Tradition and Innovation: Sicily Between Hellenism and Rome 3515091947, 9783515091947

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
CHAPTER ONE Political Evolution and Historical Events in the Greek City-States of Sicily from Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival(289–278 BC)
1.1. “The king is dead”: civil struggles and institutional changes in Syracuse, between a new democracy and further autocratic desires (289–287 BC)
1.2. Mercenaries, marauders and settlers: the foundation of the Mamertine State in Messina (287 BC)
1.3. Minor tyrants of eastern Sicily between Carthage and Syracuse: aims of power or instincts of self-preservation?
1.4. Phintias and the revival of Agrigentum: history of a tyrant who looked like an Hellenistic monarch (289/288 – 280? BC)
1.5. Hicetas’ autocratic rule in Syracuse: from victory to decline (285–279 BC)
1.6. “Another king will save us”: last civil strife in Syracuse and the appeals to Pyrrhus (279–278 BC)
1.7. The arrival of the Syracusan ambassadors and the first steps of Pyrrhus’ Sicilian expedition (summer-autumn 279 BC)
1.8. The Carthaginians on the international scene. The Punic diplomacy between Rome and Pyrrhus, and the renewal of the Romano-Punic alliance (autumn 279 – spring 278 BC)
1.9. Some notes about the Romano-Carthaginian treaty: matters of understanding
1.10. A passage of Diodorus and the carrying out of the treaty; quick cooperation in Rhegium (spring 278 BC)
CHAPTER TWO Pyrrhus and the Greeks of Sicily: military events, political meanings and ideological implications
2.1. Preliminary notes. The situation in Sicily and Pyrrhus’ last arrangements for the expedition
2.2 The situation in Magna Graecia. Some more enlightenments about the events in Rhegium
2.3. The first stage of the Sicilian adventure: from Taras to Syracuse (summer/autumn 278 BC)
2.4. The political title of Pyrrhus in Sicily: an example of Hellenistic kingship?
2.5. Pyrrhus’ coinage in Sicily: Greek propaganda, ideological inferences and economic innovations
2.6. The war-campaign of 277 BC. First steps of glory in Southern Sicily: traces of Pyrrhus at Heraclea Minoa and Azones, between historical and archaeological evidence
2.7. The war-campaign of 277 BC. From Selinous to Eryx; Pyrrhus’ march through the Elymian territories
2.8. The conquest of Panormus and the Punic fortresses of the Conca d’Oro
2.9. First step to defeat: the siege of Lilybaeum (autumn 277 BC)
2.10. “The king has turned to be a tyrant!”. The last months of Pyrrhus in Sicily and the rebellion of the Greeks (spring 276 BC)
CHAPTER THREE The First Punic War: Greeks and Natives of Sicily among Hellenistic Kingship, old Masters and new Conquerors
3.1. The first steps of Hiero II (276/275–271 BC): civil struggles and autocracy in the fate of Syracuse
3.2. “Getting rid from those barbarians”. Hiero’s warfare against the Mamertines (270–269 BC) and the alliances with the Greek city-states of eastern Sicily
3.3. Messina squeezed: the outbreak of the first Punic war, between diplomacy and fighting armies
3.4. Between resistance and deditiones: that is, how the Greek communities of eastern Sicily approached the Romans
3.5. “Friend of Rome, lord of Syracuse, king of Sicily”: the peace-treaty between Hiero and the Romans, and the new role of Syracuse within Sicily and the Mediterranean basin
3.6. The Greeks and the natives during the first Punic war; from the siege of Agrigentum to the first Roman mission to Africa (262–256 BC)
3.7. From Sicily to Africa, and the way back; tempests, Roman shipwrecks and first Punic crushes in the ejpikravteia (256–250 BC)
3.8. Lilybaeum, Eryx, Drepana: the Roman triumph and the new fate for the Greeks of Sicily (250–241 BC)
3.9. Romanisation or acculturation? Roman ways of approach towards the Sicilian city-states
3.10. Some signs of “realpolitik”.Rome and the city-states of Sicily between local identity and new politicalperspectives. The case-study of the Elymian cities
Conclusions
Bibliography
General Index
Index of classical references

Citation preview

Efrem Zambon Tradition and Innovation: Sicily between Hellenism and Rome

HISTORIA Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte Revue d’histoire ancienne Journal of Ancient History Rivista di storia antica –––––––––––––––––– EINZELSCHRIFTEN Herausgegeben von Kai Brodersen/Erfurt Mortimer Chambers/Los Angeles Martin Jehne/Dresden François Paschoud/Genève Aloys Winterling/Basel

HEFT 205

Efrem Zambon

Tradition and Innovation: Sicily between Hellenism and Rome

Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart 2008

Umschlagabbildung: Silbermünze von Hieron II. (274–216 v. Chr.) Vorderseite: Kopf des Hieron II. mit Diadem Rückseite: Nike in einer Quadriga Münzkabinett der staatlichen Museen Berlin Foto: Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin 2008

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. ISBN 978-3-515-09194-7 Jede Verwertung des Werkes außerhalb der Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Übersetzung, Nachdruck, Mikroverfilmung oder vergleichbare Verfahren sowie für die Speicherung in Datenverarbeitungsanlagen. © 2008 Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Druck: Printservice Decker & Bokor, München Printed in Germany

Contents PREFACE Introduction and acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 CHAPTER ONE Political evolution and historical events in the Greek city-states of Sicily from Agathocles’ death to Pyrrhus’ arrival (289–278 BC). . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.1. “The king is dead”: civil struggles and institutional changes in Syracuse, between a new democracy and further autocratic desires (289–287 BC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.2. Mercenaries, marauders and settlers: the foundation of the Mamertine State in Messina (287 BC). . . . . . . . . . . 33 1.3. Minor tyrants of eastern Sicily between Carthage and Syracuse: aims of power or istincts of self-preservation?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 1.4. Phintias and the revival of Agrigentum: history of a tyrant who wanted to look like an Hellenistic monarch (289/288–280? BC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 1.5. Hicetas’ autocratic rule in Syracuse: from victory to decline (285–279 BC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 1.6. “Another king will save us”: the last civil strife in Syracuse and the appeals to Pyrrhus (279–278 BC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 1.7. T he arrival of the Syracusan ambassadors and the first steps of Pyrrhus’ Sicilian expedition (summer-autumn 279 BC) . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 1.8. The Carthaginians on the international scene. The Punic diplomacy between Pyrrhus and Rome, and the renewal of the Romano-Punic alliance (autumn 279 – spring 278 BC). . . . . . . . . . 81 1.9. Some notes about the Romano-Carthaginian treaty: matters of understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 1.10. A passage of Diodorus and the carrying out of the treaty; quick cooperation in Rhegium (spring 278 BC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92



Contents

CHAPTER TWO Pyrrhus and the Greeks of Sicily: military events, political meanings and ideological implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 2.1. Preliminary notes. The situation in Sicily and Pyrrhus’ last arrangements for the expedition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 2.2. The situation in Magna Graecia. Some more enlightenments about the events in Rhegium. . . . . . . . . . . . 103 2.3. The first stage of the Sicilian adventure: from Taras to Syracuse (summer/autumn 278 BC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 2.4. The political title of Pyrrhus in Sicily: an example of Hellenistic kingship?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 2.5. Pyrrhus’ coinage in Sicily: Greek propaganda, ideological inferences and economic innovations. . . 121 2.6. The war-campaign of 277 BC. First steps of glory in southern Sicily: traces of Pyrrhus at Heraclea Minoa and Azones, between historical and archaeological evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 2.7. The war-campaign of 277 BC. From Selinous to Eryx; Pyrrhus’ march through the Elymian territories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 2.8. The conquest of Panormus and the Punic fortresses of the Conca d’Oro. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 2.9. First step to defeat: the siege of Lilybaeum (autumn 277 BC). . . . . . . . . 156 2.10. “The king has turned to be a tyrant!”. The last months of Pyrrhus in Sicily and the rebellion of the Greeks (spring 276 BC). . . . . . . . . . . . 167 CHAPTER THREE The first Punic war: Greeks and natives of Sicily among Hellenistic kingship, old masters and new conquerors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 3.1. The first steps of Hiero II as strathgo;~ aujtokravtwr (276/275 – 271 BC): civil struggles and autocracy in the fate of Syracuse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 3.2. “Getting rid from those barbarians”. Hiero’s warfares against the Mamertines (270–269 BC) and the alliances with the Greek city-states of eastern Sicily. . . . . . . . . . 191

Contents



3.3. Messina squeezed: the outbreak of the first Punic war, between diplomacy and fighting armies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 3.4. Between resistance and deditiones: that is, how the Greek communities of eastern Sicily approached the Romans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 3.5. “Friend of Rome, lord of Syracuse, king of Sicily”: the peace-treaty between Hiero and the Romans, and the new role of Syracuse within Sicily and the Mediterranean basin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 3.6. The Greeks and the natives during the first Punic war; from the siege of Agrigentum to the first Roman mission to Africa (262–256 BC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 3.7. From Sicily to Africa, and the way back; tempests, Roman shipwrecks and first Punic crushes in the ejpikravteia (256–250 BC). . . 233 3.8. Lylibaeum, Eryx and Drepana: the Roman triumph and the new fate for the Greeks of Sicily (250–241 BC). . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 3.9. Romanisation or acculturation? Roman ways of approach towards the Sicilian city-states. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 3.10. Some signs of “realpolitik”. Rome and the city-states of Sicily between local identity and new political perspectives. The case-study of the Elymian cities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 General index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 Index of classical references. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

Preface

Introduction and acknowledgements In the preface to his A History of Sicily. Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest, Moses Finley stated that in the history of the island one can always find some evidence of very important subjects, that can be referred to political, cultural or even demographic topics. At any rate, Sicilian history is an independent subject, above all because Sicily was always and forcefully involved with the history of Greece, of Carthage and Rome, perhaps in a way that was exclusive if compared with the other countries of the Mediterranean basin. I believe that this assertion is correct, and furthermore that it can be usefully applied to the historical period in which these three political entities stood against each other. This historical period is the basic object of the investigation in this book. It is not so extended, if considered under a simple chronological point of view, given that it covers just some fifty years of Sicilian memoirs (289–241 BC). Nevertheless, it was one of the most significant ages considering the political evolution in the chief city-states of the island. The two mentioned dates speak by themselves: 289 BC is the year of the murder of Agathocles, who had been the king of Syracuse and was acknowledged as a ruler by a great number of the Greek communities of eastern Sicily; 241 BC is the date of the Roman naval victory in the battle of the Aegates islands, which put an end to the first Punic war and marked the ultimate banishment of the Carthaginians from Sicily, fated to be the first official Roman provincia only some years afterwards. When Agathocles ruled in Syracuse and tried to go up against the Carthaginian attacks toward the eastern part of Sicily, the world outside the island deeply changed: the new Hellenistic monarchies grew up in the eastern Mediterranean basin, after the break down of the empire of Alexander the Great; neither Greece, nor Italy and even Sicily could ignore the power and the ambitions of the kings of Macedonia and Epirus (and even those of the Egyptian Ptolemies). Agathocles tried to follow the main suggestions of this transformation, giving to his own career new traits, if compared with the old tradition concerning the history of the Sicilian tyrannies. Nevertheless, even if the history of Sicily seems to overlap the history of Syracuse, one can only imagine what happened in the multifaceted universe of the Sicilian city-states and if Agathocles’ decisions were always accepted or rejected. The main question should be: did the Sicilian poleis follow the political choices of Agathocles, his Hellenistic way of thinking, his modernization of Sicilian history? Or did they follow the customary habits and the traditions which marked their past? I have decided to start my investigation from the detailed study of the few extant sources concerning the last months of Agathocles’ reign and his last political decisions, mainly for one reason. In spite of all the attempts made by the king of Syracuse to preserve his power, Agathocles kingdom collapsed; in that moment, one can try to restore the variety of reactions of several city-states, who preferred the traditional option of the tyranny. Anyway, the new tyrants did not behave as

12

Preface

conventional lords: they did not forget the example of Agathocles, and sometimes they decided to be called king. From that moment onwards, going through a number of crucial political happenings (the Sicilian venture of Pyrrhus; the different stages of the reign of Hiero in Syracuse; the uninterrupted struggles of the Greek communities against the Cartha­ ginians; last but not least, the coming of the Romans), the history of Sicilian poleis seem to be a incessant association of conservative alternatives and traits of political innovations. The main aim of this book is to state and enlighten most of the evidence and bring the readers into the task of its evaluation, and to follow the steps of the political evolution of Sicily in the first half of the III century BC, when the island became the first Hellenistic kingdom of the western Mediterranean, and after fifty years turned to be the first Roman provincia. This work is the revised and expanded version of a D.Phil. thesis which focused on the western expeditions of Pyrrhus, with particular reference to Sicily: the original topic of my PhD course was suggested to me by Lorenzo Braccesi (University of Padua). To treat the several topics faced during my investigation, I drew on different historiographical approaches: analysis of the literary sources and of the political language used by ancient authors; close attention to the propaganda items, stemming from the examination of both epigraphic and numismatic evidence; reevaluation of some archaeological data, always compared – when possible – with the historical accounts. I deeply wanted to use an inter-disciplinary approach, trying to stress the significance of each witness, since I attempted to make the material available to classicists and historians as well. During the elaboration of the work, I incurred in many debts, and it is for me a pleasure to list some of them; I want really to express all my gratitude, and this of course does not mean agreement or responsibility for any mistake remaining in the text. I have to express my gratefulness to a number of persons and friends who gave me some of their time and their precious suggestions while I was both conceiving the thesis and writing it; they all encouraged me throughout the process. I am glad to thank Giovannella Cresci Marrone (University of Venice “Ca’ Foscari”), for comments and assistance on every chapter, but especially for all the remarks concerning the Roman attitude towards the natives and the Greeks, and the Roman point of view about the relationships with both Pyrrhus and the Carthaginians. As well, I am grateful to Cinzia Bearzot (University “Cattolica” of Milan) for backing and unconditional scientific assistance, particularly on the value of the political language used by Plutarch in the Life of Pyrrhus. Flavio Raviola (University of Padua) and Luca Antonelli read carefully the earlier version of the text and gave me valuable suggestions about topics and textual readings; they even spent much of their time discussing some themes with me, always with a supportive attitude and a skilful methodology. Giovanni Millino, who has been first a friend and then a companion during the PhD course, conversed with me for nearly three years about Pyrrhus, without ever being annoyed by my doubts and troubles; I owe him a great debt for his patience and for his assessments.

Introduction and acknowledgements

13

While working, I took great advantage from the advices of John Kenyon Da­ vies (University of Liverpool): in addition to his friendship, he has offered me a masterly scholarship, giving many suggestions on a number of methodological traits, and I have learned from him to appraise the economic matters in ancient history, as well as to focus the attention on the different ethnical identities of Hellenistic Sicily. His kindness and his encouraging behaviour have supported me the whole time of my investigation. I would like to thank warmly Emmanuele Curti (Birkbeck College, London; Università della Basilicata), who helped me early on, reading the whole chapters of the thesis and giving me precious ideas, especially about some social aspects of Hellenistic Syracuse; and Kathryn Lomas (University College, London), who reviewed the early version of the text when she was in Newcastle and cheated about the main topics with me enduringly (even by E-Mail). I owe her particular thanks, since she gave me the chance to join some international conferences in the United Kingdom, where I met many other scholars who shared with me their opinions about my work. Likewise, it is for me a pleasure to acknowledge my great thankfulness to the following people, for assistance, criticism, discussion and any encouragement: Roger Brock (University of Leeds), Tim Cornell (University of Manchester), Stefania De Vido (University of Venice “Ca’ Foscari”), Simon Hornblower (University College, London: I have learnt much from him about historiographical matters concerning the lost historians of Hellenistic Sicily), Sian Lewis (University of St. Andrews), Claude Mossé (Ecole des Hautes Etudes – Paris; she masterly and helpfully discussed with me about Agathocles and Hellenistic kingship), Jonathan Prag (University of Oxford, who kindly let me read his paper on the Cotta’s miliarius before publication), Louis Rawlings (Cardiff University), N.K. Rutter (University of Edinburgh, especially for his help with the coinage), Stephen Ruzicka (University of North Carolina – Greensboro), Brian Shefton (University of Newcastle upon Tyne), Slawomir Sprawski (Jagjellonian University – Krakow), Christopher Tuplin (University of Liverpool), Grace West (University of Dallas). I have finally to thank prof. Kai Brodersen (formerly University of Mannheim, now University of Erfurt) for the suggestions concerning the publication of the book and the editorial process; but first of all I owe him my gratitude for his tolerance in regards to my delays and hesitations. This book could not have been conceived and written without the loving support and the devoted encouragement of both my parents, my wife Paola and my sons Jacopo and Elisabetta (not always sensibly understood by me): I owe them my supreme gratitude.

CHAPTER ONE Political Evolution and Historical Events in the Greek City-States of Sicily from Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival (289–278 BC)

1.1. “The king is dead”: civil struggles and institutional changes in Syracuse, between a new democracy and further autocratic desires (289–287 BC) The whole Sicily, which during the two previous decades (310–290 BC) had been powerfully attracted from the sphere of the Syracusan empire re-created by Agathocles, and had found in the cohesion the real remedy against the always pressing interferences of the Carthaginians, fell heavily in a serious condition of anarchy in consequence of the death of the Syracusan ruler. In that moment all the traditional problems, that had always been the fundamental, distinctive features of the politics in the Greek Sicily, emerged once again overbearingly: a yearning after autonomy from every single city-state; internal dissensions that habitually, starting from a naturally political ambit, transformed themselves in bloody civil struggles; a growing pressure from the Punic armies, made to extend the Carthaginians’ dominions toward the eastern part of the Island. To all these peculiarities, another matter must be added, which fits specifically with this historical moment; that is, the presence and the new role of the many mercenaries who had served in Agathocles’ army. The events in Syracuse were symbolic in comparison with all these elements, and they can be taken as an example of what happened in many Sicilian city-states after the breaking up of the Agathoclean empire. Very little is known about the other towns, owing to the deficiency of the historical evidence; indeed, though taking for granted the lacunas of our sources, it is possible to reconstruct the events that shook the political life of Syracuse after 289 BC; those affairs deeply struck root in the circumstances that immediately preceded Agathocles’ death. As a matter of fact, the shattering of Syracuse’s dominions began in the months that were dedicated to the restless preparations of the war against Carthage, in the same year 289 BC, when the Syracusan commander had a fast bodily decline; owing to this decrease, he was in need to settle the dynastic succession to the throne, to preserve unharmed his previously conquered territories and clearly to legitimize for his heir the fight against the Carthaginians. According to the fragmentary narrative of Diodorus Siculus, the king Agathocles, very aged by that time, entrusted Archagathus – who was the son of the homonymous Syracusan commanding officer, died in the first mission to North Africa – with the control of his armies. 

The bibliography about Agathocles and his government over Sicily and Syracuse is plentiful. There are some works indeed that are worth to be mentioned; see Schubert 1887; Tillyard 1908; De Sanctis 1895, 289–331 (= De Sanctis 1909, 141–206 = De Sanctis 1966, 205– 248); Berve 1953; Meister 1967; Mossé 1969, 167–177; Consolo Langher 1980, II 1, 289–342; Vattuone 1983; Meister 1984, 384–411 (with bibliography at 574–577); Braccesi 1998, 101–110. A great number of papers concerning the age of Agathocles have been produced by an Italian scholar, Sebastiana Consolo Langher; the outcome of her research has been collected in a monographic volume, which includes the most recent bibliographic survey about Agathocles: see Consolo Langher 2000.

18

Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

Therefore, this Archagathus was the king’s nephew on his father’s side. There is not actually any doubt about the ability and the skilfulness of the new general; indeed, Diodorus portrays him twice as a top-quality man, better than his contemporaries on account of bravery and boldness; he was still young when he received his task from Agathocles. In the meanwhile, the king of Syracuse, after devoting himself to transfer the strathgiva – to say, all the tasks concerning the military sphere – in the hands of a deserving recipient, had to choose who had to be the trustee of his kingship. He designated his homonymous son, Agathocles junior, as his heir on Syracuse’s throne, and made him acknowledged as his successor into the presence of the Syracusan people; this detail, which comes as usual from the summary of Diodorus’ book 21, is very important to stress the support that the people of Syracuse gave to Agathocles’ rule for the whole of its extent. I do not mean that the decision was ratified by the popular assembly, of course; after all, it was a king’s choice, and it needed not to be strengthened by any other political office in the city. Then, Agathocles sent his son to the neighbourhood of mount Etna, where ­Archagathus was encamped with a part of the army, and committed him a letter where he ordered to his commander to hand over his son the authority on the armies and the fleet. It seems clear to me, in this case, that Agathocles wanted to concentrate once again in the hands of a single person – to say, Agathocles junior – the offices of strathgov~ and basileuv~, as if he intended to avoid a dangerous division of the powers and the institutes that, till that moment, had joined together Syracuse and a lot of Sicily. Archagathus was evidently surprised at this decision, and when he understood that the reign would concern another but himself, he plotted a plan to eliminate both the king and his son. And Archagathus’ astonishment must not be ascribed – as it has been – to a supposed betrayal of the aged Agathocles, as if the king, granting him the strathgiva, had even appointed him implicitly to the succession in the kingship. As a matter of fact, it seems to me that the two offices, which anyway have been held before by one person alone, had a juridical basis and institutes which were thoroughly separate. It is quite obvious that Archagathus, after  In general, see Niese 1895, col. 432. The historical evidence is Diod. 21, 16, 2–3 (= excerpta Hoescheliana 491 W.) (military duty of Archagathus and description of his character). Diod. 21, 16, 7 (= excerpta Constantiniana 2, 254) has a different reading of the name, that is Agatharchus.  A brief biography of Agathocles’ son is in Niese 1893, col. 757. Agathocles junior was born from the marriage of his father with Alkia, and therefore was the brother of Lanassa, who became at first the wife of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, and then married Demetrius the Besieger. The account of his appointment to the succession is provided by Diod. 21, 16, 3. According to La Bua 1968, 122, the choice of Agathocles was approved even by Demetrius the Besieger when Agathocles junior was sent to him as an official ambassador (a different opinion in Consolo Langher 1980, II 1, 320; Agathocles’ choice should follow the diplomatic mission of his son); but I am confident that we could not take for support the detail that Demetrius received Agathocles junior with royal honours, since we have to bear in mind that Demetrius was an Hellenistic king, and paid royal honours to the son of another king; therefore, he simply respected the traditional custom of the new monarchies.  La Bua 1968, 122–123.

1.1. “The king is dead”

19

receiving the army’s command, looked forward to be designated as heir to the throne of Agathocles; but this was not the king’s project, as Diodorus clearly shows. For this reason, the strathgov~ was not afraid of planning a conspiracy, just because a portion of the army supported him, as we shall soon see. In the vicissitudes of the monarchy, a new character came into play at the right moment; that is Menon. Diodorus Siculus provides some news about him. Menon was born in Segesta. When Agathocles destroyed his town in 307 BC, he was captured as prisoner of war, but thanks to his incredible beauty he became one of the king’s personal slaves, and what’s more he was numbered in the group of the favourites and the king’s fivloi. It has been said properly that, just thanks to this official qualification of “Friend”, Menon must have retained some peculiar political duties, because he had a share in the restricted council of the Syracusan monarchy. Nevertheless he was delighted of this duty for a while; really, he nourished feelings of hatred towards his protector Agathocles – this is a point of view on which Diodorus particularly focuses his attention – and meditated plans of revenge, especially on account of the devastation suffered by Segesta and owing to the fact that Agathocles sexually violated him. Archagathus got in touch exactly with Menon, and he committed him the task of slaughtering the king, while he kept for himself the murder of the appointed heir. Whilst he was celebrating an offering to the gods in an island that cannot be ascertained with certainty (but it may be supposed that it lays offshore the eastern coast of Sicily), Archagathus invited to the ceremony Agathocles junior, who was sailing towards the army’s encampment near Etna; he made him drunk and he murdered him at night. Roughly at the same time, even the old Agathocles was poisoned in Syracuse by Menon: the tooth-pick, that the king used habitually after dinner, had been dipped by the favourite fivlo~ in a powerful, efficacious poison, which caused to the king a creeping gangrene. The death came soon after. 



Kroll 1931, col. 927, gives a short summary of Menon’s life. The account of Diod. 21, 16, 2 is particularly evocative with reference to the motivations that drove Menon to act against ­Agathocles. The Greek city-state of Segesta, in the Elymian area of Sicily, was conquered by Agathocles at the beginning of 307 BC; some time later the town was destroyed and the citizens were ferociously punished for their resistance; see the account of the events of Diod. 20, 71, 1–5 and the critical evaluation of the passage in Consolo Langher 1980, II 1, 310–311 and 337, note 115 (Diodorus’ account should derive from a local, native Segestan source, and maybe from the oral account of some fugitives); furthermore, see Consolo Langher 1997B, 381– 399. Mafodda 1979, 201 gives a proper explanation of the role played usually by a fivlo~ and the political meaning of the office held by Menon. Pareti 1959, 243–244 links too strongly the ethnic origin of Menon with his desire to see the destruction of Syracuse and the death of ­Agathocles; I am confident to show that the aspiration of Menon was connected with the absolute power – perhaps with the kingship – and this has nothing to do with his Segestan origin. Huttl 1929, 133–134; Pareti 1959, 239–240; La Bua 1968, 123–124; Consolo Langher 1980, II 1, 320. The historical account is provided by Diod. 21, 16, 3 (murder of Agathocles junior) and 4 (Menon’s poisoning of king Agathocles). There is even another historical tradition concerning the death of Agathocles; according to it, the death came for natural reasons, and was due to a disease that began while he was waging a military campaign against the Bruttians; the account is provided by Just. 23, 2, 3–5. For a useful comparative analysis of the two historical traditions, see Consolo Langher 1990A, 157–162. The correct setting of Agathocles’ junior

20

Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

As I said before, Diodorus’ narrative is very scrappy and even if it allows an easy reconstruction of the events, it does not explain with enough usefulness every aspect of the succession to Agathocles. Therefore, I think that some matters deserve a more profound scrutiny. First of all, I am persuaded that it is necessary to find out why Archagathus was at the foot of mount Etna, together with a portion of the Syracusan army and fleet. It has been conjectured that those were the troops that the old Agathocles had gathered considering a new military expedition in North Africa, and that the fleet riding at anchor offshore was the one appointed to the infantry’s transport towards the Carthaginian territory. Some other scholars thought that Archagathus’ army consisted entirely of mercenary troops. Nevertheless, I prefer to turn the attention again to Diodorus’ excerpta; in book 21 (16, 1), it seems that the massive Syracusan fleet (quadriremes and hexeres, fully manned; in all, two hundred ships) had to be parted in two squadrons. In fact, the task of Agathocles’ fleet was twofold; on the one hand, the navy had to carry out the transfer of the army in Africa; on the other hand, it had to prevent the Carthaginians from being able to supply themselves with grain, importing it from Sardinia and Sicily. A question not of minor irrelevance derives again from the diodorean account, as far as it concerns the precise commission of Archagathus; actually, if one base himself on Diodorus’ information (21, 16, 2), it seems that Archagathus had the command only of the troops that were drawn up in the open field, i.e. of the infantry and maybe cavalry (this seems to me the literal meaning of the diodorean saying ta;~ uJpaivqrou~ dunavmei~); indeed, if one goes along with the data given by the excerpta in the following paragraph (21, 16, 3), it is possible to infer that Archagathus was even the commander in chief of the fleet (nauvarco~), since he was ordered by the king to hand over to his son both pezika;~ kai; nautika;~ dunavmei~. Stirring among many conjectures, I believe that one fact remains indisputable; that the military forces at the disposal of Archagathus could not be the same troops and ships made ready for Africa by Agathocles. It should be minded that Diodorus – making reference to the king’s planning – writes absolutely of great preparations of nautikai` dunavmei~, but never of an army: clearly, Agathocles’ purpose was to displace simultaneously the war both in the Mediterranean sea and in Africa. I guess it is more logical to see in the fleet sailing offshore the eastern coasts of Sicily a squadron that had the assignment of patrolling the commercial route which went assassination is unknown; anyway, I want to point out the suggestion made by Pareti 1959, 239, in whose opinion the correct location should be the modern Isola dei Ciclopi, on the eastern coast of Sicily, in front of the seashores of Aci Trezza.  It may be worth quoting the Greek text of Diod. 21, 16, 1: dienoei`to (i.e. Agathocles) gavr pavlin eij~ th;n Libuvhn diabibavzein stratovpeda, kai; tai`~ nausi;n ei[rgein tou;~ Foivnika~ tw`n ajpo; tw`n Sardw`n kai; Sikelw`n sitopompiw`n.  A correct translation of the Greek adjective uJpaivqro~ is problematic (see Liddell-Scott, ad locum), but the meaning seems to be very clear; the uJpaivqroi dunavmei~ of Diod. 21, 16, 2 are the encamped troops, and for that reason they can be only infantry troops; this does not mean that they were quite exclusively mercenary troops (as supposed by La Bua 1968, 127 and Mafodda 1979, 200, note 16).

1.1. “The king is dead”

21

northwards, through the Strait of Messina, to the Tyrrhenian sea: one of the most travelled grain trade routes in the West! One should not be astonished for the muddle which distinguishes the diodorean text as it concerns Archagathus’ military offices before they were officially appointed to Agathocles junior. As I said, before the heritage in the basileiva and in the strathgiva was assigned by Agathocles to his son, the strathgov~ was legitimately Archagathus: therefore, it is evident that even the navy had, for any reason, to refer to him, as if the office of strategos included the duties of the nauvarco~. One matter remains to be established, that is, who were the troops encamped at the foot of mount Etna and what were their duties: I will attempt to answer these questions in my work later. A following riddle necessarily involves the relationship between Archagathus and Menon, because in the depiction of Diodorus Siculus it is not enlightened, nay it strikes for its immediate simplicity. Why Archagathus made use of the complicity of the young boy from Segesta to get rid of Agathocles? Clearly, the enlightenment must be sought in some previous relationships between the two plotters, and Archagathus could blindly trust to his colleague only in one instance; he had to know very well how much Menon had strictly personal relations with the king and how much intensely he had a mortal hatred of him. I have already observed how much Diodorus insists on Menon’s detestation of Agathocles, both for the devastation of his motherland Segesta, and for the sexual brutalities he suffered from the king. The swift resolution of Archagathus, that is to come to an agreement with Menon for the manslaughter of the king, persuades obviously to conjecture previous relationships between the two of them. On the other hand, there is no surviving evidence of earlier concurrences turned to the formulation of a palace plot. There is indeed another very ticklish question, which has been surprisingly overlooked by the scholars; that’s why I believe it is worth to be investigated in details. Diodorus Siculus is not at all the only source of information on what happened during the last year of Agathocles’ life. Indeed, we own the data coming from the epitome of the lost historical work written by Pompeius Trogus, the Historiae Phi­ lippicae, made by Justin; particularly, one has to take care of the book 23, chapter 2. Unfortunately, this section has been considered merely for the final news, which concern the counter-offensive of the Carthaginians in Sicily in the days of Agathocles’ death. Justin says that “dum haec aguntur Karthaginienses, cognitis quae in Sicilia agebantur, occasionem totius insulae occupandae datam sibi extimantes, magnis viribus eo traiciunt multasque civitates subigunt”. This datum has not been accepted unquestionably; some scholars have made a close connection between the movements of Carthaginian troops and the military preparations ordered by Agathocles in the months immediately previous to his death. Others thought that this la

The question has been rightly pointed out by La Bua 1968, 123: I believe he went too far when he suggested that king Agathocles quickly appointed his son as successor in the kingship because he had news concerning a conspiracy plotted against him by Archagathus and Menon together.

22

Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

conic mention of Justin was an author’s effort to join Agathocles’ death with the Sicilian expedition of Pyrrhus, so that the Punic offensive at issue should be the one broken out in 278 BC. The most recent attitude of the commentators seems to encourage a positive revaluation of Justin’s remark, taking for granted its very problematical placement within the historical context. I cannot help assenting this previous consideration; it seems to me plain that a lessening in the chronology is not at all advantageous, therefore the statement of Justin must not be dated to 278 BC. In the same way, it is patent that several months of evolution of the military operations in Sicily must have been shortened in Pompeius Trogus’ succinct account; really, there are no news relating to towns conquered again by the Carthaginians before the death of Agathocles, whereas we know that a large amount of Punic troops was in Sicily after Agathocles’ demise, when – as we shall see – they rushed to the help of Menon. As far as we know, the towns were recaptured by the Carthaginian army while pushing eastwards in Sicily and only after the decease of the Syracusan king10. But this is not the crucial point of the subject. The whole paragraph of Justin’s epitome provides very important details exactly about the succession to Agathocles’ throne. Justin portrays Agathocles as seriously ill, compelled to give up his military operations against the Bruttians and to come back to Sicily. More specifically, at 23, 2, 5, it is said: ex qua desperatione bellum inter filium nepotemque eius regnum iam quasi mortui vindicantibus oritur; occiso filio regnum nepos occupavit. The information, which is very embarrassing to take into consideration, makes available some elements that are not existing in Diodorus Siculus’ narrative. In both the ancient sources we have news concerning a war between Agathocles ju­ nior and Archagathus; but only here, as it seems to me, we learn that the struggle broke out independently from the hereditary wills of the king of Syracuse. So far as Justin describes it, I suppose that Agathocles, while he was sick, did not choose anyone of the two contenders as heir to his basileiva, because even Agathocles junior tried to seize upon the kingdom – whereas, according to Diodorus’ report, the sovereignty had already to be his own. What's more, we come to know that after Agathocles junior’s decease – which, I assume, happened during a battle, and not for a wicked, premeditated murder – Archagathus took possession of the kingship, clearly depriving of power even the dying Agathocles. Therefore, in Justin’s account there is no trace either of Menon or of a violent death of the king of Syracuse. In the following paragraph (23, 2, 6), Trogus tells that Agathocles, when he gave up 10 The historical value of Just. 23, 2, 13 has not been accepted without any doubt by all the modern scholars; for a critical survey see Niese 1893, 487, note 3 (the information has to be connected with the military preparations made by Agathocles before his death); Beloch 19272, IV 1, 542, note 1 (he dated the news to 278 BC, and thought that the passage was a sign of the great efforts made by Justin to link in his epitome the death of Agathocles and the Sicilian venture of Pyrrhus); Vallone 1955, 28–29 and 31 (she believed in the reliability of Justin’s text, but she did not compromise with the chronology); Lévêque 1957, 453 (supports Beloch’s conjecture); Pareti 1959, 244 (the passage includes a summary of many years of Sicilian historical events); La Bua 1968, 129, note 46 (encouraged a re-evaluation of Justin’s account). More recently, Galli 1982, 151–169 emphasized the historical significance of Pompeius Trogus’ work for the history of Agathocles.

1.1. “The king is dead”

23

hope to save himself (undoubtedly, this happened after his nephew took the power), let his wife Theoxena and the two children run away to Egypt, being frightened of the chance that they found an enemy in Archagathus (timens ne praedonem regni sui hostem paterentur)11. But there is something more. From the prologus of the book 23 it is possible to gain another piece of evidence, concerning a detail which was clearly described in the lost work of Trogus and has been skipped by Justin in his summary. The pro­ logus states: Omnibus subactis rex seditione filii exheredati ac nepotis oppressus interiit. Once again one can see here a different report, though it is not mismatched with the previous passage of Justin’s epitome: anyway, the completely new information concerns the position of Agathocles junior. Indeed, it must be supposed that at first he had been chosen to succeed his father, but then Agathocles came back to his decisions and deprived his son of the inheritance, which was the kingdom. As for the nephew Archagathus, his role was fully matching with the news provided by the accounts of Diodorus Siculus and Justin’s abstract of Pompeius Trogus. Nonetheless, the two Trogian evidences can be joined together. It is more than believable that, on account of the king’s new decision, a struggle broke out between the two “rebels”, Agathocles junior and Archagathus. The piece of information that Pompeius Trogus – to be more exact, Trogus’ source – does not make clear, and that it seems to me correct to inquire about, is the following: who was Agathocles’ designated heir? Unfortunately, this is a question that has to be left unsolved. However, even if at first sight the two pieces of evidence are different for their contents and structures – even owing to the fragmentary character of the text of Diodorus, and to the summary of Trogus’ one – I assume they are fit for a useful comparison. Archagathus’ rebellion – the one which is mentioned in the prologus to Pompeius Trogus’ book 23 – is easily recognizable even in Diodorus Siculus’ book 21 (16, 3); it was a natural consequence of a decline in prestige and a lack of power, produced by Agathocles’ choice to transfer to his son the offices of a military kind. Apparently, the allusion of Trogus to an open war between Agathocles junior and his competitor may seem less understandable; actually, Diodorus does not speak of 11 To all intents and purposes, it is impossible to say without doubt who was Theoxena. The marriage with Agathocles has been mentioned by Just. 23, 2, 6. It has been suggested that she was the daughter born from the marriage between Ptolemy I Soter and Euridike, i.e. the daughter of Antipater of Macedonia (Beloch 19272, IV 1, 201; Beloch 19272, IV 2, 179). Other scholars thought she was the daughter of Ptolemy I Soter and his wife Berenike (Bouché-Leclerq 1903, I, 42, note 3; 87 and 90: Geyer 1934, coll. 2255–2256). The first hypothesis has been supported by Nenci 1953, 122–123, in whose opinion the date for the marriage between ­Agathocles and Theoxena should be set in the period 310–307 BC (Berve 1953, 67 shared this chronological point of view), and the wedding should be interpreted in the light of the great anti-Punic political plans that were common to the Ptolemies of Egypt and to Agathocles (con­ tra Lévêque 1956, 83–90). The second conjecture has been once again proposed – with more convincing arguments, I believe – by Will 1964, 324–326, note 1 (= Will 1998, 344–345, note 24), who proposed a date around 300 BC and was followed in this by Seibert 1967, 73 and 104. For a lower chronology, approximately 295 BC, see Huss 1979, 127, note 32. The most recent survey of the argument in Manni 1984, 480–483 (= Manni 1990, 289–294).

24

Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

a warfare, but one must admit that even in his narrative there is an unfriendly connection between the two challengers to the kingship, and it took place in an unknown little island facing the eastern coast of Sicily. So, the wrestle between ­Agathocles junior and Archagathus is absolutely unquestionable, because the aimed role of basileuv~ was at stake. It is not fully verifiable if there was a fight, or not; but the very piece of evidence – provided by Diodorus (21, 16, 3) – bearing out that Archagathus was in command of troops drawn up near mount Etna, may suggest that he was ready for any occasion. It is yet undeniable that on the other side of the background – that is the fight between Agathocles junior and his cousin – one has most of all to enlighten the struggle between two political factions, who were both linked to the sphere of the king’s fivloi. One party, who related with the strathgov~ and included even the slave Menon – without any doubt, if we trust on the diodorean account –, believed in the legitimacy of Archagathus’ claims concerning the basileiva, and evidently was supported unconditionally by the greatest part of the army. The other party was formed by all the pro-agathoclean men, who remained trustworthy to the king’s choices and, far from judging the designated heir as an inexperienced boy, chewed over Archagathus’ ambiguous plans with great worries12. The discrepancies between the narratives of Diodorus and Justin are nonetheless the minority; in short, they can be reduced to the fickle relationship between Agathocles and his son, who was a rumoured mutineer (he was designated heir to the throne in Diodorus’ account; he was disinherited by his father in Justin’s epitome – but clearly after he had been officially appointed as the kingdom’s successor); and to the reason of the death of the old Syracusan king (who died for the consequences of a terrible and powerful disease, according to Justin; on the other side, he had been poisoned by his favourite Menon, in the narrative of Diodorus). The matter, which cannot be worked out in a strictly historical prospect, finds a more than conceivable solution if one thinks about the different historical sources that Diodorus and Pompeius Trogus employed in their works concerning Agathocles; that, according to the scholars, were Duris of Samos and Timaeus of Tauromenium13. 12 Mafodda 1979, 199–200, has pointed out the existence in Agathocles’ entourage of some political factions, but he then indicated only one party, which should have been favourable to Archagathus and opposite to Agathocles junior. Consolo Langher 1980, II 1, 314–315, quoting Polyaen. Stratagemata 5, 15, has rightly emphasized the role of Agathocles’ fivloi as a sort of concilium principis already from 316 BC. For a different opinion about Agathocles’ kingship, see Lévêque 1957, 462; Lévêque 1968–1969, 148. 13 For some different positions of the modern historians about the historical sources of Diodorus and Pompeius Trogus on the history of Agathocles’ age, see Schwartz 1905A, coll. 1853– 1856 (the historical work of Duris was the source of information of Diodorus); De Sanctis 1958, 99–102 (Diodorus’ books 19 and 20 based on Duris’ histories); Cary 1928, 617–637 (Timaeus as source for Diodorus’ account); Manni 1957–1958, 81–88 (= Manni 1990, 599– 605); Manni 1960, 167–173 (= Manni 1990, 525–531); Manni 1970, 74–78 (= Manni 1990, 609–612); Dolce 1960, 124–166 (Diodorus’ narrative based upon the comparative reading of Duris’ and Timaeus’ works, made by Silenus: conjecture rightly rejected by Meister 1970A, 84–91); Orlandi 1964, 216–226; La Bua 1966, 195–198 (properly stressing Schwartz’s hy-

1.1. “The king is dead”

25

Agathocles junior, in that case, was killed or murdered by Archagathus. His body, after being thrown in the sea, was driven by the streams as far as Syracuse’s shores, where it was fished out and identified14. Even his father who, owing to Diodorus’ account, should already have been a prey to the atrocious pangs of the long anguish following the poisoning (or produced by a sickness, in Justin’s summary), became acquainted of the felony. His reaction was severe and, at any rate, really unforeseeable, as we learn from Diodorus (21, 16, 4), who reports that when Agathocles was on the brink of death, he summoned the ejkklhsiva, reported the impious deed of Archagathus and induced the crowd to take revenge on him; most of all, he said that he wanted to give the democracy to the people. Almost always, the scholars wanted to regard the sudden decision of Agathocles as a rough oversight in the assessment of the political events, more or less brought about by his old age and the hurtful, lengthy anguish of the king’s body. No doubt, that pronouncement led to massive outcomes, not only in the Syracusan povli~; a renewed eagerness distinguished, in the months following the king’s death, the struggles between the democratic party of Syracuse and the faction of Menon, and I guess it was only a pattern of what happened in the towns of the former ­Agathoclean empire, who then had become independent. Indeed, it is plain that the choice of giving back the democracy to the Syracusans meant, in one sense, even the formal grant of independence to all the other city-states that once were under Agathocles’ control. It is of course reasonable and very fitting to acknowledge that, in order to allow the basileiva to endure over the slaughter of his own natural descent, Agathocles had necessarily to give his preference to the plotter, Archagathus; but the king clearly did not want to abandon his kingdom’s destiny in a slayer’s hands. The choice of Agathocles has to be considered just from this point of view: it has been said that “Agathocles restores the republican and democratic freedom to the citizens of Syracuse, because he understood that the kingship could not survive anymore as a political institution”. This statement of Helmut Berve, which is surely a little bit forced, seems to me to hit the mark; Agathocles favoured the dh`mo~ of Syracuse against his nephew Archagathus in the succession; nay, he wanted the people to decide if they could trust in Archagathus as a good heir, or if the restoration of the democracy was a better alternative. Obviously, Agathocles knew very well what would have been the people’s preference, because the lifetime of the kingship in Syracuse came to an end, as the events of those days clearly showed. This is the reason why Agathocles’ last provision seems not to be a meaningless pronouncement, rather the outgrowth of an ultimate, sharp calculation in politics; it

pothesis); Consolo Langher 1990A, 43–133; Consolo Langher 1990A, 157–162; Sacks 1994, 213–232. The last valuable work about the topic is Consolo Langher 1999B, giving even a wide bibliography. As regards a general view of Timaeus, his age and his works, see usefully Brown 1958, particularly 71–90; Pearson 1987; Vattuone 1991; Walbank 1992, 5–24; Vattuone 2002, 177–232. For a general survey about Duris, see Ferrero 1963, 68– 100; Kebric 1977; Pédech 1989; Landucci Gattinoni 1997 (giving a detailed bibliography). 14 See Diod. 21, 16, 3, a pathetic account, based no doubt on Duris’ description of the event.

26

Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

seems much more the end result of a skilful estimation of the events, than of the thirst of revenge against a murderer15. Few days after the democracy had been re-established, Agathocles died; according to Diodorus Siculus’ narrative (21, 16, 5), he was still alive, but already unconscious, when the representative of king Demetrius the Besieger, named Oxy­ themis16, made the king’s body be placed on the funeral pile and be burnt. In the meantime, a quick constitutional transformation took place in Syracuse, and the democratic faction strengthened his position to power; the people’s reaction to the news of the death of the old king – who since ever had been regarded by the Syracusans more as a tyrant than as a basileuv~ – was vehement; clearly, the king’s option to restore the democracy could not itself change the citizens’ attitude towards the monarchy. And so, as if they wanted to make good their previous losses, the greatest part of the Syracusans demanded the requisition of Agathocles’ properties; probably, this was the first legislative measure to indicate that the Syracusan ­ejkklhsiva, who delivered the confiscation’s decree, had completely regained her autonomy. As for the rest, on the account of the solitary support given by Diodorus (21, 16, 6), many violent actions took place in the town and a resentful damnatio memoriae, mainly with the demolition of all the king’s statues and portraits. A further confirmation of the constitutional change is provided by the coinage: some bronze coins, of the same kind of those minted by the Syracusan mint during Agathocles’ reign, have been appropriately dated to the period which followed the king’s death, as it is illustrated by the figurative typologies and the plain legend, which commemorate Zeus Eleutherios17 and Artemis Soteira; moreover, contrary to the bronze coins previously issued, they all display the legend SURAKOSIWN, that gives even more reasons for their democratic connotation. There are particularly four issues that have been quite univocally attributed to this period by the scholars18:

15 Some different opinions have been expressed about the restoration of the democracy made by Agathocles; see De Sanctis 1895, 329–331 (= De Sanctis 1909, 204–206 and De Sanctis 1966, I, 246–248; a wrong decision, but humanly understandable); Pareti 1959, 240; Manni 1966, 161 (a sound choice, since Agathocles could not accept a new government based upon the murder of his son); La Bua 1968, 124–125 (a heavy mistake and a meaningless pronouncement). 16 According to Diod. 21, 15, 1, this Oxythemis was appointed by Demetrius the Besieger to take back home in Syracuse Agathocles junior, after he signed a formal treaty of alliance and friendship with the king, but nonetheless his real duty was to watch over the development of events in Sicily. See in general Lenschau 1942, coll. 2046–2047; Athen. Deipn. 6, 253a; 14, 614c. In 304 BC, after Athens had been freed by the Besieger, Oxythemis was appointed with the honorary citizenship by the Athenians; Syll.3 nr. 343. 17 The portrait of Zeus coupled with the title of Eleutherios no doubt ever had a connotation clearly unfavourable to tyrannies; see Gielow 1940–1941, 103–114; Garraffo 1976–1977, 9–50; Castrizio 2002, 151–168. On the names of the “saving-Gods”, like the case of Artemis, see usefully Manganaro 1965A, 174–178. 18 See Poole 1876, 200; Holm 1906, 194; Head 19112, 182; Gabrici 1927, 81–82; Holloway 1962, 12–17.

1.1. “The king is dead”

27

− Obv. Head of Artemis; inscription SWTEIRA. Rev. Winged thunderbolt; inscription DIOS ELEUQERIOU. − Obv. Head of Zeus; inscription DIOS ELEUQERIOU. Rev. Winged thunderbolt; inscription SURAKOSIWN. − Obv. Head of Artemis; inscription SWTEIRA. Rev. Winged thunderbolt; inscription SURAKOSIWN. − Obv. Head of Zeus. Rev. Winged thunderbolt; inscription DIOS ELEUQE­ RIOU. Some other scholars have ascribed to the same period of restored democracy other three coins, perhaps emphasizing some aspects both of their devices and of their inscriptions that could be referred to a “democratic” happening (particularly the suddenly disappeared sign of the king, and the contemporary appearance of the mark SURAKOSIWN)19. Even if we do not have any evidence, it is reasonable to imagine that, ensuing from the democracy’s reinstatement and the following formation of a republican government in Syracuse, took place some banishments – or voluntary exiles – of the representatives of the other political factions. It is worth while to remember that in Syracuse there were not only a democratic party and a political faction of proagathoclean men; as I have previously highlighted, quite before Agathocles’ death, his friends divided themselves at least in two different groups. Consequently, it is very feasible that all the former Agathocles’ fivloi had been expelled from Syracuse; one could not give other reasons for the departure from the town of Menon, who had been an outstanding exponent of the party challenging Agathocles, but at the same time he even belonged to the restricted entourage of the king’s favourites – and most of all, if one accepts the literary tradition of Duris, that has been used by Diodorus Siculus, he had been the real author of the king’s poisoning: an action which had to inspire the approbation of all the democrats towards him. As a matter of fact, we know thanks to Diodorus (21, 16, 6) that Menon, immediately after the government’s revolution in Syracuse, was beside his associate Archagathus in the encampment at the foot of mount Etna, where he arrived sailing from Syracuse’s harbour. As I mentioned before, this information clearly shows that all the supporters of the party defending the monarchy run away from Syracuse, both the friends who were devoted to Agathocles and those who were against him: but I suspect that the diodorean news keep secret on some details20. 19 The most famous among the three issues has on the obv. the head of Heracles and a shortened inscription SUR, with a lion on the reverse; for the undecided chronology, see Gabrici 1927, 81–82; Consolo Langher 1964, 320, nr. 598 (between 289 and 287 BC); Holm 1906, 191 (310–306 BC); Giesecke 1923, 103; Naster 1959, 124, nr. 688 (279 BC); Forrer 1922, plate 65, nr. 1689 (age of Pyrrhus in Sicily); Holloway 1979, 92 (last period of Agathocles’ life). It may be worth mentioning that Jenkins 1968, 153–154 has stated that the group D of the electrum coinage minted at Syracuse – bearing the devices of Apollo and Artemis – was issued in the “interregnum” between the death of Agathocles and the autocratic government of Hicetas. A useful survey of the Syracusan issues of this period is made by Rutter 1997, 174–176. 20 For the banishment of the citizens who at an early stage supported Agathocles, see Vallone 1955, 30; La Bua 1968, 126; Mafodda 1979, 199.

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Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

Why did Menon flee from Syracuse? I assume it is patent the unfeasibility to declare that his hasty departure was an immediate outcome of Agathocles’ poisoning, because as we have already seen this action drew on him even the approval of the democratic party; on the other hand, it is more than reasonable that his escape took place at the same time with the flee of the other promoters of the monarchic faction. Hence, I think it is necessary to postulate a convincing reason that drove the democrats to banish Menon, “the tyrannicide”. In this case, the mysteriousness of Diodorus, that is owed to the fragmentary character of his surviving text, is anyway revealing a precious detail. At 21, 16, 6 he wrote that Mevnwn […] pefronhma­ tismevno~ de; ejpi; tw`/ dokei`n katalelukevnai th;n basileivan, to;n me;n ∆Arcavgaqon ejdolofovnhse (“Menon, who grew proud, because it seemed that he himself had overthrown the kingdom, treacherously killed Archagathus”). As it has been previously remarked, the diodorean slight indication makes understanding that the real undertaking of Menon – which was somewhat of a secret, but not too much – was taking the place of Agathocles in the role of Syracuse’s basileuv~. Therefore, he must have performed some actions that made the Syracusan people able to grasp his authentic objectives, unmask him and compel him to escape; regrettably, even in this case our sources keep silent and leave open space to unpretentious suppositions. If following the democracy’s restoration – as it is very reasonable – in Syracuse were immediately held elections according to the regulations, it maybe occurred the case of corruption, which happened (as we know) unquestionably in an electoral session that followed, two years after; or, alternatively, Menon tried to find a remedy for the electoral defeat using the strength. If the hypothesis of the elections is acceptable, it is not necessary to believe that many months elapsed from the death of Agathocles to the expulsion of the royalists and Menon21. Nonetheless, the yearning after the basileiva had not been a distinctive feature of Menon alone; it had been even for Archagathus a compelling motivation to rise up against the old Agathocles, and a spur to slay his uncle Agathocles junior, at the end of a fratricidal fight. With his two relatives slaughtered, Archagathus had to believe that every single impediment in his way towards the coveted kingship had been removed, and now that he was very strong thanks to the backing of the various troops, who were in his service; but he had to bring to account even Menon, who certainly laid a claim to a sharing of the power. At this moment, the struggle that made them partners in crime, had to convert them in adversaries, as a matter of fact. After his arrival in the military camp at the foots of mount Etna, Menon deceitfully 21 See Vallone 1955, 30; La Bua 1968, 126 (who suggested that some information provided by Diodorus were lost due to the summary of his historical source, probably made by Silenus; compare La Bua 1966, 188 and 199–201); Mafodda 1979, 200 (Menon conceived the project to seize the power in Syracuse, establishing his own tyranny, only after the arrival in Archagathus’ camp). The suggestion of Pareti 1959, 243–244, that Menon wanted the complete destruction of Syracuse, needs to be absolutely rejected, as much as the chronology conjectured by Vallone 1955, 31, in whose opinion we must assume an interval of some months between the death of Agathocles and the flight of Menon, which probably happened in 288 BC; I assume, on the contrary, that it happened in the same 289 BC.

1.1. “The king is dead”

29

killed his former collaborator and became the only central character of Syracuse’s political scene, together with the democratic party. Diodorus Siculus, who is the only ancient author to give a brief report of the new manslaughter (21, 16, 6), does not provide any justification about it. If one trusts the diodorean information, thus one ignores not only the motivation that brought about Menon’s crime, but even the procedure of the felony itself; yet, as I said before, the reason could not be any but the will to get rid of the last, dangerous competitor for the administration of power and the succession to the basileiva. As far as it concerns the procedure, even if we face a complete lack of evidence, it is possible to make some suggestions. Indubitably, Menon alone could do very little against Archagathus who, in his position of skilful and dexterous strathgov~, enjoyed the complete assistance of his troops. For that reason, it is right to deduce that Menon had some companions who were powerful even to the army; these friends could have been the former Agathocles’ “Friends”, who fled from Syracuse all together with him and took shelter in Archagathus’ encampment. I guess that Diodorus’ text provides a corroboration in this sense, as it may be understood from the completion of the above-mentioned passage (21, 16, 6). After the murder of Archagathus, Menon took possession of the military camp, and after having gained the mass’ good opinion thanks to his fine words, he decided to declare war upon Syracuse and to claim for himself the absolute power. So, according to Diodorus Siculus, there was a plainly definite sequence in the happening of the events. First of all, Menon slaughtered Archagathus, and only as a consequence to this assassination he could become the new master of the troops which were encamped near mount Etna. Thus, the presence of some partners who helped him to put in practice his challenging plot seems to me to have been absolutely indispensable; indeed, in all likelihood the abettors could not have already been in the military camp, where there was only Archagathus’ army. Some modern historians wanted to recognize in the words used by Diodorus – to say, stratovpe­ don and plhvqh – a plain reference to the presence of some military staff and civilians in Archagathus’ encampment. Nevertheless, I assume that the citizens of Syracuse who took refuge with Agathocles’ grandson had to be very few; the first Syracusans who arrived in the camp must have been just those who ran away from the town at once with Menon22. Once Archagathus died, Menon had to face the army’s reaction; somehow, talking skilfully, he succeeded in appeasing the soldiers and in drawing them by his side. His last resolution was to march on Syracuse and claim for himself the town’s dominion. Even in this case, the political vocabulary which is used in Diodorus’ passage allows to understand that Menon’s real target was to overthrow once again the newborn political system of Syracuse, ousting from the leading position the democratic party – to say, the Surakosivoi of Diodorus’ passage – and almost certainly establishing a tyranny – to say, the diodorean dunasteiva. Simultaneously 22 The presence of both civilians and soldiers in the camp of Archagathus is emphasized by Vallone 1955, 30 and Mafodda 1979, 199, note 12 (incredibly stressing that the Greek words stratovpedon and plhvqh would stand for citizens and mercenaries).

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Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

with these events, that convincingly can be dated to the first half of 288 BC, and as a consequence of the dangerous plot of Menon, whose news surely had yet reached the town, the Syracusans designated a new strathgov~, named Hicetas, and entrusted him the army’s command to wage war against Menon. This information, which comes again from Diodorus’ book 21 (18, 1), allows me to strengthen much more a point of my argument. Thanks to the survey of Diodorus, which provides evidence of the existence in Syracuse of a regular army that was trustworthy towards the representatives of the democratic party, it seems to me unconvincing the opinion of those scholars who thought that in 289 BC Agathocles was both without successors and without an army, and that his decision to restore the dhmokrativa in Syracuse was somehow explainable with the desire to provoke the camaraderie of the army and the mercenaries who, seeing that he was dying, had to prefer Archagathus23. Indeed, as I yet tried to show, the one at the military camp near mount Etna was only a branch of the army and – as I shall point out in a while – not even too much immense; so it can be sure that the greatest portion of the soldiers remained faithful to Agathocles and to the resolution to designate the democratic party as his heir. As we have seen before, Diodorus himself pointed out (21, 16, 5) an important differentiation in the pronouncement of the dying Agathocles; on the one hand, the reinstatement of the power to the dh`mo~; on the other hand, the denouncement of Archagathus’ ajsevbeia and the demand of revenge to the plhvqo~. The naming of the plhvqo~ is a key point, because I guess we must single out exactly in the multitude the part of the army who remained dutiful to Agathocles; the one to whom the dying king had to address an implicit request of loyalty to the rising Syracusan democracy. And this was right the army that the strathgov~ Hicetas drew up against Menon; and it must have been a huge amount of soldiers, as we can argue from the fact that the antagonist, who could count on the former armed forces of Archagathus, never wanted to engage in a pitched battle against Hicetas. The counteroffensive of the Syracusan military forces, as it seems, was immediate; but the fight against Menon’s troops did not settle in time, because the strategy adopted by him turned the simple struggle in a war of nerves. The skirmishes kept on for some time – as Diodorus wrote in book 21, 18, 1, mevcri mevn tino~ – because Menon methodically refused a decisive battle; but, in doing this, he had a convincing motivation. Actually, he was waiting for the intervention of the Cartha­ ginian army, which had to prove decisive in order to settle the struggle against Hicetas24. We ignore what has been the grounds of the alliance stipulated between Menon and the Carthaginians; no one can make clear – at least at a first sight – why they were with great forces in the eastern sector of Sicily. Nevertheless, while an answer may be given to the first question only by means of a suggestion, the second subject is solvable if one takes into account the above mentioned passage of Justin (23, 2, 13) concerning the Carthaginian counterattack that took place quite concurrently 23 For instance, see Consolo Langher 1980, II 1, 320. 24 La Bua 1968, 128, note 44; Mafodda 1979, 201.

1.1. “The king is dead”

31

with Agathocles’ death. The presence of Punic armed forces in the plain of Catane is precisely the result of the ejpikravteia expansion eastwards in Sicily, through the lands run by the northern water-course of the river Himera and of the river Salsus, as far as the river Simetus. The idea of the Carthaginians was, therefore, to divide Sicily into two sections, and to set apart in the southern area the regular Syracusan army of Hicetas, who at that point – as we will soon uncover – was between two fires; on one hand, the joint troops of Menon and the Carthaginians who assaulted from the North; and the other, the attack of the people of Agrigentum, led by the new ruler Phintias. In these terms, we find a much more feasible placement in the chronology even for Pompeius Trogus’ extract, which collects the events occurred during a wide range of time, and can be estimated by a couple of years, 289–288 BC: to say, from the months immediately preceding Agathocles’ casualty to the end of the hostility between Menon and Hicetas. In this period we can easily set the report of Justin concerning the recapture of many Greek towns by the Carthaginians; a piece of evidence that is absolutely puzzling, if we put the Punic military pressure only before Agathocles’ passing away. Concerning the aims that made the Carthaginians get involved on the side of Menon, I have really no well-founded explanation. But once again it is possible to stress that it was not Menon who straightforwardly got in touch with the Punic agents, but his partners who did, i.e. the former Fivloi of Agathocles who ran away with him from Syracuse. The evidence, again, comes from a diodorean passage (21, 18, 1), where he says that the Carthaginians intervened to help Menon’s supporters. It has been suggested that the Punic forces were compelled to accept the request of Menon to wage a war against Hicetas, because they were probably worried by the attempt made by the Syracusan leader to collect in his own hands a great power25. Perhaps this is not right; I am confident that in all probability at the beginning of 288 BC, when Hicetas was appointed for the first time as a strathgov~, he did not have any other power in the city, except for the military command of the army. The evolution from a simple strathgiva to the extraordinary office of strathgo;~ aujtokravtwr was yet to come and the democratic offices had still their full meaning, as it is shown by the fact that after Hicetas’ setback and the return of the exiles in Syracuse, the quick intercession of the presbuvtai of the city’s boulhv was basic to avoid another civil war26. Hicetas, then, standing in front of overwhelming armed forces, was forced to give ground and withdraw to Syracuse, probably without any fight. The Carthaginians, who were now the arbitrators of the political contentions inside the povli~, dictated the terms of an unconditional surrender to Hicetas. Unfortunately, on account of the fragmentary character of the diodorean text only two clauses have been preserved, that is the delivery to the Carthaginians by the Syracusan dh`mo~ of 25 See Vallone 1955, 32. The counteroffensive of the Carthaginians in Sicily after Agathocles’ death is mentioned even by Just. 23, 2, 13. 26 Mafodda 1979, 198, note 8, states pointlessly that the role of the presbuvtai in that event suggests that they were selected to be members of the council due to their personal qualities and for their reputation among the Syracusan people.

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Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

four hundred hostages, and the return to town of the exiles. Apart from those who had been exiled for political reasons – and whose largest group must have consisted of the pro-monarchy exiles, banished in 289 BC – I believe that even a huge number of the mercenaries who amounted to Menon’s army went back to Syracuse; and for them the Carthaginians demanded the grant of the citizenship. In any case, compelling the Syracusans to accept those restrictions had an explicit political connotation for the Carthaginians; they wanted to weigh down the democratic faction who then was prevalent in Syracuse, trying to make fickle or completely break the political balance that the city-state painfully achieved in 289 BC. Only if they conjectured the uninterrupted struggles which would have involved the democrats, the former exiles and the mercenaries, the Carthaginians would have been sure that in Syracuse there would not have been an enduring power, able to put in danger their supremacy over Sicily, which already extended as far as the eastern coasts of the island. In this sense – to say, the hindrance posed by the Punic representatives to the establishment of a new Syracusan dunasteiva – one has to think about the disappearance from the political scene of Menon, who probably was slaughtered by the Carthaginians themselves. In fact, Carthaginian’s involvement, according to Menon, was essential helping to get hold of the power in Syracuse. But they weighed substantially in a different way the two central characters of the contemporary Syracusan political scene. If the danger coming from Hicetas’ yearning after the dominion in the town had been avoided by the chaos of the domestic Syracusan politics, created by the return of the exiles and of the mercenaries, and which certainly would have caused many struggles, the Carthaginians understood that Menon’s request for help was justified by his longing for the basileiva. If they had helped him to consolidate his power in Syracuse, there would have been a real danger that he would re-form and re-consolidate the old Agathoclean empire, and most of all would resume the anti-Cartha­ ginian politics of the former king. This was the reason why Menon had to be eliminated27. The exiles’ and mercenaries’ homecoming took place reasonably at the end of 288 BC. With the beginning of the new year, 287 BC, there was the preparation for the new elections for the Syracusan authorities, whose lawful course was made quite unmanageable by the internal politics’ insecurity, produced by the unfeasible cohabitation of the democrats, the monarchists, the oligarchs and the former mercenaries (who by then had become citizens by full right, as it is showed by their active sharing in the elections with their own nominees); a situation that was previously expected by the Carthaginians. It was just the dilemma of some former mercenaries’ potential election to the civic offices that made the representatives of the democratic party anxious, so that they caused unavoidable corruptions during the electoral sessions. Diodorus Siculus (21, 18, 1) is very patent; as it has been previously emphasized by some scholars, the diodorean turn of phrase tw`n de; misqofovrwn 27 Diod. 21, 18, 1 (Hicetas’ defeat and peace conditions), with Vallone 1955, 31–32; La Bua 1968, 128–130 and 131 (not persuasive about the disappearance of Menon); Mafodda 1979, 201–202, who suggested that the clause concerning the return of the exiles in Syracuse was extended even to the oligarchs who had been defeated by Agathocles in 305 BC.

1.2. Mercenaries, marauders and settlers

33

ajtimazomevnwn ejn tai`~ ajrcairesivai~ clearly suggests that the mercenaries’ applicants were systematically boycotted in all the electoral sessions, so much manifestly that the soldiers themselves understood they had been illegitimately deceived. A new bloody civil war between the mercenaries and the representatives of the democratic faction was about to blow up in Syracuse; the challengers already drew their swords when the presbu`tai of the town council, with a skilful diplomatic exploit that lasted for some time and not without a hitch, succeeded in lessening the soldiers and in repairing the dispute. The two factions came to an arrangement; today, only the brief data of Diodorus survives. He wrote that only one condition was granted to the mercenaries, which was the opportunity to put up for sale their properties and leave Syracuse. However, I believe that there were additional clauses, as Diodorus himself seems to specify, using the phrase kata; ta;~ oJmologiva~ (21, 18, 3)28. The mercenaries then left Syracuse; considering that the council of the presbu`tai took some time to settle the struggle between the soldiers and the Syracusans peacefully, and that the clause concerning the sale of their possessions and dispatch their business had to bestow some time for the mercenaries, I believe that the departure from Syracuse took place at the end of spring (or the beginning of summer) of 287 BC29. 1.2. Mercenaries, marauders and settlers: the foundation of the Mamertine State in Messina (287 BC) Unfortunately, one must again have recourse to the fragmentary historical text of Diodorus to have some news about the following events, to say what the mercenaries did after the departure from Syracuse and which direction they travelled ­before reaching Messina; but I will conceive once more to reconstruct the facts plausibly. According to Diodorus, there were no halting-places during the voyage from Syracuse to Messina, which was – as we shall see – the landing place of the sol28 For the different chronologies that have been suggested, see Vallone 1955, 31 and 33 (the Carthaginian intervention on the side of Menon dated between the end of 287 and the beginning of 286 BC; the elections took place in 286 BC); Pareti 1959, 244 (return of the exiles dated to 287 BC; elections generally to 286–285 BC); La Bua 1968, 130 and 133 (return of the exiles between the end of 288 and the beginning of 287 BC: elections in 287 BC): Tagliamonte 1994, 191 (dates the skirmishes between the Syracusan people and the mercenaries to 287 BC). The phrase of Diodorus has been correctly understood by Vallone 1955, 32 and La Bua 1968, 133, note 56; I do not agree with Holm 1901, II, 511, in whose opinion the mercenaries were excluded from the elections. 29 Other chronologies: Schubring 1873, 67 (287 BC): Niese 1893A, I, 488 (288 BC); Holm 1901, II, 513 (288 BC); Ciaceri 1902, 13, note 2 (288 BC); Vallone 1955, 33 (end of 286 BC): Pareti 1959, 244 (between the end of 286 and the beginning of 285 BC): Elnickij 1960, 103–113 (end of 286 BC): La Bua 1968, 135 (spring of 286 BC): Mafodda 1978, 347–351: Mafodda 1979, 203 (spring of 287 BC): Meister 1987, 84–85 (more or less 285 BC); Tagliamonte 1994, 191 (spring of 286 BC).

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Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

diers. Even in this occurrence it is correct to assume that some information could even be lost, due to the summary of the original text; Diodorus could have been aware of some midway steps of the mercenaries; but I am confident these took place while marching to Messina, not in the districts west of Syracuse. Therefore, one must assume that the mercenary troops marched towards the northern extremity of Sicily, following the way along the eastern coast of the island. They had to pass through the territories of independent towns, such as Catane and Tauromenium, where new tyrannies had been established after having regained the freedom from the Syracusan power in 289 BC. The local tyrants, who were obviously engaged in strengthening their authority in the city-states, skilfully did not thwart in that occurrence the mercenaries’ passage. Otherwise, the soldiers could follow even the route inside Sicily, marching northwards across the plain of Catane and bypassing the mount Etna. Finally, anyway, the former Agathocles’ troops reached Messina30. Elsewhere, together with the occupation of Messina by the Mamertines, Diodorus (23, 1, 4) reveals another violent action that they perpetrated against the two towns of Gela and Camarina. In the passage of Diodorus, Hiero II, king of Syracuse, brings to the Roman ambassadors’ mind first of all the two episodes of violence against Gela and Camarina, and he evokes then the capture of Messina; certainly this is not by chance, and it seems to me obvious that Hiero’s words perceive a plain chronological progression of the events. Moreover, the same information provided by Diodorus compels to propose a completely different route travelled by the soldiers: after they ran from Syracuse, they must not have immediately moved northwards. They had to turn their steps towards the southern coast of Sicily and from there they went westwards, as far as they could into Gela’s territory and the borders of the increasing dominion of Agrigentum’s new tyrant, Phintias. From the southern coast, they had to move again northwards, passing through Sicily quite upright, until they arrived into the lands where the river Simetus flows, eventually reaching the northern Sicilian coast31. It seems to me really incredible that the news concerning the attack against Gela and Camarina produced much trouble for many scholars, and that they must have had to insinuate an alliance between Agrigentum’s tyrant, i.e. Phintias, and the ex-agathoclean army – or, anyway, a direct connection between them – to give good reason for the events. I already reviewed the problem in another paper32, and I want to point out again the same conclusions that I achieved earlier.

30 Diod. 21, 18, 1 and 3, twice stressing that the foreigners left Syracuse and arrived in Messina, where they were welcomed by the native community as if they were friends and allies. For the role played by the mercenaries in the history of Sicily, see Tagliamonte 1999, 547–572; Millino 2001, 125–188; Zambon 2001A, 229–277. The topic has been faced by several scholars in a conference held in Erice in October 2003; see Prestianni Giallombardo; Fantasia; Péré-Noguès; Tagliamonte 2006. 31 Diod. 23, 1, 4 (answer of Hiero II to the Roman representatives). As far as I know, only Vallone 1955, 45, did not believe that Hiero mentioned the historical events in a chronological succession. 32 See Zambon 2000, 303–308.

1.2. Mercenaries, marauders and settlers

35

As a matter of fact, we do not only have the above-mentioned diodorean evidence about the raid of the mercenary army against Gela; we also have a further suggestion drawn once again from the remains of Diodorus’ book 22 (2, 2). This indication apparently contradicts my previous statement. In fact, the historian wrote that Phintias founded a city by the sea and gave it his name: the new foundation had fortification walls, a notable market place and temples of the gods. He settled there with the last inhabitants of Gela, who were driven from their homes after he tore down the walls and the houses of their hometown. What is worth stressing is that in this occurrence the destroyer of Gela is the tyrant of Agrigentum, Phintias. He acted without any assistance of the former Syracusan armed forces – as it is apparent from the diodorean passage – and slashed the walls and houses of the Greek city-state. In opposition to the belief of those modern historians who thought it was necessary to take apart the two suggestions of Diodorus, as if they were pertaining to two absolutely distinct chronological moments, other scholars thought equally allowed to regard the diodorean fragments as fully matching and therefore they tried to reconstruct the events as follows. After leaving Syracuse and before reaching Messina, the mercenaries would have been very important allies of the Agrigentine Phintias. If rewarded by him, they would have helped out the tyrant in the devastation of Gela and Camarina. This restoration seemed to be very feeble to the scholars themselves, and so they wanted to make it stronger with the supplement of a passage from the Histories of Polybius (1, 43, 2), referring to the deeds of a certain Achaean man, whose name was Alexon; according to Polybius, he had been the saviour of the citizens of Agrigentum, when the mercenaries of Syracuse tried to betray them33. According to some modern historians, the passage of Polybius shows that the former Syracusan soldiers tried to take control of Agrigentum by fraud, but when Alexon found out and declared their plot, they were forced to leave the town, and then they turned their steps to Messina. Nevertheless, this is an unconvincing hypothesis34. 33 See Polyb. 1, 43, 2; Zon. 8, 15, 7 (Alexon in Agrigentum). Walbank 1957, I, 108; La Bua 1966, 116–117; La Bua 1968, 136–141, assumed that the source of information of Polybius was the local historian Philinus (contra, Pédech 1952, 258–261). Some different chronological settings have been suggested for the episode; Holm 1901, II, 487 (between 288 and 283 BC): Beloch 1893B, 486; Kirchner 1894, col. 1471; Beloch 19272, IV 1, 558 (just before the beginning of the first Punic war, in 264 BC). A general review of the other critical positions in De Waele 1971, 152–154. A completely new chronological setting of the episode, which is absolutely apart from the events concerning the Mamertines after the death of Agathocles, in Zambon 2000, 303–308. 34 Pareti 1914, 214, note 3, thought at first that Diodorus’ passages were referring to different situations, but then he changed his opinion. Some scholars agreed with the first conjecture of Pareti, and ascribed Diodorus 23, 1, 4 to the period following the death of Agathocles, and so they assumed that Gela had been destroyed by the Mamertines, and not by Phintias (Beloch 19242, III 1, 559–560; Holm 1901, II, 515; Ziegler 1910, col. 952). Orsi 1906, col. 21 supposed that the two passages of Diodorus hinted at the same event, and so he inferred that the Mamertines, payed by Phintias, had destroyed Gela: his suggestion was then shared by La Bua 1968, 138–141; Manni 1971, 129 (= Manni 1990, 323); Mafodda 1979, 203 (the scholar, nonetheless, suggested that the joined attack of the Mamertines and Phintias against Gela hap-

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Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

I believe that the two passages of Diodorus Siculus are paired, and I will prove that they must be connected in a different way. First of all, with reference to the mercenaries, Diodorus wrote that they put Gela and Camarina to fire and sword, and not that they destroyed the towns; on the other hand, Phintias tore down the houses and the walls, so he physically razed the city. Two more details must not be neglected; first, Phintias demolished the famous Gela’s walls, which had been since always a stumbling block so insurmountable for any besieger, that even some de­ cades before Xenodicus of Agrigentum had to get into Gela at night by fraud, in order to get over the walls defended by the Syracusan troops. Consequently, if the walls stood strong until Phintias’ pulling down, it is worth presuming that the mercenaries did not even go into the city, but they limited themselves to ravaging its territory, breaking the citizens’ resistance thanks to devastations and pillages. The same actions they had to carry out in the surrounds of Camarina, where – this is the second weighty piece of information – we do not record any deed of Phintias. It is better to keep in mind that at least until 289 BC, both Gela and Camarina were part of Agathocles’ kingdom; hence, it is likely that two years after the breaking up of the Syracusan dominance, both the cities still fell within the sphere of influence of Syracuse; at the most, if one wants to exclude Gela, at any rate one can incorporate in it Camarina, which was closer to Syracuse and was exactly the target of the mercenaries’ offensive. After all, the exploit of Phintias (against Gela) and the mercenaries’ deeds (first against Camarina, and in a second time against Gela) are unconnected; I guess that, while Phintias was going to tear down the walls and the houses of Gela and to move its citizens to the new founded city of Phintias, the mercenary troops had to be already on their way to Messina. And now I return back to the events in Syracuse, in the spring of 287 BC and try to make a new reconstruction of the events35. The former Syracusan soldiers, after selling their goods, left Syracuse and turned their steps towards the South-East lands, making a way into the boundaries of Camarina and then of Gela, laying them waste and breaking the resistance of the two cities and of the local populations thanks to repeated assaults and quick incursions: a confirmation that those attacks never had the typical violence of a finishing stroke is provided even by the fact that, while Gela was subsequently razed by Phintias and abandoned by its inhabitants, Camarina kept on existing; and more than that, the Greek city-state played a very important role in the complicated events of the first Punic war. This role has been correctly stressed even by La Bua, but he even thought that Camarina had been destroyed too by the Mamertines; indeed, the pened after the conquest of Messina by the mercenaries); De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 345– 346; Tagliamonte 1994, 191. A complete revision of the topic, with new considerations, in Zambon 2000, 303–308. 35 Diod. 20, 31, 4–5 (Xenodicus’ rescuing of Gela). After the conquest of the city by Agathocles, the fortification walls of Gela were further strengthened; the buttresses dating to the end of the IV century BC have been identified with the second raising made with green bricks at Capo Soprano: see Orlandini 1956, 174; Orlandini 1957, 71–75; Adamesteanu 1957, 28–30; Orlandini – Adamesteanu 1960, 67–246; Morciano 1993–1994; Griffo 1995; Panvini 1996, 117–120; Mertens 2000, 320–323.

1.2. Mercenaries, marauders and settlers

37

events of the first Punic war show clearly that the city-state could live on just because, after the incursions of the Mamertines in the neighbourhood, Phintias the tyrant did not give it the finishing stroke; perhaps, at that time, he could not have the chance to enter so deeply in the cwvra of Syracuse, that included even the city of Camarina. Nevertheless, the robberies of the mercenaries harmed even the countryside of Camarina, with particular reference to the Greek villages settled on the route going from Syracuse to Gela, and further on to Agrigentum. Some field excavations made at the site of modern Scornavacche, which has been dated to the age of Timoleon and Agathocles, brought to light many marks of a violent destruction of the site, that has been connected with the deeds of the Mamertines36. The soldiers plundered the cities and acted clearly according to their mercenary customs; perhaps they even wanted to damage Syracuse, by that time an enemy city, by assailing two cities which were still depending from its sphere of influence. Then, they made their way northwards, until they reached the lands of the river Simetus. It is not surprising that they did not face any resistance or any opposition while marching towards Messina, because they at first had to advance along the borders of Agrigentum’s dominions and afterwards they moved across the territories belonging to the Carthaginian ejpikravteia; and of course they had nothing to fear from the Carthaginians. Finally, the mercenaries reached Messina; in this case, we are not lacking in the data. Diodorus Siculus twice wrote (21, 18, 1 and 3) that, when the mercenaries arrived in the vicinity of the Strait of Messina, they were favourably welcomed from the local inhabitants, as if they were friends and allies (Diodorus wrote unequivocally fivloi kai; suvmmacoi). But after they had been offered hospitality by the citizens, by night they suddenly massacred their hosts, they married their women and they took possession of the town. Moreover, Diodorus says that they changed the name of the city – Messina – labelling it as Mamertina, deriving its name from Ares, the Greek divinity of the war, who was called Mamers in their language37. The narrative of Polybius (1, 7, 1–2) follows Diodorus’ one; indeed, it inserts some details which significantly change the events’ description. First of all, according to Polybius the mercenaries who left Syracuse would have been Campanians; so this is the first chance to assign a nationality to the former soldiers of Agathocles. But this is a question I will point out in a while. In any case, the soldiers long former gazed at the attractiveness and the benefits of the town; they only waited for the right moment to take possession of it by treason. As maintained by Polybius, too, the soldiers were kindly received in Messina, but only as fivlioi, not as suvm­ macoi: after that they conquered the city (katascovnte~ th;n povlin) and slaughtered some citizens, while some other they banished. Finally, they kept for themselves 36 La Bua 1968, 141, note 73, wrongly conjectured the complete destruction of Camarina. Di Stefano 1987, 159–161, connects the damage of Scornavacche and Camarina with the activities of the Mamertines (but I do not agree with the chronology she suggests, i.e. 270 BC, which seems to me too late). 37 Diod. 21, 18, 1 (= Excerpta Hoescheliana 493 W.) and 21, 18, 3 (= Excerpta Constantiniana 2, 256). The only difference among the two Greek texts is that in the first one the Mamertines are labelled as xevnoi, while in the second one they are named as misqofovroi.

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the women and their children, as the chance assigned to each one when they deceived the city38. The substance of the two narratives is similar: that is to say, the mercenaries arrived at Messina; they were friendly welcomed, but they betrayed and killed the citizens; they took possession of the women, the children and the whole town. But it is evident that, both in the summaries of Diodorus and in the passage of Polybius, events relating a wider chronological period have been condensed. What is more, the two ancient historians have a completely different attitude towards the same mercenaries; as a matter of fact, Diodorus simply considered their criminal action with a disapproving nuance; on the other hand, Polybius speaks plainly of para­ nomiva and categorizes the soldiers as bavrbaroi (1, 9, 3). I guess that we can ascribe this divergence to the assorted historical sources adopted by the authors: modern historians rightly singled out Timaeus of Tauromenium as the source for Polybius’ passage, and Philinus of Agrigentum as the basis for Diodorus’ text. Some scholars thought that Duris from Samos fit well with Diodorus’ narrative, but this hypothesis is unconvincing39. We even have a third account about the capture of Messina by the mercenaries; it is illustrated by an unknown Roman poet, whose name is Alfius, who was the author of a poem entitled Bellum Carthaginiense that unfortunately has been quite entirely lost, except for a wide fragment that has been preserved by Festus, in his Lexicon (s.v. Mamertini). It is worth quoting fully: Mamertini appellati sunt hac de causa: cum † de toto Samnio gravis incidisset pestilentia, Sthennius Mettius eius gentis princeps, convocata civium suorum contione, exsposuit se vidisse in quiete praecipientem Apollinem ut, si vellent eo malo liberari, ver sacrum voverent, id est, quaecumque vere proximo nata essent, immolaturos sibi; quo facto, levatis post annum vicen­ simum deinde eiusdem generis incessit pestilentia. Rursum itaque consultos Apollo respondit non esse persolutum ab his votum, quod homines immolati non essent: quos si expulissent certe, fore ut ea clade liberarentur. Itaque i iussi patria decedere, cum in parte ea Si‹lae silvae› consedissent quae ‹adhu›c Tauricana dicitur, forte laborantibus bello novo Messanensibus auxilio venerunt ultro, eosque ab eo liberarunt provinciales: quod ob meritum eorum, ut gra­ tiam referrent, et in suum corpus communionemque agrorum invitarunt eos, et nomen accepe­ runt unum, ut dicerentur Mamertini, quod coniectis in sortem duodecim deorum nominibus, Mamers forte exierat: qui lingua Oscorum Mars significatur. Cuius historiae auctor est Alfius libro primo belli Carthaginiensis. The Mamertines hold this name for the following reason. Since the whole Samnium had been hit by a severe plague, Sthennius Mettius, who was the head of that population, summoned up an assembly of his fellow-citizens and said he saw in dream Apollo who exhorted them – if they wanted to be freed from that misfortune – to consecrate a ver sacrum; that is to say, they had to sacrifice to him everything would be born in the following springtime. Once they had been freed from the plague, another pestilence of the same kind hit them after twenty years. And immediately Apollo, when he was consulted, answered they did not perform completely the vow, because they did not sacrifice to him even the persons; if they banished them, they certainly would have be freed from that calamity. Therefore, the men were ordered to go away 38 Polyb. 1, 7, 1–2, together with Walbank 1957, I, 52. 39 La Bua 1966, 203–204; La Bua 1968, 144, note 80. The source of Diodorus’ passage from Duris was conjectured by Vallone 1955, 35.

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from their homeland; once they settled in that part of Sila’s forest which is nowadays called Tauricana, they by chance and spontaneously helped the citizens of Messina, who had many difficulties in a late war, and discharged them from the conflict; for this reason, owing to their support, the citizens of Messina – who wanted to thank them – brought them into their civic body; they parted their own lands with them; and they assumed a single name. So they were called Mamertines, because, after they drew lots for the names of twelve gods, by chance the name of Mamers had been pull out; and Mamers is the name of Mars in the language of the Oscans. The author of this story is Alfius, in the first book of the poem Bellum Cartha­ giniense.

So, according to Alfius’ sequence of events, the starting point of the Mamertines coincided with a ver sacrum vowed to Apollo, in order to break off a deadly disease which broke out in Samnium. The young Samnites, led by one Sthennius Mettius, left their homeland and, after settling in an area of the Sila mountains which is named Tauricana, they would have crossed the Strait of Messina and helped the citizens of the Greek city-state, who were busy with the preludes of a new war40. As far as it concerns a justification of the name Mamertines, that they assumed in the circumstance, Alfius wrote exactly that they began to have a single name deriving it by chance from the name of the Oscan god of the war, who was named Mamers. For sure, the description of the Roman historian has a different source if compared with the accounts of both Diodorus and Polybius: some scholars rightly point out that we must catch in it a glimpse of a historical tradition favourable to the Mamertines, which perhaps goes back directly to the moderate environments of Messina’s citizenship41, who wanted to remove the memory of the mercenaries’ misdeed – i.e. the carnage of many inhabitants and the treason towards the city – inserting their arrival in Sicily in the purely Italic tradition pertaining to the migrations which followed the ver sacrum’s rituals42. 40 Fest. s.v. Mamertini, fr. 150 L. It is impossible to set a fixed chronology of the poet Alfius: Klebs 1894, col. 1475 thought about the age before Sulla, on the basis of the topic treated in the poem Bellum Carthaginiense. Cichorius 19612, 58–67 identified Alfius with the Latin poet Alfius Flavus, contemporary with Verrius Flaccus, and therefore set him in the age of the emperor Augustus; his opinion was then shared by Heurgon 1956, 69 (= Heurgon 1957A, 25, note 2). We owe to Cichorius even the amendments of the Latin text, that have been generally accepted; see Heurgon 1956, 69 (= Heurgon 1957A, 25, note 3); De Francisciis – Parlangeli 1960, 18–20 (contra, Vallone 1955, 35). 41 Mommsen 1850, 196; Holm 1901, II, 512; Kroll 1935, col. 240; Vallone 1955, 35–36, note 5; De Sanctis 19602, II, 385, note 58; Cichorius 19612, 61; Heurgon 1956, 67–69 (= Heurgon 1957A, 24–26); Settis 1964, 122; La Bua 1968, 144, note 83; Pinzone 1981, 51; Campanile 1993, 603; Tagliamonte 1994, 192. 42 On the ritual of the ver sacrum, see Heisenhut 1935, coll. 911–923; Heurgon 1956, 63–81 (= Heurgon 1957A, 20–35); Lacroix 1965, 146–151, who correctly emphasized the Greek influence, perhaps applied by the city-state of Rhegium, in the adjustment of the ritual (“en effet, un rite propre aux popolations italiques et il est étroitement lié au cult du dieu Mars. Seule une influence hellénique peut expliquer que Mars ait cédé la place à Apollon, qui joue ici son rôle habituel, celui de chef et de protecteur de la colonisation”); Scholz 1970, 49–51; Martin 1973, 23–38; Costabile 1979, 536–537; Pinzone 1981, 17–19; Costabile 1984, 53–54; Camassa 1987, 133–162 ; Tagliamonte 1989, 361–376; Tagliamonte 1994, 192 and 217; ­Aigner Foresti 1995, 141–147. This opinion was not shared by Campanile 1985, 11–20,

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Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

I assume this is very plausible; I believe it is not nonsense to take into consideration Alfius’ evidence in another way; that is, to bear in mind what is the context from which it derives, to say a Bellum Carthaginiense of a Roman historian, probably dating to the Augustan age. Apart from any accepted correlation that a reference to the Mamertines’ beginnings may have with the main subject of Alfius’ historical poem, I guess one has to direct the attention to its essential meaning; according to me, the basic question is what connection has the pro-Mamertines’ historical tradition with the Punic war. It is comprehensible that in this case the evidence provided by the Latin historian must be linked up with the topics about the oJmofuliva between the Romans and the Mamertines; Polybius himself dealt with the subject (1, 10, 2), obviously with a negative attitude. If this linkage is accurate, the testimony of Alfius has not only the peculiarities of a historical tradition propitious to the Mamertines, but clearly even to the Romans. Moreover, it would be extremely significant to bring together the two historical traditions, both the one unsympathetic to the Mamertines (and followed by Diodorus and Polybius) and the one which is favourable to them (supported by Alfius). In fact, up to now the suggestion provided by the Latin poet has always taken a back seat, only because it rejects a priori the crime of the mercenaries. However, if we pay careful attention, there is even a detail which is shared with the sources favourable to the Greeks, i.e. the fact that the soldiers were friendly accepted in Messina by the citizenship. It is even readily understood that some details of Alfius’ account are less trustworthy, for example the absolute optimistic view of the peaceful integration of the soldiers with Messina’s people, and moreover the derivation of the name Mamertines from the name of the god Mamers – as it has already been thoroughly pointed out43. This last question has been recently proposed to the attention of the critics; if the linguistic derivation of the name Mamertines, which has been offered by Alfius, was rightful, one would presume the correct name is Mamertii, because the adjectives which stem from the name of the gods are not formed with the suffix –inus, who thought that there was no real evidence to prove that the Mamertines were the outcome of a vereiia. De Franciscis 1959, 499, rightly pointed out that in any historical context concerning an exodus – and the ver sacrum was one of them – the choice of the leader had to be restricted only to those persons who could ensure, thanks to their own aptitudes, a successful enterprise; see even Romano 1984, 105–106. Finally, on the consecration of the settlers to Apollo, see Parke 1948, 82–114. 43 The main reference to the topic of the oJmofuliva between Romans and Mamertines appeared in Polyb. 1, 10, 2, but another quite clear remark is in Dio 11, fr. 43, 6. See De Sensi Sestito 1977, 64–67 and 209–210; Pinzone 1983, 89–137; Costabile 1984, 47–57; Tagliamonte 1994, 197–198; further bibliographic details will be offered in chapter 3, where I will deal with this topic thoroughly once more. Pinzone (especially 114–117) has correctly emphasized the source of this argument, which has to be found in the Greek historiography, perhaps in the historical works of Timaeus and Philinus (who were both, indeed, sources of information for Polybius); anyway, there is no need to exclude that the topic was present even in the Roman historical sources (maybe the annalists, Fabius Pictor, and Naevius). Nevertheless, the information provided by Polybius seem to presuppose the concept of Rome as a “barbarian city”, which was widely known in the III century BC: Fraschetti 1981A, 97–115; Poccetti 1984, 147. Settis 1964, 122; Campanile 1993, 603 and Tagliamonte 1994, 193 particularly claim that many false arguments are included in Alfius’ narrative.

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that is peculiar to the Latin cognomina. Anyway, there can be no doubt that the mercenaries’ name, after their arrival in Messina, changed into Mamertines, because on this point the surviving historical sources allow no contradictions. So, it must be supposed that, behind the name Mamertines, there was a proper term Mamertium: actually, the place-name is attested by Stephanus of Byzantium, in his lexicon (s.v. Mamevrtion): povli~ ∆Italiva~. To; ejqniko;n Mamerti`no~ (“It is a town of Italy. The ethnical adjective is Mamertinus”). A more meticulous topographical placement is provided by Strabo (6, 1, 9. 261), who set the city of Mamevrtion in the Bruttium, exactly in the hinterland of Locri, matching with the forests of the Sila mountains. This information must be definitely recognized with Alfius’ account, who does not precisely refer to Mamer­ tium, but brings to mind that the young boys led by Sthennius Mettius, after they moved from Samnium, stopped in the neighbourhood of Sila Silva, and settled in a village – or stopped in the village in a “settling down” which probably was not of urban kind, as the verb consedissent seems to point out44. The reference made by Alfius to the settlement in the Bruttium (i.e. in Tauricana), besides showing – in the typical Italic viewpoint of a ver sacrum – a traffic by land towards the area of the Strait of Messina, and then directly to Sicily, even attests that there were certainly some relationships and interactions between the Mamertine community of Messina and the Bruttian area of Tauricana, where probably the people coming from Samnium stayed on the site of Mamertium. As it has been supposed yet, perhaps those relations prompted an immigration movement of the Bruttians themselves towards the lands of the Mamertines; but this interchange had anyway to reach its height at the beginning of the III century BC45. As far as it concerns today’s identification of the site of Mamertium, after de­ cades of vagueness and supposed locations, a favourable outcome has been achieved thanks to the excavations which have been methodically carried out from the 1980’s onwards in the area embraced between the site of Castellace and contrada Mella, near Oppido Mamertina46. In Castellace, a highly noteworthy situation about the 44 The question of both the philological and linguistic correctness of the name Mamertines deriving from the god’s name Mamers has been fully discussed by Campanile 1993, 602. The adjectives stemming from the names of the divinities have been analized by Kajanto 1982, 211–218. Some place-names were created in the Oscan territories of southern Italy: Silvestri 1985, 67–87. The correspondence of the place-name Mamevrtion with the person-name Mamer­ tios (sometimes varied in Mamerkos) has been pointed out by Devoto 1962, 127–128, and Heurgon 1972, 63. The place-name Mamevrtion is attested even by Herodian. Prosodia Catholica 3, 1, 368: Campanile 1993, 602 conjectured that it was not properly a city, but more probably a village, as the similarities with other rural settlements of the Bruttians seem to show (for the latter, see Pugliese Carratelli 1987A, 281–294; Lombardo 19912, 249–297). 45 Settis 1964, 135–138; Poccetti 1988, 119–125; Poccetti 1989, 114–115 (long dated migrations from Bruttium to Messina); Hoffmann 1969, 165, note 28; Tagliamonte 1994, 193 (migrations only after the conquest of Messina). 46 Oldfather 1928, col. 952; Lattanzi 1986, 418–419; Visonà 1988, 665–668; Lattanzi 1989, 562–563; Costamagna 1990, 63–68; Visonà 1990A, 69–84; Michelini 1993, 484– 490; Costamagna – Visonà 1996; Costamagna 1996–1997, 115–134; Visonà 1996–1997, 237–241.

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Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

settlement can be observed, if it is compared with the rest of the territory; in fact, in all the embankments which lay south of the river Petrace (which can be equated to the old river Matauros, which marked the northern borders of Rhegium’s cwvra) the excavations have brought to light a lot of proto-historical materials; then we have an almost complete lack of evidence relating to the following period – to say, the Classical age; and finally a sudden occurrence of archaeological data, which can be chronologically set from the end of IV/beginning of III century BC to the whole Hellenistic age. In the funerary corredi which have been recovered, many conscious features and grave goods appropriate to the Italic culture can be seen, especially the Italiote red-figured vases and the bronze belts; and the Italic cultural facies may be found in all the surrounding mounds of the area, chronologically at least up to the beginning of the I century BC. Again, if one has to make a reference to a community that was strictly Italic by means of its culture, I call to mind the instance of a male burial in the necropolis of Torre Inferriata (near Castellace). The man was unmistakably a warrior, as it is confirmed by the presence of the Italic bronze belt, and the form of burial is cremation; but the man’s ashes were deposited into a circular structure, encircled with cobble-stones – a burial custom which plainly refers to the funeral rituals of the central and southern areas of the Apennines47. Nevertheless, the most valuable information is the following; in Castellace and in the necropolis of Torre Inferriata the archaeological evidence cannot be dated later than the beginning of III century BC, which is the higher chronological limit for the finds in the excavations of other sites, like contrada Mella. This is a basic point; it allows to assume a progressive southwards occupation of the territory by the Italic populations, who – starting from the first place they settled in, i.e. Castellace – spread towards the neighbouring banks, taking possession of places that were more suitable for a defence and fit for establishing some permanent and monumental settlements. Incidentally, the lack of any monumental installation in Castellace is perfectly matching with the literary evidence provided by the passage of Alfius, already mentioned, who made reference to temporary settlements (the verb he used, as I have underlined, was consedissent)48. One of the neighbouring embankments is exactly contrada Mella (near Oppido Mamertina); it lays east of Castellace, in a place that is backward and far away from the road system. The chronological relationships of the archaeological materials that have been found in the two sites is a clear indication that the settlement 47 Givigliano 1987, 95–97 gives a survey of the findings in Castellace during the field excavations. Gualtieri 1990, 161–213 provides a useful comparative analysis between the grave goods discovered in the male sepulture excavated at Torre Inferriata and those usually included in the tombs of the southern Apennines’ area. 48 I agree with the suggestion proposed by Poccetti 1989, 114, about an overland route used for the movement of mercenary troops from southern Italy to Sicily; I think that a great role was played from the route joining Capua and Rhegium. Of course, I do not exclude that another route followed to convey the Italic mercenaries in Sicily was the Tyrrhenian sea-route between Campania and Sicily, even at the end of the IV century (Lepore 1985, 113); but I would not give it any pre-eminence, as Colonna 1980–1981, 183–184.

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moved from one site (i.e., Castellace) to another (contrada Mella). It is undeniable, too, that the site of Contrada Mella has to be assigned to the population of the Tauriani; we owe this firmness to the discovery, on the edges of a cobble paved road, of the remains of a water main, which was made with bricks that are stamped with the natives’ seal, TAURIANOUM. The settlement’s chronology can be set between the end of IV century BC – which is the moment of its beginning, as it is showed too by the pottery’s evidence – and the first decades of the I century BC. In 1986, on the top of the edge, the remains of some buildings’ walls were brought to light, which can be dated between the III century and the I century BC, and they were rightly related to a urban centre; the delimited rooms have a squared plan and the buildings were oriented along the cobble paved road that I above mentioned; some of them covered a very wide area (even more than 300 square meters)49. There is not so much archaeological material which can be connected with the Hellenistic age; scraps of black-glazed pottery (especially pertaining little cups and basins with a moulded base), of unguentaria and oil-lamps. But even the evidence provided by the grave goods (again some unguentaria with a three-level base, dating from the first half of the III century BC) and the coinage finds show that the site was copious populated yet at the end of the IV century BC. Just in contrada Mella, a coin hoard – which is scattered nowadays – was found at the beginning of 1900: it consisted of nearly 300 electrum coins of 25 litre’s value minted by Agathocles, and it was probably buried at the beginning of III century BC; almost certainly it may be recognized as the salary which was paid to an Italiote warrior who served as a mercenary in Agathocles’ army50. Therefore, the differences between the site of Castellace and the settlement of contrada Mella are significant; on the one hand, we stand in front of the absence of a permanent settlement; on the other, we have the evidence of wall structures – even if many of them are to be placed chronologically to the end of the III century BC and the first quarter of the II century BC – whose peculiarities are a sign of the development of the house’s architecture in Magna Graecia during the Hellenistic age. Again, on the one hand we may notice the presence of a community which was stricto sensu Italic by means of its cultural features; on the other, we meet an Italic community which was deeply hellenized and by right completely involved in the economic-commercial routes of the Greek towns laying on the Strait of Messina and on the Ionian shore. Import-articles have been found in the excavations in contrada Mella; they have a chronological limit extending from the end of the IV century BC (for example, a guttus medallion with relief decoration, that is an object coming from a workshop of Magna Graecia), along the III century and the II cen49 The wide plans of the buildings in contrada Mella have been emphasized by Visonà 1990A, 71–72. This is not surprising, especially in the Hellenistic age, because it is widely attested both in Magna Graecia and in Sicily; just for example see the evidence provided for Caulonia by Iannelli – Rizzi 1985, 304–310, plate 8, F5, with a house plan covering an area of 378 square meters. For the Sicilian figures, De Miro 1980, 727–734. 50 Visonà 1990A, 76, note 10, giving other information concerning the numismatic finds at contrada Mella. A general survey and a chronological classification of the Syracusan electrum’s issues has been made by Jenkins 1968, 145–162.

