Transforming Masculine Rule: Agriculture and Rural Development in the European Union 9780472117734, 9780472027354, 2011003377

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Transforming Masculine Rule Agriculture and Rural Development in the European Union ELISABETH PRÜGL The University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Page iv → Copyright © by the University of Michigan 2011 All rights reserve This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publisher. Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America Printed on acid-free paper 2014

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A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Prugl, Elisabeth. Transforming masculine rule : agriculture and rural development in the European Union / Elisabeth Prugl. p. cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-472-11773-4 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-472-02735-4 (e-book) 1. Europe—Economic integration. 2. Rural development—European Union countries. 3. Women agricultural laborers—European Union countries. 4. Sex role in the work environment—European Union countries—Case studies. 5. Women's rights—European Union countries. I. Title. HC241.P798 2011 338.1082'094—dc22

2011003377

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Preface Why a book on agriculture and gender in the European Union? In the mid-1990s “gender mainstreaming,” that is, inserting considerations of gender into all policy areas, became the favored vehicle for governments and international organizations to advance gender equality. No longer was gender equality considered something that a women's bureau or ministry should tackle; rather, it was something that should become the business of all government agencies. Not surprisingly, the approach immediately raised questions about how gender mattered in different issue areas. In particular, why should gender be a factor in the organization of markets when economists tell us that markets are neutral mechanisms? Probing agriculture, long the EU's most expensive policy, provided me one way to answer this question. If gender is a constitutive element of society and does its work throughout society—as feminist theorists suggest—then there should be gender politics in the organization of agricultural markets. In this book I show that the feminist argument holds water. Much of my research over the years has focused on gender politics in international organizations and global governance, and this book is no exception. At the same time, the topic of this book—agriculture in the European Union—was entirely new to me. While I had grown up in rural Europe, agriculture in the European Union was not my area of expertise. Thus, in the initial stages of developing the project, I immersed myself in a range of new literatures and gained important help from colleagues throughout Europe. The idea for the book was developed during a sabbatical at the Jean Monnet Centre for European Studies at the University of Bremen in 2001–2. Thanks to Professor Ulrike Liebert and her colleagues, who immersed me in all things European, I had a most hospitable environment there. I am also grateful to Birgit Locher who, in addition to being a stimulating intellectual interlocutor, Page viii → provided me crucial organizational support and made me feel at home in Bremen. The Fulbright Commission funded my stay there and thus enabled my initial foray into the topic of European agricultural policy and gender. In the summer of 2003 I had the privilege of spending time at the Fachbereich Ökologische Agrarwissenschaften of the University of Kassel and at the Political Science Department of the University of Vienna, which provided me a much-needed introduction to agricultural politics in Germany, Austria, and the EU. I am indebted to Professor Onno Poppinga, not least for an unforgettable trip to help pick up a breeding bull from Brandenburg. More important, Professor Poppinga and his colleagues, Götz Schmidt and Dieter Voegelin, gave generously of their time and allowed me broad access both to their knowledge and to the resources of the Fachbereich. I am also grateful to my Vienna hosts, Birgit Sauer at the University and Theresia Ödl-Wieser at the Federal Institute for Less-favoured and Mountainous Areas, for their hospitality and for enabling access to libraries and collections. From 2004 to 2007, I conducted interviews in Brussels, Berlin, Bavaria, and Saxony-Anhalt and received financial support for this research from Florida International University and the Miami European Union Center, for which I am grateful. I would like to thank members of the Commission of the European Union, nongovernmental organizations, and activists for accommodating my many requests for interviews in Brussels. In Berlin, Rainer Gießübel welcomed my questioning about gender mainstreaming in the agriculture ministry and helped me make connections to other important players in town. In Bavaria, administrators and LEADER managers readily welcomed me even when I called without introductions. In Saxony-Anhalt, Wolfgang Bock generously arranged for a tour through the countryside, including meetings with local activists and administrators, and patiently answered my endless questions. Thanks to him and the many people he introduced me to for their remarkable generosity. I spent the past 15 years of my academic life at Florida International University and would like to thank my colleagues and students there for their intellectual engagement and support. They never questioned that gender politics in European agriculture was a topic that fit squarely into the field of International Relations, and indeed they enriched my approach by engaging with my work from a range of perspectives. I miss them. At my new place of employment, the Graduate Institute in Geneva, Nell Williams did a fabulous job preparing the index. I owe her my gratitude.

Finally I am grateful to my husband Peter for being in charge of the Page ix → household. And I would like to thank Helen for being the wonderful daughter that she is. Portions of the manuscript were previously published in “Does Gender Mainstreaming Work? Feminist Engagements with the German Agricultural State,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 11, no. 2 (June 2009): 174–95 © Taylor & Francis; and in “Feminism and the Postmodern State: Gender Mainstreaming in European Rural Development,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 35, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 447–75 © 2010 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved. They are reprinted with permission. Geneva, April 6, 2010

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Introduction:

European Integration and the Transformation of Masculine Rule in the Countryside In the 1960s, the European Union created a common agricultural policy as a core feature of the European “agricultural welfare state” (Rieger 1995b). In order to ensure the welfare of people in the countryside, it fixed prices in agricultural commodities to transfer resources into the rural economy and encouraged agricultural modernization. At the basis of these policies lay a firm commitment to the preservation of family farming, which entailed a highly unequal gender regime characterized by a strongly complementary gender division of labor and the subordinate position of women. Since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has begun to liberalize its agricultural sector, initiating a profound transformation of the agricultural welfare state. Liberalization was part of an international embracing of neoliberalism, spearheaded in Europe by the EU. It was accompanied by a redistribution of state authority, shifting powers of decision making to the supranational level on the one hand and to the subnational level on the other. This reconfiguration of authority has led to a new form of state in Europe, a decentered state. Liberalization and state decentering have helped prepare the ground for undermining masculine rule in the European countryside. Feminist activism has contributed to the transformation of masculine rule in the European countryside and, in turn, has changed with the liberalization of European agriculture and the attendant decentering of the European state. In the 1980s, feminist activism focused on equal rights, on giving the spouses of farmers an employment status so that they could qualify for social welfare benefits, participate equally in cooperatives and professional associations, and gain legal entitlement to farm earnings. The target of this activism was the European multilevel polity, that is, the EU and the national welfare states. At the turn of the new century, “gender mainstreaming” moved to the foreground Page 2 → , an effort within government bureaucracies to mitigate or eliminate negative impacts on women of government policies and programs. Unlike the equal rights strategy, which targets governments in their lawmaking capacity, gender mainstreaming in addition focuses on the administrative capacity of the state. It has become more salient in rural development than in agricultural policies and has appeared in the new “state spaces” of the reconfigured and decentered European state, that is, local, subnational, national, and EU-level authorities connected with private actors in functional policy fields. This book examines how European integration has transformed gender relations in the countryside and how feminists within the European Union have contributed to this transformation. Specifically, it focuses on the effect of EU policies in Germany, the largest member state of the EU and a crucial player in the formation and transformation of the common agricultural policy (CAP). It shows that European agricultural and development policies have long been implicated in the perpetuation of masculine rule and that the change of these policies contributes to undermining masculine rules and rule. The book explores two feminist encounters with the transforming European state: an equal rights strategy encountered the European agricultural welfare state while gender mainstreaming encountered a liberalizing decentered state that is gradually shifting funds from supporting agricultural markets to encouraging sustainable rural development. It demonstrates that feminist activism meets a series of “mechanisms of power” (including co-optation, subversion, and normalization) in these encounters, and that the changing character of the state requires new feminist strategies to oppose these mechanisms. The book starts from the suggestion that gender regimes in German agriculture have been a preserve of masculine rule with strongly negative effects on the lives of women farmers. These effects become visible in their long hours of work, ill effects on their health, and the tendency to be pushed out of agriculture as their labor is no longer needed. An extensive literature has documented these effects. In West Germany, attention has focused on the way in which modernization has meant a disproportionate burden for women farmers,1 the impacts on their health, and the highly gendered structure of agriculture, with women's work increasingly concentrated in auxiliary activities and on small farms. Studies since the 1960s, often responding to government interest in the topic, have measured women's labor time on farms and found that they worked disproportionately long hours. Franklin (1969: 41)

reported that in the early 1960s the workweek of women farmers averaged between 71 and 77 hours, compared to 60 to 66 for men. A similar Page 3 → survey from the late 1970s found even longer average weekly hours: 74.9 hours for all women farmers and 80 hours for women working on part-time farms (Hülsen 1980). Ten years later, Claupein and Günther (1991: 81) reported from their survey of organized women farmers that a third regularly worked more than 12 hours a day, and 33 percent never took any vacation. A number of studies have documented the everyday life of women farmers and the meaning they attribute to their experiences. In their classic book, Inhetveen and Blasche (1983) explored the lives of women on part-time farms, drawing a vivid portrait of the way in which they are integrated into agricultural labor, describing a feminization of agricultural labor on small farms, and giving a voice to women farmers interpreting their lives. Their findings showed that women love farmwork, but also that the majority found their labor burden high or excessive. They emphasized the influence of Hofdenken, an attitude that puts the survival of the farm, conceived as the family heritage, at the center of all doing and planning. This type of thinking is in profound tension with more individual aspirations toward personal fulfillment and constructing a life according to one's own dreams. It is particularly prevalent among women on farms that are expanding, who tend to subordinate their own needs to those of the farm's survival (Inhetveen and Blasche 1983; Inhetveen and Schmitt 2001: 253–54). The literature has documented negative health effects on women resulting from increased competition in the context of European integration and the struggle for survival. Scholars have diagnosed “a shocking increase of psychic and psychosomatic illness” among women farmers (di Lorenzo 1987; also Niebuer 1993). Eva Wonneberger coined the term “modernization stress” (1993: 13) to describe pressures arising from the struggle to survive. She found that women farmers rarely saw doctors and continued to force themselves to work despite health problems. Inhetveen and Schmitt (2001: 253–54) confirmed this thesis in a follow-up to the 1983 study by Inhetveen and Blasche, finding health indicators among women on expanding farms worse than among those on shrinking or part-time farms. A remarkably large proportion of women farmers say that they would not choose their jobs again if they had a choice, and they tend to discourage their daughters from marrying a farmer (Niebuer 1993: 66). Despite women's strong commitment to farming and despite their high labor burden, as revealed in this literature, their work has received little recognition. Long treated as unpaid family labor (mithelfende Familienangehörige), they typically are given little respect for their work, have no right to Page 4 → an income or wage, and until the 1990s had no independent claim to a pension. In her autobiographical analysis, Mara Wimer (1988) recounted that her brother was valued for what he would be, that is, a farmer, whereas she was valued only for what she could give, that is, her ability to sacrifice. These values have long informed the everyday conduct of women and men on farms. But these understandings also have been challenged by a slowly increasing number of women who have broken old taboos and trained to become farmers. Mathilde Schmitt's (1997a) study of women running their own farms documented the struggle of these women to assert themselves in a profession that has been defined as masculine and their frequent failure to remain farm managers when they married and had children, especially if their husbands also were trained farmers. Typically, women would then resort to doing the caring and household work expected of them, carve out small projects of their own on the farm, but in general cut back on their involvement in farming. Thus, while women working on farms have put in long hours and while they have pushed toward gaining a higher status, the masculine rules that have characterized the farming sector have tended to marginalize them and push them out of farming. Modernization and liberalization under the CAP have reinforced this tendency. From 1949 to 1999, women's proportion of family farm labor shrank from 53.5 to 36 percent (Franklin 1969: 27; Prügl 2004: 356), indicating their disproportionate exit from farming. Arguments about trends toward a feminization of farming (Inhetveen and Blasche 1983; Pfeffer 1989) seemed paradoxical in this context. But the discussion makes sense if one considers only family labor employed full-time and takes into consideration the bifurcation of farming structures that has been associated with restructuring: as the number of German farms has shrunk, the proportions of very large and very small farms have both increased. And while men disproportionately have worked on large farms on a full-time basis, women have done so on small farms. Since the 1970s, they have consistently accounted for more than 80 percent of full-time family labor on farms in the 2-to-5-hectare category, increasing from 65

percent in 1957–58 (Prügl 2004: 356). Small, “part-time” farms accounted for the vast majority of German farms, that is, over 65 percent of family farms in 2005, and their numbers were increasing (BMELV 2007: 10). Thus, while the overall number of women in agriculture has been dropping, they form the backbones of the small farms that typify German agriculture. The story is somewhat different for women farmers in Eastern Germany, Page 5 → the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Here the collectivization of agriculture in the 1950s turned farmers into workers. With regularized, fixed working hours, women in East German agriculture were able to avoid the long hours of drudgery and ill health effects characteristic of the West. Re-unification abruptly changed the living and working conditions of these women. The largest impact was women's disproportionate job losses in rural areas. While they accounted for about 40 percent of those employed in agriculture during GDR times, their proportion dropped to 31 percent by 2006 (Goldammer 1987; Arbeitsmarkt 2006: 194). Thus, as in the West, women were pushed out of agriculture, albeit as a result of a different kind of restructuring. The immediate impact in the aftermath of unification was even more stark: Only 35 percent of those employed in East German agriculture in 1989 still had jobs there in 1991; the corresponding figure for women was an astounding 25 percent (Lasch et al. 1992: 10). Scholars documented the effects of this massive displacement on women's everyday lives. In addition to losing income and risking poverty, the tendency of pushing women back into housework amounted to an “immense devaluation of their qualifications” (Lasch et al. 1992: 11–12, my trans.). Women expressed feelings of being stigmatized as “good-for-nothings” and a sense that “inside, the soul gets ruined” (van Hoven 2001: 42). Scholars found among these women a type of internal migration, a sense that they no longer belonged (Hörschelmann and van Hoven 2003: 748). The lives of women who remained in East German agriculture after unification have received remarkably little attention. There is some evidence that they were disproportionately represented in white-collar positions—albeit not in the leadership—on the large farms that continue to dominate the East German countryside. On the newly (re)created family farms of the East, in contrast, the male breadwinner model has asserted itself, with men becoming the main farmers. Men ran 81 percent of the new family farms in the East in the early 1990s, a proportion almost as high as the 91 percent in the West (Schmitt 1997b: 162). This book suggests that the secondary status of women in German agriculture, their long hours of work, the ill health effects, and the tendency to be made redundant are symptoms of a set of rules that encode masculine rule. This set of rules encompasses customs as much as government policies and laws that circumscribe the conditions of women's work and influence their basic well-being. But, like gender, masculine rule is not static and changes in Page 6 → parallel with other social and political transformations. One especially important influence has been European integration and in particular the policies of agricultural liberalization since the 1980s.

Integration, Trade Liberalization, and the Transformation of State Authority in European Agriculture Creating a common market in agriculture was one of the key goals of the European Economic Community (EEC) from its beginnings. The Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC in 1957 included the intention to create a common agricultural policy and specified the following goals for it: “to increase agricultural productivity … to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community … to stabilize markets … to assure the availability of supplies … to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices” (Fennell 1997: 14). A compromise between the original six member states of the EEC, the CAP thus combined the goals of agricultural modernization, rural welfare, and food security, and it envisioned that these goals would be achieved through the creation of a common market. Despite various changes made to the treaty in the course of the years, the commitment to these basic goals has remained constant, although the means by which to achieve them have changed. The early shape of the CAP reflects a political compromise involving in particular the interests of the largest member states, France and Germany. Whereas the French favored a liberalization of trade in agricultural products in order to create a European market for their agricultural surplus, the Germans were concerned that European competition would hurt its relatively uncompetitive farming sector.2 Germany was interested in guaranteeing

income equivalences in agriculture and industry, as specified in its 1955 Agricultural Act, and accomplished this goal domestically by setting artificially high prices for agricultural commodities.3 In the end (and some have argued as a quid pro quo for trade liberalization in industrial products in which it was competitive) Germany agreed to a common market in agriculture and competition from more efficient European producers (France in particular) under the condition that high prices would be maintained so that the social welfare of German farmers would not be jeopardized (Moravcsik 1998). Through the CAP it de facto projected the German agricultural welfare state onto the European level, creating free trade within the EEC that at the same time discriminated against products grown outside the community (Rieger 1995a). Page 7 → On paper the CAP pursued a range of objectives, but in practice it expended most of its resources on price supports and complemented these with variable levies and export subsidies on key products, such as cereals, meat, and dairy products (Moravcsik 1998; Hendriks 1991). The administration of the price mechanism and of agricultural policy more broadly involved a complicated system of multilevel governance in which the governments jealously sought to preserve their powers. They retained the power to fix prices and decide on substantive legislation, limited the influence of the European Parliament on agricultural policy-making, and established the Special Committee on Agriculture, composed of national civil servants to prepare meetings of the Agricultural Council. Furthermore, a set of management committees, including officers from the Commission and the member states, oversee the implementation of agricultural policy (Rieger 2000: 188). Thus, while the CAP emerged as the first common policy of the EEC, it de facto left much of the decision making to member states. In particular, the bulk of rural development policy and social welfare policy in the agricultural sector remained a matter of national competence. Germany, like other member states, developed a series of social policy measures in the 1950s and 1960s including an old age benefits scheme paid to the farmer or his surviving spouse, and an accident and health insurance scheme (OECD 1974: 49). Its structural efforts, largely financed from domestic sources, focused on developing rural infrastructures, the reparceling of agricultural land to allow for more efficient production, and providing farmers access to capital in order to facilitate investments in technology and farm infrastructure (Wilson and Wilson 2001). European agricultural policy thus emerged as a policy shared between the EU and its member states, with a strong bias toward intergovernmental policy-making. The CAP was effective in achieving its goals, in particular safeguarding the incomes of farmers, even if it did so in a highly unequal fashion, benefiting in particular the large producers. Thus, 80 percent of CAP expenditures have long gone to about 20 percent of farmers, an issue that has become a matter of considerable political contention (Rieger 2000: 193; European Voice.com 02/24/2005). In addition, the CAP periodically has come under attack for a series of unintended consequences. Since the 1980s, a progressively more vocal green movement has criticized the negative impacts of intensified production on the environment. The cost of the CAP, which in the 1980s regularly swallowed about 60 percent of the EC's budget, became an ever more contentious issue and came to a head with the prospect of enlargement Page 8 → in the new century, threatening budgetary strains with the addition of a large number of eastern European farmers.4 But perhaps most important, the principles of market intervention that informed the CAP clashed with the increasing salience of neoliberal doctrine, and its market-distorting effects became a matter of both European and international critique. Price supports encouraged overproduction and led governments to implement costly storage schemes and dump agricultural commodities on the world market. This generated conflict with the United States and other countries with highly efficient agricultural export sectors, which insisted on the liberalization of agriculture on a global scale. Agriculture for the first time became an issue of international negotiations at the Uruguay round of trade negotiations in the mid-1980s, and it continued to be central in the Doha round that started in 2001.5 The Uruguay round Agreement on Agriculture included commitments to replace market-distorting fixed prices with direct payments to farmers, reduce export subsidies, and provide increased access to EU markets through the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers. A major step toward implementing these commitments was the 2003 CAP reform, which initiated a process of decoupling farm payments from levels of production. Support was now increasingly provided through direct payments to farmers based on compliance with animal welfare and environmental

standards. The result was a cut in the level of support payments to farmers in the EU from an estimated 41 percent of farm gross receipts in 1986–88 to 27 percent in 2006–8 (OECD 2009: 45).6 With global market liberalization and CAP reform a new political logic came to inform the regulatory activities of European authorities. No longer was the welfare of farmers and their families at the center of government action. Instead, the focus shifted toward fostering equilibria in an increasingly deregulated market. As a corollary and in order to counteract undesirable “externalities” such as environmental destruction and rural poverty, the EU complemented market liberalization with policies of environmental preservation and rural development, and it responded to political pressures from organized farmers by finding means to continue support payments delinked from production. One outcome of these efforts was the suggestion, in the European Council's landmark “Agenda 2000” document, that there existed a “European model of agriculture” that needed preserving and that therefore justified government support. A key characteristic of this model was that it conceptualized agriculture as “multifunctional,” that is, as producing not only a private good (food and biomass) but also public goods. Specifically, Page 9 → agriculture was defined as central to shaping the rural landscape, preserving the rural environment (through land conservation, management of natural resources, and preservation of biodiversity), and contributing to the socioeconomic viability of rural areas (Maier and Shobayashi 2001). The concept of multifunctionality frequently was interpreted as a way for Europeans to avoid full-scale liberalization. It helped justify within the WTO differentiations between types of support payments, some of which were considered more noxious than others.7 Parallel to the opening of European agriculture to external competition, the EU strengthened programs on rural development and expanded its competency in this area. The 1996 Cork Declaration called for a transformation of the CAP into an integrated rural development program.8 Two rural development regulations (EC, No. 1257/1999 and EC, No. 1698/2005) were passed subsequently to implement the shift in policy, the latter including a mandate for the creation of a European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). The objectives of the fund, as specified in the 2005 rural development regulation, are threefold (see European Union 2005, Article 4): First, it should work to improve the competitiveness of European agriculture. This goal continued earlier efforts to encourage farm modernization, but the point of comparison had moved from the European to the world market. Second, rural development funds should be used to support efforts to improve the environment, and third, they should be used to enhance the quality of life in rural areas, in part by encouraging a diversification of economic activity. The latter two goals indicated the shift in policy toward environmental sustain-ability and rural (rather than purely agricultural) welfare goals. The goals thus combined the long-standing movement toward creating a more efficient agriculture with efforts of environment preservation and economic diversification. The EU's move toward liberalizing agriculture while preserving the countryside and encouraging rural development has been accompanied by reorganizations of the division of authority between member states. Perhaps most prominently, the shift from organizing a common market to providing direct payments has entailed a “renationalization” of agricultural policy-making, allowing member states to decide how they target direct payments and which types of farmers to support (Rieger 2000: 190). The Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in December 2009, accelerated this process by declaring agriculture to be an area of “shared competence” between the member states and the EU, thus reversing an earlier understanding that the EU had sole competence for agriculture in the area of market organization. This new interpretation Page 10 → sanctioned the broader application of the principle of “subsidiarity,” which is codified in the Maastricht Treaty and suggests that matters should be handled by the lowest competent authority if possible. While the treaty also for the first time empowered the European Parliament to co-decide matters of agricultural policy, and thus implicitly consolidated authority at the European level, the implications of this step toward democratization for the division of authority in the agricultural sector were unclear at the time of this writing (Massot Martí 2008).9 The new emphasis on rural development introduced into the countryside practices typical for the administration of the structural funds, whose share of the EU budget with CAP reform began to surpass that of agriculture. Structural funds include those funds targeted to rural areas in addition to a much larger portion supporting disadvantaged groups and regions. Unlike in agricultural policy, the principle of subsidiarity has long played a role in the structural funds. In introducing the notion of “partnership” in the late 1980s, the Commission suggested

that it would work closely with relevant authorities at national, regional, and local levels in order to implement structural fund programming. While subsidiarity suggests the devolution of authority to subnational levels, working in partnerships also allowed the Commission to circumvent governments and the intergovernmental politics of the Council, finding allies for its agendas in local authorities (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 108). But the Commission ran into difficulties when it attempted to control the activities of local authorities despite imposing an ever-growing number of reporting requirements. It found additional allies for its agendas in the private sector and extended partnerships to firms, trade unions, and local public interest groups—some argue to extend its control over the local state. In Germany, this meant primarily the inclusion of business groups and unions (the “social partners”), as both governments and the social partners resisted an inclusion of environmental and women's groups (Bauer 2001: 137).10 The spirit of subsidiarity and partnerships entailed the creation of new “state spaces” (Brenner 2004), loci of politics within the decentered state that straddled the EU and local authorities in addition to public and private authorities. The liberalization of agriculture and the refocusing of attention on rural development thus occurred in tandem with a transformation of the European agricultural welfare state and the emergence of a decentered state that emphasizes the principles of subsidiarity and partnership. The addition of diversification and environmental preservation to the policy of agricultural competitiveness entailed a reorganization of European political space Page 11 → through new patterns of multilevel governance and the formation of new state spaces organized around the implementation of rural development programs. Interwoven in these projects were new constructions of gender and rural hierarchies, and feminist strategies adapted to this reorganization of European authority.

Equal Rights and Gender Mainstreaming The EU's equality regime has been built in stages, shifting approaches and expanding in scope over time. Scholars have described a three-stage movement from a focus on equal rights and treatment, to positive action, to gender mainstreaming (Rees 1998; Mazey 2001; Booth and Bennett 2002). In the agricultural sector, the equal rights approach and gender mainstreaming have been particularly relevant. In the 1970s, feminists found in the EU an “opportunity structure” that helped them advance their agenda. In a key court case in Belgium, feminist lawyers drew on Article 119 of the Rome Treaty, which prescribes the requirement for equal pay, to make an argument for equal treatment, an argument that ultimately succeeded. At the same time, within the European Commission, feminist officials helped move an agenda to affirm and broaden the EU's commitment to gender equality. These activities drew energy from the political atmosphere of a revived women's movement and benefited from the proclamation of a UN Women's Year in 1975 and ultimately a UN Women's Decade (1976–85). Governments wanted to show that they were active in the area of women's rights and to present concrete accomplishments to the UN world conferences on women. In the European Union this meant the formulation of a series of gender equality directives, most important, an equal pay and an equal treatment directive in the 1970s. The EU also passed in the 1980s a directive on equal treatment of women in self-employment, including agriculture (Hoskyns 1996). Together with diverse rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) affirming the direct applicability of Article 119, these directives established the core of an EU gender equality regime (Walby 2004). This regime came to encompass a variety of soft law instruments in addition to treaty provisions, directives, and court rulings. A major challenge for the equal rights approach was the implementation of EU norms at the national level. National-level institutions upholding the male breadwinner norm functioned as “needles' eyes” through which European-level Page 12 → policy prescriptions needed to pass, sometimes leading to a distortion of their intent (Ostner and Lewis 1995). In Sonia Mazey's words, “national policy styles beget a dense ‘hinterland’ of detailed programmes, policies, and institutions and it takes a very long time for EU institutions and policies to permeate and change this hinterland significantly” (1998: 145). The difficulty was not the same for all member states. “Mediating institutions” such as equality agencies and labor tribunals, the quality of state-society relations, and a fit with broader national discourses could facilitate implementation (Caporaso and Jupille 2001; Valiente 2003; Calloni 2003).

Feminist activism was key to accomplishing changes at both national and EU levels. In a politics reminiscent of Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's (1998) “boomerang pattern,” activists sometimes sought rule changes at the European level in order to gain support for their struggles at national levels, and indeed they sometimes kicked issues back and forth (Sifft 2003; Zippel 2004). Activists also used the European Court of Justice and national courts to move gender equality forward (Egan 1998; Cichowski 2007). Often governments were outmaneuvered in a pincer movement from above and below, combining pressure from the European Court and local activists (van der Vleuten 2007). In Germany, legal pressure from the EU generated public debate and elite learning on issues of equal rights in the workplace (Liebert 2002: 252; Kodré and Müller 2003; Berghahn 1998). But there were limits to the equal rights strategy that feminists were well aware of. Even when legal equality was written into the law, there continued to be considerable inequality in outcomes. Typically the legal strategy left in place the male norm and was not capable of addressing the structural disadvantages that resulted from centuries of discrimination. Moreover, the emphasis on individual choice in the equal rights strategy and the interpretation of nondiscrimination as being treated like a man produced a gender equality policy in tune with deregulation. ECJ rulings invariably led to a less favorable treatment of women in instances where they previously were treated preferentially (e.g., equalizing working hours, night work, and retirement age), and governments used equalization arguments to justify cutbacks, for example, eliminating “husband-only” benefits (Ostner 2000). In the 1980s, the increasing salience of neoliberal ideas generated increasing hostility toward social legislation. As further directives to advance gender equality were stalled, the Commission changed strategy and developed a series of “action programs.” The first of these added to the legal strategy a positive action approach supporting women in areas where they were disadvantaged Page 13 → in order to level the playing field. In particular, this meant funding educational and job-training programs to desegregate the labor market (Hoskyns 2000). But because positive action undermined traditional privilege, it was threatening and ultimately generated serious opposition. In the infamous 1995 Kalanke case, the European Court invalidated the policy of giving preferential treatment to an underrepresented group in the selection process for jobs in public administration, validating accusations of reverse discrimination. Subsequent legislation counteracted the negative fallout from this judgment, but the case illustrated the degree to which positive action generated masculine resistance. As neoliberal economic policies gained salience in the EU, gender mainstreaming became “an attractive form of ‘policy succession’” (Mazey 2002b: 20), adding to and often replacing both the equal rights approach and positive action. Introduced into international debates at the UN's Beijing Women's Conference, gender mainstreaming promised to shake solidified masculine rule. For policymakers it resonated with a demand to reduce regulation, and in bureaucracies hostile to gender equality agendas, it became a tool to neutralize positive action (Stratigaki 2005). In the EU, gender mainstreaming broadened the scope of the gender equality agenda to include all issue areas, moving beyond the confines of social and labor market legislation. It built on a theoretical understanding that gender inequality was pervasive throughout society and thus needed to be addressed everywhere. Government policies inattentive to gender differences were in danger of perpetuating inequality inadvertently. Thus, it was necessary to move the feminist agenda out of the ghettos of women's ministries and spread responsibility for gender equality throughout the administrative apparatus of the state. Gender mainstreaming required that a gender equality perspective be integrated into all policies and programs and that differential effects on women and men be considered at all stages of policy-making. Like positive action, the strategy was first embraced in a Commission action program in the early 1990s; it was subsequently codified in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and in the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights. Gender mainstreaming was implemented in a highly uneven fashion, in part as a result of weak support in the Commission, which failed to set concrete goals or timetables for implementation (Stratigaki 2005). Hafner-Burton and Pollack (2009) argue that the lack of “hard” incentives led to a disinterest in the bureaucracy and slowed implementation. Others have identified lack of political will, lack of expertise, and bureaucratic cultures as key variables Page 14 → hampering implementation (Woodward 2003). In the Commission, those directorates-general (DGs) that “historically [were] interventionist in character, and relatively open to consideration of social justice issues,” such as the structural funds and DGs charged with employment and development policy, were receptive to gender mainstreaming. By contrast, “the most strongly neoliberal” DGs, including those focused on competition

policy, resisted gender mainstreaming (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000: 440), as did DGs in important issue areas such as the environment, transportation, foreign policy, and, significantly, agriculture (Woodward 2003: 75; Braithwaite 2000). Even where gender mainstreaming was adopted, scholars noticed a “degendering” and reframing of feminist policies as feminist ideas were made to fit areas of EU competence (e.g., Stratigaki 2004; Lombardo and Meier 2008). Transfer to the national level was left to the “Open Method of Coordination,” a soft law instrument that relies on government reporting but lacks sanctions (Mazey 2002a; Lombardo and Meier 2008). Not surprisingly, implementation here has been wanting as well. In her eight-country research project, Mary Daly (2005) found that governments tended to apply the approach in a rather technocratic and nonsystematic way. Like others (Verloo 2005; Walby 2005), she found conceptual problems with gender mainstreaming. Another difficulty was that movement activists felt lukewarm toward gender mainstreaming and thus rarely played the role of advocates demanding accountability from European or national institutions (Lang 2009). Where activists embraced gender mainstreaming, as in Sweden, the strategy became firmly institutionalized and showed some successes (Sainsbury and Bergqvist 2009). Regardless of the approach, introducing gender equality considerations into European agriculture has been difficult. The equal rights approach generated the 1986 directive on the equal treatment of women in selfemployment, including agriculture (Directive 86/613/EEC), almost a decade after the equal pay and equal treatment directives. Even then many member states opposed demands for an occupational status for women farmers, equal remuneration, equality in social protection, and equal access to training and professional and cooperative organizations. Although the directive was a relatively weak instrument that required little of member states, it generated some legislative change. Yet, in Germany, activists did not use it to press their case, nor has it been used in judicial review proceedings that have been instrumental to generating policy change on other issues of equal treatment. Similarly, gender mainstreaming has had limited impact in the agricultural Page 15 → sector, despite multiple high-level pronouncements in the Agricultural Council and in the European Parliament announcing and encouraging the adoption of the strategy. For the most part, it appeared that gender mainstreaming served to deflect feminist challenges to agricultural policy by redirecting them into the area of rural development. And although organized women farmers did not take ownership of gender mainstreaming, the focus on developing the service sector in rural areas, combined with attention to gender equality in the structural funds, has begun to undermine masculine rule in the European countryside.

Research Rationale, Statement of Purpose This book examines how European integration has contributed to transforming gender relations in the countryside, using Germany as a case study. Since the 1970s, European integration has included the formulation of norms on gender equality and generated pressures to change local practices perpetuating the subordinate status of women on farms. But European integration also has meant the regulation and liberalization of agricultural markets, a process that has been marked by three distinct moments. The first moment, largely preceding feminist activism, entailed the construction of the common market, which opened German agriculture to Europe-wide competition, thus setting a new standard. This is not typically thought of as a move toward liberalization because the common market was highly regulated; however, a central element of agricultural integration was trade on equal terms between the European member states generating competition and producing efficiencies in production. To the extent that the CAP activated this market mechanism it can be understood as a form of liberalization. The second moment was defined by the EU's response to the freeing of agricultural trade at the international level and the resulting sharpened competition. For farmers it meant stronger price competition and the gradual delinking of agricultural subsidies from production. The third moment involved the integration of East German agriculture into the European regulatory system, including reprivatization, organizational restructuring of farming enterprises, and their integration into a global market together with massive job losses. The research presented here investigates how these moments of integration interwove with feminist activism to transform gender relations in agriculture.

European rules are transmitted to the local level through a political system reconfigured by processes of integration. In the first moment of agricultural Page 16 → integration, national welfare states became embedded in a system of multilevel governance whereby the EEC regulated markets in order to help ensure the welfare of farmers. The deregulation of the European common market in agriculture and the shift of emphasis toward rural development brought to the fore a new form of European state, one consisting of decentered networks of local, subnational, national, and European-level authorities working with private actors in the field of rural development. Rules produced in the multilevel welfare state and in these networks helped to both fix and undermine local gender rules, in this way stabilizing and destabilizing masculine rule. The book seeks to answer three questions: First, how has agricultural policy helped institutionalize masculine rule in the European countryside? Second, how has the liberalization of agricultural policy helped transform such rule? Third, how have feminist strategies contributed to this transformation? My investigation puts the European state (in its multilevel and de-centered form) at the center of analysis, suggesting that integration (entailing both market liberalization and feminist strategies) initiates processes within the state leading to changes of rules, which in turn fix or undermine local gender regimes. I hypothesize that different feminist strategies initiate different mechanisms of power in the state's rule-making processes with different effects on masculine rule. I also hypothesize that rule changes in the state and their impacts vary depending on local gender regimes. Accordingly, the book makes two comparisons. It first compares the impacts of the feminist equal rights strategy to the impacts of gender mainstreaming. Second, it compares the impacts of gender mainstreaming in the context of two different gender regimes, East and West Germany. The argument proceeds as follows: chapter 1, following this introduction, develops a theoretical framework and outlines a research design and methods. It introduces feminist state theories and conceptualizes the relationship between state and society in efforts to change gender regimes. It recalls the Weberian distinction between authority and power (Macht and Herrschaft) to theorize encounters between feminists and the state as efforts often stymied by power plays. It presents a typology of “mechanisms of power” operative in these encounters, depending on whether feminists attack rules of entitlement, rules of labor division, or rules of identity. Among these mechanisms are co-optation, subversion, and normalization. Finally, it outlines a research design and specifies methods. Chapter 2 traces the transformation of gender rules in the CAP from its Page 17 → founding to CAP reform. It surveys the gendered organization of farming on a European scale, highlighting in particular the centrality of pluriactivity. It explores the ideological commitments to preserving the family farm in discourses around the CAP's founding and traces feminist interventions at the EU level since the 1970s. While only briefly discussing the struggle for a directive on women in agriculture (which is treated extensively in chapter 5), it explores at length efforts to mainstream gender into the work of the institutions of the EU. It traces the gradual shift in feminist efforts from a focus on women farmers to a focus on rural women more broadly. Chapter 3 maps the development of two very different authoritative gender regimes in rural East and West Germany with particular emphasis on the states of Saxony-Anhalt and Bavaria, the sites of my field research. It distinguishes between rules of entitlement that specify farm ownership and inheritance, rules of labor division that specify assignments of productive and reproductive tasks, and rules of identity in self-perceptions and government documents—defining what it means to be a Bäuerin (female farmer) or a Bauer (male farmer). It finds disowned women concentrated in reproductive activities and self-defined as co-owners in the West. It finds women identified as workers, disowned like men, but also part of a thorough gender division of labor in the East. It is these gender regimes that feminists challenge in their encounters with the state. The following two chapters offer case studies of feminist engagements with the state in the area of agricultural policy. Chapter 4 details the feminist encounter with the European agricultural welfare state. Focusing on the early West German experience in the EU, it recounts the struggle of women farmers in the 1980s for an employment status that would give them equal rights to social security, membership in cooperatives and professional associations, and legal entitlement to farm earnings. At the EU level this was a fight for a broad directive on nondiscrimination in the area of agriculture, which encountered fierce resistance in the Council. At the German level the fight fed into a struggle over independent pension rights for women farmers, entitlements independent of

those of their husbands. The German struggle yielded a compromise law that gave women rights to their own retirement benefits but that left their employment status ambiguously identified as “quasi entrepreneurs.” It also ignored the different situation of women in part-time farming for whom the new pension benefits were unaffordable. Refusal, compromise, and the silencing of difference emerged as power mechanisms characteristic of this feminist engagement with the patriarchal welfare state. Page 18 → Chapter 5 examines the feminist encounter with the decentered European state through the lens of rural development, a policy field with highly dispersed authority that has gained prominence with CAP reform. It describes the results of efforts to mainstream gender into EU structural funds at the German national and Länder levels, focusing in particular on the different results in Bavaria and Saxony-Anhalt and comparing experiences at the local level of an EU-funded rural development program (the LEADER program) in the two Länder. The chapter finds outright refusal to adopt gender mainstreaming in Bavaria and ambivalence in Saxony-Anhalt with scant evidence of implementation in local project contexts. While the program benefited women in both locales, it did so inadvertently and despite bureaucratic routines that fostered the “evaporation” of gender mainstreaming as it moved down the bureaucratic hierarchy. As a result, it tended to subvert efforts to reduce male control over women's labor, reproducing a highly unequal gender division of labor. The chapter also draws on the knowledge of experts on gender mainstreaming to speculate about mechanisms of power that might assert themselves if the strategy were implemented. In these speculations gender mainstreaming becomes governmentality, part of the state's art of administration that generates a tendency to normalize what it means to be a rural woman and to coopt women into the state project of diversifying the rural economy by developing a tourism and services industry. The power mechanisms of subversion, normalization, and co-optation emerge as characteristic of the encounter of gender mainstreaming with the decentered European state. The conclusion summarizes key findings regarding the impact of European integration on gender regimes in the EU. They support the contention that the state is an important intervening force that directs the form of such impacts. The chapter draws out differences between policy-making in the welfare state and in new state spaces and develops propositions about the operation of different types of mechanisms in different policy contexts, arguing for feminist strategies to work against these mechanisms. Finally, it explores the relevance of the approach in this book for a set of debates in feminist International Relations and proposes new research agendas in a feminist constructivist vein.

