Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations: In Due Course? 9781685855147

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
Preface
1 In Due Course: A Vague Paradigm
2 Tracing U.S.-Korea Abnormality
3 Reinvigorating "Due Course" in the Post-Cold War Era
4 Asia's Role in Shaping Korea's "Due Course"
5 Implementing a New U.S. Policy
6 Conclusion: How? When?
Selected Bibliography
Index
About the Book

Citation preview

TOWARD NORMALIZING U . S . - K O R E A RELATIONS

TOWARD NORMALIZING U.S.-KOREA RELATIONS In Due

Course?

Edward A. Olsen

LYN NE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Olsen, Edward A. Toward normalizing U.S.-Korea relations : in due course? / by Edward A. Olsen, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58826-109-3 (he : alk. paper) 1. United States—Foreign relations—Korea. 2. Foreign relations— United States. I. Title. JZ1480.A57 K66 2002 327.730519—dc21 2002021374 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1

To my Korean friends and colleagues

CONTENTS

Preface

ix

1

In Due Course: A Vague Paradigm

1

2

Tracing U.S.-Korea Abnormality

7

3

Reinvigorating "Due Course" in the Post-Cold War Era

39

4

Asia's Role in Shaping Korea's "Due Course"

81

5

Implementing a New U.S. Policy

105

6

Conclusion: How? When?

137

Selected Bibliography Index About the Book

139 143 148

vii

PREFACE

C

ONSIDERING HOW TO IMPROVE U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE long-divided Korean nation and the evolving relationship between the two Korean states, this book explores counterintuitive alternatives to and advocates fundamental changes in existing U.S. policy toward both North and South Korea. My analysis draws upon libertarian strategic traditions,1 as well as other liberal and conservative positions on U.S. strategic independence.2 The emphasis is on assessing where—and why—U.S. policy toward Korea went astray and on recommending appropriate means to put it back on a proper track, one that will best serve U.S. national interests. Although this book focuses on circumstances in Korea, its underlying premise is how to rectify a long-term problem with U.S. foreign policy. Throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War years, the United States has been enmeshed in diverse strategic engagements that contribute to U.S. interventionist policies worldwide. The situation in Korea is just one major example of an excessive and unnecessary commitment on the part of the United States. Although U.S. and Korean citizens have become accustomed to a certain level of entanglement, there are viable alternative means for preserving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula that do not require such a degree of U.S. involvement. As important as these alternatives should be for rectifying flaws in U.S. grand strategy, they also are important to Koreans as a catalyst for normalizing U.S.-Korean relations and seeking national reconciliation in an international environment conducive to regional equilibrium centered on a stable Korean Peninsula. Such alternatives can serve the national interests of both the United States and the entire Korean nation—South Korea, North Korea, and a future United Korea.

ix

X

Preface

The book draws upon the merits of a noninterventionist approach to U.S. foreign policy. However, such an approach to U.S. foreign policy overall is not a precondition for considering or implementing the Korea policy paradigm advocated here; the paradigm is equally applicable to existing internationalist U.S. foreign policy parameters. The attacks of September 11,2001, although not directly linked to the foundation of U.S .Korea relations, clearly have changed the context within which the United States carries out its foreign policy. Those events—and their repercussions for the U.S. role in world affairs—created an opportunity to reexamine U.S. policy priorities in a variety of circumstances. One major and obvious situation involves relations with a country that the United States declares to be a terrorist state, namely, North Korea. This reality must be factored into an examination of U.S. options toward an evolving interKorean context. Accordingly, this book also assesses the ways that the war on terrorism is transforming U.S. strategic priorities in Korea. The views expressed herein are the author's personal views, and do not represent the position of any branch of the U.S. government. Moreover, it is important to note that these views will be controversial to some—including many Korea-watchers. Nevertheless, these views are offered in the hope that they will contribute to a long-term debate about the most appropriate policy goals for the United States. As scholars, students, journalists, pundits, and policymakers weigh the pros and cons of various options, the alternatives and recommendations offered here can be added to the mix, hopefully influencing the decisions that U.S. leaders will make on policy toward Korea.

Notes 1. For relevant libertarian writings, see Murray N. Rothbard, "The Foreign Policy of the Old Right," Journal of Libertarian Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 1978, pp. 85-96; Earl Ravenal, "The Case for Strategic Disengagement," Foreign Affairs, April 1973, pp. 505-521, and Never Again: Learning from America's Foreign Policy Failures, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980; Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances After the Cold War, Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1992, and Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars, Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1994; Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996; and the numerous foreign and defense policy analyses included in the Cato Institute's Policy Analysis series. See also the author's critical evaluation of U.S. grand strategy, U.S. National Defense for the Twenty-First Century: The Grand Exit Strategy, London: Frank Cass, 2002.

Preface

xi

2. For prominent examples of such thinking, see Robert W. Tucker, New Isolationism: Threat or Promise? Washington, DC: Potomac Associates/Universe Books, 1972; Melvyn Krause, How NATO Weakens the West, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986; David Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance, New York: Basic Books, 1987; Richard M. Ebeling and Jacob G. Hornberger, The Failure of America's Foreign Wars, Fairfax, VA: Future of Freedom Foundation, 1996; Patrick J. Buchanan, A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming America's Destiny, Washington, DC: Regnery, 1999; and Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, New York: Owl Books and Henry Holt, 2000.

1 IN DUE C O U R S E : A VAGUE PARADIGM

T

HE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KOREAN NATION IS COMplex. Despite having waged a major war in Korea and having been integrally engaged in Korean affairs for more than half of the twentieth century, many U.S. citizens at the start of the twenty-first century know amazingly little about Korea. 1 This situation exists despite the substantial efforts of U.S. scholars, journalists, and officials to educate the U.S. public about the country's stake in Korea and to set forth policy alternatives. 2 There are many facets of U.S.-Korea relations worthy of attention and capable of influencing the future of that relationship, but this book focuses on one, namely, the need to normalize U.S.-Korea interactions. The term normalize ordinarily is applied solely to U.S. relations with communist North Korea. Several analysts have evaluated the pros and cons of U.S. diplomatic normalization with the regime in Pyongyang. 3 That set of issues shall be part of this discussion, but only part. The contention here is that U.S. relations with all of Korea—both states within that divided nation—require normalization. This proposition will come as a surprise to some in the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance, including political-military players and commercial partners in South Korea who do not think the ROK's relations with the United States require any normalizing. One task of this book is to demonstrate to South Koreans and their U.S. counterparts why U.S. relations with all of Korea are in need of normalizing. 4 In this sense the infamous phrase in due course, used first by the United States, China, and Great Britain in the 1943 Cairo declaration ("three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and 1

2

Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations

independent"), embodies the quest for what remains unaccomplished as a by-product of World War II.5 This phrase, which is scarcely known to the overwhelming majority of U.S. society, is all too familiar to Koreans, who abhor its intent and its consequences. Clearly those who first used the phrase as part of the war-time planning process did not anticipate the evolving Cold War circumstances that would spawn two Korean states from one Korean nation. Moreover, although an argument can be raised that having two Koreas pursuing separate forms of independence amounts to fulfilling the in-due-course mandate, such a proposition stretches credulity. It is abundantly clear that the intent behind the commitment was to help foster the reemergence of a single, independent, sovereign Korean nation-state. Still more clear, that goal remains unfulfilled. To minimize any ambiguity about what is meant by criticism of U.S. policy for slighting, neglecting, or ignoring the war-time commitment to in due course, it is worthwhile clarifying what such a policy template might have looked like had other factors not caused the United States to modify its policy. Although in due course is a manifestly vague paradigm, it also embodies an endgame mandate that constitutes a de facto template for what should be pursued and implicitly suggests a range of activities that are counterproductive. The analysis presented in this book focuses on these juxtaposed factors, how U.S. policy toward Korea dealt with them, and how U.S. policy might be rectified. This template may appear unduly idealistic and unrealistic when perceived in the context of the contingencies that emerged during the Cold War and that still overshadow Korea. In that sense this template is offered largely for theoretical purposes, to help clarify much of the analysis that follows in this book. Foremost would be a principled commitment by the United States to Korean national independence via selfdetermination. Attendant to that commitment would be strong support for a stable geopolitical environment predicated on cooperation with other interested parties, as well as economic support conducive to such an environment. Based on that commitment, the U.S. conceptual goal would be to accelerate the processes embodied by the expression in due course. Implied in that phrase is recognition that the process might not be swift. However, it is safe to assume that those who initially enunciated the original goal were not thinking in terms of a truly prolonged process stretching into the twenty-first century. Consequently, as an abstraction it is legitimate to interpret the long-term U.S. goal as the sooner the better. In other words, had extraneous Cold War events not

In Due Course: A Vague Paradigm

3

impeded progress, the long-term U.S. quest would have been met in a short time frame. Against this backdrop, the U.S. policy guidelines for achieving these endgame aspirations should have had a clear top priority, namely, to help the Korean nation achieve national independence through self-determination. Moreover, as emergent Cold War circumstances got in the way, the United States should have attempted to manage events in ways that permitted U.S. policy to get back on track as quickly as possible. Consequently, all policies that deviated from that endgame should have been subjected to greater scrutiny. In order to do so, U.S. officials would have had to clarify far more than they ever did what was desirable for two rival policy templates—one composed of Cold War endgame goals and means, the other composed of in-due-course endgame goals and means. At that point U.S. officials could have articulated what tradeoffs were acceptable and explained the logic behind delays, detours, and—perhaps ultimately—the desertion of in-due-course goals in order to better pursue Cold War policies. Bearing such theoretical templates in mind will help observers of the evolving situation in Korea appreciate the historical nuances in Korea and the consequences of U.S. policy decisions. The Cairo conference's raising of the future of Korea after the prospective defeat of the Japanese Empire, reinforced by the successive war-time objectives emanating from the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, collectively created an aura of ambiguity around the normative goal for Korea. Although the stated endgame was positive and relatively clearcut, the contextual milieu was suffused with uncertainty stemming from the task of extricating Korea from the grip of Japan. Perceptions of that context were dependent upon the perspective of the participants. For Koreans who either dwelled under repressive Japanese imperialism, actively fought against the Japanese Empire as saboteurs or members of Allied armed forces (whether U.S., Soviet, or Chinese), or politically resisted Japan through participation in Korea's governmentin-exile, there was little reason to doubt what the future held in store. Koreans had ample reason to assume that in due course would be a period of very short transition. Their expectations regarding independence of the entire Korean nation were not met. Whether the postwar period might have produced a succinct interregnum had the Cold War not distorted Korea's geopolitical context is an intriguing possibility. Koreans tend to be predisposed toward accepting that alternative outcome, but there are profound historical, political, and strategic reasons that make it problematic. These reasons shall be explored in this book, which will

4

Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations

assess why the original paradigm failed so abjectly. Underlying this failure was a pervasive ambiguity about Korea's role as a component of the Japanese Empire in World War II and the events that led up to it, which in turn helped to shape what the anti-Japanese Allied powers were prepared to do about Korea's future. As important as those conflicted attitudes were with regard to guiding the postwar evolution into the Cold War, the latter parts of this book assess the ways in which a continuation of U.S. ambiguity about Korea's current and future roles in Asian affairs perpetuates an inability to fulfill the original promise of the in-due-course commitment with regard to the entire Korean nation's freedom and independence. That analysis will set the stage for concluding observations and policy recommendations that will be predicated on the notion that the implicit and explicit U.S. commitments expressed through the 1940s pledge to Korea remain a viable twenty-first-century policy option. Although the processes inherent in fulfilling the U.S. commitments to a free and independent Korea have legitimately subjected the in-due-course paradigm to scorn and condemnation, it is important to consider the ways in which this admittedly vague paradigm can be revitalized. Instead of treating the expression as a relic of the past, this book's conclusions and policy recommendations shall seek to apply it as a renewed paradigm salient to an innovative U.S. approach to the long-standing failure to meet the expectations of the Korean nation. Such U.S. failure is part of a larger set of flawed U.S. policies. Throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War years the United States has hewed to an internationalist agenda created during World War II to compensate for perceived weaknesses in prewar U.S. policies. This strategic, political, and economic agenda cultivated an array of alliances and emphasized the importance of regional allies. This approach yielded an emphasis on entangling obligations. It also led to distortions in U.S. priorities that did not always serve U.S. national interests as much as it served the interests of various regional partners. Although the situation in Korea was not the only arena in which U.S. policy was distorted by postwar pressures to assume a leadership role, it was an important example. Consequently, just as the in-due-course paradigm is an instructive theme for reassessing what should be rectified in U.S. policy toward Korea, so too it is useful in assessing how U.S. policy worldwide warrants rethinking. In short, it is time for the United States to recognize that the pressures of evolving circumstances call for U.S. society to rectify the abnormality

In Due Course: A Vague Paradigm

5

of flawed policies by seeking to normalize U.S. relations with the entire Korean nation—whether divided or unified.

Notes 1. For analysis of polling data that demonstrate how little the people of the United States know about Korea, see Philip J. Powlick, "U.S. Public Opinion of the Two Koreas," in Tong-Whan Park, ed., The U.S. and the Two Koreas, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 2. For solid examples of such analyses, see, inter alia: Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Republic of Korea: Background for Policy, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1982; Gerald L. Curtis and Han Sung-Joo, eds., The U.S.South Korea Alliance, Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1983; Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter, eds., The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997; William H. Gleysteen Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999; Wonmo Dong, ed., The Two Koreas and the United States, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000; Robert J. Myers, Korea in the Cross Currents: A Century of Struggle and the Crisis of Reunification, New York: St. Martin's, 2001; and Park, The U.S. See also the author's U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, San Francisco and Boulder: World Affairs Council of Northern California and Westview, 1988. 3. For analyses of U.S. options with regard to dealing with North Korea, see Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Unification, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995; Thomas H. Henricksen, "North Korea's Two Kims and American Foreign Policy," in Thomas H. Henricksen and Jongryn Mo, eds., North Korea After Kim II Sung: Continuity or Change? Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1997; Selig Harrison, ed., Dialogue with North Korea, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1989; Michael J. Mazarr, "Toward a Coercive Engagement of North Korea," in Jae H. Ku and Ok Jae-hwan, eds., Change and Challenge on the Korean Peninsula: Developments, Trends, and Issues, Washington, DC, and Seoul: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Research Institute for National Reunification, 1996; Selig S. Harrison, "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea," in Dae-sook Suh and Chae-jin Lee, eds., North Korea After Kim II Sung, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998; and Scott Snyder, "North Korean Crises and American Choices: Managing U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," in Dong, The Two Koreas. 4. Although this concept is relatively unorthodox, it has been noted previously in explicit ways. See, for example, Chang Jongsuk, Diplomacy of Asymmetry: Korean-American Relations to 1910, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990. 5. The text of the Cairo statement is from a White House news release in Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1943, p. 393, reprinted in The

6

Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations

Record on Korean Unification, 1943-1960, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Publication 7084, October 1960, p. 42. For full coverage of the Cairo declaration, see Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945, New York: Knopf, 1985.

2 TRACING U.S.-KOREA ABNORMALITY

T

HE HISTORY OF U.S.-KOREA RELATIONS IS COMPLEX, THIS

chapter addresses one theme in that history, namely, the ways in which U.S. policy has coped with Korean aspirations for independence. Three chronological facets of that theme are surveyed: key events prior to the end of World War II, the period between the end of that war and the Korean War truce, and the post-Korean War era through the end of the Cold War. Origins of U.S.-Korea Abnormality

In keeping with the concept of seeking to normalize U.S.-Korea relations, it is worthwhile to define normality and to ascertain whether it has ever been characteristic of U.S.-Korea relations. In 1982 many U.S. and South Korean scholars commemorated the one-hundredth anniversary of U.S.-Korea diplomatic relations. 1 This proved to be an awkward event for a number of reasons, stemming in part from the four-decadelong Japanese interregnum that disrupted a century of U.S.-Korea ties. Yet another cause of mutual unease was the glaring reality that the last third of the century being commemorated—embodying the period of the U.S.-ROK relationship—ignored the northern half of the Korean nation. But perhaps most mortifying was the inescapable truth that the formal phase of U.S.-Korea diplomacy began under the cloud of Western imperial inroads into Asia. To be sure, the United States in the 1870s and early 1880s was far from being a leading player in Western imperialism. Instead, the United States might best be perceived as a free-rider on the 7

8

Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations

British Empire, maximizing its leverage and position whenever possible. 2 In the case of Korea in the 1880s, the United States essentially seized the moment in the wake of Japanese diplomatic inroads and took advantage of Ching Dynasty China's pressures on Yi Dynasty Korea to diversify Seoul's diplomatic posture among the Western powers to offset growing Japanese ambitions on the part of the still relatively young Meiji state. The net result of these competing forces was a move by the United States to reinforce its positions in China and Japan by trying to be the first Western power to exchange diplomatic recognition with Korea. As the infamous unequal treaties of that age went, the U.S.-Korea Treaty of Amity and Commerce of May 22, 1882—widely known as the Shufeldt Treaty after its U.S. signatory, Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt—signed at Inchon, was relatively benign and can be viewed as comparatively enlightened. In these terms the formative phase of U.S.-Korea diplomacy might be held up as an example of normalcy. It was an instance of a weak Asian regime experimenting with an alien form of diplomacy under the inept tutelage of China interacting with a fledgling Western power that was experimenting with imperial foreign policies about which U.S. society of the era held profound reservations that made those policies both half-hearted and half-baked. If this was normalcy, it does not constitute much of a yardstick to measure prospective future normalizing goals. Still worse, one can look back at that era with a far more jaundiced eye. Although the U.S. government and the public it represented may have been ambiguous about the overtones of an unequal treaty relationship with Korea, and despite the sincere efforts of U.S. diplomats led by Horace Allen, U.S. merchants and missionaries on the ground in Korea often took full advantage of the decline of Korea and the concurrent ascendancy of the United States.3 The United States was not the key culprit influencing Korea's worsening position, but the people of the United States were not averse to benefiting from the evolving juxtaposition of a victimized Korea and a group of countries abusing it. To the extent the United States as well as U.S. representatives on the scene helped make matters worse they contributed to mixed feelings among Koreans about the U.S. policies and attitudes toward Korea during those seminal years. 4 This form of normalcy in U.S.-Korea relations does not represent a model worthy of emulation. In these terms, then, the early U.S. record of relations with Korea does not constitute an admirable foundation upon which to build for the

Tracing U.S.-Korea Abnormality

9

future. Unfortunately, the subsequent phase in U.S. relations with Korea marked a deterioration. As Japanese national power grew in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Korea found itself in the crossfire between Japan and its two main regional rivals—China and czarist Russia. Korea became a pawn in their respective competitions for power. Via the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Japan edged out China and Russia geopolitically. A prime piece of contested territory was the Korean Peninsula, which became a victim of its three neighbors. Other Western powers were largely bystanders in this arena—very interested bystanders. 5 Japan's successes marked its entry into the imperial age's power elite. This was highlighted by the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. For its part, the United States tilted in favor of Japan via various means, none of which helped Korea's cause. At the same time as Japan became the only Asian major player in the region's imperial struggle, the United States discovered a sense of direction within that same contest. In the wake of the Spanish-American War, the United States began its bid for colonial stature in Asia through an outpost in the Philippines. Derivative of that newfound stake in Asia, the United States did what a number of other Western countries did as to potential rivals; namely, it entered into arrangements in which one party would acquiesce to another party's imperial claim in exchange for reciprocal recognition of the first party's territorial stake. In the case of U.S.-Japan relations, Washington—via the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908—negotiated with Japan to essentially trade mutual acknowledgment of one another's respective positions in the Philippines and Korea. 6 By so doing the United States effectively signaled to Korea that U.S. priorities were much higher elsewhere. More telling, the United States rather blatantly sold out Korea and complied with Japanese desires for a free hand in its backyard. U.S. actions can be viewed as pragmatic in light of U.S. imperial goals of the day. Also, in recognition of U.S. domestic difficulties with Japanese immigration problems, striking a deal at Korea's expense can be seen as prudently expedient. Yet it is difficult, if not impossible, to see these policies as ethically or morally principled. Korea was used by the United States as a means to an end, thereby sacrificing it to Japanese interests. Bilateral U.S.-Korea relations during the Japanese colonial era were officially nonexistent because Washington formally acknowledged Japanese control over Korea. In that sense this period, a diplomatic vacuum of sorts, represents the extreme of abnormality in U.S.-Korea relations.

10

Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations

Nonetheless, there were remnants of what could have been had the United States not left Korea in the lurch. These remnants included an ongoing U.S. missionary presence in Japanese-controlled Korea that facilitated a U.S.-inspired alternative vision that contrasted positively to imperial Japan's dictates. They also included U.S. outreaches to Koreans via educational opportunities, usually created by the missionaries. On the political end of the spectrum, the United States also eventually hosted representatives of the Korean government-in-exile. Although their main representatives resided in China, World War I-era Wilsonian idealism about national self-determination and pre-World War II tensions between the United States and Japan made the United States a tempting focus of Korea's government-in-exile. Despite a few positive aspects of U.S.-Korea relations during Korea's domination by Japan, the prevailing circumstances were very negative. Korea scarcely registered on the U.S. scale of interests in Asia. Priorities were elsewhere—containing Japanese ambitions, reinforcing Chinese self-determination, and maximizing U.S. influence in Asia. The U.S. experiment with Asian colonialism in the Philippines had mellowed over time as the United States tried to become the benevolent mentor. Nonetheless, the Philippines and other U.S. territorial positions in the Pacific Islands reinforced the U.S. strategic presence, which in turn supported U.S. economic and diplomatic interests in the region. Measured against the backdrop of such interests, Korean attempts to persuade the U.S. public about the merits of Korean nationalistic arguments barely registered on their consciousness. Very few among the body politic paid any attention to the case Koreans were trying to make.7 On the contrary, for most Americans who bothered to pay any attention to Korea in the interwar years, Korea had assumed a degree of permanence as part of the Japanese Empire. This was intensified by Tokyo's culturally oppressive policies, through which Japan tried to Japanize the Korean people via enforced usage of Japanese names and language. This set of policies was comparable to what the British Empire achieved over many years in Ireland, with the result that throughout Ireland today people primarily speak English. Had Japan won World War II, there is every reason to believe that the Korean people could have undergone cultural cleansing, making them virtually indistinguishable from their Japanese overlords to outsiders. This seeming aside is important in that it casts some light on the reasons why the U.S. masses and elites in the prewar years were resistant to what appeared to many to be futile Korean arguments. It also helps explain why the

Tracing U.S.-Korea Abnormality

11

people of the United States, when they looked to Korea, had reason to see a part of the Japanese Empire that posed threats to U.S. interests. Moreover, elements of the U.S. public whose focus was Japan's threat potential were not exactly receiving unbiased views from the Japanese about the Korean people under Tokyo's control. Japanese condescension toward Koreans was rampant, and that filtered through to Westerners who studied Japan and indirectly shaped U.S. attitudes toward, and expectations about, Koreans. In sum, the Japanese era in Korea seriously skewed U.S. readiness to be objective or impartial about Korea. As World War II erupted and the United States faced Japanese forces on the field of battle, one reality was the presence of Koreans in Japanese uniforms, and another reality was that the Korean infrastructure and workers became an economic prop for the Japanese war machine. To be sure, U.S. leaders got word that Koreans should not be held accountable for Tokyo's actions because the Korean nation was a captive nation operating as a puppet of Japanese policy. Nonetheless, there was enough residual U.S. ambiguity about the precise degree of Korean victimization versus the extent to which some Koreans had become voluntary participants in Japan's aggressive game plan. The possibility existed that many Koreans were collaborators—thereby fostering the idea that there could be Korean versions of the Quisling and Vichy underlings. These uncertainties about Korea spawned the hesitancy that led to the in-due-course limitation at Cairo. The United States and its Allied partners clearly wanted and intended to do the right thing on behalf of Korea, but there was concern about the timing of the prospective changes and—crucially—the readiness of Korean society to absorb and implement the changes. In this sense, the intensification of Korea's subjugation by Japan in the interwar and war-time years exacerbated the degree to which U.S.-Korea relations had become abnormal and created formidable obstacles to any postwar quest for real normalization. Japan's defeat unleashed a panoply of geopolitical forces affecting Korea's role in world affairs. Just as Korea's inexperience in the ways of nineteenth-century imperialism contributed to its victimization to imperial competition, Korea's involuntary and unwanted role during the war made it an inadvertent victim in the process of the Allies' postwar treatment of the vanquished enemy. Korea was compelled by circumstances to trade one form of abnormality for another type, which proved to be at least as debilitating. When the Japanese Empire was defeated and its component parts divided among the victors as a result of war-time

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Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations

planning sessions for the postwar era (Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam), logical outcomes were anticipated for Southeast Asian decolonization, Chinese consolidation, and Korean self-determination. The first and second situations evolved, at least initially, more or less as anticipated with the oversight of clear responsibilities by the victors. Korea's liberation from Japan at the hands of the U.S. and Soviet victors had the potential for being equally effective. After all, those two countries had cooperated on other issues of greater importance to each than could be ascribed to the Korean portion of a vanquished Japanese Empire. There was no reason to believe that a temporary administrative division of Korean territory would necessarily be more than an expedient way to share the honors and burdens of accepting Japan's surrender in an area of Asia where there was no obvious chaperon like China in Taiwan and no possibility that the former colonial power (i.e., Japan) could perform the sort of decolonizing roles anticipated for the Western colonial powers in Southeast Asia. Had the Cold War never materialized, a plausible case can be made that the U.S.-Soviet division of Korea might have become a short-term phenomenon with true Korean liberation from foreign control occurring in a 1945-1946 form of due course. However, signs that this was not to be were evident well before the Asian portion of the Cold War was visible on the horizon. As U.S. planning for the occupation of soon-to-be-defeated Japan evolved, U.S. officials committed themselves to take the same lead role in that occupation as the United States had in waging war against Japan. They were intent upon retaining U.S. control so that the U.S. government could shape Japan's postwar evolution in ways that would prevent it from reemerging as a threat to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. 8 U.S. policy toward Korea as a subset of that overall Japan-based policy was overshadowed by the higher-priority issues of first subduing, then controlling, Japan. 9 Due in large part to delays in Soviet entry into the Asia-Pacific theater (understandable in light of its struggle against Nazi Germany), there was little reason for U.S. officials who were about to launch a U.S. occupation of Japan to be particularly magnanimous in sharing control over that process. It made far more sense to exclude the Soviet Union from an important administrative role in Japan and to deflect Soviet desires for more spoils of war by channeling Soviet interests into a region where Russians had a long history of involvement, namely, the Korean Peninsula.10 This notion made still more sense in that the United States essentially lacked any geopolitical ambitions with regard to Korea.

Tracing U.S.-Korea Abnormality

13

As long as the Soviets' role in the occupation of Japan could be minimized by busying them in Korea, a place where Soviet knowledge of the situation could be useful in a temporary joint effort to put Korea on the road to self-determination, this seemed to be a logical course of action. Unfortunately for the Korean nation, events did not evolve as envisioned by U.S. policymakers. Extraneous forces severely delayed an indue-course timetable (see discussion below). Because of these profound detours, the decisions made by the United States prior to the eruption of Cold War tensions in order to serve expedient purposes with regard to Japan yielded unintended and unforeseen consequences for the act of dividing Korea administratively. Put into the context of previous U.S. policies regarding Korea (made for reasons rooted in U.S. interests toward Japan), the rationales behind using Korea as a means to manipulate the Soviet Union after Japan's defeat and prevent it from assuming a major role in shaping postwar Japan resonated in very negative ways for many Koreans. Once more it had been victimized by expedient moves that struck Koreans as naive, ill-informed, and shallow and effectively ignored Korea's long-term interests. With reason, therefore, Koreans sensed that their country was being used as a pawn in a nascent game between two powers in which one—the United States—was throwing a Korean bone in the geopolitical path of a Soviet dog to distract it from Japan. The longer this ploy dragged out as Cold War tensions mounted and enveloped Korea, the more victimized the Koreans became. The expression in due course was transformed from innocuous diplomatic jargon based on unwarranted concerns into an ominously open-ended euphemism for denying Korean self-determination.

