Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia: Case Studies from Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore 9811946167, 9789811946165

Table of contents :
Acknowledgement
Contents
Editor and Contributors
Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia: An Introduction
Transnational Chinese Diaspora and Mobile Practices
Social Embeddedness, Capital, and Person-Centered Ethnography
Regional Context and Contemporary Chinese Diaspora
Conclusion
References
2 New Chinese Diaspora, Parallel Communities and Transnational Experience: A Case Study in Chiang Mai Province, Thailand
Introduction
Classification of New Chinese Diaspora Sojourning in Chiang Mai
Locating Chiang Mai in Chinese Imaginaries
Chinese Imaginaries Versus Thai Perspectives
Narrative on “Sino-Thai Brotherhood”
Two-Sided Stereotypes About Chinese in Ordinary Thai Perspectives
Chinese Portrayals in Thai Locality and Its Impacts on the New Chinese Diaspora
New Chinese Diaspora and Social Discrimination in Thai Locality
“Discrimination Chain” of Chinese
Embedding in Thai Cultures and Locality or Not?
The Social Formation of “Parallel Communities”
Example of Online-Offline Informal Clubs: Chinese Parents Group
Examples of Religious-Based Social Spaces
Conclusion
References
Re-Conceptualizing Chinese in Bangkok: Embeddedness, Mobilities and Folk Diplomacies
Introduction
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
Method and Data
Historical Context
The Historical Development of Chinese Community in Sampeng-Yaowarat
The Historical Chinese Community of Talat Noi or Tak Lak Kia
Huay Khwang’s Newer Xinyimin of the Fourth Wave
Lat Krabang: New Destination for Cheap Tour Packages for Chinese Tourists
Sua Pa Plaza: Newer Xinyimin of the Fourth Wave in Mobile Accessories’ Businesses
Political Context
Mobile Embedding and Embeddedness of Mobilities
Chinese “Student-Preneurs”
Chinese Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
Chinese Professionals
Reflections: Departure from Static Conceptualization of Migratory Practices
Self-Fashioning of Unofficial Dual-Accredited Folk Diplomats
Introducing the Case Study of Mr. DJ
Unofficial Folk Diplomatic Contributions to China
Unofficial Folk Diplomatic Contributions to Thailand
Self-Fashioning Through Lived Experiences and Intersubjectivity
Reflections: Departure from Static Preoccupation of Friend-Foe Dilemma
Conclusion
References
Reconsidering the Chinese Identity: Cultural Reproduction in Phuket Gastronomy
Introduction
Cultural Reproduction and Inheritance of the Social Identity Through Chinese Cuisine
Culinary Landscape of Overseas Chinese in Phuket
The Emergence of New Chinese Generation in the Phuket Gastronomy Tourism
Jee Pek: Culinary Reproduction Through the YouTuber of Phuket Cuisine
Hua: Transformation of Traditional Hokkien Sweet Snacks
Ploy: Double Identity of the New Generation as a Sweet Maker
Shun and Peng: The Chinese Volunteers Migrated to Phuket
Conclusion
References
New Transnational Chinese Migrants in Malaysia
The Chinese in Malaysia
The Rise of China and the New Transnational Chinese Migrants
The New Transnational Chinese Migrants
The Exceptions—the Uighur
The New Migrants in Recent Malaysian Political Sphere
Concluding Remarks
References
Identity, Politics, and Transnationalism: Deciphering New Chinese Diaspora in Singapore, 2010–2020
Introduction
A New Political Economy
Socio-Political and Economic Changes, 2010–2020
Changing Demographics and the New Chinese Diaspora
Changing Demographics
Between De-Territorialization and Re-Territorialization
Government Policies Towards New Chinese Migrants
Sino-Singaporean Businesses: Traversing Between National and Transnational
China Enterprises Association (CEA)
Wang Quancheng and Transnational Entrepreneurship at the Time of the BRI
Concluding Remarks
References
Epilogue
Introduction
Salient Observations on Research Project
Cycles of Disruptions, Continuities and Innovations in Covid-19 Era
Future Research: Paradigmatic Shifts in Problematics
Chinese International Politics Amidst Flexible Alliances in Bipolarity and Conflicting Multiscalarity
Sophistication of Chinese Transnationalism Amidst (Im)Mobilities’ Infrastructures
Paradoxes of Embeddedness, Xenophobia and Multi-Accredited Diplomacies of Social Actors
Conclusion
Bibliography

Citation preview

Yos Santasombat   Editor

Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia Case Studies from Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore

Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia

Yos Santasombat Editor

Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia Case Studies from Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore

Editor Yos Santasombat Faculty of Social Sciences Chiang Mai University Chiang Mai, Thailand

ISBN 978-981-19-4616-5 ISBN 978-981-19-4617-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4617-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgement

This research monograph is about contemporary transnational Chinese mobile practices with special focuses on three ASEAN countries: Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, and their interactions with the ethnic Chinese communities in the host countries. Field research and data collection started in 2018. The last phase of our research was rudely disrupted by the pandemic resulting in the inevitable delay of publication. This volume is the fruit of collective efforts made by a team of dedicated researchers who have worked with, argued with, and assisted each other for many years. I am grateful to all the researchers and contributing authors for their untiring research efforts, endurance, and cooperation. Our team would like to express special thanks of gratitude to the late Professor Chulacheeb Chinwanno for his invaluable contribution to our project. We owe a debt of gratitude to our colleagues for their comments on previous drafts of papers presented at various workshops. We would like to acknowledge the contributions made by Professors Siriporn Wajjwalku, Lee Kam Hing, Ngeow Chow Bing, Peter Chang, Por Heong Hong, Wasana Wongsurawat, Kornphanat Tungkeunkunt, Sittithep Eaksittipong, and Lee Lai To. Research and workshops were made possible by financial and organizational support from the Thailand Research Fund. Special thanks to Profs. Isra Sarntisart and Sukanda Luangon Lewis for their continuous support of our research; and to Prof. Suthipun Jitpimolmard, the director of the Thailand Research Fund. Special thanks are due to the staffs of Thailand Research Fund, particularly Ms. Rungnapa Lakkanapornwisit for her continuous and kind assistances. Palaiwan Srisaringkarn deserves special recognition and gratitude for her untiring organizational skills throughout the project duration. Chiang Mai, Thailand November 2021

Yos Santasombat

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Contents

Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia: An Introduction . . . Yos Santasombat

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New Chinese Diaspora, Parallel Communities and Transnational Experience: A Case Study in Chiang Mai Province, Thailand . . . . . . . . . . Aranya Siriphon and Jiangyu Li

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Re-Conceptualizing Chinese in Bangkok: Embeddedness, Mobilities and Folk Diplomacies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kian Cheng Lee

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Reconsidering the Chinese Identity: Cultural Reproduction in Phuket Gastronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jakraphan Chaopreecha, Nicha Tovankasame, and Pittaya Limbut

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New Transnational Chinese Migrants in Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Danny Tze Ken Wong Identity, Politics, and Transnationalism: Deciphering New Chinese Diaspora in Singapore, 2010–2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Hong Liu Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Kian Cheng Lee Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

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Editor and Contributors

About the Editor Yos Santasombat is Professor of Anthropology, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, and Chair, Ph.D. Program in Social Sciences as well as Director, China-Southeast Asian Studies Center, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, and Senior Research Scholar, Thailand Research Fund. He is the author of numerous books, including Lak Chang: A Reconstruction of Tai Identity in Daikong (Canberra: Pandanus Books, ANU, 2001); Biodiversity, Local Knowledge and Sustainable Development (Chiang Mai: RCSD, 2003, 2014); Flexible Peasants: Reconceptualizing the Third World’s Rural Types (Chiang Mai: RCSD, 2008); The River of Life: Changing Ecosystems of the Mekong Region (Chiang Mai: Mekong Press, 2011); as well as the edited volumes Impact of China’s Rise in the Mekong Region (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) and Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia: Cultures and Practices (Palgrave Macmillan 2017), and the Sociology of Chinese Capitalism: Challenges and Prospects (Palgrave Macmillan 2019).

Contributors Chaopreecha Jakraphan Department of Computing, College of Computing, Prince of Songkla University, Phuket Campus, Phuket, Thailand Lee Kian Cheng Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand Li Jiangyu Yunnan Normal University, Kunming, China Limbut Pittaya Faculty of International Studies, Prince of Songkla University, Phuket Campus, Phuket, Thailand Liu Hong School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

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Editor and Contributors

Santasombat Yos Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand Siriphon Aranya Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand Tovankasame Nicha Faculty of International Studies, Prince of Songkla University, Phuket Campus, Phuket, Thailand Wong Danny Tze Ken Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia: An Introduction Yos Santasombat

Transnational Chinese Diaspora and Mobile Practices Transnational Chinese diaspora is constantly in flux. The term refers to extraterritorial Chinese populations, including temporary, permanent, or circular migrants, as well as their descendants (Zhou, 2017: xi). The Chinese diaspora has been, and still is, one of the largest and oldest groups in the world. History has witnessed successive waves of migration from China to the outside world since time immemorial and from Chinese diasporic communities to other countries since World War II. The transnational Chinese mobility can be divided into five distinguishable moments delineated as follows: (a) The early history of the Chinese trading practices in Southeast Asia and colonial invasion in the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries; (b) the transnational labor movement in the latter half of the nineteenth century; (c) the nationalist movement of the early twentieth century; (d) the period of nation-building and the cold war era; and (e) the post-1978 China’s economic reform in the era of globalization and neoliberalism (Dongen & Liu, 2018: 35–36). The latest Chinese diasporic moment, the focus of our study, has just begun. Chinese diaspora has been central to economic transformation and significant sociocultural and political changes in Southeast Asia for centuries. Scholars of Chinese studies (Wang, 1991, 2002; Suryadinato 2007; Rae & Witzel, 2008, Barrett, 2012) have well-documented the role of the overseas Chinese community and the development of Southeast Asian economies. Conventional thinking was that the China-centered allegiance was replaced by assimilation to local cultures after the Communist Revolution in the 1950s (Skinner, 1957, 1958), and the ethnic Chinese have become Southeast Asians (Suryadinato, 1997). Over the past few decades, however, the fundamental changes taking place in China and in Chinese diasporic communities have challenged this conventional wisdom. The rise of China as a Y. Santasombat (B) Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Santasombat (ed.), Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4617-2_1

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regional and global power as well as the vibrant business networks among the ethnic Chinese and People’s Republic of China (PRC) Chinese have led some observers to look once again at the integration process of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Are we witnessing an oscillation between de-sinicization and re-sinicization of the Southeast Asian Chinese? This book is about contemporary Chinese transnational mobile practices with special focuses on the ethnographic exploration of the lives, experiences, views, and narratives of the Chinese mobile subjects in three ASEAN countries: Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and their interactions with the ethnic Chinese communities in these countries. Two critical interpretations shape the starting point of our research. First, we consider mobility/migration to be an integral part of Chinese socio-economic life rather than its exception (Kuhn, 2008). Since Admiral Zheng He’s first expedition in 1405, the trajectories of growth in China’s maritime trade had provided the impetus for both internal and international migrations of Chinese diaspora over the past centuries (Suryadinata, 2007, Amrith, 2011). We see mobility as an essential part of a process of adaptation that enabled Chinese families to deal with changing environments. Chinese mobility was briefly interrupted when Mao came to power in 1949 till his death in 1976 (Karl, 2010). Since the going out policy was initiated in 1999 by the PRC to promote investments abroad, it has introduced numerous forms of support to assist domestic companies in developing a global strategy to exploit and utilize opportunities in the expanding local and international markets (Yos, 2017). Since the launch of the going out policy, interest in overseas investment by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and private companies has exponentially increased. Some of the most prominent Chinese business and professional institutions are expanding their investments in the international markets. Along with this expansion, the world has encountered a massive movement of PRC Chinese out of their homeland. Secondly, we think of the PRC as a state keen in stimulating and molding mobility within and across its national borders. Being a tightly-structured political organization, which controls every fabric of social life of its citizens, the PRC government and its going out policy has been a proactive, coordinated machine with all its agents acting in unison to facilitate transnational flows of the Chinese to go global. Since 2001, PRC’s economic policy has pushed its SOEs and national champions to go global to develop Chinese brands that can conquer the world market (Callahan, 2011: 9). Chinese transnationalism arose before the turn of a new millennium with a global shift from Fordism to globalized regimes of flexible accumulation (Ong & Nonini, 1997). Transnational forces operate alongside the centralized policy of going out and encourage transnational linkages (Barabanseva, 2011: 8–9). The processes of rethinking nation and nationalism (Darr, 2011), the art of rewriting school textbooks on national history (Guo, 2004), reconstructing a Confucian imagined community and reconstituting a standardized mother tongue (Hartig, 2016) are all essential parts of the PRC state’s production of national identities that go hand in hand with the formation of transnational subjectivities in constructing an image of the

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modern Chinese patriots. The production of national identities and the formation of transnational subjectivities reinforce each other to strengthen its relevance and primacy. Several scholars (Liu, 2005, Callahan, 2008, Barabanseva, 2011) have documented the re-emergence of overseas Chinese nationalism that has been mainly boosted by Beijing’s transnational strategies seeking to facilitate the growing number of new migrants (Xin yimin) in accordance to the going out policy. Duara (1997, 2005) proposed the term “deterritorialized nationalism” to refer to the new form of nationalism among the transnational Chinese. Deterritorialized nationalism has a different reality from the territorial nation. People in deterritorialized nations such as transnational diaspora live in different places and deal with different groups of people. Inevitably, they have to confront and overcome challenges arising for the varied situational contexts. Xin Yimin or new transnational migrants differ from their predecessors due to the more extensive and intensive linkages that they have established with the motherland. They are culturally and politically attached to PRC through modern education, state policies and state-supported intermediaries such as Chineselanguage newspapers and magazines, radio and television programs, and websites. Networks of Xin yimin who are linked by shared ideas of history, culture, and identity have constituted an imagined China that transcends geopolitical borders. The PRC government has also actively engaged with its diaspora through various kinds of support for overseas Chinese organizations that perform cultural and entrepreneurial activities in many foreign countries and regions. The multiplicity of PRC agencies not only shapes transnational mobile practices but also forms their subjectivities. The scope of these agencies often exceeds the territorial boundaries of the political construct of the state. Qiaowu (To, 2014), for instance, refers to the government agencies responsible for extra-territorial policies towards the Chinese diaspora. The main purpose of these agencies is to cultivate, influence and manage Chinese diaspora as part of a global transnational project to rally support for China. Has the PRC government been successful in its extra-territorial policies? While this is a difficult question, Barabanseva (2011) provided a partial answer when she cited the cases of Tibetan uprising in 2008 that sparked international outcry over PRC treatments of its ethnic minority and subsequent vehement protests by Chinese overseas students against the Western media coverage of the Tibetan incidents that were deemed as anti-Chinese. As millions of Chinese overseas students have been one of the prime targets of the PRC’s global project to rally support for China and cultivate a deep feeling and commitment towards China, various groups amongst them have embraced it (Chan, 2009). The sense of patriotism and loyalty is not necessarily confined to the territorial integrity within the nation-state. Transnationalism radically transforms the conventional meaning of territory and sovereignty. On the one hand, the state has continually attempted to cultivate and influence the transnational identities of Chinese diaspora, but on the other hand, individuals and communities have constantly struggled to resist, subvert, or adapt to such influence. Benedict Anderson (1991) contended that nationalism emerged once people can see themselves as part of an “imagined community” culminating from a shared

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language, printed capitalism, and the educational pilgrimages that ambitious youth have made to national centers. Building on Anderson’s concept of nationalism, Aihwa Ong (1997) suggested that the imagined communities could be applied to imaginaries pertaining to the reconfiguration of global capitalism. Vannessa Fong (2011), in her study of transnational Chinese students, argued further that the availability of the increasingly globalized nature of the media, language, and educational pilgrimages encourages Chinese youth to aspire to belong to an imagined developed world community composed of mobile, wealthy, educated and well-connected people worldwide. Transnational Chinese students believe that pilgrimages to developed countries would not only help them becomes flexible citizens of the developed world but also facilitate efforts to make their homeland part of the developed world. Over the past few decades, millions of Chinese families, especially from the expanding urban middle class, have struggled to send their children abroad with the hope that college education abroad could transform them into citizens of the developed world even if they would eventually return to China for permanent residence (Fong, 2011: 35). Contemporary transnational Chinese are well-educated, well-traveled, well-connected, and well-informed. They can navigate global flows in strategic and flexible ways. The increasingly globalized world and information flow through the internet make them more aware of the challenges and opportunities that the world presents them. Where transnational migration was once a one-way move from the country of origin to a desirable country of choice, it is now more common to see transnational migrants returning to their homes or moving to a third country and beyond in response to available opportunities. From the perspectives of the host countries, the questions of integration, embeddedness, and loyalty are paramount. If transnational Chinese migration is to help host countries maintain vibrant and innovative economies, these societies are going to have to invest in innovative integration measures and strategies to make it possible for those with high skills to contribute to the economy (Zhang & Duncan, 2014: 4). From the PRC’s perspectives, the central government not only legitimizes dual social embeddedness or “dual allegiance” (Nyiri, 2004: 120) but celebrates transnational diaspora as a patriotic act, thus encouraging transnational mobile practices among the younger generations of PRC citizens. Transnational Chinese diaspora is celebrated as patriotic members of imagined communities of modernity, a hybridized third culture (Nonini & Ong, 1997: 11, Callahan, 2004: 48) that is mobile, deterritorialized but contingent on China. Our research focuses on the questions of integration and social embeddedness. Is it possible that the transnational Chinese diaspora be simultaneously embedded into two or more nation-states and geopolitical spheres? Should their integration at Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and their maintenance of transnational ties with China be mutually exclusive? It is hypothesized that the Chinese transnational migrants do not necessarily assimilate to any host countries; however, they develop multiple social embeddedness where they acquire a deepening sense of integration with the host country while continuing intensive transnational connections with the homeland simultaneously.

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Social Embeddedness, Capital, and Person-Centered Ethnography Among the complex interrelations between transnational Chinese diaspora and their rapidly changing socio-economic and political environment, their mobile practices shift and are transformed under changing circumstances, networks, and business opportunities. Transnational entrepreneurs are never aimless individualistic wanderers. Their actions are purposive and interested. Economic life is by necessity socially embedded; business organizations, enterprises and markets are entangled in social networks. The concept of social embeddedness implies that actors, actions, and relations are in essence ingredients of social production and processes. The concept of embeddedness was coined by Karl Polanyi whose lifelong study of the linkages between economy and society ranged from the reciprocal exchange and other traditional customs in the South Pacific economies to the political economy of the institutions regulating the global economy in the nineteenth century. In The Great Transformation (1944), Polanyi provided a historical description, an analysis of the emergence of the market economy and the destruction of the traditional economies. Polanyi (1944) argued that contrary to popular belief, markets have been of marginal importance in traditional societies throughout history. In traditional pre-capitalist societies, the economic system had been conceived of as a part of the broader society governed by social customs and norms as much as by market principles of profit and exchange. The rise of capitalism involved political efforts to dismantle the linkages between the economy and the social environment. The market economy emerged after a prolonged battle against traditions as a separate domain of human activity disconnected from the ‘social institutions’ in which it was fundamentally embedded. More recently, the concept of embeddedness has also been adopted by Mark Granovetter (1985) to refer to social entanglements of economic actors or how social networks are implicated in economic transactions. The concept of embeddedness expresses the notion that social actors exist within relational, institutional, and cultural contexts and cannot be seen as atomized decision-makers in maximizing their own utilities. Economic action is embedded in concrete ongoing systems of social relations. The embedded actor exists in a set of social relationships with others whose choices influence and affect his or her own choices as well. This implies that the choices actors make are not wholly determined by facts internal to their spheres of individual deliberation and beliefs. Actions are influenced by the observed behavior and expectations of others. The immediate utility cannot fully explain the meaning of social relations. As a conceptual, embeddedness prioritizes the different conditions within which social action takes place. The concept of social embeddedness with its emphasis on action and actor is in line with Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, which stresses that all action “is interested” (Bourdieu, 1977:178). The French sociologist extended the logic of economic calculation to all practices as oriented towards the maximization of material and symbolic profit. Thus, material interest and symbolic interest are perceived as two equally objective forms of interest in every human society. More recently, Bourdieu (1990:

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16) also spoke of action as “strategy” to convey the idea that individual practices are basically interested where actors attempt to derive advantages from situations. In Bourdieu’s view, all actors are capital holders and investors seeking profits. He extends Marx’s idea of capital to all forms of power, whether they be material, cultural, social or symbolic. In everyday life, individuals and groups draw upon a variety of economic, cultural, social, and symbolic resources in order to maintain and enhance their positions in the social order. These resources are capital when they function as a social relation of power, that is, when they become objects of struggle as valued resources. In peasant societies, the livelihood of every household depends not only on its land, animals and farming instruments but also on its kinship ties and networks of alliances that represent a heritage of commitments and debts of honor. According to Bourdieu (1977: 178), this is “a capital of rights and duties built up in the course of successive generations and providing an additional source of strength which can be called upon when extraordinary situations break in upon the daily routine.” In modern societies, access to jobs and income in the labor market depends upon cultural capital in the form of educational credentials and work experiences as well as social capital in the form of networks of family members, friends and colleagues. Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital, as Swartz (1997: 75–77) has noted, covers a wide variety of resources including educational credentials, skills and expertise, and such things as verbal facility and aesthetic preferences. This concept emerged from his attempt to explain unequal scholastic achievements of children coming from families with different educational though similar social backgrounds. He contended that the concept offers an alternative explanation for the received wisdom attributing academic excellence or failure to natural aptitudes such as intelligence or giftedness. School success, as Bourdieu argued, is better explained by the amount and type of cultural capital inherited from the family milieu than by measures of individual talent or achievement. From his research, Bourdieu (1986: 242–243) distinguished between different forms of cultural capital delineated as follows: (a) its embodied form as internalized culture through socialization constituting schemes of appreciation and understanding; (b) its objectified form in material objects such as books, works of art and scientific instrument; and (c) its institutionalized form by which Bourdieu refers to as the educational credential system. Bourdieu’s contribution to the sociological study of power relations is the forceful illustration that various forms of capital—economic, social, cultural and symbolic— can be interchangeable. Yet the interchange is not equally possible in all directions and may vary from society to society. In general, economic capital appears to convert more easily into a cultural capital and social capital than vice versa. In other words, certain goods and services can be obtained through the economic capital, whereas other goods and services are accessible only through the social and cultural capital. Hence, while culture and social networks are forms of capital, they are not exactly on equal footing with money and property. The concept of culture as capital persuasively calls attention to the power dimension of cultural dispositions and resources, especially the ways in which cultural

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capital can be transformed into symbolic power. Bourdieu (1986: 242–250) insightfully argued that the traditional Marxist emphasis on economic and class structures underestimates the importance of the symbolic dimension of power relations. He contended that even in industrial societies the principal form of domination has shifted from coercion and the threat of violence to those of symbolic manipulation. This emphasis has brought him to focus on the role that cultural processes, cultural producers and institutions play in symbolic manipulation and power relations. In other words, there is symbolic power as well as economic power. Symbolic power is the power of domination through legitimation, or what Marx termed as ideology. Symbolic capital, like other forms of capital, can be accumulated, changed to other forms of capital, or used to legitimize certain power relations. Bourdieu assigned a key role to cultural producers (such as teachers, writers, artists and religious leaders) in legitimating the social order by producing symbolic capital. Cultural producers mediate the relationships between culture and class, between infrastructure and superstructure, by constituting cultural markets or fields that are vested with their own interests. In this research, we employ an actor-oriented approach (Yeung, 2004) to examine how transnational diaspora as cultural producers and socio-economic actors accumulate and strategically utilize and change different forms of capital in everyday action to maximize their material and symbolic benefits under particular circumstances and transnational locations of belonging. Data on the Chinese diaspora are gathered through intensive interviews and collection of life history materials. Life history or person-centered ethnography is a method of qualitative research employed in anthropology since the 1920s when Paul Radin wrote Crashing Thunder, a narrative of a Winnebago Indian, which reflected a fascinating insight into an American Indian culture (Langness, 1965: 8–10). Since then, person-centered ethnography has been perceived as a method to elucidate the workings of society and culture through personal narratives. Life history allows the researcher to probe deeper into a person’s micro-historical experiences within a macro-historical framework. Lifehistory narratives challenge the researcher to understand an individual’s experiences, current attitudes and behaviors including how these attributes have been influenced by initial decisions made at another time and in another place. Hence, it is a common practice for researchers to follow a chronological path to interviews, that is, to begin with the subject’s family history, early childhood before proceeding to other stages of life till the present. In The Children of Sanchez, Oscar Lewis (1961) juxtaposed a number of life histories from within a family to give a cumulative, multi-faceted, panoramic view of each individual and of the family as a whole, which represents many aspects of lower-class Mexican life. In this sense, the person-centered ethnography provides a linkage between subjectivities, class and cultural practices. Another writing, Nisa, presents a life-history of a Kung woman in her own words as described to the anthropologist Marjorie Shostak (1981). Her narrative presents a powerful challenge to the prevalent misconception of gender equality and egalitarian life of hunters and gatherers in Africa’s Kalahari dessert. In recent years, there has been a surge of interest in “narrative” across the human and social sciences due to its potential to emphasize

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subjectivity, agency, a plurality of viewpoints and the richness and complexity of human affairs not only to anthropologists but historians, geographers, psychologists and philosophers as well (Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001; Caplan, 1997). The centrality of our collection of transnational Chinese migrants’ life histories is concerned with the “embeddedness” or “legitimacy” of economic activity. In daily life, capital holders make decisions based upon self-interest and rules of competition as constant factors conditioning their actions. As with Granovetter (1985), we maintain that the ongoing concrete systems of social relations are another factor influencing socio-economic action. For Weber (1978), an action is economicallyoriented if it is concerned with achieving certain goals. These goals can be defined as specific, concrete, real or imagined advantages of opportunities for present or future use. Economic action is differentiated from economic social action by the absence of reference to the behavior and expectations of others. An action is “social” insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the expectations of others. Weber also distinguished between “associative” and “communal” relationship. Communal relationship entails a sense of belonging together whilst the associative relationship has to do with rational, calculated agreement typically involving material interests. Weber (1978: 41) contended that no matter how calculative such associative relationship may be—as that of an entrepreneur to his customers—it is quite possible for it to involve emotional attachments, which transcend its utilitarianism. This communal component is “social embeddedness,” a value we can discern from the observable actions and self-reflexive narratives in the life-histories of the transnational Chinese subjects. The analytical focus of our endeavor is on the micro level of social relations, networks, interactions, cultural content and meanings that inform actions rather than institutional patterns. In the world of diaspora, transnational migrants utilize their acquired life orientations and their specific ways of engaging business opportunities for social negotiations. The personal experiences of the transnational migrants throughout life impinge upon their business agency or their specific way of doing business. However, rather than reducing the Chinese diaspora to their business roles, our research views them as full persons with broad social involvements they have become entangled with at different stages of life. Hence, it is pertinent to explore the following issues: (1) How have diverse ethnic and gender experiences impinged upon the entrepreneurial forms, economic social actions and communal relationships of the transnational Chinese? (2) How do transnational mobile practices evoke a tension between the migrants’ cultural capital (knowledge and acquired skills) and the requirements of the host countries’ situations in which they operate? (3) For a business to succeed, what types of cultural creativity, meaning-making and innovations are required in specific socio-cultural contexts? (4) How are market niches created through social engagement with diverse forms of people from different cultures and ethnicities in face-to-face interaction? (5) What are the mechanisms and institutions utilized in the process of embedding in local forms of sociality? (6) As business profits may be used to support a local charity, ethnic associations, or religious obligations, does religious affiliation and conversion after migration (Tan, 2015) allow the

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transnational Chinese to have a “sense of belonging” that is related to the homeland as well as allowing them to be part of the local host society? Ong (1999) asserted that the change in the provision of financial services has led to the development of a new form of social organization that requires deterritorialized, highly-mobile intercultural communications. Due to the segmented international division of labor, the new transnational professionals have developed new distinctive lifestyles characterized by high mobility, new patterns of urban residence and new kinds of social interactions (Chiang, 2010: 40). Thus, hybridized third cultures have emerged out of the new social arrangements in conjunction with new evershifting identities and consciousness. Hence, it behooves this research to consider: “How does transnational diaspora reconstruct their ‘Chineseness’ in hybridized third cultures where new imaginations are produced by the transnational flow of capital?”. We see diaspora as a dynamic agency negotiating ambiguous meanings of “Chineseness” between the PRC-constructed global deterritorialized nationalism and locally available meanings and strategies. In their life histories, we search for markers of diasporic cultural belongings/social embeddedness that are developed in the interaction with various homes, hosts and transit locations. Hence, our research focuses on diasporic subjectivities, human experiences, imaginaries, memories and narratives grounded in complex transnational locations of belonging. This can be succinctly explicated by Ping-hui Liao who has eloquently put it as follows: “Diasporas desire to belong while tortured by lack; their worldviews and discursive practices are informed by fetish desires to reproduce or to fill in the gap between the home and the new world” (Riemenschnitter & Madsen, 2009: 5). Transnational diaspora transcends here and there by continuously coming and going across borders. The term “transnationalism” refers to the process whereby the Chinese diaspora produces and sustains multiple social embeddedness and relations that tie together the country of origin and the countries of settlement. Transnationalism crosses the geographical national boundaries. The diaspora engages economically, socially, culturally and politically in their host countries while residing abroad but at the same time maintaining close ties with people and events in their home country. Transnational diaspora defines and sustains multi-stranded socio-economic relations that transcend geographical boundaries. Living in between multiplicity of cultures and dealings with demands from different cultural predispositions can be psychologically and socio-culturally challenging. Managing and negotiating multiple cultural belongings and identities at the individual, group and community levels is a complex process involving multiple negotiation strategies of de-sinicization, re-sinicization, and hybridization. Shuang Liu (2015) used the concept of “cultural home” to describe the psychological need to belong for those who experience cultural transition and the diaspora’s desire for a sense of place in the transnational space. Moving in the transnational space, the migrants may experience a strong yearning for a cultural home where they, as cultural beings, could gain a sense of belonging, of being accepted and secure. Cultural home may not be in one space for bicultural or multicultural diaspora (Liu, 2015: 5–6). The question is whether the transnational Chinese diaspora is motivated to negotiate cultural membership and social belonging in a new country.

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Our research aims to shed new light on whether the transnational diaspora can negotiate cultural membership to adapt to the situational requirements or is unable to reconcile the different cultural expectations and become isolated from the host countries.

Regional Context and Contemporary Chinese Diaspora The socio-economic significance of Chinese diaspora has long been recognized by the Chinese and Southeast Asian ruling elite for centuries. It is highly significant that the emergence of the PRC as an economic superpower over the past decades should have been concomitant with the soaring rates of Chinese migration to various parts of the world. Since the early 1990s, China has experienced a new surge of emigration, which has been perpetuated by the rapid expansion of economic growth, the increasing affluence of the Chinese middle class, the rising influence of China on the global stage, going out policy and relaxed control over emigration, reconnected regional and global diasporic networks. Attesting to this, regular mobility has amounted to “several million Chinese migrants annually” (Thuno, 2007: 1). The most interesting feature of contemporary Chinese diaspora is not the reproduction of high numbers of Chinese mobile subjects but mobile practices that are shaped by forces of transnationalism and globalization. The increasing complexity of contemporary Chinese diaspora leads us to shift from a unilinear model of migration—departure, arrival, integration—to a more dynamic lens of mobility depicted by a continuous process of relocation, settlement, return, re-immigration, and resettlement in various locations and countries. Chinese mobilities are spanning geographical spaces (interprovincial and cross-border spaces), vocational spaces (across different careers), economic spaces (investment and entrepreneurial prospects), religious and ideological spaces (where mobility brings more freedom of choices), cultural spaces (where more desirable lifestyles, better living environment and international education systems are sought). The emergence and expansion of the Chinese middle-class after China’s economic reform and opening in the late 1970s have led to increasing education mobility for the Chinese middle-class children who were born at and after the turn of the century. Their parents have invariably experienced major tumultuous events in China including the Cultural Revolution, the one-child policy, the economic boom in the 1980s and 1990s, and the going out policy during the late 1990s. The new middle-class parents experienced varying degrees of struggle and suffering when they were young, and they have achieved wealth through personal efforts, education, and investment, leading to a life totally different from the earlier generation. Many middle-class parents regard education as a top priority and freely invest a large sum of money into the education of the only child. Due to the increasing competition and examination pressure, these parents feel very anxious about the children’s future. They perceive the possible solution to this through the acquisition of Western education. With the gradual opening of

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the international education market inside and outside China, parents see new opportunities and choices to convert economic capital into cultural and social capital by sending their children to study abroad. The new middle-class children were born after the turn of the century into a world of high-tech, internet, and social media. They have a vivid sense of transnationalism, cosmopolitanism and a deep appreciation of global citizenship; therefore, their sense of belonging and nationalism is more complex than the sense of their preceding generation. International education has prepared and enabled them to link their host countries with their home country while allowing them to maintain multiple relationships in transnational activities. They speak multiple languages, have social networks, careers and investments in two or more countries, and regular transnational communication has become their ways of life and means of livelihood. The new middle-class children perceive education mobility either as a steppingstone on their way to some other places or as a place of temporary refuge. Educational objectives play a key part both in driving mobility and in framing the transnational household strategies subsequently adopted by many of Chinese diaspora families. Over the past two decades, Chinese mobile subjects in Southeast Asia have shifted from being typically male, young laborers from the rural areas in Southeastern China to self-enterprising diaspora of both sexes from urban areas all over China. Increasing numbers of women have become xinyimin (new migrants) as students, language instructors and entrepreneurs as well as peidu mama (study mothers) who accompanied their children abroad. As a result of expanding commercialized international education sectors in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, Chinese student mobility has increased numerically. This has inadvertently transformed Southeast Asia into a steppingstone for many Chinese students and family members moving outside China for the first time before moving on to the United States, Australian and European cities. Contemporary transnational Chinese diaspora in Thailand is a complex process involving both economic (investors, entrepreneurs, skilled professionals) and reproduction (students, study parents, retirees) mobility. Our recent survey of Chinese diaspora in Bangkok and Chiang Mai found that students make up the largest category of new Chinese in Thailand. Most Chinese students are at tertiary levels, which include bachelor and graduate students. Apart from university students, there has been an increasing enrollment of young Chinese students at primary and secondary levels in various international schools. These young students are usually accompanied by parents/mothers (peidu mama) who sees Thailand as a gateway for their children to obtain a higher education in the western countries. Retirees are another large group of Chinese who have moved to Thailand for healthy environment and low cost of living. Over the past decade, Thailand has also witnessed increasing numbers of Chinese investors of all levels. Their investments include large projects in metal products and machinery, chemicals, paper industries and agriculture. In recent years, there has been a remarkable increase in Chinese investment in real estate industry in Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Phuket as residential homes, vacation destinations or investments. Large-scale investment projects have brought an expanding number of skilled workers employed by Chinese state agencies, academic institutions, and

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private companies. The largest number of skilled workers are Chinese language instructors sent by the Office of Chinese Language Council International or Hanban and Chinese graduates from Thai universities who are employed by Thai educational institutions. Many Chinese graduates have decided to stay on and gain more working experiences in Thailand. Other key factors influencing their decision are the comfortable living conditions, more leisurely lifestyle and lower level of stress. Over the past decade, Thailand has attracted increasing numbers of Chinese entrepreneurs who are searching for new business opportunities and potential overseas markets. There are expanding numbers of medium and small Chinese investors in trading, importexport consumer products, garment, tourism, service providers, hotels, guesthouses and restaurants. In Chiang Mai, official numbers of new Chinese collected from the immigration authority amount to approximately 20,000. The largest group are Chinese pupils ranging from kindergarten to graduate students. The second largest group is the group of study-parents while Chinese entrepreneurs, skilled workers and retirees make up most of the remainder of the new Chinese diaspora. The majority of the xinyimin in Chiang Mai are between the age of 20 to 40 years old. Even though the new Chinese in Chiang Mai face no racial discrimination and exclusion, language barriers force many of them to develop less interactions, activities and attachments with the host society. In other words, many of them are unable to reconcile the different cultural expectations and are isolated from the host country. Based on an ethnographic study of new Chinese diaspora, chapter one by Siriphon and Li argues that the xinyimin in Chiang Mai, especially the peidu mama, have been able to construct cohesive “parallel communities” in religious and digital spheres. The concept of parallel communities offers an insight into how the Chinese diaspora create a sense of belonging to a community apart from the local society. Parallel communities refer to the communities interstitially situated at home and nationality while located spatially in-between nations, localities and cultures. In other words, the new Chinese diaspora community experiences the host country, but it is not necessarily integrated with it. On the other hand, to the diaspora, China is an ideal home to reminisce from afar and to visit occasionally but not necessarily a place to return to settle. To share a sense of belonging in a foreign country, new Chinese diaspora forms self-organized groups making use of Chinese social media, especially we chat, as platforms for sharing information and experience on problems and issues pertaining to diasporic communities. The digital communities not only offer support for newcomers to connect with Chinese circles but also provide them with opportunities to freely dialogue, experiment and learn new cosmopolitan knowledge appropriate to their transient mobile livelihood. Increasing numbers of religious conversion among the peidu mama and their family members, and the formation of church-based organizations are other forms of parallel communities providing the Chinese diaspora with social, emotional, and spiritual support during the transient mobility. Southeast Asian countries offer the Chinese diaspora the favorable freedom of religious practices and openness unavailable in China. Religious space and active participations in

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religious activities in Chinese churches in Chiang Mai become another platform for the diaspora to produce and enhance a sense of belonging among fellow Chinese. Churches have thus become a new form of Chinese association where networks and trust are established, and help is sought. Xiaoxia Lan (2021), in her study of religious conversion among the peidu mama in Chiang Mai, raises an interesting question on why the middle-class, well-educated women brought up in a secular context in China are attracted and voluntarily choose to join a patriarchal Christian community that seem to design the perpetuation of their subordination? She argued that the Chinese Christian community has assumed an important function in women’s religious conversion through providing the peidu mama with a friendly, close-knitted community and a sense of belonging to a home. In this community, the Christians whom the peidu mama encounter, along with their faith, values, and generosity, have served as a source of positive incentives for the participation of church activities. In other words, church members provide them with social and emotional support. Although the church is patriarchal, the family-like community and social activities provides the peidu mama with needed attachments, social interactions, and connections. The young mothers are happily performing tedious church activities such as cooking, cleaning and visiting sick members of their group. The Christian churches are far more than places of worship as they have become a platform of social interaction and a home away from home where the young mothers’ Chinese Christian identity has been reproduced and reaffirmed. In line with the ideology of Confucianism, the Chinese Christian church asserts a set of Christian beliefs prescribing women as inferior and subservient to men, reflecting traditional Chinese family and gender values of obedience and endurance as the prerequisite for family harmony and cohesion. Xiaoxia argued that the peidu mama attempt to renegotiate their material relationship and power within the Christian and traditional Confucian patriarchal contexts by employing the strategy of submission. They use submission as a leverage to bargain for family harmony while influencing family members’ behavior by subtle suggestions. They show their sincere obedience to their husband that can inspire their husbands to correct and improve their behavior. In more ways than one, transnational mobility is characterized by struggles to gain individual liberties. The newfound independence, however, could lead to feelings of isolation. In a sense, the peidu mama escape from and give up their freedom for security. They submit to outside authorities for a sense of connections. Christian conversion provides the young mothers with a friendly community of acceptance and support whereby the traditional Chinese femininity and culture of submission are reproduced. Religious affiliation and enchantment after migration allows the transnational Chinese women to have a sense of belonging that is related to the homeland as well as allowing them to be a part of a Chinese community in Thailand. Moving in the transnational space, the diaspora may experience a strong yearning for a cultural home where as a cultural being the diasporic individual needs a sense of belonging, of being accepted and secure. Xiaoxia (2021) and Siriphon and Li’s chapter find that many groups of Chinese diasporas are motivated to negotiate cultural membership and social belonging. Digital and religious spheres are

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constructed cultural home where many groups of Chinese diasporas in Thailand negotiate cultural belongings and social embeddedness that are developed in their interaction with various Chinese, Thai, and other ethnic groups to foster their transient mobile practices socially and emotionally. Chapter two by Kian Cheng Lee examines the relationship between embeddedness, mobilities and folk diplomacies as exemplified by the new Chinese diaspora in Bangkok. Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, an estimated 100,000 new Chinese were legally residing in Bangkok. This research adopts an actor-oriented approach through qualitative, semi-structured interviews with over 50 respondents of diverse occupation and family backgrounds such as the Chinese ‘student-preneurs’ (those who have acquired legal status through student visa while undertaking economic pursuit as entrepreneurs), small and medium enterprise investors, and skilled professionals. Lee distinguishes between structural and relational embeddedness in terms of the structure and quality of the established interrelationships between the Chinese diaspora and other groups. Structural embeddedness represents network characteristics, how the new Chinese functionally integrate themselves in various social structures while relational embeddedness refers to the strength of the relationships. The author coins the terms “mobile embedding” to refer to the dynamic practices engaged to forge integration through functional and relational means, and he coins the term “embeddedness of mobility” to describe how self-enterprising transnational diaspora develop ingrained habitual state of mobile practices in their multiple embeddedness. Based on his research, the author argues that mobility is intricately associated with embedding at the relational and structural dimensions in multiple forms. For example, Chinese associations assist new Chinese to embed themselves in Bangkok. Buddhist and Christian religious institutions and practices have also played a significant role in facilitating mobile embedding. New transnational Chinese might intentionally attenuate their Chinese affiliations to explore new opportunities and deepen integration with the Thais and ethnic Chinese in Bangkok. The Chinese transnational migrants do not necessarily assimilate to Thailand but develop multiple social embeddedness, a deepening sense of integration with the host country and continuing intensive transnational connections with the homeland at the same time in their business world of the diaspora. Another form of transnational Chinese embeddedness is characterized in this paper as folk diplomacy. This term refers to the new Chinese who unofficially pursue activities to foster cultural understanding and socio-economic collaborations between China and Thailand. Folk diplomats actively propagate Chinese language and cultural appreciation through education exchange and mutual learning. These new Chinese contribute to Sino-Thai relations through different forms of guanxi connections and promote positive shared future of both countries through the social and economic domains of folk diplomacies. The biographies and mobile practices of the folk diplomats documented in Lee’s chapter illuminate the coexistence of tenacious communal relationships and social embeddedness in transnational contexts, which is a value we can discern from the observable action and self-reflexive narratives in the life-histories of the transnational Chinese subjects in Bangkok.

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In southern Thailand as well as many overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, cuisine culture has long been a significant element of ethnic Chinese diasporic communities, passing from one generation to another. Food has played important roles in connecting the individual households to a larger domain of social groups. The ways in which cuisines are remembered and reproduced have become a major part of family narratives and traditions. Culinary experiences lay the foundations for a distinctive taste, values and identity of an ethnic community. Due to the influences of globalization and deterritorialization, Chinese transnationalism and the transnational networks of overseas Chinese based on the practices of flexible entrepreneurship and business connection have reproduced the discourses of ethnic self-celebration of hybridized cuisine cultures. Their imagined ethnic community is reproduced partly through a process of reinscribing culture in new time-space contexts. Cuisines represent the cultural identity of the transnational groups. A paper on “Reconsidering the Chinese Identity: Cultural Reproduction in the Phuket Gastronomy” by Jakraphan Chaopreecha, Nicha Tovankasame and Pittaya Limbut focuses on the evolution and transnationalization of the ethnic Chinese in Phuket, southern Thailand, through the lens of culinary practices. The ethnic Chinese in Phuket are mostly descendants of Hokkien Chinese who have migrated from Fujian Province more than a century ago. Phuket cuisine is a regional variation in Nyonya cooking with Thai influences, such as more liberal use of tamarind and other sour ingredients. With the increasing importance of tourism over the past two decades, their evolving culinary cultures and practices have become one of the main sources of local incomes and national revenues. Hybridized Chinese food symbolizes the production of “authentic” traditions of Chinese diaspora under the social context of Phuket whereby the culture is utilized to drive the tourism industry. The ethnic Chinese descendants in Phuket, especially the younger generations, are transnationalized through the reproduction of their cuisines to meet the demands of global visitors. Danny Wong’s chapter in this volume examines the new Chinese and their relations with the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia. For hundreds of years, millions of Chinese have called Malaysia home since their ancestors sailed over and settled in this country. Most of them are descendants of Southern Chinese immigrants whose larger ethnic subgroups include Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka, and Teochew. Chinese trading communities have long been present in Malaysia since the fifteenth century (at Malacca), but large-scale migration has only begun in the nineteenth century because of British policy. Young Chinese males were encouraged to go to Malaysia to work in tin mining for several years before returning to China with their earnings. By the early twentieth century, immigration of Chinese women had increased, and settlements of Chinese communities had also been established. The increased size of the population allowed the communities to build temples, schools, graveyards, clan, and ethnic associations. Most Chinese were found in urban areas and had little interaction with Malays and other indigenous peoples who lived mainly in rural areas. Chinese migration to Sabah and Sarawak followed a similar pattern. After independence, the Chinese grip on the economy became stronger. The May 13, 1969 race riots led to the constitutional amendments on “special rights” and the

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New Economic Policy (NEP). As late as 1988, Chinese activists and politicians who protested against the NEP and the erosion of non-Malay culture and education were arrested and detained without trial under the Internal Security Act. As the Malaysian government moved toward Malay-only state schools in the 1970s, most Chinese preferred to send their children to private Mandarin-language schools. Although the Chinese was represented in the government, they were marginalized in the key policy decision-making process. In successive elections, most Chinese votes have gone to Chinese-based opposition parties. Even though the Chinese have benefited from the country’s relatively good economic performance of recent decades, members of this minority retain a high degree of resentment over the Bumiputras. Wong delineates the two phases pertaining to the arrivals of the new transnational Chinese to Malaysia as follows: Those who came before and after the introduction of the BRI in 2013. Those who came prior to 2013 were mainly students and employees of Chinese SOEs in search of partnership and joint-venture projects. This group chose to work with the ethnic Chinese communities in Malaysia to gain access to the local market and build connections with the government. After 2013, more Chinese companies focusing on communication and infrastructure have set up branches in Malaysia. Over the past decade, China has become Malaysia’s largest trading partner. Chinese investment has also been on the rise. Mega-projects on infrastructure development have been initiated. Since the introduction of BRI, the number of new transnational Chinese has also risen rapidly in every state in Malaysia. It is estimated that there are now between 120,000 and 150,000 new Chinese subdivided into four categories: students, workers, participants in the Malaysia My Second Home Program (MM2H), and the Uighur Chinese Muslims. As the presence of the transnational Chinese has become a common feature in the everyday life of Malaysians, the integration issue remains a sensitive topic and a cause for concern by the Bhumiputra. Despite the presence of such concern, however, Chinese investments are considered an important contribution to the economy of the country. The integration issue remains unresolved and requires careful consideration. On October 3, 1990, Singapore established diplomatic ties with China, and soon after Singaporeans found themselves surrounded by the new Chinese diasporas who are ethnically, linguistically, and culturally related to them. Over the 1990s, labor shortages and declining fertility rates forced the Singaporean government to initiate new measures to make the city-state a more favorable destination for immigrants. China became an important source of skilled and cheap labors required by the rapid industrialization process taken place in Singapore. The population of new PRC Chinese residing in Singapore increased steadily and reached a total of half a million in 2015. While the host government emphasized the importance of integrating the new Chinese into the Singaporean social fabric, integration has been harder due to the Chinese diaspora being stereotyped to have uncivilized and objectionable manners in public. More importantly, Singaporeans seem to doubt whether the new Chinese diaspora really want to integrate. The newcomers, on the other hand, tend to regard Singapore as a Chinese society with a sense of familiarity. Consequently, many new Chinese choose not to learn to communicate in English and these diasporas have been unable to integrate well into Singapore society.

