Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs 3030644952, 9783030644956

Table of contents :
Foreword
Preface
Contents
Notes on Contributors
Chapter 1: Introduction to African Political Theory of Needs
Introduction
Reasons Motivating a Need-based Project
The Idea of African Political Philosophy in an African Context of Need
References
Chapter 2: The Need for Others in Public Policy: An African Approach
Introducing Relational Values
Two Ways to Value the Need for Others
Motivating the Need for Others as Relational
Virtue
Meaning in Life
Love
Applying the Relational Need for Others
Wealth
Employment
Education
The Fourth Industrial Revolution
Concluding Remarks on the Need for Others as Relational
References
Chapter 3: Afro-Communitarian Personhood and the Political Philosophy of Needs
Introduction
Afro-Communitarianism and the Political Philosophy of Needs
Afro-communitarianism Personhood and the Political Philosophy of Needs
As Afro-communitarian Persons, We Have a Fundamental Need to Care for Others
There Ought to Be a Particular Kind of Relationship Between the Person(s) Who Are Needy, the Providers of Those Needs, That Is It Matters by Whom and How a Need Is Satisfied
Afro-communitarian Personhood, Needs and Justice
Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: Personhood, Dignity, Duties and Needs in African Philosophy
Introduction
Personhood as a Moral Theory
Personhood and the Politics of Duties
Personhood, Duties and Needs
Conclusion
References
Chapter 5: Social Persons and the Normativity of Needs
Introduction
Make Me into a Person, Son of Solomzi
The Normative Conception of Person
The Nature and Normativity of Needs
Conclusion: Two Objections and Replies
References
Chapter 6: Understanding and (Re)configuring Personhood Contra Systemic Dehumanisation
Introduction
Dehumanisation in Kantian Moral Theory
Re-humanisation in the Communitarian Moral View
Morality, Duty and the Rights
Conclusion
References
Chapter 7: Uncovering Needs in African Thought Through Igbo Proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty
Introduction
Theoretical Challenges and Conceptual Clarification
Why Apply Igbo Proverbs to Articulate Needs
A Sketch on Needs in African Thought Through Igbo Proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty
An Analysis of Needs Through Igbo Proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty
A Socio-political Reading of Igbo Proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty
Conclusion
References
Chapter 8: Prioritization of Clashing Needs in African Politics
Introduction
Relationship Between Basic and Non-basic Needs
An Analysis of the Complexity of the Relationship Between the Two Types of Needs
The Importance of Non-basic Needs
Conclusion
References
Chapter 9: Needs, Representation and Institutional Change in Africa
Introduction
Needs and Real Modern Politics
Political Representation
Institutional Change
Conclusion
References
Chapter 10: Duty to Human Needs from African Rights
Introduction
Needs from an African Realist Critique of Human Rights
Needs in African Communitarian Rights: Wiredu and Gyekye
Basic Needs and Natural Rights
Recognition of Needs in Rites of Ubuntu: Ramose and Dladla
References
Index

Citation preview

Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs Edited by Motsamai Molefe Christopher Allsobrook

Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs

Motsamai Molefe  •  Christopher Allsobrook Editors

Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs

Editors Motsamai Molefe Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa University of Fort Hare Alice, South Africa

Christopher Allsobrook Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa University of Fort Hare Alice, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-030-64495-6    ISBN 978-3-030-64496-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Margaret Thatcher would hate this book. In an interview with Woman’s Own magazine in 1987, Thatcher said, ‘you know, there’s no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families’. Had Thatcher read more African philosophy perhaps she would have encountered the famous counter-argument by Ifeanyi Menkiti that actually it is society that exists, not individuals. For Menkiti it is more realistic to start with the community and to recognise that it is the community that makes us into a person by naming us, giving us our language, our accent, educating us, rewarding us with recognition for good behaviour and punishing us for bad. We may be born human but society makes us persons. In fact, Menkiti continues, we need to recognise how, as persons, we live on in the community after our bodies die, being remembered by friends and family in ways that influence their lives, as if we were living beings with power over them. For example, when Boris Johnson quipped, ‘there is such a thing as society’, in response to the Covid-19 virus in early 2020, many saw him as repudiating Thatcher, as distinguishing himself from her influence, as marking himself free from a women dead some eight years earlier. As this example illustrates, philosophy can call into question our deepest assumptions about reality, about what exists, and who exists, and what this means for society and therefore politics. Had Thatcher read more African philosophy perhaps she also would have appreciated how her community denied some people the right to become ‘individuals’. Those deemed unworthy in terms of sex, language, religion and race, could never v

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achieve recognition of full personhood—expressed in her context as ‘the individual’. This example also illustrates the unique and powerful contribution of African philosophy in understanding contemporary life. In her interview with Woman’s Own magazine, Thatcher extended on her comment that ‘there is no such thing as society’ with the claim: And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look after themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then, also, to look after our neighbours.

However, if Menkiti is right and society does exist before persons do, then maybe we have a duty not just to ourselves and to our neighbours, but to our community more widely too. Surely too, we have collective needs such as national security, as well as group needs for recognition, and individual needs like food and water. If this is right, what are these collective, group and individual needs exactly, how should we understand them, and what should we do to meet them? What is the role of collective actors and especially the state in these processes? These, and more, are the questions about needs that are tackled by the contributors to this book. Indeed, the editors have done a fantastic job of gathering both emerging and established African political philosophers, including National Research Fund (NRF) chairs, Directors of Institutes and A-rated scholars into this ground-breaking publication. Excitingly, this edition is intended as the first in a series of ongoing themed books in African philosophy planned by the editors. I started this foreword by saying that Margaret Thatcher would hate this book. I want to finish by saying that Nelson Mandela would love it. African philosophy tends towards affirming the responsibility of the collective, of democratic politics; it sees in us all the potential to meet our collective needs, and the indivisibility of aspects of social being. This spirit flows through Mandela’s writings. I quote: I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else’s freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity. For to be free is not merely to cast off one’s chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others.

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Against the idea that needs must be met individually first, Mandela, like African philosophy, tends to the opposite view, that needs must be met collectively or mutually, as we are socially inter-dependent. In a global context where wants seem to trump needs, and rights trump duties, and both tend to reinforce rather than constrain the scramble for money and power, a return to the concept of needs is both refreshing and promising. Are there ways of re-thinking ourselves collectively, and organising systems accordingly, such that social relations can be transformed into a more positive sum game? Surely the African intellectual legacy of thinking to consensus, working for inclusion, giving priority to needs and affirming the common good are under-explored resources that could help humanity think its way out of the negative-sum spiral that currently confronts us. Cape Town, South Africa

Laurence Piper

Preface

Our objective with this volume has been to bring to wider attention innovative developments in political theory from sub-Saharan Africa. The editors, Motsamai Molefe and Christopher Allsobrook, are based at the University of Fort Hare, an institution with a long tradition in political theory, where students such as Nelson Mandela, Chris Hani and Robert Sobukwe have challenged the colonial presumption that Blacks should be restricted to practice. Where disputes over ideas and ideology were once heated, post-­ liberation politics in Africa since the 1990s has focused more on practical matters, such as elections, party politics and personalities, development, debt, disease, poverty, crime and corruption. Theory has often taken a back seat. But widening inequality and slow transformation put under pressure the truce that set aside differences between liberalism, socialism, African nationalism, pan-Africanism and so on. As we see, with US President Donald Trump, the unrealistic realist, no wealth of attention to masses of empirical data makes up for poverty in principled normative theory. Calls for access to higher education and toppling of statues follow with critique of standard solutions that neither recognise nor hold together our diverse polity, nor equip us to deal with challenges like racism, digitalisation, global warming and wars in information and trade. This collection does not address these problems directly but presents responses whose African situation demands consideration of the practically embedded place of theory. In flow between location, abstraction and purpose, with ix

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emancipatory, communitarian concern, African philosophy is well suited to consideration of the concept of Need. Need demands normative consideration of political interests in empirical matters. If Africa is thought to stand in need, we should recognise that the world needs Africa not just for raw resources but also for fresh approaches to social organisation, which transcend traditional distinctions in theoretical stagnation, between liberal and socialist, left and right. This volume brings together a number of theorists associated with the African Political Theory Association (APTA). We intend to extend this to a series on neglected political concepts to be systematised and theorised, such as Dignity, Tenure, Trusteeship and Consent, the aim of which is to promote the work of innovative thinkers contributing to a critical renaissance in African politics through a return to normative theory. East London, South Africa 

Motsamai Molefe Christopher Allsobrook

Contents

1 Introduction to African Political Theory of Needs  1 Motsamai Molefe and Christopher Allsobrook 2 The Need for Others in Public Policy: An African Approach 21 Thaddeus Metz 3 Afro-Communitarian Personhood and the Political Philosophy of Needs 39 Rianna Oelofsen 4 Personhood, Dignity, Duties and Needs in African Philosophy 57 Motsamai Molefe 5 Social Persons and the Normativity of Needs 87 Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe 6 Understanding and (Re)configuring Personhood Contra Systemic Dehumanisation109 Mpho Tshivhase

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7 Uncovering Needs in African Thought Through Igbo Proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty131 Lawrence Ogbo Ugwuanyi 8 Prioritization of Clashing Needs in African Politics151 Bernard Matolino 9 Needs, Representation and Institutional Change in Africa169 Lawrence Hamilton 10 Duty to Human Needs from African Rights187 Christopher Allsobrook Index205

Notes on Contributors

Christopher Allsobrook  is Director of the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa, at the University of Fort Hare, where he is also leader of the Humanities Research Niche Area in ‘Democracy, Heritage and Citizenship’. He is an editor of Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory. He has published in leading journals in political theory, including Angelaki and Politikon. Lawrence  Hamilton (BA [MA], MPhil, PhD Cantab MASSAf) is Professor of Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits); and SARChI/Newton SA-UK Bilateral Research Chair in Political Theory, Wits and Cambridge. He teaches and researches on various topics in political theory from and for the global South, in particular needs, rights, development, democracy, freedom, power and representation. His many articles and books including Amartya Sen (2019), Freedom Is Power: Liberty Through Political Representation (2014), Are South Africans Free? (2014) and The Political Philosophy of Needs (2003). He is working on a book on the future of democracy. Bernard Matolino  is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal. He specialises in African philosophy, social and political philosophy. He is the author of three books: (1) African Philosophy and Personhood (2014), (2) Democracy as Consensus in Africa (2019) and (3) Afro-Communitarian Democracy (2019). Thaddeus Metz  is a Professor at the University of Pretoria, affiliated with the Department of Philosophy. Metz has published around 250 scholarly xiii

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works in value theory, comparative philosophy, and moral, political and legal philosophy, many of which focus on African themes. Recent books include Jurisprudence in an African Context (with D.  Bilchitz and O. Oyowe, 2017) and Agwa Oma N’Echiche Ndi Afrikana Nkowa Nke (An Account of African Moral Thought, a collection of essays translated into Igbo and edited by L. O. Ugwuanyi, Timeless Publishers 2018). Motsamai  Molefe  is a senior researcher at the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa, at the University of Fort Hare. He is the author of three books: (1) An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality and Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), (2) African Personhood and Applied Ethics (2020) and (3) An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics: A Reflection on Abortion and Euthanasia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). Rianna  Oelofsen  is a senior lecturer at the University of Fort Hare, South Africa. She has held research positions at the Centre for Applied Public Policy and Ethics (CAPPE) at the Australian National University in Canberra, as well as at the Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation in Ireland. Her areas of specialisation and publication include African philosophy; race and gender theory; phenomenology and feminist philosophy. Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe  is a senior lecturer at the University of the Western Cape. His research interests straddle the African and Western philosophical traditions and often find expression at the points of intersection between philosophy and practical moral and political concerns. He has published in a number of top journals. Mpho Tshivhase  is a South African philosopher who teaches applied ethics at the University of Pretoria. Tshivhase became the first black woman to receive a PhD in Philosophy in South Africa in 2018, with her thesis, entitled ‘Towards a Normative Theory of Uniqueness of Persons’. Her research is focused on uniqueness, individuality, race and ethnic relations. Her research includes themes of Love, Death, Religion, Autonomy and Authenticity, amongst other themes relating to personal uniqueness. She has recently written ‘Personhood: Implications for the Moral Status and Uniqueness of Women’, in Handbook of African Philosophy of Difference (2020). Lawrence Ogbo Ugwuanyi  is Professor of Philosophy and Director of Internship and Linkages Services Unit (ILS), University of Abuja, Abuja,

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Nigeria. He is the founder of Centre for Critical Thinking and Resourceful Research in Africa (www.cectraafrica.org). He was a visiting scholar to the University of South Africa (2005); visiting associate professor at the Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo-Zimbabwe (2014); and Deputy Vice Chancellor (Academics and Administration), Legacy University, The Gambia (2018–2019). Ugwuanyi has 53 publications to his name and has published in West African Review (USA), East African Journal of Humanities (Kenya), South African Journal of Philosophy (South Africa), Religions (Switzerland) and Theoria (South Africa). He has won scores of grants to attend conferences, seminars and workshops in several countries.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction to African Political Theory of Needs Motsamai Molefe and Christopher Allsobrook

Introduction This volume is a contribution to African philosophy with a focus on the axiology of a normative political theory of needs. The volume explores the category of need as a primary ground and objective of African moral-­ political thought. Our aim in this opening chapter is to give the reader a bird’s eye view of the volume. The first section discusses the need for such a project on the priority of needs in African political thought. The second section distinguishes two ideas of political philosophy or political theory1 employed by different contributors to the volume, and it proceeds to delimit crucial concepts such as ‘Africa’, ‘need’, ‘community’, ‘ubuntu’ and ‘personhood’. We touch on relevant methodological issues and cover the major ideas canvassed by the contributors. 1

 We use the terms political philosophy and political theory, interchangeably.

M. Molefe (*) • C. Allsobrook Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa, University of Fort Hare, Alice, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Molefe, C. Allsobrook (eds.), Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3_1

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Reasons Motivating a Need-based Project In our view, three central considerations motivate the theorisation of needs as a foundational concept in post-independence (or, post-colonial) African political thought, namely, (i) the centrality of and limitations to Human-Rights-based political theory, (ii) the centrality of communitarian socialism to the philosophical vision of post-independence African political leaders, grounded in satisfaction of basic needs and (iii) the implicit, underacknowledged foundational role attributed to needs in the thinking of pioneers of formalised African philosophy. Firstly, we have been following very closely the emergence and salience of human rights in contemporary African philosophy.2 In the literature, we can distinguish at least five broad theses that attempt to defend the relevance of human rights for typically African traditions of political thought. The reader may be familiar with the radical communitarian position that regards human rights as secondary to the primacy of duties (see Menkiti 1984). This view does not necessarily jettison rights; it simply introduces them as a political measure of last resort in the event that the communitarian mechanisms of consensus-based altruism fail to operate normally and efficiently to secure the good of society as a whole (see Molefe 2019a: Ch. 5). The reader will also be familiar with the moderate communitarian position, which takes human rights and social duties to occupy the same moral standing in Afro-communitarian (Gyekye 1992, 1997; Chemhuru 2018). A just society is one that responds to the human dignity of the individual by simultaneously respecting her negative rights and by providing basic goods necessary for human existence. The third thesis, limited communitarianism, limits the role and scope of duties owed to the community, and places a novel emphasis on human rights in African political theory (Matolino 2014, 2018). The fourth thesis invokes the axiological category of Ubuntu and interprets it in ways that yield a novel view of human rights. On this view, human rights are interpreted in terms of their function for respecting and protecting the human capacity for community or friendliness (e.g., see Metz 2011, 2012). Finally, an under-explored view of the salient category of personhood has been interpreted to embody a novel account of human dignity and rights 2  Each of us have published in the area of human rights in the tradition of African philosophy (see Molefe 2018, 2019a; Allsobrook 2016, 2018). Moreover, recently we co-edited a special issue of Theoria, on ‘African philosophy and Rights’ (see Molefe and Allsobrook 2018).

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in African philosophy (Ikuenobe 2016, 2018). On this view, human dignity and rights are largely a function of the agent conducting themselves in ways that promote communal living and collective well-being.3 The literature has raised serious objections against philosophical attempts to secure human rights in African philosophy. Two kinds of objections stand out against these attempts to secure rights. On the one hand, the idea of human rights is interpreted as a uniquely Western moral-­ political category. The fundamental axiological categories for African political cultures, such as communalism, Ubuntu and/or personhood, do not align well with human rights understood as individual entitlements. Jack Donnelly (1982: 303) puts this argument as follows: most non-Western cultural and political traditions (including Africa) lack not only the practice of human rights but the very concept … the concept of human rights is an artefact of modern Western civilization.

Likewise, consider Claude Ake’s (1987: 5) insightful commentary on the status of rights in Africa: The values implicit in all this [rights] are clearly alien to those of our [African] traditional societies. We put less emphasis on the individual and more on the collectivity, we do not allow that the individual has any claims which may override that of the society. We assume harmony, not divergence of interests, competition and conflict; we are more inclined to think of our obligations to other members of our society rather than our claims against them.

The view that emerges from both these scholars, one a leading political scientist from the West and another from Africa, is that values inherent in human rights discourse are absent from and alien to Africa. A careful analysis of salient moral categories in African cultures reveals persistent commitment to the idea and ideal of human dignity, but this is usually protected by appeal to means other than rights (see Cobbah 1987). The moral categories prevalent in African cultures—ubuntu, personhood, humanism, ujamaa and so on—are socially oriented and operate on the logic of care, 3  One of us defends a theory of human rights in the African tradition distinct from the five outlined above (see Allsobrook 2018), which takes the normativity of human rights to be predicated on universal principles grounded in recognised customary norms, rather than on essential ontological attributes of human personhood.

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empathy and altruism. Most recent efforts to insert human rights into contemporary African polity, as captured in the Banjul Charter, call our attention to the collective or to people’s rights, to convey a communitarian political orientation whose foremost concern is the good of all, rather than the good of each individual qua individual (see Sandel 1982; Neal and Paris 1990). Essentially, the objection to human rights in Africa is that human rights are not traditionally recognised in African cultures. Morality, law and politics are grounded in community in Africa and not on claims held by individuals as entitlements against the state (Cobbah 1987; Molefe 2018). A second objection to attributing a central role to human rights in African law and politics is raised by Anthony Oyowe (2013, 2014), who evaluates various salient philosophical attempts to defend the centrality of human rights to African political thought: This paper contests specifically the position that a conception of human rights is culturally relative by way of contesting the claim that there is an African case in point. That is, it contests the claim that there is a unique theory of rights. It analyses three examples of what often passes as African conception of human rights arguing that they have little or nothing to do with human rights, are simply inadequate or are not African in the sense at issue in a cultural relativism. (2014: 329, emphasis mine)

In the essay under consideration, Oyowe distinguishes radical, moderate communitarianism and ubuntu-inspired interpretations of human rights. In the final analysis, he observes that the literature ought not to classify these accounts as political theories of human rights; instead, we should rightly interpret them, at best, as political theories of duties. This conclusion should not be surprising given that the concepts of personhood, ubuntu and communalism tend to embody other-regarding virtues like care, compassion, kindness and so on, which place an emphasis on promoting the welfare of others in society (see Donnelly 1982; Molefe 2019a). It is on the basis of such critiques of the dominance and shortcomings of human rights-based approaches to African political theory in the literature, which, in part, motivated us to take up the research presented in this volume, into the primacy of needs as an axiological category of African political thought. The second reason for our focus on need in African political thought derives from historical facts relating to the post-independence politics of

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African countries in the late 1950s and 1960s. In some sense, a special group of leaders emerges on a special occasion when the African continent required leadership and a political re-orientation beyond colonisation to lead the continent to a trajectory of freedom, development and prosperity. We have in mind leaders like Nkrumah, Senghor, Nyerere, Awolowo, Kaunda and Sekou Toure. These leaders appreciated the importance of philosophy in leading Africa to development and prosperity. Though they assigned themselves the urgent task to develop practical political programmes and policies, they also sought to ground these on sound theoretical, cultural and philosophical underpinnings. It is for this reason that Wiredu bestows on these leaders the status of philosopher kings, since they tried to build robust post-colonial societies informed by philosophical thought drawing on plausible features of African communalism (see Wiredu 1998). We can here think of Nkrumah’s Consciencism, Kaunda’s Zambian Humanism and Nyerere’s ujamaa as philosophical basis for their social reconstruction and development of Africa. The views advanced by these leaders, though they were associated with a Western socialist political orientation, should properly be appreciated in relation to an historical epoch dominated by the ideological divide imposed by the struggle between Western [American] capitalism and Soviet Communism. These African leaders and thinkers believed that traditional African societies were much closer, in terms of moral and political orientation, to socialism than to the capitalist framework. The political association of Afro-communitarian thought with socialism, in our view, is important because it signals the primacy of social needs, rather than individual human rights, as a normative concept for distinctively African political projects of communitarianism that emerged with independence. Think about it! Socialism operates on the axiological logic of the primacy of needs to regulate the distribution of goods among human beings. Remember the famous socialist maxim—from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. Nyerere’s political programme of ujamaa embodies an instantiation of this need-based socio-political philosophy. Nyerere affirms the centrality of needs by tacitly invoking the family as a political model for developing a robust society. Notice Michael Jennings’ (2013: n.p) comment on the political agenda of ujamaa: The idea of Ujamaa emerged from the writing and speeches of Tanzania’s first president, Julius K Nyerere, from the late 1950s and into the 1960s. Usually translated as ‘familyhood,’ it was a form of African socialism that

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blended broadly conceived socialist principles with a distinctly ‘communitarian’ understanding of African societies, and a strong commitment to egalitarian societies. It was to form the bedrock of efforts to institute profound social change from the late 1960s, directed and shaped by the state.

Nyerere’s interpretation of African socialism qua ujamaa points us to the family as the model for conceptualising politics in African thought (Shutte 2009). At the centre of the ideal of the family, in African social and political thought, is the idea of the primary institution that is responsible for ensuring the provision of basic human needs as a matter of duty (Shutte 2001). The family, as the model of securing individual needs, ought to inspire our political institutions, like the state and its subsidiaries, to prioritise the provision of public goods understood in terms of needs. To further clarify the centrality of the family, as one way to make sense of the African socialist political views, consider the contrast between the ‘individual luck principle’ and ‘parental debt principle’ (Oruka and Juma 1994). On the former principle, the individual is conceived as self-­sufficient and is entitled to whatever he will produce through her talent and effort, and it is her right to use it as she wishes—this principle comes very close to the libertarian view of self-ownership (Kymlicka 1990). The latter principle, on the other hand, prioritises the securing of the needs of all since underprivileged and poor individuals can rely on the other members of the family to provide for them (see Ramose 2003). This comment is instructive on the importance of needs on the family model of politics: The parental debt principle takes precedence over the individual luck principle … Why, for example, would we not see it as senseless that an individual member of a family would want to do anything she wishes with her possessions, while a member of her kith and kin may be in desperate need of her help. (Oruka and Juma 1994: 125)

The point we are making is that the dominant socialist interpretation of political thought in post-independence Africa reflects in no small measure the centrality or primacy of needs in any African axiological system, as captured by the idea of communalism—we say more on communalism below. The centrality of communal needs to most African political formations finds its representative expression in the analogy of a family, which is typically used to represent how political institutions ought to operate on

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society, where the collective, common needs of individuals are the primary political point of focus (see Behrens 2013). The final reason that points us to the primacy of the foundational concept of need in African political thought stems from its underacknowledged centrality to the moral and political ideas of pioneers of formally constituted African philosophy, such as Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye, Kwasi Wiredu, Henry Odera Oruka, Dismas Masolo and many others. Some of these thinkers feature significantly in the volume. Many of their writings show an appreciation of the relevance and importance of human rights. It is equally true that they also point us to the salience of needs as an important component of Afro-communitarianism (see Wiredu 1996; Gyekye 1997; Masolo 2004). For example, Gyekye, throughout his writings in political philosophy, insists on the centrality of basic needs and human responsibility in Afro-communitarian thought (see Gyekye 1992, 1997, 2010). The same conclusion holds true in relation to Wiredu’s interpretation of Afro-communitarian thought (see Wiredu 1992, 2008). Masolo (2004: 494) points out that the African moral-political system operates on the logic of the ‘economy of affection’, which ‘builds on empathy and other such altruistic feelings’, at the heart of which lies the importance attached to ‘helping [the] needy’ (ibid.: 493). Odera Oruka’s (1997) ethical and political vision of the human minimum embodies a need-based moral-political category in African thought (see Graness 2015). An interpretation of Oruka’s human minimum as embodying a needs-based approach is suggested by Jonathan Chimakonam (2020: 105–106, emphasis mine) when he defines it to refer to the sum of basic provisions a state must guarantee to its citizens, without which it is impossible for citizens to act rationally. In the absence of this human minimum, Oruka argues that people will suffer from compromising poverty that will rob them their dignity and self-worth, making it impossible for them to act rationally most of the time.

We have discussed three indications in the literature on African ethical and political thought that suggests the salience of the concept of need as a significant normative basis for political decision-making and distributive legitimacy in African political theory. In the following section, we distinguish two distinct approaches to political philosophy taken by different contributors to the volume and we clarify the use of related concepts, including Africa, needs, communalism, ubuntu and personhood.

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The Idea of African Political Philosophy in an African Context of Need Let us begin with the general idea of political philosophy underpinning this volume. We acknowledge that not all contributions in the volume follow this interpretation of political philosophy, but they admit of the general distinction. Louis Pojman (2002: xi), a leading expert of moral and political philosophy in the Western tradition, known for his rejection of ethnocentrism, in defence of certain universal categories of political philosophy, defines the general discipline in two related ways, distinguishing primary and secondary aspects of political philosophy as follows. The primary aspect or function of political philosophy addresses ‘the nature and purpose of government’ or the state. In this sense, political philosophy consists of questions relating to the state, its legitimacy, as well as justifications for and limits on its existence, its role, its purpose, its coercive apparatus, the rule of law and so on. In the primary sense, political philosophy is concerned with ‘political action’, that is, with actions relating to the state acting on behalf of and for the sake of society and its citizens—the whole question of representation (Strauss 1957: 353; see also Hamilton 2003). The essential question regarding the primary sense to conceptualise political philosophy revolves around the question of the state and its legitimacy and purpose in human societies (Kymlicka 1990). The second aspect of political philosophy Pojman distinguishes is concerned with ‘concepts and theories’ that are crucial to make sense of a just or justifiable social and ‘political order’, such as, ‘the nature of [the] value of justice, liberty, equality, political obligation, moral perfectionism, nationalism, globalism, and sovereignty’ (Pojman 2002: xi). In this book, questions relating to the state, its legitimacy and its representation are in the background of most of the discussions, but the major focus is on secondary concepts and theories which help to make sense of political action and socio-political order in the context of an African theoretical framework. The specific moral-political concept of need, as reflected in typically African conceptualisations of normative orders, will be the focus of theorisation taking place in the volume. To appreciate our understanding of this general account of political philosophy, a few of the following clarifications are crucial. First, it is important to distinguish political science from political philosophy. Political scientists generally focus on describing facts relating to the state, its institutions and its functions. Hence, political science tends to take a

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descriptive posture towards politics as a subject matter. For example, political scientists tend to focus on empirical considerations relating to the actual functionings of extant political institutions, agencies, arrangements, policies and so on. Political philosophy, on the other hand, typically tends to be concerned with normative enquiry, pivoting on questions of ‘ultimate value’ (Kymlicka 1990: 3). For this reason, the task of political philosophy involves political philosophers engaged in normative reflections on question relating to the state and/or a society, with the view to unfold the normative basis for the intersection of the two. To pursue normative political exposition, most of the authors in the volume take the idea of need as the foundational value in African political philosophy. Though the book largely takes a normative political orientation, it is crucial that we distinguish a subtle and, at times, an overt disjuncture between two distinct approaches to political philosophy taken by different authors in the volume. The disjuncture that plays itself out in the volume is of a meta-ethical or methodological nature. Whereas, some scholars are strictly engaged in normative political theorisation, drawing on African thought, without touching concrete reality of lived experience in the African continent, there is a sense that other authors are engaged directly with reality on the ground, and want to theorise through and from concrete reality. The reader will notice that Thaddeus Metz, Marianna Oelofsen, Anthony Oyowe, Motsamai Molefe and Mpho Tshivhase take an approach to normative political theorisation, which proceeds from objective normative ideas to the formation of moral-political theory, which, in turn, they apply or prescribe on real and material circumstances on the ground. This approach to political theorisation is, in some crucial sense like that of Descartes and Kant, which Souleymane Diagne (2016: 2–3) appositely describes in this fashion: Descartes who closed the door of his heated room on the disparate, variegated world, lacking foundation in reason, so as to better apply his attention to eternal truths. Similarly, Kant insisted on ‘purity’ in matters of moral philosophy, which must be carefully and completely cleaned of all empirical elements.

On this approach, the philosophical activity focuses on the intersection of ideas and theorisation, in their abstractness, and the empirical elements, material reality, benefits from the prescriptions of the outcomes of philosophical theorisation.

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Two considerations are crucial to appreciate about the above-­mentioned contributors that use a largely theoretical approach to needs in the volume. Firstly, most of these scholars, for their moral-political analysis and contribution to the discourse on needs in African thought, rely on the salient African axiological concept of personhood—we say more on this concept below.4 Secondly, the reader will also notice that these chapters form the first part of the book, where the reader will encounter various interpretations of the idea and ideal of personhood [virtue] as the basis for need-based moral-theoretical views. On the other hand, Christopher Allsobrook, Bernard Matolino and Lawrence Hamilton, proceed dynamically, with a basis in immanent critique, from an agonistic context of material conditions to the normative basis of political ideas and back, where the intersection of reality and theory influences the process of theorisation politically. Hamilton’s (2003: 25) comment illuminates this approach: An analysis of needs based on forms of needs and particular and general needs provides a means of understanding how concepts and material reality interact, and how this process occurs with regard to the concept of needs and thus affects the nature of needs … the causality is bidirectional: ideas and material reality interact causally on one another.

On this approach, the relationship between ideas [theory] and empirical [material] reality is causally bi-directional. These thinkers are explicitly resistant, to use the phrase of theorist Raymond Geuss (2008) to ‘politics as applied ethics’. We raise such meta-ethical and methodological issues in order that the reader appreciates the theoretical disjunctures at play in the volume; unfortunately, they never quite receive attention in their own right. We hope colleagues and academics interested in the area of needs and political philosophy in Africa and the global south will join the discussion and contribute in this direction. 4  I caution the reader to notice the difference between two distinct moral notions of personhood. Metz, Oyowe, and Molefe use the idea of a person to refer to a moral agent exuding with virtue, whereas Tshivhase uses the idea of personhood in the sense of moral status, which concept identifies moral patients (see Behrens 2013; Molefe 2019a, 2020). The notion of personhood qua virtue is agent-centred insofar as it assigns personhood relative to conduct and performance, whereas the notion of personhood qua moral status is patientcentred, where personhood is assigned relative to possessing relevant ontological features (see Molefe 2020).

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Now that we have clarified how we understand the idea of political theory, the reader must have noted that we have not commented on two central concepts related to the project—‘African’, as it relates to the title of the book, and ‘needs’, as the primary theme of the book. We quickly turn to these concepts below, starting with the concept of Africa or African, alongside a few related concepts, which include communalism, ubuntu and personhood. We are quick to caution the reader that we do not use the idea of Africa in a way that imagines a static and homogenous whole. Rather, we understand the term to represent a heterogeneous region, characterised by all kinds of diversity and complexity in social, cultural, economic and political outlooks. For the purposes of this book, we will use the concept of Africa in two related ways. Oyowe (2014: 330) makes this instructive comment regarding the concept of Africa: The term African is potentially problematic. Along the way, I shall rely on a distinction between two senses of the term: One picks out a geographical category merely while the other refers to a family of ideas distinctive of cultures in the geographical area denoted as Africa.

Oyowe begins by alerting us to how the concept of Africa is potentially problematic. He proceeds, however, to single out two uses of this term that are uncontroversial and unproblematic insofar as they are descriptively useful to facilitate meaningful discourses. Oyowe specifies two distinct senses of the term Africa. On the one hand, the concept of Africa identifies or specifies a particular geographical location or place. In this sense, you can report to friends that you will be touring the continent of Africa or some specific countries in the continent. In this case, you will be pointing to a specific geographic location or place that you will be exploring, which can be explained by appeal to something like a map or Google maps. The second sense of the term Africa identifies a family of ideas distinctive in that geographical context. In this sense, you can identify certain ideas to be prominent in one place in a way that they are not in others. To claim, however, that some idea is distinct to a place [Africa, for example], does not mean that the idea only appears in that place. In Metz’s (2007: 324) adumbrations on this idea of Africa, he makes this important point: They are values that are more often found across not only a certain wide array of space, from Ghana to South Africa, but also a long span of time in that space, from traditional societies to contemporary African intellectuals.

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They are also values that recur more often in the literature on African ethics than in that on Western ethics. So I am speaking of tendencies, not essences.

Talk of some idea or value being African identifies it as being salient in the place Africa, which should not be construed wrongly to mean (1) it is believed by all African people, (2) it is absent from all other places in the world and (3) it is not believed by all non-Africans. In this volume, for example, there will be references to normative ideas of communalism, ubuntu and personhood, which are African ideas in the second sense. These three concepts are especially salient in African ethical thought. In this volume, we use the term African in both senses of the term. We are specifically referring to a place and we are interested in ideas salient in this place. Let us consider the ideas of communalism, ubuntu and personhood, each in turn. The reader will see references to the idea of communalism, which features in the writings of Menkiti, Gyekye, Wiredu, Masolo and so on. In the literature in African political thought, scholars use the idea of communalism to capture the moral-political structure of traditional African societies. The concept of communalism is usually invoked as a theoretical resource to address the formative moral and political orientation of most contemporary African societies (see Wiredu 2008; Ramose 2009).5 Whereas the goal is to build contemporary societies, there is a sense that there are values inherent in the discourse of communalism that are timeless, which will help build robust societies. One such timeless concept is that of consensus (Gyekye 1992; Wiredu 1992; Matolino 2018). The reader will see that Allsobrook (also in 2019) and Hamilton both critique the concept of consensus as it is used in the writings of two leading African philosophers, Gyekye and Wiredu, for relying on a confluence of interests in the agonistic context of politics. A related comment is equally fitting regarding the concepts of personhood and ubuntu in African moral-political thought. References to the concept of personhood is a normative category of political discourse, making reference to good conduct, is a salient feature of most African cultures. It is a moral term that signals moral approval or admiration for the moral agent. The moral approval or admiration is a moral reaction that tracks the 5  The reader will do well to take note of Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò’s (2016) essay—‘Against African Communalism’—that provides a trenchant criticism of modern appeals to communalism in African moral and political thought.

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good character of the moral agent. To be denied personhood is to be morally disapproved, as one would be judged to be living below what is befitting a human existence. This concept was popularised in formal academic African philosophy by the pioneering works of Menkiti (1984, 2004), Gyekye (1992, 2010), Wiredu (1996, 2004, 2008, 2009) and Masolo (2004, 2010). More recently, this idea of the normativity of personhood in African political thought and cultural practice is systematically discussed by scholars such as Ikuenobe (2006, 2015, 2016), Oyowe (2013, 2018), Matolino (2011, 2014) and Molefe (2018, 2019a, 2020). The common and dominant view concerning personhood is that it is taken to be a definitive feature of most African ethical thought, as a basis for normative evaluation, and it embodies a perfectionist view of moral agency (see Masolo 2010, Behrens 2013; Ikuenobe 2016). The reader will notice how Metz, Oelofsen, Oyowe and Molefe appeal to this concept to demonstrate the salience of needs in Afro-communitarian thought. The ethical concept of ubuntu is dominant largely among the Bantu-­ speaking peoples of Africa (Ramose 1999; Eze 2005; LenkaBula 2008; Molefe 2019b). Scholars usually explain this concept in terms of the maxim—a person is a person through other persons. A careful analysis of the maxim will reveal that at the heart of the ethical discourse of ubuntu is the idea of personhood, which we discussed above. On the discourse of ubuntu, the goal is for a human being to become a person, a moral exemplar (see Motlhabi and Munyaka 2009; Metz 2010; Molefe 2019a, b). It is in this light that one of us defends the view that personhood and ubuntu amount to the same ethical view (see Molefe 2019a, b, 2020). In fact, Ikuenobe (2016: 445) expresses this view in this fashion— Let me examine this communal idea of personhood that provides the foundation for a plausible African conception of moral dignity and autonomy. This idea has equivalences in different African linguistic groups. In Bantu, it is Ubuntu; it is Unhu in Shona in Zimbabwe, Botho in Tswana of Botswana, and it is captured in Kiswahili by the concept of Harambee, and Nyerere captures it using the idea of Ujamaa.

In this particular essay, Ikuenobe aims to account for the concept of dignity in terms of the Africa communal idea of personhood. Before he does so, he begins by giving the reader some understanding of the African communal idea of personhood in the literature in African philosophy. In this light, he notes that the idea of personhood is linguistically equivalent

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with the concept of ubuntu. Put concretely, to affirm that one is a person and to state that one has ubuntu, amounts to morally praising them for being ‘generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compassionate’ (Tutu 1999: 31). Both moral terms affirm and approve the quality of the character of the agent—these moral terms signal virtues that embody ‘excellences of character’ (Gyekye 2010: n.p). The concept of needs features in two distinct ways that the volume does not fully explore, and it does not resolve. The tension that arises out of this treatment of needs leaves intact a productive critical dynamic. First, there is a noticeable approach to the concept of need that takes it to embody objective and universal conditions of lack, and, on this interpretation of the concept, need can easily be distinguished from desires, wants and preferences (see Miller 2012). On this understanding, needs are characterised as morally salient insofar as they are necessary for leading a satisfactory human life (Braybrooke 1987; Miller 2012). Scholars like Metz, Oyowe and Molefe seem to take this approach towards the concept of need, where it is understood to embody morally salient goods which are necessary for human agency. On the other hand, there is an approach to needs that features significantly in the writings of Lawrence Hamilton (2003) and in his chapter in the volume. Matolino’s contributions seem also to come close to this approach to the concept of needs. Hamilton offers a ‘tripartite categorisation of needs’—vital, social and agency (2003: 22). Roughly, vital needs focus on health and physical goods that sustain human life; these include goods such as food, oxygen, shelter and so on. Particular social needs, roughly, refer to the fact that all needs, in some sense, are contextual and particular. The need for mobility, for example, may be a universal one, but it will take different forms and degrees of importance, depending on the nature of a society in question. Agency needs must also be understood in light of power-relations in social contexts, and we need to be mindful of social structures that legitimate certain needs. Agency needs specify ‘the necessary conditions for the individual and political agency that is characteristic of full human functioning and that enables the participant evaluation of everyday needs’ (ibid.: 36). What is important to notice is that we distinguish two distinct treatments of the concept of needs in the volume. The one treatment of needs regards them as objective, and the role of the moral theorist is to discover them and to apply them to a society. Such an approach is compatible with traditions that produce lists of rights, capabilities or, in this case, needs

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(Griffin 2008; Nussbaum 2011; Miller 2012). The alternative approach insists that needs are wired together with wants, desires and preferences. Needs emerge in social contexts and are fraught with power, contestation, social ills and conditions of scarcity. On this latter view of needs, it is quite foreign and strange to talk of a universal list of needs that applies to all contexts (Hamilton 2013). In the volume, this difference in relation to the treatment of needs manifests throughout the book. Consider, for example, how Oyowe argues ‘making, negotiating and satisfying certain kinds of needs are at the heart of what it means to be a person in community’, though he never quite specifies what he has in mind when he speaks of certain kinds of needs. Matolino, on the other hand, appreciates a disjuncture between basic (physical) needs and non-basic needs (freedom, rights and self-determination) which are so ruptured in African political context that this distinction is rendered otiose. In analysing the reality and history of African politics, he aims to identify which of the two needs, basic and non-basic, ought to take priority. In our discussion of the basic concept of political philosophy, we distinguished a primary and a secondary sense of the general idea. We also noted a meta-ethical/methodological disjuncture between two distinct approaches to political theory and in the discourse on needs. On the one view, needs are treated as an objective concept that we will simply theorise about and apply to a society, and, on the other view, the idea of need is understood as wired intrinsically with material reality and political contexts, which in turn affect our essentially contested conceptions of needs and their relationship to politics. We continue to clarify our understanding of the concept of Africa and needs in the course of the volume.

References Ake, Claudia. 1987. The African context of human rights. Africa Today 34: 5–12. Allsobrook, C. 2016. Toward an African recognition theory of civil rights. In Philosophies of multiculturalism: beyond liberalism, ed. L. Cordeiro-Rodrigues and M. Simendic, 189–208. London: Routledge. ———. 2018. Universal human rights from an African social contract. In Perspectives in social contract theory, ed. E.  Etieyibo, 265–306. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. ———. 2019. Consensual recognition of universal rights in African custom. Angelaki 24 (2): 22–33.

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Behrens, K. 2013. Two ‘normative’ conceptions of personhood. Quest 25: 103–119. Braybrooke, G. 1987. Meeting needs. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chemhuru, M. 2018. African communitarianism and human rights: Towards a compatibilist view. Theoria 65: 37–56. Chimakonam, J. 2020. Is the debate on poverty research a global one? A consideration of the exclusion of Odera Oruka’s ‘human minimum’ as a case of epistemic injustice. In Dimensions of poverty, ed. V. Beck, H. Hahn, and R. Lepenies, 97–114. Cham: Springer. Cobbah, J.A.M. 1987. African values and the human rights: An African perspective. Human Rights Quarterly 9: 309–331. Diagne, B. 2016. The ink of the scholars: Reflections on philosophy in Africa. Oxford: African Book Collective. Donnelly, J. 1982. Human rights and human dignity: An analytic critique of non-­ Western conceptions of human rights. The American Political Science Review 76: 303–316. Eze, O. 2005. Ubuntu: A communitarian response to liberal individualism. Pretoria: University of Pretoria. Geuss, R. 2008. Philosophy and real politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Graness, A. 2015. Is the debate on ‘global justice’ a global one? Some considerations in view of modern philosophy in Africa. Journal of Global Ethics 11 (1): 126–140. Griffin, J. 2008. On human rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gyekye, K. 1992. Person and community in African thought. In Person and community: Ghanaian philosophical studies, ed. K. Gyekye, 101–122. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. ———. 1997. Tradition and modernity: Philosophical reflections on the African experience. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2010. African ethics. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, ed. E.N.  Zalta. Accessed August 20, 2020. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ fall2011/entries/african-­ethics. Hamilton, L. 2003. The political philosophy of needs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2013. Power, Domination and Human Needs. Thesis Eleven 119: 47–62. Ikuenobe, P. 2006. Philosophical perspectives on communalism and morality in African traditions. Lanham: Lexington Books. ———. 2015. Relational autonomy, personhood, and African traditions. Philosophy East & West 65: 1005–1029. ———. 2016. Good and beautiful: A moral-aesthetic view of personhood in African communal traditions. Essays in Philosophy 17: 125–163. ———. 2018. Human rights, personhood, dignity, and African communalism. Journal of Human Rights 17: 589–604.

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Jennings, M. 2013. FBOs in Tanzania. In Handbook of Research on Development and Religion, M Clarke (ed.). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; 491–504. Kymlicka, W. 1990. Contemporary political philosophy: An introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. LenkaBula, P. 2008. Beyond anthropocentricity—Botho/Ubuntu and the quest for economic and ecological justice. Religion and Theology 15: 375–394. Masolo, D. 2004. “Western and African Communitarianism: A Comparison.” In Companion to African Philosophy, edited by K. Wiredu, 483–498. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. ———. 2010. Self and community in a changing world. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Matolino, B. 2011. The (Mal) Function of “it” in Ifeanyi Menkiti’s Normative Account of Person. African Studies Quarterly 12: 23–37. ———. 2014. Personhood in African philosophy. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. ———. 2018. The politics of limited communitarianism. Filosofia Theoretica 7: 101–122. Menkiti, I. 1984. Person and community in African traditional thought. In African philosophy: An introduction, ed. R. Wright, 171–181. Lanham: University Press of America. ———. 2004. On the normative conception of a person. In Companion to African philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 324–331. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Metz, T. 2007. “Toward an African Moral Theory.” Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (3): 321–41. ———. 2010. Human Dignity, Capital Punishment and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights. Journal of Human Rights 9: 81–99. ———. 2011. Ubuntu as a moral theory and human rights in South Africa. African Human Rights Law Journal 11: 532–559. ———. 2012. Developing African political philosophy: Moral-theoretic strategies. Philosophia Africana 14: 61–83. Miller, S. 2012. The ethics of need: Agency, dignity and obligation. New  York: Routledge. Molefe, M. 2018. Personhood and rights in an African tradition. Politikon 45: 217–231. ———. 2019a. An African philosophy of personhood, morality and politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2019b. Ubuntu ethics. International encyclopedia of ethics. Accessed June 15, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee936. ———. 2020. An African ethics of personhood and bioethics: A reflection on abortion and euthanasia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Molefe, M., and C.  Allsobrook. 2018. Editorial: African philosophy and rights. Theoria 65: v–vii.

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Motlhabi, M., and M. Munyaka. 2009. Ubuntu and its socio-moral significance. In African ethics: An anthology of comparative and applied ethics, ed. F.M. Murove, 324–331. Pietermaritzburg: University Kwa-Zulu Natal Press. Neal, P., and D. Paris. 1990. Liberalism and the communitarian critique: A guide for the perplexed. Canadian Journal of Political Science 23: 419–439. Nussbaum, M. 2011. Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Oruka, O. 1997. Practical philosophy. Nairobi: East African Publishers. Oruka, H. & Juma, C. 1994. Ecophilosophy and Parental Earth Ethics. In Philosophy, Humanity and Ecology. Edited by Oruka, H. Nairobi: ACTS Press. Oyowe, A. 2013. Personhood and social power in African thought. Alternation 20: 203–228. ———. 2014. An African conception of human rights? Comments on the challenges of relativism. Human Rights Review 15: 329–347. ———. 2018. Personhood and strong normative constraints. Philosophy East & West 68: 783–801. Pojman, L. 2002. “What is Ethics?” In Ethical Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings, edited by L. Pojman, 1–7. London: Wadsworth. Ramose, M. 1999. African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. ———. 2003. The ethics of Ubuntu. In The African philosophy reader, ed. P. Coetzee and A. Roux, 324–331. New York: Routledge. ———. 2009. Towards Emancipative Politics in Africa. In F. Murove (Ed.), African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics. Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press. Sandel, M. 1982. Liberalism and the limits of justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shutte, A. 2001. Ubuntu: An Ethic for a New South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. ———. 2009. “Ubuntu as the African Ethical Vision.” In African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics, edited by Felix Murove, 85–99. Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press. Strauss, L. 1957. What is Political Philosophy? The Journal of Politics 19: 343–368. Táíwò, O. 2016. Against African communalism. Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 1: 81–100. Tutu, D. 1999. No future without forgiveness. New York: Random House. Wiredu, K. 1992. Moral foundations of an African culture. In Person and community: Ghanaian philosophical studies, ed. K.  Wiredu and K.  Gyekye, vol. 1, 192–204. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. ———. 1996. Cultural universals and particulars: An African perspective. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

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CHAPTER 2

The Need for Others in Public Policy: An African Approach Thaddeus Metz

Introducing Relational Values When reflecting on human need as a moral-political category, it is natural to include some intersubjective conditions. Surely, children need to be socialized, adults need to be recognized, and the poor at any age need to be given certain kinds of resources. There will be disagreement, however, over precisely why these things are needed from others. According to the ‘intrinsic’ perspective, a person needs socialization, recognition, aid, and the like in order to obtain some further things that are desirable for herself and make  no essential reference to anyone but her. Perhaps she needs something from others in order for her to be healthy, feel good, or develop autonomy. In contrast, according to the ‘relational’ approach, a person might instead (or also) need others in order to obtain something desirable that makes essential reference to someone else besides herself. For example, perhaps she needs to be party to a loving relationship with another person as something good for its own sake.

