Troubled Pasts in Europe: Strategies and Recommendations for Overcoming Challenging Historic Legacies 9781529233643

Table of contents :
Front Cover
Troubled Pasts in Europe: Strategies and Recommendations for Overcoming Challenging Historic Legacies
Copyright information
Table of Contents
List of Figures and Table
List of Abbreviations
About the Authors
Acknowledgements
1 Introduction
Theoretical background
Conceptual approach – memory and conflict: the past in the present
Multidisciplinarity
Troubled pasts in official and oral history
Troubled pasts in journalistic and citizen- led media
Troubled pasts in political discourses, attitudes and policies
Troubled pasts in arts and culture
A multi- level design for cross- country comparative analysis
Brief description of troubled pasts in country cases
Zeroing in on policy recommendations
2 Methodology: From Research Results to Recommendations
Drafting the first version of the policy recommendations
Identifying and engaging relevant interlocutors
Merging the perspectives of policy makers, stakeholders (and some others) with the research findings
PART I Non-EU Member States
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Coexistence to Unresolvable Past?
Introduction
Methodological approach to writing the recommendations for Bosnia and Herzegovina
Background: the European Union’s changing approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s troubled past
First phase: the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–5)
Second phase: the European Union’s enhanced role in the post-war period (1995–2008)
Third phase: from the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement until today (2008–)
Policy recommendations for Bosnia and Herzegovina
History
Media
Politics
Arts and culture
Conclusion
4 Kosovo: Troubled Past and Its Path to Moving On
Introduction
Methodology and data collection
Background: the European Union’s approach to the troubled past of Kosovo
Policy recommendations for Kosovo
History
Media
Politics
Arts and culture
Conclusion
PART II EU Member States
5 Germany: The Wall is Dead, Long Live the Wall!?
Introduction
Methodological background
East Germany in the European Union and the European Union’s approach to Germany’s (post-)socialist legacy
Policy recommendations for Germany
History
Media
Politics
Arts and culture
Conclusion
6 Ireland beyond Ethnopolitics: Recommendations for All-Island Integration
Introduction
Methodology and data collection
Background: the European Union and the Troubles
Constitutional approach from 1973 to 1998
Peacebuilding approach from 1998 to 2016
European Union policies after Brexit
Policy recommendations for Ireland
History
Media
Politics
Arts and culture
Conclusion
7 Spain: How to Overcome the Polarization about the Conflicts of the Past?
Introduction
Methodology
The European Union’s approach to the troubled past in Spain
Policy recommendations for Spain
History
Media
Politics
Arts and culture
Conclusion
8 Cyprus: The EU’s Role in Europe’s Last Divided Country
Introduction
Methodology
The European Union’s approach to the troubled past in Cyprus
The European Union pre-accession period (1973–97)
The European Union accession talks period until the 2004 Annan plan referendum (1998–2004)
The post-accession period (2004–)
Policy recommendations for Cyprus
History
Media
Politics
Arts and culture
Conclusion
9 Poland: Strategies for Challenging the Growing Dominance of Right-wing Memory Politics
Introduction
Methodological approach
Background: the European Union’s approach to the troubled past in Poland
The 1990s: from the end of the Cold War until joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The period 2000–4: entering the European Union
The period 2005–15: Law and Justice Party takes over the power
The post-2015 period
Policy recommendations for Poland
History
Media
Politics
Arts and culture
Conclusion
10 The European Union
Introduction
Methodological approach to writing the recommendations for the European Union
The evolution of the European Union’s approach for addressing the troubled pasts in the ‘RePAST countries’
Reflections from the policy makers and stakeholders on the European Union’s approach to troubled pasts in the RePAST countries: analysis of interviews
Policy recommendations for the European Union
History
Media
Politics
Arts and culture
Conclusion
11 Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Chapter 10
References
Index

Citation preview

Višeslav Raos, University of Zagreb

Based on the findings of a major research project, this book investigates how European societies confront their troubled pasts today. In particular, the text explores what kinds of measures can be taken and which strategies endorsed to facilitate the process of overcoming difficult historic legacies in seven European states: Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus and Poland. The book is written by an international team of experts and examines strategies and actions in both policy making and civil society of European countries, as well as throughout the EU as a collective.

TROUB LED PASTS I N E U RO P E

“This book and the policy recommendations within represent a rare case of comparative research that includes European countries with very different historic, democratic and war-related experiences.”

RO K Z U PA N ČI Č E T A L

ISBN 978-1-5292-3362-9

9 781529 233629

B R I S TO L

@BrisUniPress BristolUniversityPress bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

@policypress

TROUBLED PASTS IN EUROPE ROK ZUPANČIČ, FARIS KOČ AN, KENNETH ANDRESEN, K ATARZYN A BOJAR SK A, RIC ARDO DACOSTA, SE AMUS FARRELL, ANKE FIEDLER, ABIT HOXH A, NIK ANDROS IOANNIDIS, NI AMH KIRK, IRENE M ARTÍN, DIMITRA L. MILIONI, DIONYSIS PANOS, M ARTA PARADÉS, TOM ASZ RAWSKI, VASILIKI TRIG A AND TJAŠ A VUČKO

TROUBLED PASTS IN EUROPE Strategies and Recommendations for Overcoming Challenging Historic Legacies Rok Zupančič, Faris Kočan, Kenneth Andresen, Katarzyna Bojarska, Ricardo Dacosta, Seamus Farrell, Anke Fiedler, Abit Hoxha, Nikandros Ioannidis, Niamh Kirk, Irene Martín, Dimitra L. Milioni, Dionysis Panos, Marta Paradés, Tomasz Rawski, Vasiliki Triga and Tjaša Vučko

First published in Great Britain in 2023 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 374 6645 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2023 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​3362-​9 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​3363-​6 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​3364-​3 ePdf The right of Rok Zupančič, Faris Kočan, Kenneth Andresen, Katarzyna Bojarska, Ricardo Dacosta, Seamus Farrell, Anke Fiedler, Abit Hoxha, Nikandros Ioannidis, Niamh Kirk, Irene Martín, Dimitra L. Milioni, Dionysis Panos, Marta Paradés, Tomasz Rawski, Vasiliki Triga and Tjaša Vučko to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the authors and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: Hayes Design and Advertising Front cover image: First battle line between the Croatian and BiH armies on the right bank of the Neretva River in Mostar, 1993. Photograph: Arne Hodalič Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of Figures and Table List of Abbreviations About the Authors Acknowledgements

iv v vii x

1 Introduction 2 Methodology: From Research Results to Recommendations

1 16

PART I Non-​EU Member States 3 Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Coexistence to Unresolvable Past? 4 Kosovo: Troubled Past and Its Path to Moving On PART II  EU Member States 5 Germany: The Wall is Dead, Long Live the Wall!? 6 Ireland beyond Ethnopolitics: Recommendations for All-​Island Integration 7 Spain: How to Overcome the Polarization about the Conflicts of the Past? 8 Cyprus: The EU’s Role in Europe’s Last Divided Country 9 Poland: Strategies for Challenging the Growing Dominance of Right-​wing Memory Politics 10 The European Union 11 Conclusion Notes References Index

23 40

57 72 95 110 126 143 164 171 176 198

iii

List of Figures and Table Figures 1.1 1.2 10.1

Conceptual basis of the project RePAST Map of case studies Preparing the EU policy recommendations

6 11 147

Table 1.1

Criteria for case study selection

iv

10

List of Abbreviations AfD ARMH BiH BIRN CEE DG COMM DG EAC DPA EACEA EC EEC EP EU FRY GDR GFA ICTY IPN IRA KLA KSC NATO NGO NI NRTN OSCE

Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory) Bosnia and Herzegovina Balkan Investigative Reporting Network Central and Eastern Europe Directorate-​General for Communication Directorate-​General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture Dayton Peace Agreement European Education and Culture Executive Agency European Community European Economic Community European Parliament European Union Federal Republic of Yugoslavia German Democratic Republic Good Friday Agreement International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Institute of National Remembrance Irish Republican Army Kosovo Liberation Army Kosovo Specialist Chambers North Atlantic Treaty Organization non-​governmental organization Northern Ireland National Radio and Television Networks Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe

v

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PiS RoC RS SAA SPO

Law and Justice Party Republic of Cyprus Republika Srpska Stabilisation and Association Agreement Specialist Prosecutor’s Office

vi

About the Authors Kenneth Andresen is Professor of Media Studies at University of Agder in Norway. He holds a PhD in Journalism and Media Studies from the University of Oslo. His current research interests are within transitional journalism, conflict history and historical postcards. Katarzyna Bojarska is Assistant Professor in the Department of Cultural Studies of the SWPS University in Warsaw, Poland. Ricardo Dacosta is Pre-​doctoral Researcher in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. He holds a master’s degree in Political Analysis from the University of Barcelona. Seamus Farrell holds a PhD from Dublin City University on the topic of ‘A Political Economy of Radical Media’. In addition to research on radical media and politics, Seamus is interested in critical perspectives on Irish development, having worked on the RePAST project. Anke Fiedler is a communication historian at the Department of Media and Communication at the Ludwig-​Maximilians-​Universität in Munich. Her research focuses on the memory of National Socialism and communism in Germany. Abit Hoxha is Assistant Professor at the Institute for Nordic and Media Studies at University of Agder in Norway. He is a PhD candidate at the Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich. His current research interests (and projects) are within the field of conflict news production, transitional journalism, media, democracy and dealing with the troubled past. Nikandros Ioannidis is a PhD student at Pompeu Fabra University. His doctoral research is related to political representation. He holds a master’s degree in Democracy and Comparative Politics from University College London. vii

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Niamh Kirk is Lecturer in Data Journalism and Social Media in the Department of Journalism, University of Limerick. Faris Kočan is Assistant Professor at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. His research is focused on the Europeanization of the Western Balkans and the role of the European integration in addressing the troubled past of post-​Yugoslav space. Irene Martín is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Her main lines of research deal with elections, political parties and political culture and legacies of the past. Dimitra L. Milioni is Associate Professor in Media Studies at Cyprus University of Technology. Her research interests lie in alternative media, communication technologies, protest, conflict and critical data/​ algorithm studies. Dionysis Panos is Assistant Professor at the Department of Communication and Internet Studies of Cyprus University of Technology. His recent research work focuses mainly on social media and web communication, misinformation and ‘memory construction’, digital archiving and algorithmic memory, and digital oral history. Marta Paradés is Adjunct Professor at Comillas Pontifical University and postdoctoral researcher at the University Carlos III of Madrid and at the Autonomous University of Madrid. Tomasz Rawski is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Warsaw. He is a political and cultural sociologist focused on researching memory politics, nationalism/​war, and state socialism in contemporary Eastern Europe and beyond. Vasiliki Triga is Associate Professor at the Department of Public Communication at Cyprus University of Technology. She holds a PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the European University Institute in Florence. She has published in various journals such as Southern European Society and Politics, Journal of Common Market Studies, Public Management and IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics. Tjaša Vučko is a PhD student in Balkan Studies at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. Her doctoral research is focused on everyday peacebuilding with special emphasis on non-​war communities. viii

About the Authors

Rok Zupančič is Associate Professor in Security Studies at University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. Currently, he leads the research project Anxious Peace, which aims at answering the question of how to reduce the ethnic distance between the people previously involved in armed conflicts by using a novel interdisciplinary approach at the nexus of peacebuilding studies, social psychology, neurobiology and body-​oriented somatic techniques.

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Acknowledgements This monograph is an output of the project RePAST –​Revisiting the Past, Anticipating the Future –​which has received funding from the European Union (EU)’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement no. 769252. The majority of data used in this book was collected and analysed within this EU-​funded project. However, in the last phase of the book writing, the data were additionally collected and analysed in the framework of the project Anxious Peace –​Anxieties in Cities of Southeast European Post-​conflict Societies: Introducing an Integrative Approach to Peacebuilding –​since some of this project’s objectives have synergies with the RePAST project. The project Anxious Peace has been led by Dr Rok Zupančič and funded by the Slovenian Research Agency (Grant N5-​0178). The authors are grateful to the EU and the evaluators who recognized the merits and the importance of both projects for both theory and practice of addressing the troubled past. The authors would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this monograph and Stephen Wenham, Zoe Forbes and Inga Boardman from Bristol University Press, who made the process from the book proposal to getting this book published a breeze. Lastly, it must be acknowledged that this book would have never been published without the kind people from various conflict-​affected European countries who shared their life stories with the researchers in the form of interviews and focus groups and provided other kinds of data and inputs for this book. We devote this book to the people living in countries affected by troubled pasts.

x

1

Introduction The European integration project, and along with it the survival of the European Union (EU), is currently challenged by deep-​rooted, revived or emerging sources of conflict and signs of disintegration such as the European financial crisis, the refugee and migration crisis, and a political crisis, the rise of populism, radicalization and reactionary politics. Simultaneously, age-​old antagonisms between and within European nations are being galvanized and openly nurture explicit anti-​EU public sentiments. Many of these conflict discourses are traced back to problematic historical legacies of Europe, which, far from being ‘settled’, continue to make their way into the public discourse. Responding to this problem, academics, experts and institutions –​ including the EU, conceived and largely established as a ‘peace project’ per se –​constantly look for ways to work through these conflicts by supporting research endeavours. The RePAST project was one such initiative that aimed at investigating how European societies deal with their troubled pasts today. ‘Troubled past’ is understood in this book in a wide sense, covering the Second World War, including the Holocaust and National Socialism, communist pasts, authoritarian pasts, interethnic conflicts and colonial pasts. Grown out of the project RePAST, the idea of a book such as the current one, which offers concrete strategies and recommendations for mitigating the negative consequences of troubled pasts on the European integration, is very timely. A series of internal and external crises (for example, financial crisis, Ukraine crisis, refugee crisis, rise of illiberalism in Central and Eastern Europe, Brexit) have contributed to the upsurge of various types of identity and memory politics that are undermining the ideational foundation of the European integration (that is, a ‘success story’ that managed to address the antagonisms among the Western European countries after the Second World War). The present book builds on the analyses of the mnemonical and historical trajectories of European states to offer concrete strategies and recommendations that could potentially receive broader societal consensus.

1

Troubled Pasts in Europe

The RePAST project focused precisely on how historical discourses are articulated today in European countries with troubled pasts. Adopting a multidisciplinary approach, it focused on eight diverse types of countries within Europe: six EU member states where troubled pasts resurfaced (Cyprus, Ireland, Spain, Germany, Poland and Greece)1 and two states in the EU neighbourhood (Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina) where the EU is directly involved in post-​conflict stabilization efforts. The RePAST project’s research objectives consisted of: 1. Analysing conflict discourses in four discursive fields of paramount importance for collective memory and identity formation (oral and official history, mainstream and digital/​social media, formal and informal politics, and arts and culture). 2. Exploring the reception of troubled past conflicts by members of the public and key civil society actors (for example, citizens, artists, political actors) and how they reproduce, negotiate, (re)appropriate or subvert these discourses. 3. Understanding the impact of conflict discourses on political actors’ and citizens’ attitudes towards European integration through comparative public opinion analysis. 4. Furnishing civil society and market actors (for example, educators, artists, researchers, journalists, individual citizens, cultural institutions, tourism industry) with concrete tools and mechanisms for acting upon troubled pasts. 5. Delivering actionable policy recommendations, tailored to the needs of policy makers at the national and European level.

Theoretical background Passerini (1992) remarks that the 20th century was, for the most part, a time of cancellation of memory, not only in totalitarian but also in democratic or transitional regimes. Since the end of the Cold War, public interest in memory has grown considerably, in tandem with the rise of multiculturalism (Kammen, 1995). The study of memory challenged historiography as a source of cultural domination in the name of repressed groups. Another factor was the fall of communism, which brought a cataclysmic reinterpretation of the past in the East and the West. The Holocaust, as an integral part of European experience and identity, contributed to a radical re-​evaluation of the Second World War as a shared European fight against fascism. Lastly, postmodernists (Nora, 1992; Huyssen, 1995) deconstructed the conceptual underpinnings of linear historicity, truth and identity, raising interest in the linking between history, memory and power. The politics of memory highlight issues of popular memory, memory contestation, and 2

Introduction

instrumentalization of the past, while public debates on historical issues are less about historiography than about contemporary political identities. The Second World War became a dominant site of victimhood and atrocity in Europe that triggered the need for European integration. Habermas and Derrida (2003) claim that contemporary Europe is the result of the experience of the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century and the Holocaust. The European core values of freedom, equality, respect for human rights, democracy, tolerance and solidarity form the backbone of European integration. Much effort is made through European policies to create a ‘European historical memory’ to legitimize the European project and foster the European identity (Prutsch, 2017). As José Manuel Barroso, the 11th President of the European Commission, stated, ‘we have to build bridges linking the past to the future by keeping alive the history of our common roots: a community born from the bold vision of men and women who wanted to build a peaceful, free and united Europe’ (Barroso, 2014). Today, beyond monuments and public celebrations, representations of the past in genres such as cinema, oral tradition, theatrical plays, textbooks, art, comics, memoirs, photography and online spaces show the ‘democratization’ of the flow of memories, creating a truly novel commemorative universe, where new categories of memory makers, mediators and consumers emerge. Collective memories brought new perspectives into the public sphere and new narrative paths to deal with the past. At the same time, the recent emergence of alternate stories deconstructed some myths that for a long time constituted the cornerstones of post-​war European societies, that is, about the unity against the Axis and the mass character of civil or armed resistance. As these myths are being contested, so is the idea of European integration. To give some examples, in Poland, current tendencies of nationalism, anti-​ immigrant attitudes, Euroscepticism, populism and anti-​modernism have emerged, which are traced back to the country’s unresolved Second World War ‘traumas’, and even earlier on, to the heritage of serfdom, exploitation and the phantasm of the nation’s unity. In neighbouring Germany, the party Alternative for Germany and populist movements such as Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident revive claims such as ‘Lügenpresse’ (lying press) –​an expression that dates back to the 19th century and was also used by the Nazi regime to describe the media as being part of a ‘Jewish world conspiracy’ –​to assert that a small political elite used the media to run the country against the ‘real’ will of the people. In postcolonial countries with divided societies, such as Cyprus and Ireland, EU membership was heralded as an opportunity to cultivate a civic European identity that could transcend former colonial identities and interethnic divisions (Peristianis, 1998). However, failure to address the troubled legacy of conflicts has intensified anti-​immigrant attitudes rather than fostered a sense of European integration. In Northern Ireland (NI), 3

Troubled Pasts in Europe

for example, hate crimes and anti-​EU immigration attitudes are strongly aligned with the youth of former conflict communities (Doebler et al, 2016; McKee, 2016). In Cyprus, the EU rarely addressed the core issues which underpinned the conflicts and the memories that resurface in times of crisis (Demetriou, 2005). The division of Cyprus remains an intractable conflict within the EU causing frictions with disruptive trends. In potential candidate countries such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the European integration perspective is challenged on many fronts. Kosovo struggles to deal with its past, opposing the Specialized Chambers of the Criminal Court that will deal with war crimes committed by the former guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army, refusing to ‘lustrate’ former communist figures and to open archives. Due to its centuries-​old deep-​rooted societal divisions and conflict, an anti-​European sentiment is growing as the European perspective is considered a top-​down condition and the ongoing ‘Belgrade-​Prishtina dialogue’ is seen as a leverage that favours Serbia only. In BiH, the shadow of the Second World War is cast upon the present, as the unresolved disagreement about which sides had fought ‘the Just War’ relates to support of nationalist leaders who argue that the EU is an elite-​driven project, and their nation should seek allies elsewhere. Troubled pasts do not always impede the EU integration. In Spain, during the time of transition to democracy, the European Community was seen as a movement towards democratization and against the divisions of the past. Even current secessionist movements, such as the one in Catalonia, see their future in the EU. This role of the EU in dealing with the conflicts of the past in Spain is what seems to explain the low incidence of Euroscepticism, even in times of crisis. What all these examples attest to is the fact that difficult historical legacies, far from being settled, make their way into the public discourse in various ways. Some of these discourses were always present in the public debate; others are being revived or accentuated, often in surprising ways. Increasingly, they are being entangled with emerging sources of conflict, such as the European financial crisis, the refugee/​migration crisis, and the rise of populism, radicalization and reactionary politics. Concepts like multiculturalism, pluralism and integration run the risk of becoming empty shells, unless we look for the under-​represented memories of these under-​ represented or rival groups. In view of this, what is the likelihood of a common European culture of memory? Is it destined to be a field fragmented by definition? What does it mean for Europeans to familiarize themselves with the memories of ‘the Other’, the Other being the Western or Eastern Europe after 1989, the Muslim refugees in Europe today, the Balkan neighbours, former victims and oppressors, Holocaust perpetrators, and so on? The general conviction 4

Introduction

informing this research is that any integration or peaceful cohabitation in Europe will be impossible if the past is not dealt with. The troubled pasts cannot be worked through if the collective subject (the ‘we’) is trapped in a repetitive compulsion of recurring forms of discourse, and already established discursive and subject positions. Against this background, the RePAST project mapped and analysed contemporary conflict-​laden discourses rooted in Europe’s difficult pasts, as factors that shape the present and will, to a large extent, determine Europe’s future.

Conceptual approach –​memory and conflict: the past in the present A key concept in the study of the contested or ‘troubled’ past is a collective memory. According to Halbwachs, memory is clearly situated not in the subjective minds of individuals but in social arrangements (Coser, 1992). Collective memory, the active past that forms our identities (Roudometof, 2002; Bell, 2006), refers less to the past and the way the past is remembered than to the present –​what Assmann calls ‘mnemohistory’ (1997). Memory is a process, not a thing (Zelizer, 1995); neither it is a static vessel that carries the past into the present. Following Olick and Robbins (1998), we approach memory through four key concepts: identity, contestation, malleability and persistence. Social identities are constituted mainly through memory processes. When troubled pasts are concerned, how national, ethnic and civic identities are constructed through memory is a core question. The construction of identity is almost always situated within cultural struggles, ‘different stories vie for a place in history’ (Sturkin, 1997), while ‘people and groups fight hard for their stories’ (Olick and Robbins, 1998). Contestation is at the centre of the study of the past. It is therefore imperative to look at popular or ‘counter-​memory’ (Foucault, 1977), that is, memories that diverge from and contest hegemonic discourses. Lastly, based on the notion that the past is produced in the present and is thus malleable, a significant question to ask is how troubled-​past narratives change over time, recognizing that they can also be remarkably persistent (Schwartz, 1996; Rothberg, 2009). In line with this conceptual approach, RePAST sought to unearth how troubled pasts of Europe live on in the present, focusing on aspects of troublesome historical legacies that persist over time or are revived today to produce conflict discourses. The main analytical concepts we use are conflict discourses rooted in troubled pasts and their articulation in four key fields of civil society that act as powerful sources of identity formation for people of Europe (Figure 1.1). The conceptual approach of the project is further based on two pillars: multidisciplinarity and a multi-​level design for cross-​country comparative analysis. 5

Troubled Pasts in Europe

Figure 1.1: Conceptual basis of the project RePAST

COLLECTIVE MEMORY (troubled past) CONFLICT discourses (present) MANIFESTED in:

HISTORY (official and oral)

POLITICAL DISCOURSES (official and civil society)

MEDIA (journalistic-led and citizen-led)

ARTS AND CULTURE

RePAST research I. ANALYSIS of conflict discourses

IV. DISSEMINATION

II. RECEPTION of conflict discourses

III. How conflict discourses are MEDIATED by: a. Gender b. EU membership c. Crisis (economic-refugee-political)

V. INNOVATION

VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

RECONCILIATION AND EU INTEGRATION (future)

Multidisciplinarity Although memory has been approached by various disciplines (for example, sociology, history, anthropology, psychology, art history, political science), it remains ‘a non-​paradigmatic, transdisciplinary, centreless enterprise’ (Olick and Robbins, 1998, p 106). Olick and Robbins (1998) identify the key institutional fields that produce memory: politics, arts, media and cultural representations. Accordingly, the project explored conflict discourses rooted in troubled pasts in four fundamental spaces of civil society: oral and official history; media (journalistic and citizen-​led); formal and informal politics; and arts and culture, drawing on concepts from sociology, history, communication/​media studies, cultural studies, political science and law. The four topical foci are discussed in more detail in the following sections. Troubled pasts in official and oral history This research area had a double focus on official and oral history. Research on official history aimed at: 6

Introduction

• reflecting on the transformation of the role of the historian in academia and the public sphere as public intellectual; • studying the political and social dimensions of revisionist historiographical trends in terms of contested pasts and evaluating the impact of historical discourses in contemporary issues through the reinterpretation and appropriation of historical analysis. Oral history reflects the fact that most people learn about the past by listening to accounts of individuals with first-​hand experiences of past events. Oral history sheds light on the subjective perspective of history; it emphasizes imagination, symbolism and emotion of the individual rather than the search for ‘true facts’ and affects the shaping of memory and past-​ related public discourses, especially in cases of ‘traumatic’ pasts. The related research aimed at: • studying historical narratives about conflict and comparing different ‘troubled past’ case studies, and identifying procedures, mechanisms and policies that shape troubled-​past discourses; • identifying and classifying dominant narrative themes from a variety of aspects (political, societal, religious) within specific instances such as commemoration and apology instances, reparation assertions and so on. Troubled pasts in journalistic and citizen-​led media The media are a crucial source of informal education and a decisive factor in creating, preserving (or silencing), deepening (or disrupting) hegemonic collective memories (Lang and Lang, 1989; Dayan and Katz, 1992). An example is the concept of ‘transitional journalism’ (Andresen et al, 2017), which reflects on how journalists cope with the need of societal transitions after prolonged periods of conflict. Digital and social media have challenged the mainstream media’s monopoly of publicity. When it comes to how people remember (and forget) troubled pasts, digital/​social media play a crucial role, contributing to the creation of a new memory ecology. Research work focused on journalistic and social media to map their role in dealing with the past, to examine how journalistic and citizen media environments give rise to mediated discourses of troubled pasts, and to create best practice recommendations for media practitioners, policy makers and media regulatory bodies. Troubled pasts in political discourses, attitudes and policies This line of research centred on analysing national political discourses and narratives about troubled pasts, their relationship to the EU and European 7

Troubled Pasts in Europe

integration, and their impact on citizens’ attitudes. The starting point was that the use of the troubled past as a facilitating factor for the EU integration is mediated by discourses of political elites and by the political and economic context. To study how troubled pasts influence political elites’ discourses and disentangle how the EU integration is negotiated in these discourses, RePAST employed textual analysis of party manifestos in salient elections before and after the EU accession and in-​depth interviews with key political actors. To understand citizens’ attitudes and the dynamics in public opinion over time, the project employed comparative public opinion analysis, drawing on national polls published in the year before the EU accession and in the pre-​electoral periods after the EU membership (where applicable), Eurobarometer surveys and a new survey in the RePAST countries that collected citizens’ attitudes about the relation between their countries’ troubled past and the EU integration. Focus group discussions with citizens explored in depth whether dominant negative perceptions of the EU integration depend on specific ‘traumas’ or past conflicts. Troubled pasts in arts and culture Arts and culture have gained great importance in memory studies. As art inspires and sparks creativity, it is a very appropriate tool for conflict resolution (Kang, 2004; Zupančič et al, 2021b). It creates safe spaces where delicate issues can be discussed, while allowing room for critique, self-​ reflection and emotions that could be channelled through artistic methods to express complicated and sensitive feelings (Mercieca and Roomey, 2015). In reconciliation processes that entail tension, art can channel tension and empathy with ‘the Other’, facilitating understanding (International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2014). Research within this area explored artistic appropriations of memory in relation to troubled pasts and their receptions by critics and the wider public. It focused on: • analysing troubled-​past discourses articulated through ‘high’ art, popular culture and street art; • exploring public responses to artistic works to understand how they shape public perceptions; • analysing strategies and tools employed by artists and cultural workers that either instigate conflict or work towards working it through. These discursive fields are not isolated from each other; rather, they are strongly interrelated. For instance, how people interpret their experience of the past is affected by official historical discourses as well as media discourses; in turn, artistic and cultural works also affect media discourses, which are 8

Introduction

heavily affected by political discourses and so on. Furthermore, EU integration is a horizontal dimension of analysis through investigation of how the EU (or its prospect in potential candidate countries) mediates and is mediated by conflict discourses. For instance, in some of the countries studied, the EU has played a very positive role in alleviating past conflicts, while in others it still functions as an important (or even the only) mechanism actively endorsing and sustaining policies of reconciliation.

A multi-​level design for cross-​country comparative analysis Europe’s troubled pasts involve a large number of European countries. So far, comparative approaches to troubled pasts are rare.2 This process produces the bias of ‘exceptionalism’, that is thinking that a single traumatic past event or the experiences of a victimized group are unique and unprecedented. The comparative approach is necessary to overcome parochialism and produce solid theoretical concepts that apply beyond specific cases. To this end, the selection of the national case studies was driven by the necessity to address as many diverse types of troubled pasts as possible. A typology of troubled pasts was constructed based on four criteria: • The historical factor refers to the source of the ‘troubles’ regarding key historical events. • The timespan of the EU membership refers to countries’ status regarding the EU accession and the various enlargement rounds. • The topical factor refers to the troubled past’s relevance to current developments. • The risk factor refers to the kind of ‘threat’ that ongoing past-​rooted discourses pose for European integration. After examining all European countries with contested pasts that have ongoing reverberations, we selected the following countries that constitute cases with a unique combination of troubled past characteristics (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2). These cases cover, first, the most substantial sources of conflicts in Europe’s history, namely the Second World War, Holocaust and National Socialism, communist pasts, authoritarian pasts, interethnic conflicts and colonial pasts. Second, the selection represents the stages of the EU enlargement. Third, it addresses countries with ongoing conflicts, countries where seemingly resolved conflicts are being revived, and countries where conflicts are currently in the making, invoking their troubled past, or constitute a risk zone for the future. Lastly, this selection allows us to focus on understanding current factors that endanger European integration, for example, Euroscepticism, departure from core human rights, fragmentation and division, and secession tendencies. 9

Troubled Pasts in Europe

Table 1.1: Criteria for case study selection Criteria studies

Case

Historical factor

Second World War/​Holocaust

•

Communism

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Colonial past

Cyprus Ireland BiH Kosovo Spain Germany Poland (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

•

•

Time span Founding of the EU members membership 1st enlargement (1973)

•

Ongoing conflict

•

•

•

•

Revived conflict Risk zone Risk factor

•

•

Potential candidates Topical factor

•

•

2nd and 3rd enlargement (1981–​6) 5th enlargement (2004)

•

•

Authoritarian past Interethnic conflicts

•

•

•

•

•

• •

•

•

•

•

•

•

Euro-​scepticism Departure from core human rights

•

Secession Fragmentation/​ • division

•

• •

•

10

•

•

•

•

•

•

Introduction

Figure 1.2: Map of case studies

Brief description of troubled pasts in country cases Cyprus, a divided country for over 40 years, is included as a case of an EU country, which is faced with the possibility of permanent division and remains a constant source of political tension for the EU and its external relations, impeding its political stability. Cyprus’ troubled past is rooted to colonial history and the anti-​colonial struggle of Greek Cypriots in the 1950s, the interethnic conflicts with Turkish-​Cypriots and the 1974 Turkish invasion, which resulted in the split of the state. Cyprus’ EU accession has made the ‘Cyprus problem’ a European problem, a constant source of tension in the EU–​Turkey relations that hampers political stability in the EU. Despite the ongoing negotiations and the EU endorsement of a final settlement, there is a real risk that the division will be permanent. This troubled past is constantly invoked by political leaderships, the Church and the media, which reproduce a divisive discourse where both sides blame each other for the violent past. The deeply rooted identity conflict incapacitates sociocultural and political life on both sides of the ‘Green Line’. Exacerbated by the country’s recent economic problems, this divisive discourse heavily influences citizens’ stance towards the EU and undermines attempts of genuine and deep-​seated integration, casting the EU–​Cyprus relations in instrumental terms, at best. Ireland’s troubled past began in the 1960s as the legacy of colonialism and the ethno-​nationalist conflict that followed the island’s partition into a British region (NI) and an independent Irish region (Republic of Ireland). The troubled past of Ireland concerns the ethno-​nationalist conflict that began in the 1960s in NI but spilled over in the Republic of Ireland. The focal point of this conflict, which affected the Irish identity significantly, is the identity rift between Catholics/​nationalists who favour union with the 11

Troubled Pasts in Europe

Republic and Protestant/​unionists who support the status quo. Although the 1998 Good Friday Agreement formally ended the violence of major groups, the post-​conflict society remains deeply divided along traditional ethnic lines. Further, European integration has helped ease tensions and allow for political solutions to emerge. Yet, Brexit has created a lot of uncertainty over the borders between NI and the Republic of Ireland and has resurrected talk of union through a relevant referendum. Although the intensity of the conflict is no longer high, there is a constant undercurrent of tension, especially around controversial rituals such as the Orange parade. The 1916 centenary celebrations of the proclamation of the Republic led to tensions and public discussions concerning Ireland’s past and present. The Northern Irish border places Ireland at the heart of debates about the future of the European integration and the meaning of European versus ethnic and national identities. Moreover, the Irish case is a valuable example of how troubled pasts are revived in light of contemporary political developments. In BiH the troubled past focuses on the war in this country (1992–​5) although the legacy of its internal discord is significantly longer. Despite the fact that the 1995 Dayton Agreement ended the bloodshed, the country remains divided along ethno-​political lines. The troubled past is often misused by politicians of all main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats), who apply the narrative of victimized nation only to their nation, and at the same time securitize and strengthen the clear ethnic divisions as a means of ethnicity’s survival. Although the EU accepted BiH’s membership application in 2016 and gave BiH the candidate status in 2022, the internal conflicts rooted in its troubled past not only impede its European perspectives but will also eventually become a part of the EU politics and further complicate the process of integration. Therefore, the difficulties emerging from slow integration of this Southeast European country into the EU and its internal divisions can hinder the integration of the European continent as a whole. Hence, it is considered a significant ‘risk zone’, which ought to be studied to anticipate future complications. Kosovo’s troubled past goes back many years. However, the past that still haunts Kosovo and Serbia most visibly today starts with the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the Habsburg reign after the First World War, when a new state (of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) was established. In this political entity that was later renamed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians were citizens of second order with significantly less rights than Slavic nations. The formation and consolidation of the communist Yugoslavia after the Second World War did not, at least not in the first decades, bring new rights to Kosovo Albanians, although it must be acknowledged that their political rights increased with time. However, the renewed suppression of Kosovo Albanians’ rights in the late 1980s only fuelled the desire of Albanians to be independent, which brought the ruling 12

Introduction

Serbian elites in a direct clash with Kosovo Albanians in the 1990s. The conflict is ongoing: in the meantime, Kosovo declared independence (2008), and nowadays Kosovo Serbs –​being supported by Serbia –​claim that their rights in a newly formed state are not respected. The conflict extends to the highest levels of the EU, which has through its envoys and institutions in Kosovo established itself as a broker who might be able to help local people to overcome the burden of historic legacy. Kosovo’s contemporary conflicts, which are rooted in its troubled past, are considered a significant future risk for the European integration. In Spain, troubled pasts go back to the civil war (1936–​9) and the Franco dictatorship (1939–​76). The predominant model of dealing with conflicts in Spain (whether the civil war or secessionist tendencies) has been based on oblivion instead of on open debate. This strategy has not led to reconciliation or a stable solution of conflicts but, on the contrary, to the constant reviving of conflicts. In the case of the civil war/​dictatorship, it has recently become one of the dimensions adding to political polarization. In the case of separatist tendencies, avoiding dialogue on divisive issues is leading to an increased polarization of the conflict as well. For some of the actors involved in these conflicts, the EU appears as a ‘solution’ to these conflicts. In this respect, the analysis of the case of Spain is especially relevant, as it will allow us to understand the mechanisms by which the EU is still seen as a protection against conflict and dictatorship. At the same time, however, the current situation renders the country a ‘risk zone’ in terms of political stability and unity in the EU, as for other actors the EU is seen as neglecting the protection of human rights by accepting the strategy of forgetting the past and looking towards the future. Germany’s troubled past addressed in this project go back to both its National Socialist past (1933–​45) and communist past (1945–​89). While National Socialism and the Second World War have been considered to be a major driving factor behind Germany’s pro-​EU integration policy, Germany’s communist past and the ongoing ‘East–​West divide’, more than 25 years after reunification, are considered to be one reason for the rise of anti-​EU populism in Germany today. Boosted by the crisis and fears about the influx of refugees, anti-​EU and populist parties and social movements recently entered the German political scene, using populist, Euro-​sceptic, racist and even anti-​Semitic discourses. In 2014, one-​sixth of Germans stated that they want the Wall back –​most of them East Germans and supporters of the newly established right-​wing party Alternative for Germany. Explanations about the reasons of East Germans’ increased support for Euroscepticism point to post-​communist realities. Some researchers blame the authoritarian political system of the former German Democratic Republic for failing to provide civic-​democratic education for East Germans. For others the problem lies in how reunification was experienced as ‘annexation’ by many East Germans 13

Troubled Pasts in Europe

(Meyen, 2013), as socialism was demonized in the public discourse, East Germans struggled with the devaluation of their own biographies. This feeling of disappointment and contempt in light of a ‘failed’ reunification was passed down to the next generation. Today more than half of East Germans feel like ‘East Germans’ rather than ‘Germans’ and one-​quarter disagrees with the statement ‘I am a European citizen’. This is particularly interesting considering the fact that the German Democratic Republic, as a unique example in European history, joined the European Community without accession procedure unlike other Eastern European states, which had to undergo bureaucratic, democratic and economic accession exercises. Poland’s troubled past includes numerous instances of conflict, violence, suffering, subjugation and trauma related to the Second World War and the Holocaust, along with what is known as its ‘long shadow’ (Tych, 1999). The recent upsurge in nationalism, anti-​immigrant stances, Euroscepticism and anti-​modernism can be traced back to the ambivalent role of the Polish community vis-​à-​vis the Nazi genocide, the idea of victimhood under the Soviet-​imposed government and, even further back, to the Romantic idea of the ‘chosen nation’ (activated every so often, especially when the nation’s innocence is being questioned). The fact that this troubled past has not been acknowledged and worked through properly keeps influencing numerous conflicts experienced in the present. One of these, related to Poland’s role in Europe, is the lack of the so-​called collective spirit, namely a crisis of social solidarity resulting from the unequal spread of wealth after 1989 and the misappropriation of symbolic capital of the victory over the oppressive state power.

Zeroing in on policy recommendations While interested readers can find more information about the RePAST project’s theoretical and methodological parameters and contributions as well as its empirical findings on the project’s website (www.rep​ast.eu), a principal objective of the RePAST project was to deliver meaningful and actionable policy recommendations, tailored to the needs of key policy makers at both national and European level, and developed in cooperation with them. The produced reports took the form of roadmaps and strategies for transformational policy reforms in four areas (history, media, politics, and arts and culture), aiming at improving the countries’ strategies for dealing with their troubled pasts. Furthermore, concrete sets of policy recommendations are directed at the EU level. Out of these reports of policy recommendations grew the current book, which we hope will be a valuable guide not only for scholars working on conflicts from different conceptual and epistemological perspectives but also for practitioners in the fields of troubled pasts, reconciliation, peacebuilding 14

Introduction

and so on as well as experts and senior students. In the following pages, Chapter 2 will lay out the methodological approach to producing policy recommendations, namely how policy makers were engaged in the process along with the advantages and disadvantages of this method. Chapters 3–​9 cover the policy recommendations for each of the seven countries; these chapters follow a consistent structure that includes the main characteristics of the key conflict(s) in the country, the evolution of the EU’s approach for addressing troubled pasts and the actual recommended strategies for overcoming troubled pasts in each discursive field (history, media, politics, and arts and culture). Chapter 10 is dedicated to the EU in its entirety, following the same structuring logic. It should be noted that the gender dimension was taken into account also during the production of recommended strategies, resulting in gender-​specific policy recommendations (where applicable). Chapter 11 is the concluding section, which summarizes the gist of policy recommendations across case studies and looks for similarities, while paying due attention to the specificities of each case study’s troubled past. The strategies for addressing troubled pasts included in this book will be useful for scholars working on areas such as international relations, security studies, European studies and memory studies; practitioners focusing on conflict, reconciliation and peacebuilding; experts working in international organizations (for example, the EU, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and others); think tanks and non-​governmental organizations; and postgraduate students eager to learn about post-​conflict societies, peacebuilding, reconciliation and other. The proposed strategies, while being specific to the case studies investigated, are broad enough in their logic to be of use in other post-​conflict societies. They are also intended to be meaningful, realistic and implementable, in order to offer readers fresh ideas and perspectives. We hope that the book will assist scholars and policy makers working for these ideals to bring back into focus revamped notions of the European integration that can make sense to current and future citizens of Europe and eventually strengthen our collective efforts towards a peaceful European future.

15

2

Methodology: From Research Results to Recommendations Developing policy recommendations based on comprehensive, in-​depth research is not an easy task. Whether a recommendation is accepted by policy makers –​and that is what matters in real life and what can (in our case) move us a step forward in addressing the difficult past –​often depends on factors beyond the researchers’ control. This is one of the reasons why academic researchers, approaching the complexity of the social world in ways that are not straightforward, are often reluctant to write short and concise policy recommendations, even though they are aware that serious engagement in the process can have immense benefits for society (CARDI, 2012). In addition, researchers are often not adequately trained to communicate research findings in forms other than academic publications, even though publishing shorter, more widely understood texts is an important element in maximizing impact. Finding a middle ground in making recommendations, which some may also view as watering down recommendations, is a process that takes time. However, if the recommendation is based on solid evidence on the one hand and does not fundamentally challenge the interests of key stakeholders on the other, the recommendation is more likely to be adopted. It should come as no surprise that this is difficult to achieve, especially in countries with a troubled past that are targeted by these recommendations. This chapter explains the logic used to move from research findings to specific policy recommendations and is therefore organized as follows. First, it explains the process of creating the first version of the recommendations, which was based solely on the project’s research findings. The second section explains how relevant interlocutors (policy makers and stakeholders) were involved in the process of revising the earlier versions of the recommendations. The third and final section describes how some of the interlocutors were additionally recruited for interviews and how some other perspectives from

16

Methodology

people who were not directly involved in this process were included in the final version of the recommendations.

Drafting the first version of the policy recommendations The RePAST research consortium had the aforementioned considerations in mind when thinking about how to compile the policy recommendations; they were to be written for the EU as an institution and for seven countries struggling with difficult pasts (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Kosovo, Poland and Spain). The researchers’ idea was to draw up concrete roadmaps for improving the countries’ strategies for dealing with the burden of historical heritage and to propose to the EU what role it could play in this context. In doing so, the national and the EU roadmaps were to be aligned and interlinked in such a way that they would reinforce each other. The aim underlying this process was to make the recommendations feasible and ultimately implementable. Since the research project is built on distinct but closely interrelated pillars (history, media, politics, and arts and culture) that affect the way a country’s troubled past is debated and reappraised, it was decided that the recommendations should focus on each of the four areas. Therefore, the first step was for the country teams to draft the first version of the recommendations, based solely on the previous research conducted as part of this project. In order to make the recommendations comparable across the case studies, it was also decided that the content and structure of the recommendations should follow a common logic that would apply to all recommendations.

Identifying and engaging relevant interlocutors In order to make the recommendations realistic and potentially actionable, the consortium’s agreed plan was to involve policy makers and stakeholders from all the countries studied, as well as staff from various EU institutions, in the process of developing the policy recommendations. Indeed, the consortium researchers were aware that publishing recommendations that would be based solely on academic research might lack the much needed ‘reality check’ –​the label that academics often (rightly or not) earn in their work. In other words, the authors of the recommendations were careful not to be too ambitious in their proposals because it would be pointless to produce just another set of documents with no serious impact. Each of the consortium partners responsible for their case study (country) was first supposed to identify and contact the key institutions, policy makers and stakeholders who have an influence on how the troubled past is addressed in that country. The identification of relevant interlocutors was done at 17

Troubled Pasts in Europe

two intertwined levels: the level of a country (national level) and the nexus where the EU ‘meets’ a particular country (EU–​country nexus). Each of the case study partners was to identify, engage with and receive feedback from different policy makers and stakeholders at both levels. Institutions that seemed appropriate because of their competence or ambition to deal with the burdened past at national level included various government ministries (for example, of education, media, culture and so on), specific government agencies (for example, those responsible for war veterans, displaced persons or missing persons) and non-​governmental organizations dealing with the burdened past (for example, commissions of enquiry, truth commissions and so on). At the EU country level, the following groups of interlocutors were involved in the elaboration of the recommendations, which differ from case to case: members of the European Parliament (EP); representatives of the EU delegations and offices dealing in some way with difficult pasts of a particular country; state representatives involved in the drafting of certain policies or documents on the difficult past that have an ‘EU component’ (for example, the documents adopted by the EP or the documents adopted by the EP that constitute ‘the memory of the EU’); non-​governmental organizations or think tanks accredited to the EU that have dealt with the troubled past in the country under study;1 members of the friendship groups in the EP (those were relevant in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). Once the interlocutors relevant to each case study had been identified, the researchers responsible for a particular case study sent the draft recommendations to the interlocutors for comment. These were asked, on the one hand, to comment on the actual need for a particular recommendation and, on the other hand, to give their opinion on the actual possibility of implementing the recommendation in practice.

Merging the perspectives of policy makers, stakeholders (and some others) with the research findings The next step was to obtain feedback from policy makers and stakeholders on the first version of the recommendations. In addition, the researchers were to meet and interview at least six policy makers and stakeholders per country, both to obtain feedback on specific recommendations made by the consortium and to learn additional background information and context that may have been inadvertently omitted by the researchers but that is important in understanding the country’s troubled past. Due to the COVID-​ 19 pandemic, several meetings between researchers and interviewees were conducted online using available conferencing tools. There was a set of interview questions to be asked by all country teams to ensure comparability 18

Methodology

of the case studies.2 In addition, the researchers also asked specific questions tailored to the particularities of their cases. Some policy makers, stakeholders and interviewees that commented on recommendations wanted to remain anonymous or only be mentioned by their respective roles and positions. Authors of this book took this into account and that is why each chapter contains detailed methodology where policy makers and stakeholders are listed accordingly. Last, but not least, it should be mentioned that the RePAST project organized two events for a general audience where some of the recommendations were presented and discussed. First, at the international workshop for policy makers and stakeholders entitled ‘Overcoming troubled past(s): What can European countries and the EU do?’, RePAST researchers received comments from experts in the field of troubled past(s) who were not directly linked to the project.3 In addition, another event –​also in the form of a conference call –​was organized at the end of the RePAST project. The conference, ‘Negotiating troubled pasts: History, politics, arts and the media’, again attracted several dozen participants from all over the world who had the opportunity to discuss the future steps that should be taken regarding the troubled pasts of European countries and the ways in which the EU could help in this regard.4 The opportunity to critically review the findings of the consortium and to combine these findings with the feedback on the draft recommendations (gathered in interviews and in writing from stakeholders and policy makers from the EU institutions and at the national level) gave the authors of this book more confidence for the final version of the respective recommendations presented in the following chapters of this book.