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Another chapter in this volume by Hong Liu is concerned with the changing relationship between the state, society, identity, and transnationalism against the backdrop of a rising China and its growing influence in Southeast Asia. Liu argues that the development of the new Chinese diaspora in Singapore has been significantly shaped by the state’s policies toward integration. Over the past decade, significant changes have taken place with respect to the political economy of Singapore and new Chinese diasporic communities. The influx of many new Chinese has presented new challenges for the Singapore government’s policy of identity formation in a multicultural city-state. The xinyimin are from a rising global power with a rich cultural tradition and a strong sense of nationalism promoted by the PRC. They are culturally and politically attached to the homeland through modern education, state policies and state-supported intermediaries such as Chinese-language newspapers and magazines, radio and television programs, and websites. Networks of xinyimin who are linked by shared ideas of history, culture, and identity constituted an imagined China that transcends geopolitical borders. The PRC government has also been actively engaged with its diaspora through various kinds of support for overseas Chinese organizations that perform cultural and entrepreneurial activities in many foreign countries and regions. In this light, the questions of integration, embeddedness, and loyalty are of paramount importance. If transnational Chinese migration is to help host countries maintain vibrant and innovative economies, these societies are going to have to invest in innovative integration measures and strategies to make it possible for those with high skills to contribute to the economy. Integration of the new Chinese into a multicultural society has become an integral part of Singapore governmental policies supported by a wide range of mechanisms. The multiculturalism policy helps the Chinese diaspora to see integration as a process of adaptation to avoid conflicts with the local culture and to get along with the local Singaporeans. The efforts of integration, identity construction and transnational business networking have been institutionalized to ensure smooth and productive coordination of various governmental agencies and effective implementation of the constantly transforming policies. One of the most important institutions is the Chinese Community Liaison Group set up in 2000 to strengthen relations between the government and the Chinese diasporic communities and associations. Therein lies the dilemma of identity and integration. On the one hand, the state policies toward integration stresses the construction of a Singaporean identity, but on the other hand, the new diaspora’s contribution to the national economy through transnational business networks has been increasingly important in assisting Singapore to meet the dual challenges of a declining workforce and a rapidly ageing society. The new Chinese have become a vibrant force in transnational business networks bridging China and Singapore. Business transnationalism and networking between Singapore and China has also been strengthened by the growing investments and trade resulting from the BRI projects. Liu argues that the political logic of identity construction in Singapore is always considered as top priority while the economic logic of transnationalism has been subservient to the nation-building agenda.

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Conclusion It is hypothesized at the beginning of our research that the new transnational Chinese diaspora do not necessarily assimilate to any host countries but may develop multiple social embeddedness, a deepening sense of integration with the host country and continuing intensive transnational connections with the homeland at the same time in their business world of the diaspora. Our case studies confirms that the development of new Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia reflects a tendency to construct and reconstruct fluid lives and a sense of belonging to communities in multiple sites with unceasing attachments to both their localities of origin and newly constructed communities in the host countries. The evolving complexity of transnational mobile practices points to an increasing importance of the role of the states involved in Chinese mobility. As a state keen in stimulating and molding mobility within and across its national borders, the PRC government has been a proactive, coordinated machine with all its agents acting in unison to facilitate transnational flows of the Chinese to go global. Regimes of flexible accumulation and transnational forces operate alongside the centralized policy of going out and encourage transnational linkages. The dynamic processes of rethinking nation and nationalism, the art of rewriting school textbooks on national history, reconstructing a Confucian imagined community and reconstituting a standardized mother tongue are all essential parts of the PRC state’s production of national identities which go hand in hand with the formation of transnational subjectivities, constructing an image of the modern Chinese patriots. The production of national identities and the formation of transnational subjectivities reinforce each other to strengthen its relevance and primacy. From the PRC’s perspectives, the central government not only legitimizes multiple social embeddedness but celebrates transnational diaspora as a patriotic act, thus encouraging transnational mobile practices among the younger generations of PRC citizens. Transnational Chinese diaspora is celebrated as patriotic members of imagined communities of modernity, a hybridized third culture that is mobile, deterritorialized, but contingent on China. New transnational Chinese diaspora differ from their predecessors because of their more purposive, extensive, and intensive linkages with the motherland. The rise of China as a regional and global power, the active role of the Chinese state agencies, the vibrant business and social networks among the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and PRC Chinese, and the increasing importance of reproduction mobility have contributed to the increasing fluidity of mobile practices of new transnational Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. From the perspectives of the host countries, the questions of integration, embeddedness, and loyalty are extremely important. Unfortunately, Singapore is the only country in Southeast Asia that has invested in multicultural, innovative, integration measures and strategies to make it possible for the new Chinese to embed socially and contribute to the economy. The Malaysian as well as Thai states have made no investment in integration measures and strategies, leaving the tasks of facilitating mobile embedding to other institutions such as Chinese associations and religious institutions to assist new Chinese to embed themselves to host countries.

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The persisting importance of Chinese networks and associations, albeit in changing forms, cannot be overstated. Traditionally, intra-ethnic networks contributed to the rise of Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia. With the influx of the transnational Chinese diaspora from all over China since the 1990s, however, we witness the increasing importance of cross-ethnic multi-layered networks in the daily life and business activities of the transnational Chinese diasporic communities. The development of new Chinese association, such as The Singapore Hua Yuan Association, recruiting diasporas from diverse geographical and social backgrounds originated from China and producing multiple layers of social networking within the new Chinese community, networking with other Chinese communities, and networking with the Chinese and Singaporean governments. Multiple layers of social networking are also found in the case of new transnational Chinese diaspora in Bangkok and other urban centers in Thailand. In the context of Southeast Asia where the ethnic Chinese tycoons are working more closely with the new Chinese investors and SOEs, we see increasing importance of new associations established by the PRC government and private enterprises. Traditional forms of networks and associations are becoming obsolete and subservient to the new form of PRC dominated networks and associations. The Thai-Chinese Culture and Economy Association, the Thai-Chinese Exim Associations, the Thai-Chinese Artists Associations are just a few examples of new forms of associations supported by the PRC government to facilitate trade and investment agreements, multi-faceted bilateral collaborative activities, and mutual interactions between government officials and private investors from both countries. The traditional, locality-based ethnic Chinese and clan associations in Thailand and other countries are co-opted by the networking resources from China to become parts of global ethnic and clan associations with their cultural and educational activities forging transnational, multi-levels connections between China and Southeast Asia. With the intensification of BRI projects after the weakening of covid-19 pandemic, it is more likely that Southeast Asia will see an increasing Chinese mobility in the region and beyond. The future and wellbeing of the Chinese diaspora and Southeast Asians will depend on how China and the ASEAN governments deal with the social embeddedness measures and strategies to make Chinese mobility more beneficial and appreciative to both homeland and host countries.

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Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J.F. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of theory of research for the sociology of education. New York: Greenwood Press. Research for the sociology of education. New York: Greenwood Press. Bourdieu, P. (1990). The logic of practice. Stanford University Press. Brockmeier, J., & Carbaugh, D. (2001). Narrative and identity: Studies in autobiography, self and culture. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co. Callahan. W. A. (2002a). Diaspora, cosmopolitanism and nationalism: Overseas Chinese and neonationalism in China and Thailand. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, Southeast Asia Research Center, Working Paper Series No. 35. Callahan. W. A. (2002b). 2004. Contingent states: Greater China and transnational relations. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. Callahan. W. A. (2002c). 2011. Introduction. In W.A. Callahan & E. Barabanseva (Eds.), China orders the world: Normative soft power and foreign policy. Washington D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Caplan, P. (1997). African voices, African lives: Personal narratives from a Swahili Village. Routledge. Chan, S. (2009). The overseas Chinese (Huaqiao) project: Nation, culture and race in Modern China, 1890–1966. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in History, UC Santa Cruz. Chiang, C. (2010). ‘Diasporic theorizing paradigm on cultural identity. Intercultural Communication Studies XIX, 1, 26–46. Darr, B. J. (2011). Nationalism and state legitimation in contemporary China. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Iowa. Dongen, E. van, & Liu, H. (2018). The changing meaning of diaspora: The Chinese in Southeast Asia. In G. Liu-Farrer & B.S. Yeoh (Eds.), Routledge handbook of Asian Migrations. New York: Routledge. Duara, P. (1997). Nationalists among transnationals: Overseas Chinese and the idea of China, 1900–1911. In A. Ong & D. Nonini (Eds.), Ungrounded empires: The cultural politics of modern Chinese transnationalism. New York: Routledge. Duara, P. (2005). The legacy of empire and nations in East Asia. In P. Nyiri & J. Breindenbach (Eds.), China inside out:contemporary Chinese nationalism and transnationalism. Budapest: Central European University Press. Fong, V. L. (2011). Paradise redefined: Transnational Chinese students and the quest for flexible citizenship in the developed world. Stanford University Press. Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481–510. Guo, Y. (2004). Cultural nationalism in contemporary China: The search for national identity under reform. Routledge Curzon. Hartig, F. (2016). Chinese public diplomacy: The rise of the confucius institute. Routledge. Karl, R. E. (2010). Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century world: A concise history. Duke University Press. Kuhn, P. A. (2008). Chinese among others: Emigration in modern times. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Lan, X. (2021). New Chinese mobility and religious enchantment: Case study of Christian conversion in Chiang Mai Province. PhD dissertation in Social Science, International Program, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University. Langness, L. (1965). The Life history in anthropological science. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Lewis, O. (1961). The children of Sanchez: Autobiography of a Mexican family. Random House. Liu, H. (2005). New migrants and the revival of overseas Chinese nationalism. Journal of Contemporary China, 14(43), 291–316. Liu, S. (2015). Identity, hybridity and cultural home: Chinese migrants and diaspora in multicultural societies. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

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Nonini, D. M., & Ong, A. (1997). Chinese transnationalism as an alternative modernity. In A. Ong & D. Nonini (Eds.), Ungrounded empires: The cultural politics of modern Chinese transnationalism. New York: Routledge. Nyiri, P. (2004). Expatriatic is patriotic?: The discourse on ‘new migrants’ in the peoples’s Republic of China and identity construction among recent migrants from the PRC. In B.S.A. Yeoh & K. Willis (Eds.), State/nation/transnation: Perspectives on transnationalism in the Asia-Pacific. New York: Routledge. Ong, A. (1997). Chinese modernities: Narratives of nation and of capitalism. In A. Ong & D. Nonini (Eds.), Ungrounded empires: The cultural politics of modern Chinese transnationalism. New York: Routledge. Ong, A. (1999). Flexible citizenship. Duke University Press. Ong, A., & Nonini, D. (Eds.). (1997). Ungrounded empires: The cultural politics of modern Chinese transnationalism. Routledge. Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time. Beacon Press. Rae, I., & Witzel, M. (2008). The overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia: History, culture, business. Palgrave Macmillan. Riemenschnitter, A., & Madsen, D. L. (2009). Introduction. In A. Riemenschnitter & D.L. Madsen (Eds.), Diasporic histories: Cultural archives of Chinese transnationalism. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Santasombat, Y. (2017). Introduction. In Y. Santasombat (Ed.), Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia: Challenges and prospects. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Shostak, M. (1981). Nisa: the life and words of a Kung woman. Harvard University Press. Siriphon, A. (2015). Xinyimin, New Chinese migrants, and the Influence of the PRC and Taiwan on the Northern Thai Border. In Y. Santasombat (Ed.), Impact of China’s Rise on the Mekong Region. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Skinner, G. W. (1957). Chinese society in Thailand. Cornell University Press. Skinner, G. W. (1958). Leadership and power in the Chinese community in Thailand. Cornell University Press. Suryadinata, L. (Ed.). (1997). Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians. Palgrave Macmillan. Suryadinata, L. (Ed.). (2007). Chinese diaspora since admiral Zheng he with special reference to maritime Asia. Singapore: Heritage Center and Huayi Net. Swartz, D. L. (1997). Culture and power: The sociology of pierre Bourdieu. University of Chicago Press. Swartz, D. L. (2013). Symbolic power, politics and intellectuals: The political sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. University of Chicago Press. Tan, C.-B. (Ed.). (2015). After migration and religious affiliation: Religions, Chinese identities and transnational networks. World Scientific. Thuno, M. (2007). Introduction. In M. Thuno (Ed.), Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese migration and the global expansion of China. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. To, J. J. H. (2014). Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese. Leiden: Brill. Wang, G. (1991). China and the Chinese overseas. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. Wang, G. (2002). The Chinese overseas: From earthbound China to the quest for autonomy. Cambridge: |Harvard University Press. Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. University of California Press. Xiang, B., Yeoh, B. S. A., & Toyota, M. (Eds.). (2013). Return: Nationalizing transnational mobility in Asia. Duke University Press. Yeoh, B. S. A., & Willis, K. (Eds.). (2004). State/nation/transnation: Perspectives on transnationalism in the Asia-Pacific. Routledge. Yeung, H. W. (2004). Chinese capitalism in a global era: Towards hybrid capitalism. Routledge. Zhang, J., & H. Duncan (2014). Introduction. In J. Zhang & H. Duncan (Eds.), Migration in China and Asia: Experience and policy. New York: Springer. Zhou, M. (Ed.). (2017). Contemporary Chinese diaspora. Palgrave Macmillan.

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Yos Santasombat is Professor of Anthropology, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, and Chair, Ph.D. Program in Social Sciences as well as Director, China-Southeast Asian Studies Center, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, and Senior Research Scholar, Thailand Research Fund. He is the author of numerous books, including Lak Chang: A Reconstruction of Tai Identity in Daikong (Canberra: Pandanus Books, ANU, 2001); Biodiversity, Local Knowledge and Sustainable Development (Chiang Mai: RCSD, 2003, 2014); Flexible Peasants: Reconceptualizing the Third World’s Rural Types (Chiang Mai: RCSD, 2008); The River of Life: Changing Ecosystems of the Mekong Region (Chiang Mai: Mekong Press, 2011); as well as the edited volumes Impact of China’s Rise in the Mekong Region (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) and Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia: Cultures and Practices (Palgrave Macmillan 2017), and the Sociology of Chinese Capitalism: Challenges and Prospects (Palgrave Macmillan 2019).

New Chinese Diaspora, Parallel Communities and Transnational Experience: A Case Study in Chiang Mai Province, Thailand Aranya Siriphon and Jiangyu Li

Introduction Since the 1990s, Chinese emigration from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) throughout the world has occurred at a phenomenal rate. According to the United Nations (UN), the figure of Chinese migrants doubled from 4.22 million in 1990 to 9.96 million in 2019. In Asia, the figure increased from 2.8 million in 1990 to 4.97 million in 2019, where the highest number was found in East Asia, mainly in Hong Kong, Macao, North/South Korea, and Japan (United Nations, 2019). This migration includes the recent influx of Chinese to Thailand, the second most popular recipient of Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia. Thailand received 77,581 Chinese migrants in 2019, which was more than twice the figure of 33,311 in 2005 (United Nations, 2019). Chan and Koh (2018) asserted a new trend in Chinese emigration starting in the mid-2000s. It was characterized by global, transnational mobility flows in diversified contexts and varied forms of migration, illustrating neoliberal tendencies and their influences. Chan (2018: 211–221) found that new Chinese emigrants, for example, young, sophisticated Chinese emigrants, have emigrated to pursue their individual development, career advancement, overseas education, and international work experience. These different migration goals have formed various relationships with China and their respective host countries during their transnational practice. A new trend of Chinese emigration could be seen in the Chiang Mai Province of Thailand. Many Chinese migrants have come for varied reasons. The most popular reasons for migration among the new Chinese migrants to Thailand include business start-ups, commercial investments, traveling, international education, in-vitro A. Siriphon (&) Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] J. Li Yunnan Normal University, Kunming, China © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Santasombat (ed.), Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4617-2_2

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fertilization (IFV) and other health-related tours. This paper explores recent Chinese migration to Chiang Mai, especially those who live in transience (Gomes, 2017). It focuses on Chinese citizens from the PRC who are temporarily residing in the expected host countries (here, the case of Chiang Mai) and whose living practices last for a specific duration to serve their transnational traveling goals. The research classifies several categories of Chinese sojourners including businesspeople, entrepreneurs, government expatriate staff, international students, and education guardian parents. It seeks to understand how the “new” Chinese diaspora in Chiang Mai province is socially (dis)embedded in Thai society and cultures. In this research, we conceptually deploy two notions: cosmopolitan sociability (Schiller et al., 2011) and parallel communities1 (Gorchakova, 2011; Gome, 2017). According to Schiller and her team (Schiller et al., 2011), cosmopolitan sociability refers to mobile people, migrants, diaspora, and their mobile practices, which not only create their own possibilities for open cosmopolitanism, but they also encounter the limitations of the particular pathway they have fabricated within specific circumstances. Therefore, the notion of cosmopolitan sociability reflects a set of practices and active participants’ abilities to find aspects of shared human experience, including aspirations for a better world. Hence, the notion of cosmopolitan sociability allows us to understand the conditions and difficulties that the new Chinese diaspora have been encountering with emerging social relations in the host country. The notion of parallel communities elucidates how the Chinese diaspora creates a sense of community without necessarily integrating with the society or culture. This contributes to our understanding of how new Chinese diasporas inhabit where they occupy and gain new experiences in the host country. According to Gomes (2015, 2020), the international students in her Australian case study failed to interact with the host society and culture. Instead of integrating into the local society, Asian international students have formed a parallel society, a self-organized group. By using social networks and entertainment media, they exclusively set up fellow associations among those who primarily come from the same home country, sharing a sense of belonging in a foreign country. While this parallel society allows international students to create a sense of community in Australia, its side effect is a perceived social distance from the local society (Gomes, 2015, 2020). Methodologically, the research uses both quantitative and qualitative research methods to gather data and information. The quantitative method is conducted through online surveys with Chinese sojourners staying between six months and eight years in Chiang Mai. “Wenjuan Wang (the web of questionnaires),” one of China's most influential questionnaire tools, is the online channel we have used for gathering information. We have received 220 responses from survey sampling in total. Apart from quantitative research, we have also applied a qualitative method by observing and interviewing Chinese diaspora sojourning in Chiang Mai in 1

The notion of parallel communities is coined by the sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer with respect to the integration deficits of immigrants in Germany. It is then applied in other West-European countries with. immigration. (please see more debate in Nadezda Gorchakova (2011)).

New Chinese Diaspora, Parallel Communities …

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different groups, for example, guardian parents, entrepreneurs, and government expatriate staff. The selected informants were observed and interviewed during the fieldwork between 2018 and 2019 to collect information about their life histories, mobility patterns, mobile living experiences, and perspectives toward Thailand and Thai people. This article uses the terms “recent Chinese diaspora” and “Chinese sojourners” interchangeably. This is because we look at their international migration in a period of growing transnational practices considered as “continuous,” rather than “completed” or permanently settling in host countries. On the one hand, the “sojourner” dimension arises from the new Chinese diasporas in Chiang Mai where they usually travel back and forth between Chiang Mai and Mainland China. On the other hand, the assumption behind the term “sojourner” lies in the person’s temporal stay where they completely return or find new places for travel. This migration situation and their mobile practices also correspond with the so-called transient migration process (Gomes, 2017; Gomes et al., 2017:7–11; Xiang, 2017: 3–5). Some scholars (Klineberg & Hull, 1979; Ady, 1995) used the term “sojourner” to describe travelers who live in-between societies and cultures. Sojourners such as businesspeople, overseas students, and technical experts are distinguished from longer-term intercultural travelers such as immigrants and refugees (Wade, 2001). This article is organized into three parts. The first part explores the group classification of new Chinese diaspora sojourning in Chiang Mai, which is reflected mainly in the business and education domains. It also examines why the members of the new Chinese diaspora have selected Chiang Mai as their destination to meet their traveling goals. The second part seeks to contextualize the image of China and Chinese citizens as depicted by Thai people in different groups. Prejudices and discrimination, which were engendered by the inherent images, impacted the members of the new Chinese diaspora in their social life in Chiang Mai. The third part focuses on whether or not the Chinese diaspora has socially and culturally been embedded in Thai society and, if so, how and what forms have been created. The paper explains the social formation and practice of a parallel community as a self-organized group. The two religious-based spaces and online Chinese parents’ groups have indicated their cosmopolitan sociability in creating the parallel community to cope with the barrier conditions in their social life in Chiang Mai.

Classification of New Chinese Diaspora Sojourning in Chiang Mai According to our gathered information and official documents (various types of visa extension from Chiang Mai Immigration office of Thailand during 2016–2019), we have identified Chinese citizens who have recently traveled to Chiang Mai under two main categories: (a) those who have engaged in business; and (b) those who have engaged in overseas education.

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In the business domain, at least two types are found. First, Chinese companies and individual entrepreneurs refer to Chinese sojourners who came for business purposes and self-employment. For example, they are individual entrepreneurs, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), staff of Chinese companies, business people who conduct tourism-related activities, e-commerce, and retail trades on Thai products to serve Chinese customers in China. Some may set up companies and register them under the Foreign Business Act B.E.2542 (A. D 1999) of National Law, as a 100% company from China State-owned enterprise (SOE), as SME companies, or as a 51–49% working relationship with Thai partners or Thai companies. According to the Department of Business Development (2019), we found 1,650 Chinese companies registered under the Foreign Business Act B. E.2542 (A. D 1999) during 2016–2018, ranking Chiang Mai as the fourth city after Bangkok, Chonburi, and Samut Prakan of Thailand. (See Fig. 1). The second group in the business domain is staff working for official and private institutes—they include for example, officers and teachers working for Confucian Institutes (CIs), Chinese teachers working for private schools, or Chinese language institutes. According to Li (2020), there were approximately 200 CI employees in Chiang Mai in 2019. In 2016, 2017, and 2018, there were 58, 39, and 41 Chinese teachers, professors, and experts working for government educational institutions respectively, while in private educational institutions, the numbers were 134, 84, and 123, respectively (see Fig. 2). In the education domain, we classify Chinese enrolling according to their different education levels. Apart from Chinese students in Thai universities, there are many Chinese pupils at kindergarten, elementary and secondary education levels studying at 21 international schools in Chiang Mai. In particular, these Chinese pupils are usually accompanied by their guardians, popularly known as peidu mama (陪读妈妈) in Chinese, or “accompanying mothers in study.” Sometimes, these guardians could be other family members (father, grandparents, relatives) who would travel with the Chinese kids for overseas education. The number of Chinese pupils enrolling at the 21 Chiang Mai international schools (kindergarten to high

Province

2016

2017

2018 amount

3 years total number

amount

amount

Bangkok

4,705

4,317

7,313

16,335

Chonburi

629

764

1,560

2,953

Samut Prakan

674

628

1,184

2,486

Chiang Mai

389

429

832

1,650

Phuket

258

309

627

1,194

Rayong

176

192

346

714

Fig. 1 China’s companies registered under the Foreign Business Act B.E.2542 (A.D 1999) of Thailand by region and popular provinces during 2016–2018. Source Department of Business Development, https://www.dbd.go.th/dbdweb_en/main.php?filename=index Updated on July 9, 2019

New Chinese Diaspora, Parallel Communities … Visa type/year Tourism purpose (4) visa on arrival at CM immigration office Study in government educational institution/in a private educational institution A family member of an alien who has been permitted a temporary stay in the Kingdom for study in an educational institution (11) A family member of an alien permitted a temporary stay in the Kingdom (20) Retirement (22) Business necessity (1) Teachers, professors, experts in government educational institutions/in private educational institutions Conducting training or research in a university or research institute Perform duties in a public charitable organization, a foreign private company, foundation, association, foreign chamber of commerce, Thai Chamber of Commerce, or Federation of Thai Industries (21) Receiving medical treatment, attending rehabilitation, or taking care of a patient (25)

27 2016

2017

2018

Jan-Sept 2019

1,285

1,687

2,267

2,041

1,634/1,427

1,946/1,855

2,085/2,424

881/2,332

424

642

877

874

75

115

132

106

117

180

322

402

320

282

308

284

58/134

39/84

41/123

45/93

77

81

40

6

80

49

33

60

10

37

23

42

Fig. 2 Number of Chinese visitors, getting different types of Thai Visa extension at Chiang Mai Immigration office during 2016–September 2019

school levels) reached approximately 2,000 in 2019. There were 874 peidu mama in the last half of 2019 (see Fig. 2). The number of Chinese students studying at colleges (undergraduate/graduate) and taking short courses in Chiang Mai was more than 2,000, among whom 1,129 were studying at Chiang Mai University in 2019.

Locating Chiang Mai in Chinese Imaginaries Unlike the new Chinese diaspora in Bangkok (please see Lee, 2021: this volume), Chiang Mai Province attracts a novel Chinese diaspora with respect to attachment to natural and cultural environments. Chiang Mai is the second-largest city in Thailand with natural and culturally diverse landscapes where one can find a beautiful old city, ancient temples, mountainous villages, and multiple ethnic groups around and outside the city. Chiang Mai has been a popular tourism destination for many years, ranking third after Bangkok and Phuket for Chinese tourists and travelers. Since 2012, when the Chinese blockbuster road trip movie “Lost in Thailand” successfully promoted Chiang Mai, millions of Chinese tourists have arrived in Thailand to re-enact the itinerary filmed in the movie. This reflected Chinese geopolitical ideas about northern Thailand (Mostafanezhad & Tanya, 2018) while developing Chiang Mai tourism and generating mixed returns for the Thai economy (Brzeski, 2013). By collecting questionnaire surveys, conducting a literature review, and gathering information from online Chinese websites related to Chiang Mai, this paper

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has found several reasons behind Chinese people visiting Chiang Mai. With regards to this culturally significant province, there are two particular imaginaries that Chinese travelers have constructed. These imaginaries are formed through travel tips, popular online sources, and friendly hearsay. The first imaginary is coined as Manshenghuo (màn shēng huó—慢生活), meaning “slow living,” and the second is Maicun, (mài cūn–迈村), meaning “village of Mai (referring to Chiang Mai).” Tao (2019: 99–116) found that Chinese tourists and travelers use the word Manshenghuo to represent Chiang Mai as “a city for relaxation and recreation.” These Chiang Mai images are derived from their desire to seek temporal escape from their routine-based and fast-paced urbanized lives in China. Many Chinese tourists tend to describe Chiang Mai with the Chinese adjective Youxian (悠闲), meaning “relaxed, and leisure.” To them, Chiang Mai has become a place of Manshenghuo, where people could live a simple life as they do not have any specific task to accomplish. It also represents a temporary retreat, especially for tourists who have been toiling wearily and chaotically in China. Manshenghuo is depicted as an attractive destination that can fulfill a variety of needs. It conjures images of Northern-styled Thai cuisine, captivating nature, clean air, and cultural diversity. Teparit Maneekul and his team (Teparit et al., 2019) found that such descriptions are all about natural beauty, distinctive cultures (Buddhism, for instance), and exotic local food. These descriptions also paint a picture of how local Thai people are hospitable, easy-going, and friendly to strangers (Teparit et al., 2019). Apart from that, the description of earlier Chinese migration to Thailand has also attracted many Chinese of the younger generations to follow in the footsteps of their pioneers who had moved to Thailand to seek fortune and happiness in the Land of Smiles during the early twentieth century. The stories about these pioneers (who had worked hard in Thailand, contributed to the Thai economy, and remitted money back home) have inspired many recent young Chinese in the gold rush by crossing the border. Maicun, another description, is coined by both Chinese tourists and the new Chinese diaspora living in Chiang Mai. The term “Chiang Mai Village” is imaginatively narrated with two underlying meanings. First, as a “village,” Chiang Mai posits a city with less advanced infrastructural development and modernization than Chinese cities of the same scale, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, where many new Chinese diasporas originate. Second, Maicun connotes favorable geographic conditions in two aspects. The first aspect is the city’s “natural environment,” allowing Chinese sojourners to find warm weather, sprawling greenery, picturesque mountains, clean water and air (apart from seasonal smog), and safe food sources. The new Chinese diaspora, disheartened by the excessive use of agricultural chemicals and unethical production methods in many Chinese food industries, has conceived Thailand as an imagined food haven for safe consumption. The second aspect refers to the city’s “human environment,” where Thai people are known for their warm-heartedness, kind hospitality, and indiscriminate

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treatment of strangers. In this regard, Maicun, the “Chiang Mai Village,” conjures an image of a much-anticipated peaceful rural living in the hearts of the urbanized Chinese diaspora.

Chinese Imaginaries Versus Thai Perspectives This section aims to understand China's positive and negative images, and how Thai people view Chinese citizens. We trace back to historical contexts to decipher the Chinese portrayal within Thai society. There are two levels to be discussed. First, the brotherhood narrative is reflected within the Thai official discourse. Second, the ordinary Thai people currently depict China and Chinese citizens in both negative and positive aspects. We also explain the results of the previous brotherhood narrative and the emerging Chinese images in Thai and global trends.

Narrative on “Sino-Thai Brotherhood” The first perspective in Thai society is manifested through the political rhetoric portraying China as a generous big brother, which has been circulating within Thai diplomatic discourse. For decades, the brotherhood narrative has been constructed to serve official Thai interests in developing China-Thailand friendships by highlighting the interests of security and economic development. The brotherhood narrative usually refers to deep ties between both countries, which have long been created through lasting historical and cultural links. Tungkeunkunt and Phuphakdi (2018) suggested that the brotherhood narrative was formulated articulately after the huge influx of Chinese citizens flowing to Thailand during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when political controversy had appeared, casting doubt over Chinese loyalty to the Thai kingdom. Then, the Thai government implemented a national policy in the complete assimilation of overseas Chinese into Thai society. Thereafter, the brotherhood narrative, as a diplomatic tool, has been fluctuating in association with the tidal current of the China-Thailand relationship intersecting with US-global politics. For example, after the victory of the Communist Party in 1949, the China-Thailand relationship was tense and anxious. China was seen as a national threat to Thailand when Thai elites were suspicious of China supporting communist insurgencies in Thailand. Tungkeunkunt and Phuphakdi (2018) proposed that the discourse of the Sino-Thai brotherhood had been widely utilized, and it had become the diplomatic discourse after the late 1970s when the Thai state ended hostility and moved toward peace with China under the tidal current of changing US international relations with Thailand. Within

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the global situation relating to Thai international relations with China and the U.S., the Thai state and policymakers, including the Thai Royal House, needed to find valid and reasonable evidence to support the policy change so that it made sense to convince Thai citizens. Then, the brotherhood discourse took over the antagonistic behaviors generated by Chinese engagement during the Communism war periods against the CPT in Thailand (Tungkeunkunt & Phuphakdi, 2018: 609). During China’s domestic reform and economic globalization after the late 1970s, China adjusted its domestic politics, economic improvement, and foreign policy. Under the economic rise of China, China sought to project an image of a peace-loving nation and a warm international collaborator. Such an emerging portrayal was an attempt by China to remove the “red threat” notions of her renewed great power while painting a new picture as a “good neighbor” and a responsible power. China’s soft power (Nye, 1990) calmed the fear and anxiety of reemerging national power among Southeast Asian countries and other regions by providing humanitarian assistance and multidimensional cooperation with neighboring countries of economic partnerships. One example of China’s soft power applied in Southeast Asian countries was the financial assistance during the financial crisis in 1997 when the Chinese state contributed by providing Southeast Asian countries with solutions, while the U.S. government, the other great power, remained silent. As a result, China gained more trust with Asian countries, even though some Asian countries might have paradoxically responded in different levels and dimensions of international relations due to issues such as those in Sri Lanka and the Chinese debt trap (Moramudali, 2019, May 14), and the South China Sea’s territorial dispute between China, the Philippines, and Vietnam2—as for Thailand, the Thai government has smoothly broadened its engagement with China in many areas of trade, economy, military, and education (Chinwanno, 2008; Tungkeunkunt & Phuphakdi, 2018: 597–621). As discussed by Tungkeunkunt and Phuphakdi (2018: 597–621), the result of rhetorical discourse on the Sino-Thai brotherhood has not only been utilized effectively by the Thai state and official bureaucracy, but it has also been employed dispersedly by three different levels of Thai actors. These actors comprise the following: (a) Chinese and Thai leaders who have selectively adopted the discourse to highlight friendship and strengthen ties for economic cooperation from time to time; (b) Chinese and Thai governmental agencies who have emphasized the discourse, especially during programs of official exchange, to gain knowledge and improve mutual understanding; and (c) Thai public organizations, such as the Chinese Chamber of Thailand and Chinese Associations of Thailand, that have sought to gain beneficially from the economic rise of China through the engagement of the brotherhood discourse to gain benefits from trade, foreign investment, and a peaceful international environment.

2 Find more detail and conflict background at the https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/ conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea and https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/article/2186449/ explained-south-china-sea-dispute (retrieved June 22, 2020).

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Two-Sided Stereotypes About Chinese in Ordinary Thai Perspectives Having been immersed in the Sino-Thai brotherhood narrative for several decades, the Thai mainstream, especially the old waves of overseas Chinese and their descendants in Thailand, has acceptably learned of how the Chinese and China have become Sino-Thai brothers, “Jin Thai Pi Nong Kan.” Within the ordinary Thai perspectives, the Sino-Thai brotherhood narrative has engendered a good feeling among the Thai people in favor of Chinese and China as one of Thai’s Pi Nong, the elder brother country that truly helps Thailand in many aspects. However, when examining the current situation where huge numbers of Chinese tourists and travelers are flowing into Thailand, the narrative on the Sino-Thai brotherhood that appeared in the Thai mainstream has been conceived paradoxically. Chinese tourism and images about Chinese tourists appearing in Thailand are connected to two-sided paradoxical images negatively stereotyping all Chinese citizens traveling overseas. The first refers to a positive portrayal of the Chinese flow into Thailand, furnishing the economic contribution narrative. As discussed earlier, under the Sino-Thai brotherhood narrative, Thai people perceive the Chinese government as stimulating several sectors of the Thai economy with which Thai people are engaged. From this perspective, China and Chinese travelers are seen as a new opportunity from which Thailand could generate revenue and thus accelerate Thai economic improvement. According to the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT), Chinese tourists and travelers have proven viable in enhancing the Thai economy in almost every sector. For example, Chinese tourism revenue in Thailand had risen by 3% to 1.93 trillion baht due to the arrival of 10.99 million Chinese visitors in 2019.3 This means that Thailand has relied heavily on Chinese tourists and travelers to sustain the Thai tourism economy and service sector. The second refers to negative portrayal, comprising stereotypes such as “foolish but rich” and “uncivilized manners,” which are imputed on Chinese tourists and travelers traveling to Thailand and worldwide. “Foolish but rich” is a derogatory term to portray Chinese consumers who could make casual purchases of extremely expensive items or some materialistic Chinese who attach the meaning of life to material possessions. “Uncivilized manners” is another derogatory term used to describe those Chinese who adopt unruly behaviors, such as breaking legal and civil regulations, littering, queue-jumping, and flouting traffic laws. This stereotype also includes narratives claimed by Thai commoners depicting Chinese as acting violently, committing offensive acts, speaking loudly, and displaying fussy and highly demanding personalities. The two negative portrayals have impacted Chinese tourists and Chinese residents when they are interacting in Thai locales. The Chinese tourists are not the only ones receiving a negative stigma from ordinary Thai people. The Chinese businesspeople have likewise been affected 3

More detail at https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1842844/foreign-tourist-arrivals-up-4-in2019 (retrieved June 25, 2020).

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when they conduct business partnerships with their Thai counterparts. For example, the stereotype about Chinese people being selfish and deceptive has often been brought up among Thai business people. Misconducting business, fraud, and scams, including unfair cuts, are considered dismissive Chinese images from Thai perspectives. One Thai informant, among others, said, “Chinese businessmen not only cheat on Thai and other foreigners, but they cheat on their own compatriots, for example, producing fake foods, cheating and robbing Chinese tourists when conducting tourism-related business here” (interviewing Noi, June 25, 2019). In contrast to the positive images of Chinese people and China among Thai people, such negative images actually create a “threat” rather than an opportunity for Thai business people’s perspectives. Some scholars (Banterng, 2017:1–10; Tungkeunkunt, 2013:1–9) took the cases of Huai Khwang district in Bangkok and other growing tourism-related businesses conducted by Chinese business people and entrepreneurs in Chiang Mai and other touristic cities as examples. The arguments and yelling among the Thai people reflected an “anxiety” that Thai traders and entrepreneurs have seen in the proliferation of Chinese entrepreneurs and business people, who may have stronger financial support. Chinese-based market opportunity and entrepreneurial skills would hurt Thai businesses throughout the supply chains, beginning in manufacturing and extending to wholesale centers and community shops. Such a negative portrayal of Chinese citizens could sometimes be manifested in real life encounters such as Thai police officers arresting Chinese sojourners and accusing them of cheating on businesses (with or without Thai coordinators) or committing illegal business activities. In a case, two Thais and one Chinese were arrested in 2018 for allegedly serving as nominees for a Chinese-owned tour company on the island of Samui.4 Another case was in Chiang Mai in 2019 when Thai police personnel, reportedly assisted by Chinese police officers, arrested a group of Chinese nationals using Thailand as a locational base for an online gambling operation.5

Chinese Portrayals in Thai Locality and Its Impacts on the New Chinese Diaspora The two sides of stereotypes viewed by Thai people and constructed rhetorically through Thai social media and publicity have produced social discrimination. The response from the new Chinese diaspora in Chiang Mai regarding these stereotypes

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More detail at https://www.chiangraitimes.com/crime-chiang-rai-thailand/three-arrested-in-kohsamui-accused-of-cheating-businesses/ (retrieved June 21, 2020). 5 More detail at https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1510486/six-chinese-held-onlinegambling-operation-busted and More detail at https://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/advanced/ 1093148/new-wave-of-chinese-coming-to-live-in-thailand (retrieved June 22, 2020).

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and discriminatory behaviors is worth examining. According to our 220 online respondents, mainly Chinese parents living in Chiang Mai, only 18.64% of them indicated that they had never experienced discrimination. Interacting with locals has given them pleasure. A total of 55.91% of respondents said that “Thai people are nice, and it is normal to be discriminated.” Even so, they “do not care, and there is no need to be shocked.” However, 19.09% of them had encountered discrimination. Within this group, 15% of them described the discrimination as resulting from Thai people showing their preferential hospitality to Westerners over the Chinese. While 6.36% of respondents did not mind the discrimination, 3.64% of them felt hurt. However, they did not retaliate because of language barriers. Only 0.45% of the respondents who had experienced discrimination fought back and won.

New Chinese Diaspora and Social Discrimination in Thai Locality As indicated by the survey mentioned above, encountering rhetorical images in reality has affected Chinese sojourners living in Chiang Mai. Apart from the survey, some Chinese mothers in our interviews mentioned that discrimination in public domain, like international schools or local markets, has impacted their living. For instance, in the local markets, Thai traders deceive the Chinese parents with simple tricks. When selling Thai products, Thai vendors fraudulently charge the Chinese customers or lure them to buy very expensive Thai items, which is even worse than ripping them off using little tricks (interviewing Yelin, October 7, 2018). Other cases of discrimination occur at an international school where students and families develop a multicultural sense of experiencing and appreciating foreign cultures. Nonetheless, instead of being immersed in a multicultural environment where cultural differences could have been dissolved, these Chinese parents have found themselves excluded from the Western and Thai families during school social events. Some Chinese families in Chiang Mai perceive that Thai people distinguish between Chinese and Euro-Americans while showing favoritism to the latter as shown below: Thai parents gave preferential treatment to Euro-American families over the Chinese ones. Once, the school organized a Sunday market event. It then requested family members of students to join in the event by preparing food, setting shops, and sharing activities. We, peidu mothers, were excited to attend this event. However, when it came, we realized that it was difficult to join in since other families had left us to organize our own Chinese groups. Other Thai and foreign families had excluded us from participating in the event. They thought Chinese families would make a lot of noise while participating in the event. Therefore, we could do nothing, but we had to simply stay within our Chinese groups. (interviewing Yang Li, 32 years old, May 1, 2019)

Sometimes, social discrimination resulting from miscommunication and misunderstanding could be spread by word of mouth in the Thai public and it should be rectified. Lai, a 35-year-old Chinese resident in Chiang Mai, provided the following narration:

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Most of the time, conflicts between Chinese and Thai people originate from insufficient information and understanding. Nevertheless, the inherent negative images and discriminatory behaviors exacerbate such conflicts without the actors realizing the real situation. Taking a case of misunderstanding at one international school as an example. Mr. Wang, a 40-year-old Chinese father, is the head of WeChat groups of Chinese parents in Chiang Mai. He helped to handle a “discrimination case” in 2019. There was a peidu grandmother, Xinxin’s grandmother, who “tearfully” complained that her granddaughter was bullied by her classmates. Later, the headteacher from the kindergarten punished her granddaughter at the school. When this news was circulated within the WeChat group, all its members were infuriated and made several declarations including: “the Chinese could not be bullied,” “this is racial discrimination,” and “the Chinese are always being biasedly treated.” After the heated discussion, this conflict was solved by the relevant groups of people: the parents’ committee and the school committee. It turned out that the events had not occurred as Xinxin’s grandma had stated; her granddaughter started that conflict with another kid, and grandma was anxious since she could not understand what was happening and how to negotiate with the headteacher at the school. Having learnt the case, Mr. Wang, as the Head of the WeChat peidu parent group and the organizer for resolving the chaotic situation, concluded with the following: We should not listen to only one side; otherwise, we would never know the truth. These disputes are not always related to discrimination as there are many other compounding aspects that are involved. Therefore, we should actually try to understand and investigate thoroughly before jumping into conclusions prematurely and making erroneous decisions.

Taking a closer examination, this case is not just a matter of misunderstanding nor having inadequate information. However, the texts circulating within the Chinese WeChat group have reflected an underlying issue where negative images and the idea of being discriminated have taken root within the new Chinese diaspora group.

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“Discrimination Chain” of Chinese However, this research has found that Thai people have sometimes discriminated against Chinese sojourners in Chiang Mai. Chinese residents (recent Chinese diaspora), especially Chinese pioneers who arrived 10 years ago (2010), have also discriminated against the new incoming Chinese sojourners. There is a word “discrimination chain” (鄙视链-bǐ shì liàn) among Chinese parents, describing how Chinese pioneers have claimed that the newcomers are impolite, too noisy, or misconducting in business. We have found that sometimes Chinese newcomers behave inappropriately here. They are blamed by the Chinese pioneers. However, we should not be looking down upon them. Instead, we should give them some support and help. On the other hand, at the same time, as you may know, these Chinese newcomers have formed their “island culture,” implying how they would like to withdraw from the outside world because they do not want to get involved with it. Therefore, the newcomers may have nothing to rely on us. The circle of support may depend on the network they codevelop. (interview from Mr. Wang)

Another interview was conducted by Wang Jun, a 22-year-old Chinese student. She mentioned further that: …In China and other places in the world or even in Chiang Mai, we could find some Chinese businessmen who produce contaminated food, make fake products to be sold in the markets or lure customers by exaggerated advertising tactics. I feel ashamed of these terrible behaviors, and I don’t want to be regarded as one of them…

Regarding these two claims, it is worth noting that the discrimination chains that appear among the Chinese outside China may not only be associated with those who have arrived 10 years earlier, such as the Chinese pioneers; it reflects the tip of the iceberg among the Chinese people and China’s hierarchical societies today. It may indicate the current social context of China and its social distance; that is, there is a differentiation of economic classes among Chinese travelers who can now move everywhere and have often participated in discrimination chains when interacting with Chinese people from different economic and social backgrounds.

Embedding in Thai Cultures and Locality or Not? This part examines whether the Chinese diaspora has been socially embedded in Thai society and cultures, and if so, what forms have been created. Under the conditions mentioned above with both positive and negative images and discrimination, the recent Chinese diaspora has enhanced distinct social relations and has transnationally experienced both inclusiveness and exclusiveness within the Thai culture and locality during their transient mobility. According to our 220 online respondents, we have also found interesting responses on how Chinese and Thai people have been interacting socially and culturally with each other. The online survey indicated that the Chinese do not

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deem it necessary to engage with Thai people. There are two main reasons to this. The first reason is their social life in Chiang Mai. The survey shows that 47.73% of the respondents have chosen to socialize only with their parents and children, whilst 26.82% of them have chosen to hang out with their Chinese friends from their WeChat groups. The rest of them have had their own social life with Chinese fellows (6.36%), relatives (2.73%), and work partners (2.27%). Only 14.09% of respondents indicated that they have their own social life with Thai and other foreign friends in Chiang Mai. The second reason is that Chinese respondents have challenges in engaging freely with the Thai culture and locality. This is due to language barriers (55%), and their difficulties in socializing with locals (18%). When confronted with the Thai language barrier, some respondents felt that learning the Thai language is necessary (70.4%), but only 20.45% of them have decided to learn Thai. Some Chinese respondents thought that there was no need for them to learn Thai (15.91%), while some respondents thought that English language might be sufficient to facilitate their communication (30.91%). Regarding their learning of Thai culture and language, the statistics have proven that the Chinese felt that engaging with Thai people may not be necessary, and/or they may selectively engage with Thai cultures in the locality. This is because 65% of Chinese respondents said that they have adequately known Thai cultures and prohibitions by observation, but they treat them equally as all other foreign cultures. A total of 24.09% of respondents indicated that while they show respect to Thais for Thai cultures, they would prefer to keep their own lifestyle without having to force themselves to socialize with the Thai locals. A total of 4.55% of Chinese respondents preferred not to socialize with local cultures. Only 6.36% of Chinese respondents stated that they know Thai cultures well and they could communicate with Thai people deeply. The lack of Chinese engagement with Thai local people is also illustrated by how they have asked for help in taking care of their kids whenever they are away. Among 220 Chinese respondents, 50.45% relied only on themselves and self-management when the temporal absence was present. However, some respondents formed a “family community” network with close Chinese friends who could help take care of their children when necessary. They could ask for support from close friends they made naturally (31.82%) or neighbors who could take care of their kids (12.73%). When considering their social and cultural activities in everyday life practices in Chiang Mai, Chinese residents are unlikely to engage much. Instead, whenever they feel lonely and need help, they explore online and on-site public platforms to garner support. Hence, creating a “parallel community” among the new Chinese diaspora in Chiang Mai is an attractive alternative for them. Under such context, their local embeddedness in the Thai locality is worth examining in particular.