T. Metz (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Molefe, C. Allsobrook (eds.), Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3_2

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My primary aims in this essay are to spell out this distinction between intrinsic and relational ways of understanding the need for others, to motivate the plausibility of the latter approach as a major supplement to (though not supplantation of) the former, and to demonstrate how the relational approach has interesting and important implications for public policy. What we give to the poor, why people are entitled to jobs, what we teach, and even when we deploy robots would all likely be affected if the state were seeking to meet needs and a person needed to relate to others for its own sake, not merely in order to improve her own life construed individualistically. As I try to show here, quite often institutions in the West and in societies influenced by it focus on the intrinsic, where acknowledging that we need others for relational considerations would affect public policy in revealing and plausible ways. Relationality is prominent in African normative thought to no less a degree than any other philosophical tradition, and greater than many.1 In particular, a common interpretation of ubuntu, the southern African word for humanness often used to encapsulate morality, is that certain kinds of relationships are to be pursued as ends in themselves. As the influential theologian and Nobel Peace Prize winner Desmond Tutu remarks of those who hold an ubuntu ethic, ‘Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is for us the summum bonum—the greatest good’ (1999: 35).2 To spell out a relational approach to our need for others I often draw on African sources. However, I also consult some Western ones, particularly the psychoanalyst and social theorist Erich Fromm when he distinguishes between ‘I love you because I need you’ and ‘I need you because I love you’ (1962: 41). As I discuss below, Fromm calls the former ‘immature’ and the latter ‘mature’, in my terms contending that the latter, relational valuation is a better reason for needing others than is the former, intrinsic one. Despite what is suggested by Fromm’s labels, I am not out to show that it is improper to need others because of something intrinsic to oneself. My aim is the more moderate one of motivating the view that to need only in that way would be insufficient (or immature); one also plausibly needs others because one needs to relate in certain ways.

 See Metz and Miller (2016) for an overview of relationality in three global philosophies.  For broadly similar approaches, see Mokgoro (1998: 16–18), LenkaBula (2008), Mkhize (2008). 1 2

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In addition, in this essay, I do not seek to argue that at least one proper job of the state is to meet people’s needs (on which see Hamilton 2003; Gyekye 2004) or the closely related condition of their capabilities (on which see Alkire 2005). I realize that it is a controversial premise, one that would be rejected by both utilitarians, who would prefer that the state promote subjective well-being (e.g., Tännsjö 1998), and Kantians, who would have it distribute means that could be used to evaluate and bring about a wide array of ends (e.g., Rawls 1999). My project here instead assumes for the sake of argument that the state would be just to strive to meet people’s needs (amongst other possible aims), with me showing some of what that would look like according to a relational appreciation of our need for others. In the following section, I spell out the intrinsic/relational distinction with more care (Section ‘Two Ways to Value the Need for Others’), after which I provide reason to take seriously the idea that relational values are essential to understanding why we need others in our lives (Section ‘Motivating the Need for Others as Relational’). Then, I consider how needing others for relational reasons would mean effecting changes to public policy in crucial ways, specifically in respect of poverty, employment, education, and the fourth industrial revolution (Section ‘Applying the Relational Need for Others’). I close by suggesting that, while I will not have argued that the state ought to meet people’s needs, the various examples advanced in the essay implicitly lend support to that position, insofar as readers have found them attractive (Section ‘Concluding Remarks on the Need for Others as Relational’).

Two Ways to Value the Need for Others In this section, I do more to spell out the two different ways of valuing the need for other people and begin to motivate the idea that a relational valuation is essential for a complete understanding of this need. Here I provide an example pertaining to individual choice, discussing applications to various spheres of institutional choice only in further sections. Consider my need to obtain input on pre-publication drafts of this essay. I need to receive feedback on my ideas from colleagues by giving talks and seeking out advice from my editors and the reviewers they select. Why do I need such input? One sort of reason could be intrinsic. To value the need for the judgement of experts intrinsically would be for me to seek it out because it can

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help me, narrowly construed in terms of features of myself that make no essential reference to anyone else. So, for example, I might need collegial feedback in order to learn more than I knew before. Or I might need it in order to get the paper published and hence obtain a bonus from my university, which I then spend towards a holiday in Mauritius. My knowledge and my holiday are individualist or self-regarding ends, in the sense that no one else has to figure onto them, even if input from others is an essential means to obtain them. In contrast, I might (also) value the need for expert input relationally, that is because receiving it would constitute interaction, or enable me to interact, with others in certain ways. Relational reasons can come in a variety of ways, as follows. I might have a need for expert input because I need a certain relationship (a) with those experts or (b) with someone other than those experts. I also might have a need for expert input because I need something to come (c) at the time of receiving the input or (d) at some time down the road. Given that different persons correlate with different locations on the planet, one can view these as spatial and temporal distinctions, respectively, and, further, as ones that crosscut each other. For an example of (a + c), the need for collegial feedback from persons X, Y, and Z could be a matter of a need for the presence of an academic community, with the reception of feedback from them partially constituting that. For an example of (a + d), the need for collegial feedback from persons X, Y, and Z could be a matter of determining which ones I would like to collaborate with on future projects. For an example of (b + d), the need for collegial feedback from persons X, Y, and Z could be a matter of wanting to learn more so that I can share the knowledge with others (persons A, B, and C) in a final draft of this paper (or of wanting to get the bonus from its publication so that I can give my sons a holiday). Finally, for the unusual case of (b + c), the need for collegial feedback from persons X, Y, and Z could be a matter of keeping a promise that I had made to someone else, perhaps their supervisors, to engage with them. Note that the intrinsic versus relational distinction is not equivalent to the distinction between means versus ends in respect of a specific instance of relating. The point is not quite that an intrinsic valuation of the need to relate to others treats a given relationship as a means to the production of something good for an individual, while a relational valuation treats that relationship as an end. Instead, while an intrinsic valuation of the need to relate to others does treat a relationship as a means to an individualist end, a relational valuation might treat that particular relationship either as an

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end, as in the cases of (a + c) and (b + c), or as a means to some further relational end, vide (a + d) and (b + d). Seeking input from you in order to determine whether to co-author with you down the road or to share your knowledge with readers is to value your input as an intermediate means, albeit a means towards ends that are relational in the sense of essentially including some positive way of engaging with others besides myself. The distinction concerns the ultimate point of needing others— does one need them simply because of one’s individualist features, such as feeling pleasure or realizing autonomy, or does one need them because of relational features of some kind or other?

Motivating the Need for Others as Relational I presume the above examples of valuing interaction with others relationally have some intuitive pull for readers. Many will appreciate the suggestions that the need for input on one’s academic work is not exhausted by individualist concerns and that it is also important insofar as it facilities interaction in various ways, for example, with those providing the input, those in the broader scholarly community, and those in one’s family. In this section I note some additional, theoretical considerations that tell in favour of viewing the need for others as something more than a mere means towards intrinsic ends such as one’s knowledge, pleasure, autonomy, authenticity, self-confidence, self-expression, or uniqueness. Specifically, principled considerations of virtue (Section ‘Virtue’), meaning in life (Section ‘Meaning in Life’), and love (Section ‘Love’) entail that one needs others in certain ways for extrinsic reasons, roughly because satisfying the need for others facilitates interaction that is plausibly viewed as good for its own sake or as an end that merits pursuit in itself. Virtue In the African tradition, virtue is routinely spoken of in terms of ‘personhood’, where the greater one’s personhood or the more of a person one is, the better one’s life (e.g., Menkiti 2004; Nkulu-N’Sengha 2009). In southern Africa, the influential term for virtue is ‘ubuntu’, which means humanness in the Nguni languages there, the similar idea being that the more one manifests human excellence, the better one’s life (Letseka 2000; Mnyaka and Motlhabi 2005). Conversely, those who are lacking in virtue and instead exhibit vice are often said to be ‘non-persons’ or even

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‘animals’ in serious cases (Letseka 2000: 186; Nkulu-N’Sengha 2009: 143–144). A central way to avoid having a bad character and instead to manifest more personhood or humanness is, by consensus, to act beneficently (Paris 1995: 136–137; Gyekye 1997: 50; Tutu 1999: 34; Mnyaka and Motlhabi 2005: 227; Masolo 2010: 251, 252). Insofar as being good to others is a way of realizing one’s higher nature or virtue, doing so is desirable for its own sake. To illustrate the point, return to the example of receiving collegial input on a draft of my ideas. Those who gave me help are better persons or more human to some degree for having done so. However, it is also plausible to think that a deep reason why I have a need for help from others concerns the development of my own personhood. If I let others help me, I am giving them the opportunity to enhance their personhood. Now, helping to enhance others’ personhood is a way to help them, and surely one of the most important ways to help them according to an ethic of personhood/humanness, where virtue is the paramount human good. And, then, by helping others, I thereby confer more personhood/humanness on myself. The point is, of course, generalizable to many other contexts, including relationships amongst family members, colleagues in an academic department, or participants in a stokvel (a cooperative scheme in which money is pooled and lent out on a non-profit or profit-sharing basis, on which see Koenane 2019). This point, that enabling others to help me is also a way to help them (because it fosters their personhood), is the flip side of a point that will be more familiar to African readers. It is common to encounter the suggestion that our humanness is interdependent, perhaps most influentially said by Desmond Tutu when he claimed that when apartheid supporters dehumanized others, they thereby dehumanized themselves. In a real sense we might add that even the supporters of apartheid were victims of the vicious system which they implemented and which they supported so enthusiastically. This….flows from our fundamental concept of ubuntu. Our humanity was intertwined. The humanity of the perpetrator of apartheid’s atrocities was caught up and bound up in that of his victim whether he liked it or not. In the process of dehumanizing another, in inflicting untold harm and suffering, inexorably the perpetrator was being dehumanized as well. (Tutu 1999: 35)

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Tutu invokes the example of an apartheid cabinet minister who ‘could heartlessly declare that the death in detention of a Steve Biko “left him cold”’ (Tutu 1999: 36). If dehumanizing another person thereby means that one has dehumanized oneself, then surely the reverse is also true: by humanizing another person, one thereby humanizes oneself. That is, by enabling others to develop their personhood, one thereby becomes more of a person oneself. And since enabling others to develop their personhood can involve receiving help from them, receiving help from others is a way of developing one’s own personhood. In sum, my need for help from others can also constitute a need to help them; by giving others the opportunity to enhance their personhood by helping me, I thereby help them and enhance my personhood. Or, as Tutu also says, ‘We are different so that we can know our need of one another, for no one is ultimately self-sufficient. The completely self-sufficient person would be subhuman’ (1999: 214). If I were self-reliant and did not let others enhance their humanness by helping me, I would be failing to help them in an important respect, which would cost me some humanness. It might sound as though appeal to one’s own personhood/humanness as a ground for needing others is an intrinsic rationale. It could seem that I am suggesting that one should receive help from others since that would lead to one’s own self-realization down the road, which looks like a self-­ regarding good. However, a careful analysis of the concepts involved reveals that this is not my claim. Above I noted that intrinsic goods are by definition those that make no essential reference to others (even if others are essential as means to bring these goods about), but personhood/ humanness in the African tradition is precisely not a state internal to a person that can be captured without thought of another person. Instead, by the present account, personhood/humanness is nothing other than the manifestation of certain other-regarding attitudes and actions.3 These constitute the virtue. Meaning in Life Another theoretical way to understand the relational value of one’s need for others is in terms of what makes a life meaningful. By this I largely have in mind those traits of a life that merit reactions such as pride or esteem 3  In contrast to the view advanced in Molefe (2019: 37–66), in which personhood is merely caused by other-regarding behaviour and is not constituted by it.

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from a first-person perspective, or those such as admiration or praise from a third-person perspective (on which see Metz 2001; Kauppinen 2012). Creating a work of art and obtaining an education are common examples. However, probably the least contested source of meaning in life comes from helping others; it appears that literally every long-standing philosophical-­religious worldview maintains that one’s life would be more meaningful for doing what one expects will improve others’ lives and for succeeding (Küng and Kuschel 1993). Making sacrifices for others that indeed make their lives go better surely merits esteem and praise, if anything does. Returning to the example of collegial input, when my colleagues help me by providing feedback on my work, their lives are somewhat more meaningful for doing so. However, insofar as I give them the opportunity to help me and hence enhance the meaningfulness of their lives, I am thereby helping them and hence also enhancing the meaningfulness of my life. After all, an important way to help others is not merely to make them happier, but also to make their lives more meaningful. As with personhood, the suggestion here is not that by helping others I am causing some distinct, intrinsic state of meaningfulness in me down the road. Instead, what constitutes the meaningfulness in my life, what it is that warrants the esteem and praise, is precisely the relational action of helping others, and in this case by giving them the opportunity to enhance the meaningfulness of their lives by helping me. It is not just our humanity that is plausibly intertwined, but the meaning of our lives, too. Martin Buber makes this point in his classic book I and Thou: ‘You need God, in order to be—and God needs you, for the very meaning of your life’ (1947: 82). Note that, even if one does not find the above analyses of personhood and meaning compelling, there are ways of appealing to these values that are less controversial and still support a relational valuation of the need for others. So, specifically, suppose one is disinclined to think that my personhood and meaningfulness would be enhanced in the act of giving commentators the opportunity to help me with my work. Even so, one should surely accept that my personhood and meaningfulness would be enhanced by using their comments to help other parties, such as readers of the revised and improved draft.

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Love Love is a third theoretical lens through which to appreciate the relationality of our need for others, where sometimes an ubuntu ethic has been understood in terms of a loving disposition or way of relating (e.g., Tshivhase 2018; Metz 2019) and life’s meaning has been, too (e.g., Buber 1947; Wolf 2002; Baggini 2004: 181–184; Eagleton 2007). I presume the reader will agree that one is a better person, or that one’s life is more meaningful, for being loving or acting in loving ways, or that love makes a life go better for a reason independent of any other value. Now, it is plausible to think that there are better and worse ways to love, which influence the degree of one’s personhood or meaningfulness, returning us to Fromm’s distinction between mature and immature love mentioned in the introduction. What Fromm considers immature or infantile love is summed up with the statement, ‘I love you because I need you’. I interpret this to mean that I care for you only because you have done or can do something for me, individualistically construed, such as feed me or give me pleasure. In contrast, mature love, which is typified by ‘I need you because I love you’, amounts to ‘a sense of new union, of sharing, of oneness’ (Fromm 1962: 40). Here one engages in loving behaviour for its own sake. So, another way to appreciate the relational worth of my need for collegial input is that I have to have it in order to do the epistemically loving thing of sharing the best reflections I can with a readership. To publish without having tried to get feedback beforehand on a draft (that I could have obtained) would be to display a lack of concern for the interests of readers. Were I not to seek out collegial input before publishing a piece of work, I would probably be publishing out of a concern for my (individualist) interests, or at least not so much those of my scholarly community.

Applying the Relational Need for Others In the rest of this essay, I suppose that the previous section has established that one large reason we need things from other people is so that we can do good  things for those people or others. In this section, I apply this relational valuation of our need for others to some important issues in public policy. If we accept that the state is obligated to meet people’s needs, what might this mean for law and administration if their needs for others are substantially relational? I address this question in the contexts

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of wealth (Section ‘Wealth’), employment (Section ‘Employment’), education (Section ‘Education’), and the fourth industrial revolution (Section ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution’). Wealth An elderly African woman I once interviewed about ubuntu and lacking wealth told me that, for her, ‘the problem with being poor is that I have nothing to give away’ (first cited in Metz 2011: 238). Here, the relationality of her need for help from the state is patent. The woman did not say that the problem with being poor is that she is in pain or her desires are frustrated, as per a utilitarian account of the injustice of poverty. Nor did she say that the problem with being poor is that she is unable to reflect critically on her conceptions of the good and pursue a wide array of them, as per Rawls’s (1999) and similar liberal theories of injustice. In contrast to these two intrinsic accounts of the need for state aid, the woman would seek aid so that she could in turn aid others. If we take that conception of need seriously, then what the state should allocate is, well, a gift that keeps on giving, not so much to the initial recipient, but to people beyond her. That is, the state has strong reason to give to the poor what will enable them to give to others (although not only that). Money could surely be part of such an allocation, insofar as it is a transferable good. However, what else could a state ensure that its residents have that is likely to enhance their personhood by enabling them to enhance still others’ personhood or otherwise to improve others’ lives? One reasonably clear, even if unusual, answer is parenting classes.4 A state could fund enquiry into the most up-to-date knowledge about how to rear children in ways likely to avoid neurosis and expected to turn them into morally upright agents, and then it could systematically pass on this knowledge to prospective and actual parents. Indeed, it might even require parents to pass a test on such material and obtain a license (LaFollette 1980)—for, as the analogy goes, if the state rightly does so when it comes to driving a car, it may rightly do so when it comes to steering the course of a child’s life. Similarly, the state could offer couples therapy, enabling a given person to share his best self with his partner, which could well include enabling her to do the same.

4

 The ideas in the rest of this paragraph borrow from Metz (2011).

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To be sure, we do not normally associate parenting classes and couples therapy with poverty reduction. However, the suggestion is not that the state should disregard more familiar needs such as those for food, shelter, and the like. In addition, it would be a rich life that were both able to raise children with minimal damage and with the result being a virtuous individual and able to be a loving romantic partner and bring out the same in another. If at least one major aim of the state is to meet people’s needs, and not merely enable them to satisfy marketplace demand (thereby fulfilling utilitarian preferences or realizing Kantian ends), then these relational ways to ameliorate an impoverished life should be attractive. Employment Valuing our need for others relationally also has interesting implications for how to think about the need to be given a job.5 The default position amongst redistributivist or egalitarian theorists in respect of work is the principle of equal opportunity, according to which those with comparable talent, effort, and education should have similar chances at jobs, with the state going out of its way to provide the requisite education. Setting aside considerations of redress for past injustice (such as affirmative action), most believe that, when it comes to nearly all of an economy, jobs should go to those who are well qualified for them, as opposed to be allocated on a racial or religious basis or because one’s parents happen to have lived in a certain neighbourhood. If the need to be paid in exchange for labour is understood relationally, we get an under-considered but plausible account of why equal opportunity is appropriate. For the utilitarian, the well-qualified applicant does not have a right to the job, but should receive it because she would likely do the job well and consequently promote the general welfare better than those who are poorly qualified. For the Rawlsian, the well-qualified applicant does have a right to the job, in large part because having an equal chance at a job brings an equal chance at good pay and self-esteem in its wake. In contrast, if one’s need for a job is important substantially because of the value of relating to others in certain supportive ways, then the well-­ qualified applicant does have a right to the job, in large part because it is a vital way for her to help other people. As Bénézet Bujo, a Congolese theologian who has published two important books on sub-Saharan ethics,  The ideas in this paragraph borrow from Metz (2015, 2020).

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notes, ‘It is a well-known fact that in traditional Africa, work had nothing to do with “salary.” The development of the clan’s community life is what was emphasized’ (1997: 164). For the state not to hire a woman as a firefighter despite her ability and willingness to do the job would be for it to fail to meet her needs, which are not merely for a salary or self-esteem, but also for making a social contribution that she could make particularly well. Such relational virtue and meaning ground a plausible rationale for a principle of equality of opportunity; the state should require at least major employers to award jobs on the basis of qualifications (setting aside considerations of redress, say, for occasions when they failed to in the past). Education If the need for a job is substantially relational, then so is the need for secondary and tertiary public education, at least insofar as a person could not obtain such a job without it. Part of the point of educating high school and university students should be to enable them to acquire work that would enhance their virtue and meaning by improving other people’s quality of life. Such an education is not the same as imparting whichever knowledge would enable a student to do whatever the market calls for in exchange for a salary. The aims of post-primary public education are not, however, reducible to employment, even when conceived in a beneficent way. Most of those who have reflected on the final ends of such education agree that it has a point beyond merely enabling students to get jobs, even socially useful ones. For instance, it is common amongst utilitarian and Kantian thinkers to maintain that it ought to enable students to satisfy their preferences, critically reflect on their conceptions of the good, or develop a sense of justice. Part of doing so is normally thought to involve taking a cosmopolitan approach to cultural instruction, that is, teaching students about a wide array of different ways of life from around the world, taking a neutral attitude about which ones are preferable, and leaving it to students to choose one(s) for themselves. Now, if the need to receive knowledge from others is understood relationally, this sort of cosmopolitanism is suspect to some degree. Instead of education merely enabling students to get a job and to choose whichever way of life suits them best (that is consistent with justice), a relational approach entails that they need the kind of information that is going to enable them to live in certain, supportive ways with others. Concretely,

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this probably would involve two approaches to public higher education that are controversial—at least outside of an African milieu. First off, a primary aim would be to enable students to improve their moral decision-making in day-to-day life, that is, to exhibit personhood or ubuntu.6 It would mean a curriculum and pedagogy oriented towards imparting not merely an abstract apprehension of moral points of view or even controversies, but also some moral wisdom and sound practice. The aim would not be so much moral education, an orthodox focus on belief formation, but more education for morality, an orthopraxy. On this score, a university should teach students, say, how to become more aware of their implicit biases, how to identify and deal with conflicts of interest, and how to become more attuned to other people’s points of view and feelings. Such instruction would go far beyond merely enabling students to evaluate and adhere to the state’s just laws. Second, another aim of public higher education, if the need for it were valued relationally, would likely be to enable and prompt students to contribute to their local cultures. So far in this essay, I have focused on beneficent ways of relating, ones in which a person cares for other people. However, another kind of relationality that is intuitively valuable involves identifying with others or being interdependent with them. Part of what is desirable about a loving or friendly relationship is the respect in which the parties to it go out of their way to please each other, but additional parts are that they do things together, for instance enjoying certain rituals, and that they support one another’s projects, even when these projects do not involve making themselves better off. These are respects in which personal relationships are not so much a matter of caring for each other’s quality of life, but more sharing a way of life with each other. Now, insofar as such ties are valuable, instructors and their students have moral reason to give some kind of priority to the cultures of their society (while not utterly disregarding other ones).7 There is something wrong when a music department in an African university is focused largely on Western classical music, or when a literature department in a Japanese one addresses mainly works in English. Instead, there is intuitively some moral reason for a university to engage seriously with the cultures in which it is set, where they could of course be quite heterogeneous or admit competing interpretations. The need of students to share a way of life with  The rest of this paragraph has been cribbed from Metz (2018: 169).  The rest of this paragraph has been cribbed from Metz (2018: 170).

6 7

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others well explains the intuition; for the sort of information and skills they need are ones that would particularly (not solely) facilitate their ability to understand, enrich, and participate in the cultures of the society in which they live. The Fourth Industrial Revolution Finally, for now, let us consider some implications of a relational valuation of our need for others to give us technology, specifically in the form of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR), in which technology becomes an intimate part of people’s biology and sociality. For instance, imagine that artificial intelligence developed to the point where robots could cook our food and give us orgasms. Should they? One advocate of 4IR who is prominent in the African context has said, ‘It is inhumane to expect that which can be done by a machine to be done by a human being’ (Marwala 2016: slide 39). If our need for others is substantially relational, then at least one reading of this statement is incorrect. I asked my 11-year-old son which he would prefer to do the cooking, if a robot and I could cook the same meal, one that were identical in taste and nutrition. He said he would prefer that I do it, and not because he is inhumane or the like, but instead because he recognizes that the cooking would express my love for him. I presume comparable remarks clearly apply to sex—even if a robot could physically please my romantic partner, it would not be inhumane of her to expect me to do it. The point is not that I would be wrong to have a robot cook for my son once in a while or that my partner should never use a sexbot. It is instead that when deciding how to fashion and employ 4IR technology, a key issue is clearly about the respects in which doing so would threaten to upset relational values, for example, would lead me not to make an effort for my son or would undermine my romantic relationship. We need to live with others in a context where devices relieve us of burdens and confer benefits on us, but our need for that is conditioned on friendliness or love. Our use of technology ought not to undermine such a way of relating, and instead ought to be deployed in ways that foster it. Concretely, then, those programming smart machines should include a ‘nudge’ prompting consumers to avoid allowing the robots to do everything that can be done by a human. In addition, government should

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perhaps require manufacturers to so programme robots, or at least engage in educational outreach to warn consumers of the risks to relational values of letting robots do too much.

Concluding Remarks on the Need for Others as Relational In closing, I remind the reader that I have not sought to argue that the state ought to strive to meet people’s needs. I have instead taken that for granted, with the aim of considering what it would look like on a relational valuation of our need for others. However, I presume the examples given to illustrate what would be involved in fostering relational goods for people have also served a motivational purpose. That is, I suspect many readers will have found the examples to be attractive. If, say, they have found appealing the ideas of the state doing what it can to strengthen family relationships and to make students into more virtuous agents, then there has been some implicit support for the view that the state indeed ought to strive to meet people’s needs, as opposed to fulfil people’s contingent preferences (utilitarianism) or give them resources useful for achieving a wide array of contingent ends (Kantianism/Rawlsianism). There is some evidence against the dominant, Western conceptions of the proper function of the state and for a conception of it that is at home in the African philosophical tradition. We may conclude not merely that our need for others is often because of a need for a relationship with them, but also that we need the state to meet such needs.

References Alkire, Sabina. 2005. Needs and capabilities. In The philosophy of need, ed. Sorean Reader, 229–251. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baggini, Julian. 2004. What’s it all about?: Philosophy and the meaning of life. London: Granta Books. Buber, Martin. 1947. I and thou. Translated by R.G.  Smith. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Bujo, Bénézet. 1997. The ethical dimension of community: The African model and the dialogue between North and South. Translated by C.N.  Nganda. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa. Eagleton, Terry. 2007. The meaning of life: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Fromm, Erich. 1962. The art of loving. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. Gyekye, Kwame. 1997. Tradition and modernity: Philosophical reflections on the African experience. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2004. Beyond cultures: Ghanaian philosophical studies, volume III. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Hamilton, Lawrence. 2003. The political philosophy of needs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kauppinen, Antti. 2012. Meaningfulness and time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84: 345–377. Koenane, Mojalefa. 2019. Economic development in Africa through the Stokvel system. Filosofia Theoretica 8: 109–124. Küng, Hans, and Karl-Joseph Kuschel. 1993. Global ethic: The declaration of the parliament of the world’s religions. Translated by J.  Bowden. New  York: Continuum. LaFollette, Hugh. 1980. Licensing parents. Philosophy and Public Affairs 9: 182–197. LenkaBula, Puleng. 2008. Beyond anthropocentricity—Botho/Ubuntu and the quest for economic and ecological justice in Africa. Religion and Theology 15: 375–394. Letseka, Moeketsi. 2000. African philosophy and educational discourse. In African Voices in Education, ed. P. Higgs et al., 179–193. Cape Town: Juta. Marwala, Tshilidzi. 2016. The 65th Bernard Price memorial lecture: The fourth industrial revolution. Accessed March 15, 2020. https://www.slideshare.net/ tshilidzimarwala/bp-­lecture-­r5. Masolo, Dismas. 2010. Self and community in a changing world. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press. Menkiti, Ifeanyi. 2004. On the normative conception of a person. In A companion to African philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 324–331. Oxford: Blackwell. Metz, Thaddeus. 2001. The concept of a meaningful life. American Philosophical Quarterly 38: 137–153. ———. 2011. An African theory of dignity and a relational conception of poverty. In The humanist imperative in South Africa, ed. J. de Gruchy, 233–241. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media. ———. 2015. An African egalitarianism: Bringing community to bear on equality. In The equal society: Essays on equality in theory and practice, ed. G.  Hull, 185–208. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. ———. 2018. An African theory of the point of higher education: Communion as an alternative to autonomy, truth, and citizenship. In Contemporary philosophical proposals for the university: Toward a philosophy of higher education, ed. A. Stoller and E. Kramer, 161–186. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2019. Distributive justice as a matter of love: A relational approach to liberty and property. In Love and justice, ed. I. Dalferth, 339–352. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

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———. 2020. African communitarianism and difference. In Handbook of African philosophy of difference, ed. E. Imafidon, 31–51. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Metz, Thaddeus, and Sarah Clark Miller. 2016. Relational ethics. In The international encyclopedia of ethics, ed. H. LaFollette, 1–10. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Mkhize, Nhlanhla. 2008. Ubuntu and harmony: An African approach to morality and ethics. In Persons in community: African ethics in a global culture, ed. R. Nicolson, 35–44. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Mnyaka, Mluleki, and Mokgethi Motlhabi. 2005. The African concept of ubuntu/ botho and its socio-moral significance. Black Theology 3: 215–237. Mokgoro, Yvonne. 1998. Ubuntu and the law in South Africa. Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1: 15–26. Molefe, Motsamai. 2019. An African philosophy of personhood, morality, and politics. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Nkulu-N’Sengha, Mutombo. 2009. Bumuntu. In Encyclopedia of African religion, ed. M.K. Asante and A. Mazama, 142–147. Los Angeles: Sage. Paris, Peter. 1995. The spirituality of African peoples: The search for a common moral discourse. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Rawls, John. 1999. A theory of justice. Revised edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Tännsjö, Torbjörn. 1998. Hedonistic utilitarianism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Tshivhase, Mpho. 2018. Love as the foundation of ubuntu. Synthesis Philosophica 65: 197–208. Tutu, Desmond. 1999. No future without forgiveness. New York: Random House. Wolf, Susan. 2002. The true, the good, and the lovable. In The contours of agency: Essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt, ed. S. Buss and L. Overton, 227–244. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

CHAPTER 3

Afro-Communitarian Personhood and the Political Philosophy of Needs Rianna Oelofsen

Introduction This chapter proposes that the political philosophy of needs does not emphasise an aspect of being human, which Afro-communitarian personhood highlights, namely our fundamental interconnectedness and contextual existence. I will argue that an emphasis on context, relationships and community is central to Afro-communitarian personhood, and that an African political philosophy of distributive justice would be incomplete without taking this into account. To show why this is the case, I will investigate the relationship between Afro-communitarian personhood and the political philosophy of needs. In order to understand this relationship, I will give an exposition of what Afro-communitarian personhood I am referring to entails, and evaluate some issues around the political philosophy of needs and distributive justice from this framework.

R. Oelofsen (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Fort Hare, East London, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Molefe, C. Allsobrook (eds.), Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3_3

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Distributive justice can be understood in numerous diverse ways, but a general definition is that the topic of distributive justice concerns ‘[a]rguments about which frameworks and/or resulting distributions are morally preferable’.1 The principle of distributive justice, is, therefore ‘best thought of as providing moral guidance for the political processes and structures that affect the distribution of economic benefits and burdens in societies’.2 I will argue in this chapter that Afro-communitarian personhood adds emphasis to three essential components with regard to our thinking about distributive justice, which are lacking when only taking into consideration the political philosophy of needs. These three aspects are (1) that caring for others is a fundamental human need; (2) the fact that as human persons understood in an Afro-communitarian fashion, we have to take into consideration whom and how one takes care of people’s needs, not only that these needs are taken care of; and (3) that distributive justice in Africa needs to be cognisant of the history of colonialism on the continent. The question of distributive justice is affected by the Afro-communitarian understanding of the person. I will argue that distributive justice ought to take into consideration our essential interconnectedness, and thus that caring for others is a fundamental human need. This can be explained through the understanding that, if as a person we do not care for others (i.e. provide for their needs) you are not a complete person. When we help others, we not only take the focus off our own worries, which makes us feel better and is one of the reasons why actions of altruism can feel good, but, more importantly, caring for and helping others means that you are improving your personhood by improving your relationships with others. Improving one’s personhood is a human need and capability which is not taken into consideration by the capabilities and needs approaches. Second, essentially interconnected and interrelated human persons are not only interested in that their needs be met, or that they have the freedom to choose to act according to their specific capabilities. Over and above that, we have to take into consideration who takes care of people’s needs, as well as how they do so. I will argue that there should be a deliberate building of a good relationship and community between those providing for needs, and those whose needs are being provided for. Practically, needs might not be met as a result of the community’s wishes not being taken into account with regard to how they want their needs met, which 1 2

 Lamont and Favor (2013).  Lamont and Favor (2013).

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needs are to take priority and so forth. However, the point I will make is a deeper one, namely that without the relationship between the persons involved in the provision and acceptance of needs, the persons provided for are dehumanised according to Afro-communitarian personhood. For Afro-communitarian personhood, when referring to dehumanisation, this includes an erosion of one’s humane responses, as well as a perception of others as not being worthy of similar respect and value as oneself. How needs are met is also important for the same reason, namely that having basic needs be met in certain ways can be dehumanising and alienating from our essential interrelatedness with others. Finally, in Africa, the question of distributive justice is, I will argue, also intimately tied to the principles of restorative justice, as a result of the legacy of colonialism on the continent. As distributive justice is about justice with regard to the distribution of goods, the systemic historical injustices with regard to the current distribution of goods needs to be taken into account. This is encapsulated in the principles of rectification and reparation, and, Afro-communitarian restorative justice would require this principle to be executed. An African society in which there has not been rectification for the economic implications of colonialism, is not one which has been restored to a balance, and in which, though basic human needs might be met, there is once again a particular type of dehumanisation that comes with the denial of restorative justice.

Afro-Communitarianism and the Political Philosophy of Needs For the purposes of this chapter, when I refer to the political philosophy of needs, I refer to the proportional distribution of goods (which could include non-material goods) according to the need of the relevant persons and communities. Need is understood to have normative implications, in such a way that to know that someone has a basic need is a reason to provide them with what it is that they need.3 According to this understanding, needs are central to an ethics of care, which is focused on ‘attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take responsibility’.4

3 4

 Brock and Miller (2019).  Held (2006: 10).

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I understand the political philosophy of needs as the basis for the capabilities approach as set forward by Amartya Sen5—the capabilities approach takes into account basic needs, especially in the account of Martha Nussbaum, with her list of combined capabilities.6 However, the capabilities approach goes further, and emphasises freedom in whether a person chooses to act on a particular basic need, as well as providing for an emphasis on the fact that basic needs can be catered for in different ways, and that the way in which it is catered for should depend on the choices of the needy person. I will not elaborate on this understanding of the political philosophy of need here, but instead, I will argue that any understanding of needs requires a particular emphasis in order for it to count as an Afro-communitarian political philosophy of needs. While engaging with the literature in African philosophy, it becomes clear that many African philosophers have argued for a different metaphysical and normative conception of the self from what is dominant in most philosophy from the global north. Antjie Krog claims that ‘ubuntu or interconnectedness is not an isolated exceptional phenomenon [only present in South Africa], but part of a much broader, more general context found in a variety of forms, under a variety of names, manifesting in a variety of cultures across the large African continent.’7 However, this claim is not essentialist, and does not entail that sub-Saharan Africans all subscribe to this understanding of the self, or the ethics which flows from it. I will utilise Kwasi Wiredu and Mogobe Ramose8 in explicating the central features of what I understand to be Afro-communitarian personhood for my purposes in this chapter. Kwasi Wiredu writes that ‘It is a human being that has value, ‘Onipa na ohia’. The English translation, as he points out, however needs supplementation, as ‘ohia’ in this context is ambiguous—it means both ‘which is of value’ and ‘that which is needed’. So, Wiredu claims that not only does  This is in line with the argument made by Sabine Alkire (2005).  Nussbaum (2011: 41–42). 7  Antjie Krog (2008: 360). Also see her ‘…if it means he gets his humanity back…’: ‘The Worldview Underpinning the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ in Journal of Multicultural Discourses, Volume 3, Issue 3, 2008, and her book Begging to be Black (2009, Random House Struik), especially pp. 184–186. 8  Afro-communitarian views of existence can be traced back to many other African philosophers such as for example Mbiti, Menkiti and Gyekye, to name a few. However, for my purposes in this chapter, I focus on Wiredu and Ramose’s notions of personhood as examples of Afro-communitarian personhood. 5 6

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‘all value derive from human interests’, but also ‘that human fellowship is the most important of human needs’.9 What ought to be understood with regard to the fact that human fellowship is the most important of human needs, is that our very personhood depends on our relationships with others—we need the other in order to become a person. This understanding of personhood is what I refer to as Afro-communitarian personhood. Wiredu writes: It is that, for the Akans, a person is social not only because he or she lives in a community, which is the only context in which full development, or indeed any sort of human development is possible, but also because, by his original constitution, a human being is part of a social whole.10

But what exactly does Wiredu refer to here, when he says that we not only live in, and develop in a community, but that we are essentially part of a social whole? I understand this to mean that we are born with relationships already in place—ideally, our needs are taken care of as children, and as we grow up, we start caring for the needs of people that we have relationships with. This is not only as a result of the fact that they are needy, but also as a result of the fact that, in order to become a complete human being in the full sense of the term, we need to care for others. This means that, without providing for the needs of others, we remain always incomplete as human beings. It is our very responsiveness to others’ needs which makes us human. Another African philosopher, Mogobe Ramose,11 claims that Ubuntu (another form of Afro-communitarian personhood) is of vital importance in Africa, as ‘[I]t would profit us little to gain all the technology in the world and lose the humanist essence of our culture’.12 Ramose explains that Ubuntu, often understood as ‘I am because we are’ or ‘I am a person through other persons’ is actually two words in one. It consists of the prefix ubu-and the stem ntu. Ubu evokes the idea of being in general. It is enfolded being before it  Wiredu (2002: 194).  Wiredu (2002: 197). 11  I am aware that, for some, Ramose’s view may not necessarily be read as a communitarianism as such. However, according to my interpretation, Ubuntu is a philosophy of humanness among Afro-communitarians and thus a type of Afro-communitarian personhood. 12  Wiredu (1980: 21, cited in Ramose 2006: 13). 9

10

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­ anifested itself in the concrete form or mode of existence of a particular m entity. Ubu as enfolded being is always unfoldment, that is, incessant continual concrete manifestation through particular forms and models of being. In this sense, ubu is always oriented towards ntu. At the ontological level, there is no stick and literal separation and division between ubu and ntu. Ubu- and -ntu are not two radical separate and irreconcilably opposed realities.13

Another way to explain this is that ubu- (when combined with -ntu) is what encapsulates the essence of human beings in general. The general essence of the human being, which is related to and part of the whole of humanity, exists before it is instantiated through the particular individual, or -ntu. But the generality of ubu- is not something which can be understood as an essence in the Platonic way—rather, it is the essence of being in the manner of Brahman being the essence of Anatman in Buddhist philosophy. The ‘be-ing of an African person is not only imbedded in the community, but in the universe as a whole.’14 What this means, according to my understanding, is that the wholeness of humanity, and the particular individual, are always necessarily connected, and always affect each other, as the individual is made up of and constituted by the whole. The actions of the individual affect humanity in general, and the context and situation of humanity, in general, affect the individual’s actions and being. So, Ubuntu means and is the fact that everything is not only interrelated but part of one whole, which instantiates itself in particular beings.15 This is expressed through the generality of ubu- as the universe containing, enfolding and comprising of everything. -Ntu on the other hand is a process, not an entity, as the ‘unfolding of the universe by concrete manifestations in different forms and modes of being. This process includes the emergence of the speaking and knowing human being’.16 There is a one-­ ness and wholeness, an interconnectedness-towards-wholeness17 of the ongoing process of the unfolding of the universe.18 From looking at these two accounts and relating them to the political philosophy of needs, it becomes clear that the Afro-communitarian  Ramose (2002: 41).  Ramose (2002). 15  Ramose (2002: 41). 16  Ramose (2002). 17  See Krog (2008). 18  Ramose (1999: 49–52). 13 14

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understanding of the person (and the cosmos) is one in which everyone and everything needs everyone and everything else, in order to be able to realise itself. Afro-communitarian personhood means that our freedom (and thus capabilities19) depends crucially and necessarily on the cosmos, and others as part of the cosmos, for their realisation. Importantly, our practical freedom is always situated within a historical and social context. As our freedom is situated, it comes into contact with other persons and their projects. We should therefore take particular notice of others, whether their needs are met and whether they have the agency to manifest themselves in the world, as the very possibility of our own projects and needs related to those projects depend on them. Our projects might be individual, but they are embedded in a social and historical situation and need other persons for their fulfilment. If we are to take up the project of, for example, the millennium development goals (MDGs), this is not an individual project—the MDGs are not possible without the collective support and work of others. We need to appeal to others to take up the same cause, and we have to convince them of the validity of our projects. Afro-­ communitarian personhood captures this insight but relates it back to every single action or project one might have—from the smallest, such as getting a drink of water, to the biggest, such as the MDGs. Afro-­ communitarian personhood claims that we should care about the needs and well-being of others (and this well-being can be set out through the capabilities approach) because even if we do not realise it, enhancing the agency of others will enhance our own agency. In order for us to be flourishing human beings, we cannot live in a world without other flourishing human beings and their projects. From the above, we can derive an understanding of Afro-communitarian personhood as the concept of ‘collective virtue’. What I mean by collective virtues is communal self-realisation through the promotion of harmony. Individual virtue (and thus flourishing in the Aristotelian sense) cannot be realised in a society of others who are unable to meet their basic needs, or act on their basic capabilities. The self can only be realised, can only fully flourish, in a world in which there is individual and communal commitment to the type of society, which allows and which is made up of flourishing human beings. Thus, the  Relationship between people and our environment is emphasised in Afro-communitarian personhood, as we are interdependent in the way explained above. The relationships themselves  I am referring to the literature on the capabilities approach by Amartya Sen here.

19

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are of vital importance and value, and we should strive for relationships in which we care for others’ needs and they care for ours. This worldview sees the process of who we are and who we become as created by being necessarily socially and historically embedded, and how we, in turn, affect our social and historical context through our (collective and individual) actions. When we speak of Afro-communitarian personhood (of ubuntu, or of the extended family), it is the creation of a collective ‘we’ that we are interested in. It is the recognition that we are intricately constituted by our relations with others—whether we want to be or not. The collective ‘we’ need not subsume and devour the individual ‘I’…and yet the ‘I’ is never complete, a flourishing and fulfilled human being, unless she recognises how much others constitute her, and act on that knowledge through enhancing and providing for the needs of others so they can flourish.

Afro-communitarianism Personhood and the Political Philosophy of Needs In this section, I will examine some implications for the understanding of Afro-communitarian personhood above, namely our fundamental interconnectedness with others, as it relates to distributive justice and needs, in two examples by Ramose. I will argue that an implication of Afro-­ communitarian personhood is that as human beings we need to care for others in order to realise our humanity, that there has to be a positive relationship with mutual recognition of the agency of the other, (between the needy and the provider), and that it matters how needs are met. Ramose analyses two examples of the philopraxis of ubuntu in his article ‘Philosophy and Africa’s struggle for economic independence’, that are relevant to the struggle against poverty,20 and thus the political philosophy of needs. The first example he analyses is the practice of dikgomo tsa mafisa: Dikgomo is the plural form of kgomo, meaning, a cow. Briefly, this practice springs from the principles of mutual concern, care and sharing (Griaule 1965, 137). …What happens is that the owner of many cattle identifies a member of society who is in need of cattle. Once identified, the needy member of society is allocated one or more cattle for rearing. These may be used for survival in terms of using them for ploughing and milking them. When  Ramose (2006: 13).

