Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics: Husserl's Critique of Heidegger. Volume 2 [126, 1 ed.] 3031395891, 9783031395895

Table of contents :
Part I Being and Beings
1 Heidegger on Region, Dasein, and Being 3
2 Dasein, Determination Judgments and the Essence 41
CODA.1—Remarks on Agamben’s Remark on Heidegger 68
3 Husserl and the Regions of Beings 73
CODA.2—Husserl, Heidegger and Two Interpretations of Aristotle:
A Reading Hypothesis 104
CODA.3—Phaenomenologia Sub specie Regionis:
A Geography Yet to Be Written 108
Part II Metaphysics or, of Last Philosophy
4 Husserl Metaphysicus 119
5 The Sea of Suffering 159
6 Forms-of-Life and the Reform(s) of Philosophy 199
Conclusion (Notes for Future Research) 243
Index 253

Citation preview

Contributions to Phenomenology 126

Daniele De Santis

Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics Husserl’s Critique of Heidegger Volume 2

Contributions to Phenomenology In Cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology Volume 126

Series Editors Nicolas de Warren, Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA Ted Toadvine, Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA Editorial Board Lilian Alweiss, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Elizabeth Behnke, Ferndale, WA, USA Rudolf Bernet, Husserl Archive, KU Leuven, Belgium David Carr, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA Chan-Fai Cheung, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sha Tin, Hong Kong James Dodd, New School University, New York, USA Alfredo Ferrarin, Università di Pisa, Pisa, Italy Burt Hopkins, University of Lille, Lille, France José Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada Kwok-Ying Lau, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sha Tin, Hong Kong Nam-In Lee, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea (Republic of) Dieter Lohmar, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany William R. McKenna, Miami University, Ohio, USA Algis Mickunas, Ohio University, Ohio, USA J. N. Mohanty, Temple University, Philadelphia, USA Dermot Moran, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Junichi Murata, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Thomas Nenon, The University of Memphis, Memphis, USA

Gail Soffer, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy Anthony Steinbock, Department of Philosophy Stony Brook, University Stony Brook, New York, USA Shigeru Taguchi, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan Dan Zahavi, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, USA Scope The purpose of the series is to serve as a vehicle for the pursuit of phenomenological research across a broad spectrum, including cross-over developments with other fields of inquiry such as the social sciences and cognitive science. Since its establishment in 1987, Contributions to Phenomenology has published more than 100 titles on diverse themes of phenomenological philosophy. In addition to welcoming monographs and collections of papers in established areas of scholarship,the series encourages original work in phenomenology. The breadth and depth of the Series reflects the rich and varied significance of phenomenological thinking for seminal questions of human inquiry as well as the increasingly international reach of phenomenological research. All books to be published in this Series will be fully peer-reviewed before final acceptance. The series is published in cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology.

Daniele De Santis

Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics Husserl’s Critique of Heidegger. Volume 2

Daniele De Santis ÚFAR Charles University Praha, Czech Republic

ISSN 0923-9545     ISSN 2215-1915 (electronic) Contributions to Phenomenology ISBN 978-3-031-39589-5    ISBN 978-3-031-39590-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39590-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

E se tu vuoi che ’l ver non ti sia ascoso, tutta al contrario l’istoria converti But if for truth you are particular, Like this, quite in reverse, the story goes Ludovico Ariosto, Orlando Furioso, XXXV, 27 Ad Anna, paziente compagna

Preface

This book presents the ideal continuation of the arguments that first appeared in my Husserl and the A Priori: Phenomenology and Rationality (Springer 2021). Ideal— not real—continuation because the two works are independent from one another, and the reader does not need any familiarity with the former book’s arguments in order to be able to understand this one’s, and vice versa. Notwithstanding their independence, the connection between the two books should be emphasized because they represent the first two parts of a trilogy or triptych about the different forms of rationality in Husserl. And just as the a priori book’s conclusions announced the present work, so does the present book end up paving the way for the third part of my Husserlian project. The book is published as two relatively (non-)independent volumes. The volumes can be read and understood separately, but only a thorough knowledge of both will provide actual insight into my systematic interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy as a whole. While the first volume dealt with transcendental idealism as its main theme, this second volume focuses on the contrary on the question of being from the angle of the difference between ontology and metaphysics in the philosophy of Husserl.1 Praha, Czech Republic

Daniele De Santis

 The research behind this book was supported by the Cooperatio programme provided by Charles University (research field: philosophy), and implemented by the Faculty of Arts. 1

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Introduction to Volume 2

1. The present volume contains the continuation of the arguments unfolded in the previous volume and that bear on the Husserl-Heidegger confrontation, yet regarded from Husserl’s own perspective (Husserl’s Critique of Heidegger. Volume 1). Briefly put, the first volume established the following points: the text where Husserl responds, so to say, to the conception of phenomenology first laid out by Heidegger in Being and Time is the Cartesian Meditations; in this respect, the conception of the “monad” or concrete ego that Husserl introduces in the Fourth Meditation should be regarded as his own attempt to address some of the concerns first raised by Heidegger as regards Husserl’s idea of phenomenology from the time of Ideas I; Husserl’s idea of “transcendental idealism,” which he publically presents for the first time in §41 of the Fourth Cartesian Meditation, should be understood in direct connection with Heidegger’s assessment of “understanding” (Verstehen) in Being and Time; the major difference between Heidegger’s concept of Dasein and Husserl’s understanding of the concrete subject or monad revolves around the notion of region. Whereas Heidegger invests all his energy is arguing against the “regional” determination of Dasein, that is to say, of the transcendental subject, Husserl never abandons the talk of region to refer to what phenomenology is about (whether “pure consciousness” or the “monad”). If this is the case, a systematic assessment of the manner in which Husserl and Heidegger respectively conceive of the “region” can no longer be postponed. Unlike Volume 1, whose main topic was Husserl’s and Heidegger’s view on the “transcendental” dimension of the subject (whether the monad or Dasein), the second volume of this work will focus on the problem of being instead. Accordingly, the first three chapters will assess, first, Heidegger’s understanding or, as the readers will soon realize, misunderstanding of the “region” (not only in Being and Time, but also in some of his lectures from the 20s), then the quite peculiar way in which on the contrary Husserl conceives of it. As the first and third chapters will clearly show, in fact, while Heidegger tends to endorse the equation region = highest genus, this ix

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is exactly what Husserl on the contrary rejects. The “region,” Husserl would rather explain, does not correspond to a highest genus, but to a unitary system of highest genera (and is hence not to be identified with any of them) (for a preliminary discussion of these problems, see De Santis, 2023). The difference is noteworthy not only with regard to the Husserl-Heidegger confrontation (as we will try to reconstruct it over the course of the next six chapters), but also for what concerns the development of Husserl’s thought. In fact, one of the main claims made in Chap. 3 is that the structure of the region is not and cannot be understood “mereologically” upon the basis of the distinctions (between “moment” and “piece,” “non-independent” and “independent” part of an “object”) first presented by Husserl in the Logical Investigations. While Chaps. 1 and 3 are dedicated to Heidegger’s and Husserl’s understanding of the region, Chap. 2 elaborates upon a thesis first introduced over the course of the second chapter of the first volume of this work. It is the thesis to the effect that the arguments presented in §9 of Being and Time, notably, the claim that the essence of Dasein’s consists in its ways-to-be, should be read and interpreted in a most direct connection with the ontology (and the “doctrine of ideas”) of two early members of the phenomenological movement: Jean Hering and Roman Ingarden. The main point we make in Chap. 2 is not only that Heidegger’s conception of Dasein’s “essence” is the result of a radical and straightforward rejection of Hering-Ingarden’s position on the “essence-existence” articulation (= Heidegger contra Hering-Ingarden), but also that Heidegger’s view on Dasein’s “essence” should be also properly deemed a radicalization and re-elaboration of Hering’s own concept of “individual essence” or Wesen. This is one of the senses, we maintain, according to which Heidegger should be regarded also as an early phenomenologist. For, early phenomenology is the tradition to which he belongs, even if only in the attempt at departing from it once and for all. We wrote, one of the senses— because already in the final Appendix to the first volume (whose title sounds: Of a Hegemonic Discourse about the History of Early Phenomenology: Outline of a Paradigm Revision), the claim was advanced that Heidegger should be regarded as participating in a quite specific discussion proper to the early phase of the phenomenological movement: the one that revolves around the understanding of “phenomenology” as either a method with no specific field of investigation (Reinach et alii) or as a science with just one exclusive field of inquiry (Husserl).

2. But the problem of “being” will be addressed in the following not only from the angle of what Husserl calls ontology or, better: ontologies; it will also be addressed (mainly from) the angle of the difference between ontology and metaphysics in the philosophy of Husserl. The commonplace interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology as being metaphysically neutral will be systematically challenged over the course of Chaps. 4 and 5. In the former, a most systematic reconstruction of the development of Husserl’s conception of metaphysics will be offered with the aim of

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showing that at least three phases can be distinguished in the way in which Husserl thinks of the relation between metaphysics and phenomenology. A first phase in which metaphysics is regarded by Husserl as “first philosophy” is followed by a second phase in which “phenomenology” assumes the noble title of “first philosophy” and metaphysics is regarded as “last philosophy.” Finally, a third phase can be pinpointed in which “metaphysics” is no longer identified with any of the parts of the system of philosophy (whether first or last philosophy1), but rather with its overall accomplishment and realization. As a consequence, metaphysics—as the ultimate interpretation of factual reality—coincides with the realization of a phenomenologically “grounded” system of all the (a priori and a posteriori) sciences from the standpoint of the theoretical form of reason. But the problem of how to properly or correctly understand Husserl’s relation to metaphysics (see the recent assessment by Ip, 2023) is important not only in order to attain a correct overall picture of Husserl’s philosophy as a whole; it is crucial because it directly bears upon the Husserl-Heidegger confrontation. And this in two different senses. Husserl’s claim that the analytics of Dasein results in a confusion between transcendental philosophy (first philosophy) and philosophical anthropology (see the arguments provided in Volume 1, Chapter 1; and in the first chapter of the present volume) entails two sub-criticisms. One, that the analytics of Dasein ends up undermining the possibility of all the ontologies other than the fundamental one (we argue for this over the course of Chap. 1). Two, Husserl criticizes Heidegger for attributing transcendental value to some of the “factual” (and therefore absolutely “irrational”) aspects of our human existence in the world. In order to elucidate this point, the last part of the present volume (see Chap. 5) is concerned with Husserl’s own grim of picture human existence, which he conceives of as affected by numerous irrationalities. What we are really interested in here is not the mere quaestio facti of whether Husserl ever addresses the problems of our human, factual existence in the world (which is to be answered in the affirmative without further ado); what really interests us here is the quaestio iuris about the “position” that such questions would have within his overall conception of a phenomenology-based philosophy.

3. It is with these questions that this second volume, hence the whole work is brought to conclusion. Just as the conclusion to the book on the a priori (De Santis, 2021) already announced the present research, so the present volume’s conclusion hints at the further developments of our Husserlian project. Whereas in fact the book on the  It is a real pity that in his last book on the history of metaphysics between “first” and “last” philosophy, Giorgio Agamben (2023) barely mentions Husserl. This seems to be just another sign of his unjustified (unjustified, because his knowledge could prove to be extremely useful to Agamben) lack of interest (almost a prejudice) in the philosophy of Husserl. 1

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a priori) was dedicated to the ontological form of rationality, and whereas this one strives to investigate and understand the “transcendental” side of Husserl’s thought (thus, the relation between the ontological and the transcendental rationality, which Husserl labels Rationalität and Vernünftigkeit respectively), our projected third book will have a difficult but unique task: that of addressing the problem of the irrational nature of our existence from the standpoint of the philosopher and, in particular, of the “function” he or she is meant to fulfill.

References Agamben, G. (2023). Filosofia prima filosofia ultima. Il sapere dell’Occidente tra metafisica e scienze. Einaudi editore. De Santis, D. (2021). Husserl and the a priori. Phenomenology and rationality. Springer. De Santis, D. (2023). Regiony, nejvyšší rody a idea fenomenologické geografie. In J. Čapek, & E.  Fulínová (Eds.), Myšlení konečnosti. Pavlu Koubovi 70. narozeninám (pp.  125–134). Karolinum. Ip, L. (2023). From “second philosophy” to “last philosophy”: Husserl’s idea of metaphysics as the absolute science of factual reality. In D. De Santis (Ed.), Edmund Husserl’s Cartesian meditations. Commentary, interpretations, discussions (pp. 497–521). Karl Alber.

Contents

Part I Being and Beings 1

Heidegger on Region, Dasein, and Being ����������������������������������������������    3

2

 Dasein, Determination Judgments and the Essence ����������������������������   41 CODA.1—Remarks on Agamben’s Remark on Heidegger����������������������   68

3

 Husserl and the Regions of Beings ��������������������������������������������������������   73 CODA.2—Husserl, Heidegger and Two Interpretations of Aristotle: A Reading Hypothesis ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  104 CODA.3—Phaenomenologia Sub specie Regionis: A Geography Yet to Be Written ����������������������������������������������������������������  108

Part II Metaphysics or, of Last Philosophy 4

Husserl Metaphysicus������������������������������������������������������������������������������  119

5

The Sea of Suffering��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  159

6

Forms-of-Life and the Reform(s) of Philosophy ����������������������������������  199

Conclusion (Notes for Future Research)��������������������������������������������������������  243 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  253

xiii

Abbreviations

Husserl Hua volume, page:

Edmund Husserl, Husserliana. Edmund Husserls Gesammelte Werke Hua-Mat volume, page: Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Materialien Hua-Dok volume, page: Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Dokumente

xv

Part I

Being and Beings

Chapter 1

Heidegger on Region, Dasein, and Being

1. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, §37, Heidegger makes the following, critical remark about the general idea and possibility of a philosophical anthropology: How, then, does an anthropology become philosophical? […] Certainly, an anthropology may be said to be philosophical if its method is philosophical, i.e., if it is pursued as the essential investigation of the human being. In this case, anthropology strives to distinguish the entity that we call human being from plants, animals and every other type of entity, and by such delimitation it attempts to bring to light the specific essential constitution of this determined region of the entity. Philosophical anthropology becomes then a regional ontology of the human being, coordinated with other ontologies with which it shares the whole domain of the entity. Understood in this way, philosophical anthropology cannot be considered without any further explication the center of philosophy; above all, this last pretension cannot be based upon the internal problematic of this anthropology (our italics) (Heidegger, 2010a, 210–211; 1965, 217–218).

Anthropology becomes philosophical if it pursues the eidetic investigation of the “human being” as a “region of being.” More explicitly put, philosophical anthropology is the regional ontology of the human being, and it cannot be “the center of philosophy.” As far as we understand Heidegger’s line of thought, the rejection of the hypothesis of regarding the analytics of Dasein as a “philosophical anthropology” does not derive from what we could label the regional conception of Dasein per se taken; rather, it  derives from the fact that, the region der Mensch being a region coordinated with other regions, its ontology (= philosophical anthropology (see also Heidegger, 1997a, 270)) cannot be the center of philosophy (as on the contrary the analytics of Dasein aspires to be). The passage above is one of the few in which the concordia discors and the discordia concors between Husserl and Heidegger becomes the most apparent: that philosophical anthropology cannot be “the center of philosophy” or, in Husserl’s jargon: “first philosophy” because the region der Mensch is only a region among others (within the macro-region © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. De Santis, Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics, Contributions to Phenomenology 126, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39590-1_1

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world)—this is a point that Husserl would concede without any hesitation. Only an extra-­regional being, hence its relevant science, could occupy “the center of philosophy.” Yet, if for Heidegger extra-regional means irreducibility to every regional determination, for Husserl extra-regional means irreducibility to the worldly regional determination of the being in question. Hence, the necessity of disclosing that new region of being called “pure consciousness” investigated by that new eidetic material science labeled “phenomenology” on which alone philosophy can build. A brand new continent can be discovered according to Husserl (a Neuland (Husserl, 1968, 42)), the mapping out of which is the proper task of phenomenology. On the contrary, Dasein challenges every possible cartography or philosophical geography: the presupposition is that regions can only be coordinated with one another and that there cannot be a region irreducible to the ones already present in the rich landscape of philosophy. As is apparent, upon the basis of the just quoted excerpt a (misleading) impression might arise to the effect that Heidegger would be willing to accept the regional determination of Dasein if the latter could be a “region” that is not “coordinated” with all the other regions. Yet, as we know from the analyses developed in Volume 1, Chap. 2, §§4–7, in Being and Time Heidegger invests a great amount of energy in dismissing every possible attempt at understanding the concept of Dasein as a “region” or, to put it better, as a highest category, of which the individual Dasein would be only an individualization (in the sense of the Husserlian individuum): this is the consequence and implication of Dasein’s not having a material what (ein sachhaltiges Was) (see Heidegger, 1967, 12; 2010, 11) and its essence lying in its existence. However, since in the lectures of 1923 on Ontology Dasein is regarded as a Seinsregion or region of being (Heidegger, 1988, 25–26; 1999, 21), and since immediately after Being and Time the concepts of region and regional ontology are mobilized for instance during an interpretation of Kant (Heidegger, 1995, 35 and ff.), the necessity arises to address the following two issues: (a) the way in which Heidegger understands the Region in the book of 1927; (b) how he came over the years to slowly, yet quite systematically, regard it with skepticism to the point that he openly denies that Dasein could be a “region of being.”

2. The term “region” (Region), and all the expressions derived from it seem to be used by the Heidegger of Being and Time in a multiplicity of manners and in many different places, from the beginning to the end of the text. Heidegger speaks of specific and circumscribed “regions,” as for example in the case of “history” understood “as the region of the entity that one distinguishes from nature with regard to the essential determination of the existence of the human being as ‘spirit’ and ‘culture’” (Heidegger,

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1967, 379; 2010, 361).1 At the beginning of §25, the expression “region” is used to designate the manner in which Dasein should not be (ontologically) misunderstood: The answer to the question of who this entity is actually seems to have already been given with the formal indication of the basic characteristics of Dasein (cf. §9). Dasein is the entity which I myself am, its being is in each case mine. This determination indicates an ontological constitution, but no more than that. At the same time, it contains an ontic indication, albeit an undifferentiated one, that an I is always this entity, and not others. The who is answered in terms of the I itself, the “subject,” the “self.” The who is what maintains itself as an identity throughout changes in behavior and lived-experiences (Verhaltungen und Erlebnisse), and in this way relates itself to this multiplicity. Ontologically, we understand it as what is always already and constantly present (je schon und ständig Vorhandene) in a closed region and for that region, as that which lies at its basis in an eminent sense, as the subjectum. (…) Dasein is tacitly conceived in advance as objective presence (Vorhandenheit) (Heidegger, 1967, 114; 2010, 112).

Since we have already reflected upon the implications of the allusion to §9 (see Volume 1, Chap. 4, §2) as regards the method of “formal indication” and the determination of Dasein’s essence, we can now discuss the role played by the concept of region. Although it is not (yet) evident whether Heidegger would identify Region and Vorhandenheit in such a way that every possible regional determination (whether of Dasein or other) would always fall under the class of what is vorhanden—the “region” designates here the ontological characterization of the “who” of Dasein understood as a subjectum. More generally however, what is vorhanden seems to circumscribe a region, that is to say, what Heidegger refers to in passing as “the region of being of what is present” (die Seinsregion des Vorhandenen) (Heidegger, 1967, 82; 2010, 80). Yet, the fact that “region” should not be taken here at face value is shown by Heidegger usually speaking of “Region” des Vorhandenen in inverted commas (“region”), for the Vorhandenheit cannot designate, properly speaking, the result of a division of the entity in different domains, i.e., a region among many other regions (e.g., nature, culture and the like). If this were the case, in fact, given the opposition between Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit that sustains the entire edifice of Being and Time, also the Zuhandenheit would have to be assumed as designating a certain region of the entities alongside others. In this regard, the remarks first made by Heidegger in §69b, then again in §76 about science as a mode of being of Dasein (Heidegger, 1967, 392; 2010, 373) are of crucial importance in order to shed light on the connection between Region and Vorhandenheit (see Greisch, 2014, 343–345). In §69b Heidegger tackles The Temporal Meaning of the Way in which Circumspect Taking Care Becomes Modified into the Theoretical Discovery of That Which is Present within the World. Here, the question is addressed, “how theoretical discovery ‘arises’ from circumspect taking care” (Heidegger, 1967, 356; 2010, 340). What is at stake is the “ontological genesis of the theoretical comportment,”  In the entry on Martin Heidegger published in 1928 by R.  Bultmann (now in Bultmann & Heidegger, 2009, 272), yet composed by Heidegger himself (see Bultmann & Heidegger, 2009, 43–49), the core of the project laid out in Being and Time is described as: eine universale Ontologie, die auch die Region der Geschichte umfasst, zu entwerfen. 1

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and the ultimate aim is the existential concept of science. Since it is not our intention here to discuss in extenso the notion of circumspect taking care, we will confine the analysis to a few general observations. “Circumspection, Heidegger explains, moves in the relevant relations of the context of useful things at hand” (Heidegger, 1967, 359; 2010, 342). But a “modification” of our circumspect taking care can take place.2 In our circumspect use of tools, “we can affirm that the hammer is too heavy or too light. Even the sentence that the hammer is heavy can express a heedful deliberation and mean that it is not light, that is to say, that it requires force to use it or it makes using it difficult. But the statement can also signify that the being before us, with which we are circumspectly familiar as a hammer, has a weight, namely, the ‘property’ of heaviness” (Heidegger, 1967, 359; 2010, 343). What happens is that the understanding of being guiding the dealings with inner-worldly things “has been transformed.” To the modification of the understanding of being corresponds what Heidegger calls here a “release” of the surrounding world: “the multiplicity of places of useful things at hand within the confines of the surrounding world is not simply modified to a mere multiplicity of positions; rather, it means that the entities of the surrounding world are released from this confinement. The totality of what is present (des Vorhandenen) becomes thematic” (Heidegger, 1967, 362; 2010, 344). In this case, a releasing of the surrounding world belongs to the modification of the understanding of being. Following the guideline of the understanding of being in the sense of objective presence, this release becomes at the same time a delimitation of the “region” of what is objectively present (Region des Vorhandenen). The more appropriately the being of the entities to be investigated is understood in the guiding understanding of being, and the more the totality of the entities is articulated in its fundamental determinations as a possible region of a science, the more assured will be the actual perspective of methodological questioning (Heidegger, 1967, 362; 2010, 345).

A region expresses the way the totality of the entity artikuliert ist: what interests us here is less the relation between “region” and (the existential concept of) “science,” than that between “region” and what is “objectively present” (vorhanden). The entity can be “articulated” or can disclose its own articulation (into regions and sub-­ regions) only to the extent that it has already become “thematic” as something objectively present. In this respect, whereas it belongs to the very essence of our own dealings with inner-worldly things to exclude any possible region-alization of the entity, the latter is possible only on condition that the entity, notably, the understanding of its being has undergone a “thematic” transformation—thereby turning  Let us warn the reader that we are interested only in the ontological implications of the existential modification. No analysis will be provided of its “genetic” account, and of the way in which the modification is actually brought about. The latter Heidegger first preliminarily assesses in §16. Towards the very end of this paragraph, Heidegger speaks of die mögliche Brüche, “the possible breaches” in the totality of reference that “push forward” (vordrängen) die Vorhandenheit des Seienden (Heidegger, 1967, 76; 2010, 75). For a beautiful and meticulous analysis of this issue, see Maschietti, 2005, in particular, 57 and ff.; and Slama, 2021, 210–217. For a discussion of the difficult and quite problematic relation between Vorhandenheit, theoretical attitude and science, see McManus, 2012, 59 and ff. It is a pity that McManus never really appeals to Husserl’s notion of Einstellung to shed light on Heidegger’s. 2

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the entity into something present. Only what is already “present” in the sense of the Vorhandenheit can be regionally “articulated.” The expression “Region des Vorhandenen” should not be hence taken as designating an actual articulation of the entity, but rather, the condition of every possible regional articulation, as there cannot be any region prior to or independently of the entity becoming something thematic. This finds further confirmation in §76, where Heidegger emphasizes that every science is “primarily constituted by thematization,” in such a manner that “what is known pre-scientifically in Dasein as disclosed being-in-the-world is projected upon its specific being”: “The region of the entity is delimited by this project” (Heidegger, 1967, 393; 2010, 373). Ontologically speaking, the entity that is divided and articulated into regions has the character of the Vorhandenheit; existentially speaking, the region arises out of a modification of Dasein’s understanding of being and dealing with inner-worldly things, which are no longer dealt with in their Zuhandenheit but rather thematized and ascribed “properties.” If we connect what has just been argued with the passage above on the regional determination of the “who” of Dasein as a subjectum, the following is obtained. The subjectum is nothing but the result of the thematization of Dasein in the sense described by Heidegger in §§69b and 76: Dasein is turned into something “present” and ascribed a series of properties. This is why Heidegger can write, “Dasein is tacitly conceived in advance as objective presence (Vorhandenheit).” The process presented by Heidegger in these pages had already been partially encountered in §33 during the assessment of the “statement” as a derivative mode of the explication (Auslegung). Here Heidegger’s ambition is to clarify in what sense “the ‘judgment’” is based upon understanding and represents “a derivative form of explication” (Heidegger, 1967, 153–154; 2010, 149). In what sense, or through which existential modification does the statement or judgment originate from our circumspect taking care? (Heidegger, 1967, 157; 2010, 152). The example is the same one Heidegger will use in 69b: “The hammer is heavy” (yet, this time it is not the hammer itself as an entity to be at the center of Heidegger’s attention, but rather the character or nature of the relevant judgment). Here is what Heidegger explains: “Something at hand with which we have to do or perform something turns into something ‘about which’ the statement that points it out is made. […] Within this discovering of objective presence which covers over handiness, what is encountered as objectively present is determined in its being objectively present in such and such a way. Now the access if first made available for something like qualities” (Heidegger, 1967, 158 2010, 152–153). What follows is that, “The what (das Was), by which (als welches) the statement determines what is objectively present is drawn from what is objectively present as such.” The “as” or Als by means of which the entity is being determined is no longer that of “the totality of relevance” (= “hermeneutical as”); rather, it is that of the what (das Was) of the entity (see Graeser, 1993 for a more systematic discussion of the hermeneutical “as”). For the sake of our discussion in both this and the next chapter, the just quoted excerpt is of crucial importance. Das Was of the entity, hence its Eigenschaften (see once again Volume 1, Chap. 2, §5–6) (or, in the more Aristotelian-sounding jargon spoken by Jean Hering, its τί εἶναι and ποῖον εἶναι (see Hering, 1921, 505 and ff.))

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are drawn from the entity to the extent that an existential modification has already taken place.3 In other words, what is objectively present is what is determined in terms of Was and Eigenschaften, and on the basis of which alone it can also be divided and articulated into different regions. But what Heidegger is now adding is that in order for this to be possible, also the nature of the λόγος must have experienced or undergone an “existential modification.” The hermeneutical as has turned into the apophantic one: “To what extent this problematic has an effect on the interpretation of the λόγος and, on the other hand, to what extent the concept of ‘judgment’ has, by a remarkable counter-movement, an effect on the ontological problematic, is shown by the phenomenon of the copula” (Heidegger, 1967, 159; 2010, 154). “Binding” and “separating” become a matter of “relating” (Beziehen) and the λόγος itself ends up being “experienced as something objectively present and interpreted as such, and the entities which it points out have the sense of objective presence as well.” As Heidegger then concludes the long arguments developed in §33: “This sense of being itself is left undifferentiated and un-contrasted with other possibilities of being so that being in the sense of the formal being-something (Etwas-Sein) is at the same time fused with it and we are unable to obtain any regional division (regionale Scheidung) between these two” (Heidegger, 1967, 160; 2010, 155; on the question of the λόγος’s nature in Being and Time, see Dorfma, 2006, 109 and ff., where some of the difficulties connected to the Vorhandenheit-­ Zuhandenheit relation are also tackled).4 The (existential) modification that the “entity” undergoes corresponds to a relevant (existential) modification experienced by the λόγος itself: and as the former can be thus articulated into regions based on its Was or τι εἶναι, so is the latter organized and articulated around the concept of Etwas-Sein or “being-something.” And the Etwas überhaupt, Husserl would explain in Ideas, is the highest category around which the fundamental concepts of the so-called formal region of formal ontology revolves (see Hua III/1, 26–27; Husserl, 2014, 25): “Precisely for this reason, the ‘apophantic logic’, even when its assertions are exclusively about meanings, nonetheless belongs to formal ontology in the all-encompassing sense [of the latter term]” (Hua III/1, 227; Husserl, 2014, 25). As is evident, by briefly retrieving a line of thought already systematically expounded in the lectures of 1920–1921 (see Volume 1, Chap. 4, §§3–4), Heidegger is making the claim that, as a consequence of the (existential) modification undergone by both the entity and the λόγος, it is impossible to make any distinction between the regional character of the former and

 This is why we think it is misleading to speak of “the tendency to force the Being of the entities into categories to which they do not belong to (our italics)” (McManus, 2012, 51). Based upon Heidegger’s own words (“The what… is drawn from…”), the situation is exactly the opposite: the categories are determined starting from the entity itself. 4  See Michalski, 2002, 189–190 for a close-up examination of the expression Zuhandenheit. The ambiguities of Heidegger’s conception of the Zuhandenheit have been already stressed by scholars; see Dreyfus, 1983, who addresses the problem from within the wider horizon of Heidegger’s reflections on technique; and Sinclair, 2008, 426 and ff. 3

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that of the latter. As Heidegger would put it, no matter whether the region in question is the purported formal region of formal ontology (to which apophantic logic belongs) or one of the material regions, the “individuals” of which are ascribed a Was and a series of Eigenschaften—in both cases we are dealing with something vorhanden. And against such a common backdrop—which is that of an undifferentiated ontological determination—it is not possible to make any “regional division” (regionale Scheidung): insofar as they are all “regions,” no ontological distinction can be ascertained between them.5

3. This might be the right moment to make a few remarks on the very concept of Vorhandenheit, hence  on its link with the “categories” as Heidegger understands them in Being and Time. No matter how strange this might sound, the point for us is to recognize that the Vorhandenheit is de facto an “empty class”; in fact, according to the book’s ontological framework, there is nothing that prima facie corresponds to it or falls under it, and the relation between Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit is not that of two “coordinated” classes by which the totality of the entity could be divided up and hence classified. The same applies to the distinction between “existentials” and “categories,” regardless of the manner in which Heidegger presents it in the famous §9. As is known, here Heidegger remarks that, “Existentials and categories are two fundamental possibilities of the characters of being. The entity which corresponds to them requires different ways of primary interrogation. The entity is either a who (existence) or a what (objective presence in the broadest sense)” (Heidegger, 1967, 45; 2010, 44). Now, even if the way in which Heidegger presents the distinction between who and what, thus “existentials” and “categories” with their relevant mode of interrogation, might give rise to the impression that the two are on an equal footing—the difference depending on the mode of being of the entity in question— the state of affairs is in truth quite different. As we have in fact just seen, the determination of the entity (i.e., of any entity, not only of Dasein) as something vorhanden to be categorially determined based upon its what (das Was) is the result of an “existential modification.” In other words, it would be a real mistake to think that the distinction between existentials and categories, therefore the one between who and what, corresponds to the very distinction between Dasein and any other entity

 This does not mean that Heidegger does not recognize the difference between the one “formal” domain and the many “material” and regional determinations of the entity; see for example the beginning of §48, where Heidegger explicitly admits the necessity of de-formalizing (entformalisieren) the formal structures in relation to the many possible material (sachhaltiges) and regional modifications of the entity (Abwandlungen) (Heidegger, 1967, 241; 2010, 232). For an overview of the problem of the categories in Heidegger, see Ferrari, 2003, 195–206. See Fultner, 2013, for an analysis of the relation between assertion and the existential determination of language. 5

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the mode of being of which is different from Dasein’s. It would be a real mistake to think that, prior to the existential modification, the distinction between “Dasein” and, say, the “hammer” with which we interact in our circumspect taking care is a distinction between who (the former) and what (the latter). Quite the opposite. “Prior” to the existential modification, these entities have the mode of being designated by the term Zuhandenheit: this is nothing but the expression of the mode of being of the entities as they are encountered by Dasein in its circumspect taking care. In sum, prior to the existential modification by means of which the entity is “thematized,” thereby displaying the mode of being of what is vorhanden, everything within the world has either the mode of being of Dasein (Existenz) or is an expression of the mode of being of Dasein (zuhanden). And neither can be categorially determined based upon its what: neither Dasein of course (whose mode of being challenges every categorial determination) nor the “hammer” of which we circumspectly take care (as this is not “yet” something objectively present or vorhanden).6 By the same token, after the existential modification, both Dasein and the entities, the mode of being of which is different from the former’s, can be categorially determined based on their what. This is the reason why we ventured to affirm that Vorhandenheit designates an “empty class”: for prior to the existential modification, it does not refer to any kind of entity or mode of being. Prior to the “existential modification,” every entity is either a who and has the mode of being of existence (it is an individual Dasein) or is the expression of Dasein’s circumspectly taking care of the world and has therefore the mode of being of the Zuhandenheit. The limit case, which perfectly epitomizes our point, is represented by “nature”: “‘Nature’ is also discovered in the use of useful things, ‘nature’ in the light of products of nature. But nature must not be understood here as what is merely objectively present (Vorhandene) […]. The forest is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry rock, the river is water power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails’” (Heidegger, 1967, 70; 2010, 70). In order for “nature” to be determined as something vorhanden, we need “abstract from nature’s mode of being as handiness (als zuhandener).” The point is less to stress the pragmatic view

 As far as we know, there are only two interpreters of Being and Time who seem to have understood this point clearly. The first one is Carlo Antoni who, in his posthumously published essay on Being and Time, claims that Heidegger ends up regarding the world sub specie utilitatis (Antoni, 1972, 49). The point needs be rightly understood though. It would be a mistake to simply assume that Antoni is criticizing Heidegger for falling prey to some crass form of pragmatism. Quite the opposite. Resorting to the categorial apparatus developed by Benedetto Croce, in particular the distinction between the four forms of spiritual activity (theoretical activity: artistic and logical forms; practical activity: economic and ethical forms), Antoni blames Heidegger for reducing the categorial complexity of the life of the spirit to just one form, that of the economic activity. The second interpreter is Maximilian Beck, the author of the first, long review of Being and Time. In his text (Beck, 1928, 11–14) Beck explicitly accuses Heidegger of establishing a form of “ontological continuity” between Dasein and the entities within the world, so that every entity encountered by Dasein is necessarily a more or less direct expression of Dasein’s own mode of being (= the so-called Zuhandenheit). 6

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that seems to emerge from these lines7 than the question concerning the determination of nature’s mode of being (within the horizon of Dasein’s circumspectly taking care of the world) as something originally zuhanden. What follows from our discourse is an important consequence bearing on the “categories.” For if the categorial determination of the entity, primarily by means of the first two Aristotelian categories (τί ἐστι and ποιόν (Metaph., Δ, 1017, 25–26) or Was and Eigenschaften in the language of Hering), requires that the “mode of being” of the entity be the Vorhandenheit, then the “categorial apparatus” (= any categorial apparatus) can emerge only thanks to Dasein’s own existential modification. This does not at all amount, however, to a form of subject-ivization of the categories; quite the opposite: “The what (das Was), by which (als welches) the statement determines what is objectively present is drawn from what is objectively present as such.” The determination of the τί of the entity or, even better: the categorial determination of the entity as something is drawn from the entity itself. Yet, as the latter is possible only on condition that the entity’s mode of being be the Vorhandenheit, the so-­ called existential modification is the condition of possibility for the very appearance of the categories. The emergence of the categorial apparatus, the possibility of determining “categorially” the entity requires an actual transcendental genesis: the existential modification, by means of which the entity is no longer taken care of circumspectly, and the λόγος no longer determines the entity exclusively in a hermeneutical manner (= the “hermeneutical as” is replaced by the “apophantic as”). What one could label the objective categorial determination of the entity (“The what… is drawn from what is objectively present”) rests upon Dasein’s existential modification, only thanks to which the entity is primarily understood as something objectively present and categorially determined. La perspective heideggérienne est ici… tout à la fois réaliste et transcendantale (Courtine, 2007, 155). Of course, it would make no sense to raise the question whether there is any chronological distinction between the thematization of the entity upon the part of Dasein and the modification of its mode of being; Heidegger would likely explain that what, ontically, we call thematization is what, ontologically, corresponds to a modification of the mode of being of the entity.8 Figure 1.1 should clarify why the distinction between “existentials” and “categories” on the one hand, and between Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit on the other is not and cannot be a distinction between coordinated concepts. If prior to the existential modification, hence to the thematization of the entity, there is nothing falling under the class of the Vorhandenheit, it is only after the existential modification that the categories arise. If prior to the existential modification there is only the who (= Dasein) and the entities whose mode of being is the expression of the former’s “existence,” after the existential modification anything and everything can be  For a wider discussion, see Čapek, 2007, 105 and ff.; Overgaard, 2004, 117 and ff.; see Sinclair, 2008, 432 and ff. on the difficult relation between nature and the two modes of Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit in and after Being and Time. 8  For a discussion of this topic in the years before Being and Time, see Gauvry, 2013, in particular, 122–127.

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1  Heidegger on Region, Dasein, and Being Zuhandenheit

Dasein

Hermeneutical As Existential Modification Apophantic As (

Dasein

Vorhandenheit

Fig. 1.1  Heidegger’s existential modification

categorially determined, including that entity whose mode of being is “existence” (= possibility of a philosophical anthropology).9 The point is not simply to recognize the ontological “priority” of existentials over categories; for without the entity that exists there could be no existential modification, hence no categorial determination of the entities (this being Dasein’s ontological priority). Rather, the point is to admit that it is only on the basis of the one and only mode of being of Dasein (let us label this: existential-ontological monism) that there can eventually emerge the plurality of the categories (which are in fact “drawn” from the objectively present entities). Nevertheless, if we do not venture to speak of an ontological plurality of the categories (in contrast with the existential monism just pointed out), it is because for Heidegger whatever is or can be categorially determined (no matter if by means of its τί or ποιόν) is marked by the ontologically undifferentiated mode of being of the Vorhandenheit. To go the other way around: the existential modification, implied by Dasein’s “thematization” of the entities, results in the entity displaying the ontologically undifferentiated mode of being of the Vorhandenheit, only against the backdrop of which it can be categorially determined based upon its τί and ποιόν.10 Whether all of this would also also imply a systematic attempt at deducing the categories (whether Aristotelian or other) from the existentials themselves, so that the existential modification of Dasein results in such and such a specific existential (being-in-the-world, de-distancing, temporality, and so on and so forth) being modified into such and such a specific “category” of the entity (e.g., πρός τι, πού, ποτέ…), the present investigation is not yet in a position to properly decide.

 If we have been using the phrase “existential modification” both in relation to Dasein itself and the entity, this is for the following reason. Since what is at stake in the existential modification is the “modification of the understanding of being” on the part of Dasein, the former always goes hand in hand with the latter and vice versa: as the existential modification always means the modification of the understanding of the mode of being of the entity, the expression “existential modification” can be used to describe either one of them indifferently (because it always embraces both). 10  The issue in question goes then far beyond Dreyfus’ interpretation of it, according to which Heidegger would be trying to find a place for “traditional” (meaning representational) intentionality (Dreyfus, 1991, 60–70 and ff.). 9

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4. Following up on the idea of the existential-ontological monism just denounced, a few additional and critical observations impose themselves as regards “the problem of the multiplicity of modes of being” (to borrow an expression employed by Heidegger in the course of the SS 1927) (see also our remarks on the Vorhandenheit below, §§9–10). To be more precise, what follows is not meant to be a criticism of Heidegger’s own position, but the expression of a concern about an issue of which he grew more and more conscious, as far as we can tell, after the publication of Being and Time. In the words of the lectures The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: “The articulation of being varies each time with the mode of being of the entity” (see Heidegger, 1997, 170; 1988, 120). Here Heidegger recognizes that the manifold modes of being of the entity imply a plural articulation of being; the question for us being whether, despite Heidegger’s claim, such plurality can be effectively vindicated given the ontological framework of Being and Time. As far as our line of thought here is concerned, a first allusion to the problem of the articulation of being according to its plurality is made in the Introduction to Phenomenological Research (§3): If we compare this how-character (Wie-Charakter) of existence with others that the Greeks knew, then we see that they are concerned with determinations of what things are (Was-­ Bestimmungen). There are various respects in which existence is materially characterized: (1) Πράγματα, the things which “one” (man) has to deal with. The entity is accordingly addressed in this respect. (2) Χρήματα, the things insofar as they are used for needs that the existence of the world itself motivates and requires. (3) Ποιούμενα, the things in the world that are produced, that are made and are available as ἔργα for 1 and 2. (4) Φυσικά, the existing things of the world that are not produced but instead are in themselves, coming to be on the basis of their specific being but capable at the same time of being that out of which something can be produced (wood, iron) and thus having a relation to 3. (5) Μαθήεματα, the sort of entities that have the specific character of being able to be learned and concerning which there is a kind of knowing that can be communicated to everyone without their thereby having a practical relation to matters. (6) Within each of these characterizations and the being named by them, there are paradigmatic things which have the peculiar character of being that is designated οὐσία (Heidegger, 1994, 45–46; 2005, 34–35).

These distinctions are of course neither made nor accepted by Heidegger himself. It is the Greeks, he says, who recognize a plurality of ways (Hinsichten) to materially (sachlich) determine the entity itself. Heidegger explicitly opposes the Was-­ Bestimmungen upon the basis of which the Greeks can distinguish between the six determinations above and the Wie-Charakter of the phenomenological investigation of the mode of being proper to Dasein. “In our explication we did not encounter these categories of the world” (Heidegger, 1994, 46; 2005, 35). “Phenomenology” proceeds in fact only by analyzing the φαινόμενα; it lets the mode of being of the entity encountered within the world by Dasein show itself for what it is (sich-selbst-­ zu-zeigen): “Φαινόμενα then is precisely the being addressed in all these characters, but is this being only in the respect of showing itself.” Rather than imposing, from the outset, upon the entity a certain Was-Bestimmung (as the Greeks seem to have

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done), phenomenology determines the entity only “formally” as a φαινόμενον, thereby letting it show itself for what it is from within the horizon of Dasein’s encounter with the world. This is precisely what Heidegger will explicitly do over the course of §15 of Being and Time (The Being of the Entity Encountered in the Surrounding World): “The phenomenological exhibition of the being of the entities encountered nearest to us can be accomplished under the guidance of the everyday-being-in-the-world, which we also call dealings in the world with inner-worldly entities” (Heidegger, 1967, 66–67; 2010, 66). The phenomenological question, Heidegger adds, is concerned with “the being of those entities encountered when taking care of something.” In a way that is reminiscent of what he had already argued for in 1923–24, Heidegger notices: “The Greeks had an appropriate term for ‘things’: πράγματα, that is, that with which one has to do in taking care in dealings (πρᾶξις). But the specifically ‘pragmatic’ character of the πράγματα is just what was left in obscurity and ‘initially’ determined as ‘mere things.’ We shall call the entity that is encountered in taking care useful things (Zeug)” (Heidegger, 1967, 68; 2010, 67–68). As it is not our ambition to address in detail the manner in which Heidegger presents the concept of Verweisung or “reference” (“there ‘is’ no such thing as a useful thing”) (see Rosales, 1970, 32–36; Overgaard, 2004, 117–126), let us just limit ourselves to recalling the examples given by Heidegger. In accordance with their character of utility, useful things are always in terms of their belonging to other useful things: writing utensils, pen, ink, paper, desk blotter, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room (Heidegger, 1967, 68; 2010, 68). As the what-for of the hammer, plane, and needle, the work to be produced has in its turn the mode of being of a useful thing. The shoe to be produced is for wearing (footgear), the clock is made for telling time. […] But the work to be produced is not just useful for…; production itself is always a using of something for something. A reference to “materials” is contained in the work at the same time. The work is dependent upon leather, thread, nails, and similar things. Leather is in turn produced from hides. These hides are taken from animals (Tiere) which were bred and raised by others. We also find animals in the world which were not bred and raised and even when they have been raised these entities produce themselves in a certain way (stellt sich… her). Thus entities are accessible in the surrounding world which in themselves do not need to be produced and are always already ready to hand (zuhanden). Hammer, tongs, nails in themselves refer to, they consist of, steel, iron, metal, stone, wood. “Nature” is also discovered in the use of useful things, “nature” in the light of products of nature (Heidegger, 1967, 70; 2010, 69–70). As the “surrounding world” is discovered, “nature” thus discovered is encountered along with it. We can abstract from nature’s type of being as handiness (als zuhanden); we can discover and define it in its mere objective presence (Vorhandenheit) […] The botanist’s plants are not the flowers of the hedgerow, the river’s “source” ascertained by the geographer is not the “source in the ground” (Heidegger, 1967, 70; 2010, 70).

Here is what Heidegger preliminarily concludes by referring to the examples mentioned above: “The type of being of these entities is handiness (Zuhandenheit)” (Heidegger, 1967, 71; 2010, 71). Tools in the strictest sense of the term (pen, ink, paper, hammer, doors, windows), but also animals (domesticated and non-­ domesticated), and nature in the broadest sense of the term (including both the

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products of nature as well as flowers and the water source in the ground): as long as they all are entities encountered by Dasein in its “circumspect taking care,” they all display die Seinsart of what is zuhanden.11 The end of §15 will point out once again: “Handiness is the ontological-categorial determination of the entities as they are ‘in themselves’” (Heidegger, 1967, 71; 2010, 71). Now, there is no doubt about Heidegger acknowledging, already in Being and Time, Leben (which would correspond to the entities called “plants” and “animals”) as eine eigene Seinsart (Heidegger, 1967, 50, 241; 2010, 49, 232). Yet, in the two passages in which this happens, Leben is either considered the result of a “privative interpretation” or is directly set on an equal footing with the Vorhandenheit-kind of ontological characterization. Here is the first passage: In the order of possible understanding and interpretation, biology as the “science of life” is rooted in the ontology of Dasein, essentially accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life takes place by way of a privative interpretation. It determines what must be the case if there can be anything like just-being-alive. Life is neither sheer being present (pures Vorhandensein), nor is it Dasein (Heidegger, 1967, 49–50; 2010, 49).

In the second passage (from §47, dedicated to The Seeming Impossibility of Ontologically Grasping and Determining Dasein as a Whole), after the long assessment of the possibility of ontologically determining the phenomenon of death, Heidegger quickly concludes, “From the previous discussion of the ontological possibility of conceiving of death, it becomes apparent at the same time that substructures of entities of a different type of being (objective presence or life (Vorhandenheit oder Leben)) thrust themselves to the fore unnoticeably and threaten to confuse the interpretation of the phenomenon” (Heidegger, 1967, 241; 2010, 232). That Vorhandenheit and Leben should not be identified, as they designate two different Seinsarten (see also below, §9), Heidegger affirms apertis verbis in the previous quotation. Yet, no matter in what the difference might consist, their being put on an equal footing rest on the fact that they are both to be understood as privative types of being vis-à-vis the mode of being of Dasein (= existence) and of what is encountered (= Zuhandenheit). For just as we already know that the character of being called Vorhandenheit can appear only by means of an “existential modification” upon the part of Dasein, so in the first quoted passage does Heidegger speak of “a privative interpretation,” only by means of which the ontology of life can take place (vollzieht sich auf dem Wege einer...). Moreover, the point should be made to the effect that in this paragraph Heidegger does not say that Leben should not be understood in terms of Vorhandenheit sic et simplicter; rather, he maintains that life is not

 In §43, Heidegger will on the contrary write that, “Not all objective presence is the objective presence of things. ‘Nature,’ which ‘surrounds’ us, is indeed an inner-worldly entity, but it shows neither the kind of being of handiness nor of objective presence as ‘natural thing’ (Aber nicht jede Vorhandenheit ist Dingvorhandenheit. Die ‘Natur’, die uns ‘umfängt,’ ist zwar innerweltliches Seiendes, zeigt aber weder die Seinsart des Zuhandenen noch des Vorhan- denen in der Weise der ‘Naturdinglichkeit’)” (Heidegger, 1967, 211; 2010, 195). Yet, in what such third kind of being would consist, Heidegger does not say. 11

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pures Vorhandensein (as though there were a difference (but which one?) between Vorhandensein and pures Vorhandensein). As far as we understand Heidegger in fact, and if our analyses in §§2–3 are correct, to the extent that Leben designates the type of being of the subject matter of the ontology of life, then the latter, just like any other ontology (e.g., ontology of nature, of the psyche and so on…), first needs the “existential modification” to take place. Which means that—prior to the existential modification— “animals” and “plants” (that is to say, das Leben) can be originally characterized only in terms of the character of being of the Zuhandenheit (which is what de facto occurs over the course of §15).12 Prior to Dasein’s “existential modification,” the one and only mode of being of the entity is the Zuhandenheit; after the existential modification, the only overall mode of being of the entity is the Vorhandenheit. If this is the case, then the very talk of “life” as eine eigene Seinsart is difficult to accept in its very possibility. Let us be clear on this point. We are not denying that Leben should be regarded as eine eigene Seinsart; what we are disputing is rather that this is consistently possible considering the very starting point of Heidegger’s analytics of Dasein. Indeed, if the character of being of the entity is in general to be originally determined, from within Dasein’s own circumspect taking care of the world, as Zuhandenheit (be it a pen, an animal, a flower or nature in the loosest sense of the expression), then only two alternatives are possible. Either we explicitly embrace a form of ontological monism (there are only two characters of being, existence and Zuhandenheit, with the latter being a direct expression of the former from the angle of the entity13). Or we lay claim to the multiplicity of modes of being (e.g., life), yet also admit they are only the result of a privative determination of the character of being of Dasein. In this case then, Leben cannot be eine “eigene” Seinsart (the problem being the adjective itself eigene as meaning “proper” or “peculiar”). In the former scenario, it is not possible to recognize Leben as a character of being, and to speak in general of characters of being other than Dasein’s. This can be factually done in the latter case, yet the talk of a character of being other than Dasein’s in the proper sense of the expression turns out to be quite questionable, to say the least. A Randbemerkung by Husserl testifies to how deeply he had understood the implication of Heidegger’s discourse here: “Heidegger transposes or  Since in Being and Time Heidegger is not really interested in a systematic ontological determination and elucidation of the mode of being of life, it is not easy to tell whether the access to it would immediately coincide with the appearance of the ontology of life (broadly construed) and the its categorial determination (in terms of genera and species), or whether there could be an existential modification prior to the one by means of which life is determined categorially. Probably it would be much better to recognize that, as Heidegger is not interested in assessing the mode of being of life per se taken, the problem appears only and exclusively in terms of possibility of the ontology of life. 13  Let us not forget that the Zuhandenheit is called by Heidegger an “ontological-categorial determination” (see the end of §15  in Heidegger, 1967, 71; 2010, 71). Accordingly, this is the only category (in the loose sense of the term) that, being direct expression of Dasein’s circumspect taking care of the entity within the world, is present prior to the existential modification and the overall determination of the Seinsregion des Vorhandenen that follows from it. 12

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changes the constitutive-phenomenological clarification of all regions of the entities and universals, of the total region of the world, into the anthropological; the whole problematic is shifted over” (Husserl, 1994, 13; Husserl, 1997, 284). Here the accent is not to be laid upon the “anthropological,” but rather on the “region.” Since on the next page he himself will underline the passage, “The ontologies whose theme is entities with a non-Dasein character of being”—the conclusion can be drawn that under the heading of “philosophical anthropology,” Husserl is denouncing the risk of “anthropologically” reducing the ontological plurality of the regions to the one and only mode of being of Dasein itself (existential-ontological monism)14 and that of the Zuhandenheit.15 Since our only interest is Being and Time, we will not try to follow the development of the question of the many modes of being throughout the texts (lectures or other) that followed its publication. Yet, and in order to briefly show to what extent Heidegger himself must have perceived the problem in question, a few remarks can be made, thereby paving the way for future research. If it is true that in the famous lectures of 1929–30 on The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger will launch himself into a systematic confrontation with the mode of being of “life,” and the problem of the “access to life” (Zugänglichkeit des Lebens) will receive great attention over the course of a “comparative” examination with the modes of being of a stone and of Dasein (Heidegger, 1983, 265 and ff.; 1995a, 178 and ff.), the quite crucial transition point is represented by the lectures of 1928–29 on Einleitung in die Philosophie. If in the lectures The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger had confined himself to mentioning four different “modes of being” (= existence, Vorhandensein, Zuhandensein, and Mitdasein Anderer) (Heidegger, 1997, 396; 1988, 279)—,which do not essentially go beyond the boundaries of Being and Time—the situation which we face in 1928–29 is different. Alongside the mode of being of Dasein as Existieren, other entities are explicitly ascribed fully (von Grund aus) different modes of being: Animals and plants live; material things, ‘nature’ in a quite specific sense, are objectively present (vorhanden); useful things are ready to hand (zuhanden). […] In opposition to the character of being of things such as stones and debris, things such as a piece of chalk, a sponge, a blackboard, a door, a window have a completely different way to be, which we designate as being-ready-to-hand (Zuhandensein). Moreover, there are also things such as space and numbers; they are not nothing and, as long as they are, they are. We can affirm that they subsist (bestehen); they have consistency (Bestand). Accordingly, with respect to these various characters of being of the entity we can distinguish: what exists: human beings; what lives: plants, animals; what is objectively present: material things; what is ready-to-hand: useful things in the broadest sense; what subsists: numbers and space (Heidegger, 1996, 71–72).

 The full sentence commented upon by Husserl reads: “The ontologies whose theme is entities with a non-Dasein character of being are accordingly founded and motivated in the ontic structure of Dasein itself. This structure includes in itself the determination of a pre-ontological understanding of being” (Heidegger, 1967, 13; 2010, 12). 15  Contrary to that claimed by Slama, 2021, “henology” (he speaks of hénologie impossible) seems to us to be precisely the consequence of Heidegger’s ontological-existential discourse. 14

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During the previous year Heidegger had already remarked that while Dasein exists, a cat lives and a stone neither exists nor lives: it is “simply objectively present” (see Heidegger, 1978, 159). What matters here is not only the actual plurality of the Seinseweisen identified; what is of most interest is the decision to explicitly limit the application of the Vorhandensein-character of being to “material things” and “nature” in the broadest sense of the term. Which goes hand in hand with the equally limited application of the Zuhandensein-mode of being to useful things in the strict sense of the term. Just as the latter no longer stands for the overall character of being of whatever is encountered by Dasein in its taking care of the world, so does the former no longer overlap with what in Being and Time Heidegger called die Seinsregion des Vorhandenen. In this respect, the text in which Heidegger departs furthest from the ontological framework of Being and Time is clearly The Origin of the Work of Art. The “work of art” displays neither the ontological constitution of a “thing” (Ding) (regardless of the specific way in which one can conceive of die Dingheit des Dinges) (Heidegger, 2003, 7 and ff.; 2002, 5 and ff.) nor that of a Zeug and its Dienlichkeit (Heidegger, 2003, 13; 2002, 10).16 While the former would have, in the conceptuality proper to Being and Time, the mode of being of what is vorhanden, the latter would be characterized in terms of Zuhandensein. That the work of art opens up (eröffnet) “the being of the entity” (Heidegger, 2003, 25; 2002, 19) designates a “character of being” that is nowhere to be found in the book of 1927. It is completely unconceivable upon the basis of the ontological background (the opposition between Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit) against which the analytics of Dasein takes place and unfolds.17 That in Being and Time Heidegger can de facto allude to proper (eigene) modes and characters of being other than Dasein’s is one thing; that the assumption of such modes of being could be actually justified in light of the (existential) ontology (in Husserl’s own jargon: philosophical anthropology) developed therein, quite another. What is to be emphasized here is that Husserl, as it appears from some of his marginal notes on the book, seems to have actually grasped the issue.

5. The possibility of categorially determining the entity based upon its what, hence of dividing it up into species, genera and highest genera or regions, requires the appearance of what Heidegger labels (quite improperly) the “Region” des Vorhandenen.  For a beautiful approach to the problem of the conception of being implied by the framework of The Origin of the Work of Art and in connection to the question of the plural articulation of being, see Courtine, 2015, 262 and ff. 17  Husserl refers critically to Heidegger’s idea of defiziente Praxis in Hua XXXIV, 260. For a systematic discussion of this problem against a backdrop far different from ours, see Slama, 2021, 276–280. 16

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In turn, the latter is possible only on condition that Dasein’s circumspectly taking care of the entity undergoes an “existential modification.” But how does Heidegger construe of the concept of “region” in the former sense of the expression? As far as our line of inquiry is concerned, the most crucial passage can be found right at the beginning of the book (§1). Here Heidegger lists the three major prejudices (originally “rooted in ancient ontology”) that “constantly instill and repeatedly promote the idea that a questioning of being is not needed” (Heidegger, 1967, 2–3; 2010, 2). Now, the prejudice that interests us in the present context is the first one, the prejudice concerning the universality of the concept of being, and from which the second main prejudice directly derives. 1. “Being” is the most “universal” concept: τὸ ὄν ἐστι καθόλου μάλιστα πάντον (Metaph., III.4.1001 a21). Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione, est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit. “An understanding of being is always already contained in everything we apprehend in the entity.” But the “universality” of “being” is not that of genus. “Being” does not delimit the highest region of the entity (Sein umgrenzt nicht die oberste Region des Seienden) so far as they are conceptually articulated according to genus and species: οὔτε τὸ ὂν γένος (Metaph., III.3.998 b22) (Heidegger, 1967, 3; 2010, 2).

The excerpt, and the overall context of discussion, is crucial for us for at least two different, and yet closely related reasons. In the first place, because of Heidegger establishing an equivalence between γένος and Region. Heidegger remarks, first, that “the ‘universality’ of ‘being’ is not that of genus,” and then that being “does not delimit the highest region of the entity.” It could hence be assumed that for him, region means the same as highest or supreme genus, and that there are as many regions of the entity as there are highest genera. As we can reframe Heidegger’s words, “being” is not (and does not delimit) a region of the entity because it is not a “genus” at all (let alone a highest genus) (see also An. Post., 92b 13: Τὸ εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδενί. Οὐ γὰρ γένος τὸ ὄν). In the second place, the simple fact that such discussion of the concept of being as a region takes place within during the assessment of certain “prejudices” that hark all the way back to “ancient ontology” testifies to Heidegger’s attempt at underplaying the novelty of the notion of region as it was first introduced by Husserl. The tendency to speak of the region as a “highest genus” already emerges in the lectures of 1920–21 on Aristotle, where Heidegger speaks of oberste Gattung und Region (Heidegger, 1994a, 25), and of oberste Region (Heidegger, 1994a, 58), and goes all the way back to the dissertation on Scotus, where die oberste Gattung is said to be what delimits a Region (Heidegger, 1972, 286). The second prejudice directly derives from has just been said. 2. The concept of “being” is indefinable. This conclusion was drawn from its highest universality. And correctly so, if definitio fit per genus et differentiam specificam. Indeed, “being” cannot be understood as an entity. Enti non additur aliqua natura: “being” cannot be defined by attributing entities to it. Being cannot be derived from higher concepts by way of definition and cannot be represented by lower ones. But does it follow from this that “being” can no longer constitute a problem? Not at all (Heidegger, 1967, 4; 2010, 3).

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“Being” cannot be defined because of its highest universality, and we know that for Heidegger such a höchste Allgemeinheit is not that of a genus or “highest genus.” Now, regardless of how Heidegger would properly understand being’s highest universality, let us pinpoint what is implied—per viam negationis—by Heidegger’s discourse. It seems that there cannot be any way of defining other than the “traditional” one that operates per genus et differentiam specificam. Every possible definition requires a “higher” genus to be divided by means of a “specific difference.” No matter what we think of being in general, no definition can ever be provided of a region, if “region” means a “highest genus,” above which there is nothing “higher.” If regions are indefinable due to their highest generic universality (they represent the very formal-ontological condition of possibility of definitions in general), being is also indefinable yet because of its extra-regional, i.e., extra-generic highest universality. A distinction can then be drawn between three different cases. • Being is indefinable because of its extra-generic highest universality, which is also and by definition extra-regional (given the equivalence “region” = “highest genus”); • Regions taken as “highest genera” cannot be defined because every attempt at a definition presupposes a higher genus to be further divided by a specific difference; finally, • Dasein cannot be defined because it does not have a sachhaltiges Was to be ordered and “articulated according to genus and species” (and only thanks to which it could be defined in the traditional sense of the expression: per genus et differentiam specificam).18 And yet, as already alluded to in §1 of the present chapter, in 1923 Dasein was still being referred to by Heidegger as a Seinsregion or region of being (Heidegger, 1988, 25–26; 1999, 21). In what sense was this still possible? When and why did Heidegger stop characterizing Dasein, i.e., its existential nature in terms of “region”? When does the term “region,” in particular the way Husserl uses it to designate the subject matter (= pure consciousness or the monad) of his phenomenology, become for Heidegger something to be fully rejected?19

 In this respect, Philipse’s reconstruction is quite misleading: “According to the phenomenological theme, the totality of beings is carved up into ontological regions. Each of these regions should be explored by a proper regional ontology, and the mistake of traditional metaphysics was that it applied categories developed for the regions of artifacts or of nature in the sense of occurrentness (Vorhandenheit) to the region of Dasein [our italics]” (see Philipse, 1998, 166). The point is rather that Dasein is not anymore a region for the Heidegger of Being and Time. See for example the following passage in Heidegger, 1967, 42; 2010, 40: “Thus, Da-sein is never to be understood ontologically as a case and instance of a genus of beings as objectively present.” 19  Let us hasten to point out that in the following we will be considering only those lectures, the content and argument of which we deem material and fundamental to our analyses thus far. 18

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6. In the lectures from the SS of 1920 on phenomenology of intuition and expression, the concept of region does not play any role whatsoever. It appears once towards the end of the text (§16), during the discussion of Dilthey, and it does not seem to be imbued with any technical or specific meaning (Heidegger, 1993, 154; 2010b, 119). Here the task of phenomenology is already understood as the explication of the foundation of the unity and multiplicity of sense in “existence” (Heidegger, 1993, 35; 2010b, 25), and a doubt is cast on “its elaboration in the sense of an a priori science of reason [which] remains only secondary and phenomenologically not original” (Heidegger, 1993, 33; 2010b, 23; see Kisiel, 1995, 123–137, for a detailed assessment). Having already quite extensively discussed Heidegger’s critical stance on the distinction between “formalization” and “generalization” in Ideas, therefore on the concept of “region” in the lectures of 1920–1921 on The Phenomenology of Religious Life (Volume 1, Chap. 4, §§3–5), we will directly consider the lectures of 1923 on Ontology. Surprisingly, and depiste the critical remarks made during the former course, the idea of “region” is now mobilized systematically. Already at the beginning of the lectures, the expression “region” is used to characterize the domain of investigation of modern ontology: “Ontology of nature, ontology of culture, material ontologies: they form the disciplines in which the objectual content of these regions is drawn out as subject matter and displayed in its categorial character” (Heidegger, 1988a, 2; 1999, 1–2). Modern ontology however (it is not easy to tell in what sense it is modern, and what such modernity would embrace) is afflicted by two “inadequacies.” Firstly, “from the very start, its theme is being-an-object,” and the objectivity of the object is given “for an indifferent theoretical intention.” Secondly, it results from this that the “access” is blocked “to that entity that is decisive within philosophical problems, namely, Dasein, from out of which and for the sake of which philosophy ‘is’” (Heidegger, 1988a, 2–3; 1999, 2). This is why we are told that “Dasein” does not designate an “isolating relativization into individuals who are seen only from the outside”: it does not stand for a “regional demarcation in the sense of an isolating contrast” (Heidegger, 1988a, 7; 1999, 5). The how of the being of Dasein, its “facticity,” has the ontological character of what is always our own (unseres eigenen). Nevertheless, Heidegger does not hesitate to use the concept of “region” to refer to Dasein as the “thematic object” of hermeneutics: The thematic object of hermeneutics is in each case our own Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time, insofar as it is interrogated with respect to, on the basis of, and with a view to the character of its being and the phenomenal structures of this being. Working thus from the point of view of a universal regional systematics, hermeneutics cuts out of this a certain domain for the purposes of a systematic investigation of it which is conducted in a specific manner. In choosing a term to designate this region of being and appropriately demarcate it, we have avoided the expression “human Dasein,” “human being,” and will continue to do so. In all its traditional categorial forms, the concept of human being fundamentally obstructs what we are supposed to bring into view as facticity.

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1  Heidegger on Region, Dasein, and Being The question “What is the human being?” blocks its own view of what it is really after with an object foreign to it (Heidegger, 1988a, 25–26; 1999, 21).

In perfect compliance with what he will claim in Being and Time, Heidegger avoids resorting to the traditional “categorial” mode of determining what we are by means of expressions such as “human Dasein” and “human being.” Both of them block our access to the being of Dasein by projecting on it a what. If this is the case, the reason why Heidegger speaks of “region” and “region of being” to refer to Dasein becomes even more obscure. Later on, he will explicitly point out that, Our theme is Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time. And our task: to bring this into view, have a look at it, and understand it in such a manner that in it itself basic characteristics of its being are able to be brought into relief. Dasein is not a “thing” like a piece of wood nor such a thing as a plant; nor does it consist of lived-experiences, and still less is it a subject (an ego) standing over against objects (which are not the ego). It is a distinctive entity which precisely insofar as it “is there” for itself in an authentic manner is not an object, in formal terms: the toward-which of a being-directed toward it by intending it. It is an object insofar as it becomes a theme of observation (Heidegger, 1988a, 47; 1999, 37).

By stressing that Dasein is neither a “thing” nor an “ego” consisting of “lived-­ experiences,” does Heidegger not thereby  reject and repudiate any possible “regional” determination of Dasein (or, in a more specific manner: any determination of Dasein in terms of either the “region” world or the “region” consciousness)? Why would he nevertheless still affirm that Dasein is a Seinsregion or region of being? The hypothesis could be advanced to the effect that, after the critical assessment of the course of 1920–21, Heidegger is still holding fast to the possibility of distinguishing different conceptions of what a region is: one corresponding to the authentic mode of access to the being of the entity which we are; the other on the contrary consisting in its preliminary ascription to a “determined material domain” (categorially determined) (see Heidegger, 1988a, 68 and ff.; 1999, 54 and ff.). Although Heidegger never frames his position in this fashion, our hypothesis will be further corroborated if we consider how he presents the overall task of philosophy as ontology in der heutigen Philosophie, as well as his discussion of the developments of phenomenology offered towards the end of the text. The theme of philosophy is the universal, the one and only totality of the entities which includes everything and makes of it a unity. Insofar as a multiplicity of regions, levels, and gradations of being comes to be encountered, there arises vis-à-vis it the task of a system which can encompass it and which as such includes two tasks: first, sketching out the conceptual framework, the basic guidelines of the context of order, and then allocating the respective places for the concrete entity in the various domains of the system (Heidegger, 1988a, 40–41; 1999, 32).

Whoever still remembers Heidegger’s critical attitude, in the lectures of 1920–1921, vis-à-vis the traditional conception of the task of philosophy as “classification” and “division” of what there is in its generality (Volume1, Chap. 4, §3), should immediately understand in what sense the just quoted excerpt cannot be spelling out what he thinks philosophy should be all about. What is to be avoided in fact is the attempt, once the totality of the entity has been divided and classified, to also think that what

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Heidegger calls here “the concrete entity” (meaning Dasein) should be assigned a certain “place” within such totality based on its determination as an object with a material “what.” Clearly then, if Heidegger can affirm at once that Dasein is a Seinsregion but should not be regarded as “part” of an Ordnungszusammenhang, it is because he is not yet dismissing the concept of region per se. Let us now take a quick look at the end of what is now §14 and that bears upon the nature and subject matter of “phenomenology.” Originally, Heidegger explains with a reference to the Logical Investigations, “phenomenon” did not stand for a “category” and “phenomenology” designated only the how of research (wie der Forschung) which makes the object present in intuition (see Heidegger, 1988a, 71–72; 1999, 56–57). This is why Heidegger can also go on to add, this time with a critical reference to the first volume of Ideas, that it is “misleading” to speak of phenomenological philosophy, as if phenomenology had its own scientific field of inquiry (which, as we know from the analyses of the first part, is precisely Husserl’s own position in the 1913 book). Accordingly, he writes, “the sense of the thematic category of ‘phenomenon’ had to be re-worked into a regional (zu einer regionalen) category”: “Thus, it encompassed those objects characterized with the expressions ‘lived-experiences’ and ‘connections of consciousness.’ Lived-experiences as lived-­ experiences are here the phenomena. Hence one domain of being was demarcated over against others. Phenomena were now the objects of a specific science” (Heidegger, 1988a, 72; 1999, 57). The text is quite difficult and needs to be carefully unpacked. In the first place, and in compliance with our analyses in the final Appendix to the first volume of this work, the transition from the conception of phenomenology of the Logical Investigations to the first volume of Ideas is described as a passage from a purely methodological conception (of the idea of “phenomenon”) to the scientific one. In the second place, and in addition to such Einengung of the phenomenological inquiry (to speak à la Conrad-Martius), what is being looked at with suspicion is the determination of the “domain” of phenomenology, hence of the phenomenon, in terms of “lived-experiences” and “connections of consciousness.” If we are on the right track, and in light of Heidegger speaking of Dasein as a Seinsregion— Heidegger is not (yet) rejecting the concept of “region”; rather, he is rejecting the scientific characterization of the idea of the “phenomenon” and then, more specifically as regards content, its determination as consciousness and Erlebnisse. The problem is not (yet) the designation of Dasein by means of the notion of region; rather, the problem is the determination of such a region in terms of a what that is “part” of the Ordnungszusammenhang of the totality of what “there is.” The possibility that one can still refer to Dasein as a “region” testifies to the fact that, at least implicitly, the latter does not necessarily express a place within the Ordnungszusammenhang. In contrast with what Heidegger will firmly point out in 1929, “regions” do not necessarily need to be “coordinated” with one another, as one could also re-phrase his words here; this is the meaning of the passage: Dasein does not mean a “regional demarcation in the sense of an isolating contrast.”

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Heidegger then divides the further development of early phenomenology into four main phases. The further development of phenomenology is characterized by four moments: 1. The thematic field which had been designated with the term “consciousness” and thereby included the totality of the real and intentional content of the stream of experience was held fast. The horizon for posing questions about it and the basic approach to it came in from elsewhere: what came from the Marburg school was the posing of epistemological questions (a return to Descartes is characteristic of both), and Dilthey was consulted on the issue of laying the foundation of the human sciences (nature and spirit). Thus transcendental idealism entered into phenomenology. And the countermovement to this also arose in phenomenology by taking up traditional realism. These opposites became the guiding foci for academic discussions within the different directions phenomenology took. No one raised the radical question of whether epistemological questions might not in fact be meaningless in phenomenology. Everyone went to work within a bad tradition. 2. The investigations carried out in the field of logic were also applied to other traditional domains of inquiry. In line with the approach and the kind of person doing the work, a specific model of inquiry was in each case picked up from the tradition. One set to work with a limited fund of phenomenological distinctions. 3. The drive for a system is noticeable everywhere, what we said earlier about the philosophical consciousness of today also holds here. 4. What has resulted from the escalation of these three moments and from the infiltration of traditional terminology into phenomenology is a general watering down. Everyone acknowledges the affinity between the opposing sides. Phenomenological research, which was supposed to provide a basis for scientific work, has sunk to the level of wishy-washiness, thoughtlessness, and summariness, to the level of the philosophical noise of the day, to the level of a public scandal of philosophy (Heidegger, 1988a, 73–74; 1999, 57–58).

It is not our ambition to assess or critically evaluate Heidegger’s distinction between these four different moments characterizing the “further development of phenomenology.”20 For the sake of our line of thought in both the Appendix to the first volume and this chapter, what matters the most is 1. Heidegger makes a distinction between the determination of the exclusive thematic field of phenomenology in terms of consciousness and the entrance of “transcendental idealism […] into phenomenology.” The latter, as it seems to us, follows upon the former and yet is to be kept sharply distinct from it; and Heidegger’s exclusive interest in these lectures is to dismiss the former. If we link together what we have just learned about Husserl’s “phenomenology” at the time of Ideas with what Heidegger had pointed out at the beginning as regards “modern ontology,” it follows that phenomenology, as the ontology of the region “pure consciousness,” suffers from two inadequacies. Its theme is given as an object “for an indifferent theoretical intention” (first inadequacy); thereby blocking the access to the entity that “is decisive within philosophical problems, namely, Dasein” (second inadequacy).

 For this would require us to also take into meticulous consideration the text of the lecture of 1926 on Begriff und Entwicklung der phänomenologischen Forschung (now in Heidegger, 2016, 161–178). 20

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The skepticism about modern ontology (in this case, Husserl’s own phenomenology) assuming its theme only as an “object” given to “theoretical intention” already points in the direction of the more systematic discourse on the ontologically “indifferent” mode of being of the entity which has been “thematized” by Dasein, who in turn has undergone an “existential modification.”21

7. The line of thought pursued by Heidegger in these lectures is taken up once again during the course of 1923–24 Introduction to Phenomenological Research. As was already the case with the previous course, here Heidegger explicitly raises the question, “What is the theme or the material ontological connection that is the object of the research that today is designated phenomenology?” (Heidegger, 1994, 47; 2005, 35). If the answer is the one provided on the basis of the first volume of Ideas (“consciousness”) (Heidegger, 1994, 48; 2005, 36), then the problem is “to understand the thematic field’s turnaround (Umschalg) from the entity as world to the entity as the consciousness of it”; thus, “it is necessary to sketch the features of the end-­ station, i.e., present-day phenomenology, as it becomes necessary for our research” (see Heidegger, 1994, 49; 2005, 37). With respect to the Ontology lectures—in which Heidegger simply confined himself to ascertaining the difference between the conception of phenomenology of the Logical Investigations and the conception first set forward in Ideas—here he alludes to the necessity of a genealogy of the thematic shift accomplished in the work of 1913. As we will see over the course of the next pages, however, it will be only in 1925 that such genealogy is actually sketched. One more aspect of Heidegger’s way of approaching Husserl’s own phenomenology needs to be emphasized. Although later on (in what is now §46 and ff.), during the comparative assessment of the concept of consciousness in both Husserl and Descartes, Heidegger will be referring mainly, if not even exclusively, to Ideas, the point of departure of his discussion amounts to showing that the idea of “consciousness” which we usually associate with the work of 1913 can already be found in the Logical Investigations. He interprets the Logical Investigations on the basis of a concept which is publically introduced by Husserl only in Ideas: the notion of “region” (see Chap. 3 of the present volume). What is now §5 is dedicated to “The theme of ‘consciousness’ in the Logical Investigations” (see Heidegger, 1994, 52; 2005, 39); here the topic of the book is presented as follows: We want to make clear to ourselves, from the standpoint of the subject matter, how the attempt to work on specific objects of logic demands that one secures and brings into view what is designated by consciousness. Following tradition, logic has as its theme: concepts,

 On this aspect of Heidegger’s early critique of Husserl, see Westerlund, 2010, in particular, 38–52. 21

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1  Heidegger on Region, Dasein, and Being judgments, inferences. They are something meaning-compliant that stands in some connection with the linguistic expression, a connection that is not something contingent. For all thinking and knowing, all theoretical research is set down in “assertions.” Hence, in the investigation of logic, interest is directed at theoretical thinking. A definite type of thinking is preferred and is, at bottom, the theme exclusively. Insofar as this theme is set down in assertions and is connected in a quite peculiar way to what complies with meaning and to experiences of thinking, the task consists in seeing this entire complex in its primordial unity, in order to acquire the possibilities of researching these facts of the matter in specific respects (Heidegger, 1994, 53–54; 2005, 40).

Whoever is familiar with the Logical Investigations will partially recognize the way in which Husserl himself presents the goal of the book in the introduction to the second volume of the work (at least for what concerns the second half of the quotation). What interests us are the first two lines though: “[…] how the attempt to work on specific objects of logic demands that one secures and brings into view what is designated by consciousness.” Husserl’s concern, according to Heidegger, consists in “securing” and “bringing into view” consciousness: this however, as we know from Volume 1, Chap. 6, is precisely the task into which Husserl will invest all his energy in Ideas. After he adds that Husserl inherits his doctrine from Brentano, Heidegger goes on to mention a crucial distinction between different species of acts. One can establish the following distinction in acts of meaning: 1. acts in which an empty understanding occurs; 2. the sort of understanding of meaning that can develop into the sort that is oriented to the meant state of affairs itself and fulfilled by it. Emptily meaning something and fulfillment of meaning are acts. For a genuine understanding and, at the same time, for an orientation regarding when such acts are presentational (vorstellig) at all, we need to come to some understanding of what is to be understood by “act.” Acts are identical with the intentional lived-experience. An act delimits a determinate genus within the entire sphere of lived-experiences, a sphere that is designated as consciousness. Consciousness stands for nothing other than a region of specific events that have the character of lived-­ experiences. The concept of consciousness must be understood in this regional sense. Husserl still holds fast to this understanding today [our italics]. Under the title “consciousness” a definite category of objects is delimited. The question is, what entities that are experiences can be designated or characterized as consciousness? These belong to the region of “consciousness.” All these objects have one quite characteristic manner in which they themselves can be grasped. This sort of access is designated inner perception. I am conscious of these lived-experiences. The entire region of experiences is that of which it is possible for me to become conscious in immanent perception. Consciousness in the sense of inner perception as the perceiving of the immanent is immediately related to the first concept of consciousness as a region of lived-experience (Heidegger, 1994, 54–55; 2005, 40–41).

The passage is quite crucial and needs to be carefully broken down. (a) It is not immediately clear whether Heidegger would identify region with genus, notably, highest genus. If region and what he calls the entire sphere of lived-experiences coincide, the term “region” will not stand for a genus or a highest genus, but rather for that within which a genus or a plurality thereof can be distinguished. If, by contrast, region and genus are to be identified, which is what happens also in Being and Time, then to affirm that consciousness is a region means the same as to state that it is a genus, notably, highest genus (within which specific difference can be distinguished). (b) As Heidegger remarks in passing, “Husserl still holds fast to this

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understanding today.” Which understanding, properly? The understanding of consciousness “in this regional sense”: Heidegger is employing a concept, that of region, to already characterize Husserl’s stance in the Logical Investigations, thereby underplaying the difference between the two books, notably the ontological framework they respectively build on. Moreover, the hypothesis cannot be ruled out to the effect that Heidegger is claiming that—still in the Twenties—Husserl is committed to the very same regional idea of the subject (consciousness) first proposed in Ideas I. (c) Heidegger goes without further ado from “inner perception” to the “perception of what is immanent” to describe the mode of access to consciousness as a region. Accordingly, and more specifically, the two main characteristics of “consciousness as a region” are: (i) its specific mode of access (= inner or also internal perception); (ii) the fact that “this region contains in itself that specific class of lived-experiences, the acts that are completely fundamental for the structure of consciousness” (Heidegger, 1994, 56; 2005, 42). At least at this stage of the lectures, Heidegger’s skepticism seems to bear on the determination of the mode of access to consciousness in terms of “inner perception” or “perception of what is immanent.” In so doing, one takes for granted, Heidegger would say, the fact that its mode of being is such that perception can represent the most adequate mode of grasping and studying it: “What kind of being, determined by what character of being, is the region called ‘consciousness’?” (see Heidegger, 1994, 57; 2005, 42). The answer is nowhere to be found because the question is never really asked by Husserl. Towards the very end of what is now §48, however, the following passage can be found in which Heidegger’s skepticism about the idea of “region” per se considered comes to full light. Transcendental consciousness falls prey to a further reduction, the eidetic one. The generic characters of various lived-experiences are to be established; consciousness in general is to be determined by the basic character of “intentionality” and then the various basic genera. The methodical division is guided by the ontological determinations: genus, species, eidetic singularity, specific difference, categories that have their definite basis and have nothing to say about such a being as consciousness. Given this predominance of the care about certainty, it is not surprising that, in the course of the formation of the method of investigation of pure consciousness, something like the idea of the mathesis of lived-experiences became possible (Heidegger, 1994, 274; 2005, 210–211).

Although the term “region” is never used here, the “ontological determinations” listed by Heidegger fully match those listed by Husserl in §12 of Ideas (Hua III/1, 30; Husserl, 2014, 26): genus, species, and eidetic singularities are what makes up the content of a region, so to speak. The idea of region, and of determining something as a region (in this case, “pure consciousness”), seems now to fully and automatically result in what Heidegger labels: “Mathesis der Erlebnisse.” As it is unlikely that by the latter phrase Heidegger means the same as what Husserl means by it in §75 of the first volume of Ideas (Hua III/1, 158; Husserl, 2014, 135), where the hypothesis of a mathematization of consciousness is vehemently rejected as impossible because of the nature of such region, what he must be referring to is something more general and broader, namely, the fact of methodically dividing and

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classifying by means of ontological determinations of a progressively higher order. If in the lectures of 1920–21 on The Phenomenology of Religious Life Heidegger argued against the actual possibility of holding fast to the distinction between “formalization” and “generalization,” thus to the different forms of generality to which they would respectively lead; if in the lectures on Ontology of 1923 it was the determination of the region as “consciousness” to be dismissed, here it is the idea itself of “region” as a way to ontologically determine the entity that is discarded once and for all. If in the Ontology lectures Dasein could still be called a region of being because “region” did not automatically carry with itself the inclusion of the entity within the Ordnungszusammenhang, now the concept of region seems to automatically signify the same as Mathesis der… Unlike what he was still doing in the Ontology lectures, here Heidegger never seems to resort to the terms “region” and “region of being” to refer to das menschliche Dasein: now the very idea of “region” overlaps with Husserl’s idea of phenomenology. That we are on the right track in holding the 1923–24 Introduction to Phenomenological Research lectures as the very moment when, quite likely, the “region” starts designating for Heidegger an actual ontological determination of the entity, which is thus modified in its mode of being, is also corroborated by the following. Not only does Heidegger employ traditional expressions such as ens formale, ens creatum and ens increatum, ens in se, ens qua ens, ens absolutum, summum ens and ens medium (just to give a few examples); he also coins the term “ens regionale” (Heidegger, 1994, 258, 264; 2005, 198, 203): “Consciousness as absolute consciousness is determined by the ontological character of being a possible region for a science or an ens regionale” (Heidegger, 1994, 264; 2005, 203). And to be an “ens regionale” means now for the entity to display a certain Seinscharakter, a “character of being” or “ontological character.” By coining and using the Latin-sounding expression ens regionale, Heidegger attains two goals at once, as it were: (a) that of characterizing the “region” as an actual “character of being”; (b) that of strongly underplaying the historical novelty of the Husserlian concept of region.22 Moreover, if the question were asked whether by ens regionale Heidegger is referring to what in Being and Time he will label die Seinsregion des Vorhandenen or whether it is meant to designate just the specific and circumscribed domain of investigation of a science—the answer can only point to the ambiguity of the expression. On the one hand, “ens regionale” seems to express the possible region of a science (in this case, phenomenology as the eidetic science of “pure consciousness”), thereby coinciding with the latter option. On the other, the fact that ens regionale signifies a “character of being” or an “ontological character” of the entity speaks in favor of the former interpretation instead.

22  If in the first part of the lectures Heidegger had underplayed the difference between the Logical Investigations and that of Ideas, now he is undermining the key-concept of Husserl’s material ontology.