19

PART I

Non-​EU Member States

3

Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Coexistence to Unresolvable Past? Introduction The history of the Balkan Peninsula, like that of many other regions of the world, has been marked by violence. The turmoil was caused by the spread of different religions in these areas (for example, the spread of Islam with the Ottoman Empire) and intra-​religious schisms (for example, the schism between the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches in the 11th century). The 20th century brought fundamental political changes to this part of the world that still reverberate today: the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century, followed by the Balkan Wars (1912–​ 13), the two world wars and the Yugoslav era (Calic, 1995; Bose, 2002). The inability to resolve many ‘ethnic issues’ continues to weigh immensely on the people of the area today –​including in present-​day Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), where the war that devastated the country between 1992 and 1995 deepened ethnic, religious and national divisions. These divisions, which were relatively mild (or effectively put down) during the Yugoslav era, when BiH was praised a symbol of coexistence, are still present today. This is not surprising given that the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), which effectively ended the armed violence in 1995 –​but did not bring reconciliation –​set the country’s divisions in stone and even legalized them. Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats ‘got’ the Federation of BiH (51 per cent of the territory), while Bosnian Serbs were ‘rewarded’ with the Republika Srpska (RS), covering 49 per cent of the territory (Bougarel, 1996; Carmichael, 2002). By perpetuating at least three different streams of ethno-​nationalist rhetoric, underpinned by the portrayal of the ‘other’ as the enemy, the political elites of each nation maintain a firm grip on power in both entities to this day. Many people living in BiH have personally experienced the war or, if they are members of the younger generations, have strong beliefs about the 23

Troubled Pasts in Europe

war based on what they have been told about it or what they have read about it. Moreover, people living in the aftermath of armed violence are ‘reminded’ of the war and current ethnic tensions on a daily basis –​which is not surprising given that the DPA established the ‘ethno-​political functioning’ of modern BiH. Thus, it is not surprising that the consequences of the war are passed down through generations of people and strongly affect the lives of all people, both on an individual and collective level. As the country seems unable to break away from ethnic and nationalist narratives, many aspects of people’s everyday lives in BiH have remained similar, if not the same (in most cases, dire) over the past 25 years. Many share the belief that the three main nations living in BiH have been forced to share a country, even though coexistence between them is not possible. The international community, including the EU –​the institution that has actively participated in post-​conflict stabilization efforts, including significant efforts to come to terms with the troubled past –​believes that BiH should remain within its existing borders and form. This is also the main reason why this chapter, before making our own recommendations, analyses the EU’s approaches so far to dealing with the troubled past and conflict resolution in BiH. In this chapter, we offer a non-​exhaustive list of recommendations: a possible roadmap for addressing some of the current challenges arising from the country’s troubled past that could take the stabilization of this Southeastern European country a step further. As explained in the previous chapter on methodology, the recommendations come from the intensive field research conducted between 2018 and 2020 and span all areas of enquiry of the collaborative research project RePAST: history, media, politics, art and culture.

Methodological approach to writing the recommendations for Bosnia and Herzegovina In this monograph, with the recommendations for BiH at the forefront, we follow a methodological approach that has been adapted to all case studies, as already explained in the chapter on methodology. In developing these particular recommendations –​rather than the others –​we not only draw from the feedback we received from policy makers and stakeholders on our draft recommendations, on which they were able to comment, but we also contextualize the recommendations within the framework of other existing initiatives being undertaken in BiH by other non-​governmental and governmental organizations (for example, Nansen Dialogue, Forum ZFD, Trial International, United Nations Development Programme, United States Agency for International Development, the Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe and the Council of Europe). In this way, we 24

Bosnia and Herzegovina

seek to complement and support ongoing efforts to come to terms with the troubled pasts, which in BiH, as in many other post-​conflict societies, are far from rare. The methodology underpinning the policy recommendations for BiH is based on a two-​step strategy to ensure quality based on previous RePAST research and to obtain input from relevant stakeholders and policy makers who have a good sense of what is feasible and ultimately implementable in terms of recommendations. The first step was to write the draft policy recommendations for BiH (this step, based on intensive research on BiH in the RePAST project, was completed in May 2020). In the second step, which followed a few weeks later, the draft recommendations were sent to the selected national policy makers and stakeholders in BiH, as well as to policy makers and stakeholders in the EU dealing with BiH issues. We sent 50 emails to BiH and EU policy makers and stakeholders asking for comments on our draft recommendations. The interlocutors were selected according to specific selection criteria. We wanted to ensure that contributions came from three groups: 1. policy makers/​representatives of the main Bosnian-​Herzegovinian parties; 2. representatives of the state of BiH and Bosnian-​Herzegovinian non-​ governmental organizations; 3. EU policy makers and stakeholders. The response rate was very low, perhaps due to the difficult situation with COVID-​19 in BiH. However, we managed to receive comments on our draft recommendations from eight policy makers and stakeholders, six of whom participated in additional interviews.1 • Policy makers and representatives of BiH political parties that commented the draft version of recommendations: Marija Iličić, a member of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) BiH in the Parliament of the Federation of BiH; Saša Magazinović(*), a member of the Joint Committee on European Integration in the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and the leader of the BiH Social Democratic Party’s representatives in the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH; Snježana Novaković-​Bursać(*), a member of the Joint Committee on European Integration in the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and a member of Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD). • Representatives of the BiH state and BiH non-​governmental organizations (NGOs): Velma Šarić(*), the president of a local NGO, the Post-​Conflict Research Center; Ante Vujnović(*), the director of the Office for the Protection of Monuments, BiH Ministry of Culture and Sports. • EU stakeholders and policy makers: Dr Klemen Grošelj(*), a member of the Foreign Committee in the European Parliament and the president 25

Troubled Pasts in Europe

of the European Parliament–​BiH Friendship Group; Dr Christian Preda(*), a former Standing Rapporteur for BiH in the European Parliament; representatives of European Union External Action Service, Sarajevo Office. Due to the situation with COVID-​19, the authors of this report were not able to travel to BiH and conduct the interviews in person. Therefore, it was necessary to do interviews via Zoom and Skype. However, the interview with Dr Grošelj was done in person because he was in the same country as the interviewers at the time of the interview. After receiving feedback from these eight interviewees, the consortium’s internal reviewers conducted a peer review, on the basis of which the final recommendations were written.

Background: the European Union’s changing approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s troubled past In order to justify our own policy recommendations, we must first outline the basic contours of the EU’s attempts to reduce the weight of BiH’s contested history. Indeed, over the past three decades, the EU has actively proposed and supported policies that could have contributed to overcoming the troubled past; many believe that this has been in vain. The EU’s approaches in this regard have changed considerably, from modest attempts to help the country and its people in the early 1990s to more elaborate and costly efforts after the end of the war. The EU’s approach can be divided into three major phases: 1. the period from 1992 to 1995; 2. the period from 1995 to 2008; 3. the period from 2008 to the present.

First phase: the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–​5) The first phase was initiated with the declaration of BiH’s independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, followed by the war that ended in 1995. Various endogenous and exogenous actors expected the European Community (later the EU) to react and intervene meaningfully in the war. However, efforts to develop a common policy towards war-​torn BiH were hampered by the ‘intergovernmental nature’ of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, which in practice meant that there was no substantive common policy towards the country (Dover, 2005). This contributed to the fact that apart from the financial and humanitarian assistance provided to BiH by the European Community/​EU during the war, the ability to successfully stop the armed violence could not be pursued by this international organization. The limited role of the EU during the 26

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Bosnian war was also observed at the signing of the DPA in 1995, as the representative of the EU was ‘only’ a co-​chair alongside the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. This rightly left many with the impression that the US was the main actor that ‘brought’ peace and that the EU was an actor that only watched the war as a spectator. However, the DPA signed in 1995 set out the terms of international engagement in BiH, including the platform for the EU’s post-​war efforts in the years to come.

Second phase: the European Union’s enhanced role in the post-​war period (1995–​2008) The second phase identified brought significant changes to the EU’s role in BiH and can be considered perhaps the most active period for the EU. The EU became the main external actor in BiH, alongside the Office of the High Representative, replacing the US in this respect.2 Moreover, it was during this period that BiH began negotiations for the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) following the Thessaloniki Declaration in 2003, in which BiH received an unequivocal commitment to its future in the EU. The EU’s efforts in the post-​conflict period, which should be understood as initiatives to successfully implement the DPA while aiming at BiH’s ‘Euro-​Atlantic integration’, can be divided into three major groups of activities: 1. constitutional reforms; 2. police reform; 3. bringing war criminals to justice (Arvanitopoulos and Tzifakis, 2008; Rangelov and Theros, 2009; Juncos, 2017; Zdeb, 2017). In the context of the constitutional reforms, the role of the EU was twofold. First, the EU championed the reforms to strengthen the central government and pursued the institutional and administrative dimension to reduce the visibility of the division into political entities along ethnic lines. Second, in advocating for the military and intelligence reforms, the EU worked substantially on the security dimension to achieve sustainable peace (Padurariu, 2014; Juncos, 2017; Kudlenko, 2017). It can be argued that police reform was the main priority of the EU, as the European Commission considered it as one of the last remaining obstacles to start negotiations on SAA (European Parliament, 2005). This reform was not only important for building the institutional capacity of the central government, but was also sought because the police in the grip of one ethnic group were an important instrument of ethnic cleansing during the war. The limited outcome of the reform may be due to the fact that RS –​one of the two entities in BiH –​was not prepared to integrate its police structures 27

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with those of the Federation of BiH and the Brčko District into one central police force. It is also important to note that at that time all EU instruments of the ‘second pillar’ of both Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy were deployed in BiH, namely: EU Special Representative, EU Monitoring Mission, EU Police Mission and the EU peacekeeping force EUFOR (Kronenberger and Wouters, 2004; Dover, 2005; Juncos, 2013). The EU’s main efforts in dealing with BiH’s troubled past lie in its efforts to bring to justice those who committed war crimes after 1995. It took nine years (until 2005) for RS to start extraditing those accused of war crimes to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. However, the most wanted indictees, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, remained at large during a long period of strong international presence in BiH. Perhaps the most positive development in the field of punishing war crimes was the restructuring of BiH’s judicial system when the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court and the Special War Crimes Unit in the Bosnian Prosecutor’s Office were opened (Meernik and Barron, 2018). In the same year, the EP also adopted its first declaration on Srebrenica (altogether, the EP adopted three different declarations on Srebrenica; in 2005, 2009 and 2015), which was meant to serve as a pillar of reconciliation, but rather further entrenched the positions of the ethno-​political parties (Milošević and Touquet, 2018).

Third phase: from the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement until today (2008–​) The third phase, identified for the purpose of disentangling the EU’s approach to BiH’s troubled past, begins in 2008 with the signing of the SAA between the EU and BiH, which can be considered one of the most important steps in the process of BiH’s demanding integration into the EU (Kočan and Zupančič, 2022). Notwithstanding this success for BiH, the period between 2008 and 2016, when BiH finally submitted its application for EU membership, can be understood as a ‘period of regression’. The EU’s efforts, which sought reforms to create a more ‘functional state’, met with resistance from the political authorities in the RS. The EU’s approach was risky because it created the narrative of ‘pushing back the Bosnian Serbs and Croats while strengthening the Bosniaks’ (Noutcheva, 2012); however, it should be added that it is difficult to say how the EU could have addressed this problem more effectively. The decision for constitutional reforms –​an example of which could be the Prud and Butmir processes3 –​ opened the ‘Pandora’s box’ of a power-​sharing system that no one was really happy with, but which the political elites did not want to challenge. Accordingly, neither the ‘stick’ of the Bonn powers nor the ‘carrot’ of possible 28

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EU accession could have driven the implementation of top-​down reforms that were not supported by the ethno-​political elites (Muehlmann, 2008). An important indicator of this was the secessionist rhetoric of the Bosnian Serb Milorad Dodik, then prime minister of the RS, who had stated several times that RS would declare independence from BiH (Mušinović, 2015), but the EU was not able to do anything substantial in this regard, other than deploring this rhetoric. The EU’s efforts did not end here, as the EU argued on many occasions that the SAA would not enter into force unless the Dayton Constitution was revised in accordance with a 2009 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights, Sejdić-​Finci, which called for electoral reform of the tripartite Presidency of BiH and the House of Peoples, as these were reserved only for ethnic Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats (the plaintiffs in this lawsuit were two citizens of BiH, Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci, who are of Roma and Jewish ethnicity, and could not as such stand for the elections as candidates). However, the coercion by the EU was reduced and the EU presence in BiH was significantly reduced. For example, the strength of EUFOR troops was reduced from 7,000 troops in 2004 to 2,000 troops in 2010, followed by the termination of the EU police mission in BiH in 2012 (Palm, 2017). In this context, it is also important to note the EU’s shift from security and sociopolitical to economic initiatives, as the only visible EU efforts during this period were visa liberalization in 2008–​10,4 and the launch of the EU Economic Reform Programme and the Competitiveness and Growth Programme in 2014–​15. Finally, this ‘period of regression’, marked by Milorad Dodik’s opposition to the EU, culminated in 2016 when RS held an unconstitutional referendum on the National Day of the RS. This action violated the DPA and unsurprisingly triggered strong reactions from EU officials (Rettman, 2017). In the following years, there were no innovative efforts by the EU to overcome the difficult past; not even in 2022, when BiH –​amidst the war in Ukraine –​received the green light and officially became an EU candidate country, having requested the status already in 2016.

Policy recommendations for Bosnia and Herzegovina The historic legacy of the conflict(s) and their often diametrically different interpretations among the peoples of BiH pre-​date the most recent war (1992–​5); it goes back centuries to the Middle Ages and the Ottoman era. The often negative perception of the ‘Other’ (ethnic, religious, cultural and so on), including prejudices and stereotypes, developed in the Balkans mainly in the 19th century with the age of ‘national awakening’ and romantic nationalism leading to the Congress of Berlin (1878) and the emergence of new independent states in the region. The 20th century, with the Balkan 29

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Wars (1912–​13) and the two world wars, reinforced the perception of the other ethnic group as the ‘eternal, bloodthirsty enemy of us’ (Zupančič and Arbeiter, 2016). The recent war has only further entrenched these widely held beliefs. When thinking about how to overcome the troubled past –​and what policy recommendations should be proposed –​it is important to bear in mind that the division between peoples in BiH does not only occur along ethno-​religious lines. On the contrary, the conflicts of the longue durée have been marked for decades by severe intra-​ethnic divisions, which also lead to opposing interpretations and mutually exclusive ideologies at this level. Therefore, we acknowledge that it is difficult to expect significant steps towards overcoming the troubled past, as the current political system, which is constructed to entrench ethno-​political divisions, is a desired outcome and a suitable modus operandi for the ethno-​political elites of all major ethnic groups in BiH. The difficulty of moving forward from a troubled past can be observed fairly well in dealing with even the most imminent issues such as that BiH as a state has not endorsed the establishment of the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts on war crimes in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The reason for not endorsing it was the absence of consensus among the members of the BiH Presidency on this initiative (RECOM, 2018). This was also confirmed in our earlier research within the RePAST project and can be also documented in the work of other scholars (Calic, 1995; Bose, 2002; Bojicic-​Dzelilovic, 2015). Although this chapter divides the recommendations into four different sections (history, media, politics, culture and arts), we do so for analytical purposes only. The recommendations should be read comprehensively, as they deal with the intertwined nature of the troubled past, which permeates several areas of social life.

History Since students at all levels of the education system in BiH have different curricula (and different textbooks), it is not surprising that different schools have different emphases on ‘important events’ and that ignoring the other events that do not speak to a particular dominant (ethnic) narrative is the norm (see, for example, Soldo et al, 2018). Our first recommendation therefore concerns the need to reform the teaching of history in schools and is addressed to all ministries of education in BiH.5 The reform should aim to ‘de-​ethnicize’ the teaching of history at all levels of the education system and seek to create curricula that go beyond the glorification or exclusive right of one ethnic group –​and conversely, beyond the portrayal of the other ethnic group as a fixed, monolithic bloc responsible for all the misery that has befallen ‘our’ ethnic group. This would be possible if a comparative and competitive teaching of history based on historical facts is developed. 30

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It must be noted that, when it comes to the teaching of 20th-​century history, the debate often revolves about ‘big’ geopolitical ideas and ideologies at the global level, whereas their impact on the local environment(s) of BiH or wider Yugoslavia has often been neglected. Our second recommendation suggests that not only the most recent history (the last war), but also the events that have led to the war and the interethnic issues preceding this war should be brought into school discussions –​in particular, how different ethnic groups nowadays assess certain important historic events related to the troubled past, and what arguments do they use to support their stances. In particular, it has to be debated how and why the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) was established after the First World War, how diverging opinions on the country’s future, promoted by different ethnic groups, have developed since its inception more than a century ago, how different ethnic and social groups saw their place in the socialist Yugoslavia, how and why nationalistic ideas in republics have been suppressed ‘in the name of unitary Yugoslavia’ and so on. Since recommending writing common history textbooks that would be used throughout BiH is at a given point perhaps an over-​ambitious goal due to the current political divisions (regardless of the need for doing so), a step forward might be our next recommendation. We suggest the ministries of education in both the Federation BiH and RS develop a scheme, which would support the teachers to travel to other parts of BiH in order to give lectures or organize seminars at the schools with different curricula than their own. Although this seems to be most relevant for history teachers, the scheme could provide means also for teachers of other subjects to benefit from this scheme and engage in lectures or seminars throughout BiH. Not only in history courses, but also in other subjects it should be encouraged to promote the ‘individuality of war crimes’, to contrast the belief that a specific war crime was committed by ‘the nation’ as a whole. Moreover, not necessarily in history classes only, but also elsewhere (in high schools also in ethics, philosophy, psychology, sociology and so on), it should be emphasized that if a member of one ethnic group committed a war crime, it does not mean that the whole ethnic group the perpetrator belongs to is responsible for committing the war crime. However, it has to be acknowledged –​if this was the case –​that the crime might have been committed ‘in the name’ of a given ethnic group or a particular political idea, but the teachers should be careful in their explanations that this does not automatically mean that the whole ethnic group support(ed) the perpetrators’ actions. We propose also that the ministries of education in BiH consider how the evidence, which demonstrates that all ethnic groups suffered in the war, could be included in the curricula (for example, see Historija [2020], which discusses the story of two young girls, one Croat and one Bosniak, who 31

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were killed in Sarajevo on the same day and in the same place, and are both considered as victims), and also how the many examples of interethnic help during the war could be discussed at schools (for example, when neighbours of different ethnic origin tried to save each other during armed violence). This might sensitize children and students in the sense of universalism (humanism), which transcends ethnic identities and helps them understand that it was the people who suffered (and not that only members of a particular ethnic group suffered), and could eventually demythologize the other ethnic group as a monolithic bloc attempting to destroy ‘us’. We recommend the BiH ministries of education to offer teachers at all educational levels the possibility of continuous education and training at the international level; this does not pertain to history teachers exclusively, but to teachers of other courses, as well. To stimulate this, the ministries of education in the Federation of BiH and RS should allocate resources, which would encourage and financially support the expansion of schemes enabling teachers to travel abroad for study reasons. Such schemes would allow teachers attending the seminars or other activities, where they would have a chance to learn how other countries –​also previously involved in armed conflicts –​managed to reach a certain level of mutual understanding or a certain degree of reconciliation (for example, France and Germany after the Second World War). At such events, the teachers from all parts of BiH, otherwise working within different curricula, could come together on ‘a neutral terrain’ without being closely monitored for their words by their peers (intra-​ethnic pressure). In addition, developing some other skills could also be possible at such seminars (for example, how to recognize and deal with trauma; skills in trauma-​informed active listening and treating students; learning how psychosocial issues prevent people from being inclined to reconciliation). International donors in BiH could also further support programmes and activities of this kind. The last recommendation in this section concerns building the places of consciousness throughout BiH (monuments, artistic installations and so on). It is the BiH Ministry for Civil Affairs, which could advocate for building such places throughout BiH.6 The places of consciousness would not counter, but rather complement, the existing places of remembrance (for example, Srebrenica-​Potočari commemoration on 11 July, where the predominantly Bosniak victims of genocide are remembered every year; the commemoration for the Serbian victims in Bratunac; commemorations for Croats killed in BiH). The places of consciousness would perhaps offer a possibility, to some people at least, to transcend the particularities or burdens of narrowly defined ethno-​religious identities and the narrative that only ‘our’ ethnic group suffered during the war. It must be acknowledged that such initiatives already exist in BiH but are hard to implement. In Prijedor, for example, building the memorial for killed children has been delayed for 32

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years, although the international community, including the Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe, have been actively trying to implement this, yet to no avail. However, there are already some places that could be regarded as places of consciousness –​the War Childhood Museum in Sarajevo, for example.

Media Media outlets should gain more independence and break away from political and business influence. The sociopolitical context in BiH makes this a great challenge, and in this regard, we suggest that the authorities consider the possibility of establishing the central registry of media ownership, including online media. Another way to decrease the political and business influence over media, partially at least, is to stimulate journalist associations to seek funding from international organizations (including the EU), NGOs and other initiatives that support professional journalism. An example that can be followed is the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN). This is an independent network of local and regional NGOs that strive to foster media independency and freedom of speech (the BIRN’s platform, Balkan Insight, regularly publishes professional and evidence-​based reports about the ‘troubled past’ of BiH, including war crimes and sufferings, as experienced by all victims of war, regardless of their ethnicity). In the interest of raising the quality of BiH media, our second recommendation emphasizes the need to strengthen, improve and update media regulations in the country. Although the Communication Regulatory Agency of BiH is operational, multiple analyses (see, for example, Bukovska, 2012) have shown that the Agency’s independent work has been hindered by several issues (for example, budgetary constraints, the over-​politicized process of selecting its leadership and supervisory bodies). There is also the Press Council (Vijeće za štampu BiH), which is supposed to support professional standards in print and online media, but as a non-​governmental entity it has limited powers regarding the imposition of regulations and laws in the media and is, according to a few experts (Kasumović et al, 2019; Sokol, 2019), mostly inefficient. Thus, NGOs, international organizations, local and foreign media experts and/​or political parties could send an initiative to the Council of Ministers to launch the process of making necessary changes, which would decrease the political influence over the Communication Regulatory Agency, especially its governing bodies. This would foster the professional standards needed for the overall improvement of media reporting in BiH, as also some other institutions could directly benefit from this. Our third recommendation pertains to the changes of laws for the protection of journalists, who are, as our research and several other analyses 33

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have shown (see, for example, Institucija ombudsmena/​ombudsmana za ljudska prava BiH, 2017), often targeted because of their work, in particular when it comes to unravelling corruption and crime. We recommend the relevant institutions –​first and foremost, the Ministry of Justice of the Federation BiH and the Ministry of Justice of RS –​to launch the public debate, followed by the procedure leading to the legislative changes, which would define the attack on journalists as a serious violation of public order (or, in the most serious cases, as a special act of crime). The political landscape, ethnic divisions and even journalist intimidation minimize the diversity in the media, promote segmentation and discourage freedom of expression in BiH. Although the country’s Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, it remains questionable how much people truly feel comfortable practising it. Thus, our recommendation is to further promote and ensure the freedom of expression in the media, but at the same time, to limit and sanction the spread of disinformation and fake news. In this regard, as the first step, we suggest launching public debates at the institutional levels throughout BiH, in order to come up with the draft of legislative changes in relevant domains –​including the sanctions for violations and hate speech in the media. As a non-​traditional form of media, social media represents a great challenge in terms of regulation and has been the hub of hate-​speech rhetoric and tensions among the main ethnic groups in BiH, especially among the younger generations and the diaspora, which is also very active online. Hence, this recommendation, which is related to the previous one, necessitates strengthening the regulations of hate speech in social media and its sanctioning. By establishing stronger regulations within the relevant legislative frameworks (for example, the Law on Communications of BiH, the Law on Public Information of RS and Law on Communications of FBiH and so on), online space for ethnic animosities could potentially be minimized. The Press Council has the role in this regard; its work and responsibilities should be further promoted, so that people in BiH become aware of the existence of this important institution. We also recommend that faculties with journalism departments consider modernizing media curricula (new special courses, practical teaching methods and so on). In this regard, the ministries, and other institutional bodies in BiH responsible for media and/​or education, NGOs and so on should support or offer courses, workshops and conferences to improve the skills and professional standards of journalists. In the RePAST media analysis, we found that BiH media mostly focus on political and historical issues that solely pertain to ethnic divisions, and much less on gender issues. On the other hand, an increasing number of artists and activists are addressing stigmatized issues of BiH history, which is an example to be followed also by the media. Thus, our final 34

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recommendation in this section is to stimulate the debate on gender issues in the media, especially destigmatization of wartime rape and its female –​ and male –​victims.

Politics The first recommendation concerns the need to support the ‘de-​ ethnicization’ of BiH political parties –​especially those embracing ethno-​ political rhetoric –​through fostering integration into the political groups in the EP. While the divisions along the ethnic lines are mostly visible in the BiH’s political arena, the potential ‘Europeanization’7 of political parties in BiH is still not explored and utilized enough. In this regard, the EU could, through the EP, for example, guarantee internships or traineeship positions for professionals and leaders from BiH political parties. Many political parties have so-​called ‘youth wings’ (sections), which are the extensions of parties that provide space for young people to develop their skills and meaningfully participate in political life. Youth wings in general serve different purposes, all of which provide entry points to enhance both youth political participation and strive towards reconciliation. As Ozerdem (2016) argues, there are many examples of the contribution that the youth have made towards reconciliation, such as strengthening of community cohesion and trust-​building activities across different ethno-​ religious groups. The potential of youth party wings within this paradigm should not be neglected. Even more, the prospective of youth wings for facilitating networks and formation of personal and/​or issue-​based alliances across ethnical lines is perhaps possible due to their shared burden of being young and inexperienced and often not taken seriously in public sphere. This recommendation concerns the need to professionalize national youth party wings in BiH through EU grants and programmes, for example, via the Council of Europe Schools of Political Studies, or via already existing seminars and workshops that could be organized by the EU Delegation in BiH. The BiH educational ministries and institutions should launch a public campaign, aimed at encouraging political parties’ youth wings to engage in these frameworks in order to develop skills, expand knowledge and create networks. Our research in the RePAST project has shown that the links between youth of different ethnic background in BiH are scarce and weak. Thus, this recommendation links with the previous recommendation and concerns the need to support intra-​country mobility of political youth wings. While the political reality of BiH is predominantly unravelled within each respective political entity,8 this does not mean that the strongest political parties (such as the Party of Democratic Action, Alliance of Independent Social Democrats and Social Democratic Party of BiH, HDZ BiH and 35

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so on) do not have their local branches throughout BiH and assure their representation in each of the two political entities. Furthermore, they tend to be even more instrumentalized if they function in an entity where they are representing an ethnic group that lacks clear majority (for example, HDZ BiH or Party of Democratic Action in Republika Srpska or SNSD in Federation of BiH). This type of antagonizing, which is predominantly based on the talks on ‘who is the legitimate representative of one ethnic group in one political entity’ could be mitigated if younger generations of future political elites would bridge the lack of intra-​country mobility. Such initiatives could strengthen the civic dimension and in return offer a platform for conducting political activities beyond entity-​level. Last, but not least, the actions that stimulate political or civic participation of young people, who are not members of youth wings of political parties, should also be supported. Our next recommendation is to support initiatives that try to hold accountable BiH’s political parties, in particular its elites. Consolidated democracies have, through time, developed robust civil society platforms –​usually called Truth-​meters –​that are focused on promoting the accountability of political parties and public officials towards their citizens. Such platforms already exist in BiH; one of them is Istinomjer, which evaluates public officials’ statements in terms of their truthfulness and fulfilment of the promises and election promises they have given. By backing Istinomjer and similar initiatives with financial and political endorsements and public campaigning, the EU could foster the accountability of political parties and public officials. This would shed a light upon (shallow) promises from the main BiH political parties, which have been exhibiting a clear pattern of populism and ethno-​ political exclusivism. Even though life in BiH is dominated by ethno-​politics, it does not mean that social solidarity across ethno-​politics never happens. In the last few years, our findings in the RePAST project have shown that there have been several examples of mobilization ‘beyond entity lines’ and beyond identity politics (the protests in Tuzla in 2014, floods throughout the country in 2014, protests for David Dragičević in 2019, LGBT activities that connect activists from both entities and so on). Stemming from this, our last recommendation is to advocate for functional partnerships through issue-​based policies and topics beyond ethnic lines. In line with this, new political parties or younger political parties should learn from such trans-​ethnic or civic activities and search for policies that do not inherently contain ‘ethnic character’. Here, the contemporary strategies adopted by the EU, such as the New Green Deal or Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans, could be used to forge trans-​ ethnic political partnerships in order to achieve sociopolitical transformation of BiH’s political landscape. 36

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Arts and culture The field of arts and culture is in BiH perhaps one of the most relevant in terms of the possibility of making a step towards overcoming the troubled past, as arts and culture often inherently believe in universalistic and humanistic rather than narrowly defined ethnic principles. The ‘interethnic contacts’ and exchanges between artists and cultural workers have made significant progress in the last years, and this should be further supported. Our first recommendation is to enhance the support for cultural and artistic projects and activities that foster the idea of the common belonging of all human beings, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, political opinions and so on. Like other ministries, cultural affairs also fall under the jurisdiction of different political entities. This means that cultural affairs are also not centralized, as several institutions throughout BiH deal with culture. The ministries and institutions responsible for cultural affairs in BiH should stimulate such projects and should also engage in acquiring donors’ money for supporting such activities. Such projects, transcending ethnic boundaries, could eventually loosen the grip of ethno-​political narratives pervading in BiH. The next recommendation concerns a shortage of qualified and skilled professionals in the cultural sector in BiH; this is what the findings in the RePAST project and some other studies have shown (British Council, 2018). The latter study demonstrated that the skill gaps in the cultural sector are so wide-​ranging that the potential of cultural workers cannot be fulfilled. Thus, we recommend that the BiH institutions responsible for cultural affairs, in cooperation with international donors, who eagerly support such activities, strengthen the programmes for acquiring the knowledge on cross-​sectoral and technical skills of workers in the cultural sector. As the report of British Council (2018) has shown, individuals working in the cultural sector, including those in managerial positions, lack the managerial skills and are ‘self-​taught’ or work based on their ‘inspiration’ in this regard, because these skills have not been taught during their education. We propose the ministries of education and faculties to modernize educational and training programmes in culture by fostering knowledge and skills needed in the 21st century. For example, knowledge on general cultural management (including event management and marketing), strategic planning, critical thinking and critical writing, audience development and audience engagement, entrepreneurial and business skills (including proposal writing and income generation) is something that can be fostered and financially supported. It is recommended that the institutions responsible for cultural affairs throughout BiH develop programmes and policies for ‘audience development’. The need for ‘audience development’ is important for all 37

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segments of the cultural sector; in particular, public cultural institutions face a big problem attracting audiences and visitors. However, the costs of people’s participation at such events in a country with difficult economic circumstances is something that should be prioritized in the future thinking (for example, free or subsidized tickets), because many people cannot afford to participate in cultural events. Regarding understanding the position arts and culture have in BiH, it has to be acknowledged that the stereotype of artists as persons who are always depending on the other (for example, state support) and cannot earn money with their work is quite common. Thus, it is recommended that the ministries and institutions responsible for culture in BiH launch campaigns to alter the impression that artists are people who cannot make a living from their artistic work alone (for example, by showing some good examples of artists who earn enough to make a living from their artistic work). Our research has shown that, with some rare exceptions, the majority of BiH artists work and perform/​display their work in the political entity they live in. Thus, our last recommendation in this domain concerns fostering mobility in the artistic and cultural sector. In addition to the need to enhance international exchange of cultural workers and artists (which would enable visiting professors and experts coming to BiH and BiH teachers and cultural workers going abroad), intra-​country mobility programmes of cultural workers and artists should be developed by the ministries and institutions responsible for culture and education in BiH. Also, cooperation between schools and universities teaching arts across the boundary of a political entity is something that can be encouraged with different projects (for example, Bosniak and Bosnian Croats students meeting their peers in RS, and vice versa, or, at least, to exchange ideas and works online).

Conclusion Our research confirmed that although the conflicts in BiH are complex and intertwined, and thus, hard to dissolve, because they serve the ethno-​ political elites and the centres of power well, there are nevertheless several positive elements that could be utilized in future attempts for overcoming the troubled past. The loss of the two most important ethno-​political parties, Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and Party of Democratic Action (SDA), at the local elections in Sarajevo and Banja Luka in late 2020, voices of some journalists, civil rights activists and others that unequivocally speak against ethnic nationalism, civil rights actions that cross ethnic boundaries (LGBT movement, the initiative ‘Justice for David’ and so on), interethnic cooperation during the emergencies (floods) and some other developments we unravelled in earlier work in the RePAST project have shown that ‘the 38

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ethno-​political glue’ might not be a means which would per se and always be a trump card that wins in BiH. New information technologies and the overall digitalization of life –​the topics that have not been explored in this project in detail but can nevertheless be considered in these concluding thoughts –​offer several possibilities for BiH, as well. They are relatively cheap and offer more chances for greater participation in public life, and are, as some authors claim, consequently more ‘democratic’ (Ulbricht, 2020). Some of these aspects can be directly and relatively quickly utilized in the implementation of these policy recommendations (for example, exchanging work of artists across ethnic lines or history textbooks through e-​platforms). Our research has also shown that many young people are less burdened with the impact of the most recent war in BiH. A lot of them are willing to question prejudices against other ethnic groups, have fewer stereotypes and are prepared to challenge the dominant ethno-​political narratives despite the fact that they might face pressure from their social groups. Research has also shown that especially young people (students) in BiH do not necessarily perceive ‘the Other’ in BiH through an ethno-​political lens (Zupančič et al, 2021b). Hence, as clichéd as this might sound, the youth in BiH is the group that is on average more willing to engage in the activities that go beyond ethnic boundaries –​if the opportunities are provided, of course. However, exactly here lies the problem. It is the dire social, economic and political context that generates frustration for young people. In such circumstances, it is easier to fall prey to ethno-​political narratives, which do not only give people a sense of (illusory) stability, but often also provide some sort of economic security (for example, by securing jobs through political connections). Creating viable opportunities for youth, thus, might be a step forward in overcoming the troubled past. As this is not happening, it is no surprise that young generations from all ethnic groups are leaving BiH at alarming rates (for example, since 2013, more than 200,000 people have left the country) (Sarajevo Times, 2020). The public debate on the troubled past should be promoted by all means, especially among the youth. However, such a debate should aspire to go beyond ethnic boundaries and the questions that do not work for the good of reconciliation (for example, which of the groups suffered more during the war). The discussions should perhaps be led by actors that do not resort to narrow ethno-​political interpretations of history and the present; there are a few of them in BiH and they could be mobilized by the stakeholders that strive for overcoming the troubled past in cooperation with international actors for this purpose. This way, the message that people from all ethnic groups suffered in the war –​and are still suffering today from the things that fairly transcend ethnic boundaries (poverty, lack of opportunities, corruption and so on) –​could be better heard. 39

4

Kosovo: Troubled Past and Its Path to Moving On Introduction Debates about Kosovo’s troubled past mostly reflect on the last war (1998–​9) that de facto brought to an end the reign of Serbs. Occasionally, these discussions extend to the period of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the foundation of the Albanian independent state in 1912, the Second World War and the period of Yugoslavia when Kosovo was for some time an autonomous province populated with Albanians, Serbs and other communities –​and even further back, to the Middle Ages, when the Serbian medieval state ruled these territories. Mostly, for Kosovo, the troubled past started erupting again in the late 1980s, when the autonomous province was stripped of autonomy by Milosevic; many researchers take the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo that took place at Gazimestan near Prishtina in 1989 as a prelude to the point of no return, which was then set in stone in June 1999 with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops being deployed to Kosovo after a NATO military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). During the clash between Kosovo Albanians and FRY in the 1990s, segregationist policies were implied in education and Kosovo Albanians self-​organized parallel institutions, schools, elections and healthcare as a non-​ violent movement in response to segregation policies imposed by Milosevic’s Serbia. Parallel with the non-​violent movement, Kosovo Albanians who were dissatisfied with non-​violence organized the military resistance which led to creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The war started with sporadic clashes between the FRY forces and the KLA in 1998, which erupted in March 1999 just before the NATO intervention that started on the 24 March 1999 and lasted until 10 June 1999. The Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe (OSCE) in a report from 2003 estimated that during that time 862,979 refugees left Kosovo and were pushed towards

40

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neighbouring countries in Albania, Macedonia and some in Montenegro in the attempts to ethnically cleanse Kosovo (OSCE, 1999). After the war ended in 1999, a new period of dealing with the past started, mainly dominated by court processes and less armed violence in the ethnically still divided society. To date, conflicts of the past are often brought back to life by the media and political discourses which produces hate and stands in the way of ethnic reconciliation and overall political progress. Dealing with the past is a difficult issue for Kosovo but also Serbia for various reasons. Especially in Kosovo, the conflict extends to the narratives on European integration and regional stability. In this regard, most of the advances made so far are a result of European Union (EU) mediation. Kosovo’s contemporary conflicts, which are rooted in its troubled past, are considered a significant future risk for European integration. Media, a very important power in Kosovar society, often looks back at the past to work with the present and future through extended roles of journalists and through daily coverage of the conflict. Consequently, dealing with the past is one of the important subjects for journalists in Kosovo (Sweeney et al, 2020). This is reflected in the media contents as well. Kosovo’s troubled past is very much part of day-​to-​day politics and public debates. These debates are filled with central narratives on war crimes committed by Serbian forces during the war but also on crimes committed by Albanians after the war officially ended. These debates grew with the establishment of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) with the law by the Kosovo National Assembly in 2015 but were also present during the indictments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) during the early 2000s. In 2015, the law on KSC and SPO was adopted by the Kosovo Parliament and was sponsored by then President of Kosovo who was accused of human organ trafficking among other things in a report of the Council of Europe compiled by Dick Marty (CoE, 2010). As a result, four KLA leaders and several lower ranking officers have been accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity and joint criminal enterprise by the ICTY. For the last two decades, dealing with the past in Kosovo has been fed on major narratives of Serbian war crimes against Albanians. Ethnically motivated crimes committed against Kosovo Serbs after the signing of the Kumanovo Agreement (NATO, 1999), according to which FRY’s armed forces had to retract to Serbia, were rarely mentioned. The narrative on Kosovo’s troubled past and crimes of Albanians against Serbs sparked up again during the government led by Vetëvendosje’s Albin Kurti, which lasted only four months, when his advisor –​a Kosovo Albanian –​accused the KLA of committing crimes against Kosovo Serbs in post-​war setting (Frontal, 2020). He was released from duty by Kurti due to public pressure. These debates prove that war crimes are a major theme in the field of dealing with the past and for the transitional justice initiatives in Kosovo. The 41

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ICTY and other justice mechanisms in both Kosovo and Serbia, in many people’s opinion, have been unable to address the challenges of prosecuting individuals for crimes committed during and immediately after the war in 1999. The debate now provides a political arena for competing narratives about the war in 1999 and post-​war, both internally in Kosovo but also in international forums when discussions about Kosovo arise. Albanian competing narratives are mainly focused on one side on the peace-​oriented Democratic League of Kosovo and war-​oriented KLA along with political parties deriving from KLA leadership. On the other side, there is a competitive narrative between Serbs with more nationalistic ideals who are represented by Serbian List (Lista Srpska) and the more liberal narratives stemming from the non-​governmental organizations. There are limited activities within non-​ nationalistic and ethnocentric political parties among Kosovo Serbs such as the Serbian Liberal Party or other initiatives. The Kosovar landscape is thus multilayered with political and competing narratives. The EU institutions have been proactively trying to work with Kosovo and Serbia in normalization of relations, with the EU-​facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia remaining a priority for the EU (Zupančič, 2018; Osland and Peter, 2019). The EU Special Representative for Kosovo, Miroslav Lajčák, was appointed to ‘achieve comprehensive normalization of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, improve good neighbourly relations and reconciliation between partners in the Western Balkans, helping them overcome the legacy of the past, and contribute to the consistency and effectiveness of EU action in the Western Balkans’ (CEU, 2020). Miroslav Lajčák was only partly welcomed in Kosovo as his appointment was met with scepticism. According to one of the interviewees, the European institutions present in Kosovo (both the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and the European Commission) but also the Council of the EU have not been actively promoting a unified approach to dealing with the troubled past. Lately, the sentiment that the EU is treating Kosovar Albanians with higher standards in many areas is growing mainly due to the inability of the EU to decide on the visa liberalization for Kosovo after Kosovo fulfilled all preconditions and due to slow progress in negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia.

Methodology and data collection We produced the first draft for discussion with policy makers based on 20 oral histories of interviewees that experienced conflict both directly and indirectly (indirectly meaning that interviewees have transmitted information regarding the conflict), eight in-​depth interviews with journalists from leading media outlets that cover historic subjects and dealing with the past, and six guided group discussions with 56 participants throughout Kosovo, 42

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including discussions with Kosovo Serbs in the northern parts of Kosovo. The discussions with policy makers were designed in two levels: European level and national level in Kosovo. At the EU level we managed to receive feedback and responses from two important policy makers: • Marek Antoni Nowicki, a former Ombudsperson in Kosovo who is involved in establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission upon the invitation by the President of Kosovo. • Tanja Fajon, who was then a rapporteur in the EP on the visa liberalization process for the Western Balkans including Kosovo. At the national level, we interviewed a list of policy makers, chairs of political parties and civil society organizations from the Kosovo Albanian community and Kosovo Serb community: • Valon Murati, politician of the Movement for Unity, a political party that seeks peaceful unity of Kosovo with Albania, and human rights specialist, former director of the Human Rights Center at the University of Prishtina. • Shkodran Ramadani, a transitional justice and political analyst in Prishtina. • Raba Gjoshi, a lawyer and transitional justice researcher in Prishtina. • Interview with a Western country diplomat who wishes to remain anonymous. • Nevena Radosavljević, a PhD researcher at LMU Munich in the field of peace and dealing with the past. • Boban Simić, an non-​governmental organization activist with 20 years of experience in the field in dealing with the past in Kosovo. • Aleksandar Tanasković, activist in dealing with the past in Kosovo. • Krenar Gashi, Endowment for Democracy Officer for Western Balkans and political science researcher. • Arbër Ahmetaj, researcher on dealing with the past and international humanitarian law. The Kosovo Serb perspective is seen as an important aspect of this chapter. Views of Kosovo Serbs are taken from one guided group held in the northern part of Kosovo, two oral history interviews and an interview with a prominent journalist. Additionally, for this chapter, three out of nine interviewees from Kosovo are Kosovo Serbs. Despite this, those who were willing to talk to researchers represent more liberal views of Kosovo Serbs. Out of 11 interviews, eight were video-​recorded and two took place as a discussion while answers for one of the interviews were provided via email. Policy makers and experts represent a multitude of initiatives in and about 43

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Kosovo. This chapter, however, is not based solely on their point of view but is an inclusive amalgamation of data analysis, authors’ expertise and inputs from the interviewees. Finally, the authors recognize two limitations to this chapter. The first limitation is that several political representatives in the EU and in Kosovo did not respond to the invitation for commenting and interviewing for this work. The second limitation is that Kosovo Serbian voices that accepted the invitation to speak about dealing with the troubled past and give interviews are not a fully representative sample of Serbian community in Kosovo. Several Kosovo Serbs refuse to speak to anyone about issues of dealing with the past and several invitations for collaboration and comments on dealing with the past were not answered by political representatives of Kosovo Serbs and civil society organizations.

Background: the European Union’s approach to the troubled past of Kosovo The first significant document between the EU and the Republic of Kosovo signed in 2015 was the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) even though the EU involvement in Kosovo dates way back even before the 1999 war and continues throughout more than 20 years of post-​war Kosovo (Zupančič et al, 2018) in the fields of peacebuilding and rule of law. This Agreement also maps some areas with the potential of dealing with the past. Section (g) of the SAA commits ‘to foster[ing] regional cooperation in all the fields covered by this Agreement’. In addition to that, article 13, section 2 states that ‘Kosovo commits to continued engagement towards a visible and sustainable improvement in relations with Serbia’. The SAA gained political reaction from the Vetëvendosje in Kosovo but only on the political level. For the most part, the SAA did not receive much attention in Kosovo and respondents in three interviews, focus groups and interviews with journalists confirm the lack of deeper knowledge of the EU involvement in dealing with the troubled past in Kosovo. In evaluating what the EU means for Kosovo and the EU approach to the troubled past in Kosovo, many in Kosovo believe that the EU has helped Kosovo in the past but the reluctance of five EU member states to recognize Kosovo seems problematic (these are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain). Data from focus groups conducted in six different regions in Kosovo suggests that the EU is seen as an ideal aspiration without the deeper understanding of mechanisms and responsibilities of being a member of the EU. In Kosovo, data points to shallow knowledge of the EU normative framework and core EU values. Likewise, data suggests that when it comes to dealing with the past, the EU has not been able to help Kosovo move beyond conflict. Participants point to bold statements of the EU officials 44

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visiting Kosovo and promising ‘European future and integration’ without the ability to deliver it. Visa liberalization is mostly mentioned, and these opinions are also mostly seen through the eyes of news media. Different authors (Balfour and Basic, 2010; Stefanova, 2013; Kostovicova, 2014) see the hope for the EU integration and the European approach of dealing with the past through Europeanization; the latter being an umbrella of a peace project above all and non-​violence as an umbrella of resolving disputes including those of the past. But the problem with this approach is that it takes too long and painful years of pre-​accession processes have led to a rise in Euroscepticism. Other researchers such as van Meurs (2006) raise a hypothesis that Europeanization is a ‘placebo’ for the whole region as there are no clear indicators of a European future for the entire region. This is not far from the truth considering the low success rate of implementations of Brussels Agreements between Kosovo and Serbia which were mediated by the EU (Russell, 2019). These agreements were more practical on the issues of transport, travel and, in particular, enabled Kosovo to have its own mobile network code. It is estimated that these agreements are insufficient for any normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia (ICG, 2013). In northern Kosovo, there is a clear misunderstanding about the EU according to both focus groups and interviews with activists. Additionally, the lack of visa liberalization for Kosovo is an important aspect where the EU is seen as ‘placebo’ considering that Kosovo is the only country that fulfilled all the criteria set by the EU already in 2018 for visa liberalization. In 2023, Representatives of the European Parliament, Commission and Council reached an agreement on visa liberalization for Kosovo with implementation no later than 1 January 2024. The visa liberalization process has been part of most political debates regardless of subject when Kosovo institutions dealt with the EU in any form (European Council, 2022).