20

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these have multiplied the owner gets back the original number of cattle offered to the needy one.21

The other example of the philopraxis of ubuntu Ramose analyses is the practice of letsema. The translation of this term as ‘work parties’ is somewhat misleading. It places emphasis on the idea of a group of people working together as a fact. The problem with this emphasis is that it fails to capture and convey the fundamental premise of letsema. Here the fundamental premise is once again the principles of mutual concern, care and sharing. The community comes together in response to some of its members who need help, usually with regard to ploughing. Then arrangements are made for people to go and provide the necessary labour. Here it is critical to note the following. The group of people decide voluntarily to go and help but not to be employed by another member of the community. The group is thus not at the mercy of the one assisted, as is the case with employment.22 What can we learn about the philosophy of Ubuntu and the political philosophy of needs from the explanation of these examples of Ubuntu, dikgomo tsa mafisa and letsema? I will argue that, along with the understanding of collective virtue as set out in the previous section, it can show us (1) that as Afro-communitarian persons, we have a fundamental need to care for others, and (2) that there ought to be a particular kind of relationship between the person(s) who are needy, and the providers of those needs, that is, it matters by whom and how a need is satisfied. As Afro-communitarian Persons, We Have a Fundamental Need to Care for Others With regard to the practice of dikgomo, the first lesson we can learn when we interpret the practice in terms of Afro-communitarian personhood, is that, as persons, we have a fundamental need to care for others. The person who has excess cows recognises the need of the person who does not have any and responds to the normative force of that need. In this practice, the provider instantiates the need for persons to care for others. If we  Ramose (2006: 14).  Wiredu concludes his account of a similar practice in Akan traditional moral culture with the pertinent statement that ‘life is mutual aid’. Wiredu (2002: 293, cited in Ramose 2006: 14). 21 22

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are able to help others, this can bring social status, as we are recognised as more of a person. In other words, without caring for others (which can be construed as providing for their needs), we are not fully human. Altruism towards others makes you a person, and at the same time allows you to enjoy the positive feelings that come with altruistic actions, as well as the social status that is a side effect of being a provider to the needy. You have also improved your personhood by improving your relationship with others in your community. The practice of letsema also highlights the fact that as human beings we have the fundamental need to care for others. Community members get together to help, not only because they might themselves be in a position where they require aid in future, but also because it aids in the development of their own personhood and humanity. There Ought to Be a Particular Kind of Relationship Between the Person(s) Who Are Needy, the Providers of Those Needs, That Is It Matters by Whom and How a Need Is Satisfied When we analyse dikgomo tsa mafisa and letsema in light of Afro-­ communitarian personhood, we can derive from it that the needy person has to have a particular kind of relationship with the provider and vice versa, namely one of ‘mutual concern, care and sharing’. In these examples, community members have relationships with each other that recognise their humanity. In terms of the recognition of our own and the other’s humanity, we recognise our fundamental vulnerability and the fact that we ourselves might in future be in need of aid. What is this type of relationship, apparent in both these examples? The relationship is personal, in that the persons involved know (or at least know of) each other. It is possible to be helped by someone close to me while keeping my dignity intact, and yet the very same fulfilment of my needs by a stranger might be embarrassing and affect my dignity. There has to be the right kind of relationship in place in order for the needy to keep their dignity intact. Who it is that fulfils my needs is important. In the practice of dikgomo tsa mafisa, the provider is the one who identifies someone in need that they get to know of, and initiates the practice by providing the cows to the needy person. The person who is needy, however, is expected to return the original loan once they have been able to lift themselves out of the situation of need. The relationship is thus one in which the person in need is recognised to have the ability to uplift

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themselves, and this is part of the mutual recognition of the other’s humanity. To care for another is to fulfil needs, but not to the extent that it does not allow the person to grow and develop into being able to take care of themselves and others. In other words, we must take into consideration that taking care of the needs of the other should result, at least in the case of persons who have the potential capability, in the ability and desire to care for others. This relates to the salience of mutual aid and reciprocity in the Afro-communitarian personhood tradition. What would this say about the political philosophy of needs, and what needs to be emphasised from an Afro-communitarian personhood perspective? When we provide for the needs of another, this should come with building a relationship with them as human, and should not be seen as a form of charity where the needy are faceless and nameless, as this dehumanises the needy. While this kind of personal relationship is not possible on a large scale in states and in the global sphere, Afro-communitarian personhood would prescribe that the providers of need must ensure that at the very least, the systems set up to provide for the needy do not dehumanise them. The providers should recognise the humanity of the needy, and the needy should never become a mere number in the practice of providing for their needs. The providers also have to attend to the needy in a particular way— it is not only who that is important in the fulfilment of needs, but also how. On a personal level, the provider should do so with grace and a particular comportment, but for Afro-communitarian personhood, we can also argue that there are systemic requirements with regard to how needs are met. While needs can be provided for in any kind of economic system (which provides the how we address needs), according to Afro-communitarian personhood, we should prefer an economic system which supports our interconnected being, as opposed to an individualistically orientated one. This worldview would claim that individualism, consumerism and capitalism are not the ways in which to structure society in order to aim for happiness and a healthy flourishing society. For Afro-communitarian personhood, there is an understanding that working towards a better and more flourishing society centrally affects individuals in that society as well. Individualism and collectivism can be related to the economic structures of capitalism and socialism and the possible relationships between these economic structures and ‘human being’. Daniel Bell writes that ‘[t]here is undoubtedly a worrying trend in contemporary societies toward

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a callous individualism that ignores community and social obligations’.23 It would seem that, in order for capitalism to flourish, there is a particular focus on the individual, and the creation of individual desires for commodities through incessant marketing and advertising campaigns. The education system of the global north individualises and instils the values of competition and thus capitalism from a young age. In fact, one of the ways in which Triandis defines an individualistic society over a collectivist one, is that in an individualistic society, economic ‘exchange theory adequately predict their social behaviour’.24 Cultures of the global north can be classified as competitive and individualistic within the economic and ideological framework of capitalism. With the independence of many African states in the 1960s, some African philosophers and statesmen noted that the traditional cultural communal structures of African society did not lend itself to this type of competitive economic system, and this was one of the reasons why socialism was so widely implemented in post-colonial African states upon gaining independence from colonial powers.25 In terms of Afro-communitarian personhood, society is meant to be supportive, non-competitive, taking the course of action which is best for all, which also relates to the consensus model of democracy. There is a history of thought which claims that the kind of individualistic competitive consumer society which is the result of and basis for capitalism is one which is based on created desires we have that are not in our (collective, or even individual) interests. In the language of needs, there are needs created by the society which are not basic, and that actually undermine our personhood and flourishing. Avner Offner (2006) gives empirical evidence that the capitalistic society ‘offers us one novel consumption opportunity after another, and “novelty tends to produce a bias towards short term rewards, towards individualism, hedonism, narcissism and disorientation”.’26 Offner gives evidence not only that we are prone to choose short-term satisfaction even if it is bad for us in the long term, but also of something known as the ‘hedonic treadmill’. The ‘hedonic treadmill’ refers to the fact that people  Bell (1993: 7).  Triandis (2001: 909). 25  The works of Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere are of particular importance for the formulation of African Socialism. 26  Schwartz (2007: 32). 23 24

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adapt to new situations, and that subjective well-being tends to stabilise itself. In other words, psychological studies have shown that (after basic needs have been satisfied) more wealth does not bring more satisfaction, as it does not take long for people to adapt to their newfound wealth, after which it takes more to please them than it did before.27 Other research presents evidence that subjective well-being is related to active pleasures connected to a person’s sense of self. Activities such as mastering a musical instrument, and athletic achievement, for example, leave the agent subjectively better off than ‘passive pleasures’ such as watching television, which, over a period of time, actually has a negative impact on well-being. We ‘lose ourselves’ in such active pleasures and this is often experienced very positively: our self is not the object of attention and we gain great joy from this loss of narcissistic self-focus. 28 One of the active pleasures connected to a person’s sense of self, one might argue from an Afro-communitarian personhood perspective, is fostering meaningful relationships with others. Afro-communitarian personhood is able to take these empirical insights about human nature into account: the community is meant to counterbalance impulsive short-term pleasure fulfilment in terms of consumer goods, as well as support quality relationships, which is one of the things which truly add to people’s welfare. When we focus on basic needs of the needy, Afro-communitarian personhood’s insight is that providing for the needy is also fulfilling a need for the affluent, in terms of their personhood and flourishing. I suggest that personhood from an Afro-communitarian framework would take the subjective well-being of individuals and the negative effects of ‘passive pleasures’ into account, but instead of stressing individual active pursuits, would focus on the building of relationships, which requires social skills, and is an active pleasure. But Afro-communitarian personhood does not only prescribe that there ought to be a relationship of mutual concern, care and sharing in which it matters by whom and how a need is satisfied; and that caring for the needs of others is important for the development of our personhood. From personhood from an Afro-communitarian perspective, there are also important implications for how we understand justice in the African context. Capabilities and needs are both not historically contextual in the relevant sense, and so do not take into consideration that people are in  Kupperman (2006: 11).  Csikzentmihalyi (1991).

27 28

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need of rectification and justice. According to Afro-communitarian personhood, seeing as our selves are situated and constituted by our community, distributive justice needs to be contextualised within a historical framework.

Afro-communitarian Personhood, Needs and Justice In this section, I will argue that even if all the basic needs of Africans are fulfilled (which, obviously, they are not) then there is the question of the economic dependence on the West and East which would still have to be addressed. It is thus my contention that the political philosophy of needs (if we speak of basic needs) allows for the continued oppression and devaluing of African lived experiences and knowledge systems unless it also focuses on the need for restorative justice. Ramose argues that the ‘philopraxis of ubuntu is a necessary cultural and political ingredient in the quest for African economic independence’.29 When Africa went through the process of political decolonisation, there was the vision of economic independence for the continent. However, as Ramose argues, politically ‘[d]ecolonised Africa is yet to realise economic independence’.30 He writes: The decolonisation of Africa guaranteed the retention of economic power in the hands of the former colonial rulers. It is precisely the recognition, protection and promotion of this unjustly acquired economic power that constitutes the foundation for a very grave concern over the structural economic dependency of contemporary Africa.31

Ramose argues that poverty (and thus distributive justice) is historical, structural, systemic and contextual.32 I claim, following Ramose, that the context and history of colonialism have to be taken into consideration when considering distributive justice in Africa. This is for the reason that distributive justice according to basic needs, without the economic independence of Africa, still falls short of restorative justice. In his book No Future Without Forgiveness, Desmond Tutu writes:  Ramose (2006).  Ramose (2006). 31  Ramose (2006). 32  Ramose (2006: 9). 29 30

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there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which was characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not retribution and punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships … restorative justice is being served when efforts are being made to work for healing, for forgiveness and for reconciliation.33

Llewellyn and Howse argue that restorative justice problematizes the issue of which set of practices can or should in a given context achieve the goal of restoration of equality in society. The identification of these practices requires social dialogue that includes victims and perpetrators and involves concrete consideration of the needs of each for restoration.34

Afro-communitarian personhood views reparations as a necessary part of restorative justice35 and agrees that there has not been a restoration of equality and equity in African society without reparations.36 It is inconsistent to say that one form of justice (distributive) would have to undermine another form of justice (restorative), and thus a form of distributive justice which does not undermine restorative justice, but rather which supports it, has to be implemented. Context, history and economic systems matter in terms of distributive justice.

Conclusion This chapter examined the relationship between Afro-communitarian personhood and the political philosophy of needs. I argued that if one takes an Afro-communitarian understanding of personhood, this would have particular implications for a political philosophy of needs. According to Afro-communitarian personhood, taking care of the needs of others is central to what it means to be a person. We are essentially interrelated with and constituted by others in our communities and societies, and to not recognise that this means we ought to care for the needs of others, is a

 Tutu (2000: 51–2).  (1999: 375). 35  See Oelofsen (2016). 36  Ramose sets out some of the means of reparation necessary in his 2006 article. 33 34

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moral failing. It is our very responsiveness to others’ needs which makes us human. Every person, every individual, and every society must take responsibility for being the kind of society that it is—we live in the kind of society in which people starve, go hungry, don’t have shelter, don’t have dignity and don’t have many of their other basic needs met. It is our moral responsibility to respond to the needs of others. But this responsibility will not only assist the persons in need—according to Afro-communitarian personhood, it will also assist us in becoming flourishing human persons. We all have a duty to engage with one another, and be responsible for the state of our society, and ensuring that the needs of all our members in society are met.

References Alkire, S. 2005. Capabilities and needs. In The philosophy of need, ed. S. Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bell, D. 1993. Communitarians and its critics. Oxford University Press. Brock, Gillian, and David Miller. 2019. Needs in moral and political philosophy. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), ed., E.N.  Zalta. Accessed April 15, 2020. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2019/entries/needs/. Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1991. Flow: The psychology of optimal experience. New York: Harper Collins. Held, V. 2006. The ethics of care: Personal, political, global. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Krog, A. 2008. ‘This thing called reconciliation…’ forgiveness as part of an interconnectedness-­towards-wholeness. South African Journal of Philosophy 27: 353–366. Kupperman, J. 2006. Six myths about the good life: Thinking about what has value. Hackett: Indianapolis. Lamont, J., and C. Favor. 2013. Distributive justice. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring), ed. E. N. Zalta. Accessed September 2015. http://plato. stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/justice-­distributive/. Llewellyn, R., and Howse, J. 1999. Restorative Justice - A conceptual framework, Law commission of Canada Nussbaum, M. 2011. Creating capabilities: The human development approach. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Oelofsen, R. 2016. Afro-communitarian implications for justice and reconciliation. Theoria 63: 1–19.

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Offner, A. 2006. The challenge of affluence: Self-control and well-being in the United States and Britain since 1950. New York: Oxford University Press. Ramose, M. 1999. African philosophy through ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books Publishers. ———. 2002. The philosophy of ubuntu and ubuntu as a philosophy. In Philosophy from Africa: a text with readings, ed. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 230–237. Oxford University Press. ———. 2006. Philosophy and Africa’s struggle for economic independence. Politeia 25: 3–17. Schwartz, B. 2007. Stop the treadmill! London Review of Books, March 8. Triandis, H. 2001. Individualism-collectivism and personality. Journal of Personality 69: 909. Tutu, D. 2000. No Future without Forgiveness. New York: Doubleday. Wiredu, Kwasi. 2002. The moral foundations of an African culture. In Philosophy from Africa: a text with readings, ed. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 230–237. Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 4

Personhood, Dignity, Duties and Needs in African Philosophy Motsamai Molefe

Introduction In this chapter, I explore the relationship between ethics and politics in African philosophy. To pursue the philosophical exploration of the relationship between ethics and politics, I will rely on the salient moral category of personhood in African philosophy. I understand the moral concept of personhood to embody the final value of moral excellence or virtue. To attribute personhood to a moral agent is to approve her moral conduct or judge her to have a good character—the idea of moral perfection. At least this is my understanding of how the literature construes personhood (see Gyekye 1997; Matolino 2014; Menkiti 1984). I submit that the ethical concept of personhood is the embodiment of the final good qua moral virtue suggests its own vision of politics, or a conception of a good society (see Menkiti 1984; Molefe 2019a, b; Oyowe 2013a). Roughly, I use the term ‘politics’ to refer to the overall structure of society arranged with the particular normative purpose to make certain (valuable) forms of human

M. Molefe (*) Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa, University of Fort Hare, Alice, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Molefe, C. Allsobrook (eds.), Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3_4

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existence possible (see Larmore 2012; Nussbaum 2008). My aim in this chapter is to tease out an account of politics associated with the ethical idea of personhood in African thought. To tease out the vision of politics inherent in the discourse of personhood, I point the reader to a particular tendency in the literature on personhood. Scholars of Afro-communitarian thought tend to implicitly associate personhood with a conception of politics. I think it is vital that we zoom into this tendency because I believe it will give us a philosophical platform to rethink the dominant account of conceptualising the relationship between ethics and politics in the discourse of personhood in African philosophy. It is common in the literature to conceptualise politics, in the ethical discourse of personhood, in terms of human rights. That is, the insight is that a society that expects its citizens to acquire personhood qua moral virtue should ensure the provision of human rights. In this chapter, I will propose an account of politics associated with the concept of personhood that grounds it (politics) in the category of need. The proposal is that the concept of need is more compatible with the discourse of personhood than the concept of human rights. For now, I specify two ways the literature on personhood treats ethics and politics to be contiguous. Firstly, scholars use the concept of personhood qua moral virtue as the foundation for rights in Afro-communitarian thought. Scholars start their philosophical journey from the ethical concept of personhood and then move on to account for rights, which move I construe as a progression from ethics to politics (see Gyekye 1997; Oyowe 2014; Matolino 2014; Ikuenobe 2018).1 Remember, for example, that Gyekye (1992) begins by criticising Menkiti’s concept of personhood. Afterwards, he proceeds to propose his own view of personhood and then offers his own account of human rights. For another, Ikuenobe (2018) details his account of personhood and then considers its

1  I caution the reader that scholars of African thought are not always clear regarding which concept of a ‘person’ is crucial in the discourse of human rights. Often the discussions are on the agent-centred notion of personhood, which is not entirely clear how it is related to the concept of rights (see Molefe 2016). Gyekye, on his part, has both the agent-centred and patient-centred notion of personhood, but he ultimately uses the latter to ground the idea of rights (ibid.). The tendency in the literature on rights is to invoke the patient-centred notion of personhood, the idea of moral status or dignity, and use it as the foundation of rights (see Donnelly 2009; Toscano 2011).

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implications for an account of human rights.2 The discourse on personhood, as the basis for human rights, has produced at least three distinct views that attempt to offer plausible account of them, namely radical communitarianism (Menkiti 1984), moderate communitarianism (Gyekye 1997) and limited communitarianism (Matolino 2014). The second instance of this tendency manifests itself in some of the harshest criticisms raised against the idea of personhood in the literature. For one, Kai Horsthemke (2015, 2018) argues that the idea of personhood is essentially anthropocentric. His concern is that the anthropocentrism manifested in (South) Africa is surprising given the history of struggle and victory against the racist agenda of apartheid. He is surprised that most victims of apartheid would embody the same political stance of prejudice, domination and discrimination similar to the racist regime of apartheid, except that now it is meted towards animals—which moral-political stance he refers to as ‘species apartheid’ (Horsthemke 2015: 14). For another, consider the criticism that the ethical idea of personhood fails to accommodate women, children, the disabled and homosexuals in the moral community (Oyowe 2013a; Manzini 2018; Horsthemke 2018). The criticisms are that the ethical concept of personhood is patriarchal, ageist, ableist and homophobic. All these criticisms amount to the view that the idea of personhood fails to embody a plausible socio-political view. I say so because all these criticisms hinge on the claim that the idea of personhood fails to embody an egalitarian socio-political outlook, which treats everyone, including animals, equally. In fact, Oyowe argues for the rejection of personhood since it fails to embody an egalitarian socio-political view (see, Oyowe 2013a).3 The examples discussed above exemplify the tendency in the literature on personhood to presume the relationship between ethics and politics. In the one instance, personhood (ethics) is the starting point or even the foundation for the discourse on human rights (politics). On the other 2  I find Ikuenobe’s approach of relating personhood to dignity and rights to be original and very interesting. In several of my works, I have objected to his personhood-based conception of dignity (see Molefe 2019a, 2020a, b). Moreover, below I offer an interpretation of the politics of personhood consistent with Menkiti’s view that assigns primacy to duties and relegates rights to a secondary status. 3  Elsewhere, I offer an interpretation of personhood that responds to these criticisms (see Molefe 2020a). The strategy is to point to a distinction between the patient-centred (moral status or dignity) and agent-centred (moral virtue) facets of personhood. Answers to most of these objections are found on the patient-centred facet of the ethics of personhood.

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hand, politics, imagined in terms of social egalitarianism and inclusiveness, is invoked to expose the implausibility of personhood as a final value. These two examples give us two distinctive (yet related) ways to think of the relationship between ethics and politics. On the one view, roughly, ethics informs politics, that is, the final good of moral excellence commits us to the necessity of human rights. On the other view, roughly, politics informs ethics, that is, insofar as the political consequences of personhood as moral theory are implausible then we should reject it. In light of the tendency to relate ethics and politics, I aim in this chapter, as stated above, to rethink the relationship between ethics and politics in the discourse of personhood. I propose a need-based approach as more suitable to capture a robust political vision than human rights. I will insist that the ethical concept of personhood presupposes a political view, where we imagine politics in terms of duties and needs. I further point out that a plausible interpretation must take politics to be prior to ethics in the discourse of personhood insofar as politics specifies necessary and conducive social conditions for the possibility of pursuing moral virtue (personhood). In other words, to judge some agent to be a person (morally excellent) already commits one to a prior assessment and satisfaction with the prevailing political conditions—the political assessment that society is structured in ways conducive for moral agents to pursue moral excellence. In other words, the necessary minimal political conditions for development and expression of agency ought to be open and available to all; otherwise, such a judgement (that one has failed to achieve personhood) is misplaced and irrational. In thinking of politics as prior to ethics, I will also be making the following suggestions. First, human rights do not embody the indigenous moral values and attitudes that characterise the ideals of personhood in African cultures.4 Secondly, I seek to point to the politics of duties as the most suitable way to account for the ethics of personhood. More specifically, however, I wish to give content to the politics of duties by substantiating them in terms of need as the primary political category for organising society for securing the possibility of human agency—Gyekye’s insights in accounting for Afro-communitarianism, among others, will be extremely helpful in elucidating this view. My overall exposition will amount to a sketch of a political theory of needs as the basis for the ethics of 4  My adumbrations on the unsuitability of rights will not be exhaustive here. I offer an exhaustive argument for this view, here (see Molefe 2017, 2018, 2019a: Ch. 5).

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personhood in Afro-communitarian thought, which will be suggestive but useful to facilitate a move away from rights to needs as a primary political category for imagining a good society. To make a case for needs as the political basis for the ethics of personhood, I structure this chapter as follows. I begin by discussing the ethics of personhood, where I will reveal the three dimensions that constitutes this moral view—(1) the fact of being human, (2) the idea of moral status (or, human dignity) qua the capacity for virtue and (3) the final value of moral virtue/perfection.5 Secondly, I will start tracing the politics of duties as the characteristic feature of Ifeanyi Menkiti’s (1984) account of personhood,6 or at least I will interpret it in this fashion. Though Menkiti does invoke rights in his philosophy, it seems that he is ultimately committed to a politics of duties. Next, I give content to the politics of duties in terms of the idea of common good, which I will explain in terms of needs—I will draw largely from Kwame Gyekye in this regard.7 In the end, I hope the reader will appreciate how the morally salient needs are crucial for agency, which is the essential component for the pursuit of moral excellence.

Personhood as a Moral Theory Below, I offer an exposition of personhood as a moral theory. I interpret the ethics of personhood to have three components: (1) the fact of being human; (2) distinctive features of human nature that make moral perfection possible—moral status and (3) the final good posited by the idea of personhood—moral perfection or excellence. To begin, notice that African scholars usually point to the idea of human nature as primary in the discourse of personhood. Note, for example, this comment by Ramose (2003: 413): 5  I use three phrases to refer to the final value of personhood—moral perfection, moral excellence or moral virtue. I take them to be equivalent or interchangeable. 6  I believe that the politics of duties is also a prominent feature of Gyekye. I justify this reading of Gyekye, below. 7  It is interesting to notice though Gyekye (1992, 1997), on face value, appears to be committed to rights, he keeps making statements, however, that can be interpreted to point to the primacy of duties. This tendency is stronger and more daring in his later writings (see Gyekye 2004, 2010). In his latter writings, he is openly committed to the idea of needs as primary in African political thought. It is important to notice that this aspect of his political philosophy is generally ignored in the literature.

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the concept of a person in African thought takes the fact of being a human being for granted. It is assumed that one cannot discuss the concept of personhood without in the first place admitting the ‘human existence’ of the human being upon whom personhood is to be conferred.

Here, Ramose distinguishes the fact of being human as necessary in the discourse of personhood qua moral virtue. The distinction between being human and being a person should not be a surprise given the tendency in the literature by scholars to distinguish between the ontological and normative concepts of personhood. For example, consider Wiredu (2009: 16): Take, for instance, the Akan word for a person, which is Onipa. A little understanding of Akan will reveal that the word is ambiguous. In contexts of normative comment, the word means a human individual of a certain moral and social standing, as we have explained. On the other hand, in narrative contexts it means simply a human being.

Here, Wiredu points us again to the distinction between the fact of being human and being a person. The former concept of a person refers to the metaphysical fact of being human and the latter to a moral judgement that recognises and approves the agent’s good character. The question that emerges is—why is this distinction crucial for the ethics of personhood? It is important for two reasons. The first revolves around the goal of conceptual precision, where we avoid ambiguities and conceptual confusion in our philosophical engagement. The second reason, which is more important in this chapter, points to the belief that human nature has a distinctive capacity or ability that metaphysically grounds the normative idea of personhood qua moral virtue. In other words, there is a distinctive aspect of human nature that explains our belief that human beings can achieve personhood qua moral perfection. To point to the distinctive ability of human nature to pursue moral virtue is to anticipate another crucial distinction in African moral thought, which scholars often overlook in the literature on personhood. We can now distinguish the fact of being human from the idea of moral status. The logic of this second distinction is the recognition that it is not every capacity associated with the fact of being human or, our nature, which is crucial for the possibility of morality qua moral virtue. For example, the fact that we are bipedal, we can sing and dance, though important human functions in other regards are not essential or relevant to the possibility of

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moral excellence. The fact of being one-legged, for example, has nothing to do with the moral agent’s ability to pursue moral virtue. The idea of moral status identifies that capacity of human nature that marks them out as morally significant, and it is in virtue of possessing this capacity that we believe that they can pursue moral perfection. African scholars keep pointing us to the view that there is/are human capacities that is/are relevant for the possibility and pursuit of morality (moral virtue) though most never quite specify it. Note, for example, Sebidi (1988: 84) observes that: For Africans, human nature is capable of increasing or decreasing almost to a point of total extinction. There are actions … that are conducive to the enhancement or growth of a person’s nature, just as there are those which are destructive of a person’s nature.

I interpret Sebidi to be pointing us to the capacity of human nature that make the pursuit of personhood possible. He understands the capacity to be capable of increasing (development) or decreasing (deterioration). For another, consider that Wiredu (2009: 15) explains an individual that has achieved personhood qua moral virtue as a ‘morally sound adult’. In the same passage, he goes on to explain why it must be an adult. He observes that, ‘The individual will have to be an adult, because otherwise she has not had enough time to develop her capabilities’ (2009: 15, emphasis mine).8 Wiredu, in my view, still points us to that distinctive metaphysical capacity necessary for moral perfection, though not specifying it. Gyekye (1992: 110, emphasis mine) espouses a similar view when he observes, ‘The pursuit or practice of moral virtue is held as intrinsic to the conception of a person’. I understand Gyekye here to mean that human beings are born with certain capacities that make the pursuit of personhood possible. To say the practice of virtue is intrinsic to the conception of personhood points us to the metaphysical capacities of human nature that inform the possibility of the practice of moral virtue. It does not mean, however, that the achievement of personhood is automatic and guaranteed. The idea of moral status specifies the distinctive metaphysical feature of human nature in virtue of which they deserve moral attention and recognition (Behrens 2013). This technical moral term—moral status—is 8  I am aware that Wiredu’s account of personhood in terms of an adult that is morally sound can be criticised for being ageist (see Manzini 2018). Elsewhere, I propose an interpretation of personhood that responds to this criticism (Molefe 2020a).

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crucial in moral philosophy, specifically in the domains of bioethics, environmental ethics and political philosophy. Consider, for example, Immanuel Kant’s (1996) categorical imperative that forbids the instrumentalisation of other human beings because such treatment degrades their autonomous nature (see Kaufmann 2010). Peter Singer (2009) rests his case for animal rights on the claim that animals, like human beings, have the capacity for sentience; hence, we owe them equal moral consideration. Nussbaum (2011) offers an account of justice based on (human) basic capabilities. These accounts differ in terms of what they take to be distinctive capacities of human nature. Kant’s deontology posits autonomy, utilitarianism sentience and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach basic capabilities, and the ethics of personhood, an African moral view of moral status, posits the capacity for virtue. Until now, I have specified two components of the ethics of personhood. The fact of being human and the specific human capacity that informs the possibility for moral excellence. Below, I specify the account of moral status that informs the final good of moral perfection. I draw the view of moral status embodied in the ethics of personhood in the writings of Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) and Kwame Gyekye (1992), who are leading scholars of personhood. To repudiate the view that animals have rights, Menkiti (1984: 177, emphasis mine) invokes a particular conception of moral status: the conclusion naturally follows that the possessor of the rights in question cannot be other than a person. That is so because the basis of such rights ascription has now been made dependent on a possession of a capacity for moral sense, a capacity, which though it need not be realized.

The reader should notice that the idea of a ‘person’ used here is that of moral status as opposed to that of moral virtue. This is the case because ‘personhood’ here is a matter entirely of possessing a certain metaphysical capacity, specifically the capacity for moral sense, note, not its use, which possession entitles one to rights. On Menkiti’s (ibid., emphasis mine) view, animals are not entitled to rights because they lack the ‘the constitutive elements in the definition of human personhood’, which he explains in terms of the capacity for moral sense.9 Hence, for him, to embrace animal 9  I caution the reader to note that Menkiti espouses an interpretation of personhood that denies animals rights. Elsewhere, I offer an interpretation of it that accommodates them in

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rights is to ‘undermine … the clearness of our conception of what it means to be a person’ (ibid.). A clear conception of what it means to be human involves recognising entities with the capacity for moral sense, which makes the attainment of personhood (moral virtue) possible. Gyekye defends a similar view of moral status in the discourse of personhood. In adumbrating his account of personhood qua moral virtue, he points to its underlying view of moral status: the human person [human being] is considered to possess an innate capacity for virtue [moral status], for performing morally right actions and, therefore, should be treated as a morally responsible agent.

Gyekye’s also talks of the innate capacity for virtue in these terms— ‘man [a human being] is a being endowed with moral sense’, which does not mean that ‘his virtuous character is a settled matter, but that he is capable of virtue’ (111, emphasis mine). In the light of the above, we can rightly conclude that human beings have moral status insofar as they possess the capacity for virtue (see Molefe 2020a, b). The development and unfolding of the capacity for virtue, moral status, is the objective status of being human that explains why we expect human beings to be able to achieve moral virtue. Morality, in terms of pursuing personhood, is possible because we have the metaphysical capacity for virtue. In light of the fact that we have specified the distinctive feature of human nature that accounts for moral status qua the capacity for moral virtue, we now turn to consider the final good of the ethics of personhood. The idea of personhood, as the final good, is usually explained as a moral achievement. Menkiti (1984: 171) opines, ‘For personhood is something which has to be achieved, and is not given simply because one is born of human seed’. Wiredu (2004: 18) also notes, ‘Personhood, on this showing, is something of an achievement’. The achievement of personhood essentially involves the moral agent nurturing ‘one’s distinctively human and valuable nature’ qua the capacity for virtue (Metz 2007: 31). Scholars account for the achievement of personhood in terms of nurturing a virtuous character (Ikuenobe 2006, 2016; Molefe 2019a; Oyowe 2013a). Note, for example, that Menkiti (1984) associates personhood with moral excellence four times in his essay. In one instance, Menkiti speaks of personhood and excellence in this fashion: ‘the word of muntu includes an the moral community (see, Molefe 2020a, b).

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idea of excellence’ (1984: 171). I submit that it is the normative dimension of the word muntu under consideration here. When we say, one is a muntu (person) in the normative sense, we mean their life is characterised by moral excellence. Menkiti (1984: 172, emphasis mine) corroborates this view thus: Hence, the African emphasized the rituals of incorporation and the overarching necessity of learning the social rules by which the community lives, so that what was initially biologically given can come to attain social self-­ hood, i.e., become a person with all the inbuilt excellencies implied by the term.

Talk of inbuilt-excellencies signals the development of the distinctive and valuable features of human nature to embody moral perfection. That is, for the moral agent to develop a virtuous character, which is overflowing with moral virtues or ‘the practice of virtue’ (Gyekye 1992: 113). Menkiti also speaks of personhood in terms ‘excellencies as truly definitive of a man’ (1984: 171). He also associates it with ‘a widened maturity of ethical sense—an ethical maturity’ (ibid.: 173). In other words, a human being achieves personhood insofar as she develops a virtuous character (Gyekye 1992; Ikuenobe 2018). It is for this reason that Wiredu (2009: 15) speaks of it as referring to ‘a morally sound’ individual. From the above, we note that personhood embodies a moral view that espouses the development of a good character as its chief goal. Behrens (2013: 111) comments on the idea of personhood is illuminating: Menkiti’s association of the term ‘excellencies’ with personhood also implies that the becoming a person is essentially related to developing virtue. Thus, the African conception of personhood could be thought to propose a theory of ethics that brings to mind what Western philosophy calls ‘perfectionism’: Persons should seek to develop a good or virtuous nature in order to become true or fully moral persons.

The idea of personhood embodies a perfectionist moral view, which imposes on the agent the duty to develop a character that is exuding with moral excellence. To attribute personhood to some individual is to judge her to have successfully engaged in the process and project of character perfection (Menkiti 2018). Scholars of African moral thought point to a variety of character traits (virtues) that they associate with the achievement of personhood. Gyekye

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(2010: n.p; 1992: 110), for example, talking of personhood talks of the ‘excellences of character’, which ‘include [the virtues of] generosity, kindness, compassion, benevolence, respect and concern for others’. Desmond Tutu (1999: 35, emphasis mine) speaks of an individual that has attained personhood ‘generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you have’.10 Justice Yvone Mokgoro (1998: 3) notes that personhood is characterised by social values of ‘Group solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity, humanistic orientation and collective unity have, among others been defined as key social values …’ From the above, we can conclude that personhood embodies a character-centred moral theory, where the goal of the agent is to perfect her own character (see Ramose 1999; Shutte 2001; Van Niekerk 2007). We also note that the kinds of virtues that are associated with personhood are relational insofar as they embody other-regarding duties. Hence, we note that an individual that has personhood is one that is exuding with other-regarding virtues.11 To sum up, the ethics of personhood roots morality on the fact of being human. Human nature, among others, is characterised by the metaphysical capacity for virtue. The capacity for virtue specifies that property that explains why human beings deserve utmost moral respect, which amounts to a theory of moral status or dignity associated with the discourse of personhood. The capacity for virtue specifies the metaphysical capacity that secures the status or intrinsic dignity of the human agent (Michael 2014; Sulmasy 2008). It is the development of the capacity for virtue, on the part of the moral agent, that translates to personhood or moral perfection. The achievement of a morally excellent character is the same as what scholars call achievement dignity (Michael 2014). It is a dignified form of existence that emerges in the light of the effort and exertion of the moral agent in terms of developing her capacity for virtue. A moral agent with achievement dignity, or a morally virtuous character, exudes other-­ regarding excellences like generosity, care, compassion, friendliness and so on. 10  I am aware that Tutu talks of Ubuntu and does not specifically use the idea of personhood. The same consideration applies to other scholars cited in this article like Mokgoro, Shutte, among others. It is my considered view that the discourse of Ubuntu and personhood are the same (see Molefe 2019c, 2020a). 11  Space does not quite allow me to motivate and justify why we should take seriously the moral vision of personhood. In several places, I have proffered justifications of personhood as a moral theory (see Molefe 2019a, 2020b).

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In the next section, I trace the politics of duties in the ethics of personhood in Menkiti’s moral-political philosophy.

Personhood and the Politics of Duties The aim in this section is to offer a philosophical exposition and interpretation of Menkiti’s account of politics associated with the discourse of personhood. Before I do so, however, I begin by giving the reader the sense of how I will be using the idea of politics. I use the idea of politics in the way used by Martha Nussbaum (2008) in her capabilities approach. She thinks of politics in these terms: it is the task of the ‘basic structure’ of society to put in place the necessary conditions for a minimally decent human life, a life at least minimally worthy of human dignity, expressive of at least minimal respect (2008: 359–360).

She uses the phrase basic structure to refer to the idea of a government. She understands the major task of the government to involve the creation of social conditions that will be compatible and expressive of the recognition and respect of human dignity. This role involves creating conditions that are minimally decent for human existence. Another way to think of politics is to frame it in terms of institutional arrangements that protect human dignity and ensure the possibility for achieving dignified existence. Remember, earlier we specified two distinct senses of dignity: (1) status or intrinsic dignity that a human being has in virtue of possessing the capacity for virtue, at least in the African view; (2) achievement dignity that the moral agent achieves relative to developing their capacity for virtue. I now introduce the third sense of dignity, which I explain in terms of the basic structure (the state) creating dignifying conditions for human existence to be meaningfully possible. Conditions of existence are dignifying insofar as they provide human beings with an enabling social environment compatible with what is morally distinctive of their nature—their moral status or dignity. The content of what is to count as an enabling environment or necessary conditions will be the function of the proposed political theory. It is this understanding of politics that informs the universal repudiation of institutions and process like that of slavery, colonisation and patriarchy since they do not recognise the status dignity of all human beings and fail to provide minimal conditions for individuals and groups

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to lead decent human lives. Below, I consider Menkiti’s conceptualisation of politics in terms of personhood. I emphasise the point that I take politics to be prior to ethics. Without the political conditions that recognises the dignity of human beings and the social conditions required for them to live dignified lives, the ethical is rendered almost impossible or is relegated to the sphere of the heroic. It is unjust, unfair and even cruel to expect human beings to lead morally robust lives under conditions that undermine their (intrinsic) dignity and those that serve as impediments to their pursuit of their moral destiny like slavery. The crucial point here is that for a human being to function as a moral agent they must exist under conditions that are conducive for the development and function of their agency. The idea of politics, as used here, provides a theoretical construction of such conditions. Now, I offer an interpretation of Menkiti’s moral-political philosophy on the relationship between ethics and politics on the discourse of personhood. Central to Menkiti’s moral philosophy is the idea of personhood, which he understands in terms of the achievement of moral perfection. To achieve personhood, for Menkiti, is to add dimensions of moral excellence into one’s humanity. How does politics come into play in Menkiti’s moral-­ political view? Menkiti introduces politics in his discourse on personhood in two ways. What follows below is what I take to be a robust constructive interpretation of Menkiti’s view, rather than a mere exposition of his ideas. Other thinkers might construe his moral-political philosophy differently, which is important for philosophical dialogue and debate in moral-­political philosophy (see Ikuenobe 2018). First, Menkiti associates or compares his account of personhood with that of John Rawls. Menkiti believes that his account of personhood comes very close to that of Rawls’ in Western philosophy. Menkiti (1984: 176) comments: John Rawls, of the Western-born philosophers, comes closest to a recognition of this importance of ethical sense in the definition of personhood. In A Theory of Justice he makes explicit part of what is meant by the general ethical requirement of respect for persons, noting that those who are capable of a sense of justice are owed the duties of justice, with this capability construed in its sense of a potentiality which may or may not have been realized.

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There are at least two ways to interpret Menkiti here. One way to interpret Menkiti might just point out that Rawls and Menkiti are actually dealing with two distinct concepts of personhood. Whereas Menkiti is dealing with an agent-centred notion of it, which involves the agent pursuing moral excellence, Rawls’ notion is patient-centred insofar as it assigns respect to some entity relative to it possessing the relevant metaphysical capacity for a sense of justice. In Menkiti’s view, the moral agents’ actual conduct is decisive for personhood. In Rawls’ view, the mere possession of the capability of a sense of justice is decisive for the status of being a moral patient (see Behrens 2013; Molefe 2020b). On this interpretation, one reads Menkiti as confusing two distinct moral terms, which have no relationship at all. For another promising and constructive reading, I propose that we take note of the fact that Menkiti is actually aware that the idea of personhood qua the agent-centred and the patient-centred one qua moral status are actually distinct moral concepts. This view is borne out by the fact that Menkiti informs us that Rawls’ notion comes very close to his own notion of personhood; he never claims that they are the same. One robust reading of this closeness could be that the agent-centred notion embodies its own conception of the patient-centred notion of personhood (a theory of moral status), which will allow us to enter into the discourse of politics. Remember, Rawls informs us that ‘The sufficient condition for equal justice [is] the capacity for moral personality’ (quoted in Menkiti 1984: 176). The capacity for moral personality embodies Rawls’ view of human dignity or moral status (an ethical view) is married to the condition of equal justice (a political view). To possess the capacity for moral personality requires social conditions of equal justice, which Rawls, at least according to Menkiti, expresses through a regime of rights—the view that we owe any entity with moral status equal rights. In this light, I suggest that we construe Menkiti’s concept of personhood (agent-centred) to embody its own view of moral status (dignity), which entails a conception of social justice (politics). I substantiate this reading of Menkiti by considering his treatment of animals as falling outside the boundaries and benefits of social justice. Menkiti criticises philosophical views that accommodate animals in the moral community since they wrongly assign them rights. He contests assigning rights to animals because it deviates from a correct understanding of African personhood. Menkiti’s (1984: 177, emphasis mine) points out that:

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The danger as I see it is that such an extension of moral language to the domain of animals is bound to undermine, sooner or later, the clearness of our conception of what it means to be a person.

In his view, animals do not have rights because they cannot pursue moral perfection, what he refers to as ‘our conception of what it means to be a person’. To be a person means moral achievement and this kind of achievement is not possible to animals. On Menkiti’s view, we owe rights only towards entities that can pursue moral virtue (personhood). The support for this view is that personhood (moral virtue) embodies its own of view of moral status qua the capacity for moral sense, which capacity animals lack (see Molefe 2020a). Remember, Menkiti insists that animals lack ‘the constitutive elements in the definition of human personhood’. He explains constitutive element of human nature that secures human rights, which animals lack, in terms of ‘the capacity for moral sense’ (ibid.). Menkiti clearly states: ‘the basis of such rights ascription has now been made dependent on a possession of a capacity for moral sense’ (ibid.). The conclusion is beyond controversy that in Menkiti’s view we do not owe animals any duties of justice, captured in terms of rights, because they lack the capacity for moral sense. The capacity for moral sense is necessary for the pursuit of moral perfection. Above, we see Menkiti associating the regime of rights with the concept of personhood. The concept of personhood interpreted in both senses of the term as moral status (capacity for virtue) and the actual achievement of moral virtue embodies a political vision of a just society. We owe entities that possess the capacity for moral sense human rights. Menkiti essentially connects ethics, which he construes in terms of moral status and moral virtue, with politics that he explains in terms of the regime of rights. Politics, understood in terms of the provision of human rights, embodies the minimal conditions that are necessary for human beings to lead decent lives. I will come back to the status of rights in Menkiti’s political view later on. The second approach Menkiti employs to relate ethics with politics is in terms of the notion of community. In this interpretation of Menkiti, the concept of the community is decisive for the possibility of human development. This explains why for Menkiti the very project of being human, understood both ontologically and morally, is not possible outside of the community. He expresses this point as follows:

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the force of the statement “I am because we are” is made… in reference … to an individual who recognizes the sources of his or her own humanity, and so realizes, with internal assurance, that in the absence of others, no grounds exist for a claim regarding the individual’s own standing as a person. The notion at work here is the notion of an extended self (2004: 324).

The ‘we’ in the maxim ‘I am because we are’ refers to the centrality of social relationships (community) in the construction of what it means to be a human being and the moral possibility of moral virtue. The individual’s internal assurance is a function of her being rooted in robust and on-­ going communal relationships. It is crucial to notice that Menkiti distinguishes three ways to conceive of a community or society, namely (1) ‘collectivities in the truest sense’, (2) ‘constituted human groups’ and (3) ‘random collections of individuals’ (Menkiti 1984: 179–180). Menkiti associates (1) with the African socio-political view and (2) with the Western view. The major difference between the two views of the ‘community’, according to Menkiti, is that the African view considers the community to be an essential component of human existence, both ontologically and normatively, as expressed in relation to Mbiti’s assertion that ‘I am because we are’. What is of interest for us is the political dimensions of the idea of community in Menkiti’s moral-political view. Menkiti is extremely helpful in terms of delineating the political consequences of his understanding of the community. Menkiti (1984: 181) notes ‘The difference between the two views of society is profound’ and he goes on to capture them in these terms: In looking at the distinction just noted, it becomes quite clear why African societies tend to be organized around the requirements of duty while Western societies tend to be organized around the postulation of individual rights. In the African understanding, priority is given to the duties which individuals owe to the collectivity, and their rights, whatever these may be, are seen as secondary to their exercise of their duties.

Menkiti suggests that these two conceptions of a community have political consequences regarding how to conceive of social justice. The Western view of society is a strictly individualised one, where individuals’ rights regulate political relationships. What is the stake in the political organisation in the Western tradition are rights of individuals. The African view, on the other hand, imagines a political order where being human

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and its moral prospects in terms of ‘beingness-with-others’, where positive duties regulate political relationships (Menkiti 2004: 324). It is crucial to notice that Menkiti’s view of community places emphasis on a political order that talks of the duties that we owe to the collectivity, note, not to the individual qua individual (Menkiti 2004: 324). The distinction here is that, in the Western tradition, we owe rights the individual qua individual, whereas, in the African view, we owe duties to the whole community (Ikuenobe 2018). Though the African view, as represented by Menkiti is not opposed to the rights of individuals per se, it considers them secondary. The positive duties to the collective are primary in his political thought. To sum up, we notice that Menkiti’s connects his commitment to the final good of personhood (moral virtue) to a conception of politics. The commitment manifests in two forms. In the first instance, Menkiti associates personhood qua moral virtue with Rawls’ concept of personhood qua moral status. To have moral status entitles one to rights, which are crucial for social justice. Menkiti suggests a conception of moral status qua capacity for moral sense associated with personhood qua moral virtue. For an agent to develop the capacity for virtue, she requires a society arranged around the provision of certain human rights. On the other hand, Menkiti appeals to the idea of a community to unfold a distinct political vision. An African conception of politics prioritises duties to the collective and secondarizes human rights. A life of moral virtue requires conditions characterised primarily by duties to the collective. Thus, we note that Menkiti gives us two political visions that associate with the ethics (moral virtue) of personhood. Since Menkiti takes rights to be secondary and duties to be primary in African ethical thought, in what follows we will focus on his politics of duties. We do so largely because Menkiti does not give us the details of the politics of duties to the collective, though he is clear that duties are primary on this political vision.12 We also do so because we believe it will usher us into needs as a primary moral-political category. Below, I elaborate on the politics of duties.

12  I think, in the instance when Menkiti invoked rights, it is because he was relating his political view with that of John Rawls who appeals to them. When, however, he turns to the centrality of the community, the political contexts where individuals in the African context realise their moral possibilities, he points us to socio-moral transactions facilitated by otherregarding duties. It is for this reason that Menkiti insists on the primacy of duties to the collectivity rather than individual rights. In another place, I offer an interpretation of the role rights as secondary in African political thought terms of being merely remedial (Molefe 2019a).

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Personhood, Duties and Needs Two central claims are clear from the above discussion on the politics of duties. First, rights will not offer us an account of politics appropriate for the discourse of personhood, though they are not entirely rejected. Hence, Menkiti relegates them to a secondary status. Secondly, duties to the collectivity are primary in imagining the political conditions that ought to hold for morality to be possible. Below, I seek to propose one robust interpretation of the politics of duties associated with the discourse of personhood. I propose two ways to think of the politics of duties. Firstly, I suggest that we think of the duties to the collectivity in terms of the idea of the common good. Secondly, I propose that we make sense of the common good in terms of the idea of need. I begin with the idea of the common good. One salient way to think of the duties to the collectivity, or, the politics of duties, is in terms of the common good. This view is quite common in the literature in the African moral-political thought (see Gyekye 1992, 1997; Ilesanmi 2001; Masolo 2004; Molefe 2019a; Wiredu 1992). To get a sense of these duties in Afro-communitarian thought, I will draw largely from Kwame Gyekye’s view on personhood and Afro-communitarianism. Gyekye (1992: 119) comments in this fashion: the common good, which is an outstanding goal of the communitarian moral and political philosophy, requires that each individual should work for the good of all. The social and ethical values of social well-being, solidarity, interdependence, cooperation, compassion, and reciprocity, which can be said to characterize the communitarian morality, primarily impose on the individual a duty to the community and its members. It is all these considerations that elevate the notion of duties to a priority status in the whole enterprise of communitarian life (Gyekye 1992: 119).

Note the following crucial points from Gyekye’s adumbrations. Firstly, the common good refers to the outstanding goal of African moral-politics. The common good as the goal of the political system involves a social context in which each individual works for the good of all. Secondly, the values to characterise the moral duties that we exercise to contribute to the good of all are other-regarding—social well-being, solidarity, interdependence and so on. Finally, the very idea of the common good points to the primacy or elevated status of duties, to be specific, other-regarding duties to secure the good of all. In other words, the discourse on the common

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good is one that is duty-based, and these duties are primarily oriented to all human beings. Hence, we can observe that Menkiti’s talk of the duties to the collectivity refers to our duties to promote the good of all. Thus far, at least, we have a sense of the values that are to characterise the dispensing of these duties—other-regarding virtues. We also have a sense of the scope of our duties—everyone. We are still not clear, however, regarding exact nature of the common good, specifically, how to think of the good that we owe to all, and we still need clarity regarding the concept of duties. Note this comment by Gyekye (1992: 117): [Communitarianism] Concerned, as it is, with the common good or the communal welfare, the welfare of each and every member of the community, communitarianism will, perhaps undoubtedly, consider duty as the moral tone, as the supreme principle of morality. By ‘duty’, I mean task, service, conduct or function that a person feels morally obligated to perform in respect of another person or other persons.

