessional conflicts among Christians. As in his ‘cosmopolitan’ argument concerning international trade, Cruc´e envisages a bond between all human beings regardless of their religion: ‘how is it possible, some one will say, to bring in accord peoples who are so different in wishes and affections, as the Turk and the Persian, the Frenchman and the Spaniard, the Chinese and the Tatar, the Christian and the Jew or Mohammetan? I say that such hostilities are only political, and cannot take away the connection that is and must be between men’.222 Therefore, any solution to the problem of how best to organise and provide a reliable order of states must be primarily political, and should not take religious issues as its dominant framework. Since all religions tend towards the same end, namely the adoration of the divinity, the differences that exist between different religions should not be perceived as an obstacle to peace. Nor should the Christians ‘persecute those who do not wish to embrace’223 the Christian faith. Discussion of pirates is given similar weight and space in the Nouveau Cyn´ee as the issue of religion. Cruc´e is no different to other political thinkers of the time in perceiving pirates as figures excluded from civilised society and living outside the legal order of the international community. Specifically, he views pirates as a threat to international trade and commerce.224 This is the main reason behind Cruc´e’s discussion of the issue. Thus, while initially his position might seem close to those of Bodin and, in particular, Gentili, his motivation is from the outset very different. It is true that Cruc´e, too, envisages pirates and the savage people of the new world as occupying a similar conceptual space, both existing outside the civilised community: ‘I place among beasts savage peoples who do not reason. They will give likewise a just object of war, as well as pirates and thieves who have no calling except brigandage’.225 But this is already as far as any parallel between Gentili and Cruc´e might go regarding the question of piracy. Unlike Gentili, Cruc´e likens pirates neither to atheists nor to Turks. On 221 223 224

225

222 Cruc´ Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 20. e, The New Cyneas, p. 84. Cf. also p. 86. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 88. See notably Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 76. Cruc´e demands that the heads of state should ‘free their coasts of brigandage, and by this means commerce being assured men will have a fine occasion to give themselves up to trade as well by sea as by land’. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 52. Compare Gentili, The Three Books on the Law of War, p. 22. See also the discussion in Chapter 1.3.

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the contrary, despite his rather brutal claims about such men, he argues that they must be dealt with not only militarily but also politically. For Gentili it was impossible to include pirates in a legal framework as their very raison d’ˆetre rested on the fact that they were outside any law226 ; what proved problematic was his polemical and discriminatory use of the case of ‘the pirate’ to exclude other groups from a legal existence. Cruc´e takes the opposite approach, and his political answer to the problem of piracy is as a result more flexible and hence more appropriate to the challenge at hand. His aim is indeed to purge the world of the pirates, which is difficult as they ‘are more difficult to catch, because of the wide extent of the sea, which serves them as an asylum and refuge’.227 If, however, ‘the Kings and potentates of to-day have a good understanding together, they can in a short time sweep the sea free of these brigands. It is a shame that not only they are tolerated, but also that they are given important places for refuges, such as Algiers in Barbary’.228 The problem is not only the indulgence some monarchs show towards pirates, but also the use these monarchs make of them in their own political schemes, a situation that, according to Cruc´e, has to end. However, Cruc´e does not suggest that an outright war should be immediately declared against the pirates of the world. Instead, he advocates ‘to try in the first place mildness, and offer them some honest salary’.229 This suggestion demonstrates awareness of the ambiguous place pirates occupied within interstate relations, as they were frequently employed by sovereign states to act against enemy states. We thus find a more nuanced and less polemical discussion of piracy in the Nouveau Cyn´ee than in Gentili, despite the latter’s authorship of the most detailed discussion of piracy in the legal writings on international law of this period. Cruc´e advances an economic and political argument when he demands that pirates be offered land to allow them to support themselves honestly, thus preventing poverty from forcing them to continue their ‘illicit existence’.230 This far-sighted argument leaves no doubt that a proper calculation of the costs involved would always favour such an attempt. Rather than to try to prosecute pirates, it would be less expensive in the long run to provide ‘some permanent 226

227 229

Even today this remains a highly charged problem in international law, which reoccurred in different forms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the concepts of the partisan and terrorist. Still unparalleled on this subject is the discussion by C. Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan, translated by G. L. Ulmen (New York 2007). See also G. Slomp, Carl Schmitt and the Politics of Hostility, Violence and Terror (Houndmills 2009) and P. Schr¨oder, “Der Feind hors la loi – Piraten, Partisanen und Terroristen” in Freund-Feind-Denken, ed. by R. Voigt (Stuttgart 2011), p. 195–212. 228 Cruc´ Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 68. e, The New Cyneas, p. 68. 230 Cruc´ Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 70. e, The New Cyneas, p. 70.

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position’231 for them. In modern parlance, Cruc´e aimed to eradicate the social reasons for the existence of piracy: ‘This liberality would be done at the public expense, but it would receive the profit. One buys sometimes peace very dearly from an enemy. Why not anticipate the bad designs of those people, who denounce war to all the world, by an honest liberality, which would soften their hearts ( . . . ) and reduce them to a tranquil life?’232 Only if all these measures fail, Cruc´e asserts that those who ‘continue their stealings, ( . . . ) must be pursued ( . . . ) without mercy’.233 The way in which Cruc´e considers the question of pirates and Turks, incorporating them within his plan for univesal peace, makes for a remarkable vision of interstate relations. The issue of religious conflict, either interconfessional or between the different religions, is downplayed as a divisive factor in interstate relations: ‘it does not belong to men to punish or correct the mistakes of faith’.234 In this respect, his position in many ways resembles demands made by Protestants, who tried to provide a universally valid answer to the confessional conflicts in Europe through a profound reformulation of the natural law tradition. Unlike them, however, Cruc´e neither refers to the natural law tradition, nor does he make any use of just war theory. Instead, he reformulates the notion of interest. Human interest in commerce and trade is flagged up as a strong incentive to establish universal peace. Neither a balance of power, nor a universal monarchy would be able to achieve a reliable and lasting peace. Cruc´e understood the underlying problems posed by the refusal of sovereign states to accept a superior power or arbiter, resulting in anarchical interstate relations.235 His proposed international assembly was intended to amend the structural deficiencies of such interstate relations. This would establish the conditions to trust other states. It would grant stability by providing an institutional structure to arbitrate emerging differences or conflicts, eliminating the need to go to war. A further consequence of this stability would be enhanced prosperity and an increase in trade. Fear of the breach of treaties and apprehension about how far to trust other states would fade. In a word, if the rulers of the world were to agree to establish a general council, as suggested by Cruc´e, they ‘would receive the principal 231 232 233 235

Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 70. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 72. The way the Turks managed and domesticated the pirates under the leadership of Barbarossa serves Cruc´e as the most impressive historical example. 234 Cruc´ Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 74. e, The New Cyneas, p. 98. Cruc´e refers critically to Jean Bodin and his theory of sovereignty throughout his writing, especially in view of the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire. See notably Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 112 and p. 320.

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fruit of universal peace. For they strive in vain in their present state. Let them fortify themselves with alliances as much as they wish, let them build citadels, and arm themselves on every hand, they will always have reason for fear if they do not agree unanimously upon a general concord’.236 Those237 who argue that early plans for some form of European federation can be found in this period should perhaps turn to Cruc´e rather than to Sully. The latter wrote within the reason of state tradition, advancing arguments which are very similar to those of B´ethune and Rohan, indeed also of Bodin and Machiavelli. Cruc´e’s plan, on the other hand, is not exclusively European, but a rare early modern attempt to include the whole world, and notably the Turks, in a peace which provides international institutions to negotiate between different interests and arbitrate potential conflicts. Cruc´e was prepared to trust the other non-European powers and the pirates who infested the trading routes. Instead of perceiving them as alien and outlaws, he endeavoured to include them in his scheme. By deploying trust in this manner Cruc´e demonstrates a dynamic understanding of trust. He chose to trust, and by extending trust on this scale, he was prepared to introduce a certain trust-specific vulnerability.238 This kind of initially one-sided trustworthiness was quite daring, and many would indeed claim it was too great a risk to take. 236 238

237 See the discussion at the beginning of this chapter. Cruc´e, The New Cyneas, p. 124. Modern scholarship has too often relied on a static concept of trust, which is taken as an anthropological or psychological given. See the pertinent criticism by Hartmann, “On the Concept of Basic Trust”, p. 8: ‘many authors working with the concept of basic trust treat it as a simple given that may be destroyed but that seems to have no history’.

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c h a p ter 3

Jus Naturae Et Gentium – The Limits of a Juridical Order

Natural public law ‘is a new discipline that emerged in the seventeenth century. It ( . . . ) represents one of the two characteristically modern forms of political philosophy, the other form being politics in the sense of Machiavellian reason of state’.1 The emergence of natural public law had significant implications for international political thought, as Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf developed their ‘three foundational approaches to international order and law’.2 The interpretation of the philosophical relationship of these three figures is controversial.3 However, the importance of their contribution is not contested.4 In many ways 1 2

3

4

Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 190. B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann, “State of Nature versus Commercial Society as the Basis of International Law: Reflections on the Roman Foundations and Current Interpretation of the International Political and Legal Thought of Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf” in The Philosophy of International Law, ed. by S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (Oxford 2010), p. 33. A good overview about the anglophone controversy concerning the relationship of Grotius and Hobbes is to be found in M. Harvey, “Grotius and Hobbes” in British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (2006), p. 27–50. On Grotius and Hobbes, see also B. Ludwig, “Auf dem Wege zu einer s¨akularen Moralwissenschaft: Von Hugo Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis zu Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan” in Jahrbuch f¨ur Recht und Ethik 8 (2000), p. 3–31 and P. Schr¨oder, “Freiheit und Herrschaft in den Rechtslehren von Grotius und Hobbes” in Staat bei Hugo Grotius, ed. by N. Konegen and P. Nitschke (Baden-Baden 2005), p. 107–123. On Pufendorf and his relationship to Grotius and Hobbes, the work by Fiammetta Palladini is important, and now partly accessible in English. F. Palladini, Samuel Pufendorf Discepolo di Hobbes. Per una reinterpretazione del Giusnaturalismo moderno (Bologna 1990), F. Palladini, “Appetitus Societatis in Grozio e Socialitas in Pufendorf” in Filosofia Politica X (1996), p. 61–70 and F. Palladini, “Pufendorf Disciple of Hobbes: The Nature of Man and the State of Nature: The Doctrine of Socialitas” in History of European Ideas 34 (2008), p. 26–60. Many general accounts of Grotius’s importance for international law read along similar lines to Hans Morgenthau’s assessment. ‘A core of rules of international law laying down the rights and duties of states in relation to each other developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These rules of international law were securely established in 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia brought the religious wars to an end and made the territorial state the cornerstone of the modern state system. Hugo Grotius’s On the Law of War and Peace ( . . . ) is the classic codification of that early system of international law’. H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York 1973), p. 272. See the criticism by Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, p. 251–288. For further discussion of the context of Grotius’s The Right of

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Grotius was much closer to the views of the Spanish scholastics than he himself and his later interpreters and followers were prepared to admit.5 Notably Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius claimed that Grotius was part of a modern natural law tradition which, for them, marked a divergence from scholasticism. In particular, Thomasius proposed a history of natural law which was rife with invectives against the scholastics, a history culminating in the alternative of an alleged coherent development from ‘the incomparable Hugo Grotius who can never be praised too much’ to ‘the blessed Baron Pufendorf and his opponents, when he attacked the irrational opinions of the scholastics’.6 Most natural law thinkers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries followed Pufendorf’s natural law doctrine and implicitly his interpretation of Grotius. But what are the limits of natural law for regulating interstate relations? What is the role of trust within natural law and its application to the international sphere, and how is trust used by Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf?7 Do their accounts differ?

5

6

7

War and Peace, see also E. Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge 2002), p. 40 and B. Kingsburry and A. Roberts, “Introduction” in Hugo Grotius and International Relations, ed. by H. Bull, B. Kingsbury and A. Roberts (Oxford 1990), p. 3f. See also H. Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law” in British Year Book of International Law 23 (1946), p. 1–53 and K. Haakonssen, “Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought” in Political Theory 13 (1985), p. 239–265. For discussion of the similarities between Su´arez and Grotius, see P. Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (Paris 1983), p. 521, and now D. Recknagel, Einheit des Denkens trotz konfessioneller Spaltung. Parallelen zwischen den Rechtslehren von Francisco Su´arez und Hugo Grotius (Frankfurt am Main 2010) and Panizza, “Political Theory and Jurisprudence”, p. 216: ‘the content of Grotius’ new rationalistic science of natural rights and the scholastic-theological theories of international justice remained remarkably similar. In brief, the differences between Grotius and the Spanish theologians mostly concern only the formal structure of their discourse, not the substance’. A. Brett, “Natural Right and Civil Community: The Civil Philosophy of Hugo Grotius” in The Historical Journal 45 (2002), p. 50 cautions that we should not ‘assimilate Grotius with Su´arez and the scholastic Aristotelians’. C. Thomasius, “On the History of Natural Law until Grotius” in Essays on Church, State and Politics, ed. by I. Hunter et al. (Indianapolis 2007), p. 44 and 46f. This essay was the foreword by Thomasius to the first German translation of Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis. Adam Friedrich Glafey made a very similar point when he claimed: ‘Eben also fieng mit Grotio ein neuer Periodus an, in welchem die Gelehrten im Studio Juris Nat. weiter nichts thaten, als daß sie u¨ ber dessen Jus B & P [i.e. the Latin abbreviation of Grotius’s On the Law of War and Peace] disputirten, commentirten selbige in Compendia und Tabellen brachten, und endlich gar in andere Sprachen u¨ bersetzten. Dieses dauerte so lange, bis Pufendorff auftrat’. A. F. Glafey, Vollst¨andige Geschichte des Rechts der Vernunfft, worinnen in dieser Wissenschaft ans Licht getretenen Schriften nach ihrem Inhalt und wahren Werth beurtheilet (Leipzig 1739), p. 111. See also the discussion by F. Grunert, “The Reception of Hugo Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis in the Early German Enlightenment” in Early Modern Natural Law Theories: Contexts and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment, ed. by T. Hochstrasser and P. Schr¨oder (Dordrecht 2003), p. 89–105 and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy. A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge 1998), p. 66–70. On Grotius’s use of trust, though not in the context of international political thought, see Fikentscher, De fide et perfidia and challenging Fikentscher H. Blom, “The Meaning of Trust: Fides between SelfInterest and appetitus societatis” in The Roots of International Law, ed. by P.-M. Dupuy and V. Chetail (Leiden 2014), p. 39–58.

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To what extent can it be argued that Pufendorf advanced the positions he found in Grotius and Hobbes? When locating Hobbes within the development of early modern natural law regarding interstate relations, it gives pause for thought that for Emer de Vattel, author of ‘the most important book on the law of nations in the eighteenth century’8 , ‘Hobbes was ( . . . ) the first who gave a distinct though imperfect idea of the law of nations. He divides the law of nature into that of man, and that of states: and the latter is, according to him, what we usually call the law of nations. ( . . . ) This author has well observed, that the law of nations is the law of nature applied to states or nations. But we shall see in the course of this work, that he was mistaken in the idea that the law of nature does not suffer any necessary change in that application ( . . . ). Pufendorf declares he unreservedly subscribes to this opinion espoused by Hobbes. He has not therefore separately treated of the law of nations but has every-where blended it with the law of nature properly so called’.9 Vattel was rather dismissive about Grotius but highlighted the importance of Hobbes and Pufendorf, while reserving his main praise for Christian Wolff.10 The fundamental difference between Grotius and Hobbes is not only to be seen in Grotius’s idealism and Hobbes’s voluntarism.11 Hobbes wanted to demonstrate that political order and state sovereignty were preconditions of law. Law had to achieve security and should not be concerned with ideal eternal values. It was in this sense that he transferred the voluntarism of the Deus aeternus he had found in Duns Scotus and Ockham to the state, the Deus mortalis. Grotius pursued the opposite route and enquired into the eternal ideal character of natural law. These differences inform their take on trustworthiness. Hobbes is more sceptical about the possibility of trust among humans and states alike, whereas Grotius’s concept of natural law presupposes the reasonable possibility of trust. In his main 8 9 10

11

B. Kapossy and R. Whatmore, “Introduction” in E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, ed. by B. Kapossy and R. Whatmore (Indianapolis 2008), p. IX. Vattel, The Law of Nations, p. 8f. Christian Wolff (1679–1754) belonged to a later generation within the tradition of natural law. ‘Wolff’s most well-known follower, the Swiss Emer de Vattel (1714–1767), transposed Wolff’s abstractions into the most widely used textbook of the law of nations in the late eighteenth century’. M. Koskenniemi, “Transformations of Natural Law. Germany 1648–1815” in The Oxford Handbook of International Law, ed. by A. Orford and F. Hoffmann (Oxford 2016), p. 67. For discussion of the terms voluntarism and idealism in Hobbes and Grotius, see Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, p. 95–100 and H. Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit (G¨ottingen 1990), p. 114–129. On Hobbes’s voluntarism see also J. Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics in Restoration England (Rochester 1999), p. 140–172. Ian Hunter argues that ‘the depth of Pufendorf’s voluntarism ( . . . ) holds the key to his criticism and transformation of Grotius’ construction of natural law’. I. Hunter, Rival Enlightenments. Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge 2001), p. 177.

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work, The Right of War and Peace, he has several chapters on trust, and argues that ‘faith is to be kept with all sorts of Enemies’12 , even with those that are untrustworthy and ‘that are perfidious’.13 The main aim of this chapter is to show that the discussion of trust holds a crucial place within the different strands of natural law theories of Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf.14 Pursuing the meaning and use of trust in their theories will at the same time allow a re-evaluation of certain claims regarding the early modern natural law tradition. This chapter will also demonstrate how Grotius’s much more optimistic concept of natural law was employed by him within contemporary disputes.

3.1 Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) Grotius was not only of outstanding learning, but he also had experience as a lawyer as well as a politician and a diplomat.15 Although Grotius began his main work with a claim to originality, he was keen to position himself within existing traditions.16 His work abounded with references to holy scripture and ancient and medieval authorities in the humanist manner. Grotius wanted to convince his readers that he had the tradition of ancient natural law doctrine on his side. He repeatedly acknowledged the influence of the Stoics and in particular Cicero.17 Grotius founded his argument 12 13 14

15

16

17

H. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. by R. Tuck (Indianapolis 2005), p. 1533. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 1545. Hans Blom argues that Hobbes removed ‘trust out of his social logic’. Blom, “The Meaning of Trust”, p. 49. However, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 3.2, trust played an essential part within Hobbes’s political theory. During the Thirty Years War Grotius served as a Swedish diplomat at the French court. He knew how to flatter the powerful and dedicated his work The Rights of War and Peace to the French king Louis XIII. Rousseau was quick to reproach Grotius this dedication in spiteful rhetoric. J.-J. Rousseau, “The Social Contract” in The Social Contract and other Later Political Writings, ed. by V. Gourevitch (Cambridge 2003), p. 59. For the biographical details see C. Butler, The Life of Hugo Grotius (London 1826) and C. S. Edwards, Hugo Grotius. The Miracle of Holland. A Study of Political and Legal Thought (Chicago 1981). For the influence of ancient thought in Grotius’s theory, see the important study by B. Straumann, Hugo Grotius und die Antike. R¨omisches Recht und r¨omische Ethik im fr¨uhneuzeitlichen Naturrecht (Baden-Baden 2007). Haggenmacher, “Grotius and Gentili”, p. 174: ‘If anything, Grotius was “backward-looking”. Never would he – any more than Gentili – have thought of himself as the prophet of a new legal order’. Schneewind believes that it ‘would be a serious mistake’ to assume that ‘Grotius ( . . . ) was developing a Stoic doctrine of natural law for modern times’. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, p. 175. But see now against Schneewind the convincing argument by Straumann, Hugo Grotius und die Antike, p. 129–136. See also Haggenmacher, “Grotius and Gentili”, p. 172. A similar point had already been made by Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit, p. 125. For the wider context, see the articles in H. W. Blom and L. C. Winkel (eds.), Grotius and the Stoa (Grotiana 22/23, Assen 2004).

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of right and justice on man’s ‘Desire of Society’.18 Against Carneades19 , whom he briefly used as a foil to put his own argument into sharper light, Grotius defended the existence of right and justice and declared that ‘this sociability ( . . . ) is the Fountain of Right ( . . . ) to which belongs ( . . . ) the Obligation of fulfilling promises, ( . . . ) and the Merit of Punishment among Men’.20 Grotius insisted that the obligation of fulfilling promises and the possibility of punishing those who do not keep their obligations were essential for regulating interstate relations. But for him trust was not only possible because agreements could be enforced by using the threat of punishment.21 Trust needed to be advanced towards adversaries and ‘all Agreements between enemies depend upon Faith, either expressed or implied’.22 Without citing him by name, Grotius denounced Machiavelli as undermining good faith: ‘They who endeavour to instill into them [the princes] the Art of Deceiving, practise the same they teach. Their Practices cannot possibly prosper long, which render Men unsociable to Men, and hateful to GOD’.23 For Grotius there existed three different sources of international law, and he claimed in the first paragraph of the preliminary discourse that these had not been studied systematically. ‘The Civil Law, whether that of the Romans, or of any other People, many have undertaken, either to 18

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Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 79. Grotius unambiguously declared the Stoic influence on his own understanding, when he asserted (p. 81) that the disposition of social appetite had been termed okeiosis by the Stoics. See the discussion of Carneades in Chapter 1.1. Richard Tuck based his argument about scepticism and what he interprets as the humanist response in the early modern period on the reference to Carneades. See in particular R. Tuck, “The ‘modern’ Theory of Natural Law” in The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. by A. Pagden (Cambridge 1987), p. 109: ‘Grotius ( . . . ) did signal quite clearly that his main intention was to answer the sceptic [Carneades]. ( . . . ) The use of Carneades as the principal spokesman for the position which Grotius was about to attack, was, I think, unprecedented in any work on the laws of nature’. See also R. Tuck, “Grotius, Carneades and Hobbes” in Grotiana IV (1983), p. 43–62, against Tuck’s interpretation of Grotius, see Straumann, Hugo Grotius und die Antike, p. 39. Adam Friedrich Glafey’s account of Carneades in his influential history of the natural law tradition refers to this discussion. He considered Grotius’s refutation of Carneades and stated that one could either follow Grotius, or alternatively adopt Carneades’s position which would, according to his judgement, necessarily lead to Hobbes’s war of all against all. According to Glafey, Grotius and Hobbes were thus fundamentally opposed because they held a radically different position regarding Carneades. Glafey, Vollst¨andige Geschichte des Rechts der Vernunfft, p. 35–37. On Glafey see now F.-S. Schmidt Praktisches Naturrecht zwischen Thomasius und Wolff: Der V¨olkerrechtler Adam Friedrich Glafey (1692–1753) (Baden-Baden 2007). Glafey also asserted that if international politics were organised on the basis of Carneades’s principles, there would be no trust among nations. As far as I can see Glafey’s argument has not been properly appreciated so far. I plan to write on Glafey’s discussion of Carneades. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 85f. As a matter of fact, the notion of punishment is problematic in Grotius. See also Panizza, “Political Theory and Jurisprudence”, p. 234f. 23 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 1639. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 1551.

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explain by Commentaries or to draw up into short Abridgements: But the Law, which is common to many Nations or Rulers of Nations, whether derived from Nature, or instituted by Divine Commands, or introduced by Custom and tacit Consent, few have touched upon’.24 Grotius himself rather dismissively asserted: ‘I have likewise seen some particular Treatise concerning the Rights of War, some of which were written by Divines, as Franciscus Victoria ( . . . ), some by Professors of Law ( . . . ) but upon so copious a Subject, they have all of them said but very little, and most of them in such a Manner, that they have, without any Order, mixed and confounded together those Things that belong severally to the Law Natural, Divine, of Nations, Civil and Canon’.25 Grotius contrasted this tradition of thought with Gentili and Ayala.26 He distinguished between these two approaches. Despite his criticism of Gentili, Grotius reiterates in substance what he had found in Gentili’s De Iure Belli. It has been argued that ‘the key features of [the] idea of international society’ which are central to Grotius’s The Right of War and Peace‘ are all present in Gentili’s work, and Grotius adds little to Gentili’s account’.27 What Grotius added, however, was a new basis on which to build a theory of universal obligation of and trust in the norms, rules and customs of international society, which had been plunged into devastating wars.28 24

25 26

27

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Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 75. On the structure of Grotius’s work, see also C. Gellinek, “Staat und V¨olkerrecht bei Hugo Grotius” in Staat bei Hugo Grotius, ed. by N. Konegen and P. Nitschke (Baden-Baden 2005), p. 67–78. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 109. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 110: ‘What was most wanting in all those, viz. Illustrations from History, the most learned Faber has undertaken to supply ( . . . ). The same has been done more largely, and that by applying a multitude of examples to some general maxims laid down, by Balthazar Ayala, and still more largely by Albericus Gentili, whose Labour, as I know it may be serviceable to others, and confess it has been to me, so what may be faulty in his stile, in method, in distinguishing of questions, and the several kinds of right, I leave to the reader’s judgement. I say only this, that in the decision of controversies, he is often wont to follow either a few examples that are not always to be approved of, or even the authority of modern lawyers in their answers, not a few of which are accommodated to the interest of those that consult them, and not formed by the invariable rules of equity and justice. The causes, from whence a war is denominated just or unjust, Ayala has not so much as touched upon: Gentili has indeed described after his manner some of the general heads; but neither has he touched upon many famous questions, which turn upon cases that are very common’. Kingsbury, “Confronting Difference”, p. 719. I had previously followed this argument myself, but, for reasons that will become clear in this chapter, I now believe that despite the existing similarities between Grotius and Gentili, this judgement has to be further differentiated. Grotius did not explicitly refer to the Thirty Years War, but given the devastation of the renewed Dutch-Spanish war and the Thirty Years War, there can be little doubt that Grotius had these conflicts in mind when he asserted in the Prolegomena: ‘I had many and weighty Reasons inducing me to write a Treatise upon it [i.e. the right of war]. I observed throughout the Christian World a Licentiousness in regard to War, which even barbarous Nations ought to be ashamed of’. A little

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This is why Grotius so insistently tried to reintroduce the notion of legal procedures based on natural laws which he claimed to be universally accepted by all. Grotius’s criticism of Gentili targeted this problem – the ‘invariable rules of equity and justice’29 which Gentili had allegedly failed to observe were the natural laws. Following Bodin, Gentili had based his theory on the state as the only legitimate political actor in foreign politics.30 Bodin is crucial to explaining Gentili’s shift away from the scholastics, using Bodin’s insights of state sovereignty to forge a theory on which to build mutual trust and procedures of engagement even during war. Gentili not only limited ‘war to a contest between sovereign powers – whereas Grotius expressly includes private warfare in his definition – he also stressed the idea of legality and regularity which is conspicuously absent from the Dutchman’s formula’.31 The exclusion of those who were not trustworthy was a central part of Gentili’s argument; an aspect which he also found in Bodin. Grotius, on the contrary, was prepared to include even pirates in his natural law doctrine. In the chapter, ‘Concerning Faith between Enemies’ of his The Rights of War and Peace he argued that ‘such sort of People have not with others that particular Community, which the Law of Nations hath introduced between enemies engaged in solemn and compleat War. But yet, as Man they are to enjoy the common Benefits of the Law of Nature’.32 Even with pirates a relationship of trust is envisaged, since ‘it is one of the most inviolable Laws of Nature that we should perform what we promise’.33 Grotius pursued a different and in many ways much more ambitious aim than Gentili. His natural law theory claimed to be based on justice and to be applicable to all human society. The concept of the sovereign state as developed by Bodin and Gentili was only of limited concern for Grotius’s theory. Although the sovereign state was also discussed by Grotius, ‘his ultimate frame of reference remains the Ciceronian humani generis societas inherited from Stoicism, a society of mankind rather than of states’.34

29 30 31 32 33

later this is, however, contradicted by Grotius: ‘He will do me wrong whoever shall think that I had Regard to any Controversies of the present Age’. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 106 and p. 131. For further discussion see P. Piirim¨ae, “Just War in History and Practice: The Legitimation of Swedish Intervention in the Thirty Years War” in The Historical Journal 45 (2002), p. 499–523 and more generally K. Repgen, “Kriegslegitimationen in Alteuropa. Entwurf einer historischen Typologie” in Historische Zeitschrift 241 (1985), p. 27–49. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 110. See the discussion in Chapter 1. The same point is made by Haggenmacher, “Grotius and Gentili”. Haggenmacher, “Grotius and Gentili”, p. 169. See a similar argument by Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 159f. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 1536f. 34 Haggenmacher, “Grotius and Gentili”. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 1537.

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That natural laws are not easily intelligible is denied by Grotius. He reports that his ‘first care was, to refer the Proofs of those Things that belong to the Law of Nature to some such certain Notions, as none can deny, without doing Violence to his Judgement. For the Principles of that Law, if you rightly consider, are manifest and self-evident’.35 But there remained a fundamental problem: on which basis could a binding force of the natural laws be founded? The answer Grotius gives is not much different from Aquinas: ‘Natural Right is the Rule and Dictate of Right Reason, shewing the Moral Deformity or Moral Necessity there is in any Act, according to its Suitableness or Unsuitableness to a reasonable Nature, and consequently, that such an Act is either forbid or commanded by GOD, the Author of Nature’.36 Without the reference to God Grotius’s whole system of obligatory natural laws would falter. By allowing, a degree of divine voluntarism, Grotius shifts the ground of the argument from the political sphere as found in Bodin and Gentili towards the realm of morality and the fear of God. Much has been made of Grotius’s proposition that his theory would be valid even if ‘we should ( . . . ) grant, what without the greatest Wickedness cannot be granted, that there is no God, or that he takes no care of human Affairs’.37 The Spanish scholastic, Su´arez38 , had made the same point when he declared that Gregory of Rimini39 had previously argued ‘that even if God did not exist, or if He did not make use of reason, or if He did not judge of things correctly, nevertheless, if the same dictates of right reason dwelt within man ( . . . ) those dictates would still have the same legal character’.40 It was not a matter of doubting the existence of God. What these thinkers wanted to show was that their perception of natural law would be valid even if there were no God, a position very different from ‘a wholly secular theory of natural law’.41 It is this understanding of 35 36 38

39 40 41

Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 110. 37 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 89. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 150f. See with further references the discussion in P. Zagorin, “Hobbes without Grotius” in History of Political Thought 21 (2000), p. 28f. and Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, p. 68f. and p. 73f. Martin van Gelderen put the emphasis of the Spanish influence on Grotius differently. He stressed that ‘Grotius constricts his civil philosophy in permanent dialogue with leading Neoscholastics, not just with Vitoria, but also with Domingo de Soto and above all with Fernando V`azquez’. Gelderen, “Universal Monarchy, the Rights of War and Peace and the Balance of Power”, p. 59. Gregory of Rimini was not the only medieval thinker who had made such a hypothetical assumption. For the wider context, see Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit, p. 94. F. Su´arez, “On the Laws and God the Lawgiver” in Selection from Three Works of Francisco Su´arez vol. 2, ed. by J. B. Scott (Oxford 1944), p. 190. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, p. 67. See also Haggenmacher, “Grotius and Gentili”, p. 171 and Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit, p. 104.

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the validity of natural law that limits divine voluntarism because even an omnipotent God cannot change the natural laws by his volition. Grotius’s view of the normative value of natural law oscillates between the dictates of right reason and God’s command: ‘And this now is another Original of Right, besides that of Nature, being that which proceeds from the free Will of God, to which our Understanding infallibly assures us, we ought to be subject: And even the Law of Nature itself, whether it be that which consists in the Maintenance of Society, or that which in a looser Sense is so called, though it flows from the internal Principles of Man, may notwithstanding be justly ascribed to God, because it was his pleasure that these Principles should be in us’.42 Regarding the status of natural law Su´arez took a middle course: ‘not only does the natural law indicate what is good and evil, but furthermore, it contains its own prohibition of evil and command of good’.43 Su´arez’s position informed Grotius’s theory of natural law, whereas Hobbes fundamentally opposed such an interpretation of natural law. For the latter the idea that in view of war there could be a meaningful discussion of right and wrong or just and unjust was inconceivable.44 How are these contradictory positions related to the meaning of trust?45 Above all, does the obligation of right cease in war? Grotius develops his concept of natural law to demonstrate ‘that on the contrary, no War ought to be so much as undertaken but for the obtaining of Right; nor when undertaken, ought it to be carried on beyond the bounds of Justice and Fidelity’.46 Fidelity is thus accorded the same importance as justice, with 42 43 44

45

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Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 90f. Su´arez, “On the Laws and God the Lawgiver”, p. 191. These fundamental and substantial differences are not discussed by Richard Tuck, who insists onesidedly on the similarities of Hobbes and Grotius. Cf. Tuck, “Grotius, Carneades and Hobbes”, p. 43–62, Tuck, “The ‘modern’ Theory of Natural Law”, p. 99–119 and Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace. For criticism of the position put forward by Tuck, see in particular R. S. Shaver, “Grotius on Scepticism and Self-Interest” in Archiv f¨ur Geschichte der Philosophie 78 (1996), p. 27–47 and Zagorin, “Hobbes without Grotius”, p. 16–40. Pufendorf will find himself left with the task of trying, if not to reconcile these positions, at least to see to what extent they could be aligned within his natural law theory. See S. Pufendorf, “Elements of Universal Jurisprudence” in The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf, ed. by C. L. Carr and translated by M. Seidler (Oxford 1994), p. 84. Fur further discussion, see Chapter 3.3 and Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit, p. 130, H. Welzel, Die Naturrechtslehre Samuel Pufendorfs. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin 1986), p. 41, H. Medick, Naturzustand und Naturgeschichte der b¨urgerlichen Gesellschaft. Die Urspr¨unge der b¨urgerlichen Sozialtheorie bei Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke und Adam Smith (G¨ottingen 1981), P. Schr¨oder, Naturrecht und absolutistisches Staatsrecht. Eine vergleichende Studie zu Thomas Hobbes und Christian Thomasius (Berlin 2001), p. 66–99, T. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment (Cambridge 2000) and Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, p. 148–196. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 101.

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both seen as means to foster peaceful relations among states. Grotius needed to rely on justice and fidelity to compensate for the shortcoming of juridical obligation, and to treat the conduct of war in a way analogous to judicial proceedings: ‘to render Wars just, they are to be waged with no less Care and Integrity, than judicial Proceedings’.47 Grotius relies on the natural law and just war theory developed by the Spanish scholastics, but puts these to different use, advancing the existing tradition by viewing natural law as universal, transcending the contemporary confessional division of Europe.48 However, this claim to universality was contested. Depending on the contingent outcome of war, one of the conflicting parties would find itself in the position of being judge over the other. Discussion of punishment played a major part in international political thought. Theologians and jurists alike were readily prepared to consider the exercise of punitive war. In the early seventeenth century the issue of punishment was taken up by Grotius.49 He asked whether ‘the power to punish [is not] essentially a power which pertains to the state’50 , only to deny it emphatically: ‘Not at all! On the contrary, just as every right of the magistrate comes to him from the state, so has the same right come to the state from private individuals; ( . . . ) Therefore, since no one is able to transfer a thing that he never possessed, it is evident that the right of chastisement was held by private persons before it was held by the state. ( . . . ) The law of nature, or the law of nations, is the source from which the state receives the power in question’.51 Grotius’s claim that the right to punish was not a prerogative of the state, but belonged already to private individuals introduced a different and even more contested notion of punishment into the international sphere. To justify the capture of the Santa Catarina52 , a Portuguese carrack, in the Straits of Singapore by the Dutch captain Jacob van Heemskerck, Grotius used the notion of punishment in a polemical mode for a juridical battle. Initially, this event was not concerned with interstate relations, being an 47 48 49

50 51 52

Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 102. Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit, p. 124. For a general account of the early modern debate of punishment, see D. H¨uning, “Die Begr¨undung des ius puniendi in der Naturrechtslehre des 17. Jahrhunderts” in S. Kesper-Biermann and D. Klippel (eds.), Kriminalit¨at in Mittelalter und Fr¨uher Neuzeit (Wiesbaden 2007), p. 77–114. H. Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, ed. by M. J. v. Ittersum (Indianapolis 2006), p. 136. Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, p. 136f. As we will see in what follows, Grotius reconsidered his position in The Rights of War and Peace. Grotius provides a detailed discussion of this event in Chapter XI of his Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty.

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internal affair of the Netherlands. The United Dutch East India Company or VOC53 , under whose authority Heemskerck had sailed, attempted to convince the Estates General that the capture of the Portuguese vessel was justified. Jan ten Grootenhuys, the younger brother of the director of the VOC had approached Grotius, supplied a range of information for him and asked him to provide such a justification. The expectation was that from the reports of the VOC Grotius would, as Grootenhuys reminded him in a letter, ‘clearly understand ( . . . ) what the Portuguese have attempted against each of the voyages for the purpose of destroying our men. In addition, you will derive from them countless proofs of perfidy, tyranny, and hostility suitable to your apology. We trust that your apology, begun so felicitously, will be completed in a short while’.54 In fact, Grotius took his time to write the demanded apology for the VOC and this pi`ece d’occasion turned out to be considerably more bulky than had been expected.55 One might be tempted to argue that Grotius moved away from the specific context of this affair when he developed his argument. But it would be impossible to reconcile such an interpretation with the textual evidence. After several hundred pages of a rather general account, Grotius turned to this affair in Chapter XIV, arguing that ‘we have furnished abundant proof of the fact that the despoliation of the Portuguese because of the injuries inflicted by them, and the delivery of the captured goods into the possession of certain merchants, were deeds that conformed to the requirements of piety, nature, and custom’.56 The notion of private punishment served to justify that the VOC had a right to punish the Portuguese for their previous acts against the VOC. Thus Grotius claimed the capture of the Santa Catarina to be legitimate.57 53 54 55

56

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The acronym stands for Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie. Letter from Jan ten Grootenhuys to Hugo Grotius, 20 October 1604. This translation is taken from Appendix II of Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, p. 547. The full text was not published before 1868, only the twelfth chapter was published during Grotius’s lifetime in 1609 as Mare Liberum and quickly translated into English by Richard Hakluyt as The Free Sea. Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, p. 437. There can be no doubt that Grotius wanted to furnish arguments in favour of the VOC against, as he put it in polemical terms, ‘those persons who are deterred by preconceived false opinions from committing their judgement to the guidance of reason’. Ibid., p. 437. For the wider context, see M. van Ittersum, Profit And Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories And the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies, 1595–1615 (Leiden 2006) and the collection of earlier articles in H. W. Blom (ed.), Property, Piracy and Punishment: Hugo Grotius on War and Booty in De Iure Praedae Concepts and Contexts (Leiden 2009). Given that the argument of this text was informed by the position Grotius took in a controversial case in which he tried to defend the vested interests of the VOC, one needs to be cautious when discussing it in relation to his major work, The Rights of War and Peace, which he published a good

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When Grotius turned his attention to the issue of punishment in interstate relations in The Rights of War and Peace, he advanced a more cautious argument. In the second book he provides a substantial discussion of punishment engaging with the stoic and scholastic natural law traditions and with the existing views on punishment. He argued that the origin and nature of punishment had been misunderstood and ‘given Occasion to many Mistakes’.58 Like many of his predecessors, Grotius related punishment to the concept of justice, since it is a reaction to a wrong that has been done. In agreement with the stoics and scholastics alike, he conceptualised punishment as a means to right a wrong and thereby defend justice.59 However, the legitimate execution of punishment among states was less straightforward than he presumed. Like Vitoria60 , Grotius perceived the right to punish as a natural right which belonged to each human being. The notion of punishment is confused here and has no significant content in contrast to individual violence used in self-defence.61 Punishment is perceived by Grotius as one of the just causes of war.62 At the same time, he maintained that it was not possible that natural law could determine ‘to whom the Right of Punishing belongs. ( . . . ) For

58 59 60

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twenty years after this affair. Richard Tuck apparently does not take these differences into account and the result is that he attests Grotius ‘schizophrenia’. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, p. 63. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 949. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 949: ‘Punishment ( . . . ) in its general Acceptance is the Evil that we suffer for the Evil that we do’. Vitoria had argued that ‘the prince who wages a just war becomes ipso jure the judge of the enemy, and may punish them judicially and sentence them according to their offence’. F. Vitoria, “On the American Indians” in Vitoria Political Writings, ed. by A. Pagden and J. Lawrence (Cambridge 2003), p. 283. Given this textual evidence, there is in principle no significant contrast regarding the right to punish between Vitoria and Grotius. See the discussion of Grotius’s ‘principle of international punishment’ by Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 102f. and G. Hartung, “Von Grotius zu Pufendorf. Die Herkunft des s¨akularisierten Strafrechts aus dem Kriegsrecht der Fr¨uhen Neuzeit” in Samuel Pufendorf und die europ¨aische Fr¨uhaufkl¨arung, ed. by F. Palladini and G. Hartung (Berlin 1996), p. 130. For a much more critical discussion of the theoretical validity of punishment as a principle in interstate relations, see H¨uning, “Die Begr¨undung des ius puniendi in der Naturrechtslehre des 17. Jahrhunderts”, p. 113. H¨uning convincingly demonstrates the existing differences between Hobbes and Pufendorf on the one hand and Grotius and Locke on the other. See also D. H¨uning, “Naturzustand, nat¨urliche Strafgewalt und Staat bei John Locke” in Souver¨anit¨atskonzeptionen. Beitr¨age zur Analyse politischer Ordnungsvorstellungen im 17. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by M. Peters and P. Schr¨oder (Berlin 2000), p. 85–108, D. H¨uning, “Nonne puniendi potestas reipublicae propria est – Die naturrechtliche Begr¨undung der Strafgewalt bei Hugo Grotius” in Jahrbuch f¨ur Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics 8 (2001), p. 93–124 and D. H¨uning, “Is not the Power to Punish Essentially a Power that Pertains to the State? The Different Foundations of the Right to Punish in Early Modern Natural Law Doctrines” in Politisches Denken. Jahrbuch 2004, ed. by V. Gerhardt, H. Ottmann and M. P. Thompson (Berlin 2004), p. 43–60. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 395: ‘Most Men assign three just Causes of War, Defence, the Recovery of what’s our own, and Punishment’.

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natural reason informs us, that a Malefactor may be punished, but not who ought to punish him’.63 Natural law ‘suggests indeed so much, that it is the fittest to be done by a Superior. ( . . . ) The Consequence of which is, that a Man ought not to be punished by one who is equally guilty with himself’.64 The purpose of punishment is to deter future wrong-doing, not to justify revenge.65 Revenge leads man to unreasonable and passionate behaviour.66 Therefore only a superior authority that is not party to the conflict ought to punish those who wronged another, the twofold aim being to right the committed wrong and to deter future offences. On this basis, justice would not only depend on the goodwill of the different actors but could also be defended. Did punishment furnish a framework which would allow trust in other actors? Was it able to provide an incentive to keep obligations? Although The Rights of War and Peace was meant to supply a theory for relations among states, Grotius discussed punishment mainly in relation to the internal conduct of a state. Punishment safeguards the laws and thus permits trustworthiness among the citizens.67 Within a state, these concepts avoided the difficulties of interstate relations where a superior authority was lacking.68 To surmount the problems which come to the fore when 63 64

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Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 955. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 955. However, Grotius also claims that the right to punish malefactors ‘is a Right that by the Law of Nature everyone is invested with’. There is thus a certain tension in Grotius’s theory regarding the concept of punishment. See J. Locke, Two Treaties of Government, ed. by P. Laslett (Cambridge 1988), p. 272: ‘every Man hath a Right to punish the Offender, and be Executioner of the Law of Nature’. In view of Grotius’s argument, Locke’s claim to originality as far as the right to punish in the state of nature is concerned was certainly exaggerated. This was already observed by Tuck: Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, p. 63. Given that Grotius’s and Locke’s positions on punishment differ fundamentally from Hobbes’s theory of punishment it is surprising that Richard Tuck insisted in his later works so much on the similarities between Hobbes and Grotius and dropped this and other insights of his important earlier study on natural rights theories. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 1558: ‘he that has the Justice of the War on his Side, should obtain what he took up Arms for, and also recover the Costs and Damages, but not that he should get any Thing farther by way of Punishment, for that is odious’. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 959, where Grotius defines revenge as a ‘Desire or Appetite ( . . . ) void of all Reason’. Where the concept of the ‘contract shifts the focus of trust on to the efficacy of sanctions, and either our or a third party’s ability to enforce them if a contract is broken’. Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?”, p. 221. Grotius does not deal in any detail with the issue of universal monarchy as a concept to establish peace and order. But he is unambiguously clear that he dismisses such a concept from the outset. It is quite telling that he tackles this matter in the chapter dealing with the unjust causes of war: ‘I should not here have observed the Vanity of the Title with which some have dignified the Roman Emperor, as if Right of governing the most distant, and even undiscovered Parts of the World, was his, had not Bartolus ( . . . ) presumed to declare that Man an Heretick, who should dare to deny it; because, forsooth, the Emperor does sometimes stile himself Lord of the Universe; ( . . . ) Nor are the Arguments used by Dante for the universal Jurisdiction of the Emperor ( . . . ) at all convincing;

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considering punishment in interstate relations, Grotius formulated his idea of a societas humana. This human society does not replace the sovereign state, but it allows Grotius to apply his natural law theory to the international sphere, shifting away from interstate relations and the structural conflict of sovereign states towards the Ciceronian concept of human society. 69 Regarding punishment and trustworthiness, we need to consider, therefore, what the implications of this concept are. Did the natural right to punish undermine trust and trust-building? Or did it help to safeguard the observance of agreements and promises? The fact that the victorious party of the war assumed the role of judge and executioner of punishment against the former enemy made the notion of a punitive war problematic. As if it were not enough to lose a war, the vanquished enemy was also discriminated as the culpable and unjust party after the war had ended. Grotius conceded that ‘forasmuch as he that punishes, if he punish justly, must have a Right to punish, which Right arises from the Crime of the Delinquent’.70 He who committed a crime was aware of the consequences, ‘so that he that commits a Crime, seems voluntarily to submit himself to Punishment’.71 But would there be no dispute as to whether the civil law of a state or the universally valid natural law had been breached? Was not the initial problem to decide whether a crime had been committed in the first place? Grotius seems to suggest that this question was not contested. He went further and claimed there was ‘no great Crime that is not punishable; so that he who will directly commit it, is by Consequence willing to incur the Punishment’.72 This argument, derived from the Thomist natural law doctrine, allowed Grotius to maintain that there is no need for interpretation since the delinquent already anticipates and accepts his punishment.

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for the Advantages he proposes are counterpoised by the Inconveniences that attend them. For ( . . . ) an Empire may be extended over so great a Number of Men and Places so widely distant from each other, that the Government of it becomes a Task, to which no one Sovereign can be equal. But however, allowing what he contends for, the Expediency of such an universal Monarchy, yet the Right of Empire cannot be thence inferred. For Consent is the Original of all Right of Government’. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 1106f. D. Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge 2000), p. 108–114 offers an important discussion of ‘the British reception of Grotius’ (p. 111) and the quotation above from Grotius would also further endorse Armitage’s argument. For lack of a better term, I call this the international sphere. Cosmopolitan would be even more anachronistic. Eliav-Feldon focuses only on Grotius’s theory regarding international law for states, but not regarding human society. Her assertion that ‘Grotius ( . . . ) is best known for his international law, a law based on the assumption that aggressive relations between states could be restrained but not eradicated’ thus misses an important aspect of Grotius’s natural law theory. Eliav-Feldon, “Grand Designs. The Peace Plans of the Late Renaissance”, p. 60. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 953. 72 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 954. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 954.