Policy recommendations for Kosovo Before the KSC and SPO, the ICTY had a full mandate to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity in former Yugoslavia. However, the numbers prosecuted remained very low in comparison to the war damages on human life and other crimes. Because of such low numbers in prosecutions, the ICTY was unable to provide a justice-​based narrative of dealing with the past or to establish a basis for truth about the war. War criminals and individuals indicted by the ICTY remain national heroes in Serbia and events are being revised in the political narrative, such as the Raçak Massacre in 1999 by the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, for the purpose of political revisionism (Balkan Insight, 2019). In the political discourse regarding war crimes and dealing with the past in Kosovo over the past years, there is a fear of ‘balancing war crimes’ 45

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between ‘Serbian Crimes’ and ‘Albanian Crimes’. The discourse around war crimes in Kosovo as described previously shows the need for lifting policies on dealing with history in Kosovo. In the framework of dealing with the troubled past, Kosovo state institutions have done little to institutionalize any initiative. Besides the Truth Commission initiative by the president of Kosovo (Kosovo Presidency, 2018) and a Division for Transitional Justice at the Ministry of Justice, there is presently no government strategy or policy paper that lays the foundation for policies of the Kosovo government in dealing with the troubled past. The first institution is merely a preparatory team for establishment of the Truth Commission. It oversees setting legal grounds and attempts to inform the public but has been functioning weakly whereas the Division for Transitional Justice at the Ministry of Justice has not made any activity public. Even important processes like ICTY indictments and decisions, KSC and SPO indictments and processes as well as Truth and Reconciliation initiatives such as the one initiated by the former president of Kosovo, find it very difficult to change narratives and practices already established in historic context both in official history and in oral history traditions, media, culture and arts. The following recommendations in four domains are in favour of arguments to adapt better practices and a more integrative approach to collective memory which will lead to the improvement of interethnic relations and possibly contribute to the wider context of reconciliation.

History Kosovo has a rich historic narrative about the past which is highly polarized at the same time. Kosovo Albanians learn history from different books than Kosovo Serbs and this leads to contested interpretations of the past. Such narratives are very much part of the debate today and one can argue are also fuelling conflict as well. Both Albanian and Serbian history books in Kosovo need a deeper reform and rewriting to reflect a more non-​politicized interpretation of the history. Several research publications about Kosovo recommended that already. Gashi argues that history books even contain factual errors and historical inaccuracies besides purposeful misinterpretation of historical events and Di Lellio claims that even history classes heavily rely on oral history narratives due to a lack of trust in the official history books (Gashi, 2016; Di Lellio et al, 2017). Similarly, the empirical evidence from the RePAST project suggests that there is a distrust in official history books and an understanding of the political influence on history books. Oral history interviewees in both cases agree that their views of conflict are shaped to a great extent by their social and family relations. In the framework of recommendations for the history curricula and education, little can be done for Kosovo Serbs due to the fact that education 46

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in Serbian is mostly following the official curricula from Serbia. However, there are some useful examples of joint efforts for multiethnic schools like in Kamenica where both Albanians and Serbs learn some of the classes together (Balkan Insider, 2018). Our recommendation aims at the regions with mixed populations where this can be applicable. As this is already being tested also by the Ministry of Education of Kosovo, only additional recommendations are evident here. One of the improvements that we recommend for the Kosovo government is that there is a need for a comprehensive initiative to review history curricula in Kosovo, starting from primary school through to high school education. A scientific approach should be considered as a means of textual construction of narratives of history. Along with this, teacher-​educator trainings should be utilized to enhance teaching techniques and interactive learning of history. This should also include visits, treasure hunts and other digitalized methods of teaching history such as gaming and virtual reality. During the RePAST fieldwork, many interviewees responded that they have little information about public spaces and commemorations of the troubled past. Namely, museums have very little presence in learning about history and the troubled past. On a national level, the Museum of Kosovo is open and functional, but it is not frequently visited by pupils and the younger population of Kosovo. On a local level, such initiatives are generally basic and unstructured where history is learned as ‘all in one’ from ancient times to the most recent troubled past of the war in 1999. The situation could be improved by establishing an ethnically inclusive approach to museums and history learning by the Kosovo government and parliament. Establishing a museum of war/​conflict certainly would contribute to enhancing knowledge and understanding of collective memory and history for the younger generations belonging to all sides and communities in Kosovo. Along with the inclusive approach, visits to such museums should be part of the obligatory education curricula. As seen from previous research, teachers in Kosovo receive little training in this area. Most history teachers have a university degree or even a postgraduate degree, but training in collective memory, oral history and research methods would enhance the abilities to teach history in a more democratic way. Our next recommendation is for the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology to organize trainings for primary and secondary teachers to enhance their knowledge of the importance of the other side of historic truths and multi-​sourced information regarding the troubled past. Also issues such as collective memory, troubled past and oral history are important to be included in such trainings. History is said to be unattractive but, from the focus groups, we have seen that the opposite is true. Many in Kosovo express that they are eager to learn history, but that the learning methodology should change. Typically, 47

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history learned in school is traditional and official whereas in today’s communication and information society, there are alternatives to learn history and learn more about the troubled past. In northern Kosovo, there is a general understanding that history is problematic and often a source of conflict in the Western Balkans according to an anonymous interviewee. We recommend including more communication tools in learning such as gamification of the history learning process as well as learning by visiting and explaining historical events. Accurate representation of the history is important and therefore the situation would improve should the government of Kosovo give space to alternative ways of learning which remain faithful to truthfulness and historic accuracy. This could include innovative ways of learning history by history games, treasure games and other quizzes that will enable curiosity and exploration of history by pupils and students. In addition to that, actions such as the organization of treasure hunt games in historic places to make such trips and visits more interactive and personal for those who are learning, would improve knowledge of history. Predominantly, this should be done in primary and secondary schools but also at university levels. We noticed during our work that respondents are somewhat confused about what museums should cover. Suggestions were that museums should represent the suffering of children, women and other marginalized groups more as that is what is not present in the current representation of the troubled past in Kosovo. Specifically, suggestions for a museum of sexual violence, museum for child victims and museum of communist crimes were mentioned. Kosovo has recently seen an unusual initiative to deal with the past, namely the proposal to turn Prishtina prison into a museum of communism which materialized only in 2022. The former speaker of the Kosovo National Assembly proposed that Prishtina’s train station be turned into a museum to commemorate the expulsion of citizens by Serbian forces in 1999 on a train towards Macedonia. Many other proposals to turn public buildings into museums have been announced but have received little attention. Nevertheless, it is of utmost importance that museums in Kosovo include all ethnic groups in the way they treat the past, no matter what kind of museum it is. Video installations, objects of art and culture and interactive methods should be employed more to make it easier for audiences to comprehend such materials. Kosovo should have a strategy and lay down plans for commemorating the past where museums include the contested past. Kosovo has contested narratives and past(s) and that should be included in the museums. Events, places, installations and architecture should be part of the past. Places with contested historic value such as the Monument of Brotherhood and Unity in Prishtina, Graves of Martyrs in Prishtina, or a destroyed monument in Landovica near Prizren can easily be reconstructed with older photographic evidence and video-​archive. 48

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Media The media model developed in Kosovo after the war has a gap when it comes to dealing with the past. To start with, lessons from March 2004 have hardly been learnt. In 2004, the media was blamed by the OSCE for emotional, unsubstantiated reporting about a tragic event involving innocent children (three Kosovo Albanian children were reported to be chased by Serbs into a river where two tragically drowned) and one-​ sided reporting about the unjust arrests of ‘liberators’ by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the blockade of the main roads of Kosovo by rebellious Serbs. (OSCE, 2004) Our first recommendation is therefore aimed at tackling the problems in media reportage, which today still includes ambiguous coverage of the past in current media productions and mostly manifests as inflammatory language and hate speech in social media (Hoxha, 2020). The Press Council of Kosovo can play a big role as it should issue recommendations to its members on dealing with coverage of the past based on the current Code of Ethics and applicable laws in Kosovo. It is important that self-​regulating bodies understand that media coverage must keep a standard of reporting in relation to the past and refrain from inflammatory language. Media regulation in Kosovo through the Independent Media Commission is of a high standard and self-​regulation of the press through the Kosovo Press Council is well organized. However, little is known about the ownership, modes of operation within newsroom, censorship and self-​censorship in the newsroom. Deriving from this, it is also little known about the propaganda or the propaganda models on which such newsrooms are premised on (Andresen et al, 2017; Jungblut and Hoxha, 2017; Hoxha and Andresen, 2019). Our second recommendation is therefore to work more on disclosing this information as only full transparency and inclusive media can build a more democratic society. Besides media, Kosovo has one of the highest penetrations of internet in the region with 88.8 per cent (Hoxha, 2007; Jungblut and Hoxha, 2017; Hoxha and Andresen, 2019) and inevitably high involvement rate on social media networks. Social media and networks are very popular in Kosovo among political leaders, parties and for overall communication. Mustafa’s government for a couple of years only communicated with the public via Facebook and the last coalition government was negotiated through Facebook by publishing details even before the news had reached the other party in negotiations. Similarly, political parties, organizations and individuals with influence mainly use Facebook to communicate. Media also have a very high presence on social networks (Shahini-​Hoxhaj, 2018). 49

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The biggest problem with the media in Kosovo remains in the sphere of social networks due to it being unregulated and without any filtering of content. Misinformation and purposeful accusations about the past have been also conducted by the political leaders. Therefore, our third recommendation is that it is essential that Kosovo media regulation and self-​regulating bodies take the initiative and proactively meet needs and expected roles in democracy and functional society. Institutions such as the Independent Media Commission should have a proactive approach in identifying content that is contrary to the regulations, namely against the Code of Ethics especially in the field of privacy and dealing with the past. So far, this institution mostly operates on a complaint basis, but it should take a more proactive role. One important problem with reporting in Kosovo is that Serb journalists in Kosovo do not associate often with Albanian journalists, either in forums or in membership in the Association of Journalists, unless mediated by UN agencies or the OSCE. Kosovo Serb journalists have their own association which collaborates closely with the Serbian Journalism Association. This is deepening divisions in ethnic reporting in the media but also in relation to dealing with the past. Our next recommendation is therefore to create joint shared associations, forums or support different kinds of joint efforts for better cooperation between Serb and Albanian journalists in Kosovo. Both of the two most important media-​regulating institutions (namely, the Independent Media Commission and Kosovo Press Council) should be more proactive in information literacy and learning about dealing with the past. These two institutions should play a more proactive role with audiences as well in training and explaining the nature of the news in relation to dealing with the past. On top of that, they should be helping northern Kosovo Serb media in developing their capacities further for better information.

Politics In Kosovo, all the political parties have different approaches in dealing with the troubled past. One should mention that, thus far, there has been very little attempt at a systematic approach to dealing with the past. There have been some attempts, like the creation of the Institute of War Crimes, established to gather materials and dossiers related to Serbian crimes in Kosovo. This Institute was established in 2008 and was headed by a well-​respected retired diplomat and professor but with not much success. All governments announce that they will establish some institute for investigating war crimes, but this never materialized so our first recommendation is to deal with war crimes in a systematic and unified way. The political party system in Kosovo should invest more in interethnic dialogue and dealing with the troubled past. Youth organizations of 50

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political parties should be empowered and given the space for interethnic collaboration and joint efforts starting from political manifestos to application of such actions. This should also be reflected with the Kosovo government which should have a systematic and ethnically inclusive approach to dealing with the troubled past by creating an inclusive strategy, encompassing all of the ethnic groups. Our third recommendation is connected to the rule of law. Institutions should not try to override judicial justice so the government’s first approach should be judicial, and that should be followed by other actions of transitional justice as well as commemoration and so on. Here, civil society should also be included. The Kosovo government should recognize and adopt the work done by non-​governmental organizations and learn the lessons in the field. Lessons involve memory projects such as Humanitarian Law Centre with the Memory Book and non-​governmental organization Integra with its memory project of interviews of surviving families of missing persons. Normative initiatives such as the Truth Commission (Office of the President of Kosovo) should be reinforced for a sincere internal dialogue focused on dealing with the past in an ethnically inclusive manner.

Arts and culture Troubled past is often a theme of artistic and cultural exhibitions in Kosovo. The artistic scene in Kosovo has produced several films that deal with the troubled past such as Jamie Donoughue’s Shok, which was nominated for an Oscar.1 The fact that Jeton Neziraj’s (2017) play caused controversial reactions as well as other similar developments in artistic field, indicates the lack of political will to deal with the past. Jeton Neziraj’s paradoxes are seen as ‘antipatriotic’ and ‘Yugonostalgia’. Another interesting development in Kosovo in the artistic scene in relation to dealing with the past is the subject of sexual violence. An artistic installation was created at the Football Stadium in Prishtina called ‘Men doj per Ty’ (Thinking of You) in 2015 for several months to increase awareness of sexual violence during the conflict in Kosovo. There is a stigma attached to sexual crimes and debating on the subject publicly. The artists and producers of the installation ‘Mendoj per Ty’ tackled this problem and wanted to break these taboos by asking women and men to donate women’s dresses for the installation. Some 5,000 dresses were donated for the installation that was supported worldwide. The president of Kosovo started by donating her own dress and supporting this initiative. This installation was followed by the erection of Heroinat monument in 2015. The unveiling of this monument caused mainly positive reactions in Kosovo. Although it is a main narrative that 20,000 women were subjected to sexual violence during the war in 51

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1999, the Kosovar society has not been very open in recognizing this crime and speaking about it. The unveiling of this monument created a momentum and recognized all women by awarding each of them a medallion (hence the monument is made of 20,000 medallions with a woman’s face). After this monument and the ‘Mendoj Per Ty’ campaign, many women came forward and spoke openly about sexual violence and rape that had happened during the war in 1999. Furthermore, more women came to denounce such crimes. But this monument did not go uncriticized. Political parties at the national assembly blocked a law for official victim status for victims of sexual violence for 3–​4 years and only very recently has this law been approved. Besides this, a radio drama produced by Kushtrim Koliqi, which tackles missing persons and sexual violence as result of war, caused (negative) public reactions as well. This production was broadcast on National Public Radio in 2020. In the northern part of Kosovo, namely in the city of Mitrovica, interesting projects are serving as a basis for enhancing interethnic collaboration in the artistic field. Mitrovica Rock School is a good example of a joint initiative, which, according to its description, ‘connects Serb and Albanian teenagers through music’. It brings back ‘a music tradition that makes both sides proud and it invests in the city’s young people’ (Mitrovica Rock School, nd). The school claims to stand for ‘quality education in popular music, teaching employable skills, and putting the “rock” back in the “Rock City” of Mitrovica’ (Mitrovica Rock School, nd). Similarly, there are other initiatives such as ‘Kosovo Reality Show’, a four-​ part television series made by Kosovar Serb and Kosovar Albanian artists (Brownell, 2013) or joint initiatives to address the traumas of the wartime past where collaborations with Serbian artists are intended to bridge post-​ war divides. All these initiatives mentioned earlier have sometimes also sparked angry reactions because of the lack of knowledge of the other side’s story. Rarely museums in Kosovo show the components or stories of other ethnic groups. Our first recommendation is connected to the need of inclusive artistic and cultural activities. Memory and the past should be more integrative and not exclusive to ethnic groups. Museums and memory agents should consider the ethnic composition of Kosovo and the collective suffering from conflict. In addition to that, memorialization of the past through culture and arts should be more systematic to not enhance the nationalistic and problematic heroization of known and unknown crimes. This applies also to the truths about the conflict established by justice mechanisms that should not be contested in official narratives of the conflict and dealing with the past. Often, in Kosovo it is noticed that ICTY and other court decisions are contested in public and in official narratives and this practice does not help dealing with the troubled past. 52

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Conclusion The heaviest burden of dealing with the past in Kosovo falls on the Kosovo Albanian community as the majority of the population in Kosovo is part of this community. However, it has to be acknowledged that also Kosovo Serbs, on the one hand, have difficulties because many of them do not want to have anything with the state of Kosovo, and, on the other hand, they also feel ‘abandoned’ by Belgrade. The framework of making reforms in the education curricula, making museums interactive and useful for the aim of Kosovo as a multiethnic state with European integration aspirations, as well as making media and politics work for the people of Kosovo, are tasks for the government which has to improve life in Kosovo after much suffering and the war of 1999. Dealing with the past is the best course of action for the future of Kosovo but also for regional stability. This chapter recognizes the difficulty of interethnic collaboration and reconciliation. Several factors heavily influence such a difficult environment, among which are also those of a practical nature, such as language. Serbian and Albanian are different languages and Kosovo Albanians and Serbs do not include learning Serbian and Albanian in their respective schools. An exception is in Kamenicä/​Kamenica, in the eastern part of Kosovo, where pilot schools started joint classrooms in primary schools. Another aspect that makes dealing with the past very difficult is that the political climate is polarized to the degree of fundamental discrepancies of opinions of political elites in how they see the future of Kosovo. For Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo is an independent country and will remain so, whereas a majority of Kosovo Serb follow the official political standpoint on Kosovo by the Serbian state. This makes dealing with the past almost impossible when it comes to practical policies such as museums, education curricula or arts projects. The political climate influences two more major aspects of life in Kosovo which makes collaboration and reconciliation hard if not impossible. Due to political rhetoric and narratives, cleavages in society have deepened since the 1980s and it is difficult to set a line of collaboration in any sphere. Some exceptions are in the area of missing persons, with the mediation of the EU in finding missing Albanian victims of war in mass graves in Serbia and attempts to find those who went missing in post-​war Kosovo. Another aspect influenced by political rhetoric is the bottom-​up approach dialogue, which is not very popular except for civil society organizations which are donor-​driven in most cases. Overall, Kosovo needs to step up in dealing with the past as soon as possible. Reforming education curricula in history, making good use of museums and other education resources to increase quality in education will

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decrease social media hate narratives and deepening of the conflict between communities. Artistic projects of joint interethnic nature will contribute to a better society and increase interethnic tolerance. Last, but not least, the media has a particular role to play in post-​conflict and reconciliation, namely the role to inform and work in the general interest of the people.

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PART II

EU Member States

5

Germany: The Wall is Dead, Long Live the Wall!? Introduction ‘If the goal is to escape the power of the past, whether that is more likely to happen through forgetting or remembering is still quite open’ writes Helmut König (2008, p 33), referring to the question of how to deal with the destructive power of history. According to the German political scientist, the pendulum between the two poles of remembering and forgetting is not primarily about morality but about which option can be expected to yield the most significant return in terms of the stability of the social order (König, 2008, p 39). The question at stake is how history and memory politics can promote integration processes and, thus, ensure social cohesion. If this were easy to answer, many of yesterday’s conflicts would be resolved today. Yet, it is precisely this question that is at the heart of this chapter, which aims to provide an impetus for rethinking the (post-​)socialist practice of remembrance in Germany. In recent years, with the emergence of Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident in 2014 and the landslide electoral successes of the right-​wing party Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany –​ AfD) in the Eastern German states, Germany’s (post-​)socialist past has once again become the focus of attention. Finding the reasons for the advance of the right in the East has been driving scholars and researchers ever since, filling many a bookshelf in the 30th anniversary year of the fall of the Wall and German unification (see, for example, Dahn, 2019; Engler, 2019; Kowalczuk, 2019; Mau, 2019; Pollack, 2020). Moreover, the shift to the right in East Germany has put the question of how to deal with the (post-​)socialist legacy back on the political agenda. In April 2019, the German government under the then-​chancellor, Angela Merkel, set up the Commission ‘30 Jahre Friedliche Revolution und Deutsche Einheit’ (30 Years of Peaceful Revolution and German Unity) operating under the motto, ‘German Unity is a process that is not yet complete’ (Enders et al, 2021). The Commission’s 57

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report, published in December 2020, contains recommendations for action aimed at increasing public focus on East Germans’ ‘lifetime achievements’ over the past 30 years. In particular, the transformation experiences of East Germans are highlighted as an essential asset for today’s change-​driven society, including ‘major trends such as digitalization, globalization, sustainability, climate protection, and energy transition’ (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, 2020, p 19). At this point, it is essential to mention that the foundations of hegemonic (post-​)socialist memory in Germany over the last 30 years are not the subject of the Commission’s report, nor are they called into question, which shows the self-​evident use of specific terms and formulations in the report.1 Hegemonic (post-​)socialist memory includes, first, the memory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) that has long been constructed primarily through the prism of dictatorship and totalitarianism (Sabrow, 2009; Meyen, 2013; Heß, 2014; Glück, 2021). It encompasses, second, the memory of the fall of the Berlin Wall, which has gone down in the history books under the narrative of the peaceful revolution (Rudnick, 2011), and, third, the accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic, commonly referred to as ‘reunification’, now openly dubbed a ‘takeover’ (Dahn, 2019; Kowalczuk, 2019) or ‘annexation’ (Milev, 2018). The politics of history and memory in any society are determined by power relations that underlie the various narratives. This explains why some narratives have greater penetrating power than others, which exist in a society but are hardly perceived publicly (Molden, 2016). In Germany, too, everyday memory of the (post-​)socialist past is far more pluralistic (Martens and Holtmann, 2017; Meyen and Pfaff-​Rüdiger, 2017; Fiedler et al, 2022). Some voices, especially from left-​wing circles, never tire of emphasizing the many positive aspects of the GDR, such as family policy, gender equality and social security. In their view, these achievements were deliberately pushed into oblivion after the fall of communism to erase from public memory leftist ideas and utopias (Wippermann, 2009). If one zooms into right-​wing milieus, one will likely come across the narrative of the stolen revolution of 1989. The East German people had been deprived of the promise of national unity by the immediate sellout of Germany to Brussels through the 1992 Maastricht Treaty or the introduction of a common European currency (Fiedler, 2023). Others, in turn, see the period of post-​socialist transformation as the nucleus of the current social unrest. Petra Köpping (2018), Minister of State for Social Affairs and Social Cohesion in the East German Federal State of Saxony, speaks of ‘humiliations, insults and injustices’ (p 9) that East Germans experienced ‘quasi collectively’ (p 71) after the fall of the Wall, including the large-​scale privatization of formerly state-​owned companies, the devaluation of diplomas and qualifications, or the loss of jobs leading to 58

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unprecedented mass unemployment in the East. She claims, therefore, that the post-​unification period should be subjected to a political reappraisal. ‘To this day, there is no all-​German understanding of … the administrative and, despite the best intentions, paternalizing development aid process’ that East Germany witnessed after unification, writes East German author and dramaturge Thomas Oberender (2020); and ‘[t]‌here is a lack of understanding about how comprehensively and unprotected all social bodies and enterprises experienced this shock therapy in a short period’ (pp 43–​4; similarly, Engler and Hensel, 2018, p 69). The persistence of an East–​West polarization in Germany today is not only directly related to this past, that is, the German division and the unity of the two German states under Federal Republican auspices. It is also closely linked to the contemporary public construction of Ostdeutschsein (East German-​ness) that results from this historical legacy (Kollmorgen, 2022; see also Foroutan and Hensel, 2020). Unlike West Germans, people from East Germany are often blamed as a collective group, associated with negative attributions (Clarke, 2002; Ahbe et al, 2010; Kollmorgen and Hans, 2011). If one follows social scientist Daniel Kubiak (2019), the German public is regularly confronted with ‘discussions about East Germans and East German-​ness’, which focus on ‘whether this social group reacts differently to cultural developments’ and provide explanations for why ‘East Germans are still less democratic and less integrated into normal German society’ (pp 151–​2). Today, about a quarter of West Germans, but more than half of East Germans, see origin from East or West Germany as one of the most significant social dividing lines (Köcher, 2019; see also Schweiger, 2019, p 24). In particular, the strong support that the AfD enjoys in the East has given new fuel to the idea of an East German Other, who appears ‘as a deviation from an unmarked West German norm’ (Heft, 2018, p 358). Even though the Wall between West and East is slowly crumbling in people’s minds (Heller et al, 2020), 69 per cent of West Germans and 74 per cent of East Germans agree with the statement that the differences between West and East Germans are still considerable 30 years after the fall of the Wall. Drawing on the theoretical concept of ‘agonistic memory’ (Bull and Hansen, 2016), borrowed from Chantal Mouffe’s (1999, 2012) understanding of agonism, the remainder of this chapter argues for bringing to the surface the ‘layered field of sedimentations’ (Marchart, 2005, p 25) in the memory of the (post-​)socialist past in Germany, indeed to the centre of the debate. Specifically, following philosopher Oliver Marchart (2005), this means that the ‘contingent origin is made visible in the confrontation of competing definitions of the past’. As is argued, the re-​centring of (post-​)socialist memory in Germany is important because, until now, it has been primarily the extreme right and left that have attempted to capitalize on the specific 59

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historical experiences of the East German population and instrumentalize them for their own ends. If one follows Anna Cento Bull and Hans Lauge Hansen (2016), agonistic remembering is, on the one hand, understood as distinct from the antagonistic mode of remembering that is closely linked to the notion of the territorial nation-​state associated with ‘first modernity’ –​with a world divided into ‘us’ and ‘them’. Analogously, history is told from the perspective of the ‘good and bad guys’, enriched with nostalgia, glorification and heroism. On the other, agonistic remembering contrasts with the cosmopolitan mode of remembering that dominates most European societies, including Germany, to this day. Cosmopolitan recollection points to ‘the human suffering of past atrocities and human rights violations and represents good and evil in abstract terms’ (Bull and Hansen, 2016, p 390). Its narrative features are characterized by a triad of reflexivity, regret and mourning. While this understanding of remembering principally refers to National Socialist memory in the German context, a one-​sided focus on the victims and downsides of socialist rule (see Sabrow, 2009) cannot be dismissed with regard to the GDR past. According to the agonistic paradigm of remembering, as an alternative way of remembrance, the canon of history and memory politics should have a plural character that considers the different perspectives of victims, perpetrators and third-​party witnesses alike. In the same spirit, a Manichean crystallization of historical action, that is, a juxtaposition of good and evil, should be dispensed with by recognizing ‘the human capacity for evil in specific historical circumstances and in the context of socio-​political struggles’ (Bull and Hansen, 2016, p 399). Agonistic memory is ‘reflexive, dialogic, multiperspectivist’ –​in the sense that the constructed character of memory is exposed (Bull and Hansen, 2016, p 400). Emotions and empathy are not suppressed or one-​sidedly oriented towards pride (antagonistic) or shame (cosmopolitan) but geared towards democratization. Underlying this conceptual orientation is Mouffe’s (1999, 2012) basic theoretical premise that conflict is an integral part of politics. The Belgian political scientist has been criticized for claiming that social consensus is ‘a dangerously utopian idea’ (Erman, 2009, p 1040). With Bull and Hansen, however, it is argued that we need to think of new forms of remembering to deal with the challenges of the present. The reason is that the widely propagated cosmopolitan mode of remembering, which can be associated with ‘second modernity’, has not succeeded in overriding antagonistic collective memory. On the contrary, the cosmopolitan memory is increasingly pressured by ‘new antagonistic collective memories constructed by populist neo-​nationalist movements’ (Bull and Hansen, 2016, p 390). This is also true for Germany, where the latter strive to cloak post-​socialist memory in Germany in a national garb –​for instance, with slogans such as ‘Then as now: We are the people’ (Damals wie heute: Wir sind das Volk), 60

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‘Complete the turnaround’ (Vollende die Wende) or ‘Turnaround 2.0’ (Wende 2.0), thus feeding the narrative of a stolen revolution (Jessen, 2021, p 32). It can therefore be noted that agonistic remembering is understood as an act that helps society live with (rather than overcome, one might add) social divisions. The formal requirements for the length and the structure of the individual parts of this chapter on the German case mean that some aspects can only be sketched out that would otherwise require detailed explanation and elaboration. For instance, this chapter lacks a thorough overview of the status quo of (hegemonic) (post-​)socialist memory discourse in Germany (see, for example, Sabrow, 2009). The positioning of public commemoration of the (post-​)socialist past in the larger overall context of public communication structures and processes in Germany must also be left out. Consequently, the partially selective accounts of this chapter are primarily intended to stimulate discussion and are not to be understood as a conclusive state of knowledge. The chapter first provides an overview of the data on which the further explanations build. The following section considers the role of the European Union (EU) in East Germany and how the EU deals with (post-​)socialist memory. How the theoretical approach of agonistic memory can be implemented in concrete terms is discussed in the following section by presenting recommendations for action.

Methodological background As in the entire RePAST project, quantitative and qualitative research methods were used to collect data for the German case study. In East and West Germany, 36 guided group discussions with 193 participants and 78 semi-​structured interviews were conducted, resulting in a total of 271 participants in the studies. In addition, the project conducted a representative telephone survey of the population using a standardized questionnaire (N=​ 1,005). Sixteen journalists from leading German media houses and 32 experts working at the intersection of history, memory and culture were interviewed. Furthermore, qualitative content analyses of six print and online newspapers were conducted. Fieldwork began in December 2018 and was completed in spring 2020, ahead of the COVID-​19 lockdown in Europe. Recommendations were refined through five qualitative expert interviews, for which experts from Eastern Germany were almost exclusively recruited from politics, history, media and culture. Ethical considerations (informed consent, anonymity) were considered, as were methodological rigour and consistency. The theoretical framework used was exclusively a discourse theory approach, assuming that discourses are carriers of historical and mnemonic knowledge. Specifically, we posit that memory is to be understood as a discourse that makes visible the contingency and alternativity of causes, extent, forms and consequences of 61

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collective remembrance. This discourse reflects power processes that centre on negotiating socially legitimate truths (Foucault, 1972). The abundance of data, further, does not allow for a detailed evaluation of the various qualitative and quantitative data sets, to which cursory reference is made. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the recommendations are derived from the results of the data analysis and interpretation against the backdrop of the concept of agonistic remembering.

East Germany in the European Union and the European Union’s approach to Germany’s (post-​)socialist legacy When people talk about ‘EU enlargement to the East’ today, they are referring to the accession of ten Central and Eastern European states to the EU on 1 May 2004 and 1 January 2007. The term ‘reunification’ is commonly used to refer to the restoration of Germany’s national unity on 3 October 1990. There is no official term for the integration of the GDR into the European Community (EC), nor is there a separate holiday in the calendar. With the accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany under Article 23 of the Basic Law, united Germany, including its five new states, ‘naturally’ became a member of the EC. Twenty years later, the Dutchman, Carlo Trojan, then-​representative of the Brussels Commission in the so-​called German–​German unification negotiations, recalled that the GDR had been ‘absorbed into the association of states, automatically and without a sound’ (König, 2010, paragraph 2). ‘Will we get a 13th member?’ Jacques Delors, former president of the European Commission, asked West German Foreign Minister, Hans-​Dietrich Genscher, even before the fall of the Berlin Wall. ‘No’, Genscher had replied. ‘We are not getting a 13th member, but one of the twelve is getting bigger’ (König, 2010, paragraph 5). To speak of an ‘integration’ of the East German constituent state is mistaken if one takes the accession process to the EU of the other countries of the former Eastern Bloc as a yardstick. Fulfilment of the accession criteria (democratic and constitutional order, functioning market economy, acquis communautaire), bindingly defined since 1993 as the Copenhagen criteria, usually presupposes a profound transformation ex-​ante, which the EU financially supported and administratively accompanied. Such an ex-​ante integration process did not exist either in the GDR or East Germany. However, those who assume or speak of a ‘quiet slipping in’ (König, 2010; see also Europedirect, 2021) of the East German constituent state into the EC fail to recognize the political realities of that time. According to Hans-​Dieter Kuschel, former Head of the Unit for the Accession of Third Countries to the EC at the Federal Ministry of Economics and Head of the German negotiating delegation for the integration of the former GDR into the EC, 62

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the larger EC countries, in particular, were afraid that a ‘new Hong Kong’ would be created in the Eastern German accession area through ‘generous exemptions from EC competition and state aid law, from the requirements of the internal market rules on health, safety and consumer protection and the plant-​and product-​related environmental law’ (Kuschel, 1991, p 81). The temporary derogations were, therefore, only to be achieved by the promise that the products manufactured in the accession area of East Germany would be consumed and processed in this area only and not transferred to the rest of the EC territory (Kuschel, 1991, p 81; see also König, 2010). Against this background, and considering increasing tensions between the ‘old’ Western Europe and the ‘young’ Eastern European EU member states (for example, Schweiger and Visvizi, 2018), the causes of which are often negotiated in light of the question of cultural identity in the post-​communist space –​which, of course, also includes Eastern Germany (for example, see Pollack, 2004), Jacques Delors’ designation of the GDR as the 13th member of the EC seems, in retrospect, very appropriate. Whereas the EU today, through the common market, creates above all a level playing field for companies and, thus, enables Europe-​wide economic growth, the distribution of wealth is essentially the responsibility of the member states themselves. To a comparatively limited extent, however, the EU also acts in a balancing way to promote the EU’s ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’ (Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). Against this backdrop, the EU’s range of action in East Germany is modest, but it comes out, above all, in the significant use of cohesion funds. Although cohesion policy is not an EU specificity for East Germany, it is an EU policy that, in the case of Germany, applies almost exclusively to East Germany. With the current EU budget and the supplementary COVID-​19 reconstruction funds, considerable funding, once again, flows into Eastern Germany, above all into the lignite regions, which receive special support through the EU’s Just Transition Fund intended to achieve CO2 neutrality by 2050 to make the transition in these regions as equitable as possible. Despite these financial instruments, the East German population’s attachment to and identification with Europe has rapidly declined over the years (Krämer, 2002, p 37). Ten years after unification, the two economists Kathleen Toepel and Christian Weise (2000, p 190) described the weak support for European integration by the population in East Germany as a ‘serious failure’, which was ‘all the more difficult to understand given the positive assessment of how East Germany’s integration into the EC had been shaped’. In their view, the advantages of the EU membership were ‘less obvious for the East Germans’ than for other Eastern European populations, where the EU was perceived as an ‘anchor of modernization’. In the case of East Germany, according to the two authors, ‘this reference point was not the EC but the “old” Federal Republic’. East Germans were not sufficiently 63

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aware ‘that the success of the Federal Republic’s economic order can hardly be separated from its membership in the EU’ (Toepel and Weise, 2000, p 191). This highly functionalist view contrasts with the fact that the West has only partially succeeded in emotionally binding the citizens of the former GDR to the European project. ‘The Euro-​enthusiasm noted in the earlier Eurobarometer surveys in the former GDR’, summarized a special report for the EC in 1993, ‘has now subsided, and the new EC citizens are now in the group of Euro-​sceptics’ (Kommission der europäischen Gemeinschaften, 1993). In 2016, 80 per cent of West Germans felt they were EU citizens, compared to under two-​thirds of East Germans. Whereas more than half of the West Germans supported the idea that more decisions should be taken at the EU level, only a third of the East Germans felt the same way (Europäische Kommission, 2016, pp 5–​8). If one believes the historian Heinrich August Winkler, the East Germans had ‘no chance of developing a post-​national self-​confidence; despite the state doctrine of socialist internationalism, they remained German in a conventional way’ (Winkler, 2018, p 147) –​a thesis that would have to be empirically substantiated, however. While the post-​socialist transformation of the early 1990s hardly seems to play a role in the discourse of remembrance promoted by the EU, the memory of the European continent’s socialist past solidifies into an anti-​ socialist paradigm. The literature notes a trend towards radicalizing socialist remembrance, especially after the turn of the millennium (for example, Mälksoo, 2014). While, initially, the focus was primarily on a moral-​ normative condemnation of the legacy of socialism, over time, calls for the legal criminalization of socialist acts in several Eastern EU countries have intensified (for example, Belavusau, 2018). In 2008, 23 August was proclaimed a Day of Remembrance for the Victims of all Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe. In 2011, the Platform for European Memory and Conscience was founded in Prague, supported by the EP and the Council of the EU. If one follows Kristen Ghodsee (2014, p 117), ethnographer and scholar of Russian and Eastern European studies, this mnemonic strategy must be interpreted ‘in the context of regional fears of a re-​emergent left’ in the wake of the 2010 Euro crisis. ‘In the face of growing economic instability in the Eurozone, as well as massive anti-​austerity protests on the peripheries of Europe, the “victims of communism” narrative may be linked to a public relations effort to link all leftist political ideals to the horrors of Stalinism.’

Policy recommendations for Germany Returning to the initial question of this chapter (that is, how can [post-​] socialist memory in Germany be rethought to help society better deal 64

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with social divisions?), and theorizing it through the lens of agonistic memory, which is to be understood as an alternative to both the dominant cosmopolitan memory in Germany and the antagonistic memory propagated by right-​wing populist forces, then one can identify four modes of action (Bull and Hansen, 2016, pp 400–​1): • The pluralization of voices in the public discourse of (post-​)socialist memory in a European context. • The comprehensive consideration of the historical context and the sociopolitical struggles in the past. • The exposure of the constructed character of (post-​)socialist memory in the present. • The recovery of the meaning of civic and political passions in the public realm. Before applying this framework to the specific case of Germany, however, another conceptual building block for rethinking (post-​)socialist memory is required. In the modes of action proposed here and derived from theory, it is necessary to find the right balance between what Charles Taylor (1994) calls the politics of equal dignity and the politics of difference. The philosopher distinguishes between these two concepts in his famous treatise on the politics of recognition –​a buzzword that has become an integral part of the discourse on East Germany. At the centre of the debate is the recognition of the lifetime achievements of East Germans as a strategy to reduce resentment resulting from a lack of respect (for example, in the report of the Commission appointed by the Federal Government [see Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, 2020]). However, ‘to recognize the life achievements of East Germans sounds as if the East German is dead and must now be rehabilitated’, writes Alexander Osang (2019, p 23). While the concept of recognition, according to the East German journalist, is nothing less than an elegant way for West Germans not to have to move out of their comfort zone even 30 years after the fall of the Wall, others fear that its overemphasis leads to an essentialization of East German identity. Cementing East German identity, that is, recognizing it as a matter of course, would hinder the completion of German unity. Old walls would be replaced by new ones (Ganzenmüller, 2020). Indeed, it is now undisputed that the collective feeling of relative deprivation, that is, perceived inferiority, disadvantage and non-​recognition of East Germans vis-​à-​vis West Germans, plays a significant role in the relationship between East and West (Pollack, 2020; Hidalgo and Yendell, 2021). However, as the cited examples show, there is a lack of a basic notion of how recognition is to be understood, because there is also a lack of definitional underpinning. Undoubtedly, Taylor’s (1994) approach 65

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to the politics of recognition can be considered controversial, but his conceptualization is helpful for what follows, because it highlights the tension in which recognition policy operates. According to Taylor, the politics of equal dignity refers to the equal treatment of people regardless of origin, gender, ethnicity or religion. Applied to the German case, the term relates to establishing a social climate in which people from all over Germany meet on equal terms, are given equal opportunities, and are heard equally in public discourse. Following this definition, no distinction should be made between the East and the West. The politics of difference expresses the goal of remembering, preserving and perpetuating what has been lost in particularistic interests of the East, not only with regard to material traditions (such as arts and culture), but also in terms of intangible assets and property (such as knowledge and skills from a different sociopolitical system and a political transformation). Thus, it is about more than lifetime achievement. ‘What we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of [a]‌group, their distinctness from everyone else’, writes Taylor (1994, p 38). ‘The idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity’ (Taylor, 1994, p 38). Based on this theoretical foundation, agonistic remembering, which is situated in the field of tension between the politics of equal dignity and the politics of difference, recommendations for action are presented in the following section. Although theory usually forms the structural bracket for such recommendations as a matter of course, in this book, for the sake of consistency, they are formulated along four social domains that have simultaneously shaped the RePAST project: history, media, politics, and arts and culture. This explains potential overlap and redundancy.

History ‘Everything already researched?’ asked historian Ralph Jessen (2010, p 1052) 20 years after German unification. The transfer of the files of the GDR party and state leadership to the Federal Archives in Berlin and their rapid indexing in the early 1990s led to a ‘spectacular boom in contemporary historical research on the GDR and a steadily growing stream of relevant publications’ that reached a temporary peak in 2009 (Jessen, 2010, p 1056). Today, another ten years later, Germany is experiencing yet another post-​ socialist memory boom. This time, the focus is on the period of sociopolitical transformation in East Germany after the fall of the Wall and German unity. If one takes the book market as a yardstick, then there seems to be no doubt that the public calls to reassess the history of the post-​socialist transitional period fall on fertile ground. Titles on the role of the Treuhand in the liquidation of former GDR businesses (for example, Böick, 2018; Jacobs, 2020) are today lined up 66

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alongside stories of East German identity negotiation (for example, Foroutan and Hensel, 2020; Schönian, 2020). Yet, the need for conversation is still great. Anyone who has ever attended a public event at which life in the ‘East German transformation society’ (Mau, 2019) was discussed can attest to how many hands go up in the air. Everyone wants to contribute something to this topic. The abundance of books on the subject cannot write away the feeling of one’s speechlessness, which is undoubtedly also because many of the theses from eyewitness accounts and non-​fiction books from the science labs have not yet entered the public canon. The large-​scale promotion of oral history projects in the sense of a politics of listening could flank ‘classical’ historical science at this point. More importantly, a central concern must be the pluralization of voices in public remembrance, which should go hand in hand with the recognition of the legitimacy of the people’s very different experiences, not their delegitimization. East Germans as legitimate speakers, this means: What skills, knowledge, and expertise do East Germans bring with them that can be of use to today’s society? Journalist Christian Bangel played this out using the example of ‘post-​capitalism’. Ecological, social and economic challenges will bring about the end of the capitalist age of profit maximization, commercialization and waste of resources. Thinking a society anew and differently, according to Bangel, is exactly the point where the East German perspective is needed, in the middle of which ‘the fixation on market economy and profit characteristic of the West is missing’ (Bangel, 2020, paragraph 31). To turn the wheel further, many of the questions and demands of the 1989–​90 transitional period become relevant again today and are more topical than ever. Historical scholarship should make the countless position papers and visions of the future of the various actors of the ‘Wendezeit’ the subject of research and examine them for their usefulness today. These documents bear witness to a time without barriers to thought, when political and economic particularistic interests had not yet gained the upper hand. Such a change of perspective would also help to raise public awareness of the period of (post-​)unification as an all-​German conflictual context in its own right. The results of qualitative research in the RePAST project have shown that this part of German history –​including the dismantling of East German industry, mass unemployment, but also the ‘baseball bat years’ (Bangel, 2020, paragraph 21) as a reference to xenophobic attacks in East Germany –​is still understood by many (West) Germans primarily as genuinely East German history and not as a shared past of Germans as a whole. One of the reasons is that structural connections, including the role of the West in these events, are not recognized as such and should be more clearly emphasized in public memory, which is currently limited to a chronology of a few significant events of that time. 67

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School education can make a positive contribution to such a development. Topics and issues concerning the history of both German states, including the sociopolitical implications that shaped the period of German division and unification and continue to shape the memory discourse today, should be given a higher priority in (history) school instruction than is currently the case. Especially the younger generations, whose knowledge is based exclusively on handed-​down family memories and school history lessons, often feel insufficiently informed about this part of German history and consequently complained in the interviews and focus groups conducted in the RePAST project about the inadequate coverage of this period in the school curriculum.

Media ‘If East Germans were phenotypically recognizable, there would have been a quota long ago’, writes sociologist Steffen Mau (2019, p 185). The transfer of elites after the fall of the Wall (Kollmorgen, 2021) and the sellout of East German media houses to West German publishers (Tröger, 2019) have resulted in an under-​representation of East German journalists in the upper echelons of media houses that is still noticeable today (Kollmorgen, 2020). Although an Eastern quota should be viewed critically, measures must be taken to make media houses aware of this imbalance. A comprehensive awareness programme ideally starts at the relevant journalism schools and in media and communication studies, where Germany’s (post-​)socialist history and research on the East must be anchored as core elements in the curricula. Correcting the East–​West imbalance would have the positive consequence of less one-​sided reporting on the East. ‘Ossi bashing is one of the obligatory exercises of the most important opinion makers’ (Engler and Hensel, 2018, p 31). The pluralization of perspectives on the period of German division, unification and the post-​transition period, but, even more so, their airing and the recognition of their legitimacy, are inevitable. Last, but not least, the media should be encouraged to question their role in the unification process, make their (previous) interests transparent, and rethink entrenched media memory practices and stereotypes about the (post-​) socialist past. ‘Critical navel-​gazing’ could have the side effect of regaining the (East German) audience’s lost trust in the media.

Politics ‘If it were possible in East Germany today to activate this reserve of maturity and joy that was formed in most people from the experience of the peaceful revolution in 1989, that would be an enormous empowerment’ (Oberender, 68

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2020, p 45). But how can politics succeed in replenishing this now-​dried-​ up reservoir of civic and political passion that characterized the period of political upheaval in East Germany in the 1990s? The need for many East Germans to talk has already been addressed earlier in this chapter, as has the imperative for a politics of listening and the need to evaluate and harness the ideas and visions of the transformation phase. At this point, the large-​scale promotion of grassroots remembrance politics can be added. Initiatives, such as ‘Aufbruch Ost’ and ‘Netzwerk 3te Generation Ost’, already show what bottom-​up remembrance can look like. One of the most exciting RePAST findings for the German case is probably that, according to the representative survey conducted as part of the project, 37 per cent of respondents wanted the EU to do more to address the concerns of people who were affected by the consequences of German unification (39 per cent were neutral on this question, only 16 per cent opposed this request, 8 per cent did not answer). Interestingly, it is primarily those respondents who feel close to the East German side that want to see more EU involvement in dealing with this conflict-​r idden past. Of them, 56 per cent agreed with the statement that the EU should pay more attention to the concerns of people who were affected by the consequences of German unification. What if Germany were to set a cautionary example in Europe and reflect on the period of upheaval after 1989 in a public and critical way? Germany could set the tone here with a fundamentally renewed remembrance policy in the EU, which would address both (post-​)socialist history as such (what happened in 1989/​ 90, including the liquidation of the GDR, which was often perceived as premature) and the consequences of the memory practices of the past 30 years (including the ongoing challenges in the German–​German unification process). Such a mnemonic incision at the political level would have a broad societal impact on other areas of society (such as media, culture and arts). A critical public approach to the memory practices of the past 30 years could not only motivate other European countries to reflect on how to deal with the (post-​)socialist legacy of the continent but would also send an important signal to the Eastern European states within the EU. ‘To be European is to be Western European’ (Oberender, 2020, p 57). A European remembrance policy should consider the (post-​)socialist transformation experience of the so-​called former Eastern Bloc societies and its meaning and role for today. Thus, Germany could exemplify in the national what concerns the EU as a whole. A critical reappraisal should ideally include a revision of archival legislation, particularly the handling of the archival heritage from the party and state apparatus of the GDR. Although this archival heritage was made accessible to the scientific community on a large scale after unification, many files from the times of unification are still under lock and key on the part of the 69

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Federal Government. ‘The consequences of this imbalance for historical research are serious and well-​known among archivists and historians in Germany’, writes communication historian Mandy Tröger (2020). ‘They relate to a broader political agenda [and] to the writing and construction of German-​German history. They also partly explain the often one-​sided and GDR-​centric approaches in current German-​German history writing’ (Tröger, 2020, paragraph 3).