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Chapter one: From Agathocles’ Death to Pyrrhus’ Arrival

tury BC (to this wide period can be dated a black-glazed cup [series Morel 2520], which came from the Etruscan area), up to the I century BC (indeed, many faience figurines, whose chronology goes from the IV century to the I century BC). Anyway, there is even a lot of local materials, especially pottery and coroplast pieces, which are of course inspired by Greek shapes; but it is even likely that some Greek or Greek-named skilled workers were active in the territory of the Tauriani. And this is an aspect that allows us to converge once again our attention towards the area of the Strait, because all the imports necessarily had to reach the Tauriani from there. As Roberto Spadea has very carefully emphasized, the imports’ phenomenon – as far as it concerns the Strait of Messina – is proportional to two factors; the first is about the nature of the place itself, to say the contact point between two very traded seas that lays exactly in the waters facing Messina and Rhegium; the second is the koiné’s works, peculiar of the medium-late Hellenistic age, which more or less directly passed through those seas, and got to the Strait’s towns just at the beginning of the III century BC. Import-articles coming from the whole Mediterranean area passed through the two main clearing stations of the Strait and from there reached the hinterland, where they powerfully inspired with their shapes even the local productions51. For example, from Attica came the several classes of relief pottery, called the Westslope ware, which were subsequently manufactured even in loco; the scraps that have been found in Rhegium and Messina did not arrive there from the Attic workshops, and the local manufactures are easily observable for the worse quality of their glaze. Nevertheless, we can number among the trading routes those coming from Rhodes, whose wine came both to Rhegium and Messina in abundance52 (and probably the storage took place in Syracuse, where a great concentration of Rhodian amphora-stamps has been put to light); another one came from Carthage, and this point allowed Jean-Paul Morel to characterize a Punic koiné originated from the trade of Carthaginian goods, that passing through the territories of the Sicilian ejpikravteia travelled all over the Mediterranean basin (in Rhegium, a particular significance has to be attributed to the brazier supports, moulded with human faces, whose matrixes have been recovered in Rhegium’s workshops)53; finally, one has to mention the route touching the Aeolian islands, travelled by a lot of products which arrived first in Sicily and then crossed the Strait. A separate hint has to be devoted to the manufactures of the Alexandrine craftsmen, which are properly represented by the well-known glass cup adorned with gold figures which has been found in Tresilico – a village of Aspromonte, behind Rhegium – in a grave of a 51 Spadea 1987, 337–360. 52 Campagna 1992, 29–56 provides evidence of the plentiful scraps of Rhodian amphorae that are preserved in the National Museum of Messina. 53 As regards the Punic productions and their imitations, that Spadea rightly compares with samples of the “Magenta ware”, see Ferron – Pinard 1960–1961, 77–170; Morel 1980B, 29–75; Morel 1986, 41–45; Sguaitamatti 1991, 117–146. For a general evaluation of the “Magenta ware”, see Higgins 1976, 1–32; Szilagyi 1983, 358–364; Michaelides 1994, 311–322.

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person of high descent54. It is very tempting to connect even Tresilico with the Italiote tribe of Tauriani, but I think this is not basic for my arguments. Indeed, I presume it is much more important to stress the information about the cup’s provenance and the apparent trade-route it travelled. I guess it is undeniable that, after leaving Egypt, the intermediate point was the harbour of Rhegium; from there, the masterwork went on its way to the hinterland, and reached a community of Italiotes who were already open-minded towards any cultural stimulus coming from Greece or the Mediterranean basin. What is more, I think that these strong commercial relationships are a corroboration of the deep cultural links among the Mamertine community of Messina, the Campanians of Rhegium and the Italic settlements of the southern Bruttium (I have already remarked that those links were underlined even by the ancient literary sources). Going back to the question of the Mamertines’ ethnicity, the piece of information about their Samnite nationality which is provided by Alfius’ narrative is undeniably in contrast with the accounts concerning a Campanian ethnic group that we find in Polybius (1, 7, 1–2); nonetheless, we have evidence of the Samnite hypothesis in two passages of Diodorus Siculus (20, 11, 1 and 20, 64, 2), who made twice a list of the mercenaries engaged by Agathocles for his African expedition, and numbered – besides Greeks, Tyrrhenians, Celts and Libyans – the Samnites as well. Summing up, so far we met Mamertines whose descent is said to be Samnite; Mamertines who had a significant, cultural similarity and an unmistakable linkage with the Bruttians and the Lucanians, even if they had a Samnite descent; finally, we even met Mamertines whose nationality was said to be Campanian. Other literary sources – for example, Silius Italicus in his poem about the Punic Wars (Punica 14, 194–195) – and the proofs offered by the epigraphic evidence and the coinage make clear that the nationality of the Mamertines was Oscan. Based on this information, and calling to mind that according to the historical tradition followed by Polybius (1, 7, 1–2) only a part of the male natives of Messina were massacred by the mercenaries – to say, of course, that a great part of the survived population was Greek –, I would like to deduce that the newborn community of Messina/Mamertina was apparently multiethnic; its major members – a part from the native Messenians – were the Oscans, followed by components of Campanian, Samnite, Bruttian and Lucanian nationalities. The presence in Messina of different ethnic groups at the same time has some corroboration from the epigraphic data. The inscriptions that have been discovered during the excavations in modern Messina are drawn up in Oscan language and with a Greek alphabet; the corpus of the inscriptions is not so abundant, and a group of them, which is quite homogeneous, can be dated to the end of the III century BC. The style and language’s dependence of Messina inscriptions on those unearthed in the native Oscan area allowed some scholars to suppose that the former 54 Galli 1929, 272–273, provided the first information on the Hellenistic/Roman necropolis of Tresilico. With particular reference to the so-called “Tresilico’s cup”, the basic work is Cristofani 1966, 63–79; furthermore, Harden 1968, 32–33; Morel 1981, II, 1325a, 1; De Masi 1990, 20–28.

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mercenaries entrusted the performance of the inscriptions exactly to a class of lapidaries, who travelled all around the territories which had been influenced by Oscan culture and language and so upheld a considerable standardization in the formulary they used55. The most well-known inscription – the so-called Vetter 196 – regards a dedication of a temple to Apollo, which was made by two local meddices on behalf of the Mamertine people’s assembly, indicated as twÛto mamertino.56 This information is of great interest, because it explains the social and political structure of the Mamertine community of Messina at the end of the III century BC; as far as it concerns the choice of this chronology, it seems to me decisive the comparison with the coinage, where the portrait of Apollo ousted that of Ares just about the end of the III century BC57. As far as it concerns the linguistic point of view, we have some incongruities produced by the impact of the Greek language model; for example, the first two attempts of the text’s edition show some traces of a “iotacistic” pronunciation, which is typical of a consistent adhesion to the Greek spoken language (above all, we can see the use of h for i in the word stattihh~; ei for i in the word kaleini~; oi for i in the word stenoi~). Most of all, there is a second very important affair coming out from this text; after the assimilation of the foreign Mamertine members with the natives, in Messina there were two meddices – i.e., the supreme official magistrates – and an official people’s assembly, called twÛto.58 One must not disregard the fact that in Messina there were two magistrates; I assume that we are dealing with a plain adaptation to some democratic requirements of the typical Samnite institute, the sin55 The most useful collections of Oscan inscriptions are Conway 1897; Von Planta 1893–1897; Wackernagel 1917, 1248–1249; Vetter 1953; Poccetti 1979. For the chronology (end of the III century BC), Heurgon 1957A, 33–34; Costabile 1979, 535–537; Pinzone 1981, 8– 10; Morandi 1982, 143; Costabile 1984, 52–57; Poccetti 1988, 143; Tagliamonte 1994, 194. On the contrary, the inscriptions have been dated at the beginning of the III century BC by Campanile 1978, 105–106, and Campanile – Letta 1979, 23. The importance of the lapidaries has been stressed by Poccetti 1983, 178–198; Poccetti 1988, 149; Orioles 1994, 211. 56 Even Mommsen 1850, 193–195, nr. 39; Conway 1897, I, nr. 1; Von Planta 1893–1897, I, nr. 1; Buch 1904, nr. 62; Bottiglioni 1954, nr. 86; Parlangeli 1956, 29–30, nr. 1; Lejeune 1970, 284, note 44; Marinetti – Prosdocimi 1988, 46 and 51, nr. a69; Tagliamonte 1994, 258–259, nr. c5; Campanile 1995, 463–467. 57 The chronology given by Campanile 1995, 463 (end of III century BC) does not match what he himself previously suggested, that was a higher date (beginning of the III century BC: Campanile – Letta 1979, 21–23). The comparison between the numismatic portraits of Apollo and Ares, which was first made by Särström 1940, 100–115, has been once again highlighted by Costabile 1979, 536; Costabile 1984, 53; Campanile 1995, 463. 58 Several readings of the word toÛtw have been suggested: Devoto 19694, 333, translated it as “Mamertine state”; Vetter 1953, nr. 196, intended it as “civitas Mamertina” (on the same position, Vallone 1955, 37; Costabile 1979, 537; Costabile 1984, 52–57); Campanile – Letta 1979, 21 (reassessed by Campanile 1993, 601 and Campanile 1995, 463) assumed that the word was similar to the Greek dh`mo~, and so they rendered it as “popular assembly”. A wider investigation about the linguistic meaning of the word toÛtw, which is analogous to the Latin word nomen, was made by Prosdocimi 1978, 29–74, but without any particular reference to the community of Messina (see even Prodoscimi 1985, 40–43).

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gle meddix59. The same mercenaries who, even in Alfius’ account, were led by the princeps Sthennius Mettius, used to adopt the typical homeland institution of the single meddix until they arrived in Messina; so, it is reasonable that Mettius could have been their meddix on the way to Messina. Going back to the inscription Vetter 196, we can see that the names of the paired meddices provide further evidence; the given name of the first one, that is stenis kalinis (Sthennius Calenius), is characteristically Oscan – just call to mind, of course, the leader Sthennius portrayed by the poet Alfius – while the surname seems to be linked up quite certainly to the Campanian area, as it is modelled on the basis of the Oscan ethnic name of the town of Cales. The other meddix, whose name is maras pompties (Maras Pontius), could adorn himself with the name of one of the most famous Samnite families, the Pontii60. On the contrary, little information can be obtained from the epigraphic evidence and the literary sources as far as it concerns the III century BC, even because the archaeological materials are sometimes not published61: anyway, the information about a multiethnic Mamertine society, even in the period which followed the conquest of Messina, is beyond doubt true. The bricks’ seals have been the subject of many scholars’ attention, because they are indeed an essential means to prove – by a linguistic point of view – the links and the cultural osmosis between the Italic elements and those who were speaking the Greek language: the importance of these documents has rightly been stressed by Paolo Poccetti, in relation to the fact that they had a very large flow, a wider distribution and they were more easily serviceable than an inscribed stone, which normally could not be moved away. As far as this last point of view is concerned, I am a bit perplexed, because we have very few inscribed stones in the modest corpus of Mamertine inscriptions of Messina. Nevertheless, I think that concerning the common hypothesis, the scholars’ opinion – and particularly Poccetti’s theory – has to be absolutely shared62. 59 Campanile 1995, 465–467. On the Italic office, see Weinstock 1931A, coll. 26–29; Weinstock 1931B, 235–246. The literary evidence is provided by Fest. fr. 123 M.; Enn. Annales 8, 298; Liv. 26, 6, 13. 60 The presence of a gens Mettia in the Samnium is supported even by the epigraphic evidence: Vetter 1953, nr. 176; Poccetti 1979, nr. 108; Tagliamonte 1994, 196, note 95; Campanile 1994, 564. The stemming of the surname kalini~ from an unattested *kalênyos has been suggested yet by Von Planta 1897, II, 596. The Latin version seems to be the Calenius attested by CIL X, nr. 4675 (from the city of Cales), while the version Calinis is attested by CIL X, nr. 2204 (from Puteoli): see Tagliamonte 1994, 195, notes 85–87; Campanile 1995, 464–465. The gens Pontia, as well, is widely testified by the Oscan inscriptions: Vetter 1953, nr. 8 (from Pompei), nr. 125 (from Saticula), nr. 202 (from Sulmona); Poccetti 1979, nr. 48 (from Boiano) and nr. 75 (from Campochiaro): see Tagliamonte 1994, 195, note 84 (with further bibliography); Campanile 1994, 562–563; Campanile 1995, 465. 61 Tagliamonte 1994, 196, refers that during an excavation made in 1971 in a necropolis of Messina (the complete information still have not been published), a vase bearing an inscription in Greek language was found in a chamber tomb, dated to the end of the IV century BC. The vase – and the tomb, of course – was property of one Pavkia Povmptia, a woman who had the same surname of the meddix mentioned in the inscription Vetter 196. In all probability, she came in Messina from Samnium as well. 62 For a general survey concerning the importance of the seals to understand the process of cul-

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The piece of evidence I want to highlight – although it is already well-known, thanks to recent research papers – is the presence of the seals RHGINWN at Messina, and of the many bricks bearing the inscription MAMERTINOUM in Rhegium. The production of bricks in Rhegium is not surprising, because the distinctiveness of Rhegium’s building during the III century BC was the clay, which was very abundant and accessible and was skilfully worked by the local cratftsmen. The workshops were considered property of the state, as it is showed by the above-mentioned seal; at any rate, the call for bricks had to exceed their production, and some workshops were almost certainly giving out contracts to private craftsmen, as it is proved by the seals RHGINWNORQWN or the bricks bearing the inscriptions RHGINWN SANNWN, which are plentiful even in Messina. I think that the presence of Rhegium’s bricks in Messina and, on the other hand, the slabs of Messina in Rhegium must be explained only with the co-operation which was established among the two towns’ common ethnic groups, since the Mamertines firmly established themselves in the Strait area. Further, here they imported bricks bearing the seal TEICEWN that were manufactured in Rhegium (where they were used for building the fortification walls), presumably in view of the reinforcement of Messina’s ramparts. In Messina many bricks have been found bearing the inscription APOLLWNOS, and others with the seal IERA APOLL­ WNOS: the Mamertines imported them from Rhegium, and probably they wanted to use them for the construction of a shrine entitled to Apollo63. Calling back to mind the question of the ethnic integration in the Messina of the Mamertines, it must be underlined that, as well as the numismatic evidence, even the seals bear the population’s ethnicity both in the Greek language form (MAMERTINWN) and in Oscan idiom (MAMERTINOUM), following the wellknown phenomenon of the name’s “linguistic interchange”, which is typical of the areas where many languages were spoken, and allowed a person to change the linguistic form of his/her name – passing from an idiom to the other – and to use it in conformity with his/her needs64. A readily understood exemplification of the deliberate and clear assimilation of several ethnicities in Messina is provided even by the amphora-stamps; I want to draw attention particularly to a stamp which has been found in Pergamum, with the following inscription and device; MAM/trident/MESS. The class of the amphora is not easily understandable, but the deposit where the amphora-handle has been recovered is abounding of Rhodian stamps dating to the end of the III century BC. The ascription of the piece to Messina’s workshops, which has already been proposed by some German scholars, seems out of any doubt; indeed, there can not be any uncertainty about the symbol of the trident, tural mixing in Messina, see Poccetti 1988, 123; Orioles 1992, 331–345; Orioles 1994, 207–212. 63 Manni Piraino 1972–1973, 347; Lazzarini 1982, 145–157; Costabile 1984, 37–56; Spadea 1987, 350–353; D’Amore 1998, 291–296. Some of those bricks have been used for the building of the Roman “Villa del Casale”, at Piazza Armerina: Ampolo – Carandini – Pucci – Pensabene 1971, 255–256, fig. 121. 64 Some good examples of “linguistic interchange” are provided by De Simone 1989, 263–280.

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which was a real paravshmon of ancient Messina; and I guess the same confidence we can have while completing the text, which must be Mamerti`no~ Messhvnio~ [oi`no~]. This could be an evident corroboration of a renowned passage of Strabo (6, 2, 3. 268) about the sweetness of the wine which was produced in Messina and, after the arrival of the mercenaries into town, took the label of “Mamertine wine”65. Some doubts have been expressed by the scholars as regards another stamp MAMAR, which is engraved on the neck of an amphora – perhaps of the MPS IV classification – which was found in Gela; sometimes ago, it was assumed to be an evidence of the real presence of the Mamertines in the Greek city-state that was soon after devastated by them, but it is more plausible that the amphora was simply imported from Messina and arrived by merchantman to the southern coast of Sicily66. One must take into account even the information coming from the numismatic Mamertine evidence, always in the sense of the cultural integration between the Greek natives and the Italiote soldiers67. The Mamertines issued exclusively bronze coins, carefully following the numismatic tradition of the Sicilian bronze coinage and, needless to say, to approach the requirements of the local economies68. In the period that immediately followed the capture of Messina, the mercenaries adopted a twofold weight standard with three denominations, that have been labelled by Särström as unit, double and quadruple because of the similarity of the Mamertines’ weight standard with the Attic one; indeed, the Mamertine quadruple weighed from 16.24 and 17.43 gr., that is approximately the weight of an Attic tetradrachm. By means of this uniformity, it is possible to compare the three Mamertine denominations with the Attic drachm, didrachm and tetradrachm. The types of the first period’s coinage are the following:

65 The amphorae-stamps that can be without doubt ascribed to Messina have been discussed by Van Der Mersch 1994, 169–170. See Boehringer – Krauss 1937, 150, note 67; Grace 1949, 182, for the piece found in Pergamum. 66 The find of the amphora-neck in Gela was published by Adamesteanu – Orlandini 1956, 348, nr. 3. For the first hypothesis – real presence of the Mamertines in Gela – see Manganaro 1977 [1985], 151, note 18; Manganaro 1980–1981, 183–184. The amendment has been made by Van Der Mersch 1986, 574–575, and then accepted by Manganaro 1996A, 47, note 87. 67 Holm 1906, 199–201; Giesecke 1923, 96–99; Särström 1940, 39–73 (a basic work, since many of the following papers refers to the Mamertine coinage using Särström’s classification); Naster 1947, 125–127; Nenci 1953, 77–78; Vallone 1955, 38–39; Consolo Langher 1964, 240–243; De Caro Balbi 1972, 9–50; Miní 1977, 297; De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 346; Calciati 1983, I, 89–91; Tagliamonte 1994, 193, note 71 (with further bibliography); 197; appendix B, 248–254. 68 A different opinion has been expressed by Baldanza 1970, 3–24, who marks as silver coinage the specimens nr. 7–9; nevertheless, those are bronze coins, as it has been pointed out by De Caro Balbi 1972, 23, note 71, who explained that the presence of some silver residues on the surface of the bronze coins may be ascribed either to the adulteration of the metal (and so, to a chemical reaction), or to the conditions of the hoard.

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– Obv. Head of Ares, to the right, and laureate; behind it, symbol (helmet, with apex and cheek-piece). Border of dots. In front, inscription AREOS. Rev. Bull charging to left; plain border; above and in the exergue, inscription MAMERTINWN. The coin is a quadruple. – Obv. Head of Ares, to the right, and laureate; behind it, symbol (arrow-head). Border of dots. In front, inscription AREOS. Rev. Eagle standing towards left on thunderbolt; plain border; around in the field, inscription MAMERTINWN. The coin is a double In both the dies of the two denominations we may see little warrior’s devices (the arrow-head, the helmet) which are normally set behind the divinity’s head or near to the bull. The coins, which seem to follow extra-Sicilian figurative models, were in all probability issued in the years 288/285 BC, immediately after the conquest of Messina, and above all they do not yet have been influenced by the Syracusan bronze coinage of Hicetas69. In the following series, it appears for the first time the head of Zeus, and the field of the coin is enriched with several emblems of the warrior’s way of life; moreover, the thunderbolt is set in the field, noticeably near Zeus. We have: – Obv. Head of Ares, to the right, and laureate; behind it, symbol (type A: helmet, with apex and cheek-piece; type B: uncertain logo, which has been tentatively read as an axe-head; type C: arrow; type D: spear-head; type E: spear). Border of dots: In front, inscription AREOS. Rev. Eagle standing towards left on thunderbolt; plain border; around in the field, inscription MAMERTINWN; sometimes in the field, symbol F. The coin is a quadruple. – Obv. Head of Zeus, to the right; behind it, the symbol of the thunderbolt; border of dots. In front, inscription DIOS. Rev. Bull charging to left; plain border; in the exergue, inscription MAMERTINWN. The coin is a double. In this case, the connection of the second denomination’s devices with the Zeus Hellanios standing on the Syracusan coins of Hicetas is plainly clear. In the following series, the types alternate but the strictly military representations, which highlight the ethnic identity of the Mamertines, never disappear. Anyway, the chief problem is the fact that, even during the first phase of the Mamertine control of Messina, we stand in front of some issues of bronze coinage bearing the inscription MESSANIWN, which are no doubt the production of the craftsman working in the official city’s mint. Indeed, if some doubts persist about the plentiful bronze series bearing on the obverse the head of Pelorias and on the reverse Pheraimon – a series which may be definitely dated, but its chronological 69 Tagliamonte 1994, 197 (about the occurrence of the symbols). A particular attention has been focused on the analysis of the helmet’s type, which has been included in the class of the socalled “Italische Knaufhelm”, widely attested among the Samnites and the Lucanians: Dintsis 1986, I, 149–153. Poole 1876, 109, nr. 3 thought it was a typical Macedonian helmet. As regards the unfamiliar models of the devices engraved in the Mamertine coinage of the first period, see Särström 1940, 45, who suggested that the prototype of Ares’ head was the portrait of Apollo cast on the so-called Macedonian “Philippeioi”.

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range is really too wide (from 310/305 to 288 BC) – there are not uncertainties about the bronze series bearing on the obverse the head of Pelorias, and on the reverse a biga with two galloping she-mules, driven by Nike. As a matter of fact, it is exactly the representation of the Nike, who was embodied in Syracuse while driving the chariot only beginning from the gold drachms minted by Hicetas (where she replaced the male charioteer, typical of the Agathoclean series), which allows to set in the years 288/287 BC the terminus post quem concerning the issue of Messina70. Therefore, it is obvious that the numismatic evidence too substantiates what I assumed before, on the basis of the literary and epigraphic sources: that is, even in the phases immediately following the arrival of the soldiers in Messina there was in the town a deep, growing progression in the ethnic assimilation, that involved both the natives and the members of the mercenary troops (who were themselves really a set of nationalities; Samnites, Oscans, Campanians and maybe Bruttians and Lucanians, too). The process, as we have seen, had to do with all the features of the town’s social and political life. As a result, if on the one hand we have to take with care into account the Latin passage of Alfius, because it is not so much pertaining to the historical situation, it is indeed too much overstated the negative emphasis that the Greek historians used in their representation of Messina’s occupation. I think it is very conceivable that the massacre performed by the mercenaries after their arrival was directed exactly towards those citizens and the town’s authorities who did not accept either the mercenaries’ presence in the town, nor the integration’s practice which had to renovate completely the city in the following decades. We cannot say if the population agreed with the incorporation of the Mamertines, or not; but I think that the evidence allows a positive answer71. Finally, I want to succinctly take into account the archaeological evidence. The excavations specifically of the last decade show that Messina enjoyed a huge development in the urban chart, both by means of the planimetry and the buildings, just from the beginning of the III century BC: an immediate effect of this enlargement was a significant intensification of the craftsmen’s activities, particularly the local production of pottery72. Many furnaces, datable to the Hellenistic age, have been identified widely in the area embraced between the present via Cesare Battisti and viale San Martino. This area drew up the boundaries of a former vast neighbourhood of pottery workshops, laying in the plain south-west of Messina’s harbour and today we may add three more furnaces where plain ware was created, all datable to the III century BC. 70 A decisive standpoint concerning the survival of an official mint of Messina even in the period following Agathocles’ death has been expressed by Caccamo Caltabiano 1993, 150–152. Nevertheless, I do not agree with her conclusions, especially as it regards the conjecture of a lower terminus post quem for the Mamertine issues minted after the Sicilian venture of Pyrrhus. 71 La Bua 1968, 147; Campanile 1993, 604. 72 For the history of the archaeological excavations in Messina before the 1980s, see Scibona 1987, 433–458 and Caccamo Caltabiano – Gulletta – Scibona 1992, 16–36. Preliminary reports about the excavations made by the Soprintendenza of Messina after 1987 in Spigo 1992, 9–28; Bacci 1993, 15–22; Bacci Spigo 1993–1994, 923–943; Bacci 1995, 427–430.

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They have been brought to light in the area of via dei Mille, which is well-known for several recoveries of the same kind, and characterized with large archaeological levels corresponding to the furnaces’ deposits of the Hellenistic habitation area, which are very important to investigate because of the quality of the local productions and imports in the Strait’s area. I want to emphasize the votive objects, that led the archaeologists to presume that a cult-place had to be very near. The most noteworthy object is a border of a black-glazed cup, whose chronology is, more or less, the half of the III century BC, and bears the painted inscription UGIEIAS. This is the oldest indication of the cult of Igea in Messina, whereas we possess many famous proofs of it relating to the Roman age73. I also want to include information concerning a little altar, which has been found nearby; it bears some typical Punic devices engraved on the stone (such as the star and the “bottle-shaped” idol). These engravings led some scholars to think that the altar was a proof of the alliance between the Mamertines and the Carthaginians, which was drawn up at the time of Pyrrhus’ Sicilian venture; but I guess it’s impossible to argue such an hypothesis from this piece of evidence alone. Indeed, we have help from the remains of the fortification walls to understand how large the urban plan of the city was in the Hellenistic age. A stiff segment of the fortified circuit has been discovered in via Santa Marta. The stiff segment is quite five meters in breadth, and it was built partly with stones of the same size, partly with the e[mplhkton technique. The wall’s sector goes from north-west to south-east along the southern hillside of Montepiselli, a site which has yet been inhabited during the second half of the IV century BC. According to Gaetano Scibona, the wall’s directional positioning was a reinforcement of the town’s defensive system that was connected to the other stretches of the fortification walls which were discovered behind the harbour at the beginning of 1900s by Paolo Orsi74. Again, the archaeological data too allows to judge the arrival in Messina of the mercenaries coming from Syracuse as an element of economic and cultural evolution, which had to be impossible in the case of a forced assimilation, like the one portrayed disapprovingly by the Greek historical sources. During the Mamertine period, Messina absolutely seemed not to be a town with a plan limited in the area around its harbour; indeed, there was an extraordinary and steady expansion westwards and northwards, while in the south-east area of the town the industrial neighbourhood strengthened, in part overwhelming the habitation area of the archaic and classical times. This was the dawn of the Mamertine state, which played a primary role in the history of Sicily during the whole first half of the III century BC. We will see, the mercenaries led Messina to rule the whole north-eastern corner of the island, being 73 The cup bearing the dedicatory inscription is fragmentary, since it does not have the two handles and the lower part; see Morel 1981, II, nr. 3211 (dated to the second quarter of the III century BC). For the cult of Igea, which was associated in Messina with Asclepius, Bonanno Gorgone 1984, 221–227; Manganaro 1996C, 82–84. A general investigation about the iconography in Sobel 1990. 74 Orsi 1916, coll. 201–205; Scibona 1992, 35–36 (on the finds in via Santa Marta).

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a crucial harassing thought for Pyrrhus during his Sicilian endeavour, and finally being the basis for the arrival of the Romans in Sicily. 1.3. Minor tyrants of eastern Sicily between Carthage and Syracuse: aims of power or instincts of self-preservation? While the citizens of Syracuse lived the thrilling moments following the succession to Agathocles, which are well testified – as I have already pointed out – with a certain amount of evidence, we do not have much information about the political life in the other major towns of Sicily. Anyway, a short account of Diodorus Siculus (22, 2, 1) makes clear the wide diffusion of tyrannies in many Sicilian city-states: kata; de; Sikelivan h\san tuvrannoi ÔIkevta~ ejn Surakovsh/, Fintiva~ eij~ ∆Akravganta, Tundarivwn ejn Tauromenivw/, kaiv e{teroi tw`n ejlattovnwn povlewn. Diodorus himself, while describing the expedition of Pyrrhus in Sicily, gave the names of a few other tyrants and of the towns where they ruled. In one passage (22, 7, 6) the historian of Agirium wrote that in Syracuse, after Hicetas, one Sosistratus governed as a tyrant (I will treat this figure fully again); somewhere else (22, 8, 5) we are knowledgeable about the name of the tyrant of Leontini, Heraclides. The situation of Catane, that is the town which was the anchorage of Pyrrhus’ navy after the navigation along the eastern coast of Sicily towards Syracuse, is a little bit tricky. In his Historia animalium (5, 39), Aelianus named an Onomarchus, tyrant of Catane; some scholars thought he was one of the e{teroi tuvrannoi mentioned by Diodorus. Indeed, I assume we have no certain verification supporting this hypothesis, and I would be suspicious in thinking of Onomarchus as a III century Sicilian tyrant75. What is more, the above-mentioned diodorean list of tyrants creates many other problems and should drive to solve some matters: for example, it would be interesting to stress: when those tyrants took the power? which role did they play in Sicily after the death of Agathocles, until the coming of Pyrrhus? and last but not least, did the Sicilian tyranny have some distinctive features during the decade 289–279 BC? Now I want to address the chronological question, which is certainly the less challenging of all and even the easiest to be settled. As a matter of fact, even if we do not find in the surviving sources many factors that allow to determine an absolute chronology, I believe there is a concrete correlation between the swift decline of Syracuse’s power, especially in foreign political affairs, and the recurrent, sharp development of the Sicilian tyrannies. This could happen only after the decease of 75 On the topic of the Sicilian tyrannies at the beginning of the III century BC, see Berve 1967, II, 458–462; La Bua 1968, 126; Roussel 1970, 7–10. The most recent survey is Zambon 2004, 455–472. As regards an appraisal of the city-state of Catane and the tyrant Onomarchus, quoted by Aelianus Hist. anim. 5, 39, the scholars are divided: Sandberger 1970, 174–175, nr. 63 and De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 345 agree in setting the chronology of this tyrant at the beginning of III century BC. An opposite evaluation has been expressed by Kroll 1939, col. 505, and Berve 1967, II, 461.

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Agathocles, between 289 and 288 BC. The new tyrants came into sight when the Sicilian city-states, which were previously in the Syracusan sphere of influence, became free from the sway of Agathocles, but soon after they fell pray to new class-struggles and devastating fights. The new rulers somehow were successful in breaking off the home fights and strengthened their dominions in the awkward political scene of Sicily for the whole decade 289–279 BC. A good corroboration of this suggestion seems to be, once again, a passage of Diodorus’ Byzantine summary of book 22 (8, 3 and 5), pertaining the two tyrants Heraclides and Tyndarion; according to Diodorus, they were both holding safely their authorities when Pyrrhus came to Sicily76. Regrettably, owing to the persistent lack of epigraphic or literary evidence, it is almost impracticable by any attempt to reconstruct the political activity of the new autocrats during the ten years heading to the arrival of the Epirote king. Nonetheless, there is one point which may help to understand why those tyrannies persisted for many years and why they were so tough; that is, all the autocracies were concentrated in the environs of the eastern coasts of Sicily. Indeed, it was the sector of the island that suffered the pressure of the increasing Carthaginian supremacy. The Punic troops achieved in expanding significantly their ejpikravteia towards the eastern zone of Sicily only after the victory against the Syracusan army in the battle of Terias river. It is very likely that the Greek towns of eastern Sicily – particularly Leontini –, even if they preserved their sovereignty before Pyrrhus’ coming, stood on the side of the Carthaginians, who were about moving against their old enemy, i.e. Syracuse. The city-states that laid more to the north, like Tauromenium, certainly devoted themselves in protecting their territories from the persistent danger caused by the Italic mercenaries, who established themselves in Messina. It is almost unachievable to say something more. No different, it is very challenging to understand what was the social basis of those new tyrannies, because the sources of the many internal uprisings in the towns and even the outcomes of the civil strife are ignored. Perhaps, it is probable to win some help taking into account the political position of the single cities towards Agathocles. Already after he conquered the leadership in Syracuse, some city-states strongly went up against the political programme of the Syracusan tyrant and sustained the oligarchic governments; among them, was Tauromenium. Several city-states replaced the oligarchs with democratic governments, supported by the populations; this happened in Catane and Leontini. Later, owing to the development of the Sicilian politics, the democratic party seized power in almost every town that was a member of the Agathoclean empire. Therefore, in 289 BC, democratic governments had to be in charge in Tauromenium, Catane and – with much confidence – in Leontini; it is reasonable to think that in those towns a fierce restoration of the oligarchs took place and thanks to their faction’s help the new tyrannies established77. 76 Same chronology in La Bua 1968, 126. On Heraclides, tyrant of Leontini, see Lenschau 1912A, col. 462; Berve 1967, II, 461; Sandberger 1970, 109–110, nr. 36. 77 A general survey of the many rebellions in the Greek city-states of Sicily during the long period of Agathocles’ rule in Consolo Langher 1980, II 1, 289–342. With particular reference to

1.3. Minor tyrants of eastern Sicily between Carthage and Syracuse

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Finally, I assume it is arduous to give an answer to the last question, about the distinctiveness of those secondary tyrannies and its correlation with the peculiarities of the phenomenon in the history of Sicily. This correspondence is almost nonexistent; during the ten years between 289 and 279 BC, the Sicilian tyranny lost two fundamental features which highlighted its development during the classical age, i.e. its role of safeguard against the Carthaginians and – deriving from this – its thrust towards the conquest and the expansion. No one of the above-mentioned towns – and not even those who were the strongest in Sicily, for which we have a more ample evidence – truly acted in response to the intensifying encroachment of the Carthaginian troops towards the eastern part of Sicily, and to the growing control they exerted over several Greek towns’ governments78. In other words, a natural feeling of individualism, an instinct of self-preservation and survival overshadowed all over eastern Sicily, revealing itself notably in Tauromenium, Leontini, Catane and several city-states that we unfortunately ignore. The significant topic was not much the yearning of political power or the need to take up a foreign policy of conquest, but the necessity to steady the home politics, in consideration of the security against the dangers that could weaken the town’s strength from outside. These objectives had to be gained, of course, without giving up the freedom and self-government of each town from Syracuse (or the Carthaginians, as well). It has been said that, besides some political experiences which are in point of fact much more noteworthy – like the tyranny of Phintias in Agrigentum – in the decade between 289 and 279 BC there were in Sicily tyrants who were “conservatives” and paternalists79. I have some doubts about this assessment, because the above-mentioned peculiarities were valid for all the dynasts, Phintias of Agrigentum included, as we shall soon see: nevertheless, many Sicilian towns enjoyed during those years of a patent internal strength and perhaps of some economic wealth. According to some scholars, the situation of Tauromenium seemed to be emblematic. Although the town was endangered by the relentless threat of the Mamertines, and spoiled in the commercial trades by the presence of an inflexible Carthaginian ship blockade in the area of the Strait, Tauromenium seemed to have been able to mint in this period plentiful issues of gold and silver coinage, following a twofold weight stan­ dard system. I will discuss this in detail later, but I anticipate I disagree with the common opinion80. Leontini, see Berger 1988, 93–96; Berger 1991, 140–141; Gula 1995, 172–174. Details concerning Tyndarion in Lenschau 1948, coll. 1775–1776; Berve 1954, 274–276; Berve 1967, II, 461 and 733; Sandberger 1970, 211–212, nr. 83. 78 A useful general survey on the distinctive features of the old-aged conflict between Greeks and Carthaginians in Sicily has been offered by Kallala 1995, 161–170. 79 Berger 1992; Braccesi 1998, VII–XI (features of the Sicilian tyrannies); Roussel 1970, 9 (paternalists and conservatives tyrants). 80 The conjecture of the economic development of Tauromenium at the beginning of the III century BC has been suggested by Lévêque 1957, 470 (on the basis of the numismatic evidence provided by Giesecke 1923, 113–114). See my remarks and amendments in the following chapter. The topic of the historical evidence about Tauromenium in that period is very puzzling: for example, according to Sartori 1954, 363, the so-called “list of the strathgoiv” (IG XIV, nr.

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The same distinctive features that I have tried to stress, speaking of the less important tyrannies, are suitable even for the well-known autocracies of Agrigentum and Syracuse; both towns were involved in a common war that consented to the Carthaginians a slow but unbroken onslaught towards eastern Sicily. In fact even when the Syracusans, as soon as they eliminated the danger of Agrigentum, replied under the leadership of Hicetas to the offensive of the Punic troops, their response was encouraged by the impulse of self-protection and to safeguard their own autonomy. 1.4. Phintias and the revival of Agrigentum: history of a tyrant who looked like an Hellenistic monarch (289/288 – 280? BC) As we have seen, the death of Agathocles in 289 BC furthered an outburst of freedom and promoted a hazardous call to independence and autonomy in a lot of the Greek towns that previously were part of the Syracusan empire. The progressive crack that led to the breakdown of the old Agathoclean empire’s union was almost direct but even ongoing, and it did not implicate all the Greek city-states: indeed, whilst some Sicilian towns remained under the control area of Syracuse, even as a result of their geographical position – as the circumstances concerning Gela and Camarina, which I previously suggested –, some others, which were faraway from Syracuse and were even her historical enemies, acquired very soon the indepen­ dence and found once again an institutional way out in the tyranny. The situation that historical sources record with peculiarity is about Agrigentum, where the tyrant Phintias held strongly the power for nearly a decade81. First of all, I want to state that after his conquest of power in Agrigentum, following the example given by the basileuv~ Agathocles, Phintias almost immediately awarded himself with the basileiva, minting his coinage with the inscription BASILEWS FINTIA (or else FINTIA BASILEWS). Therefore, we should judge him as the king of Agrigentum. Nevertheless, the literary news about him, which are all drawn from the Byzantine summary of Diodorus Siculus’ book 22, represent him as using the typical attributes of the tyrant. Anew, these reports must be ascribed to an ancient historian who had to be unwelcoming Phintias’ tyranny, and I assume that this author was Philinus of Agrigentum. This is the reason why we can plausibly refer to Phintias as to a tyrant. Thanks to the information gained from the Histories of Diodorus Siculus (22, 2, 1–3), it is possible to date with confidence the beginning of Phintias’ tyranny in 288 BC, soon after the death of Agathocles; I guess it is not conceivable to suppose a higher chronology, because – as I said before – we have to imagine that almost in 421) should be dated to the end of Tyndarion’s tyranny: this opinion has been rejected by Manganaro 1963A, 19–29. 81 La Bua 1960, 98–109; Berve 1967, II, 458–462; La Bua 1968, 126–127, 131–133 and 155– 160; De Waele 1971, 143–147. The most recent survey on the tyranny of Phintias is Zambon 2001B, 179–189.

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all the towns of the former Agathoclean empire, when rumours of his death arrived, many internal contentions took place, involving the old supporters of the Syracusan king and his challengers. There are some more details on the subject of Agrigentum, where a government supported and directly formed by the aristocratic members of the town held the power in 289 BC, and perhaps even in the previous years. As it has been said, the statement that the aristocracy had leadership in Agrigentum seems to give good reason for the troubles of Agathocles – whose origins were from the lower-class – in applying an official influence over the town, whose hostility he had always to face. It is not achievable to aver the political and social basis of the new master of Agrigentum. At any rate, a passage of Diodorus (22, 2, 4) reveals that during his tyranny he put to death many members of the upper classes; consequently, I guess that the communis opinio of the modern scholars – to say, that Phintias was an associate of the democratic party – may be supported. After the news concerning the outbreak of the civil war in Syracuse arrived in Agrigentum – a struggle that, if considered from the point of view of the citizens of Agrigentum, had to reduce at least for the short term any risk of Syracusan pressure and control on their home politics – the political faction of Phintias went up against the aristocratic party, which had the power at the moment, and provoked an internal warfare which lasted for some time; as a result of the events, Phintias, who had to be certainly an eminent member of the democrats, seized the leadership and established his tyranny. Of course, I assume it is necessary even in this case – as we already have seen in Syracuse with Hicetas – to suppose that Phintias purged many of his political opponents thanks to death sentences or forced exiles, followed by the confiscation of their properties82. The political scene which stood in front of the tyrant in 288 BC was readily understood and very advantageous for the beginning of a foreign policy consecrated to the expansionism and to the recapture of the territories neighboring Agrigentum, which had been lost in the fights against Syracuse, during the reign of Agathocles. The Syracusans, commanded by Hicetas, were absorbed in tackling the joint menace of Menon and the Carthaginians and after that in finding a resolution for the trouble of the mercenaries; so they could not counter the eastward march of Phintias’ army. The Carthaginians, who were actually engaged in holding up Menon’s actions against Syracuse and, at the same time, in taking control of many former possessions of Agathocles, joining them to their ejpikravteia, did not dis­ agree with the establishment and the development of Phintias’ tyranny, as they understandably did in a second moment. The troops of Agrigentum, entering eastward the territories of Syracuse, played the part of Carthage. Being free from all those hassles, Phintias took the advantage to increase Agrigentum’s dominions in the only two directions which were possible, that is northwards and eastwards. It has been rightly said that the foreign policy of expansion pursued by Phintias must be 82 Several chronologies have been suggested about Phintias’ seize of power in Agrigentum: Schubring 1873, 70; Holm 1901, II, 514 (286 BC); Pareti 1959, 244 and 247 (287 BC); La Bua 1968, 126; De Waele 1971, 143 (between the end of 289 and the beginning of 288 BC). For Phintias’ democratic origin, see even La Bua 1960, 98–99.

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considered under the point of view of a corroboration of his internal power and of his tyranny; recapturing from Syracuse the properties which previously Agathocles stole from Agrigentum, Phintias could definitely obtain a great reputation among his fivloi. On the contrary, a potential success of the tyrant could not be used to hush his contending political party, i.e. the aristocracy; really, in view of the violent behaviour and of the cruelties which distinguished the internal politics of Phintias – and whose evidence is provided again by Diodorus Siculus (22, 2, 3) – one has to suppose that the challengers had to be shut up already after the success of the Agrigentine democratic party in the internal strife of 289/288 BC, which was surely followed by many unlawful deaths and exiles of the members of the aristocratic party83. Nevertheless, if it is possible to date back this foreign policy to the second half of 288 BC, similarly one has to acknowledge that it lasted considerably and that the forward movement – at least eastwards – of the troops of Agrigentum was longwinded and gradual. Indeed, in the first times the onslaught northwards had to be promoted; by this action, the soldiers of Agrigentum conquered many villages and towns, at least including Agirium, that according to Diodorus (22, 2, 3) was one of the towns which rose up against the harsh tyranny of Phintias. Therefore, I assume that Phintias’ army achieved successfully in moving northwards until it took control of the areas the river Simetus flowed through. I think that those military operations were facilitated by the fact that the former mercenaries of Agathocles did not arrive yet in the Strait area or capture Messina. If actually the northwards progress was made possible by the dearth of any strong resistance, including the unfriendliness of the Carthaginians, who were in the same way occupied in a lengthy recapture of the dominions which Agathocles previously subtracted them, I guess it is impossible to have the same judgment about Phintias’ foreign policy towards the eastern area of Sicily. It is true that the attack against Syracuse began in a moment of growth and prosperity for Agrigentum, standing out against the insecurity and the political weakness of the Syracusans, who kept busy in working out the thrilling internal strife and the disorders provoked by the mercenaries; but, in spite of what one should think, the outcome of those troubles and the mercenaries’ banishment fortified Syracuse, and at the same time gave time to the citizens to make plans for a resistance against the danger of Agrigentum. Phintias, who prepared carefully during the winter of 288/287 BC his march to Syracuse and was ready to set off in the springtime of 287 BC, had soon to stand in front of the huge group of Oscan and Campanian mercenaries who, almost simultaneously, left Syracuse and tramped westwards, sacking and pillaging. The external political projects of Phintias suffered then a sudden halt and almost certainly the tyrant’s army was forced to move back to Agrigentum, while the mercenaries ransacked Camarina and Gela, and then made their way to the Strait of Messina. I think that exactly at this moment we can set the beginning of the building works of the new town founded by Phintias, which he called with his own 83 La Bua 1968, 132 (Phintias’ foreign policy as a revenge against the political opponents in Agrigentum).

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name – i.e. Phintias – following the example and the practice of any other Helle­ nistic basileuv~; the evidence, once again, is provided by a summarized paragraph of Diodorus’ histories (22, 2, 2)84. So, the tyrant of Agrigentum built Phintias in a place which was strategically very important and perhaps previously settled, that is the mouth of river Salsus; his aim was manifestly to shelter Agrigentum itself not only against the unlikely raids of the Syracusans, but especially against the dangerous and very realistic attacks of the Mamertines. For these reasons, Phintias conveyed in the newly founded town the survived inhabitants of Gela, who were without a roof over their head after the pillage of their homeland by the Oscan mercenaries. Following these events – which are thickened in Diodorus Siculus’ pithy and concise account, but were probably scattered on a longer period – Phintias could resume his fight against Hicetas and the Syracusans, marching for a second time eastwards, and on this occasion he could rely on the non-existence of mercenary troops in the territories of Gela and Camarina. The first action of Agrigentum’s army moving ahead was the complete annihilation of the remains of Gela’s habitation area, which probably happened in the springtime of 286 BC, as I previously argued (on the basis of Diodorus 22, 2, 2). This action has to be weighed up under a twofold point of view; on the one hand, it could be addressed against the survived members of Gela’s aristocratic faction, who had to be plainly opposing Phintias’ tyranny and might be even mutinous in an area which had been controlled with many difficulties by the tyrant of Agrigentum; on the other hand, this act was no doubt set to frighten Syracuse, because Gela had been since ever in her sphere of influence, and Syracuse itself might have taken advantage of the extant habitation area of Gela as a supporting place in the fight against Agrigentum85. Anyway, the military forces of Phintias succeeded in their forward movement at least to the banks of river Hyblaeus: as we know once again from a passage of Diodorus (22, 2, 1), there took place the decisive combat between the tyrant’s army and the troops of the Syracusans. The historian talks about an official war-declaration between Phintias and Hicetas, and then he refers to the final battle near the river Hyblaeus, which ended with the success of the Syracusan army. However, the victory of Hicetas, which was even the signal of the political downfall of Phintias, indeed followed a prolonged period of hostilities and skirmishes, which were put on ice in the winter of 286/285 BC and started again in the 84 Several chronologies have been suggested about the foundation of Phintias: Schubring 1873, 70 (281–280 BC, in consequence of his dating the sack of Gela by the Mamertines to 282 BC); Pareti 1959, 246 (283 BC); La Bua 1968, 153 (285 BC); Manni 1971, 129 (after the spring or summer of 286 BC, which he considered the most probable date for the destruction of Gela); Carità 1972, 43 (284 BC); Manganaro 1990, 392 (the resettlement of the citizens of Gela to Phintias happened more or less in 285 BC, when the city had already been settled). 85 The presence of a Greek cwrivon in the neighbourhood of cape Ecnomus even before the foundation of Phintias has been conjectured appropriately by De Miro 1956, 269–270 and then reevaluated by Manganaro 1990, 392–393. The strategic position and the anti-Syracusan meaning of the new city have been stressed by La Bua 1968, 153, and Manni 1971, 129–130. For the political meaning of the complete destruction of the remains of Gela, see Cataldi 1982, 891.

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following year; I assume that this is the information we have from the following piece of evidence, coming as always from Diodorus (22, 2, 1: katadroma;~ de; pro;~ ajllhvlou~ poiouvmenoi ta;~ kthvsei~ dihvrpasan, th;n de; cwvran ajgewvrghton ejpoivh­ san). Therefore, it is even-handed to set the battle of river Hyblaeus in the springtime of 285 BC86. And this was not the only trouble for Phintias: in addition to the standstill he suffered from his rival Syracuse, and the need to draw back to the banks of river Salsus – which became in that moment the official border between the Agrigentine and the Syracusan spheres of influence – Phintias had to reckon even with many problems concerning his home politics. Several towns, which were under Phintias’ political control and accepted him against their will, suffering the overbearing actions and the banishments charged by the tyrant, hence mutinied; I think that it is necessary to set this rebellion in the chronology after the setback near the river Hyblaeus, which no doubt matched the first moment of political and military weakness of Phintias. Diodorus Siculus (22, 2, 3–4) related that the first town to rise up against the tyrant was Agirium, and even several other expelled from their citadels the garrisons established there by the tyrant. It seems almost that Phintias could be successful in putting down the rebellion without making use of the army, but only modifying his brutal government’s customs; to say, more or less tyrannizing with temperance. I presume that the foremost upholders of the insurgence against Phintias were the members of the aristocratic party, who since ever had been opposing and unwelcoming the tyrant’s policy, and suffered from him the most wicked and bloodthirsty suppression. As Diodorus clearly wrote (22, 2, 4: pollou;~ tw`n eujpovrwn ajnairw`n), Phintias put to death many of the wealthy men; the historian here referred clearly to the risings which followed probably the battle of river Hyblaeus, but I guess we can easily recognize a more general and usual situation. If we have confidence in the information concerning a partial amendment of the tyrant’s ruling methods, I guess that this was exactly the chief political mistake which led Phintias to downfall; indeed, it is out of the question that a tyranny, which from its beginnings distinguished itself as gory and vicious, could become straight away a “moderate” regime. Of course, there was a tangible, instantaneous advantage; the “new” tyranny thrived in putting out the rebellion: however, Phintias was thus forced to grant much more liberty of action to his political challengers, the aristocrats, who, taking into account the increasing powerlessness of the tyranny, tried to pull it down. They were indeed well aware that their project needed to be encouraged even by political and military forces outside Agrigentum, who similarly were opposing Phintias. Consequently, they took a look around and unsurprisingly asked the Carthaginians for help. Needless to say, the Punics accepted the request. On the one hand, a chance was given to them to 86 The battlefield cannot be identified; Schubring 1873, 110, thought that Hyblaeus was a foothill; Holm 1901, II, 514 suggested a river; Ziegler 1914, col. 29, identified it with the modern river Irminio. As well, several chronologies have been recommended for the battle: see Pareti 1959, 246 (283 BC); La Bua 1968, 152 (spring of 285 BC); De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 346 (summer of 285 BC).

1.4. Phintias and the revival of Agrigentum

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amplify steadfastly eastwards their ejpikravteia, putting in Agrigentum itself and all the territories which were under its control, and at the same time to set its borders very near to the Syracusan state. On the other hand, the Carthaginians could even achieve the political control of Agrigentum, if they banished the tyrant Phintias and establishing to power the pro-Punic aristocracy, that gave them more warranties about a political stability. As I will point out later, it is very plausible that when Pyrrhus landed in Sicily in 278 BC, the town of Agrigentum was still controlled by the Carthaginians, on account of a military garrison87. Therefore, Phintias step by step lost his power and disappeared from the political scene of Sicily; it is unhappily impractical to set a defined chronology, but it is realistic to think about 284–283 BC or, in any case, the years which immediately paved the way to Pyrrhus’ coming in Sicily. We know nearly nothing about his death, but another passage of Diodorus Siculus (22, 7, 1) has to be absolutely true, when he said that the tyrant of Agrigentum had a dream which revealed him the manner of his death. He was hunting a wild boar, when the swine rushed at him, struck his side with its tusks, pierced him through and killed him. The dream that forecasts the death to a tyrant, as it is described by the literary source used by Diodorus – and that in this case is absolutely opposing Phintias – may be plainly placed in the chestnut of the tyranny’s violent conclusion; what is more interesting, the last bronze coinage issues of the tyrant remind straightforwardly the information provided by the literary source. The first bronze issues minted by Phintias have the following devices: – Obv. Head of laureated Zeus; around it, incomplete inscription AKRAGANT [INWN]88. Rev. Eagle preying upon a hare; in the field, shortened writing FI[NTIAS]. – Obv. Head of laureated Apollo: around it, complete legend AKRAGANTOS. Rev. Two eagles preying upon a hare89. – Obv. Head of laureated Apollo. In the field, some traces of inscription that cannot be read. Rev. Standing eagle, turned to the right: abridged inscription FI[NTIAS].

87 La Bua 1960, 100–101 was worth to have rightly re-evaluated the old hypothesis of Holm 1901, II, 487, who accepted as true the presence of a Punic garrison in Agrigentum after the departure of Phintias: but nevertheless, the support to this conjecture cannot be given by the amended reading of Diod. 22, 10, 1. The correction was due to Beloch 1893A, 630, who thought that Sosistratus took immediately the power in the city (followed by Meltzer 1896, II, 226 and 554; Lévêque 1957, 457; Pareti 1959, 247; Berve 1967, II, 459 and 732; De Waele 1971, 145, note 736; De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 347–348). 88 This is the addition of Consolo Langher 1964, 213; it may be possible, but I would suggest rather a more reasonable AKRAGANTOS, on account of a comparison with the second specimen here cited. 89 Due to the lack of any reference to Phintias’ name, Gabrici 1927, 119, nr. 127, dated this coin to the period 279–241 BC.

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– Obv. Young male head, perhaps Apollo, with long hair and laureated. Rev. Eagle killing a snake. In the field, SI. Around, quite complete legend [F]INTIAS.90 These issues deserve some observations91; it is worth to stress that they no doubt belong to the very first time of Phintias’ autocratic government in Agrigentum, since there is no allusion to the title of king, which is patent on the coinage of the last period; nay, these bronze coins still bear the sign of the official minting authority of the Greek city, although there can be no doubt that the two letters on the reverses were meant to be an abbreviation of the tyrant’s name. Therefore, it seems quite feasible that these coins belong to the first days of Phintias’ tyranny. In all probability, Phintias decided to use the official dices of the city, just adding on them his own mark. Everything changed in the last issues. Their typology and the devices are as follows; – Obv. Head of Persephone. Rev. Wild boar rushing to left. In the field, inscription BASILEWS FINTIA. – Obv. Head of the river-god Akragas. Rev. Wild boar rushing to left. In the field, inscription BASILEWS FINTIA. – Obv. Head of Artemis. Rev. Wild boar rushing to left. In the field, inscription BASILEWS FINTIA. – Obv. Head of Artemis; in front, inscription SWTEIRA. Rev. Wild boar rushing to left; in the field, inscription FINTIA BASILEWS. Hence, the wild boar is represented in many issues of the tyrant, but I presume that one can match with the diodorean passage only the two issues bearing on the obverse the head of Artemis, occasionally with the SWTEIRA legend. If there cannot be any doubt about the manifest relationship between the two documents, there is indeed one more question to answer; what came first? Was the coinage minted originally, or was the legend previously invented? I think that the dies’ succession itself shows patently that the story of Phintias’ dream was created on the basis of the wild boar portrayed on the reverse of the bronze issues; perhaps, the two series bearing the head of Artemis and the epithet of SWTEIRA followed the forgery of the story about Phintias’ death by the opposing political propaganda. It is as if the tyrant wanted to propitiate a favourable intervention of the goddess, who is portrayed with the distinctive features and symbols of the hunting-goddess92. 90 Quoted only by Consolo Langher 1964, 213, nr. 27. 91 On Phintias’ coinage, see in general Poole 1876, 20, nr. 31–34 and 131–139; Holm 1906, 201–202; Head 19112, 123; Giesecke 1923, 98; Grose 1923, I, 245; Gabrici 1927, 119; Consolo Langher 1964, 213–214; Jenkins 1970, 115; De Waele 1971, 25; Rutter 1997, 175. For some good specimens (with reproduction), see SNG Copenhagen, nr. 97–104. 92 An exhaustive analysis of the topic in Zambon 2001B, 187–189, where I showed that the position held by La Bua 1968, 142–143, note 76 is objectionable. The connection between Diodorus’ account and the device of the boar on the coin was made yet by Holm 1906, 202 and De Waele 1971, 25. By the way, the wild boar was cast even on the silver coins of the Sicilian city of Abacenum: see Bertino 1975, 112. For the cult of Artemis Swvteira see Wernicke 1895,

1.5. Hicetas’ autocratic rule in Syracuse

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Whatever the case may be, Phintias completely disappeared from Agrigentum’s history when Pyrrhus came to Sicily, in 278 BC. 1.5. Hicetas’ autocratic rule in Syracuse: from victory to decline (285–279 BC) The fortunes of Agrigentum and Syracuse were closely tied, with a “cause-effect” connection, at least until the springtime of 285 BC, when the Syracusan army in command of Hicetas defeated the troops of Phintias in close proximity to the river Hyblaeus. In that year Hicetas had been appointed by the Syracusan people with the title of strathgov~ for the fourth consecutive time. As we have previously seen, the way Hicetas had to go along to toughen his standing was not unproblematic and lacking in troubles; first of all, he had to deal with the war against Menon and the Carthaginians; afterwards, he settled the question of the former mercenaries of Agathocles with the advantageous intervention of the members of the Syracusan boulhv. Phintias of Agrigentum took advantage of the unsteadiness of Syracuse’s offices to set up and then perform an expansion of his own state in opposition to the territories which still were under Syracusan control. Nevertheless, the outcome of all the problems concerning the home politics, and particularly the banishment of the Oscan-Campanian mercenaries, played a chief role in underpinning the position of Syracuse in the Sicilian political scene and in giving a boost to Hicetas’ strathgiva. After the bloody struggle against the mercenary soldiers came to an end and there were again to some extent harmony and agreement inside the Syracusan citizens, Hicetas could give attention yet in the second half of 287 BC to restructure his home politics and prepare a counteroffensive focusing on the defence of Syracuse against those years’ traditional rivals, i.e. the Carthaginians and – most of all – Phintias93. The authority and the influence of Hicetas in all the political resolutions approved by the Syracusans in that period had to be considerable; the historical source of Diodorus Siculus – that, once again, can be identified with Philinus of Agrigentum – described Hicetas using the label of tuvranno~ (22, 2, 1): we have seen before that he inserted Hicetas in the inventory of the Sicilian tyrants ruling after Agathocles’ death (Kata; de; Sikelivan h\san tuvrannoi ∆Ikevta~ ejn Surakovsh/ […]). Somewhere else in the summary of Diodorus’ book 22 (7, 2) – a short passage that allows to set a date for the duration of Hicetas’ strategy (ejnneva e[th dunasteuvsa~, that is from 288 to 279 BC) – Philinus described the authority of Hicetas as a turanniv~.

col. 1399; Kahil 1984, 680 (nr. 764–766), 682 (nr. 805) and 684 (nr. 833). The political meaning of this cult is plainly showed by the case of Megalopolis: Jost 1985, 414–415. 93 Meltzer 1896, II, 224–228; Lenschau 1912B, coll. 1596–1597; Huttl 1929, 134–135; Pareti 1959, 243–247; La Bua 1960, 102; Berve 1967, II, 458–460; La Bua 1968; Meier– Welcker 1979, 23–24; De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 345–347; Hans 1983, 84–85.

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The information of Philinus, made available by Diodorus, hold a different view as regards the evidence coming from the coinage94. As a matter of fact, all the gold coins minted in Syracuse in the period of Hicetas’ strategy bear only the inscription EPI IKETA, which characterized the strathgov~ exactly as an officeholder of the Syracusan democracy. It seems that neither Hicetas claimed unduly for himself the title of basileuv~ – thus giving a helpful response to the democracy’s wants and to the desire of his predecessor Agathocles – nor he established a tyranny; indeed, this last option was really unworkable in those years’ Syracuse. Nonetheless, it must be considered that the title of strathgov~, that was officially appointed to Hicetas for nine consecutive years by the Syracusan boulhv, gave him the almost absolute control of the army and therefore put in his hands the town’s fate: without any doubt he was a strathgo;~ aujtokravtwr. For that reason, without breaching the democratic constitution of the city – and more than that, having a teamwork with the local offices, as in the case of the mercenaries’ banishment – and upholding all the institutions, it is clear that Hicetas succeeded in converging on himself all the activities concerning the town’s internal politics. Hence, how must this numismatic data be explained? Some scholars wanted to understand the inscription EPI IKETA as a shrewd exercise of the officeholder directed to mask the tyrannical attributes of his nine years’ strategy in Syracuse. While open for criticism, it is obvious that such a kind of justification has the task of matching up the data coming from Philinus and the numismatic evidence95. First of all, we cannot fail to remember what was usually Philinus’ judgment about tyranny; indeed the historian of Agrigentum marked disapprovingly all the lords of the Sicilian towns in the decade before the arrival of Pyrrhus, starting from Phintias, tuvranno~ in Agrigentum. As a result, it is evident that the information coming from Philinus and provided by Diodorus Siculus must be riddled carefully. Secondly, I want to turn the attention again to the numismatic evidence, without restricting only to the inscription EPI IKETA. I have already emphasized that the legend is inscribed only on the gold coins96; which are the iconographic devices of these coins? Not including all the symbols engraved in the coin’s field both on the obverse and on the reverse97, we have one iconographic style alone: 94 Poole 1876, 200–206; Holm 1906, 195–198; Head 19112, 183; Giesecke 1923, 100–102; Holloway 1962, 12–17; Consolo Langher 1964, 320–335; La Bua 1968, 151; Buttrey 1973, 1–17; Rutter 1997, 45–46. 95 On the meaning of the inscription EPI IKETA, Holm 1906, 195 (thanks to the ejpiv, Hicetas qualified himself as a republican magistrate); Huttl 1929, 134 (“seine Münzen […] bezeichnen ihn nur als Lenker des Syrakusanischen Staates”); Holloway 1962, 12 (he thought that Hicetas ruled “[…] as a republican magistrate”, and that his coinage was just a second stage of the post-Agathoclean democratic issues); La Bua 1968, 151 (the ejpiv marked Hicetas as a magistrate, not as a king and not even as a tyrant); De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 346 (Hicetas’ expedient to hide the authocratic shape of his power); Rutter 1997, 175–176 (the use of EPI IKETA “[…] seems to indicate that Hicetas wanted to maintain the fiction that his position was simply that of a republican magistrate”). 96 Not in all the coinage of Hicetas, as assumed by De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 346. 97 At present, there is no complete survey concerning the symbols. On the obverse, we have the

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– Obv. Head of Persephone turned to left; in the field, inscription SURAKOSIWN. Rev. Biga driven by Nike, rightwards; in the exergue, inscription EPI IKETA.98 A thorough investigation of the coinage devices shows clearly that its “democratic” nature must be ascribed not only to the inscription referring to Hicetas’ office: according to me, there is one more characteristic which leaves any doubt, that is the presence of the ethnic inscription SURAKOSIWN, featuring even both in the ­Agathoclean issues preceding his appointment to the basileiva and in the coinage that were minted by the Syracusan democracy, after Agathocles’ passing. In reality, I guess that what is truly describing Hicetas’ position is the figure of the charioting Nike on the reverse, which perfectly fits with the role of army commander owned by the Syracusan officer. It is exactly the presence of a charioting Nike on the following silver tetradrachms; – Obv. Head of Persephone turned to left. Rev. Quadriga driven by Nike; in the exergue, inscription SURAKOSIWN which allows an association with the gold drachms surely minted in Syracuse at the time of Hicetas, and even lets ascribe the silver issue to the same chronological phase99. An equivalent inference as well is applicable to the very plentiful bronze coinage, which is typified as follows: – Obv. Head of Persephone, turned to left. Rev. Biga driven by a male charioteer; in the exergue, inscription SURAKOSIWN.

ear of grain (SNG Oxford, nr. 2097; SNG Aberdeen, nr. 85); the poppy (SNG Cambridge, nr. 1362); the torch (SNG Lockett, nr. 1007; SNG Cambridge, nr. 1361; SNG Lloyd, nr. 1523); the cornucopia (SNG Copenhagen, nr. 798); the bee (SNG Klagenfurt, nr. 523–524; SNG München, nr. 1292–1293). On the reverse, there is the star joined with a thunderbolt (SNG Oxford, nr. 2097; SNG Klagenfurt, nr. 524; SNG Aberdeen, nr. 85); the moon with a circle (SNG Cambridge, nr. 1361–1362; SNG Lloyd, nr. 1523; SNG Copenhagen, nr. 798; see the noteworthy reading of this symbol made by Buttrey 1976, 248–252); the star with an ear of grain (SNG Lockett, nr. 1007). 98 For some specimens with those devices, see Poole 1876, nr. 430–435; Holm 1906, nr. 437; Head 19112, 183; Giesecke 1923, 100; Caccamo Caltabiano 1993, 150; SNG Copenhagen, nr. 798; SNG München, nr. 1292–1293; SNG Oxford, nr. 2097; SNG Klagenfurt, nr. 523–524. Perhaps the most important find of Hicetas’ gold coinage was made by Paul Deussen in Morgantina, during the excavations of 1966; see Stillwell 1967, 248 and 250, plates 73–74. The total amount of the hoard was 44 coins; 20 among them were specimens of the EPI IKETA gold issue: Buttrey 1973, 1–17; Buttrey – Erim – Groves – Holloway 1989, 102–103 and 145–146. 99 Poole 1876, nr. 436–440; Head 19112, 183; Giesecke 1923, 100; Grose 1923, I, nr. 2865, plate 103, 10 (bearing the following symbols: obv. bee/rev. star); SNG Copenhagen, nr. 799 (bee/star); SNG München, nr. 1294 (bee/star); SNG Lockett, nr. 1008–1009 (bee/star). Holm 1906, 195–196 did not agree in dating those silver coins to the age of Hicetas; according to him, they had to be ascribed to the age of Agathocles.

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Even in this instance, the similarity of the symbols compared with those of the silver and gold coinage allows to attribute this abundant bronze issue to the period of Hicetas’ strategy. A useful resemblance of this coinage with the contemporary issues of Messina has recently allowed the scholars to raise again the chronology of the Syracusan issues in all the three metals at least up to the beginning of the strathgiva.100 Thus, the numismatic evidence seems not at all to validate Philinus’ judgement about the tyrannical quality of Hicetas’ strategy; on the contrary, it corroborates the long lasting and the slow but sure settlement of the democratic institutions in Syracuse, together with the back up of Hicetas’ military office. This partition of appointments and responsibilities is absolutely realistic; on the one hand, the democracy’s executives attended to the rearrangement of the economy and of the home politics; on the other, Hicetas chiefly devoted himself to the army’s reorganization and to plan a defence and a counteroffensive against Agrigentum and the Carthaginians. Once again, the literary and numismatic sources drive to these conclusions. It is unquestionable that Syracuse, at least from 287 BC – which is, we have seen, the closing date of the internal struggle against the mercenaries – enjoyed a considerable economic prosperity. The confirmation is given once again by the plentiful issues of gold drachms which, on the account of the dies’ succession established by the scholars, had to last for the whole period of Hicetas’ strategy. As I said, perhaps the most important measure of the Syracusan strathgov~ was the army’s restructuring: Hicetas, who since from the times of the civil strife against Menon and the Carthaginians could count on the contribution of conventional Syracusan troops – skilfully mixed with mercenary soldiers who were loyal to the town – had to face the mutiny of the Osco-Campanian mercenaries. Sometimes it has been argued – according to me, a little bit ingenuously – that Syracuse evacuated all the mercenaries in 287 BC; indeed, I want to emphasize again that for the greatest part only the Oscan and Campanian soldiers run off the town. So Hicetas could put his faith in those mercenary troops consisting of the Celts, the Libyans, the Tyrrhenians and the Greeks who had been engaged by Agathocles.

100 Poole 1876, 201–203, nr. 441–467: Head 19112, 183: Grose 1923, I, plate 103, nr. 11–18: Consolo Langher 1964, 321–322, nr. 603 (she agrees for the chronology [287–279 BC] with Gabrici 1927, 133): Calciati 1986, II, nr. 255–269: SNG Copenhagen, nr. 800–806: SNG Klagenfurt, nr. 1368–1371: SNG Oxford, nr. 2098–2101: SNG München, nr. 1295–1306. Holm 1906, 196, nr. 439 did not agree to date these bronze coins to the age of Hicetas (the specimen was ascribed to the so-called period III of Agathocles, 306–289 BC). A decisive evidence for the correct assignment to Hicetas’ age is the comparison between the symbols of the gold coins and those on the bronze issues, which are quite the same: the star (SNG München, nr. 1296: SNG Copenhagen, nr. 800–802: SNG Evelpidis, nr. 636 and 639); the ear of grain (SNG Oxford, nr. 2098: SNG München, nr. 1295–1297 and 1306: SNG Stockholm, nr. 588); the poppy (SNG Oxford, nr. 2100–2101: SNG München, nr. 1298–1299: SNG Evelpidis, nr. 638); the torch (SNG Lockett, nr. 1007: SNG Stockholm, nr. 590: SNG München, nr. 1302–1305). Buttrey 1973, 17 suggested to set a chronology limited to the last years of Hicetas’ government: on the contrary, the “traditional” chronology is supported by Caccamo Caltabiano 1993, 151, on account of the likeness of the issues with the contemporary coinage of Messina.

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The Syracusan strathgov~ played even the role of nauvarco~, as previously did Archagathus; the navy of Syracuse, even if it was inferior to the Punic one as regards the number of warships, was not too much reduced; a corroboration seems to be provided once again by an information owed to Diodorus’ historical account (22, 8, 5); the story refers exactly to 278 BC, but reasonably it reveals a preceding state of affairs. Diodorus says that when Pyrrhus in 278 BC rescued Syracuse from the Carthaginian blockade and took over the town’s navy, which was at anchor in the Great Harbour, he could join to his own flotilla 120 decked vessels (i.e. warships) and 20 ships without decks (i.e. commercial ships), and what’s more the basilikh; nau`~ with nine banks of oarsmen; in all probability, the greatest part of this fleet had to be yet in command of Hicetas, and probably the royal ship was even a legacy of Agathocles. Once Hicetas reinforced the troops of his army and arranged a counterattack against Phintias’ military forces, he was successful in being the victor in the crucial fight, which took place close to the banks of river Hyblaeus in the springtime of 285 BC. If we confide in the above-mentioned passage of Diodorus (22, 2, 1), we should understand that immediately following the action of Hicetas was the war against the Carthaginians; but I think that the second half of 285 BC run through a series of skirmishes between the Syracusan army and the troops of Phintias; those clashes were used by Hicetas to be at the heels of his rival and draw him back beyond the river Salsus, which since that year became the border line of the Agrigentine and Syracusan spheres of influence101. Once he got back the territories that Phintias wrenched to the Syracusans during his eastwards mission, Hicetas almost certainly went back to Syracuse, where he spent all the winter of 285–284 BC in the preparations of the war in Sicily against Carthage. The Punic army went extremely through the eastern areas of Sicily, reaching the territories flown through by the northern streams of river Simetus and by the river Dittainus, until they settled in the country around Leontini. The final battle, which unfortunately cannot be dated with firmness, was fought even this time in the vicinity of a river, whose name is Terias; it was a burning, but even logical defeat for the Syracusans. The account of the battle is given by Diodorus Siculus (22, 2, 1), who relied upon the historical narrative of Philinus. For Hicetas and the Syracusans, who were forced to withdraw to their homeland, the catastrophe was twofold; on the one hand, as we clearly understand from Diodorus’ information, Syracuse paid a very onerous tribute strictly speaking of human lives; but, what’s more, the defeat had a specific meaning, because it paved the way to the Carthaginians’ invasion of the south-eastern corner of Sicily, allowing them to point straightforwardly towards Syracuse102. Some scholars wanted to connect the issue of gold drachms, bearing as devices the Nike charioting the biga and the inscription EPI IKETA, with the war cam101 La Bua 1968, 153–154; De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 346. 102 On the battle of river Terias, see Pareti 1959, 247 (regrettably, he suggested a too low chronology, that is 280 BC); Berve 1967, II, 459 (referring to this battle as to a decisive fighting between Hicetas and Phintias!); La Bua 1968, 154–155 (assuming a higher chronology, that is 284 BC): Meier-Welcker 1979, 23; De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 347.

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paign fought by the Syracusans against the Punic soldiers. I have already tried to provide convincingly evidence that those coinage’s issues covered all the age of Hicetas’ strategy. Anyway, I assume that there is one more factor that may be used to deny the previous chronological setting of those coins. Indeed, what could have been the meaning of a coin’s device, which was celebrating a victory yet before the war against the Punic troops had been fought? What could be the common sense to perpetuate such an iconography even after that awful downfall? Furthermore, Hicetas’ issues did not have any iconographic device which could be associated to proHellenic or anti-Carthaginian propaganda, as one would naturally expect. Indeed, I suppose that it is possible to explain the devices correctly if we relate the Nike representation to another important military triumph, gained by the Syracusan army “ejpi; Ikevta/”: that is the battle near the river Hyblaeus, the victory against Phintias of Agrigentum103! Strictly speaking of anti-Carthaginian propaganda, we can easily explain the bronze coinage issued by the Syracusan mint during (and in all probability even after) the war operations led by Hicetas against Carthage. They bear the following iconography; – Obv. Head of bearded Zeus (sometimes the symbol of the thunderbolt is even represented); in the field, inscription DIOS ELLANIOU. Rev. Eagle standing on the thunderbolt; in the field, inscription SURAKOSIWN.104 Some of these coins have been found during the excavations of Gela, exactly in correspondence with the terrain levels dating to the town’s devastation. The numismatic analysis allowed to ascertain that these bronzes were over-struck on the bronze coins (bearing the head of Persephone on the obverse, and the galloping chariot on the reverse) minted during the whole period of Hicetas’ strategy105. 103 Buttrey 1973, 16; Buttrey – Erim – Groves – Holloway 1989, 145, nr. 340 date the gold issues of Hicetas to the years 279–278, but they do connect them with an ill-defined war-campaign against the Carthaginians; against their point of view, see Caccamo Caltabiano 1993, 151. 104 Poole 1876, 204–205, nr. 468–490: Head 19112, 183: Giesecke 1923, 111–112 (he dated erroneously these coins to the period of the Sicilian venture of Pyrrhus, 278–276 BC): Gabrici 1927, 316–321 and 334–339: Consolo Langher 1964, 335, nr. 676: Calciati 1986, II, 255– 269: Buttrey – Erim – Groves – Holloway 1989, 102–103 e 145: Rutter 1997, 176, note 204 (Zeus Hellanios should have been evoked by the Greeks as a protector against the Italic mercenaries). Holm 1906, 196–198 cathegorically rejected any attempt to date those bronze coins to the age of Hicetas, because he thought that the “Zeus Hellanios” coins were minted immediately after the death of Agathocles, and consequently before the election of Hicetas as strathgov~; his opinion was then supported by Franke 1961, 265–275. But it is unpersuasive, since many specimens were overstruck on the bronze coins of the class “Persephone/biga”, which were undoubtedly minted during Hicetas’ government. On the cult of Zeus Hellanios, see Franke 1961, 276, note 1; Lepore 1964–1965, 490 and 502–504. 105 Poole 1876, nr. 476 (overstruck on “Persephone/biga”); nr. 483–485 (overstruck on Agathocles’ bronze coins with “Artemis/thunderbolt”, whose devices are still visible on the new coins); nr. 488–489 (again over “Persephone/biga”); Buttrey 1973, 17. Some specimens have been found in Morgantina; see Buttrey – Erim – Groves – Holloway 1989, 102, nr. 341b, h, m (overstruck on Agathocles’ bronze coins with “Artemis/thunderbolt”) and nr. 341j (over-

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Therefore, Hicetas was defeated, and as a result of lack of evidence we completely ignore his following actions. It is unquestionable that he succeeded in being re-elected as strathgov~ until 279 BC, when one Thoinon, son of Mameus, deprived him of his authority. In the meanwhile, the Syracusans had to give attention to the defence against the Carthaginian offensive, which was at any rate measured: the Punic army arrived in front of the town’s fortification walls in 279–278 BC, that is the year preceding Pyrrhus’ appearance. And this could easily have been one of Hicetas’ last political acts; indeed, he seems to have tried to get in touch with Pyrrhus at the end of his period in office, to save Syracuse. Diodorus Siculus (22, 7, 3) recounts that Thoinon and Sostratus had banished Hicetas, and then they once again (pavlin) invited king Pyrrhus to come to Sicily. I guess that the Greek adverb pavlin – which is frequently used with a timemeaning – allows to suppose that Hicetas himself asked Pyrrhus for help against the Carthaginians, but most likely he was not successful. Therefore, Syracuse was destined to go through the Punic military forces’ blockade; and, once Hicetas fell down, a new civil war was about to break out in the town106. 1.6. “Another king will save us”: last civil strife in Syracuse and the appeals to Pyrrhus (279–278 BC) As we have seen, exactly in 279 BC – after nine years in which he virtually controlled the Syracusan politics in a way that his contemporaries categorized as turan­ nikov~ – Hicetas was deprived of his power and removed from his office by one Thoinon, son of Mameus; this is the only information we have from the summary of Diodorus’ book 22 (7, 2), and unfortunately the Byzantine epitome is parsimonious in other data about him. Something more we learn from the Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (20, 8, 1), who identified Thoinon with a ­frouvrarco~, that is the commander-in-chief of a military garrison. An accurate examination of his father’s name, Mamevw~, which does not belong to the inventory of the Greek proper names, suggests that this was the Greek adaptation of an Italic name. Therefore, I assume that the commander Thoinon had to be the son of an Italic man – in all probability a mercenary – who arrived in Sicily during the previous decades, while Agathocles was ruling. Thoinon himself was a mercenary soldier engaged by the Syracusans, and he was appointed the control of a garrison; I believe that, just as a result of his soldiers’ assistance, he was successful in dispossessing Hicetas of his authority and in taking his place thanks to a coup de main107. struck on “Heracles/standing lion” of the late Agathoclean age). Some other coins have been found in Gela: Holloway 1962, 12–17; Buttrey 1973, 17; Caccamo Caltabiano 1993, 151. 106 Meier-Welcker 1979, 24, assumed – without any support from the literary sources – that a first appeal to Pyrrhus was made by Hicetas himself. 107 Huttl 1929, 134; Geyer 1936, coll. 306–307; Pareti 1959, 247; Berve 1967, II, 460; La Bua 1968, 155; Sandberger 1970, 208–209, nr. 80; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 14 and 32; Meier-Welcker 1979, 24; De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 347; La Bua 1980, 179, note 2; Hans

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Together with Thoinon, there was in Syracuse even another individual whose name in the literary sources is in turn Sosistratus and Sostratus. Strangely enough, it is possible to obtain from the few literary fragments of Diodorus more data about Sosistratus than for Thoinon, but on the contrary the identification of the ­frouvrarco~ is easier than Sosistratus’. The troubles deriving from the investigation of our evidence are very difficult to work out; maybe, I guess, there is even no way out. It has been suggested that Sosistratus was a grand-son of the Agathocles’ rival bearing the same name; if so, he would have been a member of one of the aristocratic, noble families in Syracuse. But regrettably there is not any ancient source to uphold this hypothesis. The only information we have, as previously mentioned, is that both Thoinon and Sostratus succeeded to Hicetas. In any case, this does not mean that the first time they worked as a team to prevent their adversary from gaining another renewal of his responsibility, like some scholars have supposed; if we trust the reduced account of Diodorus, the two central characters of Syracuse’s politics fought one another ferociously, and came to a partition of the town. More than this, I want to stress that Diodorus himself (22, 7, 2) testifies that it was ­Thoinon alone to overthrow Hicetas’ “tyranny”; it is just the real meaning of this action that may help to understand what was the authentic role of Sostratus108. Indeed, Thoinon’s deed was directed against Hicetas, but it had an adverse effect and put in danger mainly the safety of Syracuse’s democratic institutions which, even as a result of the nine years’ renewal of the function to the strathgov~, never had been in danger, not even after the defeat in the battle of Terias river against the Punic army. But now the Syracusans had to find a remedy for the precarious moment, just to prevent the recurrence of the same situation that happened some years before, when the town had been terrorized by the Oscan and Campanian mercenaries; indeed, the coup de main was even at the moment set off by a frouvrarco~ with the aid of his soldiers. That is why I think that the citizens asked Sosistratus for help, to go up against Thoinon and fight him. The civil war broke out vehemently in Syracuse’s streets, but Sostratus took advantage of becoming the new tyrant of the city and, maybe, to get rid of his political challengers. Several scholars take into account an information provided by the Stratagems of Polyaenus (5, 37) to put emphasis on the very hasty procedures adopted by the new Syracusan tyrant to thwart his old and current opponents. It has been said impulsively by some critics that Polyaenus’ information cannot be referred to the Sosistratus who was rival to Agathocles, because he never established a tyranny in Syracuse109. Therefore, we should consider he was the Sosistratus who was rival to 1983, 85; Tagliamonte 1994, 202, who suggested that the Greek Mamevw~ developed from an Italic name *Maamiis (see the epigraphic evidence provided by Vetter 1953, nr. 32, from Pompei). 108 Geyer 1927, coll. 1174–1175; Lévêque 1957, 403; Pareti 1959, 247; La Bua 1960, 101; Berve 1967, II, 460–461; Sandberger 1970, 204–206, nr. 76; La Bua 1980, 181 (conjecturing an initial teamwork with Thoinon). 109 On the passage of Polyaenus see Bianco 1997, ad loc. Ciaceri 1902, 31–32; Berve 1967, II, 733; Sandberger 1970, 204; La Bua 1980, 182–183 (but compare his previous opinion: La Bua 1960, 101, note 14) refer the passage to the “succeeding” Sosistratus.

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Thoinon, and if this was the truth, the information provided by Polyaenus’ anecdote would be very interesting. In reality, the main problem is that it is just impossible to accredit the information of Sosistratus junior; more than this, there is a detail in the text which makes me believe that the story refers to Agathocles’ rival. Indeed, this is the chief statement of Polyaenus: Swsivstrato~ e[peise to;n Surakousivwn dh`mon, a[ndra~ fivlou~ ∆Agaqoklei` prov~ te th;n turannivda sumpravttonta~ feuvgein meta; tw`n oijketw`n yhfivsasqai (“Sosistratus persuaded the people of Syracuse to order by vote that all the men, who were loyal to Agathocles and worked together with him for the tyranny, were banished jointly with their relatives”). Of course, Agathocles’ fivloi could not be but his associates and all the persons who helped him when he tried to establish a tyranny in Syracuse. Quite the opposite, it would be very surprising that, ten years after the death of the old king of Sicily, the pro-Agathoclean – i.e. monarchic – party lived through the Syracusan democracy and the new requirements of the town’s home politics. There seems to be no doubt that the evidence provided by Polyaenus has to be awarded to the elder Sosistratus, who dynamically cooperated with the Syracusan dh`mo~ and the democratic institutions to drive out from the town the companions of Agathocles and their families; in a second time – as Polyaenus points out in the last section of his Stratagem – he got rim of them thanks to a bloodshed. This detail maybe did not single out the ephemeral tyranny of the “younger” Sosistratus, who was just appointed by the citizens of Syracuse to fight energetically Thoinon, the enemy of democracy; he then worked together with the polivtai and for the greatest part he had them by his side at least until Pyrrhus arrived in Sicily; in truth, Sosistratus together with the Surakosivoi delivered the town in the hands of the Epirote condottiere, as Diodorus wrote in his book 22 (8, 4). I have to confess that several details provided by Polyaenus’ story seem to fit well even with Thoinon’s contender; in truth, he could even count on the aid of regular troops – on the contrary, I wonder that the mercenaries took rather the sides of the frouvrarco~ – and on the support of the aristocracy’s members and the oligarchs. Yet again, Diodorus reports in his book 22 (7, 6) that no less than ten thousand soldiers fought in the streets of Syracuse until they achieved the success for the tyrant; in fact, Thoinon was forced to withdraw with his troops in the island of Ortygia, which he controlled until Pyrrhus’ arrival, while Sosistratus held sway over the rest of the city. To conclude, I think that it is better to agree with those scholars who matched the Sosistratus of Polyaenus’ narrative with the old enemy of Agathocles110. The restoration of the events which led Sosistratus to become tyrant in Syracuse, as I have been proposing, can be drawn only by the fragmentary text of Diodorus’ lost histories; we have seen that Sosistratus is marked as a Syracusan citizen, and explicitly as tuvranno~. Nevertheless, there is one more diodorean passage which could unequivocally alter the version I have just given. 110 De Sanctis 1895, 291 (= De Sanctis 1909, 145, note 2 = De Sanctis 1966, I, 207, note 5); Geyer 1927, col. 1174: La Bua 1960, 101, note 14 (but he changed his mind later: La Bua 1980, 182–183).

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Diodorus (22, 8, 4) says that Sosistratus occupied Agrigentum with many other cities, and had an army of more than ten thousand men. Some scholars thought that this piece of evidence was enough to assert that Sosistratus was just the tyrant of Agrigentum, and so the successor of the overthrown – or maybe dead – Phintias. If so, obviously, the reading of the civil war that paved the way in Syracuse to the coming of Pyrrhus has clearly to be changed. According to these scholars, the Syracusans themselves asked for help their fellow-citizen Sosistratus, who had become tyrant in Agrigentum, to take charge of the opposition to Thoinon. Of course, he took advantage of this situation, and established a tyranny even in Syracuse, where he held firmly the power even after Pyrrhus arrived in Sicily. In the springtime of 277 BC, finally, being even the tyrant of Agrigentum, he went with a military vanguard before the army of the Epirote commander, and he delivered to him the town and its dominions (as I will show in detail in chapter 2, Diodorus tells about no less than thirty towns controlled by Sosistratus). Nonetheless, this hypotesis does not persuade me, and I guess it lays itself open to criticism111. With regard to the narrative of Pyrrhus’ enterprises in Sicily, too, Diodorus Siculus based himself on the historical work of Philinus from Agrigentum; I have already tried to show what was Philinus’ attitude towards the tyrannies which were established in his hometown and, more in general, in many other towns of Sicily. Yet again, I emphasize that he had almost completely a negative point of view, particularly towards his contemporary fellow citizen Phintias. What is most important to underline is that all the Sicilian tyrants of the beginning of the III century BC, who are known thanks to the epitome of Diodorus, are understandably marked with a vocabulary which is typical of their role; indeed, we find the word tuvranno~, otherwise the analogous verb turanneuvw. As we saw, Philinus – and so, Diodorus too – used the title of tyrant even to portray Hicetas of Syracuse: if there were not the few pieces of evidence about him provided by Diodorus Siculus’ summary, and we had to depend only on the numismatic data, it would be perfectly correct to describe Hicetas as a representative of the Syracusan democracy; quite the reverse, Philinus/ Diodorus wrote that Hicetas ejkbavlletai th`~ turannivdo~ by Thoinon! Hence, according to Diodorus’ historical source, Sosistratus ejkuriveusen Agrigentum; he did not write ejturavnneusen, nor ejdunavsteusen (which is another terminology that Philinus used when referring to Hicetas’ authority and to Tyndarion, who was the tyrant of Tauromenium). Indeed, we can count even on another passage of Diodorus, which seems very important (22, 7, 6); ’Oti Qoivnwno~ th`~ Nhv­ sou kurieuvonto~, kai; Swstravtou th`~ Surakovsh~ turannou`nto~, e[conte~ strati­ wvta~ murivou~ diepolevmoun ajllhvloi~ (“Thoinon controlled the Island (i.e. Orty111 Huttl 1929, 134; Pareti 1959, 247; Berve 1967, II, 460–462; De Waele 1971, 144–145; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 32; De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 347; Hans 1983, 85; Tagliamonte 1994, 202 (all supporting the hypothesis of Sosistratus as tyrant of Agrigentum). The question has been faced even by Roussel 1970, 17, note 18, in whose opinion “le cas de ce Sosistratos est particulièrement obscur. On ne sait même pas s’il était agrigentin ou syracusain”. On the contrary, La Bua 1960, 100–104; La Bua 1980, 179–183 states that Sosistratus was a Syracusan citizen, and that he was tyrant only in Syracuse.

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gia), and Sostratus was the tyrant of Syracuse; they had ten thousand soldiers, and carried on war with each other”). Therefore, when he described the outcome of the Syracusan civil war, Philinus ascribed to Thoinon the ownership of Ortygia, where he withdrew with his supporters, and not carelessly he called Sositratus with the title of tuvranno~. As a consequence, I suppose that his role was a little bit different in the two towns; Sosistratus was tyrant in Syracuse, but he simply controlled Agrigentum. We ignore when exactly and how Sosistratus achieved the hegemony in Agrigentum. Diodorus (22, 10, 1) tells that in 277 BC Pyrrhus left Syracuse towards Agrigentum and when he arrived there, the town was delivered to him by Sosistratus, together with a significant amount of soldiers and thirty several towns which were under his control. Some scholars, of course, used even this diodorean information to reinforce their hypothesis about Sosistratus as tyrant of Agrigentum; therefore, he only had to commit his own territories to king Pyrrhus. On the contrary, if my suggestions are plausible, I assume that we could set in the chronology Sosistratus’ conquest of Agrigentum exactly in that moment. As I will point out in the following chapter, while Pyrrhus was spending the winter of 278–277 BC in Syracuse, both Thoinon and Sosistratus were in all probability with him. Therefore, it seems to be evident that, if he had to hand over the town to Pyrrhus, Sosistratus would have to go before him to Agrigentum; so he could have enough time to force out from the town the Carthaginian garrison which very probably had been there established after Phintias’ withdrawal, and then he could even get back the towns which were under the control of Agrigentum – but it would be better to say under Carthaginian influence. After all, there is a final trouble to be dealt with. According to some modern historians, the real motivation of the Punic military intervention against Syracuse – otherwise incomprehensible – must be sought out in the action of the new tyrant of Agrigentum who, after achieving authority even in Syracuse, had joined the territories dominated by the two Greek towns; this could obviously be a noise to the Carthaginians112. This may be true, indeed; but I think that the justifications of the Punic attack are more than a few, and that if we want to understand well their action, we must call to mind which was the political behaviour of the Carthaginians towards the Sicilian city-states during the whole decade 289–279 BC. Since the home political revolution that followed in Syracuse after the death of Agathocles, Carthage had been an almost inactive witness in the Sicilian arena, even because she was very confident about her function of arbitrator among the Siceliotes and in relation to the usefulness of the struggles which were undermining the union inside the towns: indeed, as the things went by, she did not have to face a great effort to take control of the whole Sicily. For that reason, the involvement in favour of Menon against the brand new Syracusan democracy in 288 BC may be interpreted as the Punic wish to prevent him from establishing once more a tyranny in Syracuse and, what’s more, as an actual opportunity to increase their ejpikravteia towards the eastern part of Sicily. In this way, we can easily find a way out to an112 This was the basic suggestion provided by Berve 1967, II, 460–461.

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other question, that is the complete lack of any Carthaginian contribution to the Mamertines’ capture of Messina and especially the fact that the Punic army did not interfere with the hasty growth of the mercenaries’ state, because it was a useful complication against the foreign expansionistic policy played both by Phintias and by Hicetas. The fierce assault against Syracuse in 279–278 BC must be included inside this general scene. The Carthaginians, after their victory in the battle of river Terias, achieved the control over the large plain of Leontini and Catane – two towns where they could at least count on the neutrality of the local tyrants, if not on their complete approval – and hence they impended over Syracuse from the north. In any case, if these were the only scene’s conditions, a massive attack both by land and by sea could not have been workable; as a matter of fact, the Punics could not block Syracuse leaving uncovered their right flank, westwards, where Agrigentum was waiting to act. That’s why a precautionary offensive in the territory of Agrigentum was necessary; this intervention, as I suggested before, was probably encouraged by the members of the local aristocracy, who overthrew Phintias’ tyranny. Once they set up a military occupying force in Agrigentum, the Carthaginian army could not have any complication while moving on Syracuse and, once more, the Punic commanders could easily wait that another civil struggle break out in the town113. As I said, Hicetas, the skilled politician who had been the promoter of Phintias’ disgrace, but then suffered the serious defeat in the battle of river Terias, was able to understand even before his own downfall that very soon Syracuse would have been in a great menace; in all probability, that’s why he asked Pyrrhus for help. But the initial rejection of the Epirote king and Hicetas’ breakdown produced the offensive of Carthage. I guess that this can be the only enlightenment of a passage of Pausanias (1, 12, 5), who most likely found this information in the lost historical text of Proxenus114. Pausanias says that the Carthaginians had crossed over Sicily and were destroying the Greek cities, and had sat down to invest Syracuse, the only one now remaining (h} de; h\n loiphv). Syracuse was therefore the last impediment standing in front of the Carthaginian troops; there could not have been a more encouraging moment than this – when the town once again suffered because of bloody contentions and, what’s more, was absolutely wanting in allies – to move a crucial assault. I guess that two were the main marching directions of the Punic soldiers; some troops moved towards Syracuse from the north, i.e. from the country of Leontini; some other made their way towards eastern Sicily, getting there from the region of Agrigentum. Furthermore, a powerful Carthaginian flotilla, sailing along the southern coasts of Sicily and then doubling Pachynus promontory, appeared in front of the Great Harbour of Syracuse and there blockaded the Greek navy. This was the beginning of the Carthaginian

113 Pareti 1959, 244 and 246; La Bua 1968, 130–131 and 148–150; Hans 1983, 84–90. 114 On Proxenus, see Ziegler 1957, coll. 1033–1034; Lévêque 1957, 28–32; La Bua 1966, 217– 220; Sandberger 1970, 204; La Bua 1971A, 1–61 (with further bibliography); Musti – Beschi 1982, 301.

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assault against Sicily’s last free town; I assume that in all probability it can be dated back to the beginnings of springtime in 278 BC115. Standing in front of those huge military and naval forces of Carthage, Thoinon and Sosistratus were forced to close the eyes to their quarrels and to put aside their disagreements, to find a joint ally. Diodorus said (22, 7, 6) that, becoming exhausted in the war, they sent both ambassadors to Pyrrhus. Their preference was absolutely not unexpected, because Pyrrhus was still by some means tied to Syracuse: in truth, he married Agathocles’ daughter, Lanassa, who bore him a son, whose name was Alexander. In addition, the echo of the victories and the activities of the Epirote condottiere against the Romans had a vaste reverberation even in Sicily. It was ­Thoinon’s and Sosistratus’ turn to act and try to persuade him; it was all but easy, and the diplomatic missions from Syracuse followed one another without a break, almost day by day. Of course, the appeals of the Syracusans had an amount of consequences; the decision of Pyrrhus could have moved all the international background, and at least two other great powers were deeply involved in this, that were Carthage and Rome. The Carthaginians knew that they were not so far from the complete conquest of Sicily, provided they could finally overwhelm the mighty defences of Syracuse; thus, they were worried enough by the possibility that Pyrrhus wanted to consent to cross from Italy, and they tried their best to keep him busy with the war against the Romans in southern Italy. On the contrary, the Romans knew they could get a great advantage from the departure of Pyrrhus to Sicily; they could have recovered from their previous territorial losses and secured their dominions in southern Italy. This was first and foremost diplomatic matter, and the representatives of the two powers met to improve their previous agreements; they renewed their early commercial treaty, including on that occasion some military clauses, and when they knew for sure that Pyrrhus had taken his decision, they tried to prevent him from crossing the Strait of Messina by the easiest place, which was the city of Rhegium. I will now turn the attention on these events, leaving for a while the history of Greek citystates of Sicily to their own fate; but after all, it cannot be denied that this was the first time when Carthaginians and Romans met to talk about Sicily; it was like they felt it would have been very soon a place to fight for! For the moment the appeal for help came not to them; it was the turn of a foreign prince to save the freedom of Greek Sicily – most of all, of the Syracusans – from the serious pressures of the Carthaginians. This was another episode of the never-ending fight between the Greeks of Sicily and the Punic bavrbaroi.

115 The same chronology for the beginning of the Carthaginian assault on Syracuse is given by Meltzer 1896, II, 232; Lévêque 1957, 455; La Bua 1980, 205.