Postponing "Due Course," 1945-1953

The eight years between the end of World War II in the Pacific, August 15, 1945, and the armistice that halted the Korean War, July 27, 1953, were momentous for the Korean nation in many ways.11 For better or worse, it was the formative era for modern Korea. The entirety of this period is very complex, multifaceted in its nuances, and has been the subject of careful historical analysis to which readers who seek a detailed chronological narrative are referred.12 What is critical here are the aspects of that history that led to procrastination, delays, and manipulation in the U.S. and Soviet efforts to implement Korea's self-determination. It is important to note at the outset that neither the United States nor the

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Soviet Union entered this period with the premeditated intention of disavowing the in-due-course commitment to the Korean nation's complete independence. Instead, largely unforeseen circumstances evolved and transformed both countries into superpowers and in turn transformed their perception of the importance of the Korean Peninsula. These processes yielded an accumulation of factors that caused each superpower to gradually favor postponing "due course" without overtly acknowledging what was occurring. Two events demarcate this trend: Korea's absorption into the emerging Cold War, and the eruption of the Korean theater, which led to a hot war. Neither event had deep roots within the Korean nation, but both swiftly enveloped the Korean nation's destiny—incrementally pushing the criteria for implementing a due-course deadline beyond the reach of the Korean people. As World War II ended and the Allied victors reevaluated mutual promises for postwar cooperation, second-guessing of the others' motives raised questions about the wisdom of those promises. Some doubts were relatively minor, such as the tensions between U.S. expectations with regard to self-determination versus British plans to reinvigorate its empire. 13 Had a U.S.-Soviet Cold War not emerged, conflicting perceptions over the merits of decolonization versus the need for imperialism might have proven to be more serious. In that sense, although Korea's situation was distorted by what constituted the Cold War, many of the Cold War-based tensions among neighboring countries in Asia were deeply rooted in the others' national interests. It is likely they would have caused strains in postwar Asia's international relations even if the Cold War had not become the dominant geopolitical factor. However, that opportunity never arose precisely because U.S.-Soviet tensions that yielded a Cold War eclipsed other circumstances. U.S. cooperation with the Soviet leadership during World War II had been somewhat strained by anticommunist sentiments in certain segments of U.S. society, but those strains were more than offset by the Franklin Roosevelt administration's empathy for the suffering of the Soviet masses at Nazi hands and by the New Dealers' open-mindedness with regard to radical societal reforms. By war's end, however, without Hitler to make Stalin look relatively benign, the voices in the West—U.S. and British voices in particular—who argued that a communist authoritarian dictatorship was comparable to the excesses of Nazism gained credibility and momentum. In short, the erstwhile U.S. ally's territorial and ideological ambitions regarding postwar Europe began to raise profound doubts about

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the possibility of working together in the name of postwar harmony. These U.S. doubts, reciprocated by Soviet suspicions with regard to U.S. intentions, spawned a deteriorating geopolitical environment in Europe that drew the United States into the Cold War.14 If this situation had remained the domain of Europe, it should not have mattered very much to the people of distant Korea. That was not to be, however, for a variety of reasons—most of which had little to do with Korea. Foremost was the overarching concern of Western leaders that whatever devices they might create to assure postwar peace and stability must not succumb to the problems associated with the failed post-World War I solutions. Consequently, the actions of the Soviet Union in Europe after the Nazi collapse, when coupled with Moscow's alternative global vision based on a Marxist world order, augured poorly for the Western countries with regard to what institutions would work best for world peace. Among a Eurocentric cluster of noncommunist countries with global interests, some possessing power and others bent on reestablishing their international status wrecked during the war, it was natural to extend to the rest of the world the significance of destabilizing events in early postwar Europe. The Soviet Union not only threatened their interests in the Euro-Atlantic region; it also posed a threat to Europe's reassertion of its stature and to European interests in far-flung corners of the world. In a perverse manner, then, Western countries that claimed to be pursuing world peace and stability effectively exported Europe's postwar troubles to Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The Soviet Union's location in the core of the Eurasian continent exacerbated this process. Anxieties about what had once been a Eurasiacentered geopolitical "heartland" 15 shifted westward under the Nazis to be Germany-centered, 16 then eastward again to encompass a broader domain that seemed to link Europe's fate directly with that of Central, East, South, and Southeast Asia. This produced Western concerns about constraining Soviet power within that revised heartland via control of the continental "rimland" 17 that produced in the United States an appreciation for George Kennan's notions of containment. 18 In short, the geopolitics of the Cold War took shape during World War II and was poised for unleashing as a result of latent distrust among the Allies. When this unleashing occurred, various countries located around Eurasia's rimland were prime candidates for inclusion. Given Japan's role as an instigator in World War II and its total defeat in that war, there was scant reason to bemoan its being caught up in

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the postwar spillover of European tensions to Asia. Had Japan been divided by the United States and the Soviet Union, akin to Germany's division, there would have been a degree of equity evident. That is premised on an arguable assumption that the Cold War could not be avoided. Be that as it may, thanks to U.S. planning for Japan's occupation and relative disinterest in Korea, Japan found itself reconfigured into the cornerstone of an emergent U.S. strategy for containing the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region. Korea, by contrast, again became a victimized innocent bystander.19 During the early years of U.S. and Soviet occupation of Korea (1945-1947), in due course was ostensibly still a work in progress. This was exemplified by the efforts of the so-called Big Three powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain—meeting in Moscow in December 1945. This yielded the Moscow agreement, which ostensibly put occupied Korea on a path to national independence and was followed up by fruitless joint U.S.-Soviet and United Nations (UN) attempts to pursue that goal. Emerging Cold War tensions impeded any meaningful progress toward that end. Because no official overall Korean national government had been established, the Soviet Union's relatively coherent commitment to guiding its administrative portion of Korea in the direction of a communist model was made more striking by the ambivalent and at times indifferent U.S. role in guiding the southern Korean zone. 20 It was not until the fledgling European Cold War began to spill over into Asia, and U.S. leaders, informed by suspicions about Soviet global ambitions that could be furthered by pressing its agenda in Korea, began to perceive Soviet operations in northern Korea in a more sinister light, that the United States began to get serious about devising a meaningful set of policies toward Korea. However, even these developments were not sufficient to cause the United States to create a balanced set of policies; its diplomatic focus was far sharper than its strategic grasp of the issues at hand. For many U.S. military leaders the Korean Peninsula was peripheral to vital U.S. interests in the region.21 Despite that reality, a larger geopolitical context prevailed that led U.S. leaders to redefine the importance of Korea to U.S. national interests in eastern Eurasia as a result of North Korean aggression against South Korea that was widely perceived by the U.S. public as part of a Soviet-led campaign against Western interests in a nascent Cold War. This helped spawn, shape, and define the Korean War as a major arena of the Cold War, which transformed U.S. policy toward both Korean states within the Korean nation. It solidified both the basis of U.S.-ROK

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military cooperation, which produced a formal alliance after the Korean War truce was achieved, as well as the characteristics of the adversarial U.S. relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, i.e., North Korea). The Korean War, although often labeled a "forgotten war," has been widely studied and constitutes one of the most important events of the twentieth century. 22 It was an experimental laboratory for transforming U.S. military strategy and doctrine and yielded the brand of "limited war" that became a cornerstone of U.S. national security policy throughout the remainder of the Cold War; it persists in modified form into the post-Cold War era, and its importance cannot be overstated. In the current setting, however, the Korean War's importance stems from its role in fundamentally changing U.S. thinking about the concept of complete Korean independence and autonomy coming about in due course. In other words, the Korean War—coming in the wake of the ambivalent and tense Cold War transition period (1945-1950)—served to solidify the rationale behind postponing the day of reckoning. This does not mean that U.S. leaders who shaped policy toward Korea made any objective decision to the effect that the United States was no longer interested in Koreans achieving national self-determination. On the contrary, the goals built in to the in-due-course commitment and reinforced by U.S. support for a U.S.-Soviet preliminary plan to implement that commitment evolved into a Cold War-era rhetorical shibboleth in the midst of the Korean War. However, because of the way the Korean War was waged and resolved (i.e., through negotiations that accepted a geopolitical stalemate on the peninsula), the net result was de facto U.S. acceptance of an indefinite postponement of in-due-course endgame political goals. They had to be put in abeyance indefinitely, and that very act became the foundation for a much longer term process of revamping U.S. policy toward the two states in the divided Korean nation. Just as the ways in which the early Cold War geopolitical transition had unintended consequences for the U.S.-Soviet stake in Korea's in-due-course prospects, so too did the Korean War's outcome yield unintended postponement of meeting the Korean nation's aspirations.

Perpetuating "Due Course" Avoidance, 1953-1990 The post-Korean War era of the U.S. Cold War policies toward Korea is tremendously complex and nuanced compared to what transpired

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previously. A hallmark of that era with regard to the question of in-duecourse goals was a shift from inadvertent policy results to consciously sought policy results. The cornerstone of this U.S. shift has been its acceptance of a virtually permanent division between the two halves of Korea. The United States moved beyond its formal sponsorship and recognition of the ROK as the legitimate Korean state by formally signing in Washington the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1, 1953, that went into effect on November 18, 1954. U.S. policy continued throughout the Cold War years to acknowledge, and officially support, its South Korean ally's policies with regard to Korean reconciliation and unification aimed at bringing about a Korean nation-state epitomizing self-determination. 23 Yet on another, more pragmatic level the United States operated on the basis that its ally's aspirations could be perpetually forestalled. Naturally this change had a major impact on U.S. relations with both South and North Korea, leading to distinctly abnormal qualities in each relationship. To some extent this transition from unintended consequences to intended consequences was itself initially the by-product of U.S. obligations and interests cultivated by its participation in the Korean War. The quasi-accidental nature of the original process in the initial phase of the Korean War was rapidly overtaken by a more calculated perspective on the issues at stake. Although the United States may not have had much reason early on to perpetuate Korea's division—aside from buffering the fledgling ROK from external pressures and preserving its viability—those concepts swiftly gained geopolitical stature as the Korean War's stalemated results became part of the foundation of Cold War-era U.S.-Soviet relationships. In short, the momentum of trends caused by the Korean War soon became a fixture of the post-Korean War Cold War era that infused U.S. interests in the stability of the ROK with far greater meaning than was previously evident. These changed atmospherics led to the emergence of relatively clear rationales behind the U.S. pursuit of policies that consciously avoided having to address the in-due-course goals by perpetuating alternative models in bilateral U.S. relations with the ROK and with the DPRK. Each set of relations was driven by a different rationale. In the case of U.S.-ROK relations, the United States was motivated by a desire to strengthen the alliance bond that had been forged in battle, based on criteria that had not been foreseen adequately prior to the Korean War. The strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula to the U.S. geopolitical outpost on the Japanese archipelago had been underscored by North

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19

Korean, Soviet, and Chinese desires to dislodge the U.S.-backed and UN-sanctioned ROK. In this sense the Korean War redefined what the Cold War would mean strategically for the United States in Asia and underscored U.S. interventionist policy preferences. 24 In turn, that geopolitical redefinition imbued U.S. interests in South Korea with a level of profundity that they had previously lacked. That altered context spurred the United States to intensify the range of U.S. commitments to the half of the Korean nation for which so many members of the U.S. armed forces had given their lives. Having rescued South Korea, the United States found itself bearing new responsibilities for integrating the ROK into a budding system of anticommunist alliances worldwide. The U.S. role as a buffer protecting its South Korean postliberation temporary ward emerged from warfare and truce negotiations as an open-ended entanglement on behalf of a newfound protégé. U.S. officials, formerly almost cavalier about Korea's strategic importance, came out of the Korean War with diametrically opposite views of Korea's geopolitical value and the need to maintain a credible U.S. military presence in South Korea for the sake of Cold War deterrence. 25 Based on these interests the United States began to cultivate a cadre of Korea expertise within the U.S. bureaucracy that helped Washington to devise better-informed policies. The U.S. foreign policy and national security affairs bureaucratic establishment was long noted for its Eurocentrism in terms of regional expertise. As the Cold War unfolded and the United States found itself involved in diverse areas of the world, demands were put on the U.S. civilian and military bureaucracy to cultivate non-European expertise. They did so through internal training institutions and by drawing upon activities within U.S. society such as academia and the Peace Corps. This often occurred in an uneven fashion. Within Asia, the United States entered the postwar era with significant expertise on Japan and China that expanded rapidly. Korea was among the countries that were slighted, but in the wake of the Korean War—as the South Korean economy gradually began to flourish, as Korean immigration to the United States expanded, and as support groups such as the Korea Foundation contributed to the process—relatively stronger cadres of Korea expertise emerged in U.S. society that bolstered U.S. bureaucratic expertise on Korea. A direct outgrowth of this radically different societal and strategic perspective was the emergence of an expanded view of what maintaining the ROK's viability connoted. What formerly had simply meant assuring survival in the face of communist aggression became a far more

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nuanced U.S. commitment, that is, to the development of the ROK as a Cold War exemplar of political and economic development. In other words, a country that formerly was on the political and economic margins of the U.S. consciousness was rapidly transformed by the aftermath of the Korean War into an important client state to which the United States extended major developmental assistance. Although it is important to note that the United States did not introduce the notion of clientstatism to Korea's international relations, because premodern Korea experienced such ties extensively with China in a Sino-centric system, the United States did not model its altered post-Korean War bilateral relations with the ROK on any Chinese precedent. It pursued its own brand of client-statism fostered by an intensified Cold War in East Asia, facing strong Soviet and Chinese adversaries and anxious to cultivate a network of resilient allied countries. 26 U.S. policy rationales regarding North Korea, designed to tear down rather than build up half of the Korean nation, were the mirror opposite. As a stalemated aggressor state adversary of a newly valued Cold War ally, North Korea epitomized an adversarial model that deserved to be deterred militarily, marginalized diplomatically, and impeded economically. In short, the United States treated the DPRK as a pariah that lacked legitimacy and credibility as a sovereign entity in world affairs. This perspective on the North Korean half of the Korean nation precluded any genuine U.S. interest in pursuing the realization of in-due-course self-determination objectives for the entire Korean nation that would involve negotiated compromise with the Kim Il-sung regime. And because the Cold War balance of power on the Korean Peninsula after the Korean War backed by the United States and the Soviet Union would be destabilized by successful South Korean military actions against the North, which risked escalation, the United States found itself in the strange position of not being able to urge its South Korean ally to prevail over the shared North Korean adversary. As a result of this mixture of policy rationales the United States drifted into policies that consciously perpetuated the active avoidance of anything that could be interpreted as promising to implement long overdue in-due-course commitments. This awkward situation yielded a prolonged period of U.S. policies toward both Koreas until the end of the Cold War that reinforced separation within the Korean nation and tension-maintenance on the Korean Peninsula. This is not the place for a detailed treatment of that historical evolution, but it is worth highlighting some of the key trends of that period.27 They are most readily seen

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in U.S.-ROK relations that are relatively transparent, as compared to the far more opaque U.S.-DPRK relationship. Moreover, the latter tended to be shaped in reaction to the former. In the post-Korean War years of the late 1950s Washington managed its relations with Seoul with a great deal of assurance and overwhelming power. South Korea's postwar reconstruction required the kind of assistance and guidance that only its U.S. ally could provide in abundance. Moreover, thanks to the U.S. ardor for Cold War internationalism, Washington was newly enthusiastic about providing such assistance. Pragmatically, South Korea had nowhere else to turn. Despite the Syngman Rhee government's unhappiness about the way its U.S. ally had dragged the ROK into a negotiated truce to halt the de facto civil war between the two Koreas in a manner that—at least for the time being—ensured the continued division of the Korean nation, it had to face the reality that Seoul had no viable alternative. Its sole protector and benefactor was more than willing to sanction a lasting division rather than risk compromise that could undermine the U.S. international stance. Making matters worse, even as U.S. policies were intended to make conditions in South Korea materially better, the U.S. economic and military assistance programs were reshaping the ROK in ways that made it even more different compared to its Stalinist northern adversary. Because Seoul required such aid to recover, and wanted more U.S. economic cooperation in order to prosper, South Korea's leaders found themselves drawn into an evolutionary process that contributed to a more permanent form of division between the two Koreas. Making matters worse still, South Korean leadership in the mid- to late 1950s barely warranted that label. Faction-ridden, prone to corruption, and burdened with Confucian values that esteemed the scholargentry classes while scorning the gritty hard work necessary to lift a war-torn society out of its dire straits, South Korea's leaders were inept at carving out any semblance of a viable independent path to national self-determination. As part of the U.S. assistance package that revived South Korea, U.S. officials injected their strategic, economic, and political priorities into the ROK's identity. Most of those priorities were rooted in U.S. interests in the Cold War rather than U.S. perceptions of South Korean interests in that geopolitical struggle. Moreover, U.S. attitudes toward the South Korean people and their leaders were skewed by both the U.S. stake in 1950s Japan and by past and contemporary Japanese experiences in Korea and biases toward Koreans. Clearly neither of these sets of U.S. attitudes toward South Korea helped sensitize

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U.S. leaders or the public to Korean angst about delays in pursuing the goals suggested by the phrase in due course. Lest this critique be seen as putting too much blame on U.S. officials working on Korean affairs at the time, it must be recognized that Soviet and Chinese backing for the post-Korean War reconstruction of the DPRK contributed to the perpetuation of Korea's division. Equally important, it shaped the willingness of U.S. society to accept leadership responsibilities in the international system. This in turn shaped the context for Korea in the international system. Compared to South Korea, North Korea—despite the severe damage inflicted on it during the Korean War—retained infrastructure assets, natural resource advantages, and human capital reserves that enabled it to rebound relatively quickly during the 1950s. Although the DPRK's secretive ways and closed society make measurement of its accomplishments (or lack thereof) extremely difficult to determine with any accuracy, it is nonetheless widely acknowledged that North Korea's postwar recovery was more swift and thoroughgoing than was South Korea's. Of the two halves of Korea during that stage of their development, the DPRK appeared to be more successful. 28 The fact that these successes were integrated into a loose, Soviet-led system of Marxist states reinforced the Marxist-Leninist ideological drive motivating North Korea and drew it in a radically different direction than that guiding South Korea. U.S. policy toward North Korea underscored this accentuation of Korea's division as a key portion of the Cold War international system. In a bilateral sense there was no U.S. policy toward North Korea because the DPRK was treated as a nonstate. Only the ROK was recognized as officially constituting "Korea." Yet this posture of nonrecognition was clearly undermined by regular U.S. dealings with North Korean military counterparts at Panmunjom under the UN flag when meetings of the Military Armistice Commission were held. More significantly, the U.S. adversarial bond with North Korea as the main enemy of the South Korean ally rapidly led to U.S. demonization of the Kim Il-sung regime, which was more than reciprocated by Pyongyang's diatribes against U.S. "imperialism." Although South Korean anticommunists, with fresh memories of the Korean War, did not need any urging from Washington to layer invective on their North Korean foes, the fact that the U.S. role as the anticommunist camp's leader imbued the ROK's sole ally with unique qualities magnified Seoul's fervor. The more South Korean anticommunist rhetoric aimed at North Korea (and its Soviet and Chinese backers) could be heard by receptive U.S. ears,

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23

the stronger the foundation of the U.S.-ROK alliance could become. All of this served to intensify the divisions between the two Koreas and added to U.S. inclinations to perpetuate the avoidance of in due course. The inter-Korean conditions that evolved during the mid- to late 1950s were made still more rigid by domestic events in South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s. During a nine-month interregnum in 1960-1961, South Korean democratic self-determination briefly flourished. 29 Otherwise the 1960s and 1970s were marked by two seemingly contradictory developments, namely, a military-backed regime installed via an armed coup led by Park Chung-hee, and an economic reinvention of the ROK that put it on the path toward capitalist nation-building. The Park coup was controversial in many ways. It was not in harmony with Korean civil-military traditions. Neither was it in keeping with the U.S.-style civil-military paradigm that U.S. officials assumed they had successfully exported to Korea from the late 1940s through 1960. In short, the Park coup was a rebuke to the political ideals for which the United States was leading its camp in the Cold War.30 Nonetheless, the Park administration that it yielded was adamantly anticommunist in ways that made it a steadfast member of the U.S. camp in Asia's Cold War. In other words, the ROK—despite a de facto military dictatorship that generated a prolonged period (extending beyond Park's grip on power) of criticism of U.S. sanctioning of militaristic authoritarianism—effectively moved closer to the kind of ally the United States wanted in order to buffer its core geopolitical position in offshore Japan.31 That transition was bolstered by the economic accomplishments of the Park years that transformed South Korea's standing in regional and world affairs—becoming one of the "Asian tigers." Based on an odd blend of government-backed development models, strongly shaped by the military elite's previous experiences of becoming relatively proficient during the late Rhee years, entrepreneurship borrowed from Japanese influences in Korea's past, and strong desires to lift South Korea from poverty through application of a Confucian work ethic, South Korea persevered and enjoyed rapid growth and increasing prosperity.32 During the almost two decades that Park ran South Korea, it attained significant economic stature in ways that the ROK's U.S. mentors in the preceding decade could scarcely have imagined. Ironically, despite the major role played by the United States as an economic aid donor, as the economic center of world capitalism, and as the manager of a free world geopolitical system into which the ROK became ever more integrated, a substantial amount of the credit for facilitating South Korea's

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progress goes to Japan. Japanese business models and development models dating back to the Meiji era, along with Japanese state entrepreneurship that had sunk roots among Korea's commercial classes, were adapted by the Park administration for use in South Korea. Moreover, Japanese private-sector investment in Korea, as well as Japan's acting as a postwar role model for Asian-style capitalism, provided an attractive alternative for the Park government. 33 The net result of these economic efforts was to pull South Korea up by its proverbial bootstraps. At the same time as the ROK was being drawn ever closer to a U.S.-led and Japan-reinforced capitalist development model, North Korea in the 1960s and 1970s persisted in its Leninist ways. 34 Unfortunately for the DPRK, its Soviet and Chinese role models did not compare well to the counterparts for the other half of Korea. The Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev and China under Mao Tse-tung were wasteful bureaucratic states that were frittering away the assets of both countries as they clung tenaciously to Marxist ideologies destined to fail. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet split and China's Great Cultural Revolution exacerbated the downward cycle. Caught amid these inferior role models, North Korea reacted by pursuing its own idiosyncratic developmental alternative based on a blend of ethnocentric nationalism, Stalinist jargon, and Korea's "hermit kingdom" legacy.35 This yielded a quest for juche (autarkic autonomy) that put North Korea on a radically divergent path away from the interdependent course South Korea was pursuing. 36 Because North Korea's policies of regime empowerment and independence from the constraints imposed by Moscow and Beijing were perceived as threatening to South Korea and the U.S. interests in the south, this juxtaposition of trends strengthened the U.S. moves to perpetuate avoidance of national self-determination exemplified by the phrase in due course. They also reinforced U.S. convictions about the soundness of the U.S. internationalist policies. In perverse ways the late 1970s spawned new pressures in U.S.ROK relations that underscored that U.S. policy tendency. Emerging from the Vietnam War era, in which the Park government succeeded in building an overall closer alliance relationship with the United States by being one of the few countries to rally around the U.S.-led cause with some enthusiasm and a substantial commitment of ROK armed forces, Seoul was taken aback by the U.S. official Nixon Doctrine (also known as the Guam Doctrine) urging greater burden sharing by U.S. Asian allies and by popular U.S. sentiment widely characterized as the Vietnam syndrome. 37 U.S. neoisolationist sentiments in the wake of the Vietnam

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War were a cause for concern in Seoul and motivated the United States to reinforce its existing forms of support for South Korea versus North Korea. 38 The last thing the United States wanted after losing South Vietnam to North Vietnam was any prospect for a similar turn of events on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea also was shaken by stronger U.S. support for Japan during the 1973 oil crisis, which sent a signal to Seoul that it needed to become more assertive in securing its energy supplies. 39 As a result of these U.S. regional positions, South Korea pursued two broad courses of action as means to be more assertive. The Park government began a post-oil crisis quest for greater self-reliance through economic interdependence. Despite the similarity in the surface objective of the two Koreas to be less dependent on a narrow band of outside players, the means used by Seoul and Pyongyang were diametrically different. The ROK was embracing interdependence within a revamped, post-Vietnam War, U.S.-led international system as a means to spread its risk, whereas the DPRK was bent on achieving autarky to avoid risks. This difference reinforced the ways in which national self-determination of the entire Korean nation was being put in abeyance. The Park government also attempted to deal with the shocks to U.S.ROK solidarity by unilaterally exerting Korean leverage over Washington in the form of intensive lobbying, taking yet another leaf out of Japan's policy book. Unlike Tokyo's relative deftness, however, Seoul's lobbying was ham-handed and blew up in the face of the Park regime in the form of the Koreagate scandals. Congressional investigations during the Jimmy Carter administration added further strains to U.S.-ROK relations that had already been stressed by President Carter's human rights agenda and by the administration's modifications to the Nixon Doctrine in the form of plans for further cuts in U.S. force levels in Korea. 40 By pursuing this leverage option in reaction to doubts about the credibility of U.S. support for the ROK at the same time as Seoul, in contrast to Pyongyang, was seeking to broaden its network of interdependence, South Korea functionally reinforced systemic change in the major powers' roles in Korea. U.S. policy reactions to Koreagate led South Korea to begin to cultivate a more autonomously shaped interdependent role globally and prepare to adapt to international change. North Korea did not experience comparable developments. This nudged the ROK further down the road toward divergence between the two Koreas. Even though this subtle shift was not a calculated U.S. policy initiative, it nonetheless served the broader purpose of perpetuating

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Korea's division as part of an entrenched Cold War international structure in a way that enhanced regional stability and fostered a more selfconfident regime in Seoul. That level of stability and confidence was about to be shaken again by a new series of developments in both Seoul and Washington that installed new players and a new tone in the bilateral relationship. In the latter stages of the Cold War a different set of factors exerted influence on the U.S. position toward Korea and reinforced Washington's perpetuation of avoidance. After the assassination of President Park in 1979 and the transition from the Carter administration to the Ronald Reagan administration, South Korea's relations with the United States followed another altered path. Park's assassination and the subsequent manipulation of domestic political events and harsh suppression of dissenters in the southern city of Kwangju produced an incremental military takeover by General Chun Du-hwan, which in turn led to his assuming the presidency in a controversial manner. This raised serious allegations about U.S. complicity in South Korea's authoritarian transition. 41 As serious as the questioning of U.S. motives was at the time, and as damaging as it was to the long-term historical legacy of U.S. policy toward Korea, it had relatively little impact on the post-Park and post-Carter era for U.S.-ROK relations. This new period was marked by a distinctly conservative tilt in both countries as Chun Du-hwan solidified his power base throughout most of the 1980s and U.S. society embarked on the Reagan era. Of the two situations, the advent of the Reagan administration in the United States represented a far more dramatic political change of course, with the pendulum swinging from center-left to fairly far to the right. 42 Most of the meaning of that shift was extraneous to events in Korea, but a few facets of Reagan's rise to power had major importance for Korean affairs. Most obvious was Washington's emphasis on a tougher anticommunist posture, which reinvigorated the Cold War worldwide, but it also set the stage for Seoul to get its message across that the ROK served a vital purpose as a resilient adversary of North Korea and was a steadfast ally that deserved to be cut some slack in terms of South Korean political practices. Reagan's conservative administration extended its welcome to President Chun early in his tenure, helping to establish some degree of legitimacy for Chun. This enabled the Chun government to assume the mantle of post-Park continuity and get on with the business of governing South Korea. 43 This U.S. attitude stands in sharp contrast to the more prolonged and difficult adjustment

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27

process President Park experienced in his early relations with the United States. The Reagan administration's embrace of Chun's South Korea is symbolized by their conservative political harmony, but it also reflects broader themes. Because of the different arguments Washington used with Seoul and Tokyo to get South Korea and Japan to rally around Washington's intensified Cold War, this helped to differentiate each ally's perceived importance to the United States. With Japan, the United States focused on the Soviet adversary, whereas with Seoul the United States stressed North Korea (and its Soviet backers) as a reason for the United States to emphasize South Korea's value for regional stability. South Korea was aided in this process by U.S. conservatives' memories of the ROK forces as Vietnam-era allies, in contrast to the Japanese, who abstained from that war. Cumulatively these factors added to the new rapport between the United States and South Korea during the ReaganChun years. As positively as conservatives on both sides perceived these developments, an inadvertent by-product of the closer ties was a reinforcement of Korea's national division. Coincidentally, not long after Chun and Reagan entered office, the United States and South Korea began to commemorate the one-hundredth anniversary of the establishment of U.S.-Korea diplomatic relations. Major conferences were held to address the centennial. All of them confronted the dilemma posed by the sometimes erratic qualities of U.S. policies toward Korea, how to deal with North Korea's lack of a meaningful role in the commemoration, and the awkward aspects of U.S. support for Korean authoritarian figures and for the de facto division of Korea. 44 That discomfort, though real, proved to be transitory in terms of bilateral U.S.-ROK ties during the Chun-Reagan years. The 1980s were dominated by the U.S. self-imposed mandate to move away from indefinite coexistence with the Soviet Union and to up the strategic ante worldwide in ways that would enable the United States to prevail at the end of the decade politically and economically by bankrupting its adversary in an arms race. As part of this global process the United States turned to various strategic partners worldwide for assistance in upping the ante on the local level. In Asia, South Korea proved to be amenable to U.S. goals and desires. Seoul's prominence in the rekindled Cold War was aided in ways not controllable by the United States or South Korea when the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007 on September 1, 1983, killing 269 passengers and crew, including sixty-one U.S. citizens. That event, controversial for a variety

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of reasons, served to bring the United States and South Korea closer together versus the Soviet Union and, indirectly, versus its North Korean protégé. 45 The 1980s reinforced the division of Korea by exacerbating the tensions on the peninsula and drawing each half of Korea closer to its main Cold War mentor. This was underscored by the ways in which the Reagan administration was bent upon assuring that U.S. foreign and defense policy did not succumb to neoisolationist temptations by reintensifying the Cold War and the importance of U.S. leadership in that global struggle. The Chun government's readiness to embrace the cause led by the Reagan administration was authentic but was tempered by spillover issues from the ROK's simultaneous quest for means to buffer it from excessive dependence on one benefactor. South Korea continued to build a network of interdependence with a spectrum of other countries as its foreign policy matured to match its expanding economic horizons. 46 In principle this trend should have been harmonious with the conservative free-trade context of U.S. policies during the Reagan administration. Those free-market proclivities were sufficiently strong that they led the Reagan administration, under Secretary of State George Shultz's guidance, to experiment with a very oblique form of engagement with North Korea through so-called smile diplomacy that permitted U.S. officials not to snub North Koreans they might have occasion to meet. Although this proved futile, it did not die out under President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) and helped to create a legacy that President Bush's successor in office, Bill Clinton, was able to draw upon. However, the Reagan administration's anticommunist free-market instincts had an ambivalent influence on U.S.-ROK relations. Although anticommunist, South Korea's domestic system under Chun Du-hwan increasingly favored a corporate-state approach embodied by the label "Korea, Inc.," with its quasi-mercantilist echoes of "Japan, Inc.," that led to a more negative image among the U.S. public for South Korea's far less than free trade economic practices and controversial societal patterns of corruption and favoritism. 47 Also, lingering authoritarianism hurt attempts to project a new political facade through sports diplomacy based on plans for the 1988 Summer Olympics, held in Seoul. 48 Taken together these cumulatively offset some of the positive attributes of Chun-Reagan late Cold War cooperation. So those years were a marked improvement over the traumatized Park-Carter relationship, and they helped set the stage for what was yet to come as the Cold War ended (partially as a result of the U.S. coordinated efforts with strategic partners

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29

such as South Korea), but at that time the product of an enhanced relationship did not appear very impressive. 49 Interestingly, although the Chun and Reagan administrations began and ended under radically different circumstances—the former under a cloud and the latter as part of a routine electoral succession process— there was chronological similarity. Moreover, just as the Reagan legacy was passed on to President Bush, there was every intention in Seoul for President Roh Tae-woo to carry on with the patterns established by President Chun and for Chun to be a behind-the-scenes power guiding his successor. That prospect utterly failed to materialize, and South Korea moved into yet another period of internal transition that once again accentuated the divisions between the two Koreas. The Roh government had a split personality. Although President Roh was elected in a relatively open democratic process and led a ruling party that starting under President Chun had established greater grassroots support systems, there was no denying that Roh and Chun were products of a military takeover. Their civilian political bona fides were shaky at best. Nonetheless, Roh had a lot going for his administration in terms of South Korea's economic stature, its international standing, and its many assets compared to North Korea.50 Moreover, Roh and his advisers were fairly deft at coping with rival political claimants, notably the "three Kims"—mainstream progressive Kim Young-sam, permanent conservative insider Kim Jong-pil, and perennial contender Kim Dae-jung, who seemed to be South Korea's "Harold Stassen" by virtue of his repeated failed attempts to become president. Because of this relative equanimity, Roh Tae-woo enjoyed a positive image in the United States, and U.S.-ROK relations benefited from that positive perception, which was radically different from prevailing U.S. impressions of North Korea as the Cold War was coming to an end. 51 The end of the Cold War introduced Korea, as it did the rest of the world, to a new era. Prior to addressing that altered context, it is worthwhile evaluating the consequences of U.S. efforts to perpetuate the U.S. avoidance of coming to terms with the full meaning of the phrase in due course. On balance the United States succeeded in institutionalizing means to defer having to come to grips with its fading pledge. A major portion of that institutionalization process was ingrained with the seemingly permanent characteristics of the Cold War and the U.S. commitment to institutionalized international interventionism. The Cold War's international divisions were epitomized on the ground in Korea by a nation long divided into immutable rival camps, armed to the teeth and

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arrayed against each other across a very visible geopolitical scar across the peninsula's midsection. Although drawn into Korea's tension by contextual forces of the early Cold War as that conflict hardened worldwide over the decades, what had originally been a U.S. policy derived from a compilation of virtual accidents with a thin veneer of purpose became transformed into a symbol of U.S. ideological steadfastness against the forces of evil. Emphasizing the differences between the two halves of Korea became a hallmark of U.S. policy. The situation in Korea is all the more striking when compared to the more nuanced policies the United States pursued regarding Japan and— to a lesser extent—China. While the Korean nation became so emblematic of the rival camps in the Cold War that those stark qualities outlived the Cold War, Japan was dealt with as a useful partner with a network of economic ties in the Asia-Pacific region that reinforced U.S. Cold War strategic structures. Initially a divided China—Red China versus Free China—was dealt with in a manner similar to Korea. However, that changed dramatically in the last two decades of the Cold War, starting with Richard Nixon, when the United States handled China in a manner more like Japan than Korea. All of these facets of U.S. policy in Asia reflected the evolving nuances of U.S. internationalism during the Cold War. For current purposes, however, it is important to note the peculiar hallmark role the Korean Peninsula played as the symbol of rival camps. It also became part of the price the ROK paid for maintaining U.S. support. And it was a heavy price in terms of each Korea's separate evolutionary path, which transformed a once homogeneous political culture into two radically different societies whose politics, economies, values, and mores ceased to have much in common. For more than half a century two generations of Koreans on each side of the border have been split farther and farther apart. As the Cold War came to an end, one prominent event was the reunification of West and East Germany, which understandably attracted enormous Korean interest and generated attempts to learn lessons applicable to Korea. 52 Such lessons may yet prove valuable as the two Koreas work out their differences, but as the end of the Cold War materialized Germany's progress stood in sharp contrast to Korea's lack thereof. In fact, a plausible case can be made that Korea's divided plight seemed to be pushing the Korean nation toward the sort of permanent ethnic separation that one sees in the larger German nation's division among Germany proper, Austria, and the German Swiss. The potential exists for a permanent South Korea, North Korea, and a sizable ethnic Korean state within the Manchurian portion

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31

of China across the Yalu River. That potential was reinforced by the Cold War's tensions and became integral to U.S. policy toward Korea. Perhaps the most devastating consequence of more than four decades of Korean partition and the geopolitical centrifugal forces that pulled each half of the Korean nation into diametrically opposed ways of life was the manner in which each Korea's need for external support systems induced Seoul and Pyongyang into psychological acceptance of their respective positions as normal. South Koreans, in particular, developed an affinity for being in the U.S. orbit. This was most obvious as the Cold War's end approached in the realms of security and economics, but it also was a factor in political, diplomatic, and cultural affairs. Consciously or inadvertently, the people of the United States and their government encouraged South Korea to take this path by playing such an overpowering hegemonic role leading the noncommunist camp in the Cold War. Although North Korea's juche pretensions inhibited somewhat the extent to which North Koreans adhered to leaders in the rival camp, the DPRK clearly pursued an alternative path that exacerbated the divisions between the two Koreas. U.S. responses to North Korea in this context very consciously drove a wedge deeper between the two Koreas. As a result of these factors, the U.S. role in Korea from the Korean War through the end of the Cold War illustrates contradictory qualities. Although U.S. policymakers routinely and legitimately take credit for all the positive facets of U.S. policy toward Korea over that period in terms of helping a deserving state to survive and prosper—albeit in a truncated form and having experienced considerable trauma—few in U.S. society have been ready to accept blame for dividing Korea and contributing to its national separation. Yet the end of the Cold War created a new international context in which the duality of the U.S. role in Korea could not be as readily obfuscated.