Arts and culture It is ‘time for a change of perspective’, says East German author, Marko Martin (2020, p 33), writing against the forgetting of GDR culture. Literature, film, songs or paintings from the East are ‘unexpectedly relevant again today’ –​they exist, ‘not because of the party regime or against it, but despite its strangulating effect’ (Martin, 2020, p 13). If one follows Martin (2020), then renitence is the magic word: GDR literature, for example, tells ‘how subordination has always worked in Germany’ (p 30). He writes of Deutsche Film Aktiengesellschaft (DEFA) films that never survived censorship or eventually disappeared into the archives, of novellas with subversive messages, and of songs whose lyrics no one remembers today. While East German collections (often under West German management) now exhibit West German works as a matter of course, it is considered absurd to show East German art in West German collections. ‘Where do works by Hermann Glöckner hang today, except in Dresden?’ (Oberender, 2020, p 75). Only those who have left the East are considered legitimate East German artists. It is time to raise the cultural treasures of Germany’s socialist past, to make them more visible in public –​in school lessons, in exhibitions, in museums, in the media and to acknowledge more emphatically that the art and culture of the GDR belong to the cultural heritage of the Germans. Moreover, this public visibility should also benefit art in the post-​transition period. ‘For the post-​revolutionary transformation period and its wildness, its traumas, struggles, abandonment, and survival strategies in East Germany, there is still no adequate language, except perhaps in art, in films about the post-​ unification East’ (Oberender, 2020, p 46).

Conclusion The public (post-​)socialist memory discourse in its current form may be only one of many causes for the actual or subjectively perceived East–​West difference in Germany. However, it is precisely the public discourse of remembrance that, like a background foil, determines and defines how society deals with this very difference between the East and the West. 70

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Therefore, it is precisely here that one needs to start to meet the societal challenges of the time effectively. Using the theoretical concept of agonistic remembering, this chapter identifies and discusses how (post-​)socialist memory in Germany can be rethought. A new approach is imperative, if only to counteract tendencies of antagonistic remembering. The latter is becoming increasingly prevalent despite the dominant cosmopolitan memory paradigm. The recommendations for action proposed in this chapter are based on the thesis that we do not need to learn to overcome social divisions but to accept and endure them. When marginalized, excluded or delegitimized voices are given a stage alongside dominant ones, the historical context in which past sociopolitical struggles were fought is naturally reassessed, dominant narratives of the present are renegotiated, and civic and political passion is brought back into the public sphere. These recommendations for action form only a tiny part of what would be possible with the concept of agonistic memory beyond the societal fields presented here –​history, media, politics, and arts and culture. One could add, for example, education, research, pedagogy, urban planning or economics. The latter were not treated as separate research fields in the RePAST project. Nevertheless, each of them, in its way, plays an essential role in memory work. For the European context, it can be summed up that there is still a great need for research on the discursive reappraisal of the Cold War, the fall of the Iron Curtain, and the post-​socialist transformation in Europe by the EU and its appreciation by the population in (East) Germany and other (East) European states. This empirical deficit can also be observed in the reception and perception of the self-​evident accession of the former GDR territory to the EU from a historical and contemporary perspective. Here, science and research still have some catching up to do.

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6

Ireland beyond Ethnopolitics: Recommendations for All-​Island Integration Introduction Since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in April 1998, Northern Ireland (NI) has experienced a degree of transformation and has made substantial progress in many areas in terms of peacebuilding, community cooperation, enhanced economic growth, inward migration and outward engagement with the international community. While the Troubles may have officially ended more than 20 years ago, the legacy of the conflict remains to this day. Collective and individual traumas are still present along with continued community divisions. Unionist and republican communities have yet to find consensus on a range of issues, including the release of political prisoners and parades, as well as annual issues stoking cross community tensions such as the 12 July bonfires commemorating the victory of Protestant King William of Orange over the Catholic King James in 1690. The emergence of a new Irish Republican Army (IRA) paramilitary and the political party Saoradh, perceived to be their political wing, has been a new factor raising tensions. Communities face new challenges such as the decision for the UK to leave the European Union (EU), despite the North largely voting to remain. The need for peacebuilding initiatives within NI and cross-​border cooperation between the North and South of Ireland is ongoing. As well as concerns about the potential for the reintroduction of the border creating high level political tensions at a state level, the Brexit referendum highlighted continued divisions within NI. The resurgence of nationalism among the loyalist and republican communities and the expression of their allegiance to the UK and the Republic of Ireland respectively are seen in the continued debates between the place of NI in the UK and the calls for a border poll to vote for a reunification with Ireland. There are concerns that the political divisions 72

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could percolate down through the population and provoke an increased division at a community level, that if unaddressed could result in a return of inter-​community violence. Our research into the challenges faced by organizations in NI and Ireland as they deal with the legacy of the Troubles revealed a number of initiatives in place. These seek to identify opportunities for further cooperation, integration, social and economic justice, healing from wounds and inter-​state cooperation. Several themes emerged that cut across each of the policy areas: trauma and the need for healing; the pluralization of identities rather than a two-​sided society; barriers to ongoing community and organizational engagement both within the North and between the North and South of Ireland; and the need for publicly available resources and accurate information. The current chapter builds upon existing initiatives and the findings of our research into the memory of the conflict in order to develop a set of recommendations and potential pathways for a future for the whole of Ireland and its inhabitants. The chapter further relies upon a set of interviews with key policy stakeholders. We asked these key persons to discuss the continued legacy of the Troubles in the four key areas at the heart of RePAST: history, media, politics, and arts and culture. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the methodological considerations. It then moves on to discuss the existing EU policy responses to the conflict from a historical perspective, corresponding to the different phases of the Troubles and the key event of the GFA, concluding with the current phase of the fraught Brexit negotiations. Having set the context, the fourth section discusses the four key policy areas as previously outlined, laying out a series of policy proposals.

Methodology and data collection The methodology underpinning this chapter, which follows the methodological approach applied also in the cases of other countries investigated in this book, is based on a two-​step strategy in order to secure the quality based on the previous field research in Ireland and to receive inputs from relevant stakeholders and policy makers across key areas. Insights were also sought from the education and community work sectors, all of whom have extensive experience in assessing what types of cross-​community projects are feasible and actionable. In Ireland the key context specific criteria for selecting stakeholders were: • Engagement with cross-​border project, conflict legacy issues and/​or Brexit in the last four years as an organization or representative body. • Development of reports, policy or other lobbying activities on said topics as representative of a sector or specifically as an organization. 73

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• Funded by local, national or European bodies to engage in research, advocacy and policy on said topics, with particular interest in PEACE-​ funded organizations (GovUK, 2020).1 • Having a more general sectoral interest in said topics and social cohesion across the island such as non-​governmental organizations, civil society, education and community sector. The first step was writing the draft version of the proposed recommendations for future strategies for addressing troubled past. This step, based on the previous research on Ireland and NI in the RePAST project, was completed in early May 2020. The policy issues we sought to address largely emerged from the findings from focus groups and interviews detailed in Chapter 2. The second step followed in mid-​May; the draft recommendations were sent to the selected policy makers and stakeholders. Each participant provided a written report about the policy recommendations and this was followed up with interviews. We sought to find policy makers in the four main areas that address the main work packages: 1. government representatives (Department of the Taoiseach, Department of Commemorations and Members of the European Parliament [MEP]); 2. community-​based organizations representing victims of the conflict (Wave Centre, Youth Network for Peace); 3. representatives of the media (NUJ, News Brands Ireland [the representative body for national newspapers], and the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, and so on); 4. arts and culture organizations, both national and cross-​border (Irish Museums Association, Arts Council of Ireland and Centre for Creative Practice). Despite the difficulties of the lockdown periods during the COVID-​19 pandemic in 2020, in Ireland we succeeded in engaging six key persons. A particularity of the sample of people who engaged with us is that they straddled a number of our key areas and gave us important feedback and ideas in fruitful interviews. Their experience included working in non-​ governmental organizations, cross-​border sector, the arts and heritage sector, community support and peace activists.

Background: the European Union and the Troubles Main phases of the EU’s engagement with the Troubles: • 1968–​72 Civil Rights period –​there was no EU but negotiation of the UK and Ireland assumption to the European Economic Community (EEC); 74

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• 1973–​98 Troubles period –​the EU was not directly involved; • 1998–​2016 Peace Agreement –​EU Funding through Peace, and so on; • 2016–​present post-​Brexit period. The EU approach to NI and Ireland’s troubled history has three main phases: first a constitutional approach from 1973 to 1998; second a peacebuilding approach from 1998 to 2016; and, finally, after Brexit, a defensive role.

Constitutional approach from 1973 to 1998 Neither NI or Ireland were members of the EEC in the early stages of the conflict during the Civil Rights era from 1968 to 1972. Both the UK and Ireland joined the EEC on the same day in 1973 as the Troubles escalated after Bloody Sunday. While NI became a member via the accession of the UK, the EEC’s approach was to allow the UK and Ireland to address the Troubles on their own. In 1981, the EP established a working party to review the conflict and in 1984 published the Haagerup Report that states the EEC had no role to play in NI’s constitution (European Communities, 1984; Lagana, 2021). While the report condemned violence, it did not seek to intervene, although it advocated European Community involvement in the social and economic reconstruction in the state. In 1985, the EP backed the Anglo-​Irish Agreement by 150 votes to 28, a symbolic gesture of support and, later, in 1992, the EP launched an investigation into anti-​Catholic discrimination in NI. However, from the accession of the UK and Ireland up to the GFA, the EU treated the Troubles as an internal issue for the UK. The EU wanted to be seen as politically neutral (Rois, 2019).

Peacebuilding approach from 1998 to 2016 The EU approach changed substantially, becoming more engaged after the GFA. The UK’s and Ireland’s membership in the EU provided an important platform for the GFA negotiations because there was a common customs and travel area (Rois, 2019; Kołodziejski, 2022). This meant that the border and checkpoints between NI and Ireland could be more easily removed. After the GFA, there was a much stronger focus on economic stability and structural investment. Trade was a common cause as was common travel and all of the stakeholders in the GFA had a shared future in Europe. From 1998 to 2016, the EU financially funded a range of special projects under the Northern Ireland Peace Programme and Interreg Programme (Interreg, nd; GovUK, 2020) in NI, Ireland and the UK run by the Special EU Programmes Body. The Special EU Programmes Body was established in 1998 after the GFA to facilitate the positive impact that European Regional 75

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Development Funding will have on the lives of people living across NI, the Border Region of Ireland and Western Scotland (Interreg, nd). Since 1998, it has released six rounds of funding (Peace I–​IV and Peace Plus round) for a range of projects from cross-​community arts projects to combatant reform (Coop Ire, 2021; Kołodziejski, 2022). • • • • • • •

1989 funding of the PEACE Programme established; 1995–​1999 Peace I; 2000–​2004 Peace I extension; 2004–​2007 Peace II; 2007–​2013 Peace III; 2014–​2020 Peace IV; 2021–​2027 Peace Plus.

Focus of funding initiatives is on cross-​community, cross-​border and regional development as opposed to the cross-​national. Such do not address substantive issues such as justice, truth and accountability at a state level or in terms of legacy investigations into the Troubles, factors which have been central to the discourses of people in NI and Ireland. Additionally, socioeconomically, particularly after 2008, funding to cross-​community groups from the EU does not make up the wider funding cuts (austerity) administered by national governments.

European Union policies after Brexit The decision by the UK to leave the EU has substantially complicated the peacebuilding process in NI by creating two customs areas on the island of Ireland as well as introducing complications in the arrangements regarding the free movement of people on the island. This marks the third and most recent phase of the EU approach to the conflict in NI. Because of the complicated nature of the Brexit negotiations, the final agreement between the UK and the EU has been reached only in December 2020 and includes the Protocol on Ireland/​NI which came into force in January 2021. However, some aspects of the arrangement regarding the border in NI with the EU (Ireland) are still being contested. In 2021, the UK faced severe difficulties because of the Brexit agreement in several areas (moving livestock, pets, medicines, steel quotas and so on) and asked the EU for flexibility on the Protocol. In July 2021, the UK asked for changes in the Protocol on Ireland/​NI including removing the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU over the Protocol (UK Government, 2022). This was the line the EU did not want to cross and after the UK government in May 2022 announced that it would introduce legislation to suspend parts of the Protocol, the EU started infringement proceedings against the UK 76

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that could lead to proceedings at the Court of Justice of the EU (European Commission, 2022). The Protocol on Ireland/​NI states that the GFA will be protected in all its parts. This includes the provision of no hard border on the island and a continued all-​island economy. However, at the same time both the EU and UK recognize that two different customs jurisdictions introduce a range of complications in a range of policy areas. Among the positions the EU took is the defence of the rights of Irish citizens in NI and the recognition of their status as EU citizens too. The rights of Irish citizens to live, work and access public services in the UK are protected under the Common Travel Area arrangement (European Commission, 2018; 2019). Much of the focus of the EU’s position during Brexit negotiations was on trade and travel rather than the potential for the resurgence of violence, although there was strong support for avoiding a hard border on the island that many believe would be subject to attacks from the New IRA. In this regard, the EU did not directly engage with the issue of the conflict, although the support for the primacy of the GFA did display a strong support for continued peacebuilding. Going forward, the future of EU support structures such as the PEACE funding is unclear as they were inherently cross-​national and cross-​communal but within the EU. One of the purposes of the funding was to enhance and normalize cross-​border activity with the idea that the conflict would over time transform in lockstep with the social and economic developments (Lagana, 2018).With the UK outside the EU, it is not clear that funding would be supplied to organizations or projects not based within the Union. A Joint Committee of European Commissioners and UK ministers will develop and implement the measures regarding the border. Donald Tusk, the then President of the European Council (2020), has said that NI can rejoin the EU without the formal application process in the case of a united Ireland (RTE, 2017). The Brexit agreement involves also a border set in the Irish Sea but the implications of the new border arrangements on the peace process will have to be seen when the agreement is practically implemented.

Policy recommendations for Ireland Ahead of detailing specific policy recommendations, it is necessary to outline the broad objectives researchers were seeking to achieve and the dynamics of the contexts in which policy recommendations might be deployed. One of the main challenges that emerged from the analysis of focus groups and interviews with the public was the differences in experiences of conflict across the island, from first-​hand experiences in the North to a mix of direct and indirect experiences along the border and finally more mediated experiences farther south. The question for researchers here was how to 77

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bridge the gaps in understanding between those whose experiences are indirect and mediated with those who have direct experiences, many of whom are actively part of justice movements. Key to the thinking that underpins these recommendations is the need to build up multiple relationships across the island, on a cross-​community basis within NI, on a cross-​community basis across the island and more broadly the relationship between NI and the ‘South’. Similarly, there is a need to build relations at multiple levels, from state institutions to community groups. The precarity that resulted from Brexit is another issue researchers considered in policy development. The ultimate impact of Brexit on institutional relationships north and south is unclear. The referendum has provoked a significant shift in Northern Irish politics. The Stormont elections of 2022 saw the Democratic Unionist Party lose support, due to their pro-​ Brexit agenda, in favour of more neutral parties such as Alliance, and leading party Sinn Fein announced they would seek a border poll with their five-​year term. Therefore the policies were designed to withstand significant changes and aim to operate within processes that have been agreed would continue after Britain leaves the EU. In line with the methodological approach of this book, recommendations are broken down into four distinct sections; history, media, politics, arts and culture. The following sections are structured by introducing the issue that emerged from field research followed by the authors’ analysis and recommendations.

History In this section recommendations are focused on three key areas: first, the development of public resources accessible from across the island. The development of public historic resources feeds into multiple sectors, each of which is addressed in turn. Second, support for the use of new resources and, third, a revision of commemorative practices. One of the most pervasive themes that emerged from stakeholders across each of the sectors was the importance of recording, documenting and archiving the history of the conflict on one hand and making it accessible to the public on the other. We see a need for an extensive project that collects and indexes a wide range of texts associated with the Troubles. By digitizing this archive it is accessible across the globe while local supports and training can be developed for different sectors across the island. While the primary materials can be digitized and made accessible, support materials can be adapted for educational settings, as public resources and for cultural institutions. Many of the respondents in interviews and focus groups identified substantial variations in what each generation learned at school about the 78

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conflict and through comparison recognized gaps in their education. In the Irish education system, the history of conflict is either identified as lacking or limited to a chronology of violent events and significant milestones to be learned. The curriculum of modern history tends to stop about 30 years before the year of study which contributes to the generational variations in education regarding the Troubles and colonialism more broadly (Department of Education, 2003). For example, students in the year 2000 would have learned Irish history up to 1970. In Ireland, the history syllabus for second level students regarding NI covers the years 1949–​93, cutting off before the peace talks began or the GFA was reached. While the curriculum is comprehensive in covering the main topics of this phase of the Troubles, it would be desirable to provide more complete coverage of the main part of the Troubles in NI, including the fact that peacebuilding was part of the conflict and continues today. As part of this, there is opportunity to teach critical approaches to history and representations of ethnic or sectarian conflicts. In this regard, educators may need additional resources and training incorporated into their practice, education or as part of specialized career development workshops and seminars. There is a need for future reform of history education at all levels (primary, secondary, third level, adult and community) that could consider contextualizing the history of conflict in Ireland with a particular emphasis on under-​represented issues. The latter can be the broader legacy of colonialism across the island, socioeconomic dimensions underlying conflict or/​and the role of state actors as active political agents rather than external neutral forces. This could provide a firm basis for a more cohesive and critical understanding of conflict. Our research indicates that there is an under-​representation of the diversity of identities in Ireland and NI. This under-​representation concerns both native identities associated with history and conflict as well as new ethnic hybrid-​ identities such as those of people from a migrant background. Contemporary life on the island of Ireland comprises a wide range of national, ethnic and religious communities. People identify with a diverse range of Irish historical, cultural and political histories as well as histories from a range of nations around the world. The enhancement of resources such as the Blue Star Programme (Blue Star, nd) that explores the variety of ethnic and national identities in Ireland at a primary school level, by including recognition of the range of identities in Ireland and NI, as well as the development of a similar initiative for second level when students are more mature and able to engage with more challenging concepts and questions of identity, would broaden the understanding of the plurality identities beyond the binary perspective of two communities associated with the Troubles. To redress the variations in the educational experiences and phases of conflict mediation in Ireland for the public, a comprehensive publicly 79

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available resource could bridge educational and experiential gaps across a wide audience. A digital repository that collects a range of primary research material about the Troubles, including state papers, records, political debates, newspaper articles and oral histories from all the international parties involved, the UK, Ireland, the EU and the US, could be collated in similar manner to the Decade of Centenary initiative in Ireland. This in turn would allow the public to independently explore the issue (Centenary Ireland, 2012). This resource could be integrated with training and educational supports developed specifically for educators, tour operators, media, and historians and other sectors. To support public engagement and understanding of the Troubles, a project that could ‘datafy’ the Troubles across a range of areas could make this subject more accessible to contemporary audiences. Examples of the areas that could be developed into data sets include the deaths, injuries, incidences such as bomb explosions and bomb threats, arrests, internments, trials, convictions, the location of incidents can be mapped, demographic information of those involved and impacted can be recorded systematically to facilitate data analysis. Other information from state actors could also be addressed such as the number of security orders issued, policy documents and political speeches. Such a resource would show the scale of the inequalities that led to the Troubles as well as reveal the impact on different parts of Northern Irish, Irish and British society through descriptive statistics. This in turn would reveal patterns and insights that cannot be achieved through qualitative analysis alone. To enrich this, the data can be accompanied with qualitative content that chronicles the personal experiences of those who lived through the Troubles and were affected by them. Such a project would support a more systematic analysis of the Troubles’ impact on Irish and Northern Irish society and can also incorporate the personal experiences of victims, perpetrators, political and paramilitary actors to provide a rounded and grounded resource. Stakeholders in the arts and cultural sector describe an absence of knowledge on what artefacts exist and memorabilia from the Troubles, such as civil rights posters, prison art works and military equipment. It is largely unclear what items are available and what their significance is. This is because many of the artefacts are held in private collections or are held by private individuals or families. As such, we recommend the development of an online archive or repository of artefacts of significance in the Troubles, which can be utilized by those who research the material history of the Troubles as well as the public historical sector such as museums. In this way the material history of the conflict can be documented and preserved where necessary while also preventing significant artefacts from disappearing from public or research use. To develop such a repository, an audit of artefacts identifying what they are, where they are held and by whom as 80

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well as additional research for background or contextual information and photographic documentation, would also be required. Such a resource could be made available to a variety of arts, cultural and educational organizations in Ireland, NI, the UK and Europe. Responses from both interviews and focus groups about the Troubles highlighted the issue of ‘silence’. This was both a familial and social issue. Among some families, particularly around the border area, in order to protect children from the trauma and fear of the conflict, they were at times not told about details or exposed to the horrors of the violence. Similarly, among social and professional groups, the issue was not always openly discussed for fear of an individual revealing details that might encourage others to stereotype them as being on one side of the conflict or another. A range of oral history projects have been undertaken over the past 20 years in Ireland (Reinisch, 2016)2 to collect the voices of those who experienced the conflict. Often these projects are separate and miss the opportunity to recognize and utilize this information as a substantial historical resource that could be collated or indexed and made available to researchers to examine from a range of angles. It would be an important resource that can be added to the information in the public digital repository mentioned previously. A review of the topics and issues that have already been undertaken should be conducted, gaps in the record identified and research undertaken to address any omissions. Where gaps are found, we propose the development of open but moderated forums, either in person or online, that allow people to speak openly about their experiences. These could help break the chain of silence and normalize discussion about life experiences around the conflict without incurring stigma. One of the outcomes of Ireland’s commemorations of the War for Independence and subsequent civil war was the extent to which people did not talk or discuss their own or family involvement and how the appeal to come forth with memorabilia and stories enhanced public knowledge and revealed unknown connections between families and communities (NMA, 2016). Involvement in political conflicts has led to division in families (Dolan, 2006) and some efforts to create a space where people can talk openly to overcome the silence surrounding the conflict would help the public and academics better understand the hidden histories and consequences of the Troubles. In our research, one of the key issues that emerged was that the two main sides of the conflict in NI commemorate their respective tragedies separately. At times such commemorations and celebrations can be seen as antagonistic to the other community. The separation of community commemorations and celebrations, while understandable, can perpetuate community division. This highlighted the need for more cross-​community commemorative acts and events that can recognize the shared experiences of both communities. 81

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When we asked participants in focus groups about what could be celebrated or commemorated in the future, respondents highlighted the opportunity to focus on positive aspects such as the peace agreement and peacebuilding efforts. In this regard some efforts for cross-​communal commemoration of the events that brought communities together and overcame the sectarian divides could be introduced. In this way communities can commemorate their respective tragedies separately, as well as mark the events that overcame the divides that caused them. Our literature review of the study of women during the Troubles showed that there is comparatively little exploration of the experiences of women during the Troubles, either as participants in the conflict or as victims or their roles as peacebuilders. This is reflected in the responses from focus groups where participants suggested that there were few differences between men and women regarding their views or experiences of the Troubles. Here, one should point that some participants did suggest that they believed women took on different roles as the conflict progressed and their fathers, brothers and husbands were interred or arrested. Some respondents from NI suggested women would create safe houses, providing supplies and alerting communities to raids by security services. As a result, they too were subject to intimidation by state security forces. While there has been some academic research into women during the Troubles, such as Pierson (2018) looking at parliamentary affairs; Wahidin (2016) examining political protest; Ahmed et al (2016) examining principles for understanding women roles in history; and Graff-​McRae (2017) examining commemorative politics; there is comparatively less research into the roles and experiences of women in the family context, the nature of the abuses suffered, motivations to support paramilitary activities, their views on the cross-​community divides, and a range of other underexplored areas regarding the role of women in conflict history. Exploring this dimension can only happen following attempts to break the silence, encouraging women to talk openly about what they experienced. In addition, silence for women means that trauma was repressed rather than addressed. As a beginning, we propose the creation of safe spaces for women to come together and talk in ways that allow them to relate their experiences in confidentiality, connect with others, and develop an approach to help themselves and other women involved in conflict in Ireland and beyond, including, for example, refugees that have recently settled in Ireland.

Media One of the key issues that emerged from our analysis of media was the need for dedicated support for journalists to investigate and cover issues related to the Troubles. Primary resources can be challenging to access, the demands of the day-​to-​day newsroom can make it challenging to focus on 82

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historic issues or investigations, and there is an underappreciation for the role and challenges of journalists operating in the conflict and following the peace process. We propose enhanced support for conflict journalists in terms of their professional development. One of the key findings from the research into journalism production during the Troubles was the issue of professional development for journalism and media workers. Our research showed various motivations and processes of career development for Irish and Northern Irish journalists who were covering the Troubles and who were working in and continue to cover social, political, economic and cultural topics in Ireland and NI. However, these were ad hoc and reactive as the situation in NI evolved. An overarching professional development framework should be established specifically for conflict journalism. Specifically, we propose the development of literacy on media representations, the role of providing context, trauma support, enhancing access to primary research material and investigating underexplored events, actors and consequences. In addition to professional development, we also see a need for ongoing professional support for trauma and impact training. Responses from participants in our focus groups frequently referenced the need to address mental health issues as a result of growing up in conflict environments as an important social issue in NI. These issues range from acute suffering by victims of violence, surveillance and raids by state security, to broader anxieties and sensitivities around navigating life in a space where bombs and bomb threats or intimidation by state security were frequent features. It is increasingly recognized in journalistic ethical codes and principles that journalists are required to take special care when dealing with victims of trauma, or grief. On the other hand, ethical codes rarely include any practical guidance. Additionally, journalism education programmes do not focus so much on dealing with trauma. This results in a gap in formal training and support for professional journalists in the appropriate practices in dealing with, interviewing, reporting on and representing the individuals involved in violent conflicts or who have suffered personal trauma. An additional dimension concerns the trauma or mental health consequences for journalists themselves as a result of being exposed to conflict events or vicariously through reliving the trauma of others. To ensure the fair and sensitive handling of individuals and communities in post-​conflict societies and to protect and prepare journalists themselves, it is necessary to develop and implement best practice guidelines. Such guidelines should be developed by media professionals and regulations working in association with mental health experts and victims’ groups. To ensure that such practices are sustained over time, annual workshops or short courses could be developed to help support journalists planning to develop projects in this area. In Ireland, there are a range of high-​quality information and 83

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communication university departments who can work with a network of partner organizations and the stakeholders identified to develop and facilitate the ongoing training of media practitioners through seminars, workshops or dedicated short courses to better help address this specialist subject. As noted, NI has experienced inward migration from countries outside the UK and Europe (NISRA, 2020) and sometimes from regions of the world that have also experienced conflict. In this regard, some people from a migrant background have moved from a space where there is a legacy of conflict resulting in collective trauma to another place where there is a legacy of conflict and collective trauma. It is not clear what the impact of this might be on both those people from a migrant background or the communities where they resettle and if there is a sense of solidarity or antagonism or whether this creates barriers to integration in NI. Initiatives addressing trauma in NI and along the border should be open to include and support the experiences of other ethnic and national communities who have resettled in the area. As well as direct support for journalists there is a need to improve understanding around conflict journalism and peace journalism. Journalists who participated in interviews described the prioritization of standard news values in terms of day-​to-​day reporting of the events of the Troubles. They described journalistic routines and newsroom practices which are to some extent formulaic, for example, the over-​reliance on official sources which can result in the narrative of state or official sources represented more frequently and considered more salient by the general public (McCombs and Shaw, 1994). News titles covered events for their respective audiences which were often aligned to either side of the conflict. Nonetheless, we found that not all violence was represented in the same way; republican, or IRA, violence was the most frequently raised, most strongly opposed and often lacked explanatory factors or reference to the actions as political conflict. Rather, these were framed as acts of terrorism. Largely absent from coverage is the question of British state violence, while the strategic representation of republicans as terrorists by the British state served to exclude republicans from the public conversation. The rhetoric and language regarding republican actions revolving around crime and terrorism sometimes resulted in the stigmatization of communities associated with actors in the conflict. Similarly, representations of state actors were often that of peacekeepers, necessary security services and legitimate in their actions. However, conflict journalism, particularly in cases of long sectarian history, requires a more nuanced approach so as not to exacerbate established divides, perpetuate stereotypes and stigmatize communities. Journalism research institutes and professional support organizations have developed general and conflict specific handbooks for journalists covering the conflict (Buromensky et al, 2016; Edwards et al, 2018; War Journalism Resources, nd). In particular, 84

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the conflict-​specific handbooks, such as those used for Ukraine (Webster, 2015), support journalists in acquiring a deeper understanding of the conflict, the actors and the consequences of news coverage politically, socially, economically, taking into account victims and vulnerable communities in these societies. Such resources help guide journalists in navigating complex situations and avoid errors, stereotyping and reductive or overly simplistic representations of ongoing conflict events. Similar research and guidelines have been produced on coverage of peacebuilding and peace journalism, seeking to address the root causes of conflict in order to explore the potential non-​violent responses and failures that led to conflict rather than peacebuilding (see, for example, De Michelis, 2018). Peace journalism aims to address the structural parameters of journalism as a profession that tend to prioritize death, destruction and violence in news coverage. However, there are comparatively fewer resources for journalists’ professional support regarding peace journalism than war reporting. The development of both general best practices for post-​conflict society news reporting and peace journalism, as well as resources and country-​specific guidelines for best practice would be a substantial support to help inform and guide journalists in evaluating and understanding the impact of their work, and the sensitivity required in the representation of post-​conflict communities. In our review of the academic and news media exploration of the Troubles, we found that there was comparatively little interrogation of the socioeconomic contexts that led to inequalities between communities in the North and from which the violent conflict emerged. By contrast, the participants in the focus groups and interviews highlighted that from their experiences, rooted in their communities, much of the aggression, frustrations and capacity for recruitment into paramilitary groups and a radicalization to violence was rooted in economic deprivations, social and political exclusion of Irish Catholics; and that much of the recruitment and radicalization among unionists was also rooted in economic deprivation and lack of opportunities. As such, there is a public interest in the exploration of such issues by the news media. To some extent this is associated with the formats and guidelines for peace reporting mentioned previously and can be addressed in part through improved access to resources and professional training mentioned in what follows. Although such resources could be supported by further research, we recommend the commissioning of specific research by both media and academics into the impact of social and economic factors that shaped the conflict so as not to lose the opportunity to record details and collect evidence and accounts from those who experienced the conflict in their communities. We propose a long form and in-​depth collaborative investigative journalistic project undertaken by journalists from both sides and from the two 85

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parts of Ireland, possibly looking into the history and composition of paramilitary groups, recruitment strategies, and motivations for individuals for joining, supporting or being complicit in the conflict; this may be the last opportunity to speak to some of those involved directly as the first generation of those involved are now aged over 70.3 Aligned with the need for documenting and digitizing the Troubles, journalists similarly need enhanced access to primary research materials. Recognizing the input from journalists who have covered the Troubles to date and the work of academic research by Spencer (2004), there can be frustrations and barriers to accessing primary and secondary material required for reporting and investigations. This is particularly true for the investigation of state security forces and political decision-​making regarding the management of the Troubles in the North by the British, Irish and Northern Irish political institutions. Each year as the statute of limitations on state records lapses that there is ad hoc coverage of historic correspondences, reports and other such state documents. Stakeholders in journalism and news researchers report that there are challenges in accessing the necessary materials regarding the Troubles; particularly from the perspective of the limits stemming from focusing only on one jurisdiction (the NI one). In this respect, all documents related to NI held in NI, Ireland and the rest of the UK could be collected, archived and indexed for ease of reference and investigation. To address this issue, we propose the creation of a centralized database that would include primary and secondary source materials, media packages, resource kits and guidelines for best practices regarding the process of reporting, investigating conflict as well as representing and dealing with victims of trauma. As part of this, an index of experts in various areas related to Irish history and the Troubles that are willing to work with the media should be included. Both the public and journalists highlighted the idea that there were important under-​represented events and perspectives on the Troubles and peacebuilding. We propose that more bursaries or funding are made available especially for early career media professionals to produce media projects about the Troubles, in order to bring a fresh perspective and investigate under-​represented issues or communities. Our research showed that in media content, there were barriers to the thorough coverage of events during the Troubles caused by challenges in production practices of the day. This suggests that the public record of significant events is not comprehensive, and that the significance or impact of seemingly less important events are underexplored. Filling these gaps could help address omissions in public knowledge as well as support the efforts in securing trust, acknowledgement of harm and accountability for victims of the conflict. The digital media environment has changed significantly over the past ten years and audiences are fractured across multiple media platforms. Research 86

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shows that there are substantial differences in the main sources of news used by younger and older demographics (Kirk et al, 2019). Supporting the development and production of new material about the conflict for a range of new media platforms would constitute a means of ensuring that stories are published or broadcast where new audiences are, both online and on traditional media. Recognizing changes in the profession of journalism and the increase in freelance journalists, bursaries would help support freelance and early career journalists covering the conflict, and its legacy.

Politics In the areas of politics, cross-​state and cross-​community, we see a need for the de-​sectarianism of politics including government and state institutions and the prioritization of community representation by political parties through integration into broader European political groups. When we asked participants in focus groups about their identities, a range of complex cultural identities emerged. For example, some who identified as ‘republican’ discussed deep affinity for parts of British culture and may not have interest in Irish language. Many, however, said that they did not overtly identify with being either unionist or republican, interpreting the terms as representative of the conflicting factions during the Troubles and not really part of their contemporary lives. Such complexities were not often reflected in party political representation in NI which tends to revert to the type of sectarian identities formed during the Troubles. GFA seems to have established a segregated peace that in the short term helped to end violence but in the long term has reinforced division and created a barrier to the evolution of political parties that can represent the evolved complex identities for Northern Irish citizens. Segregation in education and in housing communities are examples of how the peace is preserved through division. The agreement between the two sides of the conflict to share power encourages political parties to continue to largely represent and prioritize their respective communities. In campaigning, these parties reassert and promote their respective party-​ political identities. This effectively undermines either of the main sectarian political parties’ capacity to be representatives for all of NI. It may be more productive therefore, to adopt, endorse and encourage measures countering this segregation, for example, removal of Stormont ‘identity’ criteria, 4 desegregation of public services and education (primarily), while also addressing underlying division within housing and other public amenities. Furthermore, we propose the development or extension of initiatives directed at young people to engage with non-​sectarian political activism which should include provision to network with other European political parties to address common concerns such as climate change. 87

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We propose to foster improved trust in state institutions through transparency and accountability processes. Our research into public discourses clearly indicates that many Northern Irish and British state institutions were not seen as trustworthy in governing state affairs in a fair and just manner and in supporting a truly independent and fair judiciary. This was acute in the interviews with victims of the Troubles who expressed resignation and felt there was no hope for seeing truth, accountability of justice for what was suffered during the conflict. The low level of trust in institutions in NI and Britain limits the capacity of institutions to meaningfully deliver and sustain conflict mitigation initiatives and undermines current efforts to address past conflict incidents. This highlights the need to address the organization of such initiatives. In order to achieve meaningful truth and reconciliation the administrators and leaders of such initiatives must be trusted to be fair, transparent, thorough and nonpartisan. Therefore, any institution leading initiatives or investigations into the Troubles should meet criteria that would establish its trustworthiness among Northern Irish citizens who can then be confident in any outcomes. Oversight could be achieved through auditing or mediating by established organizations such as the UN or the European Commission, or a new board established for this project. Any inquiries into historic events should be conducted by independent actors and audited. To enhance this, there is also a need to evaluate former inquiries into the Troubles and report the findings to the public. Previous investigations should be audited to ensure their integrity through employing a transparent set of criteria for assessment or rating system.5 Existing and future investigations into historic events and malpractices should be carried out by independent bodies with full cooperation between the Republic of Ireland, NI and the UK with the EU support. In addition, victim groups should be represented on the governing boards of such organizations, bodies or projects. Communities in Ireland transverse the border from Louth on the east coast to Donegal on the west and decisions are made at local, national and European levels that impact on the everyday lives of the people who live there. To deepen democratic engagement and ensure ongoing involvement in important community, social and political concerns there is a need for ongoing dialogue at an inter-​community and cross-​border level. The development of a cross-​border civic forum or citizens’ assembly where communities can discuss critical local, national and European policy developments that will impact their lives can be discussed and debated in an organized way with mediation. Such forums are increasingly a feature of Irish life and have been conducted transnationally (Ireland Abroad Unit, 2017) and are playing a central role in the redrafting of the Irish constitution (Citizens Assembly, nd). Such initiatives are also recognized by the European Commission as beneficial for supporting participatory community development (Longurova Girova, 2019). For the assembly to 88

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properly function as a public forum, complex language and lengthy proposals should be simplified and summarized succinctly so that all participants can be equally informed. Political action or political engagement workshops that inform and enable people and community groups to engage with political issues in NI in a non-​violent way would help create an environment where this is a more readily available option. These could form part of a programme on civic education, enabling and empowering people to participate politically without fear, anger or resentment. The need for ongoing educational exchanges between NI and Ireland would be important to sustain community building within NI and between the two states. The Irish government has committed to funding Northern Irish students’ participation in the Erasmus scheme going forward. However, we propose the development of a similar exchange scheme within the education sectors on the island of Ireland for all third level students North and South that would include those who do not identify as Irish. While gender equality featured prominently in the peace agreement, in practice little was done to ensure participation in public and political life. Women continue to be under-​represented in significant positions in the political, economic, judicial and social life of NI. Substantial work is required to ensure the more equitable representation of women in Northern Irish public life. There are a range of potential initiatives that should be explored to identify the best support mechanisms to enhance participation for Northern Irish women. This could include the introduction of gender quotas in political parties and public institutions, educational and career development supports to enable more to women to meet criteria required to take up positions, supports for family life and for dependents where women are primary caretakers, allowing more time to dedicate to participation in national public affairs. To avoid perpetuating divisions in politics, any initiatives should operate as non-​sectarian. Substantial reform of the distribution of funding services for women’s organizations is required. There can be a presumption that NI comprises only two communities divided along political and religious grounds. However, this is inaccurate, and it is necessary to recognize the peacebuilding contributions of, and need for protections for, new communities such as migrants, that have emerged in NI since the GFA. The border between Ireland and NI has been invisible for citizens of the island for almost 20 years. However, it has been an ongoing issue for migrant communities in Ireland that are not from the EU member states as there are variations in visa requirements between the two jurisdictions. It is critical that there is a harmonization of entry requirements for non-​EU member nationals on both sides of the border to enable the travellers and workers in various sectors. Engaging with labour unions or facilitating the cooperation between unions North and South to ensure the fair treatment of workers on both sides of the border would 89

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enhance the voice of migrant workers in the region and ensure there is clear representation for their human rights. By doing so this recognizes that integration of migrant communities is not something that happens in parallel to peacebuilding and the development of a more inclusive society in NI but is part of it. The PEACE funds are a highly valuable asset to the enhancement of Irish and Northern Irish relations and their value cannot be overestimated. Thousands of people across the border region have benefited from the PEACE funds distributed for education and skills development, youth and community work as arts and heritage projects (SUEBP, 2011). All stakeholders stressed the importance of the retention of the PEACE funds in the face of the UK leaving the EU and the need to ensure they are still accessible. However, some reforms may make the PEACE funds more impactful and broaden its reach. Many stakeholders report that the EU funding process, particularly via PEACE funding, is highly limited and administratively laborious. The skillset, knowledge and time required to apply for PEACE funding often excludes a range of organizations from being able to apply. The reform of the PEACE funding application process coupled with support services for smaller organizations would enable them to gain the skills and knowledge to develop an application and, in turn, enhance this initiative in NI and across the border by broadening the range of organizations that can apply and secure funds for community initiatives. Additionally, those who have previously secured PEACE funding report that the administrative process to be extremely cumbersome, so much so that it often detracts from the on-​the-​g round work of the projects that are funded. PEACE projects are often funded for a long period of time, up to four years, and while this is of great benefit to ensure longer-​term impacts in communities, there is a need for more flexibility; particularly when it comes to the amendments in order to respond appropriately in times when the socio-​political environment changes. The specific aims and initiatives that funding is applied for to support may require alteration over the course of four years to ensure that they continue to have impact and meaning. Therefore, the inclusion of checkpoints in PEACE funding processes whereby projects and the EU funders can discuss the need for amendments and secure their approval in a timely manner would ensure that the funding initiative has more meaningful impact. Furthermore, the availability of funding for smaller scale projects would also improve the impact of PEACE funding in Ireland and NI.

Arts and culture In the area of arts and culture, we again see the need for better recording and indexing of material about the Troubles, in particular when it comes to highlighting the diversity of cultural artefacts. Furthermore, it should honour 90

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under-​represented art from the Troubles, particularly community arts and for future curators, artists, authors, and so on to draw on. Here the approach aims to bring more people across the island into space of arts and culture about the conflict. The key objectives that will help achieve wider and enhanced participation are to offer more financial supports, to broaden participation beyond professionals and to develop supports for community arts. State and national institutions both North and South should partner to support cross-​national projects and work to enhance the integration of cultural bodies across the island. Our research shows that the representation of the conflict through arts and culture is somewhat localized and confined to a few organizations that address both common and divergent cultural experiences of the Troubles. However, there is a need to extend and expand the engagement with arts from the conflict to cross-​national culture projects, in Ireland North and South as well as in the UK combining work between cultural bodies in the Republic of Ireland and NI, from ‘high level’ culture projects to localized arts and crafts initiatives. In addition, state agencies and bodies on both sides of the border could include coverage of the entire island in their cultural initiatives. To support North–​South institutional collaborations and show the multiple experiences and interpretations of the conflict by different communities, we propose the development of cross-​border arts organizations collaborative projects. Often cross-​border arts projects are focused on enhancing the connection of the Dublin to Belfast corridor and there tends to be a contention on cross-​border organizations along the border. To bring the multiple perspectives of the conflicts throughout the island, we propose supporting a range of culture and artist collaborations across the whole island of Ireland, examining differences and contexts of memories of conflict on the island and the impact of ‘unequal’ peace and conflict legacy. For example, a series of installation and curated programmes in multiple urban sites, such as Limerick, Dublin, Cork and Derry, would allow these perspectives to be explored. In addition to our first recommendation and with recognition of the work that is already being done, we propose the development of a centralized resource database, which could include lists of source materials (such as indexes of cultural works on the Troubles, the mediums used, artists, and so on), training resources both online and in communities to support various art forms, packages and resource kits. The latter being articles and interviews with artists and subjects about the cultural representation of conflict and trauma. Based on our findings, we recommend commissioning or rewarding works that give voice and a creative outlet to under-​represented communities such as women and migrants. Given the capacity of art to evoke emotional responses and to provoke shifts in perception, it has a unique role to play 91

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in communicating various aspects of the conflict to audiences. Powerful art can rupture public consciousness; poetry and literary reading events, musical performances, visual art exhibitions or installations, which would allow audiences to see the Troubles from alternative perspectives, would be a valuable contribution for audiences to better understand the various experiences of the Troubles. We propose the financial support of cultural programmes that span a variety of mediums; interactive art exhibitions or installations, the writing of poetry anthologies and literature, production of theatre and composition of music, that can be presented to the public in a way that facilitates, enables and guides visitors through a multidimensional analysis of the conflict. This should also include efforts to support the audience in understanding the variation in experiences by different demographics such as gender, age groups or minority groups. In NI, we found that some of the artworks were temporary, ranging from fleeting events such as performance art that occurred live in city centres to temporary works such as the wall murals which fade, are edited and sometimes painted over. A digital repository of artistic and cultural works of historical importance to the Troubles or at least an index where there may be copyright issues, would serve to keep a record of this part of the conflict’s cultural heritage. We propose a systematic documentation of public artworks, including photography, recordings of musical or theatrical performances, and recording of artists and contexts of production and where possible interviewing the creators regarding their motivations and creative approach. This would then constitute a highly beneficial resource for scholars, artists and art critics. Such additional details would also function to support cultural literacy, helping audiences to ‘read’ the texts. To support the ‘reading’ of the texts to identify cultural meanings, we propose the development of supporting material that unpacks the signs and symbols and terminology of the artworks, and explains the contexts of production and reception by professional critics. Innovative digital tools can be used to enhance the user experience of such a repository. For example, by hovering over parts of an image or section of a video of a performance, pop-​up explanations could help users better understand what they are seeing. In order to highlight the transnational character of conflicts in Europe and enhance public engagement with the Troubles and the other conflicts in Europe and beyond, we propose a touring exhibition of cultural artefacts about the conflicts in Europe. This would extend the knowledge beyond national boundaries and share the experiences and consequences of conflict, trauma and peacebuilding with the rest of the European community. Such exhibitions can be inclusive of a wide range of art styles and artists, from the traditional arts such as paintings and sculptures, to popular arts such TV shows, public arts such as wall murals, as well as music, theatre and literature. 92

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Our study shows that there is a need to support new artistic practices of performing memory and the facilitation of empathy. To address this, new support programmes could be developed building on existing concepts such as ‘Art as exchange’ (AAEX, 2016), which is an inclusive approach to art production that aims to bring artists from various backgrounds to work in the same space independently or in collaboration with a view to developing their practice in a mutually respectful and enriching way. Central to this is that the art should be made for the public and be open to artists from various backgrounds. We also recommend bursaries to support new forms of art using new methods and materials, including digital and virtual reality artworks, that develop new and experimental art projects about the Troubles. Such projects could also be developed in association with university or third-​level education and training on multimedia and art programmes to offer a stepping-​stone for early career artists and designers. Such projects, if they were also implemented in other partner countries in the RePAST project and beyond, could also be developed into touring exhibitions or opened up to the wider European community through innovative digital tools and technologies. Personal photography of the Troubles is an under-​represented visual component of the Troubles. Moving beyond photo or broadcast journalism or professional photography –​an effort to collect and make public, where possible, personal photography of the Troubles. This would support the use of photography to engage with multidimensional analysis and democratize the representation of the Troubles. Photographs taken by ordinary citizens can be collected, details of the photographs recorded and permission secured to make them public and display the Troubles via photography of the people who lived through it and can show the day-​to-​day experiences as well as the stand-​out moments through the eyes of normal citizens. The fight for peace did not just take place at the state and political party level but also at the community level. The inclusion of the acts of peacebuilding and community engagement that occurred at the grassroots level can be highlighted. In this way, the exhibition could represent everyday life in NI beyond the significant events of the Troubles. Thus, the Troubles can be presented as through the eyes of the citizens and via different media, from the polaroid cameras of the 1960s right through to the use of smartphones and Instagram today. While photographers represent the citizens and residents of NI as subjects of their work, this allows them to represent themselves and enables artistic agency on those who are typically subjects of others’ artistic work. Recognizing that there is a growing community of people in NI from migrant backgrounds, this exhibition should provide a platform for migrant communities and include the stories that also depict their lives and experience of migration from various parts of the world and resettlement in NI. 93

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Conclusion Our research identifies the need to address the conflict in three main ways. First, de-​localizing the conflict and understanding it as a conflict that affected the island of Ireland. Second, enhancing resources available to historians, educators, media, artists and the public. Third, enhancing support for the victims of the conflict. As such, the specific recommendations across four policy areas are designed to achieve these goals. The enhancement of the understanding of the origins and history of the conflict across the island underpins the recommendations under the section on history. Politically, there is a need to explore the socioeconomic conditions of the conflict and contextualize the conflict and its legacy within this framework and to reform the structures in NI that perpetuate division and introduce practices that support cross-​communal and cross-​national activities through focus on overcoming conflict. Across all policy areas there is a need to develop comprehensive informational resources about the conflict that archive and record the events from multiple perspectives and for multiple purposes. Similarly, we identify a need for ongoing funding and support of media, arts and history projects that can be adapted for education, media and public exploration of the conflict as well as the reform of funding structures to ensure that a wider range of projects can be initiated and accessed by institutions North and South. Central to each of the recommendations is the enablement of more diverse perspectives and voices about the experiences and impact of the Troubles to be heard and seen as well as the integration of new communities in NI and Ireland. Our recommendations aim to support the appropriate treatment of victims of trauma by, on the one hand, better informing the historians, media and artists who treat them as subjects of their work, and, on the other hand, enabling self-​expression and self-​representation of experiences by victims. Our objective in these proposals is to lay a set of recommendations that can then be picked up by the main stakeholders at the local, national and EU levels and developed further. Future research can explore other areas that the conflict may have touched, and identify the impact that Brexit had on the continued legacy of the Troubles.