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1.7. The arrival of the Syracusan ambassadors and the first steps of Pyrrhus’ Sicilian expedition (summer-autumn 279 BC) Generally, the scholars thought that during the months that followed the battle of Ausculum Pyrrhus was almost inactive, either because he was forced to immobility by the wound he suffered while fighting against the Romans – indeed, it should be supposed that the historical tradition about the wounding is trustworthy, but this is very difficult – or because he was short both of soldiers and money. Plutarch himself, who is for sure the most reliable source with reference to the narrative of the events, ended his account of the battle at Ausculum (Pyrrh. 21, 15) relying on the work of a pro-Roman author (possibly Dionysius of Halicarnassus)116, and he made a dramatic description of Pyrrhus’ feelings; the condottiere was disheartened by reason of the loss of many Epirote soldiers and many friends who died on the battlefield, and he was annoyed because he could not substitute them with some new troops; furthermore, the allies too were dejected. The historical tradition favourable to the Romans, which is well represented by the accounts of Eutropius (2, 13, 4) and Zonaras (8, 5, 7), remembers that after the defeat (!) Pyrrhus withdrew to Taras, to reorganize his army and wait there for the reinforcements coming from Epirus. Despite the historical tradition favourable to the Romans and deeply influenced by the narrative of the annalists, there is absolutely no doubt that Pyrrhus won the battle fought at Ausculum; for sure, it was an expensive victory, especially as regards to the losses, and it was less worthwhile than the triumph of the previous year, as regards the tactics; all these figures were of course overstressed and negatively depicted by the Roman annalists. As a matter of fact, Pyrrhus won but he could hardly take advantages of the success that he gained in a territory where Rome’s influence was much more deep-rooted than elsewhere (I am thinking about Campania, where Pyrrhus made his way after the victory in Heraclea in 280 BC) as a result of the presence of the two colonies of Venosa and Luceria and in consideration of the alliance with some very important cities in Daunia, like Arpi. Furthermore, while the army of Valerius Levinus progressively retreated in 280 BC, giving the opportunity to Pyrrhus to move ahead, through Campania, to Rome, in 279 BC the armies of the two consuls were joined together in Apulia; they did not withdraw at all, perhaps they took refuge in Venosa, but no doubt they were ready to enter the battlefield once again. Therefore, I believe in this occurrence Zonaras can be trusted, and I think that Pyrrhus, even if he was the winner, preferred to go back to Taras to arrange his ideas and replace the dead soldiers with the new reinforcements he summoned from the motherland. It is expected that such operations lasted for some time, and so the Epirote king was compelled to stop for a while his military activities. In all proba116 It seems to be very likely that the source of Plut. Pyrrh. 21, 15 is Dionysius of Halicarnassus, given that the description of Pyrrhus’ feelings after the battle of Ausculum offered by the biographer comes immediately after a direct citation of Dionysius’ words. The same anecdote quoted by Plutarch was alluded to even by Diod. 22, 6, 1–2, where the attention has been focused on the ancient idiom “a Cadmean victory”.

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bility, the same measures had to be taken by the consuls themselves, who were at that time in Apulia, possibly in Venosa117. While Pyrrhus was in Taras, some diplomatic missions coming from several Greek city-states of Sicily and a delegation arriving from Greece reached the town; the representatives had been appointed respectively with the task of asking the king’s intervention in Sicily against the Carthaginians, and to announce on the other hand that after the death of Ptolemy Keraunos he could have had a great opportunity to recover the throne of Macedonia. The historical tradition concerning the embassies to Pyrrhus has been emphasized by Plutarch (Pyrrh. 22, 1–4), whose words are worth to be quoted: “But while he was involved in such perplexities, new hopes once more inspired him, and projects which divided his purposes. For at one and the same time there came to him from Sicily men who offered him to put into his hands the cities of Agrigentum, Syracuse and Leontini (h|kon ejk mevn Sikeliva~ a[ndre~, ∆Akravganta kai; Surakouvsa~ kai; Leontivnou~ ejgceirivzonte~ aujtw`)/ , and begged him to help them to drive out the Carthaginians and rid the island of its tyrants (tw`n turavnnwn ajpallavxai th;n nh`son); and from Greece, men with tidings that Ptolemy Keraunos with his army had perished at the hands of the Gauls, and that now was the time of all times for him to be in Macedonia, where they wanted a king. Pyrrhus rated Fortune soundly because occasions for two great undertakings had come to him at one time, and thinking that the presence of both meant the loss of one, he wavered in his calculations for a long time. Then Sicily appeared to offer opportunities for greater achievements, since Libya was felt to be near (toi`~ Sikelikoi`~ meizovnwn uJpokei`sqai pragmavtwn dokouvntwn, Libuvh~ ejggu;~ ei\nai dokouvsh~), and he turned in this direction…”. The evidence provided by this passage is essential, because it settles the question of the king’s supposed conception a priori – that is before Pyrrhus’ departure from Epirus, or immediately after his arrival in Taras – of the Sicilian projects; furthermore, it invalidates as well the hypothesis about the craftily invention of Pyrrhus’ Western projects by the authors who developed his political propaganda118. More simply, Plutarch’s passage allows to set chronologically the dawn of the Sicilian venture. The embassies of the Sicilian city-states reached Taras in the sum117 For several opinions about the idleness of Pyrrhus while in Taras, see e.g. Schubert 1894, 199 (due to the restlessness of the allies); Von Scala 1896, 152 (due to the wound suffered in battle); Wuilleumier 1939, 124 (due to lack of human resources and shortage of supplies); De Sanctis 19602, II, 401–402 (sensible powerlessness of the king, who could not endure anymore another war campaign in Apulia). 118 The discussion among modern scholars has its focus on the well-known dialogue about the lifeprojects of the king, which has been described by Plutarch (Pyrrh. 14, 4–14) as occurred between Pyrrhus himself and his Thessalian friend Cineas (on this, see helpfully Schubert 1894, 70 and 166–168; Hamburger 1927, 7–8; Wuilleumier 1939, 107, note 3; Nederlof 1940, 74; Nenci 1953, 30 and 133; Lévêque 1957, 289–292; La Bua 1966, 216–222; La Bua 1980, 190; Canfora 1993–1994, 135–142; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 22–23). Some scholars believe that Pyrrhus thought about Sicily even before his arrival in the West (see e.g. Niese 1897, II, 30; Cross 1932, 69–70; Lepore 1964, 113; Brauer 1986, 128); other scholars think that all the projects have been craftily created ex eventu (like La Bua 1980, 190–192: Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 22–24).

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mer of 279 BC, and if one may understand that Pyrrhus was uncertain about what he had to choose between the two opportunities, it is possible to assume that he decided to organize an expedition to Sicily soon after, perhaps between the end of the summer and the beginning of autumn 279 BC. Needless to say, I do not think that all the details provided by Plutarch’s narrative are unambiguous and that they may be historically accepted; as a matter of fact, I guess that the excuse which was presented by Plutarch’s source as regards to the choice of Pyrrhus – i.e. that besides Sicily, there were more and greatest enterprises, such as the conquest of northern Africa – may not be fully acknowledged. There have been many debates among the scholars about the motivations which urged Pyrrhus to embark on the new adventure in Sicily, rather than going back to Macedonia following the advices of the diplomats who came from Greece. Many suggestions have been made; some scholars considered Pyrrhus as a “patriot”, some others as shrewd politician who, owing to the unfeasibility of a definitive reverse of the Romans, preferred to bend to Sicily119. I believe that almost all the suggestions which have been offered up to today are less compelling and I think that we must be resolute and lay emphasis on the characteristic of unavoidability of the Sicilian expedition among the Western plans and projects of the king; as much as in the attempts of his historical forerunners, a stage in Sicily and the unification of several and different Greek cities under Pyrrhus’ only flag – and so, needless to say, the expulsion of the Carthaginians from the island – were basic and mixing elements of a planned effort to bring together all the western Greeks, i.e. the project that Pyrrhus conceived after his arrival in Taras. Therefore, it seems possible once again to see beyond the choice of the Epirote king the memories of the Western projects of Alexander the Molossian and of his precursors. On the other hand, what could be the real meaning of Pyrrhus’ return in Macedonia, even under a sensible point of view? I guess it would have been considered just an abandonment by the Italic allies and by the Romans themselves, who could have their hands free – as it really happened after Pyrrhus’ departure for Sicily – to resume their expansion and their advance southwards in Italy. A homecoming to Epirus meant exactly to throw to the wind two years’ efforts and victories, that had been gained even as a result of great sacrifices; indeed, a half-done union of the western Greeks had already been obtained by Pyrrhus, with the exclusion of Campania – that was deeply connected with Rome, especially owing to her economic organization – and of the very important base of Rhegium. Furthermore, Pyrrhus could count on an excellent and already gained amalgamation among the Greeks and the Italiotes, that seemed to assure him – even if he would have been away from Italy for a while – the safeguarding of his possessions against the predictable attack of the Roman legions. As a result of these deductions, Sicily must be considered as the second step that Pyrrhus had necessarily to cover in order to complete his way to the accom119 See Von Scala 1896, 155; Meltzer 1896, II, 226–229; Schubert 1897, 200–202; Niese 1897, II, 38–42; Beloch 19272, IV 1, 552; Hamburger 1927, 65–66; Cross 1932, 74–75; Nenci 1953, 129 and 178–179; Lévêque 1957, 402–404; Kienast 1963, col. 146; La Bua 1980, 189; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 17–24.

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plishment of his project: a great empire which could bring together all the Greeks who were living in the West. If he chose to go back in Macedonia, he would have for sure disowned his western plans. Plutarch’s account is not the only one about the Sicilian embassies; the historical tradition, though not so abounding, recalls the envoy of other diplomatic missions, and this data seem to create some problems of interpretation if we compare them with the above-cited passage of Plutarch. In 279 BC the situation of the Greek city-states in Sicily was really doomed to failure; some of them had been included once again in the Carthaginian ejpikravteia, some other fell into the new local tyrants’ hands. Particularly, in Syracuse the events collapsed after the banishment of Hicetas and the outbreak of the civil war between Thoinon and Sosistratus. The two challengers at the same time sent quite daily new appeals to Pyrrhus, to invite him in Sicily against the serious danger of the Cartha­ ginians’ advance. The evidence is provided by two short reports of the lost book 22 of Diodorus’ histories (22, 7, 3 and 6) that I have previously mentioned: in the first one, Diodorus said that once Thoinon and Sostratus had banished Hicetas from Syracuse, they once again invited king Pyrrhus to come to Sicily. In the second one, the historian accurately described the different roles played by the two challengers in Syracuse during the civil war, saying that Thoinon controlled the Island (that is to say the fortress located in Ortygia), while Sostratus was the tyrant of Syracuse: when they became exhausted in the civil war, they both sent ambassadors to Pyrrhus. It is clear that the historical source of Diodorus – I previously said that for the Sicilian events of the period he relied mainly upon the work of Philinus of Agrigentum – did not know any embassy sent neither by the citizens of Leontini, nor by the inhabitants of Agrigentum, at least for this instance; indeed, as I will point out next, Diodorus mentioned a delegation sent by Leontini to Pyrrhus, but this happened when the king already was in Syracuse. Furthermore, many other Greek city-states of Sicily sent their representatives to Pyrrhus, but they did so only when the Sicilian venture was fully developing (as it is shown by Diodorus, 22, 8, 5 and 22, 10, 1). We must not be astonished if the historical sources generally never mentioned any ambassadors coming from Agrigentum. As a matter of fact, after the end of Phintias’ tyranny, the Greek city-state in 279/278 BC was in all probability controlled by a Carthaginian occupying force and joined to the territories of the Punic ejpikravteia; therefore, I guess it is logical that the citizens of Agrigentum could not sent their appeals for help to Pyrrhus, at least while the Carthaginians were incessantly and growingly expanding their dominions to the eastern lands of Sicily. The two quoted passages from the remains of Diodorus’ historical work make possible to clear out the chronology of the diplomatic missions. Unfortunately, it seems to be quite impossible to find out which was the real succession of the events in Syracuse during the painful year 279 BC; for sure, we know that it is possible to date exactly in that year the end of Hicetas’ supposed tyranny in Syracuse and the following seize of power by the military forces led by Thoinon; nevertheless, it is impossible to set either a firm starting point for the beginning of the civil war in Syracuse, or for its conclusion. I believe that in Plutarch’s account only the first

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deputations that left Sicily are mentioned, and they in all probability match with the embassies sent by Hicetas; therefore, if the arrival of the Sicilian envoys in Taras must be necessarily dated after the battle of Ausculum – to say, after June 279 BC – it is possible to set a more specific date for the end of Hicetas’ Syracusan supremacy, that is the summer of 279 BC. The first among the above-mentioned passages of Diodorus shows, according to me, how much the two new challengers in Syracuse, Thoinon and Sosistratus, were acquainted of the appeal for help that was sent by their predecessor to Pyrrhus. They wanted to renew it, and this decision seems to be a sign that at the half of 279 BC the Carthaginian pressure was already very tough, even if the stage of the final assault to the last free Greek city-state of eastern Sicily was still remote. So, this excerpt from Diodorus’ histories is in open contrast with Plutarch’s account; the historian of Agirium indeed quotes yet a second mission of the Syracusan representatives, while Plutarch seems to be acquainted with only one diplomatic mission of the Sicilian people before Pyrrhus’ expedition to Sicily. But no doubt the embassies kept on. The diplomatic missions that are quoted in the second above-mentioned passage of Diodorus (22, 7, 6) seem to me definitely different from the preceding ones. The two Syracusan contenders are indeed exhausted by the civil war, which broke out in the city in the second half of 279 BC; therefore Diodorus specified in this occurrence a situation which was closer to the autumn of 279 BC, and his suggestion seems to show that we are here facing a third series of diplomatic missions to Taras by the Syracusan envoys. Another interesting point is that Diodorus provides no definite motivation for the embassy; it is possible to realize that the civil war in Syracuse was long lasting and that the two opponents came to an agreement to ask Pyrrhus for help; nonetheless, it is clear that the Carthaginians’ threat was by that time more and more frightening and compelled Thoinon and Sosistratus to join their forces. Not even in this case it seems possible to get a definitive solution to the problem, but I believe that the lack of any explanation is very remarkable, because it could even mean that Pyrrhus already took his decision; it may be remembered that this should be the third stage of the diplomatic missions, which I previously dated in the autumn of 279 BC. I think that a corroboration to what I have just said may come from another piece of Diodorus’ book 22: “Pyrrhus was ready for the crossing; the Carthaginians were laying siege to Syracuse by land and by sea (Puvrrou paraskeuazomevnou pro;~ to;n e[kploun, ta;~ Surakovsa~ Karchdovnioi ejpoliovrkoun kai; kata; gh`n kai; kata; qavlattan) and they were blockading the Great Harbour with a task force of one hundred warships; by land, assaulting the city’s walls with more than fifty thousands men, they were forcing the Syracusans to stay inside the fortified circuit of the walls, while they pillaged the Syracusan countryside, laying it waste of any wealth. Therefore, exhausted by the war (…) the Syracusans sent almost daily one envoy after another to Pyrrhus (kaq∆ hjmevran a[llou~ ejp∆ a[lloi~ prevsbei~ e[stellon pro;~ aujtovn)”. Diodorus himself gives us the essential component to date correctly his passage, because he says that Pyrrhus was ready to cross to Sicily, therefore the epi-

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sode may be dated to the beginning of the summer of 278 BC. Anyway, it is even clear from the same piece that the Syracusan ambassadors did not leave their hometown to persuade Pyrrhus to go to Sicily, but for other reasons which we unfortunately ignore! To come to the point, the Syracusan diplomatic missions were at least four – and not the only one quoted by Plutarch, even if it was probably all inclusive – and it is possible to verify that in all probability Pyrrhus, either at the end of summer or at the beginning of autumn of 279 BC, already took his decision to go to Sicily and fight against the Carthaginians. The first embassies mentioned by Plutarch and Diodorus (22, 7, 3) perhaps occurred before Pyrrhus’ choice, and they match with the missions sent first by Hicetas and, after his removal, by Thoinon and Sosistratus. So, when the civil war in Syracuse was nearly at the end, owing to the very close arrival of the Punic soldiers under the city’s walls, Pyrrhus yet decided he wanted to help the Greeks of Sicily. Furthermore, I think it is reasonable to state that the diplomatic missions that reached Pyrrhus in Taras in the summer of 279 BC – as it is clearly shown by Diodorus’ excerpts – were sent by the Syracusans alone, because they were the only one who could still ask for help against the Carthaginian troops. It is logical that Plutarch, in the typical style of his biographies, wanted to assemble in one stage the appeals of some cities (the most representative), which on the contrary occurred in several chronological moments, as it is shown by the details provided by Diodorus. The narrative of Philinus of Agrigentum (quoted by Diodorus), which seems to be the most trustworthy with reference to the events concerning the Sicilian expedition of the Epirote king, meets an important substantiation thanks to another branch of the historical tradition: i.e. the evidence provided by the official historian of the Epirote court, Proxenus, which has been quoted first by Pausanias (1, 12, 5) and afterwards by Zonaras, as well (8, 5, 7): both the authors stated that Pyrrhus was called for help in Sicily by the Syracusans alone who, according to Zonaras, “committed to him themselves and their city”!120 1.8. The Carthaginians on the international scene. The Punic diplomacy between Rome and Pyrrhus, and the renewal of the Romano-Punic alliance (autumn 279 – spring 278 BC) At the end of the summer 279 BC, the Carthaginians were trying by force to gain control of Sicily, increasing progressively more their ejpikravteia eastwards. The last resistance was put up by their traditional opponents, the Syracusans, who nevertheless were facing at that time moments of deep weakness, due to the unremitting domestic strifes. Of course, they did not ignore what was happening at the same time in Magna Graecia; no doubt, it was not by chance that the Syracusans sent their ambassadors exactly to Taras to ask Pyrrhus for help. Similarly, one has 120 The same conjecture about the best reliability of Diodorus’ account on the embassies has been expressed by La Bua 1980, 186–188 and Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 18–20. As regards the source of Pausanias, the name of Proxenus has been quoted by Schubert 1897, 26–32; Segre 1928, 229–230; Lévêque 1957, 70–71; La Bua 1971A, 47–49.

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necessarily to suppose that the Carthaginians were as much aware as the Syracusans of Pyrrhus’ strategic moves, but they had even to be worried – after the outcoming of Ausculum’s combat – for the reactions of their commercial allies, that is the Romans. The great inclination of the Romans to accept the peace offers that had been suggested for the second time by Pyrrhus – and the peace, I am sure, was no doubt the necessary preamble for any Sicilian venture – was no doubt the reason that drove the Carthaginians to action; indeed, they could not willingly accept an agreement between Pyrrhus and the Romans. Therefore, squeezed between the danger of a plausible treaty of Rome with the Epirote king and the continual missions of the Syracusan representatives to Taras, the Carthaginians appointed one Mago with the task of going Rome as an ambassador, under the escort of a remarkable task force of warships. The event has been clearly quoted by Justin (18, 2, 1–5), who said: “Mago, the commander of Cartha­ ginian forces, who has been sent with one hundred and twenty warships to help the Romans, went in the Senate and stated that the Carthaginians were regretful that the Romans had to suffer in Italy a war which had been caused by a foreign king. He said that he had been sent to them for this reason, namely so that they could have help from foreign troops, since they had been attacked by a foreign enemy. The senators expressed gratitude to the Carthaginians but they sent back all their benefits. Nevertheless after some days Mago, according to the typical manners of the Carthaginians, went secretly to Pyrrhus, as if he was a peace mediator for the Carthaginian side, but indeed he wanted to be aware of the king’s projects about Sicily, where they said he had been called for help (Sed Mago Punico ingenio post paucos dies tacitus, quasi pacificator Karthaginiensium, Pyrrhum adiit speculatu­ rus consilia eius de Sicilia, quo eum arcessi fama erat). As a matter of fact, this was the reason that exactly forced the Carthaginians to send reinforcements to the Romans, so that Pyrrhus could be detained in Italy due to the war against the Romans, and that he could not go to Sicily (ut Romano bello, ne in Siciliam transire posset, Pyrrhus in Italia detineretur)”. Therefore, the reason of the Carthaginian embassy is absolutely clear just thanks to the last detail mentioned by Justin: the Carthaginians deeply needed to detain Pyrrhus in Italy, until they had completely taken the control over Sicily, and this could happen if they had been able to defeat at last the Syracusans. What technique could have been better for them than supporting another war campaign of the Romans against Pyrrhus? The above-mentioned passage, quoted from the summary of the lost Philippikà written by Pompeius Trogus, is for sure the most important source which bears witness of the relationships between Rome and Carthage. Nonetheless, the episode concerning the Punic war fleet of Mago has been mentioned even by Valerius Maximus (3, 7, 10) with some different details: indeed, as stated by Valerius, the warships of the Carthaginian task-force were one hundred and thirty; furthermore, Mago never arrived to Rome, but he was joined by some Roman representatives in the harbour of Ostia. The general colour of the passage is no doubt favourable to the Romans; Valerius Maximus terminates his reference by singing the praises of the Romans’ skilfulness about embarking on a war and bringing it to an end with their own resources, even in difficult times. So, it is better to

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focus the attention again on Justin’s account, which as a matter of fact is plentiful of implications and basic suggestions121. The main problem, as always, regards the chronology; regrettably, the information of Trogus’ epitome must be taken into account very carefully, due to the nature of the text itself. Nevertheless, as regards this occurrence, there is a very significant concurrence: in his summary, Justin placed the mission of Mago after the battle of Ausculum. Therefore, as the fight took place in the second half of the summer 279 BC, we may deduce that according to Pompeius Trogus the Punic diplomatic mission occurred between the second half of 279 and the summer of 278 BC. However, I think it is very plausible that Mago reached Rome more or less in the autumn of 279 BC. The armada which escorted him in his mission was for sure very impressive (as I have said, it numbered more or less one hundred twenty/one hundred thirty warships); I guess it would be very unrealistic that if Mago had been really escorted by such a navy in the springtime of 278 BC the Carthaginians could at the same time blockade the Great Harbour of Syracuse as well with another hundred warships. Even if Carthage was a quite uncontested naval power in the western Mediterranean basin, it may be difficult to acknowledge that she could keep a war navy of approximately two hundred fifty ships in the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian areas alone!122 Unluckily, it is not possible to say if the quantity of Carthaginian ships quoted by Justin (or the amount given by Valerius Maximus) is trustworthy; however, in this way the historical tradition no doubt meant to emphasize that the Carthaginians gave a basic significance to the diplomatic mission of Mago, and clearly they were able to give a great exhibition of their own power to the Romans. If they wanted to do this, they should not have been involved at the same time in other crucial military operations by sea, like the siege laid by sea to the town of Syracuse, which began in the spring of 278 BC. Therefore, excluding the winter’s months of 279/278 BC, when the sailing season was temporarily suspended, and the spring/summer of 278 BC, I suggest to date the Punic embassy to Rome in the autumn 279 BC123. 121 On the passage of Valerius Maximus, see the useful remarks of Passerini 1943, 100 (who emphasized “l’elaborazione annalistica in maggior gloria di Roma” of Valerius’ account) and Lefkowitz 1959, 156 (in whose opinion “the haughty refusal of aid by the Romans in Valerius Maximus…probably represents the pronounced hostility of Roman tradition to Carthage”), who nevertheless erroneously thought that a careful chronological indication may be offered by Valerius’ passage; her opinion has been accurately rejected by Meister 1971, 196–201. 122 The diplomatic mission of Mago has been dated to the end of the summer 279 BC by Passerini 1943, 101; Lévêque 1957, 412–415; Kienast 1963, col. 146. The same chronology has been supported by other scholars, who nevertheless linked the mission of Mago with the renewal of the treaty between Rome and Carthage (see Frank 1928, 649; Broughton 1951, I, 193; Walbank 1957, I, 349; De Sanctis 19602, II, 384). The event has been even dated to 278 BC (Beloch 19272, IV 2, 275–277; Wuilleumier 1939, 130; Mitchell 1971, 653, note 93). Nenci 1958, 283 and 295, vaguely dated the episode in the period 279–278 BC, nevertheless without connecting it with the Romano-Carthaginian treaty, which should be dated in his opinion to 280 BC; Lefkowitz 1959, 155 and 161–163, thought dimly enough to the period 280– 279 BC, while the sign of the treaty should have occurred in 278 BC. 123 A useful status quaestionis about the scholars’ conjectures on the navy employed by the Carthaginians in that instance is in Scardigli 1991, 175–177. According to Hans 1983, 86, the

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As we have seen, Justin as well stated that the Romans gently turned down Mago’s proposal of help, and they nonetheless took the chance to sing the praises of the Roman virtue. The Romans’ rejection, which was yet temporary, was wholly congruent with their need of turning away Pyrrhus from the Italian theatre of war; it must not be forgotten that, following the second military defeat suffered by the legions in Ausculum, the political party of Caius Fabricius Luscinus, which was favourable to the peace negotiations, for sure got many consents: yet some scholars rightly pointed out that the election of Fabricius Luscinus and Quintus Aemilius Papus as consuls in May 278 BC seem to corroborate this suggestion. Therefore, I guess that the internal struggles and the growing importance of the Roman democratic party on the political scene, together with the existing necessities, were the reasons that led the Romans to reject the Carthaginians’ help. The restoration of the following events may be based only on suppositions. In his summary of Trogus’ lost histories, Justin mentioned a secret mission of Mago to Pyrrhus’ camp. Generally, the modern scholars acknowledged the truthfulness of the episode, even if they have been inclined to deny any negotiation between Rome and Carthage before it. I do not agree with their suggestion, and I believe that the excerpt of Justin may confirm my doubts124. As a matter of fact, some time elapsed between the kind refusal of the Romans and the mission of Mago to Pyrrhus’ encampment, and we may indeed realize this thanks to Justin’s words, because he describes this while as “post paucos dies”. This – I believe – may only imply that, following to the failure of the negotiations in the Roman Senate, the Carthaginian task force already left the harbour of Ostia! This hypothesis clears out the scene from the above-mentioned wrong suggestion of many scholars, who enhanced the anteriority of the meeting between Mago and Pyrrhus in relation to the negotiations between Mago and the Romans; but also, it drives me to hint a second diplomatic mission of the Punic representatives to Rome, which should have been necessary to ratify the existing alliance-treaty between the two states. I will soon discuss in detail the question, but I know that regrettably there is not the support of the literary sources to strengthen this opinion125. same warships then escorted Mago to Pyrrhus. Some critics have thought that the fleet which took Mago to Rome was the same that afterwards blockaded the harbour of Syracuse (Meltzer 1896, II, 232; Cross 1932, 76; Kienast 1963, col. 148; Garoufalias 19792, 381–383), but this opinion has been properly rejected: see Passerini 1943, 97–98; Lévêque 1957, 411; De Sanctis 19602, II, 378; Dexter Hoyos 1984A, 411. 124 See Meltzer 1896, II, 548 (the mission of Mago is not historical); Wuilleumier 1939, 130 (Mago met Cineas, when the latter went to Rome for his own negotiations); Nenci 1953, 281, note 80 (the mission of Mago is unlikely to have happened); Judeich 1926, 16; Cross 1932, 76 and 117–118; Passerini 1943, 104; Thiel 1954, 28; Lévêque 1957, 413–414; Lefkowitz 1959, 156 and 162; Kienast 1963, col. 147; Dexter Hoyos 1984A, 414–415 (all accept the mission of Mago as an historical event). 125 Cross 1932, 117–118; Ciaceri 1932, III, 59; Thiel 1954, 28–29 (Mago returned to Rome after the meeting with Pyrrhus); Judeich 1926, 16; Passerini 1943, 96–101; Lévêque 1957, 414; Lefkowitz 1959, 156 and 162 (conjecture other contacts between Romans and Carthaginians after Mago’s mission to Pyrrhus). As far as I know, only Dexter Hoyos 1984A, 415 rejected both these suggestions.

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There have been many arguments about the reasons that drove Mago to visit Pyrrhus, and the submissions of the historians have been very assorted. Some scholars thought that the mission was a manoeuvre of the Carthaginians to force the Romans to sign the renewal of the treaty; but this would compel to assume that the Carthaginians were looking for the military cooperation of the Romans more than for the continual stay of Pyrrhus in Italy, as the narrative of Justin clearly shows. Again, some other scholars conjectured that Mago offered to Pyrrhus some help to carry on the war against Rome; if so, what could have been the meaning for the Carthaginians to search previously the cooperation with the Romans?126 I think that these two assumptions held in low regard a very important reference of Justin; according to his summary, Mago visited Pyrrhus “speculaturus con­ silia eius de Sicilia, quo eum arcessi fama erat”. As a matter of fact, this is the most logical justification: after the negative response of the Roman senators, the Cartha­ ginian ambassador had nothing else to do but to sound which were the real objectives of Pyrrhus about Sicily and perhaps – “punico ingenio”, to use Justin’s words – to discover if the arrangements for the expedition were going on yet. Furthermore, the weighty segment of Justin’s summary wholly validates my previous premise, i.e. that the Carthaginians actually were conscious about the appeals for help that the Syracusans incessantly were sending to Taras; this seems to be the only meaning of the words “quo eum arcessi fama erat”. Hence, after his arrival in Taras, Mago undoubtedly understood that the king could not be dissuaded from his own purpose to move the theatre of war in Sicily; in few words, Pyrrhus’ decision was irrevocable. As a consequence the fleet which escorted Mago set sail for Sicily, considering the coming of the winter. The narrative of Justin about the diplomatic relationships between Rome and Carthage comes to an end; as regards the other ancient sources about the subject, Valerius Maximus does not add any further information; Livy (Periocha 13) and Polybius (3, 25, 1–5) referred only to the stipulation of the treaty between Rome and Carthage; Diodorus (22, 7, 5) cited only events that followed the stipulation. So, in the restoration of the events that I have proposed, we are facing a situation that may be summarized as follows: first, Pyrrhus and the Romans were still busy with negotiations, notwithstanding the attempt of the Carthaginians to take the Romans by their side, quite subsidizing the war in Italy127. Second, Mago went 126 Several conjectures have been made about the reasons that drove Mago to reach Taras; some scholars thought that Trogus quoted just one of the motives, perhaps the most intriguing for his account (Judeich 1926, 16; Thiel 1954, 28; Lefkowitz 1959, 166); some other guessed that the real aim was to persuade Pyrrhus to stay in Italy (Passerini 1943, 104; Lévêque 1957, 414); Büttner-Wobst 1903, 166, thought Mago’s was just an exploratory mission; according to Kienast 1963, col. 147, Mago tried to find out Pyrrhus’ projects about Sicily and, after informing him of the negotiations with the Romans, he wanted to persuade the king to go back to Greece. 127 I use the verb “subsidize” without any economic or financial meaning; some scholars have indeed thought that the Carthaginians actually bought the alliance with Rome paying with coins, and the evidence should be offered by the resemblances of some devices in the coinages of the two cities (e.g. Mattingly 1924, 181–192; Frank 1928, 649; Cross 1932, 76; Thiel 1954, 28; De Sanctis 19602, II, 405; Heurgon 1973, 214 and 220; Nederlof 1978, 154; Garou-

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to Taras and could be confident that Pyrrhus was planning to succour the Greeks of Sicily. In an imaginary third point of the list we should place the approval of the alliance between the Romans and the Carthaginians, which I will exhaustively treat immediately. Nonetheless, there is a blank space in the list of the literary sources, and this prevents an accurate analysis and a genuine restoration of the historical happenings; and yet, even without the backing of any direct testimony, I believe that the outlines of that historical moment may be sketched out. It must be supposed that the Romans, turning down at some time the peace negotiations with Pyrrhus, began quickly to increase the number of the clauses of their commercial alliance with the Carthaginians, converting it exactly in a military alliance. No doubt, at present it is possible to give different readings with reference to the presence of a Carthaginian navy in the harbour of Ostia, in 279 BC; essentially, it was a demonstration of military power towards Rome, but we do not have to fail to remember that the Punic fleet was a basic component of the new military arrangements with the Romans. Regrettably, I believe that it is impossible to verify which was the reason that drove the Romans to change side. However, I agree with the greatest part of the scholars, and I conjecture a second journey of the Punic ambassadors to Rome, perhaps led once again by Mago himself, to debate with the Roman senators about the results of their recent meeting with Pyrrhus. In opposition to some modern historians, I think it was basic for the Romans – even if in an unexspected way (just remember that Mago went to Pyrrhus’ camp “tacitus”, to use the expression of Justin) – to know that the decision of Pyrrhus to go and fight in Sicily was absolutely irreversible; as a matter of fact, only in this case and with this specific guarantee, they could reject the peace proposals of Cineas, and accept the support offered by the Carthaginian diplomacy. 1.9. Some notes about the Romano-Carthaginian treaty: matters of understanding It is accepted that the text of the renewed treaty between Rome and Carthage causes to the scholars many troubles as regards its understanding, both for its philological evaluation and for its historical matters128. As some critics already pointed out, falias 19792, 385). Anyway this conjecture has been rightly rejected: see Passerini 1943, 94; Nenci 1958, 284–285; Mitchell 1971, 651; Dexter Hoyos 1984A, 432. Some critics have erroneously supposed that a financial support was included even as one of the clauses in the treaty of alliance (e.g. Cross 1932, 76; Thiel 1954, 28; La Bua 1971A, 90); see the right refusal of Walbank 1957, I, 351; Cassola 1962, 167. 128 The bibliography concerning the treaty between Rome and Carthage at the time of Pyrrhus is really overflowing; one of the most recent surveys has been made by Scardigli 1991, 163– 166. I have actually consulted the following works: Meltzer 1896, II, 228–232 and 545–548; Klotz 1908, 443–447; Homo 1926, 249–256; Beloch 19272, IV 2, 476–479; Passerini, 1943, 92–94 and passim; Mazzarino 1947, 67–69 and 165–167; Nenci 1953, 129–186; Nenci 1958, 263–295; Manni 1958, 169–173 (= Manni 1990, 295–298); Lefkowitz 1959, 155– 157 and 169–170; Kienast 1963, coll. 146–148; Toynbee 1965, 519–520 and 544–555;

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Polybius as well had many problems when he translated the Latin text of the treaty – which was by itself a version of the original treaty written in Phoenician – in the Greek language. However, it is better to quote directly the Polybian passage (3, 25, 1–5; the text of the treaty covers the paragraphs from 3 to 5): (1) “Eti toigarou`n teleutaiva~ sunqhvka~ poiou`ntai ÔRwmai`oi kata; th;n Puvr­ rou diavbasin pro; tou` susthvsasqai tou;~ Karchdonivou~ to;n peri; Sikeliva~ pov­ lemon: (2) ejn ai|~ ta; me;n a[lla throu`si pavnta kata; ta;~ uJparcouvsa~ oJmologiva~, provskeitai de; touvtoi~ ta; uJpogegrammevna. (3) ∆Ea;n summacivan poiw`ntai pro;~ Puvrron e[ggrapton poieivsqwsan ajmfovteroi i{na ejxh`/ bohqei`n ajllhvloij ejn th`/ tw`n polemoumevnwn cwvra/: (4) oJpovteroi d∆ a]n creivan e[cwsi th`~ bohqeiva~, ta; ploi`a parecevtwsan Karchdovnioi kai; eij~ th;n oJdo;n kai; eij~ th;n e[fodon, ta; de; ojywvnia toi`~ auJtw`n eJkavteroi. (5) Karchdovnioi de; kai; kata; qavlattan ÔRwmaivoi~ bohqeivt­ wsan, a]n creiva h\/. Ta; de; plhrwvmata mhdei;~ ajnagkazevtw ejkbaivnein ajkousivw~. For the moment, I leave the paragraph 3 of the Polybian passage without punctuation marks, because the most difficult matters, as regards the reading, have to do exactly with the first clause of the treaty. Therefore, I start with a detailed analysis of the passage. 1. What does it mean summacivan pro;~ Puvrron? The translation of “alliance against Pyrrhus” has been suggested at the end of XIX century by Unger, who thought that in the Latin text of the treaty – the one saw by Polybius – there was an adversus, which at any rate was wrongly understood by the Greek historian129. On the contrary, I guess that the supposition commonly accepted by modern scholars has to be preferred, that is to explain Polybius’ words as “alliance with Pyrrhus”130. First of all, I believe that the historical context I have previously explored supports this version; the historical sources at our disposal never mention a patent alliance between the Roman and the Carthaginians against Pyrrhus. The danger could come just as a result of an agreement between the Romans and the Epirote king; and this is exactly the option which is pointed out by the first clause, that included no doubt the Carthaginians as well. Furthermore, there are several linguistic reasons that may be appropriate to strengthen my reading. For sure, the prov~ joined with an accusative may stand either for a friendly relationship or an hostile one; but the Greek turn of phrase summacivan pro;~ ajutovn poiei`n can not be questioned with reference to its ­Schmitt 1969, III, 101–106, nr. 466; Ferenczy 1969, 259–282; Meister 1970B, 408–423; Meister 1971, 196–201; Mitchell 1971, 633–655; Flach 1978, 615–617; Badian 1980, 161–169; Heisserer 1985, 125–139; Dexter-Hoyos 1984A, 402–435; Dexter-Hoyos 1984B, 92–109; Huss 1985, 207–215; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 29–31. 129 The original suggestion of Unger 1882, 201–203 has been then shared by Soltau 1889, 278– 284; Meltzer 1896, II, 229 and 546; Klotz 1908, 445; Heuss 1933, 39; Mazzarino 1947, 166–167; Dahlheim 1968, 151 and 185, note 4; Kienast 1963, coll. 146–147; Mitchell 1971, 644; Meister 1970B, 412–413; Meister 1971, 196–198; Meister 1975, 136; Heisserer 1985, 131 and 139. 130 The traditional reading (alliance with Pyrrhus) has been rightly suggested by Lévêque 1957, 416; Nenci 1958, 290; Musti 1972, I 2, 1140; Flach 1978, 616; La Bua 1980, 197; Ruschenbusch 1980–1981, 75; Dexter-Hoyos 1984A, 420–423; Scardigli 1991, 167.

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meaning, because usually it stands for “to form an alliance with someone”. As Nenci and Dexter-Hoyos correctly pointed out, there are several occurrences of its usage in the Histories of Polybius; if this would not be enough, we could even draw on a passage from Appian’s Samnite Book (10, 1), where the same phrase summacivan pro;~ Puvrron was used. Even in that occurrence, the only possible translation is “alliance with Pyrrhus”131. What was foreseen by the new article of the alliance, no doubt, was only a prospect; but the tendency of the treaty was clearly hostile to the Epirote king, who was a challenger to both the signatories (it does not matter if de facto, as regards the Romans, or in fieri, with reference to the Carthaginians); indeed, they had in turn the need to look after their own interests. Therefore, the Roman and the Punic governments had to consider what should be done if one of them had changed a hostile or neutral relationship towards Pyrrhus into a peaceful agreement with him; the way out had to be a guarantee that the potential arrangement would not be retorted against the party who did not sign it. 2. e[ggrapton. Usually, two interpretations are quoted by the scholars, but these do not change the meaning of the Greek text. If the adjective is followed by a comma, it should be linked with the name summacivan (therefore, it should mean “a written alliance”); otherwise, if we suppose that it was preceded by a comma, it was a neutral accusative used like a modal adverb, linked with the verb poieivsqwsan (so we should read the phrase like “let them make it in writing”). I think it is much more difficult, with reference to the second explanation, to read the adjective e[ggrapton as a predicative of the name summa­ civan.132 3. ajmfovteroi. I do not believe that the Greek meaning of the word was equivalent to the Latin word ambo, because this should imply an action which was undertaken together and at the same time by the two contracting parties (of course, I mean a likely action); rather, I think the Greek word reminds the Latin utrique, not so much to imply two separate stages in the agreement with Pyrrhus, but to suggest a double opportunity (indeed, both the Romans and the Carthaginians could come to an agreement with the king). Anyway, the clear objective of the clause is to avoid that a third party could obtain any benefit from a possible one-sided treaty, which excluded one of the two signing powers133. 131 Particularly Dexter-Hoyos 1984A, 420–421, has noted that the Greek word summaciva together with the preposition prov~ to suggest a hostile relationship has never been used by Polybius; when the historian wanted to express such an idea, he made use of katav + genitive. Furthermore, something different may be noted even in the Greek phrase summavcesqai prov~, which means “to join into an alliance against someone else”; for its use, see e.g. two Aristotelian examples: Pol. IV 15, 15 (= 1300 a 18); Rhet. 1396 a 18. 132 Unger 1882, 202; Niese 1897, II, 42, note 2; Beloch 1901, 282–288; Beloch 19272, IV 2, 476; Klotz 1908, 444; Lévêque 1957, 416; Walbank 1957, I, 350; Dexter-Hoyos 1984A, 434 (a comma after e[ggrapton): Soltau 1889, 134; Meltzer 1896, II, 229; Kienast 1963, col. 146; Garoufalias 19792, 384; Flach 1978, 616; Heisserer 1985, 136–137 (a comma before e[ggrapton). 133 On the meaning of this clause, see the very helpful notes of Nenci 1958, 290; Flach 1978, 616; Scardigli 1991, 186.

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4. i{na ejxh/` bohqei`n ajllhvloi~ ejn th`/ tw`n polemoumevnwn cwvra/. Even as regards this statement, we have different explanations given by the scholars. Some of them considered this as the beginning of the second article of the renewed treaty; therefore, i{na should have the same value of the Latin ut (declarative sense). Unfortunately, we do not have any example which may support this use of the Greek i{na.134 The most spread interpretation, with which I agree, suggests that this is the finishing point of the first clause; so the phrase must depend from the verb poieivsqwsan, and the i{na has the value of the Greek o{pw~ and w{ste, which is abundantly attested, especially from the beginning of the IV century BC. With reference to the historical subject, I think it is worth to underline the innovation brought to the Roman-Carthaginian treaty by the clause ejn th`/ tw`n polemoumevnwn cwvra/, which marked clearly an overcoming of the previous commercial alliance of 306 BC, in which the spheres of action of the two powers were clearly delimited and the prohibition for both of them to violate the territorial borders of the opponent was plain135. 5. ta; ploi`a parecevtwsan Karchdovnioi kai; eij~ th;n oJdo;n kai; eij~ th;n e[fodon. The controversy among the scholars concerns the interpretation of the words ploi`a and e[fodon: nay, it has been emphasized that the evaluation of the first term is closely linked with the value of the second one. Ploi`on has been generally used to indicate the Greek merchantman; some scholars, nonetheless, thought that in this occurrence Polybius used the Greek name to denote the warships136. I am confident that a lot of examples show that we have to acknowledge the most reasonable meaning of the word. In the whole historical work of Polybius, the word ploi`a occurs nearly twenty times; only in three of them, the historian thought advantageous to connect with the name a qualifying adjective, to adjust the only sense that ploi`a had for him, that is ships used to convey men or goods137. But it is not Polybius alone who authenticated the 134 Such a grammatical meaning of i{na, introducing a second clause of the treaty, has been suggested by Schubert 1894, 205; Meltzer 1896, II, 547; Beloch 1901, 282; Taübler 1913, I, 268; Homo 1926, 254; Hamburger 1927, 72; Pareti 1952, II, 29; La Bua 1980, 197; Dexter-Hoyos 1984A, 427. 135 For i{na with the meaning of o{pw~, see Walbank 1957, I, 351; Lévêque 1957, 417; Nenci 1958, 291, note 128; Manni 1958, 169 (= Manni 1990, 296); Toynbee 1965, 548; Meister, 1970B, 414. 136 Büttner-Wobst 1903, 177; Klotz 1908, 446; Hamburger 1927, 74 (ploiva = merchantmen). On the contrary, Nenci 1958, 291, supposed that Polybius wanted to mean warships, and he followed in this conjecture the old-aged reading of Schweighauser 1822, 291; “Sunt naves onerariae ad iter et naves longae ad adgrediendum hostem, ad pugnam”. 137 There really seems to be no doubt for Polybius’ text, where the word ploiva is used 18 times (2, 7, 10; 3, 25, 4; 3, 42, 2; 4, 10, 4; 4, 52, 7; 5, 3, 3; 5, 45, 4; 5, 46, 10; 5, 62, 2; 5, 95, 3; 5, 108, 1; 10, 44, 6; 15, 2, 2; 15, 2, 6; 15, 18, 3; 24, 6, 3; 31, 12, 12; 31, 18, 10). Just in three of them, Polybius felt it was necessary to side by the name a specifying adjective: 3, 42, 2 (tav te monovx­ ula ploi`a pavnta kai; tou;~ levmbou~); 5, 45, 4 (tav potavmia ploi`a); 15, 18, 3 (ta; makra; ploi`a paradou`nai pavnta plh;n devka trihvrwn). The latter seems to be the most important to note that Polybius meant; ploi`a = merchantmen: ploi`a makrav = long warships. A clear and thorough investigation of the meanings of ploi`on has been provided by Anderson 1962; Casson 1971, 157, note 1 and 169.

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value of the term; a very helpful resemblance is provided by some passages of Herodotus (in book 7, chapter 36, where Herodotus described the bridge made of ships, which had been assembled by Xerxes to cross over the Hellespont, he used the word ploi`a to specify the only ships that, conveying men, could reach the Pontus, passing through the breaches left between the warships)138; of Thucydides (in book 4, chapter 116, it is reported that the Athenians abandoned Lekythos and fled to Pallene ploivoi~ kai; nausiv, that means “with merchantmen and warships”)139; of Plato himself (in the Hippia maior, 295d, where we may see once again the association between ploi`av te kaiv trihvrei~)! I think that it may be stated that in this new clause of the Roman-Carthaginian treaty the signing powers wanted to assert that the Carthaginians had to supply the merchantmen, to take on board their own troops (or, in turn, the Roman legionaries) and carry them ejn th`/ tw`n polemoumevnwn cwvra/. Some more problems are caused, on the contrary, by the meaning of e[fodon: all the ancient manuscripts provide the same textual reading. Therefore, the meaning of the clause is that the Carthaginians had to provide the merchantmen both for the trip (that is, oJdov~), and for the attack (e[fodo~). Nevertheless another hypothesis, suggested for the first time by Reiske, is quite permanently accepted at present by the scholars140; unfortunately, Reiske’s suggestion sets off from an assertion which is absolutely questionable, that is to amend the text which has been offered by all the manuscripts with a single reading; Reiske’s purpose was to change e[fodon in a[fodon, which is “the return voyage”. In this way, Polybius’ passage would match even more with the historical happenings; the Punic navy had to undertake the role that the Roman fleet, yet inadequate, could not play. Otherwise, we could hardly comprehend a one-way voyage for the Punic (or Roman) troops, which needed even to count on the shipping back to their homeland. Therefore, I accept as well the correction of the reading that has been suggested by Reiske.

138 For the meaning of the word ploi`a in Herodotus’ work, see especially Morrison – Williams 1968, 128 (“The most colourless word which Herodotus employs for a ship or boat is ploion. He uses the word as a collective, or when he wants to say merely by sea’. The general term for oared warships seems to be long ships”); 244 (“Naus by itself commonly means a trieres, and ploion by itself often means one of the lighter types of oared ship in contrast to the trieres, once or twice in contrast to the pentekontoros”). It may be useful to quote the passages where Herodotus used an adjective to further the meaning of ploi`a: 5, 30, 18 (ploi`a makra; pollav); 6, 48, 7 (keleuvwn neva~ te makra;~ kai; iJppagwga; ploi`a poievesqai); 7, 21, 6 (iJppagwga; ploi`a); 7, 97, 9 (Trihkovnteroi de; kai; penthkovnteroi kai; kevrkouroi kai; iJppagwga; ploi`a smikra;); 7, 147, 12 (ploi`a sitagwgav). 139 For the meaning of ploi`a makrav in Thucydides see Wallinga 1993, 63–64. 140 The amendment of Polybius’ text – which has been reproduced the same in all the manuscripts – has been proposed at first by Reiske 1763, IV, 205, and then accepted by Meltzer 1896, II, 229; Büttner-Wobst 1903, 177; Klotz 1908, 445; Beloch 19272, IV 2, 479; Thiel 1954, 29; Meister 1970B, 416; Lévêque 1957, 417; Kienast 1963, col. 146; Flach 1978, 615, note 4; Dexter-Hoyos 1984A, 430; Dexter-Hoyos 1984B, 107. It has been rejected by Frank 1928, 649; Walbank 1957, I, 350; Nenci 1958, 291; Mitchell 1971, 648, note 74.

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6. ta; de; plhrwvmata mhdei;~ ajnagkazevtw ejkbaivnein ajkousivw~. This last phrase of Polybius has caused some troubles, too. Some scholars thought that the Carthaginian crews were not compelled to set ashore and help the Romans in their land operations; some other, on the contrary, said that the Roman troops that were boarded on Punic ships could even decline to land. Anyway, I think that the evaluation of Nenci is correct; according to his words, the Roman soldiers boarded on Carthaginian ships depended on their own commanders and could not be forced to take land by Punic orders141. Therefore, I think that a plausible translation of Polybius’ passage may be as follows: “Exactly for this reason, the Romans signed again the last pacts with the Carthaginians at the time of Pyrrhus’ crossing to Sicily, just before the Carthaginians started the war for Sicily; in the treaty, they preserve all the other clauses, in conformity with the accords in force, but they add to those the following provisions: ‘If an alliance will be endorsed with Pyrrhus in writing, both shall make it that they may go to the help of each other in whichever country is attacked. No matter who requires help, the Carthaginians are to provide the merchantmen, both for the way-out route and the way-back trip; each country shall provide the pay for its own men. The Carthaginians, if necessary, shall come to the help of the Romans by sea too, but no one shall compel the crews to land against their will’”. There has been a long debate among the scholars, if the renewal of the RomanCarthaginian treaty was a success more for the Punic representatives than for the Roman delegates. I guess it is not correct to estimate stricto sensu the meaning of the new paragraphs; anyway, if in the first part of the Polybian text we find stipulations that seem to be evenly balanced for the two signing powers, I must admit that the second part of the treaty is no doubt favourable to the Romans; but this, needless to say, was of the greatest relevance for the Carthaginians themselves! We must not be surprised by the absence of any obligation or military responsibilities of the Romans towards the Carthaginians, because they were prevented by the historical context itself, which foresaw for sure the departure of Pyrrhus to Sicily, well known to each one of the two signing powers. However, I think that we must not forget a basic detail of the renewed treaty, i.e. that the historical prospect pointed out by the new clauses was not real, but only likely. I mean that it was all but impossible that, thanks to a second diplomatic mission, Pyrrhus could obtain from the Romans their refusal to take sides before his departure for Sicily; of course, the Punic representatives had to do their best to avoid that their challengers could come to an agreement. As well, the Romans had a special interest to sign the new alliance; as a matter of fact, they had to avoid the option that the Epirote king, after bringing to an end the war in Sicily, could come again in Italy secured by a summaciva treaty with Carthage.

141 A great reading of the final clause has been offered by Nenci 1958, 292–293.

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1.10. A passage of Diodorus and the carrying out of the treaty; quick cooperation in Rhegium (spring 278 BC) As I have previously said, the historical sources concerning the renewal of the treaty between Rome and Carthage may be profitably divided in three classes: the sources about the diplomatic negotiations; the account about the signing of the treaty; finally, the sources that concern historical events following the conclusion of the new alliance. With reference to this last group, I want to quote a well-known passage of Diodorus Siculus, coming from the Excerpta Hoescheliana of his book 22 (22, 7, 5): “The Carthaginians, after signing an alliance with the Romans (sum­ macivan poihvsante~ meta; ÔRwmaivwn), took on board on their own ships five hundred men; then, they made their route to Rhegium, avoiding to put the city under siege, but making some incursions in the environs; they destroyed by fire the timber which had been prepared for the creation of new ships, and they stayed there to keep a close watch on the Strait of Messina, trying to block Pyrrhus’ crossing ­(dievmeinan fulavttonte~ to;n porqmovn, parathrou`nte~ th;n diavbasin Puvrrou)”. This passage, too, caused a lot of troubles to the scholars, with particular reference to the nationality of the five hundred men who were on board in the Carthaginian ships, and the characteristics of the Punic armada. The greatest part of the modern historians explained Diodorus’ reference as a proof – the only one – of the military co-operation between the Romans and the Carthaginians, following the approval of the new treaty; therefore, the men on board should have been Roman soldiers, in accordance with the above-mentioned clause of the signed alliance142. On the contrary, some other scholars conjectured that Diodorus did not mean at all to describe a military operation undertaken together by Romans and Punic forces; in particular, the diavbasi~ of the Carthaginians should entail a starting point in Sicily, and as a consequence of this the men taken on board by the Punic crews could not have been Romans143. Anyway, we should not forget that this is a summary of the historical account of Diodorus; it seems to me that the wide-ranging sense of the excerpt leave no doubts at all, and so I would agree with those who read the passage as a proof that the clauses of the alliance were carried out. Nonetheless, the opinion of those scholars who support the opposite assertion may be easily questioned. First of all, I think that we do not have to translate the word diavbasi~ with “the crossing of Messina’s Strait”; indeed, the second occurrence of the term in Diodorus’ text is connected with the crossing of Pyrrhus, which started from Taras and arrived – via Locri – to Sicily, without passing through the Strait. In second place, the occurrence of the 142 Beloch 19272, IV 2, 479–485; Hamburger 1927, 100–102; Ciaceri 1932, III, 62, note 3; Cross 1932, 76, note 2; Wuilleumier 1939, 131; Heurgon 19702, 203; Mazzarino 1947, 167–168; Thiel 1954, 30–31, note 81; Lévêque 1957, 419–420; Cassola 1962, 173; Kienast 1963, coll. 147–148; La Bua 1971B, 74–76. 143 There is quite no scholar at present who still rejects the passage of Diodorus as an evidence of the activation of the Romano-Punic treaty; the last supporters of this conjecture have been Mitchell 1971, 650–651, and Dexter-Hoyos 1984A, 433 (“It is quite unlikely that the expedition was a joint venture under the pact, or indeed a joint venture at all”).

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adjective ijdiva~ seems to suggest that there must be a distinction between the Carthaginian component (to say, the armada) and something that was not Punic at all, that is the soldiers on board. Last but not least, the reference at the beginning of the passage to a summaciva between Rome and Carthage leaves no more doubts144. Nevertheless, these few considerations may not help to resolve all the troubles caused by the reading of Diodorus’ text. I presume that the intervention of the man who summarized the original text is plainly perceptible, and it could seriously have an effect on a correct interpretation. As a matter of fact, it may be seen that the subjects of every action were the Karchdovnioi; but if this may perfectly match with the first part of the passage, I have some more difficulties to link the Carthaginians with the deeds described in the second part of the text. The responsibility of the Punic fleet in the raids and in the fire of the timber prepared for the ship-building is not so clear, and it could be much more plausible if the two actions had been undertaken by the five hundred men who took land in Rhegium. Therefore, I believe that the author of the summary has considerably made worse the reading of the original text, making only the Carthaginians responsible for every action. A further topic is the classification of the fleet: sometimes, it has been conjectured that it was the same armada which had escorted Mago to Rome for his diplomatic mission. Obviously, if true, this assumption would lead to think that the Punic representative signed additional pacts with the Romans already in the first stage of the negotiations, in the autumn of 279 BC; after boarding the five hundred Roman legionaries, he should have carried them during his way-back journey to Rhegium, and then he should have set sailed for Sicily. But the difference between this interpretation and my personal reconstruction of the events is very manifest. If the two fleets correspond, the voyage of Mago to Pyrrhus would be absolutely puzzling, because it would require to assume first of all that the enormous Punic navy stayed for a while in Rhegium, just to land the Roman troops; then, the warships had to set sail northwards and very close to the coast, up to the gulf of Taras; finally, they had to go back in Rome and then in Sicily. All these movements should have occurred in close proximity to the winter time, when sailing was traditionally stopped! Furthermore, we should suppose that the new treaty between Rome and Carthage was signed in the autumn of 279 BC, while the evidence encourages to maintain a lower chronology. On the other hand, it is impossible to date both the missions to the spring of 278 BC; the trouble in this instance regards the whole number of the Carthaginian warships that were actively operating in the area between Sicily and the Tyrrhenian sea. Indeed, at the beginning of spring 278 BC we may date the start of the siege of the Great Harbour in Syracuse by some one hundred Punic warships; it seems at least unlikely that, at the same time, a massive war fleet was at disposal of Mago for a demonstration of power in the harbour of Ostia: we should think that the Cartha­ ginians at that time could easily employ a navy of quite two hundred and fifty warships wholly for the sea-route between Sicily and the central Tyrrhenian sea! 144 The value of the word diavbasi~ as “crossing of the Strait of Messina” has been emphasized by Dexter-Hoyos 1984A, 433, note 122.

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Therefore, I am confident that the two missions have to be considered as unconnected, and that Diodorus’ passage exactly provides the only evidence of an application of the “Polybian” clause, ta; ploi`a parecevtwsan Karchdovnioi kai; eij~ th;n oJdo;n kai; eij~ th;n a[fodon. Moreover, this conjecture allows a further reference to the real meaning of the Greek word ploi`a, that hints at the merchantmen, and clearly matches with the kind of fleet quoted by the Diodorean summary. It has been supposed a long time ago by Beloch that Rhegium was only the arrival of the Carthaginian sailing and the end of the Roman soldiers’ mission; perhaps those legionaries were an outpost of the second occupying force sent by Rome to Rhegium during the consulate of Caius Fabricius Luscinus (to say, after the 1st of May, 278 BC)145. The number of the further garrison’s soldiers fluctuates in the historical sources between five and four thousand men; this led some scholars to think that Diodorus too stated the same number, to mean that the quantity provided by the Byzantine summary should be amended (from five hundred to five thousand)146. But, at present, the established opinion among the scholars is that the contingents were different, even if their duty had to be identical. Rhegium was in 279/278 BC the last pro-Roman outpost in Magna Graecia, and its control became even more important when Pyrrhus decided to cross to Sicily. The only harbour where the Punic ships could moor was no doubt Rhegium. Of course, Rhegium was not even the place that the five hundred Roman soldiers renounced to lay siege to – this should have been a self-contradiction, as much for the political attitude of the city as for the slight amount of the aggressors – and in all probability the timber stored up for the ship-building was not in her property. Some scholars suggested that the timber belonged to a southern Greek city which was sided at that time with Pyrrhus147. In opposition with what has been stated by the scholars, I guess it was not a task of the Romans to control the Strait of Messina, in order to spot the movements of Pyrrhus’ armada; I believe, on the contrary, that the subject of this action were the Karchdovnioi, as it has been rightly pointed out – at least in this case – by the author of the Diodorean summary. With the city of Rhegium firmly under Roman control, the Punic ambassadors had one last step to do, that was to search for a factual alliance with the Mamertines of Messina; a pact which would have assured to Carthage the complete control of the Strait of Messina, on account of the co-operation with the fresh allies and of the power of the Punic navy. Therefore, in all probability in the spring of 278 BC, the Carthaginian diplomats were again in action, and the evidence is once more pro145 Meltzer 1896, II, 232; Niese 1897, II, 43; Scano 1925, 78–79; Frank 1928, 650; Pareti 1952, II, 30–31 suppose that the target of the mission – even for the Carthaginians – was an attack against the Legio Campana of Decius Vibellius. 146 On the question of the two battalions sent to Rhegium and the likely mistake of the Diodorean excerptum, see Beloch 1901, 288; Beloch 19272, IV 2, 479–480; Passerini 1943, 97, note 1; Lévêque 1957, 419, note 7; La Bua 1971B, 92, note 3; La Bua 1980, 203. 147 In my opinion the place cannot be for sure identified; Beloch 1901, 285 and De Sanctis 19602, II, 378 thought about Locri Epizefirii (but Beloch 19272, IV 2, 480 suggested then the city of Hipponium). See the useful remarks of Scardigli 1991, 196, note 131.

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vided by a passage of Diodorus (22, 7, 4): ”Oti Mamerti`noi oiJ Messhnivou~ dolo­ fonhvsante~ summacivan meta; Karchdonivwn poihvsante~, e[krinan koinh`/ dia­ kwluvein Puvrron th;n eij~ Sikelivan diavbasin (“The Mamertines, who treacherously killed the inhabitants of Messina, signed an alliance with the Carthaginians and decided in agreement with them to prevent Pyrrhus from crossing to Sicily”). The Romans and the Carthaginians were now waiting for the following strategic move of their common rival. The Romans were in all probability in the most favourable situation because, after the departure of Pyrrhus for the Sicilian campaign, the Italic allies should have been much more in a weak position and less united; so, for the Roman army, it was quite time to wage another war campaign to recover back all the positions and the cities that were previously under Roman control in Magna Graecia. As regards Carthage, her representatives had prepared at best with their diplomatic missions a series of complications, to disturb and make more difficult the crossing of Pyrrhus to Sicily. After obtaining the help of the allies to control the Strait of Messina, and once they detached there a huge number of warships to spot Pyrrhus’ movements, the Carthaginians could focus their attention on their last objective, the only one which prevented them from the complete conquest of Sicily. The Greek city-state of Syracuse, in the spring of 278 BC, was assaulted by land by fifty thousand Punic infantry soldiers; the Great Harbour, in turn, was blockaded by one hundred Carthaginian warships. The objective of the Greeks of Sicily was only one; to resist until the arrival of Agathocles’ heir, Pyrrhus, who was crossing to the island carrying with himself the good reputation of the victories against the Roman legions and the hope to be the saviour of the Greeks from the Punic troubles.

CHAPTER TWO Pyrrhus and the Greeks of Sicily: military events, political meanings and ideological implications

2.1. Preliminary notes. The situation in Sicily and Pyrrhus’ last arrangements for the expedition The siege laid to Syracuse by an army of fifty thousand soldiers together with a navy of about one hundred warships, starting from the spring of 278 BC, was the last attempt made by the Carthaginians – before the looming arrival of Pyrrhus – to complete the conquest of eastern Sicily, with the fall of the last bulwark of the Greeks of Sicily. As I have pointed out in the previous chapter, all the efforts made by the Punic ambassadors and by the Punic military forces trying to detain Pyrrhus in Magna Graecia were finally made null and void; this was not as much for the strong opposition of the Roman senators – who, at first, rejected the military aid of Carthage to continue the war against the Epirote king – as for the early decision of Pyrrhus to make a military expedition to help the Greeks living in Sicily. The firmness of the king was evident, as it is showed by the continual diplomatic missions sent by the citizens of Syracuse to Taras (legations that had to be known to the Carthaginians, as we have seen). In the decade after the death of Agathocles, Sicily went through a hasty political evolution that brought to a kind of division in four parts of all the island. A role on the scene had to be played by the post-Agathoclean Syracuse, which was able to find in Hicetas a leading character with a strong personality and great political and military skills, before falling into another bloody civil war which gave to the Punic forces the occasion to attack the city. As second, we have Carthage, the city that was the undisputed ruler of the western Mediterranean sea and had under control all the western side of Sicily. The third party was the new component on the setting, that is the new-found mixed community of Messina, whose basic constituents were the old mercenary soldiers of Agathocles, called Mamertines: Messina at that time had under control all the territories and the cities of the north-eastern corner of Sicily. Finally, there was the Greek city of Agrigentum, that in the years of Phintias’ tyranny was able both to restrain a little bit the pressure of the Carthaginian army towards the eastern side of Sicily, and to broaden Agrigentum’s authority over a great area of central Sicily: then, at the time of the Punic expansion eastwards, together with the disappearance of Phintias from the political scene, the city was controlled by the Carthaginians thanks to a military garrison. Therefore, at the time of Pyrrhus’ crossing to Sicily, only three of the four components I have just mentioned were active on the Sicilian stage – that is, Carthage, Syracuse and Messina – and so it is not possible to refer to a division in four parts of the island; furthermore the Carthaginians, on account of the alliance signed with the Mamertines, controlled quite the whole of the island, with the exception of Syracuse and of some communities of the eastern territories that were yet independent, like Tauromenium and Catane; those Greek cities were governed by tyrants who tried to remain in a neutral political attitude but were nevertheless much

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more worried by the growing expansion of the Mamertines than by the impending final struggle between Syracuse and Carthage. The Sicilian venture was carefully prepared by Pyrrhus, yet past the first appeals for help that came from Syracuse at the end of 279 BC and the “fiasco” of the peace negotiations with the Romans. Pyrrhus’ arrangements had to be twofold; in order that the project to conquer Sicily did not turn into a failure, Pyrrhus needed to have more reliable news from the island, as much to know exactly what would have been the support of the Siceliotes (not only of the Syracusans) to his enterprise, as to understand more or less how many were the forces he had to fight against after his arrival. On the other hand, it is commonsense that he could not leave for a new destination without settling thoroughly the political situation in Magna Graecia and in all the territories that had been conquered against the Romans with so huge labours; Pyrrhus had to protect his backside, to avoid that while he was away in Sicily the Roman legions once again could move ahead to southern Italy, winning back many cities that were at that moment kept under control by Epirote garrisons, and cutting off him in Sicily. As Plutarch says in his Life of Pyrrhus (22, 4), the king once again took an advantage from the great diplomatic and declamatory skills of the Thessalian Cineas, and sent him to Sicily to make negotiations with the city-states. Unfortunately, according to his customary historical method of work, Plutarch summarized even in this instance the historical events, and so it is quite impossible to state without any doubt which were the cities then visited by the Thessalian ambassador. Nevertheless, Pyrrhus’ journey to Syracuse took place with really definite steps, and almost everywhere it came out to be an exultant welcome by the local rulers and citizenships, as I shall illustrate in a while, as well in Tauromenium as in Catane, and finally in Syracuse. Therefore, it may be deduced that the diplomatic activities of Cineas carefully paved the way of Pyrrhus at least in the above-mentioned Greek cities. Particularly, in Tauromenium the political efforts of Cineas showed to be crucial, as this was the town that had been indicated as the landingplace for the Epirote armada which set sail from Locri. This is the last occurrence in which the historical sources mention Cineas; as a consequence, some modern historians supposed that the representative, who was yet aged at the moment of the Sicilian mission, died in the island. I believe that it is possible to make an improvement to this hypothesis. Of course, the fact that the surviving historical sources never mentioned again Cineas may not be taken as a verification of his death in Sicily; I think that, at least, he could have had enough time to go back to Taras and report to Pyrrhus the successes of his diplomatic mission. On the contrary, I have much more scepticism about the lack in the historical sources of any reference to an involvement of Cineas in the negotiations with the Carthaginians, when they were under siege in Lilybaeum in 277 BC: I will point out, some very heavy tactical and political mistakes made by Pyrrhus in that occurrence could have been produced by the insufficient diplomatic ability of the condottiere, who then settled by himself with the Carthaginians. 

Niebuhr 1853, III, 562; Schubert 1894, 207; Stahelin 1921, col. 476; Lévêque 1957, 455, note 3; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 33, note 3 (Cineas died in Sicily).

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Plutarch again (Pyrrh. 22, 5) gave evidence for the measures that Pyrrhus himself took on in Taras, where he established an occupying force of Epirote soldiers in order to preclude any restlessness to his allies: “the citizens accepted it unwillingly and wanted that Pyrrhus either continued to fight against the Romans – to say, the purpose for which he had come in Italy – or, going away from their homeland, that he left the city in the same conditions he found at the moment of his arrival. But Pyrrhus did not answer them benevolently at all; nay, he ordered them to stay calm and to wait his own like; then he set sail”. It must be not surprising that Pyrrhus left in Taras a garrison in command of Milo, even if this decision not easily can be explained thanks to the reasons given by Plutarch. I guess that the doubts and the uncertainties of the king can be linked mostly with matters concerning the home politics, as if he felt the probability that, after his departure, the members of the political party favourable to the Romans once again could open the city’s gates to the enemy. I think that this suggestion may even give a more plausible explanation to the request of the Tarentines to Pyrrhus, that is to go on with the war against Rome; on the contrary, it would be better to exclude that it was an ultimatum, as Plutarch seems to say (of course, for this passage, he had to rely on an historical source which was patently hostile to the Epirote king). In Taras, Pyrrhus embarked the troops, the elephants and all the supplies that were necessary for the expedition. To make an evaluation of the amount of the troops that Pyrrhus conveyed to Sicily, it is possible to quote a passage of Appian (Samn. 11, 6), which is unfortunately corrupted and sets a puzzling reading: the manuscripts’ text is oJ me;n dh; Puvrro~ ejpi; touvtoi~ ej~ Sikelivan dievplei metav te tw`n ejlefavntwn kai; ojktakiscilivwn iJppevwn (“After this, Pyrrhus set sail for Sicily with his elephants and eight thousand horsemen”). Clearly, the lack in the passage of any mention concerning the infantry is astonishing; furthermore, the number of the horsemen is plainly out of all proportion, if compared with any contingent of infantry troops. Nowadays, the scholars commonly concur in reading the text according to the amendment which had been suggested by Niebuhr, who conjectured the following Greek text: oJ me;n dh; Puvrro~ ejpi; touvtoi~ ej~ Sikelivan dievplei metav te tw`n ejlefavntwn kai; ojktakiscilivwn [pezw`n kai; (vacat)] iJppevwn. Therefore, it seems to be more likely to believe that Pyrrhus boarded in Taras his elephants – that, by the way, were in all probability destined to have no impres

 

The evidence for the Epirote garrison in Taras is provided even by Zon. 8, 5, 8. Brauer 1986, 153, suggested that when Pyrrhus decided to leave for Sicily, there was a sudden revival of the activities of Tarentine party that was hostile to the king. Furthermore, it can be assumed that Taras was not the only city-state of Magna Graecia where Pyrrhus left an occupying force; another one was for sure Locri Epizefirii (see Just. 18, 2, 12), where the management was appointed to Pyrrhus’ son, named Alexander. See Schubert 1894, 207; Beloch 19272, IV 1, 552, note 2; Hamburger 1927, 77; Lévêque 1957, 455–456; De Sanctis 19602, II, 408, note 1; La Bua 1980, 206–207; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 42–43. Niebuhr 1853, III, 598.

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sive effect in the battles against the Carthaginians –, more or less eight thousand infantry troops and an unspecified amount of horsemen. These numerical data are helpful to understand how much Pyrrhus had to be sure he could count on a great support, both with soldiers and with supplies, by his Sicilian allies; as a matter of fact, he could not believe he could tackle, only with the forces boarded in Taras, a Punic army that numbered – with reference to the siege by land of Syracuse – quite fifty thousand soldiers! Another problem for the king concerned the transport, not so much for the amount of the merchantmen and the warships, but especially for the choice of the sea-route. The Epirote fleet numbered more or less sixty ships, and the greatest part of them were useful only for the carrying of the supplies and of the animals (elephants and horses): this number is provided by a passage of Diodorus (22, 8, 2 and 5), where the historian reports that the Syracusan fleet, which passed under Pyrrhus’ control after the flight of the Carthaginians, came to quite one hundred and forty ships; this amount must be subtracted from the total number of the ships employed by Pyrrhus during the years of his Sicilian venture, which Plutarch (Pyrrh. 22, 6) says was two hundred. Pyrrhus, who never was naïve as regards tactical and military skills, had to be completely aware that his enemies were undoubtedly enhanced in a probable seafight; as a matter of fact, the hegemony of the Carthaginian navy in the western Mediterranean sea was not unknown. It does not have a great importance to determine how many were the Punic warships that cruised in the waters of the Strait of Messina and off the coasts of eastern Sicily in the spring of 278 BC. In that moment, Pyrrhus had one and only need; to avoid a sea-fight (and a very likely disaster) against the Carthaginian fleet. The aim of the king was to convey safe and sound all his men and supplies to Sicily, preventing the risk to suffer the loss of the greatest part of them while crossing the sea. On the other hand, it was impossible at that time to cross the Strait of Messina in other ways. Not counting the Tyrrhenian area, it was out of the question to make a diavbasi~ between the coasts where they are less far-off. Indeed, on the one side the king had to face immediately the Mamertines of Messina, the brand new allies of the Carthaginians, with whom they had signed an alliance treaty just to prevent Pyrrhus from crossing to Sicily: on the other hand, the main problem was Rhegium, that was securely under the control of the Campanian mercenaries in command of Decius Vibellius, on behalf of the Romans. Therefore, the two customary landing places – to say, Rhegium and Messina – were absolutely out of order. So, the choice of the king was bound; he had to make a direct crossing of the Ionian sea, taking advantage of the halfway harbour of Locri to make a temporary halt in the cruise.

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2.2 The situation in Magna Graecia. Some more enlightenments about the events in Rhegium To tell the truth, the city of Rhegium was the last impediment before a complete success over Magna Graecia by Pyrrhus; the pro-Roman attitude of the citizens became apparent very soon, and so much that they asked to the Romans to send a defence force, in order to protect the city from the raids of the Italic populations that were settled in the Bruttium. The action of those soldiers and the frightening behaviour of their commander, Decius Vibellius, are a central episode of the Pyrrhic wars, particularly with reference to the period when Pyrrhus fought for the freedom of the Greeks living in Sicily. Regrettably, the historical sources that provide evidence for the massacre of a part of Rhegium’s inhabitants by the soldiers of the octava legio set many dilemma in the interpretation, due to the contrast in the description of the events; moreover, another important matter is the historiographical one, because unluckily we do not possess original historical sources, which were contemporary to the happenings. Anyway, I think sincerely that it is quite hopeless to understand exactly which was the historical source that has been used by the ancient historians whose works have been preserved; the historiographical debate which began few decades ago about the “Quellenforschung” produced some passionate controversies and even some outstanding papers, but the final results have been very poor. I would like to begin by an examination of the main texts about the episode, first of all an important passage of Polybius’ Histories (1, 7, 6–9): ÔRhgi`noi gavr, kaq∆ o}n kairo;n Puvrro~ eij~ ∆Italivan ejperaiou`to, kataplagei`~ genovmenoi th;n e[fodon aujtou`, dediovte~ de; kai; Karchdonivou~ qalattokratou`nta~ ejpespavsanto fulakh;n a{ma kai; bohvqeian para; ÔRwmaivwn. OiJ d∆ eijselqovnte~ crovnon mevn tina diethvroun th;n povlin kai; th;n eJautw`n pivstin, o[nte~ tetrakiscivlioi to;n ajriqmovn, w|n hJgei`to Devkio~ Kampanov~: tevlo~ de; zhlwvsante~ tou;~ Mamertivnou~, a{ma de; kai; sunergou;~ labovnte~ aujtou;~ parespovndhsan tou;~ ÔRhgivnou~, ejkpaqei`~ o[nte~ ejpiv te th`/ th`~ povlew~ eujkairiva/ kai; th`/ tw`n ÔRhgivnwn peri; tou;~ ijdivou~ bivou~ eujdaimoni;a/: kai; tou;~ me;n ejkbalovnte~, tou;~ d∆ ajposfavxante~ tw`n politw`n to;n aujto;n trovpon toi`~ Kampanoi`~ katevscon th;n povlin. OiJ de; ÔRwmai`oi barevw~ me;n e[feron to; gegonov~: ouj mh;n ei\covn ge poiei`n oujde;n dia; to; sunevcesqai toi`~ proeirhmevnoi~ polevmoi~. When Pyrrhus crossed to Italy, the citizens of Rhegium, scared by the opportunity that the king could attack their city, but even frightened by the Carthaginians, who at that time were controlling the seas, got from the Romans a garrison and simultaneously a great help. The force which came, four thousand in number and under the command of Decius, a Campanian, kept the city and their fate for some time, but at length, anxious to rival the Mamertines and with their cooperation, played the people of Rhegium false, and eagerly coveting a city so favourably situated and containing so much private wealth, expelled or massacred the citizens and possessed themselves of the city in the same manner as the Campanians had done. The Romans were highly displeased, yet could do nothing at the time, as they were occupied with the wars I have previously mentioned. 

See even chapter 1, where I have dealt with the passage coming from the summary of Diodorus’ book 22. The latest and most complete treatment of the subject matter has been offered by Bleckmann 1999, 123–146.

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Some other details of the episode are provided by two accounts of Diodorus (22, 1, 2–3). Joining together the two excerpts, which differ only for some trivial points, it is possible to restore quite easily the narrative of Decius Vibellius’ deeds made by Diodorus, who asserted as much as Polybius that the garrison settled in Rhegium dia; Puvrron to;n basileva, that is “because of king Pyrrhus”. Nevertheless, the differences of Diodorus’ account if compared with Polybius’ one are actually noteworthy. The battalion was sent to Rhegium by the Romans; it was in command of Decius, a Campanian native. After the slaughter of the inhabitants of Rhegium, Decius was driven out from the city by the same men who helped him in the butchery, owing to the inequitable division of the booty. Therefore, Decius took shelter in Messina, where he even carried a part of the ill-gotten gains; there, he was appointed as strathgov~ by the Mamertines. Afterwards, Diodorus quoted the episode – which seems to me craftily invented – of Decius’ blinding, which should have occurred when he was already in Messina, due to the deeds of a doctor native of Rhegium who wanted to avenge himself for the bad fate of his hometown. Finally, there is the account of the events made by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (20, 4, 3–8); it is quite extended and exhaustive, but even filled by many inventions of the Roman annalists, that have the defined purpose of rejecting any Roman responsibility about the bloodbath in Rhegium. Some very important data must be underlined; the first among them is Dionysius’ careful chronology for the establishment of the garrison in Rhegium, at the time of the military expedition of Fabricius Luscinus against the Bruttians and the Lucanians: therefore, the date is no doubt 282 BC. Dionysius seemed to have a very unambiguous idea about the organization of the occupying force, which should have been made up by eight hundred Campanians and four hundred Sidicines, all in command of Decius. According to him, the carnage of the population was motivated after revealing an attempt made by the representatives of the political faction favourable to the Epirote king, who wanted to make a coup de main, forcing out the garrison and opening the city’s gates to Pyrrhus; when some news reached the city, that the king was nearly sending in Rhegium five hundred of his soldiers to help the seditious citizens, immediately the troops of Decius started with their act of retaliation. After the massacre, Decius, who was frightened to give any reason of his own deeds and crimes to the Romans, made an alliance with the Mamertines. Among the basic historical sources concerning the events, the narrative of Appian (Samn. 9, 1–2) is quite a middle course between the account of Dionysius and the excerpts of Diodorus, and even in this occurrence there are some different details that need to be emphasized. Indeed, according to Appian as well, the soldiers who were members of the garrison in command of Decius were Romans, not Campanians: there were enough good reasons (absolutely imaginary, as maintained by the author) for the massacre of the citizens of Rhegium, since they were about to betray the battalion, committing it to Pyrrhus. Then Appian quoted the episode of Decius’ blinding for the vengeance of a doctor, native of Rhegium; but his narrative diverges from Diodorus’ one in a detail, i.e. that the doctor left Messina to Rhegium, and then he went back to Sicily. This should allow us to assume that Decius

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was never driven out from Rhegium after the slaughter; of course, the point throws some shadow on Diodorus’ excerpt. Therefore, I believe some preliminary notes have to be done, starting with the chronology about the arrival of the occupying force in Rhegium, which is clear only in two historical accounts, but even different: the soldiers entered the city in 282 BC (according to Dionysius), or in 280 BC (following the indication of Polybius). Both the chronologies may be helpfully consistent with the desire of the Romans to have power over the Greek city, given that they could even sail the searoutes at least up to cape Lacinium; it was just if they wanted to embrace between two extreme ends – that were Thurii, the city that appealed for help to the Romans against the raids of the Lucanians, and Rhegium – a third area of expansion in Magna Graecia: the other two routes of the Roman expansionism to the South, of course, run through Campania and Daunia, and pointed in turn the territories of the Lucanians and the Bruttians, and to Taras. Furthermore, the defence force settled in the city in the same period when the Romans strongly acted against other Greek communities of southern Italy, establishing some garrisons even in Locri and in Croton. Another discrepancy between Dionysius’ account and Polybius’ narrative concerns the amount of the troops established in Rhegium: as maintained by Dionysius, one thousand and two hundred men (four hundred were Sidicines, the other Campanian natives); according to Polybius, the soldiers were four thousand. Nevertheless, when Dionysius quoted the final capture of those who had been responsible of the mass murder in Rhegium, he referred to an amount of four thousand and five hundred men; therefore, the arrival of a second contingent which supplemented the initial defence force may be eventually connected with the coming of the consul Fabricius Luscinus in Rhegium, to say in 278 BC. To give good reasons for this addition to the Campanian battalion settled in Rhegium – what seems to me a little bit out of proportion, to tell the truth – some modern scholars used the passage of Diodorus (22, 7, 5) about the Roman soldiers boarded on the Carthaginian fleet and landed near Rhegium (the evidence has been previously discussed at the end of the previous chapter). Indeed, these scholars argued that the target of the Roman-Carthaginian mission was an attack on Rhegium, to bring to reason the soldiers of the garrison and then maybe to penalize them; otherwise, the joined action of the Romans and the Carthaginians could be addressed exactly to help the Campanian defence force against a likely attack of the Epirote king. Some more comments could be useful on this topic. Beloch yet understood that it was very difficult to imagine in 278 BC a military intervention of the Carthaginians and the Romans against an allied city-state. In my  

On the “third way” for an invasion of Magna Graecia, see the thoughtful suggestions of Musti 1994, II, 363–399. Meltzer 1896, II, 232; Niese 1897, II, 43; Holm 1901, II, 520; Scano 1925, 78–79; Frank 1928, 650; Pareti 1952, II, 30–31; Thiel 1954, 30–31 (supporting the hypothesis of an attack against the rebellious Campanians). La Bua 1971B, 74–77, and Goukowsky 1996, 13–37 espouse the idea of a cooperation between the Romans and the Carthaginians, in view of strengthening the Campanian garrison of Rhegium against the crossing of Pyrrhus.

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opinion, two great difficulties are worth being highlighted. First, it is difficult to accept that the Carthaginians could attack Rhegium, but not so much because the city-state was allied with the Mamertines, who recently had in turn partnered with the Punic forces in Sicily. If Diodorus account refers to an application of the clauses of the recently renewed treaty between Rome and Carthage – what is beyond any doubt even for those scholars disagreeing Beloch’s original suggestions – a naval attack of the Punic navy against Rhegium’s harbour would have be seen as a clear violation of the treaty: as a matter of fact, the Carthaginian vessels had to provide only the technical support, but the attack had to be made by the Roman troops. This matches with Diodorus’ observations, that the Carthaginians gave up with the idea of laying siege to Rhegium, and made only some raids (whose aim had to be the destruction of the wood). Second, it is difficult to support too the conjecture of an attack of the Romans to Rhegium in 278 BC; this would mean necessarily to trust the version created by the Roman annalists, about a double punishment of the Campanian garrison, which was used only to give explanation both for Fabricius’ deeds and for the good faith of the Romans facing the butchery performed by the Campanian soldiers. Whatever chronology we may rely on, the basic point that becomes apparent from the historical sources is exactly that, from 282 (or 280) BC to the homecoming of Pyrrhus from Sicily, Rhegium was devoted to the political party opposing the Epirote king. That’s why it seems more likely that the Roman contingent carried by the Punic fleet in the waters of the Strait of Messina was a regiment made by soldiers who had been ordered to support and strengthen the occupying force led by Decius Vibellius, against another expected attempt of the political party favourable to the king to seize the control of the city, to support the forthcoming Sicilian venture of Pyrrhus. I don’t want to go back on the matter of the obscurity regarding the critical reading of Diodorus’ passage, but I think it may be advantageous to state again that the action of the Carthaginians – in that instance – had to do merely with the carrying of the Roman troops, and this was exactly consistent with the clauses of the treaty that had been recently signed with the Romans. The second basic deed of the Carthaginian fleet was obviously connected with the patrolling of the waters in the Strait of Messina; all the other performances quoted by Diodorus were accomplished by the Roman legionaries, and of course they were not addressed against Rhegium. It may be questioned who really destroyed the piles of timber, used to build new warships; since these piles may have been amassed near the coastline, it 



The suggestion of Beloch has more recently been supported by Lévêque 1957, 419–420 and Cassola 1962, 171–174: the latter has been extremely contested by Goukowsky 1996, 16–17 (at note 26: “Cet auteur fournit un excellent exemple de l’aberration qui consiste à ne pas lire les textes tels qu’ils sont, mais tels qu’ils devraient être pour coïncider avec des idées préconçues”). It may be worth to summarize the news provided by an extremely interesting account of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (20, 15, 1–2), who said that in the Sila forest there were several kinds of trees – fir-trees, poplars, pine-trees and maritime pines, oaks and ash-trees – that were cut and then conveyed to the nearest harbours, where they were used to build the ships. Neverthe-

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is likely that they were burnt up by the Carthaginian ships as well, throwing flaming bullets from the sea. Anyway, this is not a crucial point. What has to be emphasized, on the contrary, is that for that occurrence, all the members of the anti-Epirote alliance were factually working together against the king: the Carthaginians, the Romans, the Campanians settled in Rhegium and the Mamertines of Messina! Going back to the historical sources concerning the episode happened in Rhegium, it seems to me that the account of Dionysius, that he recuperated from an annalistic source, nevertheless emphasizes the authentic aspects of the happening, of course together with some elements that are strongly tendentious, because they try to reduce or even to remove completely any trace of Roman responsibility as regards the killing of those citizens in Rhegium who sided openly with Pyrrhus. There is no need to say that the doubling of the overthrow of the Campanian garrison, as well as the news concerning the replacement of the old soldiers with a new occupying force that was enhanced up to 4.500 men in 278 BC, are more than dubious10. On the other hand, I think that the evidence provided by Polybius – that has been so undervalued by the critics – is consistent enough; first of all, it gives a very accurate chronology about the establishment of the Campanian garrison in Rhegium, that is 280 BC; furthermore, it points out that the punishment of the murderers made by the Romans was a single action, and that it took place exactly “when the Romans had concluded all the wars they were fighting in”. I believe that the events took place more or less as Polybius described them. In 278 BC, when Pyrrhus was ready to leave southern Italy for his venture in Sicily (that is – if we consider this under a Roman perspective – when there was the chance for the Romans to get back in Magna Graecia all the sites they previously lost), and after the renewal of the alliance with Carthage, the Romans had quite no need to get free of a group of Campanian soldiers, who would have been very useful in the following years of war, as I will point out later. Finally, I would like to make a closing remark on Polybius’ text. As far as it concerns the strength of the Campanian battalion, Polybius states that from the very beginning the soldiers were in number of 4.000; indeed, I do not agree with the greatest part of the scholars who think that this statement is erroneous. Indeed, if we add to this number the five hundred men who were embarked in the Punic ships in 278 BC, we actually have the so looked-for total of 4.500 soldiers; this amount first of all matches the number, given by the annalistic source used by Dionysius, about the soldiers who were heavily punished in 270 BC; then, if we trust Dionysius’ statement that at the first moment the occupying force was made up by 1.200 men, we are not forced to change the text of Diodorus (as Beloch did). This action should be considered with much trouble, since the reading of the news in the manuless, a great quantity of wood was used to produce the pitch, whose export gave great incomings to the Roman state. See even Meiggs 1982, 462–466; Costabile 1992D, 169–174; Luppino – Battista Sangineto 1992, 174–191 (a number of pitch-amphorae found at Trebisacce). 10 See Cassola 1962, 176; La Bua 1971B, 64–70; Musti 1988B, 539–541; Musti 1994, II, 377.

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scripts is a single one, i.e. the Roman soldiers transported by the Punic fleet were 500. To finish, if the amount of the troops was at first 4.000, as Polybius declares, it may be easily understood how was it possible that the historical tradition could speak of a legio, just referring to a simple occupying force!11 The most severe hostilities against Polybius’ narrative have been expressed by an Italian scholar, Vincenzo La Bua, who clearly preferred Diodorus’ account; the historian, who focused his attention on the recovering of the historical sources of the diodorean excerpta, and was firmly persuaded to find quite in every single phrase the spirit and the opinions of Philinus of Agrigentum, finally held in low esteem the documentary value of Polybius’ witness. I think we cannot deny that Polybius’ narrative sets some complications that, at first sight, seem to be difficult to resolve; first of all, the nationality of the garrison’s troops, who were Romans according to Polybius (supported in this only by Appian), and not Campanians as for the rest of the historical tradition. If we do not want to consider the troops as the subject of the Greek sentence oƒ d∆ eijselqovnte~ crovnon mevn tina […] – which is patently mistaken – it is clear that Polybius thought to a battalion made of Roman citizens12. On the basis of his own historical source of information (probably Timaeus), I assume Polybius thought about the political nature of the garrison, which had been sent clearly by Rome, and therefore could be considered “Roman” as well; indeed, legally the soldiers were cives Romani sine suffragio. I would like to make two more remarks; first of all, Polybius knew well the ethnic origin of the commander Decius, named by him as Kampanov~; then, why he didn’t want to spell out the nationality of the other soldiers as well? I think that the most important thing for Polybius – and, of course, for Timaeus – was to show cautiously the Roman responsibility in the massacre in Rhegium of the citizens sided with Pyrrhus; an involvement that was necessary, if not fully intended, because Rome had to secure the control of a favourable position in a Magna Graecia that was quite totally in the hands of the enemy. Furthermore, Polybius did not ignore completely the real presence of the Campanians in Rhegium; who were the Mamertines, according to him? They were oiJ Kampanoi; th`~ Messhvnh~ (1, 8, 1), and of course in opposition to another band of Campanians who were not settled in Messina! At last, I believe that we must take apart what Polybius knew very well but didn’t want to declare (i.e., that the garrison was made up by soldiers of Campanian ethnic), and what he clearly wanted to highlight – even if with some caution –, that is the involvement of the 11 On the name Legio campana, see Heurgon 19702, 204–206 (the legions were not designated with the name of the recruitment’s zone: these were “formations spontanées et irrégulières dont Rome, après Syracuse, s’employa à exploiter à ses propres fins les vertus belliqueuses, et, au besoin, l’insubordination native”), followed by Pareti 1952, II, 77; Lévêque 1957, 330, note 7. On the contrary, the data coming from the literary sources has been unquestionably been accepted by Niese 1897, II, 32; Holm 1901, II, 517; Philipp 1914, col. 500; De Sanctis 19602, II, 395; La Bua 1971B, 92–93, note 3. The scholars have usually rejected the designation of octava legio, provided by Oros. 4, 3, 4: see Passerini 1949–1950, 550–551 (= De Ruggiero 1949–1950, 550–551); Lévêque 1957, 310, note 6; Cristofani 1968B, 40. 12 On Polybius’ account, see the key commentary of Walbank 1957, I, 52–53, together with the analysis of La Bua 1966, 202–212; La Bua 1971B, 72–73.

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Romans in the episode of Rhegium (thanks to a group of cives Romani sine suffragio). I want now to investigate briefly the evidence provided by Diodorus, which in the opinion of La Bua (and more recently even of Goukowsky) should be preferred both for the transparency and the chronological sequence in the explanation of the events. Who is Decius according to Diodorus? He is oJ ÔRwmai`o~ cilivarco~ (in the Excerpta Hoescheliana: 22, 1, 2); but he is even to; gevno~ Kampanov~ (in the Excerpta Constantiniana: 22, 1, 3). Therefore, this is for sure the only discrepancy between the source of information used by Diodorus and the one utilized by Polybius; the first one, though describing politically the commander of the garrison, wanted to denote his real ethnic; the second one, on the contrary, stopped to the political connotation. Therefore, I believe that the real meaning of Diodorus’ account is that the political blame of the slaughter of Rhegium is partly Roman; nevertheless, the Romans had quite an excuse for their deeds, that is the nationality of the garrison’s soldiers, who were actually Campanians, and very similar to the Mamertines both in the gevno~ and in their behaviour, which was typical of the barbarians! I am a little bit baffled to accept the usual suggestion of La Bua as regards Diodorus’ source of information; according to him, undoubtedly this source is Philinus, since “the account of Diodorus does not provide a Roman tradition, and therefore cannot be based upon a Roman annalist”. I agree that the sources of Diodorus and Polybius for this event are different, but I have some doubts about Philinus. Indeed, there is a mutual intention between the two historians, who were first of all two Greek historians; their first need was to deplore the barbarian behaviour and the slaying of Greek citizens made by extraneous populations. To Polybius as well as to Diodorus, the most important thing was to point the finger at the paranomiva of the barbarians, were they Mamertines (that is, Campanians of Messina) or Campanians of Rhegium (and nevertheless cives Romani sine suffragio)13. There is another topic to investigate, in regards to the criticism to the Polybian narrative, and it concerns the relationship between Decius and the Mamertines in Messina. Some scholars declared that Polybius persistently preserved a mutual relationship between the Mamertines and the Campanians of Rhegium, but he was wrong in this, because this connection is not mentioned at all in Diodorus and it is false both for a historical evaluation and for the importance that Polybius gave to it in the development of the events14. I think that not only Diodorus, but even the other literary sources highlighted the connection between the Mamertine community of Messina and the occupying force of Rhegium, whether it was established before the massacre, or it followed. Particularly, Diodorus (22, 1, 2) stated that Decius, after he had been expelled from Rhegium by his soldiers, went to Messina, and there he was appointed as ­strathgov~ by the Mamertines; I believe this event should be considered out of the question, if 13 La Bua 1966, 202–212 (Timaeus as source for Polybius); Gelzer 1933, 134–136; Walbank 1957, I, 52 (Fabius Pictor as source for Polybius). Vallone 1955, 34 and 42 mixed the two sources (paragraphs 1–4 from Timaeus; 5–13 from Fabius Pictor). 14 La Bua 1966, 202.

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there was absolutely no relationship between the two city-states even before the killing happened in Rhegium. Furthermore, the link between the two communities of the Strait of Messina is not exaggerate at all in the historical evaluation made by Polybius, as it is clearly showed by the following events, either when Pyrrhus crossed the sea to Sicily, or during his absence in Magna Graecia, or else when he made his way back to Taras. There could be other discussions about the literary sources, but I guess that we cannot diverge the archaeological data (some of them I have already discussed in the first chapter). In an excellent report dated 1968, Mauro Cristofani15 has made clear that the archaeological data of Hellenistic Rhegium are, on the one hand, a patent sign of the tumultuous happenings of the second decade of the III century BC; on the other hand, they strengthen the idea of close relationships between the two city-states of the Strait. The graves of the Hellenistic age that have been discovered in the necropolis unearthed in the area of the National Museum of Reggio, approximately at 50 metres from the fortification walls dated to the IV century BC, are very similar in their typology to the graves dating to III/II centuries BC that have been discovered in the countryside of Rhegium. The grave goods are extremely poor; all the pieces may be dated between the end of the IV century and the first half of the III century BC. The basic attribute of the greatest part of the tombs is that they have been made using ancient materials, particularly many blocks of sandstone which were previously employed in the walls of the IV century BC. This means that the graves – and, of course, the establishment of the necropolis – were constructed after a destruction of the fortification walls (we ignore if it was violent or not), happened between the half of the IV century BC – that is the period when they had been built – and the first half of the III century BC: Cristofani has rightly connected the demolition of the walls with the period of the Campanian presence in the city16. As far as it concerns the connection with the Mamertines, I already discussed the evidence provided by the tiles and the bricks, with the seals of the two communities, that were mutually traded across the Strait of Messina. Unfortunately, there is quite no help from the numismatic evidence, but I want to point out that just in one of the above-mentioned Hellenistic graves in the necropolis of the Museo a single coin of the Mamertines has been discovered, and it is part of an issue that may be dated to the decade 288/278 BC, following Särström’s chronology17. Significant information is provided by the pottery. The finds show that between the second half of IV century BC and the first half of III century BC the people of Rhegium favoured the purchase of Sicilian pottery, while the citizens of Croton and 15 Cristofani 1968B, 37–53. 16 Galli 1942, 208 (where the scholar points out that the grave nr. 101 was at first thought to have been a sector of the city walls, since it was made using the same square blocks employed for the fortifications): De Franciscis 1957, 381–396 (underlines the influence of the Carthaginian funerary customs on those of Rhegium): Spadea 1987, 347–348, plate XXXIV, nr. 1. With particular reference to the questions about the fortifications, see Tropea Barbaro 1967, 1–130. 17 De Franciscis 1957, 394–395.

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Locri had a preference for the Lucanian and Apulian vases. Cristofani mentioned five pieces that were put to light in the necropolis of the Museo; three of them may be classified as Sicilian pottery of a late period of production, with painted ornaments that imitate those of the Gnathia pottery. These pieces may be connected for sure with the commercial relationships with western Sicily that Rhegium had during the period of the Campanian dominion; of course, these connections were facilitated by the Mamertine community18. Another significant evidence supports the presence of Campanian natives in Rhegium, as well as the existing relationships in the first decades of the III century BC between the Italic groups who established in Sicily and Magna Graecia; it is provided by the votive bronze statuettes made in the Italic style, that have been found in the surrounding areas of the Strait of Messina. Five pieces which have been found in Rhegium (even if the precise context of the excavation is unknown) may be classified in the group of the Italic bronze votive sculptures, since they represent the kind of the “Italic Heracles” whose evidence is provided by many other finds all over the Bruttium (i.e. Cosenza, Cariati, Croton, Tiriolo). Two of the five statuettes were produced in workshops where the craftsmen were undoubtedly influenced by a very high-cultured modelling tradition, and they may be dated for sure to the second half of the IV century BC. As regards the third piece which has been described by Cristofani, it is possible to decrease the chronology, and set it at the beginning of the III century BC. The last two statuettes, that may be considered two examples of a more schematic design in the portrayal of the hero, and may be easily compared for this with many bronze sculptures of the same kind that have been found in Bruttium, may be dated in the second half of the III century BC. No doubt, their finding in Rhegium can be explained only with the presence of Italic people in the city, and therefore – if we relate them with the chronology – with the Campanian garrison. The military character of the cult of Heracles Victor, or even the typical Campanian nature of the “ctonian” Heracles (which seems to be portrayed in the statue nr. 3 of Cristofani’s list), may both be connected with the Campanian occupying force of Rhegium. For sure, the finds of Rhegium provide another example of votive bronzes that hint at the presence of Italic mercenaries; the same conjecture has been made for the pieces coming from Croton – even if it may be worth to remind that in that city the cult of Heracles was significant for the Greek community yet in the V century BC19. Further support to this conjecture may be provided from an analysis of another kind of bronze sculptures, i.e. the amulets portraying a man and a woman 18 See Cristofani 1968B, 48–49; Trendall 1967, 587, nr. 13; 588, nr. 27; 683, nr. 40; 685, nr. 72. 19 The first report to the five bronze statuettes of Rhegium is in Cristofani 1968B, 49–50, plates VII–VIII. As regards the pieces found in the Bruttium, see Cristofani 1968A, 45–64. A general survey of the votive sculptures associated to the cult of Heracles, see Richter 1915, 97, nr. 161–162; Kent Hill 1949, 44–51; Andrén 1948, 16–20, plates XI–XII; Cederna 1951, 185–193; Fogolari 1954, 392–396; Colonna 1961, 257–267. For the cult of Heracles in ancient Italy, see Latte 1960, 214, note 2; Radke 1965, 140–144; Giannelli 19632, 135–151 (with particular reference to Croton).