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Within a state, those who commit a crime might well be aware of the consequences in the form of a threatened punishment. This notion is, however, problematic when applied to the interstate level. Grotius’s argument still relied on the medieval – Thomist – idea of universal justice which, if undermined by human wrong-doing, is re-established by punishment.73 But this would be a contradictio in adiecto, since the idea of punishment is to inflict an evil as a deterrent. To assume that those who committed a crime want to be punished empties the discussion of content. Per definitionem, punishment needs to be something the person or state on whom it is inflicted does not want! Pufendorf criticised Grotius for his attempt to deduce the right to punish in this way.74 Grotius’s argument comes full circle: ‘We must also know, that Kings, and those who are invested with a Power equal to that of Kings, have a Right to exact Punishment, not only for Injuries committed against themselves, or their Subjects, but likewise, for those which do not peculiarly concern them, but which are, in any Person whatsoever, grievous Violations of the Law of Nature or Nations. For the Liberty of consulting the Benefit of human Society, by Punishments, which at first ( . . . ) was in every particular Person, does now, since Civil Societies, and Courts of Justice, have been instituted, reside in those who are possessed of the supreme Power, and that properly, not as they have an Authority over others, but as they are in Subjection to none’. Grotius realised the problem of being judge in one’s own case (ipse judex), which he addressed on the level of the state, where he reintroduced the sovereign kings into his argument as the only authorities who could exercise punishment. However, it is still not clear who had the competence to decide in the case of interstate conflicts. The problematic principle of ipse judex remained in force among sovereigns. But if sovereign states were in subjection to none, then it is difficult to see why one sovereign state would accept punishment from another. In the end, Grotius was not in a position to provide a convincing foundation for interstate punishment. If punishment ensured the observance of natural and international law, his system either had to remain open to abuse by trespassers, or he would have to accept that those sovereigns who yielded the power to do so would decide when a breach of natural law 73 74

Hartung, “Von Grotius zu Pufendorf”, p. 128–131. Cf. S. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, ed. and translated by B. Kennet (London 1717), p. 766. Carl Schmitt concluded that compared to Gentili and Bodin, ‘let alone to the later systematic clarity and conceptual power of Hobbes, Grotius’ line of argument ( . . . ) is unsteady and uncertain’. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 159f. Gerald Hartung rightly stressed the differences regarding the right to punish between Pufendorf and Grotius. Instead he highlighted the existing ¨ ‘Ubereinstimmungen der Strafrechtslehre von Hobbes und Pufendorf’. Hartung, “Von Grotius zu Pufendorf”, p. 131f. For further discussion see Chapter 3.3.

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was committed by a member of the societas humana.75 Thus Carneades’s criticism would stand, since this would mean the establishment of right by de facto power.76 As far as international law is concerned, Grotius used the concept of punishment to justify a war as just.77 It is not the just war which puts the victor in the position to punish the enemy; rather the right to punish becomes one of the justifications for waging war.78 Grotius conceded that the exercise of state sovereignty could not be constrained by natural law: ‘between Kings and Nations ( . . . ) can be no superior Power’.79 Voluntary agreements among sovereign states might regulate interstate relations, but even such an institution as arbitration, which is not part of natural law, finds its limits: ‘for it is common agreement that gives the arbiter his authority, and no one is compelled to entrust his rights to this person’.80 Grotius used natural law to grant existing rules and procedures universal validity, grounded in an objective justice. But there was no conceptualisation of how a conflict about the very notion of justice could be mediated. The underlying assumption remained that one side of the conflicting parties was in the wrong. It was for Hobbes to cut through the abundant material Grotius had heaped in the three books of The Rights of War and Peace and to deny the appeal to higher truths and values in political conflict. Indeed, such an appeal was a dangerous weapon that set those claiming access to these higher-order values in a position to discriminate against an adversary by denying him an equal moral status. For Hobbes, trust between sovereigns – if it existed – had to be sought at a lower, less ambitious level.

3.2 Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) Although Hobbes does not develop an explicit political philosophy of interstate relations81 , his political thought offers much more to the discussion 75

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In the Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty the notion of the human race embraced also the possibility of private punishment. Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, p. 139: ‘the private avenger has in view the good of the whole human race ( . . . ); this goal corresponds exactly to that common good toward which ( . . . ) all punishments are directed in nature’s plan’. See Rousseau’s sarcastic criticism: ‘Grotius ( . . . ) most frequent mode of argument is always to establish right by fact’. Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 42. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 189 and p. 201. See also Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 160f. Or as Nietzsche put it: ‘punishment as a declaration of war’. F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. by K. Ansell-Pearson (Cambridge 2003), p. 58. See also M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison (London 1991), p. 48: ‘The right to punish ( . . . ) is an aspect of the sovereign’s right to make war on his enemies’. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 1582. Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, p. 145. When writing on Hobbes and international political thought in the late 1990s I mentioned the fact that literature dedicated to this aspect of Hobbes’s political philosophy remained rather scarce.

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of interstate relations than he is often credited with. His assertion that ‘concerning the Offices of one Souveraign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing’82 became the locus classicus for early modern political thinkers such as Samuel Pufendorf or Emer de Vattel83 , as well as modern political analysts.84 The equation of the Law of Nations with the Law of Nature follows on from Hobbes’s claim that the conditions of the state of nature persist between sovereigns, which ‘became an essential topic of political philosophy only with Hobbes’.85 For Howard Warrender, the laws of nature go beyond the famous image of Hobbesian man in the

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See P. Schr¨oder, “V¨olkerrecht und Souver¨anit¨at bei Thomas Hobbes” in Souver¨anit¨atskonzeptionen. Beitr¨age zur Analyse politischer Ordnungsvorstellungen im 17. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by M. Peters and P. Schr¨oder (Berlin 2000), p. 41. The most notable exceptions at that time were T. Airaksinen and M. A. Bertman (eds.), Hobbes: War among Nations (Farnham 1989) and P. Caws (ed.), The Causes of Quarrel. Essays on Peace, War and Thomas Hobbes (Boston 1989). This situation has since changed considerably. Among the recent work on Hobbes’s international political thought, see in particular N. Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations” in N. Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford 2002), p. 432–456, D. Armitage, “Hobbes and the Foundations of Modern International Thought” in Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, ed. by A. Brett and J. Tully (Cambridge 2006), p. 219–235, R. Prokhovnik and G. Slomp (eds.), International Political Theory after Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation (Houndmills 2011), U. Kleemeier, “Krieg und Milit¨ar in Hobbes’ Leviathan” in U. Kleemeier, Grundfragen einer philosophischen Theorie des Krieges (Berlin 2002), p. 125–213 and M. C. Williams, “The Hobbesian Theory of International Relations: Three Traditions” in Classical Theory of International Relations, ed. by B. Jahn (Cambridge 2006), p. 253–276. David Armitage provides a useful summary of the earlier literature on Hobbes’s international political thought in his essay on p. 221. For further discussion on the existing literature, see also P. Schr¨oder, Hobbes (Leipzig 2012), p. 96–107. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 244. I have traced these traditions cursorily in P. Schr¨oder, “Natural Law, Sovereignty and International Law: A Comparative Perspective” in Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty, ed. by I. Hunter and D. Saunders (Houndmills 2002), p. 204–218. On Pufendorf see also Chapter 3.3 and Kingsbury and Straumann, “State of Nature versus Commercial Society as the Basis of International Law”, p. 33–51. Although Emer de Vattel is beyond the scope of this study, see the brief discussion with further references in Chapter 3.1. Those citing Hobbes in this way include Aron, Peace & War, Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations and H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London 1984). See also the discussion in M. C. Williams, “Recasting the Hobbesian Legacy in International Political Theory” in International Political Theory after Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation, ed. by R. Prokhovnik and G. Slomp (Houndmills 2011), p. 147–167 and C. Boisen and D. Boucher, “Hobbes and the Subjection of International Relations to Law and Morality” in International Political Theory after Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation, ed. by R. Prokhovnik and G. Slomp (Houndmills 2011), p. 81–101. Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 184. Kinch Hoekstra rightly observed that ‘readers of Hobbes’s account of the natural condition of mankind would have been struck by how different it was from the prevailing contemporary view’. K. Hoekstra, “Hobbes on the Natural Condition of Mankind” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. by P. Springborg (Cambridge 2007), p. 111. See Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 90. Regarding the so-called realists C. R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton 1999), p. 31 claims that ‘International skeptics have seized on this feature of Hobbes’s theory to support the view that there are no effective moral obligations in international relations’.

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state of nature86 , extending to a significant role in interstate relations.87 However, this argument should not be embraced too hastily. We need to remind ourselves of Hobbes’s pessimistic critique of human conduct to question whether Hobbes perceived there to be a realistic chance to pacify interstate relations. Hobbes’s question is whether there can be trust between sovereign states. Distrust of other states is more likely to be justified than trust, as it is unlikely that other sovereigns’ interests will coincide with one’s own for any significant length of time. Furthermore, any alliance or interstate agreement depends entirely on the goodwill of the contracting sovereigns. Hobbes claimed, like Machiavelli though without mentioning him, that ‘most men are of evil character, bent on securing their own interest by fair means or foul; and so the man who performs his part first is laying himself open to the greed of the other party to the contract. For it is not reasonable for anyone to make performance first if it is not likely that the other will perform his part later. And it is for the fearful party to decide whether that is likely or not’.88 James Harrington89 , one of the most intelligent critics of 86

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Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 89: ‘In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty brutish, and short’. For an exhaustive discussion of Hobbes’s state of nature, see D. Eggers, Die Naturzustandstheorie des Thomas Hobbes (Berlin 2008). See H. Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Oxford 1957), p. 77f. and p. 118f. A similar argument was advanced by Schr¨oder, “V¨olkerrecht und Souver¨anit¨at bei Thomas Hobbes”, p. 44–46, Schr¨oder, “Natural Law, Sovereignty and International Law”, p. 205–207 and Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations”, p. 439: ‘Indeed, there is something very implausible about the claim that Hobbes’s laws of nature cannot apply at the international level’. T. Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. by R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne (Cambridge 1998), p. 37. See J. G. Fichte, “Machiavelli als Schriftsteller” in Werke vol. XI, ed. by I. H. Fichte (Berlin 1971), p. 420: ‘The main principle of Machiavellian politics, and we may add without reservation, also of our own, and, in our opinion, indeed of any theory of the state, which understands itself, is contained in the following words of Machiavelli: “that in constituting and legislating for a commonwealth it must needs [sic] be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers”. [Discorsi I.3, p. 111f.] It is not even necessary to discuss the question, whether this view of human nature does correspond to reality as assumed in this sentence, or not. In short, the state, as a constraining authority, does suppose humans to be thus and only this supposition justifies the existence of states’. Although there is no comprehensive study as yet on Harrington’s international political thought, see more generally J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton 1975), J. G. A. Pocock, “Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century” in J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time. Essays on Political Thought (London 1972), p. 104–147, J. Scott, “The Rapture of Motion: James Harrington’s Republicanism” in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, ed. by N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner (Cambridge 1993), p. 139–163, B. Worden, “James Harrington and ‘The Commonwealth of Oceana’, 1656” in Republicanism, Liberty and Commercial Society, 1649–1776,

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Hobbes in the seventeenth century, made a similar point: ‘they who dare trust men do not understand men; and they that dare not trust laws or orders do not understand a commonwealth’.90 In the absence of a legal and institutional framework, one only has recourse to individual judgement and self-interest, therefore there remains a risk to be taken before trust is invested in others.91 Equating interstate relations with the state of nature is not simply an abstract theoretical device. It provides concrete indicators as to the fundamental problems any theory of interstate relations must tackle.92 According to Hobbes, sovereign agents can have no appeal to arbitration for the nonperformance of promises, as there can be no judge above the sovereign. A contrast with the equivalent situation between citizens clarifies Hobbes’s insight: ‘in the civil state where there is someone to coerce both parties, whichever party is called upon by the contract to perform first should do so; since the reason why he was afraid that the other party might not perform no longer exists, as the other can be compelled’.93 The reasonable fear of non-performance is mitigated as soon as there is recourse to an institutional framework in the form of state sovereignty. Institutions and offices secure the procedures among the citizenry.94 Trust is thus not given

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ed. by D. Wootton (Stanford 1994), p. 82–138, G. Mahlberg and D. Wiemann (eds.) European Contexts for English Republicanism (Farnham 2013) and the unjustly neglected important study by A. Fukuda, Sovereignty and the Sword. Harrington, Hobbes, and Mixed Government in the English Civil Wars (Oxford 1997). J. Harrington, “A Discourse upon this Saying: The Spirit of the Nation is not yet to be Trusted with Liberty; lest it Introduce Monarchy, or Invade the Liberty of Conscience” in The Political Works of James Harrington vol. II, ed. by J. G. A. Pocock (Cambridge 1977), p. 744. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 117f.: ‘Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature ( . . . ), if there be no power errected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men’. Following Hobbes, Raymond Aron equates the state of nature with interstate relations and like Hobbes also mentions the differences between the two. Aron, Peace & War, p. 580f.: ‘Since states have not renounced taking the law into their own hands and remaining sole judges of what their honor requires, the survival of political units depends, in the final analysis, on the balance of forces, and it is the duty of statesman to be concerned, first of all, with the nation whose destiny is entrusted to them. The necessity of national egoism derives logically from what philosophers called the state of nature which rules among states. Relations among states are not, for all that, comparable to those of beasts in the jungle. Political history is not purely natural. Diplomatic-strategic conduct tends to justify itself by ideas; it claims to obey norms, to submit to principles’. In his criticism of Hobbes and the so-called realists, Charles Beitz rather misleadingly only quotes the first half of Aron’s statement. See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 28. Note for our context that Aron only emphasises fear, but not the issue of trust. Aron, ibid., p. 87: ‘sovereign states are condemned to fight each other because they fear each other’. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 37. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 96. Hegel characterised this as a ‘disposition ( . . . ) of trust’. G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. by A.W. Wood and translated by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge 1998), (§268) p. 288. He

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on the basis of a personal relationship, but citizens are asked to trust in the workings and fairness of the increasingly impersonal apparatus of the state. This route of appeal provides a secure and reliable setting for contracting agents within civil society, which is not available to sovereigns in interstate relations. However, Hobbes did not entirely dismiss the possibility of contracts in the state of nature. They could exist, even where there is no institutional framework allowing those involved to have reasonable and reliable grounds for mutual trust. ‘In every contract either both parties immediately perform what they contracted to do, so that neither trusts anything to the other; or one performs and the other is trusted; or neither party performs. When both parties perform immediately, the contract ends with the performance. But when either or both are trusted, the trusted party promises to make performance later; and a promise of this kind is called an AGREEMENT’.95 However, these agreements always remain precarious and volatile in the state of nature where distrust is more likely to prevail.96 The issue Hobbes faced was that if ‘peace without subjection’97 is unrealistic, a state of nature in interstate relations would remain inherently antagonistic. Hobbes pointed to a crucial divergence in the analogy of the

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argued that the people ‘trust that the state will continue to exist and that particular interests can be fulfilled within it alone; but habit blinds us to the basis of our entire existence. It does not occur to someone who walks the streets in safety at night that this might be otherwise, for this habit of safety has become second nature, and we scarcely stop to think that it is solely the effect of particular institutions’. Ibid., p. 289. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 36. However, as Hart pointed out, ‘to argue that international law is not binding because of its lack of organized sanctions is tacitly to accept the analysis of obligation contained in the theory that law is essentially a matter of orders backed by threats’. Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 217. Despite his criticism of this Hobbesian view, Hart makes a profoundly Hobbesian argument when he continues to emphasise ‘those elementary truths about human beings and their environment which constitute the enduring psychological and physical setting of municipal law. In societies of individuals, approximately equal in physical strength and vulnerability, physical sanctions are both necessary and possible’ (ibid., p. 218). According to Hart, they are required to protect those who do submit to the law against those ‘malefactors who would in the absence of such sanctions, reap the advantages of respect for law on the part of others, without respecting it themselves’ (ibid., p. 218). However, Hart insists that ‘the simple truisms which hold good for individuals do not hold good for states’ (ibid., p. 219). It would thus be misleading to consider the situation between states in these analogous terms. The validity of international law does not, and should not depend on coercive force. It is just not the case in interstate relations that those who are not observing their obligation are ‘likely to suffer the sanction or punishment threatened for disobedience’ (ibid., p. 217). Hart concedes, however, that ‘the rules of international law are indeed vague and conflicting on many points’ (ibid., p. 223). This point is reiterated, though from a different perspective, by Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, p. 279: ‘European actors of the ancien r´egime ( . . . ) displayed a considerable amount of “social” behavior ( . . . ) in the European system. ( . . . ) At least a partial explanation for this social behavior is that the actors in question did indeed feel part of a single society’. The importance of dynastic relations further strengthens Osiander’s argument. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 119.

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state of nature when applied to individual sovereign agents.98 In Leviathan he made the point with full rhetorical vigour: ‘in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is their Forts, Garrisons, Guns upon their neighbours, which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men’.99 To achieve civil society and state sovereignty is to achieve internal peace. External peace is a very different matter, as each sovereign state must pursue the protection of its citizens. To this end, Hobbes states that the sovereign’s task lies in the ‘preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home, and Hostility from abroad’.100 According to Hobbes, ‘every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring his own safety. And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Conscience of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but in the Conscience onely’.101 The natural laws are binding in foro interno to the sovereign, but they lack coercive power and cannot be enforced in foro externo. The persuasive force of this argument with regard to interstate relations should not be overlooked. Hobbes’s argument draws two conclusions which underpin interstate relations: firstly, the existence of protection within the state guarantees the enforcement of the laws, thus trust among citizens is made possible by sovereign authority; secondly, given that such an authority is absent in interstate relations, it is therefore risky to place trust in other sovereign states. And yet, might there still be good reasons to take this risk? 98

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Other modern scholars often point to another difference between the state of nature and interstate relations, insisting that the assumed equality of individuals is simply not a given in interstate relations. See, for example, Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 40f., M. A. Heller, “The Use and Abuse of Hobbes: The State of Nature in International Relations” in Polity 13 (1980), p. 27 and Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, p. 207. Arguments such as those put forward by Beitz and Heller tend to obscure Hobbes’s profound insights into some of the most puzzling structural problems of interstate relations. They do not do justice to the complexity of Hobbes’s analysis. See the pertinent criticism by Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations”, p. 450. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 90. It is baffling and highly problematic when Knutsen simply claims that Hobbes’s state of nature could rightly be ‘considered a forceful analogy to international society’. Knutsen, A History of International Relations, p. 103. He substantiates this simplified statement by citing the quotation above, but crucially, he omits the last sentence (ibid., p. 105). 101 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 244. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 124.

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Hobbes emphasised the importance of good faith and trust within civil societies: ‘Civil Societies are not mere gatherings; they are Alliances, which essentially require good faith [my emphasis] and agreement for their making’.102 The sovereign is not only entrusted by the people to protect their survival, but is obliged in foro interno by the laws of nature to advance their interests and well-being.103 As to the problems and conflicts of interstate relations, Hobbes suggested that relations among states had to operate with second-best options, which fell short of making full use of the means he had outlined to overcome the state of nature among individuals.104 102

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Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 24. Although Locke is usually credited with this insight, Hobbes had already made this point forcefully. Locke, Two Treaties of Government, p. 359 and p. 412f. On Locke see Chapter 4.2 as well as the insightful analysis by Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke, esp. p. 120–186, Dunn, “Trust in the Politics of John Locke”, p. 34–54, Dunn, “Trust and Political Agency”, p. 73–93 and A. W. Sparkes, “Trust and Teleology: Locke’s Politics and His Doctrine of Creation” in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1973), p. 263–273. In his study on Hobbes, David Gauthier insists on the substantial difference between Hobbes’s and Locke’s understanding and use of trust. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, p. 176. For a rare explicit discussion of Hobbes and trust, see F. D. Weil, “The Stranger, Prudence, and Trust in Hobbes’s Theory” in Theory and Society 15 (1986), p. 759–788, as well as, Jean Hampton’s important discussion of the role of trust within Hobbes’s political philosophy. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 60, p. 117 and p. 134–137 and Hartmann, Die Praxis, p. 406–429. The importance of trust in Hobbes’s international thought is discussed passim in T. Christov, Before Anarchy. Hobbes and His Critics in Modern International Thought (Cambridge 2015), p. 106. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 144: ‘Those who have taken it upon themselves to exercise power in this kind of commonwealth, would be acting contrary to the law of nature (because in contravention of the trust of those who put the sovereign power in their hands) if they did not do whatever can be done by laws to ensure that the citizens are abundantly provided with all the good things necessary not just for life but for the enjoyment of life’. However, discussion as to how it would be possible to achieve ‘all the good things necessary not just for life but for the enjoyment of life’, had only just begun to be of concern for international political thought; and Hobbes, too, made only passing remarks on the subject. In this respect Hont claimed that he ‘was not the first of the moderns but the last of the post-Renaissance ( . . . ) theorists of politics’. I. Hont, Jealousy of Trade. International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Harvard 2005), p. 21. See also the discussion in Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, p. 79 and p. 17–22. Hobbes discussed trade exchanges between commonwealths, but the importance of international trade in Hobbes’s theory as furthering ‘cooperation and interaction between states’ is overstated by Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations”, p. 452. What Malcolm does not mention when referring to this part of Leviathan is the crucial fact that for Hobbes, supply of wanted goods can be achieved ‘either by Exchange, or by just Warre’. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 171. See also the discussion of trade and international political thought in Hobbes by Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations, p. 160f. In his criticism of the so-called realist theorists of international relations, Charles Beitz points out important Hobbesian insights, and suggests that ‘the moral problem posed by Hobbes’s theory is how to create conditions in which the laws of nature would be effective. Characterizing international relations as a state of nature poses a similar problem. If international relations is a state of nature, it follows that no state has an obligation to comply with regulative principles analogous to the laws of nature. But it also follows that widespread compliance with such principles would be desirable from the point of view of each state’. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 33. It is important to note, however, that Beitz has also seriously misunderstood key

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However, the fundamental problem of the state of nature recurs in interstate relations: the ‘blameless liberty’105 each state enjoys in employing all available means it deems necessary to protect itself and advance its interests. Hobbes drew attention to the issue of interstate relations to reinforce the applicability of the laws of nature to the full range of human conduct, highlighting that this conflictual situation was inherent in the state of nature, not only for individuals, but also for relations between sovereign states. At the beginning of De Cive, in his dedication to the Earl of Devonshire, Hobbes used forceful rhetoric to make the claim: ‘There are two maxims which are surely both true: Man is a God to man, and Man is a wolf to Man. The former is true of the relations of citizens with each other, the latter of relations between commonwealths. In justice and charity, the virtues of peace, citizens show some likeness to God. But between commonwealths, the wickedness of bad men compels the good too to have recourse, for their own protection, to the virtues of war, which are violence and fraud’.106 His infamous homo homini lupus made specific reference to interstate relations to emphasise the differences between relations of citizens within the state and relations between sovereign commonwealths. Hobbes argued that it is only by considering these significant differences that a full understanding can be achieved regarding the role the laws of nature play in determining the conduct of various agents. Hobbes stated: ‘A Law Of Nature (Lex Naturalis) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved’.107 Therefore the laws of nature provide council for the self-preservation of individual agents. The crucial question is whether these guiding principles are equally applicable to sovereign states in interstate relations? Did the laws of nature have a role to play in interstate relations? Hobbes suggested that they should be considered the best option available. Given that the preferred option of an exeundum that is to leave the volatile situation of interstate relations was not envisaged, this was only a second-best option. The very nature of sovereignty fixes states within an unstable and hostile framework where, ‘the First, and Fundamental Law of Nature; which is, to seek Peace, and follow it’108 seems much less compelling for states, than for

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aspects of Hobbes’s international political thought. For a convincing challenge of Beitz’s overall reading of Hobbes, see Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations”, p. 450f. T. Hobbes, The Elements of Law, ed. by J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford 1994), p. 79. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 3f. 108 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 92. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 91.

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the individuals in the state of nature. Thus ‘the Second, ( . . . ) which is, By all means we can, to defend our selves’109 suggests itself to be followed in order to avoid being exposed ‘to prey’.110 All states have, like all individuals in the state of nature, the fundamental right of self-preservation.111 The decision as to what constitutes the appropriate employment of any means deemed necessary for self-preservation is at the discretion of each state, since ‘by natural law one is oneself the judge’.112 Hobbes pointed to an inherent structural and juridical problem in the right to everything (ius in omnia) which becomes manifest where everyone remains judge of their own case.113 Thus states have a right to everything, ‘but it was of no use ( . . . ) to have a common right of this kind. For the effect of this right is almost the same as if there were no right at all. For although one could say of anything, this is mine, still he could not enjoy it, because of his neighbour, who claimed the same thing to be his by equal right and with equal force’.114 For states to overcome the inherent conflicts of the state of nature, Hobbes did not suggest pursuing the same solution as for individuals relinquishing this right. Indeed, his very characterisation of sovereignty entailed that the sovereign remains in possession of the right to everything.115 Hobbes conceded that the security of commonwealths is deficient, as the first law of nature – ‘seek peace’ – cannot serve in the same sense as for individuals, who leave the state of nature by artificially establishing state sovereignty. The solution of creating a single sovereign or establishing a federative structure to wield sovereign authority is ruled out, as state sovereignty is in itself a supreme authority. This is why Hobbes concluded that interstate relations would have to accept second-best options. Yet, while these options may be second-best, Hobbes considered them to have a role to play in organising interstate relations: ‘the practice of natural law 109 110 112

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Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 92. 111 Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 27 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 92. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 27. See also Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations”, p. 446: ‘The various commonwealths that exist in the world are in the same jural vacuum as individuals in the state of nature. At the jural level, therefore, the parallel between states and individuals holds precisely’. Anglophone scholars seem much less concerned with this aspect of Hobbes’s theory than their continental European counterparts. One crucial exception is N. Malcolm, “Hobbes and Spinoza” in N. Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford 2002), p. 31: ‘the primary state of conflict between individuals posited by Hobbes is not a contingent ( . . . ), but rather a necessary jural conflict between people whose rights overlap or conflict’. One of the most succinct studies on the antinomy of rights in Hobbes’s theory is H¨uning, Freiheit und Herrschaft. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 29. Regarding equality of states, see Hobbes’s discussion earlier of the dis-analogy between the state of nature and interstate relations. See also Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations”, p. 450. Cf. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 72–74 and Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 120f.

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is necessary for the preservation of peace, and security is necessary for the practice of natural law. We must therefore consider what it is that can afford such security’.116 Given ‘that the natural laws do not guarantee their own observance’117 , the issue of trust is at the heart of whether the laws of nature can be meaningfully applied to interstate relations. Thus the second law of nature is especially relevant to interstate relations: ‘Stand by your agreements, or keep faith’.118 Given the volatility of the state of nature, the question of whether the principle of pacta sunt servanda can be upheld in interstate relations has provoked animated discussions in Hobbes scholarship119 and wider international political thought.120 While Hobbes’s second law of nature refers explicitly to trust, many of the natural laws which Hobbes enumerated aim at trust-building within the anarchic situation where conduct is not governed by the rule of law or enforced by civil institutions in the form of sovereign power. This can be seen in the fifth precept of natural law that ‘one should pardon another for the past ( . . . ). Pardon (for the past) or remission of an offence, is simply the granting of peace to one who after provoking war, repents of his action and asks for peace’.121 Emphasis on trust again brings Hobbes’s concept of natural law to bear on interstate relations. If anything, natural law becomes most meaningful and applicable in the domain of interstate relations. Explicit reference to interstate relations is made by Hobbes’s assertion in the fourteenth precept of natural law that ‘Mediators of Peace should have immunity. ( . . . ) the first dictate of reason is Peace, the rest are the necessary means to Peace. But Peace cannot be had without mediation, nor mediation without immunity’.122 Mediation is designed to resolve conflicts peacefully as part of concrete political trust-building. The same is true for arbitration, which is elaborated in Hobbes’s fifteenth to nineteenth natural laws. Within the state the sovereign assumes the office of arbitrator, but the fact that Hobbes makes arbitration necessary and possible under the conditions of the state of nature is quite telling. Parties who have a dispute should ‘submit to the arbitration of a third party’.123 116 117 119

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Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 70. 118 Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 43. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 70. For some of the most pertinent examples, see Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, p. 97f., Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 89f., Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, p. 27–98 and p. 207–212, H¨uning, Freiheit und Herrschaft, p. 133–157. See Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 214–222 and Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 122–155. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 48. The same holds true of the sixth, seventh, ninth and tenth laws of nature as presented by Hobbes in De Cive. See Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 49f. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 51. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 51. As we have seen in Chapter 1, Hobbes made a very similar point to Bodin or Gentili, but he considers the issue in a more systematic way.

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The arbitrator should not be party to the dispute and have no vested interest in the outcome of the conflict. If the scenario were exclusively intended to demonstrate that right reason dictates men to leave the state of nature through the creation of a civil state, there would be no point elaborating on the means to resolve and mediate conflicts in the state of nature; unless, that is, one considers their implications for interstate relations. Enumerating the options available for sovereign states under the conditions of the state of nature was intended to address the intrinsic conflicts and to establish trust to overcome the limitations of the state of nature. Hobbes made a compelling point about the deficiency of trust in the preface to De Cive: ‘Even within commonwealths, where there are laws and penalties set against wrongdoers, individual citizens do not travel without a weapon to defend themselves or go to bed without barring their doors against fellow citizens ( . . . ). Can men express their universal distrust of one another more openly? All commonwealths and individuals behave in this way, and thus admit their fear and distrust of each other’.124 Thus even the civil state remained deficient in its capacity to put distrust to rest entirely. Between states this situation was exacerbated because there was no recourse to a higher coercive power to arbitrate conflicts, as states necessarily remain judge of their own case. Since Hobbes cannot apply to interstate relations the solution he elaborated for individual men, many interpreters consider this the limit of the laws of nature and have abandoned Hobbes’s argument prematurely. Hobbes commented that although civil and natural law ‘are silent among arms, ( . . . ) in wars between nations a degree of restraint has normally been observed’.125 This residue of restraint may not constitute a coercive power, but nor should it be underestimated, let alone ignored. To what extent are his observations relevant to interstate relations? The answer to this question will allow us to better understand what I described as Hobbes’s second-best options for regulating interstate relations. According to Hobbes, individuals retain the potential to revert to the state of nature, at any time, if they believe that their life is threatened – does this not also apply to sovereign states?126 It has been argued that, for Hobbes, even the civil laws ‘operate by persuasion rather than by physical force’.127 As argued earlier, it is the institutional framework allowing security of conduct and trade of promises, 124 125 126 127

Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 10f. See also T. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 89. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 69. Some scholars have argued that this possibility undermines the Hobbesian theory of civil power. See in particular H¨uning, Freiheit und Herrschaft, p. 242f. Q. Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge 2007), p. 171.

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rather than an exercise of force by the state, that makes civil society preferable to the state of nature. Individuals relinquish the right to be judge in their own case as the tangible benefit of security within civil society outweighs the state of nature as regards their self-preservation. Absolute sovereignty may provide the most efficient protection for the citizens within civil society, but what if sovereign power reaches its limits, where people believe it is no longer in their interest to submit to the sovereign? Here the importance of persuasion becomes most apparent, as the advantages of civil society must be brought increasingly into focus to prevent individuals placing themselves in a state of nature with the sovereign. If we consider the effect of persuasion, do we need to insist on such a categorical notion of Hobbes’s concept of sovereignty when considering interstate relations?128 The laws of nature provide council, both to individual men and to sovereigns, as to how to conduct their behaviour according to those laws, but as we have seen, this extends only as far as being in the interest of self-preservation. The strength of civil society and interstate relations lies in persuading the individual and the sovereign states respectively that they may trust that the outcome of participating will be in their interest. As the situation between sovereign states is highly volatile, the issue of whether trust should be granted represents a critical consideration for international politics. According to Hobbes, ‘the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting, but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary’.129 Given Hobbes’s conception of war, states remain perpetually at war, which amplifies the importance of trustworthiness in averting potential conflict. Hobbes not only provides a way of theorising the conflicts of interstate relations in the language of legal philosophy, but he also demonstrates what can be done to engage with and mitigate the potential conflicts where the solution of an overarching sovereign authority is ruled out. Two further aspects of Hobbes’s political philosophy are crucial for international political thought: just war theory and the punishment of unjust enemies. According to Hobbes, ‘nothing can be Unjust’ in the state of nature, and consequently ‘the notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice’.130 If the notion of justice has no place in the state of nature, it does not make sense to argue for the principle of a just war. Contrary to Grotius, Hobbes suggested that ‘Force and Fraud, 128 129

Cf. Heller, “The Use and Abuse of Hobbes”, p. 29. 130 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 90. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 89.

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are in warre the Cardinall vertues’.131 It is not only legitimate, but a law of nature to make use of all the means necessary to defeat an enemy. The antinomy of rights means that both parties to the conflict pursue a just cause, or rather, that the notion of justice simply has no place in such a conflict. The just war doctrine is irreconcilable with Hobbes’s political and philosophical understanding.132 According to Hobbes, any conflict among individuals in the state of nature or among sovereign states is carried out by both sides with the same claim to natural right, because the ius in omnia means ‘one man rightly attacks and the other rightly resists’.133 This antinomy of rights represented ‘an unfailing spring of suspicion and mutual resentment’.134 This was the reason why trust was such a critical and fragile component of civil and especially international relations. The state of nature is never entirely relegated to the past, but rather a facet of the human condition and the threat that it may be returning with the full force of lawless aggression remained real even for civil society. Especially regarding interstate relations the laws of nature provided a set of councils for establishing conditions under which trust would be possible. But trust remained fragile and could easily be replaced by power relations. However, neither the laws of nature nor power relations provided justification for punishing sovereign states. According to Hobbes, sovereign states could not be subjected to punishment.135 They wield the right to enact punishment, but they are not submitted to any authority which could possibly claim the right to punish them. His justification for the sovereign’s right to punish represents a problem in his political philosophy. In the Elements of Law and De Cive Hobbes enumerated the right to punish as one of the principal prerogatives of the sovereign, but did not show why such a right was legitimate. In Leviathan, too, he cited the right to punish among the sovereign rights in Chapter 18136 but it is only later pointed out, in Chapter 28, that ‘there is a question to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the Right, or Authority of Punishing in any case, came 131

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Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 90. This has resonances of Machiavelli’s argument in Chapter II-13 of his Discorsi. Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 310. On Machiavelli see the discussion in Chapter 1.1. On the wider context and the way ‘Machiavelli and Hobbes are twisting an earlier view’, see Hoekstra, “Hobbes on the Natural Condition of Mankind”, p. 123. Note that the notion of just war is, nevertheless, employed by Hobbes at least once. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 171. 134 Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 29. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 29. Since there can be no worldly judge above the sovereign, it follows that it is inconceivable that there can be worldly punishment of the sovereign. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 124.

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in’.137 Although Hobbes’s justification of punishment is problematic138 , it does help to illuminate his ideas about interstate relations. Contrary to Grotius and Locke, who argue that the right to punish is derived from natural law and was enjoyed by all, Hobbes asserts that ‘PUNISHMENT is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority [my emphasis], on him that hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience’.139 Hobbes’s concept of punishment leaves no room for private punishment, which was still widely practised in Europe in the form of the exercise of often arbitrary local and feudal power.140 Furthermore, Hobbes asserts that there can be no punishment without a law having been broken141 , thus placing some limits on the sovereign.142 If the concept of punishment depends on the existence of law and coercive state authority143 , a right to punish cannot exist in the state of nature, because ‘in this condition of enmity there is no common or overarching power, and therefore no law; ( . . . ) nor is there justice or injustice, understood as obedience to or infringement of law’.144 137 138

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Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 214. What is striking is that this key aspect of Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty turns out to be the Achilles’ heel of his political philosophy. Hobbes scholarship has only begun to pay adequate attention to this problem. However, Leo Strauss has already drawn attention to the fact that Hobbes’s concept of punishment entailed ‘an insoluble conflict between the rights of the government and the natural right of the individual to self-preservation’. Strauss, Natural Law and History, p. 197. This is not the place to pursue this issue further, but see, with further references, the discussions in D. H¨uning, “Naturrecht und Strafgewalt. Die Begr¨undung des Strafrechts in Hobbes’ Leviathan” in Der lange Schatten des Leviathan, ed. by D. H¨uning (Berlin 2005), p. 269, D. H¨uning, “Hobbes on the Right to Punish” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. by P. Springborg (Cambridge 2007), p. 232, M. A. Cattaneo, “Hobbes’s Theory of Punishment” in Hobbes Studies, ed. by K. C. Brown (Oxford 1965), p. 275–297, Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, p. 146–148, O. Dix, Lebensgef¨ahrdung und Verpflichtung bei Hobbes (W¨urzburg 1994) and Schr¨oder, Hobbes, p. 61–65. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 214. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 214f.: ‘neither private revenge, nor injuries of private men, can properly be stiled Punishments, because they proceed not from publique Authority’. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 216: ‘Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law that forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility’. For further discussion and references, see H¨uning, “Hobbes on the Right to Punish” and Schr¨oder, Hobbes, p. 59–68. Punishment was intended as a deterrent and served as the coercive force behind the law to assure the obedience of the people. Hobbes argued accordingly ‘the final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves in which we see them live in commonwealths is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent ( . . . ) to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants and observation of those laws of nature’. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 117. Hoekstra, “Hobbes on the Natural Condition of Mankind”, p. 111.

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Not only was there no sovereign in the state of nature who could exact punishment, the ius in omnia ruled out the possibility of a crime145 being committed in the first place.146 Moreover, the analogy of the state of nature precluded the idea of punishment among sovereign states, because ‘before the Institution of Commonwealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of Punishing, which is exercised in every Common-wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right; but onely in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him ( . . . ) and ( . . . ) as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature’.147 The sovereign was thus the only one who remained in possession of the ius in omnia which provided the basis and justification for the sovereign’s authority to punish. Hobbes advanced this concept because he held that ‘no man is supposed bound by Covenant not to resist violence’.148 It was inconceivable to Hobbes that people could relinquish their right of self-preservation: ‘It is manifest therefore that the Right which the Common-wealth ( . . . ) hath to Punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subject’.149 The ensuing 145 146

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See the insightful discussion of the innovative conceptualisation of crime by Hobbes in H¨uning, “Hobbes on the Right to Punish”, p. 220. Locke seems rather feebly to engage with Hobbes’s position. He observed repeatedly that to his ‘strange Doctrine, viz. That in the State of Nature, every one has the Executive Power of the Law of Nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, That it is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their own Cases’. What Locke offered in his Second Treatise of Government is hardly more than an unwilling confirmation of Hobbes’s argument. Locke, Two Treaties of Government, p. 275. Leo Strauss goes as far as to assume that Locke was much more influenced by Hobbes than he was prepared to admit. Strauss, Natural Law and History, p. 165f. This is at least partly due to the fact that he reads too much of Hobbes into Locke. This is especially the case when he claims that Locke had argued that ‘in the state of nature all men are judges of their own cases and ( . . . ), therefore, the state of nature is characterized by constant conflict’. Strauss, Natural Law and History, p. 228. On Locke’s theory of punishment, see also H¨uning, “Naturzustand, nat¨urliche Strafgewalt und Staat bei John Locke”, p. 85–108. As we saw in Chapter 3.1, Grotius was explicit about the right of punishment among states. Locke only perceived an implicit right of punishment among sovereign states, by the existing analogy of the state of nature and interstate relations. Locke, Two Treaties of Government, p. 276. The consequences of Locke’s idea about property acquired through labour and punishment culminated in a forceful political, though philosophically unsound, argument for the displacement of the North American natives. See the excellent article by J. Tully, “Rediscovering America: The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights” in J. Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge 1993), p. 137–176. Critically with further references D. Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina and the Two Treatises of Government” in D. Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge 2013), p. 90–113. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 214. 149 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 214. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 214.

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problem is that the sovereign is no longer above the citizen, as judge and peace keeper: instead the sovereign becomes one of the conflicting parties. Where man is threatened with punishment it necessarily follows that he falls back into the state of nature, as it is always the highest interest of man to pursue self-preservation. Neither do states resign their right of selfpreservation when faced with an aggressor, however, states do not depart from the state of nature, which means that punishment and the exercise of legitimate authority are inconceivable between states. One could argue with Hobbes that states who claim to have a right to punish other states exercise ‘not Punishment, but an act of Hostility’.150 Hobbes provided a succinct discussion of trust, which has so far not properly been appreciated in relation to his international political thought: ‘In the state of nature agreements made by a contract of mutual trust [in contractu ubi fides mutua est] (by which both parties trust the other and neither makes any performance immediately) are invalid if a just fear arises on either side’.151 This has relevance and implications for interstate relations as Hobbes pointed out in Leviathan: ‘For a League being a connexion of men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one Man, or Assembly (as in the condition of mere nature) to compell them to performance, is so long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust [my emphasis]: and therefore Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull, but also profitable for the time they last’.152 Hobbes left no doubt that such alliances would be of a rather short-lived nature, as changes in circumstances and interests may soon lead to a change of allegiance. Although the laws of nature remained an inadequate means of overcoming conflict, Hobbes argued that they remain the best option available to pacify interstate relations by showing how mutual trust should be possible among states, thereby rendering their relations less antagonistic.

3.3 Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) Even among scholars of international political thought, the importance of Samuel Pufendorf as a political thinker is well-established.153 His 150 151 153

Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 216. 152 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 163. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 37. Pufendorf is best known as a jurist and political philosopher, but he also commented on the confessional strife which broke out violently after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. We will discuss his contribution to this conflict in Chapter 4.2. A succinct overview of the older scholarship on Pufendorf is to be found in A. Dufour, “Pufendorfs f¨oderalistisches Denken und die Staatsr¨asonlehre” in Samuel von Pufendorf und die europ¨aische Fr¨uhaufkl¨arung, ed. by

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main contribution lies in his ‘distillation and conceptualization of the implications of Westphalia in terms of sovereignty and the integrity of states’.154 For Pufendorf, sovereignty was indeed the key concept which determined whether any human association qualifies as a state. In this respect he is much closer to Hobbes than to Grotius. He argued in one of his earliest writings, the Elementorum jurisprudentiae universalis, that ‘supreme sovereignty ( . . . ) is found in every state whatsoever, and that group in which it is not found is not to be reckoned as a state’.155 Pufendorf approached interstate relations on several levels. For him they were determined by the concept of sovereignty, and a state ‘has no one upon earth to whom it is beholden, or who can bring it to order by legitimate authority’.156 This led him to use history and state interest in a pragmatic way to propose modes of organising interstate relations. But he also addressed interstate relations by developing the jus naturae et gentium. Although it could be argued that Pufendorf’s application of natural law to interstate relations was ultimately limited, he nevertheless provided an innovative theory of how natural law could be meaningful as a guiding principle of order in interstate relations.157 Pufendorf followed Hobbes’s equation of the law of nature with the law of nations: ‘Something must be added now also on the subject of the Law of Nations, which ( . . . ) is nothing other than the law of nature, in so far as different nations, not united with

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F. Palladini and G. Hartung (Berlin 1996), p. 105–109. Unparalleled is the bibliography provided by D. D¨oring, Pufendorf-Studien Beitr¨age zur Biographie Samuel von Pufendorfs und seiner Entwicklung als Historiker und theologischer Schriftsteller (Berlin 1992). D. Boucher, “Resurrecting Pufendorf and capturing the Westphalian moment” in Review of International Studies 27 (2001), p. 559f. On the various positions regarding the Westphalian system, see my discussion in the introduction earlier. S. Pufendorf, Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, ed. by T. Behme (Indianapolis 2009) (II-V-18), p. 387. Pufendorf, Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, (II-V-18) p. 387. His major work De Jure Naturae et Gentium does not offer as much on the issue of interstate relations and international law as the title might suggest. On Pufendorf’s contribution to the law of nations, see D. Wyduckel, “Recht, Staat und Frieden im Jus Publicum Europeaum” in H. Duchhardt (ed.), Zwischenstaatliche Friedenswahrung in Mittelalter und Fr¨uher Neuzeit (K¨oln 1991), ¨ p. 185–204, E. Reibstein, “Pufendorfs V¨olkerrechtslehre” in Osterreichische Zeitschrift f¨ur o¨ffentliches Recht 7 (1957), p. 43–72, Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 140–165, H. Klenner, “Bileams Pferd auf die Kanzeln! Zur Natur- und V¨olkerrechtslehre des Samuel Pufendorf” in Samuel Pufendorf und seine Wirkungen bis auf die heutige Zeit, ed. by B. Geyer and H. Goerlich (Baden-Baden 1996), p. 195–208 and S. Goyard-Fabre, Pufendorf et le droit naturel (Paris 1994), p. 207–238. On Pufendorf’s natural law theory more generally, see also K. Saastamoinen, The Morality of the Fallen Man. Samuel Pufendorf on Natural Law (Helsinki 1995), T. Behme, Samuel von Pufendorf: Naturrecht und Staat. Eine Analyse und Interpretation seiner Theorie, ihrer Grundlagen und Probleme (G¨ottingen 1995), L. Krieger, The Politics of Discretion. Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law (Chicago 1965), Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, p. 148–196 and Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, p. 40–71.

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another by a supreme sovereignty, observe it, who must render one another the same duties in their fashion, as are prescribed for individuals by the law of nature. On this point there is no reason for our conducting any special discussion here, since what we recount on the subject of the law of nature and of the duties of individuals, can be readily applied to whole states and nations which have also coalesced into one moral person. Aside from this law, we are of the opinion that there is no law of nations, at least none which can properly be designated by such a name’.158 If Pufendorf was not too concerned to show precisely how these duties could regulate interstate relations, an important lesson can nevertheless be drawn from what Pufendorf actually had to offer.159 Adam Friedrich Glafey (1692–1753) regarded Pufendorf as crucially important in the evolution of natural law theory. Previous natural law thinkers, he found, simply followed Grotius, merely commenting on his work, whereas Pufendorf advanced his own theory. Also for Glafey, given Pufendorf’s engagement with Hobbes’s theory and the way he adopted and reconsidered key elements of Hobbes’s thought, Hobbes’s political philosophy should not be dismissed too easily. Although Glafey viewed Hobbes’s theory as erroneous, he gave him credit for having developed natural law doctrine in a fruitful direction.160 Pufendorf referred explicitly to central aspects of Hobbes’s (self-preservation) and Grotius’s (sociability) theory when he claimed: ‘the fundamental laws of nature and those from which all the rest flow are two: (1) That any one whatsoever should protect his own life and limbs, as far as he can, and save himself and what is his own. (2) That he should not disturb human society ( . . . ). These laws ought 158 159 160

Pufendorf, Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, (I-XIII-24) p. 225. This point had already been made by Reibstein, “Pufendorfs V¨olkerrechtslehre”, p. 43. Glafey, Vollst¨andige Geschichte des Rechts der Vernunfft, p. 180: ‘Im u¨ brigen muß ich noch zum Beschluß erinnern, daß des Hobbesii Buch voll der sch¨onsten Lehren sey, obgleich auch einige starcke Fehler mit unterlauffen, so daß man dieses ingenieuse Buch nicht so unter die Banck stecken und verachten solte. Es kan einem dasselbige die sch¨onste Materie zum meditiren an Hand geben, da man denn der Wahrheit noch einst so sehr vergewissert wird, wenn man die Falschheit des Gegensatzes erblicket. Es beweiset solches Pufendorff an seinem eigenen Exempel, indem er zwar frey bekennet, daß er dem Hobbesio viel zu dancken habe, gleichwohl aber in seinen Schrifften solche Lehren dem Publico vortr¨agt, welche des Hobbesii Grund-S¨atzen ganz un¨ahnlich sind, und sattsam an den Tag legen, daß Pufendorff durch Lesung des Hobbesii Buches Gelegenheit erlanget, der Sache weiter nachzusinnen, und solchergestalt hinter die Wahrheit zu kommen’. The classical study on the intellectual relationship of Hobbes and Pufendorf is Palladini, Samuel Pufendorf Discepolo di Hobbes. Palladini does not mention Glafey, and her argument goes further to demonstrate (p. 21) ‘che Pufendorf pensa con mente hobbesiana il cuore stesso della sua dottrina’. On Glafey see also Schmidt, Praktisches Naturrecht zwischen Thomasius und Wolff and T. Toyoda, Theory and Politics of the Law of Nations. Political Bias in International Law Discourse of Seven German Court Councilors in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Leiden 2011), p. 103–122.