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Spain: How to Overcome the Polarization about the Conflicts of the Past? Introduction Two conflicts of the recent past are still very present in the collective memories and the political discourse in Spain, namely the civil war (1936–​9) and Franco’s dictatorship (1939–​77). The Spanish civil war was the result of a major internal conflict of an ideological, social, religious and regional character that intensified during the Second Republic (1931–​9). One of the dimensions of the division was the centre–​periphery cleavage, between the Republicans, more sensitive to demands for decentralization –​especially intense in regions such as the Basque Country and Catalonia –​and the so-​called ‘Nationals’ in favour of a strong and centralized nation-​state. The war started in 1936 when a group of army officers attempted a coup d’état against the democratically elected Republican government. They were internally supported by the military, landowners, businessmen and the Catholic Church, and externally by the fascist German and Italian armies. The Republicans were led by the government and the army was supported by the militias of other leftist and anarchist political parties, trade unions and volunteers from all over Europe and the Americas who joined the communist-​run International Brigades. In society, the Republicans found support mainly among urban workers, agricultural labourers and the educated secular middle class. The Soviet Union provided highly conditional assistance to the Republic. The UK and France, on the other hand, supported an arms embargo that effectively doomed the Republic. More than 350,000 Spaniards died in the fighting. The multiple ‘cleavages’ and conflicts that divided Spanish society were further deepened during almost 40 years of dictatorship. During this period, many of the defeated were displaced, tortured, imprisoned or killed. Between 30,000 and 50,000 people were executed on political grounds in 95

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the aftermath of the civil war and 500,000 went into exile. There were more than 188 concentration camps, and many people were in forced labour (Aguilar et al, 2011, p 63). During the dictatorship, any sign of nationalist identity (for example, speaking in Basque or Catalonian language) was totally suppressed. The repression of the state was felt until September 1975 when the last five people were executed. There are no official figures but according to the National High Court, between 1936 and 1951 there were more than 114,226 victims of enforced disappearance (De Greiff, 2014). Franco died in November 1975 and a process of ‘liberalization’ began, orchestrated by a sector of the Francoist elites. A process of democratization followed in which the same elites held control of political change, notwithstanding constant negotiations with the opposition. The first democratic elections took place in 1977. The Spanish transition to democracy has been praised as a paradigmatic case of a ‘transition through transaction’, also called ‘reforma pactada’ (agreed reform) (O’Donnell et al, 1986; Colomer, 1991). One of the main features of this period was the high degree of ‘consensus’ reached between the political elites of the dictatorship and those of the opposition, which applied as well to how the conflicts related to the civil war and dictatorship were to be handled. A ‘pact of silence’ or ‘pact of oblivion’ was agreed by a vast majority of the political parties represented in parliament. A decision was adopted to ‘look to the future’ instead of to the past. This pact was materialized in the Amnesty Act passed in parliament in 1977, according to which political prisoners (including members of the terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and many trade unionists who were imprisoned due to conflicts in the context of labour relations) were freed and those in exile were allowed to return. As a product of a last-​minute decision, the party in government (Unión de Centro Democrático, UCD) proposed the inclusion of an additional element that guaranteed impunity for all those representatives of the state (authorities and civil servants). The law was passed with wide support. It received 296 votes in favour (Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), Partido Comunista de España (PCE), the Basque-​Catalan minority and the mixed group), 18 abstentions (the rightist Alianza Popular (AP) and two other MPs of regional parties), two votes against (AP MPs) and one null. The Amnesty law is, still nowadays, one of the most controversial aspects about how to handle the crimes committed during the civil war and the dictatorship, and its validity and application are subject to opposed interpretations by the different political groups. During most of the democratic period, all governments and most judges have understood it as a last point according to which all issues related to the violations of rights in the past should be left out of any political or judicial decision. Since the early 2000s, a different approach was increasingly voiced by several groups in civil 96

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society (see, for example, Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica [ARMH] and Foro por la Memoria) and political parties of the left, which interpret the Amnesty law in the framework of international human rights law. According to this interpretation, offences of the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity are imprescriptible. Consequently, the debate about the rehabilitation of the memory of the losers of the civil war in Spain has intensified since 2000. The changes that were taking place at the time in the world in international law, the generational change and responses to the first electoral victory of the Popular Party in 1996 (some prominent leaders of this party had held high positions in Franco’s regime) were among the factors behind this questioning of the official narrative built during the transition to democracy. Among those who are critical of the application of the Amnesty law nowadays (that is, many ‘memorialist’ associations, as well as some representatives of left-​wing parties), some claim that it should be abolished, while others consider that its interpretation should be updated according to today’s interpretation of international human rights law (Aguilar Fernández and Sánchez-​Cuenca, 2021). The latter position finally prevailed with the approval of the Law on Democratic Memory in 2022, as detailed later in this chapter. However, the dominant interpretation among judges is that of non-​retroactivity of Penal Law (that is, the non-application of laws to crimes committed in a time when these laws did not exist).1 Another prominent demand of these ‘memorialist’ groups has been the intervention of the state to initiate and fund the exhumation of the mass graves where more than 100,000 non-​combatants still lie unidentified. Two decades later, and years after the recommendation by the UN special rapporteur in this sense, this aspect has been included in the aforementioned Law on Democratic Memory passed in the Congress in July 2022 and in the Senate in October 2022.2 In the meantime, several historical decisions have taken place that should be highlighted. First, the concept of universal justice has been gaining ground both at the international and the national level. Two cases have become the paradigm of the application of universal justice to crimes against humanity: the case of former Chilean dictator Pinochet, accused of torture by the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón in 1998; and the case of former Argentinian naval officer, Adolfo Scilingo, condemned in Spain in 2005.3 Second, the first term of the socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004–​8) meant a break with the previous years in how to confront the conflicts of the past in Spain. The year 2006 was declared the Year of Historical Memory and in 2007 the Law on Historical Memory was passed in parliament. This Act honoured the victims of the civil war on both sides for the first time in the history of Spanish democracy, but it also became one of the most bitter points of confrontation among the different political 97

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parties. The Act considered ‘unfair’ and ‘illegitimate’ the courts’ sentences for political reasons and the violence that occurred during the civil war and the dictatorship. Material reparations to the victims and their relatives were extended. The state committed to assist in the identification and exhumation of mass graves. Symbols praising persons or events of the period of the civil war or the dictatorship had to be lifted from public buildings and spaces, unless there are artistic reasons that justify their remaining. The law also provided that the Valley of the Fallen4 should function like any other religious site; acts praising Franco, the coup d’état and its leaders, the civil war and the dictatorship are forbidden; and the memory of those fallen during the civil war and the following years will be rehabilitated. The members of the International Brigades, as well as descendants of those exiled were then able to obtain Spanish citizenship. A Documentation Centre for Historical Memory was created. Since then, almost all regional parliaments have adopted their own memorial laws and there have also been several initiatives at the local level. The Law on Historical Memory was in part ‘abolished’ de facto by Mariano Rajoy, when the Popular Party won the elections in 2011, as no budget was allocated for its implementation. This was one of the aspects criticized by the reports elaborated in 2014 by the UN Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the UN special rapporteur Pablo de Greiff. The first of these reports emphasized that ‘the State should accept its responsibility and take a leadership role’ in implementing the measures. It also urged the state to act, given the advanced age of many of the witnesses and relatives. More specifically, the report highlighted that important challenges still lay ahead, such as: [T]‌he limited scope of the Law on Historical Memory, the lack of any budget to implement it, the continued applicability of the Amnesty Act as interpreted by the courts, impunity in all cases of enforced disappearance, the fact that there is no specific offence of enforced disappearance, the lack of any law on access to information, the difficulty in accessing the archives, and the lack of any national plan on the search for disappeared persons. (2014) In his report, de Greiff pointed out also the lack of a state policy to elucidate the truth, with the consequence of leaving this responsibility to victims and associations, as well as to excessive formalism and restrictive interpretations of the Amnesty Act, and to the principle of legality that led to a denial of access to justice and impeded any sort of investigation. The Socialist Party won the elections again in July 2018 and the Law on Historical Memory was immediately modified to make it more ambitious. In line with this reform, the remains of Franco were removed from the 98

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state-​funded mausoleum of the Valley of the Fallen in October 2019. The electoral debates before the November 2019 elections reflect to a good extent the persistence of the political polarization about how to deal with the conflicts of the past. The exhumation of Franco’s remains did not seem to have a huge impact on the electoral results, although it may have helped VOX, the radical right-​wing party, in gaining some votes (Simón, 2020, p 16–17). In January 2020, the coalition government –​the first one in Spain since the transition to democracy –​formed by the Socialist Party and the leftist Unidas Podemos proposed a new Bill on Historical and Democratic Memory. It is a minority government that obtained the confidence in parliament thanks to the support of other left-​wing and regional parties, including Basque and Catalan nationalists, and therefore is obliged to enlist the support of a number of other parties in order to move forward with new legislation. After long negotiations with its ‘allies’ in the Parliament, the Congress finally passed a new version of a Bill on Democratic Memory in July 2022, which was latter approved in the Senate in October 2022.5 Compared to the Law passed in 2007, the new text includes a more extensive definition of victims, a compromise by the state to assume an active role in the search for victims –​the estimated number is 114,000 –​in the remaining unearthed massive graves, the creation of a DNA bank and a census of victims, the re-​ signification of the Valley of the Fallen, and the reform of the Law on Public Secrets dating from 1968 that would give public access to the archives of Franco’s regime. The new Law also extends the investigation of human rights violations to the period between 1978 and 1983, declares illegal the Franco regime, and considers ‘null’ the sentences dictated during that period. The investigation of human rights violations is related to the negotiations with Basque Country Unite (Bildu) and has been one of the most controversial aspects. Right-wing parties have used the agreement with this party to say that the government humiliates ETA’s victims by favouring Franco’s victims. Some of Bildu’s members were previous members of ETA. In 2021, they expressly regretted, for the first time, the sorrow of the ETA’s victims but the parties of the right keep equating them to terrorists. The approval of the Law on Democratic Memory by the Congress coincided in time with the 25th anniversary of the murder by ETA of Miguel Ángel Blanco, a Basque local politician of the Popular Party, in an especially cruel manner. Although the new Law incorporates several of the recommendations of the previously mentioned reports, prior to its approval Fabián Salvioli –​ special rapporteur of the UN on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-​recurrence since 2018 –​pointed out that it leaves unaddressed questions related to justice such as the application of the Amnesty Law and the non-​collaboration with Argentinian courts. Although the Law mentions explicitly that the Amnesty Law must be interpreted in accordance with international law, it does not abolish it, which is one of 99

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the main arguments by the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and the Galician Nationalist Bloc for abstaining, and of Junts per Catalunya and the Popular Unity Candidacy for voting against in the Congress. This leads to a double critical stance towards the version approved: both from some leftist and nationalist parties, for the reasons just explained, and from the right-​ wing parties who consider that the Law is ‘totalitarian’, ‘divides Spaniards’ and humiliates the victims of ETA’s terrorist group.

Methodology In this chapter, we propose some recommendations for Spain based on the data collected during the project RePAST. We are inspired by the literature on the topic and the information collected during our fieldwork from different activities, mainly: • Personal interviews, 10 with people with direct memories of the conflicts, and 12 with young people. • Interviews with eight journalists from the following media outlets and platforms: Cadena Ser and Radio EITB (radio stations), El País, El Español, ABC and El Diario (newspapers), and a couple of freelance journalists. • Eight focus groups with citizens of different profiles and regions in Spain: two focus groups were held in Madrid, two in Bilbao (Basque Country), one in Olot and one in Barcelona (Catalonia), one in Valdivielso and one in Manzanedo (Burgos, Castilla León). • Media analysis of a sample of five national newspaper outlets: El País, ABC, El Correo, Punt Avui and La Vanguardia. • Analysis of some contemporary art and cultural pieces such as films, novels or exhibitions. • A representative survey of the Spanish population focused on questions about how to deal today with the conflict and crimes committed during the civil war (the sample was 1,000 people). • Interviews with 12 policy makers and stakeholders. The 12 interviews with policy makers, experts and stakeholders played a special role in the elaboration of the final recommendations presented here. We drafted a letter in which we summarized the findings of RePAST and asked for their collaboration. This letter was accompanied by a draft with our provisional recommendations and a list of questions slightly adapted to the profile of the interviewees. We first made an initial list of 26 possible interviewees representing different political parties, civil society organizations and experts in the field. We took into account their current or past responsibilities with regard to memorial issues, their ideology, their region,6 the institutions they were related to, their gender, as well as 100

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whether their experience had taken place at the local, regional, state or/​ and European level. Those finally interviewed include three MPs that participated in the Constitutional Commission that discussed the Law for Historical Memory back in 2007 (these include both the representative of the Socialist Party, a representative of ERC –​the Catalan nationalist leftist party that had initially promoted the initiative but did not vote the law because they considered it too ‘timid’, and a representative of one of the Basque nationalist parties, the State Secretary for Historical Memory, a regional level MP that participated in the debates on the Andalusian Law of Democratic Memory, two local counsellors who actively participated in Madrid’s memory plan (one as part of the local government and the other as a member of the opposition), and an MEP who is also member of the informal Group of Historical Memory of the EP. We also interviewed the President of the State Council for Education; the Director of the Institute for Memory, Coexistence and Human Rights of the Basque Country; a Professor of History of Law expert in memory issues (more precisely in the study of Spaniards deported to concentration camps and the Catalonian memory law); and a researcher from Amnesty International in charge of memory issues at this organization. In total, we contacted nine women and finally conducted interviews with three of these (unintendedly, all of them from the Basque Country). Our biggest challenge was to contact the MEPs. We contacted five MEPs, but received no response. As we had previously interviewed an MEP for another working package of the project, we ended up using this information for the purpose of this report. Also, we found it especially hard to interview right-​wing policy makers and finally just one is represented. This is in line with our previous experience trying to interview right-​wing citizens or journalists when the issue of ‘historical memory’ is mentioned. Most of the fieldwork took place between 2019 and 2020, prior to the negotiations around the latest Law of Democratic Memory and its approval in the Congress and the Senate in 2022. We will mention those recommendations that find a reflection in the changes that have occurred since then.

The European Union’s approach to the troubled past in Spain At the time of the transition to democracy in the late 1970s, there was a very wide consensus among both Spanish society and elites about joining the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC was not explicitly associated with ‘overcoming past conflicts’, but with economic progress, cultural modernization and democracy (Díez Medrano, 2003, p 160). The interviews with citizens and the focus groups carried out during the 101

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RePAST project fieldwork in 2019–​20 show that this link between the EEC and the conflicts of the past in Spain is still not evident. Even the journalists interviewed have had trouble responding when asked how they would address writing an article connecting the two. For Spaniards, European integration helped counteract the years of diplomatic and economic isolation of Spain with respect to the rest of the world, especially since the end of the civil war until the mid-​1950s. This is one of the reasons why Spain is well known for the Europhilic attitudes of its citizens to date (Cavallaro, 2019; Mudde, 2019). Regarding the specific actions endorsed by the European Union (EU) in Spain, one could say that they are rather scarce. We could even go further by stating that the European Commission has, in general, been reticent to take a stance on the issue, while the EP has been more active. However, most of the initiatives in this arena refer to the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. One of the most significant initiatives took place in 2006 with the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the coup d’état that led to the Spanish civil war, when 200 MEPs requested from the Commission and the Council explicitly a debate on condemning the Franco regime. The Conference of Presidents rejected the possibility of a debate and considered that it was preferable that the president and the political groups at the EP make a statement (European Parliament, 2006). In April 2009, the EP approved a resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism that explicitly mentions Spain as one of the countries that suffered from ‘long-​ lasting fascist regimes’. This resolution underlines the importance of keeping the memories of the past alive, because there can be no reconciliation without truth and remembrance, and points at the importance of documentation and testimonies. In general, whenever there has been an initiative asking the Commission to act, the response has been to defer it to the national authorities. This was the case when in 2014 a Spanish MEP from the European United Left/​ Nordic Green Left (GUE/​NGL) posed a question to the Commission about the comments by the UN Special Rapporteur on the inaction of Spain regarding the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-​ recurrence with respect to the Franco regime. More specifically, he asked if the Commission thought that inaction on the part of the Spanish institutions was in keeping with the provisions of Council Framework Decision 2008/​ 913/​JHA. The answer given by the Commission was that ‘the state policy as regards the victims of the Franco regime does not fall within the scope of Union law. It is thus for the concerned Member State to ensure that its obligations regarding fundamental rights –​as resulting from international agreements and from their internal legislation –​are respected’. The EP adopted the report (Nagy report, by reference to the EPP-​MEP from the Slovak Republic, József Nagy) on the situation of fundamental 102

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rights in the EU in 2015. According to this document, the EP encourages the Spanish authorities to collaborate in the investigation of crimes of the past (see article 63). The inclusion of this recommendation was promoted by a group of Spanish MEPs that work on issues related to violations of rights in the past. According to this group, the Commission should evaluate the situation under the application of the Rule of Law Framework adopted in 2014. In 2018, the EP adopted a resolution on the rise in neo-​fascist violence in Europe. The resolution urges member states to take ‘effective’ action against organizations that ‘glorify’ Nazism and Fascism. As mentioned previously, this is one of the aspects included in the new Law on Democratic Memory. It also calls for the ‘effective withdrawal of all other symbols and monuments that glorify the military uprising, the Civil War and the Franco dictatorship’.

Policy recommendations for Spain We would first like to acknowledge the work of memory associations and other individuals who have done a great deal of previous work on these issues and have already put forward interesting recommendations in this field (see, for example, the reports and recommendations of Amnesty International Spain, the ARMH, the Human Rights Plan of the City of Madrid, the group on ‘memory politics’ at Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), and so on). Our proposals aim at incorporating the points of view found in society at large, and adopt a holistic perspective by considering the views of different social and political actors. In order not to be redundant with previous proposals made by civil society actors, or reflected in the law itself, we have tried to make proposals that present some novelty or that have not been emphasized before. Finally, we have intended to be realistic given the high level of polarization around the topic, especially among political parties. In line with the structure of the RePAST project, recommendations are divided in four distinct sections: history, media, politics, and arts and culture.

History In this section, we propose recommendations referring to the teaching of history in schools, the informal learning of history in other contexts, and also with the training of professionals on history or history-​related contents, sources of information and research methods. The results of the survey we carried out in Spain show that the teaching of history in schools is one of the main sources of information about the past for Spaniards (38 per cent). Among the youngest (18 and 34 years old), 55 per cent said that the school was the main source of information about this period. However, actors or institutions (politicians, traditional media, social media or associations) 103

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seem to be taking a more prominent socializing role. In the interviews with young citizens and the focus groups, many citizens also expressed a general perception that education about the period of the civil war and the dictatorship in Spain is limited or biased. The civil war is covered in the curriculum more than Franco’s dictatorship, which is explained in a quicker and more superficial way. The situation seems to have changed in recent years, as some of the youngest participants had a satisfactory experience in this sense. For instance, the students that attended the focus group discussion in the Basque Country agreed that it depends a lot on the teacher’s will and that some of them were actually very pedagogical, bringing objects of the time (such as textbooks or ration cards) to the classroom, and using other strategies that were useful to captivate the student’s interest. This is not a novel finding, as the poor results regarding knowledge about this period have already been analysed by experts in the field (Hernández Sánchez, 2014; 2020). Díez-​Gutiérrez’s article (2022) confirms this finding and suggests that Franco’s repression, the anti-​Franco fight, the role played by the Catholic Church or the movement for the recovery of memory have little presence in the school historical narrative. However, the decentralization of the education system in Spain and the high level of autonomy of schools seem to lead to a huge diversity of situations. We also noticed that, in general, the younger generations feel less informed than the older ones, and that this sometimes leads to over-simplifications and polarization around the conflicts of the past. One of the students in the focus group discussion in Madrid acknowledged that in school, pupils do not get objective information about what Franco’s regime was because it happened too recently. This is resulting in a knowledge gap among younger generations that did not live through the regime. In this regard, the recently approved Law on Democratic Memory states that the curriculum of secondary education will be updated to include contents on the history of the Spanish democratic memory and the struggle for democratic values and freedoms in the recent history of the country. Furthermore, it urges the educational authorities at all levels to introduce this issue in all the teacher trainings and when updating the curriculum. As expected, there has been an immediate reaction against this proposal from representatives of right-​wing political parties and media. Any regulation about the contents of the education curriculum is expected to provoke accusations about ideological bias and attempts of indoctrination of the students. Therefore, we think that alternative, or complementary, measures should be adopted. Our first recommendation is to work in environments not widely exposed to the media and not to expect rapid changes. As a long-​time expert in education expressed in an interview, it is more likely that long-​lasting changes take place after building a trust relationship between the actors involved. This 104

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needs time and working in discreet environments. In other words, a bill is probably not the most effective way to advance, as it is subject to discussion in parliament and, therefore, to the scrutiny of the media, and to polarization. Another expert also pointed in a similar direction by drawing attention to the fact that in some regions such as the Basque Country, progress has been made without the need to approve a new law. We recommend exposing young people directly to oral testimonials of first-​hand witnesses of the civil war and the dictatorship of all sides involved in the conflict. Our interviews with citizens that had direct experience with the conflicts, as well as some educational experiences, show that those who have lived the conflicts have more nuanced narratives that those just exposed by political parties or the media. We carried out an educational project in a rural area (Las Merindades in Burgos) where students from a secondary school interviewed their older relatives and neighbours in order to gather information about the democratic memory of the area. These testimonials should not be understood as ‘objective’, as they will be result of personal experiences, as well as related to a specific stage of life. As a journalist who has interviewed some prominent actors of the civil war told us, some of them ignore or even contradict in their declarations the facts that are well documented and on which a large number of historians agree. However, students can learn about the importance of looking for information from primary sources which they can compare with other sources of information. Also, it will force them to compare perspectives and get used to the idea of the existence of ‘different truths’. In relation to the previous recommendations, it is as important to collect the testimonials of the few direct witnesses that are still alive, and to make public and easily accessible the already existing archives with materials of this kind (for example, archives of associations of victims, such as the Association 14 de Abril, the archive of the Fundación Bernardo Aladrén and so on). It is crucial to disseminate and facilitate access to primary sources (oral testimonies, pictures, objects) about the period. This could be done by coordinating the efforts of different institutions and actors and by funding research projects promoting the collection of information, especially testimonies of the older generations. This recommendation also includes completing the map of the mass graves. The official map of the mass graves was created in 2011 by the government but needs to be updated and used as a resource at the educational level in order to raise awareness about the number of graves in each area. A change in the focus used to teach on the troubled past is also required. Namely, educating from a human rights and democracy perspective, and avoiding too specific recommendations about the contents of the curricula to allow for adaptation to different contexts (regional, social, age, discipline), might contribute to a better understanding of the past. Also, we recommend 105

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adopting cross-​curricular points of view, as issues related to past conflicts can potentially appear in any class and be related to different contents, as well as including popular culture material (novels, films, documentaries) as pedagogic tools, which could be designed with the collaboration of writers, filmmakers, artists and others such as conflict-​mediators. We recommend setting up a committee of experts (historians, educators, journalists) proposed by different political parties with the aim to develop a set of good educational practices around the conflict that is not immediately criticized by the parties of one or the other side for being biased. These practices should include issues such as how to assess the validity of different sources, analyse the versions of all sides in the conflict (this is not equivalent to legitimizing all versions of the conflict), and deal with all periods of history with the same amount of detail. Training the professionals working on the troubled past regarding the legal aspects related to the prosecution of crimes against humanity would also be desirable. There are aspects of education that apply to higher/​continuous education of specific professionals, such as teachers, judges, archivists or journalists whose training should be more sensitive to international law and be more connected to social problems. The recently approved Law on Democratic Memory includes measures in the initial and permanent training of teachers, but many more professionals deal with the conflicts of the past in their professional life, and their decisions have important implications.

Media Many citizens perceive the media reporting on the conflicts of the past as biased and polarized. According to our interviews, journalists feel they have editorial freedom to report on the troubled past. Policy makers and stakeholders are in favour of freedom of speech and against any regulation of the media, even though there is criticism about how the media cover these issues. Some recommendations in the previous section apply also to media, mostly about the training of journalists, the participation of journalists in the definition of good educational practices, of the centralization and systematization of materials produced by journalists, among others. Our first recommendation in the media section is to give more visibility to the victims and adopt a human rights approach. There are certain issues that are more prone to create empathy in people that sympathize with different sides (these are violence, mass graves and stolen babies). Therefore, it is recommended to give more visibility to these issues that may create empathy rather than division in society. Information campaigns about human rights led by media holdings of different ideologies would help increase sensitivity and awareness around the victims of conflicts. This would require identifying and handling with care and respect the rejection towards the conflicts of the 106

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past found in certain sectors of the population to avoid further rejection/​ polarization. Another aspect that could make a difference is to support the news outlets in which political parties and their representatives adopt attitudes or act in a way different from the usually polarized tone of discussions. A good case in point could be the examples of certain right-​wing politicians, who expressed a great deal of sensitivity regarding the opening of mass graves.7

Politics Several studies have pointed to a growing ideological and affective political polarization in Spain (Gidron et al, 2019; Miller, 2020; Simón, 2020). This polarization is also observed regarding the conflicts of the past, where the positions are clearly divided. While the parties with a right-​wing ideology are in favour of forgetting and ‘leaving the past behind so as not to reopen wounds’, left-​wing parties are more in favour of recognition and reparation for the victims of the crimes committed during the civil war and Francoism (Ruiz Torres, 2007). In order to mitigate this, we propose some recommendations to promote that the political parties work in favour of reaching an agreement about the way to refer to the conflicts of the past. Our recommendation is to link any initiatives related to the memory of past conflicts to the fulfilment of legal obligations both with national and, especially, with international law; as well as recommendations of international institutions (for example, the UN, EP, Council of Europe). Political initiatives related to past conflicts should make specific reference to legal obligations acquired by Spain through the signing of international treaties, and to recommendations of international institutions. We recommend that referring to ‘historical memory’ should be replaced by terms such as history, human rights, democracy and legal obligations. The concept of ‘historical memory’ is currently associated with proposals of leftist sectors and sympathizers of the Republican side. For this reason, it would be a good idea to use terms that can be used to include sectors on both the left and the right avoiding that a part of Spanish society may feel excluded. Politicians should focus on individual victims and not differentiate between those from one or another side (at this point, it should be mentioned that differentiating between the victims of ETA’s terrorism and the victims of the Franco regime also hinders the process of reconciliation). This would also entail not referring to the sides of the conflicts as if they were just good or just bad and acknowledge the heterogeneity of the circumstances of the people on the different sides of the conflict and how they were influenced not only –​or not at all –​by ideological positions, but also by social factors (class, urban/​rural, gender). 107

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An emphasis on identifying the initiatives that have garnered the support of different political parties is needed. In most parties there are examples of agreements on important issues about the past such as the unwavering condemnation of the Franco regime by the politicians of the Popular Party, or their support for the opening of mass graves in certain communities/​ regions. There has been a growing agreement on the need to exhume mass graves to allow family members to recover the remains of victims of the conflict. This issue used to be highly polarized and it can be taken as an example of how political positions can change over time. In this sense, it is important to highlight that a state policy for the exhumation of mass graves is included in the Law on Democratic Memory. For most parties, polarization does not pay electorally but, on the contrary, it may may lead to votes for extremist parties. Since October 2000, during the exhumation of a mass grave in Priaranza del Bierzo, when the ARMH was created, several initiatives have emerged from civil society to promote historical memory (Ferrándiz Martín, 2007; Feenstra, 2018). Bringing to light the role of ordinary people or institutions that fight for human dignity (that is, the Red Cross and their role in saving children, Spanish inventor Emilio Herrera, or writer Federico Garcia Lorca) might help to share experiences that go beyond partisan views. Additionally we recommend to promote exchanges of citizens who have experienced other conflicts so that they can help see their own conflicts from another point of view. Finally, it is of vital importance to encourage participation in decision-​making in an inclusive way by representatives of different parties and civil society organizations.

Arts and culture Popular culture (novels, films, TV series) dealing with the conflicts of the past has been on the rise during the past years and has been well received by society at large. We recommend to actively promote the production of cultural assets that could help overcome the conflict. The production of artistic and cultural work should be encouraged through specific funding. Stories that focus on individual suffering and different points of view would help reduce polarization, create empathy with the victims, and find support to restore their dignity. The Ministry of Culture could promote the dialogue between culture producers, victims (and victims’ associations) and actors in other arenas (for example, educators, politicians, journalists) through the creation of forums or workshops. There is a lack of museums dedicated to a balanced view of conflicts of the past. There should be an effort to create consensus around their creation and contents. The new Law on Democratic Memory establishes the re-​ signification of the Valley of the Fallen with a pedagogical purpose. The 108

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Law also includes the creation of a State Register of Places of Democratic Memory, in order to promote public awareness about the events behind these places.

Conclusion Since 2000, many initiatives on addressing the troubled past have been commenced by civil society. Furthermore, new legislation on the difficult legacy of history has proliferated in the last few years. These have been greatly facilitated by changes at the international level (for example, changes in international law with respect to universal jurisdiction and UN declarations). However, historical memory remains highly politicized in Spain. The mere mention of ‘historical memory’ creates rejection in important sectors of society. An effort must be made to redefine the terms and ways of acting about the conflicts of the past for the restoration of past crimes and the building of consensus towards a more effective future. Through the analysis of the data collected during the RePAST project, we identified that political parties, victims’ associations, non-​governmental organizations and other actors have clear priorities and concrete positions on how to deal with the troubled past in Spain. Many of these positions are contradictory with those of other stakeholders, and therefore prone to conflict and polarization. Efforts should be made not just to put the issue on the agenda, nor even to regulate it, but rather to promote a calm and sensible debate that goes beyond confrontation. In the current state of affairs, changes triggered by new legislation only last until the government changes and the issue itself provokes a rejection from many citizens that associate it to political fights. The main losers of this situation are the victims of the crimes of the past that are being revictimized. Despite this great polarization on the issue, we have been able to identify shared approaches among different actors with respect to several elements of the discussion on the troubled past. The condemnation of human rights violations regardless of the side of the perpetrators or the recognition of the right of the victims to recover the remains of their relatives are two examples of this. In this chapter, we aimed to put the focus on these aspects which, we estimate, are more likely to find support among different stakeholders and the civil society as well, and therefore could push forward the implementation of the recommendations.

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Cyprus: The EU’s Role in Europe’s Last Divided Country Introduction The two communities in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, lived relatively peacefully on the island for centuries. Even after the Greek revolution in 1821 against the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the ‘Enosis’ ambition (annexation of Cyprus to Greece) among the Greek Cypriots, the two communities continued to live in harmony. Political developments of the 20th century, such as British colonialism and the hostilities between Greece and Turkey, were crucial in generating a Greek–​Turkish conflict in Cyprus. Greek Cypriots considered their community as the historical inhabitants of the island and thus sought the annexation of the island to the newly founded Greek state. On the other side, Turkish Cypriots considered that ‘Enosis’ would degrade their rights and wanted to divide the island into two parts. After a four-​year anti-​colonial armed struggle (1955–​9), Greek Cypriots failed to achieve ‘Enosis’, and the two communities compromised on the foundation of an independent state. The foundation of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was not the priority for either of the two communities, so bi-​communal conflicts continued. In 1974, after a failed coup d’état orchestrated by the Greek junta against the legitimately elected president of the RoC, Turkey invaded the northern part of the island. The Turkish invasion forced hundreds of thousands of Cypriots to leave their homes and migrate to the north or south. Since then, Turkey has deployed a large military force in the northern part of Cyprus, while, according to international law, an illegal state was founded, which is solely recognized as a sovereign state by Turkey. After 1977, the five parties involved in the Cyprus Problem (Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece, Turkey and the UK) sat at the negotiating table several times to find a mutually acceptable solution, which has not yet been achieved. The two communities had lived in complete isolation for many years, as until 2003, the regime in the north did not allow anyone to cross to the 110

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other side of the island. In 2003, the opening of some checkpoints allowed inter-​communal contact for the first time in almost 30 years. Nevertheless, to this day, the relations and the contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are still considered marginal. In this chapter, by interviewing policy makers and stakeholders and investigating Cyprus’s troubled past, we propose policy recommendations addressed to the European Union (EU) to help both communities overcome the island’s troubled past. In the next section, we explain the methodological approach, which derives from an overall framework drafted by the RePAST project in March 2020. The third section reviews the EU’s historical connection to the Cyprus Problem, while the fourth section describes our policy recommendations for each of the four dimensions. The chapter concludes by summarizing the implications as well as the limitations of the present study juxtaposed with opinions expressed in interviews with selected policy makers and stakeholders.

Methodology The following methodology consisted of a two-​phase design. The first phase involves drafting a set of policy recommendations. Those recommendations incorporate the knowledge gained from a thorough research of the relevant literature regarding the case of Cyprus. The second phase, which concerned the conduct of interviews with policy makers and stakeholders, started in mid-​May 2020. Despite a large number of contacts (approximately 40), many stakeholders were unwilling to speak about inter-​communal relations. Finally, eight agreed to an interview. All interviews were conducted online due to the imposed government’s restrictive measures against the contamination of COVID-​19. For the interviewees’ selection process, we initially tried to include representatives from the political arena, civil society and academia. Equal representation of women was also essential for us, as, for years, women’s views about the Cyprus Problem and bi-​communal relations were not equally valued compared to those of men. Due to the controversy surrounding the Cyprus Problem and bi-​communal relations, the latter is managed entirely by the political leadership and not by state technocrats, who mostly remain uninvolved. Thus, we mainly spoke with prominent elected politicians. Although we believe our sample is sufficient, we must note that no Cypriot MEP or Turkish Cypriot politician accepted our request for an interview. Five of the eight interviewees are elected MPs with a significant impact on culture and education. Out of the remaining three, one is a key figure in the unique physical space for cooperation between the two communities; another is an academic with significant work on how the Cyprus Problem 111

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impacted the education system and culture of the two communities; and the third had served as a senior EU official and former commissioner. The conducted interviews provided significant material with a crucial impact on revising the first version of our policy recommendations. The revised version was sent out for internal peer review.

The European Union’s approach to the troubled past in Cyprus The EU approach to Cyprus’ troubled past cannot be compared to the corresponding approach to the Eastern European countries’ troubled pasts. The Cyprus Problem differs structurally, socially and legally from the internal problems faced by other European countries in their struggle to recover from their troubled pasts. The Cyprus Problem remains unresolved to this day, while the rest of the European countries are already evaluating the recovery from their troubled pasts. Sixty-​two years after RoC independence, the two communities barely have any meaningful relationship. Any assessment of the EU’s approach to the Cyprus Problem should consider the problem’s complexity and the difficulties that arise from it. The EU approach to the troubled past of Cyprus (if, of course, it can be called ‘past’) can be divided into three periods mainly based on the magnitude of the EU’s involvement. These periods are: the EU pre-​accession period (roughly from 1973 to 1997); the EU accession talks period until the 2004 Annan plan referendum (from 1998 to 2004); and the post-​accession period (from 2004 onwards).

The European Union pre-​accession period (1973–​97) The first period has as a starting point the signature of the Association Agreement between the RoC (which after 1963 was solely governed by Greek Cypriots) and the European Community (EC) in 1973. At the beginning of the same year, the UK became a member of the EC. The UK had important trade relations with its former colony. In this context, the agreement between the EC and the RoC was of an economic rather than political nature and was intended to facilitate an undisturbed trade relationship between the UK and Cyprus. However, a year later (1974), the coup d’état against President Makarios, orchestrated by the Greek junta, and the ensuing Turkish invasion did not allow for the development of trade relations between Cyprus and the EC (Müftüler-​Bac and Güney, 2005). After the end of the Turkish invasion, two political entities resulted on the ground: the southern part, which is governed by the internationally recognized RoC (ruled by the Greek Cypriots), and the northern part, which is governed by a state recognized only by Turkey (ruled by Turkish Cypriots). The EC’s 112

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involvement in the negotiations for the island reunification was negligible. Its influence remained marginal until the beginning of the accession negotiations of the RoC to the EU. The most important reason for the non-​involvement of the EC was the involved parties’ established belief in the UN procedure. Although the EC was unwilling to get involved, a sequence of events forced it to participate in the Cyprus Problem (Hutchence and Georgiades, 1999). Initially, in 1981 Greece became a full member of the EC. The main goal of Greece’s foreign policy was Cyprus’ accession to the EC too. As a result, the Greek Cypriots, disappointed by the stagnation of negotiations and the constant failed attempts towards a solution, gradually launched their efforts to join the EC. In 1987, a Customs Union Agreement was signed between the RoC and the EC. The agreement did not benefit Turkish Cypriots as its terms were not applied in areas not governed by the recognized government (Yakinthou, 2009). In addition to Greece’s accession and the RoC’s Customs Union Agreement, a decision by the Court of Justice of the EU practically imposed an embargo on Turkish Cypriot exports to the EU due to property rights by Greek Cypriots over the occupied areas of the unrecognized state in the north. These developments led to even greater isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and triggered distrust towards the EU (Kyris, 2012). Continuing its European course, in 1990, Cyprus applied to become a full member of the EU. The application generated mixed reactions. Cyprus’ accession was considered an effective mechanism to create new perspectives regarding the already stagnant negotiations on the Cyprus Problem (Barkey and Gordon, 2001). At the same time, however, it was seen as posing a challenge to Turkey since Cyprus’ accession to the EU, preceding Turkey’s, could allow Cyprus to partially freeze EU–​Turkey relations until the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island. The Turkish Cypriots also complained because the accession of the RoC before the island’s reunification would only benefit the Greek Cypriot community (Müftüler-​Bac and Güney, 2005). Finally, Cyprus’ accession talks started in 1998 as the RoC met the economic and political criteria to become a full member. Furthermore, two more factors led to this decision: first, Greece’s intention to veto the accession of Eastern European countries if the application of Cyprus was rejected due to the Turkish occupation; and, second, the uncompromising attitude of Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş, which was seen as the main reason for the failure of the negotiations (Nugent, 1997; Kyris, 2012).

The European Union accession talks period until the 2004 Annan plan referendum (1998–​2004) The starting point of the second period is the beginning of the accession talks between the RoC and the EU. The start of the talks provoked strong reactions 113

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from the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Rauf Denktaş rejected the proposal by the president of the RoC, Glafkos Clerides, for equal participation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the committee that had undertaken the talks with the EU officials (Stivachtis, 2002). The EU considered that the process of accession would result in the Greek Cypriots making significant concessions on the security issue because Greek Cypriots believed that any attack on Cyprus would mean an attack on the EU. Respectively, the Turkish Cypriots would also make concessions regarding their demands for equal governance, as European law would guarantee their human and political rights. Also, for the Turkish Cypriots, the solution to the Cyprus Problem would automatically mean the transition from complete isolation to accession to one of the largest supranational organizations in the Western world (Yakinthou, 2009). The prospect of EU accession had a catalytic effect on the Turkish Cypriot community. The progressive forces that wanted the immediate reunification of the island utilized the promised benefits deriving from the EU membership to demand a change in the political establishment. At the same time, the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey (2002) and his more flexible stance on the Cyprus Problem reinforced the Turkish Cypriot hope for a solution. The Turkish Cypriot civil society spontaneously organized dozens of demonstrations. Their central demand was for a change favouring the island’s unification, which would end their international isolation. Rauf Denktaş was forced to accept the start of a new process for resolving the Cyprus Problem. During the new negotiation round, Cyprus became a full EU member. Once again, the Turkish Cypriot community protested against the political establishment and demanded the opening of the checkpoints between the two entities for citizens to be able to cross to the EU, which included the southern part of the island. One week after the finalization of the accession talks, the Turkish Cypriot regime decided to satisfy their demands and opened the checkpoints allowing for inter-​communal crossing for the first time since 1975. The overall course of Cyprus’ EU accession had created momentum for finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem. For the first time in the elections in 2003, Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of parties supporting a federal solution to the problem, sending the message that they wanted an end to their international isolation. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots appraised their EU membership as an essential step towards some control over Turkey’s aggression (Christou, 2004). Following the completion of the last round of negotiations, the UN Secretary-​General, Kofi Annan, has proposed holding a referendum in both communities on whether or not to adopt a reunification plan based on a bi-​zonal, bi-​communal federation (2004). However, Greek

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Cypriots blocked the plan since only 24 per cent of the electorate supported it, while Turkish Cypriots approved it by 65 per cent. The Turkish Cypriots’ vote was interpreted as an evident change of attitudes triggered by the EU membership and the benefits that it could bring. On the contrary, Greek Cypriots, being in an advantageous position compared to their Turkish Cypriot counterparts, rejected the plan, hoping that their European position would lead to a second better plan, which would remove the invasive rights of Turkey. The vote against the Annan plan had significant consequences. It increased mistrust between the two communities, ended a long round of negotiations, and proved that the EU’s involvement was insufficient for a solution (Christophorou, 2005).

The post-​accession period (2004–​) The third phase regarding Cyprus’ troubled past is mainly affected by the failure of the Annan plan. Once again, Turkish Cypriots are facing the consequences of being isolated. In addition, EU support to Turkish Cypriots, due to legal issues, is limited. Yet, by accepting the Turkish Cypriot community as part of the European acquis communautaire and considering it an equal community to Greek Cypriots, the EU had to respond to the community’s complaints against isolation. Based on the acceptance of the Annan plan in opposition to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots called for developing trade relations with the EU. However, this was coming in complete antithesis to the Court of Justice of the EU’s rulings and was rejected by the RoC, acting now as an EU member state. The main goal of the RoC was to ensure its legitimacy and remain the only recognized political entity on the island. To this end, any proposals involving the participation of institutions of the unrecognized regime in the north were rejected (Yakinthou, 2009). During this period, the EU implemented integration policies for the Turkish Cypriot community without cooperating with the institutions of the unrecognized regime. These policies concerned mainly the participation of representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in various EU conferences and events; the establishment of the Green Line Regulation, which regulates the movement of products between the two communities; and financial assistance to the Turkish Cypriot community in order to improve its social, economic and political standards (Hatay et al, 2008). Meanwhile, the Cyprus Problem had taken a back seat for the Greek Cypriots as the Eurozone crisis in 2012 brought great financial difficulties. The adopted austerity policies provoked significant domestic reactions. At the same time, the election of the rejectionist Dervis Eroglu as the leader of the Turkish Cypriots froze any effort for potential negotiations. Even after 2015, when the financial crisis was over, the Turkish Cypriots elected 115

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the moderate Mustafa Akinci as their leader; the EU initiatives and its participation in the negotiations were almost meaningless. Turkey’s economic integration into the European Single Market has created a relationship of economic dependence between EU countries and Turkey. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected any efforts made by the Greek Cypriots to involve the EU in the negotiations as an equal stakeholder.

Policy recommendations for Cyprus History The main narratives on the two communities regarding the island’s troubled past are not based on the promotion of reconciliation and have remained ethnocentric and prejudicial (Kyris, 2012). The case is a classic dipole of ‘we against the others’, a narrative that leaves limited hope for resolving the Cyprus Problem soon. The main objective of the narratives of both communities is to prove that they are victims of the other community. This also emerged from the RePAST survey findings (Martín et al, 2020), which revealed that 57.3 per cent of the Greek Cypriots feel that they suffered more than Turkish Cypriots. This feeling of victimhood is linked to arguments that make reconciliation difficult. Both communities promote only the events that provide evidence for one community’s victimization against the other and ignore their mistakes and violent actions (Papadakis, 2008). The strengthening of those points that emphasize the violent actions of the other community consolidates the dysfunctional relationship between the two sides. How both sides perceive the past is reflected in their history textbooks (Papadakis, 2008). The review of history textbooks in Cyprus is a point of political intensity since they contribute to the reproduction of the dominant narrative about the violent past between the two communities. History textbooks have been instrumentalized to promote the moral superiority of one community over the other. They also serve as evidence for the political parties’ positions regarding the resolution plan each party considers the most appropriate (Latif, 2019). In this context, any attempts to change the history textbooks in Cyprus have provoked strong disagreements, especially in the Greek Cypriot community. Since the issue of history textbooks and, more generally, any research of what happened before 1977 has been linked to party competition, possible changes are likely to incur political costs for political parties whose proposed resolution plan is not in line with the historical record of events. To this end, any significant change in history textbooks does not seem to happen quickly, even in the case of the Greek Cypriot history textbooks, which mostly skip significant events between 1960 and 1973 (Papadakis, 1993, 1998).

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Based on this, our first recommendation is to review history textbooks and add chapters that refer extensively to the events between 1955 and 1974 and the negotiations that started right after. To implement this proposal, a group of dedicated and impartial academics from both sides should constitute a task force to revise textbooks. An independent committee should select a group of academics whose work should be presented to teachers and students in both communities. In addition to clarifying the historical facts that are currently ignored, we also consider it essential to explain the course of the negotiations throughout the decades. By adding these chapters, students will better understand the other community’s worries. A better knowledge of modern Cypriot history is tantamount to a better understanding of the concerns and demands of each side. Due to the impossibility of cooperation between the RoC and the northern part, our second proposal is to create a bi-​communal committee under the supervision of the EU, which will aim at an objective historical recording of events and their adaptation to history books. We believe that history recording should be done on a scientific and bi-​communal basis to overcome doubts about their validity. The EU as an intermediary will increase credibility and assure that the responsible body will be composed of respected and impartial experts. Moreover, a joint bi-​communal committee under the auspices of the EU will be able to better request data and documents from Greece, Turkey and the UK. There are still several unknown events that can shed light on what happened from 1955 to 1977, which can be studied in historical documents owned by Greek, Turkish and British authorities. Greece recently (2017) handed over the so-​called ‘Cyprus File’ to the RoC, and so should Turkey and the UK, issuing documents of equal importance. However, due to the absence of cooperation between Cyprus and Turkey, since Turkey does not recognize the sovereignty of the RoC, these documents can be handed over to a ‘mediator’ such as an EU institution. For decades, Cypriot citizens from both communities have had a blurred idea of what exactly happened and who are the main responsible actors for the current situation on the island. In addition, after handing out the ‘Cyprus File’ for the first time, hundreds of thousands of new data and testimonies were revealed that need to be examined. An expert EU body could contribute to reconstructing Cypriot history by mobilizing financial and technocratic resources. We believe that history textbooks should also focus on thoroughly investigating the common struggles of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The two communities have coexisted on the island for centuries, and several times they have organized joint struggles against the Ottomans and the British colonists. The depiction of the joint struggles of the two communities against the colonial forces that ruled the island underscores the peaceful coexistence before the turbulent second half of the 20th century. It also 117

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transmits the message that since the two communities have managed to put aside their differences in the past, harmonious coexistence can also be achieved in the future. There are also other communities on the island whose historical origins and current role are still completely ignored by history textbooks. There are communities of Maronites, Armenians and Latins, whose presence on the island dates back centuries. The history textbooks should include references to these communities to make history more comprehensive. The conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and the Turkish invasion inevitably affected the lives of all the other communities on the island, so the attempt to better understand the concerns of all communities should be more inclusive. Despite the traumatic past of the island, even during the difficult times of bi-​communal violence and the Turkish invasion, there are dozens of incidents of compassion and reconciliation. There are stories where Turkish Cypriots helped Greek Cypriots escape the onslaught of the Turkish army and, on the other hand, stories from the 1960s when Greek Cypriots protected Turkish Cypriot friends from bi-​communal violence. There are also figures in folk stories associated with these inseparable relationships, such as Misiaouli and Kavazoglou, Ioannis Maratheftis and Fethi Akinci. The history textbooks completely ignore the valuable historiography of the role of such personalities. This recommendation builds on the fact that generations who coexisted are still alive. Based on this, we propose starting an oral history project led by the Ministry of Education, where teenagers will get in contact and interview elders about coexistence. The results of such an initiative can provide material to be incorporated into the new history textbooks.