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The Social Formation of “Parallel Communities” Faced with the difficulties in social life mentioned above, both Chinese individuals and groups usually build and maintain their own social and cultural networking spaces. Some Chinese newcomers have participated with well-established Chinese social and cultural institutions. For example, informal clubs of Chinese guardians could help connect Chinese families, both earlier ones and newcomers. Religious organizations constitute another social space, which Chinese families have shared a common sense of Sino-based community in Chiang Mai. This article exemplifies the emerging religious sphere and extended social communications in the digital sphere, illustrating how the Chinese create “parallel communities” to deal with such barrier conditions and live their social life circulating within Chinese circles in host countries. Here, the parallel communities do not only support the connection of the new Chinese diaspora with Chinese circles giving them a sense of belonging in the host country, but these communities also extend their social communications in the digital sphere situated in a more religious/ digital freedom of Thailand. Parallel communities have provided them an opportunity to freely communicate, experiment, experience, and learn more cosmopolitan knowledge in different spirituality and moral values in which their social world is to be more open during their transient life. Furthermore, the social formation of parallel communities has provided them with social and emotional support, which fosters their transient livelihood and presented a result of their “cosmopolitan sociability.” In other words, the ability of Chinese participants to enact and embed themselves within distinct social relations appear under the specific circumstances they have encountered in Chiang Mai. The next section will exemplify the parallel community created by new Chinese diaspora groups, online-offline informal clubs organized by Chinese guardians who accompany their children in Chiang Mai, and religious-based organizations (Buddhism and Christian-based organizations) established and participated in by the new Chinese diaspora including students, intellectuals, and business people residing in Chiang Mai.

Example of Online-Offline Informal Clubs: Chinese Parents Group Based on our online survey, the Chinese social media application WeChat plays a very important role in Chinese life everywhere in the world. WeChat serves as the main channel for providing local information (44.09%) as it provides Chinese parents with information about overseas study even prior to their travels. In addition to Chinese social media, overseas Chinese social circles (29.55%) and English social media (21.36%) are significant. Only 5% of Chinese respondents asked for favors from local social circles. Therefore, they prefer using WeChat to

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communicate and collect useful information while building up a new Chinese network from the WeChat group. 84% of Chinese respondents use WeChat applications to study immigration policies and news intensively. In Chiang Mai, we found several informal clubs of Chinese guardian parents that connect Chinese families whose children attend Chiang Mai international schools. The informal associations could be treated as a “social group” for Chinese sojourners residing in Chiang Mai or elsewhere. These informal clubs usually link Chinese members with WeChat social media while providing updated information about immigration regulations and schooling issues. The leaders of clubs and associations actively help newcomers deal with obstacles or other school issues when needed. The largest informal club of Chinese guardian parents in Chiang Mai is called “the Group of Consultation on Studying in Thailand” (泰国留学咨询群, tài guó liú xué zī xún qún). It is the largest nonprofit counseling platform initiated by Mr. Potato, a Chinese father who is working at Microsoft. Approximately 1,000 members have registered within the WeChat group and have been using this online platform to acquire information, chat, and ask questions. The group members usually utilize the “online library” menu to search for information and ask questions from other members in the same group. The content of the “online library” organized by Mr. Potato has carefully curated from daily discussions in the WeChat group chatting room on visas, educational choices, shopping, and other survival skills in local society, as well as written blogs, guides, essays, instructions, official files, and others. Our research team exported the chat records from October 2018 to October 2019, and performed a content analysis on more than 60,000 pieces of information. The most frequently read articles of this group revolve around topics such as: “Where should you begin if you are considering studying abroad?” Most searched topics discussed within the group are related to issues including international schools and education, all kinds of visas, especially non-ED visas and retirement visas, guidance for living in Chiang Mai, driver’s licenses, international hospitals, bank accounts, international logistic services, and mobile services. These WeChat platforms play a significant role as free counselors and mutual assistance systems. Chinese families, especially newcomers, rely on the online platform to overcome any challenges in the new living environment. This kind of mutual assistance community has been mostly established online due to its convenience and approachability while providing offline actual assistance if there are any conflicts. Hence, technological advancement could facilitate information exchange and social interaction, and it could assist the formation of the corresponding “social group” practiced by the new Chinese diaspora when living afar. Within this emerging social formation, an online-offline social networking sphere is found where the members of Chinese diaspora who are sharing the same purpose from the “here,” “there,” and “anywhere” dimensions can converge. Through WeChat group formation, new Chinese diaspora establishes connections virtually in the air and online on social media, informal clubs and organizations. The WeChat group platform has functioned in offline cases, as shown through

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the example of Xinxin’s grandmother, which was mentioned earlier. The fiery discussion went viral over the WeChat group, and all its members were furiously declaring that “the Chinese cannot be bullied” potentially aggravating the conflicted situation from an “individual issue” to a “national” one. Thankfully, there is the “Group of Consultation on Studying in Thailand” that represents the Chinese diaspora and connects its members via WeChat as a social group in Chiang Mai. It has taken a major role in resolving the conflict. As a result, some parents who are well-versed in English and Thai laws have even volunteered themselves to provide free service for Xinxin’s grandmother. Further, the WeChat group initiator has gathered parents to organize a committee and invited the school committee to meet with each other to solve the conflict. Incidents such as the above case often happen in transient lifestyle, especially in the education field, where individuals encounter unpredictable difficulties and cultural conflicts. It is an ongoing issue for those who live in a foreign land. As seen in the case of the study parent group, the Chinese diaspora’s formation of the WeChat group is one social mechanism connected via the online to help themselves. Hence, the WeChat group is operated actively and practically where information dissemination, discussion, and other actions arising from the online platform can enable offline real-life activities.

Examples of Religious-Based Social Spaces In addition to the Chinese guardians’ associations or informal clubs discussed above, religious organizations, such as temples and churches, are constituted as another social space. In religious social space, Chinese families build a sense of Sino-based community through religious curiosity and engagement, which could not be easily found in China due to the restrictive control by the Chinese regime over religious issues. This research has chosen two main religious-based organizations; they include the Buddhism-styled spiritual place, and two other Chinese Christian churches. For example, Chinese parents with their children, students, retirees, and business people usually spend their free time there. Their attendance in religious activities is above and beyond their other everyday life practices, such as regular school-to-home drop-off and pick-up routine, regular schooling time, and working. By deploying the notion of “cosmopolitan sociability” (Schiller et al., 2011), the cases of the recent Chinese diaspora in Chiang Mai who actively participate religious activities with these two religious-based organizations have illustrated that their competence and communication skills are based on the human capacity to create social relations of inclusiveness and openness to the world. In this notion, both religious-based organizations have become a social space fostering a sense of Sino-based community belonging outside China amongst the new Chinese diaspora. In this space, the utilization of the Chinese language, rituals and beliefs, and normative cultures are shared and appropriated. However, the most important

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aspect is that the new Chinese diaspora could find an avenue to experientially learn cosmopolitan knowledge and openness to the world through their participation in a new religious-social space in a transient life. With regards to the participation of religious practices, Chinese practices should be understood in specific situated contexts. On the one hand, the challenging context of a “religious gaze” in China refers to how the Chinese government has exercised control over religions, which has curbed one’s sense of curiosity about the outside world and has limited one’s freedom to explore different spiritualities and moral values. On the other hand, Thailand has provided a favorable context of “religious freedom” and openness to produce an alternative among other processual pathways to experience worldly spiritual knowledge in a moment of transient living. Hence, the religious sphere and extended social communications, in the digital sphere situated in the more freedom-oriented Thailand, have allowed them to take part in communication freely, while enabling them to gain cosmopolitan knowledge of different spirituality and moral values in their transient time of overseas living. Here, we will exemplify the cases of newly religious spaces originating and operationalizing amongst the new Chinese diaspora. The religious space could be indicated as, on the one hand, a “parallel community” providing social and emotional support for them to deal with barrier conditions during their transient phase of life. On the other hand, the “cosmopolitan sociability,” an ability of the new Chinese diaspora in Chiang Mai to experientially construct distinct social relations under both the encountered specific constraints, and the possible aspirations for openness. (1) Chinese Christian Churches: Religious Freedom and Openness Christianity and Chinese Christian Churches in Chiang Mai, particularly the newer ones established to serve the new Chinese diaspora, could be seen as a set of practices and an ability of active participants in creating a parallel community that not only support recent Chinese diaspora to connect with Chinese circles, but it also gives them chances to freely take part in religious activities and discuss different aspects of spirituality and moral values. The study has explored at least two Chinese Christian churches under the Protestantism doctrine established for the new Chinese diaspora. The first church is the “Home of Love” Church (爱之家, ài zhī jiā). It was established in 2009 by a couple of American-Chinese Christian leaders and a pastor from Singapore. The second is the Chiang Mai Chinese Christian Church (CMCCC清迈华人基督教会, qīng mài huá rén jī dū jiāo huì). According to the fieldwork conducted by Lan (2020) and Ping (2020), the “Home of Love” Church has approximately 60–80 Chinese members. It is mainly popular among Chinese students enrolled in Thai universities in Chiang Mai. The “Home of Love” Church reflects its objectives that are not only an attempt to gather new Chinese students into Christian embracement, but they also seek to provide the members with warm homey feelings. To receive God’s blessing of love and a feeling of being at home in Thailand, the church, apart

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from bible study, organizes warm activities related to Chinese cultures and uses the Chinese language for all church activities. For example, the Church provides regular Chinese Bible lessons to the Chinese students through modifying the biblical stories to closely mirror Chinese student life. In these Bible lessons, the students are taught how to find peace and warmth whenever they feel lonely and homesick in a strange place. Moreover, the students also get to learn how to excel in their education through showcasing exemplary examples as inspiration. In addition to Bible teaching, the church organizes practical meetings for the students where they could share their positive and negative experiences in Thailand, enjoy social activities relating to Chinese cultures, for example, Chinese food and joint cooking, singing songs, and setting parties during Chinese festivals (Spring Holiday, Mid-Autumn Festival and the Dragon Boat Festival). Although all activities are geared towards supporting members spiritually, the church has provided tangible assistance to the Chinese students as they struggle in an overseas education environment. For example, the church supports new arrivals by picking them up at the airport, helping to find the proper accommodation, and warmly welcoming new students at the church. Realizing how the students face challenges in the course of pursuing international study programs in Chiang Mai, the church arranges an English training course, including a Western manners class, for them. These courses assist the Chinese students, as church members, in their English assignments while familiarizing them with Western and Thai languages. The second Church popularized among the Chinese diaspora in Chiang Mai is the Chiang Mai Chinese Christian Church (CMCCC-清迈华人基督教会, qīng mài huá rén jī dū jiāo huì). It was originally established in 2015 as a branch of the Chinese congregation of the Chiang Mai Grace Church (恩典教会—ēn diǎn jiāo huì). However, in 2017, the CMCCC decided to separate from the church and found a new location in the Hang Dong district to set up an independent community. This is because the number of new Chinese members has increased to approximately 100 members from different fields, and they could barely fit in the old church premises. Our interviews with Chinese families at the CMCCC have ascertained that many existing members and newcomers of Chinese families attend Church activities every Sunday, and during their free time on weekdays. On Sundays, they usually bring their children along to join them in the Church services. Apart from gathering during the prayer meetings, the children join activities such as Chinese bible learning courses provided by the Church. The Bible courses for kids are taught by volunteer parents who are members of the church. Other Chinese families attend the prayer meeting, consultation session, or group meeting before having lunch together at the church. Like the Home of Love Church, all activities at the CMCCC are conducted in the Chinese language. These activities include bible lessons, Sunday service peaching, online-offline information dissemination, food preparation, and traditional Chinese festival celebration. Several Chinese newcomers would

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initially visit the church with their personal agenda. For example, some Chinese businesspeople have visited the church for business networking and information connection purposes while some Chinese students have come to make more Chinese friends and observe new moral knowledge that they could not find in China. Nonetheless, the church gradually enfolds them through religious activities and helps them embark on a spiritual journey. The activities allow the members to feel at home while enabling them to help each other; these actions are significant as they have rarely done so in China with those who are not their family members, relatives, or friends. As a result, their actions drew the curiosity of the new comers. Thus, having experimented these actions, some of the attendants then make the final decision on converting to Christianity. However, some Chinese are still in the process of considering conversion, which requires more time to be certain. Nonetheless, regardless of Christian conversions, both churches bear similarities in providing a common platform that socially and culturally engages the Chinese participants with Sino-based identification, language, and culture. However, we have also discovered how the new Chinese diaspora has experienced some limitations in learning cosmopolitan knowledge. This could be illustrated through an example of religious/Bible understanding. Although religious space provides material support to include them in a Sino-based religious group, the possibility of translating bible doctrine into their own China background-based interpretation is much needed. As Lan (2020) suggested, when Chinese attendants visit the Christian church for the first time and attempt to understand the bible, they would find strange and unfamiliar explanations. This is because in China, they have acquired socialism-based religious knowledge guided by the Chinese regime. Although religious revival has surfaced in China since the past decade, the Chinese government still controls religious institutions and belief systems in China. Thus, churches that are not registered under the Chinese authorities are intensively suppressed under the Xi Jinping regime. In particular, Christianity, which is perceived by the Chinese regime as a westernized regime, has become a sensitive issue in China along with other religions such as Islam. These religions are discouraged from being adopted and practiced in China. However, when mobile living appeared among the new Chinese diaspora, their curiosity in this aspect has been ignited, along with their pragmatic purposes. Therefore, several Chinese Christians have appropriated modifications while adopting religious values into their mobile living. As a case study, Ms. He, a 40-year-old study mother, shared her experience as follows: In China, we never learned anything about Christianity or other religions. We only studied Marxism or evolution theory to understand how humans existed and where humans came from. When attending the church at the beginning, there was no conviction at all. However, when areas of doubt were explained, scientific knowledge was added up in explaining human life, and importantly, there were opportunities to gather with others through heartwarming activities, I felt touched. (Interviewing May 5, 2018)

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The Christian-based organizations mentioned above have illustrated the emerging religious spaces among the new Chinese diaspora as a parallel community practiced in the host country. This parallel community aims to socially and emotionally support the new Chinese diaspora to connect with Chinese circles while giving them a sense of Chinese belonging in a foreign land through religious activities. However, when participating in the Christian-based activities, the new Chinese diaspora experiences cosmopolitan knowledge of different spiritualities and moral values that could not be found in China. (2) Buddhist-Styled Spirituality: Experimenting with Religion in a Thai Locality Pertaining to Buddhism, it is crucial to understand the new Chinese diaspora’s participation in the Buddhist-styled spirituality in the Thai locality. This is because the existing conditions and activities are conducive for the inclusion of Chinese. Noticeably, these religious-based organizations are connected by Han Chinese identification, an ethnic identity rather than a political identity. Hence, the Chinese diaspora from the PRC, Taiwan, or elsewhere could participate in Buddhism’s worldly learning in a Thai locality while familiarizing themselves with Thai locals. This research has selected a Buddhist-styled spiritual place, named 妙觉寺 Miào Jué Sì Compassion Foundation, or Miaojuesi for short, as a case study. It was established in 2016 by Taiwanese Buddhist monks with the financial support from wealthy Thai-Yunannese in Chiang Mai (who donated a parcel of land for the spiritual building), the Taiwanese network and other donors. After its establishment, the Buddhist-styled spiritual place has become popular among the new Chinese diaspora from the PRC. The Chinese newcomers found it to be a calm and relaxing place to visit. They usually take their children to attend Chinese writing and reading courses during weekends while mothers spend relaxing time to participate in some activities such as Thai language class, flower decoration class, and food-making course. Miaojuesi is neither purely a traditional temple that practices and spreads Mahayana Buddhism (大乘佛教, dà chéng fó jiāo) nor simply an overseas Chinese Association. However, it is a sophisticated Buddhism education institute and charity association, and it has become a Chinese social space connecting the new Chinese diaspora to the locality. Additionally, Miaojuesi is not a Buddhist temple under the legality of Thai Buddhism; therefore, it could not be registered according to Thai laws as the founder is a foreigner. Therefore, the founders decided to register the place under the name “Compassion Foundation,” which belongs to a foreign charity organization. The leading monk, Jianzhi, is from Taiwan, and he manages all Buddhist teachings, chanting of scriptures, meditation, and other activities. Jianzhi, the leading monk, has graduated from a Buddhism University and has received his bachelor’s degree there. He is highly respected by residential followers who address the leading monk respectfully as “Shifu” (师父, the Master). Shifu

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usually gives “morning class” (早课, zǎo kè), “enlightening class” (开示, kāi shì), “evening class” (晚课, wǎn kè) and sometimes meditation. When Shifu sometimes returns to Taiwan, several Dashixiong (senior practitioners) organize regular spiritual activities. According to our observation, among the regular followers who attend Shifu’s sermon every day, most of them are Thai citizens comprising of the elderly generation of overseas Chinese, especially Kuomintang (KMT) descendants from northern Thailand living in the city, and Chinese study parents from China. As an increasing number of Chinese families from PRC have been arriving at Chiang Mai, Miaojuesi has since begun to support Chinese newcomers by doing charitable, religious activities. One of the senior practitioners, Zhuxin, a Chinese peidu mother and a devout Buddhist, always encourages her son to do volunteer cleaning for Miaojuesi. She explained to her son that his volunteering acts could cultivate his compassion and responsibility. As a pioneer guardian mother in Chiang Mai, she knows how hard it is to survive in a foreign land, especially at the beginning when everything needs to be resettled. After she had mentioned the difficulty to Shifu, Miaojuesi decided to open charitable language classes for the people, especially Chinese newcomers who need to learn. One Thai residential follower who can speak Chinese very well teaches Thai language to the Chinese diaspora as well as teaching the Chinese language to Thai followers at Miaojuesi. In response, hundreds of Chinese newcomers have joined the elementary Thai language class followed by mid-level class while Thai followers have also received Chinese language education from Miaojuesi. By the middle of 2019, to celebrate the graduation of the pioneering class, Miaojuesi even organized a small friendship party and sold goods for charity for both Chinese and Thai followers. During language learning, Miaojuesi has become a connecting node that links the Chinese newcomers and Thai society through the acquisition of languages, Buddhist knowledge and chanting skills. Before the Thai language class begins, the students are required to follow the teachers in chanting “The Heart Sutra” (心经, xīn jīng). After the success of organizing language classes, Miaojuesi progresses in providing flower art, clay sculpting, painting, and classic Chinese reading classes for children. These charitable activities are very practical for newcomers to make new friends, receive free lessons, join in local charitable activities, and experience “real” Buddhism (due to the limited availability of religious instructions in mainland China). Due to the diversity of activities held by Miaojuesi, an increasing number of Chinese newcomers have also become supporters of this Buddhist-styled spiritual place. Miaojuesi organizes a dharma assembly to pray for good and against evil. In some special dharma assemblies, followers can make large donations to eliminate guilt for their past actions. One peidu grandma donated 15,000 RMB to Miaojuesi for her daughter, a peidu mother, to eliminate her sin of abortion two years ago. Not only do purposeful followers make donations, ordinary followers also make different kinds of donations. While cash money is still the most popular avenue, Miaojuesi even opened a WeChat wallet account for Chinese people to offer money donations; the donors can get a paper receipt upon request. By 2019, Miaojuesi has

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received enough money to purchase 24,749 square meters of land to build a larger meditation center that could contain more than 250 attendants. The total budget for the building is 54,512,000 baht (US$ 1.8 million). While we do not know how much the new Chinese diaspora’s donations have contributed to this amount, it is certain that a new residing Chinese diaspora has instrumentally developed Miaojuesi into an established religious institute in Chiang Mai. Social groups and religious-based organizations, such as Miaojuesi, are providing connections through the Han-Chinese ethnic and cultural identification rather than political identity, which can be controversial. In other words, regardless of whether the individual belongs to the Taiwanese Kuomintang (KMT), an older wave of Thai-Chinese residents, or a newer wave of Chinese diaspora from the PRC or elsewhere, all “Chinese people” could come to participate in these places of Buddhist’s worldly experience where there is inclusivity and openness of perspectives.

Conclusion This research has presented the several conditions and difficulties of the new Chinese diaspora who are socially and culturally embedded in Thai society while sojourning in Chiang Mai, Thailand. In addition, this research has elucidated the challenges, such as the barriers of language competence, and in especial, the prejudices and stereotypes engendered by both positive and negative images circulating within Thai society, faced by the new Chinese diaspora. Under these conditions, the new Chinese diaspora does not necessarily choose to integrate in the Thai locality, albeit selectively interacting with Thai cultures in the locality. As a result, we have seen how they have socially formed a “parallel community” while engaging emerging religious-based and online offline-based spaces to foster ties in support of their transient mobile livelihood. Taking the examples of two religious-based spaces and online Chinese parents’ groups, this research has demonstrated the efficacy of the new Chinese diaspora in forming a parallel community. Through participating in Christian-based spaces while forming their parallel community, the new Chinese diaspora experiences a sense of belonging in a foreign land. In addition, they have also gained transnational cosmopolitan knowledge while experiencing different spiritualities and moral values that have been provided by the Thai locality. It is worth noting that in the case of Buddhist-styled spirituality, the open criterion of utilizing Han-Chinese ethnic identification rather than focusing on citizenship, has facilitated the new Chinese diaspora to experience worldly Buddhism while receiving assistance from Thai-Chinese locals to overcome cultural barriers in Thai society.

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Tungkeunkunt, K., & Phuphakdi, K. (2018). Blood is thicker than water: A history of the diplomatic discourse. China and Thailand Are Brothers. Asian Perspective, 42(4), 597–621. Thai economy. The hollywood reporter, December 2. http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/ chinese-hit-comedy-lost-thailand-420445. Accessed 30 May 2020. Tungkeunkunt, K. (2013). China’s soft power in Thailand. ISEAS Perspectives, 33(3), 1–9. United Nation (Population Division). (2019). International Migration 2019 Report. https://www. un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/index.asp. Accessed 20 Sep 2019. Ward, C., Bochner, S., & Furnham, A. (2001). The psychology of culture shock. Hove: Routledge. Xiang, B. (2017). Preface: Hundreds of millions in suspension. Transitions: Journal of Transient Migration, 1(1), 3–5.

Aranya Siriphon is currently an Associate Professor at Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, Northern Thailand. Her research interest includes border and transborder studies, Ethnicity, and Chinese migration in Mainland Southeast Asia. She obtained her MA (2002) and Ph.D. degree (2008) from Chiang Mai University. Jiangyu Li is a lecturer at the Department of Sociology, School of Law and Sociology, Yunnan Normal University. PRC. She teaches several courses including sociology of education, Thai society and cultures. Her recent research includes Chinese cross-border e-commerce to Thailand. She obtained her Ph.D. degree in 2019 from International Program of Social Science, Chiang Mai University.

Re-Conceptualizing Chinese in Bangkok: Embeddedness, Mobilities and Folk Diplomacies Kian Cheng Lee

Introduction This paper examines the contemporary People’s Republic of China (PRC) Chinese in Bangkok, Thailand, focusing on their patterns of mobile embedding and their self-fashioning as unofficial dual-accredited folk diplomats. With the burgeoning literature on the meteoric rise of China, this paper would like to address the following existing gaps: (1) little attention on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) recipient states (Liu & Lim, 2018: 4); (2) conceptual limits of migration studies constrained by the “departure-movement-arrival-integration” framework (Schapendonk et al., 2020: 2); (3) preoccupation on China as “friend-foe” dilemma (Lee, 2019: 92–93); and (4) fixation of single nation-state sovereignty in traditional citizen diplomacy (Lee, 2020a: 129). Through responding to these gaps in a composite manner, the paper aims to provide a re-conceptualization of Chinese in Bangkok that consequentially mitigates the global challenges of rising trade wars, protectionism, xenophobia and racism with positive sum outcomes. Being one of the highest receiving countries of Chinese diaspora historically, Thailand provides an intriguing case to explore the intricate people-to-people interactions between the two countries. Prior to the Covid-19 global pandemic whilst the research was ongoing, an estimated figure of 100,000 new Chinese immigrants—excluding irregular migrants with false documents or irregular employment—were residing in Bangkok. Besides, as the political, information and economic center of the country, Bangkok is a choice research site for it has attracted numerous self-actualizing individuals who utilize the location as a base for their daily operations. Through an ethnographic exploration of lives, experiences, views, and narratives of the Chinese, this paper sets to unravel the complexities involved in their relational and structural strategies of embeddedness, their multiple forms of K. C. Lee (B) Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Santasombat (ed.), Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4617-2_3

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mobilities, and their unofficial diplomatic contributions across both Thailand and China. In the succeeding section, this paper provides a critical literature review on salient theoretical issues while formulating a conceptual framework. Subsequently, this paper establishes the method and data employed in this research. The fourth section provides an extensive local-oriented historical context reflecting the transformative landscape of Chinese in Bangkok. Thereafter, this paper succinctly considers the political context at state-centric level as well as the domestic qualitative perspective. Next, the case presentation and analysis of findings are provided in two sequential sections illustrating embeddedness, mobilities and folk diplomacies and their implications. Finally, this paper concludes with reiteration of the contributions, limitations and recommendations of the paper.

Literature Review and Conceptual Framework This section provides a literature review problematizing the traditional migration studies, integrating mobilities and embeddedness, bridging the contextual concepts of neoliberalism and post-materialism, raising the limitations of citizen diplomacy and soft power, while converging these elements to form the conceptual framework. With the “mobilities turn” (Sheller & Urry, 2006: 208), society has been reconceptualized as inherently mobile where linkages between mobility practices, social relations and their manifestations in everyday life are increasingly recognized (Cresswell, 2010; Urry, 2007). As conceptual tool, this research engages mobility lens as departure from the conceptual limits of migration studies constrained by the “departure-movement-arrival-integration” framework (Schapendonk et al., 2020: 2). This research recognizes the complexity of multi-local geographies for highly mobile groups (Camenisch & Müller, 2017; Favell, 2008; Tarrius, 1995). Within such dynamic landscape, the trajectories of mobility and immobility help us appreciate social life (Adey, 2006; Cresswell, 2006) with local anchorage and relative stability (Zhang, 2018). Hence, this research seeks to elucidate linkages between social, temporal and material aspects shaping everyday mobility, which remain under-researched (Rau & Sattlegger, 2018: 46). In exploring social life under mobility lens, there is a scarcity of literature examining migrants’ management of mobilities across their career trajectories (Liao, 2019: 215). Through mobility lens, one could appreciate migrants’ fragmented journeys with extended residing periods (Collyer, 2007; Crawley et al., 2018; McMahon & Sigona, 2018), and their integration processes accompanying new forms of mobility and circulations (Moret, 2017). Mobile migrants engage multiple activities as a form of social-embeddedness in the host country for long periods of time (Yeoh & Huang, 2013). This social-embeddedness could also involve home-making practices within mobility (Hunter, 2016; Prazeres, 2018). Contra to the depiction of migrants as rootless sojourners, mobile migrants ground themselves in foreign lands (Beaverstock,

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2011). Through situations of immobility, they lay down roots and engage placemaking to foster familiarity, belonging and local embeddedness (Liao, 2019: 219). In Chinese transnationalism, Liu and Ren (2017) advocated the departure of solitary nation-state fixation through conceptualizing “dual embeddedness” to describe the involvement of immigrant entrepreneurs in both the societies of origin and settlement, where economic activities are embedded in social relations and institutions. According to Zukin and Di Maggio (1990), embeddedness describes the properties of a social system in terms of the structure and quality of the established interrelationships amongst members. In this regard, structural embeddedness represents structural network characteristics, including the promotion of common goals and identities and the provision of access to tacit knowledge (Lee et al., 2019). When applied to Chinese transnationalism, this research utilizes structural embeddedness to explicate how Chinese diaspora functionally integrate themselves in various social structures. On the other hand, relational embeddedness refers to the strength of the relationships amongst community members (Wajid et al., 2019). Taking this into account, this research explores symbolic integration in the sense of happiness and belonging forged through relationships. Finally, due to the dynamism involved in establishing connections, relationships and access to resources in different social contexts, this research has adopted “embedding” as a useful concept (Ryan & Mulholland, 2015). Taking a step further, this research employs “mobile embedding” and “embeddedness of mobilities” to conceptualize the multifaceted expressions of embedding in motion reflecting an underlying notion of diverse mobilities as embedded amongst Chinese in Bangkok. By working definition, this research coins “mobile embedding” as referring to the dynamic practices engaged to forge extended and fragmented integration through functional and relational means. On the other hand, this research coins “embeddedness of mobilities” to describe the ingrained habitual state of individuals where multiple lived spaces—tangible and intangible—are constantly navigated, negotiated and consumed. Some scholars construed mobile practices as performances (Cresswell & Merriman, 2011) and “physical, imaginative and communicative travel” (Benson, 2011; Urry, 2007). Yet, in most literature, both embodying and enacting practices are oriented towards producing the self as highly skilled migrants while harnessing resources to sustain one’s status in pursuit of career trajectories across phases of transnational mobility (Liao, 2019: 216). In the same vein of thought, Liu and Ren (2017) demonstrated how immigrant entrepreneurs navigate transnationalism and integration in dual-embedded contexts with the purpose of accumulating economic and social resources for survival and for career development. However, this research distances from such “situation-dependent” view where migrants’ interests are confined in material terms while underplaying affective dimensions altogether (Tong, 2010: 5). In contrast, Lee (2020a: 131–132) elsewhere articulated Thailand’s composite contextual conditions of neoliberalism and post-materialism as attractive to Chinese entrepreneurs. On one hand, Chinese neoliberalism encourages “self-actualizing or self-enterprising subjects” (Laungaransri, 2015: 121). On the other hand, post-materialism, referring to a value shift in the quality of life, individual autonomy and creativity, drives many younger members of the China’s

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working, middle, and capitalist classes to enter different sociocultural and national forums (Zhang et al., 2017: 66, 77; see also Lee, 2020a: 131–132). Hence, within this context, this research recognizes the contextual conditions and adopts a hybridized lens appreciating both instrumental and affective dimensions behind the motivations of Chinese social actors. Under contextual conditions comprising both Chinese neo-liberalism and postmaterialism, Lee (2020a: 127, 140–142) articulated how Chinese have been seeking the enhancement of Sino-Thai bilateral relationships while simultaneously promoting further economic exchange between the two countries. In other words, these Chinese transcend the conceptual boundaries of traditional citizen diplomacy, which are problematized as fixed within the geographical limitations of only a single nation-state sovereignty (Lee, 2020a: 127). In this vein of thought, this research problematizes Joseph Nye’s “soft power,” which is defined as the ability to attract or co-opt countries to one’s will (Nye, 2013). This is because the underlying philosophy of soft power accumulation is the unilateral obsession in seeking sovereign interests of a single nation-state (Lee, 2020b: 5). Even amongst literature revolving around China’s soft power influence, scholars tend to focus on the “appeal as either a state-led project to boost its image overseas or simply a ‘passive’ notion of China’s growing ‘charm’” (Ham & Tolentino, 2018: 47; see also King, 2013 and Kivimaki, 2014). Hence, this research takes heed of the respondents’ self-expression by replacing “citizen diplomacy” with “folk diplomacies” to transcend the fixation of single nationstate sovereignty in dual-accreditation, to accentuate the unofficial non-state social element, and to capture the multiple forms of diplomacy. In other words, this research analyses the dynamism of “self-fashioning” (Ong, 2008) by Chinese social actors as unofficial dual-accredited folk diplomats. In China, local and central governments have used “people-to-people exchange” (人文交流 ren wen jiao liu) to build political trust and promote trade and economic cooperation as China’s foreign policies (Zhuang, 2021:10). However, such people’s diplomacy has been problematized as being over-emphasizing on “exhibitive and pretentious unilateral exports of values, cultural displays, and governmental planning” while neglecting “organic links among civil societies” (Zhuang, 2021: 26). Hence, in place of “people’s diplomacy,” this chapter coins a new conceptual term, “folk diplomacies (民间外交 min jian wai jiao),” to emphasize the dynamic diplomatic participation amongst the realm of common people as opposed to ruling classes or elites. Figure 1 below represents the conceptual framework of this research project. In this framework, the differentiated layering of idiosyncratic identifications in concentric circles seeks to express the complexity of Chinese in Bangkok. According to sociologists, “layered identity” can be a form of emergent identity where ethnicity emerges from “constantly evoking interaction between nature of local community, the available economic opportunities and the national or religious heritage of a particular group” (Yancey et al., 1976: 397; see also Tong 2010: 13). However, this research expands the scope of interaction to include the multiplicities of embeddedness, mobilities and folk diplomacies.

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Fig. 1 Conceptual Framework. Source Author’s own compilation

Method and Data This research takes on an actor-oriented approach through participant observation and qualitative, semi-structured interviews with both Chinese and Thai respondents. Conducted from May 2018 to September 2020, this research engaged over 50 respondents of diverse occupations and family backgrounds. However, due to the delimited space of this paper, views of at least 15 of them were selected, analyzed and presented. To capture the diverse range of informants, this research interacted with Chinese students, entrepreneurs, professionals, and Thai local historians, academics, researchers1 and civil servants. These research participants were identified through personal networks and referrals with the focus on their contributions on various aspects of Chinese migration experiences and future plans. Instead of fixating on rigid model of relocation and settlement, this research encourages open sharing depicting mobile forms of embedding while exploring their motivations behind their practices of mobility and immobility. While there was neither delimitation on age nor length of stay, the majority of the respondents fell within the age range of 30–50 and the Chinese staying in Bangkok between two and 20 years. In the succeeding section, this paper provides the historical context reflecting the dynamic transformation of Chinese in Bangkok in significant places. Without necessarily constrained by geographical limitations, old existing and new Chinese gravitate and mobilize through variegated socio-cultural and entrepreneurial expressions.

1

This research gives credit to Dr. Chada Triamwithaya from King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology Ladkrabang and Dr. Aungkana Kamonpetch from Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University who worked as research assistants in this project from April 2018 to November 2019, and February 2020 to October 2020 respectively.

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Historical Context The migration of ethnic Chinese to Thailand constitutes part of the mosaic of global Sino diasporization that has occurred since several hundreds of years ago. The early migrants are largely from the southern China comprising of the Chaozhou from the northeast of Guangdong, the Hokkien from the southern Fujian, Hainanese from the northeast of Hainan island, Cantonese from the center of Guangdong, and the Hakka from the north of Guangdong. Amongst these diverse dialect groups, the Chaozhou— commonly known as Tae Jiu in Thailand—constitutes the largest Chinese minority in Thailand. The earliest wave of Chinese migration to Thailand occurred during the Aythaya, Thonburi and early Rattanakosin eras. Historically, the Tae Jiu Chinese who are Han Chinese natives have started migrating to Thailand in large numbers as early as the mid-thirteenth century during the Yuan Dynasty or the Sukhothai period. For over hundreds of years, the Thai-Chinese have largely intermarried with many claiming Thai identifications. During the reign of King Taksin who was the son of a Chinese immigrant from Guangdong province, the Tae Jiu Chinese actually became part of the Royal Thai Navy. Following this victory, the capital was moved to Thonburi, and the Siam kingdom was reunified. As a result, these Tae Jiu Chinese acquired an elevated status compared to other ethnic groups because of their strategic military assistance to Thailand. In the Rattanakosin era, the Tae Jiu Chinese began to create a permanent settlement in the Sampeng district of Bangkok. The Chinese settlers were merchants of all kinds, thus creating a hub for retail commerce that continues to thrive today. These communities have become what is known as Bangkok’s Chinatown. The second wave of overseas Chinese immigrants occurred during the reign of King Rama VI. Subsequently, between 1920 and 1940s, Chinese migrants entering Thailand constituted the third wave. However, soon after that, the Communist Revolution and the closing doors of China halted the flow of Chinese migration to Thailand. This disruption persisted till 1980s when China re-opened up giving rise to the emergence of the fourth wave of new Chinese migrants (新移民xin yi min), which continues to the present. Contra to the previous wave, many of them left China seeking economic opportunities rather than mere survival.

The Historical Development of Chinese Community in Sampeng-Yaowarat “Sampeng,” a term referring to the three-way intersection of road configuration with the center near Wat Pathum Kongka Temple, was considered as the first “Chinatown” in Thailand. Built during 1892–1900 during the reign of King Rama V, it was given the formal name of Yaowarat as a royal honor and as a reference to the then-crown prince, His Royal Highness Prince Maha Chiranit. Bangkok’s Chinatown, with the heart at Sampeng, extends from Talat Noi in Sampantawong District through the

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entire stretch of Yaowarat Road while including some parts of Pomprap Satruphai District. The entire area covers approximately 2.5 km2 . The initial Chinese settlers and their descendants have steadfastly held on to distinct aspects of Chinese cultures spanning language, cuisine, spiritual worship, holidays and festivals. Due to its dense concentration of small-scale enterprise, it is also a commercial hub drawing traders and consumers of all ethnicities during the day while converting itself into a magnet attracting tourists to eat and shop during the night. Hence, the area represents a dense and complex combination of business, residence and recreation as an urban lifestyle center. According to Mr. SK (Interview 23 July 2018), a local historian and a Chinese descendant, he used to help his mother, a strict follower of Chinese tradition, to prepare things for worship rites. Ten years later, his mother died suddenly. Though he initially intended to stop the rituals, he carried on for 3 years as it provided a way for him to remember his mother. However, he did not stop since as he discovered the value hidden in the minor details of Chinese rituals. With a changed perspective, he took on a new rhythm of life, which led him to study about the history of Sampeng district where he discovered another world. The following is Mr. SK’s (Interview 23 July 2018) description of the recent historical development. When China had the policy in opening up the country, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone augmented the fourth wave. This wave was different from the older waves of Chinese. Riding on their relatives in Thailand, this fourth wave started coming in while carrying cheap goods from China to sell in Chinatown. These products ranged from cheap electrical appliances to artificial leather shoes. Interestingly, they sold their products in Chinatown, which belonged to the preceding Chinese waves who were comprised of Thai-Chinese descendants. The interconnectivity between the former and latter waves could also be seen in the following example: There was a Thai family of Chinese descent who was selling shoes in the Sampeng community. The family wanted their son to marry an authentic Chinese girl from Chaozhou who was a grandchild of a relative who lived in China. Further, it was noteworthy that even though originating from Chaozhou, sale habits differ in accordance to specific villages. For instance, for those who were from Au Chao Yang Village, they arranged their goods according to descending order of sizes in their shops. However, those from Tien Ang (Chao An) Village did not seem to be organized in their arrangement in their shops. Nonetheless, they seemed to have a system where the salespersons could find their products efficiently. Besides, those from the village Cheng Hai Village organized their shops well and kept their products clean, free from dust. Interestingly, in the event if the shop could not find a particular product required by a client, the shopkeepers would acquire the product from another store so as to retain their customers. According to Mr. SK (Interview 23 July 2018), the third Chinese wave who entered into Thailand could be said to have come from five groups, namely Fujian, Chaozhou, Guangdong, Hainan and Hakka. Each of these groups has its local spoken language with local traditions. Prior to the formation of various associations in Thailand, these Chinese from the preceding wave simply gathered at their respective regular shrines of worship. During the 1980s, the fourth wave’s new Chinese migrants came to find their relatives in Thailand, which were the third wave. However, the

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Thai Chinese descendants of the third wave disliked these new arrivals as the latter lacked hygiene practices and social etiquette. Further, the discrepancy of languages had caused communication problems as the Thai Chinese descendants of the third wave would use Thai but not the Chinese language. Hence, though the new Chinese migrants of the fourth wave who came during the period between 1980 and 1989 relied on their first relatives initially, they quickly moved on to find their new place as they were not welcomed by the descendants of their relatives. For some who were wealthier, they had the capital to start a business. However, for others who were less wealthy, they had to take products to sell in Sampeng. Further, the social structures of Chinese communities in Bangkok’s Chinatown are divided into two categories. The first depicts the formal social structure comprising of committees representing twenty-two communities as established by the district office. These formal committees are responsible for maintaining the management of the shrines as well as other race and clan association matters. The second refers to an informal social structure where self-reliant communal relationships where uncertain management systems perform activities. This rare pattern serves people in the community at diverse dimensions permeating Chinese wedding bands, grocery stores, and all kinds of eateries at alleyways. Due to the urbanization of Bangkok with the infrastructural changes taking place such as changes in mass transit system and land transport, Sampeng-Yaowarat has experienced changes to the Chinese residential patterns. To escape congestion, new settlers are spreading into new communities at other vicinities. To this, Mr. SK who resides in Sampeng-Yaowarat commented, “Many people who have lived in Chinatown have chosen to live elsewhere such as downtown condominiums or large landed properties in distant places. Due to the congestion and noise pollution, no one would like to stay in Yaowarat” (Interview 23 July 2018). Another respondent Mr. Mong who was born and raised in the Chinatown area said, “After my graduation, I found a job. With a regular income, I subsequently bought a house at the suburbs, and I have since moved out from the cramped townhouse at Yaowarat. Suddenly, I felt the spaciousness and the fresh air with clear blue sky. Nowadays I visit the Yaowarat area two to three times a month to do some trading, to do some shopping and eating. However, it does not taste like before. If you were to ask me whether I would return to live in this place again, then my answer would be “no longer.” I would be happy merely to come here for occasional errands” (Interview 23 July 2018). Hence, Sampeng-Yaowarat has a declining Chinese population of the descendants of the third wave. Many shop owners are of the older generations, and many shops are serving as trade facades with the converted functions of warehouse storage and employees’ housing. Summarily, the three groups of people currently living in Sampeng-Yaowarat include the following: (1) third wave comprising older generation overseas Chinese owning homes and engaging in traditional trade, (2) tenants of houses where the traditional owners have bought homes elsewhere, and (3) outsiders of different ethnicities and backgrounds who have come to conduct trade, especially wholesale business involving daily products. Interestingly, it is the third group that has the largest population in Sampeng-Yaowarat today.

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The Historical Chinese Community of Talat Noi or Tak Lak Kia The Chinese community in Talot Noi is formed as an expansion of Sampeng during the early part of the Rattanakosin era. Situated near the Chao Phraya River, Talat Noi was once coined as the “street art community.” After WWII, Chinese business in auto spare parts, due to the abandoned war vehicles and machines, began to thrive. An interesting feature of Talat Noi is the mixture of Thai and Chinese cultures. This includes all five ethnic groups of overseas Chinese (Hokkien, Tae Jiu, Hainan, Hakka, and Cantonese). With the unmistakable Chinese influence seen in the language, cuisine, spiritual worship, and the architecture of the shrines, Talat Noi resembles other enclaves of overseas Chinese in and around Bangkok. The original settlers of Talat Noi came after the fall of Ayuttaya where some of them were the Portuguese as one could still recognize the Christian establishments in the area, such as the Santa Cruz Cathedral on the western bank of the Chao Phraya River. In 1782, King Rama I moved the capital of Siam to Thonburi. Based on the design of the shrines in Thonburi dating back to the late eighteenth century, many of the overseas Chinese who fled Ayuttaya then took refuge in the Christian sanctuaries where many of them were probably ethnic Hokkien. In tandem with Bangkok’s growth during the Rattanakosin Era, the Talat Noi Chinese community continued to develop and prosper where many of its business families became quite wealthy, privileged and were even being granted high status in the Sakdina system of the time. One famous clan was the Posiyachinda family, which had owned the Poseng Harbor and Pier during the reign of King Rama II. Besides, much of the land of what is now Talat Noi was originally owned by Chao Sua Niyom (Phra Sri Song Yot). Later, Chao Sua bequeathed land and buildings to his two daughters, and one of whom had the nickname “Noi,” hence the name of the community became “Talat Noi.” Today, the older overseas Chinese generation of Talat Noi speaks a diverse mix of Chinese and dialects, including Hokkien and Khae. With structures displaying architectural features of antiquity, the place has attracted tourists viewing paintings and murals, which are decorating the outside walls and doors of structures in the neighborhood. In fact, the area has become a favorite for backpackers due to its affordable lodging, central location, multiple transit options, and historical cultural heritage of the area.

Huay Khwang’s Newer Xinyimin of the Fourth Wave Huay Khwang, an area commonly known as Little Chinatown or New Chinatown, is one of the newest settlements of the fourth Chinese wave to Thailand. Commercially, tens of millions of baht changed hands over numerous souvenir shops with Thai goods (e.g., latex rubber pillow stores, Bird’s Nest tonic shops, cosmetics outlets, handbag stores, crocodile skin belts) and sent back to China through this place on a daily basis.

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The stores carry quality brands that are well-known and trusted by the Chinese. In addition, they serve as brokers with mainland Chinese in purchasing fixed assets, such as properties and education institutes. Geographically, Huay Khwang is strategically located in proximity to the Chinese Embassy and the China Cultural Centre. Having established the diplomatic relations between Thailand and China in 1975, the Chinese Embassy was set in operations at Ratchadapisek Road. The Embassy has a consulate, commercial attaché, administrative section, and visa section. The consulate keeps Chinese citizens in Thailand informed of any emergency situation, political developments, safety issues, selected travel routes and destinations while also providing advice in avoiding political demonstrations. The commercial office promotes bi-lateral trade, investment, and finance. The visa section helps Chinese citizens in Thailand to replace their lost or expiring passports while providing essential translation services. Second, the China Cultural Center is located at the intersection of Rama 9 Road and primarily serves to showcase Chinese culture. The Center is supported by Chinese overseas and Thais with Chinese ancestry. The Center also supports the teaching of Chinese language and Chinese history with the goal to promote peace and friendship between both nations. On regular basis, the Center hosts exhibitions staged at various schools to improve familiarity with China while offering on-site demonstrations of Chinese arts (rope weaving, paper cutting, tea brewing, calligraphy, traditional music, etc.). Furthermore, the Center organizes free presentations of documentaries each week, as well as an annual film festival called a Week of Chinese Cinema during December. Collectively, these two institutions provide a gravitating factor for new Xinyimin to concentrate at Huay Khwang. Huay Khwang’s locational strength could also be found in its accessibility to places of recreation, shopping, entertainment, medical facilities and convenient mass transit stations. In terms of shopping facilities, Huay Khwang is easily accessible to Central Rama 9 Department Store, Central Plaza Grand Rama 9 Shopping Complex, Fortune Town Complex, The Street-Ratchada shopping center, the Esplanade Ratchada shopping complex, and the Rachada Railway Market. In terms of Chinese restaurants, Huay Khwang offers authentic dishes made with home-made Yunnan, Szechuan, and Dongbei recipes. Flanking the road on both sides and bringing comfort to the younger Xinyimin away from home, there are at least thirty restaurants featuring hotpot, mala-soup, mala-hotplate, mala-potato, steamed wanton, tomato omelet, Szechuan fried tofu, chicken fried with dried chili and peanuts, Szechuan dried bean sprouts, minced meat fried with potato, spicy cucumber salad with sesame sauce. In terms of medical facilities, Huay Khwang has convenient access to medical centers such as Rama 9 Hospital, the Asoke Skin Hospital, Rutnin Eye Hospital, and Bangkok Hospital, in addition to numerous clinics and pharmacies. Moreover, Huay Khwang’s neighborhood is surrounded by major thoroughfares including Ratchadapisek, Lat Phrao, Rama 9, and Ramkamhaeng Roads. Further, the place has superior location advantages as it has direct links to Sukumvit and Silom Roads while being in equidistant from Don Muang and Suwannaphumi Airports. All of these features have spontaneously made Huay Khwang an attractive site, in especial, to the younger Chinese migrants.