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to conspire, and, as it were be intertwined with one another as ( . . . ) that society among men be not disturbed’.161 It is true that Grotius also allocated self-preservation an important place within his theory. Hobbes’s influence on Pufendorf will be demonstrated in more detail in the following. As has been shown by Alfred Dufour, Pufendorf’s theory of interstate relations and his law of nations did not rely on the concept of sociability.162 Furthermore, Pufendorf’s understanding of sociability differs from Grotius’s. ‘It is precisely at this point that Pufendorf parts company with his honoured predecessor’.163 Many of the arguments found in Pufendorf sound familiar, because they resonate either with Grotius or with Hobbes. For instance, in his De Statu Hominum Naturali Pufendorf considered men’s condition outside civil society in the state of nature. He retraces the problem of security we encountered already in Hobbes and reaffirms that under the conditions of the state of nature ‘relying solely on others’ good faith and agreements is really to rest one’s own safety on a very slippery foundation’.164 But although Pufendorf closely engaged with Grotius’s and Hobbes’s doctrines, he had much more to offer than a simple synthesis of his illustrious predecessors.165 We can single out two concepts which Pufendorf took up from Hobbes and developed much further: the notion of the state as a composite moral person and the discussion of a system of states. Examination of these concepts and their relevance for international political thought returns us to the question: to what extent did Pufendorf’s doctrine engage with the issue of trust? From Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty Pufendorf took up the idea of representation.166 A state constituted by agreement ‘is conceived as one 161

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Pufendorf, Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, (II-IV-4) p. 327. Cf. Krieger, The Politics of Discretion, p. 105. Haakonssen, “Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought”, p. 253: ‘Hobbes took up Grotius’s problem in a completely different way by first turning people’s natural sociability into its opposite and then introducing the laws of nature as heuristic devices to which we had a simple prudential obligation. And Pufendorf turned this into a full-fledged voluntarism in stark opposition to Grotius by first agreeing with Hobbes’. Dufour, “Pufendorfs f¨oderalistisches Denken und die Staatsr¨asonlehre”, p. 122. Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, p. 178. The same point was made by A. Randelzhofer, Die Pflichtenlehre bei Samuel von Pufendorf (Berlin, New York 1983), p. 16 and Palladini, “Appetitus Societatis in Grozio e Socialitas in Pufendorf”, p. 69 who also asserts a ‘grande distanza tra Pufendorf e Grozio’. S. Pufendorf, De Statu Hominum Naturali/On the Natural State of Men, translated and ed. by M. Seidler (Lampeter 1990), p. 123. For an earlier discussion of Pufendorf’s engagement with Grotius and Hobbes, see Krieger, The Politics of Discretion, p. 92–101. A good overview of recent different interpretations regarding Pufendorf’s position towards Grotius and Hobbes is now available in Kingsbury and Straumann, “State of Nature versus Commercial Society as the Basis of International Law”, p. 33–51. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 121: ‘A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men,

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person, and is separated and distinguished from all particular men by a unique name; and it has its own special rights and property ( . . . ) Hence a state is defined as a composite moral person [my emphasis], whose will blended and combined from the agreement of many is taken as the will of all so that it may employ the forces and capacities of every individual for the common peace and security’.167 The definition of the state as a composite moral person allowed Pufendorf to formulate an understanding of sovereignty as resting on the idea that ‘in order to completing the Essence of a just and regular State, such an Union is requir’d as shall make things which belong to the Government of it, seem to proceed from one Soul’.168 The state as a moral person thus had an independent will of its own. To what extent has the conception of the state as a composite moral person with its own volition the capacity to generate trust? Pufendorf discussed the issue of trust in some detail when he considered human speech and the benefits which can be derived from it, such as teaching others, issuing and obeying commands and generally rendering human life sociable. Because of these benefits of speech, he argued, ‘it must be suppos’d a Precept of the Law of Nature, That no Man deceive another’.169 Yet observance of such a demand was not straightforward, ‘since he, who is ever freely publishing and declaring his own Concerns, lays himself open to the Fraud of wicked Men’.170 It might ‘therefore ( . . . ) not be advisable for us to exclude from human Society, the Act of innocent Dissimulation, till all Wickedness, and all Folly of Mankind is turn’d into Probity and

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shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative)’. On Hobbes see in more detail Chapter 3.2. S. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, ed. by J. Tully (Cambridge 1991), (II-6–10) p. 137. See also the insightful discussion by Boisen and Boucher, “Hobbes and the Subjection of International Relations to Law and Morality”, p. 95f., as well as the important discussion of Pufendorf’s concept of sovereignty in B. Holland, “Pufendorf’s Theory of Facultative Sovereignty: On the Configuration of the Soul of the State” in History of Political Thought 33 (2012), p. 427–454. Although his suggestion that Pufendorf ‘developed a novel, creative theory of sovereignty based in large part on his adoption of Suarezian precepts’ (p. 429) would need to be further substantiated, this piece provides an insightful analysis of Pufendorf’s concept of sovereignty. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VII-V-13) p. 678. There is no need to analyse Pufendorf’s conception of the entia moralia in detail here. It suffices for the interest of my interpretation to take his definition of a state as a composite moral person. For further discussion of the entia moralia in Pufendorf’s doctrine, see Welzel, Die Naturrechtslehre Samuel Pufendorfs, esp. p. 27f., T. Kobusch, “Pufendorfs Lehre vom moralischen Sein” in Samuel von Pufendorf und die europ¨aische Fr¨uhaufkl¨arung, ed. by F. Palladini and G. Hartung (Berlin 1996), p. 63– 73, K.-G. Lutterbeck, “Pufendorfs Unterscheidung von physischem und moralischem Sein und seine politische Theorie” in Naturrecht und Staatstheorie bei Samuel Pufendorf, ed. by D. H¨uning (Baden-Baden 2009), p. 19–35, Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, p. 121 and Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, p. 164f. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (IV-I-1) p. 307. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (IV-I-9) p. 321.

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Wisdom’.171 Pufendorf is quick to forestall unlimited recourse to innocent dissimulation, since it is ‘certain at the same time, that he who makes use of these practices of Concealment and Cunning farther than is necessary for his own Defence, renders himself unfit to be trusted, and uncapable of being dealt with in a honest Affair or Business; in as much as ‘tis impossible, but that such a Person must be suspected in all that he says or does’.172 As to the political aspects of trust, the same dilemma exists. On the one hand, ‘Governours of States may sometimes too very lawfully use a manner of speaking not strictly true; in as much as their Counsels and Resolutions, if divulg’d, frequently come to nothing, or perhaps turn to the prejudice of the Commonwealth. And therefore ( . . . ) they may veil their Designs with feigned Speeches’.173 On the other hand, ‘the same Privilege [will not] hold at all in the case of Promises and Engagements’.174 These are considered of a different order and sanctity. While drawing attention to the influence of political calculation on opting to exploit the trust of others, Pufendorf has not yet proposed how to safeguard conditions guaranteeing trustworthiness in politics. Were the natural laws a means to regulate interstate relations? Even in the case of war, a certain level of trust endured: ‘The most proper forms of action in war are force and terror. But one has equal right to use fraud and deceit against an enemy, provided one does not violate one’s pledged faith. Hence one may deceive an enemy by false statements or fictitious stories, but never by promises or agreements’.175 But the problem of trustworthiness among states remained acute. Trust was almost impossible in the state of nature where ‘there is a lively and all but perpetual play of suspicion, distrust, eagerness to subvert the strength of others, and desire to get ahead of them or to augment one’s own strength by their ruin’.176 Interstate relations, though, constituted a special constellation. It would be too easy simply to equate them with the state of nature. After all, ‘the civil state is surely much more perfect than our natural state’177 and, as such, it marks ‘a sort of remedy for human imperfection’.178 The 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178

Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (IV-I-9) p. 321. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (IV-I-9) p. 322. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (IV-I-17) p. 327. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (IV-I-17) p. 327. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-16–5) p. 169. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-1–11) p. 119. S. Pufendorf, “On the Natural State of Men” in Samuel Pufendorf’s On the Natural State of Men, ed. and translated by M. Seidler (Lewiston 1990), p. 110. Pufendorf, “On the Natural State of Men”, p. 111. The distinction between men and states in the state of nature is further explored in Of the Law of Nature and Nations where Pufendorf argued

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point is profoundly Hobbesian: ‘in the state of nature each is protected only by his own strength; in the [civil] state by the strength of all. There no one may be sure of the fruit of his industry; here all may be. There is the reign of the passions, there there [sic] is war, fear, poverty, nastiness, solitude, barbarity, ignorance, savagery; here is the reign of reason, here there is peace, security, wealth, splendour, society, taste, knowledge, benevolence’.179 Nevertheless, Pufendorf did not echo Hobbes’s equation of the state of nature with interstate relations.180 In De Jure Naturae et Gentium he emphatically claimed: ‘Hobbes is the more inexcusable for maintaining that his natural State cannot be remov’d and broken up, but by letting in the Sovereignty of another, and by uniting in the same Commonwealth: For that those Commonwealths, how distinct soever, which are allied by Friendship and leagues, should still continue in a State of mutual War, is a Contradiction evident to common Sense of Mankind. Nor should we (as he would have us) discard all Peace, as not deserving that Name, which is not sufficiently firm and certain’.181 Despite the absence of a superior power or arbiter, Pufendorf declined to perceive relations among states as irredeemably conflictual by analogy with the state of nature. Without a

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that ‘Commonwealths, and the Governors of them, may fairly declare themselves to be in a State of natural Liberty, while they are furnish’d with sufficient Strength to secure the Exercise of that grand Privilege. Whereas, when Men live singly in a mere natural State, it is no manner of Pleasure or Advantage to them to own no Superior; inasmuch as upon account of their own small Force and Ability, their Safety must needs be in perpetual Doubt and Danger’. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (II-II-4) p. 109. Pufendorf makes use of Hobbes’s theory of the state of nature. However, he continues his argument ibid., p. 110 to argue against Hobbes’s contention that the state of nature is a state of war. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-1–9) p. 118. However, it is worthwhile reminding ourselves that Pufendorf fully subscribed to Hobbes’s equation of natural law with the law of nations: ‘Mr Hobbes divides natural Law, into the natural Law of Man, and the natural Law of States, commonly called the Law of Nations. ( . . . ) This Opinion we, for our Part, readily subscribe to: Nor do we conceive, that there is any other voluntary or positive Law of Nations, properly invested with a true and legal Force, and obliging as the Ordinance of a superior Power’. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (II-III-23) p. 149f. See Chapter 3.2. Given the above-mentioned attempt by Ben Holland to show that Su´arez rather than Hobbes influenced Pufendorf’s thought, it might not be amiss to remember that Su´arez had argued ‘that the ius gentium is outside the realm of natural law’. Su´arez, “On the Laws and God the Lawgiver”, p. 333. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (II-II-8) p. 113. See also the much more precise translation in S. Pufendorf, “On the Law of Nature and Nations” in The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf, ed. by C. L. Carr and translated by M. Seidler (Oxford 1994), (II-II-8), p. 146: ‘Hobbes’s opinion is even less acceptable insofar as he is prepared to have his natural state eliminated only by submission to the sovereignty of another and by uniting into the same civil sate. For it makes no sense to anyone that even those civil states linked by treaties and by friendship should be in a mutual state of war. An insufficiently trustworthy peace is not immediately equivalent to no peace at all’. Interestingly Pufendorf’s discussion of the state of nature in On the Duty of Man and Citizen does not refer to interstate relations.

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sovereign there could be no positive law, but for Pufendorf that did not necessarily mean that states could not coexist in peace.182 That the application of natural law to interstate relations remained precarious was highlighted by Samuel Rachel in his Dissertationes de jure naturae et gentium first published in 1676. Against Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf, Rachel argued that one had to distinguish a positive law of nations from the natural law: ‘Not only has Nature provided its own Law for men, whereby, as if by a world-wide chain, they are bound to one another in virtue of being men, but mankind has itself also laid down various positive laws for its own guidance, not merely those by which in every State the government binds its subjects to itself ( . . . ), but also those which the human race, divided up as it is into independent peoples and different States, employs as a common bond of obligation; and peoples of different forms of government and of different size lie under the control of these rules, which depend for their efficacy upon mutual good faith [my emphasis]’.183 Even such a positivist position as Rachel’s relied on good faith. Yet the obligatory power of law among states remained doubtful, regardless of the theoretical position taken.184 We are at an important juncture here. For Pufendorf, interstate relations are not determined by natural law alone.185 In his Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, he discussed interstate 182

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Given this textual evidence it is impossible to see how Goyard-Fabre could claim that ‘Pufendorf thinks that it is indispensable to distinguish the jus gentium and the jus naturae’. Her argument that Pufendorf tried to construct a ‘cosmopolitan right’ is not only at odds with what Pufendorf actually said, but also against the spirit of his juridical and political thought. Goyard-Fabre, Pufendorf et le droit naturel, p. 234. Her endeavour to portray Pufendorf as an adversary of Hobbes is motivated by this kind of underlying anachronistic agenda. See S. Goyard-Fabre, “Pufendorf, adversaire de Hobbes” in Hobbes Studies 2 (1989), p. 65–87. S. Rachel, Dissertations on The Law of Nature and of Nations, ed. and translated by J. P. Bate (Washington 1916), p. 157. Compare also Richard Zouche, who also argued in favour of positive international law. R. Zouche, An Exposition of Fecial Law and Procedure or of Law between Nations and Questions Concerning the Same, ed. by J. L. Bierly (Washington 1911), p. 1: ‘Law between Nations is the law which is recognized in the community of different princes or peoples who hold sovereign power’. G. G. Titius, Einleitung zum jure naturae et gentium (Halle 1708) pointed out the misuse of international law to cover up atrocities. Glafey, Vollst¨andige Geschichte des Rechts der Vernunfft, p. 261 praised Titius because he had shown the ‘Mißbrauch des V¨olcker-Rechts, da man nemlich fast alle schlimmen H¨andel und Grausamkeiten mit diesem zu besch¨onigen sucht’. Dufour even claims that interest and not natural law is the foundation of Pufendorf’s international law. Dufour, “Pufendorfs f¨oderalistisches Denken und die Staatsr¨asonlehre”, p. 122: ‘die Staatsr¨ason, wie sie in seiner Staatsinteressenlehre formuliert ist, [bildet] den fundamentalen Grundsatz des V¨olkerrechts’. An excellent overview of the place of historiography within Pufendorf’s political thought is given by M. Seidler, “Natural Law and History. Pufendorf’s Philosophical Historiography” in History and the Disciplines. The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe, ed. by D. R. Kelley (Rochester 1997), p. 203–222.

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relations from an empirical historical account of the European political scene. Pufendorf wanted to ensure that his theory as presented in his natural law doctrine was related to these concrete political issues. Following the reason of state doctrine, he recognised interest as the guiding principle for state actions: ‘the Interest of each State ( . . . ) is to be esteemed the Principle, from whence must be concluded, whether State-Affairs are either well or ill managed’.186 Interest can be misunderstood and thus state affairs misguided. The study of contemporary history can help to identify the real interest of a state and to avoid policies whereby ‘great Errors are committed ( . . . ) against the Interest of the State’.187 Thus the interest of one state can be opposed to the interest of another, and it can change with time. A striking feature of his historical accounts of Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain and Germany is that Pufendorf always draws the same conclusion: a severe warning to be suspicious of Louis XIV’s France.188 Pufendorf’s theory of interstate relations thus takes two distinctively different aspects into account. Firstly, one has to consider historical experience and analyse the conflicting interests of the various states.189 One 186

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S. Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, ed. by M. J. Seidler (Indianapolis 2013), p. 7. Pufendorf did not mention Rohan’s De l’Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestient´e in this work, but the structure and underlying principles suggest that he might well have been influenced by Rohan’s work of which he owned a copy in his library. See F. Palladini, La Bibliotheca di Samuel Pufendorf (Wiesbaden 1999), p. 206. On Rohan see Chapter 2.2. Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, p. 8. Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, p. 602: ‘The foundation of the good Correspondency betwixt France and Sweden was built upon the common agreement of keeping under the overgrown Greatness of the House of Austria, but since the case is now altered, the King of France now pretends to play the Master over Princes. Sweden ought not to assist France in those Designs which overturn the Westphalian Treaty, or are intended against the Protestants in Germany and Holland’. Ibid., p. 321: ‘France alone seems to be their [the Swiss] most dangerous Neighbour; and it has been the wonder of many, why the Switzers rely ( . . . ) upon the French Alliance and Promises, and do not in the least endeavour to secure their Country against the growing Power of France’. Ibid., p. 311: ‘The Hollanders ought to stand in great fear of France on the Landside, especially since that King [Louis XIV] is their great Enemy’. Ibid., p. 95: ‘The King of France ( . . . ) is the capital and most formidable Enemy to Spain’. Ibid., p. 357: ‘France has of late made itself so Powerful, that this Kingdom alone may do more mischief to the Germans, than any of the rest of their Neighbours’. See also early on in Pufendorf’s career as a political writer his chapter ‘On the State-Interest of the German Empire/de ratione status Imperii’. S. Pufendorf, The Present State of Germany, ed. by M. J. Seidler (Indianapolis 2007), p. 210–247. On the perception of and reaction to a French threat in Europe, see the following chapter. There is a strong indication that Pufendorf’s understanding of interest led him to argue in his natural law doctrine, too, that ‘the relation of states to each other is a somewhat precarious peace. It is therefore a duty of sovereigns to take measures to develop military virtue and skill with weapons in the citizens ( . . . ). But one should not take the initiative in aggression even with a just cause for war, unless a perfectly safe opportunity occurs and the country’s condition can easily bear it’. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-11–13) p. 154

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aggravating factor in this already volatile situation was that rulers often pursue ‘an Imaginary Interest’, for instance, ‘when a Prince judges the welfare of his State to consist in such things as cannot be perform’d without disquieting and being injurious to a great many other States, and which these are oblig’d to oppose with all their Power’.190 Above all else, the pursuit of universal monarchy is ‘the Fuel with which the whole World may be put into a Flame’.191 Because rulers do not only pursue the ‘real interest’192 of their state, it is much more difficult to calculate the behaviour of the various actors. In the end there may be no alternative than that ‘everyone decides for himself whether the measures are apt to conduce to self-preservation or not’.193 Secondly, Pufendorf analyses how these actors relate to a whole set of new ideas. Two key concepts of the state as a composite moral person and a state system come into play. For Pufendorf, natural law can be meaningful for regulating interstate relations only in the specific context of a system of states. Because natural law thereby acquires a new place within interstate relations, it would be wrong to privilege the concept of interest as foundational for Pufendorf’s international political thought.194 On the contrary, Pufendorf advanced his argument by making use of the whole range of ideas at his disposal. Hobbes had already elaborated on the concept of system – which was to become one of the key terms to theorise interstate relations195 – in outlining a theory of regular and irregular political bodies: ‘Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of Systems ( . . . ), by [which] I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest, or one Businesse. Of which some are Regular, and some are Irregular. Regular are those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted Representative of the whole number. All other are Irregular’.196

190 191 192 193 194

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Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, p. 7. Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, p. 8. Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, p. 8. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-1–8) p. 117. This is the argument made by Meinecke and Dufour. See F. Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsr¨ason (Munich 1960), p. 264–286 and Dufour, “Pufendorfs f¨oderalistisches Denken und die Staatsr¨asonlehre”, p. 122. More nuanced is the argument by Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations, p. 246: ‘It is certainly the case that in trying to accommodate self-interest with the universal standards of conduct expressed in the Natural Law, the ethical constraint often appears to be extremely weak, and even subordinate to the Reason of State’. See the instructive discussion by Boucher, “Resurrecting Pufendorf and Capturing the Westphalian Moment”, p. 570f. and M. Wight, Systems of States (London 1977), p. 21–45. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 155.

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Although indebted to Hobbes for having coined the concepts of system and regular and irregular political bodies197 , Pufendorf countered that ‘it is evident ( . . . ), that when a State is composed of several subordinate Bodies, we must not on this account presently give it the Name of System: Tho’ Mr Hobbes is pleas’d thus to style it’.198 As we will see, Pufendorf envisaged a more sophisticated use of the term system. The constitution of the Holy Roman Empire had proved an almost inexhaustible source of inspiration and controversy alike for political thinkers on issues of ideal constitution, sovereignty and interstate relations.199 ‘If the European system as a whole can be called a loose, informal regime with few institutions ( . . . ), the empire was essentially a more developed regime with more elaborate institutions, providing a system of governance for matters of common interest while leaving internal government to each of the participating actors individually’.200 Pufendorf also re-deployed the Hobbesian differentiation of regular and irregular political bodies. When writing about the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, Pufendorf incorporated the Hobbesian categories into his theory on the irregularity of the Empire.201 He had shown that Bodin’s 197

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Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VII-V-16) p. 681. He had also drawn this part of the book to the attention of Christian Thomasius. See Pufendorf to Thomasius (Berlin 9 April 1692) in S. Pufendorf, Briefwechsel, ed. by D. D¨oring (Berlin 1996), p. 340. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VII-V-16) p. 681. See H. Duchhardt, “Reich und europ¨aisches Staatensystem seit dem Westf¨alischen Frieden” in Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung in der Fr¨uhen Neuzeit? ed. by V. Press (Munich 1995), p. 179–187, esp. p. 179, H. Duchhardt, “Das Reich in der Mitte des Staatensystems. Zum Verh¨altnis von innerer Verfassung und internationaler Funktion in den Wandlungen des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts” in P. Kr¨uger (ed.), Das europ¨aische Staatensystem im Wandel. Strukturelle Bedingungen und bewegende Kr¨afte seit der Fr¨uhen Neuzeit (Munich 1996), p. 1–9 and now C. Kampmann, “Peace Impossible?: The Holy Roman Empire and the European State System in the Seventeenth Century” in O. Asbach and P. Schr¨oder (eds.), War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe (Farnham 2010), p. 197–210. As we will discuss in Chapter 4.3, the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre will make innovative use of the Holy Roman Empire for his project to achieve peace in Europe on the basis of a European federation. Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, p. 279. See the excellent study by B. Roeck, Reichssystem und Reichsherkommen. Die Diskusssion u¨ ber die Staatlichkeit des Reiches in der politischen Publizistik des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart 1984). On Pufendorf and the Holy Roman Empire, see Schr¨oder, “The Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire after 1648”, p. 961–983 and Boucher, “Resurrecting Pufendorf and Capturing the Westphalian Moment”, p. 557–577. His claim (p. 571) that ‘Westphalia rendered the Emperor politically impotent’ is simply wrong. It is most regrettable that this kind of unsubstantiated, fanciful judgement is so stubbornly recurring in the scholarship on international relations. See, as yet another example, Knutsen, A History of International Relations, p. 85: ‘The Treaty of Westphalia ( . . . ) rendered the Holy Roman Emperor politically impotent’. Much more nuanced and accurate in their assessment are C. W. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy 1618–1815 (Cambridge 1994), p. 49– 54 and now the impressive study by J. Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Maximilian I to the Peace of Westphalia, 1493–1648 (Oxford 2012), p. 619–631 and J. Whaley, Germany and the

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definition of sovereignty was not a sufficient category to characterise the constitution of the Empire. However, the concept of sovereignty was not to be abandoned. On the contrary, while building on Bodin and Hobbes, Pufendorf recognised that the strict notion of absolute sovereignty was applicable neither to the Holy Roman Empire nor to interstate relations. On the former, he famously concluded that ‘the best account we can possibly give of the Present State of Germany, is to say, That it comes very near a System of States, in which one Prince or General of the League excells the rest of the Confederation’.202 What he effectively argued for was a system-based concept of sovereignty which would allow states to enter into agreements without giving up their sovereignty entirely. A ‘system results when several neighbouring states are so connected by perpetual alliance that they renounce the intention of exercising some portions of their sovereign power, above all those which concern external defence, except with the consent of all, but apart from this the liberty and independence of the individual states remain intact’.203 Natural law and interest were perceived in a different relationship within the context of a state system, composed of moral persons. These moral persons had their own volition, which differed from the often short-sighted interest of individuals. The state is meant to understand and pursue the real interest. Pufendorf distinguishes between the office and the person holding the office, which means that ‘a certain Method of governing’ is prescribed to the person of the ruler.204 The state as a composite moral person which wills, commands and forbids on its own account, and being distinctively different from the will of individual rulers, should, according to Pufendorf, provide a less passionate way of reasoning. Man is short-sighted and less likely to follow natural law, but there is hope that the state, the composite moral person, has a better and more reasonable understanding of the real interest of the various commonwealths and would thus follow the prescribed natural law, despite the lack of coercive power to enforce it.

202 203

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Holy Roman Empire: The Peace of Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich, 1648–1806 (Oxford 2012), p. 10–17. Pufendorf, The Present State of Germany, p. 178. See also, ibid., p. 161 and 217. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-8–15) p. 145. On the innovative and modern character of Pufendorf’s position, even in relation to discussions about the European Union, see Boucher, “Resurrecting Pufendorf and Capturing the Westphalian Moment”, p. 572–577 and more generally W. Maihofer, “Schlußwort: Was uns Pufendorf noch Heute zu sagen hat” in Samuel Pufendorf und seine Wirkungen bis auf die heutige Zeit, ed. by B. Geyer and H. Goerlich (Baden-Baden 1996), p. 223–282. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VII-VI-9) p. 695. To establish this constitutional framework trust was again key: ‘A King, by the Act of accepting the Administration, is supposed tacitly to engage, that he will conscientiously perform his Trust’. Ibid., (VII-VI-10) p. 696.

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One of these ‘common duties of natural law [was] that no one require for himself more than he allows others, ( . . . ) but allow others to enjoy their own right equally with him’.205 As Hobbes’s theory of natural law could already be applied to interstate relations, Pufendorf tried to make this point even stronger. Pufendorf demanded active engagement and argued that ‘it is not enough not to have harmed ( . . . ) others. We must also give, or at least share, such things as will encourage mutual goodwill’.206 This remained only a second-best choice, but given the circumstances, Pufendorf hoped that the system of composite moral persons would allow for conditions which would make it more likely and endorse the observance of the natural law among states. Pufendorf argued that regarding ‘Systems properly so call’d, these Two kinds do especially fall under Notice: One, when two or more States are subject to one and the same King; the Other, when two or more States are link’d together in one Body by virtue of some League or Alliance’.207 Pufendorf had initially developed the idea of a system of states in De Systematibus Civitatis from 1667.208 The argument – summarised in De Jure Naturae et Gentium – was that ‘when several States are, by some special Band [sic], so closely united, as that they seem to compose one Body, and yet retain each of them the sovereign Command in their respective Dominions, these we term systems of States’.209 Pufendorf further differentiated 205 206 207

208

209

Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (I-7–3) p. 63. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (I-8–1) p. 64. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VII-V-17) p. 681. This point had already been made by Pufendorf in S. Pufendorf, “De systematibus civitatum” in Dissertationes academicae selectiores . . . (Lund 1675), p. 289: ‘Arctiorum systematum duas potissimum deprehendimus species; unam, si duae pluresv`e civitates unum & idem habeant caput; alteram, si duae pluresve civitates foedere in unum corpus connectantur’. It took some time before Pufendorf’s insights were widely accepted. J. H. Zedler (ed.), Großes vollst¨andiges Universal-Lexikon aller Wissenschaften und K¨unste vol. 41 (Leipzig, Halle 1735–1745), p. 1213 has an entry ‘Systema’ stating all the variants and different uses but nothing is elaborated here concerning political theory. In vol. 39, p. 707, however, there is an entry ‘Staats-Systema’, but it only refers to the entry ‘Staats-C¨orper’ in the same volume. The concept is exclusively defined as internal to the state and not in relation to the international sphere. It reads, p. 647: ‘Staats-C¨orper oder Staats-Systema ( . . . ) heißt insgemein nichts anders, als der Staat, oder die Verfassung eines Landes, oder einer Republick, nach der daselbst eingef¨uhrten Regiments-Forme, oder der Verbindung zwischen denen dazu geh¨origen H¨auptern und Gliedern’. See Pufendorf, “De systematibus civitatum”, p. 264–330. See also the excellent article by M. Seidler, “Monstrous Pufendorf: Sovereignty and System in the Dissertations” in Monarchism and Absolutism in Early Modern Europe, ed. by C. Cuttica and G. Burgess (London 2011), p. 159–175. Useful discussion is also to be found in Dufour, “Pufendorfs f¨oderalistisches Denken und die Staatsr¨asonlehre”, p. 109–121 and Boucher, “Resurrecting Pufendorf and Capturing the Westphalian Moment”, p. 569–572. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VII-V-17) p. 681. The same point was made in Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-8–13) p. 144: ‘We speak of a “system of states” when two or more complete states are connected by some particular bond in such a way that their

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between equal and unequal leagues: ‘The first are such as are alike on both Sides; or when not only the Engagements and Promises are ( . . . ) on both Sides equal; but also when the Manner of passing them is equal, so that neither of the Parties is obliged to harder Conditions, or left any Way obnoxious to the other’.210 He was, though, enough of a realist to know that such an ideal situation of an equal league with equal conditions for all contracting parties was rarely obtained in actual interstate politics. Unequal leagues meant in turn that ‘either the Promises are unequal; or ( . . . ) either of the Parties is obliged to harder Conditions’.211 Unequal leagues are more prone to change, rendering promises less reliable. Indeed, Pufendorf differentiates the real interests of states between those attaching to the unchanging conditions of a country, and those that are temporary, being determined by ‘the Condition, Strength and Weakness of the neighbouring Nations; for as those vary, the Interest must also vary’.212 For such a system to function, sovereign states must not insist categorically on preserving their sovereignty in all cases. The very innovation of a system entailed a more flexible use of sovereignty. Furthermore, certain rules had to be observed, as provided by natural law. The claim to independent sovereignty had to recognise the same claim by other states, which meant that the legal equality of all members of the system had to be confirmed. Thus ‘interstate systems must reach a unified resolve by appealing to reason and persuasion rather than sovereignty’.213 Ultimately, this would be in the well-understood interest of all states. Although not advocating a balance of power policy per se, Pufendorf’s concept of an international system approximates this idea, explicitly so in specific cases: ‘it is the chiefest Interest of England, to keep up the Balance betwixt France and Spain’’.214 The functioning of a system depended on agreement215 , however, and not on power relations where each state would watch the other states with a suspicious eye. Tensions ensued because such voluntary agreements

210 211 212 213 214 215

combined strength may be regarded as the strength of one state. Systems arise in two principal ways: by having a king in common, and by alliance’. See also Pufendorf, “De systematibus civitatum”, p. 266: ‘Systemata civitatum nobis appellantur plures una civitates, vinculo aliquo ita inter se connexae, ut unum corpus videantur constituere; quarum singulae tamen summum in sese imperium retineant’. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VIII-IX-3) p. 858. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VIII-IX-3) p. 858. Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, p. 8. Seidler, “Monstrous Pufendorf: Sovereignty and System in the Dissertations”, p. 172. Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, p. 189. Pufendorf, “De systematibus civitatum”, p. 306f.: ‘Dispiciendum jam est de illis systematibus, quae ex pluribus civitatibus constant foedere perpetuo inter se nexis, in quo conventum fuit circa exercendam communi consensu partem unam aut alteram summi imperii’.

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remained feeble without the backing of sovereign power. As Michael Seidler has shown, eventually for Pufendorf ‘coordinate, systemic means for achieving unified willing depend, in anything less than ideal circumstances, on sovereign, subordination mechanisms – and this at all levels where systems function. The dependence is mutual ( . . . ) since sovereign imposition is not only required but also facilitated by systemic methods’.216 We have come full circle. Here, discussion about a system of states – essentially guided by the individual state’s interest, including the agreements they might make or their voluntary observance of natural law principles when they believe this is in their interest – leads to the issue of command and coercive force. This, in turn, led Pufendorf to raise the question of punishment in international political thought. Viewing the state as a composite moral person provided a means of justifying the right to punish: ‘Bodies politick, which are compounded of a number of Men, may have a Right resulting from such a Composition, which no one of the particulars was formally possess’d of; which Right, derived from the Union, is lodged in the Governors of such Bodies’.217 Pufendorf argued against Hobbes’s justification of punishment and also denied the Grotian idea that individuals would have an explicit right to punish in the state of nature. Against Hobbes, he insisted that ‘the Right of Punishing is different from the Right of Self-preservation’.218 He paraphrases almost verbatim the crucial passage of Chapter 28 of Leviathan where ‘Hobbes ( . . . ) asserts, That the Right the Commonwealth has to punish is not grounded on any Concession ( . . . ) of the Subjects, but that the Foundation of that Right is built upon that other, which, before the Institution of Commonwealths, every Man had to every thing, and to do whatever he thought necessary to his own Preservation. And therefore that the Right was not given, but left to the Commonwealth’.219 Pufendorf rightly spotted the shortcomings of Hobbes’s argument regarding the right to punish and rejected Hobbes’s justification of it, that is that only the sovereign was still in the possession of the right to everything, which included punishment. His concept of the state as a composite moral person allowed him to justify this right on the grounds of state sovereignty 216 217

218 219

Seidler, “Monstrous Pufendorf: Sovereignty and System in the Dissertations”, p. 173. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VIII-III-1) p. 762. See also Goyard-Fabre, Pufendorf et le droit naturel, p. 211–220 and D. H¨uning, “Souver¨anit¨at und Strafgewalt. Die Begr¨undung des jus puniendi bei Samuel Pufendorf” in Naturrecht und Staatstheorie bei Samuel Pufendorf, ed. by D. H¨uning (Baden-Baden 2009), p. 71–93. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VIII-III-1) p. 763. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VIII-III-1) p. 762. See H¨uning, “Souver¨anit¨at und Strafgewalt. Die Begr¨undung des jus puniendi bei Samuel Pufendorf”, p. 82f.

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without the need for individuals to concede explicitly the possibility that a right to punish might be exercised against them, nor the need to have recourse to the problematic Hobbesian solution. Regarding the right to punish in interstate relations, Pufendorf and Hobbes nevertheless share an understanding that punishment can be inflicted only if there is a superior authority endowed with this right.220 Although Pufendorf subscribed to Grotius’s definition of punishment as an evil inflicted for an evil which had been done221 , he insisted against the Dutchman that neither in the state of nature nor in a war between states would it make sense to speak of punishment. Pufendorf argued against the position Grotius had advanced in Chapter 20 of his De Iure Belli ac Pacis and maintained ‘that it is an improper Expression to say, a Man is obliged to be punished, or that such a one owes a Punishment; because Punishment signifies Harm inflicted against a Man’s Consent, and implies Aversion of the Will to it’.222 Pufendorf had established the sovereign’s right to punish on the idea of the state as a composite moral entity, which allowed him to provide a much more convincing foundation. His understanding of punishment meant that a legitimate authority had to be in place to inflict the punishment against the will of the person who had trespassed the law. Thus Pufendorf profoundly contradicted Grotius’s notion of punishment regarding the state of nature and interstate relations. As far as natural law was concerned he was adamant that ‘violations of natural law ( . . . ) have no penal sanctions attached’.223 So on these grounds it was impossible to justify punishment. But if ‘evils inflicted in war or in self-defence in fighting are not punishments, because they are not by authority’224 , how could a system of states allow for a right to punish? Pufendorf suggested that to exercise punishment as such was contingent upon a regular attribution of sovereignty. Had a system of states established such an authority? Pufendorf was unambiguous. Punishment could have no part within such a system. While states would give up ‘some portions of their sovereign power’225 , that did not mean that they would accord some higher authority the right to punish. This would jeopardise the independence of the individual state. Therefore, in a ‘System 220 221

222 223 224 225

See Hartung, “Von Grotius zu Pufendorf”, p. 123–136. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-13–4) p. 158: ‘A punishment is an evil one suffers, inflicted in turn for an evil one has done; in other words, some painful evil imposed by authority as a means of coercion in view of a past offence’. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, (VIII-III-4) p. 766. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-12–4) p. 155f. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-13–4) p. 159. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-8–15) p. 145.

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of several independent States united by a League or Confederacy, the safest course ( . . . ) is to ( . . . ) be sollicitous to preserve their own possessions, than think of taking any thing from their Neighbour’.226 There was no way of safeguarding a system of states in the same way a singular state could enforce its laws by coercive power. However, the differentiation between regular and irregular states suggests that there was some scope for interpretation. Pufendorf had maintained that ‘the forms of a state are either regular or irregular. The form is regular where sovereignty is so concentrated in one subject that, originating in one will, it pervades all the parts and affairs of the state, undivided and unimpaired. Where this is not found, the form of the state will be irregular’.227 Would an irregular state system provide a legitimate way to establish an authority within the system of state which could rightly claim the right if not to punish at least to rein in those who threatened the common interest? It is a sign of Pufendorf’s pragmatic realism that he believed that ‘there are infinite ways to deviate from correctness [of a regular state or state system], and so in the case of irregular forms of government one cannot define fixed and definite kinds’.228 This is where theory touches its limits and where pragmatic solutions need to be negotiated and found by politics. As the next chapter will show, Pufendorf’s ideas were key to the plans for pacifying Europe by creating a European federation. His Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe stressed the importance of taking contingent empirical conditions into account when dealing with interstate relations. He was adamant that disputes among states had to be dealt with in a pragmatic way and on a case-by-case basis.229 This indicates the limits of a juridical order and consequently of trust based on natural law as an effective agency for regulating interstate relations. Pufendorf’s engagement in the religious disputes and his polemics against Louis XIV in order to defend his fellow Protestants are testament to his conviction that struggle and conflict were part of the contemporary political setting in which thinkers and counsellors like himself had to strive to advance solutions. On a theoretical level, Pufendorf’s notion of the state as a composite moral person acting within a system of equals described conditions under which trust would not only be less precarious, but would also 226 227 228 229

Pufendorf, The Present State of Germany, p. 216. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-8–2) p. 142. Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-8–12) p. 144. This point is persuasively made by Seidler, “Monstrous Pufendorf: Sovereignty and System in the Dissertations”, p. 175: ‘disagreements require pragmatic, context-sensitive responses and cannot be generally avoided by resorts to universal schemata’.

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reinforce stability within the state system.230 The crucial task, as Pufendorf perceived it, was to work out how to achieve these conditions without ignoring the contingent reality. He was prepared to adopt a flexible theory of interstate relations allowing scope for compromise. Anything which would help to advance stability and avoid conflict between states was taken on board. The idea of irregularity helped to overcome the stringent notion of sovereignty and accommodated political compromise. For Pufendorf, the Holy Roman Empire and the post-Westphalian order provided concrete historical examples of how such an irregular system could function. Pufendorf operated in two different intellectual domains, as a natural law thinker and a counsellor and historian. The difference of the genre is not accidental; it is functionally different and opens up a pragmatic approach which would provide a new framework in which natural law and trust in the system could become meaningful and less precarious. 230

Hartmann, “On the Concept of Basic Trust”, p. 15: ‘Trust always is an achievement and can never be taken for granted’.

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ch a p ter 4

The Struggle for Hegemony and the Erosion of Trust

The second half of the seventeenth century was dominated by Louis XIV, and it was none less than Voltaire who coined this ‘the age of Louis XIV’.1 Following Mazarin’s and Haro’s negotiations over the details, the Peace of the Pyrenees and the marriage contract between Louis XIV and MarieTh´er`ese were concluded in 1659. This treaty added the missing piece to the Treaties of Westphalia.2 Mazarin, close to his death, was keen to see French foreign policy and diplomacy continue in the spirit of 1648 and its established state system.3 However, it did not take long before Louis XIV’s attitude to this mode of conducting French diplomacy and war changed.4 Not surprisingly, this fundamental shift in French foreign policy also changed the European state system in which the Habsburgs had traditionally been portrayed as the major threat to peace and stability. At the same time as the French king was reconsidering how best to advance French interests in the European context, political writing and pamphleting were increasingly aimed at discrediting French foreign policy more generally, arguing that already under Mazarin unbridled French self-interest involved the use of deceit and cunning towards the other 1

2 3

4

Voltaire, The Age of Louis XIV: To which is added, an abstract of The Age of Louis XV (London 1779). As only one further example in modern scholarship, see also W. J. Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV. The Rise of Modern Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass. 1976). For the terms hegemony and aggressive employed here, see Aron, Peace & War, p. 85: ‘since history offers few examples of hegemonic states which do not abuse their force, the state to which victory would give hegemony is regarded as aggressive, whatever the intentions of those governing it’. M. Rohrschneider, Der gescheiterte Frieden von M¨unster. Spaniens Ringen mit Frankreich auf dem Westf¨alischen Friedenskongress 1643–1649 (M¨unster 2006). On Mazarin and his vision for French foreign policy, see L. B´ely, L’art de la paix en Europe. Naissance de la diplomatie moderne XVIe – XVIIIe si`ecle (Paris 2007), p. 266–269. On the Peace of the Pyrenees, see notably the collection of essays in Duchhardt (ed.), Der Pyren¨aenfriede 1659 and B´ely, Haan and Jettot (eds.), La Paix des Pyr´en´ees (1659). Many studies have traced the French king’s foreign policy. See, for example, Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, J. A. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV (London, New York 1999), V.-L. Tapi´e, “Quelques aspects g´en´eraux de la politique e´trang`ere de Louis XIV” in XVIIe Si`ecle 46–47 (1960), p. 1–28 and Malettke, Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, p. 303–331.

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European powers. Seen in this light, one could discern continuity in French foreign policy, rather than rupture: ‘The King, no longer having a private tutor after the death of Cardinal Mazarin, did not fail to guide himself by his maxims and by his advice, as if he had still been living. ( . . . ) Thus the princes of Germany were treated civilly enough, appearances of common right were kept up, and a show was made of preserving the Peace of Westphalia and German liberty’.5 A contemporary polemic suggested that Mazarin’s political position had always been exemplified in the bon mot ‘that a man of distinction should not be the slave of his given word’.6 Other writers warned that Mazarin’s and Louis XIV’s common predilection for breaking promises and violating existing treaties should have come as no surprise.7 After Mazarin’s death, in May 1667 Louis XIV declared the War of Devolution with the invasion of the Spanish Low Countries. This was followed by the Dutch War from 1672 to 1678, concluded with the Treaties of Nijmegen.8 But the wars waged by Louis XIV were not the only wars to unsettle Europe. The Scanian War from 1674 to 1679 profoundly troubled the European state system.9 The northern powers Brandenburg-Prussia and Sweden were facing each other and at different points each sought French subsidies.10 This war was far from only being a conflict at the European periphery. Brandenburg-Prussia, under the rule of the Great Elector Frederick William11 , was a rising power. Sweden was still a major European power and, alongside France, a guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia. What role does the notion of trust play in the writings of leading political thinkers of this decisive period? Many of them display disappointment and irritation that neither the Peace of Westphalia nor the Peace of the Pyrenees succeeded in pacifying Europe. The period between the Peace of Nijmegen 5

6 7 8 9 10 11

G. W. Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus” [1683] in G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, ed. by P. Riley (Cambridge 1988), p. 125. On the pamphlet literature, see generally Kaeber, Die Idee des europ¨aischen Gleichgewichts and H. Gillot, Le r`egne de Louis XIV et l’opinion publique en Allemagne (Paris 1914). Anonymous, Appel de l’Angleterre touchant la secrete Cabale ou Assembl´ee a` Withael (Amsterdam 1673), p. 19: ‘qu’un honneste Homme ne doit point estre esclave de sa parole’. See now also the excellent study by B´ely, Les Secrets de Louis XIV. On the Dutch War see Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, p. 113–159. The authoritative account is R. I. Frost, The Northern Wars 1558–1721 (Harlow 2000). Cf. Frost, The Northern Wars, p. 209. D. McKay, The Great Elector (Harlow 2001) provides an excellent study of Frederick William. Still ´ useful, especially on the relations with France, are also G. Pag`es, Le Grand Electeur et Louis XIV, 1660–1688 (Paris 1905) and C. Hinrichs, “Der Große Kurf¨urst 1620–1688” in C. Hinrichs, Preussen als historisches Problem (Berlin 1964), p. 227–252.

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and the outbreak of the Nine Years War in 168812 was a deeply troubled period.13 With the accession to the English throne in 1688 by William III of Orange, war ensued anew.14 The extent to which 1688–1689 was a period of upheaval can also be seen in the April 1689 declaration that France, though a guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia, was declared an enemy of the Holy Roman Empire.15 This was a clear indication that France had lost all its political credit within the Holy Roman Empire. The dramatic loss of confidence of almost all European states in the French monarch severely undermined both the French position and the new Westphalian order.16 The decade after the Peace of Nijmegen in 167817 marks what is known as the armed peace or reunions (1679–1688)18 which saw the violent seizure of the imperial city of Strasbourg by French troops in 1681 and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.19 Both events caused considerable concern among Protestant princes and political thinkers alike. Was trust plausible or even possible under such conditions? And how was trust employed in contemporaneous political pamphlets and theories?20 12 13

14

15

16

17 18 19

20

The Nine Years War was concluded by the Peace of Rijswijk which was more or less immediately overshadowed by concerns over the Spanish succession. See Chapter 4.3. Other conflicts further undermined the fragile peace. Most importantly the Ottomans posed a profound threat to the Austrian Habsburgs, as in their siege of Vienna, only relieved in 1683. See J. Stoye, The Siege of Vienna (London 1964), R. Waissenberger (ed.), Die T¨urken vor Wien. Europa und die Entscheidung an der Donau 1683 (Vienna 1983) and H. Kretschmayr, Die T¨urken vor Wien, Stimmen und Berichte aus dem Jahre 1683 (Munich 1938). In recent years research on the Ottoman Empire has been considerably advanced. See notably the overview studies by C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire (Houndmills 2002), J. Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons. A History of the Ottoman Empire (London 1999) and C. Finkel, The History of the Ottoman Empire. Osman’s Dream (New York 2006). The Nine Years War from 1688 to 1697. C. Boutant, L’Europe au grand tournant des ann´ees 1680. La succession palatine (Paris 1985), p. 759–817 provides a detailed account of the developments on the eve of this war. See also Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, p. 191–265. See the account in J. J. Pachner von Eggenstorf, Vollst¨andige Sammlung aller von Anfang des noch f¨urw¨ahrenden Teutschen Reichs-Tags de anno 1663 biss andero abgefassten Reichsschl¨usse (Regensburg 1740–1776), p. 673–676. Contemporary observers of these agreements quickly gained a much more nuanced view of these treaties than modern scholars often seem prepared to concede. See, for example, K. J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648–1989 (Cambridge 1991), M. G. Lyons and M. Mastandundo (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore, London 1995), p. 5f. and Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society, p. 75 and p. 136. A good summary account of the events can be found in Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, p. 21f. See also L. B´ely, La France moderne 1498–1789 (Paris 2003), p. 405–417. ´ See J. Garrisson, L’Edit de Nantes et sa r´evocation. Histoire d’une intol´erance (Paris 1985). For Strasbourg see H. Schilling, H¨ofe und Allianzen Deutschland 1648–1763 (Berlin 1989), p. 236–240, C. Boutant, L’Europe au grand tournant des ann´ees 1680 and Histoire de Strasbourg des Origines a` nos Jours. Tome III: Strasbourg de la Guerre de Trente ans a` Napol´eon 1618–1815, ed. by G. Livet and F. Rapp (Strasbourg 1981). See also Weil, A Plague of Informers, p. 27–103.