Media In RoC, a strict legal framework does not allow the ownership of multiple media outlets by just a small circle of owners. Additionally, the active participation of politicians in the media field is not allowed. The same cannot be said for the Turkish Cypriot community, as some media belong to politicians or individuals who are members of major political parties. However, both Greek and Turkish Cypriot media reproduce symbols and images that reinforce nationalism since they adopt an ethnocentric approach (Avraamidou, 2018). Despite the purported independence and freedom of the Greek Cypriot media from political parties, the media, in their effort to remain popular with Greek Cypriots, adopt the same line of argumentation as traditional history textbooks, reproducing nationalistic narratives. In the past, state television broadcasted programmes concerning reconciliation and friendship between the two communities. Unfortunately, the audience’s interest in these shows was minimal. Another effort concerned 118

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creating and adopting a glossary for journalists to replace terms that cause polarization with terms that are considered ‘neutral’. The glossary was never adopted after a heated debate between journalists. Due to the minimal interest in broadcasts about reconciliation, our proposal focuses on how the media should cover issues in the other community. News regarding the political developments in the other community is only covered by the media when it concerns the course of the negotiations. The rest of the political events are usually ignored. This approach leads to a representation of a homogeneous image for the other community. We believe mainstream media should cover news related to political developments from the other community that are not linked to the Cyprus Problem. Presenting politicians discussing everyday issues will enable viewers to comprehend the concerns of the other community overall and deconstruct today’s homogeneous, if not stereotypical, image. Something similar applies to Turkey’s political developments. In the Greek Cypriot media, the authoritarian image of Recep Tayyip Erdogan monopolizes news broadcasts, while the rest of Turkey’s political forces are entirely ignored. This creates the impression that all Turkish political parties adhere to the same authoritarian position towards the Cyprus Problem. The Turkish people are represented to have one position aligned with Erdogan’s views. We suggest that the media should include a broader range of Turkey’s political developments that are not necessarily linked to the Cyprus issue. The media of both communities should work together at an everyday level to exchange and reproduce news that promotes a better understanding of what is happening in both communities. We propose to give tangible incentives so that news can be translated into Greek and Turkish so that it is easier for the media to include news items in their bulletins and broadcasts. A significant number of reconciliation projects and non-​governmental organizations or other initiatives could be engaged in providing resources (such as translations). Finally, we consider that promoting cooperation between media outlets and exchanging content regarding everyday events from each community might be a decisive factor in bridging the gap between the communities.

Politics Indicative of the absolute weakening of relations between the political parties among the two communities is that whenever a politician from one community visits a counterpart in the other community, this meeting is top news, as cooperation between them is now considered highly unusual. The only parties that established and maintained relations are the Greek Cypriot communist Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) and the 119

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Turkish Cypriot socialist Republican Turkish Party (CTP). Also, their youth branches have established joint actions that promote the reconciliation and reunification of the island (Katsourides, 2013). Political parties in both communities are unwilling to be actively involved in the reconciliation movement. They consider it insignificant as the negotiation process does not bring results. The latest active involvement of a political party was during the referendum of the Annan plan (2004), which cost the current president of the RoC, Nikos Anastasiades, almost ten years of ‘political exile’ due to his support for the plan. Political parties push their negotiating side to demand what they consider most important for their community. So the political situation formulated through the years not only does not promote cooperation between the political parties but also harms them (Loizides, 2007). Part of the public opinion considers any attempt for cooperation between parties from the two communities treacherous. On that basis, politicians prefer to operate in line with a rather traditional negotiating position that represents their partisan audience rather than forge cooperative relations with politicians from the other community. The only common ground that can bring the political parties from the two communities closer is their participation in the collective bodies of party groups of the EP. More specifically, the Greek Cypriot centrist The Democratic Party (DIKO) and social democratic The Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK) and the Turkish Cypriot Socialist CTP participate in Socialists and Democrats. Also, EDEK and CTP are members of the same European party –​Party of European Socialists, but they do not cooperate at any level. Participation in the same European party group can be a significant motive for the beginning of a constructive dialogue, as long as the European parties have the will to help and bring the two sides closer through their collective bodies. An initiative can be organized through the EP so that these parties participating in the same party group can come closer. Even the arrangement of a social event in Brussels (as none of those parties will accept to cross the Green Line) can contribute to constructing ties between them since communication is non-​existent. Our second proposal is for European party groups to start talks with the rest of the Turkish Cypriot parties. Apart from the two major political parties of the Turkish Cypriot community, the conservative The National Unity Party (UBP), and the socialist CTP, the other Turkish Cypriot parties are not participating in any European party group and do not hold any ties with the EP. At the European level, the obstacles in Cyprus that complicate any form of cooperation do not have the same adverse effects; thus, we believe that the European institutions can promote cooperation between the Cypriot political forces. Therefore, the participation or even the communication of

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Turkish Cypriot parties with European party groups is considered a possible significant development. Apart from the stagnation of negotiations and the relations between the two communities’ political parties, which lead to the consolidation of the problematic status quo, European citizens are largely unaware of the island’s current situation. Also, Turkish Cypriots are partly excluded from European society, in general. Thus, we propose the arrangement of an annual forum in Brussels with the participation of mainly civic groups and social movements from both communities. Civil society must be strengthened as its role today is minor in Cyprus. As a result, the existing anomalies and the prevailing situation do not promote a broad-​ranging debate among all social groups from both communities. That said, we believe that an annual forum on the Cyprus Problem, with the participation of active citizens and social movements from both sides, can achieve two goals. First, to inform Europeans about what is happening on the island and what the main concerns of the two communities are, and, second, to bring active citizens closer together in an environment that does not exacerbate tensions. The latest recommendation, perhaps the most substantial, is to redefine the EU’s role in the negotiation process for resolving the Cyprus Problem. The EU has not been actively involved in the negotiations due to Turkey’s refusal. It is an observer of the process and cannot exercise significant influence. However, the tension in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the RoC directly affects Euro-​Turkish relations and is a significant obstacle to normalizing the relations between the two sides. Therefore, for the EU, there is a significant stake in the solution to the Cyprus Problem since it is the only way to fully normalize its relations with an important economic partner, Turkey. However, we understand that this suggestion is a timeless point of intense discussions that have not yielded any results. We believe that the participation of the EU can be a catalyst for resolving the Cyprus Problem; thus, its involvement in any form and level can be beneficial.

Arts and culture Probably the only field that has benefited and was developed between the two communities after the opening of the checkpoints is that of arts and culture. During the first years after the checkpoints opened and the excitement from the reconnection of the two communities, social events with traditional dances and music were organized. The traditional music and dances shared by the two communities for centuries have been promoted as a key point of reconciliation. Those events remind us of the times when the two communities lived harmoniously together. However, such events tend to vanish due to the consolidation of the status quo. The reconciliation 121

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movement employed music and dance extensively to promote its actions and increase its reach. Unfortunately, rising tensions and the halt of negotiations have led the reconciliation movement to isolation from the rest of society. However, we believe that the area of arts and culture can significantly help to overcome the troubled past and create bridges of communication between the two communities. Our first recommendation is to set up a student exchange programme, like-​Erasmus+​, so that Turkish Cypriot students will be encouraged to spend at least six months studying at a Greek Cypriot university. Due to the non-​recognition of the regime in the northern part of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot students have little opportunity to spend part of their studies abroad. With the contribution of the EU, a European programme can be set up to mediate between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot universities to facilitate the study of Turkish Cypriot students at Greek Cypriot universities. This programme will trigger the creation of relations between the youth of the two communities. At the same time, it will help the Turkish Cypriots to practise their English and acquire valuable experience. In addition to the various social events that began after the opening of the checkpoints, many camps were organized for young people. These initiatives have been instrumental in setting up the reconciliation movement, as most of the youngsters who met at the summer camps are supporters of peace. Various summer camps managed to turn into annual gatherings. Our second recommendation is to provide an EU fund to finance the organization of bi-​communal summer camps. This fund must be distributed according to strict terms and conditions to benefit the summer camps that, through their activities, promote the reconciliation and creation of relations between the youth of the two communities. From time to time, various bi-​communal social movements have chosen the buffer zone as the ‘venue’ for their events and activities. The most significant joint actions took place in the buffer zone, which is under the UN administration and is considered a grey zone where citizens from both communities can visit without any problems. Also, the only building that hosts the reconciliation movement and the non-​governmental organizations trying to overcome the troubled past is the ‘Home for Cooperation’ in the buffer zone. At the Home for Cooperation, various cultural events are organized, while from time to time, joint visits are made by schools from both communities. Our experience suggests that the buffer zone is a point of strengthening bi-​communal relations, as the conditions on the rest of the island are not very encouraging for such initiatives. Therefore, our third proposal is to strengthen the initiatives already located in the buffer zone, such as the Home of Cooperation, or, if it is possible, to create another similar space elsewhere in the buffer zone. Since the Home of Cooperation is located in Nicosia, the hosted events are mainly attended by residents 122

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of the capital. We believe it would be helpful if a similar space is opened elsewhere in the buffer zone to be closer to other cities. Our last recommendation is to organize a film festival within the buffer zone for only Cypriot producers. In recent years, independent cinema has flourished in both communities. The most important film festivals are organized mainly in Limassol, located in the southern part of the island, which is not accessible to most Turkish Cypriots. Independent cinema is almost the only field that extensively deals with the troubled past, so strengthening and supporting it through organizing a festival in a place that can be accessible to both communities may help build deeper relationships.

Conclusion In this chapter, we present our conclusions shaped by the feedback we received from the interviewees. First, we discuss our conclusive points regarding the policy recommendations for every dimension separately, while in the second part, we outline our broader conclusions. Regarding the media field in Cyprus, the interviewees acknowledge that the ways in which the other community, as well as Turkey, are represented are one-​sided. However, we have found that issuing a call to the media to depict the other side more in-​depth is impractical. The media in Cyprus, mainly the Greek Cypriot, are unwilling to follow suggestions, as they consider this to interfere with their freedom of expression. We have seen this in practice with the recent failure to implement a glossary for journalistic use, which recommended replacing words and phrases and indeed caused tension. It became apparent to the participants that the one-​sided coverage of the events by the media reproduces narratives that maintain the distance between the two communities. They claimed that public radio and television stations, which operate under a legal framework different from private media, can promote unbiased news coverage by representing both communities’ positions. Regarding bi-​communal broadcasts, it was stated that there were such initiatives in the past without success. The only initiative that can succeed is establishing a bi-​communal news agency that will provide ready-​made news in both languages to private stations. EU assistance will be needed here as such a bi-​communal news agency cannot be set up and sustained just by private funds. Almost all interviewees were supportive of recording historical events and reviewing history textbooks. However, such a decision was admitted to cause tensions and disagreements, something that, as we were told, no one wishes at this time as the Cyprus Problem is going through a critical period. Nevertheless, the participants suggested that any attempt to revise history textbooks must be made objectively. They proposed to assign this task to a large group of historians, both Cypriots and Europeans, and to ask 123

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for the active participation of the EU in this effort. The EU’s involvement will enhance the legitimacy of the results, which will be much needed due to the controversy around the issue. Also, the three guarantor powers need to assist in restoring the truth and handing over whatever information and historical records they hold about Cyprus’ troubled past. Participants believed that if there is a willingness on the part of the EU to assist in setting up a ‘truth committee’, then a thorough and objective history record can finally be made. Regarding our recommendations for politics, we found a significant difference between the participants’ responses. The politicians considered that the possibly most drastic action of the EU is its participation as the sixth party at the negotiating table to solve the Cyprus Problem. They stated that the active participation of the EU in the negotiations could provide immediate solutions to deadlocks that have hindered the process for decades. The non-​politicians focused on the fact that there must be a mechanism to push politicians from both communities to come into contact with the other community. Nevertheless, everyone agreed that even simple social gatherings should occur between politicians and non-​governmental organizations. Here, we must emphasize that relations between the vast majority of politicians of the two communities are almost non-​existent. For example, after the election of Ersin Tatar as the new leader of the Turkish Cypriots in 2020, the president of the RoC stated that before any negotiations between them, they should first know each other, proving that even the most popular politicians have no relations with their counterparts in the other community. Regarding our proposals for arts and culture, we realized they face practical difficulties. The participants pointed out that these initiatives need financial support. We believe the EU needs to revisit any possibility of providing financial aid dedicated to assisting initiatives that have brought Greek and Turkish Cypriots closer. There are already some common art festivals for which citizens’ interest decreases yearly, making it increasingly difficult for these festivals to continue their work. Through the interviews, mainly with non-​politicians, we realized a significant omission. Most bi-​communal events and festivals occur in Nicosia, which is divided between the non-​ recognized regime and the territories controlled by the RoC. Thus, the people of Nicosia are in an advantageous position, as they have easier access to these events compared to other Cypriots. As a result, the same groups of people participate in these events. We believe that the EU should make it clear that any funding given to bi-​communal initiatives should be able to contribute to strengthening relations between all citizens of the island and not just those living by the Nicosia buffer zone. In conclusion, we can say that all participants considered the EU’s contribution crucial and positive but not sufficient. The main problem 124

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preventing the two communities’ rapprochement is the continuation of the status quo, which reproduces the troubled past’s adverse effects. Also, during the last two years, the increase in tension between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus further complicates the already minimal range of possibilities for rapprochement between the two communities. We believe that the EU could play a key role. Unfortunately, the EU’s contribution has not been enough to strengthen the efforts made by civil society and non-​ governmental organizations to bring the two communities together.

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Poland: Strategies for Challenging the Growing Dominance of Right-​wing Memory Politics Introduction Before the Second World War, about one-​third of the population of Poland were members of national minorities, including Ukrainians, Jews, Belarusians and Germans. However, as a result of the Nazi and Soviet invasion of Poland, the Holocaust, the expulsion of Germans and the resettlement of Ukrainians, the post-​1945 Poland became an ethnically homogeneous nation-​state. It is estimated that about 5.7 million Polish citizens lost their lives during the German occupation and about 150,000 Polish citizens lost their lives during the Soviet occupation. In the aftermath of the war, Poland was a state with reduced sovereignty. The communist Polish United Workers’ Party gained firm control over domestic politics, which nonetheless remained under the Soviet influence. In the period 1945–​89, the country’s memory politics was fully dependent on the narrative dictated by the state and influenced by the pro-​Soviet optics. However, the collective memory, the acts of oppositional memory, and oppositional commemorative acts recurred in this period and re-​emerged in the early 1990s. This is when many troubled past issues entered the public sphere from various vantage points and in various ways, including the Holocaust, the Roma genocide, forced sexual labour of women and rape as a war crime, the Polish–​Ukrainian conflicts, the Polish anti-​Semitism and the role of Poles in the Nazi genocide, the participation of Poles in the communist regime and in oppositional movement against the regime. These and many other elements of the Polish troubled past have been used and abused in public debates, in which participate politicians, cultural and artistic institutions, writers and artists, non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) and academics.

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Although in post-​1989 Poland this conversation has been multidimensional, two dominant competing trends/​narratives can be distinguished: the so-​called ‘pedagogy of shame’ versus the so-​called ‘patriotic pride’. The former one is associated with European integration, modernization, emancipation and equality within the European Union (EU), where Poland features as a partner who has worked through its historical traumas, recompensated for the guilt and so on. It was called the ‘pedagogy of shame’ by right-​wing historians and journalists. On the other hand, ‘patriotic pride’ is associated with nationalistic, Catholic, conservative and anti-​European positions. The discourse of pride counters the discourse of guilt and shame by refusing to acknowledge the collective condition of being implicated (Rothberg, 2019) and, at times, complicity of Poles in the war and post-​war crimes and in the wrongdoings against the minorities. This position focuses mostly on stressing the victimhood of the Polish nation. In the RePAST project, we have revisited some of the episodes from the Polish troubled past and analysed their effects in the present. This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we explain our methodological approach regarding this task. We describe the rules of interviewee selection, elaborate on the main factor that influenced the selection process (COVID-​ 19) and list the names of the interviewees who gave their feedback to us. In the section that follows, we reconstruct the EU’s approach to the troubled past in post-​1989 Poland. Then comes the main section, in which we propose policy recommendations. Finally, we close our chapter with concise conclusions and recommendations.

Methodological approach The methodology underpinning this chapter follows the methodological approach applied also in other cases investigated in this book. First, the early draft of the policy recommendations for Poland, based on the initial results of RePAST research, was written in late spring 2020 and sent to the policy makers and stakeholders, whom we asked to comment on this. Second, in August and September 2020 we conducted interviews with all the actors who responded to our request. Due to the first wave of COVID-​19, we decided to wait out the period of the greatest social chaos and tension and turned to our interviewees during the summer period of partial normalization. As shown by the high response rate (~50 per cent), this was a good decision. Importantly, due to COVID-​19, all interviews were conducted online, via video-​conferencing tools. Third, after receiving comments from the interviewees, we revised the early draft and came up with this chapter. In selecting our interviewees, we were guided by the principle of equal representation of experts from national and EU levels. We also ensured a proportionate representation of the two main expert groups; policy makers and 127

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stakeholders. More precisely, at the EU level, we focused on inviting policy makers –​people who are best informed about what European policies towards the troubled past are, at the same time, most needed and most feasible. In turn, at national level, we gave the floor primarily to stakeholders who represented think tanks and public institutions, and are critically oriented towards the policies of the current right-​wing government in Poland. In this way we attempted at providing the widest possible response to our recommendations. The following interviewees provided their feedback to the early draft: • EU-​level: Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz –​a Polish centre-​left MEP (2019–​24); Danuta Hubner –​a Polish centre-​right MEP (2019–​24) and a member of the International Honorary Council of the European Academy of Diplomacy (since 2012); Michał Boni –​a Polish centre-​r ight MEP (2014–​19). • National-​level: Bartosz Machalica –​a historian, political scientist and the co-​founder of the Ignacy Daszyński Centre think tank, an institution focused on cultivating the memory of the achievements of Polish social democracy; Katarzyna Wielga-​Skolimowska –​the former director of the Polish Cultural Institute in Berlin, the former Director of the Goethe Institute in Saudi Arabia, and since 2022 the Director of Kulturstiftung des Bundes; Paweł Machcewicz –​a Polish historian and university professor, the former president of the Bureau of Public Education at the Institute of National Remembrance and the former director of the Museum of the Second World War in Gdansk.

Background: the European Union’s approach to the troubled past in Poland The EU approach to the troubled past in post-​1989 Poland is worth seeing as part of a broader EU approach to troubled past in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In the case of Poland, this trend can be divided into four main phases, of which the third one is the most significant. These phases are: • the 1990s (until Poland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization); • the period 2000–​4 (until Poland joined the EU); • the period 2005–​15 (until the Law and Justice Party [PiS] took power in Poland); • the post-​2015 period (until today).

The 1990s: from the end of the Cold War until joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization During the 1990s, memory politics in the EU and Poland largely did not go hand in hand. On the one hand, at the EU level, the turn of the 1980s 128

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and 1990s marked the emergence of a direction for building a common, Europe-​wide historical narrative with the Second World War and the Holocaust as two key elements (Berger, 2010, p 134). This strategy, developed throughout the 1990s, assumed that it was possible to build a sense of Europeanness based on a consensus on what were the common elements of European culture and history. On the other hand, the main trend in Poland at that time was the new cleansing of the past (Karge, 2010, p 139) after the period of communism, marked by a complete turn away from communist memory politics in favour of a return to the tradition of national martyrdom and national uprisings (Ochman, 2013, pp 1–​3). For Polish memory politics regarding the Second World War and the communist past, this meant adopting a perspective whereby the Polish nation was a double victim –​of fascism on the one hand and of communism on the other. In short, while in the 1990s EU-​level political actors were looking for what was common, supranational for Europeans, in Poland the focus was rather on appreciating what constituted the local. This also meant pushing such problems as Jewish victimhood during the Holocaust, the role of Poles in the Holocaust or the role of Poles in the installation of communism into the distant past. Although such problems were episodically addressed and tackled both by some liberal-​left politicians and academics, no systematic policies were implemented.

The period 2000–​4: entering the European Union This period should be considered as a transition phase, marked by the EU’s early efforts to Europeanize Poland’s past by promoting key values such as openness, tolerance, human rights, minority rights and plurality of historical perspectives. On the one hand, these efforts found some allies among the prominent Polish political forces, such as the post-​communist Democratic Left Alliance party, which saw liberal Euro-​integration as a way to modernize Poland and ‘return’ it to Europe. On the other hand, they meant a certain alienation of prominent right-​wing parties that, although not explicitly Eurosceptic, considered the EU’s cultural efforts as a threat to Polish national culture (Wagner, 2003, p 200). As a result, after 2000, a fundamental conflict emerged in Polish memory politics between the pro-​EU liberal perspective and the right-​wing perspective focused on forcing a martyrdom-​heroic narrative about the great Polish past (Wagner, 2003, p 191; Ochman, 2013, p 5). A good example of it is the 2001 case of Jedwabne pogrom, whose memorialization coincided with the EU policy of cementing the key significance of the Holocaust for European memory (Clarke, 2014, p 5). The case was sparked by publication of the book Neighbours written by US-​based Polish historian Jan Tomasz Gross. 129

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The period 2005–​15: Law and Justice Party takes over the power The third period has been marked by an EU approach aimed at complementing the European historical narrative with the experience of CEE with Poland as one of its main vehicles (Mälksoo, 2009, p 662). In general, CEE (Polish) political actors at the EU level were primarily concerned with levelling out the disparities in the European narrative, where the experience of the Nazi crimes and atrocities was considered much more significant and thus more commemorated than the experience of the communist violence. The outcome of the openness of the ‘old-​EU states’ to the CEE perspective and the determination of the ‘new-​EU states’ was the common course to promote and legitimize the narrative of two totalitarianisms (Ghodsee, 2014) that afflicted Europe in the 20th century. From the CEE perspective (especially in Poland) narrative on totalitarianisms was two-​fold. On the one hand, Polish efforts to deal with troubled past of totalitarisms were concentrated, as Laure Neumayer (2018, p 229) put it, on criminalizing communism, that is building a ‘Europe-​wide narrative of indictment of Communism, which makes the criminality the essence of the communist ideology and of the Socialist regimes across all national contexts and historical periods’. Key milestones in this respect were achieved between 2008 and 2011. Precisely speaking, in 2008, the EP members adopted two key resolutions setting this commemorative direction: The Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism (signed 3 July), initiated by the Czech government and Vaclav Havel, that equated the crimes of Nazism and communism and the European Parliament’s proclamation of European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism (the Black Ribbon Day) that was adopted on 23 September and set on 23 August, that is the anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-​ Ribbentrop Pact. In subsequent years, Poland was promoting this CEE perspective as can be seen, for example, in the statements of Jerzy Buzek, then president of the EP, who, on the 2010 Black Ribbon Day, described the Molotov-​Ribbentrop Pact as ‘the collusion of the two worst forms of totalitarianism in the history of humanity’ (Buzek, 2010). It is also visible in the activities of the Polish government during the Polish presidency of the EU, such as the 2011 conference on the Black Ribbon Day, during which the Warsaw Declaration was adopted, which proclaimed that crimes of totalitarian regimes in Europe should be condemned from whatever ideological background. On the other hand, Poland remained aloof from the EU-​led trend of emphasizing the pan-​European dimension of the Allied victory over fascism in the Second World War (8 May 1945). The emergence of this trend was made possible thanks to Germany’s unambiguous joining of the European memory project at the turn of the 1990s and 2000s (Korzeniewski, 2011, 130

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p 94). Poland was sceptical about the spread of this trend from the beginning, which should date back to 2005, when two events commemorating the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War took place (V-​Day): the pan-​European anniversary celebration in Moscow hosted by Russia (9 May) and the anniversary resolution of the European Parliament (12 May). Polish representatives took part in the parade in Moscow mainly in order to emphasize the differences between victorious narrative developed by Russia and the ‘old EU states’, and narrative of complex CEE experience (Mälksoo, 2009, p 664), while the anniversary resolution adopted by the Polish parliament had both anti-​fascist and anti-​communist overtones (Rawski, 2019, p 925). This discrepancy persisted in subsequent years. It was supported on the national level by increasingly powerful right-​wing memory politics launched with the opening of the Warsaw Uprising Museum in 2004 and tested during the 2005–​7 first term of office of the PiS. In the case of the Holocaust commemorations, the EU trend has consistently sought to articulate the key importance of its universalist interpretation, that is, presenting the Nazi genocide against the Jews as a unique tragedy in human history, as part of the ‘two totalitarianisms’ narrative. This interpretation was anchored in the International Holocaust Remembrance Day (27 January), which is evidenced, for example, in the statements of certain EU officials in 2005 (Berger, 2010, p 134; Clarke, 2014, p 7); the 2007 proposal to criminalize the Holocaust denial made by the German EU presidency (Traynor, 2007); or the 2012 Seventy Years Declaration on the Anniversary of the Final Solution Conference at Wannsee that condemned attempts to diminish the unique, global significance of the Holocaust. Polish officials participated in this trend but at the same time were preoccupied with an internal conflict over the Polish nation’s complicity in the Holocaust, that sparked –​as previously mentioned –​in 2001 and returned in subsequent years without coming to a solution.

The post-​2015 period The existing analyses of this period focus primarily on showing Polish national-​ level memory politics as a soft-​power tool of a broader policy of dismantling the rule of law (for example, by using commemorative law-​making; see Bucholc, 2019). Many authors believe that this is primarily aimed at ensuring legitimacy and consolidation of the illiberal democracy (Agh, 2016).

Policy recommendations for Poland History It is most desirable to counteract the political divisions in the academic historians’ circles, which are deepening as a result of the increasingly intense 131

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attempts of governmental politicization of historical knowledge regarding the Second World War and the communist past. Although the divisions here are smaller than those inside the journalists’ community, they are still deep enough to be visible even to non-​historians. Defeating these divisions can be done in several ways, as discussed in the following. Support should be provided for reforming key, non-​academic public research institutions dealing with the history of the Second World War and the communist past, for example, the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), which was established in 1998 on the political initiative of the then ruling right to settle the crimes of the communist period and that remains to this day an institution operating between academia and politics. It is desirable to support the opposition to the governmental attempts to make the IPN a tool of political struggle –​as was the case with the attempt to amend the Act on the IPN in January 2018, which was eventually ‘softened’ by the right-​wing government thanks to combined pressure from Polish and international opinion-​makers. The efforts aimed at de-​politicizing the IPN should be supported. There seems to be no need for employment of over 100 prosecutors at the IPN who investigate communist and Nazi crimes. Also, the reliable research activities of the IPN should be advocated for, that is, by striving to significantly spread the knowledge among the public about the availability of the IPN archives. This could prevent the production of biased interpretations of the past which are difficult to prove. This would also prevent right-​wing politicians from using blackmail against political opponents by making allegations of their alleged support for the communist repression apparatus. Although this method was particularly popular at the turn of the 1990s and 2000s (so-​called ‘wild lustration’), it remains a political tool. Support is needed for independent public institutions involved in both research on the Second World War and communist past and the dissemination of knowledge, such as the Museum of the Second World War in Gdansk or European Solidarity Centre in Gdansk. This can be done, for example, by taking a clear political position in disputes about the politically motivated changes in management boards, as was the case with the Museum of the Second World War in spring 2017. This is necessary in order to provide counterbalance to the activities of the Pilecki Institute, the second main government-​controlled institution (after the IPN) that is strongly oriented towards right-​wing instrumentalization of the Polish past. Support should be provided for grassroots, collective initiatives made by reliable academic historians in order to oppose attacks by politicized historians and prevent deepening divisions in the academic milieu –​such as a 2016 letter of the opposition signed by 200 historians against the attack made by an IPN historian, Bogdan Musiał, on recognized scholars of Polish–​German relations, whom he accused of ‘favouring German interests’, ‘providing 132

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arguments to Erika Steinbach’ and ‘reproducing theses of communist propaganda’ (Leszczyński, 2016). It seems necessary to strengthen the connection between independent liberal-​left media and independent historians/​researchers, particularly by strengthening the public role of historians and sociologists as the main actors in narrating the past who take responsibility for their actions, that is, initiate and profile public debates, indicate which past and historical traditions the society prefers to refer to, and show the complexity of available positions and interpretations of troubled events and periods. This could allow to: • strengthen public trust in the role of historians and reduce the dominance of politicians and historical journalists in troubled past issues; • dismiss the still recurring public belief that historical science and the public sphere are two spheres separated by a hard border which the historians should not cross; • articulate the difference between academic disputes that are deeply rooted in the tradition of Polish historical thought and the instrumentalization and simplification of these disputes for political purposes (for example, the dispute between ‘pedagogy of shame’ and ‘pedagogy of pride’ regarding the attitude of Poles towards Jews during the Second World War); • provide a more complex picture of troubled past in media, which is important particularly for users from smaller cities, for whom, as demonstrated by oral history interviews in our project, participation in a particular discursive group or a ‘bubble’ is decisive in shaping opinions, attitudes and historical-​political engagements. This applies especially to younger users who don’t have their own biographical experience of conflict yet are engaged on an everyday basis in radical symbolic/​discursive conflicts in social media. Greater support is needed for schoolteachers from smaller towns and villages. They require training and education programmes dedicated to their needs, as well as supporting initiatives aimed at increasing their monthly salaries. This will allow to counteract the negative tendency identified in oral history interviews that residents of local communities outside of the large cities perceive their life-​worlds as completely detached from historical events, as separated milieus not affected by ‘big world’ problems. So, these activities would aim at breaking a sense of separation and developing a sense of belonging and agency in socio-​historical processes. There is a need for reform of history teaching at all levels of the educational system. Although the number of hours of history in school curricula seems sufficient, these curricula require modifications in at least three aspects: 133

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• Introducing more contemporary history, which is the main period of troubled past events, at the cost of reducing the history of earlier centuries. Respondents indicated that the school programme was overloaded with content related to the 18th and 19th centuries, as a result of which history teaching usually stops at the Second World War, while later events are rarely discussed. Equalizing these proportions in favour of the 20th-​ century history would improve students’ knowledge of the post-​war period, which could in turn reduce the social credibility of simplistic narratives about it that currently dominate in the public sphere. • Introducing more social perspectives (including everyday life, relations between various social classes, changes in the social structure), gender perspectives (presenting them as active agents of changes) and the history of national minorities (including in particular the longue durée perspective on the Polish–​Jewish relations) at the expense of dominant political history narrative focused on breakthroughs and great events/​protagonists. Equalizing these proportions would increase a sense of agency of representatives of various social groups (including minorities) and build a conviction that they are all equal subjects of the historical process. • Introducing more critical understandings of history and memory at the expense of nation-​affirmative perspective. This would allow teaching about the complexity of interpretations regarding key troubled past events (for example, the Warsaw Uprising dispute) as well as show more negative sides of history (for example, atrocities committed by Poles towards Jews during the Second World War).

Media In this area, the recommendations include suggested ways of counteracting four key negative trends on the Polish media scene regarding troubled past. Growing polarization into liberal-​left mainstream and right-​wing/​ nationalist media can be countered especially by supporting those liberal-​ left mainstream (and non-​mainstream) outlets/​journalists oriented towards building and articulating complex interpretations of the communist past in Poland as well as maintaining a pro-​European perspective on the Second World War and the Holocaust. The desirable complex interpretations would shift the emphasis from the plane of political conflict during communism towards the dynamics of social, cultural and economic life in this period, processes that had both negative and positive consequences from the point of view of society’s everyday life. Strengthening such interpretations and ensuring their long-​term presence in the public discourse would allow to break the current domination of an extremely simplistic right-​wing anti-​ communist narrative, which has been negatively assessed by most interviewed mainstream journalists and focus group interviewees. Moreover, it would 134

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help to articulate past conflicts which have remained a silenced part of family histories to such an extent that it is difficult even to determine their impact on contemporary relationships in families and the political divisions among their members. There is a need to maintain the strong position on the universalist interpretation of the Holocaust (as the globally exceptional genocide in history), symbolically anchored to the International Holocaust Remembrance Day, by extending the existing perspective focused mainly on suffering of innocent Jewish victims, with the perspective of witnesses and bystanders of the genocide. In this way, it would be possible to counteract in particular the visible increase in the number of sceptics among centre-​r ight mainstream journalists, who tend to partially undermine this interpretation, claiming it to be essentially particularistic and anti-​Polish. It is desirable to strengthen the symbolic significance of pro-​European V-​Day commemorations, which lost their importance in Poland after 2004, in spite of the fact that during the 1990s productive debates around it continued. Strengthening the significance of the V-​Day could allow, in particular, to counteract right-​wing attempts to blur the symbolic boundary between war and communism. Such attempts serve the right-​wing radicals to build a narrative about Polish nation continuously persecuted by external forces from 1939 to 1989. It is recommended that the stability of employment in the journalistic profession be supported, especially in private mainstream media, in order to strengthen journalistic independence. As for the media scene in general, interviewed journalists unanimously reported that the deterioration of the journalistic job market over the past 15 years has meant the devaluation of the profession, and one of its main consequences was the decline of journalistic independence. Journalists are increasingly ceasing to be spokespersons for public affairs, becoming exponents of opinions favourable to various interest groups. Since the most important aspect of the problem with journalistic independence is governmental politicization of some right-​wing/​nationalist media, this should be countered by putting pressure on modifying legal regulations regarding money flows between the state budget and the media outlets. What seems most crucial regarding public media is to regulate the issue of the Act on the Radio-​television (RTV) licence fee, which is the primary source of the abuse of public media financing by the right-​wing government. Although in Poland the licence fee is the main source of financing for public media, which should grant them independence from direct political influence, after 2015 the right-​wing government introduced an additional, direct stream of financing from the state budget. Regarding private media, it seems crucial to regulate the issue of their budgetary co-​ financing through advertising fees paid by state-​owned companies. The 135

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right-​wing government uses this tool to co-​finance its adherents among far-​r ight media outlets. This can be countered, for example, by introducing the ‘principle of maximum diversity’, according to which state-​owned companies would have to advertise themselves in maximally diverse media outlets and would be placed under restrictions regarding maximum amounts of money that could be spent on advertising fees in one outlet. Supporting such narratives and attitudes to the troubled past in which common values would be linked to their pragmatic justifications/​rationale is needed. Increasing change in mainstream optics towards the troubled past from idealism to pragmatism is essentially a turn from a vision of Europe as a community of pan-​European values to Europe as a conglomerate of national interests. This was largely reflected in the opinions of focus group and oral history respondents, who perceived the EU and Europeanness primarily in pragmatic terms, paying less attention to common values. Since this trend seems to be already quite strongly embedded in public opinion, counteracting it should not simply seek to stop and reverse it but also to emphasize links between idealism and pragmatism. This could effectively weaken the dominant right-​wing/​nationalist optics, which in recent years has challenged, for example, the universalist interpretation of the Holocaust not only from an idealistic-​moral perspective (that is, by claiming that the Polish nation maintained moral purity in the Second World War, so Poles cannot be considered complicit in the Holocaust), but also from an economic perspective (that is, by claiming that the focus on Jewish victimhood in the Holocaust is a symbolic justification for the allegedly real property claims of the contemporary Jewish community against the Polish state). Strengthening the link between idealism and pragmatism would help to consolidate the pro-​ European position by referring to the deep roots of the EU, as a community founded on both common values and interests. There is a need for improving gender perspective on troubled past on the whole media scene. Strong male dominance should be counteracted in both aspects: among journalists themselves and in the media discourse about the troubled past. In the first aspect, journalistic awareness of the reasons for this dominance should be strengthened by providing them with professional knowledge about its sociocultural mechanisms. Although basically all interviewed mainstream journalists noticed the very existence of male dominance in their profession –​both in terms of numerical disparities between men and women and in the presence of women in discourse about the past –​very few of them were able to diagnose why this was the case. In the second aspect, it is desirable to provide support for developing such interpretations of the troubled Second World War and communist past that consider both female perspective on the past and an active role of women as agents in history, show both their momentous contributions to historical breakthrough moments (for example, the emergence of the ‘Solidarity 136

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movement’ in 1980) as well as their major impact on everyday social life. As focus group respondents pointed out, counteracting male domination would be about displaying and de-​stereotyping women at the same time, that is, showing them as significant historical actors in roles other than those envisaged by conservative discourse: caring mothers, innocent victims and so on.

Politics In this area, the recommendations include suggested ways of counteracting three negative trends: increased tilting of the increasingly polarized political scene to the right; the rise of right-​wing populism; and the decline in the ruling party’s confidence in further EU integration. What is needed first and foremost is to support the interest of liberal parties in troubled past issues. This would reduce the very large disproportion between the strongly identity-​oriented far-​right parties, including mainstream PiS and the populists, which are keen to develop and promote the extensive political repertoires of interpretations regarding the Second World War and the communist past, and the other parties, which are much more inclined to stick to the central tropes of modernization and the pragmatic belief that further European integration will somewhat automatically bring solution to the troubled past issues. The latter position refers in part to the centre-​r ight mainstream party (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), which, despite some efforts in memory politics in the last decade, has not had any significant symbolic successes, mostly because it has focused mainly on attempts to correct trends imposed by the PiS without proposing an alternative. However, it also refers to the newly emerging liberal parties and movements, which to a large extent ignore the troubled past issues (Nowoczesna is a good example here). Support for left-​wing memory initiatives is urgently needed. The left-​wing parliamentary coalition has shown large interest in troubled past issues, but it does not have enough political clout to make its perspectives influential. There are two major commemorative trends worth supporting there: first, a trend oriented towards promoting a complex interpretation of the communist past, developed especially by the post-​communist left (Democratic Left Alliance party); and, second, a trend oriented towards the promotion of the idea of critical patriotism, mainly through the introduction of complex interpretations of the Second Republic of Poland and Second World War past, developed especially by the independent new left (Razem). Here, gender topics, topics related to national minorities and the dark chapters of Polish history, including the Poles’ attitudes towards the Jews during the Second World War, are strongly exposed. Both trends seem to respond to the demand of the liberal-​left media mainstream. 137

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Citizens’ initiatives aimed at monitoring transparency and accountability of political elites should be strengthened. These are initiatives that follow the example of those consolidated democracies that hold public officials accountable for the fulfilment of political promises made to citizens, for their truthfulness and adherence to the acceptable limits of public debate (for example, use of hate speech). One of the largest Polish initiatives of this type is mamprawowiedziec.pl (translated, Ihavetherighttoknow.pl). Supporting them might potentially neutralize the populists, whose political success depends to a large extent on skilful manipulation of civil society –​ including information gaps, fake news, low-​quality journalism and so on –​ as well as on turning social discontent/​anger into political support using non-​complicated discursive dichotomies, including the most fundamental one between the ‘good people’ and the ‘evil elites’. Trust in state institutions should be improved. In post-​1989 Poland it has never been high, but after 2015 it has decreased even more due to the actions of the ruling party (PiS) that began dismantling some of the basic institutions of liberal democracy, including an independent judiciary. Here, social trust might be improved through supporting independent NGOs that organize mass protests and social campaigns against these changes. One of the most important, stable organizations of this kind is the Democratic Action (akcjademokracja.pl) that has operated in Poland since 2015. Counteracting the decline in the ruling party’s confidence in further EU integration should be pursued. This decline seems to have accelerated especially after two crises at the EU level occurring in 2014 and 2015, that is, the refugee crisis in Europe and Russian aggression in Crimea and East Ukraine. Those events radicalized the attitude of the ruling right (PiS) and the populist right (2015–​19 this was Kukiz, after 2019 it is Confederation) towards Euro-​integration. Both these groups used the crises to further support for the nationalist-​conservative agenda in the domain of culture and identity. Additionally, the ruling right has become even more willing to promote a strictly pragmatic vision of the EU integration as interest-​ driven cooperation of independent nation-​states and sought greater political collaboration with the US, while the populist right introduced the claim that because the EU does little to improve international security in Eastern Europe, Poland is facing serious danger of Russian military aggression. The invasion in Ukraine was important also because it aroused discourses regarding troubled past experiences of Russian expansion in the region that has been the case since the 18th century until 1945 and then 1989. Counteracting this trend would require intensified attempts among key EU-​level political forces focused on showing their uniform commitment on how to solve problems affecting the entire Union. This would dismiss the right-​wing nationalist agenda in Poland that the shift 138

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towards nation-​states and national interests must be seen as the only reasonable answer to deepening internal divisions in the EU.

Arts and culture Arts (both performative and visual) and culture (both institutional and grassroots) is doubtless one of the most important spheres where negotiation of collective memory takes place, and conflicts over the shape of the cultural (political and social alike) collective are re-​enacted. Artistic and cultural field provides a laboratory of sorts where particular historical conflicts can be animated, relived, and where affective attitudes towards them can be renegotiated, traumas worked through, and subject positions reconsidered and transformed. The crucial perspective for appropriate consideration of arts and culture in the context of troubled pasts and their present role/​meaning is to treat them as equal (even though operating according to different procedures and thus analysed and valued according to different methodologies) actors in the public sphere or co-​creators of the counterpublics, and artists and cultural workers as citizens or citizens of memory. On the one hand, a very powerful, on the other, a rather precarious agent as regards support, financing and modes of social existence and dissemination (the latter has drastically changed due to the internet and social media). This dual and paradoxical position of arts and culture needs to be taken into consideration. Financial support from state for arts and culture should be without any influence. As far as support for cultural and artistic projects that address the troubled past in its multiple dimensions is concerned, art should not accompany state historical politics –​even though such art is also needed as in state commissions for commemorative art, art in public space, monuments, and so on –​nor should it be in line with dominant memory politics. Its role is to experiment, to question existing modes of memory, to express resistance, to offer scandalous analogies (when it comes to revisiting different histories of violence and conflict, different victimized groups) and so on. These practices should be encouraged in a society that wants to develop, to work with its past in productive rather than reductive ways, and that is eager to face various aspects of its heritage (including its shameful or ambivalent aspects). The state patronage should provide support without exercising excessive control, let alone censorship. Initially unwelcome, some acts of artistic intervention (especially those considered scandalizing or provocative) may turn out to be crucial for the processes of reworking social and memory structures, for reframing attitudes and even cognitive processes. With time they may turn out to be beneficial or even indispensable. Diversification of sources of funding is desirable: state, local, private, European, NGOs, and so on. Art and cultural institutions as well as individuals should have access to information and be able to apply for funding to agencies 139

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and subjects which in turn should not regard themselves as competitors but rather collaborators for the common benefit, which is diversified creation and equal distribution of projects which address various aspects of the troubled past (see, for example, the European Cultural Foundation). We recommend supporting programmes aimed at the prevention of any form of state or institutional censorship and at the same time aimed at clearly defining and discussing in detail hate speech, discrimination and violence condemned and forbidden in artistic and cultural productions. These programmes should be developed in collaboration with international experts and subject to public discussion and negotiation. Artistic interventions should be welcomed/​included in historical museums and intuitions devoted to historical education in order to allow the historical narrative presented there to be interpreted from different perspectives, commented upon with specific sensibility, contrasted with individual, potentially marginal voices and experiences of that past. Art within historical museums can offer a space for different kinds of reflection on the past but also on confronting with the past in an institutional context. Such initiatives have been undertaken by Museum of the Warsaw Uprising and Museum of the History of Polish Jews (Polin), among others. School teachers and headmasters should be encouraged to participate in public programmes of art institutions and art institutions in turn should employ professionals to properly design educational programmes and offer support and inclusive education to all regardless of their social status or political formation. Most cultural and artistic institutions offer educational programmes either as accompanying or independent events. It is, however, due to the lack of or inadequate education beyond these institutions that is oftentimes responsible for the rejection or misinterpretation of artistic and cultural interventions on site. Thus, tools and mechanisms need to be acquired early on in the course of education for the public to eagerly and in an unprejudiced way participate, feel included and properly addressed. People involved in writing about art should be provided with opportunities to participate in workshops and programmes which would allow them to improve their skills and provide them platforms for collaboration with critics from other historical and cultural contexts, which in turn provides global perspective and allows for discussing troubled pasts as expressed in arts in an international and comparative context. There can hardly be a well-​developed and fruitful artistic and cultural sphere or responsive audience without professional and progressive art and cultural critique/​criticism. Critics are responsible for providing discourse (tools and language) to introduce arts and culture in the living experiences of individuals and communities, and that is why they need to be well educated and connected. There is a growing need for collaborative projects which require working beyond national, ethnic, religious boundaries and divisions, which enforce 140

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empathy as major factor in working through troubled pasts and past traumas, which prevent fixations on the uniqueness of suffering and national martyrology (stressed by nationalistic propaganda), competition of suffering, competing memories and so on but rather offer forms of open, collaborative patriotisms, understanding of complexity and interrelatedness of various historical events and subjects as well as the memories of different groups (dependent on class, gender and racial belonging). Support for minoritarian artistic and cultural projects which deal with aspects of the past and history outside of the mainstream, frequently disregarded or even socially repressed, such as gender or class, ethnic minorities, violence against children, bodily historical experience, disability and so on, is needed. Artistic and cultural initiatives can introduce hitherto absent voices and experiences into public discussion of the past, make them visible and heard. Art allows for formation and transmission of cultural memories and prevents ignorance, thus providing a kind of emotional and cognitive framework for acknowledging and respecting these minoritarian experiences not only in the past, but also in future.