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In summary, the attractive factors of Huay Kwang could be presented as follows: (1) continuous and lucrative economic activity, (2) economic expansion driven by younger Chinese merchants and consumers, (3) places for recreation and a variety of cuisines, (4) expansion of the real estate market by 5–7% per year, and (5) a centrallylocated subway station providing a direct link to key parts of central Bangkok. Thus, it is not difficult to imagine how many Xinyimin have come to Huay Khwang to seize economic opportunities. As a strategic hub of wholesale export to China, there is a constant flow of capital through the neighborhood. Concomitantly, a growing number of the Xinyimin have invested in the neighborhood’s real estate through third parties since the value of the land and buildings in the area has been increasing each year. As a result, one could easily spot numerous high-rise condominium projects in that area, which rent out units to the Xinyimin. Since the turn of the twentieth-first century, this place has gradually been inhabited by these latest Xinyimin—the fourth wave’s younger Chinese generation—who are generally well-educated (at least bachelor’s degree), and are commercially savvy. Born after 1980, they have largely come from Guangxi and Yunnan Provinces. These residents are not permanent or at least they do not intend to settle permanently in Thailand. Many came here in the capacity as tourists to either continue their education or seek short-term employment. The variegated jobs include being Chinese language tutor, translator, tourist guide, store sales staff, company employee and restaurant worker. As an example, one could find numerous Yunnan cuisine outlets along Pracharat Bampen Road that have menus that are written only in Chinese. Thus, Chinese literacy is an essential skill for virtually every resident and visitor here. During a survey conducted with the Chinese living in Huay Khwang, more than 90% of them expressed that it was the first time that they had migrated outside China. About 74.8% said that they came for employment, such as white-collar jobs, Chinese-language teachers and tour guides, while 21% came for study and 4.2% to accompany their family. Some intended to return to China once they have made their fortune or succeeded in their endeavors. During the course of research, it was discovered that the recent Chinese emigration could be precipitated by the lack of job opportunities in China. Statistically, the unemployment rate in China has hovered around 4% for the last 5 years, and some other reports indicated that the jobless rate has tripled to 12.9% since 2012. In deeper analysis of the concentration of new Chinese migrants at Huay Khwang, this research project unravels Thailand’s agreement with the Hanban Institute in recruiting new Chinese bachelor’s degree graduates as Chinese teacher volunteers more than a decade ago. Granted a 1 year term of service, each volunteer spent both the orientation as well as pre-departure periods at Huay Khwang where the “first seed of romance with Thailand” had been firmly planted. Over time, the interests of some of the new Chinese migrants had shifted from volunteer teaching to small-scale commercial enterprise in collaboration with their Thai counterparts. Such collaboration had the effect of promoting longer-term Chinese transnational migration in Thailand. With Huay Khwang as the hub, these young Chinese entrepreneurs gradually established wheel of connections where their spoke-like connections branch into

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varied communities including Suthisarn, Latpro, Ramkamhaeng, Ramintra, Chaoren Krung, and Asiatique Riverfront. These areas are noteworthy for their marketing of Thai products (such as dried fruit, bird’s nest tonic, latex rubber pillows, crocodile skin bags, Thai cosmetics, etc.) to Chinese tourists who either bought them as retail purchases or in bulk, using companies to handle shipping, customs, and delivery.

Lat Krabang: New Destination for Cheap Tour Packages for Chinese Tourists Lat Krabang is one of the eastern districts of Bangkok. Since 2005, it has become one of the five districts included in the new special administrative area of Nakhon Suvarnabhumi around Suvarnabhumi Airport. As Thailand remains popular among Chinese tourists, Lat Krabang has become a source of attraction to Chinese people. The five biggest Thai-Chinese travel agents and Chinese tour bus companies are located in Lat Krabang. Besides, there are many Yunnan-styled Chinese restaurants. Yet, the district’s notorious episode came through a crackdown by Thai authorities on cheap tour packages for Chinese tourists. These companies offering “zerodollar-tour” packages, which had damaged the image of Thai tourism, causing a loss of revenue to Thailand. In addition, some of these younger fourth wave’s Chinese opportunists in this area have also made real estate investment known as “Condotel,” which refers to small businesses combining the functions of condominiums and hotels. Providing the Chinese tour groups with cheaper daily and monthly rental lease options, this business model poses a risk for some illegal activities to be conducted in these premises. From the economic perspective, the popularity of “Condotels” has also impacted on the hotel industry causing a decline in hotel revenue. Thus, the hotel association has retaliated by accusing “Condotels” as violating Thailand’s Immigration Act and building control policy. Consequently, many condominiums have attempted to make renting units on a weekly or daily basis as unlawful.

Sua Pa Plaza: Newer Xinyimin of the Fourth Wave in Mobile Accessories’ Businesses According to local historian Mr. SK (Interview 23 July 2018), those who have come after the year 2000 are generally more knowledgeable. Normally, they have a good network of connections with the initial arrivals from the fourth Chinese wave, and they are well-prepared when entering into Thailand. Many of them speak fluent Thai with Chinese accent and adopt progressive and niche business strategies. Having started small businesses in China, they ventured into Bangkok’s old Chinatown (shoes, clothing, and toys), and swiftly switched their businesses dealing with more advanced

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commodities in tandem with the changing times. Seizing opportunities, they occupied the Sua Pa Plaza Shopping Center selling electrical appliances. To date, 60% of all businesses is owned by these new comers. In this shopping center, one could easily find electronic devices and myriad types of mobile phones and accessories such as headphones, chargers, transformers, and batteries. It is also known that they carry cheap products from China where there are two main routes of illegal IT goods’ import: (1) from Kunming (low grade products) and smuggled through Xishuangbanna to Phitsanulok to Bangkok, and (2) from East China (quality products) to Thailand through Vietnam. Besides, according to Mr. SK (Interview 23 July 2018), some of these newer Xinyimin also sell authentic Chinese food such as curry rice shops. There is another new market, known as “The Leng Buai Ia Shrine Market,” where they have brought products from China to sell there. Interestingly, many of these newer Xinyimin who sell their products at Sua Pa Plaza would say that they are Thai people of Chinese descent. They do not engage much in conversation with their customers, which is a phenomenon quite unlike Thai salespersons who would cultivate relationship with their regular customers. This shows their peculiarity in business conduct. In summary, this historical section has attempted to paint a picture of transforming characteristics of the Chinese settlement in Bangkok. It also portrays the diverse attributes of new Chinese entrepreneurs and their business practices. The next section provides the political context situating the Chinese in Bangkok.

Political Context While this research adopts mobility lens in distancing from the normativity of the nation-state, it does not ignore issues of power, representation and politics (Dahinden, 2016). This section provides the political context of Thailand with regards to Chinese migration. With the Chinese expansion into the entire economy of Thailand over the centuries, Thailand designed and implemented “patriotic” measures from 1939 onwards to restrict Chinese activities in terms of remittances, employment, population control and join ventures (Wu & Wu, 1980: 66, 71). After World War II, Thailand joined the “free world” due to bipolarity while China aligned with other Communist regimes, resulting a long hiatus in diplomatic relations (Sirindhorn, 2015: 1). In addition to the anti-Communist policy, the Thai government implemented nationalist policies from the late 1940s to 1958 (Chantasasawat, 2006: 88). These assimilationist policies included the following: the closing of Chinese-medium schools, arresting openly pro-Chiang Chinese leaders, cowing Chinese clan associations into submission, nationalizing Chinese-registered companies and Chinese-dominated industries, and severing the financial flow from Thai Chinese businessmen to China (Chan, 2019: 329). From 1958 till most of the 1960s, due to the threats from Laos and Vietnam, Thailand continued to seek protection from the US, and availed herself to be the American airbase for the Vietnam in 1965 (Chantasasawat, 2006: 88). It was until

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after President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972—instrumentalized by “ping pong diplomacy”—that the then Thai Prime Minister, Thanom Kittikachorn revised Thailand’s policy towards China through cultural, trade and sports visits (Chantasasawat, 2006: 89). At the height of the Cold War where US shifted its policy focus away from Southeast Asia, Thailand recognized the need to form friendly ties with China (Chantasasawat, 2006: 89). It was the Cambodian conflict (1978–1991) that brought Thailand and China together once more (Chinvanno, 2015). During the Asian Financial Crisis, the Chinese government earned the appreciation from Thai officials when the former pledged USD1 billion with the commitment of maintaining the value of RMB (Chantasasawat, 2006: 91). In the perception of Thai elites, this contrasted gravely to the arrogance and disinterest exhibited by the United States towards Thailand during the 1997 financial crisis (Raymond, 2019: 348). Finally, with the signing of a “Joint Declaration on the Cooperation Program of the Twenty-First Century” in 1999, the contemporary Sino-Thai relations have been augmented beyond security-focused partnership to include multiple trade interactions (Chinvanno, 2015; Freedman 2014). By the turn of the twentieth-first century, there has been a re-emergence of the phenomenon of Chinese migrants heading to Southeast Asia (Sung, 2015). According to Santasombat (2015), new Chinese migrants have generated more extensive and intensive connections with the local communities while maintaining their cultural and political attachments to China as their fatherland. In the case of Thailand, recent Chinese migration has been driven by economic and political factors stemming from the China’s global openness, connection to Southeast Asia through the Greater Mekong Subregion’s regionalization, and the China’s utilization of soft power strategies (Siriphon, 2015: 150–152). From the recipient’s perspective, Thailand has grown in confidence and affection for the China through the latter’s many constructive efforts—including buying surplus agricultural products and supplying tourists to buttress the Thai economy in recent years (Chinvanno, 2015). With China’s current top national strategy of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Thailand has accelerated industrialization through China’s investment (Yu, 2017: 120). In 2018, China’s investment has been expected in Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor, comprising high-speed rail services as well as airports, to be linked with China via the BRI so as to help Thailand grow its automobile, electronics, and information technology industries and thus escape the middle-income trap (Raymond, 2019: 342–343). However, with the lingering territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea, Thailand fears becoming too economically dependent on China and has become suspicious about the latter’s motivations with the BRI’s ambiguous geopolitical and geostrategic implications (Yu, 2017: 121–122). Essentially, while maintaining congruence to the institutional vision of a connected and integrated ASEAN, Thailand has to skillfully weave her pragmatic geo-economics into her foreign policy establishment so as to prevent unbalanced dominance by either China or the United States in their great power competition (Raymond, 2019: 353). In deepening qualitative research, an interview was conducted on 9 April 2020 at the Immigration Bureau with Police Colonel Mr. PR, a Thai inspector of Investigation Division I, Bangkok who shared his perspectives concerning transnational crimes involving Chinese. Having graduated from Beijing with a bachelor’s degree,

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Mr. PR speaks fluent Chinese. In describing the Chinese criminals, Mr. PR narrated: “The first group comprises of the economic fugitives who have escaped to Thailand as they have been involved in corruption in China. Pertaining to this group, the Thai police department works with China’s security task force on repatriating the offenders. The second group, known as call-center fraudster gang, networks both Chinese and Thai partners to phone scam the elderly living in China and Thailand respectively. The third group includes those who operate online stock manipulation or illegal online gambling. These criminals choose Thailand as they find it easy to acquire tourist visas allowing them to stay for 2 months.” (Interview 9 April 2020). In dealing with these criminals, Mr. PR expressed that the current immigration policies are applicable to all foreigners, not just the Chinese. Unlike civil cases requiring prolonged legal proceeding, extradition and deportation involving foreign cases could be proceeded immediately. Hence, coupled with the technological advancements and rigorous Chinese law-enforcers, the situation is well-managed. According to Mr. PR, “while there has been an increasing trend of fraud cases, the situation is well-controlled and there are hardly any serious crimes committed by the Chinese. Not many offenders have been able to escape the tracking by the Chinese police. Even when some offenders have died in Thailand, Chinese legal policies would seriously require evidences on identifications” (Interview 9 April 2020). In essence, Thai immigration policies neither discriminate nor augment both Chinese transnational business as well as criminal activities. According to a Thai academic from School of International Affairs at Chiang Mai University (25 June 2019), there is a lack of targeted sophistication and responsiveness in policy-making, especially towards regional and international relations. Consequently, Chinese mobilities at Bangkok are largely subjected to the variegated legal and clandestine mechanisms. Against this backdrop of fluctuating and volatile Sino–Thai state-centric diplomatic relations as well as abstracted immigration policies, this research will now articulate the mobile embedding and the embeddedness of mobilities by the PRC Chinese in Bangkok.

Mobile Embedding and Embeddedness of Mobilities Chinese “Student-Preneurs” In this category, Chinese “student-preneurs” are defined as those who have acquired their legal status to stay in Thailand through student visa while undertaking economic endeavours as entrepreneurs. For the purpose of illustration, this research raises Mr. CZ as a case study. During the time of interview (23 July 2018), Mr. CZ was 36 years of age and was holding a student visa as he was pursuing his Master’s degree then. Besides his student identity, Mr. CZ, an entrepreneur, was scouting for business opportunities in Thailand. Born in Beijing China, Mr. CZ’s parents are government officials from the military who have started a family business dealing with medicinal herbs. Adopting Chinese government’s “going-out” philosophy, Mr.

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CZ’s parents encouraged him to travel to gain multiple advantages. Interestingly, Mr. CZ went to Singapore when he was 25 years old and by 2009, he has completed his first Master’s degree at Nanyang Technological University. During the 2 year’s study stint in Singapore, he had registered a company as a golf training school while connecting with his family firm based in both China and South Korea through importing and exporting their products. After a few years, Mr. CZ decided to travel to Thailand as he felt that it had been increasingly challenging to gain business profits in Singapore’s competitive economic landscape. On the contrary, he felt that Thailand had many advantages such as having a less stressful social environment, a loosely-structured system that allows greater business manoeuvrability, favourable social sentiments towards Chinese, a choice location with strategic connection with ASEAN countries as well as close geographical proximity to China. In Thailand, Mr. CZ has chosen Bangkok as it is the information exchange hub of Thailand making it more conducive for his international connectivity with China, South Kore and Singapore. After completing his second Master’s degree, Mr. CZ had several plans ahead of him. which included pursuing his philosophy of doctorate at Mahidol University while looking for a suitable place to start a company and build his factory in Thailand. In sum, Mr. CZ expressed his motivation as follows: “I prefer using the student visa as it gives me a feeling of gaining a new experience. I believe in unceasing and continual learning in self- development too” (Interview 23 July 2018). Here, we could see Mr. CZ.

Chinese Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) This category refers to the business persons who have acquired work permits through their formal registration of small and medium enterprises in collaboration with Thai nationals so as to conduct commercial activities in Thailand. For the purpose of illustration, this research depicts Mr. CK who had started two companies, namely Thaiyen Bird’s Nest Company and Elephant Tex (Thailand) Company during the time of interview (24 July 2018). Originating from Kunming Yunnan, Mr. CK first came to Thailand in the year 2003 as a fresh graduate at merely 23 years of age. Then, he was part of the first batch of volunteer teachers under the Confucius Institute Headquarters or Hanban program sent by the Chinese government to teach Chinese in Thailand. For the initial 3 years prior to him coming to Bangkok, he was dispatched to remote places to teach in Chinese language schools. Over time, Mr. CK has grown in his appreciation of Thai humanities, cultures and local customs and has developed a fond affection towards the kingdom of Thailand. In embedding himself relationally at Bangkok, Mr. CK got acquainted with some well-established and successful ThaiChinese who had become his students when he volunteered to provide weekend remedial classes. Beyond classroom, Mr. CK forged deep friendships with these affluent business persons. Fortuitously, this began his entry into the business world as these Thai-Chinese had influenced him. One particular “older sister” guided him and taught him the ropes in Sino-Thai commercial trade. With her support, Mr. CK

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began focusing on importing Chinese goods to be sold in Thai market and gradually extended to exporting Thai goods back to his hometown in China. Hence, it could be surmised that relational embedding is actively at work in him. Transiting into business has also surfaced Mr. CK’s vocational mobility. In specialization, Mr. CK narrowed down to bird’s nest and latex pillows as he felt that these products are unique local products benefiting health and they could also serve as representative icons of Thailand. Invoking the Buddhist belief system, Mr. CK articulated how he would not neglect charitable deeds while gaining economic profits. He put it this way: “In fact, this philosophy of carrying out charitable acts has become a key pillar supporting us as we strive to do well daily in our business endeavors” (Interview 24 July 2018). In terms of structural embedding, Mr. CK collaborated with Thai-Chinese in setting up his companies where he takes 49% share-holding rights. Besides, Mr. CK holds several distinguished appointments including Director of the Thailand’s Chen Clan Association, and Associate Secretary General of both ASEAN-China Commerce Association and Thai Young Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Mr. CK has chosen to reside in Bangkok as it is the capital state, and the political and cultural center of Thailand. Having set up his family here, Mr. CK sent his children to Thai local schools. When asked what his future would be like, Mr. CK candidly replied, “In my earlier years, I might have considered much. However, now that I have a family and my kids are living here, I am less anxious. The world we live in is diversely multicultural and the world is getting smaller. Nowadays, I am no longer concerned about where I live for everywhere is the same” (Interview 24 July 2018). It speaks of how mobility has been embedded as a way of life in his mindset.

Chinese Professionals This category comprises of those who have acquired work permit, spousal visa or other forms of special pass and are gainfully employed as professionals in various settings. In our study, we found a variety of people in this category such as employees of Sub-Confucius Institute, Confucius Institutes, Thai Universities, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), and other private companies. For the purpose of discussion, this research examines the case of Mr. ST who is a sales manager with main office of CPGC Industrial Estate, Bangkok, which is a Thai-Chinese joint venture company between C.P. (Charoen Pokphand) Land Public Company Ltd., and China’s Guangxi Construction Engineering Group (Interview 16 September 2020). While being a third-year undergraduate from Guangxi University, Mr. ST travelled to Burapa University, Thailand as an exchange student in 2010. Concurrently, Mr. ST worked a short stint for Siang Long Trading Co. Ltd., which was a small ThaiChinese company dealing with steel scrap business. His main job was to provide interpretation and translation services as the company had workers from Thailand, Lao and Myanmar. Though his initial motivation in mastering Thai language was to have a career with the Chinese National Security Bureau, Mr. ST did not see his dream

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materialize. Having returned and completed his final year at Guangxi University, Mr. ST’s application was rejected as the Chinese National Security Bureau required someone who could speak Indonesian language instead. Feeling despondent, Mr. ST decided that government official work might not be suitable for him after all. He then found his first job upon graduation as a customer service officer with the American Express Office in Suzhou, Jiangsu province. With a salary of 30,000 Thai Baht per month, Mr. ST quit after four months. Subsequently, he secured the job as an assistant to the owner of Onsen & Spa Hotel in Shanghai with a monthly salary of 60,000 Thai Baht. Between 2012 and 2016, Mr. ST often accompanied his boss to Thailand where they particularly visited shopping malls such as Siam Paragon and Icon Siam, and hotels along Chao Pharya River. Through the years, Mr. ST expanded his command of Thai language as well as his personal networks in Thailand. Thereafter, between 2016 and 2018, Mr. ST worked as assistant to the CEO (Chief Executive Officer) at Shanghai CP Industries Co. Ltd. with a monthly remuneration of 80,000 Thai Baht. Again, he was introduced to many significant companies and prominent business characters. Due to his fluent Thai, Mr. ST was entrusted with the role of contacting with affiliated companies of CP (Charoen Pokphand) in Bangkok. By the time the company decided to pull out from the joint venture with its Thai counterpart in 2018, Mr. ST had decided to leave the company as he found it more interesting to work in Thailand. Mr. ST officially joined CPGC Industrial Estate, Bangkok on April 2019 with monthly salary of 80,000 Thai baht. As a sales manager, Mr. ST had to travel to many places in China to attract Chinese customers in purchasing lands for the purpose of constructing plants or factories in designated areas under CPGC Industrial Estate. According to Mr. ST, his current position was strategic because “the China-US Trade War has caused China’s manufacturing activities to be relocated to Southeast Asian countries so as to evade American tariffs on Chinese-made goods, and Thailand is considered as a safe country for investments and affordable place for relocation of Chinese facilities” (Interview 16 September 2020). In terms of mobile embedding, Mr. ST’s initial launching pad was international student mobility, which he acquired students’ network through various social media platforms where he received assistance and recommendation in employment opportunities. Besides, instead of relying on co-ethnic relations with the older Chinese oversea generations, Mr. ST related more with the upbeat contemporary Thais. He felt that the perspectives and business models adopted by the older waves of Chinese immigrants were obsolete. For instance, Mr. ST created online marketing and sales through releasing critical information under Thai regulations to potential investors who are in his network of Chinese agencies located in China. Finally, while he enjoyed the amicable social milieu in Thailand, he still felt a lack of warmth in contrast to China as his parents, siblings and close relatives were away from him.

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Reflections: Departure from Static Conceptualization of Migratory Practices The first research findings of this study reified the argument that migration studies had been constrained by the “departure-movement-arrival-integration” framework (Schapendonk et al., 2020: 2). Based on the cases mentioned in this section, movements are not necessarily defined by a unilinear fashion. On the contrary, this research has unraveled Chinese mobilities as depicted by relocation, settlement, return, reimmigration and re-settlement. Professor BY from Thammasat University, a Beijing academic who had relocated to Thailand upon retirement, narrated the following: “When the Chinese first relocated to Thailand, they might settle for a considerable period of time and would return back to China. However, they soon realized that their prospects might still be better in Thailand. Thus, they re-migrated to Thailand. Through various modes of social, economic and political connections, they found themselves re-settled in Thailand” (Interview 25 July 2018). Beyond this description, the research has shown the diversity of Chinese mobilities spanning physical spaces (inter-provincial and international), vocational spaces (across different careers), economic spaces (seeking better economic prospects), cultural spaces (where new learning experiences are sought) and ideological spaces (where mobility has been forged as a mindset). Concomitantly, mobility is intricately accompanied with embedding at the relational and structural dimensions in multiple forms. In this regard, Professor BY delineated the three types of Chinese association as organized according to the following: region (different provincial origins), family clan, and professions. While not all new Chinese migrants adopt this approach, joining Chinese associations help some to embed themselves in a foreign place. Religious institutions and practices have also played a significant role in facilitating mobile embedding. According to Professor BY, “I have met many Chinese Buddhists. They were converted to Buddhism in China but felt that they lacked freedom in religious practices. As a result, they came over to Thailand seeking for greater religious mobility. Interestingly, many served as volunteers in Chinese temples, especially those that were built by the Taiwanese” (Interview 25 July 2018). In addition to embedding in Buddhism, this research has discovered many Chinese also sought embedding through Christianity. While Buddhism has undisputedly been the predominant religious institution and practice in Thailand, new Chinese Christianity has recently been added due to the increasing influx of Chinese mobile subjects. Outside of China’s tight ideologically-controlled environment, Thailand has become a metaphorical haven and spiritual oasis for their insatiable thirst to consume the Christian faith. Inevitably, several were converted to Christianity in Thailand and had found edification ministries provided by the Christian community as critical avenues for relational embedding. For instance, the Maitrichit Baptist Church and Sapanluang Church conduct worship services in Thai, English and Chinese languages targeting both Thai people of Chinese descent as well as new Chinese mobile subjects. In addition, these churches conduct religious classes with biblical lessons contextualized through using Chinese Confucian and

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scientific examples. Beyond providing spiritual nourishment, relational embedding has been accomplished through the social activities organized by the churches such as birthday celebrations, language classes, and cooking events. Deriving from the biblical principle of Christian fellowship, the churches cater to their needs for social bonding, giving them a sense of belonging. According to a respondent, this embedding is as follows: “As our Thai language has not been very proficient, the activities in church have helped us to build bonds—somewhat like the guanxi system. We get to learn and practice language skills together. We get to enjoy cooking together. We celebrate birthdays of one another. On average, there are about ten to twenty new Chinese joining us. The church has become a second home to us” (Interview 1 September 2019). However, apart from depending on co-ethnic relations, some of these new Chinese mobile subjects chose to distance from them. The findings of this research have surfaced how new Chinese mobile subjects might also intentionally attenuate their Chinese affiliations so as to explore new opportunities and deepen integration with Thais in a foreign environment. In summary, this section argues that mobile embedding in variegated forms has been adopted while intrinsically, multifaceted mobilities have also been embedded amongst the new Chinese.

Self-Fashioning of Unofficial Dual-Accredited Folk Diplomats Introducing the Case Study of Mr. DJ Mr. DJ, a Chinese professional and PhD candidate residing in Bangkok, concurrently holds senior management positions at the International School, Rajaphruk University, and the College of Innovation and Management, Suan Sunandha Rajabhat University. Mr. DJ was 35 years old when we first met (Interview 25 July 2018). As a brief historical overview, when he had just completed his Bachelor’s degree at Szechuan in the year 2005, Mr. DJ flew to Thailand under the Confucius Institute Headquarters or Hanban program of China’s Ministry of Education. However, after teaching for 2 years, Mr. DJ decided to quit as he intended to pursue his Master’s degree in the field of translation for business and education at King Mongkut’s University of Technology. Since then, Mr. DJ found himself working at different universities focusing on academic interactions between Thailand and China while fostering cultural understanding and economic collaborations between the two countries. Repeatedly, Mr. DJ has coined the term “folk diplomat (民间大使 min jian da shi)” to describe his self-acclaimed mission in serving the diplomatic interests of both countries. From an international relations perspective, Mr. DJ has fashioned himself as an unofficial dualaccredited citizen diplomat to pursue mobile embedding within a self-constructed ideomaterial hybridization of Chinese neoliberalism and post-materialism where instrumental and affective aspects are intricately intertwined.

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Unofficial Folk Diplomatic Contributions to China On one hand, from the standpoint of seeking diplomatic interests for China, Mr. DJ actively propagates Chinese language and culture through education. During the first 3 years in Thailand, Mr. DJ had transfused Chinese cultural understanding in his language training for Thai nationals who were teaching Chinese. Such cultural transfusion includes the introduction of Chinese arts, lion dance, Tai Chi, calligraphy, and musical instruments. As some of his trainees were lacking spontaneity and passion, Mr. DJ used different approaches to arouse interest, which he recounted: “Once, I gave them an assignment, which they were required to produce a work related to Chinese arts. When I probed further, the students revealed how they were fascinated by Chinese antiques and traditional costumes used in Chinese drama. In the course of it, they felt inspired and started doing online research, thus learn more vocabulary words and acquire deeper appreciation of Chinese culture. Finally, they submitted creative replicas of Chinese antiques and Chinese traditional costumes while providing historical background to them” (Interview 20 October 2019). Later on, as his career developed, Mr. DJ volunteered to assist in conducting several summer camps for Thai students where they could appreciate Chinese cultures through learning Chinese language, folk music, traditional lion dance and other forms of fine arts. In addition, Mr. DJ organized short trips for Thai students to gain exposure to Chinese language and cultures in China. Besides, from the Chinese transnational education diplomacy dimension as part of China’s national BRI (Belt Road Initiative) strategy, Mr. DJ has often painstakingly sourced scholarships from Chinese reputable universities for Thai students. Nonetheless, this inadvertently involved Mr. DJ in bearing additional burden to assist the Thai families in dealing with their emotional and material challenges that accompany transnational education. In this regard, Mr. DJ elaborated: “I truly seek to improve the livelihood of the Thai community from a totally selfless approach. Having recommended available Chinese scholarships to them, several Thai parents were anxious about the safety of their children and unfairly demanding that I should be their guarantor should any issues or mishaps occur even though I did not gain any financial incentives. Consequently, I had to shoulder a huge responsibility in pandering to the endless enquiries and requests of parents whenever their children fell ill or had problems overseas. They would blame me when things go awry but would forget about me if their children became successful. Though I felt a sense of being exploited and victimized, I took it in my stride as I was serving a good cause as I could help them understand China better” (Interview 20 October 2019). Being a member from the Chinese Communist Party, Mr. DJ expressed his role in safeguarding Chinese interests: “Many Thais bear a negative impression of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). Due to the historical defeat of KMT (Kuomintang) troops, many Thai Chinese descendants have been indoctrinated with the idea of that CCP had in times past committed vicious acts against the Chinese capitalists. And such false ideology has been erroneously imparted down the generations. However, without gaining a complete and updated picture, many remain ignorant about the CCP’s transformation, progress and contributions. Further, in pale comparison to the

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developed West and advanced Japan, China has never been perceived as a preferred destination for the Thais to pursue higher education. Hence, I felt obliged to paint an objective view through helping the Thai commoners” (Interview 20 October 2019). Finally, at the personal level, Mr. DJ often sought to resolve Thai’s perception of Chinese as unrefined, which he illustrated as follows: “Many Thais often complain to me saying that the Chinese are inconsiderate in raising their voice in public places appearing like verbally abusing the Thais. I would then explain to the Thais that since young, the Chinese have been trained to speak up at home and in school lest they were deemed as ill or lacking self-confidence. Hence, with the explanation of Chinese socio-cultural context, the Thais could begin to understand the Chinese behavior” (Interview 19 December 2018).

Unofficial Folk Diplomatic Contributions to Thailand On the other hand, Mr. DJ also serves as Thailand’s unofficial folk diplomat at several fronts. First and foremost, Mr. DJ has promoted Thai universities to potential Chinese students at middle and high schools, and other tertiary institutes in China. Through organizing exchange programs, Mr. DJ has provided opportunities for the Chinese students to have short-term training in Thai language and cultural familiarization. For instance, on 11 July 2018, Mr. DJ hosted eighteen students from Hezhou University at Guangxi, China for a two-weeks program of learning Thai language and culture. By the end of the program, the Chinese students received a certificate of completion from the Thai university. Furthermore, at the regional dimension, Mr. DJ represented Thai universities in attending China-ASEAN education collaboration activities hosted by the Chinese government. In 2018, he participated the 19th Hainan International Tourism Island Carnival and China-ASEAN University Students’ Cultural Week. Most significantly, he was the master of ceremony presiding over the 18th anniversary celebration of China-Thailand Cultural and Economic Cooperation Summit Forum, the Thai-Chinese Artists Association and the Thai-Chinese Economic and Trade Exchange Center held on November 18, 2017 in Beijing. At the transnational inter-city dimension, Mr. DJ played a crucial role in boosting Sino-Thai bilateral trade partnerships at multiple levels—city, provincial and district. Due to his fluency in Thai, Chinese and English, he became instrumental in facilitating trade agreements and mutual interactions between government officials from both countries. As a case in point, he was the only representative from Thailand who responsibly helped establish “friendship cities” between Thailand’s Chachoengsao Province and China’s Jieyang City. Mr. DJ narrated: “Many Thai entrepreneurs are eyeing Chinese import and export opportunities since China has a massive market and resource base. As a result, the Thai government initiated the forging this partnership to enhance cultural, economic, education, agricultural and other industrial interactions between niche locales. I was then selected and appointed as the middleman representing Thailand in this collaboration. Subsequently, I conducted my research, and I strategically

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planned and systematically executed on the task. Through several months of exploration, dialogue, extensive and elaborate documentary translation work, and other related administrative matters, the partnership between Chachoengsao Province and Jieyang City was finally institutionalized on 1st June 2018. Henceforth, the multifaceted benefits reaped by Thailand include education enhancement, improved diplomatic relations, and increased income for Thai agricultural producers. Though I had to cover the cost, such as travel, tele-communication and other related expenses on many official occasions before the partnership was sealed, I felt that they were part of my contributions to the Thai society” (Interview 20 October 2019). In addition to these, Mr. DJ holds the position of Deputy Secretary-General at the Thai-Chinese Artists Association, which serves as a Sino-Thai cultural diplomatic bridge through organizing interactive activities including artists, state officials and prominent individuals from both China and Thailand. For instance, during one of the occasions celebrating the 60th birthday of Her Royal Highness, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn of Thailand, the association hosted a calligraphy art exchange event where many renowned artists and distinguished guests attended. At the event, a famous Chinese painting was sold for 60 million Thai baht and the proceeds were donated to the royal family as a gesture of diplomatic goodwill. Besides, through the Thai-Chinese Artists Association, Mr. DJ has been embedding himself in different folk-based family clans including Teochew Clan, Cantonese Clan, Cai Clan and Zhang Clan, as well as other vocation-based and locality-based clans. Through these connections, he was able to tap on the available human and other networking resources in conducting his multifaceted bilateral collaborative activities. Finally, even at the personal level, Mr. DJ has sought every opportunity of daily life to assist the Chinese in understanding Thais, which he described: “Many Chinese often complain about the inefficiency of Thai administrators. Whenever I encounter these impatient Chinese, I would explain to them that Thai people are meticulous and treat every step of the work process with respect. Hence, Thai people produce quality work and they regard every customer as highly valuable deserving their excellent service. With such an explanation, these Chinese could gain a new perspective and begin to appreciate the Thais” (Interview 20 October 2019).

Self-Fashioning Through Lived Experiences and Intersubjectivity In terms of his underlying motivation in coming to Thailand, Mr. DJ candidly espoused the hybridization of both instrumental and affective dimensions, where he highlighted: “First, Thailand presents herself as rich in business opportunities. Second, there is an intrinsic desire to serve the community altruistically without seeking personal profits. My motivation is embedded in-between. If I do not have self-sufficiency, then how would I be able to contribute anything to the society? Hence, if I were entrepreneurial, then I would be able to create job opportunities

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providing employment to many Thai people” (Interview 25 July 2018). To Mr. DJ, this process involves “gaining profits to make a living” while “seeking a feeling of self-fulfillment and a sense of self-worth” (Interview 19 December 2018). Through the many years residing in Thailand, Mr. DJ had his fair share of personal disappointments. In particular, he shared about how he had experienced a failed marriage. While Mr. DJ’s fluent Thai could help him cross the language barrier, it did little to help him overcome their enormous cultural and philosophical differences. Mr. DJ explained: “Thai people generally believe in contentment. Living in a Buddhist country, Thai children have been indoctrinated in their education system that birth, old age, sickness and death are natural and they have to curb their desires, which are the cause for suffering. Consequently, their inner drive for development is weak. However, this is contrary to the Chinese philosophy, which is not to be satisfied with status quo but diligently seeking development. For instance, my Thai wife was satisfied with me earning a hundred Thai baht a day. She would be contented with a bowl of porridge and two side dishes expecting me to be home by 5 pm each day. She often lamented that my busyness was a waste of time and I did not need to suffer. However, I felt otherwise. My life is full of opportunities to be realized, which are beyond monetary value. There are many meaningful things waiting for me to accomplish. Why should I live as such a deprived victim? Why did I bother to leave my country to a faraway place? Since I have left my hometown, I should have a grand plan and be prepared to fulfill it by unleashing my potential. I decided to give up my relationship. Though many weddings in Thailand are not officially registered, I chose formal marriage because I was sincere, and I respected the lady, her family, and their cultures and traditions. Consequently, upon divorce, my ex-wife and her family took my house, my car and my money. Apparently, I had been their cash cow” (Interview 19 December 2018). In spite of the traumatic marriage failure, Mr. DJ maintained his unofficial dual-accredited folk diplomatic vision, which he elaborated: “After this incident, I don’t generalize that all Thai people are materialistic. In fact, my Thai superiors, colleagues and friends have been kind to me. Though this painful and tormenting experience has made me more cautious, I do not reject Thailand for I believe that shady characters will inevitably exist but will comprise a minor segment in every society. Regardless of the circumstances, I will always be involved in educational and cultural exchange. My strength is to assist people in realizing their dreams through forging transnational bridges between Thailand and China at multi-levels and multi-dimensions” (Interview 19 December 2018). From an intersubjective perspective, this research has interviewed Mr. DJ’s Thai colleagues. First, Ms. TS is a Thai lecturer at the College of Innovation and Management, Suan Sunandha Rajabhat University. When asked whether Mr. DJ could be considered as a folk diplomat representing both China and Thailand, Ms. TS replied: “Absolutely. Since we have started our international curriculum, Mr. DJ has introduced at least 64 undergraduate students and 17 graduate students pursuing our bachelor’s degree and master’s degree programs respectively. Mr. DJ is a very open, nice and friendly person. For instance, there was once when a new Chinese student was looking for accommodation. Due to difficulty in communicating, I requested Mr. DJ to assist. Though it was a public holiday, he agreed spontaneously and drove us around

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the entire day till we had finally found a suitable dormitory for the Chinese student. Mr. DJ loves Thailand very much. He understands Thai people, Thai personalities, Thai mentality, and Thai lifestyle. He could translate between the two languages fluently. In several Thai-initiated projects, Mr. DJ has helped to promote our Thai products at major exhibitions in China” (Interview 20 October 2019). Next, Assistant Professor PS is a Thai who occupies the office of Vice-Dean at the College of Innovation and Management, Suan Sunandha Rajabhat University. When asked how was Mr. DJ as a person and co-worker, Assistant Professor PS expressed as follows: “He is a good-natured but determined person. He has helped us to overcome many obstacles. He has led us to tap into the vast students’ networks in China. With the new incoming batch of 150 Chinese students, Mr. DJ has easily introduced more than 200 students from China to us. From the broader perspective, he has contributed greatly to Thai education, economy and tourism industries. Besides, he has also helped to integrate both Thailand and China through culture and arts. In his own capacity, Mr. DJ has also been ordained as a Thai novice monk for a period of time as well. In view of dealing with the world’s contemporary challenges, it is critical to have human capital and innovation. Mr. DJ is truly a valuable human capital who can create value-added innovative services that will allow us to navigate successfully into the future” (Interview 20 October 2019).

Reflections: Departure from Static Preoccupation of Friend-Foe Dilemma The second research findings unraveled the Chinese self-fashioning of folk diplomats as embedded within the embeddedness of mobilities. Commenting this phenomenon on his own accord, Professor BY highlighted: “There are many xinyimin (new Chinese migrants) who have contributed to Sino-Thai bilateral relations through different forms of guanxi (Chinese connections). Some of them organize charitable activities, which are beneficial to Thailand. For instance, out of gratitude to Thailand, new Chinese entrepreneurs and social groups offer their services during critical situations such as rendering assistance to the rescuing of kids trapped inside Tham Luang Nang Non cave at Chiang Rai province in 2018, raising funds for victims affected by natural disasters, providing food for the handicapped children, and donating clothes and other daily necessities to the needy in the Thai society. All these initiatives are driven at the folk level, which are non-state-centric in nature” (Interview 25 July 2018). Apart from Mr. DJ, there are several like-minded spirited individuals who have expressed similar passion in self-fashioning as folk diplomats. Inferring to dual-accredited unofficial folk diplomacy, Mr. CK put it this way: “I believe that cultural propagation is bi-directional. It is not unidirectional, which could be considered as cultural invasion. On the contrary, it is a form of cultural blending. On one hand, we transmit the Chinese cultural strengths to Thai people while, on the other hand, we transmit positive Thai cultural philosophy and values back to China so

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that more people could understand this country better. It is bi-directional” (Interview 24 July 2018). Next, Mr. FJ is a Chinese entrepreneur who has founded four Thairegistered companies in the respective fields of translation services, tour agency, business management and real estate. As a particularistic form of folk diplomacy, Mr. FJ coined the term “communication diplomat” to refer to himself as one who utilizes his impeccable Thai linguistic skills to serve both Thai and Chinese people through providing verbal interpretation services and documentary translation work (interview 19 October 2019). Mr. FJ’s “communication” diplomacy hosts a broad spectrum of beneficiaries ranging from royal, government official, embassy, private enterprise as well as comprising diverse fields such as academic-related publications, cultural sports, legal real-estate issues, and tourism-related issues. During our interaction, Mr. FJ elaborated at great length as to how he volunteered his services to assist people from both countries in both formal and informal bases. With a permanent resident card, Thai wife and daughter with Thai nationality, Mr. FJ lives an in-between life as he is not willing to give up his Chinese citizenship. Consequently, Mr. FJ could not enjoy the full privileges as a Thai citizen, such as the right to vote. Nonetheless, Mr. FJ’s dual-embeddedness makes him empathetic to needs of both Thai and Chinese when they encounter problems in foreign countries. In attesting to Mr. FJ’s genuineness in charity, Ms. TC, a Thai researcher, illustrated: “Every Sunday, Mr. FJ conducts free lessons on Chinese language for elderly folks and he has also been a Thai novice monk for a certain period too” (Interview 24 July 2018). Finally, Mr. YP is the founder of two companies (Sin Charoen Rubber Factory; and Tinma International Trading Co. Ltd.), chairman of three organizations (Artist Association of Thailand and China; Thai-Chinese Economy and Trade Interchange Centre; and Thailand Fengshun Overseas Chinese alumni), and associate chairman of Thailand Cai Family Clan. Within cultural diplomacy, Mr. YP has been using “sports” and “arts” diplomacy to foster and sustain bilateral relations between the two countries (Interview 25 July 2018). By sports diplomacy, Mr. YP has used sports competition to bring Thai personnel to the different Chinese cities. By arts diplomacy, Mr. YP has invited Chinese artists to visit Thailand for fine art conventions and vice-versa. In order to finance his diplomatic initiatives, Mr. YP runs businesses in Thailand and in Hong Kong, China. Currently, Mr. YP’s two elder children of his four offspring are assisting him in running the family firms. Fundamentally, his undergirding philosophy is to make Sino-Thai relations a closely-knitted family. Due to the massiveness and frequency of the cultural diplomatic events, as well as the prominence of invited guests and the social-economic impact made, Mr. YP’s folk diplomacy bears exemplary characteristics as follows: (1) altruistic self-funding; (2) non-state bottom-up approach; and (3) significant mobilization and impact. Sharing his motivation, Mr. YP articulated: “There is a prevalent negative stereotype that perceives Chinese migration from purely economic dimension. There is a lack of investigation on how Sino-Thai cultural exchange has been taking place as well as how Chinese have contributed to societies” (Interview 25 July 2018). According to Mr. DJ, “Mr. YP is a classic example of a folk diplomat. He has selflessly funded projects that enhance Sino-Thai bilateral relations over 40 years. Like him, there are many people who understand both countries well and they are here to facilitate

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migrants’ integration and development of careers for the well-being of all” (Interview 25 July 2018). To explicate the static preoccupation of “friend-foe” dilemma, it is pertinent to recognize how several scholars have raised concerns about the presence of Chinese political influencing agents in other countries. However, the researcher has consistently observed that the Chinese respondents in this study are not politically orchestrated nor strategically influenced by the Chinese state. Though some of them might have declared their party affiliation in China, they have not been instrumentally funded by any agencies to conduct their livelihood or diplomatic operations in Thailand. In addition, many Southeast Asian scholars have decried the rise of Chinese economic imperialism. As a case in point, through the study of a Chinese neoliberal project in the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, Laungaransri (2015: 143) critically exposed how China’s “civilizing mission” had deterritorialized Lao residents and Burmese workers - depleting them of negotiating power and freedom. This cautionary stance, while proffering a balanced perspective, has inadvertently resulted in subtly encouraging neighbouring countries to adopt either the “flight” or “fight” approach, referring to “drastic avoidance or extreme confrontation,” towards China (Lee, 2019: 92–93). To this, Santasombat (2019: 23–24) advised against falling into the Thucydides trap—as denoting “tensions between an established hegemon and the rising challenger” by working together to “rectify and improve the global economic, political and security challenges.” In the same vein of thought, Zhuang (2021: 22) advocated “working together” by sending volunteers to “work together” with local people in “fields of their core concerns” thereby promoting an “organic linkage” between Chinese and foreign civil societies, and solidifying the social foundation of relations among nations. As illustration, Zhuang (2021: 25–26) provided the examples of China’s transnational volunteer services to the following places: Indonesia after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in late 2004; Laos for the purpose of improving the melon cultivation method; and Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia for “engaging Chinese language teaching, medical and health service, agricultural science and technology, physical education, computer training, vocational education, industrial technology, international relief.” While these “people-to-people exchanges” had gone beyond superficiality, they were still unwittingly confined as Chinese state-initiated and citizenship-oriented. On the contrary, this research has stepped beyond perceiving China in a “friend-foe” binarism while elucidating the currencies of folk diplomacies transcending state, citizenship and superstructures. In other words, Zhuang’s (2021: 28) “community of shared future for mankind” where “people of different countries for common interests and emotional concerns have formed transnational joint activity networks and even a set of common values system” is not just a distant dream. Hence, it behoves scholars, entrepreneurs, professionals, policy-makers, non-governmental organizations, and members of civil and civic societies to recognize, facilitate and co-construct with the social realm of folk diplomats for a shared future.