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Chapter 1

Studying Masculine Rule in the Decentered European State In order to gain a better understanding of the impact of neoliberal restructuring on women, feminists have recently recalled the role of the state. It is necessary, they argue, to better understand the way in which states, as agents of global governance, participate both in the regulation of global markets and in the reproduction of gender (Randall and Waylen 1998; Waylen 2004; Rai 2004). The wide adoption of gender mainstreaming in international organizations, including the EU, has further revived interest in understanding the role of states in advancing gender equality and in the relationship between bureaucracies and feminist movements (Wöhl 2007; Sauer 2001). This has included a concern with democratization more broadly and a call for a better understanding of the relationship between state and society (Rai 2003; Walby 2005; Daly 2005: 447). The relationship between the capitalist state and masculine rule has been at the center of feminist political inquiry for years. What is new about this relationship today is that the state has changed: it has moved from a national orientation toward providing welfare for its people to an international orientation that seeks to position local and national economies within a globalizing market. This chapter provides a conceptual discussion of my research topic. It fleshes out the concept of the decentered European state, relates it to the notion of masculine rule, and develops a theoretical framework for studying the transformation of masculine rule in such a state. It reformulates the concept of gender regimes, which has been developed to describe welfare states to suggest that, in a decentered state, these regimes should be conceptualized as local and delinked from the nation-state. It specifies the meaning of gender regimes and masculine rule by reference to three sets of gendered rules—rules of entitlement, rules of labor division, and rules of identity. It also specifies Page 20 → mechanisms of power that come to play as feminist interventions challenge gender regimes in agriculture and rural development.

A Decentered State In a seminal 1996 article, James Caporaso suggested that the EU could be thought of as a “postmodern state.” He argued that the EU is very different from Max Weber's Westphalian state: it neither holds the monopoly of legitimate violence nor works through centralized authority-structures within an exclusive territory. He furthermore argued that the EU is more than a “regulatory state” making rules but not distributing resources—as suggested by Giandomenico Majone (1996). The notion of the regulatory state hides the question of who benefits from the rules this state makes. Caporaso proposed as a third model the idea that the EU might be a postmodern state. The characteristics of this state are that it has a weak core, operates in many spatial locations, and entails a significant reorganization of the relationship between capital and labor (Caporaso 1996). Other authors have similarly described the reorganization of authority in the European Union, though typically without reference to state theory. Philippe Schmitter (1996) has shown how in the EU authority is separated from territory, unbundled horizontally and vertically, and dispersed to different levels and functional issue areas. He identifies two dimensions of unbundled authority: a functional dimension that characterizes the fact that decision making in the EU is organized differently depending on functional issue areas, and a territorial dimension, which characterizes the fact that subnational, national, and supranational authorities share competencies in policymaking (see also Traxler and Schmitter 1995). Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2001) have employed the image of “multi-level governance” to describe the territorial dimension of this unbundling of authority, John Ruggie (1998: 195) has spoken of “neo-Medievalism” to describe proliferating and overlapping authorities, and Rainer Eising and Beate Kohler-Koch (2003) have introduced the notion of “network governance” to characterize the linkages between political actors. Characterizing the EU as a phenomenon of globalization, Saskia Sassen (2006) similarly has evoked the notion of networks and described the EU as an assemblage in which networks produce new territorial scales and denationalize authority and rights, but in which the global is imbricated with the national. In a simplified fashion it is possible to identify three elements of state restructuring described in these writings: the Page 21 → first pertains to a functional decentering, the second is a territorial decentering, and the

third discerns a new type of state-society relations. I propose the label decentered state to capture all three of these elements. Hooghe and Marks (2001) developed the concept of multilevel governance in their study of the EU's cohesion policy. It is therefore particularly suggestive for the purposes of this study, which includes an exploration of rural development. Like cohesion policy, which focuses on inequalities between regions, the EU's rural development policy supports economic activities and populations not benefiting from or hurt by integration, and it does so by similar means. In the governance of cohesion policy, Hooghe and Marks identified shared powers of decision making among actors at different levels and a significant loss of control on the part of national governments. In addition, they found interconnections among political arenas (rather than hierarchical nesting among different levels of government) and the creation of “transnational associations.” While this type of governance typifies the EU's structural policies, it is a poor descriptor of its governance practices in other functional issue areas, including the area of agriculture, where national governments have been loath to delegate too much authority. In later work, Hooghe and Marks further elaborated the notion of multilevel governance, taking account of different types of decentering by identifying two types of multilevel governance (2003). The first type involves general-purpose jurisdictions and encompasses a nested, hierarchical, federalist structure. It includes units with nonintersecting membership (typically states) that operate with legislative, executive, and judiciary institutions at a limited number of levels and are embedded in a systemwide architecture. In contrast, the second type of governance involves task-specific jurisdictions organized along functional issue areas, comprising intersecting memberships and overlapping and competing authorities at an unlimited number of jurisdictional levels. There is no overarching architecture in Type II multilevel governance, but the structures are flexibly designed. Indeed, flexibility is a characteristic of both types of multilevel governance, but while the first type is relatively permanent, the second type exists in great variety and is impermanent. Both types of governance can be observed in the European Union. The first case study in this book focusing on the multilevel European agricultural welfare state approximates politics in Type I multilevel governance; the second case study of politics in rural development resembles Type II multilevel governance. The concept of multilevel governance captures state restructuring in different issue areas and the vertical decentering of authority to different levels. Page 22 → But it fails to account for the changes in state-society relations that come into view when adducing state theory. Caporaso (1996) alerts us to the need to ask cui bono when looking at the EU's market-making project. Sassen (2006) similarly signals that the separation of authority from territory entails a spatial restructuring not just of the state but also of state-society relations. She makes the argument drawing on literatures in geography, in particular Neil Brenner's (2004) concept of “state spaces.” The concept of state spaces derives from a combination of geographic literatures on scale and neo-Marxist understandings of the state.1 Following the seminal work of Henri Lefebvre (1991), critical human geographers have suggested that space should not be understood as a passive container or platform for social processes, but that it is itself constructed through such processes. They have used this understanding to reformulate the cartographic notion of scale, suggesting that scales are not ontologically given but produced through social relations, in particular through relations of capitalist production and reproduction (Marston 2000). Brenner (2004) has adopted the notion of socially produced scales to theorize state restructuring in Europe. He proposes that we understand this restructuring as a process of “rescaling national territoriality” and that one outcome of this restructuring may be the creation of deeply contested and highly unstable new state spaces akin to what Hooghe and Marks (2003) characterize as Type II multilevel governance, but expanded by a consideration of social forces. Brenner describes the production of these state spaces in a case study of urban locational policy, that is, the efforts of cities to attract business within the liberalized European “post-Keynesian competition state.” Uneven spatial development has entailed the creation of an “Archipelago Europe” with urban “core islands” disconnected from their rural hinterlands. Urban policies have increased the competitiveness of cities against each other but also networked them with one other. A decentralization of intergovernmental relations has accompanied this process, along with the “metropolization” of national spatial-planning systems, that is, a rescaling of regulatory space. This rescaling is not simply a relocation of regulatory activity from national to local agencies.

Instead, state restructuring entails the creation of a new state, the shift from Keynesian strategies of creating economically integrated national territories to post-Keynesian strategies constructing competitive and networked localities.2 Brenner's concept of state spaces usefully complements the literature on multilevel governance by bringing into view social forces. In the following investigation of gender in rural development, the creation of state spaces is Page 23 → nicely illustrated in the LEADER program, an innovative rural development program run by the European Commission from 1991 to 2006.3 LEADER operates through local action groups (LAGs), privatepublic partnerships formed in regional contexts to serve as a motor for diversification and economic development. LAGs are embedded in vertical networks linking them to the Commission and to the national level. They are linked with each other in horizontal networks for the purpose of encouraging the exchange of information. And they link public and private actors, bringing into the policy process the voices of privileged social partners and civil society groups. They operate in parallel to (and sometimes in competition with) traditional administrative structures, creating new arenas for political engagement and struggle. Through their networks, they produce nonterritorial state spaces that can be considered typical for one type of governance in the European de-centered state. State decentering has consequences for the way in which masculine rule is reproduced and gendered power is exercised, and for the kinds of gender relations legitimated. The reorganization of the state has generated changes in feminist strategy, including the boomerang and ping-pong patterns of kicking issues to different levels (Sifft 2003; Zippel 2004), the pincer movements of pressuring national governments from above and below (van der Vleuten 2007), and the push for gender mainstreaming to reach new state spaces. But how is one to conceptualize this new decentered state from a feminist perspective? Is it a patriarchal state like the welfare state that makes women into clients (Gordon 1994), like the liberal state that reproduces gender by denying its significance (MacKinnon 1989), like the capitalist state that through its regulations constructs women as a reserve army of low-wage labor (Barrett 1980), or like the security state that casts women as in need of protection (Brown 1995; Young 2003)? It is difficult to postulate any singular logic to describe a state with multiple centers of authority and a complexity of the type of the contemporary, decentered European state. Indeed, cognizant of the diversity of gender constructions, feminist theorists for the most part have come to reject unitary conceptualizations of the state as patriarchal. The revival of feminist state theory seeks to validate a variety of gender constructions while at the same time accounting for the persistence of masculine rule.

Masculine Rule Feminists have abandoned the figure of the patriarchal state in part because empirical evidence has shown considerable complexity of state policies, in Page 24 → part because theoretical developments contradicted the unitary construction of the state and the unitary logic of gender oppression. In the context of welfare state retrenchment in the 1980s, scholars began to argue that the state may be an ally of women, not just a problem; it not only made women into clients but it also empowered them and helped them survive (Boris and Bardaglio 1987; Gordon 1994). In Australia and Europe, scholars explored various forms of “state feminism” and argued that women's policy machineries mostly worked to advance feminist goals (Stetson and Mazur 1995; Braithwaite 1998; Watson 1990). They identified feminists working within the state—as bureaucrats or politicians—who saw themselves as accountable to the feminist movement. These “femocrats,” as they were labeled in Australia, are policy entrepreneurs who help capture the state for feminist projects and thus help push forward feminist agendas. At the same time, those influenced by post-structuralist approaches argued against theories that proposed single logics of domination. As Wendy Brown (1995) has suggested, there is no single arena of patriarchy within the state, no one masculine interest, and no single mechanism of masculine rule. Instead, the state is gendered throughout as masculinity has historically shaped “the multiple modes of power circulating through the domain called the state” (177). In this understanding the state emerges both as an “it” that we invariably invoke, yet really as a nonentity, “a significantly unbounded terrain of powers and techniques, an ensemble of discourses, rules, and practices, cohabiting in limited, tension-ridden, often contradictory relation with one another” (Brown 1995: 174; Kantola 2006).

How then have feminist scholars studied this nonunitary state? In the European context, comparative research developed the notion of gender regimes to group states according to the way in which they organize the relation of paid and unpaid work. In a seminal article, Jane Lewis (1992) distinguished different welfare regimes according to the degree to which they incorporate the male-breadwinner model, a typology that has since been critiqued and further developed by a number of authors (e.g., Schunter-Kleemann 1992; Siaroff 1994; Sainsbury 1994; Kofman and Sales 1996; Duncan 1996). According to this literature, states distribute welfare differentially for women and men. In the process, they produce masculine and feminine identities and define the differential needs of gendered populations (Sauer 2001: 135; Fraser 1989). Scholars have sought to adapt the notion of gender regimes to account for the effects of neoliberalism and the reality of European integration. They have found a tendency toward an individualization of responsibility Page 25 → undermining traditional gender regimes (Pascall and Lewis 2004). They also have described the emergence of a distinctive EU regime. Angelika von Wahl (2005) has characterized this regime as an “equal employment regime” juxtaposed to liberal, social-democratic, and conservative types at the national level. Sylvia Walby (2004) has suggested that the EU has produced a regulatory regime, as opposed to regimes guided by a notion of democratic public service or by the market. This regime is focused on social inclusion through the regulation of employment. Walby (2009) broadens the notion of gender regime from one that describes gender norms in the welfare state to one embedded in a larger social system encompassing other regimes of inequality. In her understanding, gender regimes vary, and they operate in a variety of domains including the economy, the polity, the organization of violence, and civil society. These gender regimes have “ontological depth,” that is, they are not reducible to a privileged domain from which they spring, such as the family. Through this reconceptualization Walby pluralizes gender regimes, separates them from the national welfare state, and makes the concept useful for an exploration of gender politics in the decentered state. She argues that gender regimes develop within complex systems, and struggles between social forces shape this development. But while it is useful to delink gender regimes from the class structures and the economic domain that inform the welfare state literature, Walby's systems-theoretical approach has two shortcomings: First, it lacks a formulation of the impact of social forces and indeed of the workings of rule and power more broadly. Second, it remains wedded to preformulated social domains derived from a state-centric analysis that precludes the pluralization and decentering of gender regimes in parallel to the decentered European state. Recent reformulations of state theory by German feminist scholars can help address the first issue. Feminist reformulations of state theory bring into view the politics inherent in the social practices that reproduce gender regimes (Ludwig et al. 2009). Thus, Birgit Sauer (2001: 158) adopts a neo-Marxist understanding of the state as a social relation to argue that the state is a condensation of gender relations. There are masculine interests that are institutionalized in the state to produce—in Bob Jessop's (2001) words—the “strategic selectivity” of the state. This strategic selectivity is not a matter of preexisting masculine interest but the outcome of earlier struggles, and it circumscribes the chances of political forces to assert themselves. Thus, social forces are always already reflected in the state—indeed they cannot be conceptualized as independent Page 26 → of the state. Conversely the state is implicated in the production and reproduction of gender regimes and masculine rule. Accordingly, for Sauer (2001: 48), gender regimes are durable forms of organizing andrarchic rule, anchored in the norms and procedures of the state. The state participates in the organization of gender regimes, and because of previously institutionalized commitments the outcomes it produces are by necessity skewed. Feminist state theory in this way affirms the role of the state as a warrantor of masculine rule. But feminist state theory goes beyond this understanding seeking to account in addition for the power politics identified in the state by theorists such as Brown. This has entailed a rethinking of the meaning of power in the way the state relates to society. German feminists recall the Weberian distinction between power (Macht) and rule (Herrschaft)4 and argue that a concept of rule is central to a feminist analysis of the state; post-structuralists err in focusing exclusively on power and ignoring the effects of rule (Löffler 2001; Pühl 2001; Sauer 2001: 154). In Weber's understanding rule is legitimated by law, tradition, or charisma, and it differs from the exercise of power, which he conceptualizes as illegitimate. But unlike Weber, Löffler (2001) does not consider rule as only attached to states; instead the practices of state institutions and society jointly produce rule. And unlike Weber, she does not consider legitimacy the central characteristic of rule; instead the key trait of rule is that it constitutes an attempt to create

social order. In other words, rule characterizes the state as a condensation of social relations, which is in turn implicated in the ordering of society. In this formulation the state does not simply reflect social forces and political struggles as suggested in neoMarxist versions of state theory. Instead, state and society form a continuum jointly involved in the creation of rule. Löffler (2001) distinguishes between implicit and explicit rule. She argues that rule is mostly implicit, that is, unspoken. Implicit rule is social and cultural. It incorporates hegemonic conceptions of order, a commonsense understanding of right and wrong, of what is “natural.” It encompasses what Pierre Bourdieu (2001) has described as masculine domination, the formation of a feminine and masculine habitus and the somatization of social relations of domination in male and female bodies. In contrast, explicit rule designates the opportunity to fix positions and means of power through the law, and it characterizes the state. Rule by the state is explicit because it is deliberate and public, but also because it makes explicit implicit understandings of a social order conceptualized as natural. Löffler may overestimate the degree to which the state's codification of Page 27 → rule is always explicit. Beyond the enactment of laws, the state apparatus through bureaucratic and habitual practices also reproduces understandings of a proper gender order implicitly. That argument has been made by those advocating a strategy of gender mainstreaming and is captured in Brown's suggestion that the state is gendered throughout. Thus, the distinction between implicit and explicit rules does not map neatly onto the distinction between state and society. Yet it provides an interesting tool to conceptualize efforts to change rules and the role of the state in such efforts. Rule, in both its implicit and explicit forms, structures situated power struggles; it privileges certain forces but without determining the outcomes of particular struggles. This is where Löffler's concept of rule meets the Foucauldian conception of power. While gender regimes and rule are relatively static concepts, the conceptual tools of post-structuralists—techniques and discourses—shift the focus to the mobility of rules and to processes of rule construction. They furthermore aid in conceptualizing the mechanisms of power that operate in situated struggles over masculine rules, a task undertaken below. First, however, it is necessary to reintroduce the notion of gender regimes—not attached to national states but geographically and functionally dispersed, as suggested by Walby—and adapt it to understanding gender regimes in agriculture and development in the decentered European state. Gender Regimes in Agriculture and Rural Development The terms agriculture and rural development designate particular social relations and practices geared toward the production of food and fiber and toward economic life in the countryside. Agricultural and rural development policies reflect and make possible the practices that constitute these fields. In other words, agriculture and rural development are guided by rules, many of which are institutionalized through the state. Like all social practices, those in the areas of agriculture and rural development are gendered. The rules of agriculture and rural development policies participate in constructing gender regimes, that is, bundles of mutually supporting rules that constitute and guide relationships in local contexts. Here state-produced rules intersect with the rules of society to create locally specific regimes. They may be embedded in Type I or Type II forms of multilevel governance, part of local and national gender relations in the first case and part of new, deterritorialized state spaces in the second. According to Nicholas Onuf (1989) regimes are sets of rules, which Page 28 → through the repetition of speech acts become institutionalized. Reminiscent of Sauer's conceptualization of regimes as organizers of andrarchic rule, Onuf suggests that rules distribute privilege in various ways and in the process create rule or Herrschaft. A reading of feminist literatures through the lens of rule-based constructivism suggests that gender regimes consist of three kinds of rules: rules of entitlement, rules of identity, and rules of labor division.5 Rules of entitlement specify the access individuals are granted to valued (material and nonmaterial) resources. They encode commitments made between individuals and between citizens and the state. Entitlements enhance the capabilities of subjects, giving them agency and the power to participate in economic and political relations. Rules of entitlement are often formulated as rights. In the area of agriculture these are particularly property rights

relating to land and the farm. Women traditionally have few rights to land and as a result own only about 1 percent of all land globally (Seager 1997: 76). Rights of inheritance complement land rights in preserving male entitlements to land and capital. In Europe, traditional inheritance rules systematically exclude girls from becoming farmers (Delphy and Leonard 1992). Other rules of entitlement include rights to an income and rights to participate in professional organizations and cooperatives. While many discriminatory rules of entitlement are no longer codified in European national laws, and while international rules typically are silent on the issue, agricultural policy-making is based on abstract understandings of disembodied producers and has functioned to condone the highly unequal organization of entitlements in the farming sector. The second category of rules is rules of labor control. Divisions of labor are a central element of modern society. Because these divisions extensively rely on categorical status distinctions, they become a source of inequality. Categorical differences structure whole fields, including job markets, in a way that reproduces the binary construction of gender and makes them available for purposes of allocating rewards (Tilly 1998). Thus, gender centrally informs divisions between paid and unpaid work, between types of jobs, and between job hierarchies. In probing the origins of patriarchy, Heidi Hartmann (1981) found it in the material interest of men to control women's labor and sexuality. Perhaps a material interest in control is not at the root of masculine rule, but control certainly is one of the patterns that sustain it. This is particularly visible in the area of agriculture. Farming depends on the deployment of flexible labor in parallel with growth cycles. On family farms, Page 29 → hierarchies of age and gender allow the farmer control over such labor, making such farms uniquely adapted to labor needs in agriculture. Rules of labor division make women's unpaid labor available to male household heads; marriage to a farmer (and for the housewife to any man) is thus a relation of production (Delphy and Leonard 1992). Rules of labor control have extensive ramifications for the reproduction of agriculture and capitalism more broadly, suggesting that they may be particularly difficult to change. Rules of identity empower subjects to act while simultaneously disciplining their agency. They are central to producing performances of gender, binary constructions of femininity and masculinity (Butler 1990). They create certain types of masculinity as hegemonic, such as rational man or heroic man, and buttress them with subordinate constructions of femininity, such as the helpmate or the innocent in need of protection (Connell 1987; Hooper 2000). In this way, rules of identity instruct who is an actor and what an actor's status is within a hegemonic gender order, providing guidelines for action and interaction. In the agricultural sector in Europe, gendered rules of identity have long defined farmers as male, and woman farmers as “spouses.” In Germany, rules of identity make it unthinkable that a woman would be a Bauer (farmer), a self-employed entrepreneur operating a farm by herself or with the help of her family. A woman farmer (Bäuerin) is by definition married to a farmer and performs supplementary housework and farm-work. Rules of identity have significant implications for entitlements; in turn rules of entitlement contribute to producing gendered subjects. While these categories of rules can be distinguished conceptually, they often appear together in practice and support each other within particular gender regimes. But distinguishing them is useful for analytical purposes. Differentiating categories of rules makes it possible to separate the diverse effects of local gender regimes, specify the types of rule they encode, and conceptualize different types of feminist activism as targeting different types of rule. It also makes it possible to relate challenges of different types of rule to different mechanisms of power.

Masculine Rule and Mechanisms of Power in Feminist Encounters with the Decentered State Masculine rule manifests itself in local gender regimes as sets of rules that perpetuate women's oppression, subordination, and inequality. Such rules are the target of feminist contestation. Studying feminist encounters with the Page 30 → decentered European state entails a focus on the relationship between implicit and explicit rule, as theorized by Löffler, and the dynamics of power set in motion as feminist movement actors enlist the state to challenge masculinist rules. Löffler argues that explicit rule is weaker than implicit rule. But explicit rule can either support or challenge implicit orders, that is, it can legalize existing social practices or question them. Whether challenges are ultimately successful depends on concrete power struggles carried out around particular issues. The state can provide new means (e.g., laws, financial incentives) to fight implicit rule, but the success of

change is not guaranteed. Conversely, successes in particular and situated power struggles need codification by explicit authority in order to gain permanence, coherence, and direction. In order to conceptualize how power interacts with rule in these situated contestations, it is useful to identify mechanisms of power that operate to obstruct feminist challenges to masculine rule. Jeffrey Checkel (2006) has suggested that studying processes of social construction amounts to studying causal mechanisms (also Liebert 2003; Tilly 2001; Hedström and Swedberg 1998). By focusing on mechanisms, constructivists are able to navigate the interaction between structure and agency, and the shoals of positivist and post-positivist epistemologies. Power mechanisms circumscribe the extent to which feminist demands are adopted by the state and the kinds of impacts they produce in society. They include effects resulting from efforts to reconcile differing interests, from the exercise of threats, and from the deployment of tools of governmentality. They relate to the three types of rules identified, with different types of rules sparking different types of mechanisms of power. Mechanisms of power affect state responses to feminist challenges as well as the impacts of such responses and challenges on society. In other words, they affect both the outcomes and the impacts of government action. Outcomes include equal rights laws passed or administrative directives to implement gender mainstreaming. In contrast, impacts focus on the way in which such outcomes affect society, the way in which they modify masculine rule. Power mechanisms that direct outcomes circumscribe the extent to which feminist demands are adopted by the state. They are located between the extremes of the state's full embrace of feminist demands together with a transformation of society on the one hand, and the state's outright refusal of feminist demands together with the reproduction of masculine rule on the other. For example, the equal rights strategy targets rules of entitlements and tends to generate compromise, a result of bargaining for equal rights constrained Page 31 → by path dependencies and the state's strategic selectivity. Thus feminists may argue for equal treatment but in practice often have accepted less for various pragmatic reasons. Gender mainstreaming is aimed at rules of labor division and identity and has generated a different set of mechanisms of power within the state. Caroline Moser (2005: 584) has summarized these as policy evaporation (“when good policy intentions fail to be followed through in practice”), invisibilization (“when monitoring and evaluation procedures fail to document what is occurring ‘on the ground’”), and resistance (“when effective mechanisms block gender mainstreaming, with opposition essentially ‘political’ and based on gender power relations, rather than on ‘technocratic’ procedural constraints”). A different set of power mechanisms is at play when we shift the view from the outcomes of feminist contestations within the state to its impacts on society, that is, when we focus on the impact of feminist challenges on local gender regimes. These mechanisms help shape new entitlements so that they remain within the confines of broad social commitments, preserve relationships of control over labor, and limit the empowerment of subjects to confines of normality. Table 1 introduces these mechanisms of power and relates them to the three types of rules identified and to configurations of rule emerging from these rules.6 It also specifies the pernicious effects of these configurations of rule on women and the feminist goals formulated to counter them. Feminist demands for entitlements have been couched in the language of equal rights, demanding the same entitlements as men in order to rectify injustices and unequal access to power and wealth. The state may respond by granting entitlements or refusing these demands. But another mechanism of power may assert itself in the struggle for equal rights—co-optation, the sub-ordination Page 32 → of feminist agendas to other state projects and the use of feminist equality goals to accomplish other objectives. For example, giving women equal rights in the workplace has enabled the flexibilization of labor markets, eliminating well-paid and secure male-breadwinner jobs and making it increasingly more imperative for households to earn two incomes. Co-optation has advanced feminist equality goals and generated entitlements. But a system of rights based on abstract notions of equality has limited equal outcomes and ensnared women in neoliberal state commitments. Processes of co-optation make visible the heteronomous character of rule based on rights: the granting of rights is possible only by virtue of subordination to a larger social contract (compare Onuf 1998).

When feminists have challenged rules of labor division they have used the language of exploitation, seeking to throw off the shackles of masculine hierarchy and seeking to gain control over their own labor and income. The politics of economic liberation have invited extensive refusal, including violence (domestic battery, rape), harassment in the workplace, and resistance to entering privileged masculine realms from the boardroom to running a farm. Thus, while women have gained access to the paid labor force, they continue to perform the bulk of low-paid work, reproducing gender divisions of labor in new ways and maintaining gendered hierarchies. This particular enactment of power amounts to a subversion of feminist goals. Finally, feminists have sought to change rules of identity in a way that creates “more and/or better subject positions” (Kantola and Dahl 2005: 57). They have sought to empower feminine subjects through a politics of recognition, acknowledging the different needs of women (Fraser 1997) or through a politics of displacement that destabilizes existing constructions of gender (Squires 2005). These politics attack constructions of masculinity as hegemonic based on naturalizations of difference and the evoking of biological metaphors. Both the recognition and the displacement of difference can yield empowerment by making such naturalizations conscious. However, a politics of recognition also risks the silencing of difference within the categories recognized, subsuming diverse experiences emerging from class positions, ethnicity, race, locality, and so forth under unitary definitions and hiding distinct experiences. It also risks the normalization of feminine identity, new definitions of what women “really” are while fixing new understandings of difference. As they encounter the state, politics of recognition and displacement may become embedded in a practice that Foucault (1991) has described as “governmentality,” the state's efforts to administer populations in order to Page 33 → further welfare and wealth. The art of administration includes the classification, categorization, and sorting of populations, making objects legible and maintaining the right disposition of things. Gender is pervasive in these operations as an identifier of classes of subjects, as a producer of order, and as a marker of normality.7 Co-optation, subversion, the silencing of difference and normalization, all constitute ideal-typical mechanisms of power. They are not the only ones, and others could be identified.8 But they suffice as methodological tools for the purposes of this study. They make it possible to assess the reproduction of masculine rule as feminists challenge gender regimes in agriculture and rural development in the decentered European state.

Research Design This study seeks to answer the following questions: First, how has agricultural policy helped institutionalize masculine rule in the European countryside? Second, how has the liberalization of agricultural policy helped transform such rule? Third, how have feminist strategies contributed to this transformation? The study's time frame is provided by the creation of the European Union's common agricultural policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s and its policy shifts since then. It seeks to answer the posed questions through a case study of the impact of agricultural policy-making in Germany, the largest member state of the EU. Germany is a particularly good choice for this study because it was a key player in establishing the CAP in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and in the new century has become a strong proponent of CAP reform. Furthermore, the German division of the country during the Cold War provides a natural experiment for comparing the impact of feminist politics on local gender regimes because it produced two fundamentally different regimes and thus different path dependencies. In order to answer the first and second questions, the study draws on feminist state theory as outlined, conceptualizing gender regimes as sets of rules encoding masculine rule that are buttressed by state authority. It explores gendered rules in the German countryside and the way in which agricultural policies have supported these rules. It describes two local gender regimes—one in Western Germany and one in the East—specifying the respective rules of entitlement, labor division, and identity. It then probes how these rules have changed with the different forms of liberalization of agricultural policies, that is, with the integration of West German agriculture into Page 34 → the European common market, with the end of collective agriculture and its insertion into a world market in the East, and with the gradual elimination of price supports and increased exposure to world market competition of both parts of the country. Data for identifying gendered rules largely come from secondary literature—including published and unpublished materials—and statistical information compiled from European, German national, and sub-national government agencies.

In order to answer the third question on how feminist struggle has contributed to transforming masculine rule, the study makes two comparisons. First it compares two types of feminist strategy, the struggle for equal rights and the effort to implement gender mainstreaming. In the case of Germany, the struggle for equal rights took place in the 1980s and 1990s and focused on women's entitlement to equal pensions. Gender mainstreaming emerged in the new millennium and has been more prominent in rural development programs than in agriculture. The comparison makes it possible to assess whether different mechanisms of power arise with different feminist strategies and how these impact masculine rule in the countryside. The second comparison varies gender regimes. It focuses on the impacts of gender mainstreaming in the former West and East Germany by probing its implementation in the EU's LEADER program in the Danube/Bavarian Forest region in Bavaria and the Altmark region in Saxony-Anhalt. The different histories of West and East Germany make it possible to test the impact of the same strategy on different gender regimes. This provides additional insight into different power mechanisms that come to play depending on existing forms of masculine rule. Data for answering the third question come from official documents, archival sources, and interviews. These include documents produced in European institutions, German national and subnational governments, and the agrarian women's movement. An archival collection at the University of Kassel's Department of Ecological Agriculture (Fachbereich Ökologische Agrarwissenschaften) proved a valuable source of information on the history of the campaign for equal pension rights. Finally, I conducted interviews with about fifty officials, feminist experts, and activists in Brussels and throughout Germany—mostly but not only in Berlin, Saxony-Anhalt, and Bavaria. These included officials of the European Commission and of NGOs lobbying the EU; officials in the German federal government, in the two state governments of Bavaria and Saxony-Anhalt, and in substate local administrations in the Danube/Bavarian Forest region and in the Altmark; gender experts at all levels Page 35 → of government; LEADER managers; local community leaders; and leaders in rural women's organizations. Most of the interviews were transcribed and thus available for repeated close readings. Because the identity of the interviewees is not essential to the argument of the book, they are kept semiconfidential, identified by their job titles only or the role they played in a particular context. A feminist methodology guided the interpretation of data; this encompassed a privileging of situated knowledge, a focus on struggles in particular locales and the knowledge created in these struggles (Ackerly and True 2006; Nagar et al. 2002). Thus, the definition of topics emerged from the point of view of women in the countryside and feminists concerned with the countryside, and interpretation entailed looking at the evidence through a “gender lens,” that is, seeking to find the workings of gender that feminists postulate as ubiquitous (Brush 2003; Peterson and Runyan 1993). Along with a feminist methodology comes a commitment to produce emancipatory knowledge, knowledge that is useful in fighting gender-based subordination and advancing the goal of gender equality. Thus, the purpose of this study is to contribute to feminist engagements with the state and to help undermine masculine rule in the European countryside.

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Chapter 2

Masculine Rules and Their Transformation at the European Level: The CAP and Rural Development Policies Because gender regimes combine rules of the state with rules of society, the form they take in the decentered European state is local. But local regimes are sites where rules from different scales meet; they are imbricated with understandings of gender constructed in European, national, and subnational practices. In the local gender regimes of Europe, the rules produced in the European Union since the 1960s constitute a key vector of influence. Affirmed in an arena of interstate bargaining, they were not the subject of such bargaining but reflected the implicit rules of nation-state societies at the time of the CAP's founding. These rules changed over time in parallel to two transformations outlined in the introduction and chapter 1. First was the shift from a concern with the welfare of farmers to a concern with making European farming globally competitive while ensuring environmental preservation, that is, the transformation of the European agricultural welfare state into an assemblage of liberal environmentalism. Second was the refocusing of governance from agriculture to rural development, and with it the reorientation from a form of multilevel governance that combines hierarchically nested authorities to multilevel governance in networked state spaces, that is, from Type I to Type II governance. These transformations entailed a change in gender rules. Whereas the rules of the agricultural welfare state constructed women farmers as flexible workers in a family organization, the rules of liberal environmentalism reinterpret them as individual rural service entrepreneurs. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the transformation of gender rules in the CAP and in the EU's policies on rural development. The chapter first provides an overview of the gendered organization of European farming, emphasizing in particular the centrality of family farming and the shift toward pluriactivity, that is, the tendency for farming families to earn income in on-and Page 37 → off-farm economic activities in addition to agriculture. It subsequently relates these changes to EU-level discourses. Such discourses included the ideological commitment of the founders of the CAP to the preservation of family farming. And they have included, since the 1970s, feminist discourses on equality and gender mainstreaming. The chapter reviews the transformation of European farming in parallel with the difficult and gradual change in the European commitment to family farming in light of feminist interventions.