More precisely, Gyekye defines the common good in terms of the welfare of each and every member of the community. In the previous pages, he talks of the common good as the ‘the provision for the social conditions which will enable each individual person to function satisfactorily in a human society’ (116). In another place, he refers to the common good as ‘human good’ that is ‘essential for the ordinary or basic functioning of the human person in a human society’ (2004: 45). The idea of the common good embodies what African scholars refer to as ‘humane conditions for everyone’ (Masolo 2010: 494, see also, Kudadjie 1992). In this light, it is clear that the idea of the common good refers to a set of basic and necessary social conditions that enable each and every individual to lead a satisfactory human life. These goods are common insofar as they are required by each and every human being. They are called goods because without them human existence will be less than adequate, unfortunate and handicapped. It is also important to notice that Gyekye associates the common good with the politics of duties, which every individual has to exercise to contribute to the good of all. Gyekye defines duties in terms of tasks, service, function one feels morally obligated towards the other. These other-­ regarding duties, what Masolo (2010: 494) refers to as ‘practical altruism’, are crucial for the securing and creation of enabling conditions for satisfactory human function or existence. Masolo (ibid.) comments as follows

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regarding the politics of duties: ‘It is expected that everyone should carry their share of the responsibility for creating humane conditions of life for everyone’. To get a better handle of these duties—we might want to understand their nature or source. Specifically, we want to understand what it is about the human condition that engenders these duties. I believe that asking this question leads us to explore the idea of needs. I say so for two reasons. Firstly, there is agreement among leading scholars of African thought that rights are not the primary basis for our duties (see Gyekye 1997; Menkiti 1984; Molefe 2017, 2019a). In fact, an analysis by Anthony Oyowe (2014, see also 2013b) of the status of rights in African philosophy in the literature is quite revealing. Oyowe argues that, though the views advocated by scholars of African thought appear to be committed to rights, the theories they ultimately develop are duty-based ones. Oyowe’s conclusion is not surprising at all given the observation that African societies tended to operate on the basis of social duties and not on rights (see Ake 1987; Donnelly 1982). The philosophical explanation for why rights tend not to be a suitable fit for cultures that emphasise community and personhood is the other-regarding facet of this moral view. Whereas rights refer to individuals’ claims or entitlements that right-holders can and ought to insist upon, the idea of personhood, on the other hand, places emphasis on the other and the other-regarding duties we owe to them (Donnelly 2009; Molefe 2017, 2019b). That is, rights place the self, as a right-holder, at the centre of focus and power, in the political stage, whereas a duty-based ethics draws our attention to the other as a centre of focus on the political stage. Note Gyekye’s (2010: n.p., emphasis mine) comment: African ethics does not give short-shrift to rights as such; nevertheless, it does not give obsessional or blinkered emphasis on rights. In this morality, duties trump rights, not the other way around, as it is in the moral systems of Western societies. The attitude to, or performance of, duties is induced by a consciousness of needs rather than of rights. In other words, people fulfil— and ought to fulfil—duties to others not because of the rights of these others, but because of their needs and welfare.

It is crucial to appreciate the fact that Gyekye connects directly the source of these duties to be the others’ needs. In other words, the natural human condition of neediness is the basis for our duties. The force of

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individuals’ rights fizzles in comparison to the demands placed on us by human neediness. Here Gyekye presents us with two competing political systems to respond to the human condition of human neediness—rights and duties. Gyekye is unequivocal that African ethical thought is on the side of duties as the best moral-political resource to respond to the human condition. So important are duties to respond to the human condition of need that they override individual rights. The fact that duties, associated with the human condition of need, can trump rights suggests that the African view is radically a need-based system. The analogy of rights as trumps is usually understood to point to their ‘special normative force’ or peremptory status, where they are considered to almost always override ‘non-rights objectives, such as increasing national wealth’ (Wenar 2020: n.p, see also Donnelly 2009). In the political system associated with African thought, the special normative force associated with rights is occupied by the duties we owe to others in virtue of their natural and perpetual neediness. If rights are so trump-able then it should follow that they do not hold sway in this ethical system (Molefe 2018). The second reason that buttresses the pivotal status of needs revolves around the essentiality of the community in African thought. Members of the community, individual human beings, are naturally characterised by inadequacies from birth to death. These inadequacies are bodily, material, social and so on. One can capture the natural inadequacy of human beings in terms of ontological imperfection, which points to the fact that human beings have to go outside of themselves to satisfy themselves (Passmore 2000). In other words, in and of ourselves as human beings, we are not self-sufficient to satisfy our bodily, psychological, spiritual and social needs; we must gain access to goods external of us to make our existence possible and meaningful. It is for this reason that Wiredu (1992: 194) in accounting for his humanistic ethics makes the following observation: The commonest formulation of this outlook is in the saying, which almost any Akan adult or even young hopeful will proffer on the slightest provocation, that it is the human being that has value: Onipa na ohia. The English translation just given of the Akan saying, though pertinent, needs supplementation, for the crucial term here has a double connotation. The word ‘(o)hia’ in this context means both that which is of value and that which is needed. Through the first meaning the message is imparted that all value derives from human interests and through the second that human fellowship is the most important of human needs.

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I hope the reader can appreciate how Wiredu associates the fact of being human with both value and needs. On the one hand, some facet of human nature is the source of all moral value, and, on the other hand, it is characterised by needs that ought to be fulfilled in order for human value to be realised. Human fellowship (community), therefore, becomes the most important means for responding to the human condition. What is the human condition? On Wiredu’s (1992: 202) view, the human condition is characterised by ‘essential dependency’ on others (ibid.). He goes on to observe: ‘The idea of dependency may even be taken as a component of the Akan conception of a person’ (ibid.). In other words, on the Akan (African view), it is a fact of being human that she will always be dependent on others for her to function as a human being. Wiredu continues to observe that ‘a human being is not only not self-sufficient but also radically self-insufficient … he or she is totally dependent on others … Human beings, therefore, at all times, in one way or another … need the help of their kind’ (ibid., emphasis mine). The second reason that grounds the essentiality of needs in terms of the idea of the community. The community is highly prized in Afro-­ communitarianism because it offers the best means to respond to the human condition of need. The human being, by nature, is perpetually and radically insufficient. Human insufficiency explains the importance of dependence or mutual dependence in the discourse of African ethics (Behrens 2010). The community is crucial because it is a means for meeting the vulnerability and radical inadequacy associated with being human. Talk of human vulnerability, dependence and radical insufficiency is another way to talk of the natural human condition of neediness. The community is crucial in African political thought because it offers the best means to respond to human neediness. Wiredu (2008) talks of the human neediness always requiring the help of others—the talk of help flowing from human fellowship points us to duties and rights. We just saw African scholars associating our duties to others to the perpetual condition of need. We saw our duties to respond to the human condition assigned a special normative force. The best way to understand this special normative force, we noted, is in terms of the community. We can now note the relationship between the community and the common good. The aim of the community, each and every member of society and the state, is to secure the good of all. To talk of the good of all is to recognise the basic needs of every human being. What is not clear, however, is what do we mean when we talk of basic needs? Note, for example, Gyekye

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(2004: 4 & 48) talks of the ‘existential needs’ that he associates with ‘the problems of material existence—problems of providing food, clothing, shelter, and other material needs’. Joyce Engmaan (1992: 187) talks of ‘the necessity of attention to needs and interests arising from embodied existence.’ The central question might be why we must meet existential and material needs. The answer suggested by Gyekye, Wiredu and Engmaan is that the provision of needs is necessary for human beings to function properly and satisfactorily. Note, for example, Gyekye (2004: 48) makes this comment regarding basic needs: Basic needs, qua basic, are those that can be said to be intrinsic to the functioning of human beings as human beings; they are the things that make human life at all worth living.

By basic needs, Gyekye is referring to those needs that are intrinsic or necessary for human beings to function as human and to be able to lead lives of worthy of their kind. I think the idea of function signals the idea of agency. To give content to the idea of agency and needs, I will draw from the scholar of needs Sarah Clarke Miller’s (2012), adumbrations on needs because she elaborates, though in a different context, ideas that are merely implicit in African communitarianism. Her elaboration are in a feminist framework, which in some crucial ways shares some commonalities with African moral thought. For example, both ethical systems are committed to relationalism (Metz 2013). To begin, she defines basic needs, as those if they go unmet or unsatisfied will cause great harm to the individual. The harm involved in not meeting basic needs involves undermining human agency, which is at the heart of satisfactory human existence. She conceives of agency in terms of three aspects—rationality, emotional attunement and relational abilities (2017: 4). For a human being to be self-determining and to exist in social relationships, she will need to develop her rational powers, relational abilities and emotions to enter into meaningful and lasting bonds with others. Gillian Brock (1987: 15) comments as follows regarding basic needs and human agency: The needs that matter are bounded by the idea of the necessary, the essential, the indispensable, or the inescapable. Furthermore, if the needs are not met, we are unable to do anything much at all and certainly are unable to

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lead a recognizably human life. Meeting the morally relevant needs is central to our abilities to function as human agents.

What we refer to as basic needs is captured in the literature on needs also in terms of fundamental needs or morally relevant needs. These needs are basic or fundamental because, as Gyekye puts it, they are intrinsic to human functioning, or as Brock puts it, they are crucial for us living recognisably human life. These needs, we notice, are trans-cultural, that is, they have to do with the human condition as such. In this light, when we talk of the common good, we are talking about the duty of the basic structure to create the human conditions for human existence. Remember, by the common good, we are referring to meeting the basic needs of every human being. Meeting the basic needs of each and every individual is necessary ‘to establish, maintain, or restore human agency’ (Miller 2012: 17). Robust agency is important for a recognizably human existence (see Hamilton 2003).13 In the light of the above, we now have a clearer picture of the politics of duties. These duties are engendered by the human condition of vulnerability and dependency—the objective human condition of neediness. We noted the duties imagined in African ethics are characterised by other-­ regarding virtues of care, compassion, solidarity, reciprocity and so on. The importance of meeting these needs has to do with establishing, maintaining and restoring human agency. If the basic structure or society does not meet human basic needs, it is the possibility of functioning as a normal human being that is threatened. The politics of duties imagines social conditions necessary for the development and preservation of human agency. The government and every agent must create conditions conducive for the development and sustenance of human agency. The fundamental goal of politics, therefore, is to create conditions that are conducive for development and exercise of human agency. Now that we have a vision of the politics of duties, we can revert to the ethics of personhood and its relation to politics. I hope it is now clear why 13  It is my view that what Gyekye refers to as basic needs, Miller fundamental needs and Brock needs that morally matter corresponds to a combination of what Lawrence Hamilton (2003: 27–38) refers to as vitality needs and agency needs. Vitality needs, understood within a framework of continuum, refers ‘to everyday minimal human functioning’ requirements like access to water, food and things like clothes, shelter and so on (31). Agency needs refers to those that must be provided in order for human beings to be able to occupy socially relevant roles and perform socially valuable tasks associated with those roles.

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politics is necessary for ethics. If the aim of politics is to create humane conditions for the development and exercise of agency then it makes sense to expect moral agents to pursue and even achieve it. Remember, I spoke of the personhood that we achieve as the agent-centred notion of it, which points to the centrality of a robust agency in this ethical discourse. The achievement of personhood requires the exercise of agency, and it is impossible to achieve moral virtue without a robust agency. We cannot quite expect individuals to exercise their agency, in relation to the pursuit of moral perfection, if their fundamental needs are unmet, which undermines the very condition of agency that is required for them to be able to flourish as human beings. It is in this sense that we note that politics, in some sense, is prior to ethics. To hold the high standards that individuals ought to achieve personhood implies, in the first place, that the social arrangement necessary for the development and sustenance of agency are in order and freely open to all. To close off this section, it might be helpful to think of a list of basic needs that might give us a rough sense of humane conditions necessary for developing and exercising agency. Note that Gyekye (2004: 48) talks of ‘material needs’—‘providing food, clothing and shelter’. In another place, he speaks of these in terms of survival needs, which largely focuses of bodily deficiencies like ‘hunger, thirst and sex’ (1992: 44). He also speaks of ‘social needs’ or trans-survival needs like ‘security, peace, safety, love, recognition, status, honor, influence, happiness, solidarity, human creativity and productivity, motherhood, fatherhood, success and prosperity’ (ibid.). He also speaks of social institutions that also provide and support the possibility of the provision of these basic as part of these basic needs (Gyekye 2010). As such, we can think of basic needs as covering survival/ bodily, social and institutional needs. I think the list of needs proposed by Miller (2012: 41–42) is useful and consistent with the vision proposed by Gyekye: Nutrition and water; Rest; Shelter; Healthy Environment; Bodily Integrity; Healing; Education; Attachments; Social Inclusion, Participation, and Recognition; Play and Security.

The basic structure and each member of society has the duty to ensure the provision of these basic needs. These basic needs are necessary for the development of human agency, which is necessary for human beings qua moral agents pursuing moral virtue. Without the provision of the basic

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needs, the very prospect of a robust human existence is threatened and the possibility of personhood (moral virtue) is in jeopardy. It is in this sense that politics is required and prior to the possibility of the goal of personal development and perfection (the ethical), because it justifies our moral expectations that moral agents’ ought to pursue and achieve personhood.

Conclusion In this chapter, I explored the relationship between ethics and politics in the discourse of personhood. The aim was to shift the politics in the discourse of the ethics of personhood from its fixation with human rights to needs as a fundamental political category. I did this by noting that it is common in the discourse of personhood for scholars to point to the importance of rights, yet, underlying their ethical framework, is a radical commitment to duties to the collective, or what we referred to as the common good. Some scholars even observe that rights are secondary or that they can be trumped by others’ needs. I suggested that one progressive way to construe the common good is in terms of the provision of the basic needs of each and every individual in the society. The provision of the basic needs is crucial for human agency, which is at the heart of the moral agents being able to pursue personhood (moral virtue). It is essential for a society that is committed to moral agents pursuing and achieving moral excellence (ethics) that it must provide social conditions necessary for them to develop their agency, which is central for the possibility of reaching this moral goal. Though this chapter might be a good first step towards introducing needs in Afro-communitarianism, it still leaves many questions unanswered. For example, it does not tell us what is it about human needs that make them normatively special or peremptory such that we must fulfil them. This account of needs seems to rely on the Western conception of it; it has not yet reflected on African concepts of need to explore this concept in light of cultural and moral implications rooted in African languages. The distinction between rights and needs still requires clarification and justification. Future research projects will turn to these and other associated questions related to needs in African moral-political context in our quest to offer a fuller and clearer account of the politics of needs in African political thought.

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P.  Kaufmann, H.M.  Kuch, C.  Neuhauser, and E.  Webster, 67–84. New York: Springer. Kudadjie, K. 1992. “Towards Moral Development in Contemporary Africa: Insights from Dangme Traditional Moral Experience.” In Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1, edited by K. Wiredu and K. Gyekye, 207–222. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Larmore, C. 2012. What is political philosophy? Journal of Moral Philosophy 10: 276–306. Manzini, N. 2018. Menkiti’s normative communitarian conception of personhood as gendered, ableist and anti-queer. South African Journal of Philosophy 17: 18–33. Masolo, D. 2004. Western and African communitarianism. In Companion to African philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 483–498. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. ———. 2010. Self and community in a changing world. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Matolino, B. 2014. Personhood in African philosophy. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Menkiti, I. 1984. Person and community in African traditional thought. In African philosophy: An introduction, ed. R. Wright, 171–181. Lanham: University Press of America. ———. 2004. On the normative conception of a person. In Companion to African Philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 324–331. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. ———. 2018. Person and community—A retrospective statement. Filosofia Theoretica 7: 162–167. Metz, T. 2007. “Toward an African Moral Theory,” Journal of Political Philosophy 15: 321–41. ———. 2013. The Western ethic of care or an Afro-communitarian ethic? Specifying the right relational morality. Journal of Global Ethics 9: 77–92. Michael, L. 2014. “Defining dignity and its place in human rights.” New Bioethics: a Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body 20: 12–34. Miller, S. 2012. The ethics of need: Agency, dignity, and obligation. New  York: Routledge. ———. 2017. Reconsidering dignity relationally. Ethics and Social Welfare 2: 108–121. Mokgoro, Y. 1998. Ubuntu and the law in South Africa. Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1: 1–11. Molefe, M. 2016. Revisiting the debate between Gyekye-Menkiti: Who is a radical communitarian? Theoria 63: 37–54. ———. 2017. Critical comments on afro-communitarianism: The community versus individual. Filosofia Theoretica 6: 1–22. ———. 2018. Personhood and rights in an African tradition. Politikon 45: 217–231.

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———. 2019a. An African philosophy of personhood, morality and politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2019b. Ubuntu and development: An African conception of development. Africa Today 66: 96–118. ———. 2019c. Ubuntu ethics. International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Accessed May 20, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee936. ———. 2020a. African personhood and applied ethics. Grahamstown: NISC. ———. 2020b. An African ethics of personhood and bioethics—A reflection on abortion and euthanasia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Nussbaum, M. 2008. Human dignity and human entitlements. In The president’s council on bioethics, human dignity and bioethics: Essays commissioned by the president’s council, 351–380. Washington, DC: President’s Council on Bioethics. ———. 2011. Creating capabilities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Oyowe, A. 2013a. Personhood and social power in African thought. Alternation 20: 203–228. ———. 2013b. Strange bedfellows: Rethinking ubuntu and human rights in South Africa. African Human Rights Law Journal 13: 103–124. ———. 2014. An African conception of human rights? Comments on the challenges of relativism. Human Rights Review 15: 329–347. Passmore, J. 2000. The perfectability of man. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Ramose, M. 1999. African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. ———. 2003. The ethics of ubuntu. In The African philosophy reader, ed. P. Coetzee and A. Roux, 324–331. New York: Routledge. Sebidi, J. 1988. Towards the definition of ubuntu as African humanism. Private Collection: Paper. Shutte, A. 2001. Ubuntu: An ethic for a new South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Singer, P. 2009. Speciesism and moral status. Metaphilosophy 40: 567–581. Sulmasy, D. 2008. Dignity and bioethics: History, theory, and selected applications. In The President’s Council on Bioethics, Human dignity and bioethics: Essays commissioned by the President’s Council, ed. F.  Davis, 465–501. Washington, DC: President’s Council on Bioethics. Toscano, M. 2011. Human dignity as high moral status. The Ethics Forum 6: 4–25. Tutu, D. 1999. No future without forgiveness. New York: Random House. Van Niekerk, J. 2007. In defence of an autocentric account of Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy 26: 364–368. Wenar, L. (2020). Rights. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta. Accessed July 17, 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/ entries/rights/. Wiredu, K. 1992. Moral foundations of an African culture. In Person and community: Ghanaian philosophical studies, ed. K.  Wiredu and K.  Gyekye, vol. 1, 192–204. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

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———. 2004. “Introduction: African Philosophy in our Time.” In Companion to African Philosophy, edited by K. Wiredu, 1–27. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. ———. 2008. “Social Philosophy in Postcolonial Africa: Some Preliminaries Concerning Communalism and Communitarianism.” South African Journal of Philosophy 27: 332–39. ———. 2009. An oral philosophy of personhood: Comments on philosophy and orality. Research in African Literatures 40: 8–18.

CHAPTER 5

Social Persons and the Normativity of Needs Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe

Introduction How might one ground the idea that needs carry significant weight in moral and political reasoning? In this chapter, I explore how the experience and practice of communalism in traditional African communities and the implied understanding of person, particularly in the writings of Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwasi Wiredu, might offer theoretical grounding for the normativity of needs. Specifically, I attempt to do three things. Drawing on an experience relayed by Zakes Mda, the chapter begins with a brief illustration of how claims regarding needs typically crop up in ordinary social interactions. This will be the focus of the first section. In the second section, I develop Mda’s intuitions more fully, by first showing how Menkiti and Wiredu unpack the thought that relationships, and the social interactions they spawn among members of a community, are sites for addressing basic needs. I try to show that their attempts to articulate a normative conception of person rooted in the experience and practice of communalism in traditional African societies have a clear objective: to

O. A. Oyowe (*) Department of Philosophy, University of the Western Cape, Bellville, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Molefe, C. Allsobrook (eds.), Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3_5

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demonstrate that person-type obligations are grounded on need claims. In other words, making, negotiating and satisfying certain kinds of needs are at the heart of what it means to be a person in community. Central to this exploratory work is an attempt to account for the normativity of needs. I take up this task in the third section. In part, my goal is to show that needs are a distinctive category and so are not only significant in, but also structure moral and political reasoning. I provide some rough criteria for distinguishing basic needs from cognate concepts and then show why what Menkiti and Wiredu take to be most central to personhood qualifies as a basic need. My other interest concerns the special obligations with which persons are confronted in ordinary relationships and social interactions. I shall argue that in these contexts Menkiti and Wiredu see a correlation between duties and needs, rather than rights. I then suggest some strategies for making sense of the view that needs are normatively salient, in the sense that they have special authority to bind persons in community. In the final section, I examine two scepticisms that may be addressed to Menkiti and Wiredu. One concerns whether we can reliably determine which needs are politically salient. The other has to do with whether a political theory of needs can reliably guide legislators and policy makers. In addressing these concerns, I hope to show that the normativity of needs in African political thought is not in grave predicament.

Make Me into a Person, Son of Solomzi In his book, Sometimes there is a void: memoirs of an outsider (2012), Zakes Mda recalls a fascinating encounter with a fellow-villager that powerfully illustrates what Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwasi Wiredu probably had in mind when they set out their accounts of what it means to be a person in traditional African thought. Mda is with his uncle, Press, at his tavern in the village of Qoboshane when the following interaction ensued: ‘Khawundenz’ umntu, mntak’a Bhut’ Solomzi,’ a grating voice startles me. Make me into a person, son of Solomzi.

Mda’s father’s name is Solomzi. He knew straightaway that the words are being addressed to him:

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I know immediately that the ragged old lady uttering these words is asking me for a favour. It is how words are used by my people. When someone needs help from you she is in fact asking you to make her into a person. We are not people, my grandmother used to instil in us, until somebody makes us into people by being generous towards us. When we are born we are animals. … Until someone makes us people by showering us with acts of kindness.

Initially, Mda pretends not to have understood the old lady’s request: When you say I must make you a person, grandma, are you not yet a person?’ I ask the old lady.

The old lady is not impressed at all: ‘Sukundigezela,’ the old lady says. Don’t ask me a silly question. ‘How can I be a person when you have not made me a person?’1

As it turns out, she is actually asking for a quart of beer. We can ignore for a moment as Mda does that heeding the request involves sponsoring the old lady’s quest to get drunk. This is not because it is a trivial or immoral need, but because it points to something much deeper. In the context of the book, the request is situated within the broader issue of inequality and poverty in a South African village. As the old lady explains, ‘The problems of poverty, my child … they have stripped people like us of all personhood’.2 So, it is not the beer that is at issue, but something more pressing. She is also asking to be made into a person. And she does so by appealing to a shared understanding, which Mda understands rather well. On this understanding, part of what it means to be a person is to be the object of certain kinds of attitudes and treatment. In particular, to count as a person in the social world, one must be treated by another in kindly and generous ways. There is something else worth keeping in mind. It has to do with the fact that both participants have a real stake in the interaction. Contrary to appearance, it is not only the old lady that has a need worth satisfying in that interaction. Mda also stands to benefit as well. As he explains:

1 2

 Mda (2012: 223–224).  (2012: 224).

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Whenever my grandmother discovered such selfishness she would shout at the culprit, ‘Awungomntu!’ You are not a person! Why? Because only those who are generous and compassionate have reached the state of personhood.3

In other words, the interaction is an opportunity to have his need to be acknowledged as a person by a fellow-villager met. By asking to be made into a person, the old lady is offering Mda the opportunity to have his own need met by another. Like the old lady, he too had to be regarded as a person by others. There are three ideas thrown up by above that I wish to explore in some detail. One is that ordinary relationships and interactions are the sites for making and satisfying need claims. Second, interactions like the one above, and the relationships that underlie them, support a range of obligations for their participants. It is important to make sense of why someone in these interactions is indeed obligated to act in the required ways. Third, it is clear from the story that at stake is person-status in community. Mda is making a point about what it means to be a person in his village, yet what emerges is the intuition that to be a person is both to have certain needs and to take part in the cooperative endeavour of having them met. My hypothesis is that the obligations that transform one into a person are correlated to basic needs. It should not be surprising at all that at the heart of the exploration of an African political theory of needs is the question of what it means to be a person. After all, philosophical models for understanding political phenomena typically conceive human subjects a certain way, even when this is not acknowledged explicitly. At any rate, I am interested in the nature of the subject that stands behind a political theory of needs. In other words, how should we cognise and conceptualise beings like ourselves if we are to make sense of a political theory of needs? The answer I lean towards requires me to turn attention to a conception of person that has received the philosophical attention of Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwasi Wiredu. I want to analyse it as a plausible foundation for the normative salience of needs.

The Normative Conception of Person Before taking up that task, it would be helpful to say why one might be persuaded to ground a political theory of needs on this traditional African conception of person. One reason is that unlike standard approaches to 3

 (2012: 224).

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personhood, the African one privileges experience over a set of necessary and sufficient a priori conditions. According to Menkiti, traditional Africans exhibited an empirical attitude of mind. They were guided by an ‘empirical temperament, or attitudinal posture having to do with staying put with known things––with things attested to, or attestable to, by experience…’4 As such, it is more sensitive to the conditions of everyday life, with the implication that it is methodologically suited to a political theory of needs conceived as a ground-up and not a top-down approach to politics. Moreover, as I shall explain in some detail, the approach goes beyond the psychoanalytic framework, which is dominant in Western discourses. It offers a sociological understanding of person, in that it situates them within many kinds of human interactions. As we saw earlier, in the Mda story, need claims are meaningful and authoritative within ordinary relationships and social interactions. A sociological understanding of person is not only a fertile ground for need claims, but is also able to illuminate the political aspects of living together in community. Further, the normative conception of person already envisages a wide range of obligations that are not straightforwardly correlated to rights. In this way, it both anticipates and reinforces the thought that needs have normative force in their own right. In other words, they have special authority to bind individuals in everyday interactions. To put it differently, such a conception of person is well placed to account for the normativity of needs. This is a crucial consideration. If a theory of needs is to stand as a worthy rival to a theory of rights, it should be accompanied not only by an alternative, but also a plausible account of why needs obligate agents. Finally, the account has implications for the nature of needs and can illuminate the question of which need claims are normatively salient. Although it is not my intention to provide a complete analysis of needs that addresses current difficulties without remainder, I hope to show that the normative conception of person entails different categories of needs and so can provide some practical guidance for a political theory of needs. According to Wiredu, although some African approaches to personhood specify certain a priori conditions, which must be met for something to count as person, they are deemed to have little practical relevance. The reason is that they do not really illuminate the social and political conditions that characterise the lives of persons. To get to grips with what it means to be a person and to live the life of a person in society, traditional 4

 Menkiti (2004a: 329; See also his 2004b).

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African peoples paid attention to the social formation that emerge out of the kinship system. In other words, our best chance of understanding persons is in their natural habitat––the social world. This is why attention has tended to shift from those a priori conditions to the social aspects of person.5 Menkiti takes a similar approach as it is well known. It is in the lived world of experience that knowledge of who counts as a person is acquired. The decision that one is a person can be reliably made only when there is some evidence in everyday interaction that corroborates that judgement. For him, personhood cannot simply be decided independently of an experience of a shared world with others. This methodological stance explains why both Wiredu and Menkiti are not drawn towards psychoanalytic approaches to personhood. Many of the standard views specify and then analyze personhood in terms of one or more essential typically psychological properties. Harry Frankfurt is well known for proposing that persons are beings with effective second-­order desires. Put differently, persons have what he calls second-order volitions essentially. For Lynne Baker, it is the conceptual capacity to conceive oneself as self. In other words, the essential property of persons is a first-person perspective.6 What these and similar views share is the following: the possibility of deciding a priori which entities count as persons by simply applying the criteria they specify. Right at the outset Menkiti explains how his approach differs. The mere possession of some abstract and static property does not distinguish person from nonperson. The possession of psychological properties essentially does not plausibly distinguish the class person. The sort of properties underlined by Frankfurt’s and Baker’s approach is crucial obviously, but they do not provide a complete picture. For Menkiti, these accounts are not only reductionist they also dislocate the subject of their analysis. To get the complete picture of what it means to be a person we must look beyond these intrinsic properties, to the exigencies of human society. Specifically, to the ways individuals relate with each other and interact in the social world. ‘It is not enough’, Menkiti tells us, ‘to have before us the biological organism, with whatever rudimentary psychological characteristics are seen as attaching to it’. In addition, ‘[we] must also conceive of this organism as going through a long process of social and ritual 5 6

 Wiredu (1992: 198).  Frankfurt (1971) and Baker (2015: 79).

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transformation until it attains the full complement of excellencies seen as truly definitive of man’.7 In place of a purely psychoanalytic approach, Menkiti advocates a sociological analysis of person, as implied in Wiredu’s reference to the kinship system as a social formation. The kinship system for Wiredu can be viewed both structurally and normatively. The former concerns its composition, with the family as the most basic unit of society. ‘African societies are, famously, communalistic’, he writes. ‘The individual is brought up, from the beginning, with a sense of belonging and solidarity with an extensive circle of kith and kin…’8 Over time, Wiredu continues, the circle enlarges to lineage and then a clan. In another place, he explains that at the level of lineage, the individual already has an extensive network of relationships and the ‘evolving sense of bonding is a learning process in which the individual comes more and more to see herself as the centre of obligations and rights’.9 Although he mentions rights, he is not interested in them as such—at least not as much as he is interested in the wide range of needs around which they revolve and that arise in human existence and interaction.10 Later, I shall explain why Wiredu’s frequent reference to rights conceals the role of needs in his overall account, and in the process give the latter some prominence. For now, keep in mind that the obligations he says arise in a kinship system are in response to the needs of others. Alternatively, whatever he means by rights, they are grounded on the ordinary needs of people and are not themselves the basis for the relevant obligations. Kinship systems evolve in part as a response to practical challenges. Some of these challenges bring to the surface the complex dependencies in human relationships, interactions and cooperative endeavours. The acknowledgement of mutual dependencies in turn reinforces those relationships, interactions and cooperative endeavours that are so central to the system. So, rather than some real or perceived deprivations of entitlements, it is the fact of neediness or dependency of individuals in society that informs the obligations Wiredu has in mind. The well-known Nguni axiom, I am because we are, or its variant, a person is a person because of other people, is an attempt to capture the notion of mutual dependency in the social world of persons.  Menkiti (1984: 172).  Wiredu (2005). 9  Wiredu (2008: 333). 10  Wiredu (2008: 333, emphasis mine). 7 8

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By insisting on the kinship system with its complex layers of dependencies as a framework for understanding the nature of persons, it seems to me that Wiredu’s aim is to shift attention to the intimate connection traditional societies saw between being a person and being responsive to ordinary human needs. Under these conditions, living the life of a person is an ongoing process of identifying and responding to each other’s needs. Unlike Wiredu, Menkiti does not mention needs specifically. Even so, he sees the challenge of becoming a person as a cooperative endeavour. For him, becoming a person is not one that can be undertaken individually and in isolation. Moreover, where individuals go through it alone, the consequences of failure can affect others in the community. Hence, he says, traditional societies recognise ‘that they are caught up in an inextricable dance with their component individuals’, and as such, ‘they join the task of transforming the individual into a true person’.11 Hence, like Wiredu, Menkiti implicitly acknowledges not only that the nature of the social world is inextricably linked to the dependencies and neediness of individuals, but also that persons exist in part as agents responsible for basic human needs. As he goes on to explain, it is in the complex processes involving social incorporation, participation and recognition that individuals take part in the collective work of identifying, negotiating, making and satisfying need claims. In other words, become persons in the social world. Social incorporation implies something more than bare membership in the human species. It is to human society what baptism is to a Christian church. Although one can be a part of the Catholic church in the factual sense, one ought to be baptised to be recognised as a full member. In virtue of the ritual of baptism, one correctly identifies oneself as Catholic and crucially other Catholics regard one similarly. Likewise, by way of rituals and other processes of initiation, a socially incorporated individual acquires the status of full membership in a human community. ‘Without incorporation into this or that community, individuals are considered mere danglers to whom the description “person” does fully apply’.12 To illustrate, we might say that Frankfurt’s and Baker’s persons are mere danglers in Menkiti’s scheme. Social participation is only possible for the socially incorporated. It implies active membership in community. At the most basic level, it  Menkiti (2004a: 326).  Menkiti (1984: 172).

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requires that individuals take part in group activities, learn, understand and apply social rules. It also entails that individuals adopt and contribute to efforts towards realising collective aims. According to Menkiti, the ultimate form of participation involves discharging certain obligations. These obligations depend on social roles and positions. In his words, ‘personhood is the sort of thing which has to be attained in direct proportion as one participates in communal life through the discharge of the various obligations defined by one’s stations’.13 Wiredu agrees. ‘The corresponding idea of person’, he writes, ‘would be of a morally sound adult who has demonstrated in practice a sense of responsibility to household, lineage and society at large’.14 In other words, it is in his role as father, for example, that a man has certain obligations to his household and it is in her role as mother that a woman has certain obligations to her children. The man and the woman occupy distinct roles in marriage and so have certain obligations towards each other. Moreover, as we have already seen, these role-linked obligations revolve in the first instance around the needs of others in community and not predetermined rights. Social participation thus involves the work of identifying and responding to need claims from the point of view of one’s social role. I shall return a little later to this connection between social roles and responsiveness to needs, as it suggests an important clue as to why the latter is obligatory. Finally, social recognition is the response of others in community to effective social incorporation and participation.15 It is precisely what Mda and the old lady stand to benefit in the interaction with which we began. I do not have the space to analyse the notion of recognition, but it is important to note that both Menkiti and Wiredu see it as part of the ordinary practice of attributing praise and ascribing the title of person to others.16 Living the life of a person in community then is a complex and ongoing process of intragroup recognition.17 In sum, being made into persons in the social world, or alternatively, intragroup recognition, is the foundational need of beings like us. To adopt that perspective involves the commitment that personhood cannot  (1984: 176).  Wiredu (2009: 16). 15  Menkiti (2004a: 326–327). 16  See Menkiti (1984: 176–177) and Wiredu (2009: 14–15). 17  See Gail Presbey’s (2002) examination of the case of the Massai.  For an analysis of recogntion, see Honneth (1995). 13 14

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be determined in advance of everyday relationships and social interactions that are generative of human needs, which in turn confronts their participants with certain obligations. In terms familiar to readers of Menkiti, one might say that it is in carrying out a range of duties that respond to basic human needs that one becomes a person—that is, have one’s own need for social recognition as person met by the other. Seen from this perspective, the normative conception of personhood is suitably placed to ground a political theory of needs. After all, the point of politics is to discover and respond to ordinary needs, which cannot be determined a priori.18 In the same way, identifying the needs of persons is not something that can be undertaken a priori. The Nature and Normativity of Needs The attempt to ground a political theory of needs on the normative conception of person involves two specific tasks. The first involves showing that needs constitute a distinct, basic and nontrivial category of analysis in political theory. It also involves an explanation of why we have to take special account of them. In other words, why needs are a reliable currency for articulating claims in politics and so why they cannot be simply subsumed under some other cognate concepts like wants, interests, capabilities, and so on. The second task is to account for the normativity of needs. In other words, why needs have special authority to bind agents in particular ways? We can begin with the first. Theorists of needs more or less agree that needs are categorical rather than instrumental. For Wiggins, for example, whereas needs of the latter sort exist for the realisation of an unspecified set of ends, the former are deeply entrenched needs whose purpose is fixed and the avoidance of which is likely to cause harm.19 In my view, categorical needs are basic, in that they are constitutive of beings like us. Their existence in part defines who we are as persons. A need is constitutive of person in the sense that one would cease to be a person if one did not have that need met. Such a need is not just a means for achieving some goals in the life of a person. A drug addict’s need to satisfy his addiction is not categorical in the required sense. Not only does it not constitute him as a person, as we shall see shortly, the purpose for which it exists is not  For this understanding of politics, see Hamilton 2003; see, for example, p. 65.  Wiggins (1998: 9).

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compatible with what it means to be beings like us––persons. At least, in the sense advocated by Menkiti and Wiredu. To see this, consider that the need for recognition is categorical. It is a constitutive part of what it means to be a person in community. In other words, on the account we are examining, without intragroup recognition, there would be no person. For Menkiti in particular, strictly speaking, an individual whose need for recognition has not been met falls outside the boundary of personhood. That need and the expectation that it ought to be met are not subsequent to our identity as persons, but constitute it. We might, on the basis of this difference, distinguish needs from mere wants. Whereas our hypothetical addict wants a drug, perhaps to achieve a state of euphoria, a person has the basic need for ongoing social recognition, if he is to remain a person. Again, recall Mda’s interlocutor: she insists she could not be a person without being recognised as such by Mda. In addition, categorical needs are also seen as objective.20 They do not depend on any one individual as an independent structure of desire, but track aspects of person-life common to individuals in community. As well, they correspond to external constraints in the social world. It is clear, while reading Menkiti and Wiredu, that whatever the needs of individuals in community are, they exhibit a social character. They require that needs conform to some social standard and are aligned to some conception of the good life, which revolves around the value of community. Indeed–– and this is a third feature of needs worth highlighting––categorical needs are characteristically positive, in the sense that satisfying them is beneficial to those who have them. Again, by way of illustration, our addict’s desire for a drug fails the test of objectivity and positivity. Although it is an undeniable aspect of his subjective experience, it does not satisfy shared standards of what counts as a need worth satisfying. It is not constitutive of the life of a person. In fact, persons should seek to overcome that impulse and they should be supported in doing so. Moreover, it does not enhance the good life that underpins the conception of person we have been analysing. It is beneficial neither to the addict nor to the community to have that need satisfied. All of that means that it is quite possible for one to be mistaken about one’s needs.21 Since they do not track the wants, feelings or drives of an individual––all of which emanate primarily from her as an independent  Waldron (2000: 129).  McCloskey (1976: 4).

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structure of desire––they are not always transparent to the individual. This is why I started with the thought and have observed frequently that needs properly understood emerge or are identified in the context of everyday interactions and relationships. On the approach of Menkiti and Wiredu, it is through active social participation in society that an individual comes to distinguish her needs clearly from her wants, desires and drives. It is not that the subjective experience of her wants, desires and drives are not important to the individual. The point, on the contrary, is that only when they are brought into and tested in the social domain that their true status as needs, and not merely wants, desires and drives is made evident. We have to keep in mind that it is not only needs that are influential rhetoric in the social domain. In fact, interests are central to social interactions. In some of Wiredu’s writings, for instance, one finds frequent deployment of interests as opposed to needs.22 Hence, it is essential to distinguish interests from needs as well. One way to do that is to recognise that although realising our categorical needs is something we have an interest in, not all of our interests track categorical needs. Our addict might have an interest in the soon-to-be-enacted legislation banning the use of drug substance, but that does not transform his wants into a need. The language of interest captures our expectations about having our needs met, but they do not coincide with the needs they express. For our hypothetical addict, his specific interest tracks his wants, which are neither categorical, objective nor beneficial.23 It should be clear by now that the categorical need for recognition, central to the normative conception of person, is not only categorical but objective and beneficial as well. It is objective, in part because it is based on a shared understanding and expectation regarding what it means to be a person in community. Recall that it is precisely that shared understanding that the old lady appealed to when she puts forward her need-claim to Mda to make her into a person. As such, it is the central presupposition of all social interactions and a practical requirement for politics. It is also objective because it is based on shared conception of the good life––one that is lived with others in community and not in isolation as a dangler. This latter consideration also highlights its positive character. Satisfying the need to be recognised as a person in everyday interactions and relationships is beneficial to persons because it enhances their social nature.  See Wiredu (1997) and (2008).  For a similar distinction between “interests” and “needs”, see Hapla (2018).

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Thus far, we have seen that there are useful ways of specifying needs that distinguish them from cognate concepts. Of course, focussing on the general need for recognition as persons in community does not shed light on the specific needs of individuals. However, the latter is beyond the scope of this exploratory work. I think the broad classification of needs that have been highlighted would suffice for my present purpose. What remains to be tackled is the issue of the normativity of needs. Moreover, to do that we have first to turn attention to the status of rights vis-à-vis needs in the normative conception of personhood. Indeed, it may seem odd initially to attempt to ground a theory of needs on Menkiti’s normative conception of person. Not only does he not adopt the language of needs, he explicitly mentions rights instead. Granted, as many critics have noted, rights have a much weaker normative status in his general account. Even so, it is rights, and not needs, that get a mention. As such, one might have stronger reasons to characterise Menkiti’s view of person as anchoring a political theory of rights, as opposed needs.24 In what follows, however, I want to discourage the focus on rights notwithstanding Menkiti’s reference to it. Alternatively, perhaps more clearly, I want to rearticulate the role he sees for rights. More importantly, my aim is to suggest that when analysed more closely, the issues at the front and centre of Menkiti’s approach are more suited to a philosophy of needs. I begin by observing that there are three reasons why the person-type obligations that feature prominently in the account are not meant to correlate to rights. The first is the obvious one that Menkiti assigns a secondary role to rights. This does not mean that persons lack rights or are poor right-holders. On the contrary, in his more recent writings Menkiti has clarified in a tone that would probably placate many of his ardent critics that persons in community must express a willingness to participate in the social game, otherwise the game doesn’t get going. This implies that he anticipates that they have at the least the right to suspend participation when, as he explains, the rules of participation have been imposed from above.25 In my view, the prolonged debates about the status of rights in his account have resulted from a fundamental misunderstanding of his intentions. Rather than imply that persons do not have rights in community, the stress on the secondary role of rights pointed to something else. 24  See Molefe (2016) for an attempt to make sense of rights in Menkiti’s account. My approach below differs substantially from Molefe’s. 25  Menkiti (2017, 466–467, emphasis as in the original).

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It had to do with whether and to what extent the obligations that characterise person life in community are correlated to rights. For Menkiti, the answer is unequivocal. As far as the obligations of personhood are concerned, the idiom of rights takes a back seat. Rarely do these obligations emerge because their beneficiaries claim a set of rights against the community or members of the community. This is what Menkiti actually says: In the African understanding, priority is given to the duties which individuals owe to the collectivity, and their rights, whatever these may be, are seen as secondary to their exercise of their duties.26

Pay attention to the italicised text. Notice that he is not saying rights have no place at all. In fact, he is explicit that they do. What he is denying is that the duties towards others and the community derive their normative force from those rights. The rights of individuals do not provide the rationale for the wide range of obligations in community. To put the point differently, many person-type obligations exist not because they are correlated to rights, but often irrespective of them. This is why rights are seen as secondary to the exercise of duties. So, crucially, because these obligations do not derive their normative force from rights as such, Menkiti leaves open the possibility that something else does the work of explaining why persons have the duties they have to others in community. That is, something other than rights is seen as primary to the exercise of duties. My suggestion is that the secondary role of rights in Menkiti’s overall approach anticipates his implicit view that (most of) the duties that characterise the life of a person in community derive their authority from the ordinary needs of individuals. Although it is not mentioned, it seems to me that the idiom of needs can fill the gap Menkiti thinks the language of rights is unable to fill. This idea is explicit in Wiredu’s writing. Earlier on, we noted that kinship systems evolve in part as a response to felt dependencies as individuals coexist in a social world. In this connection, Wiredu, unlike Menkiti, specifically mentions and is explicit about the normative salience of needs, implying that rights derive whatever normative power they have from needs:

 Menkiti (1984: 180).

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The sorts of things around which the obligations and rights revolve are all the different kinds of needs that arise in human existence and interaction. This, in roughest sketch, is what African communitarianism is.27

Clearly, needs are more fundamental. They form the axis around which obligations and rights revolve. What he means is that although some rights may be grounded on needs, it is ultimately needs that give normative force to obligations as such. The foregoing should not be surprising. Given the ways both Menkiti and Wiredu conceive community, and the model of kinship-based communal societies they assume, rights are poor candidates for making sense of obligations. In the first instance, they are unavoidably conflict notions, in that they can be claimed only under conditions of deprivation and discord. Moreover, many claimable rights are compatible with the absence of many of the values, including cooperation, association, harmony, and so on, highly prized in communalistic societies. One might, for example, reasonably claim a right to not associate with members of one’s family, which although under certain conditions may be necessary, does not overall enhance community. We can add that the notion of rights often carries with it the presumption of independence and self-sufficiency, which although valuable in many ways, can potentially frustrate community. By comparison, needs imply mutual dependency and therefore a much higher premium on community. The range of duties they spawn are more likely to support community. As such, they are suitably placed to account for obligations in societies that conceive the good life in terms of community. As I have characterised them, Menkiti and Wiredu clearly think that the needs of others can obligate persons in community and that they are better suited for this role than rights. However, it is not yet clear why needs have special authority to bind persons in community. The challenge then is to explain why needs obligate. To begin to address this challenge, we will draw on earlier points on what it means to be a person in community, which we characterised earlier in terms of social incorporation, participation and recognition. Our earlier consideration of the role of the kinship system as the basis of social life is a useful starting point to answering these questions. We noted there that it is in the context of the relationships and social interactions that needs emerge or are identified. This implies that needs assume  Wiredu (2008: 333, emphasis mine).

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special significance in close and caring relationships. When Wiredu tells us that a person is ‘a morally sound adult who has demonstrated in practice a sense of responsibility to household, lineage and society at large’, he is not merely describing a Kantian superhero who has overcome her inclinations when undertaking the relevant responsibilities.28 He is describing a mother who cares about her relationship to her child and takes up her responsibility in that spirit; a father who is responsive to the needs of his family for whom he cares. Wiredu is describing persons who value these relationships and so interact with the individuals in them as persons whose needs are especially weighty. We might say then that within the context of significant and caring relationships, need claims have a special authority over others who are positioned in roles of responsibility. One might protest understandably that given the scenario just described, it is not the needs as such, but the caring relationships that are normatively salient. To see this, recall Mda’s experience. In that case, it would seem that whatever obligation there is, exists because Mda and the old lady are related as fellow-villagers and that the old lady appeals to personal knowledge of Mda by locating him within a family and a network of relationships with which she is familiar. Although he may not know the old lady personally, he appears to take her claim seriously partly because it is made in connection with his father with whom she presumably had some relationship. Our hypothetical objector might insist that although the relevant obligations respond to needs as understood and expressed in everyday interactions, it is the nature of the relationships between people that make them special, not the needs themselves. Wiredu indirectly addresses something akin to this dilemma––and in terms readily applicable to contemporary moral challenge of immigration and xenophobia. However, his response implies that needs are able to impose obligations absent these close and caring relationships. He invites us to consider how a community might respond to the presence of a stranger within its ranks. Let us assume that the stranger is strictly speaking neither part of the caring relationships forged through kinship nor an incorporated member of the community at large. Yet, Wiredu argues, obligations owed to kith and kin apply even more strongly to the stranger. Here is Wiredu:

 Wiredu (2009: 16).