Notes 1. For examples of studies done to observe that event, see Han Sung-joo, ed., After One Hundred Years: Continuity and Change in Korean-American Relations, Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1982; Kwak Tae-hwan, John Chay, Cho Soon-sung, and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982, Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1982; Ronald A. Morse, ed., A Century of United States-Korean Relations, Washington, DC: Wilson Center/ University Press of America, 1983; and Koo Young-nok and Suh Dae-sook, eds., Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984.

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2. For insights into U.S. motives and policies as a fledgling imperial power in Asia, see James C. Thompson Jr., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry, Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia, New York: Harper and Row, 1981. 3. For his assessment of conditions at that time, see Horace N. Allen, Things Korean, Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, 1980. 4. For analysis of these factors, see "The Interests, 1860-1904," in Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York: W. W. Norton, 1997, chap. 2. 5. For background on the Japanese roles in Korea's victimization, see Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960. 6. For an overview of the context in which the United States developed these policies, see Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 7. Korean efforts to shape their own destiny in that period are analyzed in Han Woo-Keun's, "Exploitation and Resistance Between the Wars," The History of Korea, Honolulu: East-West Center/University Press of Hawaii, 1980, chap. 33. 8. For analyses of that crucial period, see Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961; Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965; Hugh Burton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, New York: Occasional Paper No. 196 of East Asia Institute, Columbia University, 1967; and William Craig, The Fall of Japan, New York: Dial, 1967. 9. That often overlooked side of U.S. policy toward Asia is evaluated in James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984, and Matray's "Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945-1948," Korean Studies, vol. 19, 1995. See also Han Mu-kang, "Réévaluation of United States Military Government in Korea," in Andrew C. Nahm, ed., The United States and Korea: American-Korean Relations, 1866-1976, Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 1979. 10. For a succinct history of Russia's long-term interests in Korea, see Synn Seung-kwon, "Imperial Russia's Strategy and the Korean Peninsula," in Chung Il-young, ed., Korea and Russia: Toward the 21st Century, Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1992. 11. For background on this facet of U.S.-Korea relations, which is little known to most in U.S. society, see Rosemary A. Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 12. See Choy Bong-youn, A History of the Korean Reunification Movement: Its Issues and Prospects, Peoria, IL: Institute of International Studies, Bradley University, 1984, especially chap. 3, "Unification Efforts During the Occupation Period (1945-1948)"; Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York: W. W. Norton, 1997; Glenn D. Paige, The Korean

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Decision, June 24-30,1950, New York: Free Press, 1968; and Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953, New York: Times Books, 1987. For the U.S. official view of U.S. entry into that war, see United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Publication No. 3922, July 1950. 13. For the larger context of that debate, see Philip Darby, Three Faces of Imperialism: British and American Approaches to Asia and Africa, 1870-1970, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. 14. For analysis of the European roots of U.S. policy toward the nascent Cold War, see Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953, New York: Hill and Wang, 1994; and Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 15. See Halford J. Mackinder's 1904 paper, "The Geographical Pivot of History," reprinted in his posthumous Democratic Ideals and Reality, New York: W. W. Norton, 1962. 16. The foremost adaptor of the Mackinder model to German purposes was General Karl Haushofer, whose Nazi connections did so much to discredit the scholarly label of geopolitics. For analysis of his contribution to geopolitics, see Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action, Port Washington, NY: Kennikot, 1966 [1942], 17. These were derived from the seminal World War II study of evolving geopolitical patterns by Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1969 [1944], 18. For an analysis of Kennan's central role, see Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. 19. For insights into this juxtaposition, see Michael Scholler, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 20. For analyses of the Soviet versus U.S. roles in shaping Korean society during this vulnerable period, see Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1966; and Paik Hak-soon, "North Korean State Formation 1945-1950," Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1993, and "The Gates of Chaos," in Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, chap. 5. 21. America's limited strategic priorities regarding Korea prior to the Korean War are assessed from different perspectives in J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969; and Rosemary A. Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985. 22. For insightful analyses of the Korean War and its historical context, see Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, New York: McGrawHill, 1982; William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995; James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International,

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1989; and Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. 23. For analyses of U.S. Cold War-era statements of support for the ROK's unification policies, see Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Republic of Korea: Background for Policy, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1982; and Ralph N. Clough, Embattled Korea: The Rivalry for International Support, Boulder: Westview, 1987. 24. For an in-depth critique of the interventionist versus noninterventionist debate that occurred in the United States in response to events in Korea that confirmed U.S. proclivities toward interventionism that became mainstream as a result of World War II, see Murray Rothbard, "The Foreign Policy of the Old Right," Journal of Libertarian Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 1978, pp. 85-96. 25. As Gregory Henderson noted, based on his firsthand observations before and after, "The Pentagon, now so determined to stay [in Korea], was then equally determined to go and with a haste which, to many of us then at the Embassy in 1948 and 1949, seemed more rash than wise, deliberate or seemly." Gregory Henderson, "Korea, 1950," in Cotton and Neary, The Korean War in History, p. 178. 26. The author explored U.S. client-state ties with the ROK in greater depth in "South Korea Under Military Rule: Friendly Tyrant?" in Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, eds., Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma, New York: St. Martin's/Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1991. 27. For useful detailed analyses of the history of U.S. policy toward both Koreas and why they stayed divided, see Buss, The United States; Park Tongwhan, ed., The U.S. and the Two Koreas, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998; and various authors who contributed chapters to part 4, entitled "The United States and the Two Koreas," in Dong Won-mo, ed., The Two Koreas and the United States, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000. See also the author's U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, San Francisco and Boulder: World Affairs Council of Northern California and Westview, 1988. 28. For background on that phase in North Korea, see Karoly Fendler, "Economic Assistance from Socialist Countries to North Korea in the Postwar Years: 1953-1963," in Han S. Park, ed., North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995, pp. 161-173. See also Suh Dae-sook, "After the War," in his Kim II Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, chap. 8. 29. For an analysis of why the post-Syngman Rhee experiment with democracy did not succeed, see Han Sung-joo, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. 30. See Kim Se-jin, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971. See also the author's "The Societal Role of the ROK Armed Forces," in E. A. Olsen and Stephen Jurika Jr., eds., The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies, Boulder: Westview, 1986. 31. For a critical analysis of the Park years and U.S. complicity in South Korean excesses, see Harold Hakwon Sunoo, America's Dilemma in Asia: The Case of South Korea, Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979. For a critique of the postPark excesses, see Anonymous, "A Stern, Steady Crackdown": Legal Process

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and Human Rights in South Korea, Washington, DC: Asia Watch Report, May 1987. 32. For balanced treatment of the emergence of South Korea's economic successes, see Michael Keon, Korean Phoenix: A Nation from the Ashes, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall International, 1977; Paul W. Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic of Korea, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977; Leroy P. Jones and Sakong II, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980; and Song Byung-nak, The Rise of the Korean Economy, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990. For less balanced ROK government-sponsored pronouncements on its core economic visions during the Park years, see Park Chung-hee, Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction, Seoul: Dong-A Publishing, 1962; and Park Chung-hee, Saemaul: Korea's New Community Movement, Seoul: Secretariat for the President, Republic of Korea, 1979. 33. For background on both sets of influence, see Carter J. Eckert, O f f spring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991; and Lee Chong-sik, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1985. 34. Japan's contextual influence is evaluated in Chapter 4. In addition to sources cited there, for background on Japan's influence over ROK development, see Brian Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990s: From Antagonism to Adjustment, Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1993; and Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. 35. For insights into North Korea's dilemma, see Joseph C. Kun, "North Korea: Between Moscow and Peking," China Quarterly, no. 31, July-September 1967, pp. 48-58; Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang Between Peking and Moscow, University: University of Alabama Press, 1978; and Joseph Chung, The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1974. 36. For the full meaning of North Korea's pursuit of self-reliance under Kim Il-sung, see Suh Dae-sook, "On Kim's Political Thought," in his Kim II Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, chap. 17; and Han S. Park, "The Nature and Evolution of Juche Ideology," and Ingeborg Gothel, "Juche and the Issue of National Identity in the DPRK of the 1960s," both in Han S. Park, ed., North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1996. 37. South Korea's unease during that period is analyzed in William J. Barnds, ed., The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs, New York: New York University Press, 1976; and Nam Joo-hong, America's Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine, Cambridge, UK: LSE Monographs in International Studies/Cambridge University Press, 1986. 38. For a comprehensive listing of critical analyses, see Richard Dean Burns and Milton Leitenberg, The Wars in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1984, chap. 4, "United States and the Politics of Intervention."

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39. For analysis of South Korea's responses, see Kim Dalchoong and Shin Euisoon, eds., Energy Policies in Korea and Japan: Comparison and Search for Cooperation, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1986. 40. For detailed coverage of the Koreagate scandal, see Robert Boettcher with Gordon L. Friedman, Gifts of Deceit: Sun Myung Moon, Tongsun Park, and the Korean Scandal, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1980; and Moon Chung-in, "Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 1, March 1988, pp. 67-89. For background on the Carter administration's difficulties in dealing with South Korea, see Astri Suhrke and Charles Morrison, "Carter and Korea: The Difficulties of Disengagement," World Today, October 1977, pp. 366-375; Nathan White, U.S. Policy Toward Korea: Analyses, Alternatives, and Recommendations, Boulder: Westview, 1979; Donald L. Ranard, "Korea, Human Rights, and United States Foreign Policy," in Tom J. Farer, ed., Toward a Humanitarian Diplomacy: A Primer for Policy, New York: New York University Press, 1980; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986; and William H. Gleysteen Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999. 41. For analyses of that traumatic period, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997, chap. 5, "Assassination and Aftermath"; Donald N. Clark, ed., The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea, Boulder: Westview, 1988; and Tim Shorrock, "Debacle in Kwangju," The Nation, December 9, 1996, pp. 19-22. 42. For balanced overviews of what that era represented for the United States, see Kenneth Oye, Robert J. Lieby, and Donald Rothchild, eds., Eagle Resurgent: The Reagan Era in U.S. Foreign Policy, Boston: Little, Brown, 1987; and Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. 43. For a relatively sympathetic treatment of the Chun government's rise to power and approach to U.S.-Korea relations, see Harold C. Hinton, Korea Under New Leadership: The Fifth Republic, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. 44. For examples of volumes resulting from that commemorative phase, see Cho Soon-sung, Kwak Tae-hwan, John Chay, and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982, Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1982; Han Sung-joo, ed., After One Hundred Years: Continuity and Change in Korean-American Relations, Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1982; Dong Wonmo, ed., Korean-American Relations at Crossroads, Princeton Junction, NJ: Association of Korean Christian Scholars in North America/1882-1982 Korea-USA Centennial, 1982; Koo Youngnok and Suh Daesook, eds., Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984; and Ronald A. Morse, ed., A Century of United States-Korean Relations, Washington, DC: Wilson Center/University Press of America, 1983. 45. For a popular analysis of that event and its consequences, see Seymour M. Hersh, "The Target Is Destroyed": What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It, New York: Random House, 1986.

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46. For analysis of how South Korea during the Chun years broadened its foreign policy parameters en route to greater interdependence, see Koh Byungchul, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984; Kihl Young-whan, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest, Boulder: Westview, 1984; and Clough, Embattled Korea. 47. For insights into those problems and their legacy, see George E. Ogle, South Korea: Dissent Within the Economic Miracle, London and Washington, DC: Zed Books and International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, 1990; and Mark L. Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994. 48. The domestic political evolution during the Chun years that shaped and hampered the ROK's foreign policy is assessed in: Ilpyong J. Kim and Kihl Young-whan, eds., Political Change in South Korea, New York: Paragon House, 1988; and Rhee Chongik, Korea: The Turbulent Decade, Seoul: Naman Publications, 1989. 49. For analyses of the U.S.-ROK dynamic in the mid- to late 1980s, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Hong-koo, eds., Korea-U.S. Relations: The Politics of Trade and Security, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988; and the author's U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, San Francisco and Boulder: World Affairs Council of Northern California and Westview, 1988. 50. Roh's accomplishments are evaluated in: Lee Manwoo, The Odyssey of Korean Democracy : Korean Politics, 1987-1990, New York: Praeger, 1990; and James Cotton, ed., Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Démocratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations, Canberra, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1993. 51. For a conservative appreciation of the Roh government's value to the United States on the eve of the end of the Cold War, see A. James Gregor, Land of the Morning Calm: Korea and American Security, Lanham, MD: Ethics and Public Policy Center/University Press of America, 1990. 52. See, inter alia, Mo Jongryn, "German Lessons for Managing the Economic Cost of Korean Reunification," in Thomas H. Henriksen and Lho Kyongsoo, eds., One Korea? Challenges and Prospects for Reunification, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1994; and In K. Hwang, "The Prospects for One Korea in Comparison with One Germany," in Kim Yun and Shin Eui-hang, eds., Toward a Unified Korea; Social, Economic, Political, and Cultural Impact of the Reunification of North and South Korea, Columbia: Center for Asian Studies, University of South Carolina, 1995.

REINVIGORATING " D U E COURSE" IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

S THE COLD WAR WAS TERMINATED, THE KOREAN PENINsula's position reflected a conglomeration of ill-fitting factors. The southern half clearly emerged on the victorious end of the geopolitical struggle, whereas the northern half not only was on the losing end; it was a stalwart advocate of diehard resistance. North Korea could not have been more out of step with the societal trends fostered by the Cold War's end and the Soviet Union's abject collapse. The ideological and economic successes of the victorious camp enabled the Republic of Korea to demonstrate to the entire Korean nation, and to the world at large, that its cause was vindicated. Nonetheless, Koreans in both halves of Korea were well aware that the end of the global Cold War did not mean that there would be cause-and-effect spillover into the peninsular strategic stalemate. The paradigm of the late 1940s, which saw Korea contaminated and victimized by U.S.-Soviet tensions that spawned the Cold War, was not matched by a corresponding endgame paradigm helping the two Koreas reconcile their differences. On the contrary, a still divided Korea remained a remnant of the former Cold War—victimized once more by forces beyond Korea's control. At the core of these forces was a set of paradoxical U.S. and ROK security interests reshaped by emergent post-Cold War factors. The United States under the leadership of President George H. W. Bush was reassessing its global strategic options in a context no longer determined by Soviet-inspired threat perceptions. This led the United States toward a revised security posture in what appeared to be a less dangerous environment, but it also provoked concerns within U.S. society that the United States should avoid precipitous cuts.1 Overall, Asia and the 39

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Western Pacific from the start was the odd one out because of China's potential to become a serious strategic rival of the United States and because of the persistence of a radically communist regime in North Korea. 2 This led then General Colin Powell to aptly characterize the pragmatic utility of North Korea in the early stages of the post-Cold War era when he observed, "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim II Sung." 3 Although this was apposite, the conscious U.S. demonization of North Korea as an instrument to retain the focus on residual threats in the region also demonstrated the continued intent to make use of Korea's division for its own purposes. This does not imply there was anything sinister about the U.S. policy posture. On the contrary, the United States, with the best of intentions, was bent upon perpetuating the style of international leadership that Washington assumed the world relied upon. In short, U.S. leaders were doing their duty to the international community—including Korea—where this facet of U.S. policy was being carried out. The United States was coming to terms with the unification of Germany and adjusting its force levels within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as Europe began its post-Cold War adaptations. 4 Even as it did so the United States was reasserting its commitments to South Korea and opposition to North Korea in ways that served to perpetuate Korea's division. On the face of it the United States was entrenching its involvement in Korea, in part to preempt arguments on behalf of reducing or cutting such obligations. 5 The reinforcing of the U.S. position toward Korea was part of a larger process of adjusting to post-Cold War Asian circumstances on the security and economic fronts. 6 Despite U.S. efforts to continue policies that permitted Washington to deflect the conundrum of an in-due-course option, the realities of Korea's place in post-Cold War Asia made it more difficult to perpetuate avoidance of the issue. A new dynamic was engulfing Korea that called renewed attention to the long-term failure of the United States to achieve its initial commitment. The nature of that dynamic can be seen in the policies of all the key players involved in the peninsula. The focus here is on the United States. The non-Korean regional players shall be addressed in the following chapter. Even as the United States sought continuity regarding the two Koreas, Washington was actively urging democratic and economic reforms in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. 7 This amounted to proactive support for national self-determination in these countries, which fits the bill for an accelerated in-due-course paradigm.

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In other words, the United States was encouraging Russians and the other peoples of the former Soviet Union to do what the United States was delaying with regard to the entire Korean nation. U.S. motives for this posture were predicated on U.S. international leadership within Korea's anachronistic remnant of the Cold War, in contrast to a postCold War posture regarding the states of the former Soviet Union. It is important to note that Japan also adopted this same posture for more parochial reasons, linked to Tokyo's desire to retain a U.S. buffer in Korea. At a minimum this constituted a double standard. Although a plausible argument exists for the legitimacy of this based on Korea's lingering quasi-Cold War division and on inducements for reform in the former Soviet Union comparable to what was attempted in the early post-World War II period regarding vanquished Japan, it remains a double standard. That Korean dynamic's nature is even more grating when the two Koreas are juxtaposed to what the United States is no longer willing to characterize as the "two Chinas." In contrast to long-standing U.S. efforts to help stabilize Korean affairs and protect its South Korean ally, the United States has had a one-China policy since the Nixon administration and in various ways has supported China-Taiwan tension reduction and reconciliation. The end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War detracted from efforts to build greater U.S.-China bilateral harmony and, as noted earlier, encouraged some U.S. analysts to perceive China as a potential threat. Nonetheless, the United States continued to deal with a one-China paradigm and supported democratic political reforms on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that—if fully achieved—would lead to national selfdetermination for China. In other words, even though the "one China" remained divided and a case existed that U.S. ties with one portion of the Chinese nation verged on the adversarial, the United States was proactive in the ways it perceived a timetable for a Chinese version of in due course. This stands in sharp contrast to U.S. policies toward a divided Korea, with one friend and one adversary, which officially and pointedly remained on a "two Koreas" track. 8 Thus, in terms of a contextual setting, the U.S. approach to keeping the focus on Korea's differences, which preempted any acceleration of Korean national self-determination, stood out as an aberration in Asia. And as the post-Cold War era unfolded in the 1990s each Korea gradually began to pursue policies toward each other, and toward the United States, which set North and South Korea on paths that could lead them toward levels of cooperation capable of realizing the endgame embodied

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by the phrase in due course. What made this problematical for the United States was that a new pattern did not occur as an epiphanic transformation; it emerged on an incremental basis with substantial detours. Had North-South Korean post-Cold War cooperation been unambiguous, with no reason to doubt that the two Koreas were moving rapidly toward their own version of an in-due-course endgame, the United States would have been compelled by circumstances to reevaluate its policies that had neglected that template. Unfortunately, this did not occur. The two Koreas' cooperation was sporadic and sufficiently reminiscent of the Cold War to permit Washington to retain its old policy template. Those deviations naturally drew upon the histories of each Korea's relations with the United States and helped to present each Korea to Washington in a light that cast North and South Korea as essentially hewing to policies and interests largely unchanged from the Cold War years. Hence, it seemed entirely logical for the United States to persist with its tried-and-true policy format, leaving an in-due-course endgame far beyond a distant horizon. This can best be understood by briefly reviewing the U.S. post-Cold War relationships with each half of Korea. As the post-Cold War era dawned, South Korea discovered that some of the foreign policies it had been pursuing in the 1980s inadvertently positioned the ROK to great advantage. Motivated by a desire for greater economic interdependence and by Olympics-driven sports diplomacy, Seoul successfully reached out to a diverse range of countries throughout the world, including many Marxist states. Foremost were the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Due to the successes of South Korea's nordpolitik (modeled on West Germany's ostpolitik) begun during President Roh's tenure in the late Cold War period (1988-1990) as a means to conduct an end run around North Korea and open ROK contacts with Moscow and Beijing, Seoul found itself experimenting with a nascent form of multilateralism well before it became fully fashionable in the post-Cold War years. 9 That approach to multilateralism on an experimental basis was consistent with the approach taken by the George H. W. Bush administration. This demonstrated the basic overlap in foreign policies between the United States and South Korea during those years. Even though President Bush's appointment of a former CIA officer, Donald Gregg, who reportedly served as station chief in Seoul in the 1970s, as U.S. ambassador to the ROK caused concern in South Korea about U.S. manipulation, the Bush administration soon got on track. 10

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Washington was vocally supportive of President Roh's efforts to cultivate improved ties with North Korea, in part because this was in keeping with the smile diplomacy pursued by the United States during the middle to late Reagan years. During President Roh's July 1991 visit to Washington, President Bush affirmed that the United States "stands ready to help the Koreas reunite" and stated lasting peace in Korea can only occur "when Korea is made whole." 11 President Bush emphasized that notion before the Korean National Assembly in January 1992 when he said "Korea will be whole again. . . . The American people share your goal of peaceful reunification on terms acceptable to the Korean people. This is clear. This is simple. This is American policy." 12 These supportive rhetorical statements were in keeping with previous overt U.S. support for Seoul, but they were also matched by positive diplomatic developments during this period. Along with Russia and China, the United States helped facilitate the joint entry of the ROK and the DPRK into the UN General Assembly in September 1991.13 The United States, well aware of the pressures Seoul faced in the wake of German unification, also supported the Roh administration's diplomatic overtures that yielded the Agreement on Reconciliation and Nonaggression in December 1991, which appeared to be very promising. 14 That pact was dependent upon further progress toward nuclear transparency in Korea to assure that the DPRK was not pursuing a nuclear option. In keeping with that agenda, President Bush had announced in September 1991 that the United States would remove tactical nuclear weapons from various locations, including South Korea. 15 This enabled South Korea to pronounce the ROK to be nuclear free by November 199116 and to sign another agreement with North Korea intended to make all of Korea a nuclear-free zone when it was implemented. 17 Although these steps merited praise, they also warranted closer inspection. Had they succeeded, there would be no reason to second-guess them. The main reason they did not succeed was North Korea's persistence in pursuing its nuclear option in ways that fomented a later crisis. Without sanctioning Pyongyang's deviousness, it is nonetheless worth noting that the U.S. caution with regard to the risks in Korea may have contributed to the long-range outcome. For example, as the United States was backing Seoul rhetorically and via local nuclear cuts, the United States also postponed planned moves to cut U.S. forces in Korea pending final resolution of the inter-Korean nuclear issue.18 Furthermore, as symbolically useful as the U.S. nuclear cuts in Korea were, they were primarily driven by larger shifts in U.S.-Russia relations attending the

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end of the Cold War, and they did not mean that South Korea was no longer protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella sheltering its various allies. These moves did not diminish North Korea's threat perceptions, which focused on U.S. strategic support for South Korea. Also, as constructive as the two Koreas' dual entry into the United Nations was in so many respects, there was no concealing the fact that South Korea was far more enthusiastic about the concept than North Korea and that Pyongyang went along under pressure from a changing Beijing-Moscow dynamic. More pertinent to the in-due-course theme of this book, U.S. backing for two Koreas in the United Nations effectively helped to reinforce Korea's division by adding the imprimatur of the international community to their separate identities. This also was consistent with the U.S. approach to international leadership. On balance, the U.S. support for South Korea's cause during this phase in the early post-Cold War era contains nuances that warrant close attention. Given the circumstances surrounding the two Koreas at the time they entered the United Nations, there was a valid reason for the United States to support dual entry. Nonetheless, U.S. interest in dealing with two Koreas rather than one raises suspicions about ulterior motives. This is not to suggest—as a hypothetical counterfactual proposition—that the United States should have opposed dual entry into the United Nations as a way to fulfill the in-due-course mandate. On the contrary, having both Koreas within the United Nations may prove to be a catalyst for reconciliation. However, it would have been better and far more consistent with the in-due-course mandate if the United States had pressed for joint entry of the two states as part of a single Korean nation as an overt expression of support for a future single Korean sovereign state. The transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War years also roughly coincided in South Korea with the transfer of power from the Roh Tae-woo government to the Kim Young-sam government. Technically that political shift occurred in December 1992, but the Roh-Kim transition process really began in late 1989, when Kim ostensibly was co-opted by Roh's ruling Democratic Liberal Party. 19 In fact Kim proved more clever than his co-optors assumed when he in effect turned the tables and co-opted them as the party's executive chairman. Given President Kim's civilian political background and his decidedly progressive reputation, it was clear that the Roh-linked political grouping, with its conservative and military-backed roots, had reason to believe it had pulled off a good deal. 20 In time this proved to be a misjudgment that redounded to Kim Young-sam's benefit.