The Status of Women in European Agriculture European farming is overwhelmingly family farming: farms are owned by families, and family members provide the bulk of agricultural labor. Property and labor within the family farm are not distributed equally but are allocated according to gender and age. Farms typically are passed down through generations from male holders to their male offspring. Thus, the family farm is patriarchal in both senses of the word: it represents the rule of fathers and the rule of men. A heterosexual couple forms the core of the farm and provides most of the labor according to a relatively strict division of tasks. Women's work in this organization (as in all households) is unpaid and for the benefit of the head. Thus, for all women marriage typically implies a labor contract, the commitment to provide household labor, but in the case of marriage to a farmer that contract extends to agricultural labor in addition. More than other families, the farming family thus is an economic system, which thrives on the exploitation of women's labor (Delphy and Leonard 1992). In the EU 27, 88 percent of the total agricultural labor force consisted of family labor in 2005 (Eurostat 2007: 18). There was some variety, with family labor close to 100 percent in Greece, Poland, and Slovenia, and as low as 70 percent in France and the Netherlands. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were outliers where regularly employed nonfamily members made up the bulk of the agricultural workforce in 2005 (European Union 2007: Table 3.5.1.5.2; Eurostat 2007: 25). But family farming clearly is the predominant pattern in the European Union. Farm management and ownership are disproportionately male. In 2005 men managed four out of five holdings in the EU 27, a ratio down slightly from the 81 percent in 1997 in the EU 15 (Eurostat 2007: 23). In contrast, women

provided the bulk of unpaid family labor as 80 percent of “spouses” were women.1 The statistics provide the image of a strongly complementary gender order in which men own and manage farms while women provide unpaid labor. Page 38 → But there is some variation across member states in the gender division of labor on family farms. This variation is related in part, but not entirely, to different structures of farming: Countries with lots of small farms tend to have more women holders. Other factors, such as the communist legacy of women's labor force participation, or the tendency to report men as the holders regardless of actual ownership and management practices, also influence the statistical profile. In 2005, the rate of women holders was highest in the Baltic States and Austria (over 30 percent) followed by Italy, France, and Greece. It was lowest in Ireland, Finland, Malta, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands (around 10 percent in 2005). Across the EU 15, in 1997 women's holdings were smaller economically than those of men, with 82 percent of women's farms classified as small compared to 68 percent of men's (Commission of the European Communities 2002a; Eurostat 2001, 2007). Farm headship by women has been increasing, in particular on small farms. Braithwaite (1994: 57) describes the pattern in Spain: “Many female farm entrepreneurs are heads of small, economically unviable farms.” In both Austria and Italy the proportion of farms run by women has been increasing, as has the proportion of the female agricultural labor force (Braithwaite 1994: 63; Overbeek et al. 1998: 65; Bachmann 1999: 164). In Germany, women do a disproportionate share of the work on small farms, even if they don't appear as farm managers in statistics. They accounted for more than 80 percent of full-time workers on very small farms between the mid-1970s and mid1990s but for only about 40 percent of such workers on very large farms (Prügl 2004: 356). Susanne SchunterKleemann (1995: 198) recounts the pattern for Portugal: “A majority of very small family farms in the north, predominantly worked by women, is juxtaposed to the extensive agriculture in the Alentejo.” About 30 percent of farming couples in the EU 27 performed another gainful activity in addition to agriculture in 2005, and this other gainful activity usually was the main source of income (Eurostat 2007: 24). Job opportunities traditionally have been in industry and more available for men. Thus, the tendency toward a feminization of agricultural employment in some Mediterranean states has been linked to the availability of alternative employment opportunities for men in industry. In Italy, Braithwaite (1994: 63) observed that women made up an increasing share of agricultural employment, and in the Northern Italian province of Udine, women's participation in agriculture was declining at a slower rate than men's (Overbeek et al. 1998: 58). In Portugal, the number of men employed in agriculture decreased while the number of women remained virtually stable (Schunter-Kleemann 1995: Page 39 → 198). In Germany as well, the agricultural labor force became more feminine in some regions as men increasingly worked off the farm, and women took on tasks traditionally reserved for men (SchunterKleemann 1995: 199; Rieger 1995c: 87). These tendencies were in contrast to developments in Greece where agricultural modernization in the absence of alternative employment opportunities for men entailed a much more pronounced exodus from farming for women, resulting in a masculinization of agriculture with the ratio of men to women increasing from 1.7 in 1971 to 2.8 in 1991 (Overbeek et al. 1998: 27). Regardless of whether agricultural labor was feminized or masculinized, these patterns provide clear evidence that rural restructuring has been strongly gendered. Small farms have not simply disappeared because they are inefficient, but have provided an opportunity to contribute income for those with few opportunities outside farming, that is, in many countries predominantly for women. At the same time small farms have feminized while large farms have tended to masculinize. There is evidence that women on large farms increasingly have left farming for off-farm occupations while husbands have remained full-time farmers (Blanc and MacKinnon 1990). Women have been allowed a leading role only on farms that account for a minor share of family income and are not economically viable in an unregulated world market. In this sense, women's expanding headship of farms may be no more than an extension of their role as flexible laborers. They have taken over the work on small farms as their husbands have found jobs off the farm and are supplementing his steady income. Pluriactivity, that is, multiple forms of income earning, has emerged as an integral feature of European agriculture. With a stronger emphasis in European policy discourse on environmental sustainability and the diversification of

incomes, small farms may have received a new lease on life, and indeed they may become more than a supplemental occupation for women who might otherwise be unemployed. In general, existing research shows that women's opportunities have increased in parallel with the new policy priorities, but it also finds contradictory effects on women's empowerment. In Germany, statistics show that the decline in women's labor input into agriculture reversed in the late 1990s parallel to an intensification of organic farming and to a stronger emphasis on rural diversification (Prügl 2004). Organic farming is highly labor intensive and has been shown to create new job opportunities for women in Greece, but with no positive effects on women's working conditions (Overbeek et al. 1998). In Germany, Mathilde Schmitt (1994) found in her study of women farmers that Page 40 → they were much more likely to adopt organic farming than farmers as a whole. It appears that the focus on sustainable farming resonated with them in particular. But Schmitt also documents the extensive obstacles women farmers faced as they transgressed into a thoroughly masculinized profession. Efforts to develop a stronger services sector in rural areas apparently also have benefited rural women. A study financed by the EU shows that activity rates of women were higher in diversified areas than in a less diversified area, while those of men did not seem affected by diversification. As shown earlier, environmentally sustainable agriculture yielded benefits for women, but these benefits were amplified in the context of a diversified economy. In a highly diversified area in Norway, new policies supporting extensive and environmentally sensitive forms of agriculture also spawned tourist enterprises run by women farmers, giving them a source of income that they controlled. Diversification apparently also cushioned the detrimental effects of farm modernization on women farmers. While modernization led to a decline in women's agricultural employment in Northern Italy without them being compensated by the industrial jobs available outside agriculture, it improved both levels and conditions of women's employment in agriculture in a highly diversified region in the Netherlands (Overbeek et al. 1998). In sum, the European commitment to family farming has helped create a structure of farm ownership and management dominated by men, where women flexibly have provided labor as needed. The diversification of the rural economy and the introduction of more labor-intensive, environmentally sustainable forms of production have increased the demand for women's labor and have offered them new opportunities for entrepreneurship. The change in agricultural policy and the associated transformation of the rural economy thus have prepared the grounds for a destabilization of masculine rule in the European countryside. While this effect was largely unintended, gender relations also have been a topic of political debate, and the rhetorics of the agricultural welfare state and liberal environmentalism have projected different ideals of gender relations, one celebrating the traditional family as an economic organization and the other emphasizing individual initiative. While their political rationalities have been anchored in geopolitical and international economic priorities, they also have suggested new European gender rules that have influenced local gender regimes. In addition, feminist politics have played a role in attacking traditional rules at the European level, beginning in the 1970s with the campaign for an EU directive on women in agriculture and continuing in the Page 41 → 1990s with the implementation of gender mainstreaming. Thus, the gendered changes in European farming were not just an accidental outcome of processes of restructuring but in addition produced and were the product of gendered discourses on agriculture in the European Union. These discourses initially centered on the family farm as an ideological commitment.

The Family Farm as an Ideological Commitment Often mistakenly considered a traditional form of economic organization, European family farming is actually a modern phenomenon. Preconditions for the formation of family farms were the liberation of European peasantry from feudal dependencies and sharecropping arrangements, land reforms, the introduction of liberal property rights, and the rule of private law. The “second agricultural revolution” of the mid-twentieth century, which provided a new round of technological innovations, was crucial to establishing family farms in their contemporary form. As agricultural laborers flocked to the cities to take on industrial employment, farmers substituted this labor by investing in technology. For a variety of reasons, including concerns over food security and rural welfare, governments supported the modernization of farming. Mechanization (tractors, harvesters, etc.), the use of chemicals (fertilizers, pesticides), the introduction of new breeds of animals and new strains of crops, and new

methods of cultivation and animal husbandry all led to an enormous surge in productivity (Ambrosius and Hubbard 1989: 174–80) that made it possible to operate a farm with the labor of just the farming couple. The creation of the modern family farm paralleled the development of Fordism as an industrial regime of accumulation and of the welfare state as a mode of regulation. But why did European policymakers favor family farming over other forms of organizing agriculture? Given the high degrees of exploitation and self-exploitation on family farms, why not introduce agricultural cooperatives as in the communist part of Europe or industrial-style agriculture as in the United States? Functionalist arguments suggest that the family farm is uniquely adapted to help stabilize farm incomes because it enables a flexible deployment of family labor in response to the vagaries of the weather and biological growth cycles, and it allows the combination of off-farm and on-farm income earning as a form of social insurance. Yet, there were other models that would have been equally rational. For example, there is a long tradition of cooperative organization in European agriculture, ranging from Page 42 → credit cooperatives to the cooperative buying of inputs and selling of farming products, that could have been extended to production. In the face of logical alternatives and intense state intervention in European agriculture, the functionalist argument finds its limits. Today it may be precisely the erratic shifts in government intervention rather than the unpredictability of nature that require farmers to be flexible (Rieger 1995a: 29–30). To understand the preference for family farming in Europe requires a look at discourses in agricultural politics, including their underlying constructions of gender. The documents of the 1958 Stresa Conference, in which the original six member states of the EEC agreed to the outlines of the CAP, included an explicit commitment to preserving family farming; indeed participants asserted the “unanimous will to preserve the familial character” of European agriculture (Conférence 1958: 223, my trans.). The reasons for this commitment were largely ideological, related to liberal sentiments about free enterprise and private property, conservative patriarchal sentiments, and the geopolitical competition with the communist East (Sinkwitz and Herrmann 2000). As the German minister of agriculture Heinrich Lübke suggested at the conference, the preservation of the family farm was necessary “for reasons of both social and political order” (Conférence 1958: 47, my trans.). The official Stresa documents do not spell out what this social and political order was all about, but national rhetoric was abundantly clear. Here politicians framed family farming according to national political priorities. In a newly divided Germany the preoccupation was with communism, but discourses also drew on a romantic tradition that associated the family farm with national health and moral fortitude. In modernizing France the perceived urban disorder emerging from the industrial proletariat inspired a rhetoric of preserving family farms as a bedrock of republican values. In Germany, the Christian Democrats, who dominated government at the time the CAP was negotiated, supported a market economics tamed by social commitments. Rooted in Catholic social thought, their conservative ideology combined strident anticommunism with a strong commitment to strengthening families. Family farms constituted an alternative on the one hand to the large East Elbian estates and their Prussian owners, who had played a key role in bringing the Nazis to power, and on the other hand to the agricultural production cooperatives and state farms created by the East German communists. Based on private ownership and imagined as free enterprise, family farms were presented as the superior alternative to large-scale socialist-style agriculture that agglomerated small landholdings. This is reflected in the Page 43 → comments on the Rome Treaty by an official of the German agricultural ministry: A “healthy peasantry” needs to be maintained “because it is a crucial element of social order based on personal freedom and personal property” (cited in Hagedorn 1992: 64, my trans.). Thus, according to Matthias Sauer (1990: 266), “for political reasons of the ‘Cold War,’ the desired process of rapid modernization of the farming sector … had to be brought about without destroying the basic structure of family-based ownership and labour.” Throughout the 1960s, anticommunism and the need to preserve family farming provided potent arguments against liberalizing the CAP, as in the suggestion of Edmund Rehwinkel, the longtime leader of the Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV), that proposals to liberalize farming (such as the infamous Mansholt plan) “threatened the existence of the family farm and aimed at the formation of huge collective farms, which would throw European farmers in kolkhozy” (Averyt 1977: 56).

Cold War rhetoric was accompanied by a conservative ideology that celebrated the family farm as the heart of the nation and implicitly its patriarchal constitution as natural and healthy. The same official of the German agricultural ministry commenting on the Rome Treaty argued that in addition to upholding the free market social order, “the peasantry embodies moral values that are central to the continuation of the state and the people” (cited in Hagedorn 1992: 64, my trans.). In the words of Franz Josef Strauß, leader of the conservative party in Bavaria, “A nation without farmers is no nation” (Hendriks 1991: 92). Born out of nineteenth-century Romanticism, German nationalism envisioned the nation as rural and the farmer as the guardian of the national soil. Connected to romantic nationalism is an understanding of the countryside as the embodiment of all values. In Strauß's words, the rural sector is a “treasure trove of Christian attitudes and way of life” (Hendriks 1991: 92). Indeed, both major churches in Germany, in their policy statements on agriculture, affirmed their commitment to the “independence of the family farm” and their rejection of “agricultural factories.” According to the Protestant church (Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands), family farming not only provided “a high degree of satisfaction, in terms of independence, entrepreneurial initiative, control over working hours,” but also “closeness to the spouse, nature, and animals, and a sense of knowledge about growth, maturing, and death” (Hendriks 1991: 209, 211). Women figured in this order at the level of nature and animals. Together they anchored a nation that saw its values warranted by rurality and the harmonious farming couple. Masculine rule was imagined as part of a natural order that Page 44 → not only upheld national ideals but also provided the state a rationale to fight communism. In France, the debate over the status of family farming took a somewhat different direction. Central to this debate was the question of how best to modernize agriculture. Should family farms be saved by forming cooperatives, by guaranteeing high prices, or by policies of structural reform (Keeler 1987)? Unlike the Germans, some quarters of French politics—including de Gaulle's administration in the 1950s—recognized the need for an agglomeration of small farms in order to achieve economies of scale and efficiency. Ironically, here right-wing forces suggested that forming cooperatives was the solution, and they were criticized for evoking the specter of the kolkhoz. On the left, the Mouvement de Défense des Exploitants Familiaux most vocally fought Gaullist policies of modernization through agglomeration and sang the praises of the independent family farmer. The push toward preserving family farming received support in a discourse centered on stemming the rural exodus in order to maintain an equilibrium between industry and agriculture and to counteract problems that may arise through the formation of an urban underclass. Achieving a balance between rural and urban life was considered a matter of creating social and political stability. Whereas for the Germans the family farm offered a bulwark against an external enemy, that is, communism, for the French the peasant was the fortress against an internal enemy, the urban proletariat. Cities brewed revolution, including the not-too-far-off Paris Commune in 1871 and the massive demonstrations during the Popular Front government in the 1930s. Family farms were constructed as a counterbalance to urbanization and “overindustrialization,” incorporating republican values and tempering the danger emanating from an urban working class (Keeler 1987; Peer 1996). Gender equality apparently did not figure among these republican values. Thus, the political reasons for preserving family farming varied in France and Germany, but all could agree on its intrinsic value. Even the EEC's notoriously liberalizing agricultural commissioner Sicco Mansholt agreed, with qualifications: Preserving the family farm was above all a social, sociological, and political affair, but also an economic matter, and needed to be justified by the family farm's economic importance (Conférence 1958: 47, 96). Speaking for the Commission as well as the governments that favored liberalization such as Italy and the Netherlands (see Moravcsik 1998: 209) Mansholt stressed the need to modernize family farms and to create a “healthy structure” of agriculture and anticipated the disappearance of “submarginal” enterprises Page 45 → (Conférence 1958: 112, my trans.). Despite these qualifications and despite quite different understandings of the role of family farming in the six member states, the parties at Stresa could agree that the family farm needed preserving. With the end of the Cold War, the creation of global markets, and the reform of the CAP, anticommunist rhetoric and the fear of an urban proletariat have receded, and appeals to the preservation of family farms now rarely emerge at the European level. But family farming continues to inspire political forces from both conservative and green quarters, and the image of the harmonious family farm informs political rationalities envisioning a new

European agriculture in tune with the rural environment. An unquestioned premise of the new policies has been that environmental protection needs a populated countryside, in particular the presence of small and medium-size family farms. Family farms have thus been reconceived as producing a rural landscape that embodies environmental health and European tradition (Potter and Burney 2002: 39). In Germany, the green agrarian opposition has sought to maintain a bäuerliche Landwirtschaft (peasant agriculture) against the environmentally unsustainable industrialized agriculture that is resulting from global competition. In this new framing, family farms are seen as uniquely suited to advancing goals of environmental preservation and animal welfare because they embrace values other than pure profit and are set up for mixed production and extensive forms of cultivation. Conservative forces have added arguments about the preservation of rural cultures and traditions. In these discourses, as one of my interviewees recognized (Interview 44), the “problem of reproduction” remains unresolved. Gender equality is largely absent from public debate on saving small-scale agriculture. Appealing to the preservation of the family farm has helped politicians make a series of arguments about the contributions of agriculture to society, including the advancement of free enterprise, providing a counterweight to political radicalism, ensuring environmental preservation, maintaining the cultural landscape, and safeguarding public virtues such as responsibility, industriousness, private initiative, humanism, and tolerance (Hagedorn 1992: 66). None of these appeals has included an explicit consideration of gender relations. But women's subordinate status is a constitutive element of family farming, and the kinds of benefits it may have produced for European society have often come at the expense of women farmers. Women farmers have not just passively endured their subordinate status. Indeed, the family farm has undergone considerable change since the formation Page 46 → of the CAP, not least as a result of women refusing to contribute their free labor. Increasingly, women married to farmers come from nonfarming families and keep their off-farm jobs. While their negotiating power still is lower than that of their husbands, especially if they have children, working off the farm provides them increased social status and economic autonomy. Women's increased opportunities and assertiveness may spell the end of the family farm, a transition from family farming to “one-man farming” (Blanc and MacKinnon 1990). Will this also entail an attenuation of masculine rule, or are we witnessing women farmers taking on a triple burden of home, farm, and career? Ultimately, their position will be the outcome of negotiations within the family and in the political arena. Women farmers and their allies have engaged in these negotiations at the European level through their demands for equal rights and gender mainstreaming.

Feminist Encounters with the CAP The language of equal rights informed much feminist activism in the 1970s, and this was no different in the European Union. Women were demanding equal pay for work of equal value and equal treatment in the workplace and in social security, and the European Union took up these demands in various directives. But the issue was more complicated with regard to women in agriculture who were not in a clear employer/employee relationship and whose rights were mediated through the rules of family farming. In the 1970s, the European agricultural welfare state was well entrenched, and women farmers found little sympathy for their demands for a professional status that would recognize their economic contribution and provide them equal rights, from rights to remuneration to independent access to social security. A directive (86/613) on self-employed women, including women in agriculture, passed in 1986, but the language was watered down to such an extent that it generated little change in the member states. Equal rights apparently were incompatible with commitments to maintaining the agricultural welfare state, together with the family farm on which it was built. In November 2010, a new directive together with a repeal of the old directive was signed into law. Debates around the new directive repeated some of the themes of the 1980s; specifically the new directive strengthens provisions for maternity and social security protection. Equality for self-employed women and women farmers is no longer couched in the language of equal rights but in the language of reconciling work and family, which has come to Page 47 → the fore in EU efforts formulated in the so-called Lisbon agenda to increase the competitiveness of the European economy. Within this discourse, the demand for recognizing the economic contribution of women farmers and the demand for a separate status have dropped off the agenda, though they were still raised in working

groups preparing the directive, apparently staffed with femocrats. By first producing a weak directive and by continuing to silence the issue of the status of women farmers, the EU has acted in a strategically selective manner, affirming its existing contract with organized farmers, which has entailed the promise to preserve family farming together with the availability of women's unremunerated labor. Chapter 4 recounts in detail the struggle around the directives and the kinds of power mechanisms that have asserted themselves, modulating both the outcomes and impacts of the effort. In the context of this chapter it is necessary to note the profound difficulty of the feminist struggle for equal rights in agriculture connected to the EU's commitment to preserve family farming. The restructuring of the agricultural welfare state and the effort to gradually transform the CAP into a policy of rural development have opened new opportunities to challenge state-sanctioned masculine rule in the European countryside. Feminist advocates in the EU have found it possible to infuse gender equality considerations into rural development policies through the strategy of gender mainstreaming, adopted by the EU in the aftermath of the 1995 UN women's conference in Beijing. While the equal rights strategy and the struggle for the directives have included the interest organizations of women farmers, gender mainstreaming has empowered feminist actors within the EU's various institutions to put forward new agendas for gender equality. These EU femocrats have shifted the focus from women working on farms to women living in the countryside, as welfare regulations did not fall into the competence of the EU and as gender mainstreaming resonated better in rural development discourses than in the hands-off discourses on market regulation. Under the umbrella of gender mainstreaming, the EU initiated new activities to advance gender equality in the European countryside, some outside DG Agriculture, others in the directorate-general, and yet others emerging from the Council and the European Parliament. What they shared is a shift in focus from women in agriculture to women in rural areas, from a focus on gender equality on farms to creating economic opportunities for rural women in the services sector. They included studies and projects funded as well as resolutions passed. Page 48 → In the 1990s, the Commission funded two studies on rural women and women in agriculture that started from the ideal of a diversified rural economy and signaled the shift in the approach to gender issues. A 1994 study (funded by DG X: Relays and Information Networks) compiled information on rural women's work, finding substantially lower activity rates and considerably higher unemployment rates than among men, as well as a heavy concentration in low-skilled and unskilled occupations. It recommended that governments produce more accurate and comparative statistics and that gender be mainstreamed into research and rural policy initiatives, in addition to suggesting a range of measures to support women's economic participation. Among these were the encouragement of self-employment and independent legal status, together with a revision of EC directive 86/613. But anticipating the theme of diversification, the report also identified opportunities for women in tourism and leisure industries and listed the efforts of various rural associations to create employment “through the production and marketing of both traditional crafts and hand-crafted products … ; agrotourism and rural tourism … ; personal and community services; cultural activities” (Braithwaite 1994: 26).2 Employment and self-employment in the services industries seemed to hold promise for rural women, including women on farms. The 1998 comparative study by Overbeek et al. cited earlier was funded by DG Agriculture and explicitly concerned itself with diversification. It compared rural women's economic activity in diversified and nondiversified areas and found that diversification entailed distinct advantages for women both in terms of access to work and in terms of the quality of their work. Signaling a new construction of the woman farmer, the study concluded that “in diversified areas farm women already contribute to diminish the vulnerability for changes in agricultural policies, because they work outside … or work on farms with productions [sic] less dependent on EUincome policies” (Overbeek et al. 1998: 205). The authors again recommended recognizing the occupational status of women farmers but also increasing opportunities for paid services in rural areas (e.g., child care and other services), balancing demand and supply of labor qualifications, and a more serious mainstreaming of gender considerations in the EU's regional and structural funds. The two studies were significant because they redefined the problem of gender equality in agriculture to one that

encompasses rural areas as a whole. In doing so, they connected the discussion on women in agriculture to the Page 49 → larger shift in EU policy from agricultural welfare to rural development. They described women's status as affected not only by their status on the farm but by their status in employment (e.g., off the farm, or on the farm but outside farming) and by the degree to which an economy was diversified. With this shift came a shift in the image of the rural woman. Within the new European model of agriculture, she no longer appeared as a flexible family support but as an individual service entrepreneur. She was constructed as taking advantage of income streams that opened up through the commodification of the rural landscape, most importantly tourism, and the professionalization of traditionally unpaid services. And by joining the rural workforce in the services sector she contributed to cushioning the negative impacts of a liberalization of agriculture. It appears that the introduction of gender mainstreaming facilitated this shift in discourse as rural gender equality policy adjusted to the political exigencies of agricultural policy reform. The fact that institutional rather than civil society actors—EU femocrats rather than organizations of women farmers—became the motor behind gender equality initiatives encouraged a readjustment to the EU's new priorities for agriculture. An implicit corollary was that agricultural policy was quarantined from feminist interventions, with gender mainstreaming limited to rural development. The process of shifting gender equality considerations toward rural development and refusing gender mainstreaming in the agricultural sector becomes visible in various documents issued by the EU institutions since the mid-1990s. A 1996 communication by the Commission to the Council on integrating a gender perspective into EU policies and programs initiated the strategy of gender mainstreaming. It included a section on self-employed women and spouses of the self-employed but failed to treat them as contributors to agricultural production. Instead, it suggested that women play a role in farm tourism and local services: “Les femmes conjointes d'agriculteurs sont directement impliquées dans le développement du tourisme à la ferme et de services locaux”3 (Commission of the European Communities 1996). In May 2002, the Agricultural Council, under the Spanish presidency, adopted a conclusion “incorporating the gender perspective” into its work that totally excised any reference to women farmers (Council of Agricultural Ministers 2002). Although the presidency's information note to the Employment and Social Policy Council included a reference to giving women working on farms “genuine farmer status,” the reference was eliminated from the Page 50 → Agricultural Council's conclusion (Spanish Presidency's Information Note 2002). Indeed, the conclusion contained not a single reference to women's agricultural labor. Instead it constructed rural women's labor as “diversified” labor and linked the diversification of the rural economy to women's empowerment. Thus, the Council recognized the need to continue promoting the integration of women into the various sectors covered by new sources of employment as part of integrated rural development, such as new information technologies, teleworking, local services, rural tourism, leisure services, services providing childcare and care for dependants, and the promotion of environment-friendly activities. (Council of Agricultural Ministers 2002: 7)4 In June 2003, the European Parliament (EP) followed with a resolution on women in rural areas that welcomed the action of the Agricultural Council and called on the member states to implement gender mainstreaming in agricultural and rural development policy (European Parliament 2003). While the EP resolution brought up again the issue of professional status for spouses, it emphasized in particular the role of women in strengthening the CAP's second pillar, that is, rural development, and called for mainstreaming the structural funds and rural development initiatives. The emphasis in the EU became mainstreaming rural development policies and programs supported by the structural funds. Indeed, the structural funds were the first area where gender mainstreaming was applied, mandated by a 1996 Council resolution. At the time, the EU's agricultural and rural development policies were financed through the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF). The vast majority of moneys in the fund have traditionally gone to support payments with highly unequal gender implications. In a communication on gender

mainstreaming in the structural funds, the Commission acknowledged as much. The majority of funding [in the EAGGF] concerns the agricultural sector where women are underrepresented. Actions are primarily focused on farms and their beneficiaries are the farm owners. The fact that only one out of five farm owners is a woman reduces the possibility for women to benefit directly from these projects. Farmers' wives and female employees are ignored by this kind of funding. (Commission of the European Communities 2002b) Page 51 → Looking through a gender lens made visible the implicit biases and unequal distribution of resources through the CAP, yet it was largely immune to feminist interventions. Even in the “guidance” section of the EAGGF, which was specifically dedicated to structural measures, gender mainstreaming found little resonance. In her 1999 evaluation, Mary Braithwaite (2000: 7) established that “in spite of the clear policy commitment on the application of gender equality to all policy areas and programmes, certain areas of the Structural Funds have been protected from ‘interference,’ most notably … the more ‘technical’ areas of the EAGGF (such as milk quotas, early retirement schemes).” In other words, it was particularly difficult to pursue gender equality strategies in those areas of rural development associated with the modernization of agriculture, a priority carried over from the agricultural welfare state. These areas accounted for the bulk of rural development activities throughout the 2000–2006 budget period. An evaluation of the later period confirmed Braithwaite's observations: Although gender mainstreaming was mandated, most programs lacked sexdisaggregated statistics, analysis of gender inequalities, and gender impact assessments. Most interventions targeted “the farm,” and since women managed only one in five farms in Europe, most neglected them. This was true for agricultural investments and marketing programs but also for agrienvironmental measures in less-favored areas (Bandarra Jazra 2002: 615). Some programs clearly disadvantaged women: “Gender imbalances might even increase when, for instance, as indicated in a measure to encourage young farmers to take over or improve farms, it is explicitly foreseen that less than 6% of the beneficiaries will be women” (Commission of the European Communities 2002b: 8). The 2003 midterm evaluation on rural development confirmed this suspicion in a qualified manner. It found that “in most cases fewer women benefited” from aid to young farmers setting up, though in some cases aid made “a positive contribution to the number of female entrants to farming” (Impact Assessment 2004: 46). While the European Union thus apparently refused feminist goals in its agricultural modernization agenda, it allowed for such goals in its focus on rural diversification efforts. Braithwaite (2000: 7) observed in her evaluation that “in DG Agriculture and Rural Development … it has not yet been possible to take equality issues beyond the most ‘soft’ of areas (training, agrotourism, crafts, …),” suggesting that gender equality issues were being marginalized into the areas of nonagricultural development. The 2002 communication of the Commission on gender mainstreaming in the structural Page 52 → funds confirms this tendency by suggesting that “measures which might have a positive impact on gender equality mainly cover areas such as diversification, training, new employment opportunities, and setting up small enterprises in rural tourism, producing and selling regional products, childcare” (Commission of the European Communities 2002b: 8; also see Hortet Tarroja 2004). Women are envisaged as central actors creating and taking nonagricultural and service jobs. A booklet produced by the Commission entitled “Women Active in Rural Development” affirms this understanding: It suggests that women are helped by the development of new economic sectors, “such as telecommunications, local services, tourism and leisure services, and environmental improvement” (Commission of the European Communities 2000: 11). Governmental interventions should target vocational and personal training and help women set up businesses. By entering into self-employment and setting up small businesses women can be at the forefront of innovation and diversification in rural areas, for example by developing agri-tourism activities, artisanal food and drinks production, craft enterprises, telecommunication, and caring services. Women often have the added advantage of an awareness and knowledge of local needs, and special interpersonal and communication skills. (Commission of the European Communities 2000: 23)

The booklet was written by Mary Braithwaite, one of the expert allies of women farmers, who had participated in the activities around the 1986 directive. Braithwaite alerts the reader to the problem of women's status on farms in the booklet, but interventions were no longer targeted toward addressing the issue. But even in the area of rural diversification, the allocation of funds targeting gender equality was problematic. The Advisory Group on Women in Rural Areas, a group convened by the Commission to support its gender equality agenda in rural areas, in its March 2009 meeting criticized the fact that no specific budget was allocated to gender equality in the so-called Axis 3 measures, that is, the measures in the EAFRD targeting rural quality of life and diversification. Furthermore, it noted that spending in this category was particularly low in new member states. The group suggested that it was necessary to apply gender budgeting to these types of measures (Advisory Group 2009). Through gender mainstreaming, feminists in the Commission were able Page 53 → to analyze and critique existing practices, and they were able to suggest how women should be considered in rural development policies. But they had little control over the implementation of their ideas, in part because they lacked institutional capacity, in part because implementation is in the hands of member states. But the Commission did have a higher degree of control over implementing gender mainstreaming in its community initiative for rural development, the LEADER program, since community initiatives are directly implemented from Brussels. Because of its focus on diversification, the program provided openings for the reconfiguration of rural gender relations. While LEADER I preceded the adoption of gender mainstreaming in the Commission, the evaluation of the program found considerable diversification, mostly through the development of tourism and the creation of new enterprises, and interesting innovations in particular in the processing and marketing of agricultural products. Though the evaluators bemoaned a dearth of recordkeeping with regard to gender, women held a large number of the jobs that were created through the program. The high number of projects focusing on tourism apparently facilitated this: almost twice as many new jobs in tourism went to women as men (Ex-Post Evaluation 1999). But while LEADER I created jobs for women these jobs often reproduced traditional gender divisions of labor. Men predominated in jobs generated through small and medium-size enterprises, crafts, and services, and in the area of exploitation of agricultural products. In contrast, women predominated in tourism and many of their jobs were part-time (Ex-Post Evaluation 1999: 11). Presumably, serious attention to the differential impacts of the program on women and men, as demanded by gender mainstreaming, could have rectified this problem. There is little evidence that the second phase of the program, now presumably including efforts at gender mainstreaming, consistently changed practices. Although tourism was somewhat less prominent (but still accounted for 30 to 50 percent of the budgets submitted by groups), women held about half the jobs created or safeguarded through the program (Ex-Post Evaluation 2003: 206, 209). There was considerable local variation in outcomes. For example, 64 percent of jobs created through LEADER II in Ireland went to women but only 21 percent in Germany. Women's participation in the LAGs was higher in the Nordic states and in areas designated as “Objective 1,” that is, areas in the European periphery such as eastern Germany, than those designated “Objective 5b,” that is, disadvantaged rural areas. The midterm evaluation of the third LEADER+ phase of the program found that Page 54 → women were underrepresented in the LAGs, accounting for an average of 30 percent of members. Again there was considerable variation, with no women represented in some LAGs (including Fens Leap, Saarland, and Valencia) and women accounting for as many as 60 percent of the LAG in Hertfordshire (Synthesis of Mid-term Evaluations 2006: x, 98). Thus, the program showed success in the agenda of job creation for both women and men, but there seemed little attention to pernicious gender divisions of labor. Furthermore, benefits to women differed by locale, reflecting the important impact of local politics and local gender regimes. Similarly, LEADER apparently made possible participation in certain contexts but not in others. The local politics of the LEADER program will be further explored in chapter 5. In sum, the emerging regime of environmental liberalism paired with gender mainstreaming shifted the focus of feminist encounters with the EU from women farmers to women living in the countryside. Gender mainstreaming found particular resonance in rural development programs concerned with diversifying rural incomes. While women seemed to benefit from the inclusion of gender considerations in rural development policies, the practice appeared to cement a segregation of rural labor markets and had uneven impacts in different locales. Gender

budgeting, as called for by the Advisory Group on Women in Rural Areas, might have rectified some of these problems. In the meantime, the vast majority of public support continued to flow to a masculine agricultural sector, which continued to be regulated by welfare state principles—albeit in a modified fashion. In this sector, the European Parliament continued to be most vocal in seeking to remedy the blindness to women's status. For example, in its 2003 resolution it attacked the notion that direct payments should be distributed to “farms” without any recognition of the number of people working on such farms. A gender-mainstreamed common market organization, it suggested, might question the practice of basing direct payments on heads of cattle or acres of land and instead might base subsidies on the number of people earning a living on a farm (European Parliament 2003). It also might prevent practices such as the one reported from Ireland, where a milk quota restructuring scheme discriminated against applicants who jointly owned and managed holdings, which de facto penalized farming couples who sought more egalitarian gender relations on their farms (Commission of the European Communities 2000b). In a related manner, the Advisory Group on Women in Rural Areas (2009) criticized that the single payment system “tends to give precedence to men rather than recognizing joint ownership and therefore women are and remain invisible in this system.” Page 55 → Indeed, the system makes no allowance for registering two names; payment can be only to one beneficiary—the “farmer.” In sum, EU policies on agriculture and rural development may appear to respond largely to economic conditions and political pressures. However, as this chapter shows, another politics interweaves these policies: a politics of gender. The appeals to preserving the family farm as a matter of social and political order in the 1960s, the resistance to giving women farmers an economic status in the 1980s, and the displacement of demands for gender equality from agriculture to rural development at the turn to the new millennium all reflect a strategic selectivity in favor of masculine interests. But regional, Brussels-based institutions are just one location where gender rules are constructed in the European multilevel state and power mechanisms operate to deflect feminist challenges. The relevance of these rules to the everyday lives of women farmers and rural women becomes visible only in concrete national and subnational contexts that will be the focus of investigation in the remainder of this book.

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Chapter 3

Rural Gender Regimes and Their Transformation in West and East Germany The regulation of agricultural production in twentieth-century Germany followed radically different paths in West and East. But since the unification of the country in 1991, both parts of Germany have been embedded within the European Union's common agricultural policy (CAP), and both have struggled with the effects of agricultural liberalization though from very different points of departure, both in terms of the structure of agriculture and in terms of gender regimes. This chapter outlines the organization of agriculture in West and East Germany since the end of World War II, its transformation under the changing policies of the CAP and in the wake of unification. In the capitalist West agriculture was organized around private property ownership, which put family farming at the center; here the family owned the means of production and provided most of the labor. In contrast, in the communist East, agriculture was organized collectively in agricultural production cooperatives (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften or LPGs). Farmers de facto became workers in the cooperatives indistinguishable from other worker members. Reunification paired with the liberalization of agricultural markets created a highly diversified structure of agriculture in Germany, on the one hand ensuring the continued survival of small farms in the West but also creating highly efficient and very large farms in the East. The purpose of this chapter is to make visible how gender helped organize agricultural production in the western and eastern parts of the country differently and how state policies participated in constructing and transforming these gendered relations of production. I probe three types of rules that characterized the reproduction of masculine rule: rules of entitlement, in particular property rights; rules of labor division; and rules of identity. I Page 57 → show how these rules were perpetuated and changed through government policies at both European and national levels.