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The sense of human solidarity which we have been discussing works particularly to the advantage of foreigners, who … are doubly deserving of sympathy; on grounds, first, of their common humanity and, second, of their vulnerability as individuals cut off for the time being, at any rate, from the emotional and material supports of their kinship environment.29

His explanation illuminates two specific issues. The first is that although the focus has been on the bonds of kinship, the normative conception of person anticipates significantly wider boundaries of the human community. The goal is never to unnecessarily focus on a narrow set of relationships. What binds human beings is the shared basic need to participate in society and be recognised as persons in community. Wiredu emphasises a common humanity, Menkiti emphasises a common soil of origin. From this perspective, the hasty characterisations of Menkiti as endorsing a narrow perspective on community, one whose borders are culturally and linguistically delineated, fall flat in the face of a careful analysis of some of his poetry and recent clarification of his position on the idea of community.30 For both of them needs whether in the immediate kinship environment or in the wider human community have special significance. Ultimately, it is recognition in human communities, rather than one particular community, that underlie our identity as persons. The second is that even when caring relationships based on a kinship system are absent, as is the case with the stranger, the relevant obligations may still exist. The implication is that it is the need as such that generates the obligation—a condition of vulnerability and dependency that demands some response. Caring relationships are thus seen in their true light. They add a further layer of significance to the exercise of the relevant obligations, but their absence does not diminish their strength. Another reason why it is needs as such, and not the caring relationships in which they feature, that obligate persons can be deduced from the intimate link Menkiti sees between social positions and roles, on the one hand, and obligations, on the other.31 The suggestion is that in virtue of occupying these positions and roles in society, a person is entangled in  Wiredu (1992: 202).  See Menkiti (2007). In addition, Uchenna Okeja (2020) for a perspective on Menkiti’s conception of person in community from the point of view of his poetry. Moreover, Dismas Masolo (2009) has characterised a plausible sense of community that can anchor the normative idea of personhood. 31  Menkiti (1984: 176). 29 30

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joint commitments with others. A shared commitment to be responsive to human needs wherever they are identified and as far as it is possible and reasonable to do so. Menkiti does not develop an account of shared commitment. However, as we know from standard accounts, like that of Margaret Gilbert, joint commitments differ structurally from personal ones, in that they cannot be rescinded unilaterally by any one party to the commitment. As such, when one becomes part of a joint commitment one is obligated to other parties to the commitment, in such a way that excusing oneself from that obligation without the permission of the others is blameworthy. If such an account is plausible, as I believe it is, it offers a bridge between human needs as a brute fact and the expectation that one ought to respond to them. At any rate, Wiredu insists that needs are not just facts about human beings, but carry with them an imperative: Onipa hia moa, meaning, by way of first approximation, ‘a human being needs help’. The intent of the maxim, however, is not just to observe a fact, but also to prescribe a line of conduct. The imperative here is carried by the word ‘hia’, which in this context also has a connotation of entitlement: A human being deserves, ought, to be helped. This imperative is born of an acute sense of the essential dependency of the human condition. The idea of dependency may even be taken as a component of the Akan conception of person.32

The passage offers one further clue for making sense of the bindingness of needs. In particular, I am referring to Wiredu’s point that satisfying categorical needs arising from the fact of human dependency is part of what it means to be a person. The idea is that categorical needs are normatively salient because they are existentially necessary. I do not mean this merely in the biological sense that food and oxygen are necessary for existence. As we saw, these are key needs as well. However, what I mean in addition is that since categorical needs in general (i.e., including the need for social recognition) are constitutive of our identity as persons, their satisfaction is existentially necessary. In other words, when these needs are not adequately met, persons in the social world are confronted with the threat of non-existence.

 Wiredu (1992: 201).

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Consequently, one answer to the question of why needs obligate is that they constitute persons. This means that responsiveness to the needs of others is fundamental to our being persons. To abrogate one’s responsibility to the need of others for recognition as persons is the ultimate moral failure, because it ultimately amounts to annihilating others in community. As I have argued elsewhere, if Menkiti and other proponents of the normative conception are right that being a person is a matter of being recognised as one, then individuals whose need for social recognition are unmet are victims of social death, in Orlando Patterson’s sense of the term.33

Conclusion: Two Objections and Replies We can conclude by briefly stating and then replying to two main worries that ostensibly put a political theory of needs in grave predicament. One concerns whether there can be consensus regarding human needs across time and space. The idea is that the list of needs that will be deemed normatively salient is likely to vary from one culture to another and from one generation to another. The lack of consensus about and perhaps the instability in any one list of needs renders a political theory of needs less attractive. Moreover, critics of the normativity of needs worry not only that human needs are many but also that humans have an insatiable appetite. As a result, those who have the obligation to satisfy these needs are unfairly burdened with responsibilities that may never be accomplished. This is especially the case if we assume that it is human needs as such that matter, and not merely the needs of those with whom one is in a caring relationship. It is simply unbearable for any one person to have the responsibility to meet human needs wherever they are found. One reply is that our approach to the normative conception of person in the writings of Menkiti and Wiredu encourages a broad characterisation of basic human need––one around which some degree of overlapping consensus might be achieved. The basic need for recognition is a deeply felt human need. Of course, in practice what it means to satisfy that basic need will differ from one place to another. However, that should not be seen as an obstacle to foregrounding needs in political theory. This is because the disagreements that are likely to occur concern which form the satisfaction of that basic need should take. For Mda’s fellow-villager, a quart of beer may satisfy the need for recognition, although, as I hinted above, her real  See Oyowe (2020). For a discussion of the notion of social death, see Patterson (1981).

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concern is about the widespread poverty that has ravaged village societies in South Africa. We might say that empowerment schemes, including for example, funding for cooperative farming, that uplift people from poverty might be a way of satisfying the need for recognition. In contrast, satisfying the basic human need for recognition in affluent societies will take a different form, perhaps access to internet, and so on. In relation to the suspicion that meeting human needs is demanding, it should be noted that this is a problem that some versions of a rights approach faces as well. After all, many such rights are linked to human needs and interests. Therefore, the challenge is not to a needs theory as such. More importantly, it is not likely, at least given the approach of Menkiti and Wiredu, that any one person or group of persons will be overwhelmed by the obligation to meet human needs that arise from the basic need for recognition. This is because at the heart of the account is a stress on community and therefore cooperation. In addition, each person’s obligation is a function of her social position and role, as we noted earlier. In other words, the expectation that one is obligated to meet the needs of others as much as one is able to do. Those who are more able to do so will take up positions and roles with greater responsibility. It is a matter of degree. Even individuals who stand to have their needs met also have a responsibility towards the group, depending on what they are able to contribute. There are no free riders. Both Menkiti and Wiredu emphasise the importance of mutual aid. The old lady may depend on an Mda to satisfy her basic need for recognition by way of a quart of beer, but she too has a responsibility to others as well.

References Baker, L.R. 2015. Human persons as social entities. Journal of Social Ontology 1: 77–87. Frankfurt, H. 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. The Journal of Philosophy 68: 5–20. Hamilton, L.A. 2003. The political philosophy of needs. Cambridge: University Press. Hapla, M. 2018. Theory of needs as justification for human rights: Current approaches and problems of uncertainty and normativeness. The Age of Human Rights Journal 10: 1–21. Honneth, A. 1995. The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social conflicts. Trans. J. Anderson. Cambridge: Polity Press. Masolo, D.A. 2009. Narrative and experience of community as philosophy of culture. Thought and Practice 1: 43–68.

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McCloskey, H.J. 1976. Human needs, rights and political values. American Philosophical Quarterly 13: 1–11. Mda, Z. 2012. Sometimes there is a void: Memoirs of an outsider. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Menkiti, I.A. 1984. Person and community in African traditional thought. In African philosophy: An introduction, ed. R.A. Wright, 171–181. Washington, DC: University Press of America. ———. 2004a. On the normative conception of a person. In A Companion to African philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 324–331. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. ———. 2004b. Physical and metaphysical understanding: nature, agency and causation in African traditional thought. In African philosophy: New and traditional perspectives, ed. L. Brown, 107–135. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007. Before a common soil. Washington, DC: Ilora Press. ———. 2017. Community, communism, communitarianism: An African intervention. In The Palgrave handbook of African philosophy, ed. A.  Afolayan and T. Falola, 461–473. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Molefe, Molefe. 2016. Revisiting the Menkiti-Gyekye debate: Who is a radical communitarian? Theoria 63: 37–54. Okeja, U. 2020. “Before a Common Soil: Personhood, Community and the Duty to Bear Witness.” In  Menkiti on Community and Becoming a Person,  ed. E.  Etieyibo and P.  Ikuenobe, 219–236. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Oyowe, O.A. 2020. Social persons, social inequality and social death. Transcience 11: 1–16. Patterson, O. 1981. Slavery and social death. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Presbey, G. 2002. Massai concepts of personhood: The roles of recognition, community, and individuality. International Studies in Philosophy 34: 257–282. Waldron, J. 2000. The role of rights in practical reasoning: “Rights” versus ‘needs’. The Journal of Ethics 4: 116–129. Wiggins, D. 1998. Needs, values, truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wiredu, K. 1992. Moral foundations of an African culture. In Person and community: Ghanaian philosophical studies, ed. K. Wiredu and K. Gyekye, 193–206. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. ———. 1997. Democracy and consensus in African traditional politics: A plea for a non-party polity. In Postcolonial African philosophy: A critical reader, ed. E.C. Eze, 303–312. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. ———. 2005. Personhood in African thought. In New dictionary of the history of ideas, ed. M.C. Horowitz. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. ———. 2008. Social philosophy in post-colonial Africa: Some preliminaries concerning communalism and communitarianism. South African Journal of Philosophy 27: 332–339. ———. 2009. An oral philosophy of personhood: Comments on philosophy and orality. Research in African Literatures 40: 8–18.

CHAPTER 6

Understanding and (Re)configuring Personhood Contra Systemic Dehumanisation Mpho Tshivhase

Introduction The experience and process of an individual being dehumanised is a matter of both justice and morality. The interplay between morality and justice is inextricably linked to the idea of redistribution, where such redistribution is generally aimed at responding to basic needs. The one ideal of justice, for which humans claim to aim, is that of equality. It is the principle of equality that citizens of different countries fight for when they protest against racial discrimination, wage disparities, gender rights, untransformed education syllabi, and so forth. Each of these social issues presents instances where equal distribution of these goods/values has been

A word of gratitude to Tony Oyowe and Chris Alsobrook whose comments benefitted this paper. M. Tshivhase (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Molefe, C. Allsobrook (eds.), Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3_6

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disrupted. I think that what enables people in the socio-political system to accept the disparities and even enjoy the benefits of such disparities, necessarily involves how individuals consider the respect of the dignity of all persons. There is a sense in which our societies have come to fail at recognising the dignity of all persons and this lack of recognition has resulted in some groups of people thinking they are superior to others, and so, are entitled to be awarded more rights than others, so to speak. They commit to the non-recognition of certain groups of individuals as deserving of the values and goods that are due to all persons by virtue of being persons, in part, because of the mistaken view that personhood is a state of being that is due only to those with certain characteristics. Such a view immediately excludes people who do not present the listed criteria. Dehumanisation of another individual involves a sense of entitlement that is founded on the view that one is superior to another person. What is at play here is, in part, misrecognition and non-recognition—misrecognition of one’s personhood and the non-recognition of another individual’s personhood. Misrecognition of one’s personhood is evident in instances of subjugation when one overestimates and overly exerts what one considers to be one’s power. Michael Clifford, following Michel Foucault, rightly points out that power is involved in every aspect of experience. Power corrupts relationality when it is used to oppress others. Oppression denies people their humanity and it does so in systematic ways that gnaw at their dignity by means of subtracting the opportunities that grant them access to education, shelter, freedom, dignity, and other values of inclusion in participation in society as full humans (1992: 33–35). Oppressors, directly and indirectly, create this superficial hierarchy by identifying some social factor to discriminate against another. These social factors vary from physiological aspects such as race and gender, to spiritual ones such as religion, notwithstanding the linguistic aspects that relate to culture and tradition. The point is that dehumanisation is a result of oppression that stems from discrimination, which presents an assault on one’s dignity thereby diminishing one’s capacity for freedom to participate in society as a full human being. What I am interested in here is the value of dignity in relation to basic human needs. I will examine dignity in the context of personhood because I want to argue that the problem of redistribution, or lack of fair redistribution in responding to basic needs, is a matter relating to dignity. We cannot speak of redistribution of goods/values to meet basic needs before we make sense of who is deserving of the goods being distributed, which necessarily involves persons with dignity. Dignity, according to Immanuel

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Kant, is an inestimable value that one has by virtue of being a person. Personhood is defined, in large part by one’s capacity for rationality, a capacity that Emmanuel Eze claims Kant withheld from black individuals, thereby denying them personhood. The denial of personhood in this way precludes black people from being recognised as beings with basic needs that warrant moral and political attention. I want to illustrate that if we accept Kantian personhood, then his denial of black individuals as persons immediately skews the issue of distributive justice as it becomes a question about some individuals and not others. I want to argue that we cannot speak of distributive justice and the response to basic needs without interrogating the very definition of personhood upon which morality is built and (re)configuring it to rid it of the racially discriminatory element that misrecognises black people as naturally devoid of rationality, thereby immediately ignoring their status as beings with basic needs. My overarching view is that an African political theory of needs cannot benefit from a discriminatory view of persons, and I will illustrate the Kantian view of persons as representative of the kind of discrimination that undermines the basic needs of black people based on their race by excluding them from the category of persons.

Dehumanisation in Kantian Moral Theory There are different criteria that seem to matter when it comes to the mechanisms of discrimination. These include, but are not limited to, class, race, gender, sexuality, religion, and so forth. I think personhood should be added to this list of criteria for discrimination. I understand the discrimination that dehumanises individuals as an aspect of human experience, where Clifford asserts that human experience is a matter of three axes namely, knowledge, power and ethics (1992: 33–34). I think personhood is a good topic from which to analyse the damage that comes with Kant’s race theory and its implications for the personhood of black people, wherein one such implication is the undervaluing of black people’s basic needs. The Kantian view of personhood is offensive on at least two counts; the first is a matter of race and the other is a matter of gender. Both race and gender, as stated earlier are relevant criteria for discrimination, which ultimately hinder fair and just redistribution of goods and values when responding to needs. For the moment, let me discuss Kant’s racial offence

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in his conception of personhood. I will start by explaining the theory and then illustrate how it is offensive to black people. According to Kant, a person is a being with rational capacity. Rational capacity makes a person a being with moral worth. It is this moral worth that gives one the value of dignity. Dignity exalts the value of persons above price, where price is understood to make it possible for things to be interchangeable in the same way that objects are. The value of dignity makes persons irreplaceable and incomparable unlike objects or, if we follow Kant’s logic, animals. Kant argues that the correct way to respond to a person’s dignity is with respect. That is to say, harming or violating the wellbeing of a person is considered immoral and is thus unacceptable. It follows that those who lack the capacity for rationality are non-persons. It may serve the reader well to keep in mind that Kant’s aim in his theory of persons is to uncover what makes persons more valuable than non-­persons. His view is that persons are more valuable than animals because persons have dignity, a value that animals lack (Ak 4: 434–435). Given that it is rationality that gives persons dignity, this claim makes rationality the atomic feature that determines the difference between animals and persons where persons are moral beings with the value of dignity instead of interchangeable price. In short, rationality stands out in Kant’s view as the distinguishing aspect between animals and persons. Furthermore, it is rationality that makes persons educable. Kant understands persons to be innately corruptible and he thinks it is moral education that will save persons from their natural corruptible state (Luik 1992: 163). In order to master moral education, persons have to overcome their egocentric delusion of self-love. He claims that self-love and moral law cannot be on par with each other. He insists that self-love and the related inclinations must be subordinated to moral law, as it is the job of moral law to correct self-love and its tendency to deceive persons into thinking that they act impartially with the view that the interests of other persons in their community are equal to their own (Luik 1992: 164). It appears in his second Critique, as follows: We find … our nature as sensuous beings so characterized that the material of the faculty of desire (objects of the inclination…) first presses upon us; and we find our pathologically determined self, although by its maxims it is wholly incapable of giving universal laws, striving to give its pretensions priority and to make them acceptable as first and original claims, just as if it were our entire self. This propensity to make subjective the determining

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ground of the will in the general can be called self-love; when it makes itself legislative and an unconditional practical principle, it can be called self-­ conceit. (Critique of Practical Reason: 77)

Kant’s view is that we delude ourselves into thinking that the principle of self-love can bring about morally valuable outcomes. He maintains that it is only principles of moral law that matter in the moral world; the outcomes of actions borne of our freedom are morally relevant and those borne of our sensuous nature are not. This idea of actions motivated by inclinations lacking in moral worth is also discussed in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of the Morals. Herein, he argues that moral acts are those that are done from the motive of duty (Ak 4: 397–399). The motive of duty requires autonomy which one can only arrive at through rationality. Herein, Kant uses rationality to distinguish between morally worthy actions and actions that lack moral worth. He does this by showing how autonomy is instrumental in the moral world. In so doing, he connects personhood with autonomy, so that a person is understood as a rational being who is directed by autonomy to oblige to the principle of duty. Rationality, then, is not only the seat of personhood, it is also that which gives actions their moral worth. Understood in this way, the fate of non-persons lies outside the considerations inherent within the moral world. If you exist as a non-person, the fact of lacking the value of dignity by virtue of not having the capacity for reason leaves you vulnerable to all sorts of immoral acts. In other words, actions exerted upon non-persons cannot be said to be morally blameworthy or praiseworthy since non-­ persons are thought to lack moral worth. It is this status of non-persons that Emmanuel Eze argues black people are relegated to, in Kant’s work (2002: 438–439). Eze illustrates the racial discrimination that is embedded in Kant’s ideas. Eze argues that Kant’s racial taxonomy is racist and it champions the view that black people are an inferior people because they lack the capacity for rationality (2002: 439–441). Apart from its deplorable claim, Kant’s racial taxonomy is quite a primitive view of black individuals. The discrimination against them is based on the fact of their dark pigmentation. They lack this capacity for rationality because of their dark pigmentation. In other words, black people1 lack rationality because they are 1  Kant does not single out black people. His taxonomy of race includes Indians and Americans, with black people being the lowest ranking race because their complexion is the

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non-European. Eze’s analysis of Kant’s work asserts three arguments that Kant makes that turn out to exclude black people from the category of persons, ultimately rendering them things lacking in agency and moral value. Eze asserts that Kant’s views aim to illustrate that black people (1) have no rationality; (2) are replaceable because they lack dignity, and so, their value is that of price; and (3) they are not moral (2002: 437–439). Each of these claims has implications that are detrimental to the moral and political status of the black beings. The first claim about lack of rationality involves the idea that the capacity for rationality is natural. One is supposedly born with it. Kant calls this a natural talent, a natural gift and his view is that black people are not favoured by nature as nature did not endow them with this gift of rationality (1960: 110–111). Kant’s logic implies that rationality is a physiologically determined aspect about persons. He defends his claim by arguing that black people do not possess rationality because they are non-­European. By virtue of not having rationality then, black people are not educable (Kant 1775). That is to say, black people have no rationally valuable intelligence. They are incapable of learning and, dare I say, creating knowledge. This idea that black people cannot learn or create knowledge has, over the centuries, enabled the erasure of African knowledge systems. It is this very ludicrous idea that black people have no rationality that thinkers such as Mabogo More (1996) and Mogobe Ramose (2002) have tried to dispel. The danger of this statement has shown its influence in academic disciplines such as Philosophy where African Philosophy was not recognised as philosophy proper. This was not because Africa had no knowledge systems. This was because of the belief that Africans lack rationality and so they cannot create knowledge. The assumption here is obviously that it is only Europeans who can create knowledge. Ramose blames Aristotle’s assertion that ‘Man is a rational animal’ for the exclusion of African Philosophy and Africans learning and practicing Philosophy (2002: 1–3). Ramose identifies rationality as the aspect about humanity that has been used to maintain elitist principles in Philosophy. His conclusion is that this assumption that Philosophy cannot be learned and taught by Africans is in itself a crime against Philosophy since the discipline of Philosophy is about wisdom in general and not wisdom from one continent (2002: 4–6).

darkest in comparison to the other races. He argues that non-Europeans lack rationality. For the purpose of this chapter, I focus on black people.

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Eze’s second charge against Kant, that is black people do not have the value of dignity and are thus replaceable, implies that the worth of black people is tantamount to that of things that can be owned, discarded and replaced. This is quite worrying since, in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that it is non-persons who lack the value of dignity. Herein dignity is to be understood as the value that exalts the worth of persons above that of animals and objects (Ak 4: 411, 4: 434–435). We are to understand anything that is classified as a non-person to be interchangeable in the same way that we think of objects being interchangeable and replaceable. By interpretation, non-persons cannot be considered irreplaceable because they can be bought. Think of houses, food and other objects in the world that have a price; these things are manufactured in numbers and so if you lose or break one today, you can, in most cases, buy another one to replace it. Unlike persons with dignity, objects of price are replaceable and comparable. On the contrary, persons have dignity and the correct response to persons is respect. This idea of dignity of persons is supported by one formulation of his categorical imperative which calls upon individuals to refrain from treating persons instrumentally but rather, to treat them as ends in themselves (Ak 4: 428–429). This imperative applies only to persons. It is designed to protect the dignity of persons. A person is expected to live a life that prevents him/her from harming him-/ herself and others. Thus, the respect owed to persons is not the kind that only others must show the person, but the person is expected to also treat himself or herself with respect. One is not allowed to harm himself or herself, nor is she or he allowed to harm others. According to Charles Mills, the categorical imperative would not apply to black persons, thereby limiting dignity to a value that captures the moral value of white persons (Mills 2002: 17; 29). Furthermore, the third assertion about black people lacking morality follows logically from his ideas about personhood and dignity. Kant thinks that it is rationality that gives people the value of dignity and dignity affords one moral value. It follows then, that if one lacks rationality, one also lacks moral worth. Eze argues that what Kant says about black people does not even give them the status of a moral patient. The view portrays black people as incapable of moral actions as well as lacking in moral worth (2002: 437–441). It makes sense that Kant would not find anything wrong with prescribing that black people should be whipped till they bleed if one is to teach them anything at all (See Kant 1960: 110; Eze 2002: 438–439). Apart from violating one’s wellbeing, this is quite

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dehumanising in the sense that it strips black humans of the moral value that protects them from kinds of abuse, which is incompatible with the social and political aim to respond to individuals’ basic needs. The assertions that Kant makes precludes black people from learning and creating knowledge, from receiving recognition and respect as persons, and from participating in the society as moral agents or patients. One way to understand his view is this; because black people have no rationality, they are unable to learn anything, even moral principles, and thus they are not worthy of respect and can thus be appreciated only for their instrumental value, since they lack dignity. Black people are not persons. Put differently, Kant devalues black bodies to the point of dehumanising them as he strips them of any value that would empower them to judge others as morally blameworthy or praiseworthy. Kant’s exclusion of black people from the moral world denies black people proper humanitarian consideration. Naturally, it is not all thinkers who agree with Eze’s view that Kant was racist in his work. Thomas Hill and Bernard Boxill defend Kant against the charge that he was racist (2000). One of their arguments is that Kant was not a racist, he simply adopted the prejudices of his time, that is the Enlightenment period (2000: 458–459). They assert that what we can glean from this is that Kant underestimated the strong influence of inclinations when individuals consider what is permissible and impermissible (ibid: 468–469). Kant champions the idea that we should overcome inclinations as they interfere with acting rightly. When acting rightly it is our moral strength that should guide us to act right, not our desires, emotions or attitudes. He considered overcoming inclinations and desires to be relatively easy: [t]hus in the moral cognition of common human reason we have attained to its principle, which it obviously does not think abstractly in such a universal form, but actually has always before its eyes and uses as its standard of judgment. It would be easy here to show how, with this compass in its hand, it knows its way around very well in all the cases that come before it, how to distinguish what is good, what is evil, what conforms to duty or is contrary to duty, if, without teaching it the least new thing, one only makes it aware of its own principle, as Socrates did; and thus that it needs no science and philosophy to know what one has to do in order to be honest and good, or indeed, even wise and virtuous. (Ak 4: 404)

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It would appear that in overestimating rationality, Kant took the strength of inclinations and desires for granted—at least that is what Hill and Boxill would like to argue. But, there is something hypocritical in Kant championing rationality and then excluding black people from personhood based on his prejudices, which are themselves a matter of inclinations. Kant’s own theory about the primacy of rationality is, itself, not based on rationality. The prejudice against black people is what motivates him to argue that black people are not persons—his prejudice is not a matter of rational judgement. Given that his moral theory prompts us to act rightly and that acting rightly is a matter of moral strength, then one can say that Kant failed to act morally in judging black people as non-persons. Granted, identifying right from wrong is not an easy matter, and Kant himself failed to get it right. Hill and Boxill’s further argument in defence of Kant is that those who consider Kant a racist have not considered his larger body of work and have isolated one part of his work to muddy the rest of his canon. They find it hypocritical to want to dismiss Kant because of the racial prejudice found in his work. Their view is that Kant is not a racist and neither is his work. They argue that Kant’s work actually provides a framework for morality that applies to all human beings; that we should consult his framework to fight racism in our societies instead of accusing Kant of being a racist (2002: 470). Herein, one is to believe that Kant’s racism is based on the implications of what he writes, but that the deeper principle in his work is, itself, not racist. Hill and Boxill submit that Kant had racial prejudice but urge critics to separate the thinker from his work because Kant’s prejudice was not part of his central philosophy. The overall suggestion made in defence of Kant requires critics of Kant to simply accept Kant’s ignorance and how it endorsed or supported racial views or attitudes without affecting the ‘core of his moral philosophy’. My view here is that Kant constructs a race theory that is based on the idea that black people are inferior and he is even credited for giving Philosophy the first systematic writings on race (Bernasconi 2001: 25–30; Eze 2002: 449). The fact that Kant is credited for creating the first philosophical theory of race nullifies the charge that racial discrimination is not an important part of his work. Following the place of his race theory in Philosophy, one can argue that the principle of universalism that he champions in his work is thus ‘a particularised universalism that excludes blacks from the category of human beings qua rational beings’ (More 1996: 114). In other words, Kant’s universalism is a kind of universalism that does not recognise black

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people as persons or, as Mills mildly puts it, sabotages itself in contradictions (Mills 2002: 29). Kant’s defenders call upon one to consider Kant’s work in totality in order to save him from the racist (and sexist) accusations. However, I am not sure why Kant’s work deserves such courtesy when it is written in acquiescence to the stereotypical and prejudicial views about non-­ Europeans in order to denigrate their moral worth, intelligence and character. The thing about the abovementioned defence is that it glosses over the fact that Kant tried to universalise a theory that discriminates against a group of people without a rational basis—not that a rational basis would make it morally acceptable, but his defenders would at least be able to argue that it meets his own rational standard of scrutiny. It is not the charge of racism that is hypocritical. It is this defence of it that is hypocritical as it urges us to preserve the fruit of a poisonous tree, so to speak. The arguments advocate the brilliance of Kant’s work and let him off the hook for his racial prejudices. What seems to be prioritised here is Kant’s body of work over its devastating racial implications. It is as though the ‘brilliance’ of Kant’s work is more sacred in comparison to the value, and by extension the needs, of black people. I think that Kant’s defenders find it more devastating to question the racism in Kant’s work because the unity of his body of work may not fully survive the charge of racism. He builds his egalitarian and inclusivist moral and political ideas on rationality, yet he states that certain groups of people, that is, black people lack such rationality. The implication here is that all that is moral, all that is good, all that is right matters only when we are speaking about the Europeans. This implies that Kant’s work is designed to explain the superiority of Europeans—the moral worth, intelligence and character of Europeans. Perhaps the problem here is the overly inflated centrality of rationality. If rationality were to be removed from the pedestal that makes it the marker of moral worth and intelligence, then perhaps there would be no offence to black people. However, the real issue here may be Kant’s irrational application of rationality as a tool to exclude black people. Black people are not irrational, and so, it is irrational and morally deplorable for Kant to imply that they are. In an effort to find a compromise, Thomas and Boxill argue that the idea that the solutions to the problem of racism in Kant’s work should not involve abandoning rationality as that would be like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. They say:

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[i]t is reason that led us to appreciate that the emotions, passions, and attitudes can distort the results of reason’s efforts to determine what is right; and it was reason that led us to see that rational self-examination alone may not always enable us to bring all the morally relevant facts vividly before us. Finally, it is reason that will enable us to solve the problem, which in general is to find some way to bring morally relevant facts before common human reason. (Hill and Boxill 2000: 470)

The recommendation from Hill and Boxill involves not abandoning reason since  the solution to racial discrimination depends on reason. Although the problem may lie with the role given to reason in Kant’s work, the solution is not to rid his work of reason. This anxiety about letting reason go is understandable since reason is the bedrock of Kant’s central philosophy; it may be greatly weakened without reason. One can understand this. However, to suggest the prioritisation of a theory over the value of persons seems irresponsible. Re-reading major texts allow for different interpretations and these interpretations (and their implications) should not be precluded due to fear that the re-interpretations could be damning to the theory. I reject Hill and Boxill’s recommendation that we should disregard the charge of racism against Kant because his attitude towards non-Europeans is not central to the core of his theory and that we should look to Kant’s reason to resolve a problem that is brought about by the prioritisation of reason. I follow Charles Mills who argues that we should not accept and teach sanitised versions of theories as they often present concepts of Western political theory such as liberalism, humanism and egalitarianism as racially inclusive and without contradiction: political struggles around race, conquest, slavery, imperialism, colonization, segregation; the battles for abolition, independence, self-government, equal rights, first-class citizenship; the movements of aboriginal peoples, slaves, colonial populations, black Americans and other subordinated people of color; and the texts of all these movements, vanish into a conceptual abyss papered over by the seemingly minor, but actually tremendously question-­ begging, assumption that all humans are and have been recognized as equal persons. (Mills 2002: 33–34)

Hill and Boxill suggest that we should endeavour to build institutions that encourage dialogue among people with different views and urge those who are superior to listen to their inferiors sympathetically:

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Listening to others with different viewpoints, different emotions and attitudes, and consequently different blind spots is a beginning but not enough. The confident and complacent do not listen sympathetically to those they feel to be their inferiors, even when they invite these inferiors to speak. Somehow, we must design institutions that will help us to listen to others sympathetically. (Hill and Boxill 2000: 470–471)

I will set aside the assumption that part of the solution to dealing with racism in Kant’s work is expressed in positionalities of those who are superior who must listen to those who are inferior as this kind of expression, in some inconspicuous way, maintains the very binary created by Kant’s racial taxonomy. What is useful here is the view that the problem of racism does not lie only with theorist (and those who defend him) but also with the institutions that do not challenge racial prejudice. Kant has been recognised as the philosopher who brought the theory of race into fruition, therefore the view that we have to consider Kant’s work in its entirety to realise that it is not racist implies that we should read everything but his racial theory. No, we cannot cherry-pick and ignore texts that have damning racial views, especially since Kant’s racial theory, among many others, has had far reaching consequences that continue to plague black people in our society. The main reason for exploring Kant’s moral theory has been to show that it may not be very useful in guiding us to establish fair principles of redistribution in Africa since the theory proffered by him excludes Africans by virtue of denying them the value of dignity, thereby dehumanising them and excluding them from the moral world. The values of dignity, respect and moral worth are relevant to any theory of needs. If we are to develop a philosophical theory of needs, it should be one whose principles do not discriminate along race or gender lines, among other important social ideals. One possible view that could have the potential to assist in thinking about redistribution in response to basic needs in Africa is the communitarian view of personhood as provided by Ifeanyi Menkiti and others. What is attractive about this view is that, while it is also morally loaded, it lacks racial prejudice. The communitarian view of persons succeeds where Kant’s view fails—it manages to affirm persons without discriminating along racial lines. The communitarian view of personhood aims to endorse one’s dignity as a member of a society who is naturally embedded in a web of interrelations, where such a web is appropriately not racially exclusive.

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Re-humanisation in the Communitarian Moral View The communitarian moral view is expressed through personhood. This view of personhood is discussed often as a rejection of the Kantian view (among others) which isolates one aspect about humanity as the ultimate mark of being (Menkiti 2004: 326). Many thinkers such as Menkiti and Masolo have argued against this view because it is a bit too clinical and ignores the important place of relationality among persons in a community. Apart from ignoring relationality, Kant’s personhood also turns its back on those with brain disorders such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s, which disrupt the brain as the seat of rationality. In addition, children also do not seem to be accounted for, not even as potential persons. Interestingly, on Kant’s account, aliens and robots could qualify as persons. Arto Laitinen makes a similar observation and he argues that if we take rationality to be the person-making capacity, then membership in the Homo sapiens species ceases to be a necessary requirement (Laitinen 2007: 250). Suffice it to say that the communitarian view of personhood places emphasis on group solidarity within a community (Masolo 2010: 217). The communitarian view of personhood as discussed by Menkiti asserts that personhood is not something that one is born with, but it is rather something that one develops through a process involving relationality— personhood is an aspect of individuals that is acquired, not given at birth (Menkiti 2004: 174, 178, 179). Here, it is the community that is central to one’s development into personhood—‘it is the community which defines the person as person, not some isolated static quality of rationality, will or memory’ (ibid: 172). Menkiti goes so far as to argue that the community is ontologically prior to the individual, and so, it is the individual’s duty to care about the welfare of others before one’s own (ibid: 171, 180). The communitarian view of personhood endorses moral perfectionism. In other words, the communitarian view of personhood is morally loaded and recognises personhood in those who display moral excellence. The other principles that are present in the communitarian view of personhood are duty and altruism. Kwame Gyekye criticises Menkiti’s view of personhood for its prioritising the community over the person and for misrepresenting personhood as something that one can achieve. Gyekye disagrees with Menkiti’s characterisation of personhood because he thinks it affords too much weight to the community thereby sacrificing an individual’s autonomy (1997: 53–56). It is unclear for him that one’s autonomy can be properly

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accounted for in a theory that gives ontological priority to the community and places the interests of others ahead of one’s own. Moreover, Gyekye thinks that we attain moral knowledge but we cannot speak of personhood as something that people attain at the behest of the community’s emphasis on its own interests (Gyekye 1997: 47–52). Furthermore, Gyekye argues that Menkiti criticises the metaphysical view of personhood for isolating one aspect about persons as the mark for personhood, but ultimately does the same thing by virtue of isolating moral perfection as the marker of personhood (Gyekye 2002: 325). While the charge of racism cannot be levelled against the communitarian view of persons, Gyekye does present a charge of the imposing authority that is given to the community in determining one’s personhood. This extreme emphasis on the community’s authority hinders one’s autonomy and so would infringe on one’s individual rights. Gyekye distinguishes between moral right and individual rights, and he suggests that the community’s development and success would be enhanced if communitarianism endorsed the autonomous management and the exercise of individual rights (2002: 329–330). Another critique of the communitarian view of personhood is levelled by Zinhle Manzini who argues that the theory discriminates against women and queer folk, as well as people with disabilities. Manzini employs Menkiti’s exclusion of biological criteria as sufficient criteria for personhood to argue that ceremonies that celebrate the rights of passage are heavily grounded in ideas of gender binaries that exclude intersexual people who are referred to as hermaphrodites. She asserts that the failure to expand gender categories immediately forces people who do not present as male or female to squeeze into and be socialised as masculine females when developing into persons. In short, Manzini argues that the set gender bias immediately excludes those who do not conform to cisgender roles as they fail to conform to the community’s norms. The expected heteronormativity precludes intersex people from being considered persons (2018: 26–28). Morality, Duty and the Rights I consider both moral theories presented by Kant and Menkiti to be theories that seem to prioritise the good. That is to say, both theories are mainly about how best to live well with one another within the society. Both provide sorts of guidelines that assist us in treating others ethically.

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They adjudicate rightness and wrongness of acts based on principles that ensure harmony in a society. Their foundations differ, but what they aim to defend, that is, the moral value of persons and the protection of that value from violation, is similar. Nonetheless, concerns about the redistribution of resources and values in response to human needs are not properly addressed by ideas about the good. Or rather, theories of the good are not sufficient in establishing the best principles for redistributing values or resources in response to basic human needs. The reason I argue this is that one or other group is always marginalised by virtue of commission or omission in the abovementioned theories, which weakens their potential to recommend principles for a theory of needs. Theories that aim to address the social needs of persons in society ought to capture both the right and the good. If one had to choose between the two approaches to personhood, one could argue for more potential in the communitarian theory of personhood because of its emphasis on the need to ensure the welfare of persons. On the surface, this theory seems to accept the equal consideration due to all persons, provided they conform to the moral aims and interests of the community. This can be interpreted to mean that part of what it means to be a person is to care about the needs of others and to accept the duty to act in response to such needs. Molefe argues that Menkiti’s view of personhood addresses both issues of morality and rights. He argues that Menkiti does not omit the importance of rights. In response to Gyekye’s critique that Menkiti presents a radical communitarian view of persons thereby neglecting rights, Molefe argues that Menkiti does not ignore rights; he simply prioritises duties over rights. Herein, Menkiti is said to offer a patient-centred notion of personhood that concerns itself with the issue of who is owed justice (Molefe 2016: 47–48). What one ought to take from Menkiti’s communitarian view of personhood is that duties trump rights (ibid: 49–50). The characterisation of the priority of duties over rights is meant to defend Menkiti against Gyekye’s charge that Menkiti is a radical communitarian. Considering Menkiti as a partial instead of as a radical communitarian is useful, when thinking of the political theory in relation to the moral theory. My view is that duty and justice should not be understood as values that relate in terms of priority and posteriority. The two should operate as pairs so that issues of the moral world and issues of justice are addressed without neglecting or negating the other. The relativity of morality makes it possible for people to abdicate their moral duties or to use the principles selectively to exclude certain groups of people from the

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moral world. The reward of personhood is not always incentive enough to make an individual moral—Gyekye already criticises the tying of personhood to moral perfection. Elsewhere, I argued in favour of a neutral view of personhood that is devoid of the moral load so as to allow an individual to choose to live morally or immorally. I do not champion for people to live immorally. I simply advocate that a person should live with the knowledge that they have the freedom to choose to live morally or immorally, but should remain cognisant of the consequences of their choice (Tshivhase 2018: 75–76). A theory of personhood that can best bring balance to the significance of the right and the good is one that offers the best way to handle the relationship between the person and the society so as to maximally protect the values of duties and rights. Given the idea, as conceived of by Michael Clifford, following Foucault, that personhood is a matter of experience where such experience necessarily involves the axes knowledge, power and ethics, it makes sense to accept the situatedness of a person within webs of interrelations (1992: 33–35). At different moments, persons move between positions that give them power or that subjugate them to power. Hence, one should not be too enthusiastic about theories that prioritise the community over the individual as power relations can manifest in exclusionary ways. Personhood, qua rationality or relationality means little without moral consciousness and freedom. Herein reason and communal regard present limits that indicate a level of exclusion, which in itself indicates a structure of powers and authorities who can adjudicate on personhood. It is possible for one to be rational and immoral. In addition, a person can do good and still be immoral. The problem here is moral perfectionism. Personhood ought to be built on aspects about people that are fluid, just as humanity itself is not static. With regard to the African view of personhood, I think the idea of relationality is still too heavily dominated by patriarchal principles that inadvertently hinder communal harmony by neglecting the complexities of matters relating to gender and sexualities in relation to personhood qua moral perfectionism. Issues of gender and sexuality are still not thoroughly discussed on the African view of personhood, which gives the concerning idea that the category of persons is exclusively male. Not enough of the African thinkers on personhood have explicitly stated this, but the omission of gender and sexuality arguments in the African scholarship is too noticeable to be left unmentioned. One has only to look at the spike in gender based violence in South African communities to see

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clearly that it is imperative to stretch current theories of personhood to account for gender and sexuality in the moral world. Overall, I have showcased two approaches to personhood with the aim to show the relevance of personhood in the philosophy of needs. I argued that both theories have the potential to capture the relevant sort of personhood that should be considered in a philosophy of needs. Both approaches fall short, either along gender or racial lines or both. Kant’s philosophy is racially biased, and so it fails, at a basic level, to account for values of racial equality and inclusivity thus making it unsuitable in establishing a theory of needs. The communitarian view also fails to capture gender equity thus falling into a somewhat similar caveat. My view is that any plausible theory of needs should account for gender and racial equity and inclusivity. It is inconsistent with social cohesion to establish a political theory of needs that neglects the intersectionality of gender and racial matters. History has placed black people and women (and those who identify as women) at a disadvantage that rendered their needs inconsequential, and so, any political theory of needs should endorse the prioritisation of the needs of all persons, perhaps with a view to capture and/or restore their dignity as moral and political subjects. Put differently, the foundation of a plausible theory of needs should account for dignity and rights without exclusions that are based on an individual’s ontological reality. Much like Mills (2002), I do not think that we need to bother with trying revise Kantian theory so as to make it consistent with racial inclusivity. I am not sure that the theory can properly remain Kantian if such a revision is made. I am persuaded to think that the African view of personhood has room to develop new avenues in thinking about what it means to live as gendered persons with sexualities among other gendered people with sexualities without violating each other’s wellbeing. The promotion of relationality and other values such as duty, respect, altruism, love, care, compassion and so forth, are gender-neutral values that should be understood and applied without discrimination. What is problematic with the African view of personhood is the patriarchal subtext that is consistently ignored—it is this patriarchal subtext that should be interrogated and dismantled to form a new conception of personhood that can account for persons as gendered individuals with sexualities. In other words, the communitarian view of personhood has the potential to account for and should account for the needs of women and those who identify as women. Gender and sexuality, much like race, should not be qualities about persons that

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can be used to exclude them from personhood, thereby failing to condemn the violations such as unjust incarceration of queer folk in some African countries, (corrective) raping, and killing, of women and those who identify as women. There is much about gender and sexualities that present life-threatening socio-political consequences for those who refuse to conform to dominant patriarchal norms that govern our relationality, and I think this justifies the need to revise the African view of personhood in order to make it directly relevant to the dynamic differences among persons in society. Given the oppression and marginalisation of African Philosophy as a discipline—a political move that stifled African Philosophy for centuries— I am inclined to think that the communitarian view of personhood can be revised in ways that account for the ethics of gender and sexualities. The relational foundation already offers a potential gateway into a formulation of personhood that offers much-needed attention to the plight of women and those who identify as women. I suspect that part of the violation of women and those who identify as women is a matter of non-recognition and misrecognition. If we are to account for their needs, we necessarily have to re-examine and dismantle the implicit prioritisation of patriarchal norms in theories of personhood. In short, of the two approaches I discussed in this chapter, I think, it is the communitarian approach to personhood that has the potential to account for a view of personhood that can relevantly contribute to an African political theory of needs.

Conclusion While I concede that there is not one perfect theory that can account for human solutions to human problems, I do maintain that Kantian theories on race and personhood only offer us guidance in so far as illustrating what we should avoid, that is, racial exclusions. A theory of needs should be constructed with the aim to attain justice for all, not just some persons. In our society, it is mainly women, children and black people, who are politically and socially vulnerable, among other things. A theory that does not account for these groups of people as possessing the value of dignity that should be respected and safe-guarded cannot guide us on issues of needs as it relegates these beings to the category of non-persons who are uneducable and possess a value equivalent to that of objects. Even if we look to Kant’s view of rationality based duty, we still struggle to take his guidance seriously, as justice necessarily involves compassion, not just

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rationality. Given that rationality is, according to Kant, a necessary condition for personhood, and that black people and women lack said rationality, it follows that women and black people are not persons. The exclusionary tone of this personhood view has devastating moral and political implications. I dare add that it has devastating implications for one’s sense of self-knowledge, esteem and the ability to exist as a free and full-fledged person. Kant’s racial theory has far-reaching consequences that continue to linger in our society to date. Hill and Boxill rightly state that his fault is one of commission and omission. However, he cannot be left off the hook and exonerated based on arguments that suggest that we should ignore his prejudices as judging his work based on his prejudices is tantamount to building ad hominem views against him. I showed this argument is not convincing since the charge of racism in his work stems from a racial theory which he has been credited for solidifying in Philosophy. The overall point is that Kant’s theory of personhood disappointingly discriminates against black people and a theory that informs fair consideration of needs should not discriminate racially. Menkiti’s view of personhood seemed to have the potential to inform views on fair consideration of needs because it contains no racial bias and it seems to emphasise the wellbeing of community, which is dependent on the welfare of its members. Nonetheless, Gyekye showed that the proposed relation between person and community leaves the individual worse off because of the insistence on the priority of the community over the person. While the moral import of the theory is acceptable and should not be sacrificed, it appears that the implication of the priority of the community over the individual that is endorsed by radical communitarianism diminishes the importance of individuality and freedom. The lack of these values could prove to be oppressive in instances where the power relations of the community oppresses personal aspects that do not conform with that community’s norms—issues of gender and sexuality discrimination come to mind here. Perhaps Molefe’s charitable view of Menkiti’s view of personhood as prioritising the duty over rights is a good starting point to making revision to the communitarian view of personhood. This may be a good start to reconfiguring personhood—duty and rights—in relation to gender and sexualities in a way that would contribute more relevantly to an African political theory of needs. My overarching view is that neither Menkiti nor Kant’s theories on personhood, as they stand, offer proper guidance that can help establish

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principles of a theory of needs. At the very least, they indicate what needs to be avoided when thinking about fair means of redistribution. To be sure, any theory of personhood that I think would be useful in contributing towards establishing principles that consider basic human needs cannot discriminate by omission as Menkiti’s theory does, or by both omission and commission as Kant’s does. Menkiti omits consideration of those whose individuality does not conform, say, to heteronormative norms that are generally accepted without question—norms that keep women and queer folk subjugated in some form or another. Perhaps I am expecting too much from these theories. Perhaps these theories of personhood are not designed to provide guidance on matters of the right, in which case, we should not look to theories of personhood to provide insight into issues of basic human needs. I do not think it wise to give in to the idea that theories of personhood cannot guide us in issues of redistributive justice that address basic human needs; at the very least, the communitarian view of personhood holds potential to reconfigure personhood in mattering ways that would contradict systemic dehumanisation. Even though I recognise the potential contribution of the communitarian theory of personhood to the African political theory of needs, I assert that it is only a theory of personhood that is devoid of discrimination and exclusionary implications that will be useful here—a theory of personhood that affirms all individuals as beings with moral worth and rights, as well as the accompanying values of autonomy and a healthy desire to maintain relationality in ways that empower members of a community to question, re-evaluate or redesign norms over time. Just as the criteria for personhood should not be static, so too, should the relation between rights and duties when politically theorising about needs.