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For U.S. policy purposes the most important facets of the Roh-Kim transition were that it began the civilianization evolution away from ROK military-backed regimes and that it did not occur as the result of overt U.S. policy guidance or duress. This is not to suggest that there was no U.S. role in this process. Of course, part of the U.S. role was the legacy of past U.S. efforts to encourage Seoul to adopt more humane human rights policies and to shed some of its coup-related imagery. There was no doubt that South Korean politicians had such visions in the back of their minds as they sought to build a bigger political tent in the name of Seoul's ruling party. As a backdrop, such past pressures sensitized Korean politicians to the alternatives available to them. More salient, however, was the emergence of a new political party model in the United States when President Clinton was elected shortly before President Kim Young-sam, after a campaign based on a more centrist approach to the Democratic Party's main issues and an awareness that the U.S. administration elected in 1992 would be the first entirely post-Cold War U.S. government. 21 The new U.S. administration's approach to political innovation served as an example to the new Kim government of how a progressive political leader could borrow conservative ideas in an effort to build centrist momentum and achieve results. Although later Clinton scandals caused the Kim Young-sam administration and the successor Kim Dae-jung administration, which had even stronger ties with the U.S. Democratic Party, to be far more discreet about the ways in which South Korean progressives admired the U.S. New Democrat paradigm, it is evident that both Korean presidents did esteem it. President Kim Dae-jung was elected in 1997 and inaugurated in February 1998. This marked South Korea's first electoral transition from one civilian politician to another, thereby setting the tone for Korea's genuine democratization. 22 In a limited sense these moves under the leadership of Kim Youngsam and Kim Dae-jung represented an effort by South Korea to achieve democratic political self-determination. In other words, this was progress on the part of half of the Korean nation toward the goals embodied in the phrase in due course. To the considerable extent the United States supported and praised the two South Korean Kim administrations, one could contend that this represented U.S. affirmation of an in-due-course endgame. There is a major problem with this logic, however, because these positive happenings were occurring only in South Korea. Moreover, the U.S. policy toward Korea's division remained largely unchanged at the outset of South Korea's political transformation in the

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post-Cold War era. In fact, the ways in which South Korea was democratizing (based on the legacy of the Cold War-era freedoms won on its behalf by U.S. efforts and on the strategic protection afforded South Korea in the post-Cold War years by the United States) cumulatively reinforced U.S. perceptions of the desirability of buffering the ROK from the North Korean adversary—thereby enabling South Korea to pursue greater political freedom. In these terms, then, South Korea's political progress was a by-product of U.S. support for the processes that preserved the Korean nation's division. Despite positive political developments in South Korea emerging under Roh Tae-woo toward the end of the Cold War and in the early stages of the post-Cold War era, and despite positive features gaining genuine momentum under President Kim Young-sam in the mid-1990s, from a U.S. perspective most of the major policy issues vis-à-vis Korea remained essentially unchanged. The U.S. interests revolved around perpetuating a viable forward-deployed U.S. force presence on the peninsula, assuring that South Korea understood the rationales behind the U.S.-ROK alliance, accommodating that alliance to evolving circumstances in the region, and coping with the changing threat posed by the North Korean adversary in the mini-Cold War left behind on the Korean Peninsula. To be sure, the United States modified its rhetoric to adjust to the changing times, but the fundamentals remained largely intact. 23 In this setting, U.S. support for South Korea's unification agenda amounted to unadulterated policy boilerplate. German unification and the hopes it raised among some South Koreans notwithstanding, U.S. policymakers had every reason to be confident that the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era would leave the Korean Peninsula divided. There was virtually no reason for the United States to become more pragmatic about an imminent endgame in Korea. Political progress in South Korea may have created the appearance of conceptualizing an in-due-course outcome, but—if anything—it only helped to accentuate the differences with North Korea and confirm U.S. assumptions about the correctness of U.S. policy. Amid this early post-Cold War consistency in U.S. policy, events in North Korea proceeded to stir the pot. Coming out of the Cold War near the bottom of the pile on the losing side, North Korea was traumatized by the war-termination process. The external state that was most instrumental in the DPRK's formation ceased to exist after a period of Gorbachev-era reformist experiments that the Kim Il-sung regime derided and scorned. The loss of the old-style Soviet Union eliminated one

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of the two anchors in the international socialist system that Pyongyang depended upon despite its pursuit of juche-style autarky. Moreover, North Korea benefited considerably from years of being able to play off the Soviet Union against the other anchor in China. Pyongyang no longer enjoyed that form of leverage and was wary of becoming overly dependent upon China because of Korea's history of suzerainty under China and because of Beijing's brand of dabbling with capitalist societal reforms that was, to Pyongyang, too reminiscent of what Moscow had done. In short, the post-Cold War era left North Korea in a multifaceted dilemma—made worse by South Korea's being on the winning side, hoping to emulate West Germany's track record on unification with its Marxist rival. Thrust into this untenable position and anxious to create the means to rectify its strategic situation, the Kim Il-sung regime fell back upon its juche philosophy, bent upon fostering greater economic autarky capable of making it immune to the temptations to which Moscow had succumbed and with which Beijing was experimenting. Were that the only option available to North Korea, it would simply have slipped into the kind of devastating economic decay that became so evident by the late 1990s. 24 Unfortunately, Pyongyang was far more imaginative as it explored its post-Cold War alternatives. The North Koreans had a welldeserved reputation for being a proverbial tough nut to crack. They lived up to that notoriety by pursuing the nuclear weapon option in the early 1990s, which had its roots in the late Cold War years. This caused great anxiety in South Korea, of course, because Seoul had been constrained by the United States in its earlier contemplation of a similar option. 25 North Korea's actions caused far more than anxiety on the U.S. part and led to U.S. policies that came very close to renewed warfare during the spring of 1994.26 Dealing with North Korea's nuclear potentials also led the United States to rely upon a pool of nuclear experts within U.S. society whose expertise had not been in much demand since the demise of the Soviet Union, which thereby overshadowed the cadre of Korea expertise fostered over the years since the Korean War. This, in turn, skewed U.S. policy somewhat toward global proliferation concerns and away from intrinsic Korea-related issues. 27 Subsequent to that crisis the United States coped with the North Korean nuclear option in a two-pronged manner. On the one hand, Washington found itself having to deal with Pyongyang's efforts to develop nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as either a budding reality or an extraordinarily skillful use of psychological warfare,

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tapping into South Korean and U.S. fears that Pyongyang's nuclear brinkmanship was driven by North Korean leaders who were literally insane by U.S.-ROK standards. The more North Korea's actions seemed erratic and high-risk, the more North Korea was able to make use of a form of calculated irrationality.28 The problem for the United States was that it was virtually impossible to disprove that North Korean leaders were not in fact as mentally unstable as they seemed. This compelled the Clinton administration to simultaneously bolster its strategic support for South Korea and develop institutional devices—based on the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. In turn this spawned the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1995, aimed at implementing a nonproliferation regulatory scheme in exchange for assuring nonthreatening supplies of nuclear power via light-water reactor plants and for facilitating supplies of petroleum. 29 On the other hand, and as a derivative from the Agreed Framework, the United States entered into an experimental phase in U.S.-DPRK relations guided by a desire to explore alternatives to confrontation. Although there is a history of U.S. critics urging Washington to be more innovative in its pursuit of U.S. goals for North Korea, very little progress had been made prior to the 1994 nuclear crisis.30 But the North Korean nuclear crisis—coming amid an overall trend within U.S. post-Cold War foreign policy during the Clinton administration of making better use of economic leverage—created conditions conducive to offering U.S. incentives designed to get Pyongyang to change its ways. Efforts were made in the mid- to late 1990s to cultivate improved U.S.DPRK relations by using economic and diplomatic inducements to North Korea.31 These efforts did not always find a receptive audience in Seoul during the Kim Young-sam years.32 However, after the election of Kim Dae-jung as president in 1997 and his inauguration in early 1998, followed by the launching of his so-called sunshine policy, designed to boldly reshape South Korean constructive engagement initiatives aimed at North Korea, 33 the U.S. overtures toward the DPRK appeared to be on a convergence path with Seoul's new efforts. 34 Moreover, Kim's actions toward North Korea as president were entirely consistent with his previous political orientation. 35 As positive as these developments seemed to be, there were some underlying factors that warranted concern from the in-due-course perspective. As much as President Kim Dae-jung sincerely intended his policy overtures to yield a harmonious path toward peaceful unification in the twenty-first century, and as much as his government welcomed

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the Clinton administration's support in that light, there really was no indication that there had ever been a meeting of the minds on that issue among South Korean and U.S. leaders. On the contrary, despite ample documentation of South Korean desires for unification, U.S. policy toward unification has always been tepid at best. 36 Critics long have found the U.S. approach to Korean unification wanting. 37 There is no reason to doubt that virtually all those in U.S. society who care about Korea and follow the ups and downs of U.S. relations with both Koreas sympathize with Korean desires for reunification of this divided nation. That assumption probably prevails among U.S. policymakers working on Korean issues as U.S. administrations come and go. Those attitudes are reflected in recurring expressions of U.S. support for Seoul's specific policy positions on reunification and for the general principle of unification as a normative goal. Nevertheless, there are recurring themes that undermine those positive factors. In addition to the Cold War-related U.S. policy factors that have already been assessed as causes for U.S. reluctance to embrace an endgame approach to in due course, the United States has been inhibited by Japan's perception of the value in a continued divided Korea and how that spills over into the U.S. understanding of the situation. Japanese appreciation for the stability provided by the U.S. military on the Korean Peninsula, fears about the consequences of renewed warfare in Korea, and anxiety about the potentials of a unified Korea to adversely influence Japan's interests are widely understood among U.S. officials in charge of Asia policy. 38 U.S. sensitivity to Japanese views regarding events in Korea was acute, especially in the wake of Japan's experiencing, on August 31, 1998, a North Korean Taepo-dong missile test that passed over Japan before landing in the Pacific Ocean. 39 Given South Korean anxieties about the ways Washington and Tokyo interact on Korean issues, this led to the creation in April 1999 of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group. More important, these factors condition U.S. readiness to be truly responsive to opportunities to foster Korean unification. When the U.S. main strategic partner in Asia, Japan, is so hesitant to sanction Korean unification, it is logical for the United States to drag its feet. 40 Reinforcing that discreet vacillation, camouflaged as interalliance harmony, is yet another U.S. consideration. For a long time U.S. policy toward Seoul's unification ambitions has been tempered by a realistic perception of South Korean ambivalence, verging on hypocrisy. In short, although South Korean assertions of sincerity with regard to unification

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were supposed to be accepted by its allies without questioning their motives, it has been obvious that virtually no one in South Korea expected their unification dreams to be realized in the near term. This made it that much easier for South Koreans to expound on unification plans and insist upon solid support from Washington. Because neither country really envisioned tangible progress on reunification throughout most of the Cold War, this was a low-risk approach and virtually guaranteed inertia would prevail. 41 This is analogous to what U.S. legislators call a "free vote"—situations where politicians can loudly proclaim their support for, and cast their vote in favor of, a pending law that they are confident is so controversial that its defeat is assured. In other words, a free vote is a totally symbolic political gesture with no real substantive meaning. In this sense, then, overt U.S. support for the ROK's various proposals for national reunification and self-determination have amounted to a free vote, knowing full well that circumstances will prevent success. Moreover, U.S. leaders who cast their free vote do not even experience a twinge of hypocrisy because they also know full well that their South Korean allies who make such proposals (and the North Korean adversaries who offer counterproposals) do so in a free-vote context, loading their proposals with unacceptable specifics—poison pills—that guarantee failure. This is not to suggest that the U.S. approach imposes any inhibitions on the freedom of either or both Koreas to take the initiative on unification of their own volition. Those who argue that external powers may not have any choice other than to deal with Korean decisions to pursue unification may well be correct. 42 However, because both Koreas are well aware of the free-vote milieu and are uncertain about how much meaningful external support a unified Korea might receive from powers that were ambivalent about unification's desirability, there is an environment for Seoul and Pyongyang to be less than candid about how they delay the process. The degree to which these attitudes continue to prevail in the postCold War era, given the growing plausibility of Korean unification, is difficult to estimate. In one sense the same logic persists because South Korea's hope, certainly shared with North Korea's confidence, is that North Korea will recover from its slippage enough to become a viable partner in a long-term process of unification. Short of total collapse of that process and rapid unification (a so-called hard landing), there is a reasonable chance that both Koreas' intentions—not to rush into unification at a pace neither side is prepared to adjust to or can afford—will

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prevail. 43 In this context one can assume the United States will continue to drag its feet on unification with equanimity, reassuring both Koreas and reinforcing Japan. More important, however, this posture permits the United States to postpone any endgame indefinitely. 44 Moreover, it can thus avoid coming to terms with the in-due-course resolution of Korean self-determination. The more the two Koreas actively elongate the timetable for unification, and the more Korea's neighbors reinforce such a timetable by signaling their hesitancy to sanction rapid progress on unification, the more it seems to legitimize U.S. procrastination and failure to actively pursue an in-due-course mandate for Korean national independence. This is made easier still by the ways in which Seoul's desires to prolong the reunification process—on the grounds that a slower pace provides time for the beleaguered North Korean economy to pull itself up by the bootstraps through internal reform and foreign aid—are rooted in economic rationality. South Korea's economic prudence is underscored by the ways in which Seoul recognizes the cost-effectiveness of retaining for as long as possible a U.S.-funded security guarantee for South Korea. Those funds that the ROK does not have to expend on its own defense can be diverted for economic development and to help prepare for economically absorbing North Korea within a unified Korea. As long as the U.S. public is willing to go along with these arrangements, it makes sense for South Korea to foster conditions in which U.S. policy pursues an armed presence in a divided Korea and the U.S. government remains hesitant to sanction—much less proactively support—rapid Korean reunification. 45 Perversely, the more the United States focuses on North Korea as a threat, the simpler it is to maintain the dualistic policy focus toward Korean unification. So even as South Koreans expanded their bilateral diplomatic overtures toward North Korea in the wake of President Kim Dae-jung's June 2000 summit with Chairman Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, with the pledge for a reciprocal summit in Seoul at an "appropriate time" in the future (understandably avoiding the phrase in due course),'46 various South Korean governmental 47 and economic 48 initiatives made progress, and the two Koreas presented a united sports delegation at the September 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney, marching under a joint flag at the opening ceremony, the United States persisted in following a dualistic policy. Most visibly, the Clinton administration responded to President Kim's overtures to North Korea, which were calculated to launch a

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gradual reconciliation with—and transformation of—the DPRK, by increasing the U.S. array of incentives intended to help draw the Pyongyang regime onto a path toward moderation and reform. Despite persistent conservative critiques of alleged appeasement by the Clinton administration for giving the North Koreans far more than they deserved as a dangerous, terrorist, and uncooperative rogue state, the United States created a special task force led by former Secretary of Defense William Perry to reformulate U.S. policy toward the DPRK and devise new initiatives that would basically complement those of the Kim Dae-jung administration. 49 As the result of several months of réévaluation and negotiations in 1999, surrounded by rumored word that change was afoot, and with the formal issuance of what became known as the Perry Report in the fall of 1999, the United States was en route to a far more overt constructive engagement policy toward North Korea. 50 During the following year sufficient additional bilateral progress was made to warrant a much publicized visit in early October 2000 by a high-level North Korean official, Vice Marshall Jo Myong-rok, to the White House and Pentagon.51 This set the stage for the first-ever visit by a U.S. secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, to Pyongyang for a summit with Kim Jong-il.52 This spawned plans for a visit by President Clinton to North Korea prior to his leaving office—plans that eventually were canceled amid postpresidential election turmoil in the United States.53 Even though Clinton administration engagement policies were intended to confirm Washington's support for President Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy and in effect help assure North Korea's survival long enough for Kim Dae-jung's policies to realize their potential, they also underscored the long-standing U.S. emphasis on Korea's division because they played into Pyongyang's desires for improved DPRK-U.S. relations on terms that were largely defined by Pyongyang. Ironically, the Clinton administration policies on North Korea had slipped back into the older pattern: inadvertent encouragement of Korea's division. Its divisive policies were not entirely inadvertent, however, because the U.S. Defense Department persisted—even as U.S. diplomatic overtures toward North Korea flourished—in its definition of North Korea as a serious threat requiring a long-term U.S. military commitment to deter aggression against the ROK. 54 The U.S. policies had a contradictory quality, but one common thread running through them was the net result of Washington's contributing to delays in the prospects for Korean national self-determination. That level of U.S. ambiguity was unintentionally underscored by elements of ambiguity in South Korea's overtures toward North Korea.

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Although Seoul's policies toward the DPRK were generally praised, especially after President Kim Dae-jung was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace for his political and diplomatic achievements, there were serious questions raised about several facets of South Korea's policies. 55 These included concerns about the effectiveness of economic overtures and the wisdom of making North Korea dependent on aid; 56 about using controversial intermediaries to reach out to North Korea such as the Reverend Sung Myung Moon's Unification Church 57 and a possibly vulnerable Hyundai Corporation whose founder—Chung Ju Yung—was a fervent supporter of the ROK's policy toward North Korea; 58 and about the rationality of a still recovering South Korean economy jeopardizing its post-International Monetary Fund rescue resurgence for the sake of helping North Korea. 59 This level of uncertainty created enough doubt about the prudence of Seoul's approach to the DPRK to add more legitimacy to President Kim's domestic critics, which in turn reinforced the view of those in the United States who considered the Kim-Clinton forms of engagement with North Korea to be weak-willed, intellectually muddled, and strategically verging on appeasement. In short, by the end of 2000—with the election of U.S. President George W. Bush—conditions were growing more conducive for a harder line toward North Korea. Early in the Bush administration there were indicators that Seoul was worried that the previous U.S. administration's support for its DPRK policy would be undermined by the orientation of the new focus on reinvigorating U.S. military readiness to deal with tangible conventional threats, building a missile defense system to help cope with weapons of mass destruction, and greater wariness of China's potentials for geopolitical hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. It did not require any imagination on the part of South Koreans to realize that North Korea fit all of those concerns. 60 To the degree the United States needed a visible focus of its force commitments in Northeast Asia; for its efforts to strengthen the U.S.Japan alliance; and to partially justify missile defense, it made more sense for the George W. Bush administration to treat North Korea as a discrete adversary rather than a country amenable to convergence with South Korea. Seoul's early concerns were most obvious regarding U.S. intentions to emphasize national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) because of the manifest utility of North Korea as a country requiring constraints 61 and because of Pyongyang's recognition of U.S. intentions to see North Korea in that manner.62 Washington's reported attempt to get Seoul to change the "sunshine policy" label also caused concern for the Kim administration.63 President Kim initiated

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contacts with the new administration during the transition period and shortly after Bush's inauguration, which were designed to get a U.S.ROK summit on track as soon as feasible to help coordinate the allies' policies toward North Korea and the Northeast Asian context. 64 The summit was hosted in Washington on March 7, 2001. Held early in the new administration's term in office, the meeting between Presidents Bush and Kim can be most generously described as emitting mixed signals in various ways. 65 A year after the Washington summit, an insider noted that President Kim's staff did not heed advice not to engage President Bush too early in his term and that the South Koreans pressed for the ROK-U.S. summit in order to "leapfrog" Japan in getting an audience with Bush. 66 There is no doubt that what Kim Daejung desired was essential continuity from the Clinton administration for his proactive pursuit of rapprochement with North Korea. On the eve of the U.S.-ROK summit, signs from Washington were sent to President Kim by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who stated at a March 6 presummit news conference: "We do plan to engage with North Korea where President Clinton and his administration left o f f ' ; and, "We are not avoiding North Korea; quite the contrary."67 Those reassuring words were undercut at the summit when President Bush adopted a much harder line, stressing U.S. desires for greater transparency and reciprocity that would demonstrate the ways North Korea is actually doing what it promised to do and suggesting that the United States would not be as compliant as it had been in recent years. President Bush's initial posture contrasted with his father's early policies toward Korea and was more reminiscent of Ronald Reagan but without the smile diplomacy atmospherics. This came across most vividly at the summit press conference. In response to this policy tone, one South Korean analyst observed, "America has thrown cold water over the whole North-South rapprochement." 68 An even more strongly stated judgment of the Bush-Kim interaction came from U.S. columnist Thomas Plate, who contended "what the new American president did was to cut out Kim's heart."69 Although such harsh judgments may prove warranted in the long run if the Bush administration continues to persist in its harder line toward North Korea, the early ambiguous signals emanating from Washington to Seoul and Pyongyang may have simply been a by-product of a new administration that did not have all its policymakers in office at the time the summit occurred. As Senator Joseph Biden, senior Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, commented with regard to the summit, "I still don't know if this is good cop, bad cop or confusion or

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what." 70 Whether intentional or not, the U.S. message at the summit was an awkward blend of hard-line antiappeasement pressures on North Korea to show progress before any more incentives were offered, as well as conciliatory rhetoric about the United States wanting to support Seoul's quest for North-South reconciliation. In contrast to the Kim Dae-jung administration's strident avoidance of criticism of North Korea after the North-South summit of June 2000, the United States did not hold back at the U.S.-ROK summit. 71 Secretary Powell stressed to the media that North Korea is "a threat" 72 and that North Korea "is a regime that is despotic. . . . It is broken. We have no illusions about this regime." 73 Predictably, North Korea responded with verbal attacks on the United States, thereby sending a signal to Seoul.74 There was, of course, no need for such a signal to the South Korean side because the Kim Dae-jung administration had not wavered from its course. And President Kim, speaking at the conservative American Enterprise Institute a day after the Kim-Bush summit, made it clear that the United States should "seize the opportunity" to improve U.S.-DPRK relations; in an interview on the day of the summit Kim said, "South Korea-North Korea relations can advance only so far without progress in U.S.-North Korea relations. These two must move in parallel." 75 That approach stood in sharp contrast to a highly visible policy advocacy piece by Henry Kissinger the day before the summit that belittled the results of Kim and Clinton versus North Korea and urged the Bush administration to see the notion that "Pyongyang must be convinced that the road to Washington leads through Seoul and not the other way around." 76 Although designed to help Seoul and strengthen the U.S.ROK bond, this concept was damaging to President Kim's design for improving ROK-DPRK ties by extending to North Korea, via access to the United States and Japan, the same kinds of opportunities South Korea had enjoyed for a decade via China and Russia. In the wake of the summit several U.S. observers criticized the hard-line U.S. policy toward North Korea and recommended a more moderate approach. 77 Such views were not helped by the high visibility of two prominent U.S. military officials who were outspoken in their negative descriptions of North Korea shortly after the summit. Admiral Dennis Blair, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, stated in Seoul, "I define North Korea the No. 1 enemy state when I look across my area of responsibility." 78 And General Thomas A. Schwartz, commander in chief for the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command, stated before Congress, "When I look north, I can see an enemy that's bigger,

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better, closer and deadlier, and I can prove it."79 Such perceptions are in fact nothing new, but their timing and prominence contributed to the negative tone of the Bush administration's posture toward South Korea's efforts to engage with North Korea. Seoul officials may have been taken aback by Washington's policy shifts under the new U.S. administration, which were characterized as "abrupt and sobering," but they did not permit any of this to deter South Korea from its upbeat goals for North Korea. 80 Instead, President Kim's government, as part of an internal reorganization within its cabinet, installed new ministers of foreign, defense, and unification affairs as well as a new intelligence chief. This was designed, according to an anonymous Blue House aide, because "the President hopes that this new team will be able to persuade the Bush administration to back the sunshine policy and resume diplomatic negotiations with North Korea on missile and other security issues." 81 Subsequent to those changes Seoul encouraged observers of Korean affairs and U.S. policy toward Korea to give the new Bush administration time to get its act together and to adjust to the realities of inter-Korean relations. This was summarized by the ROK ambassador to the United Nations, Sun Joun-yung, who told a news conference, "I don't think there will be any sliding back on U.S. policies. . . . It is quite natural to see a thorough review on the part of any administration. . . . I am quite optimistic that the new U.S. administration will come forward with a new position not so much different from the previous one." 82 Time will tell whether South Korean long-term hopes in this regard will be realized, but there are reasons to be skeptical because of the U.S. readiness to treat North Korea's past and current behavior as part of the rationale behind a more assertive U.S. security policy throughout the region. Nonetheless, U.S. willingness to use North Korea in that manner may be undercut by the availability of alternative diplomatic avenues for North Korea to pursue—with the encouragement of South Korea's engagement policies. North Korea experienced a surge in external diplomatic overtures and some external economic interest from a range of substantial countries—notably Britain, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand—roughly at the same time the harder U.S. position was becoming evident.83 Perhaps most startling was the new prominence of the European Union (EU) as a diplomatic player in Korean affairs. At a late March 2001 EU summit in Stockholm (Sweden holding the EU presidency at that point), the European Union announced it would send a delegation to Pyongyang in May to assist in the inter-Korean peace

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process in ways that the United States was avoiding. Sweden's prime minister, Goran Persson, then serving as EU president, said the purpose of the EU effort was "to express support for the process started by the South Korean president, Kim Dae Jung." 84 Sweden's foreign minister, Anna Lindh, provided background for the EU motivation when she said, "It's becoming clear that the new U.S. administration wants to take a more hard-line approach toward North Korea. . . . That means that Europe must step in to help reduce tension between the two Koreas." 85 In a somewhat sarcastic letter to the editors of the Washington Post responding to coverage of this EU effort, Senator Jesse Helms observed, "I was heartened by the news that the EU is willing to step in and fill the security void left by the United States on the Korean peninsula. But when, precisely, did these EU leaders say that their new European Army would be ready to take up the posts of the 37,000 American troops stationed on the demilitarized zone [DMZ]?" 86 Aside from the inaccuracy with regard to the location where U.S. forces are deployed (most are well south of the DMZ), the tone of this letter reflected U.S. sensitivity to other international players being presumptuous enough to think that they could do what the United States might do in, or for, Korea. Although the EU efforts are well intentioned and could be helpful in backing the inter-Korean peace process, they also are useful in the ways they underscore the difficulties in harmonizing U.S.-ROK policies toward North Korea and in the ways they illustrate U.S. reluctance to countenance other external players shaping inter-Korean reconciliation. 87 What is true with regard to the European Union is still more true with regard to any such role by China or Russia. Yet the more the United States becomes a hesitant participant prone to hard-line treatment of North Korea and less supportive of President Kim's policies than the ROK wants its ally to be, the more difficulty the United States may experience in formulating an effective policy. The harder U.S. line toward the reconciliation process early in the George W. Bush administration as well as U.S. unease about China's relations with the two Koreas (see below) were thrust into an altered context as a result of the April 2001 U.S.-China airplane incident in the South China Sea near Hainan Island. That event, which threatened to exacerbate tensions between the United States and China in ways reminiscent of the Cold War, was a most unwelcome development for Seoul and Tokyo.88 Neither wants the United States to move toward a military confrontation with China that could so easily entangle these two U.S. allies. The fact that the U.S. reconnaissance plane was based in Japan

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was an awkward reality for Tokyo. And Seoul had ample reason not to want U.S.-China frictions to complicate ROK-China ties or to provide North Korea with reasons to embrace China more closely while casting the U.S.-ROK relationship as an adversary to that team. Furthermore, from Seoul's perspective the worse the U.S.-China relationship becomes, the easier it would be for the United States to enforce a hard line toward North Korea. None of these factors was conducive to the sort of geopolitical climate Seoul desired for a shared U.S.-ROK engagement with North Korea. Events in the South China Sea tended to reinforce the very trends in the new Bush administration that the Kim Dae-jung government hoped to rectify. 89 U.S. popular reactions to the Bush administration's harder line on North Korea and China ranged from relative indifference on the Korean front to an active policy debate regarding China. Once again Korea was overshadowed by U.S. concerns with one of its larger neighbors. Nonetheless, the Bush administration did receive pointed criticism from sectors it probably cared about. One example, which went largely unnoticed in the media, was constructive criticism from the Council on Foreign Relations-backed Independent Task Force on Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula, which included in its ranks two former Republican ambassadors to Korea (Donald Gregg and James Lilley) and one former Democratic ambassador to Korea (James Laney) and essentially urged policy continuity.90 A former Clinton administration defense secretary (and former Republican senator), William Cohen, added to these pressures in an April 2001 speech at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government when he criticized the successor Bush administration's changes in Korea policy for "miss[ing] this opportunity." 91 Whether such criticism had its intended impact, or whether it was simply a matter of the new Bush administration being in its fledgling stage, by early May its representatives—perhaps nudged by signs of progress in formalizing diplomatic relations between the European Union and the DPRK 92 —were signaling an intention to get back on track again. 93 Despite North Korean countervailing hard-line policies, including intrusions into South Korean territorial waters that Seoul worried would exacerbate U.S. policy shifts 94 and renewed warnings that Pyongyang might renege on missile agreements, 95 on June 6, 2001, President Bush announced that the United States would return to the U.S.-North Korean talks with a new emphasis on "comprehensive reciprocity." Although many observers treated the Bush administration's completion of its policy review process as constituting a reversal of the setback inflicted by

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the Bush-Kim summit, this was not an accurate perception. The Bush administration did return to the nuclear and missile agenda for its talks with North Korea, but it added a new set of issues involving North Korea's forward deployment of conventional forces near the DMZ. When combined with Washington's focus on North Korea's threat potential as a rationale for TMD and NMD, as well as its greater emphasis on avoiding any hint of appeasement in U.S. policy toward North Korea, the Bush administration's revised policies can best be described as building upon what went before—but in a more tough-minded manner.96 It is important to note that President Bush's partial reversal was influenced by a memo sent to him by his father but written by the former President Bush's ambassador to Korea, Donald Gregg. 97 The Kim Dae-jung government was relieved by the Bush administration's policy review results and its decision to reengage in a dialogue with North Korea. Although the results were far from ideal, falling short of full U.S. support for President Kim's sunshine policy, it could have been far worse given the ambiguity evident in President Bush's early handling of Korean issues. Seoul appeared most relieved that the United States had not opted to try to renegotiate the 1994 nuclear accords, as had been feared. 98 On balance, then, Seoul had ample reason to count its blessings as evidence mounted that a relatively moderate approach to Korea had prevailed among Bush's advisers. 99 The key nuance in this U.S. rebound is the notion of relativity. Compared to what transpired in the latter Clinton years, the Bush administration's spectrum of options was skewed toward a much harder line. Washington was bent on avoiding any semblance of appeasement of North Korea, was enthusiastic about utilizing North Korea's adversarial qualities for TMD/NMD justification, and was prepared to stand up to Seoul when necessary in order to assure that inter-Korean "carrots" (incentives) did not get in the way of U.S.-ROK "sticks" (disincentives). 100 Moreover, President Bush's initial rebuffing of President Kim's sunshine agenda was far more broadly based and much higher in profile—thanks to the Bush-Kim summit—when compared to his supposed reversal, which was more narrowly configured in that it dealt primarily with U.S.-DPRK bilateral issues. It also received much less public attention because it did not entail summitry and because the positive spin it acquired made it appear that U.S. policy was simply going back on track. Upon closer scrutiny it is evident that the United States remained formally supportive of the ROK's position on engagement with North

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Korea. This was evident in that the United States—even amid its hardline pronouncements on North Korea—continued to contribute large amounts of humanitarian food aid to North Korea to help its people survive. 101 However, U.S. policy was becoming far more overtly conditional in tone—in the form of greater U.S. pressure for tangible results. U.S. skepticism also was becoming far more overt in that Washington bluntly second-guessed Seoul and did not attempt to camouflage its profound doubts about the ability of a U.S.-supported South Korean engagement policy to transform North Korea into a player worthy of any significant level of trust. The United States scarcely concealed its readiness to stress U.S. priorities toward North Korea—notably on the TMD/NMD front, which began to assume proportions akin to Washington's early post-Cold War reliance on nuclear experts over Korea experts, both of which were reminiscent of the client-state paradigm that most observers of U.S.-Korea relations assumed was obsolete. U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula, and toward virtually all other regions of the world, received a significant jolt as a result of the September 11, 2001, foreign terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and at the Pentagon. As for Korea, most of the initial impact of the U.S. war on terrorism was tangential and contextual. Foremost was the new U.S. emphasis on coping with foreign terrorist aggression and with states supporting terrorists and how it might lead to greater U.S. emphasis on North Korea's status as a declared terrorist state and its potential missile threat. Neither are new characterizations, but the latter perception has gained new credibility amid the war. This reinforced the logic of the United States using North Korea as a rationale for pursuit of U.S. antimissile defenses. U.S. views of North Korea as a terrorist state have not changed, but they were eclipsed by U.S. concerns over terrorist activities in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Unless revelations about North Korean links to the terrorists that attacked the United States materialize in a manner that refocuses attention in that direction, then Pyongyang could indirectly benefit from the U.S. preoccupation with other threats. The DPRK reinforced that prospect by promising in early November 2001 to ratify the 1999 UN-based International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.102 North Korea followed through on that pledge by signing two UN antiterrorist treaties and committing to sign five more such treaties.103 It was evident that Pyongyang was taking steps that might warrant it being removed from any lists of states that sanction terrorism. Although the situation in Korea did not loom large in the early stages of the war on terrorism, it hovered in the background. One of the