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Considerable research has been done on the Huguenot writings from the ten years preceding the crucial events of 1688–168921 , but political thought in Germany during this period – in particular that concerning interstate relations – has been less well examined. The German Protestant Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) reacted to the increasingly aggressive French policies and propaganda. In contrast to Leibniz, the importance of Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) as a political thinker has been firmly established.22 The two thinkers shared concerns about the defence of the Holy Roman Empire and Protestantism from the French quest for religious and political hegemony in Europe. A range of other works also engaged with Louis XIV’s policies and contemporary interstate relations. Of particular interest are the defence of French Catholicism and Louis XIV’s rule by the French bishop Jacques-B´enigne Bossuet (1627–1704) on the one hand, and Pierre Bayle’s (1647–1706) reaction to the aggressive religious politics of the French crown on the other. Pamphlets and other polemical writings might have limited claim to advancing political theory. This does not mean, however, that they are not worth using to better situate those theoretical innovations which did emerge. Some of the writings were semi-official and presumably all of them were written with a vested interest in the conflict. This fact poses the intellectual challenge of discerning and assessing on the one hand their polemical intention and potential impact and, on the other, their theoretical importance and validity in conceptualising interstate relations. At issue is the extent to which their rhetoric made use of the key concepts that shaped the discourse about European interstate relations. Scrutinising the way these concepts – universal monarchy, the balance of power and indeed also the notion of trust and mistrust – were employed, will advance our understanding of how political philosophy and political rhetoric developed in view of the conflicts in the second half of the seventeenth century. Political theory and political rhetoric and polemic did not only further the conceptualisation of the European state system; they were part of the ensuing conflicts. 21

22

The comprehensive study by Jonathan Israel gives an overview of this period and an exhaustive account of the existing scholarship. J. I. Israel, Enlightenment Contested Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Many 1670–1752 (Oxford 2006), esp. Part II. On Pufendorf see Chapter 3.3 with full references to the existing literature. A good overview of the existing research with further references can now be found in: Naturrecht und Staatstheorie bei Samuel Pufendorf, ed. by D. H¨uning (Baden-Baden 2009). For Pufendorf’s arguments on religion, see S. Zurbuchen, “Samuel Pufendorf’s Concept of Toleration” in Difference and Dissent: Theories of Toleration in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. by C. J. Nedermann and C. Laursen (Lanham 1996), p. 163–184.

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4.1 Leibniz (1646–1716) and his Guerre Des Plumes against Louis XIV’s Claims to Hegemony Leibniz was best known for his mathematics, equal to Newton, and for his metaphysics, equal to Pascal or Malebranche.23 But, as a court official, he also engaged with the issue of political and religious strife. Writing against the aggressive politics of Louis XIV and his advisors, notably Bossuet, Leibniz put forward his arguments not only in ardent polemics, but also in the more sober form of a theory of interstate relations, an endeavour complemented by his collection of documents which supported the position of the Empire against the French, his Codex Iuris Gentium published in 1693. In his preface to the Codex, Leibniz elaborated his moral and political theory as a foundation for a theory of interstate relations with particular importance accorded to religion.24 He recognised the divisive force of the antagonistic confessions, but at the same time attempted to unite the divided Christian church.25 When Strasbourg was taken by the French, against the stipulations of the Peace of M¨unster, Leibniz was alarmed. To what extent did trust – undermined by confessional differences – become a major concern for Leibniz’s theory of interstate relations?26 23 24

25

26

See M. R. Antognazza, Leibniz. An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge 2009), particularly p. 3 and p. 205. I will quote from G.W. Leibniz, “Codex Iuris Gentium (Praefatio)” [1693] in G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, ed. by P. Riley (Cambridge 1988), p. 165–176. For the Latin original, see G. W. Leibniz, “Praefatio codicis juris gentium diplomatici” in G. W. Leibniz Politische Schriften vol. 5, ed. by Leibniz-Editionsstelle Potsdam (Berlin 2004), p. 48–79. Although the importance of Leibniz as a political thinker has meanwhile also been recognised, those elements of Leibniz’s political thought which focus on interstate relations have yet to be fully analysed. See in particular: L. Basso, “Regeln einer effektiven Außenpolitik: Leibniz’ Bem¨uhen um eine Balance widerstreitender Machtinteressen in Europa” in Studia Leibnitiana 40/2 (2008), p. 139–152, R. S`eve, Leibniz et ´ l’Ecole moderne du droit naturel (Paris 1989), A. Robinet, G. W. Leibniz. Le meilleur des mondes par la balance de l’Europe (Paris 1994), Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, p. 236–259, P. Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence. Justice as the Charity of the Wise (Cambridge, Mass. 1996), Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, p. 95–147, Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, p. 72–110, I. Hunter, “The Love of a Sage or the Command of a Superior: The Natural Law Doctrines of Leibniz and Pufendorf” in Early Modern Natural Law Theories: Contexts and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment, ed. by T. Hochstrasser and P. Schr¨oder (Dordrecht 2003), p. 169–193 and P. Schrecker, “Leibniz’s Principles of International Justice” in Journal of the History of Ideas 7 (1946), p. 484–498. I will not endeavour to discuss this aspect in depth, as my focus is on the wide range of Leibniz’s political writings and the influence religion exercised in this domain. For a study on Leibniz’s ¨ ecumenical writings, see P. Eisenkopf, Leibniz und die Einigung der Christenheit. Uberlegungen zur Reunion der evangelischen und katholischen Kirche (Munich 1975). One of the few studies on the concept of trust in the seventeenth century is the important essay by Blom, “Patriots, Contracts and other Patterns of Trust”, p. 193–213.

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In his polemic, Mars Christianissimus, he argued against this blatant violation of the Peace of M¨unster.27 The text expresses Leibniz’s growing apprehension at the increasingly aggressive French political aims. Already as a young man, when he served the archbishop of Mainz from 1668 to 1673, he worked on a memorandum examining how German security could be maintained against the French threat.28 This text, published in 1670, argued that the most important element in order to achieve this security was a reorganisation of the political and military structure of the Holy Roman Empire to match the political and military weight of the French.29 Ever since this early engagement as a political advisor, Leibniz advocated the defence of the Empire. His imperial patriotism (Reichspatriotismus)30 shows that, even after the Peace of Westphalia, the Empire and its constitutional form were his enduring political framework.31 But it would be misleading to treat Leibniz’s political engagement in anachronistic terms as a nationalistic German reaction to French attempts to dominate Europe.32 27

28

29

30

31

32

For the Latin and French originals, see G. W. Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus Autore Germano Gallo-Graeco ou Apologie des Armes du Roi tr`es Chrestien contre les Chrestiens” in G. W. Leibniz Politische Schriften vol. 2, ed. by Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR (Berlin 1984), p. 447–502. This is one of the few polemics Leibniz published during his lifetime. He translated the original Latin into French, giving it wider circulation among French and German political leaders alike. This polemic ‘is beyond doubt his most brilliant and entertaining political work’. Riley, G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, p. 121. G. W. Leibniz, “Bedenken, welcher Gestalt Securitas publica interna et externa und status praesens im Reich auf festen Fuß zu stellen” in G. W. Leibniz Politische Schriften vol. 1, ed. by Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Darmstadt 1931), p. 133–214. On Leibniz’s plans for reform of the Empire, see N. Hammerstein, “Leibniz und das Heilige R¨omische Reich deutscher Nation” in Nassauische Annalen 85 (1974), p. 87–102, H. P. Schneider, “Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz” in Staatsdenker in der fr¨uhen Neuzeit, ed. by M. Stolleis (Munich 1995), p. 197–226 and P. Schr¨oder, “Reich versus Territorien? Zum Problem der Souver¨anit¨at im Heiligen R¨omischen Reich nach dem Westf¨alischen Frieden” in Altes Reich, Frankreich und Europa. Politische, philosophische und historische Aspekte des franz¨osischen Deutschlandbildes im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, ed. by O. Asbach, S. Externbrink and K. Malettke (Berlin 2001), p. 123–143. On Leibniz’s patriotism and the wider context of patriotism in the political theory in seventeenthcentury Germany, see H. Dreitzel, “Zehn Jahre ‘Patria’ in der politischen Theorie in Deutschland: Prasch, Pufendorf, Leibniz, Becher 1662 bis 1672” in ‘Patria’ und ‘Patrioten’ vor dem Patriotismus. Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europ¨aischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert, ed. by R. v. Friedeburg (Wiesbaden 2005), p. 367–534. Generally see M. Wrede, Das Reich und seine Feinde. Politische Feindbilder in der reichspatriotischen Publizistik zwischen Westf¨alischem Frieden und Siebenj¨ahrigem Krieg (Mainz 2004). For Leibniz see Schr¨oder, “Reich versus Territorien?”. On the importance of the Holy Roman Empire and its constitutional structure, see the masterful study by J. Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, 2 vols. (Oxford 2012). Nationalism is clearly a concept which is not to be found in the seventeenth century and its difference to patriotism is quite decisive. See notably R. Koselleck, “Patriotismus. Gr¨unde und Grenzen eines neuzeitlichen Begriffs” in ‘Patria’ und ‘Patrioten’ vor dem Patriotismus. Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europ¨aischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert, ed. by R. v. Friedeburg (Wiesbaden 2005), p. 535–552, M. J. Seidler,“‘Wer mir gutes thut, den liebe ich’:

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On the contrary, Leibniz’s criticism of French aggression was sharpened by admiration of French philosophy and society, which he had experienced and enjoyed during his stay in Paris between 1672 and 167633 , making personal contact with leading French philosophers and scientists of his day, notably Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694), Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), Christiaan Huygens (1629–1695) and Pierre Nicole (1625–1695), with whom he maintained an exchange of ideas through an extensive correspondence.34 The turn in French politics dashed the hopes he had cherished for French intellectual leadership in shaping the postwar era after the devastating Thirty Years War. Indeed, his admiration of French culture might explain his bitter reaction to the seizure of Strasbourg by Louis XIV.35 The ironic praise by which Leibniz – in parody of Bossuet’s style – pretended to defend Louis XIV against his critics is remarkable, although he was not the only writer to employ this technique. Jean Paul Franc¸ois de Lisola (1613–1674), a special envoy on several missions for the Austrian Habsburgs, wrote many of his historical polemics anonymously, stating that the writings he published were motivated by the ‘zeal of a loyal subject’.36 Like Leibniz, Lisola maintained that the ‘reason of state is the basis of my discourse’.37 Leibniz’s polemic is more sophisticated than those of Lisola or indeed of other contemporaries. In assuming the stance of defender of

33 34

35

36

37

Pufendorf on Patriotism and Political Loyalty” in ‘Patria’ und ‘Patrioten’ vor dem Patriotismus. Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europ¨aischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert, ed. by R. v. Friedeburg (Wiesbaden 2005), p. 335–365. See Antognazza, Leibniz, p. 140–175. His correspondence contains more than 15,000 letters with more than 1,100 correspondents. See the edition of his letters in the Akademie Ausgabe also available online at www.leibniz-edition.de. See also the translation of some letters by Leibniz to Arnauld, Malebranche and other French intellectuals in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and translated by L. E. Loemker (Dordrecht 1989). Leibniz was certainly not alone in thinking along these lines. F´enelon, for instance, made a very similar point in his Letter to Louis XIV: ‘Vous avez cherch´e dans le trait´e de Westphalie des termes e´quivoques pour surprendre Strasbourg. Jamais aucun de vos ministres n’avait os´e, depuis tant d’ann´ees, all´eguer ces termes dans aucune n´egociation, pour montrer que vous eussiez la moindre pr´etention sur cette ville. Une telle conduite a r´euni et anim´e toute l’Europe contre vous’. Franc¸ois de F´enelon, Lettre a` Louis XIV, ed. by P.-E. Leroy (Paris 2011), p. 51f. Anonymous [i.e. Lisola, J. p. F.], La France politique ou ses desseins executez et a` executer sur le plan des passez; projettez en pleine Paix contre l’Espagne au Pays-bas & ailleurs [Charle-Ville 1671], p. 1. On Lisola see M. Baumanns, Das publizistische Werk des kaiserlichen Diplomaten Franz Paul ¨ Freiherr von Lisola (1613–1674). Ein Beitrag zum Verh¨altnis von absolutistischem Staat, Offentlichkeit und M¨achtepolitik in der fr¨uhen Neuzeit (Berlin 1994), A. F. Pribram, Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola ´ Levillain, Le Proc`es de Louis XIV. Une 1613–1674 und die Politik seiner Zeit (Leipzig 1894) and C.-E., guerre psychologique (Paris 2015). Anonymous [i.e. Lisola, J. p. F.], La France politique, p. 2. Unlike Leibniz, Lisola changes his position in this text and he does not pretend to argue in the interest of the French monarchy. On the contrary, towards the middle of the text he unambiguously defends the interests of the Habsburgs against the French.

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Louis XIV, Leibniz has the critics of the French king ‘maintain that the taking of Strasbourg was the most violent and the most Ottoman political act that a Christian prince has ever undertaken, and that it is the height of impudence to try to excuse it; that the coup was made in peacetime without any shadow of a pretext, against freshly given pledges which guaranteed that everything would remain in the condition that it had since the departure of the King’s ambassadors for Frankfurt; that all judicious people have judged that, after this, it would be useless to rely on the rules of right and on the laws of honor; that conscience, good faith, and the law of nations are cruel terms and vain shadows, since they no longer look for even a pretext for violence. For in earlier times even those who carefully examined the minutest points of the laws of France took care not to think of Strasbourg, for fear of being taken as visionaries or for sophists surprised en flagrant d´elit, since the words of the peace of Munster are too clear’.38 In ironic hyperbole Leibniz insinuated that the omnipotence of the French king could allow him to ignore the stipulations of the peace treaties of Westphalia concluded at M¨unster and Osnabr¨uck.39 Leibniz was aware that rulers are easily seduced by power politics and reason of state to break their contractual obligations with other states if doing so would be to the advantage of their own dominion. What Leibniz demonstrates, however, is that most of the time such conduct proves short-sighted and counterproductive. It is precisely at this point of his argument that the notions of trust and mistrust acquire a political value. Article 87 of the Peace of M¨unster stated that ‘the Most Christian King [i.e. the French king] shall be required to leave not only the bishops of Strassburg and Basel, with the city of Strassburg, but also the other immediate estates of the Roman Empire that are in both Upper or Lower Alsace; ( . . . ) also the aforementioned ten imperial cities that belong to the prefecture of Hagenau, in the same liberty and immediacy to the Roman Empire that they have thus far enjoyed; such that he [the French king] cannot claim any further royal superiority over them, but shall remain content with whatever rights the House of Austria has observed and that are ceded to the crown of France through this peace treaty’.40 But only those who naively believed that these contractual commitments would have had any binding force on a man of power still referred to 38 39

40

Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus”, p. 140. On the importance of the Peace of Wetsphalia, see Dickmann, Der Westf¨alische Frieden, Duchhardt (ed.), Der Westf¨alische Friede and K. Bussmann and H. Schilling (eds.), 1648, War and Peace in Europe (M¨unster 1998). This interpretation is challenged by Teschke, The Myth of 1648. T. Helfferich (ed.),The Thirty Years War. A Documentary History (Indianapolis 2009), p. 273.

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the Peace of M¨unster as a means of restricting the ambitious politics of Louis XIV. In fact, Leibniz suggests the French had hidden their ambitious agenda because they felt they lacked the strength to enforce it. Hence when they were ‘asked why France had never heretofore demanded Strasbourg or a number of other presently occupied places, and why she had not made some mention of her claim when the occasions required it, as at the Treaty of Munster ( . . . ), or at least at Nimwegen; [they] ( . . . ) did not blush to answer that earlier these matters had not yet been in a proper state for discussion’.41 Leibniz implies that no codification of interstate laws is binding on those who have the power to ignore it. This Machiavellian argument points to the tension between morals and politics in the sphere of interstate relations.42 Leibniz’s ironic version of this argument suggests that it was the privilege of the powerful to neglect their reputation for trustworthiness if keeping trust would get in the way of their pursuit of political aims. Are there no restrictions which might limit this arrogant use of power? Trying to justify the French aggressions, and in particular the seizure of Strasbourg, is a futile exercise. One would do better to simply recognise the consequences of powerful states furthering their own aims, rather than pretending to engage in a discourse about legal titles. Leibniz is sarcastic: ‘There are some who flatter themselves that they can defend France’s enterprises with reasons drawn from ordinary right; but they deceive themselves greatly; ( . . . ) the wisest among the French avoid all disputes about right, and speak only as politicians, exaggerating, with great reason, the goodness and prudence of their monarch, who knows so well how to exploit his advantages. ( . . . ) There precisely is an outline of the jurisprudence and of the morality such as we have just established, that is, that the greatness of the King and of the French crown is above all other rights and oaths, of whatever character they may be’.43 The rhetorical style does more than parody Bossuet. We are here at the heart of Leibniz’s argument. A moral and political theory is interwoven with the polemic of Mars Christianissimus. In the following, Leibniz refers to the almighty God which leads directly to the long-standing debate regarding God’s omnipotence on the one hand, and the need to explain, on the other 41 42

43

Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus”, p. 124. See also P. Schr¨oder, “Taming the Fox and the Lion – Some Aspects of the Sixteenth Century’s Debate on Inter-state Relations” in War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth Century Europe, ed. by O. Asbach and P. Schr¨oder (Farnham 2010), p. 83–102. Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus”, p. 137.

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hand, how an omnipotent and wise God could allow for evil to exist in the world. At the same time, as major a figure as Bossuet had defended the absolute rule of Louis XIV as granted in holy scripture and the divine right bestowed on the king of France.44 Bossuet provides the philosophical and theological background for Leibniz’s polemic against Louis XIV. If we do not take it into account we will be unable to fully appreciate Leibniz’s polemic. In his Discours de M´etaphysique, Leibniz already argued against the Hobbesian idea of an omnipotent God to whom the power of determining the notions of right and justice would be attributed because of his will and irresistible power: ‘In saying ( . . . ) that things are not good according to any standard of goodness, but simply by the will of God [par la seule volont´e de Dieu], it seems to me that one destroys, without realising it, all the love of God and all his glory; for why praise him for what he has done, if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary? Where will be his justice and his wisdom if he has only a certain despotic power, if arbitrary will takes the place of reasonableness, and if in accord with the definition of tyrants, justice consists in that which is pleasing to the most powerful?’45 Leibniz rejected the voluntaristic argument of Bossuet who, like Hobbes, used it to defend absolute monarchical rule.46 In his Theodicy Leibniz took up this subject again. He maintained that ‘one must not say ( . . . ) that what we call justice is nothing in relation to God, that he is the absolute Master of all things even to the point of being able to condemn the innocent without violating his justice, or ( . . . ) 44

45 46

For Bossuet see Chapter 4.2. See also the still invaluable study by P. Hazard, La Crise de la conscience europ´eenne 1680–1715 (Paris 1961), p. 187–203. Thomas Hobbes had also maintained in his Leviathan: ‘The Right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his Laws, is to be derived, not from his Creating them as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; but from his Irresistible Power. ( . . . ) To those therefore whose Power is irresistible, the dominion of all men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and consequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdome over men, and the Right of Afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator, and Gracious; but as Omnipotent’. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 246–247. For Hobbes’s importance on the political philosophy of interstate relations, see Chapter 3.2. On the intellectual relationship between Hobbes and Leibniz, see Schr¨oder, Naturrecht und absolutistisches Staatsrecht, p. 94–98, Y. C. Zarka, “Leibniz lecteur de Hobbes: Toute-puissance divine et perfection du monde” in Leibniz. Le Meilleur des mondes, Studia Leibnitiana Sonderheft (Stuttgart 1992), p. 113–128 and U. Goldenbaum, “It’s Love! Leibniz’s Foundation of Natural Law as the Outcome of His Struggle with Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s Naturalism” in The Philosophy of the Young Leibniz, Studia Leibnitiana Sonderheft (Stuttgart 2009), p. 189–201. See also F. Palladini, “Di una critica di Leibniz a` Pufendorf” in Percorsi della Ricerca filosofica. Filosofie tra storia linguaggio e politica (1990), p. 19–27 and J. B. Schneewind, “Barbeyrac and Leibniz on Pufendorf” in Samuel Pufendorf und die europ¨aische Fr¨uhaufkl¨arung, ed. by F. Palladini and G. Hartung (Berlin 1996), p. 181–189. G. W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, ed. by G. R. Montgomery (La Salle 1973), p. 4f. It should be noted, however, that Leibniz had previously followed Hobbes’s voluntarism. Hans Welzel provides an insightful discussion of Leibniz’s shifting position. Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit, p. 146–150.

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that justice is something arbitrary where he is concerned. ( . . . ) What means would there be of distinguishing the true God from the false God of Zoroaster if all things depended upon the caprice of an arbitrary power and there were neither rule nor consideration for anything whatever’.47 For Leibniz, the concept of an omnipotent God does not mean that he can exercise his power arbitrarily, depending only on his will. There ought to be a guiding principle independent of and anterior to God’s will. The concept or idea of justice ought to be superior to God’s voluntarism.48 In his Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice, Leibniz maintained in Platonic terms49 that ‘it is agreed that whatever God wills is good and just. But there remains the question whether it is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is just: in other words, whether justice and goodness are arbitrary or whether they belong to the necessary and eternal truths about the nature of things, as do numbers and propositions’.50 We can now recognise the full consequences of the position Leibniz adopted in his polemic against Louis XIV. To the question of whether there existed any limits to the French king’s power, Leibniz had answered ‘that His Most Christian Majesty who is living today is the true and sole vicar of the world with respect to all temporal matters’.51 With irony, Leibniz not only affirmed the exceptional position of the French king, but also pushed his assertion further: ‘to this foundation I add the definition of what is just or unjust, which Plato states and explains very well through the person of a certain Thrasymachus, whom he makes say soundly: justum est potentiori utile.52 Which agrees very well with what we have said about the right of God over all things, since God is the most powerful of all. The most powerful after God, excepting always the devil, is without doubt His Most Christian Majesty’.53 The reference to Thrasymachus54 , 47 48

49 50 51 52 53 54

G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy. Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil, ed. and translated by E. M. Huggard (La Salle 1990), p. 95. How justice and the somewhat free-floating ‘ought’ can be superior to God’s will is the subject of the Theodicy. This problem was not fully solved by Leibniz. Ian Hunter makes the important point that ‘we must be careful not to treat Leibniz’s natural law as simply an alternative theory of justice to that offered by Hobbes and Pufendorf – especially not as a superior one’. Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, p. 128. See Plato, “Euthyphro” in Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, ed. and translated by H. N. Fowler (Cambridge, Mass. 2005), 9e–10e. G. W. Leibniz, “Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice” in G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, ed. by P. Riley (Cambridge 1988), p. 45. Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus”, p. 126. This reference is to Plato, Republic, 338c: ‘Justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger’. Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus”, p. 126. On Thrasymachus see K. Lycos,Plato on Justice and Power (Albany 1987).

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who in the first book of Plato’s Republic argues the case for justice being dependent on the will of the ruler, is revealing.55 Thrasymachus maintains that ‘a ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best for himself, and this his subject must do. Thus, as I [i.e. Thrasymachus] said from the first, it is just to do what is to the advantage of the stronger’.56 Socrates counters: ‘All right, Thrasymachus, so you think I’m [i.e. Socrates] a false witness?’ To which Thrasymachus answers: ‘You certainly are’.57 Leibniz used this Platonic dialogue to argue his own position on justice against Bossuet, Hobbes and Pufendorf.58 Indeed he famously claimed that ‘a celebrated English philosopher named Hobbes, who is known for his paradoxes, has wished to uphold almost the same thing as Thrasymachus: for he wants God to have the right to do everything, because he is all-powerful.59 This is a failure to distinguish between right and fact. For what one can do is one thing, what one should do, another’.60 In the Theodicy, Leibniz reiterates this criticism: ‘I believe that many persons otherwise of good intentions ( . . . ) do not see that, 55

56 58

59 60

The importance of Leibniz’s Platonism is conveniently summarised by Patrick Riley in his introduction to G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, p. 2–16. See also Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, p. 23–34, p. 119, p. 189 and R. J. Mulvaney, “The Early Development of Leibniz’s Concept of Justice” in Journal of the History of Ideas 29 (1968), p. 53–72. Hans Welzel had already argued: ‘In der ganzen Naturrechtslehre gibt es keinen Denker, der der platonischen Ideenlehre f¨ur das Recht einen so reinen und unverf¨alschten und zugleich einen so glanzvollen Ausdruck gegeben hat wie Leibniz’. Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit, p. 154. 57 Plato, Republic, 341a. Plato, Republic, 341a. See Mulvaney, “The Early Development of Leibniz’s Concept of Justice”, p. 57. Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, p. 23–34, p. 189 makes the same argument. See also Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, p. 73–79. See the quotation from Hobbes’s Leviathan, p. 246–247 earlier. Compare also Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 173. Leibniz, “Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice”, p. 47. It might be worth mentioning at least in passing that Leibniz was less critical of Hobbes than this passage might suggest. Not only did he write a laudatory letter to Hobbes as a young man (see G. W. Leibniz, “Letter to Thomas Hobbes” [1670] in Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and translated by L. E. Loemker (Dordrecht 1989), p. 105–107), but he also found words of praise for the English philosopher in the preface to his Codex Iuris Gentium. See Leibniz, “Preface to Codex Iuris Gentium”, p. 166. See also the correspondence of Mentet Kettwig with Leibniz. In October 1695 Kettwig had sent him a copy of the Epistolae de veritatae philosophiae Hobbesianae contra Ulricum Huberum, since he had noticed the esteem Leibniz had shown for Hobbes in his preface to the Codex. G. W. Leibniz, Textes in´edits d’apr`es les manuscrits de la biblioth`eque provinciale de Hanovre vol. II, ed. by G. Grua (Paris 1948), p. 653. What is more, he wrote a short essay entitled “Reflexions on the work that Mr Hobbes published in English on ‘Freedom, Necessity and Chance’”, where – despite his criticism of Hobbes’s position – he again acknowledged the ‘usual wit and subtlety’ of Hobbes’s writings. There can be no doubt, though, that Leibniz criticised Hobbes in this essay for, among other things, a position that is by now familiar to us, namely that ‘he maintains that all that which God does is just, because there is none above him with power to punish and constrain him’. G. W. Leibniz, “Reflexions on the work that Mr Hobbes published in English on ‘Freedom, Necessity and Chance’” in Theodicy, ed. by A. Farrer (La Salle 1985), p. 394.

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properly speaking, God’s justice is thus overthrown. For what idea shall we form of such a justice as has only will for its rule, that is to say, where the will is not guided by the rules of good and even tends directly towards evil? Unless it be the idea contained in that tyrannical definition of Thrasymachus in Plato, which designated as just that which pleases the stronger. Such indeed is the position taken up, albeit unwittingly, by those who rest all obligation upon constraint, and in consequence take power as the gauge of right’.61 In Mars Christianissimus, Leibniz likened Louis XIV and his advisors to Thrasymachus, implying that the absolute monarch’s unwillingness to moderate his actions rendered his conduct tyrannical. Flatly ignoring what is due to justice, Louis XIV claims – and has his advisors do so for him – that his policies, including the violent seizure of Strasbourg against the stipulations of the Peace of M¨unster, are justified. Leibniz pursued his agenda in different genres and styles without losing sight of his philosophical convictions. ‘One sees ( . . . ) every day’, he writes in his Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice, ‘that men, whether interested or disinterested, complain about the actions of certain powerful people, and find them unjust: thus the question is solely whether they complain with reason; and whether history can condemn with justice the inclinations and actions of a prince. This being granted one must acknowledge that men understand by justice, and by right, something else than that which pleases the powerful, and which remains unpunished if there is no judge capable of redressing [evil]. It is true that in the entire universe or in the government of the world it happens, happily, that he who is the most powerful is just at the same time, ( . . . ) but power is not the formal reason which makes it just. Otherwise, if power were the formal reason of justice, all powerful persons would be just, each in proportion to his power; which is contrary to experience’.62 The stakes were high. It is enough to look at the Mars Christianissimus again: ‘As early as the year 1672, it was resolved in France that the King would, in the future, no longer need to give reasons to the world for his enterprises, as his ancestors and other potentates had always tried to do by issuing superfluous manifestos. This is why, once it was decided to attack the Dutch, the declaration of war took the place of a manifesto; and the whole reason alleged for this action was the will and the good pleasure of the King, namely the ill-satisfaction of His Majesty with the conduct of 61 62

Leibniz, Theodicy, p. 59. Leibniz, “Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice”, p. 48.

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the Estates-General of the United Provinces’.63 The declaration of war was an essential part of the early modern framework of interstate relations. Prominent jurists, including Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius, had argued for a conduct of war which would limit its devastating effects, as far as possible, to recognised combatants who in turn would pursue their efforts under certain rules of engagement.64 At the same time the channels of communication would be kept open, as the enemy was recognised as an adversary who would engage in the conflict under the existing rules of war, in the manner of a duel. This was not only essential for circumscribing the war, but also for negotiating the conditions under which to end it.65 As Carl Schmitt would put it, ‘One should not exaggerate the analogy of war between states and a duel, but it largely is accurate and provides many illuminating and heuristically useful viewpoints. Where a duel as an institution is recognized, the justice of it is based similarly on the sharp distinction between justa causa and the form, between abstract norms of justice and the concrete ordo. In other words, a duel is not just because the just side always wins, but because there are certain guarantees in the preservation of the form – in the quality of the parties to the conflict as agents, in the adherence to a specific procedure ( . . . ), and, especially, in the inclusion of witnesses on an equal footing’.66 On this basis, a measure of mutual trust between sovereign European states was not an unreasonable expectation as a condition for restricting bellicose engagements to a minimum. Declaring war was a prerogative of the sovereign state. If war was declared according to the legal and customary norms, the hope was 63 64

65 66

Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus”, p. 122. Cf. Chapters 1.2 and 3.1. See also Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law, H. Bull, H. Kingsbury and A. Roberts (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford 2002), Klesmann, Bellum Solemne, P. Piirim¨ae, “Alberico Gentili’s Doctrine of Defensive War and its Impact on Seventeenth-Century Normative Views” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. by B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (Oxford 2010), p. 187–209. See Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 142 and p. 158–162. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 143. See also L. Foisneau, “Security as a Norm in Hobbes’s Theory of War: A Critique of Schmitt’s Interpretation of Hobbes’s Approach to International Relations” in War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth Century Europe, ed. by O. Asbach and P. Schr¨oder (Farnham 2010), p. 168 and Panizza, “Political Theory and Jurisprudence”, p. 214– 218. For critical discussion of the analogy of duel and international relations, though not in regard to political theory, see B´ely, L’art de la paix en Europe, p. 27–40. As one contemporary example, see W. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates (1693)” in The Political Writings of William Penn, ed. by A. R. Murphy (Indianapolis 2002), p. 418: ‘Wars are the Duels of Princes’’. On Penn see Chapter 4.2. Leibniz speaks of gladiators, see further.

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that it would be conducted and, at some point, ended according to the existing forms. After the Peace of Westphalia, these aspects of a theory of international law were largely accepted by the European states.67 But in the War of Devolution, ‘the [French] King began his war ( . . . ) in 1667 without even declaring it’.68 Following the cessation of that war in 1668, the Dutch war was begun by Louis XIV in 1672.69 Again the war was launched as a sudden attack against the Dutch, by Louis XIV on land and by the English at sea, without an official declaration of war. The English attacked Dutch ships coming home from Smyrna on 23 March 1672, five days before they issued an official declaration of war. Louis XIV, for his part, only ever issued a war manifesto – the one to which Leibniz referred in the citation earlier.70 Among the European states, consternation grew when the French crown, though a guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia, chose to ignore established customs, diplomatic procedures and legally binding treaties in pursuit of its ambitious aggrandisement. Only shortly after the Peace of Nijmegen had ended the Dutch war in 1678–167971 , on 30 September 1681 the secretary of the French war ministry, Franc¸ois Michel Le Tellier, marquis de Louvois, arrived at the gates of the free imperial city of Strasbourg with a force of 35,000 men and demanded its unconditional surrender.72 Given that the Peace of Nijmegen was intended to re-establish the Peace of Westphalia, the brutal conduct of the French and their breach of existing international law could not be cushioned by mellow words.73 With regard to the seizure

67 68 69 70 71

72

73

Klesmann, Bellum Solemne, p. 73–111. See also B. Hallett, The Lost Art of Declaring War (Chicago 1998). P. Sonnino, “The Origins of Louis XIV’s Wars” in The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe, ed. by J. Black (Edinburgh 1987), p. 118. See Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV. See Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus”, p. 122. For the wider context, see Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, p. 113 and Klesmann, Bellum Solemne, p. 85–90. The warring powers signed their respective treaties at different stages in 1678–1679. Altogether nine different treaties were signed. See Duchhardt, Gleichgewicht der Kr¨afte, Convenance, Europ¨aisches Konzert, Schilling, H¨ofe und Allianzen, p. 226–231 and H. Bots (ed.), The Peace of Nijmegen 1676– 1678/79 / International Congress of the Tricentennial, Nijmegen, 14–16 September 1978, (Amsterdam 1980). See Strasbourg, ville libre royale 1681–1792. Exposition. Catalogue (Strasbourg 1981) and D. Pfaehler, “Die Kapitulation der Reichsstadt Straßburg am 30. September 1681, ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Folgen” in Der Fall der Reichsstadt Straßburg und seine Folgen – Zur Stellung des 30. September 1681 in der Geschichte, ed. by W. Forstmann (Bad Neustadt a.d. Saale 1981), p. 3–53. L. Bluche, Louis XIV (Paris 1986) tells a much more positive story about the French king. But contrast this with, for instance, Schilling, H¨ofe und Allianzen, p. 236. For judgements similar to that of Schilling, see also P. Sonnino, Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War (Cambridge 2002) and Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV.

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of Strasbourg and the overall conduct of Louis XIV, Lucien B´ely went so far as to speak of a ‘policy of terror’.74 The aggressive policies of Louis XIV brought religion into the conflict. Leibniz denounced not only Louis XIV’s self-righteousness, but also the way in which he had exploited religion for his cause: ‘His [Louis XIV’s] mission is heroic, ordinary laws do not obligate him at all, and his greatness is the sole measure of his justice, since everything that serves to augment it serves the glory and the well-being of the Church. Thus he can fail only by too much moderation, and everything which he does with the intention of aggrandising himself will always be just’.75 Strasbourg had been a free imperial Protestant city. After its seizure by the French, the Protestants were soon under pressure either to convert to Catholicism or leave their town.76 The conduct of the French king threw the system of Westphalia into question. But it was not just Louis XIV’s unrestrained pursuit of power and status which unsettled Europe. Leibniz saw that the main political and juridical problem – as already formulated by Machiavelli77 – posed by such an ambitious ruler was the destruction of trust in an existing legal and diplomatic framework78 : ‘But France ( . . . ) forces the others to desperate resolutions and acts in such a way that it will be henceforth an impardonable folly to trust her word and to hope for a good peace’.79 At the heart of the issue Leibniz identified the philosophical and political probl´ematique80 of whether the existing political system could reasonably allow the actors to have good faith in their counterparts: ‘Certainly, if there is a way to trust in assurances in human negotiations, if the public pledge of kings has some effect, if religion and conscience are not simply names invented to fool the simple-minded, this peace ought to have been solid and sure; but since it has been broken and trampled underfoot on the first favorable occasion, one must grant (they say) that he who would henceforth trust the word of France is in fact simple-minded, and worthy 74 75 76

77 78

79

B´ely, L’art de la paix en Europe, p. 379: ‘Louis XIV poursuit sa politique de terreur un peu partout’. Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus”, p. 136. See Pfaehler, “Die Kapitualtion der Reichsstadt Straßburg”, p. 43: ‘Straßburg ver¨anderte sich rasch. Die Zusammensetzung der Bev¨olkerung wurde durch Emigration und Einwanderung verwandelt, ebenso der konfessionelle Status. Fremde Beamte kamen in die Stadt, gefolgt von franz¨osischen Jesuiten’. See Chapter 1.1. The moral philosopher Leibniz had a rather remarkable, positive view of Machiavelli. See G. W. Leibniz, “R´eflexions sur l’Art de connaˆıtre les hommes” in G. W. Leibniz, Lettres et Opuscules in´edites, ed. by A. Foucher de Careil (Paris 1854), p. 133: ‘Il est vrai que la vertu parfaite est rare, mais une e´minente m´echancet´e ne l’est pas moins. C’est d´ej`a une remarque de Machiavel. ( . . . ) Machiavel ne peint qu’un m´echant prince, et donne son portrait pour celuy du prince en g´en´eral’. 80 See Luhmann, Vertrauen, p. 46, p. 59, p. 77. Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus”, p. 143.

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of being deceived; this is why the Dutch, the Spanish, the Emperor, and the rest of the allies who treated peace at Nimwegen are being at present, or will soon be, punished for their credulity’.81 The taking of Strasbourg during peace time without any legal title and in obvious breach of the existing law had already provoked strong reactions against the French king and other princes were increasingly unwilling to trust his word. Leibniz’s Mars Christianissmus polemicises against this French coup.82 But the coup was a consequence of a formative process of hegemonic statebuilding that would not allow competing legal privileges on a local level, such as were guaranteed for the free imperial city of Strasbourg in the Peace of M¨unster. The increasing centralisation of state power, conceptualised in the notion of exclusive rights of the sovereign, subordinated the existing particular law to the needs of the emerging state. What is noteworthy, though, is that this development was not pursued by Louis XIV and his advisors simply following a rational agenda of statebuilding. The importance of religion seems to contradict the idea of a purely rational process of state-building. Not surprisingly, the reaction against the French was sharpened by confessional allegiances, which in turn further undermined trust between religious and political opponents. And yet it was in the midst of such rivalries that Leibniz tried to make sense of this ambivalent world he lived in. Looking back at the events discussed here, in 1693 – following Hobbes – he concluded ‘that between different states and peoples there is perpetual war; ( . . . ) Thus it is that peace with a powerful enemy can be nothing else than a breathing-space of two gladiators, and sometimes does not even have the character of a truce. This much was shown recently by the almost ridiculous fact that a truce [of Ratisbon 1683, following France’s seizure of Strasbourg and other territories] was established a little after a peace treaty [Nijmegen 1678], in contrast to what ought to happen; it is not difficult to judge what sort of peace it must be which needed a truce’.83 Leibniz was sceptical about the possibility of 81 82

83

Leibniz, “Mars Christianissimus”, p. 138. On the polemics against Louis XIV in general, see Chapter 4.2. The important aspect of the reaction to the seizure of Strasbourg needs still to be studied in much more detail, but see the unpublished PhD thesis by K. H¨olscher, Die o¨ffentliche Meinung u¨ ber den Fall der Reichsstadt Straßburg w¨ahrend der Jahre 1681–1684 (Munich 1896). See also G.-L. Fink, “La prise de Strasbourg et son e´cho dans les lettres Allemandes (1681–1684)” in Pouvoir, ville et soci´et´e en Europe (1650–1750) (Paris 1983), p. 131–144. Leibniz, “Codex Iuris Gentium (Praefatio)”, p. 166. Again, F´enelon makes a very similar point when he claims: ‘Les alli´es aiment mieux faire la guerre avec perte que de conclure la paix avec vous, parce qu’ils sont persuad´es, sur leur propre exp´erience, que cette paix ne serait point une paix v´eritable, que vous ne la tiendriez non plus comme les autres’. F´enelon, Lettre a` Louis XIV, p. 52.

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a stable order for Europe, but he did not give up on working for it. He realised that unless the ruthless pursuit of state interest was altered, conflicts were bound to ensue and trust between states would remain precarious. Leibniz referred to trust in a range of different genres, but the basis of his convictions was provided by his moral philosophy, where trustworthiness held a similar pivotal role as justice. However, Leibniz realised that this position was prone to be exploited unless circumstances changed. His ironic attack on Louis XIV culminated in his discrediting the sun king as untrustworthy. In Leibniz we can see trust employed in the different genres of moral philosophy, political advice and polemical attack. Leibniz, too, highlighted the importance of trust, but was he able to improve conditions for trust and trust-building?

4.2 ‘Triomphe De La Foi’ – Religion and Interstate Relations after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes Leibniz’s Mars Christianissimus was among the remarkable products of the guerre des plumes which accompanied Louis XIV’s aggressive and expansionist policies during the struggle for hegemony in the wider European context. With the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, Protestants throughout Europe recognised that trusting the French king would only leave them more vulnerable. Thus, well before war broke out again in 1688, the situation was volatile.84 Confessional strife fuelled the existing conflict even further. If confessional allegiances had ceased to dominate the very frameworks of politics, as was generally the case until the beginning of the seventeenth century85 , religion divided Europe anew along confessional lines. Mistrust in confessional adversaries regained influence as a divisive cause, undermining the post-Westphalian European settlement. Secularisation and de-confessionalisation were not unshakeable aspects of European political culture.86 From 1681 onwards, Catholic pressure on the Huguenots in France increased.87 The notorious dragonnades were an indication of this. The 84 85

86

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See Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV and B´ely, L’art de la paix en Europe, p. 377–390. Pohling, “Konfessionelle Deutungsmuster internationaler Konflikte um 1600 – Kreuzzug, Antichrist, Tausendj¨ahriges Reich”, p. 278–316 and Schilling, “Konfessionalisierung und Formierung eines internationalen Systems”, p. 591–613. See, for example, Schilling, “Konfessionalisierung und Formierung eines internationalen Systems”, Boutant, L’Europe au grand tournant des ann´ees 1680, p. 351–410 and Schilling, H¨ofe und Allianzen, p. 203. It is only fair to say that the Austrian Habsburgs were equally harrying the Hungarian Calvinists in the 1670s. The authoritative study in English on the Austrian Habsburgs is still R. J. W. Evans,

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suppression of Huguenot colleges and academies – beginning with the closure of the academy at Sedan88 – was yet another example of the increasingly hostile attempts led by the French king and his chancellor, Michel Le Tellier, to extirpate Protestantism in France.89 In 1685, the Edict of Fontainebleau solemnly revoked the Edict of Nantes: ‘And now we perceive, with thankful acknowledgement of God’s aid, that our endeavours have attained their proposed end, inasmuch as the better and the greater part of our subjects of the said R.P.R. [Religion pr´etendue r´eform´ee] have embraced the Catholic faith. And since by this fact the execution of the Edict of Nantes and of all that has ever been ordained in favor of the said R.P.R. has been rendered nugatory, we have determined that we can do nothing better, in order wholly to obliterate the memory of the troubles, the confusion, and the evils which the progress of this false religion has caused in this kingdom, ( . . . ) than entirely to revoke the said Edict of Nantes’.90 Michel Le Tellier died the following year. In his funeral oration, Bossuet praised the chancellor’s success in drawing up the edict of revocation, thus landing the final blow against heresy.91 The reaction at the Papal court was far from enthusiastic, however, and Bossuet was forced to urge Rome to join him in praising this almost miraculous achievement of his king.92 The French were challenged by other European powers. Pope Innocent XI supported the emperor Leopold I. Obsessed with the Ottoman threat, Innocent made huge sums available to pay for the effort to relieve the siege

88

89

90 91

92

The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550–1700 (Oxford 1979), see in particular p. 261–266. See also J. P. Spielman, Leopold I of Austria (London 1977), p. 83–92. In 1675 Pierre Bayle was appointed professor of philosophy at the academy of Sedan and went in 1681 into exile in Rotterdam, where he obtained a chair of philosophy and history at the Ecole Illustre. See E. Labrousse, Pierre Bayle: Du pays de Foix a la cit´e d’Erasme vol. I (The Hague 1963), p. 131–167. See E. Labrousse, “Une foi, une loi, un roi?” La R´evocation de l’´edit de Nantes (Geneva 1985), p. 173–177. M. Yardeni, “French Calvinist Political Thought, 1534–1715” in International Calvinism 1541–1715, ed. by M. Prestwich (Oxford 1985), p. 328f. makes the important point that loyalties to the French king might have been much stronger than the Calvinist polemics of this period suggest. Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 22 October 1685. This is accessible online at (last accessed 05/10/2015): www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1685revocation.html. J.-B. Bossuet, “Oraison fun`ebre de Messire Michel le Tellier [1686]” in Oraisons fun`ebres pan´egyriques, ed. by l’abb´e B. Velat (Paris 1936), p. 206: ‘Quand le sage chancelier rec¸ut l’ordre de dresser ce pieux e´dit qui donne le dernier coup a` l’H´er´esie, il avait d´ej`a ressenti l’atteinte de la maladie dont il est mort’. See also Fl´echier, “Oraison fun`ebre de Messier Michel Le Tellier [1686]”in Recueil de diverses oraisons fun`ebres, harangues, discours, & autres Pieces d’Eloquence des plus celebres Auteurs de ce tems (L’Isle 1691), p. 487–520. Bossuet, “Oraison fun`ebre de Messire Michel le Tellier”, p. 205: ‘Ne laisson pas cependant de publier ce miracle de nos jours; faisons-en passer le r´ecit aux si`ecles futurs. Prenez vos plumes sacr´ees, vous qui composez les annales de l’Eglise: ( . . . ) hatez-vous de mettre Louis avec les Constantin et les Th´eodose’.