The West German Agricultural Welfare State and Masculine Rule In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), agriculture was regulated by a multilevel state, initially the West German federal state that devolved considerable responsibility, in particular for structural policies, to the Länder, but in the 1960s increasingly became intertwined with the European Economic Community (EEC). One of the main projects of this state was to manage the reorientation of an agricultural sector that comprised large numbers of small and uncompetitive farms, from subsistence-farming toward producing for a capitalist market. In 1959, at the time of the formation of the EEC, West German agriculture consisted predominantly of very small farms; twothirds worked an area of 10 hectares or less (Averyt 1977: 8). Modernizing the farming sector entailed the destruction of many of these farms and their agglomeration into larger, more competitive farms. Between 1949 and 1966, the country lost a quarter of its farms, most of them small and part-time holdings (Franklin 1969: 23).1 Government policy sought to guide the process of restructuring in a way that cushioned its negative impact on social welfare in the countryside. The West German project of agricultural modernization was connected to the country's rapid industrialization. High-paying jobs drew labor from agriculture into industry at a time when demand for food was rising rapidly. Agriculture needed to modernize in order to be able to meet this demand while making up for the loss of cheap labor. Thus, the government sought to encourage modernization through rural development measures geared toward increasing farm efficiency. In addition, the German government, like other European governments, was interested in equalizing standards of living in urban areas and the countryside, not least in order to avoid a new flaring-up of the “agrarian question” (Sauer 1990; Rieger 1995a; McMichael 1997). It did so by securing minimum incomes for farmers through its 1955 law, the purpose of which was to “equalise the social situation of people working in agriculture with that of comparable professions” (Hendriks 1991: 38). Finally, the government strengthened the social insurance system for farmers in order to achieve comparable health care and retirement benefits. These policies inadvertently legitimated a gender order based on masculine rule. In contrast, Page 58 →

CAP reform and the focus on rural development since the 1990s have contributed to destabilizing such rule. Rules of Entitlement The family farm is a profoundly liberal institution, built on the celebration of free enterprise and private property. It emerged from the various efforts of peasants throughout the nineteenth century to free themselves from feudal dependencies and sharecropping arrangements. Long-fought-for land reforms introduced liberal property rights and the rule of private law into the agricultural sector. In this sense, the family farm is the realization of the centuries-old demand that those who work the land should also own the land. Embedded in a specifically liberalcapitalist conceptualization of property, it combines rules of private ownership with the idea of an intergenerational enterprise that simultaneously perpetuates farm and family (Rieger 1995a: 28). But while family farming may have liberated the male peasant, it did not do the same for the peasant's wife. For her, the freedom provided by the new social contract was paired with new bonds entered through a sexual contract (Pateman 1988). When a woman marries a farmer, she not only becomes a wife but enters into a relation of production with a male farmer (Delphy and Leonard 1992). In other words, being a farmer's wife is not only a marital status but also a job. She is expected to contribute her labor to the farm enterprise in a largely unremunerated and unregulated fashion. Women working on farms rarely are “employees” of their husbands, and they rarely form legal partnerships with them (though this is becoming increasingly popular). Within the institution of family farming women do not hold property in their own labor; they are not free to sell their own labor power. Instead, they flexibly contribute their labor to household work and in support of farming. The family farm thus generates gendered rules of entitlement, rules of labor division, and rules of identity. Government policies have codified these rules and in this way given authority to masculine rule. The lack of an employment status for women farmers is often justified by reference to the fact that the farm is a joint enterprise, in which women and men benefit equally. But equal benefits are not a foregone conclusion since rules of entitlement distinctly disadvantage women and function to deprive them of property rights. German inheritance and family laws have contributed to codifying inequality and have done little to challenge male preferential entitlements to owning farm land and property. The state project to Page 59 → modernize farming drove these processes together with the selectivity of the state favoring masculine interests. Under the influence of the Napoleonic Code in the early nineteenth century, farms increasingly were passed down to all heirs equally, raising concern about the splintering of land and the destruction of viable farms. From 1855 to 1930 governments in more than 20 German states and provinces, particularly in the north, enacted special legislation to counteract the new bourgeois inheritance practices and preserve the traditional preference for one heir, usually the oldest son. This so-called Anerbenrecht typically wrote into law male preference and reduced payouts for secondary heirs by deflating the value of the farm.2 The National-Socialist 1933 Reichserbhofgesetz3 expanded the Anerbenrecht territorially and further limited women's rights by stipulating that, in the absence of an oldest son, the farm should be passed to the sons of the son, the father, the brother, or the brothers' sons before considering daughters. It furthermore prohibited payouts to secondary heirs. A highly unpopular law among farmers, the Reichserbhofgesetz was invalidated after the war. However, the British occupation administration introduced a new law based on Anerbenrecht in the German north that again wrote into law male preference. Furthermore, the old Anerbenrecht came back into force in those states that had such a law before 1933 (Schardey 1961; Turner and Werner 1998; Münkel 1998). In the 1950s, the oldest daughter of a farmer from North-Rhine Westfalia challenged the preferential treatment of male heirs in the courts, claiming that it violated the equal rights clause in the post–World War II German constitution. While lower courts ruled that male preference did not contradict the constitution because it served a public interest—that is, the preservation of family farms and national food security—the constitutional court did not follow this logic in a 1963 ruling. It found that male preference was not necessary for the preservation of the public interest, ruled that male preference violated the equality clause in the German constitution, and directed the legislator to draw up a new law.4 The ruling ended years of contention, in which farmers' organizations sought to preserve the principle of male preference against changes percolating through the courts and through state

legislatures. But the old law had formalized what was common practice, and while the high court's ruling challenged the codification of male preference in law, it did little to challenge informal rules that continued to favor male heirs. A gender-neutralized Anerbenrecht is in force today in most German Länder. Page 60 → Bavaria is a major exception in that it does not have a separate law regulating inheritance of farms (Kroeschell 1990: 179; Schardey 1961: 26), but, as in the rest of Germany, farms in Bavaria are passed down to a son as a rule. A related set of German federal laws address ownership rights resulting from marriage.5 Based on different regional traditions these laws codify two patterns of ownership. The first and most common is the Zugewinngemeinschaft.6 It was established as the legal norm at the federal level through the Equal Treatment Law of 1957, replacing the law of 1900 that gave men the right to manage and profit from the farming capital their wives brought into marriage and that was found to contradict the equality clause of the postwar constitution. In a Zugewinngemeinschaft husband and wife keep separate any property they bring into marriage and only share the additional value jointly generated in the course of the marriage. If they divorce, wives have a right to their own land (in the rare cases where they brought land into a marriage) and to half of the value generated on the farm with their labor, but no right to their husbands' farm property (Teipel 1996). While the introduction of this pattern of ownership was motivated by equal rights concerns, Teipel (1996) argues that it deprives the farmer's spouse of the due deserts of her labor. Legally, she has no say in major decisions about the farming enterprise, including farm inheritance. While, in the abstract, she has no legal liability for debts incurred on the farm, in practice banks often want spouses to cosign on loans; thus she may end up with liabilities for a farm she does not own. This is particularly ironic since she is not fairly compensated for her labor, nor does she participate in creating wealth for herself. She participates in enlarging the wealth of her partner but not her own. In the case of divorce or the farmer's death, she may or may not be compensated for the labor she put into the farm. If the value of the farm did not grow during her marriage, she is paid nothing. If the value of the farm did grow, the methods used to assess the additional value generated with her labor purposely underestimate a farm's value, in order not to threaten its survival through payouts.7 Legal challenges of the constitutionality of this practice have been unsuccessful because, in the opinion of the constitutional court, the law is formulated neutrally and does not explicitly disadvantage one sex (Teipel 1996: 65f). As with the Anerbenrecht, priority is given to preserving the farm as opposed to justly recompensing the labor of spouses. And the neutrality of the law functions to perpetuate unequal entitlements. The second type of ownership arrangement sanctioned for farming couples in federal law is co-ownership, Gütergemeinschaft, which in the Middle Page 61 → Ages was typical for the areas of Germany and that continues to exist in some parts of Bavaria. Under this legal form, any property brought into marriage becomes common property, or perhaps more accurately, the woman's property gets integrated into the property of the man's family (Inhetveen and Blasche 1983: 27–28). Since the invalidation of the 1900 law that established the man as the administrator and beneficiary of the common property, Gütergemeinschaft actually provides more entitlements to women farmers than the Zugewinngemeinschaft. Co-ownership specifies that the farm is jointly administered, giving a spouse the legal right to participate in any decision made about the farm.8 While spouses are jointly liable for any debts incurred, they also are entitled to receive at least half of the farm property in case of divorce or the farmer's death. If, after divorce, the farm stays with the farmer, the spouse is entitled to half of the market value of the farm. At the death of the farmer, the spouse receives half of the farm plus a quarter of the value of the farmer's portion of the inheritance; in other words, she is entitled to at least five-eighths of the farm. Thus, under Gütergemeinschaft women farmers gain rights to the productive property, not just rights to the value generated from their labor, and are privileged in the case of the farmer's death. In Bavaria, there has been considerable pressure to abolish this more egalitarian form of ownership, largely because it is seen to threaten the survival of farms in case of divorce. Thus, the main interest organization of Bavarian farmers (the Bayerischer Bauernverband), which has a large pool of lawyers advising its members on a variety of legal matters, recommends against Gütergemeinschaft. Similarly, legal scholars have called it too complicated, inclined to produce conflict, and contradictory to the “natural sense of justice” (see Teipel 1996: 151–52). Though its prevalence is declining, joint ownership remains stubbornly common: 67.5 percent of all

women farmers in Bavaria co-owned according to a survey conducted in 1988 (Ziche and Wörl 1991: 671) and 78 percent according to a second survey of members of the Deutscher Landfrauenverband (dlv) the same year. Moreover, this second survey found almost half of respondents throughout Germany to be co-owners (Claupein and Günther 1991: 14–15). In short, the German state has codified property rights that function to maintain masculine rule in agriculture. Neutral formulations of the law, paired with customs, end up excluding women from farm ownership. In the name of modernization, the state and its agents in the farmers' organizations fight to abolish more egalitarian customary arrangements, further entrenching Page 62 → masculine rule in the organization of agriculture. Unequal entitlements to owning farm property are joined by unequal entitlements to income and profit from farming, to social security benefits, and to represent the farm to the outside in cooperatives or political settings. These entitlements became a target of feminist contention in the 1980s. Rules of Labor Control Rules of labor control on family farms complement ownership rules in reproducing masculine rule. Again, state policies have been complicit in cementing male prerogative. The state project to modernize farming produced gender divisions of labor that increasingly removed women from income-earning production and created a gender division of labor along bourgeois ideals—a male breadwinner and a female housewife—together with a severe loss of status for women working on farms. One outcome has been a profoundly gendered pattern of farm management in Europe, as shown in the previous chapter. In Germany (East and West), women accounted for only 8 percent of farm managers in 1999–2000 (Commission of the European Communities 2002a: 34). In Bavaria, women were in charge of only 3.6 percent of farms in 1987, and most of the women managing farms were unmarried or widowed (Winkler 1990: 61). By 2005, this figure had increased only slightly, to 5 percent (Bayerisches Staatsministerium 2006: 28). Policies of modernization—buttressed by the CAP—encouraged this division of labor, turning women farmers into a flexible workforce under the control of male farm managers. Rationalization made it necessary to direct the farm's resources toward specialized production. Mixed production increasingly was seen as a diversion of resources, and women's income-earning projects, such as tending small farm animals and vegetable gardens or marketing dairy, eggs, jams, fruits, and vegetables, were considered unprofitable. Furthermore, state policies increasingly prohibited direct marketing of domestically processed food, a traditional activity of women farmers, for reasons of hygiene. A 1930 German law forbade the marketing of milk handled in domestic quarters (i.e., kitchens) and prescribed basic equipment of rooms. The government put pressure on dairy farmers to join cooperatives to treat and sell their milk. This culminated in the corporatist organization of farming under National Socialism that entailed a ban on direct marketing of milk in 1933, of eggs in 1935, and of the processing of fruits and berries in 1936 (Kolbeck 1990; Münkel 1998: 155). After the war, many of these laws remained in effect and, Page 63 → in the spirit of continued modernization, were strengthened. Although many women farmers remained in charge of dairy cows, they were not represented in the cooperatives (instead the male farm holders were), and the income from dairying no longer flowed through their hands (Kolbeck 1990: 156–59; Schmitt 1997a: 15). Thus, even before World War II, women progressively lost control over independent income from the fruits of their labor. More and more, their labor was for the benefit of “the family farm,” that is, increasingly rationalized businesses managed by their husbands (Prügl 2004). Structural policies in the 1950s and 1960s—at subnational, national, and European levels—continued farm modernization.9 They were complemented by the development of rural industries to provide jobs for “workerpeasants” who maintained part-time farms but earned most of their income in off-farm occupations. The combined policies of farm modernization and rural industrialization produced a bifurcated structure of agriculture as farms either downsized to part-time farming or grew into larger highly specialized full-time farms.10 Rules of labor control differed significantly on full- and part-time farms, though in both situations there were pressures toward a housewifization of women farmers, that is, their ideological construction as nonworking housewives.11 On large, specialized farms the male farmer typically worked in agriculture full-time, while the farmer's wife split her labor power between farming, household, and caring work. As modern technologies entered work processes

and as production expanded, men and machines tended to displace women from farm labor (van Deenen and Kossen-Knirim 1981: 71), and women increasingly focused on unpaid household and caring work. A study from the late 1980s found that the larger the farm, the less a woman tended to be engaged in farmwork and the more she tended to be engaged in housework. The result was a North/South difference in agricultural gender regimes. Women on the large farms that still typify the German North were more likely to live the model of the bourgeois housewife than women on full-time farms in the South who tended to put more time into farm labor and less time into housework (Claupein and Günther 1991: 68–72). 12 Women were thus deployed flexibly either to support the farm through their household and caring work or to help out with farmwork. The situation was quite different on part-time farms where typically the male “worker-peasant” took a full-time job off the farm, mostly in industry or construction, while the female “spouse” worked the farm, drawing on the help of her husband on weekends and evenings. Thus for women, these part-time Page 64 → farms were not parttime at all, as they became the de facto farmers. From the late 1950s to the late 1970s, the proportion of women in the full-time family labor force on small farms increased from 65 to 84 percent.13 Subsequently, the trend stalled as the agricultural state sought to counteract the “excessive family labour burden” associated with part-time farming (OECD 1980: 115). Policies encouraged farmers either to abandon farming by exempting small farms from investment supports or to convert to less labor-intensive forms of production. While these efforts reduced women's labor burden, governments rarely created alternative jobs for women displaced from farming. Women's work was considered ancillary, their real calling to be a housewife. Indeed, housework has long been women's work on German farms. In the 1970s the women farmers interviewed by Inhetveen and Blasche in northern Bavaria (1983: 195) all agreed that housework was women's duty, and van Deenen and Kossen-Knirim (1981: 42) confirmed that less than 2 percent of male farmers in their study of eight villages participated in housework. Similar patterns continued into the 1980s. Among Bavarian male farmers interviewed in 1988, only 3 percent always did household work, 12 percent sometimes, 48 percent rarely, and 37 percent never (Ziche and Wörl 1991: 693). A comparative study of six European countries found that the labor burden of a woman farmer varied primarily according to whether there was another female worker (a mother, mother-in-law, or daughter) in the household (Tryfan 1983: 4.9). Apparently housework was shared by women but not by men. The introduction of agricultural education for men in the nineteenth century and the parallel offering of home economics for women supported this division of labor, introducing into rural areas bourgeois ideals of male breadwinning and female homemaking that helped strengthen masculine rules of labor control. The typical training expected of a farmer was an agricultural apprenticeship, while the typical training expected of a farmer's wife was an apprenticeship in home economics. This gender division was reflected in the student populations. While the proportion of women taking apprenticeships in agriculture began to increase in the 1960s, women still accounted for only 8.6 percent of the apprentices in 2006.14 The proportion of women pursing advanced professional training in agriculture (Meister) stood at just 1.8 percent in 1994 (Schmitt 1997b: 162).15 In contrast, there was just one man among 342 apprentices in home economics in 2006 (BMELV 2007: 107). While men thus shunned housework, women's participation in farmwork Page 65 → was standard in the postwar era and still is on many medium-size farms struggling to compete in a liberalizing agricultural market. In Ziche and Wörl's (1991) study of Bavaria in the 1980s, women spent about one-third of their working time on farming activities, engaging in typically feminine tasks such as milking cows, caring for small animals, helping with the harvest, and keeping the accounts. They provided labor in areas defined as women's work but also contributed flexibly, adjusting their labor input to the growth cycle and to economic and political stimuli. In the heyday of modernization, this often meant excessive hours of work, as outlined in the introduction. These extreme forms of labor exploitation (including self-exploitation) diminished in part due to state policies that encouraged part-time farms to convert to less labor-intensive forms of production. Thus, according to more recent studies, women on full-time farms averaged longer hours (of farm-work and housework combined) than those on part-time farms (Pfeffer 1989: 66; Winkler 1990: 63). The highest labor burden emerged for women on mediumsize farms that were struggling to survive as full-time farms and had neither downsized nor grown sufficiently.

German agricultural policy after World War II and its first two decades under the CAP was thus characterized by modernizing farming in a way that counted on the flexibility of women's labor. But both women's resistance and the shift toward liberal environmentalism began to challenge masculine rules of labor control. Women refused to become women farmers, and more and more farmers had difficulty finding wives. From the late 1980s to the mid1990s, articles in the German rural press reported that about 30 percent of all German farmers were unmarried involuntarily; in Bavaria only one in five farmers was married (Bauernhöfe ohne Hofnachfolger 1988: 29; Dirscherl 1996: 192). Life as a woman farmer apparently could not compete with the freedoms offered to women in other careers. Like at the European level, policies liberalizing agricultural markets and focusing on rural development provided impetus to weakening rules of male control over female labor on German farms in addition. Women found new opportunities to earn an independent income by expanding and commercializing the female on-farm economy (Inhetveen and Schmitt 2004). Case studies suggest that women on both large and small farms invested more labor than men in direct marketing and offering tourism services. In Lower Saxony, the revival of urban farmers' markets and the development of on-farm stores facilitated women's new on-farm work. An average of 22 hours per week of mostly women's labor went into direct marketing in the late 1990s, and the Page 66 → business was particularly common on larger farms (Fahning 2001: 41). Farm holidays (Urlaub auf dem Bauernhof) were the second most important on-farm income strategy, and women were in charge of 81 percent of the work connected to these initiatives (Fahning 2001: 42). The importance of on-farm businesses for women was illustrated in a 1991 study of the whole country that found direct marketing to be more common on smaller farms; indeed it was least common in Lower Saxony and most common in Rhineland-Palatine, the Land with the highest proportion of parttime farms in Germany. Here as well, women dominated direct marketing (Claupein and Günther 1991: 50–51). While these activities provided new ways for women to earn income, they also were associated with heavy workloads. Fahning (2001: 49) found especially long working hours for women on farms that engaged in direct marketing and offered farm holidays. In addition, 60 percent of the women in her sample thought that the income was insufficient given their long working hours (see also Schimpf 1997: 152ff.). But the expansion of women's independent income-earning marked a significant change in rules of labor control on German family farms, to a degree freeing women's labor from the claims of their farming husbands. While women apparently continued to be in charge of unremunerated housework and care work, the new model of European agriculture reopened opportunities that the policy of modernization had closed. Rules of Identity Rules of identity complemented masculine rules of entitlement and labor control in the European Union and West Germany by producing a binary categorization of people working on farms as farmers and spouses. While formulated neutrally, the opposition expresses a gendered relationship, illustrated by the fact that men accounted for 91 percent of “farm managers” and women for 92 percent of all “spouses” in Germany in 1997 (Commission of the European Communities 2002a: 34, 36). It seems that the categories farmer and spouse mutually have produced each other, and they have done so on the basis of binary gender constructions. Outside of gender relation, the two terms do not logically belong together because the term farmer invokes a productive activity, while the term spouse refers to a marital status. Statistical conventions apparently have drawn on everyday understandings rather than logical consistency and in the process have helped reproduce an association of men with farming and of women with the family. Farming thus continues Page 67 → to be gendered masculine and family affairs feminine. The opposition has naturalized complementary and hierarchical gender relations. In the German language, the gendered constitution of the binary is particularly visible in the terms Bauer and Bäuerin, which in literal translation would be the masculine and feminine forms for the English word peasant. Whereas the term peasant is not grammatically gendered, the terms Bauer and Bäuerin are. A man could never be a Bäuerin, that is, someone who gained this job title through marriage and whose job is associated with unpaid service work. By simultaneously designating jobs and gender, the terms create social roles and the associated values, status, and authority. One is a Bäuerin not only because one does a particular job but also because one is in a subordinate position to a man. That is why the figure of a male Bäuerin is unthinkable.

When a woman manages the farm, her partner is something else, perhaps a teacher. But when they both work on the farm, then it is a quasi-law of nature that the man is always the farm manager, so as to not evoke a situation or the suspicion that he might be a Bäuerin. (Baier 2002: 18, my trans.) By encoding gender, the terms Bauer and Bäuerin thus have produced a hierarchical relationship in which the Bauer dominates by definition. In addition to encoding a hierarchy, gendering the relationship between Bauer and Bäuerin also has constructed particular understandings of masculinity and femininity in agriculture. The figure of the Bauer supports an ideal of rural masculinity that defines the farmer as breadwinner, self-sufficient entrepreneur, master of technology, and CEO of his business. The Bäuerin plays the supporting cast in these identifications defined as all that the Bauer is not, indeed as belonging to a radically different kind that includes housewives, dependents, those incapable of using farm technology and inessential to a public purpose.16 A 1978 pamphlet of the German national farmers' organization, the DBV, describes what being a Bauer and Bäuerin means. It specifies his tasks in the areas of economics, production, and society. And it specifies her tasks in the areas of the family, home economics, and the farm. Whereas his tasks include optimizing the results of his enterprise, the rational deployment of personnel, and the effective application of tools, her tasks include the maintenance of the family, caring for children and the sick, and efficiently meeting the needs of family members including cooking, cleaning, laundry, and supporting the Bauer in running the Page 68 → farm, in particular by keeping the books and doing the correspondence. For these different tasks the booklet specifies the kinds of skills a Bauer and Bäuerin should have. They include for him among other things knowledge of markets, production technology, leadership skills, an interest in participating in farmers' organizations, and knowledge of the constitution. They include for her among other items understanding the meaning of the family for individuals and society, educational and caring skills, knowledge of home economics including how to care for textiles, and knowledge of basic administration and bookkeeping (Funktionsbild Bauer-Bäuerin 1978). The difficulty of breaking out of these naturalized associations becomes evident where women have violated rules of identity by seeking to become farm managers. Schmitt (1997a) describes the experience of a group of women trained to be farmers and managing farms, their struggle to hold on to their farming occupations when they got married and had children, and their struggle to be taken seriously in a field utterly dominated by men. She recounts how lessors refused to lease land to women, and how tax advisers cautioned husbands to be careful about property rights so to avoid losing land in the event of divorce. In addition, Schmitt notes that women experienced longer probationary periods in apprenticeships and that their supervisors focused on women's physical strength when assessing their ability to farm (see also Grossenbacher 1996). Half of the women in Schmitt's sample of farm managers were single, suggesting that it is easier for women to be farm managers without a male presence. When men entered the lives of women farmers they tended to assume the role of farm managers, while women tended to adopt more traditional roles. Both Hübbers (1995: 236) and Schmitt found that even when women were the designated farm managers, men apparently tended to help out with farmwork but not with housework. Typically, women's equality strategies crumbled once they had children. Women then built their own enclaves and developed new talents: growing berries, keeping goats and marketing cheese, tending vegetable gardens, and last but not least keeping the household and caring for the children. Masculine rules of identity reasserted themselves with a vengeance. The force of gendered rules of identity in farming also becomes evident in the experience of women on part-time farms. As outlined earlier, these women frequently were the de facto farmers but were not typically referred to as farmers. Thus, in Bavaria in the mid-1980s, on average, women put in 55 hours of work a week on part-time farms as compared to 22 hours for men (di Lorenzo 1987), and women de facto managed 41 percent of all part-time Page 69 → farms according to a 1996 survey (Weinberger-Miller et al. 1997: 9). Yet, government statistics listed men as farm owners of 92 percent of part-time farms in 2005 (Bayerisches Staatsministerium 2006: 28). Arguably, the difference is to be explained by the fact that one statistic refers to ownership and the other to management. However, the German term Betriebsinhaber, literally “farm owner,” is misleading. Joint ownership of farms is customary in many parts of Bavaria, as outlined earlier, but statistical conventions allow for only one Betriebsinhaber. Wives, who legally are co-owners, are counted as “spouses” or unpaid family labor in labor

statistics (compare Inhetveen and Blasche 1983: 26). Statistical practice thus not only reproduces a gendered opposition between male farmer and female spouse, Bauer and Bäuerin, but functions to hide the extensive management contribution women make to farming. In this sense, statistics produce farmer and spouse as gender identities that participate in the reproduction of masculine rule. Statistical convention also functions to hide women's contribution to agriculture more broadly. As Inhetveen and Blasche (1983) show in powerful detail, women's daily activities on the farm constantly interwove activities characterized as “agricultural” with activities characterized as “reproductive.” The artificiality of separating productive and reproductive work became intensely visible. How is one to categorize the work of a woman talking on the phone to a tax adviser or sales rep while cooking lunch? How is one to categorize the trip to town to deposit funds in the bank and to pick up the kids from school? Is she being productive or reproductive? Gender helped to sort out these ambiguities, determine that she is a helping spouse rather than a farmer, a Bäuerin rather than a Bauer. While modernization policies in the 1960s and 1970s functioned to accentuate categorical gender identities, they began to be destabilized by agricultural restructuring and associated policies recalling the environmental function of farming. From his practical work as a pastor counseling farmers, Wichert von Holten (2007, 2005) has concluded that masculine identity in agriculture has been changing together with structural adjustments and the introduction of the discourse on multifunctionality. To begin with, von Holten has argued, there has been a fundamental change in the societal esteem for farmers. Whereas they used to be understood as crucial to national food security, the global sourcing of agricultural products has voided this understanding. On the contrary, farmers are no longer seen to contribute to national purpose but to be on the dole. At the household level, this is expressed in their changing status as breadwinners. The portion of farm income gained Page 70 → from agricultural production has become quite low for many, and income from “paper work,” that is, state subsidies, is significant. Taking government handouts—no longer through the price mechanism but through direct payments—is feminizing, in part because it resembles welfare, in part because it is women who often do the bookkeeping on the farm and the paperwork necessary to get the subsidies (see also Brüggemann and Riehle 2005: 16). Family income no longer results from masculine breadwinning. Wichert von Holten also sees a feminization of the role of the farmer to the extent that he becomes a service provider, a keeper of the landscape, taking on tasks not framed as “masculine, progressive, and productive, but as caring and preserving” (2007: 254, my trans.). Brüggemann and Riehle (2005) concur that farmwork has changed: Instead of bodily strength it requires intelligence, instead of physical exertion it needs social competence, and instead of production it entails care and, most important, flexibility. They consider this rediscovery of the farmer's feminine skills akin to a long-overdue recognition of women's longtime contribution to the agricultural economy. As the farmer has become the “woman on the farm,” the jobs traditionally performed by women have gained in value. Indeed, there are feminist voices in Germany that call for a revaluation of part-time farming, subsistence production, and the provisioning production of women in home gardens (Inhetveen and Schmitt 2001; Inhetveen and Fink-Keßler 2007; Baier 2002; Meyer-Renschhausen 2002). No longer can these forms of farming be considered remnants of an earlier age or supplemental and marginal activities, but they have regained value in a discourse of multifunctionality. In sum, the West German state's project of agricultural modernization—supported by the CAP—intensified to the disadvantage of women particular rules of entitlement, participated in a reorganization of rules of labor control that made women's unpaid labor available to a rationalized farming enterprise managed by men, and reproduced rules of identity that constructed gender on farms in a hierarchical relationship. The state's legislative, policy, and statistical practices affirmed and strengthened masculine rule. Feminist movement ideas combined with the neoliberal turn in the 1990s to modify this rule. With a shift in the state's project from modernization to globalization and from an agricultural to a rural service economy, masculine gender rules weakened. Gender identities have destabilized, and men's control over women's labor has diluted, but property rights have remained stubbornly masculine. While masculine rule takes new forms in a state committed to liberalizing agricultural markets, these forms are still in the process of taking shape. Page 71 →

The East German (Post-)Communist State and Masculine Rule in Agriculture Where the West German state sought to preserve family farming, the communist state in the East sought to do away with it. East German farms after World War II tended to be much larger than those in the West, in particular in the formerly Prussian territories where land reforms had failed to eliminate the large-scale Junker estates. Because the Junkers had provided crucial support to the Nazis (Tracy 1989: 191), it was an ideological priority of the East German communists to nationalize the large estates and the farms of those branded Nazi collaborators. They distributed about two thirds of these territories to agricultural workers and refugees from the East. The rest, including large tracts of forests, was turned into state farms. However, the bulk of farmers, particularly in the southern part of the Soviet occupation zone, retained control over their farms. Ideological considerations informed this early approach to agriculture, but the state projects of agricultural modernization and achieving food security required a different approach. Taking its cues from Soviet agricultural policies, the East German government, in the 1950s, began a policy of collectivization and cajoled farmers into joining agricultural production cooperatives (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften or LPGs) in order to gain efficiencies in production. The LPGs pooled the land, machinery, and animals of several farms and eventually came to encompass up to three and four villages. Small and newly established farmers who had benefited from the earlier land reform followed this policy more willingly than larger and well-established farmers. Yet by 1960, over 87 percent of the agricultural land in the East was farmed by LPGs, 7 percent was farmed by state farms, and the rest was privately owned and managed (Wilson and Klages 2001: 279).17 The purpose of collectivization was to expand output by taking advantage of economies of scale. Large-scale farming made possible the industrialization of agriculture by, on the one hand, organizing it in the style of industry and, on the other hand, vertically integrating it with industry, drawing inputs from and producing outputs for industrial production (Wädekin 1982). Increasingly, policies also encouraged the specialization of agricultural production. In the 1970s, farms were reorganized into branches of production, and plant cultivation was separated from livestock farming, an experiment widely recognized as a failure. In the words of an LPG manager in Brandenburg, the separation impacted biological cycles: “Those who specialized Page 72 → in plant cultivation lost interest in livestock and in the economy of humus, and those who specialized in livestock started to have problems with the maintenance of pastures” (Interview 19). Another outcome was the deterioration of livestock farming as grain-producing farms failed to supply the needed fodder (Singelmann 1995: 70). In addition, the intensification of production yielded often highly problematic outcomes for the rural environment (Wilson 1998: 124). The policy of agricultural modernization initially was geared toward supporting industry and industrial workers, often at the expense of agriculture. In the 1960s, the government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) realized the need to close the income gap between industry and agriculture, in part to encourage higher levels of food production, in part to counteract out-migration from rural areas that had resulted in labor shortages. This led to the introduction of uniform wage rates as well as old age pension systems, imitating to some extent the establishment of the agricultural welfare state in Western Europe (Wädekin 1982: 164). Reunification initiated a fundamental restructuring of the organization of East German agriculture, initially guided by the West's preference for the family farm model. The first step of this restructuring was to restore private ownership. A law that addressed the process of LPG restructuring required their transformation into entities recognized under West German law, including limited partnerships, publicly traded corporations, or Western-style cooperatives. The process of restructuring gave owner-members the option to regain land from the cooperative (though typically not the specific plots their families had brought in) or to receive a payout of their share. Many owner-members chose to lease their land back to the cooperative.18 While privatization proceeded, the state's policy of reestablishing family farming thus had limited success. Most LPG members were daunted by the prospect of setting up a small farm and competing in a global agricultural market. Wilson and Klages (2001: 281) estimate that at most 3 percent of potential family farmers chose to reestablish farms. Most sought to remain in the cooperatives for reasons that differed according to gender. Men more often said that staying in the cooperative would help them remain competitive. This was a realistic assessment not only given the size of most plots and the difficulty in acquiring additional land and capital, but also given their limited experience with farming alone.

Women often preferred the cooperatives because of the security and social benefits they provided. Older women also often remembered the drudgery of women's work on small family farms and accordingly were more Page 73 → doubtful about the promises of independence (Panzig 1995: 168). Here is how the male manager of the cooperative in Brandenburg put it. With regard to single peasant farming (einzelbäuerlicher Betrieb) it is after all the case that people in agriculture, well, have become workers…. They came to work, knew what needed to be done, finished it, and when they were done, then they went home at a regular time (Feierabend). In contrast, on a family farm things can get rough—when there is the right weather for making hay, and at the same time three cows are giving birth, and then this and that, then things can get complicated. A large farm can cope with such work loads much better. And the psychological burden, I emphasize this again and again, is not as heavy because of the size of the unit … And then perhaps [there are other issues], like now, the price of milk drops by 10 percent every year, the price of pork by 15 to 20 percent, BSE with regard to beef and the decrease is 30 percent … and a lone entrepreneur, a lone farmer is then left to ask, what do I do now? (Interview 19, my trans.) In the southern parts of the GDR in particular, most farmers owned only small plots of land that would not have produced enough to feed a family. In addition, the potential heirs of the farm frequently had left the rural areas and developed careers outside agriculture, interrupting the intergenerational contract that is inherent in family farming (Laschewski 1998: 114–20).19 The outcome of these various processes has been the formation of a differentiated structure of farming that includes all sizes of family farms as well as various forms of corporate farming. Overall, farms in the East are considerably larger than in the West. Indeed, East German farms are among the largest in the European Union. While by 1998, 81 percent of all farms in the East were family farms—the vast majority (almost 71 percent) parttime—they farmed only 22.8 percent of agricultural land (Wilson and Klages 2001: 281); the rest was in the hands of large farms with an average size of more than 200 hectares. In Saxony-Anhalt 87 percent of agricultural land was farmed by large farms with more than 200 hectares in 2005—and the number of farms in this size category was growing.20 The state projects of modernization and rural welfare employed very different tools in East and West with different effects on gender relations. In the East, gendered rules of entitlement were entangled with the collectivization of property rights, gendered rules of labor control and identity circumscribed by the industrialization of agriculture and the proletarianization of agricultural Page 74 → labor. The state project was flanked by policies seeking to advance gender equality, a commitment to solving the “woman question” that had been raised in the tradition of the German labor movement. The solution was seen in freeing women from their dependence on men within the family by encouraging their economic independence. Work became both a right and a duty for women, as the government provided child-care facilities, and being a housewife was negatively sanctioned (Schäfgen and Spellerberg 1998). With unification, the German state jettisoned this active commitment to enabling women's equal participation in the labor force. While unemployment soared among both women and men, women had much more difficulty getting rehired, and initially the proportion of women in the labor force sank precipitously (Fink and Grajewski 1994). However, the continued decline of manufacturing, mining, construction, and agriculture eventually also decimated the employment prospects of men, while the expansion of the services sector began to benefit women (Kröhnert and Klingholz 2007). Unification and economic restructuring significantly impacted masculine rule throughout the GDR, particularly in the rural areas. Rules of Entitlement Land reform and the collective organization of agricultural production after World War II had a decisive impact on the entitlements of women in the GDR. Land reform benefited a large number of women because they made up a disproportionate part of the population after the war and of the refugee population in particular. De Soto and Panzig (1995: 182) cite the recollections of village women in Brandenburg, who after the war began to cultivate the fields on the former estates for daily survival while also observing the influx of displaced Germans from the

former eastern provinces. The resettlers who continuously flowed into our village suffered much worse than us. Weeks on end, twenty and often twenty-five people walked into the village. Most of them were women, children, or old people. They had lost everything. When we saw their sufferings, we women wanted to help them. Many of the women in this narrative, both the former estate laborers recounting the events and the refugees they observed, were heads of households and received small plots of land during land reform (the average size was eight hectares; Hagedorn 1997: 201) together with “a few cattle, tools, machines, seeds, and horses through a lottery method” (De Soto and Panzig Page 75 → 1995: 182). While it initially helped with survival, the new landholders faced severe difficulties because of a dearth of inputs and an excessive labor burden, and many abandoned their farms as soon as they found opportunities in expanding industries in the early 1950s (Zansinger 2004). When government policy shifted to collectivization in the 1950s, the new farmers who had benefited from land reform often were the first to join agricultural cooperatives. Older, long-established farmers followed more slowly. Both women and men joined the cooperatives.21 While nominally they continued to own their land, property rights became increasingly meaningless as the cooperatives took over all rights to use and profit from the property, arranging cultivation and constructing buildings without regard to previous territorial boundaries. In addition, the cooperatives included as members not only landowning farmers but also agricultural workers. Indeed, by 1978, among permanent workers on the LPGs 20 percent were nonmembers (Wädekin 1982: 138), and, by 1989, former landowners accounted for just one-third of all cooperative members (De Soto and Panzig 1995: 181; Wilson and Klages 2001: 279–80). Rules of entitlement were no longer organized around family and estate relations but around work relations in the collective where the distinction between owners and nonowners increasingly became blurred. While women and men both lost the right to their land, collectivization provided new entitlements previously unknown to family farmers and in particular to women farmers.22 To begin with, all cooperative members regardless of gender were entitled to an income depending on the cooperative's earnings, which was distributed to members according to hours worked. For small farmers this meant a significant improvement of their economic situation while large farmers lost. For women farmers getting a regular wage was a novelty and for the first time earned them an income independent of that of their husbands. It was understood that women, who made up about 45 percent of LPG membership on average, were to be paid equally to men (Zansinger 2004: 30). However, there was evidence already in the 1960s that women with the same qualifications as men had lower monthly earnings (Schiebel 1970: 160), a result largely of the fact that women were more likely than men to be employed in activities that paid lower wages. Other entitlements included a regularized eight-hour workday and paid vacation days. Women also had independent health and social insurance and held an entitlement to an independent pension (Lasch et al. 1992: 9). In addition, women (but not men) benefited from provisions that were geared toward making their work compatible with family responsibilities. They Page 76 → benefited from the extensive availability of child care. They received a sickness allowance of typically 90 percent of their regular income when they or their children were ill and needed care. They also were entitled to fourteen weeks of paid maternity leave (Zansinger 2004: 31) and two days off for housework (Marx Ferree 1991–92: 58). The entitlements of the communist state in this way functioned to maintain differential statuses for women and men and became the source of continued gender inequality. But they were entitlements that women farmers in the West could only dream of. Cooperative members, both women and men, had participation rights in decision making. The general assembly of members was considered the highest organ of the LPGs, concerned primarily with long-term questions. The management of current affairs fell to the chairman, virtually always a man and a member of the Communist Party, in conjunction with an elected board (Wädekin 1982: 213). Women in the cooperative in Brandenburg remembered that women and men participated equally, but leadership positions apparently were reserved for men. In the words of one woman in a management position, “We all of course had a right to participate, and the

members of the executive committee were well informed. There were no differences between women and men, although women were less commonly in leading positions” (Interview 20, my trans.). Beyond contributing to the management of the LPGs, women also participated in committees for women's issues, established under the state's active pursuit of Frauenpolitik. These committees functioned as a community but also as places to discuss issues such as child care and after-school programs, and to organize holiday programs or coordinate food provisions. In her research with former LPG members in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania in the 1990s, van Hoven (2002: 451) recounts women's strongly positive recollections about participating in the collective, and how they “used the term family [emphasis in original] to describe the feelings of integrity, purpose, and reward in the collective.” In the words of one woman: “When I got on my bike in the mornings to go to work and meet the other women, all my sorrows [at home] were forgotten.” The gendered entitlements of the LPGs changed fundamentally with the transformation of East German agriculture after unification. The most important change pertained to the vast loss of jobs. About 75 percent of agricultural employees lost their jobs and thus a regular income between 1989 and 1995. Losses were particularly pronounced for women, who were concentrated in labor-intensive production and in areas considered marginal to farming enterprise such as child-care centers, canteens, and social services Page 77 → more broadly. Indeed, “entire employment sectors that had primarily been occupied by women vanished in the aftermath of unification” (Hörschelmann and van Hoven 2003: 755). While both women and men lost entitlements to a job and income, the losses were far more extensive among women than men. The reintroduction of private ownership rights reactivated gendered power relations pertaining to the transmission of property. Shares of LPGs were returned to farmers and their heirs. Traditionally, Anerbenrecht was in place in the East, which would suggest male preference in landownership. Where cooperative farmers set up their own farms, the Zugewinngemeinschaft became the standard law with regard to ownership of agricultural property within marriage. In the successor farms to the LPGs the old farmers often reasserted themselves, taking over leadership positions and reintroducing masculine patterns of rule. In a study of three LPGs in Saxony-Anhalt that retained their cooperative form under West German law, Laschewski (1998: 133) found that in efforts to install new leaders the old farmers played a key role and that they sought to install as cooperative leaders men who came from long-established and well-respected local families. In sum, collectivization and the communist commitment to gender equality yielded a rural gender order, in which gendered rules of ownership lost much of their political force. New rules of entitlement—to pay, vacation, sick leave, and participation—replaced old ownership rights, extending entitlements to women and men in a way that moderated but also strangely reproduced old inequalities. The transformation of East German agriculture since unification has entailed a loss of many of these rights, re-endowing ownership rights with significance but also retaining agricultural employment as an object of identification. Rules of Labor Control The collectivization of agriculture in the GDR entailed an organization of labor relations that differed profoundly from that of the West German family farm. Collectivized agricultural labor was not organized by the rules of households and families. Gender played a less decisive but still significant role in the organization of hierarchy and labor divisions. As the East German state sought to liberate women by integrating them into the socialist work process, it reproduced rules of labor control that retained women's labor for lower-valued work and for unpaid housework. In the cooperatives, labor was organized in three tiers, with management Page 78 → on top, followed by brigades and work groups (Wädekin 1982: 214). Management made most of the everyday decisions, with input from a management committee. While women participated in these committees, their representation in leadership positions was proportionately low. Moving women into leadership positions was a concern of the communist state, and efforts to train women in the agricultural field made it possible to increase their proportion in the leadership positions from 20.7 percent in 1985 to 37.3 percent in 1989. But most of these gains were in middle management, and even in 1989 only 2.8 percent of LPGs were headed by women (Goldammer 1987: 83; Panzig