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last things the United States wanted at that juncture was for tensions in Korea to flare up, leading to renewed conflict on the peninsula that would place additional demands on U.S. armed forces to meet commitments there. In these terms, the situation reinforced U.S. interests in preserving a stable status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Against that background, South Korea's expressions of support for U.S. aims in the war on terrorism 104 and its offer of noncombat military support105 were welcomed by Washington. However, there was no expectation that South Korea—which has its hands full with North Korea, as evidenced by the unfortunate timing of a brief border clash at the DMZ in late November 2001 106 —was likely to become a major player in the antiterrorist international coalition created by the United States.107 South Korea's limited role in this coalition was predictable and entirely legitimate given the ROK's situation. It made far more sense for Seoul to pursue its inter-Korean agenda on its own while its U.S. ally was distracted, taking advantage of any readiness on North Korea's part to demonstrate that it was not an irrational terrorist regime. South Korea enjoyed some success in that regard by hosting a North Korean delegation in Seoul—the first in six months—for ministerial talks on September 15-18, 2001, only days after the terrorist attacks. 108 The tensions surrounding the war on terrorism injected a general sense of strategic unease into inter-Korean relations as both Koreas dealt with the uncertainties centered on U.S. responses. 109 It did not take much imagination to visualize U.S. policy toward North Korea becoming more hostile. President Bush, in his September 20 speech to Congress, drew a sharp line: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." This became the foundation for the Bush Doctrine.110 In that same speech President Bush bluntly stated: "From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." 111 In that milieu, it was abundantly clear where North Korea would fit. This was demonstrated by widespread speculation that a second phase in the U.S. war on terrorism might well encompass targeting North Korea.112 It was just as clear where South Korea fit, but in the process of plugging both Koreas into such a scenario one result was to underline the division within the Korean nation. The logic of the U.S. hard line toward North Korea was reaffirmed for U.S. hard-liners. North Korea was relegated to an outcast role in international affairs after the Cold War, which reinforced the value of utilizing a divided Korea for U.S. purposes. For South Korean conservatives, who grasped the logic of this perspective and understood the reasons why it helped the ROK to preserve a U.S.-led

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support system, initially this amounted to an opportunity to strengthen the U.S.-ROK strategic partnership. They recognized that there could be a price to pay in terms of inter-Korean relations, but it seemed to be a worthwhile price compared to the risks associated with U.S. failure to meet U.S. antiterrorism goals. Circumstances could deteriorate rapidly for the ROK if the United States were to become weakened as a result of its war on terrorism going sour. Fortunately for Seoul there was little chance of that happening, but the slim prospect was cause for some anxiety and reinforced conservative South Koreans' willingness to sanction a hard-line policy. South Korea's tolerance for a harder U.S. policy line toward North Korea was tested more severely as the U.S. war on terrorism evolved. Comments by President Bush on December 12, 2001, about the "next priority" being rogue states that "clearly are the most likely sources of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons for terrorists" and by Under Secretary of State John Bolton's remarks at a November 2001 UN meeting in Geneva that North Korea ranked close to Iraq as a source of biological weapons became grounds for second-guessing U.S. policy among South Koreans." 3 Cumulatively, such U.S. pronouncements generated an effort by Seoul to demonstrate to Washington that North Korea was not as bad as many U.S. leaders seemed to think it was. Instead of focusing on negative issues, Seoul emphasized the positive. For example, to prove Seoul's point, ROK Foreign Minister Han Seung-soo, in an interview citing steps North Korea had taken, stated: "All in all, we think that North Korea at this very critical juncture is against international terrorism." 114 Despite Seoul's stance, Under Secretary Bolton reiterated his warnings to the United Nations in Geneva in late January 2002."5 These developments set the stage for President Bush's controversial characterization in his 2002 State of the Union address of North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as constituting "an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world." 116 President Bush's phrase reportedly had its rhetorical roots in the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party,117 whereas its policy roots emerged from a widely reported internal debate between moderate and more hawkish advisers 118 in which the harderliners prevailed. 119 The "axis of evil" statement provoked angry rejections from all three countries. The logic of including North Korea in tandem with the two Middle Eastern countries was questionable. It may have been done to inject a sense of geographic balance into the metaphor. In any event it was not well received by Pyongyang. North

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Korea's official comment was variously rendered by the Rodong Shinmun as a U.S. "loudmouthed threat" and the Korean Central News Agency as a U.S. "sophism" that was intended to "pursue a policy of aggression." Within a couple of days North Korea pronounced President Bush's statement to be "little short of declaring war." It also noted, ominously, "the option to 'strike' on the lips of the U.S. is not its monopoly." For their part South Korea and Japan were far more diplomatic in their cautious reactions, but there was no doubt about the anxieties that the evolving U.S. policies stirred up in Seoul and Tokyo. 120 That level of concern was underscored several days after President Bush's speech by the dismissal of Foreign Minister Han, reportedly because he had not been able to manage U.S.-ROK relations in a manner that would have precluded an escalation of U.S. hostility toward North Korea that severely undercut President Kim's sunshine agenda. 121 Those anxieties were further exacerbated when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a speech at the U.S. National Defense University, raised the prospect of preemptive attacks against threatening terrorists and rogue-state supporters on the grounds that "the best, and in some cases, the only defense is a good offense." 122 That approach underscored the administration's hard-line message about the dangers posed by entities such as North Korea and the plausibility of the United States taking direct action against them as part of the war on terrorism.123 In the wake of President Bush's "axis of evil" remark the second Kim-Bush summit—held in Seoul on February 20, 2002—generated considerable interest for the ability of the two leaders to finesse differences and put a positive spin on U.S.-ROK policies toward North Korea. Although the policy gap could not be concealed and was underscored by thousands of South Korean protestors bearing signs such as "Bush Go Home!" 124 and a national assemblyman from President Kim's ruling party labeling President Bush as the "incarnation of evil" 125 (a comment he later withdrew under party pressure), both sides displayed great caution in not permitting fissures to be further exposed. President Bush expressed his support for South Korea's inter-Korean reconciliation efforts, and President Kim reciprocated by welcoming that support and praising the "unparalleled affection" President Bush "has for Korea." 126 Although President Bush did not back off his hard-line positions, he presented those positions in a manner that created a diplomatic veneer covering bilateral differences. 127 One of the more telling observations about the impact of this second Kim-Bush summit was a backhanded compliment offered in a Korea Herald editorial: "To many people's relief, U.S. President

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George W. Bush left here yesterday without wreaking havoc with the fledgling inter-Korean rapprochement." 128 On balance, perhaps the best that can be said about this summit is that it was relatively inconclusive, neither accelerating nor destroying the inter-Korean dialogue process. Despite the well-founded anxieties provoked among many South Koreans by the tougher U.S. approach toward North Korea, the war on terrorism also created an opportunity for South Korea to explore the ways in which Seoul might play facilitator for a U.S.-DPRK dialogue on antiterrorist cooperation. North Korea's presumed knowledge about terrorist support systems around the world constitutes the raw material for U.S.-DPRK confidence-building if Pyongyang could be induced to cooperate with the United States by providing useful information. In light of U.S. cooperation with Russia and China on these issues, Seoul may be able to urge Pyongyang to follow their lead. If it enjoys any success in that regard, South Korea would improve its position regionally and in terms of inter-Korean relations. As much as South Korea might be able to benefit inadvertently from strengthened U.S. hard-line resolve emanating from the war on terrorism, Seoul almost certainly would prefer to benefit from U.S. policies of cooperation with both Koreas as providers of assistance against international terrorism. It would be far more useful for Seoul's inter-Korean agenda whether the ROK government is controlled by liberal or conservative leaders. The war on terrorism spawned another set of developments that indirectly influenced inter-Korean relations. U.S. security relations with China and Japan adapted to the new circumstances. Of greatest concern to both Koreas, Tokyo responded to the events of September 11 by modifying the limitations Japan imposed on military cooperation with the United States. This enabled Japan to assist the U.S.-led war effort in Southwest Asia via naval and air logistical support. 129 Ironically, what Japan will actually do militarily is unlikely to surpass South Korea's limited logistical support. However, the fact that Japan's actions appeared to be very significant—Japan had done virtually nothing during previous U.S.-led coalition-building efforts—made Japan look bold in contrast to South Korea, constrained by inter-Korean circumstances. That appearance did not serve South Korea's interests. More important, the possibility that Japan might use this limited step as the first in a larger process of becoming what the Japanese call a "normal country"— willing to use its economic power in military ways—is a cause of concern for both Koreas. Consequently, Japan's readiness to cooperate militarily with the United States in the war on terrorism even while the

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conflict generates ambiguous pressures in U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula intensifies Korean concerns about Japan's actions and intentions. As long as the war on terrorism focuses on areas outside Northeast Asia, the growing role of Japan will cause limited apprehension among its Korean neighbors. However, were the United States to include North Korea as part of a broadened multifront war on terrorism, the obvious pressures placed on South Korea could well be compounded by U.S. desires for Japan to play a military role in the defense of its own neighborhood against terrorists by helping the United States cope with North Korea. It is far from certain that Japan, with its constitutional constraints against collective security, would comply with any such coalition effort. However, if Japan actually did participate in a military campaign against North Korea as part of the war on terrorism, the potential repercussions among South Koreans and in China are plentiful. That prospect likely will inhibit Tokyo's readiness to respond affirmatively, adding to the disincentives for the United States to pursue the war on terrorism in a manner that could spread to the Korean Peninsula. U.S. efforts to expand the antiterrorist coalition by reaching out to a diverse spectrum of countries produced unanticipated levels of U.S.China strategic consultations. Although there were overlapping U.S. and Chinese interests versus Islamic radicalism, there also were widespread doubts about the ability of those interests to compensate for larger contentious issues.130 More important, there was significant concern throughout the region that the United States was precipitously engaging militarily with China in ways that could prove destabilizing over the long run. 131 Such arrangements were not nearly as anxiety-provoking for the two Koreas as were the new levels of U.S.-Japan military cooperation. Nonetheless, to the extent there was any serious chance of greater regional instability, both Koreas had reason to prefer the status quo ante within which they had articulated policies each deemed viable. Neither Korea was enthusiastic about contextual changes that might diminish each's leverage. That was true of both Koreas' overall reactions to the war on terrorism. Although it transformed the U.S. policymaking context with regard to diverse issues, including dealing with the divided Korean nation, that transformation was largely beyond the ability of either Korea to decisively influence. It raised some possible opportunities for both Koreas, but on balance it was a distraction from what mattered most to the two Koreas in their inter-Korean relationship and regarding both

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Koreas' bilateral relations with the United States. The terrorism crisis made it more difficult to get the United States to coherently focus on U.S. policy toward Korea in its own right. Moreover—and of far greater salience for the core theme in this book—the ways in which the war on terrorism reinforced Korea's division, underlined Korea's role as a remnant of the former Cold War, and distracted U.S. policymakers from innovatively thinking about long-established commitments reinforced all the factors that tended to sanction inaction on the in-due-course mandate. With Washington preoccupied with waging the war on terrorism, there has been some on-and-off progress in reconciling the differing U.S.-ROK interests as to North Korea. Unless the axis-of-evil approach thoroughly derails progress, the Bush administration still possesses the wherewithal to refocus on North Korea in a nonhostile manner. Presumably the Bush administration's reluctance to be too closely identified with the Korea policy legacy of the Clinton administration was offset by an awareness that the Clinton policies were an evolutionary portion of a process begun under President Reagan and carried forward by his immediate successor, President George H. W. Bush. This makes it easier for President George W. Bush to adopt continuity as a theme.132 However, it also is clear that gaps exist on several facets of the relationship as outlined above. The main difference between South Korea's version of an engagement policy toward North Korea aimed at reconciliation and unification, and the U.S. policy of limited engagement aimed at threat-control, is that the former intends to end Korea's division whereas the latter intends to functionally prolong it in ways that ultimately damage Seoul's agenda. Although U.S. officials are aware of the dangers that an unstable North Korea facing collapse could force rapid unification on a U.S. ally, and almost certainly have contingency plans for any such eventuality, that situation would be radically different than the ends being pursued by Seoul's incrementalist quest for a unified Korea. 133 An imploding North Korea being rescued by South Korea would essentially compel Seoul to turn to the United States to geopolitically sustain and financially bankroll such a process. On the surface these differences may not appear very significant because they resemble past situations where Seoul expounded on unification plans and Washington offered rhetorical support while pursuing policies that helped keep the Korean nation divided. The novelty now is that the ROK under President Kim Dae-jung—despite domestic liabilities—seems to be totally sincere about implementing a genuine plan for national reconciliation and unification that will permit Korean

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self-determination, whereas the United States still operates on a freevote basis. 134 In short, the ROK under President Kim has reinvigorated and legitimized the in-due-course principle of national self-determination and has engaged North Korea in a process that has the potential to produce genuine results. Yet the United States persists in its outdated approaches, which threaten to stymie inter-Korean progress, derail unification, and further mock the long overdue U.S. commitment to in due course. The legitimate U.S. preoccupation with the war on terrorism inadvertently exacerbates this situation by reinforcing U.S. interests in the status quo of a divided Korean nation. Whether the two Koreas will be able to accomplish their unification goal will depend in part on how well they can mesh that goal with evolving circumstances in Asia and also on how U.S. policy helps or hurts that process. These topics are the focus of the remaining chapters in this book.

Notes 1. For preliminary analyses of that new context, see James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton, eds., Reconstituting America's Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992. For conservative and liberal arguments favoring a continued proactive U.S. security role worldwide, see, respectively: Joshua Muravchick, The Imperative of American Leadership, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1996; and Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999. 2. For assessments of China's potentials to pose threats to the United States, see Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996; Thomas Metzger and Ramon H. Myers, eds., Greater China and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Choice Between Confrontation and Mutual Respect, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1996; and Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998. 3. Quoted in "Overheard," Newsweek, April 22, 1991, p. 19. 4. For a mainstream analysis of those shifts and their impact on NATO, see David Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998. 5. For pointed examples of such advocacy, see Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996; and Selig S. Harrison, "Time to Leave Korea?" Foreign Affairs, March-April 2001, pp. 62-78. 6. For overviews of that adjustment effort, see Sheldon W. Simon, ed., East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993;

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Ralph A. Cossa, ed., Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995; Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995; Young Jeh Kim, ed., The New Pacific Community in the 1990s, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996; and Donald C. Hellmann and Kenneth B. Pyle, eds., From APEC to XANADU: Creating a Viable Community in the Post-Cold War Pacific, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997. 7. For analysis of U.S. policies toward reform in the former Soviet Union, see Fritz Ermath, "Seeing Russia Plain," National Interest, Spring 1999, pp. 5-14; Stephen F. Cohen, Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of PostCommunist Russia, New York: W. W. Norton, 2000; and Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2001. 8. The author explored the contradiction in U.S. policy toward China versus its policy toward the Korean Peninsula in greater detail in "U.S. Security Policy and the Two Koreas," World Affairs, vol. 162, no. 4, Spring 2000, pp. 150-157. 9. For analysis of the roots of South Korea's evolving post-Cold War foreign policy posture, see Lee Manwoo and Richard W. Mansbach, eds., The Changing Order in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, Seoul and Boulder: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, and Westview, 1993; Lee Seo-hang, ed., Evolving Multilateral Security Regime in Northeast Asia, Seoul: Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 1994; and Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War, Boulder: Westview, 1994. 10. Susan Moffat, "Bush Off to a Controversial Start in Korea," Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1989, p. A14. 11. Quoted in Kang Sung-chul, "Roh, Bush Demand N.K. Unconditionally Open N-Facilities to Int'l Inspection," Korea Herald, July 3, 1991, pp. 1-2. 12. George Bush, "The U.S. and Korea: Entering a New Age," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, January 13, 1992, quoted in Lee Chae-jin, "The United States and Korea: Dynamics of Changing Relations," in Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War, Boulder: Westview, 1994, pp. 70-71. 13. Kim Hyeh-won, "South, North Korea Join U.N.," Korea Herald, September 18, 1991, pp. 1-2, 5. 14. For media coverage of that agreement, see "New Era Dawning in Korea," Korea Herald, December 14, 1991, p. 1 and the full text of the agreement on p. 2; David E. Sanger, "Koreas Sign Pact Renouncing Force in a Step to Unity," New York Times, December 13, 1991, pp. 1, 12; and Clayton Jones, "North, South Korea Agree on Historic Nonaggression Pact," Christian Science Monitor, December 13, 1991, p. 6. 15. "Bush Announces Sweeping N-Cuts," Korea Herald, September 29, 1991, pp. 1, 5. 16. "Roh Declares Nuclear-Free South Korea," Korea Herald, November 9, 1991, p. 1.

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17. "South, North Agree on N-Free Korea," Korea Herald, January 1, 1992, pp. 1, 11. 18. "U.S. to Shelve Further Troop Cuts Until N.K. N-Threat Removed," Korea Herald, November 22, 1991, pp. 1-5; and Damon Darlin, "Seoul, Washington Delay Withdrawal of U.S. Forces," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, November 25, 1991, p. 22. 19. This is an interesting party label per se because of its transparent linkages to Japan's long-term ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Politicians in Seoul were bent on emulating the LDP's dominance through what was widely referred to as a "one and a half party system" in which progressive opponents were limited as a result of conservative use of a big-tent approach to coopting policy issues. 20. For additional background on South Korea's political context at that point in its history, see John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. 21. For background on Clinton's rise to power and his administration's initial international role, see David Maraniss, First in His Class: A Biography of Bill Clinton, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995; Steven E. Schier, Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton's Legacy in U.S. Politics, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000; and Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. 22. For analysis of this transition's consequences for South Korea, see Larry Diamond and Kim Byung-kook, eds., Consolidating Democracy in South Korea, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. 23. For mainstream analyses of the U.S.-Korea relationship late in the Cold War, see Lee Manwoo, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Moon Chung-in, Alliance Under Tension: The Evolution of South Korean-U.S. Relations, Seoul and Boulder: Kyungnam University Press and Westview, 1988; Harold C. Hinton, Donald Zagoria, Lee Jung-ha, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Lee Chung-min, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., The U.S.-Korean Security Relationship: Prospects and Challenges for the 1990s, Cambridge and Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988; and Robert Sutter and Han Sung-joo, Korea-U.S. Relations in a Changing World, Berkeley: University of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1990. 24. For background on North Korea's economic misadventures and deterioration in the early post-Cold War era, see Pong S. Lee, "Economic Development Strategy and Prospects for Reform in North Korea," in Ilpyong J. Kim, ed., Korean Challenges and American Policy, New York: Paragon House, 1991; Bradley K. Martin, "Intruding on the Hermit: Glimpses of North Korea," EastWest Center Special Reports, no. 1, July 1993; Lee Chong-sik, "The Political Economy of North Korea, 1994," NBR Analysis, vol. 5, no. 2, September 1994; and Marcus Noland, "The North Korean Economy," Joint U.S.-Korean Academic Studies, vol. 6, Washington, DC: Korean Economic Institute of America, 1996. For analysis of the consequences these efforts had, see Marcus Noland, "Prospects for the North Korean Economy," in Suh Dae-sook and Lee Chae-jin, eds., North Korea After Kim II Sung, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Jongryn Mo, "Prospects for Economic Reform

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and Political Stability," Chun Hong-tack, "Economic Conditions in North Korea and Prospects for Reform," and Marcus Noland, "Prospects for a North Korean External Economic Opening," in Thomas H. Henriksen and Jongryn Mo, eds., North Korea After Kim II Sung: Continuity or Change? Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1997. 25. For an analysis of South Korea's thwarted nuclear aspirations and its acceptance of the principles of nonproliferation, see Ha Young-sun, Nuclear Proliferation, World Order, and Korea, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983; and Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991. 26. Details of that complex period in North Korean policy and U.S. responses are covered in: Andrew Mack, "North Korea and the Bomb," Foreign Policy, Summer 1991, pp. 87-104; Joseph Bermudez, "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1991, pp. 404-411; Song Young-sun, "The Korean Nuclear Issue," Korea and World Affairs, Fall 1991, pp. 471—493; Michael J. Mazaar, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation, New York: St. Martin's, 1995; Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, eds., Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997; and Young Whan Kihl, "The Mouse That Roared: North Korea's Nuclear Deal-Making with the United States," Pacific Focus, Fall 1998, pp. 5-25. 27. The author also explored that aspect of U.S. policymaking toward Korea in his "U.S. Security Policy and the Two Koreas," in Joo Seung-ho and Kwak Tae-hwan, eds., Korea in the 21st Century, Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2001. 28. The author explored that hypothesis in greater detail in his "Coping with the Korean Peace Process: An American View," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1997, pp. 159-180; and "U.S. Security Policy and the Two Koreas," World Affairs, Spring 2000, pp. 150-157. 29. For contemporary analyses of those developments, see William E. Berry Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration's Response," Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper No. 3, U.S. Air Force Academy, March 1995; Thomas L. Wilborn, "Strategic Implications of the U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 3, 1995; Jae H. Ku and Ok Tae-hwan, eds., Change and Challenge on the Korean Peninsula: Developments, Trends, and Issues, Washington, DC, and Seoul: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Research Institute for National Reunification, August 1996; "Our Strategy Against North Korea," including Walter B. Slocombe, "Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue," Viktor Gilinsky, "The Nuclear Deal: What the South Koreans Should Be Concerned About," and Paul Wolfowitz, "The North Korean Nuclear Deal and East Asian Security," in Henry Sokolsky, ed., Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, September 1996, pt. 3. 30. Most of that urging came from the progressive end of the U.S. political spectrum. See, for example, Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945, New York: Pantheon Books, 1973; Selig

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Harrison, "One Korea?" Foreign Policy, Winter 1974-1975, pp. 35-62; Gareth Porter, "Time to Talk with North Korea," Foreign Policy, Spring 1979, pp. 52-73; Bruce Cumings, The Two Koreas, Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No. 269, May-June 1984; and Selig S. Harrison, ed., Dialogue with North Korea, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1989. The author urged a more conservative approach to changing U.S. policy toward North Korea based on incentives in his "Modifying the United States' Korea Policy: Offering Pyongyang an Economic Carrot," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, September 1982, pp. 41-52; "North Korea: Another Candidate for Ping-pong Diplomacy?" Christian Science Monitor, June 30, 1982; and "Does Anyone Really Want Korean Reunification?" Asian Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1983. 31. Ryan J. Barilleaux and Andrew Ilsu Kim, "Clinton, Korea, and Presidential Diplomacy," World Affairs, vol. 162, no. 1, Summer 1999, pp. 29^10. 32. For analyses of those efforts and their spillover into U.S.-ROK relations, see Lee Manwoo, ed., Current Issues in Korea-U.S. Relations: KoreanAmerican Dialogue, Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1993; Robert A. Scalapino, North Korea at a Crossroads, Stanford: Hoover Institution Essays in Public Policy, 1997; and Park Tong-whan, ed., The U.S. and the Two Koreas, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 33. For details on President Kim's policies toward North Korea, see Moon Chung-in and David I. Steinberg, eds., Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges, Washington, DC, and Seoul: Asian Studies Program, Georgetown University, and Yonsei University Press, 1999. 34. The author analyzed the basis for that convergence in his "The Role of the United States in the Construction of a North-South Korean Economic Community," International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, 2000, pp. 97-115. 35. See Kim Dae-jung's "Three Stage Unification" Proposal, Seoul: Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation (undated, circa 1996-1997). See also Kim Daejung, Mass-Participatory Economy: A Democratic Alternative for Korea, Lanham, MD: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and University Press of America, 1985; Kim Dae-jung, Prison Writings, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987; Kim Dae-jung, Building Peace and Democracy, New York: Korean Independent Monitor, 1987. 36. There are numerous studies on this topic. For a cross-section, see Kim Hakjoon, Unification Policies of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1978; Rhee Sang-woo, Security and Unification of Korea, Seoul: Sogang University Press, 1984; Kwak Tae-hwan, Kim Chong-han, and Kim Hong-nak, eds., Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches, Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University Press, 1984; Choy Bong-youn, A History of the Korean Reunification Movement: Its Issues and Prospects, Peoria, IL: Institute of International Studies, Bradley University, 1984; Harold Hakwon Sunoo, Peace and Unificaiton [sic] of North and South Korea, Beverly Hills, CA: Research Institute for Juche Idea in the U.S.A. and One Korea Movement in U.S.A., 1989; Jay Speakman and Lee Chae-jin, eds., The Prospects for Korean Reunification, Claremont,

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CA: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, 1993; Thomas Henriksen and Lho Kyongsoo, eds., One Korea? Challenges and Prospects for Reunification, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1994; Kim Yun and Shin Eui-hang, eds., Toward a Unified Korea, Columbia: Center for Asian Studies, University of South Carolina, 1995; David R. McCann, ed., Korea Briefing: Toward Reunification, Armonk, NY: Asia Society and M. E. Sharpe, 1997; Nicholas Eberstadt, "Hastening Korean Unification," Foreign Affairs, March-April 1997, pp. 77-92; Ben Kremenak, Korea's Road to Unification: Pot Holes, Detours, and Dead Ends, College Park: University of Maryland Center for International Security Studies, CISSM Paper No. 5, May 1997; Roy Richard Grinker, Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War, New York: St. Martin's, 1998; Robert Dujarric, Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia, Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1998; Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999; Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After : The Challenge for U.S. Strategy, Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 2000; and Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Planning for a Peaceful Korea, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001. 37. For an insightful treatment of Korea's dilemma and weak U.S. responses, see John Sullivan and Roberta Foss, eds., Two Koreas—One Future? Lanham, MD: American Friends Service Committee and University Press of America, 1987. 38. For analyses of Japan's posture regarding a divided Korea, see James W. Morley, Japan and Korea: America's Allies in the Pacific, New York: Walker, 1965; Saito Takashi, "Japan and Korean Unification," Japan Interpreter, Winter 1973, pp. 25-37; Kim Hong-nak, "Japan's North Korea Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," Korea and World Affairs, Winter 1994, pp. 669-694; Lee Chae-jin, "U.S. and Japanese Policies Toward Korean Unification," in Lee Chae-jin and Sato Hideo, eds., U.S.-Japan Partnership in Conflict Management: The Case of Korea, Claremont, CA: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, 1993; Kataoka Tetsuya, "Scratching an Old Wound: Japan's Perspective on Korea and Its Unification," in Henriksen and Lho, One Korea?; Park Hong-suk, "Korea's Perspective on the Changing U.S.-Japan Relationship," in Lho Kyongsoo, ed., The United States, Japan, and East Asia, Seoul: Korean Institute of International Studies, 1995; Chalmers Johnson, "Korea and Our Asia Policy," National Interest, Fall 1995, pp. 66-77; Ha Young-sun, ed., Korea and Japan: Past, Present, and Future, Seoul: Center for International Studies, Seoul National University, 1997; Ralph Cossa, ed., U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a "Virtual Alliance," Washington, DC: Center For Strategic and International Studies, 1999; Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination," NBR Analysis, vol. 10, no. 1, March 1999, Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research; Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999; and Rhee Sang-woo and Kim Tae-hyo, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies, Seoul: New Asia Research Institute, 2000. See also the author's "The American and Japanese Stake

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in Korean Unification," Journal of East Asian Affairs, Spring-Summer 1983, pp. 1 - 1 6 ; "Japan and Korea," in Robert S. Ozaki and Walter Arnold, eds., Japans Foreign Relations: A Global Search for Economic Security, Boulder: Westview, 1985; and U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1985. 39. For coverage of that event, see Peter Landers, Susan Lawrence, and Julian Baum, "Hard Target," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 24, 1998, pp. 20-21. 40. For an alternative perspective, see Mark Fitzpatrick, "Why Japan and the United States Will Welcome Korean Unification," Korea and World Affairs, Fall 1991, pp. 415-441. 41. The author examined that hypocrisy in two op-ed pieces that proved controversial among Korea-watchers. See "Does Anyone Really Want Korean Reunification?" Asian Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1983; and "The Catch-22s of Korean Unification," Asian Wall Street Journal, June 1-2, 1984. This theme was explored further in the author's U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, San Francisco and Boulder: World Affairs Council of Northern California and Westview, 1988. 42. See Victor Cha, "The Continuity Behind the Change in Korea," ORBIS, Fall 2000, pp. 585-598. 43. For analyses of South Korean and North Korean aspirations of that sort, see Dong Wonmo, ed., The Two Koreas and the United States, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000; and Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000. For further background on their prior planning, see Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Reunification, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995. 44. The author explores the pros and cons of that overall facet of U.S. strategy worldwide, and with respect to Korean commitments, in his U.S. National Defense for the Twenty-First Century: The Grand Exit Strategy, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002. 45. The author explores that convoluted logic in greater detail in his "Coping with the Korean Peace Process: An American View," in Nam Sung-woo, Koo Bon-hak, and Curt Cornish, eds., The Korean Peninsula: Prospects for Peace and Unification, Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 1997; and "U.S. Security Policy and the Two Koreas," in Joo Seung-ho and Kwak Taehwan, eds., Korea at the Crossroads, Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2001. 46. For coverage of the June 13 summit, see "Kimaraderie, at Last," The Economist, June 17, 2000, pp. 41^12; Shim Jae Hoon, "No Turning Back," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 22, 2000, pp. 16-20; and Together as One, Seoul: ROK Ministry of Unification, July 2000. 47. For coverage of Seoul's governmental overtures toward North Korea after the North-South summit, see The 1st South-North Ministerial Talks 2000.7.31, Seoul: ROK Ministry of Unification, August 2000; "The Result and Significance of the Second Round of Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks" ( 8 / 2 9 9/1), Korean Unification Bulletin, no. 22, August 2000, pp. 1 - 2 ; and Howard W. French, "Defense Chiefs of Two Koreas Meet on Reducing Tensions," New York Times, September 26, 2000.