Conclusion There are several key dimensions of the support that the EU could give Poland to contribute more effectively to solving troubled past issues. Financial support. There is a need to create a European grant fund dedicated to researchers, journalists and collective and individual cultural actors and activists who deal with the troubled past. Such a fund would finance projects aimed at working out memory conflicts, encouraging transnational collaboration and perspective, at creating bridges of mutual understanding between the conflicted mnemonic actors, at finding common elements between the Polish and European past and so on. Such a fund should fulfil three basic functions: 1. Offer systemic funding for a wide range of initiatives countering politicization and polarization around troubled past issues –​from academic research through cultural projects (museum exhibitions, popcultural production, performances, happenings, street art and so on) to different types of scholarships. 2. Strengthen international networks of people involved in working through troubled past issues. 3. Offer a specific channel of funding for people whose opportunities have been directly limited as a result of political persecution experienced in their home country. Particular attention should be paid here to grassroots, left-​wing cultural and political activists as the most precarious group. 141

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Support for institutions. There is a need to support country-​based struggles for the independence of various public institutions dealing with the troubled past. As for the historical museums, this applies in particular to efforts aimed at strengthening the autonomy of directors and collective (preferably international and interdisciplinary) councils and reducing the direct influence of the Minister of Culture on the functioning of these institutions (for example, the Museum of the Second World War in Gdansk; the European Solidarity Centre in Gdansk). As for the media outlets, it is mostly –​yet not only –​about putting pressure on modifying legal regulations regarding money flows between the state budget and right-​wing media outlets. As for the research institutions, it is primarily about a profound reform of the IPN. As for the educational institutions (schools), it is about reforming history teaching at all levels of the educational system. Furthermore, in all these cases, it seems necessary to support both the stability of the employment and the collective initiatives aimed at increasing monthly salaries of the employees. Support in communication. There is a need to establish a special Europe-​wide channel of communication with nation-​states, whose role would be to build a bridge between EU-​level memory politics and national-​level liberal-​left memory politics. Such a channel could be a durable point of reference for those actors of the mnemonic field who are oriented towards maintaining a pro-​European perspective on the Second World War and the Holocaust, and towards articulating multidimensional interpretations of the communist past in Poland. It would help to bring EU-​level and national-​level mnemonic actors closer together, to support and develop mutual understanding among them and, consequently, to solve troubled past issues more effectively. Educational support. There is a need to provide more training and education programmes dedicated to raising awareness about cultural and political mechanisms of solving troubled past issues, with a particular focus on gender history, among academic scholars, journalists and schoolteachers –​ especially those based in smaller cities, towns and villages. Furthermore, the support to already-​existing educational citizens’ initiatives aimed at monitoring transparency and accountability of political elites (for example, Mamprawowiedziec.pl) and at organizing social campaigns against the rise of right-​wing populism (for example, Akcjademokracja.pl), is needed. Support for the arts and culture sector. There is a need to encourage and support international exchange of cultural workers and artists working with troubled pasts in order to stimulate transnational perspective in addressing history, one which experiments with analogies and promotes unexcepted solidarities. There is a need to diversify funding in arts and culture sector so that cultural production avoids being dependent on current political agendas. Public institutions need to have international and interdisciplinary councils and groups of consultants. Various outlets for art writing and art criticism need to be provided to enable productive discussion within the field. 142

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The European Union Introduction The aim of this chapter is to prepare a concrete roadmap for the EU in its attempts to find strategies for overcoming troubled pasts in European countries in four different domains (history, media, politics, arts and culture). By doing this, the following roadmap attempts to answer what the EU institutions can do to help European countries, both members and aspiring candidates for the membership, to foster the processes that would lead to the overcoming of troubled pasts in respective countries. But first, a quick overview of the EU integration processes since the end of the Second World War until the present day, explained from the perspective of the ‘peace ideas’ that have been underpinning integration efforts in different times, is needed to understand how the EU developed as an actor that aims at helping the countries to overcome their troubled pasts. If the European Community (EC) was, especially in the first decades after the Second World War, ‘security-​oriented’ primarily inwards, the institution gradually evolved into an actor with stabilizing aspirations, which aims at projecting peace outside its borders. We begin in 2012, with one of the most remarkable events for the EU as a peace actor. This year, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to the EU, justifying it with the following formulation: ‘The EU’s most important result is the successful struggle for peace and reconciliation, democracy, and human rights. The stabilizing part played by the EU has helped to transform most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace’ (Birchfield et al, 2017, p 3). This prize –​although widely contested, because the EU has still been lacking effective capabilities to build peace in conflict societies –​was a result of decades-​long endeavours. The ideational basis of European reconstruction after the Second World War was building such international order, which would reduce or even fully nullify the possibility that the European states would again resort to the use of armed force for ‘resolving’ their disputes. The 143

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founding fathers of the European integration believed that this aim could be reached by, first, fostering cooperation among European states, and second, by intertwining them economically to the greatest possible extent. The first step in the direction of supranationalism, which would ‘make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible’, as the Schuman Declaration (1950) stipulated, concerned the two major Second World War enemies, France and Germany. The two countries were ‘bounded together’ along with the four other original members (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands) in the framework of the European Coal and Steel Community (Birchfield et al, 2017, p 6). While such logic of functional economic cooperation was one side of the coin, we should not neglect the then ongoing attempts to address the different historical war memories and look for ways to achieve reconciliation through regional integration. This was, conceptually speaking, a peace process per se (Schumacher, 2015) given the fact that peace, reconciliation and solidarity were central values in the starting phases of European integration (Laffan, 2004; Wiesner, 2008; Mäkinen, 2019). However, such noble attempts, referred to as a ‘peace narrative’, soon lost their initial momentum as the oil crisis in 1970s brought the national interests again to the forefront. This led Leo Tindermans (1976, p. 11) to highlight that ‘[the] European citizen does not view the reasons for the construction of Europe in exactly the same way as in 1950’ and that the ‘European idea is partly a victim of its own successes’ –​the reconciliation between formerly hostile countries and the economic prosperity in particular. However, the EC managed to retain the narrative that the European political and economic integration inherently is ‘a peace project’ and that, as such, is a conflict preventor per se. This optimistic narrative –​together with the prospects of economic cooperation –​apparently remained attractive for years and led to the second wave of enlargement, when Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) joined the EC (Kronenberger and Wouters, 2004; Stråth and Pakier, 2010). The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s ‘firmly put a nail in the coffin of the peace narrative and the narrative of “Europe as saviour” and solution to conflict’ (Manners and Murray, 2015, p 190). With the Yugoslav wars, it became evident that the existing integration of Europe, which did not encompass the whole continent, is not enough for projecting peace in the neighbouring regions of the EC/​EU (the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, northern Africa). Not only did the EC/​EU1 require new policies due to its limited response during the Yugoslav wars, which left many rightfully wondering about its effectiveness, but also the institution needed new narratives to legitimize its advantages and raison d’être. This was the time, when the EC –​evolving into the EU in the 1990s –​ on the one hand decided that it would rely on the attractiveness of ‘the 144

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enlargement card’, in particular in dealing with the states belonging to the former Eastern and Non-​Aligned blocs that aspired to join the institution. On the other hand, in the 1990s the EC/​EU started sending signals that it was eager to engage more widely geographically in providing assistance also to the states from all over the world. For that reason, the EU enlargement to the Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 was understood as the use of the trump card of the most important foreign policy instrument of the EU –​a perspective of membership for non-​members. In line with the arguments of Majstorović and Vučkovac (2016), the notion of the EU in Eastern Europe and the area of former Yugoslavia back then still contained the narrative of the EU being a peace project. In the period around 2004, when the EU expanded to ten new countries, the wind of optimism blew also to Southeast Europe. A year before the mentioned enlargement, in 2003 at the Thessaloniki Summit, Albania and the former Yugoslav countries –​then being labelled as the Western Balkans –​received the EU commitment that they will be able to join the institution after they fulfil certain requirements. By promising them this ‘European perspective’, the EU further strengthened the idea that the EU integration is a way forward for them, as well. It was believed that adopting the so-​called ‘European standards’ and making these countries politically and economically part of the EU would bring not only economic prosperity, stability and democracy, but would also help the countries overcoming the troubled past. In short, the notion of the EU as a security actor rests on two interconnected dimensions, namely: • The EU as an internally oriented peace project, primarily driven by the economic and political cooperation, which, via functional cooperation, brought also ‘the side product’ of overcoming the troubled past (thus the notion of overcoming the troubled past could not be understood as a final goal, but rather as an outcome). • The EU as an externally oriented actor, with the mission of preventing and transforming conflicts in its neighbourhood. In this regard, we should emphasize that the understanding of the EU as a conflict preventor/​ stabilizing actor outside its borders did not prevail before the fundamental reforms of the institution took place in the 1990s. The 1990s are thus perceived as ‘a benchmark’, because the EU started building its conflict prevention capabilities in a more systematic and coherent manner, which is reflected also in the Maastricht Treaty (Wouters and Naert, 2004, p 60). The chapter is structured as follows: in the next section, we explain the methodological approach undertaken to come up with these recommendations. We explain how we engaged different policy makers and 145

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stakeholders at the EU and national level at various stages of the production of this text, and furthermore, how we incorporated their insights in the final text. The third section offers a synthesis of the EU approaches to the troubled pasts in each of the seven states of inquiry; from a cross-​country comparison, this section seeks similarities, differences, and highest common denominators among national policy recommendations, and attempts to extrapolate findings on the EU level. The fourth section is devoted to the reflections from the policy makers’ and stakeholders’ interviews regarding the EU approach in addressing the troubled pasts in respective countries explored in this project. Based on earlier sections, in the fifth section we then develop the most important part of this document: the policy recommendations that the EU as an institution could take in the future within each of the domains explored in the project.

Methodological approach to writing the recommendations for the European Union These policy recommendations for the EU stem from seven sets of national policy recommendations that were written by the RePAST consortium partners. This first pool of data that has been gathered mostly in 2018 and 2019 within various outputs stemming from the analyses within RePAST working packages. The second pool of data used to produce this document were the interviews that the RePAST partners conducted with national and EU policy makers and stakeholders in ‘RePAST countries’. Due to the situation with COVID-​ 19, most partners were not able to travel and conduct these interviews in person. Therefore, the partners had to rely on online interviews to obtain policy makers’ and stakeholders’ comments on the draft versions of national policy recommendations. In the interviews, the consortium researchers also discussed with their interlocutors the EU’s approach to support the countries in overcoming their troubled pasts. Between May and December 2020, the number of the interviews conducted by the consortium partners were as follows: 16 interviews with national policy makers/​representatives; eight interviews with state and NGO representatives; 13 interviews with EU policy makers and stakeholders (the names of these interviewees are specified in each of the national policy recommendations). The data from these 37 interviews was used in the preparation of these recommendations. Based on the previously explained steps, we prepared the first draft version of the EU Policy Recommendations and sent them for commenting to the RePAST consortium partners and EU institutions that were identified as key stakeholders at the EU level in each of the four domains of the project; to obtain inputs from the EU level, the researchers asked the 146

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Figure 10.1: Preparing the EU policy recommendations Interviews with national policy makers and stakeholders in seven RePAST countries

WP2 History

WP3 Media

WP4 Arts/culture

WP5 Politics

Seven national policy recommendations (written and revised by the RePAST partners in line with the comments, received by respective national policy makers and stakeholders

Interviews with policy makers and stakeholders working at the nexus of EU and national affairs in seven RePAST countries

Reflections from the policy makers and stakeholders regarding the EU approach in addressing troubled past(s) in RePAST countries (analysis of interviews)

First draft of the EU policy recommendations

Sent for commenting to policy makers and stakeholders at the EU level

Sent for commenting to the RePAST consortium

EU policy recommendations (final version)

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Seeking the commonalities and differences in the EU approach to troubled pasts in seven RePAST countries synthesis of seven national policy recommendations, with a focus on the chapters analysing the EU approach for addressing troubled past in each RePAST country)

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experts of the following institutions to provide comments on the draft recommendations: Directorate-​General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC), Directorate-​General for Communication (DG COMM), the European Education and Culture Executive Agency of the EU (EACEA) and House of European History.2 The methodological process of writing the recommendations is illustrated in Figure 10.1.

The evolution of the European Union’s approach for addressing the troubled pasts in the ‘RePAST countries’ The comparative analysis of seven RePAST national policy recommendations –​ particularly the chapters in these documents that deal with the question of how the EC/​EU has tried to address the troubled past in each country –​has shown that the EC did not show much interest in resolving the troubled pasts of its members during the Cold War period. This is particularly reflected in the case of Spain where membership in the EC was not explicitly associated with overcoming the troubled past in this country, but with economic progress, (cultural) modernization and democracy (see the chapter on Spain in this book). While there are numerous reasons3 for the absence of such efforts in the 1970s and 1980s, when the enlargements occurred, the most relevant one –​for the purpose of our policy recommendations –​lies in the fact that the EC/​EU mnemonic structures of the Second World War via the condemnation of Nazism, Fascism and the Holocaust (without communism) as a ‘negative founding myth’ did not receive special attention/​contestation by the existing member states (Sierp, 2020, p 690). In this regard, it can be also mentioned that the Irish case (see the chapter on Ireland) insinuated that already early in the European integration process it was attempted to address the troubled past related to Northern Ireland via institution-​and state-​building efforts (so-​called constitutional approach in the period between 1973 and 1998), but the Haagerup report from 1984 showed that this was not successful. At that time, the vision of Europe in general and the EC in particular coincided with the idea of ‘imagining’ itself as a liberal-​democratic geopolitical space –​in contrast with the communist, economically backward East (Elias, 1994; Pocock, 2002). In line with this, we cannot talk about the EC/​EU as an active actor in memory politics until 1989, when the former European Commission president, Jacques Delors, warned that European citizens cannot fall in love with a Common Market and that they need something else (Blanke, 2011). From that moment on, the EC policy makers had started to invest in policies that had the power to develop the feeling of a common belonging to a supranational European identity (Sierp, 2014; Milošević and Touquet, 2018).

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The most important institutional platform for achieving this feeling of a common legacy –​a step towards the European identity –​was the EP, which from the 1993 onwards adopted several resolutions that specifically addressed the Second World War and the Holocaust. This period was also important beyond the internally driven efforts to address the troubled past (for example, 1998 Good Friday Agreement) as this period saw the desire to strengthen the EU’s foreign policy capabilities in order to directly engage in ongoing Yugoslav war(s) and have an active role in ‘designing’ the post-​conflict reality of post-​Yugoslav states. Even though the EU’s role in the Yugoslav wars was limited and ineffective, the ‘learning outcome’ of this resulted in the development of a rigid logic of conditionality via the Copenhagen criteria (1993) and the Stabilisation and Association Process (1999). The Stabilisation and Association Process is for the purpose of these policy recommendations not important only due to the formal signalization of the EU’s commitment to the post-​communist states of Central and Eastern Europe and post-​Yugoslav states, but also because it made the EU an actor able to engage in the attempts to resolve troubled pasts (Mälksoo, 2009; Reinprecht, 2017). The RePAST Policy Recommendations for BiH, Kosovo and Poland show that these developments further consolidated two types of challenges in relation to the European integration and troubled pasts, namely: • ‘Freezing’ memories during the accession process, meaning that the critical discussion of the Second World War and the Cold War legacy on the EU level came only after the integration of Central and Eastern European countries in the EU in 2004. • ‘Unfreezing’ memories during the accession process, meaning that the critical discussion of the Yugoslav wars entered both the EU memory arena and the accession process before the integration of post-​Yugoslav countries in the EU (Mälksoo, 2009, pp 653–​4). In that regard, the Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 can be understood as ‘freezing memories’, because the core EU countries tried to apply their mnemonic structures to new members. This opened space in several countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where the contesting of the Second World War remembrance commenced. Namely, the processes of advocating for ‘counter-​histories’ to ‘old Europe’ began in these countries and started challenging the EU as an institution, which realized that advocating for the creation of broader European historical consciousness can only happen after the accession of prospective candidates to the EU (Mälksoo, 2009, p 657). By doing so, the idea of a unified European memory framework through the creation of common EU mnemonic structures intensified and reached its peak in 2009 when the European Parliament Resolution on European conscience on totalitarianism was adopted. This resolution, for the first time 149

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in history, called for the recognition of “Nazism, Stalinism and Fascist and Communist regimes as a common legacy” (European Parliament, 2009). Contrary to the Eastern logic of ‘keeping a low profile’ in reflecting on the historical sources of antagonistic relations regarding the troubled past during the EU accession process, the post-​Yugoslav accession process followed a different trajectory (Mälksoo, 2009, p 660). The ‘stabilization before integration paradigm’ not only paved the way towards ‘unfreezing’ the post-​Yugoslav mnemonic space, but de facto prescribed the need to resolve the troubled past; thus, settling interethnic relations was set as a precondition for the EU membership. If the ‘normalization’ of inter-​state relations can be observed on the general level through the EU Strategy for the Western Balkans, the reconciliation efforts on the national level are at least threefold: 1. The EU’s efforts pursued the so-​called transitional justice paradigm by demanding the full cooperation with the war tribunals (Kosovo Specialist Chambers and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) and supporting the reconciliation-​aimed initiatives (ReCOM, the Berlin Process and so on). 2. The EU’s efforts pursued institutional and security reforms to reduce the visibility of the division between the antagonistic sides and achieve sustainable peace (for example, reform of security sectors in BiH and Kosovo, aimed at establishing professional services; reforms of the judiciary via the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo). 3. The EU addresses the troubled past through the pre-​established pattern of modelling the EU memory framework by European Parliament resolutions, as seen in the case study of BiH and the resolutions on Srebrenica. Before turning to the possible prescription of future EU strategies in tackling the European troubled pasts, we should highlight the fact that four out of seven national policy recommendations reflected on the contemporary EU approach on managing the troubled past, which importantly resonates with the idea of supporting local ‘bottom-​up’ projects. The cases of Ireland, BiH, Kosovo and Poland thus show that EU programmes such as Erasmus+​, Interreg, Horizon2020, Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme, Creative Europe and European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights finance bottom-​ up projects. A good example on the systemic level in this regard can be seen in the case of Ireland, where the Special EU Programmes Body was established to facilitate positive impact via European Regional Development Funding that directly derives from the Good Friday Agreement (see the chapter on Ireland for details). Finally, we should also expose the findings of Bešić and Džuverović (2020, p 455) who showed that in the period between 2002 and 2015, the EU had financed 146 reconciliation projects in the post-​Yugoslav space. However, the results of those projects –​as highlighted by Bešić and 150

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Džuverović (2020, pp 463–​6) –​exposed that ‘truth-​seeking’ efforts aiming at reconciliation in post-​Yugoslav space were largely unsuccessful due to the various historical interpretations that are opposed to each other.

Reflections from the policy makers and stakeholders on the European Union’s approach to troubled pasts in the RePAST countries: analysis of interviews This section draws from the analysis of interviews with the policy makers and stakeholders in seven RePAST countries that have been working at the nexus of European and national level (for example, members of the EP, members of committees dealing with the EU issues in respective national parliaments, experts in think-​tanks researching on the EU and so on). As explained in the section on methodology, we in the RePAST consortium developed the questionnaire in a collaborative manner. This was a precondition that the policy makers and stakeholders in seven countries investigated in the RePAST project were asked the same questions, which later allowed for a cross-​country comparison. We sought to obtain stakeholders’ and policy makers’ opinions on the questions related to the EU’s approach in addressing the troubled past in respective countries and the role of EU policies, strategies and programmes that address the country’s troubled past. We also aimed at disentangling the differences among approaches undertaken by the EU regarding its endeavours for overcoming the troubled past. Furthermore, we wanted to learn if there are any elements that speak in favour of the existence of a general agreed-​upon approach of the EU for addressing the troubled past in different countries. A general observation, based on the analysis of interviews from the seven RePAST countries, is that a universal EU approach (policies, strategies, programmes) for addressing the troubled pasts in the EU countries and the prospective candidates does not exist. However, there are important nuances that will be explained in the remainder of this section. We can still argue that the EU has been active in the field of the troubled past throughout Europe; most of the interviewees stated that smaller steps were/​are being made by the EU in this regard in the EU member states and candidate countries. Most of the interviewees said that the EU has had a role in fostering the rule of law, promotion of common values and shared identity and capacity-​building funding –​all fields that are indirectly connected to troubled past. As stated by one of our interlocutors knowledgeable of the situation in Southeast Europe, the access to funding, especially in the social area and economic regeneration, has been absolutely essential. That said, it seems that both the promotion and funding of economic and social progress is something that has seen most success in terms of reconciliation attempts by the EU. In 151

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other words, where people have the sense of personal or shared achievement, peacebuilding processes may have more positive impact. Along the same lines, EU cohesion policies have been reported to have a significant impact on the economic disparities in countries such as Germany –​ and this could contribute to overcoming the troubled past to some extent. This narrative has also been confirmed by some of our interlocutors. On the other hand, a couple of interviewees from all RePAST countries reported the lack of action by the EU when it comes to troubled past. Primarily, the lack of intervention was regarded as one of the greatest failures from the EU; this especially pertains to the (ineffective) role of the EU in BiH during the war. Many people believe that the EU decided to “look the other way” deliberately, when it comes to the most pressing issues (prosecuting war crimes, for example). In Kosovo the lack of intervention and ambivalence when it comes to finding diplomatic solutions between Prishtina and Belgrade is something that has been highly criticized by our interlocutors. Some believe that from the outset of the Brussels dialogue, the EU has been ambivalent with its ‘constructive ambiguity’ that does not demand from Serbia the recognition of Kosovo, which made the negotiating process turning into cycles of aimless negotiations. When talking about the concrete national ‘needs’ from the EU in terms of the assistance in overcoming the troubled past, almost all interviewees in Cyprus, BiH and Kosovo described the EU’s interventionism as unfocused and almost futile. In Kosovo, our interlocutors mainly agree that the EU had not demonstrated any power in impacting the political elites or the judicial processes (for war crimes), which are significant parts of the issues (this finding also resonates with other scholarly work).4 Along the same lines, Cypriot representatives have emphasized the need for EU’s assistance. Among Spanish interviewees, the EU’s perceived role in resolving the troubled past is ignoring the obvious and looking the other way, evidently the most common statement throughout all interviews. This, in turn, not only deepens the distrust towards the EU, but presents an obstacle in the process of reconciliation. Similarly, the Bosnian example calls for an intervention of a somewhat different nature –​funding projects that would motivate young people to participate in local politics in order to decrease the influence of ethno-​political elites in BiH. It becomes a pressing issue that many bright young Bosnians prefer to work for NGOs rather than in politics. Another suggestion for improvement is increased focus on creating positive discourse about the EU through integration processes. This might be of a particular importance in the case of Eastern Germany. This issue was also mentioned regarding Poland, as there is little public knowledge about EU’s involvement in the country; the EU could, according to our interviewees, improve its record in this regard by explaining what the EU does and what should be done in the future. For Ireland, the two primary points of 152

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concern are funding and protection of rights in light of Brexit. For people in Northern Ireland, Brexit had caused a high level of uncertainty concerning their relationship with the EU.

Policy recommendations for the European Union This core part of the document builds on the previous sections and the findings of other working packages of the RePAST project (see the section on methodology). The rationale leading the researchers to propose these policy recommendations was to offer the EU a viable, but not over-​ ambitious roadmap. The criteria of proposing policy recommendations to the EU followed the logic of finding the highest common denominator: the researchers explored the most frequently offered ideas proposed in ‘national policy recommendations’ (written by the researchers-​specialists on a given ‘RePAST country’ in all fields of inquiry: history, media, politics, arts and culture). By this, we attempted to establish common grounds that link all explored countries and could, as such, be proposed by the EU as an institution. Last, but not least, it must be acknowledged that the EU institutional system is vast, hence, we had to select only a few of the institutions as the recipients of these recommendations –​those that we consider the most important for addressing the issues arising from the troubled pasts.5

History The most frequently mentioned national policy recommendations that were proposed across all seven cases of RePAST’s inquiry regarding history were related to the eventual changes related to education system(s) (revising curricula, rewriting history textbooks and so on). Because the EU education policy is designed to support action at the national level –​and cannot delve into national curricula –​we propose that the EU pursues the following strategies. DG EAC should form a special task force of experts with a mission: • To revisit ‘the EU memory framework’ and prepare an overview of the common mnemonic structures that already exist in the EU and serve as some sort of cohesive mnemonic binding (for example, documents on troubled past adopted by the EP that constitute it, such as the resolutions on genocide in Srebrenica) and identify further elements that could fit in the common mnemonic structures of the EU. • To establish a history teaching toolbox that would build on past successful experience in teaching of troubled past across the EU. All relevant stakeholders (for example, governmental representatives, education trade 153

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unions, NGOs and so on) should be included in devising the history teaching toolbox, as the participation of ‘influential actors’ in this process would increase the chance of success.6 The toolbox could also draw from the successful examples undertaken within numerous NGO initiatives.7 This recommendation stems mainly from the finding in the RePAST project, which shows that students in secondary and even tertiary education are relatively unaware of the main arguments that people not belonging to their social group have to interpret certain historic events. The deliverables produced by the proposed task force could later be distributed to the ministries of education in the EU member states and prospective candidate countries for the EU membership. Afterwards, the public debate on how to integrate the task force’s deliverables in the national curricula could be stimulated (by the DG EAC/​the EU delegations in member states, for example). Scaling up these deliverables could be fostered further via teacher exchanges, conferences, cross-​border, interregional projects and other platforms that already exist at the EU level (for example, the School Educational Gateway, eTwinning and the like). Our research in the project has shown that many teachers are still unaware of the existence of these schemes; hence, it is of utmost importance to launch wider advertising campaigns, which would widely promote these opportunities. Many teachers, especially those from low-​income countries, lack the opportunities to visit other countries and to see for themselves how the troubled pasts are approached and taught in other countries; this is one of the findings in the RePAST research on history. Going to, for example, the countries where the troubled pasts have been overcome fairly well might stimulate the teachers to reconsider whether they could include perhaps slightly different, less antagonistic interpretations of history in their courses back home (for example, the narratives based on mutual understanding and explanation why certain social groups acted the way they acted during the conflict). Thus, the EU institutions (for example, DG EAC or EACEA) could consider how they could financially, organizationally and logistically support seminars and study trips for teachers from conflict-​r idden countries to countries with a longer tradition of teaching history in a less conflictual way. Building on that, EU institutions could suggest to certain EU member states establishing exchange programmes or organizing short visits for teachers from other EU and non-​EU countries.8 Such initiatives could be financed via already existing countries’ (national) schemes (for example, public diplomacy programmes) and the existing EU schemes and frameworks (Erasmus+​and so on). The latter also increases the visibility and normative power of the EU, as the RePAST research has shown. The EU delegations in the EU member-​and non-​member states should prioritize the organization of

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workshops and seminars, where applicants would be trained in applying for projects, and widely promote these opportunities. The EU institutions –​most notably DG EAC and the Directorate-​General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement –​could issue guidelines to the EU member states and non-​EU members aspiring to join the EU to foster peace education by shedding a light, through various platforms, also on the cases of humanistic cooperation during the contested times.9 The topics of peace education, which demonstrate that supra-​ethnic, supra-​religious and other types of cooperation that transcend narrowly defined identities could exist even in the most difficult times, are often deliberately ignored by the dominant narratives, but are of importance to give a more nuanced understanding of troubled pasts and to increase the value of human(istic) ethos. The EU officials, thus, could scale up peace education in the dialogue with partner countries.10 This recommendation should be embedded and pursued within the existing initiatives at the global level (the UN Development Goals, for example). In addition to what is regarded as ‘official history’ (historic textbooks, national holidays and so on), the EU delegations in the EU member-​and non-​member states could, via several schemes that they have at their disposal, support the oral history projects that offer different interpretations of historic events in respective countries. As the findings of the RePAST project have shown, oral history does provide a necessary space, where the exclusivist (state-​driven) interpretations of history in each country can be expanded in order to become more inclusive. Multi-​perspectivity in interpreting historical narratives can lead to the softening of beliefs that only one, the elitist-​led interpretation of ‘historic truths’, is correct. The EU delegations in the EU member states and the candidate countries should seek opportunities in high schools to raise awareness about the possibilities of acquiring EU funding for study trips to Brussels, where students would have a chance to visit the House of European History (via the Erasmus+​ scheme, for example). The visit to this museum should be presented –​and stimulated –​in a similar fashion as school visits to national historic museums are currently understood in European states –​as an event, which increases the feeling of common belonging (to the European family, in this case).

Media When talking about the media, the common denominator of the seven national policy recommendations are the dubious standards of journalistic professionalism when tackling the issues of troubled past, the lack of independence of journalists in their reporting or researching on the topics related to troubled past, and a general lack of institutionalized platforms, where

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journalists could exchange good practices, learn and develop professionally. Based on these findings, the recommendations are the following. We suggest establishing a platform of (investigative) journalists that work on the questions of reconciliation, European cooperation, history and war reporting, and propose the EU MEDIA programme on troubled pasts and reconciliation. The latter, which would be substantially financed within the Creative Europe programme and Europe for Citizens programme (new European Remembrance Programme), would offer trainings for investigative journalists11 that work in the most important national mainstream media outlets, alongside with the public National Radio and Television Networks (NRTN). Deriving from this, this programme could also offer an EU-​driven agenda and offer to NRTN a one-​hour weekly programme that would cover the local/​national/​transnational EU projects devoted to fostering solidarity, cooperation, inclusivity and tolerance. Similar EU-​funded projects already exist throughout Europe (see, for example, RTV Slovenija, 2017). The idea of this new platform is, first, to increase the professionalism regarding reporting/​researching on topics related to troubled pasts and, second, to increase awareness of audience how unresolved historic issues hinder the progress of countries. Here, the general idea is not (only) to produce new investigative journalism programmes, but to guarantee the investigative journalism outputs good programming slots in the national media in order to increase the ratings (outreach potential). The most appropriate platforms for such programmes are NRTNs due to their obligation to inform citizens on important public issues in an unbiased manner. Where such platforms do not exist, the EU delegations should promote the importance of quality and investigative journalism as an important pillar contributing to the rule of law. We recommend that media outlets should gain more independence and break away from political influence; we acknowledge that this is not an innovative idea. However, in the countries with troubled pasts the European Commission could push the developments in this direction by, on the one hand, funding local media via the ‘NEWS initiative’ within the new 2020 Action Plan, which supports recovery and transformation of the media and audio-​visual sectors. On the other hand, it could additionally finance the news network channel Euronews, which, among other things, reports on the issues related to troubled pasts from a pan-​European perspective. The Commission already finances the Albanian version of Euronews (launched in 2019) and Serbian version of Euronews (launched in 2021). By additionally funding the local versions of Euronews across Southeast Europe and Central and Eastern Europe, the Commission should follow the domestic ownership principle, which necessitates the inclusion of local journalists in content production. This would give the journalists, who are also, in the countries with troubled pasts, usually well educated, adequately experienced and aware of professional ethics, a much-​needed platform for work. The journalists 156

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working within such platform would be less burdened with censorship, self-​censorship and other forms of pressure (this is especially problematic in the countries with lower democratic standards). If the previous recommendation is over-​ambitious, then the EU could consider how it could in some other ways support the development of professionalism in journalism. At the present time, there are a few institutions that contribute to the development of professionalism in journalistic work in the EU member states and beyond the EU borders (for example, the European Journalism Centre); these institutions should be further supported by the EU and should perhaps also be given a dedicated budget. Such budget could allow for the organization of trainings or providing fellowships to the journalists of the countries where the troubled past hinders the progress of a society. The journalists interviewed in the RePAST project –​especially those working in low-​income countries with troubled pasts –​more or less agreed that such trainings would, first, contribute to their professionalism, and second, serve as platforms to expand their peer networks. The experiences from the past, supported with the findings of the RePAST research on media, demonstrate that the examples of journalistic production, in which journalists of different countries work together on producing a joint work, often yield high quality results and are well received by the audience. Based on this, the EU should –​through the existing programmes, for example via the programme Creative Europe –​finance the projects where journalists of different ethnic, religious or cultural backgrounds work side by side with the aim of joint journalistic production related to the troubled past (documentary, newspaper reportage and so on), and showcase such examples widely. A good example of this kind of cooperation –​although, comparing to our recommendation, significantly more long-​term and institutionally embedded –​is the establishment of the regional news exchange Eurovision News Exchange for Southeast Europe (ERNO). ERNO, which operates in the framework of the European Broadcasting Union, aims at overcoming an agonistic dialogue among the republics of former Yugoslavia in a factual and hate-​free manner since 2000. Even though the EU has failed to finance the network, ERNO is funded primarily by the membership fees of its members, which are mostly national public television stations. Certainly, such projects would be particularly welcomed in Southeast Europe, Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Media literacy appears as an important problem in all countries, but especially in those that suffer from the legacy of troubled pasts. Hence, improving media literacy throughout Europe is another field, where the EU could invest resources effectively. This should be done within the new Commission’s 2020 Action to support the recovery and transformation of the media and audio-​visual sectors and coupled with funding via Erasmus+​ , Europe for Citizens (new European Remembrance Programme), Creative 157

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Europe and Digital Europe. Thus, the EU could, through its institutions present in respective countries (EU Delegations, EU Information Offices and so on), support the trainings that educate people in this regard, ranging from primary schools to older generations. This would not only decrease the current domination of extremely simplistic (black or white) interpretations of history to a certain extent (for example, that ‘our people’ were always on the right side of the history, and that it is ‘them’ who are responsible for all wrongdoings), but also contribute to the policies of preventing hate-​speech discourse and hateful reconstructions of the past. By doing so, the EU programmes could make improvements in this area via creation of ‘fake-​news’ detector cells within the media literacy strategies (both online and social media), which is also defined as a priority by Commission (for more on tackling online disinformation, see European Commission, 2020b, 2020c). In certain countries, it is dangerous to provide incriminating evidence or publicly speak about certain wrongdoings related to the troubled past, as the consequences that could follow would be dire for a person disclosing certain information. Thus, the EU should further support institutions that protect whistle-​blowers in respective states or should consider establishing a platform at the EU level, where whistle-​blowers from the countries with troubled pasts would be protected. If such institution in a given country with a troubled past does not exist yet, then the EU should look for the ways to support the establishment of such institutions. Comparison across countries of the RePAST project also showed that many countries lack the balanced gender perspectives when it comes to reporting on the troubled past. Furthermore, the minority issues are also often not adequately reported on (for example, the LGBT movement, which has recently in some countries, such as Poland, faced serious pressure from media outlets close to the conservative political spectrum; or the issues concerning ethnic minorities in some of the countries). Thus, the EU could promote that reporting on the troubled past should pay more attention to gender and minority issues. This could also be reached, to a certain degree at least, by organizing workshops in European countries, which would raise awareness on the problematics of gender sensitivity and minority-​focused reporting.

Politics The most exposed issues regarding the field of politics in national policy recommendations are political polarization, which often results in the attempts to homogenize the views on the suffering of particular groups of people only (and present them as the only possible interpretation of collective memory), and the fact that in many states of inquiry political elites do not necessarily base their opinions and actions on accurate information, but rather on ‘half-​truths’ or even misleading or incorrect information. 158

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We suggest that the EP, as a ‘memory interlocutor’ working at the nexus of the supranational and national/​local level, forms a special committee on the EU’s so-​called troubled pasts, (co-​)chaired by the representatives of all seven political groups in the EP. Its aim would be to foster the preparation of the text for the resolution on the EU collective memory, which should be based on the heterogeneity of voices and condemnation of all totalitarian regimes, while following the values of tolerance, non-​discrimination, solidarity and mutual understanding. By doing this, this resolution could become one of the prerequisites (reference points) to follow in all the future EU projects that touch upon the troubled past. Here, the rationale is to achieve the so-​called ‘deep Europeanization’ of the national public spheres via bottom-​up actors (for example, civil society actors, independent media outlets and so on) and pave the way towards creating inclusive local environments that implement their projects on a shared understanding of the past. With the rise of authoritarianism and illiberal democracies throughout Europe in recent years, verbal attacks on the EU as an institution –​and on liberal values in general –​increased. Furthermore, many scholars, experts, interviewees and other interlocutors that have been engaged in the RePAST project believe the EU has failed so far to respond adequately to these worrying trends in the RePAST countries (and in other countries, as well). Hence, the EU institutions –​primarily DG EAC and EACEA –​should in EU member states and non-​members, through the existing programmes and schemes, strengthen the support for the organization of workshops, seminars, conferences and the work of institutions (for example, NGOs, museums) that reject simplistic interpretations of historical narratives and aim at offering nuanced views of the troubled past. Several institutions of this kind, which offer a humanistic and non-​partisan approach that transcends simplified ethno-​religious/​ethno-​political understanding of history and people’s place in it, already exist;12 they should be further promoted as good examples and, consequently, supported by the EU. In this regard, DG EAC and EACEA could consider establishing a dedicated funding for such activities within the existing schemes (Erasmus+​, for example) and further promote these opportunities given the fact that, as the RePAST research has shown, several interlocutors engaged in the RePAST project were not aware of these opportunities. It is recommended that the DG EAC and/​or EACEA organize(s) a set of seminars, workshops and study trips for young political leaders from the countries with troubled pasts to those EU member states that have a better outcome in resolving the historical issues. DG EAC and/​or EACEA could also suggest the political parties in the EP and their youth wings to organize such activities. At such events, political youth from the countries with troubled pasts could get acquainted with good practices on how reconciliation attempts and addressing the troubled past have been pursued 159

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elsewhere. These events could focus on the issues, which are similar in most cases with troubled pasts (for example, common suffering of ordinary people on all conflicting sides because of violence) and could come as an addition to the already existing seminars and workshops organized in Brussels and Strasbourg, where youth learn about the EU institutions and so on. The EU institutions –​DG EAC, EACEA and DG COMM, for ­example –​ could consider how to support the initiatives and platforms, which fact-​check the public statements of politicians on the troubled past and media reports linked to it. Similar platforms –​with different aims in terms of content –​ already exist in the EU and serve as the only possible counterbalance to the disinformation campaigns and the spread of fake news related to troubled past (for example, FactCheckEU and East StratCom Task Force). Thus, this approach could be expanded by the EU institutions for checking the accuracy of public statements the politicians make about the troubled past and media reporting linked to it. Such initiatives, if supported and financed by EU schemes, could be embedded in the existing media services and would perhaps contribute to an increase of the overall trust in state institutions and the media. In some of the explored countries, the research has shown that the dominant, identity-​based and exclusivist narratives promoted by the political elites often prevail over other (dissenting) voices, which have lower access to power structures and media and have, therefore, less opportunity to influence the public debate. Thus, the EU should further develop the strategies to empower the voices, which offer different interpretations of the historic events in comparison with the existing centres of power. Therefore, the EU delegations in the EU member and non-​member states should identify the institutions that in respective societies strive for greater civic engagement in addressing the troubled past, offer the training programmes for applying in the existing EU schemes and launch public campaigns for enhancing awareness on how the EU funding could be used to support bottom-​up initiatives that attempt to overcome the troubled past in a given country.

Arts and culture In the domain of arts and culture, all the analysed national policy recommendations have primarily focused on two issues, namely, the importance and role of museums as sociocultural actors and the impact of ‘popular arts’ for addressing the troubled past. If the former builds on the practical need of museums to educate and raise awareness about the complexity of the troubled past in an informative and factual manner, the latter builds on the fact that ‘popular arts’ can reach (and influence) more people than ‘high arts’. In line with this, we propose the following recommendations.

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DG EAC should, in cooperation with the House of European History, form a special group of historians and curators, who would prepare a permanent ‘travelling exhibition’ that reflects the inclusiveness of mnemonic structure(s) of the whole EU area through artistic expression. This travelling exhibition should be free of charge and could ‘travel’ around the EU member states and perhaps even to the EU candidate countries (the EU delegations in respective countries should serve as focal points). By doing this, the troubled past of the EU would be exposed to people of the countries with troubled pasts in an informative and factual manner, inclusive of all the difficulties of the post-​ Second World War period, which despite strong conflicting narratives did manage to get many European countries working together for the common aim (preventing future wars and increasing solidarity among nations and well-​being). The idea is to focus more on supra-​ethnic/​humanistic pieces of arts that would reflect on the previously mentioned values. Relevant institutions (DG EAC and EACEA), in collaboration with the EU delegations in the EU member states and the candidate countries, could increase support for the artistic and cultural events and projects that in the countries with troubled pasts address the difficult historic legacies from the perspectives of humanism, empathy, common belonging and the notion of the common (European) heritage. Although the recommendation to present troubled pasts in artistic and cultural expressions in its multiple dimensions may seem superficial at the first sight, these values are the EU’s important sources of normative and soft power. Hence, the EU should not shy away from supporting the values it deems important for a better future. The EU delegations should launch public campaigns and run workshops, where artists and cultural workers would be informed of these opportunities and acquire skills in applying for projects that reflect these values. Regarding the previous recommendation, the EU (EAC and EACEA) should consider the possibility of establishing a dedicated scheme of visiting fellowships for artists and cultural workers, who want to work with the topics related to troubled pasts abroad, but do not get support from their countries. The lack of support is often a result of the fact that artists and cultural workers, with their work, challenge the dominant (official) narratives, which is not perceived positively by the structures of power in a given state. In this respect, the EU could reinforce the programmes for international exchange and intra-​state mobility of cultural workers and artists. Such opportunities would provide artists and cultural workers with the chance to improve their skills and competences from various angles (including grant writing, for example). In this regard, the EU should launch several campaigns to raise awareness among artists and cultural workers on the opportunities to receive financial and other support from the EU. This recommendation concerns the possible EU role in the field of arts and culture but also pervades the recommendations in other fields of these 161

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policy recommendations. DG EAC and EACEA should reinforce support for collaborative artistic and cultural projects, which require cooperation beyond national, ethnic, religious, cultural, gender and other differences. This would not only encourage artists with different ethnic, religious and other identities and backgrounds to work together, but could have a wider impact (spill-​over effect) in societies in terms of fostering tolerance, cohesion, human rights and other values that bind the EU. The programme Creative Europe already offers several opportunities that concern the above-​mentioned recommendations, but, compared to some other fields, receives relatively modest funding. Therefore, the question of how to increase the funding for arts and culture in the next financial scheme is a topic that should be widely debated. Therefore, DG EAC and EACEA could organize a set of meetings, where the strategy for the eventual increasing of the budget for culture and arts would be discussed. The EU institutions –​not only DG EAC and EACEA, but wider –​should offer scrupulous support to the artists and cultural workers who are subject to censorship or threats because of their work. As often happens, it is exactly the artistic and cultural expression on the troubled past that triggers aggressive and even violent responses from people who perceive themselves as the protectors of the national heritage and national identity. The EU should voice its opinion on such intimidations in an unhesitant manner and protect the freedom of artistic expression by all means.

Conclusion Several policy recommendations on how to overcome the troubled past have been proposed in the past by various actors –​some being more, and other less, realistic to be implemented. The process of writing these policy recommendations for the EU, namely, what the EU could do to assist its member states and the prospective members to overcome the troubled past, followed the middle-​g round approach. On the one hand, these recommendations offer several meaningful possibilities that the EU could introduce to contribute to the overcoming of troubled past within and outside the EU. On the other hand, the document tries not to be over-​ambitious by offering a set of ideas that would be immediately rejected. The EU as an institution can hardly go beyond the will of its member states; especially with the developments in the last few years, when it seems that the core values of the EU are being questioned by some of its member states, policy recommendations should reflect the current ‘spirit of the times’. The EU of ‘different speeds’ has become a reality in various fields (the Schengen area; Common Security and Defence Policy; Eurozone and so on). From an internal viewpoint, the EU member states are everything but static actors, and the political priorities –​ including those related 162

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to the EU affairs –​change with different governments. Perhaps also in the field of troubled past the need for the multi-​speed EU should be acknowledged. Therefore, given the fact that certain recommendations might encounter reluctance in some of the EU member states, the EU institutions could anyway pursue some of the proposed ideas and support only those member states that feel comfortable with them. However, the EU institutions mentioned in this chapter should not shy away from the attempt to stimulate also less eager member states to support certain ideas. The political orientation in any of the member states is not permanent, and even if at this point a certain member state does not support a particular idea for overcoming the troubled past, the recommendation, if ‘floated’, could garner support in years to come. Last, but not least, we acknowledge that these recommendations do not cover several fields that would be beneficial for addressing the troubled past (for example, opportunities related to the digitalization and the future EU’s attempts in this regard; multilingualism as an important glue that keeps the EU together and so on). The reason for not going beyond the results of the RePAST project is, on the one hand, the fact that the list of recommendations is already extensive, and on the other, because the authors wanted to ground their recommendations on the research that has been done in the project (original and new data). Nevertheless, the countries of the EU and the prospective member states –​from the latter, this project focuses on Kosovo and BiH only –​are so different from the perspective of troubled pasts that any kind of further, all-​encompassing and over-​ambitious solutions might ‘water down’ the meaningfulness of these recommendations.