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Conclusion Overall, this paper argues that Chinese in Bangkok are multi-layered in their identifications through mobile embedding, embeddedness of mobilities, and unofficial dualaccredited folk diplomacies. In reiteration, multiple layers of social networking are demonstrated across the following dimensions: (1) Within the new Chinese community, this paper has shown how new Chinese became Christians while forging a sense of belonging with the locals as well as other new mobile Chinese through religious activities; (2) With other local Chinese communities, this paper has unraveled how Mr. CK, for example, has learnt the ropes through the help of Thai-Chinese in his entrepreneurial endeavors; (3) With transnational linkages with China, this paper has exemplified, as an example, Mr. YP’s altruistic attempts in culturally bridging the two countries through arts and sports; (4) With other ethnic Chinese communities from Southeast Asia, this paper has illustrated the example of Mr. CZ in his business connectivity with Singapore where Chinese constitutes the majority; and (5) With local non-Chinese community, this paper has articulated how Mr. DJ went beyond his duty to assist his Thai colleague and Thai-initiated projects. Yet, the significance of this research cannot be overemphasized as it seeks to provide a consequential promotion of a shared future characterized with positive sum gains amidst rising trade wars, protectionism, xenophobia and racism across the globe. In summary, the key findings of this research suggest the following directions: (1) appreciating Chinese migratory practices through the lens of multiple forms of mobile embedding and the embeddedness of mobilities in their lives; (2) peeling away the superficial stereotypification of Chinese invasion through recognizing the layered identifications co-existing in complex hybridity; and (3) operationalizing the vision of a transnational movement seeking positive shared future through the social realm of folk diplomacies. Epistemologically, this paper has provided the following contributions. First, replacing the conceptual apparatus of static and linear migratory practices with practices of mobile embedding enables social scientists to observe and analyze migrants’ fluid, creative and temporal expressions. Second, conceptualizing identifications as layered allows social scientists greater clarity in distinguishing between stigmatized identities, integration strategies and hybridized diplomatic ambitions. Third, conceptually substituting conventional citizen diplomacy with folk diplomacies elevates social scientists to transcend beyond single nation-state fixation through dual-accredited roles behind contextual motivations driven by neoliberalism and post-materialism. Based on the research sample size, this paper acknowledges the limitations in generalizing all Chinese residing in Bangkok, Thailand. Given their multifarious occupations, reasons and interests, this paper avoids compartmentalizing and glamorizing all Chinese as self-fashioned folk diplomats. Regardless, this research has discovered the potential of particularistic driven individuals with commendable initiatives that could be further orchestrated as an impactful transnational social movement. Hence, further studies should be conducted in operationalizing the vision

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of creating a shared future through the expansion of nationalities, the empowerment of folk diplomats and the synergy of ideas.

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Kian Cheng Lee is an Associate Professor in the School of International Affairs, Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University, Thailand. His current research concerns Chinese business practices, transnational entrepreneurship, cultural and citizen diplomacy, and Thai religious networks. He is also a member of the board of the Asian Pastoral Institute Ltd. in Singapore.

Reconsidering the Chinese Identity: Cultural Reproduction in Phuket Gastronomy Jakraphan Chaopreecha, Nicha Tovankasame, and Pittaya Limbut

Introduction This chapter explicates the phenomena of how gastronomic cultures of overseas Chinese descending in Phuket have been transformed into one of the main sources of local incomes, national economy, and global culinary knowledge. Cuisine culture has long been a significant element of ethnic reminiscence passing from one generation to another. For many overseas Chinese residing in Southeast Asia, food has played important roles in many aspects connecting the subjectivity to a larger domain of sociality. The ways in which cuisines are scrutinized do not just pinpoint the ingredients and recipes, but the expressiveness of family narratives and community bonding through materiality of food. In this regard, Noyes (2009) points out that the emergence of narratives circulation among social groups in the past has constructed traditions and inherited practices. Their culinary experiences become living legacy and entail the distinctive values of ethnic continuity. It is worth noting that the framework of examining the cultures of overseas Chinese is different from those of mainland China. Southeast Asia was an important sea route for China, and it was the first region where many Chinese immigrants had migrated to settle permanently. Historical evidence demonstrated how the massive influx of the first Chinese generation and their descendants had migrated to Southeast Asia. By 1949, most of them had changed their nationality as they attained citizenship from their host countries (Cao & Lin, 2018). The ethnic Chinese group is commonly referred to as Huaren (华人) or people with ancestry from China, Huayi (华裔) or Chinese descendants, and Huazu (华族) or Chinese ethnic group. They are the J. Chaopreecha Department of Computing, College of Computing, Prince of Songkla University, Phuket Campus, Phuket, Thailand N. Tovankasame (B) · P. Limbut Faculty of International Studies, Prince of Songkla University, Phuket Campus, Phuket, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Santasombat (ed.), Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4617-2_4

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Chinese people and descendants who have lived in Southeast Asia for a long time and have spread widely (Yu-tsuen, 2012). The overseas Chinese group has completely integrated into all Southeast Asian countries and has become part of the local community in the respective host countries. Although they have settled in different countries and have acculturated to distinct societies, they have retained some aspects of social values, traditions, and lifestyles, and cultural identities while maintaining their loyalty to their host countries. Based on the foregoing context, it can be concluded that overseas Chinese and their descendants who have migrated to Phuket are among the first generations. Most of them are Hokkien Chinese who have migrated from Fujian Province. These cultural identity resources, which are mainly derived from the overseas Chinese group, are the key elements in promoting tourism and generating income for Phuket in the present. Oriented by the ideology of flexible entrepreneurship and business connection, the transnational networks of overseas Chinese have gradually formed their newfangled identity (Ong, 1999). Due to the influences of globalization and deterritorialization, Chinese transnationalism has reproduced the discourses about ethnic self-celebration of hybridized cultures (Ong & Nonini, 1997). To understand their imagined solidarity, there is the “process of reinscribing culture in new time–space contexts” (Inda & Rosaldo, 2002: 10). Cuisines represent the cultural identity of the transnational groups. Such identity can create unity among members although it differs from what appears in their mother countries. However, the mobile practices might be contingent on the variegated cultural contexts of the host countries. It consequently creates multiple practices in different domains and purposes. In Phuket’s contemporary society, cultural resources are necessary for creating tourism products and services. Phuket cuisines are mostly mentioned as one of the important resources. To promote local cuisines, Phuket’s local scholars have submitted the documents to UNESCO to be a member of the creative city network. In 2015, Phuket was chosen to be a creative city involving seven categories—crafts and folk art, design, film, gastronomy, literature, media arts, and music. (UNESCO, n.d.). Phuket is categorized as a city of gastronomy in accordance with the abundance of culinary resources. Especially among Hokkien Chinese descendants, food is necessary to life nourishment and is used for symbolic communication. Some cuisines bear positive meanings; for example, noodles symbolize longevity and a dessert made from glutinous rice flour means unity among community members. At present, Phuket people still use food with prosperous meanings in their rituals. This maintains the continuity of cooking traditional recipes. However, the status of Phuket as a gastronomic city has driven the locals to find a new practice in the global food market. Many street food vendors are suggested by Michelin guide,1 which endorses the popularity of the shops. At the same time, the local restaurants have started to develop their own recipes. For instance, local Hokkien Chinese sweets are combined with ice-cream and western bakery. Local food is also promoted in the hotels and restaurants as exotic cuisines. Phuket people are in the

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See Michelin guide. https://guide.michelin.com/th/th/phuket-region/phuket/restaurants.

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dichotomous situation of either maintaining their traditional cuisine or transforming their foodways to enhance their cuisine’s economic value for commoditisation. It could be seen that the Chinese descendants have included Phuket cuisines in their cultures and economic development. Food is both life subsistence and a subject in which cultural identity is conveyed. Compromising traditional culture, food substances, communications, and economic activities, the Phuket culinary landscape has dynamically been transformed in accordance with the change of society. From tin mines to the global tourist destination, Phuket people are urged to accept the inevitable introduction of foreign cultures and technologies while maintaining the local cultures. Thus, living in the context of polarized culinary landscape, Phuket descendants need to negotiate their self-identity, the expectation of society to inherit traditional cultures, and the ways to live in modern society. Hence, this chapter aims to observe how the Chinese descendants perceive and adjust themselves to the transformation of Phuket society by using cuisines as a medium to understand the phenomena. This study utilizes the ethnographic method to examine cases. The data has been collected from July to August 2021. However, the researchers have conducted research related to Chinese cultural studies in Phuket from 2014 to 2017 and are well-acquainted with the research field and informants (Chaopreecha, 2017). To describe the phenomenon, three cases of Phuket descendants who maintain their cultural identity through the food-making process are chosen. The cases are classified by age to reflect the decision-making process of their respective generations. The first case is a second-generation Chinese descendant. At her retirement age, the informant utilizes social media to communicate her knowledge in cooking Phuket food. The second case is a third-generation, middle-aged Chinese descendant who develops Phuket cuisines for the gastronomic market. The last case is a young thirdgeneration Chinese descendant who works in the office during the day and prepares Phuket sweets at night. The sequential data reveals how different generations of Phuket descendants negotiate their ways of life under the Phuket’s fluid culinary context. Finally, the case of Chinese expatriates, through their narrative experiences, is introduced in order to unravel how Phuket culinary landscape includes the global food market.

Cultural Reproduction and Inheritance of the Social Identity Through Chinese Cuisine This section introduces the framework used to analyse the case of Phuket gastronomy. Although Phuket gastronomy permits people to develop food recipes openly, the traditional culture is necessarily concerned. Without the cultural meanings, food does not have a high value in the creative economic market. Thus, Phuket people have started to realize the significance of incorporating cultural preservation within the process of product development. Nevertheless, the food culture is dynamic as

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it is sensitive to societal changes. To grasp the development of culinary culture and its landscape, the concept of social identity and cultural reproduction should be primarily discussed. Food is not only a main source of subsistence, but it has also become a medium in which culture and social identity are communicated. Food conveys symbolic meanings (Barthes, 1972: 62). Meat symbolizes freshness and nature while vegetables symbolize high nutrition for good health. Food represents the national identity of consumers (Alder, 2015). Some recipes are widely adopted by societal members and eventually become national cuisines. The use of ingredients and the cooking process could reveal the origins of recipes. Hence, celebrating important days with national cuisines amongst friends creates a perception of communal solidarity. Cuisine is the result of a cultural process in which the edible and inedible ingredients are managed and categorized (Fischler, 1988: 287). Through a long history, people in different regions have developed their unique ways of cooking. This journey involves testing several combinations of various ingredients till the recipes for the most desired tastes are formulated. Thus, an appropriate mixture of the ingredients found in a specific locality creates a distinguishable taste. By preserving the ingredients and recipes, the social identity of people could be maintained. In the case of migration, people brought the knowledge of food with them. Although it is difficult to find the ingredients in the new settlement, the substitutable ones are chosen. This creates the variety of food in different domains when migrants seek to perpetuate their food culture. Over the decades, the emergence of new identity variants communicated through food materials is possible. However, the interconnection of collective identity among migrants in different places is still feasible. Cultural reproduction is defined as the social process of passing on cultural practices, shared belief, and values, from one generation to successive generations (Bourdieu, 1977). The meaningful transmission of culinary culture possessed by individuals and families of overseas Chinese has been brought into consideration. Cheebeng (2011) studied the development of diasporic Chinese food in Southeast Asia. By focusing on Nyonya food as a product of Baba Chinese in Malaysia, it illustrates the cultural reproduction of Chinese cuisines, as well as the creation of new foods from knowledge influenced by Chinese, local non-Chinese, and western cookery. In contemporary times, cuisines have been documented as a cookbook, which could transform the traditional meaning of food (Appadurai, 1988: 22; Baron, 2016: 284). The political, social meanings of food—high and low class, national and local regions, masculine and feminine—are intertwined when the recipes are disseminated in the modern market. Anyone with instant or ready-made food products could prepare the cuisines without difficulty in finding the ingredients. Likewise, the development of logistics in the modern market could shorten the distance between localities, which eventually dissolve the sociocultural domains of foods. It can be emphasized that food is not only a result of a scientific process through mixing the ingredients and converting the raw substances into edible ones with high temperature, but it is a cultural process too. From the methods used in gathering

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ingredients to the practices of food consumption, humans ascribe values to all procedures of the food process. Such a food process also produces cultural norms, traditions, lifestyles, and social orders. The changes occurring in the food process are concomitant to societal changes. When food recipes become merchandised products, people tend to ascribe different meanings to them as underlain by their culture. Due to the development of regional culture and globalization, culinary sense has been transformed and has inadvertently resulted in the negative value reduction in food authenticity. At the same time, the positive impact would appear to resuscitate the culinary form through social media and tourism promotion (Oh et al., 2019). In other words, the development of food production likewise affects the change of the cultural meaning of food. People perceive the developed food recipes as inauthentic ones while the creative economy needs the new products to support the growth of the economic market. Under these dichotomous circumstances, local people deal with societal change by expressing their culture through traditional cooking. This becomes a way of cultural reproduction through the process of cuisine production.

Culinary Landscape of Overseas Chinese in Phuket This section situates the context of Phuket foods through the historical lens of Chinese migrants. Culinary landscape comprises of a space–time in which the traditional practices of the food process are maintained. At the same time, the landscape has dynamic characteristics. The relations among people, food ingredients, cooking knowledge and economic activities have been transformed in tandem with the change of locality and the advent of the global market. The cultural resources are deemed to be useful for the tourism industry. Phuket has been recognized as an economic-driven city due to the transnational enterprises of overseas Chinese communities. Originally from Fujian province of Southern China, many Chinese migrants, known as the Hokkien ethnic group, had migrated to Phuket during the nineteenth century. They were the same group with other overseas Chinese settled along the Strait of Malacca, and found in Singapore, Johor Bahru, and Penang (Purcell, 1997). The term “Peranakan,” influenced by Chinese settlers in the Malay Peninsula, is employed to address the descendants who were born from the intermarriage between Hokkien-ethnic migrants and native people. Baba refers to male Peranakan, while Nyonya is used on female Peranakan (Ansaldo et al., 2007). The second generation of Chinese in Phuket was not familiar with addressing themselves as Peranakan. They preferred the term “Jeen Baba” (Chinese Baba) since the southern Thai dialect had increasingly been used in everyday life. However, the present generation of Chinese descendants just identify themselves as “Luk Lan Chao Jeen” (Chinese offspring) in Thai due to a complete loss of Baba Hokkien language in their daily conversation.

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Due to the ascendancy of nationalism, the majority of Phuketians have lost their use of the Hokkien dialect amongst their family members and other Baba companions. Nonetheless, in spite of their assimilation to Thai society, many of their practices have persisted in the multiple forms of food and recipes, festivals, belief and ceremonies, architectures, shrines, and costumes. While Peranakans in other regions may find language as the most significant identity marker, Phuketians have acculturated themselves through syncretizing and embedding Hokkien, Malay and English lexicons in Southern Thai dialect as their main language of communication at both private and public domains. Chinese traditions and values have also been amalgamated with the Malay cultures, as well as Western lifestyles. This acculturation process explains their ambiguous identity as a hybrid culture bearing some semblances of Chinese architectural design, costumes, and cuisines. It gives the impression that Chinese Babas have comfortably adjusted themselves to the host countries by embracing some elements to create their own unique cultural traits. Their malleability can be observed in the context of Jeen Baba in Phuket (Tantivit, 2006). When many Chinese Baba families from Penang migrated to Phuket, they brought their culinary tradition known as “Nyonya cuisine” along. Subsequently, they have also learnt to utilize the local ingredients in creating their own recipes. The term Nyonya represents the femininerelated cultures found in traditional costumes and heritage cuisines. To some extent, the cuisines of each region have been developed with different methods, ingredients and tastes. This heterogeneity could also be found in the culinary culture of Nyonya. For instance, the culinary identity of Malacca Baba was influenced by Portuguese and Indonesian, while Thai culinary culture had influenced Nyonya cuisine of Penang Baba to acquire a sour and tangy flavour (Yoshino, 2010). The cultural mobilities and traditional sharing between Phuket Baba and Penang Baba occurred due to the bonding of clans, ethnic alliances, and transnational businesses of tin-mining industry. The trade growth also attracted more capital, labour, innovative materials, and equipment to develop both towns (Nasution, 2013). Wong (2007) explained that tins were the only exportable product of Phuket to Penang in exchange for the import of China goods and foodstuff in the circa 1869–70, which included rice, coconut oil, brown sugar, salted vegetables, crockery, vermicelli, mats, iron pans, clothing, and Chinese trousers. Along with the success of the transnational tin business, the extensive line of exportable products from Phuket to Penang included pigs from Tongkah and watermelons from Kathu in 1901 (Kynnersley, 1901, as cited in Nasution, 2009). Phuket and Penang have been known as twin cities due to their shared cultural materials and elements in diverse aspects. The construction of old buildings in Phuket Old Town was influenced by colonial architecture in Penang due to the cultural dominance of Baba elites and businessmen operating transnational trading. Thus, to establish mutuality, all construction knowledge, materials, appliances, and craftsmen were transferred to Phuket. After a century, the idea of building preservation emerged, albeit limited knowledge of restoration. Phuket Baba has lost their Hokkien Baba dialect and craftsmanship because the national policy of cultural assimilation has played a significant role in transforming some Chinese Baba identities. In this regard,

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many Phuket Baba uphold Penang Baba for retaining authentic Baba cultures that can no longer be found in Phuket. Aun, a 30-year-old male Chinese descendant from Betong, Yala was studying in Penang for many years. He married a Phuket Baba female and opened a Baba dessert shop by receiving online dessert orders since 2019. During an interview, Aun visibly demonstrated his determination in selling his Baba dessert, which was prepared using original Penang recipe. He gave an intriguing description on authentic Baba culture, especially the Nyonya food. He stated as follows: I got the recipe for Baba kueh (sweet) from Penang. My master gave it to me. The recipes I inherited are original and are derived from our ancestral cuisine. These recipes retained the original taste. I know some ingredients are difficult to find within the local vicinity, but I can import them from Penang or Taiwan to make sure that all my kuehs are authentic and original. Phuketians should get to try how delicious and exquisite the original kueh are (Interview, August 15, 2021).

The idea of “originality” Aun used in the foregoing context implies an ethnic distinction of Chinese Baba in which Penang has maintained in everyday life for generations. When the third or fourth generation of Phuket Baba refers to “original food,” it tacitly entails the authenticity of culinary recipe and taste reflecting the phenomenon of how Phuket Baba has reminisced their cultural memories and how they are rekindling the good old days. On the other hand, Penang Baba refers to Phuket shrines and some Chinese traditions or ceremonies as the oldest cultural forms that retain the genuine beliefs and practices of Chinese Baba. Given that both Baba ethnics view their cultures perpetuating from one generation to another through the use of terms such as “authenticity,” “originality” and “oldest,” one could deduce the resilience of cultures, albeit various interpretations, against the dynamism of localization and globalization. Culinary cultures of Phuket Baba can be observed in broader settings tracing back to the expansion of industrialization. Large amount of food supplies for coolies were in demand during the growth of the tin industry in the 1820s; thus, it had established a domestic production of bean curd and reared livestock in mining areas (Nasution, 2009). The food culture of coolies has become worth discussing as a legacy till the present. Breakfast is the most significant meal that many Phuketians prefer as they require substantial energy to maintain their heavy workload. They usually consume desserts made of glutinous rice and flour-based snacks with condensed-milk flavoured kopi (coffee) in the morning. The miners’ dietary habit of heavy breakfast and rapid consumption have impacted their subsequent generations as their descendants claim how those desserts have given them tremendous amount of energy fuelling their minds and bodies, just like how the food had helped their ancestors. The culinary heritage of Phuket in the present is influenced by the local Southern Thai and Baba Malay. According to an interview with a Phuket historian, Ms. Ruedee (2021), the Baba Malay food found in Phuket was introduced by the overseas Chinese community inhabited in and travelled across the regions of Malay peninsula, including Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar. When asked about the most representative dish of Baba Malay amongst those above 60-year-old descendants, the first response was tumee or fish curry as it reminded them of their

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mother’s recipe in the past. Unlike the original flavour of traditional Malay curry, tumee has a distinctive taste of mild spiciness that comforts the Malay Baba. Meanwhile, many Chinese cuisines are fused with local ingredients (namely, coconuts and bananas) and high-class food (namely, shark’s fin and bird’s nest) by Southeast Asian influences (Junru, 2010). Another dish, normally referred to as kari maifan (known as curry mei fan in Singapore) or rice noodles with curry, characterizes the combination of Chinese ingredients and Malay curry with gently spiced flavours. Although these dishes typically exist in Singapore and Malaysia, they are uncommon in Phuket. Viewed as a non-halal option, the Phuket Baba food is regarded as different from the Malay Baba food. When it comes to localization, the Phuketians seek to include local ingredients, such as pineapple and seafood, to re-create their original Baba curry into a sour pineapple curry with shrimp and pork. Some dishes are even difficult to be recognized since their names, recipes, ingredients, and cooking methods have been transformed from one domesticity to another, which can be modified from one generation to another. Additionally, the varied foods in Phuket culture are relevant to different religious practices. Phuket people have a belief that deities in Mahayana Buddhism and Taoism abstain from meat. Thus, Phuket residents worship deities with sweet snacks bearing different meanings related to life and death. For example, a sweet snack called angku is famous for venerating deities. Angku kueh (Hokkien Chinese: 红龟粿), or angku in short, is a traditional Hokkien dessert made from glutinous rice flour filled with grinded green beans. Angku is usually moulded in the shape of a tortoiseshell with red paint (ang). The sweet snack varies in size depending on the wooden-block mould. This sweet snack could be found in various places in Southeast Asia such as Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia where Hokkien Chinese had migrated to. Phuket is one of the destinations where the migrants came to be labourers in the tin mines. Phuketians consume sweet snacks in everyday life. Energy from carbohydrates was needed for the laborers’ work in tin mines. Hokkien migrants might have ang ku with kopi as a breakfast, and this has become part of the local culture. Angku is a representation of longevity with regards to its tortoise shape with the word longevity (Hokkien Chinese: S¯ıu 寿) at the centre. Thus, it appears in numerous rituals such as worshipping deities in Chinese New Year ceremony, venerating the Jade emperor, and blessing one-month-old children. Moreover, Phuketians also worship ancestral spirits with angku in the Hungry Ghost Ceremony (Hokkien Chinese: Pu-du 普渡) conducted during the seventh lunar month. The worshippers have a belief that they must bring a larger angku to the ceremony in the following year if they have been successful in doing business. The spirit could bestow further luck on them as a result. Since there is no large wooden block, the large-size angku may be made of sticky rice, cooked with sugar, and sculpted into a turtle shape with a head and four legs. Currently, angku has become an iconic food in the tourism industry. The Hungry Ghost Festival and the Emperor God Veneration Day are promoted to be the festivals where tourists can experience local cultures and traditions. The image of angku is modified and painted by an international graffiti artist. This image has become the street art presenting on buildings in the old town area and has become a renowned

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place for photography. Gastronomy drives the economic system by transforming the cultural resources. Therefore, the local people have tried to reconcile their different perspectives towards local foods in order to conform to the new economy. In summary, Phuket’s culinary landscape is dynamic. It can be pointed out in two aspects. First, the geographical domains between localities are interconnected through the food process. Occurring across different Chinese migrants’ communities in Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan, this interconnectivity has influenced the Phuket culinary culture. The ingredients, recipes, and knowledge could be transferred between localities in the production process. Second, the food process has taken place over a period of time. In the past, all kinds of foods were produced mainly in the private domain where the housewife was the main person in the family who had the knowledge in cooking. Thus, the communication of family virtues from private to the public spheres was conducted through the Chinese rituals. However, at present, the different foods have become a product in the tourism industry. The Chinese rituals have been transformed into festive occasions meant to be promoted for tourists. Hence, housewives have transferred their traditional knowledge to their descendants who have found new roles in the modern market.

The Emergence of New Chinese Generation in the Phuket Gastronomy Tourism After Deng Xiaoping, the Communist Party’s second-generation leader in the late 1970s, announced the country’s reforms and opening-up policy, China has gradually reopened their doors. This has inevitably produced a new wave of Chinese migration resulting in a massive influx of Chinese immigrants at different countries around the globe. Although this group of people was initially referred to as “Chinese immigrants after China’s reforms and opening-up policy” in 1978, the terms used to address them have since been broadened. They are now commonly addressed as the “new generation of overseas Chinese (新华侨华人),” “new generation of Chinese immigrants (华 人新移民)” and “young Chinese immigrants abroad (中国海外新移民).” To differentiate them from the older immigrants and descendants who emigrated before 1949, they are identified as “new generation” (Cao & Lin, 2018). It is evident that in recent years, China-ASEAN economic relations have grown and have become closer to both trade and investment. In addition, the policies of the destination countries are the major factors in the resettlement of migrants. Many Southeast Asian countries have relaxed policies to attract or allow foreigners to settle. For example, Singapore has an open-country policy that provides opportunities for foreign talents to settle legally. This is an example of pull factors drawing a huge influx of young Chinese immigrants into Southeast Asia. These new Chinese immigrants include Chinese tourists, Chinese students, Chinese teachers, and Chinese workers (Triamwittaya, 2015).

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Moreover, in the case of Thailand, the government has initiated the easement of policy on entry requirements, such as the issue of visas on arrival or otherwise known as checkpoint visas, to Chinese nationals. During the year prior to the coronavirus outbreak in 2019, Thailand witnessed a large arrival number of Chinese tourists which had generated huge revenues for the Thai economy. According to preliminary data from the Ministry of Tourism and Sports, the expansion of the Chinese tourism market has been evident since 2008. Between 2008 and 2018, the tourism experienced a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 39.3% (Ministry of Tourism & Sports, 2019). This gave rise to the increased number of Chinese-based tourism businesses, such as hotels, shops, restaurants, tour companies, serving Chinese tourists in particular. Since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Chinese economy has grown rapidly to become the world’s second largest. Undoubtedly, the increase of Chinese economic power had fuelled Chinese outbound tourism, which massively contributed to the economic growth of the destination countries including Thailand. The current Chinese generation differs from the preceding one. Though they have been perceived as impolite by many in several host countries, these new Chinese possess unique characteristics as they have been nurtured under the high-pressured environment within a competitive-oriented society and nationalistic mindset (Triamwittaya, 2015). In mainland China, seafood is scarce. Thus, many Chinese tourists seek to consume seafood when they visit other countries. Since seafood in Thailand is cheap, fresh, and widely sold in the market, it has become popular among Chinese tourists. Moreover, to the Chinese, seafood consumption connotes the symbolic meaning of wealth. There is a Chinese proverb, “food is heaven for people,” which expresses the notion of how Chinese people desire to stay healthy by consuming decent food. Thus, to many Chinese tourists, the major reason to visit Thailand is to discover exotic cuisines and local fruits, such as Tom Yam Kung, fried clams, durian, coconut, and mango. As a result, there has been cooperation between Thailand and China to promote Thai food products in China. This could be seen at food festivals that are periodically conducted during festive occasions, such as Chinese New Year, Dragon Boat Festival, and Moon Festival. Related to this, Phuket’s culinary tourism was further enhanced when the Michelin Guide 2019 presented a list of restaurants located in Phuket and Phang Nga. This boosted the local tourism and generated income in the Phuket community.

Jee Pek: Culinary Reproduction Through the YouTuber of Phuket Cuisine Social media is one of the significant tools in reproducing the bygone traditions and cultures in the context of globalization. In the contemporary society, the culinary heritage has been communicated to younger generations on a large-scale through

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online platforms. The case of a local YouTuber, Jee Pek, unfolds the practical changes in Phuket cuisines when social media intermediates between the traditional culinary adeptness and modern cultural knowledge. Jee Pek is a 70-year-old woman and the third generation of Phuket Baba ethnicity who was born in a middle-class family. Her father was a government officer, and her mother was a housewife. As a daughter among seven children of the family, Jee Pek, accompanied by her little sister, assisted her mother in making Phuket dessert for sales in the neighbouring kopitiam (coffee shop). She expressed that having acquired the culinary skills and techniques from her mother, she carried on her passion by enrolling in a women vocational school. Upon graduating from junior high school, she learnt more about craft-works such as cuisine techniques, tailoring, and hairdressing. The vocational education was desired among Phuket teenage women in the 1960s to 1970s as it uplifted the domestic labour to institutionalized artisans for better job opportunities. Jee Pek explained the situation of how her life began to intertwine with cuisine and how her mother took part in the family earnings during the 1960s. She stated, When I was around 15 to 16 years old, I was a valuable assistant to my mother in making desserts. To me, her desserts were scrumptious. Our parents were not rich but they could afford to look after seven children. I remember that my father was not the only breadwinner since his salary was just sufficient for my brothers’ tuition fees in Bangkok. Thus, my mother was also an income provider for our family’s everyday meal ticket. The way that she earned money was to make desserts at home and sell them at kopitiam (coffee shops). So before going to school, my sister and I would help my mother in both making and delivering desserts to the shop. The sale of her desserts could fetch around 200 to 300 baht per day. She would spend 50 baht to buy ingredients for domestic consumption and another 50 baht on ingredients for preparing desserts for sale. Since I was the one in charge of managing finances for family living expenses, I could appreciate the amount of money needed to survive each month. As I grew older, I began to realize how much I love cooking Phuket food with flashbacks to my childhood memories of home-made food (Interview, August 17, 2021).

Domestic cooking constitutes the social reproduction process that has become the main source of a family’s income. With the provision of opportunities, financial profits from daily demands of dessert consumption have given women the significant role of provider in the social structure of transitional society. This has empowered subsequent women generations to transform their homes into workplaces while raising them as productive agents in the local economic system. This phenomenon reflects the shared characteristics of Phuket women in extending their home cooking to selling street foods and local desserts for supporting their families. Furthermore, the case of Jee Pek suggests that the inheritance of domestic cooking has constructed her culinary lifeworld transforming her cultural identity as one intricately integrated with the daily practices. Her cooking techniques have exemplified the cultural reproduction of Phuket local dessert through the lens of traditional food measurement described as follows: While cooking food or making dessert, I do not measure ingredients with a weighing machine. I normally use the whole pack of different kinds of flour and estimate other ingredients on my own. It is important to slowly pour water into the flour and mix all the ingredients with hands. I usually use my hands to feel if the dough is manageable. A way to test the dough that meets my perfect taste is to sense its stickiness with a minor stroke with the back of my

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J. Chaopreecha et al. hand. It is a traditional style. When I tell other people about this technique, they think it is easier to understand in contrast to the modern method of measurement (Interview, August 17, 2021).

At present, Jee Pek is a retired mother who lives with her son and family. She explained how she has gradually become a popular YouTuber of Phuket food cooking demonstration as her son has asked her to record her cooking and post it on her YouTube channel titled “Neophuket Food Channel” since 2015 for enjoyment. Reflected by the rising number of online followers, there is an increasing number of people who are attracted to her video clips showing the recipes of Phuket food and dessert. In response, Jee Pek decided to continue producing the clips and she has currently reached a record of more than 500 clips posted on her YouTube channel. Jee Pek described that she has been seeking for more dishes that embody the longlost Phuket cuisines, such as ju ji pao (Chinese jicama dumpling), mojie (Chinese mochi) and khao tok tang sai turian (popped rice with durian filling). She also demonstrated the cookery of festive or ceremonial foods as shown in the example of the vegetarian food, khanom ton tai as a local dessert for the festival of the tenth lunar month, and huad kueh (rice flour muffin) for paying respects to ancestors and family blessing in Chinese New Year. Her cooking representation has maximized the private space while extending to the public domain of cultural reproduction. The cuisines in YouTube are perceived and recreated by the online followers many times. Such online culinary reproduction provides meaningful outcomes in different aspects. One of the compelling narratives about her followers’ responses to her cooking clips has been captured by Jee Pek as follows, I got a message from Phuket people who live abroad. When they saw my video clips, it reminded them of how their parents cooked Phuket food. They said that the food of Jee Pek on YouTube made them feel happy as they thought of their papa, mama, ama [grandma], and akong [grandpa]. My food on YouTube rekindled their childhood memories and caused them to miss home (Interview, August 17, 2021).

The videos on YouTube have become an agent connecting the collective sentiment of shared cultural practices between ethnic members across national boundaries. In other words, such media can be a transnational agency reproducing the social imaginary of long-lost family gatherings. The culinary sociality online proliferates cultural affection of individuals and reconnects with community attachment. Moreover, the demonstration of Jee Pek’s cooking on YouTube provides a cultural source of income to the people who need local food knowledge to earn their living while persevering through the period of economic hardship. This could be seen in Jee Pek’s narration as follows: Many young followers said my recipes are quite easy to follow. Some tried to learn how to make Phuket dessert from my YouTube and sell them as they were losing their jobs. I could not feel happier to help them gain more skills to make money during these hard times. I think selling Phuket dessert does not need a lot of investment. You just need a steamer and other simple utensils that can be found in the kitchen. I just want to give all my knowledge and impart the techniques to the young people so that these desserts will not be lost and gone (Interview, August 17, 2021).

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Jee Pek expressed that she has continued posting her video clips on YouTube approximately twice to three times a week because of the positive feedback from her followers. She found that her food recipes and cuisine experiences have contributed to those who need the knowledge for cooking at home as well as making a living. The way Jee Pek utilizes social media shows that Phuket Chinese descendants need to adjust themselves to the changes of society. Although Jee Pek renders value to cooking by hands and perceiving food through five senses, she does not reject the use of the visual media. This creates a paradox in the process of cultural inheritance— to cook by sense or by knowledge. Nonetheless, Jee Pek has extended the Phuket culinary landscape and has brought the local Phuket recipes to different geographical domains. It is undeniable that the value of Phuket foods in modern society can be interpreted by means of consumption demands and communication process.

Hua: Transformation of Traditional Hokkien Sweet Snacks Hua is a 45-year-old Hokkien descendant who lives in Kathu district. Kathu is renowned as the oldest community of tin-mine laborers. The Kathu shrine, believed to be the oldest shrine in Phuket, is a centre of the community. Hua is a member of the shrine. She has registered as a female spirit medium possessed by one incarnation form of Guan Yin deity. Kathu families have a strong belief in Taoist deities and have inherited religious practices among their descendants. Every day, Hua venerates the Chinese deities at her house altar. Not only joss sticks and candles but also the cups of tea and sweet snacks are placed in front of the deity statues. Sweet snacks have positive meanings, which could be bestowed on worshippers. This brings the interest in sweet cooking to Hua. In arranging sacrificial offerings, visual elements—forms, colours, order, and size of things—are important. The deities are believed to reside in the heavenly world with the ranks. The rank of deities of nature like stars, sky, and the earth are higher while the warrior deities are lower. The offerings are managed in a way to reflect this hierarchy of deities. Kathu people worship Guan Yin as the high-ranking female deity; thus, Hua tries to prepare the offerings with colourful texture and beautiful forms. Her love for beautiful visual elements has influenced her way to cook sweets. She often spends hours to decorate the form of sweets. For example, in shaping alua2 sweets into a form of a flower, she uses a forceps to make each leaf one at a time. Although this process increases the production cost, it creates distinguishable characteristics of Hua’s sweets. Many customers want to order a set of sweets with a beautiful arrangement for worshipping Chinese deities on honourable days. Hua has accepted the change of Phuket traditions. She has no reservations when new practices are brought from other countries to Phuket. Regarding discontinuity 2

Alua is made from flour, coconut milk, fresh milk, and sugar. Pâtissier stirs all the ingredients with low-temperature heat until the flour is cooked. The colour will be added at last. Alua is usually sculpted into various forms like flower, lotus, and small animal.

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of learning Hokkien Chinese language in Phuket, many younger generations have a belief that the originality of cultural knowledge could be learned from Penang in Malaysia and Taiwan where the language is used in everyday life. Hua has a good relationship with younger generations who have learned Mandarin Chinese language from high school and have used it as a basic knowledge to learn Hokkien dialect additionally. Non, a young huatkua3 of Sangdham shrine living in Kathu community, constantly visits Hua’s house. Having graduated from high school majoring the Chinese language program in 2017, Non enrolled in the department of Chinese cultural studies of a university. Non has introduced knowledge gained from Taiwan and Penang to Hua, pertaining to the rearrangement of her house altar with new rice bushel, statues of deities, and Chinese charms. In response, Hua has found it easy to accept the transformation of Phuket traditions. Hua likewise has experiences in communicating with Penang people causing her to realize that the traditions of Phuket might not be authentic. She found that Hokkien Chinese language used in Phuket is different from the other places. Due to the lack of Hokkien Chinese language inheritance, the Phuket descendants need to learn their traditions from other countries. Phuket has changed. Yesterday, I boiled huan-ju tueng which means boiled potato with ginger and brown sugar. We usually know only the word ju teung without huan. Phuket and Penang were disconnected during the Por marshal era. Chinese schools were closed. So, we do not know the right words while Chinese people in Penang still use the Hokkien language. In Phuket, huan-ju tueng became ju tueng. Ang-mor tan became mor tan. Ang-mor lao or foreign building became mor lao. This is wrong. Ang-mor means foreign while mor is hair. Thus, the listener will misunderstand us thinking that we are referring to hair building. If you want to eat potato, you should say huan-ju. The word ju doesn’t have any meaning (Interview, August 15, 2021).

Hua acquired the knowledge of cooking Hokkien sweet snacks from Penang. She periodically travels to Penang to venerate the deities, visit sightseeing places, and buy some paraphernalia, which can be useful when conducting ceremonies in Phuket. Hua discovered that the elderly folks who own sweet shops are in need to find their heirs. Since there are no new generations interested in continuing family business, the heirs could be outsiders. Thus, the elderly folks have imparted Hua with various traditional recipes and have given her some kitchen utensils for cooking Hokkien sweets in Phuket. Currently I am cooking angku, o-aew, and hunkueh. The last one has almost disappeared from Phuket. There is only a Kaset market where you can find it, but the form is simple. I develop it more beautifully by using a mould to make it look tasty and delicious. I brought the recipes from Penang because the original cuisine culture remains at that place. The Hokkien sweet snacks in Penang are as delicious as they were while the ones in Phuket have changed. I know one elderly folk in Penang. He has a good relationship with my friend, Aun. Thus, he has taught us the traditional recipes (Interview, August 15, 2021). 3

In Phuket, there is no Taoist priest. Chinese migrants have inherited religious practices by the knowledgeable persons in the communities. A person who understands how to prepare paraphernalia for the ceremony and has some knowledge in Chinese incantation could conduct a ceremony. These groups of people become huatkuas who have an important role in Phuket shrines as assistants who can communicate with spirit mediums.

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Hua has therefore decided to open the shop near her house in Kathu. She often applies her interpretation of Chinese religious beliefs to the treatment of Hokkien sweet products. This is illustrated below: At the beginning, I cooked and sold ar-pong. Then, I wanted to find Hokkien sweets for venerating deities, but I couldn’t find the delicious sweets in Phuket. For instance, we usually throw away angku after ceremonies. Why do we venerate the deities with foods we ourselves do not eat (Interview, August 15, 2021)?

Hua has tried to expand her market channels. She currently rents a square-meter area in front of a Chinese shophouse in the old town district to sell Phuket sweets. The place transforms into a walking street every Sunday, which is a famous attraction among tourists. This provides Hua the opportunity to meet with Chinese-ethnic tourists from other countries. She said that, once, some Singaporean tourists were very surprised with Phuket sweet snacks as they did not think that there would be a Chinese cultural connection between Phuket and Singapore (Interview, July 28, 2021). Although this story does not explain how Chinese people in such places are interconnected, it certainly reflects Hua’s belief. She felt that the knowledge in cooking sweet snacks could be used to connect herself with the globalizing world. In common practice, Hua receives the orders from online channels, especially Line application and Facebook page, as she is famous in the community of Phuket shrines. The order to cook sweet snacks for venerating deities constitutes the majority. I make a prosperous set. Our customers will order a set of sweet snacks for their ceremonious purposes. Sometimes, they will tell what types of sweet snacks they need like bajang, angku, and huatkueh. I will then put them together in the tray and add some more sweet snacks. At other times, the customers simply inform me of their budget allocated for the set of sweet snacks. Recently, I just received an order of items worth 500 baht. So, I have to design a set of sweet snacks within the amount given (Interview, August 15, 2021).

Hence, this shows how Hua has initiated an innovative concept of prosperous set to extend the range of her products. Further, Hua’s customers have permitted her to introduce new ideas and they have accepted her creativity in decorating new sets. To venerate Chinese deities, there are angku, huatkueh, beekoh, and hunkueh. I choose to develop hunkueh, which has been neglected. Some people are familiar with this but cannot remember what exactly it is. It is made from green-bean flour. The distinguishable characteristics are fragrant aroma, sweet taste, and gooey texture. It is like gelatine. The Phuket recipe uses coconut milk, but Penang recipe does not. Phuket people will dye them with pink colour unlike the ones with different colours found in Penang. Taking the case of angku as an example, Penang angku is orange in colour while Phuket people believe that the colour red is meant for worshipping deities. I make hunkueh into a form of carp fish and lotus with the moulds brought from Penang. I use these moulds to make jelly first, then other sweet snacks. For angku, the mould is also from an elderly folk in Penang. The pattern is sharper than the moulds bought in Thailand (Interview, August 15, 2021).

In Hua’s point of view, traditions could be changed. Hua creatively produces new forms of Phuket sweet snacks. She paints angku with gradient colours from red to yellow, green to purple, and pink to red. The angku filling is changed from grinded yellow bean to the others.

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J. Chaopreecha et al. I also cook angku with salted-egg filling because I do not want to stop developing new recipes. Now, I am trying to prepare using Japanese-purple-potatoes, taro, egg-thread, roasted coconut, and preserved durian filling. At present, there are about ten fillings available. Angku does not need to be red. It depends on our ideas. Sometimes, the new ideas can come from our customers. For instance, there were customers who have requested us to cook angku with dried-shredded chicken (Interview, August 15, 2021).

The case of Hua has illustrated that Chinese descendants in Phuket associate their cultural identity with that of the Chinese descendants in other countries. Due to the historical assimilation of Chinese in Thailand, Chineseness has inevitably become uncertain. Chinese descendants therefore have doubts in the authenticity of their present Chinese identity. Consequently, the Chinese descendants have explored the cultural identity of self by comparing their Chinese cultures with those nurtured in other places. For Hua, the framework used to understand Hokkien Chinese identity is an international domain whereby the Hokkien identities are interconnected. Moreover, Hokkien sweet snacks have become a representation of the cultural inheritance in which the religious belief is central to. The forms of sweet snacks could be transformed insomuch as it conforms with the framework—the interconnected domain among Phuket, Penang, and Taiwan. Phuket has been changed from a traditional local community to a modern globalizing city. Chinese descendants are confronted to understand the authenticity of their identity under the dynamics of contemporary society. Hua has thus restructured her understanding within the Phuket culinary cultures by reflexively examining the cultures of Penang and Taiwan. This is the way Hua has lived in the Phuket society where the changes usually occur.

Ploy: Double Identity of the New Generation as a Sweet Maker This case shows how the modern industrialized, disciplined graphic design process could be central to the transformation of the Chinese-Thai community. Chinese culture has become a resource for the graphic design process in which such culture is intertwined with modern practices and is extended across space–time from past to future and from local to national. Ploy belongs to the third generation of a Hokkien Chinese family in Phuket. Her grandfather migrated from Fujian province in China during the tin-mining era. Skilled in conducting Taoist liturgies and crafts, her grandfather became a knowledgeable person in the community. Located near Chinese shrines including JengOng, Mah-Jor-Poh, and Juitui, their house served as a Chinese coffin-making shop where Taoist services were provided as well. The shop was renowned for conducting Chinese funerals, worship ceremonies, and shamanic rituals. Moreover, to enhance their services, Ploy’s grandfather had developed a method to make Chinese religious paraphernalia—paper effigies, lanterns, paper-cut-miniature palaces, talismans, and charms. Among the ten members in her family, only one aunt had learnt the knowledge from grandfather. The others pursued their careers in the public and private sectors. Ploy stated as follows:

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I belong to the third generation. My grandfather was from China. Then, it is followed by the generations of kor [aunt] and Ploy respectively. However, kor was the only one who has inherited the knowledge of conducting ceremonies from my grandfather. Puh [Ploy’s younger niece] also wants to obtain such Chinese knowledge, but I do not (Interview, July 29, 2021).

Ploy is a professional graphic designer working in the marketing department of the Phuket Hospital. She graduated with a master’s degree of motion graphic design from Korea National University of Arts in 2016. Her thesis was influenced by her family business, a coffin-making shop. During the thesis exhibition, Ploy displayed her video art communicating the concept of life and death. The exhibition space was dark and decorated with lanterns to replicate the kong teck ceremony conducted at the end of the Chinese funeral. At the end of the corridor where the exhibition was set, the monitor screen displayed a Chinese funeral documentary. Prior to making the short documentary where footages of the interviews were compiled, Ploy took around two years to conduct interviews with ritual specialists in Phuket. Many interviewees are familiar with Ploy’s grandfather since there is a small number of specialists in Phuket. Through this process, Ploy’s art thesis has become a way for her to understand her own culture and family traditions. This thesis makes Ploy grow an attachment with the materials in which her identity as a young generation of Hokkien Chinese family is communicated. Although Ploy does not want to obtain the knowledge in conducting ceremonies, she still has an interest in Chinese culture. This interest has shaped the way for her to live in the modern society while keeping to traditional practices. After her graduation with a master’s degree, Ploy returned to Phuket and started her own business in selling miniatures of Chinese deities called kim-sin. She used the online channels to communicate with her customers. The miniatures are ordered from China and sold in Phuket. However, a year later, she changed her business into selling Phuket sweet snacks, which are used in the Chinese ceremonies. She explained it as follows: This brand, Kim-kang-shae, means golden-light of the star. I ask Puh [her younger brother] to name it in Hokkien dialect. Since kim means gold in Chinese, the logo utilizes a golden colour against the black background. Initially, I wanted to sell kim-sin [a miniature of Chinese deities]. However, I switched to sell angku under the same brand because it could be used in conjunction with Chinese ceremonies. Angku is used for worshipping the deities. Thus, I stopped selling kim-sin as I was not into it. I could not memorize the Chinese names of every deity. Puh does not help me anymore and he has created his own Facebook page to sell kim-sin. At present, I sell angku, kiamkoi, and kosui. I have since been trying to maintain the traditional concept of making Phuket sweet snacks (Interview, July 29, 2021).