1995: 158–60; Fink et al. 1994: 213). Brigades were organized according to branches of production, and gender served as a key organizing principle for brigades. Men were concentrated in crop production, which was highly mechanized and received more financial support. Women were concentrated in animal production, which was largely unmechanized and was considered secondary because it depended on crop production for feed. Women also were concentrated in manual labor. Indeed, manual labor brigades typically were 100 percent female (Goldammer 1987: 70). The work within brigades was subdivided into work groups. Women's work tended to be more group-based than men's and included “women's projects,” labor-intensive manual work in the fields or animal sheds. Men's work tended to be more individualized, involve technology, and be valued more highly (van Hoven 2001; De Soto and Panzig 1995: 184; Lasch et al. 1992). Gender thus provided the means to allocate labor and created an association between women and less-valued activities. LPGs not only engaged in agricultural production but over time took on more and more nonagricultural tasks so that by the 1980s about 40 percent of jobs within farms were outside agriculture (Neu 2001: 242). They included jobs in construction and machine maintenance, as well as social services, including child care, canteens, libraries, pubs, shops, and hairdressers. LPGs formed the cultural and social center of the villages—they de facto replaced the villages (van Hoven 2001). They educated youth, offered adult training, organized summer camps and clubs, provided medical and therapeutic centers, and often financed communal efforts (Panzig 1995). Thus, in stark contrast to West Germany, LPGs publicly organized both agricultural production and many of the services that women in the West provided without remuneration in the private sphere such as cooking and child care. Masculine labor control was thus modified, and women were paid for their services. Not surprisingly, this public service work was gendered feminine. In the Page 79 → words of one researcher, “the allocation of women within employment was often based upon ‘typically female’ private roles, such as cleaning, caring, and nurturing which were extended to the public workplace” (van Hoven 2001: 39). The fact that this labor was considered ancillary facilitated its virtual elimination after unification. Although a good portion of housework moved into the public arena, there was still plenty of work to be done at home. This housework remained disproportionately women's work in the GDR as much as in the FRG replicating men's control of women's labor in the private sphere. A study from the mid-1980s showed that 63 percent of women in the GDR spent between one and three hours on housework every day, whereas almost half of the men spent less than an hour (Goldammer 1987: 44). A survey of women working in animal production from the early 1970s showed considerable differences in the types of housework to which men contributed. While they almost never did the laundry, cleaned the house, or did the dishes, almost half went grocery shopping sometimes (Schubert 1977: 114). Housework in the rural areas of the GDR also included gardening and tending small animals, since many LPG members engaged in some private agricultural production at home. Most of this work was women's work (Goldammer 1987). The restructuring of East German agriculture after unification led to massive changes in patterns of labor control. One result was the masculinization of the agricultural labor force. Overall, only 50 percent of women employed in agriculture still had jobs in the sector three years after unification compared to two-thirds of men (Fink and Grajewski 1994: 16). Restructuring thus entailed a progressive exclusion of women from agriculture (Lasch et al. 1992: 10). Neu (2001) found that there were significantly more men than women in the cooperatives in 1996. This is how Buechler and Buechler (1995: 35) describe what they found in their interviews. In one cooperative, only ten or twelve out of a hundred women remained employed. Another cooperative also reduced female employment from about 50% to between 15% and 20% of the total work force. If they had not continued with the labor-intensive herb production, the ratio of women to men would have been worse. The same informant estimated that the average female share of the workforce employed in all the smaller units into which the original collective was subdivided was reduced to only 10% of the total. The severity of these reductions in female employment is mitigated only by the preference for seasonal employment conceded to members' wives in some cooperatives. Page 80 →

Women were particularly affected by unemployment initially, accounting for 54.5 percent of the unemployed in early 1990 and for 65.4 percent by September 1993. In rural areas, women's unemployment was particularly high, ranging from 23 to 27 percent in 1993 (Fink and Grajewski 1994: 14). However, the gradual decline of heavy industry, manufacturing, mining, and construction and the development of a services sector as the economy picked up favored women over men. Indeed, in 2005 male unemployment was higher than female unemployment in some rural areas in the East, and women's rate of labor force participation was above that of men—though women were more likely than men to work part-time (Kröhnert and Klingholz 2007: 35, 43). Most people working in East German agriculture in 2005 were permanent and nonpermanent employees and not family laborers, accounting for over 76 percent of the agricultural workforce in the new Länder (calculated from Statistisches Jahrbuch 2007: 51).23 Women made up only 31 percent of permanently employed workers in 2006, compared to about 40 percent in GDR times (Goldammer 1987).24 But among those permanently employed, women tended to hold relatively high positions. This is supported by findings from Saxony-Anhalt, where among those with permanent positions in agriculture, women were disproportionately represented in white-collar jobs, accounting for 54.2 percent of Angestellte in 1997. In addition, their proportion in this category increased slightly from 1993 to 1997, an effect in part of targeted government measures. While women thus were pushed out of the agricultural sector, some of the efforts to modify rules of labor control bore fruit beyond the end of the communist state. Some East German women initially found family farming to be an alternative source of income. In Brandenburg they responded to De Soto and Panzig's (1995: 191) queries about why they went into family farming: “What else is left, our LPG is gone. There is no chance for other employment and unemployment is too great—we have no other choices.” However, throughout the 1990s, the proportion of female family labor in agriculture declined in the new Länder, shrinking from 37 percent in 1991 to 32.7 percent in 1997, almost 3 percentage points lower than in the West (Statistisches Bundesamt 2001: 95). Yet, women in the East also were more likely to run farms, accounting for 19 percent of all BetriebsinhaberInnen, as compared to only 9 percent in the West (Schmitt 1997b: 162). Thus, although the trend was toward a masculinization of the agricultural labor force in the East, women were able to hold on to positions of influence to a greater degree than in the West, resisting the full reassertion of masculine control over feminine labor. Page 81 → In sum, the project of modernizing agriculture through collectivization in the GDR tempered the significance of gender as a means of labor control, but continued to employ gender to organize hierarchies. Divisions of labor between management and workers, crop and meat producers, and the allocation of care and service work followed a gendered logic. The restructuring of the 1990s entailed the elimination of public care work and its reprivatization together with the displacement of women from the agricultural workplace and the masculinization of the rural labor market. But the communist equality project left a legacy of women's empowerment reflected in their continued presence in white-collar positions on farms and in the higher rate of women running family farms as compared to the West. Rules of Identity Whereas identity constructions in West German agriculture focused on the Bauer and Bäuerin, these constructs lost much of their constitutive force in the East during communism. According to Singelmann, agricultural collectivization entailed the disappearance of the occupation “farmer” as workers in the LPGs were organized along the principles of industrial labor division: “Some became tractor drivers, others milkers, and so on” (Singelmann 1995: 69–70). Farmers became specialized technicians, experts in one operation performed on the farm, but increasingly distant from the overall management of the farm. A side effect of this industrial division of labor and of the loss of property rights was a change in rules of identity. In the words of the LPG manager cited earlier, farmers became workers. Arguably, the transformation of farmers into workers, combined with the communist commitment to gender equality, reduced the importance of gender difference as a signifier of relations of rule. Whereas the modernization of agriculture through family farming in the West meant that women's labor

was defined by their gender, modernization through collectivization enabled a construction of women as fellow workers. One indicator of changes in feminine identity is education. Levels of education suggest that East German women self-identified as workers and professionals rather than housewives and helpmates—the identity often adopted by women farmers in the West. Whereas only a third of women farmers in the West had finished professional training in 1990, the same was true for almost 92 percent in the East (Panzig 1995: 158). The pattern did not change after unification when the proportion of women in agricultural education continued to be much higher in the East than in the West. In the early 1990s, women accounted Page 82 → for 21 percent of agricultural apprentices in the East (compared to 7 percent in the West), for 47 percent of students in the rural professions (compared to 5.4 percent in the West), and for 11 percent of those training to become Meister (compared to 1.8 percent in the West) (Schmitt 1997b: 162). Restructuring threatened rural women's identities as workers and professionals, entailing “displacements” into the home and the private sphere, and making them strangers in the rural polity (Hörschelmann and van Hoven 2003). Yet East German women largely refused to accommodate to a housewife status. A 2006 study found that only 2 percent of rural women in East Germany self-identified as housewives, as opposed to 24 percent in the West. They exhibited considerable job attachment: 77 percent said that having a job was “very important” as opposed to 51 percent in the West.25 Indeed, 30 percent of rural women interviewed in the study agreed with the statement “My job is so important that family life has to adjust to it,” whereas only 13 percent did so in the West.26 Part-time work also was much less prevalent among East German than West German women—24 versus 39 percent. And many—especially those most highly educated—were taking advantage of training programs offered to newly develop rural economies in the East, mostly in tourism and information technology (Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landwirtschaft 2006: 86–98, 181). In the words of an East German woman participating in the study, “By the end of the GDR, the question was no longer whether the woman had to work in order to feed the family or whatever, but the woman was now skilled and wanted to work. She had her profession. She wanted to work” (Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landwirtschaft 2006: 90). This identity of women who experienced the GDR system continued to resonate among younger women in the rural East as they navigated unemployment and actively pursued new opportunities. One of their strategies was migration to the West. Structurally disadvantaged rural areas in the East saw a massive out-migration of young women, particularly in regions where old industries, including agriculture, still played a major role. Indeed, in the first decade of the new century, East Germany exhibited the most marked imbalance of gender ratios in the European Union with up to 25 percent of young women in the age range of 18 to 34 missing in some regions. The deficit of women was particularly high in areas where agriculture accounted for a high proportion of employment. Women's high level of education opened opportunities for them in the West to a degree not available to men. Already in the mid-1990s women accounted for more than 60 percent of those graduating with the Page 83 → Abitur, a prerequisite for entry into the university. In contrast, two-thirds of high school dropouts were male (Kröhnert and Klingholz 2007: 4, 54). Another strategy that young women pursued in the new economy was motherhood, as reflected in rising rates of teen pregnancy in the rural East. In 2005 teen pregnancy accounted for over 11 percent of all births in one particularly disadvantaged region (Kröhnert and Klingholz 2007: 31). Young women who were not able to replicate the educational success of their peers often chose motherhood as a profession, seeking to take advantage of generous government support for stay-at-home moms. While this may be a shortsighted strategy, young women apparently often chose it quite deliberately: “They are in no way ‘victims' of their circumstances or of men. Young women—more than men—take charge of their lives. They choose to migrate—or to have a baby” (Kröhnert and Klingholz 2007: 33, my trans.). This assertion of women's agency was paralleled by a severe crisis of rural masculinity as men faced reduced opportunities in the labor market and were less able to adapt than women. Because of women's financial independence in the GDR, the notion of the male breadwinner was not as entrenched as in the West. However, men's jobs as industrial laborers had been highly respected, and, as shown earlier, gender divisions of labor had

been pronounced. With economic restructuring, traditional masculinity with its glorification of physical labor and male breadwinning was devalued. At the same time few young men in rural areas developed the new skills that were in demand in the new labor market. Men's chances diminished both in the labor market and in the marriage market. The dearth of women in the East German countryside reduced the number of potential marriage partners; at the same time, rural men's lack of education and wealth made them less desirable. In the age group of 25-to-34year-old men, 46 percent were without a partner in the East in 2000, compared to 37 percent in the West. Men without partners in the East were much more likely to feel disadvantaged by the system and to distrust democracy. One symptom was the attraction of poorly educated males in rural East Germany to right-wing movements and parties whose platforms celebrated the roles of housewives and mothers and denounced the equalization (Gleichmacherei) of women and men. The message seemed to be “More power to the little man from here” (Kröhnert and Klingholz 2007: 62–69; quote at 69). The identification of women as equal workers in the GDR had consequences reaching into the postunification context in terms of the self-confidence Page 84 → with which women encountered the economic crisis in the rural East. Although the masculinization of agricultural labor markets boded ill for women wanting to maintain their economic independence, they actively pursued new economic strategies. At the same time, East German rural masculinity faced a crisis, threatened by declining opportunities and by the revaluation of traditionally feminine skills in a newly emerging services economy.

Conclusion Masculine rule is a constellation of rules that unequally distribute privilege between women and men and that is supported by the authority of the state. Masculine rules include rules of entitlement, which define the differential rights bestowed upon women and men, and commitments made to them by the state; rules of labor control, which define the extent to which women's labor is subject to the command of men; and rules of identity, which instruct women and men who they are, creating gendered identities. The chapter has shown that the capitalist and communist states in the German West and East institutionalized different forms of masculine rule with different rules of entitlement, labor control, and identity. Under communist rule, the East had a more egalitarian tradition than the West with regard to entitlements and identities. In the area of labor control, however, there was less difference with the West, as women were in charge of unpaid housework, and women's position in the labor market was secondary in both parts of Germany. Nevertheless, the communist government in East Germany had emphasized gender equality, and this legacy continued to have an effect, as rural women in the East remained more active in the labor market and gained higher positions than their counterparts in the West. As a result, women in the East secured more income and thus more independence from men. In contrast, the attempt by some rural women to become farm managers in the West was viewed as a transgression of rules governing labor divisions and encountered considerable obstacles. Here strongly gendered property rights continued to exert their force in a shrinking agricultural sector. Not surprisingly, faced with blocked opportunities, rural women in the West often left the agricultural sector. The first question posed in this study can thus be answered: The capitalist and communist states both participated in constructing rules that entrenched masculine rule, but they did so differently, with communist policies producing more gender equality. The second research question, probing the impacts of liberalization, also Page 85 → can be answered from the materials provided in this chapter. There were three historical moments of liberalization. The first occurred in West Germany in the 1960s, when European countries formed a common market for agriculture, and West German agriculture was integrated into the European Community's common agricultural policy. In the East of the country, unification initiated a second moment of liberalization in 1991, when private property rights to agricultural land were reintroduced and there was a massive restructuring of farming enterprises. Neoliberal policies kicked off a third moment of liberalization with a dismantling of price supports and the creation of a global free market in agricultural products, a process that started in the 1980s and continues both in the East and West. The first moment of liberalization, which occurred in the West, yielded a decisive intensification of masculine rule. The tradition of family farming had already offered significant entitlements to men, most importantly the

shared understanding that men should be the owners of farms and associated land and that they should be the ones to inherit. From this, men derived the right to benefit from the value created from farming. The first moment of liberalization bolstered these entitlements with rights to social security and policies of modernization. Modernization created increasingly mechanized and specialized farms that shed the income-generating activities of women. Women were turned into unpaid housewives who also served as a source of flexible labor for specialized farming enterprises. One result was new rules of labor control patterned along a strong gender division of labor that assigned farm-work to men and housework to women. Strongly binary rules of identity distinguished male and female farmers, cementing a hierarchical gender order. The second moment of liberalization, which occurred in the East and was part of postcommunist restructuring, also intensified masculine rule, though to a lesser extent than the first moment did in the West—in part because the second moment did not last as long. The reintroduction of private property rights with the dismantling of communism destroyed previous entitlements of all farm labor to wages, defined working hours, vacation, and a range of social benefits. Because women were ejected from agriculture at a higher rate than men, they were disproportionately robbed of such entitlements. Gender divisions of labor strengthened as rural women initially lost jobs much more rapidly than did men, and as reproductive labor such as cooking, and care work such as child care, moved back into the private sphere. The legacy of communist equality policies attenuated the reestablishment of masculine rule in comparison to the first moment of liberalization in the West. But Page 86 → unification forcefully disrupted rules of identity that, under communism, had constructed all workers as equal, regardless of gender. Restructuring generated feelings of displacement for women and, later, a severe crisis of identity for men. The third moment of liberalization—the creation of a global market in agriculture and the associated policy of rural diversification—preceded unification and was intermingled with postcommunist restructuring in the East. In both parts of the country, it initiated a diversification of the rural economy and the creation of new jobs in the services sector. In this way, it led to new paid employment opportunities for women in both parts of the country, helping them regain a degree of control over their own labor power. In the East in particular, it allowed women to retain an identity of themselves as economically active, and they continued to pursue self-assured strategies. While the expansion of service jobs has been a boon to women, rules of entitlement in agriculture have changed little, particularly in the West. In both parts of the country, ownership and inheritance patterns remain highly unequal, although East German women are challenging masculine rule in agriculture as they have installed themselves as farm managers at a rate much higher than in the West. In sum, economic liberalization meant different things at different historical moments. Furthermore, it encountered different gender regimes in East and West. Not surprisingly it affected masculine rule differently. In the East, postcommunist liberalization meant an initial steep loss of social and economic rights for women and a loss of control over their own labor. Yet women retained identities as equals, which aided them as they strategized in a situation of economic crisis and helped them take advantage of the opportunities offered by a newly diversifying rural economy. In the West, trade liberalization within the EU initially meant an intensification of masculine rule. But the EU's response to the liberalization of the world market began to open up economic opportunities for rural women that enhanced their control over their own labor power. Yet these opportunities were mostly outside farming; the gender order within agriculture has remained remarkably intact. While the impact of liberalization on gender regimes has thus been significant, there have been changes in masculine rules that cannot be explained by the state's economic policies and market liberalization but are the result of feminist activism. Feminist activists have targeted masculine rule in the European countryside in at least two ways. They have struggled for equal pension rights in the West and for the implementation of gender mainstreaming Page 87 → in East and West. In doing so, they have encountered the rather different forms of masculine rule outlined. In the West, masculine rules of entitlement, labor control, and identity were firmly entrenched in the 1980s when feminist activists demanded an employment status for women farmers that would entitle them to equal pension rights. The implementation of gender mainstreaming in the 1990s faced modified rules in the West that put a high value on women's entrepreneurship, reflected a destabilized rural masculinity, but left in place masculine property rights. In contrast, in the East, gender mainstreaming encountered women with

tenuous access to employment, validated by their skills, confident in their strategies, and facing insecure masculinity. The reception of and resistance to feminist strategies have differed in these contexts and are the topic of the remainder of this book.

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Chapter 4

Fighting for Women's Rights in the Agricultural Welfare State The fight for equal rights was at the center of feminist strategy as the second wave of the feminist movement surged in Europe in the 1970s. Feminists attacked provisions in legal codes and entrenched practices in public and private life that perpetuated the subordinate status of women. They generated state responses throughout Europe, including the European Union, which passed a series of directives committing member states to equal pay, equal treatment, and equality in social security provisions. The effects of these changes have been characterized as one of the most salient instances of Europeanization of public policy. Impacts were substantial for the industrial and services sectors throughout Europe but less so for those working in family businesses and women in agriculture in particular. Here the gendered regimes of the agricultural welfare state persisted tenaciously. But critiques of these regimes emerged in women's organizations in the farming sector in the 1970s. Feminists there began to question existing rules of entitlement and identity. At the EU level, they demanded a directive that accorded women in agriculture an occupational status, thus questioning existing rules that often defined them as nonworkers and housewives. At the federal and subnational levels in Germany, they demanded equal entitlement to an old age pension and sought to gain with this a redefinition of their status. In the 1980s, these demands encountered strong resistance, both from individual member states at the European level and in Germany. But the right to independent social security gained some traction over the years, including in Germany, where the government passed a law in the 1990s giving women independent pension rights. In 2008, a push to strengthen the claims of women in agriculture to maternity Page 89 → and social security protection found broad support among member states. But governments continued to be wary of giving recognition to the economic contribution of women farmers, which might entail claims to profit shares and farming property. Demands for an equal status apparently struck at the heart of the agricultural welfare state, the gender order on the family farm. Not surprisingly, the struggle over women farmers' equal rights became a site for the enactment of mechanisms of power (cf. chapter 1, table 1), that is, it encountered oppositions modifying the outcomes of feminist struggles. With regard to the issue of recognition, activists faced outright refusal at the European level and also largely in Germany. With regard to individual access to social security, they needed to compromise. The compromise they were able to achieve in Germany eventually entailed new entitlements and limited recognition but also co-optation and a silencing of difference. This chapter probes how feminist activism contributed to changes in the gender regime of the West German agricultural welfare state and how changes were limited by mechanisms of power. Because this activism operated at different levels of the (Type I) multilevel state, the chapter first recounts the struggle for a directive on women in agriculture at the European level, which brought together women activists in the European umbrella of farmers' organizations with feminists in the Commission and the European Parliament. It then moves to the national level to explore the struggle in Germany over equal pension rights that activated feminists in the alternative farmers' movement to link up with more traditional rural women's organizations.

The Struggle for an EU Directive on Women in Agriculture Women in European rural areas are well organized but lack a strong, politically independent voice. Their organizations often are integrated into farmers' organizations and depend on them for resources. This is true at both the national and European levels. Reflecting the structure of agricultural organizations in many member states, including Germany, the Women's Committee of the European umbrella of farmers' organizations (COPA)1 is housed within the COPA offices in Brussels and shares some of the COPA personnel. While the chair of the Women's Committee is represented on the COPA executive committee with full voting rights, the committee rarely takes policy positions that contradict COPA. Interest representations in agriculture thus often reproduce the division of labor on farms, where men are in charge of Page 90 → production and politics, and women are in charge of ancillary farming activities, household, care labor, and community building.

The COPA Women's Committee played a key role in lobbying for the EU directive on women in selfemployment, including agriculture. According to officials at COPA, it had the support of the COPA leadership in this struggle (Interview 3). It also had a receptive ear among Commission femocrats. Since 1975, the Commission's Women's Information Service had financed regular meetings of women farmers, and the Commission's first action program on equal opportunity from 1982 to 1985 included a priority focus on selfemployment and women in agriculture in order to advance gender equality in these sectors. In the context of these activities, the COPA Women's Committee in the early 1980s initiated the first EU-wide inquiry into the legal status of women on family farms. The results of the survey were discussed at a seminar in Grado, Italy, in November 1982, organized by COPA and a Brussels-based policy think tank, with support from the Commission. The survey found considerable inequalities, and the seminar concluded that it was necessary to write a separate directive for women in self-employment and agriculture (Women in Agriculture 1988: 1–2). In the following years, according to one female Commission official involved in the issue (at the time as a staff member of COGECA, the umbrella association of agricultural cooperatives merged with COPA), professional staff in the COPA Women's Committee, femocrats in the Commission, and feminist members of the European Parliament pursued this legal strategy to change the situation of women farmers (Interview 2). According to the report presented at Grado, member states did not discriminate between male and female farm heads. Indeed, all EU member states allowed women to own and run farms, all allowed spouses to form joint companies, and most (except Ireland) allowed spouses to be employees of their husbands (Commission of the European Communities 1994: 6; Sousi-Roubi and von Prondzynski 1983: 11). But very few couples working farms were taking advantage of these legal options and instead continued the established practice of treating women farmers as assisting spouses. There were very few women running farms; most were designated “farmers' wives,” considered to be essentially different from and not comparable to farmers. Thus the charge of discrimination seemed logically impossible. Member states acknowledged the extensive contribution that women made to the farming enterprise, but the fact that they had no independent entitlement to remuneration or social security protection was not considered a problem. Their subsistence and security resulted from their Page 91 → marriage to a farmer, it was said, and if they wanted to be farmers running businesses, the law did not prevent them from doing so. At Grado participants questioned this gender-neutral formulation of the law and the continued implied practice of coverture it made possible. Without independent entitlements they knew women farmers were fully dependent on their husbands. If they divorced, they not only lost a job and livelihood but also access to pension benefits their husbands had accumulated. Furthermore, if they could not work because of disability, illness, accident, or maternity, they had no entitlement to compensation for income foregone. The Women's Committee's study also found differences in training, with women rarely taking technical courses in farmwork, and massive differences in women's access to farming organizations and cooperatives. Though there was variation across member states, their labor clearly was not accorded the same value as that of the male farmer, their status not equal to that of the male head of household and business (Sousi-Roubi and von Prondzynski 1983). The Grado seminar called for an EC directive to address the occupational status of “women farmers” with regard to property rights, tax legislation, social security, access to vocational training, farming organizations, cooperatives, and relief services. According to a Commission official involved in the preparations, French and Belgian legislation served as a model (Interview 5). The French had created a new category of legal status, the conjoint collaborateur, for assisting spouses, which allowed them to gain their own entitlement to a pension. The Walloons allowed for co-titularity, giving women and men joint title to a farm (Interview 5). A legal status that accounted for the different situation of women farmers seemed the way out. The seminar received support in this demand from the European Parliament. Simone Martin, a Liberal MEP from France, charged by the EP's newly formed Committee of Inquiry into the Situation of Women in Europe to report on women in family businesses, attended the Grado seminar. Her report to the Parliament emphasized the importance of legally recognizing women's work in the household and in family enterprises, criticized the fact that too many tax and social security provisions were tied to the status of the head of enterprise, and recommended that all family members working in a family business be given the status of partner. Her report also took up the issues of social security, maternity leave, vocational training, access to professional organizations and cooperatives, and relief services (Sousi-Roubi and von Prondzynski 1983).

Encouraged by calls for a directive from the European Parliament and the COPA Women's Committee, the Commission in 1984 drafted a proposal for a Page 92 → directive that closely reflected the demands first formulated at Grado and reiterated by the EP. It emphasized the importance of giving women farmers an occupational status as either partner or employee (rather than simply a marital status as wife). Only occupational status would gain them recognition of their contribution to family income and entitlements to social security. The draft directive also included language addressing the range of concerns discussed at the Grado seminar (Commission of the European Communities 1984). In its reading, the EP voted to support the proposal while proposing to strengthen some of its provisions. In particular, it added language that guaranteed recognition of the spouse's work with regard to rights of succession—thus introducing the loaded issue of property rights—and required organizations and cooperatives to change their statutes to allow spouses to participate.2 It also broadened the conditions that would allow for replacement services. In parallel to adopting the Commission proposal, the EP passed a resolution in which it expressed the hope that the directive would eliminate discrimination of women in self-employment and agriculture, and gain them preferential rights to inheritance, a separate income, and rights to separate treatment for tax and social security purposes (European Parliament 1984). Despite this groundswell of support, the Council (initially under the Dutch and then under the British presidency) radically watered down the draft directive.3 It reformulated provisions to recognize women farmers' professional status in a way that made them meaningless: “Member States shall undertake to examine under what conditions recognition of the work of the spouses … may be encouraged and, in light of such examination, consider any appropriate steps for encouraging such recognition” (European Union 1986: Article 7). Gone were references to acknowledging the work of women farmers in the form of cash payments, allocations of profit shares, or inheritance rights. Gone was the idea to recognize their work through an entry in a register of a trade organization. Fuzzy language replaced provisions about maternity protection and social security. The Council substituted the reference to “independent entitlements” with wording that called for voluntary contribution schemes for spouses, and only if they were not protected “under the self-employed worker's social security scheme.” In other words, derived rights were not considered a problem. Finally, the directive made no reference to eliminating unequal treatment in the tax code or gaining women access to professional organizations or equal access to training. All these had been included in the Commission draft. The EP's proposal to add language on inheritance rights was ignored. The directive passed in December 1986 as Page 93 → Directive 86/613/EEC on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a selfemployed capacity, and on the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood (European Union 1986). Not surprisingly, the directive changed little. Unlike other EU equality directives, 86/613 only once served as the basis for a case at the European Court of Justice—and in that case to argue the rights of a self-employed professional, not of a woman farmer.4 Governments reported in a 1994 review on the implementation of the directive that “it had not been necessary for them to amend or adapt their national legislation in order to implement the Directive” (Commission of the European Communities 1994: 6). The German government insisted that it was “neither necessary nor possible to improve the position of the spouse” (Commission of the European Communities 1994: 15). Nothing had changed with regard to the occupational status of women farmers: “By and large the Member States felt that there was no need for new initiatives to encourage such recognition” (Commission of the European Communities 1994: 6). And social security rights, for the most part, were still derived rights or based on costly private insurance schemes. Only in the area of maternity protection did the report find some movement—some states now granted allowances, but genuine relief services were still the exception. The first draft of the 1994 review had included critical comments from nongovernmental organizations, which reiterated that the work of spouses needed to be recognized. The Commission decided to strike these comments in the published report. Furthermore, the consultant who wrote the report suggested that the fact that she, a junior subcontractor and not a regular civil servant, was recruited to do the report implied that the Commission attached little importance to the directive (Interview 11). Fifteen years later, a report on the directive by a network of legal experts confirmed her conclusion that the impact of the directive “has been quite modest” (Network of Legal Experts 2008(?): 4). The experts identified Article 7, which so vaguely suggested that the member states take action on the issue of recognition, as one of the weakest points of the directive. They also criticized that the directive did not set minimum standards. In the area of social security, they found that most countries had not

made it compulsory for assisting spouses to gain coverage. The experts' report was the first step in a new effort to revise the directive. Although femocrats in the Commission at a strategy session in 1993 had concluded that “the chances of reviving the original proposal are very Page 94 → poor,”5 feminist members of the European Parliament continued their activism. For 20 years in a row, starting in the late 1980s, the Parliament passed resolutions calling on the Community to amend 86/613 so that spouses would be defined as “joint partners” in a family business and would enjoy “the same rights to full social protection” as female employees (European Parliament, Committee on Women's Rights 1989). It called for the promotion of training for farmers' wives, public information, and government enforcement services. It urged the recognition of the work of spouses and of other female helpers. In the context of CAP reform it began to demand that vocational training measures include “farm management courses, agri-tourism, organic farming, diversification of activities,” and new technologies (European Parliament 1994), and it emphasized the relevance of gender mainstreaming and rural development (European Parliament 2003, 2008). Throughout these years it recognized that the directive had “failed dismally” (European Parliament, Committee on Women's Rights 1997) and demanded a new directive (see most explicitly European Parliament 1997). The Parliament's continued activism eventually bore fruit in the first decade of the new century when the Commission in October 2008 proposed a revision of the directive, and the Swedish presidency in the second half of 2009 made the issue a priority. The new text provided an entirely different framing. While the original directive was seen as an extension of equality legislation, the revision was framed as an instrument for job creation under the European Union's Lisbon agenda. The agenda's ambitious employment goals included the boosting of female employment and thus of female entrepreneurship, and it put considerable emphasis on reconciling work and family responsibilities. The new draft directive reflected these priorities. The directive (2010/41/EU) entered into force in August 2010, mandating the repeal of the old directive two years later. It considerably strengthened the original directive by adding definitions of direct and indirect discrimination and defining various forms of harassment as discrimination. It also went beyond equal treatment to allow for positive action enabling the member states to counteract the dearth of women in self-employment. And it gave existing equality bodies competence on the issue, ensuring proactive initiatives and closer supervision of implementation. Most important, the directive strengthened provisions on maternity leave and social security. It required member states to set up systems that allowed the self-employed and assisting spouses/life partners6 to gain maternity protection, and it required them to give equal social security protection to assisting spouses and life partners on Page 95 → a mandatory or voluntary basis (European Union 2010). The new directive thus addressed many of the weaknesses in the old. At the same time, 2010/41/EU did not include a reference to the legal recognition of the status of assisting spouses or life partners, something that the legal experts had considered crucial since only separate status or the registration of spouses or life partners by competent authorities would ensure them economic entitlements. In order to rectify this matter, the European Parliament in its first reading of the measure passed an amendment—proposed by the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality—to reinsert the old Article 7 into the proposal with the justification that this would allow for the possibility of compensation in case of divorce or separation and thus for avoiding hardship. The committee in its report drew attention to the fact “that it is difficult to recognize the contribution of assisting spouses to business profit unless registration is made compulsory” (European Parliament 2009a: 22). But the article committing member states “to examine under what conditions recognition of the work of assisting spouses may be encouraged” and so forth did not make it into the new directive. Apparently governments were loathe to interfere in the existing gender order. Indeed, the directive specifies that it is “without prejudice to the rights and obligations deriving from marital or family status as defined in national law” and that it does not cover “relationships between the self-employed worker and his or her spouse or life partner” (European Union 2010: 2). Instead, it only applies to the relationship of self-employed workers to third parties. The new directive targeted primarily the proliferating small enterprises in a more liberal European economy, with

the shrinking population of family farms a secondary concern. The representatives of crafts organizations and some member states opposed the directive, in part out of a neoliberal impulse rejecting any kind of new rules for small business, in part because they considered the regulation of maternity and social security an infringement on the rights of member states.7 In contrast, agricultural organizations supported the directive and the goal of more gender equality for assisting spouses and life partners on family farms, as did unions and some other member states. But the gendered rules of the agricultural welfare state continued to assert themselves in the reluctance to address the recognition of the economic contribution of assisting spouses. Clearly, demands to officially recognize the work of women farmers were radical and struck at the heart of the family farm. They suggested the possibility that women farmers would see themselves entitled to property, income, Page 96 → and farm inheritance. They would, in this way, affect power relations within the farm, questioning divisions of labor that constructed the work of women farmers as secondary. And they would have challenged the ideological representation of family farming as an embodiment of cooperative values under the benevolent leadership of the farmer. What have the directives at the European level accomplished? The success of 86/613 lies mostly in the fact that it attracted attention to the issue of the status of assisting spouses in family businesses and in agriculture. But the directive did not create any new entitlements for women farmers. On the contrary, the directive amounted to a politics of refusal in which some member states put up obstacles to any meaningful reform. The new directive includes more instruments that strengthen the hands of local activists—such as giving national women's machineries competence to promote equal treatment in self-employment. It also includes entitlements to maternity leave, no longer only for spouses but also for unmarried partners. It furthermore draws attention to the issue of social security. But it similarly refuses to seriously engage with the issue of explicitly recognizing women's economic contributions on farms. The directives are a product of refusal and, in the case of the second directive, also one of compromise, that is, requiring that member states make provisions so assisting spouses can gain an independent claim to social insurance. In the European multilevel state, how did the discourse in Brussels resonate in national politics? How did it impact local gender regimes, including rules of entitlement, labor control, and identity? An exploration of the feminist struggle for agricultural pension reform in Germany can provide insight into these questions.