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of Vienna in 1683, just two years before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The crusade to roll back the Turks after the victory in 1683 was equally supported by Innocent XI in the following years. Thus Leopold I was naturally much closer to the Pope’s political designs.93 Furthermore, Louis XIV’s policy threatened the papal territory of Avignon and generally seemed to undermine the Pope’s authority within the Catholic Church. This critical Catholic reaction to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes is reflected in the pamphlet literature. For instance, the anonymously published pamphlet The Spirit of France, whose author was presumably a Catholic, criticised the king’s religious and foreign policies.94 The last chapter is entitled ‘That Lewis the XIV. King of France is nothing less than a Catholick’95 , with the author suggesting that the king’s religion ‘is but a Cloak, the better to cover his Ambitious designs’.96 The argument is that Louis XIV’s constant breach of oaths and promises contradicts the tenets of the Catholic Church.97 As to the persecution of the Huguenots, it is made clear that ‘the holy Father, being a person of sense, and not cruelly bent, would have Conversions carried on by gentler Methods, by Reason and good Examples (not by Dragoons and Torments)’.98 Bossuet’s conception of politics was based on the Gallican principle of one faith, one law and one king. With the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, he seemed to have achieved his ideal of ‘the healthy constitution of the state’s body’ which for him ‘consists in two things: religion and justice. These are the internal, constitutive principles of states’.99 Such a model of politics allowed no space for a multi-confessional state, as was made explicit in Bossuet’s Oraison fun`ebre for Michel le Tellier. God, he argued, had held in store for the dying chancellor ‘the accomplishment of this great work for religion; and he [Michel le Tellier] said, when sealing the revocation of the famous Edict of Nantes, that after this triumph of 93

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95 97

98 99

See also P. S. Fichtner, Terror and Toleration. The Habsburg Empire confronts Islam, 1526–1850 (London 2008) and G. G´ang´o, “Information and Propaganda in Print: Leibniz’s Eastern Europe” in European Review 23 (2015), p. 332–340. Despite the publication date of 1689, this text was presumably written towards the end of 1687, since it states that King James is still on the throne in England. See Anonymous, The Spirit of France and the Politick Maxims of Lewis XIV. Laid open to the World (London 1689), p. 43. 96 Anonymous, The Spirit of France, p. 68. Anonymous, The Spirit of France, p. 68. Anonymous, The Spirit of France, p. 68: ‘The Catholick Church allows not ( . . . ) the Violation of the most solemn Oaths ( . . . ) Pope Gregory spoke very Christianly, when he affirm’d, That we are truly Catholicks, and faithful, when we accomplish by our Actions, what we have promis’d by our Words. ( . . . ) Here’s what a good catholick ought to do, but I would willingly know whether Lewis the XIV. practise it’. Anonymous, The Spirit of France, p. 15. J.-B. Bossuet, Politics drawn from Holy Scripture, ed. by P. Riley (Cambridge 1999), p. 191.

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the faith and such a wonderful monument of the king’s piety, he was no longer concerned at death’.100 But Bossuet’s enthusiasm for this ‘great work’ of religion was shared neither by the Pope nor by the other Catholic princes. In the pamphlet The Spirit of France readers were warned: ‘All those new conversions which you see in France, are only to blind the Eyes of the Catholick Princes, and to amuse them, till he [Louis XIV] falls on some City, or State, which makes profession of the Reformed Religion’.101 Catholics should not be deceived by the politics of Louis XIV: ‘Do you not think when you see the great Lewis pursuing the Hugonots, as he does, that he is the most devout Son the holy Father has; and that whereas others kiss only his Feet, he is ready out of Devotion to kiss something more? But it is quite the contrary, he is a disobedient Son’.102 Bossuet’s ‘triomphe de la Foi’ is ridiculed and Catholic Europe is warned yet again about Louis XIV. His true intentions lie in his ‘appetite to the Universal Monarchy’.103 His religious politics are window dressing and ‘neither Peace, nor Truce, nor Promise, nor Oath could stop him when his Interest comes into the Scale. Even his Zeal to Catholicism vanishes, when ever it stands in the way of his other Designs’.104 It was in immediate reaction to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and in view of the increasingly aggressive French policy that leading Protestant political thinkers wrote their tracts about religion and politics.105 Pierre Bayle, John Locke and Samuel Pufendorf are examples of this trend.106 In 1687, Pufendorf published Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion to 100

101 103 105

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Bossuet, “Oraison fun`ebre de Messire Michel le Tellier”, p. 207: ‘Dieu lui r´eservait l’accomplissement du grand ouvrage de la Religion; et il dit en scellant la r´evocation du fameux e´dit de Nantes, qu’apr`es ce triomphe de la Foi et un si beau monument de la pi´et´e du Roi, il ne se souciait plus de finir ses jours’. 102 Anonymous, The Spirit of France, p. 14. Anonymous, The Spirit of France, p. 13. 104 Anonymous, The Spirit of France, p. 8. Anonymous, The Spirit of France, p. 4. Pufendorf and Bayle made it explicit that they were reacting to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, but also Locke certainly had it in mind when he composed his Letter Concerning Toleration during his exile in Amsterdam in November– December 1685. Cf. S. Mendus and J. Horton, “Locke and Toleration” in John Locke. A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. by J. Horton and S. Mendus (London, New York 1991), p. 4f. For the political formation of the alliance of the Augsburg League against France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, see Boutant, L’Europe au grand tournant des ann´ees 1680, p. 351: ‘Il e´tait e´vident que dans le rapprochement qui s’op´erait alors a` l’int`erieur de l’Empire, comme au dehors, entre Etats catholiques et Etats protestants et qui e´tait la condition de la formation d’une aussi grande ligue, l’Edit de religion pris r´ecemment en France avait un rˆole d´eterminant’. See W. Rex, Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy (The Hague 1965), F. Lezius, Der Toleranzbegriff Lockes und Pufendorfs (Leipzig 1900) and M. Seidler, “The Politics of Self-preservation: Toleration and Identity in Pufendorf and Locke” in Early Modern Natural Law Theories: Contexts and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment, ed. by T. Hochstrasser and P. Schr¨oder (Dordrecht 2003), p. 227–243.

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Civil Society, in which he warned his fellow Protestants: ‘as for such Princes and States, as have shaken off the Yoke of Popish Slavery, if they seriously reflect, how their fellow-Protestants are persecuted, and in what barbarous manner they are treated, will, questionless without my Advice, take such measures, as may be most convenient for to secure themselves from so imminent a Danger’.107 Pufendorf’s views on the French changed when he realised the extent of their aggression.108 In his Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, written and published before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, he had concluded that ‘it is not ( . . . ) very probable, that the Princes of Germany, especially those of the Protestant Religion, should be willing to see France fall before the House of Austria; since both their Power and Religion would stand on slippery Ground, if not supported by a Foreign Power. Wherefore it seems to be no difficult task to persuade some of the “Protestant” [German] Princes, at least to sit still {in any war against France}’.109 The French dragonnades were the most obvious indication of the abuse of power. God ‘did not call to his aid the Power and Authority of Civil Magistrates, to force People to receive his Words. ( . . . ) It was not God Almighty’s pleasure to pull People head-long into Heaven, or to make use of the new French way of Converting them by Dragoons’.110 A year earlier, in 1686, Bayle had reacted to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in very similar terms. Like Pufendorf, he tried to mobilise resistance against the feared onslaught on Protestantism: ‘The Calamitys of our Brethren in France will, in all probability, turn to our advantage. They have awaken’d us to a prudent Distrust of Popery; they have convince’d us that this false Religion is not to be mended by length of time, that she’s still animated as much as ever with a Spirit of Cruelty and Fraud’.111 The French claimed, of course, to have right and justice on their side. In such 107 108

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110 111

S. Pufendorf, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion to Civil Society, ed. by S. Zurbuchen (Indianapolis 2002), p. 122. D. Saunders, “Hegemon History: Pufendorf’s Shifting Perspectives on France and French Power” in War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth Century Europe, ed. by O. Asbach and P. Schr¨oder (Farnham 2010), p. 211–230. See also Schr¨oder, “The Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire after 1648”. Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, p. 271. However, as we saw in Chapter 3.3, he had already perceived France as a threat. Accordingly he had also already warned (ibid., p. 271) that ‘those lesser States bordering upon France are in great danger to be devour’d by so flourishing a Kingdom’. Pufendorf, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion, p. 33. P. Bayle, “Compel Them to Come in that my House may be Full”, in A Philosophical Commentary on these Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, ed. by J. Kilcullen and C. Kukathas (Indianapolis 2005), p. 39. See also p. Bayle, Ce que c’est que la France toute catholique: sous le r`egne de Louis le Grand (1686).

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disputes, it is unsurprising that trust – or attacking the untrustworthiness of the adversary – was invoked. But trustworthiness was at the same time seen by all parties to the conflict as more than a strategic tool.112 It was also seen as one of the foundations of human society. Bossuet argued that ‘princes who fail in their oaths (God forbid that this should ever happen to them), as far as this lies in them, make vain everything that is most solid among men, and at the same time make impossible, both social life and the repose of the human race. In this way they make both God and men their just and irreconcilable enemies’.113 Despite Bossuet’s words, for Bayle the French king had lost all credibility in Protestant Europe. This manifest confessional antagonism further isolated the French. Bayle was keen to demonstrate that ‘Lewis XIV in his Preamble to the Edict of Revocation, lets all Europe understand that he, his Father, and Grandfather, had all along a design of repealing that of Nantes’.114 This move allowed Bayle to depict French religious policy as irreconcilable with the interests of Protestant Europe. But underneath the religious and political conflict lay the more fundamental problem that all parties involved had a claim to truth. These mutually exclusive claims seemed to bar any possibility of reconciliation. As Bayle observes: ‘a Papist is as fully satisfi’d of the Truth of his Religion, a Turk of his, and a Jew of his, as we are of ours. ( . . . ) Man has no characteristick Mark to discern the Persuasion of the Truth from the Persuasion of a Lye’.115 Locke made exactly the same point: ‘every church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous and heretical. Whatsoever any church believes, it believes to be true; and the contrary thereupon it pronounces to be error. So that the controversy between these churches about the truth of their doctrines, and the purity of their worship, is on both sides equal; nor is there any judge ( . . . ) by whose sentence it can be determined’.116 The dispute about religious truth reproduces in many ways the dilemma of the state of nature, but it is a dispute which cannot be resolved by the creation of a sovereign. Each remains judge in his own case, and the structural problem of the ipse judex principle provides the framework in which these conflicts will have to be conducted. Pufendorf made a related point: ‘the Kingdom of Christ ( . . . ) is a Kingdom of Truth, where he, by 112 113 114 116

At this time of conflict, trust was also a central internal political issue in England as recently shown by Weil, A Plague of Informers, esp. p. 68–103. Bossuet, Politics drawn from Holy Scripture, p. 239. 115 Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, p. 262. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, p. 195. J. Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration” in John Locke. A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. by J. Horton and S. Mendus (London, New York 1991), p. 24.

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the force of Truth, brings over our Souls to his Obedience; and this Truth has such powerful Charms, that the Kingdom of Christ needs not to be maintained by the same forcible means and Rules, by which Subjects must be kept in Obedience to the Civil Powers, And for the same reason it is, that there need not be established a particular State, in order to propagate and preserve Truth’.117 Coexistence of different confessions should be possible, provided that none of these claimed the use of state power to further a particular creed. Bearing in mind not only the Edict of Nantes, but also the peace treaties of Augsburg in 1555 and M¨unster in 1648, which dealt with confessional strife in the Holy Roman Empire, Pufendorf argued for restricted state authority in religious matters by making reference to existing fundamental laws: ‘A much greater Obligation lies upon Sovereigns to tolerate Dissenters, if they, when they first submitted to the Government, had their Liberty of conscience granted them by Contract; or have obtain’d it afterwards by certain Capitulations, any following Statutes, or by fundamental Laws of the Land; all which ought to be sacred to Princes, and to be observed by them with the same Circumspection, as they expect a due Obedience from their Subjects’.118 Since there could be no solution to disputes about religious truth119 , Pufendorf therefore aimed to separate the state from the church and thus provide a private realm for religious belief. But as long as religious convictions remained of such importance both for the individual and for society as a whole, this attempt to rid political conflicts of religion’s influence would remain precarious. The conviction that a unified Church was the precondition of social peace in one nation ran very deep. Regarding interstate relations in post-revocation Europe, there was no judge to determine between conflicting claims to truth, nor any possibility of placing trust in one’s adversary. Hence in Bayle’s characterisation of the Catholics, he was certainly aware of this structural dilemma, but he endeavoured to demonstrate that there was one fundamental difference between Catholics and Protestants. ‘The Dispute between them and us is, whether the Church of Rome be the true Church: Common Sense requires, that we on our parts shou’d prove from common Principles, and not from 117 118 119

Pufendorf, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion to Civil Society, p. 35. Pufendorf, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion to Civil Society, p. 108. In a different intellectual context, Stephen Shapin defines truth as a ‘social institution’ whose collective identity is fundamentally a matter of trust among individuals. If in argumentum e contrario truth is so heatedly contested, the consequence is almost unavoidably that trust between the different parties is severely undermined. See S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-century England (Chicago 1994), p. 6.

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a bare Pretension, that she is not; and that they on their part prove she is the true Church, not by a bare Pretension (for that’s unpardonable in a School-boy) but from Principles common to them and us. ( . . . ) still they come about to their old Cant, We are the Church, you are the Rebels, therefore we have a right of chastising you, but you have none of returning us like for like’.120 Where Catholics were in a position of power, they spread their religion by force.121 For Bayle the fact that there could not be common ground with Catholics entailed that even if ‘we are to examine which side is right, and which wrong ( . . . ); each Party will say that they persecute righteously; and are very unrighteously persecuted: and till such time as God shall decide this great Claim at the last Day; the Strong will always oppose the Weak without control’.122 The competing claims to truth not only precluded trust, but led to conflict as open recourse to power was used by the stronger party to decide the issue. The Catholics would abuse their position of power, and Protestants were therefore well advised to be on their guard.123 Bayle pursued his argument in familiar Protestant anti-papal rhetoric, denouncing the allegiance of Catholics to the Pope: ‘this alone is sufficient Reason for never trusting Popish Subjects but upon special Security: the rather, because they clandestinely introduce Monks, and other Emissarys of the Church of Rome, who study all occasions of embroiling the State, and evolving the Crown on Heads of their own Religion; wherein if they succeed, presently they talk of nothing else but crushing the infernal Hydra of Heresy, and sacrificing all their Oaths and Assurances to the Interest of Religion’.124 Nor could one rely upon an ‘Oath or Treaty, because ( . . . ) the Law of Christianity, since it makes Robbery, Murder and Rebellion, all lawful when tending to the Interest of Religion, wou’d equally authorize the Violation of Promises and Oaths; so as he might justly apprehend, that the moment he withdrew his Armys, his Christian Subjects wou’d revolt 120 121

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Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, p. 43. See notably Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, p. 187: ‘The Bishops of France, the Jesuits, and the Monks have extol’d the Methods by which Lewis XIV destroy’d Calvinism, as being perfectly holy and divine’. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, p. 46. Bayle’s position is reiterated in many pamphlets of this period. See, for example, Anonymous, Appel de l’Angleterre touchant la secrete Cabale ou Assembl´ee a` Withael and Anonymous, Europe a Slave, Unless England Break Her Chains: Discovering the Grand Designs of the French-popish Party in England for Several Years Last Past (1706). Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, p. 47. Locke makes the same point when he claims ‘the privilege of breaking faith belongs unto themselves [i.e. the Catholics], for they declare all that are not of their communion to be heretics, or at least may declare them so whensoever they think fit’. Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration”, p. 46.

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anew, in contempt of all their Oaths, which, by a tacit Condition, they constantly postpone to the enlarging the Borders of the Church’.125 Contrast this position with Bossuet. The French bishop considered the sworn oath as the last resort in disputed matters: ‘in two cases where human justice is impotent – one being when it is necessary to negotiate between two equal powers which have nothing above them, and the other being when it is necessary to judge hidden things and the only witness or arbitrator is conscience – the only way to make matters certain is by the sanctity of the oath’.126 At the end of the seventeenth century, Catholic values carried for Bossuet a persuasive political cogency. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes was a sign of confidence: ‘A king working zealously for the church, always ready to give her more rather than to take from her as he stands accused, has achieved this happy change’.127 The role of the oath in interstate relations is underlined by Bossuet: ‘There is another kind of oath, which sovereign powers swear to their equals, to keep the faith of treaties. For since in every treaty one submits to some judge as executor, those who have only God for their judge have recourse to him in the case of treaties – as the final appeal of public peace’.128 Warding off the criticisms of Louis XIV, Bossuet was writing to rally support for his king within France, and if possible among other Catholics in Europe. While it might not persuade people like Bayle to change their mind, his Avertissement aux Protestants recognises that although the Protestants had been severely weakened within France, they had never been so united in Europe as after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Even Catholic powers lent their support to the Protestants.129 However, despite their 125 126

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128 129

Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, p. 96. Bossuet, Politics drawn from Holy Scripture, p. 194. See also Hazard, La Crise de la conscience europ´eenne 1680–1715, p. 187–203 and P. Riley, “Introduction” in Bossuet, Politics drawn from Holy Scripture, ed. by P. Riley (Cambridge 1999), p. XIII–XLIII. Bossuet, “Oraison fun`ebre de Messire Michel le Tellier”, p. 203f.: ‘Un roi z´el´e pour l’Eglise, et toujours prˆet a` lui rendre davantage qu’on ne l’accuse de lui oˆ ter, op`ere ce changement heureux’. See, for instance, Fl´echier, “Oraison fun`ebre de Messier Michel Le Tellier”, p. 516f. as yet another example. Fl´echier recites almost verbatim Bossuet (cf. above): ‘Il ne restoit qu’`a donner le dernier coup a` cette Secte mourante: & quelle main estoit plus propre a` ce Ministere, que celle de ce sage Chancellier, qui ( . . . ) meritoit d’achever l’œuvre du Prince, ou pour mieux dire l’œuvre de Dieu, en scellant la revocation de ce fameux Edit, qui avoit cout´e tant de sang & tant de larmes a` nos Peres? Soutenu par le zele de la Religion plus que par les forces de la nature, il consacra par cette sainte fonction tot le merite & tous les travaux de sa Charge’. Bossuet, Politics drawn from Holy Scripture, p. 239. J.-B. Bossuet, Avertissement aux Protestants sur les lettres du ministre Jurieu contre l’Histoire des variations (Paris 1827), p. 79f.: ‘votre Pr´etendue R´eforme, a` ne regarder que les soutiens du dehors, ne fut jamais plus puissante ni plus unie. Tout le parti protestant se ligue, et a encore trouv´e le moyen d’entrainer dans ses desseins tant de puissances catholiques, qui n’y pensent pas assez’.

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menacing political union the Protestants had lost their inner rigour and doctrinal coherence.130 Thus Bossuet reduced the Protestant cause to a purely political agitation which had no claim to any religious credibility. Eminent political thinkers such as Bayle, Locke and Pufendorf were not alone in devoting their wit and pen to the Protestant cause. Anonymous pamphlets against the religious politics of Louis XIV appeared even before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.131 But following the revocation, many more were issued.132 Some recycled the rhetoric of the religious wars. The deplorable state and condition of the poor French Protestants commiserated, and humbly represented to all Princes and People of the true Reformed Church with Reasons for a Protestant League, for instance, presented a mixture of references to holy scripture, especially the old testament, alongside contemporary accusations and insults against Louis XIV, the ‘Jesuitical Hector of France’.133 The pamphlet suggests that the old testament and church history demonstrate that princes are obliged to help their oppressed fellow brethren. Christian princes are expected ‘to deliver the Church of God from the Oppression of Tyrants’.134 For the anonymous author, the church is one body and therefore to allow the suffering of even the smallest or remotest part might put the whole into mortal danger. For this reason, assistance for the French Protestants is demanded of the princes: ‘this is the time that all Protestant Princes and States ought Firmly and Unanimously to League and Confederate with the same zeal against the Papists and their false Religion, as They do against the Protestants and the true Worship of God’.135 Religious truth is – according to this pamphlet – entirely on the side of the Protestant cause. No room remains for compromise or reconciliation. Bayle and Pufendorf, among others, had warned against this kind of religious zeal. Not least because such confessional propaganda was double-edged: it could 130

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Bossuet, Avertissement aux Protestants, p. 80: ‘Pendant qu’`a l’exterieur la R´eforme et plus redoutable, et tout ensemble plus fi`ere et plus menac¸ante que jamais, elle ne fuit jamais plus foible dans l’int´erieur, dans ce qui fait leur cœur d’une religion. Sa doctrine n’a jamais paru plus d´econcert´ee: tout s’y d´ement, tout s’y contredit’. See, for example, Anonymous, The deplorable state and condition of the poor French Protestants commiserated, and humbly represented to all Princes and People of the true Reformed Church with Reasons for a Protestant League (London 1681). See, for example, Anonymous, The Designs of France against England and Holland discovered, or, The intrigues of that Crown for the utter ruine of both those Nations, laid open (London 1686), Anonymous, The Means to Free Europe from the French Usurpation and the Advantages which the Union of the Christian Princes Has Produced, to Preserve it from the Power of an Anti-Christian Prince (London 1689) and the above-cited Anonymous, The Spirit of France. Anonymous, The deplorable state and condition of the poor French Protestants, p. 1. Anonymous, The deplorable state and condition of the poor French Protestants, p. 4. Anonymous, The deplorable state and condition of the poor French Protestants, p. 1.

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be – and, of course, had been – easily employed with the same appeal to religious truth and holy scripture by the Catholics. On a strategic level, the solicitation to form a Protestant alliance against the tyranny and universal monarchy of Louis XIV begged the question of how to deal with the Catholic enemies of the French king. This religiously motivated front against France would alienate potential powerful allies against Louis XIV, notably the Habsburgs. Pamphlets concerned with European politics presented a purely political argument. One of these anonymous texts underscored the importance of the common interest so as not to overly estrange the Catholic enemies of France. Nevertheless, the advertisement to the reader states explicitly the religious aspect and the importance of defending Protestantism: ‘These Papers (which were intended to be publish’d before this time, had the Press been open for such Truth) plainly discover the cunning intrigues, Wicked Designs, and Unchristian Practices of the French King, for the Overthrow of England and Holland, and with them the Protestant Religion’.136 This text argues for an alliance between England and the Netherlands ‘to rescue Europe from the Universal Slavery he [the French king] prepares for it’.137 Thus the political and the religious remained hand in hand. The Designs of France against England and Holland discovered concludes ‘that both the States and Prince of Orange, ought in all Respects, and at all Times, to be very cautious of the wicked and unchristian Maxims and Designs of France, the King himself being a false and perjur’d person, who, under pretence of establishing the Roman Catholick Religion everywhere, (tho by his wicked Life and breach of Faith he denies all Religion) has no other aim, but to extend his Dominion to the uttermost Bounds of Europe’.138 A similar position is put forward in The Spirit of France where an unprincipled and unrestrained thirst for power is identified as the driving force behind Louis XIV’s religious and international politics: ‘the King of France ( . . . ) leagues himself with the Turk, the Protestants, the Gentiles and the Pagans, against the Catholicks themselves, when his Interest and Grandure require it, and the arriving at the Monarchy of Europe. Here is the King’s true Religion and the Spirit of France’.139 France’s opportunistic alliances with Turks and Protestants against the Habsburgs had always been exploited by those defending the attitude of the Habsburgs as a marked contrast to 136 138 139

137 Anonymous, The Designs of France, p. 2. Anonymous, The Designs of France, p. 1. Anonymous, The Designs of France, p. 12. Anonymous, The Spirit of France, p. 73. See also D. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350–1700 (Liverpool 1954).

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French ruthlessness. Over time, as states’ lack of trustworthiness became part of the rhetorical repertoire of mutual reproaches, the room for trustbuilding became smaller.140 But this picture was further complicated by the divergent interests of the Protestant states. Firstly, the rival confessions within the Protestant camp provided a constant source of potential conflict. Calvinists, Lutherans and other sects were only pulled together by Louis XIV’s explicitly Catholic onslaught, as Bossuet recognised. A radical pamphlet like The deplorable state and condition of the poor French Protestants commiserated must have irritated more moderate Protestants. Furthermore, Protestant political thinkers were, among themselves, far from agreement. Bayle, for instance, was challenged by Calvinists. His greatest antagonist among the Huguenots was Pierre Jurieu141 , who criticised Bayle for his demands for toleration. For Jurieu, toleration carried the hallmark of impiety; therefore, he saw Bayle’s concept of toleration as undermining both state and society.142 In an anonymously published book, Jurieu depicted the Huguenots as the true royalist party in France and the only ones who without exception faithfully followed the king. This argument was put forward before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and was intended to convince Louis XIV to change his religious politics, as this would be in his own interest. The French Catholic clergy, according to Jurieu’s argument, was quite prepared to side with the Spanish and the Pope against the king’s interests.143 Leibniz’s criticism of Pufendorf also exemplifies such internal conflicts. Barbeyrac, who followed Jurieu in his severe criticism of Bayle144 , in 140

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Anonymous, The Spirit of France, p. 57f. repeatedly draws attention to ‘all the Tricks which France has plaid, since some years; of all the Frauds, Delusions, Usurpations, Injustices, and Cruelties, which its King at present Reigning, has used to make himself Master of his Neighbours possessions’. Jurieu taught also at the academy of Sedan. On his political and religious thought, see G. H. Dodge, The Political Theory of the Huguenots of the Dispersion. With special reference to the thought and influence of Pierre Jurieu (New York 1922), F. R. J. Knetsch, Pierre Jurieu (Kempen 1967) and S. Zurbuchen, Naturrecht und nat¨urliche Religion. Zur Geschichte des Toleranzbegriffs von Samuel Pufendorf bis Jean-Jacques Rousseau (W¨urzburg 1991), p. 77–83. ‘He dreamed of ultimate victory for Protestantism over the Catholic church and the return of the refugees to France’. Yardeni, “French Calvinist Political Thought, 1534–1715”, p. 333. Anonymous [P. Jurieu], La Politique de Clerg´e de France, ou Entretiens curieux de deux Catholiques Romains ( . . . ) sur les moyens dont on se sert aujourd’huy, pour destruire la Religion Protestante dans ce Royaume (Cologne 1681), p. 223f.: ‘il est de l’interest du Roy de conserver le seul parti qui luy fait serment de fidilit´e sans exception & sans reserve qui ne sc¸auroit jamais avoir de liaisons contraires a` son service ni avec l’Espagne, ni avec la Cour de Rome ( . . . ) favorisant les ennemis de l’Estat. ( . . . ) le parti de Huguenots fut le seul [parti] qui demeura dans l’obeissance. ( . . . ) il est de l’interest du Roy de proteger les reformes dans l’Estat’. In a letter to Le Clerc, Barbeyrac considered ‘les derniers Ouvrages de Mr Bayle, plus dangereux ( . . . ) que les livres de Hobbes, & de Spinoza’. Barbeyrac to Le Clerc (Berlin, 10 April 1706). University Library Amsterdam (C 3). There exists only one letter in Amsterdam. The controversy

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turn defended Pufendorf against Leibniz.145 Thus five leading Protestant thinkers, writing in response to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, were at odds with each other. Disputes existed between and within the Lutheran and Calvinist camps. Among Lutherans, an ardent debate concerned religious toleration. The question of to what extent Protestant princes could and should enforce religious conformity within their territories was heatedly discussed. The jurist Christian Thomasius criticised the Lutheran clergy for demanding that ‘one has to subordinate reason to faith, i.e. one has to believe what they say. As a result all religions are still at a stage similar to the confusion of Babel, and we are not allowed to congratulate ourselves that we have found the pure and only possible religion for salvation: There are still strange and erratic tenets in our Lutheranism which are very close to the superstitions of the papal tenets although we make much ado about our Lutheran religion’.146 Assertions like these demonstrate the complexity

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between Barbeyrac and Leibniz is also concerned with this aspect. Barbeyrac believed that Leibniz’s position regarding the relationship of binding morality and God would admit atheism. According to Barbeyrac, Leibniz argued that morality is binding without recourse to God. Bayle had made a similar, but in the end even more daring and – for Barbeyrac – more dangerous argument, by declaring that ‘Atheism does not necessarily lead to the corruption of morals’. P. Bayle, Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet, ed. by R. C. Bartlett (New York 2000), p. 165. Fiammetta Palladini has an excellent account of the complicated labyrinth of these relations: F. Palladini, Die Berliner Hugenotten und der Fall Barbeyrac. Orthodoxe und ‘Sozinianer’ im Refuge (1685–1720) (Leiden 2011), esp. p. 261ff. Locke, with whom Barbeyrac had also entertained a correspondence (see Bodleian Library Oxford (MS Locke c.3): three letters by Barbeyrac to Locke), firmly endorsed the belief that atheism would undermine all civil society. Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration”, p. 47: ‘Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all’. See Chapter 3.3. C. Thomasius, Vollst¨andige Erl¨auterung der Kirchenrechtsgelahrtheit. Gr¨undliche Abhandlung vom Verh¨altnis der Religion gegen den Staat (Franckfurth, Leipzig 1740), p. 248: ‘man m¨usse die Vernunft unter den Glauben gefangen nehmen, das ist, man m¨usse glauben, was sie sagen. Darinnen stecken noch alle Religionen, und wir sind also in Confusione Babylonica, und d¨urfen uns deswegen gar nicht r¨uhmen, daß wir die reine und seligmachende Religion h¨atten: Dann [sic] wir haben noch gar grosse Krumpen in unserm Lutherthum, und kommen auch den papisten in der Superstition am n¨ahesten, ob wir schon viel Wesens von unserer Lutherischen Religion machen’. On Thomasius’s argument on religion and the state, see T. Ahnert, “The Prince and the Church in the Thought of Christian Thomasius” in Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty, ed. by I. Hunter and D. Saunders (Houndmills 2002), p. 91–105, I. Hunter, The Secularisation of the Confessional State. The Political Thought of Christian Thomasius (Cambridge 2007), F. Grunert, “Zur aufgekl¨arten Kritik am theokratischen Absolutismus. Der Streit zwischen Hector Gottfried Masius und Christian Thomasius u¨ ber Ursprung und Begr¨undung der summa potestas” in Christian Thomasius (1655– 1728). Neue Forschungen im Kontext der Fr¨uhaufkl¨arung, ed. by F. Vollhardt (T¨ubingen 1997), p. 51–77, S. Zurbuchen, “Gewissensfreiheit und Toleranz: Zur Pufendorf-Rezeption bei Christian Thomasius” in Samuel von Pufendorf und die europ¨aische Fr¨uhaufkl¨arung, ed. by F. Palladini and G. Hartung (Berlin 1996), p. 169–180 and P. Schr¨oder, “Thomas Hobbes, Christian Thomasius and the Seventeenth-Century Debate on the Church and State” in History of European Ideas 23 (1997), p. 59–79.

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of the internal struggles within Protestantism. They culminated in such devastating criticisms as Thomasius’s, ‘that even under the Turks Christians were tolerated, so that they often might be better off than under the rule of some Protestant princes’.147 This picture is further complicated as Catholics, notably the Catholic Habsburgs, also joined in this guerre des plumes and tried to discredit the politics of Louis XIV even further. Lisola (see Chapter 4.1), writing most of his polemics anonymously148 , sought to counteract the negative image of Spain by demonstrating that already under Henry IV and Louis XIII the real threat to European peace had come from France.149 While Lisola presented his writings as an objective historical account, he employed the familiar repertoire of criticism against the French, accusing Louis XIV of aspiring to universal monarchy so as to become ‘one day the master of the world’.150 In the run-up to the Thirty Years War, the French had successfully suggested that Habsburg aspirations to universal monarchy posed the real threat to Europe. But by the early 1670s the French found themselves accused of just this aspiration.151 Lisola advanced a second charge: ‘France keeps hardly what she promises’.152 Other states and princes should therefore not trust her offers and alliances. He cites Richelieu’s words153 that ‘a common interest 147

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Thomasius, Kirchenrechtsgelahrtheit, p. 136: ‘die Christen von den T¨urcken geduldet werden, daß sie es o¨ fters besser haben, als unter einigen protestantischen F¨ursten’. Interestingly even such a radical pamphlet as The deplorable state and condition of the poor French Protestants argued p. 4 that ‘the Turks compel none in point of Religion’. See notably Anonymous [i.e. J. p. F. Lisola], La France d´emasqu´ee, ou ses irr´egularitez dans sa conduite et maximes (La Haye 1670) and Anonymous [i.e. J. p. F. Lisola], La France politique. Lisola is using the Leyenda negra to change the negative perception of the Spanish monarchy. Especially the Spanish conduct in the Netherlands had led to this catastrophic reputation of the Spanish, which was greatly exploited by Protestant writers. But even such an ardent defender of Spanish interests as Campanella had admitted that ‘it is not without good cause, that they [i.e. the Dutch] do so hate the Spaniards’. Prynne, Thomas Campanella, an Italian Friar and Second Machiavel, p. 173. Anonymous [i.e. J. p. F. Lisola], La France politique, p. 488: ‘un jour le Maistre du Monde’. See also ibid., p. 512. See, for instance, Anonymous, The Designs of France, p. 12, Anonymous, The deplorable state and condition of the poor French Protestants, p. 1 and Anonymous, Appel de l’Angleterre, p. 8. It is not unlikely that the last of these texts was also written by Lisola, but its attribution is not entirely clear. See notably p. 29 of the Appel de l’Angleterre which seems to suggest that at least a defender of Habsburg interests is the likely author of this pamphlet. France is accused of forging secret alliances which are ‘directement contraires au trait´e de Paix de Westphalie’. On p. 22 there is also praise of Baron de Lisola and his Le Bouclier d’Estat, which could also be a self-reference by Lisola himself. See generally Kaeber, Die Idee des europ¨aischen Gleichgewichts, p. 48–52. Anonymous [i.e. J. p. F. Lisola], La France politique, p. 501: ‘France ( . . . ) ne tiendra guere de ce qu’elle promet’. On Richelieu see Hartmann, Rˆeveurs de Paix?, p. 53f. and p. 84f., Thuau, Raison d’Etat et pens´ee politique, Church, Richelieu and Reason of State and Chapter 2.1.

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provided the strongest and most reliable link which can exist between states’,154 but then recalls that Richelieu himself had declared the state interest as the decisive determinant of the conduct of French politics. It is therefore not surprising that one could not trust the French: they were simply following their particular interests, changing alliances and treaties accordingly.155 Lisola was at pains to demonstrate that Habsburg, and in particular Spanish, politics were not so purely motivated by their particular state interest, but were also driven by the general interest of Europe. However, the contrast drawn between France and Spain is less than convincing, as is the argument that Spain was advocating the general interest whereas France was cunningly seducing neighbouring princes by pretending to further their private interests.156 Neutrality was not an option, as it would only provide security in the abstract, but de facto military strength would enforce the law of the stronger. Lisola reproached the French, claiming that France advanced her political aims either by force or by intrigue. In contrast, the Spanish had been more trustworthy in their dealings with other states, a claim he supported with often embellished, historical examples.157 Still, his arguments are important, as the Protestants were indeed prepared to join in an alliance with the Catholic Habsburgs, including the Spanish branch. The conclusion of an alliance between the Dutch and Spain was certainly remarkable, and only possible because of the pressure which was exerted by Louis XIV on both of these powers. As ambassador as well as anonymous writer, Lisola played his part in bringing about this radical change. Hieronymus Gundling, a leading Lutheran philosopher at the university of Halle and disciple of Christian Thomasius158 , wrote of Lisola that the only purpose of his writings was to agitate against France.159 154 155 156

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Anonymous [i.e. J. p. F. Lisola], La France politique, p. 480: ‘un commun interest, qui estoit le plus fort, & le plus seur [sic] lien qui pust estre entre les Estats’. See also p. 422. Cf. Anonymous [i.e. J. p. F. Lisola], La France politique, p. 426f. Cf. Anonymous [i.e. J. p. F. Lisola], La France politique, p. 423: ‘Et c’est l`a o`u l’Espagne & la France se peinent, l’une prechant l’interest general, & l’autre e´bluissant les Princes voisins par l’interest priv´e, qui seduit assˆurement’. Cf. Anonymous [i.e. J. p. F. Lisola], La France politique, p. 367 and p. 511. Next to Pufendorf, Thomasius was one of the leading German natural law thinkers and – among other important reforms – advocated religious toleration. See P. Schr¨oder, Christian Thomasius (Hamburg 1999) and M. Mulsow, “Gundling vs. Buddeus. Competing Models of the History of Philosophy” in History and the Disciplines. The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe, ed. by D. R. Kelley (Rochester, New York 1997), p. 103–125. H. Gundling, “Ob wegen der anwachsenden Macht der Nachbarn man den Degen entbl¨ossen k¨onne” in Gundlingiana, Darinnen allerhand zur Jurisprudenz, Philosophie, Historie, Critic, Litteratur und u¨ brigen Gelehrsamkeit geh¨orige Sachen abgehandelt werden (Halle 1716), p. 411: ‘Der Baron Isola [sic!] hat mit allen seinen Schrifften keine andere Absicht gehabt, als daß er gegen das um sich greiffende Frankreich Lermen erregen wollte’.

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Like many others, Andrew Fletcher accused ‘the French with their intrigues’ of undermining the European order160 , not least by their ‘fatal error of government of tormenting and persecuting peoples on account of their religion’.161 In his Discourse concerning the Affairs of Spain, Fletcher recites en passant the various negative clich´es against the French monarchy which were already well known. The argument put forward is – yet again – that France does not keep her promises and tries to lull the other states into acquiescence.162 Both Lisola and Fletcher use metaphors of the blinded politicians who are lulled into acquiescence of French undertakings by ‘shining gold and jewels’, ‘sleeping pills’ and ‘golden words’.163 Fletcher’s criticism of universal monarchy goes hand in hand with his criticism of absolute rule. Arbitrary power, whether within a state or as an attempt to achieve a global empire, was severely criticised.164 He singles out the French monarchy as the prime example of absolute rule. The ‘French fashion of monarchy, where the king has power to do what he pleases, and the people no security for anything they possess’165 confirmed the internal lack of trust within the French monarchy. With William of Orange’s166 accession to the English throne and the beginning of the Nine Years War in 1688, Europe faced a new and in many ways more dangerous war. For France the tables seemed to have turned and ‘for Louis the Nine Years War was always a struggle to reinforce French security, not a war of conquest. However, Europe understandably read his actions as further expression of what seemed his limitless lust for territory and power’.167 It was at the height of this war that William Penn (1644–1718) wrote An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates in 1693. This short pamphlet at 160 161 162 163 164 165 166

167

A. Fletcher, “A Discourse concerning the Affairs of Spain” in Political Works, ed. by J. Robertson (Cambridge 1997), p. 104. Fletcher, “A Discourse concerning the Affairs of Spain”, p. 114. Fletcher, “A Discourse concerning the Affairs of Spain”, p. 104. Cf. Anonymous [i.e. J. p. F. Lisola], La France politique, p. 395 and p. 423 and Fletcher, “A Discourse concerning the Affairs of Spain”, p. 103. See also Anonymous, Appel de l’Angleterre, p. 61. See, for instance, Fletcher, “A Discourse concerning the Affairs of Spain”, p. 95. A. Fletcher, “A Discourse of Government with Relations to Melitia” in Political Works, ed. by J. Robertson (Cambridge 1997), p. 18. On the importance of England in William’s politics to balance European powers against France, see the still relevant study by H. Meinberg, Das Gleichgewichtssystem Wilhelms III. und die Englische Handelspolitik (Berlin 1869) and now T. Claydon, “Protestantism, Universal Monarchy and Christendom in William’s War Propaganda, 1689–1697” in Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-Stadholder in International Context, ed. by E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (Aldershot 2007), p. 125–142. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, p. 191. Note the interesting assumption in this quote that the whole of Europe – including the British Isles – perceived Louis XIV and French politics alike.

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first glance does not seem to be particularly original.168 Penn’s argument for peace and against the current war shows that, despite the many combative polemics, concern was growing over how to overcome the existing conflicts. In a Hobbesian vein, Penn argues that ‘war ( . . . ) seizes all ( . . . ) comforts ( . . . ), and stops the civil Channel of Society. ( . . . ) No Industry, no Building, no Manufactury, little Hospitality or Charity; but what the Peace gave, the war devours’.169 Against the negative scenario of war, he contrasts the positive values of peace, at the same time demonstrating a grasp of contemporary political thinking. In just a few lines he sketches a European federation in which justice is the foundation and peace the ultimate aim. The establishment of government by consent allows people to live in society under the rule of law and to enjoy their property under the protection of the state. Penn seems to have read his fellow religious dissident, John Locke.170 Penn’s Essay draws the parallel, and its inherent consequences, between the state of nature and interstate relations. The argument is straightforward: ‘if the Soveraign Princes of Europe ( . . . ) would for the same Reason that engaged Men first into Society, viz. Love of Peace and Order, agree to meet by their stated deputies in a General Dyet, Estates or Parliament, and there Establish Rules of Justice for Soveraign Princes to observe one to another; and ( . . . ) before which Soveraign Assembly, should be brought all Differences depending between one Soveraign and another ( . . . ) Europe would quietly obtain the so much desired and needed Peace’.171 Ultimate sovereignty is to be found in a European assembly, which will have the authority to compel those members of the association who might not accept its ruling on any potential conflicts. The envisaged unity of the sovereign states also allows a use of force against non-compliant members: if ‘any of the Soveraignities that Constitute these Imperial States, shall refuse to submit their Claim ( . . . ) to them [i.e. the sovereign or imperial diet], 168

169 170

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But as I will show in the following, this text is of much greater importance than is generally assumed. The most recent example is K. K. Patel, “William Penn und sein Essay ‘Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe’ (1693). Friedensf¨urst, Vordenker europ¨aischer Einigung oder Machtpolitiker?” in Historische Zeitschrift 295 (2012), esp. p. 335. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 403. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 89. Cf. especially Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 405. I have been unable to find a study dedicated to the intellectual relationship between Locke and Penn. But see generally K. v. Raumer, “Penn und Bentham. Vom religi¨osen zum wirtschaftlichen Friedensgedanken” in Ewiger Friede. Friedensrufe und Friedenspl¨ane seit der Renaissance, ed. by K. v. Raumer (Freiburg, Munich 1953), p. 89–125, Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 33–45 and E. C. O. Beatty, William Penn as Social Philosopher (New York 1939). Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 406.

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or to abide and perform the Judgement thereof, and seek their Remedy by Arms, or delay their Compliance ( . . . ), all the other Soveraignities, United as One Strength, shall compel the Submission and Performance of the Sentence’.172 In this way, Penn addresses the structural problem that can, according to Hobbesian logic, be resolved only by the creation of an international sovereign.173 The question is not whether European states would actually be prepared to renounce a considerable degree of their sovereignty. Rather, the point is that without a federative structure that creates and legitimises a sovereign power on a higher level, there can be no reliable peace in Europe. Once this is admitted as a fact, it is pointless to discuss whether such a federation should be established at all, or whether it would be better to retain full sovereignty at the state level and refuse to delegate powers to such a European diet. That different states will have different claims regarding superiority, precedence, actual votes in the assembly and so on is discussed with a refreshing pragmatism. On a rough ‘estimate of the Yearly Value of the several Soveraign Countries, whose Delegates are to make up this August Assembly, the Determination of the Number of Persons or Votes in the States for every Soveraignty’ should be decided.174 Penn lists the various votes he would attribute to the different states, not without stressing that ‘I pretend to no Manner of Exactness, but go wholly by Guess, being but for Example’s Sake’.175 In comparison to Sully and Cruc´e, Penn is not too caught up in the minor details of the plan.176 His proposal lists the Holy Roman Empire as having twelve votes, followed by France and Spain with ten votes each, Italy eight, England six, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands and Poland four, Denmark and Venice three each and ‘The Thirteen Cantons [Switzerland], and little Neighbouring Soveraignties, Two, Dukedoms of Holstein and Courland [i.e. todays’ Baltic states], One’.177 This is indeed a peculiar list for the creation of a European assembly; the distribution of votes according to the political, military or economic 172 173

174 175 176 177

Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 406. S. Goyard-Fabre (ed.), Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe (Paris 1981), p. 482 claims that Penn’s plan was more precise and more institutional than that by the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre. This is exaggerated, since Penn was hardly more precise than the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, given Penn’s lack of concern for the details of the practicalities of his plan. But in comparison with the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre he was less cumbersome in presenting his argument. See also Chapter 4.3. On Penn’s influence on the Abb´e, see also Goyard-Fabre, La Construction de la paix, p. 100. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 408. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 409. One of the best comparisons is still Ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der Internationalen, p. 143–176. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 409.

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importance of the different countries could be questioned, but as Penn recognises, it was only meant as a rough estimate to illustrate the logic of this proposal. What is more puzzling is Penn’s selection of countries to hold concrete political power in the form of votes at the European diet. The Papacy is not singled out, being presumably subsumed under Italy, but Venice holds three votes in her own name. Nor are the Austrian Habsburgs mentioned; perhaps these are subsumed under the Holy Roman Empire, which is more than awkward, given the different territories of the Habsburgs outside the Empire. And the Dukedom of Holstein, situated in northern Germany but at the time under Danish sovereignty, is singled out. Penn concludes this list with the remark that ‘if the Turks and Muscovites are taken in, as seems but fit and just, they will make Ten a Piece more. The Whole makes Ninety’.178 He was, it seems, less interested in such details, than in painting his vision of a European diet with a broad brush. Such contrivances, not meant to be taken too seriously, were perhaps the only way to advance such an ambitious project.179 Other practical aspects, such as where the assembly should convene or the complicated issue of status and precedence among the delegates, received similar treatment. ‘The Place of their First Session should be central, as much as is possible, afterwards as they agree’.180 Penn’s approach was to suggest that these matters were of less concern than usually assumed. The concern for honour in the early modern diplomatic world could too easily impede peace negotiations. When it seemed impossible to achieve an honourable peace, ‘the different parties were prepared to continue the war, even in very difficult circumstances’.181 Penn brushed these concerns aside, pragmatically suggesting that ‘to avoid Quarrel for Precedency, the Room may be Round, and have divers Doors to come in and go out at, to prevent Exceptions’.182 As for a voting system, a majority vote of three quarters was recommended, but abstention was denied to the deputies, given that the option for such neutrality would ‘quickly open a Way to 178 179

180 181

182

Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 409. Among the few studies on Penn’s plan for peace, see in particular the comparative account in P. van den Dungen, “The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre and the English ‘Irenists’ of the 18th Century (Penn, Bellers, and Bentham)” in International Journal on World Peace 17 (2000), p. 5–31 and now Patel, “William Penn und sein Essay ‘Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe’”. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 409. Kampmann, “Peace Impossible?”, p. 205. See also Rohrschneider, “Reputation als Leitfaktor in den internationalen Beziehungen der Fr¨uhen Neuzeit”, p. 331–352 and J. Kunisch, F¨urst – Gesellschaft – Krieg. Studien zur bellizistischen Disposition des absoluten F¨urstenstaates (K¨oln 1992). Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 409.

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unfair Proceedings’.183 Ideas on how to counteract the possible corruption of deputies and a way of keeping a record of the proceedings were briefly laid out. Penn finished his account of these practicalities by confirming that he ‘will say little of the Language in which the Session of the Soveraign States should be held, but to be sure it must be in Latin or French’.184 Penn concluded his essay with a section on the benefits the realisation of his proposal would have.185 This open appeal to the interests of the European sovereigns lends his proposal a more realistic aspect. No doubt, his European diet would help to prevent ‘the Spilling of so much Humane and Christian Blood’.186 Describing the atrocities and sufferings war entails for ordinary people, he observed that although ‘the chiefest in Government are seldom personally exposed, yet it is a Duty incumbent upon them to be tender of the Lives of their People; since without all Doubt, they are accountable to God for the Blood that is spilt in their Service’.187 There is a further benefit to his proposed system: ‘The Reputation of Christianity will in some Degree be recovered in the Sight of Infidels; which, by the many Bloody and unjust Wars of Christians, not only with them, but one with another, hath been greatly impaired’.188 The point is underscored that ambition and revenge have led to wars ‘not only [of ] Christians against Christians, but the same Sort of Christians have embrewed their Hands in one another’s Blood’.189 However, it is uncertain whether his demand that ‘the Soldier turn Hermite’190 could be achieved. Penn appeals also to the clergy’s conscience, since ‘here is a wide Field for the Reverend Clergy of Europe to act their Part in, who have so much the Possession of Princes and People too. May they recommend and labour this pacifick Means I offer, which will end Blood, if not Strife; and the 183 184 185

186 187

188 189

190

Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 410. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 410. Patel, “William Penn und sein Essay ‘Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe’”, p. 343–348 stresses the personal interests Penn might have wished to advance with this essay. This claim is a little bit awkward since Penn published his essay anonymously. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 413. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 413. On the seventeenthcentury war experience of ordinary people, see notably M. Meumann and D. Niefanger (eds.), Ein Schauplatz herber Angst. Wahrnehmung und Darstellung von Gewalt im 17. Jahrhundert (G¨ottingen 1997), W. Wette (ed.), Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes. Eine Milit¨argeschichte von unten (Munich 1992) and S. Haude, “The Experience of War” in The Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years War, ed. by O. Asbach and P. Schr¨oder (Farnham 2014), p. 257–268. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 413. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 413. On Penn’s religious background, see W. W. Comfort, “William Penn’s Religious Background” in The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 68 (1944), p. 341–358. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 414.