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8. The critical assessment of the notion of region, of its role and function in Ideas represents a Leitfaden in the lectures History of the Concept of Time of 1925. In contrast with the 1923–24 lectures Introduction to Phenomenological Research, where Heidegger was moving back and forth between the Logical Investigations and Ideas (with the aspiration of underplaying the difference between them), now the focus is almost exclusively the book of 1913. As originally promised in the former course, here Heidegger first outlines the ideal genealogy (from the Logical Investigations on) of why phenomenology came to stand only and exclusively for the eidetic science of a specific and circumscribed field (the region “pure consciousness”), then he systematically tackles the nature of such a field. Let us hasten to remark that, as it is not our ambition to discuss Heidegger’s overall assessment of Ideas in the lectures of 1925, nor his general interpretation of phenomenology, in what follows only his considerations about the “region” will be singled out. What is now §8 (The Principle of Phenomenology) is dedicated to briefly elucidating the passage from the idea of phenomenology based on the imperative back to the things themselves! to its self-understanding as “the analytic description of intentionality in its a priori.” “The phenomenological maxim ‘to the things themselves!’ is addressed against construction and free-floating questioning in traditional concepts which have become more and more groundless” (see Heidegger, 1979, 104; 1985, 76). “In such formal expression” however, Heidegger further remarks, this maxim represents nothing but the “principle of all scientific knowledge” (on these Heideggerian pages, see also Øverenget, 1998, 91–97 and his discussion of the problem of the being of consciousness): The initial phenomenological investigations were investigations in logic and the theory of knowledge. They were inspired by the goal of a scientific logic and theory of knowledge. […] Logic is the science of thinking and of the laws of thought, but not of thinking as a psychic occurrence and the laws regulating its course, but instead of thinking as the lawfulness of the object, of that which is thought as such. All thinking is at the same time expression, understood as the meaningful fixation of what is thought. In the area of the objects of logic, this refers to matters like meaning, concept, assertion, and proposition. Traditionally, knowing was conceived in terms of self-contained and finished cognitions formulated in assertions, propositions, judgments, where judgments are composed of concepts and complexes of judgments are syllogisms. All of these and what they intend imply lawful structures. Judging is carried out in representational or generally in intuitive apprehension; it thus involves truth and objectivity. The concepts of these objects are to be genuinely secured; hence, they are to be drawn from themselves and demonstrated in reference to themselves. The objects of logic are meaning, concept, assertion, proposition, judgment, state of affairs, objectivity, fact, law, being, etc. Where and as what can and must such objects become accessible? Is there a field of objects which in and of themselves are coherent in content? Does the unity of a field of subject matter lead to the unity of a discipline that treats these objects? Or are these objects in the end abandoned to any passing shrewdness, which invents something for them in coarse and loose speculation? […] This is the real direction of the line of questioning in search of a scientific logic (Heidegger, 1979, 105–106; 1985, 77–78).

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At first (“The initial phenomenological investigations…”) the goal of phenomenology was to clarify and secure the objectivity of the concepts of the objects of logic by elucidating the specific mode of access to them. From the objectivity of certain objects to the specific mode of access to them—this is for Heidegger what phenomenological maxim back to the things themselves! designated “at first.” “At first,” Heidegger elaborates, the end of phenomenology was not the study of intentionality per se; rather, the clarification of the intentional correlation was only a means towards securing the objectivity of the concepts of certain objects (here, those pertaining to logic). Hence, the following questions emerge, “Does the unity of a field of subject matter lead to the unity of a discipline that treats these objects? Or are these objects in the end abandoned to any passing shrewdness, which invents something for them in coarse and loose speculation?” Heidegger’s remark here is perfectly in line, or seems to be in line with the way in which Plessner will account for the developments of phenomenology after the Logical Investigations (see Volume 1, Appendix to Chap. 6, §5). For if there is no unitary field and no unitary discipline “that treats these objects,” the consequence can only be the famous Bilderbuchphänomenologie (which is what phenomenology looked like “at first”): Since every structure must ultimately be exhibited in itself, phenomenology’s way of research at first assumes the character or the aspect of what is called a picture-book phenomenology (Bilderbuchphänomenologie). It gives greater prominence to the exhibition of individual structures which are perhaps very useful for a systematic philosophy, even though the exhibition can only be provisional. As a result, there is a tendency to give philosophical sanction to the prominent displays of particular phenomenological considerations by finding a place for them in some sort of dialectic or the like (Heidegger, 1979, 120; 1985, 87–88).

But “phenomenology” was able to pinpoint a fundamental field in which these objects are found: “Intentionality is nothing other than the basic field in which these objects are found: the totality of comportments and the totality of entities in their being” (Heidegger, 1979, 106; 1985, 78). “The field of the matters (der Sachen) of the phenomenological investigation” becomes then intentionality in its a priori”; or, to put it better and in a more technical way: “the entire region of intentionality” (Heidegger, 1979, 107; 1985, 78). Hence, Heidegger’s own assessment of the overall development of (Husserl’s) phenomenology all the way through right before Ideas: All of this, the concrete expansion of the field, the fundamental reflection upon its regional character and its demarcation from other regions, the elaboration of the basic directions in which intentionality could be explored, took place in the decade following the appearance of Logical Investigations, between 1901 and 1911. Along with the increasingly richer and clearer disclosure of the phenomenal field came the development of the method and its phenomenological theory (Heidegger, 1979, 125; 1985, 91–92).

If “at first” phenomenology was meant to secure the objectivity of the concepts of such and such a specific field (e.g., logic) by elucidating their mode of access, it ended up regarding “intentionality” as an actual thematic field of investigation, a region of its own different from other regions. It is important to always keep in mind that, in contrast with what will happen in Being and Time, where the idea of “intentionality” plays no role whatsoever (for a

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general discussion of this problem in Being and Time, see Hall, 1993), Heidegger’s ambition here is to free intentionality from its regional (meaning: “Husserlian”) characterization in Ideas so as to show that it can be understood, more originally, as a (non-regional) mode of comportment of Dasein and its In-Sein (Heidegger, 1979, 203 and ff.; 1985, 151 and ff.).23 For this reason, Heidegger’s main, and perhaps only concern in these pages is to undermine the concept of “region” by stressing its ontological inadequacies. In line with what he had already maintained in the lectures of 1923–24, Heidegger emphasizes that Husserl’s primary concern is “the idea of an absolute science”: Husserl’s primary question is simply not concerned with the character of the being of consciousness. Rather, he is guided by the following concern: How can consciousness become the possible object of an absolute science? The primary concern which guides him is the idea of an absolute science. This idea, that consciousness is to be the region of an absolute science, is not simply invented; it is the idea which has occupied modern philosophy ever since Descartes. The elaboration of pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived phenomenologically by going back to the things themselves but by going back to a traditional idea of philosophy. Thus none of the characters which emerge as determinations of the being of lived-experiences is an original character (Heidegger, 1979, 147; 1985, 107).

The reference to Descartes is quite interesting, for it is not apparent whether by “the idea which has occupied modern philosophy ever since Descartes,” Heidegger is referring only to the “idea of an absolute science” (as he calls it), or to that of the regional determination of what such science would be about. What is material to our discourse here is the claim to the effect that region is the medium (if we can so say) by means of which something is determined as the object of a science. The point is to be correctly understood. For Heidegger is not simply ascertaining that in order for a science to be possible, a relevant “region” of investigation must be identified. If this were the claim, in fact, it would be nothing but a plain description of Husserl’s own position. If in 1923–24 the expression ens regionale could still be taken as referring either to the specific region of a science or to the overall “character of being” of the entity, here the notion of region seems to stand for only the latter. The point is not simply to recognize that, in order for phenomenology as an absolute science to be at all possible, a circumscribed region needs to be available; the point is rather to recognize that region means the mode of being of the entity insofar as it is the object of a possible science. Better put: region designates the entity insofar as it becomes “thematic” and “a possible object of reflection” (see Heidegger, 1979, 143; 1985, 104). In so arguing, Heidegger radicalizes one of the two meanings implied by the neologism ens regionale and also already points in the direction of what he will later refer to as die Seinsregion des Vorhandenen. The attempt to trace Husserl’s phenomenology, namely, its conception of consciousness, back to Descartes and his position on the ego is a real Heideggerian

 The most systematic and critical assessment of Heidegger’s treatment of intentionality is by far Hopkins, 1993. See in particular the entire second part of the book (81–161); for a different perspective, see Overgaard, 2004, 104 and ff. 23

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locus classicus. The most systematic, comparative examination of the relevant differences and analogies between the two can be found in the 1923–24 Introduction to Phenomenological Research, and the version offered in the course of 1925 (§11) looks more a like an abridged version of it. As Heidegger hastens to remark in §46 of the former course, “It would be a mistake to identify the Husserlian doctrine with Descartes” (Heidegger, 1994, 254; 1999, 196). This is why Heidegger singles out five issues, around which any comparative discussion of the two should always revolve. The first one concerns Descartes’ “way of doubt” and Husserl’s “reduction,” notably, the end-goal (Ziel) which they would respectively strive to attain: “This coincidence is supported by the fact that Husserl himself explicitly refers to the Cartesian examination of doubt.” The difference is however that Husserl, unlike Descartes, is not striving to attain “a fundamentum for all sciences, but instead to find a science, a new science that not only takes the fundamentum as the point of departure but makes it the very theme of this science” (Heidegger, 1994, 259; 1999, 199). For what, on the contrary, concerns the second point of comparison, that is, Descartes’ cogito and Husserl’s own idea of consciousness, the difference is that: “Descartes interrogates the cogito first in the position of the point of departure as ‘my being’ with a view to whether it is a certum […]. Husserl does not interrogate the cogito with a view to whether it satisfies some norm; instead, he sees it positively. In a positive manner he seeks a basic structure and sees it in what he designates as intentionality” (see Heidegger, 1994, 260; 1999, 200). The third point bears upon the sense of the “absolute” of the ego and consciousness respectively: “For Husserl, consciousness is not the point of departure for a chain of proofs; rather, consciousness itself is the absolutum in the sense of an extraordinary region of being (Seinsregion)” (see Heidegger, 1994, 263; 1999, 202). The fourth aspect is the ontological character of the res cogitans and consciousness respectively: “The res cogitans is determined as an esse creatum.” Consciousness is “determined by the fact that it is a possible region for a science or an ens regionale. […] Being as consciousness is thereby set forth from the outset as the very being that yields a domain of subject matter for a fundamental science” (Heidegger, 1994, 264; 1999, 203). Last but not least, if Descartes’s horizon of thought is defined by the catholic system of belief, Husserl’s fundamental examination “is undertaken with the aim of laying the foundation for an absolute science of reason” (Heidegger, 1994, 266; 1999, 204). That Heidegger recognizes the crucial and fundamental differences between Descartes and Husserl just pointed out should not make us overlook the fact that they take place against the backdrop of a common “idea,” the one “which has occupied modern philosophy ever since Descartes.” In other words, Husserl differentiates himself vis-à-vis Descartes yet from within the same “traditional idea of philosophy” (to which there belongs “the idea of an absolute science”). There are differences, yet these differences are revelatory of a more fundamental correspondence between them: the moment of the doubt corresponds, in Descartes, to Husserl’s transcendental reduction, because they are both striving to find a “fundamentum”; they both hinge upon the discovery of the cogito regarded as the absolutum, the mode of being of which is determined in opposition to something else.

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This is why, beyond all differences, Heidegger can still identify the “uniform and basic tendency” that underlies them both. If in the case of Descartes, the “cogito sum” is taken simply and as a “triviality,” in Husserl it is “not only not discussed, but is taken over as self-evident.” Moreover, “It is not only that the cogito is taken over as a triviality without being discussed. The self-evident character is expanded in a principal sense as long as he [Husserl] now explicitly lays claim to this certitudo, not only for a determinate formal-ontological proposition erected on the cogito or for the individual cogitationes, but instead for this particular realm of objects as such in its entirety.” The cogito is now the explicit norm (in the sense of the certitudo) of “this absolute region of being” (see Heidegger, 1994, 266–267; 1999, 205–206). Finally, such care about certainty is the care “about the formation of science”: “[I have in mind] the transformation and new development of science based upon a science held up as a model, the transformation of Cartesian psychology and epistemology into the fundamental science of the phenomenology of consciousness” (see Heidegger, 1994, 268–269; 1999, 206–207; see the discussion by Serban, 2013, 246 and ff.). We are in 1923–1924; in the lectures of 1925 Heidegger will come back to “the idea of an absolute science”  that has occupied modern philosophy ever since Descartes.” Let us keep in mind that Heidegger’s reference point here is the first volume of Ideas. In particular, he has in mind §§31–32, in which the allusion to “the Cartesian attempt at a universal doubt” (Hua III/1, 65; Husserl, 2014, 55) is immediately followed by the (preliminary) introduction of a new, delimited region of being (Hua III/1, 67; Husserl, 2014, 58).24 Accordingly, the question will have to be tackled whether, with the region pure consciousness being replaced by the concrete ego or monad, the role and function of “Descartes” also undergoes a transformation.

9. Contrary to the manner in which Heidegger will present his relation to Husserl’s first two major works (Logical Investigations and Ideas) in his retrospective Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie, where the ontological breakthrough first achieved by the work of 1900–1901 is kept separate from the book of 1913 and the project of a “fundamental science” (Heidegger, 2007, 95 and ff.), in the years that immediately precede the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger, on the contrary, had tended more and more to attenuate the difference between the two works. Even if he recognizes that the idea of phenomenology as a new science with a field of investigation of its own is what specifically characterizes Ideas, the concept of “region” is systematically mobilized between 1920–21 and 1923–24 to also already understand the Logical Investigations.

24

 On these pages, see Jacobs, 2015.

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In this respect, the “region” is resorted to by Heidegger in various ways and according to different strategies. In the first place, the idea of consciousness as the region of an absolute science is what allows Heidegger to affirm that—all the differences notwithstanding—Husserl’s phenomenology falls into the shadow cone first cast by Descartes. One could call this, the region’s philosophic-epochal meaning: (He.R-1): Husserl himself shares “the idea which has occupied modern philosophy ever since Descartes” ➔ Consciousness as the region of an absolute science In the second place, and more ontologically said, the notion of “region” designates a character of being or ontological character (ens regionale), i.e., that of the entity as it is given to an indifferent theoretical intention. This is what Being and Time will characterize more broadly by means of the expression “die Seinsregion des Vorhandenen.” Let us label this, the region’s ontological significance: (He.R-2): The ens regionale designates the “mode of being” of the entity to the extent that is given to an indifferent theoretical intention If during the courses held between 1920 and 1925, it is not always clear how the “region” should be properly understood, Being and Time will be quite explicit in equating Region and γένος; to refer to X as exemplifying a region is to characterize it as falling under a genus or highest genus. We can call this, the region’s generic universality: (He.R-3): The ens regionale is an entity determined in its “generality” as a genus or, to put it better, as a highest genus The ambiguity that originally affected the expression ens regionale is resolved by Heidegger in Being and Time by means of a more fine-grained distinction. On the one hand, there is the improperly called “Seinsregion des Vorhandene” (in the singular), on the other, the many different regions (in the plural) in which the totality of the entity artikuliert ist. The former is, ontologically speaking, only the condition of possibility of the latter, namely, of its categorial determination and organization. In turn, a transcendental-existential condition is required in order for the entity to undergo a modification, thereby assuming the Vorhandenheit-“character of being”: the modification of the “understanding of being” proper to Dasein. This might be labeled the region’s existential-ontological condition: (He.R-4): Dasein’s existential modification is the condition in order  for He.R-2 + He.R-3 to be possible A new diagram can be proposed to better illustrate these distinctions (Fig. 1.2). Now, although the assessment of what Heidegger calls in passing “ontology of what is objectively present” (Ontologie des Vorhandenen) (Heidegger, 1967, 286; 2010, 264)25 would take us far beyond the limited scope of this chapter—a few remarks need to be made about it.  See Kisiel, 1995, 508 for a series of quick remarks on the emergence of the Vorhandenheit in Heidegger’s works. According to Kisiel, the term does not appear before November 1924. 25

1  Heidegger on Region, Dasein, and Being Dasein

Existential Modification

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Entity as Zuhandenheit

Entity as Vorhandenheit Seinsregion des Vorhandenen

Region1

Region2

Region3 …n

Fig. 1.2  Heidegger and the region

For even if the terms Region and Vorhandenheit should not be too hastily identified (what is being determined regionally has the “mode of being” of what is present, but the reverse does not necessarily hold true), the clarification of what is meant by Vorhandenheit could be of help in order to elucidate what is meant by the expression die Seinsregion des Vorhandenen. In other words, since what is “regionally” characterized is already understood in terms of Vorhandenheit, how does Heidegger conceive of the latter? More specifically, the question bears on the ontological implication of that concept. For while on the one hand, in his lectures Heidegger speaks of the ens regionale as a “character of being,” on the other hand, the thesis is advanced to the effect that “ens regionale” means the entity as is given to “an indifferent theoretical intention,” thereby implicitly suggesting a certain indifference visà-vis the proper mode of being of the entity (rather than a new, and different mode of being). To put it bluntly, when we refer to an entity as vorhanden, are we ascribing to it a specific mode of being? Or are we not rather considering the entity indifferently and regardless of its own mode of being? Such is the question that we want to briefly tackle. If Seinsweise is the expression used by Heidegger to designate the “mode of being” of Dasein, i.e., of the entity that “exists,” Seinsart is by contrast the term employed to refer to the many different “types” and “typologies of being” (as one could also translate it to avoid confusion): Dasein itself, Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit (these being the three main Seinsarten in Being and Time).26 In a few passages Heidegger speaks also of Seinsmodus or Seinsmodi to refer to the “modalities of being” other than Dasein itself—as is the case with Vorhandenheit, Zuhandenheit and Realität (Heidegger, 1967, 230, 323; 2010, 211, 297). The talk of Seinsart and Seinsmodus suggests an actual character of being, a positive ontological determination which—in the more traditional language of categorial

26

 See for example Heidegger, 1967, 48, 54, 70, 83, 153, 225; 2010, 45, 50, 66, 77–78, 143, 206.

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ontology—Heidegger does not hesitate to designate as substance27 (see Heidegger, 1967, 318; 2010, 293). Accordingly, to characterize something as a region in the original sense of the phrase “Seinsregion des Vorhandenen” (prior to the division of the entity into many different regions) amounts to primarily ascribing to it the “character of being” of the “substance.” Only what has already been ascribed the character or mode of being (Seinsart) of the substance (Seinsregion des Vorhanden) can be categorized and regionally organized (now in the plural sense of the term region) by primarily ascribing to it a what (τί) and a system of properties (ποῖον). However, passages can be found in which, on the contrary, Vorhandenheit does not designate a certain character or type of being of the entity; rather, it expresses the indifference vis-à-vis the entity’s own character or mode of being. In this respect, a crucial passage can be found in §10: The sources which are relevant for traditional anthropology, the Greek definition and the theological guideline, indicate that, over and above the attempt to determine the essence of the entity “human being,” the question of its being has remained forgotten; rather, this being is understood as something “self-evident” (selbstverständlich) in the sense of what is objectively present (Vorhandenseins) of other created things (Heidegger, 1967, 49; 2010, 46).

Although Heidegger’s interest here is not the Vorhandensein itself, the conclusion can be drawn to the effect that, rather than a specific “character of being,” it designates the Selbstverständlichkeit or self-evidence with which a certain character of being (here, that of the “human being”) is assumed (without the question about the “sense of being” of this entity ever being asked). Over the course of §26, for example, the adjective vorhanden is associated with expressions such as gleichgültig and Gleichgültigkeit (Heidegger, 1967, 121; 2010, 113): “indifference.” Later on, he will speak of the “vulgar understanding of being” that understands “being” indifferently as “objectively present” (das vulgäre Seinsverständnis “Sein” indifferent als Vorhandenheit versteht) (Heidegger, 1967, 389; 2010, 356). The Vorhandenheit is almost explicitly presented as the manner in which the entity is understood negatively, i.e., without any concern about its mode of being. In sum, to affirm that an entity is (being understood) als Vorhandenheit means, in this case, that its mode of being is indifferent or gleichgültig to us or that it is taken as selbstverständlich. Or, as one could also frame it, it means to understand the entity in such a way that its mode of being is left out of the understanding which we have of it. In this respect, to characterize something as a “region” in the original sense of the expression die Seinsregion des Vorhandenen (prior to the division of the entity into many different,

 According to the ambiguity for which, in Aristotle for example, οὐσία can mean both the τόδε τι and the τί ἐστι. See Raspa, 2020, 233 and ff. In the words of Heidegger himself, “οὐσία means what is already objectively present [this is how we translate das hergestellte Vorhandene selbst] or also its being-objectively-present (dessen Vorhandensein)” (see Heidegger 1997, 215, Heidegger, 1988, 151). For an interesting analysis of why and how the term substantia ended up designating the Aristotelian first category, see Arpe, 1940, 75–76. 27

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specific regions) amounts to the claim that the entity is negatively or indifferently understood as regards its character or mode of being.28 The two perspectives could of course be combined. In order to determine something as objectively present in the sense of a “substance” (to which a series of properties are categorially attributed) (this being the first reading above), the character or mode of being of the entity needs to be disregarded (this corresponding to the second perspective). The possibility of the combination, which would somehow resolve the tension between the two, should not cause us to overlook the fact that in one case (= the first) the existence of an actual mode or character of being is recognized, while in the other this is not the case.

10. If at this point we look once again at Heidegger’s refusal to accept the Husserlian ambition to regard “consciousness” as a “region of being,” the following, more fine-­ grained picture is obtained. The refusal to speak and reason regionally is in fact due not only to the refusal to regard Dasein, notably, its existence as the mere individualization of a γένος or highest genus (He.R-3) (this would correspond to the conception of the “region” in the plural, regions of being). In more ontological jargon, and depending on which perspective on the Vorhandenheit we embrace, Heidegger refuses for example the idea of regarding Dasein (= Husserl’s pure consciousness) as a substance to which “properties” can be attributed: “The analysis of the characteristics of the being of Da-sein is an existential one. This means that the characteristics are not properties (Eigenschaften) of something objectively present (eines Vorhandenen), but essentially existential modes to be” (Heidegger, 1967, 133; 2010, 126). Or, were we to embrace the second interpretation, Heidegger refuses the regional determination of Dasein (= with region being here assumed in the singular sense of die Seinsregion des Vorhandenen), because this would mean indifference vis-à-vis its peculiar mode of being. Existentially speaking however, the understanding of something as objectively present in the sense of die Seinsregion des Vorhandenen presupposes an “existential modification” on the part of Dasein (He.R-4). Thus, even if one were to accept the idea of “categorially” determining the entity as a region, this very same

 For a discussion of this question that would diverge from ours, see the analyses by McManus, 2012, 195 and ff. After a first distinction between 36 different meanings of the term Vorhandenheit (McManus, 2012, 53–56), the author singles out a 37th sense: “The 37th sense for the term presents the Vorhanden as the ‘kind’ of object one ‘sees’ when one forgets that any seeing presupposes the mastery and adoption of a particular kind of ‘measure.’” Or also: “In using this term as he does, his concern is what unites such cases: our taking the Being of entities to be self-evident and unproblematic, a non-issue, a non-question. Vorhandenheit in the 37th sense is not so much a kind of Being as the pseudo-‘kind’ of Being that corresponds to that attitude” (196). 28

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possibility cannot and should not ignore the mode of being of the entity which alone can make it existentially possible (Heidegger, 1997, 220 and ff.; 1988, 154 and ff.). The former would have to be recognized as being parasitic on this latter, as derived from it, so to say. Only an entity, the mode of being of which can undergo an “existential modification,” can categorially determine the entity, and articulate it regionally. To the extent that philosophical anthropology aspires to be the regional ontology of the human being, it presupposes—yet without interrogating it—the “mode of being” of the entity which is the object and the subject of its inquiry. This is the reason why Heidegger cannot welcome the criticism of “philosophical anthropology” (with the emphasis being on the adjective philosophical) made by Husserl.

References Antoni, C. (1972). L’esistenzialismo di M. Heidegger. Guida Editori. Arpe, C. (1940). Substantia. Philologus, 94, 65–78. Beck, M. (1928). Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Referat und Kritik). Philosophische Hefte, 1, 5–44. Bultmann, R., & Heidegger, M. (2009). Briefwechsel 1925–1975. V. Klostermann. Čapek, J. (2007). Jednání a situace. OIKOYMENH. Courtine, J.-F. (2007). La cause de la phénoménologie. PUF. Courtine, J.-F. (2015). Res singularis. Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 107, 255–274. Dorfma, E. (2006). La parole qui voit, la vision qui parle: De la question du logos dans Être et temps. Revue philosophique de Louvain, 104, 104–132. Dreyfus, L. H. (1983). De la technè à la technique: le statut ambigu de l’ustensilité dans 1’h-e et le Temps. In M. Haar (Ed.), Martin Heidegger. Cahier de l’Herne (pp. 292–301). Herne. Dreyfus, L. H. (1991). Being-in-the-world. A commentary on Heidegger’s being and time. Division I. MIT Press. Ferrari, M. (2003). Categorie e a priori. Il Mulino. Fultner, B. (2013). Heidegger’s pragmatic-existential theory of language and assertion. In M. Wrathall (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Heidegger’s being and time (pp. 201–222). Cambridge University Press. Gauvry, C. (2013). « En tant que herméneutique » et « en tant que apophantique ». In T. Keiling (Hrsg.), Heideggers Marburger Zeit. Themen, Argumente, Konstellationen (pp.  115–127). V. Klostermann. Graeser, A. (1993). Das hermeneutische “als.” Heidegger über Verstehen und Auslegung. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 47, 559–572. Greisch, J. (2014). Ontologie et temporalité. Esquisse d’une interprétation intégrale de Sein und Zeit. PUF. Hall, H. (1993). Intentionality and world: Division I of Being and Time. In C. B. Guignon (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Heidegger (pp. 122–140). Cambridge University Press. Heidegger, M. (1965). Kant and the problem of metaphysics. Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (1967). Sein und Zeit (GA 2). Max Niemeyer. Heidegger, M. (1972). Frühe Schriften. V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1978). Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (GA 26). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1979). Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 20). V. Klostermann.

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Heidegger, M. (1983). Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit (GA 29/30). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1985). History of the concept of time. Prolegomena. Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (1988). The basic problems of phenomenology. Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (1988a). Ontologie. (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) (GA 63). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1993). Phänomenologische der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (GA 59). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1994). Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (GA 17). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1994a). Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles (GA 61). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1995). Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GA 25). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1995a). The fundamental concepts of metaphysics. World, finitude, solitude. Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (1996). Einleitung in die Philosophie (GA 27). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1997). Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1997a). Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart (GA 28). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1999). Ontology. Hermeneutics of facticity. Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (2002). Off the beaten track. Cambridge University Press. Heidegger, M. (2003). Holzwege (GA 5). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2005). Introduction to phenomenological research. Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (2007). Zur Sache des Denkens (GA 14). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2010). Being and time. State University of New York Press. Heidegger, M. (2010a). Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (GA 3). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2010b). Phenomenology of intuition and expression. Continuum. Heidegger, M. (2016). Vorträge. Teil 1: 1915 bis 1932 (GA 80.1). V. Klostermann. Hering, J. (1921). Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 4, 495–543. Hopkins, C. B. (1993). Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger. Springer. Husserl, E. (1968). Briefe an Roman Ingarden. M. Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Band, Hua III/1. M. Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1994). Randbemerkungen zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit und Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Husserl Studies, 11, 3–63. Husserl, E. (1997). Psychological and transcendental phenomenology and the confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931). Springer. Husserl, E. (2002). Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926–1935) (Hua XXXIV). Kluwer Academic Publisher. Husserl, E. (2014). Ideas I. Hackett Publisher. Jacobs, H. (2015). From psychology to pure consciousness. In A.  Staiti (Ed.), Commentary on Husserl’s ideas I (pp. 95–118). de Gruyter. Kisiel, T. (1995). The genesis of Heidegger’s being and time. University of California Press. Maschietti, S. (2005). L’interpretazione heideggeriana di Kant. Sulla disarmonia di verità e differenza. Il Mulino. McManus, D. (2012). Heidegger and the measure of truth. Oxford University Press. Michalski, M. (2002). Terminologische Neubildungen beim frühen Heidegger. Heidegger Studies, 18, 181–191. Øverenget, E. (1998). Seeing the self. Heidegger on subjectivity. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Overgaard, S. (2004). Husserl and Heidegger on being in the world. Springer. Philipse, H. (1998). Heidegger’s philosophy of being. A critical interpretation. Princeton University Press. Raspa, V. (2020). Origine e significato delle categorie di Aristotele. Il dibattito nell’Ottocento. Quodlibet.

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Rosales, A. (1970). Transzendenz und Differenz. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der ontologischen Differenz beim frühen Heidegger. M. Nijhoff. Serban, C. (2013). La phénoménologie de la conscience comme fuite devant le Dasein: l’interprétation heideggérienne de Husserl à Marbourg en 1923–1924. In T.  Keiling (Hrsg.), Heideggers Marburger Zeit. Themen, Argumente, Konstellationen (pp.  237–253). V. Klostermann. Sinclair, M. (2008). L’outil et la métaphysique: (encore une) note sur le statut ambigu de l’ustensilité chez Heidegger. Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, 198, 423–441. Slama, P. (2021). Phénoménologie transcendantale. Figures du transcendantal de Kant à Heidegger. Springer. Westerlund, F. (2010). Phenomenology as understanding of origin. Remarks on Heidegger’s first critique of Husserl. In F. Rese (Hrg.), Heidegger und Husserl im Vergleich (pp. 34–56). V. Klostermann.

Chapter 2

Dasein, Determination Judgments and the Essence

1. In the famous §9 of Being and Time, Heidegger asserts that, “existentials” and “categories” are “the two fundamental possibilities of the characteristics of being. The entity, which corresponds to them, requires different ways of primary interrogations. Entities are a who (existence) or else a what (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense)” (Heidegger, 1967, 45; Heidegger, 2010a, b, 44). In the course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger comes back to the problem by affirming, even more emphatically, that since Sachheit, realitas and quidditas is what answers “the question: quid est res, What is the materially determined object?”, and since nothing like essentia or οὐσία belongs to the “ontological constitution” of Dasein, then “the being that we ourselves are, the Dasein, cannot at all be interrogated as such by the question: What is this?” (Heidegger, 1997, 169; 1988, 119). The discrepancy between Washeit and Werheit is mirrored by a distinction between different modes of primary interrogation. For only an entity the “characteristic of being” of which is the essential, can be “interrogated” by the question, Was ist das? On the contrary, if the entity is a Wer with no Sachheit the question, Was ist das? does not apply because it has no validity here. Given Heidegger using German (Wesen, Washeit, Werheit), Latin (essential, quidditas) or Greek expressions (οὐσία) indifferently, one might be tempted to attribute a general sense to his discourse. As though Heidegger were criticizing, more or less, the entire ontological tradition: the latter being accused of not acknowledging the fundamental ontological distinction between Washeit and Werheit, hence between the different, corresponding modes of primary interrogation. Now, that Heidegger’s discourse here (like in most other places) displays a bombastic tone, thereby giving the (misleading) impression of not being directed against anybody in particular—this is hard to deny. Yet, already in Volume 1, Chap. 2, we proposed to consider Hering’s doctrine of the essence/idea distinction and Ingarden’s ontology © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. De Santis, Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics, Contributions to Phenomenology 126, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39590-1_2

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as the primary reference point of some of Heidegger’s own remarks. Thus, the question can be asked whether they can still be used in order to interpret what Heidegger asserts about the “different ways of primary interrogations.” If this were the question, it would have to be answered in the affirmative. In fact, by limiting the application of the question, Was ist das? exclusively to a certain type of entity, thus rejecting the idea that any entity could be so interrogated, Heidegger is taking a highly polemical stance vis-à-vis the 1925 long essay by Roman Ingarden Essentiale Fragen (Essential Questions). In this text, published in the phenomenological Jahrbuch, Ingarden  further develops some of the ontological acquisitions of Husserl’s ontology (i.e., the division of what there is into a manifold of regions) and Hering’s investigations (i.e., the difference between essence, essentiality and the idea) by also combining them with some of the crucial logical distinctions first proposed by Alexander Pfänder in his handbook of Logik from 1921. In so doing, the Essentiale Fragen present themselves as a first and systematic attempt at distinguishing and classifying different “essential” questions, that is, the many different questions that can be asked about the object’s “essence” and its structure. As we shall soon verify, the elucidation of the specific sense of the question, Was ist das? represents for Ingarden the point of departure in order to address the more general problem of the object’s essence’s structure and of the “content” of its corresponding “idea.” If Husserl and Hering provide Ingarden with the launch pad, so to speak, for a more fine-grained series of ontological distinctions to be developed, the first part of Pfänder’s Logik asserts that different species of judgments can be singled out that correspond to the different types of “states of affairs” (Sachverhalte) which they respectively posit. In fact, each species of judgment corresponds to a certain type of states of affairs which it posits as its own objectual correlate. Since a judgment is always the “answer” to a previous question, the sense of the many essential questions (in the first place, the question: Was ist das?) can be clarified by first clarifying the specific ontological formations that are “posited” by the relevant answers (= judgments). This is why Ingarden can briefly present the core of his enterprise with the following, incisive words: Die Aufklärung und die Begründung bestimmter logische Angelegenheiten betreffs der essentialen Fragen wollen wir durch Aufklarung bestimmter ontologischer Sachlagen erreichen, die die Gegenstände wahrer und uns bekannter Beantwortungen der genannten Fragen bilden (Ingarden, 1925, 146).

In the words of Heidegger, each form of “primary interrogation” (= Was ist das? and Wer ist das?) demands a certain and specific “answer”; the latter, Ingarden would contend, is always a judgment positing (setzen) a corresponding, ontologically determined state of affairs. Accordingly, the correct sense and meaning of the initial question can be fixed by clarifying the ontological character of the state of affairs posited by the judgment representing the true answer to the question at stake. In his 1927 review of Ingarden’s text, Gilbert Ryle perfectly grasped this fundamental point (see De Santis, 2014, 74 ff., for a general introduction to Essentiale Fragen; and De Santis, 2015, 171–172):

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When we ask the question “What is X?” in its proper sense, we are asking an “Essential Question”; we are asking the What or the Essence of the object X. This question has to be carefully distinguished from other questions which, though not “Essential Questions,” are often improperly couched in the same form of words. For example we may wish merely to identify a presented object, and our question should be put “Which is that?” or “Whose is that?” or “Why is that there?” Or we may wish to be told some of the marks, adjectives or relations of an object, taking its Essence as either known or, for the business in hand, not worth knowing (Ryle, 1927, 366).

Now, it is quite likely to assume that Heidegger was directly familiar with all the works mentioned above; not only with Pfänder’s Logic, but also with Hering’s Remarks on Essence, Essentiality and the Idea as well as with Essential Questions. Although he joined the editorial board of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung in 1927, Heidegger is already helping out Husserl with the editing of the journal’s issues around 19211; moreover, a direct testimony to his critical engagement with the journal’s publications can already be found in 1925–1926. In his Logic lectures, an overview of the most recent publications on the topic is offered at the end of §5. Heidegger describes to his students the handbook of Logic by Pfänder in the following terms: Among the most recent works, I would mention: 5. Alexander Pfänder’s Logik. This logic is influenced in an essential way by Husserl. It is elaborated phenomenologically, but in such a way that holds to the framework of traditional logic. It is, if I may put it this way, a traditional logic, phenomenologically purified. Very lucid, clearly written, and excellent for orienting the beginner. Published in 1920 both as a separate book and in the fourth volume of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Heidegger, 1995, 28; 2010b, 23).

The text does not seem to have had on Heidegger the same kind of positive impression which it will on the contrary leave on Ingarden. It is nothing but a treatise on traditional logic, yet “purified” with the aid of phenomenology. Heidegger makes a mistake though: the fourth volume of the Jahrbuch (which included both Pfänder’s Logik and the Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee by Hering) did not come out in 1920, but rather in 1921.2 In the famous course of 1925 History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger makes a quick, yet quite telling remark indirectly testifying to his knowledge of Essential Questions—which had just been published in the seventh issue of the Jahrbuch (already at the end of 1924, in fact, Husserl can thank Ingarden for sending him a copy (Husserl, 1968, 32)). The remark is at the beginning of what is now §15:

 See Husserl’s letter to Ingarden from June 20, 1921: “Ihr Bergson ist im Druck, ein Bogen schon in I. Corr. Dr. Heidegger hat das große Opfer gebracht, Ihr Msc. sprachlich auszufeilen” (Husserl, 1968, 19). 2  See Heidegger’s letter to Löwith from January 25, 1921: “Im Jahrbuchband mit Pfänders Logik u.a. erscheint noch die Arbeit von Ingarden über die Gefahr einer Petitio principii in der Erkenntnistheorie. Gesehen hab ich sie nicht. Frl. Stein hat schon wieder ein neues Buch fertig über Staatsphilosophie” (Heidegger & Löwith, 2017, 32). 1

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2  Dasein, Determination Judgments and the Essence The question of being asks about being. What does being mean? Formally, the answer is: Being signifies this and that. The question seeks an answer which determines (bestimmt) something which is somehow already pre-given in the very questioning. The question is a so-called determination question (Bestimmungsfrage) (our italics). It does not ask whether there is anything like being at all, but rather what is meant by it, what is understood under it, under “being.” When we thus ask about the sense of being, then being, which is to be determined, is in a certain way already understood. In a certain way: here this means according to a wholly indeterminate pre-understanding, an indeterminacy whose character can however be phenomenologically grasped. […]. What is meant by “being”? Even this unoriented and vague pre-understanding is still an understanding. It bears, as it were, the possibility of the question within itself. It is the source of the questioning in the sense of seeking for the grounded demonstration of what is not yet understood. More precisely, the explicit questioning is in its sense immediately understood from this understanding. The questioning is itself, as it were, still indefinite. We constantly make use of this indefinite meaning and concept “being,” so extensively, in fact, that we are not even aware that we are using “being” in an indefinite meaning. This is so even as we elaborate the question: What “is” being? What “is” pertinent to its “being”? We always already live in an understanding of the “is” without being able to say more precisely what it actually means. This indicates that the understanding of “being” and a certain concept of “being” is always already there (Heidegger, 1979, 193–193; 1985, 143–144).

As we will soon see, Bestimmungsfrage is an expression coined by Ingarden himself at the beginning of Essential Questions, §9: Introductory Remarks on the Question “What is X?” (Ingarden, 1925, 164). In Ingarden’s terminology, the Bestimmungsfrage is a question, the answer to which is a judgment that he himself (following Pfänder) calls Bestimmungsurteil, “determination judgment.” Yet, upon closer examination, it turns out that Heidegger is not using the term Bestimmungsfrage in exactly the same sense in which it was first introduced by Ingarden. While Ingarden understands by Bestimmungsfrage the question Was ist das?, “What is this?”, Heidegger seems to be employing it to designate the specific question which Ingarden on the contrary frames as Was ist das, das X?, or “What is X?” The latter is an essential question in the strictest sense of the expression, because its answer is a Wesensurteil or “judgment of essence”: a judgment spelling out the “essence” of a given individual object as falling under a certain “idea.” Now, regardless of the specific manner in which Heidegger might be here (intentionally or non-intentionally) (mis-)using the expression Bestimmungsfrage, two points need to be kept in mind. In the first place, and as the expression is nowhere to be found in Pfänder’s Logic of 1921 but only in Ingarden’s text from 1925, its presence testifies to Heidegger’s familiarity with the latter too. In the second place, this being the polemical point that he seems to be making directly against Ingarden, the determination question that asks about being (in Ingarden’s language, the question, What is X?) presupposes a vague pre-understanding of being. This is what carries “the possibility of the question within itself.” Albeit Heidegger does not seem to be rejecting the overall possibility of asking the question, “What does being mean?”, the point is that since its possibility rests on a “vague pre-understanding” of being, the elaboration of the question of being requires an “initial explication of Dasein” itself (Heidegger, 1979, 192; 1985, 142).

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The questioning is itself an entity which is given with the question of the being of an entity in the act of carrying out the questioning, whether it is expressly noted or not. For now this entity must be secured more precisely. […]. To work out the articulation of the question of the sense of being hence means to exhibit the questioning, that is, the Dasein itself, as an entity […]. The actual elaboration of the articulation of the question is accordingly a phenomenology of Dasein; but it already finds the answer and finds it purely as a research answer, because the elaboration of this articulation concerns the entity which has within itself a distinctive relation of being. Dasein is here not only ontically decisive but also ontologically so for us as phenomenologists (Heidegger, 1979, 199–200; 1985, 147–148).

And the entity, the mode of being of which alone makes the Seinsfrage possible (= Dasein), “does not signify a what. This entity is not distinguished by its what, like a chair in opposition to a house” (Heidegger, 1979, 205; 1985, 153). The two problems must be kept distinct. For the impossibility of interrogating the entity, which we ourselves are, by the question, “What is this?” (which is what Ingarden technically calls Bestimmungsfrage) is one thing; but the impossibility of asking the question, “What does being mean?” without first elucidating the mode of being of Dasein and its “pre-understanding of being” is quite another. What interests us in the present context is that by denying the possibility of interrogating Dasein by means of what Ingarden refers to as the Bestimmungsfrage What is this?, he is thoroughly dismissing the logic-ontological apparatus developed by the Polish philosopher. In order to shed light upon the latter point, we will first introduce Pfänder’s own classification of judgments, then we will move on to Ingarden in order to better understand the connection between Bestimmungsfrage and essentiale Frage in the strict sense of the term. As the reader will realize, the ambition is to explain what it means that Dasein has no Sachheit and thus cannot be regarded as circumscribing a region of being. As was already the case with Chap. 2 of the first volume, the reader should regard this chapter as an attempt to address the thorny issue of Heidegger’s relations to “early phenomenology”—here with special focus on Pfänder, Hering, and Ingarden.

2. The chapter from the Logic to which Ingarden systematically refers his readers (Ingarden, 1925, 208 and ff.) is the third (Objects, States of Affairs and Judgments) from the first part (The Theory of the Judgment) of the book. Here is how Pfänder sums up the main outcomes of his division of all judgments (for a general introduction to the Logic, see Lenoci, 2000): The division of judgments that we have here undertaken is nevertheless not a purely logical one. While there are objective-material (sachliche) differences within the states of affairs posited by these judgments that provide the basis for the distinctions, these distinctions are not reflected in the judgments themselves as asserting thought-structures (Gedankengebilden).

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2  Dasein, Determination Judgments and the Essence Neither the judgment in general, nor the purely logical species of judgment, requires that particular material (sachliche) relationships necessarily be set up in the state of affairs. Therefore, from the purely logical division of judgments one cannot, as Kant erroneously thought, derive particular material categories. And the judgment in general, or, rather, the copula, still has full freedom in regard to all the possible material relations that can be posited between the subject and the predicate-determinations (Pfänder, 1963, 49; 2009, 51).

Regardless of the polemical tone against Kant, what matters for Ingarden is the impossibility of materially (sachlich) determining a judgment, hence of materially classifying it, by simply looking at its “logical” form. No sachliche characterization and division is possible unless we take into account the state of affairs posited by the judgment: “To each particular judgment there corresponds a state of affairs” (Pfänder, 1963, 35; 2009, 35). The judgment “projects” the state of affairs out of itself: “It posits it over against itself in such a way that the projected state of affairs is always kept exterior to the judgment that projects it, always beyond or ‘transcendent’ to it. Thus, no component of the state of affairs forms a component of the judgment” (Pfänder, 1963, 35; 2009, 35). And yet “no judgment can be formulated without projecting a state of affairs.” The latter is its “intentional correlate”: By projecting the state of affairs, the judgment distinguishes itself from it, in this respect, the judgment is primary and the state of affairs, secondary. Understood exclusively as projected by the judgment, the state of affairs is totally dependent upon it. It is projected the way a movie image is projected by a projection lamp. And the linguistic assertive sentence is merely, as it were, the hardware of the projector (Pfänder, 1963, 36; 2009, 36–37).

Following up on the Projektion-analogy, one could say that no materially determined division is possible insofar as we confine ourselves to fixing the formal structure of the lamp. Rather, only by turning our attention towards the material structure of the state of affairs (the movie image), can the judgment be understood and classified non-formally. The judgment can project out of itself a state of affairs in virtue of the “double function” of the “copula.” On the one hand, the copula is recognized as having the function of “referring” “the predicate-determination to the subject”: but this does not posit “any particular material relationship between the subject and the predicate-determination” (Pfänder, 1963, 42; 2009, 43). In the general formula for the judgment, the copula “is” performs in this respect only the function of relating the predicate-determination to the subject. Moreover, since even the different attributes (Eigenschaften) of one object do not at all stand in absolutely the same material relationship to it, every judgment that predicates an attribute must also co-posit (mitsetzen) the appropriate relationship of that attribute to the object (Pfänder, 1963, 43; 2009, 43).

This is the second function (Behauptungsfunktion)3:

of

the

copula,

“the

assertion-function”

We can clearly see the peculiarity of this second function of the copula when we compare the judgment to a corresponding command (Forderung). In the command that an object

 On the relation between the assertion-function and the truth-making principle in Pfänder, see Mulligan, 2014, 45 ff. 3

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47

should be a particular way, an attribute is likewise related to the subject, but there it is forced upon it. The union that is proposed between the object and its attribute is thus a demanded one. In the judgment, on the other hand, the claim (Anspruch) is made that the relation of the predicate-determination to the subject coincides with the demands of the object itself. The judgment is not a decree over the object; it is repugnant to its innermost nature to coerce the object in any way or assign to it something that it does not require of itself (Pfänder, 1963, 43; 2009, 44).

By logically “relating” the predicate to the subject (= the copula’s relating-­function), the judgment “asserts” at the same time or, to put it better, “co-posits” a certain material belongingness of the attribute to the object of the subject (= the copula’s assertion-function), thereby also projecting out of itself a materially structured state of affairs. It is by classifying the many different states of affairs that a materially determined division of the judgments can also be achieved: “Judgments necessarily refer to objects. There is no category and no species of objects to which the judgment cannot refer. Not only things, material substances, and persons, but also states, conditions, processes, activities, and finally even relationships and situations, can all become the objects of judgments” (Pfänder, 1963, 44–45; 2009, 47). Thus, since the “domain of objects to which judgments can refer” is infinite, and since “judgments that refer to different objects are in themselves distinct judgments,” then the number of the latter is also infinite. Yet, it is possible to “divide judgments into a limited number of types, in accordance with the number of categories and species of object.” But such a division has “no genuine logical value” (Pfänder, 1963, 45; 2009, 47). Such “division” proceeds by dividing all possible states of affairs into two main groups. The first major group of Sachvehalte is that of “those that lie within the object itself”; the second, on the contrary, is the group of all those states of affairs “that extend beyond the object and involve other objects.” Both of them, of course, include a series of sub-divisions. (A) Sachverhalte lying “within the object itself”: (A-1): “The comportment (Verhalten) of the object of the subject in regard to its own ‘What’ (Was) or essence (Wesen)” (A-2): “The comportment of the object of the subject in regards to its determinations of any sort (Bestimmtheiten irgendwelcher Art), of which some express the essence of the object, while others belong to the object more or less accidentally (zufällig)” (A-3): “The comportment of the object of the subject in regards to its type of being (Seinsart), i.e., its real or ideal being of any sort” (see Pfänder, 1963, 45–46; 2009, 48) (trans. modified). (B) Sachverhalte extending “beyond the object”: (B-1): States of affairs that involve “comparison” (Vergleichungssachverhalte), that is, the “comportment of the object as compared to other objects”

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(B-2): Statesofaffairsthatinvolve“belongingness”(Zugehörigkeitssachverhalte), that is, the “comportment of the object as belonging to some other object” (B-3): States of affairs that involve “dependency” (Abhängigkeitssachverhalte), that is, the “autonomy of the object or its being-dependent upon some other object” (B-4): “Intentional states of affairs” (die intentionalen Sachverhalte), that is, the object as “being-referred-to by any sort of intention upon the part of any sort of object” (see Pfänder, 1963, 46; , 2009, 48) (trans. modified). Hence, Pfänder’s conclusion, “judgments can be classified into two major groups according to the type of state of affairs they posit, the first main group being again divisible into three sub-groups, the second into four.” As Pfänder himself does not really dwell upon the second group, we too will be considering only A-1, A-2 and A-3. He calls “determination judgment” or Bestimmungsurteil the judgment corresponding to A-1, the one that posits a state of affairs determining the object in regard to “its own ‘What’ or essence.” They answer the question, “What is this?” (Was ist das?). This question can never be answered by simply listing the determinations (Bestimmtheiten) of the object, no matter how many we include. […] The question “What is this?” is generally open to many different answers. In regard to its “what” one and the same object may, in any given case, be simultaneously a material object, a living being, an animal, a bird of prey, and an eagle. In such a progression of determination judgments, the object is determined more and more exactly by assigning to it a more and more specific “what.” Usually it is a question of the most specific determinations of the object possible through its lowest species. But everything asserted of the subject in these determination judgments is posited as lying within it, and even as forming with it that peculiar unity that the “what,” the essence, the “essentia” of an object has with the object itself. […] In determination judgments, therefore, the copula not only carries out the general assertion[−function] of relating the predicate determination to the subject, something that is expressed in the general formula for the judgment by the word “is,” but posits, at the same time, that material unity (sachliche Einheit) which exists between the object and its “what.” Determination judgments are thus understood correctly when this unique, material unity is co-posited along with them (Pfänder, 1963, 46–47; 2009, 48–49, trans. modified).

Ingarden’s ambition, in his booklet of 1925, will consist in more closely elucidating the structure of “determination judgments” by also shedding light on the relation between Bestimmungsurteil and Bestimmungsfrage as well as on what Pfänder calls here in passing material unity (sachliche Einheit). This is the unity of the essence itself or, to put it better, the unity of the object as determined by its essence: in this respect, the ontological side of Ingarden’s investigation is dedicated to addressing the nature and internal structure of the object’s own essence. For what on the contrary concerns A-2, Pfänder speaks of “attribution judgments” or Attributionsurteile, as in them “an essentially different kind of material unity is posited between the subject and the predicate determination, corresponding to the different way of predication” (Pfänder, 1963, 47; 2009, 49). For example, the judgment “Sulfur is yellow” does not represent an answer to the question, “What is that?” (for it would be a determination judgment), but rather to the question, “How

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is that?” (Wie ist das?): “By means of the copula ‘is,’ it not only refers the yellow to the sulfur in an assertive manner, but posits the two as standing together in the peculiar unity that an attribute has with a material object. Although the different determinations that can accrue to the object (e.g., size, shape, hardness, brittleness, and so on) do not stand in exactly the same unity with it, they all have in common that they are in or on the object,” but in a way that is radically different from that “in which its ‘what’ is in it” (Pfänder, 1963, 47; 2009, 49). Now, as the sachliche Einheit posited by attribution judgments (= the unity of the object with its “properties”) is different from the sachliche Einheit posited in A-1 (= the unity of the object and its “essence”), and yet these two cannot be completely unrelated, Ingarden will set himself the hard task of addressing and thus clarifying their materially (sachlich) grounded inter-connection. Finally, when it comes to A-3, Pfänder speaks of “ontological judgments” (Seinsurteile) since they tell us “the type of being of the object of the subject.” Here we are answering neither the question, What is that? nor the one asking, How is that?—“For the being of any sort is essentially distinct as well from every contentual determination of the object” (Pfänder, 1963, 48; 2009, 50). The fact that the entity which we ourselves are—Dasein—cannot be interrogated by means of the question: What is that? means that it cannot be the object corresponding to the subject as it appears in a determination judgment (A-1). As Heidegger affirms over and over again, Dasein has neither a sachhaltiges Was nor an essentia consisting of properties as Eigenschaften. By contrast, while what Pfänder (and Ingarden) calls determination judgments determine the object based on its “material unity” with its own Was or essentia, what goes by the name of “attribution judgment” posits the “material unity” between the object itself and its own determinations. Now, it will be part of Ingarden’s project to ontologically elucidate the connection between these two material unities, thereby showing in what sense the totality of entities can be organized into a plurality of regions.

3. Since we are here interested in the relation between Bestimmungsurteil, Bestimmungsfrage and the determination of the essence’s internal structure (= relation between essence and idea), we will not elaborate upon the first chapter of Essential Questions (Ingarden, 1925, 126–146), where Ingarden works out the general structure of the question (The Question in General and its Properties), thus the distinction between the question’s formal and material object (for a discussion of this section of the book, see De Santis, 2014, 76–85). For the sake of our issues, Chap. 2 is the most important. Here Ingarden first clarifies and carefully discriminates between the many different meanings which the question What is this? may have and display; thus, the discussion of the question What is X? is introduced together with the concept of idea. Before we start out with the former issue, a remark is necessary. It is crucial to keep in mind that whenever Ingarden speaks of “object”

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(Gegenstand) in the strict sense of the expression, what he refers to is an individual object: “an independent object as the exemplar of a lowest species, regardless of whether it is a real or ideal object” (see Ingarden, 1925, 147; see also Ingarden, 1935, for a systematic discussion of the notion of individual objects that expands on the acquisitions of the work of 1925). As Ingarden sets out to elucidate the question, What is this?, two misunderstandings, two possible ways of misconceiving of its meaning are immediately set aside. The two hypotheses that Ingarden touches upon and rules out right away are the ones according to which the question What is this? would ask about the “name” (also in the sense of the “proper name”) of the object (still partially unknown to us) (Ingarden, 1925, 147–149), or its “species” (Art) (Ingarden, 1925, 149). “Die Frage ‚was ist das?’ dagegen hat unserer Meinung nach eine andere, eigentliche Bedeutung, in welcher sie nicht die Stelle einer anderen Frage einnimmt, sondern eine Angelegenheit betrifft, die von der Angabe der Art eines Gegenstandes verschieden ist” (Ingarden, 1925, 150). When we answer the question, What is this? by saying, This is an A—the “an A” does not stand for the lowest species; rather, it expresses “the identification of the object in question with ‘an A’” (Ingarden, 1925, 151). Wenn wir uns eines alten Terminus bedienen dürfen, so können wir sagen, daß dieses Moment das τι des Gegenstandes ist, im Unterschied zum ποῖον einerseits und zu jeglichem γένος andererseits. Dieses Moment nennen wir die „Natur“eines Gegenstades, zur Bezeichnung dessen aber, daß es sich da um ein individuelles Moment handelt und zugleich um ein Moment, welches eine aufbauende, konstitutive Rolle in dem Gegenstande spielt (Ingarden, 1925, 151).

Hering had already resorted to the Aristotelian-sounding expression “τι εἶναι” to designate not the individual essence of an individual object (Wesen), which he rather called So-sein or ποῖον εἶναι, but, more strictly, its Washaftigkeit or “what-ness” (Hering, Hering, 1921, 506 and ff.). Now, two elements must be distinguished in the answer to the question, What is this?: what the “… an A” means; and what the “copula” properly accomplishes. The “answer” or, to put it better, the judgment in question does not express the object’s individual nature. Rather, since the question is about “the individual object” and wants to know what it is, the judgment answering the question accomplishes the “identification” between the “individual object” and its “individual and constitutive nature.” This is why, expanding on Pfänder’s conceptuality, Ingarden introduces the term “determination question” (Bestimmungsfrage) to refer to the question, What is this? understood according to its “specific meaning.” More properly formulated, a “determination question” is a question, the correct answer to which is a “determination judgment,” a judgment that expresses what Pfänder had already labeled “material unity […] between the object and its ‘what’” (and which now Ingarden re-words in terms of identification between the object and its constitutive nature) (Ingarden, 1925, 164). This does not mean, however, that we already know what a “constitutive nature” is. All we know is that the question, What is this? (determination question) can be answered, for instance, by stating: “This is a square” (“determination judgment”). Yet, as soon as we ask, “What is the square?” (What is X? or, in Ingardern’s German,

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Was ist das, das X?), we step over the boundaries of the analysis thus far, thus opening up a brand new set of problems. Wir müssen jetzt zu der Analyse der Frage „was ist das, das x?“übergehen, wobei „das x“einen nichtindividuellen „Gegenstand“bezeichnet. Hier stehen an erster Stelle solche Frage wie „was ist das, das Quadrat?“, „was ist das, das Pferd;“, „was ist das, die Identität des Gegenstandes als solchen?“usw. Fragen solcher Art muß man sowohl von einer Bestimmungsfrage, wie von einer „Schemafrage“unterscheiden. Die Unbekannte des Problems bildet hier weder ein individueller durch seine konstitutive Natur erfaßter Gegenstand, noch eine „Rolle“eines Gegenstandes, die auf eine Beziehung relativ ist (Ingarden, 1925, 164–165).

We already know that Pfänder listed the latter type of judgments among those whose state of affairs extends “beyond the object” of the subject (see above §2, B-1 through B-4). By contrast, the correct answer to our new question, e.g. “What is the square?” would be (Ingarden, 1925, 165): The square is a parallelogram with four equal sides and four right angles (Das Quadrat, das ist ein gleichseitiges rechtwinkliges Parallelogramm)

From now on we will be referring to this “square”-example as Σ. In contrast to determination judgments, judgments of the Σ-type spell out “the content of the idea” (der Gehalt der Idee) of which “individual objects” are nothing but “exemplars.” Their structure is, X is Y with the properties a, b, c…

The understanding of the specific meaning of the Σ-judgments, hence of the relation between them and the determination judgment, requires Ingarden to briefly get into an analysis of the ideas’ “content” and its many components. Only by doing so, in fact, will he also be in a position to clarify the object’s individual and constitutive nature (its “essence” in the strict sense of the term).

4. In §11 of Essential Questions, Ingarden starts out by recognizing the “incredible duality” proper to the structure (Aufbau) of every idea: on the one hand, there is “the structure of the idea qua idea”; on the other hand, “the content of the idea, that is, what grounds the relation to a possible individual object and that mirrors both its quality and structure” (andererseits der Gehalt der Idee, d. h. das worin der Bezug auf mögliche individuelle Gegenstande gründet und worin die Widerspiegelung der Beschaffenheit und des Aufbaues des betreffenden Gegenstandes besteht) (Ingarden, 1925, 175). What counts here is the use of the expression Widerspiegelung: the “content” of the idea being what “mirrors” and directly expresses the Aufbau of the object (as an “exemplar” of the idea itself). Now, when it comes to their content, ideas can be divided into “particular” (besondere) and “general” (allgemeine). “A

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particular idea,” Ingarden goes on to write on this very same page, is an idea, “the immediate individualization of which is an individual object”: Eine besondere Idee, d.h. eine solche, deren unmittelbare Vereinzelung ein individueller Gegenstand ist, hat einen derartigen Gehalt, daß in ihm die idealen Korrelate der vollen qualitativen Beschaffenheit und des Aufbaus des Gegenstandes auftreten, dessen Idee die betreffende besondere Idee ist. […] Z.B. wir untersuchen die besondere Idee meines Tintengläschens, das auf meinem Schreibtisch steht. In ihrem Gehalte treten die idealen Korrelate seines vollen (gesamten) ποῖον εἶναι (in weiteren Sinne, in welchem das τι mit einbegriffen ist) mit dem alleinigen Unterschied auf, daß manche Elemente des Gehalts als vollkommen und eindeutig bestimmte Konstanten, andere dagegen nur als eindeutig bestimmte Veränderliche auftreten. Als Konstante gehören zu dem Gehalte der Idee die idealen Korrelate aller aktuellen Eigenschaften und aktuell wirksamen Fähigkeiten des betreffenden individuellen Gegenstandes [...]. Diese Korrelate treten da natürlich in einer bestimmter Ordnung und in entsprechenden Beziehungen untereinander auf. Zu den Konstanten des Gehalts gehören ferner die idealen Korrelate des formal-analytischen Aufbaus des Gegenstandes überhaupt (im Husserlschen Sinne), sowie die Korrelate aller derjenigen formalen Momente, die für das betreffende Gegenstandsgebiet, zu welchem das betrachtete Individuum gehört, charakteristisch sind (Ingarden, 1925, 176).

For what on the contrary concerns the “variable elements” of the content of a “particular idea” (e.g., the idea of “the small ink bottle on my table”), Ingarden mentions the following “moments”: “(1) the moments of time and space localization; (2) the moments that form the modus existentiae of the relevant object; (3) the momentum individuationis.” Es ist also z. B. in dem Gehalte der Idee des genannten Tintengläschens als eine Konstante enthalten, daß dieses Gläschen ein Gegenstand vom Typus der realen Gegenstände ist, daß aber dieser Gegenstand eben wirklich real existiert, kommt unter den Konstanten des Ideengehaltes nicht vor. Dagegen tritt da die entsprechende Veränderliche auf, daß der genannte Gegenstand real existieren kann. Zu den Konstanten des Gehalts gehört ferner das ideale Korrelate dessen nicht, daß das genannte Gläschen eben heute am Mittwoch in dem bestimmten Zeitmoment auf meinem Schreibtisch an einer bestimmten Stelle steht. Es gehört dagegen als eine Veränderliche zu dem Gehalte der Idee, daß mein Tintengläschen in diesem oder jenem Zeitmoment an einem beliebigen Orte sein kann. Es gehört endlich zu den Konstanten des Ideengehaltes das Momentum individuationis nicht, daß nämlich der genannte Gegenstand dieses im Original einzige Individuum ist. Dagegen tritt die Veränderliche auf, daß der betreffende Gegenstand eben ein Gegenstand von individueller Seinsform ist (Ingarden, 1925, 177).

Let us dwell for a moment on the “small ink bottle on my desk” hic et nunc. The “content” of the idea, Ingarden has already told us, is the Widerspiegelung der Beschaffenheit und des Aufbaues des Gegenstandes. In this case, the idea’s content’s constant elements are: Con-1: “The ideal correlates of the formal-analytical structure of the object in general”: for instance, according to Husserl’s own distinctions in the Third Logical Investigations, to which Ingarden himself refers, the fact that formally speaking an object is a whole made up of parts that stand in possible relations to one another (= there cannot be any object which is not subject to such ontological-­formal principles).

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Con-2: “All those formal moments that characterize the specific objectual domain to which the individuum under consideration belongs”: since the “object” in question is a so-called “cultural” product or, as Husserl would put it, an object of the region “spirit,” then the fact of being ontologically founded on a material layer (= there cannot be any cultural object which is not materially founded) belongs to the constants of the idea’s content. Con-3: “The fact that it is an object of the type of real objects”: the mode of being of a small ink bottle (meaning any ink bottle) is not the same as that of a “number,” for example. The latter is an ideal object (= non-spatial and nontemporal), whereas the “ink bottle” is a real object. Con-4: “In its content there occur the ideal correlates of its full (complete) ποῖον εἶναι (in the broad sense, which includes also the τι).” From this sentence it can be surmised that the constant elements of the idea’s content include, in this case, not only what this object is (= an ink bottle), i.e., the object’s τι; but also its ποῖον εἶναι: the fact that it is, say, “black olive” with a determined “shape” of a determined “size”; that it is made of a certain material, say, “glass” with a determined “weight” (= let us not forget that the particular idea under scrutiny is the idea of my small ink bottle on the desk hic et nunc). As for the variable elements contained in the idea’s content, the following list can be made. Var-1: “The moments of time and space localization.” The “small ink bottle” is right now on the desk next to the green lamp; yet it could be moved, thus being in a different place at a different time (without ceasing to be this small black olive ink bottle with this shape, size and weight). Var-2: “The moments forming the modus existentiae of the relevant object”: in spite of the fact that the small ink bottle actually exists hic et nunc on my desk, I can also think of it in my “imagination” as the small black olive ink bottle used by a fictional character, e.g., the Baron von Yosch to write down his memories. Although the mode of being of the object would not differ (Con-3), his modus existentiae would change instead: it would no longer be “actually” existing hic et nunc on my desk; rather, it would exist only as an “imagined” real ink bottle on the desk of a fictional character. Var-3: “The momentum individuationis”: this individual black olive ink bottle on my desk is only one possible individualization among many others of the idea of an ink bottle with a definite color, shape, size and weight. Next to this individualization on my desk hic et nunc there can be an infinite number of other individualizations; in short, next to this individual black olive ink bottle with a certain shape, size and weight there can be an infinite number of ink bottles having exactly the very same color, shape, size and weight (= different individualizations of the same particular idea). The presence, within the content of the idea, of variable elements is precisely what makes ideas “essentially different from any other objectuality,” especially individual objects. For an individual object is “absolutely, univocally determined and

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contains no variables” (Ingarden, 1925, 179). As is clear from the two lists, the content of the idea (in this case, that of a “particular idea” which can no longer be further specified, but only individualized hic et nunc) includes the formal elements of the object (Con-1), along with the material (Con-2; Con-3), and the existential ones (Var-2). These distinctions map onto the three species of “ontological investigations” that Ingarden will present and discuss in his essay of 1929 Bemerkungen zum Problem “Idealismus-Realismus” (which Husserl had called “the most beautiful and interesting of the volume” (Husserl, 1968, 55)): formal ontology (dealing with formal-ontological problems); material ontology (dealing with ontologicalmaterial problems); and existential ontology (dealing with existential-ontological problems) (Ingarden, 1929, 163–178).4 In sum, the internal structure of the idea’s content, its many different species of (“constant” and “variable”) elements, represents the subject matter of ontology according to its threefold nature. Since it is not our goal to discuss Ingarden’s ontology, let us go back to the concept of ideas, notably, more “general” ideas. Wenn wir z. B. die Idee „das Ding überhaupt“oder „das Pferd überhaupt“in Betracht ziehen, so haben wir es hier mit allgemeinen Ideen zu tun. Die allgemeinen Ideen zeichnen sich dadurch aus, daß das System der qualitativen Konstanten ihres Gehalts nie die gesamte Qualifikation eines der individuellen Gegenstände erschöpft. Die Konstante sind da ideale Korrelate nur mancher Momente der Qualifikation mancher individueller Gegenstände. In dem Gehalte einer allgemeinen Idee tritt hingegen immer wenigstens eine qualitative Veränderliche auf, die als Veränderliche natürlich eindeutig bestimmt ist. Unter einer „qualitativen“Veränderlichen verstehen wir dabei eine Veränderliche, die sich auf eines der Momente der Qualifikation des individuellen Gegenstandes bezieht und die eben als eine Veränderliche nur einen Eigenschafttypus, nicht aber die einzelnen Fälle dieses Typus bestimmt. Z.  B. in der Idee „das Dreieck überhaupt“bildet eine solche qualitative Veränderliche die relative und absolute Länge der Seiten des Dreiecks. „Das Dreieck“ist nämlich bekanntlich eine Flache, welche drei gerade Seiten von irgendwelcher absoluten Länge und irgendwelchen Verhältnissen hinsichtlich der Länge begrenzen. […] Eine andere qualitative Veränderliche bildet die absolute und relative Große der inneren Winkel. Je „allgemeiner“eine Idee ist, um so großer ist die Anzahl der qualitativen Veränderlichen im Gehalte der Idee. Der Übergang von irgendeiner allgemeinen Idee zu einem individuellen Gegenstande erfordert vor allem den Übergang zu einer besonderen Idee. Aus diesem Grunde ist der individuelle Gegenstand eine mittelbare Vereinzelung einer allgemeinen Idee (Ingarden, 1925, 180–181).

“The more general is the idea, the greater the number of qualitative variables”: this is the key-passage. The “qualitative variables” are what determines an overall “type of properties” that will be univocally determined in the relevant particular ideas. If we go back for a moment to our “small black olive ink bottle on my desk,” then we can affirm that the (general) idea “thing in general” does contain, as a qualitative variable, the Eigenschaft-Typus “color in general,” yet, no particular color is thereby already determined or prescribed. What is being prescribed or determined is the “type” of a certain property (here, the Eigenschaft “color”); yet, only the content of  See Ingarden 1935, 34, for a distinction between existential ontological problems (which bear upon possible modes of existence) and existential metaphysical ones (concerning “the ascertainment of the factual existence of something”). 4

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a particular idea can also display, as an already univocally determined color, the color “black olive.” One could distinguish a most “general idea,” such as the idea “thing in general,” the content of which would contain only the ideal correlate of a general type of properties (“color in general”). Yet, a more particular idea can be identified, the content of which contains the ideal correlate of the property “black color,” all the way down to the lowest particular idea “black olive color” (which is directly individualized in an individual object hic et nunc). Wenn in dem Gehalte einer besonderen Idee qualitative Konstanten auftreten, welche die Gesamtheit der Qualifikation des entsprechenden individuellen Gegenstandes erschöpfen, wenn zugleich andererseits in der Qualifikation des Gegenstandes sein Wesen enthalten ist, dann ist es klar, daß in dem Gehalte der Idee das ideale Korrelate des Wesens von dem entsprechenden Gegenstande eingeht. Aus diesem Grunde ist es möglich, das Wesen eines individuellen Gegenstandes in dem Gehalte der entsprechenden Idee zu untersuchen (Ingarden, 1925, 183–184).

The object’s Wesen can be investigated by looking at the content of the particular idea, of which the object itself is the direct or immediate individuation. The Wesen or object’s essence is what, as a system of properties (Eigenschaften) in the individual object hic et nunc (see for example Con-4), ideally corresponds to the content of a particular idea. As the latter contains, as a variable, also the momentum individuationis, such ideal content can be “individualized” in countless other objects, thus determining countless other individual essences. The term essence (Wesen), understood as a system of properties of the object’s ποῖον εἶναι, has in the just quoted excerpt a broad and general meaning. And it is in fact used by Ingarden to refer to both individual objects of the type of the small ink bottle on my desk and a triangle in general. As if there were no difference between the internal structure, and the ideal content, of the relevant (particular and general) ideas.

5. The distinction between constant and variable elements of the content, hence the one between particular and general ideas, require a further differentiation within the realm of ideas. It is the distinction between “three different species of ideas” that Ingarden proposes in §23 of his work: (a) “inexact” ideas; (b) “exact” ideas”; and finally (c) “simple” ideas (here we will be following the presentation offered in De Santis, 2014, 90–95 and 2015). • Inexact ideas. All those ideas, the content of which is “a conglomerate lacking any internal unity” (Ingarden, 1925, 221), are inexact. Theit content is the result of what we could call “a retroactive grouping by an empirical synthesis of all the individual objects so far experienced” (De Santis, 2015, 174). In this case the idea’s content “is only a correlate of the specific synthesis of the constants that are grasped at a certain moment (in dem gegebenen Augenblick erfaßten Konstanten)” (Ingarden, 1925, 222). As a consequence, the individual constitu-

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tive nature of the object is “only the objectual correlate of the synthesis of the ascertained properties (festgestellten Eigenschaften).” Not only is the constitutive nature a “conglomerate” lacking any internal unity; it is also a “contingent conglomerate” (Ingarden, 1925, 223). Let us take the idea of a “plate”: “It is not possible to foresee which ‘species’ of ‘plates’ are possible […]. It can always be the case that a qualitative variable is overlooked which is independent of the ones already listed” (Ingarden, 1925, 224). • Exact ideas. These are those ideas whose content includes an essential connection between its own elements. More precisely, the content of an exact idea includes “the concretization of an essentiality” so that the overall system of ­constants and variables is also determined (Ingarden, 1925, 225). We are no longer confronted with a “conglomerate,” i.e., the result of an empirical synthesis; what we have here is “a peculiar qualitative unity” (eine eigene qualitative Einheit). The example is the general idea “the square.” In contrast with inexact ideas, the exact idea’s content including the concretization of an essentiality results in the fact that, “Among the constants there obtains a particular group of constants in which there is a finite number of mutually independent constants that are intimately connected with one another (in a way that depends upon the idea).” Such group of constants is “equivalent” to the concretization of the essentiality in the idea’s content. As we will soon see, this group of constants is what is expressed by the “predicate” in the judgments of the Σ-type (see §3 above) (Ingarden, 1925, 228–229). • Simple ideas. These are ideas the ideal content of which includes the concretization of an essentiality, yet no corresponding system of properties (Ingarden, 1925, 230–231). The few examples offered are of geometrical nature: point, line and surface (Ingarden, 1925, 230). What follows from this is that according to Ingarden, only the content of exact and inexact ideas can be spelled out by judgments of the Σ-type; for in the case of simple ideas there is no “content” (in the sense of a “system of properties”) that could correspond to the “a, b, c…” However, as the content of exact ideas differs from the content of inexact ideas in that the latter does not contain any concretization of essentialities,5 the difference between the manners in which the two contents are respectively expressed by judgments of the Σ-type cannot be ignored. In fact, in the case of inexact ideas, the number of properties occupying the predicate-position (“a, b, c…”) will be indefinite. If by contrast the judgment spells out the content of an exact idea, the system of properties “a, b, c…” can be directly derived from or determined based on the essentiality concretized in the very content. In this case there is an “equivalence” between the system of properties and the essentiality itself. Let us go back for a second to the “square”-example quoted above: The square is a parallelogram with four equal sides and four right angles

 On these distinctions, see also the detailed analyses proposed by Seifert, 1996, 235–251; and the diagram partially charting these differences in Ferrari, 2001, 64. 5

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“The square is a parallelogram with four equal sides and four right angles” “X

is

Y

with the properties a, b, c…”

Equivalence Concretization of the Essentiality

System of Properties

“Squareness” (Quadratheit)

Fig. 2.1  Ingarden’s Judgment of Essence

Since what is being spelled out in this case is the structured content of an “exact idea” (the idea: Das Quadrat), Ingarden would illustrate it as follows (see also De Santis, 2015, 176 and ff.) (Fig. 2.1): The square is a parallelogram with four equal sides and four right angles

An object whose corresponding “idea” contains the concretization of the essentiality “squareness” will necessarily display a specific and a priori determinable system of properties; in this case: “four equal sides and four right angles” (the latter being equivalent to the former). This is the reason why Ingarden can write that, “the content of the idea is something unitary” (Ingarden, 1925, 229). On the contrary, in the case of the inexact idea “plate” there is no “essentiality” concretized in it; hence, no system of properties can be a priori pinpointed based upon its content. A “plate” can be squarish, roundish and so on; it can have four sides, five or even more (and none of this could be established a priori, prior to our empirical experience of individual plates). This is also the reason why also the relation between “constitutive nature” and “ποῖον” is different in the two cases: Während also bei den Exemplaren der unexakten Ideen die Scheidung zwischen der konstitutiven Natur […] und dem ποῖον […] nur durch formale Rucksichten motiviert wurde […], ist diese Unterscheidung bei den exakten Ideen (bzw. bei den unter sie fallenden individuellen Gegenständen) sowohl durch den Unterschied zwischen den in Frage kommenden Formen, wie auch zwischen dem qualitativen Moment der unmittelbaren Morphe und den qualitativen Momenten der qualitativen Konstanten und Veränderlichen des Ideengehaltes motiviert (Ingarden, 1925, 228).

Although the passage is written in a quite abstruse language, we can try to make sense of it in the following manner. Let us take, once again, the case of the inexact idea “plate” (in contrast with that of the “square in general”). Although formally speaking one can still make the distinction between what the plate is (τι) and how it is (ποῖον)—the τι cannot be regarded as something qualitatively distinct from the ποῖον, i.e., from the many different properties which we can come to empirically ascertain in our experience of individual plates. The τι is somehow the retrospective result of the many experiences of the ποῖον: the “plate” in general does not exist, it is nothing else than the many different hows of the many different plates which we have empirically encountered up to this present moment. When it comes to exact

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ideas such as the “square in general,” the equivalence between the τι (= as the result of the concretization of an essentiality) and the properties (ποῖον) does not rule out the former being qualitatively distinct from the latter: for the equivalence notwithstanding, the system of properties (ποῖον) is always to be regarded as “derived” from the constitutive nature (τι). One more aspect concerning the judgments of the Σ-type must be mentioned. In particular, what is in need of a quick clarification is the relation between the “X” and the “Y” (in our example, the relation between “square” and “parallelogram”). Since we have already discussed above the distinction between particular and general ideas, it should be easy to understand that what the “Y” stands for is the more general idea (e.g., parallelogram) under which the idea designated by the “X” falls. The essentiality concretized (“squareness”) in the content of “X” (“the square…”) particularizes the content of a more general idea (“parallelogram”), thereby determining a relevant system of (constant and variable) properties (“…with four equal sides and four right angles”).

6. Let us now come back to the “determination judgment” and its relation to the Σ-judgments. As we saw (§3), a determination question (What is this?) is a question, the correct answer to which is a “determination judgment,” that is, a judgment expressing the identity of the individual object and its “individual and constitutive nature” (Pfänder’s “material unity between the object and its ‘what’”). For example, the answer to the determination question What is this? could sound: This is a plate or This is a square. If we want to know now what the individual and constitutive nature is, a new question is required, the question: What is X? As we know, the answer now is: X is Y with the properties a, b, c…

Ingarden refers to the Σ-judgments as “judgments of essence” (Wesensurteile). By spelling out the content of an idea, not only do they express the elements making up the “constitutive nature” of the original object (its τι); they do also express the elements that determine the essence of the object (das Wesen des Gegenstandes), the unity between the nature of the object (τι) and a relevant system of properties (its ποῖον): “What belongs to the essence of the object is both the nature (τι) […] and the totality of the properties (Eigenschaften) (ποῖον εἶναι). The knowledge of the essence of an object must hence embrace the former as well as the latter” (Ingarden, 1925, 193). In so arguing, Ingarden is in a position to both complete Pfänder’s discourse and provide a further distinction, within the concept of essence, which is nowhere to be

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found in Jean Hering’s booklet of 1921.6 As for the former, Ingarden is able to clarify the relation between the material unity posited by attribution judgments (= the unity of the object with its essential properties) and the “material unity” posited by determination judgments (= the unity of the object and its essence). The unity between the two unities is immediately expressed by the Σ-judgments, and it is ontologically made possible by the derivation-relation between the system of properties (ποῖον εἶναι) and the τι within the idea’s own content. Of course, this requires a sharp distinction between two conceptions of the object’s essence. For if by “essence,” we mean the sum-total of the object’s properties (which is what Hering says at the outset of his essay; see Hering, 1921, 496), then every individual object has an essence (no matter the kind of idea which it individually exemplifies). Yet, a narrower, stricter concept of essence can be introduced: “By ‘essence’ we mean the individual and constitutive nature of the object, including all its properties, the immediate morphai of which […] are concretizations of essentialities that belong to the domain of essentialities and which are equivalent to the nature of the object (die zu dem der Natur des Gegenstandes äquivalenten Bereich von Wesenheiten gehören)” (Ingarden, 1925, 250). In this case, only certain individual objects have an essence—only those individual objects that exemplify “exact ideas,” “ideas” whose content includes the concretization of an essentiality and from which a specific and determined system of properties can be derived “a priori” (i.e., by looking at the content of the idea itself). According to the first meaning, also the many individual plates of our experience have an essence (they all have a ποῖον to be empirically ascertained); yet, according to the second, strict sense of the essence, plates do not have a Wesen because they do not individually exemplify the content of an exact idea. Thus, in their case the material unity between the τι and the ποῖον cannot be fixed and investigated by just looking at the content of the corresponding idea (there is no ontology of plates). Hence, the very expression Wesensurteil displays two different meanings, depending upon the nature of the idea whose content is being spelled out. Only in the case of “exact ideas,” in fact, can one speak of essential judgments or judgments of essence in the strict sense of the term; for only in this case does the state of affairs posited by the judgment (to speak à la Pfänder) express an a priori connection.7

7. Before we move back to Heidegger and his distinction between two different modes of primary interrogation, a few, final general remarks can be made about Ingarden’s doctrine of ideas. In a footnote to her Finite and Eternal Being Edith Stein presents

 Hering will recognize the distinction which we are about to mention in his essay on phenomenology of religion (see Hering, 1926, 111–112). On this point, see also De Santis, 2014, 36 and ff. 7  On Ingarden’s theory on knowledge, see Chrudzimski, 1999, Chapters 4 and 5. 6

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with the following words the relation between Ingarden’s Questions and Hering’s Remarks on the Essence, Essentiality and the Idea: “Hering’s study is the more fundamental of the two. Ingarden follows Hering in his discussion of essence and essentiality, but in his elaboration of the doctrine of ideas (which is only sketchily treated by Hering) he proceeds independently” (Stein, 1962, 62; 2002, 558). From a letter from Stein to Ingarden from December 13, 1925, we know that while Hans Lipps thought that Essential Questions “just did not go beyond Hering’s [work],”8 Hering himself “contested that, and, after all, he is in the best position to know” (Stein, 2015, 168–169; 2014, 231). From a still unpublished letter by Ingarden to Hering, it is clear that the latter must have regarded the Essential Questions as a “progress” (Fortschritt) with respect to his 1921 essay (Ingarden, 1926, 1).9 In Ingarden’s words, the fundamental difference seems to consist in the fact that, “The concept of the idea’s content does not appear in Hering” (Ingarden, 1925, 179, footnote). This is true, to the extent that the expression Gehalt der Idee, content of the idea, is nowhere to be found in Hering’s booklet of 1921. However, as Hering himself recognizes that the “idea” is the “place” (Stelle) in which “the eidos concretizes itself in a morphè” (Hering, 1921, 528; 2021, 85), it would be better to maintain, we believe, that Ingarden’s notion of “the idea’s content” is a further elaboration and systematization of some of Hering’s own insights. What for sure represents an element of novelty with respect to Hering is the distinction between “variable” and “constant elements,” on the basis of which the relation between more and less general ideas receives a robust formal-ontological legitimization. If Ingarden can systematically point out that, among the many variable elements contained in the content, there are also the object’s modus existentiae and momentum individuationis, Hering had already written in passing that in “the entire configuration” (gesamte Konfiguration) of the idea (of a material thing) is included “the hic et nunc-moment” (Hering, 1921, 530; 2021, 88; see our Volume 1, Chap. 2, §5). Last but not least, in his essay of 1929 on idealism and realism, Ingarden will remark that, “By [ontology] I mean every a priori investigation of the content of the ideas that belong to a domain united by means of a regional idea. Under ontology in this sense there falls also the phenomenology of pure consciousness, which […] in fact represents a determined region of being (Seins-region)” (Ingarden, 1929, 162). Ontology is the a priori investigation of a region to the extent that it “unites,” within itself or under itself, a multiplicity of other ideas (and relevant contents). In his 1921 booklet, Hering had already spoken of “regional ideas” (Hering, 1921, 533; 2021, 91–92) as “embracing” (umfassende) other ideas (Hering, 1921, 531; 2021, 89–90). This is why he will use the term idéologue (Hering, 1926, 112) to refer to the  To which Lipps himself had already critically referred in his book of 1927; see Lipps, 1976, 16–17.  “Ich bin Ihnen für diesen Brief sehr dankbar. Für den Brief, weil ich aus ihm Ihre Meinung über meine Essentiale Fragen und über meinen Habilitationsvortrag kennengelernt haben (und was die Essentialen Fragen betrifft, war gerade Ihre Meinung für mich von besonderem Interesse, da ich ja doch Probleme behandelte, an denen sie schon vor mir gearbeitet haben, und da sie unter den Phaenomenologen vielleicht der einzigen sind, der meine Behauptungen auf Grund des früher Geschauten kontrollieren konnte” (Ingarden, 1926, 1). 8 9

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“eidetic scientist” in the Husserlian sense (the ontologist, as Ingarden would rather say). The latter is an ideo-logist in the quite peculiar sense of dealing neither with individual essences nor with essentialities per se taken; rather, he or she deals exclusively with ideas and the many essentialities realized in them.10

8. As we have already seen, in his lectures The Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger will write that, “the being that we ourselves are, the Dasein, cannot at all be interrogated as such by the question: What is this (Was ist das)?” (Heidegger, 1997, 169; 1988, 119). Dasein cannot be primarily interrogated by means of what Ingarden, following Pfänder, had called “determination question”; for since Dasein has no Sachheit or οὐσία, its being cannot be fixed by a judgment pointing its essence as the material unity (sachliche Einheit) of its τι (individual, constitutive nature) and a corresponding system of properties (= its ποῖον εἶναι). Having no τι, Dasein cannot be said to be exemplifying a particular idea; hence, no ontology of Dasein is possible if by ontology we mean the a priori sciences of “regional ideas” delimiting a multiplicity of “regions of being.” “Dasein” does not circumscribe a region of being. Now, if our analyses thus far are on the right track, then the ontological framework exemplified by the Essential Questions could be regarded as the actual critical or polemical source, as it were, of the remarks made by Heidegger at the beginning of §9 of Being and Time. Which should thus be deemed a most direct criticism of the attempt at grounding every ontological investigation, then also the ontological investigation of what we ourselves are, upon “determination questions” (= the correct answers to which are always “determination judgments”). Although we have already hinted at Heidegger’s statements from §9 (Volume 1, Chap. 2), it might be a good idea to recall the text one more time, as we can now use the outcomes of this chapter as a reference point. The “essence” (Wesen) of this entity lies in its to be. The being-what (Was-sein) (essentia) of this entity must be understood in terms of its being (existentia) insofar as one can speak of it all. Here the ontological task is precisely to show that when we choose the word existence for the being of this entity, this term does not and cannot have the ontological meaning of the traditional expression of existentia. According to the tradition, existentia ontologically means being-present, a kind of being (Seinsart) which is essentially (wesesmäßig) inappropriate to characterize the entity which has the character of Dasein (Heidegger, 1967, 42; 2010, 41).