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48. For coverage of Seoul's economic summitry with North Korea, see Korean Unification Bulletin, no. 23, September 2000, pp. 7-8, and no. 25, November 2000, p. 2; and Peace and Cooperation: White Paper on Korean Unification, 2001, Seoul: ROK Ministry of Unification, April 2001. 49. For examples of conservative criticism, see Daryl M. Plunk, "After Broken Promises, Time to Change Direction on North Korea," Heritage Foundation Asian Studies Center, Backgrounder, no. 149, May 15, 1997; Richard D. Fisher Jr., "Time to Stop North Korea's Missile Blackmail," Heritage Foundation, Executive Memorandum, no. 550, September 8, 1998; Daryl M. Plunk, "Easing Trade Sanctions Against North Korea: Not Enough to Promote Lasting Peace," Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, no. 1333, October 7, 1999; and Larry M. Wortzel, "Rushing to North Korea Is a Mistake for President Clinton," Heritage Foundation, Executive Memorandum, no. 702, October 19, 2000. See also conservative South Korean politician Park Shin II from the opposition Grand National Party's "Why Be a Prop for Pyongyang?" New York Times, November 3, 2000, op-ed page. For a nonpartisan, likeminded critique, see Nayan Chanda, "Marching to Kim's Tune," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 2, 2000, pp. 16-18. 50. William J. Perry, "Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations," Office of the North Korea Policy Coordinator, U.S. Department of State, October 19, 1999. For a Korean analysis of the report, see Kim Jae-hong, "Political and Economic Implications of the Perry Report," Korea Focus, November-December 1999, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 25-33. For insights into the significance of Perry's tasking that yielded the report, see Victor D. Cha, "The Rationale for 'Enhanced' Engagement of North Korea After the Perry Policy Process," Asian Survey, November-December 1999, pp. 845-866. 51. For coverage of that visit, see David E. Sanger, "North Korean at White House, Continuing a Warming Trend," New York Times, October 11, 2000, p. 1; and Shim Jae Hoon, "Pyongyang Puts on the Charm," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 26, 2000, pp. 20-22. See also "U.S.-DPRK Joint Communique (Unofficial Summary)," in Korean Unification Bulletin, November 2000, p. 5. 52. For analyses of Albright's visit, see Jane Perlez, "Albright Receives a Spectacular Welcome to North Korea," New York Times, October 24, 2000, p. 1, and "Albright Reports Progress in Talks with North Korean Leader," New York Times, October 24, 2000, p. 1; Ilene R. Prusher, "U.S. Speeds up N. Korea Outreach," Christian Science Monitor, October 24, 2000, p. 6; and "An American in North Korea," The Economist, October 28, 2000, pp. 37-38. 53. John Lancaster, "Clinton Rules Out a Visit to North Korea," Washington Post, December 29, 2000, p. 1. For more insights into how matters went astray as a by-product of U.S. domestic political uncertainties, see Michael R. Gordon, "How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles with North Korea," New York Times, March 6, 2001, p. 1; and an insider's perspective by Wendy R. Sherman, "Talking to the North Koreans," New York Times, March 7, 2001, op-ed page. 54. Steven Lee Myers, "Pentagon Says North Korea Is Still a Dangerous Military Threat," New York Times, September 22, 2000. For a contemporary

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supportive scholarly analysis of North Korea's capabilities, see Joseph S. Bermudez, The Armed Forces of North Korea, New York: Palgrave, 2000. 55. Chon Shi-yong, "President Kim Wins the Nobel Peace Prize," Korea Herald, October 14, 2000, p. 1. 56. For analyses of those concerns, see Shim Jae Hoon, "Welfare State," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 27, 1999, p. 24; Michael Baker, "North Korea Pursues—and Resists—Some Capitalist Ways," Christian Science Monitor, August 26, 1999, p. 8; Lorien Holland, "No Paradise," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 25, 2000, p. 34; and Doug Struck, "For North Korea, the Worst Is Over," Washington Post (Weekly), September 11, 2000, p. 18. 57. Doug Struck, "The Way to Reunification May Be Business," Washington Post (Weekly), November 20, 2000, p. 15. 58. For coverage of Hyundai's role in North Korea, see "Hyundai Primes S-N Ties," Korea Newsreview, October 9, 1999, pp. 8-9; interview with Hyundai's representative to North Korea, Kim Yoon-kyu, in "North Korea: Open for Business," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 25, 2000, pp. 22-23; and John Larkin and Shim Jae Hoon, "Big Gamble on a Cruise North," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 1, 2001, pp. 21-22. See also Donald Kirk, Korean Dynasty: Hyundai and Chung Ju Yung, Hong Kong and Armonk, NY: Asia 2000 Ltd. and M. E. Sharpe, 1994. 59. Those concerns are analyzed in Ilene R. Prusher, "S. Korea's Enthusiasm Fizzles for Cozying up to North," Christian Science Monitor, November 7, 2000, p. 7; and Donald Kirk, "South's Economic Woes Dampen Hopes for a Korean Warming," International Herald Tribune, November 9, 2000, p. 1. See also Donald Kirk, Korean Crisis: Unraveling of the Miracle in the IMF Era, New York: St. Martin's, 2000. 60. Howard W. French, "Signs of Uneasiness in Seoul Over Change at White House," New York Times, February 19, 2001; Jay Solomon, "Seoul Hopes to Steer Bush Cabinet Toward Conciliation on North Korea," Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2001, p. 12; and Shin Yong-bae, "Seoul to Seek New Deal with U.S. on N. Korea," Korea Herald, February 28, 2001. 61. For background on Seoul's initial perspectives on both, see "Korea Not Considering TMD, Minister Says," Korea Herald, February 22, 2001; "Seoul Remains Concerned About NMD," Korea Times, January 29, 2001 (no author cited for either). See also Patrick E. Tyler, "South Korea Takes Russia's Side in Dispute Over U.S. Missile Defense Plan," New York Times, February 28, 2001. 62. Doug Struck, "North Korea Warns It May Test Missile," Washington Post, February 23, 2001, p. 18. 63. James Morrison, "Cloudy Sunshine Policy," Washington Times, January 31, 2001, p. 12. 64. Chon Shi-yong, "Kim, Bush Summit on N.K. Policy to Happen Soon," Korea Herald, January 26, 2001, p. 1. 65. For a basic description of the summit, see "South Korea and America: Lots to Talk About," The Economist, March 10, 2001, pp. 38-39. See also Editorial, "Bush Rains on 'Sunshine,'" Far Eastern Economic Review, March 22, 2001, p. 6; and full text of "Joint Statement of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea," Korean Update, March 2001, p. 3.

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66. Quoted in John Larkin, "Getting Bush Back on Board," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 31, 2002, pp. 24-26. 67. Steven Mufson, "Bush to Pick up Clinton Talks on N. Korea Missiles," Washington Post, March 7, 2001, p. 20. 68. Sejong Institute Professor Kim Jong-wan, quoted in Michael Zielenziger, "Bush Stirs Korea Doubts; Disagreement with South's Kim Damages Asian Ally's Position" (Knight Ridder Newspapers wire service report), Monterey Herald, March 9, 2001, p. A l . 69. Thomas Plate, "Shadow Falls on Outlook for Korea," Honolulu Advertiser, March 11, 2001, op-ed page. 70. Quoted in Steven Mufson, "Bush Casts a Shadow on Korea Missile Talks," Washington Post, March 8, 2001, p. 1. 71. For coverage of President Kim's efforts to stifle South Korean criticism of North Korea, see Shim Jae Hoon, "The Moral Cost of Engagement," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 28, 2000-January 4, 2001, pp. 26-28. 72. Quoted in David E. Sanger, "Bush Tells Seoul Talks with North Won't Resume Now," New York Times, March 8, 2001, p. 1. 73. Quoted in Ben Barber, "Powell Wants North Korea to Reduce MillionMan Army," Washington Times, March 9, 2001, p. 1. 74. Don Kirk, "North Korea Turns Up the Heat; Calls U.S. a Nation of Cannibals," New York Times, March 15, 2001; and Ben Barber, "North Korea Slams Bush Stand," Washington Times, March 15, 2001, p. 1. 75. Quoted in Steven Mufson, "Seoul's Kim Presses for U.S. Role," Washington Post, March 9, 2001, p. 22. 76. Henry Kissinger, "A Road Through Seoul," Washington Post, March 6, 2001, p. 23. 77. See, for example, Christopher Marquis, "Experts Urge Bush to Resume North Korea Talks," New York Times, March 27, 2001, p. 1; J. Peter Scoblic, "Bush Misses the Point on North Korea," Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 2001, p. 9; and Senator John F. Kerry, "Engage North Korea," Washington Post, March 30, 2001, p. 29. 78. "U.S. Pacific Military Commander Labels North Korea No. 1 Enemy" (AP wire service report), Korea Herald, March 22, 2001, p. 1. 79. Quoted in Jay Solomon and Eduardo Lachica, "North Korea's Military Buildup Threatens Peace Talks with Seoul," Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2001, p. 1. 80. The characterization by unnamed Koreans is contained in Howard W. French, "Seoul Fears U.S. Chilly About Détente with North," New York Times, March 25, 2001. 81. Quoted in Chon Shi-yong, "Kim's Reshuffle Aimed at Boosting U.S., N.K. Ties," Korea Herald, March 26, 2001, available online at www.koreaherald.com. 82. Quoted in "South Korea Doubts North Policy Derailed" (no author cited), Washington Times, April 12, 2001. 83. Howard W. French, "With U.S. Pulling Back, North Korea Opens Up to Other Nations," New York Times, March 29, 2001. 84. Quoted in "Doubts on Both Sides of the Atlantic," The Economist, March 31, 2001, p. 45.

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85. Quoted in William Prozdiak, "EU Seeks to Fill U.S. Role in Koreas," Washington Post, March 25, 2001, p. 1. 86. Washington Post, April 3, 2001, p. 20. 87. For another perspective on this issue, see Atlantic Council report, "The European Union's Role on the Korean Peninsula and Implications for U.S. Policy," a summary of an Atlantic Council April 25, 2001, conference bearing the same title. 88. "A Hint of the Cold War Over the South China Sea," The Economist, April 7, 2001, pp. 41-42. 89. For contemporary background on Seoul and Tokyo's reactions to events in the South China Sea, see Clay Chandler, "Standoff Worrying U.S. Allies in Asia," Washington Post, April 5, 2001, p. 22; and Matt Pottinger, "Asian Nations Stay Mum About U.S.-China Dispute," Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2001, p. 1. 90. See "Korea Task Force Letter to the President of United States" in Korea Society Quarterly, Spring 2001, pp. 44, 57. See also Council on Foreign Relations "Independent Task Force Report" by Morton Abromowitz and James T. Laney (cochairs) and Robert A. Manning (director), Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy, 2001. 91. Tim Connolly, "Clinton's Defense Chief Faults U.S. Stance on N. Korea," Dallas Morning News, April 20, 2001, p. 1. 92. Yuh Moon-hwan, "Western Exposure: N. Korea, European Union to Set Up Formal Diplomatic Ties," Korea Now, June 2, 2001, p. 9. 93. For coverage of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's discussion in Seoul of U.S. intentions to resume the dialogue with North Korea, see Don Kirk, "U.S. Informs South Korea of Plans to Resume Talks with North," New York Times, May 10, 2001; and Shin Yong-bae, "Planned U.S.N.K. Talks Lift Hopes for Peace Process," Korea Herald, May 11, 2001, p. 1. 94. Jim Lea, "N. Korean Cargo Ships Continue to Violate S. Korean Waterways," Pacific Stars and Stripes, June 6, 2001; and "Seoul Fears N.K. Intrusion Hardens U.S.," Korea Times, June 7, 2001. 95. Elisabeth Rosenthal, "North Korea Threatens to Pull Out of Missile Pacts," New York Times, June 5, 2001. 96. For coverage of the policy review process and the announcement that U.S.-DPRK talks would resume, see Jane Perlez, "U.S. Will Restart Wide Negotiations with North Korea," New York Times, June 7, 2001, p. 1; Steven Mufson, "U.S. Will Resume Talks with North Korea," Washington Post, June 7, 2001, p. 1; and Ilene R. Prusher, "South Koreans Wait for North to Return the Favor," Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2001, p. 7. 97. Jane Perlez, "Fatherly Advice to the President on North Korea," New York Times, June 10, 2001, p. 6. 98. Jim Mann, "U.S. Is Seen as Ready to Fulfill 1994 North Korea Reactor Deal," Los Angeles Times, June 10, 2001, p. 4. 99. For insights into the internal debate, see Evan Thomas and Roy Gutman, "See George, See George Learn Foreign Policy," Newsweek, June 18, 2001, p. 20. 100. The author explored that issue in greater detail in his "U.S.-Korean Relations: The Evolving Missile Contexts," Journal of East Asian Affairs,

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Fall-Winter 2001, pp. 270-296. For coverage of the domestic context of such thinking, see Michael Dobbs, "Redefining the Threat: Political Pressure Helped Turn Around Conventional Thinking on Missile Defense," Washington Post (Weekly), February 4-10, 2002, pp. 10-11. 101. For coverage of such U.S. assistance, see Robert Marquand, "Food Crisis Goes from Bad to Worse in North Korea," Christian Science Monitor, April 17, 2001, p. 8; Doug Struck, "N. Korea Faces Food Shortage," Washington Post, May 16, 2001, p. 20; and Christopher Torchia, "North Korea Still Requires Food Aid" (AP wire service report), Monterey Herald, February 5, 2002, p. A6. 102. "North Korea Says It Will Sign Anti-Terror Treaty" (AP wire service report), Los Angeles Times, November 4, 2001, p. 1. 103. Hwang Jang-jin, "North Willing to Sign 5 More Anti-Terror Pacts," Korea Herald, December 11, 2001, p. 1. 104. Oh Young-jin, "Kim Vows Full Support for U.S.," Korea Times, September 18, 2001, p. 1. 105. Shin Young-bae, "Korea to Provide Non-Combat Support to U.S.," Korea Herald, September 25, 2001, p. 1. 106. Kim Min-seok, "Shots Fired Across DMZ in First Incident Since '98," JoongAng Ilbo, November 28, 2001, available online at http://english. joins.com. 107. South Korea fulfilled those limited expectations by contributing four C-130 transport planes and about 150 support personnel. For coverage, see Franklin Fisher, "With Cargo Missions, S. Korea Joins U.S. War on Terrorism," Pacific Stars and Stripes, February 4, 2002, p. 1. 108. For coverage of those talks, see "Some Good News," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 27, 2001, p. 13; "Where Roads Converge," Korea Now, September 22, 2001, pp. 5-7; and "Inter-Korean Talks Restart," Korea Update, September 2001, p. 3. 109. Howard W. French, "In Yet Another Mystery, North Korea Has Suddenly Turned Testy," New York Times, October 27, 2001, p. 1. 110. For an analysis of the impact of this dividing line on U.S. allies, see Karen De Young, "With Us, or With the Terrorists?" Washington Post (Weekly), October 22-28, 2001, p. 17. 111. For an analysis of how the United States decided to stress this approach to terrorism, see Jane Perlez, David E. Sanger, and Thom Shanker, "From Many Voices, One Battle Strategy," New York Times, September 23, 2001, p. 1. 112. For coverage of such speculation, see David E. Sanger, "Don't Forget North Korea," New York Times, November 25, 2001, p. 1; and John Larkin and Murray Hiebert, "North Korea: Welcome to the War," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 13, 2001, pp. 14-18. 113. Doug Struck, "Times That Try Seoul: The Fear of Terrorism Is Undermining Efforts to Improve Relations with North Korea," Washington Post (Weekly), December 24, 2001-January 6, 2002, p. 21; and John Larkin, "Seoul Balks at U.S. Push to Link North to Terror," Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2001, p. 1. See also Don Kirk, "Sterner U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Causes Debate in South," New York Times, January 19, 2002, p. 1.

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114. Interview by John Larkin, Far Eastern Economic Review, January 31, 2002, p. 26. 115. Elizabeth Olson, "U.S. Warns of Arms Threats, Citing North Korea and Iraq," New York Times, January 26, 2002, p. 4. 116. David E. Sanger, "In Speech, Bush Calls Iraq, Iran, and North Korea 'an Axis of Evil,'" New York Times, January 30, 2002, p. 1; and Jodi Enda, "Bush Vows to Combat Terrorism" (Knight Ridder Newspapers wire service report), Monterey Herald, January 30, 2002, pp. A1-A14. 117. A former writer for the neoconservative Weekly Standard, David Frum, "coined the phrase 'axis of evil'" as noted in the Lexington column, "Paul Wolfowitz, Velociraptor," The Economist, February 9, 2002, p. 30. 118. For representative coverage of that debate, see Jane Perlez, David E. Sanger, and Thom Shanker, "From Many Voices, One Battle Stratregy," New York Times, September 23, 2001, p. 1; Michael Hirsh and Roy Gutman, "Powell in the Middle," Newsweek, October 1, 2001, p. 26; and James Mann, "A Shared Vision: Bush's Foreign Policy Advisers Need to Learn to Work as a Team to Fight Terrorism," Washington Post (Weekly), October 8-14, 2001, pp. 24-25. 119. John Larkin and Murray Hiebert, "Axis of Uncertainty," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 14, 2002, pp. 12-15. 120. Barbara Slavin and Laurence McQuillan, '"Axis of Evil' Scoffs at Bush Speech," USA Today, January 31, 2002, p. 1; John Ward Anderson, "Angry Denials from the 'Axis,'" Washington Post, January 31, 2002, p. 16; David R. Sands, "North Korea Assails 'Axis' Label," Washington Times, February 1, 2002, p. 1; "North Korea Alleges U.S. Invasion Plot" (AP wire service report), Monterey Herald, February 6, 2002, p. A8; and James Brooke, "South Korea and Japan Begin to Sweat After Bush Turns Up the Heat on North Korea," New York Times, January 31, 2002, p. 1. For updates on North Korean reactions to issues that concern it, see the Korean Central News Agency's website, www.kcna.co.jp/. 121. Willis Witter, "South Korean Foreign Minister Dismissed," Washington Times, February 5, 2002, p. 1. 122. Robert Burns, "Rumsfeld Says U.S. Could Face 'Vastly More Deadly Attacks" (AP wire service report), Monterey Herald, February 1, 2002, pp. A l A12. 123. For coverage of U.S. motives and assessments of the dangers, see David E. Sanger, "Bush Aides Say Tone Puts Foes on Notice," New York Times, January 31, 2002, p. 1; and John Larkin and Murray Hiebert, "North Korea: Welcome to the War," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 13, 2001, pp. 14-18. 124. Quoted in Clay Chandler, "Thousands Protest Bush's S. Korean Visit," Washington Post, February 21, 2002, p. 18. 125. Quoted in Kim Chang-kyun, "Assembly Paralysed Amidst Mud Slinging," in Digital Chosunilbo, February 18, 2002, http://english.chosun.com. 126. "President Bush and President Kim Meet in Seoul," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, February 20, 2002, http://www.whitehouse. gov.

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127. For coverage of President Bush's approach, see Mike Allen, "Bush Has Tough Talk for N. Korea," Washington Post, February 20, 2002, p. 1; and Jim Vandehei and John Larkin, "Bush Keeps Up Heat on North Korea but Rules Out Any Military Invasion," Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2002, p. 1. 128. "Above Anti-Americanism," Korea Herald, February 22, 2002, editorial page. 129. For coverage of Japan's legislative and bureaucratic responses, see Kathryn Tolbert and Doug Struck, "Japan Expands Military Role to Support U.S.," Washington Post, October 19, 2001, p. 22; Peter Landers, "Japan Gives Approval to Send Troops in Support of U.S. War Against Terror," Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2001, p. 1; and David Lague, "The Japanese Military; New Rules of Defence," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 1, 2001, pp. 20-21. 130. For analyses of those competing interests, see Erik Eckholm, "China's Support for U.S. on Terror Is a Dramatic About Face," New York Times, September 30, 2001, p. 1; and "China and America, Friends Again, for Now," The Economist, October 13, 2001, pp. 41-42. 131. For coverage of those regional concerns, see Henry Chu, "China's New Role as U.S. Ally Greeted with Relief and Dismay," Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2001, p. 1; Doug Struck and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Nations Across Asia Keep Watch on China," Washington Post, October 19, 2001, p. 23; and Murray Hiebert, "U.S.-Asia Ties, a Flawed Policy," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 25, 2001, pp. 30-31. 132. The thrust of continuity stressed here is based on a link between Reagan-Bush-Clinton-Bush policies. The author explored that issue further in his "U.S. Policy Toward the Inter-Korean Dialogue," in Katy Oh and Ralph Hassig, eds., Korea Briefing, 2000-2001: First Steps Toward Reconciliation and Reunification, Armonk, NY: Asia Society/M. E. Sharpe, 2002. The author's analysis of that two-year period in U.S.-Korea relations in that volume is also reflected in portions of this analysis, although the former's focus is on short-term prospects. For a different perspective on continuity in the George W. Bush administration's policies toward Korea, stressing a harder-edged conservative brand of engagement, see Victor Cha, "Hawk Engagement: Bush Policy Toward North Korea," CSIS Working Paper, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2001. 133. For a dire analysis of North Korea's desperate situation, see Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2000. 134. For assessments of President Kim's domestic weaknesses, stemming from his economic vulnerabilities, difficulties in accelerating progress on the inter-Korean front, and scandals, see John Larkin, "Kim Dae Jung Comes Up Short," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 24, 2001, pp. 18-24; Ilene R. Prusher, "Between the Koreas, a Year of Frustration," Christian Science Monitor, June 13, 2001, pp. 1, 8; and Kim Jung Min, "Rotten on Top," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 30, 2002, p. 19.

ASIA'S ROLE IN SHAPING KOREA'S " D U E COURSE"

K

OREA'S DIVISION AND THE TENSIONS SURROUNDING IT during the Cold War and its aftermath have been influenced by the Asian geographic setting. Much less obvious is the way that the Asian location has shaped the issue of Korean self-determination and the question of when in due course may be realized. To address those topics it is worthwhile to explore the interactions between a divided Korea and its regional context. Leaving aside questions on the correctness of U.S. policy toward Korean self-determination, several questions arise about the roles of the former Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), China, and Japan. Each of these major powers shall be examined against the backdrop of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras in an effort to determine policy goals, motivations, and alternatives for the future vis-à-vis a divided Korean nation and the prospects for reunification. Therefore the focus of this chapter is somewhat narrow. Many other studies already describe and analyze the complexities, contradictions, and nuances of these three powers' interactions within the region. These facets of their policies are undeniably important in their own right.1 However, in terms of our critiquing U.S. policy toward a divided Korean nation, the issues that matter are counterparts to U.S. policy toward the in-due-course issue. For this reason, comparisons between these three powers' policies and U.S. policy are utilized for heuristic (problem-solving) purposes—even if they sometimes had marginal influence in shaping each other's policies. The Soviet Union's approach to a divided Korea is superficially the easiest to assess because in so many ways it mirrored the role of the United States. As the main U.S. protagonist in the Cold War and North 81

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Korea's main backer during the Cold War, the parallels are manifest. Like the United States, the Soviet Union used the Korean Peninsula for its own strategic purposes early in the post-World War II period. 2 The main difference was the Soviet Union's, and previously czarist Russia's, far greater interest in—and appreciation for—Korea's geopolitical and economic importance to Russian national interests. In this sense it is fair to observe that in comparison to Washington Moscow was far better prepared to deal with Korea's liberation from Japan and had greater insights into the implications of dividing Korea in the course of liberating it. In that context one can contend that Moscow deserves more blame for sanctioning Korea's division and for contributing to early Cold War trends that exacerbated that division. Mitigating the blame are two factors. First, the Soviet Union was not a signatory to the Cairo declaration in which the in-due-course goal was laid out as a framework for Korean self-determination. Offsetting this somewhat was the Soviet Union's culpability resulting from its role in decisions made at Yalta that contributed to Korea's division. Second is the possibility, and perhaps probability, that Soviet officials—with a better grasp of the circumstances and a clearer vision for what should occur in Korea—may well have been more committed to implementing an in-due-course agenda, even though the Soviet Union was not obligated, more rapidly than U.S. officials, whose lack of a clear vision fostered a predisposition toward muddling through. Unfortunately for the Korean nation, the Soviet-style commitment led the Soviet Union to back North Korean aggression with the clear purpose of bringing all of Korea under the DPRK's control and in a very bellicose manner accelerate the in-due-course commitment. 3 After the Korean War truce was signed, the Soviet Union essentially collaborated with the United States in making the Korean Peninsula a semipermanent part of the geopolitical landscape. Unable to have its way in fashioning a Marxist form of self-determination for the entire Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union settled down for a long-term struggle with its U.S. adversary over shaping Korea's destiny. Like the United States, the Soviet priorities shifted toward keeping the peninsula from falling into the hands of its opponent's protégé and preventing tensions from reescalating in ways that could risk war between the superpowers. In that sense the Soviet Union learned significant lessons about limited war and long-term deterrence from the Korean War.4 Had it not been for the tensions precipitated by the Sino-Soviet split and the myriad ways in which they spilled over into Korean affairs and affected

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both Moscow's and Beijing's interactions with the Kim Il-sung regime, one could argue that Moscow's and Washington's vantage points on the Korean Peninsula had grown more alike as U.S. leaders became more sophisticated about Korea and the Soviet Union became more pragmatic about Cold War realities. 5 However, the Sino-Soviet split constrained Moscow's degree of flexibility compared to Washington's relative autonomy, causing a superpower imbalance as to Korea.6 The United States enjoyed a disproportionately large amount of influence compared to all other external actors. Despite those significant differences, Soviet caution on reunification bore a remarkable resemblance to U.S. hesitancy. And overt Soviet support for unification also bore remarkable similarities to the catch-22 and free-vote qualities regarding U.S. policy (see Chapter 3).7 The ways in which these results were unintended by-products of larger Cold War processes make them that much more intriguing. As a result, both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a choreographed charade on Korean unification, permitting each superpower to proclaim strong support for its Korean ally's unification proposals and for the processes devised by them to pursue such proposals even as Washington and Moscow shared an unwritten sense of certainty that the prospects for genuine progress were virtually nil. In these terms, then, as the Cold War evolved the Soviet Union embraced the indefinite postponement of the in-due-course endgame that characterized U.S. policy toward Korea. In turn, Moscow's policies reinforced the perceived wisdom of Washington's policies. As the U.S.-Soviet relationship moved away from the era of détente toward a reinvigorated Cold War during the Reagan years, it added another layer of nuance to the superpowers' policies toward Korea. 8 The U.S. use of its position in South Korea and Japan, as well as the security alignment that developed between the United States and China with a shared adversarial focus on the Soviet Union, simultaneously exacerbated the division between the two Koreas by making the ROK more central to U.S. security policy than the DPRK was to either the Soviet Union or China. 9 The precise role during this period of the DPRK and the two communist giants raises many questions beyond the scope of this study, but there seems little doubt that neither Moscow nor Beijing was able to make use of North Korea for its purposes in ways that Washington could utilize South Korea.10 In addition, North Korea could not rely on either communist giant in ways comparable to South Korea's ability to rely on the United States. In that sense Washington had reasons

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for wanting to perpetuate division to maintain a useful status quo, adding to the late Cold War pressures on the Soviet Union as well as on China to appreciate what the United States was doing in South Korea strategically to the benefit of the U.S.-China relationship in Eurasia. This situation was reinforced by Washington's emphasis on North-South tensions as the focus of the U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula in the name of regional stability, not superpower rivalry. This simultaneously accommodated Seoul's desires not to unduly offend the Soviet Union and contributed to U.S. policies that perpetuated a divided Korea. The Gorbachev era, in the last years of the Soviet Union, was marked by a growing recognition that Moscow needed to rapidly adapt to the U.S. successes. It also raised new possibilities in Asia that South Korea was more adept at addressing than North Korea. 11 Seoul's nordpolitik effectively did an end run around the DPRK by opening the diplomatic door for improved informal ties with the Soviet Union and China that led—more swiftly than most observers anticipated—to formal recognition by both of the ROK. Well before the actual end of the Cold War, South Korea was making progress in developing the kind of bilateral ties with Moscow and Beijing that came to characterize the post-Cold War era's innovative qualities. The irony of the improved relationships was that they nudged the Soviet Union and China toward maintaining discrete bilateral ties with separate Koreas. This made Moscow and Beijing even more proactive in sanctioning Korea's division compared to the United States, as Washington still recognized the legitimacy of only one half of Korea. Although duality was not the official position of either the Soviet Union or China just prior to the end of the Cold War, both remained overtly supportive of Korean unification, and so the impact of cross-recognition was more ambiguous. This is not meant to imply that the Soviet Union and China were any more malevolent than the United States. None of the major powers were engaging in sinister policies. All were experimenting with cross-recognition en route to establishing a more constructive dialogue process. The key factor is that the Soviet Union and China went farther down that policy path than did the United States, which raises questions about why the United States refrained from pursuing that cross-recognition option. Had all three major powers chosen that option, it might have enhanced the inter-Korean dialogue process instead of adding new complexities. Nonetheless, Moscow's and Beijing's policies toward the two Koreas effectively reinforced division and made it easier for the United States to ignore its own inattention to the in-due-course mandate. In many respects,

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these shifts in Soviet and Chinese policy served U.S. ends. They strengthened the ROK, created anxiety for the DPRK, and inadvertently prolonged the U.S. role in a divided Korea whose division was legally enhanced. That situation was dramatically altered by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Leaving aside the impact of these developments on China's role in Korea, the emergence of a post-Soviet Russia raised intriguing new circumstances. No longer bound by Cold War constraints and security interests regarding the U.S. position in South Korea, Russia was soon able to begin exploring new economic and strategic options with South Korea, even as it tried to remain on reasonably good terms with North Korea—despite lingering resentment on Pyongyang's part. 12 North Korea was well aware of the price it had paid as a by-product of reformist policies that ended the Soviet Union. Although Russia still had reasons to preserve the status quo, those reasons had changed. Instead of focusing on an inter-Korean strategic balance, Moscow could emphasize Russia's usefulness to both Koreas as a facilitator of an inter-Korean dialogue and as a nonthreatening partner. Russia also had reason to hope that a united Korea would be as economically strong as the ROK is in the post-Cold War era, making it a valuable partner for Far Eastern Russia. Moreover, Russia could also make a reasonably plausible case that it, compared to any other country concerned with Korea's prospects for unification, faced little risk from such an outcome. Although substantially accurate in terms of the threat potential a unified Korea could pose to Russia, there are potential negative attributes stemming from reunification that should cause Russians concern. Foremost is the chance that a unifying Korea would be so preoccupied with paying for the related costs that it would be poorly positioned to be much of an economic partner for Far Eastern Russia. Russia also should be concerned about the ways that Korean unification could turn sour, leaving on its eastern border a weak Korea vulnerable to Chinese and Japanese pressures. As important as Russia could be in shaping self-determination, smoothing the way for implementing the in-due-course commitment, it probably will not be as crucial as China and Japan. Like the Soviet Union, neither China nor Japan had any role in extending the in-duecourse commitment—one government not coming into existence until the postwar period, the other a successor to a vanquished foe. Of course, China was a signatory at Cairo, but the government of war-time China was the Republic of China (ROC), which later fled to Taiwan when the communists under Mao Tse-tung prevailed in the civil war. Needless to