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reason, upon free debate, will be Judge, and not the Sword. So that both Right and Peace, which are the Desire and Fruit of wise Governments ( . . . ) seem to succeed the Establishment of this Proposal’.191 Looking beyond confessional boundaries and antagonisms, Penn saw that only a fundamental change to the existing structures of interstate relations could provide an effective framework to guarantee a stable peace. In Penn’s proposal we can thus perceive the familiar argument for an institutional framework which will protect and reward the trust states may extend to other states within the international sphere. There were further tangible benefits to such a framework, including considerable monetary savings, avoidance of the destruction of cities or whole countries, and the ease of travel and security of commerce which stable peace would bring. Such a union represented at a European diet would effectively lead ‘to the Benefit of an Universal Monarchy, without the Inconveniencies that attend it’.192 Penn’s reference to universal monarchy is remarkable. Apart from the exception of Campanella, the concept of universal monarchy had for many already lost its positive connotations by the beginning of the seventeenth century. Pamphlets justified alliances and wars against Louis XIV with the argument that he posed a threat to Europe with his claims to universal monarchy. Penn seems to be one of the few thinkers towards the end of the seventeenth century who still associated the concept with positive connotations.193 In addition to references to universal monarchy, Penn used a classical topos already found in Erasmus, Gentili and other earlier writers, when he asserted that ‘another Advantage is, The Great Security it will be to Christians against the Inroads of the Turk, in their most Prosperous Fortune. For it had been impossible for the Port, to have prevailed so often, and so far upon Christendom, but by the Carelessness, or Wilful Connivance, if not Aid, of some Christian Princes. And for the same reason, why no Christian Monarch will adventure to oppose, or break such a Union, the Grand Seigneur will find himself obliged to concur, for the Security of what he holds in Europe’.194 With the defeat of the Turks at the gates of Vienna in 1683, this well-worn argument had lost some of its dramatic urgency.195 The claim is also at odds with Penn’s idea that the Ottomans 191 192 193 194 195

Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 414. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 415. See Bosbach, Monarchia Universalis, p. 107–121. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 415. See notably Anonymous, The Spirit of France, p. 26: ‘Thus, by what we see happen in our days, by the Intrigues of France, have I not great reason to say, that all the Empire, and the Electors, and

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should be included in the proposed project, represented at the European diet, and given the same number of votes as the monarchies of Spain and France. Their hypothetical number of deputies would have been above even that of the monarchies of England, Sweden or Denmark. Yet again, Penn does not supply any further details, leaving the reader with this apparent contradiction. The essay concludes with two very different points. Firstly, Penn returns to the structural problem of interstate relations and the need to prevent a situation where sovereign states are ‘Judges and Executioners for themselves’.196 This problem can only be avoided if ‘the same Rules’197 which apply to the establishment and institutionalisation of civil government also apply to sovereign states at the interstate level. Secondly, Penn refers to recent history. He recommends William Temple’s Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands198 , first published in 1687, as the best guide to ‘the Practicability of my Proposal’199 , while in his final paragraph he mentions Henry IV and the Grand Design. Like most Protestants of the period, he viewed this plan in a very positive light. Penn claims that Henry IV was about to oblige ‘the Princes and Estates of Europe to a Politick Ballance, when the Spanish Faction, for that reason, contrived, and accomplished His Murder’.200 He does not elaborate on this reference to the balance of power, perhaps not wanting to make the case for peace in Europe along the familiar lines of this argument. Rather, the balance of power and universal monarchy are not to be seen in opposition to each other, but instead as complementary political elements. The European diet would provide the

196 197 198

199 200

the other Kings, Princes and States, have great reason to oppose themselves against the designs of Louis XIV to hinder him from mounting into the Empire, lest they become his Slaves. Whereas at present he manages them, and cajoles some of ’em, that he may in time use them like a Master; he will throw off the Foxes skin, to put on that of a Lyon, and they shall hear no other Language, but for as much as this is my will and pleasure. To hinder him from aggrandizing himself, only a Peace with the Turks can put the Emperor in a condition to oppose it’. A very similar argument is put forward in Anonymous, The Means to Free Europe from the French Usurpation, p. 4–7. See also Waissenberger (ed.), Die T¨urken vor Wien, A. Wheatcroft, The Enemy at the Gate: Habsburgs, Ottomans and the Battle for Europe (New York 2009) and with a general short overview H. Jansky, “Osmanenherrschaft in S¨udosteuropa von 1648–1789” in Handbuch der Europ¨aischen Geschichte vol. 4, ed. by T. Schieder (Stuttgart 1968), p. 760f. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 418. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 418. W. Temple, Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands (London 1705). Penn was not the only writer to praise this book. It was such a great success that by 1705 it had already appeared in its seventh edition. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 418. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 419. Compare this with the much more critical and negative account of Henry IV by the Habsburg Catholic Lisola. Anonymous [i.e. J. P. F. Lisola], La France politique, p. 291–304. For further details see Chapter 2.1.

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advantages of a universal monarchy, acting as a judge above the sovereign states, who in turn are balanced against each other in the institutionalised federative system. On this basis, Penn believed, trust among states would be possible. This would in turn advance the ‘Peace and Prosperity of Europe’.201 Pious words, but Penn apparently did not doubt that there was a realistic chance for trust and ultimately for peace on the basis of his proposal.

4.3 The Abb´e De Saint-Pierre’s (1658–1743) Project for Peace and his Challenge to Early Modern Statecraft In contrast to the previous wars waged by Louis XIV, the War of the Spanish Succession202 was not started by him. It ensued because of conflicts endogenous to the European state system. The European powers had long anticipated this conflict over the Spanish inheritance since they all had vested interests in how to divide the enormous territories of the Spanish monarchy. France and the Austrian Habsburgs seemed to have equally valid dynastic claims to succeed to the Spanish throne. The Protestant maritime powers – England and the Dutch Republic – could not allow the huge Spanish overseas dominion to fall solely to the French. But all plans, secret agreements of partition and attempts to sort out these conflicting European interests on the basis of dynastic politics failed. Not long before his death, Charles II had declared in his will that Philippe of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV, should become heir to the Spanish crown.203 In the winter of 1700 French diplomacy was prepared to take the risk of driving the sea powers into the arms of the Austrian Habsburgs. When Charles II died on 1 November 1700, Louis XIV declared on the sixteenth of the same month in the name of his grandson that France was willing to accept Charles II’s testament.204 He knew that this move would provoke the other European powers and he consequently prepared to secure the execution of Charles II’s will by force. The Bavarian prince elector Max Emanuel and the prince elector of Cologne were the only allies on the French side. 201 202 203

204

Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 419. Still valuable is J. W. Gerard, The Peace of Utrecht. A Historical Review of the Great Treaty of 1713–14, and of the Principal Events of the War of the Spanish Succession (New York, London 1885). The authoritative account in English is still J. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469–1716 (London 1970), see in particular p. 370–386. See also H. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire. The Making of a World Power 1492–1763 (London 2002), p. 439–453. See now J. M. de Bernardo Ares, Luis XIV Rey de Espaˇna. De los Imperios plurinacionales a los Estados unitarios (1665–1714) (Madrid 2008), p. 176–181.

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France thus faced a formidable coalition of European forces, formed as the great alliance of The Hague in September 1701 and led by William III and Leopold I.205 With Prince Eugen and John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, the military campaign of this coalition was led by two remarkable generals. When William III died on 8 March 1702, Louis XIV recognised the son of the former King James II who had died in 1701 in French exile, as James III King of England. This was perceived as an additional threat to England, especially as it threatened to re-catholicise the English crown, and it helped to further cement the coalition between the Austrian Habsburgs and England. As we have already seen with Penn’s plan for a European peace from 1693 and Fletcher’s Discours concerning the Affairs of Spain from 1698, French aggression and the pending question of the Spanish succession attracted the attention of European political thinkers. The Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe by the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743) and a minor text with an apparently similar proposal by John Bellers (1654– 1725), entitled Some Reasons for an European State, proposed to the Powers of Europe, were written towards the end of the war of the Spanish succession and can be seen as closely related to the concerns already raised by Penn and Fletcher. Like Penn, they followed in the tradition of earlier works206 and both explicitly reference Henry IV’s Grand Design.207 205

206

207

With hindsight Boutant, L’Europe au grand tournant des ann´ees 1680, claimed p. 899: ‘La chance des Franc¸ais a, peut-ˆetre, e´t´e que Louis XIV ait eu des adversaires a` son format: le roi d’Angleterre, Guillaume III, prince d’Orange, l’Empereur L´eopold. Les empoignades franco-allemandes auxquelles ont donn´e lieu les guerres de la fin du r`egne, ont eu pour r´esultat la fixation de fronti`eres acceptables pour la France et qui ont e´t´e reconnues par ses voisins’. When considering the various influences on the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, M. L. Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre (Geneva, Paris 1959), p. 46f. is apparently not aware that the Abb´e must have known Cruc´e’s Nouveau Cyn´ee. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 33 also made the same point and claimed that the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre had not ‘heard of Cruc´e’. That this is, however, not the case can be confirmed by looking at the above-mentioned correspondence between Leibniz and the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre in which they refer to Cruc´e’s work. As a matter of fact, Cruc´e’s views on the federative structure of a European union as well as, for instance, on trade might well have informed the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s proposal. Penn’s influence on the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre has only recently been established. J. Drouet, L’abb´e de Saint-Pierre, l’homme et l’œuvre (Paris 1912), p. 122 had not fully grasped Penn’s importance. But see now in particular Goyard-Fabre, La Construction de la paix, p. 100, van den Dungen, “The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre and the English ‘Irenists’ of the 18th Century (Penn, Bellers, and Bentham)”, p. 10 and most importantly D. Sabbagh, “William Penn et l’abb´e de Saint-Pierre: Le Chaˆınon manquant” in Revue de Synth`ese 4 (1997), p. 83–105. Bellers stated in his long, cumbersome title his indebtedness to the Grand Design. The full title is J. Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State: Proposed to the Powers of Europe, by an Universal Guarantee, and an Annual Congress, Senate, Dyet, Or Parliament, to Settle Any Disputes about the Bounds and Rights of Princes and States Hereafter. With an Abstract of a Scheme Form’d by King Henry the Fourth of France, Upon the Same Subject. And Also, a Proposal for a General Council Or

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Like his friend Penn, Bellers was a Quaker.208 Unlike Penn’s and the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s writings, though, his short pamphlet does not engage with a systematic evaluation of the inherent problems of a federative constitution for Europe. He claims that the English union with Scotland shows that Europe could achieve the same and that Queen Anne should ‘use Her endeavours for Uniting the Powers of Europe in one peaceable Settlement’.209 Although he advocated that an ‘original contract’210 between the European states should be signed in order to establish a federal jurisdiction and arbitration, his argument seems initially to lack the conviction and persuasive force of both Penn and the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre. Bellers tried to influence the formulation of the war aims of the allied powers ranged against France. His appeal to interest and utility is mixed with ethical and moral claims but, similarly to Penn and later Saint-Pierre, his proposal was ‘that at the next General Peace, there should be settled an Universal Guarantee, an Annual Congress, Senate, Dyet, or Parlament, by all the Princes and States of Europe, as well Enemies, as Neuters, joyned as one State, with the renouncing of all Claims upon each other, with such Articles of Agreement as may be needful for a Standing European Law’.211 However, Bellers’ main and – compared with the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre – more audacious contribution was on religious politics. As the full title of his work suggested, he proposed a ‘General Council Or Convocation of All the Different Religious Perswasions in Christendom, (not to Dispute what They Differ About, But) to Settle the General Principles They Agree In: By which it Will Appear, that They May be Good Subjects and Neighbours,

208

209 210 211

Convocation of All the Different Religious Perswasions in Christendom, (not to Dispute what They Differ About, But) to Settle the General Principles They Agree In: By which it Will Appear, that They May be Good Subjects and Neighbours, Tho’ of Different Apprehensions of the Way to Heaven. In Order to Prevent Broils and War at Home, when Foreign Wars are Ended (London 1710). In a later edition the Abb´e changed the title of his Projet and also explicitly referred to Henry IV’s Grand Design. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet de Trait´e pour rendre la paix perp´etuelle entre les Souverains chr´etiens, pour maintenir toujours le commerce libre entre les nations, pour affirmer beaucoup davantage les maisons souveraines sur le trˆone. Propos´e autrefois par Henry le Grand, roi de France, agr´e´e par la reine Elisabeth, par Jaques Ier, roi d’Angleterre, son successeur et la plupart des autres potentats d’Europe (Utrecht 1717). At the end of this chapter the significance of the change of the title will be discussed. There are only few studies dedicated to Bellers. See in particular van den Dungen, “The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre and the English ‘Irenists’” and some scattered comments in Goyard-Fabre, La Construction de la paix, p. 103–105. Ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der Internationalen also has a short chapter on Bellers. However, he is mistaken to claim p. 177 that Bellers’s pamphlet had been published anonymously. Although his name is not mentioned on the title page, it appears three times on p. II, VI and 20. Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. II. Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. II. Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. 4.

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Tho’ of Different Apprehensions of the Way to Heaven’.212 The Quakers’ various proposals for reform were motivated by religious concerns. Penn and Bellers both proposed multiple ways to reform society and their plans for European peace have to be seen in this wider context.213 Bellers insisted that it was because of ‘the pretence of ( . . . ) Religion, [that] it’s [sic] Professors shall have the hottest Animosities and hatred, there having been far more Christian Blood spilt, by one another, than ever was spilt, by the greatest of their Heathen Prosecutors’.214 What is thus essential for achieving reliable peace in Europe is, according to Bellers, not only a federative structure as already proposed by Penn, but the end of religious persecution and ‘a New sort of General Council of all the several Christian Perswasions in Europe’.215 Bellers had been prosecuted and imprisoned several times before the English Parliament passed the Toleration Act in 1689. And he had seen the persecutions in France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. As a matter of fact, he had helped Huguenots to flee France and settle in the New World, in Pennsylvania.216 There can, therefore, be no doubt that Bellers and Penn worked very closely together on their projects. They were both motivated by religious convictions. At the heart of Bellers’ proposal for European peace lies a deep concern for religious toleration and a quest to find common ground among the different Christian confessions. Only in this way would it be possible ‘to put an end to all Wars and Bloodshed for Religion’.217 Bellers’ short work may only have had limited influence on the political debates about the reorganisation of the European state system, but his concern for a religious settlement signals an element missing in the Abb´e’s plan for peace. When the first English translation of the Abb´e de SaintPierre’s Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe appeared in 1714, Bellers commented: ‘The many Advantages of an European State and Senate, are excellently well discoursed of, by the Abbot St. Pierre, of the French Academy, lately published in English. ( . . . ) But he saith little about 212 213

214 215 216 217

Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State. Ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der Internationalen, p. 171: ‘Die Friedensbestrebungen der Qu¨aker stehen mit ihren anderen humanit¨aren und sozialen Forderungen in engem Zusammenhang. Alle erkl¨aren ¨ sich aus ihrer religi¨osen Uberzeugung’. See also J. Bellers, An Essay Towards the Improvement of Physick in twelve Proposals by which the Lives of many Thousands of the Rich, as well as of the Poor may be saved yearly (London 1714). Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. 10f. Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. 14. Cf. van den Dungen, “The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre and the English ‘Irenists’”, p. 13. Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. 14.

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a peaceable settling of the Religious Disputes, tho’ they have been some of the greatest occasions of War in Christendom, and until Persecutions and Violences about Religion are prevented or stopt, they will so long make all Arguments for a General Peace ineffectual, however valuable and demonstrable those Reasons may be’.218 However, ‘Bellers quickly became a forgotten figure, and when he was re-discovered almost a century after his death, it was not his peace plan but his schemes for economic reform which excited interest’.219 In fact the Abb´e’s own plan for peace220 was for a long time considered an eccentric and utterly unrealistic idea. Voltaire’s acid criticism exemplifies this negative view. Under the telling pseudonym of Dr Goodheart, Voltaire published his De la Paix perp´etuelle in 1769. The second half of the first sentence of this work was targeted at the Abb´e: ‘The peace imagined by a Frenchman named Abb´e de Saint-Pierre is a chimera which will never survive between princes any more than between elephants and rhinoceroses, between wolves and dogs. Carnivorous animals always tear each other apart at the first opportunity’.221 Accordingly, Kant remarked that the peace project of the ‘Abb´e St. Pierre ( . . . ) has always been ridiculed by great statesmen, and still more by heads of state, as an academic and childish idea emerging from the schools’.222 This situation has not much improved in recent scholarship. Notwithstanding some important studies223 , the significance of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre as a political thinker has long been ignored. In many ways this has to do with what appears to be no more than a minor biographical detail that stubbornly remains misleading in wide parts of the relevant literature. Even in fairly recent studies on the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, or in general accounts of the history of international relations, we find the myth 218 219 220 221

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Bellers, An Essay Towards the Improvement of Physick, p. 47. van den Dungen, “The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre and the English ‘Irenists’”, p. 15. This text is now easily accessible in a reprint: Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe [Utrecht 1713], ed. by S. Goyard-Fabre (Paris 1981). Voltaire, “De la Paix perp´etuelle” in Oeuvres compl`etes vol. 23 (Paris 1828), p. 25: ‘La paix imagin´ee par un Franc¸ais, nomm´e l’abb´e de Saint-Pierre, est une chim`ere qui ne subsistera pas plus entre les princes qu’entre les e´l´ephans et les rhinoc´eros, entre les loups et les chiens. Les animaux carnassiers se d´echireront toujours a` la premi`ere occasion’. I. Kant, “On the common saying: That might be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice” in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, ed. by M. J. Gregor (Cambridge 1996), p. 309. The first seem to be G. de Molinari, L’abb´e de Saint-Pierre. Membre exclu de l’Acad´emie franc¸aise. Sa vie et ses œuvres (Paris 1857) and two years later E. Goumy, Étude sur la vie et les ´ecrits de l’Abb´e de Saint-Pierre (Paris 1859), compare also: Drouet, L’abb´e de Saint-Pierre and H. H. Post, La soci´et´e des nations de l’Abb´e de Saint-Pierre (Amsterdam 1932).

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reiterated that the Abb´e attended the negotiations at Utrecht as secretary to the French envoy Abb´e de Polignac and that as a result of this experience he wrote his Projet.224 Nothing is further from the truth. It is difficult to see how such a misconception survives, given that Herbert G. Folkes already settled this matter convincingly in 1966.225 But for many scholars this misconception determined their negative verdict on the political thought of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, as if he only wrote in favour of his king, Louis XIV, to help negotiate a favourable peace at Utrecht for the French crown. In fact the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre simply could not have travelled to Utrecht together with the Abb´e de Polignac, who left Paris for Utrecht on 7 January 1712, because ‘on this very day ( . . . ) the Abb´e de Saint Pierre signed the attendance register of the French Academy and he kept signing it three times a week during this whole year. He missed just one of the hundred and fifty sessions, on the fourteenth of November’.226 Additional circumstantial evidence points to the same conclusion. The letters of accreditation and passports for the envoys to the congress do not show the name of Saint-Pierre, nor does the Abb´e himself talk in his Annales politiques as though he had been at the congress in Utrecht.227 The assertion – made without any endeavour to provide the slightest proof – that the Abb´e ‘was present at the Congress of Utrecht, which gave him the idea of writing the Project’ is simply not substantiated.228 224

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See only two recent examples which make similar unsubstantiated claims about Saint-Pierre’s presence at the congress at Utrecht: F. Speltore, “Federalism in the History of Thought. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre” in The Federalist. A Political Review 36 (1994), p. 221–235 and H. Kleinschmidt, Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen (Stuttgart 1998), p. 157. H. G. Folkes, “L’Abb´e de Saint-Pierre assista-t-il au congr`es d’Utrecht?” in Revue d’Histoire Litt´eraire de la France 66 (1966), p. 483–487. Folkes, “L’Abb´e de Saint-Pierre”, p. 486: ‘ce jour mˆeme ( . . . ) l’abb´e de Saint-Pierre signa le registre de pr´esence de l’Acad´emie franc¸aise, et il continua a` la signer trois fois par semaine pendant toute cette ann´ee, ne manquant qu’`a une seule des cent cinquante s´eances – celle du 14 novembre’. Folkes, “L’Abb´e de Saint-Pierre”, p. 485. See also Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre and Post, La Soci´et´e des Nations. Speltore, “Federalism in the History of Thought”, p. 221. Unfortunately, even Franc¸ois Bluche reiterates the same error in his Dictionnaire du Grand Si`ecle when he states (F. Bluche, “SaintPierre” in Dictionnaire du Grand Si`ecle, ed. by F. Bluche (Paris 1990), p. 1396): ‘En 1712, quand la paix commence de se n´egocier s´erieusement a` Utrecht, le mar´echal d’Huxelles et le futur cardinal de Polignac ( . . . ) s’appr`etent a` gagner les Provinces-Unies en qualit´e de pl´enipotentaires. L’abb´e de Saint-Pierre les accompagne, comme secr´etaire de l’abb´e de Polignac’. It is more than regrettable that this myth even found its way into such a prestigious work of reference, as it also did into Sven Stelling-Michaud’s prominent introduction to Rousseau’s writings on the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre. ´ (See S. Stelling-Michaud, “Ecrits sur l’Abb´e de Saint-Pierre” in J.-J. Rousseau, Œuvres compl`etes vol. III (Paris 1964), p. CXLI). That this error is repeated in such prominent places may well be the reason that the myth of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s presence at the negotiations at Utrecht has not died so easily.

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The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre had started on his project well before 1712. We know of at least four shorter prior versions written between 1708 and 1711.229 However, this does not mean that he was not keen to present the final version to exert influence on the preliminary peace negotiations and the outcome of the settlement: ‘It does not seem complicated to me to improve this project’, he wrote ‘( . . . ) but several people who know about public affairs and who have carefully read the book assured me that as it is, if it were printed in several languages and spread in the most important cities of Europe, it could give useful insights to the principal ministers and to those who will be involved in future peace negotiations and thus make the peace easier to achieve and more lasting’.230 The Abb´e made a similar claim in the preface to his Projet: ‘It is easy to understand that the more this project contains methods to make peace unalterable in Europe, the more it will be able to help facilitate the conclusion of the one we are currently treating at Utrecht’.231 The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s principal writings are still unavailable in English, and he is largely neglected in anglophone research on international political thought.232 Knowledge of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre in early modern Britain seems to have been channelled mainly by Rousseau’s A Project for Perpetual Peace. By J. J. Rousseau [or rather, abridged by him from the “Projet de paix perp´etuelle” of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre] . . . Translated from

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See O. Asbach, “Die Reichsverfassung als f¨oderativer Staatenbund. Das Alte Reich in der politischen Philosophie des Abb´e de Saint-Pierre and Jean-Jacques Rousseau” in Altes Reich, Frankreich und Europa. Politische, philosophische und historische Aspekte des franz¨osischen Deutschlandbildes im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, ed. by O. Asbach et al. (Berlin 2001), p. 179f. Archives du Minist`ere des Affaires ´etrang`eres (Paris), M. D. France 309, 2r f.: ‘Je voi sans paine combien je pourrois encore perfectionner ce projet ( . . . ) mais plusieurs personnes qui ont connoisance des affaires publiques ayant lu l’ouvrage avec attention m’ont assur´e que tel qu’il est, s’il etoit imprim´e en diverses langues et repandu dans les principales villes de l’Europe; il pouurait donner des vues tres utiles aux ministres principaux et a` ceux qui seront employez dans les negociations de la paix prochain pour la rendre plus facile et plus durable’. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle, p. XVIIf.: ‘Il est ais´e de comprendre que plus ce Projet refermera de moyens de rendre la Paix inalt´erable en Europe, plus il peut contribuer a` faciliter la conclus de celle que l’on traite pr´esentement a` Utrecht’. A notable exception is the still valuable study by Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre. His demonstration of Hobbes’s influence on the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre is particularly important. See also T. E. Kaiser, “The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and the Reconstitution of the French Monarchy” in Journal of Modern History 55 (1983), p. 618–643. I have been unable to trace a complete English translation of the Abb´e’s Projet or any of his other writings. See notably Selections from the second edition of the Abr´eg´e du Projet de Paix Perp´etuelle by C. I. Castel de Saint-Pierre, translated by H. Hale Bellot (London 1927) as well as Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe First Proposed by Henry IV of France, and Approved of by Queen Elizabeth, and now discussed at large and made practicable by the Abbot St. Pierre (London 1714).

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the French, with a preface by the translator (London 1761).233 Two centuries later, Richard Tuck can still claim that ‘Saint Pierre ( . . . ) was (as Rousseau pointed out) extremely na¨ıve about the process whereby the warring states of Europe could unite’.234 If Rousseau does not provide an adequate understanding of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s proposal for perpetual peace, the explanation lies in the fact that for Rousseau, but not for the Abb´e, the Holy Roman Empire was crucial to guaranteeing the balance of power in Europe. Arguably the Abb´e was sidelined because he challenged what appeared to almost all contemporary diplomats and statesmen to be the most important concept in the realm of international politics, that is to say, the balance of power among European sovereigns and states. After the Peace of Westphalia, the idea of a balance of power emerged as the highest wisdom of European statecraft to safeguard interstate relations and the status quo.235 The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre challenged the centrality of the balance of power, 233

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There are quite a few studies dedicated to the relationship between Rousseau and Saint-Pierre, ´ see in particular: Stelling-Michaud, “Ecrits sur l’Abb´e de Saint-Pierre”, S. Stelling-Michaud, “Ce ´ que Jean-Jacques Rousseau doit a` l’Abb´e de Saint-Pierre” in Etudes sur le Contrat de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Actes des Journ´ees d’´etude a` Dijon pour la commemoration du 200e anniversaire du Contrat social (Paris 1964), p. 35–45, J. L. Leclercle, “L’Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau et l’Europe” in Dix-Huiti`eme Si´ecle 25 (1993), p. 23–38, Goyard-Fabre, La Construction de la paix, p. 147–171 and Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, p. 97–133. It is thanks to the perceptive studies by Olaf Asbach that the importance of Saint-Pierre’s work, in particular as a major contribution to the political theory of international relations, was recently highlighted and put in a wider intellectual context. Apart from Asbach’s work mentioned earlier, see in particular O. Asbach, “Zwischen Souver¨anit¨at und F¨oderation. Moderne Staatlichkeit und die Ordnung Europas beim Abb´e de Saint-Pierre und Jean-Jacques Rousseau” in Zeitschrift f¨ur Politikwissenschaft 11 (2001), p. 1073–1099, O. Asbach and D. H¨uning, “Naturzustand und Rechtsbegr¨undung. Der Abb´e de Saint-Pierre zwischen Hobbes und Rousseau” in Archiv f¨ur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 84 (1998), p. 307–325 and his masterful monograph O. Asbach, Die Z¨ahmung der Leviathane. Die Idee einer Rechtsordnung zwischen Staaten bei Abb´e de Saint-Pierre und Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Berlin 2002). Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 141. For instance, C. Covell, The Law of Nations in Political Thought. A Critical Survey from Vitoria to Kant (Houndmills 2009), p. 157–161, makes a similarly misleading statement. More nuanced is Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations, p. 291. The best English study on the relationship of Rousseau and the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre is still Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre. He states on p. 9: ‘Rousseau, who as the Abb´e’s foremost interpreter has influenced the attitudes of many people, at times sacrificed accuracy to the spirit of controversy and on certain issues distorted Saint-Pierre’s projects with a heavy hand. He devoted most of his attention to the Abb´e’s specific reforms and omitted the theoretic structure on which they rest’. See L. Dehio, Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie. Betrachtungen u¨ ber ein Grundproblem der neueren Staatengeschichte (1948), E. Luard, The Balance of Power. The System of International Relations 1648–1815 (London 1992), H. Fenske, “Gleichgewicht, Balance” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland vol. 2, ed. by O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Koselleck (Stuttgart 1975), p. 959–996, K. Repgen, “Der Westf¨alische Frieden und die Urspr¨unge des europ¨aischen Gleichgewichts” in Jahres- und Tagungsbericht der G¨orresGesellschaft 1985, p. 50–66.

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seeing it instead as the obstacle to a durable peace structure.236 He was well aware that the doctrine of sovereignty was at the heart of the raison d’ˆetre of the balance of power. But he had to confront this conception if he was to provide an alternative. The constitution of the Holy Roman Empire provided him with a historical example; moreover, it served as a means of accommodating sovereignty in a wider framework, which in turn would allow for reliable peace and stability.237 Facing the dilemma that the sovereigns of the European states jealously guarded their prerogatives238 , the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre reformulated the problems already spelled out by Machiavelli and Hobbes in his attempt to provide new answers. As argued in Chapter 3.3, Pufendorf addressed this dilemma in a systematic analysis. His equation of the state of nature with the relationship between states tackled the most troublesome aspect of interstate relations, namely, how international law can be enforceable and at the same time compatible with the sovereignty of each state. The idea of a system of states allowed for a new conceptualisation of this intractable problem. However, the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre was equally critical of Grotius and Pufendorf, whose solutions rested in his view on theories of natural law. Instead – and that is, prima facie, more than surprising – he praised Hobbes as the most pertinent source of guidance: ‘Hobbes ( . . . ) has approached this more by using the good method of demonstration, but, unable to address all principles, instead of real 236

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As we have seen in the previous chapters, the Abb´e was not the first to explicitly develop a project for peace in Europe nor was he the first to elaborate a theory of international relations. For a general overview on other peace projects during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see also Malettke, “Europabewußtsein und Europ¨aische Friedenspl¨ane, p. 63–92 and Arcidiacono, Cinq types de paix. Given the lasting controversy ever since Jean Bodin’s Six Livres de la R´epublique and Samuel Pufendorf’s analysis of the Holy Roman Empire, it might indeed seem ill-conceived to attempt to solve the issue of sovereignty among states by reference to the Holy Roman Empire. For further discussion of the issue of sovereignty concerning the Holy Roman Empire, see Schr¨oder, “The Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire after 1648”, Schr¨oder, “Reich versus Territorien?”, p. 123–143, Asbach, “Die Reichsverfassung als f¨oderativer Staatenbund” and O. Asbach, “Politik und Frieden beim Abb´e de Saint-Pierre. Erinnerung an einen (fast) vergessenen Klassiker der politischen Philosophie” in Politisches Denken Jahrbuch 1995/96 (Stuttgart 1996), p. 133– 163. See Edwards, Hugo Grotius. The Miracle of Holland, p. 82: ‘there was no law and no obligations among rulers of states, since there could be no devotion to a common higher good. Further, since there was no superior human power to impose standards of behavior on individual princes, each prince remained an authority in his own right – a power above which there was no other. What this amounted to was an expressed belief that relationships among political states were unrestrainedly competitive’. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 252, claims that ‘there is not the slightest evidence that sovereign states in this century will agree to subordinate themselves to a world government founded upon consent’.

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proofs, he gave us, as Machiavelli had done ( . . . ) many important paralogisms’.239 Although in his Projet he does not mention Hobbes’s name, the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre drew on his theory of sovereignty to apply Hobbes’s political philosophy to the sphere of interstate relations. As long as a sovereign arbiter over the various nations is not implemented, the remedy provided by natural law necessarily remains deficient. Hobbes maintained that sovereignty was not applicable to relations between states. For Hobbes, one is therefore ‘not to expect such a peace between two nations; because there is no common power in this world to punish their injustice’.240 The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre applied the Hobbesian solution to overcome the consequences of the state of nature to the international sphere, namely to establish an arbiter above the anarchical society of states. At the historical watershed, where the concrete development and philosophical justification of state authority were emerging in response to the breakdown of universal Christendom, the Abb´e perceived the anarchical society of states as the obstacle to a lasting peace. That relations between states were similar to the situation of individuals or families in the state of nature was a commonplace in political theory and practice. Given that sovereigns of states claimed themselves to be judge in their own case, all treaties and contracts remained precarious, there being no redress if any of the contractual parties decided not to honour the contractual obligations. ‘Sovereigns may give their word, may bind themselves by mutual promises, sign contracts between themselves; but there is not the least security that one or the other of the contracting parties will not change his mind’.241 The lack of mutual trust re-emerges as a central problem in interstate relations.242 Promises and treaties are only binding 239

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Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Ouvrages de moral et de politique vol. 6 (Rotterdam 1729–1741), p. 127f.: ‘Hobbes ( . . . ) a plus approch´e de la bonne m´ethode de demontrer, mais, faute d’embrasser tous les principes, au lieu de v´eritables d´emonstrations, il nous a donn´e comme Machiavel ( . . . ) beaucoup de paralogismes en mati`eres tr`es importantes’. T. Hobbes, “A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England” in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury vol. VI, ed. by W. Molesworth (London 1890), p. 7f. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 17: ‘Les Souverains peuvent se donner des paroles, s’engager par des promesses mutuelles, signer entr’eux des Traitez; mais il n’y a nulle suret´e suffisante, que l’un ou l’autre des Contracteurs ne changera pas de volont´e’. The importance of trust was analysed and employed equally by the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre in his other reform projects. In particular as part of his plans for financial reform he put forward the argument that the crown would be ill-advised to continue using their brutal and deceitful measures. Instead, a transparent and well-regulated system should be put in place. This would in turn inspire ‘the confidence that would incline the state’s creditors to lend funds on terms more favorable than

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in the subjective conscience of the contracting party, but they lack an enforceable obligation in case of non-fulfilment. The issue for the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre was how to introduce the shift from a moral requirement to a legally binding framework. This challenge could only be met if politics were not determined by short-sighted calculations of self-interest that reached no further than a balance of power. This might represent a realistic response to the de facto situation of interstate relations, but failed to provide any structural stability beyond the contingent outcome of fickle alliances and the fortunes of war. Politics which skirted around the challenge of providing a framework in which mutual trust was feasible could not escape the shifting pattern of alliances and counter-alliance. Self-interest would thus perpetuate mistrust and fear among states, a regrettable situation that Saint-Pierre attributed to the balance of power: ‘If the evidence reasoning provides is not sufficient, one should consult experience, so that one sees what has happened in the last two hundred years in the system of a balance of power. One may read the history of Europe. What has this unfortunate system achieved apart from almost constant wars? How little time did the truce of Vervins243 last? I could not call with another name than truce this peace which was not able to last. However, since this truce, how long has the war lasted? Here is the effect of the balance so much desired by all. Is it not the role of the past to teach us that with a similar cause we can only expect a future with similar results? Who does not see that under the system of a balance of power one only enjoys security with weapons in one’s hand? And therefore, we cannot enjoy our freedom at the expense of our respite’.244

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those which the state presently enjoyed’. Kaiser, “The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and the Reconstitution of the French Monarchy”, p. 631. The Treaty of Vervins was concluded on 13 April 1598 between Philip II and Henry IV – officially France was again at war with Spain from 1635 onwards, but actually one could argue that Louis XIII’s nomination of Richelieu as member of the Conseil in 1624 was also the moment France resumed the war against Spain. See Weber, “Vom verdeckten zum offenen Krieg”, p. 203–217, Parrott, Richelieu’s Army and for Spain J. H. Elliott, “Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis: Spain 1598–1659” in K. Repgen (ed.), Krieg und Politik 1618–1648 (Munich 1988), p. 185–202. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 38f.: ‘Si l’evidence du raisonnement ne suffit pas, que l’on consulte l’exp´erience, que l’on voye ce qui est arriv´e depuis deux cens ans dans le Systˆeme de l’Equilibre, qu’on lise l’histoire de l’Europe? Qu’est-ce qu’a oper´e ce malheureux Systˆeme, sinon des Guerres presque perp´etuelles? Combien peu a dur´e la Tr´eve de Vervins? Je ne sc¸aurois appeller d’un autre nom un Paix qui ne peut pas durer. Combien de tems au contraire a dur´e la Guerre depuis la fin de cette Tr´eve jusqu’`a present? Tel est l’effet de cet Equilibre si desir´e. Or le pass´e ne nous instruit-il pas que d’une cause semblable, on ne doit attendre pour l’avenir que de semblables effets? Et qui ne voit pas que dans le Syst´eme de l’Equilibre on ne trouve de sˆuret´e que les armes a` la main? Et qu’ainsi l’on ne peut jamais jouir de sa libert´e, qu’aux d´ec¸ens de son repos’.

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The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre addressed two levels of argument throughout his Projet. He was keen to demonstrate that right reasoning would lead everybody to the same conclusions he drew himself. He presented his method as being in the tradition of Descartes and maintained that human reason was the critical judge of the validity of any intellectual undertaking. But, as he implies in the above citation, some people may not be used to abstract reasoning, or think it not sufficient proof in the realm of politics. When these people refer to experience, they too will be drawn to his conclusions. In recalling that the period between 1598 and 1713 was not one of peace and stability, the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre is stressing the difference between a temporary truce and an enduring peace treaty. The latter is, of course, meant to end the hostilities for good. But it is the notion of a truce, not peace, that characterises a balance of power.245 The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre denounced the balance of power as nothing more than an improvised system246 which tried, in his view entirely in vain, to address the underlying structural contradictions of the anarchical society of sovereign states.247 He was more sceptical about this system and its underlying principle of a balance of power than many of his contemporaries. What was necessary, according to the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, was the rule of law. Only this would provide stability and reliability, which would in turn make mutual trust possible. But the rule of law among states was, analogous to the state of nature, only possible if states gave up the unrestricted rights of their sovereignty.248 The problem was that ‘the present constitution of Europe would never bring about anything other than almost permanent wars because it was unable to provide sufficient security for the execution of 245 246

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As we saw in Chapter 4.1, Leibniz had made a very similar point before him. Heinz Duchhardt stressed the importance of the notion of a state system. He perceived such a system as interwoven by cultural, economic and political links which were not intended to destroy other states but were meant to last and to provide a structural basis for the relations between states. Duchhardt, “Das Reich in der Mitte des Staatensystems”, p. 2. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 47: ‘Or quand les Alliez seroient parvenus a` former une e´galit´e, un Equilibre entre deux Souverainetez, quel moyen peuvent-ils jamais avoir pour rendre e´gaux les g´enies des Souverains qui doivent dans la suite gouverner ces Etats e´gaux? Cependant sans ce moyen qui est impossible, n’est-il pas aussi impossible qu’ils ayent jamais aucune sˆuret´e de conserver cet Equilibre seulement pendant un demi-si`ecle? Or jusqu’`a quand s´eduits par de vaines apparences prendront-ils pour une r´ealit´e sp´ecieuse une chim`ere qui leur coˆute d´ej`a tant d’hommes & tant de richesses, & qui leur en doit encore tant coˆuter’. Every conflict demonstrated that each party believed it had right on its side. They were the only judge in the conflict. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 7: ‘Je suis Juge ( . . . ) & seul Juge dans ma propre Cause, & dans toutes mes pr´etentions, je ne reconnois aucun Superieur sur la Terre’.

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treaties’.249 According to the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, this unstable situation had to be overcome in order to ensure that the conflicting parties were to have ‘another rule than the will of the sovereign princes, that is to say the rule of law’.250 In reference to Hobbes, the Abb´e reiterated almost expressis verbis the Hobbesian description of the state of nature: ‘I reflected upon the sad life of the savages. In truth they do not depend on any sovereign, any law or society; but because of the necessities of life they are extremely dependent on the seasons. They are even dependent on ferocious animals and what is most terrible about their dependence is that they also depend on their neighbours who are no different from the ferocious animals and who could at any time take their possessions and even their lives without punishment. ( . . . ) It is all very well that they make mutual promises in order to enjoy their possessions in peace, they have no security whatsoever that they will be kept. ( . . . ) Who would be so eccentric as to prefer the life of the savages, with its independence of all laws coupled with its hard and perpetual dependence of each on the other, to the life that we enjoy of perfect independence from others, coupled with our dependence on laws?’251 The state of nature scenario serves once more to evoke the consequences when no legal legitimate framework safeguards human society. Without the rule of law there will be no security which would allow states to trust in the keeping of promises and contracts. Drawing the same conclusion as Hobbes reached for individuals in the state of nature, Saint-Pierre envisaged an arbiter endowed with sufficient power to enforce agreement between states, which would be in the interest of every state concerned, because it would not only overcome the fragilities of a balance of power but also enhance commerce and industry: ‘They 249

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Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 3: ‘la constitution pr´esente de l’Europe ne sc¸auroit jamais produire que des Guerres presque continuelles, parce qu’elle ne sc¸auroit jamais procurer aucune sˆuret´e suffisante de l’execution des Traitez’. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 13: ‘une autre Regle que leur volont´e, c’est la Loy’. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. II, p. 360–363: ‘J’ai fait faire r´eflexion sur la vie malheureuse des Sauvages. Ils ne d´ependent a` la v´erit´e d’aucun Souverain, d’aucun Loix, d’aucune Soci´et´e, mais a` cause des n´ecessitez de la vie, ils d´ependent extr´emement des Saison; ils d´ependent mˆeme des bˆetes f´eroces, & ce qui est le plus terrible dans leur d´ependance, ils d´ependent de leurs voisins qui sont autant de bˆetes f´eroces qui peuvent tous les jours leur oˆ ter impun´ement leurs biens & la vie mˆeme. ( . . . ) ils ont beau de faire des promesses r´eciproques pour jouir en Paix de leurs possessions, ils n’ont nulle suret´e de leur e´x´ecution ( . . . ) Qui seroit assez extravagant pour pr´ef´erer la vie des Sauvages, avec leur ind´ependence de toutes Loix, jointe a` la dure & perp´etuelle d´ependance les uns aux autres, a` la vie que nous menons dans une parfaite ind´ependance les uns des autres, jointe a` notre d´ependance des Loix?’ Compare Chapter 3.2. The well-known description of the state of nature also quoted earlier is to be found in Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XIII, p. 89.

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are not facilitated by arts or commerce, because they have no laws, nor a permanent society which can punish those who break the laws’.252 Like in Hobbes’s political society, the interstate order that Saint-Pierre envisaged is not an arbitrary social gathering of people, but the legal framework of a political body, established and thus legitimised by contract, and backed by an enforceable law.253 As to an arbiter of this system of European states under the rule of law, the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre envisaged a European Union or federation with representative institutions in the form of a permanent congress and a law court. The arbiter was, therefore, not conceptualised as a single person or individual sovereign. Unlike a social contract between individuals, however, the envisaged contract for establishing a society between the European states had to be installed to be effective.254 For the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, it was crucial to convince the European sovereigns to join together in such a contract. Hence his endeavour to demonstrate that it was not only in the interest of each state, but that such a society was at the same time a practicable solution to the endemic conflicts between the states. Nevertheless: ‘It is absolutely necessary that everyone remains in possession of what he currently enjoys’.255 Saint-Pierre grasped that preservation of the liberty and independence of the different states was a precondition and the goal of the contract: ‘It is absolutely necessary for the preservation of their lives, their goods, their freedoms and their rights, that they agree in their protestation that no one will claim to be judge of his own cause’.256 Being judge in 252

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See Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. II, p. 360: ‘Ils n’ont point le s´ecours des Arts & du Commerce, parce qu’ils n’ont point de Loix, ni de Soci´et´e permanente qui puissent punir les infracteurs de Loix’. As a matter of fact, and still in close analogy with Hobbes’s argument, only under the legal framework which was endowed with an arbiter would the notion of property be meaningful. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 78: ‘Dans l’Arbitrage chacun est sur de conserver les biens qu’il possede, & ceux qu’il pourra acquerir par son industrie, [ou] par son travail ( . . . ). L’Arbitrage ne peut point lui oˆ ter rien de ses biens, parce que l’Arbitrage est e´tabli pour conserver tranquillement chacun dans ses biens, & pour emp`echer les invasions r´eciproques. L’Arbitrage est une convention faite pour l’int´erˆet de chacun des Associez: Or, un point important pour l’int´erˆet commun; c’est que chacun puisse avoir une veritable propriet´e de ses biens’. That is to say, whereas the contractual foundation of the particular states was only a hypothesis which allowed for the consideration of the relation and, as for instance in the case of Locke, separation of powers, the reference to a foundational contract for the Union Europ´eenne had de facto to be realised. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 50: ‘Il est absolument necessaire que ( . . . ) chacun d’eux demeura en possession de ce qu’il possede actuellement’. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 51: ‘Il est absolument necessaire pour la conversation de leur vie, de leurs biens, de leur libert´e de leurs droits, qu’ils conviennent que dans leurs contestation nul ne pr´etendra ˆetre Juge legitime dans sa prope cause’.

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one’s own case (ipse judex) was the distinguishing character of the state of nature. What remained was to define an institutional organisation to guarantee the security of a society based on law. ‘It is absolutely necessary that they [the states] agree to provide sufficient means to give arbitration sufficient strength to execute the general laws and particular judgements. The sword is no less necessary for justice, than the scales, laws and judgements ( . . . ) which would be useless if arbitration had not the power to execute them. We have to make sure that no one could be tempted to resist the force of arbitration’.257 The challenging task was, on the one hand, to establish an arbiter empowered with sufficient authority and adequate powers of coercion and, on the other hand, to ensure that such an arbiter would not misuse his coercive power and thus threaten the rights and liberty of the contracting states. A federative structure of states was the Abb´e’s answer to this challenge. A political body based on federative principles would allow for the establishment of a sufficiently strong arbiter but still respect the rights and liberties of the contracting parties.258 Initially, the Abb´e chose the federative structure of the Swiss, Dutch and German states as an appropriate example for the European union of states: ‘I found that if the ( . . . ) Sovereigns of Europe in order to preserve their role in the current government, to avoid war between them and to gain all the advantages of perpetual trade from nation to nation, wanted to conclude a treaty of union and a perpetual congress, more or less on the 257

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Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 56: ‘Il est absolument necessaire qu’ils conviennent de moyens suffisans pour donner a` l’Arbitrage une force suffisante pour faire execute les Loix generales, & ses Jugemens particuliers. L’ep´ee n’est pas moins necessaire a` la Justice que la balance, les Loix, les Jugemens ( . . . ) seroient inutiles si l’Arbitrage n’avoit pas la force de les faire executer; il faut absolument faire en sorte que nul ne puisse eˆtre tent´e de r´esister a` la force de l’Arbitrage’. See especially Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 117. Political theory which advocated a federal republic was far from widespread in France. Apart from the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, a few other political thinkers, notably Mably, Montesquieu and Rousseau, later developed similar ideas, and they all seem to have been influenced by the Abb´e’s writings. See H. Hintze, Staatseinheit und F¨oderalismus im alten Frankreich und in der Revolution (Frankfurt 1989), p. 69f, O. Asbach, “Staat, Politik und die Verfassung der Freiheit. Zu den Anf¨angen des republikanischen Verfassungsdenkens in der franz¨osischen Aufkl¨arung” in Der Staat 42 (2003), p. 1–34, J. K. Wright, “The Idea of a Republican Constitution in Old R´egime France” in Republicanism a Shared European Heritage vol. I, ed. by M. v. Gelderen and Q. Skinner (Cambridge 2002), p. 289–306, M. Sonenscher, “Republicanism, State Finance and the Emergence of Commercial Society in Eighteenth Century France – or from Royal to Ancient Republicanism and Back” in Republicanism a Shared European Heritage vol. II, ed. by M. v. Gelderen and Q. Skinner (Cambridge 2002), p. 275–291, J. K. Wright, A Classical Republican in Eighteenth Century France. The Political Thought of Mably (Stanford 1997) and P. Schr¨oder, “‘Une distinction frivole’ – Enlightenment Discussions of Citizenship” in Athenian Legacies. European Debates on Citizenship, ed. by P. M Kitromelides (Florence 2014), p. 255–269.