Dasein has an “essence” in the sense of a Wesen (which is the term that not only Husserl, but also Hering and Ingarden use to refer to the essence of an individual object). And we know that Dasein is always “mine.” Yet, as Heidegger immediately  This is why Arnold Metzger and Herbert Spiegelberg will propose to drop altogether the notion of essentiality and focus only on ideas (see Metzger, 1925, 665; Spiegelberg, 1930, 229). 10

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hastens to add, “The characteristics to be found in this entity are thus not present ‘properties’ (Eigenschaften)” (Heidegger, 1967, 42; 2010, 41). The language mobilized by Heidegger is the same used by both Hering and Ingarden. If in 1925 Ingarden can affirm that, “What belongs to the essence of the object is both the (τι) […] and the totality of the properties (ποῖον εἶναι)” (Ingarden, 1925, 193); Hering had already used in 1921 the expression Washeit, “whatness,” the presence of which (Vorhandensein) determines the what of the object (e.g., its “being-horse” or Pferdsein) (Hering, 1921, 509; 2021, 68–69). Heidegger is at once using the very same terminology and transforming it thoroughly. Dasein has a Was-sein; yet such “being-what” is not to be construed in the sense of an essentia as the ideal correlate of the “content” of an idea. Rather, its Was-sein is its own “being” (Sein). By the same token, he concedes that Dasein has a Sosein or “being-thus” (Hering’s ποῖον εἶναι).11 Yet, its Sosein does not consist in a series of “present ‘properties’ (Eigenschaften)” (this concept is central to Ingarden’s text). Rather, Dasein’s Sosein is “primarily being” (Alles So-sein dieses Seienden ist primär Sein), “possible ways for it to be” (Heidegger, 1967, 42; 2010, 41). Just as for both Hering and Ingarden the essence (Wesen) in the broad sense includes “both the nature (τι) […] and the totality of the properties” (ποῖον εἶναι), so can also Heidegger affirm that Dasein’s Wesen includes both the being-what (Was-sein) and the being-thus (Sosein): it is the unity of Existenz (which replaces the τι-determination) and mögliche Weisen zu sein (replacing the ποῖον-determinations). Heidegger is not only transforming radically the ontological toolbox meticulously forged by Hering and Ingarden (thereby however confirming its adoption); he is harshly dismissing the very possibility of “interrogating” the mode of being of the entity which we ourselves are (i.e., Dasein) by means of the categorial apparatus: “Existentials and categories are the two fundamental possibilities of the characteristics of being. […] Entities are either a who (existence) or else a what” (Heidegger, 1967, 45; 2010, 44). Dasein is not a τόδε τι (Hering, 1921, 532; 2021, 90), of which one can prima facie predicate a τι and a series of properties. Dasein is not in the same mode (Weise) in which a rose is red; Dasein is always mine and “we must always use the personal pronoun along with whatever we say: ‘I am,’ ‘You are’” (Heidegger, 1967, 42; 2010, 42). The “modal” concept of the essence first sketched by Hering in his booklet of 1921, according to which a rose is red and soft in the sense that it (= the rose) is in the mode of being-red and being-soft (So-sein), is radicalized by Heidegger in such a way

 The expression is also employed, for example, by Reinach in his course of 1913 Introduction to Philosophy (Reinach, 1989, 438) as well as in the 1914 lecture About Phenomenology (Reinach, 1989, 532). But the fact that his notes on Hering’s concept of essence (Reinach, 1989, 382) were taken during the WS of 1912/1913 (see Reinach, 1989, 733) corroborates our hypothesis about Hering being the first to systematically use it to mean the individual essence. 11

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that the talk of properties (Eigenschaften) is abandoned once and for all.12 Of course, as we know from our analyses in the previous chapter, Heidegger’s own discourse does not rule out the possibility of interrogating the entity which we ourselves are by means of a determination question (= determination judgment) and a judgment of essence. Quite the opposite. What is required to this end, however, is the existential modification of our understanding of our own mode of being, which needs to be first “thematized,” thereby becoming part of the “region” of what is objectively present. Only at this point can Dasein be ascribed a material τι and a series of properties based on the ontological region to which it belongs (“philosophical anthropology”). What Heidegger is rejecting is not Hering’s theory of essences or Ingarden’s ontological discourse per se taken; rather, he is questioning the thesis that the primary interrogation of the entity—which we ourselves are— and of its peculiar mode of being can take as a point of departure a determination question. This being recognized, a further, crucial question emerges. Since Hering’s and Ingarden’s leading examples are usually a red rose and a white horse, an ink bottle on the desk and a triangle in general, the question can be asked whether they ever address the ontological (essential) constitution of a person. In other words, do they apply to persons the same “categorial-ontological” apparatus systematically used to account for the structure and the essence of, say, geometrical shapes?

9. In Ingarden’s case, there is only one passage in which the notion of “person” is referred to. This happens over the course of §7, the one dedicated to a preliminary assessment of the question, What is this? (Ingarden, 1925, 147–155). It is here that the notion of an “individual constitutive nature” is first presented. Ingarden speaks of the object’s τι to “designate” “an individual moment which at the same time plays a structuring and constitutive role.” Then the following remark is added, whose the goal is to elucidate the meaning of such individuality:  It is worth pointing out that Hering uses more often the term “traits” (Züge) to refer to the many elements making up the essence of an individual object, and the expression “property” (Eigenschaft) appears rarely and only towards the end of the essay (Hering, 1921 527). “Property” as Eigenschaft is on the contrary massively employed by Ingarden in his Essential Questions: we are under the impression that Hering’s modal conception, only sketched and never really elaborated upon by his author, is superseded in the work of the Polish phenomenologist by a more traditional view that tends to construe of the essence as a set of properties which the object itself “has.” The situation is slightly different if we look at Ingarden 1935. Here, in fact, Ingarden recognizes that “it belongs to the essence of the object to exist in a certain mode (eine bestimmte Weise),” just as it belongs to the object’s traits (Merkmale) to be in a certain manner (Seinsweise). Hence, the problem arises that consists in clarifying the relation between these two essentially different, yet inseparable “modes of being” (Ingarden, 1935, 52–53; 65 and ff.). However, the idea of the object having (Jeder Gegenstand “hat” Eigenschaften) properties seems to still guide most of Ingarden’s analyses of the formal structure of the individual object (see for example the beginning of §12 in Ingarden, 1935, 54 and ff.). 12

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2  Dasein, Determination Judgments and the Essence Die Rede von der individuellen Natur des Gegenstades darf aber nicht so verstanden werden, also ob es zwei oder mehrere Gegenstände von gleicher individueller Natur nicht geben konnte. Im Gegenteil. Wenn wir in der Natur des Gegenstandes die individuelle Seinsform (das Individualmoment), die bei jedem individuellen Gegenstand fur einen und für einen Gegenstand charakteristisch ist, von dem in dieser Form enthaltenen Qualitätsmoment unterscheiden, so können wir sagen, daß, ganz allgemeinen genommen, das Qualitätsmoment der Natur des Gegenstandes die individuelle Seinsform gar nicht nach sich ziehen muß, obwohl es dies in manchen Fällen, z. B. bei jeder Person (Ingarden, 1925, 151).

Unfortunately, Ingarden does not elaborate on the implications of his discourse. All we know is that in the case of certain individual objects, e.g., in the case of persons, the individual ontological form (the individual moment, or the moment determining the individuality of the object’s nature) cannot be “distinguished” from the qualitative moment. Every single object has its individual form (which however does not rule out the sameness of the “individual nature”). Yet, if in the case of individual objects other than persons the individual ontological form can be distinguished from the qualitative moment, this is not the case when it comes to persons. Here, the τι (= the individual and constitutive nature) does not tolerate any distinction between the qualitative moment and what makes such a moment individual, thereby belonging to just this one individual object (meaning person). The individual form, that is, its individuality, would be itself part of the qualitative moment. But if this is the case, how can we keep speaking of the same individual nature (which would characterize and determine all persons, regardless of their individuality)? Would the un-distinguishability, within the person’s τι, of individual form and qualitative moment imply a form of radical individuality and individualization of the individual and constitutive nature? None of these questions is answered by Ingarden because none of them is actually tackled by him in Essential Questions. It is not apparent whether the assessment of the ontological constitution of persons would imply a re-elaboration and transformation of the ontological toolbox employed in the essay. Based upon his few, and vague remarks, the impression the reader is under is that besides the complications which would be imposed by the “un-distinguishability”thesis, the notion of essence and that of an individual and constitutive nature, as well as the analyses of the τι, would all still hold true. Far more interesting is Hering’s position in the 1921 booklet, notably, the first chapter on the notion of “individual essence” (Wesen). Here a concept is introduced that will have a great impact upon the history of early phenomenology: the “essential core” or “core of the essence.” In these opening and seminal pages of the article the concept of individual essence is introduced by Hering understood as the sum-total of the object’s “characteristics” (Merkmale) or traits; as he in fact succinctly presents it: “The single features of being-so (ποῖον εἶναι) are features of its essence” (Hering, 1921, 496; 2021, 55). The essence is only and always the essence of this object, and every object has its (individual) essence, “which makes up the fullness of its constituting specificity” (Hering, 2021, 497; 2021, 57). It is upon the basis of this radical conception of the essence that Ingarden will be able to speak, more systematically, of an “individual

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ontological form” proper to every essence. After he explains that the concept of essence includes neither the (“Aristotelian”-sounding) ποῦ and πότε εἶναι nor the ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (see the explanation in Hering, 1921, 499; 2021, 58–59), Hering introduces a most crucial differentiation within the concept of essence. Certain essences, he claims, have a more or less simple core (Kern or Wesenskern) of fundamental traits (Kern von Grundzügen) that brings about the essence as an interconnected, unitary whole (Hering, 1921, 502; 2021, 61–62). For instance, “The description of the character of an historical personality (historischen Persönlichkeit) always leaves us unsatisfied, even when it results in a detailed enumeration of the single characteristics of the essence” (Hering, 1921, 502; 2021, 62). It is as though the mere, albeit complete, enumeration of the ποῖον εἶναι were not able to make the essence understandable. Such understanding can be attained only if “the result of our description” will be “a more or less simple core of fundamental traits” the presence of which makes “understandable that of the remaining fibers of the essence according to a priori laws that can guide us in a clearly intuitive manner or more instinctively” (Hering, 1921, 502–503; 2021, 61–62). Yhe talk of historical personalities, which is further confirmed later on by Hering speaking of “the complex essence of Julius Caesar” (Hering, 1921, 503; 2021, 63), suggests that by the concept of “essential core” Hering would be meaning a specific ontological peculiarity proper to the essence of persons alone. The impression is strengthened by what he writes on the last page of the first chapter. Here the talk is about the possible “alterability” or “variability” of the essence itself: There are of course also partial alterations, whereby, under given circumstances, what we tried to indicate with our reference to the core is what remains unaltered. Perhaps cases of people’s so-called “character changes” afford examples for this, where the changes can be quite drastic without nonetheless touching, as we put it, their innermost essence (ihr innerstes Wesen zu tangieren) (Hering, 1921, 505; 2021, 64).

If this were the case, then one could actually claim that a crucial distinction within the realm of the essence obtains, one which would discriminate ontologically between the essence of “persons” and the essence of non-person kind of objects. The former would be characterized by a kernel, a core or Wesenskern which would on the contrary be lacking in the latter’s case. At least formally speaking, the essence of a person would display a “unitary” character (to be further investigated) that is nowhere to be found in the case of non-personal essences, as it were. Unfortunately, upon closer examination the situation turns out to be far different from what we hoped for. In fact, “Caesar” is not the only example made by Hering to elucidate the case of essences with a core: “By the same token,” Hering points out after the introduction of the concept of core, “among the many predicables which belong to the essence of a geometrical figure, we feel the need to single out a limited number [of them] which constitute its fundamental essence (Grundwesen), and from the presence of which the others can be obtained intuitively” (Hering, 1921, 503; 2021, 63). During the second half of §5, “the essence of a conic section” (eines Kugelschnittes) is mentioned together with Caesar as an example of essences with a

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core (Hering, 1921, 503; 2021, 62). Both persons and geometrical figures display the same formal-ontological structure; for the presence of an essential core is present  (or may be present) in both. Of course, this does not imply that persons and geometrical figures, namely their essence, would not differ in some other respect. Since Hering’s essay is exclusively interested in formal ontological issues, however (in the general structure of individual essences and their relations to ideas), the ontological investigation of the specifically “material” region to which persons belong does not fall within its horizon. Hence, as already was the case with our remarks above on Ingarden, it is somewhat pointless to expect him to actually tackle the issue. Nevertheless, what one could call Heidegger’s “suspicion” about the possibility of accounting, even if only formally, for the essence of “persons,” namely “the entity which we ourselves are,” by means of exactly the same ontological and categorial apparatus used to account for non-Dasein kind of entities (essence, ποῖον εἶναι, characteristics, essential core, and so on and so forth) is confirmed. From the standpoint of §9 of Being and Time, Hering’s booklet of 1921 and Ingarden’s Essential Questions of 1925 epitomize the (misleading) attempt at determining the essence of what we are in a way that is “wesesmäßig inappropriate” to our own mode of being. “Persons,” just like “geometrical shapes,” would have a τι and a series of “properties” (ποῖον εἶναι) making up their essences; just like the essence of geometrical shapes (or at least of some of them), theirs too would correspond to the ideal content of “ideas” of lower and higher generality. Just like the ideas of geometrical shapes, also the ideas corresponding to the essence of persons would be thereby united by a highest (regional) idea. Although the first, public appearance of the “essential core” could be dated to the year 1916 (Max Scheler speaks of Wesenkern of the human being in his Formalismus (Scheler, 1921, 299)), it is Hering who quite likely coined it for the first time. For Hering already uses the concept of core of the essence or essential core in the dissertation version of the Bemerkungen (see Hering, 1914, 166 and ff.), composed between 1913 and 1914. And it is from reading Hering’s dissertation (see Stein, 2015, 37; 2014, 34) that, quite likely, also Edith Stein decided to start adopting it already in her early work on the phenomenology of empathy. Here she speaks of Wesenskern to refer to “a peculiar layer of the personality,” a very “deep layer” (Stein, 2016, 126). The Kern der Person designates the layer of one’s personality in which our spiritual acts are rooted and out of which they develop (see also our remarks in Volume 1, Chap. 3, §7). The “core” is also employed by Stein as a synonym for personal structure (die personale Struktur) (see Stein, 2016, 128), whose role is that of establishing the limits of the possible variations that one’s personality can undergo: But this variability is not without limits; we encounter limits here. Not only because the categorial structure of the psyche as such must be retained, but also because within its individual form we find an unalterable core: the personal structure. I can think of Caesar in a village instead of in Rome and can think of him transferred into the twentieth century. As it is certain that his historically fixed individuality would undergo some changes (Änderungen), so it is also sure that he would remain Caesar (Stein, 2016, 127–128).

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Our goal here is not to discuss Stein’s stance on the ontology of persons as spiritual subjects.13 The point for us is rather to acknowledge that the concept of “essential core” seems to have represented in the early phenomenological tradition the key-­ term (or one of the key-terms) on which the account of the ontology of persons hinges (see Sepp, 2017). It was probably first introduced by Hering in 1913–14 to account for the peculiarity of certain essences that would also include the essence of persons; Scheler employs it in 1916 to refer, as it seems, exclusively to the essence of human beings (see also Scheler, 1913, 68, where he speaks of Kern der Person). Finally, in Stein the conception of the essential core will grow in importance over time, to the point where it separates the essence of persons from all non-­ personal entities. The “core” ends up designating the essential center (Stein, 2010, 166–167) of our spiritual life out of which our personality unfolds and grows (Stein, 2016, 129): “The human personality, taken as a whole, presents itself as the unity of a qualitative specificity which shapes itself out of a core, a formation-root (Stein, 2010, 199).14 That Heidegger was quite likely familiar with the concepts of “core” and “essential core,” and with the phenomenological attempts at basing thereupon the account of the essence of persons (in the first place, by Scheler and Stein), is shown by a remark from the end of §25 of Being and Time: But if the self is conceived “only” as a mode of being of this entity [Dasein], then that seems tantamount to volatizing the authentic “core” of Dasein (des eingentlichen “Kernes” des Daseins). But such fears are nourished by the distorted presumption that the entity in question really has, at bottom, the kind of being of something objectively present, even if one avoids attributing to it the solidifying element of a corporeal thing. However, the “substance” of human being is not spirit as the synthesis of body and soul; it is rather existence (Heidegger, 1967, 117; 2010, 114).

Only by assuming that Dasein has the same mode of being of “the ‘region’ of what is objectively present” can one attribute to it a τι and a “qualitative specificity” (Stein’s term), hence also a “core” characterizing his or her own “innermost essence.” And it is only by assuming that Dasein’s essence consists of layers, at the bottom of which there is a core, that one can fear that by determining its essence in terms of existence and possible ways to be such purported core is volatized. But Dasein is not the individualization of the content of a particular idea; it cannot be primarily interrogated by means of a “determination question” because it does not have a τι nor a ποῖον εἶναι. Dasein is not to be primarily accounted for by pointing at a qualitative specificity and an individual ontological form. Heidegger’s rejection of the thesis that Dasein would designate a region of being goes hand in hand with the refusal of the core-thesis; the latter inevitably vanishes as soon as we renounce the concept of essence as it was first proposed by Hering, and further developed by  For a systematic discussion, see for example Borden Sharkey, 2010; Betschart, 2010.  Conrad-Martius had already spoken of Zentrum and Bildungswurzel of one’s own personality (Conrad-Martius, 1917, 31 and 55) in a text to which Stein will constantly refer in her works. What they intend to develop, albeit in different ways (Ales Bello, 1992, 2003; Miron, 2021, Part II), is a “centered,” and yet “dynamic” conception of the person. 13

14

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Ingarden and Stein. The core vanishes, Heidegger would specify, because it was never (originally) there.15 Having recognised this, the time is now ripe to turn to Husserl. Exit Heidegger. CODA.1—Remarks on Agamben’s Remark on Heidegger In his The Use of the Bodies (Chap. 4, Towards a Modal Ontology), Giorgio Agamben brings his reasoning to conclusion by making a quick remark on Heidegger and Dasein. After a long archeological investigation of the concept of “mode” and “the mode/being relationship” (Scotus, Suarez, Giles of Viterbo, Leibniz, Spinoza), at the very center of which is the problem of how to think and conceive of a “singularity,” the Italian philosopher summons the thinker from Meßkirch (in §3.27). Here is the text in question. Only at this point does a confrontation with Heideggerian ontology become possible. If the difference between essence and existence becomes a crucial problem in Being and Time, in the sense that “the essence of Dasein lies in its existence” […], the characteristics of this entity are not, however, to be conceived according to the model of traditional ontology as “properties” or accidents of an essence but “always and only as possible modes (Weisen) of being.” Therefore, “when we designate this entity with the term “Dasein,” we are expressing not its “what” (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its being” (ibid.). Heidegger emphatically emphasizes that the concept of existence that is in question here is not that of traditional ontology, which is founded on the clear distinction of essence and existence. The reference to the “modes of being” and the specification “every being-thus (Sosein) of this entity is primarily being” (ibid.) should have made us understand that the ontology of Dasein, even if Heidegger does not pronounce it explicitly, is a radical form of modal ontology, even if not a clearly thematized one […]. Dasein is not an essence that, as in Scotus and the scholastics, is indifferent to its modifications: it is always and only its mode of being, which is to say, it is always radically mode (paraphrasing the Scholastic motto according to which “horseness is only horseness,” Dasein is mode and nothing more). Dasein is the mode of a being that coincides completely with mode (Agamben, 2015, 226–227; 2016, 174–175).

Agamben is right in proposing to read the fundamental ontology of Being and Time, notably Dasein’s own essence, modally. Two aspects however must be distinguished, which on the contrary Agamben seems to tend to merge. On the one hand, there is Heidegger’s transformation of the essence/existence articulation, which expresses itself in the motto: “the essence of Dasein lies in its existence.” On the other hand, there is Heidegger’s decision to resort to the technical turn of phrase So-Sein to designate the new essence/existence articulation. Per se taken, however, the expression So-Sein means the re-elaboration of the notion of essence as Wesen. Indeed, So-Sein is the phrase introduced by Hering to propose a modal conception  It is noteworthy that in his habilitation of 1928 written under Heidegger, Karl Löwith seems to combine both his master’s existential jargon with Husserl’s ontology. For example, Löwith speaks of the “human individuum” as “an individuum in the mode of being of ‘person’” (Löwith, 2016, 85). A person is an “individuum” (Husserl) having a certain Seinsweise (Heidegger). It is also worth remarking that in a letter from August 1927, Löwith writes to Heidegger that his critical position vis-à-vis the analytics of Being and Time is similar (auf einem analogen Punkt) to the one adopted by the Münchener vis-à-vis Husserl’s constitutive phenomenology (Heidegger & Löwith, 2017, 140). 15

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of the individual essence, that is, a conception according to which there obtains a distinction between the object’s So-Sein (or ποῖον εἶναι) and its “So (ποῖον)” in the broadest sense (Hering, 1921, 496; 2021, 56): “For example, the brown color of this horse’s hair, which I can say is lighter than the brown color of the rider’s vestment, belongs to the ποῖον of this horse. The being-brown of the horse cannot be lighter than the being-brown of the vestment.” The system of properties of the object (p, q, r…) is one thing, but the object’s being-p, being-q and being-r is quite another. The “essence” as Wesen includes the former but consists in the latter alone: which means that for Hering too, the being-thus or so of an entity primarily consists in being (being-p, being-q and so on). Hering introduces the term “index” (Index) to refer to the fact that the essence cannot exist without its (individual) “bearer” (there cannot be any Wesen which is not always and already the Wesen von a): “And such index is always fully determined, just like the object to which it refers” (Hering, 1921, 498; 2021, 57–58). In this specific respect, the novelty of Heidegger’s gesture does not primarily consist in the modal determination of the Wesen (first accomplished by Hering, albeit only rudimentarily), as Agamben claims; rather, it consists in the re-­ elaboration of the essence/existence distinction proper to Dasein, and to which the above modal conception of the Wesen as So-Sein is applied.16 In sum, and to make our point even more explicit: if it is true that “Dasein is mode and nothing more” (Agamben, 2015, 227; 2016, 175), it is because the overall concept of Wesen had already been determined modally in terms of So-Sein. What Agamben argues about Heidegger and in opposition to Scotus (“Dasein is not an essence that, as in Scotus and the scholastics, is indifferent to its modifications”) perfectly matches Hering’s concept of the essence: the Wesen is not indifferent to its “modifications.” Quite the opposite is true. The essence is its own Wandlungen and Änderungen, the constant alterations and modifications of the So- of the -Sein of the object (Hering, 1921, 504–505; 2021, 63–65). Nonetheless, Hering distinguishes between “modifications of the thing” and “modifications in a thing.” In this case, for example, one could still speak of a “constitutive essential specificity” which does not change. The latter Agamben would still regard as corresponding to the traditional conception of the essence (Agamben, 2015, 155–178; 2016, 115–134). For sure, the very manner in which Hering describes the concept of individual essence and its relation to the bearer (Wesen von a) seems to still suggest a logical as well as ontological distinction between the essence itself (= Wesen von…) and its individual realization (= …von a) (for an analysis of all these difficulties, see De Santis, 2016). And such logical and ontological distinction openly contradicts the determination of the essence as So-Sein, namely, as the many “modes” (So-) of the object’s “being” (-Sein). Far from us is the intention of underplaying the novelty of what Heidegger states in §9 of Being and Time; the problem for us is to identify the specific background only against which the modal determination of the being of Dasein accomplished by  For a commentary on Being and Time, §9, and the notion of So-Sein, see Von Herrmann, 2005, 33–47. Unfortunately, the text entails no reference whatsoever to Hering as a possible source of Heidegger’s discourse. 16

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Heidegger was possible. The radical novelty of the affirmation “every being-thus of this entity is primarily being” does not derive in the first place from the Sosein (modal)-determination of Dasein’s Wesen; rather, it derives from its being nothing else but being understood as existence. To employ Agamben’s words, “Only at this point does a confrontation with Heideggerian ontology become possible.” Such a point, however, is not the one we ourselves find at after the long and epochal archeological journey proposed by Agamben. Rather, and more humbly, it  is that of a specific tradition to which Heidegger himself belongs (and whose ontology is worth being interrogated more seriously than Agamben has ever done17).

References Agamben, G. (2015). L’uso dei corpi (Homo Sacer IV, 2). Neri Pozza Editore. Agamben, G. (2016). The use of bodies. Stanford University Press. Ales Bello, A. (1992). Fenomenologia dell’essere umano. Lineamenti di una filosofia al femminile. Città Nuova Editrice. Ales Bello, A. (2003). L’universo nella coscienza. Introduzione alla fenomenologia di Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, Hedwig Conrad-Martius. ETS. Beck, M. (1928). Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Referat und Kritik). Philosophische Hefte, 1, 5–44. Betschart, C. (2010). “Kern der Person.” (Meta-)Phänomenologische Begründungen der menschlichen Person nach Edith Steins Frühwerk. In H.-B.  Gerl-Falkowitz, R.  Kaufamnn, & H.-R. Sepp (Hrsg.), Europa und seine Anderen. Emmanuel Levinas, Edith Stein, Jósef Tischner (pp. 61–72). Thelem. Borden Sharkey, S. (2010). Thine own self. Individuality in Edith Stein’s later writings. The Catholic University of American Press. Chrudzimski, A. (1999). Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Conrad-Martius, H. (1917). Von der Seele. Summa, II (pp. 106–136). De Santis, D. (2014). Di Idee ed essenze. Un dibattito su fenomenologia e ontologia (1921–1930), con saggi di Jean Hering, Roman Ingarden e Herbert Spiegelberg. Mimesis. De Santis, D. (2015). Wesen, Eidos, Idea. Remarks on the “Platonism” of Jean Hering and Roman Ingarden. Studia Phaenomenologica, XV, 155–180. De Santis, D. (2016). Jean Hering on Eidos, Gegenstand and Methexis. Phenomenological adventures and misadventures of “participation”. Discipline filosofiche, XXV, 145–170. De Santis, D. (ed.) (2023). Maximilian Beck e Martin Heidegger. Un’inedita disputa su Essere e tempo. Morcelliana. Ferrari, D. (2001). Consciousness in time. C. Winter. Heidegger, M. (1965). Kant and the problem of metaphysics. Indiana University Press.

 For example, were Agamben to deepen his knowledge of the early phenomenological tradition, he would find out that the modal interpretation of the “fundamental ontology” of Being and Time was already endorsed by Max Beck in the first critical review of the book (Beck, 1928). Beck’s criticism and dismissal of the “fundamental ontology” of Being and Time (whether consistent or not, we shall not decide) is explicitly directed against the reduction of the “material” plurality of the entities to Dasein’s own modes of being (see Beck, 1928, 17 and ff.). This is how we would also read the following remark by Mark Wrathall: “To understand is to be in a certain way, to embody a particular way of existing in the world” (Wrathall, 2013, 180). On Beck and Heidegger, see De Santis, (2023). 17

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Heidegger, M. (1967). Sein und Zeit (GA 2). Max Niemeyer. Heidegger, M. (1979). Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 20). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1985). History of the concept of time. Prolegomena. Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (1988). The basic problems of phenomenology. Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (1995). Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (GA 21). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1997). Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2010). Being and time. State University of New York Press. Heidegger, M. (2010a). Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (GA 3). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (2010b). Logic. The question of truth. Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M., & Löwith, K. (2017). Briefwechsel 1919–1973. Karl Alber Verlag. Hering, H. (1914). Lotzes Lehre vom Apriori. Eine philosophische Studie (Hering Archive, Fondation du Chapitre de Saint-Thomas, Strasbourg) (unpublished). Hering, J. (1921). Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 4, 495–543. Hering, J. (1926). Phénoménologie et philosophie religieuse. Alcan. Hering, J. (2021). Remarks concerning essence, ideal quality, and idea (Szylewicz, Trans. A.). Phenomenological Investigations, 1, 51–108. Husserl, E. (1968). Briefe an Roman Ingarden. M. Nijhoff. Ingarden, R. (1925). Essentiale Fragen. Ein Beitrag zum Wesensproblem. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 7, 125–304. Ingarden, R. (1926). Brief an Jean Hering (April 4). Hering Archive, Fondation du Chapitre de Saint-Thomas, in Strasbourg (Unpublished). Ingarden, R. (1929). Bemerkungen zum Problem “Idealismus-Realismus”. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. Ergänzungsband: Husserl-Festschrift (pp. 159–190). Max Niemeyer. Ingarden, R. (1935). Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes. Studia Philosophica, 1, 29–106. Lenoci, M. (2000). Logica, ontologia e fenomenologia in Alexander Pfänder. Discipline filosofiche, 673–700. Lipps, H. (1976). Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis (Werke I). Frankfurt a. M., Vittorio Klostermann. Löwith, K. (2016). Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen. Karl Alber Verlag. Metzger, A. (1925). Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 7, 613–770. Miron, R. (2021). Hedwig Conrad-Martius. The gateway to reality. Springer. Mulligan, K. (2014). Truth and truth-making principle in 1921. In E. J. Lowe & A. Rami (Eds.), Truth and truth-making (pp. 39–58). Routledge. Pfänder, A. (1963). Logik. Tübingen. Pfänder, A. (2009). Logic. Ontos Verlag. Reinach, A. (1989). Sämtliche Werke. Philosophia. Ryle, G. (1927). Review of R. Ingarden, Essentiale Fragen. Mind, 36, 366–370. Scheler, M. (1913). Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle. Verlag von Max Niemeyer. Scheler, M. (1921). Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Verlag von Max Niemeyer. Seifert, J. (1996). Sein und Wesen. C. Winter. Sepp, H.-R. (2017). Edith Stein’s conception of the person within the context of the phenomenological movement. In E. Magrì & D. Moran (Eds.), Empathy, sociality and personhood. Essays on Edith Stein’s phenomenological investigations (p. 48.62). Springer. Spiegelberg, H. (1930). Über das Wesen der Idee. Eine ontologische Untersuchung. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 11, 1–238. Stein, E. (1962). Endliches und ewiges Sein. Versuch eines Aufstieges zum Sinn des Seins. Herder. Stein, E. (2002). Finite and Eternal Being. ICS Publications.

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Stein, E. (2010). Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften. Herder. Stein, E. (2014). Letters to Roman Ingarden. ICS Publications. Stein, E. (2015). Briefe an Roman Ingarden (ESGA 4). Herder. Stein, E. (2016). Zum Problem der Einfühlung. Herder. Von Herrmann, F.-W. (2005). Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins. Ein Kommentar zu Sein und Zeit. Erster Abschnitt: Die vorbereitende Fundamentalanalyse des Daseins § 9–§ 27. V. Klostermann. Wrathall, M. (2013). Heidegger on Human Understanding. In M. Wrathall (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Heidegger’s being and time (pp. 177–200). Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 3

Husserl and the Regions of Beings

1. Enter Husserl. The history of the notion of region in (Husserl’s) phenomenology is one that has yet to be written (for two first attempts, see Majolino, 2015, Trizio, 2021, 65–67). According to Ursula Panzer, the first appearances of the region date to the ethics lectures from 1908–09 (see the introduction in Hua XXX, xxviii); here the term is introduced to designate the different objectual correlates of theoretical and axiological reason respectively (Husserl speaks of different regions of objectualities (Hua XXVIII, 283)). However, already by the time of the lectures of 1911 on The Basic Problems of Ethics and Value-Theory, the expression seems to have acquired the more technical meaning which it will systematically display in the first volume of Ideas. Here Husserl already speaks of “regions of being” (Seinsregionen) (Hua XXVIII, 197), of “categories of being” (Seinskategorien (−regionen)), and of relevant “regional ontologies” (Hua XXVIII, 199). But Husserl had spoken of “regions of knowledge” as early as the 1906–07 lectures on logic and theory of knowledge (Hua XXIV, 134). The seemingly factual-historiographical problem of to when the systematic appearance of the “region” dates is not without implications for our discourse in the present chapter. It is no coincidence, in fact, that the appearance of the concept of region immediately follows the emergence of the essence (Wesen) around 1905–06 as a concept distinct from the notion of species of the Logical Investigations (Husserl, 2002, 49; Husserl, 1984, 229; see De Santis, 2021a, b, 110–124 for a detailed reconstruction). In Ideas III, Husserl writes that, “The a priori in the sense of region is the source-point (Quellpunkt) of the ontologies” (Hua V, 36; Husserl, 1980, 32). Taken at face value, this passage states that it is not possible to speak of ontologies (in the plural) unless also the region (or “regions,” in the plural) is present; there cannot be any ontology without region. Only by seriously understanding what Husserl means by “region” and “region of being,” can one really get a grasp of how © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. De Santis, Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics, Contributions to Phenomenology 126, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39590-1_3

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he properly understands “ontology.” Historically speaking (but here the so-called historical and systematic points of view are intertwined), Husserl’s statement from Ideas III implies that prior to the appearance of the “region” one is not entitled to speak of “ontology,” notably “material ontology,” in his philosophy. If the region is the “source-point” of the ontologies, then there was no ontology before the former was actually discovered. An important consequence bearing upon the development of Husserl’s thought follows from this. Since it is only in the first volume of Ideas that a systematic presentation of the region is offered, a discrepancy will have to be recognized between the work of 1913 and the Logical Investigations. No matter how paradoxical the following statement may sound, the theory of ideal species offered in the book of 1900–01 should not be regarded as ontological. If the region is the source-point of ontologies, and if the doctrine of ideal species does not build on the notion of region, then it is fundamentally wrong to claim that the doctrine of parts and wholes of the Third Logical Investigation lays out the general coordinates for the (material) ontologies (hence, for every theory of the a priori). As we will try to show in the present chapter, the theory of regional ontologies is not to be regarded as a further development of the theory of ideal species; rather, the former represents a wider framework which includes the latter within itself. As it will turn out, the mereological apparatus forged by Husserl in the Third Logical Investigation cannot be resorted to in order to make sense of the possibility of regional ontologies.

2. Before we get into a most direct confrontation with the opening chapter of the first volume of Ideas, let us point out that between 1906 and 1913 the term essence as Wesen is quite often used by Husserl to refer to an array of different objectualities. By and large (we have already, albeit partially hinted at these distinctions in De Santis, 2021a, b, 114 and ff.), four main meanings can be identified. At the most basic level, Husserl speaks of Wesen to refer to what in Ideas he calls the what that is found “in the being that is proper to an individuum itself” (Hua III/1, 13; Husserl, 2014, 11). Now, since the technical definition of individuum is “A ‘this-­ here’ whose material essence (Wesen) is a concretum” (Hua III/1, 35; Husserl, 2014, 30), and since Husserl is very adamant on affirming that the essence in this first sense is what is given to “an experiential or individual intuition,” then this concept of essence designates a concrete essence as empirically present in an individuum hic et nunc (and hence given to an individual intuition). Better framed, it designates the “τι” (concrete essence) as a τόδε. For example, this material thing. We shall label this first concept of the essence, Essence.1. As early as 1909 Husserl speaks of “full essence” (das volle Wesen) (sometimes of Singularität) (Hua-Mat VII, 87–88 and ff.) to mean Essence.1 yet as freed from its individualization hic et nunc. Husserl will more technically call it “concretum” or concrete essence (Konkretum) (Hua III/1, 35; Husserl, 2014, 30): it is the

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sum-­total of the “eidetic singularities” that pertain to an individuum, yet in abstraction from its individualization and which can be repeated in a countless number of other individuals hic et nunc (Essence.1). Let us call this second concept of the essence, Essence.2. In the very same lectures from 1909 in which Husserl speaks of “full essence” also the expression “universal essence” (allgemeines Wesen) is used (Hua-Mat VII, 88). It designates the sum-total of the “species” (Arten) whose universals of the lowest level or eidetic singularities constitute the full essence (Essence.2). Or, in the words of Husserl: the sum-total of the universals of the lowest level (niedersten Allgemeinheiten) is what “ideally” makes up “the extent of the universal essence” (Hua-Mat VII, 88). In compliance with the previous two cases, let us refer to this as Essence.3. Finally, and to come now to the notion that will interest us the most in the following, Husserl talks also of “regional essence” (regionales Wesen) (Hua III/1, 23; Husserl, 2014, 20), whose “rigorous definition” sounds: “the unitary-essential connection of all the supreme genera that pertain to the ultimate differences within the concretum” (Hua III/1, 36; Husserl, 2014, 31) (there will be time later on to come back to this definition so as to comment on it). Let us call it, Essence.4.1 A diagram can be proposed to clarify all these differences (SpG  =  Supreme Genus; G  =  Genus; SP  =  Species; SS  =  Sub-Species; ES  =  Eidetic Singularity) (Fig. 3.1): Region (Essence.4)

Essence.3

SpG1

SpG2

SpG3

G1…n

G2… n

G3…n

S1…n

S1…n

S1…n

SS1…n

SS1…n

SS1…n

ES1…n

ES1…n

ES1…n

Individuum hic et nunc

Essence.2

Essence.1

Fig. 3.1  Husserl’s concepts of essence

 In light of these distinctions, one can appreciate (euphemistically) the naiveté of the claim: L’eidétique husserlienne repose en effet sur un équivalence entre essences et eide (Romano, 2019, 162). 1

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We will be constantly referring back to Fig. 3.1 over the course of our analyses, because it will help us to better frame the idea of regional ontology and more rigorously understand that of the object’s essence. However, before we move on, a few terminological remarks must be made. As early as 1909, Husserl recognizes that Essence.2 is not “scientifically determinable” (Hua-VII, 88); for the “differences” pertaining to the eidetic singularities cannot be “fixed” nor sufficiently discriminated. As Essence.1 is the result of the individualization of Essence.2,2 it follows that the first essence to be scientifically determinable is the so-called “universal essence” (Essence.3). More generally, in Ideas I—and all the semantic fluctuations notwithstanding—the ambiguities with which the term “essence” had been used by Husserl is partially resolved by a more fine-grained terminology. The expression “concretum” replaces “full essence” and “singularity” in order to systematically designate Essence.2; the term Wesensartung (Hua III/1, 13; Husserl, 2014, 11) is introduced to mean Essence.3 (the first scientifically determinable essence). The phrase “regional essence” (Essence.4) is referred to as Region sic et simpliciter.

3. In the opening pages of Ideas, Husserl gratifies the reader with two accounts of the concept of region. The first one is in §9, Each concrete empirical objectuality is arranged with its material essence under a supreme material genus, a “region” of empirical objects. To the pure regional essence there corresponds then a regional eidetic science or, as we might also say, a regional ontology. We thereby assume that the regional essence or, to put it better, the various genera composing it provide the ground for knowledge so rich in content and so highly ramified that, in regard to its systematic unfolding in general, it is worthwhile to speak of a science or, to put it better, of an entire complex of ontological disciplines, corresponding to the individual generic components of the region (Hua III/1, 23; Husserl, 2014, 20).

The region or regional essence is presented as a “supreme material genus” composed of various generic elements (= sub-genera). Such distinction allows Husserl to speak both of (ontological and eidetic) “science” (in the singular) and “disciplines” (in the plural): the former studies the highest genus or region (= regional ontology), the latter investigate “the individual generic components of the region” (= we could simply call them, regional disciplines). What is important to emphasize is what Husserl points out in the first line of the passage: “Each concrete empirical objectuality is arranged with its material essence under a supreme material genus.” As Husserl speaks here of konkrete and empirische objectuality, it can be assumed that what he is referring to is what we have previously labeled Essence.1. Later on, over the course of §15, Husserl will explicitly employ the expressions “original objectuality” (Urgegenständlichkeit) and “the logically absolute” (das logisch  On this distinction, see Lowit, 1954, 326–327.

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Absolute) to designate the “individuum” (Essence.1): “If we conceive the ‘operation’ of generalization under the now expanded concept of logical ‘modification’ (Abwandlung), then we can say: the individuum is the original objectuality required from a purely logical standpoint, the logically absolute to which all logical ‘modifications’ refer back” (Hua III/1, 35; Husserl, 2014, 30). The generalization-­ operation—by means of which we move up from the universals of lowest level to the higher genera and thus the supreme genus or region—refers back to an initial individuum. Now, if we were to take at face value the definition of region offered by the passage above (= the regional essence or region is a supreme genus), then for example sensible quality should be deemed a region. If, for example, we take grass green as an eidetic singularity (universal of the lowest level) and green as the corresponding subspecies, color would be the species, visual quality the genus and, finally, sensible quality would stand out as the highest genus or “region.” As a consequence, the so-called “regional ontology” would be the eidetic science of sensible quality in general, whereas the various genus or generic components (visual quality, tactile quality, auditory quality and so on and so forth) would represent the subject-matter of the many regional disciplines. Now, that this cannot be Husserl’s own opinion on the matter is shown by the very examples that he himself gives over the course of §9 to illustrate his point. Here, in fact, the regional ontology mentioned and referred to as a paradigmatic example is the ontology of nature, the eidetic science of “nature in general” (Hua III/1, 24; Husserl, 2014, 21), the corresponding individuals of which are individua in the Husserlian sense of the expression: a series of “τόδε τι,” whose material essence is a concretum (= individual things or Dinge). This could not be the case if Husserl were using the term genus, notably, supreme genus in a proper sense to designate the region; for the individuals corresponding to a genus, such as the supreme genus visual quality are not and cannot be individua in the Husserlian sense (= a this-here whose material essence is a concretum or independent essence), but only individuals whose material essences are on the contrary abstract essences (i.e., an individual color hic et nunc). Two conclusions are possible. Either Husserl is using the term “genus” improperly to designate the region (in order to pedagogically introduce the reader to his line of thought), or the “example” (= the ontology of nature) given to illustrate what he means is not correct. In our opinion, the first option is the correct one: Husserl is not using here the term genus in a technical sense (we are hence taking a position that slightly diverges from the one adopted in De Santis, 2021a, b, 213–221). That we are on the right track is also corroborated by Husserl speaking of “concrete empirical objectuality” (in the passage: “Each concrete empirical objectuality is arranged with its material essence…”): the adjective “concrete” means that the empirical objectuality in question is an individuum, namely, an individual the material essence of which is a concrete essence (we will soon come back to this). Although our concern here might look and sound to the reader purely otiose, we should not forget that the one just dismissed is precisely the conception of region assumed by Heidegger in Being and Time (see Chap. 1, §5, of this volume). At the beginning of the book, one of the arguments used to deny that “being” can be a

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region, notably, “the highest region of the entity” is that regions “are conceptually articulated according to genus and species,” but, as Aristotle had already understood, οὔτε τὸ ὂν γένος (Heidegger, 1967, 3; Heidegger, 2010, 2).3 The fact that Heidegger is here assuming the term “region” as a synonym for “genus” is corroborated both by the reference to Aristotle (who denies that τὸ ὂν can be deemed a γένος) and by his speaking of “highest region” (as if there could be regions of higher and lower universalities).4 As we will soon see, for Husserl there can be higher and lower genera, yet, the talk of higher and lower regions makes absolutely no sense. Following quite likely Heidegger, Jan Patočka also talks of regions as “summa genera of eidetic universality” (Regiony—summa genera eidetické obecnosti) (Patočka, 2009, 185), and goes as far to maintain that for Husserl (u Husserla) regio means “supreme genus” (nejvyšší rod) (Patočka, 2009, 244; the same mistake is made by an otherwise refined interpreter of Husserl’s ontology like Spiegelberg, 1930, 6; see also De Santis, 2023). It is worth remarking that in §9 Husserl is not presenting any definition of what a region in general is: the point for him being simply to recognize that in virtue of its material essence, every empirical and concrete objectuality falls under a region, here called “supreme genus.” The one and only definition of region is in fact provided in §16 and directly, i.e., “analytically” follows from the formal-ontological definitions introduced in §15 (Independent and Dependent Objects: Concretum and Individuum). After the preliminary distinction between “independent” and “dependent” objects made at the outset of §15, Husserl accounts for the following, three crucial concepts: Important determinations of the formal-categorial concepts of invidiuum, concretum and abstractum follow from this. An essence that is dependent is called abstractum; an essence that is absolutely independent is called a concretum. A “this-here” whose material essence is a concretum is called individuum. […] A concretum is quite obviously an eidetic singularity, since species and genera (expressions that in the usual way exclude the lowest differences) are in principle dependent. The eidetic singularities accordingly break down into abstract and concrete (Hua III/1, 35; Husserl, 2014, 30).

If “eidetic singularities” are (relatively) independent in comparison with genera and species, they themselves can be divided into “abstract” and “concrete.” For example, the eidetic singularity green grass is an “abstract” and dependent essence, since it requires an individual object to which it does belong (it is then an individual color, yet not an individuum); by contrast, the very individual thing in question to which the individual color belongs (e.g., a green ball) is an individuum in the sense described by Husserl above. Clearly then, the turn of phrase eidetic singularity is assumed here by Husserl as designating two different kinds of objectualities, so to speak. On the one hand, the term eidetic singularity means this or that abstract essence of the lowest level composing the concretum. On the other hand, the  See also Shoichet, 2013, 173 and ff.  On the contrary, it is not evident how the region is understood in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Heidegger, 2010a, 211; Heidegger, 1965, 218).

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expression eidetic singularity stands for the concretum itself that includes the many “abstract essences” (= eidetic singularities in the former sense) in itself (we are not saying: as “moments” for a quite specific reason which will soon become apparent). This second sense of the expression “eidetic singularity” corresponds to Essence.2— what Husserl used to call the object’s “full essence” or even also simply: “singularity” (see above, §2). Only a concretum or singularity is an “absolutely independent essence.” Technically speaking, the concretum is not a universal of the lowest level in the same sense in which green grass is a universal of the lowest level; a concretum or singularity is the sum-total of the eidetic singularities that pertain to an individuum hic et nunc. At the very beginning of §16, Husserl finally explains that,5 With the concepts “individuum” and “concretum,” the scientific-theoretical, fundamental concept of a region is also defined in a rigorously “analytic” manner. Region is nothing else than the entire, supreme generic unity belonging to a concretum, i.e., the essentially united connection of the supreme genera that pertain to the lowest differences within the concretum. The eidetic extent of the region encompasses the ideal totality of concretely unified complexes of differences of these genera; the individual extent encompasses the ideal totality of possible individuals of such concrete essences (Hua III/1, 36; Husserl, 2014, 31).

Region does not designate a genus, let alone a highest or supreme genus. Rather, region is the unity of all the “supreme genera” under which there fall the “lowest differences” (eidetic singularities in the first sense distinguished above) of a concretum. The reader can now finally understand why, in Fig. 3.1 in §2, the region or Essence.4 does not coincide with any of the supreme genera, but rather encompasses a system of supreme genera. This is also why Husserl can remark that the ideal extent of the region includes the totality of the “differences of these genera” (which would correspond to what we previously labeled Essence.3 or “universal essence,” with all the terminological differences notwithstanding). By the same token, Husserl writes that the region’s individual extent “encompasses the ideal totality of possible individuals of such concrete essences.” What, at the level of the lowest differences, falls under a region is never directly an abstract essence but always and necessarily a concrete essence, i.e., a concretum in the sense discussed by Husserl in §15. Accordingly, the individual falling under a region is always an individuum: a “τόδε τι” whose “material essence is a concretum.” While genera and supreme genera are instantiated by individual properties (in the loosest sense possible) of the individuum (e.g., an individual color instantiates the genus visual quality and the supreme genus sensible quality), “regions” can be instantiated only and always by individua, because their lowest differences are never abstract essences, but concrete ones. Let us spell out Husserl’s rigorous definition of region as follows, Hu-Region = The unity of all the “supreme genera” of the lowest differences proper to the concrete essence (= concretum) of a relevant individuum

 For the so far only systematic assessment of this passage, see the fundamental Majolino, 2015.

5

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The central role in the identification of a region is here played by the concept of individuum; the latter is the necessary starting point in order for a corresponding region to be clearly identified. For if the region is the unity of the supreme genera of the lowest differences in the concretum, then the latter is what is first needed. And the concretum is obtained by disregarding the individualization of a given individuum. We first take an individuum hic et nunc (= Essence.1). By disregarding its individualization, we obtain the “concretum” or full essence (= Essence.2), which includes a system of lowest differences (or eidetic singularities), and which can be repeated in a countless number of other individua (in the sense of Essence.1). As each lowest difference is the difference of a species (the totality of which makes up the ideal extent of a region) (= Essence.3), the unity of the supreme genera under which such species fall is the region (= Essence.4). In this sense, sensuous quality is not a region; yet, to the extent that it designates the supreme genus of a species (e.g., color) of a lowest difference (e.g., green grass) of the concrete essence (= Essence.2) of a possible individuum (= Essence.1), it contributes to the constitution of the region nature (together with other supreme genera). It should be now clear why, while recalling above Heidegger’s position on the region, we affirmed that it makes no sense for Husserl to talk of regions of higher and lower universalities: “genera” and “species” are of higher and lower universality. By contrast, by consisting in the unity of a certain number of supreme genera (thus, of the species falling under the latter), the region is to be ascribed a super-generic universality, so to say, a universality which would have nothing to do with that of the genus-species hierarchy or inclusion of the former within the latter. Husserl had already given the example of “a material thing” at the end of §2, albeit quickly: […] each individual material thing has its own essential kind of being (Wesensartung), and, at the highest level, it has the universal kind of being of a “material thing in general” with a determination of time in general, duration in general, figure in general, materiality in general. Another individual can also have everything inherent to the essence of the individuum, and the highest essential universalities of this kind (as the examples we have just given suggest) circumscribe “regions” or “categories” of individua (Hua III/1, 13; Husserl, 2014, 11).

Every individual material thing (Dinge) falls under the region “material thing in general” to the extent that this is the unity of a series of “highest essential universalities” (meaning supreme genera). Each one of these universalities is instantiated in a specific “determination” in the concrete essence of the individual thing (= individuum): (a) time in general, (b) duration in general, (c) figure (Figur) in general, and (d) materiality in general. None of them per se taken circumscribes a region; it is their unity that composes the region nature or, as Husserl calls it here, “material thing in general.” There can be no material thing that does not have a, b, c and d.6

 See Tinaburri, 2011, 118–130, on Husserl’s theory of material things in relation to Aristotle’s substance.

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Since Husserl is not interested here in intuitively clarifying the structure of the region nature (by means of which a better comprehension of what a region in general is could be attained), let us take a detour through Edith Stein’s lecture of 1920 on Introduction to Philosophy. This text, in fact, can be of great help when it comes to elucidating Husserl’s own talk of (the) region (nature).

4. The pages from the 1920 Introduction to Philosophy lectures in which Stein pays great attention to the structure of nature are clearly inspired by Husserl’s analyses from the second volume of Ideas. Yet, if Husserl’s researches are oriented both ontologically and phenomenologically (in the sense that the theory of transcendental constitution clarifies step by step the ontological structure of the material world), Stein’s approach is purely ontological, and her aim is to elucidate the “ontological structure of the “domain of nature” (Gebiet der Natur) in its universality (Stein, 2010, 23). “Things,” Stein points out right at the outset, are “closed unities” which are part of what she calls here pure nature (reine Natur) (from whose analyses all cultural products such as objects of use are excluded) or nature sic et simpliciter (Stein, 2010, 25). She lists seven constitutive characteristics of a thing in general, seven “moments” essentially pertaining to every Körperding. Within the “connection of nature,” things are (i) “closed spatial bodies” having (ii) a determined “size” and (iii) a determined “shape” or “figure” (as one might want to translate the German Gestalt), which is (iv) filled up with “sensible qualities” of any kind. Moreover, it also belongs to spatial bodies to occupy a portion of space in such a way that no other body can be at the same time in that very same place; in short, it belongs to natural things to be (v) “impenetrable.” Stein labels “materiality” that specific essential moment in the thing’s constitution upon which its “impenetrability” rests (Stein, 2010, 26–27). To these first five moments, she also adds: (vi) “motion” (Bewegung) (vii) and “duration” (see Stein, 2010, 38–43). The moment of “materiality” is what makes possible for the individual thing to stand in a system of “causal” connections with the “totality of things.” In this respect, and adopting Husserl’s own terminology from Ideas II, Stein speaks of the material thing in terms of “substance” (Substanz): such “substance”-like nature means that the thing possesses a “set of properties” (einen festen Eigenbestand) that both maintains and modifies itself through alternations and changes (Stein, 2010, 28). “Substance and causality mutually refer to one another and depend on one another; the one cannot be thought without the other” (Stein, 2010, 38). Since Stein is here interested only in the constitution of a “thing in general,” no detailed analyses are provided of the possible specifications of the seven moments just listed. For example, she merely alludes to different kinds of alterations (“alterations of the thing,” and “alterations of its qualities”), and to the difference between alteration (Veränderung) and “sudden change” (as one might translate the German Wechsel) (Stein, 2010, 48–50). As she points

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out, “Sudden change is not something that takes place over a period of time, but rather an instantaneous event.” Quite interesting for us is the case of liquids and gaseous objects (alles Flüssige und Gasförmige). Against the objection which would tend to exclude them from the domain of nature due to their lack of a stable physical body, Stein affirms that they have materiality (they stand in causal connections with other things) and impenetrability. However, they constantly change shape and the space they “fill up” (Raumerfüllung) because they do not have any “fixed” or “stable” Gestalt (gestaltmäßige Fixierung) (Stein, 2010, 29). They do have a “form,” yet an unstable and ever-changing one. Accordingly, there can be natural things having a fixed and stable Gestalt (Körperdinge), as well as natural things with no stable body (festen Körper) and no stable or fixed Gestalt: e.g., gasses and liquids. These would represent two possible “specifications,” so to say, of the highest essential universality “shape” (iii) proper to nature in general. A major difference is to be recognized between gasses and liquids on the one hand (they have materiality, yet no stable Gestalt) and what Stein calls “phantasms” (Phantome) on the other, which are not to be numbered among natural things. By phantasm, Stein means formations such as the rainbow, a mirror image and the like. What they all lack is materiality: “The things of nature are material. But not all spatial formations possess this property. A color-appearance (Farbschein) or a mirror image has a position in space; yet this space is not inaccessible to other spatial formations” (Stein, 2010, 27). In sum, a “phantom” is a portion of space filled with sensible qualities, yet with no substance-like nature, no materiality and thereby no causal position within the totality of nature. In the words of Husserl, a phantom is a res extensa without res materialis. According to Hu-Region, the region “nature” consists of the unity of a certain number of “highest essential universalities.” Were we to resort to Stein’s own distinctions between the seven moments above, it could be represented as the synthesis of the following determinations. Nature  =  (i) position in space + (ii) size + (iii) shape (Gestalt)  +  (vi) sensible quality + (v) impenetrability-materiality + (vi) motion + (vii) duration. A “natural thing” is none of these determinations separately taken, but only their unitary connection. Now, what is important for us to underline is that the seven moments just listed (just like the four moments mentioned by Husserl in §2) do not all stand to one another in the same kind of relation. For example, ii and iii cannot even be thought without one another (to the point that one might be even tempted to identify the two); the same applies to the relation between iii and iv: it is not possible to think of a shape that is not filled with some quality and vice versa. By the same token, one could say that it is not even possible to think of i without ii, iii and also iv. It is in fact impossible to think of any of these four determinations without the remaining ones. There is a different situation as we consider v: the relation between the materiality moment, on the one hand, and the first four moments (position + size + shape + quality) on the other hand, is not of the same kind. In this case, in fact, it is wholly possible to think of i + ii + iii + iv without v: it would not be a thing of course (because if there is no materiality, there can be no nature); rather, it would be only a phantasm (a “rainbow”). In this latter case, what for the lack of a better expression we could call “regional impossibility” is not to be

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identified with the former impossibility. It is not possible to think of a “natural thing” (= an individuum of the region nature) without also thinking the “materiality”determination (= regional impossibility); yet, it is possible to think of i + ii + iii + iv without v. The materiality-determination is not at all necessary in order for a phantasm to be in general possible and conceivable. By contrast, i, ii, iii and iv stand to one another in such a relation that none of them is at all thinkable without the others (as we will soon see, this could be simply labeled: “mereological impossibility” in a sense to be better explained).7 The same discourse holds true of the relation between the first four determinations and vii (or, in Husserl’s language, between res extensa and res temporalis). Of course, it is not possible to think of a natural thing (= an individuum of the region nature) without including the determination of time and duration (= regional impossibility). It is also impossible to think of a phantasm without thinking of the determination of time and duration (what is in space is also in time). Yet, it is wholly possible to separate vii from the first four determinations: we would no longer have a phantasm, but rather a purely temporal object, i.e., a “lived-experience” (Erlebnis) as Husserl presents it in Ideas I. In this case, having entered a new region of being (pure consciousness as different from nature), the determination of “duration” would be (regionally) connected to determinations other than the ones composing the region nature: for example, the two moments called “quality” and “matter” of an act (not to be confused with nature’s “materiality”). It should be evident towards what kind of conclusion we are pushing our arguments. The notion of region, that is, the unitary synthesis (of supreme genera or highest essential universalities) in which every region properly consists is not to be equated nor identified with the relation between “moments” (or non-independent parts) in the sense of the theory of species of the Logical Investigations. As a consequence, the very idea of ontology, notably, regional ontology is not to be regarded as a further development of the mereology of the Third Investigation. Quite the opposite, the theory of non-independent parts cannot be used to make sense of the structure of a region. Let us briefly review what Husserl affirms in the Third Logical Investigation.

5. The overall ambition of the Third Logical Investigation is that of laying out the coordinates for “a pure (a priori) theory of objects as such” or, more succinctly, a “formal ontology” (Hua XIX/1, 227–228; Husserl, 2001, II, 3). The first chapter opens up with a brief and general discussion of the various manners in which the  See also Hua XXXII, 29 and ff., where Husserl systematically mobilizes the concept of region to make sense of the relation and difference between nature and spirit. For example, Husserl talks of a “region of all regions” to refer to the macro-region “world” and its many internal regional articulations. 7

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concepts of “part,” “simple” and “complex” are usually defined and assumed.8 It is in §2, however, that Husserl starts introducing his own view on the matter9: We interpret the word part in the widest sense: we may call anything a “part” that can be distinguished “in” an object, or, objectively phrased, that is “present” in it. Everything is a part that is an object’s real possession, not only in the sense of being a real thing, but also in the sense of being something really in something, that truly helps to make it up: an object in itself, considered in abstraction from all contexts to which it is tied, is likewise a part. Every non-relative “real” (reale) predicate therefore points to a part of the object which is the predicate’s subject: red and round, e.g., do so, but not existent or something. Every “real” (reale) mode of association, e.g. the moment of spatial configuration, likewise counts as a proper part of the whole. The term “part” is not used so widely in ordinary discourse. If we now try to pin down the limitations which mark off this ordinary, from our notion of part, we come up against the fundamental distinction called by us that of independent and non-independent parts. Where one talks of “parts” without qualification, one generally has the independent parts (those referred to as “pieces”) in mind. Since each part can be made the specific object (or, as we also have frequently said, “content”) of a representation directed upon it, and can therefore be called an object or “content,” the distinction of parts just mentioned points to a distinction in objects (or contents) as such. The term object (Gegenstand) is in this context always taken in its widest sense (Hua XIX/1, 231; Husserl, 2001, II, 5).

Not only is Husserl here distancing himself from the ordinary discourse that assumes “part” to always be an independent part; more generally, Husserl is translating the whole mereological discussion concerning the very notion of part (i.e., the many conceptions thereof) into a discussion that bears upon the distinction between “independent” and “non-independent” objects (for a much more detailed assessment of Husserl’s strategy in these pages, see De Santis, 2021a, b, 78–94). And it is at the outset of §3 that these two notions receive their first, provisional characterization: It is self-evident, in regard to certain contents, that the modification or elimination of at least one of the contents given with them (but not contained in them) must modify or eliminate those contents themselves. In the case of other contents, this is not at all self-evident; it is not absurd to suppose them remaining unaffected despite the modification or elimination of all coexistent contents. Contents of the former sort can only be conceived as parts of more comprehensive wholes, whereas the latter appear possible, even if nothing whatever exists beside them, nothing therefore bound up with them to form a whole (Hua XIX/1, 233; Husserl, 2001, II, 6).

Then, Husserl goes on to clarify what he means in this passage by appealing to the analyses, and the examples already provided and developed by Carl Stumpf. The very famous example is that of the relation between visual quality and extension (or “the relation of both to a figure”). As Husserl does recognize, it is true that these two moments (visual quality and extension) can vary “independently” from one another; the extension can stay the same while the color changes and vice versa. Yet, as he  For the sake of our discourse in the present chapter, we will be paying attention only to the very first paragraphs of the first chapter of the Third Logical Investigation. For a more systematic assessment of the text, see De Santis, 2021a, 2021b 9  See Brisart, 2003, for an analysis of the development of Husserl’s view on the “abstract.” 8

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also hastens to add: “But, strictly speaking, such independent variability affects only the species of the moments in their various genera. While the moment of color remains constant with respect to its color-species, the extension- and shape-species may vary indefinitely, and vice versa” (Hua XIX/1, 235; Husserl, 2001, II, 7, trans. modified). Although Husserl’s discourse might not be at first very perspicuous, the sense of what he is trying to suggest is the following. With respect to a concretum (the second edition reads: Konkretum instead of the expression konkrete Anschauung used in the A-edition), to which color and shape belong as parts, a variation of “the lowest difference in the color-genus” (for example, from ruby red to blood red), or in the shape-genus, results in a variation of the concretum itself. For it is with respect to the relation between the species (color-species, extension-species or shape-­ species) that one can actually speak of “independent variability” (not in relation to the individual moments themselves). But it is the peculiar relation obtaining between the species (e.g., visual quality and extension), which Husserl refers to by the German Verknüpfung, that also determines the nature of the relation between the relevant individual moments in the object (which Husserl labels Verbindung instead) (on the distinction between Verknüpfung and Verbindung, see also De Santis, 2015). This is explicitly stated by Husserl himself in the following passage: Quality must be looked on as a second-order abstraction, just like the figure and magnitude of an extension. But just on account of the law here under discussion, the moment in question can only be named by way of concepts determined by the genera of Quality and Extension. Quality is differentiated to the qualitative moment now under consideration, by quality, e.g. the determinate shade of red, as the lowest species within this genus. Just so, a determinate figure is the last difference of the genus Figure, though the corresponding immediate, intuitive moment is further differentiated. But the combinations among the various lowest differences of the genera Figure and Color fully determine the moments in question, determine whatever else may be like or unlike them. The dependence of the immediate moments therefore means a certain necessary relationship among them, which is determined purely by their abstracta at the level just above them (Hua XIX/1, 235–236; Husserl, 2001, II, 7–8).

We cannot keep the “intensity” as it is while we vary at will the quality and vice versa: “Eliminate quality, and you unavoidably eliminate intensity, and vice versa. Evidently this is no mere empirical fact, but an a priori necessity, grounded in pure essence” (Hua XIX/1, 237; Husserl, 2001, II, 8). That is to say, grounded in the peculiar relation that binds together the relevant higher species, of which the two moments in question are but individual instances. In §5, the definition of the notion of “non-independence” (which refers back to the positive sense of “dependence”) is spelled out as follows: “The content is by its essence bound to other contents, it cannot be, if other contents are not there together with it” (Hua XIX/1, 239; Husserl, 2001, II, 10; trans. modified). The phrase “by its essence” (introduced in the B-edition) refers to the nature of the corresponding species, of which the content (meaning the object’s moment) is an instance.10 That the “moment” of color cannot be present unless also the “moment” of extension is

10

 On this, see also Plourde, 2003.

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p­ resent—such a necessity follows from the essential connection that binds the two species (“color” and “extension” as two species of the higher genus “visual quality”). The inability-to-be-by-itself of a non-independent part means that a law of essence obtains, according to which the existence of a content belonging to the part’s pure species (e.g. the species of Color, Form etc.) presupposes the existence of contents of certain pertinent pure species, i.e. contents to which, if such an addition is still needed, the content in question can pertain as a part or an adjunct, an associate. Put more simply we can affirm: non-­independent objects are objects belonging to such pure species as are governed by a law of essence to the effect that they only exist (if at all) as parts of more inclusive wholes of a certain appropriate species (Hua XIX/1, 244; Husserl, 2001, II, 12).

It is the relation of essence between the species, the impossibility for the one (the species color) to be without the other (the species extension) that brings about the necessary connection between the relevant individual moments as they are present in the individual object. It is such an objective and essence-based necessity that explains the very impossibility of even thinking of the one without also thinking of the other (Hua XIX/1, 242; Husserl, 2001, II, 11). To the extent that we limit ourselves to speaking of parts in the sense of individual moments that cannot exist apart from one another, as is the case with the moment of color and the moment of extension in an individual object, then the talk of “non-independence” applies only to them. Yet, as soon as we want to point out the reason for such an (objective) impossibility, then the talk of “non-independence” should properly apply only to the corresponding ideal species and the relation obtaining between them. It is in order to clarify this distinction that §7a was introduced in the B-edition of the Third Investigation: Our distinctions have first of all related to the being of particular individuals thought of in “ideal universality,” i.e. of such individuals treated purely as instances of ideas. But they obviously carry over to ideas themselves, which can, in a corresponding if somewhat modified sense, be spoken of as “independent” and “non-independent.” A lowest difference of some highest pure genus may be called relatively independent in relation to the hierarchy of pure species which lead up to the highest genus, just as every lower species counts as relatively independent as against higher species. Genera, the existence of whose corresponding individualizations represents an a priori impossibility, unless they simultaneously belong to the individual, but purely conceived extensions of other genera, are non-independent in regard to these latter, and so mutatis mutandis in the case of other fields of instances (our italics) (Hua XIX/1, 245; Husserl, 2001, II, 13)

Now, the fact that the second edition (in §4) replaces the expression “concrete intuition” (konkrete Anschauung) with “intuited concretum” (des angeschauten Konkretums) makes it even clearer that, regarded from the standpoint of the formal-­ ontological distinctions first introduced in 1913, the talk of non-independent objects of the Third Logical Investigation is to be confined to what in Ideas (§15) Husserl labels abstract essences (notably, only to some of them) within the concretum and not to the concretum itself as a whole. Let us try to be clear on this fundamental point. As we saw in §§3–4 of the present chapter, by the term “concretum” Husserl means “an absolutely independent essence,” the sum-total of “eidetic singularities” to be individualized hic et nunc as an individuum. As we also claimed, this was the

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fundamental starting point of our investigations, the “unity” of all the highest or supreme genera of the concretum’s eidetic singularities is what Husserl technically labels “region.” Since by individuum Husserl means a this-here, the material essence of which is a concretum, then individuum is also the technical term employed by Husserl to refer to the individual that instantiates a “region.” Not every individual is to be labeled individuum because not every individual instantiates a region: for example, the “moments” of the individual object, e.g., the moment of color, instantiate specific species, and thereby specific supreme genera (e.g., the species color and the supreme genus sensible quality11). They are individuals, yet not individua: they are the individualizations of abstracta, not of concreta. This thing is an individuum; this ruby red color (belonging to this thing here) only an individual. The former is the individual instance of a region; the latter the individual instance of one of the highest genera unified by the region nature. If we are on the right track, the strong point should be made that the notion of non-independence, as Husserl works it out over the course of the Third Logical Investigation, can be used to make sense only of the relation between some of the moments of the objects: i.e., of all those individual moments, the species of which stand to one another in a relation of ideal non-independence in such a way that the one cannot even be, or be thought (according to the objective meaning of “thinking” that Husserl elucidates in §7 of the Third Logical Investigation12), without the other and the other way around. Now, as we explained in §4 of the present chapter, the unity between the highest genera which is brought about by a region (e.g., the region “nature” or “consciousness”) is of a very peculiar nature. Only the relation between some of the supreme genera, hence species, can be accounted for in terms of the “non-independence”sort of relation of the Third Logical Investigation. What we could now officially refer to as the mereo-logical impossibility, e.g., for the moment of color to be without the moment of extension (within an individuum’s concretum) cannot be appealed to in order to properly understand what we have already referred to as the (regional) impossibility for an individuum to be without its concrete essence including a specific system of abstract essences. More intuitively put, that for example the moment of color cannot be without the moment of extension—this derives from the ideal non-independence-sort of relation that binds together the relevant species. That an individuum of the region nature cannot be and be thought without its concrete essence including the following abstract essences: position in space + size + shape + sensible quality + impenetrability-materiality + motion + duration, derives from  See the way in which Husserl formulates the corresponding definition in §13 of the Third Logical Investigation: “A content A is relatively non-independent in regard to a content B (or in regard to the total range of contents determined by B and all its parts), if a pure law, rooted in the peculiar character of the genus-essence of content in question, ensures that a content of the pure genus A has an a priori incapacity to obtain except in, or as associated with, other contents from the total ranges of the pure genera of contents determined by B” (Hua XIX/1, 264; Husserl, 2001, II, 22). 12  See Husserl’s words: “Wherever therefore the word ‘can’ occurs in conjunction with the pregnant use of ‘think,’ there is a reference, not to a subjective necessity, i.e. to the subjective incapacity-­ to-­represent-things-otherwise, but to the objectively ideal necessity of an inability-to-be-otherwise” (Hua XIX/1, 242–243; Husserl, 2001, II, 11–12). 11

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the ontological peculiarity of the region itself.13 Of course, that some of these abstract essences, notably their species, do stand to one another in a (mereological14) relation of non-independence (e.g., the first four) corroborates our interpretation so far. The regional relation between (the system of) abstract essences that make up the individuum’s concretum, therefore the regional necessity binding them together essentially, cannot be deciphered mereologically.15

6. It should be clear what Husserl means to assert when in Ideas III he writes, “The a priori in the sense of region is the source-point (Quellpunkt) of the ontologies” (Hua V, 36; Husserl, 1980, 32). And it should be clear why we have strongly affirmed that one should not even speak of material ontology in the Logical Investigations.16 A material ontology is always a regional ontology; and as long as there is no region, one is not entitled to speak properly of material ontology. Also the sense of the expression a priori changes, depending on whether we are referring to the theory of species or the doctrine of regional ontologies. An a priori proposition in the sense of the doctrine of species of the Logical Investigations could be spelled out as follows: AP.1: If x is a case of the species color, it will necessarily be connected with y as a case of the species extension with x and y being two individual moments (= individualizations of two abstract essences). On the contrary, an a priori proposition based upon the doctrine of material, regional ontologies of Ideas I will roughly go as follows: AP.2: If X is a case of thing, it will necessarily have the determinations of time-­ species, quality-species, materiality-species and so on and so forth  This is the reason why Majolino, 2015, 47, correctly speaks of “unity of being” to characterize the region. 14  We call it mereological according to Husserl’s attempt at accounting for the concept of moment in terms of “non-independence.” Of course, one could object to our argument that, insofar as an individuum is a whole made up of parts, the regional impossibility is in the end to be understood as a variation upon the mereological impossibility. We could of course agree, but only on condition that we admit that a new sense is being ascribed to the notion of whole. For in the case of the regional whole, the concretum is no longer composed of parts standing to one another in a non-­ independence-­sort of relation in the same sense in which a moment of color stands in relation to a moment of extension. 15  See Simons, 1994, for a different perspective on the matter. 16  For a systematic analysis of the a priori in Husserl, which however overlooks the distinction that here we are trying to bring to the fore, see Romano, 2010, 209–249. In the field of Husserl scholarship, see Costa et al., 2002, 72 ff., who speak of “material ontology” without acknowledging the specificity of the notion of region. De Monticelli & Conni, 2008 do not include the “region” among the technical terms of phenomenology, although their approach is ontology-oriented. See by contrast Drummond, 2007, 180, who includes an entry on the notion of region. 13

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with X standing in this case for an individuum (a this-here, whose material essence is a concretum) and not just an individual (see what we explained in §5 above). Without getting into a meticulous or detailed discussion of Husserl’s doctrine of the a priori here (which would take us far beyond the scope of this chapter), the following can however be pointed out. If in the case of AP.1 the a priori, necessary character of the ontological relation between the moments directly derives from the non-independent nature of the two corresponding ideal species, this is not the case with AP.2. In this case, the a priori, necessary character of the ontological relation between the many determinations making up the concretum, hence, the individuum itself, derives from the very nature of the region itself. Now, although Husserl never elaborates on the difference, and relevant articulation, between these two types of propositions and corresponding conceptions of the a priori, in §3 of the present chapter we saw him making a distinction (in §9 of Ideas I) between ontological and eidetic “sciences” and “disciplines” (Hua III/1, 23; Husserl, 2014, 20). Whereas the former study and investigate the region itself (e.g., the region nature or the region spirit or the region pure consciousness understood as the unity of a certain number of supreme genera), the latter deal with the relation between the various genus components (e.g., the relation between matter and quality of an act; color and extension, hyle and morphè and so on). Accordingly, it would not be too much of a stretch to claim that the doctrine of material and regional ontologies includes within itself the theory of material relations of the Logical Investigations just as regional and eidetic sciences include within themselves the various particular eidetic disciplines. The point is not to be underestimated. Different regions may partially include the same highest genera or “determinations” (respectively investigated by a group of corresponding ontological disciplines), as is the case for instance with the determinations of time and duration. In fact, they are included in both the regions nature and pure consciousness: both are present in the individua respectively instantiating them. And yet, precisely because in the two cases the overall system of determinations is different (= the supreme genera that are united by the region nature are different from those united by the region pure consciousness), the very same “determination” will necessarily display a different ontological, i.e., regional sense. A thing (= an individuum of the region nature) is not a temporal object in the same sense in which a lived-experience (= an individuum of the region pure consciousness) is a temporal object. Although they are both temporal objects. In other words, to be the instance of a region (which means nothing other than to be a certain individuum) does not mean to instantiate a genus or a generic category; it means to instantiate a specific ontological unity, to express a specific regional sense (which is more than the mere presence or co-­ presence of a group of highest genera and determinations). We are now in a position to clarify, and sharply differentiate the various meanings implied by the expression “the essence (Wesen) of…” In light of our discourse thus far and the figure provided in §2 of the present chapter, two different groups of distinctions must be acknowledged. The first distinction is the one between what for the lack of better expressions we might want to call concrete and abstract meaning. The essence of… can indeed refer either to the essence of an (A) abstract object or

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to the essence of a (C) concrete object. By abstract we mean what Husserl himself means in Ideas I: an abstract eidetic singularity or a species in the sense of the doctrine of species of the Logical Investigations. In this case, for example, one can affirm that it belongs to the essence of the species “color” (i.e., an instance thereof) to be always connected with the species “extension” (i.e., an instance thereof) as they both fall under the genus “visual quality.” Or also that it belongs to the essence of “orange” to “lie” between “red” and “yellow.” By contrast, by concrete we mean what Husserl calls an absolute concrete essence instead, i.e., an individuum as the individualization of a concretum. In this case, however, the phrase the essence of… in the question, What is the essence of…X? can mean two different things. We can either mean (C1) the individuum’s concretum’s regional essence or what Husserl regards as the first scientifically determinable essence, that is, (C2) the universal essence (what in §2 we labeled Essence.3). Since the “region” is the unity of a system of supreme genera, and since the universal essence designates the sum-total of the “species” (Arten) whose universals of the lowest level constitute the object’s full or “concrete essence,” the two (regional essence & universal essence) do not coincide. The regional essence includes under itself, so to say, a system of coordinated universal essences. Hence, the question, What is the essence of X? can either refer to the individuum’s regional essence or to its universal essence; and it can be the case that two “individua” have the same regional essence, yet different universal essences. The case made by Stein in relation to gaseous objects is in this respect quite illuminating. As they are part of “nature” (in general), they have the same regional essence as regular natural bodies (for they have exactly all the highest determinations united by the region “nature” or “thing in general”). Yet, since they do not have any stable body, the universal essence of a gaseous object will be different from that of a regular natural body. The highest determination “spatial body” would have to be differentiated into, for example, “stable bodies” and “unstable bodies”; hence, at least one of the species in question under which a gaseous object falls is different from that under which there falls a regular natural body. Or, the species making up its universal essence are not exactly the same as those that make up the universal essence of a regular natural body. The two will have the same regional essence (= the highest determinations coincide), yet different universal essences (= not all the species coincide). Despite the high-sounding sense implied by the expression region, hence by the determination of pure consciousness (as well as of nature) in terms of region, it should be now evident that what Husserl means to suggest and convey by such a way of talking is not that “consciousness” (as a “region”) is something existing over and above the individual Erlebnisse. Quite the opposite. If by “region” one means the unity of the supreme genera of the lowest differences in the individuum’s concretum or concrete essence, then to say that consciousness is a region amounts to recognizing the existence of “individua” whose structure and

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ontological unity is different from that of other individua.17 To say that consciousness is a region simply means that there are individual lived-experiences (individua), the structure of which is ontologically different from that of individual natural “things.” Majolino is then fully right in remarking that, “Husserl is not merely proposing an ontology here, he is showing how ontologies are made up” (Majolino, 2015, 48). And if he is also right in adding that Husserl’s individuals (in the sense of individua) are “the stuff of which ontologies are made, the physicalistic ontology of Quine (whose individual Urgegenstand is the physical thing),” we can no longer follow him when he also writes “as well as the fundamental ontology of Heidegger (where Dasein takes the leading role)” (Majolino, 2015, 48). We can no longer follow him because the latter statement would presuppose that the “individua” of the region “pure consciousness” were individual “concrete egos” (replaced by that other form of the concrete subjectivity called: Dasein), while we know that Husserl will not start speaking of the region “concrete ego” until the 20 s (without considering the non-regional or extra-­regional nature that Heidegger ascribes to Dasein). “Dasein” is not a concrete individual in the same sense in which a lived-experience is a concrete individual. Our reasoning thus far seems to both reinforce and weaken Heidegger’s famous objection against the fact that Husserl (see Volume 1, Chap. 3, §8) never really raised the question about “the mode of being of consciousness.” If consciousness is a region, and if to be a region simply means that certain “lived-experiences” obtain having a certain structure, then what would it possibly mean to ask the question about the mode of being of individual lived-experiences? In this sense, Heidegger’s objection seems to be defused. Husserl would reply that the question about the mode of being can and should be raised only about the specific concrete ego to which consciousness, that is to say, the individual lived-experiences individually belong. But the analysis of consciousness as a region does not at all intend to address this point, thus, the conclusion can be drawn that the question about the mode of being of consciousness does not even belong and cannot even belong to it. Yet, our discourse seems to also, and at once, reinforce Heidegger’s own objection. Would Heidegger not maintain that the determination of consciousness as a region is the result of Dasein’s self-thematization? Should we not first raise the question about the “mode of being” of the subject (the entity which we ourselves are) that alone is capable of self-thematization, thereby being able to ascribe to itself an essence (a certain What) and a system of corresponding “essential properties”? If phenomenology is the eidetics of consciousness, then it presupposes as its own possibility the ontic-ontological priority of Dasein itself: “Dasein therefore has its third priority as the ontic-ontological condition of the possibility of all ontologies” (Heidegger, 1967, 13; Heidegger, 2010, 12). But if this were the objection, Husserl  Since here we are interested only in the concept of region in general, the reader can turn to Majolino, 2010, for a detailed analysis of Husserl’s eidetics of consciousness in Ideas. A recently published interesting text on the matter is the Beilage XLVIII in Hua XLIII/1, 498–500 (Allgemeine Wesenseigenheit eines intentionalen Erlebens). 17

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would know what to directly reply. If consciousness is a region, and if the individua instantiating it have a certain ontological structure (the one determined by the highest genera united by the region itself), does it not follow that the structure of such individua (= their concreta) is always the same, regardless of the concrete subjectivity to which they pertain (sit venia verbo)? Would he not also add that the question about the mode of being of the concrete subject should always be kept separate from the analysis of the ontological-regional structure of the former? And that the latter is, at least up to a certain extent, independent from the former? Of course, we know (see Volume 1, Chap. 3) that Husserl will stop speaking of the region “pure consciousness” and will rather start speaking of “concrete ego”; and we also know (see Volume 1, Chap. 6, §1) that Husserl himself will recognize that “pure consciousness” is only an abstraction obtained from within the primum concretum. And yet, if the concrete ego or monad, whose mode of being or Seinsweise the Cartesian Meditations try to explore, is not to be identified with Dasein and its mode of being, it is because the transcendental determination of the concrete subject is not to be mixed up with the determination of that finite form of concrete subjectivity which is the human one (the latter understood as the self-­ mundanization of the former (see Volume 1, Chap. 6)).

7. This being stated, we can now go back to the “region” and discuss the main differences between Husserl and Heidegger. The first, major difference has already been pointed out in §3 of the present chapter. Whereas for Husserl regions have a super-­ generic universality (see also the diagram proposed in §2), Heidegger explicitly identifies the notion of “region” with that of “highest” or “supreme genus.” Now, whether this happens intentionally, with the intention of actually underplaying the novelty of Husserl’s discourse, or whether Heidegger simply does not recognize and grasp the difference between region and supreme genus,18 we are not in a position to tell. The latter would be a mistake no less serious than the former. In either case, a very important consequence follows from this that directly bears upon the problem of “being” (as Heidegger himself presents it). Let us recall once again the following two crucial passages from the opening pages of Being and Time:

 This specific and technical aspect concerning Heidegger’s interpretation of the region has been so far overlooked by the Husserl-Heidegger scholarship; see for example Stapleton, 1983, 24–29; and the otherwise very important pages by Øverenget, 1998, 84 and ff.; Overgaard, 2004, 74 and ff. Von Herrmann, 2000, just like Greisch, 1994, does not even seem to consider the notion of “region” as an important phenomenological concept. Hopkins, 1993, 32 and ff. (more generally, the entire Chap. 2) pays a great deal of attention to the concept of region in Ideas I, and to the manner in which Heidegger critically tackles it (see 104 and ff.); yet he never seems to raise the question how Heidegger understands or misunderstands it. 18

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1. “Being” is the most “universal” concept: τὸ ὄν ἐστι καθόλου μάλιστα πάντον (Metaph., III.4.1001 a21). Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione, est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit. “An understanding of being is always already contained in everything we apprehend in the entity.” But the “universality” of “being” is not that of genus. “Being” does not delimit the highest region of the entity (Sein umgrenzt nicht die oberste Region des Seienden) so far as they are conceptually articulated according to genus and species: οὔτε τὸ ὂν γένος (Metaph., III.3.998 b22) (Heidegger, 1967, 3; Heidegger, 2010, 2). 2. The concept of “being” is indefinable. This conclusion was drawn from its highest universality. And correctly so, if definitio fit per genus et differentiam specificam. Indeed, “being” cannot be understood as an entity. Enti non additur aliqua natura: “being” cannot be defined by attributing entities to it. Being cannot be derived from higher concepts by way of definition and cannot be represented by lower ones. But does it follow from this that “being” can no longer constitute a problem? Not at all (Heidegger, 1967, 4; Heidegger, 2010, 3).