Agricultural Pension Reform in Germany In Germany the Deutsche Landfrauenverband (dlv) had called for better social security protection for women farmers since the late 1970s. It had focused in particular on survivor benefits and old age insurance. Publications by its secretary-general appeared in feminist outlets as well as in the media targeting the agricultural sector (Dobrowolski 1978, 1979, 1984). In the mid-1980s, a law reforming social security in agriculture included a small step forward: Married farmers had long received pensions that were one-third higher than those of unmarried farmers. Women farmers were now entitled to separate payments of this portion to their own accounts if they applied to the insurance Page 97 → agency and requested separate payments. This was a minor victory, one that cost the government nothing and ultimately did not cost male farmers either: In order not to rock the boat at home, the vast majority of women farmers never availed themselves of this new option. While the dlv had called for better social security for women farmers, it did not go so far to call for independent rights. But the issue of an independent pension for women farmers appeared in conjunction with a larger government effort to reform social insurance in the agricultural sector in the early 1990s. Like previous efforts this reform primarily sought to address the increasing difficulties in funding the agricultural pension system in light of a shrinking base of contributors. The reform also sought to increase the compatibility of the agricultural insurance system with the general social insurance system. Like Austria, Italy, and Poland (but unlike countries with more competitive agricultural systems such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands), Germany had developed a separate social insurance system for farmers. The system not only delivered social security but also helped support farm incomes and was used as a tool for structural policies. As a result it was heavily subsidized by the state, which paid for approximately two-thirds of the cost (Roth 1991: 117). While useful in furthering the goals of the

agricultural welfare state, agricultural social insurance increasingly became unsustainable. The 1992 CAP reform in the context of the Uruguay round had yielded a windfall of funding dedicated to agriculture that the German government wanted to use to reform the system. Reform also was urgent in light of unification: a transfer of the existing system to the very different farming structures in the East would have significantly disadvantaged the successor organizations of the LPGs (Mehl 2008). The reform of the social insurance system provided an opportunity to advance the cause of equal pension rights, which in the end became its main characteristic, helping to stabilize the system by increasing the base of potential contributors. The state's need coincided with movement demands to make independent pensions a reality for women farmers. In the mid-1980s, a feminist campaign formed in the German countryside demanding equal rights to social security for women farmers. Significantly, the initiative for the campaign came not from the dlv whose close relationship to the Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV), the main organization representing farmers in Germany, made it cautious in pressing for radical reform. Indeed, in most Länder the dlv functioned as the women's caucus of the DBV, gaining it access to government resources but hampering its political independence. Its political Page 98 → positions typically were in line with those of the DBV, which initially was cautious with regard to independent pension rights for women farmers. Initiative for the campaign came instead from the women's caucus within the agrarian opposition movement. Young farmers, unhappy with the productivist, progrowth, and ecologically unsustainable politics of the European Union, the German government, and the DBV, organized as part of the emerging green movement in the late 1970s (Schmidt and Jasper 2001). Young women living and working on farms and participating in this agrarian opposition movement introduced more radical feminist perspectives into rural politics. These women, organized in the Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft (AbL), no longer were content to play the role of the sacrificing farmer's wife and adopted the language of equal rights in order to redefine themselves. One of the leaders explained the motivation for the campaign for equal pension rights as follows: “It all started when the dlv once again issued a statement saying that they will not fight for that [i.e., equal pension rights]. That for us was the impetus to say, we have to do something about this if the dlv doesn't take care of this” (Interview 17, my trans.). The campaign, which became known as the Bäuerinnenkampagne, originally focused on the state of BadenWürttemberg. Unlike the dlv in other German Länder, here the organization operated independently of the DBV and joined the campaign as a leading force. Leadership also came from the Evangelisches Bauernwerk, an organization of the Protestant church that focused on agrarian issues. The dlv and the Bauernwerk gave the campaign legitimacy with the mainstream agricultural organizations as well as with the government. The same woman leader from the agrarian opposition remembered the campaign. The dlv Württemberg-Baden is the only one in the country that is independent of the farmers' organization…. And that was our chance. We always wanted a coalition as broad as possible, and the head of the Württemberg dlv at the time … was a very engaged woman. She was a little older and did not come from a farm originally, but married a farmer. She was a teacher, and has always had different ideas than her colleagues…. She had backbone, and she was willing to make her own politics against the mainstream. Without her, nothing would have happened. Thus, we sparked the issue, we formulated the demand. But without [her] we would have never gotten the breadth. (Interview 17, my trans.) Page 99 → By 1992 the coalition had broadened to 24 organizations including, in addition to the lead organizations, rural youth, women's, and professional organizations associated with the Catholic and Protestant churches, and rural educational institutions. The campaign received support from the Green Party in Baden-Württemberg early on, which commissioned a study on the situation of women farmers in the region and put a proposal for changes before the state parliament (Behr and Wonneberger 1986; Grüne Politik 1987(?)). The Greens and the Social Democrats introduced similar proposals in other Länder parliaments. In 1989, the campaign went national with a hearing organized by the

women's caucus of the Social Democrats in the German Bundestag (Frauen auf dem Lande 1989). While at the time the dlv at the national level still hesitated to support the campaign, it adopted the language of the movement in early 1991, no longer calling for “better social security” but, instead, for “independent social security” for women farmers. Six months later, in a major turnaround, the DBV issued a statement in favor of independent pension rights for women farmers, considering them an improvement for “farming families.” The Bavarian section of the DBV, together with the conservative parties, continued their opposition, considering women's pension rights too costly for farming families and advocating instead private insurance schemes. But, by this time, most regional governments had come to support the initiative, and the federal government and federal insurance bodies had begun to develop models that could address the equal rights issue in conjunction with the financial troubles in the agricultural insurance system (Unabhängige Bauernstimme, March 1991: 9; November 1992: 2–3). The law finally went into force on January 1, 1995. What did the Bäuerinnenkampagne accomplish? Its demands were extensive. First was the demand for independent pension benefits. Women farmers wanted to rectify the situation where, after divorce, their work during their previous marriage was no longer recognized, and they lost all rights to their former husbands' pensions. They also sought retirement rights, noting that, under current law, they could retire only if their husbands decided to retire, even if they were disabled or otherwise unable to continue their work. Thus, in connection with independent pension benefits they wanted a flexibilization of the retirement age and a right to early retirement in case of disability. The second set of demands involved survivor benefits. Women farmers thought it unfair that children and wives got survivor benefits at the Page 100 → time of the death of the father and husband, but children and husbands got nothing at the time of the death of the mother and wife. Third, the campaign demanded that a worker should be able to benefit from her contributions to both agricultural and nonagricultural retirement systems. This was a particularly salient issue for women who started jobs outside agriculture and then married a farmer or otherwise moved between the farming and nonfarming sector in the course of their careers, in many cases losing contributions they made to the nonagricultural retirement system. The reform addressed all three of these issues, providing independent entitlements to pensions by requiring all women farmers to join the system (unless they qualified for an exemption), making their entitlements available to survivors, and making the two retirement systems more compatible. But the law did not address a series of other demands. These included the implementation of a maternal protection law entitling women farmers who gave birth to a helper in the household/farm, her right to choose whether she wanted household or farm help in case of sickness, and equal representation in the supervisory bodies of the insurance system (Unabhängige Bauernstimme, March 1991: 9–10). The law envisioned that insurance may provide for help in case of maternity up to six weeks before and eight to twelve weeks after birth, but this was not mandatory. The law also remained silent on the issue of equal representation on supervisory bodies. Thus, the campaign accomplished many but not all of its goals. The fight for equal rights in the social security system yielded a compromise. Compromise also was the result of another demand of the campaign, that is, the struggle for status and recognition. As at the European level, the campaign sought a change in instruction rules defining the identity of women farmers: Bäuerin should be understood as an occupation, not a marital status; women farmers should be considered entrepreneurs like their husbands, not wives. In the language of the campaign, a marriage contract was no substitute for social security rights. The new law addressed these inequalities by providing independent pension rights, but it did not give women farmers an occupational status equal to their spouses. Instead the pension reform law constructed women as “fictitious entrepreneurs,” a legal maneuver that helped it provide independent entitlements to pension without jeopardizing other social security entitlements. In the reading of one of the drafters this meant that the Bäuerin did not “typically” and “regularly” have the status of an entrepreneur but could be treated as such for pension purposes (Parliament of Bavaria 1992). In other words, the recognition of women's status as Page 101 → workers would not extend to other areas that would allow them to claim economic rights such as rights to a share of the profit or rights to the farm itself. The campaign regretted this construction, stating in its position paper on the draft law that it “would have wished for a clear construction of equal social status for Bäuerinnen” (Unabhängige Bauernstimme, November 1992, my trans.). But the understanding of

women farmers as wives was entrenched in other social insurance schemes, and a redefinition would have meant a loss of health benefits. This was particularly problematic for women running small farms whose husbands pursued other professions. Considered nonworking housewives, they were insured with their husbands. Acknowledging that they were running an enterprise would have meant that they needed to establish their own health insurance. The campaign relented for practical reasons: “If social equality without mandatory health insurance is possible only through ‘fictitious' entrepreneurship, then we will be able to accept that, but we are not happy about it” (unpublished draft of statement provided during Interview 17, my trans.). The difference of women on small, part-time farms thus emerged as a stumbling block on the way to equal status. The campaign compromised on their behalf, but their different situation created new problems in the process of the law's implementation: women on part-time farms found payments into the agricultural pension system to be out of proportion with their incomes from farming. Thus, once the law went into effect, part-time farmers reacted with massive protests. Within a few months the government saw itself forced to issue a corrective law that allowed broad exemptions for women working on part-time farms (Wirth 1996) with the result that the number of women who benefited from the new law shrank significantly. The majority of farms in Germany, over 55 percent in 2005, were part-time farms (BMELV 2007: 10). Not surprisingly, applications for exemptions proliferated. While in 1995 both partners were insured in the agricultural pension system in close to 65 percent of all farms, that number dropped to about 31 percent by 2004. At the same time, the number of married couples in which only “the farmer” was insured and not “the spouse” increased significantly. The largest increase, however, was in the category of couples where neither partner participated in the agricultural insurance system, accounting for more than a third of all cases. In the end, those left in the system were those who could not qualify for an exemption (Mehl 2008). These developments in the agricultural pension system must be read as a sign of the end of the agricultural welfare state and its gender order. The Page 102 → ideal-typical family farm with its complementary gender division of labor is disappearing. More typically, the husband, and sometimes the wife, earn income from nonfarm activities and run the farm only as a part-time operation. Yet these off-farm income earners were not the target of the law. The purpose of the law was to remedy the status of women on the ideal-typical full-time farm by broadening rules of entitlement and introducing new rules of identity. While the campaign's challenge to the state yielded compromises with regard to these rules, it defined the issue from the perspective of women on full-time farms, ironically silencing the difference of the majority. One effect was that this accelerated the “normalization” of the status of women farmers on part-time farms. In the world of social insurance, they became employees or housewives; they no longer were women farmers. There is some irony in the fact that a law fought for by feminists ended up turning many women whose work was previously acknowledged, albeit indirectly, into housewives. Arguably, one of the problems was that the campaign steered clear of addressing issues of labor control and in this way got co-opted into the defining parameters of the welfare state, including the preservation of its gender order. The question whether housework and caring work should entitle women to pension rights never entered the equation. This was perhaps less problematic for women on full-time farms where it is difficult to separate household and caring labor from farmwork and where raising the issue may have been counterproductive. But the same was not the case on part-time farms, where men typically earned the bulk of household income in off-farm employment, and farming supplemented this income. Here it appeared that men's income would have to subsidize women's independent pensions because the value the farm produced was relatively low. The value the woman farmer produced through her household and caring work never factored into the equation. Economic incentives were such that part-time farmers saw themselves better off defining women farmers as housewives exempt from old age insurance. The story of the struggle for equal pension rights for women farmers thus is a story of compromise, the silencing of difference, and ultimately co-optation. The campaign yielded tangible outcomes in the form of eligibility for independent pension rights for about 300,000 women working on farms (Fuhr 1995: 114). Their pension rights were finally the same as those of women workers outside agriculture, and they were independent of those of their spouses. But women farmers had to compromise on issues of maternity protection and equal participation in supervisory bodies. And they had to compromise Page 103 → on the issue of status. Yet, despite legal acrobatics

suggesting that their entrepreneurship was fictitious, women's status was redefined. Thus, in a response to my inquiry, the secretary of the dlv insisted that legally speaking the majority of women farmers today are not “unpaid family laborers” but “entrepreneurs' spouses,” a status that conveys the same rights and duties as that of the entrepreneur (Interview 15). German statistical convention and social and cultural practice, however, continued to distinguish the Betriebsleiter, that is, the person predominantly in charge of the farm, from the spouse. And there was no formal recognition of the economic contribution of the spouse or her registration with authorities, which might have given her claims to profit or farming capital. Thus the status in the pension system was only a first step in gaining fully equal rights. But it was a first step nonetheless. The outcomes of the struggle for equal pension rights also must be interpreted as a co-optation of feminist agendas. The campaign failed to problematize a central basis of masculine dominance in the agricultural sector, that is, patterns of labor control on the family farm and labor divisions ideologically constructing women's work as secondary. The support provided by the state to the family farm—which now included independent pension rights for women—led women farmers to consent to their own subordination, continuing to perform work considered nonproductive and supplementary. The inequality in labor control became most apparent in the situation of part-time women farmers. While the campaign and the law ignored their difference, they now became officially sanctioned housewives (or at least non-farmers), as their husbands' work was affirmed to be more important than their own. Part-time women farmers were officially deemed to be undeserving of the independent social protections afforded their husbands and their full-time farming colleagues. The co-optation of the campaign meant its silent acceptance of the gendered rules of the welfare state and with it the silencing of part-time farming that violated these rules. Not raising the issue of gender divisions of labor made possible the definition of parttime women farmers as housewives. In sum, the struggle for equal pension rights for women farmers in Germany is a story of compromise, cooptation, and silencing of difference. It parallels the story at the European level that encountered refusal and ultimately also compromise. The most difficult issue for women farmers was to gain official recognition for their economic contribution, something attempted explicitly in the European directives and something activists attempted Page 104 → via the social insurance system in Germany. At the European level, the state refused to introduce a rule on recognition both in 1986 and again in 2010; at the national level, activists won a severely limited recognition within the confines of pension insurance. But the campaign did achieve a crucial success, modifying one rule of entitlement at the heart of masculine rule in the agricultural welfare state and in this way chipping away at its larger edifice. In addition, the new directive includes more forceful prescriptions on social security and maternity protection that may become the fodder for new local struggles. While mechanisms of power obstructed, diverted, and slowed feminist struggles, they did not manage to arrest change.

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Chapter 5

Rural Development and Gender Mainstreaming From its beginnings in the 1960s, the common agricultural policy (CAP) included some structural measures aimed at modernizing the agricultural sector and increasing agricultural productivity (Fennell 1997: 14). These measures were funded through the guidance portion of the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF). They included investment aids aimed at improving the physical capital of farms, early retirement programs, and vocational training aimed at fostering human resource development. Supporting the agricultural welfare state, these interventions targeted “the farm” or “the farmer” and typically were blind to gender relations. The implicit assumption was that whatever was good for the farm was good for all members of the farming family. But, as I have shown in chapter 3, the result was also that these kinds of aids disproportionately benefited men. The meaning of rural development in the European decentered state changed considerably in the following decades. As outlined in the 2005 development regulation (European Union 2005), rural development now encompassed environmental preservation, improving life in the countryside, and economic diversification, in addition to agricultural modernization. In combining farm modernization and economic development with a focus on environmental preservation, EU policy joined a neoliberal policy with a policy of state intervention. Such intervention no longer saw as its main goal the welfare of the farming family but the competitiveness of rural areas in a global market. Environmental preservation, a diversified rural economy, and modern farms were thought to make it possible for rural areas to compete in a globalized economy. Unlike in the early years of the CAP, rural development policy under liberal environmentalism faces a feminist challenge. Not only did the European Page 106 → Commission adopt a general policy of gender mainstreaming in 1996, but a Council resolution specifically mandated gender mainstreaming in the structural funds the same year, including the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund.1 Furthermore, the 1999 and 2005 rural development regulations both committed to the principle of gender equality. The 1999 regulation formulated the need (among many others) to promote “equal opportunities for men and women.” The 2005 regulation specified as one of its principles, in Article 8, “equality between men and women and non-discrimination.” It formulated the principle in a way that followed the Commission's strategy of “diversity mainstreaming,” which had come to subsume gender mainstreaming. Member States and the Commission shall promote equality between men and women and shall ensure that any discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation is prevented during the various stages of programme implementation. This includes the stages of design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. (European Union 2005: Article 8) But in the Commission, gender mainstreaming was hampered by the dearth of resources allocated to gender equality. In DG Agriculture and Rural Development over many years, only one staff member was designated as the contact for gender equality issues.2 She was located in the “environment” unit, a lone gender entrepreneur voicing issues of concern to women and facing considerable resistance (Interview 5). After her retirement a new and relatively young staff person, located in “cross-cutting strategies,” was designated the gender focal point. She oversaw gender mainstreaming activities in the DG, but this assignment was just a minor part of her portfolio. She found support for her work outside the DG in the Inter-service Group on Gender Equality, which networked officials from various DGs, and in the Consultative Group of Rural Women (Working Group of Women in Rural Areas), a relatively weak civil society group established and partly funded by the Commission (Interview 1). Men dominate the DG, with women occupying only about 20 percent of administrative and management positions at the end of the twentieth century.3 This mediated against a more forceful implementation of gender equality policies and of gender mainstreaming in particular. Decision making in the European decentered state is organized differently in the area of rural development than in the agricultural welfare state. While Page 107 → the EU has increasingly sought to coordinate European rural

development policy, for the most part the policy has remained the responsibility of member states. In the German federal system, authority for rural development is shared between the federal government and the Länder. Indeed, until the late 1960s, the Länder had sole authority over rural development. Now the federal government coordinates certain “common tasks,” but the Länder still develop their own policies and are in charge of implementation. Together, the federal government and regional governments have matched and exceeded rural development funding provided by the EU. The strengthened EU commitment to subsidiarity, that is, to devolving competencies to the local level when federal and European levels are not more effective, has counteracted efforts of central control from Brussels. This chapter probes the trajectory of gender mainstreaming in rural development initiatives in Germany. It first reviews the tepid adoption of gender mainstreaming and then focuses on its implementation in the LEADER program, an EU program established in 1991 that emphasized rural diversification, the formation of regional identities, and making regions competitive. In order to probe the impacts of the LEADER program on local gender regimes, the investigation takes advantage of the German history of East/West division, which has institutionalized quite different gender constructions that continue to show effects into the present. The comparison focuses on the implementation of the LEADER program in the Altmark region in Saxony-Anhalt, a Land in the former East, and the Danube/Bavarian Forest region in the state of Bavaria, in the former West. It shows the different impacts of the LEADER program in different spaces of the decentered European state, together with different power mechanisms activated. It also illustrates the force with which existing gender regimes affect the outcomes and impacts of rural development programs.

Gender Mainstreaming in Germany Under the conservative Kohl government, which held power from 1982 to 1998, Germany sought to maintain its male breadwinner gender regime and was a laggard with regard to supporting the EU's gender equality goals. But the Red/Green coalition government that came to power in 1998 embraced the EU's mandate of gender mainstreaming. Federal government ministries jointly adopted gender mainstreaming as an administrative principle in June 1999 and set up an interdepartmental working group to implement the strategy. Page 108 → All ministries committed to offering gender training to their staff and to initiating at a minimum one pilot project that applied gender mainstreaming.4 Successively, bureaucracies and assemblies from the federal to the Landkreis (county) level issued proclamations adopting gender mainstreaming. Often the main motivator was to meet criteria for support from the EU's structural funds, and implementation was highly uneven (Müller 2007). But at the federal level, the ministries under Green leadership in particular embraced the strategy. Gender mainstreaming became the salient tool through which feminism—now mostly through the agency of femocrats—encountered the decentered state. The agriculture ministry adopted a gender mainstreaming policy in 2000 when Renate Künast of the Green Party replaced the old minister after a series of devastating food scandals. Künast relocated responsibility for implementing the approach from the personnel department to her planning staff. The ministry developed annual work plans that focused on making the strategy part of its regular practice, completed training sessions for department leaders, conducted information sessions, formed informal working groups to serve as multipliers and gender focal points in the ministry's various departments, and explored the feasibility of gender budgeting. It designated a pilot project in Saxony-Anhalt to illustrate the uses of gender mainstreaming in regional planning processes. In addition, it aimed to mainstream gender into its personnel policies, seeking to create awareness in the process of annual evaluations5 and debating extra points in evaluations and hiring decisions for people who showed gender competence. A guide for considering gender issues in the development of bills was introduced, and official forms were revised using “gender-just” language. Finally, gender considerations were mainstreamed into policy documents, departmental reports, and guidelines6 (Gießübel 2005; Interview 13; Wonneberger 2005). But because competence for rural development in Germany mostly lies with the Länder, the adoption of gender mainstreaming needs to be gauged at that level. A review of implementation efforts in Bavaria and Saxony-Anhalt shows stark differences. Bavaria, ruled by the conservative Christian Socialist Union (CSU) since 1962, was one of the last Länder to adopt a gender mainstreaming policy in 2002 and did so reluctantly. In contrast, Saxony-

Anhalt, one of the new Länder, was the first to adopt gender mainstreaming in 1998 and became a model for Germany and Europe. In Bavaria, pressure to adopt gender mainstreaming came from the EU and from women in the opposition parties in the state's legislature. Following Page 109 → activities at the federal level, the Bavarian parliament defeated several proposals introduced by the opposition Greens and the Social Democrats. The parliament was initially opposed to gender mainstreaming because it felt it was imposed by the EU. But the strategy became palatable when supporters argued that gender mainstreaming would also help realize the gender equality goal in the Bavarian constitution. In 2002 the cabinet of ministers issued two decisions on the implementation of gender mainstreaming and included the approach in its bylaws. Parliament followed with decisions about training leaders in gender mainstreaming, introducing gender considerations into the Bavarian job creation program and a general decision on the adoption of gender mainstreaming. Implementation was strongly decentralized and delegated to the ministries. The government formed an interministerial working group and initiated pilot projects (mostly focused on data collection) and training for staff in the ministries. But besides the Ministry for Work, Social Matters, Family, and Women (the ministry that was in charge of overall implementation), only the Ministries of the Interior and Finance developed their own structures of oversight. Most, including the agricultural ministry, envisioned that staff would take on the issue once they had been sensitized through training (Müller 2007: 132ff.). Not surprisingly, these ministries took no serious steps to implement gender mainstreaming. In the agriculture ministry there is little evidence of any implementation; in the words of one official, “implementation has clearly been wanting” (Interview 29, my trans.). In order to provide evidence of gender mainstreaming, the ministry on its Web site pointed to long-existing women-focused programs such as its training programs for home economics and tourist services (Urlaub auf dem Bauernhof), both targeted to women farmers in their traditional role and clearly not examples of gender mainstreaming. Indeed, during interviews with both women and men in the ministry and with a woman farmer in the Bavarian parliament, questions about gender mainstreaming invariably led to discussions about the status of home economics training in Bavaria, a domain that was under attack and had seen severe funding cuts that caused a lot of bitterness among women in the ministry (Interviews 22, 23, 29). The only other place where the ministry claimed evidence of gender mainstreaming was a series of projects implemented locally in the context of the LEADER program and a training program financed by the European Social Fund. Here three projects were cited for including initiatives that targeted women: the formation of a network of women-owned businesses, the formation of a network of women's organizations seeking to establish an intergenerational Page 110 → meeting place to facilitate women's integration into the labor market, and a mentoring initiative to help women gain access to leadership positions.7 Furthermore, gender mainstreaming (or other gender equality strategies) clearly had not affected personnel practices. In 2002, men held 93 percent of all leadership positions in the agriculture ministry (Die Lage der Gleichstellung: 5, 10). In the words of one official, “That is how it is, you cannot deny it, this is still a male-dominated domain” (Interview 29, my trans.). In contrast to Bavaria, Saxony-Anhalt was the first Land to introduce gender mainstreaming in Germany. The social-democratic government of Rein-hard Höppner (1994–2002) provided top-level support for gender mainstreaming and integrated the practice into a wider process of administrative reform. The relative openness of administrative practices after the fall of communism may have aided the institutionalization of gender mainstreaming in the Land, but political will was clearly crucial.8 The conservative government that followed continued this work, but commitment was reduced and implementation almost halted (Müller 2007: 75–110). In public pronouncements, gender mainstreaming became subsumed under a policy of strengthening families. But gender mainstreaming also became politicized, as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the successors of the Communists—which accounted for about a fifth of seats in parliament—adopted it as a cause, vocally demanding accountability from the administration and keeping the issue on the agenda (Landtag von Sachsen-Anhalt 2004, 2005; Interview 32). Unlike Bavaria, Saxony-Anhalt developed a program for the implementation of gender mainstreaming emphasizing visible support from the top, capacity building, gender-differentiated data collection, and transparency in the process of implementation. It put in place an overarching structure for the implementation of

gender mainstreaming with an interministerial working group and designated coordinating points in all ministries. Gender mainstreaming became part of overall controlling practices that were set up in a “digital work program” throughout the administration. There was a strong emphasis on providing information, including publications, a Web presence, research data, conferences, and training. In 2001, the state gave the initial funding for the establishment of a Gender Institute, which subsequently played a key role in offering research, training, and evaluation services. All ministries implemented pilot projects and evaluated the results from these projects (Zweiter Bericht n.d.; Arbeitsprogramm 2005/2006 n.d.). Despite strong initial top-down commitment, gender mainstreaming found little resonance in the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment. Unlike Page 111 → in other ministries, some of which designated high level staff to coordinate gender mainstreaming, responsibility for implementation in the agriculture ministry lay with the equality officer (Gleichstellungsbeauftragte) (Müller 2007: 77). She was required to sign off on new legislative drafts produced in the ministry and oversaw the implementation of the ministry's pilot project. But she seemed to be alone in most of her work. The ministry did invite external experts to offer training, inform, and create sensitivity (Müller 2007: 86–87), but there was little evidence of the development of internal expertise. In the words of one male ministry official, Saxony-Anhalt is no leading light when it comes to gender mainstreaming: “We are required to say something about the topic, which we find difficult.” The sense in the ministry was that gender mainstreaming was forced upon it; as a result, there was quite a bit of resistance and indeed helplessness: “We don't have the basis,” that is, a basic competence to implement the strategy. This sentiment was perhaps less pronounced in the LEADER program, but the official doubted whether there were tangible results of gender mainstreaming even where the EU required it: “There is a lot of effort, a lot of talk, but little success” (Interview 41, my trans.). The ministry's pilot project reflected this ambivalence. Gender mainstreaming was added to an existing project, which sought to provide career counseling to students in the last years of high school and steer them toward jobs in the agricultural sector. The ministry partnered with the Deutscher Landfrauenverband (dlv), the farmer's association (DBV), and a rural youth association to implement the project. The project involved publicity, information sessions, setting up of a Web site, arranging apprenticeships, sensitizing career advisers about gender mainstreaming, and sending them to schools to introduce 13 “green jobs.” The goal of the gender-mainstreaming component was to analyze gender-specific behaviors of girls and boys, to help them see a future in agricultural jobs “according to their inclinations,” reduce shortages of skilled labor in agriculture, and reduce dropout rates in training programs.9 No evaluation of the project was published, but its impact on advancing gender equality was probably marginal. Project publications and the accompanying Web site diligently employed the feminine and masculine forms in introducing jobs (e.g., Landwirt/-in; Hauswirtschafter/-in), but there was no explicit discussion of gender in any of these documents (see Berufsbildung n.d.). There was no questioning of existing gender divisions of labor—indeed girls apparently were encouraged in particular to seek opportunities in the services sector. While the project entailed a gender-disaggregated Page 112 → analysis, it failed to take the next step, to propose action to intervene in existing gender divisions of labor and the forms of labor control they often make possible. Like the Bavarian government, the agricultural ministry in Saxony-Anhalt represented its women-focused programming as gender mainstreaming. In responding to an inquiry on the implementation of gender mainstreaming from the PDS, the ministry listed the following activities: It provided general support to the local section of the dlv with about 50,000 Euro annually between 1998 and 2003. It also funded dlv projects geared toward communicating agricultural lifestyles to the general public and toward developing rural women's capacity for income earning (including the gender mainstreaming pilot project). Funds also went to other educational groups to identify income alternatives for women and provide training. The overall amounts dedicated to these projects were small—about 40,000 Euro in project money to the dlv and 24,600 to adult education in 2003—and there was little evidence of a gender-mainstreaming approach. Indeed, a PDS member of the regional parliament questioned the exclusively women-focused approach and demanded more emphasis on gender in the context of a 2005 debate (Landtag von Sachsen-Anhalt 2005: 4005; Landtag von Sachsen-Anhalt 2004: 44–45). In sum, bureaucracies adopted gender mainstreaming at the EU, German federal, and Länder levels, but

implementation varied by administrative unit and oscillated depending on parties in power. As in other contexts, the effort to implement gender mainstreaming in Germany activated the mechanisms of policy evaporation, invisibilization, and resistance identified by Moser (2005; cf. chapter 1). While there were clear differences in the levels of commitment in Bavaria and Saxony-Anhalt, agricultural ministries in both states seemed to have difficulty embracing the approach. The response in Bavaria is best described as resistance, while the response in Saxony-Anhalt was superficial adoption without any follow-through (policy evaporation). Officials speculated that gender mainstreaming may have found more resonance in the LEADER program, which connected the EU directly to local-level polities, thus helping define a new state space with networked politics. But, as this chapter will show, there is little evidence in the LEADER programs in Bavaria or Saxony-Anhalt of a faithful implementation of the EU mandate to mainstream gender. Before I move on to explore gender mainstreaming in the new state spaces of LEADER, the following excursus probes the ideal of what gender-mainstreaming Page 113 → rural development might mean if it were properly implemented. Under its Green minister, the federal Ministry of Agriculture asked precisely this question and produced a guide for practitioners. The guide and the research reports that went into making it are model interpretations of gender mainstreaming, which also make visible mechanisms of power that might be activated if gender mainstreaming were put into practice.

Excursus: Gender Mainstreaming in the Ideal—Co-optation and Normalization Saxony-Anhalt was the site of the federal Ministry of Agriculture's pilot project on gender mainstreaming. Embedded in the politics of the Agrarwende, that is, the Greens' agricultural policy geared toward more sustainable forms of farming paired with innovative rural development, the project focused on regional advisers as initiators of entrepreneurial initiatives and regional development processes. It targeted organizational structures that had emerged from alternative participatory development efforts, characterized by open networks, in which the state bureaucracy played the role of the facilitator. Specifically, the figure of the regional adviser emerged as a representative of the state, able to transmit priorities while organizing local forces toward a commonly developed goal. In this way, the regional adviser was envisioned as a key figure in the implementation of gender mainstreaming. The final report on assessing the value of gender mainstreaming in the project was written by two outside consultants—one male, one female—and illustrates the contradictory ways in which gender mainstreaming activates mechanisms of power (Putzing and Schreiber 2003a).10 On the one hand, gender mainstreaming appeared to destabilize institutionalized patterns of advantage and disadvantage—as envisioned by its proponents. On the other hand, the strategy participated in a normalization of gender; it became part of the governmentality of the state. The project's purpose was to develop and test a method to help regional advisers promote sustainable rural development. Gender mainstreaming was added to the project as an afterthought. Indeed, the consultants found that the project administrator had no knowledge of gender mainstreaming. Thus, their purpose was reformulated to assessing how regional advisers might be able to make gender mainstreaming part of regional development processes. Their final report thus was not a project evaluation but assessed what was accomplished Page 114 → inadvertently, and outlined options and possibilities, seeking to show how gender mainstreaming could have been included and developing guidelines for regional advisers to use in the future. The report documents significant inequalities in the labor market of the project area, the Altmark. There was pervasive sex typing of occupations, training, and business ownership, and in political engagement, all of which pointed to the need for gender mainstreaming. Overall the experts found that there was no systematic gender discrimination in the project, that outcomes for women and men were random. The report highlighted best practices and suggested improvements in areas where opportunities to mainstream gender were not realized. The report identified the case of a women-run bakery, set up under the auspices of the project and billed as the “first organic rural bakery,” as a positive example. The female business owner initially encountered derision as

she entered this traditionally male field. She insisted on hiring only women, claiming that male apprentices often refused to work, and that women tended to be more reliable. It was especially noteworthy that maternity leaves never materialized as a threat to the viability of her business, thereby disproving bakers in the area who tried to rationalize their bias against hiring women by reference to the burdens resulting from such leaves. As the bakery developed it became famous for its hops rolls and flourished. Soon other bakers imitated its hiring practices—gender divisions of labor inadvertently were destabilized, and women gained power through jobs and income. Gender mainstreaming was not the source of this outcome, but a regional manager attuned to it might be able to encourage similar outcomes in other contexts. In other situations the report described missed opportunities and suggested ways in which regional advisers could have helped undermine entrenched rules that cemented women's subordinate status. For example, in initiatives to save old mills (of which there are many in the rural areas of the former East) the report suggested that women should be included in nontraditional ways, and the presentation of the history of the mill should make visible the way of life and the work not only of the miller but also of his family. The report recommended that working groups organizing fairs should include women among their paid participants, as opposed to replicating the traditional pattern of using women as unpaid labor to provide cultural programming while men pursued financial and political goals through the fairs. Similarly, the report proposed, initiatives to preserve mills should make sure to include a commitment to gender mainstreaming in their bylaws, avoid divisions Page 115 → of labor where women become secretaries and cashiers while men lead the organization, and arrange for meeting times that make it possible for both women and men to attend. The report urged fair organizers and mill preservationists to be careful in their forms of address, conveying that both women and men were welcome to participate. The experts also identified a need to target men. One project entailed training to help local residents take advantage of a new bicycle path, developing tourism around the path by offering various services. They described the initiative of dlv women to set up a picnic service, taking advantage of social and home economics skills and replicating similar initiatives around the country. They noted that the majority of innkeepers, hotel owners, and storekeepers, however, were men, and that, in identifying training needs, it may be useful to realize a need for teaching these men skills in which women excel, such as social competence and the ability to create an atmosphere of comfort. The suggestions may seem trite. Indeed, one of the consultants recounted that initially she was shocked by the banality of interventions once gender mainstreaming is applied in concrete situations, “and I thought, what, this little bit, and so on, that's all there is to gender?” (Interview 16, my trans.). However, the suggestions clearly targeted gendered rules in the labor market and in community organizing, everyday rules that are taken for granted but that provide the foundations for local gender regimes. In providing a mechanism to question these rules, gender mainstreaming does what its proponents envision, that is, it serves to undermine everyday practices and conventions that unconsciously perpetuate gender inequality, and it does so with considerable ingenuity. The guidelines did not simplistically advocate equality or difference across the board but played with both concepts, pushing toward equality in participation (bylaws, leadership roles in community organizations) while valuing the difference of women's experience (the homemaking skills of the women farmers, the broader appeal to family needs if women are included in country fairs or mill museums). But the project also revealed the mechanisms of power that inhere in any effort to engage with the mainstream. As with the equal rights approach, one such mechanism was co-optation, the subordination of gender equality goals to other goals. As shown in chapter 2, for the European level the goal now was no longer the preservation of the agricultural welfare state but the diversification of the rural economy. Thus, the project report offered several reasons why regional development managers should mainstream gender into their operations: in guaranteeing broader citizen participation, gender mainstreaming Page 116 → contributes to the “atmosphere” of development efforts, which enables creativity and innovation, and makes it easier to identify and satisfy local needs. It creates more sensibility and openness toward innovation, which facilitates future development efforts and increases the quality of life. Finally, gender mainstreaming brings financial benefit: it can be used to market the region, unlock new resources for local development, and ensure the optimal use of such resources. In other words, gender equality is good because it has economic, financial, and welfare effects. Equality is not an end in itself, but a

means to other ends. But gender mainstreaming also affects rules of identity, and the consultants' report shows how, in doing so, it can set in motion mechanisms of normalization. A central complaint of the consultants' report pertains to the serious lack of data differentiated by gender. In order to engage in serious gender monitoring, they argue, it was necessary to significantly expand the types of data that were regularly collected. This would require new resources but also new efforts on all levels of society. Offices of statistics and elections would have to reorient their work; regional managers would have to engage in specific data-collection efforts; different administrative offices should collaborate on producing gender-disaggregated data; nonprofits, schools, and universities could be included in the data-collection efforts (Putzing and Schreiber 2003a: 38–39). While central to the bureaucratic process, this collective monitoring of gender relations sets in motion processes of normalization that have been described with regard to other state projects involving the administration of populations (Foucault 1991; Scott 1998). The consultants' report provides some instances of such normalization in its section describing the status of women in the project region, which employs statistics paired with other evidence. One source of data was the Land-funded office providing support and advice to women forming new enterprises. From their interviews with personnel at this office, the consultants learned that in the business and economic realm, patterns of behavior clearly differed by gender. According to the personnel, women were more likely to be motivated to form businesses for idealistic than for economic reasons. They also tended to deliberate more extensively and keep alternatives open. They were more process oriented and more inclined toward cooperation, that is, “women prefer to communicate with people rather than with machines” (Putzing and Schreiber 2003a: 35, my trans.). Their businesses tended to be more sustainable because women were more flexible, were used to carrying double burdens, had good organizational skills, had higher formal Page 117 → qualifications, were highly motivated, and were more careful and modest in their aspirations. Finally, women had their own leadership styles. This assessment of women's business behavior as a truth typifying women's difference engages contradictory operations of power. On the one hand, in formulating new rules of feminine identity, narratives of women's entrepreneurial difference valorize new types of business behavior and in this way make difference productive for the purpose of rural development. On the other hand, these new rules regiment what feminine business behavior should be, creating an expectation of feminine difference and setting a new standard to judge women integrated in rural development. This includes creating new binaries (women's entrepreneurship vs. men's entrepreneurship) and reproducing gender hierarchy. Thus, gender mainstreaming can set in motion mechanisms of normalization that empower some women while disciplining feminine rural subjectivity in new ways. The valuing of feminine difference associated with caregiving and families (evoked in the mill projects) and the production of gender equality (such as equal entrepreneurial skill) are embedded in a larger rationality of fostering economics in the countryside. Within this rationality women are being constructed as resourceful job creators, with feminine skills (caregiving, hospitality) celebrated as a new source of rural wealth. New constructions of femininity and masculinity promote the commercialization of feminine skills, services, and products. New entitlements, jobs, and gender identities may be an outcome of these processes, but so may be old and new hegemonies—the stubborn preservation of a masculine identity for farmers and the new construction of rural womanhood as entrepreneurial. Gender mainstreaming emerges as a strategy with considerable potential to undermine existing gender regimes, while at the same time participating in the creation of a new gender regime adapted to liberal environmentalism. Thus, even in the ideal, gender mainstreaming points to contradictory outcomes in terms of power—more gender equality on the one hand; co-optation and normalization on the other. An exploration of power mechanisms in the actual practice of rural development—and in the LEADER program in particular—illustrates additional dynamics.