The conception of the idea to sell Phuket sweets was formed when Ploy found that her grandmother had left behind a wooden mould used to make angku dessert. The mould is a thick rectangular-shaped block that has been engraved with the pattern of tortoise shell and Chinese characters. Each side of the mould has a different pattern; therefore, it allows bakers to choose their desired angku styles. There is also a variety of angku forms including an oval-shaped form called ang-khan and a circular-shaped form called ang-eeh. Ploy has started to practice baking angku with the support of her aunts and older sister. Ploy said that nobody likes to eat angku. People normally

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place it on the house altar to venerate Chinese deities on important days. After the ceremony, angku becomes dry, hard, and smeared with the powder from joss sticks. Thus, people tend to dispose these sweet snacks. To improve on this, Ploy has sought to extend the freshness of angku by selecting the high-quality ingredients like flour, oil, and bean. In search of the perfect formula, Ploy has experimented with different recipes on her own. Furthermore, Ploy has seized the opportunity to purchase different ingredients and utensils for her culinary trials whenever she travels to Penang to buy religious paraphernalia for her family business. As Angku will only be sold during Chinese festive occasions, Ploy has utilized social networks to secure pre-orders. For instance, after posting her menu on Facebook, Ploy’s potential customers will make direct contact with her through messengers’ software. Such communication technology supports Ploy in accessing the niche market where there is a demand for distinctive products with high quality. Additionally, Ploy has experience in designing graphics to communicate Phuket Chinese identity in the modern market. This approach has also facilitated her in promoting different products while developing the brand identity of local sweet snacks. During a particular experience, Ploy received the opportunity to design the logo and graphics for a local ice-cream shop, Torry, whose owner is her neighbourhood friend. In this assignment, Ploy created the graphics for the logo and containers. She combined Chinese graphical elements into an ice-cream form manifesting various flavours while imitating local Phuket sweet snacks such as paolang, taosor, and o-aew. With these graphical elements in place, the shop decorations were designed accordingly. As this shop is successful, it has been introduced to the public through local newspapers and online food blogs. In other words, the Hokkien Chinese identity has been ciphered and widely communicated within the modern food market. Through this process, Ploy has positioned herself as a member of the young generation who has maintained traditional practices while supporting the transformation of local identity in the modern culinary landscape. Ploy described it as follows: My friend wanted the logo for his ice-cream shop. The patterns are derived from the SinoPortuguese-styled ceramic tiles. Besides, I have tried to incorporate the ingredients of the ice-cream in designing the patterns. For example, I reduced a form of pineapple into a graphical shape and made a repetition of it to create a pattern imitating the traditional Phuket style (Interview, July 29, 2021).

Ploy likewise applies her ability in graphic design to develop her products. The love in visual forms and colours has an impact on the style of Ploy’s angku. Ploy explained as follows: I used my graphic design knowledge in the packaging of sweet snacks. Initially, I did not want to use a plastic container. However, I would have a problem with the production cost if I were to produce the box by myself. Moreover, paper boxes would not be suitable for sweet snacks that are oily. Finally, I chose the plastic box, but I arranged the direction and position of the angku carefully. I ensured accurate measurements were followed while cutting the banana leaves to be placed under the sweet snacks. I cut the four edges of each leaf to make a good composition. As I did not like dark-green banana leaves, I selected the appropriate colour by myself. I chose the colour of green beans as well. I felt that the dark-yellow ones are not delicious (Interview, July 29, 2021).

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Previous Phuket generations were taught to cook by estimating the amount of ingredients. Amongst the senses, the use of hands was a way to determine the taste of food. By the interaction between the body and ingredients, food has become a result in which the identity of local taste is inherited. However, Ploy has an opinion that the use of measurement equipment can create a standard of taste. The use of new technology in creating graphic design has influenced Ploy to rely on the schematic plan rather than feelings. Ploy explicated it as follows: I tried to calculate a certain amount of ingredients. As I would like to control the consistency of the sizes and shapes of the angku, I recorded the desired measurement of flour and filling. There is also a good side to this as I can calculate the cost when a customer makes an order. In the past, people could only estimate the amount of ingredients causing them to make both thin and thick shells of angku at the same time (Interview, July 29, 2021).

Ploy has a plan to develop her products while preparing the sweet snacks at night after her office hours. Preparing Phuket sweet snacks is her way to participate in the culture of her family. Since Ploy’s aunt constantly gives services to Phuket shrines’ members, Ploy’s house has become a meeting point for spirit mediums and ritual specialists during the sacred days designated for the Chinese deities. Sometimes, the devotees come together at night to ask for the services. Ploy’s aunt is a person who recites the sacred words to invite the deities to possess the body of spirit mediums. Ploy always attends these ceremonies. She supports her aunt by making paraphernalia and preparing sweet snacks for worshipping the deities. This case illustrates how the members of the new generation of Phuket Chinese could find their position in the society while preserving their traditions. Most of the Chinese descendants are concerned with maintaining their cultural identity while participating in the globalizing world. Since the 1990s, Phuket has become a domain of tourism businesses. The trends of modern living are conveyed through the development of tourism. This phenomenon transforms Phuket into an international community where foreigners and local people can live together. People from the new generation could maintain their identity in the private realm, like family and kitchen, while pursuing contemporary careers in the public sphere. Ploy further demonstrates how these two realms have been converged through the process of making Phuket sweet snacks. To her, being a graphic designer and maintaining her family culture are equally valuable.

Shun and Peng: The Chinese Volunteers Migrated to Phuket This section illustrates the characteristics of Chinese expatriates settled in Phuket. They are a group of young Chinese known as “new Chinese immigrants” or “Xinyimin.” Being in the fourth wave, these younger Chinese are generally welleducated as most of them have attained at least a bachelor’s degree. From the perspective of the Chinese influxes into Thailand, the new Chinese immigrants born after 1980 are classified as the fourth wave. Since 2003, most of them have first arrived

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as Chinese volunteer teachers. With economic factor as one of the main purposes of immigration (Siriphon, 2018), their entries met Thailand’s demand of Chinese teachers then. Most of the Chinese immigrants were mainly from the southern China such as Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan Provinces. As case studies, Shun and Peng, the selected research respondents, decided to continue working in Thailand after their contracts with the Hanban Institute have ended. While the first informant has continued working as a volunteer teaching Chinese, the second one has transitioned into the business field instead. Shun, a Cantonese man, was born and raised in Anhui Province. He became a Chinese volunteer teacher in Thailand in 2008. Prior to coming to Thailand, he had worked as a sales employee at an auto parts company and felt pressured to work because there were many talented colleagues in the society. Thus, he decided to work as a Chinese volunteer teacher because he knew that Phuket, a world tourist destination, would be a good place for temporary employment. Shun expressed that he enjoyed working and spending life, scenery, and delicious Thai food here. Since the end of the volunteer teaching contract, Shun has started work in a university and has settled in Phuket. He is currently a tenure-track lecturer and is studying in a Ph.D. program. Shun said, Most people prefer to eat Thai food with a sour, spicy, and non-seasonal taste at Thai restaurants or Thai dishes with ingredients from lemon, ginger, galangal, and pandan leaves. This is different from the taste of Chinese teachers who are not used to the taste of Thai food. I usually make and consume Chinese food with a salty taste in my room. The Phuket food that I like is seafood because it is fresh and clean. It has an original taste with an affordable price. This is different from the seafood in China, where the prices are high, and it is hard to find the fresh ones. I have also noticed that there are many Chinese restaurants opened by young Chinese in Phuket nowadays. They normally advertise their cuisine for sale online as well as sharing information in the WeChat group of Chinese residents in Phuket. I personally do not want these types of Chinese foods because I feel that these Chinese dishes taste differently from the original ones. Regarding local Phuket Chinese dishes, I think they really show the stronghold of overseas Chinese culture. But I do not eat them often as they taste ordinary and are no different from Thai food. The local Chinese dishes that I eat are hokkien noodles, pork satay, loba, otao, etc. Yet, in comparison with these dishes, I tend to prefer Thai food. When it comes to distinctive Chinese identity in Phuket, I would think of Vegetarian Festival, or Chinese New Year tradition, or Moon Festival because I have frequently attended these events (Interview, September 17, 2021).

Chinese people have an opinion that all kinds of Chinese foods in Thailand are not original although they are inherited from the mainland China. Through mobilities, Chinese dishes have taken on Thai-Chinese recipes. Taste is a result from the infusion of local ingredients as well as the local cultures in which social practices are the main influencing factors. Baba cuisines therefore are distinguished from that of mainland Chinese food. Next, Peng is a Chinese woman who have arrived in Thailand since 2009. She became a Chinese volunteer teacher who taught Chinese language for a year and a half in Trang. Over the next two years, she practiced speaking Thai with native people, and enjoyed the traits and personalities of Thai people. Living in Thailand did not make her feel the hustle and bustle, like living in China. She then discovered that

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there were opportunities and ways for her to earn a living. Thus, after the end of the contract, Peng decided to continue living in Thailand and became a Chinese teacher at a private school in Trang. Later, she got married with her Thai husband. During her work in teaching Chinese, she joined her Thai husband to make a living from tourism services such as selling package tours and being a tour guide to Chinese tourists in Phuket. They have also become trading intermediaries for goods or souvenirs that Chinese tourists demand online. These souvenirs are normally food items such as processed dried fruits, pellet milk, and bird’s nests. Peng and her Thai husband have one son and they have bought a house to live in Phuket. They have started a tour company to provide Chinese tourist services while venturing into the real-estate industry where they trade leases with interested Chinese clients. With regards to Phuket culinary experiences, she explained as follows: On my first visit to Phuket, I had lunch at school cafeteria, but would never get used to the taste of Thai food. Most of them have a little oily taste and contain the sweetness from sugar. Since the number of Chinese tourists has been increasing in Phuket, more Chinese restaurants have sprouted making them easily accessible, especially in Patong Beach and Chao Fa Market in Phuket Town. Most of them are Yunnan Chinese and Sichuan Chinese restaurants with a spicy tea flavour. But since these restaurants have taken some ingredients or condiments imported from China within the vicinity of tourist attractions, the price of these dishes can be quite high (Interview, September 19, 2021).

In addition, Peng has provided more information that she tends to visit the Chinese restaurants. Some of these restaurants are set in the form of a Chinese-owned residential house; therefore, the price is reasonable while the taste is delicious. At this point, Peng commented, If the import cost of Chinese ingredients or seasonings were to be reduced, the selling prices of the Chinese food could then be lowered and be kept down. It is reasonable to allow Chinese nationals who live in Phuket as well as Chinese tourists visiting Phuket to eat without worrying about the price. In addition, Chinese tourists in Phuket comprise of the seafood lovers and local food fans. The first group usually patronizes seafood restaurants near Rawai Beach, while the second group would visit restaurants in Phuket town such as Ton Pho Noodle Shop at The Circle Clock Tower, o-tao at Bangneaw Restaurant, o-aew at Lohrong Market, and Wan Lamoon, and so on (Interview, September 19, 2021).

The case of Peng shows that economy is the main factor driving new Chinese immigrants who have moved to Phuket while enabling logistics to transfer products from mainland China. The food mobilities across national boundaries convey the emerging culinary Chinese culture in Phuket. Moreover, Phuket is one of the popular tourist destinations in Thailand, known as “City of Gastronomy,” that is abounding in seafood and local dishes.

Conclusion Under the context of Phuket culinary landscape, cuisine is central to the network between the local context where the Baba Chinese cuisines are inherited and the

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global setting where the cuisines are distributed inclusively for multiple groups. The knowledge between cooking foods and using ingredients has been exchanged. Sometimes, people travel to different places to acquire the necessary ingredients or traditional utensils. Along this period in which the amalgamation of Thai, Malay, and Chinese cultures is occurring, cuisines are utilized by different generations of Chinese descendants. To be a housewife, cooking connotes symbolic meanings including caring for one’s family members and maintaining cultural values of traditional practices. Simultaneously, all foods have economic value when they are sold in the market. For Phuket people, the foods bear value both in public and private domains. If a housewife formulates the traditional cuisines, she could be recognized in the public as well. Furthermore, the ability in food-making could be demonstrated in the public whenever there is a ceremony like funeral, wedding, veneration of deities and so on. Nowadays, the way to communicate the value behind family’s cuisine has widened due to the existence of the modern market. Selling food or posting videos of food preparation on social media is widely available. Subsequently, the traditional recipes are developed in various ways. In conclusion, Chinese foods do not only convey the Chinese identity of Phuket descendants, but they also exhibit the identity of each generation which could be transformed under the context of contemporary Phuket. There has been an adaptation of Chinese descendants under the social context of Phuket whereby culture is utilized to drive the tourism industry. Chinese cuisine symbolizes authentic traditions of Chinese migrants. The descendants of Phuket maintain their identity as the Baba group while adjusting themselves to the modern economy and production process of different forms of foods. Additionally, the Phuket descendants recognize cuisine as a part of Hokkien Baba culture, which has amalgamated with Malay and Thai culture. The connection between Thai, Chinese, and Malay is still maintained. The cultural resources from Penang seem to be valuable for the Phuket descendants since the Hokkien groups in Penang can preserve the use of Hokkien language in everyday life. At the same time, Phuket descendants also need to communicate their cultural identity as Phuket Baba. The forms of Chinese foods have become symbols resulting from the negotiation between the self of Phuketians, the structure of contemporary society, and the global economy. Moreover, the characteristics of Phuket cuisine as a hybridized culture can be easily integrated with the perpetuation of dynamic cultures. The creative city of gastronomy has been evident as a social continuity in expanding the landscape of domestic cooking to the economic sphere of globalizing cuisine, incorporating multiple groups of people into the local settings.

References Alder, J. A. (2015). Expressions of diasporic identity: Travel and food as signifiers of Polish identity. Tourism, Culture & Communication, 15, 205–214.

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Ansaldo, U., Lim, L., & Mufwene, S. S. (2007). The sociolinguistic history of the Peranakans: What it tells us about ‘creolization’. In S. Matthew, L. Lim, & U. Ansaldo (Eds.), Deconstructing creole. John Benjamins Publishing Company. Appadurai, A. (1988). How to make a national cuisine: Cookbooks in contemporary India. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 3(1), 3–24. Baron, I. Z. (2016). Eating Jerusalem: Politics, food, and identity. Jewish Studies Quarterly, 23(3), 267–285. Barthes, R. (1972). Mythologies (Jonathan Cape, Trans.). The Noonday Press. Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice (Richard Nice, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. Cao, Y., & Lin, M. (2018). Chinese exclusion in Southeast Asia. CCS 2018 International Conference “New Silk Road and Chinese Overseas in Southeast Asia: Investments, Transnational Connections, and Cultural Identities” (p. 104). Chaopreecha, J. (2017). Revitalization of tradition through social media: A case of the vegetarian festival in Phuket, Thailand. Doctoral dissertation, Hiroshima University. Chee-Beng, T. (2011). Chinese food and foodways in Southeast Asia and beyond. NUS. Fischler, C. (1988). Food, self, and identity. Social Science Information, 27(2), 275–292. Inda, J. X., & Rosaldo, R. (2002). Introduction: A world in motion. In J. X. Inda & R. Rosaldo (Eds.), The anthropology of globalization: A reader (pp. 1–34). Blackwell Publishers. Junru, L. (2010). Chinese food. Cambridge University Press. Ministry of Tourism and Sports. (2019). Tourism economic report quarter1/2020. Retrieved October 25, 2021, from https://www.mots.go.th/download/TourismEconomicReport/4-1Touri smEconomicVol4.pdf. Nasution, K. S. (2009). Hokkien Chinese on the Phuket mining frontier: The Penang connection and the emergence of the Phuket Baba community. JMBRAS, 82(2), 81–112. Nasution, K. S. (2013). Exploring shared history, preserving shared heritage: Penang’s links to a Siam past. In C. Baker (Ed.), Protecting Siam’s heritage. Silkworm. Noyes, D. (2009). Tradition: Three traditions. Journal of Folklore Research, 46(3), 233–268. Oh, Y., Razak, N., Wee, D. H. T., Ching, E. L., & Rahman, Z. (2019). The development of Nyonya cuisine in the Malay Archipelago: Penang and Malacca Nyonya cuisine. Journal of Ethnic Foods, 6(17), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1186/s42779-019-0010-x Ong, A. (1999). Flexible citizenship: The cultural logics of transnationality. Duke University Press. Ong, A., & Nonini, D. (1997). Undergrounded empires: The cultural politics of modern Chinese transnationalism. Routledge. Purcell, V. (1997). Orang-Orang Cina di Tanah Melayu. Skudai. Universiti Teknologi Malaysia Melayu. Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. Siriphon, A. (2018). The mobility of Chinese and Chinese state’s roles in the 21st century. In P. Rangkla (Ed.), Social life on the move. Parbpim Publishing. Tantivit, B. (2006). I am a Phuket Baba. Wattana Publishing. Triamwittaya, C. (2015). New Chinese settlements: A case study of the new Chinese community. Chulalongkorn University. UNESCO. (n.d.). Creative cities network. https://en.unesco.org/creative-cities/home. Wong, Y. (2007). The big five Hokkien families in Penang, 1830s–1890s. Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies, 1, 106–115. Yoshino K. (2010). Malaysian cuisine: A case of neglected culinary globalisation. In J. Farrer (Ed.), Globalization, food and social identities in the Asia Pacific region. Sophia University Institute of Comparative Culture. Yu-tsuen, H. (2012). Cultural identity and transnational networks in a Chinese diaspora society in Sibu, Sarawak, Malaysia. Doctoral dissertation, University of Alberta.

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Jakraphan Chaopreecha graduated from architectural design faculty and earned Ph.D. in media and cultural studies. He is currently a lecturer in the Department of Computing, College of Computing at Prince of Songkla University, Phuket Campus. His research interests are art, design, and UX/UI research. He has utilized the concept of design anthropology in studying the process in which participants are cooperatively supported to use media technology. Recent project is to work with the local artists to create the art space in Phuket by utilizing the local cultures as a resource to produce art and design concepts. He has studied the theory of material culture and still learn how to use such concept in the design projects. He likewise established Digital Media Lab to provide the artists with various type of media technology—interactive sensors, Internet of things, projection mapping, and motion graphics. Nicha Tovankasame is a lecturer in the Faculty of International Studies, majoring in the program of Thai and ASEAN Studies and Asian Studies, at Prince of Songkla University, Phuket Campus, where she has been a faculty member for 10 years. Her research focuses on cultural anthropology and development studies in regional areas. Her published work deals with labour issues in tourism settings and other socio-economic matters influenced by neoliberal policies in Southeast Asia. She has collaborated actively with researchers in several other disciplines of communication and media designs to serve social innovation and cooperation under Digital Media Lab. The recent project is to work with a local market-based community in Phuket to preserve the cultural heritage, following the guidelines of creative economy and sustainable development approach. The core concepts focus on dynamism of urban culture and spatial transformation, memory studies and Chinese culinary culture, and gentrification of the space. Other areas of interest also lie in the study of ageing culture and medical anthropology in the modern context. Pittaya Limbut grew up in Krabi Province, which is known for being one of Thailand’s most soothing destinations. In 2011, he graduated from Prince of Songkla University, Phuket Campus, Thailand, with a bachelor’s degree in Chinese Studies. In 2013, he received a master’s degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages from Xiamen University in Xiamen, China. In 2014, he started working as a lecturer at the Faculty of International Studies, Prince of Songkla University, Phuket Campus. He is in charge of teaching Chinese for freshmen. After teaching for three years, he then pursued his studies in international relations. In 2020, he obtained his Ph.D. from the School of International Studies and Academy of Overseas Chinese Studies in Jinan University in Guangzhou, China. He has been a lecturer of Chinese at the Faculty of International Studies for more than seven years. His research interests are in international relations, with a particular focus on Thai-Sino relation after the Cold War, Asian security, and overseas Chinese studies.

New Transnational Chinese Migrants in Malaysia Danny Tze Ken Wong

It has been more than 40 years since Deng Xiaoping introduced the Open Door and Reformation policies in 1978. The initiatives have transformed China from a backward, ideological-dominated nation into a modern and powerful economic powerhouse. This transformation process also underwent changes from a gradual and experimental stage in the 1980s and 1990s to be a full-blown economic development that saw the country rising to become the fastest growing economy in the world. This transformation also brought massive changes to Chinese business enterprises from the state-owned enterprises to be multinational corporate bodies that have helped to spearhead stronger economic performance for China. In 2010, the country overtook Japan as the second largest economy in the world. The introduction of the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) in 2013, further strengthened the development of Chinese economy, and provided impetus for stronger economic performance. The country’s spectacular economic development over the last 40 years has also brought about changes to its people, including their need to travel abroad. Encouraged by the need for corporations to run their enterprises abroad, staff members of corporations followed by employees of state-owned enterprises have begun to travel abroad in an unprecedented manner. In addition, Chinese students have travelled abroad with the hope of receiving higher education while acquiring skills that are needed for the development of the country. Moreover, there are outbound travellers who went abroad with a view to settle down and invest in the host countries. These new arrivals are found throughout the world, and Southeast Asian countries have become some of the most popular destinations for the Chinese. This new phenomenon of new Chinese migrants has gained importance as part of the new Chinese Overseas experience where they have accomplished massive economic development while emigrating

D. T. K. Wong (B) Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Santasombat (ed.), Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4617-2_5

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abroad, either on short-term basis or long-term stay or even leaving China for good to become citizens of the countries they have chosen to reside. The influx of these new Transnational Chinese migrants has evoked different reactions in the host country, ranging from acceptance to very negative reaction of rejecting their presence.1 There is a need to make sense of this new Chinese experience, and its impact on the host countries. This paper will look into the experience of the new transnational Chinese by offering perspectives from four dimensions, namely, Chinese workers in Malaysia, the “Malaysia as Second Home” scheme, Chinese students in Malaysia, and the Hui (Uighur) factor. Within these four dimensions, there are four largest and most apparent groups of transnational Chinese who are currently found in Malaysia; thus, this study warrants special attention. The paper will also explore how the presence of these new transnational Chinese has impacted Malaysia, a country where racial balance is upheld as paramount. Further, the paper will also examine how Malaysia has been coping with this group of new Chinese. It is hoped that the examination of this growing trend of the transnational Chinese in Malaysia will enhance the understanding of the transnational Chinese diaspora phenomenon in Southeast Asia.

The Chinese in Malaysia Like the rest of Southeast Asia, Malaysia has started receiving Chinese immigrants in large numbers since the mid-nineteenth century. These early transnationals or migrants formed the basis of the present day ethnic Chinese population. Today, the number of Chinese in Malaysia reaches around 7 million, and constitutes 23% of the total population, making it a sizeable minority whose position could not be ignored.2 Chinese emigration basically ended in early 1950s, with some exceptions including those who emigrated from Hong Kong or Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan). Those who arrived had been integrated and had attained Malaysian citizenship. Even though the Chinese community was an immigrant society, its members had been naturalized as Malaysian citizens and they had contributed towards the nation-building process of the country since the country’s independence. The situation in Malaysia is not unlike other parts of Southeast Asia where the Chinese immigrants have settled into the national lives of the host country, and have been treated with varying degrees of acceptance and tolerance by the indigenous community.3

1

See Kurlantzick (2006), Stromseth (2019). Statistics of Population of Malaysia (2020) (Department of Statistics Online Portal: https://www. dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/cthemeByCat&cat=155&bul_id=OVByWjg5YkQ3MWF ZRTN5bDJiaEVhZz09&menu_id=L0pheU43NWJwRWVSZklWdzQ4TlhUUT09 [Accessed 16 July 2021]. 3 See Wang (2000). 2

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The Malaysian experience is well-documented and well-researched.4 Even as the community settled in the region, several features or characteristics of the community began to emerge. One of them is the distinctiveness of the community against the backdrop of the local indigenous community as the Chinese community owned their settlements, schools, religious and social institutions, and cultural expressions. While many of the features resembled those found in their ancestral land, there were also localised elements infused into them. Such localization emerged as the Chinese immigrants interacted with the local indigenous communities while being exposed to western cultural elements via their dealings with the colonial powers.5 In addition, inter-connectivity has been forged between Chinese communities in the region and the globe, making them a part of what has been described as the experience of transnational Chinese connectivity. The Chinese in Malaysia also participated in the political narratives of the country starting with their attempts to form political alliances in the 1950s and later, during the negotiation for independence from British colonial rule. Thus, in the postindependence years, the Chinese were well-represented in the political arena, which includes the securing of strategic ministerial appointments such as finance minister and chief ministers in at least two states. The coalition government of first, the Alliance Party—made up of the Malay-dominated United Malay National Organization (UMNO), Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) of the Indian community—was later expanded to become the Barisan National (National Front) coalition in the aftermath of the May 1969 racial riot and the post-1974 national elections. However, Chinese political participation was gradually diminishing in influence and stature, especially within the government coalition, albeit not suffering much in numbers. The two Chinese-dominated parties of MCA and Gerakan were seen as mainly playing bridesmaids to the Malay-dominated UMNO. The introduction of the New Economic Policy (1971) in the aftermath of the May 1969 racial riot was seen as further eroding Chinese political and economic position in the country.6 With overwhelming support from the Chinese community, the recent 14th General Elections in May 2018 witnessed the replacement of the coalition government that had been in power for sixty years by a new coalition (mainly former opposition parties).7 Backed by a strong reform agenda, the new government provided much hope for the Chinese community, which was pinning for a fairer Malaysia to meet its expectations and aspirations. Even as the Chinese were hopeful for better deals, new challenges were manifesting in the forms of China’s rise and expansion, especially through Chinese entrepreneurs and other mechanisms in the region. Although this newly elected government was replaced by another government in early 2020, the role and position of the ethnic Chinese, the descendants of the earlier transnational Chinese, has been confirmed as part of the country’s permanent fixture. Yet, at the 4

Purcell (1958); Lee & Tan (2000). See also Lee and Leo (2012). See Chia (2015) and Wong (2012). 6 Means (1991). 7 Hutchinson & Lee (2019). 5

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turn of the twenty-first century, a new wave of Chinese migrants has begun to arrive at Southeast Asia (and Malaysia), and started what is deemed to be a new transnational experience. Unlike the earlier transnational experience where the Chinese were compelled to leave a weak China during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the new transnational Chinese experience is taking place against the rise of a rich and powerful China.

The Rise of China and the New Transnational Chinese Migrants The rise of China over the past 40 years has seen the emergence of a new wave of Chinese immigrants. Initially arriving as students and later as businesspersons, these new Chinese from China began to settle in different parts of the world where many went on to become citizens of their host countries. Such phenomenon also occurred in Southeast Asia albeit different contexts as set by the peculiar conditions of the receiving countries. Though the circumstances are different, the arrival of these new Chinese migrants is similar to their predecessors. According to Wang Gungwu, this new phase of transnational Chinese migrants is known as Xin Yimin, which means “New Migrants.”8 However, the term Xin Yimin is not widely used in Malaysia. The term “migrants,” especially when being used on the Chinese, remains sensitive to the delicate ethnic balance in the country. Hence, the usage of the term Xin Yimin in Malaysia bears the connotation that these new arrivals have a specific purpose of work within a short-term stay. In contrast to the earlier arrivals before 1949 who had immigrated and settled permanently, the new arrivals are known as migrants who have moved to Malaysia on a temporal basis. While this group includes students pursuing tertiary education, many are employees of State-Owned Enterprises and other Chinese officials who have chosen to work with the ethnic Chinese community in order to penetrate into the local market and to negotiate with the local government in partnerships and joint-venture projects. Though this group was initially inconsiderable in size and transient in nature, the situation began to change with the introduction of the BRI in 2013. The BRI was introduced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 as a way of enhancing mutual development through stronger connectivity with the hope of achieving a common destiny.9 Drawing on the ancient Silk Road that linked China to the West across the mainland, the new overland 21st Century Silk Road forms the Belt section of BRI. Known as the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and forming the Road section of BRI, the maritime segment links China with the maritime countries in Southeast Asia and beyond. On the outset, the initiative looked like an overarching plan to link China to the world while providing access to markets and precious resources (natural). Yet on a closer scrutiny, the initiative has stated goals of utilising the 8 9

Wang (2000). Yang Jiechi (2019).

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connectivity towards the attainment of a common destiny for China and its partners in the BRI. The announcement was followed closely with the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016, which serves as a main funder for projects that fall under the BRI. To date, there are 106 members in the bank, which could be interpreted as countries rendering support to BRI. Since its introduction, the BRI has seen many projects springing up in member countries of AIIB. Initially led by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and followed by Government-linked companies (GLCs), Chinese companies have begun to descend on member-countries in Southeast Asia to work with local partners in initiating projects that are part of the BRI framework. These projects are mainly related to infrastructure development focusing on rail-links, hydropower plants, power plants grids, ports and port facilities, air-communication and urban development. The projects are meant to serve as the dots that link a wider range of similar projects in different locations; thus, when linked up, they would provide the connectivity as envisaged by the larger initiative. With the launch of the BRI, more Chinese companies have come to Malaysia to set up branches focusing on communication and infrastructure. The trade volume between Malaysia and China has also been increasing annually. According to the data provided by the Chinese Embassy in Malaysia, by 2020, China had become Malaysia’s largest trading partner for eleven consecutive years.10 Trade volume between Malaysia and China accounted for 17.2% of Malaysia’s total trade volume, which was an increase of 0.2% as compared to 2018 (Fig. 1). More importantly, following the introduction of the BRI, a proliferation of Chinese companies into Malaysia has begun. This resulted in a steady rise of Chinese investment in the country. Statistically, Chinese investment in Malaysia had increased from RM920 million (or 0.9%) of Malaysia’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2010 to RM6.2 billion or 9.0% in 2017.11 The figure has been rising since then. Interestingly, there has been a series of sharp increments as investment jumped from a mere 2.0% in 2012 to 2.2%, 3.0%, 6.0% and 9.0% in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 respectively.12 This sharp rise is evidently an effect of the introduction of the BRI in 2013. It has also changed the pattern and nature of investments significantly. The investments are no longer confined to State-Owned Enterprises and are no longer contended with joint-venture projects. The new firms are focusing on mega-size infrastructure development projects, especially pertaining to communication (land, sea, air and telecommunication), energy-related development projects, finance and banking as well as accommodation and support services. Since the conception of BRI, mega projects such as the Kuantan-Qingzhou Industrial Parks, East Coast Rail Link, Second 10

Statement from Department of Statistics, Malaysia, in Bernama (Malaysia National News Agency) (2020). 11 Bank Negara Malaysia as cited in China’s investment in Malaysia: Perceptions, Issues and Prescriptions, a report by Social Economic Research Centre (SERC), Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry Malaysia (2017, p. 13). 12 Bank Negara Malaysia as cited in China’s investment in Malaysia: Perceptions, Issues and Prescriptions, a report by Social Economic Research Centre (SERC), Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry Malaysia (2017, p. 13).

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Fig. 1 China’s outward FDI in 10 countries of ASEAN, by the end of 2019. Source Official website of ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/hzs/202 010/20201029172027652.pdf

Penang Bridge, Mass Rapid Transit System in Klang Valley had been initiated. And to facilitate the flow of funds and services, major banks from China were invited to open branches in the country. These include the Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The following table presents the main infrastructure construction projects of Chinese companies in Malaysia as of 2019 (Table 1): It is clear that since the introduction of BRI, the number of China-related projects has increased substantially. Concomitantly, there has been a rapid influx of transnational Chinese, which has entered into Malaysia. The new migrants are different from those who have arrived earlier. The following sections will look at the different groups of new transnational Chinese migrants who have come to live in Malaysia. They are broadly categorized as follows: (1) students; (2) workers; (3) settlers who have joined the “Malaysia as My Second Home” scheme; and (4) the Chinese Muslims, whose transnational experience in Malaysia is quite different from other new Chinese arrivals. These four groups are the most important groups of new Chinese migrants who have arrived at Malaysia after BRI.

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Table 1 Major projects by Chinese companies in Malaysia since BRI (As of 2019) No

Project name

Contractor from China

1

Kuala Lumpur Signature Tower

China State Construction Engineering (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd

2

The Second Cross-Sea Bridge in Penang

CHEC Construction (M) Sdn Bhd

3

Encore Malacca Theater

China Construction Yangtze River (M) Sdn Bhd

4

The CRRC ASEAN Manufacturing Center CRRC rolling stock center (M) Sdn Bhd

5

Xinyi Group Malaysia Industrial Park

Xinyi Energy Smart (M) Sdn Bhd

6

Kuala Lumpur PANTAI 2 sewage treatment plant

Beijing Enterprises Water Group (M) Sdn Bgd

7

Klang Valley’s Second Mass Rapid Transit China Communication Construction Company (M) Sdn Bgd

8

The Ampang Light Rail Line Extension Project

CHEC Construction (M) Sdn Bhd

9

The Kuala Ketil solar photovoltaic power station in Kedah

CGN Edra Power Group

10

The Bakun Hydropower Station in Sarawak Sinohydro Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd

11

The Malaysian East Coast Rail Link Project

China Communication Construction Company (M) Sdn Bgd

12

The railway upgrade project initiated by the Sabah State Government in 2005

China Railway Engineering Corporation (M) Sdn Bgd

13

Petroleum National Berhad (Petronas) Automated Storage and Retrieval System (ASRS) Projet

Sinopec Engineering (Group) Co. Ltd, Sinopec Shanghai Engineering Co. Ltd, Sinopec Engineering Group Malaysia Sdn Bhd

14

The 3.5 million tons Steel project at Malaysia–China Kuantan Industrial Park

MCC Overseas (M) Sdn Bhd

15

The Pulai River Bridge project

CHEC Construction (M) Sdn Bhd

16

Xiamen University Malaysia

Sinohydro Corporation Limited

17

SANY IBS (Industrialized Building System) factory in Kijal

SANY International Developing (M) Sdn Bhd

18

The Gemas-Johor Baru electrified double-track project

CRCC Malaysia Berhad

(Source China Enterprises Association in Malaysia, 2019: China-Malaysia 45 Anniversary of The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Photo Album, pp. 21–30)

The New Transnational Chinese Migrants The massive increase of Chinese companies operating in Malaysia has definitely brought about an influx of Chinese nationals into the country. However, unlike the pre-2013 years where the number was small and was confined mainly to employees of State-Owned Enterprises and a small number of Chinese students, the new Chinese

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migrants came with different characteristics. First of all, there was a sharp increase in the quantity of new arrivals. The proliferation of Chinese companies has inadvertently raised the number of arrivals as the company staff have been brought in to fill the roles in support of their many branches in the country. Secondly, the companies and the new arrivals are no longer confined to the major cosmopolitan cities such as Kuala Lumpur and Penang. Instead, they are found all over the country as the new investments have penetrated almost every state in Malaysia. Thirdly, there are also private enterprises not linked to the state and individual businessmen who have arrived in the country in search of opportunities. Many are keen to expand their businesses in the region, including Malaysia. Others are traders who are in the retail and service industries. Fourthly, these new migrants also stay longer. Having left China with their families, many have chosen to invest privately in the country by sending their children to schools in Malaysia, and purchasing private properties as a means of investment. Finally, in relation to the former two characteristics, these businessmen have begun to invest in properties in view of an extended stay. Contra to those who have come in the pre-2013 period, the new migrants portray a more confident posture as they have more capital and know-how. They are also more composed and efficient as many have graduated from top schools in China and some have had overseas education. Having learned from the experience of the pre-2013 migrants, they are able to by-pass the old migrants (local Chinese) as conduits or middlemen in their dealings with the Malaysian state, as well as the GovernmentLinked Companies. Another new dimension in the new migrants who have come after 2013 is the exponential increase of Chinese students coming to study in Malaysia. It is clear that the introduction of the BRI in 2013 marked a watershed in the transnational experience of Chinese migrants in Malaysia (as well as other parts of Southeast Asia). It is estimated that there are now between 120,000 and 150,000 transnational Chinese migrants in Malaysia. They are broadly divided into four categories, namely, students, workers, those who participated in the “Malaysia as My Second Home” scheme, and the Muslim Chinese. In the case of those who have joined the “Malaysia as My Second Home” scheme, they are made up of both workers and parents of students. (1) Students Since Malaysia introduced a plan in 2006 to position Malaysia as the main education hub in the region of Southeast Asia, it has begun to attract a large number of international students taking up places at the various institutions of higher learning in the country. From a negligible number when it started in the mid-2000s, the number had risen to more than 130,000 in 2016. Out of that, students from China numbered 10,899 constituting about 10% of the total international student population. By 2017, the percentage of Chinese students in Malaysia went up to around 15,000 constituting 14.85% of the total population of international students in Malaysia (Table 2).13 The Chinese students are enrolled in both public and private universities. There are several important impetuses for Chinese students to choose Malaysia as a destination 13

Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia (2017).

New Transnational Chinese Migrants in Malaysia Table 2 Total number of international students in Malaysia according to nationality, 2017

113

No

Country

1

Bangladesh

30,525

2

China

14,854

3

Nigeria

13,529

4

Indonesia

9,762

5

Yemen

6,748

6

Pakistan

6,033

7

Libya

3,317

8

Iraq

3,257

9

Sudan

3,104

10

Iran

11

Others Total

Total

3,068 40,163 133,860

(Source Ministry of Education, 2017)

for tertiary education. The first is the push factor in China where tough competition for places in Chinese universities has encouraged many to seek their higher education abroad. Secondly, well-run and accessible public and private Malaysian universities have motivated many Chinese students to consider acquiring their degrees in Malaysia before making plans for further education elsewhere. The cost of living and tuition fees of tertiary education in Malaysia are also considered affordable if not cheaper. Further, the high quality of Malaysian universities, reflected by their fairly good positions in World University Rankings, has prompted many to consider coming to Malaysia for their education. The recent opening of the Xiamen University Malaysian branch campus in 2014 has since significantly increased the number of Chinese students studying in Malaysia. The campus now boasts a total of 5,000 students with about two-third of them being Chinese nationals. The remainder of the students are mainly from Malaysia and other countries. In Malaysia, a China-Malaysia Students and Alumni Association was started in 2014. It was first initiated by a group of students who were doing their postgraduate studies in the University of Malaya. By 2015, the association had gained recognition from the Embassy of the Peoples’ Republic of China in Kuala Lumpur as one of its outreach avenues and contact channels—with this one focusing on students. Hence, branches of the association have since been established in different institutions of higher learning and have served as the liaison points for social events, and as a minor mutual assistance channel.14 Associated with this, there is also an increasing number of high school or even primary school attendees from China. Many of them are children of parents who 14

Interview with Zhang Runxian, President of the China–Malaysia Students and Alumni Association, PhD Student, University of Malaya and businessman, 31 January 2019.

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are working for the Chinese companies as well as those who have signed up for the “Malaysia My Second Home” scheme. (2) Workers Chinese workers in Malaysia have been growing quantitatively in correspondence to the rise in the number of Chinese companies or corporations operating in Malaysia. Earlier, pre-BRI arrivals were mainly employees of State-Owned Enterprises. Their numbers were small and many were floundering about the complex business condition in Malaysia, especially in dealing effectively with Malaysian GovernmentLinked Companies (GLC). But the number of workers has soon increased sharply after the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. With the increase in Chinese investment through the initiation of new mega-sized projects, the number of Chinese workers in Malaysia has also increased (Table 3). It must be stressed that the composition of Chinese workers in Malaysia differs sharply from other countries. Most of those countries despatch their workers to serve as unskilled labour in Malaysia. However, post-BRI Chinese workers in Malaysia are mainly white-collared professionals. Prior to the BRI, when Chinese companies first started to operate in Malaysia, they had begun to bring in Chinese workers. This was especially true in the construction sector. Previously, the construction sector in Malaysia had relied on other foreign workers and a negligible number of locals as unskilled workers. Chinese companies however, preferred their own workers and their own utility services including cooks from China and having ingredients for their food/diet being supplied from China—by Chinese companies. This method of operation had strong implications on the local operators. In the first instance, through using their own labour force, the Chinese Table 3 The number of foreign workers working in Malaysia as at 2017

No

Country

Total

1

Indonesia

728,870

2

Nepal

405,898

3

Bangladesh

221,089

4

Myanmar

127,705

5

India

114,455

6

Pakistan

59,281

7

Philippines

56,153

8

Vietnam

29,039

9

China

15,399

10

Thailand

12,603

11

Sri Lanka

5,964

12

Cambodia

5,103

13

Laos

39

(Source Ministry of Home Affairs, Malaysia, 2018)

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companies have minimised many hitches faced by local companies that are dependent on foreign workers. As a result, the Chinese companies have become more efficient in completing their tasks in shorter time. With such efficiency, Chinese companies are now posing a threat to local companies that have to compete for jobs in the market. Secondly, by relying entirely on their own labour force complemented with its own eco-system (food, utilities, etc.), there is no spill-over effect on the local suppliers. This becomes a sore point in the working relations between Chinese firms and local markets, especially in the case of labour. In fact, this issue has emerged as accusations against the former Malaysian government, which in their all-out effort to attract Chinese investments, has allegedly given way to Chinese companies to rely solely on Chinese workers in their operations. Chinese Companies in Malaysia are involved in the following industries: tourism, media, investment, IT (Information Technology), trading, hostel management, mining, construction, power station, telecommunication, education, capital, products, hardware, retail, real estate agent, logistics, exhibition, property, manufacturing, healthcare, therapy, oil and gas, medical, power energy, accountant and tax, law, machinery equipment, printing and publishing, culture and events, safety equipment, services, AI (Artificial Intelligence) and robotics, sound and lighting, technology, food and beverage, commodities inspection, the financial sector, rubber, textile, and electronic commerce.15 Based on the different types of Chinese companies in Malaysia, the composition of their executives and staff are also different. The following three categories are identified: (a) Executives and Staff in the Chinese State-Owned Multinationals Due to the high recruitment standards and requirements of Chinese State-Owned Multinationals in Malaysia, this group generally has a higher level of educational background with a bachelor degree or above, as well as overseas work experience and sophisticated professional skills. Most of them have worked in Malaysia for two to five years. All of them hold Malaysian work permits. Most of them choose to work in Malaysia to enrich their work experience and qualifications so that they can get better job opportunities when they return to China in the future. (b) Executives and Staff in the Chinese Private Multinationals Compared with Chinese State-Owned Multinationals, Chinese Private Multinationals have more relaxed recruitment requirements. As a result, their employees have more diverse educational backgrounds, albeit many are university graduates. Some came from their headquarters in China while others were Chinese students who graduated from Malaysia. They are relatively more flexible on their working style compared to employees of state-owned enterprises of the preBRI years. Most of them hold Malaysian work permits, and some hold business

15

China Enterprises Association in Malaysia and China Entrepreneurs Association in Malaysia.

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investment visas. Their working experience in Malaysia is mainly determined by their employment contract and personal wishes.16 (c) Self-employed Entrepreneurs and Directors of Small Chinese Companies This group consists mainly of those who are self-employed. Some of them are company proprietors and others are directors of companies. Ranging from primary school to doctoral degree, their educational qualifications are uneven. The group’s background and experience are also relatively complex. However, they generally live in Malaysia for a longer period, and many have lived in Malaysia for more than five or ten years. This group knows Malaysia well and has the highest degree of integration with Malaysian society. Most of their family members also live in Malaysia. Some are holders of “Malaysia My Second Home” (MM2H) visa, and others are holders of business investment visa.17 As many of the Chinese companies operating in Malaysia had initially started as joint-ventures, they were expected to work with their local partners, which would create jobs for the locals including Chinese and non-Chinese Malaysians. As more and more Chinese multinational companies begin their operations in Malaysia, the number of Chinese nationals in senior and executive positions has also increased. This gives rise to the same question: “Will these companies expand their employment targets to bring in more local Malaysians to work in their establishments?” (3) Participants in the “Malaysia My Second Home” Programme (MM2H) Since the “International Residency Scheme/Migration” programme was introduced to attract investments as well as to promote tourism in 1987, it had subsequently led to the birth of the “Malaysia My Second Home” programme.18 The idea was to attract wealthy silver-haired foreign folks to live in Malaysia. In 2002, the programme was rebranded and revamped to attract more people into the country by opening up to anyone regardless of age. In 2006, it was placed under the purview of the Ministry of Tourism where a one-stop centre was established to administer the programme. The programme allowed new residents to have ten years of residence in the country through certain investments. For Chinese nationals, the condition was for the potential resident to invest RMB$1 million, out of which, RMB$650,000 would be spent on investing in a property and with RMB$100,000 for living expenses.19 Many Chinese seized the opportunity to invest in properties while receiving the right to stay on a short-term basis. There is no intention on the part of the Malaysian Government to grant citizenship to those who have joined the programme, though granting permanent resident status is allowed. Between 2002 and 2017, a total of 35,821 applicants 16

Interview with Yang Guanghui, director of Hangxiao Steel Structure Malaysia Sdn Bhd, 26 September 2020. 17 Interview with Zheng Xiuyun, managing director of Haoyao Shi Yi Tang Traditional Chinese Medical Centre, 15 September 2020. 18 https://www.mm2h.com/mm2h-statistics/. [Accessed 7 September 2021]. 19 For latest requirements, see http://www.mm2h.gov.my. [Accessed 7 September 2021].

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have joined the programme, and had become residents in Malaysia. Out of that, 9,902 of them were Chinese nationals, making them the largest group of foreigners who had participated in the programme.20 This figure was a tremendous increase from the 154 Chinese participants back in 2010. In many ways, this has signified a change of conditions in China where massive economic transformation has allowed many to be able to afford having a second home abroad. At the same time, this has reflected the seriousness of the Malaysian government in making the programme work. Indeed, since its introduction in 2002, Malaysia has become one of the favourite places for retirees from abroad to settle down. Though a section of Chinese residents is comprised of retirees as originally envisaged by the programme, the rest is made up of younger folks. These younger ones are still active in pursuing their vocations and businesses while having a keen interest to stay long-term in Malaysia. According to a respondent, Ms JBB, she chose Penang as the base of her family’s MM2H after a short visit to the state. The idea was to allow her daughter, a junior high school student, to have a less-stressful learning environment while gaining access into top schools in the world without subjecting herself under the highly-pressurised, extremely stressful Gaokao (University Entrance Examination) in China. They had initially planned to head for Melbourne, but they decided to stay in Penang after the visit.21 In this sense, Ms JBB has become what is now commonly known as Peidu Mama (literally translated as “a mother who is accompanying her children for education”). Ms. JBB is not alone. Another Peidu Mama, Ms BW, also brought her daughter to settle in Penang under the MM2H Programme. Her daughter was still in pre-school when they made the decision. The idea was quite similar to that of Ms JBB, which was to provide a conducive environment for her daughter to grow up. Working for a major corporation, Ms BW’s husband remained in Shanghai, but he would visit the family in Penang whenever possible. Ms BW was trying to make the best out of her role as a Peidu Mama by engaging in a small bookstore business that caters to her fellow Peidu Mama.22 Mr PYQ has been in Malaysia since 2009. His two children were born in Malaysia. He has joined the MM2H Programme and is now staying in the high-end Kuala Lumpur suburb of Mont Kiara. He travels between his hometown in Wuhan and Malaysia while spending several months at both places each year. His wife stays in Malaysia with the children. According to Mr PYQ, his father had moved to Malaysia before he made his move. Mr PYQ found life in Malaysia conducive as he put it this way, “It is easy to fit into the culture here without feeling alienated as an outsider. The different races get on well with one another. It is geographically near China. The education is good, and the country maintains its traditional aspect while experiencing development…. In China, the seasons are highly drastic with extremely hot summers and freezing winters. Malaysians are very friendly. I feel this is a good place for my next generation (Table 4).”23 20

See http://www.mm2h.gov.my Ministry of Tourism, Malaysia. [Accessed 6 September 2021]. Interview with Jing Baobao, verbal and correspondence. 22 Interview with Ms BW. 23 “The 3rd Wave of Chinese Migrants: Rich and Happy, Free Malaysia Today (27 March 2017). 21

118 Table 4 Total number of residents under the MM2H in 2019 according to country

D. T. K. Wong Country

Total

China

12,881 (27.6%)

Japan

4,778

Bangladesh

4,135

United Kingdom

2,691

South Korea

2,378

Singapore

1,459

Iran

1,399

Taiwan

1,396

Hong Kong

1,087

India

1,047

112 Other Countries

9,020

(Source http://www.mm2h.gov.my)

A success factor behind this programme among Chinese nationals is the complementary role played by Chinese investments in Malaysia. Brought in by the various Chinese companies, many Chinese workers have decided to participate in the scheme as they have been lured by the attractive and affordable lifestyle in Malaysia. The other major factor has been the direct Chinese investment project such as the $100 billion Forest City project. This massive, mixed development project of a city is an endeavour by Country Garden Holdings with the purpose of attracting Chinese nationals to invest in the country. The project, the largest overseas investment in the world by a Chinese property developer, has 42% of its equity held by Malaysians including the Sultan of Johor.24 The project was heavily promoted in the national mass media in China, and was enormously popular. It sought to promote Forest City as the ideal destination for retirees to invest especially after working so hard throughout their lives. The Forest City and the “Malaysia My Second Home” programme were closely linked as they were usually promoted together. Thus, when the programme was suspended for a duration from September 2018 to March 2019, the project suffered in sales.25 For the Chinese nationals, several reasons have been given as determining factors in their choice of Malaysia as their destination for a second home: (1) it has a good quality of life where the environment is less competitive as compared with China; (2) it has friendly people; (3) its living expenses and tuition fees are affordable; (4) it bears cultural proximity and ease in communication with Chinese language and Chinese dialects; (5) its religious and halal environment is attractive to Chinese Muslims; (6) it is geographically nearer to China as compared with Western countries while having similar quality of life and education standards; and finally, (7) for some workers who have been assigned to work in Malaysia for an extended period of time, 24 25

Berita Harian (24 November 2017). Kang (2021).