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who mutually embrace themselves. Such talismans have been usually discovered in Calabria among the funerary goods of graves dating back to the Iron Age, as well in the Enotrian necropolis that have been excavated around the area of the modern river Crati (Torre Mordillo; Torano Castello; Castiglione Paludi; Francavilla Marittima), as in the graveyards of southern Calabria (Oppido Mamertina; the necropolis of Canale). Anyway, the most important implication is that some other finds of these charms have been made in Sicily; one piece was found by Paolo Orsi in the necropolis of San Giovanni, at Centuripe, among the funerary goods in the grave of a young man that, considering the whole of the goods, cannot be dated before the III century BC. Then, in 1985, while an excavation was made on the acropolis of Catania (the area of the old Benedictine monastery), a bronze amulet of the same kind was brought to light; it was buried in a great, deep pit – that was probably used for rituals – together with other objects and ruins, all datable between the end of the IV century and the first decades of the III century BC; the chronological affinity with the piece found in Centuripe seems to be absolute20. Going back to what I previously conjectured about the movements of Italic peoples from their native lands to Bruttium and then to Sicily, I think that – as concerns Calabria – we may assume that the Italic populations who settled in the old Iron Age sites of the area, starting from the IV century BC, made a continual usage of the talismans; on the other hand, as regards Sicily, we have to emphasize the cultural contribution that some groups of Italic people coming from Calabria brought into the Greek city-states. For sure, this contribution moved from the city of Rhegium, that in those years was a very attractive place both for men and for merchandises, across the Strait, to Messina and elsewhere in Sicily. To conclude, I think we have to take into consideration the possibility to date the manslaughter performed by Decius’ soldiers in 280 BC; that is the year when many southern Greek city-states, that before the battle of Heraclea were sided with the Romans, revolted after the defeat of the Roman legions in Lucania, drove out the Roman garrisons and then took side with Pyrrhus. For the same reason, a part of Rhegium’s citizens encouraged the rebellion against the Romans, and perhaps appealed to Pyrrhus to receive the help of some troops to expel the Campanian soldiers of Decius (this may be conjectured thanks to Dionysius’ account). Probably the Romans, to prevent Rhegium’s volte-face, somehow fostered the surprise attack of Decius’ troops; in due course, it is not possible to quantify the Roman responsibility in the event, even if in recent times there has been an attempt to undermine it (but not so convincingly)21.

20 A quite recent analysis of the amulets-statues portraying the two human bodies has been made by Frasca 1992, 19–24, who assumes that their discovery is a sign of the presence of Italic groups into Greek communities, and links them particularly to the Italic mercenaries. As regards the talismans recovered in the Iron Age sites of Calabria, see Zancani Montuoro 1983–1984, 7–110. A report concerning the keepsake found in Centuripe is in Orsi 1913, 58; La Rosa 1968, 17–18, 52–53 and 75–76. 21 As an example, see Musti 1988B, 540 (“l’aspetto propagandistico della durissima punizione inflitta alla legio Campana è innegabile, ma non intacca la storicità delle responsabilità di quel

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Any attempt to preserve such a stronghold like Rhegium, so important in that complicated moment of the Pyrrhic war, could justify the brutal deeds of Decius Vibellius, in the view of the Romans. Indeed, in the Latin literary sources – at variance with the Greek historical evidence – there’s no negative shade even as regards the following events, that is the Roman acknowledgment of the appeal for help in 264 BC from the Mamertines, who were held to blame by the Greeks of the betrayal and the murder against the native community of Messina: Polybius and Diodorus, indeed, accurately compare the events of Messina with the massacre of Rhegium! 2.3. The first stage of the Sicilian adventure: from Taras to Syracuse (summer/autumn 278 BC) Once he had completed all the preparations for war, Pyrrhus embarked with the troops and the elephants in the warships, leaving from Taras in the depths of summer 278 BC22, and after ten days of safe navigation he landed in the harbour of Locri. As I have previously said, it would have been impossible to cross the Strait of Messina after sailing near the coasts until the last moment, because those waters were constantly patrolled by a Punic fleet, that was appointed with the control of all the maritime traffic of the western Ionian sea. Furthermore, both the coastlines facing the Strait were in the hands of the Carthaginian allies, that were the Mamertines of Messina and the Campanian cives Romani of Rhegium. Any attempt to break down that barrage should have been a weighty mistake at the beginning of a military campaign that had been so long prepared, and no doubt the outcome would have been a disaster. Therefore, the king of Epirus set sail from Locri and cruised in the open sea, to avoid a meeting with the Punic warships; then, some days after, he landed finally in Tauromenium where he could get the first effects of the thorough diplomatic efforts previously made by his fellow Cineas23. presidio”) and compare with Musti 1994, II, 478 (the responsibility of the Romans is “più indiretta che intenzionale”). 22 Several chronologies have been suggested; Droysen 19523, III, 160; Von Scala 1896, 155; Ciaceri 1902, 15 and 24; Bengtson 19653, 397; Kincaid 1980, 79 (summer of 278 BC); Schubert 1894, 207; Meltzer 1896, II, 233; Beloch 19272, IV 1, 552; De Sanctis 19602, II, 387; Carcopino 1961, 73; Kienast 1963, col. 148 (end of summer 278 BC); La Bua 1980, 208; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 35 (not over July of 278 BC); Niese 1897, II, 43; Hamburger 1927, 66 and 78 (August of 278 BC); Lévêque 1957, 287 and 423; Pareti 1959, 251 (September of 278 BC); Frank 1928, 651; Cross 1932, 77 (autumn of 278 BC). 23 For the description of the first stage of Pyrrhus’ voyage, see Diod. 22, 8, 2–3. The reading of the phrase katapleuvsa~ to;n porqmo;n kai; diavra~ Sikelivan created so many problems to the historians, that some of them thought it was necessary to amend the Greek text; Post suggested katapleuvsa~ pro;" to;n porqmo;n; Rhodoman and Hoeschel conjectured diavra~ eij" Sikelivan. I think that these corrections are not necessary. As regards the first one, the verb katapleuvsa~ has been used 33 times by Diodorus: 19 times it supports eij~ + accusative; 5 times, genitive + eij~ + accusative; 2 times, ejpiv + accusative; 4 times it was used alone; once, it has the simple accusative; once, prov~ + accusative. It can be concluded that the amendment of Post is insubstantial. For the second correction, there is no comparison, since the verb diavra~ is hapax

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The tyrant of Tauromenium, whose name was Tyndarion, was immediately numbered by Pyrrhus among his new allies, and he in turn joined some of his soldiers to the great army that was just arrived from Magna Graecia. The friendly receiving showed by Tyndarion may be easily understood, if we bear in mind that his hometown in those days was caught between two fires; in fact, the tyrant had to beware of the Mamertines’ raids from the north while the Punic troops, that some years before defeated the Syracusan army in the battle of river Terias and then spread all over the eastern districts of Sicily could easily threaten Tauromenium from the south. On the other hand, Pyrrhus too could take a great advantage from the alliance with Tyndarion, and not only for the new troops he received from him, but especially because in his own projects the Greek city of Tauromenium played a basic role, on account of her strategic location, and it was no doubt destined to become the first Sicilian bridge-head for the relationships with Magna Graecia; indeed, Locri was the southern Greek city nearest to Sicilian theatre of military operations, as well as Tauromenium had to be Pyrrhus’ outpost for the connections with his son Helenus – who stayed back in Locri – and even a bulwark against possible incursions of the Mamertines24. Pierre Lévêque suggested that Pyrrhus rewarded Tyndarion giving him an abundance of precious metals, that provided the city with the opportunity to mint plentiful issues of gold and silver coinages. As a matter of fact, some coins of Tauromenium have been dated to that period both by Head and by Giesecke; some were fractions of the Attic gold drachm; some other were silver didrachms minted according to the Attic standard; finally, there was a single coin, minted in line with the Italic weight system of the litra. Honestly, this suggestion does not persuade me at all, to start with historical motivations; I cannot imagine that Pyrrhus was so munificent at the very beginning of his Sicilian venture, when a gift of an amount of precious metals was quite indefensible. Yet, I do not believe that Tauromenium had a different political position if compared with the other Greek city-states that were part of the alliance with the king of Epirus. Furthermore, there is even a numismatic reason that supports my doubts: if Lévêque’s argument was right, we should think that at least for some time a Greek city-state, that was allied to Pyrrhus – but officially in command of him –, could issue her own coinage, minting it with her own ethnic denomination. This seems to me an attribute that does not match the quality of allied city, even because Tauromenium – according to the above-mentioned hypothesis – should have been the only Greek city-state of Sicily to issue a coinage in the three years of Pyrrhus’ Sicilian expedition; but it is well known that the coinage circulating in the markets of the allied city-states was issued by the “royal” official mints in Syracuse and Locri, and was marked with the name of the king. Again, the outcome of a quite recent, general investigation concerning the coinage of Taulegomenon by Diodorus. At last, I believe that the meaning of text is clear enough; Pyrrhus sailed “under” the Strait of Messina (this should be, in my opinion, the right meaning of the verb kataplevw), towards Sicily. 24 See Diod. 22, 8, 3 (Pyrrhus’ arrival in Tauromenium); Berve 1954, 274–276 (about the lawful and institutional meanings of the relationship between Pyrrhus and the city-state of Tauromenium).

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romenium in the III century BC uphold ever-increasing perplexities about the theory of Giesecke and Lévêque; in fact, those same issues that the German scholar dated to the period of Pyrrhus’ staying in Sicily, have been correctly dated by Anna Carbé in the depths of the age of Hiero II, when actually the city-state of Tauromenium could make use of her autonomy and play a role of political as well as economic significance, very near to Syracuse25. Archaeology, too, provides little data concerning economics, as well as urban development of Tauromenium, as we would expect to have an authentication of the prosperity that the city-state should have had after the arrival of Pyrrhus. The archaeological situation of Tauromenium is very specific, both for the stratigraphic levels of the Roman age extending beyond the structure of the Classical and Hellenistic ages, and for the postponement of the regular excavations, that began only in 1960s. The materials of the Hellenistic age which have been discovered up to our days are not plentiful. In 1969, a sensational find was made during an excavation near the via Bagnoli; a set of buildings dating back to the late Hellenistic/Roman ages was brought to light, and the scholars identified it with the ancient gymnasium26. Then, in 1976, during a field survey made under the foundations of Santa Caterina’s church, a part of the columns’ basis of a Hellenistic temple were discovered; the temple was indeed one of the buildings that stood in front of the ancient market-place, which has been related with the current piazza V. Emanuele; during the Roman age, the same area was used as forum, the old buildings were renovated and some new ones were built up27. During the 1980s, some limestone fragments from decorations were found, quite surely related to one of the buildings that stood facing the agora; two of them were remains of the kymation, very similar to the geison of the Hellenistic temple, which has been dated to 260 BC28. Finally, during the 1990s, in the modern piazza San Pancrazio, a semicircular edifice was brought to light (the so called “Terme bizantine”); the finding in the same place of many 25 According to Lévêque 1957, 470, the political position occupied by Tauromenium in the general background of Pyrrhus’ venture was so important that “le roi acheta-t-il sans doute sa fidélite par d’abondants présents de métaux précieux qui permirent à la cité d’inaugurer un monnayage en argent et en or”. As regards the coinage, which is limited in quantity and does not match with a plentiful issue’s percentage, see Head 19112, 188–189; Giesecke 1923, 113– 115. Once upon a time ago, the same coins were assigned to the mint of Panormus (Poole 1876, 122) and this fact strengthen the need to a new, complete examination of the numismatic evidence. The most recent investigation of Tauromenium’s Hellenistic coinage is in Carbè 1995, 303–318; in her analysis, indeed, is not included any coin issued by the city-state before the age of Hiero II, and this no doubt has to be connected with the fact that during Agathocles’ and Pyrrhus’ ages the coinage which circulated in eastern Sicily was minted for the most in Syracuse. Lévêque’s hypothesis has been supported even by La Bua 1980, 209; some puzzlement, although without a personal critical idea, in Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 44. 26 Manganaro 1974, 389–409. 27 Pelagatti 1976–1977, 545–548. For the problems concerning the architecture of the Helle­ nistic and Roman buildings, see Lugli 1956, 89–107, esp. 93–95. 28 Bacci 1980–1981, 737–748; Bacci 1984–1985, 711–725, esp. 722–723. Some very different chronologies have been suggested about the limestone frames: Shoe 1952, 92–94 (archaic age); Vallet – Villard 1966, 55–58 (IV century BC); Von Sydow 1984, 347–352, plate 80, figures 32–34 (age of Hiero II).

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fragments of red-figured pottery has shown that the area was occupied in an earlier period, but some remains of the masonries may be dated to the Hellenistic age. Furthermore, a lot of cisterns – both of the Greek and the Roman ages – were discovered and they contained an amount of Hellenistic pottery remains (especially, scraps of black-glazed pottery; an amount of coarse pottery; amphorae of the Dressel 1 kind; fragments of ship’s models)29. At last, nothing seems to emphasize a huge development either of the economy or of the inhabitation area after the arrival of Pyrrhus. The king of Epirus, some time later, boarded in his fleet the new soldiers provided by his fresh ally and set sail from the harbour of Tauromenium, going southwards; the following step of the task force was Catane. Even in this occurrence, the acceptance of the native Greek citizens was wholehearted, and of course Pyrrhus’ expectations were completely satisfied; the Greeks gave vent to their joyfulness awarding to the Epirote some honours that were worthy of a conquering hero and of a king, and they emphasized Pyrrhus’ kingship granting him some gold crowns. Anyway, the sojourn in Catane was transitory; it was necessary to march as soon as possible to Syracuse, because the city was laid since some months under the siege of the Punic troops. Nevertheless, Pyrrhus used a new manoeuvre, because he was well aware that the Greeks of Syracuse were under attack by land, and the Great Harbour could not be utilized, for the reason that the Carthaginian fleet was blockading it; therefore, he decided to disembark in the harbour of Catane all the infantry, the cavalrymen and the land troops (in all probability the elephants, too), and then to make his way southwards while his fleet sailed in close proximity to the coast, keeping in touch by view with the army30. In this way, after their arrival in Syracuse, the attack on the Carthaginian forces would have been both dual and synchronized, and it would have forced the Punic soldiers to leave completely the siege and fight as well on two fronts, without any chance to have a cooperation between the infantry troops and the navy; last but not least, the people of Syracuse, free from the pressure of the siege, could even try to react and help Pyrrhus’ soldiers. Of course, the Epirote king counted on the surprise effect that his manoeuvre could have on the Carthaginians; furthermore, some time before his arrival, they had to send away without delay from the Great Harbour thirty warships that sailed to another unknown place, for a secret mission. Without the thirty ships, the Punic fleet had more or less the same amount of vessels of Pyrrhus’ one, and perhaps this was a reason, too, that compelled them to withdraw from their positions under Syracuse’s fortification walls. The project of Pyrrhus, then, came to a very important stage; the Carthaginian army raised the siege of the Greek city-state and moved back in the territories of the Punic epikrateia, to prepare either a counteroffensive or a defensive plan against the enemy’s incursions31. 29 Rizzo – Bacci 1993–1994, 945–951; Tronchet Bonaventura 1994, 149–157. 30 Diod. 22, 8, 3 (landing in Catane). For a general survey about the city’s happenings in that period, Manganaro 1996A, 19–59; Manganaro 1996B, 303–321 (with reference to the coinage issues). 31 Diod. 22, 8, 3 gives an account of the tactical problems of the Carthaginians. La Bua 1980, 210–211 has been sceptical about the news, because according to him the lack of thirty war-

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At the end of the summer (or, perhaps, at the beginning of autumn) 278 BC, Pyrrhus entered in Syracuse without even fighting against the enemies. The people of Syracuse, as they had promised in the course of the several diplomatic missions they sent to the king when he was still in Magna Graecia, committed completely their hometown to Pyrrhus, who could then depend on new troops and, particularly, on the remains of the Syracusan navy that was at anchor in the Great Harbour; to the more or less sixty vessels that sailed from Taras, he could then join more than one hundred and forty Syracusan warships, and among them there was even the old royal flag-ship (basilikh; ejnnhvrh~), that had been property of Agathocles32. The political situation in the city was no doubt more complicated than in the other Greek city-states of Sicily that had been yet visited by Pyrrhus; only when facing the shared danger of the Carthaginian attack, Thoinon and Sosistratus had provisionally settled down their quarrels and put off the civil war. The first action of the king, therefore, was an attempt to reconcile ultimately the two challengers and their own political parties, and trust in their cooperation as he had to administrate the city. So, acting as a peacemaker, Pyrrhus settled the two adversaries and once again gave peace to Syracuse; by this means, he had great advantages and became extremely admired among the people. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (20, 8, 3) and Diodorus (22, 8, 4) provide the details about the distribution of the offices made by the king; Thoinon remained in the city and was appointed as commander of the military garrison, while Sosistratus was assigned with a military duty. He had to lead a vanguard of ten thousand infantry soldiers to the conquest of Agrigentum, that was currently controlled by a Carthaginian occupying force. No doubt, the target of this mission was even to put under pressure the Punic forces that were at that time withdrawing, and in doing so the Greek united forces could move as much as possible westwards the eastern borders of the epikrateia. While Pyrrhus was engaged both with the administrative and political reorganization of Syracuse, and with the preparations for the following military campaign against the Carthaginians, many diplomatic missions coming from other Greek city-states arrived in the town; the ambassadors said that their hometowns wanted to side with the king and willingly to commit themselves to him. Particularly, Diodorus (22, 8, 5) referred to Heraclides, who was then the tyrant of Leontini, who handed over Pyrrhus his own city-state, the strongholds controlling the neighbourhood, and a group of four thousand soldiers and five hundred horsemen. The king kindly received all the ambassadors, accepted the intentional submission of the city-states and then sent back home the envoys33. ships was not relevant to the retreat of the Punic army; nevertheless, I am unconvinced of his conjecture, especially because he stated that Diodorus had this information from the work of Philinus, who was undoubtedly well informed on the evaluation of the events from the Cartha­ ginians’ point of view (see even La Bua 1966, 225). Philinus’ remark could not be used, of course, to celebrate Pyrrhus’ deeds. The meaning of this detail has been correctly strengthened by De Sanctis 19602, II, 388; Beloch 19272, IV 1, 553; Lévêque 1957, 458; Pareti 1959, 251; Kienast 1963, coll. 148–149; Vartsos 1970, 92. 32 Both Diod. 22, 8, 4–5 and Dion. 20, 8, 1 provide the same account of the events. 33 Diod. 22, 8, 5 (embassy of Heraclides from Leontini).

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2.4. The political title of Pyrrhus in Sicily: an example of Hellenistic kingship? The behaviour of Heraclides, which was no doubt representative of an extended practice that happened permanently during the autumn of 278 BC, leads straightforwardly to consider a puzzling question about the lawful and institutional ground that formed the basis for the relationships between Pyrrhus and his Sicilian allies. The scholars, who previously examined the topic of the official title of Pyrrhus during his Sicilian venture, rightly based their conjecture on a very important passage of Polybius (7, 4, 5). The historian quoted the words of a royal counsellor of Hieronymus of Syracuse – the son-in-law of Pyrrhus – who wanted to emphasize the full right of his master to rule all over Sicily in 213 BC; he says that Pyrrhus movnon kata; proaivresin kai; kat∆ eu[noian Sikeliw`tai pavnte~ eujdovkhsan sfw`n aujtw`n hJgemovna ei\nai kai; basileva (“Pyrrhus was the only one whom all the natives of Sicily accepted both by preference and with benevolence as hegemon and king”). There can be no doubt about the political titles held by Pyrrhus in Sicily, but the question is: which was their real meaning? Following Polybius, Beloch assumed that the delegates of many Greek citystates, after making a congress in Syracuse, appointed Pyrrhus as supreme commander and king; therefore, in his opinion, the word hegemon should express the role of Pyrrhus, who became in the autumn of 278 BC the supreme commander of all the military forces that the Greeks of Sicily handed over him; on the other hand, basileuv~ was the real political title of the Epirote prince. Accordingly, this should be the same institutional and lawful position held some years after by Hiero II34. Then, starting from some proposals made by Berve, it has been suggested that the royal power of Pyrrhus in Sicily was absolute and personal – that is to mean that his kingship was very similar to Agathocles’ one – and that it was extended over all the Greek city-states, that were not meant to be allies of the king, but overpowered by him35. On the contrary, according to Lévêque, all the Greeks of Sicily joined of their own free will a political project which can be defined as an “union sacrée” and considered the king as its landmark; in this case, the Sicilian basileiva should have been of the national type36. 34 See Beloch 19272, IV 1, 553, whose opinion was shared even by Niese 1897, II, 45–47; De Sanctis 19602, II, 388; Hamburger 1927, 79 (he considered the title of basileuv~ not merely as a part of Pyrrhus’ official titles – as meant by Niese – but even as a representation of a real entitlement to the kingship of Sicily); Frank 1928, 651; Ciaceri 1932, III, 61–63; Giannelli 19552, 258; Pareti 1959, 251. 35 Berve 1954, 272–277 (but see even Nenci 1953, 84–87), followed by Bengtson 1956, 168 (= Bengtson 1974, 121); Bengtson 1975, 102; La Bua 1980, 215–221; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 48–50. I believe this is the right point of view; I do not agree with Berve only as regards one topic, since I do not believe absolutely that Tauromenium had a political privileged position more than the other Greek city-states that sided with Pyrrhus. 36 Lévêque 1957, 460–461, followed by Carcopino 1961, 75; again, Lévêque 1968–1969, 148–149. Some other scholars preferred to state that Pyrrhus at first was appointed only as commander-in-chief and then, after the conquest of Eryx, even as king; Droysen 19523, III,

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As it may easily be seen from this general survey of the most acknowledged critical interpretations, the matter seems to be quite inexplicable and will remain without an absolute answer, at least until some new evidence will be at our disposal (of course, I am thinking particularly to new epigraphic documents). I believe indeed that Berve’s suggestion may be convincingly shared; as a matter of fact, the literary sources emphasize commonly that the Greek city-states of Sicily entrusted themselves of their own volition to Pyrrhus, and this detail does not allow to suggest that he was the leader of a koinovn. Some scholars said that the title of king in Sicily, in relation to the city-states, had to be interpreted in the same way as the title held by the Successors – and even by Alexander the Great – in relation to the homeland Greeks; therefore, a close relationship has been made between the League of Corinth and the alliance of the Greeks of Sicily with Pyrrhus, both created with the submission of the city-states due to any kind of political pressure37. I am confident that this conjecture is wide of the mark, since it is marked with the main difference between the two alliances: indeed, the Greeks of Sicily did not suffer any political pressure at all, either from their own representatives or from the hJgemwvn himself, as much as the homeland Greeks experienced after their defeat in the battle of Chaeronea (338 BC). The League of Corinth was meant to be a kind of prologue to the growing control of the local, autonomous governments by Philip II of Macedonia; it had a real absolute and quite tyrannical connotation, which was hidden by the Macedonian propaganda with the Panhellenic theme of the fight against the barbarians. But this did not happen in Sicily; after the death of Agathocles, when Sicily was parted between the local governments and the Carthaginians, the submission to Pyrrhus was absolutely natural and devoted to the struggle against the Punic barbarians. Therefore, it is not necessary to assume that an official meeting of the Sicilian representatives took place in Syracuse; after all, it would be a very dangerous argumentum ex silentio. Merely, the Greek envoys gave to the Epirote king the full power over their own towns, that immediately became parts of a single “state”, i.e. the kingdom of Sicily, which – in the projects of Pyrrhus – had to be joined together with the kingdom of Italy and the kingdom of Epirus, that he had committed for guardianship to his two sons, Helenus and Alexander. Therefore, Pyrrhus wanted to unify all the Greeks of Sicily under his own political rule, by means of a personal and absolute monarchy of the Hellenistic kind, which gave to the king an absolute and unlimited authority38. We have to give a great meaning to some words of Justin 152; Schubert 1894, 211; Von Scala 1896, 155; Holm 1901, II, 525; Kienast 1963, col. 151. Some other critical positions have been expressed: see Walbank 1967, II, 35–36 (“Whether Pyrrhus’ monarchy in Sicily is to be regarded as national or purely personal cannot at present be determined”); Irmscher 1968–1969, 262–279 (a typical negative reading of the kingship by an historian of the old eastern Europe); Will 19792, 110 (“nul, certes, ne pouvait lui refuser la qualité de basileus, mais il est probable que les Grecs de Sicile, comme ceux d’Italie, le considéraient, plutôt que comme “leur roi”, comme l’hégémôn de cités alliées”); Hammond 1967, 570 (“it is doubtful if basileuv~ means more than a[rcwn th`~ Sikeliva~ meant in the days of Dionysius I. It is probably an unofficial title, which recognizes his actual authority in Sicily”). 37 This has been suggested mainly by Vartsos 1970, 94. 38 Still useful for a general survey of the institutional aspects of the Hellenistic monarchies Ay-

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(23, 3, 2); he said that Pyrrhus cum Syracusas venisset, rex Siciliae sicut Epiri appellatur, i.e. “after his arrival in Syracuse, he was designated both as king of Sicily and as king of Epirus”. Hermann Bengtson has rightly pointed out that, among the reasons that could have had a great weight over Pyrrhus’ choice to undertake his adventure in the Greek West, a basic factor could have been that in Epirus the royal authority was not so unconditional, due to the rigorous limits imposed to the king’s decisions by the Federal assembly; it may be said that the Epirote monarchy was not quite of the Hellenistic kind. The attempts of Pyrrhus to make much more independent from the assembly the role of the king of Epirus are well known. Before he became king, the right to mint any coinage in Epirus was an exclusive privilege of the federal assembly of the Molossians; Pyrrhus then was the first one among the kings of the Molossians to issue coinage bearing his own name. Therefore, the resemblance of this situation with that of Sicily, as well as with Magna Graecia, is perfectly matching; the aim of Pyrrhus was to achieve, both in Epirus and in Sicily, an authentic Hellenistic kingdom. Besides, his contemporaries too looked at him as to an Hellenistic monarch; a very indicative sign, that has been rightly highlighted by Bengtson, is that the Roman literary sources – both the Latin, and the Greek ones – always refer to Pyrrhus labelling him as rex Epiri, and in doing so they compare him to all the other Hellenistic monarchs39. We will see that in a second time the evolution of the events, after the complete conquest of the power by the king, drove him to take obviously many authoritarian and quite tyrannical decisions, that did not delay stirring up plans of rebellion among those same Greeks of Sicily who had kind-heartedly received him in 278 BC. The evidence comes from a passage of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (20, 8, 1), based on the information given by Timaeus of Tauromenium, who was in all probability hostile to Pyrrhus40. The historian says that the king crossed for the second time to Italy after the fiasco in Sicily, because the most important Greek city-states mard 1948, 232–263; Aymard 1949, 579–590; Aymard 1955, 215–234. A general re-examination of the topic in Virgilio 1998, 107–176; Virgilio 20032. The most recent investigation about the subject of the Hellenistic monarchy in Sicily, with a carefully selected bibliography, is provided by a paper that I delivered in an international conference in Cardiff, Wales (July 2003); see Zambon 2006, 77–92. 39 See Bengtson 1956, 166–167 (= Bengtson 1974, 120–121: “Wenn ihn die römischen Quellen rex Epiri nennen, so zeigt dies, daß ihn die Römer mit den anderen hellenistischen Königen auf eine Stufe stellten – eine Auffassung, die natürlich den wirklichen Verhältnissen nicht gerecht wird”). For a general survey on the institution of Epirus, Nilsson 1909; Klotzsch 1911; Cross 1932; Franke 1955; Hammond 1967; Cabanes 1976; Corvisier 1999, 395–401; Davies 2000, 234–258. The close economic relationships and the commercial exchanges between Epirus and Southern Italy, as well as Sicily, are highlighted by Lepore 1964–1965, 489–512; Lepore 1985B, 7–15. Finally, for a general survey on Epirus’ coinage, see Franke 1961. 40 The debate concerning the historical evaluation of Pyrrhus’ enterprise by Timaeus is deeprooted among the modern historians; see for example Schubert 1894, 69 (supporter of the hostility); Ciaceri 1902, 9 (favouring a positive opinion of Timaeus). The most recent survey on the topic is Vattuone 1982, 245–248. On the authenticity of a monographic work of Timaeus about Pyrrhus, see Tim. FGrHist 566 F 22 Jacoby (= Polyb. 12, 25) together with Levi 1963, 195–202.

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thought that his power was typical of a tyrant, not of a king. This evidence should be handled very carefully, due to the prejudice of Timaeus against Pyrrhus, but its meaning is undoubtedly clear; it is pointed out exactly which was the conception of the monarchy for an Hellenistic king, who had to consider both Sicily and the Greek city-states not as allies – this would have been the view of an hJgemwvn – but as subjects. The reaction of Timaeus in front of the ordinary behaviour of Pyrrhus was perhaps the same of all those contemporary Greeks of Sicily who tried to revolt against the decisions of their chief; as a matter of fact, the natives of Sicily labelled as a tyranny any kind of government that set some limits to the independent administration among the local cities, and even in that instance they did not understand that Pyrrhus’ absolute comprehension of his basileiva was perfectly in accordance with those privileges that they had awarded him, which was actually the same basilikh; hJgemoniva as what he was aquainted with in Epirus. The Greeks of Sicily did not realize the political meaning of their unprompted submission; the struggles that broke out after the great victories of the first year’s warfare against the Carthaginians really had their centre in the dissimilar understanding of the royal power that the Greeks and Pyrrhus had. This was a pretty cultural divergence, spreading out from the serious efforts of the Hellenistic mentality to seep into Sicily, due particularly to the customary tendency to the self-government. The Greeks of Sicily explained the royal power in a typical “Hellenic” way, as they previously did with Agathocles or other local leaders, who were labelled as tyrants and had to face a huge opposition just because they tried to transform their dominions in – more or less – “Hellenistic” kingdoms. The events of Pyrrhus were useful for one of his representatives, Hiero II, who tried not to stress – at least in a first time – the most personal features of his own kingship. 2.5. Pyrrhus’ coinage in Sicily: Greek propaganda, ideological inferences and economic innovations The several aspects of the coinage minted by Pyrrhus in Sicily may be profitably treated at this stage; the issues were no doubt used for the financing of the war against the Carthaginians and the payment of the plentiful regular troops and mercenary soldiers fighting for the king. Nevertheless, even if they answered to immediate needs, those coins had the plain features of a wider project, focusing particularly on the propaganda meaning of the devices and on the issue itself, which was based on purpose on two weight standard systems; this was meant to unite the Sicilian economy and to strengthen – on the basis of the financial politics – the relationships among the three districts of Pyrrhus’ kingdom, i.e. Epirus, Magna Graecia and Sicily41. 41 General surveys in Head 19112, 322–325; Giesecke 1923, 105–111; Nenci 1953, 74–80; Lévêque 1957, 464–474; Babelon 1958, 53–71; Kienast 1963, coll. 110–112; Lévêque 1964, 309–312; Lepore 1964–1965, 497–499; La Bua 1980, 226–229; Borba Florenzano 1992, 207–233, partially reviewing her PhD thesis (see Borba Florenzano 1987). The most recent analysis is De Callataÿ 2000, 189–213.

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The first look must be given to the figures and the devices; everything has a clear-cut meaning, and the designs celebrate the king (with particular reference to the gold and silver coins), due to open allusions to his “heroic” ancestry and to his Epirote nationality. This is patent in the silver tetradrachms of the following kind: – Obv. Head of the Zeus of Dodona, to the left, crowned with oak’s leaves. Rev. Dione sitting on the throne, watching to the left, with the head covered by a veil and holding a sceptre with the left hand; in the field, inscription PURROU (in front of the goddess) BASILEWS (on her back). The reference to the national oracle of Epirus, that is the sanctuary of Dodona, may be immediately recognized; furthermore, the portrayal of the Dodonean Zeus and of his wife Dione is quite ordinary in the Epirote issues, sometimes even in the typical Hellenistic design of the two-sided busts. I am confident that just the presence of Dione is the key to understand the ideological message of the coin, because she was not only a national goddess of Epirus, but she was prayed and honoured widely in Sicily, too. Therefore, the device was used to point out to the Greeks of Sicily how deep were the cultural and religious links between Pyrrhus’ homeland and their own42. As regards the celebration of the king’s divine parentage43, this is manifest in the silver didrachms of the following kind: – Obv. Head of Achilles watching to the left, wearing a Corinthian-shaped crested helmet. Rev. A veiled Thetis, turned to the right, sitting on a hippocampus, holds in her hands the shield of his son; in the field, inscription BASILEWS (on the top) PURROU (below)44. Another evident suggestion comes from the following bronze coin: – Obv. Veiled female head turned to left, with long and curly hair; in front of her, inscription FQIAS. Rev. Thunderbolt; in the field, inscription BASILEWS (on the top) PURROU (below). 42 Gardner 1900, 42–43 and 59–60 (Zeus and Dione represented in the typical Hellenistic fashion); Pötscher 1966, 113–147 (the cult of Zeus and Dione in Dodona). Mildenberg 1985, nnr. 1117–1122 rightly highlights the derivation of Zeus’ portrayal from the tetradrachms of Alexander the Great. 43 With reference to this topic, it is worth of mention a tetradrachm which has been discovered in Spain in 1936, and then published only some fifteen years later; it has on the obverse the head of Pyrrhus, crowned with oak’s leaves, and on the reverse the goddess Artemis, sitting on the throne, together with the usual inscription BASILEWS PURROU: Amoros 1950, 121–125; Jenkins 1962, 26–29. The crown made with oak’s leaves for sure describes Pyrrhus as a person with an extraordinary nature, not only as a king; it may be useful to compare this portrayal with the traditional iconography of the king: Oikonomides 1983, 67–72; Brown 1995, 5–10. 44 A very good replica of the coin in Franke – Hirmer 1964, plate 150; furthermore, see Babelon 1957, 97–109. On the propaganda meaning of this issue, see Lücke 1995, 171–174, who emphasized the aspiration of Pyrrhus to illustrate even the Sicilian expedition as a Panhellenic endeavour against the barbarians. As regards the repetition of the same theme in the conflict against the Romans, see Weber 1972, 213–225.

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The inscription on the obverse of this bronze coin is basic for a correct ascription of the female head; nevertheless, there has been a long debate about it among the scholars, since it is uncertain if it is a portrait of Pyrrhus’ mother, or a kind of personification of Achilles’ homeland. However, the link with the ancestry from the Greek hero cannot be questioned45. A very weighty meaning in the iconographic propaganda of the Epirote king has the image of the Athena Promachos, which is portrayed in the following coins; – Obv. Head of Persephone towards left, with long and fluent hair, and a crown made of ears of grain. Rev. Standing Athena, moving to the left; the goddess is wrapped around a long chiton, embraces a shield with the right arm and is hurling a spear with the left; in the field, inscription PURROU (in front of the goddess) BASILEWS (behind her). The coin is a silver octobol. – Obv. Head of the young Heracles, turned to right, wearing the lion’s skin. Rev. Standing Athena, moving to the left; the goddess is wrapped around a long chiton, embraces a shield with the right arm and is hurling a spear with the left; in the field, inscription SURAKWSIWN. It is a bronze coin (11.25 gr.). Head already suggested that the figure represented on the reverses of the abovementioned coins was the reproduction of the statue of Athena Alkis, that was standing in the goddess’ temple in the Macedonian city of Pella: if this conjecture was right, we should think that Pyrrhus’ purpose was to underline his linkage with Alexander the Great, using the image of the goddess that was honoured in the first city of Macedonia. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that, before Pyrrhus, Ptolemy I of Egypt and Agathocles too wanted to reproduce in some of their issues the figure of the Athena Promachos or Alkis; a quite recent hypothesis has shown persuasively that the image was in all probability reproducing the archaic portrait of the goddess Athena which was depicted on the Panathenaic amphorae; those vases circulated all over the Mediterranean basin still at the end of the IV century BC. The symbolic meaning of the image was to recall to mind – owing to the re-evaluation of a badge connected with the Athenian supremacy – the belief of the superiority of the Greeks against the barbarians, that was the Panhellenic idea. No doubt, the Greeks of Sicily understood exactly in this way the implication of the coinage’s device, because Pyrrhus claimed the right to be labelled as their rescuer from the Carthaginian barbarians46. 45 Nenci 1953, 75–76; Lévêque 1957, 695, plate III, nr. 1; Kienast 1963, col. 111, nr. 9; La Bua 1980, 228 (all favourable to the characterization of Achilles’ homeland); Borba Florenzano 1992, 208, note 3 (Pyrrhus’ mother). 46 The hypothesis that the image of the Athena Promachos of the coins is a reproduction of the statue of Athena Alkis in Pella was proposed by Head 1874, 56–58, and has been quite universally accepted; Brett 1950, 55–72; Jenkins 1972, 217; Davis – Kraay 1972, nr. 122; Garraffo 1995, 460–461. Some doubts were expressed only by Lacroix 1949, 115–116 and 121. As regards the usage of this emblem on the Hellenistic coinages, see Mitchell Havelock 1980, 41–50; Jenkins 1960, 17–37; Kuschel 1961, 17–18; Zervos 1967, 1–16 (all focusing on Ptolemy’s coinage). The reproduction of the image of the archaic Athena has been underlined by Mitchell Havelock 1964, 43–58; Mitchell Havelock 1965, 331–340; Hadz-

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As I pointed out, the Athena Promachos of the bronze coinage was coupled with the head of Heracles wearing the lion’s skin, which was previously cast on the tetradrachms of Alexander the Great; the device appeared for the first time in Sicily on some Punic coins, bearing on the obverse the head of Heracles/Melqart and on the reverse the horse’s head, that can be dated to the beginning of the III century BC47. The presence of Heracles is eloquent, too, since he was considered the symbol for the civilizing hero who overcomes the barbarians and, in doing so, celebrates the culture of the Greeks. Nevertheless, the setting of the chronology for this coins to the age of Pyrrhus in Sicily could even be problematical if we look at the inscription on the reverses; one would expect PURROU BASILEWS rather than SURAKWSIWN. Anyway, we have to consider two unquestionable data; first of all, the chronology of the issue has to be set no doubt after the death of Agathocles (289 BC), because the analysis of the coins has demonstrated that the greatest part of them have been overstruck on the last bronze issue minted by the Syracusan king48. Then, the evidence provided by the coin-hoards suggested to date the issue before the age of Hiero II, because the coins have never been discovered in the hoards together with the king’s issues49. Therefore we have the terminus ante quem and the terminus post quem, i.e. 289 and 276 BC; owing to the fact that during Hicetas’ strathgiva there was no evidence of Heracles on the coinage of Syracuse, I think that the attribution of the issue to the age of Pyrrhus in Sicily is correct: furthermore, the mint of Syracuse used to have the right of minting and signing the bronze coinage even during the first stages of Agathocles power. In this instance, the head of Heracles could even be an allusion to Pyrrhus’ claim to have an ancestral linkage with the Heraclidai; and we cannot forget that while besieging the citadel of Eryx, Pyrrhus himself appealed his mythical ancestor for help in the final conquest of the fortress, and promised to him great feasts and sacrifices (Plut. Pyrrh. 22, 7)50. For his political propaganda, Pyrrhus made use of other samples on the coins; among them, a very significant meaning had the renovation of the traditional devices previously used by the mint of Syracuse: the head of Persephone with long hair and a crown made with ears of grain, a design that was common both on ­Agathocles’ issues and on Hicetas’ coinage, and was then reproduced on Pyrrhus’ bronze coinage; and the head of Artemis with short and curly hair, a traditional icon istellou Price 1970, 120–123. The connection with the image of Athena on the Panathenaic amphorae has been stressed by Boardman 1974, fig. 305, which is quite identical with the portray on Ptolemy’s coinage; Mitchell Havelock 1980, 42–44. A general survey on the Panathenaic amphorae in Beazley 1943, 460–461; Frel 1973; Brandt 1978, 1–23; Vos 1981, 33–46; Caruso 1990, 145–153. 47 Franke – Hirmer 1964, plate 172, nn. 569–571 (Heracles on Alexander’s tetradrachms); Jenkins 1978, 8–11 (Punic tetradrachms in Sicily). 48 Holloway 1979, 91: Calciati 1986, II, 294, nr. 151. 49 See IGCH 2202; 2203; 2205. 50 For the coins, see Forrer 1922, nr. 1699; Grose 1923, I, nn. 2891–2901; plate 104, nn. 6–10; Calciati 1986, II, 321–327 and nn. 175–183. Caccamo Caltabiano 1993, 152–154 pointed out that the Syracusan issue was contemporary to one minted in Messina, whose coins bear on the obverse the head of Heracles with lion’s skin, and on the reverse a lion walking to the right.

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of the Syracusan coinage yet from the beginning of the IV century BC, that was portrayed on the gold drachms minted by Pyrrhus. Moreover, two symbols appear on many Sicilian coins and may be certainly connected with Pyrrhus’ mission. First, the thunderbolt, a very common model in the Hellenistic age, which was regularly related to Zeus; it was used by Agathocles and was engraved in many coins of Taras issued during the Pyrrhic age. Then, the crown made with oak’s leaves, around an ear of grain; the appearance of this device is useful to date for sure to the period 278/276 BC a bronze coin of Syracuse, bearing on the obverse the head of Athena facing left, and on the reverse the crown of oak’s leaves, together with the inscription SURAKWSIWN. A superb iconography, very noteworthy for the political propaganda too, was carved on the reverse of the gold coins: – Obv. Head of Athena facing right, wearing a Corinthian-shaped crested helmet. Rev. Standing and floating Nike, walking left; she carries some trophies and is crowned with oak’s leaves; in the field, inscription PURROU (in front of the goddess) BASILEWS (behind her). The coin is a gold stater. – Obv. Head of Artemis facing right, with short and curly hair. Rev. Standing and floating Nike, walking left; she carries some trophies and is crowned with oak’s leaves; in the field, inscription PURROU (in front of the goddess) BASILEWS (behind her). The coin is a gold drachm. No doubt, these coins were issued at least after Pyrrhus’ arrival in Syracuse, when he won for the first time the Carthaginian troops. The role played by the figure of the so-called Nike Trophaiophora (= carrying war-trophies) is clearly purposeful for a celebration of the Sicilian enterprises of the Epirote king. The device was once again recovered from the coinage of Alexander the Great; as a matter of fact, the gold stater minted by Pyrrhus in Sicily is actually a facsimile of the coin issued by Alexander in the mints of Amphipolis, Odessa and Lampsacus; the differences are pretty a matter of fashion51. Some conclusions may be drawn from this general survey of the iconographic program of Pyrrhus’ coinage. Of course, the figures adopted by the king may not be explained only with a reference to their celebrative meaning; no doubt, the coinage of the period 278/276 BC has to be taken into consideration especially in connection with the place of issuing and the primary market of circulation, that is Sicily, and then as regards the receptivity of the propaganda among the Greek subjects. As we have seen, Pyrrhus did not need to celebrate with the propaganda his fresh victories, that nevertheless were alluded to by his gold staters and drachms; his basic need was to give good ideological reasons for his own role in Sicily, side by side with the Greeks, all united in the struggle against the barbarians. Therefore, his coinage went beyond the concrete events, and tried to corroborate them with the celebration of the king’s own divine nature; his Epirote nationality; his profound 51 Mildenberg 1985, nn. 1115–1116 and 1138–1142 (Alexander’s gold staters). On the use of the image of the Nike Trophaiophora as a symbol of victory in the coins, Bellinger – Berlincourt 1962; Lecomte 1983.

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linkage with the Greeks; the deep-rooted cultural relationships between Epirus and Sicily52. Another topic has to be briefly analyzed, that is the plentiful quantity of letters, symbols and marks of Pyrrhus’ coinage, since we can have some information about the work’s methods of the mint of Syracuse in the period 278/276 BC. The greatest collection of samples is provided by the so-called silver octobols, that have constantly a mark on the obverse (usually it was engraved behind the head of Persephone), and a symbol or letter – sometimes all of them – on the reverse; the most familiar is the Pyrrhic thunderbolt, which must anyway be considered as a signboard of Pyrrhus’ presence in Sicily. The signs on the obverse are plentiful and regular, but the coin was minted during a very short period and in all probability they were not meant to allude to the different engravers, or to the different mint’s representatives. The same problem concerns the reverse’s signs, which cannot be recognized as the marks of various issues, given that they do not match with the basic qualities of regularity and sequence. Therefore, it may be concluded that those were the signs engraved by the mint’s officers during the period of the issue. As far as regards the gold drachms, the symbols on the obverse are not regular, though those on the reverse are fixed; I believe that the enlightenment given by Borba Florenzano is extremely correct, because she assumes that the change of the obverse’s marks indicates that the issues were in a sequence, but that the responsibility of the work in the mint of Syracuse did not change, as the uniformity of the symbols on the reverse shows. The mint’s officers signed always the gold drachms with the Greek letter P, with a torch or with a crescent. Concerning the bronze coinage, there is the persistent occurrence of some symbols on the obverse, although they are not equal, while they are missing on the reverse; it may be that the absence was due to the fact that the control of the weight of the bronze coins by the mint’s officers had to be less meticulous than for the gold and silver issues53. The indications provided by these reflections about the coinage’s signs recommend to assume that the issues in all the three metals were really plentiful during the years from 278 to 276 BC, and they were to a certain extent necessary to put money into the war against the Carthaginians and to pay the troops. At last, we have to take into consideration the topic of the weight standard systems that Pyrrhus wanted to apply to create the economic structure of his new kingdom. The evidence provided by the Sicilian coinage strengthen the data offered by 52 No doubt, Pyrrhus followed the earlier Sicilian example of Agathocles to spread all over the Island his political messages thanks to his coinage: it was perhaps the best way for the monarchic ideology to circulate among the Greeks and the natives, as Agathocles previously showed: see Consolo Langher 1990B, 29–44; Borba Florenzano 1993, 71–77; Consolo Langher 1993, 79–81. 53 For the body of the symbols on the Sicilian coinage of Pyrrhus, I agree with the assumptions of Borba Florenzano 1992, 213–217, who provides even some useful summarizing schemes (anyway, the coins mentioned in the plates nr. 2 and 3 are bronzes, not silver). On the concept of the “numismatic epigraphy”, used to designate symbols and monograms, see Marchetti 1987, 443–463.

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the literary sources; the project of the king was to unite all the western Greeks and the Italic peoples either against the Romans – as regards Magna Graecia – or the Carthaginians in Sicily. To substantiate the relationships among the three parts of his kingdom and bring to fruition the economic and monetary integration, Pyrrhus felt the inevitability to create a single monetary system, that had to give a boost to the Greek coinage, on the one hand against the growing invasion of southern Italy’s markets by the newly created Roman coinage; on the other, the new-fangled system had to be in opposition to the extraordinary supremacy of the Carthaginian coinage in the commercial operations in Sicily. After his arrival in Syracuse, Pyrrhus could immediately make use of the Italic weight standard, which was customarily used in many city-states of Magna Graecia and – what’s of the greatest meaning – even in some Campanian communities; nevertheless, that system remained too much limited, and exactly at the beginning of Pyrrhus’ venture in Magna Graecia it went through some modifications which took it much more side by side with the Roman monetary system. Hence, Pyrrhus decided on the Attic weight standard, which was typically used in the international economic relationships; all the gold coins and the greatest amount of the silver coinage were minted according to this system. Anyway, there was another important question to face, without overlooking the requirement of a single economic structure; that was the existence in Sicily of a consolidated monetary organization. Pyrrhus could not pretend that the Greek citystates suddenly would cancel deep-rooted monetary traditions; therefore, he decided to adopt the typical Sicilian weight standard which was based on the litra; this had many analogies with the Roman libral weight system, and could facilitate both the commercial activities and the local exchanges; this was the basis for the issuing of the minor coins, such as the bronze coinage and the silver octobols54. The latter is the clear example of the arrangement between the two standard systems used by Pyrrhus, and it was the first outcome of his new united economy. The octobol has an average weight of 5.5 and 5.6 gr; in view of the fact that the Attic obol has an average weight of 0.73 gr., it has been suggested that the octobol amounted more or less to eight Attic obols (indeed, 0.73 gr. x 8 = 5.84 gr.). Nonetheless, there is a puzzling problem: among all the main coinages issued during the Hellenistic age, we do not ever find the denomination of the octobol; furthermore, any attempt to find an equivalence with the Sicilian standard systems is unproductive. However, if we try to examine the silver octobol in the view of the Sicilian adventure, it may be easily understood that the coin was exactly an arrangement between the remuneration that the soldiers were used to receive and the Attic weight standard; as a matter of fact, the octobol matches up with 1/3 of a tetradrachm, and moreover his weight gave an amount of advantages. Indeed, it was comparable with the silver coinage minted by Taras and her allies during the Pyrrhic age (the reduced weight was more or less 6.6 gr.), and even with the so-called “Pegasi”, which circulated widely all over Sicily before Pyrrhus’ arrival and often were used 54 As regards the weight system based on the silver litra, which was used in Sicily starting from the IV century BC and was based on a unit piece of 0.872 gr., see Cutroni Tusa 1968B, 44– 49; Parise 1979B, 293–304; Parise 1993, 271–275.

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to pay the mercenary troops. Furthermore, the reduced weight of the octobol gave the chance to mint more coins using the same quantity of metal55. The types of the bronze coinage have been outlined in a inventory sketched out by Borba Florenzano: I think it is worth to be reproduced here: Mint

Devices

Weight

Specimens considered

Syracuse

Persephone/Torch and crown

13.5 gr.

12

Heracles/Athena Promachos

11.2–11.5 gr.

161

Phthias/ Thunderbolt

12.0–12.2 gr.

24

Persephone/ Demeter

8.5–8.7 gr.

42

Athena/Crown and grain

5.5–5.9 gr.

19

Pyrrhus

The weight of a bronze litra of the Sicilian standard in the age of Pyrrhus was more or less 20–25 gr.; taking this as a reference weight, the first coins minted by Syracuse and the first issue of Pyrrhus may be considered just as a half of one litra, whose weight progressively more lessened during the war campaign. The other specimens issued on behalf of the Epirote king were, respectively, 1/3 of a litra and 1/4 of a litra. In conclusion, the Sicilian coinage of Pyrrhus was exactly the manifestation of a well-prepared project, which had to fill the needs of the ideological propaganda with those referring to a new economy. No doubt, the scholars who thought that those were quite “emergency” issues, whose main function was the payment of the war’s expenses – with particular reference to the remuneration of both the regular and the mercenary troops – are right; but I am confident that the bronze coinage, particularly, that was issued in accordance with the Sicilian standard system of the litra, was first of all incorporated in the local circulation, since it was destined to the development of the private commercial activities. Therefore, I think it is not possible to attach the function of the new coinage to the simple military events of the period 278–276 BC. 55 Borba Florenzano 1992, 218–219 pointed out that any other attempt to link the silver octobol both with another coin or with another weight system have been proved vain. Scheu 1955, 101–112 tried to connect it with a silver coin minted by the Bruttians, weighing approximately 5.8 gr.: but it has been rightly suggested that the chronology of that coin is lower and has to be set very near the second Punic war: Robinson 1964, 62; Pfeiler 1964, 36; Marchetti 1978, 457–460.

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Moreover, the issues had a great ideological meaning, and they completely matched the propaganda’s needs of Pyrrhus, who wanted to emphasize the links between his own homeland and Sicily; to highlight his own divine nature; due to it, to give good reason for his own support to the Greeks; finally, to rationalize his mission to rescue the Greek city-states of Sicily from the Punic barbarians. The choice to use a mixed weight system, somewhat with an international tradition, in part with a local convention, was no doubt meant to unite all the main economic systems of the western Greeks. Some scholars deny this conclusion, and they assume that if Pyrrhus really intended to do this he had to start issuing coinage at the beginning of his western adventures, just after his arrival in Taras56. Nonetheless, it is not completely true that Pyrrhus did not issue coinage after his arrival in Italy, since his deep pressure on the Tarentine coinage and on the contemporary issues of many other southern Greek city-states was clearly showed, at least, by the regular occurrence of his symbolic personal sign: the thunderbolt. However, it is important to stress the political position held by Pyrrhus towards the Tarentines and the Siceliotes: indeed, he minted coins in Sicily signing them with his own name because the Greeks of Sicily appointed him with this right, awarding him the titles of king and hJgemwvn (the clearest reference is, no doubt, the inscription PURROU BASILEWS). On the contrary, in Taras we have a different situation; even if Pyrrhus with his own decisions deeply influenced the economy of the city and the production’s sequences of the Tarentine mint, after all he was ever considered by the citizens as a xeniko;~ strathgov~. 2.6. The war-campaign of 277 BC. First steps of glory in Southern Sicily: traces of Pyrrhus at Heraclea Minoa and Azones, between historical and archaeological evidence Pyrrhus spent the winter of 278/277 BC in Syracuse, and he accurately prepared the military expedition against the Carthaginian territories of Sicily, that he wanted to inaugurate in the following spring; in the meanwhile, he had even to organize once again the political administration in the town, with the help of Thoinon and Sosistratus. While the former continued to hold his office of commander of the garrison – the same he had at the time of the civil war – Sosistratus was appointed by Pyrrhus with a very important military duty. He was sent to Agrigentum, the most important Greek city-state of Sicily after Syracuse, with a vanguard of some 10.000 soldiers: he had to win back the city and to rescue it from the Punic occupying force that established there after the fading of Phintias. While moving forwards, he succeeded in winning back to the Greek alliance many other villages and cities that were previously controlled by the Carthaginians. 56 See Borba Florenzano 1992, 223, which is the only point of her analysis that I do not agree with; I just want to underline that it differs clearly with her own suggestion (see page 219) on the silver octobol, whose weight was easily comparable with that of the silver coinage of Taras and of many other Greek city-states of southern Italy, and moreover with the so-called “Pegasi” that circulated all over Sicily.

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I have already pointed out how different the opinions of the scholars are about Sosistratus, especially in regards to his political position towards Agrigentum; there is a deep divergence too even concerning a plausible military and political control of the Carthaginians over the city after the end of Phintias’ tyranny57. No doubt, the surviving passages of Diodorus’ text do not help to shed light on the events, but I am confident that the historical evidence at our disposal provides some unquestionable information on Sosistratus. He has been labelled by Diodorus as tuvranno~ of Syracuse and as kuvrio~ of Agrigentum (respectively 22, 7, 6; 22, 8, 4), and I think that the distinction of his roles is basic. As it seems to be very likely, the main source of information of Diodorus for this section of his historical work was Philinus, a native of Agrigentum who was a great opponent of the tyrants; therefore, I would understand with trouble such weak behaviour from the historian in regards to Sosistratus, if he really had been a tyrant of Agrigentum. Furthermore, I think that for sure Sosistratus was not even in command of Agrigentum when Pyrrhus arrived in Syracuse; if so, he would have committed to the king both his two cities, together with all the minor possessions, while he handed over Pyrrhus only Syracuse. I do not think that some info given by Diodorus are divergent, even if some modern historians read them in an unusual way. At 22, 8, 4, the historian says that Sosistratus was the person in charge of Agrigentum (ejkuriveusen ∆Akravganto~) and many other towns, and that he had more than ten thousand soldiers. This very short phrase presents some news about Sosistratus which are then repeated soon after (22, 10, 1) and they may be understood as follows; Sosistratus somehow succeeded in conquering Agrigentum and even other towns – and Diodorus in the second occurrence gives the concrete figure of thirty cities – and that he had a great amount of troops, that were probably the same he controlled when he fought against the soldiers of his challenger Thoinon at the time of the civil war for the conquest of the total supremacy in Syracuse. Therefore, the information seem not to be different; nevertheless, to understand fully what they mean, it is necessary to consider which is their place in the extensive summary of Diodorus’ book 22. The short outline concerning Sosistratus first recorded by Diodorus (22, 8, 4) is included in the detailed account of Pyrrhus’ march from Tauromenium to Syracuse, but it seems to be absolutely uprooted from the general context; indeed, the author of the review states at first that Pyrrhus received the isle of Ortygia from Thoinon and the city from the inhabitants led by Sosistratus, and then he passes on to describe how the king succeeded in settling down the civil struggles in the town. Quite as an addition, he added between those two happenings the sketch concerning Sosistratus, which had clearly the significance of an update (this seems to be underlined by the Greek dev). The addendum has to be ascribed completely to the 57 See chapter 1. The greatest part of the scholars thought that Sosistratus was tyrant of Agrigentum: Huttl 1929, 134; Pareti 1959, 247; Berve 1967, II, 460–462; De Waele 1971, 144– 145; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 32; De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 347; Hans 1983, 85; Tagliamonte 1994, 202. On the contrary, I agree with the suggestion of La Bua 1960, 100–104; La Bua 1980, 179–183, who thought rightfully that Sosistratus was a Syracusan native and that he was tyrant only in Syracuse.

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author of the summary, and it was not present in the original text of Diodorus, who in all probability mentioned Sosistratus’ conquest of Agrigentum in a following chapter, as it seems to be confirmed by the occurrence of the same data in 22, 10, 1. Moreover, the latter passage has been thoroughly examined at the end of 1800s by Beloch, who thought that in one case it had to be amended. The Greek text is: o[nto~ de; aujtou` peri; th;n oJdoiporivan, h|kon ∆Ennai`oi [ejn nausi; Hoeschel] levgonte~ th;n froura;n th;n Karchdonivwn ejkbeblhkevnai ktl. (“while he was on his way, some citizens of Henna came to announce that the Carthaginian garrison had been expelled…”). The modification suggested by Beloch is undoubtedly intriguing, but it is questionable at least for two matters; first of all, it is an hazardous modus operandi and even a wrong method to revise a text which has been handed on in all the manuscripts without any different reading, as in the case of Diodorus’ passage. Then, this modification is no doubt useless, since it helps to claim that no Punic garrison was established in Agrigentum after the end of Phintias’ tyranny, which was followed immediately by Sosistratus’ dictatorship. But even La Bua’s conjecture may not be accepted, because in his opinion Diodorus’ account shows clearly that a Carthaginian occupying force was settled in Agrigentum; on the contrary, the above mentioned passage proves for sure that the garrison was driven off from any other Greek city-state of Sicily but not Agrigentum; indeed, the Punic troops had been accepted from those citizens to avoid being conquered by the tyrant Phintias58. I think that the text of Diodorus has to be read as it is, without any correction, and that it is possible to get from it some other information that is actually implied. Pyrrhus left from Syracuse to Agrigentum following with his army the route by land – this is the meaning of th;n oJdoiporivan at 22, 10, 1 – since he wanted to make contact with the vanguard in command of Agrigentum. It is not surprising at all that, while he was on his way, he was reached by some representatives that were sailing on some vessels, because this could only imply that Pyrrhus’ route was very close to the seashores of southern Sicily; that choice was no unanticipated, since it was quite a replication of the procedure used by the king when he moved forwards Syracuse; in that circumstance, the infantry ever marched close to the coast for all the trip from Catane to Syracuse, to keep a contact by view with the navy. This time, Pyrrhus in all probability followed the ancient route that from Syracuse, passing through the territories of Akrai and Casmene, led to the coast between Cama58 Holm 1901, II, 487, thought that some Punic forces settled in Agrigentum after Phintias’ disappearing; his conjecture has been wrongly supported by La Bua 1960, 100–101; Carcopino 1961, 75 (even if he accepted Beloch’s amendment of the Greek text, and so he stated that there was a Carthaginian garrison in Henna, too); Kinkaid 1980, 79–80; La Bua 1980, 179–180, note 3; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 52. The correction of Diodorus’ text was proposed by Beloch 1893A, 630, and then accepted by Meltzer 1896, II, 226 and 554; Lévêque 1957, 457; Pareti 1959, 247; De Sanctis 19602, II, 406; Berve 1967, II, 459 and 732; De Waele 1971, 145, note 736 (“Mit Recht verwirft Berve denn auch den Vorschlag La Buas. Schließlich ist die Verschreibung von ENNAU I in ENNAIOI paläographisch leicht zu erklären, worauf schon Beloch richtig hingewiesen hat”: but what about the complete absence of any alternative reading in the manuscripts?); De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 347–348.

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rina and Gela (where he could easily join with the fleet, that had doubled the Capo Passero), and further on to the newly established Phintias and finally to Agrigentum. Regrettably, the question concerning the homeland of the ambassadors who got then in touch with Pyrrhus cannot be resolved. The unattainable solution of La Bua (Agrigentum) and the quite enticing conjecture of Beloch (Henna) had to have been both rejected; it could be useful to try with some other Greek city-states of the southern coast of Sicily. Phintias has to be excluded quite compellingly; it had been founded recently by the former tyrant of Agrigentum, and there is no evidence that afterwards the city went up against him. As well, Gela seems to be out of question, given that the city was at first ravaged by the raids of the Mamertines and then completely torn down by the tyrant Phintias. Finally, Camarina cannot be a serious candidate; though the city was critically damaged by the incursions of the old mercenaries of Agathocles, it was quite permanently in the sphere of control of Syracuse, at least until the age of the first Punic war. On the other hand, the city-states that were conquered by Pyrrhus on the southern coast of Sicily to the west of Agrigentum were all watched by Punic garrisons; among the most important city-states on the southern Sicilian seashores mentioned by Diodorus (22, 10, 2) there were Heraclea Minoa and Selinous. There is no certainty at all, but I think that the anonymous Greek city may be identified with one among the coastline towns, that after the removal of the Carthaginian garrisons handed over willingly to Pyrrhus; just for a remark of Diodorus (22, 10, 2), it is necessary to keep out Heraclea Minoa, because when Pyrrhus arrived there the town was under the control of a Punic occupying force. Therefore, Pyrrhus finally reached Agrigentum, where he took over Sosistratus’ troops and the cities that had been conquered by him, and then he quartered his own soldiers in the town. Afterwards, he sent back to Syracuse some officers and perhaps Sosistratus himself; their duty was to embark in the merchantmen a number of war-machines and a great amount of weaponry, and then to sail with the fleet to Agrigentum. This statement, coming once again from the summary of Diodorus’ book 22 (10, 2), seems to corroborate the above-mentioned hypothesis; even when he moved from Syracuse to Agrigentum, Pyrrhus strategically marched along the coast, with his flotilla watching his back, and now he probably decided to move immediately all the warships to Agrigentum in order to keep control over a wide portion of the southern coasts of Sicily; he could even make safe the harbour of the city and, consequently, ensure a safe journey to all the merchantmen that reached him in a second time. The rescue of Agrigentum was particularly carrying great weight; in that period, the city was the second one by means of importance in Sicily, and the liberation from the Carthaginian control had no doubt a great ideological meaning and it was useful for the king’s political propaganda. Furthermore, under a military point of view, the new occupation of all the neighbourhood of Agrigentum allowed a considerable progress of the front for the Greek forces; in few words, it could be considered as a first step in the invasion of the Punic ejpikravteia in Sicily, even if

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it is not possible to think of Agrigentum’s territory as a traditional part of the Carthaginian dominions in the island. In Agrigentum, Pyrrhus assembled all the troops at his disposal; in regards to the figures, the evidence provided by Plutarch (Pyrrh. 22, 6) and Diodorus (22, 10, 2) is the same about the infantry – that numbered more or less 30.000 men – while there is a divergence concerning the amount of the horsemen, floating between 1.500 and 2.500. As soon as the fleet carrying the war-machines and the supplies arrived from Syracuse, Pyrrhus could begin the invasion of the ejpikravteia lands59. The first step of Pyrrhus’ march was Heraclea Minoa, that was no doubt protected by a Carthaginian garrison, as it is stated by Diodorus (22, 10, 2). Many modern historians usually assumed that in the first period of the military expedition against the Punic dominions the king did not meet any resistance, at least until the siege of Eryx; but Diodorus’ remark about the presence of a Punic occupying force in the city of Heraclea compels, on the contrary, to think that Pyrrhus’ arrival had to produce some opposition, although negligible, of the Carthaginians. Unfortunately, it is not possible to set a firm chronology for the establishment of the Punic garrison in the city, even if our evidence leads to suppose that Heraclea was occupied during the advance of the Carthaginians towards the Syracusan territory in the period following the death of Agathocles60. The archaeological excavations, although providing very significant data, do not allow to associate them incontestably with the passage of Pyrrhus in Heraclea’s country: however, the transitional period between the IV and III centuries BC is suitably observed, and the discovered materials allow to make some considerations61. With reference to the defensive system of the city, the complete perimeter of the fortification walls was more or less 6 kilometres long; at present, only the North-East side is preserved, because all the eastern section has been lost due to the landslides; the North-West barricade extended side by side with the river, and today can be mapped out thanks to the sparse appearing on the surface of the blocks; finally, there was no wall to the South, because in that side the city was geographically protected by the cliffs facing the Mediterranean sea. The section of the fortifications that had been widely explored is of course the north-eastern one; the building dates back to the end of IV/beginning of III century BC, but it shows many signs of repair and even significant changes of the structures made in the III century BC (usually they have been connected with the age of the Punic wars). The remains consist of a basis made with little chalky blocks, supporting a structure built with 59 See Diod. 22, 10, 2 (numbers 1.500 horsemen and even the war-elephants); Plut. Pyrrh. 22, 6 (mentions 2.500 cavalrymen and even the 200 warships, quite alluding to a collective forward movement of all the troops). Lévêque 1957, 476–477 and La Bua 1980, 232, discuss the divergence between the two historical sources and rightly give their preference to the information provided by Plutarch. 60 Diod. 22, 10, 2 (summary of the conquests of Pyrrhus as far as Eryx). An accurate, but exclusively historical, investigation of the events of 277 BC has been made by Lévêque 1957, 477–487; La Bua 1980, 232–241; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 51–66. 61 Ziegler 1912A, coll. 436–439; De Miro 1958A; De Miro 1958B, 69–82; De Miro 1965; De Waele 1974, 9–18; De Miro – Basso – Nenci 1989, 234–277.

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green bricks which is presently preserved only in the north-eastern bulwark. The fortification walls were strengthened with a number of squared towers and with a single round-based tower which was built on a higher ground. On the right side of the ramparts some little doors are opened. Nonetheless, in the Hellenistic age a new fortification wall set the boundaries of the city and it was built inside the enceinte of the Classical age. First, the wall was made with a curtain quite 1.10 meters thick, provided with some edges inside, while the outside face was covered with a hanging made of squared chalky hewn stones; exactly on this side there have been the most interesting discoveries, such as the employment of older materials (for example, altar’s slabs) to repair the breaches or to close the loopholes. Secondly, the walls were strengthened thanks to a new structure which was built behind with dirt and every sort of stones, until the wall itself became thicker (between 2.70 to 3.60 meters). In view of the fact that the first stage of the fortification wall dissects on the ground the remains of older buildings dated to the last quarter of the IV century BC, and is connected with the first organization of the theatre, it may be dated to the period between the end of the IV and the beginning of the III century BC. The second stage is later; during the excavations, some Hellenistic unglazed pottery and some black glazed pottery have been found, and they may be dated quite one century later (III-II centuries BC)62. Indeed, in the III century BC the city reduced her habitation area, which was then limited to the western plateau, between the theatre and the river Platani. This happening is once again linked with the age of the Punic wars; perhaps in the same period the city had to suffer the first landslides on the eastern side, which was then cut off the habitation area. Thinking to the period of the Punic wars to give good reasons for a broad reinforcement of the fortification walls is undoubtedly correct; nevertheless, there can be some doubts if the period of Pyrrhus’ Sicilian expedition may be considered too a root of the insecurity in the lands of Heraclea Minoa. The only matter that cannot be questioned is that the strengthening of the walls with a new curtain built inside the first one was made by the Carthaginians; furthermore, given that they took care particularly of the additions in the eastern side of the habitation area, this may imply that the potential danger had to arrive exactly from that side, i.e. from the coastal route. There are only two historical events that can match with the chronology of the reinforcement of the fortification walls made by the Carthaginians; either the advance of Pyrrhus in 277 BC, or the siege of Agrigentum by the Romans in 262 BC. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that in the second instance Heraclea Minoa seemed not to be in danger, because the city was securely under the control of the Carthaginians, who could convey there a great amount of troops and even a part of their navy. Going back to the matter of the reduction of the habitation area, it must be stressed that an important building was saved from the process. The theatre of Heraclea Minoa was built inside the urban plan between the end of the IV and the be62 De Miro 1952, 54–67 (particularly focusing on the wall structures of the early Classical age); De Miro 1958C, 232–287 (the lowest chronology for the second phase of the fortifications is the second half of the II century BC, in connection with the slaves’ rebellion in Sicily).

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ginning of the III century BC; the chronology is validated thanks to the archaeological data (many slips of Hellenistic pottery, dated to the III century BC, have been found in the original area of the orchestra; other scraps of pottery, dated from the IV to the III century BC, have been discovered near the foundation of the eastern analemma), and even for the architectural peculiarities; perhaps, the most significant evidence is given by the euripus of the theatre, which follows a duct opened in the fortification walls of the IV–III century BC63. The excavations made in the Hellenistic habitation area to the south of the theatre brought to light two different levels on the ground, with remains of buildings relating to diverse chronologies. The habitation area I is the most recent, and usually is dated to the period following the first servile war, matching the new settlement of the city made by Publius Rupilius (132 BC); the buildings, that are organized in blocks, are very poor and they were enclosed in the existing street plan only in the western side. Under this stratum, there are the remains of an older habitation, which is commonly dated between the end of the IV century and the III century BC; it was extended over the whole plateau and, what’s more, on the eastern side it went beyond the interior enceinte of the walls. This habitation area was contemporary to the foundation of the theatre. In correspondence with the reduction of the habitation area, there happened a significant change in the relationships between the city and her countryside, as it is showed by the basic transformations of the settlements in the rural areas. The evidence is provided particularly by four areas located in the vineyards to the north of the city, that are distinguished by the presence of plentiful scraps on the surface; the four sites have been generally labelled as suburban farms64. This is a slight but important evidence that in the Hellenistic age, along with the growing reduction of the habitation area, the settlements extra moenia increased; more or less, ten farms were founded in the neighbourhood of Heraclea during the Hellenistic age. Regrettably, it is very difficult to date correctly these settlements, because it is quite impractical to set a reliable chronology for the black-glazed pottery that has been discovered in situ; nevertheless, an incentive to establish some settlements in the countryside could have been strictly connected with the diminution of Heraclea’s urban plan, because this factor had to contribute to a new movement of the population in the cwvra. Under a pretty historical point of view, there could be an impediment to date the establishment of those farms in the first half of the III century BC; as a matter of fact, the historical events involving Heraclea Minoa in that period were quite always military enterprises, that did not persuade the people to move outside the fortification walls of the city and to settle in the country. However, the periods matching with the greatest development of the farms were the Roman Republican age and the first Imperial age, especially the two farmhouses in the zones named Castagna and Campanaio; but it is unquestionable that there was a link with the settlements of the previous ages, as it is showed by the finds of many pottery’s slips, dating to the beginning of the Hellenistic age, on the surface. Furthermore, 63 Caputo 1930, 86–88; De Miro 1955, 267–280; De Miro 1958C, 243–257; De Miro 1966B, 151–168; Griffo 1966, 99. 64 Wilson 1980–1981, 656–667; Wilson – Leonard Jr. 1980, 219–239; Wilson 1981, 249– 260; Wilson 1984–1985, 489–500.

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there is a noteworthy occurrence in a room of the Castagna’s farmhouse, which was destroyed probably in the first half of the II century A.D.; the room was built during the Roman Imperial age using a typical Greek technique – the “green bricks” method – which was applied in many buildings of the Hellenistic age in Heraclea Minoa65. Going back to Pyrrhus’ approach to Heraclea, this short historical and archaeological survey seems to suggest that his conquest of the city had not to be so diplomatic, as some scholars used to think. The city was under the control of a Cartha­ ginian garrison, as Diodorus states; the fortification walls were strengthened with particular reference to the north-eastern sector; the habitation area gradually more lessened, while the suburban settlements grew in number. All these events were deep-rooted in the first decades of the Hellenistic age, and they progressively emphasized in the following periods. Of course, owing to the condition of the present evidence, it is not possible to state how much Pyrrhus’ Sicilian adventures influenced the topographical evolution of the Greek city; but nonetheless, it cannot be excluded that the expedition of the Epirote king was for the city of Heraclea a reason of innovation, and that it had as consequence many significant alterations both in the city and in her countryside. Furthermore, it seems that there were other corresponding occurrences in Sicily during those years. The following stage of the victorious march of Pyrrhus’ army inside the Punic ejpikravteia was the citadel of Azones, as Diodorus states (22, 10, 2). Unfortunately, this site was mentioned only by Diodorus, and no other ancient source of information may provide any help to locate it correctly. The scholars suggested many locations, but no doubt the most convincing of all has been conjectured by Giorgio Bejor; subsequent to some excavations campaigns that he begun in southern Sicily in 1970, he proposed to match the ancient Azones with the fortified Punic stronghold discovered in Rocca Nadore (in the territory of modern Agrigento)66. As a matter of fact, Diodorus’ summary places the capture of Azones between the conquest of Heraclea Minoa and the willing surrender of the city of Selinous to Pyrrhus; therefore, in view of the fact that the land route followed by the troops of the king was no doubt alongside the southern coasts of Sicily (and even between Heraclea and Selinous), it is reasonable to set Azones too between the two cities. Rocca Nadore is the present place-name of an isolated calcareous spur, rising in the territory of Sciacca, not so far from the coastline; together with the mount San Calogero (on the south) and the peaks of Caltabellotta (north-east), Rocca Nadore is the most important natural barrier on the coastal region between Heraclea Minoa 65 Wilson 1982, 7–20; Wilson 1985, 11–35 (two farmhouses in Campanaio and Castagna); De Miro 1966A, 227; De Miro 1980, 717–721; Campagna 1996, 111–122 (examples of the Greek “green bricks” technique used in Heraclea Minoa). 66 Ciaceri 1902, 33, note 2 (suggested that Azones was the Punic denomination of Heraclea Minoa: but this conjecture has to be rejected, because Diodorus unambiguously made a distinction between the two cities); Hamburger 1927, 82, note 2 (identified Azones with Thermae Selinuntiae); Pareti 1959, 252 (Azones should be the modern Ribera); Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 53 (Azones should be the modern Mazara del Vallo). See Bejor 1972–1973, 247–250; Bejor 1982A, 445–458 (the reports of the excavations in Rocca Nadore).

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and Selinous. The cliff, which is very steep on three sides, slopes down gently eastwards, where the hill is clearly broken up by two cross embankments, corresponding to a double fortification “ad aggere”67. That is a wall built with a double hanging, using crushed stones, cobblestones and chunks; the interstices are filled usually with mould, chips of stone and cobbles. It was a very fast procedure, which was adopted by those communities who needed to build up their protections quickly and did not have any stone quarries in the neighbourhood (or maybe they had some troubles in carrying the blocks and set them running in sites – like Rocca Nadore – that were not easily accessible). This kind of fortification system, which once was thought to have been used exclusively during the archaic age, exploited the geomorphology of the ground, taking advantage of the differences in height, of the crags and of the overhanging rocks, to incorporate them into the strategic and defensive plan, whose outcome was quite always asymmetrical. Of course, the case of Rocca Nadore shows that the technique was used too during the Classical age and even in the first times of the Hellenistic age. No doubt, the defensive system of Rocca Nadore has some surprising resemblances with other sites of Sicily, whose fortifications are dated to the Bronze Age or to the Iron Age, and even outside Sicily, such as the site of Mursia, in the island of Pantelleria68; here the village is on the top of an hill which is precipitous on three sides, and protected on the fourth side by a natural “aggere” which is 200 meters long, and with a wall that was quite 8 meters high. But there are even some well known examples of the Classical age and even of the beginning of the Hellenistic age that can be easily compared with Rocca Nadore; among them, the fortification systems of Gibil Gabib69, Sabucina70 and Monte Saraceno71. Furthermore, the ramparts of Rocca Nadore show that the technique was adopted not only by the local communities or by the Greek city-states, but even by the Carthaginians settled in Sicily. On the top of Rocca Nadore, where in the past there was probably a shrine, many vestiges of the Medieval city-plan have been brought to light, and among them there is a section of the walls which divides the top from the eastern slope. This part of the walls is very important, because it was placed on the top of a number of buildings that have the floors made with pressed crocks; both the filled level of the ground and the supporting stratum gave back many scraps of pottery that were useful to date the whole complex between the end of the IV century and the beginning of the III century BC. Some other buildings are contemporary, too; 67 Adamesteanu 1956, 358–372; Bonacasa Carra 1974, 92–118, and focusing on Rocca Nadore at 109. For the chronology of this kind of fortification, that Adamesteanu thought being exclusive of the archaic age, see Scranton 1941, 145–148; Winter 1971, 80–81. 68 Verger 1966, 249–275. 69 Adamesteanu 1955, 185–186; Adamesteanu 1956, 367–368; Adamesteanu 1957, 172– 173; Adamesteanu 1958A, 52–54; Adamesteanu 1958B, 387–408. 70 Adamesteanu 1956, 368–369; Orlandini 1963, 86–96; Orlandini 1965, 135; Orlandini 1966, 94–95. 71 Mingazzini 1937–1938, 623–628 (dating the whole system between the end of the IV century and the beginning of the III century BC); De Miro 1956, 270–271; Adamesteanu 1956, 361– 362 (rejecting the earlier chronology; he suggested to date the fortifications to the archaic age); Adamesteanu 1958A, 47–50; Orlandini 1962, 96–98.

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they were in part cut into the rocks and have been discovered along the layout of a street running on the board of the slope, between the Medieval wall and the upper “aggere”. The main characteristic of these buildings is that they all show a thick level with plain signs of a violent destruction; this level is full of pottery scraps (especially, slips of Punic amphorae72), that may be dated generally between the end of the IV century and the beginning of the III century BC. Among the other information provided by the field excavations of Rocca Nadore, it is necessary to emphasize those coming from the drillings made near the fortifications “ad aggere”, where long sections of the city-walls have been located; they were built with irregular calcareous blocks. Especially, quite near the southern precipice, there are clear vestiges of a square-based tower, that was connected with an isolated rocky spur on the south-eastern side, thanks to a communication trench. In this area, too, the archaeologists found the usual remains and materials dated to the end of the IV century or the beginning of the III century BC. The analysis of the discovered materials, made by Giorgio Bejor, seems to be unquestionable and provides a very clear scenario. The period of development of the fortress in Rocca Nadore was very short, as it is clearly showed by the findings, and it may be correctly dated between the end of the IV century and the beginning of the III century BC. The site, standing over an earlier settlement of huts, went through the influence of the Greeks settled in the neighbouring Selinous, and then became of the greatest strategic importance when the region of Sciacca became a persistent part of the Carthaginian ejpikravteia. The above-mentioned barrage made with forts and strongholds was very useful for the Punic forces, who thought that it was a sort of defensive buttress behind the advanced post of Heraclea Minoa. Then, in the first half of the III century BC, the fortress of Rocca Nadore suffered a violent destruction, and the site remained deserted until the Middle Ages. As much as for Heraclea Minoa, only two historical events may be connected with Rocca Nadore and with its annihilation for that period, that are the military expedition of Pyrrhus and the first stage of the Punic war. Some pretty historical considerations compel to choose the first event; first of all, the king of Epirus had necessarily to run the blockade of Rocca Nadore to reach the Greek city-state of Selinous, while during the first war against the Carthaginians the Roman troops never needed to travel the western land route alongside the southern coast of Sicily, between Heraclea and Selinous. That’s why the association of the village of Azones with the Punic fort of Rocca Nadore seems to be very plausible; this hypothesis is supported too by the results of the following excavations endorsed by the Soprintendenza of Agrigento in the territory of Sciacca, concerning some native villages (influenced by the Greek presence), as well as some rural settlements. The excavations provided information that have a surprising resemblance with those about Rocca Nadore. The data obtained from the excavations made in contrada San Benedetto, near Caltabellotta (which has been quite univocally associated by the scholars to the ancient Triokala), are very interesting. The site, which was part of the natural de72 For the typology, see Cintas 1950, nr. 312–316; Bisi 1967B, 37.

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fensive system that protected – together with Rocca Nadore and mount San Calogero – the southern territories of the Punic ejpikravteia, got in touch with the Greek populations from the beginning of the VI century BC. The Greek village, placed on a rocky terrace of the mount Gulea, is surrounded by a mighty fortification wall, built with the technique “ad aggere”, which runs along the ridge of the hill where there are no natural defences (the site is surrounded by sheer cliffs to the north and to the south; to the west, the slant slopes down gently to the valley of Spinasanta, that divides Caltabellotta from Rocca Nadore). The field surveys showed that the original plan of the fortifications dates back to the VI/V centuries BC; although in part they have been restructured, they were used constantly until the end of the IV century BC. Even the Greek acculturation of the site of Caltabellotta played a key role in the policy of expansion promoted by the citizens of Selinous, who wanted to take the complete control of the inland trade routes going inside from the southern coastline of Sicily, up to the valley of Belice; and Caltabellotta continued to stay under the control of Selinous even in the IV century BC, when the city-state was dominated by the Carthaginians. Actually, many Punic coins that were minted at the end of the IV century BC have been found at Caltabellotta; quite the reverse, no objects datable later than the III century BC have been discovered. Reasonably, this situation seems to suggest that the site was completely deserted more or less in the age of the first Punic war; but the above-mentioned information may even drive to a comparison with the condition of some other settlements in the neighbourhood, like Rocca Nadore, that in all probability suffered fiercely the storming passage of Pyrrhus’ army73. With regard to the suburban settlements, the field survey converged on five inland settlements, which have been dated thanks to a comparative analysis of the objects that were found on the ground’s surface. Two farmhouses date back to the Hellenistic and Roman ages (one is contrada Gaddimi, the other in contrada Scunchipani), while the other three lived their best period of prosperity during the Roman Imperial age, even if the finds suggest that they were settled at an early stage, perhaps at the beginning of the Hellenistic age (the three farms are in contrada Guardabbasso, Montagnola and Locogrande)74. The Hellenistic/Roman farmhouse of contrada Gaddimi is even more distant from the coastline than Rocca Nadore itself; nevertheless, the remains attest that there were flourishing commercial activities in the area, and so it may be inferred that the site was for sure in touch with the villages and the city-states on the southern seashores of Sicily. The large amount of pottery (“aretina” and “terra sigillata”) should indicate that the farm was populated in the Roman Imperial age, but in the deeper levels of the ground many slips of early Campanian pottery have been recovered, and so the beginnings of the farmhouse can be dated back to the end of the IV century BC. Particularly, many scraps of little cups painted on their bases with black-glazed circles, or even with black palms, have been discovered; this class of 73 For the final results of the field excavations at San Benedetto, around Caltabellotta, see Panvini Di Stefano 1986–1987, 105–109; Panvini Di Stefano 1988–1989, 559–572; Panvini Di Stefano 1993–1994, 755–763. 74 See Tirnetta 1978, 156–174.

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pottery comes first the Campanian cups and plates of the class C, which have on the base the typical palm-shaped or rose-shaped mark, and may be dated in Sicily between the second half of the IV century and the first years of the III century BC75. The farmhouse of contrada Guardabbasso is more or less 1 Km. far from contrada Gaddimi, and it seems that it had some relationships with the latter, as it is shown by the pottery that has been found there; actually, there are few slips of Attic black-glazed pottery, which reveal that the site was frequented in the VI and V centuries BC, but there’s a great amount of scraps of Roman Imperial pottery, that can be dated to the I century A.D. Therefore, there is an incredible chronological hiatus between the first moments of life in contrada Guardabbasso and the flourishing period of the Imperial age; it has been suggested that there may be a connection between the abandonment of this site and the first historical stages of the Gaddimi’s farm. The early establishment of the Locogrande farmhouse cannot be earlier than the second half of V century BC: thanks to the discovery of some scraps of early Campanian pottery that may be compared with those brought to light at capo Soprano, near Gela (they have been dated to the age of Timoleon), the life at Locogrande may be extended up to the end of IV century BC. Nonetheless, the most important datum is that at Locogrande there is no archaeological evidence that can be dated to the following centuries (between III century BC and I century A.D.). Therefore, the site was abandoned, and it is not so hazardous to suggest that the reason of the leaving was exactly the same that caused the destruction of Rocca Nadore; that is, the passage of Pyrrhus’ army which, trying to reach the eastern slope of the Punic fortress, had to begin with an outflank of the foothills of mount San Calogero, and then to go up along the streams Portolana and Carabollace (the farmhouse of Locogrande is exactly nearby the latter). In conclusion, it may be said that not only the fortified Punic garrison of Azones suffered the consequences of Pyrrhus’ triumphal march, but even the rural settlements surrounding the Carthaginian defensive system commencing at Caltabellotta (on the north), and arriving at mount San Calogero (on the south), through Rocca Nadore. Even recalling to mind the above-mentioned information about Heraclea Minoa, it is not possible to make reliable chronological or historical analogies with the events of Azones; nevertheless, assuming that in Heraclea too the reduction of the city started in the first quarter of the III century BC (while it had a new expansion in the age of the two Punic wars), and that the fortification walls built by the Carthaginians in the eastern sector of the city can be explained as a defensive bulwark used against a dangerous menace coming from the southern coastline (that is, the direction of Pyrrhus’ advance), the two situations may be easily resembled. 75 Tirnetta 1978, 160–164 (pottery scraps found in the Gaddimi’s farmhouse). As regards the early Campanian pottery, a useful resemblance may be done with the fragments discovered at capo Soprano, near Gela, that have been dated between the end of the IV century and the beginning of the III century BC: see Adamesteanu – Orlandini 1956, 353, fig. 12, nr. 1–5; Orlandini 1957, 54, group A. For the palm-shaped decorations, see Morel 1965, 11 (plates 2 and 39) and 16 (plates 3 and 39). For the chronology and the typology of the “terra sigillata”, with reference to the scraps of contrada Gaddimi, the basic work is Hayes 1972, 21–37.

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Anyway, I believe that the meaning of Pyrrhus’ march through the different areas of Sicily is twofold, and it needs to be stressed: his progression was as much victorious and peaceful during the autumn of 278 BC, as swift and full of skirmishes and fights during the following war’s season, which culminated in the siege of Lilybaeum. It could not be diverse: it is basic to understand that Pyrrhus’ assault on the Punic ejpikravteia had first of all an upsetting effect on the Greek city-states that were involved in it; somewhere, like in Heraclea Minoa, the king had to face the unavoidable opposition of the Carthaginian garrisons that held sway over the Greek communities; somewhere else, the wish of liberation prevailed among the Greeks, who often threw out by themselves the Punic occupying forces and handed over their own fates to Pyrrhus, by means of a keen obedience. In that moment, the Greek city-states of the ejpikravteia showed many unquestionable signs of unsteadi­ ness, even with reference to the swift change of the kind of relationship between the suburban settlements and the urban area, resulting in a growing development of the farmhouses and a reduction of the city. At least for Rocca Nadore, the disturbances seem to have been thoroughly connected with the relentless advance of Pyrrhus; while waiting for some new archaeological information, I guess that a mutual correlation between the two events cannot be excluded “a priori” even with reference to Heraclea Minoa. 2.7. The war-campaign of 277 BC. From Selinous to Eryx; Pyrrhus’ march through the Elymian territories As soon as he forced the Carthaginian defensive line in the area of Sciacca, Pyrrhus and his army went on along the coastal way towards Selinous. In the summary of Diodorus’ book 22 (10, 2), it seems clear that the historical source had a clear intention to underline that from the arrival at Selinous until the siege of Eryx all the citystates handed over themselves to the king willingly, without any opposition of the Carthaginian occupying forces: this was a sign that after the first successes gained by Sosistratus in Agrigentum, and then by Pyrrhus at Heraclea Minoa and Azones, the Carthaginian troops preferred to withdraw in the direction of the most safe and protected areas of their Sicilian dominions. Therefore, before arriving at Eryx, Pyrrhus touched Selinous, Haliciae and finally Segesta, that one after another sided with him, together with many other citystates. It seems quite pointless trying to find in the excavations’ data coming from these sites some evidence about the passage of the Greek army; nevertheless, it is necessary to spend some words at least to face two questions, concerning respectively the fortified city walls of Selinous’ acropolis, and the site of the ancient Haliciae. As regards the fortifications of Selinous, the most noteworthy feature that marks the area of the acropolis after the chronological turning point of 409 BC is the conclusion of the great architectural season, with the typical temples and urban buildings of the Archaic and Classical ages, and the beginning of a typical military architecture after the devastations produced by the Carthaginian attack. What every

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visitor can see at present is for the greatest part following the historical event of 409 BC, and is due to the rebuilding ordered by the Syracusan Hermocrates. The refurbishments of the city walls were limited and made very promptly; this is shown patently by the indiscriminate use of blocks and mouldings coming from the temples that were earlier destroyed; but even by the lacking of any bond between the old curtain and the new walls, that are only resting one against the other; and finally, the inadequate thickness of the eastern curtain’s foundations76. Towards the end of the IV century BC the whole complex of Selinous’ fortification walls thoroughly changed, because the new buildings were developed in a more advanced position than the original bulwarks; this method allowed the establishment of a new defensive theory, that is the idea of an “aggressive” defence, since the new buildings allowed to make swift sorties outside the walls. At Selinous, side by side to the city walls, some outposts with approaching trenches were created, together with some gateways placed in the defensive curtain at a quite regular distance one from another. Some passages in the embankment made available a steady communication line with the city. This system was built along the whole eastern side of the city, including even the terraced levels dated to the Archaic age, while the western side shows only some signs of the beginning of the work, which was never finished there. At any rate, the core of the new defensive system was the mighty northern rampart, which was used to replace the earlier barricades and to put forward to a large extent the defensive line. It is made of a man-made ditch and of a system of galleries built on three flats; these were efficient for well-prepared sorties, because the soldiers could have a profitable advantage from the covering provided by the war machines, that were placed on the two round-based towers set on the northern and eastern sides of the galleries. Some level investigations on the ground, made near the whole set of buildings, date the new structures between the end of the IV century and the beginning of the III century BC. This chronology is strengthened even by the final results of the stratigraphic analysis of the western walls, that show in large segments clear marks of destruction (which seems to be linked with the unfinished stage of the outposts) and of a following repair, that can be dated to the second quarter of the III century BC77. Very important information is provided by the western sector of the walls, where all the gates show clear marks of fire and destruction; at the end of 1800s, some wooden vestiges of the doors together with their iron gratings were discov76 See Di Vita 1953, 39–47; Di Vita 1967, 33–59; Tusa 1971A, 47–68; Tusa 1975, 283–295; De La Genière 1975, 68–107; Rallo 1976–1977, 720–733; Martin 1977, 46–63; Di Vita 1980, 803–829; De La Genière 1981, 211–217; Tusa 1986, 111–119; Mertens 1985–1987, 53–58; Mertens 1988–1989, 573–594; Mertens 1989A, 87–154; Mertens 1989B, 391–398; Di Vita 1990, 353–356; Mertens – Drummer 1993–1994, 1479–1491. With particular reference to the mouldings and blocks of archaic temples and buildings that were used again for the creation of the new fortification system, it may be worth quoting the archaic metope (the so-called “little metope”), that have been incorporated everywhere in the city walls, including the defensive towers: Tusa 1969, 153–171; Mertens 1988–1989, 591–594; Mertens 1993, 131–138. 77 Krischen 1941, 29–33; Winter 1963, 363–387; Garlan 1974, 184–190; Lawrence 1979, 288–296; Mertens 1988–1989, 581–585; Karlsson 1989, 77–89.

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ered. These are unquestionable signs of a vigorous assault against the city, that can be set chronologically in the first half of the III century BC. Only two historical events, whose evidence is provided by the literary sources, can be linked with the information offered by the archaeological excavations; Pyrrhus’ attack during the war campaign of 277 BC, otherwise the desertion of the city made by the Cartha­ ginians in 250 BC, when they devastated Selinous before their own withdrawal to Lilybaeum. It is not easy to choose between the two happenings, because both the situations are plausible. On the one hand, connecting the march of Pyrrhus with the demolition of the western walls of Selinous would mean to underestimate the account of Diodorus’ summary, which stresses the peaceful surrender of the city to the king; on the other hand, thinking about an intended demolition of the fortifications made by the Carthaginians in 250 BC would set many more troubles with the chronology, because it would compel moving the date of the western curtain’s restorations to at least the third quarter of the III century, which clearly does not match with the information obtained from the above-mentioned ground investigations. It is not possible to state certainly who assaulted the western side of Selinous’ fortifications; nevertheless, it is more plausible to suspect that the historical source of information of Diodorus (perhaps the Epirote historian Proxenus) wanted to describe the anti-Carthaginian expedition of Pyrrhus using the features of an absolutely unstoppable advance. A second question bothered many scholars, that is the identity of the designers and the builders of the whole complex. The undoubtedly highly developed system of fortifications, that may be compared in the western Mediterranean – and particularly in Sicily – only with the Syracusan bulwarks of the Eurialus’ castle, drove the greatest amount of the scholars to think that the embankments were built at the end of the IV century BC, during the age of Agathocles. I believe indeed that these mighty outposts are an extraordinary masterpiece of the Carthaginian engineers78. It may be useful to recall that in the western sector of the city walls, which was less protected, the outpost were left unfinished, quite at the project level; on the other hand, the work was finished – even if quickly – in the eastern sector of the edge. Well, these operations really do not match with the exigencies of Agathocles, who had for sure to reinforce the defensive system towards the west; quite the opposite, the potential danger for the Carthaginians could come only from the eastern part of Sicily, through the southern coastal route. That’s why they were forced to complete swiftly the new outposts on the eastern side of the city; they could not surprisingly overlook the western embankments, because beyond that side there were the safe territories of their ejpikravteia. In the transitional period between the IV and the III century BC, Selinous was not at all a “small city”; the turn of phrase has been used by Mertens79, and it may be worth of being enlightened. The city in the IV century BC had for sure a urban planimetry that was more restricted than the massive extensions of the plan dated to 78 Krischen 1941, 33; Lawrence 1979, 294–295; Tréziny 1986, 189 (age of Agathocles); Martin 1977, 62–63 (Carthaginian architects). 79 Mertens 1988–1989, 584–585.

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the Archaic and Classical ages; just in this way, it may be said that it was “small” but not if we consider the wealth and the human resources. This assertion is supported by the numismatic evidence; it has been pointed out that, while all the numismatic finds of the late 1950s in the whole cwvra of Selinous demonstrated a large circulation of bronze coinage – which was connected with the daily economic necessities and the minor commercial activities –, in the area of the acropolis three coin hoards were discovered; they were all dated between the IV century and the III century BC, and they all contained silver coins. Therefore, they were the proof of another stage of the economic life of Selinous, that is the treasured up wealth80. Therefore, the city was not so decadent, and even in the following decades some very famous architects were able to project and complete important buildings. This seems to be corroborated by an inscription from Tharros (Sardinia), which has been dated between the III and the II century BC, where one “Baalshillek, architect of the people of Rošhmelqart” is mentioned81. The inscription RŠMLQRT is typical of a plentiful Carthaginian coinage, whose issues adopted some emblematic Syracusan devices: – Obv. Quadriga driven by a charioteer: a flying Nike crowns him. Under the line of exergue, there is an inscription (in Punic letters) RŠMLQRT. Rev. Female head. According to the evidence of the coin hoards, the chronology of the issues covers all the second half of the IV century BC, with two percentage heights in the decades 340/330 and 310/300 BC. The legend RŠMLQRT, as it is suggested from the resemblance of the epigraphic inscription from Tharros, clearly refers to a placename, not to a Punic political institution82. Therefore, the architect came from the same Sicilian place where there was the Punic mint that issued the coinage bearing the legend RŠMLQRT: it has been recently suggested that the place was exactly the city of Selinous, and the conjecture seems to be plausible, even in view of the fact that during the Hellenistic age the city went through a great architectural development. 80 Cutroni Tusa 1961, 150–156; Carbè 1986, 3–20. A comparison with all the materials recovered on the acropolis of Selinous is made by Isler 1994E, 165–168. 81 The most clear analysis of the inscription has been made by Amadasi Guzzo 1992, 523–532, who is favourable to identify the coin legend RŠMLQRT with the homeland of the architect who was mentioned in the stone from Tharros. On the same inscription, see Jenkins 1971, 53–55; Cutroni Tusa 1982–1983, 213–226; Cutroni Tusa 1983A, 37–42; Cutroni Tusa 1993, 245–269; Cutroni Tusa 1995, 235–239; Amadasi Guzzo 1997, 81–85. 82 The idea that the coinage legend refers to a political (or cultural) Punic office, which had even some administrative functions, has been suggested by Manfredi 1985, 3–8 and then by Manfredi 1995, 115–117: it has been shared by Mildenberg 1989, 8; Mildenberg 1992, 289– 293; Mildenberg 1993, 7–8 (“RŠMLQRT […] is not a name of a city or location, but a Carthaginian provincial institution in Western Sicily”); Mildenberg 1996, 259–272. Against this point of view, Bonnet 1988, 268, note 106. A general survey on the other critical positions in AA.VV. 1992, 377–378; Visonà 1995, 168–169. Amadasi Guzzo 2000, 1–12 highlights other two occurrences of the inscription RŠMLQRT on the stone, coming from Carthage (see Jongeling – Hoftijzer 1995, 866).