References Bernasconi, Robert. 2001. Who invented the concept of race? Kant’s role in the enlightenment construction of race. In Race, ed. R. Bernasconi, 9–36. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Clifford, M. 1992. Corrugated subjects: The three axes of personhood. The Personalist Forum 8: 31–41. Eze, E.C. 2002. The color of reason: The idea of ‘race. In Kant’s anthropology in Philosophy from Africa: A text with readings, ed. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 2nd ed., 430–456. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

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Gyekye, Kwame. 1997. Modernity and tradition: Philosophical reflections on the African experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2002. Person and community in African thought. In Philosophy from Africa: A text with readings, ed. P.H.  Coetzee and A.P.J.  Roux, 2nd ed., 317–335. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Hill, T.R., and Bernard Boxill. 2000. Kant and race. In Race and racism, ed. B. Boxill, 448–471. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1775. On the different races of man. Reprinted in Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader, ed. E.C. Eze, 38–48. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. ———. 1960. Observations of the feeling of the beautiful and sublime. Trans. J.T. Goldthwait. Berkeley: University of California Press. ———. 2002. Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals. Trans. A.W.  Wood. London: Yale University Press. Laitinen, A. 2007. Sorting out aspects of personhood. In Dimensions of personhood, ed. A. Laitinen and H. Ikäheimo, 248–270. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic. Luik, J.C. 1992. Kant and the education of the human race. Man and Nature / L’Homme et la Nature 11: 159–170. Manzini, N.Z. 2018. Menkiti’s normative communitarian conception of personhood as gendered, ableist and anti-queer. South African Journal of Philosophy 37: 18–33. Masolo, D.A. 2010. Self and Community in a Changing World. Indiana (USA): Indiana University Press. Menkiti, Ifeanyi. 2004. On the normative conception of person. In A companion to African philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 324–331. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Mills, C. 2002. Kant‘s untermenschen. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7865/ c7f24fa9bd68035e1db09b016d6732188a37.pdf. Accessed February 2020. Molefe, M. 2016. Revisiting the Menkiti-Gyekye debate: Who is a radical communitarian? Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 63: 37–54. More, Mabogo. 1996. African philosophy revisited. Alternation 3: 109–129. Ramose, M.B. 2002. The struggle for reason in Africa. In Philosophy from Africa: A text with readings, ed. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 2nd ed., 1–8. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Tshivhase, Mpho. 2018. Personhood without ubuntu. In Ubuntu and personhood, ed. J. Ogude. New Jersey: Africa World Press.

CHAPTER 7

Uncovering Needs in African Thought Through Igbo Proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty Lawrence Ogbo Ugwuanyi

Introduction Universally, the idea of needs arises from the limited nature of man. Arising from this limitation, the desires involved in being human are such that man is trapped in a world of needs, which are biological, psychological, social, political, economic and so on. But the understanding that defines and directs these needs depends on the context and culture where the human being functions. This chapter sets out to articulate the key issues that define the idea of needs in African thought. To do this, it applies the instance of the idea of needs in Igbo thought as an illustration of meaning

I wish to acknowledge the assistance of B.M. Mbah, a professor of the Igbo language at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, for editing the Igbo orthography in this work. L. O. Ugwuanyi (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Abuja, Abuja, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Molefe, C. Allsobrook (eds.), Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3_7

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assigned to needs and the understanding that informs reactions to needs in African thought. It translates needs into three components, namely (1) Required necessity (Lack), (2) Required necessity that could be provided through an agent (Care) and (3) Required necessity that should be provided by an agent (Duty). It then maps out Igbo proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty, and applies them to articulate the idea of needs in African thought. It will also articulate the social and political imperatives implied by this understanding. To achieve the aim of the work, I shall in the first part of the work make some clarifications on the theoretical challenges involved to provide the justification for the work as well as the limitations. To do this, I will attempt to explain the challenges involved in the effort to abstract African philosophical thought through its expression in the culture and worldview of a group. I acknowledge the diversities of the cultures that are called African, but I proceed to defend the view that this does not invalidate the relevance of such enquiry, as philosophical thoughts often emanate from the worldview of a people even if the reflection on this is carried out through an individual. Thereafter, I will proceed to justify the application of Igbo proverbs in doing this. I will proceed from here to uncover needs in African thought, as they are available in Igbo proverbs. The application of the word uncover is to emphasise the distinction of the work—that is, to show that it is an attempt at articulating in a distinct way the idea of needs is registered in Igbo thought and how it may compare with the notions of needs in other cultures. In the remarkable literature devoted to the analysis of Igbo thought (Nwala 2010; Opata 1998; Nwoga 1984; Okafor 1992; Oguejiofor 1996), the question of needs has not been addressed. Thus, this work stands out as the first effort in this regard. It is also for this reason that much of the views volunteered would be based on oral literature in Igbo thought.

Theoretical Challenges and Conceptual Clarification A number of challenges confront the effort to articulate ideas, concepts and values in contemporary African philosophy through a study of the thinking of a given group. The first challenge (1) is how not to assume that the thinking of a group or an ethnocultural group is enough to stand for the thinking of Africans in general, given the diversity of cultures that

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can be called African. The second (2) is how not to assume that an individual’s understanding and interpretation of concepts and values found in African worldview is qualified to represent what the group thinks about them—that is, how to locate the limitations of an individual thought about the ideas held by a group in the effort to discuss ideas that emanate from and are held by the group. The third challenge (3) involved in articulating the thought of a group is the hermeneutical challenge of how to locate and isolate the content, context and contest of the thoughts of a given group. By this, I mean how to ensure that in inheriting the thoughts of a group, one is, as it were, not committing a major error of assuming a foundational knowledge of the ideas embedded in the thought structure of the group, which may have passed through some forms of social dynamics that are not known to the author. This work acknowledges these challenges but argues that they do not invalidate the project. This is because the character of philosophy enables it to seek meaning by interrogating meanings, and the process of filtering truths through preliminary assumptions is part of the demand of achieving a second-order philosophy, which ultimately is philosophy in its proper demand. In doing this, part of such assumption is that examining ideas should start with examining the meaning it makes to the examiner. Also, philosophy would start from a reflection of the ideas held by a group as revealed in myths, values and stories. Indeed, it is for this reason that philosophy usually begins from non-­ philosophy—that is, by interrogating a given idea or concept as it is held amount a community and seeking to uncover truths and ideas implied by looking at how and why it is disclosed within a given human community the way it is and not otherwise. Thus, whether it is the Igbo human community, the German human community or the Greek human community, there is the implicit assumption that interrogating ideas as they are held to be cogent and valid by and among such a community implies doing so on ideas as they could be held by any other human community of minds and ideas, and this is what inspires a valid philosophical study. It is, however, important to note (1) that the view expressed here does not represent the views of all Africans on needs. Similarly, (2) the views on needs expressed here do not necessarily represent the views held by the entire Igbo community. Third (3) the claim made here does not imply that only the Igbo community might hold the view outlined. What I wish the readers to understand is that the Igbos are an ethnic group in Africa and that their idea of needs validly represents an idea of need that can be called African. Thus, even if there is a variant notion of needs, it does not

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annul the legitimacy of the Igbo idea of needs as an African idea of needs. Similarly, while the views expressed in this work are hugely drawn from a part of Igbo area that the author is familiar with, they could be found to be similar in other parts of Igbo thought.

Why Apply Igbo Proverbs to Articulate Needs The next question that demands to be addressed in the effort to uncover needs in African thought through Igbo proverbs is, why apply proverbs to discuss needs in African philosophy? The answer to this lies in the role proverbs play in the social and cultural life of Africans. There is strong evidence to support a claim that African thought makes use of proverbs. Among the Akan people of Ghana, for instance, there is a popular saying that ‘the wise man is spoken to in proverbs, not in speeches (or words)’ (Gyekye 1987: 64). Proverbs are a very impactful aspect of African thought pattern. They are so cogent to African thought schemes that much of African philosophy can be held to substantially reside in African proverbs. Indeed, if African philosophers were to remain faithful to the definition of philosophy as the love of wisdom, it is doubtful whether there is a better illustration of the love of wisdom in Africa than the use of proverbs. Proverbs, in African thought, as in other thought schemes, appeal to people’s emotion while provoking thought and reason. Hence, they are often insightful, impactful and rational. These virtues are also proven qualities of wisdom. Proverbs come from the Latin word proverbium, which means a saying supporting a point. In playing this role, proverbs exhibit a number of qualities that make it a strong intellectual item for thought. A number of views on proverbs support this claim. Larson (1984) cited J. Igono and U.O. Ogudu 2018:1–8) defines proverb as “a string of words whose meaning is different from the meaning conveyed by the individual words”. Nwoga (1972, cited in J. Igono and U.O. Ogudu 2018: 1–8) suggests that ‘proverbs are the wisdom of many and the wits of one.’ In the same vein, Peters (1971: 98) holds that proverbs are frequently used ‘because of their literal attributes of being figurative, colourful and terse, and their earthly qualities of containing truths and hard facts borne out of experience’ while Momoh (1989: 232) also suggests, ‘a proverb is a remnant from old philosophy, presented amid countless destruction because of its brevity and fitness for use.’

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These notions of proverb suggest that a proverb is compelling wisdom. However, a proverb is not compelling in the raw sense of the term but in the technical sense of the term. A proverb is compelling because of its rational and emotional appeal. It relies on the authority of wisdom to suggest a universal meaning and appeal. Thus, although a proverb may arise from a particular circumstance and from one social group, it so soon makes meaning within another social group such that its inter-subjective and inter-group appeal is easily outstanding. When speech is delivered in proverbs, the audience is literarily told to please consider this wisdom or choose foolishness if you like. This is because of what may be called the imagined concrete subject of proverbial wisdom. By imagined concrete subject is meant the one who is expected to gain from a proverb. It means that while proverbs are not usually crafted with one person in mind, any person who would fit into a particular form of action captured by the message becomes a concrete subject of the proverb. Because of the capacity of proverbs to engage its audience individually and cause for critical reflection, some African scholars have applied proverbs to locate African philosophy (Okolo 1985; Momoh 1989; Gyekye 2001, etc.). Some of them are pioneers of philosophical writings in black Africa. They have made philosophical reflections on the proverbs of some African languages, suggesting thereby that the African philosopher should cultivate strong interest in African proverbs. Having illustrated why proverbs have been found valuable for this project, this work has to illustrate why Igbo proverbs are preferred. A major reason for the choice of Igbo proverbs is that the use of proverbs is spectacular in the Igbo language. In the Igbo manner of speech, proverbs are used to garnish speech and convey compelling wisdom. Indeed, as Achebe (1994: 11) puts it, ‘Among the Igbo the art of conversation is regarded very highly, and proverbs are the palm-oil with which words are eaten.’ At least three proverbs illustrate the revered status of proverbs in Igbo thought. The first Igbo proverb, which is the elaboration of the citation made earlier, says that ilu bụ nmanụ ndi ̣ Igbo ji eri okwu, meaning ‘proverbs are the palm oil with which the Igbo eat words’ just like they use palm oil to eat yam. The second proverb states that ‘A child who knows how to use proverbs have justified the dowry paid on his mother’s head’ (Kanu 2014). The third Igbo proverb that captures the unique and invaluable worth of proverbs in administering wisdom in Igbo thought says A tụọrụ ọmara ọ mara; a tụọrọ ofeke o feba n’ọhi ̣a—‘if you speak to the wise in proverbs he/she understands but if you speak to the fool he/she allows

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your words to fly to the bush.’ These proverbs highlight the place of proverbs in administering wisdom in Igbo thought. By applying Igbo proverbs to discuss the idea of needs in the Igbo worldview, I therefore attempt to address the question of needs through a relevant intellectual medium, where it is expressed in Igbo thought.

A Sketch on Needs in African Thought Through Igbo Proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty Before I proceed to outline the proverbs that account for the idea of needs in Igbo thought, it is important to capture the idea of needs. In Igbo thought, need translates to the word Mkpa. Mkpa connotes that which makes one uncomfortable or that which disturbs one’s peace. Hence, when one wants to know the other’s need, he or she asks the other: Kedu mkpa na-akpa gi ̣? or, Kedu ihe na-akpa gi ̣?—‘What is your need or what is it that makes you uncomfortable?’ The assumption here is that one should be at ease with the universe and mkpa amounts to that which makes this desired ease or peace difficult. When this ease or peace is disturbed, or when it is difficult to realise this peace, the other could complain by saying that ihe na-akpam bụ nkea meaning ‘My need is this,’ whereupon the respondent will mention the particular need. A crucial issue needs to be resolved here. The word Mkpa, which translates to need, also translates to want in Igbo thought. Thus, the need arises to ascertain whether it is the same attitude and response that define and direct needs in Igbo thought that define and direct want. The answer to this is no, at least to a significant degree. This is because when one wants to know the other’s need or what bothers the other, the question would be Kedu ihe na-akpa gi ̣? But when one wants to know the other’s want, the question would be Kedu ihe i ̣ chọrọ or Ihe i ̣ chọrọ bụ gịni ̣—‘What do you want?’ The other thing is that while Ihe i ̣ chọrọ bụ gịni ̣? can be interpreted to mean, ‘What are you looking for,’ ihe na-akpa gi ̣ is ‘what is your need?’ The later expression ‘What is your need?’ commands a more urgent attention. By this, I mean that while one who has wants would ordinarily be thought to have met her needs, which are considered more urgent, one who has needs would likely be at the mercy of anybody in the search for a response since this is believed to be very fundamental to one’s wellbeing, failure of which disturbs one’s peace. There is yet another crucial issue to discuss in relation to needs. As something that disturbs one’s peace, it could be expected that needs might necessarily be associated with anger. The view here could be that while

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anger is not singularly caused by needs but could be caused by other factors, such as disappointment and expectation, anger could be a way of expressing needs. Although this might be the case in other world cultures, it is rarely the case in Igbo thought. While one might be angered by the failure to meet a given expectation, such as the desire for justice and loyalty to traditional values, it is not the case that one’s needs can unilaterally be described as what would lead to his anger. Anger iwe cannot be solely caused by mkpa apparently because mkpa causes a sober outlook on life and urges reflection on the path of the needy. This sober disposition to needs is what enables them to attract an urgent response. Mkpa is usually held to be that which can be grasped by any compassionate ear. Thus, mkpa has an inter-subjective demand and a public appeal—that is, mkpa amounts to that which can be appreciated by the other. It is contradictory to talk of mkpa, which is private and cannot be shared by anybody. This does not imply that everybody is entitled to know the other person’s mkpa, but the implication majorly is that someone must be in a position to listen to and appreciate the other person’s mkpa. Mkpa illustrates the commonality of human nature in Igbo thought. Everybody is expected to have one form of it. Thus, the most awkward claim someone can make in Igbo thought is that he or she has no mkpa. No matter how self-sufficient someone is, there must be an indication that he or she appreciates the ethics of interdependence or communion and has needs that can be provided by the other. Whoever lives in a way that shows otherwise is held to be queer in Igbo thought and is denied the affinity of the neighbours. There is often an illustration of this in the case of those who live in such an elitist way that they do not care for other people’s attention and fellow feelings. Such people are not held in esteem. Indeed, sometimes there are instances of those who live this way, who claim to be so modernised, perhaps in the purely Western notion of the idea in the Igbo world, who feel that they are so self-sufficient that they live as though they have no need of anybody. When tragedy befalls such people, few people usually come round to identify with them. This, it is often held, makes them realise how wrong their idea of life is in Igbo thought. The notion of mkpa can be further illustrated by the following popular Igbo story about Mbe, the tortoise. In this short anecdote, the queen of birds invited all animals to a festival in the sky. However, the tortoise had no wings with which to fly to the sky and for this reason was in need of wings. Consequently, the birds contributed feathers, which were built into wings to enable the tortoise fly to the sky. However, on their way to the

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sky, the tortoise suggested that they acquire special names for the festival. Upon the approval of this proposal, the tortoise chose the name ‘All of you’ for the festival. At the sky, when the host offered kolanuts, one of the animals asked her, ‘For whom are these kolanuts meant?’ The host answered, for ‘All of you.’ And the tortoise took hold of the kolanuts and ate them all. Thereafter, the host brought food and another animal asked her, ‘For whom is this food meant?’ She answered, ‘For All of you.’ Again, the tortoise took hold of the food and ate all of it. The tortoise ate so much that he stuffed some food in his feather for the return to earth. When it was time to fly back to the earth, the birds were hungry and in anger demanded their wings from the tortoise. After collecting their wings from the tortoise, they flew back and left behind the tortoise, who had no wings in the sky. In a bid to return to the earth, the tortoise leapt down without wings, landed on the hard earth and got a broken backbone. Upon seeing the agony of the tortoise as he writhed in pains as a result of his broken bones, all the birds yet gathered and helped to massage and re-set his broken backbones. This is why the tortoise functions with the cracked bones he has at the moment. A lot of lessons are couched in this story. However, a particular message that can be obtained from it is that need comes at the depth of human feelings and brings out the best in interpersonal intelligence or what we might call empathy or relational intelligence in Igbo thought. In the story, we see the willingness to help the needy tortoise for which all the birds embarked on the contributory venture of affording the tortoise wings to fly to the sky, but he did not reciprocate this kind gesture. He applied the wings to fly to the sky to outwit them at the festival. We also see how he fell from the sky and ended up with a broken backbone. Finally, we see how the force of need and empathy moved the birds to assist the tortoise by setting his cracked shell to enable him to move again. The story presents the moving force of needs in Igbo thought. It mirrors the three items that explain needs in the Igbo thought: the first is lack, the second is care and the third is duty to address lack through care. These items, imbued in the principle of needs, also involve the ethics of responsibility and relationship as well as human bonding. They are also implicated in the demands of personhood in Igbo thought where addressing the needs of both society and the individual is the fundamental demand of attaining personhood. After an explanation of the nature of needs, I now proceed to itemise Igbo proverbs on need. I shall do this by mapping out the proverbs on lack, care and duty. I first begin by mapping out the proverbs on lack:

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A. Igbo Proverbs on Lack: i. Onye a na-eduga mposi na-ebu ụzọ—‘It is the person directed to the rest room that leads the way.’ This means that a person in need must advertise the need so as to prompt response by others. ii. Nganga kpuchie akwa, agụụ ekpughe ya—‘If pride covers the wear, hunger will uncover it.’ This means that need does not tolerate pride. iii. Ọ kụkọ avụke sị na uche ya agharala ihe dị n’elu—‘The hen with bald head and weak wings laments that she no longer looks skywards.’ This means that what is not within one’s competence should cease to worry the person. iv. M gaghị abụ ogbenye bụrụ amuusu—‘I cannot be a poor person and a witch at the same time.’ This means that one should not be both poor and wicked. This means that need should generate honesty and integrity from the needy. v. Onye ụbịam adighị aza ‘Ome ọ kachie’—‘The indigent person does not take the title of ‘Omeọkachie’, that is, if pruned, it regenerates.’ This means that need generates humility. vi. Anụ enweghi ọdụ, Chi ya na-achụrụ ya ijiji—‘An animal without tail has its flies driven away by its Chi (Guardian Spirit).’ This means that a person’s inherent lack or need has ontological roots, but can be met by his or her guardian angel. vii. Onye yie nkịrịka akwa, a gwa ya nkịrịka okwu—‘One who dresses in rags should expect rough words.’ This means that need does not excuse decency. viii. Onye na-enweghi ego, ọ na-eri ofe Owere?—‘Does a poor person prepare a sumptuous soup?’ This means that the aspiration of the needy should be within their means. The next set of proverbs I shall outline is proverbs on care. I do this because in Igbo thought lack necessarily demands care. Thus, arising from lack is a strong feeling that care should generate. B. Igbo Proverbs on Care: i. Akwa agbata obi na-echu ụra—‘The wailing of a neighbour disturbs others’ sleep.’ This means that the needs of an individual can disturb the community.

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ii. Ọ nụrụ ube nwa nne agbala ọsọ—‘One who hears the cry of a relative should not run.’ This means that kindness is a moral imperative. iii. Ọ kọ kọọ anụmanụ ọ gaa n’osisi kọọ ya mana ọkọ mmadụ, ọ gakwuru mmadụ ibe ya—‘When an animal has itching pains, he runs to a tree, but a human being seeks another human being to scratch him or her.’ This means that availability to the other makes us human. iv. Okenye anaghị anọrọ n’ulọ ewu amuọ n’ọgbịrị—‘A goat cannot be allowed to undergo labour pains tethered to a tree when an elder is standing by.’ This means that saving life is a categorical imperative. v. O metụ imi, o metu ọnụ—‘If it touches the nose, it touches the mouth.’ This means that each person is connected to the other. The third set of proverbs that this work will outline is proverbs on duty. This is because duty is central to a response on care. While lack attracts care, it is the force of duty that leads the mind in the direction of care to address the perceived need. C. Igbo Proverbs on Duty: i. Ihe a na-aṅụchitere di ochi bụ mmanya mana ọ dịghị onye naadachitere ya elu—‘Everyone wants to take the place of a wine tapper at a drinking session but no one accepts to crash from the palm tree on his behalf.’ This means that duty is individual and personal. ii. Agbata obi ya na mmadụ bi n’ ụlọ ka mkpa karịa nwa nne ya bi n’agụ—‘A close neighbour is more important than a distant relation.’ This means that nearness imposes duty and responsibility. iii. Ọ kụkọ ghara kwọm, kedu ihe ọ ga-eji zụọ ụmụ ya?—‘If a hen abandons her feeding habit, with what would she raise her children?’ This means that to feed or do good to the other is a welcome habit. iv. Chọọ ewu ojii mgbe chi ka adị?—‘Make hay while the sun shines.’ This means that duty demands the urgency of now. v. Ihe nwoke mere ibe ya bụ ngaa jidere m—‘What a man does for a fellow man is just an expectation of what he will also get from him.’ This means that favour is reciprocal. vi. Mberede ka e ji ama dike—‘A hero is known by the ability to meet an urgent need or danger.’ This means that a hero meets the urgent need.

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An Analysis of Needs Through Igbo Proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty After an effort to itemise these proverbs on lack, care and duty, I next proceed to analyse these proverbs with a view to illustrating how they present the idea of need embedded in Igbo thought. Before I do this, let me map out what appears to run through the entire proverbs and how one might generally locate the lessons implicated in these proverbs. The first is that needs invoke the notion of human nature as may be found in Igbo thought. By this, I mean that needs serve to highlight the limitation of man wherein arises the sociality of man as a being with others. The idea of sociality or interconnectedness of human beings is rendered very eloquently in the notion of needs that runs through Igbo thought. The second lesson is that needs touch on the ontology of the individual in the sense that there is a strong link between the physical and spiritual aspects of the human person’s interpretation of needs. Both aspects of the person are connected to what the Igbo identifies as his/her needs. Because of the quality of belief in the interconnection of individuals, needs then become an avenue to the social ontology of Igbos. In Igbo thought, there is, as, one would think, among other Sub-­ Saharan Africans, the belief that to become human and to realise the personhood that is desired of the human nature, ‘the individual is under strict metaphysical command to be in ontological relations with her surroundings so that she can come to realise her personhood’ (Matolino 2014: 6). This injunction demands that the individual identifies with and becomes a reliable agent for the realisation of the needs of society. However, the needs of society often turn out to be the needs of the individuals in the society. For this reason, addressing the needs of the individual becomes a fundamental way of fulfilling the social and moral responsibility through which the individual ascends the ladder of personhood. It can then be understood why it is correct to suggest that African societies ‘were structured along strict principles of care and co-operation’ (Matolino 2014: 31), and why it has been suggested that in Africa ‘the duty of one is often the right of the other’ (Cobbah 1987). These features of African society are realised through responses to needs as can be read through Igbo proverbs on need outlined earlier. Having mapped out the general features of needs in Igbo thought as can be read from the proverbs, I now proceed to discuss needs by looking at the different strands of need, namely lack, care and duty, and the

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proverbs that have been outlined to explain them. A study of the proverbs of lack, as can be read from the proverbs outlined, shows that lack does not suggest the source or interrogate the cause. Consequently, it is not a common practice in Igbo culture to ask why someone is in need before assisting the person. For instance, it is not common to ask why someone is hungry before providing the person food. Similarly, it is not common to ask why fire is gutting the building before quenching the fire. There is what amounts to descriptive and pragmatic attention to needs that focus on how it should be met and not who should meet it. As a result of this, other demands of needs, such as why the needs should be met, are also downplayed. On another note, lack demands humility and integrity to assert its status. This is because it touches on the soul of the human person, and for this reason, it is expected that what is held to be a lack must be that which rightfully deserves the attention of the other and that this declaration should be a true reflection of the situation at hand. This can be seen in proverbs Ai, Aii, Aiii, Aiv and Av. It is also expressed very eloquently in proverb Avi, which invokes Chi, the Igbo concept of guardian spirit in expressing the notion of lack. What this proverb suggests is that Chi would step in to provide for an urgent lack. Even if the same Chi is invoked by the same person for a different reason, Chi would from its nature and from the urgency of need step to solve the problem of the person in issue relating to need. Such honesty of intentions, which invokes honesty of attention, means that someone in need must not be too proud to declare it or to appreciate the attention achieved in declaring it (Aii). The nature of lack leads us to consider the notion of care as can be read from the proverbs. From the proverbs mapped out, it can be seen that care is a norm and that caring for the other is a normative aspect of Igbo life. Care is a right defined by the duty implied by need. Somebody must care! This is a social maxim of Igbo life, and one would suggest that this would apply to much of Africans, at least those who live south of the Sahara. This can be illustrated through proverbs Bi and Bii, both of which draw attention to the demand for care as the appropriate response to need. The normative nature of care in Igbo thought is such that by raising the question ‘is nobody there?’ in the face of danger, an obligation has been imposed on anyone close by to respond to the danger. Failure to respond to this would often lead to severe indictment made on anyone who is proximate to the rescue mission demanded at that time. Care in Igbo thought is also a form of empathy. It goes beyond sympathy, which it is associated with, in several other world cultures, to full

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empathy. This is illustrated in proverb Bv. A typical illustration of this aspect of care is when misfortune, such as tragic death, befalls someone, especially the death of a youth. At the occurrence of such a tragedy, it is often expected that everybody would identify with the victim of the tragedy and share in the sorrow and grief in a visibly touching manner. At the death of young people, it is expected that people should shed volumes of tears as a sign of their empathy. Those who shed tears are often held to be caring, concerned and connected with the immediate victims of the tragedy. Although the ritual of shedding tears is expected more from women, it is also desired from the menfolk such that while they are expected to be manly enough by absorbing the tragedy, the ability to shed some tears, even if one would thereafter resort to the ethics of courage, is a valued sign of care. From the foregoing, it can be held that care is at the heart of Igbo communalism and that it is a strong item that illustrates identity and solidarity—that is, the ability to connect with the other and to see oneself as the extension of the other. This is illustrated in proverb Biii. In this proverb, being human is upheld as a responsibility to be connected with the other. When the Igbo holds that what touches the ear touches the mouth, the lesson is that although the nose and the mouth are different organs, they are bound by the same head and harboured by the same person. Thus, there is a form of bond connecting the two. The next item that captures the idea of need in African thought is the concept of duty. Duty in Igbo thought as can be read from the proverbs is work that is defined by one’s state and status. By this, I mean that where one is and what one is define what one should do in respect of the ethics of duty. For this reason, it can be upheld that there is mobility and dynamism in the notion of duty in Igbo thought. For instance, proverb Cii says that a close neighbour is more important than a distant relative. The implication of this is that there are certain duties conferred on one for just being a neighbour to the other. This duty includes responding to an emergency to intervening in family disputes if invited to do so. Performing duties is also seen as what one should cultivate as a habit and perform without seeking a reward. This is illustrated in proverb Civ. But although duty does not attract reward, duty also attracts its reciprocity in the sense that one who carries out a certain duty would necessarily expect that when in need, he/she will not be abandoned. Thus, duty may be seen to be a right to be helped but perhaps not in the sense of a measured right but the placement of the individual within the web of communal relations that

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define Igbo life, where interest and care to one’s problem can be achieved. For this reason, duty defines rights. Duty, thus, can be held to be moral and social responsibility in Igbo thought. Moral responsibility is that which one is bound by conscience to perform. For instance, it is held to be the duty of any reasonable person in Igbo thought to assist a stranger to locate where he or she is going and to assist a missing child in locating the parents. This aspect of duty may not carry the same sanctions when they are not done but they are expected to touch the conscience of whoever fails to do so. It falls within duty as a moral responsibility. But this is not the same with fulfilling other duties, such as clearing the road and securing the community at night, a duty that is often assigned to youths. This is duty as a social responsibility. Here, duty assumes another status as that which will attract sanctions and penalties when it is not performed. Further readings of the proverbs on lack, care and duty suggest that goodwill and shared identity considerably foreground the response to need in Igbo thought. This is shown in the proverbs on care and duty, which are responses to need. For instance, the entire proverbs on care emphasise the need to identify with the other and to illustrate goodwill in dealing with others. Similarly, proverbs Ci and Civ on duty emphasise on goodwill and identity. This is in line with the ethics of communitarianism, which stands as a prominent ethical principle in Igbo thought and the larger African thought on morality. A number of African scholars would generally defend the view that morality in Africa is grounded in a form of communitarianism (Gyekye 1996; Coetzee and Roux 2004; Nze 1989; Ikuenobe 2006; Bujo 1998; Nicolson 2008). The kernel of this moral conviction is that African moral thought is often shaped by this communitarian ideology and that communalism/communitarianism is often applied to interpret that which should be held to be good or bad in society. Several scholars have attempted to articulate the demands and implications of this idea. They include Menkiti (1979), Nze (1989), Bujo (2008), Augustine Stutte (2001), Ramose (1999), Metz (2007) and Ikuenobe (2006). The communitarian ethic here does not just amount to charting the path of the community but upholding the other as an embodiment of, and a representative of, the community and identifying and addressing his or her needs as one would do, if mandated to do so for and on behalf of the community. My final reading of the Igbo proverbs on need is that they reflect the values that shape the Igbo worldview. These values include the ‘sense of human value’, ‘sense of hospitality’, ‘sense of the sacred’, ‘sacredness of

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life’, ‘sense of community’, ‘sense of good human relations’ and ‘sense of identity’ (Onwubiko 1991). For instance, proverb Biv harps on the need to assist a pregnant goat to go through the pains of labour free of chains. It draws attention to the sanctity of the life of both the goat and its kid and the need to preserve the sanctity of life. Similarly, proverb Civ reflects the need for a good sense of human relations. The emphasis here is that one should rather than expect immediate gratification from a favour done to another see it as a thread that leads to reciprocity.

A Socio-political Reading of Igbo Proverbs on Lack, Care and Duty In this aspect of the work, I want to discuss what it would amount to if the Igbo idea of needs, as illustrated in the proverbs outlined, is evaluated from a distinctly socio-political angle. I had already made some remarks in this regard by highlighting what I call the social responsibility implied by duty, which is a response to needs in Igbo thought. In this part of the work, I wish to focus more narrowly on needs in relation to the state and society in Igbo thought, with the view to see how or whether one can locate very distinct principles that can enhance policy formulation through a closer look at the proverbs. To do this, I make the following theoretical assumptions. The first is that social formations are usually a response to individual and common needs. The second is that political formations are often a response to protecting social formations and are aimed at articulating and providing rights and privileges with the corresponding obligations, responsibilities and duties. In the light of the proverbs outlined, I ask the following questions: by looking at needs in Igbo thought as articulated through the proverbs on lack, care and duty, what notion of right and duty is implied? What type of society would be desired by the idea of needs in Igbo thought, and what type of political organisation will be desired? In a socio-political arrangement that would defend the Igbo idea of needs, it is fair to suggest right would be held to be that which is collapsed by the ethics of duty for which right would be reciprocal and is responsibility driven. Right(s) would then be located as that which positions the individual within the group and that which is aimed at positioning the beneficiary to contribute to the group. Duties would then be defined as obligations and responsibilities that primarily direct social interactions. Consequently, one is only allowed to

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demand for one’s right to the extent that one has fulfilled his duty or has applied the right enjoyed to the benefit of the society. Thus, we would have what can be called a regenerative notion of right, one that is latent on duty. There would be a strict balance of duties and rights given that one is only qualified to anticipate his right to the extent that he has performed his/her duty. Sanctions and punishments for failure to carry out one’s duties and obligations would then amount to a denial of rights and privileges. Indeed, in Igbo society, it is common to read of sanctions imposed on persons who fail at their social obligation by denying them certain rights. In several towns, those who fail to attend communal work or fail to contribute towards a common community project are sanctioned through denial of the right of collective empathy when they lose their relatives. In a particular village known to this author, those who fail in their duty are also denied collective empathy at the loss of their relative such that they would hire gravediggers to execute this need, a form of empathy that would usually come from members of an Igbo community at death. Such sanction can also be imposed at such positive events as marriage, where the community would bar anyone from going to felicitate and identify with such a person. A socio-political reading of the proverbs would therefore suggest that Igbo social and political ethics support what Sudarkasa has called the underlying principles of rights and duties in Africa. According to Sudarkasa, the principles that underlie rights and duties in Africa are ‘respect, restraint, responsibility and reciprocity’ (Cobbah 1987: 321). The import of this ethical demand, as I see it, is that one’s exercise of his or her rights falls within the rights of the community—that is, what the community claims must be done to enhance her corporate image and identity. While respect guarantees that rights are graded and are afforded as one grows according to seniority, restraint ‘enforced a balance between individual rights and the requirement of a group’ (Cobbah 1987). Similarly, responsibility imposes a social burden on members of the society, and reciprocity ensures that there is always a pay-back to each member of the society, which can lead to or account for an aspect of rights. These principles underpin the idea of rights in Africa, and it is for these reasons that rights do not necessarily serve to severe an individual from the social group or one social group from another but serve to strengthen group belonging or social relations between one person and another. This ethics of rights are amply illustrated in the Igbo group and manifest remarkably in the Igbo sense of equality,

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republicanism and egalitarianism, which are remarkable principles in Igbo thought (Nwoga 1984; Opata 1998). It can therefore be suggested, reading from the import of Igbo proverbs on needs, that a strongly desired feature of the Igbo social and political community would be a community of interests shaped by a balance of rights and duties, one in which rights are grounded on duty.

Conclusion This work has tried to discuss the concept of needs in Igbo thought by looking at how this can be read through Igbo proverbs. The work has attempted to go into the Igbo intellectual archive to locate how proverb, which is a highly valued pattern of speech, is applied to capture needs. To do this, it applied the three concepts of lack, care and duty to capture the hidden dimensions of needs upon which it mapped out a number of Igbo proverbs that reflect these items. The work draws attention to the need to take proverbs seriously in Igbo thought and, by extension, the larger African life. The work claims a form of originality in the sense that the question of needs has not received significant attention in African philosophical enquiry drawn from Igbo thought before now. Needs are often captured through the principle of akara aka—or destiny—as though needs are and must be uniquely individual. But needs have a strong social aspect and have a strong communal nature and demand. This is often seen in emergencies and is illustrated in the Igbo ethics of response to emergencies. The work has also gone ahead to reflect on needs from its significance in the broader Igbo worldview as well as its socio-political significance. It is hoped that this effort can lead to further research on the nature of needs in Igbo thought and that abstractions made therein can shape the understanding of needs in African thought. For instance, researchers can still address the nature of needs from the point of view of the sexes and age-grades, by looking at the kind of needs that can be associated with the youth, the elderly and women. Such a study can look at how or whether the Igbo society had the kind of political equilibrium that could be said to have addressed these needs justly and equitably. Such response can then inform further search on how to strengthen the modern African society by looking at the strengths and weaknesses of Igbo society, and how or whether Igbo thought can provide answers to the search for a more just order in Africa.

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References Achebe, Chinua. 1994. Things fall apart. USA: Anchor Books. Bujo, B. 1998. The ethical dimension of community: The African model and the dialogue between north and south. Trans. C.N.  Nganda. Nairobi: Paulines Publications. Cobbah, J.A.M. 1987. African values and the human rights debate: An African perspective. Human Rights Quarterly 9: 309–331. Coetzee, P.H., and A.P.J. Roux, eds. 2004. Philosophy from Africa. 2nd ed. Cape Town: Oxford University Press of Southern Africa. Gyekye, Kwame. 1987. An essay on African philosophical thought: The Akan conceptual scheme. New York: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1996. African cultural values: An introduction. Ghana: Sankofa Publishing Company. ———. 2001. African cultural value: An introduction. Ghana: Sankofa Publishing. Igono, J., and U. Ogudu. 2018. Translation of selected Igbo proverbs and idiomatic expressions: Implications for curbing economic recession. International Journal of Applied Linguistics and Translation 4: 1–8. Ikuenobe, Polycarp. 2006. Philosophical perspectives on communalism and morality in African traditions. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Kanu, I.A. 2014. Igbo proverbs as embodiment of Igbo-African philosophy. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 4. Larson M. 1984. Meaning-Based Translation: A Guide to Cross-Language Equivalence. London: University Press of America. Matolino, B. 2014. Personhood in African philosophy. South Africa: Cluster Publications. Menkiti, Ifeanyi. 1979. Person and community in African traditional thought. In African philosophy: An introduction, ed. Richard Wright. New York: University Press of America. Metz, Thaddeus. 2007. Towards an African theory. Journal of Political Philosophy 15: 321–341. Momoh, C.S. 1989. Philosophy in African proverbs. In The substance of African philosophy. Auchi: African Philosophy Project. Nicolson, Ronald. 2008. Persons in community: African ethics in a global culture. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Nwala, T.U. 2010. Igbo philosophy. New  York: Triatlantic Books Ltd and Niger Books and Publishing Company. Nwoga, D.U. 1984. NkanaNzere: The focus on Igbo worldview. 1984 Ahiajoku Lecture. www.IgboNet. Accessed May 20, 2019. Nze, C.B. 1989. Aspects of African communalism. Onitsha: Veritas Publishers. Oguejiofor, J.O. 1996. The influence of African traditional religion on the socio-­ political character of the Igbo. Nsukka: Fulladu.

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Okafor, F.U. 1992. Igbo Philosophy of Law. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers. Okolo, B.C. 1985. An analysis of Igbo proverbs and idioms. Kansas: Kansas University Press. Onwubiko, O. 1991. African thought, religion and culture. Enugu: Self Published. Opata, D.U. 1998. Essays in Igbo worldview. Nsukka: A.P. Publishers. Peters, H. 1971. “Reflections on the Preservation of Igbo folk Literature”, Conch 3 (2): 97–103. Ramose, M.B. 1999. African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. Stutte, A. 2001. Ubuntu: An ethic for the new South Africa. Cape Town: Cluster Publications.

CHAPTER 8

Prioritization of Clashing Needs in African Politics Bernard Matolino

Introduction I divide needs between basic and non-basic (see Schuppert 2013). Basic needs are those that are absolutely fundamental to people’s physical survival or existence. These needs include basics such as shelter, food, healthcare, clean environment (including air and water), and maybe physical security. Non-basic needs, in contrast, are considered very important for other purposes of human existence which are not so crucial to our physical survival. Non-basic needs, normally, refer to issues such as individual rights as broadly defined. This would include rights to self-determination, rights to freedoms of expression and association, and freedoms from harassment and protection from state persecution. In very obvious ways the extent to which non-basic needs can be realized depends on political systems, while basic needs do not appear to have such a direct dependence. If we were to follow this distinction, thinking about needs would be easily divided

B. Matolino (*) Department of Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Molefe, C. Allsobrook (eds.), Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3_8

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between political needs and basic human needs. In Africa, I will argue, such a distinction does not work. The primacy of the political system in determining how needs are fulfilled has complicated how we should theorize about them. What I seek to do in this chapter, while maintaining the distinction between basic and non-basic needs, is to outline how the pervasiveness of the failure of African politics has blurred this distinction so much that the violation of non-basic needs shows itself in the abrogation of basic needs. Or more poignantly, the realization of basic needs has become impossible alongside the realization of non-basic needs. This creates a problem not only of understanding the peculiarity of the relationship between these needs but also of how needs are to be characterized, conceptually, as distinct categories of analysis that can make sense on their own without undue influence from neighbouring needs. This has led to the practical problem of thinking about the best way to secure basic needs while minimalizing political influence. In order to paint a full picture of the problem, I divide the chapter into three sections. The first section will outline close links between basic and non-basic needs which lead to a political problem of understanding needs. The second section will outline the conceptual complexity as a result of the inter-relation between these needs. And the third will attempt a defence of the importance of non-basic needs in the face of the prioritization of basic needs at the expense of securing the former.

Relationship Between Basic and Non-basic Needs “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be added unto you” (Pierre 2013: 37) are words pronounced by Kwame Nkrumah in an attempt to emphasize the importance of political freedom in determining progress, even beyond the political spectrum. This addresses the primacy of political freedom in determining the course of life for citizens of a given political territory. If political freedom is absent, on Nkrumah’s thinking, it also follows that freedoms to meaningfully pursue other aspects of life will not be possible. But once political freedom, which is called a kingdom, is attained, all other things will fall in place. This thinking has been quite common with African leaders, particularly the first generation of leaders of independent Africa. As their struggle was for the political freedom of their people, they believed that with the arrival of the political kingdom, everything would be taken care of. This strategy presumed a close link between politics and economics. Inevitably, it led either

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to centralized economic models or to heavy state regulation of the economy (Wunsch 2019). All this was carried under the spirit of collectivism that was believed to be capable of prospering everyone. Since the first wave of leaders were committed to African socialism, they also committed their economic practices to basic tenets of social and economic praxis of socialism. As they traced the origins of socialism in traditional societies, they sought to model all social activity on principles that would promote the good of the community. Implicit in this thinking was the belief that whatever needs a single individual has, they would be satisfied in the shared good of the community (Kanoute 1964). This thinking, and by deliberate insistence, is different from that of Karl Marx, who holds that the basic structure of all experience resides in the economic organization of society. Marx believes that the other structures of society such as politics are only a reflection of the forces guiding and influencing the economy. If, for example, one sees discrimination in the political sphere, it is a result of the discrimination that is fundamental to the operations of the economic sphere. Even though there are differences in views of what principally shapes society, there is a huge similarity between these two approaches. They both can be described as determinist. They both are committed to the view that all social structures of human behaviour are determined by necessary occurrences at some primary level. These primary occurrences, in turn, direct how different but equally important facets of life unfold in response to the direction of the deterministic forces at the primary level. Nkrumah (1964) is quite forceful in his support for this view when, in his Consciencism, he argues that philosophy is essentially always in service of ideology. Ideology, in turn, is responsible for the ordering of society so that it can run efficiently. What this thinking supports is a commandeering approach to life, a form of engineering of all facets of social life that is based on the principles of politics. As a result, the economic order is not allowed the freedom it needs to proceed according to its forces. Rather, whatever forces are responsible for shaping economic activity must either proceed from the political or must be adjusted to fit the political programme. What this creates is a deterministic link between two types of needs that may actually be independent of each other. Since the political sets the agenda for the economic, whatever activities take place at the economic level are essentially of a political sort.

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This close association of these needs does not mean that they are incapable of divergent classification. What it simply means is that such divergence has been whittled to insignificance by virtue of creating dependence of basic needs on non-basic needs, dependence of non-political needs on political needs (Gasper 2005). This type of dependence in Africa has created significant problems. The political sphere as a site for the struggle of independence and freedoms of African people has never been quite a site of success politically and in other respects. While freedom has been gained from former colonizers, there are questions of what this freedom really is with some believing that it is only nominal (Eze 1997). Yet for others, the struggle for freedom has not been complete, as there are lingering issues of neo-colonialism and continued servitude of African countries to former colonial masters. Yet for others, the project of freeing Africa is incomplete because it has been hijacked by Africa’s very own ruling elite who have turned themselves into a predatory class that preys on the people (Ayittey 1992; Kenyon 2018). In the latter camp, the accusations have been that African leaders have contributed to the impoverishment of Africans through pursuing policies that neither make sense nor are capable of empowering Africans. In fact, some serious accusations of grand acts of theft exist against many post-colonial African leaders. However, the greatest problem with the political sphere in Africa is that in many cases it has turned out to be dictatorial and has ended up serving the narrow interests of the leader and his clique. Instead of creating a robust political system that is tolerant of dissent and innovative ideas, what has been promoted is sycophancy with all levers of political power hijacked to serve the interests of those at the top. Ayittey (2006) is uncompromising in his argument that African political elites have hijacked traditional systems of governance for their own purposes. Since the political was supposed to regulate all other needs to success, once it is corrupted it follows that all structures that have been made dependent on it will also be corrupted. How does this happen? An explanation will illustrate this. But first I reiterate that my distinction between basic and non-basic needs sees both needs as important but belonging to two different spheres. This does not mean that these spheres are not related or that they should not work together (see Hamilton 2013). Rather, my view is that where they work together, they should only do so with minimal regulation of one over the other. Coming back to our illustration, any economy is ordered around basic principles of demand and supply. In the course of people pursuing their lives, they will seek out

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those things that sustain their lives. Whoever is up to meeting those demands then supplies requisite products and services, with the expectation of making good returns, of course. This is how an open market-based economy works, and needless to say, this system has its own formidable enemies. The African socialist political view, at least, was opposed to the open market economy. It preferred an economic system that would respond to political direction and it accordingly sought to order the economic sphere in accord with the direction it preferred. Since its politics failed, the economic system also failed. This was followed by attempts at reform that sought to delink the economy from political control. These attempts also appear to have failed, as both the economic and political spheres have not made much progress in most cases while staying stagnant or deteriorating in other cases. The African case has been one where a change in attitude or proclamation does not necessarily equate to change in behaviour. Political systems that have been afflicted with corruption for decades of independence continue to bear negatively on the economic sphere. And the result is that what can be correctly characterized as a political failure has now become a social and economic failure that restricts people in all aspects. A country that is politically corrupt, and that can never meet its citizens’ demand for decent political subjectivity will also be a danger to its citizens’ other (basic) needs. But what could be the reasons for that failure? While we can think of a variety of reasons for that failure, I will outline what I think could be key reasons for it. The first could be the way in which African politics was geared to satisfy various interpretations of traditional communitarian descriptions of social, political, and economic arrangements of traditional society. These descriptions were also taken to be responsible for composing philosophies of individual identity and other important considerations of a social nature. Because of the need to satisfy these definitional demands, there may have developed a theory and practice that could only satisfy such communitarian views. This of course may have stifled both thought and practice by limiting it from growing as it could. This would have happened by excluding other possible interpretations of both traditional society and demands for the present. The insistence on living up to a communitarian ethos, as a primary determinant of thought, limited understanding of life and interpretation of needs, including the task of defining what the relationship between needs is and what the primary determinant of those relationships could be. The second reason could be that there was

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too much expectation of what the political aspect was capable of achieving when made to play the primary role of determining the direction of all of society. It could have been the case that politicians and theorists who placed such primacy on the political had too much hope in its ability to bring about change in aspects of life it was not competent to direct. The result was that the expectation did not meet the actual delivery. The third reason could be historical. Africa’s independence occurred at the height of the cold war. It could be that the cold war adversely affected Africa thereby confining it into a dysfunctional status. The fourth reason could be that the political instability characterized by civil wars, coups, brutal and inept dictators, one party and tribal politics, weak institutions, and a lack of continental integration led to the collapse of all things African. Under these circumstances, the security of non-basic political needs was the first to go since the structure that was meant to meet them was completely dysfunctional. This, then, compromised or completely decimated the fulfilment of basic rights as political tools of securing the dignity of individuals. Stripped of their access to dignity, African citizens no longer had a claim to decent existence envisaged under what it could possibly mean to be a human with secure entitlements. The precariousness of life at the political level left citizens bereft of any protection from state intrusion as it left them unable to pursue what they considered to be their life plans and choices. The kingdom that Nkrumah had thought of as primary and necessary for everything else was starting to prove elusive. As long as that kingdom was elusive, so was everything else that was supposed to be added to it. How then are we to make sense of political rights? I suggest that as a non-basic and non-material need, it may appear not so fundamental. However, on close examination, we shall find that this need is actually responsible for the way in which material needs are pursued and realized. As an organizing principle of distribution of chances and expectations in society, it determines each individual’s chances of successfully pursuing basic and material needs. If an individual is completely denied the freedom and ability to be self-determining, by a sullied political environment, then her chances of ever satisfying her basic needs are either non-existent or significantly diminished. To state the matter plainly, economic activities have suffered in Africa from subordination to political objectives, which undermine their efficient development. A fair challenge that can be raised against my manner of proceeding at this stage would be to state that what I seem to be pursuing is a liberal

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agenda or liberal kind of politics. It could be said that I am making a case for a free political order where individuals and businesses are allowed as much scope as possible to determine and pursue whatever goals they please. My response to this objection is to point out that freedom is an inevitable part of any human’s experience as a self. The real debate may be to what degree we allow that freedom. In the traditional African context, the freedom of the individual is never denied. It is only required that the individual exercise their freedom in ways that contribute to the well-being of the entire community. While that may demand certain sacrifices on the individual, that individual’s talents and dispositions are never completely ignored (Gyekye 1997). It was actually a perversion of this understanding by some one-party state socialist regimes that led to freedom being viewed as an enemy of party systems. What can be said then is that emphasis on the political has had a great impact on the organization of other needs in the other spheres of life. There is a way in which politics, under ordinary circumstances, is supposed to take a lead in determining how the entirety of social structure will look like. However, there are limits that must be placed on what the political can be expected to do and what it can’t do. In the African situation, the beginning of political freedom was characterized by the push for politics to be an all-determining and overarching regulatory institution. This proceeded from the belief that, since it was geared to satisfy some fundamental needs relating to identity and dignity, it would direct how all other needs are adequately met. However, what happened is that the political collapsed for its own reasons, and this had a negative effect on the needs that were subordinated and dependent on the political. Effectively, needs as a possible theoretical project or as a hierarchical and ordered experience of life gave way to thinking about what disaster Africa was becoming and how its chaotic structures were fundamentally in betrayal of the meeting of basic needs.