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it is hard to cope with changes back in China when they returned. Hence, many have decided to move their families to settle down in Malaysia while continuing to work in China-invested companies in Malaysia, or start their own businesses.26 Despite the attractiveness of MM2H and its popularity, the Chinese understood that the programme could facilitate only a short-term residency of ten years for them while being subjected to prevailing conditions upon renewal. There is neither any promise of a permanent residency nor any prospect for citizenship. Due to the sensitivity of race politics with concerns of racial imbalance in the country, Malaysia has not positioned itself as an immigrant-receiving country for Chines planning to emigrate; on the contrary, it is set as a destination for investments with a short-term stay.

The Exceptions—the Uighur The notion of Chinese transnationalism took on a new dimension with the arrivals of Chinese Muslims from China in significantly noticeable numbers during the 1980s. Their numbers began to rise in the late 1990s and early 2000. By 2015, their presence had been widely accepted as part of the Chinese transnational experience though the circumstances of their arrivals differed significantly from other Chinese transnational diasporas. One important dimension is the religion factor, which is basically absent from the experience of their Han Chinese counterparts. More recently, Ngeow and Ma27 provided some very interesting perspectives on the Hui in Malaysia focusing on the background to their emigration to Malaysia and how pockets of Hui communities have emerged. The Hui group (and Uighur, Ningxia and Dongxia, etc.) took advantage of Malaysia’s Islam fraternity by coming to Malaysia first as students, and later as businessmen or workers. The Hui group was especially favoured by the Muslim Halal Restaurants. For education, Hui students selected the International Islamic University of Malaya (IIUM), which was supported by the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), to be one of their favourite institutions of higher learning amongst other public and private universities. There has been a growing number of religiously motivated and economically driven Hui migrants since 2000. They come to Malaysia to learn about Islam, to serve as an imam (religious leader) to the Chinese Muslims or simply to live in a Muslimmajority environment while seeking job opportunities or expanding their business networks. The first trace of their arrivals took place during the 1980s when a small group of Hui students was sent to study in the many Islamic religious institutions of learning. Later, after the establishment of the International Islamic University (IIUM), many of the Hui students were enrolled in this university. 26

New Straits Times (2017). Ngeow Chow Bing and Ma Hailong. 2016 More Islamic, No Less Chinese: Explorations into the Overseas Chinese Muslim Identities in Malaysia. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39: 12, 2108–2128.

27

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The recent mushrooming of Hui-established restaurants, Chinese halal markets and travel agencies, and the visibility of Hui imams are clear evidence of their presence as well as their ability to adapt to the Malaysian environment. Some Hui students confessed that living as a Muslim in China was fairly easier; apart from observing the prohibition of pork, there were little other rules and regulations that govern Muslim way of life. This is different in Malaysia where adherence to the Islam religion is a way of life and thus it provides impetus for stricter observance of the religion.28 Although there are no official figures of Hui migrants in Malaysia, it is estimated that there are about 2,000 Hui students studying and 100 Hui families living in Malaysia where most of them first came as students and later engaged in business activities. Being Hui students in Malaysia, many are worried that they might be stigmatised by their ethnicity. They are fearful that they would not be welcome back unless they have completed their studies.29 It is worth noting that although the Chinese Muslim and non-Muslim communities in Malaysia are from China, they have little interaction with each other. Besides, their lifestyles, social networks and business networks are very different from each other. On the contrary, there is more interaction with closer relationships between Chinese Muslims and Malays since they both share an inseparable religious identity. More recently, as part of the Chinese Muslim community, some from the Uighur community have begun to use Malaysia as a transit point to eventually move to Turkey—a common route that has allegedly been taken by Uighur Muslim separatists. This development has become a point of contention between the Uighur on the one side, and the Malaysian and Chinese Governments on the other. In 2017, the then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Zahid Hamidi announced that Malaysian Government had since 2012, repatriated 59 alleged Uighur militants or separatists to China.30 The revelation caused an uproar among the Uighur and Human Rights NGOs (non-governmental organization) as it was likely that those who were repatriated would inevitably be arrested and sent to prison. The move at that point however, would definitely win the friendship of China, which was investing heavily in Malaysia. However, the Malaysian Government made a change of plan in October 2018 when eleven Uighurs, who escaped from Thai prisons, had landed in Malaysia. Instead of repatriating them to China, the newly elected Malaysian Government led by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, decided to send them to Turkey, the ultimate destination desired by the Uighur escapees. The decision was said to have defied the Chinese at a time when bilateral relations was at a low point since a Mahathir-led coalition swept to power in the May 2018 General Election.31

28

Interview with Ma Ying, PhD Student at University of Malaya, 30 January 2019. Interview with Zhang Runxuan, 31 January 2019. 30 Berita Harian (13 January 2017). 31 New Straits Times (2018). 29

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The New Migrants in Recent Malaysian Political Sphere As the influx of the New Migrants into Malaysia escalated, especially after the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, the development invoked some negative reactions within Malaysia. The scenario was exacerbated by the sudden introduction of many big projects which attracted a lot of attention in the press. Among others, the Forest City, the Kuantan-Qingzhou Industrial Parks, the Melaka Golden Port, the East Coast Rail Link, the Bakun Hydropower plant in Sarawak, just to name a few. As the projects were expensive and cost a great deal, they were deemed to be of mega-size, and more importantly, they were found all over the country. As Malaysians were looking at these projects, certain concerns began to emerge. First, many were worried that the Malaysian government was allowing the Chinese to gain too much concessions to the point of losing Malaysian sovereignty over lands that were slated for the various projects. Many were looking at certain renowned (notorious) cases that were reported of taking place in some neighbouring countries, including Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. In those cases, Chinese firms were reported to have been given concessions that were of exceptionally long period (some land concessions were alleged to be as long as 99 years), and thus plunging those governments into long-term debts that could not be repaid. Between 2013 and 2020, there were many instances in Malaysia where resentments towards Chinese-initiated projects were expressed. It was a case of too big, too many projects, and the negative image was further exacerbated by the conspicuous incoming tourists. The overwhelming perception of Chinese swarming the country was also caused by the sharp increase in the number of Chinese tourists who visited the country. Between 2016 and 2019, Malaysia received an average of 1.5 million Chinese tourists. Though considerably smaller compared to the Chinese tourists arriving at Thailand and Singapore, the presence of this huge number of tourists, the most visible group of Chinese nationals in Malaysia, had caused some ripples among the Malaysian public. While the tourists are not migrants, their semblance could not be distinguished from the New Migrants—at least not for those who were forming such opinion. In a country where ethnic balance in demography has been deemed to be crucial and sensitive, the sudden increase in the number of ethnic Chinese was clearly not well-accepted, especially in fear of tilting the ethnic balance in the country. Even though the ethnic Chinese have long been a part of the country’s racial composition, they were perceived to be colluding with the New Chinese Migrants. In recent years, when Chinese investment in the country has become part of the political discourse, literature has begun to link the Chinese investments to alleged corruption of those in power. Of particular interest, there was the alleged ties between the Malaysian sovereign fund of 1MDB and their links to the BRI projects including the Kuantan Industrial Park and the East Coast Railway Link.32 The opposition politicians, especially Liew Chin Tong, had a field day in highlighting the questionable 32

Clare Rewcastle Brown, The Sarawak Report: The Inside Story of the 1MDB Exposé, Petaling Jaya: Gerakbudaya Enterprise, 2018,

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manner the projects were introduced and the likelihood they would become a burden to Malaysia.33 Even as the country was heading towards the 14th General Elections, the Chinese and China factors began to attract attention. The walls surrounding the KuantanQingzhou Industrial Park in Kuantan were labelled by the opposition parties as the “Great Wall of China.” When the billboards advertising the park were found to be written only in Chinese, cries of Malaysia losing its sovereignty to China were heard. The Forest City Project also invited severe criticism as one that has been dominated by Chinese nationals. In fact, during the election campaign, the issue was used by the opposition against the Government of Prime Minister Najib, which was accused to have been buttressed by massive Chinese loans where some of which had allegedly helped settle the debts of the scandal-riddled 1MDB State Sovereign Fund. During the run-up to the elections, the Mahathir-led opposition also accused the Chinese projects as a form of Chinese economic imperialism excluding local labour from taking part, which subsequently “struck a chord with voters.”34 Even after Mahathir had come to power, he continued with this seemingly less favourable posture towards China, in which some of the presses have labelled as “antiChina” sentiment. It caused anxiety within the property industry engendering fears that the Chinese investment, which had risen so sharply since 2013, would suffer. In 2017, Chinese nationals invested RM2.3 billion into Malaysian property market. The persistent “anti-China” sentiment would cause a decline in Chinese confidence in the Malaysian property market and would shift their attention elsewhere. There was also the fear that such attitude would put a dent to the successful “Malaysia My Second Home” programme of which the Chinese constitute the largest number of participants.

Concluding Remarks This paper addresses a new phenomenon that is taking place in the region of Southeast Asia with the specific focus on the case of Malaysia. This new transnational experience by the Chinese began as part of the Open Door and Modernization Policy introduced in 1978. The initial pre-BRI period did not see an immediate rise in the number of Chinese nationals coming to Malaysia. However, with the introduction of the BRI in 2013, the number of transnational Chinese arriving in the country, either as businessmen, workers, students or people who have decided to take up residency in Malaysia, has increased in an unprecedented rate. This brought about a possible new transnational experience, which this paper is trying to address.

33

Liew Chin Tong, Investments from China: Malaysia can afford to be—and should be—choosy. (https://www.facebook.com/liewchintong.my/posts/investments-from-china-malaysia-can-aff ord-to-be-and-should-be-choosyinvestments/10154161909730911/)—13 January 2017. 34 Financial Times, 13 December 2018.

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The transnational Chinese migrant experience in Malaysia thus far is definitely different from the traditional ideas of diasporas and migration. In the past, the experience would involve acculturation, assimilation or multiculturalism. However, these concepts are inadequate in explaining the new phenomenon such as “circulatory mobility, migrants’ constant contacts with the sending country societies, deterritorialized imagination of ethnic community, cultural reproduction and hybridity reinforced by constant cross-border flows of symbols and value, ….”35 On the outset, the current transnational Chinese diaspora experience may seem to be a later wave of Chinese emigrating China and immigrating into the region, including Malaysia. However, a closer examination presented a scenario quite unlike the experience of the earlier Chinese in Malaysia and Southeast Asia. The experience of the transnational Chinese who have come after the introduction of the BRI is unique as exemplified by their characteristics. The post-2013 BRI transnational Chinese are confident and rich in resources. They are also no longer confined to State-Owned Enterprises as those who came before 2013. The post-BRI arrivals also include employees of large multi-national companies who are investing in a huge way through the various projects associated with the BRI. In addition, there are new groups, including more private enterprises, that have changed the nature of Chinese transnationalism. The increasing number of Chinese students studying in every level of education—expanding tertiary education to include elementary and high schools—has also transformed the nature of the Chinese students in Malaysia. The presence of these students and also their parents have contributed to the popularity of the “Malaysian My Second Home” programme, making the presence of the Chinese transnationals a common feature in the societal life of Malaysia. As the presence of these transnational Chinese in Malaysia has become a common feature in the everyday life in Malaysia, their presence in large number remains a cause for concern by certain sectors in the Malaysian public. This is due to the sensitivity pertaining to the influx of these Chinese, which could tilt the ethnic balance in the country. The presence of the transnational Chinese and the massive Chinese investments featured in the 2018 General Elections campaigns provides a stark reminder of the sensitive nature of the issue posed by their presence. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that despite the presence of such concerns, Chinese investments are regarded as important to the economy of the country, thus will require careful considerations and handling.

References Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia as cited in China’s investment in Malaysia: Perceptions, Issues and Prescriptions, a report by Social Economic Research Centre (SERC), Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry Malaysia. (2017). 35

Ngeow Chow Bing and Ma Hailong. More Islamic, No Less Chinese: Explorations into the Overseas Chinese Muslim Identities in Malaysia. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39: 12, 2108–2128.

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Bank Negara Malaysia as cited in China’s investment in Malaysia: Perceptions, Issues and Prescriptions, a report by Social Economic Research Centre (SERC), Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry Malaysia. (2017). Berita Harian. (24 November 2017). Bernama (Malaysia National News Agency). (30 December 2020). Statement from Department of Statistics, Malaysia. Chia, F. (2015). The Babas. Landmark Books. Free Malaysia Today. (2017). The 3rd Wave of Chinese Migrants: Rich and Happy. Hutchinson, F. E., & Lee, H. A. (Eds.), The Defeat of Barisan Nasional: Missed Signs or Late Surge (2019). ISEAS. Kurlantzick, J. (2006). China’s Cham Offensive in Southeast Asia. Current History 270–276. Lee, K. H. & Tan, C. B. (Eds.) (2000) The Chinese in Malaysia. Oxford University Press. Lee, H. G., & Leo, S. (Eds.) (2012) Malaysian Chinese: Recent Development and Prospects. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Means, G. (1970). Malaysian Politics. Oxford University Press. Means, G., & Politics, M. (1991). The Second Generation. Oxford University Press. New Straits Times. (13 July 2017). Purcell, V. (1958). The Chinese in Malaya. Oxford University Press. Stromseth, J. (2019). The testing ground: China’s Rsing influence in Southeast Asia and Regional Responses, Global China (pp. 1–12). Brookings Institution. Wang, G. (2000). The Chinese overseas: From earthbound Chinese to the Quest for Autonomy. Harvard University Press. Wong, D. T. K. (2012). A hybrid community in East Malaysia: The Sino-Kadazans of Sabah and their search for identity, Archipel 84, 107–127.

Online Resources Accessed September 7, 2021, from http://www.mm2h.gov.my. Accessed September 7, 2021, from https://www.mm2h.com/mm2h-statistics/. Accessed September 6, 2021, from http://www.mm2h.gov.my Ministry of Tourism, Malaysia. Kang, S. L. (2021) Second home dream crushed as pandemic puts MM2H in Limbo, The Edge. Accessed September 17, 2021, from https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/special-report-sec ond-home-dream-crushed-pandemic-puts-mm2h-limbo. Statistics of Population of Malaysia. (2020). Department of Statistics Online Portal: https:// www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/cthemeByCat&cat=155&bul_id=OVByWjg5Y kQ3MWFZRTN5bDJiaEVhZz09&menu_id=L0pheU43NWJwRWVSZklWdzQ4TlhUUT09. Yang Jiechi on the Belt and Road Initiative and Preparations for the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019/03/30. Accessed July 16, 2021, from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1650535.shtml.

Danny Tze Ken Wong is currently Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Universiti Malaya. He is also Professor of History at the Department of History where he teaches history of Southeast Asia and History of China. His research interests include the Chinese in Malaysia, China’s relations with Southeast Asia and History of Sabah. His more recent publications include, Wang Gungwu and Malaysia, (edited, Universiti Malaya Press, 2021), The Kinabalu Guerrillas and the 1943 Api Uprising (Yang Ming Chiao Tung University Press, 2021) & Lead & Grow: 115 Years of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce & Industry of Selangor and Kuala Lumpur (UM Press, 2021).

Identity, Politics, and Transnationalism: Deciphering New Chinese Diaspora in Singapore, 2010–2020 Hong Liu

Introduction This chapter is concerned with developments of (new) ethnic Chinese communities in Singapore in the changing contexts of state–society relations and transnationalism against the backdrop of a rising China and its growing influences in Southeast Asia. This chapter seeks to substantially expand and update some of themes discussed in my earlier work pertaining to Chinese diaspora in Singapore, such as the transnational social sphere and regional networking (Liu, 2012; Liu & Zhang, 2020), complex relationship between new migrants and the mainstream society (Liu, 2014; Liu & Huang, 2022), diaspora Chinese entrepreneurs and their dual embeddedness (Liu, 2008, 2016; Liu & Ren, 2017), and new Chinese capitalism in relation to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Liu, 2022; Liu & Lim, 2022; Ren & Liu, 2022). In addition, this chapter examines in detail the new demographics, the state’s recent policy initiatives, and business transnationalism. While it touches upon local-born Singaporean Chinese who are broadly defined to be included in the Chinese diaspora, my focus is on new Chinese migrants who have left mainland China and have resided overseas since the start of its reform and opening-up in the late 1970s. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Singapore in 1990 and the growing economic ties since then have provided a further impetus for the arrival and settlement of a large number of new migrants in the country, ranging from businesspeople, professionals to laborers (see next section for details). Scholars have also examined in detail the complexity of new migrants in the nation and diverse patterns of reactions by the citizens (e.g., Yap, 2015; Zhou & Liu, 2016; Kong & Woods, 2019; Gomes, 2019; Zhan & Zhou, 2020; Yang, 2022; Frost, 2021; Ho, 2020; Dirksmeier, 2020; Ho & Kathiravelu, 20212021). These studies have collectively highlighted the multiple patterns of identities of ethnic Chinese in Singapore from comparative and H. Liu (B) School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Santasombat (ed.), Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4617-2_6

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interdisciplinary angles. The growing literature on Singapore has also demonstrated the larger value of social science theorization of the small city–state, which is a multiethnic society. Built upon this literature, this chapter attempts to place the changing ethnic ties in the context of the new political economy as well as the interactions between state–society relationship and transnationalism. Singapore serves as an illuminating and conducive site for a detailed analysis of changing relationship between the state, society, identity, and transnationalism not just because it is the only country outside China with an ethnic Chinese majority in the population, but it is also enjoying thriving trade linkages with China. While bringing about significant economic benefits and opportunities, these bilateral trade linkages have contributed to local anxieties on the role of new diaspora, which has been complicated by the intensified American–China rivalries over the past few years. In the meantime, as will be detailed in the subsequent pages, the past decade has witnessed significant changes in Singapore’s domestic socio-political scene, which has a major impact upon relationship between the state, society and identity as well as the nation’s future trajectory. My analysis of these issues is situated in the broad literature of state–society relations as well as transnationalism, which is defined as: “The processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasise that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. Immigrants who develop and maintain multiple relationships—familial, economic, social, organisational, religious and political—that span borders we call ‘transmigrants.’ An essential element of transnationalism is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both home and host societies” (Basch et al., 1994, 7; see also Portes et al., 1999; Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007).

This chapter aims to identify the intersecting spaces between these two theoretical domains of analysis and to decipher the complex patterns of their interplay. Data for this chapter are drawn from two main sources. The first is personal interviews with relevant stakeholders and participant observations of relevant activities in both Singapore and China (such as ceremonies of new migrant associations and business conventions), which help formulate an actor-centric perspective. The second type of data is publicly available documents such as population and trade statistics, speeches by statesmen, reports of meetings, surveys of business development and public attitudes, special publications of Chinese new migrant associations, and media reports in both English and Chinese. They represent both the state’s perspectives and outsiders’ views of diaspora development in the island state whose domestic political economy has been invariably shaped by the external environments. This chapter is organized into three main parts. The first is an overview of the socio-political changes taking place over the past decade and how they have impacted upon the Chinese diaspora and their relations with the state/society. The second part examines the changing demographics, emergence of new diaspora associations, and the Singaporean state’s policies towards the diaspora, which constitute an overarching framework for an understanding of state–society relations and transnationalism. The third part of the chapter looks at the operations and characteristics of new Chinese business transnationalism by focusing on Chinese businesses in Singapore and new

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migrant business in China. These simultaneous trends have taken place against the backdrop of a rising China and its changing policies on diaspora engagement. The conclusion discusses the theoretical implications of the Singapore experience and proposes future research directions.

A New Political Economy The past decade has witnessed significant changes in the social and political environments of Singapore, which have in turn shaped the nation’s engagement with the new diaspora in general. First and foremost is the 2011 General Election in which the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) won only 60.1% of the popular votes, the lowest since the nation’s independence in 1965. The second major event was the demise of the founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in March 2015, marking the end of an era in modern Singapore. The subsequent years have seen the beginning of the gradual transition from the third generation of the political leadership led by current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to the fourth generation. The third was economic restructuring in which the nation has been more firmly geared toward internationalization and innovation. All these events have direct impact upon the state–society relationship in the context of ethnicity, changing demographics, and transnationalism.

Socio-Political and Economic Changes, 2010–2020 As one of the most contested political events in the island-state’s recent history, the 2011 General Election heralded some major changes for the whole decade and beyond. Although the economy was doing quite well, achieving a respected GDP growth rate of 14.7% in 2010, surpassing the previous record of 13.8% set in 1970 and constituting the fastest growing economy in Asia of the year,1 the ruling PAP did not perform well in the May 2011 parliamentary election. It received 60.1% of popular votes while opposition parties won a “landmark gain.” In the presidential election held in August of the same year, Tony Tan, former Deputy Prime Minister who was seen “as the preferred candidate” of the PAP, won with a slim margin of

1

“Singapore economy sees record expansion in 2010,” https://www.bbc.com/news/business-121 06645 (January 3, 2011).

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7,269 votes out of over two million valid votes cast in the four-way race.2 The postmortem review identified four main reasons for the PAP’s poor election performance in 2011 as follows3 : 1. Sharp increase of the cost of living including house prices; 2. Overcrowding on public transport; 3. The hospital bed crunch, transport woes and stagnating wages were blamed on a large influx of foreign workers due to a liberal immigration policy; 4. The main opposition party Workers’ Party’s theme of a First World Parliament resonated with residents in Aljunied [where the main opposition party had a landslide victory]. The first two factors were closely intertwined with the third, namely, migration issue, evidenced by the rapid and large-scale influx of foreigners in the country during the first decade of the twenty-first century (Liu, 2014). It had played a big part in leading to this watershed event, which perpetuated a series of policy changes including restrictions on migration. It has led to what some called popular nationalism in the nation’s political environment. As Jason Lim (2015) contended, “Popular nationalism is concerned about local issues concerning national identity, social cohesion, and an appreciation (or at least an understanding) of local heritage. Proponents of popular nationalism …. view Singapore as a nation-state with a unique and evolving identity destabilized by a liberal immigration policy.” The demise of Singapore’s founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in March 2015 was another major turning point in the nation’s political history. Since the mid-1950s when Lee co-founded the PAP, he had been at the centre of the local politics and shaped almost every aspect of the new nation’s political, social, and economic developments. The post-Lee Kuan Yew era has continued the trend of “new normal.” The nationalist revival also shaped the local socio-political scene in which many nativeborn Singaporeans displayed negative views towards new immigrants and wanted the government to do more to help the locals (Welsh, 2015). Alongside with the changing social and political landscape that calls for “compassionate meritocracy,” the country was also preparing for the political leadership transition after the PAP won a convincing victory of 69.9% of votes in the 2015 general election (Tan & Boey, 2017). The 2020 general election, held amidst the global Covid-19 pandemic, saw the PAP’s share of the popular votes decreased to 61.24%, with the opposition party Workers’ Party winning unprecedented 10 seats in the 83-member parliament. The third major change in the mid-2010s was pertaining to economic development strategy. Since the end of the twentieth century, the state has strengthened a regionalization strategy, in which firms are encouraged to venture into markets adjacent to Singapore, including but not limited to China. The goal is to develop a second market to augment Singapore’s small domestic market. Although Singapore continued to do 2

“Singapore presidential election won by Tony Tan,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pac ific-14690176 (August 27, 2011). 3 “GE2015: A look back at the last 5 general elections from 1991 to 2011,” Straits Times, August 28, 2015. For a more detailed analysis of the 2011election and the relations with anti-immigration sentiments, see Chong (2012), Tan (2012), Lim (2015), and Gomes (2019).

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well in comparison with other economies in the region, there were some underlying issues as follows: (a) slow global economic growth; (b) a prolonged fall in oil prices; (c) shifts in international trade flows; and (d) a mismatch between current workforce skills and new jobs being created by disruptive technologies (Tan & Boey, 2017). After a year-long extensive review and consultation, the government announced the “Committee on the Future Economy Report” in February 2017, aiming to transform Singapore’s future economy by embracing innovation and becoming a digital economy through focusing on five key areas: (a) future growth industries and markets through internationalization; (b) corporate capabilities and innovation; (c) jobs and skills; (d) urban development and infrastructure; and (e) connectivity (Committee on the Future Economy, 2017). This short overview of major transformations in the second decade of the twentyfirst century highlights a few key themes that are closely related to this chapter. In the first place, Singapore has a rapidly changing demographical profile. The firsttime voters in 2011 election were estimated to be 200,000, and together with other voters below 35, they numbered about 600,000 out of the 2.3 million voters (Chong, 2012). Born after the mid-1980s, they grew up in a time of Singapore’s entry into the advanced economy and prosperity. Their views of the nation, national and ethnic identity, and its future are different from the earlier generation who lived in a much more difficult period after Singapore’s forced separation from Malaysia in which the fighting for survival was the top priority. While the younger generation has firmly established their national identity as Singaporeans, their perceptions of China and new Chinese migrants in the country are more detached, which is partly driven by the English education environment they grew up with many considering English as their new “mother tongue” (c.f., Toh & Liu, 2021). This is the socio-linguistic mosaic for the new Chinese diaspora. Secondly, the passing of Lee Kuan Yew and the subsequent process of transition of political leadership has opened up a new space for the government’s active engagement to build a more inclusive society through dialogues and civic consultations. It also entails close integration of new migrants into the nation’s social and political fabrics. A number of nation-wide Singapore Dialogues launched during the decade repeatedly highlighted this theme of identity and inclusiveness. Speaking at the “Building Our Future Singapore Together” dialogue in June 2019, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Heng Swee Kiat spoke of the need “to shift from a government that focusses primarily on working for you, to a government that works with you.” One of the key foci of the 4G leadership is to “build on the strong foundation of a multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-cultural society, to build an even more caring, gracious, kind and cohesive community, and strengthen our identity as one people.”4 Third, the new economic development strategy has provided ample opportunities not only for the general populace to enhance their employability through life-long 4

“Speech by DPM and Minister for Finance Heng Swee Keat at the ‘Building Our Future Singapore Together’ dialogue on 15 June 2019,” https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/DPM-Heng-Swee-KeatBuilding-Our-Future-Singapore-Together-Dialogue.

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learning programmes, but it also serves as a conducive platform for those highlyskilled new migrants to develop their careers in Singapore. As the nation does not have sufficient quantity of talents in these emerging fields, it has to turn to overseas to supplement the human capital that is critical for the new economy. Furthermore, connectivity and internationalization are the twin foci of the new economic strategies, which are in tandem with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Indeed, since 2014, Singapore has been the largest foreign direct investor in China, and close to 26% of China’s investment to the 60-plus BRI countries went to Singapore in 2018.5

Changing Demographics and the New Chinese Diaspora Changing Demographics Singapore’s population development since the beginning of the twenty-first century has been shaped by two main factors: the country is rapidly becoming an ageing society with a chronically low fertility rate. There has been a steady increase in the size of Singapore’s elderly population over the years. In 2017, those aged 65 years and older increased to 13% of the resident population from 7.2% in 2000. It is projected that 22.1% of the resident population will be aged 65 years and over in 2030.6 In the meantime, the past five decades have witnessed a steady decline in demographic trend, registering one of the lowest total fertility rates in the world: from 2.62 (1970– 75), to 1.57 (1995–2000), to 1.14 (2019), far below the population replacement level of 2.1 (Channel News Asia, 2020; Sun, 2012). More specifically, the birth rate for ethnic Chinese was even lower than the national average, at about 1.05, thus posing a potential challenge to the nation’s racial balance in which the Chinese have been accounting for roughly 75% of the total population since independence. The government has made it clear that the immigration policy had to be calibrated to maintain this balance (Frost, 2021). A liberal immigration policy thus constituted an important component of the government’s population policy. The then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong announced in 1999 that “without talents, we cannot become a first-world economy and a worldclass home; we must import talents from overseas to supplement local talents.”7 Lee 5

“Singapore was the largest overseas investment destination for China along the Belt and Road and captured close to 23% of the total investment outflow from China to Belt and Road countries in 2018.” Press Release by Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry (April 29, 2019). “Singapore deepens economic cooperation with China through new platform with Shanghai and Third-Party Market Cooperation.” Available at https://www.mti.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Releases/2019/04/Sin gapore-deepens-economic-cooperation-with-China-through-new-platform-with-shanghai. See also Liu et al. (2021). 6 Ministry of Social and Family Development, Ageing Families in Singapore, 2000-2017 (Singapore: MSFD, 2019), p. 3. 7 Lianhe Zaobao, August 23, 1999.

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Table 1 Population growth in Singapore (1990–2019). (Number in thousands) Year

Total Population

Singapore Residents Total

Citizens

Non-Residents Permanent Residents

1990

3,047.1

2,735.9

2,623.7

112.1

311.3

2000

4,027.9

3,273.4

2,985.9

287.5

754.5

2010

5,076.7

3,771.7

3,230.7

541.0

1,305.0

2019

5,703.6

4,026.2

3,500.9

525.3

1,677.4

Source Department of Statistics Singapore: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/popn/c2010acr/key. pdf https://www.singstat.gov.sg/find-data/search-by-theme/population/population-and-population-str ucture/latest-data

Kuan Yew believed that Singapore’s diminishing population would slow down the economy and regarded the task of increasing the country’s population as its “biggest challenge” (Liu & Zhang, 2016). Pointing to the stagnation of the Japanese economy as a result of their hostility to immigrants, he put it bluntly: “Like it or not, unless we have more babies, we need to accept immigrants.”8 As a result of the government’s proactive initiatives in recruiting “foreign talents” and a liberal immigration policy regime, the first decade of the twenty-first century had seen a rapid growth in the foreign permanent resident (PR) population, which represented the fastest-growing segment of the population in Singapore (Table 1). Singapore’s total population was 5.08 million as of June 2010. There were 3.77 million Singapore residents comprising 3.23 million citizens, 541,000 permanent residents, and 1.31 million non-resident foreigners who were on various work permits or long-term visas. The past decade has seen steady growth of Singapore population, thanks in large part to the fast pace of migration and non-resident population. Between 2000 and 2010, Singapore’s non-resident population increased from 18.7% to 25.7% (Fig. 1). Over the same decade, the number of Singapore PRs had increased by on average 8.4% annually rising from 8.8% of the total population to 14.3%. In 2011, the Chinese made up 61.4% of this increased PR population (Frost, 2021). As to how many new Chinese migrants have been in Singapore (including those who have naturalized and become permanent residents of the nation), the information has not been released by the government. My earlier studies estimated the number to be around 350,000–400,000 (Liu, 2012). It was only in early 2020 that the United Nations published the data pertaining to the sources of Singapore’s international migration. As shown in Fig. 2,9 the largest source of migrants (defined as those naturalized citizens, permanent residents, and long-term work pass holders who 8

Straits Times, Feb. 4, 2012. For a more detailed analysis of Lee Kuan Yew’s view on foreign migrants, see Liu and Zhang (2016). 9 Tan Ee Lyn, “Migrants in Singapore: UN report debunks popular perceptions,” Straits Times, Jan., 19, 2020. The UN data are available at https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migrat ion/data/estimates2/countryprofiles.asp.

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Fig. 1 Number of international migrants to Singapore (1990–2015). Source https://www.ceicdata. com/en/singapore/population-and-urbanization-statistics/sg-international-migrant-stock--of-pop ulation

were born outside of Singapore) came from Malaysia (44% of 2,155,653 in 2019, or 948,487) followed by those from mainland China (18% of total migrants, or 388,000). New Chinese migrants emerged as a result of China’s reform and opening-up in the late 1970s. They are not a homogenous entity, and they are composed of people of different socio-economic, regional, and sub-ethnic backgrounds (Liu, 2005; Zhou, 2017). According to the World Migration Report 2020, the number of international migrants originated from China was 10.7 million.10 By comparison, new migrants in Singapore only accounted for 3.6% of total new Chinese migrants. Like those in other countries, new migrants in Singapore shared some demographic characteristics with their counterparts elsewhere who originated from all over China instead of originating from the traditional qiaoxiang (Chinese diaspora’s ancestral hometowns) in South China. Apart from about 70,000 labourers (in the early 202011 ), those new immigrants with “portable skills” are generally much better educated than the local population, and they are overrepresented in some research and higher education sectors. For instance, the National University of Singapore has the following demographical distribution: Among its 1,671 full-time teaching faculty members in 2000, 887 (53%) were Singaporean citizens and the remaining 784 (46.9%) were foreigners, of whom 110 (14%) were PRC citizens. Among the 842 full-time researchers, only 221 (26%) were Singaporean citizens; 621 (74%) were foreigners while 329 of whom (39%) were from the PRC (cited in Liu, 2008). This is a reflection of the policy efforts on the part of the Singapore government in recruiting foreign migrants who are divided into highly skilled and low-skilled with the former meeting the needs for the nation’s drive towards a smart city-state amidst the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Zhan & Zhou, 2020). The low-skilled foreign laborers, on the other hand, are needed for manual

10 11

https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020_en_chapter1_004.pdf, p. 3. http://www.chinaembassy.org.sg/chn/kjxgfyyqztxx/t1773552.htm.

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Fig. 2 Growth and sources of international migrants in Singapore. Sources United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and Sunday Times (January 21, 2020)

work that few Singaporeans want to do, and they have no prospects of settling down in Singapore.

Between De-Territorialization and Re-Territorialization In comparison with traditional Chinese organizations based upon primordial ties such as locality and kinship (Liu, 1998; Liu & Ren, 2017), new associations tend to be more inclusive through their recruitment of members from diverse geographical and social backgrounds originating from China. Here, we highlight two such examples to showcase their characteristics and functions. While deterritorialization emphasizes the separation of people, processes and sentiments from a particular locality or nation,

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“this image of global space as a ‘placeless, distanceless, and borderless’ realm is the geographical essence of deterritorialization approaches” (Brenner, 1999, p. 61). The Singapore Hua Yuan Association was established in 2001 by mainlandborn Chinese professionals to recruit members from the new emigrants who have become Singaporean citizens or permanent residents. The key individuals attending the founding ceremony in May 2001 were indicative of its intended mission to serve as a bridge between Singapore and China as well as between new migrants and the local-born Singaporean Chinese: (a) Chan Soon Sen, the then Senior Parliamentary Secretary in the Singapore Prime Minister’s Office, Zhang Jiuhuan, the then Chinese Ambassador to Singapore; (b) Freddy Lam Fong Loi, President of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which was founded in 1906 and has since been one of the most influential Chinese organizations in the nation; and (c) Chua Gim Siong, the General Secretary of the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations, which was established in 1986 with a view to liaise with some 300 Chinese voluntary associations in Singapore (Singapore Hua Yuan Association, 2016, p. 81). The Association also recruits “para-members” among those PRC citizens who are on long-term student visas or employment permits. According to its constitution, the association has six main missions: (a) to assist members to better integrate into the multi-ethnic society of Singapore; (b) to promote information exchange and communication; (c) to foster the spirit of mutual help; (d) to promote exchanges and communications with other associations; (e) to uplift its members’ social lives by organizing various activities; and (f) to promote commercial and trade relationships between Singapore and China. As the largest association representing new migrants from China, the Hua Yan Association claimed to have a membership of more than 6,000 in 2016 (Singapore Hua Yuan Association, 2016, p.8), who collectively represented nearly every province in China and majority of whom had at least a college degree. Table 2 is a detailed analysis of the events organized by the Association during its first 15 years of development, revealing that there are four major types out of all 187 listed activities (in other words, there is an average of one event organized per month). It should be noted that the above events are often multi-purposed with mixed aims to maximize social, cultural, economic, and sometimes, political benefits; hence, they could be overlapping in their operations. They do, however, reflect a trend of integrating with the local society and enhancing transnational business networking, in addition to serving as a platform for new migrants for cultural bonding. The integration efforts were also clearly demonstrated in the New Migrants Outstanding Contribution Awards the Hua Yuan Association has organized, with the award criteria focusing on the awardees’ contribution to Singapore and the awards have also been given to non-Chinese.12 In the meantime, reflecting the fact that the new diaspora were born in China and still maintain family, social, and business ties with the ancestral homeland, the activities in relations to China account for about one-third

12

Based upon author’s participation as a member of selection panel for the second award (2012/13) and third award (2018/19).

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Table 2 Breakdown of events organized by Hua Yuan Association (2001–2016) Types of Events

Integration with the local society

Business networking

Social-cultural bonding among members

China engagement

Number and percentage

77 (41.2%)

36 (19.3%)

49 (26.2%)

25 (13.3%)

Examples

Co-organizing events with the People’s Association; attending functions hosted by Singaporean politicians

Receiving delegations from China and other countries on business collaborations; working with local companies to promote business

Recreational and enriching activities such as sports, seminars, singing competition, and matching

Attending National Day celebration in China and/or Chinese embassy in Singapore

Source Author’s compilation based upon “15-year Milestone,” in Singapore Hua Yuan Association (2016), pp. 64–95

of the Association’s overall activities (including some business networking events held in Singapore, and root-seeking programmes). De-territorialization is also a characteristic of another new Chinese association established by and for the new migrants. Just as the case of the Hua Yuan Association, the Singapore Tianfu Hometown Association, founded in 2000, represents the hometown in a more symbolic manner. Although Tianfu is an alias of Sichuan Province, the Association’s membership is not confined to the traditional organizing principles of locality (namely, those born in Sichuan and speak the local dialect), but it also includes those who have studied or worked in the province or have business/ cultural contacts with Sichuan. The word “Hometown” was dropped from the name of the association in 2006, and the Tianfu Chamber of Commerce was established as an affiliated entity. Its members were born in every part of China. As of March 2018, it had registered members of 1,312, in which 95% of whom had a college degree and a further 60% had a masters or PhD (Singapore Tianfu Association, 2018, p. 16). Its President Du Zhiqiang revealed that about 30% of its members studied in Singapore and more than half of them had master’s degrees (Lianhe Zaobao, August 9, 2020). While the Tianfu Association has vowed that “Singapore is our home” and aims to contribute to “our society and serving our country [Singapore]” in its pledge, it does not mean that it has totally cut off from linkages with China. On the contrary, the dual embeddedness in both Singapore and China has provided significant social and economic capital for its leadership and business members in their activities (Liu & Ren, 2017). The Association’s key leadership, for example, has been invited by central and local governments of China to attend major functions such as National Day celebration. There are other similar new Chinese associations being formed over the past two decades. While the number of such associations was six in between 1990

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and 2010, at least five new associations were set up between 2011 and 2016 (Leong, 2016).13 We have mentioned about new Chinese Associations’ tendency to develop deterritorialization in that the locality linkage has been decoupled or delinked in their efforts to reach out a wide audience from all over China and engage China as a political and cultural symbol, we should not assume that locality linkage has been totally discredited or given away. In effect, similar to earlier globalization of overseas Chinese clan associations in which primordial ties such as kinship and locality had been revitalized to serve the new needs of economic development (Liu, 1998), there is a form of re-territorialization, the symbolic and real reattachment of the hometowns, taking place among some major Chinese associations after they have been firmly established in the new host societies. The co-existence of de- and re-territorialization is reflected in the Tianfu Association’s 18th anniversary celebration held in March 2018 in Singapore, with the then Minister for Education Ong Ye Kung (who also chaired the government’s Chinese Community Liaison Group at the time) as the guest of honor. The celebration was held in conjunction with the 5th annual meeting of the Presidents of Overseas Sichuanese Associations. The 30 presidents represented in the meeting included those from the USA, Europe, Australia, Japan and Southeast Asia, with their ancestral hometowns being Sichuan province or Chongqing (which used to be part of Sichuan), or the neighboring provinces such as Guizhou. This mechanism of global networking was established in 2014 in Sichuan with the backing of the local provincial government, serving as a linkage between Sichuan province and those (mostly) business leaders originating from Sichuan as well as the neighboring provinces (Singapore Tianfu Association, 2018).

Government Policies Towards New Chinese Migrants The development of the new diaspora has been significantly shaped by the Singapore government’s policies. While the largest source of international migrants come from Malaysia, the issue of integration is less of a concern for the Singapore state, mainly because the two countries have had long-standing social, economic and cultural linkages dating back to the colonial period when both territories were under the British rule and were united as a country for two years prior to Singapore’s independence in 1965. The integration, therefore, would have to be focusing on the second largest source of international migrants who are from mainland China. There are two main underlying logics behind the government’s positions pertaining to the new diaspora. The first is economic and demographic logic, which requires Singapore to attract foreigners with good educational credentials and the

13

Leong Weng Kam, “New Clan Group for Residents from Jiangsu,” Straits Times, November 14, 2016.

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needed skillsets to facilitate the country’s economic development and transformation. This would also directly address the issue of declining fertility rate. Speaking in 2016 about Singapore’s drive toward research, innovation and enterprise, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (2016) made it clear: “We have to be able to attract international talent and be open to talent in order to be able to deepen our talent pool, to create new knowledge and to enhance our technological expertise. If we can do that, then we can get the right mix of local and foreign talent. We have to make this a creative, a fertile, an innovative and enterprising environment.”14 The second logic is political and identity-driven, which requires the government to ensure the newcomers to be politically loyal to the country (if they have been naturalized to become Singapore citizens), and to be closely integrated into the local multi-ethnic socio-cultural mosaic. While the two logics may not be contradictory to each other, the government has given priority to the second throughout the past decade as a direct reflection of the changing political economy documented in the first section of this chapter. As a young nation in the process of forming its own national identity, Singapore wants to avoid any potential distractions that might not be conducive to this larger and more important project. This is especially the case in relation to new migrants from China, a rising power that has had a long cultural tradition. The mounting US-China confrontations over the past decade have reinforced this policy preference. As Lee Hsien Loong has written in the July/August 2020 issue of the Foreign Affairs, the existence of a significant number of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia is an “extremely sensitive” issue and an “obstacle that would prevent China from taking over the security role currently played by the United States” (Lee 2020b, p. 60). He specifically highlighted the delicate challenges faced by Singapore: Singapore is the only Southeast Asian country whose multiracial population is majority ethnic Chinese. In fact, it is the only sovereign state in the world with such demographics other than China itself. But Singapore has made enormous efforts to build a multiracial national identity and not a Chinese one. And it has also been extremely careful to avoid doing anything that could be misperceived as allowing itself to be used as a cat’s-paw by China. For this reason, Singapore did not establish diplomatic relations with China until 1990, making it the final Southeast Asian country, except for Brunei, to do so (Lee 2020b, p. 60).

Guided by these two main considerations, the Singapore government has formulated a series of policies towards the Chinese community in general and new migrants in particular, with interconnected agendas that have been aptly summarized by the then Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security, Teo Chee Hean, at the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations (SFCCA) 16th Council investiture ceremony held on 7 October 2018. He highlighted the role of the SFCCA to be an important bridge for Singapore: “First, a bridge between our people; second, a bridge between new and old; and third, a bridge between countries” (Teo, 2018). The first role is for the Chinese community to enhance “multiracial society and 14

“PM Lee Hsien Loong’s speech at the Research, Innovation and Enterprise Council (RIEC) Press Conference,” January 8, 2016. Available at. https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/pm-lee-hsien-loong-research-innovation-and-enterprisecouncil-riec-press-conference.