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From Selinous, Pyrrhus began to enter inland into the Carthaginian ejpikravteia, through the territories of the Elymian population. First of all, this action meant that the king lost the support of the navy that went along with him on the sea-route from Agrigentum to Selinous, which was in all probability the place where the warships cast anchor. Indeed, it seems very unlikely that the warships arriving from Syracuse could go on westwards with their circumnavigation of Sicily, sailing in waters that were undeniably under the complete control of the Punic fleet: therefore, it is better to conjecture that Pyrrhus’ armada stayed rode at anchor in a Greek harbour of the southern coast of Sicily. While Pyrrhus was advancing northwards, many cities of the Elymian region handed themselves willingly over the king. Among them, Diodorus mentioned Haliciae and Segesta. The exact location of the former is still an unsolved matter, owing to the poor and insufficient evidence provided by the sources that can be referred to the city. The main doubt at present is about the existence of two different sites named Haliciae, one established in the eastern districts of Sicily, the other in the western part of the island. Scholars debate especially a passage of Thucydides’ histories (7, 32), where the historian quotes the citizens of Centuripe in association with those of Haliciae, but this does not mean that there was even a geographic connection between the two sites83. The city is twice mentioned by Stephanus of Byzantium (s.vv. ÔAlikuvai and ∆Akravgante~); at first, he says that the city was mentioned even by Theopompus (FGrHist 115 F 365), and that it can be located between Entella and Lilybaeum; then he recalls a passage of Duris (FGrHist 76 F 46), who stated that Haliciae was among those Sicilian city-states that got their name from a river. Therefore, trusting Stephanus, Haliciae was in all probability a city that had been founded near a river; unfortunately, this topographical description somehow matches that of many other settlements of western Sicily, that had often been settled in dominating positions above the hills, where the inhabitants could easily control the river routes. Anyway, the too specific location provided by Stephanus – that is between Entella and Lilybaeum – can be further detailed84. Diodorus (14, 48, 4–5), referring to the historical events of 397 BC, tells that the troops of Dionysius of Syracuse, after ravaging the territories of Solous and Panormus and before laying siege to Segesta and Entella, run through and devastated the woody neighbourhood of Haliciae; the five cities, says Diodorus, were in friendly relationship with the Carthaginians. This information, if associated with the slight evidence provided by Stephanus, allows to limit the previously men83 See Thuc. 7, 32. The hypothesis of two cities named Haliciae is supported by Kahrstedt 1947, 28–31; Pareti 1959, 38; Manni 1976A, 16–17; Manni 1976B, 611. The better conjecture of a single Haliciae is proposed by Raubitschek 1944, 13–14; Bejor 1973, 741–765. 84 It can be interesting to note that, according to the German humanist Philipp Cluver – nicknamed Cluverius – the name of Haliciae could have been stem from the Greek word a{l~, and this could drive to the conclusion that the city had been settled exactly along an ancient commercial route (on the trading routes of the salt, see usefully Traina 1992, 363–378). The hypothesis has been rejected by Beloch 1893A, 632, and more recently by Chantraine 1968, I, 65. The place-name should have stem from the languages of Asia Minor according to Durante 1961, 89, note 34.

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tioned territory between Lilybaeum and Entella to a part of the region included between Segesta and Entella, where the site of Haliciae can be rightly located; the cwvra of the city had to extend both northwards and eastwards, towards Panormus and Solous85. As regards to the location of Haliciae’s remains on the ground, the most recent archaeological excavations proved that it is impossible to situate the ancient city at Monte Castellazzo, near Poggioreale86; many scholars, who relied only upon the information provided by Stephanus of Byzantium, concurrently suggested to place Haliciae in the modern site of Salemi: nevertheless, some excavations that have been performed recently brought to light in the habitation area only some vestiges of the Roman age and of the early Christian times: the materials discovered in some suburban settlements (Monte Polizzo; Montagna Grande; Monte Finestrelle)87 do not allow at present any enlightenment about the nature of the sites, and not even with reference to their plausible bond with the Elymians88. Therefore, it seems that the puzzle about Haliciae cannot be worked out with certainty with the present data: the only point that cannot be questioned is that the city belonged to the Elymian zone which, thanks to the passage of Pyrrhus’ soldiers, began for the greatest number of its cities a sort of release from that propitious dependence from the Carthaginians, that had been established a long time before. The emancipation of cities like Segesta, Haliciae and many other in favour of a new power which was out of the ordinary if considered under the point of view of the Sicilian political background (with reference to the situation of the previous decades, the focal points of Sicilian history had been Syracuse and the Carthaginians), was counterbalanced by the pretty exclusive pro-Carthaginian behaviour of some other Elymian centres, like Eryx, that by then had been completely incorporated – politically, strategically and economically – into the Punic ejpikravteia. Domenico Musti has rightly pointed out that Segesta’s devotion to Pyrrhus must not be considered as an expression of shared aims with the local Greek communities, but as a general acceptance of the unifying role of the foreign political power in 85 See Bejor 1984, 169. 86 The suggestion was put forward by Adamesteanu 1962, 205. For the survey about the excavations at Monte Castellazzo, see Tusa 1972A, 57–60; Falsone – Leonard Jr. 1979, 59–78; Falsone 1990, 301–312; Fresina 1993, 61–66; Spanò Giammellaro 1993, 159–164; Spatafora 1993, 165–171. 87 Holm 1901, I, 137–138; Ziegler 1912B, coll. 2265–2266; Pace 19582, I, 116, note 5; Pareti 1959, 72; Storti 1997, 1287–1296 (Haliciae on the site of modern Salemi). For a general survey of the archaeological excavations in Salemi, see Novara 1975, 47–55; Bejor 1986, 515: with reference to the surroundings, particularly to Monte Polizzo, Tusa 1972–1973, 395; Tusa 1972B, 119–121; Vassallo 1992, 434–435; De Cesare – Gargini 1997, 371–374. 88 The problem of the ethnic nature of the people living in Haliciae has been long questioned by the scholars. Haliciae could have been a Sikanian city (Holm 1901, I, 137–138 and Butti De Lima 1997, 183–204); a city of the Sicels (Ziegler 1912B, col. 2265; Ziegler 1967, col. 924; Bejor 1973, 742–744; Bejor 1982B, 838–839); a city of the Elymians (Manni 1976B, 611; Nenci 1990, 21; Gallo 1992, 317–318 and 328–329). Finally, Musti 1990, 162 and Cataldi 1997, 303–356, suggested convincingly that the city was multiethnic, including Elymians and Sikanians, as well as Greek elements.

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relation to the Elymian territory, whose cities in that moment claimed clearly their own difference from the Punic context89. Segesta, too, shows very important innovations – proved by the archaeological finds – at the beginning of the III century BC, especially pertaining to the new relationship that was established between the city and her countryside, after the political crisis of the last decade of IV century BC. Indeed, in the neighbourhood of Segesta the basic element of the suburban background is the single farmhouse, whose dimensions were enough reduced; the evidence on the ground is marked by the presence of imported objects. The materials that have been discovered in the course of recent excavations are absolutely standardized, and they include above all Punic amphorae, Graeco-Italic amphorae and many pieces of local black-glazed pottery. A warning sign is represented by the plentiful loom-weights, that provide strong evidence for the diffusion of the stock-raising and the commercial activities bond with the wool. This kind of settlement, associated with the presence of nearby rivers and with connections to the main trade routes, endures even in the cwvra of Segesta, at least until the age of the Slave revolts90. Another characteristic of the suburban scenery of Segesta in the Hellenistic age is the presence of some villages, whose dimensions were usually considerable; they can be recognized even because the manufactured articles are very humble. All the villages that have been already located are far away from the city of Segesta, and they are particularly scattered in the northern zone; they have been usually established above the hills, but even in close proximity to the rivers and the watercourses. If for a moment we recall to mind the above-mentioned situation of Heraclea Minoa, it can be seen that even the condition of Segesta and of her hinterland is not so different; actually, it seems that the progressive decadence and, at the same time, the inability to preserve the citizens into the towns were the two basic causes of the strong development of the settlements into the “extra muros” lands. Another interesting piece of information comes out from the final results of the excavations that have been recently exploited in the necropolis “SAS 15”, dated to the Hellenistic age. In the excavation area 123 single graves of a different kind have been discovered: for the greatest part (109 tombs), we have inhumations in graves that usually were not filled up; the other are cremation burials, and quite half of the ashes were buried in graves, while the other in cinerary urns. As regards the funerary equipments, the vases are usually similar both for their shapes and for their quality; a large amount of unguentaria have been discovered, and the blackglazed pottery was no doubt local production. Furthermore, many little amphorae of a shape which is typical in western Sicily during the Hellenistic age, have been brought to light. It may be worth to stress that twelve Graeco-Italic amphorae have been discovered91 and that there is a quite complete lack of any other objects in the 89 Musti 1990, 167–171. A general survey of the political behaviour of Segesta and the Elymians in the age of Agathocles is in Consolo Langher 1997B, 396–399. 90 Bernardini – Cambi – Molinari – Neri 2000, 100–104. As regards the single farmhouses, see Martin – Vallet 1980, I 2, 321–354; Bove 1994, 79–111. 91 The amphorae of the “SAS 15” necropolis have to be yet evaluated; it can be worth saying that

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contents of the whole necropolis; just few bronze coins have been found, together with some strigils and astragals. The chronological and even anthropological evidence coming out from the analysis of the objects discovered in the “SAS 15” necropolis is fascinating. The chronology can be considered quite sure, thanks to the comparative analysis of the local shapes discovered in the habitation area of Segesta and in the excavations at Porta di Valle (“SAS 7” excavation area). Apart from some objects, no one among the different shapes found in the grave goods of the necropolis can be dated earlier than the end of IV century/beginning of the III century BC; nay, a lot of those shapes did not circulate before the beginning of the III century BC (some little bottles were distributed not earlier than the second half of the III century BC). No doubt, this necropolis was installed after Agathocles’ siege against Segesta (307 BC), and it was used for the whole III century BC92. While waiting that the preliminary reports given by Babette Bechtold improve with new data, a final observation can be made about the coexistence in the Hellenistic necropolis “SAS 15” of three different kinds of burials: even if the inhumations are predominant, it may be reasonable to understand the three diverse types of burials as a clear proof that the necropolis was used by people who had several cultural peculiarities, and perhaps it is not so hazardous to conjecture that the graves themselves belonged to persons coming from quite a few ethnic groups; the same groups that are typical of the cultural background of Segesta in the III century BC, and that in my view are a clear sign of the growing necessity to differentiate the local ethnic group from the Punic cultural background which previously influenced the city. The march of Pyrrhus went on northwards, to the Carthaginian stronghold in Eryx, which was destined to become the setting of one among the most magnificent gestures of the king during his Sicilian venture. Indeed, the conquest of Eryx, that seemed to be very difficult by reason of the location of the fortress (which was naturally fortified and strengthened by a mighty system of barricades), had a very special, ideological meaning in the projects of Pyrrhus; this viewpoint is pointed out particularly in Plutarch’s narrative of the event (Pyrrh. 22, 7–12). The historian says that Eryx was the most secure among the Carthaginian possessions in western Sicily, and the one that could count on the greatest amount of they have been found in some other excavation areas in Segesta, where they were often mixed with the Punic amphorae of the “Mañá C” kind (see Mañá 1951, 71–78; Van Der Werff 1977–1978, 171–200), as it has been pointed out by Bisi 1989, 594–596. An example of this association was found in the “SAS 5” excavation area: see Denaro 1997, 537–548. The Graeco-Italic amphorae are a warning sign for the chronology of the sites, because they were produced from the end of IV century to the end of II century BC; see the surveys of Will 1982, 338–356; Manacorda 1986, 581–586; Van Der Mersch 1994. I just want to single out that the find of a particular kind of “Mañá C” Punic amphora in Mozia has been used to show that the habitation area of the island was still populated in the second half of the IV century BC: see Toti 1997, 1297–1304. 92 A preliminary report of the excavation data about the “SAS 15” necropolis can be found in Bechtold 2000, 79–90. A chronological table referring to the local pottery discovered in the excavations at Porta di Valle (“SAS 7”) will be soon published: see the forthcoming volume Segesta III. Le difese di Porta di Valle.

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defensors. When Pyrrhus decided to assault the fortifications, he at first appealed to Heracles, vowing him sacred games and sacrifices, if he showed to all the Greeks living in Sicily that the king was a fighter worthy both of his descent and of the current events. Then he made his attack; like Alexander the Great, he was the first to climb the city walls, making a massacre of his opponents. Plutarch emphasized that he did not suffer any wound, and that he was a clear example of what Homer meant, when he wrote that only the bravery – among all other virtues – often inspires mighty exuberances. Plutarch provides for sure the hint useful to make some reflections. Some modern scholars rightly emphasized the atmosphere of the passage, which is typical of Homer’s epic narrative; nonetheless, it is explicitly attested by a direct mention of Homer’s turn of phrase. Of course, the historical source of information for Plutarch had to be naturally favourable to the Epirote king; at present, the critics quite univocally identify this author with the court-historian Proxenus93. What deserves the greatest attention is no doubt the constant reference to Heracles, who was evoked before the battle and then honoured with sacrifices and games after the success. Pyrrhus, who boasted to have a descent from the hero94, wanted clearly to repeat Heracles’ exploits, showing to be a worthy successor of him and conquering the same territory which – in the common belief of the Greeks, and particularly those living in Sicily – belonged to the Heraclidai from the mythical ages, when Heracles achieved it, after the defeat of the eponymous local hero Eryx95. Therefore, Pyrrhus’ action was a claim to belong to a very renowned stock, and it was not chance, because it allowed him to overcome brilliantly the troubles concerning his equivocal Greek origin, referring to a well-known symbol of the Panhellenic ideals, like Heracles. Furthermore, that claim had a high priority meaning and a political aim; according to Plutarch, the reference to Heracles was used exactly to show to the Greeks of Sicily that the basilikh; hJgemoniva of Pyrrhus had a “divine” nature, and that it went beyond a simple heritage, provided by the kinship he attained after the marriage with Lanassa, i.e. Agathocles’ daughter96.

93 For the episod of Eryx, see Lévêque 1957, 478–479; La Bua 1980, 233–234; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 54–56. As regards the identification of Proxenus as the source of Plutarch, see Schubert 1894, 31; Von Scala 1896, 71; I do not agree with Hamburger 1927, 83, note 5, who suggested that the source of information was Timaeus. The turn of phrase assigned to Homer can be easily found in many passages of the Ilias (e.g. 5, 185: 6, 101: 9, 238). 94 The mythical ancestry linking Pyrrhus with Heracles was stemming exactly from the marriage between Neoptolemus Pyrrhus (the son of Achilles) and Lanassa (Heracles’ niece); Just. 17, 3, 3–4. The legend was probably elaborated by the Epirote court-historian Proxenus, to celebrate the authentic marriage between king Pyrrhus and Agathocles’ daughter; Vartsos 1963–1964, 92; La Bua 1971A, 30–31. 95 The basic narrative about Heracles’ mythical conquest of the lands near Eryx is Herod. 5, 43, 1; see the critical readings of Nenci 1995, 215 and Braccesi 1999, 39–42. 96 As regards the meaning of Pyrrhus’ reference to Heracles during the siege of Eryx, see Nenci 1953, 70–72; De Vido 1997, 201; Braccesi 1999, 80–82 (a very original – but unconvincing – reading, considering Pyrrhus’ propaganda as an ideological attack against the Spartan king Areus I).

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The appeal to Heracles had to be very important, since Diodorus (22, 10, 3) as well refers to it; furthermore, the historian underlined a detail that was omitted by Plutarch. Diodorus says that the siege laid by Pyrrhus to Eryx lasted of course for much time; this was due to the fact that the city took great advantage from the natural defences, because the plateau where it was settled is on the top of a rock whose faces fall sheer on two sides; the third one slowly slopes down to the sea, towards the gulf of Trapani. Furthermore, the fortress was surrounded with mighty walls, that may be seen at present; their thickness is about 2–3 meters, and they are regularly interrupted by square-based towers, placed 25 meters one from the other97. The main feature of the fortification walls in Eryx is that three levels overlap one another, and they have been built up using different techniques: starting from the lower stage, we find a “megalithic” structure quite 4 meters high, which was built using enormous limestone blocks, joined together only by some little stones that have been inserted into the interstices. The middle level was built using squared and regularly shaped blocks; they have been set up methodically and horizontally; in this level of the walls, many loopholes of a different kind were opened. These had to be the bulwarks faced by Pyrrhus and his soldiers, because the third level of the walls was built up during the Middle Ages (even if some renovation dating back to the Roman age may be seen). Of course, the technique divergences of the first two stages have to be considered even under a chronological point of view, since they coincide with different stages of the history of the city. Unfortunately, the field surveys exploited in the past at the basement of the walls could not help to set a definite chronology for the two levels; even if the objects and the scraps are more than a few, they seem to be a sign – quite a chronological schedule – of the typical life in a city like Eryx (the same prospectus that the archaeological finds would show in many other cities of western Sicily)98. There is an important data, useful to understand the chronology of the walls’ levels in the citadel of Eryx; only the blocks of the middle level are inscribed with Punic letters that, thanks to the palaeographic analysis, can be dated to the IV/III centuries BC, and even with some stylized figures. In all probability, the letters were engraved on the blocks before their usage and even if their implication still remains uncertain, it is plausible to conjecture that somehow they served to some technical purposes during the building of the walls (perhaps to show where exactly the blocks had to be employed). Therefore, it may be concluded that the middle stage of the curtain was built by the Carthaginians between the IV and the III century BC: it was built over the “native” – that is, Elymian – level, and this may be a symptom that Eryx (unlike other Elymian cities) completely lost her tendency to

97 A general and clear survey about the archaeological finds in Eryx is provided by De Vido 1989, 349–378. Perhaps, one of the most interesting excavation’s area is the necropolis at Piana delle Forche, because it provided many information about the Punic presence at Eryx; see Bisi 1970A, 209–222; Bisi 1970B, 5–10; Bisi 1971A, 640–661; Bisi 1978, 21–50. 98 Bisi 1968A, 272–292; Bisi 1968B, 17–27; Bisi 1968C, 103–106; Bisi 1968–1969, 307–315; Bisi 1969, 223–224.

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the autonomy, so much that the city was quite entirely absorbed into the political and military sphere of influence of the Carthaginian dominions99. Just this diverse position into the political scenery of Sicily forced Eryx to resist to the bitter end against Pyrrhus, until the mighty siege-machines of the king succeeded in paving the way to the complete conquest of the rock. The Carthaginian garrison was swiftly eliminated, and replaced with a Greek occupying force. Finally, the king won, and Heracles had his own games and sacrifices. 2.8. The conquest of Panormus and the Punic fortresses of the Conca d’Oro After thanking Heracles with magnificent sacrifices, Pyrrhus once again moved across the lands of the Punic ejpikravteia, turning back from Eryx towards Panormus. The description of his actions is provided by another abstract of Diodorus’ original text (22, 10, 4), where it is said that once he garrisoned the citadel of Eryx, Pyrrhus moved to the city of the Iaitinans, which was renowned for the fortified location and the geographic position adjacent to Panormus. The citizens sided with him willingly, and quite immediately the king could move forward to Panormus, where on the contrary he had to face the resistance of the Punic troops; nevertheless, he conquered the city by force. Finally, he took control even of the fortress of Heirkte, thus becoming master of all the Carthaginian dominions of Sicily, not including Lilybaeum. Leaving out temporarily some specific questions (perhaps the most important is the real location of Heirkte, that is debated by many modern scholars), the content of Diodorus’ description is no doubt a lively sketch of Pyrrhus’ conquest of the whole zone of the Sicilian Conca d’Oro, that was controlled by the powerful Carthaginian city of Panormus thanks to a well-organized defensive system made of an amount of forts; these fortifications were established on the top of the rocky hills at the back of the city, and they were used to look over the passes and the communication routes going inland. The archaeological investigations exploited in recent times in the region of the Conca d’Oro have brought to light the vestiges of a great amount of fortified settlements that were founded on the top of the hills to the south of Panormus. The pottery finds clearly show that those sites were deserted in the first half of the III century BC, and then they were occupied once again only in the Middle Ages100. Even if the passage of Diodorus provides to summarize the events, it is quite surprising that there is no mention of another important Punic stronghold in northwestern Sicily, i.e. Solous, together with Iaitas101, Heirkte and Panormus. If consid99 Salinas 1883, 410–414: Amadasi 1967, 58; De Vido 1994, 131–149. 100 See the general and exhaustive surveys of Di Stefano 1990B, 249–250; Di Stefano 1995B, 363–373; Di Stefano 1999, 223–233. 101 A very specific bibliography concerning the archaeological activities at Monte Iato is provided by Isler 1992A, 368–375. It may be useful to add even Isler 1990A, 7–27; Isler 1991, 66– 72; Caflisch 1991; Isler 1992B, 7–43; Isler 1992C, 54–64; Isler 1992D, 395–405; Frey

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ered under a perspective of local topography, the city of Solous was deeply linked with Panormus, because both of them were quite laying on a wide gulf which was easily identifiable from the sea, thanks to the existence of two reference points, i.e. Monte Pellegrino on the north and Monte Catalfano on the south-east; furthermore, all the territories next to the coast and included between the two cities were no doubt characterized by an ethnical and cultural identity, due to the presence of the Carthaginians. The two cities had to live in close relationship to each other, even if their location had some distinctive features as regards the connections with the inland region of western Sicily. The field investigations exploited from 1992 proved that in all probability the archaic Phoenician “emporion” at Solous was settled on the plateau at San Cristoforo, whose slopes fall sheer to the sea; many vestiges of buildings have been brought to light, especially referring to workshops used for the production of the pottery, and the whole plateau was exactly covered with scraps of unglazed pottery, and a great amount of Punic amphorae’s slips: however, no materials going back to the Hellenistic age have been discovered, since the objects that have a low chronology date back to the first half of the IV century BC102. The necropolis of the Archaic site of Solous has been discovered at Campo­ franco, where nonetheless the burials of the Archaic age are mixed with those of the Classical and Hellenistic ages; that’s why it is correct to stress the junction role of the necropolis between the old and the “new” Solous, that was established a little bit at the back of the earlier settlement, and may be at present identified with the above-mentioned site of Monte Catalfano. This location was even more profitable under a defensive point of view, and furthermore it was suitable for the control of the territory, thanks even to the support of minor centres like Monte Porcara and Pizzo Cannita; during the IV and III centuries BC they were used as military garrisons to protect the important communication and trading routes to the inland103. In conclusion, if the account provided by Diodorus has to be fully trusted when saying that Pyrrhus, after the conquest of Panormus and Heirkte, became the master of the whole Carthaginian dominions, it is plausible that the king took under control even the other very important Punic site in that zone, that is Solous. We must not be astonished if Diodorus stressed the meaning of the conquest of Panormus, saying that the city had the best harbour of Sicily. Indeed, the strategic Kupper 1992, 281–297; Isler 1993A, 7–30; Isler 1993B, 59–66; Isler 1993C, 85–92; Isler 1993–1994, 1183–1186; Isler 1994A, 7–26; Isler 1994B, 31–42; Isler 1994C, 27–47; Isler 1994D, 239–254; Isler 1995A, 26–37; Isler 1995B, 19–38; Isler 1996A, 7–30; Isler 1996B, 52–64; Isler 1997A, 23–44; Isler 1997B, 48–60; Isler 1997C, 1019–1028; Isler 1997D, 29–35; Isler 1998, 40–50; Isler 2000, 715–729. 102 For the location of the archaic Phoenician settlement of Solous at San Cristoforo, see Giustolisi 1970, 144–165; Fatta 1982, 57–64; Villa 1983, 151–157; Greco 1993–1994, 1165– 1176; Greco 1997A, 889–908; Greco 1997B, 97–112. As regards the fragments of Punic amphorae found at San Cristoforo, see Bartoloni 1988, 63–65, series G2; Ramon Torres 1995, 176–177, series 1.4.5.1. 103 Tusa 1971B, 33–48; Villa 1993, 215–218; Greco 1995, 93–95; Greco 1997A, 899–908; Greco 1997C, 25–33 (necropolis of Campofranco). Tusa 1958, 159; Giustolisi 1973, 31–53 (Monte Porcara). Citro 1952–1953, 265–299; Tusa 1957, 79; Tusa 1958, 151; Tusa 1985, 598–608 (Pizzo Cannita).

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value of the city and the wide area covered by her harbour, which was suitable both for the commercial activities and for the military navies, goes back to the Classical age: Diodorus himself (11, 1, 5 and 2, 1) wrote that early in 480 BC the harbour could host an armada of two hundred warships together with a great amount of merchantmen, and it had such mighty shipyards that a whole armada, shipwrecked and damaged by a tempest after the crossing of the Mediterranean from Carthage to Sicily, could be repaired there. These are typical features of the harbour of Panormus, that did not exist at Solous, where the chances to go ashore were reduced and the navigation along the coasts was dangerous for a long time. Panormus was closely linked with the hinterland owing to many smaller sites, whose chronology can be set between the VI century and the III century BC; they were as usual settled in higher positions to control the passing routes towards the mountain passes. The most important among them, even for the purposes of Pyrrhus, was no doubt the site at Portella della Paglia, which allowed the connection with the area of Belice, passing through the valley of river Iatus; that was quite surely the way run by Pyrrhus to enter into the plain of Conca d’Oro and then begin the attack to Panormus. The site of Cozzo Paparina developed alongside that route; it was inhabited until the first half of the III century BC, and then deserted up to the Middle Ages; the plentiful finds of black-glazed pottery’s scraps (that can be dated between the IV century and the III century BC) drive to suggest that the highest mark of occupation has to be dated between the end of IV century and the beginning of III century BC; the objects no doubt can be compared with those analogous discovered in the necropolis of Panormus104. There were at least other two roads that granted the control of the hinterland thanks to some strategic spots. The first one went up along the river Oreto to the plain of Partinico; just at the mountain pass of Sagana, the scholars have brought to light the remains of the settlement named Castellaccio della Sagana, established on the top of a geographically defended hill and protected by another fortification embankment, which run along the edge of the rocky hill; the pottery that has been discovered there proves that the site was inhabited from the Archaic age until the first half of the III century BC. The second route connecting the plain of Conca d’Oro with the territories of the river Belice was dominated by the settlement of Monte d’Oro di Montelepre, whose highest point of expansion has to be spot between the VI century and the V century BC; nevertheless, its necropolis (which has been identified at Manico di Quarara) provided both collective inhumation burials of the Classical age and the so-called “enchytrismos-burials”, that were typical of the Hellenistic age105. 104 For the relationship between Panormus and the hinterland, see Di Stefano 1998, 56–61; as regards the pass of Portella della Paglia and the settlement of Cozzo Paparina, see Tusa – Lo Cascio – Mammina 1990, 29–62. 105 See Tusa 1970, 248–249; Di Stefano – Mannino 1983, 83; Di Stefano 1990B, 249–250; Greco 1993, 199–202 (settlement at Monte d’Oro di Montelepre). Among the objects that provided evidence to connect the necropolis of Manico di Quarara with those of Panormus and Solous, I want to point out many scraps of cups, decorated with flower’s petals; on this typical shape, see Vassallo 1996, 91–113.

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Once he had the control of the way in to the Conca d’Oro through the pass of Portella della Paglia, thanks even to the willingly commitment of the city of Iaitas, Pyrrhus began his attack on Panormus. The investigations about the topography of the Hellenistic city-state have been particularly passionate in the last decade; some unplanned excavations outside the modern Cassero – which the scholars usually identify as overlapping the old city – and other exploited in the zone of the monastery of San Lorenzo and at Palazzo Mirto, showed that approximately at 3–4 meters under the ground there were some levels filled with scraps and objects dated to the IV–III centuries BC (especially slips of Punic amphorae). The plan of the Hellenistic city was quite regularly extended, and included between the modern Piazza Marina and the church of San Francesco106. It may be worth saying something about the fortification walls, that in all probability were assaulted by Pyrrhus’ soldiers in 277 BC. As it has been showed by the final results of the investigations about the portion which was brought to light under the Palazzo Reale, the walls of Panormus, too, reveal several stages of their building: after a first level which has recently been dated to the second half of the V century BC on the basis of the building technique (use of perfectly squared blocks, with ashlars on the basement stones) that in all probability involved Greek craftsmen, there is a second level that has been dated to beginning of the Hellenistic age. It was built with a hanging, made with massive limestone blocks, which is leant against the earlier level. The city gate that was opened through the fortifications of the Classical age was used again, but its dimensions were half-reduced; the loophole of the V century BC was closed, but in all probability the defensive towers of the Classical age were still used107. After the conquest of Panormus, Pyrrhus had the quite complete control of north-western Sicily and even of the mountain passes to the hinterland. Nevertheless, as it has been emphasized by Diodorus, there was one more important place to take over, that was the fortress of Heirkte, which at present has been quite univocally identified with the Punic settlement at Monte Pellegrino108. A very detailed description of the site is provided by Polybius (1, 56, 3–8), when he refers to the occupation of the fortress by Hamilcar during the first Punic war; from there the Carthaginian commander could resist for three years to the Roman attacks. A copious archaeological evidence confirms that the hill of Monte Pellegrino was inhabited between the IV century and the III century BC; the objects and the scraps have been discovered particularly around the ancient ways in to the settle106 Bonanno 1975, 111–112; Belvedere 1987, 289–303; Di Stefano 1988–1989, 595–598; Di Stefano 1990A, 133–151; Di Stefano 1991–1992, 38–49; Di Stefano 1993B, 259–263; Di Stefano 1995A, 359–362. 107 See Tusa 1984–1985, 595; Camerata Scovazzo 1990, 97: Di Stefano 1997, 587–594. 108 For the identification of Heirkte at Monte Pellegrino, see Schubring 1870, 3–7 and 11–13; Holm 1901, I, 51–52; De Sanctis 1958, 72; Manni 1976B, II, 612; Giustolisi 1979 (but for his different previous suggestion about Monte Pecoraro, see Giustolisi 1975, 55–60); Bejor 1983, 347, note 4; Mannino 1986, 61–65. Some other conjectures have been advanced: see Kromayer 1912, 58 (Monte Castellaccio, to the south-west of Panormus); Pottino 1987 (Monte Palmita, to the north-east of Panormus). A wider bibliography is provided by Tamburello 1992, 420–432, and Canzanella 1992A, 419–420.

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ment, and even in the south-eastern slope, between the two places named Prima Cupola and Seconda Cupola. During the 1970s in that area many slips of unglazed pottery and black-glazed pottery were unearthed, of Punic as well as Greek manufacture, and they were all dated between the end of the V century and the III century BC; furthermore, a portion of the fortification walls was discovered, together with a cistern. On Monte Pellegrino there are several evidences of the embankments; in the north-eastern sector, the archaeologists have brought to light the vestiges of a citadel surrounded by a double defensive curtain109. Starting from 1992, some field surveys have been exploited at Piano della Grotta. Some buildings that can be referred to a rural complex of the Roman age have been brought to light; however, the major walls stand over some ground levels filled with pottery slips that can be dated to the IV–III centuries BC, and are analogous to those discovered in the other settlements of the Carthaginian dominions110. A further remark that the site of Monte Pellegrino was hugely inhabited by the Carthaginians between the end of the IV century and the beginning of the III century BC is provided by the numismatic evidence, coming from the coins unearthed there. In 1997, during the prolongation of the field survey in close proximity to the sanctuary of Santa Rosalia, 63 coins have been found; among them, the most ancient are seven Punic bronze coins that can be dated between the second half of the IV century BC and the Roman conquest of the site. Some other chance finds at Monte Pellegrino have been delivered to the Museum of Palermo; among them, it is worth to emphasize a group of 375 coins, including for the most Punic issues (278 bronze coins). The most represented issue (207 coins) bears on the obverse the head of the Punic goddess Tanit, and on the reverse the typical horse standing, with a palm-tree behind him. Only 13 specimens have those little spheres that are distinctive of those issues, while on 5 specimens the Punic letter aleph is engraved in the field, in front of the horse; finally, the distinguishing feature of 17 pieces is the caduceus. These issues are sporadic enough, and the scholars usually assign them to a Punic mint of Sardinia. The high percentage of the bronze coins bearing on the obverse the head of Tanit, and on the reverse the head of a horse111, is particularly meaningful; they too have been ascribed to a Punic mint of Sardinia, and had been previously discovered at Monte Pellegrino. The whole data suggest that the specimens were found in a single coin hoard, which can be dated to the first half of the III century BC112. 109 Bonanno 1973, 55–62; Di Stefano – Mannino 1983, 25–35; Di Stefano 1999, 228–229. 110 Di Stefano 1993–1994, 1102–1105; Di Stefano – Garofano – Gandolfo 1997, 3–24. 111 See Cutroni Tusa 1956, 224; Gandolfo 2000, 538. 112 A general survey about the coin finds at Monte Pellegrino is provided by Gandolfo 2000, 533–546. With particular reference to the seven different types of Punic bronze coins that have been discovered nearby the sanctuary of Santa Rosalia, see Jenkins 1969, nr. 107–108 (devices: obv. palm-tree/rev. Pegasus); nr. 109–119 (head of Tanit/horse standing, with a palm-tree behind him); nr. 192 (head of Tanit/head of horse); nr. 120–123 (male head/running horse). The whole group of coins that at present is preserved in the Museum “Antonio Salinas” in Palermo has been quoted by Gandolfo 1987, 284–285. The coins have been assigned to a Punic mint

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All this information provide strong evidence for matching Monte Pellegrino with the powerful Carthaginian stronghold of Heirkte, which was assaulted and conquered by Pyrrhus during the successful war campaign of 277 BC. The abovementioned passage from Diodorus (22, 10, 4) seems to reveal a basic feature of the king’s strategy; as a matter of fact, the conquest of Panormus did not mean only that Pyrrhus got a victory against one of the most important Punic dominions inside the ejpikravteia. The outcome of that territorial achievement could have been more than a few: first and foremost, the king had to revitalize for sure the feelings of salvage from the barbarian supremacy – that was the main ideological characteristic of his Sicilian venture – even in those territories of north-western Sicily that had been strongly influenced by the Punic culture. The conquest of Panormus took away from the Carthaginians the control of a primary harbour, which could provide huge supplies and host entire navies, but especially had to be vital to control easily the sea-route that, developing along the northern coasts of Sicily, connected the island with the Magna Graecia; with his attack, Pyrrhus at least reduced the Carthaginian hegemony over the northern Sicilian waters, and perhaps this could have been an advantage even for the local commercial activities. Finally, Pyrrhus concluded at Panormus in the second half of 277 BC the inexorable forward movement that led him from the south to the north of Sicily; thanks to this march from Selinous to Panormus, he set a brand new eastern border to the Carthaginian ejpikravteia, and compelled the Punic troops to withdraw and by force to segregate themselves in the cwvra of Lilybaeum. Of course, the new frontier had another significant strategic value, because it prevented the Carthaginians from having any relationship by land with their allies, settled in the eastern part of Sicily. In the Greek and freed sector of Sicily, only the political opposition of the Mamertines and their raids against the Greek city-states on the borders of their territory could give Pyrrhus some trouble; but once they had been separated from the Carthaginian alliance, the king could have dealt with them independently. Pyrrhus decided to begin with the most complicated obstacle, therefore flawlessly answering to the initial appeal of the Greeks of Sicily, that was to push out completely the Carthaginians from Sicily. That is why the following stage of his march was Lilybaeum; but there Pyrrhus and the Greeks of Sicily had to meet their fate. 2.9. First step to defeat: the siege of Lilybaeum (autumn 277 BC) With the conquest of Panormus and of the most important military positions of the Carthaginians in the plain of the Conca d’Oro, Pyrrhus and the Greeks of Sicily quite realized their primary target to set free Sicily, and they did it only in one year. From the spring to the autumn of 277 BC the forward movement of the Greek troops from Agrigentum to the farthest western borders of the Punic ejpikravteia had been forceful and quite relentless; the strongest opposition of the Carthaginians of Sardinia by Visonà 1990B, 191; Visonà 1992, 124; in contrast, Acquaro 1988, 54, ascribes them to the mint of Carthage.

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occurred when Pyrrhus assaulted the fortified Punic positions, that were protected by mighty embankments and defended by strong garrisons; Heraclea Minoa, Azones, Eryx, Heirkte. The surviving literary sources do not mention any pitch battle between the king and the Carthaginian troops, and there is no reason to conjecture that the ancient historians wanted to skip some events; in my opinion, this kind of battle was absolutely unsuited with the kind of warfare that the challengers were fighting. It is inaccurate to suggest that the Carthaginians had really no chance to win such a battle, if they were compelled to fight it; as a matter of fact, they still could count in the island on an army of at least fifty thousand men – the same that the Punic commanders led against Syracuse in 278 BC – and they even had the complete control over the maritime routes connecting Africa with western Sicily. It seems more likely that the Carthaginians could not stir a pitch battle against the Epirote king, because they were compelled to fight a merely defensive war, trying to protect their own positions inside the ejpikravteia. The decisive events at Lilybaeum, that are well presented especially by Diodorus (22, 10, 4–7), are useful to understand clearly the troubles and the defensive strategy of the Punic forces. In Diodorus words, the Carthaginians brought over from Libya to Sicily a great amount of forces, grain and engines of war; they did it safe, while Pyrrhus was making ready to assault the city, because they had the control of the seas. Furthermore, the city was strengthened with new fortifications; the Punic citizens walled off the land approaches, constructed many defensive towers at short intervals and dug a great ditch. They then were ready to come to terms with the king, who in turn was quite willing to leave them the possess of Lilybaeum; but the king’s Friends and the delegates of the Greek city-states compelled him to attack, to drive out from Sicily all the Phoenicians, and to make the sea the boundary of his domain. Therefore, Pyrrhus began to attack the walls with the war engines he conveyed there from Syracuse, but he could not damage them definitely, and what’s more he lost many men; so, he tried then to unsettle the walls by mining operations, but the rocky ground was of great advantage for the Carthaginians. Finally, after two months, the king decided to lift the siege. A less detailed account of the siege, and not referred exactly to the assault against Lilybaeum, is provided by Plutarch (Pyrrh. 23, 2–3). If compared with Diodorus’ account, Plutarch offers an additional detail concerning the peace negotiations between the two challengers; besides a huge amount of money, the Carthaginians presented to Pyrrhus even a number of warships, provided they could come to a final agreement with him. For sure the two historical texts are harmonizing; this drove many scholars to suggest that in all probability both Diodorus and Plutarch trusted on a single source of information, which has been quite univocally identified with the court-historian Proxenus. Nonetheless, in my opinion there remains a basic doubt, because following a thorough comparison between the two accounts, it may be seen that the behaviour of Pyrrhus during the peace negotiations is absolutely dissimilar. According to Diodorus, the Epirote king was quite about leaving Lilybaeum to his enemies, and he was prevented from doing this by the prompt intervention of his Friends; Plutarch, on the other hand, portrayed Pyrrhus as an absolutely incorruptible man,

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actually strong-willed to drive out from Sicily the Carthaginians, even if they were ready to bribe him with money and navy supplies. It is unlikely to ascribe the divergence in the detail to an altered evaluation of the information by Plutarch and Diodorus, while using the same historical source, because if this latter was really the same, such a depiction of Pyrrhus would not be admissible. Under an historiographic perspective, the question seems to be indecipherable; nevertheless, it seems likely that Plutarch actually adopted the openly commendatory version of Proxenus, while Diodorus went on trusting the account of Philinus, who was no doubt much more interested in highlighting the influential involvement of the Greek representatives, who made clear to the king the objectives of the Carthaginians and then compelled him to complete the total conquest of Sicily and to keep faith to his own promises113. Leaving aside the historiographic question, it must be pointed out that the extended passage of Diodorus offers some very important indications, that are worth to be emphasized. Of course, it is not always possible to match the real chronological succession of the events with the sequence which is provided by the summary of Diodorus; with reference to the siege of Lilybaeum, it seems very unlikely that the mighty fortifications, the defensive towers and the walls’ strengthening were entirely exploited by the Carthaginians while they were under the pressure of the swift assault of Pyrrhus. The short description of Lilybaeum’s defensive system made by Diodorus must be released from the account of the events; indeed, it merely represent a sketch of the strategic resources of the Punic city when it was laid under siege by the Greeks. As a matter of fact, this conjecture seems to be supported by the archaeological data, that demonstrate that the Punic fortifications of Lilybaeum were built up in the IV century BC. Then, the account of Diodorus emphasizes again the extraordinary superiority of the Carthaginians on the sea, if compared with the naval skills of any other challenger; it was just owing to the absolute and safe control of the sea-routes connecting Africa and Sicily that many troops, supplies and war-machines could be conveyed in a row at Lilybaeum. The information of Diodorus supports what I previously suggested, that Pyrrhus was escorted by his Greek navy only when he marched along the southern coasts of Sicily. Then the Epirote and the Syracusan warships moored either at Heraclea Minoa or at Selinous, and waited for some new orders; that regretful choice – nevertheless, it had been somehow required, given that Pyrrhus decided to move from Selinous towards the hinterland – allowed the powerful Carthaginian navy to lord it undisturbed in the waters of western Sicily. These conjectures may be helpful to understand the real meaning of the appeal for peace made by the Carthaginians to the king. The most immediate necessity of the Punic army was to gain time; they indeed had to convey at Lilybaeum the more armies and supplies that they could, and furthermore they had to complete the reinforcement of the yet existing defensive fortifications. Anyway, the Punic repre113 For the hypothesis of a single source used by Diodorus and Plutarch, see La Bua 1980, 236– 237, note 3; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 60–61 (with a lot of contradictions). Previously, Hamburger 1927, 83 suggested that the sources of information were two, and he chose to trust Diodorus, underestimating Plutarch’s account.

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sentatives skilfully jumped to the following possible events; what would have happened if their proposal had been successful and Pyrrhus had come to an agreement? Given that the Carthaginians exerted a sort of thalassocracy with their powerful navy in the western Mediterranean basin, and even that it was very difficult to approach the harbour of Lilybaeum which was protected by many sandy soundingdepths, the safeguarding of such a stronghold – which could not be easily conquered by land and was almost inaccessible by sea – became basic for the Punic forces, even in view of an expected counteroffensive, that they no doubt would have started if Pyrrhus had withdrawn (and much more if he had gone back to Italy). The agreement proposed by the Punic representatives was based upon the lawful principle of the “uti possidetis”; this comes out clearly from Diodorus’ passage, where he states that Pyrrhus was quite ready to hand down to the enemies the city of Lilybaeum. The acceptance of such a proposal would have produced a peaceful break which was useful for both the challengers; Pyrrhus could have devoted himself to his future plans – as Plutarch pointed out – that is to project the military expedition to northern Africa, otherwise to prepare his return to Magna Graecia, where the events were quickly evolving on the side of Rome. On the other hand, the Carthaginians could have meticulously reorganized their own forces in view of a possible counterattack114. The Carthaginians’ proposal aimed then to suspend for an indefinite period the war operations in Sicily, hoping that this action could turn away Pyrrhus from the island, or else that he could even pick up the war against the Romans where he left it off. In this perspective, it is easy to understand the meaning of Plutarch’s information regarding the ships supplying that the Carthaginians wanted to offer to their adversary, if the negotiations arrived to a positive conclusion. For sure, the fleet had to assist the king while moving a part of his troops to eastern Sicily (perhaps, to Syracuse) and maybe further, to Magna Graecia; in my opinion, this was the heartfelt dream of the Carthaginians. As some scholars pointed out, their project seemed to include an evident contravention of the clauses about the alliance signed with the Romans in 278 BC; but that pact, which had been signed only with the aim to prevent a dangerous agreement between the Romans and Pyrrhus, and to detain the latter in Magna Graecia, did not have any more weight by then and lost any value in the Punic opinion after the landing of the king in Sicily. Therefore the Carthaginians, who could have asked to the Romans to enforce the treaty’s clauses – that was to give them some merchantmen to convey the Roman troops in Sicily and fight against Pyrrhus – preferred to give the king a peace negotiation based on the principle of “uti possidetis”, and they were ready to offer him a huge war allowance and even the resources to encourage his departure from Sicily115. 114 Schubert 1894, 210–213; Von Scala 1896, 157–158; Meltzer 1896, II, 235–237; Niese 1897, II, 45–46; Holm 1901, II, 521–524; Ciaceri 1902, 33–35; Beloch 19272, IV 1, 553– 554; Hamburger 1927, 80–84; Frank 1928, 651–652; Lévêque 1957, 477–483; Pareti 1959, 252–253; De Sanctis 19602, II, 409–410; Kienast 1963, coll. 149–150; Vartsos 1970, 95–96; La Bua 1980, 235–238; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 61 and 64. 115 Excellent observations about this topic in Lévêque 1957, 482–483; La Bua 1980, 237; Dexter Hoyos 1984A, 416–417, where he states rightly that “there is no sign that the Romans

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Pyrrhus’ refusal necessarily caused the prolongation of the war. It is not important to understand if the king decided only by himself, or if he really was influenced by the warnings of his Friends and of the Greek allies; furthermore, it is nonsense to side either with those scholars who think that he made a great mistake when he did not accept the proposals of the Punic diplomats, or with those who feel that he was wrong in trusting his own Friends116. The development of the events shows that quite unexpectedly the king performed a number of tactical mistakes; he underestimated the defensive skilfulness of his enemies, against whom he did not ever fight on the battlefield; on the other hand he did not understand that he had to face a test that no doubt was harder than Eryx, because the city of Lilybaeum was defended on two sides by the sea, besides the mighty city walls that had been further strengthened by the latest works of the Punic architects. Again, Pyrrhus did not understand that even if he had driven out quite easily the Carthaginians from their ejpikravteia, he could have expelled them completely from Sicily only if he beat them on the sea, where on the contrary they were by then invincible. It is just on account of that Punic thalassocracy that the king could not conquer Lilybaeum; and that was for sure one of the basic reasons that led Pyrrhus to the defeat and the Greeks to loose their hopes. Finally, there was perhaps only one wrong political evaluation; it was that Pyrrhus did not realize that the peace negotiations had strictly a practical meaning for the Carthaginians, and they used that time to complete the defensive system and organize the resistance at Lilybaeum. Pyrrhus then decided to attack continuously the fortifications of the city, using all the war machines that he ordered to convey there from Syracuse. The defensive qualities of the garrison have been pointed out by Diodorus, as well as by Polybius (1, 42, 6–7) when he described the siege laid to the city by the Roman consuls in 250 BC: the historian said that the city was excellently defended both by walls and by a deep moat all around, and on the side facing the sea by shoaly water, the passage through which into the harbour required great skill and practice. The description of Diodorus more or less matches Polybius’ account. The archaeological excavations, that have been exploited one after another during the 1900s, and the aerophotogrammetric surveys corroborate the indications offered by the literary sources, and allow to re-establish with some certainty the original plan of the city and even the layout of the fortification walls117. were brought in (or even informed) [about the negotiations with Pyrrhus]; but there is no way of telling whether Carthage was living up to Punicum ingenium and preparing to leave her ally in the lurch”. 116 See among the others Schubert 1894, 212 (he considered that the refusal of the Punic proposal was a political mistake); Lévêque 1957, 484 and La Bua 1980, 238 (Pyrrhus quite enforced himself to take that decision, because it was a sort of political necessity); Will 19792, 110 (Pyrrhus was generally irresponsible, both when he rejected the Punic offer, and when he decided to attack such an unconquerable stronghold); Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 64 (whose conjecture seems to me absolutely perplexing; she thinks that Pyrrhus worried about the proposal of the Carthaginians, whose aim concerned sincerely the peace and even to take some more time, since the real enemy was Rome. I guess, indeed, that this is clearly an a posteriori evaluation, and cannot be supported by any contemporary source). 117 Schmiedt 1963, 49–72; Schmiedt 1964–1965, 297–300; Schmiedt 1970, II, plate 99.

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As regards the moat that shielded Lilybaeum on the two sides of the city facing the terra firma, the information provided the aero-photography were of the greatest importance to ascertain both its layout and its length. In the sector which is included between the modern bulwark of San Francesco and the sea, the moat was quite 28 meters wide and before reaching the sea it turned slightly to the North: at present it is not sure how it was connected to the sea, but it may be conjectured that a secondary channel had to join the moat with the water basin of Punta d’Alga. The layout and the course of the moat have been indeed established exactly in the place where the city walls were mostly defenceless, that is the modern rampart of Porta Trapani: the distance of the moat from the walls is quite 27 meters, and at first it was valued in order that the fortification walls could not be reached easily by the projectiles thrown by the besieging war-machines, like those used by Pyrrhus. In 1972, the work exploited by some building yards next to Porta Trapani in a palace named Mortillaro brought to light a tunnel (2.22 meters wide; 2.55 meters high) that had been completely dug into the rock; it was in all probability connected with one of the defensive towers that safeguarded one of the gates on the northeastern side of the city. Regrettably, the course of the tunnel is stopped after some thirty meters by a level of ground, which begins in close proximity to a niche on the right face, whose function is still inexplicable for the critics. The most meaningful feature of the tunnel is that many graffiti have been engraved on the tufaceous surfaces118: some of them are yet undecipherable, because the surfaces are highly deteriorated. Among the subjects, there is a young male portrait which was scratched with some strange symbols and with a Latin inscription, i.e. SIDAMONI, which seems to join together the names of two Punic divinities, Sid and Hammon; then, we have a fighting warrior, a two-hedged hatchet, an erotic scene, some animals. Most of all, the attention of the scholars focused rightly on the figure of a ship whose shape is typical of the Hellenistic age, having a rostrum, but without the mast and the oars119. Perhaps this is another representation of a Punic warship, which was often sketched in the Hellenistic age even on the funerary stones (where, nonetheless, it was associated with the two-hedged hatchet120) and was painted sometimes on the surfaces inside some caves in the neighbourhood of Palermo, like in the Grotta Regina121. This barrier of ground was filled with scraps and objects that provided a terminus post quem that can be fixed at the beginning of the II century; the whole blackglazed pottery was of the Campanian type, and included some pieces of the Lamboglia classification, together with many fragments of skyphoi and oil-lamps, and 118 For the graffiti, see Rocco 1980–1981, 275–291; Purpura 1981, 39–42; with particular reference to the representation of the Carthaginian warships, Hours Miedan 1950, 15–160; Vuillemot 1965, 50; Basch 1969A, 139–162; Basch 1969B, 227–245; Bartoloni 1977, 147– 157; Bartoloni 1978, 31–36; Purpura 1979, 58–64. 119 The shape was very similar to that of the Carthaginian craft which shipwrecked in front of Marsala, and whose remains have been correctly dated to the III century BC: see Frost 1972, 651–673. 120 This association seemed to have had a typical funerary meaning: see Cintas 1966, 229–239. 121 Rocco 1969A, 23–26; De Simone 1998, 66–67.

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even a kind of askos which was then discovered in some funerary contents of Lilybaeum’s necropolis. In the lower ground stages, there have been found slips of preCampanian pottery and of bottle-shaped vases bearing an overlapped painted decoration; among the pieces of the unglazed pottery, it is worth to mention some unguentaria, the typical Punic amphorae, some other kind of Hellenistic amphorae, jugs, pyxides, bowls and pieces of kitchen ware122. Some other analogous communication trenches have been spot thanks to the following archaeological surveys both on the south-eastern side of the moat’s course (that is, in modern via Amendola) and on the north-eastern side. No doubt they were part of those tunnels and underground trenches that often were a supplement of the defensive systems in the Hellenistic city-states, and they were used to guarantee to the besieged people the chance of a few sorties against the enemy; something similar, as we have seen, was built in Sicily at Selinous. As regards the fortifications, it must be said that the first archaeological surveys at Lilybaeum were based upon a key topographical study of Schubring, a German scholar; his descriptions of the ruins located at Cape Boeo in all probability drove Antonio Salinas to explore in 1894 the north-western sector of the city walls, which was more or less 67 meters long; the segment had a slightly curved course, and it was built up with two curtains made with squared limestone blocks; there, Salinas identified even a little gate, that was reinforced by two square-based defensive towers123. Along the north-eastern side, which is just one of the two sections facing the surrounding lands, the vestiges of a trait of the city walls were discovered next to Porta Trapani, and they were visible until 1954, while at present they have been quite destroyed; they included the remains of a gate that was flanked by two squarebased towers. The area is the same where the archaeologists discovered the abovementioned underground trench; so there cannot be any doubt that it was one of the most reinforced places of the whole fortification walls of Lilybaeum; the towers had an oversize plan (13.40 x 14.30 meters), and the walls were quite 7 meters thick, and built up using a double curtain of limestone squared blocks. 122 See Lamboglia 1952, 139–206 (shapes nr. 24–26, 28, 34–36c, 40, 44 and 54); Howland 1958, 67–69, nr. 25 (oil lamps); Bisi 1971B, 703 nr. 35 and 707 nr. 41b (askos); Bisi 1967A, 262–292 (unglazed pre-Campanian pottery); Forti 1962, 151, nr. 4 (unguentaria); Adamesteanu – Orlandini 1956, 355, plate 1; Mingazzini 1969, plate 13, nr. 4; Bisi 1971B, 684–686, nr. 16–17 (Punic and Hellenistic amphorae). 123 The first basic topographical study about Lilybaeum is Schubring 1866, 49–82: the German scholar highlighted the location of a piece of the walls strengthened by two defensive towers on the north-western coastline, and he mentioned even the two bulwarks in close proximity of Porta Trapani. The final results of Salinas’ excavations were not published officially, but there are some news about them in Gabrici 1941, 273–275. On the remains nearby Porta Trapani, see Whitaker 1921, 107. The most recent information have been provided by Bisi 1967C, 99–101; Bisi 1967D, 315–318; Bisi 1968D, 259–265; Di Stefano 1971A, 41–48; Di Stefano 1971B, 62–80; Di Stefano 1972–1973, 414–419; Di Stefano 1973A, 4–5; Di Stefano 1973B, 71–79; Bisi 1974, 20–23; Di Stefano 1980A, 7–20; Di Stefano 1980B, 93–94; Di Stefano 1980C, 787–799; Di Stefano 1980–1981, 870–872; Di Stefano 1981, 121–126; Di Stefano 1984A, 21–35; Di Stefano 1993A.

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The field surveys exploited in the south-eastern sector from 1971 – exactly in Cocchiara’s property – allowed to ascertain the structure and the dimensions of that part of the walls, that had been built up using the typical double curtain of squared limestone blocks, even if they were less thick (approximately 5.80 meters). The two curtains are preserved to a maximum height of 1.30 meters. Another part of the fortification was discovered in 1971 in via Amendola; the features of the fortifications were very similar to the previous sector, but in that part it was possible to spotlight the remains of an old gate (0.80 meters wide) which was protected by a square-based tower, built up using mighty tufaceous blocks, which is jutting about 13 meters out from the course of the walls. A particularly interesting find was made in 1971 in the modern Via del Popolo; another sector of the walls, which was dissimilar from the above mentioned because the two curtains were in that instance joined together by a number of supplementary blocks; furthermore, in correspon­ dence with the south-western edge, there were some limestone blocks that had been knocked down outside the walls, and were leaning on the remains of a huge fire’s level. As in the previous case of Via Amendola, this discovery allowed the scholars to conjecture that there was too on that side a little gate safeguarded by a defensive tower. Finally, the scholars did not have any data about the fortifications in the southwestern side until 1980, when the remains of a mighty tower were discovered on the Lungomare Boeo; they have been only partly explored, but the building technique is the same; the tower was made using squared limestone blocks, and the basements lay completely on the rocks that descend gradually to the sea; the blocks of the first row have been deeply embedded in the rocky embankment. Perhaps the tower was flanked by an analogous building on the north-western side of the walls, as it seems to be demonstrated by some surviving, lined up limestone blocks. As far it concerns the objects that have been unearthed during the excavations, it may be worth to make a general sketch: – Surface levels. There have been found objects referring to different chronologies. In the excavation area of Via del Popolo a little white-glass unguentarium has been discovered, that can be dated to the late Hellenistic age; in the area of Via Amendola, there have been discovered a lot of scraps referring to oil-lamps, some of them having on the foot the Latin inscription AUGENDI124, and even the fragments of a Rhodian amphora, bearing the stamp. – Lower levels. The typical find is the Campanian pottery (class A); nonetheless, there were even many slips of Hellenistic wine amphorae and Punic amphorae, of unguentaria and little vases, together with some pyxides, bowls and kitchen ware.

124 Those oil-lamps were in all probability made in northern Africa during the Roman Imperial age: see Walters 1914, 79, nr. 527, plate XVI; Ponsich 1961, 70; Balil 1968, 165; Deneauve 1969, 225.

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– Ground levels embedded with the rocks. It is worth to mention the finds of preCampanian pottery, and two scraps of a skyphos, decorated in the Gnathia’s pottery style125. The chronology suggested by the finds compelled the scholars to state that the fortifications of Lilybaeum – and particularly the south-eastern side – were built up in the IV century BC; an hypothesis which perfectly matches the evidence provided by the literary sources. Summing up the above mentioned data, it may be suggested that Lilybaeum was mostly fortified on the two sides that faced the hinterland, i.e. those for sure mostly exposed to possible attacks of the enemy; those were no doubt the sectors that suffered for the most the siege of Pyrrhus’ troops. The fortifications were made up with a mighty wall whose thickness was about 6 meters, reinforced with gates, loopholes and square-based towers. On the contrary, the two sides of the city in front of the sea, even if strengthened, had less mighty defensive structures, just because the main defence was in that case the sea, constantly patrolled by the Cartha­ ginian navy. As the archaeological data show, it seems that the protections of Lilybaeum were not built in haste, under the pressure of an immediate danger; nay, they were made carefully, beginning in the IV century BC, and more and more reinforced. This has to be the real meaning of the previously cited passage of Diodorus (22, 10, 5–7), that is that the already existing fortifications of Lilybaeum were further toughened when Pyrrhus laid the city under siege; indeed, the primary activity of the Carthaginians in that instance was to convey supplies and troops from Africa to Sicily. There is another direct evidence bearing out the existence of close relationships between the Punic community of Lilybaeum and the homeland’s Carthaginians, and it is provided by the study of the objects coming from the funerary contents recovered in the Punic necropolis of the city, which lays in close proximity to the eastern border of the fortifications. There have been discovered three different kind of burials: inhumation burials into graves and hypogea (between the IV and the III centuries BC); cremation burials, that increasingly overwhelmed the inhumation burials between the III century BC and the I century A.D.; finally, once again inhumation burials into graves made with stone slabs, or into previously used Punic hypogea (from the II to the V centuries A.D.)126. A period is particularly meaningful as regards Pyrrhus’ Sicilian context; between the end of the IV century and the III century BC, there was a considerable amount of unglazed pottery of bad quality, that was produced in the local workshops, together with a number of black glazed vases, similarly of a bad quality and made by native craftsmen. Another class of 125 In the excavations of Cocchiara’s property, a little black-glazed cup and a skyphos were discovered, whose shape can be easily compared with that of some pieces unearthed in Olynthus and in the Athenian Agora: see Sparkes – Talcott 1970, 260, nr. 349, plate 16. 126 On the necropolis of Lilybaeum see Pace 19582, III, 711–712; Bisi 1970A, 209–213; Bisi 1971C, 31–42; Bisi 1971D, 17–28; Di Stefano 1974, 162–171; Di Stefano 1976–1977, 772 (on the stone slabs’ graves); Di Stefano 1984B, 38–43; Valente – Bechtold 1992, 687– 701; Bechtold 1993, 31–49; Bechtold 1999; Caruso 2000, 217–262. Further bibliography is provided by De Vido 1991, 42–76.

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black glazed pottery, covering a wider chronological period, has been singled out thanks to the better features of the shapes (many imitations of the Attic kylikes of the “Bolsal” kind; lekyhtoi; aryballoi; skyphoi; kantharoi). It is worth to mention that the stamps, that are quite peculiar, may be nevertheless compared with those found in other cities of the Punic dominions in Sicily; above all, there is a crossshaped stamp which can be found not only in Lilybaeum, but even in Carthage itself, in Solous and Pantelleria127. The finds of plentiful amounts of Sicilian and Attic pottery in the funerary contents of the end of IV century BC, while the peculiarity of the contents dating back to the first quarter of III century BC is the pottery imported from Etruria and Latium, show in my opinion that in Pyrrhus’ age the commercial relationships between the Carthaginians and the Greeks of Sicily were more and more reduced128. Therefore, besides many vases and objects that were imported from the motherland, between the IV and the III centuries BC there was no doubt a powerful production of pottery in the workshops of Lilybaeum, where the imported goods were originally imitated; regrettably, the vestiges of the workshops are yet very limited on the ground, since only the remains of a furnace that have been brought to light near the Museum Baglio Anselmi may be ascribed to the above mentioned period. Further proofs strengthening the close relations between Carthage and Lilybaeum at the beginning of the III century BC are offered by the numismatic evidence. More than a few coins have been discovered among the funerary contents of Lilybaeum’s necropolis; they were included of course in the rich contents, together with the imported pottery and many objects typical of the Greek cultural attitude, especially the mirrors (female burials) and the strigils (male inhumation burials)129. In the greatest part of the graves that can be dated to the first half of the III century BC Punic coins of the following two kind have been discovered: – Obv. Head of the goddess Tanit. Rev. Horse standing; behind it, a palmtree130. – Obv. Head of the goddess Tanit. Rev. Horse’s head. The first coin, which was minted in western Sicily, has been found in the graves 109 (9 specimens), 95 and 115b (5 specimens each). On the contrary, the first kind appeared together with the second one into an hypogeum unearthed in corso Gramsci; the second coinage began to be issued around 300 BC, and it was minted either

127 Di Stefano 1992, 257–263. The shapes of the black glazed pottery have been carefully analyzed by Morel 1981, series 2170 (Attic kylikes of the “Bolsal” kind); 5383–5385 (other Greek vases). For the cross-shaped stamp, see Morel 1980A, 1580. 128 Bechtold – Valente 1990, 39–50 (the Punic fornace). For the Attic pottery and vases, see Trendall 1967, 621–622; Trendall 1970, 106–108, plates 26–27 (Sicilian pottery); Sparkes – Talcott 1970, 107–108, 132–135 and 147 (Attic pottery). For the Etruscan cups, see Morel 1969, 59–117 (“petites estampilles”). 129 The most recent general survey is Frey Kupper 1997, 711–728. 130 For this coinage, see particularly Buttrey 1980, 137–149.

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in western Sicily or in Carthage. Then, the mint was moved to Sardinia in the second decade of the III century BC. These are no doubt the main issues, but they are often sided by some other Punic coins that were minted outside Sicily; just for example, it may be worth to mention the case of the grave 114, where a cinerary urn was found, and it included three specimens of the above-mentioned second kind together with one specimen bearing on the obverse the head of the goddess Tanit, and on the reverse the standing horse and the palm-tree, with a caduceus in the field; this kind of coinage was issued by a Punic mint of Sardinia between 280 and 270 BC (which matches the period of Pyrrhus’ western and Sicilian adventures). Another two graves – nr. 122 and 196 – provide perhaps the most remarkable detail, since both of them included some specimens of a Punic coin, bearing on the obverse a male head, and on the reverse a riding horse. This kind of coinage was minted at Carthage in the first quarter of the III century BC, usually overstriking previous coins with the Tanit/ horse with palm-tree devices, that were issued in western Sicily. This supports the hypothesis of close relationships between the two Punic communities of Carthage and Lilybaeum; the coinage minted in Sicily between the end of the IV century and the beginning of the III century BC reached Carthage, where it was overstruck and then sent back to Sicily, where it became a piece of a funerary content in the necropolis of Lilybaeum in the second quarter of the III century BC. Furthermore, it may be worth to point out that in few inhumation burials of Lilybaeum there have been unearthed even many “foreign” coins; they bear the typical devices of the Campanian and Samnite coinage (on the obverse the head of Apollo; on the reverse, the man-headed bull, crowned by Nike), of the Syracusan coinage (issues both of Agathocles and Hiero II) and of the Mamertines131. The absence of Pyrrhus’ coins is fully comprehensible; more than this, it is worth to stress the resemblance between the numismatic draft of Lilybaeum and the one provided by Selinous, where – excluding all the V century BC issues and those following the destruction of 250 BC – 60 coins of Syracuse and 18 specimens of the Samnites have been catalogued132. In conclusion, all this information and data seem to corroborate the idea that for the Carthaginians it was crucial to keep the possession of the Sicilian base of Lilybaeum in the struggle against Pyrrhus. They shielded the city tirelessly, and so Pyrrhus, after besieging it without any result for two months, became aware that he was only wasting many precious forces. Therefore, he was forced to acknowledge his own setback and to withdraw to Syracuse; there he spent the winter time of 277/276 BC, adjusting his projects and mulling over his future tactics.

131 Cutroni Tusa 1966, 348–352; Cutroni Tusa 1967, 404–406; Cutroni Tusa 1971, 763– 769. 132 See Cutroni Tusa 1957, 200–203; Cutroni Tusa 1958–1959, 306–316; Cutroni Tusa 1968A, 190–226. A great part of those coins has to be linked with the period of the first Punic war, excluding obviously the coins of Agathocles and those of the Mamertines, that relate to an old issue (on the obverse, the head of Zeus; on the reverse, eagle standing on the thunderbolt).

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2.10. “The king has turned to be a tyrant!”. The last months of Pyrrhus in Sicily and the rebellion of the Greeks (spring 276 BC) The literary sources do not provide so much evidence about the last months of Pyrrhus in Sicily; however, they emphasize the extremely unfavourable behaviour of the king against the Greeks of Sicily, and they more or less look into the stages of his final defeat, until the return to southern Italy. Nevertheless, two things have to be pointed out: first, those months were for sure filled with great happenings, with enormous projects that were only sketched, with rebellions and continue hostilities; and all those events deeply paved the way to the final defeat both of Pyrrhus and, particularly, of the Greeks of Sicily against the Carthaginians. Second, the literary sources provide in this case perhaps the most important information about the political relationships between Pyrrhus and his Greek subjects, who finally rebelled against his autocratic deeds. The king, after his withdrawal to Syracuse, tried in all probability to understand what warning could have been drawn from the defeat under the fortifications of Lilybaeum, given that it had not been enough to segregate all the Punic forces in their westernmost dominion in Sicily. The formidable and uncontested maritime supremacy of the Carthaginians in the western Mediterranean basin allowed them to have a continual and close relationship with the motherland; therefore, they could bring in Sicily all the soldiers, supplies and resources they needed to arrange a strong resistance against the enemy and maybe a counterattack. With the rest of Sicily in his own hands – apart from the north-eastern area, that was under the control of the Mamertines – Pyrrhus thought that the Punic hegemony over Lilybaeum was not an excessive menace for him; by then, the real enemy was Carthage itself, that relentlessly gave support to the Sicilian Punic centre. It is absolutely not surprising that both Diodorus (22, 10, 7) and Plutarch (Pyrrh. 23, 3) pointed out that the major proposal of Pyrrhus for the new year 276 BC was to carry the war on the African ground. Some scholars think that the African project of Pyrrhus was conceived just after the debacle at Lilybaeum, and that the king was really persuaded that it could result as a successful plan, due to the parallel venture that had been undertaken by Agathocles at the end of IV century BC. Nonetheless, in my opinion the reverse suffered against the last Punic stronghold of Sicily in the autumn of 277 BC confirmed to Pyrrhus the absolute necessity to act the last stage of his conquest’s plans in the western Mediterranean; the reminiscence of the successful deeds of Agathocles – who was just planning a second invasion of northern Africa before his murder – may be seen as an evidence that in Pyrrhus’ opinion the direct attack to Carthage was a quite compulsory stage in his western enterprises, that included one after the other the conquests of Magna Graecia, Sicily and Northern Africa (i.e. Carthage); this is just the same schedule that the king sketched while discussing with his Thessalian friend, Cineas, as it was quoted by Plutarch (Pyrrh. 14, 4– 14)133. 133 See Schubert 1894, 213; Von Scala 1896, 158; Meltzer 1896, II, 240; Niese 1897, II, 46;

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By way of thinking over the conduct at Lilybaeum, Pyrrhus was compelled to pass from the planning (and perhaps even the idealization) of the African venture to its realization; nevertheless, he was well aware that it was necessary first of all to assemble a mighty fleet, both to convey the troops in Africa and to counter the Carthaginian warships in the waters of western Sicily. So, he turned once again to his Greek allies, to get new incomes and to draft the crews. Plutarch (Pyrrh. 23, 3–4) says that the king aimed clearly at Libya but many of his warships had no crews; therefore he began to recruit many rowers from the Greek city-states, but he did not act towards them gently and kindly; he forced them and sometimes he punished violently the citizens, so that he appeared to be a dictator. Plutarch says that in the first times Pyrrhus did not behave in such a way; nay, the Greeks of Sicily had been positively impressed by his thoughtfulness, as the king trusted anybody and he did not worry anybody; but then, when he altered his moods, from a demagogue changing into a tyrant, he got even the reputation to be a turncoat and an unthankful person. However, the affair of the compulsory recruitment was just the last matter of a long inventory of tyrannical acts of Pyrrhus against his Greeks allies of Sicily, who nevertheless went through them willingly, since they were persuaded that those measures were necessary to get the objective they had planned. Plutarch clearly divided into three stages the political behaviour of Pyrrhus towards the Greeks of Sicily; the first period was marked by an extreme and perhaps not fully unselfish friendliness; the second one was distinguished by a number of overbearing actions, that began in all probability soon after the Greek city-states appointed him as leader and king of Sicily. Most probably, the source of information used by Plutarch for this passage was unfavourable to king Pyrrhus, and quite the reverse sympathetic towards the Greeks of Sicily; according to this source, Pyrrhus’ unfaithfulness became clear when he changed from king to tyrant134. His unconditional decisions have been patently emphasized by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (20, 8, 1–3): “Pyrrhus took away the estates of Agathocles’ relatives and friends from those who had received them at that ruler’s hands and presented them to his own friends, and he assigned the chief magistracies in the cities to his own shield-bearers and captains, not in accordance with the local laws of each city nor for the customary period, but as was pleasing to him. Lawsuits and controversies and all the other matters of civil administration he would in some cases decide himself and in other cases would refer them either for reversal or for determination to those who hung about the court, men who had an eye for nothing Holm 1901, II, 524; Ciaceri 1902, 37–38; Beloch 19272, IV 1, 555; Hamburger 1927, 85; Nenci 1953; Lévêque 1957, 487–489; Pareti 1959, 253–254; Kienast 1963, col. 151; La Bua 1980, 239–241; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 67. 134 The source is in my opinion still vague to identify, but it may be right to suggest the name of the historian Timaeus of Tauromenium (as it has done by La Bua 1980, 218–219 and 244– 245). However, there cannot be any doubt that the same source was used by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and by Appian (Samn. 12, 1), who said that Pyrrhus was a burden for the Greeks of Sicily, owing to the hospitality, the supplies, the garrisons and the tributes (“h[dh kai; toi`~ Sikeliwvtai~ baru;n ejpiv te xenivai~ kai; corhgivai~ kai; frourai`~ kai; eijsforai`~ genovmenon”).

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except making gains and squandering wealth in the pursuit of luxury. Perceiving that many people were already secretly hostile to him, he introduced garrisons into the cities, taking as an excuse the war threatening from the Carthaginians; and arresting the most prominent men in each city, he put them to death, falsely alleging that he had discovered plots and treasonable acts”. This passage may even clear up some topics about the official relationships between Pyrrhus – as king and leader – and the Greek city-states; indeed, if these actions of the new tyrant were typical of his last months in Sicily, it may be presumed that on the contrary the greatest part of the Greek communities in Sicily went on by self-governing even after they handed over their cities to the king. The main political offices and the local laws were still applied, as it was customary, and the civil administration was up to the traditional city-officers. No doubt, the situation portrayed by Dionysius seems to concern especially the city of Syracuse, given that he quoted exactly the relatives and the former Friends of Agathocles, who had most likely had a primary role in flanking Pyrrhus while he prepared the military expedition against the Punic ejpikravteia. Furthermore, it seems that the king did not need at first to leave any occupying forces in the allied cities, apart from those who had been previously under Carthaginian control. The background is typical of a quite free, autonomous and self-sufficient Sicily, provided that in Pyrrhus’ view every Greek city-state was indeed part of his kingdom of Sicily; and this focal point was maybe the key trouble between the king and those citizens whom he considered as formally subjects. The quality of the measures adopted by Pyrrhus shows that the revulsion of the Greeks was deep-rooted; even if Pyrrhus’ political choices could be given good reason in view of the aimed freedom of Sicily from the Punic interference, they were interpreted from the Greek city-states as deliberate violations against their own freedom. However, after the war campaign against the Punic dominions in 277 BC, something drove the Greeks to rise up explicitly against the king; I believe that the basic reason has to be found out in the defeat at Lilybaeum. The Greeks of Sicily patently understood in that instance that Pyrrhus was really not invincible, if he had been stopped by the resistance of a single Punic stronghold, even after a victorious advance into the ejpikravteia; furthermore, during the peace negotiations with the Carthaginians the king behaved at least ambiguously. His good inclination to leave to the Carthaginians the control of Lilybaeum – what was certainly vital for them – was no doubt interpreted by the Greeks of Sicily as a betrayal of the promises that the king made just one year before; they could not accept his behaviour, and they compelled him to lay the siege against the Punic fortress. The reverse of the king provided evidence that the Carthaginian enemy was still powerful and strongly established in Sicily, and most of all that the Punic navy ruled the Sicilian waters.

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That’s why, in the Greeks’ view, the brutal appeal of the king for new forces, payments, human and economic resources was considered absolutely unacceptable135. What openly turned the secret disagreements into a rebellion was particularly Pyrrhus’ cruelty against Thoinon and Sosistratus, the Syracusan leaders who had been the first to help him to cross to Sicily and then sided with him during all the war campaigns against the Carthaginians. The account of those events is provided quite the same by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (20, 8, 3–4) and by Plutarch (Pyrrh. 23, 4–5), and it may be worth to quote the two passages. Dionysius says that “among the most important citizens, there was Thoinon, the commander of the garrison, who was admitted by all to have shown the greatest ardour and zeal in aiding him to cross over and to take possession of the island: for he had gone to meet him at the head of a naval squadron and had turned over to him the Island at Syracuse, of which he himself had the command. When, however, Pyrrhus attempted to arrest Sosistratus also, he was disappointed: for the man had become aware of his intention and had fled from the city”. These are indeed the quite similar observations of Plutarch: “Then came his dealings with Thoinon and Sosistratus. These were leading men in Syracuse, and had been first to persuade Pyrrhus to come into Sicily. Moreover, after he had come, they immediately put their city into his hands and assisted him in most of what he had accomplished in Sicily. And yet he was willing neither to take them with him, nor to leave them behind, and held them in suspicion. Sosistratus took the alarm and withdrew; but ­Thoinon was accused by Pyrrhus of complicity with Sosistratus, and put to death. With this, the situation of Pyrrhus was suddenly and entirely changed”. The final shading of Plutarch’s passage is very important to resolve a trouble that has since ever puzzled the scholars; during the Sicilian expedition, did Pyrrhus give preference to a specific part of the Greek populations? Did he politically side with a party? Starting from an analysis of the measures adopted by the king, some scholars followed the early suggestion of Schubert, in whose opinion Pyrrhus would have been the leading representative of the democratic party, and that he for sure trusted on the loyalty of the former partisans of Agathocles against the oligarchs, who on the contrary were supporting the Carthaginians against him. On the other hand, La Bua conjectured that the king was indeed associated with the Greek aristocracy, and that he dissented from the democratic party who took a liking to the Carthaginians. In my opinion, however, Plutarch’s account is extremely clear: the rising of the Greek city-states against Pyrrhus was no doubt a general rebellion, it was not associated to a specific political party; and this because, while he was in Sicily, Pyrrhus never played the role either of a prominent representative of a party, or of a 135 Droysen 19523, III, 165–166; Schubert 1894, 213–214; Von Scala 1896, 158–159; Meltzer 1896, II, 240–241; Niese 1897, II, 47–48; Holm 1901, II, 524–526; Ciaceri 1902, 39–40; Beloch 19272, IV 1, 555; Cross 1932, 81; Carcopino 1961, 80–81; Kienast 1963, col. 151– 152; La Bua 1980, 243–251 (all stressing Pyrrhus’ absolute responsibility for the failure of the Sicilian venture); Hamburger 1927, 85; Frank 1928, 652; Nenci 1953, 177; Lévêque 1957, 489–491; Pareti 1959, 254; Lévêque 1968–1969, 148–149 (accusing the Greeks of Sicily).

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single city’s officer; Pyrrhus was merely the basileuv~ kai; hJgemwvn of the Greeks of Sicily. Pierre Lévêque has rightly pointed out that it is impossible to think about the political role of Pyrrhus in Sicily as a matching part of the position he had in Taras, where as a matter of fact he had been called for help by the representatives of the democratic party136. On the other hand, if the conjectures of Schubert (otherwise La Bua) were correct, it has to be supposed that one of the two political parties – the aristocrats or the democrats – finally anyhow trusted the king, helping him to preserve his power in Sicily and to defend his own interests (commercial, political or even economical). Therefore, it should be assumed that there was a mutiny of the democrats, otherwise a rebellion of the aristocracy’s representatives; nonetheless, the literary sources emphasize only a particular feature of the Greek upheaval: it was wide-ranging! Another kind of analysis about the same topic may be suggested, just considering the matter from the point of view of Pyrrhus’ repressive methods. Indeed, the historical sources do not clear up against whom those measures were decided: it seems wrong to state that the people had to suffer the most unpleasant consequences of a government that invalidated the free choices of the magistrates, and that gave to the king and to his Friends even the administration of justice137. A thorough investigation of Dionysius’ passage shows that Pyrrhus’ aim was to replace, in the management of power, the officers who had been appointed by the single Greek city-states; he wanted to use absolutely devoted persons, either they installed themselves for the first time, or they went on with their previous duty thanks to the king’s promotion. This was the happening in Syracuse, regrettably the only one which has been pointed out by the historical sources. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten what was the social basis both of Thoinon and Sosistratus; indeed, some scholars swiftly linked them with the Syracusan aristocracy just because they were appointed by Pyrrhus with some important military and political duties. I have already tried to show that Thoinon was a soldier, who was the leader of the occupying force established in island of Ortygia, and perhaps he was even the son of an Italic mercenary soldier (as it may suggested by the Greek version of his father’s name, Mamevw~). On the other hand, the origin of Sosistratus is still unknown, but for sure he sided with the representatives of the democratic party during the civil war against Thoinon. Therefore, it must be admitted that Pyrrhus gave the management of the power in Syracuse to two representatives of the democratic faction; as a consequence, even the democrats – not only the aristocracy – suffered the consequences of the brutal measures adopted by the king. 136 For the critical conjectures about the political side of Pyrrhus in Sicily, see Schubert 1894, 204 (leader of the democratic party); La Bua 1960, 98–109; La Bua 1980, 246–251 (associated with the aristocracy). The best suggestion has been offered by Lévêque 1968–1969, 149: “la lecture de Plutarque montre bien que la haine que Pyrrhos en vint à susciter en Sicile était générale et non liée aux options politiques: les Siciliotes se révoltèrent parce qu’il leur demandait trop et que leur résistance exacerbait ses exigences. Je reste persuadé qu’en Sicile […] Pyrrhos ne fut pas l’homme d’un parti”. 137 See La Bua 1980, 245: Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 70.

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As well, it cannot be maintained that the Greek aristocracy had a great interest to continue the war because that was a source of wealth, while the democratic representatives had three great troubles as a consequence of the prolongation of the war against the Carthaginians; first, they lost their earnings due to the stoppage of the commercial relationships with Carthage; second, they had to pay huge sums of money to support the war; third, they had to suffer a tyrannical ruler and the abuses of power of the aristocrats138. Well, this conjecture cannot be supported, because Pyrrhus’ friends – that were those who governed the single Greek city-states in his name – were not necessarily members of the Greek aristocracies, as it is shown by Sosistratus and Thoinon. Furthermore, it is very difficult to understand what were the commercial relationships of the Greeks of Sicily in such an obscure period; anyway, a rapid check up of some archaeological data can show that at the end of the IV century and in the first half of the III century BC the commercial exchanges between the Greeks of Sicily and the Carthaginians carried on. As an example, the Hellenistic Punic amphorae (of the shapes called “Mañá C, D and E”) have been discovered widely in western Sicily and in many places of the Elymian zone: but they have been indeed found along the trading routes that connected western Sicily with the markets of the eastern part of the island: the southern route run from Lilybaeum to eastern Sicily, passing through Selinous and Agrigentum; the northern one run alongside the coast, passing through the Egadi islands, Terrasini, Panormus, Cefalù and arriving even to the Aeolian islands. On the other hand, the Greek-Italic amphorae have been found widely all over Sicily, and this information must be read as a clear sign of a huge diffusion of the local goods. No doubt, this data do not support the hypothesis of a great economic crisis for the Greek democrats in Sicily in the first half of the III century BC139. Definitely, those of Pyrrhus were the decisions of a typical Hellenistic king, and therefore they had a universal consequence for every single Greek subject in Sicily: this may help to comprehend the real meaning of Plutarch’s turn of phrase ginovmeno~ ejk dhmagogou` tuvranno~ (Pyrrh. 23, 3), which in my opinion does not stand for “after being the leader of the democratic party, he became a tyrant supported by the aristocracy”, but has to be translated as “after being considered guide of the Greeks of Sicily, he turned to be their tyrant”. Once again, in Sicily an irremediable struggle took place between the typical Hellenistic model of kingship performed by Pyrrhus and the idea of it which was common among all the Greeks, and especially among the Sicilian city-states; that’s why they considered Pyrrhus as a tyrant, because such was meant to be an absolute basileuv~ in the Greek political thought. Plutarch (Pyrrh. 23, 5) goes on saying that after the wide-ranging rebellion broke out the Greek city-states behaved as paradoxically as surprisingly; they did not search for their autonomy, but they in turn appealed for help either to the Carthaginians or to the Mamertines, i.e. the old enemies of Pyrrhus; needless to 138 La Bua 1980, 246. 139 For the Punic amphorae, see the thorough investigation of Denaro 1995, 183–208.

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say, the Greeks could not hope to be treated more favourably by them than by the “tyrant-king”. Therefore, the Carthaginians took a great advantage from the difficult condition of Pyrrhus and conveyed in Sicily from the motherland many other supports; then they swiftly went out from the city of Lilybaeum and steadily spread again all over Sicily, winning back all the positions and the dominions they lost during the previous year of war, and even including in their ejpikravteia many citystates that were by then controlled by the king’s soldiers. It may be worth to recall that many local leaders had to leave their cities to avoid the brutal measures performed by Pyrrhus; one among them was the above mentioned Sosistratus of Syracuse. A very interesting information is provided by a passage of Zonaras (8, 5, 11), who stated that the Carthaginians, when they saw that Pyrrhus had no more good troops and lost the esteem of the native Greeks, started once again the war and they even welcomed all those Syracusan citizens who had been banished by him. There seems to be no reason to doubt that Sosistratus was among them140. The question of the Mamertines is a little bit more puzzling; regrettably, the literary sources concerning the Pyrrhic war in Sicily say almost nothing about the political behaviour of the city-state of Messina during the Sicilian venture of the king141. The city was formally allied with the Carthaginians and could count on the support of the Campanian soldiers settled in Rhegium. Nevertheless, Pyrrhus marched even against the Mamertines, and he definitely won them after a swift brilliant war campaign; Plutarch (Pyrrh. 23, 1) says that the Mamertines gave much annoyance to many Greeks and laid some city-states under contribution, but Pyrrhus seized and put to death their tribute collectors; then he won the Mamertines in battle and destroyed many of their strongholds. It is difficult to set a definite chronology for the happening in the general background of the Sicilian military expedition, above all by reason of the position it holds in the narrative of Plutarch; indeed, the historian put it between the account of the victorious endeavour at Eryx and the slight quote about the peace negotiations offered by the Carthaginians when the king was preparing the assault on Lilybaeum. Some scholars accepted without question the chronology provided by Plutarch, and then stated that the war against the Mamertines was fought in 277 BC; nonetheless, it is an unlikely suggestion. As a matter of fact, in that year Pyrrhus more and more went away from the north-eastern Sicily, until he reached Lilybaeum; nay, the conquest of the Punic outposts in the zone of the Conca d’Oro and the downfall of Panormus were strategically use140 Cross 1932, 81; Kinkaid 1980, 82; La Bua 1980, 250, note 1 (Sosistratus fled to the Carthaginians); Niese 1897, II, 47; Frank 1928, 652; De Sanctis 19602, II, 390 (Sosistratus fled to Agrigentum). 141 We ignore even the real extension and what were the dominions of the Mamertines at the time of the war against Pyrrhus. A good attempt of recovering them has been made by De Sensi Sestito 1977, 46–51 (previously, see Servi 1903, 151–198; 241–263), on the basis of an account of Diodorus (22, 13, 1–2) mentioning a list of Greek city-states that were controlled by the mercenaries of Messina. The passage refers to the war campaign waged by Hiero II of Syracuse against the Mamertines some time later, and it may be providing some evidence for the situation of the period 278–276 BC in the north-eastern corner of Sicily. Scurria 1981, 62–63, suggested to include among those Greek city-states even Agathyrnum. On this subject, see even my further reflections in chapter 3.

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ful to preclude any chance of a direct contact between the two allies, that were the Carthaginians and the Mamertines. No doubt, it would have been very risky to make use of a part of the troops to go back against Messina, while the greatest amount of the Greek soldiers moved against Lilybaeum, led by the king himself. From Panormus, Pyrrhus could decide which one among the two enemies he wanted to face at first, and he wisely preferred to wage on the war against the Carthaginians; however, he was fully aware that he could not face at the same time both the challengers. Perhaps, then, after the defeat against Lilybaeum, he let the winter pass on, and in the springtime of 276 BC, when he had yet gone back to eastern Sicily, he fought against the Mamertines, who were probably at that time answering to the appeal for help that came from some Greek city-states. Therefore, the military expedition against the mercenaries may be seen as one of the last efforts made by Pyrrhus to keep joint his alliance with the Greeks of Sicily: but it was too late142. The sharp clash came out as a further military success of Pyrrhus in Sicily; nevertheless, his political position in Sicily was declining more and more; the advance of the Carthaginian troops was quite relentless, as much as the rising up and the mutiny of the Greek city-states; the supremacy in the island was nearly lost. To this, Pyrrhus had to combine the growing complications in Magna Graecia, from where his allies appealed daily for help, because they had been defeated repeatedly by the Roman legionaries and could not defend anymore their own cities. Those appeals for help were the alleged reason used by Pyrrhus to cover up that he was, finally, leaving Sicily voluntarily. These are the words of Plutarch (Pyrrh. 23, 5–6): “And now, as he saw everywhere secessions and revolutionary designs and a strong faction opposed to him, he received letters from the Samnites and Tarentines, who had been excluded from all their territories, could with difficulty maintain the war even in their cities, and begged for his assistance. This gave him a fair pretext for his sailing away, without its being called a flight or despair of his cause in the island; but in truth it was because he could not master Sicily, which was like a stormtossed ship, but desired to get out of her, that he once more threw himself into Italy”. It may be worth quoting another version of the events, which has been provided by Justin (23, 3, 7–10), and focuses on the last battle fought in Sicily by Pyrrhus, before his departure. According to Justin, Pyrrhus was under a double pressure, as the Carthaginians were urging him in Sicily, while the Romans were beating his allies in southern Italy; he thought it could have been risky to stay in Sicily, because the Italic allies could have deserted him if they had not been helped against the Romans; but it could as well have been tricky to cross to Italy, because the 142 Schubert 1894, 210–213; Niese 1897, II, 45–46; Hamburger 1927, 80–82; Lévêque 1957, 477–479; Pareti 1959, 252–253; Kienast 1963, coll. 149–150; Vartsos 1970, 95–96 (all dating the war campaign against the Mamertines to 277 BC). I agree with La Bua 1980, 241, for the chronology at 276 BC. The campaign was clearly mentioned even by Pompeius Trogus in his Philippic Histories, and is alluded to by Just. Prologus 23 (tertio et vicensimo volume continentur haec […] bella quae Pyrrhus cum Poenis et Mamertinis ibi gessit): see Ferrero 1957, 93; Forni 1958, 73; La Bua 1978, 188.

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Greeks of Sicily no doubt would have turned away their side after his departure from the island. Nevertheless, he decided to stay in Sicily and fight there with all his outstanding troops; it would have been better to cross over southern Italy after winning definitely the Punic army. Then he joined battle with them and he got the victory: nonetheless, since he was leaving by then Sicily, it appeared as if he was running off after a defeat; that was why the Greeks of Sicily rose up against him, and by then he lost the supremacy over Sicily, as fast as he got it. There is a slight but significant difference between Plutarch’s account and Justin’s one; the former presented the mutiny of the Greek city-states of Sicily as a cause of Pyrrhus’ departure; the latter, on the contrary, makes it a consequence of the king’s decision to answer the appeal of his Italic allies. No doubt, the difference has to be ascribed to the historical sources consulted by the authors; Plutarch based himself on information that were for sure unfavourable to Pyrrhus and well-disposed towards the Greeks of Sicily; on the other side, Pompeius Trogus used an account which was complimentary to the king. The scholars rightly emphasized a contrast between Timaeus and Proxenus143. Anyway, the last victory in Sicily could not help to change the situation in the island, which was yet out of shape; the defeat of the Carthaginians, as much as the victorious war campaign against the Mamertines, could not avoid that many Greek city-states appealed them for help and sided with them. The march of the Punic troops had been only temporarily stopped, just to make sure that Pyrrhus could leave Sicily not in haste, and without an immediate pressure of the Carthaginians on his back. Therefore, he boarded his army together with a huge booty, and in the second half of summer, 276 BC – which was exactly during the third year of the Sicilian expedition, as pointed out by Appian (Samn. 12, 1)144 – Pyrrhus forever left behind his projects the conquest of Sicily, and the idea to unite all the western Greeks under his control. The island was by then left to the struggles between the Romans and the Carthaginians, as the king seems to have foreseen while looking back Sicily from his admiral-ship. Plutarch (Pyrrh. 23, 7) refers that he exclaimed to his companions: “oi}an ajpoleivpomen w\ fivloi Karchdonivoi~ kai; ÔRwmaivoi~ palaivstran”, “my friends, what a wrestling ground for Carthaginians and Romans we are leaving behind us!”. His conjecture was soon to be confirmed; but, nonetheless, it even meant that the fate of the Greeks of Sicily was yet decided.

143 See La Bua 1978, 188 and 195–196; La Bua 1980, 252, note 3; Marino 1981, 319–320. For Proxenus as a source of Pompeius Trogus, see Schubert 1894, 27; Von Scala 1896, 159; Niese 1897, II, 49; Hamburger 1927, 85; Beloch 19272, IV 1, 555; Lévêque 1957, 492– 493; La Bua 1980, 252. 144 Meltzer 1896, II, 241; Holm 1901, II, 525; Beloch 19272, IV 1, 556; Hamburger 1927, 86; Cross 1932, 82; Lévêque 1957, 493; Pareti 1959, 254; Carcopino 1961, 81; Will 19792, 111 (for the departure of Pyrrhus in 276 BC). The suggestion that Pyrrhus left Sicily in the spring of 275 BC cannot be accepted at all; it has been supported by Niese 1897, II, 49; Frank 1928, 652; De Sanctis 19602, II, 392; Kinkaid 1980, 83; La Bua 1980, 251, note 3; Santagati Ruggeri 1997, 79–80.

CHAPTER THREE The First Punic War: Greeks and Natives of Sicily among Hellenistic Kingship, old Masters and new Conquerors

3.1. The first steps of Hiero II as strathgo;~ aujtokravtwr (276/275–271 BC): civil struggles and autocracy in the fate of Syracuse The entire historical, literary tradition – the one going back to Timaeus, as well as the one based on the narrative of Philinus – gives a single chronological term for the beginning of the political career of Hiero II, that is 276 BC, exactly after the departure of Pyrrhus from Sicily. But if we want to understand how was it possible that once again a single man could seize the control in Syracuse after the two recently failed experiences of Agathocles and Pyrrhus, only the historical narrative of Polybius may secure an answer; nay, his account gives even some information that can help to restore a wide-ranging representation of the political life in Syracuse more or less in 276 BC. Polybius (1, 8, 3) states that after the departure of Pyrrhus from Sicily, the Mamertines of Messina could control easily the city and its countryside; they indeed bothered on the borderline the Carthaginians as well as the Syracusans, and they forced many parts of Sicily to pay them a tribute. The main support for these deeds came them from the alliance that they had with the Romans who few years before occupied Rhegium. It may be worth to stress that Polybius clearly refers to the occupying force of Rhegium speaking of Romans, but I do not think that it is possible to conjecture that Mamertines and Romans were formally allied before the beginning of the first Punic war in Sicily: for sure the Campanian soldiers who controlled Rhegium were cives Romani sine suffragio, but I am confident that they signed the treaty of alliance with the Mamertines on behalf of the Greek community of the city, that was – after all – formally self-governing. Anyway, when the barbarians holding Messina were deprived of that support – that is, when the defence force of Rhegium was laid under siege, i.e. in 270 BC –, quite immediately they were in turn pursued closely by the Syracusans into their own town. According to Polybius, not so much earlier the troops of the Syracusans, who were in disagreement with “those living in the town” (tou;~ ejn th/` povlei) and at that time remained in the neighbourhood of Mergane, picked up among themselves as leaders Artemidorus and Hiero, the one who afterwards became king of the Syracusans; Hiero was still very young, but naturally inclined to face the affairs like a politician and a king. Once he had seized the power and came back into the town 

This suggestion has been stressed by La Bua 1971B, 103 ff. For the opposite point of view, see the right opinion of De Sensi 1977, 43.  Of course, the chronological reference of 270 BC is an important terminus ante quem provided by Polybius, with reference to the conquest of the power by Hiero.  Walbank 1957, I, 55 correctly says that the Greek words crovnoi~ ouj polloi`~ provteron are a generally transitional phrase and that their meaning must not be pressed; according to him, the paragraph 2 covers roughly five years, since the Syracusan attack of 8, 2 is not different at all from the situation in 10, 1.

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thanks to the help of some of his family members, he succeeded in defeating his political opponents, and behaved benevolently and thoughtfully, so much that the Syracusans – who had been all but approving the soldiers’ choices – then completely agreed that Hiero was appointed as their general. It was immediately patent for everyone from his first proposals that he had many more aspirations than those linked with the generalship. There are no doubt some questions arising from the account of Polybius. First of all, we ignore who were the troops manoeuvring near Mergane; some scholars thought that they were made for the greatest part with mercenary soldiers, and this suggestion would lead straightforwardly to imply that the key reason of their contrast with “those in the city” concerned either their payment or a practical demand for the Syracusan citizenship. But Polybius does not refer to a divergence between a group of mercenaries and the rest of the Syracusan citizens; he speaks of dunavmei~ tw`n Surakosivwn rising up against oiJ ejn th/` povlei. Therefore, I am confident that the troops at Mergane were made for the greatest part – even if not exclusively – of Syracusan citizens. But which was their duty? It has been suggested either that those soldiers were about to be employed in a mission against the Mamertines, or that they were coming back to Syracuse after some tasks linked to the Pyrrhic venture. Undoubtedly, the correct location of the city of Mergane on the ground could be helpful for a plausible solution of the problem, but regrettably this village is mentioned only by Polybius in this instance, and has never been discovered; furthermore, no exhaustive conjecture has been made by modern scholars. Nevertheless, there seem to be good reasons to support the assumption that the Syracusan soldiers were engaged for a military mission against the Mamertines; first of all, the historical context described by Polybius has no more connections with the Sicilian venture of Pyrrhus, which was by then considered a finished chapter of the history of Sicily. Second, the main danger for the city-state of Syracuse as regards the foreign policy during the early stages of Hiero’s political career was for 

For the mercenaries in Mergane see Beloch 1893B, 486; Griffith 1935, 204; Vallone 1955, 49; Berve 1959, 9; Berve 1967, I, 463; Roussel 1970, 42; Fantasia 2006 (p. 25 of the abstracts). For regular troops, De Sensi 1977, 11–12.  De Sanctis 19672, III 1, 91, note 6: Hüttl 1929, 135; Pareti 1959, 258; Rizzo 1971, 101 (mission against the Mamertines); De Sensi 1977, 12 (return from the Pyrrhic venture). According to Berve 1959, 9, the mission of the Syracusan troops was directed against the Carthaginians.  It can be a mistake in the reading of the original text of Polybius, as it has been recurrently suggested by the scholars; Walbank 1957, I, 55 proposed an analogy with the Sicilian city of Morghyna (Steph. Byz. s.v. Movrguna = Philist. FGrHist 556 F 11), which nevertheless is still undiscovered and cannot be correctly established on the field. There is anyway a modern village called Mergane in the neighbourhood of Prizzi. De Sanctis 19672, III 1, 91, note 6 identified the unknown city with Morganzia: his hypothesis was followed by Vallone 1955, 49. The problem is that Morganzia, too, has an uncertain location on the ground; see Erim 1958, 86, note 57 (a different reading for Morgantina), and the opposite suggestion of Manni Piraino 1959, 184, note 58. A useful survey of the critical positions is Bejor 1991, 565–566. I would like to suggest to preserve the name of Mergane in the text, mainly because there are no alternative readings in the manuscripts.