The core of Heidegger’s arguments can be summed up as follows. “Being” is not a genus and “does not delimit the highest region of the entity” (“region” = “genus”), therefore being’s universality is to be deemed extra- or super-generic and extra- or super-regional. It is beyond every genus (= and every region). This is why “being” cannot be defined. Heidegger explicitly sticks with Husserl’s first characterization of region from §9 of Ideas I, where (as we saw above, §3) the “region” is called a “genus,” notably “highest genus” (in such a manner that there exist as many regions as there are supreme genera of the entity). Heidegger does not seem to acknowledge the difference between this preliminary, improper presentation of the concept of region, and the actual definition that Husserl advances in §16 (or, at least this difference does not appear in Being and Time). Moreover, if Heidegger can say, quoting Aristotle, that “being” cannot be defined because it is not a genus (οὔτε τὸ ὂν γένος), this also derives from his decision to hold to the traditional conception of “definition” “per genus et differentiam specificam.” If every definition presupposes that  a genus is further differentiated into its species by means of specific differences, then not only is the definition of a supreme genus impossible (there is no “higher genus” to be differentiated); whatever lies beyond the supreme genera (and this is the case with “being”) cannot be defined. It is the view that, starting systematically with Aristotle, will flow into the very history of Western philosophy also thanks to Porphyry’s Isagoge (see de Libera, 2014, introduction). Here is a famous passage (we will quote it from both the Greek and the Latin translation by Boethius, accompanied by the English translation by Barnes) on the “genus-species” hierarchy. καθ’ἑκάστην κατηγορίαν ἐστίν τινα γενικώτατα καὶ πάλιν ἄλλα εἰδικωτάτα καὶ μεταζὺ τῶν γενικωτάων καὶ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἄλλα. ἒστίν δὲ γενικωτάτον μέν, ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος, εἰδικωτάτον δέ, μεθ’ ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὑποβεβηκὸς εἶδος, μεταζὺ δέ τοῦ γενικωτάτου καὶ τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου ἄλλα ὰ καὶ γένη καὶ εἴδη τὰ αὐτά, πρὸς ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο λαμβανόμενα (4, 15–18, in Porfirio, 2004, 64–66,). In unoquoque praedicamento sunt quaedam generalissima et rursus alia specialissima, et inter generalissima et specialissima alia. Est autem generalissimum quidem super quod nullum ultra aliud sit superveniens genus, specialissimum autem post quod non erit alia

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3  Husserl and the Regions of Beings inferior species; inter generalissimum autem et specialissimum et genera et species sunt audem, ad aliud quidem et aliud sumpta (Porfirio, 2004, 143). What I mean will be clear as follows. In each type of predication there are some most general items and again other most special items; and there are other items between the most general and the most special. Most general is that above which there will be no other superordinate genus; most special, that after which there will be no other subordinate species; and between the most general and the most special are other items which are at the same time both genera and species (but taken in relation now to one thing and now to another) (Porphyry, 2006, 5–6).

The supreme genus (τὸ γενικώτατον) is described as what is never a species (οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος) or as what does not have any other genus above itself. Since the specific difference is that by means of which something (= a genus) differs from something else (= a genus) (ἰδιαίτατα δὲ διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτερου λέγεται; Magis proprie differre alterum altero dicitur quando specifica differentia distiterit), a supreme genus cannot in turn be defined, since there is nothing above it which could be differentiated by means of a specifica differentia. Let alone, then, what lies beyond all genera (= being). For only if being were a super-genus lying above the highest genera, could the latter be defined by means of a specific difference added to such alleged super-genus. But οὔτε τὸ ὂν γένος. If the one just described is, roughly speaking, Heidegger’s position on the matter (at least for what concerns being’s universality and the impossibility of defining it), then we have finally reached the point where Husserl’s and Heidegger’s views part company once and for all, and no reconciliation is at all possible. As a matter of fact, based upon his conception of the region as a unity of supreme genera, and more generally of the relation between formal and material (regional) ontology, Husserl claims that regions can be defined (though in a sense that has nothing to do with the traditional way of defining per genus et differentiam specificam). In a manuscript written in 1914 right after Ideas, Husserl speaks of defining or radical essence (das definitorische oder radikale Wesen) to designate the regional form (Hua XLI, 85). Let us simply talk of “regional definition” (we are of course aware of the risk implied by the decision to talk of definition sic et simpliciter in a context like this one). Taking once again the example of the “region” nature or thing in general, what we would call its “regional definition” and “regional universality” could be spelled out in the following manner (what follows is based upon Hua III/1, 13; Husserl, 2014, 11): RN-Df.:  Das Ding überhaupt or Natur is an “object” (as) having a time-­ determination, a sensuous quality-determination, and a materiality-determination (and so on) The point here, in order not to mistake RN-Df. for a case of definition per genus et differentiam specificam, is to understand the function of the term “object” (Gegenstand). “Object” here does not stand for a genus “higher” than the region itself and the many supreme genera united by it (which is impossible). “Object” is a synonym for the “something in general” (Etwas überhaupt) of formal (empty) ontology. Despite some ambiguous phrases employed by Husserl (e.g., that the

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formal region has all the material regions under itself), the following remark from §10 of Ideas I is clear: “The so-called ‘formal region’ […] is not genuinely a region but instead the empty form of region in general” (Hua III/1, 26; Husserl, 2014, 23).19 The so-called regional definition is no definition at all if the only sense which we can give to the term definition is the traditional one. Properly speaking, in fact, RN-Df. expresses the original ontological-regional materialization of being. Starting from the Second Logical Investigation (§8) onward, Husserl regards the expressions Gegenstand and Sein to be equivalent (see De Santis, 2021a, b, 63 and ff.20), and to designate the empty “form” or the empty “something” of formal ontology. As a consequence, RN-Df. above could also be easily reformulated in the following two manners: 1. Das Ding überhaupt or Natur is (an) Etwas (as) having a time-determination, a sensuous quality-determination, and a materiality-determination (and so on) 2. Das Ding überhaupt or Natur is (a) Sein (as) having a time-determination, a sensuous quality-determination, and a materiality-determination (and so on) Although in English it is almost unavoidable to resort to the indefinite article in these cases (= an Etwas or a Sein or a Gegenstand), the impression is to be avoided according to which 1 and 2 (just like RN-Df. above) would be stating a partition and differentiation of Sein. What we called regional definition is no definition at all; it does not differentiate being into a multiplicity of sub-genera and species by adding a specific difference to Sein as a “genus.” Nor does it “differentiate” being into a series of “regions.” It is rather the expression of the original materiality (Sachlichkeit) of being. Sein is always and already as a multiplicity (of regions). This is the reason why the title of the present chapter is not Regions of Being (with Being in the singular, as if being were something unitary to be then divided into a certain number of regions), but rather Regions of Beings (in the plural). For the concept of region expresses the original ontological (material, in the jargon of Husserl) plurality and multiplicity of being. Being is only as beings, yet not in the sense in which the latter term is usually used to translate Heidegger’s ontological difference between Sein and Seiendes, being and entity (sometimes: being and beings). But rather in the peculiar sense according to which Sein is always already a multiplicity (of regions).21 “Regions” do come only and always in the plural, just like Sein (beings). Nobody  See the entire text Nr. 17 in Hua XXXIV, 264–278 on the question about the sense of being in relation to Heidegger, in which Husserl re-asserts with even greater emphasis the points we are making in these pages as regards the meaning of the empty “something” and the material-­ ontological plurality. 20  For a different perspective, see Mohanty, 1970, 128–151; and Arnold, 2020 for a more recent and critical analysis of the concept of object in Husserl’s phenomenology. 21  For an analysis of how to understand the problem of “analogy” in Husserl in connection to its material and regional ontology, see the beautiful study by Mariani, 2012. As the reader can imagine, the discussion of the problem of analogy in Husserl goes far beyond the scope of this book and its author’s expertise. On the concept of “multiplicity” in Husserl and its importance for the theory of constitution, see Majolino, 2012. 19

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seems to have grasped this aspect of Husserl’s ontological discourse more clearly than Herbert Spiegelberg. As he exclaims in his essay of 1930 on ontology and the doctrine of ideas with explicit reference to the ontological doctrine of Ideas I, “There is no absolute formal being, but only a being that differs from sphere of being to sphere of being” (Spiegelberg, 1930, 6).22 There is no gran mar de l’essere, no vast sea of undifferentiated being (as Beatrice says to Dante in Paradiso I, 113), precisely because Husserl understands being geographically. Husserl’s notes and remarks on his own copy of Being and Time will confirm our reading thus far. Next to Heidegger’s reference to Aristotle’s recognition of the unity of “being” as a transcendental (see Heidegger, 1967, 3; Heidegger, 2010, 2), Husserl writes that, “All entities have in common with all [other] entities that without which entities as such are not thinkable, and that is the formal ontological. For the logical categories are the formal modes of the entity as such; every individual concrete entity is in being as a concretion of these forms” (Husserl, 1994, 11; Husserl, 1997, 276). A few pages later, while commenting upon Heidegger’s statement that the question about the sense of being “requires its own conceptuality” (Heidegger, 1967, 6; Heidegger, 2010, 5), Husserl notices, “in formal generality, the formal-ontological conceptuality” (Husserl, 1997, 276). Last but not least, at the bottom of page 10 (§3), where the problem of the fundamental concepts of the sciences (and their regional limits) is tackled, Husserl remarks, “If by ‘entity’ we understand the something in general in formal-ontological generality, then we encounter the question: is there an apodictic path leading from formal ontology to a real [ontology]? There are no other concepts of ‘being’ here, and thus [no other concepts] of the structure of ‘being’ either” (Husserl, 1994, 12; Husserl, 1997, 280). For Husserl, being in general is the “something in general” of formal ontology (“There are no other concepts of ‘being’ here”). This view, however, does not reduce Sein to a mere abstraction; quite the opposite. To say that Sein is the empty something in general means to recognize its irreducible material and regional plurality. This is what Husserl intends to suggest when he points out, “If by ‘entity’ we understand the something in general in formal-ontological generality, then we encounter the question: is there an apodictic path leading from formal ontology to a real ontology?” If by Sein (Husserl does not make any distinction between Sein and Seiendes) we mean the empty something in general, then the real question is the question about its materialization.23  See De Santis, 2021a, 2021b, 225 ff., on Husserl’s ontological plurality principle from the angle of the problem of the a priori. 23  We are of course fully aware that for Husserl “formal ontology” is a science of its own and that formal-ontological categories represent “that without which entities as such are not thinkable.” We are in this case following Spiegelberg’s interpretation of the relation between formal and material ontology, the importance of which has yet to be recognized in Husserl scholarship. In his essay of 1930, Spiegelberg understands in a quite peculiar way Husserl’s own statements from Ideas I according to which, “As what is most universal, the formal (das Formale) includes everything else not only under itself, but in a certain sense also in itself. Hence, it cannot be considered without the material (das Materiale), even though it will always remain distinct from it (von diesem immer verschieden bleibt)” (Spiegelberg, 1930, 7). For example, the formal part-whole relationship can22

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8. But the statement that this is the point where Husserl and Heidegger part company once and for all presupposes that, at least up to this very point, they would be walking together, side by side. On what would they possibly agree? They would agree upon the “emptiness” of being. Husserl regards Sein as an empty form, whose materialization means the regional multiplicity of the ontologies. And it is by alluding to such emptiness that Being and Time opens up: “On the basis of the Greek point of departure for the interpretation of being a dogma has taken shape which not only declares that the question of the sense of being is superfluous, but even sanctions its neglect. It is said that ‘being’ is the most universal and emptiest concept (leerste Begriff)” (Heidegger, 1967, 2; Heidegger, 2010, 1). According to Heidegger, the dogma does not consist in the theses that being is “the most universal” and “the emptiest concept”; rather, it consists in the conviction that one could conclude from them that “the question of the sense of being is superfluous.” As he also remarks, “The indefinability of being does not dispense with the question about its sense but forces it upon us” (Heidegger, 1967, 4; Heidegger, 2010, 3). But if this is the point on which Husserl and Heidegger would both agree, then why would they part company? The acknowledgment that Sein materially obtains only as an irreducible multiplicity of “regions” leads Husserl to address the problem of the relation between such many regions. As we saw over the course of Volume 1, Chap. 6 (§6), the concept of the transcendental, hence the problem of the “relation” between the macro-­ region “pure consciousness” and the macro-region “world” (and within the latter between the many intra-worldly regions), is a most direct result of the materially irreducible multiplicity of being. Indeed, it is only by first recognizing the ontological and material irreducibility of the macro-region “pure consciousness” to the macro-region “world,” and vice versa, that one is also entitled to speak of a transcendental “relation” between them. The “relation” between consciousness and

not be fully understood ontologically without taking into account the different meanings it can take on depending on the specific “material” essence  of the entity which it characterizes. Since our ambition here is not to defend Spiegelberg’s reading of Husserl, but rather simply to suggest a possible direction, we can refer the reader to De Santis, 2014, 102–129 and ff. Up to a certain extent, Spiegelberg would argue, the very talk of formal conditions of thinkability is pointless unless one actually refers to a specific, and materially determined ontological domain. For example, as we saw above, the impossibility of thinking separately “color” and “extension” and two non-­ independent objects is not the same as the impossibility of thinking of an individual thing (= individuum) without also including all its material-regional determinations. This is the reason why in his text Spiegelberg invests a great deal of energy and time in distinguishing the many different species of (material) unities and wholes, hence the many different and materially determined part-­ whole relations. Of course, the point would be to better understand what he intends to say when he affirms that das Formale and das Materiale are verschieden, “distinct” and yet however “inseparable.” For a different Husserlian perspective, see Hopkins, 1993, 33 and ff.

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world can only be of transcendental nature because of the very ontological gap between the two. In the case of Heidegger, the emptiness of being does not lead him prima facie to a materialization of Sein into a multiplicity of regions (though we know that he would recognize a plurality of modes of being (see our analyses in Chap. 1, §§4 and 9 of the present volume)); rather, its emptiness and universality leads him to regard being as a “problem,” thereby positing anew the very question about its sense.24 But the question about “the sense of being” is in the first place the question about the mode of being of the entity which alone “understands” being (see our analyses in Volume 1, Chap. 5, §§3–4). It is in fact only by elucidating the mode of being (= its existence) of this entity, i.e., the manner in which it generally understands being that one can also possibly clarify the multiplicity of being in the sense of the very multiplicity of regions and possible modes of being of the entities. In the case of Husserl, we go from the emptiness of being through the regional definition (original materialization) to its irreducible “multiplicity.” It is the latter that makes it possible for Husserl to construe “transcendentally” the “relation” between “pure consciousness” and “world.” In the case of Heidegger, on the contrary, we move from the emptiness and “indefinability” of being to the question about the sense of being and the analysis of Dasein’s “existence,” notably, that specific existential called Verstehen, “understanding” or “comprehension.” Now, it is at this very point that they would start launching against one another a series of heavy accusations and criticisms. Heidegger would in fact point out that as long as the question of “the mode of being” of consciousness is not raised and not properly elucidated, we cannot even justify the very existence of phenomenology (in the Husserlian sense of the expression) as the eidetics of “pure consciousness.” Indeed, as long as we do not recognize that “pure consciousness,” notably its “mode of being,” is merely the result of Dasein’s self-thematization (and existential modification), and that the latter is grounded in existence as the “ontico-ontological” condition of possibility of every science, as long as we do not recognize this, we were saying, the possibility of phenomenology as the eidetic science of transcendentally reduced phenomena remains unjustified.25

 In his lectures of 1928 on Leibniz, Heidegger makes a remark that seems to go precisely in the direction of Husserl and his understanding of the relation between “being” and the regional multiplicity. Here is the text: “The term ‘being’ is meant to include the span of all possible regions. But the problem of the regional multiplicity of being, if posed universally, includes an investigation into the unity of this general term ‘being’: into the way in which the general term ‘being’ varies with different regional meanings. This is the problem of the unity of the idea of being and its regional variants” (Heidegger, 1978, 192; Heidegger, 1984, 151). Now, the reference to Aristotle, hence to the problem of the unity of being vis-à-vis its regional variants, immediately tells us to what extent Heidegger’s position should not be identified with Husserl’s own view. Aristotle (and Heidegger) does not recognize any ontological instance higher than the supreme genus: hence, the “variants” Heidegger has in mind when he speaks of “regional multiplicity of being” is the generic variant and the generic multiplicity. 25  “All ontology, no matter how rich and tightly knit a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains fundamentally blind and perverts its innermost intent if it has not previously clarified the 24

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As we already verified in Chap. 1 (§4) of the present volume, what on the contrary Husserl would accuse Heidegger of is the following: “Heidegger transposes or changes the constitutive-phenomenological clarification of all regions and universals, of the total region of the world, into the anthropological; the whole problematic is shifted over: corresponding to the ego there is Dasein, etc. In that way everything becomes ponderously unclear, and philosophically loses its value” (Husserl, 1994, 13; Husserl, 1997, 284); what follows is that, “The ontologies whose theme is entities with a non-Dasein character of being” become impossible (Husserl, 1994, 13; Husserl, 1997, 284). The modes of being of the non-Dasein kind of entities are reduced to being nothing but an expression (Zuhandenheit) of the mode of being of Dasein itself (Existenz). The question of the sense of being ends up undermining the possibility of the ontological multiplicity (of the many different modes of being of the entities). As we have already emphasized, what really matters in Husserl’s own Randbemerkung above is not the reference to the “anthropological” dimension of Heidegger’s position; rather, what for the sake of our discourse primarily matters is the mention of “all regions and universals.” What, in Heidegger’s view, represents the sole condition of possibility of Husserl’s conception of phenomenology (= a preliminary investigation of the mode of being of Dasein) is for the latter what would on the contrary make impossible the very multiplicity of being upon which his conception of the transcendental first necessarily rests. While Heidegger regards Husserl’s position to be affected by a lack and a shortcoming (= Husserl skips over the analysis of the mode of being of Dasein and its existence), Husserl deems Heidegger’s point of departure to be the result of a confusion instead between transcendental phenomenology as a “first philosophy” (the transcendental subjectivity) and philosophical anthropology (“I, this human being, am the one…”). We saw in §3 in what sense Heidegger misunderstands the notion of region that Husserl introduces in Ideas I. Whereas the latter is characterized as the unity of a system of highest genera in such a way that it does not coincide with any one of them, Heidegger explicitly construes the region as a supreme genus, thus underplaying or ignoring its novelty. Of course, the question whether Heidegger would accept to characterize Dasein in terms of region based upon such different understanding of the concept would have to be answered in the negative. For even if Heidegger were to recognize that a region is not to be identified with a genus, he would still claim that the attribution or self-attribution of a sachhaltiges Was to Dasein is the result and can only be the result of an existential modification upon the part of Dasein itself. Dasein does not prima facie delimit a region of being, no matter how this is understood. Only the “human being,” as the subject matter of philosophical anthropology, circumscribes a region of the entity.

sense of being sufficiently and grasped this clarification as its fundamental task” (Heidegger, 1967, 11; Heidegger, 2010, 12).

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9. Before we close this chapter, one more fundamental aspect must be discussed which has not yet received enough attention in Husserl scholarship. As we verified over the course of Chap. 1 (§7) of this volume, during his lectures of 1923–24 Introduction to Phenomenological Research and the discussion of consciousness in his “regional sense,” Heidegger makes the following remark: “Consciousness stands for nothing other than a region of specific events that have the character of lived-experiences. The concept of consciousness must be understood in this regional sense. Husserl still holds fast to this understanding today [our italics]” (Heidegger, 1994, 54–55; Heidegger, 2005, 40–41). What is of interest for us now is the very last sentence, the one in italics. What does it mean to say in 1923–24 that “Husserl still holds fast to this understanding today”? What understanding? The passage can in fact be interpreted in two different ways, depending upon which aspect of the argument we decide to take into account. If we focus on the concept of region, then Heidegger is saying that Husserl still holds fast to the regional conception of the transcendental subject today (in 1923–24). If by contrast we decide to focus on the concept of consciousness, then Heidegger would be claiming that Husserl still holds fast to the conception of the transcendental subject as a pure consciousness in the sense of the first volume of Ideas. Now, as we saw and explained in Volume 1, Chap. 3, §4, Husserl starts speaking of “a priori egology” and of the region “concrete ego” or, far better: of the “concrete region: ego” at least officially from the lectures of 1922–23 on (Hua XXXV, 225, and 261). Heidegger would then be right in pinpointing the regional conception of the subject to which Husserl is still holding fast at the time of his Introduction to Phenomenological Research. Yet, he would be wrong in stating that the region Husserl is striving to characterize “ontologically” is still the same as the one explored in the book from 1913. But why would all of this properly matter? In the end, in fact, and regardless of whether we speak of pure consciousness or concrete ego, what Heidegger would firmly dismiss is the general regional characterization of the entity which we ourselves are. Contrary to what it might at first seem, this issue is of the greatest importance for us. For we can now make a point which we could and should have made earlier, during our assessment of the development of Husserl’s view on the transcendental subject over the course of Volume 1, Chap. 3. If we did not make this point back then, however, it was mostly in order not to add a further difficulty to an already difficult discourse. As the reader shall remember, one of the conclusions of Volume 1, Chap. 3 was that a main difference must be acknowledged between Husserl’s own conception of the region in terms of “pure consciousness” (in Ideas I) and that of the region as a “concrete ego” or monad (which is on the contrary peculiar to Husserl at least starting from 1922 onward and that is officially presented in the Cartesian Meditations). Two different views on what the region of phenomenology is: either pure consciousness or the concrete ego (= the monad). This being rehearsed, the time is now ripe to correct this reconstruction of Husserl’s position. As far as we can tell, the technical expression region is seldom

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to be found in the text of the Cartesian Meditations: Husserl never resorts to it to characterize the concrete ego or monad.26 In other words, and to make our point explicit: the “concrete ego” understood as the unity of worldly concreteness + historical concreteness + ontological concreteness (see Volume1, Chap. 3, §§2–4) is no longer referred to as a “region of being” (not even in the sense of the lectures of 1922–23). The term region in fact appears only on six occasions and always refers to domains of being other than that of phenomenology now understood as the self-­ explication of the monad. The most evident appearance is in the title of §29: Material and Formal Ontological Regions as Indexes Pointing to Transcendental System of Evidence. In this paragraph, the term region appears a second time to designate the many ontological domains included in the world as a whole: Besides formally universal investigations, that is to say, investigations that confine themselves to the formal-logical (formal-ontological) concept of any object as such (and thus indifferent to the peculiarities of the various particular categories of objects, we have then what prove to be the tremendous problems of that constitution which occurs with respect to each of the highest and no longer formal-logical categories (the regions) of objects, such as the regions subsumed under the heading: objective world (Hua I, 98; Husserl, 1993, 63).

Here the term region is employed only to designate the material domains (not the formal ones) that make up what we call objektive Welt. This is also the sense in which it is used twice in §21, where Husserl speaks of “real regions,” and alludes to the way in which the many regions correspond to the several different modes of the “transcendental constitution” (Hua I, 88; Husserl, 1993, 50). Later on, in §64 Husserl explicitly speaks of “regions of being” or “ontological regions” (Seinsregionen): The concepts making up the formal demarcations of the formal idea of a possible universe of being in general. Hence, they must be the genuine concepts that are fundamental to all sciences. […] This is true of all the fundamental concepts that concern the concrete structure and the total structural form of sciences that relate (or can be related) to the various regions of being” (Hua I, 180; Husserl, 1993, 154).

Now, that the subject matter of phenomenology is no longer to be technically taken as a “region” of being can be directly surmised from the manner in which Husserl frames its relation to the various ontologies or eidetic sciences. A few lines after the excerpt above, Husserl explains the following: We can now say likewise that, in a priori transcendental phenomenology, all a priori sciences without exception originate with a ultimate grounding, thanks to its correlational research, and that, taken with this origin, they belong within an all-embracing a priori phenomenology itself, as its systematically differentiated branches. This system of the all-­ embracing a priori is therefore to be designated also as the systematic unfolding of the all-­

 The term appears only in the French translation of the Sommaire des leçons du professeur E. Husserl (Hua I, 196 and 197). The two expressions are: une région de l’être et de connaissance; la région de l’Ego pur. But they do not have any correspondence in the original German text of the Inhaltsüberblick: the first appearance of the French région corresponds to the German Seinssphäre (Hua I, 189), while the second has no correspondence at all. 26

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embracing a priori innate in the essence of a transcendental subjectivity (and consequently in that of a transcendental inter-subjectivity), or as the systematic unfolding of the universal logos of all conceivable being. In other words: as developed systematically and fully, transcendental phenomenology would be ipso facto the true and genuine universal ontology, not, however, just an emptily formal universal ontology, but also one that comprised in itself all regional possibilities of being [our italics], and did so in respect of all the correlations pertaining to them (Hua I, 181; Husserl, 1993, 155).

Phenomenology becomes a universal ontology as soon as all the other “ontologies” are grounded in it: “all regional possibilities of being” are comprised within such a universal concrete ontology and are thereby grounded in phenomenology. The concept of a “universal ontology” and that of “regional possibilities of being” do not coincide: the former is wider than the latter in that it also comprises within itself transcendental phenomenology as the very “self-explication” of the monadological inter-subjectivity. All the regions of being are grounded in the transcendental monadic (inter-)subjectivity which is not a “region of being.” In short, the universal ontology is the synthesis or unity of a non-region together with all the material regions of the world (= primum concretum). As if now the term region could be used only to mean worldly material regions, i.e., what is constituted, yet not what transcendentally does the constitution. Now, if we are on the right track, the interpretation of the development of Husserl’s stance on the subject sketched in Volume 1, Chap. 3 must be revised to take into account the following double distinction. • On the one hand, there obtains the infra-regional distinction between the region “pure consciousness” and the region “concrete ego”: both being understood as regions of being. • On the other hand, there is the distinction, within the conception of the subject as a “concrete ego”, between its regional conception (explicitly presented in the Introduction to Philosophy of 1922–23) and its non-regional determination (which is epitomized by the monad of the Cartesian Meditations). This being recognized, the question might turn out to be: Should the decision not to characterize anymore, in the Cartesian Meditations, the concrete ego as a “region” be regarded as a consequence of Heidegger’s criticisms? Or at least of Husserl’s direct confrontation with the analytics of Dasein of Being and Time? Although the temptation is, or would be, quite strong to answer the question in the affirmative, the truth is that we are not in a position to properly tell. In fact, whereas in the case of Heidegger the decision not to characterize Dasein regionally goes hand in hand with the refusal to primarily ascribe to it any sachhaltiges Was, this is not the case with Husserl. We know in fact from our analyses in Volume1, Chap. 4, §§10–12, that Husserl keeps speaking of the “universal eidos” of the transcendental ego in general (Hua I, 106; Husserl, 1993, 71); and yet, such “ego” is never described as a region. In what sense could the concrete ego or monad be ascribed an eidos, and therefore be eidetically explored and investigated, if it does not circumscribe a region of being? Or if it does not fall under a certain region of being in the very sense in which

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Husserl introduces this idea in 1913? In what sense could phenomenology still be deemed an eidetic science of the “transcendental” and concrete subjectivity (= the monad)? These are all questions that can and must be posited, but to which, unfortunately, the text itself does not provide any kind of answer or solution.

10. With our last remark we have eventually reached the very point in which this second part of our work can be finally brought to conclusion so as to make room for the problems of metaphysics. Husserl’s “skepticism” (to speak euphemistically) about Heidegger’s analytics of Dasein concerns two major points, as we have tried to argue for in both the first and the present volume. In the first place, it concerns the “anthropological” determination of the transcendental subject in terms of Dasein (see in particular Volume 1, Chaps. 1, 2, 5; Volume 2, Chap. 1). In the second place, this being a most direct consequence of that first confusion, it bears upon the impossibility of laying claim to the multiplicity of being or, to put it better, to the many modes of being of the entities (see in particular Chaps. 1 and 3 of this volume). Now, if the former can also be described as a confusion between the domain proper to “first philosophy” (phenomenology as the science of transcendental subjectivity in which all other ontologies and regions of being are grounded) and “philosophical anthropology” respectively—the latter directly affects what Husserl at times labels “philosophical disciplines” in the plural (Chap. 4 of this volume). The confusion between “first philosophy” (= transcendental, yet concrete subjectivity) and “philosophical anthropology” (= “I, this human being, am the one…”) undermines the very possibility of the eidetic sciences (of the different regions of beings) (for the distinction between first philosophy, second philosophies and last philosophy, see Chap. 4 of the present volume). We have addressed how Husserl construes of the “monad” or “concrete ego” (see Volume 1, Chaps. 3, 4), and, more generally, how his view on the transcendental (Volume 1, Chap. 5) is to be related to TI (Volume 1, Chap. 6). Finally, we have seen how and why Heidegger refuses to consider Dasein a region of being (Volume 1, Chaps. 2, 4; Volume 2, Chaps. 1, 2), and also what Husserl intends to designate by such technical term (Volume 2, Chap. 3). With all of this in mind, we can now enter the very last part of our work, the one dedicated to how Husserl understands metaphysics (as last philosophy) and the position this would have in relation to phenomenology as first philosophy and the many second philosophies. Hopefully, the distinction between second philosophy and metaphysics will also be clarified once and for all.

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CODA.2—Husserl, Heidegger and Two Interpretations of Aristotle: A Reading Hypothesis As is known, towards the end of the second session of his 1973 Zähringen seminars, Heidegger proposes to regard Brentano as the common root of his conception of phenomenology and Husserl’s, a common root or a “common trunk” out of which, however, two radically different phenomenologies had branched. At this point, recalling the text “My Way Into Phenomenology,” Heidegger returns to Husserl. He underlines that Husserl’s philosophical point of departure was Franz Brentano, the author of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Now, my own point of departure, he remarks, was the same Franz Brentano, but not this work of 1874; it was far rather in On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle (1862, Freiburg) that Heidegger learned to read philosophy. A strange and significant commonality between Husserl and Heidegger, who both took their first steps with the same philosopher, but not with the same book. My Brentano, Heidegger says with a smile, is the Brentano of Aristotle! (Heidegger, 1986, 385–386; Heidegger, 2002, 72).

The difference between Heidegger’s Brentano and Husserl’s Brentano maps onto the difference between “Greek thought” and “the scholastic-modern thought” (as Heidegger remarks a few lines later). If Heidegger took the Aristotle book as a point of departure (for the problem of being), Husserl, on the contrary, developed his phenomenology in the shadow of the book on psychology (for the problem of intentionality). A two-sided Brentano, thereby, two different phenomenologies. Now, this retrospective reconstruction has been substantially challenged by Majolino, 2008 (24 and ff.), who has consistently and convincingly shown that, contrary to what Heidegger maintains, the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, notably, the relation between mental phenomena and intentional object, is the direct result of an application of the ontology first developed in the book on Aristotle. In a few, extremely concise words, the situation could be described as follows. In the book on Aristotle, Brentano’s ambition is to reduce the many different meanings of the Aristotelian τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς27 to the most important meaning of being, being in the sense of “the figures of the categories” (τὸ ὂν κατὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν) (Brentano, 1960, 72; Brentano, 1975, 49). Yet, the categorial determination or sense of being is also in need of a further reduction: the conclusion will be that “being” can be said “properly” in only one sense, that of the οὐσία, in such a manner that all the categories are called being only in relation to it (see for example the title of §12. XI: Da das Seiende, das in die Kategorien zerfällt, πρὸς ἓν gesagt wird [...]) (Brentano, 1960, 144; Brentano, 1975, 94). “Being” is either an οὐσία or is in relation to the οὐσία and then considered an accident in the broadest sense of the term (see Majolino, 2008, 23). The cardinal distinction between “substance” and what is πρὸς-substance results in the distinction between different modes of existence (Existenzweisen or Weisen der Existenz). Herman Schell, a Würzburg student  “the fourfold distinction of being of accident (ὂν κατὰ συμβεβεκός), being of the true (ὂν ὡς αληθές), being (ὂν) of the categories, and being as potentiality and as act (ὂν δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργεία)” (Brentano, 1960, 7; Brentano, 1975, 3–4). For a critical reading of Heidegger’s early position vis-­à-­vis Brentano, see Shoichet, 2013. 27

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of Brentano, had already pointed out that the different “categories” signify “the forms of the different modes of in-inexistence,” of existing in the substance or in a relation to (πρὸς…) it (Schell, 1873, 4). The general distinction between “proper” and “improper” (meanings of being), hence, the one between different modes of existence represents the one major axis around which the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint revolves. For the difference between proper and improper mode of being or existence results in the distinction between “mental phenomena” (which exists in a real and intentional mode), mental contents of physical phenomena such as sounds, colors, and so on (which exist in an intentional way, but also have a claim to existence), and every other mental content (e.g., general objects, fictions, entia rationis, and so forth), which on the contrary exists exclusively in an intentional way (see Majolino, 2008, 27). As Brentano himself explains, for example in Book 2, Chapter I, Further we found that the intentional in-existence, the reference to something as an object, is a distinguishing characteristic of all mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything similar. We went on to define mental phenomena as the exclusive object of inner perception; they alone, therefore, are perceived with immediate evidence. Indeed, in the strict sense of the word, they alone are perceived. On this basis we proceeded to define them as the only phenomena which possess actual existence in addition to intentional existence (Brentano, 1973, 187; Brentano, 1995, 74–75).

Only mental phenomena are in the mode of real existence, whereas all the objects to which they refer are in the mode of “intentional in-existence” or intentionale In-Existenz (whether purely intentional or with a claim to real existence). The cardinal distinction between the one and only proper “mode of existence” of the οὐσία and the improper modes of existence of whatever is in relation (πρὸς) to it (all the remaining “categories”) is perfectly epitomized, in the psychology book, by the cardinal distinction between the one and only proper mode of existence characterizing mental phenomena and the improper one of what they refer to… (πρὸς), of what in-exists intentionally in them as an object or content.28 Contrary to what Heidegger suggests, the Aristotle book of 1862 and the Psychology of 1874 share the very same ontological apparatus and conception, they are part of the very same ontological project. In this respect, Heidegger is not simply the heir to the Greek Brentano in contrast to an alleged modern Brentano. He is the heir to Brentano sic et simpliciter to the extent that the latter’s ontological ambition is to identify and distinguish different modes of (proper and proper) being and modes of (proper and improper) existence. If then one were to pinpoint any possible structural analogy between Brentano’s enterprise (in both books) and Heidegger’s project, this would consist in the following. Just like the former identifies one fundamental proper mode of existence in the οὐσία first (1962), in the mental phenomena then (1874) to which all the others refer back, so Heidegger  For a confirmation of this reading, see the recent Antonelli & Boccaccini, 2021, 85–86 “L’impegno che Brentano profonde nel campo della psicologia empirica non si configura dunque come una deviazione dai precedenti interessi ontologici, ma si traduce nel compito di individuare in campo psicologico […] la natura dell’essere in senso proprio.” 28

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regards the mode of being of Dasein (= its existence) as the fundamental mode of being, in such a way that the modes of being of all non-Dasein kind of entities refer back to it or, to put it better, they are the expression of Dasein’s mode of being and its understanding of being. Let us not overlook the openly Brentanian tone which Heidegger uses in presenting the problem of being at the very beginning of Being and Time: “the ontological task of a genealogy of the different possible modes of being (möglichen Weisen von Sein) (which is not to be constructed deductively) requires a preliminary understanding of ‘what we properly (eigentlich) mean’ by the expression ‘being’ [our italics]” (Heidegger, 1967, 11; Heidegger, 2010, 10). Contrary to what Heidegger affirms, if there must be any demarcation line between his phenomenology and Husserl’s, it cannot be found in the difference between the “Greek” and the “modern” Brentano. Rather, it will have to consist in the difference between Brentano, his conception of ontology and his interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy, and a radically different interpretation of Aristotle. The analogy that we would like to suggest, and which is worth being pursued more systematically than we can do here, is that Brentano is to Heidegger as Otto Apelt (and his interpretation of Aristotle) is to Husserl (and his conception of being).29 The text to which we are referring is Die Kategorienlehre des Aristoteles, included in the volume of 1891 Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie. In contrast to Brentano’s reductio ad unum, Apelt opens up his text by remarking, “Per se taken, the ‘entity’ (das Seiende) is nothing but a blank white sheet (ein leeres weißes Blatt), on which one must first write something if it has to have meaning at all” (Apelt, 1891, 112). Later, he will speak of “the empty ὄν” (das leere ὄν) to signify that τὸ ὂν as such does not mean a thing (Apelt, 1891, 124). But τὸ ὂν does not have any sort of meaning of its own because, just like Husserl’s Sein, it has a multiplicity of meanings: “being is used in as many meanings as there are categories” (das Sein [wird] in so vielen Bedeutungen gebraucht, als es Kategorieen giebt) (Apelt, 1891, 113). To explain how τὸ ὂν can display a meaning, Apelt writes that, Es bleibt nur Eines übrig […] es ist das ἐστι des Urteils, die Kopula, di an sich leer, erst durch das Prädikat ihre Füllung erhält. Das ἐστι für sich ist nichts; erst das So-sein (d.i., das Prädikat) giebt ihm seine Bedeutung. Das ὄν der Kategorieen ist nichts anderes als die Anweisung auf dies So-sein, auf einen allgemeinen Begriff gebracht, d.h., es ist die Kopula. Denn diese wird eben als ein So-sein durch das Prädikat bestimmt (Apelt, 1891, 112–113).

Leaving aside Apelt’s analyses of predication, what interests us in the present context is the relation between “the empty ὄν” and the multiplicity of its “being-thus” or So-sein. How can we identify and map out all the possible “ontological determinations (Seinsbestimmungen) or predicates according to their natural genera?” (Apelt, 1891, 119). The solution he suggests seems to echo what Ingarden will propose in his 1925 Essential Questions: by analyzing and classifying the possible answers to the question about the object’s τί ἐστι.  For a historical reconstruction, see for example Raspa, 2020, 169–187 on Brentano, and 221–251 on Apelt. 29

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Nun ist zwar nach Aristoteles bekanntlich als eigentliches τί ἐστι nur die Wesensbestimmung des τόδε τι selbst anzusehen. Aber insofern sich die Eigenschaften, Zustände und Beziehungen des τόδε τι, wie überhaupt alle Vorstellungen und Worte abgesondert für sich wenigstens denken lassen, muss auch ihnen in gewissen Sinne ein τί ἐστι, eine Wesensbestimmung, zukommen, die ihnen Aristoteles auch oft genug ausdrücklich zuerkennt. Diese Wesensbestimmung nunc aller möglichen Prädikate durch das τί ἐστι ist nichts anderes als das καθ’αὑτό der Kategorieen, um das es sich hier handelt (Apelt, 1891, 119–120).

The emptiness or, to put it better, blankness of being results in the multiplicity of its essential determinations, in the multiplicity of the So-sein based upon the many possible answers to the τί ἐστι-question. “Ὄντα καθ’αὑτά sind die Kategorieen […] in Rücksicht auf das Verhältnis von Art und Gattung innerhalb ihres (der Kategorien) eigenen Gebietes” (Apelt, 1891, 123). Depending upon the domain, thereby the specific genus-species relation that obtains therein, the τί ἐστι-question will receive a different answer. Hence, “the empty ὄν” will also display a different meaning depending upon the Gebiet. But does this not mean that the τόδε τι, the individual substance no longer has the ontological privilege which is usually ascribed to it by Aristotle? In short, what happens to the τόδε τι in Apelt’s interpretation? Apelt is clear on this point, the τόδε τι does not represent the first category; the first category is the τί ἐστι (Apelt, 1891, 143). The “τόδε τι” can be considered the first category only indirectly (mittelbar): “The τόδε τι is what is determined by the τί ἐστι; the τόδε τι receives its own essentiality (Wesenhaftigkeit) through the τί ἐστι, that is, through an essential concept” (Apelt, 1891, 143). This is why he could already explain that “τόδε τι” means Dasein, Existenz (Apelt, 1891, 130): the existence of a certain determination of the τί ἐστι. Which one, exactly? Answer: the determination of the οὐσία. Hence, Apelt’s definition of the “οὐσία” as the “co-­ implication” (Ineinandergreifen) of τόδε τι and τί ἐστι. In sum, the term οὐσία means the So-sein (τί ἐστι) of a τόδε τι. Every τόδε τι has a certain number of properties, stands in a certain number of states and relations, etc. To each of them (to the τόδε τι itself as well as to all its “properties, states and relations”) pertains a τί ἐστι. In this respect, the “τόδε τι” seems to have in Apelt the very same function that the “individuum” (as the Ur-Gegenständlichkeit) will have in Ideas I. For the different τί ἐστι-questions that one can ask about them will result in different answers and different So-sein-determinations of “the empty ὄν.” If “existence” in the proper sense of the concept characterizes only the τόδε τι, each “category” has its own τί ἐστι irreducible to that of the others. Although one would look in vain in Apelt for something corresponding to Husserl’s “region,” a structural analogy must however to be pinpointed. What Apelt regards as the answer to the τί ἐστι-question about the τόδε τι (the οὐσία-category) is what, in Husserl, points upward in direction of the region (= the sequence is: individuum or τόδε τι—concretum—region); by contrast, the answer to the τί ἐστι-questions about the τόδε τι’s properties is what corresponds to the system of species and supreme genera united by the region. It is also worth noticing that in Apelt the τόδε τι seems to suffer from the very same ambiguity which it

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displays in Ideas. Husserl seems to regard the τόδε τι sometimes as what individualizes a concretum, sometimes as the individuum itself. Similarly, in Apelt the τόδε τι seems to designate sometimes the individual οὐσία, sometimes merely its existence. If there is any difference between Heidegger and Husserl, it has nothing to do with Brentano’s alleged schizophrenic legacy (“a Greek Brentano” vs. “a modern Brentano”); rather, it has to do with two different concepts of being. And it might be the case that such difference harks all the way back to two radically different interpretations of Aristotle: one (Brentano’s) that tends to reduce “τὸ ὂν” to just  one category and proper meaning (οὐσία); the other (Apelt’s) that recognizes the absolute emptiness of being which is also its own irreducible plurality (and without any distinction between proper and improper determinations). CODA.3—Phaenomenologia Sub specie Regionis: A Geography Yet to Be Written The history of the concept of region in phenomenology and, accordingly, the history of phenomenology from the standpoint of the concept of region is one that has yet to be written (let alone the one concerning its appropriation outside the field of phenomenology (Bottani & Davies, 2007)). Now, since the concept of region plays a very crucial role in Husserl’s ontology, notably material ontology, as well as, and more fundamentally, in the way the transcendental (relation between pure consciousness and world) is conceived, then the analysis of one’s perspective on the former will represent the best way to access his or her view on the latter. Since in Husserl the region is the actual “junction,” so to say, between the ontological and the transcendental side of his thought, then any change in the conception of the latter will be mirrored by a change in the conception of the former and vice versa. In this respect, the difference between Husserl’s views in Ideas I and Heidegger’s position in Being and Time is telling. Introducing in his toolbox the concept of region, Husserl moves far beyond the traditional conception of the genus-species Stufenbau; Heidegger, by contrast, explicitly construes of it as if it were no distinction between “region” and “highest genus,” thereby reducing the former to a case of the latter. By the same token, in the first volume of Ideas the peculiarity of the transcendental (relation) directly derives from the ideas of regions and macro-regions: since “pure consciousness” and “world” designate two macro-regions which no further and higher region can unite, then their relation cannot be accounted for ontologically (be it in terms of “independence” or “non-independence”). By contrast, the peculiarity of the transcendental conception proposed by Being and Time rests upon the refusal of the ontological originality of the Husserlian concept of region. For neither Dasein (= its existence) nor the entity encountered by it can be originally characterized in terms of regions (in fact, the plurality of the latter first requires Dasein to undergo an “existential modification,” only thanks to which the Region des Vorhandenen can appear). As we tried to argue for over the course of Chaps. 2 and 4 of the first volume and Chap. 1 of the present volume, the starting point of Being and Time consists in the rejection of Husserl’s ontological geography, so to speak.

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If we take a quick look, even just for a second, at some of the major figures of the early phenomenological tradition, the conclusion must be drawn that it is not clear to what extent the novelty of Husserl’s concept of region was actually and properly perceived. Most of the time, the expression is used without any preliminary clarification of how it should be properly understood. Ingarden speaks of “regions of being” (Ingarden, 1925, 273), and of regional ideas to mean the domain of a priori investigations, i.e., of ontologies (Ingarden, 1929, 162) (and yet it is not apparent what a region would be with respect to the genus-species relation). Also Jean Hering talks of “regional ideas” (Hering, 1921, 533), with the expression “region” however to be understood as “highest genus” (as can be clearly inferred from the example he gives: “the idea of ‘sensible quality sic et simpliciter’”) (Hering, 1921, 531). In this case, a new expression is used (= “region”), yet to mean something that the tradition had already recognized (= “highest genus”). Also Herbert Spiegelberg refers to the region as a “supreme material genus” (see Spiegelberg, 1930, 6), and gives the examples of “color in general” and “quality in general” (Spiegelberg, 1930, 148). Edith Stein does not seem to make any systematic use of the concept of region before Potency and Act of 1931. Here the use or, to put it better, the elucidation of the notion, implicitly, yet undoubtedly understood in a Husserlian fashion (Stein, 2015, 37 and ff.), is superseded by the ambition of identifying the regions’ different “modes of being” and existence (Seinsmodi) based upon the “potency-act” dichotomy of the Aristotelian tradition (Stein, 2015, 81). It is only with an unclassifiable figure such as Nicolai Hartman that the region is granted its importance in order for a “new” idea of ontology (akin to Husserl’s material ontology) to be consistently developed. In Chapter VII of his Neue Wege der Ontologie (Die Schichtungsgesetze der realen Welt), Hartmann affirms that the structure of the world is a unitary whole made up of different, heterogeneous layers (Hartmann, 1942, 255). He refers to such different “layers” as “regions of being” (Seinsregion) and, depending upon the specific region we consider, “the forms of unity, the types of opposition, the harmony, the continuity and the determination” of its elements change accordingly. Each such region or layer corresponds to a category, and every category determines its relevant “concreta” (Hartman uses Husserl’s expression Concretum) (Hartmann, 1942, 255). Now, whether Hartman’s ontology of the real world would correspond to Husserl’s, this is a question that cannot be tackled here; nor do we want to raise the question whether Hartman would accept the existence of “regions” other than those of the material real world (Hartmann, 1942, 256)). What is important for us is the following. While Husserl speaks of the region “nature” and “thing in general” in the singular (within which different “species” and “universal essences” can be distinguished), Hartman speaks of “layers” (regions) in the plural within the material world. Hartman recognizes a plurality of regions within what Husserl would regard as a unitary region instead. Now, while all the authors so far mentioned are mostly ontology-oriented, with Eugen Fink we face a first (= after Heidegger of course) case in which the re-­ elaboration of the transcendental goes hand in hand with a quite specific perspective on the “region.” The text to which we are referring is the famous Sixth Cartesian

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Meditation (Fink, 1988). His “me-ontic philosophy” (Fink, 1988, 183), namely the attempt at determining the transcendental concrete subjectivity in a way that precedes all being (he speaks of “pre-being” or Vor-Sein) (see Fink, 1988, 85; Bruzina, 2004, 365 and ff.), necessarily requires Fink to keep a critical distance from the ontological notion of region. Most of the remarks on the “region” are in §5 (Das Phänomenologisieren als Reduzieren), where Fink’s concern is to clarify what the subject-matter of phenomenology primarily is not (in order to avoid a certain number of confusions). Fink deems the expression “region” (as well as field) used by Husserl in the first volume of Ideas an “embarrassing expression” (Verlegenheitsausdruck). Why? Because it is an expression coined and already used by psychology in the natural or mundane attitude to designate the “closed field” of human immanence (as the subject-matter of psychology itself) (see Fink, 1988, 48). Although we cannot address Fink’s distinction between “mundane” and “transcendental language,”30 it is important to pinpoint what follows. Even though Fink recognizes that, at least at the very beginning, it is basically unavoidable for the phenomenologist to resort to mundane expressions, this is precisely what, at the time of Ideas, gave the false and misleading impression that phenomenology consisted in “the speculative absolutization of human immanence” (spekulative Verabsolutiereung der menschlichen Immanenz) (Fink, 1988, 49). On the contrary, Fink goes on to explain, phenomenology’s subject-matter is not a “region” or a “new field of being” called transcendental subjectivity in opposition to the world (which for Husserl would designate a different “region of being”); rather, phenomenology preoccupies itself with the “constitutive process,” which he also labels: “the constitutive becoming” of the subject and the world together (Fink, 1988, 49). In so doing, Fink can avoid speaking of the transcendental “relation” between (the region) consciousness and (the region) world because both the concept of “being” and that of “region” belong only to the “mundane language” of the natural attitude. The “transcendental” is no longer the result, so to say, of the distinction between two macro-regions; the transcendental (as a constitutive process) follows from Fink’s decision to drop the concept of region (as Heidegger had done in Being and Time and also Husserl seems to do in the Cartesian Meditations) as well as that of being (which both Husserl and Heidegger still retain). The situation turns out to be even more difficult as we approach some of the main authors of post-Husserlian and post-Heideggerian French phenomenology. Husserlian motives intertwine with Heideggerian demands, and vice versa in such a way that the many syntheses, connections and blending of the two make it difficult, if not even impossible, to isolate or single out concepts that one would simply label as either “Husserlian” or “Heideggerian.” In this respect, the “region” really represents an exception in that it is explicitly a Husserlian notion which Heidegger excludes apertis verbis from his fundamental ontology.

 On this, see van Kerckhoven, 1988, Chap. IV; and the beautiful pages by Bruzina, 2004, 463 and ff. 30

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Now, to the extent that the “region” plays a pivotal role in Being and Nothingness, the ontology proposed by Sartre has a clear Husserlian tone. Already at the outset of the book (Introduction), Sartre speaks of “two absolutely separated regions of being (deux régions d’être): the being of the pre-reflective cogito and the being of the phenomenon. But although the concept of being has this peculiarity of being divided into two regions (deux régions) without communication, we must nevertheless explain how these two regions can be placed under the same heading” (Sartre, 1943, 34; Sartre, 1978, lxiii). In a quite Husserlian fashion, regions can be said only in the plural; and if in the first volume of Ideas the region ontologically corresponds to a certain number of a priori, synthetic truths, Sartre can also point out that both the regions of “being in-itself” and of “being for-itself” are ruled over by “synthetic” principles. In the latter case, being for-itself “is defined […] as being what it is not and not being what it is. The question here then is of a regional principle and is as such synthetic.” Similarly, also the “principle of identity” proper to the region of being in-itself is “a regional and synthetic principle of being” (Sartre, 1943, 37; Sartre, 1978, lxv). What sounds Husserlian is: (1) the talk of regions of being in the plural; (2) the idea that each such region has a synthetic principle of its own; (3) the fact that the two main “regions” identified, being in-itself and being for-itself (later on he speaks also of the “ideal region of the self-cause” (Sartre, 1943, 818; Sartre, 1978, 624)), are incommunicables (or, in a more Husserlian language: no ontological, “super-regional” connection obtains between the two). And yet, the starting point in order for the question of the relation between the two to receive an answer is explicitly non-Husserlian, but rather Heideggerian. As Sartre writes at the beginning of Chapter one, “Consciousness is an abstraction since it conceals within itself an ontological source in the region of the in-itself, and conversely the phenomenon is likewise an abstraction since it must ‘appear’ to consciousness.” The concrete can only be a “synthetic totality”: “the human being (l’homme) within the world in that specific union of human being with the world which Heidegger, for example, calls ‘being-in-the-world’” (Sartre, 1943, 41–42; Sartre, 1978, 3). As a consequence, if ontology deals with the different “regions of being” (“in each one of which the notion of being must be taken in an original and unique sense” (Sartre, 1943, 617; Sartre, 1978, 617)), then the problem of how to overcome the “incommunicability” between the regions (= the question of the concrete or synthetic totality) can no longer pertain to ontology. The “unity” between the two regions is a fact and only a fact within the factual world, and the science addressing it is called “metaphysics”: This question of the totality, however, does not belong to the province of ontology. For ontology the only regions of being which can be elucidated are those of the in-itself, of the for-itself, and the ideal region of the “self-cause.” For ontology it makes no difference whether we consider the for-itself articulated in the in-itself as a well-marked duality or as a disintegrated being. It is up to metaphysics to decide which will be more profitable for knowledge […]: will it deal with a being which we shall call the phenomenon and which will be provided with two dimensions of being, the dimension in-itself and the dimension for-itself (from this point of view there would be only one phenomenon: the world) (Sartre, 1943, 818; Sartre, 1978, 624–625).

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For metaphysics, not ontology, is what properly addresses “concrete” and factual totalities. It is metaphysics that seeks to explain why “there is a particular world” with such and such a structure (“We apply the term ‘metaphysical’ to the study of individual processes which have given birth to this world as a concrete and particular totality” (Sartre, 1943, 811; Sartre, 1978, 619)). Of course, and here a further discrepancy between Husserl’s and Sartre’s regions must be emphasized, what the latter labels “ontology” (as the study of the structures of being) is no eidetics, no scientific, a priori investigation. The principle of regional plurality is kept (although Sartre’s regions of being are not Husserl’s regions of being), whereas that of their scientific investigation falls away. There is nothing between “ontology” (= the study of the structures of being) and “metaphysics” (= the study of concrete totalities), no “transcendental” in the Husserlian sense, the job of which would consist in bridging the gap between pure consciousness (as a region) and world (as a region). In Phenomenology of Perception by Merleau-Ponty, the expression region seems to basically play no real role; for it appears either in a sort of non-technical way (e.g., when Merleau-Ponty speaks of the horizons of perception, which constitute “new regions of the total world” (see Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 54; Merleau-Ponty, 1958, 35)) or in a way that is reminiscent of Fink (whose Sixth Meditation Merleau-­ Ponty had indeed read). During the description of the transition from the phenomenal field to the transcendental one, Merleau-Ponty points out: “At the same time the phenomenal field becomes a transcendental field. Since it is now the universal focus of knowledge, consciousness definitely ceases to be a particular region of being, a certain collection of ‘psychic’ contents; it no longer resides or is no longer confined within the domain of ‘forms’ which psychological reflection had first acknowledged” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 77; Merleau-Ponty, 1958, 69, trans. modified). The term region, notably region of being seems to be understood in the sense in which Fink used it (at least for what concerns its application to “consciousness”): as far as we can tell based upon Merleau-Ponty’s own words here, it is psychology that would speak of region and understand consciousness as a “region” in the sense of “a certain collection of ‘psychic’ contents.” Yet, as soon as the transition to the transcendental dimension is accomplished, and le monde vécu becomes the subject-­ matter of the description, then it makes no sense to keep speaking of (particular) regions of being. The situation in The Visible and the Invisible is more nuanced. On the one hand, the region is used mostly to designate what the world itself is not: “the ‘world’ […], the ambiguous field of horizons and distances, is not a region of the objective world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 41; Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 23). On the other hand, however, the notion of region (exclusively in the singular) seems to play a crucial role in the new (monistic) ontology here outlined by Merleau-Ponty. He speaks of la région sauvage, “the wild region” with no essence nor Sosein (see Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 152; Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 115); it is an “obscure region,” as he also calls it, “whence comes the instituted light, as the muted reflection of the body upon itself is what we call natural light” (see Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 199; Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 154). If in Sartre one could still speak of regions in the plural, now there seems to be only one region, a region prior to all ontological distinctions and differentiations.

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And if already in Sartre ontology was no longer a synonym for eidetics, Merleau-­ Ponty explicitly denies that our problem here is “to disengage the essence or the eidos of our life in the different regions upon which it opens, [for] this would be to presume that we will find ideal invariants whose relations will themselves be founded in essence” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 208; Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 158). The “region” no longer corresponds to an essence and is no longer to be spoken of in the plural. The line that, starting from Heidegger, runs through Fink, Sartre and Merleau-­ Ponty amounts to a progressive and systematic dissolution of both the original ontological significance of the region and its implications for the transcendental. The situation is quite different if we consider Michel Henry. In The Essence of Manifestation, the concept of “regions” (in the plural) is used in an explicitly Husserlian way; Henry recognizes the existence of a regional plurality, and “In conformity to these diverse regional types and, correlatively, interior to each ‘region’ of being, there exists for being a privileged manner of giving itself” (Henry, 1953, 5; Henry, 1973, 4). Now, the question for Henry is whether the sense of phenomenology, the subject-matter of which is the “ego,” can be reduced and limited to that of a regional investigation among others: “The meaning of the phenomenology of reason remains nevertheless limited, because the meaning of being, for whose sake it pursues its ontological task, remains subordinate in a radical way to the empire of the ‘regions’” (Henry, 1953, 13; Henry, 1973, 10). The ego, namely, its absolute being and ontological structure cannot and should not be characterized regionally: “the sense of the being of the ego cogito is not a regional sense at all, if it is true that it is in and by this ego that all the possible types of being in general and, by way of corollary, all the types of sense that are immanent to them, are constituted” (Henry, 1953, 32; Henry, 1973, 25, trans. mod.). Henry refuses to characterize the ego regionally precisely because, à la Husserl, the ego is the principle of the constitution of all possible species of being. The very essence of the ego cogito (the sense of its being, in Henry’s words) dispenses with all possible regional characterization. In a manner that is strongly reminiscent of Heidegger, it is not the regional characterization of consciousness (as a new “macro-region” of being) that determines the very transcendental constitution of the world (as a different macro-region); rather, it is the transcendental itself that seems to be incompatible with the concept of region through and through. In other words, what does the constitution of all regions of being, Heidegger would contend, cannot itself be a region. Later on, in the opening pages of Material Phenomenology, Henry will deny that “life” (“phenomenological life in the radical sense where life defines the essence of pure phenomenality”) is a “region of being,” and that the living could circumscribe a “regional ontology” (Henry, 1990, 7; Henry, 2008, 3). We can conclude here our tentative, and partial history of phenomenology sub specie regionis.31 The goal was not only to make the case for the necessity of future research; the point for us was to make a series of examples in order to better justify and corroborate part of our reading of the Husserl-Heidegger controversy. For what

31

 See Klev, 2017 on Husserl’s conception of region’s influence on Carnap and the Aufbau.

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is properly at stake in the determination, understanding, and mis-understanding of the region is not only one’s conception of ontology (what it is about and how it should be understood), but also and in the first place the relation between ontology and the transcendental sphere.

References Antonelli, M., & Boccaccini, F. (2021). Franz Brentano. Mente, coscienza, realtà. Carocci Editore. Apelt, O. (1891). Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie. Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner. Arnold, T. (2020). The object (s) of phenomenology. Husserl Studies, 36, 105–122. Bottani, A., & Davies, R. (Eds.). (2007). Ontologie regionali. Mimesis. Brentano, F. (1960). Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles. Georg Olms Verlag. Brentano, F. (1973). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Erster Band. Hamburg. Brentano, F. (1975). On the several senses of being in Aristotle. University of California. Brentano, F. (1995). Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Routledge. Brisart, R. (2003). Le général et l’abstrait: sur la maturation des Recherches logiques. In D. Fisette & S.  Lapointe (édité par), Aux origines de la phénoménologie. Husserl et le contexte des Recherches logiques (pp. 23–40). Vrin. Bruzina, Ronald. 2004. Edmund Husserl & Eugen Fink. Beginnings and ends in phenomenology, 1928–1938. : Yale University Press. Costa, V., Franzini, E., & Spinicci, P. (2002). La fenomenologia. Einaudi. de Libera, A. (2014). La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge. Seuil. De Monticelli, R., & Conni, C. (2008). Ontologia del nuovo. La rivoluzione fenomenologica e la ricerca oggi. Milano. De Santis, D. (Ed.). (2014). Di Idee ed essenze. Un dibattito su fenomenologia e ontologia (1921–1930), con saggi di Jean Hering, Roman Ingarden e Herbert Spiegelberg. Mimesis. De Santis, D. (2015). Once again, gigantomachy: Prolegomena to a reinterpretation of the Schlick-­ Husserl quarrel on the synthetic a priori. Archivio di Filosofia, 3, 161–175. De Santis, D. (2021a). Husserl and the a priori. Phenomenology and rationality. Springer. De Santis, D. (2021b). The development of Husserl’s concept of metaphysics. In H. Jacobs (Ed.), The Husserlian mind (pp. 481–493). Routledge. De Santis, D. (2023). Regiony, nejvyšší rody a idea fenomenologické geografie. In J. Čapek, E.  Fulínová (Eds.), Myšlení konečnosti. Pavlu Koubovi 70. narozeninám (pp.  125–134). Karolinum. Drummond, J. (2007). Historical dictionary of Husserl’s philosophy. Scarecrow Press. Fink, E. (1988). VI.  Cartesianische Meditation. Teil 1: Die Idee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre (Hua-Dok II/1). M. Nijhoff. Greisch, J. (1994). Ontologie et temporalité. Esquisse d’une interprétation intégrale de Sein und Zeit. Paris, Presses universitaires de France. Hartmann, N. (1942). Neue Wege der Ontologie. In N. Hartmann (Ed.), Systematische Philosophie (pp. 199–311). Stuttgart und Berlin. Heidegger, M. (1965). Kant and the problem of metaphysics. Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (1967). Sein und Zeit (GA 2). Max Niemeyer. Heidegger, M. (1978). Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (GA 26). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1984). The metaphysical foundation of logic. Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (1986). Seminare (GA 15). V. Klostermann. Heidegger, M. (1994). Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (GA 17). V. Klostermann.

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Majolino, C. (2008). Husserl and the vicissitudes of the improper. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 8, 17–54. Majolino, C. (2010). La partition du réel: Remarques sur l’eidos, la phantasia, l’effondrement du monde et l’être absolu de la conscience. In C. Ierna, H. Jacobs, & F. Mattens (Eds.), Philosophy, phenomenology, sciences. Essays in commemoration of Edmund Husserl (pp.  573–660). Springer. Majolino, C. (2012). Multiplicity, manifolds and varieties of constitution: A manifesto. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 12, 155–182. Majolino, C. (2015). Individuum and region of being: On the unifying principle of Husserl’s headless ontology. In A. Staiti (Ed.), Commentary on Husserl’s ideas I (pp. 33–50). de Gruyter. Mariani, E. (2012). Nient’altro che l’essere. Ricerche sull’analogia e la tradizione aristotelica nella fenomenologia. ETS. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception. Gallimard. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1958). Phenomenology of perception. Routledge. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). Le visible et l’invisible. Gallimard. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). The visible and the invisible. Northwestern University of Press. Mohanty, J. N. (1970). Phenomenology and ontology. M. Nijhoff. Øverenget, E. (1998). Seeing the self. Heidegger on subjectivity. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Overgaard, S. (2004). Husserl and Heidegger on being in the world. Springer. Patočka. (2009, January). Fenomenologické spisy II. OIKOYMENH. Plourde, J. (2003). Nécessité, phénoménologie et essence dans les Recherches logiques. In D. Fisette & S. Lapointe (édité par), Aux origines de la phénoménologie. Husserl et le contexte des Recherches logiques (pp. 125–147). Vrin. Porfirio. (2004). Isagoge. In appendice la versione latina di Boezio. Milan. Porphyry. (2006). Introduction. Translated with a Commentary by J. Barnes. Clarendon Press. Raspa, V. (2020). Origine e significato delle categorie di Aristotele. Il dibattito nell’Ottocento. Quodlibet. Romano, C. (2010). Au Coeur de la raison, la phénoménologie. Gallimard. Romano, C. (2019). Les repères éblouissants. Renouveler la phénoménologie. Paris. Sartre, J.-P. (1943). L’être et le néant. Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique. Gallimard. Sartre, J.-P. (1978). Being and nothingness. Pocket Books. Schell, H. (1873). Die Einheit des Seelenlebens aus den Principien der aristotelischen Philosophie entwickelt. Verlag von Franz Scheuble. Shoichet, A. (2013). From Brentano to Heidegger: Locating the “question of the meaning of being”. In T. Keiling (Hrsg.), Heideggers Marburger Zeit. Themen, Argumente, Konstellationen (pp. 163–175). V. Klostermann. Simons, P. (1994). Particulars in particular clothing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, 553–575. Spiegelberg, H. (1930). Über das Wesen der Idee. Eine ontologische Untersuchung. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 11, 1–238. Stapleton, T. J. (1983). Husserl and Heidegger: The question of a phenomenological beginning. State University of New York Press. Stein, E. (2010). Einleitung in die Philosophie (ESGA 8). Herder. Stein, E. (2015). Potenz und Akt (ESGA 10). Herder. Tinaburri, E. (2011). Husserl e Aristotele. Coscienza, immaginazione, mondo. Franco Angeli. Trizio, E. (2021). Philosophy’s nature: Husserl’s phenomenology, natural science and metaphysics. Routledge. van Kerckhoven, G. (1988). Mondanizzazione e individuazione. La posta in gioco nella Sesta Meditazione Cartesiana. il Melangolo. von Herrmann, F. W. (2000). Hermeneutik und Reflexion. Der Begriff der Phänomenologie beig Heidegger und Husserl. Vittorio Klostermann.

Part II

Metaphysics or, of Last Philosophy

Chapter 4

Husserl Metaphysicus

1. We have finally reached the last part of our investigation. After the assessment of the problems concerning the transcendental subjectivity, and the discussion of the concept of (region of) being, the time is ripe to address what Husserl means by “metaphysics” to bring our investigation full circle. The issue concerning the existence of a properly Husserlian “metaphysics” (or, to put it better: the position that metaphysics would occupy within his system of philosophy) was ignored for a very long time, for almost the entire second half of the last century, and only recently have scholars started paying attention to it. The reason is that most of the twentieth century scholarship on Husserl and phenomenology had condemned (and often still condemns) his relation to what goes by the name of “metaphysics” to an alternative. On the one hand, upon the basis of just one single and famous sentence from the Logical Investigations (to which we will have to come back), there are those who claim that Husserl’s phenomenology is and can be only metaphysically neutral, thus having no or little bearing upon metaphysical questions and concerns (whatever these latter might be).1 From this perspective, the relation between the two is that of a radical aut aut. On the other hand, upon the basis of a statement from the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl is doomed to be part of an all-encompassing “metaphysics of presence” (Derrida, 1967, 3–4), which tends to coincide with the history of Western philosophy. If in the former scenario nobody bothers herself with the question as to what Husserl means by metaphysics when he speaks of metaphysical neutrality, in the latter an alien concept of metaphysics (which is more or less directly derived from Heidegger) is imposed on his thought (De Waelhens, 1949; Diemer, 1954; Fuchs, 1976; Bernet, 1982). The

 For example, Zahavi, 2003, 4, speaks of “rejection of metaphysics.” See Funke, 1972, Benoist, 1997 and Carr, 1999. 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. De Santis, Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics, Contributions to Phenomenology 126, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39590-1_4

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relation between phenomenology and metaphysics is here that of implication: the commitment to Husserlian phenomenology implies volens nolens a commitment to (a non-Husserlian form of) metaphysics. The difficulty of assessing the role that metaphysics has in Husserl derives from the general tendency to approach it “from the outside, i.e., by employing the word ‘metaphysics’ in one or another among its pre- or extra-phenomenological senses” (Trizio, 2019, 310; see Ghigi, 2007,2 and De Santis, 2022). In this respect, it is important to always keep in mind the distinction between the following groups of questions. 1. Does Husserl’s system of philosophy imply a metaphysics in a positive sense of the term? 2. What is Husserl’s own relation to traditional “metaphysical” systems, i.e., the philosophies of the “metaphysical era” (pre-Kantian rationalisms) (see Hua-Mat IX, 189; and De Santis, 2021, 232 and ff. on Husserl and Spinoza)? 2.1 Is there any philosopheme, concept or problem belonging to traditional metaphysics (= 2) that Husserl includes in his own conception of metaphysics (= 1)? 2.2 Is there any philosopheme, concept or problem belonging to traditional metaphysics (= 2) that Husserl approaches non-metaphysically instead? 3. Is there any aspect, philosopheme or concept of Husserl’s own phenomenology that can be regarded as “metaphysical” in a non-Husserlian and negative sense of the expression?3 Whereas 3 concerns the discussion of the metaphysical sense of TI, which then does not fall under 1, Leibniz’s “metaphysical” question concerning the existence of only one real world falls under 2.2 (see De Santis, 2018, and Volume 1, Chap. 5, §§9–10 of this work). In the following, we will concern ourselves only with 1, with the firm conviction (already affirmed in De Santis, 2021a) that Husserl has a specific perspective on metaphysics which progressively and consistently develops throughout his life, and which runs parallel to the development of his view on phenomenology. In a few words, the overall development of Husserl’s metaphysics can be divided into three macro-periods.  Despite its title (La notion de métaphysique chez Husserl), Sivák, 2015 does not tackle the concept of metaphysics in the way Husserl properly understands it; rather, it proposes an analysis of the many aspects of his ontology and of the relations between ontology and transcendental philosophy. Similar is the case with Vannata, 2007. 3  We are under the impression that, albeit they rightly identify the core meanings of Husserl’s metaphysics, Arnold & D’Angelo, 2020 tend to use the concept of “metaphysics” to cover an array of different themes which have nothing to do with what Husserl means by metaphysics (they include the discussion of ideal objects, the categories, space and time as objects of ontology or also from the standpoint of the theory of constitution, modalities, the mind-body problem and God). Moreover, they end up claiming that “phenomenological metaphysics” is a “metaphysics of the world” (Arnold & D’Angelo, 2020, 21), thus leaving undecided whether by “world” we should mean the world as an idea (= ontology of the real) or as a fact. 2

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I. The first period runs more or less from the beginning of Husserl’s career4 to around 1905: this being the period in which “metaphysics” is called “first philosophy” (see §4 of the present chapter).5 II. The second period starts around 1906–1907 (with the lectures on Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge), and characterizes his thought until the lectures on First Philosophy of 1923–1924. This is the period in which metaphysics undergoes a radical re-elaboration as a consequence of the introduction of the concept of eidetic sciences and the idea of regarding phenomenology as a “first philosophy” (see §§ 5–6 of this chapter): here metaphysics is called “last philosophy.” III. The third and last period is inaugurated by a footnote to the First Philosophy lectures and runs through his latest texts, also including the Cartesian Meditations: Husserl speaks here of “metaphysics in a new sense,” yet without fully renouncing II (see §§ 7–8). For the sake of our problems in the present work, in the following we will strive to achieve two main goals. One, we will try both to elucidate the difference between the three “phases” just distinguished and bring to light the unitary sense that nevertheless underlies them all. Two, and as far as the Husserl-Heidegger controversy is concerned, we will have to shed light on the articulation between phenomenology as a “first philosophy,” what we have already called “second philosophy” (or philosophies), and the different meanings of the term “metaphysics.” As a consequence of this, the necessity will eventually arise to address the irrational character of human existence. Nevertheless, given the ambiguity of the term metaphysics (there seem to be as many concepts of metaphysics as there are phenomenologists), it might be a good idea to start out by preliminarily mentioning how metaphysics was understood within the early phenomenological tradition in order to get a better grasp of the peculiarity of Husserl’s position on the matter. To this end, we have chosen three figures in particular: Peter Wust and his The Resurrection of Metaphysics from 1920; Moritz Geiger’s text The Reality of the Sciences and Metaphysics from 1930; and Heidegger’s view in both Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The decision to refer here to Heidegger should not need any particular justification: what is at stake in the difference between his concept of metaphysics around 1927 and Husserl’s own views is precisely the distinction between first philosophy, second philosophy and metaphysics. For what concerns Wust, we will refer to him for one specific reason: because the reading of Husserl he proposes epitomizes the tendency to confuse or just  Let us not forget that in a famous letter to Peter Wust Husserl explains that, “from the very beginning my philosophy was, and did not want to be anything else but the path (Weg) towards a radically authentic metaphysics, that is, a truly justified and radically scientific metaphysics […]. Already in my 1887 inaugural lecture I defended the idea of a new scientific metaphysics” (Wust, 1967, 30). The reference is to the Antrittsvorlesung in Halle on Die Ziele und Aufgaben der Metaphysik held on October 24th, 1887 (Schuhmann, 1977, 22). 5  Hence, nothing could be more distant from the truth than the claim: “Husserl diskutiert die metaphysischen Fragen erstmals in Texten von 1908–1910” (De Palma, 2019, 188). 4

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overlook the difference between “ontology” and “metaphysics” (in Husserl’s sense of the terms). Finally, the text by Geiger relies on a conception of metaphysics that matches the one endorsed by Husserl himself in the first period (= I), and which nevertheless undergoes a transformation in both II and III.

2. According to Wust, the beginning of the twentieth century is marked by a general and new “steering towards metaphysics” (Hinwendung zur Metaphysik) that characterizes European culture, i.e., not only philosophy but also the many arts, education and so forth (Wust, 1963, XXII). Wust speaks of a rotation of axes (Achsendrehung) that is systematically pushing philosophy away “from the subject towards the object” (Wust, 1963, XXII). Philosophy is finally returning to the object (die Rückkehr der Philosophie zum Objekt) (Wust, 1963, 259), and logic and theory of knowledge are no longer the dominating disciplines. Quite the opposite. Logic stands nowadays still and “astonished before the entrance gates of metaphysics (vor den Toren der Metaphysik)” (Wust, 1963, 13). What about Husserl? Die Göttinger Schuler Husserls aber gleitet geradewegs zur Methode der Intuition, der Wesensschau, und zum alten Realienproblem hinüber. Der herrische Funktionalismus des Denkens, der das Denken aus sich selbst sich erzeugen läßt, ist hier bereits gebrochen: eine ganz andere geistige Haltung macht sich bemerkbar (Wust 1963, 13).

 Wust comes back to Husserl and his phenomenological revolution in chapter three of his book. The Logical Investigations are in fact regarded as “one of the few epoch-making works of recent philosophy”; for their appearance marks “a return to Plato’s κόσμος νοήτος” (Wust, 1963, 146), to “the ancient Platonic problem” (Wust, 1963, 150). Wust had already described the latter as a quite specific form of “realism,” i.e., the one in which “thinking and being are brought together into an essential relation and unity. Thinking will once again be subservient to being” (Wust, 1963, 16). As far as we can tell from the many ways in which Wust speaks of “metaphysics,” the term is used as a synonym for “realism” and “object-oriented ontology” (Wust, 1963, 261). Wust construes the “steering towards metaphysics” of contemporary philosophy also in the sense of a renewed unity: the new “metaphysical tendency” promotes a departure from “the pluralistic isolation of the single provinces of knowledge” towards a larger “unity of all being” (Wust, 1963, 261). “Ontology” (ontologische Metaphysik), “turn to the object” (die Rückkehr zum Objek), “unity” and “totality of being” (Einheit alles Seins): these being the expressions by which Wust characterizes the core-meaning of metaphysics. Now, according to Wust, not only is Husserl’s phenomenology a most perfect epitome of such conception of metaphysics; he is to be regarded as one of the most effective supporters or initiators of die Hinwendung zur Metaphysik. However, as we will soon see, “ontology” and “metaphysics” do not coincide for Husserl. Quite the opposite. And

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if at a certain moment he seems to understand metaphysics and ontology as having the same meaning (we will see “when” exactly), this happens against the backdrop of a twofold notion of metaphysics and in order to better introduce the idea of ontologies as eidetic sciences. That one could describe metaphysics as the science of being is one thing (Husserl does it). That one could thereby also identify “ontology” and “metaphysics,” namely the different modes in which they investigate being, is quite another. There is a completely different situation if we turn to Moritz Geiger’s 1930 work Die Wirklichkeit der Wissenschaften und die Metaphysik. Quite straightforwardly, the subject-matter of metaphysics is presented as “reality” (Wirklichkeit) understood as “the ultimate being” (das letzte Sein) (Geiger, 1966, 3). Or, to frame it better, metaphysics is “the doctrine of the ultimate, independent and self-contained being” (in sich selbst ruhenden Sein) (Geiger, 1966, 1). That such “independent” and “ultimate” being should not be confused nor identified with Wust’s is testified by Geiger speaking of “reality” as Wirklichkeit. In other words, metaphysics does not concern itself with being in general in the sense of Wust’s ontologische Metaphysik (which is what corresponds to Husserl’s ontology); rather, it has to do with the factual or actual “reality” investigated by the many empirical sciences (he speaks of “natural knowledge”). But if metaphysics and the many natural sciences investigate the same “reality,” then the question is, “How do [they] relate to one another?” (Geiger, 1966, 2). If the “sciences” proceed and work independently from any metaphysical consideration, metaphysics cannot ignore them. As Geiger points out at the end of the introduction, metaphysics “understands and clarifies the sciences and their reality” (Geiger, 1966, 13). Metaphysics clarifies what Geiger calls the “immanent presuppositions” of the sciences, the general presuppositions without which the science themselves (be they Naturwissenschaften or Geisteswissenschaften) could not even proceed. They include: “the existence of a world really independent from the subject; and [the fact that] the real existence of the world belong[s] to the immanent ontic structure of these sciences” (see Geiger, 1966, 10). In addition to these “general presuppositions,” Geiger also mentions a series of “specific presuppositions,” those characterizing the many single empirical sciences per se taken: So spielen sich die Geschehnisse von Biologie und Geisteswissenschaften in einem dreidimensionalen euklidischen Raum und einer eindimensionalen Zeit ab, während die relativistische Physik für ihre Welt diese Voraussetzungen ablehnt. So nimmt die Physik ferner die sekundären Qualitäten von Farben und Tönen nicht in die realen Voraussetzungen ihrer Welt mit auf, sondern läßt nur die quantitativen Bestimmungen gelten, während die Geisteswissenschaften die Farben und Töne in ihrer vollen Anschaulichkeit als real anerkennen (Geiger, 1966, 11).

Since it would be non-sensical to play off the “presuppositions” of one science against those of the others (e.g., those of relativistic physics against those of psychology), metaphysics has the difficult task that consists in elucidating the manifold relations between “the immanent ontic structure of the sciences” (their presuppositions) and what Geiger labels “the transcendent ontic structure, the ontic structure of the ultimate being” (Geiger, 1966, 9). When Geiger writes that metaphysics,

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unlike the many sciences that merely provide us with reality (Wirklichkeit), gives “ultimate reality” (letzte Wirklichkeit), this means that metaphysics has the ambition of working out a most unitary picture of reality (“as it is in itself, independent from all appearance to a subject” (Geiger, 1966, 9–10)), within which the different “worlds” of the many empirical sciences will eventually be accommodated. “Reality” and “actuality” (Wirklichkeit), “structural reality sic et simpliciter” (schlechthin), reality “as it is in itself” (sowie es an sich ist), “ultimate reality” (letzte Wirklichkeit), “ultimate being” (das letzte Sein) and “ultimate entity” (das letzte Seiende) (Geiger, 1966, 144): these being the synonyms by which Geiger describes metaphysics. Metaphysics is the doctrine of the “determination” of being as “it is in itself,” and regardless of its appearance to a subject whatsoever. Although Geiger seems never to make the following point, it could be added that if metaphysics is the doctrine of reality as it is in itself, then it must be kept distinct from both “ontology” (to the extent that ontology is the doctrine of being in general and not merely of reality) and “theory of knowledge” (insofar as theory of knowledge investigates being as it appears to a subject).

3. Let us now turn to Heidegger. How is metaphysics to be understood upon the basis of the texts that Husserl himself had read? What is the relation between ontology and metaphysics in them? Surprisingly, in Being and Time metaphysics does not seem to play any significant role, and it is not easy to tell whether Heidegger is in general assigning to it any specific meaning. Passages can be found in which metaphysics and ontology seem to overlap if not even coincide. It is the case, for example, with the very opening page of the book: “The question [of being] has today been forgotten, although our time considers itself progressive in again affirming ‘metaphysics’” (Heidegger, 1967, 2; 2010, 1). A few pages later the same point is made again: “At the outset (§1) we showed that the question about the sense of being was not only unresolved, not only inadequately formulated, but despite all interest in ‘metaphysics’ has even been forgotten” (see Heidegger, 1967, 21; 2010, 21). We do not ignore that in both cases (as in many others) Heidegger writes the term “metaphysics” with inverted commas. The goal of the inverted commas is to mark and emphasize the difference between metaphysics and the question of the sense of being: this difference consisting in the fact that “metaphysics” is the name of a failure, so to speak. “Metaphysics” does not designate something other than ontology, i.e., a discipline whose subject-matter would be different from that of ontology: metaphysics is the name Heidegger uses to refer to the history of all the inadequate attempts at addressing the question of being. This becomes even more apparent if we keep reading from the last quoted page: “Greek ontology and its history, which through many twists and turns still defines the conceptual character of philosophy today, are proof of the fact that Dasein understands itself and being in general in terms of the world”

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(see Heidegger, 1967, 21–22; 2010, 21). As one could also affirm, “metaphysics” is the name Heidegger employs to refer to the history of ontology insofar as—within it (which still defines “the conceptual character of philosophy today”)—Dasein has always been mis-understood “in terms of the world.” That Heidegger can move without further ado from the question of the sense of being to that of Dasein’s self-understanding should not be surprising. If the correct understanding of the question of the sense of being requires a clarification of Dasein’s ontological constitution, a failure in the latter inevitably results in a failure in the former. Metaphysics is the name of a history that failed in correctly addressing the question about the sense of being primarily because it failed in understanding Dasein. The hypothesis can thus be advanced that Heidegger would drop the inverted commas—thereby identifying ontology and metaphysics—if the mis-­ understandings concerning the ontological constitution of Dasein were to be set aside once and for all. Our reading thus far is confirmed by an excerpt from §12: The understanding of being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Dasein first makes possible the insight into its existential spatiality. This insight will keep us from failing to see this structure or from previously cancelling it out, a procedure motivated not ontologically, but ‘metaphysically’ in the naive opinion that human being is initially a spiritual being which is then subsequently placed ‘in’ a space” (Heidegger, 1967, 56; 2010, 57).

Here metaphysics (“‘metaphysically’ in the naive opinion…”) means the failed attempts at “seeing” (Heidegger’s own words) a certain ontological and existential “structure.” Yet, passages can also be found in which metaphysics seems to display a meaning of its own. This is the case with what Heidegger affirms in passing in §49 on the existential analysis of death: Finally, an existential analysis of death lies outside the scope of what might be discussed under the rubric of a “metaphysics of death.” The question of how and when death “came into the world,” what “meaning” it can and should have as an evil suffering in the totality of the entity, all these are questions that necessarily presuppose an understanding not only of the character of the being of death, but the ontology of the totality of the entity as a whole (Heidegger, 1967, 248; 2010, 239).

The expression “metaphysics of death” should quite likely be read as a reference to the 1910 essay Zur Metaphysik des Todes by G. Simmel, where death is analyzed as a part of the phenomenon of life (Simmel, 1900–1911, 57). What is interesting is that metaphysics refers now to something that would follow, and build upon the existential analytics—yet without being identical with it. Only after the analytics has existentially elucidated death as belonging to the mode of being of Dasein can a metaphysics of death be possible that concerns itself primarily with the meaning death has in the factual world as a form of suffering. If we now consider Section Four of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (sub-­ sections B and C), the expression metaphysics is employed with no inverted commas (in the phrase “metaphysics of Dasein”) to refer back to the fundamental ontology of Being and Time:

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No anthropology which understands its own mode of inquiry and its own presuppositions can claim even to develop the problem of a laying of the foundation of metaphysics, to say nothing of carrying it out. The question necessary for a laying of the foundation of metaphysics, namely, the question of the essence of man, belongs to the metaphysics of Dasein. The expression “metaphysics of Dasein” is, in a positive sense, ambiguous. The metaphysics of Dasein not only treats of Dasein, it is also the metaphysics which necessarily is realized as Dasein. It follows, then, that this metaphysics cannot be “about” Dasein as, for example, zoology is about animals (Heidegger, 1965, 239; 2010a, 231).