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same model of the seven sovereignties of the Netherlands, or the thirteen sovereignties of Switzerland, or the sovereignties of Germany and to create the European Union based on what is good about these Unions, especially the Germanic Union which is composed of two hundred sovereignties ( . . . ) so that the weakest would have enough security, the most powerful would not be able to ruin the others, and everyone would keep their reciprocal promises exactly’.259 We ought to pause here for a moment. The enumerated advantages of such a union with a coercive power for arbitration at its disposal are first and foremost the avoidance of war, followed by trade, enjoyment of the political privileges of the sovereign states, the security of even the smaller members of such a union and the trustworthiness of given promises. The notion of trust enjoys a status in this concept that is not to be overlooked. It is of equal importance with the other prima facie more tangible benefits and values listed. The Holy Roman Empire was the prime example for the Abb´e’s union of European states. Reference to the Swiss or Dutch Republics had long been commonplace in political thought260 , but selecting the Holy Roman Empire as the key example for his own Projet was more unusual: ‘In examining the government of the sovereign states of Germany, I did not encounter more difficulties in creating this European Union for our time, than they [videlicet the German sovereigns] did previously when they created the Germanic Union, to execute on a larger scale what had already been created on a smaller’.261 What he saw in the Holy Roman Empire was an elaborate division of power institutionalised in its various political establishments and procedural customs. The Holy Roman Empire served as the best example by virtue of the fact that it successfully accommodated a range of very different political units. Greater and smaller states could 259

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Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I Preface, p. VII: ‘Je ´ trouvai que si les ( . . . ) Souverainetez d’Europe pour se conserver dans le Gouvernement pr´esent, pour e´viter la Guerre entre elle, & pour se procurer tous les avantages d’un Commerce perp´etuel de Nations a` Nation, vouloient faire un Trait´e d’Union & un Congrez perp´etuel a` peu pres sur le mˆeme modelle des sept Souveraint´es de Hollande, ou des treize Souveraint´es des Suisses, ou des Souveraint´es d’Allemagne, & former l’Union Europ´eenne sur ce qu’il y a de bon dans ces Unions & sur tout dans l’Union Germanique compos´ee de plus de deux cens Souveraint´es, ( . . . ) que les plus foibles auroient suret´e suffisante, que la grande puissance des plus forts ne pourroit leur nuire, que chacun garderoit exactement les promesses r´eciproques’. See Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555–1590, Israel, The Dutch Republic and T. Maissen, Die Geburt der Republik. Staatsverst¨andnis und Repr¨asentation in der fr¨uhneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft (G¨ottingen 2006). Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I Preface, p. VIIIf.: ‘En examinant le Gouvernement des Souverains d’Allemagne, je ne trouvai pas plus de difficultez a` former des nos jours le Corps Europ´een, qu’on en trouva autrefois a` former le Corps Germanique, a` ex´ecuter en plus grand ce qui e´toit d´ej`a ex´ecuter en moins grand’.

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form a political body because the Empire operated a wide range of institutions. But a question remains. After giving a historical account of the Holy Roman Empire from the time of Charles the Great, and of the later competitive relationship between the estates and the emperor resulting in the eventual establishment of a federal structure, the Abb´e de SaintPierre advances the claim that such a federation had been founded by commitment to a treaty and that such a treaty rested on the theoretical work of a ‘wise author of the Germanic union’262 who had sketched such a union as a project.263 Why, one has to wonder, did the Abb´e introduce this myth?264 Especially since the Holy Roman Empire was intended to play a crucial role in the Abb´e’s argument for the practicability of such a foundational contract and its ensuing functioning political institutions for Europe. This whole idea of a founding contract for the federation of the Holy Roman Empire on the basis of a previous project becomes even more puzzling when the Abb´e asserts: ‘I do not know if this project was first the idea of a prince or of an individual. I do not know either who contributed to its creation, but still the Union was to be established. It was not created without a project and it was in that time that this political masterpiece appeared, worthy of a good prince or a good citizen, and which had been so necessary for the salvation of the country’.265 Among many of the Abb´e’s critics was Leibniz, who criticised him exactly because of this conception. ‘It seems’, Leibniz argues, ‘that he conceives the German union as having begun with some treaty; but this cannot be reconciled with history’.266 Though lacking the historical facts regarding the foundation of the Holy Roman Empire, the Abb´e was nevertheless keen to demonstrate that 262

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Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 56: ‘sage Auteur de l’Union Germanique’. See also Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 67. For an extensive discussion of this puzzle, see Asbach, Die Z¨ahmung der Leviathane, p. 136–156. Compare, apart from the already cited references, notably Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 118, where he speaks of a ‘Solon Alleman’. Patrick Riley dismissed the whole of Saint-Pierre’s discussion of the Holy Roman Empire as ‘pure fantasy’. P. Riley, “The Abb´e de St. Pierre and Voltaire on Perpetual Peace in Europe” in World Affairs 137 (1974–1975), p. 188. However, such an assertion does not do justice to the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s proposal and the conceptual significance of the Holy Roman Empire in his theory. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 68: ‘Je ne scai pas si ce Projet tomba d’abord dans l’esprit d’un Prince ou d’un Partiqulier. Je ne scai pas non plus jusqu’o`u l’Auteur le porta d’abord, mais toˆujours ce fut alors que l’Union commenc¸a a` se former, elle ne se forma pas sans Projet, & ce fut dans ce tems-l`a que parut ce chef-d’œuvre de politique si digne d’un bon Prince, d’un bon Citoyen, & qui e´toit si necessaire au salut de sa Patrie’. G. W. Leibniz, “Observations on the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s ‘Project for Perpetual Peace’” in G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, ed. by P. Riley (Cambridge 1988), p. 182.

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its existing institutions could serve as a model for his envisaged union of European states.267 He knew, however, that the institutional structure of the Holy Roman Empire was less than straightforward. Criticising the emperor for undermining the federative union of the Holy Roman Empire, the Abb´e found the tension between the emperor and the estates to have jeopardised the project of a federative republic.268 It was because of ‘this old monarchical construction [that it was so difficult] to form all those states into one republican state like the Germanic one’.269 Leibniz maintained the opposite view: ‘The defect of the Empire is not, as M. l’Abb´e de SaintPierre seems to take it, that the Emperor has too much power, but that the Emperor, as Emperor, does not have enough’.270 But the Abb´e de SaintPierre’s commitment was to establish a federative union on republican principles that would overcome the structural problems of the anarchical and precarious society of European states. In the Abb´e’s account of the Empire, the Diet and the imperial law chamber, the Reichskammergericht, mutually endorsed and incorporated the federative structure, these two institutions guaranteed the representation of all the members in the Diet and served as arbiter for disputes within the federation. Also crucial was the system of the imperial circles (Reichskreise) providing for an even distribution of power within the union. However, this republican structure was threatened by the emperor: ‘The weakening of the freedom of the Germanic Union becomes even more evident if we consider the state in which the authority of the Imperial Chamber is currently found. ( . . . ) It was, so to speak, the centre of the Union ( . . . ). The authority of this Chamber combined with the authority of the Diet ( . . . ) made up all the strength of the Union, it was in the

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It is this strategy which might help to explain the ambivalent and confusing references to the history of the Holy Roman Empire. On the use of republicanism by the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre see Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Discours sur la Polysynodie (Amsterdam 1719), p. 71 and 122f., Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 275f. See also O. Asbach, Staat und Politik zwischen Absolutismus und Aufkl¨arung. Der Abb´e de Saint-Pierre und die Herausbildung der franz¨osischen Aufkl¨arung bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Hildesheim 2005), esp. p. 109–137, Asbach, “Staat, Politik und die Verfassung der Freiheit” and Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abb´e de SaintPierre, p. 108. Note, however, that Kaiser, “The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and the Reconstitution of the French Monarchy”, p. 633 sees the Abb´e as a ‘royalist’. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 85: ‘ce vieux e´difice Monarchique, [that it was so difficult/bien difficile] de faire de tout ces Etats un Etat plus Republicain, que celui de Corps Germanique’. Leibniz, “Observations on the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s ‘Project for Perpetual Peace’”, p. 182. This confirms Leibniz’s patriotic attitude towards the Empire (Reichspatriotismus) as discussed in Chapter 4.1.

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Emperor’s interests to weaken them’.271 The conflict of interests between the emperor and the estates was a commonplace topic of debate in the Holy Roman Empire and in France alike.272 Bypassing the intractable question of where sovereignty could be found in the Holy Roman Empire, the Abb´e’s emphasis was on the original structure and foundation of the Holy Roman Empire, conceived as a republican federation that endured in the form of the imperial institutions. Regrettably the Emperor had usurped the sovereignty previously enshrined in the institutions: ‘The Emperor became ( . . . ) the unique judge of the differences between the other sovereigns; therefore we can say that this single defect led irresistibly towards the ruin of the German Republic’.273 At least the notion of a founding project for the Holy Roman Empire allowed the Abb´e a point of reference that transcended the imperfect actuality of the Holy Roman Empire. In this he was different from Rousseau, who admired the existing Holy Roman Empire as decisive in preserving the balance of power in Europe: ‘Despite the negative aspects of the constitution of the Empire’, Rousseau claims, ‘it is certain that as long as it lasts, the balance of Europe will never be broken, no potentate will have to fear being dethroned by another, and the Treaty of Westphalia will have a good chance to remain the foundation of our political system’.274 Whereas Rousseau argued as a historian or politician referring to evident facts and their concrete implications, the Abb´e’s intention had been very different. ‘Rousseau’, as rightly argued by Sven Stelling-Michaud, ‘has here deformed the thought of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’.275 The Abb´e was 271

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Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 80f.: ‘L’affoiblissement de la libert´e du Corps Germanique est encore devenu fort sensible par l’´etat o`u se trouve presentement l’autorit´e de la Chambre Imperiale ( . . . ). C’´etoit, pour ainsi dire, le centre de l’Union. ( . . . ) L’autorit´e de cette Chambre jointe avec l’autorit´e de la Diette ( . . . ) faisoient toute la force de l’Union; il e´toit l’interˆet des Empereurs de les affoiblir’. See Malettke, Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, esp. p. 129–261. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perp´etuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 81f.: ‘l’Empereur devient ( . . . ) l’unique Juge des differens des autres Souverains; ainsi on peut dire que ce seul d´efaut a` conduit insessiblement la Republique Germanique sur le penchant de sa ruine’. J.-J. Rousseau, “Extrait du Projet de Paix Perp´etuelle de Monsieur l’Abb´e de Saint-Pierre” in Œuvres compl`etes vol. III (Paris 1964), p. 572: ‘Malgr´e les d´efauts de cette constitution de l’Empire’, Rousseau claims, ‘il est certain que tant qu’elle subsistera, jamais l’´equilibre de l’Europe ne sera rompu, qu’aucun Potentat n’aura a` craindre d’ˆetre d´etrˆon´e par un autre, et que le Trait´e de Westphalie sera peut-ˆetre a` jamais parmis nous la base du syst´eme politique’. However, Rousseau is generally very critical of the balance-of-power thinking. He is thus somewhat distorting the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s view, rather than making a genuine argument for the balance of power. See Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, p. 104. S. Stelling Michaud, “Notes et Variantes” in J.-J. Rousseau, Œuvres compl`etes vol. III (Paris 1964), p. 1546: ‘Rousseau d´eforme ici la pens´ee de l’abb´e de Saint-Pierre’. The historical context helps us to understand Rousseau’s treatment of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre. Madame Dupin, at whose salon

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much more daring than Rousseau gave him credit for. Rousseau warned that such a plan was ‘too good to be adopted’ and any attempt to realise it would demand ‘violent means, which are unacceptable for humanity’.276 A republican constitution for the European sovereign states was the political aim. But since experience showed that on the interstate level one was ill-advised to trust entirely the goodwill of sovereigns, the Abb´e recognised that to realise his project for perpetual peace might call for a virtuous lawgiver, if one could be found. In the third volume of his project he observed that the essence of his programme had ‘previously been proposed by Henry the Great, king of France’.277 It is telling that the Abb´e changed the title of his project after Louis XIV’s death on 1 September 1715.278 In the first two volumes of the Projet published in 1713, the Abb´e addressed only the reader in his preface and avoided reference to Louis XIV, but after Louis’s death he addressed the regent, Philippe d’Orl´eans (1674–1723), in the third volume.279 It is clear why he avoided addressing Louis XIV directly. As we have seen earlier, when considering the criticism F´enelon mounted against Louis XIV, the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre

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the young Rousseau had met the ageing Abb´e de Saint-Pierre in 1741 for the first time, asked the Abb´e de Mably to suggest to Rousseau that he should rework the political writings of the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre. The result was the above-mentioned Extrait. Mably even more than Rousseau still treated interstate relations as nothing more than a chain of alliances and counter-alliances, wars and the peace treaties which followed them. Even the title Le Droit public de l’Europe. Fond´e sur les Traitez conclus jusqu’en l’ann´ee 1740 suggests that interstate relations are founded on treaties between sovereign states, but nothing is said about their validity and their inherent philosophical and practical problems, such as the ipse judex principle. See Drouet, L’abb´e de Saint-Pierre, p. 331. Rousseau gives an account of these events in book 9 of his Confessions. J.-J. Rousseau, The Confessions, ed. by J. M. Cohen (London 1953), p. 379f. On the intellectual relationship between Rousseau and Mably, see Schr¨oder, “‘Une distinction frivole’ – Enlightenment Discussions of Citizenship” as well as the still invaluable studies by R. Derath´e, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la Science Politique de son Temps (Paris 1995) and Wright, A Classical Republican in Eighteenth Century France. See also the preface to Leibniz’s collection of international treaties (Codex Iuris Gentium, 1693), where he claims that the basis of international law is enshrined in international treaties. G. W. Leibniz, “Codex Iuris Gentium (Praefatio)” in G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, ed. by P. Riley (Cambridge 1988), p. 170. J.-J. Rousseau, “Jugement sur le Projet de Paix Perp´etuelle” in Œuvres compl`etes vol. III (Paris 1964), p. 599: ‘trop bon pour eˆtre adopt´e’, and p. 600: ‘des moyens violens et redoubtables a` l’humanit´e’. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet de Trait´e, p. 1: ‘propos´e autre fois par Henry le Grand Roy de France’. On the death of Louis XIV, see Bluche, Louis XIV, p. 879–899. Bluche’s study occasionally comes close to hagiography. Much more critical – and interesting – is Voltaire, The Age of Louis XIV. In his will Louis XIV had declared that Philippe d’Orl´eans, who was a member of the royal family of France, should serve as Regent of the Kingdom until Louis XV (1710–1774) would be of age in 1723. The first eight years of Louis XV’s official rule were politically unstable. Louis XIV’s testament stipulated that the kingdom was to be governed by a Regency Council made up of fourteen members. The Duke of Orl´eans had only limited powers as president of the council as all decisions were to be taken by majority vote. See J. Shennan, Philippe, Duke of Orl´eans. Regent of France, 1715–23 (London 1979).

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was not the only French intellectual disappointed by the way his king used his power. But now, with the death of Louis XIV, the Abb´e believed that the regent and perhaps future king, Louis XV, might make better use of his proposals.280 The reference to Henry IV appeared in the address: ‘To the regent, Sir, after having given in the third volume the remaining explanations which seemed necessary to demonstrate the importance and solidity of the famous project of Henry the Great, your ancestor; I thought that I should not dispense with offering your royal highness the entire work’.281 A single sovereign282 , it seems, might have the power to help realise a republican project of a European union. At issue for French foreign policy was a stable constitutional framework which would allow for peace and in turn foster free trade and the economic advantages flowing from it. The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre merits recognition as a political thinker who questioned certain consequences of the formation of the modern state at a time when this process was at its height. Though not the only writing which accompanied the negotiations at Utrecht283 , the Abb´e’s Projet represents 280

281

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283

See also Kaiser, “The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and the Reconstitution of the French Monarchy”, esp. p. 630. Kaiser reconstructs Saint-Pierre’s other reform plans in view of the shortcomings and failures of the French monarchy under Louis XIV. J. Klaits, Printed Propaganda under Louis XIV: Absolute Monarchy and Public Opinion (Princeton 1976) and L. Rothkrug, Opposition to Louis XIV – The Political and Social Origins of the French Enlightenment (Princeton 1965) are both still invaluable for the wider context. The best modern study on the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre and his projects during the regency is Asbach, Staat und Politik zwischen Absolutismus und Aufkl¨arung, esp. p. 139–189. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet de Trait´e, p. III: ‘AU REGENT. Monseigneur, Apr´es avoir donn´e dans ce troisi´eme Tome le reste des e´claircissemens qui paroissent necessaires pour d´emontrer l’importance & la solidit´e du fameux Projet du Roi Henri le Grand vˆotre Bsayeul, j’ai cru que je ˆ ne pouvois me dispenser d’offrir l’Ouvrage entier a` VOTRE ALTESSE ROYALE’. It is quite telling that even in the twentieth century political thinkers are readily prepared to rely heavily on the idea of individual political leadership. The most important example is, presumably, John Rawls when he somewhat surprisingly introduced the statesman as a crucial link in his international political theory. J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard 1999), p. 97: ‘It is the task of the student of philosophy to articulate and express the permanent conditions and the real interests of a well-ordered society. It is the task of the statesman, however, to discern these conditions and interests in practice. The statesman sees deeper and further than most others and grasps what needs to be done. The statesman must get it right, or nearly so, and then hold fast from this vantage’. See also the contemporary account C. Freschot, The compleat History of the Peace of Utrecht as also that of Gertruydenberg: Containing All the Acts, Memorials, Representations, Complaints, Demands, Letters, Speeches, Treaties and other Authentick Pieces relating to the Negotiations there, 2 vols. (London 1715). Freschot mentioned the English interest in establishing a balance of power, which reiterates the position which we have already seen in the early seventeenth century. One month before the treaty with Spain was signed at Utrecht, Queen Anne asserted in a speech to parliament that : ‘the present Opportunity would be irreconverably lost, of Britain’s Establishing a real Balance of Power in Europe, and Improving our Commerce’. Freschot, The compleat History of the Peace of Utrecht vol. I, p. 110. Britain’s long-standing pursuit of establishing a balance of power was eventually achieved, which meant that Britain could now claim to defend the balance of power. Not surprisingly the balance of power became an increasingly polemical term in the

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a thorough analysis of the interstate system. Contemporary concern was raised regarding the trustworthiness of Louis XIV and thus the reliability of the Utrecht peace settlement. Christoph Ziegler suggested in the subtitle of his Umst¨andliches Friedens-Diarium that French negotiations for peace were conducted with fraudulent intent.284 The treaties concluded at Utrecht expressly based the European state system and assurance of peace on the idea of a balance of power285 : ‘But whereas the war which is so happily ended by this peace, was at the beginning undertaken, and was carried on for so many years with the utmost force, at immense charge, and with almost infinite slaughter, because of the great danger which threatened the liberty and safety of all Europe, from the too close conjunction of the kingdoms of Spain and France. And whereas to take away all uneasiness and suspicion, concerning such conjunction, out of the minds of people, and to settle and establish the peace and tranquility of Christendom by an equal balance of power (which is the best and most solid foundation of a mutual friendship, and of a concord which will be lasting on all sides) as well the Catholic King as the Most Christian King have consented, that care should be taken by sufficient precautions, that the kingdoms of Spain and France should never come and be united under the same dominion’.286 That the European powers remained suspicious of each other is confirmed by the idea that a balance of power would be the best and most solid foundation of a mutual friendship. Mistrust and lack

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eighteenth century. See in particular J. H. G. v. Justi, Die Chim¨are des Gleichgewichts von Europa (Altona 1758). See also Kaeber, Die Idee des europ¨aischen Gleichgewichts and Strohmeyer, Theorie der Interaktion. The full title reads: Umst¨andliches Friedens-Diarium, worinnen anf¨anglich alle die jenige von Frankreich Zeit gegenw¨artig blutig gef¨uhrten Krieg arglistig gesuchte Friedenshandlungen bis auff die erste Conferenz inclusive, vorgestellet: Dann was von Tag zu Tag auf annoch w¨ahrendem Friedens-Congress passieret; und viel andere merckw¨urdige Begebenheiten und zu dieser Materie geh¨orige Documentten, Brieffschafften u. mehr zu finden und anzutreffen (Frankfurt am Main 1712). An excellent account on the war of the Spanish succession, including the various conflicts and struggles for hegemony outside Europe, is Bernardo Ares, Luis XIV Rey de Espaˇna. Still valuable is also Gerard, The Peace of Utrecht. See also the general assessment in Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 177: ‘The treaties of Utrecht (1713) still referred to the Respublica Christiana, though they were the last treaties to do so. They were also the first to declare that they were made in order to preserve the European balance of power’. G. Chalmers, A Collection of Treaties between Great Britain and other Powers vol. II (London 1790), p. 43, see also p. 71. References to the balance of power were made in the treaty between Spain and Great Britain and in the treaty between Spain and Savoy. See also the studies by M. Braubach, “Die Friedensverhandlungen in Utrecht und Rastadt 1712–1714” in Historisches Jahrbuch 90 (1970), p. 284–298 and H. Duchhardt, “The Missing Balance” in Journal of the History of International Law 2 (2000), p. 67–72.

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of institutional mechanisms to mediate conflicts remained intrinsic to this system. The Abb´e’s alternative programme addressed the issue of trust as well as the shortcomings of the balance of power. In his Annales politiques, published shortly after his death, he summarised again in five ‘fundamental articles for a European Diet’287 the stipulations to which all European sovereigns needed to subscribe. Only by establishing a permanent federative representation of all European states, endowed with power of arbitration to resolve any ensuing conflicts, would enduring security for all states be possible.288 This remained the essential alternative to the anarchical society of independent sovereign states and their unstable balance of power. A reoccurring objection to the idea of a federative association as an effective institutionalised framework guaranteeing peace was that it impinged on the prerogatives of (princely) state sovereignty, ‘a Thing’ as William Penn put it in his Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe ‘they will never endure’.289 But as Penn and others like Cruc´e or the Abb´e de SaintPierre, who advanced some such framework were eager to demonstrate, this objection was ‘a Mistake, for they [the sovereign states] remain as Soveraign at Home as ever they were. Neither their Power over their People, nor the usual revenue they pay them, is diminished ( . . . ). So that the Soveraignties are as they were, for none of them have now any Soveraignty over one another: And if this be called a lessening of their Power, it must be only because the great Fish can no longer eat up the little ones290 , and that each Soveraignty is equally defended from Injuries, and disabled from committing them’.291 The concept of trust had emerged in the international political thought of the seventeenth century as a key component in alternative conceptualisations of interstate relations. But on its own it remained too feeble to ground and enforce an interstate order of peace. According to the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, trust needed to be re-enforced by legitimate power. This was only possible on the basis of a delegation of sovereignty on the international level in the form of a republican federation of the sovereign states. 287 288 289 290 291

Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Annales Politiques vol. I (London 1757), p. 54: ‘Articles fondamentaux de la Diete Europ´eane’. See Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Annales Politiques vol. I, p. 54–59. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 412. Baruch de Spinoza had already made this point. Cf. B. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, ed. by M. D. Yale (Newburyport 2004), p. 179. Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 412.

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ch a p ter 5

The Doux Commerce and Interstate Relations Trust and Mistrust in the Emerging Economic Discourse

As we have observed, Cruc´e already saw commerce and trade as pacifying interstate relations. He also drew a link between commerce and trust. Nor was Cruc´e an isolated case. Exploring the economic and social role of trust in the development of the market economy in early modern England, Muldrew finds that ‘the early modern economy was a system of cultural, as well as material, exchanges in which the central mediating factor was credit or trust’.1 Indeed, ‘maintenance of interpersonal trust was of great social significance’.2 But should we make an equally positive assumption about the prevalence of trust within the international sphere? After all, the economic and political situation in the seventeenth century was largely characterised by what is now called mercantilism, the assumption that the volume of international trade was fixed and finite.3 Economic enterprise was taken to be a struggle to gain more access to other markets while protecting the domestic market to ensure a greater share of the limited economic volume at the cost of competitors. For a contemporary author on commerce, the state should ‘not ( . . . ) permit a promiscuous, straggling, and dispersed trade’.4 The role of the state was foremost perceived as safeguarding these conditions of competition.5 The underlying ideas of mercantilism are best understood ‘not as an economic theory, but ( . . . ) as part of the theory of the modern State’.6 Restrictions on foreign traders 1 3 4

5 6

2 Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation, p. 174. Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation, p. 4. Cf. R. Cameron and L. Neal, A Concise Economic History of the World (Oxford 2003), p. 131. J. Wheeler, A Treatise of Commerce (London 1601), p. 13. See also J.-F. Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce (Paris 1736), p. 8f. On the issue of protection of trade in the early modern period see O. Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce. The Institutional Foundations of International Trade in the Low Countries, 1250–1650 (Princeton 2013), p. 141–168. For an account of this struggle see Wallerstein, The Modern World System II, p. 74–125. M. Koskenniemi, “International Law and the Emergence of Mercantile Capitalism” in The Roots of International Law, ed. by P.-M. Dupuy and V. Chetail (Leiden 2014), p. 26. Melon argued that the interest of his Essai ‘ne regarde pas le commerce des Particuliers entr’eux, mais la mani´ere dont le L´egislateur peut procurer a` sa Nation les facilities de se server avantageusement de toutes les productions de son Terroir’. Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce, p. 13.

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and merchants were common. Gerard de Malynes (1586–1641) critically observed French restrictions on foreign trade7 , whereas Jacques Savary (1622–1690) complained at ‘the ill treatment French merchants suffered in England’.8 If the political and economic interests of sovereign states were mutually exclusive, could order among states be achieved on such competitive assumptions? Although Montesquieu is seen to have coined the classical formulation of the relationship between commerce and peace in the early modern period, he was not the first to make such an assumption.9 Like Cruc´e a century before him, Montesquieu believed that different nations with their different customs and a rather suspicious mutual outlook would put aside their differences because of their common interest in commerce.10 According to him commerce did not depend on a substantial set of regulations or an institutional framework. There was only one condition which was necessary for its functioning, and once this condition was met, commerce would lead to peace because of the interdependence of those engaging in commerce. But what was this condition? Montesquieu remained somewhat vague: it was ‘an almost general rule, that everywhere there are gentle [douces] mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores’.11 But did trade between foreign states really advance peaceful relations between states at this time? As the Dutch case illustrated, trade was a means of state expansion and hegemony: ‘the VOC’s mission was founded on the Grotian idea of property, which proved conducive to the expansion of overseas trade into territorial conquest’.12 The VOC (Vereenigde Oost-indische Compagnie) was 7 8

9

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11 12

G. de Malynes, The Maintenance of Free Trade (London 1622), p. 58. J. Savary, Le Parfait Negociant: ou Instruction g´en´erale pour ce qui regarde le commerce des marchandises de France, & des pays ´etrangers (Paris 1679), p. 114: ‘les mauvais traitements que les Marchands Franc¸ois rec¸oivent en Angleterre’. C. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, ed. by A. Cohler, B. Miller and H. Stone (Cambridge 1999), (20–2), p. 338: ‘The natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling, and all unions are founded on mutual needs’. See also C. Spector, Montesquieu et l’´emergence de l’´economie politique (Paris 2006) and M. Platania, “Montesquieu und der ‘doux commerce’: Wie Handel Gesellschaft und Politik verwandelt” in Der moderne Staat und ¨ ‘le doux commerce’. Politik, Okonomie und internationale Beziehungen im politischen Denken der Aufkl¨arung, ed. by O. Asbach (Baden-Baden 2014), p. 69–90. We need to note, however, that Montesquieu believed that ‘the spirit of commerce unites nations, [but that] it does not unite individuals in the same way’. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, (20–2), p. 338. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, (20–1), p. 338. K. Stapelbroek, “Trade, Chartered Companies and Mercantile Associations” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, ed. by B. Fassbender and A. Peters (Oxford 2012), p. 352.

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extremely successful in establishing its dominance in the East Asian trade. The contracts and treaties which the VOC signed with the rulers and princes in Indonesia and elsewhere show that the VOC acted on behalf of the Dutch state that thereby acquired extensive trading rights, often close to monopolies, that excluded other foreign merchants.13 Can it be said that trade between foreign states improved trust between them? Muldrew has shown how trust played a vital part in England’s early modern economy, where interpersonal relations and recourse to litigation in the courts provided more favourable conditions for extending trust to others than was the case at the international level.14 Can his positive emphasis on the role of trust within England be applied to interstate relations? Given that the situation was more volatile in the international sphere, because there was no easy recourse to law enforcement15 , trust was discussed differently. Writers employed the rhetoric of trust and mistrust. Savary thus described England as a nation of ‘bad faith’16 , cautioning ‘to undertake commerce in England, many precautions are necessary to succeed’.17 How do other agents like trading companies fit into this framework of competing states?18 To what extent did the discussion of trust within the economic sphere during the seventeenth century influence the discourse of trust 13

14 15

16 17 18

Temple, Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands, p. 227: ‘the mighty Advance they [the Dutch] have made towards engrossing the whole Commerce of the East-Indies, by their Successes against the Portugueses, and by their many Wars and Victories against the Natives; whereby they have forced them to Treaties of Commerce, exclusive to all other Nations, and to the Admission of Forts to be built upon Streights and Passes, that command the Entrances into the Traffick of such Places’. See also Mun, A Select Collection of Early English Tracts on Commerce, p. 200–203 and the studies by C. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600–1800 (London 1965), p. 103, J. A. Somers, De VOC als volkenrechtelijke Actor (Gouda 2001), p. 236f., C. G. Roelofsen, “‘Mare Librum’ and the Dutch East India Company: The Freedom of the Seas and Freedom of Trade as the Legal Bases of the Dutch Colonial State in the Indonesian Archipelago” in Grotiana 24/25 (2004), p. 69 and Stapelbroek, “Trade, Chartered Companies and Mercantile Associations”, p. 349f. Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation, p. 182 and p. 195. For Malynes, for instance, ‘the strength of the Law is in commanding, and the strength of commanding is in the constraining or executing of the Law, which belongeth unto Judges and Magistrates’. G. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria or the Antient Law-Merchant (London 1629), p. 436. It is precisely this structure that is lacking in interstate relations. Savary, Le Parfait Negociant, p. 114: ‘la mauvaise foy de cette nation [England]’. Savary, Le Parfait Negociant, p. 114: ‘pour faire le commerce en Angleterre, il faut prendre beaucoup de pr´ecautions pour y bien re¨ussir’. In the prevailing scholarship chartered companies are considered to be legal-political actors abroad, who performed public or even sovereign acts. See K. N. Chaudhuri, The English East Indian Trading Company: The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company 1600–1640 (London 1965), N. Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of Caravan Trade (Chicago 1974), M. Mollat (ed.), Soci´et´es et compagnies de commerce en Orient et dans l’Oc´ean Indien (Paris 1970), P. J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporative Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford 2011).

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regarding interstate relations? Trust and good faith were used in a wide range of registers to serve different interests. In his Edit du Roy servant de reglement pour le commerce des Negocians, first issued in 1673, it was Louis XIV’s intention ‘to assure good faith against fraud among merchants’.19 Regarding commercial agreements, merchants had to negotiate with their foreign counterparts who were used to different cultural and legal frames of reference. Specific questions were raised by trade relations: were merchants bound only by a signed contract or were they also bound by promises made in good faith? What happened if contracts were broken? These questions were taken up by a range of seventeenth-century authors of whom Malynes is the most significant. He stressed the importance of custom: ‘it plainely appeareth, that the Law Merchant, may well be as ancient as any humane Law, and more ancient than any written Law. The very morall Law it selfe, as written by Moses, was long after the customary Law of Merchants’.20 For Malynes, custom was the regulatory force of the lex mercatoria.21 Grotius made a similar argument that trade relations ought to be regulated by custom since rules derived from custom were ‘agreeable to the Law of Nature’.22 In contrast to Grotius, Su´arez saw commercial relations based on a different footing, commercial intercourse being regulated not by natural law but by ‘the ius gentium’.23 But even enforcement of the positive ius gentium was far from clear. In Grotius’s view, the customary rules would enable the resolution of ‘disputes, which could not possibly be decided ( . . . ) among those who had no common Judge to appeal to’.24 But, as 19 20

21

22 23

24

P. Bornier (ed.), Conferences des nouvelles ordonnances de Louis XIV (Paris 1694), p. 376: ‘assurer parmi les Negocians la bonne fois contre la fraude’. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 2. On Malynes see L. Muchmore, “Gerard de Malynes and mercantile Economics” in History of Political Economy 1 (1969), p. 336–358 and E. A. J. Johnson, “Gerard de Malynes and the Theory of the Foreign Exchanges” in The American Economic Review 23 (1933), p. 441–455. On international trade and conflict resolution in the early modern period see Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce, p. 102–140. On the development of the lex mercatoria see H. J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Foundation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass. 1983), p. 333–356. H. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. by R. Tuck (Indianapolis 2006), (II-XII-XXV), p. 763. Su´arez, “On the Laws and God the Lawgiver”, (II-18–7), p. 347: ‘it has been established by the ius gentium that commercial intercourse shall be free, and it would be a violation of that system of law if such intercourse were prohibited without reasonable cause’. The translation is regrettably misleading, because the Latin original does not use the term system. Given that system became a key concept in international political thought in the mid-seventeenth century as shown in Chapter 3.3, it is unfortunate that the translation suggests that the term system had been already used by Su´arez. Cf. F. Su´arez, “De Legibus, ac Deo Legislatore” in Selection from Three Works of Francisco Su´arez vol. I, ed. by J. B. Scott (Oxford 1944), (II-18–7), p. 190: ‘iure autem gentium, introductum est, ut commercia sint libera, violareturque ius gentium si absque causa rationabili prohiberentur’. Koskenniemi, for instance, makes the point that for Su´arez ‘international commerce is a “system”’. Koskenniemi, “International Law and the Emergence of Mercantile Capitalism”, p. 17. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, (II-XII-XXVI-3), p.766.

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in the dispute over the taking of the Portuguese vessel Santa Catarina in the Straits of Singapore by the Dutch, Grotius’s advocacy on behalf of the VOC on the basis of natural law and custom could not resolve the dispute beyond doubt. The structural difficulties of his natural law theory which we encountered previously remained25 , the private aspect of the natural law being transferred and translated into the public. As Koskenniemi rightly argued: ‘De jure belli ac pacis was not only fully compatible with the kind of commercial statecraft exemplified by the VOC and the EIC but [it also] provided an elaborate ideological grounding for it. It offered a theory of private natural rights as the basis on which the companies were constituted and made their claims to operate globally while protected and guaranteed by the charter-endowing sovereign’.26 Grotius advocated the interest of the VOC and the Dutch state at a time when Dutch dominance of world trade was undisputed.27 William Temple (1628–1699), who had served as English ambassador to the Netherlands, commented in his Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands, first published in 1673, on the success ‘of the East-Indian Company [i.e. the VOC]’ which was ‘managed ( . . . ) like a CommonWealth, rather than a Trade, and thereby rais’d a State in the Indies, govern’d indeed by the orders of the Company, but otherwise appearing to those Nations like a Sovereign State, making War and Peace with the greatest Kings’.28 It was no wonder that the Dutch model was discussed with envy and admiration by contemporary observers. Josiah Child (1630–1699), who later became shareholder and director of the English East Indian Company (EIC), observed: ‘The Prodigious increase of the Netherlands in their 25

26 27

28

See the discussion in Chapter 3.1. Thomas Mun also criticised Grotius and claimed that any rights of the Dutch to fish in the English sea could not be based on the arguments he developed in his Mare Liberum, but only on the English crown’s consent. Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, p. 196: ‘it is not the Netherlandish Author of Mare Liberum, that can entitle them to Fish in His Majesties Seas. For besides the Justice of the cause ( . . . ) I will only say that such titles would be sooner decided by swords, than with words; I do believe indeed that it is free for the Fish to come thither at their pleasure, but for the Dutch to catch and carry them away from thence without His Majesties licence, I harbor no such thought’. Koskenniemi, “International Law and the Emergence of Mercantile Capitalism”, p. 27f. See also Stapelbroek, “Trade, Chartered Companies and Mercantile Associations”, p. 346–48. For Grotius’s commitment to the VOC see Ittersum, Profit And Principle, E. Wilson, “The VOC, Corporate Sovereignty and the Republican Sub-Text of De jure Praede” in Grotiana 26–28 (2005– 2007), p. 310–340 and M. J. van Ittersum, “The Long Goodbye: Hugo Grotius’ Justification of Dutch Expansion Overseas, 1615–1645” in History of European Ideas 36 (2010), p. 386–411. Temple, Observations upon the United Provinces, p. 228. Cf. Wilson, “The VOC, Corporate Sovereignty and the Republican Sub-Text of De jure Praede”, p. 336 and more generally Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 321: ‘The unique federal structure of the Dutch state, and powerful influence of civic autonomy within the Republic, made it possible to devise a totally new kind of commercial organization, a chartered, joint-stock monopoly, strongly backed by the state’.

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Domestick and Foreign Trade, Riches, and multitude of Shipping, is the envy of the present, and may be the wonder of all future Generations’.29 Child used the Dutch example to advocate new policies for English trade to regain at least part of the lost share of international trade. His response was not an attempt to elaborate economic, legal or political structures that might resolve the inherent tensions of the competitive market structure, but a proposal to emulate the Dutch and regain lost territory in the trade balance.30 Charles D’Avenant (1656–1714) made a similar argument in his 1699 Essay upon the Probable Methods of Making a People Gainers in the Balance of Power.31 Malynes, in contrast, was concerned about the underlying structures of mercantile exchange and the possibility of resolving disputes: ‘many Emperours and Kings have always referred the ending of differences, which happen between Merchants, to be done & decided according to the Law-Merchant, That is to say, according to the Custome of Merchants’.32 We can thus begin to discern two different concerns in the writings on trade both of which embraced trust as an essential component. The first was concerned with the relationship between merchants from different countries. Contrary to what we could observe in Grotius, Malynes 29

30

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J. Child, A New Discourse of Trade (London 1698), p. 1. See J. O. Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton 1978), p. 73–98. Thomas Hobbes was more critical and saw in the emulation of the Dutch one of the altogether seven reasons for the English civil war which he enumerated at the beginning of his Behemoth: ‘Fifthly, the city of London and other great towns of trade, having in admiration the great prosperity of the Low Countries after they had revolted from their monarch, the King of Spain, were inclined to think that the like change of government here, would produce the like prosperity’. T. Hobbes, Behemoth or the long Parliament, ed. by F. T¨onnies (Chicago 1990), p. 3f. See also Hobbes, Leviathan, (XXIX), p. 225. Child, A New Discourse of Trade, Preface [p. XIXf.] lists on several pages under the heading “Of Trades Lost” where the English had lost their share in international trade. Generally speaking, ‘commercial discourse in Europe during the first half of the seventeenth century consisted of reactions to ideas and institutions devised by the Dutch in the century’s first decades’. Thomas Mun was equally critical of the Dutch. Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, p. 132: ‘the Dutchmen ( . . . ) doe not onely in these Kingdoms, encroach upon our livings, but also in other forraign parts of our trade (where they have power) they do hinder and destroy us in our lawful course of living, hereby taking the bread out of our mouth’. From a French perspective, Melon made a similar point. Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce, p. 59–78. E. Thomson, “The Dutch Miracle, Modified. Hugo Grotius’s Mare Liberum, Commercial Governance and Imperial War in the Early-Seventeenth Century” in Grotiana 30 (2009), p. 129. C. D’Avenant, “Essay upon the Probable Methods of Making a People Gainers in the Balance of Power” in The Political and Commercial Works of the Celebrated Writer Charles D’Avenant vol. 2, ed. by C. Whitworth (London 1721), p. 226: ‘in the general Balance of Trade, ( . . . ) what the Dutch ( . . . ) gain, is a dead loss to England’. Sir James Steuart praised D’Avenant for his understanding of economics. J. Steuart, Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy vol. II, ed. by A. S. Skinner (Edinburgh 1966), p. 607: ‘No person at that time, whose writings I have seen, appears to have so thoroughly understood these matters [public credit] as Davenant’. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 2.

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distinguished between the aspects of private and public or state concerns.33 The second was concerned with the state, or chartered companies, whose task it was to establish rules and guidelines for organising international trade. This is why Malynes argued that a proper understanding of the concerns of trade ‘ought to be the studie of Politicians or States-men, as a principall matter of State for the preservation and augmentation of the wealth of their Common-weales or Monarchies’.34 Regarding individual merchants, Malynes held that ‘in Humane actions the word Trust ( . . . ) implieth a credit or belief which wee give or repose upon others, or others do attribute and give unto us. ( . . . ) a man negotiating in this world must trust and bee trusted’.35 It is part of a merchant’s daily dealings to trust in other merchants and their representatives. They rely on information about reputation and trustworthiness. In case of failure to keep business contracts, they will withdraw trust and ultimately their business if trust was abused. The peculiar role of commissioners, who were trading on behalf of merchants, warranted several chapters in Le Parfait Negociant. Because commissioners were only dealing on behalf of others, the issue of trust was more complex. Their liability was not the same as that of merchants who invested their entire fortune in the business. Merchants would ‘in good faith entrust their goods’36 to the commissioners, who in turn were expected to be ‘bound in their conscience not to abuse the trust’37 of the merchants. The issue of trust regarding tradesmen and merchants was widely discussed in seventeenth-century literature. Richard Baxter, in his voluminous 1673 Christian Directory noted: ‘there are no Tradesman or Buyers who will profess that they look not to be trusted, or will say, I will deceive you, if I can. ( . . . ) among sober persons in Civil Socciety ( . . . ) we must ( . . . ) expect some truth and honesty, and not presume them to be all lyars and deceivers ( . . . ). Indeed we trust them ( . . . ) but with a mixture of distrust ( . . . ) we have no cause to make a Market a place of meer deceit, where every one saith, Trust not me, and I will not trust thee, but let us all take one

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Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, p. 330: ‘It is true that Ulpian was referring to private sales and to private law; but the same principle is equally applicable to the present discussion concerning the territories and laws of nations’. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 84f. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 362f. This point was reiterated by Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, p. 122. Savary, Le Parfait Negociant, p. 304: ‘qui leur confient leur bien sur leur bonne foy’. Savary, Le Parfait Negociant, p. 280: ‘ils [the commisioners] y sont obligez en conscience pour ne pas abuser de la confiance qu’ils [the merchants] ont en eux [the commisioners]’.

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another for cheaters and liars’.38 Anybody writing on commerce knew that a certain risk was always involved when trading with others, especially in the long-distance overseas trade.39 This is why Malynes pondered, ‘whether a merchant may trafficke with Turkes, Heathens, Barbarians, and Infidels, and performe promise with them?’40 Up to a certain point merchants had to trust others, and sometimes would find their trust ill rewarded. Part of the advice given in Le Parfait Negociant consists therefore in showing the different ways in which merchants risk being cheated when conducting their business.41 As William Scott put it in his advice for future merchants in his 1639 An Essay on Drapery: ‘Tis ordinary for a Citizen to trust, and hee commonly loseth much by it. I thinke there is no Citizen [who] can say hee hath had no losses’.42 A merchant’s good reputation was seen as a fairly reliable means of assessing potential trading opportunities. Credit was almost synonymous with trust43 , because a good reputation depended on whether a merchant would honour his commercial obligations, most importantly whether he would pay his bills of credit: ‘Such is the sinceritie and Candor Animi amongst Merchants of all nations beyond the seas, in the observation of plaine dealing’.44 To be trustworthy regarding business engagements was seen as an essential asset for any merchant. Conversely, those who ignored their obligations risked being ‘not only utterly discredited, but also [being] detested of all Merchants’.45 This applied not only to a signed contract. Merchants were also bound by ‘verball contracts’46 or promises made in 38 39 40 42 43

44 45

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R. Baxter, Chapters from A Christian Directory or A Summ of Practical Theology and Cases of Conscience, ed. by J. Tawney (London 1925), p. 106. Savary, Le Parfait Negociant, p. 88: ‘il faut ester tres-prudent & tres-sage dans la negociation que l’on fait dans les Pays estrangers’. 41 See Savary, Le Parfait Negociant, p. 54–56. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 6. W. Scott, An Essay on Drapery, ed. by S. L. Thrupp (Boston 1953), p. 25. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 451f., Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation, p. 174, R. Ottow, Markt – Republik – Tugend. Probleme gesellschaftlicher Modernisierung im britischen politischen Denken 1670–1790 (Berlin 1996), p. 134 and Weil, A Plague of Informers, p. 2–15. Savary observed that the buyers to whom merchants ‘vendront leur marchandise a` credit soient gens de probit´e, & de bonne foy, parceque jamais ils ne leur feront de mauvais incidents’. Savary, Le Parfait Negociant, p. 64. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 101. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 101. On the importance of a good reputation, see also Wheeler, A Treatise of Commerce, p. 19 and Malynes, The Maintenance of Free Trade, p. 20. Economic historians have argued that the ‘reputation mechanism’ has to be seen as a key element of premodern trade relationships. See A. Greif, “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders” in The Journal of Economic History 49 (1989), p. 857–882. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 126. But this was not a unanimous view, see for a contrasting position Savary, Le Parfait Negociant, p. 302: ‘il faut que toutes les conditions soient faites par e´crit, du moin sous leur seign priv´e: il seroit encore mieux que l’acte fut reconnu par devant Notaires’.