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sure represented by the Mamertines, who forced many other Greek communities in north-eastern Sicily to pay them a tribute and very often made incursions and raids in the border lands between their own cwvra and the territories controlled by the Syracusans. Therefore, the protection of the boundaries of the Syracusan dominions was clearly a main concern and it deserved even that some of the city forces were destined to that duty. This could have been the task which the city’s government appointed to the military troops led by Hiero. The basic consequence stemming from these preliminary remarks is that the conflict alluded to by Polybius had no doubt a political meaning, since he actually speaks of some Syracusan regular forces who rebelled against those who were left into the city; the reference to a dangerous situation of stavsi~, ready to break out, seems plain. The political connotation of the two parties involved in the struggle seems to be clear enough; even in the previous centuries of Syracuse’s history the army, which was customarily assembled with a lot of people coming from the popular social classes, was a chief sector of the democratic party. Consequently, those who remained in the city and may be identified too with those who dissented with the political decisions of Hiero and made their policy against him (this is the definition provided by Polybius at 1, 8, 4), could be only the representatives of the oligarchic party, that at that moment held the power in Syracuse. We ignore how the Syracusan oligarchs could be able to seize again the control of the city after the leaving of Pyrrhus from Sicily, but it may be reasonably supposed that they had a great advantage from the assassination of Thoinon and the flight of Sosistratus – who were both representatives of the democratic party, in all probability – and then even by the hasty departure of Pyrrhus. There is no certainty about the reason of the mutiny, and so even of the struggle between the oligarchs and the democratic party, but it may be ascribed to the duty assigned to the troops. Indeed, especially if their mission was about the defence of the border territories of the Syracusan cwvra, it seems obvious that the operation provided a great advantage to the oligarchs, because an amount of democratics and moderate citizens were forced to be far away from the city, due to the alleged reason of the military operations. Furthermore, the troops were usually commanded by the strathgoiv, i.e. the magistrates who had been officially designated in Syracuse, and so it may not be excluded that both of them had some connections with the oligarchic group: Polybius provides an evidence that support this conjecture, when he says that the troops in Mergane appointed their new leaders by themselves, and chose the new commanding officers among their own soldiers, thus rejecting the preference of the city’s government. The strategy adopted by the Syracusan oligarchy to strengthen the power and the control over the political institutions can be easily understood if one supposes that a huge task force made of regular Syracusan troops – who were very likely dangerous political challengers, too – was sent and retained far away from the city, thanks to the pretext of a war mission, and even more under the control of two senior officers who were likely to be manipulated by the oligarchic group. The characterization provided by Polybius (1, 8, 3) of both Hiero and Artemidorus as a[rconte~, not as strathgoiv – that is what should be looked for, in view of the usual magistrates who held that office every year in Syracuse – suggests that even the ancient histori-

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ans like Timaeus, who was in all probability Polybius’ source for the early moments of Hiero’s career, wanted to hint that the election of the new senior officers in Mergane was all but officially authorized. Polybius himself states (1, 8, 4) that the Syracusan citizens were all but approving that the soldiers appointed the officers and the magistrates by themselves alone. It must not be forgotten that the interference of the army in the elections produced great troubles not so many years before, in the period of Hicetas’ strathgiva; at that time, the polls turned out with the proscription of the mercenaries’ candidates, ordered by the official Syracusan political parties. Nevertheless Timaeus, even if he highlighted the misdemeanour in the election of the new leaders, seemed to be very thoughtful since he did not describe unenthusiastically the early political development of Hiero, who was for sure very popular among the troops and was supported by the representatives of the democratic party. He superbly commanded a part of Pyrrhus’ army during the king’s Sicilian venture; indeed, he got many victories and obtained by the king himself many gratifications and rewards for his successes. It is not surprising at all that the soldiers encamped at Mergane chose him as their leader, in view of his great tactical and military skills: no doubt, since that was a circumstance approaching a likely civil strife, the political meaning of Hiero’s election has to be marked, even if it seems dangerous to describe him as the head of the democratic political party in Syracuse. Anyway, after the mutiny and the election of the new officers, the Syracusan troops made their way home to the city, and were ready to fight against the oligarchic government. The political opposition to Hiero had to be strong enough, so much that the oligarchs tried to deny him and his followers the access into the town, probably with the help of a group of mercenary troops that were settled in Syracuse. Polybius referred that Hiero succeeded in going into the city thanks to the support of some of his relatives and trustworthy friends who opened him the gates; then he had to face his political contenders. All these events, as they are described by the historian, do not differ from those that marked many coups d’état occurred in Syracuse; it is enough and, at the same time, very noteworthy to recall to mind what happened in the city with Agathocles, in 316 BC, but even what happened after his death in 289 BC, when Hicetas was able to keep the title of strathgo;~ aujtokravtwr for a period of nine years. As regards Hiero, there is actually just one variation, but it is basic and it has been focused carefully by Polybius: it is about 

That Timaeus is the source of Polybius for the early stages of Hiero’s career is generally admitted: see Meltzer 1896, II, 551; Beloch 19272, IV 2, 11 and 483; De Sanctis 19672, III 1, 218 and 225; Walbank 1957, I, 53–55; La Bua 1966, 211–212; Petzold 1969, 150; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 201; Eckstein 1985, 269–270.  Even if he claimed to be descended from the noble Syracusan family of the Dinomenides (see Just. 23, 4, 4), it is likely that Hiero’s social basis was rather popular. Nevertheless, his father Hierocles (see both the literary sources [Zon. 8, 6; Paus. 6, 12, 4; Athen. 5, 209d] and the epigraphic ones [IG XIV 2 = Syll.3 n. 427; Blinkenberg 1941, II 1, 181, nr. 2c]) was appointed with the proxeniva in Delphi, perhaps in the year 275/274 BC when Herasippus was archon in Athens: see Syll.3 n. 396; Berve 1959, 7; Rizzo 1973, 71 ff.  On the coup d’état of Agathocles, see usefully Consolo Langher 1976, 383–429; Consolo Langher 1997A, 193 ff.; Consolo Langher 1999A, 331–334; Consolo Langher 2000.

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the behaviour of Hiero after he definitely got the complete control of Syracuse and his benevolent dealing towards the oligarchs and all the other political opponents. There is no evidence in the historical sources of any calculated annihilation of the oligarchs and their own families, and there is no reference to forced banishments. The government’s methods of Hiero as a[rcwn have been illustrated approvingly by Polybius, who used two modal adverbs: Hiero ruled pra/vw~ kai; megaloyuvcw~ (1, 8, 4)10. These accommodating hints to Hiero’s conduct, as well as Justin’s allusion to his moderatio in imperio (23, 4, 2), have been rightly and quite univocally ascribed by modern scholars to Timaeus’ judgment: this seems to be particularly meaningful, because just by reason of his link with the oligarchic party the historian had been condemned to the exile by Agathocles, and exactly to Hiero he owed his thankfulness for the return in Tauromenium11. In my opinion, the personal events of Timaeus logically support the straightforwardness of his opinion about Hiero, which was not typical of a partisan, but only of an aided man: indeed, even if he did not leave out to illustrate the unlawful stage of Hiero’s seizure of power, describing the elections at Mergane, Timaeus enlightened the moderate quality of Hiero’s government, especially towards the ajntipoliteuomevnoi he had defeated12. After he came back to Syracuse and overpowered his challengers, Hiero had definitely the complete control of the situation and he could run the city affairs by himself alone; indeed, the literary sources do not provide any more evidence about Artemidorus, who had been Hiero’s colleague as a[rcwn. But the political position of Hiero, which was properly illegitimate, could have been considered as a great trouble for the permanence of the formal Syracusan institutions; as a matter of fact, if he kept on working in the office of a[rcwn, he would have turned to be in all probability a new tyrant13. He had to give to his own power an officially permitted identity, by way of becoming part of the endorsed political institutions of Syracuse while keeping on a wide control over the community; it was just the way to disguise a new autocracy with the veils of legality. It was exactly as a result of his temperance in the supervision of the stavsi~ that Hiero thrived to persuade his fellow-citizens to give a legally recognized support to his authority, and at the same time he avoided to make a new coup d’état14. 10 Elsewhere (7, 8, 2) Polybius stated that during the lengthy reign of Hiero no Syracusan citizen was ever put to death, or banished, or even suffered a requisition of his own goods, due to a directive of the king. 11 On this problem, see Meister 1970C, 53 ff.; Pearson 1987; Meister 1992, 155; Vattuone 2002, 177–232. 12 Some scholars anyway rejected Polybius’ account, saying – ex silentio – that Hiero’s conquest of power in Syracuse was due to many violent deeds and a huge bloodshed: see e.g. Berve 1959, 10. As well, the remark of De Sensi Sestito 1977, 20 – who describes the policy of Hiero as favourable to the oligarchs – seems to me too risky. 13 In this way he was portrayed by some hostile literary sources, whose memories survive thanks to the definition provided by Pausanias (6, 12, 4), who refers to the moment of Hiero’s seizure of absolute power in Syracuse (by the way, his chronology is very accurate, because he quotes the second year of the 126th Olympic games, i.e. 275/274 BC) calling him tuvranno~. 14 The coup d’état was no doubt the starting point of Hiero’s seizure of power, and all the scholars seem to agree with this conjecture; nevertheless, the overthrow has been generally identified

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According to Polybius (1, 8, 4), who confirmed that the citizens were openly critical about the appointments made by the soldiers alone, in that occasion the Syracusans were all pleased that Hiero ruled them as a strathgov~: in all probability, the passage from the office of a[rcwn to the strathgiva matched the route from a formally illegal situation to a period of renewed constitutionality. The following historical events, but even the fact that Hiero was by that moment the only senior officer in the city, clearly show that his title had to be strathgo;~ aujtokravtwr: that was an office which was usually appointed to a single man in relation to a particularly demanding duty, and was no determined in time (while, on the contrary, the collegial office was annual). Therefore, the politically responsible behaviour of Hiero had been the ground for the appointment of the strategy by the whole popular assembly; but what were his duties? A plausible answer is provided by Justin (23, 4, 2), who wrote that Hiero was appointed dux adversus Carthaginienses, that is for the reorganization of the struggle made by the independent Greeks of Sicily against the Punic forces. Once again, everything went on according to the typical historical tradition of Syracuse; after the debacle of Pyrrhus, Hiero showed himself to his fellow-citizens as the ideal pursuer of the same anti-Carthaginian policy that not so much earlier allowed a coalition of quite all the Greek city-states of Sicily to be led against the Punic dominions under the command of a foreign condottiere. This time, what’s more, the tradition was inherited by a Greek native of Syracuse, and Hiero skilfully made the most of the theme of the “war against the barbarians” for his political propaganda, not only towards the Greek cities of Sicily, but even on the international political scene. There cannot be any doubt that the original project of Hiero had a widespread echo all over the Mediterranean basin: Theocritus, who was born in Syracuse and in those years lived at the court of the Ptolemies in Egypt, wanted to dedicate in 275/274 BC a flattering poem to Hiero (Idylls 16), where he implored the Gods of the Olympus that the Carthaginians could be driven off definitely from Sicily, and the Greek people could once again turn the attention to the agriculture and to the pastures15. It is even true that a political project based upon the struggle against the Punics was an extraordinary means to run the affairs of the home politics, because it could be used to keep on the firmness and the agreement among the people of Syracuse, and to satisfy at the same time the economic interests of the different social classes; that was what happened, nonetheless, at the beginning of the Sicilian military expedition of Pyrrhus. Indeed, the Syracusan soldiers who were actually the main political supporters of Hiero could find in the war against with the picking of the authocratic strategy, and therefore it has been variably dated: see Carcopino 1919, 65, note 1; Frank 19292, 88; Giannelli 1938, 60; Pareti 1959, 258; Walbank 1957, I, 54–55; Berve 1959, 8–11; Berve 1967, I, 463; Bengtson 19653, 398 (275/274 BC); Rizzo 1971, 102; Rizzo 1973, 73 (270/269 BC); Beloch 19272, IV 2, 279; Hüttl 1929, 135 (269/268 BC). Rightly De Sensi Sestito 1977, 24 pointed out that the coup d’état occurred at Mergane, not in Syracuse. 15 See particularly Theocr. Id. 16, 76 ff., together with De Sensi Sestito 1971, 507–514; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 22 ff.; Goldsberry 1973, 110; Hans 1983, 91; Gutzwiller 1983, 212– 238; Hans 1985, 117–125.

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the Carthaginians a way to keep themselves a bit happy, owing to the compensation and to the chances of booty; on the other hand, the oligarchs had for sure to consider optimistically the option of an hegemonic, territorial expansion of the Syracusan dominions, because this could allow to the city a huge economic revival; the commercial activities – among them stood out the grain trade, which since ever had been the best part of the city’s economy – were all concentrated into the hands of the wealthy shipowners and traders of Syracuse, but they depended not only on the production of the city’s cwvra, but even on the political control of large productive areas of both allied and subject cities. Therefore, the achievement of new territories and new alliances – which seemed to be ensured by the political scheme about the war against the Carthaginians – no doubt had to motivate the former political challengers, too. Unfortunately, at least in the first years of the strathgiva, the so trumpeted struggle against the Punic barbarians remained a mere factor of political propaganda; this conjecture seems to be implied by the complete lack of evidence regarding any military skirmishes with the Carthaginian army16. It is very likely that in those days Hiero skilfully tried to get an armistice with the Carthaginians, for a number of reasons; first of all, he needed to give some main concern to an amount of measures concerning the home politics, to be adopted in Syracuse; furthermore, the Syracusan army was no doubt too powerless and with too few soldiers to face with some hope of success a considerable military campaign, and the fleet had to be first reorganized and increased in number, because Pyrrhus had taken with him the greatest part of the navies during his withdrawal; last but not least, the power and the title that Hiero so recently had got perhaps suggested to pursue other objectives, maybe against the other sworn enemies of his city, i.e. the Mamertines of Messina. Once more, Polybius helps to shed some light on the activities of Hiero during the first stages of his autocratic power, providing details that are very useful even to recover the political life in Syracuse in the period around 274–273 BC. The first necessity of Hiero was about the home politics, because he had to nail down completely the political support of the oligarchs. Polybius emphasized an aspect which is apparently taken for granted; the control over the city’s regular army secured the firmness of the institutions. Hiero did know very well that the presence of the regular troops in Syracuse – of course, they were all trustworthy troops, including the same soldiers who backed his election at Mergane – was essential for the security of his strathgiva; Polybius quoted that if the troops and their officers left the city for some military operations, the people then tried immediately to act some political innovations; therefore the chance of a new revolution, together with the consequential civil strife, was very high (furthermore, Polybius used exactly the Greek verb stasiavzw, which does not give access to any doubt), and the probability that Hiero’s former competitors could look up again was not so remote. The office of strathgo;~ aujtokravtwr required that Hiero personally led the army against the enemy, particularly in those missions that were planned to secure the 16 A different view has been expressed by Beloch 1893B, 486–487; Berve 1959, 10; Rizzo 1971, 103.

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borders of the Syracusan dominions, where there had been many fights both against the Carthaginians and especially against the Mamertines. That’s why Hiero needed to leave in Syracuse a responsible delegate, who could lock up the internal stability of his power, avoiding any revolutionary attempt organized by the representatives of the oligarchy. Hiero just chose a representative of the Syracusan aristocracy, whose name was Leptines; he was the father of Philistides, whom Hiero married some time after17. This Leptines, perhaps the same man who had defeated several times the troops of Agrigentum in 307 BC and was appointed by Agathocles as ejpimelhthv~ of the Greek city-state of Kephaloidion18, was thought to be a straight descendant of the Syracusan historian Philistus, who in turn had been intimate of the tyrant Dionysius I. Maybe the titled ancestry appealed Hiero, too: nonetheless, the two peculiarities of Leptines’ character that have been stressed by Polybius had a greatest importance under a political point of view; the historian says indeed that Leptines outclassed all his fellow-citizens both for authority and for loyalty, and furthermore he was extremely admired among the lower social classes. Hence, a marriage policy was the channel used by Hiero to gain definitely the complete support of the oligarchy, but at the same time he could by that means provide further assurances to the people, who considered Leptines an authoritative assistant and a devoted associate of their leader. A second measure was immediately put into action by Hiero to strengthen his power. In many Greek city-states of Sicily, and particularly in Syracuse, at least from the Classical age onwards it was an ordinary deed to mix the regular armies with an amount of recruited mercenary troops, who then became assimilated with the native populations in the places where they served19. The Greek literary sources often considered them – and sometimes not wrongly – as a matter that could deeply trouble the local communities, both socially and politically, and even with reference to the matters in Syracuse their judgement proved to be correct. The old mercenaries of Agathocles had been the chief root in the civil struggle that broke out into the city after the death of the king; their banishment, on the one hand, gave to the Syracusan community a period of domestic peacefulness, but on the other side brought a lot of devastating raids and destructions among other Greek cities of south-eastern Sicily, like Gela and Camarina; most of all, they finally produced a sweeping alteration in the civic body and into the political institutions of Messina. 17 The name of Hiero’s wife has not been recorded by Polybius, but it has been provided by an epigraphic mention (see Syll.3 n. 428) and – most of all – by the legends and the inscriptions on some silver issues that were minted in her name during the years of Hiero’s kingship: see Caccamo Caltabiano – Tromba 1990, 161–183; Caccamo Caltabiano – Carroccio – Oteri 1997. 18 On Leptines see Diod. 20, 56, 2 (Leptines’ victory against Xenodicus of Agrigentum); 20, 56, 3 (Leptines as superintendent of Kephaloidion); 20, 62, 2–5 (Leptines ransacks the country of Agrigentum and defeats once again Xenodicus). 19 As regards the role of the mercenaries, with particular reference to Sicily and the West, see Parke 1933; Marinovic 1988; Tagliamonte 1994; Bettalli 1995; Krasilnikoff 1995, 171–184; Péré-Noguès 1999, 105–201; Millino 2001, 125–188; Zambon 2001A, 229–277. See even chapter 1, note 30, where I have quoted some papers of the Erice’s 2003 conference, all about the mercenaries in Sicily.

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In 274 BC, more or less, some other mercenaries serving in Syracuse – they were in all probability those who had been recruited at the time of Pyrrhus’ expedition and then remained at Syracuse after his swift departure – appeared to have bad intentions and to aim at a rebellion: Polybius portrayed them as kacevktai kai; kinhtikoiv (1, 9, 3)20. Thus Hiero thought it was time to get rid from that trouble: the chance was offered – if it was not a deliberate action – during a war campaign against the Mamertines, when he set his encampment exactly in front of the enemies next to the banks of the river Ciamosorus, in the neighbourhood of the Greek city of Centuripe. In his narrative, Polybius categorically individuates in the Syracusan army two different groups; on the one hand, there was a company including native Greek infantrymen and horsemen (polivtai); on the other, a battalion consisted of the mercenary troops, that Polybius’ source of information labelled as “the part of the army that had bad projects and wanted to rise up” (to; kinhtiko;n kai; stasiw`de~ th`~ dunavmew~: just note that Polybius, once again, used an adjective which refers to the stavsi~). Hiero then simulated a diversion while attacking the Mamertines; he kept aside the citizen troops and ordered only the mercenaries to assault the enemy. His men were completely annihilated by the Mamertines, and he let this happen, of course, before he withdrew in close order with his fellow-citizens to Syracuse. This military operation performed by Hiero, which is described by Polybius exactly as an alleged reason to get rid from the rebellious mercenaries, has been mistrusted by some modern scholars, who thought that the episode was craftily invented by Polybius’ source of information to cover up a real defeat suffered by the strathgov~ against the Mamertines21. In my opinion, this war campaign really took place, and perhaps the basic aim was to protect the northern boundaries of the Syracusan territories, which extended at least to the southern bank of river Ciamosorus, including Centuripe. This city, together with the neighbouring Agirium, played a key role in the following military missions of Hiero against the Mamertines, by reason of its strategic settlement in close proximity to the city of Ameselum, which was one of the southern strongholds of the territories controlled by the mercenaries of Messina. This suggestions are provided once again by Polybius (see infra), and seriously play a part in corroborating the likeness of the mission; perhaps Hiero even wanted to test the validity and the real strength of the opposing army, while taking the opportunity to eliminate his own mercenaries. Furthermore, the event shows that Hiero considered much more advantageous to face and work out the troubles with the Mamertines at first, and then to achieve the anti-Carthaginian plans that he previously broadcasted. A preliminary attack against the Punic troops, which should have been far-fetched just thinking about the military power of the challenger, could have given the Mamertines the chance to have their hands free, and to go on with their oppressive policy against the city-states of north-eastern 20 I do not agree with De Sensi Sestito 1977, 31–33, in whose opinion the two adjectives used by Polybius would be allusive of a specific event, in which the mercenaries would have been involved. I think they simply can be understood as a clear hint to a planned rebellion against Hiero; perhaps, this aspiration was encouraged because the mercenaries lost the political support of the oligarchs, who were then completely sided with Hiero. 21 See, e.g., Beloch 19272, IV 2, 10; De Sanctis 19672, III 1, 92, note 8; Griffith 1935, 205.

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Sicily; indeed, it could even have produced a new alliance between the Carthaginians and the mercenaries against Syracuse. The memory of what happened just few years before with Pyrrhus was very near! A war campaign against the Campanian mercenaries settled in Messina could have many more chances of success, even at the beginning, and still could give a great opportunity to Hiero: that was to induce all the Greek city-states in that moment under the control of the Mamertines to change side and make an alliance with Syracuse, either those which suffered the incursions of the mercenaries, or those which were forced to host some garrisons, or even those which payed them huge tributes. At any rate, the first expedition against the Mamertines turned out to be unsuccessful, and the defeat was perhaps only minimized thanks to the suppression of the dangerous and rebellious soldiers of the Syracusan army: Polybius (1, 9, 7) as a matter of fact says that, after their victory, the barbarians from Messina were active with bravery and without consideration. Polybius’ narrative seems to suggest that Hiero wanted to take some time to ponder about his foreign policy, while concentrating once again on some home affairs; the aim being, as always, to strengthen his personal position of state-leader. As soon as he got rid from the ajrcaivoi mercenaries, Hiero took steps to recruit the new ones: Polybius underlined that the xenologiva was absolutely private, and Hiero did not act in that instance on behalf of the Syracusan city-state. This is a clear sign that he was ready to go beyond the formal functions expected by his political office, and that he changed his temperate mood of government into a typical autocracy; really, this was probably even the intended aim of the recruitment, because the mercenary troops usually were thought to be a sort of military cream of the crop in the armies and, due to the pay they received, they became a kind of personal guard of their master. Therefore, the new mercenaries were for Hiero a new means to fortify his personal power, which he could use ajsfalw`~ only after the xenologiva (Polybius 1, 9, 6). Another proof that the new mercenaries were considered merely Hiero’s bodyguards is provided by Polybius, when he refers that the ruler decided to keep them apart from the citizen troops; indeed, in view of the new war campaigns against the Mamertines, Hiero started to train and to arm only his fellow-citizens. Even the evidence provided by the contemporary Syracusan coinage seems to corroborate the hypothesis that Hiero began very soon to rule in an absolute way, going beyond the official duties provided for by the autocratic strategy. It has been generally stated by the greatest part of the scholars that all the coinage minted by Hiero and bearing the inscription IERWNOS had to be ascribed to the period of the autocratic strategy, that is to say between 275 and 269 BC, because they do not have any message or legend referring to the kingship22. It must be nonetheless emphasized that the king’s title appears only on those silver issues that have been

22 See Head 1874, 61–69: Head 19112, 183–185; Holm 1906, 207–215; Giesecke 1923, 117– 149; Franke 1958, 57–85; De Sensi Sestito 1975–1976, 187–252; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 159–165 and 235–240.

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minted more or less in the years 218–215 BC, according to a new scrutiny of the coins23. A new approach has been suggested in more recent times towards the beginnings of Hiero’s coinage by an Italian scholar, Benedetto Carroccio, whose starting point is that all the issues bearing the legend IERWNOS followed the date of 269 BC, so they were minted when Hiero was yet king of Syracuse; it has to be consequential that while he got the office of strathgo;~ aujtokravtwr, Hiero did not have any right to issue coinage24. Some of his conclusions cannot be shared, in my opinion, and they prove to be contradictory. The first period of Hiero’s coinage, including gold, silver and bronze issues as well, may be confidently extended to the end of the war against Rome, in 263 BC, and this seems not to be a problem; nevertheless, if the starting point remains 275 BC, it is necessary to bear in mind not only the weight development of the coinage, but even the evolution of the political offices and titles held in those twelve years by the Syracusan leader, who started as a[rcwn (for not so much time), passing through the office of the autocratic strathgiva, to arrive to the renewed kingship in 269 BC. No doubt, the offices were formally different one from another: at any rate it has been shown, thanks to the account of the literary sources, that all the period is marked by a growing rate of autocracy in the government’s style of Hiero. So, there cannot be virtually any difference if the inscription IERWNOS was engraved on the coins when Hiero was still strathgov~, or when he was already king: it only shows the desire of the leader to appear as the reference figure for the Syracusan state, and the owner of the power. A short survey of the coins minted in that period may provide evidence to corroborate this conjecture. As regards to the gold coinage, only one specimen may be ascribed to this period; the average weight is 4.23 gr., which is quite the equivalent of an Euboic-Attic drachm, and the devices are meaningful: – Obv. Head of Persephone, left faced, with long hair. Rev. Biga driven by a charioteer, or even by a Nike; inscribed legend IERWNOS. The head of Persephone, we have seen, was customary in many earlier silver and bronze issues of Hicetas and Pyrrhus as well; furthermore, it was engraved even in the silver tetradrachms of Agathocles, bearing even the legend AGAQOKLEOS, without any reference to the people of Syracuse (that is to say, without the ethnic inscription SURAKOSIWN); yet, Agathocles was not king at all, when those coins were minted, and still held the autocratic strategy in Syracuse. But his sign on the coins symbolized his chief role in the town, as much as his quite absolute power; which is the same meaning of the inscription IERWNOS!25 More than this, no sug23 The lower chronology of the so-called “royal” silver issues has been suggested by Caccamo Caltabiano – Tromba 1990, 161–183; Caccamo Caltabiano – Oteri 1993, 91–110; Carroccio 1994, 21–22 and 108–113. 24 This is the approach of Caccamo Caltabiano – Carroccio – Oteri 1995, 195–274 (reproposed in Caccamo Caltabiano – Carroccio – Oteri 1997). All the following references to the single issues may be found in the same pages. 25 This has been rightly pointed out even by Caccamo Caltabiano – Radici Colace 1987,

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gestion has been made about the significance of the devices; as we have seen, it was not by chance that the charioteer was changed into a driving Nike, e.g. in Hicetas’ coinage. I cannot think to any other victorious war campaign led by Hiero, but only to the fights against the Mamertines, when he was still strathgov~: so, if the presence of the Nike should imply the celebration of a victory against the Mamertines, the coinage could have been issued only in the years 270–269 BC. Further evidence may be provided by the devices of the three bronze specimens minted in that period: – Obv. Head of Persephone. Rev. Flying Pegasus; inscription IERWNOS (average weight 10.93 gr.) – Obv. Head of Persephone: inscription SURAKOSIWN. Rev. Dashing bull; in exergue, inscription IE (average weight 5.64 gr.) – Obv. Head of Artemis. Rev. Flying Pegasus; inscription IERWNOS (average weight 2.97 gr.) It has been correctly said that the weight system adopted was based on a litra of 11 gr.; therefore, the three specimens should have been the unit, the half and the quarter of the basis specimen. This system was used in the first years of Hiero’s political career, and then put down. The conclusion of Carroccio, then, is that the unit and the quarter have to be dated after 269 BC, while the half can be dated to period of the autocratic strathgiva, because the reduced legend IE should stand for the beginning of the name Hiero26. This may be right, but I think that the message coming from the devices may strengthen this suggestion; indeed, the charging bull was used even by the Mamertines sometimes in their coinage, since it was considered to be a sacred symbol of Ares, god of war. But on Hiero’s coins a club is casted over the bull: it will be very difficult to know ever the truth, but I suggest that the club could be a reference to Heracles, the civilizing hero, and that Hiero put himself in his place with reference to the Mamertines. In conclusion, the coinage of Hiero’s first years seems to corroborate the hypothesis that his government was absolute at an early stage, even if he perhaps wanted to respect the tradition of the Syracusan mint, adopting such customary devices as the head of Persephone and Artemis, or even the flying Pegasus (used by Hiero most of all on the silver coinage), that always struck a chord of democratic appeal among the Syracusan people from the age of Timoleon27. 29–46; Caccamo Caltabiano – Radici Colace 1992, 103–120; Radici Colace 1995, 511– 512. 26 This coin has been ascribed either to Hiero (Head 1874, 69; Holm 1906, 213; Giesecke 1923, 118; Franke 1958, 59–61; De Sensi Sestito 1971, 526–528) or to Agathocles (Consolo Langher 1964, 304; Buda 1969–1970, 193–231; Holloway 1979, 90–91). 27 The bibliography concerning the circulation of the «Pegasi» in the West is plentiful; I would like to highlight just the basic (in my opinion) titles; therefore see helpfully Talbert 1971, 53–66; Anello 1974, 184–200; Holloway 1982, 129–136; Cutroni Tusa 1987, 69–78; Cantilena 1989, 13–14; Calciati 1990; Taliercio Mensitieri 1993C, 87–115; Cantilena 1993, 61–85. The «Pegasi» were minted often by Agathocles; see the careful analysis of Castrizio 1995, 295–302.

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These were, in conclusion, the last actions of Hiero before the new seasons of war. The well-founded reliability of the Syracusan political groups and the assurance that he could count on trustworthy citizen troops as well as on devoted mercenaries, all this gave to Hiero the chance to prepare carefully the second war campaign against the Mamertines. Syracuse recovered enough peacefulness and, what was more, the stability of her institutions; the last period of civil strife had been overcome, once again, handing over the major powers to a single person, who was appointed first of all with military duties, and preserving at the same time the customary institutions of the city. Syracuse, during the first years of Hiero’s government, actually was very similar to the city governed by Hicetas throughout his nine-year autocratic strathgiva: both the politicians played quite the same role and the stages of their political careers were very similar, including a careful supervision of the civil struggles; the title of strathgo;~ aujtokravtwr; the restructuring of the economy through a new coinage; the reorganization of the army; last but not least, a strong urge towards the military activities in Syracuse’s foreign policy. 3.2. “Getting rid from those barbarians”. Hiero’s warfare against the Mamertines (270–269 BC) and the alliances with the Greek city-states of eastern Sicily The second war campaign of Hiero against the Mamertines of Messina started in 270 BC, perfectly matching in time another important event that involved one of the most influent Greek city-states of southern Italy, that is the siege laid by the Roman legions to Rhegium and the occupying soldiers of the so-called octava legio, who had been controlling the city since a decade. At first, the garrison made by Campanian troops had been an indispensable instrument to keep the city under Roman control in the age of the Pyrrhic wars, and afterwards for recovering many other communities of Magna Graecia that had been previously conquered by Pyrrhus. In addition, the Campanians settled in Rhegium engaged close relationships, including a formal alliance, with their fellow-countrymen settled in Messina exactly at the time of Pyrrhus’ military expedition to Sicily, and this is very crucial information. As a matter of fact, they were officially cives Romani sine suffragio, and so it should be possible to conjecture an existing liaison between the Mamertines and the Romans before the formal deditio of Messina in 264 BC, even if it seems to be inappropriate to state that the alliance between Rhegium and Messina disguised a legitimate treaty between Rome and the Mamertines. The behaviour of the Campanian soldiers had not been every time commend­ able, particularly when they butchered all the native citizens of Rhegium who had decided to side with the king of Epirus when he was in southern Italy, but they even razed to the ground the city of Caulonia and when they devastated many other communities of Magna Graecia28. For these reasons, as soon as the Romans accom28 The destruction of Caulonia has been quoted by Paus. 6, 3, 12 and Strab. 6, 1, 10.261 (on both see De Vido 2001, 1–12). Two chronologies have been suggested; either 277 BC (see De

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plished the conquest of southern Italy, given that they needed to recover completely the confidence of the Socii Italici and to reject from themselves any suspect to have been mutually responsible of the misdeeds done by the troops of the octava legio, another Roman army in command of the consul Caius Genucius Clepsina was sent from Rome to drive out the Campanians from the city, which was laid under siege. Very important evidence provided from Zonaras (8, 6) – which has been rejected by some scholars, quite inappropriately29 – states that, fearing that the Campanians of Rhegium could get some help from the Mamertines (indeed, they were still allied with them) for the resistance against the consul, the Romans dissuaded the old mercenaries of Messina from being involved into the conflict, thanks to an agreement that the historian calls oJmologiva. The note provided by Zonaras seems to be a strong support for my previous suggestion, showing that some concrete relationships between Rome and Messina existed even before 264 BC. All those events really facilitated the opening of the Syracusan front against the Mamertines, for some reasons. As a matter of fact, Hiero could assume that the old mercenaries of Messina would have not received any help from their allies settled on the other side of the Strait of Messina, who were in turn suffering at the same time the assault of the Roman legionaries. Furthermore, in all probability neither the Romans could have sent any help to the Mamertines, even if they had good relationships with them, due to the above mentioned oJmologiva; of course, just to be correct and coherent towards the public estimation of the southern Greeks living in Italy (or even in Sicily), the Romans knew that it was not politically correct to send some help to the barbarians established in Messina, while punishing a battalion of Campanian soldiers on the opposite side of the Strait: this argument had to be soon very problematical, when faced during the political debates among the senators of Rome about the prospect to accept or reject the assistance’s appeal coming from the Mamertines in 264 BC. Last, it seemed there was not any danger concerning a new agreement between the Mamertines and the Carthaginians, duplicating the alliance made during the last stages of the Sicilian expedition of Pyrrhus; the relationships between the two had not to be so good, given that the Mamertines recurrently made some incursions even beyond the borderlines of their own dominions, into the territories of the Punic ejpikravteia; what’s more, the Carthaginians were then strengthening their own alliances and reinforcing the control of the territories they had just got back in middle-western Sicily. So, after he had straightened out the situation in Syracuse, Hiero had his hands free to fight against the Mamertines. A passage of Diodorus’ histories (22, 13, 1) provides some information to understand enough in detail which were the movements and the tactics used by the Syracusans during the second war campaign against the barbarians of Messina, and even to get many precious data concerning Sanctis 1972, III, 509–510; Oldfather 1921, col. 77; Biffi 1988, 317, note 114), or 270 BC (see Beloch 19272, IV 2, 482; Cassola 1962, 173, note 112; La Bua 1971B, 107–108, note 1; Musti 1994, II, 376–379). 29 I share the opinion of Berve 1959, 13, note 17; Petzold 1969, 156, note 4; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 44. An opposite, and unlikely conjecture, has been put forward by La Bua 1971B, 104– 105.

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the political behaviour of some Greek city-states of north-eastern Sicily during the war. Unfortunately, the opening passage of Diodorus’ chapter is partially lost, and it seems however possible to understand that the new citizens of Messina had really increased their power and they could depend on a certain number of garrisons (Tîn de; t¾n Mess»nhn o„koÚntwn Mamertivnwn hÙxhmšnwn … poll¦ me;n froÚria …). It may be useful, at this stage, to comprehend, more or less, which territories were controlled by the Mamertines, either directly or indirectly; the distinction is not so irrelevant under an official point of view, even if we may refer more generally to all the cities that fell into the sphere of Mamertine influence30. After their settlement at Messina, the mercenaries took under control the city’s cwvra; as Diodorus stated, the enlargement of their supremacy led no doubt to the conquest of new territories, that were monitored thanks to an organization of military garrisons (cwriva) that were broadly disseminated in Sicily when Pyrrhus fought there; during the war campaign against the mercenaries in the spring of 276 BC, the king who had been previously victorious in battle against the Mamertines, razed to the ground many of their strongholds (Plut. Pyrrh. 23, 1). Some of them, however, continued to exist and the territory dominated by the mercenaries once again enlarged when the Greeks of Sicily began openly to rise up against Pyrrhus; a lot of citystates then appealed for help just to the Mamertines, who did not loose the chance to get their hands on those communities, controlling them thanks to many occupying forces and by imposing the payment of a number of tributes. Some of those city-states are mentioned in the following lines of Diodorus’ text (22, 13, 2); Halaesa, Abacenum, Tyndaris, Mylae and Ameselum. They were conquered by Hiero in a different way, and this provides some important evidence to understand which was their political position in the period 276–270 BC. The people of Halaesa, Abacenum and Tyndaris welcomed Hiero, and they handed over to him without fighting; this seems to mean that those city-states fell into the Mamertine sphere of influence just because they were paying them the tributes. On the other hand, the cities of Mylae and Ameselum were conquered by the Syracusan strathgov~ by force, and the soldiers who defended them were afterwards officially enlisted by Hiero among his own troops; this must mean that in those towns the presence of the Mamertines was somehow much more tangible, and it was granted by a military garrison. Therefore, it may be conjectured that the territories controlled by the Mamertines in 270 BC, including the cwvra of Messina, the system of the strongholds and all the tributary city-states, extended along the northern coast of Sicily, facing the Tyrrhenian sea, at least up to Halaesa; the southern border in middle-eastern Sicily was the river Ciamosorus, since on its northern bank there was the fortress of Ameselum, while on the south laid the city-state of Centuripe, which was no doubt sided with Syracuse (during the former war campaign against the Mamertines, ended with the battle fought near the river Ciamosorus, the troops of Hiero en30 See Vallone 1955, 43; Pareti 1959, 245–246; Berve 1959, 13; La Bua 1968, 151; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 46–51.

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camped in the cwvra of that city); the borderline had to follow the river to his mouth in the plain of Catane. Some support to this conjecture may be provided by the numismatic data showing that the Greek city of Hadranum, which was in the interior of eastern Sicily, very near to the southern slopes of mount Etna, in close proximity to Ameselum and to the north of river Ciamosorus, was part of the Mamertine dominions. An issue of that city is characterized by the following devices; – Obv. Head of the god Adranus, bearded, looking to the left, and wearing a Corinthian-shaped helmet with crest. It is surrounded by a border of dots: behind the face, inscription ADRANOU. Rev. Standing dog to the right; in the exergue, inscription MAMERTINWN. Some specimens have above the dog a value mark, F. The issue has been dated accordingly to the ages following the military venture of Pyrrhus, and it seems to strengthen the suggestion that the Greek city fell exactly in that period under the direct control of the Mamertines, who signed with their own ethnic name the coinage of the city (keeping, nonetheless, the Greek form of the name). And it was just during the operations of 270 BC – or even of the following year – that Hiero probably conquered the city, releasing it from the mercenary garrison; indeed, the city of Hadranum was no doubt part of the Syracusan kingdom afterwards, and this is proved by the fact that it was the first city to be attacked by the Romans in 263 BC. Therefore, the issue may be dated in all probability just between 275 and 270 BC, and this chronology may even explain why so few coins of that kind were minted during that period31. If this reconstruction of the Mamertines dominion is plausible, something more has to be said concerning the main Greek city-states of the eastern coast of Sicily; if the territories ruled by the barbarians extended to the mouth of river Ciamosorus, this means that their influence spread over other important cities like Tauromenium and Catane, while Leontini as customary remained under the protection of Syracuse. It has been previously said that those communities, after the death of Agathocles but even in the three years of Pyrrhus’ sojourn in Sicily, were ruled by local tyrants who then became friendly allies of the king in his war against the Cartha­ ginians; more over, it must be reminded that when the relationship between Pyrrhus and his Sicilian allies collapsed, many Greek city-states appealed for help either to the Carthaginians or to the Mamertines. In my opinion, it is likely that both Tauromenium and Catane have to be included in the group of the Greek communities that pled the Mamertines; no doubt, they preferred to be helped by the old mercenaries who, by that time, were fully integrated with the survived portion of the Greek community of Messina (so they were quite “Hellenized” barbarians), rather than appeal to the Carthaginians and facilitate them to expand the ejpikravteia to the eastern coasts of Sicily. Furthermore, it seems to be likely that in 270 BC the 31 For the specimen, see Head 19112, 136–137; Grose 1923, I, 286; Särström 1940, 80–82; Consolo Langher 1964, 243; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 49. According to Plut. Tim. 12, 2, the city of Hadranum was sacred to the god Adranus, who was widely worshipped all over Sicily: see even Pace 19582, III, 519–520; Cusumano 1992, 151–189.

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Greek people of Tauromenium and Catane, after hearing that Hiero had declared war to the Mamertines, took the chance to free themselves from the oppressive hegemony of the mercenaries and to side immediately with the new champion of the Sicilian Greeks. This historical reconstruction is supported once again by Diodorus’ account (22, 13, 1), whose initial gap finishes with a complete meaningful turn of phrase, providing an important information. According to Diodorus, someone, after gathering an army, marched in haste towards the city of Messina, which was in that moment suffering an attack; at the same time, Hiero went away from the enemy region, and made his way elsewhere. This phrase is quite obscure, but I guess it may be interpreted in this way. Hiero perhaps tried to attack straightforwardly the cwvra of Messina. Bearing in mind that the Mamertines had a number of garrisons and military fortresses that sheltered their own possessions at least as far as the northern bank of river Ciamosorus, and that the greatest part of them had to be concentrated in central Sicily; furthermore, considering that the Greek city-states of the eastern coast of the island remained formally independent, even if they had in all probability to pay some tributes to the mercenaries, it seems very likely that the advance of Hiero occurred from the south-eastern side of Sicily through the coastline territories facing the Ionian sea, and that at the same time he got the friendship of the cities of Catane and Tauromenium, that were at last free from any other interference of the barbarians. Of course, the Mamertines had to be the subject of Diodorus’ first statement; they for sure had to gather an army which in haste ran through the cwvra of Messina, to defend the city. Anyway, Hiero avoided a battle in the open field, at least in that circumstance. The Syracusan army made his way towards the city-state of Mylae and conquered it by force, taking possession of 1.500 soldiers, that may be easily identified with the elements of the Mamertine garrison of the city. Immediately afterwards, Hiero conquered some other strongholds and arrived in the neighbourhoods of Ameselum: this city is located between Centuripe and Agirium, it was admirably fortified and possessed a great number of soldiers. Hiero laid it under siege and then he tore it down, but once again he behaved very friendly towards the defenders and enlisted them in his own army. Lastly, Diodorus states that the cwvra that was previously managed by Ameselum was then divided in two parts, and a half assigned to Centuripe while the other to Agirium. These were the chief military operations of Hiero’s second war campaign against the Mamertines. It must be enlightened that the approach used by Polybius to evaluate the first expedition seem to be false, if compared with the viewpoint expressed by Diodorus about the second one. Polybius gave explanation for every action, mentioning the desire of Hiero to get rid of his former mercenaries and to eliminate with them any danger of rebellion; on the contrary, Diodorus clearly wanted to stress that Hiero made a great effort to reduce the sphere of political and territorial influence of the Mamertines on the Greek city-states of north-eastern Sicily. It may be not erroneous to think that this was exactly the main target of the first expedition, too, which nevertheless turned to be unsuccessful because it focused on the zone which was mostly kept under control by the mercenaries’ garrisons, that

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was to the north of Centuripe’s cwvra and the river Ciamosorus, where amongst the other there were the two strongholds of Ameselum and Hadranum. In front of the unforeseen event, Hiero took the chance at least to get free from his unsafe mercenaries; then, in 270 BC, he thought skilfully to his previous experience and first of all marched along the eastern coastline of Sicily to arrive on the back of the city of Ameselum moving from the north, when he was even stronger thanks to the recent victories and the new contingents of soldiers that he enrolled in his army. When the mission came to an end, Hiero in all probability took his leave to Syracuse where he planned his following moves. This is the historical context where we have to place the first real contact between the Romans and Syracuse, which occurred in the final stages of the year 270 BC. According to the account provided by Zonaras (8, 6), Hiero sent some soldiers and supplies to the Romans who were at that time kept busy with the siege of Rhegium and were actually in great trouble due to the lack of resources. The modern scholars have long debated if already in that circumstance Hiero and the Romans signed an official treaty of friendship and alliance; in my opinion, Hiero put the basis of a personal filiva with the Romans, trying in such a way to get an advantage in the administration of the war against Messina; so, any other official or inter-state feature for that relationship has to be excluded32. I do not think that any help to resolve the problem may be provided by a general survey of Zonaras’ passages referring to the official relationships between Hiero and the Romans; indeed, he was considered as fivlo~ kai; suvmmaco~ by the Romans, as it is stated by Cassius Dio, but this information has to be judged as a matter of fact, and not to be referred to the narrow historical context of 270 BC. Furthermore, even when Cassius Dio (fr. 43, 1), expressing the viewpoint of the Carthaginians provided by the historian Philinus, mentioned the causes of the outbreak of the first Punic war, he stated that the Carthaginians used to say that the Romans were responsible, because they had signed a filiva with Hiero. Last but not least, suggesting a personal deed of Hiero really helps to overcome another trouble, that is the sending of both the supplies and the soldiers to Rhegium even if there was no official summaciva; I want to share the judgement of those scholars who said that Hiero in all probability sent yet a fleet, which was useful not only for the means of transport both of men and things, but even for blockading the harbour of Rhegium. Furthermore, we owe to Polyaenus (6, 6, 4) the information that in 269 BC a Syracusan war-fleet sailed in the waters around Messina, denying access to the harbour; it is therefore possible that this action was performed by the same warships that conveyed the aids to the Romans few months before. Consequently, any doubt concerning an official alliance between Rome and Syracuse already in 270 BC can be thrown out: on the contrary, it is for sure much more interesting to ponder which was the reason that drove Hiero to act, and in my 32 This conjecture has been previously stated even by De Sensi Sestito 1971, II, 513; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 52–54; Dexter Hoyos 1985, 56, note 85; Dexter Hoyos 1989, 53, note 5 and 63, note 23; De Sensi Sestito 1995, 29–30. See even Thiel 1954, 32; Berve 1959, 13; Cassola 1962, 177; Petzold 1969, 156; La Bua 1971B, 124–127. The evidence provided by Zonaras has been completely rejected by Pinzone 1983, 30, note 23, just because it is an unicum in the historical tradition.

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opinion the answer is quite forced. Indeed, somehow Hiero had to assure himself the neutrality of the Romans in the following war season against the Mamertines, and in all probability this had to be according to his own projects the counterbalance for the help he gave to the Romans in front of Rhegium. Nonetheless, the friendship was very constructive for the Romans, too, because they could have carried on the siege without appealing for any aid to the Socii Italici: the fact that the support of Hiero was indispensable to conquer Rhegium has been underlined even by the historical source of Cassius Dio, in whose opinion Hiero occupied the city together with the new friends. In the springtime of 269 BC Hiero declared war to the Mamertines for the third time. Once again, his winning move was the annexation of the territories that had been previously subject to the Mamertines or under their hegemony. The Syracusan fleet, as we have seen, could set sail safely to Rhegium some months before, and it could stay in front of Messina’s harbour, denying any access to other ships; furthermore, Hiero could rely on the firm support of some important Greek city-states, such as Tauromenium and Catane. So, all the Ionian region along the eastern coastline of Sicily was protected against likely incursions of the barbarians. The strengthening of the internal positions and the destruction of the mercenaries’ forts assured to Hiero the chance to march through the inner lands of eastern Sicily. One after another, Hiero conquered the city of Halaesa, that made an act of deditio to Syracuse; then Tyndaris and Abacenum, whose citizens welcomed him very happily. It may be useful to make an elucidation on the methods of the conquest; the paravdosi~ (deditio) of Halaesa implies of course that Hiero never arrived into the city, which was nevertheless far away from the theatre of the military operations. Of course, Tyndaris and Abacenum too were not conquered by force, but since the citizens of those communities opened the gates to their cities for the king, this must mean that the Syracusan army arrived in the neighbourhood. The absence of any slight remark about the events involving other Greek cities, like Kalé Akté, Agath­ yrnum and Alontium – that in all probability became allied of Hiero during this war campaign – has to be ascribed to the short form and the summary of the original text of Diodorus. Nonetheless, it is not by chance that Halaesa was mentioned, since it was for sure one of the most important Greek communities of the northeastern coast of Sicily, with particular reference to the economic point of view: a support seems to be provided by the fact that, following the institutional organization of the Roman provincia in Sicily, Halaesa was among the few Greek communities that got the official position of civitas immunis ac libera, as Cicero clearly stated (In Verrem II, 3, 13)33. The strategy aiming to the alliances proved to be successful; as a result, the dominions of the Mamertines were by that time limited to the north-eastern corner of Sicily, while the territories controlled by Syracuse were really extended, and included the south-eastern zones of the island – that were customarily linked with Syracuse – going to the north-east up to Tauromenium; to the northern coastline up 33 The well-known passage of Cicero has been thoroughly evaluated by Pinzone 1999B, 463– 495.

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to Tyndaris and Mylae, and to the west up to the allied city of Halaesa. Only at that time Hiero thought appropriate to advance on Messina; hence, feeling to be under pressure, the Mamertines decided to meet the Syracusans on the battlefield. The decisive combat took place in the neighbourhood of the river Longanus (which at present is called Patri, and flows not far away from Milazzo): there, the Mamertine army, in command of one Kyon, was hardly crushed by the Syracusan forces, that were supported even by 200 citizens of Messina who had been previously banished and in that circumstance played a major role for Hiero’s final victory34. The defeat of the Mamertines is a crucial event for the political history of Hellenistic Sicily, at least for four reasons. First, the reverse removed from the political scene of Sicily an active company that for some twenty years really dominated all over the north-eastern part of the island, thanks even to a system of fortresses spread over the region, and forced many Greek city-states to pay tributes; furthermore, the barbarians answered to the appeals for help coming from other native communities when Pyrrhus decided to head off to Sicily; they were quite a tongue in the struggle between Carthaginians and Syracusans, and grew so much in authority and independence that they gave many troubles to both the challengers, by way of raiding their territories on the borderlines with the cwvra of Messina. Second, the crash of Messina’s power proposed once again in Sicily the long-established struggle between Syracuse and Carthage; in 269 BC the Punic forces had already got back the control over the whole middle-western area of Sicily. Very interesting news is provided by Diodorus (23, 1, 1): the historian said that when Hanno, the son of Hannibal, arrived more or less at the same time in Sicily landing at Lilybaeum, he then gathered all his troops and went by land to Solous, where the infantry encamped; from the northern coast of Sicily, he then marched southwards, passing perhaps through the Elymian territories, and arrived at Agrigentum, where he persuaded the dh`mo~, who had already friendly relationships with the Carthaginians, to become officially a Punic ally; after signing the treaty, he ordered to strengthen the fortifications of the city. Now, the three cities of Lilybaeum, Solous and Agrigentum clearly set the limits of the Sicilian regions under Punic control; furthermore, it must be said that the Carthaginians continued to dominate the western Mediterranean sea routes and all the islands in close proximity to Sicily. On the contrary the Syracusans, due to the tactical skills and the enterprising political deeds of Hiero, actually managed all the middle-eastern regions of Sicily. It may be easily understood that for the both of them the ultimate hegemony over Messina was vital, and we will see that the surviving historical sources deliberately show that they both wanted the city; the Carthaginians could have entered once again eastern Sicily, while the Syracusans could complete their sway over the eastern communities of the island. Nonetheless, if one could control Messina, he could even control the Strait and all the commercial sea-routes passing through those waters. 34 For other useful reconstructions of the events, see De Sensi Sestito 1971, 716–720; Goldsberry 1973, 114; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 54–57; Pinzone 1983, 43; Meister 1987, 86–87. A strange and unconvincing chronology for the battle of Longanus, that is 265/264 BC, has been suggested by Dexter Hoyos 1985, 32–56.

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Third, the victory over Messina drove to an important political evolution in the Greek community of Syracuse, whose citizens decided – with the active support of their allies – to repeat for the third time the monarchic experience basing it on the solidity of the model provided by the great Hellenistic kingships. Indeed, when he came back in the city, Hiero was appointed as basileuv~ by his own fellow-citizens and the allies. Fourth and last, the defeat of the Mamertines was the direct cause of the arrival of the Romans in Sicily. This argument deserves much more attention, and it will be dealt with soon after. The reconstruction of the events that followed the battle of Longanus, which is apparently contradictory in the historical sources (indeed, the information provided by Diodorus and Polybius seem to be complementary), may be useful to shed some more light on the above mentioned four reasons. The moments that followed the fight have been quoted by Diodorus, and they are very helpful to understand even the account of Polybius, that for that instance is very compressed. Hiero continued to stay in the cwvra of Messina, and gave aid and hosted in his camp the commander of the Mamertine army, Kyon, who had been wounded and then captured. Notwithstanding the narrative of Polybius, it seems that the first intent of the survived Mamertines, after hearing that their commander had committed suicide in the enemy’s camp, was to hand over the city of Messina to Hiero, but they were prevented doing this by the Carthaginians. Diodorus (22, 13, 10) says that in 269 BC the island of Lipari was still controlled by the Punic forces; from that harbour, a Punic fleet led by Hannibal got ashore on the Sicilian northern coast. Hannibal went at first to meet Hiero, and the formal reason was to congratulate with him for his victory, but indeed he wanted to trick him and somehow he persuaded the Syracusan leader to stay inoperative and not to lay Messina under siege. Then Hannibal turned his attention on the city and went to Messina; the Carthaginians found that the harbour had been blockaded by the Syracusan warships, but they did not loose time. They deceived the Greek admiral, forcing him to release the line of defence and to fight against their fleet; the Punic navy won a great naval battle, and took control of Messina’s harbour, while the Syracusan fleet was quite completely annihilated. Finally, Hannibal and his men landed and deterred the Mamertines from handing over their city to Hiero and, taking as a pretext to give them some help, the Carthaginian commander established a military garrison on the acropolis. No doubt, the Punic involvement and, what’s more, the setting up of a occupying force in Messina, changed the plans of Hiero, who was forced to postpone any further project of war against the Mamertines; indeed, an attack against Messina would have led even to a war against the Carthaginians, and the army including the Syracusan citizens and the allies was not prepared to fight it. For sure, Hiero took a great advantage by remembering at that time what a disappointment Pyrrhus got some years before, when he wanted to lengthen stubbornly the siege of Lilybaeum; so he understood that it was better to make stronger his recent territorial achievements and the system of both political and military alliances that he created around himself, and to reschedule the attack against Messina. Therefore, Hiero decided to withdraw calmly to Syracuse; the allies who followed him showed to share com-

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pletely his choice, and furthermore they rewarded him by giving the title of basileuv~ (of course, together with the Syracusan citizens)35. In that way, the autocratic power which Hiero exerted in Syracuse as a strathgo;~ aujtokravtwr was officially extended over all the other Greek city-states that joined his summaciva: kingship turned to be once again the political answer for Syracuse, but the experience was destined to endure much longer on that occasion, thanks to the shrewdness and the sagacious skilfulness of Hiero. 3.3. Messina squeezed: the outbreak of the first Punic war, between diplomacy and fighting armies The most natural consequence of the defeat suffered against Hiero in the neighbourhood of the river Longanus, but most of all the establishment into the acropolis of Messina of a Punic occupying force, was the aftermath that occurred with the Mamertine internal politics. The evidence provided by Polybius’ narrative seem to be absolutely unambiguous and yet helpful to complete the account of Diodorus; as a matter of fact, even if the historian refers to the moments that immediately preceded the outbreak of the first Punic war, it may be assumed that the situation described by him stemmed from the events that followed the Carthaginian intervention of 269 BC. Polybius (1, 10, 1–2) stated that the community of Messina went through a serious split, which led to the formation of two contrary political parties. In 264 BC, some citizens took refuge to the Carthaginians, handing over themselves and the acropolis to the Punic troops; on the contrary, some other decided to send some representatives to the Romans, entrusting them their city and wanting to appeal for their help on account of the “common ethnicity” (paradidÒntej t¾n pÒlin kaˆ deÒmenoi bohq»sein sf…sin aÙto‹j ÐmofÚloij Øp£rcousin)36. The chronological problem – as it is well known – deeply characterizes all this period of Sicilian history; no doubt, if the chronology here proposed again for the battle of Longanus at 269 BC is correct, it must be admitted that the silence of the literary sources covers the events of nearly five years. Anyway, with a particular 35 I have dealt with the question of the nature of Hiero’s kingship in a communication delivered in an international conference held at the University of Cardiff, July 2003 (on “Tyrants, kings, dynasts and generals: modes of autocracy in the classical period (500–320 BC)”); see Zambon 2006, 77–92. Anyway, Hiero’s kingship has been considered either a military dictatorship (see Schenk Von Stauffenberg 1933, 22–23; Berve 1959, 41), or like a typical Hellenistic kingship, developed from the contemporary Eastern monarchies (see e.g. Goldsberry 1973, 146–148; Lévêque 1977B, 81; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 184; De Sensi Sestito 1980, II 1, 357). A useful survey on the institutional features of Hiero’s kingship has been made by Prestianni Giallombardo 1995, 495–509. 36 The critical evaluations of Polybius’ account differ especially about two topics, i.e. the chronology and the cause of the Mamertine appeal: see e.g. Beloch 19272, IV 2, 281–282; Frank 1928B, 668; Heuss 1949, 465, note 1; Thiel 1954, 133 ff.; Walbank 1957, I, 57; Berve 1959, 20 ff.; La Bua 1966, 178–179; Hoffmann 1969, 159; Petzold 1969, 133 ff.; Roussel 1970, 77–78; De Sensi Sestito 1974, 7 ff.; Molthagen 1975, 91 ff.; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 63–65; Eckstein 1987, 74–75; De Sensi Sestito 1995, 30–31.

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reference to the history of Messina, Polybius’ investigation allows to conjecture at least two subject matters. First, that the Carthaginians garrisoned the city of Messina with some military forces from 269 to 264 BC. Second, that they were able to control Messina without great troubles, perhaps helped by the everlasting civil struggles among the citizens. As it is showed by the feverish activities of Hannibal, the Carthaginians deeply wanted to take the control of Messina, since it was a strategic point they could not renounce just whilst Hiero withdrew to Syracuse and the Romans, after conquering Rhegium, had with the new king pretty close and friendly relationships. Therefore, the Punic battalion had to prevent any hostile project against Messina, coming either from the Romans or from Hiero. It is extremely difficult to associate some ethnic features with the political tendencies of the two Messenian parties; it has been suggested that the majority’s party included the Campanian and Italic elements of the city because when they appealed for help to the Romans, they worked on the subject of the oJmofuliva: on the contrary, the minority’s party, which was favourable to the Carthaginians, should have included the Greek ethnic group of the population. In my opinion, a definite association is impossible, given that the trouble seems to concern especially the topic of the supposed “ethnic relationship”; nonetheless, it may be for sure stated that the process of assimilation among the mercenaries, coming from several Italic ethnicities, and the Greek community was still imperfect37. What can be ascertained without any doubt is that in 269 BC the Carthaginians succeeded going into Messina thanks to the support of some inhabitants, the same who in 264 BC escaped from the city and searched for a safe haven exactly in the Punic encampment, handing over the Carthaginians even Messina’s acropolis. I believe that those citizens were forced to run away – the reference of the literary sources to a fughv (Polybius 1, 10, 1 has katevfeugon) may even allude to a banishment – by the greatest part of the community, that clearly did not accept willingly the presence of a Punic garrison on the acropolis and did not tolerate the intrusion of the Carthaginians in her home politics’ management. This group of citizens, which may be labelled as pro-Punic, was no doubt a minority party; on the contrary, the greatest part of the citizens, who needless to say at that time held the government of the city, were then able to send in 264 BC an embassy to Rome, making officially a paravdwsi~/deditio and appealing for help38. After receiving the Mamertine representatives, the Romans long hesitated before taking an ultimate decision, i.e. if they had to reject or receive the deditio of Messina and then send some help to Sicily. The prospect, indeed, looked really like the outbreak of a new war; therefore, the political debate in the Roman senate was very harsh. It is well known that some senators, who proped up to turn down the appeal, underlined the incoherence of the Romans if they went to help the Mamer37 For the presence of two opposite political parties in Messina, see even Beloch 19272, IV 2, 646; Frank 1928B, 667; Berve 1959, 20; Cassola 1962, 180–183 and 204; La Bua 1966, 178; Petzold 1969, 167; Hampl 1972, 414; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 65–66. 38 On the Mamertines’ deditio (alluded to even in the first chapter), see Thiel 1954, 135; Schmitt 1969, III, 135; Petzold 1969, 168–169 and 177; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 72–77; Rizzo 1980, 1912 ff.; Pinzone 1983, 32 ff.; De Sensi Sestito 1995, 31.

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tines who had been not so much time earlier guilty of many misdeeds against the Greek communities of Rhegium and Messina, while only some years before the cives Romani sine suffragio who garrisoned Rhegium had been severely punished for the same reasons. Nevertheless, if the Romans decided not to get involved, that meant they left Messina into the hands of the Carthaginians, and Polybius well emphasized that this “matter-of-fact reason” was decisive to drive the majority of senators to decide for a mission to Sicily, going beyond the pretext of the oJmofuliva which had been turned out by the Mamertines. The Romans were well aware that the Carthaginians for sure would have conquered the whole Sicily, if the Mamertines did not find some help; furthermore, if the Punic troops took control of Messina, they in short could have taken away the Syracusans too, whose city was the last obstruction to their subjugation of Sicily, since they already dominated the rest of the island. The observation of Polybius, although it is perhaps marked with some traces of pro-Roman partisanship to be attributed to his historical source, shows in my opinion that the Roman intervention in Sicily was exclusively directed against the Carthaginians (even if, quite funnily enough, the Mamertines appealed for help against the menaces of the Syracusans)39; it did not occurred on real behalf of the Mamertines, and the existence of some friendly relationship with Hiero – who, at that time, was still out of the conflict and hence decided to take side with the Punic troops – could not have been an hindrance. Accordingly, it is all but unlikely that the Roman senate did not decide at first, thinking that the illogical meaning of the intervention was exactly compensated by its usefulness; then, the greatest part of the senators (oiJ polloiv, in Polybius’ own words) was persuaded by the consuls that the Romans, although they were drained by the previous warfares, could take a great advantage by the forthcoming struggle. The convenience of the war, which is called sumfevron by Polybius (1, 11, 2), necessarily passed through the receptio in fidem populi Romani of the Mamertine community; this meant the disposed acceptance of the Roman control of Messina, and even turned out to be the lawful justification of the Roman intervention in Sicily, because from the Roman point of view the duties of the fides gave good reasons to send aids to the Mamertines40. Hence, after long debates, the majority of the senators decided to send an army to Sicily, and the task to lead legions towards southern Italy was assigned to the consul Appius Claudius Caudex, who seems to have been one of the preeminent 39 Zonaras (8, 8) is clear enough when he says that the Mamertines asked for help uJpo; ÔIevrwno~ poliorkouvmenoi! See even Berve 1959, 14–15; Petzold 1969, 133; De Sensi Sestito 1974, 9–11; Eckstein 1987, 75, note 3. 40 The basic historical account is offered by Polybius 1, 11; the chapter has been fully discussed and analysed by many scholars, e.g. De Sensi Sestito 1977, 78 ff.; Calderone 1977, 383– 387; Welwei 1978, 573–587; Musti 1978, 50 ff.; Molthagen 1979, 53–72; Meier-Welcker 1979, 25 ff.; Rizzo 1980, 1899–1920; Frézouls 1980, 965–990; Eckstein 1980A, 175–190; Calderone – Bitto – De Salvo – Pinzone 1981, 7–78; La Bua 1981, 241–271; Pinzone 1983; Dexter Hoyos 1984C, 88–93; Eckstein 1987, 74–83 (which remains, in my opinion, the clearest historical survey of the diplomatic context concerning the outbreak of the first Punic war); Dexter Hoyos 1989, 51–66; Gabba 1990, II 1, 59–60; De Sensi Sestito 1995, 31–32, note 62; Hinard 2000, 73–89.

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supporters of the expedition. Nonetheless, the swift development of the events in Sicily called for an even faster intervention of the Romans, and for this reason they decided to send further a battalion directly to Rhegium, where it was conveyed by a small fleet provided by the socii Italici, and to appoint the command of the task force to the military tribune Caius Claudius. When news of the Roman decision reached Sicily, the commander of the Punic garrison in Messina, Hanno, who was firmly persuaded that he had to keep the military control over the city, came to an agreement with Hiero and signed with him a treaty of alliance, in the name of both the Carthaginians and the Mamertines; according to Zonaras (8, 8), who is the only ancient source providing evidence for this episode, the main significance of the pact was to hinder the crossing of the Romans in Sicily, but it is fairly obvious that both the allies wanted to show first and foremost that the Mamertines were really not in danger, and in consequence to deprive the Romans of any official ruse to land in Sicily. The tribune Caius Claudius swiftly arrived to Rhegium. The poor evidence offered by the historical sources (Dio 11, fr. 43, 5–6, doubled by Zonaras 8, 8–9) show that the Roman officer had pretty diplomatic duties, and that he tried to carry them out even though the Mamertines and the Carthaginians broke up the hostilities. Claudius began then to negotiate, to force the Punic garrison to leave Messina and take under his own control the Greek city, before the arrival of the consular armies showed that the Roman action was directed mostly against the Carthaginians, not against the Syracusans of Hiero. Anyway the negotiations fell short and the tribune tried even a military solution; using probably the same fleet offered by the socii navales, he made an effort to break down the blockade of the Punic warships in the Strait of Messina, but the outcome of the following sea-battle was expected enough. Therefore, Caius Claudius was forced to withdraw once again to Rhegium41. Cassius Dio (11, fr. 43, 8), this time supported even by Diodorus (23, 2, 1), stated that after the battle the Carthaginians themselves appealed to diplomacy, and sent their ambassadors to Rhegium to ask the Romans to respect the filiva (according to Diodorus), or the eijrhvnh (Cassius Dio). Maybe the appeal was made to the consul, who had to be in close proximity to the area of the Strait, if not already in Rhegium. The Carthaginians showed to be compliant enough, when they offered to their challengers to give them back the ships they previously captured in the naval battle, but they did not forget to emphasize that they wouldn’t have allowed the Romans even to wash their hands in the sea42. Exactly in the same time, the events in Messina precipitated. The Punic garrison was expelled from the citadel, and this allowed the Romans to establish in turn on the acropolis a small battalion. The historical sources do not agree with the 41 Some scholars have considered the events involving the tribune Caius Claudius as crafty inventions of the Roman annalists (Beloch 19272, IV 1, 647, note 2; Walbank 1957, I, 61–62; Molthagen 1975, 99), but the greatest part of the critics agree on the truthfulness of the literary tradition: see Frank 1928B, 672; Thiel 1954, 151–153; Berve 1959, 25 ff.; La Bua 1966, 31 ff.; Hoffmann 1969, 175; De Sensi Sestito 1974, 34–35. 42 Thiel 1954, 157–158; Berve 1959, 36–37; Hoffmann 1969, 177; Eckstein 1987, 94–95.

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question of the responsibility of the banishment of the Punic soldiers from the acropolis; according to Cassius Dio (11, fr. 43, 10), the tribune Caius Claudius was able to force on a second instance the Punic blockade of the Strait of Messina, landing in the city’s harbour; he enchained Hanno, and compelled him to leave Messina together with his own troops. On the other hand, Polybius (1, 11, 4) clearly stated that the Mamertines drove away the Punic garrison by way of intimidation and treachery; perhaps the historian wanted, in this way, to free the Romans from any blame of aggression to Messina, and this may be a hint to the old historical quarrel between Polybius himself and the historical narrative of Philinus. Nevertheless, I think that the two versions of Cassius Dio and Polybius may be easily pooled. The cooperation of the Mamertines is all but strange, given that after the receptio in fidem the city of Messina was – de facto, if not officially – allied with the Romans; furthermore, it is likely that Caius Claudius got the active support of the Mamertines when he expelled the Punic garrison. It is not easy to restore the following events, due to the scarceness and inconsistency of the historical sources43. Hanno and the soldiers banished from Messina were then welcomed by Hiero, and signed with him a treaty, whose basic aim was to fight together against Messina (Diod. 22, 13, 9). However, to show once again how much important the Carthaginians considered the control over the Greek citystate of Messina, they did not forgive their commander after he lost the citadel both in a thoughtless and cowardly way: they put him to death and then crucified him. His substitute was Hanno II, son of Hannibal, who then arrived with new and fresh troops to Lilybaeum, where he gathered all the military forces. Hence, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily and reached Solous, where he left to the quarters all the army, while he and a small escort took the way that from Solous, passing through the inland region of Sicily, led to the southern coast; he marched to Agrigentum, which was exactly the arrival of that way. A short, interesting detail offered by Diodorus (23, 1, 2) allows us to understand which was the political behaviour of the Greek city-state in 264 BC; in that moment, Hanno could sign a formal treaty of alliance with Agrigentum, but the city was even at an early stage in friendly relations with the Carthaginians. Therefore, it may be conjectured that after Pyrrhus’ departure the Greeks living in Agrigentum once again fell under the political control of the Carthaginians, whose ejpikravteia in 264 BC had more or less the same extension than in 289 BC, when Agathocles of Syracuse was murdered. Hanno’s choice to sign a formal alliance with Agrigentum is predictable, since the Greek city was a basic centre of the island, and the starting place of many communication lines with all the other areas of Sicily; the Punic commander wanted then to fortify the town, and made his way back to Solous where he joined the rest of the army. Diodorus (23, 1, 2) maintained that exactly at Solous the Carthaginian commander got in touch with some Syracusan ambassadors sent there by Hiero, who

43 One of the best historical surveys has been offered by De Sensi Sestito 1977, 87–95; I agree with her conjectures predominantly.

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wanted in turn to sign a treaty of alliance to fight together against the Romans, if they did not withdraw from Sicily. The ground reason of this treaty is different from the previous one – which was to fight together against Messina – and this led some scholars to suppose that this was completely a new treaty; but this seems to be not necessary. First of all, the proposal is to expel the Romans from the island, and this clearly shows that actually Caius Claudius could place some of his own troops in the acropolis of Messina. Furthermore, the Mamertines were already official allies of the Romans after the receptio in fidem, and therefore to fight “against Messina” or “against the Romans, until they do not leave Sicily” had exactly the same meaning. The reason of a twofold diplomatic contact may be easily another one: Hiero signed the treaty with Hanno, who had been put to death and crucified by his own companions, and it is very likely that the king of Syracuse needed to confirm the first treaty by signing it once more with the new Punic leader, Hanno II. Finally, Diodorus’ remark about the “new” target of the treaty corroborates a statement offered by Zonaras (8, 9), i.e. that the Carthaginians presented an ultimatum to Caius Claudius, telling him to leave both Messina and Sicily within a single day. The negative response of the Roman tribune marked the factual breakout of the hostilities. The Carthaginians and the Syracusan troops jointly attacked the Mamertines and the Roman soldiers who were in Messina; the former put to anchor their fleet in close proximity to Capo Peloro, clearly wanting to patrol the Strait of Messina and to prevent any reinforcements sent to the Romans established in Messina. Then they encamped their army on a little peninsula surrounded on one side by the sea and on the other by some marshy lands, called Syneis (according to Polybius 1, 11, 6) or Euneis (Diodorus 23, 1, 3). Yet Hiero encamped on the opposite side, in the neighbourhood of the mount called Calcidicus, to prevent his enemies even that way out from the city. The siege of Messina had already begun when the consul Appius Claudius tried for the last time to avoid any field combat, sending another embassy to his opponents asking them to leave the siege; nevertheless, the account of the historical sources is again different, because Polybius (1, 11, 11) said that the deputation was sent after the arrival of the consul in Messina, while Diodorus (23, 1, 3) maintained that Appius Claudius was still in Rhegium. Furthermore, he indicated that the Roman representatives declared openly to Hiero that the Romans did not want absolutely to wage war against him. The answer of the king was harsh, and Hiero deplored the Romans’ official consideration of the pivsti~ and their real purposes, because they actually intended to become master of Sicily. Besides, Hiero seems to have underlined that the Mamertines were worthy of their present destiny, on account of their early misdeeds against the Greeks of Sicily, with particular reference to the citizens of Gela and Camarina. In conclusion, there was no more time for any other diplomatic negotiations. Appius Claudius hence reached Messina with his whole army, dodging the Carthaginian fleet that patrolled the Strait and crossing from Rhegium at night. What happened next has been referred in different ways by the historical sources. Polybius (1, 11, 12–12, 3) asserted that the consul at first attacked the Syracusans, prevailing after a protracted combat, and then chasing them to the slopes of mount

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Calcidicus, where they had their camp. During the following night Hiero, loosing any hope of success for the outcome of the events, withdrew to Syracuse. The day after, Appius Claudius assaulted the Carthaginians, killing a great part of the enemies and compelling the other to seek refuge in the neighbouring villages. On the contrary, Diodorus (23, 3) said that after the landing of the consul in Messina, Hiero at once fled to Syracuse, because he was persuaded by the Romans’ crossing that had been permitted by the duplicity of the Carthaginians, who then were defeated by the Roman consular army. Cassius Dio (= Zon. 8, 9) stated that the consul landed in close proximity to Hiero’s encampment and that he, straight away, attacked it. The success was up to the Romans, although their cavalry was crushed, and Hiero withdrew at first on the top of the mountain and then to Syracuse. Hence, Appius Claudius tackled the Carthaginians, being defeated in the first stages of the struggle, but becoming the winner at the end of the fight. At last, the Livian historical tradition (Periocha 16; Florus 2, 2; Orosius 4, 7; Eutropius 2, 18) refers only to Roman great victories. What is particularly interesting is the lost narrative of Philinus, which has been summarized by Polybius (1, 15, 1–4), in whose opinion the Romans arrived in Messina when the Greek city-state was already besieged by both the Carthaginians and the Syracusans. The Romans made a sortie against the soldiers of Hiero, but were defeated and forced to retire back to the city. They then raided against the Carthaginians, but they were once again overwhelmed and suffered many losses and many prisoners. Polybius said that this part of Philinus’ narrative is absolutely false, while the following one is veritable; that is, Hiero after his success fired his own encampment, destroyed all the garrisons he established in the cwvra of Messina and then returned to Syracuse at night. In turn, the Carthaginians left their encampment and took refuge in the neighbouring villages and towns. Scholars have been puzzled by the remark about the two Roman losses – that were nonetheless unplanned but even not decisive, even in Philinus’ opinion. It may be sufficient to recall to mind the only information which has not been alluded to by the historical sources, i.e. the presence in Messina of the small military force in command of Caius Claudius. Perhaps, while waiting for the consul to land in Sicily after the failure of the diplomatic negotiations made in Rhegium, the Roman tribune tried two separate sorties against his challengers, who outnumbered him, and was forced to repair in Messina. This would help to explain better why Hiero, after the landing of the Roman legions, felt himself betrayed by the Carthaginians and retired to Syracuse. The first measure of Appius Claudius after his definite victory was the strengthening of the occupying force of the Romans in Messina. Anyway, the break among the challenging armies was too tempting, and the Romans tried, quite at once, to enter the Syracusan kingdom and territories, openly moulding the war for Messina with the traits of a war for Sicily. Actually, there is not so much news about the following events. For sure, Appius Claudius entered the Syracusan dominions, ravaging the cwvra and trying to lay the siege on the city. Zonaras (8, 9) maintained that the siege began, but it was never terminated because many skirmishes took place in the neighbourhoods of Syracuse where the Romans sometimes were defeated and

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most of all because they began to suffer for the shortage of supplies and for the bad effects of a disease. Owing to those difficulties, Appius Claudius gave up the siege and made his way back to Messina. On his way, he tried to take by storm the city of Echetla, but he was unsuccessful; nay, according to Zonaras’ account, the citizens of Syracuse ran after the Romans and if Hiero only wanted they could force them to stop and sign a truce. In conclusion, Appius Claudius reached again Messina, and from there he set sail quite at once for Rome. He was not awarded with the triumph, but no doubt the Romans owed to him if they had been able to establish a safe bridge-head at Messina and to have a full control over their first Greek city-state in Sicily and its cwvra. As regards the challengers, they withdrew into their own dominions for the moment; Hiero spent the winter in Syracuse, while the Carthaginians stayed back in their ejpikravteia, perhaps in Agrigentum, which was the closer position to the theatre of operations. The historical sources do not provide any evidence about the fate of other Greek communities, but it must be conjectured that in the short term they remained either independent, or under the control of Syracuse (like the unknown city of Echetla; nevertheless, Polybius usefully stated that it laid exactly between the dominions of the Carthaginians and the Syracusan cwvra) or Carthage (like Agrigentum). 3.4. Between resistance and deditiones: that is, how the Greek communities of eastern Sicily approached the Romans The following year, i.e. in 263 BC, both the Roman consuls in charge, Manius Otacilius Crassus and Manius Valerius Maximus Messalla, were sent to Sicily. The Romans were ready to draw up on the theatre of war the forces of all the four legions, to which they could add up the troops controlling the city of Messina, with a total number of about 45.000 men. The enemy armies were still separated; of course, while the Carthaginians could yet be sure of their supremacy on the seas and nevertheless could trust on huge land forces, Hiero and his Greek allies would not have been able to cope with the consular army. They preferred to apply the defensive tactics that had produced good results at the end of the first year of war, provided that Syracuse could not easily be conquered, thanks to the long-dated and celebrated fortification system that had been built by the great tyrant Dionysius I. However, this manoeuvre required to leave the allied territories open to the enemy’s incursions, and while advancing to Syracuse the Romans tried to remove by force some Greek cities from the alliance with Hiero, and at the same time they strengthened the territories that fell under Roman control. Once again, the historical sources do not offer plentiful details on the new war campaign; nay, Polybius (1, 16, 1–2) only stated that until the moment when Hiero and the Romans signed the peace, many Greek city-states of Sicily in turn rose up against either the Syracusans or the Carthaginians, and at once sided with the Romans. Some other information is luckily offered by the summary of Diodorus’ account, and it is very weighty to understand which coalition the Greeks of Sicily

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chose in 263 BC, although Diodorus’ data somehow diverge with the above-mentioned statement of Polybius. Zonaras (8, 9) maintained that Valerius Messalla and Otacilius Crassus advanced in the interior territories of eastern Sicily, sometimes marching together, sometimes separately; anyway, the route followed by the consuls started from Messina, ran alongside the western slopes of mount Etna and then arrived to the lower banks of river Ciamosorus, flowing into the plain of Catane. Here was the northern boundary of the cwvra controlled by the Syracusans, where some allied city-states had to take steps by themselves for their defence. It is not by chance that the first Greek city-state that was assaulted by the Roman legionaries was Hadranum, the city that Hiero snatched from the Mamertines’ control during the victorious military campaign of 270 BC; from that moment, Hadranum became a proSyracusan outpost in close contact with Messina’s cwvra. The city-state tried to withstand the Romans’ siege, but was then conquered by force. The next one was Centuripe, the Greek city just to the south of the river Ciamosorus, that had been loyal to Syracuse already from the beginnings of Hiero’s strathgiva, and then in 270 BC received a portion of the country previously controlled by the newly destroyed Ameselum as a reward for the trustworthiness to Hiero in the fights against the Mamertines. Centuripe, too, was besieged by the Romans and some time after was conquered by force: but while the consuls were engaged in the siege, something new happened. The consuls received in their camp some Greek ambassadors coming from the city-state of Halaesa, which lays in close proximity to the northern coast of Sicily, just to the east of Tusa; they said they were ready to negotiate for peace and to hand over their city to the consuls44. Quite at the same time, many other representatives from other Greek city-states that were at that juncture allied with Hiero arrived near Centuripe, and followed the example offered by the city of Halaesa; all those cities were no doubt terrified by the power of the consular legions and even well aware that Hiero could not have been able actually to contest them. Among those representatives, there were even those of Catane (Plin. nat. 7, 214: Eutr. 2, 19, 1): Diodorus (23, 4) stated that the Greek communities that handed themselves over to Rome in that instance were 67, and his statement is supported by the detail offered by Eutropius (2, 19, 1), whose number of 52 cities – including Catane and Tauromenium, as well – is quite close to the first one; nevertheless, the number has sometimes been doubted by modern scholars45, and some said that it is more likely that it has to be referred to the total amount of communities that the Romans controlled in Sicily after the end of the first Punic war46. Of course, no evidence supports both these conjectures, but it may be worth emphasizing that all the historical sources refer unequivocally to a huge number of city-states surrendering in 263 BC and so the total of 50/60 is not so implausible! 44 On this event, see profitably Prestianni Giallombardo 1998, 59–80; Pinzone 2000, 855. 45 See e.g. De Sanctis 19672, III 1, 115, note 26; Walbank 1957, I, 69; Berve 1959, 34. Other scholars accepted the amount given by Diodorus: Holm 1901, III, 28, note 12; La Bua 1966, 39–40, note 3. 46 De Sensi Sestito 1977, 221.

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What seems very important to me is to underline the different point of view used by Polybius and Diodorus to illustrate the political attitude of the Greek communities of north-eastern Sicily in that instance. According to Polybius, the Greeks made the most of the arrival of the Roman legions to rise up against either the Carthaginian or the Syracusan control, and then willingly sided with the Romans; but if we compare with this statement the information offered by the surviving account of Diodorus, some differences may be spotted. The two city-states of Hadranum and Centuripe refused to give in to the consular armies, keeping up lucidly their own loyalty to Hiero, even if they had to suffer two disastrous defeats; this seems to indicate that they did not at all hand themselves over to the Romans willingly! Furthermore Halaesa itself, whose citizens in 270 BC too avoided to tackle Hiero on the battlefield handing over to him the city when he invaded the cwvra of Messina, chose to side with the Romans exactly when it seemed there were no more good reasons to resist. Therefore, it seems that at the outset the Greek allies of Hiero were all but encouraging to welcome in a friendly way the Romans, who in turn had to face some opposition to their entrance into the territories of eastern Sicily. The political decisions taken in 263 BC by the Roman consul must not be reduced to a simple consequence of the military operations; their main task in Sicily was then to fight against Hiero of Syracuse, but their march through north-eastern Sicily did not aim only to provide a free, easy access to the gates of Syracuse. The main area of that region included territories that were under the direct political control of Hiero, with cities that were officially allied with the king of Syracuse and could play some role withdrawing the forward movements of the Roman army; that’s what happened with Hadranum and Centuripe! Of course, taking into consideration their disastrous defeat, the other Greek communities could not do anything else but coming to terms and made their deditio: on the other hand, the consuls unreservedly accepted the voluntary surrender of Halaesa, Catane, Tauromenium and other cities because this could avoid them wasting their armed forces trying to take over them by force. By that means, they could weaken the political support of Hiero’s kingship. It could be attractive to have much more historical evidence to understand which were the originary agreements between the Roman consuls and the surrendering communities, even because the surviving information is again contradictory: according to Zonaras (8, 9), there were some general agreements (called oJmologivai); on the contrary, Eutropius (2, 19) refers to those communities as in fidem acceptae, implying that they surrendered willingly, making an official deditio to the Romans. It may be worth to choose the second option, since the information offered by Eutropius goes along the evidence provided by Diodorus (23, 4, 1), but nonetheless the two indications may be linked, given that the consuls could have promised a favourable dealing to those city-states that surrendered voluntarily47. Anyway, it seems quite certain that no Greek city-state of eastern Sicily signed an 47 This suggestion, which seems to be likely, has been offered by Roussel 1970, 88, and by Eckstein 1987, 106.

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official treaty of alliance with Rome at that time; among all those communities that were involved in the deditiones of 263 BC, only Tauromenium signed a foedus sociale with Rome, but the evidence for this is provided by Cicero (Verr. II, 3, 13) and the treaty belonged in all probability to the end of the second Punic war. In the Republican Sicily of Cicero’s time, there were too five civitates sine foedere liberae ac immunes, that is five self-governing cities that were unofficially allied with Rome and did not have to pay any tribute to the Romans; according to Ernst Badian48, a lot of the Greek cities that surrendered in 263 BC had afterwards a similar rank, being quite “free amici” of Rome. The hypothesis may be convincing, if not for Badian’s mention of Segesta as an example; it is true, indeed, that from 263/262 BC the city was unwaveringly loyal to Rome, that it never received a foedus sociale and that it was ranked as a civitas libera at Cicero’s times. Nevertheless, Segesta was not a city of eastern Sicily, and it was one of the strongholds of the Elymian zone in western Sicily, a region which has to be considered under a different point of view, that was the freedom of its own cultural identity from the influence of the Carthaginians (I will turn explicitly the attention on this later). To be fair, the two deditiones of Halaesa and Segesta, which were not so far in time one from the other, may not be compared; Halaesa perhaps did not have troubles before the arrival of the Romans, even if it was controlled politically by Hiero of Syracuse, and so it handed over to the Romans just for fear, because it could not have been protected by Hiero against them; on the contrary, Segesta deeply wanted to side with the Romans, as many other Elymian communities did in the following year, and this was a clear sign that Segesta accepted the unifying role of a foreign political power (that is, Rome) in relation to the Elymian territory, which claimed to aver its own distinction from the Punic cultural context of the surrounding ejpikravteia: and the same happened when Pyrrhus approached those lands in 277 BC! The question of the Roman agreements with the Greek communities of northeastern Sicily in 263 BC has been widely dealt with by Eckstein. He supported Badian’s conjecture by means of other suggestions, which sometimes cannot be approved; first and foremost, when he notes that two among the five civitates liberae mentioned by Cicero were Halaesa and Centuripe, both laying in the operation’s area of the Roman consuls in the year 263 BC. This cannot be taken as a similarity of their fate after the consul’s settlement in that year, given that Halaesa did make a deditio, while Centuripe was besieged and then taken by storm; nonetheless, they had – in Cicero’s times! – the same political status. This must be a clear indication that the political status of some Sicilian city-states, as it is portrayed by Cicero in the Verrines, should not be used to recover their official position quite 150 years before. I simply wonder how a rebellious city like Centuripe behaved towards the Romans in the decades following its capture, if the city was hence able to get the same status of Halaesa, which simply surrendered: regrettably, there seems to be no evidence to explain this, apart from an important detail offered again by Cicero, who says (Verr. II, 5, 83) that the city – together with Segesta – was deeply linked

48 See Badian 1958, 37–42, but even Pritchard 1975, 41–42.

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to the Romans by means of «cognatio»49. The propaganda concerning some shared mythical origins worked much more than the power of the armies; the common ethnical branch between Centuripe and Rome, both stemming from the descent of the Trojan hero Aeneas, could even go beyond any real political happening, thus meeting the fates of two towns (such as Centuripe and Halaesa) that behaved no doubt in a different way towards the Romans. On the contrary, another topic pointed out by Eckstein has to be emphasized: at least nine Greek city-states of north-eastern Sicily issued independent coinages more or less at the half of III century BC: indeed, some of them minted for the first time ever, like Alontium, Apollonia, Kalé Akté and Petra, while some other issued some coins in that occasion after one or even two centuries of absence (like Aitne, Agirium, Halaesa). This evidence does not state that all those communities became “free amici” of the Romans in 263 BC, but their independent coinage may be an indication that the new conquerors furthered the demonstrations of local identities, if they were not incompatible with the Roman interests, and much more if they supported them. Therefore, it may be conjectured that at least from the beginning the Roman supervision over the Greek city-states of north-eastern Sicily had to be very moderate; the communities, after the deditio and the consequential receptio in fidem po­ puli Romani, had to be given back their own independence and were not subject to the direct control of Rome. The Greek cities had no official duties towards their Roman comrades, but of course they did not refuse to help them in the following stages of the war, when required; provided that they did not have foedera socialia with Rome, they should not had to offer troops to the Romans, but to accept their request of support and supplies was much more a matter of political shrewdness than of suitability. 3.5. “Friend of Rome, lord of Syracuse, king of Sicily”: the peace-treaty between Hiero and the Romans, and the new role of Syracuse within Sicily and the Mediterranean basin Hiero’s kingdom slowly but relentlessly crumbled, giving the chance to the consuls to focus their efforts on Syracuse. They, once again, began to lay under siege the city, which maybe could have been able to resist for a long time with its own resources (this had been clear enough the previous year, when Appius Claudius had finally to withdraw), and even much more if the Carthaginians had made quite no effort to send some aid to Hiero, who still was officially their ally. As a matter of fact, Diodorus (23, 4) referred that the Punic fleet led by Hannibal moved (perhaps from Lipari) to take some aid to the Syracusans, but arrived in the harbour of Xiphonia – which is the modern city of Augusta, to the north of Syracuse – when it was too late, and Hiero already asked the consuls to negotiate for peace.

49 See the general survey of Manganaro 1963C, 23–44.

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The literary sources do not agree with the reasons that drove Hiero to appeal for help. Polybius (1, 16, 4) argued that Hiero made his request to the consuls because he was impelled by the panic and the disappointment of the Siceliotes, and because he was astonished facing the mighty supremacy of the Roman army on land. Diodorus (23, 4), on the contrary, said that the king pressed for peace because the Syracusans were rising up. Of course, the two points of view may even be complementary but I would like to stress Diodorus’ idea, that was about the likely danger coming from the fellow-citizens of Hiero; a menace that threatened the stability of Hiero’s kingship much more than the assults of the Roman legionaries. More­ over, Eutropius (2, 19, 1) wrote that Hiero appealed for peace cum omni nobilitate Syracusanorum, which confirms on the one hand that the Syracusan oligarchy was still the fulcrum of the political support for the monarchy, and on the other hand that the Syracusan citizens mentioned by Diodorus were for sure the representatives of the Syracusan oligarchy, who were among those who mostly suffered the consequences of a prolonged state of war. The fact that Hiero was fighting against the Romans entailed that the greatest part of the commercial relationships with many cities of central and southern Italy were then broken up. Furthermore, the theatre of the military operations was the cwvra of Syracuse, which was continually ravaged and pillaged, with serious destructions of the harvests. Last but not least, the events occurred in the last months of the war destabilized the sphere of Hiero’s alliances, and the Syracusans lost both the military aid and the economic support of many important city-states, such as Halaesa (that laid in close proximity to the northern maritime route, which was basic for all the trades and the commercial exchanges within the Tyrrhenian sea) and Catane; these two Greek communities not by chance resigned themselves to the consuls, just to avoid the consequences following a conquest kata; kravto~, that no doubt would have been destructive for their economies50. Thus Hiero, urged by his own fellow-citizens and supporters, sent his representatives to the consuls, to talk about filiva kai; eijrhvnh; his offer was keenly accepted by the Roman officers who, although winners on the battlefield, were really worried by the question of the supplies, that were lacking and very difficult to be conveyed in Sicily, due to the Punic supremacy on the seas. The great wealth and the resources of Hiero might have been very helpful, indeed; furthermore, the Romans wanted by then to be able to fight only against the Carthaginians, as Diodorus well focused. The agreement signed between Hiero and the Romans made provisions for a fifteen-years peace; the Syracusans had to pay an indemnity of war of 100 talents, and to give back the war-prisoners without ransom; they had the great advantage that from that time they were considered by Rome as fivloi kai; suvmmacoi. This is Polybius’ statement (1, 16, 9); in his opinion, the treaty of summaciva which Hiero officially signed with the Romans at the end of the first Punic war in 241 BC was deep-rooted exactly in the peaceful filiva endorsed in 263 BC. Therefore, the authenticity of the political relationships between Syracuse and Rome was 50 On this subject see Berve 1959, 35; De Sanctis 19672, III 1, 117; Thiel 1954, 164; Roussel 1970, 88; Eckstein 1987, 115 ff.

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dominated by those two peculiar moments, according to Polybius, because Hiero was officially fivlo~ kai; suvmmaco~ of Rome from 241 BC, and reasonably even in the previous years, if we take into account his deeds51. Some modern scholars conjectured that the treaty of 263 BC was supposedly an alliance, that is technically a foedus aequum, and that this would have forced legally Hiero to provide reinforcements and supplies to the Romans in case of war52. On the contrary, in my opinion the official feature of the Romano-Syracusan settlement that has to be emphasized before 241 BC is the filiva: Polybius (1, 17, 3) maintained that the Carthaginians were forced to do many more arrangements for the war after 263 BC, taking into consideration that Hiero had become their enemy; nevertheless, even in the following years of the conflict, the king of Syracuse never fought plainly on the battlefield with the Romans: he merely sent his “friends” some supplies and utilities for the war, and so he played his role as a simple “comrade”, not as an official ally. The first time it happened in 262 BC, when the Roman soldiers were about to leave the siege of Agrigentum because of the shortage of supplies; Hiero provided them, and Zonaras (8, 10) usefully detailed that the king long hesitated before taking a favourable decision, and this occurred when he thought that the Romans were undoubtedly stronger than the Carthaginians and that “it was more helpful to keep on their filiva”. Thus, there is no reason to think that Hiero’s supplies to the Romans in the period 263–248 BC (which was the duration of the fifteen-year settlement after the war) were legally required since they were the result of a foedus aequum: it was more a question of skilfulness and political good-sense! In 263 BC, Hiero could even have an immediate benefit because, although he had to give back the prisoners of war without ransom and even to pay an indemnity, he could rule free from anxiety over Syracuse – a city which remained, as a matter of fact, independent – and even over a considerable area in south-eastern Sicily, including a number of very important Greek city-states that have been mentioned by Diodorus (23, 4, 1); these were Akrai, Leontini, Megara, Helorus, Netum and Tauromenium. An information offered by Eutropius (2, 19, 1) seems to diverge from this statement; according to him, the citizens of Tauromenium, together with those of Catane, sent their envoys to the consuls while they were besieging Centuripe, and played their deditio to Rome. Some scholars thought for that reason that the reading of Diodorus’ text may be corrupted, and that the name of Tauromenium has to be changed with another one referring to a Greek city-state of eastern Sicily, in close proximity to Syracuse. On the contrary, there are some good reasons to believe that actually Tauromenium in 263 BC was included in Hiero’s kingdom: it may be symptomatic that in 212 BC the Greek city handed over itself voluntarily to the Roman consul Marcellus, as soon as he promised that it would not have either to provide auxiliary troops for the consular army or to pay any tribute. Furthermore, in that instance, Tauromenium received the official title of civitas foederata, that 51 See De Sensi Sestito 1977, 101 ff.; Eckstein 1980B, 183–203; Gruen 1984, I, 19; Marino 1988, 13–15; Millino 2003, 114. 52 E.g. Walbank 1957, I, 69: Berve 1959, 57; Dahlheim 1968, 131 and 134; Roussel 1970, 90; Cimma 1976, 38.

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was a legitimate and privileged qualification inside the administrative system of the Roman provincia Siciliae (the same title was awarded only to Netum and, of course, Messina); no doubt, such flattering behaviour would not have been expected if Tauromenium belonged to the Romans already in 263 BC and then diserted from them in 214 BC to side with the Carthaginians. It would be much more plausible if the Greek city-state, after belonging from 263 BC to the kingdom of Hiero II, did not side against the Romans in 214 BC. Another evidence to prove that Tauromenium was part of Hiero’s kingdom from the beginning of the first Punic war seem to be offered too by the dedicatory inscription which was engraved on a marble’s base of a statue of Hiero II, which has been discovered in the Greek city of Olympia; the statue was commissioned by the citizens of Tauromenium and made by the Syracusan sculptor Mikion, in all probability in the second half of the III century BC; needless to say, if Tauromenium did not belong somehow to Hiero’s dominions when the gift was sent to Olympia, such a dedication would be hardly proper53. Therefore, it seems that the borderlines of the Syracusan kingdom in 263/262 BC were limited to the north by the banks of the river Erykes up to the mouth of the river Simetus, with the city of Tauromenium outside. On the south, the region controlled by the Syracusans extended from the city of Echetla to the coastline community of Helorus. In all probability, some other Greek city-states belonged to Hiero’s kingdom; according to Livy (24, 30 and 35, 1–2), when the consul Marcus Claudius Marcellus led his military operations in eastern Sicily, the Greek city-state of Herbessus, which was used as headquarters by the Carthaginian representatives Epichides and Hippocrates, was conquered by the Roman consul together with two other communities that belonged to Hiero’s kingdom, i.e. Megara and Helorus: it is therefore very likely that Herbessus too laid in a region which was under the direct control of Syracuse. On the contrary, there is not enough evidence to state that in the second half of III century BC the city of Agirium was in the sphere of Syracuse’s political influence. The passage of Diodorus (16, 83, 3) about the massive building program at Agirium is inconclusive as far as it regards the name of the benefactor, and it is likely that the historian is alluding to Timoleon54. It has even been supposed that a kind of territoral adjustment of Hiero’s kingdom was made in 248 BC; just in the winter of 249/248 BC, one of the Roman consuls, Lucius Iunius Pullus, had most likely spent much of his time in Syracuse at Hiero’s court, gathering there the supplies and the reinforcements coming from the allies of the neighbourhoods, and waiting for the arrival of some warships from Messina. In that instance, Hiero might have tried to behave once again very kindly with his friends, and looked forward to some territorial rewards. Nevertheless, what he got was exactly a renewal of the existing treaty of filiva with the Romans, and the new agree53 On the statues of Hiero II at Olympia see Paus. 6, 12, 2–3; Marcadé 1957, II, 76; Eckstein 1958, 205–209; Moretti 1967, I, 58; Levi 1970, 153–156; Tzifopoulos 1991, n. 72; Hintzen-Bohlen 1992, 222, n. 25. 54 The best general survey of the territories and the cities belonging to the kingdom of Hiero II, offering even a very useful archaeological outlook (focusing on the city of Morgantina), is given in my opinion by Bell 1999, 257–277.