Of course, it might be argued that Heidegger’s decision to resort to the term “metaphysics” is here motivated by his desire to reconnect to Kant: Kant’s “metaphysics of metaphysics” (Metaphysik der Metaphysik) (Heidegger, 1965, 238; 2010a, 230) becomes Heidegger’s “metaphysics of Dasein” as the one and only possible foundation for ontology in general. In the presentation of its problem as well as in the point of departure, course of development, and final objective, the laying of the foundation of metaphysics must be guided solely and rigorously by its fundamental question. This fundamental question is the problem of the internal possibility of the comprehension of being, from which all specific questions relative to being arise. The metaphysics of Dasein when guided by the question of the laying of the foundation reveals the structure of being proper to Dasein in such a way that this structure is manifest as that which makes the comprehension of being possible. The disclosure of the structure of being of Dasein is ontology. So far as the ground of the possibility of metaphysics is established in ontology, the finitude of Dasein being its foundation, ontology signifies fundamental ontology. Under the designation fundamental ontology is included the problem of the finitude in man as the decisive element which makes the comprehension of being possible. However, fundamental ontology is only the first stage of the metaphysics of Dasein. We are able to discuss here neither this metaphysics as a whole nor the way in which it is rooted historically in concrete Dasein ( Heidegger, 1965, 240; 2010a, 232).

“Fundamental ontology” and “metaphysics” do not fully overlap. The metaphysics of Dasein—the fundamental question of which is “the possibility of the comprehension of being” and its rootedness in Dasein’s finitude—is what makes ontology possible. “Fundamental ontology” is understood as the “disclosure of the structure of being of Dasein” and is “only the first stage of the metaphysics of Dasein.” The “metaphysics of Dasein” preoccupies itself with the “fundamental question” of the understanding of being and the finitude of Dasein (which is what Heidegger had already addressed in §32 of Being and Time); while fundamental ontology consists in “the disclosure of the structure of being of Dasein” (the overall analytics of Dasein of Being and Time) on the basis of the former. The two of them together (metaphysics of Dasein + fundamental ontology) yield the foundation of ontology in general or metaphysica generalis (Heidegger, 1965, 4; 2010a, 1)). The hypothesis that we advanced earlier to the effect that Heidegger could be willing to drop the inverted commas when speaking of “metaphysics” (in Being and Time) in relation to Dasein is here fully confirmed. But Heidegger does not directly identify “metaphysics” and “ontology” (neither as fundamental ontology nor as metaphysica generalis). Metaphysics becomes the term designating the most fundamental aspect already laid out by the fundamental ontology of Being and Time: Dasein’s own finitude and the understanding of being (see Volume 1, Chap. 5, §3).

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Let us add that in the first of the two texts quoted above from Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger remarks that the expression “metaphysics of Dasein” is “ambiguous”: it can mean either the discipline that “treats of Dasein” (the fundamental ontology) or the metaphysics that necessarily is realized “as Dasein” (the event of Dasein’s understanding of being or, even better: the understanding of being that happens “as Dasein”). It is the radicalization of this second meaning (metaphysics “as Dasein”) that Husserl will personally witness while attending Heidegger’s lecture What is Metaphysics? in 1929: The name “metaphysics” derives from the Greek μετὰ τὰ φυσικά. This peculiar title was later interpreted as characterizing the questioning that extends μετά or trans, “over,” the entity as such. […] Human Dasein can comport itself toward the entity only if it holds itself out into the nothing. Going beyond the entity occurs in the essence of Dasein. But this going beyond is metaphysics itself. This implies that metaphysics belongs to the “nature of the human being.” It is neither a division of academic philosophy nor a field of arbitrary notions. Metaphysics is the fundamental occurrence in our Dasein. It is Dasein itself (Heidegger, 1976, 118, 121; 1998, 93, 96).

If in Being and Time, metaphysics and fundamental ontology are fully divorced, so to speak (in the sense that the former stands for the traditionally wrong attempts at addressing the problems of the latter); and if in the book on Kant metaphysics concerns the “fundamental question” of the analytics of Being and Time (the happening of the comprehension of being “as Dasein”), in the lecture What is Metaphysics? metaphysics and Dasein become one and the same and no room is left for “ontology”: “this going beyond is metaphysics itself”; “Metaphysics […] is Dasein itself.” With all of this in mind, we can now move on to Husserl’s metaphysics (there will be time later to compare Husserl with Wust, Geiger and Heidegger).

4. At the beginning of the Prolegomena, Husserl gratifies the reader with the only explicit yet quick presentation of the task of metaphysics that can be found in the Logical Investigations: “Its task is to fix and test (zu fixieren und zu prüfen) the untested, for the most part not even noticed, yet very significant metaphysical presuppositions which underlie at least those sciences that are concerned with real actuality and reality (reale Wirklichkeit)” (Hua XVIII, 26–27; Husserl, 2001, I, 16). Such presuppositions are, for example, that an external world exists, that it is spread out in space and time, its space being, as regards its mathematical character, three-dimensional and Euclidean, and its time a one-dimensional rectilinear manifold; that all becoming is subject to the law of causation, and so forth. These presuppositions, all to be found in the framework of Aristotle’s First Philosophy, are at present ranked under the quite unsuitable rubric of theory of knowledge (Hua XVIII, 27; Husserl, 2001, I, 16).

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The excerpt lays out the general coordinates to understand what has been rightly labeled “Husserl’s early concept of metaphysics” (Trizio, 2019), which characterizes his position until around 1905. It could be roughly and generally described on the basis of the following bullet points: A. The task: metaphysics “fixes” and “tests” the presuppositions of experiential sciences, that is, of only those sciences that deal with actual or real reality (reale Wirklichkeit). B. The subject-matter: the “presuppositions” metaphysics fixes and tests concern the structure of such actual reality investigated by the empirical and experiential sciences. Framed in the words of §5 of the Prolegomena: they concern (i) the existence of an external world, the (ii) nature of space and time, (iii) the relation between becoming and causality. C. Historical origin: although Husserl does not say that metaphysics conceived of in this way is identical with Aristotle’s metaphysics, he maintains that all its problems can “be found in the framework of Aristotle’s First Philosophy.” D. Present situation: the present situation is marked by a confusion between metaphysics and theory of knowledge (or logic). It could be said that A is mostly characterized by the strong attempt at clarifying what metaphysics is about, its status and nature as well as its relations and relevant difference vis-à-vis theory of knowledge (for a more systematic discussion of this problem, see Trizio, 2019, 313 and ff.). Without getting into any thorough analyses of the confusions that, according to Husserl, affect metaphysics in present-day philosophy, let us simply stress the following. In 1903 Husserl will review the book by Julius Bergmann, Die Grundprobleme der Logik (Hua XXII, 162–179), in whose introduction some of the most important views on metaphysics from the end of the nineteenth century are mentioned. The first conception that should be mentioned is F. A. Trendelenburg’s, according to which “metaphysics” and “logic” cannot be separated (nicht voneinander getrennet werden), since they make up together the one theory of science (die Eine Aufgabe einer Theorie der Wissenschaft) (Bergmann, 1895, 15). Since truth means thought’s correspondence with the objects, the harmony is presupposed between the forms of thinking and the forms of being; thus, it is impossible for formal logic to merely treat of the empty forms of thinking without always and already taking into account the content in which they manifest themselves (den Inhalt zu sehen, an dem sie erscheinen). The reference is to the first chapter of the Logical Investigations (Trendelenburg, 1862, 4–14), where metaphysics is “identified” with logic in a wider sense of the term: “this theory of science […] is the fundamental science, the philosophia fundamentalis” (Trendelenburg, 1862, 14). After Trendelenburg, Bergmann moves on to Friedrich Harms, who distinguishes “logic” from “metaphysics.” Metaphysics is the first part of the theory of science and deals with the objects that are in “common to all the sciences”: “being and all its different forms and species” (Bergmann, 1895, 16). Logic treats of the knowing subject: “In other words, logic is the science of the process of knowledge, while metaphysics has to do

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with its content” (Bergmann, 1895, 17). In contrast to Trendelenburg, who “blends together” logic and metaphysics, for Harms they are the two different sides of the same coin, namely, the two different “parts” of the one (more encompassing) theory of science. Finally, Bergmann mentions Ueberweg’s position in the System of Logic: metaphysics includes a general “rational theology,” together with which it yields the first part of “the science of the general principles” which are in common to the totality of being (sie allem Seienden gemeinsam sind) (Bergmann, 1895, 18). The reference is here quite likely to §6 of the introduction (Die Stellung der Logik im Systeme der Philosophie), where Ueberweg identifies “Aristotle’s πρώτη φιλοσοφία” with “rational theology” (Ueberweg, 1865, 10). Let us now approach C. As far as Husserl is concerned, as early as 1898 he regards Aristotle as the father of metaphysics because he is the one who first systematically laid out the science labeled “First Philosophy, πρώτη φιλοσοφία” (Hua-Mat III, 233). Here is the text from the 1898 lectures on Erkenntnistheorie und Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik: “For [Aristotle], it is the discipline from which all the others depend and on which they are grounded; it is the science of the first principles and causes (ἀρχαί αἰτίαι) of all being in general. According to Aristotle, all the other scientific disciplines have to do with specific domains of being; they are ‘ἐπιστήμαι ἐν μέρει λεγόμεναι’” (Hua-Mat III, 233). The reference is to the beginning of Metaphysics, book Γ: Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ’ αὑτό. αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἡ αὐτή. οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν (1003a, 20–26). There is a science which studies being as being, and the properties inherent in it in virtue of its own nature. This science is not the same as any of the so-called particular sciences, for none of the others contemplates being generally as being; they divide off some portion of it and study the attribute of this portion, as do for example the mathematical sciences.

“Metaphysics” should not be identified with any of the particular sciences, as none of them studies being as being (οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν). The particular sciences, by which Husserl has in mind the experiential or empirical sciences (whose subject-matter is the reale Wirklichkeit), “divide off some portion of being and study what particularly pertains to it” (Hua-Mat III, 233). Yet, as Husserl hastens to add, “alongside them a new scientific discipline is required, which has being in general as its object of investigation, and which then studies what theoretically belongs to the entity in its universality (was dem Seienden im Allgemeinen theoretisch zukomme)” (Hua-Mat III, 233–234). By this latter expression Husserl is addressing B, what metaphysics is about (das Sein uberhaupt or das Seiende im Allgemeinen) with respect to the experiential sciences. To be more specific, Husserl speaks here of being (whether as Sein or Seiendes) in a quite peculiar, circumscribed sense: “Metaphysics is the science of reality or actuality (Wirklichkeit) κατ’ εξοχήν”; “the ultimate and deepest knowledge of reality or actuality” (Wirklichkeit) (Hua-Mat III, 245). In the lectures of 1902 on logic, metaphysics (once again labeled “first philosophy”) is the science that treats of the entity in

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general (was dem Seienden im Allgemeinen zukommt) in “the sense of reality” (Sein im Sinne der Realität) (Hua-Mat II, 11); but it is also characterized as “the science of absolute being or of the absolute determinations of being” (Hua-Mat II, 12). In 1905 the designation will be: “the ultimate science of reality (als letzte Realitätswissenschaft)” or “the ultimate science of being” (die Wissenschaft, welche letzte Seinswissenschaft sein will) (Hua-Mat V, 29 and 35).6 In sum, the identification of “being” (τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν) with “reality” (whether Wirklichkeit or Realität) is what prima facie delimits the general field of metaphysics as a science. However, as we know from the Prolegomena, metaphysics is the (ultimate and deepest) science of reality because it “fixes” and “tests” the “presuppositions” of empirical sciences. Otherwise framed, metaphysics is the science of reality, and can thereby be called πρώτη φιλοσοφία because it has a certain priority over those sciences whose presuppositions it fixes and tests: “The sciences are in the first place in need of a metaphysical foundation (metaphysischen Grundlegung) (Hua-Mat I, 5). Using another Aristotelian-sounding term (Metaphysics, 1037a, 15), Husserl refers to the totality of the empirical sciences as “δεύτερα φιλοσοφία,” “second philosophy” (Hua-Mat I, 5).7 Metaphysics is thus eine ergänzende Wissenschaft (Hua-Mat III, 234, 244–245). Trizio has the great merit of having already clarified the question concerning the “incompleteness” of the empirical sciences and “the thematic horizon of metaphysics as the science completing them” (see Trizio, 2019, 319 and ff.). In few paragraphs, Trizio writes, “Husserl shows that those sciences do not in fact and cannot in principle completely satisfy the theoretical interest from which they themselves stem, i.e., they cannot come to an ultimate understanding of the being they investigate, and this precisely because they do not question the natural standpoint within which they operate” (Trizio, 2019, 319). As he further points out, given the fact that the incompleteness consists in the “uncritical acceptance of presuppositions,” a more detailed account of the latter becomes necessary. A most pivotal distinction must be made between implicit or tacit assumptions about real being and explicit hypotheses for the sake of particular groups of phenomena: while the former are common to all the sciences, the latter belong to the many “individual sciences” (Hua-Mat III, 246–247) to the extent that they deal with particular ontological domains (Hua-Mat III, 233). We have already seen the list made by Husserl himself in the Prolegomena. Here he adds the following: • Tacit Assumptions: that there is a world and a multiplicity of things, which are partially identical and partially different; that things have properties and stand in 6  The identification of the subject-matter of Aristotle’s πρώτη φιλοσοφία with the science of the real (Realontologie) characterizes Husserl’s interpretation of the Stagirite still in Formal and Transcendental Logic (Hua XVII, 84). 7  Here is Aristotle’s passage from book Z: “τούτου γὰρ χάριν καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν πειρώμεθα διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ τρόπον τινὰ τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ δευτέρας φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἡ περὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας θεωρία: οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τῆς ὕλης δεῖ γνωρίζειν τὸν φυσικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, καὶ μᾶλλον.”

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relation to one another in the real connection called mutual or reciprocal effect; that things move and change in space and time; that every species of becoming or qualitative movement is the necessary consequence of a certain cause in such a way that the entire course of the world is subject to the unitary law of causality (Hua-Mat III, 246). • Explicit Hypotheses: the different genera and species of molecules and atoms; the many species of longitudinal and transversal waves of physics; the aether with its incredible properties. Generally speaking, the specific laws of physics, chemistry, physiology, etc., to the extent that their laws claim to bear on the real or actual world (Hua-Mat III, 247). As always Trizio has noticed as regards the distinctions between “tacit assumptions” and “explicit hypotheses,” a double conception of metaphysics seems to emerge (Trizio, 2019, 321). On the one hand, there seems to be the Aristotle-inspired conception according to which metaphysics addresses the “assumptions” concerning τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν, reality qua reality; on the other hand, metaphysics seems to be called for to elucidate the hypotheses characterizing the many different sciences. As far as we understand Husserl’s stance (De Santis, 2021a, 484), metaphysics as first philosophy addresses directly and in the first place the first types of assumptions, yet not the second. As Trizio puts it, “Metaphysics is not called for to replace existing scientific theories with new ones, but only to clarify their sense on the bases of the deeper and more general insights into the nature of reality that are gained in the critical elucidation of the first group of assumptions.” In this way, one could affirm the second and “more applied” conception of metaphysics “is edified in light of the results of the first, more classical Aristotelian part of metaphysics.” Therefore, Trizio concludes, “the kind of elucidation that is here in question is one that is made possible by the integration of those sciences (of ‘second philosophy’) into the unitary edifice of the ultimate science of reality” (see Trizio, 2019, 321). Husserl recognizes that, “Clearly, metaphysics must build upon experiential sciences” (So ist es evident, dass sich die Metaphysik wird auf die Erfahrungswissenschaften aufbauen müssen) (see Hua-Mat III, 246). Also in his review of Bergmann, Husserl will write that metaphysics as a science is possible auf Grund aller Einzelwissenschaften (Hua XXII, 168–169). If then metaphysics needs to build upon the many sciences, the meaning of the adjective first or πρώτη cannot designate any kind of anteriority (neither chronological nor in the sense of the factual development of the system of philosophy); metaphysics does not precede the δεύτερα φιλοσοφία, and yet is to be called first due to the nature of its field of investigation: τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν. What makes metaphysics “first philosophy” is the identification of its domain with “the totality of being”; by contrast, since the many sciences investigate each a particular portion of being, therefore do not ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν, they are called “second philosophy” (their secondarity derives from the limited scope of their investigation). The anteriority of metaphysics, if one still wants to retain this way of talking, i.e., its being πρώτη means the anteriority of the whole (τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν) vis-à-vis the many parts into which it is divided off by the sciences. What follows is that the totality of

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the empirical sciences can be unitarily labeled “δεύτερα φιλοσοφία” only as long as it is regarded from the angle of metaphysics. It is only “retrospectively,” namely, after the sciences have already investigated all the different domains of reality, and metaphysics has already clarified their presuppositions, that one can refer to the totality of the Erfahrungswissenschaften (in the plural) as a δεύτερα φιλοσοφία (in the singular). It should be clear to what extent the possibility of metaphysics (as the ultimate “science of being” ᾗ Wirlklichkeit) requires a preliminary theory of knowledge which cannot make any metaphysical assumptions (= metaphysical neutrality). As Husserl says in the 1898 lectures, the questions falling under the heading “theory of knowledge” stand and remain “on the threshold of metaphysics” (an der schwelle der Metaphysik) (Hua-Mat III, 253). Husserl is aware that, depending on the specific assumptions we make on such threshold (for example, “knowing consciousness and known realities are two, necessarily disconnected realities”; “the knowing consciousness is always directed towards something that is really present in it,” and so forth) (Hua-Mat III, 235–236), an overall metaphysics and world-view will also follow (= solipsism, phenomenalism, relativism, etc.). This is the reason why, at the time of the Logical Investigations, Husserl appeals to the all-too-famous, or infamous, “metaphysical neutrality” of his phenomenological descriptions: Pure phenomenology represents a field of neutral research (Hua XIX/1, 6; Husserl, 2001, I, 166). The question as to the existence and nature of “the external world” is a metaphysical question. […] This theory of knowledge […] precedes, therefore, all empirical knowledge of the real, all physical science on the one hand, and all psychology on the other, and of course all metaphysics (Hua XIX/1, 26–27; Husserl, 2001, I, 178). This “clearing up” takes place in the framework of a phenomenology of knowledge, a phenomenology oriented, as we saw, to the essential structure of pure experiences […]. From the beginning, as at all later stages, its scientific statements involve not the slightest reference to real existence: no metaphysical, scientific and, above all, no psychological assertions can therefore occur among its premises (Hua XIX/1, 27; Husserl, 2001, I, 178).

It should be evident in what sense the “phenomenology” of the Logical Investigations can and must appeal to “metaphysical neutrality”; by the same token, it should be evident that such “metaphysical neutrality” does not mean that (Husserl’s early) phenomenology has in general nothing to do with metaphysics. Quite the opposite. And Husserl would agree with the following, harsh judgment once made by Nietzsche about all those philosophies that limit themselves only to problems of knowledge, thereby fully refusing to enter the kingdom of being: “Philosophy reduced to ‘theory of knowledge’ (Erkenntnistheorie): really no more than a shy epochism and doctrine of renunciation; a philosophy that does not even go beyond the threshold, scrupulously refusing itself the right to enter: this is philosophy at its last gasp, an end, an agony” (Nietzsche, 1921, 146). Precisely because Husserl’s ambition is to build up metaphysics as the crowning science of reality, no metaphysical assumptions can be made at the very beginning of the philosophical enterprise.

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For any assumption (concerning for example the being of consciousness, its lived-experiences, and that of the external world) made at the gnoseological level will inevitably result in an unjustified metaphysical view on “τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν,” thereby jeopardizing the very attempt at understanding the phenomenon of knowledge per se taken. The phenomenological clarification of knowledge needs to be metaphysically neutral precisely in order to make metaphysics possible as the ultimate science of being. It is only by first elucidating the possibility for thought to reach being (theory of knowledge) that metaphysics can eventually be possible.8 Husserl’s position does not correspond to any of the views discussed by Bergmann. For example, logic and metaphysics are for Husserl neither the two sides of the same coin (Harms) nor can they be identified (Trendelenburg). Metaphysics does not contribute to the theory of science because it comes for last, when a phenomenology-­ based theory of knowledge has already elucidated the consciousness-­being relation, and the sciences have already investigated the provinces of reality. Unlike Ueberweg, Husserl’s Aristotle’s πρώτη φιλοσοφία does not include any rational theology.

5. As one can easily imagine, the entire perspective, in particular the conception of metaphysics as a “first philosophy,” will change as Husserl continues to develop his phenomenology. For example, in the 1909 lectures on New and Old Logic the expression “first philosophy” is applied exclusively to “philosophical logic” (here characterized as the “entrance discipline of philosophy”) since “The Aristotelian name First Philosophy, which later and for contingent reasons was given the name of metaphysics, […] concerns a different discipline” (see Hua-Mat VI, 3). As he adds, “Philosophical logic lays out the deepest foundation for philosophy, and for this reason is first philosophy. But to the extent that it culminates in metaphysics, this could be called the highest or last philosophy (die höchste oder letzte Philosophie)” (Hua-Mat VI, 4). In fact, as phenomenology, as a transcendental form of philosophy, comes to take up the office of first philosophy, metaphysics will be assigned a new position and a new name (“last philosophy”). In this respect, the years 1905–1907 are decisive. If in the Logical Investigations, phenomenology is about a “domain of neutral research,” namely, that of the logical experience, and its task is to clarify the source of the fundamental gnoseological concepts on the basis of which pure logic can be

 It is therefore quite ambiguous to affirm that, “The Husserl of the Logische Untersuchungen is simply not interested in metaphysics” (Tavuzzi, 1981, 286). Quite the opposite. The Husserl of the Logical Investigations is already pretty much interested in metaphysics and its very possibility: the problem is to understand why the Logical Investigations do not and cannot concern themselves with such issue. 8

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built, around 1902–1903 theory of knowledge (as the clarification of the essence of knowledge) coincides prima facie with phenomenology itself (Hua-Mat III, 76). Yet, as early as 1905, phenomenology (which is called a “discipline” and not yet a “science”) is understood as “the all-embracing essential analysis of consciousness” (Hua-Mat V, 57) according to the distinction between theoretical, ethical and axiological experience (Hua-Mat V, 42). In 1907, phenomenology is considered a science of reduced phenomena (Hua II, 64). Now, if it is only in the first volume of Ideas that a conception of phenomenology is worked out as the most “fundamental science of philosophy” (Hua III/1, 2; Husserl, 2014, 3), it received the noble title of “first philosophy” as early as 1909, thereby usurping the position of “metaphysics.” Here is a very important  text from the lectures of 1909 on Introduction to the Phenomenology of Knowledge: As the essential doctrine of purely given phenomena, phenomenology […] exists in its own right (hat… ihre eigene Berechtigung), just like any other science. On the other hand, insofar as it is first philosophy in the most rigorous sense, [phenomenology] has a quite peculiar position vis-à-vis all the other [sciences]: it is from [phenomenology] that all the other sciences receive the ultimate clarification of the sense of their operations. As long as [phenomenology] is not developed yet, all the sciences are bereft of ultimate and absolute knowledge; yet, insofar as philosophy needs to carry on and realize the ideal of knowledge, all the sciences can become philosophies, i.e., components and foundations of an all-encompassing and absolute doctrine of being, only with the aid of phenomenology (Hua-Mat VII, 92).

As a science with a field of investigation of its own (the new macro-region “pure consciousness”), phenomenology must be called “first philosophy” vis-à-vis all the other sciences (by which Husserl means quite likely both empirical and eidetic sciences). But how should the adjective first in the expression first philosophy be properly understood? The question can be answered by quickly turning to the 1923 lectures on First Philosophy. As Husserl explains at the outset, the expression first philosophy was originally coined by Aristotle to mean what would later be named for accidental reasons “metaphysics”: In reviving the term in its Aristotelian sense, I derive from the fact that it has fallen out of common usage the highly welcome advantage that it arouses in us only its literal meaning […]. This literal meaning once served […] as a formal preliminary indication of the theoretical intention that the new discipline, whose subject matter was only later to be defined more precisely, hoped to realize. This formal preliminary indication can serve us, too, quite admirably, however far the science to which our lectures are to be devoted may depart from the Aristotelian First Philosophy in its subject matter. For this reason, we take over the term “First Philosophy” and make it the point of departure for our initial consideration (Hua VII, 3–4; Husserl, 2019, 3).

Husserlian first philosophy has been divorced from the Aristotelian πρώτη φιλοσοφία once and for all. Not only is transcendental phenomenology in no way “metaphysics”; the latter can no longer be deemed “first.” When it comes to the adjective first, Husserl distinguishes two meanings. In the first place, the adjective can designate a philosophy that is first “in itself”: “whereas the others, the ‘second’ philosophies, would represent merely the necessary steps, so to speak the antechambers of that highest holiness” (see Hua VII, 4; Husserl, 2019, 4). In the second place,

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this being the meaning Husserl is opting for here, the adjective first can refer to “a scientific discipline of beginnings”: “this discipline would have to precede all other philosophical disciplines, grounding them both methodologically and theoretically” (see Hua VII, 5; Husserl, 2019, 5). It could be easily argued that whereas the first meaning of the adjective first was the one used by Husserl to refer to metaphysics as a “first philosophy” (see §4 of this chapter), the latter is by contrast the one Husserl has in mind when he calls “phenomenology” “first philosophy.” Let us not forget that metaphysics was not first in any chronological sense, quite the contrary. For it built upon the already accomplished work of the experiential sciences (“the antechambers of that highest holiness”).9 Moreover, Husserl no longer speaks of second philosophy (in the singular), but of “second philosophies” (in the plural). As far as the second meaning of the adjective first is concerned, phenomenology is here said to play a foundational role not vis-à-vis the many empirical sciences, but with respect to what Husserl calls “all other philosophical disciplines,” namely, the many eidetic sciences. As we will soon better see, this mode of talking mirrors Husserl’s own position from the early 20 s onwards: phenomenology is first philosophy vis-à-vis the “eidetic sciences”; and the empirical sciences are in turn to be called second philosophies (in the plural) with respect to the foundational role played by the conjunction between “first philosophy” (transcendental phenomenology) and “eidetic sciences.” However, and without anticipating our future line of thought, a question arises: if phenomenology is now “first philosophy” (and the meaning of the adjective first has changed), how should metaphysics be understood? How should it be characterized? In order to address this problem, we should take into account the transformation which the concept of “metaphysics” undergoes in the 1906 lectures. Generally speaking, here Husserl talks of metaphysics in almost exactly the same terms as he used in the “early” period; metaphysics is “radical ontology, the science of the ὄντως ὄν,” it is “the definitive science of being,” whose aspiration is “to satisfy our highest and ultimate (höchsten und letzten) ontological interests and […] investigates what has to be considered actual (das Wirkliche) in the ultimate and definitive sense” (Hua XXIV, 99; Husserl, 2008, 96–97). As Husserl also writes, This radical science of being, the science of being in the absolute sense, is metaphysics. Naturally, it arises through a certain critical investigation of the ultimate sense and value of the theoretical foundations of the empirical sciences, through elucidating and ultimately securing them. If this critique has been carried out, then it can be ascertained which interpretation of being proves true and definitive. So that, therefore, metaphysics is obviously a science related to the other sciences of reality and already presupposing them (Hua XXIV, 99; Husserl, 2008, 96).

A few pages later, the same point is made again as regards “material metaphysics”:

 For a critical reading of Husserl’s determination of “first philosophy” in the 1923 lectures, see Allen, 1982. 9

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Metaphysics is to investigate what is realiter in the ultimate and absolute sense. It claims to provide the interpretation, the ultimate interpretation, of the empirical sciences of reality. It is, we said, essentially related to the content of these sciences (bezogen auf den Inhalt dieser Wissenschaften). Through it, it acquires its relationship to the actually present reality, to reality as it is de facto (auf Wirklichkeit, wie sie faktisch ist) (Hua XXVI, 100; Husserl, 2008, 98).

As it seems, the introduction of the term “ontology” (and the Platonic expression ὄντως ὄν) aside, this account perfectly corresponds to Husserl’s early conception of both the role and function of metaphysics until around 1905 (when it was still conceived of as “first philosophy”). Metaphysics is the “ultimate science of being” (the expressions are: Sein, Wirklichkeit and Realität, just like in 1898); it has a critical function; it does presuppose the sciences of reality. However, Husserl hastens to explain to his students that this should be more appropriately called “material metaphysics” as something different from “formal metaphysics”: the “a priori science of the real” (Hua XXIV, 102; Husserl, 2008, 99). As he writes, “The [latter] […] is a priori, the [former] a posteriori metaphysics. The [latter] is prior to all empirical sciences; the [former] comes after all empirical sciences.” And it is precisely “formal metaphysics” (which Husserl will later call eidetic sciences or ontology of the real) which is now assigned what used to be the task of (the early conception of) metaphysics as a first philosophy. Here is a long yet very clear passage on the matter: The idea of an a priori ontology arises there, not in fact a formal logical one, but a metaphysical one. Wherever it is a question of reality, in life and in all empirical sciences (im Leben und in allen empirischen Wissenschaften), we apply certain concepts like thing, real property, real relation, state, process, coming into being and passing away, cause and effect, space and time, that seem to belong necessarily to the idea of a reality. Whether, now, all these concepts are actually intrinsic to the idea of reality, such concepts, the basic categories in which what is real as such is to be understood in terms of its essence, nevertheless, surely exist. Therefore, a group of investigations that simply reflect upon everything without which reality in general cannot be conceived must, nevertheless, be possible. This is where the whole a priori theory of time, a priori kinematics would belong, and pure geometry, providing those people are right who believe that, without the relationship of all reality to a three-dimensional Euclidean space and one-dimensional, so to speak, linear time, reality in general cannot be conceived. No knowledge of actual reality is yet given with such investigations, for they concern the actual, as well as every possible, reality. […] Now, however much may in fact be subject to doubt here, especially the a priori necessity of an ordered Euclidean, three-dimensional space for every reality, it is certain that a most universal concept of the real in general can and must be kept distinct from the particularities grounded in the essence of the real. Individual reality as being-for-itself, or thing in the broadest sense, likewise real property in the broadest sense, real relation, even time, cause, effect, concepts like that, are surely necessary ideas of possible reality and require a study of the analysis of essence and of essential laws. There must, therefore, be a science of what really is (vom Realseienden) as such in the most universal universality, and this a priori metaphysics would be the necessary foundation for empirically based metaphysics (Hua XXIV, 101–102; Husserl, 2008, 98–99).

The distinction between “formal metaphysics” (= the “a priori ontology” of the real) and “material metaphysics” should be clear. The former comes before the “empirical sciences” in that it studies what belongs to reality in general or, to put it better, to the being-real of reality (Real-Sein): thing in the broadest sense, real property,

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real relation, time, cause, effect, process, state, coming into being and passing way. These are concepts which we employ “in life and in all empirical sciences.” And these are those concepts (with the exception of the presupposition concerning the existence of the external world) which metaphysics (as first philosophy) used to be about. If in 1898 Husserl had affirmed that metaphysics is possible auf Grund aller Einzelwissenschaften, the expression used here is: “It is […] essentially related to the content of these sciences (bezogen auf den Inhalt dieser Wissenschaften).” “Material metaphysics” develops or provides “the ultimate interpretation of the factual reality” (= not of reality qua idea or possibility) upon the basis of the outcomes of the empirical sciences. On this point, there obtains perfect agreement between this new position and the early conception of metaphysics as a first philosophy (I). On one point, however, there seems to be great discrepancy. What in I was the task of metaphysics, namely, to fix and test the presuppositions of the empirical sciences (by analyzing notions such as “space,” “time,” “causal connection” and so forth), is now explicitly assigned to formal metaphysics as the a priori ontology of the real. The latter is now given the task of elucidating the many presuppositions of the empirical sciences. If this is the case, then in what does the “task” of material metaphysics consist? How can we understand the expression “ultimate interpretation”? Before we try to answer this question, one point  can be made with certainty. Although Husserl is here employing the term “metaphysics” ambiguously, i.e., to designate both formal and material metaphysics—the former expression will soon be altogether dropped by Husserl. Husserl will soon (see Ideas I) stop speaking of formal metaphysics, thereby confining himself to the talk of eidetic or a priori science (of the real). The ambiguous use of the term metaphysics in these lectures is not to be confused with the way in which Peter Wust talks of metaphysics in Husserl. What Wust refers to as (Husserlian) “metaphysics” would correspond to what Husserl calls “formal metaphysics,” the eidetic science of the real (which Husserl will more and more systematically keep separate from metaphysics). In short, despite the ambiguity of the 1906 lectures, for Husserl only “material” (or “a posteriori”) metaphysics should be labeled metaphysics; “formal metaphysics” being no metaphysics at all. Clearly, with respect to I, in which “ontology,” “metaphysics” and “first philosophy” were used as synonyms—now these concepts designate three irreducible different disciplines: while “first philosophy” is now applied only to “transcendental phenomenology,” “ontology” designates all the a priori and eidetic sciences (including the ontology of the real). Finally, “metaphysics” designates only the “a posteriori metaphysics.” “Ontology” refers to reality qua idea or possibility (it does concern “the actual, as well as every possible, reality”); “metaphysics” refers to reality qua faktische.10 It is important to understand that what we are confronted with here is not simply a terminological readjustment. Indeed, the reason why metaphysics used to be

 Tavuzzi, 1981, 294–297, clarifies correctly the distinction between metaphysics, ontology and first philosophy. 10

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called “first philosophy” is different from the reason why phenomenology (which is an ontology, i.e., the ontology of the macro-region “pure consciousness”) is now regarded as “first philosophy.” And the reason why the many sciences used to be called “second philosophy” is different from the reason why they are now called “second philosophies.” In Husserl’s early conception of metaphysics, first philosophy and second philosophy had the same “referent,” as it were: the totality of being qua reality; the difference was that “first” philosophy would treat of the totality of being “as such” (τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν), whereas “second” philosophy would treat of being according to the different divisions and partitions of the sciences. In the present context, first philosophy and second philosophy do not have the same referent. “First philosophy” (phenomenology) is the science of a brand new region of being and is called first to the extent that it lays out the transcendental foundation for the totality of the ontologies and eidetic sciences (also called: philosophical disciplines). In sum, first philosophy has now a transcendental nature and no longer belongs to the macro-region of the “world.” The empirical sciences are now labeled second philosophies not with respect to a purported science of the ὄν ᾗ ὄν; rather, they are second philosophies with respect to the already accomplished transcendental foundation of the ontologies, including the ontology or a priori science of the real (reality qua idea).11

6. An additional, and fundamental, question arises. If “material metaphysics” comes after the work of the empirical sciences, which presuppose the eidetic science of the real, which in turn is rooted in transcendental phenomenology as “first philosophy,” what is the role of such metaphysics exactly? If it is no longer expected to be the science of the ὄν ᾗ ὄν, what is it then? We have already quickly encountered the way Husserl now characterizes metaphysics. In Old and New Logic, Husserl says that to the extent that philosophy “culminates in metaphysics, this could be called the highest or last philosophy (höchste oder letzte Philosophie)” (Hua-Mat VI, 4). The same expression is used in a 1908 manuscript, which refers to metaphysics as die letzte Philosophie (Hua VII, 385). The passage from the 1909 lectures is clear: metaphysics is the highest or last philosophy insofar as it represents the culmination of philosophy. In De Santis, 2021a, 487, we ventured to coin the phrase “τελευταία φιλοσοφία” to refer to metaphysics as “last philosophy”: with the Greek term “τελευταία” explicitly expressing the double sense of last (= last philosophy) as both “ending” and “completing.”

 As should be evident, since here we are interested only in the overall and general structure of what we would call Husserl’s “system of philosophy,” no specific analyses of the actual transcendental foundation of the sciences will be pursued. A most clear analysis of this problem, with which we would fully agree, can be found in Trizio, 2021a. 11

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Metaphysics is last philosophy insofar as it comes to the fore for last, i.e., at the end of the phenomenological enterprise, after the already laid out (transcendental) foundation of philosophy (first meaning of the adjective τελευταία). But metaphysics is called last philosophy also because it completes the system of philosophies (second meaning of the adjective τελευταία). Now, before a solution is offered to the problem about the function of metaphysics, the question could be asked whether there is a predecessor that could represent the background of Husserl’s position here, thus helping us partially contextualize what the father of phenomenology is arguing for. Given the characterization of metaphysics as the science of being as actuality (to which Husserl holds fast from the very beginning of his career onward), one name comes immediately to mind: R. H. Lotze12 (whose general importance for Husserl is quite known; see Beyer, 1996; Varga, 2013). As Lotze concisely explained to his students during his late lectures, “Metaphysics is the science of the actual, not of what is merely thinkable.” “Actuality” (Wirklichkeit), he goes on to further clarify, “is what distinguishes a thing that is from one that is not; an event that happens from one that does not happen; a relation that obtains from one that does not obtain” (see Lotze, 1883, 8). Although Lotze’s, 1841 metaphysics already presents it as the science of the “general presuppositions […] concerning the nature of being” (Lotze, 1841, 19), when it comes to the Husserl-Lotze relation, the difference between Lotze’s early and late metaphysics should not be ignored. While in 1841 the problems of knowledge are part of metaphysics itself (= the latter is broader than the former), in the late system of philosophy theory of knowledge is the last part of logic as the doctrine of thought and is the “doorway” to metaphysics. For the Lotze of 1874, only if we first clarify the possibility for thought to grasp being can metaphysics be established. As the science of reality, metaphysics includes in itself three sub-disciplines. • Ontology: it investigates “the most general presuppositions, the ones concerning the nature of all things and the possibility of their connection” (see Lotze, 1883, 7): “being,” “becoming” and “effecting.” • Cosmology: it “tests the forms in which the single elements of actuality are connected in an orderly whole” (Lotze, 1883, 7): its concepts are “space,” “time” and “movement.” • Psychology, on the actual relations between the objective world and the world of spirit. In addition to the description of metaphysics as the science of reality or actuality, the following point can also be made on the Husserl-Lotze relation. As Lotze affirms over and over again, the subject-matter of metaphysics is a series of universal presuppositions (Voraussetzungen), that is, those “concepts” and “propositions” underlying both our “everyday life (im gewöhnlichen Leben) and the particular sciences”  We have already emphasized the importance of Lotze’s “metaphysics” (and not simply of his logic and theory of validity) to better appreciate Husserl’s in both De Santis, 2016, and 2021, 66 and ff. 12

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(Lotze, 1883, 2). In this specific respect, the introduction to the second volume of the System of Philosophy is of crucial importance for us. Here, in fact, not only does Lotze describe the very ambition of metaphysics as that of “clarifying” and “testing” (Prüfung) such “presuppositions” (Lotze, 1879, 13) or “assumptions” (Annahmen) (Lotze, 1879, 14); he also dwells extensively and systematically on the relation between metaphysics and the many sciences. In §VI, Lotze remarks that contrary to what used to be the case in the past, metaphysics no longer aspires to “demonstrate any of the special laws, which the course of things in its various directions de facto follows” (Lotze, 1879, 9). Metaphysics is not prior to the work of the sciences because it on the contrary concerns only the universal conditions of the “universal law-bounded connection of the various facts” (Lotze, 1879, 8–9). However, metaphysics will continue “to demand that the results at which experience arrives should admit of being interpreted in such a manner as to fit these ideal forms and to be intelligible as cases of their application” (Lotze, 1879, 10). The expressions or turns of phrase used by Lotze correspond to those which Husserl himself will employ. Just as Lotze speaks of “presuppositions” of our “everyday life (im gewöhnlichen Leben) and the particular sciences,” so does Husserl speak of the general “presuppositions” underlying the empirical sciences and our life: “Wherever it is a question of reality, in life and in all the empirical sciences” (Hua XXIV, 101; Husserl, 2008, 98). Just as for Lotze the task of metaphysics is to clarify and “test” the sciences’ presuppositions, so will Husserl affirm that metaphysics as first philosophy fixes and tests the untested (in the Prolegomena). Last but not least, just as for Lotze metaphysics demands a certain “interpretation” of reality, so does Husserl describe in 1906 metaphysics as “the ultimate interpretation” of reality (Hua XXVI, 100; Husserl, 2008, 98). However, and all these similarities notwithstanding, a major discrepancy must be noticed. In fact, if Lotze’s conception of metaphysics as the science of actuality perfectly matches with Husserl’s account in both I and II, what it is about corresponds only to I, yet not to II. After 1905, in fact, the subject-matter of what used to be metaphysics as first philosophy is assigned to formal metaphysics (the ontology of the real).13 In what does metaphysics’ “ultimate interpretation” of reality consist? We are thus led back to our question: what is the task of the τελευταία φιλοσοφία? Here too, Husserl is, at least terminologically, very Lotzean. In the 1908 text quoted above, a reference to Lotze can be found there where Husserl says that the phenomenological investigation of theoretical, volitional,  and evaluative consciousness make possible “a teleological metaphysics, the true ‘reconciliation of the mechanical conception of nature with the teleological one’” (Hua VII, 382).14 It is not easy  This statement, however, should be taken cum grano salis in order to avoid retro-projecting onto the early conception the account which Husserl develops after 1905. In fact, and even if terminologically speaking the subject-matter of formal metaphysics coincides with that of metaphysics as first philosophy, a major difference must be underlined: if the latter was said to build upon the work of experiential sciences, formal metaphysics is a priori instead. 14  On Lotze’s teleological metaphysics, which cannot be discussed here, see the second part of Beiser, 2013. 13

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to tell what he means by “teleological metaphysics”; yet the idea is in line with what he will explain in both his 1911 lectures on ethics and the Introduction to Philosophy lectures from 1916–1920. In the former, Husserl speaks of completing the system of knowledge by an a posteriori philosophy,15 “the philosophy of the absolute in the a posteriori, i.e., the science of the absolute knowledge of factual being according to its theoretical, axiological and also practical value-content” (Hua XXVIII, 177). In the lectures of 1916–1920, not only will Husserl re-affirm the distinction between ontology (Hua-Mat IX, 96) and metaphysics as “the absolute science of actuality, namely, of the given existent actuality” (Hua-Mat IX, 329, 426, 427); he will re-­ affirm its teleological nature based upon a new foundation laid out by transcendental phenomenology (Hua-Mat IX, 209).16 The main distinguishing features of metaphysics as last philosophy (corresponding to II) can be presented with the following series of bullet points: A. The task: understood as “last philosophy,” metaphysics is the culmination of philosophy and consists in a teleological “interpretation” of factual reality based on the threefold value-content of consciousness (theoretical, axiological, practical). B. The subject-matter: because of its a posteriori character, metaphysics concerns given actuality and reality; unlike ontology (or “formal metaphysics”), which treats of reality qua idea, metaphysics as last philosophy concerns reality qua factuality. As we will see even better in the next paragraph, even if Husserl refers to metaphysics by the term “last philosophy,” this should not mislead us into assuming that metaphysics would be a discipline or a philosophy of its own that exists over and above phenomenology as first philosophy, the many ontologies and the empirical sciences as second philosophies. Metaphysics is the culmination of the system of philosophy in the sense that it is the way in which the system of philosophy ends. This is the reason why Husserl tends to speak of metaphysics more and more in terms of interpretation. In short, the “completion” of the system of philosophy ((first philosophy + eidetic sciences) + second philosophies) results in a metaphysical (teleological) interpretation of the factually given actuality.

7. By now it should also be evident to what extent Husserl’s position on metaphysics cannot be fully identified with Geiger’s. Of course, there are correspondences, at least when it comes to I.  On this aspect of Husserl’s metaphysics, see Trizio, 2021b, in particular, 524–525.  For an insightful analysis of the function of teleology in these Husserlian lectures in connection to Plato, see Trizio, 2020; see also Trizio, 2018 for an assessment of the relation between the teleology of consciousness and the world. 15 16

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Both Geiger and Husserl speak of metaphysics in terms of the science of reality as absolute being (Husserl himself employs the expression “absolute determinations of being); and for both of them, the task of metaphysics is to clarify the “presuppositions” of the empirical sciences. Already at this level, however, a difference can be noticed: for whereas Geiger assigns to metaphysics not only the task of clarifying the “general presuppositions” of the sciences, but also the “specific” ones (i.e., the presuppositions characterizing the many different sciences individually taken), Husserl expects of metaphysics only the direct elucidation of the sciences’ “tacit assumptions” (see above, §4). Last but not least, the task of working out a most unitary picture of the world, which Geiger ascribes to metaphysics, does not seem to be found anywhere in Husserl’s conception of metaphysics in I.17 It is important to keep in mind that all the possible analogies between I and Geiger notwithstanding, as soon as Husserl moves on to II, his conception of metaphysics is no longer superimposable with that of the Munich phenomenologist. In particular, with the distinction between formal (a priori) and material (a posteriori) metaphysics, Husserl moves beyond the framework outlined by Geiger. This being underlined, we can now approach III, notably, what Husserl calls metaphysics in a new sense in a footnote to §26 of the First Philosophy lectures. Here is the central part of the text. The basic concepts and principles of the ontologies are the necessary “guiding clues” for a universal phenomenology at the highest stage of a phenomenology of reason, or, alternatively, for a systematic outline of the constitutive problematic. These guiding clues are related, on the one hand, to the formal-ontological quasi-region “object in general” and, on the other hand, to the highest regions of objectualities. […] All of this then carries over to the positive sciences, in the phenomenological interpretation of which arises all the ultimately scientific (letztwissenschaftlichen) factual sciences, those that are in themselves philosophical, which no longer tolerate alongside them any special philosophies adhering to them. By the final (letzte) interpretation of the objective being that is explored in them as a fact (als Faktum), which accrues to them through the application of eidetic phenomenology, and through a universal regarding of all regions of objectivity in relation to the universal community of transcendental subjects, the universe, the universal theme of the positive sciences, takes on a “metaphysical” interpretation, which is nothing other than an interpretation behind which it makes no scientific sense to search for another. But behind this

 In this respect, Geiger’s position has something in common with another Lotze-inspired conception of metaphysics, that of Stumpf. In line with Lotze, Stumpf understands metaphysics as a “post-science” (Nachwissenschaft), with the prefix post- meaning that metaphysics arises after the already accomplished work of the sciences (notably, physics and psychology) (Stumpf, 1907, 42). Just as Lotze maintains that metaphysics does not demonstrate any of the special laws, and just as Husserl points out that metaphysics “build upon” the work of experiential sciences, Stumpf remarks that it presupposes them in such a way that it can be called “the experiential science in the most pregnant sense of the term” (Stumpf, 1907, 43). While Husserl, however, limits the task of metaphysics to the investigation of the “general assumptions” of the experiential sciences, in line with Lotze, Stumpf ascribes to metaphysics not only the function of addressing “the question as to the common laws” underlying the many sciences of reality, but also that of working out “the unitary inter-connection” of all objects (“the universal law-bound connection of the various facts”). Thus, metaphysics is for him an actual “world-theory” (Stumpf, 1907, 43). Yet, the critical function that, in line with Lotze, the early Husserl ascribes to metaphysics is nowhere to found in Stumpf. 17

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interpretation, a new problematic opens up on phenomenological ground, one that cannot be further interpreted (nicht mehr zu interpretieren): that of the irrationality of the transcendental fact, which expresses itself in the constitution of the factual world and of the factual spiritual life, that is, metaphysics in a new sense (Hua VII, 187–188; Husserl, 2019, 193–194, footnote).

Based on what we have been explaining thus far, the text (at least the first half) should not be too difficult to decipher. What he is presenting is the overall system of philosophy as it was already understood in II. It is only at the end of the footnote that a brand-new concept is introduced, that of “metaphysics in a new sense.” Two senses of metaphysics must be distinguished. As was already the case in II, metaphysics is “the final interpretation of the objective being” which, as a fact, is explored by the factual sciences. Such final interpretation of the objective being follows from what Husserl calls “the phenomenological interpretation” of the positive sciences. Or, to say it better, the phenomenological interpretation of the positive-empirical sciences results in the metaphysical, final interpretation of the objective being as a fact. In what does the former consist? “The phenomenological interpretation” of the positive sciences consists in a two-­ step operation. First of all, it consists in the embeddedness of all the ontologies and “regions of being” (as the “necessary ‘guiding clues’”) in transcendental phenomenology (as “phenomenology of reason”). In the second place, the conjunction of “transcendental phenomenology” + “ontologies” carries over to the many “positive sciences.” The positive sciences are not simply grounded in the ontologies; they are grounded in the ontologies insofar as these are grounded in phenomenology. It follows that the so-called metaphysical interpretation of the objective being as a fact is nothing but the conjunction of these two moments (and wholly corresponds to what we explained at the very end of §6).18 What Husserl calls metaphysics (“metaphysical interpretation”) represents the way in which the system of philosophy (first philosophy + second philosophies) comes to a conclusion. This is why already in De Santis, 2021a, 489, we ventured to say that the metaphysical interpretation of the objective being as a fact means its consideration sub specie systematis rationis, i.e., as a part of the system of the phenomenology of reason. This is also the way in which the teleological nature of metaphysics that Husserl recognizes in II should be properly understood. Husserl never affirms that factually given reality has a metaphysical structure of its own (whatever this might mean); nor does he ever say that factually given reality  Trizio explains as follows Husserl’s claim that the “metaphysical interpretation” is the “final interpretation of the objective being”: “what the theory of constitution rules out is any philosophical doctrine according to which the being investigated by the empirical sciences would only be an aspect or a manifestation of a deeper reality. In other words, no talk of hyperphysical reality is possible, simply because no hyperphysical reality is conceivable. This excludes the unknowable thing in itself à la Kant, but also the slightly less unknowable will of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. Furthermore, a metaphysics such as Spinoza’s, according to which both nature and the mind amount to modes of an infinite substance, is also ruled out, because it implies that beyond nature and mind there lies a deeper reality, an ultimate, self-subsisting substance” (Trizio, 2021a, 84). 18

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has a teleological structure of its own. Telos is not an ontological concept, but rather a rational one in the sense that only reason as Vernunft can be said to be teleological. Accordingly, in this context “metaphysics” always amounts to interpreting factually given reality metaphysically. But if such a “metaphysical” interpretation of factually given reality is nothing but the result, so to speak, of the application of the conjunction between “first philosophy” and “a priori sciences” to the positive sciences (second philosophies), it follows that the “metaphysical interpretation” of factually given reality corresponds to reason (Vernunft) “interpreting” (interpretieren) factual reality as the domain in which it strives towards realizing itself (telos) through the activity of the many positive sciences. Reason “interprets” factually given reality as its own realization via the sciences. Since Husserl labels “concrete ontology” (Hua IX, 251; Husserl, 1997, 99) the conjunction of first philosophy (= transcendental phenomenology) and the ontologies or “philosophical disciplines,” then one could simply affirm that the positive sciences can be labeled “second philosophies” to the extent that they are grounded and embedded in concrete ontology. And what Husserl refers to as the “metaphysical interpretation” of being as a fact is precisely the result of the conjunction of concrete ontology and second philosophies in the sense just explained (Fig. 4.1).19 Our interpretation so far differs in one fundamental respect from that proposed by Bernet, Kern, Marbach in their 1996 introduction to Husserl. They equate “first philosophy” (i.e., transcendental phenomenology) and “universal ontology” (Bernet et al., 1996, 210; see also Kern, 2021, 151 and ff.), while we claim that universal and “concrete ontology” is the unity of all the ontologies, that is to say, of transcendental phenomenology as a first philosophy and all the eidetic and a priori sciences. In short, it is a mistake to assume that the extent of “universal ontology” coincides with

 A most clear text on the topic is the 1914 draft of a letter to K. Joel: “Ich reduziere keineswegs die Philosophie auf Erkenntnistheorie und Vernunftkritik überhaupt, geschweige denn auf transzendentale Phänomenologie. Diese ist in meinen Augen eine eigene Wissenschaft, die eidet Wissenschaft vom transz reinen Bewußtsein und seinen Korrelaten, die in gewisser Weise alle anderen eid Wissenschaften (das System der formalen und materialen Ontologien) umspannt und doch nicht in sich schließt. Der vollständige Entwurf der Ontol und die systematische Ausführung der ihnen entsprechenden und zur höchsten Einheit zurückführenden transzendentalen Phänomenologien ist m. E. die kardinale Bedingung der Möglichkeit einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie, ist ihr vollständiges eidet Fundament. Des näheren: Sie allein ermöglichen eine wissenschaftliche Metaphysik, die es nicht mehr mit bloß idealen Möglichkeiten, sondern mit der Wirklichkeit zu tun . Ganz wie Sie sage ich: Die Metaphysik ist die eigentliche Wissenschaft von der Realität” (Hua-Dok III/6, 205–206). The account of the system of philosophy here sketched by Husserl perfectly matches with the one we have been describing thus far (with the only exception of the positive sciences, which are not mentioned in the letter): there is first transcendental phenomenology as the eidetic science of consciousness; what follows are the many other ontologies. The conjunction of “phenomenology” and all the other “ontologies” is the condition of possibility for a scientific metaphysics (as the science of reality) to be at all possible. The fact that, towards the end of the quoted excerpt, Husserl uses “scientific philosophy” and “scientific metaphysics” interchangeably confirms that metaphysics should be regarded as the culmination of philosophy. 19

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Phenomenology

+

A Priori Sciences

Positive Sciences

(First Philosophy)

Concrete Ontology

+

Second Philosophies

Metaphysical Interpretation of the Objective Being as a Fact Fig. 4.1  Metaphysical interpretation

that of first philosophy. Moreover, they understand the expression “second philosophy” to refer to “metaphysics” (Die zweite Philosophie oder Metaphysik) (Bernet et al., 1996, 210), while in our opinion “second philosophy” or “second philosophies” are the positive sciences as they are embedded in concrete ontology.20 The positive sciences acquire a philosophical meaning, and thus become second philosophies as soon as they recognize themselves to be part of concrete ontology, of reason’s effort at determining objective being as a fact (factually given reality). From the angle of Husserl’s overall system of philosophy, il n’y a pas de hors-philosophie. Before we move on, two crucial remarks can be made about this conception of metaphysics. First of all, the talk of sciences, notably “positive sciences” should be taken at face value. The fact that Husserl points out that the “‘metaphysical’ interpretation” bears on “the universal theme of the positive sciences” means that metaphysics is confined to the domain of “theoretical reason,” notably “purely theoretical reason.” As we saw in §6, in II Husserl was speaking of metaphysics in terms of “the philosophy of the absolute in the a posteriori, i.e., the science of the absolute knowledge of factual being according to its theoretical, axiological and also practical value-content” (Hua XXVIII, 177). The last two determinations of reason (the axiological and the practical) are nowhere to be found in the footnote to the First

 This is no otiose issue and the difference is not merely terminological. For what is at stake in the determination of the positive sciences as “second philosophies,” namely, as a part of the concrete ontological tree is nothing but the so-called problem of the “crisis of European sciences.” Although the topic cannot be addressed here, for it would take us far beyond the limited scope of this chapter, let us remark the following. For Husserl, the crisis of the sciences means a crisis of both the philosophical sciences or a priori ontologies (which have renounced being part of concrete ontology) and the positive or empirical ones (which have renounced being part of the determination of the totality of being upon the part of concrete ontology). In other words, the crisis of European sciences is the crisis of “reason” (Vernunft) and its ambition to “interpret” factual reality as the telos of its “objective determination” of being. For an interpretation of the concept of “crisis” in Husserl with which we would fully agree, see Trizio, 2016. Contra, see Heffernan, 2017. 20

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Philosophy lectures. In other words, the “metaphysical interpretation” of being as a fact upon the part of reason and its teleology is of purely theoretical nature: it concerns the objective determination of being as a fact only to the extent that this is the theme of scientific investigation. Reason “interprets” factually given being as its own realization from the angle of the verum, as the result of its teleological tendency towards the truth. Secondly, it is important to emphasize that, contrary to II in which Husserl would still speak of metaphysics both as an “interpretation” and a “philosophy” (“the last philosophy”), here the latter term is nowhere to be found. Husserl has dropped the talk of metaphysics as a philosophy once and for all in order to avoid giving the misleading impression that metaphysics is a branch of the philosophical tree, a kind of philosophy next to others. Quite the opposite. There is no metaphysics in addition to “first philosophy,” the “ontologies” and the “second philosophies.” In this sense, Husserl’s own scientific, and phenomenology-based rehabilitation of metaphysics is also, and at the same time, its most radical dismissal. Metaphysics is no longer possible as a philosophy (whether first or last) because it is possible only as the interpretation of factual being sub specie systematis rationis theoreticae. As has been correctly pointed out, “Husserl never thought that metaphysics was literally another science with a different domain of research, and it is not possible to imagine that, even before the transcendental turn, Husserl could have formulated this process of the grounding of the sciences in this way. After all, once we think that one does metaphysics in Husserl’s sense precisely by turning the empirical sciences into metaphysics” (Trizio, 2021a, 83).

8. As Husserl states very clearly towards the end of the footnote, the metaphysical interpretation is “an interpretation behind which it makes no scientific sense to search for another.” There is nothing behind reason’s metaphysical interpretation (concrete ontology + positive sciences) of factual being as “the universal theme of the positive sciences.” Here comes the conclusion of the footnote: But behind this interpretation, a new problematic opens up on phenomenological ground, one that cannot be further interpreted (nicht mehr zu interpretieren): that of the irrationality of the transcendental fact, which expresses itself in the constitution of the factual world and of the factual spiritual life, that is, metaphysics in a new sense (Hua VII, 188; Husserl, 2019, 194, footnote).

Albeit short, the passage is not easy to decipher. Let us proceed step by step. • Husserl says that the new problematic “cannot be further interpreted.” Since by interpreting (interpretieren) Husserl can only mean here what he has been meaning thus far, that is to say, the “‘metaphysical’ interpretation” of “factual being”

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sub specie systematis rationis theoreticae, what follows is that the “new problematic” cannot be interpreted in this way. • The “new problematic” is that of “the irrationality of the transcendental fact”: the problem is precisely how to understand this expression. Husserl is very clear on this point: such irrationality expresses itself (sich… ausspricht) “in the constitution of the factual world and of the factual spiritual life.” Since at this stage the transcendental constitution of the factual world has already been accomplished, the expressions “factual world” and “factual spiritual life” can only mean this factual world and this factual spiritual life (= ours). If we are on the right track, metaphysics in a new sense (new, with respect to the “metaphysical” interpretation of objective being as a fact) concerns the irrationality of this factual human world and our own human spiritual life in it. Since at this stage the system of philosophy has already come to a conclusion (in the metaphysical interpretation of factual being), the irrationality of which Husserl is here speaking has to do neither with the eidetic rationality nor with the transcendental one.21 It is a new form of irrationality, and the reason why Husserl keeps speaking of “metaphysics” is not easy to understand. But were we to play with the expression, one could say that if by φύσις we mean the totality of objective being as a “fact” investigated by the so-called positive sciences, and by μετὰ-τὰ-φυσικά we mean its inclusion within concrete ontology, the new sense of metaphysics should be labeled meta-metaphysical: meaning that we are beyond (μετὰ) the inclusion of objective being as a fact (φυσικά) within the system of reason (μεταφυσικά). Now, in order to properly understand this idea of irrationality, thus the new sense of metaphysics, a distinction must be made and always borne in mind: the distinction between the ontological form of intelligibility or rationality (Rationalität) and the transcendental one (Vernünftigkeit). We have already encountered it at the very end of Volume 1, Chap. 6, §13, in which the notion of a “higher form of intelligibility” (the transcendental one) was indeed discussed. It is in fact no coincidence that both the distinction between two forms of intelligibility and rationality and the new concept of metaphysics surface towards the end of the Cartesian Meditations (see §59 of the text). The first form of irrationality is the one that the phenomenologists encounters at the very outset of the philosophical enterprise and consists in the contingency (Zufälligkeit) of the factual world itself. A first form of intelligibility and rationality is bestowed upon it by the eidetic investigations of its a priori and material structures. It is the consideration of the “world” sub specie possibilitatis; a preliminary form of intelligibility is obtained as soon as the world is investigated as an idea and in its essential invariants (i.e., ontological intelligibility and rationality), in such a manner that the world’s “contingency” is traced back to a system of eidetic necessities. Here is what Husserl writes in §59 of the Meditations,

21

 This is why Husserl writes, “it makes no scientific sense to search for another…(our italics).”

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the task of an a priori ontology of the real world, which is precisely the discovery of the a priori belonging to the world’s universality, is inevitable but, on the other hand, one-sided and not philosophical in the final sense. Such an ontological a priori (for example, of nature, of the psycho-physical, of sociality and culture) does indeed confer on the ontic fact, on the factual world in respect of its contingencies (Zufälligkeiten), a relative intelligibility (relative Verständlichkeit), that of an evident necessity of being-thus by virtue of eidetic laws; but it does not confer philosophical, that is to say, transcendental intelligibility (Verständlichkeit) (Hua I, 164; Husserl, 1960, 137).

We should  already be familiar with the way in which Husserl uses here Verständlichkeit, since the issue of a higher form of intelligibility, i.e., the transcendental and concrete intelligibility was at the center of our assessment of the Husserl-­ Heidegger relation in Volume 1, Chaps. 5 and 6. Husserl is clear: the ontological sciences provide the world with a preliminary form of intelligibility. The irrationality of the contingency of the world is ontologically rationalized; but this is no transcendental rationality yet. Philosophy, after all, demands an elucidation by virtue of the ultimate and most concrete essential necessities; and these are the necessities that satisfy the essential rootedness of any objective world in transcendental subjectivity and thus make the world intelligible concretely: as a constitute sense. Only, then, moreover (Und damit erst), do the supreme and ultimate questions become disclosed, those that are still to be addressed to the world even as understood in this manner (Hua I, 164–165; Husserl, 1960, 137–138).

The passage needs to be carefully read because it introduces the crucial expression “the supreme and ultimate questions” (die höchsten und letzten Fragen), which represents the very key to what Husserl labels “metaphysics in a new sense.” Alongside the ontological rationality and intelligibility bestowed by the a priori sciences, there appears a higher form of intelligibility, the one provided by the transcendental consideration of the world in terms of “sense.” It is the world, and its a priori structure as a part of the primum concretum; in other words, it is the transcendental determination of the world as a correlate of the transcendental monadic inter-subjectivity. It is at this point, namely, at the end of the transcendental process (which coincides with the metaphysical interpretation of the factually given world) that a third form of “irrationality” emerges. After the successfully executed a priori investigation of transcendental subjectivity, and after the explication of the experience of the other, of the inter-subjectivity and this factual world as its only possible correlate (see Volume 1, Chap. 5, §§9–10; and 6, §12), what we are confronted with is “this factual world,” marked by a series of “irrationalities” that can no longer be accounted for eidetically or transcendentally (they go beyond the interpretation of “this” factual world sub specie systematis rationis theoreticae). They are the irrationalities proper to our human life and our own factual world, the one we live in. This is what Husserl means when he writes the following words: the irrationality of the transcendental fact, which expresses itself in the constitution of the factual world [= this one] and of the factual spiritual life [= our own factual and human spiritual life].

So far we know that “metaphysics in a new sense” has to do with a series of irrationalities that are neither those with which “ontologies” and a priori sciences deal, nor

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the ones addressed by the “transcendental constitution.” If we are right in linking the expression “metaphysics in a new sense” to what Husserl calls “the supreme and ultimate questions,” then the question arises concerning the meaning of these questions. For if metaphysics in a new sense opens up after the “metaphysical” interpretation of factual being, and if the supreme and ultimate questions become disclosed after the accomplishment of the “rootedness” of the objective world in transcendental subjectivity (and inter-subjectivity), then there should be no doubt about the two expressions meaning exactly the same thing. As was already explained in De Santis, 2021b, 244, these questions are called ultimate and supreme because they do not concern the fundamental dimension of the self-constitution of the transcendental subjectivity; they are no transcendental questions (die Fragen der unteren Stufe (Hua IX, 253)). They are ultimate and supreme because they appear at the end of the constitutive process (thus, the adjective letzten) and are the expression of the irrational nature of our human existence. What are the supreme and ultimate questions? As is known, Husserl writes a quite long list in a letter from June 3, 1932 to his life-long friend Gustav Albrecht: Die höchstgelegenen aller Fragen, diejenigen, die nicht ohne weiteres jeder Mensch in ihrem eigentlichen, strengen, echten Sinn fassen und verstehen kann, sind aber die metaphysischen; sie betreffen Geburt und Tod, letztes Sein des „Ich “und des als Menschheit objektivierten „Wir“, die Teleologie, die letztlich zurückführt in die transzendentale Subjektivität und ihre transzendentale Historizität und natürlich als oberstes: das Sein Gottes als des Prinzips diese Teleologie und der Sinn dieses Seins gegenüber dem Sein des ersten Absoluten, dem Sein meines transzendentalen Ich und der sich in mir erschließenden transzendentalen Allsubjektivität—der wahren Stätte göttlichen „Wirkens“, zu dem die „Konstitution “der Welt als „unsere “gehört—von Gott her gesprochen die ständige Weltschöpfung in uns, m unserem transzendentalen, letztlich wahren Sein (Hua-Dok III/9, 83–84).

The list might of course be slightly different, since for example the Cartesian Meditations also include the “contingent facticity” (zufällige Faktizität), Schicksal (which could be for example translated as “adverse fate,” “destiny” or “fortune” in a sense to be explained in the next chapter), “the possibility of a ‘genuine’ (echten) human life as ‘meaningful’ (sinnvoll) in a particular sense”; “the sense of history” (Hua I, 39, and 182; Husserl, 1960, 156). They all have something in common: indeed, they concern us “human beings.” As Husserl writes in the letter, the “most elevated questions” bear upon the ultimate being of “the ‘Ego’ and the ‘We’ objectified as humanity (als Menschheit),” and on the constitution of the world as our own human world (der Welt als “unsere”). In order to understand Husserl’s talk of teleology and of God as its ultimate source, it is important to keep in mind that it is the total-subjectivity, namely, the transcendental inter-subjectivity objectified as “humanity” that represents the true place (der wahren Stätte) of God’s “self-­ realization.” Von Gott her gesprochen, Husserl concludes, the self-realization of the transcendental inter-subjectivity objectified as humanity is the Weltschöpfung itself, the “creation of the world.” Reference to God aside, one thing should be apparent. The “supreme and ultimate questions” do not belong to first philosophy, nor are they the subject-matter of any of the ontologies or the positive sciences. For, they go beyond the metaphysical interpretation of the factual world sub specie systematis rationis theoreticae.

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9. This is the reason why our interpretation substantially diverges from the one developed by L.  Tengelyi and offered in his otherwise profound book, Welt und Unendlichkeit. In fact, and no matter how insightful and interesting his “metaphysics of the Urtatsachen” might be,22 his assessment and interpretation of Husserl’s metaphysics rest, we believe, on an initial and crucial misunderstanding. Tengelyi mistakes the expression “the irrationality of the transcendental fact” from the footnote to the 1923 lectures on First Philosophy to be referring to the factuality of the structures proper to the transcendental-concrete subjectivity (and to the inseparability of “fact” and “essence” proper to the monad as a concrete form of subjectivity). Moreover, Tengelyi identifies what in the footnote above Husserl labels metaphysics in a new sense with “metaphysics as the fundamental science of reality” (Metaphysik als Grundwissenschaft der Wirklichkeit) (see Tengelyi, 2015, 181, 184), thereby also conflating and confusing two meanings of the expression “metaphysics” (corresponding to what we have designated as I-II and III respectively).23 On the basis of Text Nr. 21 from Husserliana XV (Gang der systematischen Beschreibungen bis zur Monadenlehre, nach der Reduktion (Oktober 1931)), Tengelyi identifies four groups of original and primordial facts (vier Gruppen von Urtatsachen): (1) the primordial fact of the “ego” with its own factual structures; (2) the “possession of the world” (Welthabe) as one of these primordial egological structures; (3) the intentional intertwinement between the egos; (4) history as a form of teleology  See the analyses of Tengelyi’s position offered by Römer, 2017, 120–123.  Tengelyi’s interpretation has been recently developed by Breuer, 2020, who writes: “transcendental phenomenology is grounded upon a phenomenological metaphysics. In what follows, I will show how and why Husserl moves from a transcendental philosophy understood as an eidetic science to a phenomenological metaphysics based on originally given primal facts, focusing on the transformation of the concept of the ego” (214). Just like Tengelyi, Breuer explicitly confuses the meaning of the two expressions “the irrationality of the transcendental fact” and “metaphysics in a new sense” from the 1923 lectures with the problem of the factual structures of the transcendental and concrete ego. See for example p. 221: “Already in a supplementary sheet to his First Philosophy of 1923–24, Husserl extends the scope of this problematic to the realm of the ‘irrationality of the transcendental fact’ as the content of a ‘metaphysics in a new sense’ […], a phenomenological metaphysics, on which the transcendental-eidetic phenomenology is grounded and which no longer allows any distinction between ‘static’ and ‘genetic.’” This argument is affected by at least three difficulties. In the first place, nowhere is the expression “phenomenological metaphysics” ever justified. The author introduces the expression, taking for granted that a directly understandable meaning can be attached to it. In the second place, it is not true that the new idea of the transcendental ego “no longer allows any distinction between ‘static’ and ‘genetic.’” The distinction between static and genetic is re-affirmed by Husserl in dozens of texts written after the 1923–24 lectures, for example in the Cartesian Meditations: here, it is precisely the distinction between static and the genetic philosophy that allows for a new, concrete conception of the transcendental ego as a monad. Thirdly, it is far from being true that “transcendental-eidetic phenomenology” would be grounded in “metaphysics in a new sense.” The footnote in question affirms the exact opposite: what Husserl labels “metaphysics in a new sense” follows, and presupposes the already accomplished “transcendental-eidetic phenomenology.” See also the last footnote to the present chapter. 22 23

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(Tengelyi, 2015, 184–185). Now, whoever remembers what we explained over the course of Volume1, Chap. 3 about the threefold concreteness of the monad as a concrete subjectivity, should also know that with the exception of 4, the first three refer to problems that fall completely within the domain of transcendental phenomenology in the sense of the egology of CM IV. On the contrary, 4 is misleading because it could refer either to the teleology of the transcendental subject or to the irrational dimension of our “human existence” (see Chap. 5 of the present volume). Even if it is true that in the 1931 manuscript above from Husserliana XV Husserl himself uses the expression “‘metaphysical’ primordial fact” (die ‘metaphysische’ Urtatsache) (Hua XV, 366), this should be taken with lots of grains of salt. It is not clear why the expression is written with inverted commas (“metaphysics”), and the hypothesis could be advanced that Husserl is not using it in any technical sense of the term. However, and even if we were to take the expression at face value, this could only signify that here Husserl is using the adjective “metaphysical” in a new sense which should not be identified with metaphysics in the strict sense of the term as the conclusion of the overall system of reason. In sum, Husserl would be using the term “metaphysics” in a sense that does not correspond to what he means by metaphysics in the sense of the ultimate science of reality (whether “first” or “last philosophy”) or as the metaphysical interpretation of reality. In fact, whereas the latter two presuppose, as we have already seen, the already accomplished self-­ constitution of the monad and that of the transcendental inter-subjectivity, the four primordial facts listed by Tengelyi concern different aspects of the transcendental constitution itself (i.e., that of the ego, of the other and of the world itself), thereby falling without rest under the domain of transcendental phenomenology24 (of course, not in the sense of the first volume of Ideas, but rather according to the project of the Cartesian Meditations).

 If we were to further elaborate upon our argument, the following hypothesis could be advanced. Is it just a coincidence that Husserl uses the adjective “metaphysical” in order to characterize the ego’s structures and the fundamental forms of its transcendence (i.e., towards the other ego, towards the world and as history) immediately he had read once again all of Heidegger’s works? As we briefly saw towards the end of §3 of this chapter, Heidegger calls meta-physics Dasein’s transcendence, which is precisely what Husserl would understand in terms of the many forms of the ego’s transcendence. This would also explain why Husserl uses the adjective “metaphysical” in the 1931 manuscript with inverted commas: the point for him is to avoid confusing the proper meaning of the concept of metaphysics (as the metaphysical interpretation of factually given being) with this new, and more Heideggerian-sounding use of the term. It is interesting to stress that, at the beginning of his argument, Tengelyi refers to Held, 1966, 178 and 147 (see Tengelyi, 2015, 183), to more strongly support his interpretation. However, none of the pages referred to by Tengelyi speaks of metaphysics in his sense of the term. However, Held too seems to confuse “metaphysics in a new sense” with the problem of the human determination of the transcendental inter-subjectivity (Held, 1966, 178; see our analyses in Volume1, Chap. 5, §§9–11). A position similar to Tengelyi’s can be found in Arnold & D’Angelo, 2020, 53–56. The authors include under the label of “metaphysics” questions as diverse as: the transcendental fact of the subject (in Tengelyi’s sense); the supreme and ultimate questions; as well as the problem of the existence of just one real and actual world. 24

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10. Three different notions of metaphysics have been distinguished over the course of the present chapter: the conception of metaphysics as a “first philosophy” that characterizes Husserl’s view from before the Logical Investigations to around 1905 (§4); the conception of metaphysics as “last philosophy,” which is dominant until the early 20 s (§§5–6). This is the phase in which Husserl speaks of metaphysics both in terms of “philosophy” (“last philosophy”) (second meaning) and simply as the metaphysical interpretation of objective being as a fact (third meaning). A fourth concept could however be pinpointed in a footnote to the lectures from 1923–24 on First Philosophy (see §§7–8). While the concept of metaphysics understood as what brings the system of philosophy to conclusion is simply identified with the metaphysical interpretation of factually given being, a “new sense” of metaphysics is introduced which goes beyond the system of philosophy. Such new idea of metaphysics (which is added to the previous one, yet without replacing it) neither designates a (new) branch of philosophy, nor does it express an interpretation of factual reality. Rather, this metaphysics designates or refers to a group of questions and problems (whose number can vary) concerning the “irrational” dimension of our own human existence. It would be a mistake to contend that these are questions that philosophy could not answer. Rather, it would be better to affirm that after phenomenology-­grounded philosophy has accomplished its task and completed its metaphysical interpretation of the factual world (sub specie systematis rationis theoreticae), new questions arise whose sense cannot be reduced to what phenomenology and philosophy have already asserted about the world.25 Not only should metaphysics never be confused with phenomenology as a form of first philosophy; it is important to always keep distinct the concept of metaphysics as a part of philosophy (i.e., as its “completion”) and as it appears after the already accomplished metaphysical interpretation of the factual world. At the beginning of this work (see Volume1, Chap. 1, §7), a series of distinctions was made which would later help us better understand all the complexity of Husserl’s attitude vis-à-vis Heidegger (Fig. 4.2). It slowly became evident in fact that Husserl accuses Heidegger of a double confusion, so to say. On the one hand, as we better saw over the course of Chaps. 1 and 3 of this volume, Husserl accuses Heidegger of conflating a (“I, this human being, am the one…”) and b (“Transcendental subjectivity”), or, in his philosophical jargon: “philosophical anthropology” and “first philosophy” (i.e., transcendental phenomenology in its foundational role vis-à-vis all the other philosophical disciplines). As we saw over the course of Chap. 1 of the present volume, according to Husserl the consequence of such a first confusion is the impossibility of laying claim to the entities’ many modes of being. What is made thereby impossible is the very

25

 On this problem, see the analyses by Ip, 2023.

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4 Husserl Metaphysicus (a) “I, this human being, am the one…” (b.1) Consciousness-world correlation (b) Transcendental subjectivity (b.2) The concretely full being (c) My Dasein as a human being

Fig. 4.2  Husserl’s three subjects

possibility of the philosophical disciplines (a priori sciences or ontologies), hence of what Husserl also calls “concrete ontology.” But now we can also see in what sense, according to Husserl, Heidegger would be guilty also of a second confusion: the one between b (“Transcendental subjectivity”) and c (“My Dasein as a human being”). How should we properly describe the latter confusion based upon our reconstruction of Husserl’s philosophy thus far? As we already know (see Volume 1, Chap. 1), in his 1931 lecture on Phenomenology and Anthropology, Husserl employs the turn of phrase “my Dasein as a human being” to designate the transcendental-ego’s self-apperception in the world (Hua XXVII, 174; Husserl, 1997, 494). In short, the term Dasein (c) is used by Husserl to refer to the self-apperception of the transcendental inter-subjectivity at the end of the process of constitution (see Volume 1, Chap. 5, §§9–11). Dasein designates or points to the domain of what Husserl labels: “metaphysics in a new sense,” that is to say, our own human existence and its irrational character. As a consequence, Husserl would accuse Heidegger of also conflating “first philosophy” and “metaphysics” in a new sense. As if Heidegger, Husserl would probably argue, had misleadingly assigned a transcendental and constitutive meaning and function to (some of) the “irrational” aspects of our human existence. Although Husserl seems never to make this point in any of his texts, a Randbemerkung on Being and Time fully corroborates our hypothesis. Husserl’s Bemerkung is on page 250, line 40 (§50, on A Preliminary Sketch of the Existential and Ontological Structure of Death), where Heidegger writes: Death is a possibility of being that Dasein always has to take upon itself. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being. In this possibility, Dasein is concerned about its being-in-the-world sic et simpliciter. Its death is the possibility of no-­ longer-­being-able-to-be-there. When Dasein is imminent to its death as this possibility, it is completely thrown back upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being. Thus imminent to itself, all relations to other Dasein are dissolved in it. This nonrelational ownmost possibility is at the same time the most extreme one. As a potentiality of being, Dasein is unable to bypass the possibility of Death [our italics] (Heidegger 1967, 250; 2010, 241).

Husserl’s Randbemerkung bears on the sentence italicized. He first writes, “The possibility of death is thereby always presupposed, not clarified”26; then, he also adds:

26

 For a critical discussion of death as a possibility for Dasein, see Puc, 2013, 72–75.

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Another inevitable possibility is the universal hazard (der universale Zufall), the adverse fate or fortune (Schicksal), the universe of irrationalities (das Universum der Irrationalitäten) (Husserl, 1994b, 32; 1997, 258).

It is not easy to tell what Husserl means when he remarks that, “The possibility of death is thereby always presupposed, not clarified.” What is important for us is that by mentioning the concepts of Zufall and Schicksal, and by also referring to das Universum der Irrationalitäten, Husserl is clearly including “death” (hence, Heidegger’s analysis of it) within the scope of the so-called supreme and ultimate questions (= “metaphysics in a new sense”). Later, Husserl will point out that, “Death is intertwined with hazard (Zufall) and in general with the ‘contingency’ (Zufälligkeit) of the duration of one’s life (Lebensdauer)” (Husserl, 1994b, 32; 1997, 359). From Husserl’s perspective, which on this point may for sure be philosophically less exciting than Heidegger’s, death (just as the general contingent facticity of our own human existence) does not designate any transcendental-existential structure of the subject. Rather, it is nothing else but one of the expressions of the irrationality of our human existence. Nothing more, nothing less. It should now be evident to what extent Husserl’s concept of “metaphysics” has also nothing to do with the way in which Heidegger uses the term “metaphysics” between 1927 and 1929 (at least in the texts with which Husserl himself was familiar). If in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (see §3 of the present chapter), the phrase “metaphysics of metaphysics” was used in order to point to the core of the analytics of Dasein of Being and Time, that is, the event of Dasein’s transcendence,27 for the Husserl of the late 20 s “metaphysics” no longer designates a branch or field of philosophy. Metaphysics is either the very “culmination” of the system of philosophy as it is grounded upon phenomenology, but in this case it has nothing to do with our own Dasein. Or it is “metaphysics in a new sense,” and bears on our Dasein and the irrationalities of our human existence in the world, but then it cannot have the foundational role which Heidegger still assigns to it in the 1929 book.

 If our criticism of Tengelyi’s own metaphysics of the Urtatsachen is on the right track, then Husserl’s expression “‘metaphysical’ primordial fact” (die ‘metaphysische’ Urtatsache) (Hua XV, 366) should be read against the backdrop of Heidegger’s decision to characterize as “metaphysical” the event of Dasein’s transcendence. For example, Heidegger speaks of “metaphysical primordial or primal fact” in one of the texts with which Husserl was most familiar, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (§42): “The construction proper to fundamental ontology is distinguished by the fact that it lays bare the internal possibility of that which holds sway over Dasein. This dominating element is not only that which is most familiar to Dasein but is also that which is most indeterminate and self-evident. This construction can be understood as an effort in the part of Dasein to grasp in itself the primordial metaphysical fact (das metaphysische Urfaktum) which consists in this, that the most finite in its finitude is known without being understood” (Heidegger, 1965, 233; 2010a, 241). And such “primordial metaphysical fact” is the comprehension of being proper to Dasein’s finitude, and which alone makes its “transcendence” and being-in-the-world at all possible. 27

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Nietzsche, F. (1921). Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Nietzsche’s Werke (Band VII). Kröner Verlag. Puc, J. (2013). Das Selbstsein. Eine Kritik von Heideggers Begriff der eigentlichen Existenz. In T.  Keiling (Hrsg.), Heideggers Marburger Zeit. Themen, Argumente, Konstellationen (pp. 71–81). V. Klostermann. Römer, I. (2017). Was ist phänomenologische Metaphysik. In M. Gabriel, C. Olay, & S. Ostritsch (Eds.), Welt und Unendlichkeit. Ein deutsch-ungarischer Dialog im memoriam László Tengelyi (pp. 115–130). Karl Alber. Schuhmann, K. (1977). Husserl-Chronik. M. Nijhoff. Simmel, G. (1900–1911). Zur Metaphysik des Todes. Logos: Zeitschrift für systematische Philosophie, 1, 57–70. Sivák, J. (2015). La notion de métaphysique chez Husserl. VEDA. Stumpf, C. (1907). Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften. Verlag der König. Akademie der Wissenschaften. Tavuzzi, M. (1981). On Husserl’s conception of metaphysics. Angelicum, 58, 285–311. Tengelyi, L. (2015). Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik. Karl Alber. Trendelenburg, A. (1862). Logische Untersuchungen. Verlag von S. Hirzel. Trizio, E. (2016). What is the crisis of European sciences? Husserl Studies, 32, 191–211. Trizio, E. (2018). The telos of consciousness and the telos of the world. Humana-Mente, 11: https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/214 Trizio, E. (2019). Husserl’s early concept of metaphysics as the ultimate science of reality. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 17, 309–329. Trizio, E. (2020). Husserl’s Timaeus. Plato’s Creation Myth and the Phenomenological Concept of Metaphysics as the Teleological Science of the World. Studia Phaenomenologica, XX, 77–100. Trizio, E. (2021a). Philosophy’s nature: Husserl’s phenomenology, natural science and metaphysics. Routledge. Trizio, E. (2021b). Phenomenology, teleology, theology. In H. Jacobs (Ed.), The Husserlian mind (pp. 521–531). Routledge. Ueberweg, F. (1865). System der Logik und Geschichte der logischen Ideen. Adolf Marchus Verlag. Vannata, S. (2007). Radical empiricism and Husserlian metaphysics. The Pluralist, 3, 17–37. Varga, P. A. (2013). The missing chapter from the logical investigations: Husserl on Lotze’s formal and real significance of logical Laws. Husserl Studies, 29, 181–209. Wust, P. (1963). Die Auferstehung der Metaphysik. Felix Meiner. Wust, P. (1967). Leben und Werk. Verlag Regensberg. Zahavi, D. (2003). Phenomenology and metaphysics. In S. Heinamaa, H. Ruin, & D. Zahavi (Eds.), Metaphysics, facticity, interpretation. Phenomenology in the Nordic countries (pp.  3–22). Kluwer Academic Publisher.