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Conclusion The project RePAST investigated how seven European societies –​the EU member states and the countries aspiring to join the EU –​deal with their troubled pasts today, with a view on the impact of conflicting discourses on European integration. It also explored what is the role of the EU in this regard. After an intensive field research (2018–​21) in each of the societies, of which scientific results are available on the project website, the consortium attempted to offer several practical ideas how a few steps towards overcoming the troubled pasts could be taken. The added value of the project RePAST was that it attempted to disentangle the troubled pasts in four interrelated domains of social life: history, media, politics, and arts and culture. Drawing on earlier research, the main aim of the book is to offer meaningful and actionable policy recommendations, tailored to the needs of interested stakeholders at both the national and the EU level (policy makers, researchers, journalists, students, citizens). The policy recommendations should be read in an integrative manner and should be implemented as comprehensively as possible despite the authors acknowledging the fact that this would be difficult. Regardless of that, even a few small steps –​implementing or even thoroughly considering a few of the recommendations –​would be an important policy-​related impact of the project. In this concluding chapter, we do the following: first, we summarize the gist of policy recommendations and look for similarities across case studies; second, we pinpoint and discuss the specificities of each case study’s troubled pasts. These policy recommendations, which could also be understood as strategies for transformational policy reforms in four investigated areas, are developed to reflect upon the possible strategies for dealing with the troubled pasts of different countries. In doing so, the recommendations and strategies proposed are grounded on the analysis of mnemonical and historical trajectories to understand how different types of discourses (for example, oral and official history, journalistic-​led discourses, political and civil society-​led discourses) on past conflicts inform the present and how 164

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those discourses are reproduced, negotiated and (re)appropriated amidst the European integration process and an ever closer Union among peoples. Since there are diverse types of troubled pasts in Europe, the book followed the typology of troubled pasts along the four criteria, namely historical factor, time span of the EU membership, topical factor and risk factor. In line with these criteria, the book covered countries that –​both in the past and to a certain extent even nowadays –​are inherently underpinned with the most substantial sources of conflicts in Europe’s history, spanning from the Second World War, Holocaust and National Socialism, communist past, authoritarian, colonial past, and interethnic conflicts. Furthermore, some of them are experiencing ongoing open and omnipresent conflicts, whereas others are seeing their (past) conflicts being revived from time to time. This constitutes a risk zone for the future, all of which poses certain challenges for the European integration. The latter is thus understood as one of four criteria in terms of Euroscepticism, departure from core human rights, fragmentation and division, and secession tendencies. While the criteria for case study selection is explained in Chapter 1 in detail, the countries that were scrutinized in the book were the following: BiH and Kosovo as non-​ EU members; and Germany, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus and Poland as the EU member states. Last, but not least, the book also offers recommendations to the EU, as one of the grand questions at the heart of the project was how European collective memory can be built and how such collective memory could resuscitate the idea of European integration. We begin with recommendations for the field of history, where research focus was on studying national and European historical narratives on (troubled) pasts, particularly from the perspective of (re)interpretation and appropriation of the historical/​milestone events. In all case studies, policy recommendations derive from the limits of the existing school curricula at both primary and secondary/​high school level on covering the sources of conflict. Most of them propose to review history textbooks and add selected chapters that would cover –​in a critical manner –​the events that ‘feed’ contemporary societal and political antagonisms. While most of the cases advocate for the domestic-​driven incentives that would pave the way towards such reforms (for example, formation of interdisciplinary committees that would address the historical recording of events in an unbiased manner), the case of Cyprus promotes the idea of domestically driven incentives being supported by the external actors. Here, the proposed strategy was that the EU should act as an intermediary between the domestic actors in conflict. This means that the EU would supervise the proposed bi-​communal committee consisted of Turkish and Greek Cypriots that would strive towards the adaptation of the historical recording of events in history books. While the cases of BiH and Kosovo focus more on interethnic components of these expert committees that would reform the existing history curricula, we 165

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should also mention German and Irish recommendations, where researchers emphasize the potential of cross-​community collaboration within the expert committees. While the Irish case argues that such inclusion in reforming history teaching would overcome the sectarian divide, the German case argues that such form of collaboration would ‘close’ the so-​called East–​West division that exists even 30 years after the unification of the country. The second strategy within the area of history that is proposed in the vast majority of the cases is the idea of fostering school exchanges, which would not only be limited to teachers, but would also encompass pupils and students. Three case studies stand out in this regard, namely the case of BiH, Poland and Germany. In the case of BiH, the proposed strategies aim to develop a scheme that would support the teachers to travel to other parts of the country to give lectures (for example, a teacher from Republika Srpska goes to the Federation of BiH and vice versa). In contrast to this, the Polish case highlights the need to focus on providing support for teachers in smaller towns and villages, because analysis showed that they are –​due to their local life-​worlds –​somehow detached from the historical events. While the case of Poland and BiH are focused on teacher exchanges, the case of Germany proposes theme-​based pupil/​student exchanges. The latter builds on the need for the so-​called ‘inner-​German dialogue’, which is (still) based on stereotyped images due to the fact that there are still people in Germany that have never travelled to the former other part of the country. All the policy recommendations mentioned here also fit well with the strategies proposed in the chapter on the EU, where the main identified idea was to finance extensively schemes that would promote functional collaboration between different (ethnic/​minority) groups. Before turning to the second topical foci, one should also pinpoint the specificities of the cases in terms of the proposed strategies in the ‘history section’. Here, we could mention the cases of Ireland and BiH, where recommendations aim to expand the scope of history teaching. While in the case of BiH the proposed strategy is to promote the individuality of war crimes (to contrast the belief that a specific war crime was committed by ‘the nation’ as a whole), the case of Ireland proposes the so-​called ‘breaking the silence’ paradigm. The latter is understood as both familial and societal issue, as families living in the vicinity of the border often remain silent as some revealing details might encourage others to stereotype them as being on one side of the conflict or another. This is something that could also be potentially explored and proposed in the case of BiH as well, since there are many cases where (collective) silence prevailed after the war (for example, the case of Višegrad in eastern BiH). The second topical foci of interest are media. Here, the research focus was on analysing how journalistic and citizen media environments give rise to mediated discourses of troubled past and how media contributes to the 166

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creation of a (new) memory ecology due to its role in guiding the discourse on both remembering and forgetting. In all case studies, the proposed recommendations are developed on at least three levels, meaning that they touch upon the macro (that is, state regulations, laws), mezzo (that is, media outlets and their everyday work) and micro (that is, journalists as individuals and journalists vis-​à-​vis the general public) levels. When touching upon the macro level, we can mention the cases of Kosovo and BiH, where the analysis showed that there is a need to strengthen the media regulation and self-​regulating bodies not only for the purpose of hate speech (for example, promotion of ethno-​nationalism), but also for the purpose of meeting the expected roles of media in democracy. In this regard, the proposed strategies touch upon the media commission(s), press councils and communication regulatory agencies that have the potential to solidify the standards of reporting in relation to the troubled past. In the case of BiH, one of the recommendations also touches upon the need to establish the central registry of media ownership, which would help establish clear lines between politics and (independent) media outlets/​journalism as such. The second level, which touches upon the media outlets and their everyday work regarding the troubled past, is mostly reflected in the German and Cypriot case studies. In the case of Cyprus, researchers proposed strategies that are mostly focused on how media outlets operate in their day-​to-​day life. For example, they propose that: certain news should be available in both Greek and Turkish language in order to promote better understanding of what is happening in both communities; and, media outlets should include a wider range of Turkey’s key political developments that are not necessarily linked to the Cyprus problem. The latter builds on the argument that Turkish Cypriots only see the image of Turkey as constructed by media, which is limited to relations between Turkey and Cyprus. Unlike in the case of Cyprus, where strategies are limited to the day-​to-​ day operation of media outlets, the case of Germany also touches upon the organizational structure of media outlets. If the East/​West dichotomies and the Cyprus question offer similar research angles (dividing lines in society), then the East/​West gender balance in leading positions in media is where the German case study goes further. Here, the argument is that journalists in leading positions of East German origin are still under-​represented in Germany’s media houses, and that most of the editors of big German media outlets are men from West Germany. Finally, when talking about the micro level, that is, journalists as individuals and their work vis-​à-​vis the general public, one should revert to the Polish and Irish case studies. The Polish case, for example, advocated for strategies to mitigate the deterioration of the journalistic job market, as journalists are becoming less and less independent due to their unstable employment status. 167

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Contrary to the Polish case, the Irish case promotes the idea of expanding journalistic literacies and strengthening journalistic practice in the field of peace reporting and collaborative (investigative) journalistic projects from both Ireland and Northern Ireland. In this regard, the Irish policy recommendations are focused on journalist training(s) and collaborating among journalists (for example, media projects about the Troubles) in order to transform the ways in which journalists report on the troubled past. Before moving to the third topical foci, we should also highlight certain specificities. The most important one being the case of Poland, where one of the proposed strategies in the ‘media section’ focused on consolidating a pro-​European perspective among the journalists and media outlets when it comes to reporting on the Second World War and the Holocaust. In emphasizing this, the proposed strategy fits well with the chapter on the EU, where the proposed strategies regarding the media focus on the EU being able to (financially) support the national media outlets. One of such proposal was that the EU utilizes the Creative Europe programme and Europe for Citizens programme to establish EU MEDIA programme on troubled past and reconciliation to finance news networks in both EU and non-​EU member states. The third topical foci of interest are politics, where the research focus was on analysing national political discourses and narratives about troubled past, its relationship to European integration as such, and their impact on citizens’ attitudes. As observed in the chapters, the proposed recommendations are –​contrary to other topical foci of interest –​mostly focused on the transnational frame. The latter means that chapters promote the idea of the EU being the most appropriate (ideational) fora for the political elite to meaningfully engage in order to address troubled pasts and prevent further antagonization of their respective societies. Here, the strategies are least twofold, meaning that one set of recommendations aim for top-​down Europeanization (for example, chapters on BiH, Cyprus and Ireland) and the other advocate for bottom-​up Europeanization (for example, chapters on Poland and Germany) of the domestic politics. For instance, the proposed strategies that envision top-​down Europeanization –​as observed in the case of Cyprus –​go in the direction of redefining the EU’s role in the negotiation process for the resolution of the Cyprus problem and fostering integration into the political groups in the European Parliament to start resolving ongoing issues on the EU level. Contrary to the top-​down Europeanization, the cases of Poland and Germany advocate for changing the predominant perception on the EU as ‘an abstract entity’ in order to reverse the populist, illiberal and nationalist domestic political forces. This should be done by progressive liberal forces –​as shown in the chapter on Poland –​that are not limited only to the political elites, but other relevant stakeholders as well (for example, non-​governmental organizations, media outlets, other active citizens). 168

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Besides strategies that are focused on the transnational frame, there are also certain similarities between chapters in proposed recommendations when it comes to the domestic (national) frame. Here, we could mention the chapters on Spain and Kosovo, where the focus is on how the domestic political elites and their political parties can address the existing antagonisms regarding the troubled past. For example, the case of Kosovo advocates for interethnic round tables on the troubled past and proposes refurbishment of the Truth Commission to focus more on internal dialogue by including all ethnic groups. On the contrary, the Spanish case study promotes the idea of establishing certain initiatives devoted to the troubled past that would bring the domestic political parties closer together and tying the initiatives related to the memory of past conflict(s) in Spain with the idea of fulfilling both domestic and international legal obligations. Finally, we should also mention one specific strategy, which the chapters on BiH and Ireland propose, that is the promotion of functional partnerships through issue-​based policies and topics beyond ethnic (or sectarian) lines. Here, the idea is that social solidarity –​even if the political elite does not promote it –​across ethnic or sectarian line exists. In this regard, the two cases propose that any new political parties or younger political parties should learn from trans-​ethnic activities that derive from social solidarity and search for certain policies that do not contain ethnic or sectarian character. Finally, the fourth topical foci of interest is arts and culture, where the focus was on researching artistic appropriations of memory (that is, ‘high’ art, popular culture and street art) in relation to troubled past(s) and their receptions by critics and the wider public. In all the scrutinized case studies we can find the recommendation on the need to support cultural and artistic projects that address the troubled past. Here, we can mention the case of Poland, which highlights the importance of supporting such artistic and cultural projects that question existing or dominant modes of memory, express resistance and offer ‘scandalous analogies’. In a similar vein, the chapter on BiH proposes supporting projects and activities for fostering the idea of common belonging of all human beings. The most particularistic in this regard are the chapters on Cyprus and Germany, where strategies in advance presuppose projects that specifically target the persisting antagonisms in society. If in the case of Cyprus, the strategy is to promote artistic events within the buffer zone, the case of Germany focuses on the promotion of East German pre-​unification arts and culture. The idea here is to acknowledge more emphatically that arts and culture of East Germany belong to the cultural heritage of the Germans. Another important strategy that can be found in several case studies is the promotion of the so-​called ‘community art’. Particularly chapters on BiH, Kosovo and Ireland show how ‘ordinary’ citizens should be able –​through various forms of artistic expressions (for example, personal photography, collaborative paintings, murals, graffiti) –​to 169

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express and position themselves vis-​à-​vis the experiences and traumas that derive from the troubled past. Another important idea for strengthening the potential of arts and culture in addressing the troubled past, which can be observed both on the national and EU level, is fostering the institutional support for artists and cultural workers. On the national level, the chapters on BiH and Poland advocate for financial support for the artists to participate in workshops and programmes that would allow them to broaden their horizons. On the EU level, it goes beyond workshops and programmes as the proposed strategy aims to establish a scheme of visiting fellowships for artists and cultural workers, who want to work with the topic related to the troubled past abroad. Such strategies would thus –​if the institutional support is robust enough –​enable the reinforcement of collaborative artistic and cultural projects, which require cooperation beyond national, ethnic, religious, cultural, gender and other differences. Finally, we should also highlight certain specificities within the ‘arts and culture field’. Here, the most specific –​strategy-​wise –​case study proved to be the Cypriot one, where (at least) two recommendations stand out. The first one being the financing of bi-​communal summer camps, which would offer the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot youth space for meaningful socialization. In doing so, the activities that these summer camps would offer should promote reconciliation and peace. The second recommendation that the Cypriot case offers in this regard is the promotion of the Limassol Carnival, the largest cultural event on the island that is visited by hundreds of Turkish Cypriots who cross the Green Line to visit. Here, the idea is to utilize the potential of this festival to promote the cooperation between the municipality of Limassol and the authorities of the Turkish Cypriots in order to solidify the festival being the focal point of socialization between the two communities. To conclude, the majority of the scrutinized case studies and proposed policy recommendations and/​or strategies can only prove successful if there is a genuine commitment by all the relevant (societal) stakeholders to address the troubled pasts. (Un)fortunately, in order to bring policy recommendations and/​or strategies ‘to life’, the commitment must be both material (that is, financing different schemes, projects and initiatives) and non-​material (that is, will). Only then can the potential of transformative reforms and the process of de-​antagonization of the societal everyday life occur. Until then, the book, which is based on the results of a three-​year project, can provide a rich source of inspiration to all the aspiring (active) citizens that may or may not hold important political, cultural, social or economic positions in the society and want to start changing their respective societies in regard to their troubled pasts. In the end –​as also argued in the beginning of the conclusion –​even a few small steps towards overcoming the troubled past(s) can prove big and transformative in the long run. 170

Notes Chapter 1 1

2

The RePAST project (Revisiting the Past, Anticipating the Future), financed by the Horizon 2020 scheme of the European Union, also included the study of Greece as a national case study. Due to technical and logistical reasons, Greece is not included in this book. Interested readers can access material related to Greece through the project’s website (www.rep​ast.eu). Some exceptions of research that focuses on more than two countries are Borneman (1997), Rosenberg (1995), Watson (1994), Cerulo (1995), Bennett (1995) and Lowenthal (1985) on cultural heritage, and more recently, Pakier and Stråth (2012), Sierp and Wüstenberg (2015), Sierp and Karner (2017) and Delanty (2017).

Chapter 2 1

2

At least six think tanks are recognized as ‘political foundations at European level’. They also serve as frameworks for national or regional think tanks, policy foundations and academics. These think tanks are: Coppieters Foundation (affiliated to European Free Alliance); European Christian Political Foundation (official think tank of the European Christian Political Movement); European Liberal Forum (affiliated to Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe/​Renew Europe); Green European Foundation (affiliated to the Greens); New Direction (affiliated to Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe/​The European Conservatives and Reformists); Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (affiliated to European People’s Party). The questions were as follows: 1. Does your country/​institution have a generally agreed approach to dealing with the problems arising from the troubled past (strategy, policy and so on)? 2. Can you explain whether there has been any development in your country/​institution in dealing with the troubled past (has the approach changed with the change of government, certain developments in the country or in a broader international context and so on)? 3. What would be needed at the national level to deal with the troubled past, but is not available? 4. How, if at all, do EU policies, strategies and programmes help your country to address the burdened past? 5. What would be needed from the EU –​or other international actors –​to support the country in its efforts to address the troubled past?

3

4

Due to the pandemics, the workshop was organized as a teleconference. More than 100 people attended the workshop, which took place on 26 March 2021. The following questions introduced the discussion: 171

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1. What can be done in general about the troubled past(s) of European societies? 2. What have we learned so far, theoretically and practically, about the troubled past(s) and the effective means to overcome them? 3. Are good practices transferable from one context to another in a highly differentiated European context characterized by the rise of illiberalism, hate speech and other undemocratic standards? 4. What role can European countries –​EU members and non-​members –​and the EU as an institution play in trying to overcome the troubled pasts? The online conference was organized on 15 October 2021.

Chapter 3 1

2

3

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6

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The asterisks (*) mark the names of those, who, in addition to the commenting of draft recommendations, also consented to the interview. The DPA established the Office of the High Representative to oversee its implementation. Furthermore, the Office of the High Representative received wide-​ranging powers to impose decisions (‘Bonn powers’) in cases where the authorities are unable to agree, or where political and economic interests are considered to be at stake. It is important to mention that the Office of the High Representative had dismissed a total of 119 officials, issued 757 decisions and imposed 286 laws until 2005 (Majstorović and Vučkovac, 2016). Prud and Butmir Processes were two informal attempts to create an agreement on the institutional reforms in order to implement key changes and put an end to the dysfunctional power-​sharing institutional arrangement that was installed by the DPA (Zdeb, 2017; Kasapović and Kočan, 2022). In 2008, the EU concluded visa facilitation agreements with all Southeast European countries. However, in 2009, the EU announced that the citizens of BiH would not enjoy visa-​free travel due to lack of reform progress. The EU conditions were met in October 2010, when BiH was granted visa liberalization. In accordance with the BiH Constitution, there are 12 responsible institutions of education in BiH: the Ministry of Education and Culture of RS, ten cantonal ministries of education in the Federation of BiH and the Department for Education of the Brčko District Government (European Commission, 2020a). The BiH Ministry for Civil Affairs coordinates the work of several entity ministries throughout BiH. In the Federation of BiH, these institutions are Ministry of Regional Planning, Ministry of Culture and Sports; Institute for the Protection of Monuments; in RS, these institutions are Ministry of Regional Planning, Civil Engineering and the Environment; Ministry for Education and Culture; Institute for the Protection of cultural-​ historical and natural heritage (CoE, 2017). Europeanization is referring to the interactions between the EU and the countries that aspire to join the EU. In this respect, the prospective candidates adopt certain changes in their countries and implement a few good practices that already exist in the EU and implement them in the political, economic, social, legislative and other systems. Until now, this kind of ‘Europeanization through socialization’ was left to individual political groups in the European Parliament, which are usually filling these positions with members of their affiliated political parties from member states. By political entities, we refer to the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska.

Chapter 4 1

Shok is a Kosovar short drama film written and directed by Oscar-​nominated director Jamie Donoughue, based on true events during the Kosovo war. Shok’s distributor is Ouat

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Media, and the social media campaign is led by Team Albanians. The movie was nominated for the Academy Award for Best Live Action Short Film at the 88th Academy Awards.

Chapter 5 1

For a conceptual-​historical approach to the rhetoric of German unity, see Tschammer (2019).

Chapter 6 1

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3

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The PEACE funds for Northern Ireland is a EU special programme to encourage cross-​ border cooperation between Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The programme addresses the specific problems caused by the conflict with the aim of creating a peaceful and stable society. PEACE-​funded organizations include museums, crafts networks and other non-​governmental organizations. For example: ‘Contested Memories, Oral History, and the Northern Irish Conflict’ (Reinisch, 2016) and several projects including victims and dealing with the past; ‘Oral History in Post-​conflict Societies: Experiences from Researching the Northern Ireland Troubles. This in-​depth collaborative project could take an experimental form, such as the one by The Migrants Files (nd) or The Manifold Files (nd). As part of power-​sharing agreements in NI some ministerial positions must be divided between two communities with each held by a person representing the republican and unionist communities (DFA, 1998). For example, British state investigations into British state security forces that do not have independent oversight would be signalled as non-​independent, while reports commissioned by independent third parties would be labelled as independent.

Chapter 7 1

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According to a member of the Constitutional Court –​Judge Balaguer –​this interpretation is not necessarily incompatible with the application of international human rights law. The Bill was finally approved in the Senate on 5 October, and it came into force on 19 October when it was published into the Official State Gazette. In 2010 victims of human rights violations during the civil war and the dictatorship took their cases to the Argentinian courts. Nowadays, there are 150 cases pending to be solved. Some perpetrators of crimes committed during the civil war and the dictatorship have been accused in Argentinian courts but the Spanish political and judicial authorities have so far resisted all calls for collaboration (that is, rejecting the cases alluding to the Amnesty Act, denying detentions of perpetrators, declarations or extradition of torturers). Recently, the Minister of Labour Relations and Minister of Internal Affairs during the last years of the dictatorship and the first years of the transition to democracy –​Rodolfo Martín Villa –​declared in front of Argentinian judge María Servini, accused of crimes against humanity for the death of four people shot by the police. The Argentinian Court of Appeal has considered that there are not enough evidence for proofs for his incrimination. The Valley of the Fallen is a massive monument in the shape of a cross, erected near Madrid on Franco’s initiative to, allegedly, commemorate all those who died during the civil war regardless of their side in the conflict. In practice, the monument, which was built by republican prisoners of war, served as a mausoleum and place of worship for Primo de Rivera (founder of the Spanish fascist party Falange Española) first, and for Franco himself after his death in 1975. Franco’s corpse was exhumed and moved to a private family mausoleum in 2019. With the approval of the Law on Democratic Memory, it is expected that Primo de Rivera’s corpse will be exhumed and moved as well. 173

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6

7

The Spanish parliament is bicameral, and therefore, after the Congress (Lower House), the Bill had to be approved by the Senate, or otherwise return to the Congress for a second vote. The text was passed in the Senate without any amendments. Our interviewees cover the experiences of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Andalusia. The first two regions are known for having taken early and widely encompassing initiatives dealing with past conflicts. The case of Andalusia allowed us to analyse one of the regions in Spain most harshly affected by violence during the civil war and how this may have a different impact on how party representatives position themselves when compared to other regions. Unlike other regions, Andalusia started a process already in 2003 that led to the adoption of the Andalusian Protocol for Exhumation of Victims of the Civil War and the Post-​war Period of 2009. In February 2020, the regional parliament of Castilla-​La Mancha unanimously approved an institutional declaration (promoted by Amnesty International) in support of a Bill to promote the investigation and attention of cases of stolen babies in Spain during the Franco dictatorship. More recently, in February 2021, the local government of Alicante, ruled by a coalition government of the centre-​r ight parties Partido Popular and Ciudadanos, promoted the exhumation of a mass grave of victims of Franco’s regime. These all are cases of different attitudes that must be known.

Chapter 10 1

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4 5

The EU was formally established when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force on 1 November 1993. In November 2020, we sent out 34 requests for comments and managed to receive substantive feedback from six experts: Klavdija Černilogar-​Dwyer, Policy Assistant to Director-​General at European Commission (DG EAC); Mariachiara Esposito, Policy Officer at the DG EAC; José Gutiérrez Fernández, Head of Sector, EACEA; Diego Marani, Cultural Policy Coordinator at the European External Action Service; Giacomo Mazzone, Deputy Director at Radiotelevisione Italiana (News Department) and a former Head of Institutional Relations at the European Broadcasting Union; Martin Rømer, a consultant at EDU-​ACT and a former European Director of International Education (2002–​16). For example, the geopolitical context; the logic of (exclusively) economic integration; and the lack of political instruments by the EC for pursuing such agenda. For example, Zupančič and Pejič (2018) and Elbasani (2020). Several institutions of the EU have a role in addressing the troubled past, each from a specific perspective. We name only the most relevant: 1. DG EAC, which proposes recommendations, develops legislation and gives funding; 2. EACEA, which is an executive agency managing certain parts of the EU funding programmes in education; 3. Council of the EU, which negotiates and adopts EU laws, and coordinates member state policies; 4. European Parliament Committee on Culture and Education, which adopts and initiates reports, proposes amendments, negotiates with the Council of the EU and so on; 5. European External Action Service, which as an external dimension of the EU deals with the third countries also from the perspective of troubled past; 6. The Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments; 7. Directorate-​General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, which works with neighbourhood and enlargement countries, including BiH and Kosovo, which are explored in the RePAST project.

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According to Martin Rømer, one of the experts who reviewed the draft version of these recommendations, the European Trade Union Committee for Education was instrumental to the signature of the first and so far the only agreement between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots in the field of education. This demonstrates the importance of the inclusion of all influential actors in such processes. Education International, for example, which together with trade unions developed programmes on peace education (Education International, 2012). Some attempts in this direction have already been made and a few programmes are being prepared at the time when these recommendations were written. Erasmus Teachers Academies, for example, is one such programme, which was launched in February 2021 within the new Erasmus Programme to create networks of teacher education institutions and teacher associations (European Commission, 2020a). Such ­examples –​for example interethnic rescuing and help during the war, joint actions of various groups’ representatives for peace, erecting monuments to all victims of violence, building public sites of consciousness in addition to the public places of remembrance that often ‘belong’ to one social group only –​could make people more aware that groups are rarely cohesive in their acting and feelings, and that it was more an exception than the rule that only one group would suffer in the conflict. Understanding that social groups differ significantly, if scrutinized in depth, could lessen the antagonizing views of other social groups as unitary actors that are per definitionem against ‘us’. A similar recommendation, although from a different angle, has been given also by the Quaker Council for European Affairs (2019, p 35). Here, one possibility for further practical training could also lie within the existing Erasmus Mundus Master Courses in the field of journalism, where the content is developed and delivered by an international consortium of universities. A good example is the War Childhood Museum (Muzej ratnog djetinstva) in Sarajevo, which documents war experiences of children from their perspective. As such, it has no ethno-​political connotation, but seeks to present the brutality of the war through a child’s eyes. In 2018, the museum received the Council of Europe Museum Prize.

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197

Index References to figures appear in italic type; those in bold type refer to tables. References to endnotes show both the page number and the note number (172n5).

A agonistic remembering  59, 60–​1, 66, 71 Akinci, Mustafa  116 Albania  52, 145 see also Western Balkans ‘Albanian Crimes’  46 Albanian history books  46 Albanian journalists  50 Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)  57, 59 Anastasiades, Nikos  120 Annan, Kofi  114 Annan plan  115, 120 Argentinian courts  173n3 Armenians  118 ‘Art as exchange’ (AAEX)  93 arts and culture  8–​9 see also case study countries’ policy recommendations B Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN)  33 Balkan Peninsula (Balkans)  23–​4, 29–​30 Barroso, José Manuel  3 Basque Country Unite (Bildu)  99 Battle of Kosovo  40 ‘Belgrade-​Prishtina dialogue’  4 Berlin Wall  58 Black Ribbon Day  130 Blue Star Programme  79 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)  4, 11, 23–​39 case study selection criteria  10 comments on recommendations  25–​6 constitution  27, 172n5 cultural affairs  37 ‘ethnic issues’  23 ethno-​politics  36 ethno-​religious/​intra-​ethnic divisions  30 EU approaches  26–​9, 152 EU candidate status  12

EU creating a ‘functional state’  28–​9 ‘Euro-​Atlantic integration’  27 EU visa liberalization  29, 172n4 intra-​country mobility programmes  38 judicial system  28 Ministry for Civil Affairs  32, 172n6 ‘the Other’  39 ‘period of regression’  28–​9 police reforms  27–​8 post-​war period  26–​7 RePAST methodologies  24–​5 Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)  27, 28 stereotype of artists  38 Thessaloniki Declaration  27 war crimes  28 see also Republika Srpska (RS); Yugoslavia Bosnia and Herzegovina policy recommendations  29–​38, 170 accountable political parties  36 arts and culture  37–​8, 169, 170 ‘audience development’  37–​8 de-​ethnicizing history teaching  30–​1 de-​ethnicizing political parties  35 functional partnerships and issue-​based policies  36 history  30–​3, 165 intra-​country mobility programmes  38 laws to protect journalists  33–​4 media  33–​5, 167 ministries of education  32 opportunities for youth  39 places of consciousness  32–​3 politics  35–​6 support for cultural and artistic projects  37 young people questioning prejudices  39 ‘youth wings’  35–​6 Bosniaks  23 Bosnian Croats  23 Bosnian Serbs  23

198

Index

Brčko District (BiH)  28 Brexit  72, 76–​8 British Council  37 Brussels Agreements  45 Buzek, Jerzy  130

revising history textbooks  117, 123–​4 student exchange programmes  122 Cyprus Problem  110–​16, 119, 121, 124–​5

C cancellation of memory (Passerini)  2 case study countries  10, 11–​14, 11 Castilla-​La Mancha, Spain  174n7 Central and Eastern Europe post-​communist states (CEE)  128, 130, 149 integration  62, 149 (post-​)socialist transformation  69 see also East Germany; Poland Clerides, Glafkos  114 collective memories  3, 5, 6 commemorative politics  82 communism  2, 130 communist memory politics  129 Congress of Berlin  29 contestation  5 cosmopolitan memory  60, 65, 71 Creative Europe  162 criminalizing communism  130 Cyprus  4, 11, 110–​25 awareness of situation  121 buffer zone  122–​3 case study selection criteria  10 checkpoints  111, 114, 121–​2 compassion and reconciliation  118 ‘Enosis’  110 EU approaches  112–​16 history textbooks  116 Home for Cooperation  122–​3 music and dance  121–​2 other communities  118 peaceful coexistence  110, 117–​18 post-​accession period  115–​16 reconciliation  119–​20, 121–​2 reconstructing Cypriot history  117 RePAST methodologies  111–​12 reunification referendum  114–​15 Turkish invasion  110, 112–​13, 118 ‘we against the others’ narrative  116 see also Greek Cypriots; Republic of Cyprus (RoC); Turkish Cypriots ‘Cyprus File’ (Greece)  117 Cyprus policy recommendations  116–​23 annual forums  121 arts and culture  121–​3, 124, 169 bi-​communal committees  117 bi-​communal summer camps  122, 170 film festival  123 history  116–​18, 165 media  118–​19, 123, 167 politics  119–​21, 124 redefining EU’s role  121

D Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)  23, 26, 29 de Greiff, Pablo  98 Delors, Jacques  62, 63, 148 Democratic League of Kosovo  42 Democratic Left Alliance party (Poland)  129 The Democratic Party (DIKO, Cyprus)  120 Denktaş, Rauf  114 destructive power of history  57 Deutsche Film Aktiengesellschaft (DEFA)  70 digitalization of life  39 Directorate-​General for Education Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC)  153–​4, 155, 159, 161, 162 Directorate-​General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement  155 Dodik, Milorad  29 Donoughue, Jamie  51, 172–​3n1 E Eastern Bloc countries see Central and Eastern Europe post-​communist states (CEE) East German Other  59 East Germany  EU approaches  62–​4 ‘humiliations, insults and injustices’  58–​9 national unity  58 people as EU citizens  64 politics of equal dignity  66 politics of recognition  65–​6 relative deprivation  65 ‘reunification’/​‘takeover’ by FDR  58 rise of the AfD  57, 59 skills, knowledge, and expertise  67 under-​represented journalists  68 see also German Democratic Republic (GDR) East Germany policy recommendations  arts and culture  70, 169 history  66–​8 media  68 politics  68–​70 Education International  175n7 ‘Enosis’ (Greece annexing Cyprus)  110 Erasmus Mundus Master Courses  175n11 Erasmus+​ programmes  89, 122, 150 Erasmus Teachers Academies  175n8 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip  114, 119 Eroglu, Dervis  115 EUFOR  29 Euronews  156 European Broadcasting Union  157 European Community (EC)  Association Agreement with RoC  112 BiH  26–​7

199

TROUBLED PASTS IN EUROPE

integration of East & West Germany  62–​3 memory politics  148 ‘security-​oriented’  143 Yugoslavia  144–​5 European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism  130 European Economic Community (EEC)  Spain  101–​2 UK and Ireland assumption  74, 75 European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA)  159–​60, 161, 162 ‘European historical memory’  3 European identity  3, 149 European integration  3 Europeanization  45, 159, 168, 172n7 European Parliament (EP)  declaration on Srebrenica  28 and European identity  149 Franco regime and fascists  102–​3 Greek and Turkish Cypriot parties  120 as a ‘memory interlocutor’  159 Resolution on European conscience on totalitarianism  149–​50 European Regional Development Funding  75–​6 European Security and Defence Policy  28 European Solidarity Centre  132 European Trade Union Committee for Education  175n6 European Union (EU)  143–​62 access to funding  151–​2 approaches to ‘RePAST countries’  148–​53 ‘bottom-​up’ projects  150 and Brexit  76–​7 cohesion funds  63 cohesion policies  152 collective memory  159 Common Foreign and Security Policy  26 Competitiveness and Growth Programme  29 ‘different speeds’  162 East Germans’ support for integration  63–​4 Economic Reform Programme  29 embargo on Turkish Cypriot exports  113 enlargement  62, 144–​5 ‘Freezing’/​‘Unfreezing’ memories  149 integration  4, 145, 152–​3 interventionism  152 MEDIA programme  156 memory politics  148 ‘negative founding myth’  148 Nobel Peace Prize  143–​4 ‘old’ Western and ‘young’ Eastern states  63 PEACE funding  77, 90, 173n1 ‘peace narratives’  144 post-​Yugoslav accession processes  150 remembrance policy  69 RePAST methodologies  146–​8 role in BiH  152

as a security actor  145 Special Representative for Kosovo  42 Stabilisation and Association Agreements  27–​9, 44 support for artists and cultural workers  170 universal approaches to troubled pasts  151 European Union policy recommendations  147, 153–​62 arts and culture  160–​2 collaborative artistic and cultural projects  162 education policies  153–​5 empowering voices  160 ‘EU memory framework’  153 exchange programmes  154–​5 fact-​checking statements  160 history  153–​5 independent media  156–​7 international exchange/​intra-​state mobility  161 journalistic standards  155–​6, 157 media  155–​8 media literacy  157–​8 oral history projects  155 peace education  155 politics  158–​60 protecting whistle-​blowers  158 seminars on historical issues  159–​60 supporting EU as an institution  159 travelling exhibitions  161 European United Left/​Nordic Green Left (GUE/​ NGL)  102 Eurovision News Exchange for Southeast Europe (ERNO)  157 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)  96, 99 F Fajon, Tanja  43 fall of communism  2 Federal Republic of Germany see Germany Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)  23, 30, 40–​1, 145 see also Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH); Kosovo Finci, Jakob  29 France  95, 144 Franco dictatorship  95–​6, 99, 102, 104, 174n7 see also Spain ‘Freezing’ memories  149 G Galician Nationalist Bloc  100 Genscher, Hans-​Dietrich  62 German Democratic Republic (GDR)  13–​14, 58, 62–​3, 70 see also East Germany Germany  3, 11, 57–​71 agonistic remembering  60 case study selection criteria  10

200

Index

East–​West polarization  59 hegemonic (post-​)socialist memory  58, 61 post-​socialist memory  60–​1, 70–​1 post-​socialist transformation  58, 64 RePAST methodologies  61–​2 ‘reunification’  58, 62 Schuman Declaration  144 social dividing lines  59 ‘takeover’ of GDR  58 Germany policy recommendations  64–​70 arts and culture  70, 169 education  68 EU addressing unification  69 grassroots remembrance politics  69 history  66–​8, 166 media  68, 167 politics  68–​70 rethinking (post-​)socialist memory  64–​5 revising archival legislation  69–​70 Good Friday Agreement (GFA)  72, 75–​6, 87 see also Ireland; Northern Ireland (NI) Greece  ‘Cyprus File’  117 EC membership  113 ‘Enosis’ (annexation of Cyprus)  110 RePAST project  171n1 Greek Cypriots  background  110 bi-​communal summer camps  170 common struggles with Turkish Cypriots  117 ‘Enosis’ ambition  110 and the EP  120 EU accession talks  114 history textbooks  116, 117 media  118–​19 reunification referendum  114–​15 victimhood  116 see also Cyprus; Turkish Cypriots H Haagerup Report  75, 148 Habermas, J.  3 hate speech  34, 49, 140, 158, 167 ‘historical memory’  101, 106–​7, 108, 109 Holocaust  2, 129, 130, 131, 136 House of European History  161 I identity-​based exclusivist narratives  160 ‘individuality of war crimes’  31 Institute of National Remembrance (IPN)  132, 142 Institute of War Crimes (Kosovo)  50 interethnic help  32 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)  28, 41–​2, 45, 46, 52 international exchange of cultural workers and artists  38, 161

International Holocaust Remembrance Day  131, 135 Interreg Programme  75 intra-​religious schisms  23 investigative journalism programmes  156 Ireland  11–​12, 11, 72–​94 border communities  88–​9 case study selection criteria  10 diversity of identities  79 education system  78–​80 EU constitutional approaches  75 EU engagement with the Troubles  74–​7 EU peacebuilding approaches  75–​6 EU PEACE funding  77, 90, 173n1 EU policies after Brexit  76–​7 European integration  148 Good Friday Agreement  72, 75–​6, 87 Protocol on Ireland/​NI  76–​7 RePAST methodologies  73–​4 Special EU Programmes Body  75–​6, 150 themes  73 War for Independence & civil war  81 see also Northern Ireland (NI); Republic of Ireland; the Troubles Ireland policy recommendations  77–​93 archive about the Troubles  78 ‘Art as exchange’ (AAEX)  93 arts and culture  90–​3 bursaries  93 commemorations and celebrations  81–​2 conflict journalism and peace journalism  84–​5 cross-​border civic forums/​citizens’ assemblies  88–​9 cross-​national arts and culture projects  91 database of artefacts and source materials  80–​1, 86 digital repository  79–​81, 92 diversity of identities  79 education  78–​9 educational exchanges  89 history  78–​82, 166 investigating security forces and political decision-​making  86 issue of ‘silence’  81 journalists guidelines  83–​4 media  82–​7, 168 migrant communities  89–​90 non-​sectarian political activism  87 PEACE funds  90, 173n1 politics  87–​90 socioeconomic contexts  85–​6 support for journalists  82–​3 touring exhibitions  92 trauma and impact training  83 trust in state institutions  88 women  82, 89 Istinomjer  36

201

TROUBLED PASTS IN EUROPE

J Jedwabne pogrom  129 Jessen, Ralph  66 journalists  7, 156 see also case study countries Junts per Catalunya  100 K Karadžić, Radovan  28 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes  31 Kosovo  4, 11, 12–​13, 40–​54 Brussels Agreements  45 case study selection criteria  10 ethnic cleansing  40–​1 EU approaches  41–​2, 44–​5, 152 EU visa liberalization  42, 45 Independent Media Commission  49, 50 Institute of War Crimes  50 interethnic collaboration and reconciliation  53 internet use  49 joint Serb and Albanian initiatives  52 limitations  44 major narratives and debates  41–​2 media  41 Ministry of Justice  46 official histories  46 polarized political climate  53 RePAST methodologies  42–​4 Serbian and Albanian journalists  50 ‘Serbian Crimes’ and ‘Albanian Crimes’  46 sexual violence  51–​2 social networks  49–​50 Truth Commission  46 war crimes  45–​6 see also Yugoslavia Kosovo Albanians  40, 43, 53 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)  40–​1, 42 Kosovo policy recommendations  45–​52 arts and culture  51–​2 dealing with the past  53–​4 gamification of history learning  48 history  46–​8, 165 history curricula  47 inclusive artistic and cultural activities  52 Independent Media Commission  50 journalists’ joint shared associations  50 media  49–​50, 167 media regulation  49, 50 media reportage  49 memorializing the past  52 memory agents/​projects  51, 52 multiethnic schools  47 museums  47, 48, 52 politics  50–​1, 169 rule of law  51 teacher training  47 Truth Commission  51

‘Kosovo Reality Show’ (TV series)  52 Kosovo Serbs  42, 43–​4, 46–​7, 53 Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC)  41 L Lajčák, Miroslav  42 Latins  118 Law and Justice Party (PiS, Poland)  130–​1, 137, 138 Limassol, Cyprus  123, 170 ‘Lügenpresse’ (lying press)  3 M Maastricht Treaty  58, 174n1 malleability  5 Manichean crystallization of historical action  60 Maronites  118 media  7 Bosnia and Herzegovina reforms  33–​5 Kosovo  41 media curricula  34 media literacy  157–​8 memory  European socialist past  64–​5 multidisciplinarity approaches  6 as a process  5 memory associations  103 ‘Men doj per Ty’ installation  51–​2 Merkel, Angela  57 Mitrovica, Kosovo  52 Mitrovica Rock School  52 Mladić, Ratko  28 ‘mnemohistory’ (Assmann)  5 Molotov-​Ribbentrop Pact  130 Mouffe, Chantal  59, 60 The Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK, Cyprus)  120 Museum of Kosovo  47 Museum of the History of Polish Jews (Polin)  140 Museum of the Second World War  132 Museum of the Warsaw Uprising  140 N Nagy report  102–​3 National Radio and Television Networks (NRTN)  156 National Socialist memory  60 National Unity Party (UBP, Cyprus)  120 Neighbours (Gross)  129 Neumayer, Laure  130 non-​politicized interpretations of history  46 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  40 Northern Ireland (NI)  3–​4, 72–​94 Brexit referendum  72 diversity of identities  79 educational exchanges  89

202

Index

EU approaches to  74–​7 EU PEACE funding  77, 173n1 Good Friday Agreement  72, 75–​6, 87 inward migration  84 nationalism  72 power-​sharing agreements  173n4 Protocol (EU/​UK)  76–​7 see also Ireland; Republic of Ireland; the Troubles Northern Ireland (NI) policy recommendations  77–​93 arts and culture  90–​3 history  78–​82 media  82–​7 politics  87–​90 Northern Ireland Peace Programme  75 O Office of the High Representative (DPA)  172n2 official and oral histories  6–​7 ‘old’ Western EU member states  63 Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe (OSCE)  40–​1, 49, 50 Ostdeutschsein (East German-​ness)  59 P Party of Democratic Action (SDA, BiH)  38 Party of European Socialists (EP)  120 Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident  3, 57 PEACE funds  90, 173n1 persistent historical legacies  5 Pilecki Institute  132 Pinochet, Augusto  97 places of consciousness  32–​3 Platforma Obywatelska (PO, Poland)  137 Poland  3, 11, 14, 126–​42 Allied victory over fascism  130–​1 case study selection criteria  10 dealing with troubled past  130 as a double victim  129 ethnicity of population  126 EU approaches  128–​31 Europeanizing past  129 Law and Justice Party (PiS)  130–​1, 137, 138 memory politics  128–​9 oppositional memory  126 ‘pedagogy of shame’/​‘patriotic pride’ narratives  127 political polarization  134 RePAST methodologies  127–​8 Russian military aggression  138–​9 Soviet influence  126 United Workers’ Party  126 universalist interpretation of the Holocaust  135 V-​Day commemorations  135

Poland policy recommendations  131–​41 arts and culture  139–​41, 142, 169, 170 collaborative projects  140–​1 education  133–​4, 140, 142 EU integration  138 EU support  141–​2 gender perspectives  136–​7 history  131–​4 independent public institutions  132 journalistic independence  135 liberal parties  137 media  134–​7, 167 minoritarian artistic and cultural projects  141 monitoring transparency and accountability  138 museums  140 non-​academic public research institutions  132 politics  137–​9 preventing censorship  140 Radio-​television (RTV) licence fee  135–​6 reforming history teaching  133–​4 supporting academic historians  132–​3 supporting left-​wing memory  137 trusting state institutions  138 visions of Europe  136 politics of difference (Taylor)  65, 66 politics of equal dignity (Taylor)  65, 66 politics of history and memory  58 politics of recognition (Taylor)  65–​6 Popular Unity Candidacy  100 postcolonial countries  3–​4 post-​Yugoslav accession processes  150 Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism  130 Press Council of Kosovo  49 Press Council (Vijeće za štampu BiH)  33 Priaranza del Bierzo, Spain  108 Prishtina, Kosovo  48 Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL, Cyprus)  119 Protocol on Ireland/​Northern Ireland (EU/​UK)  76–​7 Prud and Butmir processes  28, 172n3 Q Quaker Council for European Affairs  175n10 R Raçak Massacre  45 Rajoy, Mariano  98 reconciliation  32 relevant interlocutors  17–​18 RePAST project (Revisiting the Past, Anticipating the Future)  1–​2, 164, 171n1 arts and culture recommendations  169–​70 case study selection  10, 11–​14, 11 conceptual approaches  5, 6

203

TROUBLED PASTS IN EUROPE

cross-​country comparative analysis  9 feedback on research  19 first version of recommendations  17 history recommendations  165–​6 media recommendations  166–​8 methodologies  16–​19 policy recommendations  14–​15, 16–​19, 164–​5 politics recommendations  168–​9 school exchanges  166 typology of troubled pasts  165 Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)  100 Republican Turkish Party (CTP)  120 Republic of Cyprus (RoC)  110, 112–​15 EC Association Agreement  112 EU Customs Union Agreement  113 see also Cyprus Republic of Ireland  11–​12, 72, 88–​9, 91 see also Ireland; Northern Ireland (NI) Republic of Kosovo see Kosovo Republika Srpska (RS)  23, 27–​9, 31 see also Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Russia  138–​9 S Schuman Declaration  144 Second World War  2–​3, 129, 130–​1, 132 V-​Day  131, 135 Sejdić, Dervo  29 Serb Democratic Party (SDS)  38 Serbia  45 ‘Serbian Crimes’  46 Serbian List (Lista Srpska)  42 sexual violence  51–​2 Shok (film)  51, 172–​3n1 Simić, Boban  43 social identities  5 social media  34, 49 social networks  49–​50 Spain  11, 13, 95–​109 Amnesty Act  96–​7 case study selection criteria  10 dictatorship  95–​6 education  103–​6 EU approaches  101–​3, 152 Franco dictatorship  95–​6, 99, 102, 104, 174n7 human rights claims  173n3 Law on Democratic Memory  97, 99–​100, 104, 108–​9 Law on Historical Memory  97–​9 Law on Public Secrets  99 ‘liberalization’  96 ‘memorialist’ associations  97 ‘pact of silence’/​‘pact of oblivion’  96 parliament  174n5 political polarization  107–​8 popular culture  108

RePAST methodologies  100–​1 State Register of Places of Democratic Memory  109 transition to democracy  4, 96 universal justice  97 Valley of the Fallen  98–​9, 108–​9, 173n4 Year of Historical Memory  97 Spain policy recommendations  103–​9 arts and culture  108–​9 education  103–​6 exhuming mass graves  108 forums/​workshops  108 ‘historical memory’  107, 108 history  103–​6 individual victims  107 media  106–​7 memory associations  103 memory of past conflicts  107, 169 museums  108–​9 oral testimonials  105 politics  107–​8, 169 Special EU Programmes Body  75–​6, 150 Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (SPO)  41 Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA)  27–​9, 44 Stabilisation and Association Processes  149 stolen babies  174n7 see also Franco dictatorship T Tanasković, Aleksandar  43 Taylor, Charles  65 Thessaloniki Summit and Declaration (2003)  27, 145 Tindermans, Leo  144 totalitarian regimes  3, 130 ‘transitional journalism’ (Andresen)  7 the Troubles  archive  78 digital repository  80 EU engagement with  74–​7 issue of ‘silence’  81 legacy of the conflict  72 personal photography  93 socioeconomic contexts  85–​6 study of women  82 support for journalists  82–​3 under-​represented art  90 see also Ireland; Northern Ireland (NI) Truth-​meters  36 Turkish Cypriots  background  110 bi-​communal summer camps  170 common struggles with Greek Cypriots  117 embargo on exports  113 and the EP  120 EU accession talks  114

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Index

EU integration policies  115 isolation  110–​11, 115 media  118–​19 reunification referendum  114–​15 trade relations with EU  115 see also Cyprus; Greek Cypriots Turkish Cypriot Socialist CTP  120 Tusk, Donald  77 U UK  112 see also Brexit Ukraine  138–​9 ‘unfreezing’ memories  149 universalism (humanism)  32 universal justice  97 UN Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances  98 V Valley of the Fallen, Spain  98–​9, 108–​9, 173n4 V-​Day  131, 135

visions of Europe  148 Vučić, Aleksandar  45 W War Childhood Museum  175n12 Warsaw Uprising Museum  131 ‘Wendezeit’  67 Western Balkans  145, 150 see also Albania West Germany  63–​4 see also East Germany; Germany whistle-​blowers  158 Y ‘young’ Eastern EU member states  63 youth party wings  35–​6 Yugoslavia  23, 30, 40–​1, 145 see also Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH); Kosovo Yugoslav wars  144, 149 Z Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez  97

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