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ment – using the words of Zonaras (8, 16, 6) – established actually a filiva ajivdio~; there is not even any slight evidence about territorial adjustments55. Of course, the filiva ajivdio~ has not to be considered yet as a summaciva: only at the end of the first Punic war, when Caius Lutatius Catulus made his peace negotiations with the Carthaginians, Hiero signed with Rome a new treaty of filiva kai; summaciva, as it is clearly stated by Appian (Sik. 2, 2). By that time, the political and economic interests of both the Romans and the Syracusans again coincided. If Hiero obtained some territorial refunds, it must have happened in 241 BC; he might then have got back some areas he lost at the beginning of the war, since he was sure that there would not have been any Punic resurgence or revenge in the island, and even that he could go on without troubles with all his commercial activities that even in the previous years of political turbulence had made of Syracuse the central point both of the Sicilian economy and of the tradings to foreign countries (with a particular reference to Egyptian links); by 241 BC, as we will see, Sicily was finally in peace, and on the way of a forthcoming romanization56. Just another point has to be remarked with reference to the peace arrangements of 263 BC, and it refers to Hiero’s Greek allies. They are mentioned several times by Polybius in his narrative, as soon as they proclaimed Hiero as basileuv~ in 269 BC after his victories against the Mamertines until 241 BC, when the Carthaginians had to sware to the Romans that they would have waged war anymore neither against Hiero nor his allies. Regrettably, no ancient historical source refers to any Greek city-state of Sicily with the political qualification of “ally” of Syracuse during the first Punic war; thus some scholars thought that the Greek communities mentioned by Diodorus (23, 4) were allied with Hiero, but some differences may be drawn up. When Marcus Claudius Marcellus definitely overwhelmed the Syracusans in 212 BC, completing the Roman conquest of Sicily, he treated in a different way the native communities; according to Livy (25, 40, 4), all the cities that before the conquest of Syracuse either did not desert the Romans or renewed their friendship with them, had to be joined to the Roman dominions with the position of trustworthy allies (ut socii fideles). Those communities that surrendered just for panic, after the conquest of Syracuse, they had to be treated with the conditions that the winners as a rule imposed to the conquered people. In the first group only Tauromenium and Netum were included, while Herbessus and Helorus – that, although they had changed sides, surrendered voluntarily (Livy 24, 29, 12–30, 1) – were 55 A new demarcation of the borderlines of Hiero’s kingdom as a result of the negotiations in 248 BC has been suggested by Lenschau 1912C, col. 1507; Berve 1959, 37; Dahlheim 1968, 41; Roussel 1970, 230; Goldsberry 1973, 125–126; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 116–117. Just the renewal of the friendship has been correctly stated by Eckstein 1980B, 192–202 and Eckstein 1987, 124–128, and shared by De Sensi Sestito 1995, 36. 56 The idea of a formal summaciva between Hiero and Rome has been shared by the greatest part of the scholars: De Sensi Sestito 1977, 110–112; Pinzone 1979, 20–21; Marino 1988, 14– 16; Ferrary 1988, 13–17; De Sensi Sestito 1995, 36. Another critical position has been maintained by Eckstein 1980B, 194 ff. and again Eckstein 1987, 127–130, in whose opinion there never was an official alliance between Rome and Syracuse, but just the friendship went on until the end of Hiero’s long reign. I believe that Appian’s evidence may be isolated, but not absolutely rejected or rebuffed.

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among the civitates decumanae, just as Syracuse, Leontini and Akrai. This happened no doubt because the Romans did not consider those cities as self-governing, but dependent from Syracuse. Among the other Greek city-states belonging to Hiero’s kingdom, Megara had a specific rank; the city was marked as a civitas censoria, given that it had been conquered by force. Therefore, if Tauromenium and Netum became civitates foederatae and were treated – to use Livy’s words – as socii fideles, this seems to denote that, as a matter of fact, they somehow were autonomous from Syracuse; that’s why they could be considered as suvmmacoi of Hiero. The peace negotiations of 263 BC, as well as the moderate behaviour of the Romans towards the defeated Greeks of Syracuse, helped Hiero to overcome the troubles coming from the likely rebellion of his fellow-citizens, especially the members of the oligarchy and of the nobilitas (that had been the chief supporting ground of his monarchy). Taking into account – as we will see – the complete account of the historical events occurred in the time-consuming first war for Sicily between Rome and Carthage, Hiero appears just few times and is always sending some technical aid (supplies, war-machines) to his Roman friends; as far as it may be known, no war activity involved Syracuse in more than two decades. This is a clear sign that in those years there was a considerable accordance among the citizens of Syracuse, who had to be in agreement with their king with reference to his wishes. Most probably, Hiero behaved from the beginning as a typical Hellenist ruler and took his political decisions after consulting with a private council of fivloi kai; suggenei`~, whose activity is attested by the historical sources with reference to some events dated to the last decades of the king’s reign57. Free from any apprehension for the war, Hiero had to concentrate first of all on the economic and administrative questions: they concerned particularly the strengthening of the political structures, the reinforcement of the commercial relationships with several markets of Sicily, including those of the western side of the island that were traditionally depending on Carthage’s economy and, last but not least, the creation of a new taxation system, which was based on a careful consideration concerning the matters of Sicilian agriculture; the topic was so important that Hiero wrote even a critical treatise about it, which was appreciated by such an expert as Varro (de re rust. 1, 1, 8). The lex Hieronica, which was labelled lex frumentaria by the Romans – who applied it everywhere in Sicily, not only inside the Syracusan kingdom, from 227 BC – has strong correspondences with the taxation system that was introduced in Egypt by Ptolemy Philadelphos when he had to make up the great costs for the official cult of Arsinoe II, who died in 270 BC; this seems to be further evidence of the deep interactions between Syracuse and Ptolemaic Egypt during the III century BC58. The precedence of Egyptian law, which was applied first in 265/264 BC, cannot be questioned; usually, the scholars date the lex Hieronica quite immediately 57 On the concilium principis in Syracuse see De Sensi Sestito 1977, 124, notes 71–74; De Sensi Sestito 1995, 40. It is mentioned by Polyb. 7, 5, 2; Diod. 24, 15; Plut. Marc. 14, 12. 58 On the lex Hieronica, see especially Pinzone 1979. For the relationship between Syracuse and Egypt, see Bengtson 1964–1965, 321 ff.; Rizzo 1973, 31 ff.; Goldsberry 1973, 143, note 207; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 156 ff.; Will 19792, 195; Manganaro 1989B, 513–553;

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after the Roman conquest of Agrigentum in 262 BC, but in recent times a lower chronology (241 BC) has been suggested, considering that the law seems to be the expression of a consolidated monarchy and a powerful economy59. Nevertheless, the law had such an extraordinary and innovative quality that I assume its development must be linked with an official and unquestionable purpose, that drove the Syracusans to accept it without any particular defiance or any menace of rebellion. It had to be presented as a necessary operation connected with specific financial trouble of the kingdom: this could unlikely have occurred after 241 BC, when the Syracusan kingdom of Hiero was one of the most powerful sovereign states of the Mediterranean basin, in regards to its economic system. So, it would be preferable to search for another conjecture for the creation and introduction of the lex Hieronica. In my opinion, this cause may be the obligation to pay the indemnity of war for fifteen years, that Hiero had to assume upon himself after the peace negotiations of 263 BC, and they can be identified with the cwrhgivai that the Romans asked him quite immediately in 262 BC, while they were besieging Agrigentum. No doubt, during the fifteen-years period Hiero had some troubles while searching for sure receipts to support the royal funds, and he found the solution introducing the tithe on the agricultural products. As a matter of fact, dividing the duty of the contribution among the farmers of his kingdom, Hiero avoided using every year the system of the eijsforav, or getting his financial resources thanks to the contribution of the wealthiest citizens. For sure, the solution of the lex Hieronica was welcome to the representatives of the oligarchy, who were giving basic political support to the king60. The literary sources often refer to Hiero labelling him as “king of Syracuse”, but the other official evidence provided especially by the inscriptions seem to prove clearly enough that Hiero’s kingdom had a federal structure. The king was labelled as rex Siculorum in the celebrative inscription of Valerius Messalla’s triumph of 262 BC; another famous inscription recovered in Syracuse mentioned a koinovn of the Siceliotes together with the king, and this would mean that the communities were in a straight line linked with the ruler, not with Syracuse (this was a usual feature in all the Hellenistic kingdoms, and even with Alexander the Great before; and those had been the sources of inspiration for the Sicilian monarchies both of Agathocles and Hiero). It may be worth mentioning the fragmentary text of this inscription (CIG III, nr. 5367 = IG XIV, nr. 7, with the commonly accepted additions made by Manganaro), which will help to emphasize some topics of the institutional evolution in Syracuse after the peace with Rome and, particularly, after the conclusion of the first Punic war:

Bonacasa 1995, 59–78; Sfameni Gasparro 1995, 79–156; De Sensi Sestito 1995, 17–57; Millino 2003, 114–115. 59 Carcopino 1919, 66; Bengtson 1964–1965, 326 (after 262 BC); Mazza 1980–1981, 302– 303; Manganaro 1989B, 522 (after 241 BC). 60 The same conjecture has been forwarded by De Sensi Sestito 1995, 41–43.

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Column I (on the left) [-----ejpainw`n de;] [o{ti provkeitai uJmi`]n frontivzein [uJpe;r uJmetevrwn] basilevwn kai; ta;n [povlin uJmw`n sun]idw;n pavsan par[ev] [cein megivsta]n eij~ aJme; eu[noian [ejktenw`~ a[ris]ta movnon pareskeu [avsamen toi`~ S]uracosivoi~. Fanero;n dh; [pa`sin gevgonen ej]n tosouvtoi~ e[tesi wJ~ [oujdeno;~ tw`n p]rovteron aJghmevnwn [pravxei~ ta]likau`tai uJpavrc[onti] [---triak]avdi tov te koino;[n tw`n] [Sikeliwta`n kaiv t]e aJmei`~ oJ [mognwvmo] [ne~ o{rkion uJmi`n ajf]estav[lkamen o}n] [kalw`~ moi dokei` e[cein uJma`~ ojmovsai] [---------------] Column II (on the right) [--------Oijovmeqa de; a[l] [lwi m]hdeni; ejxou[sivan ei\nai pla;n oi|~ uJmei`~] didw`te pravssein aj[po; ta`~ povlew~ ejf∆ w|ite] praxei`n: e[ti de; kai; t[a;n politeivan a{n ei\con] oiJ patevre~ uJmw`n kai; t[a; divkaia kai; ta; novmima] diafulavssein a} ejnti; [paradedomevna. e[rrwsqe.] Orkion boula`~ ka[i; stratagw`n] kai; tw`n a[llwn [polita`n] ojmnuvw ta;n JIstivan tw`n [prutanevwn kai; to;n Diva] to;n ∆Oluvmpion kai; ta;n [Davmatra kai; to;n] Poseid[a`na----------------------] Due to his fragmentary status, the inscription may be not translated, but the sense is clear enough. The king Hiero speaks directly to the Syracusans. In the first lines of the left column there are some traces of the basilei`~, that is the two kings Hiero II and his son Gelo, who are in turn compared somehow with the previous rulers of Syracuse. Then, the mention of the Syracusans follows together with a clear statement of their goodwill towards the king; thanks to this kindness, they were awarded with some privileges that were somehow connected with the collection of the tithe. Then there is the mention, although fragmentary, of a koinovn, which has to be intended as the group of Hiero’s allies; finally, we have the formula of an oath of the city, with all the official constitutional bodies (the popular assembly, the magistrates and the citizenship) that assert to undertake an unknown duty (unfortunately, the following text has been lost)61. 61 For the text see Wilhelm 1900, 162–171; Manganaro 1965B, 312–321; Robert 1966, 446,

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So, it seems that the basic content of the letter is Hiero’s statement of a new political arrangement that involved one way or another the other members of the royal family, and was in turn accepted willingly by the citizens of Syracuse and from the allies. This may be the introduction of the dynastic system into the monarchy of Syracuse, exactly when Hiero decided to join to his power the son Gelo. The decision may even suggest another Egyptian influence on Sicilian politics, since the Ptolemies usually were involved with the kingship both father and son (the first had been Ptolemy Soter, who shared his throne with Ptolemy Philadelphos from 285 BC); anyway, Hiero skilfully adjusted the Egyptian practice to the Sicilian reality, given that the basileiva in Syracuse did not stem from a self-assertion of power (as like for the great eastern Successors, or even for Agathocles): it was awarded voluntarily to Hiero by the Syracusan community and the Greek allies. Therefore, if Hiero wanted to share his kingship in Syracuse with another member of his family, the decision had to be approved officially by the political institutions and formally accepted by the people. It may be worth recalling that according to Livy (24, 4, 6–8) the will where Hiero appointed his nephew Hieronymus as his successor was first read and then endorsed by the Syracusan popular assembly, which was on the other hand the traditional political institution of Syracuse where the ajrchv was awarded both to the dynasts and to the kings62. It may be reasonable to date this settlement of the monarchy after the end of the first Punic war, when the new order established in Sicily, the new characterization of the relationships with the Romans and the latest outlining of the borderlines of Syracusan kingdom maybe encouraged Hiero to strengthen the foundations of the state, in order to prevent some possible grounds for internal struggles63. An effect of this institutional arrangement appeared clearly in the following years both in Syracuse itself – where the dh`mo~ began to play an active role in politics, because it was protected by the heir Gelo – and even considering the growing extent of autonomy among some allied city-states; once again the best substantiation is provided by the city of Tauromenium: its famous financial registers clearly bear a resemblance to Hiero’s taxation system64, and the city owed by that time some privileged conditions, such as the aujtonomiva and the ajtevleia, that were preserved too under the Roman dominion, when Tauromenium was both civitas foederata and immunis, and Cicero knew well that from there “decumae venire non soleant”65. n. 515; Berve 1967, II, 734; Goldsberry 1973, 151 ff. and notes 258–260; De Sensi Sestito 1977, 126–127; De Sensi Sestito 1995, 44–45. 62 Diod. 16, 74, 5 (Dionysius Jr. summoned a meeting of the assembly to approve his father’s decisions about the heritage of power); Diod. 21, 16, 3 (Agathocles staged his son Agathocles Jr. to the popular assembly, presenting him as his successor); Diod. 21, 16, 4 (approaching the final moments of his life, Agathocles summoned up the popular assembly and restored democracy in Syracuse). 63 See Berve 1959, 61–62; Franke 1961, 278; Holloway 1962, 25 (set Hiero’s assessment in 241 BC); Manganaro 1965B, 315 and 320 (some years before 241 BC); De Sensi Sestito 1977, 125–126; De Sensi Sestito 1995, 48 (some time after 241 BC). 64 See IG XIV 422–430, and the critical suggestions of Sartori 1954, 377; Consolo Langher 1963, 409 ff.; Manganaro 1988, 155–190. 65 The list of the strathgoiv (IG XIV 421) starts from 270 BC, as has been rightly suggested by

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Thus, it may be stated without doubt that the monarchy of Hiero was supported both by the Syracusan people and by the allied Greek city-states. To keep on the backing of the latter, Hiero gave preference to a political programme which did not grant privilege to Syracuse compared to the allies. He then followed the ideas that had been the base for his political propaganda at the beginning of his career, when he led the army against the Mamertines. Those designs were helpful especially after 263 BC, when some Greek cities of the koinovn had been taken by storm by the consular army, and some other willingly surrendered just to avoid most unpleasant consequences. But this feature of political skilfulness and the manoeuvres were customary even in the foreign policy of Hiero, especially after the end of the first Punic war; it can be worth quoting some evidence, just to show the wide, international range of Syracuse’s foreign policy in the second half of III century BC. In 240 and 238 BC, when the Carthaginians were in great trouble for the rising up of their mercenaries in Africa, Hiero provided them munificently with supplies, and met all their appeals66. The next year, 237 BC, to counterbalance the support offered to Carthage, Hiero went to Rome to join the celebration of the Ludi, and conveyed there a huge amount of grain for the people of Rome (Eutr. 3, 1). Some years after, his son Gelo married the Epirote princess Nereis, thus consolidating the existing and long-dated friendly relationship between Syracuse and Epirus67. When Ptolemaic Egypt went through many troubles due to a huge famine, Hiero was solid for Ptolemy Euerghetes, and he gave him as a gift the gigantic ship named Syrakosia (afterwards named Alexandris), which had been built following the project of Archimedes; the vessel was left to the pharaoh together with its precious and wealthy shipment, including cereals, sun-dried fish, fresh tuna-fishes and cheese (Athen. Deipn. 5, 206e – 209c). Last but not least, Hiero sent many amounts of grain to Athens and some other city-states of mainland Greece and the islands of the Aegean sea, and his munificence was celebrated in the verses of the Athenian poet Archimelus (Athen. Deipn. 5, 209e). In conclusion: for sure all along the first half of III century BC, the political behaviour of every single Greek city-state of Sicily was marked by a decisive and unavoidable basic choice. Each city-state had to side with the Romans, or to go against them – paying the consequence, that was, for the most, a violent subjugation. This had been true at first even for Hiero, but the king understood the importance of a friendly relationship with Rome: therefore, even at the end of his long reign, when Syracuse and some other Greek communities of eastern Sicily decided Sartori 1954, 356–383; Consolo Langher 1963, 395 ff.; Antonetti 1983, 16–17; Antonetti 1985, 15, note 56. Furthermore, the date of 270 BC matches perfectly the addition of Tauromenium to the group of Syracuse’s allies during the war campaign of Hiero against the Mamertines (Diod. 22, 13, 2). The financial registers start more or less from 241 BC. The turn of phrase by Cicero comes from Verr. 2, 3, 13 (see Calderone 1960, 4, note 3). 66 See Polyb. 1, 83, 2–4 with Walbank 1957, I, 146. 67 Polyb. 7, 4, 5: Paus. 6, 12, 3. According to these two passages – supported by other literary sources (e.g. Livy 24, 6, 8) – Nereis was the daughter of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus; but the same Pausanias (4, 35, 3) states that she was the daughter of Pyrrhus II, who was the nephew of Rome’s challenger.

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to rise up against Rome, following the news about Hannibal’s victories in Italy, Hiero was aware that the only chance for his kingdom to survive and for the other Greek city-states to preserve their own self-sufficiency was to be devoted to a filiva kai; summaciva with the Romans68. 3.6. The Greeks and the natives during the first Punic war; from the siege of Agrigentum to the first Roman mission to Africa (262–256 BC) The cwvra of Syracuse, which had been the main theatre of the military operations during the first two years of the war, was by then left by the challengers, and Hiero’s kingdom began to live an enduring period of economic prosperity and peace, together with the allied city-states and including even those that were directly controlled by the Romans. Nevertheless, the war was all but concluded between Rome and Carthage, since the meaning of the war for Messina had been lost, and it had become a war for Sicily: therefore, all the Sicilian city-states were by then involved in the fight. Needless to say, the literary sources do not focus on the political behaviour of the Greeks, even because they played for the greatest part the role of the inactive spectators. The Romans, after signing the peace with Hiero, had no longer to fight against two enemies and could concentrate on the Carthaginians who, in turn, decided to increase their forces in Sicily. Polybius (1, 17, 4–6) reports that they hired a lot of mercenaries coming from Liguria, Spain and the Celtic tribes, and they conveyed them to the island, concentrating all the new forces in Agrigentum. The strategic position of the city, which controlled the two routes along the southern coast of Sicily (the one leading to the west, passing through Heraclea Minoa and going into the Punic territories; the other heading to the north-east, first to Henna and then on to Catania), provided perhaps the best place to start an attack either against the eastern side of the island, or against the Carthaginian ejpikravteia. The Greek city had become officially allied with the Carthaginians in 264 BC when Hanno, son of Hannibal, marched from Solous to the southern coast of Sicily just to meet the representatives of Agrigentum, sign an alliance and fortify the citadel. Therefore, the Punic forces could take a great advantage from the beginning of the operations. They considered the city to be the most functional for their preparations and at the same time the most powerful in their dominions: that’s why they finally decided to convey there all the troops, together with the newly-hired mercenaries and the supplies. However, the new Roman consuls of 262/261, who were Lucius Postumius Megellus and Quintus Mamilius Vitulus, being aware of the Punic projects, decided to leave out – at least temporarily – all the other theatres of the war and concentrate on Agrigentum. Polybius’ narrative seems to suggest that at the same time there were several theatre of operations, but regrettably there are no details about them. 68 This idea has been properly suggested in recent times even by Rizzo 2001–2002, 23–27.

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Nonetheless, the development of the events intimates to exclude the cwvra of Syracuse. Some helpful information is offered by a fragmentary passage of Diodorus (23, 4–5), which refers to some military operations of the Romans against several Greek city-states of Sicily, after the peace negotiations with Hiero. Diodorus stated that the Roman army besieged for many days the village of Hadranum, which may be identified with the site of Monte Adranone (in the neighbourhood of Sambuca di Sicilia), and the city of Makella69. Diodorus goes on by saying that the citizens of Segesta, who had been previously under the control of the Carthaginians, willingly sided with the Romans, and the same was done by the community of Haliciae. Quite the reverse, the unknown cities of Hilarus, Tirittus and Ascelus refused to go along with Rome, but they were conquered by storm. Last, something happened even at Tyndaris, whose people, fearing to be neglected, decided to hand over the city to the Roman troops; but the Carthaginians reacted immediately when they understood the plan of the citizens. Hence, they took the noblest among them as hostages to Lilybaeum, and carried away from the city all the grain-supplies, the wine and the other rations. Besides the events that occurred in Tyndaris, it may be conjectured that already after signing the filiva-treaty with Hiero, at least one of the Roman consuls led a military campaign against the closest territories belonging to the Punic ejpikravteia, in the middle-western region of Sicily; here, the Romans could have been helped by the intentional deditio of the Elymian communities of Segesta and Haliciae. Some more words are worth to be said for the case of Segesta, which is paradigmatic to appreciate that some historical and mythical traditions concerning the origin of a town could grow in importance when they had a particular political role; Cicero (Verr. 2, 4, 72) wrote that «Segesta est oppidum pervetus in Sicilia, iudices, quod ab Aenea fugiente a Troia atque in haec loca veniente conditum esse demonstrant. Itaque Segestani non solum perpetua societate atque amicitia, verum etiam cognatione se cum populo Romano coniunctos esse arbitrantur». So, there was a tradition that ascribed the settlement of Segesta to Aeneas, and the basic reason was to show that the Elymian city-state was deeply linked with Rome given that they both had the same settler. Furthermore, just starting from the second half of the III century BC, Segesta issued some very interesting coins; they bear on the obverse the customary female head, intended to portray the nymph Segesta, while on the reverse – instead of the typical dog, or the naked hunter which was engraved on the earlier coinage – there is the figure of Aeneas, carrying his father Anchises on his back70. There cannot be any doubt that this mythical connection was skilfully created exactly at the beginning of the first Punic war, when the political relationships between Rome and Segesta became particularly close and meaningful; of course, it was used both to give good reasons for and to strengthen the alliance signed be69 The identification of Hadranum with the site of Monte Adranone has been suggested early by De Miro 1967, 180–185; the most recent work is Fiorentini 1995. Even the city of Makella has been recently recognized, namely with the place called Montagnola di Marineo: see Spatafora 2001, 111–114. 70 See for some specimens Poole 1876, 137; Holm 1906, 127–129 and 236; Galinsky 1969, 97 and 173, fig. 49; Vanotti 1995, 52.

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tween the two cities against the Carthaginians, on the basis of a supposed common ethnicity stemming from a mythical, shared ancestry. Indeed, the earlier historical sources about the origin of Segesta never refer to Aeneas; neither Hellanicus (who nonetheless talked about Elimus and Egestus), nor Thucydides (who attributed to the Elymians a Trojan heritage)71. Consequently, in regards to the character of Aeneas, there is no doubt that he could have been easily included into the wide tradition concerning the mythical past of Troy, but the story has to be considered as merely fictitious and skilfully created. A lot of responsibility has to be ascribed to the people of Segesta, and Cicero himself knew this (he used the verb demonstrant). They needed to stress the existence of a close partnership with the Romans, based on the same ethnicity (cognatio), because such an affiliation appeared to be much more meaningful than a simple relationship due to an alliance (societas) or to a friendship (amicitia). Segesta’s people acted in that way simply because they wanted to take the greatest advantage from the cooperation with the Romans, in order to emphasize their freedom from the oppressive influence of the Carthaginian rule; the Romans, in turn, could count on a firm and loyal outpost in western Sicily, which had to play in their own plans a leading role in the Elymian area to turn away from the Punic side as many cities as possible. However, the main centre of the operations remained in Agrigentum: that’s why both the consuls led their troops in close proximity to the city too, and set their encampment more or less a mile away from the walls, blockading the Carthaginians into the town. Polybius (1, 17, 9) provides a very useful detail for the chronology, since he says that the siege began at harvest-time, that is in June 262 BC. The first skirmishes between the two armies occurred in the neighbouring countryside; the Punic troops made some sorties, while the Roman legionaries were busy with the forage, and the armies suffered both some casualties. Then, the consuls decided to divide their forces in two groups. They encamped with a part of their legionaries in close proximity to the sanctuary of Asclepius, just in front of the city; the rest of the Roman soldiers put the military camp on the side of the city which faced the way to Heraclea Minoa, i.e. to the west of Agrigentum. They both made some reinforcements between the two camps and on both the sides of the city. They dug a ditch inside to protect themselves against the Punic sorties from Agrigentum, and one outside the barracks, to keep an eye on the supplies and the military reinforcements coming from the ejpikravteia. It is particularly interesting that Polybius (1, 18, 5) stated that all the other allies of the Romans gathered their supplies and the provisions for the legionaries, and then carried them to Herbessus. First of all, this statement shows that the Romans did not fight the war on their own, and this is strengthened by information provided by Diodorus (23, 7, 1) when saying that those who besieged Agrigentum with the Romans, digging the trenches and building the palisades, were more or less 10.000. It would even be very interesting to know who were actually those allies, but it may be only conjectured that they included forces coming from the Greek city-states that had been receptae in fidem, like Messina 71 See Hellanic. FGrHist 4 F 31; Thuc. 6, 2, 3; and the critical evaluation of Moggi 1997, 1164– 1166. A different opinion has been expressed by Braccesi 1990B, 107–114.

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and Halaesa, and those that had been conquered, like Hadranum and Centuripe. Of course, the village of Herbessus mentioned by Polybius is not the Greek city which laid not so far from Syracuse, but an unidentified site near enough Agrigentum, and it was either dependable from Rome or it had been previously conquered by the consular armies. Anyway, the control over this village was vital, given that the Romans could take from there a great amount of their supplies and therefore face the lengthy siege of Agrigentum much more easily. The siege went on for quite five months, until November 262 BC, and by then the Carthaginians began to suffer the unwelcome consequences of the food’s shortage, even because the people that were forced to stay in the city numbered more or less 50.000 men. The Punic commanderin-chief, Hannibal – he was the same who previously gained control of Messina’s acropolis, after the victory of king Hiero in the battle of Longanus – sent many appeal for help straightforwardly to Carthage, and this may denote two things; either the Carthaginians had nonetheless the control over the harbour of Agrigentum and kept there a flotilla, or the Punic messengers ran through the Roman lines and reached Heraclea Minoa, which no doubt was a stronghold of the ejpikravteia at that time. Furthermore, the narrative of Polybius indicates that the Punic supremacy by sea was still complete. As a result, other troops and many war-elephants were sent at first from the homeland to the other Carthaginian commander-in-chief, Hanno, who was in Lilybaeum. When the reinforcements landed in western Sicily, the Punic general gathered them and marched along the southern coast of Sicily reaching Heraclea Minoa, where he assembled all the fresh troops. His first action, according to Polybius (1, 18, 9), was to assault and then to conquest Herbessus, thus preventing the Romans from having any access to their resources; this action of Hanno allows to conjecture that Herbessus necessarily laid somewhere in the territories between Heraclea Minoa and Agrigentum. Afterwards, the Punic general returned back to Heraclea, where he joined together with the rest of the army and all the war-elephants, and prepared to march towards Agrigentum. A quite different version of the events is provided by Diodorus’ narrative (23, 8): the historian said that Hanno was still at Heraclea, when he welcomed some men who just arrived there to announce him that they wanted to hand over him the city of Herbessus. This detail is rather interesting because it would imply that in the second half of 262 BC there was yet a strong political opposition inside the city, and that perhaps the pro-Carthaginian party was ready to give up Herbessus to the Punic troops at the first good opportunity. Of course, the detail offered by Diodorus does not eliminate the account of Polybius, and they both may be related. It is therefore very likely that those men who had escaped from Herbessus reached Heraclea and then told Hanno that they were ready to hand over to him the city, and that they waited for a sortie of the Punic general to open the gates of their hometown (this seems to be insinuated by Polybius’ words, indeed). The fall of Herbessus caused so many troubles to the Romans, especially with reference to the provisions, that they thought about leaving the siege of Agrigentum. Maybe they forgot they could even trust the friendship of some wealthy and exclusive Sicilian fivloi, such as Hiero of Syracuse, who for the first time made any effort he could to help

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his friends. According to Polybius (1, 18, 11), the king of Syracuse got all the supplies the Romans needed, and therefore they could carry on the siege. Once he returned to Heraclea Minoa and from there he left with the whole army to Agrigentum, Hanno ordered to attack at first the Roman encampment which had to control the communication-route with Heraclea Minoa, and by using a proficient trick he succeeded in overwhelming his opponents. Then, the Carthaginian troops set up their own encampment, and the skirmishes between them and the Roman soldiers continued for two months more, until January 261 BC. Hanno decided to establish himself on a hill which was nicknamed “Bull-hill”, and laid more or less 10 miles away from the Roman trenches; at present, we ignore where the hill exactly is, but thanks to an information offered by Polybius (1, 19, 7) we know that from the Punic encampment the general could clearly see the fire-signals made by the besieged forces of Hannibal in Agrigentum. Inside the city, the situation was very difficult; the people could not suffer anymore the consequences of the siege and of the shortage of food, nay many citizens decided for that reason to side with the Romans. Therefore, Hannibal decided to try an extreme solution and to fight against the consuls on the battlefield; but he had a bad luck and was defeated, and the Romans indeed killed many Carthaginians on that instance. The survivors reached their place of safety at Heraclea Minoa; at night, in view of the inadequate alertness of the Roman troops, Hannibal and his mercenaries – who in all probability garrisoned the acropolis of Agrigentum in the previous months – had the chance to escape from the city without being spotted. A very interesting literary version which has been provided by Zonaras (8, 10) and no doubt derives from an annalistic Roman account, states that the attempt of running away was noticed and that Hannibal in that instance suffered many losses among his own men, not only because they were killed by the Roman troops, but even by the citizens of Agrigentum; therefore, it could be very fascinating if, at the end of the siege, the Greek people decided to take some revenge of the Punic forces, thus playing a somewhat active role on the side of the Romans against the Punic barbarians who previously occupied their hometown, but the historical source deeply rooted in the Roman annalistic suggests much more that the tradition could have been skilfully created to show that, at long last, the Greeks of Sicily really welcomed the Romans as liberators and sooner or later they helped them in the long-lasting war against the Cartha­ ginians. It seems better to trust again the narrative of Polybius, and say that the Romans realized the flight of Hannibal only at dawn; they immediately assaulted the gates of the mighty fortification walls of Agrigentum, but they needed not to fight, as they faced really no opposition; therefore they could enter undisturbed in the city and ransack it. Diodorus (23, 9, 1) and Orosius (4, 7, 6) underlined that all the people was enslaved, and Diodorus says that more or less it numbered 25.000 persons. This was the fate of Agrigentum, which at last was conquered by the Romans; the military operations had been basic under several points of view, but first and foremost because they finally helped to take away from the Carthaginians the control over a Greek strategic stronghold, which was even very close to the eastern territories of Sicily still under the political control of Rome. Such a hegemony became by

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then unquestionable, and it has not to be forgotten that some city-states of western Sicily handed over willingly to Rome yet in 263 BC. Some modern scholars expressed a negative assessment about the Romans’ behaviour towards the people of Agrigentum, as they thought that the decision to enslave all the citizens played a part for an unconstructive propaganda of the Roman policy among all the other Greeks of Sicily, driving them either to resist or even to side with the Carthaginian forces in the following stages of the war72. Nevertheless, it is much more likely that the decision of the Greek communities was quite always the consequence of the present occurrences and even influenced both by a number of internal and outer factors. Just taking a look to the previous years of the war, it may be easy to note that there were several deditiones, even if they could be rationalized in a different way; indeed, the deditio of Halaesa – as well as those of many other Greek communities of eastern Sicily – was no doubt justified from a farsighted policy, because Hiero of Syracuse would not have been able to protect them against the Roman army, and in case of resistance their own fate would have been already decided, as the events occurred to Hadranum and Centuripe clearly showed. On the other hand, the situation of Segesta and Haliciae, two Elymian city-states inside the Punic ejpikravteia, suggests that their preference was much more affected by ideological motivations – which is exactly the version offered by the literary sources – but even joined with a meaningful desire of freedom from the political and cultural influence of the Carthaginians, expressed by the greatest part of the Elymian communities. I will deal again with this topic, since it is helpful to understand the skilful behaviour of the Romans towards the natives in Sicily. But now it may be really useful to recall to mind what happened in the same western territories and which had been the behaviour of the Elymian cities during the expedition of Pyrrhus. According to Diodorus’ narrative (22, 10, 2), when the army of the king marched through the lands of middle-western Sicily, a great number of Elymian city-states willingly handed over to him, and it is not by chance that the historian of Agirium just mentioned on that occasion Segesta and Haliciae among them: indeed, it is not by chance too that Eryx, that can be categorized as the most “Punic” among the Elymian towns of Sicily, remained loyal to the Carthaginians both in 277 and in 263 BC, and had to go through a tremendous siege during the two military campaigns. Therefore, it cannot be doubted that the aspiration to autonomy and the desire to claim the cultural identity that had been expressed by some Elymian towns such as Segesta and Haliciae in 277 BC were exactly the same that transpired during the first military Roman campaign in middle-western Sicily in 263 BC. Last but not least, it must be considered that, although the surviving historical sources provide not so much evidence, there were no doubt a lot of political skirmishes inside the city-states, between the pro-Carthaginian parties – who could take a great advantage and were often supported by the influential presence of the 72 See Frank 1928B, 677; Scullard 19613, 147; Warmington 1964, 184; Caven 1980, 26; Scullard 19892, 547; Bagnall 1990, 57–58. I follow the opposite, right evaluation of Lazenby 1996, 61.

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Punic occupying forces – and the self-regulating parties, whose supporters saw in the Romans’ arrival just a means to seek the freedom. It may be useful to recall the situation of Herbessus; in the words of Polybius (1, 18, 5), the city had to be among the Romans’ allies in the summer of 262 BC – we do not know if the city made deditio, or if it was taken by storm – but then some months later passed under the control of Hanno, who could take a great advantage in all probability by the active cooperation of some members of the pro-Carthaginian party. The war, anyway, was all but over. As Polybius well stated (1, 20, 4–6), the two Roman consuls of 261 BC, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, directed the military operations of the new year with the best approach, but the basic matter which impeded to drive off immediately the Carthaginians from Sicily was that they continued to have the supremacy on the seas and therefore they scared many Greeks who lived in the cities on the Sicilian coastlines, particularly in the West. As a matter of fact, when the Romans already occupied Agrigentum, many Greek city-states of the surrounding area decided to surrender them or even to side with them just because they were alarmed about the strength of the consular army: the same thing had happened with the Greek cities of eastern Sicily. Nevertheless, an even greater number of Greek city-states on the coastline either defected from the Romans or sided with the Carthaginians, exactly because they were alarmed by the incursions of the Punic fleet. Hence, it was clear that the enemy had to be deprived of that supremacy, and by that time the Romans began to build and to equip their first war-fleet. It seems likely that both the consuls of 260/259 BC, who were Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Asina and Caius Duilius, were appointed with the command of the fleet, even if at a first stage the position was given only to Cornelius, who then left Rome for Messina beforehand with 17 warships, as he wanted to prepare in the Sicilian harbour all the things that could be useful for the fleet73. While in Messina, Gnaeus Cornelius had the chance to take over treacherously the city of Lipari, on the Aeolian Islands. Lipari had been a naval operation base of the Carthaginian fleet at least from the time of Hiero’s victory against the Mamertines in the battle of river Longanus, and there cannot be any doubt that all the Aeolian Islands were under Punic control even during the following years. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that some citizens of Lipari were in friendly relationship with the Romans, since at the beginning of IV century BC one of their commanders, whose name was Timasiteus, had freed and helped some Roman envoys who were sailing to Delphi and had been captured by his own fellow-citizens, thinking that they were pirates. The historical sources stated that the Roman representatives, being grateful to Timasiteus, awarded him the publicum hospitium and Diodorus (14, 93, 5) said that when the Romans, more or less in 252 or 251 BC, tore up Lipari from Punic control, they wanted that the heirs of Timasiteus were free from any tribute and treated as free citizens. It may be conjectured, then, that a little part of Lipari’s citizens, 73 It may be worth to recall that Strabo (6, 2, 3. 268) stated that the Romans used the harbour and the city of Messina as their base of operations during the whole conflict against the Carthaginians (™cr»santo d∆ Ðrmhthr…J ÔRwma‹oi prÕj tÕn SikelikÕn pÒlemon tÕn prÕj Karchdon…ouj).

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including in all probability the successors of Timasiteus, were favourable to hand over the city and the harbour to the Roman consul. Gnaeus Cornelius decided to leave immediately from Messina with his 17 warships and landed in the island of Lipari, taking undoubtedly control of both the harbour and the city. The Carthaginian commander Hannibal, who was perhaps the former commander of the Punic garrison in Agrigentum and by that time was staying in Panormus, became aware of the Romans’ assault and sent to Lipari a member of the senate of Carthage, whose name was Boodes, in command of 20 warships. After sailing by night along the northern coasts of Sicily, Boodes arrived in Lipari and cut off the Roman consul and his soldiers in the harbour. Consequently, Lipari immediately turned to be controlled by the Carthaginians, who then escorted the 17 Roman warships and the consul as a captive of war to Panormus74. In the meanwhile, Hannibal himself decided to sail and to come across the Roman fleet that by then was approaching Sicily: the navy of course was in command of Caius Duilius who, as soon as he heard news of the disaster suffered by his colleague Gnaeus Cornelius, awarded the command of the land forces to the tribunes and by himself turned to direct the fleet. At the same time, the Punic troops were wreaking havoc on the cwvra of Mylae, that since few years was controlled by the Romans; the Greek city-state of Mylae had been conquered by storm by Hiero of Syracuse during his war against the Mamertines, and it may be conjectured that it had been one of those Greek cities that cheerfully surrendered to Rome in 263 BC, sending an embassy to the consuls while they were besieging Centuripe. Caius Duilius decided then to move against the Carthaginians with the fleet; the enemy prepared 130 warships and set sail led by Hannibal, who was using still at that time a hepteres, i.e. “a vessel with seven oarsmen”, which had been captured to the fleet of Pyrrhus perhaps when he run away Sicily. The navy battle fought in the waters of Mylae was the first great naval victory of the Roman history, and Caius Duilius was able either to sink or capture more or less 50 enemy warships, including the admiral-ship of Hannibal. Encouraged by the naval victory, the Romans again landed in Sicily and tried to conclude even the military operations on land75. At first, they prevented the 74 On the episode of Timasiteus, see Liv. 5, 28, 2–3; Valer. Max. 1, 1, 4; Diod. 14, 93, 3–5; Plut. Cam. 8, 5–8. Some literary sources, that are patently favourable to the Romans, suggest on the contrary that the people of Lipari offered to betray the Carthaginians and hand over their town just to deceive the consul: see Zon. 8, 10; Polyaen. 6, 16, 5. 75 It has been discussed by the modern critics whether those operations came first or followed the battle at Mylae, because the honorary inscription which is engraved on the so-called columna rostrata (= CIL I2, 25) and the elogium of Caius Duilius (= ILLRP 319) both mention the release of Segesta from the Punic siege and the conquest of Makella before the naval fight at Mylae. Thiel 1954, 187–188, suggested that both the inscriptions do not follow a chronological order of the events, but just mention the happenings terra marique, as it was usual: his suggestion has been followed by Lazenby 1996, 68, and previously rejected by e.g. De Sanctis 19672, III 1, 127 and Sordi 1967, 265, note 1. Even Walbank 1957, I, 79–80 has suggested that the military campaign on land took place before the naval warfare. Some scholars, on the contrary, rejected the honorary inscription of the columna rostrata as a forged document: see Campanile 1977, 81–93.

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Elymian city of Segesta from being further besieged by the Carthaginian troops, and so they stopped the siege: Zonaras (8, 11) stated that the new commander of the Punic forces, whose name was Hamilcar, laid an ambush to a Roman battalion commanded by the tribune Caius Caecilius just in close proximity of Segesta and destroyed it, thus corroborating the evidence offered by Polybius (1, 23, 1) about the fact that Caius Duilius gave up the command of the Roman land forces to the tribunes before the naval battle fought at Mylae. After the relief of Segesta, the Romans conquered by storm the city of Makella, that successfully withstood them in 263 BC, and afterwards they laid siege to the city of Mitistratum; nonetheless, Diodorus (23, 9) stated that the tribunes had to retreat after seven months, suffering many losses. After the naval battle of Mylae, in 260/259 BC the commander of the Punic army, Hamilcar, who was by then staying in Panormus, grasped that the allies of the Romans rose up. The event is slightly alluded to by Polybius (1, 24, 3), but his reference is particularly important, because it stresses an impression that Diodorus too had enlightened when he described the Roman siege of Agrigentum, i.e. that the Roman troops were to all intents and purposes supported by huge contingents of Siceliotes and Greeks during the war; indeed, Polybius clearly shows that those allies rioted against the Romans. Regrettably, we ignore the grounds of the mutiny; it has been supposed that it occurred because the Romans did not officially acknowledge the importance of the allies’ cooperation in their latest military successes. However, the rebellion was for sure very unusual and the Greek allies decided to encamp separately from the legionaries: Polybius said that their camp was established in the zone between the old city of Paropos (which may be identifiable with the remains in the neighbourhood of the modern Collesano, just to the west of Terme) and the city of Terme. The allies were hence suddenly attacked by Hamilcar, and suffered really heavy casualties (more or less 4.000 men). The battle, which was fought in all probability in the coastal plain just to the east of Terme, took place seemingly in the spring of 259 BC. Of the two consuls elected for the year 259/258 BC, Caius Aquilius Florus alone was sent to Sicily, while Lucius Cornelius Scipio went to Sardinia; this could even be a reason why the main military successes were achieved by the Carthaginians in that period. Diodorus (23, 9, 5) informs that they conquered back Henna and Camarina, and in both times they took a great advantage of the support offered by the members of the pro-Punic parties of those communities; nay, the political struggle seem to have been particularly harsh in Camarina, because the city was taken over twice by Hamilcar, and this information implies that it changed side on occasion between the challengers. On the other hand, the Carthaginians strengthened in the ejparciva some of their possessions, and above all they surrounded with mighty defensive walls the city of Drepana, where they moved all the people that lived at that time in Eryx; there, the Punic forces destroyed the city, but left unspoiled the famous temple of Venus on the acropolis and its surroundings. In the meanwhile, the Roman army conquered the fortress of Mazarides and enchained all its inhabi­ tants; the place cannot be identified without doubt, but a very helpful suggestion is

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offered by the resemblance of the name Mazarides with the modern town of Mazara del Vallo, which lies on the southern coast of Sicily76. The Roman consuls of 258/257 – indeed, only Aulus Atilius Caiatinus, who joined with the proconsul Caius Aquilius Florus (the consul Caius Sulpicius Paterculus was then sent to Sardinia) – advanced deeply into the Punic territories and went to Panormus, which was the place where the Carthaginians established their own winter quarters. The Romans approached the city lining up the whole army, but the Carthaginians did not accept to exit from the city and then to fight. According to Polybius (1, 24, 9–10), the Romans hence departed and turned their attention on the city of Hippana, which they took by storm; the conquest of that city is mentioned by Diodorus, too (23, 9, 5), but the reading of the name in his text is Sittana. Since the first half of the XIX century, the ancient site of Hippana has been identified with the old remains unearthed at Montagna dei Cavalli, few kilometers south of Prizzi (central Sicily), and quite all the scholars have agreed with Crispi’s conjecture77. Anyway, there is some more evidence of the city of Hippana, and it is provided by the coins, particularly by some rare silver litrae bearing the following devices: − Obv. An eagle standing on a capital: inscription IPANATAN. Rev. Dolphin and mussel78. Some other bronze coins were published then in 1982, bearing on the obverse a charging bull and on the reverse the astragal; all the coins were overcast on earlier Punic coinages (of the kind “male head/riding horse”), and they have been attributed to Hippana by the editor due to partial inscription IPA which was engraved under the bull just on a single specimen79. Finally, after the excavations of 1991 at Montagna dei Cavalli, other 278 coins have been discovered, and 15 bronzes among them have the same devices of the above-mentioned (“bull/astragal”); unfortunately, there is quite no inscription on those coins, apart from a P which may be spotted just on a single specimen. So, in all probability the site of Montagna dei Cavalli was the official mint of the bronze coins, but the chronology of the issue does not refer to the age of the first Punic war, given that they were all cast over Punic coins dated to the second half of the IV century BC. This means that Montagna dei Cavalli had an independent mint, but that it still worked for sure in the second half of IV century BC. Furthermore, there may be some doubts about the attribution of the silver coins with the legend IPANATAN to Montagna dei Ca­ 76 See Lazenby 1996, 72–73. The text of Diodorus has been – strangely enough – misinterpreted by Walbank 1957, I, 80, and Caven 1980, 30, who thought that Mazarides was then occupied by Hamilcar and the Carthaginians! 77 See Crispi 1836, 234; Pace 19582, I, 314; Collura 1971, 38–42; Bejor 1982B, 828–829. 78 On this issue see particularly Holloway 1975, 144. Tusa 1961, 113 doubted whether the issue had to be referred to the Hippana mentioned by Polybius, but he offered an unacceptable solution, that is to conjecture that the coin was minted in an unknown place of Sicily called Hipana. 79 See Calciati 1983, 239–242; Calciati 1988, 267 and 271–272; Manfredi 1990, 195–203. On the Punic bronze coin with “male head/riding horse”, see Cutroni Tusa 1983B, 35–42.

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valli, because the place where they had been discovered is unknown; nevertheless, it is very tempting to refer the coins to the city mentioned by Polybius and conquered by the Romans80. On that circumstance, the Romans succeeded in taking over even the city of Mitistratum, that laid probably on a very favourable defensive position and had been able to resist against the previous attacks of the legionaries; but its refusal to go along with the Romans was in all probability the cause of the really severe reaction of the consuls, who decided to raze the city to the ground and to put on the slave-market all its inhabitants. Zonaras (8, 11) stated that the Punic garrison was able to get away before the city surrendered. Regrettably, there is no confidence even on the real location of Mitistratum, but a useful suggestion may be offered by the numismatic evidence once more; some coins bearing the half-done inscription MUTI have been unearthed in the modern town of Marianopoli, more or less 30 kilometers west of Henna, and if they belong to the ancient city of Mitistratum it is very likely that it laid in the neighbourhood. Further evidence may be offered by the fact that the first Greek city-state that was conquered by the Roman army after Mitistratum was exactly Henna, even if both the narratives of Polybius and Diodorus say that the next defeated city was Camarina. Henna and Camarina had been both taken by Hamilcar the year before, and maybe the support of the pro-Carthaginian groups of their citizens played a great role in the Punic triumphs. The information provided by Diodorus (23, 9) utter that the Romans, too, took over Henna treacherously, and this drives to suppose that during the short period of the Punic supremacy over the city there was a persistent political contrast among the citizens, which then was settled with a definite prevalence of the pro-Roman party, whose representatives helped the consular army to enter the city. The Punic garrison was partly slaughtered, but some soldiers could run away and found a safe harbour among their allies; of course, the Roman established in Henna their own occupying forces. The Greek city-state of Camarina required the legionaries many more efforts, and the siege was more difficult and prolonged. The Romans were able to conclude it with the active support of the king Hiero of Syracuse, who sent to the consul Atilius Caiatinus his own siege-machines; they approached the city-walls with the engines and they tore them down. As well as in the previous occurrences, after entering the town the Romans enslaved the greatest part of the citizens. Some secondary historical sources, clearly drawing on the description of the events made by the annalists and by other sources favourable to the Romans81, state that Caiatinus, while approaching Camarina, was caught in ambush by the Punic forces and just saved by the swift involvement of a tribune, who was able to focus on himself and his men the assault of the Carthaginians. The sources say that all the Roman died, with the 80 On the most recent field excavations at Montagna dei Cavalli see Tusa 1961, 113–121; Vassallo 1988–1989, 313–323; Vassallo 1990, 313–323; Vassallo – Gandolfo – La Lumia 1993, 116–136; Vassallo 1993–1994, 1259–1271; Fucarino 1994–1995, 125–160; Gandolfo 1997, 791–798. 81 Claudius Quadrigarius fr. 42–43 Peter; Cato fr. 83 Peter; Liv. Perioca 17; Plin. nat. 22, 11; Oros. 4, 8, 2; Zon. 8, 12.

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exception of the tribune who was captured alive; but the doubts concerning this incident and its historical truthfulness are consistent. They cannot be reduced only to the various readings of the tribune’s name, but they have to focus especially on the fact that the Roman soldiers should have been in number of 300. The situation, indeed, evokes too much the affair of Leonidas and the 300 Spartiates at Termopile, and it is worth to be suspected as a clone! Polybius (1, 24, 12) added that, after Henna and Camarina, the consul Caiatinus succeeded in seizing some minor places such as Kamikos, which is described as a fortress managed by the people of Agrigentum, and again Herbessus, which most likely has to be identified with the city that served as a supplies’ depot for the Romans during the time-consuming siege of Agrigentum in 262 BC. The last military operations of the Romans described by Polybius concern an attempt to siege the city of Lipara, and Zonaras (8, 12) maintained that both the island and the city were defended successfully by Hamilcar. In 257/256 the Roman consul Caius Atilius Regulus, who was in command of the navy, went to Sicily. The historical sources do not agree completely on the manoeuvres he made: Polybius (1, 25, 1–4) only refers to a naval battle in close proximity of Tyndaris; a fragmentary citation of Naevius (fr. 37 Büchner) mentions the sack of Malta; Orosius (4, 8, 5) cites some raids both on Malta and Lipari; finally, Zonaras (8, 12) keeps information both of the incursion on Lipari and the naval fight off Tyndaris. The surprising event is no doubt the mission against the island of Malta, because the other places are very close one to another, and their connection may be explained even by military tactics. It is very likely that the attack against Malta followed the victory off Tyndaris82, and that it was scheduled just to achieve a midway station on the sea-route that linked Sicily to northern Africa, in consideration of the planned African expedition that followed in 256 BC. Zonaras said that the consuls, coming to Sicily, tried to attack once again Lipari and that it was on that instance that they met the Punic fleet off Tyndaris. This time, the annalistic historical tradition quite completely harmonize the narrative of Polybius, who nonetheless did mention the attack on Lipari just in the previous paragraph of his work but stated that only Caius Atilius Regulus tackled the Carthaginians on the sea. He landed in close proximity to the city of Tyndaris, which at least from 263 BC had been under the direct control of the Punic forces that moved forcibly the most reputed citizens to Lilybaeum, making them prisoners of war. We really ignore what happened the following years; indeed, if even in 263 BC some people was encouraging to side with the Romans, it may be supposed that they made not only a single try, and perhaps Tyndaris was at that time controlled by the Romans. However, even in this instance, there is a clear evidence of the pressing civic struggles with reference to the prospect of banking on the protection of the Romans, or else to keep on the Punic garrison: what’s more, Tyndaris – as well as all the other Greek city-states involved in the war – had no chance of being independent and no hope of autonomy. 82 Rightly supposed by lazenby 1996, 78. The sequence of the two events is changed by Scullard 19613, 150; Scullard 19892, 553–554; Thiel 1954, 203; Caven 1980, 32.

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So, Atilius Regulus engaged in battle with the Punic navy; he underwent great dangers in the first stages of the battle, but then he was successful inducing the Carthaginians to flee at the end of the battle, when they took refuge once more in the Aeolian islands, in their safe harbour of Lipari. It seems likely that at that time the consul led his fleet to the south of Sicily, and then tried to attack the Punic quarter in Malta. In the meanwhile, the land troops achieved no significant outcome and they spent their time engaging in trivial actions: anyway the Carthaginian offensive of 259 BC, during which the Punic army arrived at least as far as Camarina, was then kept in check by the Romans, and the enemy was still narrowed in western Sicily, although keeping a firm control on the cities of Lilybaeum, Drepana and Panormus. 3.7. From Sicily to Africa, and the way back; tempests, Roman shipwrecks and first Punic crushes in the ejpikravteia (256–250 BC) A new stage of the war began at the end of 257 BC, because the aim of the Romans was at that time to bring the fight exactly in Africa; of course, the Carthaginians wanted to prevent this occurrence, since they knew that their homeland was easily accessible from Sicily for a mighty foreign power (they underwent with the great expedition of Agathocles rather 60 years before, and perhaps they did not forget the planned missions both of Agathocles – before his murderer – and Pyrrhus); therefore, they pressed to work out the contest on the sea. Consequently, the Romans concentrated their efforts in the ship-building during the winter of 257 BC, and in the summer of the following year they sent from Rome to Messina 330 new warships. The fleet then left Messina southwards – Polybius said that the ships kept Sicily on their right – and doubled cape Pachynus, arriving then to cape Ecnomus, which is a hill rising on the right bank of river Himera, and it has been identified with the modern Poggio Sant’Angelo (or even with the mount Cufino). The nearest city-state was Phintias, that had not exactly an harbour, but offered a useful natural haven which was protected by the promontory. The Roman troops were encamped there, and the best trained soldiers were then boarded on the ships. The Carthaginians, quite at the same time, left their homeland with some 350 vessels, they approached Lilybaeum and then set sail again southwards, landing at Heraclea Minoa. From there, they went on sailing eastwards, until the two navies met off cape Ecnomus. The Roman task force was instructed by Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Vulso, who had been elected as consuls for the year 256/255 BC; the Punic fleet was ordered by Hanno – the general who had been defeated at Agrigentum in 262 BC – and the Hamilcar who at first crushed the Romans and Caius Atilius Regulus in the naval battle off Tyndaris. The outcome of the new battle was, in general, favourable to the Romans; according to Zonaras (8, 12), their fleet hence returned to Messina, and perhaps there were even some peace requests from the Carthaginians (but this information has to be handled carefully, since it is matchless in the historical tradition). However, the consuls could actually realize their plan, and they cruised towards north Africa. After the first successes and the conquest of

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the african city called “Aspis” (i.e. “shield”), Lucius Manlius returned back to Rome in the autumn of 256 BC, and there he was awarded with the triumph: Polyb­ ius says (1, 29, 10) that “he could sail alongside the coasts of Sicily without any risk”. Atilius Regulus remained in Africa. Of course, the war turned to be now a conflict for Africa, and the historical sources do not offer quite any information about the events involving the Greek city-states of Sicily. It can be enough to say that the new Punic commanders, Hasdrubal and Boostar, were sent from Carthage to Heraclea Minoa where Hamilcar was at that time encamped, and they called him back to homeland; thus, it may be deduced that Heraclea Minoa was still one of the most important strongholds of the Punic ejpikravteia, together with the traditional forts of Lilybaeum, Drepana and Panormus. Indeed, the military situation in Sicily had to be calm, given that Hamilcar could board on the ships 5000 foot-soldiers and 500 horsemen, and then leave Heraclea to Carthage. The mission of Regulus in Africa turned out to be a disaster, as it is well known; the Romans, at the beginning of summer 255 BC, set afloat 350 warships and appointed the command to the new consuls Marcus Aemilius Paullus and Servius Fulvius Paetinus Nobilior, who received the task of going to Libya – passing by Sicily – and from there return with the survivors of Regulus’ army. According to Zonaras (8, 14), the fleet was caught off guard by a tempest and it found a safe refuge in the harbour of Cossyra (the modern island of Pantelleria); the Romans sacked the city and established there an occupying force, but it was just for a while, because the following year the Carthaginians took the island once again under their control. However, the information provided by Zonaras is strengthened by another evidence, coming from the so-called Acta Triumphalia, that maintain that the consuls celebrated in January 253 BC their triumph “over the citizens of Cossyra” («procos. de Cossurensibus et Poeneis navalem egit»). Coming back from northern Africa, the Roman fleet was caught once again by a tempest while approaching the coastal territories close to Camarina; therefore the sea-route followed by the consuls went from Africa, perhaps through Malta, to cape Pachynus in Sicily, and then had to follow the coastline eastwards to Messina. The storm quite destroyed the whole navy, since only 80 ships of a total amount of 364 arrived safe in the harbour of Camarina. Diodorus (23, 18, 1) says that Hiero of Syracuse kindly took care of the survivors, welcoming them in Syracuse and providing them with food and new clothes; finally, he escorted them safely to Messina. Polybius stated that the responsibility for the disaster was up to the commanders, because they had been warned by their steersmen that the route to cape Pachynus had to be avoided, since it was very dangerous, but this seems to be groundless: given that Heraclea Minoa, Selinous, Lilybaeum, Drepana and Panormus were firmly under Carthaginian control, the consuls had really no other chance than following the southern sea-route to the eastern coasts of Sicily, and from there reach Messina83. 83 See De Sanctis 19672, III 1, 138; Meltzer 1896, II, 308; Thiel 1954, 237–238; Lazenby 1996, 112.

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In 254 BC the main theatre of the military operations was again Sicily: according to Polybius (1, 38, 1) the Carthaginians, who were encouraged both by their land victory and by the news they got about the Romans’ catastrophic shipwreck off Camarina, decided to send to Sicily once again Hasdrubal; they entrusted him all the soldiers that had remained in the ejparciva, those who had been moved from Heraclea Minoa to Africa and furthermore 140 war-elephants: in the meanwhile, they built a war-fleet numbering 200 vessels. Hasdrubal crossed without any problem to Lilybaeum, and when he reached the city he just had to take care to train both his soldiers and the animals. The information is deeply in contrast with the accounts of Orosius (4, 9, 14) and Eutropius (2, 24), who both dated the arrival of Hasdrubal in Sicily to 251 BC, and even with Polybius’ account; it seems indeed very strange that such a mighty army did not help the city of Panormus, that soon after was besieged by the Romans. It is therefore very plausible that Hasdrubal was not sent to Sicily in 254 BC, but some time after84. The two consuls of 254/253 BC, Aulus Atilius Caiatinus and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Asina, prepared the new armada and then sailed to Messina, where they joined together with the 80 warships that had endured the shipwreck off Camarina. Then they set sail along the northern coast of Sicily and when they arrived to Panormus – which is labelled by Polybius as “the most powerful city-state of the territories under Punic control” (¼per Ãn barut£th pÒlij tÁj Karchdon…wn ™parc…aj: 1, 38, 7) – they encircled it. According to Diodorus (23, 18, 3), before attacking Panormus the Romans conquered Kephaloidion (that is the modern Cefalù), thanks to the active support of some turncoats: that operation, too, is a clear sign of the cooperation that part of the Greek local population offered to the Roman troops. Furthermore, the events show that even Kephaloidion had been previously kept in check by a Punic garrison, as well as Tyndaris, and no doubt the two Greek city-states were among those coastal communities that at the beginning of the war between Rome and Carthage preferred to side with the Punic forces, opening their gates to the establishment of their battalions, because they were frightened by the mighty supremacy of the Cartha­ ginian fleet which cruised off the northern coast of Sicily. Needless to say, the emergent successes of the Roman army played a great role in strengthening the political position of the pro-Roman parties inside those cities, so much that often they actively contributed to the Roman conquest of the towns, like at Tyndaris and Kephaloidion. There cannot be any doubt about the truthfulness and the historicity of that triumph, because Kephaloidion lays exactly alongside the sea-route which was run by the Roman fleet in the travel to Panormus; on the contrary, there could be some doubts about the news concerning a following raid to Drepana that had been repelled by the Punic general Carthalo. This commander, as soon as the Romans suffered their disastrous wreckage off Camarina, suddenly attacked the city of Agrigentum and was able to take over it once again; nevertheless, soon after he burned the city and razed to the ground the fortification walls, while the survived people found a safe refuge in the colossal temple of the Olympian Zeus. We do not know exactly why the Carthaginian commander decided to destroy Agrigentum; some 84 Rightly pointed out by Caven 1980, 35–37; Lazenby 1996, 113.

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scholars just suggested that he was not able to be in charge of it. Anyway, it may be much more plausible to follow the information offered by Diodorus on the Roman raid against Drepana; if Carthalo had news about it – as it may be conjectured – he quite immediately had to withdraw to western Sicily and offer his help to the Punic stronghold: so, he may have decided to destroy Agrigentum just not to leave the town undamaged in the hands of the Romans. Furthermore, there is another evidence which support the historical reliability of Diodorus’ account concerning the raid against Drepana: the Acta triumphalia again maintain that only the consul Scipio Asina celebrated his triumph in March 252 BC for his victory at Panormus. Thus, it is likely that the consuls divided their forces, and that Atilius Caiatinus actually made an unsuccessful incursion against Drepana, while Scipio Asina besieged Panormus. The Romans entered with their navy in the harbour of Panormus, and after landing their troops they entirely encircled the city with a palisade and a trench; afterwards, they gathered the siege-machines in two separate places and then approached the fortification walls. The main defensive tower which was facing the sea was easily conquered, and the “new city” together with its neighbourhood was taken by storm. The inhabitants found a safe haven in the palaia; povli~, “the old city” (which has to be intended as the acropolis), and decided to send some envoys to make negotiations with the consul. Diodorus (23, 18, 4) stated that the Romans chose to set free all the citizens who were able to pay two minae for their own ransom; thus, 14.000 inhabitants received freedom, but quite the same number were enslaved and then put on the slave-market. As a result, the Romans took over Panormus and they established a garrison into the citadel. Afterwards, Diodorus (23, 18, 5) maintained that before the consuls withdrew to Messina the people of Iaitas threw out the Carthaginian garrison and handed over the city to the Romans; the model was immediately followed by the citizens of Solous, Petra, Cytattara85 and Tyndaris (this city was definitely under Roman control from this time onwards). Therefore, the portion of Sicily that was directly dominated by Rome further extended, and what’s more it included for the first time a very important piece of the Carthaginian ejpikravteia, together with other cities of the Elymian territories. The Carthaginians still held firmly their positions at Terme, Drepana, Lilybaeum, Selinous and Heraclea Minoa. In the summer of 253 BC the new consuls, Gnaeus Servilius Caepio and Caius Sempronius Blaesus, reached Sicily with the aim of sailing once again to Africa. In this instance, too, only Caius Sempronius was awarded with the triumph, and so it may be conjectured that he himself went alone to northern Africa, while his colleague remained in Sicily together with the proconsul Scipio Asina. If Zonaras has to be trusted (8, 14), it seems that before reaching northern Africa the Roman navy tried to attack Lilybaeum, but it was an unsuccessful effort. The African expedition was again wretched, and the consul went back to Sicily. It may be interesting to 85 The name of the city in the text of Diodorus is Enattarus, and there is no alternative reading in the manuscripts; but the correction is possible thanks to the mention of the city in the inscriptions found at Entella: see Bejor 1982B, 815–840.

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note with Polybius (1, 39, 5) that on that occasion the fleet sailed to Panormus, that had been conquered the year before, and so the warships did not hesitate to double the promontory of Lilybaeum; perhaps the consul remembered the perils along the southern coastal sea-route of Sicily, the same that played a great part in the shipwreck off Camarina two years before. Nevertheless, from the harbour of Panormus he decided to sail straightforwardly to Rome by open sea; he thus was caught by another tempest, and 150 ships were sunk. The year 252/251 BC was not one of the most important of the war, and quite no significant operation belong to that period; that’s why, perhaps, Polybius completely says nothing about it. Nevertheless, it may be understood thanks to a slight remark (1, 39, 12–13) that in the two years 252 and 251 BC there occurred a lot of skirmishes between Romans and Carthaginians both in the surroundings of Lilybaeum and in close proximity to Selinous, and that the use of the war-elephants played a great role in those fights. Furthermore, the Romans succeeded in taking over after besieging them both Terme and Lipari, that were at that time cut off from the rest of the ejparciva after the surrender of Panormus, but they failed to subjugate Heirkte (as indicated by Diodorus 23, 20). Zonaras stated (8, 14) that, although taking Terme, the Roman soldiers could not capture any citizen at all, because the Carthaginians had previously helped them to run away; on the contrary, with reference to Lipari, Zonaras said that the consul Aurelius Cotta got some warships from the king Hiero of Syracuse and then sailed to Lipari; after landing the troops, he entrusted the command to the tribune Quintus Cassius, and ordered him to go on with the siege of the city without engaging in battle; but the tribune did not as he was told, he was defeated and suffered many losses. However the consul could take over the city and the island, but then massacred the citizens and removed the tribune from his task. Zonaras gives a correct chronology for those victories, because he refers to the consulate of Caius Aurelius Cotta and Publius Servilius Geminus, that is to the year 252/251 BC; furthermore, in the Acta triumphalia we have the mention of Aurelius’ triumph as cos. de Poeneis et Siculeis idibus april. in the year 251 BC. Last but not least, it seems to be very meaningful that the consul of 65 BC, Lucius Aurelius Cotta – who was a direct heir of the consul of 251 BC – issued some coins that reproduced the same devices of the coinage previously minted by the Greek city of Lipari86. In 251/250 BC the Romans decided to persevere with some military operations only by land, therefore they chose not to build a new fleet. The consuls Lucius Caecilius Metellus and Caius Furius Pacilius reached Sicily with their legions, and 60 merchantmen conveyed there the supplies. Just towards the end of their office, a very important fight took place. Furius Pacilius left Sicily for Rome, while Lucius Metellus stayed in Panormus with two legions, and his duty was to keep an eye on the allies who had to gather the harvest; this is a very important detail to set a firm chronology, to June 250 BC. Then, Hasdrubal moved with the army from Lily86 The coins, that were Roman denarii signed with the mark L. COT[TA], bear on the obverse the usual head of the god Ephaistos (Vulcanus): on the reverse, the device is a flying eagle with a thunderbolt. I agree with the suggestion of Cavedoni re-proposed by Cesano 1940–1942, 58; Sydenham 1952, 78–79; it has been indeed refused by Grueber 1910, I, 200–201.

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baeum: Diodorus (23, 21, 2) specified that his way went through the hills of the territory neighbouring Selinous. He therefore set his encampment on the borderline of Panormus’ cwvra, while the consul took his leave into the city and prepared the resistance. Hasdrubal entered the country of Panormus passing through some narrow gorges and began to devastate the crops until he arrived next to the city. The consul Caecilius did not react, and thus he forced Hasdrubal to cross the river that flowed ahead of the city; this was a skilful manoeuvre that allowed him in a second time to annihilate the Carthaginian war-elephants and to make them turn back against the Punic troops. Exactly at that point, Caecilius went out from the city with his own forces and definitely defeated the enemies; a detail offered by Zonaras (8, 14) seems to be interesting, as he said that Caecilius Metellus submitted freedom and privileges to all the prisoners who were able to control the elephants and so could even deal with their capture. The animals were afterwards conveyed to Rome by land, as soon as they crossed the Strait of Messina thanks to some big rafts made up with floating jars. 3.8. Lilybaeum, Eryx, Drepana: the Roman triumph and the new fate for the Greeks of Sicily (250–241 BC) The success drove the Romans to another big effort, trying to win absolutely the war, and so they once again undertook the operations on the sea. As a matter of fact, the two consuls of 250/249 BC were both specialists of the naval warfare; Caius Atilius Regulus won against the Carthaginians the battle off Tyndaris and then led the incursion to Malta; Lucius Manlius Vulso was the winner of the battle off cape Ecnomus. In the winter of 250 BC the Romans built 50 new warships, they enlisted the crews and searched for other vessels among the socii navales. The two consuls went to Sicily with 120 warships and landed in close proximity to Lilybaeum, where they were joined by the land troops; quite immediately they began to lay the siege to the city. The attack to Lilybaeum, which was never rounded off with a complete success, marked a further turning-point in the history of the war for Sicily, because that was the first time when the Romans tried to hit the political and strategic heart of the Punic ejpikravteia, given that the eventual downfall of the stronghold would actually have meant the end of the Punic presence in western Sicily. Polybius (1, 41, 6) favourably underlined that the Carthaginians devoted themselves completely to send every aid and to suffer everything just to defend Lilybaeum, “because they had no other military control centre in the rest of Sicily, apart from Drepana”. In fact, this information seems to be corroborated by the account of Diodorus (24, 1, 1), who stated that previous to the siege of Lilybaeum, the Carthaginians had razed to the ground the city of Selinous and moved all the people from there to Lilybaeum: it is very likely that Heraclea Minoa underwent the same fate at that time, although it must be considered that the city was again mentioned by Polybius (1, 53, 7) when he described the naval operations of the year 249 BC.

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To a great extent, the general description of the mighty fortification system of the Punic stronghold has been already made in the second chapter, and perhaps it may be recalled that the great military expedition of Pyrrhus in 277 BC and now the war against Rome were the two basic events that led to a huge work of reinforcement of the existing defensive structures. Polybius (1, 42, 7 ff.), just referring to the situation of 250 BC, says that Lilybaeum was defended by an excellent ring of walls and completely surrounded by a deep ditch, while on the sides that faced the Mediterranean sea there were shallow waters, and the access to the harbour passed through them; therefore, that manoeuvre required a great ability and skilfulness. The Romans set their encampments on both the land-sides of the city, and blocked the zone between the two camps with a lot of fortifications (including a trench, a palisade and a defensive wall), and in the meanwhile they even tried to obstruct the entrance to the harbour, sinking there 15 ships that they previously loaded with stones. Afterwards, they built a great number of war-engines and they concentrated them against the defensive tower which was the closest to the sea: when it was destroyed, they went on with the siege and succeeded tearing down six other defensive towers next to the above-mentioned; every day the towers were hit, and the huge number of citizens together with the 10.000 mercenaries settled in the city began to be very alarmed. The Punic general, Himilco, attended to the erection of new fortifications and even he ordered to dig some passageways, through which he aimed to make some sorties from the city and create some troubles to the Romans, attacking their siege-machines and trying to burn them. The mercenaries of the Carthaginians made at that time an attempt to betray the city, and they went out furtively at night to make some negotiations with the Roman consul; however they were discovered and immediately neutralized thanks to the interference of a mercenary Achaean leader, whose name was Alexon, who even previously – but the instance is unknown – had been able to save the city of Agrigentum from being betrayed by some mercenaries of Syracuse (clearly payed, at that time, by the people of Agrigentum)87. In the meanwhile, the Carthaginians of the homeland began to send reinforcements to the besieged people; Hannibal left Carthage leading a fleet of 50 ships boarding more than 10.000 men, he landed at the so-called Aegates islands (the modern Egadi) and waited for the most advantageous moment to sail to Lilybaeum. Quite surprisingly, the Romans did not thwart the Punic fleet, because they thought that the fury of the wind could be enough to prevent it from approaching the harbour; therefore, Hannibal could indeed enter the anchorage and disembark the reinforcements without any trouble. The reaction of Himilco and his beleaguered men was instantaneous; as soon as he made some accurate plans and assigned the different duties, the general led out from the city his army and assaulted quite everywhere the siege-machines of the enemy; nevertheless he had to suffer many casualties among his forces and was forced to recall back into the city his men. So, the Romans could save some machines and kept safe their equipments. 87 For the event see Kirchner 1894, col. 1471; De Waele 1971, 152–154; Zambon 2000, 306– 307 (with a new evaluation).

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After this operation, Hannibal at night left secretly Lilybaeum with the navy and sailed to Drepana, where he met Adherbal. It is not by chance that Polybius (1, 46, 2) at this time stated that “for his favourable position and the benefit of its harbour, the Carthaginians ever devoted themselves in the defence of Drepana”: no doubt, their efforts increased twofold at that time because – after the drop of Panormus, the destruction of Selinous, the far-off location of Heraclea Minoa with reference to the main theatre of operations (and maybe the city had even suffered the same fate of Selinous), and the contemporary siege of Lilybaeum – Drepana was as a matter of fact the only harbour of western Sicily controlled by the Carthaginians. Indeed, the Romans were going on with their blockade of Lilybaeum’s anchorage, but they could not prevent one Hannibal, nicknamed “Rhodian” (he was an outstanding citizen of Carthage and one of the most practised men in making the difficult manoeuvres to enter the harbour of Lilybaeum), from sailing into the harbour and make a reconnaissance of the situation; then he could even go back to Carthage – or maybe to Drepana – and make a detailed report to his fellow-citizens. The Romans, who had previously tried to block the access of the anchorage sinking 15 ships, then sought to build up an embankment, and they made it just where the level of the water was not so high. Thanks to this new bank, they were able to capture Hannibal “the Rhodian”, and according to some historical sources – needless to say, all favourable to the Romans – they used afterwards his ship as a model for their new warships, that won the final battle of the war. For the meantime, the siege of Lilybaeum went on: while the besieged people used efficiently the defensive system, a sudden and windy storm broke up some machines of the Romans; so, a group of Greek mercenaries who were then on the side of the Carthaginians tried to take an advantage from this and burned other siege-engines: their action was so successful that the Romans lost quite all the machines and suffered many casualties (above all, many sailors were then killed), and had therefore to change their method to siege the city. They encircled Lilybaeum with a ditch and a high palisade, while they even protected themselves by building a fortification wall around their encampment; afterwards, they just waited, while the inhabitants restored the sections of the walls that had been previously damaged. Once again, the Roman army began to suffer the consequences of the shortage of food supplies; according to Diodorus (24, 1, 4), only the great efforts made by king Hiero of Syracuse to supply his friends with a lot of rations prevented them from leaving the siege. These difficulties marked the end of the year 250/249 BC. During the winter of 249 BC in Rome some 10.000 fresh sailors were enlisted and then sent to Sicily; once they crossed the Strait of Messina, they reached the Roman camp outside Lilybaeum by land, because the Punic navy was at that time at anchor in Drepana and no doubt could have prevented them from arriving at Lilybaeum following the sea-route along the north-western coast of Sicily. At that time, the consul Publius Claudius Pulcher – who had been appointed for the year 249/248 BC together with Lucius Iunius Pullus – decided to attack Drepana, and so he left Lilybaeum with the fleet thinking he would have been able to take by surprise Haderbal, the Punic general who at that moment managed the city. But the naval battle that took place in the waters off Drepana produced a complete triumph

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of the Carthaginian navy, and the consul Publius Claudius had to go through the consequences since he was even put on trial in Rome and had to pay a huge indemnity. His colleague Lucius Iunius Pullus was sent to Sicily in 249 BC, maybe in the second half of the summer, and he had the duty of conveying rations to those who were besieging Lilybaeum and other supplies to the troops; as soon as he reached Messina, he joined to his fleet the vessels that had come there from the harbour of Lilybaeum (so, it must be supposed that those ships left the waters of western Sicily before the naval battle off Drepana took place) and from some other places of Sicily; then he set sail quickly for Syracuse, numbering a total of 120 warships and more or less 800 merchantmen. From Syracuse he sent forward to Lilybaeum some 400 merchantmen and some warships to escort them, in command of the quaestors, because he wanted to supply as soon as possible the army in the West; in the meantime, he remained in Syracuse, where he waited for the other ships that were sailing from Messina and he received the supplies offered by the Greek allies of central Sicily. No doubt, this decision clearly states that Lucius Iunius Pullus, while he was in Syracuse, did not have any news about the defeat of his colleague off Drepana. The Carthaginian commander of Drepana, Haderbal, sent directly to Carthage the captives and the Roman warships he captured after the battle: then he ordered his colleague Carthalo (this general was the same who assisted the city in 254 BC, after having conquered and burned Agrigentum), who had arrived in Drepana after the naval battle, to go to Lilybaeum with some 100 warships and either to destroy or to seize the Roman vessels. According to Diodorus (24, 1, 6), Haderbal sent even Hannibal to assault Panormus with other 30 ships, and the Punic admiral succeeded in taking away the grain provisions that the Romans wanted to send to Drepana, and then he supplied with them the Punic troops that were defending Lilybaeum. The incursion of Carthalo was successful, too, even because Himilco at the same time attacked the Romans with his mercenary troops. Carthalo then sailed southwards along the coastline from Lilybaeum to Heraclea Minoa, because he wanted to impede the cruise of the Roman merchantmen that had left Syracuse to Lilybaeum. He knew that the Romans were approaching, as much as the enemy was aware of his presence there; the quaestors, thinking that they could not tackle a naval battle, decided to land “at a little city that was among those subjected to the Romans; it had no harbour, but it offered some safe anchorages and havens in a favourable position” – these are the words of Polybius (1, 53, 10). Which was the city? Given that Diodorus (24, 1, 7) stated that the two fleets sought each other in close proximity of Gela, it must be supposed that the city was Phintias, just to the east of the mouth of river Himera, and facing the promontory of Ecnomus. As soon as they landed, the Romans prepared to withstand the Punic attack, thanks even to the support of some war-machines that they got from the citizens; nevertheless the Carthaginian troops, in consideration of the great obstructions in that place, chose to catch some merchantmen and then to withdraw next to a river, where they stayed at anchor and waited that the Romans again set their vessels afloat. Meanwhile the consul Lucius Iunius Pullus, who stayed in Syracuse, left the city and after doubling the cape Pachynus headed for Lilybaeum, completely unac-

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quainted with the incident occurred to the fleet led by the quaestors. Carthalo, who had been told by his patrol ships that many other Roman ships were approaching, left his safe haven and quickly moved against the consul, just to prevent the two Roman navies from joining one another. Nonetheless, Lucius Iunius did not dare to engage and he in turn moved away to some perilous places near the coast: Carthalo absolutely refused to come close to them, and chose to occupy a promontory from where he could keep in check both the enemy fleets. Suddenly, a storm rose up from the sea; Carthalo’s steersmen convinced him to leave swiftly and to double cape Pachynus, where he could be safe, while the Romans suffered another disaster; since the places where they took refuge had quite no harbour at all, they once again endured a shipwreck off Camarina. Owing to the recent defeat off Drepana, to the drop of some warships at Lilybaeum and to the shipwrecks off Camarina, the Romans decided to renounce to fight at sea, but they still had the supremacy by land; on the other hand, the Cartha­ ginians were yet the masters at sea, and so they were encouraged to engage in battle once more, without giving up their hopes to get back even their traditional possessions of the ejpikravteia. After the wreckage, the consul Lucius Iunius made his way to the encampment outside Lilybaeum; his next manoeuvre was a sudden attack to the hill of Eryx, where he took control of the sanctuary of Venus on the acropolis and then occupied the city, that had to be quite lacking inhabitants because in 259 BC the Carthaginians had moved the whole population to Drepana. Polybius (1, 55, 9–10) stated that the city lays just below the top of the hill, and that on every side the way up is very long and steep. The consul established a garrison into the acropolis and another battalion was sent to guard the way connecting Dre­ pana to the top of mount Eryx; therefore, he could keep an eye over both those places, with particular reference to the ascent, and he thought he was able to control both the city and the whole hill. According to the information provided by Diodorus (24, 1, 10–11), Lucius Iunius buttressed a place called Aighithallos, then known as Akellos, establishing there an occupying force of some 800 men; the place has been identified by the modern scholars with the modern Pizzo Argentaria, or Pizzo Sant’Anna88. Anyway quite immediately Carthalo took over that position, but again after some skirmishes he lost it to the Romans (Polybius 1, 58, 2). The consuls appointed for 248/247 BC were Caius Aurelius Cotta and Publius Servilius Geminus (as stated by Zonaras 8, 16), but that year has to be mentioned first and foremost because in the springtime of 247 BC the Carthaginians sent to Sicily to command the fleet another general; Hamilcar Barca, the father of the great Hannibal. His first activity has been mentioned by Zonaras (8, 16), when he gave the account of an attack made by the new consul of 247/246 BC, Numerius Fabius Buteus, against Drepana. The consul took over at first an island called Pelias, that had been previously occupied by the Punic forces, and the next day had to undergo a counteroffensive of Hamilcar. Buteus diverted his enemy by attacking himself Drepana: he did so by building an embankment to fill the channel that divided the 88 Huelsen 1893, col. 974; Kromayer 1912, III 1, 35: see anyway the short but exhaustive remarks of Bejor 1984B, 7–8.

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island of Pelias from the city. The main impediment to believe to that happening is given by the identification of the island; there were two islands in close proximity to Drepana, named Lazzaretto and Colombaia, and the former is at present linked with the mainland. For sure, this last detail recalls to mind the operation ordered by the consul; nevertheless, the ancient name of the island seems to be connected with the Greek word pevleia, “dove”, which resembles the modern Italian name Colombaia. Thus it may be – as it has been suggested – that the name was up to the island that was much close to the mainland, but when it finished to be an island, the name was transferred to the other one89. In contrast, if we trust Polybius (1, 56, 3), the first manoeuvre of Hamilcar was to make some incursions against the cities on the coasts of southern Italy, and when he came back he arrived with his whole fleet in the waters off Panormus, and landed in the cwvra, where he occupied the place called Heirkte. Polybius said that the place lies between Eryx and Panormus, close to the sea, and that it was much more useful than other positions for a protracted sojourn of the troops. The description made by Polybius seems to be – at first sight – very accurate: Heirkte was a very steep hill, raising to a high elevation in the country; the border on the top was no less than 100 stadia. Under the top, the ground was plentiful of pastures and may be cultivated, since it was even open to the light winds coming from the sea, and there were no dangerous animals. The hill was surrounded by unapproachable sheer drops everywhere, and could even offer a plain that served both as an acropolis and as look-out post towards the surrounding territory. Heirkte easily controlled an anchorage which was placed in a very favourable position on the sea-route that led from Lilybaeum and Drepana to Italy. Pyrrhus too conquered the fortress at Heirkte during his expedition in 277 BC, and this of course implies that after his departure from the ejpikravteia the Carthaginians got it back; I have previously suggested – as the greatest part of modern scholars – that Heirkte may be located on the modern Monte Pellegrino90. Moving without restraint from Heirkte and its harbour, Hamilcar could make recurrent incursions on the coasts of southern Italy, as far as Cuma: then, when the Romans set their encampment in front of his land position, exactly 5 miles ahead of the city of Panormus, the skirmishes between the two armies lasted for three years (247/246 to 245/244 BC). A single happening, which has raised many doubts among the scholars, has been mentioned by Diodorus (24, 6); in his opinion, Hamilcar made even some raids against a fortress called Italion which was in close proximity to the place named Longon, in the cwvra of Catania. No doubt, the fortress is far away from the Punic operative base at Heirkte, but it may be not forgotten that Hamilcar in those years repeatedly reached without troubles even the coasts of central and southern Italy. Another problem is that there is no evidence of a place 89 The hypothesis has been made – convincingly in my opinion – by Lazenby 1996, 146. Many doubts have been expressed about it by Dexter Hoyos 2003, 11–12. 90 See Walbank 1957, I; Dexter Hoyos 2001, 490–495; Dexter Hoyos 2003, 12–13 who agree with the old identification of Heirkte with Monte Castellaccio, made by Kromayer (but they just consider the evidence provided by Polybius’ account, and this seems to be not enough at all).

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called Longon in the countryside of Catane; on the other side, there is much evidence for the well-known city of Longanus, close to Messina and Mylae, where Hiero of Syracuse defeated the Mamertines in 269 BC. Furthermore, the geographic lexicon of Stephanus of Byzantium (s.v. Loggwvnh), quoting the reference of the Syracusan historian Philistus (FGrHist 556 F 38), has it that the city was even called Longone: therefore, it is likely that Longon can be a different reading of the name, and Dexter Hoyos has rightly conjectured a mistake of the copyist of Diodorus’ text, who wrote Katavnh~ frouvrion instead of Meshvnh~ frouvrion. Maybe the Mamertines themselves managed that area on behalf of the Romans, to keep an eye on the coastal sea-route that led to western Sicily: as the name of the fortress was Italion, it could even be a reference to the ethnic origin of the mercenaries who lived in Messina91. Perhaps in 244 BC, while the Romans looked over the mount Eryx both on the acropolis and on the foothills facing Drepana, Hamilcar succeeded in taking over the city of Eryx, which was located exactly between the two Roman garrisons. This means that he had completely lost any hope to win back Panormus, and maybe he feared to be secluded from the other Punic troops that still controlled Lilybaeum and Drepana; on the contrary, the movement to Eryx – leaving thus Heirkte to the Romans – let him being closer to the other Punic strongholds. Diodorus (24, 8–9) stated that Hamilcar butchered the Roman soldiers in Eryx, and that he moved then the population to Drepana: this evidence necessarily implies that somehow the Carthaginians had again conveyed there at least part of the citizens they had previously transplanted in Drepana in 259 BC. Of course, the Roman battalion which was on the top of mount Eryx was in danger of being besieged, but the Carthaginians too were in turn encircled, given that the enemies arrived from every side and the supplies could not be conveyed there easily: indeed, their position was linked to the sea just in one place, and there was only a way in, that could be effortlessly checked by the Romans. The fight at Eryx went on for two years (244/243 to 243/242 BC), but it did not decide the outcome of the war: the most important event turned to be, again, the decision of the Romans to reopen their naval policy. According to Polybius (1, 59, 3–4), they took that resolution for the third time; the first time, they retreated due to the shipwreck off Camarina in 255 BC; the second time, after the wreckage off cape Palinuro in 253 BC; the third time after the defeat off Drepana in 249 BC. No doubt, even the second wreckage off Camarina in 249 BC had played a great role. A great effort to furnish the new warships was made by the private citizens of Rome; then the consul Caius Lutatius Catulus left at the beginning of the summer 242 BC for Sicily and, given that his arrival was unexpected, he could suddenly occupy the harbour of Drepana and the anchorages close to Lilybaeum, while the 91 See generally Dexter Hoyos 2003, 13, note 10. The truthfulness of the event has not been distrusted by Lazenby 1996, 148, who nevertheless explained it as an incursion that aimed to put some pressure on Hiero of Syracuse. According to Manni 1981, 197, Longon would have been the name of an unknown river in the neighbourhood of Catane: regrettably, this is an ex silentio argument. The name of the fortress has been interpreted as an allusion to the presence of Italic people in Sicily even by Mazza 1981, 31.

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Punic fleet as a whole withdrew to Carthage. The consul then made his preparations for the siege of Drepana; he focused his attention on this operation, but he took care even of training his warships, because he had no doubts that the Punic navy had to come back to Sicily with reinforcements. He was right: the Carthaginians furnished the new warships during the winter of 242 BC, loading them with grain and supplies to be conveyed to the Punic troops at Eryx. The new commander of the fleet, Hanno, arrived at the beginning of 241 BC near the Aegates islands (the modern Egadi) and landed at the Sacred island, which is the ancient name of current Marettimo; he made every attempt to reach the mount Eryx without being spotted by the enemy, just to unload the provisions, to make the ships less burdensome and then board new forces. But the consul Catulus understood his plans and set sail to the island of Aigussa (modern Favignana), which is just in front of Lilybaeum, and there he waited the right moment to engage in battle. These were the preliminaries of the ultimate fight at the Aegates islands, which took place on March 10th, 241 BC and marked the most significant victory of the Romans: the few Punic ships that could escape withdrew again to the Sacred island. The consequences of the naval fight were decisive: the Carthaginians understood they could not supply their Sicilian troops anymore, because the Romans finally got the supremacy not only by land, but even at sea. Therefore they entrusted full powers to Hamilcar, who skilfully began to send envoys to the consul, asking to negotiate for peace. Lutatius Catulus keenly accepted the Punic proposals, and put an end to the war, signing the following agreements: “Let it be friendship relations (filiva) between Carthage and Rome on these grounds, if the Roman people assent; the Carthaginians have to go away from Sicily, they do not have to wage war against Hiero, and they do not have to take up arms either against the Syracusans or their allies. The Carthaginians have to give back to the Romans all the prisoners of war, without any ransom; they furthermore have to pay, in 20 years, a war indemnity of 2200 Euboic silver talents”. Those agreements at first were not completely accepted by Roman people, who decided to send to Sicily a group of ten representatives, asking them to weigh up the situation. As soon as they arrived in the island, they did not change anything in general with reference to the previous agreements, although they chose to impose the Carthaginians a little bit harsher conditions; indeed, they decided that the war indemnity had to be paid just in 10 years; they added up to the total other 1000 silver talents, and they detailed that the Carthaginians had to run away even from all the islands that laid in close proximity to Sicily and Italy (which means the Aeolian islands and the Aegates islands)92. When the above-mentioned agreements were officially signed, Hamilcar led the Punic troops of Eryx – nothing is said by the historical sources about the troops of Drepana – back to Lilybaeum, and then gave up his office. The new Punic general that had to manage the last things in the city was Gescon, and he just took care 92 See Walbank 1957, I, 126–127; Schmitt 1969, III, 173–181; Huss 1985, 249–251; Scardigli 1991, 205–243; Dexter Hoyos 1998, 118–123 and 130–131; Dexter Hoyos 2003, 18–19.

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to move the Punic forces to their homeland. The war for Sicily was really over, and actually the Greek city-states were by that time sure about their fate. 3.9. Romanisation or acculturation? Roman ways of approach towards the Sicilian city-states The conquest of Sicily marked a decisive turning point in the history of Rome, not only because it produced the complete removal of the Punic danger from the island, but even because the Romans were compelled to face some institutional regulations and changes as they needed to manage new territories – no matter how much they were involved in the administration – and to cope with many political and cultural identities that were for the most completely original. No doubt, this requisite followed especially after the contacts established by Rome with the western regions of Sicily, including the Elymian cities, as well as the Greek communities and at last many Punic centres of the ejparciva, that is what Livy labelled as the «vetus provincia» (24, 44, 4; it is in opposition with the territories of the «Sicilia finibus eis quibus regnum Hieronis fuisset»); the Romans ought to arrange a new political orderliness, bearing in mind that they had to handle with people and territories that were something different from the «terra Italia», and such a situation for sure involved some tactical as well as governmental problems. In the period which suddenly followed 264 BC, when the Romans were for the first time drawn in the Sicilian affairs, and for all the duration of the first Punic war, it can be easily understood that Rome continued to operate using all the political rules that signed her behaviour until that time, with a particular reference to the period of her conquest of southern Italy93. As we have already seen, one of the key methods used by the Romans in their foreign political affairs was the option of the fides as a propaganda-concept: they exploited it both with the Greek communities of southern Italy – the best example is provided by Locri, that minted even a coin reproducing on the reverse the device of Rome and Pistis, in all probability during the Pyrrhic age – and with some Greek city-states of Sicily. The main trouble, nonetheless, was that the Romans and the Greeks did not agree many times on the political effects of the fides, which was seen even by Hiero II in 264 BC as a simple means of conquest. That seems to be the reason why the Romans employed even other ideological channels to give good reasons of their own intervention in Sicily; a basic role was played by the common ethnical links with some cities, supported by the theme of the ­suggevneia (as I pointed out, it was used with Centuripe, Halaesa and – in western Sicily – with Segesta and other Elymian communities)94. 93 The best survey about the means used by the Romans in their approach and conquest of southern Italy, especially with reference to the Greek communities, is offered by Lomas 1993. 94 As regards the problem of the fides as a political concept, used by means of propaganda, it is enough to quote here the basic work of Calderone 1964, together with Heinze 1929, 140– 166; Gruen 1982, 50–68; Freyburger 1986; Hölkeskamp 2000, 223–250; Pinzone 2000, 862–863. For the coinage issued at Locri, bearing the device with Rome and the Pistis, see usefully Caccamo Caltabiano 1978, 99–116; Marchetti 1995, 345–354.

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Some features of the old bureaucratic system can be singled out for the case of Sicily thanks to the historical news offered by Cicero in the Verrines. The first aspect is about the treaties («foedera») that Rome signed with some cities, that were labelled then as «civitates foederatae»; in the age of Cicero, three Sicilian cities owed that political status, i.e. Messina, Tauromenium and Netum (the latter being even subject to the payment of the tithe)95. No doubt, the three pacts that survived in the I century BC were all dating back to the events of the III century BC; Messina became de facto partnered with Rome after the deditio of 264 BC, even if the official treaty was in all probability signed at the end of the first Punic war; Tauromenium and Netum had to wait the end of the second Punic war, but their foedera were no doubt the consequence of what had happened during the first Punic war, with particular reference to the formal alliance that had been signed between Hiero II and the Romans in 241 BC, given that the two Greek city-states retained a privileged position inside the Syracusan kingdom96. Both Livy and Cicero actually refer even to the «civitates decumanae» (those paying the tithe) as «sociae», while the Greek historical sources labelled them as suvmmacoi. At first sight, this could be a problem97, given that this title should have been awarded only to the «foederatae»; however, it has been correctly suggested98 that the Romans had a different standpoint about the political alliance, and that they thought about the «societas» not exactly in the same way as the Greeks considered a summaciva; with a particular reference to Sicily, the Greeks had a more flexible perception of the alliance, and this can be ascribed to the age-old relationships they had with the Carthaginians; an alliance did not include necessarily the official signature over a treaty, to compel the partners to offer their support when required. That’s the way the Romans acted, and perhaps this is the reason why there were no «civitates foderatae» in western Sicily: even at present, the scholars can fittingly refer to many Sicilian cities as «socii sine foedere» (which is exactly what Badian and Eckstein called “free amici”). The Sicilian city-states that came «in fidem et amicitiam populi Romani», like the 67 that followed the deditio of Halaesa in 263 BC, could be considered factually allies by the Romans, and that situation could be very useful, provided that the Romans were in action far away from their own centre of power, where the magistrates had the task to endorse officially the international agreements. The state of affairs of the city-states of western Sicily who gave themselves «in fidem populi Romani», and were included by Cicero in the group of the «sociae et decumanae», was in all probability very similar to the condition of Messina during the first Punic war, when the Mamertines had been plainly allies of the Romans, even if the institutional process of the «deditio» made in 264 BC was completed and formally endorsed with the pact signed in 241 BC. Perhaps, this was the fate for all the citystates of western Sicily as well; they officially had the status of «dediticiae» for 95 See Cic. Verr. II, 3, 13 (Messina and Tauromenium); Verr. II, 5, 133 (Netum). Helpful comments in Pinzone 1978, 353–379; Genovese 1993, 171–243. 96 This conjecture has been forwarded by Calderone 1964–1965, 87–93. 97 This problem has been focused carefully by Sartori 1974, 240 ff. 98 Kienast 1968, 330–368; Dahlheim 1997, 24, note 23; Kienast 1984, I, 105–123; Pinzone 1995, 489, note 51; Pinzone 2000, 856.

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sure until the end of the first Punic war, but quite probably until the arrival of the Roman praetor in Sicily in 227 BC. Therefore, one may think about a «societas» without a «foedus», which is definitely a way to make use of power slightly, respecting the local identities and the old-aged political traditions of the Sicilian communities, no matter if Greek or native; the allies, indeed, were autonomous and free, but they were of course compelled to provide the Romans with the support and the supplies they asked for, that is especially military aid and provisions, with a particular reference to the grain which was basic for the Roman troops fighting everlastingly in the island; as I have pointed out, this topic has been stressed enough even by the historical sources about the first Punic war, like Polybius and Diodorus. Those allies were consequently “free amici”, and their political position can be quite compared with that of another group of cities mentioned by Cicero, that is the «civitates sine foedere immunes ac liberae» (Verr. II, 3, 13), including Centuripe, Halaesa, Segesta, Haliciae and ­Panormus99. The only difference, in my opinion, refers not to the «libertas», given that all those communities were self-governing, but only to the «immunitas», because the 5 above mentioned cities were free from the compulsion to provide the Romans with the supplies. Of course, not all the local communities were favourable to the arrival of the Romans, and did not welcome them at all; nay, resistance and fight were many times the answers, especially when the cities were controlled by occupying forces made up with Punic garrisons. The outcome was as a rule the conquest kata; kravto~ of those cities, but even Cicero (Verr. II, 3, 13) remembered that «perpaucae Siciliae civitates sunt bello a maioribus nostris subactae»; their cwvrai became then «ager publicus populi Romani», even if the scarceness of evidence does not allow to understand how much it was in western Sicily100. But the conquest by force of the «perpaucae» cities was the source of another important happening, which is worth to be alluded to, since it produced a great consequence in the evolution of the economic system of Hellenistic and Roman Sicily. Often, the rebellious and the seditious cities went through several fates, including the occupation of the sites by the Roman troops, the butchery of a part of the population, the destruction of the buildings; many times, the fate for those citizens who openly showed to be hostile to the Romans was the exile, but a normal outcome was the enslavement of a lot of people; as we have seen, 25.000 people were enslaved at Agrigentum in 262 BC (Diodorus 23, 9, 1); the people of Mitistratum and Camarina were yoked in 258 BC (Polybius 1, 24, 11–12; Diodorus 23, 9, 4–5); finally, 13.000 citizens of Panormus could not pay the war-indemnity of two minae to save their freedom, and were en99 For a general survey about the «civitates immunes ac liberae», focusing even on the main questions concerning their political status, see Pinzone 1979, 165–194; Pinzone 2000, 852–853. 100 For the questions arising from the topic of «ager publicus» in western Sicily, see especially Pinzone 2000, 851–853. The problem of the «perpaucae civitates bello subactae» has been widely dealt with by the scholars; see Calderone 1960, 3–25; Calderone 1964–1965, 63– 98; Manganaro 1972, 442–461; Sartori 1974, 225–248; Pritchard 1975, 33–47; Pinzone 1978, 353–379; Pinzone 1979, 165–194; Manganaro 1980, 415–453; Mazza 1986, 13–20; Caliri 1989, 3–23; Genovese 1993, 188–243; Pinzone 2000, 852–853.