Chapter 5

The Sea of Suffering

1. In Volume 1, Chap. 1, §4, we quoted Kaufmann’s harsh judgment about the philosophers from the “past generation,” with their “old-style idealistic philosophies,” interested in the “absolute consciousness,” and who knew nothing of “death” and the “finitude of life” (Kaufmann, 1930, 165). As we slowly yet quite undoubtedly acknowledged over the course of Chap. 4 of this volume, nothing could be farther from the truth than the idea that Husserl’s idealistic-transcendental phenomenology would have no interest in “death” or the “finitude of life.” However, the problem is not to maintain that next to the idealistic-transcendental-intellectualistic Husserl, who would mainly concern himself with theoretical topics, there would be another Husserl, an existentialist Husserl who would by contrary address problems and themes usually regarded as characterizing what goes by the name of “existentialism” (regardless of the specific philosophers we may have in mind).1 As if the problem could be resolved by merely piling a new Husserl on the many with which we are already familiar: a realist Husserl, a Platonist Husserl, an idealist Husserl, a transcendental Husserl, and so forth, and then finally also an existentialist Husserl.2 Instead, what is required is what in a letter to Roman Ingarden Husserl calls Problemgeographie, a correct “geography of problems” (Husserl, 1968, 4). In sum, the question is to identify and circumscribe the specific locus that the problems of

 Let me hasten to remark that the arguments of the present chapter were conceived and written before I became aware of the existence of Cavallaro & Heffernan, 2022. 2  For an important perspective on Husserl’s philosophy of existence that would differ from ours, see Heffernan, 2021, who speaks of an “existential Husserl” but not in the sense of an “existentialist Husserl” (and yet, it is not clear to us in what the difference between the two would properly consist). 1

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human existence (or human Dasein,3 according to Husserl’s Heideggerian-sounding language) have within the system of philosophy.4 As we saw towards the end of our assessment of Husserl’s metaphysics, such a place is to be found μετὰ, i.e., beyond the ultimate interpretation of being sub specie systematis theoreticae rationis. The Cartesian Meditations are clear on this point, “the supreme and ultimate questions” arise only at the end of the phenomenological enterprise, once that both the eidetic and the transcendental forms of intelligibility have been bestowed upon the world (Hua I, 164–165; Husserl, 1993, 138). Of course, Husserl himself admits to Ingarden that what the text argues about “metaphysics in a new sense” is insufficient. In a letter from March 19, 1930, he explains that the German edition of the Meditations will have to be longer than the French edition because of the peculiar situation of German philosophy, characterized by “a trendy turn towards the philosophy of existence.” For this reason, he adds, the German edition will include a much “broader presentation and development” of the “supreme ‘metaphysical’ problem” (Husserl, 1968, 50). But if the account given in the Cartesian Meditations is descriptively insufficient, a slightly more systematic presentation of these themes can be found at the beginning of Husserl’s last masterpiece, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (§3). Here he lays claim to “the unity of a theoretical system” and denounces the so-called positivistic concept of the sciences as a “residual” one (Hua VI, 6; Husserl, 1970, 9). Hence, Husserl exclaims, the positivistic concept has dropped all the questions which had been considered under the now narrower, now broader concepts of metaphysics, including all questions vaguely termed “ultimate and highest” (höchsten und letzten). Examined closely, these and all the excluded questions have their inseparable unity in the fact that they contain, whether expressly or as implied in their meaning, the problems of reason, reason in all its particular forms (Hua VI, 6–7; Husserl, 1970, 9).

Husserl is clear: the so-called ultimate and highest or supreme questions belong to metaphysics. Metaphysics can be understood either “narrowly” or “broadly”: and we know from our previous assessment that they belong to metaphysics in the broad sense of the expression (metaphysics in a new sense). Interestingly enough, Husserl admits that they “contain […] the problems of reason, reason in all its particular forms.” Although this sentence seems to partially contradict what we explained in the previous chapter as regards metaphysics in the strict sense, this is not really the case. For as we saw during our analysis of the footnote to the lectures on First Philosophy, “metaphysics” construed as a “metaphysical” interpretation of “the universal theme of the positive sciences” is an expression of the purely theoretical form of reason. This is why we coined the turn of phrase the interpretation of the  For an analysis of the ways in which Husserl uses the term Dasein, and in which nevertheless the perspective here outlined is not taken into account, see De Gennaro, 2013, 63–88. 4  This is why in a 1931 text (gegen Heidegger), Husserl speaks of the necessity of an an sich erstes Aufgabensystem, a system within which the different tasks are clearly identified and differentiated (Hua XXXIV, 260). 3

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factual world sub specie systematis rationis theoreticae. But then, new questions arise which bear on the sense of our human existence, and for which “theoretical reason” has or seems to have no direct answers. Indeed, it is the specifically “practical” forms of reason that will be here at stake. Reason is the explicit theme in the disciplines concerning knowledge (i.e., of true and genuine, rational knowledge), of true and genuine valuation (genuine values as values of reason), of ethical action (truly good acting, acting from practical reason); here reason is a title for “absolute,” “eternal,” “super-temporal,” “unconditionally” valid ideas and ideals. If the human being becomes a “metaphysical” or specifically philosophical problem, then he or she is in question as a rational being; if his or her history is in question, it is a matter of the “sense” or reason in history. The problem of God clearly contains the problem of “absolute” reason as the teleological source of all reason in the world, of the “sense” of the world. Obviously even the question of immortality is a question of reason, as is the question of freedom (Hua VI, 7; Husserl, 1970, 9).

Let us hasten to warn the reader that here we are not interested in tackling the problems of practical reason per se considered. If we have been mentioning it, it is only to better understand what Husserl means to designate by the turn of phrase “the supreme and ultimate questions” in connection to the wider problem of the irrationality of human existence. The questions here mentioned by Husserl map onto some of those listed in the 1932 letter to Albrecht: the problem of history; God as the absolute reason and the “teleological” source of all reason in the world; the sense of the world. Only to the extent that metaphysics includes also the latter problems can one understand why “metaphysics,” “the science of the ultimate and supreme questions,” used to be “honored as the queen of the sciences” (Hua VI, 7; Husserl, 1970, 9). In contrast with the footnote to the lectures on First Philosophy, where a sharp distinction was made between metaphysics as the ultimate interpretation of factual being and metaphysics in a new sense—here Husserl speaks of metaphysics in a sense that includes both yet without making any distinction. However, we should not infer from this that the former difference no longer holds. Quite the contrary. The problem is that Husserl is here mainly interested in re-affirming, against the positivistic and non-metaphysical idea of philosophy, the thesis that authentic philosophy culminates in metaphysics in general. But the distinction between metaphysics as the ultimate interpretation of factual being (hereafter: Με-1) and metaphysics in a new sense (hereafter: Με-2) must be held fast to. For it corresponds to a most crucial distinction: the distinction between reason interpreting factual being from the vantage point of the verum (the world as the totality of what there is; or, to put it better, as the universal theme of factual sciences), and the questions bearing upon our human existence and its irrational character.

2. If we put together what Husserl writes in §3 of the Crisis, in his letter to Albrecht as well as in the Cartesian Meditations, the following list proper to Με-2 can be proposed (the list has already been discussed in De Santis, 2021, 245):

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(a) The ultimate being of the “ego” and the “we” objectified as humanity (b) Birth and death (c) Teleology and the sense of history→ God as the source of all sense in the world (d) The sense of a “genuine” and “meaningful” human life (e) The transcendental total-subjectivity as the “true place in which the divine is ‘effective’” and to which there belongs the constitution of the world as “ours” As we will soon see, a, b, c, d, and e do not stand on an equal footing. As we already mentioned towards the end of the previous chapter, a and e are not two questions among others; rather, they designate the overall framework of Με-2: for the latter bears only upon our factual world (e) and our own human existence in it (a). The fact that these questions, and the problems associated with them, are qualified as ultimate (letzten) should be read in a sharp opposition to the adjective first (erste) which Husserl describes “transcendental phenomenology” in its foundational role. Those questions are ultimate in that they come to the fore for last and are not to be confused with the questions with which phenomenology has on the contrary to start out. And they are labeled supreme (höchsten), in contrast with the questions of the “lowest level” (Hua IX, 253; Husserl, 1997, 101),5 because they cannot even be assessed before the eidetic structures of the transcendental subjectivity have been examined. The supreme and ultimate questions are neither philosophically foundational questions nor do they concern the eidetic structures of a transcendentally purified subjectivity.6 This is the reason why we have been avoiding here (and will be avoiding as much as we can) the misleading expression Grenz-Probleme, with which the editors of Husserliana XLII strive to characterize also the aforementioned supreme and ultimate questions. De facto, Husserl has used the expression Grenzprobleme only once and later replaced it with “problems of higher level” (see Hua XXXIX, 876). Nowhere does Husserl regard the supreme and ultimate questions as questions that “step beyond the limits of phenomenological description” (die Grenzen phänomenologischer Deskription überschreiten) (Hua XLII, xix). Since the latter comment entails or seems to imply a quite negative value judgment on Husserl’s way of proceeding that we do not prima facie share—we will never refer to the supreme and ultimate questions as “limit-problems of (phenomenology),” thereby suggesting that Husserl would not be phenomenologically entitled to tackle them. What is needed to comprehend properly the sense and implications of Με-2 is an analysis of how Husserl himself understands the conditions of our own human existence: what is at stake for him is the existence in a world in which “humanity” (Mitmenschheit) is verhüllt und bemäntelt mit dem Meer der Leiden, “shrouded and

 Husserl presents the questions of the lowest level as those concerning “the purely descriptive eidetic analysis of the structures of a transcendentally purified subjectivity (of the ego as a monad).” 6  That this is the way in which the distinction between the supreme and ultimate questions, on the one hand, and those of lowest level, on the other, should be understood is shown by Husserl’s own words to G. Albrecht. In a famous 1932 letter, he explains that phenomenology has to proceed von unten bis zu dieser höchsten Spitze (Hua-Dok III/9, 84). 5

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cloaked in a sea of suffering.” For human existence is constantly at the mercy of a “fate”7 that can at any time meaninglessly break forth upon us (sinnlos hereinbrechenden Schicksal) and wipe us out (Hua XLII, 406). It is against the backdrop of such grim picture of human existence that the discussion of the supreme and ultimate questions imposes itself on Husserl’s attention. What is needed is then an actual phenomenology of the irrational: a description and categorization of the many different forms of irrationality that affect our existence. To this end, this chapter will be divided into two parts. We will first present the reader with the different forms of irrationality of our existence (thereby elaborating on the analyses first suggested in De Santis, 2021) by also making the case for regarding Husserl’s perspective as a further and radical development of a classical theme from the history of Western philosophy, i.e., that of the Fortuna (in a sense to be explained). We will then go back to Με-2 to elucidate the relation between a, b, c, d, e and the irrational nature of our existence. Let us hasten to warn the reader that since Husserl’s meditations on the irrationality of existence are scattered along many manuscripts and texts, the very task of the interpreter is that of organizing them in a coherent way, thus showing how systematic Husserl’s own view on the matter is.

3. For Husserl, the most fundamental and basic characteristic of human existence is that it consists in a constant “struggle with the irrationalities” (Kampf mit den Irrationalitäten) (Hua XLII, 482)— not with one specific irrationality (in the singular), but rather with a multiplicity of irrationalities (in the plural).8 Which ones? The most elementary dimension of the irrationality of human existence is what Husserl designates as “the irrationality of contingency” or contingent irrationality in the sense of the German Zufall. Here Husserl makes explicit reference to Kierkegaard: “Here there is the great fact of the irrationality of what is accidental (Zufalls), whose significance has been properly discovered or maybe re-discovered only by Kierkegaard” (Hua XLII, 285).9  Here the term Schicksal is being translated only for the sake of clarity. For reasons that will become apparent over the course of the present chapter, the expression will always be left in German. 8  Borrowing an expression from a former student and war-veteran, Arnold Metzger (Metzger, 1979, 125), Husserl also speaks of Kampf um das Dasein, “struggle for existence” (Hua XLII, 430). 9  Since it is not immediately apparent to which texts and arguments by Kierkegaard Husserl could be referring here, we will not even try to pursue this line of investigation. Schulz, 1994 offers a quite detailed and systematic reconstruction of the role of both Schicksal (114–202) and Zufall (203–244), the latter as “an ontologically fundamental determination of the individual factual existence” (see p. 205 and ff.). An important analysis of the role of the Zufall in Kierkegaard can be also found in Glöckner, 1998, 53 and ff. Among the works on Kierkegaard with which Husserl was quite likely personally familiar (see Hua-Dok III/3, 15) there is Thust, 1931. The book is a system7

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Die Natur ist relativ zum Individuum und als seine Umwelt betrachtet eine Welt voll von Zufällen. Durch Zufall ist er in sie hineingestellt, Zufall ist seine Geburt, seine Erziehung, das Zusammentreffen mit anderen, ihn und sein Leben wesentlich mitbestimmenden Menschen. Das Schicksal ist das große Wort für den einzelnen Menschen und für die Gemeinschaften. Die Welt ist unberechenbar; und wäre sie selbst berechenbar, so nützte das dem Ich nichts, das durch Zufall und Schicksal in sie hineingeraten und von ihr und in ihr herumgezerrt wird. […] Gewiss, es gerät allerlei, es glückt. Aber eben es glückt, und es mag auch nicht glücken. Millionen Menschen sind aus der Bahn des „Es glückt“herausgeworfen oder der Tod reißt sie aus der Kulturarbeit heraus (italics all mine) (Hua XLII, 285–286).

The passage is dense, and it should be clear why we refrain from translating it. Zufall is connected to the determination of the world (Welt) as “nature” (Natur); or, to put it better, what we label surrounding world is, as nature, a realm full of accidents (voll von Zufällen). We have introduced it as the most elementary dimension of the irrationality of our existence because it bears on its natural layer, so to speak. In the words of Husserl, it is the fact of being born and of being born in such and such a place (in the world hineingestellt). It is the Zufall of the “environment, education, health and illness, especially mental illness” (Hua XLII, 409). Husserl speaks of “the infinite realm of contingencies and accidents” (unendliches Reich der Zufälle) (Hua XLII, 300) that characterize the “general uncertainty or insecurity of life” (allgemeine Unsicherheit des Lebens): sickness, insanity, and death, Krankheit, Wahnsinn und Tod (Hua XLII, 317, 409, 411, 420, 421). Husserl also speaks of “the irrationality of facticity” (Irrationalität der Faktizität) (Hua XLII, 378). This is perfectly in line with the Randbemerkung on §50 of Being and Time which we discussed at the very end of the previous chapter (§10). There, Husserl speaks of “the universe of irrationalities” (Universum der Irrationalitäten) and couples together Zufall and death (Tod): “Death is intertwined with hazard (Zufall) and in general with the ‘contingency’ (Zufälligkeit) of the duration of one’s life” (Husserl, 1994, 32; 1997, 359). The turn of phrase natural layer should however be

atic analysis of the structure of the subject from the standpoint of the “religious phenomenon” (see 7 and ff.): “Nur so kann der Dichter des Religiösen das Menschliche in seiner reinen Menschlichkeit darstellen” (Thust, 1931, 27). In the text Husserl and his phenomenology are mentioned on a few occasions and in relation to different topics. On page 198 Husserl is mentioned in relation to the correct understanding of the term überhaupt (Dieses kleine Wörtchen „überhaupt“) during what looks like an “eidetic” account of the phenomenon of eros. On page 253 Husserl is explicitly evoked again for his meticulous discussions of “conscious experience” (Bewusstseinserlebnis) as a most unitary phenomenon (and on whose analogy Thust tries to understand Kierkegaard’s concept of Abwandlung). Finally, Husserl is briefly discussed towards the end of the book (p. 539) for his idea of philosophy as a rigorous science, and according to which both the Begriffsbildung und Methode des Forschers should be determined on the basis of the relevant Sachgebiet. As far as we understand Thus on this point, his claim is that this is precisely what Kierkegaard does: “Im demselben Sinne sind auch wir, denen gleichfalls das Ideal mathematischer Strenge vorgeschwebt hat, zu einer künstlerischen Darstellung geführt worden, die, wie wir im folgenden dartun wollen, der Eigenart Kierkegaards und seiner Probleme bis aufs letzte angepasst ist.” Now, that this is the text which Husserl might have in mind when he says that Kierkegaard has rediscovered the importance of the Zufall for our human existence can be inferred from the fact that the manuscript in question was written in 1920, in the very same year in which Husserl writes his letter to Bell already quoted at the beginning of this footnote (Hua-Dok III/3, 15).

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taken cum grano salis: it encompasses the irrationalities that pertain to our “natural” dimension in a strict sense of the term (birth, death, the duration of one’s life, health, illness) as well as those proper, not to the Umwelt, but to the Umgebung (the environment in a far broader sense of the term): education and the encounters or coincidences (Zusammentreffen) determining the course of our lives in general. Although the reader might have the impression that in the passage quoted above (as in most of the manuscripts published in Husserliana XLII) Husserl’s reflections and arguments are not as strict or rigorous as they should be (and as they indeed are in other texts and contexts)—Husserl is using a quite technical concept here, one with which we are already familiar: the notion of Individuum. The “world” is to be regarded as a “surrounding world” (Umwelt) and “nature” (Natur) only relativ zum Individuum or “relatively (in relation) to an individuum.”10 Now, the manuscript was written at the beginning of the 20 s and, although the notion of “monad” or “concrete ego” is here nowhere to be explicitly found—one could easily recognize the “monad’s worldly concreteness.” What Husserl is describing in the text above from page 285 is the monad’s worldly concreteness11—yet from the angle of its mundanization as a finite and human existence. What at the level of the transcendental and concrete individuum (monad) is the surrounding world (Umwelt) as the ontological correlate of its concrete content corresponds to nature as the surrounding world of a concrete human individuum with all its contingencies and irrationalities.12 While Zufall seems to be mostly associated with verbs composed with the prefix Hinein-, such as (in the passage still under discussion) hineingestellt and hineingeraten, the case with the term Schicksal (which we will try not to translate for now for reasons to be elucidated later on) is quite different. Schicksal is associated with the “unpredictable” or even “erratic” (unberechenbar) nature of the world. Even if Husserl seems to use on some occasions Zufall and Schicksal as synonyms, it is important to keep in mind that when he employs the latter expression, Husserl is not analyzing the irrationalities of our existence as a fact (Irrationalität der Faktizität); rather, he is addressing our existence from the standpoint of praxis. Thus, the very same contingency could be considered from the angle of either Zufall or Schicksal. From the standpoint of the former—an illness is only one of the many accidents that affect our existence as a fact; yet, from the angle of our praxis, an illness is an unpredictable, and irrational disruption of practical reason (eine Welt, die als Reich  Since in §6 of the present chapter Husserl’s reflections will be linked to Aristotle’s talk of τύχη, it is worth referring the reader to Diano, 2022, 60, and his analysis of the notion of “event” (with which he translates τύχη) in the Greek world. As Diano suggests, event is a phenomenological category, always implying: (1) the reference to a determined subject (Individuum, in Husserl’s jargon), and (ii) a horizon or ἄπειρον περιέχον (the Um-Welt as nature, according to Husserl). 11  As we explained this point in Volume1, Chap. 3, §2: “An ego regarded monadically or concretely is an ego surrounded by a world understood as the ontological (als seiend) correlate of its positions and explications.” 12  See Hua XXXIV, 258–259, where the Geltungsfundierung-relation between the concrete being of the transcendental subject (and its absolute being) and its objectivization as a human being is emphasized contra Heidegger. 10

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irrationaler, unberechenbarer Zufälle solch praktische Vernunft stört) (Hua XLII, 321). In a manuscript from the mid 20 s, Husserl is clear: Schicksal designates all those Zufälle that “disrupt the purpose-oriented rationality (Zweckrationalität) of our life, the unfolding of our plans and projects” (Hua XLII, 206). In another text from the same period, he speaks of the fact of “the universality of Schicksal” that “annihilates (zerstört) the rationality of all human praxis” (Hua XLII, 238). With respect to the determination of the Zufall of the world as nature, the characterization of what Husserl calls Schicksal (hence of Zufall as Schicksal) entails the following two elements: (i) “unpredictability,” and (ii) disruption of our “plans and projects” or, more generally, of the purpose-oriented rationality (Zweckrationalität) proper to us human beings. In both cases what is implied is a relation to the individual subject (relativ zum Individuum). However, while in the former case the relation is what brings about the determination of the world as nature, therefore the individuum’s position in it; in the latter the relation is the very expression of practical rationality (in a broad sense of the term), of our praxis as a “purpose-oriented rationality.” Not only of our individual actions but also—more broadly—of “the purpose-oriented rationality of our life” (which is what Husserl more technically labels: Vernünftigkeit). And if in the former case we recognized the mundanization of the monad’s worldly concreteness—what is here involved is the mundanization of two additional aspects of the monad as a transcendental and concrete subjectivity: the mundanization of its being a decision-making and a position-taking subjectivity (Volume1, Chap. 3, §2); and the mundanization of its “historical concreteness” (Volume1, Chap. 3, §3), namely, its being “the unity of possible and com-possible forms of life.” Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to infer from this that, in contrast with the former account of the Zufall, what Husserl means to suggest by the expression Schicksal would be something more subjective, as it were. Or, to put it better: it would be a real mistake to assume that while Zufall designates a form of objective irrationalities deriving from the world as the nature in which finite human subjects are embedded (hineingestellt), Schicksal would by contrast express the subjective form of such irrationalities. For since the concrete subject is the very unity of “personal character”  PLUS_SPI  “surrounding world” (= the monad’s “worldly concreteness”), its mundanized form (= the finite human subject), thus all the irrationalities affecting it, cannot be divided into a subjective (Schicksal) and an objective (Zufall) side. Husserl himself does not reason in this way. In fact, if in the case of Zufall Husserl speaks of the “world as nature,” when it comes to the irrationality of the Schicksal, the turn of phrase “the Schicksal-structure of the world” (die Schicksalsstruktur der Welt) is explicitly used (Hua XLII, 433).13 Thus, the difference between Schicksal and Zufall should not be misconstrued as a difference between subjective and objective determination; rather, they should be interpreted as different expressions of the very subject-world relation. Or, to resort to Husserl’s jargon: of the concreteness of the monad yet mundanized in the form of human existence.  See also Hua XLII, 400, where Husserl speaks of the wesentliche “Struktur” einer Umwelt (to which both Zufälle and Schicksal actually belong). 13

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Now, Husserl succinctly describes the Schicksal-structure of the world with the following words: Schicksal ist eine Tatsache meines Lebens, und Schicksal ist eine beständig offene Möglichkeit, aber nicht eine leere, sondern eine reale, in aller Unbestimmtheit des Wo und Wann und Wie doch vorauszusehende, mit der ich beständig rechnen muss (Hua XLII, 403).

Then he asks the question whether also “my death” should be included as a “possibility” which will certainly occur and yet is (still) undetermined in its when and how. If from the angle of the Zufall, death is the most explicit expression of the Irrationalität der Faktizität of our existence (the undetermined determined fact that we die as the ultimate, most crude dimension of our being in the world as nature), from the angle of Schicksal, death means the “annihilation” (not mere Störung, but rather radical Zerstörung) of one’s life and its Vernünftigkeit.14 The difference between Störung and Zerstörung, between the disruption of individual praxes (the former) and the annihilation of the Vernünftigkeit (the latter), is sometimes accounted for by Husserl also based upon their respective consequences. While in the former case Husserl tends to talk of Unglück or “unlucky” result (Hua XLII, 242), in the latter case we are confronted with an Entwertung, a “loss of value” or “devaluation” instead (Hua XLII, 206). For what is lost here is not the realization of this or that Zweck (disruption of goals), but rather the Vernünftigkeit and purpose-oriented rationality of life in general (annihilation of reason). A more radical case of irrationality (which however should be understood as a variation upon the Entwertung-scenario) is that of what Husserl refers to as “dis-­ teleology” (Dysteleologie) (Hua XLII, 258). It would be tempting to understand the dis-teleology-scenario in terms of a reversed, upside-down or even perverted form of teleology, so to say: a teleology that would not realize goals and values of a progressively higher order but rather of a progressively inferior type. It would be a form of teleology striving towards the worse rather than the better. Now, since Husserl’s leading example is the war, we think that a different meaning should be attributed to it. In a 1923 manuscript Husserl asks himself the question: “How can I live in a ‘sense-less’ (sinnlosen) world?” when—for instance “as a result of a war” (infolge eines solchen Krieges)—“I have to consider the world as deprived of reason” (wenn ich die Welt als eine vernunftlose beurteilen muss) (Hua XLII, 307).15 Dis-teleology does not mean a (positive) teleology striving towards the worse (negative determination); rather, it entails a systematic annihilation of Vernünftigkeit, of the possibility itself of “the purpose-oriented rationality of our life,” of teleology in general: no matter whether progressively striving towards the better (positive) or the worse (negative).  We are thereby correcting the account first provided in De Santis, 2021, 248, where it was stated that Zufall would include also the cases of disruption of human praxis (which we are now listing under Schicksal). 15  We have translated sinnlos as “sense-less” rather than “meaning-less” for two reasons: first, because we want to avoid confusing Sinn and Bedeutung; second, because it is important to keep in mind that whenever Husserl speaks of Sinn, “sense,” what is at stake are the problems of reason as Vernunft. 14

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This is why Husserl speaks of sense-less world or of a world deprived of reason: since Sinn is the correlate of reason as Vernunft, “sense-less world” and “world deprived of reason” are synonyms. A world without sense and deprived of sense is a world without Vernunft and vice versa; a world in which there is no factual possibility for a purpose-oriented rationality to realize itself. Let us hasten to remark that, as was already the case with death, also the phenomenon of war can be addressed from two different angles. For even if Husserl tends to think of it from the standpoint of Schicksal (the annihilation of “the purpose-­ oriented rationality of life”), the phenomenon of war could be interpreted also based on his conception of Zufall. From the standpoint of the latter, “war” would be one of the many elements characterizing the nature in which we are hineingestellt; hence, it would for example designate the accidental, and irrational fact of being born in a war-torn world. But if we look at Erich Maria Remarque’s novel Im Westen nichts Neues, a third meaning could be pinpointed and attached to it which would be perfectly in line with our interpretation thus far. At the outset of Chap. 6, Paul Bäumer proposes a very quick reflection on the role of the Zufall on the front which could be assumed without further ado as a most radical depiction or exemplification of the overall contingency of life according to Husserl: The front is a cage in which we must await fearfully whatever may happen. We lie under the network of arching shells and live in a suspense of uncertainty. Over us contingent chance (Zufall) hovers. If a shot comes, we can duck, that is all; we neither know nor can determine where it will fall. It is this contingent chance (Zufall) that makes us indifferent. A few months ago, I was sitting in a dug-out playing skat; after a while I stood up and went to visit some friends in another dug-out. On my return nothing more was to be seen of the first one, it had been blown to pieces by a direct hit. I went back to the second and arrived just in time to lend a hand digging it out. In the interval it had been buried. It is just as much a matter of contingent chance (zufällig) that I am still alive as that I might have been hit. In a bombproof dug-out I may be smashed to atoms and in the open may survive ten hours’ bombardment unscathed. No soldier outlives a thousand chances. But every soldier believes in contingent chance and trusts his luck (Jeder Soldat bleibt nur durch tausend Zufälle am Leben. Und jeder Soldat glaubt und vertraut dem Zufall) (Remarque, 1971, 96–97).

Regarded from the angle of Zufall, what we label “war” designates the most radical representation of the contingency (Zufälligkeit) and accidentality of life, i.e., of the world as nature (Husserl) or as a cage (Remarque). On the contrary, assumed from the standpoint of Schicksal, the phenomenon of “war” means the same as dis-­ teleology in the sense of the most radical and brute form of Zerstörung (“annihilation”) and thereby Entwertung (“devaluation”). It is the most dramatic expression of what Husserl calls “the Schicksal-structure of the world”: neither the disruption of such and such a praxis (whose result Husserl calls unlucky result) nor the annihilation of one’s purpose-oriented rationality (the result of which Husserl labels devaluation); rather, war stands for the systematic annihilation of reason in general as Vernunft (and whose tragic outcome Husserl calls dis-teleology). Here philosophical reflections and personal experience intertwine. The fact that the Husserl family had direct experience of the “annihilation” of a life’s

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purpose-­oriented rationality (we are of course referring to the death of Wolfgang Husserl on March 8, 1916) should not be mis-taken as a sort of biographical explanation behind Husserl’s own reflections on the significance of war. As if the latter could not or would not properly arise nor stand without the former. The point is rather to admit that, contrary to what one might be tempted to erroneously believe, Husserl is a thinker belonging to his own time, immersed in its catastrophes and rapid transformations. For a philosopher like Husserl, the language of philosophy is the language of life and vice versa. It is no coincidence that in a letter to Paul Natorp from April 22, 1916, the loss of his son is described with the very same words with which a few years later he would reflect on, and characterize, the “contingent,” and therefore even more irrational, “annihilation” of one’s life: “The loss of this child affected our whole family very hard. He was the cherished darling for us all: a vital, cheerful, warm-hearted, well-directed boy (auf das Gute gerichteter Junge) whose character development never left anything to be desired (dessen Charackterentwicklung nie einen Wunsch offen ließ)” (de Warren & Vongehr, 2018, 112). Wolfgang Husserl was an “auf das Gute gerichteter Junge,” a boy striving towards the good (as one could more literally translate Husserl’s words), “whose character development” was unfolding in such a way that it would leave nothing “to be desired.” His death meant the annihilation of what in a few years Husserl will explicitly label: “the purpose-­oriented rationality of our life, the unfolding of our plans and projects” (Hua XLII, 206). The annihilation of Wolfgang’s “purposeoriented rationality” (auf das Gute gerichteter) means the annihilation of reason and its unfolding (…nie einen Wunsch offen ließ), the annihilation of the possibility of bestowing “sense” onto our factual world. If in 1923 Edmund Husserl will pose himself the crude question, “How can I live in a ‘sense-less’ world?”, in a letter to Gerhart from April 21, 1916, Malvine Husserl had written down, “Can one ever get over the loss of such a person?” (de Warren & Vongehr, 2018, 91). The words she employs in a long letter to the Albrecht Family from May 1, 1916, are almost identical: what is capable of alleviating such a loss? […] Oh God, what hopes have now disappeared! How were we rich, and how impoverished we are now! I’ll never get over it, even if I assume all again my duties and even long after I gain back my outwards composure. Wolfgang was for me not only a son; he was my best friend, my advisor, the realization of all dreams for a noble and elevated human person (die Verwirklichung aller Träume von einer edlen hohen menschlichen Persönlichkeit). He never caused any distress for one moment of his life, his development run [along] an undisturbed line upwards (Linie nach oben) (de Warren & Vongehr, 2018, 93).

The irrationality and contingency of life—“Wounded by an infantry [rifle] to the head, he was dead immediately,” in the words of the Company’s First Lieutenant (de Warren & Vongehr, 2018, 107)—did not simply anticipate Husserl’s reflections; nor did they simply provide him with the material to reflect upon. The experience of the tragedy of the “annihilation” (Zerstörung) of life contributed to shaping Husserl’s overall view on life in general. The term war, what it means and signifies, will from now on metonymically epitomize the Grundakkord of Husserl’s representation of

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human existence in the world as a whole, its contingency, accidental nature, and Schicksal-structure.16 In 1934, a former student of Husserl and war-veteran, Hans Lipps, published a booklet in which an existential analysis of the soldier’s life is attempted: The Soldier of the Last War (Der Soldat des letzten Krieges). Husserl had a copy of it (de Warren & Vongehr, 2018, 184); and, although it cannot be assumed—because of chronological reasons—that Lipps’ book contributed to shaping the Husserlian descriptions above, the assumption can on the contrary be made according to which the booklet can have represented for Husserl a corroboration of some of his own insights. A difference should however be immediately emphasized. For while for Husserl the (last) war epitomizes metonymically the overall irrationality of our human existence, Lipps is on the contrary interested in understanding the existence itself of the soldier as it has been “determined by the last war”: “One cannot speak of ‘the soldier’ sic et simpliciter, but only of the soldier of this or that war. Indeed, the soldier’s existence is determined by the form of the war. There is a morphology of the war” (Lipps, 1934, 5). And given the specific form (Erscheinungsform) of the last war, also the soldier’s existence will display a form of its own: Lipps speaks of Existenz, Typus einer Existenz, nacktes Dasein (Lipps, 1934, 9, 18). On the one hand (Lipps), there is the attempt at comprehending what kind of specific mode of existence has been determined by the war; on the other hand (Husserl), there is the attempt at understanding the war itself as a most direct expression of (the general irrationality) of our existence. In outlining what he calls the “psychology of the soldier as a psychology of existence,” Lipps uses some of the key-terms employed by Husserl to characterize the irrationality of existence. In the first place, there is the term Schicksal: Lipps speaks of the “Schicksalhafte-nature of the last war” (Lipps, 1934, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16), which determined “the specific life-situation” of the soldier in a peculiar way. The Lebensraum of the soldier is marked by the invisible presence of his enemies (der Gegner unsichtbar blieb) (Lipps, 1934, 13)—whose “encounter” (Begegnung) is always anonymous (Lipps speaks of the general Anonymität des Geschehens in the last war) and no room is left for “fear”; for what “belongs to fear [is] the openness of space” (die Weite eines Raumes) (Lipps, 1934, 16–17). Even though “the enemy is no real foe” (Der Gegner ist kein eigentlicher Feind), and there is no “hatred” involved, here “To fight against somebody means: to will his annihilation” (Lipps, 1934, 13). “You saw the other in the grip of a fate (im Zugriff eines Geschicks), in the tension of which you too were wrapped” (Lipps, 1934, 15). This is why Lipps can also write that, in the last war, “reason” no longer played any role (Vernunft kann hier keine Instanz bedeuten) (Lipps, 1934 8); and “the hazard-like character of life (das Wagnishafte des Lebens) itself has become evident.”  See Hua XLII, 400–401, in which the example of a “child” falling on the front is explicitly discussed. Let us hasten to explain that here we are not interested in Husserl’s own philosophic-­ political position during the war, but rather in the significance that the notion of war displays in his account of the irrationality of human existence. For a detailed analysis of Husserl’s relation to the so-called “war-ideology,” see Losurdo, 1991, 53–92. 16

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Anonymity and unpredictability, Schicksal, Schicksalhafte and Zufall: these are the terms with which Lipps understands in what sense the last war dramatically shapes the soldier’s life and existence,17 and these are also the expressions upon which Husserl’s account rests. If, in the case of Lipps, the form of the last war determines the form of a certain existence (that of the soldier), for Husserl the term “war” is a most direct and crude expression of the “form” of our human existence in the world.

4. But as was already the case with the previous forms of contingency and Schicksal, also the talk of annihilation of life concerns the mundanization of the transcendental inter-subjectivity. As we saw in Volume1, Chap. 5 (§§9–11), Husserl speaks of Vergemeinschaftung der Monaden to mean the total inter-subjectivity prior to its differentiation into a multiplicity of plurality of monads with their many surrounding worlds. By contrast, the one and identical world is the correlate of the “total community of monads” and, as Husserl recognizes at the end of CM IV (§41), das Seiende or whatever “there is” is—as a part of AC—“a practical idea” (see Hua I, 120–121; Husserl, 1993, 86). Now, understood in the sense of an annihilation of the purpose-oriented rationality, the radical form of Schicksal that goes by the name of dis-teleology stands for the annihilation of the very possibility of determining what “there is.” If the world, i.e., its objective legitimization “depends upon mutual agreement and its criticism” (Hua XVII, 243; Husserl, 1969, 236), the case of dis-­ teleology amounts to the annihilation of the possibility of legitimizing the objectivity of the one world by the inter-monadic-subjectivity. In sum, the annihilation of the purpose-oriented rationality has, as a consequence, the annihilation of the world’s objectivity (= of being in general as a practical idea). If we sum up our analyses thus far on the many forms of irrationality of human existence, the following relations between the transcendental side of Husserl’s discourse and its mundanized form can be established. The first and most basic form of “irrationality” falling under the term Zufall is the direct result of the mundanization of the concrete monad and its structure. It is the irrationality of facticity, which Husserl describes in terms of being born in such and such a surrounding world full of contingencies (nature). Every monad has its own

 Lipps came back to the topic in 1939 with the short essay Wandlung des Soldaten: “Denn das unterscheidet diesen Krieg von dem Bürger, dessen Wesenlosigkeit er in der Zerstörung des Scheins seiner Sachlichkeit entdeckt, daß er das, worein er gestellt ist, als Schicksal—aber nicht als ein bloßes ‚Geschick’ versteht, mit dem es sich abzufinden, von dem es sich zu lösen gilt. Geschick und Zufälle sind etwas, was vorübergeht und was als einen treffend gewärtigt wird. Schicksale‚widerfahren’ einem aber nicht nur. Es sind keine ‚äußeren’ Tatsachen und Geschehnisse, die ohne inneren Bezug zu mir mich nur als Objekt träfen. Vielmehr: man ist Subjekt ‚seines’ Schicksals” (Lipps, 1977, 97). 17

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position in the transcendental inter-monadic-subjectivity, and to each and every individual monad corresponds a surrounding world as the ontological correlate of its decision-making and position-taking nature. There is perfect symmetry between the two levels of the discourse: what at the transcendental level of the concrete monad is called surrounding world corresponds to nature as a world full of contingencies and accidents. And it is on the basis of such a most basic form of irrationality, therefore of mundanization of the transcendental monad, that also the three variations upon the concept of Schicksal rest. According to what has been called historical concreteness (see Volume 1, Chap. 3) the monad as a transcendental-concrete subjectivity is “the unity of possible and com-possible forms of life,” which are also, at the same time, the forms of its world. Now, if Schicksal in the sense of “disruption” (Störung) directly affects our “plans and projects,” Schicksal in the sense of “annihilation” (Zerstörung) bears upon the very “purpose-oriented rationality of our life” in general. The former is the “disruption” of such and such a position and decision, of such and such plans and “projects”; the latter “annihilates” the possibility of life realizing itself in a certain way and in a certain sense (Sinn). Now, as soon as the annihilation turns into “dis-­ teleology” (= third meaning of the term Schicksal), what is annihilated is not only an individual purpose-oriented rationality—but the latter in its totality. And since what follows from this is the annihilation of the total community of monads, the result is a more and more sense-less world, a world deprived of reason in which the possibility of determining the entity and what “there is” systematically and dramatically shrinks until it finally vanishes. All four forms of irrationality, hence the very distinction between Zufall and Schicksal, are derived from the transcendental-concrete structure of the monad. If the first one is a most direct mundanized translation of the monad’s worldly concreteness, the other three—by contrast—should be regarded as affecting the mundanized forms of its historical concreteness. Husserl’s discourse goes full circle on both levels of the analysis. At the transcendental level, the “objectivity of the world” (as “a practical ideal”) can only be the correlate of the “total community of monads” precisely because the correlate of every individual monad is a “surrounding world.” The former consequence derives directly from the latter premise. At the mundanized level, on the contrary, every individual human being is from the very beginning hineingestellt in a nature which he or she did not choose in the first place (As Husserl says, Ich habe mein Leben nicht gewählt, “I did not choose my life” (Hua XLII, 409)). Within such nature (the world relativ zum Individuum), the human praxis, i.e., its purpose-oriented rationality, is constantly “disrupted” or even “annihilated,” in such a manner that also the possibility of determining the objectivity of the one and only factual world (the one we live in) is either simply “disrupted” or massively “annihilated.” The discussion of the structure of the concrete monad makes it possible for Husserl to identify, at the mundanized level, different species of “irrationality” affecting our human existence (Fig. 5.1).

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Fig. 5.1  The Irrationality of Human Existence

The double distinction between “natural” and “spiritual” within the general realm of the Zufall is meant to accommodate the different examples given by Husserl in the relevant texts. For example, in the case of the “general insecurity of life,” the distinction corresponds to the examples of the duration of one’s life, health, illness, and “death” (natural), and those of mental and spiritual insanity (spiritual).18 On the contrary, in the case of the “I did not choose my life,” the distinction is between the fact of being hineingestellt in nature (natural), and the case of my “education and the encounters or coincidences” that shape my life (spiritual).

 See for example Husserl’s letter to F. Kaufmann from September 20, 1915: “The war with its deeply moving events has closed me up; it will be incredibly difficult to extricate myself from myself and express myself, even for those things in which I take a most lively interest; indeed, it is precisely with these things that it proves to be the hardest for me. Month after month, I have lost many people who were close to me, younger and older friends, in quick succession. In addition, there were health problems (gesundheitliche Störungen), but almost all of them have psychological causes. I thereby always lost again the continuity of my scientific threads of life (Lebensfadens). […] Recently, my body suddenly did not tolerate smoking anymore, where I have sinned, and had seen signs of nicotine poisonings” (Hua-Dok III/3, 339–340; English translation in de Warren & Vongehr, 2018, 172). 18

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5. Husserl’s overall description of the irrationalities of life and, more specifically, of the so-called Schicksalsstruktur der Welt should be regarded as a variation upon a most classical theme from the history of Western philosophy, that of the Fortuna and the instability of human life. Although it is not easy to tell the extent to which Husserl was aware of this, the language he resorts to leaves no room for doubt, we firmly believe, about this reading hypothesis. Not only the term Schicksal (which we have been intentionally refraining from translating), which is clearly imbued with a technical meaning, but also the expressions Geschick (Hua XLII, 255, 430) (in theory to be literally translated as “destiny”) and Glück appear systematically in the manuscripts published in Hua XLII. Most importantly, it is the turn of phrase “es glückt” that actually testifies to the tradition to which Husserl’s discourse belongs here. Even just a quick look at the systematic genealogical reconstruction of the history of the notion of Glück in the German medieval culture proposed by Sanders, 1965 confirms our ideas. Schicksal and Glück could derive from the German gelücke or gelucke in the sense of an “indifferent fate” that shakes our existence and turns it upside down (Sanders, 1965, 3); but they might also be connected with gelingen, meaning the “direction” that things unavoidably take (die definitive Richtung, die der Gang der Dinge nimmt) (Sanders, 1965, 4). As a consequence of its etymological and conceptual plurality, Glück might have either a “positive” or an exclusively “negative” meaning; yet, it can also and simply mean that things unfold in a way that is completely or fully indifferent to our own moral standards. Höre! Höre! Höre! / Alles, was ist, endet, as Erda warns Wotan in the Rheingold. In an even broader sense, Glück and Fortuna can refer to the unpredictability (Unberechenbarkeit) of the world—as is mostly the case in the Baroque tradition (Sanders, 1965, 31), thus, to the general instability of life (not to be necessarily associated with either a positive or a negative account of God’s role and function). The image of the Fortuna with a wheel (present for example in Boethius) can be replaced by its representation with the sail (mit dem Segel) (Cassirer, 1963, 80–81) guiding us human beings through the vicissitudes, adventures and misadventures of life.19 Now, since the very idea of Fortuna seems to imply in most cases a sort of necessity, or however inevitability characterizing the course of the world—which is not what Husserl prima facie means or seems to mean with his descriptions of human existence—an analysis of some of the most famous representations of the Fortuna in the history of Western thought might be useful in order to better and more properly decipher the nature of Husserl’s own position.

 A classical study of the role of the Fortuna in the Renaissance period is of course Warburg, 1907, 136 and ff. 19

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6. The concept of Fortuna, i.e., its philosophical determination, harks all the way back to the two Greek words τύχη and εὐτυχία (from the verb τυγχάνω in the sense of “occurring” or “happening”) around which Aristotle’s discussion of the problem of causality in its many different forms revolves systematically (see the general introduction by Cardullo, 2014). Among the many places in which Aristotle tackles the problem of “hazard” and “chance” (as one might want to translate τύχη20), particular attention is to be devoted to Physics II, 4–6: “ἡ τύχη and the automatic (αὐτόματον) are recognized as causes, and we say that many things are and come to be on account of them. We must see, then, in what way τύχη and the automatic fit into our causes, whether τύχη and the automatic are the same or different, and in general what they are” (Aristotle, 2006, 31; 195b, 32–35). Now, since whatever happens διὰ τύχην happens διὰ τὸ αὐτόματον, but not the other way around (the latter is a concept broader than the former), Aristotle’s concern here is to determine the character of the τύχη. It is at the outset of Chap. 5 that Aristotle lays out the general coordinates for its comprehension; here is a quite long, very famous passage: Of things which come to be, some come to be for something (κατὰ προαίρεσιν), and some do not. Of the former, some are in accordance with choice and some are not, but both are among things which are for something. Clearly, then, also among things which are neither necessary nor for the most part, there are some to which it can belong to be for something. Anything which might be done as an outcome of thought or nature is for something. Whenever something like this comes to be accidentally, we say that it is the outcome of τύχης (Ἔστι δ’ ἕνεκά του ὅσα τε ἀπὸ διανοίας ἂν πραχθείη καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ φύσεως. Τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα ὅταν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γένηται, ἀπὸ τύχης φαμὲν εἶναι). For as a thing is, so it can be a cause, either by itself or by virtue of concurrence. Thus that which can build is by itself the cause of a house, but that which is pale or knows music is an accidental cause. […]. As has been said, then, whenever this happens over something which comes to be for something, it is said to be an automatic outcome or the outcome of τύχης (Καθάπερ οὖν ἐλέχθη, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του γιγνομένοις τοῦτο γένηται, τότε λέγεται ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης). […] Thus the man would have come for the purpose of getting back the money when his debtor was collecting contributions, if he had known; in fact, he did not come for this purpose, but it happened concurrent that he came, and did what was for getting back the money. And that, though he used to go to the place neither for the most part nor necessarily. The end, the recovery, is not one of the causes in him, but it is an object of choice and an outcome of thought. And in this case the man’s coming is said to be the outcome of τύχης, whilst if he had chosen and come for this purpose, or used to come always or for the most part, it would not be called the outcome of luck. Clearly, then, luck is an accidental cause in connection with those among things for something which are objects of choice. Hence thought and luck have the same field (Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του. Διὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διάνοια καὶ τύχη), for choice involves thought (Aristotle, 2006, 33–34; 196b 17–197a 6).

 Let us remark that in the following we will try not to translate the Greek “τύχη,” or at least not to translate it with the English “luck”; it would be better to adopt the more neutral “chance” or “…by accident” in order to avoid giving to it an exclusively positive meaning (which should on the contrary be attributed to the term εὐτυχία). 20

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The example Aristotle is referring to had already been mentioned in the previous chapter; it is the example of “a man [who], as the outcome of τύχης, came into the market-place, and found there someone he wished but did not expect to find” (Aristotle, 2006, 31; 196a). Leaving aside the quite thorny and difficult issue of the nature-action analogy (see Granger, 1993), what is of interest for us is what Aristotle affirms at the very end of the quotation: “Διὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διάνοια καὶ τύχη,” that διάνοια (therefore, προαίρεσις) and τύχη are about the same, or have the same field, as Charlton’s translation puts it. Τύχη (chance or hazard) is connected with our “goal-orientation” (as one might want to translate the Greek “τῶν ἕνεκά του”). What happens “ἀπὸ τύχης” is what did not happen as the result of a προαίρεσις, but could happen and could have happened as a result of it. If we take the example of a man who “came into the market-place” and “happened” (read: ἀπὸ τύχης) to find there “someone he wished but did not expect to find,” Aristotle suggests that he could have chosen to come for this purpose (but in this case nobody would speak of τύχη). In short, the event that is said to have taken place “διὰ τύχην” is the possible goal of a possible προαίρεσις (Diano, 2022, 91–92). This is still corroborated, for instance, by Plutarch’s description of the killing of Caesar on the ides of March: “it is said by some writers that […] when [Caesar] saw that Brutus had drawn his dagger, he pulled his toga down over his head and sank— either by chance (ἀπὸ τύχης) or because pushed there by his murderers—against the pedestal on which the statue of Pompey stood” (Plutarco, 2021, 316–317; 1919, Ch. 67, §12).21 Aristotle’s point is directed against those who deny the existence of chance. The beginning of II, 4 is clear on this problem: “Some people wonder even whether there are any such things or not. They say that nothing comes to be by chance, but that there is a definite cause of everything which we say comes to be automatically or by chance (ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ἢ τύχης)” (196a 1–2). Nevertheless, once Aristotle has made the case for the existence of accidental causes (including both “αὐτόματον” and “τύχη”), the issue consists in clarifying the difference between the latter two. In the text from II, 5 quoted above, Aristotle makes the distinction between what comes to be “for something” and what does not come to be for something (Τῶν δὲ γιγνομένων τὰ μὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται τὰ δ’ οὔ). Within the former, the further difference is drawn between what comes to be “in accordance with choice” and what does not come to be in accordance with choice (τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, τὰ δ’ οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν). The “teleological” determination (τὰ ἕνεκά) does not suffice in order for us to be able to speak of chance or events happening διὰ τύχην.  This passage is even more interesting if we consider that at the beginning of Ch. 66, §1, Plutarch had employed the expression τὸ αὐτόματον to mean, as the English translation says, things that “may have happened of their own accord,” without any reference to the προαίρεσις (Plutarco, 2021, 312–313; 1919, Ch. 66, §1). Let us however note that Plutarch’s framework is not directly superimposable to Aristotle’s. In fact, in both cases Plutarch describes a sequence of human actions: the difference is that while in the αὐτόματον-case Plutarch wants to exclude that what happened was the actual and conscious result of a decision, the ἀπὸ τύχης-passage is ironically suggesting that quite likely Caesar was indeed pushed by Brutus and the others “against the pedestal on which the statue of Pompey stood.” 21

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It is the dimension of the choice or, even more broadly and clearly, of the praxis (πρᾶξις) that circumscribes the specific domain, so to say, in relation to which alone one can speak of τύχη and not simply of αὐτόματον.22 They differ in that the automatic extends more widely. Everything which happens by chance is an automatic outcome but not everything which is the latter happens by chance. For chance and its outcome belong only to things which can be lucky and in general engage in rational activity (Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης ἐστὶν ὅσοις καὶ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ἂν ὑπάρξειεν καὶ ὅλως πρᾶξις). Hence chance must be concerned with things achievable by such activity (Διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην). […] So what is incapable of such activity, can do nothing as the outcome of chance (ὥσθ’ ὁπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πρᾶξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι) (Aristotle, 2006, 35–36; 197a 35-197b 9).

One can talk of “chance” or “hazard” in general (τύχη) only in relation to the πρᾶξις, to the domain of what can be “practically” achieved (“περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ”); hence, Aristotle further affirms: Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν; “nothing done by an inanimate object, beast, or child, can happen by chance, since such things are not capable of choosing” (197b 6–8). In the latter cases, one can speak only of things that happen or come to be ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, precisely because here the dimension of the praxis is not implied. It is at this point that Aristotle speaks of both εὐτυχία or “good chance” and ἀτυχία23 or “bad chance,” as they could be respectively translated. In fact, if it is only “περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ” that one can speak of events happening or coming to be ἀπὸ τύχης, the latter is per se neither positive (εὐτυχία) nor negative (ἀτυχία), precisely because it could be both. But those who are capable of “πρᾶξις” are those who can be happy, because “happiness,” Aristotle explains, “is a kind of rational activity: it is activity going well” (ἡ δ’ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς τις⋅ εὐπραξία γάρ) (Aristotle, 2006, 36; 197b, 5). The τύχη circumscribes the domain, so to say, of whatever happens accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς) to a being who practically strives towards that form of εὐ-πραξία called happiness (εὐδαιμονία); and one can speak of ἀτυχία to the extent that such εὐπραξία is disrupted by what happens ἀπὸ τύχης. Or, to go the other way around: ἀτυχία is that accidental, hence irrational—παράλογον in the words of Aristotle himself (197a, 18)24—cause (αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς) that disrupts the (εὐ-)πραξία. If we are on the right track, then the example given above by Aristotle (that of a man going to the market-place and there running into somebody he wished to find), hence, the characterization of the τύχη which we consequently drew therefrom (“What happens ‘ἀπὸ τύχης’ is what did not happen as the result of a προαίρεσις, but could happen and could have happened as a result of it”), should  To our knowledge, the most radical and critical of Aristotle’s τύχη-theory can be found in Sasso, 1996, 248 and ff. 23  Or δυστυχία according to Metaphysics K 8, 1065b 1 (Aristotele, 2019, 516). 24  Translated in French as déraisonnable (Aristote, 1961, 71): “Καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναί τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθῶς.” For a systematic discussion of the second book of Aristotle’s Physics, see Dudley, 2021, 19–100 (with a special focus on pages 94 and ff. for the relation-difference between αὐτόματον and τύχη). 22

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not be regarded as concerning the “τύχη” in general, but rather only its positive form (εὐτυχία).25 For the τύχη, or whatever happens by chance or διὰ τύχην (das Schicksalhafte, in a more Husserlian jargon) can also result in a disruption (ἀτυχία, δυστυχία, Störung) of our Zweckrationalität or εὐπραξία.26 The originally Aristotelian context of discussion of the concept of τύχη (which we cannot follow in more detail here) is vital for us to better understand Husserl’s position because of the tight connection between πρᾶξις and εὐπραξία, on the one hand, and τύχη, ἀτυχία, and δυστυχία on the other hand. It is in fact the specific context of our goal-oriented (τῶν ἕνεκά του) and rational praxis (εὐπραξία) that alone makes it possible for Aristotle to distinguish between αὐτόματον and τύχη (as two forms of accidental cause), thereby being able to circumscribe the “extent” of the ἀτυχία. Similarly, it is important for Husserl to distinguish between Zufall and Schicksal (with the latter corresponding to Aristotle’s τύχη27) by pinpointing the goal-oriented rationality of our human praxis as the context or domain of the irruption of the Schicksalhafte. However, in Aristotle the τύχη remains philosophically an accident that happens only “οὐκ ἀεὶ δ’ οὐδ’ ἐζ ἀνάγνκης οὐδ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ,” “neither always nor necessarily nor fairly regularly” (see Metaph., K 8, 1065a; Aristotele, 2019, 514). It is with Boethius’ Consolatio philosophiae that, under the name of Fortuna, the problem of chance assumes the physiognomy of “caeci numinis ambiguos vultus,” “the fluctuating features of a blind goddess” (Boezio, 1999, 120–121; Boethius, 2001, 23, II, 1, 33–34) that rules over our life, from the beginning and without any exception. In the words of Fortuna herself: “When nature brought you forth from your mother’s womb, I took you, naked, resourceless, lacking in everything, into my arms” (Boezio, 1999, 124–125; Boethius, 2001, 25 II, 2). The images used by Boethius to characterize the Fortune and its effects will impose themselves as a reference point until modernity (Sanders, 1965, 15).28 On the one hand, we find the famous image of the “sea”: “in the high seas of this life, storm winds from all directions buffet us about” (Boezio, 1999, 82–83; Boethius,  Dudley, 2021, 92 raises the problem whether τύχη should be translated as either “luck” or “chance” in connection with Ross’ translation of Metaphysics. 26  In the words of Metaphysics K 81065a 26 ff.: “τὸ δὲ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐστίν, τύχη δέ ἐστιν ὅταν τι τούτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός: ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὄν ἐστι τὸ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὕτω καὶ αἴτιον. ἡ τύχη δ᾽ αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του γιγνομένοις, διὸ περὶ ταὐτὰ τύχη καὶ διάνοια: προαίρεσις γὰρ οὐ χωρὶς διανοίας. τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια ἀόριστα ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, διὸ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ καὶ αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἁπλῶς δ᾽ οὐδενός. Ἀγαθὴ δὲ τύχη καὶ κακὴ ὅταν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἀποβῇ: εὐτυχία δὲ καὶ δυστυχία περὶ μέγεθος τούτων” (Aristotele, 2019, 516). See also Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 13, for a discussion concerning the relation between happiness and chance (Aristotle, 1931, 441 and ff.). 27  Unfortunately, it is not always easy to keep in English the distinction and relevant correspondence between Zufall and Schicksal in Husserl and Aristotle’s τύχη. The latter is in fact usually translated with either “chance” or “hazard,” both of which we have been using to translate Husserl’s Zufall. It is what Husserl calls Schickal that corresponds to τύχη. 28  For an introduction to the text, see Harpur, 2006. 25

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2001, 7, I, 3). What the image expresses is the lack of control over one’s life; life is a sea—during whose navigation no protection is offered to us and Fortune is like a storm dragging us around. Or, to put it better and to avoid thinking of our life and Fortune as two separate things: “life” means nothing other than our being dragged around and having no or little control over the possible directions we take. As Philosophy points out to Boethius: “If you were to raise your sails to the winds, you would head not to where your will intended but to where the winds would drive you” (Boezio, 1999, 123–124; Boethius, 2001, 24, II, 1). Husserl’s words echo Boethius’: “The world is unpredictable and erratic; were it to be predictable, it would not make any difference for the ego that is placed in it by contingency and fate and who is also dragged away and around by them” (Hua XLII, 286). On the other, the image of the “storm” is used together with the equally famous image of Fortune as a rolling wheel. Boethius talks of the rotae impetum (Boezio, 1999, 123–124; Boethius, 2001, 24, II, 1, 60), thereby pointing to the essential instability of life: This is our strength, and this is the endless game we play: We spin a wheel in an ever-­ turning circle, and it is our delight to change the bottom for the top and the top for the bottom (rotam volubili orbe versamus, infima summis, summa infimis mutare gaudemus). You may climb up if you wish, but on this condition: Don’t think it an injustice when the rules of my game require that you go back down (Boezio, 1999, 126–127; Boethius, 2001, 26, II, 2).

The “coherence” of life, i.e., of the Fortuna is precisely its own “instability”: Servavit… in ipsa sui mutabilitate constantiam. Nothing remains stable, and everything turns upside down, as the rotae impetum-image suggests. Every single attempt at imposing a certain determined direction on the course of our life is doomed to fail, as the “sea winds”-analogy suggests (non quo voluntas peteret). But precisely because Fortune is like a rolling wheel that constantly and dramatically changes “the bottom for the top and the top for the bottom,” it should not be associated with Aristotle’s ἀτυχία, but rather only with the general τύχη (prior to the distinction between εὐτυχία and ἀτυχία). It is the image of the Fortuna that still shapes the world-view expressed in the most paradigmatic of all Renaissance poems, the Orlando furioso (Raging Orlando) by Ludovico Ariosto (1516–1532): Quanto più su l’instabil ruota vedi di Fortuna ire in alto il miser uomo, tanto più tosto hai da vedergli i piedi over ora ha il capo, e far cadendo il tomo. Di questo, esempio è Policràte, e il re di Lidia, e Dionigi, et altri ch’io non nomo, che ruinati son da la suprema Gloria in un dì ne la miseria estrema (Ariosto, 1976, 1177, XLV, 1)

(The higher up on Fortune’s wheel you see / A wretched ascend, the sooner he will fall, / And where his head is now, his feet will be. / Polycrates, for instance, I recall, / Croesus and Dionysius equally, / And many more—I cannot name them all— /

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Were good examples of such change of fate, / Plunged from supreme renown to low state) (Ariosto1977, 606).29 Boethius never identifies the goddess “Fortune” with a divine force, let alone with God.30 Rather, what he calls Fortune is the destiny (Boezio, 1999, 27) that dominates our life insofar as we entrust ourselves to her and to our mortal goods (Boezio, 1999, 138–139; Boethius, 2001, 31, II, 4). For the simple fact that Fortune herself can warn Boethius with the following words: “You may climb up if you wish…,” Ascende, si placet, means that one can also decide or try to decide not to climb up, as it were. In other words, and without getting into any detailed discussion of Boethius’ conception of happiness in the present context, according to his account of Fortune, one can save oneself from the instability and unpredictability of life precisely by withdrawing from the world: Mortal men! Why do you mortals look outside yourselves for the happiness that has been placed within you (extra petitis intra vos positam felicitatem)? Miscalculation and lack of awareness have dazed you all. But to you I will reveal in brief what the highest happiness hinges on. Is there anything more valuable to you than yourself? You will say: Nothing. Therefore, if you have mastery over yourself, you will possess a thing that you yourself would never want to lose and that Fortune could not ever take away from you (Boezio, 1999, 140–141; Boethius, 2001, 42, II, 4).

The miscalculation consists in not recognizing that felicitas is intra vos, within you: the possibility of escaping Fortune and the instability of life (das Schicksalhafte) coincides with the possibility of looking intra nos for what we have been on the contrary seeking extra nos in the world. But if this is the case, then Husserl’s “Geschick” cannot be identified with Boethius’ lubrica Fortuna. It is true that, with respect to Aristotle’s τύχη as an accidental cause, Boethius’ Fortune is meant to expresses the nature of our existence in the world (= its unpredictability and inevitability), thereby displaying the same extent as Husserl’s discourse on “the Schicksal-­ structure of the world.” And yet, the latter leaves no room for what “Philosophy” proposes as a consolatio to Boethius. For the old Boethius’ consolatio philosophica is not and cannot be what properly consoles Husserl. What consolatio is Husserl looking for? Husserl’s own answer to this question can be found towards the conclusion of his famous 1934 letter to Émile Baudin (which we have already recalled and discussed over the course of Volume 1, Chap. 5), where he explicitly borrows the title of Boethius’ work (Consolatio philosophiae): Sie bemerken, verehrter Abbé Baudin, wie viel die transzendentale Phänomenologie in ihrer ausgereiften Entwicklung für mich persönlich als consolatio philosophica bedeuten

 For an introduction to Ariosto’s poem, see Momigliano, 1932, 398 and ff.; Ascoli, 1987.  Husserl knows very well that the talk of fate or destiny understood as a divine, blind force or power characterizes and belongs to “pre-logical” and natural humanity: “Der natürliche, vorlogische Mensch ‚erfährt’ die Leitung eines ‚gütigen Geschickes’, ‚göttlicher Mächte’ in der Überschau seines Lebens. Er erfährt, dass er im Sinn seines Gottes lebt, wo er in möglichst konsequenter und steter Arbeit an sich selbst seinem Gewissen folgt. Er erfährt das Walten widriger, irrationaler Mächte und, weiter umblickend, erfährt er, dass sie Gott untertan sind etc.” (Hua XLII, 255). 29 30

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konnte. […] Kein gewöhnlicher „Realist “ist je so realistisch und so concret gewesen als ich, der phänomenologische „Idealist “[...]. Die Methode der phänomenologischen Epoche und Reduction setzt die Existenz der Welt, genau als was sie uns jeweils galt und gilt, voraus, und wir in dieser Methode reflectierend—jeweils ich, der sich Besinnen—sind in der voll concreten Welthabe (Hua-Dok III/7, 16).

It would be a real mistake to assign to Husserl’s words to Baudin a mere rhetorical sense, thus also underplaying the explicit reference to Boethius’ Consolatio philosophiae.31 His words cannot be mistaken: transcendental idealism in its most mature form, as the transcendental “monadology” first laid out in the Meditations (expressions such as concret and concreten Welthabe leave no room for doubt about the specific conception he has in mind) is Husserl’s consolatio philosophica. This should come as no surprise. If—as shown above—Husserl is able to “deduce” the many different forms of irrationality (as Zufall and Schicksal) from the very nature and structure of the monad (i.e., from its many forms of concreteness) in its mundanized form, then of course also the consolatio for such many irrationalities needs to be found in the determination of the concrete subject. And this is precisely what Husserl’s own words to Baudin explicitly explain: his consolatio philosophica is TI as Husserl conceives of it upon the basis of the account of the “concrete ego.” This is why such a consolatio cannot prima facie coincide with Boethius’: whereas the latter consists in the withdrawal from the world, the former hinges upon “our fully concrete possession of the world.” Of course, one could still propose the thesis that, in line with Philosophy’s invitation to Boethius to look for happiness intra nos rather than extra nos in the world, also TI would be stating that our consolation is not to be based on the naive realist’s attitude towards the world (extra nos), but rather on the transcendental idealist’s one. Thus, Husserl’s Welthabe would correspond to Boethius’ “intra nos”: for this would no longer mean a withdrawal from the world, but rather the conception and understanding of the world from the vantage point of the concrete monadological (inter-)subjectivity (intra nos). Husserl’s consolatio philosophica consists in regarding the “world” only as a part of the Welthabe (= AC), that is to say, in the sense of what we labeled “primum concretum” (see the outset of Volume1, Chap. 6). Husserl would not be embracing the consolatio philosophica first proposed to the old Boethius by “the Goddess Philosophy”; rather, he would be interpreting it in light of TI, thus of what transcendental phenomenology in general is or should be.32

 Husserl’s decision to talk of consolatio philosophica becomes now (in 1934) even more interesting if one considers that there exists a 1926–27 manuscript (Hua LXII, 400–408) on the notion of Schicksal, the title of which explicitly refers to Boethius: “Gibt es eine consolatio philosophiae? Memento Mori. Schicksal.” See §9 of the present chapter. 32  See Asper & Luft, 2000, 369–374, on Husserl and Horace in connection to the problem of reduction and some of the issues discussed in the present chapter. 31

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7. We have been refraining from immediately translating Schicksal with “destiny” or “fate” precisely to avoid (mis-)conceiving of Husserl’s position as a variation upon the Fortune-idea in the sense of a blind, almost god-like destiny hovering over our existences. And if sometimes this is still the case with Boethius’ paradigmatic and epoch-making depiction of it—with Niccolò Machiavelli, notably, with Chapter 25 of The Prince (Il principe) the traditional problem of the Fortuna is finally elaborated, or re-elaborated in a way that it can no longer be identified with destiny or fate. Indeed, in this chapter the idea of a universal Fortune undergoes an anthropological33 transformation, so to say, and eventually ends up coinciding with the immanence of our own human finitude. Since the discussion of Machiavelli’s most famous masterpiece, its many themes or problems, as well as its general meaning, goes far beyond the questions of the present book,34 in the following we shall limit our assessment to his representation of Fortune in Chapter 25. The title of the chapter is: Quantum fortuna in rebus humanis possit et quomodo illi sit occurrendum; How Much Can Fortune Do in Human Affairs, and in What Mode it May Be Opposed. Here is how it opens up: It is not unknown to me that many have held and hold the opinion that worldly things are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot correct them with their prudence, indeed that they have no remedy at all; and on account of this they might judge that one need not sweat much over things but let oneself be governed by chance (Machiavelli, 1981, 205–206; 1998, 98).

Machiavelli’s irony is critically directed against two theses. In the first place, it is directed against the general opinion that worldly things are “governed (governate) by fortune and by God,” as if Fortune (and God, in whose existence Machiavelli does not believe) were something able to govern the world.35 In the second place, Machiavelli is critical of the idea that, were worldly things actually governed by Fortune or God, humans may judge “that one need not sweat much over things but let oneself be governed by chance” (thereby condemning themselves to inactivity). However, from this does not follow that we would be in a position to control and govern worldly things. The opposite is true: Machiavelli’s intention being nevertheless to show the extent to which the roots of Fortune lie in the very limits and finitude of our own human agency. When I have thought about this sometimes, I have been in some part inclined to their opinion. Nonetheless, so that our free will not be eliminated, I judge that it might be true that fortune is the arbiter of half of our actions, but also that she leaves the other half, or close to

 Or also “secularized”—as for example Pitkin, 1984, 153, famously puts it.  Among the many important introductions to Il principe, see the classical one by Federico Chabod, 1993, 3–132; and, more recently, Inglese, 2013, 45–91; Sasso, 2015, 57–99. 35  See Leeker, 1989, on Machiavelli’s position in the Fortune-tradition (in particular 414–417 for a quick discussion of the theme in the Italian humanistic tradition as a general background to better understand Machiavelli). 33 34

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it, for us to govern. And I liken her to one of these violent rivers which, when they become enraged, flood the plains, ruin the trees and the buildings, lift earth from this part, drop in another; each person flees before them, everyone yields to their impetus without being able to hinder them in any regard. And although they are like this, it is not as if men, when times are quiet, could not provide for them with dikes and dams so that when they rise later, either they go by a canal or their impetus is neither so wanton nor so damaging (Machiavelli, 1981, 206–207; 1998, 98).

“Analogous” are both the work and the effects of Fortune: It happens similarly with fortune, which demonstrates her power where virtue has not been put in order to resist her and therefore turns her impetus where she knows that dams and dikes have not been made to contain her (Similarmente interviene della fortuna; la quale dimostra la sua potenzia dove non è ordinate virtù a resisterle; e quivi volta li sua impeti dove la sa che non sono fatti gli argini e li riparti a tenera) (Machiavelli, 1981, 207; 1998, 98–99).

Just like those “violent rivers,” Fortune acts and imposes itself whenever or wherever “men […] could not provide for them with dikes and dams”; or more explicitly: “where virtue has not been put in order to resist her.” It is the finitude of human nature and actions, the impossibility of providing infinite dikes and dams that results in those “rivers” flooding the plains and ruining the buildings. In other words, and as the most prominent interpreter of Machiavelli’s thought puts it: “[Fortune] is no longer regarded as an external—and thus ontologically subsistent—reality able to determine human history according to plans which are unknowable to the human mind. Rather, [it] is the limit itself beyond which humans cannot go” (Sasso, 1953, 190; 1965, 130).36 Fortune is no longer seen as a destiny transcending our actions; it is recognized as immanent to them, a “shadow” following and accompanying our own finitude (see Sasso’s remarks in Machiavelli, 1981, 209, footnote). This is the reason why, towards the end of Chapter 25, Machiavelli realizes that Fortune as the disruption of our actions and plans is the result of two factors: our nature and the various factual conditions or circumstances in which human beings happen to be acting. For one sees that in the things that lead men to the end that each has before him, that is, glories and riches, they proceed variously: one with caution, other with impetuosity; one by violence, the other with art; one with patience, the other with its contrary-and with these different modes each can attain it. One also sees two cautious persons, one attaining his plan, the other not; and similarly two persons are equally happy with two different methods, one being cautious, the other impetuous. This arises from nothing other than from the quality of the times that they conform to or not in their procedure. From this follows what I said, that two persons working differently come out with the same effect; and of two persons working identically, one is led to his end, the other not. On this also depends the variability of the good: for if one governs himself with caution and patience, and the times and affairs turn in such a way that his government is good, he comes out happy; but if the times and

 “[la fortuna] non è più prospettata di conseguenza come una realtà esterna e ontologicamente sussistente, capace di determinare secondo piani inconoscibili alla mente degli uomini la loro stessa storia, ma al contrario come il limite stesso do ogni pur grande virtù, il limite al di là del quale l’uomo non può spingersi e al di là del quale soltanto starebbe d’altra parte la sicurezza e la fermezza della vittoria.” 36

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affairs change, he is ruined because he does not change his mode of proceeding. Nor may a man be found so prudent as to know how to accommodate himself to this, whether because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him (Machiavelli, 1981, 210; 1998, 99–100).

As was already the case with Aristotle (τῶν ἕνεκά του), Machiavelli speaks of il fine quale ciascuno ha innanzi, “the end that each has before him,” in relation to our various activities. As the passage clearly suggests, “the variability of the good” (la variazione del bene) derives from the accord, or lack thereof, between our actions (together with their ends) and the various circumstances in which we happen to act. This is why Machiavelli remarks that: “two persons working differently come out with the same effect; and of two persons working identically, one is led to his end, the other not.”37 In his article The Human Origins of “Fortuna” in Machiavelli’s Thought, Oded Balaban proposes to understand Machiavelli’s Fortune against the backdrop of the “teleological” nature of our agency and upon the basis of a distinction between two different kinds of outcomes: “Teleological activity produces two kinds of results: (a) those that were intended by the subject, and (b) those that are unintended consequences of the subject’s actions. I refer to the former (a) as goals, and to the latter (b) as the by-products” (Balaban, 1990, 30). “By-products” are described as results that are unrelated to the goal, and which nevertheless “may arise out of the nature of the activity.” And yet, in many cases human beings “tend not to regard such by-­ products as the result of their own activities, but as the work of transcendent factors” (Balaban, 1990, 31). Having in mind Machiavelli’s violent rivers-analogy, Balaban gives the example of natural disasters to illustrate his point. Thus, had human beings not joined together in order to achieve a common goal, no settled concentrations of human population might have resulted as the unintended by-product of such common undertakings. Further, when settlements are established in the vicinity of a volcano, volcanic eruptions are treated as disasters. However, when such an event occurs at a place remote from human habitation, its human significance is reduced to that of a natural phenomenon which is of concern to no one but a small circle of geologists (Balaban, 1990, 30–31).

Since by-products (in the example just given the by-product is not the volcanic eruption per se, but rather the disaster caused by it) are not part of the “conscious goal,” “the subject initially perceives them not as the result of his own activity, but as independent phenomena pertaining to destiny, external nature, accident or chance—in short, as good or bad fortuna” (Balaban, 1990, 32). And for what concerns the “violent rivers”-example used by Machiavelli in Chapter 25: The river’s impetuosity […] does not originate in the river acting independently of the conduct of human affairs, but is rather the consequence of conditions that have been created by men in the valley. Machiavelli’s example therefore does not refer to disasters in nature, but to the economic and social conditions produced by human activity. But these social and economic conditions which were created in the valley were not intentionally created. What men consciously sought to do was to achieve their goals by taking advantage of the fertility (Balaban, 1990, 33).

37

 On this, see also the contribution by Tarlton, 1999, 747 and ff.

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Balaban’s conclusion is that for Machiavelli “human affairs are not subject to natural events.” Quite the opposite: “It is the events of nature which in their significance, scope and limiting capacity are a part of human affairs.” As a consequence, a disaster caused by a violent river overflowing its banks is human, and all too human, in the following three specific respects: First, the establishment of human settlements in a river valley is the consequence of a historical rather than a natural process […]. Second, the disaster brought about by the river depends upon the failure of men to anticipate the unwanted by-products of their teleological activity by taking timely measures against them. Third, as Machiavelli explicitly tells us, fortuna can be avoided altogether (Balaban, 1990, 33–34).

It is not our goal to assess the consistency of Balaban’s reading of Machiavelli’s view on Fortune and its relations to human agency. What for the sake of our discourse in the present chapter interests us is the overall representation of Fortune in the thought of Machiavelli that emerges from his text. In line with the originally Aristotelian context of discussion of the τύχη (hence, of both ἀτυχία and δυστυχία), also for Machiavelli the problem of accounting for the very nature of “Fortune” arises against the backdrop of our “goal-oriented rationality” (il fine quale ciascuno ha innanzi); and yet, in line with Boethius’ paradigmatic idea of Fortune (against which Machiavelli is directly arguing), the Fortuna is not simply regarded as an accidental cause (as is the case with the Aristotelian τύχη); rather, it is recognized as characterizing our life and existence in the world as a whole. However, and here comes Machiavelli’s anthropological turn, the Fortuna, notably its destructive effects, are no longer looked at as something transcending our actions and existence. Rather, its effects are now recognized as stemming from our own finitude (which cannot be changed nor altered) and the many various factual conditions or circumstances in which our actions are concretely embedded. With all of this in mind, we can finally go back to Husserl.

8. The goal of the foregoing analyses was to provide the reader with a more robust backdrop for our thesis that Husserl’s talk of the many irrationalities of our existence (the “Schicksal-structure of the world”) is to be deemed a variation upon the traditional Fortuna-motif (as it harks all the way back to a certain Aristotelian discourse on accidental causes). But they should have also made clear that Husserl’s view cannot be reduced to any of those mentioned above. Our reconstruction went from Aristotle’s τύχη (chance and hazard as causes) through Boethius’ Fortuna (chance and instability as the nature of the world in which we live) to Machiavelli (Fortune understood anthropologically). Although it is hard to resist the temptation to read turns of phrase such as blindes Schicksal (Hua XLII, 400) or sinnlos hereinbrechendes Schicksal as a “blind”

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(blindes), “irrational” (sinnlos), and transcendent force “befalling upon us…” (hereinbrechendes)—the temptation must be avoided as strongly as possible.38 In a way that is more radical than  in Machiavelli, in Husserl the concept of Fortune (das Schicksalhafte) directly coincides with the fact of our facticity and its “irrationalities” (Irrationalität der Faktizität). As Balaban says, in Machiavelli “the events of nature […] with their limiting capacity [are] a part of human affairs;” for Husserl, the “irrationality of facticity” is part of our purpose-oriented rationality, thereby also determining the extent of the Schicksalhafte. The point needs to be properly and correctly understood, especially if we want to keep our previous distinction between Zufall (and relevant verbs) and Schicksal (and relevant verbs). Fortune or Schicksal does not have any effects on our existence if by this we mean something external to it. Quite the opposite: it is our “facticity” (Zufall) according to its accidents (sickness, death and so on) (see §3 of this chapter) that—by limiting, disrupting, annihilating life’s purpose or goal-oriented rationality (Zweckrationalität)—imposes itself “schicksalhaft.”39 It is the “world” itself that, as “a domain of irrational and unpredictable contingencies” (= as the domain of Zufälligkeiten), “disrupts practical reason” (eine Welt, die als Reich irrationaler, unberechenbarer Zufälle solch praktische Vernunft stört) (Hua XLII, 321). As a consequence, it should be apparent to what extent Husserl is not Boethius. For the latter, the Fortuna imposes itself on us insofar as we entrust ourselves to her and to our mortal goods (in such a way that the possibility of not climbing up the wheel of Fortune is also granted). For Husserl, there is no way one can decide not to climb up the wheel of Fortune if the extent of the latter directly coincides with the extent of (the irrationalities of) our facticity. Now, that this is the way in which we have to understand the Zufall-Schicksal relation is corroborated by Husserl’s way of talking in a 1926–27 manuscript whose Boethiean-sounding title is: Gibt es eine consolatio philosophiae? Memento Mori. Schicksal (Hua XLII, 400–408): Ich kann plötzlich sterben, kann plötzlich geisteskrank werden, ehe ich das Meine beigetragen habe zur wahren Welt, jedermann ebenso (Hua XLII, 401). […] vom Standpunkt des einzelpersonalen Ich: Mich befällt eine hoffnungslose Krankheit, das Schicksal verfolgt mich, alles Schöne, dem ich entgegenlebte, wird mir geraubt; dem, was ich erstrebte, ist der Boden weggezogen, es entgleitet meinen Händen. Ich werde zu allem Leisten unfähig, und was mir bleibt, ist nur die Erinnerung an all das, was ich wollte, was ich liebte, erhoffte, woran ich mich in edler Freude freute usw. (Hua XLII, 402).

However, we should never lose sight of the actual ambition of the present chapter. If we decided to get into an analysis of the different forms of irrationality that characterize human existence, it was in order to elucidate the sense of what Husserl calls “the supreme and ultimate questions” (and, ultimately, of what in the lectures on

 This is the reason why we refrain from translating Schicksal as “destiny” (as on the contrary done by Cavallaro & Heffernan, 2019, 373). 39  This is why Husserl speaks of ein blindes Schicksal, von den Zufällen der Natur herstammend, “a blind Schicksal, originating from the accidents of nature” (Hua XLII, 400). 38

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First Philosophy he had introduced as Με-2). Here is the list of such questions already preliminarily presented in §1 of this chapter: (a) The ultimate being of the “ego” and the “we” objectified as humanity (b) Birth and death (c) Teleology and the sense of history→ God as the source of all sense in the world (d) The sense of a “genuine” and “meaningful” human life (e) The transcendental total-subjectivity as the “true place in which the divine is ‘effective’” and to which there belongs the constitution of the world as “ours” If we now compare this list with all the different forms of Zufall and Schicksal distinguished in §§ 3–4 above, the following correspondences can be established.40 While a corresponds to the overall irrationality of contingency of human existence, the question of birth and death (b) corresponds to the “general uncertainty of life.” By contrast, c and e encompass the meanings of the Schicksal-structure of the world singled out over the course of our analyses: disruption of the unfolding of our plans and projects; annihilation of one’s purpose-oriented rationality; and dis-teleology. If we put together the phenomenology of irrationality outlined in this chapter with the assessment of Με-1 (“metaphysical interpretation of being as a fact”) from the previous chapter, the following coherent picture emerges which clarifies the meaning of “the supreme and ultimate questions.” According to Husserl’s own line of argumentation in the Cartesian Meditations, at the end of the phenomenological self-constitution of the inter-subjectivity, thus, of the objectivity of the world, all the a priori sciences turn out to be grounded in phenomenology as a first philosophy, just as all the positive sciences are grounded in the former and thereby in the latter too. This is what Husserl calls metaphysical interpretation of being as a fact. If the doctrine of constitution excludes in general any unknowable thing-in-itself (Trizio, 2021, 84), the self-constitution of the inter-­ subjectivity excludes any other real world other than this one (see our Volume 1, Chap. 5). This world is the place in which theoretical reason expresses itself and determines its truths both in eidetic terms and on the basis of the many factual sciences. The interpretation of this factual world sub specie systematis theoreticae rationis is a most direct result of the conjunction between two forms of rationality: the rationality of being (Rationalität), and the transcendental rationality (Vernünftigkeit). In short, at the end of the phenomenological process of constitution, this “factual world” turns out to be rational in two different senses: it is ontologically rational (the world is understood according to its regions of being by all the a priori and a posteriori sciences), and transcendentally rational (it is understood as the universal correlate of the transcendental inter-monadic subjectivity). Yet, a form of irrationality now emerges which is irreducible to these two notions of rationality. It is in fact a form of irrationality that goes “μετὰ” the just described rationalization of the φύσις or, as one can say: of the φύσις as the (eidetic and transcendental) rational totality of what “there is.”

40

 See our previous attempt in De Santis, 2021, 248–249.