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multicultural traditions,” which are what “make Singapore unique.” The second is to help the assimilation of “new immigrants into our society. SFCCA should continue to create opportunities for new immigrants to better understand Singapore’s customs and culture, and to deepen interactions.” The third is for “a deep understanding of China and maintains many connections and networks in China.” The formulation and strengthening of a unique Singaporean (Chinese) identity has been at the core of the state’s policies over the past decade. In celebrating Singapore’s bicentennial in 2019, Lee Hsien Loong spoke in length about the emergence and characteristics of this unique identity and tradition. He pointed out that even before the arrival of the British in 1819, “Singapore had already had hundreds of years of history” that could be traced back to the fourteenth century. The country’s history had also “made us quite different from our neighbours and friends.” And he concluded: “Over two centuries, all these different strands wove together into a rich tapestry, a shared sense of destiny, and eventually a Singapore identity and nation.” He further highlighted that nation-building is an on-going project: “[W]e are never done building Singapore. It is every generation’s duty to keep on building, for our children, and for our future” (Lee, 2019). Identity construction explains the political leadership’s emphasis on integration of all ethnic communities as an overarching framework in confronting new migrant communities in the nation. Integrating new Chinese migrants into the multiracial society while engaging them for business networks with China have, therefore, become the dual frameworks of the government’s positions toward new Chinese migrants. The speech by Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office Chan Chun Sing (who chaired the government’s Chinese Community Liaison Group at the time) in November 2016 at the celebration event of the Hua Yuan Association is indicative of such a dual focus. In the first place, he noted that Chinese clan associations were like a bridge between Singapore and China in the past, new migrant associations are expected to position themselves differently and “are like a construction crane, with a solid foundation capable of rising and helping Singapore to reach out and connect with different parts of the world, not China alone.” He emphasized that “the new Chinese immigrants must not only integrate with the older immigrants with their younger generations all Singapore-born, but also those from the minority races.” The role of business networks is also important. In the launching event of the Global Hua Yuan Collaborative Network, Chan praised that “such networks by Chinese community groups can play a new role in connecting Singapore with the rest of the world” (cited in Leong, 2016). In a similar vein, Chan spoke in the founding ceremony of the Singapore Jiangsu Association in March 2017: “New citizens are a part of our social fabric, and it is critical that they can integrate well and at the same time, contribute to society to ensure sustainable growth for Singapore. The Association will play an important and active role in facilitating and promoting social integration, thereby further strengthening the harmony and growth of Singapore.” He urged the Jiangsu Association to “further promote exchanges and cooperation between Singapore and Jiangsu, as well as the whole of China, in areas such as trade, technology, culture and education” (Singapore Jiangsu Association, 2017, p. 3). Minister Ong Ye Kung’s opened his speech at the Tianfu Association’s 18th Anniversary gala dinner with a praise that the association

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“has actively encouraged and helped new migrants integrate into Singapore society, and has promoted various activities aiming at racial harmony” (Singapore Tianfu Association, 2018, p. 4). The above efforts of identity construction, integration and transnational business networking have been institutionalized to ensure smooth coordination of various government agencies and effective implementation of the evolving policies. One of the most important institutions is the Chinese Community Liaison Group (CCLG) comprising office-holders and PAP Members of Parliament that has been set up since 2000 to “strengthen relations between the Government and the Chinese community as well as cooperation amongst the various Chinese groups.” The first chairman was Chan Soon Seng, an MP and Minister of State. He was succeeded by Senior Minister of State (later Minister for Health) Gan Kim Yong in 2006. Chan Chun Sing took over the chairmanship in 2014, and Ong Ye Kung assumed this role in 2017 (Xinhuanet, 2014; Tham, 2017). In November 2020, Minister for Culture, Community and Youth Edwin Tong, who was also Second Minister for Law (and a Roman Catholic), took over as chairman of CCLG. In his statement, Lee Hsien Loong said: “Much synergy exists between his [Tong’s] current portfolio and the needs of the Chinese community. In the course of fostering a cohesive multiracial and multi-religious community in Singapore, Edwin will also be able to deepen the engagement of arts and cultural groups, as well as religious and youth groups in the Chinese community.”15 As both Chan and Ong are the core members of Singapore’s 4th generation leadership, their appointments demonstrate the government’s growing attention to the engagement with the Chinese community. On the other hand, Tong’s appointment could be seen as a reflection of the government’s efforts to strengthen Chinese identity in the Singaporean multiracial and multi-religious context. According to Lee Hsien Loong, Chan Chun Sing “did much to deepen and expand CCLG’s engagement with the Chinese community. He has canvassed the community leaders’ feedback and concerns, worked with them on government programmes and explained these initiatives to the Chinese ground. Mr Chan has also broadened the reach of CCLG beyond the Chinese clan and business associations, to include media, sports, arts and cultural groups” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2017). In addition to being under the helm of the PAP’s rising political stars, the CCLG is supported by a number of politicians and technocrats who are effectively bilingual (English and Chinese) and have a deep knowledge of Chinese culture. According to the local newspaper Lianhe Zaobao, the CCLG is composed of several working groups headed by senior politicians and MPs, such as those dealing with business, clan associations, Chinese religious groups, cultural and arts sector, media, bi-culturalism, and new migrants. After the 2015 General Election, five new members including two full ministers were appointed to the CCLG (Lianhe Zaobao, November 10, 2015; Xinhuanet). The wide-ranging activities under CCLG’s charge indicate the important role of what Lee Hsien Loong called “Dahuashe” (“pan-Chinese

15

Straits Times, November 12, 2020. Emphasis added.

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community”), which is composed of clan associations, business associations, religious groups, cultural groups, media, new migrants, martial art organizations, and organizers of Getai16 (Lianhe Zaobao, November 11, 2015). With a view to responding to the government’s call to better integrate newcomers into the nation’ social fabric, the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations, a consortium of more than 300 locality/kinship associations, decided in January 2012 to set up a new Chinese Cultural Centre “to integrate newcomers to Singapore and showcase the local Chinese identity” (Straits Times, Jan., 25, 2012). Located in the central business district, the Centre was open in 2017, with Lee Hsien Loong serving as its patron (Lee, 2020a). Its stated vision is “a vibrant Singapore Chinese culture, rooted in a cohesive, multi-racial society,” and the mission is to “nurture Singapore Chinese culture and enhance social harmony.”17 In summary, significant changes have taken place in the past decade with respect to Singapore’s politics, society and the Chinese community. The three interconnected driving forces behind the transformation of new Chinese diaspora in Singapore are: (a) the government’s policy, especially in terms of identity-building in a multi-racial Singapore and its role in contributing to the nation’s future economy through crossborder business networks; (b) changing demographics and the growing numbers of new Chinese migrants and their associations in the nation; and finally, (c) the rise of China as the largest economy in Asia, its growing presence in Southeast Asia, and its engagement with the Chinese diaspora (Liu & van Dongen, 2016; Liu et al., 2021; Liu, 2022).

Sino-Singaporean Businesses: Traversing Between National and Transnational Having documented the socio-political and demographic changes over the past decade, let us now turn to the changing strategies and operations of new Chinese businesses in Singapore. This section focuses on two patterns of business transnationalism; one is represented by relatively larger enterprises (including both mainland Chinese and local businesses) who formed their business association in Singapore, and the other is a case study of a new diaspora business originated in China, which has reversed its investment by going from Singapore to China. These two-directional investment activities highlight the continuing significance of national and transnational dynamisms. The cases are examined in the context of emerging patterns of

16

Getai literally means “song stage” in Chinese, it is a popular form of mass entertainment that has evolved in Singapore since the 1940s and serves as a major grassroot activities for the Chinese mass, especially those Chinese-educated. https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/ SIP_2015-02-25_161203.html. 17 https://singaporeccc.org.sg/about-us/. Emphasis added.

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new Chinese transnationalism that incorporate businesspeople from China, Singapore and beyond (such as Hong Kong), while the reverse investment by those Chinaborn Singaporean businesspeople demonstrates the blurring boundaries at the time of globalization. Put together, these cases respond to the research questions on the transformation of new Chinese diaspora at a time of a rising China with its growing influences in Southeast Asia.

China Enterprises Association (CEA) Since the establishment of the diplomatic relationship between Singapore and China in 1990, and especially after 2001 when China joined the WTO and with the launching of the BRI in 2013, economic relations between the two countries have developed rapidly, with China becoming Singapore’s largest trade partner and the volumes of trade have been on the steady increase since 2010 (Lye, 2019). In the meantime, Singapore has been China’s largest foreign investor country since 2013, when its investments in China hit US$7.23 billion. According to statistics from the Chinese embassy in Singapore released in April 2019, there were 998 Singaporean investment projects in China in 2018, an increase of 41.4% from the previous year, and the actual investment was US$5.21billion, an increase of 9.4%. The total number of Singaporean firms in China was 24,869, whereas more than 7,500 mainland Chinese enterprises existed in Singapore (Xinhua Silk Road, 2019). There have been positive corrections between the Chinese communities in Singapore (both old and new) and China’s business presence in the region (Liang et al., 2019). More broadly, it has been established that the presence of ethnic Chinese in the trade partner population and co-ethnic networks contribute to “substantial trade creation effects” and that diaspora impacts on Chinese bilateral imports are generally higher than those found for exports (Martínez-Zarzoso & Rudolf, 2020, see also Fossati, 2019), while “greater intra-ethnic cooperativeness” has been conducive to economic success of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia (Chuah et al., 2016). It is also worth noting that Singapore’s largest export partners in 2017 were mainland China (14.7%), Hong Kong (12.6%), and Malaysia (10.8%).18 With the growing number of Chinese enterprises in Singapore (about 1,100 in 2003), their representative organization was established in 1999. According to the then President of the CEA, Shen Nanning, with its excellent geographic location, robust legal environment, conducive service-oriented system and the Chinesemajority population, Singapore has become “a valuable oasis for Chinese enterprises going overseas and it can serve as a stepping stone for Chinese enterprises going international and a pilot project” (Weng, 2004, 27–35).19 In 2003, the CEA had 126 18

https://www.statista.com/statistics/378617/most-important-export-partner-countries-for-singap ore/ 19 This view of testing ground was further accorded by the Chinese embassy in Singapore, which recommended to the central government in making Singapore as a pilot for various new policy

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members whose combined assets were more than S$20 billion and employed over 16,000 locally. By the closing years of the 2010s, the CEA had further benefited from the increasing numbers of Chinese enterprises and growing investment in Singapore (and ASEAN as a whole, since Singapore has also served as a major regional hub for Chinese enterprises). According to the United Overseas Bank (UOB) Asian Enterprise Survey 2016, Singapore retained its top spot as mainland Chinese enterprises’ favourite expansion destination. One-third of Chinese enterprises surveyed also chose the city-state as the market that they would expand into for the next three to five years. Aided by the BRI, Chinese companies have been quickening their pace on regional expansion to tap on the increasing opportunities in Singapore. They are drawn to Singapore’s stable political and economic climate (43%), its favourable tax and regulatory environment (40%), and large and growing customer demand (39%).20 According to the Enterprise Singapore, a government agency tasked to attract foreign investment, there were 7500 Chinese companies, which had set up their regional headquarters, R & D and/or manufacturing centres by 2017. About 110 Chinese enterprises were listed in the Singapore Stock Exchanges, with a total capital of S$24.9 billion (Lin, 2018). As of June 2020, the CEA had 670 members,21 who were in a wide range of business sectors ranging from trade, banking and service (Table 3). Apart from some 70% companies that were mainland Chinese enterprises (most are state-owned enterprises), there were local Singaporean and ASEAN firms joining CEA including the Pacific International Lines (Pte) Ltd, the Bank of Singapore, Maybank (Singapore), ECON Healthcare Group and law firms such as Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP. There were also international firms in the membership including Deloitte & Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, and Conrad Centennial Singapore – Hilton Group. In addition, there were some Hong Kong enterprises such as the Suntec Development that was co-founded by the tycoon Li Kai-shing. The CEA has four subcommittees: finance, shipping, construction and trading. Its growing membership and international profile have demonstrated the CEA’s influences and its role in facilitating business activities that are centred in China and ASEAN. It has kept an active public profile, demonstrated by the regular news coverage of its activities (Fig. 3). As most of CEA members are state-owned enterprises, they are, as expected, closely involved in the BRI (see also Liu & Lim, 2022). The former CEA president who also was the CEO of Bank of China in Singapore, Qiu Zhikuan, stated that the BRI provided a rare opportunity for development along the route, and he urged Singaporean companies to actively use their geographical advantages to establish initiatives for management and retention of SOE staff including allowing them to obtain Singapore permanent residency. See Tang (2004), Tay (2004). 20 https://www.uob.com.sg/cn/pdfs/news20161117_en.pdf. 21 “President of CEA Cheng Jun: Tri-city cooperation more important than competition, Singapore, Shanghai and Hong Kong could work together to expand the financial market in the Asia–Pacific,” Lianhe Zaobao, Jun 12, 2020.

Identity, Politics, and Transnationalism: Deciphering … Table 3 CEA members’ business categories and respective proportions

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Business category (number of firms)

Proportion (%)

Shipping (8)

4

Air transport (7)

3

Construction (29)

14

Financial (23)

10

Energy (21)

15

Trading (17)

8

Steel (8)

4

Technology (20)

10

Law/accounting (16)

8

Representative (6)

3

Service (31)

15

Education consulting (12)

6

Source Author’s compilation based upon the 2018 Membership Directory of China Enterprises Association (Singapore) (CEA)

Fig. 3 CEA activities and news coverage (1999–2018). Source Author’s compilation based upon reports from Factiva (1999–2018)

long-term and stable cooperation mechanisms with “going out” Chinese companies. By the end of 2017, the Bank of China (Singapore) had invested some US$10b in more

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than a dozen BRI countries in the infrastructure, food processing and manufacturing sectors. In 2018, it helped the Philippines in raising more than S$300 million bonds.22 One of the private corporations belonging to CEA is Qingjian Realty (South Pacific) Group, which is a subsidiary of the Hong Kong mainboard listed company, and it has been one of the Top Ten Developers in Singapore. It is the first Chinesefunded enterprise in Singapore to obtain the PPVC IPA (Principal Approval Certificate) and the full version of MAS (Manufacturer License) for the concrete structure system. Its recent development has been driven by the Belt and Road initiative, with the strategy of “Internationalisation, Localisation and Integration.” Its business includes a number of property development projects (both public housing and private developments) in areas such as Toa Payoh and Bishan. As a Chinese company, it was a main contractor for the Chinese Cultural Centre in Singapore.23 In short, the CEA has facilitated the growing activities of Chinese enterprises in Singapore and business ties between China and Singapore, especially in the context of the BRI since 2013. As the great majority of CEA members are ethnic Chinese, it has provided a practical platform for networking among mainland Chinese and local businesses (including some new Chinese migrants whose companies are also represented). Furthermore, the participation of non-Chinese and international companies in the CEA has further bolstered the impact of the member institutions, thus demonstrating the continuing relevance of organized form of Chinese transnationalism at the time of a rising China (c.f., Liu, 2012, 2022; Ren & Liu, 2022).

Wang Quancheng and Transnational Entrepreneurship at the Time of the BRI In earlier studies (Liu, 2008; Liu & Ren, 2017), we have identified different patterns of transnational Chinese entrepreneurship, and we further argued that traversing between Singapore and China in business and social arenas have afforded new Chinese entrepreneurs with some important advantages in competing for capital and access to markets. We also argued that these new immigrant entrepreneurs had been simultaneously embedded into two or more nation-states and geopolitical spheres. Our evidence suggests that there is a strong and evolving underpinning of new Chinese capitalism that is characterized by intensive transnational connections with the homeland and deepening integration with the host-land. As these studies had been undertaken prior to the BRI’s launch in 2013, we could not examine the BRI’s impact. The following pages are devoted to a case study of Wang Quancheng 22

“Bank of China (Singapore) Riding on the BRI: Singaporean and Chinese Enterprises should establish long-term and stable cooperative mechanisms,” an interview with CEO of Bank of China (Singapore) on May 18, 2018. https://beltandroad.zaobao.com/beltandroad/corporate/story2018 0518-859852. 23 “Riding on the Belt and Road Initiative” (August 29, 2016), http://www.cnqc.com.hk/en/com pany-news/.

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who has expanded his business back to China as facilitated by growing economic ties between China and Singapore under the framework of the BRI detailed in the first section of this chapter and elsewhere (Liu et al., 2021). I have earlier classified Wang as an example of contemporary “brokerage entrepreneurs” who resembled more closely to their predecessors arriving in Southeast Asia more than 150 years ago (Liu, 2008). They usually started from scratch, working for others as manual laborers. After accumulating sufficient capital, network, and experiences, they then set up their own companies in the service or manufacturing sectors that are mostly labor-intensive. The major source of business profits is derived from their brokerage activities: between their clients (contractors) and their customers (laborers) in the local settings, and more importantly, as an intermediary between China and Singapore in the transnational setting, by bringing scarce commodities (such as knowledge for investment opportunities, laborers, or prospective immigrants) from one side to the other. Born in 1965 in Anxi county in southern Fujian, Wang Quancheng received high school education as his highest qualification. At the age of 21, he went to Singapore as a construction worker with reportedly only 20 yuan (S$4) in his pocket, laboring for more than a dozen hours a day and earning merely S$15. Three years later, using personal savings and loans from friends, he set up his own construction company, Lianquan Construction Company. The construction boom in the early 1990s and the ability to bring in cheap labor from China helped his business tremendously. His firm soon reached reportedly annual business volume of S$50 million, and Wang himself became a naturalized Singapore citizen and a director or board member of more than 30 local companies. Wang invested near 100 million yuan to build a four-star hotel in his hometown Anxi. Keenly aware of the importance of social networking among newcomers, he founded the Hua Yuan Association in 2001 (whose recent activities in both Singapore and the global Chinese arena were described in the previous section). There have been a number of new developments with regards to Wang’s socioeconomic engagements in Singapore and China over the past decade, which in turn reflect the changing nature of new Chinese entrepreneurship and the dynamic rise of China as the second largest economy in the globe. In the first place, Wang’s growing social profile and wide-ranging networks had led him to be appointed as one of the forty overseas representatives from outside China at the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress in 2018. This national representative role has been perceived with prestige, symbolized by a full-page congratulatory message on the most-widely circulated Chinese newspaper in Singapore, Lianhe Zaobao. While this political capital is a result of deliberate building of networks (social capital) and philanthropy,24 it has facilitated his accumulation of economic 24

For example, Wang and Hua Yuan Association members donated 40,000 face masks and 40,000 medical gloves, goggles and protective garments to Xiamen and other Chinese cities in March/April 2020 at the time of global Covid-19 pandemic. See “China, Singapore join hands to confront challenges amid COVID-19 outbreak International Cooperation,” available at the official website of Chinese embassy in Singapore http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/search.htm?strUrl=englishscio&sub= International%20Cooperation.

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capital, especially in China. It is reported that he has donated some 20 million RMB for various philanthropic projects in China and Singapore.25 Secondly, while Wang made his wealth from construction business in Singapore in the 1990s and early 2000s, the prospect of his business growth has been hampered not only by the economic slow-down after the Asian financial crisis in1997/98, but it has also been affected by the economic transition the country that has undergone over the past two decades, moving toward knowledge-based economy and innovation. Singapore’s small domestic market and highly competitive nature of construction business prevented Wang’s business from growing further. As a result, he has increasingly shifted his business operation to China. This shift has been done in his capacity as a Singaporean entrepreneur who was born in China and had accumulated considerable social and political capital in the previous two decades. Commenting in 2015 pertaining to the opportunities brought about by the BRI, Wang said, The 21st century Maritime Silk Road is a modern silk road for mutual benefits and friendly cooperation. The Chinese diasporas are proud of China’s remarkable progress in recent years, which has led to its massive upgrading of comprehensive national power and international influences. And they are in full support of China’s effort to revitalize its great national glory and the realization of the Chinese Dream. We have relatives and friends in the motherland, and the environment for business and investment in China has been increasingly conducive. [Furthermore], we have witnessed the determination of the Chinese government in deepening reform and its eagerness in attracting Chinese diaspora to invest in China.26

Thirdly, the past decade has seen the change of not only the geographical concentration but also his business focus. As construction sector is hard to enter in China without strong local governmental backing, Wang had started some property development (a four-star hotel in his hometown). However, it encountered many operational problems which led to legal disputes and the change of ownership. Over the past few years, he has increasingly focused on aquafarming with new technology, targeting the growing market in China whose middle-class consumers have sought for safe and nutritious foods. Wang’s wholly-owned company, Quanying Technology Co., was established in October 2013 in Zaoan county, which is close to his hometown and shares the same Southern Hokkien dialect. The initial capital was S$40 million, or 200 million RMB, making it the largest foreign investment in the city then and it was listed as a key provincial level investment project for Fujian province in 2014 and 2015. The aquaculture facility he set up has reportedly become the biggest indoor recirculating maricultural system in China. Together with Wang’s other businesses such as import and export, it is expected to produce a cumulative value of 600–800 million RMB per year once it is in full production.27 Apart from cooperating with an Australian 25

https://news.tianyancha.com/ll_6o5xyd84o1.html. “Xi Jinping: China is willing to co-build the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road together with ASEAN” (March 6, 2015). Available at https://iconada.tv/m/blogpost?id=3600580%3ABlogPost% 3A251130&maxDate=2015-06-15T10%3A38%3A43.865Z. 27 Fujian Qiaobao, September 5, 2015, available at http://www.cnepaper.com/fjqb/html/2014-09/ 05/content_12_1.htm; Lianhe Zaobao, December 25, 2016; and the author’s fieldwork in Zaoan county in Sept 2019. 26

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company through using the latest technology for aquaculture, he has also worked with Singapore’s government-link corporation and local Chinese state-owned enterprise (Fujian Tourism Investment Co.) to explore various business opportunities in the province. His unique background as a local-born Chinese and a naturalized Singaporean citizen bearing the Chinese government’s official endorsement has been a comparative advantage in facilitating his business activities, which in turn serves as a bridge between China and Singapore, just like the Hua Yuan Association he set up in 2001.28 In summary, the rise of China and its growing economic ties with Singapore have provided emerging and vast opportunities for new Chinese entrepreneurs, such as Wang Quancheng, who have traversed between two countries. Wang’s activities have benefitted from his dual attachments to both countries—he is simultaneously a national and transnational, and his re-territorialization, by returning to invest in his homeland with newly acquired social and political capital, has given him an edge that is difficult to be matched by his peers from either Singapore or China.

Concluding Remarks The proceeding pages of documentation and analysis have led to the following concluding observations, which in turn serve as starting points for thinking about future research directions. In the first place, significant changes have taken place over the past decade with respect to the political economy of Singapore and new Chinese diaspora community in the nation. New mode of state–society relationship, accelerated pace of identity construction, and ongoing transnationalism are at the core of these multifaceted transformations. These elements are driven not only by domestic politics, economic strategies, changing demographics, but they have also been affected by the rising China and its growing presence, through mechanisms such as the BRI and associated investment, in Southeast Asia in general and Singapore in particular. The intertwining of national and transnational dimensions constitutes a key backdrop for deciphering the characteristics of contemporary Chinese diaspora in Singapore and their identities. Secondly, the key issue confronting the Chinese communities in Singapore, both local-born and new migrants, has been identity—the forging, nurturing, and strengthening of a Singaporean identity in a multiracial and multi-cultural nation that was formed merely half a century earlier. As the cases in some other Southeast Asian countries (Liu, 2016; Ren & Liu, 2022) have shown, while local-born Singaporean Chinese have already firmly established their national identity through socialization and education, the influx of a large number of new Chinese migrants over the past two decades has presented new challenges for the national identity project, especially because they are from a rising power with a long and rich cultural tradition and now 28

The author’s interviews with Wang Quancheng in Fujian and Singapore, 2018–2021.

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reside in a Chinese majority country. Integration of new migrants and construction of a Singaporean (Chinese) identity have thus become the foundation of government policies, which have been effectively supported by a wide range of mechanisms such as CCLG and voluntary associations such as SFCCA. Thirdly, while politics is in command with respect to identity constructions, economic imperative is also a significant component in shaping the trajectory and identity construction of the new Chinese diaspora in Singapore. They have not only contributed to the population growth in a country that is facing the dual challenges of declining fertility rate and rapidly ageing society, but more importantly, they are a vibrant force in business transnationalism in bridging China and Singapore, which has made internationalization one of its key economic strategies since the mid2010s. Co-ethnic networking has been reinforced by the BRI through its growing investments and expanding trade. Chinese business transnationalism, therefore, has emerged through the dynamic and wide-ranging activities exemplified by the CEA in Singapore and Wang Quancheng’s new investment in China. It should, however, be emphasized that the political logic of identity construction is always considered as the priority while the economic logic of transnationalism has been formulated to supplement this nation-building agenda. With regards to future research directions, it is imperative to identify how the shifting external environments such as the mounting tensions between the US and China in recent years have impacted upon the new Chinese diaspora in Singapore (and Southeast Asian region as a whole), which has increasingly become the sphere of great power rivalries (Allison, 2020). As previously quoted Lee Hsien Loong’s Foreign Affairs essay has alluded to, ethnic Chinese issue is a sensitive one that has a larger impact upon diplomacy. Apart from this external dynamic, it is also important to examine the interplay between the political and economic logics in shaping the government’s policy, which is in turn a part and parcel of the larger on-going debates about migration and social mobility in the nation. In the final analysis, the studies of diasporic Chinese, be it in Singapore, North America, or elsewhere, have to be more compellingly and structurally brought into the domestic and international political economy of our time, which in turn requires the incorporation of a new set of analytical tools and theoretical frameworks into the field that has, for too long, been largely self-contained and aloof (c.f., Hsu, 2019; Liu, 2022). Acknowledgements The author is grateful for Professor Yos Santasombat and other project participants for their instrumental support in completing this chapter. This research is partially funded by China National Social Sciences Foundation (21&ZD022). The author is solely responsible for interpretations and any remaining errors.

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Hong Liu is Tan Lark Sye Chair Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His main areas of research include Asian governance from a transnational perspective, China’s interactions with Southeast Asia, global talent management, and Chinese international migration. He has published more than 20 books and over 100 articles including in leading international journals such as the World Politics, Journal of Asian Studies, The China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Journal of Ethnic and Migration, and Ethnic and Racial Studies. His recent publications include Research Handbook on the Belt and Road Initiative (co-edited with

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Joseph Liow and Gong Xue, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021); Changing Dynamics and Mechanisms of Maritime Asia in Comparative Perspectives (co-edited with Akita Shigeru and Shiro Momoki, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021); The Political Economy of Regionalism, Trade, and Infrastructure: Southeast Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative in a New Era (co-edited with Tan Kong Yam and Lim Guanie, World Scientific Publishing, 2022), and The Political Economy of Transnational Governance: China and Southeast Asia in the 21st Century (Routledge, 2022).

Epilogue Kian Cheng Lee

Introduction As an epilogue, this chapter argues that with cycles of disruptions, continuities and innovations during the Covid-19 era, it is imperative to explore new problematics pertaining to complex Chinese international politics, sophisticated Chinese mobile practices, and paradoxical Chinese socialization. Since the dawn of Covid19 pandemic during the first quarter of 2020, all countries across the globe have encountered an unprecedented scale of social, economic and political impact. The unexpected pandemic has instantaneously and abruptly halted the phenomenal, world-leading Chinese outbound travels. However, the state of Chinese transnationals residing overseas remains unknown. While the Chinese government has provided huge support for research on Covid-19, the scholarly contributions are largely centered within the context of China (Wang et al., 2020). During this gnawing period of extensive restrictions, scholarship focusing on Chinese transnationalism from recipient countries’ perspectives is almost non-existent, especially since the unseen pathogen has gravely affected in-person interviews, physical site-visits and other time-tested qualitative research methods used in social sciences (Wu, 2021: 3). Hence, given the significant role of Chinese transnationalism in Southeast Asia as exemplified by the chapters in this collection, it behooves scholars to pursue further problematics to unravel Chinese internationalization, mobilities and socialization at both state and social actors’ dimensions in the Covid-19 era. In the succeeding section, this epilogue chapter offers some salient observations made with regards to the accepted chapters in this research project. With the aim of debunking common misconceptions, this reflective overview not only summarizes the project but it also sets a foundation for the social trajectories implicating future research. Subsequently, this epilogue proceeds with a critical depiction of the impact of Covid-19 pandemic while examining how it affects China’s international relations. Thereafter, this epilogue provides some insights for future research given the massive impact of Covid-19 pandemic. At both state and social dimensions, this © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 Y. Santasombat (ed.), Transnational Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4617-2

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epilogue proffers a paradigmatic shift in exploring the problematics in the multiple fields of intense and complex international relations, transnational negotiation with mobilities’ infrastructures, and people-to-people interactions in-between home and host countries.

Salient Observations on Research Project Before delving into the expressions and implications of Covid-19 pandemic to Chinese transnationalism, it is crucial to recapitulate the key observations made from the preceding chapters in this book. Reiterating the objectives of this research project, this edited volume concentrates on contemporary Chinese transnational practices focusing on Chinese narratives regarding their patterns of mobility and lived experiences as they interact with co-ethnic and diverse communities in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Besides, the chapters have considered the role of the governments from home and host countries in relation to diasporic mobility too. Finally, the chapters have explored issues of integration and embeddedness as Chinese diasporic individuals interact with the local host communities. Fundamentally, the guiding research question behind these chapters is: “How significant are the increasing complexity, diversity and contradictions of ‘Chineseness’ and the changing nature of networks and associations in each country?”. In sum, gleaning from the chapters in this volume, this epilogue articulates several key overarching themes concerning contemporary Chinese transnational practices and their interactions with the host countries. First, this research has aptly presented the heterogeneity of Chinese classifications. To explicate new Chinese diasporas, it is essential to abandon homogenizing tendencies in characterizing them as possessing a universal set of static attributes. Contra to stereotyped notion, new Chinese migrants possess different socio-economic, regional, and sub-ethnic backgrounds (Liu, 2005; Zhou, 2017). Wong’s chapter has diversely portrayed the new transnational Chinese in Malaysia as the students, workers (comprising employees under State-Owned Enterprises, executives under private multinational corporations and self-employed achievers from small companies), those who participated in the “Malaysia as My Second Home” scheme, and the Muslim Chinese. Next, Liu’s chapter has explicated how new Chinese migrants in Singapore are originated from all over China, are generally better educated than the local population and are overrepresented in some research and higher education sectors. Finally, in the case of Thailand, the three chapters have delineated different Chinese categories as follows: (a) businesspeople, entrepreneurs, government expatriate staff, international students, and education guardian parents in Chiang Mai; (b) differentiated Peranakan Hokkien Chinese descendants in Phuket; and (c) Chinese “student-preneurs,” Chinese “Small and Medium Enterprises” business persons and Chinese professionals in Bangkok. In other words, as these chapters have demonstrated, new Chinese diasporas are dynamically evolving over time with heterogeneous backgrounds.

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Second, the chapters in this edited volume have yielded another interesting observation where new Chinese diasporas employ multiple strategies in their interactions with others while residing at their host countries. First, taking the three chapters in Thailand, this research project has elucidated the broad spectrum of Chinese social constructions through operationalizing variegated concepts including parallel communities, folk diplomacies, and finally, identity negotiations through gastronomic economy. According to the chapter by Siriphon and Li, due to the prejudices, stereotypes, language barriers, communication skills, and social competence issues, the new Chinese diaspora residing in Chiang Mai has created a distinct social space in the form of a parallel community while deploying resources from the emerging religious and digital spheres. However, in an almost diametrical opposing fashion, Lee’s chapter argues how some new Chinese diaspora in Bangkok have sought dual social embeddedness through making informal contributions to both Thailand and China as transnational non-state actors. Apart from these contrasting cases, the chapter by Chaopreecha, Tovankasame and Limbut has unravelled yet another dimension where cuisine has become a sociological site for cultural reproduction and embeddedness. This process also involves negotiating authenticity through drawing cultural resources from co-ethnics at other localities, such as Penang, Malaysia. Over at the case of Singapore, Liu’s chapter has explicated how the new Chinese migrants (through Chinese associations) employ the dual strategies of de- and reterritorialization to decouple locality-based linkages while re-attaching to a wider audience from all over China. Finally, in the case of Malaysia, Wong’s chapter has highlighted how some new Chinese migrants have found it easy to fit into the culture without feeling alienated as different races could get along well with one another. Hence, this project has debunked the static myth of Chinese socialization. In other words, it is oversimplistic to generalize the new Chinese diasporas as either rigid in isolation or malleable in interactivity. On the contrary, they adopt multiple strategies for achieving social distantiation, affiliation, embeddedness and other imaginaries. The third and final observation is derived from the complexity of influencing forces that have a bearing towards domestic policies with regards to the management of the new Chinese diaspora in host countries. Such complexity is delicately situated within the nexus of international political economy, transnationalism and domestic socio-economic conditions of the host countries. Liu’s chapter on Singapore is a classic case where the economic logic of transnationalism might not necessarily be congruent with the political logic of national identity construction. In spite of Singapore’s apparent success in forging a multi-racial and multi-cultural nation, the country’s critical national identity project has faced huge challenges with the massive influx of new Chinese diaspora who has come from China, a risen power with wellestablished cultural tradition and phenomenal wealth. As for Wong’s chapter, the Malaysian policies towards the influx of new Chinese have been confronted with the dilemma of competing interests. This is because on one hand, it is an issue of political sensitivity as it could tilt the ethnic balance, yet on the other, it can be an opportunity to attract Chinese investments ushering economic prosperity. Besides, Thailand has also been facing tensions in her political orientations pertaining to new Chinese migration. Given China’s constructive efforts in buttressing Thai economy

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and facilitating Thailand’s industrialization in recent decades, the Land of Smiles has grown in confidence and affection towards China. Nonetheless, Lee’s chapter has articulated how Thailand has cautiously avoided in becoming too economically dependent on China due to the lingering territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Further, with the great power competition between United States and China compounding the existing contestation, Thailand (including Singapore and Malaysia) has to face greater complexity in her foreign policy-making process with new Chinese diasporas. In summary, based on the observations made, this empirical research project has presented heterogeneity, multiplicity and complexity as analytic lenses in deciphering new Chinese transnationalism in Southeast Asia. Within the multi-faceted landscapes of Asia, the largest and most populous continent, this research project has highlighted the region’s variegated forms and diverse mix of cultural distinctiveness, economic progress, political governance and developmental state. Hence, the salient observations made in this section have signalled a need for a shift in sociological analyses of the new Chinese diasporas in Southeast Asia.

Cycles of Disruptions, Continuities and Innovations in Covid-19 Era This section focuses on the impact of Covid-19 pandemic where relentless, concurrent cycles of disruptions, continuities and innovations bear diverse implications to China’s international relations. Undoubtedly, Covid-19 pandemic has brought about unprecedented impact to the world. According to Elms (2021: 39), the best choice word for 2020 in the trade world might have been “disruption.” Since the first quarter of the year 2020, the world has experienced major disruptions. With Covid-19 pandemic, governments around the world have shut border crossings, including shipping lanes and flight paths; thus, global operations of large and small firms are significantly disrupted (Elms, 2021: 47). According to the WTO (World Trade Organization), overall global trade growth has experienced a contraction of 9.2 percent as shown in the October 2020 figure (Elms, 2021: 47). Besides, the ongoing US-China trade war continues to pose disruptions amidst Covid-19 pandemic. For a period of two years between 2018 and early 2020, both countries had imposed escalating tariff rates on each other (Elms, 2021: 44). Since then, China has made purchasing commitments of US$200 billion over a period of two years (Elms, 2021: 45). However, this target would be gravely affected by Covid-19 pandemic, which might lead to unfavorable responses from the United States. Inadvertently, this would affect other countries in Asia. For instance, due to the deep levels of economic integration inside and outside of China in supply chains, the sudden imposition of tariff rise by the United States would badly affect countries such as Korea, Japan and Singapore (Elms, 2021: 45). Hence,

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disruptions have become a new normal for many countries dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. While Covid-19 pandemic has resulted in major disruptions globally, Chinese state transnationalism has sought to maintain continuities. As a key national strategy, China launched BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) in late 2013 to advance globalization through infrastructural connectivity across countries of significant geo-economic nodes. With rampant Covid-19 travel restrictions, many BRI-related projects have experienced varying degrees of delays and cancellations (Ye, 2021: 67). Furthermore, due to the fact that the initial viral outbreak took place in China, several non-BRI and BRI recipient countries have raised hostile public opinions against China. Nonetheless, against a heightened geopolitical and societal tension between China and other countries, China has maintained a high level of continuity in pursuing BRI strategy as countries battle with the pandemic instead of withdrawing it (Ye, 2021: 66). Through the participation of professional and policy communities in China and BRI recipient countries, the Chinese state has managed to offer a stabilizing force against potential de-globalization tendencies (Ye, 2021: 66). Pertaining to China’s role in African development, the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic has sharply intensified the risk of debt crisis in many African states for China is a major creditor (Morgan, 2021: 96). However, instead of cancellations, China has opted for substantial continuities where past patterns of engagement have been retained in Africa (Morgan, 2021: 91). Moreover, such continuities have been actively buffered by China’s branding and legitimation strategies. During the Covid-19 pandemic, China has adopted “party diplomacy,” which refers to the CCP’s (Chinese Communist Party) interactions with foreign political parties and organizations (Wen, 2021: 55). Navigating through the pandemic’s three stages of “outbreak,” “giving back,” and “new normal,” China’s party diplomacy has arguably succeeded in soliciting some positive responses from some of its foreign counterparts (Wen, 2021: 55). As a case in point, an independent study during the first half of 2020 has unraveled how China’s active non-confrontational public diplomacy in Italy, Poland, and Spain has garnered a higher recognition of China’s efforts in combatting the virus (Jerdén et al., 2021: 28). Hence, amidst the tumultuous challenges to world’s political economy and China’s international reputation, China has pursued continuities as a stabilizing factor to global disruptions. China’s embracement of continuities with past patterns and engagements during Covid-19 pandemic is not characterized by static and placid norms, but the journey is also injected with social innovations. At the domestic front, China has displayed draconian measures to obliterate the spread of virus since the onset. In this vein of thought, Wang et al. (2021: 373) argued that the prevention and control policies undertaken by Wuhan city have significantly contributed to the following areas: (1) reduction of new infected cases; (2) improvement of recovery rates; and (3) reduction of mortality. In addition to curbing the spread of physical virus, the Chinese state has managed the media spread of negative information through top-down approach by holding local officials accountable through propaganda and cadre disciplinary actions (Ran & Jian, 2021: 7–8). In addition, precipitated by Covid-19 pandemic, China has inadvertently adopted a shift in BRI prioritization where the former focus on hard infrastructure projects gradually gives way to “softer and more socially inclusive

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areas of cooperation, such as information technology, medicine, educational, and the environment” (Ye, 2021: 66). This crucial social innovation vitally fills the multifaceted void caused by the devastating Covid-19 impact on many countries globally. For instance, in the case of Africa, the Chinese state made constructive readjustments by developing local manufacturing capacity, which increased employment opportunities and facilitated economic structural changes towards more productive industrialization (Morgan, 2021: 97). In so doing, the African governments have improved their abilities to repay creditors while reducing their risk of debt crisis significantly (Morgan, 2021: 97). Hence, as the pandemic causes significant effects on differentiated sectoral impact across all dimensions, the Chinese state and middle politicians—including the policy professionals, companies, and various subnational actors—will have to adapt and innovate BRI in driving the globalization’s priorities in an ever-changing world fraught with cycles of disruptions and continuities (Ye, 2021: 95).

Future Research: Paradigmatic Shifts in Problematics Based on the preceding section, the future holds a picture of volatility offering both bleak and hope. Situated within the paradox of coexisting disruptions, continuities, adaptations and innovations, this section offers problematics with paradigmatic shifts that are pertinent for future research in Chinese transnationalism in Southeast Asia.

Chinese International Politics Amidst Flexible Alliances in Bipolarity and Conflicting Multiscalarity In a world of constant changes, Chinese international politics has to negotiate with flexible alliances under global bipolarity and multiple conflicting scales of governance. Existing studies related to the contestation of global leadership between the United States and China tend to be dichotomously fixed in a zero-sum game outcome (Breslin, 2021: 179). The underlying notion of such dichotomy suggests how the policy gaps created by a great power are immediately filled by the opposing side (Breslin, 2021: 179). For instance, with United States President Trump’s protectionist policies, Chinese sources spontaneously proposed “China Solutions” or the “China Plan” addressing voided global issues such as “climate change, poverty reduction, economic development, cybersecurity, and new ‘frontier’ areas that will require governance in the future like the deep sea, space, and the polar regions” (Breslin, 2021: 179). On the other hand, North America has progressively raised a more heated debate over Chinese political influence with a more proactive stance in reducing the presumed influence of Chinese Institutes (Breslin, 2021: 181). Exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, the competition and rivalry between China and United States

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on economic, technological and geopolitical fronts will likely evolve into a “new normal” in the coming years (Lau, 2021: 33). However, while the extant literature dwells in the contestation between the two great powers, not many research has explored the dynamism of global responses to the volatile bipolarity. Under Covid19 pandemic, the future is unlikely to be neatly structured nor easily defined with static political friendship and animosity. On the contrary, the complex pragmatic self-interests situated amidst fluctuating power distributions will inevitably result in the formation of different constellations of alliances across different policy domains (Breslin, 2021: 188). Instead of falling into fixed dichotomous bloc-type alliances on either side of a bipolar division between China and United States, countries might constantly tweak their policies in response to transnational economic relationships, different levels of followership and pragmatic governance interests (Breslin, 2021: 177). In addition, the complexity of Chinese international politics is further compounded with non-uniform multiscalarity where state-based and non-state actors in BRI recipient countries adopt different, albeit conflicting priorities. In this vein of thought, Liu and Lim (2018: 1) argued how existing studies tend to focus on the perspective of Chinese actors while leaving out the responses of “the formulated players in the BRI recipient states.” Amongst the players in the BRI recipient states, differentiated interests often co-exist in contradictory and conflicting terms. Taking Myanmar as a case in point, Tun (2017: 250–251) argued how immature and outdated practices of Chinese capitalism in state-owned investment practices should be replaced by having greater transparency, fairness, and the obliteration of misuse by Myanmar authorities so as to engender greater care for Myanmar people’s values, customs, culture and emotions. In another example, Laungaramsri (2015) criticized how the Chinese neoliberal project at Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone has deterritorialized Lao residents and Burmese workers while prospering Lao state actors who collaboratively implemented deceptive, coercive and abeyant measures on their wards. Hence, future research should examine how Chinese international political economy evolves in fluid geopolitical alliances and conflicting multiscalar relations from both Chinese and host countries’ perspectives.

Sophistication of Chinese Transnationalism Amidst (Im)Mobilities’ Infrastructures With Covid-19 pandemic, Chinese transnationalism has become more sophisticated as social actors have to navigate amidst states’ (im)mobilities-related infrastructures. Under the restrictive travel measures implemented globally, “mobilities turn” (Sheller and Urry 2006: 208) has inadvertently made another “(im)mobilities turn,” which is not necessarily a complete reversal, albeit its variegated and transforming manifestations. From the migration infrastructures’ perspective, existing scholarship has traditionally focused on the facilitation of mobilities across different borders (Xiang & Lindquist, 2014; Lin et al., 2017; Shrestha & Yeoh, 2018). However,

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given the impact of Covid-19 pandemic, the convergences, contestations and conundrums revolving around medical science, politics and everyday (im)mobilities have evolved into an essential area for future research. It will be interesting to explore how Chinese transnationals are transforming their mobile practices as they navigate and negotiate amidst states’ (im)mobilities’ infrastructures at multiple home and host countries. In this light, the current under-researched areas pertaining to the linkages between social, temporal and material aspects shaping everyday mobility (Rau & Sattlegger, 2018: 46) will be further impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. Apart from the social and temporal dimensions, the material aspect is of particular interest here. Precipitated by the Covid-19 pandemic, the development and deployment of artificial intelligence has radically accelerated around the world. The race between technological advancement and the relentless spread of virus has never been more acute. On one hand, digitalization in public administration in the variegated forms of contact tracing, medical testing, vaccination, law enforcement measures and other regulatory practices is crucial as it intricately implicates any state’s readiness for greater domestic and international mobilities. On the other hand, Chinese transnationals are not necessarily passive docile subjects of state apparatuses. Regardless of retirees, students, guardians, self-employed, professionals, entrepreneurs, businesspersons, digital nomads or others with hybridized vocations, Chinese transnationals are capable of utilizing technology to advance their undertakings with new forms of mobilities. Inevitably, the accelerated technological advancement will likewise bring about more sophisticated clandestine and nefarious Chinese transnational activities bearing implications to global security. Hence, in this era of the “rise of machines,” future research should explore the multifaceted and unconventional role of technology in Chinese transnationalism from both state and social dimensions.

Paradoxes of Embeddedness, Xenophobia and Multi-Accredited Diplomacies of Social Actors Given the viral mutability and administrative unpredictability during Covid-19 pandemic, transnational Chinese social actors are encountering the paradoxical emergence of embeddedness, xenophobia and multi-accredited diplomatic initiatives. First, the increasing occasions of immobility have presented an inadvertent deepening of transnational Chinese embeddedness in host countries. According to Liao (2019: 219), the tendencies for migrants laying down roots to foster greater familiarity, belonging and local embeddedness in host countries are heightened during the situations of immobility. Such embeddedness is concomitant to existing literature featuring how mobile migrants engage multiple activities and home-making practices in host country for long periods of time (Hunter, 2016; Prazeres, 2018; Yeoh & Huang, 2013). Given the limited studies on linkages between social and temporal dimensions in everyday mobility (Rau & Sattlegger, 2018: 46), future studies should

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examine how the protracted embeddedness in host countries has reshaped transnational Chinese in their education, marriage, parenting, businesses, and other activities. Next, besides examining embeddedness, the study on local receptivity to the transnational Chinese is significant. Driven by recent high-profile espionage activities and mutual blame-shifting Covid-19 related discourses between China and the United States, it is unsurprising that many countries remain guarded against the political influence of China. Subtly, the blurring of lines between concrete evidence and xenophobic notions against transnational Chinese will likely occur. Construing how the transnational Chinese are manipulated by the political agencies in China, many state and social actors in the host countries, albeit varying degrees, are wary of these foreigners’ involvements with the local communities or the lack of it. Hence, future research should explore how Covid-19 has implicated on the multi-layered responses of the variegated actors from the different host countries in Southeast Asia towards the transnational Chinese while analyzing their geopolitical significance in light of the aggravated contestations between United States and China. Finally, from a dialectical perspective, transnational Chinese should not be merely stigmatized as economic predators nor political pawns situated primarily within the disciplinary field of international political economy. Balancing this picture, there are those who conduct themselves as unofficial citizen diplomats while serving multifaceted interests for both home and host countries (Lee, 2020a, b). Seeking political neutrality, these unconflicted social actors have no qualms in adopting altruistic initiatives to contribute to the cultural, social and economic landscapes. With the devastating impact on many Southeast Asian countries due to the Covid-19 pandemic, future research should consider how transnational Chinese serve unofficial multi-accredited citizen diplomatic roles. In sum, the world-halting Covid-19 pandemic behooves researchers to delve into and unpack the complexities arising from the paradoxical emergence of embeddedness, xenophobia and multi-accredited diplomacies.

Conclusion As an epilogue, this chapter offers a succinct summary of the salient contributions from the accepted papers in this research project while highlighting the unprecedented impact from Covid-19 pandemic, which necessitates a paradigmatic shift in the research direction of Chinese overseas studies at both state and social dimensions. With cycles of disruptions, continuities and innovations, this epilogue explicates the growing complexities pertaining to China’s international relations, Chinese transnational mobile practices and Chinese social interactions. This epilogue challenges existing and future academics to boldly confront the perplexities occasioned by the dynamic changes at an increasingly rapid pace. In reiteration, Asia, the largest and most populous continent, still presents a rich research site due to its variegated forms and a diverse mix of cultural distinctiveness, economic progress, political governance and developmental state. As a region, it simply defies any oversimplified generalization and homogenous stereotypification. Hence, as research-based academics, we

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should endeavor to explore the exemplars, notoriety, paradoxes and conundrums that are often neglected, concealed or misunderstood within an Asian, inter-Asia and intra-Asia contexts from Chinese state and social perspectives. From a methodological perspective, this epilogue encourages an incorporation of a broad range of actors ranging from nation-states, international institutions, non-governmental organizations and non-institutionalized global social actors. At the post-human dimension, this epilogue envisions a more critical employment of human and non-human assemblages, and the hybridization of natural and social systems that bear implications to the inclusivity and sustainability of public policies for all humanity.

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