Mainstreaming Gender in Rural Development Regional development projects account for a small portion of rural development funding in Germany with the bulk of such funding targeting the modernization Page 118 → of individual farming enterprises. But the goals of

environmental sustainability and economic diversification have become increasingly more important with the 2005 EU rural development directive (Deutscher Bundestag 2005). Green discourses in Germany have long included the idea of autonomous regional development as an alternative to globalization. The Greens put this idea into practice when they first entered government in the state of Hesse in the mid-1980s. They implemented a program of rural development that included “supplementing agricultural production through: the local direct-sale of agricultural products; developing a regional processing industry and products with a regional identity; local energy systems; new forms of environmentally sound tourism; and nature conservation on agricultural land” (Bruckmeier 2000: 220–21). At the federal level, they helped to extend this approach when they came to power in 1998 through a pilot project entitled Regionen Aktiv, which focused on developing regional markets in agricultural products, environmental services linked to farming, and jobs in particular for women and youth, and in the area of tourism. Both the Hessian program and Regionen Aktiv resembled LEADER in their focus on environmental sustainability, rural diversification, and local participation—indeed the Hessian program was linked with LEADER in the 1990s.11 Started in 1991 as a “community initiative,” the EU's LEADER program was directly administered from Brussels and allowed for experimental approaches in support of community goals. The program was renewed twice, and starting in 2007 the LEADER method was “mainstreamed” into the newly created European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. The main characteristic of the LEADER approach was its bottom-up, participatory, and locally oriented strategy. LEADER involved creating locally based public-private partnerships (local action groups or LAGs) that formulated their own development plans and were given the funds to implement them. It emphasized the need to tie agriculture to other economic sectors for an integrated approach to rural development that diversified the rural economy by valorizing natural and cultural resources. It encouraged networking not only between the public sector and civil society but also horizontally between LAGs throughout Europe and vertically across traditional administrative boundaries. LEADER in this way jumped geographical scales, producing new, networked state spaces and participating in the reterritorialization of European public space that scholars have described in urban contexts (Brenner 2004). Europe-wide networking funded through the LEADER program and facilitated by a European LEADER Observatory encouraged flows of Page 119 → people and goods (tourists, rural development practitioners, regional products). This created new local identities in competition with each other and in dialectic with a supranational Europe (Ray 1997, 2000, 2001). In federal states like Germany it also created opportunities for new local forms of democracy (Smith 1995). The program made salient local politics, albeit linked to entities throughout Europe, and brought to the fore the relevance of local gender regimes in the interaction between feminist strategies and the decentered European state. How have EU requirements for gender mainstreaming resonated in the LEADER program in local contexts? In light of adoption or nonadoption, how have rural development programs reproduced or undermined rules of entitlement, labor control, and identity institutionalized in local gender regimes? What kinds of mechanisms of power have asserted themselves in the encounter of this new movement strategy with the local state? The remainder of this chapter explores gender politics in rural development and the LEADER program in the Danube /Bavarian Forest region in Bavaria, and in the Altmark region of Saxony-Anhalt. Bavaria has long been the largest German beneficiary of LEADER funding, whereas Saxony-Anhalt joined only after reunification in the second round of funding in 1994. The Danube/Bavarian Forest Region: Resistance and Participatory Development Located in the eastern corner of Bavaria, adjacent to the Austrian and Czech borders, the Danube/Bavarian Forest region is characterized by an attractive countryside, more than half of which is under agricultural cultivation, and more than a third of which is covered by forests. The region is thinly populated, showing relatively high rates of unemployment and low average household incomes. Women outnumber men, in part an effect of a disproportionately older population. Agriculture accounted for just 1 percent of the labor force in 2006, industry for a relatively high 42 percent, though its proportion of employment was declining. Services were the largest source of employment, but their development was lagging and failed to compensate for losses in agriculture and industry (Niederbayern 2007; STMLF and STMUG 2007: 24–37). The region is designated a disadvantaged area by the European Union and has benefited from structural fund programming. The LEADER program particularly

has resonated with a local commitment to preserving small-scale agriculture and the rural character of the countryside through diversification, and with a long tradition of participatory approaches to rural development.12 Page 120 → Bavaria eagerly embraced the reorientation of the EU toward more territorial interventions and indeed was a leader in developing these interventions. The Bavarian Kulturlandschaftsprogramm (KULAP) pursued environmental goals long before the EU's reorientation, drawing exclusively on local funding; by 1988 the KULAP was the largest agrienvironmental scheme in the European Union in terms of its budget (Wilson and Wilson 2001: 195). Furthermore, Bavaria's relatively small-scale agriculture early on led the government to foster rural income alternatives in addition to supporting agricultural subsidies. An estimated 80 percent of Bavarian farming households drew income from nonfarming sources in 2005, supplementing their income from agriculture (STMLF and STMUG 2007: 68). Government programs also sought to create more-diverse sources of on-farm income in the services sector. They targeted men as service providers to local governments contributing to infrastructure maintenance and as generators of alternative energy. But they also targeted women as organizers of farm tourism and direct marketing. Among all farming families in Bavaria, 5 to 6 percent offered farm vacations (Urlaub auf dem Bauernhof) in 2001–2, and for the majority of these, income from tourism was equal to or higher than income from agriculture (STMLF 2004, 147). The government encouraged women to market their expertise in home economics and caring, offer lodging, food, and party services, or provide care for the elderly. It provided counseling and training to enhance “the entrepreneurial potential of women farmers [Bäuerinnen], in order to increase income opportunities on the basis of their home economics education, but also in order to increase the entrepreneurial competence of Bäuerinnen and thus to contribute added value to the countryside” (STMLF 2004: 132, my trans.). While the government offered strongly women-focused programs in the agricultural sector, there was no evidence of gender mainstreaming. Indeed, gender mainstreaming was severely lacking even in programs funded by the European Union that required the approach. A 2006 evaluation of structural funds programs in Bavaria charged that administrators had blatantly ignored recommendations of a previous evaluation for more gender analysis, definition of goals, training, awareness raising, and so forth. Instead, they had classified 87 percent of all projects as neutral with regard to their impact on gender relations. The evaluators concluded that there was little gender awareness among those administering the funds and among those charged with implementing programs. Gender mainstreaming was badly integrated (Aktualisierung der Halbzeitbewertung Bayern 2005: 30–32, 72, 75). Page 121 → A 2005 evaluation of the Bavarian LEADER+ program suggested that gender mainstreaming had little resonance in this program as well. Only about 22 percent of participants in local action groups were women (Geißendörfer et al. 2005: 67). This was considerably lower than the proportion of women participating in the federally coordinated German network of LEADER+ LAGs, which was between 42 and 44 percent (BMVEL 2005: 22). Furthermore, despite the fact that evaluation templates negotiated between the Bavarian government and the EU Commission required reporting that differentiated results data by gender, most LAGs did not keep such data (Commission of the European Communities 2001). And where LAGs claimed to address the specific needs of women, such projects typically targeted training women for tourist-oriented activities or setting up exchanges for day care. Projects focused on “activities typical for women in rural areas” (Geißendörfer et al. 2005: 87, my trans.). But the evaluators seemed oblivious to the fact that the gender-mainstreaming requirement was not met. Instead they certified that the Bavarian LEADER+ program met the goal of advancing gender equality because most of its projects equally benefited women and men, an assertion clearly not born out by facts (Geißendörfer et al. 2005: 126). In the third phase of the LEADER program, the Danube/Bavarian Forest region housed six LEADER groups, covering all of the rural territory of the region.13 Their main focus was sustainable development and valorizing existing natural and cultural resources. The development of tourism on the basis of these principles was a key element for all. According to the male official supervising the LEADER+ groups in the region, gender

mainstreaming was an issue in the formulation of regional development plans included in the application for the third phase of the program. However, there was little evidence of a systematic effort of implementation employing the broad range of tools that have been developed for gender mainstreaming in other contexts. There was no gender training in the LAGs, and the understanding of gender mainstreaming seemed tenuous as the LEADER managers interviewed in the region kept reverting back to questions of women's participation and the use of quotas. While EU guidelines required that the plans and project evaluations addressed gender mainstreaming, this did not become a criterion in the selection of winning proposals (Interviews 24, 25, 28). Given the absence of gender mainstreaming, efforts to steer the gendered impacts of LEADER projects became a matter of the individual initiative of officials on the one hand and of the way in which women were able to insert themselves in bottom-up processes on the other. Individual initiative was circumscribed Page 122 → by bureaucratic proceduralism and by the knowledge resources available to government officials. Thus, when asked, one official stated that his job was to assure that legal prerequisites were met in successful applications, including secure financing and clearly defined project partners. There were checklists for evaluating applications from LAGs, which included participation of “an appropriate number of women and youth.” But, “when the ministry … asks me to check for 50 percent of whatever, then I can check that. But when it asks me for ‘appropriate numbers' then I have to guess…. In the end, one has tried to find competent people” (Interview 25, my trans.). Bureaucratic procedure here served to hide insecurity in judging women's equal participation. The official felt comfortable assessing whether a project partner was competent but not whether there was an appropriate level of women participating. This attitude contrasted with that of two (also male) officials involved in bottom-up development in the region in a locally financed program on village renewal with structures similar to LEADER. According to them, gender equality was an issue in their office. They recalled a memo from the administration that urged them to ensure that both women and men were elected into leadership positions in their project groups. One of the officials had chosen to participate in gender training and made it a point to question the dearth of women in local working groups (Interviews 26, 27). Similarly, one female LEADER manager made it a matter of personal interest to diversify her LAG. The absence of precise instructions from above was not a problem for these officials in judging the adequacy of women's representation. Indeed, one interpreted the strong emphasis on citizen participation in the program to include a concern for broad and diverse representation, including women, youth, and the elderly. And the female LEADER manager wondered out loud why there were no gender quotas for the LAGs when these were widespread in other political arenas and when these were introduced across the border in the Austrian LEADER program (Interview 24). In all these instances, government agents operated in similar bureaucratic structures equipped with similar resources, but acted very differently when it came to advancing gender equality. In the absence of systematic gender mainstreaming, gender equality goals were left to individual initiative, with the result that existing gender rules were occasionally challenged but not in a systematic fashion. Yet, one structural element of the LEADER program, the emphasis on participation, emerged as a source to support women's entitlements and recognition, tempering the state's failure to implement gender mainstreaming. Page 123 → This outcome was mostly unplanned and indeed, as shown in the midterm evaluation cited earlier, operated in a very uneven fashion Europe-wide. In the Danube/Bavarian Forest region, the strong history of participatory rural policy-making—reflected in long-standing programs of land reorganization administered through village cooperatives and in village renewal programs—aided the inclusion of women, in particular those who were active in agriculture. The diversification of the rural economy together with women's increasing control over their own labor and corresponding identity changes empowered individual women to become both economic and political agents pursuing their goals through rural development programs. The interviewed rural development managers pointed to a series of projects where women built profitable businesses or made innovative contributions. The manager hiding behind procedure earlier cited the case of a woman farmer, who sought to expand her farm holiday operation by adding a spa including massages, a sauna, cosmetics offerings, yoga, and other health-related services. LEADER financed her investment and provided training for local women to offer these services (Interview 25). Another male LEADER manager emphasized the strong presence of women in his LAG, where they continuously accounted for a third of participants. And while

the LAG had not specifically pursued any women's projects (indeed, according to the manager, neither women nor men were interested in defining such projects), women were highly motivated and active in the program, indeed more involved than men especially when it came to social issues broadly defined, such as creating meeting spaces in the village or building a recreational infrastructure (Interview 28). In both of these men's estimation, women benefited without a proactive state. The participatory nature of the LEADER program gave them the space to develop initiative, submit project applications, and influence the direction of the program. However, the less than equal participation of women also must be judged against the background of a local gender regime that continued to prescribe a relatively rigid gender division of labor, while giving new agency to entrepreneurial women engaged in diversifying the rural economy. In sum, despite commitment at the level of the federal government, gender mainstreaming was not implemented in the LEADER program in Bavaria or in the Danube/Bavarian Forest region. The feminist strategy of challenging masculine rules through state programs must be judged a failure in this context. The salient mechanism of power asserting itself was resistance. Although the state government formally adopted gender mainstreaming following Page 124 → the mandate of the European Union, implementation was blocked as a result of a lack of political will and bureaucratic proceduralism. The impacts of rural development programs must be judged against a gender regime that circumscribed how women could benefit. This regime (described in chapter 3) included strongly complementary understandings, cemented in highly gendered rules of entitlements to property and earnings. The regime also included strong traditions of male control over female household and caring labor. In this context, LEADER and cognate participatory programs provided opportunities for individual women but did so as a side effect of individual initiatives—both of state officers and women pursuing their goals through the state and as a result of participatory practices. Gender equality was advanced not because of a planned, systematic state strategy but inadvertently. Local gender regimes may have been challenged because some women challenged rules of entitlement, labor control, and identity in these programs. But the state failed to act as a proactive force to undermine masculine rule. The Altmark: Policy Evaporation, Subversion, and Women-Led Local Development Located in the eastern part of Germany, between Hannover, Hamburg, and Berlin, the Altmark region occupies the northern part of Saxony-Anhalt, a new German Land formed after reunification. Like the Danube/Bavarian Forest region, it is predominantly rural and remote from the urban centers, including the urban centers of the Land in the south, Halle and Magdeburg. Large-scale agriculture dominates the landscape, accounting for a significantly higher number of those employed in 2007 than in Bavaria, that is, 6.8 percent in the administrative district of Salzwedel and 5.4 percent in the district of Stendal, which jointly administer the Altmark region.14 Manufacturing plays a considerable but smaller role than in the Danube/Bavarian Forest region, accounting for 31.7 percent of employment in Salzwedel and 27.1 percent in Stendal in 2007. The proximity to Wolfsburg and the headquarters of Volkswagen has generated short-term migration and spawned a local industry of auto parts suppliers. Other small and medium-size firms have emerged in metals, textiles, and food processing. Tourism is central in the services sector, which has marketed a countryside characterized by old country homes, medieval castles, Gothic churches, and complex protected biotopes around the Elbe river (Integriertes Ländliches Entwicklungskonzept 2006: 8). Page 125 → The region still shows the effects of the deep economic rupture that accompanied reunification. In the countryside, the reorganization of the old industrial-style agricultural cooperatives meant massive unemployment as about 75 percent of agricultural employees lost their jobs between 1989 and 1995. Subsequently, East Germany entered a phase of “problematic normalization” (Kolinsky 1999) characterized by continued under- and unemployment and out-migration. In 2004, only 58.3 percent of the working age population was in the labor force in Saxony-Anhalt, compared to a German average of 64.3 percent, and unemployment was 20.2 percent (MLU 2007: 32–33). Population in the Altmark was expected to shrink by almost 18 percent between 2002 and 2020, a result of the out-migration of young people in particular (Integriertes Ländliches Entwicklungskonzept 2006: 11).

Despite the apparent top-down commitment to gender mainstreaming, there was little evidence that the approach took hold in rural development programs, indicating a situation of policy evaporation and invisibilization. A 2003 evaluation of the use of EU structural funds in Saxony-Anhalt reported that planners used gender-disaggregated data in their socioeconomic analyses, widely included femocrats in their program planning, provided training and advice through the Gender Institute, developed gender-differentiated indicators, and sought to publicize gender mainstreaming. But while gender issues received extensive attention in activities focused on the labor market, they were typically reduced to a matter of participation and quotas. Projects focusing on infrastructure development, environment, and rural development showed no evidence of gender mainstreaming (Halbzeitbewertung 2003: 193–202). In comments pertaining specifically to rural development, the 2003 evaluation, as well as subsequent evaluations, conveyed the same message as those in Bavaria, stressing that interventions were neutral with regard to their effects on gender equality because they targeted projects and enterprises, not individuals. Indeed, according to the 2005 annual report, 99.1 percent of all rural development projects were classified as neutral with regard to their effects on gender equality (Jahresbericht 2006: 61). A 2008 evaluation of the use of EU funds for rural development included only two sentences on gender mainstreaming, one defining the term and the other stating that “all involved agreed that women were able to participate equally in regional groups and in relevant measures” (Aktualisierung der Halbzeitbewertung 2006: 8). These evaluations betray a striking lack of understanding of gender mainstreaming. The idea that most projects have no effect on gender relations directly Page 126 → contradicts the premise of gender mainstreaming dutifully recorded in the government's application to the EU for rural development funding for the 2007–13 period: “This means that the MLU [Ministry for Agriculture and Environment] needs to ask, for every project, how the intervention will affect women and men, and whether and how it contributes to the equal opportunities between genders. Relevance to gender equality is a given in all cases where persons are directly or indirectly affected” (Entwicklungsprogramm 2007: 472, my trans.). But despite this crisp understanding in the rural development plan, the evidence in rural development practice differed little from that reported in the implementation of structural fund programming. When Saxony-Anhalt first participated in LEADER in 1994, it created eleven local action groups, which shrank to ten LEADER+ groups in the third round of the program starting in 2000. Despite a smaller number of groups, the program increased its geographical coverage from 37 percent to about half of the Land. Unlike the Danube /Bavarian Forest region with its six groups, the Altmark was dominated by one large LAG with the name Mittlere Altmark, which formed itself in the third phase of the LEADER program, expanding from a smaller group centered in Stendal. Given massive structural problems, the government in Saxony-Anhalt encouraged an emphasis on diversification of income and quality of life in its LEADER programs with an eye toward slowing out-migration and mitigating unemployment, policies that had a strong potential for changing gender relations.15 Yet, there was little awareness in the Altmark region of gender mainstreaming including in the LAG Mittlere Altmark. While the LEADER manager was familiar with the concept, LAG members and leaders had not encountered it. As in Bavaria, officials in the local agency charged with overseeing rural development programs—one male, one female—claimed that they had no mandate to probe the gender outcomes of their programs. They hid behind procedures and notions of objectivity to justify the lack of attention to the matter: “Nobody looked at the question whether equality goals were fulfilled…. We didn't have to do that.” And with regard to the new rural development regulation: “There is very little about that [i.e., gender equality] in the directive…. It is also, I think, difficult to formulate or to determine because we are always oriented along factual goals” (Interviews 30, 31, my trans.). Gender mainstreaming, a clear mandate at European, national, and Länder level, evaporated in the top-down chain of policy implementation. Despite the dearth of evidence of gender mainstreaming, there was a remarkable consensus in the Altmark that women-focused projects were important Page 127 → to create jobs and stem out-migration, in particular of young women. Indeed, the new funding application of the Mittlere Altmark group formulated as its first tangible outcome the creation of jobs “especially for women and youth” (LEADER+ Aktionsgruppe “Mittlere Altmark” n.d.: 14, my trans.). LEADER evaluations in the Land confirmed this priority and pointed to successes in the effort. A 2005 survey of all LAG members in the state found that 55 percent considered the goal of improving the situation of women and youth “important,” and 45 percent said that employment effects for women played a significant role in

the selection of projects. Five of ten LAGs used such effects as a criterion for project selection, with five focused on the improvement of the situation of women specifically (Aktualisierung der Halbzeitbewertung Sachsen-Anhalt 2005: 51–52). The 2006 annual report on LEADER+ showed that women benefited disproportionately from jobs created under the program. Of 185 secured and newly created jobs, 117 (63 percent) were held by women (Interview 41). Furthermore, women were strongly represented in administering the LEADER program in the state. The group in the Altmark was led by a forceful female administrator. And while its male manager admitted that he had not thought much about the composition of the LEADER group, he surmised that there was probably a majority of women “because in the end, it's the women who take the initiative” (Interview 32, my trans.). Indeed, one planner told me that in a village renewal project he worked on, he purposely first recruited women, who then helped motivate their men to participate: “The men were very active. And when the women made a concrete request, then they would oblige…. And I did this also in other villages…. We made a plan in the beginning and we said we have to include the women in this process…. Very deliberately. With coffee and homemade cake…. In principle, almost all the women were there. Also the women using a cane, who had difficulty walking—they were all there…. And we appealed to the women … that they should talk with their men about it…. And I have to say this village renewal project in Schaeplitz worked. It worked with sustainable results” (Interview 35, my trans.). The salience of women in rural development initiatives became visible in another project. This was a private initiative by a woman to rehabilitate a former communist (and before that Nazi) youth camp and turn it into guesthouses and a restaurant targeting tourists using the bicycle path along the Elbe River. Finding that people in her village often were nostalgic about their experiences at the camp, she drew exclusively on small investors in the village Page 128 → —at the time of the interview, 24 had invested—who made the camp a local meeting place and a site for local festivals (Interview 39). The project had generated 14 service sector jobs. Another woman starting a new LEADER group in the Altmark saw the project as one that could benefit from public funds under the new program (Interview 40). Rural development in the Altmark thus involved women extensively, despite the lack of gender mainstreaming. There was a perceived urgency to create jobs for women in the countryside to stem out-migration, and women were a major force in trying to get this accomplished. Arguably, a local gender regime in which masculine rule was tempered enabled this outcome. As outlined in chapter 3, this gender regime combined rules of women's entitlement to jobs and participation, rules of gender identity that framed women as competent agents and workers, and rules of labor control that institutionalized gendered hierarchies and divisions of labor. This gender order was decidedly less unequal than in Bavaria. Indeed, to use Birgit Sauer's language, the local state in SaxonyAnhalt had co-opted feminism, not only by opening up the bureaucracy to a female labor force but also by defining female unemployment and out-migration as problems needing state attention. The motivation for this was not generated by gender mainstreaming but enabled by more-egalitarian local gender relations. Unlike in Bavaria, where individual women could benefit when they put their demands before an unmotivated state, the moreegalitarian gender rules institutionalized in the state in Saxony-Anhalt enabled a form of rural development that included women and their needs. Gender mainstreaming appeared redundant in this context where women had a forceful voice in the local state. Yet, what is one to make of the observation by the Mittlere Altmark LEADER manager that women dominated in voluntary work and in political positions at the local level, while men held leadership positions in the higher echelons of the state (Interview 32)? Or what is one to make of the fact that rural development jobs for women largely consisted of jobs in the “secondary labor market” (i.e., government-funded jobs in the framework of employment programs) and low-paid services sector jobs? Unequal rules of labor control asserted themselves in these types of impacts, subverting efforts to empower women economically. Though such subversion is difficult to counteract, gender-mainstreamed policies might have problematized the creation of low-paying, part-time jobs that failed to undermine existing hierarchies in the labor market and at home. Page 129 → And they might have problematized the underrepresentation of women at all levels of government, not just at the local level. As in Bavaria, gender equality goals in the Altmark were co-opted into a state project, in this case of rural

employment creation, to address practical but not strategic gender needs. In the absence of gender mainstreaming, feminist goals were subverted through the reproduction of masculine rules of labor division. Yet, the programs also did give women access to jobs and thus gained them some control over their labor power, but they did so under continued conditions of masculine rule. Policy evaporation, the failure to follow through on political commitments to mainstream gender, enabled the subversion of feminist goals in rural development projects. Whether a faithful implementation of gender mainstreaming might have prevented such an outcome cannot be known in the absence of implementation.

Conclusion The purpose of this chapter was to examine gender mainstreaming in rural development policies and to determine the extent to which it undermined masculine gender regimes. It sought to probe how gender mainstreaming operated in the new state spaces created by the LEADER program, and thus how gender relations were being reconstructed in the decentered European state. The findings underline the central role that local gender regimes play in these dynamics. Europe-wide evaluations show considerable variety in the degree to which women benefited from the LEADER program suggesting that its gender impacts resulted from interactions between activities conducted under the program with local patterns of masculine rule. In my comparison of two regions in Germany the differential impacts of the LEADER program on women were not a result of a differential implementation of gender mainstreaming. While Bavaria and Saxony-Anhalt differed in their commitment to gender mainstreaming—with the first largely resisting the strategy and the latter embracing it at least initially—neither state implemented the strategy in rural development programs at the local level. In each region, the temptation was strong to be diverted by bureaucratic details and procedures—the strategy evaporated the further it moved down to the local level. Bureaucratic proceduralism justifying the lack of implementation was pronounced in the Danube/Bavarian Forest region but visible in the Altmark as well. Given the lack of implementation, it is impossible to draw conclusions Page 130 → about the impact of the strategy—it is none by definition, though it may have provided background noise that may have encouraged individual initiative here and there. Despite the lack of implementation, rural development projects in both regions were able to boast of beneficial outcomes for women. In the Danube/Bavarian Forest region these were less systematic than in the Altmark. They resulted from bottom-up participatory practices that provided room for entrepreneurial women. In contrast, women in the Altmark benefited from a generalized understanding that women were workers. Here, creating jobs for women and counteracting their out-migration became a central preoccupation of rural development programs. Local gender regimes thus circumscribed the opportunities provided by projects in both settings. Local rules proposed that women were workers and should have control over their own labor power in the Altmark. No comparable rule existed in the Danube/Bavarian Forest region where, however, women farmers had developed strong entrepreneurial identities within pluriactive farms. Rural development projects amplified these constructions. In both regions feminist goals were subordinated to other state projects—to the project of diversifying the rural economy in Bavaria and to the project of job creation in Saxony-Anhalt. In both instances gender equality goals were secondary and, in the absence of gender mainstreaming, remained distant. Moreover, not considering the impacts of projects on gender relations subverted their emancipatory potential. In the Altmark, jobs created under rural development programs often were low-paid and part-time, keeping women available for unpaid reproductive work and arguably reproducing masculine patterns of labor control. While gender mainstreaming might have prevented such an outcome, it is unlikely to have precluded the activation of mechanisms of power. As shown in the excursus, gender mainstreaming requires the generation of extensive knowledge, and with it the typification, classification, and categorization of populations, an exercise associated not only with normalizations but also with the formation of new hierarchies and hegemonies. Working against gender reasserting itself in this way requires considerable expertise displayed by the consultants but rarely present in the new spaces of the decentered state.

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Conclusion

Transforming Masculine Rule—Agendas for Future Research This book has sought to answer three questions. First, how has agricultural policy helped institutionalize masculine rule in the European countryside? Second, how has the liberalization of agricultural policy helped transform such rule? Third, how have feminist strategies contributed to this transformation? European agricultural policy, trade liberalization, and feminism all, in different ways, are part of processes of European integration and the restructuring of the European state. Approaching the European Union as a functionally and spatially decentered system of multilevel governance allowed me to link European integration to local gender regimes. The EU's commitment to preserving family farming while building a European agricultural welfare state contributed to constructing highly unequal gender rules in rural West Germany that helped legitimate women's lack of ownership rights, affirm a thoroughly unequal gender division of labor in agriculture, and produce women's identities as subordinate partners and housewives. This contrasted decisively with gender rules in East Germany, where entitlements to jobs and welfare benefits had replaced rules of private ownership for women and men, and women's identities were constructed as those of workers and mothers, but where divisions of labor also reproduced gender hierarchies even if in an attenuated fashion compared to the West. Three fundamentally different types of “liberalization” met these different gender regimes. In the West, the integration of German agriculture into the European market in the 1960s generated pressures to modernize family farms to withstand European competition in a first moment of liberalization. In the East, the collapse of communism and reunification led to the rapid reprivatization of agricultural property and to an insertion of the new agricultural enterprises into a liberal market economy in a second moment of liberalization. Page 132 → Finally, the contemporary moment of world market liberalization has entailed abolishing the EU's highly regulated agricultural market order and has led to a new emphasis on rural development and diversification. All three moments of liberalization generated transformations of masculine rule, with the first two aggravating women's subordination and the third providing new opportunities. Differently gendered rules of entitlement, labor division, and identity in East and West Germany produced different impacts with women in the East gaining access to highlevel and secure jobs to a larger extent than women in the West, who have found opportunity in on-farm entrepreneurship and off-farm part-time work in the services sector. Feminist efforts to enlist the state in changing masculine rule must be considered in the context of these liberalizing state projects. The first such project was the formation of the agricultural welfare state, which encompassed the creation of an integrated European market in conjunction with agricultural modernization. Feminists targeted this state in order to change rules of entitlement, gaining equal pension rights in Germany but failing to secure the legal recognition of their economic contribution to agriculture. Interestingly, the German state merely granted pension rights at a time when the agricultural welfare state was in decline. Only a small number of women in agriculture benefited: those working on full-time farms. They were co-opted into the agricultural welfare state, included in order to ensure the continued viability of pension insurance. But by the time they were admitted, they only constituted a tiny proportion of women in the countryside. The situation of the vast majority—including women part-time farmers—was ignored. A new state project accompanied the moment of global trade liberalization. It continued the policy of modernizing farms but added the goals of environmental sustainability and the diversification of the rural economy. Feminists targeted the newly liberalizing state through the strategy of gender mainstreaming, encountering resistance and policy evaporation. While the state failed to become a feminist ally, women benefited from policies of rural diversification. In the German East, the identification of women as workers made them a central object of rural development programs and encouraged their active participation in such programs. In the German West, women's identity as homemakers fostered efforts to commercialize their caring and services skills, generating empowerment in an unintended fashion. In both instances, state policies opened new entries into the labor market, creating new identities for women and thereby supporting a transformation of masculine rule in the European countryside. Page 133 →

New Research Agendas In this book I pursued a theoretical agenda, that is, I sought to explore the relevance of feminist state theory for understanding the impacts of international processes—European integration, international policies of market liberalization, and state feminism—on local gender regimes and to develop a feminist constructivist research agenda to examine such impacts.1 The study points to at least four new research areas emerging from an incorporation of state theory into feminist constructivism. First, it suggests that linking research on norm translation to an exploration of the state sheds light on the way in which feminist struggles gain authority; on the role of the bureaucracy, femocrats, and gender experts in (de)stabilizing local gender regimes; and on the spatial reorganization of gender regimes together with the reorganization of the state. Second, reintroducing the role of the state into research on global governance promises to contribute a better understanding of the relationship between economic liberalization and a change of gender relations in situated contexts. Third, the study suggests the need to more extensively consider the implications of state reorganization for feminist politics, in particular the new loci of intervention opened up for feminist activism in the spatial reorganization of the state. Finally, the study introduces the concept of “mechanisms of power” as a useful figure with which to gauge the outcomes of feminist encounters within the decentered state. The rest of this conclusion will further develop these research agendas. Norm Translation and the State Feminist constructivists have a long-standing interest in how international norms of gender equality affect gender constructions in local contexts. Studies have explored the diffusion of such norms through processes of imitation and the work of NGOs (Berkovitch 1999; True and Mintrom 2001; True 2003), examined the power effects of international discourses from a feminist point of view (Prügl 1999; Bergeron 2003; Bedford 2008), and studied the politics of norm translation in local contexts (Zwingel 2005, 2009). This study suggests that feminist state theory adds to these investigations of how international rules, norms, and discourses affect local realities in a number of ways. First, state theory sharpens the understanding of how international norms gain authority locally, particularly highlighting the constellations of social forces that help articulate and, in some instances, legalize rules. While feminist constructivists have long recognized that international norms distribute Page 134 → privilege and are part of formations of discourse and power, they largely have failed to focus on the connection between these operations of power and existing social relations. Suggesting that the state is implicated in the reproduction of gendered rules and norms brings into focus the relationship between the state and society and the role of societal actors—at both local and international levels—in the perpetuation of masculine rule. In doing so, it reconceptualizes the state: it no longer is simply an implementer of international norms or an arena for struggle but also becomes a vehicle and agent for changing domestic gender orders. Second, feminist state theory brings attention to the role of bureaucratic agents in the implementation of international rules. Feminist constructivists have extensively probed the role of variously located movement agents in the creation of international rules and in their translation to the national level (e.g., Locher 2007; Zwingel 2005). But they have rarely focused on the role of the bureaucracy in the process of norm implementation. Feminist state theory brings into particularly sharp focus the role of bureaucratic agents, including that of feminist experts, in the implementation of rules and thus in the reconstruction of masculine rule. Finally, a feminist constructivism sensitive to the global reorganization of political space provides a new approach to conceptualizing masculine rule not as a unitary formation of patriarchy but as dispersed gender regimes reconstructed in politics that not only engage authorities at multiple levels but participate in the production of new state spaces. Feminist political scientists have only begun to explore the significance of new geographies for the reproduction of masculine rule (e.g., MacRae 2006). As Laura Sjoberg (2008) has argued, geography can make an important contribution to understanding “where IR takes place” beyond static “levels,” by introducing the notion of geographical scales and the processes that constitute them. This study has begun to take advantage of insights from the field of geography by identifying the different gender politics in the new state spaces crafted by European rural development programs. The tracing of political process in these spaces is fertile ground for

innovative research from a feminist constructivist perspective. Gender and Economic Liberalization While feminist constructivists in international relations largely have focused on the implementation, diffusion, and translation of international gender norms, feminist political economists have explored the implementation, diffusion, and translation of neoliberal economics into local contexts. They Page 135 → have pointed to the gender biases in neoliberal economics (Elson 2000; Elson 1995) and noted that economic liberalization has promoted flexibilization and individualization but left unresolved the issues of care labor and social reproduction (Hoskyns 2008; Young 2000, 2002; Rossili 2000). They have criticized the European Union as an agent of liberalization for weakening national welfare states while failing to develop a social dimension (Ostner 2000). Similar critiques have been put forward with regard to the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, where scholars have argued that policies of liberalization and structural adjustment have hurt women around the world, though specific impacts have varied considerably. For example, while liberalization often led to the loss of important state programs supporting women's care work, it also yielded jobs for women in export processing (Razavi 2009; Rai and Waylen 2008; Bergeron 2003). A particular challenge for this literature has been to make a connection between international policies and local impacts, a connection difficult to establish given a vast range of intervening forces. Scholars have dealt with the problem in various ways. Some simply have asserted a connection without showing it, arguing that gender inequality has increased with trade liberalization, structural adjustment policies, or increased foreign investment. Others have applied neo-Marxist, constructivist, and post-structuralist arguments about international ideas, rules /norms, and discourses to argue (or document) that these have local impacts (e.g., Benería 2003; Prügl 2008). Their work has resembled that of feminist constructivists researching the implementation of gender norms; like them, they rarely have included forms of state in their methodologies. But considering the role of the state helps make the connection between economic liberalization and gender subordination. First, gendered effects depend on the type of liberalization implemented. The findings in this book suggest that market integration and rapid restructuring are particularly detrimental to women. Thus, the creation of a common agricultural market in Western Europe and the associated pressure to modernize farming generated an intensification of masculine rule based on a sharpening gender division of labor. German unification and the associated massive loss of women's jobs also intensified masculine rule and did so by disproportionately eliminating women's entitlements to jobs and income. In contrast, global trade liberalization has attenuated masculine rule by offering new opportunities in a diversifying rural economy in both East and West Germany. Impacts depend Page 136 → furthermore on existing gender regimes, which direct the forces of liberalization in a path-dependent fashion. Women in the German East reasserted themselves in new, often high-level positions in both agriculture and services, resisting part-time jobs to a higher degree than women in the West. In contrast, rural women in the West found opportunities outside agriculture as service entrepreneurs or part-time workers. None of these impacts was preordained. First, the European Union and the German government constructed a particular form of liberalism with the common market in agriculture, and the rules of this liberalism included a commitment to family welfare as much as a gender order built on a male breadwinner. Neoliberal restructuring entailed a selective dismantling of this order together with an effort to mobilize individuals—including women—for a project of rural development that could cushion the effects of international competition. Postcommunist reconstruction meant the integration of the German East into this new project. In all instances gender relations were affected, in some instances as a target of deliberate policy. In all cases, local gender regimes mediated the impact. The model thus implies at least three layers of sociopolitical mediation between international policies of market liberalization and local gender regimes: international policies are negotiated compromises; they are filtered through states that reflect the strength of different social forces; these in turn encounter local gender regimes. This strongly complicates research efforts that probe the impact of international policies of liberalization on gender, but

it also points toward new research agendas that center on the transmission of an array of rules of liberalization (from trade liberalization to new development agendas) in interaction with social forces reflected in the state and in interaction with existing gender regimes. It raises a new set of questions around the impacts of liberalization on gender relations. For example, how do different forms of state transmit neoliberal rules differently? Which forms of state facilitate feminist interventions, and which complicate such interventions? Given findings that policies of market liberalization are particularly impermeable to feminist suggestions, what are the connections between gender rules constructed in welfare, development, and liberalization policies? And finally, how do neoliberal rules interact with local gender regimes? When do they provide opportunities? When do they become obstacles? At the center of these questions is an understanding of market-making as a sociopolitical process, which in the case of the European Union is embedded in new forms of state. Multilevel governance and the role of social Page 137 → forces—including feminism—in such governance circumscribe the way in which liberal rules become gendered and impact local gender regimes. Feminism and the Decentered State Bringing the state back into the feminist study of international relations requires a serious engagement with state restructuring. If the state is a social relation that reflects social rules and participates in changing them, what does state restructuring mean for this relation? To begin with, the decentered European state does not correspond to a uniform and undifferentiated “European society” but organizes social relations in new geographical spaces, including the European multilevel polity and the new state spaces produced by the EU's structural fund programs (Type I and Type II multilevel governance, in Hooghe and Mark's language). In this state, feminists encounter different gender regimes as masculine rule has been transformed spatially from a mode of rule generated in a relatively uniform national political space to localized constellations of Herrschaft in functionally and sectorally differentiated state spaces. Feminists studying the EU have recognized the opportunities offered by a Type I form of multilevel governance, describing pincer movements, boomerang effects, and ping-pong patterns (van der Vleuten 2007; Zippel 2004). But few have paid attention to the way in which feminists have engaged with the Type II form. Type II multilevel governance involves politics in new state spaces—political spaces that do not follow the hierarchy of levels but more directly link the EU with the local level—and may require a different kind of feminist strategizing. Such politics typically circumvent legal in favor of administrative processes, so that the site of feminist contestation with the state is not the courts but the bureaucracy and groups involving public-private partnerships. This is the case with the LEADER initiative investigated here. As an EU community program it was conceived at the European level as an experiment in policy innovation, and implementation in national contexts needs to follow EU directions much more closely than is the case with typical EU-funded programs. The EU's strong formal commitment to gender mainstreaming implies an invitation to local feminists to make gender mainstreaming useful for their own purposes. The findings of this book do not show an uptake of this invitation in Germany where administrators also did not see feminist groups as key social partners, though some made an effort to include women in LAGs and other projects. Governments gave lip service to gender mainstreaming Page 138 → at the national level and, to some extent, at the level of the Länder, suggesting that top-down feminist efforts to encourage states to adopt the strategy were successful in Type I multilevel policy-making. However, in the new state spaces of the LEADER program, implementation has been wanting, and feminists have not insisted on calling in the promise. Feminist intervention in Type II governance would require a new form of decentered grassroots activism in coordination with feminist allies inside the state. It would require funding state feminism in decentered spaces. In German practice the opposite has happened, and government equality offices have lost funding—the justification sometimes being that gender mainstreaming has made such offices redundant. Thus, as others have argued as well, gender mainstreaming is a highly demanding strategy. It requires political will and sensitivity throughout the bureaucracy and extensive, dispersed feminist activism both inside and outside the state. But it also is a strategy uniquely suited to the reality of Type II multilevel governance, a decentered kind of politics that provides access

to the state in a multiplicity of dispersed settings. Because gender mainstreaming has rarely been implemented the way feminists have proposed, it is difficult to assess how it would impact masculine rule in practice. But the experience with gender mainstreaming at local levels is bound to vary considerably. Exploring how local feminisms have successfully encountered the decentered European state is a wide-open area of potentially fruitful research. Some scholars have begun to examine gender politics in federal and multilevel systems, probing women's role in local politics and the impact of political architecture on gender mainstreaming and movement organizing (e.g., Lang 2008; Ortbals 2008; Haussman et al. 2010; Banaszak et al. 2003). Together with studies of Type I multilevel governance in the European Union, they have begun to map a new terrain of feminist research to provide a better understanding of the possibilities and pitfalls of feminist politics within a decentered state. Mechanisms of Power If European state and society have been restructuring, how has this affected the politics of (re)constructing gender regimes? To begin with, this study has moved from talking about national gender regimes (such as those associated with the welfare state) to suggesting the idea of local gender regimes. Local in this context not only is employed as a territorial designation but marks Page 139 → situated circumstances, including those defined by new state spaces such as the LEADER program. The decentered state thus helps construct decentered gender regimes. Vice versa, feminist activists no longer encounter a unitary state. In order to capture the confluence of power and authority in this decentered state, this study introduced the concept of mechanisms of power, suggesting that all feminist encounters with the state face mechanisms that modify the emancipatory effects of policies. These mechanisms assert themselves in policy-making and implementation, where they range from resistance and policy evaporation to compromise and full-scale adoption. Another set of mechanisms operates in the way in which policies impact masculine rules in society. These mechanisms of power vary depending on which type of gendered rule feminists seek to change. The study shows that efforts to change rules of entitlement have entailed the co-optation of women into existing state projects, for example, cementing the continued existence of the family farm together with its unequal ownership rights; efforts to change rules of labor control are often subverted, for example, in job creation programs that place women into part-time and low-paying service jobs; and efforts to change rules of identity have encountered normalizations and the silencing of difference among women, as in the case of the construction of the ideal-typical female entrepreneur or the silencing of women part-time farmers in equal rights struggles. Mechanisms of power allow for an assessment of the efficacy of feminist strategies. In rural Germany they hindered some feminist agendas but also facilitated other goals such as the provision of new entitlements, increasing women's control over their own labor power, and the recognition of women's work. The effectiveness of feminist strategies should be judged according to the types of rules they seek to change and the types of power mechanisms they encounter. From this perspective, the potential of gender mainstreaming to recognize women, increase control over their own labor power, and secure entitlements is hindered in the rural German context because feminists have not been able to overcome bureaucratic resistance and have encountered policy evaporation in the process of implementation. In contrast, feminists have been more successful with the equal rights strategy, accomplishing legal change at the EU and national levels with regard to social security and maternity protection, with the new directive on women in self-employment potentially being able to turn the courts into allies. Accordingly, while it is possible only hypothetically Page 140 → to judge the impacts of gender mainstreaming on masculine rules in society, it is possible to judge the impacts of legal strategies—including the power mechanisms they set into operation. In Germany a change in the agricultural pension law led to enhanced entitlements but also to co-optation and a silencing of difference. Thus, the equal rights strategy produced transformations of masculine rule—both in intended and unintended directions. No similar claim can be made for gender mainstreaming in rural Germany at this time. This is a stark finding, but it emerges from one case only and calls for confirmation from other contexts. It would be particularly interesting to compare the impacts of gender mainstreaming in a situation where it has been

implemented with other feminist strategies. In these situations, does gender mainstreaming live up to its theoretical promise (for a useful start see Sainsbury and Bergqvist 2009)? Furthermore, the comparison in this book has left out other feminist strategies, most importantly positive action. How do the three legs of the EU's gender equality stool—equal rights, positive action, and gender mainstreaming—compare (Booth and Bennett 2002)? How faithfully are they implemented? And what kinds of power mechanisms do they encounter in the process of implementation? Once implemented, what impacts do they generate, and what power mechanisms modify their impacts? Finally, the mechanisms of power identified in this study draw specifically from the empirical investigation of agriculture and rural development in the European Union. Other mechanisms are conceivable and should be identified in other contexts or in the implementation of other strategies. Focusing on mechanisms of power in this way makes possible a new type of investigation of feminist struggle. It adds to the feminist work on norm implementation by more extensively conceptualizing the operations of power and rule in feminist struggles. It focuses the attention on processes, including processes not controlled by intentional action. In this way, it recognizes that all agency is constrained, but it theorizes such constraint as internal to agency: power always is already inherent in efforts to change institutionalized rule conceived as legitimate. In sum, state theory and the notion of mechanisms of power add new tools to researching the impact of international policies—whether feminist or not—in local contexts. They complicate the relationship between international and local, giving primacy to mechanisms that sideline, sidetrack, and slow down the translation of international norms into local contexts. But they also provide a means to understand the gaps between international Page 141 → rhetoric and local practice, and the difficulties and opportunities inherent in struggles to change masculine rule. In many parts of the world these struggles involve international, national, and local forces coming together in spaces carved out by an entirely new politics of the decentered state. For women in rural Europe—as for women around the world—this new state is both a challenge and an opportunity.