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say, postwar China assumed no commitments made by the ROC. Obviously, neither China nor Japan could be held accountable for not living up to a commitment they never made. Nonetheless, neither are they blame-free. As noted in Chapter 3, Japan influenced U.S. thinking about the utility of the Korean status quo within the U.S. strategy for the AsiaPacific region. In part this reflected shared U.S.-Japanese interests in the larger Asian region and, in part, overlapping interests vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula. 13 Although those interests often overlapped, they were not truly common interests despite the efforts of many U.S. and Japanese analysts to stress that aspect. As the U.S.-Japan relationship matured during the Cold War years, many contentious issues arose over economic and security matters.14 Clearly Japan was developing and pursuing policies with regard to the Asia-Pacific region that did not always accord with U.S. policies.15 Japan's efforts were complicated by post-Cold War and post-Gulf War pressures from the United States to be more proactive in regional multilateral affairs 16 and within the U.S.-Japan alliance.17 The latter pressures eventually led to the Clinton administration's Nye initiative, designed to increase Japan's share of the strategic burden and make Japan in effect a regional deputy for the United States, which found itself functioning as a global cop but wanted to avoid being spread too thinly.18 As U.S. leaders cultivated such relationships with the Japanese, it became glaringly evident that a key location for carrying them out could be the Korean Peninsula. Although Japan and both Koreas had been exploring ways to improve Japan's relations with each Korean state and the peninsula as a whole for decades and had some progress to show for their efforts, there was no shortage of impediments on all sides.19 Foremost was the deep-seated legacy of Korean suspicions about Japanese motives and intentions that stemmed from the colonial era, memories of the distant past dating to Hideyoshi's conquests, and controversial debates over Koreans' roles in shaping what became the Japanese nation. Although Koreans harbored particularly strong animosities, verging on paranoia, they were well aware that Chinese and others shared their suspicions. 20 Those concerns about Japan, endemic in contemporary Korean society on both sides of the divided peninsula, found expression in the post-Cold War era in response to generic changes21 and, in particular, with regard to the Nye initiative's efforts to motivate Japanese strategic assertiveness. 22 These developments on the U.S.-Japan security front were a cause for Korean anxiety even when there was minimal evidence that Japan

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was prepared or willing to do very much. Japan's readiness to consider its strategic options was heightened by the North Korean missile test over Japan in 1998 (see Chapter 3). That event began a serious process of rethinking Japan's roles in Korean affairs. 23 The evolving situation was significantly altered by the U.S. war on terrorism, by Tokyo's affirmative responses to Washington's pressures on Japan to do more militarily, and by the possibility that the war on terrorism could spread to Korea. As described in Chapter 3, the events of September 11 added new dimensions to the U.S. security relations in Northeast Asia. These circumstances were exacerbated by a Japan-North Korea conflict at sea, on December 24, 2001, between the Japanese Coast Guard and a presumed North Korean spy vessel that was sunk during a Japanese attack in the East China Sea. 24 Pyongyang denounced the attack as "a crime" and "unpardonable terrorism." 25 Although that incident did not ignite a dramatic shift in Japanese policy toward Korea, it did blend into a pattern of growing Japanese strategic assertiveness in a region where Koreans possess interests and express concerns. 26 Korean reservations about Japan's regional intentions underscore the issues at stake from Tokyo's perspective when the prospect of genuine Korean reconciliation and unification is raised. Peaceful inter-Korean progress undoubtedly is more preferable to Japan than a war leading to unification by conquest that could so easily spill over into Japan. This could occur through U.S. calls for Japanese assistance, North Korean attacks on U.S. rear-area bases in Japan, domestic sabotage by Japan's ideologically divided Korean minority population, Korean refugees finding their way to Japan, and postwar pressures on Tokyo to help pay the costs for reconstruction of its newly united neighbor. 27 Cumulatively these are nightmarish scenarios for most Japanese. However, even the more preferable possibility of peacefully negotiated Korean reunification raises questions that cause anxiety in Japan. Would such a Korea be economically and militarily powerful enough to pose dangers to Japan? Conversely, might such a Korea be so weakened by the costs of unification that it would place great demands on Japan for assistance? Would such a Korea (strong or weak) still function as a geopolitical buffer for Japan? Could Japan count on U.S. forces remaining in a united Korea, helping to retain the buffer and to constrain Korean action toward Japan? 28 Would a united Korea owe any geopolitical debt to China due to its role in Korean reconciliation? These and other lower-profile concerns are sufficient to cause deep reservations among the Japanese as they are compelled to cope with international

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pressures to cooperate with both Koreas while they are attempting to resolve their differences. Although Tokyo has explored improved relations with North Korea in the past, 29 not much progress was achieved. 30 Moreover, part of that experimentation can be attributed to Japanese desires to be more evenhanded in dealing with the two Koreas because of Tokyo-Seoul frictions and a desire to underscore the division of the Korean nation into two states. Under the Kim Dae-jung administration, however, Seoul was more proactive in encouraging Tokyo to be innovative in making overtures toward North Korea as a way to reinforce South Korea's sunshine policy. 31 This progress may be part of a larger process of maturing ROK-Japan cooperation on economic, security, and sports issues—including the jointly hosted 2002 soccer World Cup. However, Japan's responses to Seoul's urging to be more innovative are equally likely to have occurred because Tokyo did not have much of an alternative open to it in the face of Washington's embrace of the sunshine approach during the late Clinton years. This led to Japan formally cooperating with the ROK and the United States through the Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group as of April 1999. A cynic could plausibly suspect that the Japanese went along with Seoul's program on the assumption that eventually North Korean clouds would block South Korean sunshine or that the United States would undercut Seoul's plans, leading in either case to another round of failure. Therefore, Tokyo's support was yet another instance of a free vote that would earn Tokyo points with Seoul at relatively little risk. Reinforcing such skepticism is the well-founded cluster of Japanese anxieties noted above, along with the very safe assumption that Tokyo is guided by a strong desire not to be relegated to bystander status as Koreans from both sides work out their future together. Japan—like the United States—feels compelled to support Seoul's agenda but has profound reservations about its wisdom and feasibility and is more than willing to discreetly drag its feet and keep its fingers crossed that matters do not get out of control. In effect, without Tokyo running the risk of acknowledging this reality, Japan is thoroughly supportive of the U.S. go-slow approach to in due course. China's role in dealing with the two Koreas is as complex as Japan's but markedly different. Whereas China has reasons to be ambiguous about Korean unification, those motives are not nearly as anxiety ridden as Japan's are. It is incorrect to put Tokyo and Beijing in the same box in opposition to Korean unification, as many analysts do. 32 China's

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main reason for harboring doubts about Korean reconciliation and reunification centers on the prospect that China may not be the lead external player in that process and that the United States may fill that function. In this sense Korea's fate is part of a much broader spectrum of U.S.-China tensions that revolve around a clash of core international identities. As is all too well known to all the countries of Asia, the Chinese name for China (Chungkuo) means "Central Country" (or "Middle Kingdom"). Every time Koreans refer to Chinese as choong gook saram, they remind themselves that the Chinese are, literally, the "Central Country people." The U.S. role in world affairs throughout the Cold War— wisely or not—was as an aspirant to such a centralized hierarchical role. In the post-Cold War period the Clinton administration, in the president's second inaugural address, formalized that goal by explicitly labeling the United States—the world's sole superpower—as the "indispensable country." 33 This was manifestly obvious to South Koreans, who had extensive experience with U.S. hubris. The difficulty for all Koreans, North and South, is that each of the two countries with the greatest ability to influence their nations' futures (i.e., the United States and China) perceive themselves as wielding virtually hegemonic power. For both Koreas there is an uncomfortable geopolitical reality to cope with, namely, the existence of two powerful countries that view themselves as indispensable, at the center of all that matters in world affairs. Both the United States and China act as though they have the right to exert their influence in ways that the two Koreas should heed. 34 There is considerable history behind this issue. Based on a very long legacy of Chinese cultural diffusion that contributed significantly to Korean identity and made Korea a major example of the Sinic cultural realm (albeit with substantial love-hate qualities that stemmed from a mixture of Korean attempts to improve upon what was imported from China and Chinese tendencies to be the Confucian big brother to Korea's little brother), both nations entered the modern era thoroughly attuned to each other's national interests. 35 As Korea's closest neighbor, there has never been any doubt that China grasped the peninsula's importance. After the creation of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 amid the rising tensions of the Cold War, China's foreign policy parameters were strongly influenced by its revolutionary fervor. When war broke out in neighboring Korea in June 1950, the conflict loomed large on Beijing's horizon. As North Korea's position in the Korean War deteriorated and U.S.-led UN forces advanced toward the Korean Peninsula's border with China, China's entry into the conflict to help

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North Korea was consistent with its long-standing territorial national interests as well as its ideological inclinations. Beijing's move changed the dynamic of the war and how the UN allies perceived it, but it also introduced another dimension to the issue of a divided Korea. 36 Along with the Soviet Union, China became one of North Korea's two backers. But the Sino-Soviet split that emerged in the aftermath of the Korean War greatly complicated Beijing's bilateral ties with Pyongyang. North Korea used its leverage to play the Soviet Union and China against each other. Although North Korea tried to manipulate both communist major powers, it found it could not rely fully on either. As the Cold War evolved, leading to U.S.-China diplomatic normalization in the 1970s, yet another source of tension was introduced to China-DPRK relations. Well before the Cold War's end seemed remotely feasible, North Korea was compelled to begin dealing with some of the factors that would eventually plague the DPRK, namely, a weakened Russia and a China whose limited commitment to North Korea's cause was strained by other interests. Pyongyang had ample reason to question China's purposes and ask why it might still value the DPRK as any kind of ally after a U.S.-China strategic alignment became an Asian reality.37 As unsettling as those developments were for North Korea, a number of other factors prevented China from straying very far from the circumstances that warranted its entry into the Korean War. Geopolitically the Korean Peninsula, because of its sensitive location, remained a permanent factor in Chinese strategic thinking. Even though U.S.-China security relations had markedly improved during the 1970s and early 1980s, and China had reasons to value the stabilizing role of the U.S. forward presence in South Korea regarding the Soviet Union and a sometimes erratic North Korea, having U.S. forces in China's front yard was nonetheless a source of consternation for a country that took great pride in its core role for Asia. The U.S. public and South Koreans should try to visualize what it might be like if the tables were turned and China possessed the kind of strategic assets in the U.S. backyard that the United States now has in Asia. In such a setting, the counterpart to a divided Korea could be a North and South Mexico, with the United States burdened by a North Mexico plagued with a faltering economy and quirky leadership while South Mexico enjoyed a robust economy, produced prudent leaders, and was protected by forward-deployed Chinese armed forces linked to other Chinese alliances throughout the Western Hemisphere, as well as to a quasi-alliance with a breakaway U.S. island territory such as Hawaii or Guam.

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These hypothetical comparisons may seem far-fetched, but they undoubtedly strike a responsive chord among Chinese leaders. The Central Country cannot easily tolerate interlopers that throw their weight around and expect to be appreciated for doing so. That form of Sino-U.S. tension has been a consistent contextual asset for North Korea, an asset that South Korea as well can—on occasion—take advantage of in oblique ways. Because of these ambiguous Chinese interests, China has had concurrent reasons to be supportive of Korea's continued division (in a finite milieu) and to embrace Korea's reconciliation and reunification in the long run. In these terms China has had more reasons than the United States and Japan to pursue the in-due-course resolution of Korea's division, although Beijing superficially often appears to be closer in its Korea policy to Washington and Tokyo. Another major factor that serves to differentiate China is the fact that it shares a similar problem with the Korean Peninsula. China's quest for bringing Taiwan into the fold of one China imbues Beijing's policies with a level of understanding of Korea's plight that the United States and Japan find more difficult to display. One consequence is that every time China does or says something with regard to Korean unification Beijing knows that there is relevance in its policies toward Taiwan. As a result it is awkward for China to back policies that help to keep Korea divided, but it would also be awkward for China to be instrumental in bringing about Korean reunification before Beijing was able to do the same thing for a still-divided China. As a result of all these circumstances, China is more ready to support and sanction Korean reunification, but Beijing's policies have strings attached that create nuances in China's role. Those nuances developed added levels as the Cold War approached its end and China began adapting to how the Reagan-Gorbachev era affected the Korean Peninsula.38 A by-product of that era was Seoul's innovative nordpolitik policy, described above. Although Pyongyang was damaged geopolitically by both Beijing and Moscow responding positively to Seoul and establishing diplomatic relations with the ROK, Moscow's responses were far easier to fathom than Beijing's from North Korea's perspective. China's reasons for diplomatically recognizing the ROK were varied. Beijing could not afford to be a bystander as the Soviet Union made the move. China also wanted to upgrade its economic ties with the far more vibrant half of the Korean Peninsula (i.e., South Korea) instead of being stuck with only the stagnating DPRK. Beijing understood the utility for both China and the Soviet Union of greater leverage over inter-Korean

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affairs than would be possessed by either the United States or Japan for as long as they each avoided cross-recognition and recognized only the ROK. Furthermore, and unique to China, Beijing appreciated the symbolic value of the loss of face Taipei would experience after the ROK switched its diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the Peoples' Republic of China after decades of ROK-ROC solidarity.39 An irony of that transition was that Beijing, although it participated in Seoul's efforts to do an end run around Pyongyang, ultimately did not severely damage the China-DPRK relationship because North Korea ended up not having anywhere else to turn after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed. As the post-Cold War era evolved and U.S.-China geopolitical relations shifted away from the late Cold War form of alignment, Beijing found itself with new contexts to deal with. China's ties with both Koreas became still more nuanced. 40 Although China now had a formal two-Koreas policy, with the implied risk that other countries could apply that same logic to dual diplomatic recognition of two Chinas, there were a number of offsetting advantages. Although a two-Koreas policy could warrant charges that China was being even more explicit than the United States and Japan about helping to keep the two Koreas divided, in fact Beijing's maintenance of dual ties enabled it to maximize its leverage over both. Beijing could play one against the other and position itself as the ideal intermediary for cultivating an inter-Korean dialogue and being the facilitator of reconciliation. In short, China could act as a benevolent big brother to the divided Korean national family. It also could use its newfound modern leverage in Korean affairs to maximize its security interests as to the two Koreas and the U.S. presence in the ROK. 41 Just as the end of the Cold War inadvertently created advantageous circumstances for China in Korea, so too did the U.S.-North Korean nuclear confrontation create opportunities for China to facilitate backchannel inter-Korean communications. China has cultivated these opportunities with both North and South Korea. Without question ChinaROK interactions have had a higher international profile because of the stark qualities inherent in the world's largest communist country—a potential adversary of the United States—interacting so closely with one of the key Asian allies of the United States. Moreover, this starkness is enhanced by assumptions that China's more traditional Korean partner, North Korea, must be losing out in the process. Although both of these perceptions have some merit, there has been throughout the post-Cold War period to date a marked effort by Beijing to be a useful big brother

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to both Koreas and to play a mediator's role in encouraging both Koreas to bridge the gap dividing them.42 China's task was not made any easier by its own internal debate over how far to permit Chinese economic reforms to foster political change of the sort that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Beijing's ability to hold up its domestic reform as a model for the DPRK to emulate to bridge the economic gap with the ROK was undercut by North Korean wariness of being induced to go down the Soviet path, as well as by its recognition of China's own internal struggles over how far to go. North Korea's deteriorating situation and often intransigent leaders made China's task that much more difficult. Part of the reason that South Korea—in the mid-1990s as the nuclear crisis and its resultant negotiations shook Korea—began to look to China as a uniquely well positioned provider of diplomatic good offices between the two Koreas was an assumption that China enjoyed access to, and leverage over, North Korea. 43 Although China did possess some influence over North Korea, it was not strong. The Cold War's ups and downs had damaged that bond. Furthermore, it was weakened by Chinese concerns about the rapidity of North Korea's economic deterioration, widespread famine, and inability to prevent refugees from fleeing to China. 44 The latter concern was made more acute by Chinese sensitivity to its own Korean minority in portions of former Manchuria within Chinese territory adjacent to North Korea. 45 In several respects, then, North Korea constituted a dilemma for China. Beijing had to do what it could to keep conditions in North Korea from unraveling totally. Moreover, there was a degree of residual empathy between the two Korean War allies. Maintaining a semblance of support was not made easier by North Korea's predilection for highrisk brinkmanship. Those tactics are best known to the world as a result of North Korea's use of its nuclear and missile options vis-à-vis the ROK, the United States, and Japan, but Pyongyang engaged in a lowerprofile form of in-your-face diplomacy in the region by cultivating DPRK-Taiwan contacts to offset China-ROK relations, presumably knowing full well their implications for Beijing. Although the ability of Pyongyang and Taipei to get in a few digs at Beijing and Seoul was intriguing, it never amounted to much more than symbolism. 46 It did, however, call attention to how China's and North Korea's concerns over each other's unification policy could take strange paths.47 This tended to underscore the ways in which China's influence over North Korea was limited by China's broader and more mainstream international interests

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in the late 1990s as Beijing pursued creative policies toward South Korea that were designed to help bring about more rationality in North Korea, making it possible for China to guide the two Koreas toward reconciliation and avoid a catastrophe that could spill over into China. 48 As much as China was prone to develop options with South Korea, and as much as Beijing regarded North Korea as quirky, China could not afford to put too much distance between itself and the DPRK. 49 China's caution in this regard was of great utility in the ties Beijing cultivated with Seoul in the late 1990s precisely because South Korea valued China's ability to temper North Korea's excesses and to do things that the United States either could not or would not do. As the ROK, the United States, and Japan pursued legitimate efforts aimed at nuclear nonproliferation via KEDO and limiting North Korea's missile options, South Korea also was reinforcing its ties with China well beyond the early levels achieved as a result of Seoul's nordpolitik and cross-recognition policies. Seoul was no longer simply doing an end run around Pyongyang; it was intensely engaging with China on a broad spectrum of activities for sound bilateral reasons and to make better use of China's ability to help generate confidence-building measures between the two Koreas. This alternative also was open to the United States and Japan, but neither possessed the reservoir of cultural, political, and strategic assets that China did. This diplomatic approach seriously took off after Kim Dae-jung became the ROK's president. Although there were parallel efforts in the U.S.-China relationship to build the basis for a strategic partnership, they were overshadowed by U.S. concerns about future U.S.-China rivalries. Seoul had reason to be concerned about the potential impact of such a future upon its U.S. ally, but it did not apply that logic to the future of China-ROK relations. South Korea had little reason, if any, to fear China's policies toward the ROK looking toward the twenty-first century. Accordingly, during the year after Kim's election in 1997 the ROK accelerated its contacts with a responsive China. These mutual overtures led to a November 1998 ROK-China summit between President Kim and President Jiang Zemin in Beijing during which the two countries created a formal "cooperative partnership" with a commitment to work together on a broad range of programs.50 President Kim asserted that "President Jiang will do his best for peace, reconciliation and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula."51 In a relatively short period of time (i.e., in due course), China moved forward on several key venues with South Korea. In August 1999, during a visit to Beijing by

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ROK Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae, meetings with Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian were conducted that led to agreements to create bilateral military cooperation systems and assurances that China's strategy toward Korea included support for Kim's sunshine policy.52 When Defense Minister Chi made a return visit to Seoul in January 2000, more specifics were laid out on how the ROK and Chinese militaries planned to cooperate, including regularizing senior officer and student officer exchanges and the creation of working groups to explore the possibility of naval exchanges and joint military exercises. 53 By April 2000, during a visit by ROK Foreign Minister Lee Joung-binn to Beijing, meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, an agreement was reached to establish a hot line between the ROK and Chinese foreign ministries to facilitate communications. 54 There are two nuances of these summit meetings worth noting. First, they all involved South Korea taking the initiative to bolster ROK-China ties, with North Korea obviously looming in the background, by making the trips to Beijing. This underscored South Korea's relative stature in comparison to China. Second, it is no coincidence that these events occurred during the period that led up to South Korea's dramatically successful diplomatic overtures toward North Korea and the ROK-DPRK summit in Pyongyang during June 2000. China's role as middleman in inter-Korean events may have been relatively discreet, but it does not take much geopolitical acumen to be able to read between the lines of the inter-Korean dialogue and detect the hand of the Central Country playing a role reminiscent of the Middle Kingdom of old. Although China has been supportive of the fourparty talks (ROK, DPRK, China, and the United States) that help provide a broader structure for bilateral inter-Korean talks that all parties acknowledge to be the essential core, it is clear that China and the United States are involved in that format as a hedge so one or the other does not steal the lead by pushing for a trilateral format. 55 However, because China possesses an asset that the United States still spurns— namely, having formal diplomatic relations with both the ROK and DPRK—Beijing is better positioned to carry out a more flexible and innovative set of policies toward the Korean Peninsula. Seeking to offset the U.S. influence on South Korea and, through South Korea, upon North Korea, China was trying to be a counterbalance to set the stage for a long-term strategic realignment. 56 What that approach will yield in the long run remains to be seen, but so far it appears to have enjoyed some success, creating a role for

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China in assuring a Chinese brand of double containment for the two Koreas cloaked in affirmations that China's purpose is to preserve the peace en route to reconciliation and reunification. Double containment in this context simply means helping to reassure each side in the interKorean balance of powers that China's influence helps to restrain reckless and aggressive behavior and that each Korea can count on China to pull it off. Along those lines, just as South Korea relied on China to be a facilitator when President Kim and other senior ROK officials held summits in Beijing, so too has Chairman Kim Jong-il used visits to Beijing in May 2000 and Beijing and Shanghai in January 2001 to demonstrate that North Korea was looking to China for some guidance and probably to function as an economic role model, both of which would fit well into China-ROK efforts. 57 China's successes in blending communism and capitalism may eventually be the basis for North Korea transforming its rogue-state behavior. 58 Furthermore, were U.S.-North Korea relations to significantly worsen as a result of an expanded war on terrorism and belligerent states, one beneficiary could be China, given its ability to temper the tensions and act as a catalyst for interKorean dialogue. China's efforts to play a larger and more constructive role on the Korean Peninsula seem to be predicated on more than real national interests in Korea. China seems to be torn between wanting to reassume celestial burdens—reminiscent of China's illustrious past as the manifest father-figure apex of a regional hierarchy of little-brother states— versus being a constrained hegemon frustrated by the U.S. role as an indispensable country (in Clinton-era jargon). Instead of being a father figure, the United States acts as what can be characterized as the essential hub of a regional wheel composed of bilateral spokes emanating from and dependent on that hub. Senior U.S. officials have used comparable nexus paradigms for the Asia-Pacific region. For example, in the George H. W. Bush administration, Richard Solomon, assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, referred to the U.S. role as a "balancing wheel," 59 and Secretary of State James Baker drew a parallel with the "spokes of a fan." 60 In a similar vein, late in the Clinton administration Admiral Joseph Prueher (at the time, commander in chief in the Pacific and, subsequently, U.S. ambassador to China), describing what the United States had to cope with in the Pacific, stated, "The Chinese believe they are the hub of the region." 61 In reality, as demonstrated by U.S. attitudes and the functions of the commander in chief in the Pacific, the United States shares with China

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a belief that each constitutes the hub of a wheel for rival models of a central organizing principle. The more China can raise the notion of an alternative wheel with a Chinese hub at the center by cultivating spoke relationships with virtually all the states in its region, the better its prospects are for dislodging the United States from such a role and discrediting U.S. hubris. This was cast in a harsher tone by events such as the U.S. accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during NATO's intervention in the Balkans, as well as the South China Sea airplane incident. China's posture in inter-Korean affairs has the potential for accelerating the agenda and sending a broad array of signals to the rest of Asia. In this sense, and as important as Russia's and Japan's roles in Korean affairs can be, China's role looms larger for both Koreas and for the United States as U.S. society moves forward into the twenty-first century. As noted at the beginning of this section, Korea's neighbors in Asia—Russia, Japan, and China—often have been only tangentially involved in how the United States handled the in-due-course mandate during the second half of the twentieth century. This could persist as U.S. policy regarding Korean unification evolves in the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, their presence and their options regarding a divided Korea today, and a potentially united Korea in the future, cumulatively constitute the parameters within which Washington can shape U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. As the United States considers its alternatives and desires with regard to a divided Korea, Washington must keep one eye on Korea's neighbors in Asia.

Notes 1. With that in mind, a number of these studies are cited among the sources for the reader's edification. 2. For background on Soviet policy in that era, see Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951, London: Oxford University Press, 1953; and Robert M. Slusser, "Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1945-1950—Stalin's Goals in Korea," in Akira Iriye, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 3. For analysis of the Soviet Union's role in the Korean War, see Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993; and Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: N e w Evidence from Russian Archives," Working Paper No. 8, Cold War International History Project. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 1993.

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4. The Korean War's role in shaping limited war doctrines is assessed in Martin Lichterman, "Korea: Problems in Limited War," in Gordon B. Turner and Richard Challener, eds., National Security in the Nuclear Age, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960; David Rees, Korea: The Limited War, New York: St. Martin's, 1964; and Allen Guttmann, ed., Korea and the Theory of Limited War, Boston: D. C. Heath, 1967. 5. The Sino-Soviet split's impact on Korean affairs is analyzed in John Bradbury, "Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea," China Quarterly, AprilJune 1961, pp. 15-28; Donald S. Zagoria, "Moscow and Pyongyang: The Strained Alliance," in Young C. Kim and Abraham M. Halperin, eds., The Future of the Korean Peninsula, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977; Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang Between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Split, 1958-1975, University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1978; and Choi Chang-yoon, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Impact on the Korean Peninsula," Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1980, pp. 280-300. 6. Those constraints are examined in Choi Chang-yoon, "Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives," in Conference Proceedings of Triangular Relations of Mainland China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea, Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1977. 7. For analysis of the Soviet Union's complex position regarding Korean unification, see Park Joon-yong, "Soviet Russia's Policies Toward the Korean Peninsula: With Special Reference to the Roles and Interests of the Soviet Union in the Reunification of Korea," in Park Jae-kyu and Joseph M. Ha, eds., The Soviet Union and East Asia in the 1980s, Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1983; Donald Zagoria, "The USSR and the Issue of Korean Unification," in Kwak Tae-hwan, Kim Chong-han, and Kim Hong-nak, eds., Korean Reunification: New Perspectives and Approaches, Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1984; and Kwon Hee-Young, "The Soviet Union and Divided Korea," in Chung Il-yung, ed., Korea and Russia: Toward the 21st Century, Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1992. 8. For insights into that larger setting, see Raymond Garthoff, Dótente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985. 9. For background on that relationship and its regional consequences, see Gene T. Hsiao, ed., Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974; David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991; and Harry A. Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992. 10. For assessments of that role, see Roy U. T. Kim, "North Korea's Relations with Moscow and Peking: Big Influences of a Small Ally," in Young C. Kim, ed., Foreign Policies of Korea, Washington, DC: Institute for Asian Studies, 1973; and Helen-Louise Hunter, "North Korea and the Myth of Equidistance," Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1980, pp. 268-279. 11. For background on Gorbachev's role in the region, see Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds., The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok Initiative, Boulder: Westview,

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1987; Roger E. Kanet and Chun Hong-chan, "Soviet Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia: The Implication of 'Perestroika,' 'Glasnost,' and 'New Thinking,'" in Shin Jung-hyun, Kwak Tae-hwan, and Edward A. Olsen, eds., Northeast Asian Security and Peace: Toward the 1990s, Seoul: Kyunghee University International Institute of Peace Studies, 1988; and Joo Seung-ho, Gorbachev's Foreign Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, 1985-1991, Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2000. For South Korea's official coverage of Gorbachev's roles vis-à-vis South Korea, see A Declaration of Peace: The Roh-Gorbachev Summit, Moscow, December 1990, Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, Policy Series 90-7; and The Roh-Gorbachev Summit on Cheju, April 19-20, 1991, Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, Policy Series 91-2. 12. For analyses of Russia's budding aspirations vis-à-vis both Koreas, see Victor I. Shipaev, "A New Russian Perception of South Korea," and Natalia Bazhanova, "North Korea and Seoul-Moscow Relations," in Chung, ed., Korea and Russia; Joo Seung-ho, "Russia's Policy Toward the Two Koreas," in Kwak Tae-hwan and Edward A. Olsen, eds., The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996; and Joo Seung-ho, Gorbachev's Foreign Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, 19851991: Power and Reform, Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2000. 13. For useful surveys of those interests, see Gerald L. Curtis, ed., The United States, Japan, and Asia: Challenges for U.S. Policy, New York: W. W. Norton, 1994; and Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995. 14. The author examined the ultimate consequence of those issues for a Japanese audience in his "Sonzai riyu no kieta nichi-bei anpo" [The U.S.-Japan Security (Relationship) That Is Losing Its Reason for Existence], Shokun, March 1995, pp. 124-131. 15. For an overview of Japan's post-Cold War approach to the region, see Wolf Mendl, Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests, London: Routledge, 1995. 16. Two insightful analyses of Japan's approach to multilateralism that include useful lists of Japanese writings in this field are Awanohara Susumu, "Japan and East Asia: Towards a New Division of Labor: A View from Japan," Occasional Paper No. 1, International Relations Program, East-West Center, Honolulu, August 1989; and Kawasaki Tsuyoshi, "The Logic of Japanese Multilateralism for Asia Pacific Security," Working Paper No. 8, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, December 1994. 17. A useful pre-Nye initiative survey of those issues is Sato Seizaburo and Jerome Kahan, cochairs, "The Japan-U.S. Alliance and Security Regimes in East Asia," Workshop Report, Institute for International Policy Studies, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, January 1995. 18. For a succinct description of that U.S. effort, see Peter Ennis, "The Nye Initiative: Can It Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance?" Tokyo Business Today, June 1995, pp. 38—41. For background on that program's intentions, see Joseph Nye et al., "Harnessing Japan: A U.S. Strategy for Managing Japan's Rise as a Global Power," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1993, pp. 29-42; and Joseph

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Nye, "As U.S. Defends Japan, Who's Being Served," Christian Science Monitor, April 17, 1996, p. 19. 19. For background on the attempts of Tokyo, Seoul, and Pyongyang to improve often testy relations, see Hahn Bae-ho and Yamamoto Tadashi, eds., Korea and Japan: A New Dialogue Across the Channel, Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1978; Hahn Bae-ho, ed., Korea-Japan Relations in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities, Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1982; and Brian Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990s: From Antagonism to Adjustment, Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1993. See also the sources cited in the Japan-focused portion of Chapter 3 herein. 20. Helping to reinforce such Korean suspicions of Japan's purposes were Western authors who detected similar qualities behind Tokyo's policies. See, for example, David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, New York: Morrow, 1971; Marvin J. Wolf, The Japanese Conspiracy: The Plot to Dominate Industry Worldwide—and How to Deal with It, New York: Empire Books, 1983; and Russell Braddon, Japan Against the World, 1941-2041: The 100-Year War for Supremacy, New York: Stein and Day, 1983. 21. For example, see Oh Kwan-chi, "The Anatomy of Anxiety in the Emerging East Asia Security Order," in Ralph A. Cossa, ed., Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995. 22. For cautious analyses of that issue see Song Young-sun, "Korean Concern on the New U.S.-Japan Security Arrangement," Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1996, pp. 197-218; Ahn Byung-joon, "The Impact of the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines on East Asian Security," in IGCC Policy Paper No. 45, La Jolla: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1998; Hong Kwan-hee, "ROK-U.S.-Japan Ties in Changing Security Situation," Korea Focus, November-December 1998, pp. 63-74; Park Hahn-kyu, "Between Caution and Cooperation: The ROK-Japan Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1998, pp. 95-120; and Kim Tae-woo, "Japan's New Security Roles and ROK-Japan Relations," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1999, pp. 147-168. 23. The author examined that event's repercussions on the Korean situation in "U.S.-Korean Relations: The Evolving Missile Context," Journal of East Asian Affairs, Fall-Winter 2001, pp. 270-296. 24. For coverage of the incident, see James Brooke, "Japan Says a Mystery Boat Fired Rockets at Its Ships," New York Times, December 25, 2001, p. 1; Doug Struck, "Sinking Renews Debate on Japan's Military," Washington Post, December 28, 2001, p. 15; and David Kruger, "A Watery Grave," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 10, 2002, p. 13. 25. James Brooke, "North Korea Calls Japan's Sinking of Mystery Boat 'Brutal Piracy,'" New York Times, December 27, 2001, p. 1. 26. For an analysis of Japan's actions and their possible consequences, see Mark J. Valencia, "Tokyo Seeks Sea Change," Washington Times, January 25, 2002, p. 16. 27. For background on this only sizable minority in Japan, the discrimination they have experienced, and their roles in supporting inter-Korean causes,

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see Richard H. Mitchell, The Korean Minority in Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967; Lee Chang-soo and George De Vos, Koreans in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981; and George Hicks, Japan's Hidden Apartheid: The Korean Minority and the Japanese, London: Ashgate, 1997. 28. For an optimistic Japanese analysis favoring their retention, see Michishita Narushige, "Alliance After Peace in Korea," Survival, Autumn 1999, pp. 68-83. 29. For background on those efforts, see Okonogi Masao, "The Political Dynamics of Japan-North Korea Relations," Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1989, pp. 331-346. 30. For a succinct assessment of the status of Japan-DPRK dialogue efforts, see Mark E. Manyin, "North Korea-Japan Relations: The Normalization Talks and the Compensation/Reparations Issue," CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS 20526, updated June 13, 2001, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 31. For coverage of that trend, see "Amends at Long Last: Seoul Welcomes Talks Between Tokyo, Pyongyang to Normalize Relations," Newsreview, December 11, 1999, p. 8; and "Japan-S. Korea Ties in Full Bloom: Mori, Kim Agree on Economic Aid for N.K.," Korea Now, October 7, 2000, pp. 10-11. 32. For a prominent example, see Henry Kissinger, "A Road Through Seoul," Washington Post, March 6, 2001, p. 23, who said, "Neither China nor Japan is eager for a rapid, if any, unification of Korea. Both consider a unified Korea a potential danger to their security." 33. For Korean coverage of Clinton's description of the United States, see Korea Herald, January 22, 1997, p. 1. 34. The author first examined these clashing agendas in "U.S. and China, Conflicting Korean Agendas," Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1997, pp. 254-269. For a more optimistic assessment of the prospects for Sino-U.S. cooperation vis-à-vis Korea, see former ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo, "Korea's Place in China-U.S. Ties," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 29, 2000, p. 29. 35. For objective treatments of Korea's historical ties to China, see Han Woo-keun, The History of Korea, Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980; and Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-baik, Lew Young-ick, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner, Korea Old and New, Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990. 36. For analyses of China's roles in the Korean War, see Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960; Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," International Security, Summer 1992, pp. 122-154; and Zhang Shu Guang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. 37. For insights into that reality, see Lee Chong-sik, "Impact of the SinoAmerican Détente on Korea," in Gene T. Hsiao, ed., Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications, New York: Praeger,. 1974. 38. For an analysis of China-Korea ties at that time,.see Hao Yufan, "China and the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese View," Asian Survey, August 1987, pp. 862-884.