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Even if this factual world has been clarified according to its causal structure both in terms of what the ontology of nature has established about the “causal” interconnection of the material world and what the empirical sciences, e.g. medicine has discovered about the causal factors determining such and such a species of phenomena—the sudden arrival of a (physical or mental) disease is something irrational (proper to what Husserl calls irrationality of facticity41), which can be rationalized neither ontologically nor transcendentally (and there is no other possible “rationalization” of the world). It is “the Schicksal-structure of the world” with its disruptions and annihilations of our praxis and goal or purpose-oriented rationality. As the manuscript above says, “all of a sudden I could get mentally ill, before I make my own contribution to the true world”; “I will no longer be able to act (zu allem Leisten unfähig), and I will be left only with the memory of what I wanted, what I loved, what I hoped.” Given the Zufall-Schicksal distinction, the fact that I could get mentally ill (by developing Alzheimer’s disease42) belongs to the irrationality of facticity (Zufall); yet, to the extent that such fact results in a disruption, or maybe annihilation, of one’s own purpose-oriented rationality (“I will no longer be able to act”), it falls under das Schicksalhafte. If we have spoken only of a correspondence between the supreme and ultimate questions and the different species of irrationality, the reason is the following: the questions correspond to the various forms of irrationality and yet are not to be identified with them. In other words, “the supreme and ultimate questions” are philosophical questions (metaphysical questions in a new sense, as one can put it by rephrasing Husserl himself) in the sense that the phenomenologist tackles them after the accomplishment of the metaphysical interpretation of being as a fact and upon the basis of the many irrationalities of existence. Let us resort to one of Husserl’s examples. The question that a soldier, or the father of a soldier fallen on the front, could desperately pose to himself, How can I live in a “sense-less” world?—this question does not belong to “the supreme and ultimate questions.” Quite the opposite. It is the phenomenologist who, faced with the irrationalities of existence, raises the supreme and ultimate question about “the source of all sense in the world” (c). Husserl’s words to Albrecht (see §8) confirm our reading: “The most elevated of all questions” are those “the proper, rigorous and authentic sense of which not every human being is able to understand and grasp (our italics)” (Hua-­ Dok III/9, 83). If we understand the passage in italics correctly, “the supreme and  See the 1925 letter to Ernst Cassirer, where Husserl speaks in fact of die Probleme der Faktizität als solcher, die der “Irrationalität” (Hua-Dok III/5, 6). It goes without saying that our interpretation of Husserl’s metaphysics, notably, the distinction between its different concepts and the identification of the specific backdrop only against which one can properly understand what Husserl means by “metaphysics in a new sense,” radically differs from De Palma, 2019. De Palma takes a quite critical attitude vis-à-vis the function of metaphysics in Husserl’s phenomenology without ever making the distinction between his different conceptions and even without raising the question as to the position that metaphysics has, or would have within Husserl’s philosophical system. 42  “Ich bin empirisch sicher, dass eine Geisteskrankheit, eine meine freie Persönlichkeit völlig verderbende, kommen wird in einer ungefähren Zeit, ein geistiger Tod” (Hua XLII, 403). 41

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ultimate questions” (Με-2) cannot be properly grasped by jeder Mensch because they are phenomenology-based questions. But if this is the case, then what follows is that only phenomenology can offer a satisfactory answer to them. If the reconstruction proposed in §§ 3–4 of the different species of irrationality is correct, also the solutions and the answers to the supreme and ultimate questions should derive from the assessment of the monad. As we briefly mentioned in §6, this is precisely what explicitly happens in a famous 1934 letter to Baudin, where Husserl explains that TI is his own consolatio philosophica. But, as we have just seen, Husserl had already employed Boethius’ own turn of phrase consolatio philosophiae to title a 1926–1927 manuscript on the problem of Schicksal. There is a most perfect correspondence between the two. In the manuscript, the answer sketched to the question of the irrationality of life is a most direct translation, into the language of human existence, of the monadic transcendental inter-subjectivity (which will be systematically presented in a few years).43 The consolatio philosophiae that Husserl opts for in 1926–1927 is the same consolatio philosophica mentioned to Baudin, and derives from his conception of TI based upon the re-elaboration of the transcendental, yet concrete subjectivity presented in the Cartesian Meditations. Let us warn the reader that since it is not our goal to discuss Husserl’s view on “genuine life” (see De Santis, 202144)—but only to circumscribe Με-2, in what follows we will confine ourselves to elucidating in what sense the answer to the supreme and ultimate questions results from TI.45

9. In the 1926–27 manuscript entitled Is There a Consolatio Philosophiae? a series of (progressively more general) variations on the same problem are unfolded: that of the possibility of the world as “a practically rational idea,” despite the unpredictable

 Let us not forget that Husserl’s last semester in Freiburg in 1928 before retirement was dedicated precisely to the problem of inter-subjectivity. 44  This would require a discussion of what Nicolas de Warren has aptly called “Husserl’s unwritten ethics” (de Warren, 2023, 391). 45  In fact, if, as Cavallaro & Heffernan, 2019, 363 correctly point out, for Husserl “A life of complete satisfaction is one in which all my beliefs and position-takings (Stellungnahmen), as well as all my volitions and actions, produce ‘the harmony of life’ (Zusammenstimmung zu einem Lebensganzen),” then the question concerning the irrational character of our existence, therefore the possibility of the “impossibility” of the harmony of life is to be deemed prior and more fundamental. Only if we first clarify how human beings can face the irrationality of life and the possible disruption or annihilation of their purpose-oriented rationality can also the problem of happiness be addressed. This is why the latter cannot be discussed in the present context. See Cavallaro & Heffernan, 2019 for an important introduction to the topic; see also Sanchez, 2007 for a general discussion of the problem of authenticity in relation to the method of reduction. 43

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Zufälle and blind Schicksal that dramatically torment and subvert the world and our human existence in it. In what follows, we will be presenting Husserl’s examples and relevant arguments as a series of three bullet-points. (α) The initial case, the one that somehow sets the tone of the entire discussion, is that of a mother, whose child has been “taken away” (entrissen) from her by illness and death. The child is for her “irreplaceable” (unersetzbar); yet, Husserl hastens to add, “Der auf das Kind gerichtete Lebenswille ist gebrochen, und doch nicht wirklich vernichtet: sofern die Liebe, die vom Ich nicht abzutrennende willentliche Entschiedenheit, nur ihren Modus geändert hat” (Hua XLII, 400–401). Husserl’s words in this context are not easy to decipher. As far as we understand the underlying argument, he seems to be suggesting that the love the mother used to direct towards her child and, via the latter’s own self-realization, towards the realization of the world itself, must now be directed elsewhere. Of course, the child cannot be replaced and “the will is, as a realizing will, impossible, but the inner decision is not eliminated.” The text seems to echo Malvine’s words to the Albrecht family: “In addition to these elevated human qualities, he also possessed an unusual scientific talent. His academic teachers […] were all unanimous, he was far more advanced in his first semester as others in their eighth. Oh God, what hopes have now disappeared! […] Among thousands and thousands of thousands, such a glorious child is born, [who] must die at the age of twenty, just about as he was about to live. But no, he lived so intensively that he is immortal” (de Warren & Vongehr, 2018, 93). The immortality (unsterblich) of Wolfgang (= the “irreplaceable” child abruptly taken away from his mother) is that of his mother’s own “Lebenswille,” which however has to now change its direction and mode (Modus) of self-realization and self-fulfillment. (β) No matter how tragic the case just mentioned may be, Husserl immediately moves on to what could be seen as the second (generalizing) variation on the theme. The text has already been quoted above (see §8): “Ich kann plötzlich sterben, kann plötzlich geisteskrank werden, ehe ich das Meine beigetragen habe zur wahren Welt, jedermann ebenso” (Hua XLII, 401). Whereas in α the will to life of the I (of the mother) survives that of her child, here it is my own I, my own will to life that is annihilated. And the solution seems to be a variation on what has already been said: “Im Gang der Erfahrungswelt zeigt sich, dass durchschnittlich das Leben genug lange dauern kann, um einige Frucht zu tragen, und dass in der Vergemeinschaftung des Lebens sich die Werte verknüpfen, erhöhen und eine fortschreitende Gemeinschaftsleistung zu Stande kommen kann und wie z.B. in der Wissenschaft wirklich zu Stande gekommen ist” (Hua XLII, 401). The function that in α was played by the mother is here played by the community of scientists of which I myself am a member: “Der Wissenschaftler bejaht die Welt der Wissenschaft. Was bedeutet da der Tod des Einzelnen und das Abbrechen seiner Mitarbeit? Es sind andere da. Und voraussichtlich wird der Fortschritt nie fehlen. Die Erbschaft jeder Generation wird die Freude der neuen sein” (Hua XLII, 402). Take now Husserl’s own words to Neumann after Reinach’s death,

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I am here two days in the Black Forest to recover a little and dampen my inner disturbances. Tomorrow, I’ll be back teaching my course on logic; of course, it will be a sad course in front of so many empty benches, since now even the ladies, who are so loyal an excited to absorb the new message of phenomenology, have gone to the munitions factories. […] Someone must master the great problems of eternity, keep an eye on them and do real work, and since the youth live with weapons and fighting, the older ones must preserve the cultural traditions, for which they are fighting, in living force and deed (de Warren & Vongehr, 2018, 263)

“Why should it not be like this in all the spheres of culture?” Husserl rhetorically asks himself. (γ) Now, if both α and β still presuppose the existence of an inter-subjective dimension (mother-child; myself and the scientific community to which I belong) able to overcome the annihilation of one’s will to life (or “purpose-oriented rationality”)—the third variation on the topic is that in which “ich nicht darauf rechnen kann, dass das ‚Unglück’ ein endliches sein muss” (Hua XLII, 403).46 “What shall I do” if the misfortune is infinite and extends over the human community of which I myself—as a human being—am a member? For example, when “we observe the falling apart of culture and civilization” (Hua XLII, 402)? When, to recall the words used by Husserl in his letter to Friedrich Neumann, “the army of the dead grows ever more powerful, and more and more of the best of those who were entrusted with the work of the future have been surrendered to this army” (de Warren & Vongehr, 2018, 263)? Or when there is no Hoffnung? (Hua XLII, 406).47 The answer amounts to an extreme radicalization of what has been already argued: “Ich kann nur Kraft haben im Glauben an eine sinnvolle Welt, an eine Welt, die von uns her Sinn gewinnt und das trotz aller Einbrüche des Widersinns, von uns Sinn gewinnt durch überwindende Kraft in der Gemeinschaft der Gutwollenden, aber so, dass eben unsere Kraft ‚Gottes Kraft’ ist” (Hua XLII, 406). The appeal to the notion of “faith,” hence to God whose “strength” would be our own “strength” might sound surprising, as though Husserl were here appealing to a transcendent instance on whose basis alone sense could be bestowed upon the world. In §11 of the Crisis Husserl will remark what follows as regards the idea of God: “Does not rational being, even as nature, in order to be thinkable at all, presuppose rational theory and a subjectivity which accomplishes it? Does not nature, then, indeed the world-in-itself, presuppose God as reason (Vernunft) existing absolutely? Does this not mean that, within being-in-itself, psychic being takes precedence as subjectivity existing purely for itself? It is, after all, subjectivity, whether divine or human” (Hua VI, 62; Husserl, 1970, 62). “God” here, as well as in the  “Aber wie, wenn ich mich besinnlich darüber stelle und diesen Verlauf selbst überschaue und nun bedenke, dass ich nicht darauf rechnen kann, dass das ‚Unglück’ ein endliches sein muss, das neuem ‚Glück’ Möglichkeiten offen lässt, dass vielmehr der Tod Endgültigkeit besagt, die zu keinem neuen Spiel dieser Art sich hergibt?” 47  “Wie viele haben mir (noch im letzten Jahren!) den Rücken gekehrt” (Husserl, 1968, 87); “Unser Zukunfthorizont wird ja stetig kleiner, u. plötzlich ist er gar nicht mehr da” (Husserl, 1968, 99). 46

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quotation from Hua XLII, is nothing other than a different label for Vernunft, “reason,” hence for the very possibility of giving sense to this world. We stress the deictic this (= this world), because Husserl’s discourse here does not concern the transcendental dimension of the constitution of the world; rather, it concerns the human world and our own human existence in it. We are not claiming that God’s strength is our own strength—but rather the opposite: our strength is God’s own strength. Differently put, Husserl is not affirming that even when human beings are no longer capable of bestowing sense on this world, the reassuring existence of a God can still be assumed as the very existence of an infinite form of reason able to do precisely what we are not anymore in a position to accomplish (i.e., the bestowal of sense upon the world).48 As far as we understand Husserl, our faith in God’s strength means the faith in the possibility for the human community of subjects to keep realizing themselves, thereby keeping bestowing sense upon the world despite the falling apart of our civilization and the army of the dead growing more powerful than ever. In contrast with Antonio Gramsci, who used to oppose the optimism of the will to the pessimism of the intellect (pessimismo dell’intelligenza, ottimismo della volontà)—for him the optimism of the will is also and necessarily the optimism of reason, and vice versa. And God is the name for the conjunction between these two: “Ich glaube nicht aus Willkür, sondern ich glaube aus der Notwendigkeit, Ich zu sein und Menschheitsglied zu sein und Gegenüber meiner jeweiligen Umwelt zu sein als wollend Tätiger” (Hua XLII, 407). It is important to bear in mind that the talk of God’s strength, hence of our faith in it, does not mean that the world is in itself sense-full or imbued with sense. Quite the opposite. The world does not have any sense, precisely because Sinn is the correlate of reason (Vernunft): this world can only receive sense “from us,” from our activities and decisions to keep realizing ourselves, our purpose-oriented rationality no matter what. This is why Husserl can make the Platonic-sounding remark, Der letzte Sinn des Seins ist das Gute (Hua XLII, 168). We should now know what this means: sense is bestowed upon being by our purpose-oriented rationality. Husserl’s point is not only that sense belongs to Vernünftigkeit, yet not to Rationalität. Rather, the point bears on our human existence in a world in which “the army of the dead” grows more and more powerful: in the human language that Husserl employs here, to have faith in “God’s strength” means to believe in the possibility for the infinite human community to keep practically bestowing sense upon its (= our) world. Without laying claim to any direct connection between Husserl and Camus, the phenomenology of existence of the former and the latter’s conception of the absurd,

 Already in De Santis, 2021, 259–260, we advanced the hypothesis to the effect that Husserl’s term Gottmenschentum (Hua XLII, 176) should be read as a most direct translation of Kierkegaard’s expression Gud-Mennesket (literarily, God-Man) from Indøvelse i Christendom or Practice in Christianity (Kierkegaard, 2017, 1942–1943). However, whereas for Kierkegaard the Gud-­ Mennesket is the Forargelse or “the scandal κατ’ ἐξοχήν,” what reason cannot understand and embrace, for Husserl it means the exact opposite. The Gottmenschentum expresses the very idea of humanity realizing itself in infinitum, thus also realizing God’s infinity within the world. 48

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Husserl’s line of thought seems to echo the words uttered by Bernard Rieux in La peste as he realizes that the plague is afflicting the city: ce vertige ne tenait pas devant la raison, or, in the English translation by S. Gilbert: One could be afraid… (On pouvait craindre…) But these extravagant forebodings dwindled in the light of reason (Mais ce vertige ne tenait pas devant la raison). True, the word “plague” had been uttered; true, at this very moment one or two victims were being seized and laid low by the disease. Still, that could stop, or be stopped. It was only a matter of lucidly recognizing what had to be recognized; of dispelling extraneous shadows and doing what needed to be done. […] The doctor opened the window, and at once the noises of the town grew louder. The brief, intermittent sibilance of a machine-saw came from a near-by workshop. Rieux pulled himself together. There lay certitude; there, in the daily round (dans le travail de tous les jours). All the rest hung on mere threads and trivial contingencies; you couldn’t waste your time on it. The thing was to do your job as it should be done (L’essentiel était de bien faire son métier) (Camus, 1947, 53; 1948, 37–38).

The talk of “God,” hence of “divine perfection or completion” (göttliche Vollkommenheit) (XLII, 406), “God-world” (Gotteswelt) and “God-humanity” (Gottesmenschentum) (Hua XLII, 176) is the way in which Husserl “translates” (sit venia verbo) into the language of human existence and life in the world some of main and central tenets of his account of the constitution of the transcendental inter-­ monadic-­subjectivity, hence of TI.  If in the Cartesian Meditations Husserl will speak of Vergemeinschaftung der Monaden to refer to the one and only infinite connection of all the monads to which corresponds the one and only real world as their own correlate, in the manuscript in question the phrase Vergemeinschaftung des Lebens (Hua XLII, 401) is used. If towards the end of the account of TI, Husserl will recognize that being is only “a practical idea” (Hua I, 121; Husserl, 1993, 86; see our Volume1, Chap. 5, §11) as the correlate of the inter-monadic-subjectivity, in the appendix to this manuscript Husserl appeals to “The idea of humanity as an absolute and practical idea” (als absolute praktische Idee) (Hua XLII, 408). If the core tenet of TI (as we saw towards the end of Chap. 6 of the first volume) is that “a coherent self-exhibition of the objective world of experience implies a coherent self-­ exhibition of other monads” (Hua I, 166; Husserl, 1993, 138), here Husserl points out that, “ich glaube aus der Notwendigkeit, Ich zu sein und Menschheitsglied zu sein und Gegenüber meiner jeweiligen Umwelt zu sein als wollend Tätiger.” The one world as the correlate of the one infinite transcendental inter-subjectivity (= transcendental level of Husserl’s discourse) corresponds now to the factual world in which we, finite beings, exist and which we ought to keep realizing by keeping realizing ourselves and our purpose-oriented rationality (= human dimension of his discourse)—just like Camus’ Bernard Rieux. As in fact the doctor replies to Tarrou’s discomforting and pessimistic observation (“Your victories will never be lasting. That’s all”): Toujours, je le sais. Ce n’est pas une raison pour cesser de lutter; “Yes, I know that. But it’s no reason for giving up the struggle” (Camus, 1947, 152; 1948, 109). If Rieux does not believe in God, in Husserl God stands for humanity’s own infinite self-realization: “God as the will to good is the ultimate reality. […] God as entelechy, God as ἐνέργεια” (Hua XLII, 168).

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If we are on the right track, this is the sense of c and e, and of God as the “ultimate source” of all sense in the world: far from Husserl is the belief that an entity named “God” would be the source of all possible sense. “God” stands for what, at the human level, corresponds to the infinite connection between the transcendental monads, i.e., the Erweiterung zur irdischen Gemeinschaft (XLII, 408). Leibniz’s dictum that this world is the best among all possible ones makes way for Husserl’s idea that this world is the only possible one in which the best can be achieved.49 Since it is not our ambition to reconstruct Husserl’s discourse on God,50 the time is ripe to wrap up our analyses thus far and move towards the conclusion of the present chapter.

10. It should be immediately evident in what sense it is utterly wrong to accuse Husserl’s discourse about Με-2 of stepping beyond “the limits of phenomenological description.” This is an impression that arises only if the preliminary yet fundamental Problemgeographie-question about the place of the supreme and ultimate questions is not really asked. For if the question is, on the contrary, asked, and if a thorough analysis is unfolded about the irrationality of our existence, thus about the relation between the structure of the monad and the different forms of irrationality—then it will immediately become clear that the answers to the supreme and ultimate questions consist in a translation of the claims implied by TI into the language of human existence. This is why, although Με-2 appears at the end of the transcendental constitution, and the supreme and ultimate questions step beyond the ultimate interpretation of factual being sub specie systematis theoreticae rationis, they must still be deemed “philosophical” questions. They derive from Husserl’s account of the mundanization of the transcendental inter-monadic-subjectivity, therefore from TI itself. But let us not lose sight of the ultimate ambition of our analyses of Husserl’s understanding of the irrational nature of our existence in the world (metaphysics in a new sense). “Facticity,” “birth” and “death” as well as “the duration of one’s life” should immediately remind the reader of some of the elements and aspects of Heidegger’s account of Dasein and its structure. For example, does not the “irrationality of facticity” (Irrationalität der Faktizität), i.e., the fact of being accidentally “placed” in the world (Hua XLII, 285–286), correspond to what Heidegger call

 We are of course aware that a complete analysis of this aspect of Husserl’s philosophy would require a discussion of the notion of “generativity” that unfortunately cannot be pursued here. 50  See what we have already argued in De Santis, 2021; for a recent text on Husserl’s philosophy of religion, see Varga, 2021. The question of how Husserl appropriates the Kantian postulates of reason goes far beyond the scope of this paper; see the 1925 letter to Cassirer already quoted above where Husserl explicitly connects the postulates of reason with the problem of the irrationality of our facticity (Hua-Dok III/5, 6). 49

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“thrown possibility” in §31 of Being and Time (Heidegger, 1967, 144; 2010, 139)? Heidegger writes that “Dasein has always already got itself into definite possibilities,” and Husserl would add that birth is something accidental, just as are accidental our education and the encounters we make in the course of our existence. In sum: accidental is the very world into which we are “placed” (Husserl) or “thrown” (Heidegger). But whereas for Heidegger all such discourse is paramount in order to clarify “understanding” as a most fundamental existential, thus paving the way for the existential-transcendental foundation of the problem of being,51 the state of affairs with Husserl is radically different. The structure of the concrete ego (the monad) is one thing, and the irrationalities of our human existence (Dasein in Husserl’s sense) in the world quite another. And while Heidegger confuses and identifies the two, thereby attributing transcendental import to our own facticity, this is not at all the case with Husserl. From the standpoint of Heidegger, one could criticize Husserl for not clarifying the mode of being of our finite existence, hence for not being able to work out a fundamental ontology in the sense of Being and Time. Yet, from Husserl’s own perspective, this is precisely what he does not do for one specific reason: he does not want to transcendentalize and rationalize our human existence and its irrationalities. The fact that the many forms of irrationality correspond to the various aspects of the structure of the monad derives from Husserl’s understanding of the finite subject as a mundanized form of the transcendental subject. But the “correspondence” between two dimensions which nevertheless remain distinct (Husserl) is one thing, and their identification (Husserl’s Heidegger) quite another. Husserl acknowledges the irrational dimension of our human existence in the world as something ultimate and irreducible to both ontology and transcendental philosophy (no matter how we might want to conceive of it). Heidegger rationalizes it by transcendentalizing the finitude of our own existence. As we saw towards the end of the previous chapter, for Husserl this amounts to confusing “the transcendental subject” (= its structures) and “my Dasein as a human being” (= the irrationality of its factual existence), namely, “first philosophy” and “metaphysic” (in a new sense). Whereas in Heidegger, Dasein designates the essence of what we are and expresses the event of the understanding of being that alone makes the very analytics of Dasein possible (= the fundamental ontology); in Husserl, Dasein expresses what cannot be rationalized, the ultimate irrational and contingent character of our human existence (and for which there cannot be any possible ontology, be it of fundamental nature or other).

 “The question of the sense of being is possible at all only if something like an understanding of being is. An understanding of being belongs to the kind of being of the entity which we call Dasein. The more appropriately and primordially we have succeeded in explicating this entity, the surer we are to attain our goal in the further course of working out the problem of fundamental ontology” (Heidegger, 1967, 200; 2010, 186). See Puc, 2013 on the problem of death in Heidegger as a possibility for Dasein. 51

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Having recognized this, our attempt at reconstructing “Husserl’s criticism of Heidegger,” thus his distinction between first philosophy, the many ontologies or second philosophies and metaphysics (according to its different conceptions), has finally come full circle.

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Sanchez, C. A. (2007). Husserl’s way to authentic being. Human Studies, 4, 377–393. Sanders, W. (1965). Glück. Zur Herkunft und Bedeutungsentwicklung eines Mittelalterlichen Schicksalsbegriffs. Böhlau Verlag. Sasso, G. (1953). Niccolò Machiavelli. Storia del suo pensiero politico. Istituto italiano per gli studi storici. Sasso, G. (1965). Niccolò Machiavelli. Geschichte seines politischen Denkens. W. Kohlhammer Verlag. Sasso, G. (1996). Tempo, evento, divenire. Il Mulino. Sasso, G. (2015). Su Machiavelli. Ultimi scritti. Carocci. Schulz, H. (1994). Eschatologische Identität. Eine Untersuchung über das Verhältnis von Vorsehung, Schicksal und Zufall bei S. Kierkegaard. De Gruyter. Tarlton, C.  D. (1999). “Fortuna” and the landscape of action in Machiavelli’s “Prince”. New Literary History, 30, 737–755. Thust, M. (1931). Søren Kierkegaard. Der Dichter der religiösen Grundlagen eines Systems der Subjektivität. Verlag C. H. Beck. Trizio, E. (2021). Philosophy’s nature: Husserl’s phenomenology, natural science and metaphysics. Routledge. Varga, P.  A. (2021). Edmund Husserl on the Historicity of the Gospels. A different look at Husserl’s philosophy of religion and his philosophy of the history of philosophy. Husserl Studies, forthcoming. Warburg, A. (1907). Francesco Sassettis letztwillige Verfügung. In H.  Weizsäcker (Hrsg.), Kunstwissenschaftliche Beiträge: August Schmarsow gewidmet zum 50. Semester s. akad. Lehrtätigkeit (pp. 129–152). Hiersemann.

Chapter 6

Forms-of-Life and the Reform(s) of Philosophy

1. We have finally arrived at the end of our long journey. One more problem remains to be discussed though: the one concerning “the locus of the transcendental” (Volume 1, Chap. 1). Let us recall Heidegger’s words to Husserl: We are in agreement on the fact that the entity in the sense of what you call the “world” cannot be clarified in its transcendental constitution by returning to an entity of the same mode of being. But that does not mean that what constitutes the place of the transcendental is not an entity at all; rather, precisely there arises the problem: what is the mode of being of the entity in which the “world” is constituted. That is Being and Time’s central problem, namely, a fundamental ontology of Dasein. It has to be shown that the mode of being of human Dasein is totally different from that of all other entities and that, as the mode of being that it is, it harbors right within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution. Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the existence of the factual self. This factual self, the concrete human being, is as such, as an entity, never a “worldly real matter of fact” because the human is never merely present-at-hand, but rather exists. And what is “incredible” is the fact that the structure of Dasein’s existence makes possible the transcendental constitution of everything positive. The “pure psychic” has arisen without the slightest regard for the ontology of the whole human being, that is to say, without any aim of [developing] a psychology; rather, from the beginning, since the time of Descartes, it has come out of gnoseological concerns. […] The question about the mode of being of what does the constitution is not to be avoided. Accordingly, the problem of being bears upon the constituting as well as the constituted (Hua-Dok III/4, 146–147; Husserl, 1997, 138).

As Heidegger puts it, what we have labeled “the locus of the transcendental” is the problem of the “entity” which “harbors right within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution.” As is clear, the problem does not concern the transcendental constitution and self-constitution, which, as we saw in Volume 1, Chap. 3, is accomplished by the concrete ego or monad (it corresponds to what we called “the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. De Santis, Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics, Contributions to Phenomenology 126, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39590-1_6

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6  Forms-of-Life and the Reform(s) of Philosophy (a) “I, this human being, am the one…” (b.1) Consciousness-world correlation (b) Transcendental subjectivity (b.2) The concretely full being (c) My Dasein as a human being

Fig. 6.1  Husserl’s three subjects

nomos of the transcendental” or the question of the “‘unintelligibility’ of the entity”); rather, it is the very problem of the character of the entity that makes the transcendental constitution possible. In Volume 1, Chap. 1, §2, we quoted from §35 of the Cartesian Meditations (Excursus on Eidetic Internal Psychology), where Husserl affirms apertis verbis, “To the concrete transcendental ego there corresponds the human ego” (Hua I, 107; Husserl, 1993, 73). We already touched upon this issue over the course of Volume 1, Chap. 4, §9, but only to warn the reader that we would not be able to actually address it before the end of the present work. The time is now ripe to do it. The problem has to do with the distinction between three determinations of the subject (Fig. 6.1): Let us recall again what  Husserl  says in his lecture on Phenomenology and Anthropology. Against all expectations, what in fact opens up here, and only through the phenomenological reduction, is a vast field of research. It is first of all a field of immediate, apodictic experience, the constant source and solid ground of all transcendental judgments whether immediate or mediate. This is a field of which Descartes and his successors were oblivious and remained so. To be sure, it was an extraordinarily difficult task to clarify the pure sense of the transcendental transformation and thereby to highlight the fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, the transcendental-ego with its transcendental sphere and, on the other, the human-ego with its psychical sphere and worldly sphere. Even after the distinction had been noted and the task of a transcendental science had achieved its pure sense, as was the case with Fichte and his successors, it was still extraordinarily difficult to see and exploit the ground of transcendental experience in its infinite breadth. […]. The reduction is the means of access to this new realm, so when one gets the sense of the reduction wrong then everything else also goes wrong. The temptation to misunderstandings here is simply overwhelming. For instance, it seems all too obvious to say to oneself: “I, this human being, am the one who is practicing the method of a transcendental change of attitude whereby one withdraws back into the pure ego; so can this ego be anything other than just a mere abstract of this concrete human being, its purely spiritual being, abstracted from the body?” (Hua XXVII, 172–173; Husserl, 1997, 492–493).

As we pointed out in Volume1, Chap. 1, §5, a clear distinction is here made between “the locus of the transcendental” (“I, this human being, am the one who is practicing the method of a transcendental change of attitude”); the concrete character of the transcendental itself (“the concretely full being,” which is what turned out to be the “absolute concretion” or primum concretum (see Volume1, Chap. 6)); and the “human person” and “my Dasein as a human being” (the transcendental ego’s self-­ apperception in the world). If Heidegger—according to Husserl—is guilty of

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confusing, first, a and b (thereby assigning anthropological features to the transcendental subject and jeopardizing the possibility of all the ontologies other than the fundamental one (see Chap. 1 of the present volume)), and then b and c (thereby giving transcendental import and value to the irrational dimensions of our existence (see Chaps. 4 and 5 of this volume)), for Husserl it is the exact opposite. For him the point is to lay claim to the difference between both b and c (= distinction between transcendental phenomenology and metaphysics in a new sense) and a and b (= distinction between the transcendental subject and the human being practicing the method of the transcendental change of attitude). This leaves us with the problem of addressing the connection between a and c. As far as the Cartesian Meditations are concerned, the issue is that of understanding the relation between the final part of the book and its opening pages. No matter how strange this may sound, this is, in fact, precisely what Husserl writes to Roman Ingarden. In a letter from the end of 1931 (letter Nr. LV, November 13, 1931), Husserl remarks to his former student that, “Aber erst nach V. muß das eigentliche Verstehen kommen u. dann die Nötigung, von I. nochmals anzufangen” (Husserl, 1968, 73). If this is the case, then the question arises how the two parts are to be connected based on what Husserl maintains at the end of the text. It is important to keep in mind that the relation here in question is to be conceived of as going from c (the “human person” or “my Dasein as a human being”) to a (“I, this human being, am the one…”) and not the other way around. We are not invited to understand the Fifth Meditation in light of the First one; rather, we are invited to understand the opening pages of the text in light of its conclusion. What is it that Husserl remarks at the end of the Cartesian Meditations?

2. Quite rhetorically, the “Conclusion” opens up by recognizing that it seems we have lost sight of the “demand, so seriously made at the beginning [of the text], namely, that an apodictic knowledge […] be achieved” (Hua I, 177; Husserl, 1993, 151). But this is not the case, Our meditations, one may venture to say, have in the main fulfilled their purpose, namely, to show the concrete possibility of the Cartesian idea of a philosophy as an all-embracing science grounded on an absolute foundation. To exhibit this concrete possibility, to show the feasibility of such a philosophy […] means exhibiting a necessary and indubitable beginning and an equally necessary and always employable method, whereby, at the same time, a systematic order of all sensful problems is pre-delineated. This much we have actually done (Hua I, 178; Husserl, 1993, 152).

The passage is quite clear. Not only does Husserl affirm that the possibility of “the Cartesian idea of a philosophy as an all-embracing science” has been shown over the course of the five Meditations; he also points out that to show the very possibility of such an idea means the same as to show the systematic order of all sensful problems, i.e., of all problems of Sinn. Which order, exactly? As we will soon see,

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the “systematic order” Husserl has in mind here is precisely the order of the system of philosophy as we reconstructed and presented it during the last two chapters. Husserl’s discourse can be divided up into five main steps. 1. “A consequentially progressing phenomenology constructs a priori […], on the one hand, the forms of conceivable worlds and, on the other hand, conceivable worlds themselves, within the limit set by all conceivable forms of being and their system of levels” (see Hua I, 180; Husserl, 1993, 154). This is the opening step, the one of the transcendental constitution (Volume 1, Chaps. 4 and 5), in which the a priori correlation between all possible worlds and all the possible forms of consciousness is ascertained and described in its eidetic generality. 2. As Husserl hastens to remark, “This is true of all the fundamental concepts that concern the concrete structure and the total structural form of sciences that relate (or can become related) to the various regions of being (Hua I, 180; Husserl, 1993, 154). 3. The combination of 1 + 2 immediately leads us to the idea of a “universal a priori”: “We can now say likewise that in a priori transcendental phenomenology, all a priori sciences without exception originate with an ultimate grounding, thanks to its correlational research” (Hua I, 181; Husserl, 1993, 155). It is the “system of the all-embracing a priori,” which must be here understood as “the systematic unfolding of the all-embracing a priori” or as “the systematic unfolding of the universal logos of all conceivable being.” In perfect compliance with what was explained in Chap. 4, §7 of this volume, Husserl speaks of a “universal concrete ontology” to mean the grounding of all a priori sciences on transcendental phenomenology (first philosophy). 4. Such a concrete ontology was possible, first, ego-logically and then inter-­ subjectively (this distinction is fully in line with the difference between the discussion of the transcendental monadology of CM IV, where the assessment of TI is first provided, and CM V). And it is only after the inclusion of the inter-­ subjective dimension that one can also affirm: “The total science of the a priori would then be the foundation for genuine sciences of matters of fact and for a genuine all-embracing philosophy in the Cartesian sense: an all-embracing science of what factually is, grounded on an absolute foundation” (Hua I, 181; Husserl, 1993, 155). Although Husserl does not yet use the expression “metaphysics” here, the passage recalled describes what towards the end of Chap. 4 of this volume we called “the metaphysical interpretation of the objective being as a fact,” “the interpretation of the factual world sub specie systematis rationis theoreticae.” His words leave no room for doubt, “All the rationality of the fact lies, after all, in the a priori. A priori science is the science of the radical universalities and necessities, to which the science of matter of fact must have recourse […]. But a priori science must not be naive; it must have originated from ultimate transcendental-phenomenological sources” (Hua I, 181; Husserl, 1993, 155–156). The fact is grounded on the a priori of the rationality of being (Rationalität), which in turn is rooted in the rationality of sense (Vernünftigkeit) investigated by phenomenology: while the connection between the latter two

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brings about the concrete ontology, the conjunction of concrete ontology with the positive sciences (the fact) results in the metaphysical interpretation of factual being. 5. Finally, Husserl himself brings in the concept of “metaphysics”: “I would point out that, as already stated, phenomenology indeed excludes every naive metaphysics that operates with absurd things in themselves, but does not exclude metaphysics as such” (Hua I, 182; Husserl, 1993, 156). Husserl does not use here the term metaphysics to designate 4 because he seems to confine its application to the domain of the “supreme and ultimate questions,” that is, to metaphysics in a new sense: “It does no violence to the problem-motives that inwardly drive the old tradition into the wrong line of inquiry and the wrong method; and it by no means professes to stop short of the ‘supreme and ultimate’ questions. […] [W]ithin the factual monadic sphere […] occur all the problems of contingent facticity (der zufälligen Faktizität), of death, of Schicksal, of the possibility of a ‘genuine’ human life demanded as ‘meaningful’ in a particular sense, among them, therefore, the problem of the ‘sense’ of history—and all the further and still higher problems” (Hua I, 182; Husserl, 1993, 156).1 Husserl is very clear, “Thus the idea of an all-embracing philosophy becomes actualized or realized (verwirklicht)” (Hua I, 182; Husserl, 1993, 156). The actualization and realization of the “Cartesian” idea of philosophy culminates in 5, i.e., in the possibility of what in the lectures on First Philosophy Husserl had quickly called “metaphysics in a new sense.” In short, the realization of the Cartesian idea of philosophy, which Husserl has introduced right at the outset of the Meditations, corresponds to our analyses in the previous chapter, namely, to the possibility of addressing phenomenologically the supreme and ultimate questions. If we are to follow Husserl’s suggestion to Ingarden according to which a full comprehension of the text is possible on condition that after we read CM V we start again from the beginning, then the sense of his words can be represented with a diagram (Fig. 6.2):

1  Husserl proposed a sketch of his overall system of the sciences in his Introduction to Philosophy lectures of 1919–1920: “Das führt notwendig auf den Entwurf eines Systems der Gesamtheit wissenschaftstheoretischer Disziplinen, zunächst der ontologischen und noematischen Disziplinen, welche in formaler Allgemeinheit von möglichen Gegenständlichkeiten überhaupt, dann, herabsteigend von möglichen individuellen Gegenständlichkeiten und Welten, von möglichen Naturen und Kulturen handeln, wie wir das ausführliche dargelegt haben. Weiter ist erfordert ein sich diesem formalen Rahmen durch materiale Bestimmung einfügendes System der material-apriorischen Disziplinen wie der Geometrie, der apriorischen Mechanik. Alles zusammen ergibt sich nach dem Leitfaden des Systems der Wissenschaftslehren ein universales System apriorischer und empirischer Wissenschaften natürlicher Blickrichtung. Diese ergeben sich offenbar nicht als bloß geordnetes Nebeneinander, sondern es sind dem Erkenntnisrang nach übergeordnet die apriorischen Wissenschaften als Wissenschaften von den prinzipiellen Allgemeinheiten gegenüber den Tatsachenwissenschaften, deren Faktizitäten unter den Prinzipien stehen. Ferner gründen sich die letzteren, die Tatsachenwissenschaften, auf die ersteren (die Wesensgesetze möglicher Wirklichkeiten gelten natürlich auch für die faktischen Wirklichkeiten und dienen dann zu ihrer theoretischen Bestimmung)” (Hua-Mat IX, 284). On the relations between phenomenology and the Cartesian tradition, see Mehl, 2021.

204 Fig. 6.2  How to read the Meditations

6  Forms-of-Life and the Reform(s) of Philosophy (a) “I, this human being, am the one…”

(b) Transcendental subjectivity

(c) My Dasein as a human being (Metaphysics in a new sense)

In our own terminology, the problem of “the locus of the transcendental” can be fully elucidated only after we have already made a distinction between a and b, reached c, and hence addressed the irrational nature of our human existence. Only at this point, in fact, can we come back to a so as to grasp what it actually means and implies. It is against such backdrop that also the significance of the references to both Socrates and Augustine at the end of the book should be properly regarded: The path leading to a knowledge absolutely grounded in the highest sense, or (this being the same thing) a philosophical knowledge, is necessarily the path of universal self-knowledge, first of all monadic, and then inter-monadic. We can say also that a radical and universal continuation of the Cartesian meditations or, equivalently) a universal self-cognition, is philosophy itself and encompasses all self-responsible knowledge. The Delphic motto γνῶθι σεαυτόν has gained a new signification. Positive science is a science lost in the world. I must lose the world by epochè in order to regain it by universal self-examination. Noli foras ire, says Augustine, in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas (Hua I, 182–183; Husserl, 1993, 156–157).

These words can be, and usually are, easily misunderstood and read as if they had only a rhetorical meaning. On the one hand, Husserl is referring back to the opening pages of the text, where the phenomenological epoché was accomplished and the journey of the meditations started. On the other hand, and this is far from being insignificant for our goal in the present chapter, an indirect reference is made, first, to Socrates and then, more explicitly, to Augustine. As we shall soon see, the reference to Socrates is far from being accidental or rhetorical and is on the contrary directly connected to Husserl’s understanding of Descartes. The reader could be easily misled to believe that here Husserl is somehow “appropriating” the sense of both the Delphic motto and the Augustinian quotation from the De vera religione (39, 72), thus attributing to them some kind of transcendental meaning. Nothing could be farther from the truth. As we saw in Volume1, Chap. 5, §§8–9, once the constitution of the inter-­ monadic-­subjectivity has reached its conclusion in §60, what is established is the existence of only one possible inter-subjectivity (the human one), hence, only one possible real world (this one, in which we human beings exist) as its own objectual correlate. Now we also know that the realization of the Cartesian idea of philosophy coincides with the assessment of the supreme and ultimate questions, namely, the questions bearing on our own human existence and its irrational nature. It is from

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within such dimension that Husserl is inviting us to come back to the opening pages of the text so as to re-read and re-interpret the sense of the epoché, the Cartesian reform of philosophy and the its relation to Socrates. The Delphic injunction γνῶθι σεαυτόν has nothing to do with the transcendental subject. Quite the contrary. It refers to “my Dasein as a human being,” i.e., the human subject who, at the end of the transcendental enterprise, has finally come face to face with the absolutely and irreducibly irrational nature of our human existence and the supreme and ultimate questions. Eugen Fink has understood this point in the sense of an existential motivation for the accomplishment of the reduction. Aus dem alltäglichen Leben selbst springen hin und wieder Motive auf, die uns aus dem natürlichen gewohnten Dahinleben herausreissen und uns über alle Besorgnisse und Geschäftigkeiten unseres alltäglichen Weltlebens hinweg mit elementarer Gewalt auf das Problem der Welt stossen. Dies geschieht dann, wenn uns die Welt etwa durch das Erleben eines Schicksalsschlages, durch das plötzliche Wachwerden des sonst und gemeinhin heimlichen und verheimlichten Wissens um die letzten Dinge, um Tod und Vergänglichkeit, durch die rätselhaften Stimmungen des Grauens und Entsetzens uns ganz unverständlich wird, wenn sie so ihre alltägliche Vertrautheit und Wohnlichkeit verliert und zu einem bangen Rätsel wird (Hua-Dok II/2, 30).

Our ambition is to show that what is at stake, for Husserl, is more than the idea that the method of the transcendental change of attitude can be “existentially” motivated or, to put it better, that it could be motivated in the sense of being a reaction against the incomprehensibility of the world. To this end, it will be of the utmost importance to see how Husserl properly understands the figure of Socrates, namely, his position in the history of philosophy and the connection between Socrates and Descartes. As far as we know, in fact, it is only in connection to Socrates (“Socrates-Plato”) and Descartes that Husserl talks of “reform of life” (the former) (Hua VI, 280; Husserl, 1970, 302–303; Hua VII, 9; Husserl, 2019, 8; Hua XXXV, 52–53; Hua-Mat IX, 22) and “reform of philosophy” (the latter). Why does Husserl speak of “reform” in these two cases? What is the relation between these two different philosophers, therefore their corresponding two reforms? What is the peculiarity of the Cartesian “reform” with respect to the Socratic (and Platonic) one? In order to answer all these questions, we will have to first briefly present some of the aspects of Husserl’s reconstruction of the history of (Greek) philosophy. Once we have clarified the position Socrates (and Plato) has in such a history, we will be able to better understand the role Husserl assigns to Descartes.

3. Before we embark on this last journey, an important observation must be made in order to avoid possible misunderstandings of what has been said thus far. The thesis that after we finish CM V the necessity arises to start anew from the beginning needs to be correctly understood.

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Husserl is not merely implying that the beginning of the text, and its overall Cartesianism, could be understood in two (more or less) different ways: in one way, the first time we start reading the Meditations; and in a second way after we have already read them once. As we will try to argue for in the following, “the second reading” is not simply a reading that would merely differ from the first one, or that could be simply added to it (as though there were two alternative readings of the beginning of the text, therefore of its general Cartesianism): the second reading is the one in which, or thanks to which, the proper meaning of the Cartesianism or, even better: “neo-Cartesianism”2 of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology (as is presented in the Cartesian Meditations) comes to full light. And it comes to full light precisely because we have already followed until the end (to the so-called metaphysics in a new sense) the process of self-constitution of the monad and its inter-subjective dimension—with all the implications that follow from it. Hence, the second reading is not alternative to the first one; rather, it builds upon it. As we saw over the course of Volume 1, Chap. 4 (§9), Husserl stops characterizing the “I” in a human way right at the beginning of §11 of the First Meditation,3 for the transcendental characterization of the subject had already been introduced in §8 (The “Ego Cogito” as a Transcendental Subjectivity). As we mentioned in the Coda to Volume1, Chap. 5, Husserl will re-introduce the “human” determination of the transcendental subject, thus its personal identity, only in §§44 (the former) and 58 (the latter). That is to say, only at the end of the account of the transcendental inter-­subjectivity and precisely in order to show that there can obtain only one total inter-­subjectivity, therefore only one “real world,” the one in which we—human beings—exist and dwell (this is precisely what Husserl explains in §60). Now, if, following Husserl’s letter to Ingarden quoted above, what we can label our “double-­ reading-­hypothesis” (henceforth: DRH) is correct—then it follows that the two readings concern the arguments unfolded by Husserl §§1–8 of the Meditations. And that only the “second reading” is the reading able to bring to full light their proper meaning and implications. With all of this in mind, we can now turn to Husserl’s understanding of Socrates and his “reform” (for a first version of the following analyses, see De Santis, 2019, 2020).

 For a quick discussion of the many possible readings of this expression, see Soffer, 1981, 141–143. 3  “No longer am I the human being who, in natural self-experience, finds himself or herself as a human and who, with the abstractive restriction of the pure contents of internal or purely psychological self-experience, finds his or her own pure mens sive animus sive intellectus; nor am I the separately considered psyche itself” (Hua I, 64; Husserl, 1993, 25). 2

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4. According to Husserl’s account of the origin of philosophy (which will be discussed here only in its most general aspects, and only for the sake of understanding his “Socrates”4) presented in the lectures and manuscripts from the early 20 s onwards, at the beginning of philosophy, we have with Thales “a pure striving towards the truth” supported and driven by no other reason than “the pure pleasure of possessing or holding the truth” (Hua-Mat IX, 7; De Santis, 2020, §2). Such idea of philosophy includes the following three aspects: I. What is sought for is the “principle of unity and order” (Prinzip der Einheit und Ordnung) able to account for the “unity of being” in its totality (Hua-Mat IX, 191); II. As a consequence of I, the theoretical interest of the first philosophers never specializes or develops out into a multiplicity of branches, regions and sub-­ domains, nor does philosophy itself ever branch out into a multiplicity of different special sciences (Hua-Mat IX, 9). III. As a result of I and II, there arises quickly “a plurality of mutually conflicting philosophies” that are in fact all-encompassing “yet very poor as regards content” (Hua-Mat IX, 11).5 The beginning of philosophy is characterized according to Husserl by a plurality of philosophies, each of which lays claim to a different, unifying principle (or principles, in the plural) of the totality of “what there is” in ways that are mutually exclusive (for each one of them claims to clarify and explain the totality of being). The more principles, the more philosophies (and vice versa). To give a few examples that perfectly match the description just provided: it is Pythagoras’ own claim that everything in the world is “number,” and “the essence of number is order, and harmony”; it is also the Heracliteian ἀνάγνη as “the order of the λόγος that rules all over the world” in its never-ending becoming (Hua-Mat IX, 11, 190). It is Xenophanes’ “ἕν καί πᾶν,” “the doctrine of the divinity that rules all over the world”; and Anaxagoras’ νοῦς as the spiritual principle of the rational “order” and constitution of the world (Hua-Mat IX, 191–192). Now, even if with Anaxagoras and Empedocles a first, preliminary distinction obtains between the material and the psychical world (see Hua-Mat IX, 192), the main characteristic of such early philosophy (I + II) is yet to be overcome:

 For a systematic discussion, see Majolino, 2017. Moran, 2021 offers a general introduction to Husserl and the Greeks. By contrast, the essays published in Larsen & Gilbert, 2021 provide a series of thorough discussions of phenomenology in general and ancient philosophy from different perspectives. 5  “Nicht eine Philosophie, sondern eine Vielheit von miteinander streitenden Philosophien erwachsen in rascher Folge und dabei von Philosophien, die zwar weltumspannend, aber inhaltlich sehr arm sind.” 4

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The incipient Greek science or philosophy (for the two are still undistinguished) focuses on the universe by an unlimited activity of the gnoseological impulse: hence, it is cosmology. Nevertheless, it could not reach the level of a rigorous and ultimately justified or grounded science. At first it is caught up with premature, un-developed and vague universalities. What arises in rapid succession is hence a series of philosophies that contradict one another, and are not logically binding (Hua-Mat IX, 13).

As we explained in De Santis, 2020, what we are confronted with at the beginning of philosophy is a bellum principiorum contra principia, and the reasons for such conflict can be listed as follows: 1st. The “great geniuses” who inaugurated the development of philosophy and science had no “logical” method or tools at their disposal (keine logische Kunst); 2nd. Hence, their investigations were simply “unmethodical and uncritical,” 3rd. And the “universalities” they arrived at (i.e., the many unifying principles of the totality of being) were simply “vague” (see Hua-Mat IX, 19). Hence, Husserl talks of a “narrow” and “restricted concept of philosophy” (ein begrenzter Begriff von Philosophie) to describe such an early phase (see Hua-Mat IX, 8): its narrowness derives from these philosophies being methodologically unfounded (2nd), both logically (1st) and as regards the many domains of being that compose the totality of what there is (I + II). But it also and primarily derives from their being poor (III) because of the vagueness and emptiness of the principles which they respectively identify and propose (3rd). It is in relation to this “narrow” conception of philosophy (= I + II  + III) that Husserl understands the role and function of the sophists, notably, Protagoras and Gorgias. As one could directly put it, the sophists bring to the fore the “skepticism” that is already implied by these philosophies. What in fact Protagoras and Gorgias did—according to Husserl—was to diabolically play off against such philosophies their own “contradictions” (die Widersprüche in und zwischen den neuen Philosophien gegen diese ausspielen) (Hua-Mat IX, 12). In other words, the sophists argued that, “Everything and anything can be demonstrated, and everything and anything can be rejected” (Hua XXV, 126). If the sophists aimed at denying the very possibility of philosophy, it is only and exclusively because such impossibility already inhabits, from within, the nature itself of these philosophies. As early as in his 1903 lectures on theory of knowledge, Husserl defined the concept of skepsis as the situation in which reason as Vernunft enters in contradiction with itself (in Widerstreit mit sich selbst) (Hua-Mat III, 85). Accordingly, if skepticism is in general to be described as reason’s being in a contradiction with itself, and if in turn the early phase of philosophy is marked by a plurality of mutually exclusive, and thus conflicting (i.e., contra-dictory), principles meant to account for the totality of what “there is” and its “unity,” then it follows that the very situation in which philosophy finds itself at the very beginning of its history is inherently and essentially skeptical. It is then clear why we said that the proper function of the sophists was to bring to the fore the skepticism implied by the early philosophies. Husserl can thus say that “the great historical significance” of the sophists and their

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skepticism consists in the changes of attitude towards a brand new dimension, that of the “critique of reason” (see Hua-Mat IX, 12): “These theories were epoch-­ making in that by means of effective skeptical arguments they forced philosophers to focus on the radical difficulties entailed in the essence of all knowledge” (see Hua-Mat IX, 12–13). If reason is what designates the correlation between truth and being as what truly is (ὄντως ὄν) (Hua VI, 10–11; Husserl, 1970, 13), it should be then evident why Husserl can point out that “pre-Sophistic” philosophies (as socalled pre-Socratic philosophy should be more properly called, according to his reconstruction) are inherently skeptical, and why the sophists eventually prompted philosophy to embark on a critique of reason. (i) They are to be deemed skeptical because reason itself is in a skeptical and “self-­ contradictory” situation: in fact, if reason were actually able to reach what “truly is,” it could not be the case that so many different philosophies arose, each of which proposed a different and exclusive principle of the unity and totality of being. (ii) What follows is that, by posing the question as to the possibility of attaining knowledge of the world (Hua-Mat IX, 15), the sophists made visible (fühlbar machte) for the first time the difficulties involved in the consciousness-being relation (Hua-Mat IX, 12): “The Sophists’s skeptical approach ends up shaking the naive confidence of early philosophers with respect to the all of being, truth and knowledge. And it provokes the rise of a new form of philosophy (Majolino, 2017, 168–169). Were we to use Husserl’s distinction between two forms of “rationality” (= the ontological one as Rationalität and the transcendental reason as Vernünftigkeit (De Santis, 2019, §2.2)), the opposition between the early period and the new era inaugurated by the sophists could be described as follows. If the early period (the narrow conception of philosophy) is characterized by an uncritical attempt at determining and fixing the ontological rationality, the rationality of the totality of being by defining its “principle(s),” the sophists bring it to an end, thereby inaugurating a new philosophical era. What arises is the need for a reflection on the rationality of sense of whatever is assumed as a correlate of reason. What is required is what Husserl calls an intuitive and a priori critique of reason: Socrates.

5. The most important texts, manuscripts and lectures in which the figure of Socrates is discussed and presented by Husserl are: the 1917 Freiburg Antrittsrede (in Hua XXV); the “critical history of ideas” sketched in the First Philosophy I lectures (Hua VII; Husserl, 2019); the lectures from 1919–1920 and 1922–1923 now published in the Einleitung in die Philosophie (Hua-Mat IX; see also Hua XXXV); some of the texts from the Crisis-period (Hua VI; Husserl, 1970; for a general introduction, see De Santis, 2019, the entire §2; but also Majolino, 2017, 170).

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On the basis of these references, the picture of Socrates with which we are provided is always the same. Husserl always presents Socrates’ philosophical contribution as a “reaction” (als Reaktion) (Hua VI, 280; Husserl, 1970, 302), an “eternally memorable reaction” directed against the sophists (Hua VII, 8–9; Husserl, 2019, 9; Hua XXXV, 52–53; Hua-Mat IX, 22). However, and as should be clear from what we said at the end of the previous paragraph, Socrates’ reaction against the sophists does not at all exclude a deeper philosophical solidarity. Quite the contrary. As Husserl often points out, Socrates and the sophists belong to the same “philosophical era” (Epoche der Philosophie), the one opened up by “the rupture” (der Bruch) originally caused by Protagoras (Hua VII, 8; Husserl, 2019, 9). But if this is the case, in what does Socrates’ reaction (hereafter: SR) properly consist? In addition to explaining that Socrates is the first to recognize “the necessity of a universal method of reason” (Hua VII, 206), Husserl says that he is also to be regarded as the one who, for the first time, sets up the idea of “a rational life” (das vernünftige Leben) grounded on an “intuition-based” form of knowledge (see Hua VII, 9, 16; Husserl, 2019, 9–10, 16–17; Hua-Mat IX, 26). All of this was possible—Husserl adds—because Socrates posited the “fundamental opposition of all waking and personal life: the one between unclear intention and evidence” (Hua VII, 206; Hua-­ Mat, 27).6 In short, the Socratic reaction against the sophists consisted in an intuitive “critique of reason” which acknowledges the fundamental difference between (empty or unclear) “intention” and “evidence,” therefore the necessity of going from the former to the latter in order for a rational form of life to be possible. Such is the nature of Socrates’ critique of reason, i.e., his “critique of practical reason.” If the sophistic attack was first directed against the theoretical form of reason but soon extended to the practical reason as well (Hua-Mat IX, 13), SR aims primarily at a re-habilitation and re-evaluation of practical and axiological reason (Hua VI, 280; Husserl, 1970, 302–303); and yet, it succeeded in re-habilitating theoretical reason as well (Hua-Mat IX, 22). As a consequence, SR can be preliminarily summarized as follows: • It is mainly directed towards re-evaluating the practical form of reason in order to promote a reason-based conduct of life; • But it also contributes to a general re-evaluation of reason (in all its forms) by means of • An intuitive method based upon the fundamental opposition between unclear intention and evidence which essentially characterizes all waking and personal life. But how is the method of this critique of reason to be properly understood? What is Socrates’ own method? In his different accounts of the Socratic method, Husserl goes from: (A) the circumscribed topic of the methodological determination of concepts, to (B) the wider question bearing on the idea of “evidence” as the actual tool for a critique of reason. Let us first consider A.

 For the importance of the notion of “wakefulness” in Husserl, see Jacobs, 2010.

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In some of his texts and lectures, Husserl describes Socrates’ method as a progressive operation of “generalization” (see for example Hua-Mat IX, 26–27) that consists of three steps. (A.1): The starting point is represented by a “sense-intention” or “meaning” of a certain word, e.g., “the intention of the ‘word’ courage” (Hua-Mat IX, 26); then, (A.2): A series of examples are contrived in order for a preliminary process of “generalization” to take place. Now, such generalization includes in turn three-­ sub steps: (A.2.i): The singling out of essential moments; (A.2.ii): A rigorous definition and determination of the interconnected marks; finally, (A.2.iii): A distinction between genera and species. (A.3): The result is that the “proper concept” (der eigentliche Begriff) emerges in place of the “vague word-intention” posited at the outset of the operation (= A.1) (Hua-Mat IX, 27).7 The A-version of Socrates’ method goes from the improper “concept” to the proper one through a series of “intended” examples: such is the meaning of his “critique of reason” understood as a generalization-based process of concept-determination. There is a quite different situation with B, whose description is characterized by an explicitly “essentialistic” terminology quite akin to the one Husserl usually employs to account for the method of eidetic variation8: “The Socratic method of knowledge is a method of complete clarification” (Hua VII, 9; Husserl, 2019, 9); and if “blind living in un-clarity” is the nature of “un-reason” (Hua VII, 10; Husserl, 2019, 11), then Socrates’ critique of reason lays claim to a “genuine knowledge as the necessary (and for Socrates also sufficient) condition for a rational or ethical life.” What Husserl calls “genuine knowledge” can be attained only by returning to the evidence yielded by the “pure intuition of essence” (Hua VII, 10; Husserl, 2019, 11). “Clarification” and “intuition of essence” are the two crucial terms in the B-version of Socrates’ method. Here is its full description: The Socratic return to evidence represents a reaction: it is making clear to oneself, by means of exemplars, the fields of pure possibilities; the free modification that upholds the identity of sense, the identity of the object as a substrate of determination, and makes it possible to intuit this identity. Over against these modifications are others that break the identity. The modifications are accomplished in the transition to the pure in-general, to the general forms of possibilities, to the essential possibilities and essential impossibilities belonging to them. There arise norm-concepts of the good, the beautiful, the truly good statesman, the genuine judge, true honor, true courage and justice, and the fundamental concepts of the critique itself: just, unjust, true, false, etc. (Hua VI, p. 280; Husserl, 1970, 302).

 As far as we understand Husserl, a proper concept is a concept properly framed on the basis of a direct apprehension of the essence of the object. Given the many different senses of the term “essence” identified in Chap. 3, Sect. 2 of this volume, a proper concept could correspond either to the regional essence or the universal one. 8  On the eidetic variation, see Volume 1, Chap. 4; but also De Santis, 2011, 2020a, 2020b; Lobo, 2006; Djian, 2021, 198–211. 7

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The difference between A and B is clear: here there is no mention of meanings and words, nor is the process ever described as “generalization.” B can be summarized as follows: (B.1): The return to evidence consists in clarifying by means of “exemplars” (Exempel). An “exemplar” is not simply such and such an individual, but an “individual” assumed to exemplify such and such an essence (Hua III/1, 15; Husserl, 2014, 13). (B.2): On the basis of an exemplar, a series of free modifications is performed whose goal is to determine the “identity of sense” of the object. (B.3): The ultimate goal is not to determine concepts, but the “general forms of possibilities” with all “the essential possibilities and essential impossibilities” belonging to them. In sum, against sophistic skepticism about the very possibility for reason to reach what “truly is,” Socrates practices a “critical” method that, in a straightforward opposition to the blind living in the un-clarity of the “irrational life” (unvernünftiges Leben), consists in the return to the “evidence” of “the identity of sense.” However, and no matter how different A and B are, they should not be regarded as necessarily alternative to one another. In fact, if Husserl seems to sometimes emphasize A at the expense of B (Hua-Mat IX, 26), or B at the expense of A (e.g., see Hua VI 280; Husserl, 1970, 302; and Hua VII, 9–10; Husserl, 2019, 10–11), there are also cases in which they seem to make up one and the same “compound” method, as it were (Hua-Mat IX, 27). Hence, the entire Socratic method could also be described as “determining” or “defining” a certain concept by first “determining” the identity of the sense of the object as “a substrate of determination.” His “method” would not simply go from the (improper) concept to the (proper) concept through a series of given “examples”; rather, it would regard these examples as exemplars on the basis of which a series of free modifications is provided. The structure of the “compound” version (C) of the method can be described as follows: (C.1): The starting point is the “meaning” of a word; (C.2): A series of examples is then provided, (C.3): And systematically assumed as “exemplars.” (C.4): On the basis of these exemplars, the “return to evidence” is accomplished by means of a series of free modifications aiming at establishing the identity of the sense of the object as “a substrate of determinations.” (C.5): Based on the identity of sense, a more proper concept can be obtained by (C.5.i): Singling out the essential moments, (C.5.ii): Determining all the inter-connected marks, and (C.5.iii): Distinguishing the different species and genera. (C.6): Given a “proper concept,” the general forms of possibilities, all the essential possibilities and impossibilities can be brought to the fore.

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If this is the overall sense and structure of Socrates’ “method,” we should now be in a position to appreciate the significance of his “critique of (practical) reason.” We saw how Husserl understands the transition from the early period to the new era inaugurated by the sophists and their skepticism. Socrates, as Husserl presents him over and over again in his texts and lectures, is not understood in opposition to some sort of pre-Socratic philosophers (whose main theme was the “totality of being” and its “unity”) and with respect to which he would accomplish an “anthropological” or ethical turn (for the inconsistency of such more traditional reading of Socrates, see Guthrie, 1971, 97–105). Both the sophists and Socrates belong to the same philosophical “era,” the one characterized by the problems of Vernunft. If the sophists are those who contribute to the rise of the need for a systematic inquiry of the relation between consciousness and being, in Husserl’s perspective Socrates turns out to be a “Greek Kant,” and the conversations he has while wandering the streets of Athens are the “practice” of an intuitive “critique of reason.” For this is what Socrates is for Husserl: a “practical reformer” (praktischer Reformator; see Hua VII, 9, 11, 206; Husserl, 2019, 9, 11; Hua-Mat IX, 22, 25, 30), whose activity and effectiveness was of “purely practical” nature (rein praktischen Wirksamkeit). As was already explained in De Santis, 2019 (see §4: Conclusion), the phrase “practical reformer” can be assigned two or three different, yet interconnected meanings. In the first place, the “practice” can be, say, the subject-matter of the reform, i.e., what the reform aims at transforming for example by means of a doctrine. In the second place, the practice could be understood as the instrument “by means of which” the reform is actually accomplished: in this case the practical reformer is someone who “practically” aims at reforming something or somebody else. In the third and last place, it can be the case that the practice is both the subject-­matter of the reform and the means by which such a reform is accomplished: the “practical reformer” being here someone who aims at transforming and reforming someone’s practice by means of his or her own practice. In this third sense, which is the one Husserl seems to have in mind, Socrates as a “practical reformer” would resemble the Socrates presented in Book I (2, 3–4) of Xenophon’s Memorabilia (which is a defense of the his teacher from the charge of corrupting the youth). As Xenophon remarks, Socrates cured vices in many people by igniting in them the desire for virtue; yet, “he never professed to teach this: but, by letting his own light shine, he led his disciples to hope that, by imitating (μιμουμένους) him, they would reach such excellence.” Socrates is a reformer whose goal is to transform someone else’s practice by inviting them to imitate his own practice, that of a never-ending critique of reason, of a constant returning to the evidence of what is given in order for a reason-based form-of-life to be eventually attained. Socrates’ “reform” is a “reform of life” (Lebensreform) (Hua VII, 9; Husserl, 2019, 9; Hua XXXV, 52): “rational life” (das vernünftige Leben) (Hua VII, 9, 16; Husserl, 2019, 9–10), “ethical life” (das ethische Leben) (see Hua VII, 11; Husserl, 2019, 11) and “life from pure reason” (Leben aus reiner Vernunft) (Hua XXXV, 52)—these are the terms systematically mobilized by Husserl to designate the nature of his “practical reform.” If in the Cartesian Meditations Husserl will emphatically point out that Vernunft “refers to possibilities of verification

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(Bewährung); and verification ultimately to making evident and having as evident” (Hua I, 92; Husserl, 1993, 57), then the sense of Socrates’ practical reform of life should be clear. It does not consist in a “life” ethically shaped by a specific material content; rather, and here the two expressions “ethical life” and “rational life” overlap and the latter determines the former, it is a life that coincides with the “form” of reason (as referring to possibilities of verification, making evident and having as evident).9 In this respect, the opposition between “das vernünftige Leben” and “das unvernünftige Leben” should not be understood as an opposition between living in the un-clarity (the latter) and living in clarity (the former). Husserl is clear on this, Socrates is the one who for the first time recognizes the opposition between empty and vague intention, on the one hand, and evidence on the other. And whereas das unvernünftige Leben ignores this very opposition, das vernünftige Leben fully builds upon it. A “rational life,” a life that practically coincides with no rest with the form of reason or, to put it better, with reason as a form: it is a “life” that recognizes the opposition between empty intention and evidence, and lives in the latter. What is inaugurated (inauguriert) by Socrates’ practical reform is, to use a term to which we will have to come back later on, a new “form-of-life” (Lebensform) (Hua-Mat IX. 36).10

6. If Socrates is merely a “practical reformer” (der reformatorische Praktiker) (Hua-­ Mat IX, 30), Husserl regards Plato as the one and only “theoretical reformer” (i.e., a “reformer of the theory of science”) (Hua VII, 9; Husserl, 2019, 9). If, on the one hand, Husserl always presents Socrates as reacting against the sophists, on the other hand, he never fails to stress that Plato is the one who lays out the only ideal of philosophy (Hua-Mat IX, 28–65; Majolino, 2017, 171) based upon the Socratic method: “Plato: founder of the genuine science via the Socratic method” (Hua VII, 298). If then the latter can be properly judged and all its philosophical implications appreciated only when looked at from the angle of its later Platonic development, it should come as no surprise that Husserl almost always speaks of a “double” or “twin-star” and writes “Socrates-Plato” (see for example Hua VII, 8; Husserl, 2019,

 Husserl states that Vernunft is not a faculty, but a “structural form” (Hua I, 92; Husserl, 1993, 57). See Pradelle, 2013, 134 ff., for a systematic analysis of the emergence of reason in history according to the genetic perspective. 10  The idea that Socrates (and Plato) shapes a new form-of-life can be found also in the Plato interpretations proposed by the “George-Kreis,” for example in Singer, 1927, 65 and Hildebrandt, 1933, 105. Unlike Husserl, these interpreters tend to underplay the theoretical import of Plato’s philosophy and the methodological aspects of Socrates’ teaching (see Singer, 1927, 38). For an introduction to Plato and the George-Kreis, see Rebenich, 2018. 9

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8; Hua XXXV, 52).11 For it is only with Plato that Socrates’ “practice” of method will be eventually replaced by an actual “science of method” (for a first version of what follows, see De Santis, 2020, 8; a different assessment of Husserl’s Platonism can be found in Arnold, 2017). Now, when it comes to Plato’s relation to Socrates (hereafter, S-P), Husserl speaks of overcoming and application. Plato is in fact seen as overcoming the limitations that still affect Socrates’ position by applying or extending his insights to this or that new domain of problems. (S-P.1): Whereas Socrates confines himself to recognizing “the necessity of a universal method of reason” as a practice to adopt, Plato radically improves “Socrates’ impulse” by looking at the method itself as a problem (Hua XXXV, 313; Hua VII, 7–8; Husserl, 2019, 7–8; Hua-Mat IX, 29). (S-P.2): Plato extends Socrates’ own “ideal” of an evidence-based conduct of life to science and knowledge. In full compliance with his master, the early Plato (zunächst) realized that knowledge, too, is part of life (ein Zweig des Lebens), i.e., a practice and activity (Lebenspraxis): the scientific activity is a Tun to be based on the very same form-of-life (Hua VII, 11; Husserl, 2019, 11–12; Hua VIII, 323; Hua XXXV, 52; Hua-Mat IX, 30–31). (S-P.3): Plato overcomes Socrates’ limitation in that the “ideas” themselves become the object of scientific investigation (Hua-Mat IX, 42). (S-P.4): Finally, Plato overcomes Socrates’ limitation in that the “Echtheiten” recognized by the latter are now taken to belong to a true and self-sufficient sphere of being (Hua-Mat IX, 39, 42). Plato is then to be called a “theoretical reformer” in two distinct, yet related senses. First, because he recognizes the method itself as a philosophical problem to be reflected upon and not simply as a practice to adopt (S-P.1); but also because the ideas become the object of philosophical analysis (S-P.3 + S-P.4). Plato is a theoretical reformer in that he adopts the “theoretical attitude” vis-à-vis the method and the ideas themselves. But Plato can be considered a “theoretical reformer” also because he extends Socrates’ own ideal of an evidence-based conduct of life to the theoretical and scientific practice (S-P.2). In this second sense, he should be more properly called a theoretically practical reformer, who recognizes theory or science as a practice in the Socratic sense of the term. This is why Husserl can point out to his students that, Socrates’ “practical dialectic becomes the Platonic dialectic as a

 The tendency to speak of “Sokrates-Platon” and their joint attempt at “re-shaping” and “reforming” (zu reformieren) humanity can be found for example in Hildebrandt, 1933, 28 (SokratesPlaton will der Gestalter des neuen Menschen), 29, 33 and many other passages. See also page 193, where an almost explicit reference to Husserl is made: Hildebrandt mentions die neue Philosophie that relies on the Wesenschau. Since a systematic confrontation between Husserl and Hildebrandt, and the former’s possible influence on the latter, cannot be proposed here, let us simply refer the reader to Vegetti, 2016, 69–87; Kim, 2018 and Bonazzi, 2020 for a wider discussion of the context of Hildebrandt’s interpretation. 11

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science, i.e., a science of method, a science of ideas as the eternally valid norms for all rational knowledge” (Hua-Mat IX, 33). Plato first recognizes that knowledge is a form of practice, namely, a scientific practice or activity to be guided by the Socratic “ideal” of life. However, rather than just limit himself to practice it, Plato addresses the question of the “possibility of knowledge” by assuming the method as the actual object of philosophical speculation. In what does Plato’s “reform” properly consist? The overall significance of Plato’s reform is presented at the outset of Formal and Transcendental Logic. Here Husserl first remarks that science in the Platonic sense of the term is “no longer a merely naïve activity based on a purely theoretical interest […], but a science consciously justifying its method and theory by means of norms” (Hua XVII, 5; Husserl, 1969, 1). He then writes: Plato’s logic arose from the reaction against the universal denial of science by sophistic skepticism. If the skepsis denied the de jure (prinzipielle) possibility of any such thing as “philosophy,” as science in general, then Plato had to weigh and establish by criticism precisely the de jure possibility of it. […] Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. […] his dialectics (in our words: his logic or his doctrine of science) was called on to make science of matters of fact possible for the first time and to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectics actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to realize it so far as possible (Hua XVII, 5–6; Husserl, 1969, 1–2).

While Socrates’ reaction and reform consisted in showing that philosophy is de facto possible as a practice to be carried out, Plato’s own reaction and reform strives towards establishing its de jure possibility, which can be successfully determined only by means of the διαλεκτική as a “doctrine of science” or of “method.” This, Husserl says, is “the first historical attempt at a universal doctrine of science, a doctrine relating to the essential conditions for any possible science whatsoever” (Hua XVII, 12; Husserl, 1969, 8); “Plato is the creator of the philosophical problem and of the science of method, that is to say, the method of systematically realizing the supreme end-idea of ‘philosophy’ implied in the essence of knowledge” (Hua VII, 12–13; Husserl, 2019, 12–13). Husserl is interested in Plato’s dialectic to the extent that it is the means by which the theoretical reform is accomplished, thereby fully realizing the reform initiated by Socrates, albeit only practically. Plato’s dialectic has two tasks: that of obtaining pure and rigorous concepts; that of working out the “formal conditions of possibility” for all “objectively valid statements” (Hua-Mat IX, 31).12 If all scientific knowledge results in “systematic connections of theoretical statements,” then what is required in the first place (erstgefordete) is a doctrine of science: This science should regard the modes of experience de jure prescribed by the essence of intuitive knowledge; it should investigate in absolute (prinzipieller) generality the universal norms for all methods, whose violation entails also the violation of the possibility of an intuition based (einsichtiger) validity, which in turn results not in truth but necessarily in

12

 For a discussion of Plato’s dialectic, see for example Havlíček, 2011; Notomi, 2011.

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falsity. In particular, such doctrine of science should also concern the forms of the contents that, as meanings, inhabit the acts of predicative knowledge, that is, those immanent ­formations […] which we call “concepts,” “propositions,” “inferences,” “demonstrations” (Hua-­Mat IX, 32).

If for Plato knowledge is an “activity,” and should hence be “guided” by the Socratic “ideal” of an evidence-based conduct of life (S-P.2), then it is clear why “dialectic” (understood as a science of method) should lay out its conditions of possibility by clarifying the ideal forms of its contents, i.e.,, “pure concepts” and the kinds of “connection” (συμπλοκή) in which the latter can or cannot stand to one other (in Husserl’s language: propositions, inferences, demonstrations). This is why Husserl can in general characterize “logic” (here, Plato’s dialectic) as “the self-explication of reason (Vernunft) itself; as the science in which pure theoretical reason accomplishes a complete self-reflection” (Hua XVII, 34/30). What we have here is no longer a Socratic method that practically restores the trust in the activity of reason and in its ability to intuitively reach an objective truth. “Trust” (Husserl himself speaks of Vertrauen, for example in Hua-Mat IX, 22) is no longer enough. With Plato, Husserl would argue, reason reflects for the first time on itself and theoretically makes thematic the very method that used to be only exercised, yet not reflected on. This is what Husserl means by “complete self-­reflection”: by reflecting upon itself, reason identifies and spells out all those conditions of possibility thanks to which it can now proceed by constantly justifying itself. In so doing, reason does not simply confine itself to practically showing its ability to reach what “truly is” (as was the case with Socrates), but theoretically works out the norms whose application and respect allows reason to claim that it is indeed in a position to grasp the ὄντως ὄν. The trust in the activity of reason (Socrates) makes way for the self-justified activity of reason (Plato). We are now in a position to appreciate the reason why Husserl writes “Socrates-Plato” as though they were just one and the same thinker accomplishing just one and the same overall “re-form” of philosophy. If without the practical reform of Socrates reason would never be deemed to be able to determine what really is, without the theoretical reform of Plato reason would not be capable of justifying its own success, thereby also claiming that the latter is not something merely factual but a de jure one. One can assert that with Plato the pure ideas: authentic knowledge, authentic theory and science and, embracing all of these, authentic philosophy make their way for the first time into the consciousness of humanity. […] Authentic knowledge, authentic truth […], being in the true and authentic sense […]: these become for him essential correlates (Hua VII, 12–13; Husserl, 2019, 12–13).

Authentic knowledge, authentic truth, what truly is: this is the essential “correlation” that reason is now in a position to ascertain and establish once and for all. “[T]he correlate of what is true in itself is being in itself” understood as the substrate of true ontological determinations (see e.g., Hua XXV, 130; Hua VIII, 322). Not only is reason in a position to justify its own mode of proceeding; it can now also fix the “correlation” between the whole of truth and the whole being.

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Plato recognizes that whenever we “judge” rationally, we are dealing with a system of ideal laws characterizing a new domain of objectualities. What follows is the widening of the concept of object which henceforth will no longer coincide with that of reality of “real being”: “object” will from now on mean everything and anything that “can be truly determined by means of predicates” (Hua-Mat IX, 43). And as mentioned in S-P.3, Plato makes precisely such “ideas” the very object of reflection or, as Husserl also writes, Thema seiner wissenschaftlichen Forschung (Hua-­ Mat IX, 48). And his dialectic was born in the attempt at elucidating “the idea of truth” and its relation to the sphere of judgment understood as the very expression of theoretical reason: it is the ambition to map out the totality of those normative “laws” that alone make possible correct judgments (Hua-Mat IX, 48–49). Reference should be here made to the Sophist by Plato, where the question is tackled as to whether there exists false speech and what its difference from “true speech” is (which for Husserl represents the condition of possibility of philosophy): “Our object was to establish λόγον as one of our classes of being. For if we were deprived of this, we should be deprived of philosophy (φιλοσοφίας ἂν στερηθεῖεν), which would be the great calamity” (Plato, 1921, 259; 260A). What is important for Husserl is that “ideas” were primarily introduced by Plato in order to make sense of the very possibility for reason to grasp what “truly is.” In sum, he arrived at the discovery of such objectualities and formations while trying to shed light on “the forms of the contents that, as meanings, inhabit the acts of predicative knowledge,” as well as on the truths that derive from them and without which knowledge in general would not even be possible (Hua-Mat IX, 69). Hence, the invention of dialectic as the science of ideas, i.e., of pure concepts and their possible combinations in propositions, inferences and demonstrations on whose basis can one firmly establish the eternally valid norms for all rational knowledge. Plato is then the “father” and “original father” (Urvater) of the idea of “philosophy as a science” (Hua VII, 12; Husserl, 2019, 12; Hua XXXV, 53; Hua-Mat IX, 28). Indeed, from this moment onward philosophy, in the Platonic sense, can be conceived as the science of the logos in the most pregnant sense (Hua XVII, 22; Husserl, 1969, 18): the “ideal” (Hua VIII, 324) that consists in “the production of a system of a universal and absolutely justified truth” (Hua VII, 24; Husserl, 2019, 25–26). Husserl can thereby speak of the beginning of a new era (Hua VII, 13; Husserl, 2019, 13), in which philosophy strives towards realizing itself as the sum-total of all true knowledge, whose correlate is “the totality of what truly is” (Hua XXXV, 53).

7. If our reconstruction thus far is correct, then what we are confronted with here is “the beginning of a new era” of philosophy within an already established new “philosophical era.” Husserl makes a distinction between the philosophical period inaugurated by Protagoras’ own “rupture” (Hua VII, 8; Husserl, 2019, 8), which inaugurates the era of the (need for a) “critique of reason,” and, within it, the

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beginning of a new era, the one started by the Platonic theoretical reform (i.e., the foundation of logic) on the basis of Socrates’ practical reform: it is the era of the ideal of philosophy as a science (see De Santis, 2020, 13 and ff.). A double distinction is then to be recognized: the one between pre-Sophistic philosophies and prePlatonic ones. The former phase is marked by the lack of a need for any preliminary critique of reason; the latter embraces, on the contrary, any philosophy that is yet to become a “science” (that is to say, also the sophists and Socrates himself). The double meaning implied by the term “re-form” in the two expressions practical (Socrates) and theoretical (Plato) re-form or re-former should also be evident. “Form” is in the first place that of philosophy itself, which is hence re-formed in the quite specific sense of assuming or being given a brand new form (re-forming) and shape (re-shaping). “Socrates-Plato” accomplishes a “re-form” of philosophy in that they make philosophy possible as a “science”: the former by practically showing the possibility for reason to reach and grasp what truly is; the latter by theoretically determining and establishing the valid norms for all rational knowledge. Plato’s reform builds on Socrates’ reform; and Socrates’ practical reform is fulfilled and brought to full realization by Plato’s own theoretical reform. And yet, there is more than this to the term re-form. The re-form establishes a new Lebensform, as we mentioned in §5. If Socrates’ practical reform is in the first place a Lebensreform (Hua VII, 9; Husserl, 2019, 9; Hua XXXV, 52), Plato’s theoretical reform brings about a “new life (a life of a new universal form, of a new style)” (einem neuartigen Leben (einem Leben neuer allgemeiner Form, eines neuen Stils)) (Hua XXXV, 58). However, there is a difference between the two: if in the case of Socrates the re-form of philosophy coincides with the re-form of life (= the practical re-form of philosophy equals a new form-of-life), in the case of Plato the re-form of life is the consequence of the theoretical re-form of philosophy. Socrates’ practical re-form proposes a “form-of-life” to be imitated in which life coincides with the form of reason, or with reason as a form: das vernünftige Leben. Plato fixes the valid norms and laws for all rational knowledge—thereby establishing the correlation between the totality of “truth” and the totality of “being.” Plato does not “propose” a new form-of-life to be practically imitated; rather, he theoretically fixes the norms to be followed in order for the Socratic form-of-life to be realized (this is why Husserl uses the expression “methodologische Reform” to describe what Plato does (Hua-Mat IX, 29)). It is the μεταβάλλειν τόν βίον of the Seventh Letter (Ἐπιστολή Ζ, 330d1 1–2). And yet, if Husserl always presents Descartes (we will soon better see the words he employs at the beginning of the Meditations) as accomplishing a new reform of philosophy (new, with respect to the one already attempted by “Socrates-Plato”), it is because the ancient reform was not really or completely successful. Plato, Husserl would explain, was not able to fully realize the “ideal” of philosophy as a science, and to bring to completion the re-form initiated by Socrates. Why? What is the relation-difference between the re-form of philosophy attempted by both Socrates and Plato (Socrates-Plato) and the one accomplished by Descartes at the dawn of modernity?

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If today I were asked to look back upon the entire history of European philosophy and say, on the basis of the convictions that I have come to hold over the course of decades, which philosophers shine brightest of all, I would name two, or better three. They are the names of the greatest beginners, the greatest path-openers of philosophy. First I would mention Plato, or rather the incomparable twin-star Socrates-Plato. The creation of the idea of true and genuine science, or of philosophy, which for a long time meant precisely the same thing, as well as the discovery of the problem of method, lead back to these thinkers, and as a perfect creation to Plato. Second I would name Descartes. His Meditationes de prima philosophia represent a completely new beginning in the history of philosophy in their attempt to discover, with a radicalism unheard of up to then, the absolutely necessary beginning of philosophy, while deriving this beginning from absolute and entirely pure self-knowledge. From these noteworthy Meditations on First Philosophy stems the tendency, found throughout the whole modern period, of recasting all philosophy as transcendental philosophy. This tendency indicates a basic character not only of modern philosophy, however, but also, as can no longer be doubted, of all scientific philosophy as such, now and for all time (Hua VII, 7–8; Husserl, 2019, 7–8).

Later on, Husserl comes back to the reasons behind (Socrates-)Plato’s failure: However much Plato was at pains to found a logic in this radical spirit, he did not break through to the requisite beginnings and methods, and Aristotle already fell into the quite natural trap of taking for granted a pregiven world, thereby relinquishing every radical grounding of cognition. Thus it happened that the science of antiquity, in spite of all of its claims to be philosophy, i.e., actual, finally justifying and fully satisfying science, and in spite of all of its admirable achievements, only managed to bring into being that which we call dogmatic science and can only count as a preliminary to genuine philosophical science, not genuine science itself. So long as cognizing subjectivity, which must be conceived along with all actual and possible cognitions and sciences as an essential correlate, has not been examined, so long as a general and pure science of every possible cognizing consciousness, a science in which all true being reveals itself as a subjective achievement, has not been founded, no science, no matter how rational it may otherwise be, is fully and in every sense rational (Hua VII, 56; Husserl, 2019, 59).