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Notes Introduction 1. I use the term women farmers to refer to all women involved in agriculture. This is unconventional in light of the fact that studies often differentiate women working on farms according to the degree to which they have management responsibilities and the amount of time they invest in farming (as opposed to housework and off-farm work). Scholars have introduced the categories “working farm wives,” “farm housewives,” or “working wives” in addition to “women farmers” (see Kazakopoulos and Gidarakou 2003: 401). In using the term women farmers without distinction I follow the convention that developed in the 1980s among rural women's organizations fighting for equal status. Since the purpose of my book is less a sociological description of diverse gender relations, and more the analysis of political ideologies and regulatory constructions, I find it useful to approach naming and categorizing as political acts. In adopting the term women farmers I hope to contribute to destabilizing the construction of women as “nonfarmers” whereas men are considered farmers even when their primary occupation is off the farm. 2. With 26.6 percent of its population employed in agriculture (compared to 17.9 in West Germany), and 16 percent of its GNP derived from agriculture (compared to 8.4 percent in West Germany), the agricultural sector was economically much more important to the French than the Germans (Lindberg 1963: 221). Like West Germany, France had a large number of small farms; however, proportionately there were more French than German medium- and large-scale farms (Averyt 1977: 22). 3. The French agricultural orientation law of the 1960s was modeled after the German law in that it called for “parity” of agricultural incomes with those in industry, but it sought to accomplish this through longterm structural reform rather than high prices (Averyt 1977: 30; Keeler 1987: 65). 4. At that time the CAP accounted for about half of the EU's budget (Lowe et al. 2002: 3). Page 144 → 5. Trade negotiations in the post–World War II era have proceeded in “rounds.” The Uruguay round started in 1986 and lasted an unprecedented seven years, primarily because of contention about liberalizing agriculture. One outcome of negotiations was the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the time of this writing, Doha round talks have stalled in a confrontation of governments in industrialized countries with a group of newly emerging countries under the leadership of Brazil and India. 6. Percentages are estimates of producer support (PSE) as calculated by the OECD. They measure “the monetary value of transfers from consumers and budgetary payments to producers, as a share of gross farm receipts.” See OECD 2009: 40. The OECD average for the PSE was 21 percent in 2008. 7. The Uruguay round defined how to measure domestic support and then specified which types of supports needed to be eliminated and which could continue. It categorized support into three “boxes.” The amber box contained supports considered market distorting, which needed to be eliminated. A green box contained supports that continued to be allowed, including some types of welfare payments and regional and environmental aids. A more controversial blue box emerged from a compromise between the United States and the European Union, which allowed for the continuation of compensation payments to farmers if coupled with production-limiting programs. See Moyer and Josling 2002: 136–38. 8. The declaration was the outcome of an EU-sponsored conference held in Cork, Ireland, in November 1996. 9. The implications are unclear because the treaty muddies waters. It reserves powers in certain areas (provision of aid, fixing prices, levies, etc.) for the Council and fails to draw clear boundaries between areas where the Council has sole decision power and areas where the Parliament will co-decide. There likely will be fights over competence and need for interinstitutional agreements. See Massot Martí 2008. 10. The implementation of partnerships yielded very different governance structures, including, in the British context, the extensive privatization of public administration (Adshead 2002).

Chapter 1 1. For a discussion of literature on geographic scales, see Marston 2000; Brenner 2001; Marston and Smith

2001; Marston et al. 2005. For an influential statement of neo-Marxist state theory see Jessop 2002. For an application to feminist state theory see Jessop 2001. 2. Saskia Sassen (2006) has formulated these processes more broadly as the production of a new assemblage of territory, authority, and rights that endogenizes the global into the national. Globalization is thus conceptualized as denationalization, Page 145 → a process by which global forms come to inhabit national structures, and these structures are changed in the process. The use of human rights law in national courts is an example of this as is the employment of global digital networks in financial markets. Key to her interpretation for my purposes is the imbrication of the world scale in national and local spaces. 3. LEADER stands for Liaisons entre les actions de développement de l'économie rurale (links between rural economic development actions). The program ran in three phases: LEADER I from 1991 to 1993; LEADER II from 1994 to 1999; and LEADER+ from 2000 to 2006. While the program has been discontinued, the LEADER method has been integrated into the new European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. There it continues to create new state spaces. 4. Translating the Weberian notion of Herrschaft is difficult. It is typically rendered as domination or authority capturing on the one hand involuntary submission and on the other voluntary submission (Bendix 1977). I am following Onuf (1989: 197–205) in translating Herrschaft as rule, indicating its reproduction through rules and the repetition of speech acts. But I also employ the related terms, domination and authority, in order to evoke the different shades of meaning of the term where appropriate. 5. The three categories of rules correspond to Onuf's (1989) commitment rules, directive rules, and instruction rules. Onuf suggests that these rules emerge from the repetition of speech acts with propositional contents that commit a speaker to a future action, direct the hearer to adjust their action to what is demanded, or invite a hearer to agree to a definition. 6. For a development of the relationship between rules and rule (heteronomy, hegemony, hierarchy) see Onuf 1989, 1998. 7. Foucault traces the development of the state from the feudal and administrative state that seeks to control territory to the governmental state that seeks to administer populations through economic saviors. For an argument in favor of extending governmentality theory to European policy-making see Merlingen 2006. 8. One potent mechanism of power, for example, is ridicule.

Chapter 2 1. Note that in agricultural statistics spouse designates a job in addition to a marital status. In other words, agricultural statistics recognize that marriage to a farmer amounts to an economic contract. 2. An update of Braithwaite's paper is Bock 2001. 3. “The spouses of farmers are directly involved in the development of farm tourism and local services.” 4. Interestingly, the Council adopting the conclusion on gender mainstreaming included an unprecedented six female agricultural ministers. They were Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck from Belgium, Vera Dua, the Flemish minister for the environment Page 146 → and agriculture, Mariann Fischer Boel from Denmark (who joined the Commission as agricultural commissioner from 2004 to 2009), Renate Künast from Germany, Margareta Winberg from Sweden (minister of agriculture and minister for equal opportunities combined), and Margaret Beckett from the United Kingdom.

Chapter 3 1. The process is continuing today at a rate of about 3 percent per year (see Agrarbericht published annually by the German agriculture ministry and available on its Web site at www.bmelv.de). 2. The territories for which Anerbenrecht was put into law included Bavaria, Hessen, Braunschweig, Lauenburg, Brandenburg Schlesien, Schleswig-Holstein, Kassel, Prussia, Westfalia, Baden, MecklenburgSchwerin, Oldenburg, Lübeck, Bremen, Hannover, Schaumburg-Lippe, Waldeck-Pyrmont, Schaumburg(-Hessen), Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Lippe, and Württemberg. Schardey 1961: 16–17. 3. Literally “law about inheritance of farms in the Reich.” 4. BVerfGE 15, 337—Höfeordnung. Urteil. At http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/dfr/bv015337.html. Accessed

June 21, 2002. 5. They are included in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), which came into force in Germany in 1900 to codify private law. The BGB, with many changes since 1900, still is the central law in force in Germany today. 6. A literal translation would be “added-value community.” 7. The value of the farm is calculated based on the income it generates and not based on its market value. Furthermore, when assessing the initial value of a farm at the time of marriage, the law disallows a negative value for indebted farms. This means that, if a wife's labor contributes to pulling the farm out of debt, she gets nothing for this labor when the marriage is dissolved (either through divorce or death of the farmer). 8. Not surprisingly, farmers fiercely protested the first change of the law in 1990, which required them to consult their spouses if they intended to sell any of the properties the wife introduced into the marriage (Inhetveen and Blasche 1983: 29). Note that contemporary law also provides an option to designate one co-owner as the primary administrator. In this case the second co-owner gives up decision rights. 9. This included the development of rural infrastructures, the reparceling of agricultural land to allow for more efficient production, and providing farmers access to capital in order to facilitate investments in technology and farm infrastructure (Wilson and Wilson 2001). 10. Whereas holdings of 50 hectares and larger accounted for 0.8 percent of all farms in 1949, 19 percent belonged to this size category in 2001. The threshold of Page 147 → growth, that is, the hectare size above which the number of farms has been growing and below which it has been shrinking, has progressively moved higher. In the early 1980s it was around 30 hectares; in the new century the number of farms was increasing only in the size category 75 hectares and more. While the vast majority (88 percent) of farms in Germany still were smaller than 75 hectares—indeed about 34 percent were in the 2–10-hectare category—small farms continued to be the primary victims of agricultural restructuring (BMVEL 2004). Yet, small farms have survived if they have added other sources of income. Indeed, the majority of farms in Germany are part-time farms in the new century, and their proportion (though not their number) has been on the increase, from 39 percent of all farms in 1977 to 55 percent in 2007 (Hülsen 1980: 17; BMELV 2010: 8). 11. The term housewifization was introduced by Mies (1982) in order to describe the situation of homebased lace-makers in subcontracting arrangements in India. For an empirical extension to home-based workers see Prügl 1996. 12. Whatmore (1991) found a similar pattern in the United Kingdom. 13. By “small farms” I mean farms in the 2–5-hectare category. Figures refer to 1957–58 and 1976–77. Note that in contrast, the proportion of women in the full-time family labor force shrank in the same period on large farms, that is, those with more than 50 hectares (from 49 to 46 percent). See Prügl 2004: 356. 14. The 2006 figure includes apprentices in the new Bundesländer. Schmitt (1997b: 162) found that in the West, the proportion of women in agricultural apprenticeships seemed to be stuck at about 7 percent in the early 1990s. 15. Meister literally means “master.” It is the highest level of education in the German system of crafts training that includes the levels of apprentice, associate, and master. 16. Driving a tractor is one of the most iconic expressions of this. With regard to her research on farming in France, Lise Saugeres (1999) has argued that tractors are symbols of masculinity that mark the boundary between men's and women's work on the farm. 17. Privately held land was farmed by small, specialized farmers, the church, and workers on state farms who were entitled to control a small plot of their own land. 18. Note that those who had gained land as a result of land reform had no right to compensation (De Soto and Panzig 1995: 187). Privatization was much more contentious with regard to state farms, where previous owners with estates under 100 hectares were entitled to restitution; those who had owned estates larger than 100 hectares were not. The process pitted the old, precommunist owners against the successor firms of the LPGs and those

who reestablished or newly established independent farms (Wiedereinrichter and Neueinrichter). While some of the old owners sought to regain what they considered family land rather than accept restitution, the latter sought to purchase or Page 148 → lease nationalized land. In part this was land that had been made available by the state to LPGs for cultivation. The privatization of state land was a drawn-out process during which rules changed in parallel to political constellations (Hagedorn 1997). A basic point of contention was the purpose of this state project: Should the state's priority be the protection of private property or the preservation of jobs? In the end the emphasis shifted from favoring the old owners and family farms toward favoring the large cooperative/corporate farms that had emerged from the LPGs (Wilson and Klages 2001: 285). Those who ran these farms fought the sale of nationalized land on the open market, fearing that it would be snapped up by West German investors. In order to diffuse this conflict, the unified German state gave long-term leases for land it sought to privatize, most of it to the cooperative/corporate farms, with the prospect of eventually selling this land, and with preference given to the lessees (Wilson 1998). Because many former LPG members rented back their land to successor farms of the LPGs in addition, 90 percent of agricultural land in the East was leased in the 1990s. Note that the tendency in West Germany is also toward an increasingly higher proportion of land leased as more and more people leave agriculture and make their land available to others for production. 19. In addition to practical considerations that discouraged family farming, the European Union and the German state sent ambiguous signals. While rhetorically supporting the setup of family farms, the policy of price supports and direct payments rewarded large farms that continued to garner the bulk of EU subsidies. Indeed, after the 2003 common agricultural policy reform, German efforts to cap subsidy payments to large farms encountered severe resistance, not only from the managers of the former LPGs but also from their new allies, the West German farmers' organization, the DBV, which is politically dominated by large farmers. Second, the German government gave beneficial terms on old debts to the successor farms of the LPGs while at the same time those who established new farms were saddled with new debt. Thus, some complained, the terms under which former farmers could reestablish their farms were inferior to those that supported the continued existence of large farms (Gerke 2003). Finally, initial structural adjustment aid was offered to all businesses but not to small part-time holdings (Wilson 1998: 128). Despite these mixed signals, considerable sums went toward the establishment and modernization of family farms (Wilson and Klages 2001: 280). But in the end, the efficiency of large structures, the preferences of East Germans working in agriculture, and the increasing political influence of the former LPGs began to severely challenge the German state's commitment to family farming. 20. The amount of land farmed by farms with more than 1,000 hectares was 42.5 percent—though this category was shrinking and in 2005 encompassed just eight enterprises (Bericht zur Lage n.d.: 15). 21. In the language of the East German LPG charter, “the agricultural cooperatives Page 149 → are voluntarily formed associations of female and male peasants, gardeners, and other citizens who joined together in a common socialist production process and for a continued embetterment [sic] of food supplies and raw materials for industry” (cited in De Soto and Panzig 1995: 183). 22. The following discussion focuses on LPGs only and excludes a consideration of the situation on state farms, which accounted for less than 10 percent of the land worked in the GDR. 23. The figure for Saxony-Anhalt, the site of my case study on gender mainstreaming, was even higher: less than 20 percent were owners and family workers in 2005 (Operationelles Programm 2005: 60; Bericht zur Lage 2006: 80–81). 24. The figure refers to “sozialversicherungspflichtig beschäftigte Frauen,” that is, those who fall under social insurance laws. See Arbeitsmarkt 2006: 194. 25. In Schadeleben in the Altmark, the figure for those considering a job very important was above 80 percent. Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landwirtschaft 2006: 87. 26. The corresponding figure for Schadeleben in the Altmark was 38 percent, representing the highest rate of the 15 villages surveyed. Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landwirtschaft 2006: 92.

Chapter 4

1. The acronym is from the French Comité des organisations professionnelles agricoles. 2. The Economic and Social Committee, in its opinion on the proposal, was more circumspect with regard to having the state mandate what the professional organizations should put in their statutes. See Economic and Social Committee 1984. 3. Proponents of the directive had waited for the Dutch presidency of the Council, hoping that it would be sympathetic to the proposal. See European Parliament, Committee on Women's Rights 1989: Part B, 8. 4. The case involved a Danish woman rheumatologist who charged that the transition to a regulation of medical offices according to part-time or full-time status discriminated against women who temporarily reduced their hours to take care of their children, only to find their jobs to be classified as part-time at the time they retire. She lost the case (European Court of Justice 2000). There are two other court cases in which the directive is mentioned. But in neither case did it provide the core basis for decisions. 5. Unpublished minutes provided to author during Interview 11. 6. The inclusion of the term life partners is new and accounts for the situation of same-sex couples and unmarried life partners. 7. Eight mostly new member states had not met the conditions set for maternity protection set out in the directive, but the Commission considered the cost of Page 150 → meeting the terms of the directive minimal. With regard to social security, the Commission proposed various scenarios to keep the cost low (Commission of the European Communities 2008: 5).

Chapter 5 1. Other structural funds at the time included the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF), and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) has replaced the guidance portion of the EAGGF, which previously funded structural policies in agriculture. 2. This compares to 784 employees in DG Agriculture in 2001, according to statistics provided by the Commission. 3. According to internal Commission statistics, women made up 17 percent of personnel in category A (administrative and management) in DG Agriculture in 1999, 18 percent in 2000, and 20 percent in 2001. This compares to 22 percent in 2001 for the Commission as a whole. 4. For an outline of German government practices on gender mainstreaming see its Web site at www.gender-mainstreaming.net. 5. Part-time employees, most of them women, were found to receive worse evaluations. 6. Specifically, into the framework plan of the Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der Agrarstruktur und des Küstenschutz (GAK), the federal government's instrument to coordinate rural development activities. 7. See Web site of the Ministry for Work, Social Order, Family, and Women: http://www.stmas.bayern.de /gs/projekte/stmlf.htm. Accessed August 21, 2008. 8. For example Saxony, another new Land like Saxony-Anhalt, joined Bavaria in postponing implementation of gender mainstreaming. 9. See project sheet at http://www.g-i-s-a.de/content/artikel/588.html. 10. See also the accompanying guidelines for regional advisers by the same authors: Putzig and Schreiber 2003b. These were published as Gender-Mainstreaming 2004. 11. Bruckmeier (2000) described this as a co-optation of movement ideas through government agendas. 12. Bavaria had the largest number of LEADER+ groups in Germany (45), covering 42 percent of the state's territory and affecting 25 percent of its population (STMLF 2005, 2). The total number of LEADER+ groups in Germany was 148. The state with the next highest number of regions after Bavaria was Lower Saxony with 17. See Web site of the LEADER+ Vernetzungsstelle at http://www.leaderplus.de/index.cfm /0001B7981A0C125D97D96521C0A8D816. 13. The groups were Deggendorf, Donau-Vils-Wolfach, Freyung-Grafenau, Passau Nord, Regen, and Straubing-Bogen. See Web site of the region at http://www.region-donau-wald.de. Page 151 → 14. This compares to 2.7 percent for Saxony-Anhalt as a whole. Statistische Berichte 2008, table 1.10. The Altmarkkreis Salzwedel and the Landkreis Stendal have formed a planning community but keep

separate statistics. The Altmark region straddles the two districts. 15. According to the federal plan for rural development for the 2007–13 funding period for EU structural funds, Bavaria planned to dedicate only 10 to 15 percent of funding to diversification and improving quality of life in rural areas, while Saxony-Anhalt allocated 33 to 40 percent (BMELV 2006: 31–32).

Conclusion 1. On feminist constructivism see Locher and Prügl 2001a, 2001b.

Page 152 → Page 153 →

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Index Action program, 12, 13, 90 Agenda 2000, 8 Agreement on Agriculture, 8, 97, 144 Agricultural Council, 7, 15, 49, 50 Agriculture European model of, 8, 49, 66 multifunctional, 8, 9, 69, 70 organic, 39, 40, 94, 114 Altmark, 34, 107, 114, 119, 124–30 Anerbenrecht, 59, 60, 77 Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft (AbL), 98 Assisting spouse, 1, 7, 29, 37, 43, 49–50, 60–69, 90–103, 145 Austria, 38, 97, 122 Authority, 16, 20–23, 30, 33, 58, 67, 133, 139. See also Rule Bauer/Bäuerin, 17, 29, 67–69, 81 Bäuerinnenkampagne, 98, 99 Bavaria, 17–18, 34, 60–65, 68–69, 99, 107–9, 112, 119–30 Brandenburg, 71–76, 80 Breadwinner, 5, 11, 24, 32, 62, 67, 69, 83, 107, 136 Bureaucracy, 26, 122–26, 129. See also Proceduralism Care/Caring labor/Care work, 63–66, 70, 79, 90, 102, 124, 135 Charter of Fundamental Rights, 13 Child care, 48–52, 68, 74–79 Christian Democrats, 42 Christian Socialist, 43, 108 Cohesion policy, 21 Cold War, 33, 43, 45

Collectivization, 5, 71–78, 81 Commission. See European Commission Common agricultural policy (CAP), 2, 4, 6–10, 33, 36–55, 62, 65, 70, 105 reform, 16–18, 33, 58, 94, 97 Common market, 6, 9, 15, 16, 85, 135, 136 Communism, 38, 42, 44, 71–86, 131 Compromise, 6, 17, 30, 89, 96, 100–103, 136, 139. See also Mechanisms of power Constructivism, 28, 133, 134 Cooperative(s), 1, 14, 17, 28, 41–44, 56, 62, 63, 72–79, 85, 90–92, 96, 123, 125, 148 Co-optation, 2, 16, 18, 31–33, 103, 113. See also Mechanisms of power COPA (Comité des organizations professionnelles agricoles), 89, 90 women's committee, 89–91 Danube/Bavarian Forest, 34, 107, 119–23, 129, 130 Denmark, 38 Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV), 43, 67, 97–99, 111 Deutscher Landfrauenverband (dlv), 61, 96–99, 103, 111–15 Directive, 17, 30, 40, 46, 47, 88, 89, 118 equal pay and equal treatment, 11, 14 equal treatment of women in self-employment, including agriculture, 11, 14, 46, 48, 90–96, 103, 104, 139 Direct marketing, 62, 65, 66 Page 178 → Directorate-general, 14, 106 agriculture, 47, 48, 51 Direct payments, 8, 9, 54. See also Support payments Discrimination, 12, 17, 28, 90–94, 114 reverse discrimination, 13 Displacement, 5, 31, 32, 55, 81, 82 Diversification, 18, 85, 87, 130, 135 diversification of LAG, 122 Division of labor, 16–19, 28–35, 36–38, 53–56, 62–64, 81–86, 96, 102, 103, 111–14, 128–31

Education, 64, 81–83, 112 Employment, 1, 25, 38–41, 48–52, 64, 74, 77–82, 86, 87, 94, 102, 119, 124–29. See also Unemployment Employment status, 1, 14, 17, 49, 58 self-employment of women, 11, 14, 48, 52, 87, 90–96 Entitlements, 28–32, 58–62, 74–76, 84–89, 91–96, 100, 117, 122, 124, 135, 139, 140 Entrepreneur, 29, 36, 40, 49, 67, 73, 106, 113, 117, 120, 123, 130, 132, 136, 139 fictitious, 100–103 Environment, 14, 110 environmentalism, 40, 54, 65 policy, 36, 39, 50–52, 69, 72, 105, 106, 117–20, 125 preservation, 7–10, 45 Equal pay, 11, 14, 46, 55, 77, 88 Equal remuneration. See Equal pay Equal rights, 17, 31, 32, 46, 47, 58, 59, 60, 84, 88–103 approach (or, strategy), 1, 2, 11–14, 16, 30, 34, 68, 115, 139, 140 European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 9, 52 European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF), 50, 51, 105 European Commission, 7, 10, 12–14, 23, 34, 49–53, 88–94, 106 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 11–13, 93 European Economic Community (EEC), 6, 7, 16, 42, 44, 57 European integration, 2, 3, 6, 15–18, 21, 131, 133 European Parliament, 10, 15, 47, 50, 54, 89–95 European Social Fund, 109, 150 European Union (EU), 1, 2, 7–18, 19–24, 33, 36–41, 46–55, 66, 73, 82, 89–104, 105, 106, 119, 120, 124, 131–40 Family farm(ing), 1, 17, 28, 37–46, 62–66, 69–73, 77–86, 89, 90, 96, 102, 103, 131 Family labor, 1, 3, 4, 29, 37, 38, 46, 47, 56–62, 80, 103. See also Farm labor Farm, 57–87, 96, 147 full-time, 63, 65, 102, 132 labor, 1–4, 28, 29, 32, 37–41, 50, 57, 58, 63–66, 72, 77–87, 91, 96, 102, 103, 130–32, 135. See also Division of labor; Family labor

manager, 38, 62, 66–68, 73, 84 part-time, 3, 4, 17, 57, 63–69, 101, 102, 147 small, 2–4, 38, 39, 44, 45, 56, 57, 64, 71–75, 101, 143 Farmers, 55, 59, 61, 64, 69, 70, 75, 77, 86, 117 male farmers, 5, 17, 29, 37, 58–69, 86, 91, 97 women farmers, 2–5, 14–17, 28, 29, 36–40, 45–55, 58–68, 75, 76, 81, 87, 89–103, 109, 115, 120, 123, 130, 132, 143 Farm holidays/Farm vacation (Urlaub auf dem Bauernhof), 66, 76, 123 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 57, 79 Feminism and activism, 1, 2, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 24, 29, 30, 46, 87, 88, 89, 133, 138 constructivism, 134 strategies, 2, 11–16, 18, 23, 33, 34, 47, 88, 119, 123, 131, 132, 137–40 Feminization, 3, 4, 38, 70 Femocrats, 24, 47, 49, 90, 93, 108, 125, 133 Food security, 6, 41, 59, 69, 71 Fordism, 41 France, 6, 37, 38, 42, 44, 91, 143, 147 Gender competence, 108, 111 Gender equality, 11, 12 Page 179 → directives, 11, 12, 14, 46–48, 88, 90, 94, 95, 103, 126 regime, 1, 11, 16–19, 25, 31, 34, 77, 81, 87–89, 107, 115, 117, 124, 128–30, 131–39 Gender inequality, 12, 13, 25, 29, 31, 58, 76, 115, 135 Gender mainstreaming, 1, 2, 11, 13–18, 19, 23, 27, 30, 31, 34, 37, 41, 46–54, 87, 94, 98, 105–30, 132, 137–40, 145, 149, 150 Gender regime, 1, 2, 11, 16–20, 24–34, 36–40, 54, 56–87, 88, 89, 95, 96, 101, 102, 107, 115–24, 128–30, 131–39 Gender relations, 2, 15, 23–31, 40, 45, 53–58, 66, 67, 70, 73, 77, 81, 95, 96, 105, 116, 120, 125–30, 133–36, 143 German Democratic Republic (GDR), 5, 72–74, 77, 79–83, 149 Germany, 2, 10, 12, 14–17, 29, 33, 34, 38, 39, 53, 62, 70, 82, 84, 88, 89, 96–104, 107–19, 129, 132, 137, 139, 140, 146, 147 East, 4, 42, 53, 56, 78, 82–86, 125, 131, 132, 135

West, 2, 6, 7, 34, 42–45, 56, 57, 66, 86, 132, 135, 143, 148 Globalization, 19, 20, 70, 105, 118, 144 Governance, 19, 133 multilevel, 7, 11, 16, 20–23, 27, 36, 55, 57, 89, 96, 131, 136–38 Governmentality, 18, 30, 32, 113, 145 Greece, 37–39 Greens, 45, 99, 107–9, 113, 118 green movement, 7, 98 Gütergemeinschaft, 60, 61 Health, 2, 3, 5 insurance, 7, 57, 75, 100, 101 Herrschaft. See Authority; Rule Hofdenken, 3 Home economics, 64, 67, 109, 115, 120 Housewife, 29, 62–64, 74 Housework, 29, 63–68, 76–79, 84, 85, 102 Identity, 32, 69, 81, 82, 86, 117, 123, 132 rules of. See Rules, of identity Industrialization, 44, 45, 57, 73 Industry, 6, 38–44, 57, 63, 64, 71–75, 80, 83, 88, 119, 124 Inheritance, 28, 58–61, 92, 96 Insurance agricultural, 97, 99 health, 7, 57, 75, 100, 101 old age, 7, 17, 34, 72, 75, 87–89, 91, 93, 96–104, 132, 140. See also Pension rights social, 41, 57, 75, 96, 97, 101–4, 132, 149 Invisibilization, 31, 112, 125 Ireland, 38, 54 Italy, 38, 40, 44, 90, 97

Job creation, 39, 48, 52–54, 64, 85, 86, 94, 109, 127–30, 135, 139 Künast, Renate, 108, 146 Labor burden, 2–4, 17, 37, 38, 46, 53, 63–69, 80, 102, 103, 114, 116, 130, 132, 139 control, 18, 28–32, 62–66, 70, 73, 77–81, 84–87, 96, 102, 103, 112, 119, 123, 124, 128–30, 139 flexible, 28, 36, 39–42, 49, 62, 86, 116 See also Family labor Länder, 18, 57, 59, 80, 98, 99, 107, 108, 112, 126, 138 Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft (LPG), 56, 71–81, 147–49 decision making in, 76, 78, 86, 97 LEADER, 18, 23, 34–35, 53, 54, 107–12, 117–29, 137–39 Liberal environmentalism, 36, 40, 65, 105, 117 Liberalization, 1, 4, 6, 8–10, 15, 16, 24, 33, 44, 47, 55, 56, 70, 84–87, 131–36. See also Neoliberalism Lisbon Treaty. See Treaty of Lisbon Local action groups (LAGs), 23, 53, 54, 118, 121–23, 126, 127, 137 Macht. See Power Male breadwinner, 5, 11, 24, 32, 62, 67, 69, 83, 107, 136 Malta, 38 Market, 15, 19, 33, 39–47, 54–57, 65, 70, 72, 85–87, 105, 131, 132, 136 deregulation, 6, 8, 12, 15, 16, 34, 65, 133 intervention, 2, 6–9, 14, 34, 64, 105, 120, 148 Page 180 → Marriage, 29, 37, 60, 61, 67, 77, 83, 91, 99, 100, 145 Masculine rule(s), 1–4, 13–16, 19, 23–35, 36–47, 56–71, 74, 77, 84–87, 123, 124, 128, 129, 131–41 Masculinity, 24, 29, 32, 67, 83, 86, 87, 117, 147 Masculinization, 39, 79–83 Maternity leave, 76, 91–96, 100, 102, 104, 114, 139, 149 Mechanisms of power, 2, 16–18, 20, 24, 27–34, 47, 55, 89, 104, 107, 113–19, 123, 130, 133, 138–40, 145 co-optation, 2, 31–33, 103, 113

normalization, 33, 113, 115 subversion, 33, 124, 128 Migration, 72, 82, 124–30 Mittlere Altmark, 126–28 Modernization, 1–6, 9, 39–44, 51, 57–86, 105, 131, 132, 135, 148 stress, 3 Mouvement de Défense des Exploitants Familiaux, 44 Neoliberalism, 1, 4, 6, 8–10, 15, 16, 24, 33, 44, 47, 55, 56, 70, 84–87, 131–36. See also Liberalization Netherlands, 38, 40, 44 Network, 16, 20–23, 36, 112, 113 Normalization, 2, 16, 18, 33, 113, 115, 139, 140. See also Mechanisms of power Norm translation, 133, 134, 140 Norway, 40 Occupational status. See Employment status Open method of coordination, 14 Ownership (of farms), 17, 37, 38, 40–43, 50, 54, 56–62, 69, 72, 75, 77, 85, 131, 139, 146–49 Participatory practices (programs, traditions), 53, 76, 113, 117–30 Partnership, 10, 23, 58, 72, 118, 137, 144 Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), 110, 112 Pay, 11, 14, 46, 54, 55, 77, 78, 86, 89–92, 128, 139. See also Remuneration Peasant, 41–45, 58, 63, 67, 73, 149 Pension reform, 72, 96, 97, 98, 100, 103 rights, 4, 17, 34, 75, 87, 88, 89, 91, 97, 99, 101, 102, 104 Pluriactivity, 17, 36, 39 Policy evaporation, 18, 31, 112, 124–26, 129, 132, 139 Portugal, 38 Positive action, 11, 13, 94, 140 Power, 16, 24–33, 137, 145

Price support, 7, 8, 34, 44, 85 Privatization, 15, 72, 77, 81, 85, 131 Proceduralism, 26, 122–26, 129. See also Bureaucracy Professional organization, 1, 14, 17, 28, 91, 92, 99, 149 Property, 42, 43, 58 ownership, 17, 28, 37–43, 50, 54, 56–62, 69–77, 85, 89, 95, 131, 146–49 rights, 28, 41, 56–62, 68, 70, 73–77, 81, 84–87, 90–92, 124, 139 Recognition, 3, 31, 32, 46–48, 54, 70, 89–104, 122, 132, 139, 140 Refusal, 17, 18, 30–32, 49–51, 68, 89, 96, 103, 104. See also Mechanisms of power Reichserbhofgesetz, 59 Relief services, 91, 93 Remuneration, 11, 14, 46, 54, 55, 77, 78, 86, 89–92, 128, 139 Replacement services. See Relief services Resistance, 13, 17, 31, 32, 55, 65, 87, 89, 106, 111, 112, 119, 123, 132, 139 Restructuring, 4, 5, 15, 19–22, 39, 41, 47, 57, 69, 72, 74, 79–86, 131, 135–38, 147 Reunification. See Unification Rule, 16, 20, 25–27, 30, 31, 32, 41, 58, 133–35 masculine, 1–5, 13–16, 19, 23–35, 37–55, 56–71, 74, 77, 84–87, 123–29, 131–41 Rules, 12, 17, 24, 28–33, 36, 46, 56, 58, 66, 84–87, 96, 102, 116, 119, 123, 124, 132, 139, 140 of entitlement, 28–34, 58–62, 73–77, 88, 102, 117, 128, 131, 135 of identity, 29, 31, 32, 66–70, 81–84, 86, 88, 100, 102, 116, 117, 139 Page 181 → of labor control, 28, 31, 32, 62–66, 70, 73, 77, 80, 81, 103, 112–15, 128, 129 Rural development, 2, 8–11, 15–18, 23, 57, 94, 105–30, 136, 140 policy, 7, 21, 27, 36–55, 107 regulations, 8, 9, 16, 22, 54, 105, 106, 126, 132 Rural women, 17, 18, 34, 40, 48–55, 80–87, 89, 99, 106, 112–30, 131, 135 Saxony-Anhalt, 17–19, 34, 73, 77, 80, 107–13, 119, 124–30, 149–51 Scale, 22, 36, 118, 134, 144, 145

Self-employment, 11, 14, 29, 46–52, 67, 90–96 Services, 15, 18, 36, 40, 47–53, 65, 67, 70, 74, 80–86, 109, 111, 115–24, 128, 132, 136, 139 Silencing of difference, 17, 31–33, 89, 102, 103, 139, 140. See also Mechanisms of power Social Democrats, 99, 109, 110 Social forces, 22, 25, 26, 133, 136 Social policy. See Insurance Spain, 38 Specialization, 62, 63, 71, 72, 81, 85, 86, 147 Spouse. See Assisting spouse State, 24, 136, 140, 144 authority, 1, 6, 9–11, 16, 18, 20–23, 30, 33, 84, 107, 139. See also Welfare state decentered, 1, 2, 10, 18, 19–35, 36, 105–8, 119, 129, 130–33, 137–41 European, 1, 2, 16–18, 19–35, 36, 46, 55, 96, 105–7, 119, 129, 131, 137, 138 multilevel, 1, 16, 21, 24, 55, 57, 89, 96, 137, 138. See also Governance postmodern, 20 regulatory, 20, 22, 143 spaces, 2, 10, 11, 18, 20–23, 27, 36, 107, 112, 118, 129–31, 134, 137–41, 145 Statistics, 34, 38, 39, 48, 51, 66, 69, 70, 103, 116, 145, 150 Strategic selectivity, 25, 30–31, 47, 55, 59 Stresa Conference, 42, 45 Structural funds, 10, 14, 15, 18, 48–45, 106, 108, 119, 120, 125, 126, 137 Structural policy, 4, 7, 15, 39, 41, 54–57, 63, 69–86, 89, 105, 120, 125 Subsidiarity, 10, 107 Subversion, 2, 16, 18, 33, 124, 128. See also Mechanisms of power Support payments, 8, 9, 54. See also Direct payments Sweden 14, 38 Tax/Taxation, 68, 69, 91, 92 Tourism, 18, 48 Trade, 6, 15, 87, 131, 132, 135, 136

negotiations, 8, 144 Training, 108–11, 114, 121, 122, 125 vocational, 13–15, 52, 64, 78–82, 91–94, 105, 109, 112, 115, 120–23, 147 Transformation, 1, 2, 15, 16, 19, 33, 34, 36, 56, 81, 131, 132, 137, 140 Treaty of Amsterdam, 13 Treaty of Lisbon, 9 Treaty of Rome, 11 Unemployment, 48, 74, 80, 82, 119, 125–28 Unification, 5, 56, 72–81, 95–97, 124, 125, 131, 135 United States, 8, 41, 144 Vocational training, 13–15, 52, 64, 78–82, 91–94, 105, 109, 112, 115, 120–23, 147 Welfare state, 1, 2, 6, 10, 16–18, 19–25, 36, 40, 41, 46, 47, 51, 54, 57, 72, 88–104, 106, 115, 131–38 Women farmers, 2–5, 14–17, 28, 29, 36–40, 45–55, 58–68, 75, 76, 81, 87, 89–103, 109, 115, 120, 123, 130, 132, 143. See also Farmers Women's labor, 37, 96, 102, 111, 115, 123, 130 farming, 1–4, 17, 28, 29, 32, 38–40, 46–50, 54, 58–87 Women's machineries, 96 Worker, 5, 41, 72, 83 agricultural, 36, 38, 47, 56, 71–73, 75, 80–82, 86, 88, 92, 95, 100–102, 131, 132, 136, 147 Worker-peasant, 41, 43, 45, 58, 63, 67, 73, 149 Zugewinngemeinschaft, 60, 61