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chained in 254 BC (Diodorus 23, 18, 5). The effect was of course a dynamic pro­ cess of forced migration, that produced the movement of great masses of population inside the island; the greatest part of the slaves who worked in Sicily during the second half of III century BC were in all probability local people, coming from those Sicilian cities that had been conquered by force by the Romans during the military operations of the first Punic war101. This kind of forced population transplant goes along another kind of dynamic phenomenon which was really meaningful for Roman Sicily, that is the new foundation (sunoikismov~) of some settlements: the best examples are offered by the case of Entella – which will be dealt with in detail in the next paragraph – and the new establishment of Agrigentum; the main difference between the two happenings is that the sunoikismov~ of Entella was an autonomous happening, quite unprompted, and it involved some other native populations just in the perspective of some material aid, while the new foundation of Agrigentum was all but spontaneous, since it was worked out by the Roman prae­ tor Manlius in all probability at the beginning of II century BC, following an official instruction coming from a senatus consultum, and it involved several people coming from different countries102. It may be said that the Romans played a somewhat indirect role in the new foundations, that were accomplished to be precise by the native populations, even if they nearly always superintended them (this is true for both the cases of Entella and Agrigentum); the first Roman foundations (coloniae) in Sicily can be dated to the age of Octavianus Augustus103. The Romans intentionally avoided at an early stage of their conquest of Sicily any process either of colonization or of urbanization; this decision showed once more that they wanted to co-operate with the natives to strengthen their own presence in the island, and that they perhaps did not want to have an immediate effect on the existing social and economic conditions. Nevertheless, a Romano-Italic migration movement towards Sicily began at a very early stage, and it had to do with some definite classes of Roman society (equites, unscrupolous businessmen, traders, land businessmen and all those who could gain 101 On the question of the enslavement, see Westermann 1955, 60–62; Volkmann 1961, 55–56; Toynbee 1965, II, 198–199; Anastasi 1999, 406–407; Pinzone 1999A, 398. 102 The sunoikismov~ of Agrigentum has been attributed by Cicero (Verr. II, 2, 123) to a «Manlius praetor», who has been identified by the greatest part of the scholars with Lucius Manlius Vulso, who was praetor in 197 BC (see Münzer 1928, col. 1223; Broughton 1951, I, 293 and 333–334, note 2; Gabba 1959, 310; Manganaro 1964, 425; Goldsberry 1973, 240 ff.; Manganaro 1980, II 2, 422–423 and 426, note 44). A different opinion has been expressed by Rizzo 1968–1969, 375 ff., who matched that praetor with the Lucius Manlius, who was appointed in 207 BC with the task of bringing back to Sicily all the exiles who searched for a safe haven in mainland Greece. For all the matters about the institutional questions of the new settlement of Agrigentum, see Gabba 1959, 354–355; Rizzo 1968–1969, 375 ff.; Asheri 1969, 268; Manganaro 1980, II 2, 422–424; Rizzo 1996, 75–82; Anastasi 1999, 405–406. 103 It has been recently suggested (see Caccamo Caltabiano 1988, 353–379; Buttrey – Erim – Groves – Holloway 1989, 141–142; Caccamo Caltabiano 2000, 202–203) to date the foundation of the «municipium Hennae» in the age of the second Punic war. Many doubts about this conjecture have been forwarded by Pinzone 1995, 483 ff.; Bitto 1999, 98; Pinzone 2000, 850 who preferred the traditional chronology, set more or less to 44–43 BC (see Grant 1946, 191; Manganaro 1972, I 1, 457–458; Manganaro 1988B, 12).

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some advantages from the «pascere»), even if it seems that such dynamic movement involved particularly people coming from southern Italy and many Campanians, who could count on age-long relationships with the Campanian communities settled in a number of Sicilian city-states. The evolution of this wandering process became clear soon after the creation of the Roman provincia; the exploitation of the huge money-making chances offered not only by the vast rural lands of Sicily, but even of the African ones, could not leave out of consideration the presence in Sicily of a number of «negotiatores» already from the end of the first Punic war; to support this conjecture, one must remind a famous passage of Appian (Sik. 2, 6) referring to the institution of the «portorium», which has been considered by some scholars104 as an inheritance stemming from the taxation system used by the Carthaginians. Appian refers to the qalavssia that the Romans imposed to the Sicilian city-states before sending to the island an annual magistrate; of course, those taxes may be considered to be a reference to the compulsion of the allies to give naval equipments to the Romans (what is attested by Cicero for the Mamertines and several city-states), but one cannot exclude that the reference is to some customs duties, that had been collected earlier in Sicily both by the Carthaginians and by the Syracusans105. The same Caius Lutatius Catulus was thought to be a representative of the commercial social class, and he probably favoured his mates during the peace negotiations with the Carthaginians in 241 BC, when he was assisted by the «decem legati» sent to Sicily by the senate of Rome; then the control over central and western Sicily was up to the Roman «quaestor», who stayed in Lilybaeum106. The office outlasted even the events of the second Punic war when the Romans, after the conquest of Syracuse’s kingdom, decided to place there the governor of the Sicilian «provincia» and even another «quaestor»; the preservation of Lilybaeum’s office may be easily explained, since the firm possession of the city was basic to control the whole lands of western Sicily, together with the sea-routes leading to north-Africa and the western Mediterranean basin. That’s why I suppose that the «quaestor» of Lilybaeum did not have only military and administrative tasks; he had indeed to protect and control all the commercial activities that converged in western Sicily, together with the traders who came both from the eastern Mediterranean (especially from Rhodes) and particularly from southern Italy107. Furthermore, it has been sug104 The most important reference is to De Laet 1949, 65, but see even Hans 1983, 143–149. 105 On the passage of Appian, see the comments of De Laet 1949, 65–66; Ferrary 1988, 19; Crawford 1990, I 2, 92; Pinzone 1995, 478, note 10; Pinzone 1999, 390–391. 106 For Lutatius as a leader of the commercial class, see the suggestion of Schur 1927, 16–17, that has been accepted even recently by Pinzone 1999, 391. On the «quaestor» of Lilybaeum, see Pinzone 1979, 9, note 32; Crawford 1990, I 2, 93; Loreto 1993, 494–502; Pinzone 2000, 860–861. Some scholars have expressed some doubts as regards the chronology of 241 BC as the starting point for the quaestorship in Lilybaeum; see Harris 1976, 92–106; Dahlheim 1977, 34–35; Eckstein 1987, 112; Ferrary 1988, 19, note 48. 107 One cannot have reservations about the economic importance of western Sicily for the Romans even before the first Punic war; this has been widely proved by the basic investigations on the diffusion of the black-glazed pottery (see Morel 1980A, 1574–1582) and on the grain trade (see Gallo 1992B, 384 ff.). No doubt, the commercial relevance of western Sicily furthered

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gested correctly that the decision to send to Sicily a «praetor» in 227 BC, that is to say a magistrate who had as a chief privilege the «ius dicere», can be linked with the necessity to work out several legal quandaries – criminal as well as commercial ones – that drew in the native people and the foreigners, including the Roman citizens and the Italic businessmen108. Therefore, the general background that can be traced thanks to the evidence which has just been examined (including some details offered by Cicero that can be referred to the historical situation of the III century BC) allows to stress the concept of a “moderate” process of Romanisation, which involved several kind of channels: the persistance of local institutions and identities; a slow but relentless migration of individuals from southern Italy to Sicily; the establishment of some relationships with the Campanians settled and mixed with the local populations; the use of political propaganda to get in touch or even to strengthen existing associations with some Sicilian city-states; the skilful application, at an early stage, of the pretty Augustan adage «parcere subiectis, debellare superbos». All those features may be profitably highlighted taking into consideration, by and large, the progress of Roman advance into the territories of western Sicily, but with particular reference to the Elymian zone; the evidence – for the most part epigraphic – produced by Entella and Segesta is worth to be examined in detail. 3.10. Some signs of “realpolitik”. Rome and the city-states of Sicily between local identity and new political perspectives. The case-study of the Elymian cities The history of the relationships between Rome and Sicily during the III century BC, with a particular reference to the period of the first Punic war, can be considered under a twofold point of view. First of all, as I have just pointed out, a clear-cut chronological succession of the military events can be singled out (paying a tribute to the deficiency of information of some important historical sources); second, a slow but relentless process of political infiltration has to be emphasized. This pracon after the conquest of the island in 241 BC; many amphorae-stamps, that have been found in the neighbourhoods of Eryx, provided evidence of the commercial activities and the wine-trade of a number of businessmen coming from southern Italy: see Empereur – Esnard 1987, II, 29; Brugnone 1986, 101–113; Tchernia 1986, 49 ff.; Van Der Mersch 1994, 163 and 168–169. As well, the presence of Rhodian traders in Western Sicily (Entella, Eryx, Segesta) is attested from the Rhodian amphorae; see Manganaro 1994, 263; Garozzo 1997, 807–844; Garozzo 1999A, 173–175; Garozzo 1999B, 281–383. 108 The chronology of 227 BC is the traditional one (favoured among others by De Sanctis 19672, III 1, 196, note 114; Broughton 1951, I, 229; Dahlheim 1977, 52, note 110). At present, some scholars suggested that already from 241 BC the Romans sent to Sicily a magistrate (or even a private citizen) with the «imperium» to administrate the island: see Kienast 1984, I, 105 ff.; Crawford 1990, I 2, 92–93; Lintott 1993, 22 ff.; Vishnia 1996, 19 ff.; Pinzone 2000, 860–861. There is no support to the hypothesis forwarded by Richardson 1986, 7 ff., in whose opinion the Romans quite for a decade after the first Punic war left the control over the «vetus provincia» to Hiero II of Syracuse.

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tice for sure started at the beginnings of the war, and the first results were achieved by the Romans in eastern Sicily, when they took under control the city of Messina and then fought against king Hiero of Syracuse and his allies; but then it was employed even in the western regions of the island, thanks to the same political and diplomatic instruments that the Romans had used in their relationships with many Greek communities of eastern Sicily in the first years of the war. Those methods allowed the Romans to integrate themselves into the political and social system of Greek and indigenous Sicily, without rejecting its peculiarities; nay, they accepted the local traditions and encouraged the stability of the local institutions, of course when these latter did not conflict with both the strategy of war and the political interests of Rome. This policy, which featured really a moderate interference towards the Greek city-states and the native communities, was then pursued again by the Romans in the period between the two Punic wars, when they had to consolidate their rule in Sicily; no doubt, their intention was to restore an economic prosperity in those territories – particularly of western Sicily – whose social systems and commercial activities had been seriously damaged by the devastations of the war against the Carthaginians. It seems to be likely that, as soon as they took under their control the territories of the Elymian/Punic area in the North-West of Sicily (whose strategic value cannot be doubted), the Romans wanted to face quite immediately the question of a fast renewal both of the commercial activities and the political life among the local communities. Of course they wanted to play a somehow moderate role, while they entered in a very particular social context: indeed, the Elymian area had been strongly influenced by the contacts with the Greeks, but the people settled there had an anhellenic origin and it had been for a long time under the cultural sphere of influence of the Punic ejpikravteia: thus, it could have been easier for a foreign power to manipulate it, and this was proved clearly already at the time of Pyrrhus’ Sicilian expedition. The weighty interests of the Romans for the western territories of Sicily and especially for the Elymian area had as final consequence the selection of Lilybaeum as the headquarters for one of the 2 quaestores classici who were sent to Sicily in 241 BC; anyway, some other significant suggestions about the moderate Roman rule over the natives and the endurance (encouraged by the new conquerors) of the distinctive political features of both the Greek and native communities come from a general survey of Rome’s relationships with the Elymian cities laying close to the valley of river Belice, particularly Segesta and Entella, and even with Eryx. Luckily, the whole corpus of the well-known inscriptions recovered at Entella provides a lot of data; it may be worth summarizing the content of the decrees, without a detailed analysis of the texts, but stressing some other meaningful items, such as the enduring and developing official links among the Sicilian cities; the evolution of the political institutions in those communities; the really judicious management of the Romans towards the natives109. The iscriptions of Entella offer 109 The basic works to be consulted are the papers included in two volumes: Materiali e contributi per lo studio degli otto decreti di Entella, «ASNP» 12, 1982, 771–1103, and the proceedings

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evidence for two stages of the city’s political life; the first one regards a war against the Carthaginians, when the citizens of Entella were actively supported in their military efforts by those of Herbita and Gela (decrees 1 and 2), and the event has been dated recently at the end of the IV century BC. Then, there was a time when Entella was abandoned and the citizens were in part banished; they were at first welcomed and hosted by the Greek city-state of Henna (decr. 7 to 9), and afterwards they returned to their homeland thanks to the active support of the Elymian city of Segesta (decr. 9). They made a new settlement of their city (sunoikismov~) and they were helped in this by an ejpimelhthv~ named Tiberius Claudius Antias (decr. 4); he was honoured and granted with the proxeniva, which was extended to all his successors, and the same privilege was awarded even to some other individuals mentioned in the decree n. 5, because they had helped the city of Entella with contributions of grain. The decrees quote the names of 9 communities that had some kind of official relationships with Entella, either before or after the new settlement of the city: the Greek city-state of Gela; the Elymian city-state of Segesta; some native centres whose people had been more or less influenced by the Greek culture, that were Herbita, Assorus, Petra, Kytattara, Schera, Makella and Henna. What emerges from this short listing is that the political relationships of Entella were not based on the common ethnicity with the other members; this indeed had been in all probability the chief feature of Entella’s foreign policy during the IV century BC, when the Campanians settled there seem to have favoured the other Campanian communities established in Sicily, particularly in the eastern part of the island – at least with some limits, posed by the situation of great influence exerted by the Carthaginians on the Elymian zone110. The sort of relationship with those cities seem to be different if considered before and after the new settlement of the city; before the sunoikismov~, Entella had an ijsopoliteiva with the city of Assorus; a filiva and some sworn pacts with both Herbita and Gela; finally, a real summaciva with Gela. The city of Entella was enough politically isolated before the new settlement, while the situation following the sunoikismov~ is marked with a significant broadening of the political links with other communities, without forgetting the old partners: on the one side, the citizens of Entella quickly restored the military alliance with Herbita and Gela, and the ijsopoliteiva with Assorus; on the other side, they changed the general relations of eu[noia with the four Koinav, Segesta and Henna, turning them in real ijsopoliteiva. Following this decisions, the community of Entella awarded the partners with some official privileges; the suvnqesi~ was granted only to the allies (Herbita and Gela); Gli Elimi e l’area elima fino all’inizio della prima guerra punica (Palermo – Contessa Entellina 1989), Palermo 1990; very useful surveys are offered by Giustolisi 1985; Dexter Hoyos 1988, 30–43; Dubois 1989, 253–271; Moggi 1992, 483–500; Mattioli 1995, 5–21. 110 The methodical policy of annihilation performed by Timoleon against the Campanian communities of eastern Sicily has been rightly suggested as the key factor that deprived Entella of the political relations with its expected partners; on this see rightly Moggi 1992, 497, note 9. On the Campanian communities in eastern Sicily, with particular reference to their coinages, see usefully Cutroni Tusa 1970, 250–267; Garraffo 1978, 23–43; Castrizio 2000.

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the klh`si~ to Herbita, Gela, Assorus and the Koinav; the proedriva to the four Koinav; the eu[noia, together with the filiva, was bestowed to all the partners (and for the first time even to Assorus). In my opinion, there are two general remarks that can be made after a glance; first, the enlargement of the official interstate relationships of Entella was no doubt a consequence of the links established when the city was not inhabited and when it was newly founded; second, the political and ideological background of those political bonds is for sure unfavourable to the Carthaginians, and this must lead to suppose that the depopulation of the city has to be attributed to the Punic forces, while on the contrary the new settlement was due to (or influenced by) the emergence of a new political power which was clearly adverse to the Punic hegemony111. The promptness of the interventions and the great number of the communities that were involved seem to suggest that the political background of the area was persistently developing, and it may be conjectured that some significant political – as well as military – changes concerned those cities that had some relationships with Entella. As far as regards the chronology of the events, it has been stated by some scholars that they have not to be seen as a continuous; particularly, the war against the Carthaginians was not necessarily the cause of the depopulation of Entella, and it cannot be identified with the war of 345 BC, because at that time the city of Gela had not yet been re-founded by Timoleon. However, what’s more is the mention of a Mamertine in the decree nr. 5 and the role played by the Roman Tiberius Claudius Antias; these drive quite unavoidably to date the whole body of inscriptions at least to the age of the first Punic war112. However, this chronological suggestion is supported by a general survey of the political position played in those years by the other communities mentioned in the decrees113. Gela at that time did not exist anymore, given that it had been destroyed some years before by the tyrant of Agrigentum, Phintias, who had moved the surviving people to the new foundation of Phintias; it must be underlined that the citizens soon after began to call themselves Geloans once again, and that their absence from the inscriptions of Entella – notwithstanding the existence of an alliance between Gela and Entella – may be due to the difficulties of a newly established community caught between the two challenging powers of Rome and Carthage in Sicily. As regards Herbita and Assorus, regrettably there is no evidence to show what was their real behaviour towards Entella; however, the political bonds with Entella were quickly restored after the sunoikismov~, and this seems to imply that both the communities decided not to get involved actively in the Punic war. Henna was conquered by Hamilcar in 259 BC, and quite immediately was recovered by the Romans; this seems to suggest that already in the first stages of the war the city decided to side with Rome, and that it kept enduringly that political position. As we know from the decrees, Henna welcomed the refugees of Entella, and the people 111 This position has been correctly upheld by Lombardo 1982, 870–871; Moggi 1992, 486. 112 See Orlandini 1956, 158–176; Lombardo 1982, 867 ff. and 874–877; Corsaro 1982, 993– 1032; Moggi 1992, 490–491. 113 On the cities that are mentioned in the Entella tablets and their political behaviour, see the very useful survey of Gargini – Vaggioli 2001, 97–110.

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even offered them to move definitely either in their city or in the neighbouring cwvra; maybe, the place was so safe even because all the representatives of the people who had been supporting the forces of Carthage had been already banished from the city. Last but not least, the support of Henna no doubt occurred before the end of the second Punic war, because then Henna suffered the bad consequences of its devotion to Carthage114. Segesta played from the beginning of the war an antiCarthaginian role, given that it made deditio to Rome in 263 BC and encouraged many other cities and villages of the Elymian zone to do the same: no doubt, apart from the period when it suffered the siege of the Punic troops led by Hamilcar (261/260 BC), the city could unsurprisingly support the refugees of Entella and encourage them to go back to their hometown. No evidence is provided for Schera: on the contrary, Makella was conquered by the Romans in 260 BC – it was the same war-campaign that led to the decisive conquest of Segesta –; Kytattara and Petra threw out their Punic garrisons and sided without delay with Rome in 254 BC, after the Roman conquest of Panormus115. Therefore, from 254 BC, all the four Koinav were sided with Rome and could easily play the role described in the inscriptions at the moment of the new settlement of Entella, while in the previous years they were probably under the authority of the Punic ejpikravteia, and they could not have given any hospitality to the refugees of Entella (particularly if they had been banished from their city by the Carthaginians in the first years of the conflict, as I suppose). Indeed, the people of Entella could even take a great benefit from the help of other cities of the Elymian zone that are not mentioned in the inscriptions; a typical case is that of Iaitas, whose people decided to throw out from the citadel the Punic garrison exactly in 254 BC. Further evidence may be quoted as regards Iaitas: an inscription which is engraved on a projectile used by a slinger – and may be dated between the IV and the III century BC – bears the name of one Damatrios Attos (who may have been an Italic soldier) and even the outline of the riding horse, which was customary on the coin issues minted in the IV century BC by the Campanian mercenaries of Entella and Nakone116. Further inscriptions on tiles and pottery provide evidence of close links between Entella and Iaitas during the III century BC and afterwards: some tiles bears Latin inscriptions that allow to date them around 130 BC, and some scholars rightly suggested that some Roman representatives could have played a role in the renewal of the city117. 114 Furthermore, the name of Henna is missing from the list of Sicilian communities quoted in the famous inscriptions of the theoroi of Delphi (on which see Manganaro 1964, 414–439, especially 420 ff.; Manganaro 1977, 1339–1341 and 1347–1348; Manganaro 1996D, 129–144), and this may suggest that the city was not completely autonomous until the beginning of the II century BC: see Corsaro 1982, 1030–1031; Mattioli 1995, 18. 115 As regards Petra and the possible location on the ground, see Gargini 1997, 799–806. 116 For Damatrios Attos see Manni Piraino 1971, 170–183; Rawson 1973, 220; Rawson 1977, 351, note 77 (doubtful about the connection between Attos and Appius); Gallo 1982, 922, note 29. On the glandes, see particularly Manganaro 1977, 1329–1345; Manganaro 1982, 237–243; Isler 1999, 393–405. 117 For an epigraphic survey, see usefully Nenci 1991, 31–40. On the tiles with Latin inscriptions, see Wilson 1990, 27, 102 and 355, note 84; Isler 1990B, 55–56.

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Hence, the historical events evoked by the inscriptions of Entella cover a wide period of time, going more or less from the end of the IV century to the second half of the III century BC. For sure, those circumstances truly had an effect on the institutions of the city; very useful information come from the analysis of the eponymous magistrates mentioned in the decrees. The eponymous chronology based on the mention of the iJeromnavmwn characterizes some of the inscriptions found at Entella, and this feature is exactly consis­ tent with the Greek institutional facet of the city, exemplified even by the boulhv and the aJliva. Furthermore, the occurrence of the eponymous magistrates coming from local religious offices is particularly attested in the Greek world from the Hellenistic age, and some examples just refer to Sicily: the ajmfivpoloi of Syracuse and Akrai; the iJerapovloi of Phintias and Morgantina; the iJeromnavmwn of San Marco d’Alunzio; the iJeroquvtai attested in several cities that were for decades included in the Punic ejpikravteia, such as Agrigentum, Segesta, Solous and the isle of Malta. All the evidence at our disposal can be referred to the Roman age (from the end of III century BC onwards), but it is very likely that in some cases the mention of the eponymous magistrates can be dated back to the institutional reorganization of many Greek and native communities of Sicily performed by Timoleon118. As regards Entella, it seems that the eponymous iJeromnavmwn was not the leading officer on the political scene, but that the magistrate had especially an honorary and representative role; in this, the case of Entella is not different from that of many other cities of Sicily, where the eponymous priests were supported by more important officers (like the proavgoro~ at Agrigentum, the a[rconte~ at Malta, the prostavth~ th`~ boulh`~ at Phintias). At Entella no doubt the most influential magistrates were the two a[rconte~, who were eponymous officers too! This office is really peculiar on the political background of Sicily: there is evidence for the Greek world and even for Southern Italy (i.e. at Locri in the Hellenistic age), but usually the group of a[rconte~ was made up by three persons119. Therefore, it is likely that the couple of magistrates of Entella has a different political tradition from the Greek one: but what was it? Provided that any comparative case must have some links with the historical experience of Entella, a first situation may be offered by a Punic inscription of Eryx, dated to the III century BC, 118 For a general survey, see Ghinatti 1964–1965, 331–356; Cordano 1999, 149–158. For the single cases, see Diod. 16, 70, 6; Pugliese Carratelli 1951, 68–75 (Syracuse); IG XIV, 256–258 (Phintias); Manganaro 1989C, 189–216, part. 203 ff. (Morgantina); Manganaro 1965C, 202 (San Marco d’Alunzio); IG XIV, 952 (Agrigentum); IG XIV, 290 (Segesta); Tusa 1963, 185–195; Sherk 1993, 267–271; Di Veroli 1996, 309–310 (Solous); IG XIV, 953 (isle of Malta); Manganaro 1961, 127 (Hadranum). 119 A couple of eponymous archontes has been identified by Manganaro 1961, 126–135 on a Greek inscription coming from the Sicilian city of Hadranum: his suggestion has been appropriately rejected by Gallo 1997, 776–777, since the Greek text does not have any mention of the title of the magistrates. Furthermore, the chronology of the inscription is uncertain, but in all probability it has to be referred to a later stage of the Roman political organization of Sicily. According to Manganaro 1963B, 1–4, the couple of magistrates is mentioned even on an inscription from Centuripe (IG XIV, 574); but, against his view, see helpfully the right conjecture of Dubois 1989, 21.

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which provides evidence of the existence in the city of the two Punic eponymous magistrates (the “sufeti”), then attested as a[rconte~ in some other Carthaginian centres during the Roman age120. However, it seems unlikely to conjecture that the office of Entella was influenced by the Carthaginian example; even if the two cities shared the common Elymian ethnicity of their settlers and were both included in the Punic territories of the ejpikravteia, their political behaviour towards Carthage had been really different. It may be worth to recall that in the two most seriously critical happenings for the Punic dominions of Sicily – that were the military expedition of Pyrrhus and the first Punic war – Eryx had been the only city-state of the Elymian zone which decided ever to side with the Carthaginian forces, and this fact is a clear sign of the deep-rooted Punic political and cultural influence over that community: on the contrary, there is no evidence about a marked political control of the Carthaginians over the other Elymian cities, due to weighty control of the native institutions121. With a particular reference to Entella, it must be highlighted that already during the IV century BC the Campanians settled in that city showed they wanted to pursue self-governing policy against the leading power; and there is really much evidence to corroborate this opinion122. Thus, it is very unlikely that the Punic office of the two sufeti attested in Eryx influenced the establishment at Entella of the two a[rconte~. Quite the reverse, a useful resemblance with Entella’s case is provided by one of the inscriptions coming from the city, exactly the decree referring to the city of Nakone, which was a settlement of the Elymian area that had been deeply influenced by the Greek culture and then had been occupied by the Campanians during the IV century (just like Entella itself). The inscription quotes the names of two eponymous individuals, without describing their title; one is a Greek (Philonidas Phil…), the other was an Oscan (Leukios Kaisiou)123. It has been suitably conjectured that they were the two eponymous a[rconte~ of the community, but some scholars hazardously suggested that the couple of officers appointed at Entella and Nakone may be a replication of the two Roman consuls. It seems to be more likely 120 The inscription is quoted by Amadasi 1967, 53–55; Bondì 1980, I, 183–184. Both the literary and the epigraphic sources provide evidence of the a[rconte~ in some Punic centres during the Roman age; see App. Lib. 8, 113; Plut. Cat. min. 67 (as regards Utica); IG XIV, 953 (isle of Malta). Both Brugnone 1990–1991, 174 and Ghinatti 1994, 67 have conjectured that the eponymous magistrates of Entella developed from the Punic office of the sufeti; their suggestion has been fully and appropriately rejected by Gallo 1997, 776–777. 121 I have previously dealt with this matter in the book: see passim chapter 2 (on the Sicilian expedition of Pyrrhus) and chapter 3 (historical events of the first Punic war). It may be useful to see Gallo 1992, 318 ff. and Gallo 1997, 771–790, who expressed similar conjectures. Another point of view is expressed by Bondì 1980, I, 183–184, and Bondì 1990–1991, 227, who suggested that even many other Elymian cities were deeply influenced by the Punic control, so much that they had been quite standardized to Carthage as regards the political institutions. 122 I.e. the coinage minted during the IV century down to the age of Agathocles, bearing the inscription (in Greek!!!) KAMPANWN (see usefully Garraffo 1978, 23–43; Garraffo 1990, 193–201; Zambon 2001A, 231–232); the willingly support given to Dionysius of Syracuse in 368 BC (Diod. 15, 73, 2); the anti-Carthaginian behaviour of 345 BC (Diod. 16, 67, 3); the small amount of pro-Punic citizens put to death by Timoleon in 342 BC (Diod. 16, 73, 2). 123 See usefully on the names included in the Entella’s decrees Lejeune 1982, 787–799.

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that the analogy between Entella’s and Nakone’s officies has to be found out in another common feature of the two cities, that is the presence of a strong and prominent group of Campanians; among the Oscan political institutions, the most known was the single supreme officer called meddix, but there was even much evidence about the couple of highest officers, the two meddices, not only in some southern Italian cities like Nola and Velletri but even in Sicily124. I have widely dealt with the case of the Mamertines in Messina in the first chapter, but it is worth to recall that the inscription Vetter 196 – a dedication to Apollo by the Mamertine community – mentions clearly the two meddices, and that it is in all probability a proof of the reorganization of the institutions based on the authority of the Oscan mercenaries soon after their conquest of Messina. The reform was made taking into account even the previous Greek customary bodies, and the aim was to mix the demands of the different ethnicities; this seem to have happened in Nakone, too, where one of the two eponymous individuals is no doubt Greek, while the other was an Italic; Entella further resembles the case of Messina, because the magistrates had all an Oscan origin (even if they bore sometimes Greek names), and this may suggest that the Campanian group played a leading role on the political stage even in the III century BC and goes along the typical tendency of all the Campanian mercenary groups who always tried to keep marked their own ethnicity and political features in the native communities where they established themselves125. As far as regards Entella, it clearly emerges that the presence of the Roman ejpimelhthv~ Tiberius Claudius Antias was just linked with the supervision of the new settlement but it did not involve a control over the renovation of the political offices of the town. It has been conjectured that the passage from the two eponymous a[rconte~ to the iJeromnavmwn dated back more or less to the arrival of the Romans in the Elymian zone of western Sicily; this seem to be true, in my opinion, and it would provide further evidence to state that the Romans tried to rule and organize their new possessions leaving the management to the native populations, as they previously did in the eastern territories of Sicily. For Entella, it may have been a question of reducing a bit the political weight of the Campanian group, changing the eponymous institutions of the city; the passage to an eponymous priesthood indeed made the situation at Entella to look really like many other Greek city-states of Sicily that had such an eponymous magistrate since the age of Timoleon. If an interference of the Roman controller occurred, it was slight enough; it was just a matter of driving the natives and the Greeks to administrate their cities on behalf of Rome and following her political instructions. For sure, it was not by chance that a member of the gens Claudia was appointed as supervisor of the new settlement of 124 On the plausible title of the individuals mentioned in the decree of Nakone, see Nenci 1982, 1078; Asheri 1989, 139; Gallo 1997, 777, who properly rejects the hypothesis of a resemblance of the office with the Roman consulate (expressed by Corsaro 1982, 1024–1025 and Costabile 1984, 61 ff.). 125 For Messina, see widely chapter 1. On the tendency of the Campanians, see Colonna 1980– 1981, 178; Zambon 2001A, 229–277. Both Knoepfler 1985–1986, 22 and Manni 1987, 8 suggested that the two a[rconte~ of Entella look like the Oscan magistrates. A helpful general survey of the evidence for the case of Entella is provided even by Fantasia 1997, 655–683.

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Entella: there is evidence for the presence of some Claudii in Sicily from the III to the I century BC; it can be significant to remember that a Caius Claudius Pulcher, who was appointed as pro-praetor in Sicily in 94 BC, reformed the constitution of Halaesa: the city had been founded by Herbita, whose citizens had a long-standing friendly relationship with Entella, and what’s more it had been the first community in north-eastern Sicily to use diplomacy to negotiate with the Romans in 263 BC! The established associations between the Claudii and the Campanian area may suggest that the Campanians played some role in the Roman invasion of Sicily, maybe through a contribution of the Campanian mercenaries who had conquered Messina; indeed, a Mamertine named Minatus Corvius is mentioned in one inscription of Entella, while a Mamercus Claudius Mamertinus was awarded with the Roman citizenship at Messana by the consul Appius Claudius Caudex just at the beginning of the first Punic war126. Accordingly, there is no reason to doubt that the Romans could count on the support of the Campanian groups – already deep-rooted in the native or Greek communities since the IV century BC – to walk over the western lands of Sicily in the first half of the III century BC. I suppose nonetheless that just in the Elymian area a key role was played by the “quite-Greek” people of Segesta, whose political behaviour gave in my opinion the greatest assistance not only to the citizens of Entella when they went back to their hometown, but even to the Romans when they needed to secure their presence in the Elymian zone. It may be worth to search an answer to two questions, that are when and how the Romans could arrive exactly at Entella. The southern coastline of Sicily was connected with the inside lands of the Elymian area thanks to the route following the river Belice; the whole territories around Entella, and particularly the fertile plains between the Belice and the Platani, were covered with Roman farmhouses, whose remains have been dated (especially by Wilson) between the III century BC and the Imperial age. The greatest amount of the farm’s remains lies in the zone of modern Sambuca, which is not so far away from Monte Adranone, whose community had in all probability some relationships with Entella; indeed, some modern scholars have identified the city at Monte Adranone with the ancient Nakone, mentioned in the inscriptions from Entella, but the question is still debated (given that other people suggest to match Monte Adranone with the ancient Hadranum). Conceivably, that zone was already under Roman control in 263/262 BC, together with the inside route that connected all the Punic fortresses; just following this way, as I have pointed out in the previous paragraph, they had to face a strong resistance both at Makella and Hadranum, and afterwards they reached Haliciae and Segesta, coming within reach of Entella as well127. However, it is likely that the Romans moving westwards with their armies used primarily another way, which may be indentified with the modern path connecting 126 The presence of Campanians in the Roman nobilitas and the close relationships between the Campanians and the gens Claudia have been highlighted by Cavallaro 1956, 40; Rawson 1973, 219–223; Rawson 1977, 340–344; Fraschetti 1981B, 63; Pinzone 1983, 93–95; Corsaro 1982, 1006–1007; Tagliamonte 1994, 195–196. 127 See Bejor 1975, 1275–1303; Canzanella 1992B, 151–172.

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Poggioreale to Corleone (through Entella); that route exactly crossed over the great road linking Panormus to Agrigentum, and just the Romans in all probability restored at the beginning of the first Punic war the path from Panormus to Prizzi, not far away from Entella. A well known Roman milestone signed by the consul Caius Aurelius Cotta, which has been found in the neighbourhoods of Corleone, must be dated in all probability around 250 BC, that is a period of trivial war manoeuvres in the area, which was used by the Roman legionaries to strengthen the recently conquered positions even by means of securing the main land routes128. Furthermore, a lot of coin hoards have been unearthed along the route connecting Panormus with Agrigentum, and the coins show that the area was haunted regularly by the Romans exactly from the age of the first Punic war; a very famous hoard has been recovered at Bisacquino (nearby Contessa Entellina), since it contained some coins marked with the signs of Roman magistrates129. The early deditio of Segesta in 263/262 BC must have been forwarded by some diplomatic relations (the same happened with Halaesa for eastern Sicily), and what’s more it had no doubt some immediate consequences even for Entella and Nakone; this comes clear if one takes into account the kind of connection between Segesta and Rome, based on the myth of Aeneas which had the greatest implication for all the Elymian communities and in all probability smoothed the progress of their siding with the Romans. A concept that I have previously illustrated may become clearer: the choice of Segesta and other Elymian towns to side with Rome must be seen as a quick reply to a political opportunity, as it had been with Pyrrhus in 277 BC, and it must be interpreted as an unambiguous warning sign to the Carthaginians; those towns for sure wanted to become independent from the longstanding cultural and political influence of the Punic ejpikravteia, securing their own autonomy; with particular reference to Segesta, the city certainly wanted to maintain a kind of “ordinary” supremacy in that region, controlling even some dependencies like Entella and Nakone130. 128 The chronology of the milestone (CIL I2, 2877 = ILLRP 1277) is still debated, but the “high” chronology is usually preferred: see Di Vita 1955, 10–21; Reynolds 1960, 206–207; Di Vita 1963, 478–488; Barbieri 1964–1965, 313–315; Manganaro 1972, I, 453; Verbrugghe 1976, II, 61–64; Uggeri 1982–1983, 424–426, notes 3–4; Wachter 1987, 454–455, note 207; Coarelli 1988, 38–39 (with some doubts); Mattioli 1995, 14; Pinzone 1995, 488; Uggeri 1997–1998, 302; Pinzone 2000, 856 (250 BC); Degrassi 1967, III, 195–204; Degrassi 1969, 169–170; Degrassi 1971, IV, 64 (end of III century BC); Wilson 1990, 351, note 30 (200 BC). The last comprehensive study on the milestone is Prag 2006, 733–744: I express all my gratitude to the author, who kindly allowed me to read the final draft of his paper in advance. The construction of the way has been considered quite unusual by Crawford 1990, 103 ff., given that the consul should have considered Sicily as terra Italia, that was the only condition which allowed the building of a via publica. The most recent survey on the route-system of Sicily in the Republican age is Di Paola 1999, 459–469 129 See Cutroni Tusa 1976–1977, 304–315; Cutroni Tusa 1979, 280–282 and 291–292; Vassallo – Greco 1992, 706–707. 130 Galinsky 1969, passim; Gabba 1976, 84–101; Braccesi 1990B, 107–114; Rizzo 1990, 145– 153; Gallo 1992, 316 (about the diffusion and the propaganda of the Trojan origins of Rome); Rizzo 1974, 15–43; Pinzone 1983, 89 ff. (on the mythical connections between Segesta and Rome). Evidence of another relationship of that kind, between Rome and Centuripe, is pro-

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The Carthaginians for sure acted in response to the deditiones of Segesta and Haliciae: some of their forces went to occupy the chief points and to watch over the key places, while some other tried to get the rebellious cities back. This happened with Segesta, as we have seen; the Roman consul Caius Duilius relieved the city from the Punic siege in 260 BC, and in the same year the city of Makella was finally conquered (its garrison had been reinforced with new Carthaginian troops clearly on that occasion). Other cities rose up afterwards against the Carthaginians; in 254 BC the cities of Iaitas, Petra and Enattarus expelled the Punic occupying forces. In conclusion, it seems to me very likely that Entella too was guarded (if not occupied) by some Punic troops very soon, since Diodorus (23, 8, 2) in a very fragmentary passage mentioned it as a povli~ referring to 262 BC, when the Romans besieged Agrigentum. Indeed, it is possible that the Romans as well established garrisons in that places after conquering them, or after receiving their deditiones: this happened at Entella, too, and the Roman forces were joined by some representatives, like Tiberius Claudius Antias. The duties of the ejpimelhthv~ must not have been limited to the military field, as the justifications of the proxeniva awarded to him by the citizens of Entella seem to imply. He had to play an efficient role for Entella’s crisis, which in all probability was primed by a political fracture among the citizens (something similar to the diaforav suffered by Nakone); the division emerged between the parties was no doubt favoured by the deditio of Segesta, that led to the supremacy of the group openly favourable to the Romans. The main trouble for Rome was to guarantee the stability of Segesta’s cwvra from the beginning, and the consuls had to act immediately to avoid that the neighbouring cities – like Entella – turned to be once again into Punic hands; after all, it was all but unlikely to happen, since the Carthaginians were still controlling the greatest part of their Sicilian possessions in 262 BC. Such an involvement would have been surely less risky for the Romans in 254 BC, following the conquest of Panormus and the surrender of Iaitas; this may be a puzzling question for the chronology, but I just want to recall that the chronology of the events at Entella covered a wide period of time. The banishment of the citizens from Entella and their return to their homeland, with the new settlement (sunoikismov~) of the city, do not necessarily follow one another; indeed, in my opinion it seems better to think that some years passed from the exile to the revival of Entella. Therefore, I would suggest to put the banishment more or less in 263/262 BC, just as a consequence of the quick deditio of Segesta; the strong reaction of the Cartha­ ginians in those years is clearly attested by the literary sources, since Segesta itself was then suddenly attacked and besieged by Punic forces for a long time until 260 BC, and many other cities of the Elymian area refused to go along with the Romans. Perhaps, the new foundation of Entella took place most probably around 254 BC, when the literary sources provide evidence of a huge mutiny by the Elymian vided by Cicero (Verr. II, 5, 83); there seems to be no doubt that the privileged status of both Centuripe and Segesta during the Roman age was stemming from the mythical relationship with Rome. On the whole matter, see Mattioli 1995, 15 (even if it is difficult to agree with her that the Romans, just at the moment of Segesta’s deditio, could not count yet on great military successes in Sicily).

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cities that decided to side with Rome and to expel the Punic garrisons. In that moment, Rome could have been able to secure her new dominions in the West, beginning with the renovation of the route between Agrigentum and Panormus131. The connections of Entella with the other cities seem to state that in western Sicily there was a weak political balance, but this was secured by the age-old bonds among communities that were often distant one from the other, and sometimes had different cultural and social identities; those relationships could have been seriously smashed up by such a significant event as the coming of the Romans, but on the contrary they became tougher. A corroboration comes from the evidence concerning the revitalization of Entella’s liaison both with Herbita and Gela, whose communities did not get involved in the new settlement of the Elymian city; how can this fact be justified? Maybe Herbita’s choice has to be attributed to the ambitions of autonomy and self-sufficiency that were typical among the Sicilian cities, while the behaviour of the citizens of Gela – who were linked to the city of Entella by really ancient bonds – depended from the quite recent fate suffered from the Greek city-state, that had been destroyed by Phintias of Agrigentum some decades before. Furthermore, the population transplant from Gela to the new city of Phintias really resembled the fate of Entella, whose people had been banished and then could return back to the motherland, acting a new sunoikismov~; the only difference – but it is substantial, of course! – is that the new settlement of Entella was straightforwardly favoured or even supervised by Rome, by means of Tiberius Claudius’ involvement and – what’s more – the early intervention of Segesta132. And this is just the focal point of the question: in connection with either Nakone or Entella, the representatives of Segesta did mediate to restore the quite unbalanced situation of a strategically significant area of western Sicily where the progression of the Roman conquest had already begun through the respect and the “management” of the existing cultural and political identities in the native communities. That’s why the accomplishment of Segesta was just a mask for the political interests of the Romans who needed to rearrange the equilibrium of the Elymian zone, which had been squashed by their conflict against the Carthaginians, thanks first to their newly acquired mythical bond with Segesta; then, taking a great advantage from the leadership of Segesta among the other cities of the Elymian zone, the new conquerors tried to strengthen the effective relationships among several cities of those territories, without altering their customary organization. It was just a new, skilful way of conquest; Rome decided to draw on the native peoples and on their 131 According to Moggi 1992, 483–500, the leaving and the new settlement of Entella must be placed in the first decade of the first Punic war. Dexter Hoyos 1988, 30–43 conjectured that Tiberius Claudius Antias could act even before 264 BC, but this does not persuade me (see even Corsaro 1982, 1027–1029). The sunoikismov~ has been dated to 260 BC by Knoepfler 1985–1986, 1–29; on the contrary, Tagliamonte 1994, 205–206, put it at the end of the first Punic war. 132 On the conventional links between Entella and Gela, see Giangiulio 1982, 801–814. The citizens of Gela who were mentioned in the inscription nr. 2 from Entella have been rightly identified with those who had been moved to Phintias; see Cataldi 1982, 890–891; Bejor 1982B, 820; Lombardo 1982, 872, note 80. A useful comparison between the new settlements of Gela and Entella has been made by Manganaro 1990, 391–396.

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institutions to secure the newly conquered territories. This happened in the first stage of the war against Syracuse and in the time-consuming invasion of the Carthaginian dominions; that is to say, the method of showing consideration for the customary laws and political institutions of the Greek city-states was used for the whole duration of the first Punic war, and applied everywhere in Sicily. The Romans played skilfully in the “training-ground” which had been left them by Pyrrhus; the Greeks and the natives – apart some situations, always managed by Carthaginian garrisons – decided that they had to trust the new mighty conquerors, if they wanted some of their old-fashioned traditions and political institutions to live on. After all, deditio and cooperation were for sure more helpful than any impossible resistance!

Conclusions

The institutional evolution in the greatest part of the Sicilian city-states in the period 289-241 BC was particularly confused, because it was deeply influenced by the effects of time-consuming, bloody civil wars; furthermore, the consequences of exhausting military campaigns intensely affected both the social and the economic activities in Sicily; last but not least, the development was considerably marked by the importance and the innovation of the political solutions adopted by the leading city-states. The most consequential was the innovation used by Agathocles of Syracuse: in the last decade of the IV century BC, trying to emulate the famous Successors of the East, he assumed the royal title and introduced for the first time in Sicily (but exactly in Syracuse) the Hellenistic-fashioned kingship, intended as a new way to express the autocratic power. Incidentally, the autocracy was a customary shape of power specifically in Syracuse, where it had been held in the two previous centuries by the Deinomenids and by the two Dionysii. The innovation of Agathocles was therefore something deep-rooted in the political history of Sicily, and it dynamically put a close tie with the past and the traditions of the island. In any case, the political background of Sicily during Agathocles’ age was conventional, and marked by the age-old struggle between the Greeks and the Cartha­ ginians of the ejpikravteia; such a contrast, although it was portrayed by the Greeks with different reasons (that is, a crusade against the foreigners and the barbarians, fought to free definitely all the Greek and native communities of the island from the political influence of the Punic forces), was actually a fight for the supremacy and the total control over Sicily. Really Agathocles had a magnificent sixth sense, when he thought to wage the war in the enemy’s motherland and achieved the first invasion of northern Africa (such a project was skilfully used afterwards by the Romans, as well); he was planning a second African mission, when he was murdered. This episode marked the beginning of a decade characterized by some worthy political changes all over Sicily. Enough historical sources allow us to understand in detail the institutional developments in Syracuse, where a struggle for the absolute power among the members of the royal family proved Agathocles that the kingship in Sicily could not have a safe and sound future, especially because in that moment there was not a strong figure who could have played the role of an Hellenistic monarch. Agathocles himself paid with his life the consequences of a palace-plot, and before dying he thought both to punish the guilty nephew and to save his fellow-citizens only trusting those traditional institutions that remained active even after the introduction of the monarchy; first among the others, the popular assembly. The restoration of the democracy in Syracuse and the collapse of the Agathoclean empire had mainly two effects in the rest of Sicily; first, a swift recovery of the Punic expansion towards the eastern regions of the island; second, the sudden emergence of ancient shapes of authocratic power, such as the tyrannies, that distinguished the political history of many Greek communities in that period. This could have been another tie with the past political tradition of the Sicilian tyranny; however, at the beginning of the III century BC, this kind of autocracy began to have new features. It was neither a defensive shape of power against the supremacy of the Carthaginian forces, nor an answer to several desires of conquest and expan-

268

Conclusions

sionism (as it had been during the Classical age). First and foremost, this became a way to strengthen the home political institutions of the single city-states against the dangers coming from outside without renouncing to the autonomy and to the independence. Anyway, when the new tyrants behaved like the absolute dynasts of the IV century BC, they actually looked more like the Hellenistic kings than the Sicilian tyrants of the Classical age, and in some instance the tyrants really were aware of this; Phintias, the tyrant of Agrigentum, wanted to sign himself as king on his coinage, and clearly imitated the great Successors when he founded in Sicily a new city, that he called with his own name. Not even Syracuse was free from the emergence of a new kind of autocracy in the catastrophic background of the post-Agathoclean democracy, because the autocratic strategy awarded for nine consecutive years to Hicetas was the only way to save the city from the Carthaginian attack and even from the conquest aims of Phintias; therefore, the autocratic power was quite a mask used to rescue the contemporary Syracusan democracy; Hicetas himself signed the coins with his name but wanted to appear as a magistrate of the democratic institutions. The political evolution in Syracuse produced another significant consequence. A huge group of Italic mercenaries, who served for Agathocles’ army and after his death, had been considered as a real menace for the steadiness of the democracy by the citizens of Syracuse, and were banished from the city. Those soldiers, after ravaging the countries of south-eastern Sicily, moved northwards to Messina and they took the control of the city. Besides the usual purges of the unwelcoming natives, the new background of Messina was distinguished by a mixing of ethnicities; Italic soldiers and Greek population lived together, using some typical Italic offices (such as the meddix) that were then adjusted to the usual Greek, democratic customs. The development – both objective and political – of the new Messina was of the greatest importance for the future of the Sicilian history, because it was formally thanks to the city’s deditio that the Romans could make their first steps in Sicily. Therefore, the background of Sicily after the death of Agathocles was marked by significant changes, even if the institutions and the political systems of many city-states remained dependable on the historical tradition; the monarchy in the short term ceased to live on, while new democratic systems and tyrannies were established. However, the main feature was that of a general state of anarchy and unsteadiness that could just offer once again the usual topic; the struggle between the Greeks of Sicily and the Punic barbarians. Being called for help by the Syracusan people, Pyrrhus – king of Epirus and son-in-law of the old king of Syracuse, Agathocles – answered to their appeal; after his first victories, the Greeks of Sicily themselves appointed him as king, and sided with him in an official alliance which aimed to banish definitely the Carthaginians from the island. It was the second monarchic experience in Sicily; but for Pyrrhus, as well as for Agathocles, the outcome was a failure. The Greeks and the natives, although they had awarded Pyrrhus with the basilikh; hJgemoniva, did not ever consider themselves dependent on the king, but definitely his official allies; a typical example is offered by the behaviour of the Elymian city-states of western Sicily, that willingly sided with Pyrrhus because they simply considered his venture a

Conclusions

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means to aggregate themselves and to claim the autonomy of their own ethnicity from the cultural and political influence of the Punic world. The contrasts between Pyrrhus and his allies, that afterwards turned to be an open mutiny, had their source in a pretty cultural difference concerning the autocratic shape of power; Pyrrhus had already an Hellenistic mentality, while the Greeks of Sicily used to think once more to the autocracy in a quite “Hellenic” way, and thus the decisions and the absolute behaviours of the king were decoded as the deeds of a tyrant. Consequently, the heritage of Pyrrhus was picked up by one of his officers, Hiero, who seized the control in Syracuse and was appointed by his fellow-citizens as commander-in-chief for the military campaigns against the Mamertines of Messina. Then, after his victories, he got the title of king, not only from the compatriots but even from the Sicilian allies. By remembering the mistakes of Pyrrhus, Hiero succeeded in changing the features of his kingship, settling it in the cultural background of Sicily; thus, he was somehow a “moderate” king, who was respectful of the autonomy of his allies. No doubt, the most significant factor of Sicilian history between 289 and 241 BC was the arrival of the Romans and their steady conquest of the whole island. This period may be singled out in two stages; first, the entrance in Messina and the war against Hiero of Syracuse that led to the capitulation of the eastern sector of Sicily; second, the time-consuming, exhausting war against the Carthaginians, that ended up in 241 BC with the complete submission of western Sicily. The Sicilian city-states went through thrilling and turbulent times which included military occupations; massacres; destructions; new settlements and population transplants; all these events have been attested by historical sources and sometimes have been authenticated by the archaeological data. The destiny of those people who lived in the cities that openly decided to side with the Carthaginians or even tried to resist against the Roman armies, was often characterized either by forced banishments or by enslavement. But many other city-states had a different fate, that is the communities that decided to side willingly with the Romans making their deditio in fidem; this behaviour was typical both in the first stage of the war against Syracuse, and even during the invasion of western Sicily. Again, an example is provided by the Elymian communities that, as well as with Pyrrhus, took great advantage from the coming of a foreign, successful power, to claim their own cultural and ethnic identity, and stress their independence from the Punic influence. Rome employed in Sicily a new method of conquest, which relied on the local communities and on their ancient political institutions to strengthen the new possessions; the Romans showed a great respect and a profound consideration for the customary laws and for the native’s institutions, and they encouraged their stability. Therefore, in the first stage of the Roman age Sicily did not look at all like a capitulated country; even after the Roman conquest, the island carried on a dynamic nature and continued the evolution process which had marked the last fifty years. The Greeks made this under the watchful attention of the Romans, who were really wide awake as regards especially the commercial and economic activities, but even respectful of the traditions of an island whose recent past – which was indeed still alive as much as the political institutions – could really ennoble them.

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General Index Abacenum 62; 193; 197 Achilles 122; 123; 149 Aci Trezza 20 Adherbal 240 Adranus (god) 194 Aegates islands 11; 239; 245; 245 Aegean sea 220 Aelianus 53 Aeneas 211; 222; 223; 260 Aeolian islands 44; 172; 227; 233; 245 Africa 17; 20; 77; 157; 158; 159; 163; 164; 167; 168; 220; 232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 250; 267 Agatharchus 18 Agathocles, king of Syracuse 11; 12; 13; 17; 18; 19; 20; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 26; 27; 28; 29; 30; 31; 32; 34; 35; 36; 37; 43; 45; 51; 53; 54; 56; 57; 58; 63; 64; 65; 66; 67; 68; 69; 70; 71; 73; 75; 95; 99; 115; 117; 118; 119; 121; 123; 124; 125; 126; 132; 133; 143; 147; 148; 149; 166; 167; 168; 169; 170; 179; 182; 183; 186; 189; 190; 194; 204; 217; 219; 233; 257; 267; 268 Agathocles II (Junior) 18; 19; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 26; 28; 219 Agathyrnum 173; 197 Agirium 53; 58; 60; 80; 187; 195; 211; 214; 226 Agrigentum 31; 34; 35; 36; 37; 38; 55; 56; 57; 58; 59; 60; 61; 62; 63; 64; 66; 68; 72; 73; 74; 77; 79; 81; 99; 108; 117; 129; 130; 131; 132; 133; 134; 136; 141; 145; 156; 172; 173; 186; 198; 204; 207; 213; 217; 221; 223; 224; 225; 226; 227; 228; 229; 232; 233; 235; 236; 239; 241; 248; 249; 254; 256; 260; 261; 262; 268 Aighithallos 242 Aigussa 245 Aitne 211 Akellos 242 Akragas (river-god) 62 Akrai 131; 213; 216; 256 Alexander the Great 11; 119; 122; 123; 124; 125; 149; 217 Alexander the Molossian 78 Alexander, son of Pyrrhus 75; 101; 119

Alexandris (ship) 220 Alexon 35; 239 Alfius 38; 39; 40; 41; 42; 45; 47; 51 Alfius Flavus 39 Alkia 18 Alontium 197; 211 Ameselum 187; 193; 194; 195; 196; 208 Amphipolis 125 Anchises 222 Antipater of Macedonia 23 Apennines 42 Apollo 27; 38; 39; 40; 46; 48; 50; 61; 62; 166; 258 Apollonia 211 Appian: 88; 101; 104; 108; 168; 175; 215; 250; 257 Appius Claudius Caudex 202; 205; 206; 207; 211; 259 Apulia 76; 77 Archagathus 17; 18; 19; 20; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 27; 28; 29; 30; 67 Archimedes 220 Archimelus 220 Ares 37; 46; 50; 190 Areus I 149 Arpi 76 Arsinoe II 216 Artemidorus 179; 181; 183 Artemis 26; 27; 62; 68; 122; 124; 125; 190 Artemis Soteira 26; 62 Ascelus 222 Asclepius 52 Asclepius (sanctuary of: Agrigentum) 223 Asia Minor 145 Aspis 234 Aspromonte 44 Assorus 253; 254 Athena 123; 124; 125; 128 Athena Alkis 123 Athena Promachos 123; 124; 128 Athenaeus 182; 220 Athenians 26; 90 Athens 26; 182; 220 Attica 44 Augusta 211

314

General Index

Aulus Atilius Caiatinus: 230; 231; 232; 235; 236 Ausculum (battle, 279BC) 76; 80; 82; 83; 84 Azones 136; 138; 140; 141; 157 Baalshillek 144 Belice (river) 153; 252; 259 Belice (valley) 139; 153 Berenike 23 Bisacquino 260 Boiano 47 Boodes 228 Boostar 234 Bruttians 19; 22; 41; 45; 51; 104; 105; 128 Bruttium 41; 45; 103; 111; 112 “Bull-hill” (Agrigentum) 225 Caius Aquilius Florus 229; 230 Caius Atilius Regulus 232; 233; 238 Caius Aurelius Cotta 237; 242; 260 Caius Caecilius (tribune) 229 Caius Claudius (tribune) 203; 204; 205; 206; Caius Claudius Pulcher (pro-praetor) 259 Caius Duilius 227; 228; 229; 261 Caius Fabricius Luscinus 84; 94; 104; 105; 106 Caius Furius Pacilius 237 Caius Genucius Clepsina 192 Caius Lutatius Catulus 215; 244; 245; 250 Caius Sempronius Blaesus 236 Caius Sulpicius Paterculus 230 Calabria 112 Calcidicus (mount) 205; 206 Calenius 47 Cales 47 Calinis 47 Caltabellotta 136; 138; 139; 140 Camarina: 34; 35; 36; 37; 56; 58; 59; 131; 132; 186; 205; 229; 231; 232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 242; 244; 248 Campanaio 135; 136 Campania 42; 76; 78; 105 Campanians 37; 45; 51; 103; 104; 105; 107; 108; 109; 191; 192; 250; 251; 253; 257; 258; 259 Campochiaro 47 Campofranco 152 Canale (necropolis) 112 cape Boeo 162 cape Ecnomus 59; 233; 238; 241 cape Lacinium 105 cape Pachynus 74; 233; 234; 241; 242 cape Palinuro 244 cape Passero 132 cape Peloro 205

cape Soprano 36; 140 Capua 42 Carabollace (stream) 140 Cariati 111 Carthage: 11; 17; 44; 57; 67; 68; 73; 74; 75; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 91; 92; 93; 94; 95; 99; 100; 106; 107; 144; 153; 156; 160; 165; 166; 167; 172; 198; 207; 216; 220; 221; 224; 228; 234; 235; 239; 240; 241; 245; 254; 255; 257 Carthaginians : 11; 12; 17; 20; 21; 22; 30; 31; 32; 37; 52; 54; 55; 56; 57; 58; 60; 61; 63; 66; 67; 68; 69; 73; 74; 75; 77; 78; 79; 80; 81; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 87; 88; 90; 91; 92; 93; 94; 95; 99; 100; 102; 103; 105; 106; 107; 116; 117; 119; 121; 126; 127; 129; 130; 133; 134; 137; 138; 139; 140; 141; 145; 146; 150; 152; 155; 156; 157; 158; 159; 160; 164; 165; 166; 167; 169; 170; 172; 173; 174; 175; 179; 180; 184; 185; 186; 188; 192; 194; 196; 198; 199; 200; 201; 202; 203; 204; 205; 206; 207; 210; 211; 212; 213; 214; 215; 220; 221; 222; 223; 224; 225; 226; 227; 228; 229; 230; 231; 232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 237; 238; 239; 240; 242; 243; 244; 245; 247; 250; 252; 253; 254; 255; 257; 260; 261; 262; 267; 268; 269 Carthalo 235; 236; 241; 242 Casmene 131 Cassero 154 Cassius Dio 40; 196; 197; 203; 204; 206 Castagna 135; 136 Castellace 41; 42; 43 Castellaccio della Sagana 153 Castiglione Paludi 112 Catane 31; 34; 53; 54; 55; 74; 99; 100; 116; 131; 194; 195; 197; 208; 209; 212; 213; 244 Catania 112; 221; 243 Caulonia 43; 191 Cefalù 172; 235 Celts 45; 66 Centuripe 112; 145; 187; 193; 195; 196; 208; 209; 210; 211; 213; 224; 226; 228; 246; 248; 256; 260; 261 Chaeronea 119 Ciamosorus (river): 187; 193; 194; 195; 196; 208 Cineas 77; 84; 86; 100; 113; 167 Claudius Quadrigarius 231 Cocchiara (Marsala) 163; 164 Collesano 229 Colombaia 243 Conca d’Oro 151; 153; 154; 156; 173 Contessa Entellina 260 contrada Gaddimi 139; 140

General Index contrada Guardabbasso 139; 140 contrada Locogrande 139; 140 contrada Mella 41; 42; 43 contrada Montagnola 139 contrada San Benedetto 138 contrada Scunchipani 139 Corleone 260 corso Gramsci (Marsala) 165 Cosenza 111 Cossyra 234 Cozzo Paparina 153 Crati (river) 112 Croton 105; 110; 111 Cuma 243 Cytattara 236 Damatrios Attos 255 Daunia 76; 105 Decius Vibellius: 94; 102; 103; 104; 106; 108; 109; 112; 113 Delphi 182; 227; 255 Demeter 128 Demetrius the Besieger 18; 26 Dinomenides 182; 267 Diodorus: 17; 18; 19; 20; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 26; 27; 28; 29; 30; 32; 33; 34; 35; 36; 37; 38; 39; 40; 45; 53; 54; 56; 57; 58; 59; 60; 61; 62; 63; 64; 66; 69; 70; 71; 72; 73; 75; 76; 79; 80; 81; 85; 92; 93; 94; 95; 102; 103; 104; 105; 106; 107; 108; 109; 113; 114; 116; 117; 130; 131; 132; 133; 136; 141; 143; 145; 150; 151; 152; 153; 154; 156; 157; 158; 159; 160; 164; 167; 173; 186; 192; 193; 195; 197; 198; 199; 200; 203; 204; 205; 206; 207; 208; 209; 211; 212; 213; 214; 215; 216; 219; 220; 222; 223; 224; 225; 226; 227; 228; 229; 230; 231; 234; 235; 236; 237; 238; 240; 241; 242; 243; 244; 248; 249; 256; 257; 261 Dione (goddess) 122 Dionysius I of Syracuse: 119; 145; 186; 207; 257; 267 Dionysius II of Syracuse 219; 267 Dionysius of Halicarnassus: 69; 76; 104; 105; 106; 107; 112; 117; 120; 168; 169; 170; 171 Dittainus (river) 67 Dodona 122 Drepana 229; 233; 234; 235; 236; 238; 240; 241; 242; 243; 244; 245 Duris of Samos 24; 25; 27; 38; 145 Echetla 207; 214 Egadi islands 172; 239; 245 Egestus 223 Egypt 23; 45; 184; 216; 220 Elimus 223

315

Elymians 146; 147; 223 Enattarus 236; 261 Ennius 47 Entella 145; 146; 236; 249; 251; 252; 253; 254; 255; 256; 257; 258; 259; 260; 261; 262 Ephaistos 237 Epichides 214 Epirus 11; 18; 76; 77; 78; 113; 114; 116; 119; 120; 121; 122; 126; 136; 191; 220; 268 Erykes (river) 214 Eryx 118; 124; 133; 141; 146; 148; 150; 151; 157; 160; 173; 226; 229; 242; 243; 244; 245; 251; 252; 256; 257 Eryx (eponymous hero) 149 Etna (mount): 18; 19; 20; 21; 24; 27; 28; 29; 30; 34; 194; 208 Etruria 165 Euneis 205 Eurialus (castle) 143 Euridike 23 Eutropius 76; 206; 208; 209; 212; 213; 220; 235 Fabius Pictor 40; 109 Favignana 245 Festus 38; 47 Florus 206 Fortune 77 Francavilla Marittima 112 Gauls 77 Gela 34; 35; 36; 37; 49; 56; 58; 59; 68; 69; 132; 140; 186; 205; 241; 253; 254; 262 Gelo 218; 219; 220 Geloans 254 Gescon 245 Gibil Gabib 137 Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Asina: 227; 228; 235; 236 Gnaeus Servilius Caepio 236 Great Harbour (Syracuse) 67; 74; 80; 83; 93; 95; 116; 117 Greece 11; 45; 77; 78; 85; 220; 249 Greeks (esp. western) 12; 40; 45; 55; 66; 68; 78; 79; 81; 86; 95; 99; 103; 113; 116; 118; 119; 120; 121; 122; 123; 124; 125; 126; 127; 129; 141; 149; 156; 158; 160; 165; 167; 168; 169; 170; 171; 172; 173; 174; 175; 184; 192; 193; 195; 204; 205; 207; 209; 216; 221; 225; 226; 227; 229; 246; 247; 252; 258; 263; 267; 268; 269 Grotta Regina 161 Haderbal 240; 241 Hadranum 194; 196; 208; 209; 222; 224; 226; 256; 259

316

General Index

Halaesa 193; 197; 198; 208; 209; 210; 211; 212; 224; 226; 246; 247; 248; 259; 260 Haliciae 141; 145; 146; 222; 226; 248; 259; 261 Hamilcar 154; 229; 230; 231; 232; 233; 234; 254; 255 Hamilcar Barca 242; 243; 244; 245 Hammon 161 Hannibal 198; 199; 201; 204; 211; 221; 224; 225; 228; 239; 240; 241 Hannibal the Great 221; 242 Hannibal the Rhodian 240 Hanno 198; 203; 204; 205; 221; 224; 225; 227; 233; 245 Hanno II 204; 205 Hasdrubal 234; 235; 237; 238 Heirkte 151; 152; 154; 156; 157; 237; 243; 244 Helenus 114; 119 Hellanicus 223 Hellespont 90 Helorus 213; 214; 215 Henna 131; 132; 221; 229; 231; 232; 253; 254; 255 Heraclea (town in Lucania) 76; 112 Heraclea Minoa: 132; 133; 134; 135; 136; 138; 140; 141; 147; 157; 158; 221; 223; 224; 225; 233; 234; 235; 236; 238; 240; 241 Heraclidai 124; 149 Heraclides 53; 54; 117; 118 Heracles: 27; 69; 111; 123; 124; 128; 149; 150; 151; 190 Heracles Victor 111 Herasippus 182 Herbessus 214; 215; 223; 224; 227; 232 Herbita 253; 254; 259; 262 Hermocrates 142 Herodianus 41 Herodotus 90 Hicetas 27; 30; 31; 32; 50; 51; 53; 56; 57; 59; 63; 64; 65; 66; 67; 68; 69; 70; 72; 74; 79; 80; 81; 99; 124; 182; 189; 190; 191; 268 Hiero II, king of Syracuse 12; 34; 115; 118; 121; 124; 166; 173; 179; 180; 181; 182; 183; 184; 185; 186; 187; 188; 189; 190; 191; 192; 193; 194; 195; 196; 197; 198; 199; 200; 201; 202; 203; 204; 205; 206; 207; 208; 209; 210; 211; 212; 213; 214; 215; 216; 217; 218; 219; 220; 221; 222; 224; 226; 227; 228; 231; 234; 237; 240; 244; 245; 246; 247; 251; 252; 269 Hierocles 182 Hieronymus, king of Syracuse 118; 219 Hilarus 222

Himera (river) 31; 233; 241 Himilco 239; 241 Hipana 230 Hippana 230 Hippocrates 214 Hipponium 94 Homer 149 Hyblaeus (river) 59; 60; 63; 67; 68; Iaitas 151; 154; 236; 255; 261 Iaitinans 151 Iatus (river) 153 Igea 52 Ionian sea 43; 102; 113; 195 Irminio (river) 60 Isola dei Ciclopi 20 Italion 243; 244 Italiotes 45; 78 Italy (esp. southern): 11; 41; 42; 75; 78; 82; 85; 91; 100; 101; 103; 105; 107; 111; 119; 120; 127; 129; 159; 167; 174; 175; 191; 192; 202; 212; 221; 243; 245; 246; 250; 251; 256 Justin: 19; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 30; 31; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 101; 119; 174; 175; 182; 183; 184 Kalé Akté 197; 211 Kamikos 232 Kephaloidion 186; 235 Kyon 198; 199 Kytattara 253; 255 Lampsacus 125 Lanassa 18; 75; 149 Latium 165 Lazzaretto 243 League of Corinth 119 Legio Campana 94; 108; 112 Lekythos 90 Leonidas 232 Leontini: 53; 54; 55; 67; 74; 77; 79; 117; 194; 213; 216 Leptines 186 Leukios Kaisiou 257 lex Hieronica 216; 217 Libya 77; 157; 168; 234 Libyans 45; 66 Liguria 221 Lilybaeum 100; 141; 143; 145; 146; 151; 156; 157; 158; 159; 160; 161; 162; 164; 165; 166; 167; 168; 169; 172; 173; 174; 198; 199; 204; 222; 224; 232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 237; 238; 239; 240; 241; 242; 243; 244; 245; 250; 252 Lipari (island) 199; 211; 228; 232; 237 Lipari (town) 227; 228; 232; 233; 237 Livy 47; 85; 214; 215; 216; 219; 220; 228; 231; 246; 247

General Index Locri Epizefiri 41; 92; 94; 100; 101; 102; 105; 111; 113; 114; 246; 256 Longanus (town) 244 Longanus (river) 198; 199; 200; 224; 227 Longon 243; 244 Longone 244 Lucania 112 Lucanians 45; 50; 51; 104; 105 Luceria 76 Lucius Aurelius Cotta 13; 237 Lucius Caecilius Metellus 237; 238 Lucius Cornelius Scipio 229 Lucius Iunius Pullus 214; 240; 241; 242 Lucius Manlius Vulso (consul): 233; 234; 238; 249 Lucius Manlius Vulso (praetor) 249 Lucius Postumius Megellus 221 Lucius Valerius Flaccus 227 Lungomare Boeo (Marsala) 163 Macedonia 11; 77; 78; 79; 123 Magna Graecia: 43; 81; 94; 95; 99; 100; 101; 103; 105; 107; 108; 110; 111; 114; 117; 120; 121; 127; 156; 159; 167; 174; 191 Mago 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 93; Makella 222; 228; 229; 253; 255; 259; 261 Malta 232; 233; 234; 238; 256 Mamercus Claudius Mamertinus 259 Mamerkos 41 Mamers 37; 39; 40; 41 Mamertii 40 Mamertina 37; 45 Mamertines 34; 35; 36; 37; 38; 39; 40; 41; 45; 48; 49; 50; 51; 52; 55; 59; 74; 94; 95; 99; 100; 102; 103; 104; 106; 107; 108; 109; 110; 113; 114; 132; 156; 166; 167; 172; 173; 174; 175; 179; 180; 181; 185; 186; 187; 188; 190; 191; 192; 193; 194; 195; 197; 198; 199; 201; 202; 203; 204; 205; 208; 215; 220; 227; 228; 244; 247; 250; 258; 269 Mamertinus 41 Mamertios 41 Mamertium 41 Mameus 69; 171 Manico di Quarara (necropolis) 153 Manius Otacilius Crassus 207; 208 Manius Valerius Maximus Messalla: 207; 208; 217 Maras Pontius 47 Marcus Aemilius Paullus 234 Marcus Atilius Regulus 233; 234 Marcus Claudius Marcellus 213; 214; 215 Marcus Porcius Cato 231

317

Marcus Tullius Cicero 197; 210; 219; 220; 222; 223; 247; 248; 249; 250; 251; 261 Marettimo 245 Marianopoli 231 Mars 39 Marsala 161 Matauros (river) 42 Mazara del Vallo 136; 230 Mazarides 229; 230 Mediterranean sea/area 11; 12; 20; 44; 45; 83; 99; 102; 123; 133; 143; 153; 159; 167; 184; 198; 217; 239; 250 Megalopolis 63 Megara 213; 214; 216 Melqart 124 Menon 19; 21; 22; 24; 25; 27; 28; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33; 57; 63; 66; 73 Mergane 179; 180; 181; 182; 183; 184; 185 Messenians 45 Messina 33; 34; 35; 36; 37; 38; 39; 40; 41; 44; 45; 46; 47; 48; 49; 50; 51; 52; 54; 58; 66; 74; 94; 95; 99; 102; 104; 107; 108; 109; 112; 113; 124; 173; 174; 179; 185; 186; 187; 188; 191; 192; 193; 194; 195; 196; 197; 198; 199; 200; 201; 202; 203; 204; 205; 206; 207; 208; 209; 214; 221; 223; 224; 227; 228; 233; 234; 235; 236; 241; 244; 247; 252; 258; 259; 268; 269 Mettia (gens) 47 Mikion 214 Milazzo 198 Milo 101 Minatus Corvius 259 Mitistratum 229; 231; 248 Molossians 120 Montagna dei Cavalli 230; 231 Montagna Grande 146 Montagnola di Marineo 222 Monte Adranone 222; 259 Monte Castellaccio 154; 243 Monte Castellazzo 146 Monte Catalfano 152 Monte Cufino 233 Monte d’Oro di Montelepre 153 Monte Finestrelle 146 Monte Gulea 139 Monte Iato 151 Monte Palmita 154 Monte Pecoraro 154 Monte Pellegrino 152; 154; 155; 156; 243 Monte Polizzo 146 Monte Porcara 152 Monte San Calogero 136; 139; 140

318

General Index

Monte Saraceno 137 Montepiselli 52 Morgantina 65; 68; 180; 214; 256 Morganzia 180 Morghyna 180 Mortillaro 161 Mozia 148 Mursia 137 Museo Archeologico (Palermo) 155 Museo Baglio Anselmi 165 Mylae 193; 195; 198; 228; 229; 244 Naevius 40; 232 Nakone 255; 257; 258; 259; 260; 261; 262 Neoptolemus Pyrrhus 149 Nereis 220 Netum 213; 214; 215; 216; 247 Nike 51; 65; 67; 68; 125; 144; 166; 189; 190 Nike Trophaiophora 125 Nola 258 Numerius Fabius Buteus 242 Octava legio 103; 108; 191; 192 Octavianus Augustus 39; 249 Odessa 125 Olympia 214 Olympus (mount) 184 Olynthus 164 Onomarchus 53 Oppido Mamertina 41; 42; 112 Oreto (river) 153 Orosius 108; 206; 225; 231; 232; 235 Ortygia 71; 72; 73; 79; 130; 170; 171 Oscans 39; 45; 51 Ostia 82; 84; 86; 93 Oxythemis 26 Palazzo Mirto (Palermo) 154 Palazzo Reale (Palermo) 154 Pallene 90 Panormus 115; 145; 146; 151; 152; 153; 154; 156; 172; 173; 174; 228; 229; 230; 233; 234; 235; 236; 237; 238; 240; 241; 243; 244; 248; 255; 260; 261; 262 Pantelleria 137; 165; 234 Partinico 153 Paropos 229 Patri (river) 198 Pausanias 74; 81; 182; 183; 191; 214; 220 Pegasus 155; 190 Pelias (island) 242; 243 Pella 123 Pelorias 50; 51 Pergamum 48; 49 Persephone 62; 65; 68; 123; 124; 126; 128; 189; 190

Petra 211; 236; 253; 255; 261 Petrace (river) 42 Pheraimon 50 Philinus: 35; 38; 40; 56; 63; 64; 66; 67; 72; 73; 79; 81; 108; 109; 117; 130; 158; 179; 196; 204; 206 Philip II, king of Macedonia 119 Philistides 186 Philistus 186; 244 Philonidas 257 Phintias, tyrant of Agrigentum 31; 34; 35; 36; 37; 55; 56; 57; 58; 59; 60; 61; 62; 63; 64; 67; 68; 72; 73; 74; 79; 99; 129; 130; 131; 132; 254; 262; 268 Phintias (town) 36; 59; 132; 233; 241; 254; 256; 262 Phoenicians 157 Phthias 122; 128 Piana delle Forche (necropolis) 150 Piano della Grotta 155 Piazza Armerina 48 Piazza Marina (Palermo) 154 Piazza San Pancrazio (Taormina) 115 Piazza Vittorio Emanuele (Taormina) 115 Pistis 246 Pizzo Argentaria 242 Pizzo Cannita 152 Pizzo Sant’Anna 242 Platani (river) 134; 259 Plato 90 Plinius the Elder 208; 231 Plutarch: 12; 76; 77; 78; 79; 80; 81; 100; 101; 102; 124; 133; 148; 149; 150; 157; 158; 159; 167; 168; 170; 172; 173; 174; 175; 193; 194; 216; 228; 257 Poggioreale 146; 260 Poggio Sant’Angelo 233 Polyaenus 70; 71; 196; 228 Polybius 35; 37; 38; 39; 40; 45; 85; 87; 88; 89; 90; 91; 103; 104; 105; 107; 108; 109; 110; 113; 118; 120; 154; 160; 179; 180; 181; 182; 183; 184; 185; 186; 187; 188; 195; 199; 200; 201; 202; 204; 205; 206; 207; 208; 209; 212; 213; 215; 216; 220; 221; 223; 224; 225; 227; 229; 230; 231; 232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 238; 239; 240; 241; 242; 243; 244; 248 Pompei 47; 70 Pompeius Trogus 21; 22; 23; 24; 31; 82; 83; 84; 85; 174; 175 Pontia (gens) 47 Pontii 47 Pontus 90 Porta di Valle (excavations) 148

General Index Porta Trapani 161; 162 Portella della Paglia 153; 154 Portolana (stream) 140 Prima Cupola 155 Prizzi 180; 230; 260 Proxenus 74; 81; 143; 149; 157; 158; 175 Ptolemies 11; 23; 184; 219 Ptolemy I Soter 23; 123; 124; 219 Ptolemy II Philadelphos 216; 219 Ptolemy III Euerghetes 220 Ptolemy Keraunos 77 Publius Claudius Pulcher 240; 241 Publius Rupilius 135 Publius Servilius Geminus 237; 242 Punics 60; 184 Punta d’Alga (Marsala) 161 Puteoli 47 Pyrrhus: 12; 18; 22; 27; 51; 52; 53; 54; 61; 63; 64; 67; 68; 69; 71; 72; 73; 74; 75; 76; 77; 78; 79; 80; 81; 82; 84; 85; 86; 87; 88; 91; 92; 93; 94; 95; 99; 100; 101; 102; 103; 104; 106; 107; 108; 110; 112; 113; 114; 115; 116; 117; 118; 119; 120; 121; 122; 123; 124; 125; 126; 127; 128; 129; 130; 131; 132; 133; 134; 136; 138; 139; 140; 141; 143; 145; 146; 148; 149; 150; 151; 152; 153; 154; 156; 157; 158; 159; 160; 161; 164; 165; 166; 167; 168; 169; 170; 171; 172; 173; 174; 175; 179; 180; 181; 182; 184; 185; 187; 188; 189; 191; 192; 193; 194; 198; 199; 204; 210; 220; 226; 228; 233; 239; 243; 252; 257; 260; 263; 268; 269 Pyrrhus II 220 Quintus Aemilius Papus 84 Quintus Cassius (tribune) 237 Quintus Mamilius Vitulus 221 Reggio Calabria (Museo Nazionale) 110 Rhegium 39; 42; 44; 45; 48; 75; 78; 92; 93; 94; 102; 103; 104; 105; 106; 107; 108; 109; 110; 111; 112; 113; 173; 179; 191; 192; 196; 197; 201; 202; 203; 205; 206 Rhodes 44; 250 Ribera 136 Rocca Nadore 136; 137; 138; 139; 140; 141 Romans 12; 40; 53; 75; 76; 78; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 87; 88; 91; 92; 93; 94; 95; 100; 101; 102; 103; 104; 105; 106; 107; 108; 109; 112; 113; 122; 127; 134; 159; 174; 175; 179; 191; 192; 194; 196; 197; 199; 200; 201; 202; 203; 204; 205; 206; 207; 208; 209; 210; 211; 212; 213; 214; 215; 216; 217; 219; 220; 221; 222; 223; 224; 225; 226; 227; 228; 229; 230; 231; 232; 234; 235; 236; 237; 238; 239; 240; 241; 242; 243; 244; 245; 246; 247; 248; 249; 250; 252;

319

254; 255; 258; 259; 260; 261; 263; 267; 268; 269 Rome 11; 40; 75; 76; 78; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 92; 93; 94; 101; 106; 108; 159; 160; 189; 191; 192; 196; 201; 207; 208; 210; 211; 212; 213; 215; 216; 217; 220; 221; 222; 224; 225; 226; 227; 228; 233; 234; 235; 236; 237; 238; 239; 240; 241; 244; 245; 246; 247; 250; 251; 252; 254; 255; 258; 260; 261; 262; 269 Rošhmelqart 144 Sabucina 137 Sacred island 245 Sagana (mountain pass) 153 Salemi 146 Salsus (river) 31; 59; 60; 67 Sambuca 222; 259 Samnites 39; 45; 50; 51; 166; 174 Samnium 38; 39; 41; 47 Samos 24; 38 San Benedetto (Caltabellotta) 139 San Cristoforo (Solous) 152 San Francesco (bulwark; Marsala) 161 San Francesco (church; Palermo) 154 San Giovanni (necropolis: Centuripe) 112 San Lorenzo (monastery; Palermo) 154 San Marco d’Alunzio 256 Santa Caterina (Taormina) 115 Santa Rosalia (sanctuary; Palermo) 155 Sardinia 20; 144; 155; 156; 166; 229; 230 Saticula 47 Schera 253; 255 Sciacca 136; 138; 141 Scornavacche 37 Seconda Cupola 155 Segesta: 19; 21; 141; 145; 146; 147; 148; 210; 222; 223; 226; 228; 229; 246; 248; 251; 252; 253; 255; 256; 259; 260; 261; 262 Segesta (nymph) 222 Segestani 222 Selinous 132; 136; 137; 138; 139; 141; 142; 143; 144; 145; 156; 158; 162; 166; 172; 234; 236; 237; 238; 240 Servius Fulvius Paetinus Nobilior 234 Siceliotes 73; 100; 129; 171; 212; 217; 229 Sicels 146 Sicily: 11; 12; 13; 17; 18; 19; 20; 21; 22; 24; 26; 27; 30; 31; 32; 34; 39; 41; 42; 43; 44; 49; 52; 53; 54; 55; 56; 58; 61; 63; 67; 69; 71; 72; 73; 74; 75; 77; 78; 79; 80; 81; 82; 85; 86; 91; 92; 93; 94; 95; 99; 100; 101; 102; 103; 104; 106; 107; 110; 111; 112; 114; 115; 117; 118; 119; 120; 121; 122; 123; 124; 125; 126; 127; 129; 131; 132; 134; 136; 137; 138; 139; 140;

320

General Index

141; 143; 144; 145; 147; 148; 149; 150; 151; 152; 153; 154; 156; 157; 158; 159; 160; 162; 164; 165; 166; 167; 168; 169; 170; 171; 172; 173; 174; 175; 179; 180; 181; 184; 186; 188; 191; 192; 193; 194; 195; 196; 197; 198; 199; 201; 202; 203; 204; 205; 206; 207; 208; 209; 210; 211; 212; 213; 214; 215; 216; 219; 220; 221; 222; 223; 224; 225; 226; 227; 228; 229; 230; 232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 237; 238; 240; 241; 242; 244; 245; 246; 247; 248; 249; 250; 251; 252; 253; 254; 256; 257; 258; 259; 260; 261; 262; 263; 267; 268; 269 Sid 161 Sidicines 104; 105 Sikanians 146 Sila 39; 41; 106 Silenus 24; 28 Silius Italicus 45 Simetus (river) 31; 34; 37; 58; 67; 214 Sittana 230 Solous: 145; 146; 151; 152; 153; 165; 198; 204; 221; 236; 256 Sosistratus (rival of Agathocles) 70; 71 Sosistratus (tyrant of Syracuse) 53; 61; 70; 71; 72; 73; 75; 79; 80; 81; 117; 129; 130; 131; 132; 141; 170; 171; 172; 173; 181 Sostratus 69; 70; 73; 79 Spain 122; 221 Spartiates 232 Spinasanta (valley) 139 Stephanus of Byzantium 41; 145; 146; 244 Sthennius Calenius 47 Sthennius Mettius 38; 39; 41; 47 Strabo 41; 49; 191; 227 Strait of Messina 21; 37; 39; 41; 43; 44; 48; 52; 55; 58; 75; 92; 94; 95; 102; 106; 110; 111; 112; 113; 114; 192; 198; 203; 204; 205; 238; 240 Successors (Diadochoi) 119; 219; 267; 268 Sulla 39 Sulmona 47 Syneis 205 Syracusans : 26; 29; 30; 32; 33; 56; 57; 58; 59; 63; 67; 68; 69; 70; 72; 75; 80; 81; 82; 85; 100; 179; 180; 181; 184; 192; 198; 202; 203; 205; 206; 207; 208; 211; 212; 214; 215; 217; 218; 245; 250 Syracuse : 11; 12; 13; 17; 18; 19; 22; 25; 26; 27; 28; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33; 34; 35; 36; 37; 44; 51; 52; 53; 54; 55; 56; 57; 58; 59; 60; 63; 64; 65; 66; 67; 69; 70; 71; 72; 73; 74; 75; 77; 79; 80; 81; 83; 84; 93; 95; 99; 100; 102; 108; 114; 115; 116; 117; 118; 119; 120; 124; 125;

126; 127; 128; 129; 130; 131; 132; 133; 145; 146; 157; 159; 160; 166; 167; 169; 170; 171; 173; 179; 180; 181; 182; 183; 184; 185; 186; 187; 188; 189; 191; 192; 193; 194; 196; 197; 198; 199; 200; 201; 204; 205; 206; 207; 208; 209; 210; 211; 212; 213; 214; 215; 216; 217; 218; 219; 220; 221; 222; 224; 225; 226; 228; 231; 234; 237; 239; 240; 241; 244; 250; 251; 252; 256; 263; 267; 268; 269 Syrakosia (ship) 220 Tanit 155; 165; 166 Taras 76; 77; 78; 80; 81; 82; 85; 86; 92; 93; 99; 100; 101; 102; 105; 110; 113; 117; 125; 127; 129; 171 Tarentines 101; 129; 174 Tauriani 43; 44; 45 Tauricana 39; 41 Tauromenium 24; 34; 38; 54; 55; 72; 99; 100; 113; 114; 115; 116; 118; 130; 168; 183; 194; 195; 197; 208; 209; 210; 213; 214; 215; 216; 219; 220; 247 Terias (river) 54; 57; 70; 74; 114 Terme 229; 236; 237 Termopile 232 Terrasini 172 Tharros 144 Theocritus 184 Theopompus 145 Theoxena 23 Thermae Selinuntiae 136 Thetis 122 Thoinon 69; 70; 71; 72; 73; 75; 79; 80; 81; 117; 129; 130; 170; 171; 172; 181 Thucydides 90; 145; 223 Thurii 105 Tiberius Claudius Antias 253; 254; 258; 261; 262 Timaeus 24; 25; 38; 40; 108; 109; 120; 121; 149; 168; 175; 179; 182; 183 Timasiteus 227; 228 Timoleon 37; 140; 190; 214; 253; 254; 256; 257; 258 Tiriolo 111 Tirittus 222 Titus Otacilius Crassus 227 Torano Castello 112 Torre Mordillo 112 Torre Inferriata (necropolis) 42 Trapani 150 Trebisacce 107 Tresilico 44; 45 Triokala 138 Troy 222; 223

General Index Tusa 208 Tyndarion 54; 55; 56; 72; 114 Tyndaris 193; 197; 198; 222; 232; 233; 235; 236; 238 Tyrrhenian sea 21; 42; 93; 193; 212 Tyrrhenians 45; 66 Utica 257 Valerius Levinus 76 Valerius Maximus 82; 83; 85; 228 Varro 216 Velletri 258 Venosa 76; 77 Venus (sanctuary in Eryx) 229; 242 Verrius Flaccus 39 via Amendola (Marsala) 162; 163 via Bagnoli (Taormina) 115 via Cesare Battisti (Messina) 51

321

via del Popolo (Marsala) 163 via dei Mille (Messina) 52 via Santa Marta (Messina) 52 viale San Martino (Messina) 51 Vulcanus (god) 237 Xenodicus 36; 186 Xerxes 90 Xiphonia 211 Zeus 26; 27; 50; 61; 68; 122; 125; 166 Zeus Eleutherios 26 Zeus Hellanios 50; 68 Zeus Olympios 235 Zonaras 35; 76; 81; 173; 182; 192; 196; 202; 203; 205; 206; 207; 208; 209; 213; 215; 225; 228; 229; 231; 232; 233; 234; 236; 237; 238; 242

Index of classical references Aelian. App. Arist. Athen. Cato Cic.

Hist. anim. V, 39: 53 Lib. 8, 113: 257 Samn. 9, 1–2: 104 Samn. 10, 1: 88 Samn. 11, 6: 101 Samn. 12, 1: 168, 175 Sik. 2, 2: 215 Sik. 2, 6: 250 pol. 1300a 18: 88 rhet. 1396a 18: 88 Deipn. V, 209d: 182 Deipn. V, 206e – 209c: 220 Deipn. V, 209e: 220 Deipn. VI, 253a: 26 Deipn. XIV, 614c: 26 fr. 83 Peter: 231 Verr. II, 2, 123: 249 Verr. II, 3, 13: 197, 210, 220, 247, 248 Verr. II, 4, 72: 222 Verr. II, 5, 83: 210, 261 Verr. II, 5, 133: 247

Dio Cass. XI, fr. 43, 1: 196 XI, fr. 43, 6: 40 XI, fr. 43, 5–6: 203 XI, fr. 43, 8: 203 XI, fr. 43, 10: 204 Diod. XI, 1, 5: 153 XI, 2, 1: 153 XIV, 48, 4–5: 145 XIV, 93, 3–5: 228 XIV, 93, 5: 227 XV, 73, 2: 257 XVI, 67, 3: 257 XVI, 70, 6: 256 XVI, 73, 2: 257 XVI, 74, 5: 219 XVI, 83, 3: 214 XX, 11, 1: 45 XX, 31, 4–5: 36 XX, 56, 2: 186 XX, 56, 3: 186 XX, 62, 2–5: 186

XX, 64, 2: 45 XX, 71, 1–5: 19 XXI, 15, 1: 26 XXI, 16, 1: 20 XXI, 16, 2: 18, 19, 20 XXI, 16, 3: 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 219 XXI, 16, 4: 19, 25, 219 XXI, 16, 5: 26, 30 XXI, 16, 6: 26, 27, 28, 29 XXI, 16, 7: 18 XXI, 18, 1: 30, 31, 32, 34, 37 XXI, 18, 3: 33, 34, 37 XXII, 1, 2–3: 104, 109 XXII, 2, 1: 53, 56, 59, 60, 63, 67 XXII, 2, 2: 35, 56, 59 XXII, 2, 3: 56, 58, 60 XXII, 2, 4: 57, 60 XXII, 6, 1: 76 XXII, 6, 2: 76 XXII, 7, 1: 61 XXII, 7, 2: 63, 69, 70 XXII, 7, 3: 69, 79, 81 XXII, 7, 4: 95 XXII, 7, 5: 85, 92, 105 XXII, 7, 6: 53, 71, 72, 75, 79, 80, 130 XXII, 8, 2: 102, 113 XXII, 8, 3: 54, 113, 114, 116 XXII, 8, 4: 71, 72, 117, 130 XXII, 8, 5: 53, 54, 67, 79, 102, 117 XXII, 10, 1: 61, 73, 79, 130, 131 XXII, 10, 2: 132, 133, 136, 141, 226 XXII, 10, 3: 150 XXII, 10, 4: 151, 156, 157 XXII, 10, 5: 157, 164 XXII, 10, 6: 157, 164 XXII, 10, 7: 157, 164, 167 XXII, 13, 1: 192, 195 XXII, 13, 1–2: 173 XXII, 13, 2: 193, 220 XXII, 13, 9: 204 XXII, 13, 10: 199

324

Index of classical references

XXIII, 1, 1: 198 XXIII, 1, 2: 204 XXIII, 1, 3: 205 XXIII, 1, 4: 34, 35 XXIII, 2, 1: 203 XXIII, 3: 206 XXIII, 4: 208, 211, 212, 215, 222 XXIII, 4, 1: 209, 213 XXIII, 5: 222 XXIII, 7, 1: 223 XXIII, 8: 224 XXIII, 8, 2: 261 XXIII, 9: 231 XXIII, 9, 1: 225, 229, 248 XXIII, 9, 4: 248 XXIII, 9, 5: 229, 230, 248 XXIII, 18, 1: 234 XXIII, 18, 3: 235 XXIII, 18, 4: 236 XXIII, 18, 5: 236, 249 XXIII, 20: 237 XXIII, 21, 2: 238 XXIV, 1, 1: 238 XXIV, 1, 4: 240 XXIV, 1, 6: 241 XXIV, 1, 7: 241 XXIV, 1, 10–11: 242 XXIV, 6: 243 XXIV, 8–9: 244 XXIV, 15: 216 Dionys. XX, 4, 3–8: 104 Hal. XX, 8, 1: 69, 117, 120, 168 XX, 8, 2: 168 XX, 8, 3: 117, 168, 170 XX, 8, 4: 170 XX, 15, 1–2: 106 Duris

FGrHist 76 F 46: 145

Enn.

Ann. VIII, 298: 47

Eutr.

II, 13, 4: 76 II, 18: 206 II, 19, 1: 208, 209, 212, 213 II, 24: 235 III, 1: 220

Fest.

s.v. Mamertini, fr. 150 L.: 38, 39 s.v. meddix, fr. 123 M.: 47

Flor.

II, 2: 206

Herod.

V, 30, 18: 90 V, 43, 1: 149 VI, 48, 7: 90 VII, 21, 6: 90 VII, 36: 90 VII, 97, 9: 90 VII, 147, 12: 90

Hellan.

FGrHist 4 F 31: 223

Herodian.

Pros. Catholica III, 1, 368: 41

Il.

V, 185: 149 VI, 101: 149 IX, 238: 149

Iust. XVII, 3, 3–4: 149 XVIII, 2, 1–5: 82 XVIII, 2, 12: 101 XXIII, 2, 3: 19 XXIII, 2, 5: 19, 22 XXIII, 2, 6: 22, 23 XXIII, 2, 13: 22, 30, 31 XXIII, 3, 2: 120 XXIII, 3, 7–10: 174 XXIII, 4, 2: 183, 184 XXIII, 4, 4: 182 Prologus XXIII: 23, 174 Liv. V, 28, 2–3: 228 XXIV, 4, 6–8: 219 XXIV, 6, 8: 220 XXIV, 29, 12: 215 XXIV, 30, 1: 214, 215 XXIV, 35, 1–2: 214 XXIV, 44, 4: 246 XXV, 40, 4: 215 XXVI, 6, 13: 47 Periocha XIII: 85 Periocha XVI: 206 Periocha XVII: 231 Naev.

fr. 39 Büchner: 232

Oros.

IV, 3, 4: 108 IV, 7: 206 IV, 7, 6: 225 IV, 8, 2: 231 IV, 8, 5: 232 IV, 9, 14: 235

Paus.

I, 12, 5: 74, 81 IV, 35, 3: 220

Index of classical references

VI, 3, 12: 191 VI, 12, 2–3: 214, 220 VI, 12, 4: 182, 183

Philist.

FGrHist 556 F 11: 180 FGrHist 556 F 38: 244

Plat.

Hipp. maior 295d: 90

Plin.

nat. VII, 214: 208 nat. XXII, 11: 231

Plut.

Cam. 8, 5–8: 228 Cat. min. 67: 257 Marc. 14, 12: 216 Pyrrh. 14, 4–14: 77, 167 Pyrrh. 21, 15: 76 Pyrrh. 22, 1–4: 77 Pyrrh. 22, 4: 100 Pyrrh. 22, 5: 101 Pyrrh. 22, 6: 102, 133 Pyrrh. 22, 7: 124 Pyrrh. 22, 7–12: 148 Pyrrh. 23, 1: 173, 193 Pyrrh. 23, 2–3: 157 Pyrrh. 23, 3: 167, 172 Pyrrh. 23, 3–4: 168 Pyrrh. 23, 4–5: 170 Pyrrh. 23, 5: 172 Pyrrh. 23, 5–6: 174 Pyrrh. 23, 7: 175 Tim. 12, 2: 194

Polyaen

Strat. V, 15: 24 Strat. V, 37: 70 Strat. VI, 6, 4: 196 Strat. VI, 16, 5: 228

Polyb.

I, 7, 1–2: 37, 38, 45 I, 7, 6–9: 103 I, 8, 1: 108 I, 8, 3: 179, 181 I, 8, 4: 181, 182, 183, 184 I, 9, 3: 38, 187 I, 9, 6: 188 I, 9, 7: 188 I, 10, 1: 201 I, 10, 1–2: 200 I, 10, 2: 40 I, 11, 2: 202 I, 11, 4: 204 I, 11, 6: 205 I, 11, 11: 205

I, 11, 12: 205 I, 12, 1–3: 205 I, 15, 1–4: 206 I, 16, 1–2: 207 I, 16, 4: 212 I, 16, 9: 212 I, 17, 3: 213 I, 17, 4–6: 221 I, 17, 9: 223 I, 18, 5: 223, 227 I, 18, 9: 224 I, 18, 11: 225 I, 19, 7: 225 I, 20, 4–6: 227 I, 23, 1: 229 I, 24, 3: 229 I, 24, 9–10: 230 I, 24, 11: 248 I, 24, 12: 232, 248 I, 25, 1–4: 232 I, 29, 10: 234 I, 38, 1: 235 I, 38, 7: 235 I, 39, 5: 237 I, 39, 12–13: 237 I, 41, 6: 238 I, 42,6–7: 160, 239 I, 43, 2: 35 I, 46, 2: 240 I, 53, 7: 238 I, 53, 10: 241 I, 55, 9–10: 242 I, 56, 3–8: 154, 243 I, 58, 2: 242 I, 59, 3–4: 244 I, 83, 2–4: 220 II, 7, 10: 89 III, 25, 1–5: 85, 87 III, 25, 4: 89 III, 42, 2: 89 IV, 10, 4: 89 IV, 52, 7: 89 V, 3, 3: 89 V, 45, 4: 89 V, 46, 10: 89 V, 62, 2: 89 V, 95, 3: 89 V, 108, 1: 89 VII, 4, 5: 118, 220 VII, 5, 2: 216 VII, 8, 2: 183 X, 44, 6: 89 XII, 25: 120

325

326

Index of classical references

XV, 2, 2: 89 XV, 2, 6: 89 XV, 18, 3: 89 XXIV, 6, 3: 89 XXXI, 12, 12: 89 XXXI, 18, 10: 89 Quadrigarius frr. 42–43 Peter: 231 Sil.

Punica XIV, 194–195: 45

Steph. Byz.

s.v. ÔAlikuvai: 145 s.v. ∆Akravgante~: 145 s.v. Doggwvnh: 244 s.v. Mamevrtion: 41 s.v. Movrguna: 180

Strab.

VI, 1, 9. 261: 41 VI, 1, 10. 261: 191 VI, 2, 3. 268: 49, 227

Theocr.

Id. XVI: 184

Theop.

FGrHist 115 F 365: 145

Thuc.

IV, 116: 90 VI, 2, 3: 223 VII, 32: 145

Tim.

FGrHist 566 F 22: 120

Val. Max.

I, 1, 4: 228 III, 7, 10: 82

Varr.

de re rust. 1, 1, 8: 216

Zon.

VIII, 5, 7: 76, 81



VIII, 5, 8: 101 VIII, 5, 11: 173 VIII, 6: 182, 192, 196 VIII, 8: 202, 203 VIII, 9: 203, 205, 206, 208, 209 VIII, 10: 213, 225, 228 VIII, 11: 229, 231 VIII, 12: 231, 232, 233 VIII, 14: 234, 236, 237, 238 VIII, 15, 7: 35 VIII, 16: 242 VIII, 16, 6: 215

CIG

III, 5367: 217

CIL I2, 25: 228 I2, 2877: 260 X, 2204: 47 X, 4675: 47 IG XIV, 2: 182 XIV, 7: 217 XIV, 256–258: 256 XIV, 290: 256 XIV, 421: 55, 56, 219 XIV, 422–430: 219 XIV, 574: 256 XIV, 952: 256 XIV, 953: 256, 257 ILLRP

319: 228 1277: 260

Syll.3

343: 26 396: 182 427: 182 428: 186