As has been already explained, if the Socratic-Platonic reform of philosophy restored and justified the trust into reason’s ability to reach objective knowledge (to put it better: “a truth valid in itself”), it was “powerless” (machtlos) when “confronted to the ‘problem of transcendence’” (Majolino, 2017, 175–176; see also Hua XXXV, 56). In other words, “Socrates-Plato,” namely, their ideal of philosophy was able to overcome Protagora’s general skepticism once and for all—yet not that of Gorgias.13 In this respect, the systematic importance that Husserl ascribes to Descartes in his many lectures can be summarized as a series of five bullet-points. (α) In his Meditationes, Descartes does not break with the Platonic ideal of philo­ sophy; quite the opposite, he strives to bring to full “realization” the original “re-­form” accomplished by Socrates and Plato (Hua VII, 8; Husserl, 2019, 8;

13

 For a general introduction to the sophists, see Kerferd, 1981, and Untersteiner, 2008

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Hua-Mat IX, 247; see Hua XXXV, 56, where Husserl says that Descartes erneurt the universal concept of philosophy mit einer Art Urkraft).14 (β) He does so by seriously taking into account the sophistic “skepticism” and its implications in order to overcome it once and for all: “The novelty of the Cartesian philosophy, and with it of the entire modern philosophy, consists in the way it takes up anew and in an entirely new spirit the battle against skepticism (Kampf gegen den Skeptizismus), which in the general developmental situation had not yet been overcome” (Hua VII, 60 and 68; Husserl, 2019, 63 and 72). (γ) Yet, it would be a mistake to believe that Descartes’ ambition is to simply oppose skepticism. Quite the opposite. For since “the essence of all skepticism is subjectivism” (Hua VII, 58; Husserl, 2019, 60), Descartes manages to overcome “the radical subjectivism of the skeptical tradition” by “bringing it to fulfillment (wahrzumachen)” (Hua VII, 61; Husserl, 2019, 63): Descartes discovers for the first time transcendental subjectivity (Hua VII, 63; Husserl, 2019, 66; Hua-Mat IX, 328).15 (δ) By means of γ, Descartes opens up a new domain of research, that of the essential correlation between being and consciousness (Hua-Mat IX, 267; Hua VII, 68; Husserl, 2019, 71–72). If Plato had already established (only) the correlation between the totality of truth and the totality of being, Descartes proposes to  The “unitary” character of this account of the history of philosophy, in particular the thesis that the sophists, Socrates, Plato and Descartes belong all together to the same history, us contributing to it in different manners, is what sets Husserl’s position apart from the mainstream interpretations in Germany in the 20 s and 30 s. With a few exceptions (see the already quoted Hildebrandt, 1933, 65 and passim) in fact, “Plato” is constantly opposed to both the sophists and Socrates on the one hand, and Descartes on the other. Plato is opposed to Socrates because he embodies the northern and Arian race, while the son of Sophroniscus is said to represent the oriental type (Chapoutot, 2012, 313–317). On the other hand, Plato is opposed to the sophists because they too embody the “Asian” race and endorse abstract intellectualism and individualism (Günther, 1966, 17 and ff.). This is the reason why Plato was also opposed to Descartes and modern philosophy in general because of their intellectualism and scientism (see Hildebrandt, 1933, 172–173). 15  la révolution… la plus décisive, en bien ou en mal, qui se soit produite entre Aristote et Kant (Gilson, 2017, 200). For what concerns the relation-difference between Descartes and Agustin, see what Husserl says right at the outset of his lectures on First Philosophy: “The modern period begins with Descartes because he was the first to attempt to do justice at a theoretical level to what is indubitably true about the skeptical arguments. He was the first to take possession theoretically of the most general ground of being, a ground that even the most extreme skeptical negations presuppose and to which in their arguments they all refer back, viz., self-certain, cognizing subjectivity. In a certain sense, to be sure, Augustine had already claimed this ground as his own; he had already pointed out the indubitability of the Ego Cogito. But the new turn emerges in Descartes through the way he takes an anti-skeptical point made in the context of a mere counterargument and makes it into a theoretical determination” (Hua VII, 61; Husserl, 2019, 64). That Husserl is here following Descartes’ own opinion on the difference between his cogito and Augustine’s, can be confirmed by Gilson, 2017, 191–201 (Le cogito et la tradition augustinienne); 259–268 (Descartes, Saint Augustin et Campanella). See also Rodis-Lewis, 1990, 101–125 (Augustinisme et cartésianisme), who argues for a stronger thesis: “Descartes, loin d’avoir recueillir l’écho d’un augustinisme philosophique ambiant, aurait permis à ses contemporaines de retrouver l’originalité métaphysique du penseur d’Hippone, dans ses affinités avec la démarche cartésienne.” 14

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explore systematically the totality of being as a correlate of the ego (Husserl speaks of science of the many Tätigkeiten and Leistungen (Hua-Mat IX, 246)). (ε) Yet, he himself misunderstands the sense of his discovery (δ) by construing the ego in terms of a mens sive animus sive intellectus, thereby paving the way for transcendental “realism” and metaphysical “dualism” (Descartes is therefore the Vater des Realismus und Dualismus) (Hua-Mat IX, 250, footnote; Hua XXXV, 72–73). Descartes is at the origin of both the transcendental idea of philosophy (yet to be fully realized) and its psychologistic-anthropologistic misconceptions.16 What follows is that Descartes’ reform, too, failed—yet not because he did not take sophistic skepticism seriously (as was already the case with the Socratic-­Platonic “re-form”), but rather, because he fatally misunderstood the nature of what he had discovered, confusing the transcendental sense of the “pure ego” with its “anthropological” or psychological characterization. We are thereby led back to our starting point (see Volume 1, Chap. 1, §5), to the problem of the obscurity and confusion of the transcendental subject that, according to Husserl, affects Heidegger’s account of Dasein in Being and Time and which can be overcome once and for all only through transcendental phenomenology (see Volume 1, Chap. 4, §§8–9). Having pointed this out,17 we can approach the opening pages of the Cartesian Meditations in order to both understand how Husserl introduces Descartes there and better confirm DRH.

8. It would be a mistake to misread the Introduction to the actual Cartesian Meditations (§§1–2) as a mere captatio benevolentiae.18 Quite the opposite. As has been recently, and for the first time, pointed out (Djian, 2021, 135 ff.; Majolino, 2023), Husserl opens up his Meditations by recognizing the historic-philosophical importance not of a certain philosophy (that of Descartes himself), but of a book: the Meditationes de prima philosophia. The Introduction is more about the book than the philosopher. The opening pages of the Introduction invite the beginning philosopher to reconnect, not to the “content” of a given philosophy, but to the motif included in the book Meditationes de prima philosophia—which is to be held as a “paradigm” (Hua I, 44; Husserl, 1993, 2).

 For a recent analysis of Descartes’ position and role within the crisis of modern sciences, which cannot be followed here, see Djian, 2021, 162 and ff. See also Rodis-Lewis, 1990, 127–148 (Le dualisme platonisant au début du XVII siècle et la révolution cartésienne) for a general discussion of Descartes’ dualism. 17  For two recent, more systematic accounts, see Majolino, 2023, and Rizo-Patron de Lerner, 2023. 18  “I have particular reason for being glad that I may talk about transcendental phenomenology in this, the most venerable abode of French science” (Hua I, 43; Husserl, 1993, 1). 16

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France’s greatest thinker, René Descartes, gave transcendental phenomenology new impulses through his Meditationes; their study acted quite directly on the transformation of an already developing phenomenology into a new kind of transcendental philosophy. Accordingly, one might almost call transcendental phenomenology a neo-Cartesianism, even though it is obliged, and precisely by its radical development of Cartesian motifs, to reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy (der Cartesianischen Philosophie). […] Every beginner in philosophy knows the remarkable train of thoughts contained in the Meditationes. Let us recall its guiding idea. The aim of the Meditationes is a complete reforming (Reform) of philosophy into a science grounded on an absolute foundation. That implies for Descartes a corresponding reformation (Reform) of all the sciences, because in his opinion they are only non-self-sufficient members of the one all-inclusive science, and this is philosophy. Only within the systematic unity of philosophy can they develop into genuine sciences. [...] With Descartes, this demand gives rise to a philosophy turned towards the subject itself. The turn to the subject is made at two significant levels. First, anyone who seriously intends to become a philosopher must “once in her life” withdraw into herself and attempt, within herself, to overthrow and build anew all the sciences that, up to then, she has been accepting. Philosophy, wisdom (sagesse), is the philosopher’s quite personal affair. It must arise as her wisdom, as her self-acquired knowledge tending towards universality, a knowledge for which she can answer from the beginning, and at each step, by virtue of her absolute insights. If I have decided to live with this as my aim, the decision that alone can start me on the course of a philosophical development, I have thereby chosen to begin in absolute gnoseological poverty (Erkenntnisarmut). […] Accordingly, the Cartesian Meditationes are not intended to be a merely private concern of the philosopher Descartes, to say nothing of their being merely an impressive literary form in which to present the foundations of his philosophy. Rather, they draw the prototype (Urbild) for any beginning philosopher’s necessary meditations, the meditations out of which alone a philosophy can grow originally (Hua I, 43–44; Husserl, 1993, 1–2, translation modified, and emphases added).

This is only the first level at which the turn to the subject is accomplished in the Meditationes, and since most readers of the Husserlian text tend to rush to the second level, thereby paying little or no attention to what Husserl says on the very first two pages, let us dwell for a second on them. • Husserl makes a distinction between the “aim” (Ziel) of the Meditationes and the “turn” to the subject by which such aim is eventually realized. Now, on the basis of our analyses above, the meaning of the expression employed by Husserl to characterize Descartes’ aim should come as no surprise: he speaks of Reform der Philosophie to express the necessity of giving a new “form” to philosophy.19 And here such reform is presented in exactly the same terms as those which will be used by Husserl at the end of the text of the Cartesian Meditations to recall the book’s overall ambition (see above, §2): the “aim” being to determine the totality of the sciences as “members” of philosophy as “the one all-inclusive science.”

 Let us add that although the language of the “reform” characterizes Husserl’s jargon systematically and can be found in many of his lectures from the 20 s, the expression “reform of philosophy” is applied to Descartes on only a few occasions: in Hua XXXV, 247 and in the Cartesian Meditations. 19

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• Such aim is attained by means of a turn to the subject, and the Meditationes are described as an actual paradigm or prototype (Urbild) to be looked up to. Husserl is clear: the Meditationes “are not intended to be a merely private concern of the philosopher Descartes”; rather, they are to be taken as an Urbild which any and every individual philosopher as a “person” (Husserl speaks of “the philosopher’s quite personal affair”) can use. It is not without significance that Husserl opens up the Introduction by explicitly speaking of himself and his own personal experience of the Cartesian text: “their study acted quite directly on the transformation of an already developing phenomenology into a new kind of transcendental philosophy.” It is quite likely to assume that, even if Husserl speaks here only of the Meditationes, he has in mind also the Discours de la méthode. Here for example (see the Première Partie), Descartes explicitly says that he does not want to teach his method (mon dessein n’est pas d’enseigner ici la méthode), but only de faire voir en quelle sorte j’ai tâché de conduire la mienne. Descartes presents his own life comme en un tableau, or une histoire, une fable, of which certain examples need be “imitated” and certain others should not (en laquelle, parmi quelques exemples qu’on peut imiter, on en trouvera peut-être aussi plusieurs qu’on aura raison de ne pas suivre) (Descartes 1970, 48). • Whoever does so chooses “to begin” in what Husserl labels here “absolute gnoseological poverty” or Erkenntnisarmut. The person who decides to use the Meditationes as a model or paradigm will have no knowledge whatsoever: he or she can only follow and, as one could also say, put into practice the Gedankenzug of the Meditationes. In a way that is reminiscent of the description of Socrates as a practical reformer, the Meditationes are presented and understood by Husserl (at least at “the first level” of the turn to the subject) as an Urbild whose train of thoughts should be imitated and practiced by whoever wants to accomplish “the reform of philosophy.” However, it is important to keep in mind that here the Urbild is not a person (as in the case of Socrates’ reform of life), but rather a “text.”20 In other words, the person Husserl is urging any person who is a beginning philosopher to do what he (Husserl himself) has already done at least once in his life, namely, to regard the Meditationes de prima philosophia as an Urbild to be imitated,21 thus striving towards the accomplishment of a radical reform of philosophy.

 This crucial fact has been understood, we believe, only by Majolino, 2023, §2.4: “The fact that the Meditationes are a book, the only philosophical book ever explicitly discussed qua book by Husserl, is all but irrelevant for our purpose. As Husserl explains in the Origin of geometry, it is only insofar as they are delivered in a written form that the intentional achievements of a truthoriented conscious activity are set to be historically transmitted, handed over from one generation to another, replicated, discussed, used as a basis for further demonstrations or meditations and give rise to a ‘tradition.’ The same applies to Descartes’s Meditationes which appear as the factual inscription in the history of humanity of both a distinctive variety of meditation and the theory it gives rise to.” 21  In Hua XXXV, 59, Husserl himself quotes from the Regula VIII: qui serio student ad bonam mentem. Here is the full passage from the Cartesian text: “Si quis pro quaestione sibi proponat, 20

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But such first level of the turn to the subject immediately makes way for the “second level.” When we turn to the content of the Meditationes, so strange to us men of today, we find a regress to the philosophizing ego in a second and deeper sense: the ego as subject of its pure cogitations. The meditator executes this regress by the famous and very remarkable method of doubt. Aiming with radical consistency at absolute knowledge, he or she refuses to let himself or herself accept anything as an entity (als seiend gelten) unless it is secured against every conceivable possibility of becoming doubtful. […] The meditator keeps only himself or herself, qua pure ego of his or her cogitations, as having an absolutely indubitable being, as something that cannot be done away with, something that would be even though this world were non-existent. Thus reduced, the ego carries on a kind of solipsistic philosophizing. He seeks apodictically certain ways by which, within his own pure inwardness, an objective outwardness can be deduced. The course of the argument is well known: First God’s existence and veracity are deduced and then, by means of them, objective nature, the duality of finite substances, in short, the objective field of metaphysics and the positive sciences, and these disciplines themselves. All the various inferences proceed, as they must, according to guiding principles that are immanent, or “innate,” in the pure ego (Hua I, 44–45? Husserl, 1993, 2–3).

Such a “second level” of the Cartesian turn to the subject is precisely the one that— content-wise— Husserl and his phenomenology reject once and for all. Just like Xenophanes’ Socrates, Husserl is inviting the beginning philosopher to do what he already has done, to imitate what he himself has already imitated: the Gedankenzug of the Meditationes. Nevertheless, such invitation does not want to also imply a commitment to the doctrinal content (Inhalt), but exclusively to the motif implied in them. Even better: the “doctrinal content” is rejected and corrected precisely in name of the “motif”; or, to go the other way around, the “re-activation” (wiedererweckt) of the “motif” requires that the doctrinal content of the Cartesian Meditationes be almost fully and completely abandoned: […] in philosophy, the Meditationen were epoch-making in a quite unique sense, and precisely because of their going back to the pure ego cogito. Descartes, in fact, inaugurates an entirely new kind of philosophy. Changing its total style (Stil), philosophy takes a radical turn: from naive objectivism to transcendental subjectivism, which, with its ever new but always inadequate attempts, seems to be striving towards some necessary final form, wherein its true sense and that of the radical transmutation itself might become disclosed (Hua I, 46; Husserl, 1993, 4).

This is why Husserl can conclude his own Introduction by making the following point: “In a quasi Cartesian fashion we intend, as radically beginning philosophers, to carry out meditations with the utmost critical precaution and a readiness for any, even the most far reaching, transformation of the old-Cartesian meditations. Seductive aberrations, into which Descartes and later thinkers stayed, will have to be clarified and avoided as we pursue our course” (Hua I, 48; Husserl, 1993, 6).

examinare veritates omnes, ad quarum cognirionem humana ratio sufficiat (quod mihi videtur semel in vita faciendum esse ad ijs omnibus, qui ferio student ad bonam mentem pervenire), ille profecto per regulas datas inveniet nihil prius cognosci posse quam intellectum, cum ab hoc caeterum omnium cognitio dependeat, & non contra” (Descartes, 1965, 71; AT 395).

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In this respect, not only does Husserl’s exhortation to follow the Gedankenzug of the Meditationes imply no commitment to its “doctrinal content”; it calls for its radical correction: which is precisely what happens, first, in §§3–8 and then again in §§10–11. Since there is no need for us to follow step by step Husserl’s reflections here, the following summary will suffice to clarify what we mean. (A) “We make a new beginning” by presupposing no idea of a particular science (as by contrast Descartes did)—yet without renouncing “the general aim of grounding science absolutely”: “We consider how it might be thought out as a possibility and then consider whether and how it might be given determinate actualization” (Hua I, §3, 48–49; Husserl, 1993, 7–8).22 (B) We have to “make distinct the guiding idea that, at the beginning, gloats before us as a vague generality” (Hua I, 50; Husserl, 1993, 9). This can be done by “immersing ourselves” in the “scientific striving and doing,” or in the “intention of scientific endeavor.” By acknowledging the distinction between immediate and mediate judgment we arrive at the concept of evidence: For “judging is intending […] that such and such is and has such and such determinations: the judgment (what is judged) is then a merely supposed affairs (Sache) or state of affairs: an affair, or a state of affairs, as what is meant” (Hua I, §4, 51; Husserl, 1993, 10). (C) “Evidence” is then characterized as the experience of an entity and of its being in a certain way, von Seindem und So-Seiendem: “Perfect evidence and its correlate, pure and genuine truth, are given as ideas lodged in the striving for knowledge, for fulfillment of one’s meaning intention” (Hua I, 52; Husserl, 1993, 12). A “first methodological principle” is established: “since I am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence” (Hua I, §5, 54; Husserl, 1993, 13). (D) A distinction is then made between adequate and apodictic evidence: “An apodictic evidence is, however, not merely certainty of the affairs or states of affairs evident in it; rather, it discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as having the signal peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute inconceivability of their non-being” (Hua I, §6, 56; Husserl, 1993, 16). (E) It follows that the question whether the existence of the world presents as such apodictic evidence is answered in the negative: the world cannot exclude “the possibility of eventual doubt whether the world is actual and the possibility of its non-being” (Hua I, §7, 57; Husserl, 1993, 17). (F) “At this point, following Descartes, we make the great reversal that—if made in the right manner—leads to transcendental subjectivity: the turn to the ego cogito as the ultimate and apodictically certain basis for judgments, the basis on which any radical philosophy must be grounded” (Hua I, §8, 58; Husserl, 1993, 18). As is evident from F, it is precisely by “following Descartes” (Descartes folgend) that Husserl is able to dismiss the “doctrinal content” of the Meditationes while holding on to the “motif” contained in them. In fact, if the motif is that of philosophy as a science grounded on the apodictic evidence of what is given

 See Sacrini, 2018, 268–275, for a series of interesting observations on the role and function of “science” as a cultural formation in these opening pages of the text. 22

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(B + C + D), then once we recognize that the world does not and cannot have such a kind of evidence, also the determination of the ego cogito as a “part” of the world itself (mens sive animus sive intellectus) necessarily falls away. The description of the ego cogito as a transcendental one is introduced first in §8, and then again in §11. As Husserl remarks in the latter, “No longer am I the human being who—in natural self-experience—finds himself as a human being and who, with the abstractive restriction to the pure contents of ‘internal’ or purely psychological self-­ experience, finds his own pure ‘mens sive animus sive intellectus’” (Hua I, 64; Husserl, 1993, 25). Once the ego cogito has been “de-humanized” (Nicht mehr bin ich… als Mensch), the “Cartesian meditator” can start referring to the ego as a “universal and apodictic structure of experience” (Hua I, 67; Husserl, 1993, 28), thereby officially launching the phenomenological scientific investigation of the subjectivity which will be pursued over the course of the subsequent meditations. Such is the trajectory and the meaning of the first reading of the Cartesian Meditations, notably, of the very beginning of the text. This first reading concerns the possibility of grounding phenomenology as a science of the transcendental subjectivity understood as the one and only possible basis “on which any radical philosophy must be grounded” (Hua I, 58; Husserl, 1993, 18). The philosopher Husserl invites any other philosopher to do what he has already done once: to personally imitate, or put into practice the very train of thoughts presented in the Meditationes de prima philosophia—thereby re-­ activating their motif.23 Pursuing the ambition or ideal of the book—the reform of philosophy as a science which goes all the way back to the Socratic and Platonic “first” reform of philosophy—the Cartesian mediator is led to abandon the doctrinal content of the Meditationes, in the first place the disastrous determination of the subject as a mens sive animus sive intellectus.24 The possibility of phenomenology as a rigorous science hinges upon the articulation between the philosopher’s personal decision to follow faithfully the train of thoughts of the Meditationes and the necessity, deriving therefrom, of de-­humanizing the ego (Nicht mehr bin ich… als Mensch). It is precisely such dehumanization that can prevent the meditator himself or herself from determining the ego cogito in the old Cartesian fashion as a mens sive animus sive intellectus (or, as one can also add at this point, and fully in line with Husserl’s reasoning, as a “menschlisches Dasein”). Now, we know what the phenomenological trajectory of the Cartesian Meditations looks like since we have already addressed it over the course of the first

 Also Descartes, in his Discours de la méthode admits that: La seule résolution de se défaire de toutes les opinions qu’on a reçues auparavant en sa créance, n’est pas un exemple que chacun doive suivre (Descartes, 1970, 64). See Leroy, 1929, 195 and ff. on the importance of Descartes’ own decision to write the Discours de la méthode in French. Let us add that Husserl’s invitation to imitate what he has already imitated semel in vita is addressed to the philosopher, and it has here nothing to do with the problem of the beginning of philosophy (precisely because it presupposes the reality of the philosophical community). This is a problem which cannot be discussed in the present context. 24  See Moran, 2012, 122, on the de-humanization of the transcendental subject. 23

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part of this work (see for instance Volume 1, Chap. 3, §1; Chap. 4, §9; Chap. 5, §§5–11). Once the risk has been avoided of imposing upon the transcendental subject features and aspects of myself as a human being (= de-humanization) (CM I), and the field of the transcendental experience opened up (CM II) and described according to its tri-partite structure (ego-cogito-cogitatum), CM III introduces the pregnant conception of constitution. Finally, CM IV brings in the concrete determination of the ego as a monad—on the basis alone the correct sense of TI can be appreciated (see Volume 1, Chap. 6). The goal and function of CM V, notably, of the account of the constitution of the “inter-monadic-subjectivity” is that of making the case for the existence of only one actual inter-subjectivity, hence of only one real and actual world. The text of the Cartesian Meditations opens up with the necessity of reconnecting to the Socratic-Platonic idea of philosophy, and, as Husserl himself recognizes towards the end of the book, “the idea of an all-embracing philosophy becomes realized” when we reach metaphysics in a new sense. At this point however—as Husserl said to Ingarden—there arises “die Nötigung, von I. nochmals anzufangen.” But what is it that the second reading would add? Since the “de-humanization” of the ego has already been accomplished, there is no more any need to worry about it, and to worry about the risk of misconceiving of the transcendental subject as a mens sive animus sive intellectus or as a menschlisches Dasein. Moreover, the philosopher who now goes back to the First Meditation is one who has already clarified both the relation and difference between the monad and its mundanized form. It is a philosopher who knows that—the difference between these two notwithstanding—there can be only one mundanized form of the transcendental inter-monadic-subjectivity, i.e., the human inter-subjectivity whose existence is shrouded and cloaked in “the sea of suffering” (Chap. 5 of this volume). Last but not least, it is a human being for whom TI is the one and only consolatio philosophiae. But if this is the case, and if the human being who goes back to the beginning of the text has already ascertained the distinction between the three determinations of the subjects (“I, this human being, am the one…”; the transcendental subjectivity; “my Dasein as a human being”), he or she is not going to repeat the journey just completed. The re-form of philosophy has been accomplished but, as was already the case with Socrates-Plato, the re-form of philosophy means also a re-form of life: we now come back to the outset of the Meditations because the decision to realize the neo-Cartesian phenomenological reform of philosophy results in the assumption of a new “form-of-life.” Thus, the question can finally be asked, what does Husserl mean by Lebensform?25

 For an important text in which an argument very similar to ours is developed, yet not in connection to the Cartesian Meditations but to the general method of transcendental reduction, see Jacobs, 2017. 25

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9. Lebensform or “form-of-life” is not usually numbered among the notions or philosophemes for which Husserl is famous. Wittgenstein—and not Husserl—is usually regarded as the reference point for a proper philosophical understanding of the concept of Lebensform on the basis of a few passages from the Philosophical Investigations.26 One of the main questions usually addressed by scholars is the one concerning its singular (human Lebensform in general) or plural (in a socio-cultural sense) nature (see Ferber, 1992 for a discussion of the different positions on the matter). We do not know, and it is not immediately clear where or from whom Husserl borrowed the notion of Lebensform.27 The term makes its first systematic appearances in the 1924 Kaizo-text Renewal as a Problem of Individual Ethics (Hua XXVII, 20–43), and in a few other manuscripts from the mid 20 s and early 30 s. Since Husserl never defines the concept of Lebensform, the only way to make sense of it is to look at how it is used in all the different contexts and hope that a unitary meaning can be eventually, if not sharply identified, at least clearly circumscribed. Let us start with the Kaizo-article, in which the term Lebensform is systematically mobilized. Here is the term used in the first place in the plural (Lebensformen) and as a synonym for human “forms of being” or Seinsformen (Husserl himself speaks of menschlichen Seins- und Lebensformen in Hua XXVII, 23): both of them mean the same as “human type” or “types” (Menschentypen). Husserl’s goal here is that of describing different “particularizations” (Besonderungen) of the one general idea of the human being as a “free being” (freies Wesen): the main distinction being the one between the ego as passively driven by its affects and inclinations, and the ego as actively self-determining through its will (Hua XXVII, 24). Such first distinction intersects with two further differentiations: the one between the ego that critically examines itself and the ego for which this is not the case, and the one between “singular and universal” critical self-reflections. “Denn zum Wesen des Menschen gehört es, daß er nicht ein singuläres Vorstellen, Denken, Werten und Wollen üben, sondern auch solchen Akte auch in den Formen des Überhaupt vollziehen kann” (Hua XXVII, 24–25). Husserl speaks of Lebensform also to refer to the different possible social organizations of the will: different individual subjects  Let us simply recall here these famous Wittgensteinian passages “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life (eine Lebensform)” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §19, 8–8e); “the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life (einer Lebensform)” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §23, 11–11e); “It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not an agreement in opinions but in form of life (Lebensform)” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §241, 88–88e); “Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life (komplizierten Lebensform)” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 174–174e); “What has to be accepted, the given is, so one could say, forms of life (Lebensformen)” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 226–226e). See Kolman, 2017, 58–59 and ff. for a pragmatic reading of Wittgenstein’s Lebensformen. 27  Husserl might have borrowed the expression from the 1921 book on Lebensformen by Eduard Sprenger. See Padilla Gálvez, 2015, 257–258 for a brief discussion of the many origins of the expression Lebensform. 26

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can organize their wills in such a way that a “higher order personality” is formed, and a “higher form-of-life” also displayed (Hua XXVII, 22). But over and above such “plural” understanding of the Lebensform(en), the term is employed also in the singular. In opposition to the many, pre-ethical “forms of universal self-regulation” (in which the Selbstgestaltung or critical “self-shaping” of the Lebensformen has only a “relative” value), the expression die ethische Lebensform, “the ethical form-of-life” can also be found (Hua XXVII, 29): Husserl speaks of it as “the only absolutely valuable (wertvoll)” form-of-life. While in the case of “pre-ethical” forms-of-life the critical reflection is to be regarded as “relative” because related to particular “duties” (Sollen) (e.g., that of one’s profession), the ethical form-of-life is called the only valuable because the ego reflectively embraces (überschauen) its “entire life” (sein ganzes Leben), thereby critically and rationally examining it in its totality (Hua XXVII, 30–31). Last, but not least, the singular Lebensform appears also in the B-section of the text in the phrase “the form-of-life of genuine humanity” (Lebensform echter Humanität) (Hua XXVII, 33): it is the ideal of a “genuine and true human being,” of an absolutely “personal perfection or completion.” The context of appearance of the Lebensform is different in a 1930 manuscript now published in Hua XV, 142–147: Appendix VII: Normality in the Field of the Personal World (Mores, etc.). Here the term “form” in the expression form-of-life (Lebensform) is explicitly used as a synonym for the terms “norm” (Norm) and “style” (Stil): “der Mensch lebt in der Norm, indem er sich ihrer als Norm bewusst wird. Normaler Lebensstil als Stil des Gemeinschaftslebens ist nicht nun ein Faktum für ihn, sondern ein Seinsollen, und ein Sein aus dem Lebenswillen gemäß dem Sollen. Das Leben in seiner Lebensform wird bejaht, und obschon nicht an die Form gedacht ist, wird das einzelne gebilligt, bejaht in seiner Form, um seiner Form Willen” (Hua XV, 143–144). Husserl speaks here of “normal form” to refer to the “form of a common surrounding world” and its “tradition” (Form des Traditionellen) within which there obtain different “professional forms-of-life” (Hua XV, 144): the “form of the public official, the officer, the private citizen, the functionary…” etc. (Hua XV, 146). Husserl’s talk of “individual form” (Individualform) can thus understood as follows: there is a multiplicity of “form-structures” (Formgliederungen) and “form-degrees” or “levels” (Formstufen) (Hua XV, 144) characterizing the life of every person (was gehört zu einer Person) (Hua XV, 146). Individualform means both the determined individual form (bestimmten Individualform) of an individual person (to be understood as a system of forms according to their different structures and degrees) and that of the individual world (Die “Form” der Welt) to which the person belongs: “Welt als Individualform ist nicht Welt als Wesensform für jeden erdenklichen Menschen, das ist für den Menschen als ‘Wesen.’ Aber jeder erdenkliche Mensch ist doch individueller und lebt im Rahmen einer Individualform” (Hua XV, 146).28

 On this, see also González-Castán, 2015, 283–289, who argues for the identification of Lebensform with Lebenswelt. 28

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Surprisingly, this is one of the few places (if not the only one) where Husserl resorts to the Stoic expression καθῆκον. Husserl uses it, first, as a synonym for what is “moral” in a broad sense of the term (Hua X, 144). Then, he speaks of “the form of the kathekon” to mean—“within the broader individual form”—das personal Gewöhnliche, das zugleich den Charakter des Seinsollenden hat (Hua X, 145).29 In both cases, the καθῆκον means the identity between form and ought-to-be. According to Diogenes, the first philosopher who used the expression καθῆκον and submitted it to a systematic discussion was Zeno (φασί δὲ καὶ πρῶτον καθῆκον ὠνομακέναι καὶ λόγον περὶ αὐτον πεποιηκέναι) ([A]230[2], Radice, 2018, 106). According to what Stobaeus relates, the definition of the καθῆκον (ὁρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθῆκον) is: “the coherence in natural life, the action imbued with a plausible reason” (τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῆ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει) ([A]230[3], in Radice, 2018, 106). But the καθῆκον applies also to “living beings without reason” (ἄλογα), because also in their case one can speak of “coherence” in conformity with their own nature (ἀκόλούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει). When it comes to rational animals (τῶν λογικῶν ζῴων), one can speak of τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ, “coherence in life” (with “life” not to be understood in a natural way) (in Radice, 2018, 106). Husserl’s decision to appeal to the term καθῆκον in the 1930 manuscript still under analysis is far from being meaningless and inappropriate. His understanding of it represents a rehabilitation and a radicalization of the notion as was in fact employed by Zeno. Whether Husserl would recognize its validity or application also in the case of non-rational animals, it is a question that here cannot be tackled.30 But just as Stobaeus says that in the case of rational animals τὸ καθῆκον means the same as τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ, thus acknowledging the distinction between “τὸ ἀκόλουθον” by nature (φύσει) (that of the zoe) and a different, irreducible form of ἀκόλουθον (that of the bios)—so also Husserl employs the term καθῆκον within the context of a discussion of the forms-of-life, with the term Leben to be always kept distinct from the Latin-sounding term Animal, by which he refers to “animal life” in general and prior to the distinction between Mensch and Tier.31 However, Husserl’s way of using it means a radicalization also to the extent that “the form of the kathekon” stands for a form among the many possible “forms-of-­ life.” Accordingly, even if one can speak of τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ (with the emphasis being upon the preposition ἐν) to refer to a certain “form-of-life” (e.g., that of “what is personally usual and ordinary” within the “individual form”), the identity between “life” and “form” does not fail, so to speak. In this sense, the fact that “τὸ καθῆκον” will be translated by Cicero as officium (Ac. Post. I 37, in Radice, 2018, 106) is also perfectly in line with Husserl’s talk of “forms” in relation to the different “functions” of a person (Hua XV, 146) (for which  See for example also Hua XXXIX, 429, where Husserl speaks of konventionelle Lebensformen, Sitte, Getue. On the possible different characterizations of the “norm” in connection with the notion of Lebensform, see Jaeggi, 2014, 152–182. 30  See Carella, 2021 for a most recent discussion of Husserl’s position on animals. 31  On all these distinctions, see Carella, 2021, 124 ff.; on Husserl’s concept of “life,” see for example Montavont, 1999, 42–73; Orth, 2006, and Crowell, 2013. 29

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he also uses the expression Beruf, or profession, in Hua XXIX, 227 and ff.).32 Cicero’s claim that the officium embraces those actions that stand in an intermediate position (inter recte factum atque peccatum… media locabat) (Radice, 2018, 106), and that can be judged as coherent only according to the circumstances, finds its correspondence in Husserl’s talk of Funktionär, the “functionary” that every person is depending upon the specific function that he or she has within a relevant community (in the broadest sense possible and according to which also Cicero’s talk of “circumstances” should be understood).33 With respect to the previous 1924 text, the manuscript from 1930 allows us to make the following points with even more strength and certainty. In the first place, what is important is the equivalence “form” = “style” = “norm”: a form-of-life being not simply a life that has a form and a style and that is submitted to a certain norm; rather, it is a life exhibiting its own normativity: Sie ist und soll sein. In 1936 Husserl will go as far as to use the expression Pflichtleben (see Hua XXIX, 237) to refer to a life that coincides with its “duty” (Pflicht) or “ought” (Sollen) according to the person’s (different) “functions” within the community (Hua XXIX, 239–240). This leads us to the second, crucial point: the relation between form (in the singular) and forms (in the plural). It is evident in what sense there cannot be any alternative between the two: even in the case in which the “singular” is in fact used (Lebensform, Individualform, Stil)—the form is always understood as a structure (Gliederung) with different levels (Stufen) of forms, therefore exhibiting different norms.

 Let us note only in passing that it is in this context that Husserl’s (otherwise vague) notion of the philosopher as a “functionary of humanity” could be properly and consistently understood. A crucial text in the history of the term officium as “profession” is The Fundamental Issue by E. Kantorowicz. The text was written by the great historian against The Levering Act, a law introduced in 1949 by the State of California that required all state employees to take an anti-communism loyalty oath. In his test, Kantorowicz first makes the distinction between “profession” as officium and “employee,” and then explains: “A profession, as the word itself would suggest, is based upon conscience, and not upon working hours as in the case of modern trades, or on Time in general. In this respect the scholar resembles the judge whose duties are not disposed of by sitting in court, or the clergyman whose duties are not exhaustively described by the mention of ritual performances and sermons on Sundays. The conscience is actually the essence of the scholars ‘office’ (officium) which he is entrusted with and through which he becomes truly a ‘public trust.’ From whatever angle one may look at the academic profession, it is always, in addition to passion and love, the conscience which makes the scholar a scholar. And it is through the fact that his whole being depends on his conscience that he manifests his connection with the legal profession as well as with the clergy from which, in the high Middle Ages, the academic profession descended and the scholar borrowed his gown. Unlike the employee, the professor dedicates, in the way of research, even most of his private life to the body corporate of the University of which he is the integral part. His impetus is his conscience” (Kantorowicz, 1950). 33  This is why Husserl can remark, Im Leben beurteilt man die Anderen nach dem Kathekon (zunächst) (Hua XV, 145). It is a pity that in his archeology of the officium, Agamben (2011), probably because of his suspicion towards Husserlian phenomenology, does not even mention his appropriation of the Stoic kathekon or his use of the expression Lebensform. For a discussion of the Stoic kathekon, see Bracegirdle, 1974, Ch. 1 on Cicero, and Ch. 4 on Digenes and Stobeaus. 32

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We can now turn to the last three manuscripts from 1926 and 1930 now published in Hua XXXIV: here, the singular-plural articulation of the expression Lebensform displays a brand new sense, one that is irreducible to what has been said thus far. The expression “form-of-life” can be spoken of in the plural because there correspond to it two “fundamental attitudes.” On the one hand, there is the “natural life” in its “naiveté” (Natürliches Leben… in seiner Naivität); on the other hand, there is its “transcendental apperception” or “transcendental interpretation.” The latter Husserl explicitly calls “transcendental idealism” (Hua XXXIV, 16): it consists in recognizing the “natural form-of-life” as an “abstract layer of the concretion of the transcendental subjectivity” (Hua XXXIV, 198). In opposition to what one could label “transcendental form-of-life” (Hua XLII, 338), the natural form-of-life is characterized by a Davon-nichts-Wissen, a lack of knowledge of its own being part of the Konkrektion of the transcendental subject (Hua XXXIV, 225). Since there is only one Lebensform corresponding to the “natural life” (and its attitude), we can speak of the “form-of-life” of transcendental idealism (and of its corresponding attitude) only in the singular. In both cases, in fact, it would not make any sense to even try to speak of “forms-of-life” in the plural (Lebensformen)—as though there could be multiple natural or transcendental forms-of-life, hence of their relevant attitudes. And yet, at least from the vantage point of the form-of-life of the transcendental-idealistic attitude, its one Lebensform does not dispense with an internal “structure” or articulation (Gliederung): the singular form-of-life of the natural attitude is in fact “recognized” (erkannt) as belonging to—or being part of—the singular form-of-life of TI (as one could say). Is it now possible to circumscribe a semantic core underlying all the different usages that Husserl makes of the expression form-of-life in his writings? (LF.1): The first aspect to be pinpointed, shared to different degrees by all the above cases, is the equivalence form  =  norm (and style): Lebensform should not be understood as a life having a form, but rather as being a certain form. This is why Husserl speaks of Seins-Form: the idea is precisely to avoid thinking of it in terms of “having” and “possessing.” (LF.2): A distinction is drawn between forms-of-life in which life is assumed in its totality, and those for which this is not the case. When it comes to the different functions that a person has within the community (“father, spouse, friend, citizen, member of a nation etc.” (Hua XLII, 396)), the form-of-life concerns only some aspects or parts of her life. This means two different things. For not only can a life display a form either throughout its existence (= the ethical form-of-­ life) or temporarily (in the case of the form of a certain function); life can either reflectively address its own totality (as in the case of the ethical form-of-life that reflectively embraces the entire life), or only some parts of it (as in the case of the pre-ethical forms-of-life) (Hua XXIX, 236). (LF.3): Also in the case of its relative determinations, the form-of-life always determines a corresponding habituality and habitual norm-ality (Hua XXIX, 236–237) also according to the relations between lower and higher forms-of-life (from

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father to citizen all the way to member of a nation).34 For instance, the form-of-­ life “member of a nation” might characterize a life, yet without this necessarily implying that my “entire life” is also reflectively “embraced” by it. (LF.4): A peculiar case is that of the “transcendental form-of-life.” Just like any relative form-of-life, also the transcendental or apodictic form-of-life has its own frequency and “periodicity” (Periodizität) (Hua XXXIX, 315). Nevertheless, in contrast with the relative forms-of-life, not only does the transcendental form-of-­ life equal a radical reflection on the totality of my life; it regards the entire natural life only as an abstract layer of the concrete transcendental subject. (LF.5): It is also important to emphasize the use of the term style (Stil) as a synonym for form and norm: Lebensform means the same as Lebensstil (Hua IV, 270; Husserl, 1989, 282). Among the many different meanings ascribed to the term style in his texts,35 Husserl speaks of “style of my life” (Stil meines Lebens), “unitary style” of my “personality” (Hua IV, 273; Husserl, 1989, 285; Hua IV, 277; Husserl, 1989, 289) in the same sense as LF.1 and LF.2.36

10. If DRH is correct, the difference/articulation between the two readings hinges upon the difference/articulation between the person as is mentioned at the beginning of the Meditations (i.e., prior to the “de-humanization” of the ego accomplished by the transcendental reduction in §§8 and 11) and its re-introduction at the end of the transcendental constitution in §§44 and 58. The person is appealed to at the beginning of the Meditations—when Husserl speaks of the “the philosopher’s… personal affair”—in the minimal sense of a “self-­ responsible” and self-committed subject.37 Here the philosopher Husserl—who has already once in his life “imitated” the trains of thought of the Meditationes—appeals as a person to the personal-character of any other philosopher (as members of the philosophical community to which belongs the text called Meditationes de prima philosophia) and urges them to do what he has already done once in his life: to responsibly (meaning personally) regard the text of the Meditationes as an Urbild. Committing himself or herself to the motif of the Meditationes, the philosopher can also responsibly and personally reject the doctrinal content to be found in them (= de-humanization of the ego cogito). But the “person” re-introduced towards the end of the Meditations is a person now understood as the mundanization of the transcendental-­concrete subject and its historical concreteness: as the unity of  See Heinämaa, 2013, on the concept of “normality” in Husserl.  See Meacham, 2013, in particular, 14–18 (General and Individual Style). 36  See Jaeggi, 2014, 70–77, for a different perspective on the relation/difference between Lebensform and Lebensstil. It is a pity that, as far as we can tell, Husserl does not even appear once in her book. 37  I owe this observation to Majolino, 2023.

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possible and com-possible Formen des Lebens or “forms of life.” In other words, whereas the person before the de-humanization needs be understood only in the minimal sense of a self-responsible subject who is part of a certain community (= the community of the philosophers), and to whom the philosopher Husserl empirically and personally appeals, the person at the end of CM V is to be understood on the basis of the threefold structure of the monad. The person at the beginning of the text precedes the de-humanization and the discovery of the transcendental-concrete ego (= the nomos of the transcendental); the person at the end of the text is the mundanized form of the monad. What else are in fact the different forms of the καθῆκον mentioned by Husserl if not an expression of the functions that every person has thanks to her position(s) within the transcendental inter-monadic-subjectivity in its “mundanized” form (and with its corresponding “surrounding worlds”)? What is a Lebensform if not the unity of the Formen des Lebens that make up an individual “monad,” and which display their own immanent normativity as they are taken in the mundanized form they acquire at the end of the transcendental self-constitution? Socrates was a practical reformer, while Plato was a theoretical reformer. Just like Socrates-Plato, Descartes is said to have accomplished a new re-form of philosophy (réformation, in the words of Descartes himself (1970, 64)). And just as Socrates brought about a re-form of life and then Plato introduced a new “form-of-­ life,” “a life of a new style” (Stil), so did Descartes change philosophy’s style (Stil). The philosopher who now—after the re-form of “the Cartesian idea of philosophy as an all-embracing science” has been accomplished—goes back to the beginning of the text of the Cartesian Meditations is a philosopher who now knows that the “personal” decision to imitate Husserl means the assumption of a new Lebensstil-­ Lebensform: the form-of-life of TI. Better said: TI, understood as the shape philosophy displays with the realization of the Cartesian-phenomenological re-form of philosophy,38 (also) means (for the philosopher) a new form-of-life. The Socratic form-of-life is a life that coincides with the form of reason in the sense of a practice that recognizes the opposition between empty intention and evidence and strives to live in the latter. Plato’s form-of-life is a life that lives in the correlation between the totality of truth and the totality of being by having fixed the valid norms for all rational knowledge (διαλεκτική). Descartes aims at reforming his own thoughts (à reformer mes propres pensées) by establishing a “method”: and Par methodum autem intelligo regulas certas et faciles, quas quicumque exacte servaverit, nihil unquam falsum pro vero supponet; “By a method, moreover, I understand certain and easy rules, such that, if one has followed them exactly, then one

 For a very different assessment of Descartes’ “reform,” see Maritain, 1925, 75–128, where Descartes is famously accused of un péché d’angélisme due to his conception of the human mind on the model of the angelic one. As Maritain writes at the outset of his essay: Disons que Descartes a dévoilé le visage du monstre que l’idéalisme moderne adore sous le nom de Pensée (77). The reference is not without importance since Maritain will soon be very critical also of the Husserlian idealism as is presented in the Cartesian Meditations in his quasi review of the book in Maritain, 1932. 38

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will never suppose anything false to be true” (Descartes, 1965, 46; AT 372; Descartes, 1998, 85). Descartes speaks of la vraie méthode (Descartes, 1970, 66), necessary to learn how to make use of one’s reason (l’usage de notre raison) in a way that is réglé: Mais ce qui me contentait le plus de cette méthode était que, par elle, j’étais assuré d’user en tout de ma raison, sinon parfaitement, au moins le mieux qui fût en mon pouvoir, “What pleased me the most about this method was that by means of it I was assured of using my reason in everything, if not perfectly, at least as well as was in my power” (Descartes, 1970, 74). It is by following such a method (quomodo mentis intuitu sit utendum) (AT 372) that, according to Husserl, Descartes is led to both discovering the ego sum, ego existo (Descartes, 1992, 72; AT 25) and misconceiving of it as a mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio (Descartes, 1992, 76; AT 27). Descartes’ “re-form of philosophy,” which is also at the same time a “re-form of life,” is both a synthesis of the original Socratic-Platonic re-form of philosophy and its completion. It is a synthesis in the sense that, just like Socrates’ practical reform, it aims at reforming the use of our reason (l’usage de notre raison) through a practice to be imitated.39 Moreover, it is a synthesis because, just like Plato’s theoretical reform, it aims at re-forming philosophy and life by establishing a method as a system of regulae to pervenit ad veram cognitionem (Descartes, 1965, 46; AT 372; Descartes, 1998, 85). But Descartes’ new reform of philosophy overcomes (and also completes) the Socratic-Platonic reform in that it finally “turns” to the ego, thereby thematizing all its performances and operations (Leistungen and Tätigkeiten, or actiones as Descartes writes in the Regula III, AT 368). What happens when, as a consequence of the phenomenological-Cartesian re-­ form of philosophy, la raison (ratio) is no longer understood as a “faculty” to be “used” in a certain way, but rather as a “structural form belonging to all transcendental subjectivity” (Hua I, 92; Husserl, 1993, 57)? What happens is what was already explained in Volume 1, Chap. 5, §5: rather than a faculty to be correctly used on the basis of rules, Vernunft is a structural form for which every object designates “a structural rule (Regelstruktur)” (Hua I, 90; Husserl, 1993, 53). The phenomenological “form-of-life” is not anymore the (Cartesian) life  that coincides with the form of reason to the extent that it learns how to use it in accordance with certain rules. Rather, it is a life that has reason as its own structural form from within which (by means of “reflection”) the structural rules of the world manifest themselves.40 It is a form-of-life for which the world is only a practical idea to be realized in infinitum. It is a life whose form includes or carries within itself the totality of the intermonadic-subjectivity in the mundanized form of a “humanity” to be realized in

 Descartes speaks of un long exercice, et d’une méditation souvent réitérée (Descartes, 1970, 81, Règles de la morale). 40  This would be the proper sense of Husserl’s cartesianismo de la vida (Serrano de Haro, 2016, 211). 39

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infinitum—and for which the world is nothing but an abstract layer (see the beginning of Volume 1, Chap. 6).41 Friedrich Würzbach was right when, in his Nietzsche book of 1932, he wrote that Husserl aims at realizing a “form-of-life”; but he was utterly wrong in polemically describing its nature as eine rein intellektuelle Lebensform, “a purely intellectual form-of-life” (Würzbach, 1932, 122, footnote). For a philosopher like Husserl, for whom reason cannot undergo any “distinction” (Unterscheidung)42 between theoretical, practical and aesthetic form (Hua VI, 275; Husserl, 1970, 341),“life”) does not tolerate any opposition between an alleged purely intellectual dimension and whatever other dimension or form one might want to oppose to it.

11. We can now slowly move on towards the conclusion of the present chapter, hence of the entire work, by finally coming back to the problem of the “locus of the transcendental.” What is its locus? Now, and no matter how disappointing the answer may be to most ears (especially to those who are familiar with the ontological-existential import that such question has for Heidegger and Heidegger-inspired scholars), for Husserl the place of the transcendental does not reside in the ontological depth of human Dasein. Its locus is of course that of Dasein—but only if by such an expression one means the exact opposite of what Heidegger would mean by it: not the place of a more fundamental ontology, but of what no ontology whatsoever can make sense of (what it can ever rationalize)—the realm of the irrationality of our  Although the problem goes far beyond the present context of discussion, a few remarks could be proposed as to the long-standing question of the different ways to the phenomenological reduction, in particular the “Cartesian way” (Kern, 1962). Husserl’s mode of working in the Meditations perfectly matches the 4 characteristics of the Cartesian way listed by Kern, 1962, 304–30: (1) the idea of an absolute science at the beginning of the reflection; (2) the search for absolute evidence; (3) the ego cogito as what remains after the bracketing of the world; (4) the recognition of the world as an intentional phenomenon. However, there is one point in particular which does not correspond to the Cartesian idea of the reduction: the idea of the ego cogito as an empty consciousness (which is what Husserl himself retrospectively criticizes in §43 of the Crisis). For as we have already seen in Volume 1, Chapters 1 and 4, the result of the phenomenological reduction is a concrete subjectivity that is completely irreducible to the region “pure consciousness” of Ideas I. Let us also add that the peculiarity of Husserl’s own Cartesianism in the Cartesian Meditations, namely, that of resulting in a peculiar “form-of-life” is not even mentioned by Kern. The point is not only that of re-thinking the distinction between the ways to the reduction; the problem is rather to start recognizing the true nature of Husserl’s own phenomenological Cartesianism. 42  It would be interesting to better understand what Husserl means by keine Unterscheidung in this case. For if the term is taken at face value, he would seem to be saying that the theoretical, the practical and the aesthetic forms of reason are just one and the same form: the unity of reason (whatever this expression could mean) would not tolerate any internal differentiation (as for example Giovanni Gentile would argue). If, by contrast, Husserl means that they cannot be detached from one another, in such a way that each form implies the others, then Husserl would be proposing a position worth being compared with Croce’s dialectics of the distincts (Croce, 1927, 53–66). 41

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life and human existence. It is precisely in order to confront the irrationalities of our existence that life can display a certain form: the “form-of-life” of IT discovered by the phenomenologist by imitating the train of thoughts of the Meditationes de prima philosophia. Towards the end of Chap. 1, §8, we saw how Heidegger, in his lectures of 1925, characterized Husserl’s relation with Descartes. After he emphasizes that Husserl’s own concern is the (modern) idea of an absolute science, Heidegger remarks the following: Husserl’s primary question is simply not concerned with the character of the being of consciousness. Rather, he is guided by the following concern: How can consciousness become the possible object of an absolute science? The primary concern which guides him is the idea of an absolute science. This idea, that consciousness is to be the region of an absolute science, is not simply invented; it is the idea which has occupied modern philosophy ever since Descartes. The elaboration of pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived phenomenologically by going back to the things themselves, but by going back to a traditional idea of philosophy. Thus none of the characters which emerge as determinations of the being of lived-experiences is an original character (Heidegger, 1979, 147; Heidegger, 1985, 107).

It is now time to see if this description (of both Husserl’s own concern and his relation to Descartes) actually corresponds to what Husserl does in the Cartesian Meditations. It does not suffice to recognize that, in contrast to the first volume of Ideas, Husserl no longer speaks of “region” to refer to what phenomenology is about (Chap. 3, §9). The more fundamental problem is also to recognize that if Husserl refers to Descartes and his attempt at an absolute foundation of science (see §1 of the Meditations), the way such reference is made and what follows therefrom no longer matches with Heidegger’s description. Quite the contrary. Husserl’s reference to the idea of an absolute foundation serves to reject the almost totality of the doctrinal content of Descartes’ own thought and, in the first place, to both dismiss its own account of the ego and clarify the nature itself of the transcendental (or its mode of being, were we to adopt Heidegger’s own way of talking). And if Heidegger himself can present the very “intention” of the analytics of Dasein of Being and Time affirming that it “raises the ontological question of the being of the sum,”43 it should be clear why Heidegger’s statements above no longer hold true of what Husserl’s ambitions. For him, the appeal to Descartes and the idea of philosophy that is contained in the Meditationes de prima philosophia (and that goes all the way back to Socrates and Plato) is necessary precisely to avoid, and correct, what he himself perceives as Heidegger’s own mistake: the characterization of the  Here is the passage from the beginning of Being and Time (see  Volume 1, Chap. 2, §2): “Historically, the intention of the existential analytics can be clarified by considering Descartes, to whom one attributes the discovery of the cogito sum as the point of departure for all modern philosophical questioning. He investigates the cogitare of the ego, within certain limits. But the sum he leaves completely undiscussed, even though it is just as primordial as the cogito. Our analytics raises the ontological question of the being of the sum. Only when the sum is defined does the manner of the cogitationes become comprehensible” (Heidegger, 1967, 45–46; Heidegger, 2010, 45). 43

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transcendental in terms of “Dasein.” No matter how paradoxical this may sound— this is in effect regarded by Husserl as a repetition of Descartes’ erroneous identification of the ego with the mens sive animus sive intellectus. If there is any Cartesianism in Husserl’s thought, it would consist in a direct and straightforward rejection of (among others) Heidegger’s Cartesian mistake. And it is a mistake that consists in the confusion between “first philosophy” and “metaphysics.”44 It is precisely by rejecting the possibility of confusing the nature of the transcendental in the sense of Descartes and Heidegger (as a mens sive animus or as menschliches Dasein) that Husserl can successfully elucidate its structure and mode of being as a monad and its relations to the world, and then also determine its locus in the human Dasein as this emerges at the end of the process of constitution after the accomplishment of the “metaphysical interpretation” of the factual world. Not only does Husserl’s Cartesianism in the Meditations no longer subscribe to the characterization of the subject-matter of phenomenology in terms of “region” (which is only an abstraction from within the primum concretum); Husserl’s Cartesianism entails the idea of a Lebens-Form that, establishing the identity between life and form, displays its own immanent “normativity,” thus being able to escape the opposition between the many forms of reasons that one might want to distinguish. But with the introduction of the concept of form-of-life we have stepped far beyond the boundaries of the present work—and the time has finally arrived to bring it to conclusion.

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Conclusion (Notes for Future Research)

1. Our long journey has finally come full circle, and it has ended exactly where it first started. It first opened up by discussing Heidegger’s letter of 1927 to Husserl and Husserl’s own possible response to it against the backdrop of the distinction between two problems: the ones to which we referred as “the locus of the transcendental” and “the nomos of the transcendental” (Volume, Chap. 1). The answer to the question how Husserl understands them or re-elaborates them in light of Heidegger’s remarks took as a point of departure a quite specific philological thesis, and part of our enterprise consisted precisely in the attempt at justifying it: the thesis according to which if there is any text in which Husserl’s response to Heidegger (if there must be any such thing) can be found, such text is not TheCrisis of European Sciences but the Cartesian Meditations. It is in the Meditations that Husserl presents a first radical re-elaboration of some of the central tenets of his phenomenology that directly address Heidegger’s concerns. Of course, this does not mean nor imply that the Crisis would have nothing to do with Husserl’s confrontation with Heidegger. Quite the opposite is true. Insofar as Heidegger is regarded by Husserl as committing the very same error as Descartes, the grandiose archeology of the Crisis, through which he aims at tracing the crisis of philosophy back to the development of modern thought from Descartes to Kant, includes Heidegger, but exclusively as one of the manifestations of the crisis itself. By contrast, in the Cartesian Meditations Husserl proposes a re-elaboration of the nature of the transcendental subjectivity which is far from being superimposable to the concept of “pure consciousness” of 1913, and which does not represent the focus of the Crisis. On the basis of this first, preliminary textual thesis, a second, theoretical claims was also slowly, yet systematically advanced: the one according to which Husserl’s objection that Heidegger confuses the transcendental subject with its anthropological determination entails a much deeper claim, i.e., the confusion between different © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. De Santis, Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics, Contributions to Phenomenology 126, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39590-1

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parts of the system of philosophy. Upon closer examination, Husserl’s objection to Heidegger implies three sub-theses, so to say. The first one is the confusion between the transcendental subject (understood as the very field of investigation of phenomenology as a first philosophy) and the anthropological subject (as the field of investigation of “philosophical anthropology” construed as one of the many possible eidetic or a priori sciences). But this first sub-thesis immediately leads to the second sub-thesis or sub-criticism. As we tried to argue for over the course of Chap. 1 of this second volume, in fact (and, more generally in the entire second part of the work), the erroneous identification of the nature of the transcendental subjectivity with the anthropological one seems to undermine the very possibility of all the ontologies other than the fundamental one. In this respect, Husserl’s reproach of “anthropologism” bears much less on the structure of Dasein than on what the analytics of Being and Time should ground: the very plurality of being, with its relevant eidetic or a priori sciences. Last but not least, Husserl’s reproach implies a third critical point, namely, that the analytics of Dasein ascribes to the transcendental subjectivity (thus, to the realm of first philosophy) characteristics that would by contrast pertain to the domain of metaphysics (“metaphysics in a new sense”) as Husserl conceives of it from a certain moment onward. Or, to put it better and by repeating what was stated over and over again in Chaps. 4 and 5 of this volume: Husserl seems to be criticizing Heidegger for having transcendentalized (sit venia verbo), i.e., having attributed transcendental value and import to some of the “factual” (and therefore absolutely “irrational”) aspects of our human existence. The three parts of this work mirror these three aspects of Husserl’s criticism of Heidegger. However, the reason why the first part (see Volume 1) is much longer than the other two should be apparent: it is the first mistake (the misconception of the transcendental subject, hence of what first philosophy should be about) that for Husserl directly leads to the other two. It is by misconceiving the nature of the transcendental subject that the analytics of Dasein is not able to do justice to the regional plurality of being (thereby making the many ontologies impossible); and it is by ascribing a transcendental meaning to the irrational dimensions of our human existence that Heidegger ends up confusing first philosophy and metaphysics (in a new sense). The conviction that one could ascribe transcendental import to the irrational dimensions of our human existence (its finitude or death; its ultimate facticity and thrownness) is per se the expression of the “confusion” between first philosophy (hence, of the structure of the transcendental subjectivity) and metaphysics in Husserl’s own sense of the term (thus, of what he means by the expression Dasein). If our reconstruction is on the right track, Husserl would not be accusing Heidegger of committing such and such a (doctrinal) error; rather, he would be accusing him of mis-conceiving of the system itself of philosophy, notably, the distinction between first, second and last philosophy. Of course, the objection could be made to the effect that Husserl’s criticism is more revealing of his own view on phenomenology than of Heidegger’s position. It is true; but the same could be affirmed of all the critical points which Heidegger himself usually makes against Husserl’s phenomenology.

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2. Husserl’s assessments of the problems “the locus of the transcendental” and “the nomos of the transcendental” go hand in hand. As we should remember, whereas the former concerns the place of the transcendental, namely, the nature of the entity which harbors it (to use Heidegger’s jargon); the latter corresponds to the issue of the “intelligibility” of the entities. As we tried to explain over the course of the first part of the present work, the way Husserl conceives of the problem of the “locus” directly bears on the way the “nomos” is also understood, and vice versa. The latter is expressed, in fact, by Husserl’s transcendental idealism as is presented in §41 of the Cartesian Meditations and as a most direct consequence of the re-elaboration of the field of investigation of phenomenology: this being no longer regarded as the region pure consciousness, but as a concrete ego or monad. And TI directly follows from such re-elaboration. But the assessment, or re-elaboration of the “locus” of the transcendental occurs in two steps, so to speak, mirroring the distinction between “first philosophy” and “metaphysics in a new sense” (see respectively Volume 1, Chapters 4; and Chaps. 5 and 6 of this second volume). Husserl recognizes that phenomenology and psychology do not coincide “proposition for proposition” and that the “monad” corresponds to the concrete human subject, in such a way that the effort he makes at the beginning of the Cartesian Meditations consists in de-­ humanizing the subject (thereby avoiding Descartes’ or Heidegger’s own mistake), while at the same time retaining the concreteness of its structures (in Volume 1, Chap. 4 an analysis was produced of the role and function of the method of “self-­ variation,” the goal of which is precisely that of bringing to the fore the eidos of the concrete ego’s structures). But once the structures of the monad have been elucidated, and on their basis TI actually presented, then the issue of the “locus” of the transcendental can be addressed also from the angle of what Husserl calls “metaphysics in a new sense,” from the perspective of the irrational dimension of own human existence in the world. It is at the end of the phenomenological enterprise, when also the relations between Socrates, Plato and Descartes (and the idea of philosophy) have been elucidated, that there emerges a new concept, that of Lebensform—by which the issue of the nomos and that of the locus are finally reconciled, if not even identified, as it were. From now on, TI is no longer to be seen as a doctrine, but rather as the form of a certain life, as one could put it: the life of the philosopher who strives towards the re-activation of the “motif” contained in the Meditationes de prima philosophia (which in turn reconnects to the original Socratic-Platonic reform of philosophy and its “ideal”). Unfortunately, the concept of form-of-life could be only introduced here and not really expanded on. It follows from the way in which we have approached the Husserl-Heidegger controversy from the angle of Husserl himself, and yet it already hints at something that goes beyond it: the question of the life of the philosopher, hence of nature itself of philosophy as a Lebensform.

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3. With the last remark the future course of our research has already been prescribed. In De Santis 2021, Husserl’s phenomenology was considered and studied only from the perspective of one of the two hemispheres of his philosophy: that of the a priori, assumed as the expression of one of the two forms of rationality recognized by Husserl, the “ontological” rationality (Rationalität) in contrast with the transcendental form of rationality which he calls Vernünftigkeit. By contrast, the ambition of the present work was to both tackle the latter concept and clarify the connection between the two forms of rationality within the system of philosophy. As we saw during the last part, the relation between the two results in the completion of the system of philosophy, hence in the “metaphysical interpretation of the objective being as a fact.” Beyond this, a new problematic emerges: that of the metaphysics in a new sense. If this has been here only presented to better grasp what we take to be Husserl’s stance on Heidegger, its systematic assessment will be at the center of our future research. But if the concrete ego is always an absolutely individual one (no distinction between singularity and individuality obtains in it), and if to study the idea of philosophy is to understand an individual life whose form coincides with TI itself, then our future research will concern itself with the form-of-life of the philosopher as it manifests itself in an absolutely individual form-of-life: here, that of Husserl himself. The ambition will be to write neither a factual nor a philosophical biography of the “human being” known as “Edmund Husserl.” Rather, the ambition or the task is to understand the philosophical form-of-life as it emerges from Husserl’s Briefwechsel (with special attention to the letters written in the 30 s). As in Plutarch, the ambition is εἰδοποιεῖν τὸν ἑκὰστου βὶον, “to give form to the life of each” (Plutarco 2021, 5; Plutarch 1919, Ch. 3, §3). As a sort of anticipation, this is also the reason why, already during the third part of the present work (see in particular Chap. 5, §§3, 6 of this volume), Husserl’s letters were discussed. In his letter to Baudin, Husserl speaks of TI as his own consolatio philosophica; the words he uses to write about the death of his son mirror what he would write as regards the irrational nature of our existence and vice versa (he writes manuscripts in which the events of his life are directly present); and at the beginning of the Cartesian Meditations Husserl invites the readers to do what he has already personally done semel in vita. It would be a mistake to believe that we (and Husserl himself) have been conflating “philosophy” and “life,” the arguments the former is supposed to produce and the experiences the latter goes through. The fact that Husserl himself resorts to his own philosophical terminology to talk about (his own) factual life should be seen as a sign (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα) of the inseparability of the two (life and philosophy) once the concept of Lebensform has been introduced. When Husserl writes to Ingarden that his “future horizon” (Zukunfthorizont) is shrinking more and more (wird ja stetig kleiner) (Husserl 1968, 99); when he talks of the situation in Germany at the end of 1933 by mentioning the Schicksalof the non-Arians (Husserl 1968, 83)— all such phrases (primarily the term Schicksal) should be understood

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technically. Just as a technical meaning must be attributed to Husserl’s confession to Baudin above: for they are the words of a life which expresses its own form, thereby regarding the world itself—thus, its irrationalities—from the perspective of that consolatio philosophica which TI itself is as a form-of-life. It is no accident that Husserl himself speaks of it as “my normal anomaly” (meiner normalen Anomalität) (Husserl 1968, 92): the reason is that the life of the philosopher, his or her form-of-­ life, displays a normativity (a norm or norm-ality) which radically differs from that of all the non-philosophical “forms-of-life” (whatever one might want to mean by such ambiguous and vague turn of phrase). Now, the ambition of our future research will be that of writing about a life (Husserl’s) that writes about its (philosophical) form and from the standpoint of its (philosophical) form, thereby shedding light (if possible) upon the very idea of philosophy according to Husserl against the backdrop of his reflections on the (“irrational”) political situation of Germany and Europe in the 30 s. There is a coincidence that has always struck and still strikes the author of the present book. The years in which Husserl publishes the Méditations cartésiennes (in which Augustine’s motto is also quoted: in interiore homine habitat veritas); the years in which he keeps working on their expanded German version; in which he writes the letter to Baudin quoted above and reflects on TI as his own consolatio philosophica and in which the claim is made that “our strength” is God’s own “strength”—these years are also those during which the prominent Italian historian Delio Cantimori was working on his book on the history of that sixteenth century heretical movement called Anabaptism. The book was released in 1939, and it was ready more or less at the time of Husserl’s death in 1938. There is no historical connection between the heretical movements reconstructed by Cantimori and Husserl’s philosophy; nor is there any between Husserl himself as a philosopher and Cantimori as a historian. Yet, a structural analogy between Cantimori’s project and Husserl’s cannot be ignored. Just as Husserl assumes TI as a peculiar form-of-life to heroically react against the irrationalities of his time (Husserl 1968, 93)—so is Cantimori trying to reconstruct the lives of men and women who, as he points out, were “heretics” in the sense of “rebelling against every form of ecclesiastic community” (Cantimori2009, 5, 9). All the persons, whose life Cantimori tries to reconstruct, share the very same conviction: they all refuse to accept any of the available and existing forms precisely because they claim to be able to find God within themselves in such a manner that the universality of God would coincide with that of humanity itself (as the very locus in which a universal republic can be realized) (Cantimori 1968, 380 and ff.). The ambition of our research will be that of showing the extent to which Husserl’s view on the idea of infinite humanity, which directly follows from TI, would lead to conclusions (political ones, in a sense to be better specified) akin to those at which many of the Anabaptists actually arrived (without this implying that Husserl himself knew them or explicitly espoused their religious, social and political world-view).

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This does not imply either that one has to accept Husserl’s language when it comes to describing our human existence, its many irrationalities, and TI as the sole form of consolatio philosophica. What we are referring to is, in particular, the language and the rhetoric of heroism which Husserl mobilizes massively in his texts on the irrational nature of our existence. He himself speaks, for example, of Die große, werterhöhende Bedeutung des Kampfes gegen die irrationalen Widrigkeiten als Heroismus im Ausharren trotz gehäufter Missgeschicke (Hua XLII, 325). Husserl speaks of “heroic” life (Hua XLII, 304), of “heroic will to life” (Lebenswillen) (Hua XLII, 325), and of “heroic steadfastness” (Hua XLII, 329); but also of heroism as the will “to be and remain human” (Mensch zu sein und zu bleiben) (Hua XLII, 522). As long as the “war”phenomenon is what metonymically expresses or exemplifies the irrational nature of our existence, in such a way that any and every individual existence assumes the physiognomy of what could be called “existential soldier,” then the one and only possible reaction to it is the “heroic” one. So that just as the war exemplifies the general traits of our irrational existence, so does the figure of the soldier symbolize each one of us as an individual existing ego. And Hans Lipps will remark that the “tragic figure of the hero embodies a world-view”; and also that the “attitude of the soldier was heroic,” sofern das Geschehen in das er gestellt war von ihm aktiv übernommen wurde (Lipps 1934, 21–22).1 Once again, for Husserl the language of life coincides with that of philosophy, and vice versa. “It is with heartfelt sorrow that I answer your honorable lines from the 8th with the painful news of the heroic death (Heldentod) of your brave son”— reads one of the statements of condolence from the military command. “[…] it is with deep regret that the Regiment must inform you that Lieutenant Wolfgang Husserl on the 8th of this month, in combat near Vaux at Verdun, met a hero’s death”; “According to God’s will, he died a heroic death in brave command of his Platoon” (de Warren & Vongehr 2018, 106–107). And even Malvine Husserl, in her last letter to Roman Ingarden published in the Briefwechsel, communicates the death of her husband by underlining: Sein Leben und Sterben was stilles Heldentum, “His life and death were silent and calm heroism” (Husserl 1968, 104). But for those—like the author of the present book—who are used to a more sober and prosaic language when it comes to describing and accounting for the nature (whatever this may be) of our existence in the world,2 Husserl’s “heroic” language could and is to be abandoned by primarily renouncing the “war”-characterization of our existence and its irrationalities (what Husserl also calls: Schicksal-structure of the world). For to the extent that Husserl’s own appeal to heroism goes hand in hand with the war-like nature of our existence, then it is only by dropping the latter that also the former can be finally dispensed with (the language of heroism being in fact directly implied, as its more natural consequence, by the war-like characterization and description of our existence).

 See also de Warren 2014; and the recently published de Warren 2023 (on Husserl, see 367–400).  We would rather associate ourselves with the more sober language of Ferrara 1983.

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4. Two more points can be made as regards the importance of exploring the many conceptual and theoretical resources (as possible lines which our future research could take) implied by the concept of “form-of-life” (once its semantic richness has been acknowledged). For example, one might want to think of the talk of “normativity” which has lately become so popular among phenomenologists and phenomenology-­minded philosophers. But the talk of “normativity,” be it the normativity of perception of whatever other act and mode of consciousness one might want to take into account, necessarily refers back to—and presupposes—the very possibility for life to exhibit and display its own immanent forms and norms. We are of course aware of the ambiguity of the term form in the expression form-of-life as is employed by Husserl. For one thing is the plurality of the forms and norms which life displays based, for example, on the different functions which one can have within a given community (it is in this case, and in this case only that Husserl speaks of Sollen and ought-to-be), but the form which life displays once it assumes that “form-of-life” (in the singular) which is TI itself as Husserl thinks of it in the Cartesian Meditations is another. In this case, in fact, the norms and forms are the constitutive ones which life itself displays as a whole and as it recognizes the world to be only and exclusively an abstract layer of its own concreteness. We are not disputing the possibility of talking of the normativity of perception, or of whatever other specific act per se considered; the problem is rather to recognize that if such talk makes any sense at all, it is precisely because, by coinciding with the “form” of reason or with reason itself as a “form,” life is its own norms and displays them. It is the latter that justifies that very possibility of the former. If life were not always already a form-of-life (that of TI itself), it would not make any sense to argue that the different acts of consciousness per se considered can display such and such a normative content.

5. But there is also another reason why it is worth paying attention and elaborating upon Husserl’s understanding of the notion of form-of-life (according to the many different meanings it displays in his writings). Recently, during a conversation about the meaning and actuality of phenomenology, a prominent French philosopher working in that (but not only) tradition has been asked the question as to why it is or would be important to leave behind “the transcendental framework or perspective of phenomenology” (Filiz 2021, 184). After he recognizes that, “A transcendental phenomenology” is for Husserl himself “at the same time an idealist phenomenology, which postulates that the being of consciousness is ‘absolute,’ while the being of the world and of objects is ‘relative,’ that is to say, depending on that of consciousness,” the philosopher in question adds the following:

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Why do I think that we gain something by abandoning that conception? The first reason is that this entire transcendental problematic is linked to a foundational perspective in philosophy that triumphed in modern thought from the “tree of philosophy” of the prefatory letter of Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy all the way to Husserl himself. Philosophy had to be conceived as the queen of the sciences or as fundamental science. I think that this conception is inadequate for both philosophy and for the sciences themselves. I do not think that philosophy can really vindicate this status of scientificity that the majority of modern authors have attributed to it. And I also do not believe that the undertaking of a foundation of different sciences in “absolutely primary” truths, emerging from transcendental subjectivity, really makes sense today in light of the developments of contemporary epistemology. Something has become profoundly obsolete in Husserl’s very approach (Filiz 2021, 184–185).

Let us immediately point out that here we do not want to address the actual reasons produced in order to support the claim that this “entire transcendental problematic” should be abandoned. Here we want to elaborate on the sense and meaning that one could ascribe to the answer itself. Indeed, and besides the fact that the answer is here simply answering a question, the problem for us is rather why one would propose to abandon Husserl’s transcendental and foundational perspective. In other words, and to make here our point finally more explicit: Is there any philosopher (phenomenologist or phenomenology-minded philosopher) who—after Husserl—has ever tried either to reconnect to Husserl’s transcendental-foundational project or to develop it further? Is not the transcendental and “foundational” aspiration of Husserl’s phenomenology one of the few aspects of his philosophy that died together with Husserl’s own physical death in 1938? It is rather surprising that one might want to abandon a philosophical perspective that does not seem to have even survived its author’s death. Is there any post-Husserlian phenomenologist (or contemporary phenomenology-minded philosopher) who is trying to reactivate and vindicate what we are here told should be left behind once and for all? Or, differently but more clearly said: is there any post-Husserlian philosopher (from Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty, from Sartre to Levinas, from Ingarden to Stein, from Fink to Marion or Derrida, from Paci to Gaos and from Millán-Puelles to Vanni Rovighi and so on), who—by reconnecting to his “idealist phenomenology”—ever tried to state and re-state the thesis of the “absoluteness” of consciousness and the “relativity” of the world (taking for granted that one could identify Husserl’s transcendental idealism, hence his foundational project, with such thesis3)? The talk of “modern philosophy” and the thesis that “Something has become profoundly obsolete in Husserl’s very approach” “in light of the development of contemporary epistemology” implies that at least all the way to Husserl himself these ideas were neither obsolete nor inadequate. Now, if the “approach” has now become obsolete and the very foundational aspirations of Husserl’s thought have now turned out to be inadequate, does this mean that also his diagnosis of the so-­ called crisis of (European) philosophy has become obsolete and inadequate4? If we  Which is precisely what we disputed in Volume 1, Chapters 5 and 6.  For a correct interpretation of the concept of the crisis, see Trizio 2016. See also the beautiful pages by Donnici 1996, in particular Chapters v-vii.

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agree that for Husserl the transcendental-foundational project was meant to be the only possible way out of the state of crisis into which he saw philosophy had fallen, does the thesis that the “cure” has become obsolete imply that the diagnosis of the disease has become obsolete too? Or does the fact that the cure has become obsolete call for a new, different medicine? One that by renouncing the transcendental-­ foundational aspirations of Husserl’s phenomenology would nevertheless still accept and recognize the validity of his diagnosis? Thus the positivistic concept of science in our time is, historically speaking, a residual concept. It has dropped all the questions which had been considered under the now narrower, now broader concepts of metaphysics, including all questions vaguely termed “ultimate and highest.” Examined closely, these and all the excluded questions have their inseparable unity in the fact that they contain, whether expressly or as implied in their meaning, the problems of reason, reason in all its particular forms. Reason is the explicit theme in the disciplines concerning knowledge (i.e., of true and genuine, rational knowledge), of true and genuine valuation (genuine values as values of reason), of ethical action (truly good acting, acting from practical reason); here reason is a title for “absolute,” “eternal,” “supertemporal,” “unconditionally” valid ideas and ideals (Hua VI, 6–7; Husserl 1970, 9) Can reason(Vernunft) and that-which-is (Seiendes) be separated, where reason, as knowing, determines what is? (Hua VI, 9; Husserl 1970, 11). Skepticism about the possibility of metaphysics, the collapse of the belief in a universal philosophy as the guide for the new human being, actually represents a collapse of the belief in “reason,” understood as the ancients opposed episteme to doxa. It is reason which ultimately gives meaning to everything that is thought to be, all things, values, and ends, their meaning understood as their normative relatedness to what, since the beginnings of philosophy, is meant by the word “truth,” truth in itself, and correlatively the term “what is,” the ὄντως ὄν. Along with this falls the faith in “absolute” reason, through which the world has its meaning, the faith in the meaning of history, of humanity, the faith in the human freedom, that is, his capacity to secure rational meaning for his individual and common human existence (Hua VI, 10–11; Husserl 1970, 12–13).

The crisis of sciences is part and parcel of the crisis of reason according to all its forms—part and parcel because as long as we focus on the sciences, we consider only the theoretical form of reason, the one that expresses itself in the opposition, first established by Plato, between έπιστήμη and δόξα. But Husserl is clear, what is in a state of crisis is the correlation of Vernunf and what truly is (the ὄντως ὄν, according to a Platonic-sounding jargon5) according to all its Sondergestalten, particular or “special forms”: theoretical, practical, axiological. In other words, what Husserl calls the crisis of reason is the falling apart of the major acquisitions of the Socratic-Platonic reform of philosophy. If Socrates first recognized the opposition between “das vernünftige Leben” and “das unvernünftige Leben”—with Plato, reason’s capacity to grasp the ὄντως ὄν is de jure also established. However, we know that the “reform of philosophy” (Reform der Philosophie) was also, at the same time, a reform of life (Lebensreform). In this respect, the crisis  See for example Sophist, 240B, 7–8 on the opposition between ὄντως ὄν and μὴ ἀληθινὸν.

5

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of reason (as a crisis of the original Socratic-Platonic reform) is necessarily also the crisis of a form-of-life. The “collapse of reason, understood as the ancients opposed episteme to doxa,” means the collapse of the identity of life with the form of reason, or with reason as its own form. More profound than the crisis of the sciences is the crisis of reason (of which the former is only the expression): the crisis of reason is the breakdown of the unity of life and reason, of the form-of-life first established by the Socratic-Platonic reform, and to which also Descartes reconnected. Life no longer recognizes reason as its own form: the opposition between “das vernünftige Leben” and “das unvernünftige Leben” falls apart and, together with it, that between έπιστήμη and δόξα. And with reason being no longer the form of life, the ὄντως ὄν can no longer count as reason’s “correlate.” We need to understand what a life looks like that no longer coincides with reason as a form: a life for which the oppositions proper to the different forms of reason (true-untrue; beautiful-unbeautiful; and so on) no longer hold. And see whether after the falling apart of the Socratic-Platonic re-form, a new form-of-life can be found that is able to replace it.

References Cantimori, D. (2009). Eretici italiani del Cinquecento e Prospettive di una storia ereticale italiana del Cinquecento. Einaudi. De Santis, D. (2021). Husserl and the a priori. Phenomenology and rationality. Springer. De Santis, D. (2021a). Problemas limite de la fenomenología trascendental: teleología, generatividad, absoluto. In A. Serrano de Haro (Ed.), Guía Comares de Husserl (pp. 237–255). Granada. de Warren, N. (2014). The first world war, philosophy and Europe. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 76, 715–737. de Warren, N., & Vongehr, T. (Eds.). (2018). Philosophers at the front. Leuven University Press. de Warren, N. (2023). German philosophy and the first world war. Cambridge University Press. Donnici, R. (1996). Intenzioni d’amore, di scienza e d’anarchia. L’idea husserliana di filosofia e le sue implicazioni etico-politiche. Bibliopolis. Ferrara, G. (1983). Apologia dell’uomo laico. Rusconi. Filiz, K. (2021). Phenomenology with big-hearted reason: A conversation with Claude Romano. Philosophy Today, 65, 183–200. Husserl, E. (1962). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. M. Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1968). Briefe an Roman Ingarden. M. Nijhoff. Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Northwestern University Press. Husserl, E. (2014). Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Springer. Lipps, H. (1934). Der Soldat des letzten Krieges. Vittorio Klostermann. Plutarch. (1919). Caesar. Harvard University Press. Plutarco. (2021). Le vite di Alessandro e Cesare. Rusconi. Trizio, E. (2016). What is the crisis of Western sciences? Husserl Studies, 32, 191–211.

Index

A Anabaptism, 247 Analytics of Dasein, 3, 16, 18, 102, 103, 126, 154, 195, 238, 244 Ariosto, L., 179, 180 Aristotle, 19, 36, 78, 80, 93, 96, 98, 104–108, 127–129, 133, 134, 165, 175–180, 184, 185, 220 B Being and time, 4, 5, 8, 9, 13–15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33–35, 41, 61, 66–70, 77, 92, 93, 96, 97, 102, 106, 108, 110, 121, 124–127, 153, 154, 164, 195, 199, 222, 238, 244 Boethius, 93, 174, 178–182, 185, 186, 189 C Cantimori, D., 247 Chances, 168, 175–178, 182, 184, 185 Concrete, 22, 23, 30, 33, 74, 76–80, 86, 87, 89–92, 96, 100–103, 110–112, 144–148, 150, 151, 153, 165, 166, 171, 172, 181, 189, 195, 199–203, 228, 234, 245, 246 Contingencies, 147, 148, 154, 163–165, 168–172, 179, 186, 187, 193 Crisis of European sciences, 145, 160, 243

D Descartes, R., 24, 25, 31–34, 199, 200, 204, 205, 219–226, 235, 236, 238, 239, 243, 245, 250, 252 E Essence, 4, 42, 74, 126, 195, 207 Essence as Wesen, 68, 74 Exact ideas, 56–59 Existence, 4, 9–13, 15–17, 21, 37, 41, 61, 62, 67–70, 86, 90, 98, 99, 104–109, 113, 123, 132, 137, 151, 160, 162–165, 167, 170, 171, 174, 180, 182, 185, 186, 188, 192, 194, 195, 199, 201, 204, 225, 226, 228, 233, 238, 246, 248 Existential modification, 6–12, 15, 16, 19, 25, 34, 37, 38, 63, 98, 99, 108 F First philosophy, 3, 99, 103, 121, 127–129, 131, 133–138, 140–146, 149, 150, 152, 153, 160, 161, 187, 195, 196, 202, 203, 209, 220, 239, 244, 245 Form-of-life, 210, 213–215, 219, 228–239, 245–247, 249, 252 Fortuna, 163, 174, 175, 178–180, 182–186

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. De Santis, Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics, Contributions to Phenomenology 126, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39590-1

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254 G Geiger, M., 121, 123, 124, 141, 142 Genus, 19, 20, 26, 27, 34, 37, 75–80, 85–87, 89, 90, 92–95, 98, 99, 108, 109 H Heidegger, M., 3, 41, 77, 119, 194, 199 Hering, J., 7, 11, 41–43, 45, 50, 59–69, 109 Human existence, 121, 149, 151–154, 160–163, 165, 166, 170–172, 174, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192–195, 204, 205, 238, 244, 245, 248, 251 Husserl, E., 3, 42, 73, 159, 199 Husserl, H., 119 I Inexact, 55–57 Ingarden, R., 41–46, 48–52, 54–64, 66, 68, 106, 109, 159, 201, 203, 206, 228, 246, 248, 250 Intuition of essence, 211 Irrationalities, 143, 146–148, 150, 154, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169–172, 181, 186–188, 194, 195, 237, 247, 248 Irrationality of human existence, 161, 163, 170, 173

Index O Ontologies, 3, 4, 8, 9, 15–19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 34, 36, 41, 42, 54, 59–61, 67, 68, 70, 73, 74, 77, 78, 83, 88, 91, 94–99, 101–104, 106, 108–114, 122–127, 135–149, 153, 154, 188, 195, 196, 199, 201–203, 237, 244 P Pfänder, A., 42–51, 58, 59, 61 Phenomenological ontology, 42 Phenomenology, 4, 43, 73, 119, 159, 201 Phenomenology of the irrational, 163 Plato, 122, 205, 214–221, 235, 236, 238, 245, 251 Presence-at-hand, 41 R Reasons, 8, 21, 22, 31, 32, 73, 86, 113, 134, 142–147, 151, 160–162, 165, 167–170, 172, 186–188, 191–193, 207–215, 217–220, 231, 235–237, 239, 244, 246, 247, 249–252 Reform of philosophy, 205, 219, 220, 224, 227, 228, 236, 245, 251 Region, 3, 42, 73, 119, 187, 202 Regional ontologies, 3, 4, 20, 38, 73, 74, 76, 77, 83, 88, 89, 95, 113

K Kathekon, 231, 232 L Last philosophy, 103, 121, 133, 138, 139, 141, 146, 151, 152, 239, 244 Lipps, H., 60, 170, 171, 248 Lotze, R.H., 139, 140, 142 M Machiavelli, N., 182–186 Meditationes de prima philosophia, 220, 222, 224, 227, 234, 238, 239, 245 Mereology, 83 Metaphysics, 103, 111, 112, 119–154, 160, 161, 196, 202, 203, 225, 239, 244, 251 Metaphysics in a new sense, 121, 142, 143, 146–151, 153, 154, 160, 161, 188, 194, 201, 203, 206, 228, 244–246

S Schicksal, 149, 154, 163–168, 170–172, 174, 178, 181, 185–187, 189, 190, 203, 246 Socrates, 204–207, 209–217, 219, 220, 224, 225, 235, 236, 238, 245, 251 Species, 18–20, 26, 27, 42, 46–48, 50, 54–56, 73–75, 77, 78, 80, 83, 85–90, 93–95, 97, 107–109, 113, 128, 172, 188, 211, 212 Specific difference, 20, 26, 27, 93–95 The Stoics, 231, 232 T Transcendental idealism, 24, 181, 233, 245, 250 Transcendental philosophy, 150, 195, 220, 223, 224

Index U Ultimate and supreme questions, 161 Ultimate interpretation of reality, 151 Understanding of being, 6, 7, 12, 17, 19, 34, 36, 93, 106, 126, 127, 195

255 W Wust, P., 121–123, 127, 137 Z Zufall, 154, 163–168, 171–173, 178, 186–188