An Analysis of the Complexity of the Relationship Between the Two Types of Needs In this section, I wish to pursue some thoughts on how needs, as basic and non-basic, relate in ways that make their analysis complex in the African context. The complexity I have in mind refers to how needs are made to intertwine leading to a conceptual impasse of how they can be separated

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into distinctly analysable units that can have their languages of justification and fulfilment. What I think is a dominant theoretical approach, or even methodological assumption in African philosophy, is the primacy of the community (Menkiti 1984). Having appeared in different shades, its ultimate goal is to analyse life experiences and as a concept in a holistic manner. This does not mean that concepts cannot be divided into distinct units of analysis, but those units of analysis must be able to make sense within the larger setting of communitarian goals. This approach can pose a problem of understanding and justifying issues in their distinct form. Let us, for example, take the idea of how we understand what a human person is or how we identify a human person. There surely are various ways of approaching this issue. We could divide the different forms of analyses into compartments of what they seek to achieve with the analysis itself. For example, we could divide the subject matter into a metaphysical approach and a communitarian approach. However, what turns up as the final determinant of what a person really is is the communitarian aspect. What this illustrates is how the fundamental category of thought can lead up to a holistic view that downplays any form of thinking that is not consistent with communitarian goals. The distinctive feature of African thought is communitarian, so the story normally goes (see Molefe 2017). However, when it comes to how we think of needs as legitimate categories of reflection, how does communitarian thinking aid in distinguishing needs, as they are specific to entities and situations? I think there is a way of thinking about human persons that is non-­ communitarian, but legitimate still. Here I am not referring to whether other forms of approach to what a person is are justifiable when compared to the communitarian view. I refer to how we could see a person as an entity that is to some serious degree capable of demarcating between what it considers to be its own individuated experience and its community experience. As an entity that is instantiated by whatever process, a person is, to some degree, entitled and responsible for the fate that she becomes. She is also entitled, within her own capabilities, to pursue whatever she is capable of. It is in that pursuit that a frame of needs develops. Whether those needs are shared or not shared with everyone else, they still belong to the individual. What then, we may ask, is the best methodological tool of understanding this demarcation? As an analytical tool, what does communitarianism do to advance understanding needs as belonging to different categories, even different political categories? Categories such as the politics of

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method and definition and categories of community and individualism must have an equal bearing on how philosophy as a reflective tool approaches what thinking on needs is. I think what has been too readily assumed in the communitarian camp is that an individual is justifiable only in relation to his surrounding reality. If the individual has to be complete, she must link herself successfully to that reality. This position, already, has determined what the rules of reflection are and what the outcome is supposed to be. But this is just one aspect of understanding how an individual is to be approached as an entity that is communally oriented. Not only is it possible for the individual to turn against the community and make demands that the community must recognize her for her individuality, it is actually desirable that the individual be conceived in such terms. Such a conception shows us what the individual is as a constituted entity. It is in that constitutive make-up that her own story develops in ways that may eventually fit with the community. The ways in which we think about entities have a serious bearing on how those entities are allowed entitlements. Could it be the case that the political failure we see on the continent is owed to how mistaken our thinking has been on basic entities? I do not have a ready answer to this question, but what I am willing to state is that our thinking has tended to prioritize certain entities as having needs that are superior to similarly rated entities. This mode of thinking has complicated how matters of freedom for individuals have been ultimately treated. The political situation in Africa gives ample testimony to how the individual has been, ultimately, relegated to a category that does not have any worth. What is worthwhile, instead, is the defence of some category of the viability of shared community interests which represent good for all. However, that category has remained elusive, as it has been destroyed by forces that were supposed to support it. If we were to distance the individual from the connections of the community, what would that do to our understanding of needs? Particularly at the political level, what would be the result of such analysis? I think there will at least be an understanding of how non-basic needs are different from basic needs and how we should think of the possible influence they could have on each other. Such a difference will point to the fact that non-basic needs are important for political purposes. Those purposes are important in determining and constructing social and economic infrastructure that enables people to operate the way they do. Some infrastructure allows people to operate as optimally as possible, while other types of

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infrastructure only serve to hinder or frustrate people’s pursuit of their chosen goals. Since the role of structures that are meant to satisfy the realization of non-basic needs is political, a choice must be made about what sort of politics enables people to realize their best and what sort of politics hinders people from the same realization. Certain political institutions and practices have a tendency to stifle people, while different institutions and practices will have the opposite outcome. It follows then that the political process and institutions that are chosen to govern people must be of a sort that shows this awareness. But implied in this awareness is a further understanding of what people at an ordinary level need and expect from their political institutions. If people are going to subject themselves to the authority of political institutions as legitimate determinants of what they can expect as well as what they are not justified to expect, will those institutions be truly capable of reflecting the interests of the people? Put in a different way, when institutions are in charge of people, can they claim to have a thoroughgoing knowledge of what those people expect and what their reasons are for those expectations? Further, will the institutions be able to judge whether the reasons the people have for their expectations are justified as well as offer justification for their findings? If political institutions are able to do this, then there will be an agreement between what the justifications of individual needs are at both the private and public levels. What may also be achieved is a clear outline of how far the political is allowed to intrude into other spheres that are determinants of individual pursuits. If there are specific needs that individuals seek to fulfil, what are their political corollaries? If such corollaries exist, by what virtue are they allowed to extend themselves into the private domain without abdicating their public responsibility? Let us think of a very private thing such as sexual orientation. I am sure that what cannot be disputed is that individuals do make conscious decisions about their sexual orientation or identities. However, no sooner has that conscious decision been made than there is chaos and argument about whether it is a decision that an individual is entitled to or not. Since the disputation around the decision comes from public institutions and considerations, is it not fair to seek to inquire about both the competence and entitlement that public judgements can claim to have on such issues? If indeed sexual identity shows itself as a need that individuals have for their own sense of self and proper functioning, how do we go about balancing individual aspirations with public pronouncements on the same issues? In this particular instance, I

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would like to propose, it is not enough that public institutions rely on the idea of the common good to justify their intrusions on the individual. It is not even sufficient for public institutions to invoke some idea of what it means or what it is to be African to find fault with such individual commitments. The only way that public dictates can be justified to outweigh individual orientations is by unduly prioritizing their own importance. But such prioritization betrays a fundamental misunderstanding about how distinct needs are when thought of as weighing on either the individual or the community side. A political determinant of private issues must have a strong justification for doing so. Such justification must be more than mere collectivism. I do concede that the argument I am making can only work when there is explicit acceptance of the distinction between the individual and the community. This means that the view of community that must be held and defended, on my account, is one that sees the community as a loose association of individuals who have volunteered to be constitutive of that community. I can imagine some friends of extreme versions of community rejecting both my proposal of the constitution of the community and the subsequent distinction between basic and non-basic needs. My take on this is that this is a political question that needs to be addressed or answered. Whether African thinkers will ever agree on what version of community is plausible or not, whatever version they choose, they must accept its political consequences and how they bear on individual entitlements.

The Importance of Non-basic Needs I hope I have succeeded in making clear the connection between basic and non-basic needs. If we were to look at the relationship between these two, we see how they have influenced each other to a point where they are almost indistinguishable by virtue of their failure. But their close connection also brings with it an obstinate problem. Which of these needs is prior, and why is it so? The majority of Africans who live in poverty or live very close to poverty would want to see their fortunes change. They might not even care how those fortunes will change, but they still would want to see them change anyway. It could be in the pursuit of that desire that things begin to go wrong in how these needs are thought of and prioritized.

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Let us imagine an African country that has not seen peace since independence. There have been different armed groups fighting to capture the capital. The country has witnessed senseless brutal killings along ethnic lines. There is no economy to talk of, and all normal civic and state structures have completely collapsed. However, in time, a very powerful warlord emerges, and he succeeds in assembling a powerful rag-tag army. Through his alliances with some powerful tribal warlords, he eventually manages to capture the capital and surrounding areas. He gets the necessary support of regional and international bodies to be recognized as an interim leader. He eventually leads his country through a sham of an election, and he wins most of the votes. He quickly transforms himself from a warlord into a nationalist and adopts a business-like approach in running his country. Citizens begin to notice a positive change in their material standing, the country is prospering, and things are beginning to function again. After a couple of years, the country moves to a mid-income bracket. However, there are rumours of the disappearance of political opponents, critical journalists, and independent-minded professors. The judiciary is filled with incompetent judges, and prosecution is controlled by politicians. The state broadcaster becomes a propaganda mouthpiece, there are spies everywhere, the government line is taught in schools, and at every opportunity, the leader reminds his citizens of their violent past and how he led them out of it. He points to the successes he has brought them and he promises them more success, and he delivers on his promise. Over time, individual freedoms begin to disappear in direct proportion to the development the country is registering on the economic front. This imaginary scenario presents the stark choices that Africans may be faced with in attempting to work out how needs can be placed into some kind of order that can be satisfied without some dilemma. In response to my imaginary scenario, most Africans who know that their lives are vulnerable to material want will most likely not mind having such a leader. They could actually endorse such a leader and political system as long as they believe that they will be assured of having decent lifestyles. But what does that choice show, if at all it is a choice? What it shows is, probably, how precarious the relationship is between basic and non-basic needs. It also shows that the most basic of needs are still far from being met without regard to the political cost attached to them. It also shows that needs themselves, particularly of the sort I have in mind, can be shaped in direct and indirect ways by other categories of needs.

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While these relations are common everywhere and may form discussions in other places and traditions, in Africa they have tended to cause a polarity between them and how they are eventually satisfied. The polarity is a trade-off based on some underlying commitment to the justification for restrictions on private non-basic needs, which in order to bring about material development, there must be a point at which all action is coordinated by a well-meaning and all-knowing entity. This was so in the days of socialism, and there is a ring of it in the appeal to the politics of big men. I think the only way that we can begin to develop an account that will be able to settle this polarity is by making clear what an acceptable commitment is in this tense relationship. Africa’s recent history, starting with the slave trade going all the way down to colonialism, has been a history of violation of African people’s freedoms. Immediately after the attainment of independence, that violation was to be continued by home-grown dictators who perpetuated serious human rights violations. This has continued up to the present day with an unpleasant addition: widespread poverty and underdevelopment. For a place with such a history of twin tragedies, thinking about what to prioritize when tackling the problems they present is an unpleasant choice. However, in this instance, I think that it is appropriate to insist on political freedom for a variety of reasons. The first reason is historical. The recent history of African people has been one for the fight for their freedom. This fight has taken different forms, depending on who the perpetrator of oppression is. We could then think of the issue of freedom as a historical problem. It could be characterized as a struggle that has had different phases that have required different responses depending on the nature of oppression. Indeed each phase has produced different heroes who serve as an inspiration to African people. The second reason is that freedom is a valuable and cherished goal in itself. A free people are better off in every sense than an oppressed people. It matters that people are able to determine their own course of life and that the choices they make are out of their own volitions. People who lead such lives are better off compared to those who lead constricted lives. It does not matter what the qualitative experience of material well-being is, if a life is limited in the sort of political ways that our progressive dictator in the example above limits his citizens’ life, such a life is impoverished. Any life that is not permitted to be politically free will almost not be free in other respects. Even if such a life was to be adorned with material privilege, that material well-being will not make up for the absence of political freedom. The third reason is that political freedom is a necessary freedom. It is what

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some people refer to as inalienable. Political freedom, including the right to freely associate, criticize, and question one’s rulers without endangering one’s own existence is so fundamental to the political organization of any society and the political identities of individual members of those societies. The fourth reason is that freedom is the biggest enabler of social progress. If a society allows its members to be whatever they choose to be, to think and speak freely, such a society is likely to grow from a free exchange of ideas that follows there on. A society that does not allow these freedoms or one that actively stifles these freedoms will give rise to fear of authority and deference to established habits. Innovation is never from fear and deference but from free exercise of each individual’s capacities in response to what they encounter from fellow human beings. The fifth and final reason is that traditional African politics was more tolerant of dissent than our latter-day dictators have pretended. While traditional African politics was based on the idea of community societies, this does not mean that these were totalitarian arrangements. Members of society had full political membership and responsibility for all political processes. If there is an argument to be made about the recovery of traditional African societies as an inspiration for our current and future progress, then there must be an appreciation of how free individuals in traditional societies were. Or at least there must be an appreciation of the variety of anarchist traditional societies and how they truly functioned. In fact, freedom was such an important aspect of any political system that it was not unusual for any thoroughly disaffected people to remove themselves from the physical space of oppressive political authority. This was done as a protest against what would be perceived as an intrusion by that authority into the people’s freedoms. The way in which Africans have been impoverished is a denial of their freedom. It is a denial of their freedom to choose, their freedom to be truly self-determining. That denial itself is rooted in the long history of denying African people their dues. Through slavery and colonialism, we see an extreme denial of the rights to be self-determining. It is as if Africans are held in a perpetual state of childhood where someone has to make decisions for them. But this denial of freedom also has serious implications for how Africans can be able to determine their material well-being. Since they are held in perpetual dependence, they cannot take full responsibility for improving their lives. It could be the case that modern African rulers are just participants of denying African people their freedoms as well as their potential. In the example of the dictator who brings peace and

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prosperity to his country, while on the face of it he may appear to have actually brought peace and progress, he has not. What he has succeeded in doing is imposing his version of material progress which has worked up to that point. But that material progress could be much better if other people were to be allowed to contribute freely to the project that the dictator has in mind. Even those who do not agree with the dictator’s proposal might benefit his project with their sharp criticism. Needs, on the account I have attempted here, are still tied to political reality in fundamental ways. The way needs are tied to this political reality requires that either we should think very carefully about how that political reality may be made an enabler of how people lead decent lives or needs of a political nature have to be attended to as primary and foremost to any other consideration. In attending to political needs as foremost, what might be hoped for is the transformation of the political plane that it begins to take people’s freedoms seriously. In taking people’s freedoms seriously, it is also hoped that Africans can eventually become empowered to take charge of the direction of their progress. For that goal to be realized, I would argue that choices have to be made between a minimalist government and a centralized and controlling government. Such a choice will be informed by two important considerations. The first would have to do with what we think the role of government is in ordering people’s lives. This consideration will have to ask questions about the direction that we think Africa should take in a global world and how best to find a path pointing to that direction. The second consideration will have to deal with how we think of African citizens as agents that have capacity for self-determination. In particular, how do we think of Africans as political citizens who have a legitimate stake in determining how politics is shaped? This consideration may lead to views that may cause us to rethink the relationship between citizens and their government and how far we think governments can be allowed to intrude into people’s lives. The curious fact about the majority of African states is that although they are withered and broken, they have shown an ability to intrude into citizens’ lives in ways that create definite threats to individuals’ political freedoms. While one could expect such broken states to lack capacity to threaten individual entitlements, these states’ totalitarian outlook has ensured that all its citizens are within reach of their totalitarian and securitized apparatus. It is this apparatus, which probably is the only well-­ functioning state entity, that is relied on to interfere with individuals’ political freedoms. Hence, the need for a minimalist state remains necessary.

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Conclusion What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to introduce a distinction between what I have characterized as basic and non-basic needs. Basic needs are those that are about our survival, while non-basic needs are meaningful to us as humans and are normally expressed in the political realm as demands for freedom and rights. I have attempted to show that the connection between these two forms of needs, in Africa, is so fundamental that they cause a conceptual difficulty. However, in order for basic needs to be fully realized, they need to be disentangled from the failures of the political realm as the author of non-basic needs. This leads to questions of which of these two types of needs is fundamental, and what role governments should play in allowing the separation of these needs and how they are eventually fulfilled. This, I argue, will have to involve how we think of governments’ roles in general, how individuals are conceived as citizens who have agency, and how the relationship between government and citizens is conceived. These issues have received scant attention in political philosophy on the continent, as they have been assumed to be sufficiently provided for in collectivist theories and practices. While debates have been on the viability of communitarian theories, the issues raised by theorization on needs point to another direction, a direction where we have to rethink the relationship of the state as governing authority and the citizens as entities entitled to evaluate what that relationship should be.

References Ayittey, G.B.N. 1992. Africa betrayed. New York: St Martin’s Press. ———. 2006. Indigenous African institutions. New York: Transnational Publishers. Eze, E.C. 1997. Toward a critical theory of postcolonial African identities. In Postcolonial African philosophy: A critical reader, ed. E.C.  Eze. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Gasper, D. 2005. Needs and human rights. In The essentials of human rights, ed. C. van den Anker and R. Smith. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Gyekye, Kwame. 1997. Tradition and modernity: Philosophical reflections on the African experience. New York: Oxford University Press. Hamilton, L. 2013. Power, domination and human needs. Thesis Eleven 119: 47–62. https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513613511308. Kanoute, P. 1964. African socialism. Transition 13: 49–51. https://doi. org/10.2307/2934431. Kenyon, P. 2018. Dictatorland: The men who stole Africa. London: Head of Zeus.

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Menkiti, Ifeanyi. 1984. Person and community in African traditional thought. In African philosophy: An introduction, ed. R.A. Wright. Lanham: University Press of America. Molefe, M. 2017. Individualism in African moral cultures. Cultura: International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 14: 49–68. Nkrumah, Kwame. 1964. Consciencism: Philosophy and ideology for de-colonization and development with particular reference to the African revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press. Pierre, J. 2013. The predicament of blackness: Postcolonial Ghana and the politics of race. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Schuppert, F. 2013. Distinguishing basic needs and fundamental interests. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16: 24–44. https://doi. org/10.1080/13698230.2011.583532. Wunsch, J.S. 2019. Centralization and development in post-independence Africa. In The failure of the centralized state: Institutions and self-governance in Africa, ed. J.S. Wunsch and D. Olowu. New York: Routledge.

CHAPTER 9

Needs, Representation and Institutional Change in Africa Lawrence Hamilton

Introduction Africa is not one country. Its peoples, conditions, concerns, needs and interests are manifold. Yet, many have assumed a commonality of purpose or good across its diverse histories, geographies and forms of decolonizing struggle. This common good in (or for) Africans is normally based on principles of communal coordination that assume a set of ‘basic needs’ shared by all Africans. This is as clear in, for example, Kwame Gyekye’s defence of communalism as it is in Kwasi Wiredu’s defence of consensual democracy.1 Wiredu expresses it most clearly when he says ‘the principle of  There is now a relatively large literature that has developed out of or diverged from Gyekye and Wiredu, including Masolo (2010), Matolino (2014), Molefe (2019) and Oyowe 1

L. Hamilton (*) Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa Politics and International Studies (POLIS), Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Molefe, C. Allsobrook (eds.), Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3_9

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consensus… was based on the belief that ultimately the interests of all members of society are the same, although their immediate perceptions of those interests may be different’ (Gyekye 1995, Wiredu 1996: 185, Wiredu 1980; cf. Hountondji 2002). In this chapter, I show how this assumption regarding ‘common interests’ and ‘basic needs’ is flawed. I then defend a politics of needs that would start, rather, from the here and now in each context of individuals’ felt needs. The erroneous assumption of a common good of basic needs is commonplace amongst communitarian thinkers across the globe, though my focus here is on African political theory. The assumption is based on two failures of representation. First, political elites—or political representatives—have failed to convince that they properly and effectively represent citizens’ needs and interests in a variety of African contexts. In many cases, this is simply because they do not. They are more interested in their own and their cronies’ needs and interests. This is overt oligarchy and there is enough of it in various states in Africa for me not to have to expound further. Second, the idea that we all have the same needs and interests and consensual democracy amongst elites will bring these to the fore (even if actual citizens misperceive them, at least initially) rests on a misrepresentation of the nature of politics and how human needs are formed and transformed. This failure of representation is an instance of covert oligarchy. To be clear, I am not suggesting that this latter form of misrepresentation generates or causes the former kind, that is, that this form of covert oligarchy is the main causal determinant in the prevalence of overt oligarchy in Africa. Rather, it is an observation regarding the co-existence of the two, and that the latter form of misrepresentation—that intellectual elites can, without much reference to others, set out peoples’ needs in theory— does not help in the urgent need to criticize the former, the fact that the political elites are not held accountable for failing adequately to respond to real needs. Or, in other words, the failure of material and ideological representation is only one amongst many other variables we need to explain the pitfalls of democracy in Africa, but this latter, demanding goal is not my purpose here. My initial purpose is to show that the (2013), amongst others, some of which is discussed in many of this book’s other chapters and is well summarized in the book’s main introduction. For reasons of space and in order not to repeat these eloquent summaries and discussions, in this chapter I stick to Gyekye’s and Wiredu’s own formulations as exemplars of a very influential form of African communalism.

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communalist approach to needs and democracy is a poor conceptual and practical means of enabling African countries to engender meaningful democracy and thus meet needs more efficiently and with greater contextual sensitivity. Yet I do suggest here that at least part of the cause of these failures of representation emanate from a certain way of thinking about and judging in politics that has held sway in the West for at least a couple of centuries, arguably underpinning the liberal capitalist form of democracy that has been exported to Africa via colonialism and neo-colonialism: utilitarianism (subsequently overlaid with rights-based politics, about which here I say no more, but see Hamilton 2003, and Geuss and Hamilton 2013). There is then an array of reactions to this ‘triumph of utilitarianism’ in the West and beyond. These often draw on older, communal traditions: communalism in Africa, Confucianism in China, socialist, communist and cooperative movements in the West and so on. Mainly due to colonialism and its legacies, African polities are not exempt from this history. In fact, communalist ideas emanating from Africa have a great deal of traction in opposition to the brutal reality that, in many cases, African polities were used as laboratories for utilitarian (and associated) experiments by their colonial masters (Bell 2016). In other words, although the legacies of colonial domination are multifarious, this is the most pernicious as it legitimizes a structural disconnect between political, philosophical and religious elites and everyday citizens and residents, despite avowals to the contrary by communalist ‘public philosophers’, to borrow Gyekye’s phrase. Put differently, the uncritical adoption of communalist ideas, often rendered as something essentially African, acts as an unhelpful, if understandable, veil over the real, various and contextually determined everyday needs of Africans all over the continent. This is the result of a misplaced move in theory and practice. It is supposed that the best means of overcoming the utilitarian legacy, particularly its individualism, is to turn to communalist (or communitarian) ethics. This seems like the most effective route out of the Western-imposed utilitarian, capitalist worldview. But this is to misdiagnose the problem: it is not so much utilitarianism’s individualist ethics that undermines effective democracy in Africa but the politics it underpins: a politics of preference aggregation without any requirement or even possibility of evaluating individual preferences. A politics of needs, properly understood, disputes this fundamental tenet of utilitarian politics. But not via a turn to communalism. This is not the answer, I argue here, because—for different reasons—communalism, ironically, ends up

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generating a similar outcome: it too ignores the real, expressed needs of actually existing individuals in different conditions and contexts around Africa for it assumes erroneously that correctly determined common needs or interests can be specified by the right ethical theories. The remedy, I submit, is to discard both utilitarianism and communalism and use the language of needs and interests in a much more nuanced fashion than has hitherto been the norm. This then provides the conceptual means to remove the rose-tinted glasses of communal, consensual democracy and stare clearly into the reality of needs and politics in the various polities that constitute Africa, especially what follows from this in terms of understanding their political economies: a focus on representation and institutional reform aimed at overcoming all forms of domination.

Needs and Real Modern Politics Needs are all about us. Humans, animals, corporations, states, environments; they all have them. Though, this is not mirrored in the work of most political and economic theorists, a few notable exceptions notwithstanding: Smith (1975, 1976), Marx (1992, 1973, 1967–8, 1996), Sen (1985a, 1985b, 1987a, 1987b, 1993) and Wiggins (1998). Why are accounts of needs so scarce and, when they are discussed, reduced to simple accounts of universal basic needs? In part, this is because of the triumph of utilitarianism in the West, and strong reactions in opposition to it across the globe. The latter draw on older traditions: communalism in Africa, Confucianism in China, socialist, communist and cooperative movements in opposition to the rise of capitalism in the West and so on. So, first, as regards the former, the seeming appeal and longevity of utilitarianism are due to the justification it provides for a mechanistic view of the polity and the economy, which ends up in the idea that markets can manage themselves, responding organically to preferences via the price mechanism. This is underpinned by a view that individual political preferences are not only sovereign but can successfully be aggregated to generate coherent decision outcomes. In, other words, with a few caveats thrown in, the legacy of utilitarianism provides justification for purely preference-based economics and politics (Bentham 1970; Marshall 1964; Becker and Stigler 1977; Menger 1981; Arrow 1963; Sen 1970, 1973, 1976–7; Sen and Williams 1982).

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Utilitarianism’s subject-relative approach to morality, which treats pleasure or desire-satisfaction as the sole element in human good, has provided constant support for the reduction of economics and politics to the aggregation of individual preferences (or avowed wants). This involves an understanding of human agency as equivalent to utility maximization. This has had appeal not only due to the supposed objectivity and scientific character it lends to economic analysis but also due to a simplistic view that democracy requires unquestioned acceptance of preferences; anything beyond their mere aggregation is deemed paternalist and dirigiste (and on occasions, it has been, as in the Soviet Union; see Fehér et  al. 1983). The concept of preference has therefore come to be prioritized because of its alleged epistemological importance in calculating individual welfare and the moral imperative to respect the judgement of individuals (as expressed in their preferences). Second, then, across the globe, this impoverished and subject-relative view of politics and economics has also generated a variety of reactions that yearn for a unitary, objective sense of good—above and beyond individual perception and expression of their preferences—and some set of incentives that would drive individuals to seek this good. Hence the flip-­ side of this egoistic philosophy is the communism, communalism and religious communitarian accounts that have re-emerged across the globe, with particular resonance in Africa. A whole array of thinkers in philosophy, politics and development studies have supposed that the best route to this form of objectivity or universality is to posit that human needs are fixed, unchanging requirements tied to a reified view of human nature. The very notion of ‘basic needs’ in development exemplifies this, as does, for example, Gyekye’s defence of communalism, as a uniquely positive African way of navigating between the global extremes of Western liberalism and Marxist-Leninism. He ties this to an Akan conception of humanism that sees humans as naturally sociable and born into an interdependent life based on the natural fact of their vulnerability: given that they are born with individual capacities that ‘are not sufficient to meet basic human requirements… the individual inevitably requires the succour and relationships of others in order to realize or satisfy basic needs’ (Gyekye 1995: 155). As he goes on to say on the same page, ‘[h]uman sociality… [is] the consequence of basic human nature’. This realization of our inherent human sociality makes us see that we are naturally communal, that our ‘personal sense of responsibility is measured in terms of responsiveness and sensitivity to the needs and demands of the group’ and that communal

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benefits equate to individual benefits. This is all because the ‘communal social order is… characterised by such social and ethical values as social well-being, solidarity, interdependence, cooperation, and reciprocal obligation—all of which contribute to an equitable distribution of the resources and benefits of the society… thus… [it is in] the doctrine of communalism that the individual can find the highest good—materially, morally and spiritually (psychologically)—in relationships with others and in working for the common good’ (Gyekye 1995: 156–157). I am not opposed to the consequentialist reasoning and sovereignty of individual judgement epitomized in the utilitarian framework, or—at the other extreme—the emphasis on mutual vulnerability and interdependence. As will become clear, these are both central in a nuanced account of the politics of needs. However, for opposing reasons, both sides of this coin are guilty of a certain kind of theoretical zealousness that leads them to exclude most of the real world they purport to understand. In the case of the utilitarianism this is due to a quest for a universal ‘calculus’. And, in then going on to evoke communality, cooperation, consensus and the common good, thinkers such as Wiredu and Gyekye are guilty of transposing a questionable set of ideals onto modern conditions, which inadvertently enables powerful elites to dictate people’s needs, covertly legitimized via the language of tradition and community. It is then all too easy for these elites to use their power to satisfy their own needs and interests, and those of their associated economic and politics elites, something all too common in Africa. This inadvertent conceptual move is most obvious in Wiredu’s defence of consensual democracy in opposition to majoritarian, party-based democracy. It rests on what first seems like a perfectly innocuous distinction between formal and substantive representation, where the former is the ‘representation of a given constituency in council’ and the latter is ‘the representation of the will of the representative in the making of a given decision’. In contrast to majoritarian views of democracy, on this view, substantive representation is given priority—it is, as Wiredu says, ‘a matter of fundamental human right’ (Wiredu 1996: 186). This is dangerous as substantive representation, in this account, is equivalent to the will of the representative so it unambiguously prioritizes the will of the representative—or the ‘the right to be represented in counsel’—over the will of ordinary citizens and residents or, put differently, the need to have one’s needs and interests represented in council. Consensus is then the principle that drives the elite representatives to avoid the ‘inclemencies of

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adversarial politics’. Moreover, ‘the system was set up for participation in power, not its appropriation, and the underlying philosophy was one of cooperation, not confrontation’ (Wiredu 1996: 186–187). This may be possible if a set of elites have unbridled access to knowledge of a set of unchanging needs and interests. But that is to ask too much of modern politics and society—as I shall show, our needs are manifold, historically determined and often in direct conflict with another. This vision of cooperative, consensual politics at the level of representatives—without much analysis of how they would become representatives or be held accountable as representatives—is only possible if you negate the historical, conflictual character of human needs (or at least the voices that express them). Utilitarianism and communalism, therefore, constitute a form of covert oligarchy: the powerful players in the market in the first case the community leaders in the second. Both approaches, therefore, exclude any systematic understanding of how preferences have, in fact, been formed and any evaluation of how they are and ought to be transformed within, for example, existing state institutions, legal practices, welfare provision, production and consumption practices and so on (Hamilton 2003: 7–8). In the case of utilitarianism this is based on a principled allergy against questioning any choice, thus undermining any possibility for providing a coherent understanding of human agency and political judgement. In the case of communalists, it is based on a view that we all share a set of unchanging common basic needs and interests and they will come to the fore irrespective of reference to actually existing felt needs. In relying on a process outside of everyday reference to expressed needs, both obviate the need for understanding real judgement about central matters such as individual well-being, who to elect and how best to proceed. For, in the market, and elsewhere, while real people are often motivated by utility maximizing self-interest and cooperation and compromise, they are also driven by self-hate, habit, prudence, ethical principles, ethical ideals, altruism, manipulation, coercion and so on. By contrast, properly conceived, a politics of needs, that is, a politics that determines and responds to existing needs rather than a politics based on individual utility alone or a common good of basic needs, constitutes a normatively and historically rich tool for understanding most human goods and motivations for actions as well as a practicable mechanism around which to organize policy and think about representation and its associated institutional forms. One of its advantages is that, in

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understanding and evaluating the institutions and practices that generate needs, it interrogates the sources of demand and avowed wants. Another is that it must also interrogate the institutions and practices through which needs are represented and judged. To see this, it is necessary, first, to grasp the nature of human needs. At a high level of abstraction, it is possible to argue that human needs are the necessary conditions and aspirations of human functioning. They have three forms: (1) vital needs, (2) agency needs and (3) social needs. Vital needs are the necessary conditions for minimal human functioning, for example, the need for water, shelter, adequate nutrition, mobility and social entertainment. They are ‘vital needs’ because their satisfaction is a necessary condition for vita, or life. This is more obvious with needs such as oxygen and water than for, say, adequate shelter. But the lack of satisfaction of any of these needs tends to impair healthy human functioning (Braybrooke 1987; Doyal and Gough 1991; Hamilton 2003). Agency needs are the necessary conditions and aspirations for individual and political agency characteristic of normal human functioning. These include freedom, recognition, power and active and creative expression. They are ‘agency needs’ because they are means and aspirations whose development increases an agent’s causal power to carry out intended actions and to satisfy and evaluate needs (Hamilton 2003; cf. Doyal and Gough 1991). It is very important to note right off, though, that these are not the way needs are normally experienced. Everyday needs are not normally felt as abstract vital and agency needs, but as particular drives or goals, for example, the desire to drink apple juice, the need to work or the need to find meaning in life. These concrete needs are what I call social needs and include a broad spectrum of needs which are either the focus of public policy or seen to be of private concern. They are brought to light by bald need-claims, for example, the need for an efficient train service; by the content of public provision, for example, the need for basic income support; and by patterns of production and consumption, for example, the need for a car, as elaborated below (Hamilton 2003). While it is obviously true that needs are not simply strong wants— needs are objective and normative (Wiggins 1998; Thomson 1987), they directly affect human functioning (Hamilton 2003) and ‘wanting something does not entail needing it, and vice versa’ (Frankfurt 1998: 30)—the associated sharp analytical distinction between needs and wants belies a more complicated causal reality. First, wants over time can become

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interpreted as needs. Think of how easily the desire for refrigerators, televisions and cell phones has become a legitimate need for these commodities. Second, new commodities generate new wants, which affect our ability to satisfy our needs. For example, the car produces both the desire for a car and a need for more motorways. Subsequent economic and political decisions that shift investment from the upkeep of an efficient public transportation system to the construction of more motorways ensure that, for me to be able to satisfy my need for mobility, I need a car. The three forms of needs underscore something else too. While the normativity and objectivity of needs are important, needs are not simply normative and objective. They are also historical, social and political. This is true even of vital needs: depending on the context, the need for nutrition, for example, can be met differently in different contexts—not everyone everywhere needs knives and forks to eat, not to speak of even more complex vital needs such as the need for shelter. The objectivity of needs is not universal: I have an objective need for nutrition even though I may satisfy it by means of chopsticks in one place and knives and forks in another. Needs are affected by wants and institutions, and they change as human nature changes. Thus, the normative force of needs is best captured via an analysis of the history of the institutional environment within which social needs were generated. Needs-based ideas, policies and institutions would be firmly focused on what best enables judgement in context (Hamilton 2009a). Rather than providing universal alternatives to utility or consensual cooperation directed by a supposed common good, the political representation of needs provides a subtle, context-sensitive means of involving citizens and residents more actively in the determination and satisfaction of their needs via forms of democratic representation. This historical, institutional focus must therefore be rooted in an account of power and enabled by policies and institutions designed to avoid domination, for it is existing power relations and degrees of domination that determine citizen power. This is thus a proposal for an inter-subjective and genealogical evaluation of needs and institutions geared towards enhancing representation and overcoming domination. This depends on our power as citizens to identify and overcome what Foucault called ‘states of domination’. Power, here, is the socially determined abilities or capacities of agents in relations of power to identify, confront and overcome domination (Foucault 1991, 2002; Lukes 2005; Hamilton 2014b). This ability depends upon the extent to which citizens can determine and satisfy their vital and agency

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needs. More exactly, this capacity depends upon the prevailing political and economic institutions and the degree to which citizens find themselves in situations of domination. A situation of domination can take various forms. Existing power relations may: (a) mislead me in my attempts to identify my needs, via direct coercion, intentional manipulations or fixed, traditional, non-transformed norms and practices, for example, patriarchy; (b) ensure that I do not have the voice to express my needs, for example, life under a regime that does not grant me the power to do so, such as apartheid South Africa and (c) disable meaningful evaluation of needs, for example, unregulated liberal capitalism, even if the regime in question provides me with the formal means and freedoms (or rights) to make claims (Hamilton 2014b; Lovett 2010). The nub then is realistic citizen power, which is often—if not always—mediated by forms of representation.

Political Representation All across the world, political representatives today administer highly complex economies. Not everyone agrees that this is a good thing—Hayek, Thatcher, Reagan, to name just a few—but it remains an ever more embedded and important fact of life as capitalist economies become almost ubiquitous across the globe. In every modern polity, therefore, there exists a prudential requirement of sustaining effective means for citizens to judge, criticize and resist constantly and effectively the prevailing principles of their society’s political and economic organization as well as the performance of their political authorities with regard to macroeconomic judgements and policies (Dunn 1990). Moreover, given the complexity and division of labour of modern states, our lives are characterized by membership of a whole variety of overlapping and interdependent groups and various forms of associated representation.2 In the face of this reality, apostles of the ‘free market’ and ‘consensual democracy’ alike retreat to inchoate ideas around organic, self-sustaining competition or fixed conceptions 2  I can merely assert here that my use of ‘group’ does not assume that an individual’s identity is determined by a single group identity (or that it is essential and unchanging); it rests on the reality that individuals normally are ‘members’ of various groups determined by class, caste, interest, social perspective, gender, employment and its lack, societal role and so on. Contrast this to Gyekye’s and Wiredu’s tendency to talk about the group (in the singular) and the subsumption of the individual under the group (Gyekye 1995: 156; Wiredu 1996: 182–190).

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of the common good. These seem like secure foundations, but in ignoring the ever-present realities of state (or state-like) power and authority as well as political representation, they leave little or no room for understanding these realities and proposing how best to hold these authorities and representatives accountable and responsive to the needs of the populations they rule. I will now propose a view of political representation, and a set of political institutions, that may help us avoid these dead-ends. Political representation is normally conceived in terms of either ‘mandate’ or ‘independence’: political representatives do or ought to respond directly to the expressed opinions and interests of the citizens they represent (Dahl 1989); or, by contrast, they do or ought to act independently of these interests and judge for themselves what is in the best interests of the citizenry and state (Hobbes 1996; Burke 1999; Gyekye 1995; Wiredu 1996). These two main views of representation assume that all relevant needs and interests exist antecedent to the process of representation itself, and in the former case also that legitimate representation must track interests. There are four main problems with this, although I only elaborate on one here (for more see Hamilton 2014b). Citizens’ needs and interests are not pre-existing and fixed waiting to be tracked through representation. Rather, they require identification, articulation, expression, evaluation and representation. Needs and interests have a dualistic nature—they are attached and unattached, subjective and objective—and this lies at the heart of the ambiguities of any form of interest group representation (Pitkin 1967; Hamilton 2003). Moreover, individual and group interests often become present as a result of representation, that is, they are experienced, identified and expressed as a result of the actions and concerns of representatives. This is the case formally and informally: political representatives actively identify and generate new interests; and representation often occurs via identification, where there is no appointment of a representative. In the latter case a representative, such as the leader of a cause, brings forward a claim to represent a group, evidence for which is found in their capacity to attract a following; and members of the group feel they have a presence in the actions of the representative by dint of what the representative has in common with them—causes, interests, identities or values. So, a different approach is needed based on the nature of needs and judgement, which remains realistic about the following four characteristics of representation. First, representation is never simply the copy of some

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pre-existing external reality. Representation always creates something new: Mandela’s account of the realization of democracy in South Africa does not simply replicate the historical events, it creates a new version of them in the act of representing it. There is therefore always a ‘gap’ between an object and the representation of that object and this holds in politics too. Political representation opens up a gap between the government and the people. Second, the act of representing creates new versions of the people and their interests, and this creative process gives representation its dynamism. Political representation provides citizens with images of themselves, or partisan groupings thereof, upon which to reflect. Third, it follows that representation generates more than one version of ‘the people’. This highlights an oft-forgotten central component of politics: political judgement is usually regarding partisan not general or common interests. Finally, none of the versions of the ‘the people’ on offer to ‘the people’ ought ever to succeed in closing the gap between the represented and their representatives. Even the attempt to do so is futile and dangerous. It is not the realization of democracy but an invitation to tyranny because it thwarts any opportunity for the people to reflect on and judge their representatives; and the effect of closing the gap will be to remove the possibility for the portrayal of other competing images, visions and interests of the polity. Representation understood in these terms enables citizens to avoid or overcome domination. How so? First, political representatives as independent of ordinary citizens are empowered to judge ‘for us’. Second, citizens are likewise able to assess the judgements of their representatives, something they do best when their representatives are unambiguously separate from them and their interests. Third, if the unavoidable and necessary ‘gap’ is ‘filled’ with the following mechanisms and institutions, these additional representative institutions provide a means through which citizens can affect the judgements of their representatives aimed at keeping states of domination to a minimum.

Institutional Change Despite my broadside against them, communalist critiques of representative democracy are definitely onto something extremely important. Representative democracy as it is has developed and been practised in the West and ‘exported’ around the globe, mainly due to colonialism and now forms of neo-colonialism, leaves a deep ‘democratic deficit’. It fails to enable sufficient participation and representation for residents and citizens

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in the institutions and practices of democracy as most of us now know it. As I have argued, the result is a politics that focuses insufficiently on determining and responding to people’s needs. Africa is no exception. In fact, due to the warped legacy of colonialism—the combination of imposed macro-political structures and institutions and persistent poverty and extreme inequalities—the democratic deficit is even more stark and consequential in African polities than most others. Many Africans hardly ever feel the positive effects of their national politicians, for want of access and means, that is, both rulers and ruled lack the necessary power, or they manifestly feel the negative effects of their lack of control over their representatives (who thus find it all too easy to loot the coffers of their state). However, as I have argued, the communalist’s argument that the answer to this rests in a return to pre-colonial forms of consensual democracy based on a common good of basic needs is not the answer. Given this, and the account of representation I outlined in the previous section, what kinds of institutional reforms and additions might follow? Here I propose four possible institutional changes. These would enable greater participation in the determination of needs and the means effectively to hold representatives to account in light of this politics of needs. Two things are important to note before laying these out. First, they are intended as reforms or supplements to the existing main institutional structures of representative democracy; they are not intended to replace those. Second, the exact form they would take would have to be determined by context, in this case African context; and these contexts vary a great deal across the continent. So, these are not proposed as a one-size-­ fits-all solution or blueprint for every polity in Africa or even a single over-­ arching African polity (the United States of Africa, say, something I doubt would help much in the process of enabling a responsive, representative politics of needs, but that is an argument for another day and place). (a) District Assemblies: (1) to enable the articulation and evaluation of needs and interests, the substantive outcome of which would then be transferred by the district’s counsellor to the national assembly for further debate and legislation; (2) to make available to citizens full accounts of all the legislative results emanating from the national assembly; (3) to provide a forum for the presentation of amendments to existing legislation; and (4) to select counsellors for the revitalized consiliar system.

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(b) A Revitalized Consiliar System: (1) would rest on the network of district assemblies; (2) each district assembly would select one counsellor for a two-year period, who would be responsible for providing counsel to the representatives in the national assembly regarding the local needs and interests of the citizenry and existing institutional configurations and their links to states of domination, that is, what changes are required to better satisfy needs and interests and diminish domination.3 (c) Updated Tribunate of the Plebs: a partisan, separate and independent electoral procedure by means of which the least powerful groups, classes or castes in society would have exclusive rights to elect at least one-quarter of representatives for the national assembly, alongside the normal, open party-dominated processes of electing representatives. Membership of this electoral body would be determined by either a net household worth ceiling or associated measures, enabling those with the least economic power in any polity to select representatives who would be empowered to propose and repeal (or veto) legislation (Hamilton 2014b; cf. McCormick 2011). (d) Constitutional Revision and Safeguard: (1) a decennial plebiscite, following a month-long carnival of citizenship—a public holiday— in which all citizens would have equal formal freedom to assess existing social, economic and political matrices and their effects on the determination and satisfaction of needs; (2) a right of constitutional revision that would have to be procedurally safeguarded, that is, a right of any citizen at any point to propose the assessment and possible amendment of a component of the constitution based on two important considerations: fallibility of reason (that reason is prone to error and subject to change over time and thus a constitution may require revision) and antityranny (that it is necessary to shield present and future generations from the unchecked power of past generations, that is, any constitution is a product of the power relations, needs and interests of a particular generation and it is necessary to ensure that the imperatives and concerns of one age are not cast in stone, forever lording it over the ever-changing 3  For more on district assemblies and an explanation of my adoption of the term and institution of ‘counselor’ from Ancient Rome (as opposed to the more normal modern English term and institution of ‘councillor’), see Hamilton (2009a, 2014b).

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needs and interests of subsequent generations [for more on ‘fallibility’ and ‘antityrrany’, see Urbinati 2008 and Hamilton 2009b]); procedural safeguards giving priority to the satisfaction of contextually determined vital needs, safeguarding counsellors from manipulation, coercion and corruption, ensuring the administration of district assemblies and so on, as specified above, and securing constitutional revision. Together these four main institutional changes would provide sufficient power, class antagonism, and institutional checks and balances to generate and safeguard freedom as power for citizens and residents in any African polity, or at least ensure against one powerful group usurping the power of all the citizens, classes and groups that constitute the polity in question. This is a road map for how we can properly make the well-being of an African state’s population the raison d’être of its government. For this, we need a politics that allows us to express and assess our needs and determine who is best placed to represent us in responding to these needs, all in non-dominating conditions (Hamilton 2003, 2014b). Most importantly for Africans, it provides the institutional means to learn how to keep oligarchs away from political power. Under representative democracy, bar outright revolution, we do not have the power to affect the everyday decisions of our representatives, but we can keep those with exclusive social and economic interests out of positions of political power. These proposed changes are particularly important for most African countries. This is the case for three main reasons that highlight the importance of the link between needs and representation. First, it helps identify why an African political theory of needs can only help rulers and ruled respond adequately to real, existing needs if it avoids the pitfalls of both utility and community: they both foreclose the possibility for the democratic determination of needs and accountable political representation. Second, most African countries gained their independence over the last 60 years or so. Thus, not only are their politics more obviously determined by newly conceived formal constitutions, but these constitutions are created in the post-war era of human rights constitutionalism, which only reinforces the tendency to judge how best to proceed independent of the existing needs and interests of actual citizens and residents. In other words, the human rights constitutionalism of our age only reinforces the drawbacks we find in political theory based on utility and community (or the common good of basic needs). Third, in devising mechanisms for African

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political theory to be focused on the contextual determination of needs, interests and forms of representation, this kind of political theory provides practical means of empowering African citizens and residents today and keeping oligarchs at bay.