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good faith.47 The trustworthiness of a merchant was, therefore, decisive in introducing some predictability into volatile market relations overseas.48 Given the importance of credit and trust, it was remarked by commentators that ‘when words have obtained an esteem, and sort of veneration, their meanings will be varied as often as those in possession of reverence ( . . . ) have occasion to make different uses of them. ( . . . ) no word has suffered more from this abuse than the word credit’.49 The problem remained that these concepts were prone to being exploited. When defining the significant aspects of a merchant, Malynes followed the commonplace that a merchant undertakes the business of buying and selling. However, he did not stop there, because ‘next in order, the conditions and properties which a merchant ought to have, are to be considered; namely to be without fraud and deceit in his buying and selling of commodities, and to keep faith with all men’.50 Trust and good faith were considered essential qualities.51 This is confirmed by references to negative reputation. For instance, Italian – and in particular Genoese – merchants were considered reckless trading partners.52 Merchants were supposed to keep good faith even without sanctions and external arbitration. The risk of losing a good reputation was seen as an essential incentive to keeping good faith. ‘It is certainly in the interest of all men to keep up the reputation of their honesty as long as it can be kept, in order to be trusted for the future’.53 However, like others writing on trade, Malynes also insisted on the need to establish institutions which enabled enforcement by an external body in case of non-performance.54 This aspect could be regulated 47 48 49 50 51

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See Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 94 and p. 126. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 104: ‘The Credit of Merchants is so delicate and tender, that it must bee cared for as the apple of a mans eye’. J. Trenchard and T. Gordon, Cato’s Letters: or, Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and other important Subjects, ed. by R. Hamowy (Indianapolis 1995), p. 754. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 5f. See, for instance, also T. Gainsford, The Rich Cabinet (London 1616), p. 91: ‘Merchant must take heede to keeping his word and credit: for if he faile at his daies, and absent himself from common place of countercourse, as we cal it the Boursse, let him be never so rich, he losseth a good opinion, and hazardeth his reputation for ever’. Savary, Le Parfait Negociant, p. 124: ‘il n’y a point de Negocians dans l’Europe plus fins & plus subtils que les Italiens; & qui soient plus adroit a` surprendre; c’est pourquoy ceux qui negocient avec eux doivent bien prendre garde a` ce qu’ils font, car il faut estre bien clair-vyoant dans tout ce que l’on fait avec eux, & particulierment avec les Gennois, don’t la pluspart n’ont pas toujours toute la probit´e qu’il seroit a` souhaiter’. The caricature of the soit-disant unreliable Italian merchants was frequently employed in seventeenth-century literature on trade. Trenchard and Gordon, Cato’s Letters, p. 756. Cato’s Letters continue: ‘but when they can be trusted no longer, nor are able to pay what they are already trusted with, and can decline paying it when they see apparent ruin being honest, it is easy to guess what course will be taken’. Trenchard and Gordon, Cato’s Letters, p. 756.

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relatively easily through a system of arbitration to which the merchants had to subscribe: ‘The authoritie and proceedings of Merchants Courts, or Priors and Consuls, [was] to decide their differences’.55 In other words, merchants ultimately depended on the existing framework under which they conduct their business. This is the link to the seventeenth-century debate on trust in regard to international political thought. Economic historians have tended to assess seventeenth-century writings on trade, and economics more generally, through the anachronistic lens of Adam Smith, thus distorting the insight of these earlier writings on the subject.56 The vocabulary and structure of the argument of economic thought were often close to natural law doctrine.57 Cicero returns in Malynes’s Lex Mercatoria: ‘This Law of Merchants ( . . . ) in the fundamentals of it, is nothing else but (as Cicero defineth true and just Law) ( . . . ): True Law is right Reason, agreeable to Nature in all points, diffused and spread in all Nations, consisting perpetually without abrogation’.58 In Sir Thomas Elyot’s The Boke named the Governour we find an earlier example: ‘As Tulli saieth, faith is a constaunce and trouth of things spoken or covenaunted. And in another place he saieth, nothing kepeth so to gether a publike weale as doth faith’.59 Thus while not particularly original in his reference to Cicero, Malynes provided one of the more comprehensive economic accounts of his time, 55 56

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Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 7. See ibid., p. 443–446. On the early modern system of litigation in commercial disputes see also Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation, p. 199–312. J. Hoppit, “Attitudes to Credit in Britain, 1680–1790” in The Historical Journal 33 (1990), p. 305: ‘The history of economic ideas in Britain is dominated by a great tradition which in its early stages focuses on Adam Smith. For the century before the publication of the Wealth of Nations in 1776, economic ideas are most often studied in relation to the “arrival” of Smith and commented on with regard to the degree to which they may be considered precursors of his ideas. ( . . . ) Consequently, our perception of economic ideas between the Restoration and the Wealth of Nations continues to be highly and perhaps atypically selective’. See also C. Muldrew, “Interpreting the Market: The Ethics of Credit and Community Relations in Early Modern England” in Social History 18 (1993), p. 164: ‘Ideas about the nature of human relationships within the market used by historians have largely come from economic theory as it has developed since Smith’s work. Overwhelmingly, such theory has presented a very reductionist, instrumental account of “rationalist” self-interested behavior, and this has been an obstacle to a more comprehensive historical treatment of market relations’. The collection by H. C. Clark (ed.), Commerce, Culture, & Liberty. Readings on Capitalism before Adam Smith (Indianapolis 2003) addresses this criticism. C. Larr`ere, L’Invention de l’´economie au XVIIIe si`ecle. Du droit naturel a` la physiocratie (Paris 1992), p. 95f. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 3. See also ibid., p. 461: ‘The law of Nature, whose virtue is alone, and the same every way in all’. T. Elyot, The Boke named the Governour, ed. by F. Watson (London 1907), (III-8), p. 222. However, references to Cicero in the early modern literature are quasi omnipresent in most genres, and it is therefore not surprising that he was also taken on board in the discussion on the role of trust in the economic sphere.

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demonstrating how recourse to natural law helped build his argument regarding the lex mercatoria. It is particularly interesting to assess the role of trust in this argument, as the structural parallel to various uses of natural law sheds light on the way the problem of trust in the international sphere was perceived within economic thought. Malynes stressed the need to ‘observe the difference between Lawes and Customes according to the description of the said worthy author Cicero’.60 Custom evolves over time and by consent. It gradually gains in strength to oblige. In contrast, law is a command ‘by absolute authority of a Prince’.61 It could be expected, therefore, that law commands a greater force to oblige. But not so for Malynes: ‘Customes are of no lesse power than Law’.62 Status and the binding force of custom seem to be inflated by Malynes. At the same time we can detect a striking resonance of the natural law concept of pacta sunt servanda, emphasised by Cicero, Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf alike: ‘M. Tully attributes so great a Power to Promises that he calls faithfulness the Foundation of Justice’.63 Malynes asserted that ‘all agree that bona fides inter mercatores est servanda, Faith or trust is to be kept between merchants, and that also must be done without quillets and titles of the law’.64 And yet, Malynes also proposed that ‘in buying and selling of things there are required ( . . . ) necessary conditions’.65 These conditions were summarised in the law of nature: ‘the law of nature [is] to be regarded and observed, Quod tibi fiery non vis, alteri ne feceris, or do as you would be done unto’.66 Insisting on the golden rule as the guiding principle was also a commonplace within the early modern natural law tradition.67 But 60

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Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 4. Even when discussing specific aspects of the lex mercatoria such as usury ‘Cicero, and many other learned Philosophers and Orators’ are enlisted by Malynes in support of his argument. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 327. See also reference to Cicero regarding the difference between arbitration and law suits. Ibid., p. 450. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 4. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 4. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, (II-XI-I-5), p. 703. See Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (I-9–3), p. 69: ‘The general duty imposed by natural law in this matter is that every man must keep his faith given, or fulfill his promises and agreements’ and Hobbes, On the Citizen, (III-1), p. 43. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 93. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 92. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 92. See also ibid., p. 461: ‘All laws are tending in substance to the upholding of trueth, maintaining of justice, to defend the feeble from the mightie, for the suppressing of iniuries, and to roote out the wicked from amongst the good, prescribing how to live honestly, to hurt no man willfully, and to render everie man his due carefully, furthering what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong, summarily to be understood according to the saying of our savior Christ. What you will have men to do unto you, do the same unto them’. See Matthew VII-12: ‘All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them: for this is the law and the prophets’. See also Luke VI-31: ‘And as ye

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Malynes seems to believe – with Grotius – that these prescripts carry in themselves sufficient binding force.68 The structural and practical difficulties in the political discourse based on natural law thus recur in the writings on trade. The same limits of trust are touched upon. This was the case not only for Malynes, but also for others who discussed conditions of trade. Scott, too, based his argument on the Ciceronian and Grotian concept of justice: ‘deceit ( . . . ) is against justice towards others’.69 He continued to make an argument somewhat suggestive of a point to be made later by Hobbes in his epistle dedicatoria of the second edition of his 1647 De Cive: ‘the greatest evils that come to man, come from man. Homo homini Lupus, one Man is a Wolfe to another. ( . . . ) man exerciseth cruelty against man ( . . . ) this is against civill Society; for the preservation whereof, it is necessary that men converse safely together, without feare for one of another’.70 This threat needed to be addressed. And one way of doing so was to point to the specific merits of international trade for fostering relations between individuals and states alike. Like Cruc´e, Malynes viewed commerce ‘to bee a means to maintaine peace through all the whole world’.71 He argued further that ‘Princes and Common-weales; ( . . . ) (notwithstanding particular differences) are generally inclined to maintaine trafficke’.72 This shared interest of the different states should lead them to accept the establishment of a trading organisation with the authority to arbitrate conflicts. States are expected to resign – qua contract – part of their sovereign rights to this authority.73 Moving towards a different level of his discussion in his Lex Mercatoria, Malynes identifies the need to conclude a ‘universal and

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would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise’. Even Hobbes argued that a proper understanding of what the natural laws prescribe was summarised in the golden rule. Hobbes, On the Citizen, (III-26), p. 53. This was taken up in the Dutch debate about natural law and trade in the Dutch Republic. See A. Weststeijn, Commercial Republicanism in the Dutch Golden Age: The Political Thought of Johan & Pieter de la Court (Leiden 2012), p. 160. On the contemporary discussion of the golden rule see also J. Goodman, The Golden Rule, or, The Royal Law of Equity Explained (London 1688). As discussed earlier, Hobbes and Pufendorf were more sceptical about the obligatory force of natural law. Scott, An Essay on Drapery, p. 19. Scott, An Essay on Drapery, p. 19. But as we have seen previously in Chapter 3.2, Hobbes’s concern was very different and his use of the image of the infamous homo homini lupus was accordingly also considerably different. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 353. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 356. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 356: ‘To which end, the said Princes or Potentates are to renounce all laws, priviledges, exceptions, or immunities, of what high nature or dignitie soever to the contrarie, and to make approbation of this contract’.

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perpetuall Contract of Commerce ( . . . ) to be made between all Princes, ( . . . ) for the surer maintaining of Peace amongst Christians, and increase of Trafficke and Trade through all the world’.74 He touches upon the need for structures and institutions which would permit the restriction of state sovereignty by way of institutionalised arbitration. These would have to be established by contractual agreement, and hence would depend on states and sovereigns considerably extending their trust towards other states and sovereigns. But in turn these institutions should help to foster and maintain trust. Well-understood interest should lead to the understanding that abrogation of unrestricted sovereignty was not a loss of state power, but ultimately an enhancement of it. The crux of such an argument was that interpretation of what the best and real interest of a particular state would be remained to be decided on a case-by-case basis. This argument, also pursued by Cruc´e and Penn, was taken up decisively by the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, who discerned the political and economic interest of sovereign states to lie precisely in establishing institutions which would forestall the fickleness of constant reassessing and evaluating a particular state interest. The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre argued in the name of interest, but placed the need to provide institutionalised conditions for trust at the heart of his argument. ‘I admit that the liberty of a Sovereign to keep or not to keep his promises he made to his neighbours, according to his judgment of whether this would correspond with his interests, would be a great advantage’.75 But, given that each state would have equal liberty to keep its word according to its interests, this liberty cannot any longer be seen as an advantage or prerogative.76 While the liberty of being judge in your own case (ipse judex) was undeniable, to insist obstinately on state sovereignty would eventually undermine the state’s true interest. According to the Abb´e, commerce would be very limited, ‘if nobody can trust promises ( . . . ), it is also certain that in order to maintain commerce sufficient security is needed to safeguard the execution of promises’.77 If every 74 75

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Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 354. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet de Trait´e pour rendre la paix perp´etuelle entre les Souverains chr´etiens, p. 109: ‘Je conviens que cette libert´e qu’a un Souverain de tenir ou de ne pas tenir ses promesses a` ses voisins, selon qu’il le juge, ou juste ou conforme a` ses interˆest; seroit un grand avantage pour lui’. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet de Trait´e, p. 109f.: ‘si tous ses voisins n’avoient pas pareille libert´e de se tenir dispensez de lui tenir parole, selon qu’ils le jugent ou juste ou conforme a` leurs interˆest; mais comme ils ont tous pareille libert´e a` son e´gard, ce n’est plus un avantage pour lui, ce n’est plus une pr´erogative’. Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet de Trait´e, p. 110: ‘s’ils ne pouvoient pas se fier aux promessess les uns des autres ( . . . ) il est certain aussi qu’il faut pour entretenir ce Commerce, qu’il y ait sˆuret´e suffisante de l’execution des promesses’.

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contracting party has the liberty to decide whether to execute or whether not to execute the promises according to its own fancy or judgement, there would be ‘consequently insufficient security, no reciprocal trust, and soon no commerce’.78 A crucial question was thus whether it was possible to make a convincing argument that the interest of a sovereign state was best served by agreeing to abrogate a measure of sovereignty in favour of international institutions, so as to provide structures that would overcome mistrust and antagonism. The Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s argument was directed not least against those positions that relied on reason of state and balance of power doctrine for their political and economic thinking. One earlier but still influential proponent of this school of thought had been Cardinal Richelieu who, like few others of his day, had perceived the utility of commerce purely in view of political power.79 This becomes manifest in his assessment of Dutch commerce. The Dutch, ‘who are properly speaking just a handful of people in a corner of the earth where there is only water and meadows’ have just shown the stunning effects of commerce. ‘Although this nation only produces butter and cheese, she is providing almost all European nations with the greatest part of what they need’.80 Richelieu cannot entirely hide his envy of the Dutch commercial success: ‘Navigation has made them famous and powerful in all parts of the world’. The Dutch Republic is the uncontested ‘maitresse du Commerce’.81 For Richelieu, commerce and trade are instrumental for achieving and maintaining political power. His argument is political not economic, and his message is straightforward: it is in the best-understood state interest in competition with other states to provide favourable conditions for national trade.82 In his Essay on the 78 79

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Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, Projet de Trait´e, p. 110: ‘par consequent nulle sˆuret´e suffisante, nulle confiance r´eciproque, & bientˆot nul Commerce’. See Thuau, Raison d’Etat et pens´ee politique, p. 411f. and S. Externbrink, “Kardinal Richelieu – ein Sch¨uler Machiavellis?” in Der Machtstaat. Niccol`o Machiavelli als Theoretiker der Macht im Spiegel der Zeit, ed. by V. Reinhardt, S. Saracino and R. Voigt (Baden-Baden 2015), p. 137–153. D’Avenant, An Essay, p. 376 observed ‘that Richelieu ( . . . ) was undoubtedly one of the greatest men that ever undertook the guidance of a state, and ( . . . ) had very near all the good qualities necessary for one to whom the reins of empire are committed’. Richelieu, Testament Politique, p. 360: ‘qui a` proprement parler ne sont qu’une poign´ee de gens reduits a` un coin de la terre o`u il n’y a que des eaux & des prairies ( . . . ). Bien que cette Nation ne retire de son pays que du beurre & du fromage, elle fournit presque a` toutes les Nations de l’Europe la plus grande partie de ce qui leur est necessaire’. Richelieu, Testament Politique, p. 360: ‘La navigation l’a rendue si c´el`ebre & si puissante par toutes les parties du monde’. See also J. Viner, “Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries” in Revisions in Mercantilism, ed. by D. C. Coleman (London 1969), p. 61– 91.

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balance of trade, D’Avenant endorsed Richelieu’s view.83 Like Richelieu, he saw trade as one of the areas in which the competition between states was fought out. A state’s power depended on success or failure in trade.84 However, as contemporaries were quick to criticise, neither Richelieu nor Mazarin was able to see the advantages of trading companies despite the experience of the Dutch and the English.85 Richelieu’s perception of competitive commerce in the service of state power leads away from the specific sphere of economics, advancing a purely political agenda in which the state was not enabling conditions of trust, but undermining them. A more sophisticated analysis of the relationship of economics and politics was offered by Malynes. He observed that in principle ‘the valuation or alteration of money concerneth only the sovereignty and dignity of the Prince or governour of every country’.86 But princes depend on the banks and the men running them87 , and banks had gained an undue influence over the financial sector: ‘if we do but consider what the readie monie and wealth of London would come unto, if it were gathered in some one man’s hands, much more if a great deale of riches of other countries were added thereunto, as these Bankers can cunningly compasse by the course of the exchange for monies: the ebbing and flowing whereof, is caused by their motion from time to time’.88 But princes did not exactly know how this financial trade worked.89 They were, therefore, not only relying on the financial services provided by banks, but they were also dependent on the insider knowledge of the bankers. A lively discussion ensued as to whether or not bankers could be trusted. One of the staunchest advocates of the English exchange and banking system was the London-based merchant and one of the directors of the East India Company, Thomas Mun (1571–1641). He took Malynes head on: ‘Malynes setteth down the admirable feats (as he termeth them) which 83

84 85 86

87

88 89

D’Avenant, An Essay, p. 260. The importance D’Avenant attributes to Richelieu, whom he quotes more than almost anybody else throughout his Essay, is also stressed by the fact that he concludes it with a long quotation from Richelieu’s Testament Politique. D’Avenant, An Essay, p. 227: ‘all countries thrive or decline by trade’. Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce, p. 76f. G. Malynes, A Treatise of the Canker of England’s Commonwealth (London 1601), p. 14. See also J. G. Harris, “‘The Canker of England’s Commonwealth’: Gerard de Malynes and the Origins of Economic Pathology” in Textual Practice 13 (1999), p. 311–327. Malynes, A Treatise of the Canker, p. 20: ‘A Banke is properly a collection of all the readie monies of some Province, Citie, or commonwealth, into the hands of some persons licenced and established thereunto by publike authoritie of some Prince’. Malynes repeats this passage verbatim in Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 131. See also Malynes, A Treatise of the Canker, p. 26f. Malynes, A Treatise of the Canker, p. 24. Malynes repeats this passage verbatim in Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 132. Malynes, A Treatise of the Canker, p. 64: ‘the cunning course of the exchange [is] unknown’.

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are to be done by Bankers and Exchangers, with the use and power of Exchange: but how these wonders may be effected he altogether omitteth, leaving the Reader in a strange opinion of these dark mysteries, which I cannot think he did for want of knowledge’.90 Mun accused Malynes of having ‘disguised his own knowledge with Sophistry to further his private end by hurting the public good’.91 Malynes’s charge against those who were running the exchange and banking system – of using information to the advantage of their private ends to the detriment of the public – was thus turned by Mun against Malynes. Malynes ‘hath misinformed many, and put us to trouble to expound these Riddles’.92 The opacity of the banking system introduced a level of insecurity. As the dispute between Malynes and Mun shows, the intricacies of the exchange market introduced anxiety into society, making it difficult to trust in the proceedings and dynamics of an ill-understood market. Most authors on economics believed that ‘bankers were necessary for commerce’.93 Appeals that those in charge of the banking system ‘should be men of honor and without reproach’94 rather show that one had to live with the lack of transparency and the insider knowledge of a few bankers, who might use it to their own advantage to the detriment of society at large. Indeed, Malynes went as far as to conclude that ‘the use of Banks are not to bee suffered in any well-ordered Common-wealth’.95 John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon in their collection of letters, which appeared under the pseudonym of Cato in the London Journal from November 1720, made a similar polemic point. Their concern was that politics was increasingly dominated by a few powerful but untrustworthy merchants who manipulated commerce. But their analysis goes right to the heart of the question concerning the lack of transparency and the dependence this lack creates. According to the authors, these merchants took advantage of their own insider knowledge to accrue disproportionate personal profit at the cost of the majority of people who believed in the 90

91 92 93 94 95

Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, p. 164. On the different and competing arguments of Mun and Malynes see J. D. Gould, “The Trade Crisis of the Early 1620’s and English Economic Thought” in The Journal of Economic History 15 (1955), p. 121–133. Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, p. 164. Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, p. 176. Savary, Le Parfait Negociant, p. 370: ‘Les Agens de banque estant si necessaries au commerce’. Savary, Le Parfait Negociant, p. 370: ‘soient des gens d’honneur, sans reproche’. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, p. 409. Johnson argued that ‘Malynes was ( . . . ) a wellmeaning patriot who was thoroughly disgusted with the financial world in which he lived. His inability to comprehend the function of speculation deserves more sympathy than has been accorded to him. The world moved too rapidly for Gerard de Malynes, but it ought not to be forgotten that when economic changes are rapid, abuses may develop and be obscured by the very celerity of transition’. Johnson, “Gerard de Malynes and the Theory of the Foreign Exchanges”, p. 454.

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free movement of the market. Those who were not part of this kind of inner circle were excluded and deceived by secrecy and ‘a sort of cabalistical learning’.96 However, Cato warned, the behaviour of these oligopolies not only undermines the free trade of a commercial society, but also threatens political independence: ‘there will be a secret and vulgar knowledge; one to be trusted only to the trusty adepts and managers; ( . . . ) pretty advantages will be made by being in the secret. As for example: Just before any publick misfortune is to make its appearance, those who know of it may sell out; and in the height of the danger buy again; and when it is over, by taking another opportunity, they may sell a second time. And when these evils are averted they may go to market once more, and so, toties quoties, till the greatest part of the property of the kingdom be got into the hands of but a few persons, who will then undoubtedly govern all the rest’.97 This kind of criticism was increasingly articulated. As early as March 1694, stock-jobbing was criticised in the English Parliament, and various attempts were made to regulate the activities of brokers.98 Charles D’Avenant had been among those who were extremely wary of the negative influence of commercial activities. For him, trade was nothing less than a fundamental assault on the moral values of society: ‘Trade, without doubt, is in its nature a pernicious thing; it brings in that wealth which introduces luxury; it gives rise to fraud and avarice, and extinguishes virtue and simplicity of manners; it depraves a people, and makes way for ( . . . ) corruption’.99 As we saw in relation to Richelieu, D’Avenant realised the importance of trade for maintaining a position of state power. Following Lycurgus’s example of banning trade altogether was, therefore, not an option and D’Avenant conceded that trade had ‘become with us a necessary evil’.100 The damaging impact of trade included instigating fraudulent behaviour and thus undermining trust. With the South Sea crisis in the spring of 1720, or the bursting of the South Sea Bubble as it soon became known among contemporaries, the situation in England worsened. The uneasy and embarrassing connection 96 98

99

97 Trenchard and Gordon, Cato’s Letters, p. 758. Trenchard and Gordon, Cato’s Letters, p. 758. Under 24 November 1696 it was reported in the Journals of the House of Commons: ‘The pernicious Art of Stock-jobbing hath, of late, so wholly perverted the End and Design of Companies and Corporations, erected for introducing, or carrying on, of Manufactures, to the private Profit of the first Projector, that the Privileges granted to them have, commonly, been made no other Use of, by the First Procurers and Subscribers, But sell again, with Advantage, to ignorant Men, drawn in by the Reputation, falsely raised, and artfully spread, concerning the thriving State of their Stock’. The Journals of the House of Commons vol. 11 (1803), p. 595. Cato’s Letters speak of the ‘abuses occasioned by the vile trade of stock-jobbing’. Trenchard and Gordon, Cato’s Letters, p. 759. 100 D’Avenant, An Essay, p. 275. D’Avenant, An Essay, p. 275.

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between the South Sea directors and members of the government, who attempted to manipulate the price of the South Sea stocks, was all too apparent. In the second of Cato’s Letters, entitled ‘The fatal effects of the South-Sea Scheme, and the Necessity for punishing the Directors’101 , Gordon and Trenchard found extremely aggressive words: ‘The resurrection of honesty and industry can never be hoped for, while this sort of vermin [the stock-jobbers] is suffered to crawl about, tainting our air, and putting every thing out of course; subsisting by lies, and practising vile tricks, low in their nature, and mischievous in their consequences’.102 Cato’s Letters criticised the emerging international political economy and the challenges of an increasingly market-based society. Politics seemed dependent on complex and ill-understood events on the stock market: ‘Artful and conspiring men shall buy up desperate debts, and then use intrigues and corruption to load their country with them’.103 This made for an uncomfortable connection between influential businessmen and politicians.104 The lack of transparency and the feeling of being at the mercy of a few stock-jobbers, who were unaccountable to the state and society as a whole, raised the issue of trust and mistrust. Trust was called to mind to criticise how this dynamic of modern politics and economics corrupted society: ‘It enriches the worst men, and ruins the innocent: It taints men’s morals, and defaces all the principles of virtue and fair dealing, and introduces combination and fraud in all sorts of traffick. It has changed honest commerce into bubbling; our traders into projectors; industry into tricking’.105 In the context of this polemic, Bernard Mandeville’s (1670–1733) writings appear even more provocative, challenging not only those who were keen to defend the existing moral convictions, but also those who felt increasingly ill at ease with the emerging commercial society.106 In the preface to his 101 103 104

105

106

102 Trenchard and Gordon, Cato’s Letters, p. 42. Trenchard and Gordon, Cato’s Letters, p. 40. Trenchard and Gordon, Cato’s Letters, p. 759. D’Avenant claimed that ‘governments are not to be long preserved’ unless the political class of the members of Parliament, who ‘represent their country do hold a strong hand over the men of business, calling those to an account, who either through folly, or upon some wicked design, pursue destructive measures’. D’Avenant, An Essay, p. 377. Trenchard and Gordon, Cato’s Letters, p. 760. D’Avenant equally complained that ‘very many betray their trusts ( . . . ) and let fundamentals be invaded, flattering themselves, that when they are grown as great as they desire to be, it will be then time enough to make a stand and redeem the commonwealth’. D’Avenant, An Essay, p. 302. Mandeville, who should not be mistaken for having developed new economic principles, put forward one of the most influential and challenging views of human self-interest in the emerging market society. F. A. Hayek, “Dr. Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733)” in The Trend of Economic Thinking. Essays on Political Economists and Economic History (Indianapolis 1991), p. 80: ‘what Mandeville has to say on technical economics seems to me to be rather mediocre, at least unoriginal’. See also E. J. Hundert, The Enlightenment Fable. Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society (Cambridge

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Fable of the Bees, he famously claimed that man’s ‘vilest and most hateful Qualities are the most necessary Accomplishments to fit him for the largest ( . . . ) and most flourishing Societies’.107 Mandeville saw the commercial society of his day as driven by a dynamic that left moral considerations out of the equation: ‘All Trades and Places knew some Cheat; No Calling was without Deceit’.108 Mandeville was provocative in claiming that all human society was ultimately founded on self-love and self-interest, which would overrule honesty and the keeping of promises.109 And self-interest was the driving force of the market. This analysis led Mandeville to subscribe to the prevailing conservative assumptions regarding foreign affairs. He advocated conducting foreign policy according to the wisdom of reason of state, albeit emphasising the economic dimension of foreign relations.110 These dynamics of the market, driven by profit and self-interest, led to European expansion and conflict. In the international sphere trust once more risked being sidelined if no regulatory or institutional framework could be found. Simply emphasising the need for trust, in the manner of Malynes or Cato’s Letters, would be insufficient to successfully overcome the obstacles. The only valid alternative was put forward by Cruc´e, Penn or the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, who argued for establishing such an international institutional framework on political and economic grounds, as it would also provide the necessary conditions for trust to operate in the dealings of international trade and politics. According to Muldrew the market was not understood by ‘contemporaries ( . . . ) through the use of a language which stressed self-interest, but rather one which stressed credit relations, trust, obligation and

107 108 109

110

1994), p. 186 and M. M. Goldsmith, Private Vices, Public Benefits. Bernard Mandeville’s Social and Political Thought (Cambridge 1985), p. 124. B. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, ed. by F. B. Kaye (Oxford 1924), (Remark L), p. 4. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 20. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 346: ‘I have spoke of our Love of Company and Aversion to Solitude, examin’d thoroughly the various Motives of them, and made it appear that they all center in Self-Love. I intend now to investigate into the nature of Society, and diving into the very rise of it, make it evident, that not the Good and Amiable, but the Bad and Hateful Qualities of Man, his Imperfections and the want of Excellencies which other Creatures are endued with, are the first causes that made Man sociable beyond other Animals the Moment after he lost Paradise; and that if he had remain’d in his primitive Innocence, and continued to enjoy the Blessings that attended it, there is no Shadow of Probability that he ever would have become that sociable Creature he is now’. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees (Remark L), p. 116f.: ‘Foreign Affairs must be ( . . . ) prudently manag’d, and the Ministry of every Nation ought to have a good Intelligence Abroad, and be well acquainted with the Publick Transactions of all those Countries, that either by their Neighbourhood, Strength or Interest, may be hurtful or beneficial to them, to take the necessary Measures accordingly, of crossing some and assisting others, as Policy and the Balance of Power direct’.

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contracts’.111 It might come as a surprise, but I find Muldrew exaggerates the significance of trust. Discussion of trust played an important role in seventeenth-century discourse, specifically in the debates about trade and economics. However, the contemporary discussion questioned the role trust could play within political and commercial society. Temple, for instance, saw one essential reason for the success of the Dutch in the structures their state provided to safeguard trust: ‘Trade cannot live without mutual trust among private Men; so it cannot grow or thrive, to any great degree, without a Confidence both of publick and private Safety, and consequently a Trust in the Government, from an Opinion of its Strength, Wisdom, and Justice; which must be grounded either upon the Personal Virtues and Qualities of a Prince, or else upon the Constitutions and Orders of a State’.112 Trust was not the dominating concept shaping the political and economic debate in the seventeenth century. Rather it was articulated as a problem and placed within alternative concepts of which interest was certainly one.113 But as Temple was keen to demonstrate, true interest and trust might not have to be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the interest of trade demanded conditions conducive to trust.114 111

112 113

114

Muldrew, “Interpreting the Market”, p. 163. See the criticism of the importance of trust within the economic discourse by T. W. Guinnane, “Trust: A Concept too Many” in Jahrbuch f¨ur Wirtschaftsgeschichte/Economic History Yearbook (Berlin 2005), p. 77–92. Temple, Observations upon the United Provinces, p. 214. In this respect, it is quite telling that Muldrew not even once mentioned Mandeville, who has to be seen as the proponent of self-interest of his time. This is true for Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation and Muldrew, “Interpreting the Market”. Given Muldrew’s focus on Smith, whom he singles out for being responsible for the emphasis on interest, it is revealing that according to Smith Mandeville had claimed that ‘man ( . . . ) is naturally much more interested in his own happiness than in that of others, and it is impossible that in his heart he can ever really prefer their prosperity to his own. ( . . . ) All public spirit, therefore, all preference of public to private interest, is, according to him [Mandeville] a mere cheat and imposition upon mankind’. A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Oxford 1976), p. 308f. See also ibid., p. 312: ‘It is the great fallacy of Dr. Mandeville’s book [The Fable of the Bees] to represent every passion as wholly vicious’. See the discussion of interest in Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, p. 38. Pufendorf made a similar argument regarding interest and trust, see Chapter 3.3.

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Conclusion The Thing Which Was Not

The problem of trust was forcefully reformulated in early modern political thought by Machiavelli. By asking ‘Quomodo fides a principibus sit servanda’ (‘How may trust be preserved among princes’), the Latin heading of Chapter XVIII of the Principe calls into question that trust should be maintained under all circumstances.1 Even a cautious and sceptical Hobbes answered this challenge in the affirmative: ‘Fidem observandam esse’ (trust must be maintained).2 For him justice and trust were not only rhetorical concepts, but the fundamental principles that civil society had to protect. Only ‘from defect of Reasoning ( . . . ) unjust Actions have been Authorised, by the force, and victories of those who have committed them’.3 This ‘anti-Machiavellian’ stance4 leads Hobbes to refute those who believe that violation of the laws of nature is not unjust because ‘the Practice of all Nations cannot be unjust’.5 For Hobbes this was the problem. Short-sighted interest alone could not be made the sole principle which determined the actions of states. Interstate relations remain precarious, but he was not prepared to give up on the idea that there are regulatory mechanisms – in the form of natural law (pacta sunt servanda) – available to guide the conduct of sovereigns. Hobbes understood these as second best options, vulnerable to abuse and lacking the authority of enforceability, 1 2

3 4

5

Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 61 [translation altered]. T. Hobbes, De Cive, ed. by H. Warrender (Oxford 1983), p. 108. Montaigne also felt the need to answer Machiavelli. M. de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, ed. and translated by M. A. Screech (London 1991), p. 891: ‘Is there anyone for whom treachery should not be loathsome’. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 204. Cf. N. Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. by B. Crick (London 2003), III-41, p. 515: ‘when the safety of one’s country wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention should be paid either to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or ignominious’. See also Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 204. In this passage Hobbes also argued against the contingency of fortune, which cannot make unjust conduct just nor vicious conduct virtuous, only because success or failure determine whether we see it in a positive or negative light. Thus he takes on some of the major concepts (fortuna and virt`u) employed by Machiavelli. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 204.

219

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but he advanced them nevertheless, as still being better than submitting to war of all against all. Yet there was no way round the problem. Trustworthy conduct in itself could not guarantee protection against abuse, because ‘we cannot tell the good and the bad apart’, the good ‘would still be saddled with the constant need to watch, distrust, anticipate and get the better of others, and to protect themselves by all possible means’.6 Recognising this fundamental dilemma, John Dunn declares ‘the central issue in political philosophy (properly so called) to be that of how to conceive the rationality of trust in relation to the causal field of politics’.7 We have observed an enduring debate about trust between sovereign states in early modern political thought. Is it possible to discern an evolution of the argument? This study has scrutinised the concept of trust across different and sometimes antagonistic genres of international political thought. The natural law tradition and reason of state tradition worked on different assumptions, but they mutually influenced each other. In a volatile time of confessional divide, interstate trust remained elusive. Different concepts developed within these traditions of political thought, such as interest or sovereignty, influenced the discussion of trust-building. The seventeenthcentury programmatic theorising about trust shows that there was not just one coherent argument, but that in different conceptual contexts the meaning and importance accorded to trust varied. There was thus not one straightforward evolution of the argument, but a range of conflicting arguments that used trust differently. A progressive advance towards increasing trustworthiness in seventeenth-century interstate relations cannot be discerned; all that emerges is an ongoing discussion of trust and mistrust.8 This conceptual ambivalence towards trust indicates that trust did not dominate the political discourse, but was used according to different interests and structures.9 The arguments regarding trust and mistrust 6 8

9

7 Dunn, “Trust in the Politics of John Locke”, p. 34. Hobbes, On the Citizen, p. 11. In 1726 Jonathan Swift told his readers that the Houyhnhnms had no conceptualisation of lying. J. Swift, Gulliver’s Travels (London 1985), p. 286: ‘I remember in frequent discourses with my master concerning the nature of manhood, in other parts of the world, having occasion to talk of lying, and false representation, it was with much difficulty that he comprehended what I meant, although he had otherwise a most acute judgement. For he argued thus; That the use of speech was to make us understand one another, and to receive information of facts; now if any one said the thing which was not, these ends were defeated’. Trust was not a problem in this society. But the human condition is very different and trust always precarious. How far lying and the keeping or breaking of promises can be mapped directly onto the issue of trust and distrust is a question which was not explicitly pursued here. On the relationship between lying and trust, see B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (Princeton 2002), p. 94 and Jay, The Virtues of Mendacity, p. 26–31. See, Hartmann, “On the Concept of Basic Trust”, p. 5, who analyses the ‘fuzzy notion of trust’.

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help us to organise and better understand the different approaches to interstate relations, but the concept of trust itself was not foundational for international political thought. Balance-of-power thinking regarded trust as purely strategic, whereas the proponents of designs for peace proposed institutional solutions to make trust among states possible. They perceived trust as an essential aim. To achieve it, the existing anarchical situation between states had to be changed fundamentally by introducing federative structures. Implementing the necessary requirements for trust would mean establishing the conditions for peace between states. Advancing a juridical argument which aimed to overcome confessional division, Gentili took up Machiavelli’s question and – using Bodin’s theory of sovereignty – based his proposed programme on the early modern sovereign state. He demonstrated the common ground of the European states, which even in war should recognise each other as legally equal entities, a political theory of war and interstate relations that marked a shift in international law from a universalist Christian (Catholic) system to an increasingly multi-polar interstate relationship. At the same time, Gentili excluded those who were not part of occidental Christianity, on the grounds that only European states possessed a framework in which trust could be advanced. While this framework remained precarious, Gentili viewed pacification of a divided Europe as impossible without trust. His intention can thus be read as a limited but definite contribution to trust-building within the emerging European state system. Gentili was influenced by Spanish Catholic natural thinkers such as Vitoria, and politiques such as Ribadeneira. It would, therefore, be wrong to perceive international political thought as having been dominated by Protestant thinkers. Indeed, Gentili was concerned with the extent to which trust and good faith were distorted by Protestant and Catholic thinkers alike to advance their particular confessional cause. A European interstate order could only be established once sovereign states were able to trust each other at a minimum level. Alongside this development, programmes for designing a federative structure gained traction. Sully wrote within the reason of state tradition, advancing arguments similar to those of B´ethune and Rohan, indeed also of Bodin and Machiavelli. His Grand Design appealed to trust, not with the aim of enhancing a plan for European peace but rather to advance French interests in the European concert of powers. Sully recognised trust as a political asset and endeavoured accordingly to counter suspicions and to construct alliances where possible. His rhetoric sought to win others over to the French cause, but without a substantial commitment to trust-building.

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Trust was deployed as one of the several registers politicians needed to master when conducting their business. In contrast to Sully, Cruc´e proposed addressing the problems posed by the refusal of sovereign states to accept a superior power or arbiter, a refusal that resulted in anarchical interstate relations. He envisaged an international assembly that would amend the structural deficiencies of such relations and provide the conditions for trust among states. Such an assembly would constitute an institutional structure to arbitrate interstate conflicts, eliminating the need to go to war. A further consequence of this stability would be enhanced prosperity and increased trade. Fear of the breach of treaties and uncertainty about how far to trust other states would fade. Cruc´e’s plan for a European ‘federation’ rested on a key assumption: only if the exclusivity of absolute state sovereignty was challenged would a reliable and enforceable interstate framework be possible. When Grotius took up the natural law tradition and explored it further, he was still heavily influenced by the Spanish Scholastics. Grotius’s programme was ambitious. He aimed for a universal solution and suggested universally valid norms. The contrast between Grotius and Hobbes is quite striking. Whereas Grotius believed that natural law provided a normative framework to regulate interstate relations, Hobbes was more sceptical. But both men perceived trust as essential for pacifying interstate relations. They differed in their assessment as to whether natural law could be imposed as the guiding principle for the conduct of interstate relations. This difference is also reflected in their fundamentally different understanding of punishment in interstate relations. Pufendorf, like Hobbes, realised that an ill-conceived notion of interest entailed subversive dangers for regulating interstate relations, and thus redefined the concept of interest. His analysis of key concepts offered a more sophisticated set of analytical tools. The German constitution and the Peace of Westphalia provided concrete historical examples of a system of states, in which sovereignty was maintained. While building on Bodin and Hobbes, Pufendorf recognised that the strict notion of absolute sovereignty was not applicable to interstate relations. His preference was a system-based concept of sovereignty which would allow states to enter into agreements without relinquishing their sovereignty entirely. A ‘system results when several neighbouring states are so connected by perpetual alliance that they renounce the intention of exercising some portions of their sovereign power, above all those which concern external defence, except with the consent of all, but apart from this the liberty and independence of the individual

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states remain intact’.10 For such a system to function, sovereign states must not insist categorically on preserving their sovereignty in all cases. The very innovation of a system entailed a more flexible understanding of sovereignty. Furthermore, certain rules had to be observed, as provided by natural law. The claim to independent sovereignty confronted the same claim by other states, such that the legal equality of all members of the system had to be confirmed. Pufendorf theorised interstate relations employing the post-Westphalian concept of system, which allowed him to reconcile natural law and reason of state (interest).11 The various conflicts that followed the Peace of Westphalia eroded the existing framework of trust and mechanisms for trust-building. In particular, the violent seizure of the imperial city of Strasbourg by French troops in 1681 and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 provoked considerable concern among Protestant princes and political thinkers alike. Was trust possible in such circumstances? Leibniz’s attack on the Sun King as untrustworthy was an instance of trust employed in the genre of moral philosophy, political advice and polemical attack. It was not an isolated case. Trust was an underlying concept in political pamphlets and theories of the time. William Penn’s Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe from 1693 and Andrew Fletcher’s Discourse concerning the Affairs of Spain from 1698 show how debates in England and Scotland were closely related to the situation in continental Europe. The programme advanced by Penn foreshadowed the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre’s Projet pour rendre la Paix perpetuelle en Europe. Pre-dating the Peace of Utrecht of 1714, the Abb´e’s Projet represented a thorough analysis of the interstate system. The concept of trust was an original aspect of his thought, but remained too weak by itself to organise interstate relations. Trust needed to be reinforced by legitimate power. According to the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, this would entail a delegation of sovereignty to the international level in the form of a republican federation of sovereign states. We identified a parallel development during the seventeenth century regarding the discussion of trust within the economic sphere, which in turn 10 11

Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, (II-8–15), p. 145. At the same time he realised that just war and punishment, concepts which seemed at first apt to regulate interstate relations, were exacerbating interstate conflict. To a certain extent this was already present in Gentili and his criticism of Vitoria and the Spanish Scholastics, though it was only fully drawn to the fore by Hobbes and Pufendorf in reaction to the doctrine of Grotius, who had ‘vastly expanded the operation of “punishment”’ from what he had found in Vitoria. Panizza, “Political Theory and Jurisprudence”, p. 234.

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influenced the discourse of trust concerning interstate relations. Conditions for trust in the international sphere of trade and commerce remained volatile because there was no easy recourse to law enforcement. Very similar structural difficulties – which we discussed regarding natural law – also arose regarding commercial agreements. In view of these deficiencies, custom was used to advocate some kind of regulatory force of the early modern lex mercatoria. Many more pages of political pamphlets, as well as philosophical and juridical treaties on the subject of interstate trust, would still be written, but the essential territory had by then been well charted by these seventeenthcentury thinkers. In the eighteenth century, Emer de Vattel’s Drois des Gens from 1758 returned to the importance of the balance of power, but by then he was also employing Pufendorf’s idea of a state system: ‘Europe forms a political system, ( . . . ) closely connected by the interests of the nations inhabiting this part of the world. ( . . . ) The continual attention of sovereigns to every occurrence, the constant residence of ministers, and the perpetual negotiations, make of modern Europe a kind of republic, of which the members – each independent, but all linked together by the ties of common interest – unite for the maintenance of order and liberty. Hence arose that famous scheme of the political balance, or the equilibrium of power; by which is understood such a disposition of things, as that no one potentate be able absolutely to predominate, and prescribe laws to others’.12 Written during the Seven Years War, Vattel’s positive view of the balance of power favoured England’s role within the European state system as the holder of the balance. This was sharply criticised by the Prussian natural law thinker and cameralist, Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi. Published in the same year as Vattel’s Droit des Gens, Justi’s The Chimera of the European Balance of Power is a forceful polemic against balance-of-power thinking, which he regards as a mere pretext for forming belligerent alliances.13 The 12

13

Vattel, The Law of Nations, p. 496. Vattel went on to criticise Sully’s plan to achieve an equilibrium by striving to make European powers equal as unrealistic. Instead he recommended alliances and confederacies to check the natural rivalry of France and the Habsburgs. ‘England ( . . . ) has the glory of holding the political balance’. Ibid., p. 497. David Hume, to mention just one other eighteenth-century political thinker, also argued in favour of the balance of power to organise relations between European states. D. Hume, “Of the Balance of Power” in Political Essays, ed. by K. Haakonssen (Cambridge 1994), p. 157. Justi, Die Chim¨are des Gleichgewichts von Europa, p. 12. Justi attacks the work by another German scholar, Ludwig Martin Kahle, who was vice provost of the University of G¨ottingen from 1749–1750 and who was at the time advocating British interests. Kahle wrote in defence of the balance of power

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225

Abb´e de Mably, too, viewed balance-of-power politics in a negative light. He argued that William of Orange’s antagonism towards Louis XIV led him to propagate an alliance against France, which gave ‘birth to the system of a balance of power’.14 The balance of power is discredited here as little more than a cunning propaganda enterprise with the aim ‘of ruining the French’.15 But most eighteenth-century political thinkers continued to rely on the precarious concept of the balance of power, albeit as an unstable mode of conducting policies.16 The discussion of the balanceof-power politics in the eighteenth century demands further analysis, but the tensions inherent in the balance of power had already been succinctly diagnosed by the Abb´e de Saint-Pierre, who argued that this concept would increase rather than overcome suspicion among states. Within seventeenth-century political thought there was not one consistent narrative of trust, but a complex, multi-layered, occasionally improvised and even contradictory understanding and use of the concept. In a range of different programmatic approaches, seventeenth-century political thinkers addressed the question of how to overcome the inherently antagonistic relations between sovereign states. The different programmes pursued different strategies, but they were all aimed at providing a framework for peace within Europe. In different, even contradictory ways, trust was one of the key concepts used in addressing the conflictual situation

14 15 16

and his La balance de l’Europe consider´ee comme la regle de la paix et de la guerre (Berlin, G¨ottingen 1744) clearly provided propaganda material to support George II’s pro-Hanoverian policies. On German writings in support of British interests and in particular the importance of the university of G¨ottingen, see T. Biskup, “A University for Empire? The University of G¨ottingen and the Personal Union, 1737–1837” in The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714–1837, ed. by B. Simms and T. Riotte (Cambridge 2007), p. 128–160. Abb´e de Mably, Le Droit public de l’Europe. Fond´e sur les Traitez conclus jusqu’en l’ann´ee 1740 vol. I (Amsterdam 1748), p. 183: ‘naissance au sistˆeme de l’´equilibre’. Abb´e de Mably, Le Droit public de l’Europe, p. 183: ‘`a ruiner les Franc¸ois’. Notable exceptions are Rousseau, Kant and Bentham. Cf. Asbach, Die Z¨ahmung der Leviathane, D. Armitage, “Globalising Jeremy Bentham” in Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge 2013), p. 172–187, O. Asbach, “Internationaler Naturzustand und Ewiger Friede. Die Begr¨undung einer rechtlichen Ordnung zwischen Staaten bei Rousseau und Kant” in D. H¨uning and B. Tuschling (eds.), Recht, Staat und V¨olkerrecht bei Immanuel Kant (Berlin 1998), p. 203– 232, O. H¨offe, “Kant als Theoretiker der internationalen Rechtsgemeinschaft” in D. H¨uning and B. Tuschling (eds.), Recht, Staat und V¨olkerrecht bei Immanuel Kant (Berlin 1998), p. 233–246 and Schr¨oder, “‘Irgend ein Vertrauen . . . muss . . . u¨ brig bleiben’ – The Idea of Trust in Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy”. In contrast, Hegel was very sceptical about the idea of ‘a federation of states which would settle all disputes’ between states. For Hegel, as for many other political thinkers, such an agreement ‘would always be dependent on particular sovereign wills, and would therefore continue to be tainted with contingency’. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, p. 368.

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within Europe. Despite the ongoing search for trust between states, we are today still faced with the same structural problems as in the seventeenthcentury European system.17 17

R. Aron, Peace & War. A Theory of International Relations (New Brunswick 2003), p. 161: ‘peace by consent presupposes that confidence is general; it therefore requires a revolution in the procedure of international relations, a revolution which would bring to an end the era of suspicion and inaugurate that of security. But this revolution, unless there is a conversion of souls, must affect institutions. In other words, universal peace by universal consent and mutual confidence does not seem to me effectively possible if the political units do not find a substitute for security by force’. On the relationship of trust and security, see also R. Ammicht Quinn, “Trust Generating Security Generating Trust: An Ethical Perspective on a Secularized Discourse” in Behemoth. A Journal on Civilisation 8 (2015), p. 109–125.

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