Conclusion This chapter has identified a series of problems in the main Western and contending African accounts of democracy, with particular reference to how they conceive of—and thus silence—needs. They are also guilty of assuming away representation or suggesting that elite’s consensual, cooperative politics will, ipso facto, successfully represent citizens’ and residents’ needs and interests. I have proposed here a distinct view of needs, representation and institutional transformation that would empower citizens and residents of African countries to effectively determine who should represent them and their interests and how to ensure they act to keep domination at bay. The question of how African citizens and residents would bring about these institutional changes in the face of the overt and covert forms of oligarchy that obtain today is a topic I have touched on elsewhere (Hamilton 2014a, 2017, 2018) and hope to reinvigorate in my next research project. The short answer is: via the credible threat of revolution (not revolution itself).

References Arrow, K.J. 1963. Social choice and individual values. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press. Becker, G.S., and G. Stigler. 1977. De gustibus non est disputandum. American Economic Review 67: 76–90. Bell, D. 2016. Reordering the world: Essays on liberalism and empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bentham, Jeremy. 1970 [1781]. Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. London: Athlone. Braybrooke, D. 1987. Meeting needs. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Burke, E. 1999. Speech to the electors of Bristol. In Select works of Edmund Burke, 4 vols. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Dahl, R. 1989. Democracy and its critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. Doyal, L., and I. Gough. 1991. A theory of human need. London: Macmillan. Dunn, J. 1990. Liberty as a substantive political value. In Interpreting political responsibility, ed. J. Dunn, 61–84. Cambridge: Polity.

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Fehér, F., A.  Heller, and G.  Markus. 1983. The dictatorship over needs. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Foucault, M. 1991. Discipline and punish. New York: Penguin. ———. 2002. Power. London: Penguin. Frankfurt, H. 1998. Necessity and desire. In Necessary goods: Our responsibilities to meet others’ Needs, ed. G. Brock et al. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. Geuss, R., and L.  Hamilton. 2013. Human rights: A very bad idea. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 60: 83–103. Gyekye, K. 1995. An essay on African philosophical thought: The Akan conceptual scheme. Rev. ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Hamilton, L. 2003. The political philosophy of needs. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2009a. Human needs and political judgment. In New waves in political philosophy, ed. C. Zurn and B. de Bruin, 40–62. London: Palgrave. ———. 2009b. (I’ve never met) a nice South African: Virtuous citizenship and popular sovereignty. Theoria 119: 57–80. ———. 2014a. Are South Africans free. London: Bloomsbury. ———. 2014b. Freedom is power: Liberty through political representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2017. Ideas, powers and politics. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 64: 72–78. ———. 2018. Freedom in the decolonizing republic. The Good Society 26: 120–134. Hobbes, T. 1996. Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hountondji, P.J. 2002. The struggle for meaning: Reflections on philosophy, culture, and democracy in Africa. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Lovett, F. 2010. A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lukes, S. 2005. Power: A radical view. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave. Marshall, A. 1964 [1920]. Principles of economics (8th ed.). London: Macmillan. Marx, K. 1967–8 [1867]. Capital. Trans. D. Fernbach. Harmondsworth: Penguin. ———. 1973 [1939–41]. Grundrisse. Trans. M. Nicolaus. Harmondsworth: Penguin. ———. 1992 [1932]. Economic and philosophic manuscripts. In Karl Marx: Early writings, ed. L. Colletti et al. London: Penguin. ———. 1996 [1890–1]. Critique of the Gotha programme. In Marx: Later political writings, ed. T. Carver, … Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Masolo, D. 2010. Self and community in a changing world. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Matolino, B. 2014. Personhood in African philosophy. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. McCormick, J.P. 2011. Machiavellian democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Menger, C. 1981 [1871]. Principles of economics. Trans. J.  Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz. New York: New York University Press. Molefe, M. 2019. An African philosophy of personhood, morality and politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Oyowe, A. 2013. Personhood and social power in African thought. Alternation 20: 203–228. Pitkin, H. 1967. The concept of representation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Sen, A.K. 1970. Collective choice and social welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day. ———. 1973. Behaviour and the concept of preference. Economica 40: 241–259. ———. 1976–7. Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 317–344. ———. 1985a. Well-being, agency and freedom: The Dewey lectures 1984. The Journal of Philosophy 82: 169–221. ———. 1985b. Commodities and capabilities. Amsterdam and Oxford: North-Holland. ———. 1987a [1979]. The equality of what. In Liberty, equality and law, ed. S. M. McMurrin, … Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1987b. On ethics and economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ———. 1993. Capability and well-being. In The quality of life, ed. M.C. Nussbaum and A.K. Sen. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sen, A.K., and B.  Williams. 1982. Utilitarianism and beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, A. 1975 [1776]. An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 2 vols. Reprinted In …., eds. R.  H. Campbell, A.  S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd, ….. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1976 [1790]. The theory of moral sentiments. Reprinted in …eds. D. D. Raphael and A. A. Mackie … Oxford: Clarendon Press. Thomson, G. 1987. Needs. London and New York: Routledge. Urbinati, N. 2008. Representative democracy: Principles and genealogy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wiggins, D. 1998. Needs, values, truth. Oxford: Clarendon. Wiredu, K. 1980. Philosophy and an African culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1996. Cultural universals and particulars: An African perspective. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

CHAPTER 10

Duty to Human Needs from African Rights Christopher Allsobrook

Introduction Need serves a valuable function in political theory and in public policy as a principle of judgement, for the regulation of collective social action, including identifying and justifying social objectives or obligations, allocation of resources, and assessment of the legitimacy of public institutions and practices. This chapter considers the normative function of needs in allocation, distribution and regulation of access to public resources. I examine a notable turn in realist theory away from abstract human rights to the practical function of need as a normative basis for legitimate political engagement. This move is assessed alongside a similar turn in African political philosophy towards theorisation of political normativity in terms—not of individual human rights—but of duties of persons towards the collective well-being of their family, kin and community.

C. Allsobrook (*) Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa, University of Fort Hare, Alice, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Molefe, C. Allsobrook (eds.), Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3_10

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Does need provide a foundational measure for political normativity any more secure than rights? Such a challenge to hegemonic liberal orthodoxy offers to realists and Africanists a false alternative, I argue, since needs depend on good deeds until the state is obliged by legislation to enforce these as rights. Relevant needs either do or should fall in the ambit of rights. The danger with a turn away from rights to needs lies on the slippery slope towards a naturalistic fallacy, to distinguish subjective from objective needs. Wanting more from the state than rights demand, needs fall back on an external standard to state law. I locate African political theories of human needs, from considerations of human well-being, in the work of Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye and Mogobe Ramose, among others, on human rights. Most contemporary accounts of human rights are compatible with these African accounts of human need. I argue there is no need to reject rights in favour of need or vice versa. These categories of political normativity are mutually supportive and enabling. Furthermore, the explicit cultural basis of an African political theory of needs guards against the naturalisation of their universal normativity. Human rights grounded in needs may be universal, but their interpretation is by no means natural. I conclude that an African political theory of needs is therefore preferable to the realist account, since the latter is susceptible to a problem of ideological naturalisation which the former avoids.

Needs from an African Realist Critique of Human Rights Political philosopher, critical theorist, cultural critic and intellectual historian, Raymond Geuss, puts forward a persuasive realist critique of political theory through human rights in his harsh attack on the idealist Ethics of John Rawls and Juergen Habermas in Philosophy and Real Politics (2008). Geuss rejects what he calls an ‘ethics first’ approach to political philosophy, which starts with an ideal theory of ethics that prescribes how humans should act, given a set of basic principles about human nature and some supposedly shared ethical intuitions, without reference to the historical, sociological, psychological and economic conditions which shape them, and which then appeals to these ethical principles to prescribe and judge our political behaviour. He argues that political philosophy ought to start with a realist account of how social, economic and political institutions

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actually operate in some society at a given time, given real motivations. Politics responds to historically structured, changing contexts of action, where people may not act on beliefs. Geuss claims European political philosophy has not been sufficiently historical, starting with a naturalised framework of individual rights and approved codes of conduct to judge social action. Politics does not commence with an ideal framework of rights around which to build society (2008: 59–60). Politics does not develop under a system of rights and it does not need this to carry on. Moreover, he argues, ‘any overview of social and political systems should surely pay attention to the relations of power that exist in the system and how power can influence thought, feeling and action’ (2008: 91). ‘A theoretical approach with no place for a theory of power is… actively pernicious, because mystifying’. Political theory must start with history and power to avoid naturalising and universalising prejudiced intuitions as ideological presuppositions. Taking up the realist manifesto, political theorist Lawrence Hamilton defends The Political Philosophy of Needs (2003) from precisely such a critical vantage point. For a small book, the scale is ambitious. Hamilton rejects ‘unwanted glorification of the virtues of justice and welfare’ in modern moral, legal, economic and political thought, ‘at the expense of political participation, democratic sovereignty and the satisfaction of human needs’ (2003: 1). Drawing on Geuss’s critique of idealist reason in liberal political theories, which ‘reduce politics either to the sanctity of individual human rights or the aggregation of individual preferences’, Hamilton ‘develops and defends an approach to theorising and practising politics that is based on a political understanding and conception of human needs’ (ibid.). He aims to reduce the significance and scope of rights within ‘a theoretical conception that better articulates the larger material and ethical concerns of practical politics’—that is, his theory of needs (2003: 2). Liberal-constitutional political theory and rights discourse are presented as outcomes of attempts to provide secure conditions for political order by proposing a free-standing and universal framework for politics. Hamilton argues that rights are a meta-political, retrospective outcome of politics, which impede further participation and naturalise and entrench the status quo. They ‘are not free-standing, universally accepted material requirements or moral elements of universal human nature or existence’ (2003: 5). Rather, the ascription of rights to individuals depends on a wider social framework, legal apparatus and political formations which

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arose with the Imperialist Enlightenment. The theorisation of politics within a framework of rights, justice and welfare functions ideologically, the delicate reasoning realising an imposing brutalist architecture, fixing all the main political decisions in advance of democratic participation or popular sovereignty; imposed from above by tyrannical fiat by the well-­ meaning philosopher king. ‘Liberal constitutional democracy locks citizens in an iron cage of rights by entrenching historically variable conditions and goals within (largely) historically variable legal structures’ (154). Geuss and Hamilton take their realism from a long line of defetishising critique of liberalism, which Bonnie Honig (1993) traces back to Nietzsche and Arendt. This school of thought rejects the liberal rights tradition, of Kant, Rawls and Sandel, for indulging in moralising ‘virtue theory’ of politics, by deploying principles of right, rationality, community and law as politically insulated variables to protect their theories from the conflict and uncertainty of political reality. The danger is that such specification of universal ideals can impose homogeneity and suppress diversity. Rights are open to contestation since they are universalisable, but the battleground is not level. They are a political achievement, but their functioning strengthens the normative reasoning that subdues us. By fixing theory against political reality, in advance, liberal rights theory fails to reckon with politics in theory. Needs function as an alternative normative foundation in Hamilton’s political theory. He claims a practice is best evaluated not just in terms of what participants think is good about it (i.e. immanent critique) but also in terms of the following external goods: ‘how it meets vital needs, develops agency needs, and facilitates the evaluation of true interests, and whether it aids the legitimation of institutions that do or do not facilitate the achievement of these three goods’ (2003: 118). True interests refer back to vital and agency needs. Institutions are best evaluated according to needs or needy criteria, such as evaluation of true interests (needs), legitimation of norms governing practices (needs) or how they affect the balance of normative power in analysis of true interests (needs) (119–121). This ‘institutional consequentialism’ bases political evaluation of institutions on the meeting of needs or the evaluation of true interests (needs), including the overriding coercive power of the state (122, 132). The main function of the state in Hamilton’s account is to constantly transform institutions and roles in line with a correct evaluation of true interests and the meeting of valued human needs (140). Meeting of need determines the accountability or legitimacy of authority (161).

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Hamilton avoids the trap of setting out an ideal list of universal and unchanging needs, which would replace the framework he rejects with a substitute that fits the same form and function. Rather, following a realist approach, he breaks with most modern theorists of need, who have developed ‘static’, ‘paternalist’, ‘purely normative conceptions of needs as universal basic requirements of human existence that ought to be met by the state and whose evaluation can safely ignore preferences and the evaluation of how needs are formed’ (2003: 10). Such complete lists of prescribed human needs or human functioning (c.f. Martha Nussbaum), he argues, are ‘archetypal examples of the dictatorship of theory’, which his account avoids as best as possible (2003: 12). Hamilton’s account of general needs, which ‘ensure individual full human functioning and the good life’ (2003: 14), still distinguishes different types of needs, such as vital needs, which are ‘necessary conditions for human functioning’, particular social needs, which include contingent but ineluctable private and public needs, and agency needs, which are generic ethical and political objectives of individuals and groups, such as intersubjective recognition, active, creative expression and autonomy (2003: 23–24). Just how these general needs are interpreted and recognised in practice depends on particular conditions of evaluation that belong in situ, ‘for reasons that relate to the importance of contextual political participation’ (2003: 13). He stresses that specification of needs in any particular context ‘will always be a political problem’, which ‘will always require evaluation and choice over different paths and the subsequent use of coercion to cause some groups to choose the evaluated paths’ (2003: 60). Having considered the nature and form of needs, he concludes: in order to be practically effective and causally explanatory, a need-based approach to political theory ‘should start with felt needs, and actual institutions, practices and roles and criticise actual needs and their conditions in terms of whether they obstruct the attainment of vital and agency needs’ (2003: 62). This critique of rights-based liberal political theory and ‘civil society’, and its theoretical account of the nature of needs are both well-observed. On the basis of these treatments, Hamilton then goes on to consider the formation, articulation, interpretation, recognition and legitimation of needs, including beliefs, rules, norms and conventions of needs (including normative power to affect their public perception). Finally, he considers the role of the state in the enforcement of chosen needs (and public participation in identifying them). But, having dismissed most extant liberal political and policy instruments, such as universal rights, he runs into a

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bind: the more damning the criticism of extant rights law, the more unrealistic this makes the alternative. The more practical the technical details of the ‘speculative institutional proposals’ Hamilton suggests (160), regarding the correct political evaluation of needs through suitable and relevant practices and institutions, the further we move from our extant, contemporary political situation. Hamilton speculates that local representatives, under local state authority, may be tasked with evaluation of true interests signalled by an ongoing census of citizens’ needs. But South Africans struggle with weak local capacity and state structures. The state already barely reaches them. The most realistic element of this theory is its foundational account of human needs, which secures the normative function left vacant by human rights. The following section shows how decolonising critique of rights discourse in African philosophy aligns with this realist critique of liberalism. It compares the turn to needs from a realist critique of rights with a similar set of arguments in African political philosophy, which criticise universal rights discourse for Eurocentric origins and interests in application, and for narrow private individualism, and which argue for an alternative framework of legitimacy and justice, based on collective duties to meet implicit needs of communal well-being, including food, security, shelter and so on. Realist and Africanist eschewals of rights for needs both start with defetishising critique of the ideological function of abstract theories of universal ideals, which fails to track real political conditions and thus disguise and shore up the interests of the dominant elites in dominant states. By contrast, needs just track reality. Or rather, they index the conditions to which politics attends, as measures of legitimacy.

Needs in African Communitarian Rights: Wiredu and Gyekye African political theorists commonly argue that international human rights law excludes regional interpretations of justice and legitimacy. Moreover, what is presented to all societies as universal law tends to impose a Western model of the just society, based on European norms and experience, serving Western interests, with a long history of global domination. The extension of European universal law to societies outside Europe closely attends imperialism, first as natural law, to justify colonial conquest, then, with decolonisation, as international human rights law. This contemporary

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African criticism contrasts sharply with the enthusiastic support of newly decolonised African states for international human rights law after the Second World War when the universality of rights was used as a basis to defend regional sovereignty against foreign incursion. As Anthony Anghie explains, representatives of developing countries, involved in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, insisted on their universality but they anticipated scope for local interpretations, emphasising duties over rights, for instance (2013: 114). Anghie distinguishes two aspects of ‘community’ and ‘duty’ espoused by Africans thinkers: first, the idea that individuals cannot be conceived independently of the community to which she belongs, and second, that, correspondingly, she owes duties to other members of that community (115). Developing countries insist on the ‘right to self-determination’ of all peoples and nations, as a human right, and as a condition for all other rights. The right to self-determination was first raised as a right against all other human rights by the South African government, to defend its jurisdiction over domestic policies denounced as crimes against humanity by the outside world. African political scholars have since turned to this defence, to justify prioritisation of economic rights to development over competing political human rights, and to resist international human rights enforcement mechanisms used to justify foreign intervention in  local affairs, through sanctions or use of force, to advance a marketisation and deregulation agenda (119–121). Deployment of sanctions, another human rights precedent established in response to apartheid, has been increasingly used more widely and more aggressively to defend the direct interests of the USA. This problem of transnational jurisdiction puts into question the universality of human rights as well as the particularity of historical, political and cultural norms in their origins and applications. Human rights are addressed primarily to states, to prescribe obligations and to delimit their authority, in relation to citizens. Their interpretation and enforcement depend on a whole institutional and legal state apparatus, with its particular history, cultural norms and traditions. The African thinkers whose work we examine all argue that, in African ethical thinking, human rights are grounded on collective duties to attend to human needs, which take priority over human rights, if these come into conflict in practice. They disagree, however, on whether human rights are natural. Let us begin with the work of two influential African philosophers, Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu, who have written extensively on traditional Ghanaian interpretations of human rights. Both thinkers claim

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rights are grounded in the moral duties of all persons towards the needs of others. And both thinkers, as I explain, invoke such rights and duties on the basis of natural laws of essential human nature. Gyekye argues that ‘the basic or ultimate criterion for evaluating cultures is human well-being’ (2004: 15), which he interprets as ‘social harmony or human flourishing’ (16) or ‘human fulfilment’ (18). Wiredu likewise claims that the morality at the root of all human culture has a basic underlying practical function, namely, harmonisation of interests in society for the sake of human fellowship (2002: 193–195). In traditional Akan culture, this insight is represented in a symbol found in many parts of Africa, of the crocodile with one stomach and two heads locked in combat. The lesson in this is that, ‘although human beings have a core of common interests, they also have conflicting interests’, and so, ‘the aim of morality, as also derivatively of statesmanship, is to harmonize these warring interests through systematic adjustment and adaptation’ (197). Wiredu claims that ‘there is a strong sense of the irreducibility of human dignity in Akan thought’ (199), which presumes that ‘human interest is basis of all value’ and ‘human fellowship is the most important of human needs’. Since humans are essentially interdependent, that is, we ‘at all times, in one way or another, directly or indirectly need the help of their kind’, our primary moral duty, therefore, is to help one other (201). Wiredu acknowledges that cultural contexts and customs influence our understanding of morality (193) and he pays particular attention to the philosophical sayings and parables of Akan culture. Like Gyekye, he argues, Akan morality is communitarian and humanistic, ‘grounded in conceptual and empirical considerations about human well-being’ (195). In his culture, Wiredu claims, all human beings are attributed with irreducible human dignity, which deserves basic respect and sympathy. Beyond this, one’s status in one’s community is measured by the responsibilities one meets within: a thick set of concentric circles of obligations and responsibilities matched by rights and privileges revolving around levels of relationships irradiating from the consanguinity of household kith and kin, through the ‘blood’ ties of lineage and clan, to the wider circumference of human familyhood.

Akan morality is grounded in communal duties, to attend to the wellbeing of one’s community. Adult members of a lineage are expected to assist ‘one of the fold fallen on hard times’. Levels of responsibility extend

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from members of a matrilineal household to one’s grandmother’s family and her children and grandchildren, to her cousins, the wider lineage and society (200). In sum, Wiredu claims that one’s duties towards the needs of others lay the foundation of human rights in Akan culture. Gyekye distinguishes African from Western ethics but denies normative cultural relativism, which contends that we cannot judge the actions of a society that is different from our own (2004: 13). While they focus on values of Akan culture, Wiredu and Gyekye both insist on the ultimate commensurability of human values on the basis of an original aim, to promote human well-being. ‘Given our human nature and its basic needs and goals’, Gyekye argues, ‘there will be large areas of agreement between the various conceptions of well-being’, including, ‘“basic human needs” and “human fulfilment”’ (2004: 18). Well-being is not just physical, but also includes ‘non-sensible values’ such as ‘dignity, liberty and the opportunity for self-development’ (19). Gyekye identifies ‘basic needs’ as ‘those that can be said to be intrinsic to the functioning of human beings as human beings… that make human life at all worth living’ and which are ‘distinguishable from the specific desires of the particular human beings that we are’ (19). Basic needs are the needs of all humans. Human well-being, he argues, is ‘the common measure by which cultures can be evaluated’, and ‘all other values are reducible ultimately to the value of well-being’, which is a ‘master value’ (19). The universality of human values grounds ‘some degree of universality of values… as human values’ (19). Gyekye argues that some human values—which are intrinsic to organised, functioning society, since they are essential for the well-being of humans and their societies—transcend cultural values (23). For instance, he argues that slavery is immoral since it goes against the basic human value of dignity (22). Likewise, female circumcision, apartheid and incest are crimes against dignity (19–20). Human values, he insists, are universal values ‘that are essential for the flourishing—the well-being—of human beings and their societies and transcend the particularities of cultures’. These values, he goes, ‘constitute the foundation of what are now referred to as human rights (which prior to the twentieth century were known as “natural rights”)’ (23). Rights originate from values, he explains, and human rights are ‘special or fundamental human values, generally or ultimately of a moral nature’, He argues, it is ‘bizarre and incomprehensible’ for Western scholars to be sceptical about human nature while making human rights ‘a central plank of their political platform’. He insists on a

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universalist and essentialist concept of human rights, ‘derived from human nature or essence’ (23). In his lecture, ‘The Morality of a Shared Humanity’, Gyekye defines morality as ‘the principles, values, and norms that guide or are intended to guide the conduct of a people in a society’. ‘Moral vocabulary’, he argues, ‘is related, ultimately, to the basic desires and needs of human beings’, and ‘morality is instituted for a purpose—a telos—which fundamentally is human well-being’ (2004: 50). From the concept of common humanity, he continues, ‘we can infer a concept of a common human good… as well as a concept of basic human needs or interests’ (51). He claims the fundamentally social character of human life prescribes a morality that mandates concern for fulfilment of duty towards the interests and welfare of one’s fellows in one’s community and beyond. This includes respect for individual rights, but not a ‘blinkered obsession with rights-based morality’, with an ‘individualistic ethos’, such as Western societies pursue, to the detriment of duties to the needs and interests of others (52). Gyekye identifies responsibility, or duty, as ‘the cornerstone of the morality of a shared humanity’ (55) and claims this morality elevates duty to others to an equal status to that of rights. Our shared humanity mandates, ‘a kind of moral outlook animated by the awareness of the needs and interests of others and the demonstration of sensitivity to those needs’ (56). Moral duties, he argues, are grounded, not in the rights of others, but in their needs (57). Some needs - basic needs, which are ‘indispensable to the fulfilment of ordinary, bearable human life,’ he admits, ‘give rights to rights, such as, food, shelter, health care, security, freedom and education, which it is incumbent on the society or state to provide’ (57). But, more so, he argues, our shared humanity prescribes ‘a morality that grounds the decision to perform duties to fellow human beings, not on their rights, but on the raw and spontaneous desire to fulfil their needs and well-being’ (58). To meet our common human needs, he concludes, more than a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, our shared humanity ‘should also mandate, “The Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities”’. With liberal democratic capitalism as the sole contender for the crown of hegemonic global ideology, it is no accident that Wiredu and Gyekye are among the African philosophers most well-known in the West; raised to global recognition for a sage liberal sensibility—that is ‘moderate communitarianism’—in the late 1990s, back when democratic socialism was rebranded ‘social democracy’ in Germany and Britain’s Labour Party popularised ‘third way’ Thatcherism to help open up the market for

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post-ideological realism on property rights. As Gyekye explains, ‘Communism could no longer “deliver the goods”’ (73). In the final lecture of his 1999 J.B. Danquah series, ‘Thoughts on Globalization’, Gyekye puts forward two revealing contentions I go on to critically contest in the following section. First, he claims, ‘liberal economic practice will continue to be in the ascendant and become the outstanding feature of “increasing integration of the world economy”, since free-market capitalist economic globalisation “is known to work for most nations” and “seems to work for most people and to give them satisfaction”, because private ownership, at its base, is a fundamental value for most people, who want to lay their hands on the value of their labour’ (73); second (this is worth quoting in full): There would be no tension or conflict between global cultural homogenization and preservation of local cultures and identities, because homogenization will occur at the level of values that human beings have in common and the basic human needs that will need to be fulfilled, irrespective of the particularities of local or national cultures. (76)

Basic Needs and Natural Rights Realist and African political theory are aligned in the turn to needs, as a practical field of orientation for studies of the politics of legitimate collective action and coercive authority, motivated in part by defetishising critique of the contested ideological functioning of hegemonic rights-based discourse. Both criticise hegemonic Western liberal democratic political theory of rights for imposing prejudiced ethical preconceptions on the lived reality of political judgement. Both see the imperialist history of human rights as a negative influence on their ethical character and on their political function. What is supposed to apply to everyone and to work for everyone turns out to suit particular interests, at the expense of the majority, who play along in part because they trust the universalist sales pitch. African and realist approaches both emphasise historical and cultural conditions of rights, which the abstract universalism of international human rights law fails to factor into consideration. In both cases, this defetishising critique of universal rights motivates a turn to the political theory of needs (specifically, theory of obligations towards needs) to cut through ideology to their direct concerns. It is argued that the state, at least, ought to ensure that citizens’ basic needs, or, vital needs are met. Neither critique aims to

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jettison rights, but they claim that political theory unduly focuses on rights at the expense of more important consideration of the duties of the state (and citizens) towards the needs of citizens. They argue due consideration of need remedies the ideological weakness of rights. Hamilton, Wiredu and Gyekye all emphasise practical, consequentialist, constructivist credentials of their critique of rights, their turn to needs, and of political theory of the nature and function of needs. Gyekye admits the existentialist view that ‘human universality “is not something given; it is being perpetually made”’ (24). Hamilton describes his approach to needs-based political evaluation as a mode of ‘institutional consequentialism’—that is, ‘evaluation of institutions in term of measures that relate to their effects on meeting vital needs’, as well as perception of needs and interests, and roles with respect to them (17), including ‘a more elaborate and frequent census to engender the articulation of needs’ (104). He assesses institutional outcomes in terms of their effects on objective human goods, in terms of ‘whether the institutions meet vital needs and develop agency needs, or at least affect either or both, or facilitate the evaluation of true interests by individuals’ (122). Wiredu takes pains to index his interpretation of universal principles directly to Akan cultural insight. He claims the underlying and legitimating function of morality is to promote human well-being. And yet, for all their cultural and institutional constructivism, all three rely on a foundation of universal basic needs. The problem with this turn from right to need is that explicitly constructed and contested political norms and legal precedents are substituted for a basic unit of analysis— certainly, in terms of vital needs, at least—whose function corresponds with that of natural rights. In comparison with rights, needs give the appearance of independent normative variables, representing cold, hard, empirical facts. But a mass of sense data is meaningless without the higher-order judgement of political algorithms, which render explicitly constructed political norms of duty out of the raw material of needs. Once the state is obliged to ensure the basic needs of citizens are met, we are talking human rights. Once states are obliged to account to one other for rights, we have international human rights law. In interpretation of human rights, it is important to consider their basis in human needs. But, if we worry that the system of international human rights law is rigged, then consider manufactured needs, and even certain basic needs. A thneed, in Dr Seuss’s prescient tale of ecological crisis, the Lorax (1971), ‘is a fine thing that everyone needs’.

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As Michel Foucault and Wendy Brown warn, neoliberal attention to our needs is more insidious than public rights. Needs, per se, provide no firmer epistemic foundation for political theory than rights, but the explicit political artifice of the latter is at least accountable. The Trojan horse of universal rights is less ideologically susceptible to the intellectual trafficking of Western norms into Africa than the anonymous mule of needs, with nothing to declare as customs. Rights, unlike raw needs, impose enforceable duties. They also cover needs, where duties towards needs are legislated. Basic needs are covered by real legal human rights institutions. There is no need to reinvent the wheel. As Adorno writes, with a wry ironic reference to post-war American popular culture, in Minima Moralia, ‘to make a principle of this is to throw the baby out with the bathwater’. He goes on to distinguish an important lie in the notion that culture obscures the ugly realities of man and life, that culture is ideological. This, in itself, is ideological. Adorno warns against reduction of human relations to their material origin and to the explicit interests of participants: ‘It is easy to discern cloaked interests beneath all that mediates the material’, but the problem with this today is that ‘everyone is in the know and trusts no one’. ‘At least culture might prevent the domination of the exchange principle,’ he concludes: ‘In the face of the lie of the commodity world’, when ‘even the lie that denounces it becomes a corrective’, we should not further the failure of a failing culture (§22). No historical icon represents the evisceration of liberal culture more faithfully than incumbent US President Donald Trump. These desperate times, when Rawls and Habermas are not enough, call for the dark corps of cynical critical theorists to ‘Make Liberalism Great Again’. To explain the problem, I turn briefly to Guy Aitchison’s account of two of the most insightful critical theorists of liberal democratic rights in the neoliberal era, Michel Foucault and Wendy Brown. Like Theodor Adorno, before them, these fierce immanent critics of enlightenment also follow a well-worn trail of liberal nostalgia. As Brown argues, in Undoing the Demos (2015), economic values under neoliberalism undercut and hollow out long-standing liberal democratic rights and public political norms. For Foucault, the idea of individual choice, at the heart of liberal rights discourse naturalism, internalises historically contingent external circumstances which influence that choice. Moreover, the regime of rights exerts a normalising pressure on those subject to it, according to a conception of personhood congruent with dominant power. We take this on when we appeal to rights and thereby

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inadvertently strengthen these forms of power that subdue us (Aitchison 2017: 4). Aitchison claims there is considerable agreement among philosophers that rights are ‘political’ and Foucault’s view of rights ‘stresses that rights are a political achievement’ (7). Aitchison aligns this claim with James Ingram’s insight, that human rights norms are subject to constant revision, and part of their value is that they are inherently universalisable and open to contestation by dominated groups. Foucault would agree, he argues, that ‘specification of a universal ideal should not impose a homogenous idea of human beings and suppress diversity’ (9). Brown warns that pushing for identity-based legal rights against oppression risks codifying subordinated identities and promoting possessive individualism (10); and formal equity obscures structural inequality in wealth and power (11). But neoliberalism is an order of normative reason which imposes market logic on all of social life. Political equality and the common good are interpreted as matters of individual concern (12–13). Liberal rights and citizenship, the idea that states should be accountable to citizens and bound to the common good—these modes of potential domination are also something we stand to lose (13). In response to the eighteenth-century rationalist philosophers of natural rights, Edmund Burke argued that rights emerge, not on the basis of prescribed speculative ideals, but from customary social practices, developed over time, through experience, reason and compromise. This insight resonates with the common African faith that we are guided in ethical conduct by our ancestors’ ways. Human rights are not generally thought to be rights held naturally by individuals, independently of society. As David Boucher explains, they are the rights of persons in societies organised around a state which presents typical threats (2011: 766). The prevailing assumption is that, through a long process of convergence and agreement, we have come to settle on human rights norms which canvassed widest support in the process of being accepted as universal. This process of convergence and agreement involves conventional and customary law more than right reason, natural law or human nature. In fact, most fundamental rights have their origins in international customary law (ibid.). They are declared to have the recognition of the international community and are morally justified on grounds that they contribute to the common good of global society. If it seems strange for Western scholars to be sceptical about human nature, while pushing human rights in

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politics, then remember, the political institutions meeting essential human needs are made by real human deeds.

Recognition of Needs in Rites of Ubuntu: Ramose and Dladla This final section considers an alternative approach to political theory of needs, grounded in African customary norms of Ubuntu, defended by Mogobe Ramose, which is a preferable alternative to the realist account and the moderate communitarian, since it locates needs in African customary rights. While Gyekye celebrates globalisation of liberal market principles and rights in his lectures on common humanity: ‘Beyond Culture’ in 1999, in the same year Ramose published African Philosophy Through Ubuntu, which presents a damning immanent genealogical critique of natural rights in the history of European international natural law alongside an alternative view of human rights in African culture. His chapter on globalisation gives a prescient account of oncoming cultural tensions caused by the dogmatic justification of boundaries, control and property in the dominant political ideology of economic fundamentalism, which is established by colonial epistemicide and remains with decolonisation, weakening sovereign boundaries and authority of the state. The dogma of economic globalisation and competition as a means to profit-­maximisation, he argues, negates the right to life. It undermines liberal principles on which it is predicated, undercutting its conditions. By contrast, he offers a compelling account of Ubuntu as an African basis for human rights in need. His point is, ‘Contemporary globalisation as pursuit of profit above all is challenged by Ubuntu’ (151). Ramose claims post-colonial globalisation reflects a ‘resilient racism’ in its conception of rational humanity, which is historically grounded in exclusion of non-whites, women, children and slaves (1999: 5). In South Africa, with the end of apartheid, the poverty-stricken and unemployed majority now elect and thus give jobs to those who rule them, such that ‘a deadly overdose of democracy is injected into the patient by force’ (1991: 8). Imposition of democracy, globalisation and human rights, he argues, ‘reflect the will to dominate of the condescendor’ (1991: 6). Decolonisation and globalisation in the pursuit of profit generate a crisis for Africans, since ‘all the basic necessities of life depend on money’. This is experienced in loss of sovereignty and violation of the right to life (or, basic subsistence) (7). The underlying aim of capitalist globalisation, as a mode of

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governance, is ‘to render a way of life applicable and functional throughout the world’ (1999: 127) according to a homogenous system of ideas, which specifies that ‘everything is marketable for the purposes of profit’ (1999: 119). In an earlier paper on constitutional change in South Africa, during the negotiations to exit apartheid, Ramose interprets the core inalienable right to subsistence, protecting humanness, as ‘a fundamental indivisible integral trilogy of rights, namely the human rights to life, freedom and work’, which any Bill of Rights ought to include (1991: 8). ‘The duty of government is to ensure that the human right to life is exercised peaceably.’ It is ‘duty-bound to ensure that the necessaries to stay alive are available and within the reach of all members of the state’ (10). This trilogy of rights, the non-derogable foundation of state legitimacy (13), calls economic globalisation into question (1999: 135). Citizens cannot be expected to trade life for civil society, and the state cannot maintain law and order if it disregards the right to life (137). ‘Recognition of the right to life is the only option the state has.’ The free enterprise system, bound to profit making, undermines its foundation, ‘where money, as substance and function, substitutes life as the yardstick of all value’ (140). Having subjected the liberal democratic system of globalisation and international human rights law to immanent genealogical critique of the contradictions of its rationality and historical foundations, Ramose proposes an alternative foundation for human rights, ‘based on the culture and experiences of African people’ (33). The universal social principles of humanness he distinguishes in normative practices of Ubuntu are not ‘beyond culture’; they are explicitly rooted in African cultural history. Ramose insists that the starting point for African philosophy is the political and moral problem, that, ‘Africans have been injured and humiliated’ (32). He insists Ubuntu is not a reified -ism, but a -ness; manifested not in an act but in activity and in motion, in human relations of mutual recognition (36). Ubuntu is expressed through various practices, including politics, in the claim, that the source and justification of power are through the people, in ethics, in the claim, that a person is a person, worthy of recognition, through recognition of her personhood in her relations with other people (113). In economics, one must choose life, if one chooses between life and wealth (114). Against the negative effects of globalisation, Ramose concludes, ‘Ubuntu human rights philosophy is a credible challenge to the deadly logic of the pursuit of profit at the expense of preserving human life’ (151).

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According to Ramose, the right to private property cannot preclude the right to life and the state cannot enforce the former without the latter. Economic and social rights are not secondary. Ramose lays out five criteria for an ‘authentic constitution or a bill of rights’ which align with African culture. The key factors in Ramose’s account are that it must be rooted in the customary norms and in the sovereignty of the people to whom they are attributed; it cannot be prescribed by fiat from above. He insists it must be rooted in the historical experience of the people, having been examined in the light of reason and conscience, with the concern of the people to construct a system of rights, to allow for the realisation of their just and legitimate claims, agreeing to invoke reasonableness as the foundation of a mutually acceptable and beneficial system of rights and having given their consent. If members of the state have the duty to obey its laws, the state must enforce their rights (1991: 15). Ndumiso Dladla, like Ramose, is critical of the ‘perverse’ use of the term Ubuntu since the early 1990s, ‘by the elite parties involved in the “negotiations” for the transition to the “new” South Africa, to justify the new society’. Many ‘Ubuntus’ that have taken hold since the 1990s to help justify the ‘miracle’ of South Africa’s peaceful transition to a new constitutional regime, which, after a perverse ritual of coerced forgiveness, protects wealth acquired through a crime against humanity, at the expense of universal subsistence. Dladla contends that these ‘Ubuntus’ are ‘without abantu’ (the people) and ‘quite often without isintu’ (the culture) (2017: 43). By contrast, Ramose’s interpretation of human rights through duties towards common human needs, represented by a family of African customary norms expressed in proverbs relating to Ubuntu, is (a) rooted in the Bantu languages, cultures and traditions (isintu) which are its philosophical basis and (b) grounded in lived historical struggle for sovereignty of African people, against conquest in unjust colonisation (2017: 39, 44). Michael Eze gives an aligned account of Ubuntu, grounded in lived historical experience and living ethical and religious norms (2010). The cultural relativity of these ideals does not preclude universalist ethical and political implications, regarding the right relation of duties to needs in rights, which this explicitly cultural standpoint entails, and which it shares with cultures of all people, as we see in the convergence of universal human rights. Ramose’s account is aligned with the turn to needs from a defetishising critique of ideological human rights which we have examined in the political theories of Hamilton, Gyekye and Wiredu. However, unlike Hamilton, Gyekye and Wiredu, the foundations of Ramose’s account are explicitly Africanist, that is grounded in African

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struggles for resistance, decolonisation and restoration of sovereignty (62). Duties towards collective human needs in human rights converge in all of these accounts, but while all the political theories we discussed are from Africa, only Ramose grounds needs in distinctively African rights.

References Aitchison, G., et  al. 2017. Foucault, democracy and the ambivalence of rights. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22: 770–785. Anghie, A. 2013. International human rights and a developing world perspective. In Routledge handbook of international human rights law, ed. N. Rodley and S. Sheeran, 109–125. New York: Routledge. Boucher, D. 2011. The Recognition Theory of Rights, Customary International Law and Human Rights. Political Studies 59: 753–771. Brown, W. 2015. Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism’s stealth revolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dladla, N. 2017. Towards an African critical philosophy of race: Ubuntu as a philo-praxis of liberation. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 6: 39–68. Eze, M. 2010. Intellectual history in contemporary South Africa. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Geuss, R. 2008. Philosophy and real politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gyekye, K. 2004. Beyond cultures: Perceiving a common humanity, Ghanaian philosophical studies III. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Hamilton, L. 2003. The political philosophy of needs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Honig, B. 1993. Political theory and the displacement of politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Ramose, M. 1991. In search of a workable and lasting constitutional change in South Africa. Quest 5: 4–31. ———. 1999. African philosophy through ubuntu. Harare: Mondi Books. Wiredu, K. 2002. The Moral Foundations of an African Culture. In Philosophy from Africa: a text with readings, eds. P. H. Coetzee & A. P. J. Roux, 193–206. Oxford University Press.

Index1

A Achievement dignity, 67 Africa, 1, 3, 5–7, 10–13, 15, 152, 154, 156, 157, 159, 163, 165, 166 African philosophy, 1–3, 2n2, 7, 13 Afro-communitarian, 58, 61, 74 Afro-communitarian personhood, 39–54, 42n8, 43n11 Afro-communitarian restorative justice, 41 Agency, 14, 60, 61, 69, 79–82, 80n13 Agency needs, 176–178 Altruism, 48 B Basic capabilities, 64 Basic needs, 151, 166, 169, 170, 172, 173, 175, 181, 183 Be-ing, 44

C Capabilities approach, 42, 45, 45n19 Capacity, 2, 61–65, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73 Capitalism capitalistic, 49, 50 Care, 131–147 Categorical imperative, 115 Categorical needs, 96–98, 104 Collective virtue, 45, 47 Collectivism, 49 Colonial epistemicide, 201 Colonialism, 171, 180 Common good, 61, 74, 75, 78, 80, 82 Common humanity, 196, 201 Communal, 169, 171–173 Communalism, 3–7, 11, 12, 12n5, 87, 169, 170n1, 171–173, 175 Communalist, 171, 180, 181 Communitarian, 120–128, 155, 158, 159, 166, 170, 171, 173, 194, 201

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

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© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Molefe, C. Allsobrook (eds.), Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64496-3

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INDEX

Community, 1, 2, 4, 15, 39, 40, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50–52, 59, 65n9, 66, 70–78, 73n12 Consensual democracy, 169, 170, 172, 174, 178, 181 Consensus, 174 Culture and tradition, 110 D Defetishising, 190, 192, 197, 203 Dehumanisation, 41, 110 Democracy, 170, 171, 173, 174, 180, 181, 183, 184 Desmond Tutu, 26 Determinist, 153 Dignity, 58n1, 59n2, 59n3, 61, 67–70, 110, 112–116, 120, 125, 126 Dikgomo tsa mafisa, 46–48 Discrimination, 109–111, 113, 117, 119, 125, 127, 128 Distributive justice, 40, 111 Duties, 59n2, 60, 61, 61n6, 61n7, 67–69, 71–78, 73n12, 80, 82, 113, 116, 121, 123, 125–127, 131–147 E Economic fundamentalism, 201 Education, 23, 28, 30–33 Empathy, 138, 142, 146 Employment, 31–32 Ethics, 57–62, 59n3, 64–69, 71, 73, 76–78, 80, 82 F Family, 5, 6, 11 Fourth Industrial Revolution, 34–35 Freedom, 152–154, 156, 157, 159, 163, 164, 166

G Gender, 109–111, 120, 122, 124–127 H Harmony, 22, 123, 124 Human communities, 103, 133 Humanism, 173 Humanity, 193, 196, 201, 203 Human minimum, 7 Human need, 21 Humanness, 22, 25–27 Human Responsibilities, 196 Human rights, 58–60, 58n1, 71, 73, 82, 187, 188, 200 Human rights law, 192, 197, 198, 202 I Ideology, 153 Igbo, 131–147 Inclinations, 112, 113, 116, 117 Individualism, 49, 159 Inequality, 89 Inhumane, 34 Institutional consequentialism, 190, 198 Institutions, 156, 160 Intersubjective conditions, 21 Intrinsic, 21–25, 27, 28, 30 J Justice, 109, 111, 123, 126, 128 K Kant, 111–122, 113n1, 125–127 Kantian, 32 L Lack, 131–147 Legitimacy, 187, 190, 192, 202

 INDEX 

Legitimation, 190, 191 Letsema, 47 Limited communitarianism, 2 Love, 29 M Meaning in life, 25, 28 Menkiti, 87, 88, 90–92, 91n4, 93n7, 94–101, 94n11, 94n12, 95n15, 95n16, 99n24, 99n25, 100n26, 103, 103n30, 103n31, 105, 106 Misrecognition, 110, 126 Mkpa, 136, 137 Moderate communitarian, 2 Moral education, 112 Moral excellence, 57, 60, 61, 61n5, 63–66, 69, 70, 82 Morality, 109, 111, 115, 117, 123 Moral law, 112, 113 Moral perfection, 57, 61–64, 61n5, 66, 67, 69, 71, 81 Moral virtue, 57, 58, 59n3, 60–65, 61n5, 71–73, 81, 82 Mutual dependencies, 93 N Needs, 1, 2, 4–7, 10, 11, 13–15, 23, 41, 60, 61, 61n7, 73, 76–82, 80n13, 87–91, 93–106, 131–134, 136–139, 141, 144, 145, 147, 151–166, 172–179, 187–197, 199, 201–204 Neo-colonialism, 171, 180 Neoliberalism, 199, 200 Non-basic needs, 151 Non-recognition, 110, 126 Normative conception of person, 91, 96, 98, 99, 103, 105

207

O Objectivity, 97 Objects of price, 115 Oligarchy, 170, 175, 184 covert oligarchy, 170 overt oligarchy, 170 Open market economy, 155 Orthopraxy, 33 P Particular social needs, 14 Patriarchal, 124–126 Person, 58n1, 60, 62–66, 71, 72, 75, 78, 87, 110, 112–126 Personhood, 1–4, 3n3, 7, 10–13, 10n4, 25–30, 27n3, 33, 57–71, 58n1, 59n2, 59n3, 61n5, 63n8, 64n9, 67n10, 67n11, 73, 74, 76, 80, 82, 88–92, 95, 97, 99, 100, 103n30, 110, 111, 113, 115, 117, 120–128 Philopraxis, 46, 47, 52 Political freedom, 152 Political representation, 179, 180 Politics, 57–61, 59n2, 61n6, 68–71, 73–75, 80, 82, 188, 189 Positivity, 97 Poverty, 89, 106, 161, 163 Practical freedom, 45 Proverbs, 132, 134–136, 138–147 Psychoanalytic, 91–93 R Race, 110, 111, 113n1, 117, 119, 120, 125, 126 Racial taxonomy, 113, 120 Racism, 117–120, 122, 127 Radical communitarian, 2

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INDEX

Rationality, 111–118, 114n1, 121, 124, 126 Rawlsian, 31 Recognition, 94, 95, 97–99, 101, 103–106 Rectification, 41, 52 Redistribution, 109–111, 120, 123, 128 Re-humanisation, 121–126 Relational, 21–24, 27–29, 32, 34, 35 Relationality, 22, 110, 121, 124, 125, 128 Religion, 110, 111 Reparation, 41, 53n36 Representation, 170–172, 174, 175, 177–181, 183, 184 Required necessity, 132 Responsibility, 138, 140, 141, 143–146 Restorative justice, 41, 52, 53 Rights, 2, 2n2, 58, 58n1, 59n2, 60, 60n4, 61, 61n7, 64, 64n9, 70–74, 73n12, 76–78, 82, 88, 91, 93, 95, 99–101, 99n24, 106, 187–197, 199, 200, 202 S Self-determination, 151, 165 Sexual identity, 160

Social game, 99 Socialism, 153, 163 Social needs, 176, 177 Social participation, 94, 95 Social responsibility, 144 Subjective experience, 97, 98 U Ubuntu, 1, 3, 4, 7, 11–14, 22, 25, 26, 29, 30, 33, 43, 43n11, 44, 47, 201–204 Utilitarian, 32 Utilitarianism, 171, 172, 174, 175 Utility, 173, 175, 177, 183 V Values, 195–197, 199 Virtue, 25–27, 32 Vital needs, 176, 177, 183 W Wealth, 30–31 Well-being, 195 Wiredu, 87, 88, 90–95, 92n5, 93n8, 93n9, 93n10, 95n14, 95n16, 97, 98, 98n22, 100–106, 101n27, 102n28, 103n29, 104n32