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39. For a cross-section of evaluations of China's reasoning on this issue, see Ilpyong J. Kim, "The Normalization of Chinese-South Korean Diplomatic Relations," Korea and World Affairs, Fall 1992, pp. 4 8 3 ^ 9 2 ; Kim Woo-sung, "South Korea's Diplomatic Normalization with China and Its Impact on Old Ties Between South Korea and Taiwan," Journal of East Asian Affairs, SummerFall 1993, pp. 371^103; Jia Hao and Zhuang Qubing, "China's Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," Asian Survey, December 1992, pp. 1137-1156; Ming Lee, "The Impact of Peking-Seoul Diplomatic Ties on Northeast Asia," Issues and Studies, September 1992, pp. 122-124; and Kim Hakjoon, "The Establishment of South Korean-Chinese Diplomatic Relations: A South Korean Perspective," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Summer 1994, pp. 31-48. 40. For an excellent comprehensive analysis of those relationships, see Lee Chae-jin, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1996. 41. For insights into Beijing's concerns on that issue, see Hu Weixing, "Beijing's Defense Strategy and the Korean Peninsula," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Fall 1995, pp. 50-67; and Wang Fei-Ling, "Tacit Acceptance and Watchful Eyes: Beijing's Views about the U.S.-ROK Alliance," Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 1997. 42. For media coverage of these Chinese efforts, see "China Plays Careful Game of Balancing Ties with Two Koreas," Korea Herald, November 2, 1994, p. 5; and Kevin Piatt and Michael Baker, "Beijing Juggles Trade, Ideology Over Two Koreas," Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 1997, p. 6. 43. For analyses of China's abilities in that regard, see Han Yong-sup, "China's Leverage Over North Korea," Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1994, pp. 233-249; and Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu: Chinese Assessments of North Korea," Asian Survey, June 1995, pp. 538-545. 44. For coverage of these developments, see "Report Says 7,000 North Koreans Fled to China," Korea Herald, March 29, 1996, p. 1; Jonathan S. Landay, "U.S., China Struggle to Uncover Reach of North Korea Famine," Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1997, pp. 1, 6; "North Korean Refugees: Down to the Wire," The Economist, May 18, 2002, p. 42; and Charles Hutzler, "China Seeks a Delicate Balance with North Korean Refugees," Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2002, p. 11. 45. For background on that region, see Lee Chae-jin, China's Korean Minority: The Politics of Ethnic Education, Boulder: Westview, 1986. 46. For coverage of DPRK-Taiwan contacts on diplomatic, investment, tourism, and nuclear waste storage issues, see Korea Herald, October 6, 1993, p. 1; October 21, 1993, p. 2; April 30, 1996, p. 1; December 19, 1997, p. 2; and December 29, 1997, p. 1. 47. For an evaluation of their experience with that issue, see Chang Kongja, "A Comparative Analysis of Unification Strategies: Communist China and North Korea," Journal of East Asian Affairs, Spring-Summer 1983, pp. 17—41. 48. Lorien Holland, "Lips and Teeth: Smiles Are Strained Now Between China, North Korea," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 29, 1999, p. 15. 49. Bates Gill, in "China's Korea Quandary," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 18, 1999, p. 30, put it succinctly: "Taking a cue from Washington's

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Cold War manual, the view of many in Beijing is this: 'They may be crazy, but at least they're our crazies.'" 50. Chon Shi-yong, "Kim, Jiang Strike 'Partnership,'" Korea Herald, November 13, 1998, pp. 1, 12. 51. Chon Shi-yong, "Kim Looks to China to Play Stronger Role for Korean Peace," Korea Herald, November 14, 1998, p. 1. For a broader analysis of that issue, see Victor Cha, "Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Détente and Korean Security," Survival, Spring 1999, pp. 73-98. 52. Lee Sung-yul, "Korea, China Seek Military Exchanges and Cooperation," Korea Herald, August 24, 1999, p. 1; and Lee Sung-yul, "Seoul, Beijing Beginning to Build Military Confidence," Korea Herald, August 25, 1999, p. 1. 53. Kang Seok-jae, "Korea, China to Step Up Bilateral Military Exchanges," Korea Herald, January 21, 2000, p. 1. 54. "Express Diplomacy: Seoul-Beijing Hot Line to Hook Up Foreign Ministries," Korea Now, May 6, 2000, p. 7. 55. Chon Shi-yong, "China Supports Korean Peace Regime Through FourParty Talks," Korea Herald, October 19, 2000, p. 1. 56. For insights into Chinese thinking on that theme, see Lorien Holland and Shim Jae Hoon, "China's Korea Game," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 15, 2000, pp. 16-18. For an alternative view of what China may desire in Korea, see Yi Xiaoxiong, "A Neutralized Korea? The North-South Rapprochement and China's Korea Policy," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 2000, pp. 71-118. For the broader context of China's geopolitical maneuvering, see Karby Leggett, "China Forges Alliances in Effort to Gain More Influence in Asia," Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2001, p. 1. 57. For coverage of those visits' meaning, see Craig S. Smith, "North Korean Leader Makes Trip to Shanghai," New York Times, January 17, 2001. 58. A former student's term-paper typo—the result of a word-processing spellcheck "correction"—raised an intriguing and potentially prescient semantic shift. Instead of labeling North Korea a "rogue" state his paper labeled it a "rouge" state. If North Korea adapts China's blend of capitalism and not-so-red communism, it could indeed become a pinkish (or "rouge") state. 59. Richard H. Solomon, "U.S. Relations with East Asia and the Pacific: A New Era," U.S. Department of State, Dispatch, May 27, 1991, pp. 383-390. 60. James A. Baker, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1991-1992, p. 4. 61. Quoted in Richard Halloran, "Reading Beijing," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 25, 1999, p. 28.

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OW THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FULLY INTO ITS TWENTYfirst-century foreign policy, it is time to come to grips with the unfulfilled in-due-course U.S. commitment to Korean self-determination. The best way to deal with this embarrassing relic of twentieth-century turmoil is to implement a set of explicit policies that would belatedly resolve the issues at stake. In other words, the United States needs to determine a specific course of action to rectify the legacy of in due course. Precisely how that might be done is the focus of this chapter.

Pursuing "Due Course" as a U.S. Normative Goal

Before exploring concrete policy options, it is worthwhile to assess some normative issues that should motivate the U.S. public as it urges the government to significantly change course on the Korean Peninsula. It also is worthwhile to assess the normative issues implicit in modifying U.S. foreign policy in ways that will be supportive of a change in U.S. policy toward Korea. Both themes are the focus of this section. Perhaps most fundamental for U.S. citizens' consciences is to ask whether U.S. policy toward Korea has been of high moral standing. The answer to that must be ambiguous—yes and no. 1 There is no question about the values underpinning U.S. support for South Korea during the Korean War. They were largely altruistic in terms of supporting people whose lives and quest for freedom were in direct jeopardy as a result of North Korean aggression. Even though the United States also was motivated by pragmatic interests pegged to defending its stake versus the

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Soviet Union and to its geopolitical outpost in Japan, there is ample reason to rate the U.S. motivation for coming to the rescue of South Korea very highly on humanitarian grounds. Such principles have remained at the core of U.S. policy toward Korea throughout the years since the Korean War truce was signed. And they are reinforced by the memories of war-time casualties plus the post-truce casualties suffered periodically by U.S. forces in the defense of South Korea. In these terms, the answer as to whether U.S. policy toward Korea has been of high moral standing is a resounding yes. However, the United States frequently let its interests in Japan, overall Cold War interests, and evolving post-Cold War interests get in the way of doing the right thing with regard to facilitating Korean national self-determination. Because that goal supposedly led the United States to initially assume the set of responsibilities and obligations it did as it liberated Korea from Japan and preserved South Korea's liberty from North Korea, the ways in which U.S. leaders have avoided or postponed meeting the in-due-course mandate for the entire Korean nation have greatly diminished the high moral tone derived from the Korean War's humanitarian qualities. Cumulatively, these incremental U.S. failures to pursue that critical goal have translated into a muddling-through. As U.S. society contemplates the consequences of the six decades of active U.S. involvement in Korean affairs and asks why an in-duecourse schedule has not been met, we can safely ascribe a large portion of the failure to inter-Korean squabbles. However, we also must recognize that the United States bears a significant onus for not being more proactive with regard to pushing a self-determination agenda for all the Korean people. As much as the U.S. government can claim credit for enabling South Korea to survive and prosper, U.S. society also must be ready to accept some blame for carrying out policies that helped keep the Korean Peninsula divided and impeded achievement of the stated U.S. goal. Perhaps the best way for the people of the United States to gain a better understanding of how the U.S. role in Korean affairs may be perceived in a negative light is to recall the aphorism derived from Native American experience that advises "walking a mile in another person's moccasins." An excellent way to achieve that level of empathy is to recall the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865) and imagine how the U.S. nation might feel had that war been waged and resolved in a manner akin to the Korean War, which was, of course, also a civil war waged by rival halves of one nation. 2 There are few similarities between the Korean

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civil war and the U.S. Civil War. The roots and context of each were totally different. Unlike Koreans (Northerners and Southerners), residents of the American colonies (Northerners and Southerners) had not been liberated from imperialism by foreign powers. Would-be U.S. citizens had liberated themselves from the British Empire through revolutionary warfare and enjoyed self-determination of their own making. Similarly, the U.S. Civil War was entirely of the leaders' own making, and they resolved the war largely on their own, although there was some foreign diplomatic, economic, and military meddling on the margins. However, Union officials in particular made a major effort to block European intervention precisely because they feared it would impede national unification. 3 This is important to remember because Civil War-era U.S. leaders enjoyed a degree of leverage that Korean War-era Korean leaders were unable to exercise to a similar extent. Moreover, there was nothing remotely akin to the Cold War as a filter for inter-U.S. tensions or to the United Nations as a vehicle for foreign intervention on behalf of either warring faction. Nonetheless, as a hypothetical exercise intended to generate some level of mass U.S. empathy for today's Koreans, it is worthwhile to visualize the following situation. If rival coalitions of European imperial powers had decided to intervene in the name of humanitarianism or in pursuit of collective interests in maintaining a stable balance of power in North America, one could visualize the U.S. Civil War's active fighting ending in an 1865 internationally imposed truce, with rival American regimes digging in for the long haul, maintaining defenses against each other, and being backed by external powers with a stake in each side's survival. Against that backdrop, the rest of the 1860s, 1870s, 1880s, 1890s, and early 1900s would have passed with the two adversarial American states poised to deter each other and maintain external support systems. This would loosely equate with what the two Koreas experienced from 1953 to the start of the twenty-first century. If U.S. society had gone through what Koreans did during the twentieth century, as half a century unfolded after the hypothetical 1865 U.S. truce, both Americas would have been as frustrated as both Koreas are today. Had both Americas persisted in trying to resolve their divisions (as Koreans do today), they would have been counseled by international powers not to rush matters and to expect at least another twenty or thirty years to pass before they could work out their differences. Virtually all U.S. citizens would find it difficult—if not impossible— to conceive of something like that happening to their country. Neither

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could they readily accept that U.S. leaders would acquiesce to such conditions being imposed on them in the name of an international entity. Still worse, U.S. society would likely reject the notion that any ally would want to perpetuate such conditions at their expense. Yet U.S. and Soviet involvement in the Korean War, and support for rival Koreas throughout the remainder of the Cold War, fostered these circumstances in Korea. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States assumed an even larger proportion of the responsibility for sanctioning Korea's continued division. To be sure, from the vantage point of mainstream U.S. foreign policy analysts, there are sound and logical geopolitical rationales justifying what the United States has done and still does. Moreover, its ROK ally manifestly desires continued U.S. support. Nonetheless, the same propositions could be offered for the hypothetical example of how the U.S. nation might have felt victimized had European powers intervened to protect and buffer the Confederacy versus the Union for so many years following the hypothetical 1865 armistice. Based on these hypothetical parallels, the U.S. masses and their leaders in Washington should be more touched by the plight of the stilldivided Korean nation and moved to identify with their predicament in ways that will motivate the United States to take remedial actions by placing a much higher priority on realizing the in-due-course objective via proactive support for Korean reconciliation and reunification. That normative standard should be underscored by the ways in which the U.S. role in handling the divided former Axis nations in Europe differed from Korea's place in Asia. In Europe, the former Nazi Germany found itself carved into what became West Germany and East Germany. A former Nazi-annexed country, Austria, was treated with remarkable benevolence by World War II planners for the postwar era. Despite the considerable enthusiasm displayed by Austrians about their incorporation into Nazi Germany, the 1943 Moscow declaration (by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) opted to treat Austria as a victim of Nazi aggression and call for renewed independence after the Axis powers were defeated. Although Austria was divided into four occupation zones, it was able to maintain a single governing structure and, by pursuing neutrality, was able to secure full-fledged independence in 1955.4 The parallels and contrasts between Germany-Austria and Korea are striking. In Korea's case, it was far more of a victim of imperial Japan's policies than Austria was of Nazi Germany's, but Japan—unlike Germany—was not carved up. Instead, the Korean victim was partitioned.

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Still worse, the Austrian version of in due course was implemented relatively rapidly even though the Austrians, when compared to the culpability of the Koreans, arguably deserved far harsher treatment than they received. Koreans have every reason to feel abused by the grossly unfair ways that postwar Koreans suffered, because they had been an involuntary part of the Japanese war machine, whereas a more deserving culprit was treated gently after the war. Although this different treatment has been an irritant to Korean sensibilities for decades, it is a double standard about which Koreans can do little but wince. Moreover, those events were far enough in the past to be eclipsed by more recent history. Looming larger today is the way a variety of countries, including the United States, had shown far more enthusiasm and support for Germany's unification. U.S. support for West Germany's stance versus East Germany and its Soviet backer appeared, to the South Korean allies of the United States, remarkably similar to the U.S.-ROK alliance's posture toward North Korea. 5 To be sure, there were important differences. Foremost was the widespread acknowledgment that part of the Cold War's de facto rationale was to minimize the superpowers' geopolitical problems by assuring that Germany's ability to exert influence in Europe was hampered by its partition. Keeping Germany's threat potentials constrained served a doublecontainment function for the superpowers as they deterred each other throughout the Cold War. The memories of Germany's roles in World War I and World War II reinforced the approach to a divided Germany. No comparable fear existed in Washington and Moscow as to Korea's ability to throw its weight around should the two Koreas work out their differences and move toward national unity. The only exception may have been Tokyo. Against this backdrop of nervousness, U.S. willingness to embrace German unification, and in ways that tended to assure the Europeanization of Germany with minimal risk of the Germanization of Europe, raised interesting prospects for Korea. 6 Foremost was the issue of why the United States was so much more supportive of West Germany's actions on behalf of unification toward the end of that process than the United States was regarding Korean unification during the Clinton administration or has been during the George W. Bush administration. Korean unification policy specialists have paid close attention to the political and economic aspects of German unification, attempting to extract lessons of value to both the ROK and the DPRK. 7 It is obvious to South Korea that the former West Germany's ability to absorb the financial

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burdens of German unification surpasses the ROK's ability to play such a role for the Korean nation. The potential costs to South Korea of unification have been the subject of much speculation, with estimates running as high as $2.2 trillion. 8 That problem was made still more manifest by South Korea's need to be bailed out by the International Monetary Fund rescue package in 1997-1998. South Korea's relative weakness on those grounds contributed to the motivation behind the Kim Dae-jung administration's sunshine policy, calculated to help uplift North Korea en route to reconciliation on a more level playing field. In that sense South Koreans share with U.S. leaders an appreciation for a go-slow approach to Korean reunification. Nonetheless, U.S. enthusiasm for German unification versus its lack of genuine enthusiasm for Korean unification strikes an unsettling chord among Koreans. A major difficulty for the United States in any attempt to treat Korea in a manner analogous to Germany is a twofold problem given Korea's place in Asian affairs. Unlike the German situation, there is absolutely no daunting prospect of a Koreanized Asia, akin to fears of a Germanized Europe. And because Asia is not organized regionally in a manner remotely resembling the former European Community (EC) or today's European Union, Asia does not possess ready means to formulate an Asianized Korea approach modeled on the Europeanized Germany theme that facilitated accommodation to German reunification. Although it is possible that an externally guaranteed neutralized model for Korean unification could gain acceptance, 9 that approach is not comparable to what eased the way for German unification and is of questionable appeal to most mainstream U.S. analysts of U.S. interests in Korea. Nonetheless, as a normative facet of U.S. policy toward an indue-course endgame, this too may warrant consideration. Just as there are meaningful normative issues at stake in U.S. policy toward Korea, so too are there profound normative themes embedded within existing overall U.S. foreign policy. Throughout the history of U.S. foreign policy since the founding of the republic, U.S. citizens have debated the degree to which the United States should be engaged in international affairs as well as the most appropriate means for engagement. This debate has been explicitly normative, with advocates of greater or lesser U.S. engagement internationally arguing the shoulds and should-nots of either side. This is not the place to survey the scope of that multifaceted debate between various forms of proactive internationalism versus countervailing forms of isolationism, neoisolationism, and noninterventionism. Suffice it to say that has been, and remains,

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a heated issue among Americans who are interested in U.S. foreign policy.10 Today it is clear that the assertive internationalist perspective is in the driver's seat guiding U.S. foreign policy. In the midst of the U.S. war on terrorism, predicated on an international coalition, this is unlikely to change in the short term. 11 However, the debate still continues. A strong case can be made (see the Preface) on behalf of selective noninterventionism and strategic disengagement. This author is firmly supportive of that alternative within overall U.S. foreign policy. And there is a strong normative case in favor of applying this brand of U.S. foreign policy to the situation on the Korean Peninsula in ways that will benefit both the United States and the entire Korean nation. Consequently, the following recommendations for reshaping U.S. policy toward Korea should be considered as complementary policy suggestions. Not only will they rectify problems in U.S. policy toward the entire Korean nation; they will also help to rectify problems in overall U.S. foreign policy. Although the primary focus here is to address the need to do the right thing for the Korean nation's quest for independence as a unified state, there are solid normative reasons to utilize these policy improvements regarding a specific geographic subregion of Asia as part of the process of putting overall U.S. foreign policy worldwide on a sounder footing. It should be noted, however, that the policy recommendations offered here are not predicated on the acceptance of an overall transformation of U.S. foreign policy. They are equally as applicable to existing mainstream internationalist policies. Against the background of Korea's division and efforts to achieve reunification, and of the U.S. policy actions toward Korea and the normative issues they reflect regionally and globally, it is time to move on to an evaluation of the options open to the United States and the likelihood for them to be effective. It is important to reemphasize in this regard that the very notion of making a case for a significant shift in U.S. policy toward Korea is a normative matter in that it results from a contention that past and current U.S. policy toward Korea is not doing an adequate job of pursuing a truly long-standing goal of U.S. policy.

Normalizing U.S. Policy Toward Korea: Options and Prospects U.S. policy toward the entire Korean Peninsula needs to be normalized to rectify flaws stemming from much that has transpired since 1945. It

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is time to fully implement the in-due-course commitments made to the Korean nation. As well-intentioned as past U.S. policy often was, and current U.S. policy still is, it has profoundly hampered self-determination by the entire Korean nation. Instead, U.S. overt support for a one-Korea policy (in the name of upholding the status of the ROK as the sole legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula), when combined with a de facto two-Koreas policy (treating one Korean state as an ally and the other Korean state as an adversary to deter militarily and contain diplomatically), has yielded endemic dependency by both Koreas within a system over which they have little say. Neither half of Korea has been able to deal with the United States as a normal country in the sense that nearly all other countries in the international system routinely do. Accordingly, this chapter shall explore the options open to U.S. policymakers that would enable them to remedy this situation. A policy designed to foster Korean national self-determination and engender conditions enabling the Korean nation-state to conduct normal relations with the United States should incorporate several policy goals. First, Washington should shed its manipulative—and in many respects phony—one-Korea and two-Koreas approaches because they put so much emphasis on the existing ROK and DPRK. Second, the United States should formally revise the meaning of the term one Korea to emphasize the entire Korean nation on the entire Korean Peninsula en route to a single nation-state. Third, the United States should explicitly revitalize the expression in due course for use in current U.S. policy and make a firm public commitment to carry it out on behalf of one Korea by making Korean reunification the highest priority in U.S. policy toward Korea and proactively pursue that goal. Lastly, U.S. citizens and their government should look forward to the positive aspects of conducting normal relations with a single independent Korean nation-state rather than focusing on clinging to relationships that perpetuate abnormal U.S. ties with a sadly divided people. As the U.S. public embraces a future characterized by positive U.S.-United Korea relations, they should also recognize the ways in which that future can help to influence overall U.S. foreign policy in affirmative respects. Based on these policy priorities, the United States faces a complex agenda incorporating an array of alternative options that should be prudently contemplated prior to altering the course of U.S. policy toward Korea. A basic element in this process is simultaneously simple and multifaceted. There is a need for U.S. society to engage in a national debate about the pros and cons of U.S. policy toward Korea. Because of

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the multilayered nuances in any such debate about Korean issues, the chances of the U.S. public being sufficiently interested in the topic to pay serious attention to—much less actively participate in—a national discussion of U.S. policy alternatives are nil. It is extraordinarily difficult to get the U.S. public to pay serious attention to Korea. The only major example in recent years was the media-driven focus on the combined Korean delegation at the opening ceremony of the Summer Olympics in Sydney in September 2000, carrying a symbolic white flag with a blue Korean Peninsula. Arguably the main reason that event received so much notice was its sports context, which virtually guaranteed a larger U.S. audience than developments in Korea normally attract. In short, the complexity of the topic would likely cause most residents of the United States, who know or care little about Korean affairs, to tune out. Consequently, as has been true in the past—and remains true today— a debate about why U.S. policy toward Korea should be fundamentally revised almost certainly will be left to those U.S. citizens who care about Korea and about U.S. foreign policy, defense policy, and economic policy as they apply to Korea and its Asia-Pacific context. In one sense this is not a new phenomenon, because there has been an ongoing debate in such circles about U.S.-Korea relations for decades that has shaped the parameters of U.S. policy. In these terms, generating the proposed debate is a simple task. But because the suggested revisions in U.S. priorities are relatively iconoclastic and question some sacred cows of past and current policy toward Korea in ways that could revolutionize U.S. policy by making multilayered changes, conducting this type of debate would not be simple. If the desired debate occurs (and this book will help facilitate that process), and if it succeeds in altering U.S. goals for Korea, the relative disinterest of so many in U.S. society on Korean issues actually would make it easier to put into practice a transformed U.S. policy toward Korea. That is an ironic and fortunate by-product of prevailing mass disinterest in Korean issues. A core element in implementing a revised U.S. policy toward Korea would be the delicate issue of how to convince Koreans—North and South—that the United States is completely serious about its intentions to alter course. Of course, Washington can, and should, declare its sincerity. However, any such declaration is unlikely to suffice. Koreans are accustomed to inconsistency on the part of U.S. policymakers from the nineteenth century, through the U.S. administrations that shaped U.S. policy during the Korean War and Cold War, down to the seemingly erratic twists and turns of post-Cold War policies during the Clinton and

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George W. Bush administrations. Hence, those in the United States who support a change in U.S. policy would have to wage a campaign to persuade Koreans as to why the United States really wants to shift course. This Korea-focused campaign should be concurrent with the effort to change Washington's policies. Those who advocate these changes will have to rely on the logic of their arguments in terms of U.S. and Korean national interests, aided by U.S. sensitivity to Korean needs and aspirations as a persuasive case is made. One problem likely to compound difficulties in convincing Koreans about U.S. sincerity is the strong likelihood that dissenting U.S. analysts who disagree with the effort to shift priorities can be counted on to defend the old priorities in ways that damage the credibility of the new arguments. Because such societal and bureaucratic infighting probably will be unavoidable, the only option available to Washington as it attempts to demonstrate its sincerity on the revised goal is to try to reach as extensive a domestic consensus as possible before launching the new policy approach. At that juncture Washington could cope with the dissenters' impact on Korean perceptions of U.S. shifts by candidly acknowledging the existence of a diversity of opinion within U.S. society. Beyond declaring U.S. sincerity about the revised priorities, Washington should implement the transformed policies in ways that instill confidence among Koreans on both sides of the divided peninsula. The specifics of those policies shall be addressed below, but for current purposes it is crucial to note the importance of U.S. leaders presenting the revised policy case to both Koreas in ways that are politically and culturally sensitive to the factors that differentiate the two halves, as well as those that constitute a common bond. For example, because both Korean societies are accustomed to dealing with major external players in a very deferential manner (known among Koreans as sadae jui), causing charges and countercharges about being a flunky, it is important for U.S. policymakers to gauge the nuances of Korean reactions to yet another change of course in U.S. policy. 12 This is also important because the two Koreas harbor shared suspicions about the manipulative powers of external players, which lead to common Korean anxieties about being victimized. The key to coping with such problems is to ensure the clarity of the logic behind an altered U.S. policy and to present it deftly and with finesse. At the core of this entire process is the matter of explaining what the U.S. government truly means by the phrase one Korea. This is, in part, a semantic issue, calling for greater definitional clarity. However,

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it also is a philosophical issue, calling for greater clarity of purpose. Clarifying both facets will be awkward because there is no reason for confusion about what the words one or Korea mean separately or combined. So for U.S. leaders to raise the issue of reassessing what the United States really means by that expression within U.S. foreign policy will necessitate an admission that U.S. officials and scholars previously used the phrase in contexts where claiming to support Seoul's quest for unification of one Korea was a meaningless, risk-free gesture because the United States could be confident that the quest would fail. This is not an admission that U.S. leaders were being deceptive, because the United States was not really deceptive. However, it comes uncomfortably close to deceptivity because it involves U.S. willingness to take advantage of North and South Korean deceptiveness toward, and manipulation of, each other. In that sense, the United States deserves less criticism than Seoul and Pyongyang, but U.S. representatives are still tainted by some hypocrisy—affecting the pursuit of lofty goals while it was clear there was little chance of attaining those goals. Moreover, because of the utility of a divided Korea to U.S. national security interests regarding China, Russia, and Japan, there was not much reason for U.S. officials to want to improve the chances of attaining the goal of unifying the divided nation into one Korea. Although this was a pragmatic posture and a realpolitik use of the phrase one Korea, U.S. policy toward Korean unity remained suffused with pretense. For U.S. officials to begin to use the expression one Korea in an altered context, in which the United States not only sanctions full-fledged interKorean efforts to achieve reunification but also becomes a proactive facilitator of the unification process because of the desirability of the endgame, will require candid U.S. explanations about why the shift in focus came into existence and why the former stance was terminated. Arguably the best way to accomplish that transition is to acknowledge the facts surrounding the U.S. failures to implement an in-duecourse mandate as well as U.S. readiness to take advantage of the circumstances resulting from those failures. Consequently, a U.S. campaign to revitalize the original commitments behind in due course and make them the foundation for a new U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula will enable Washington to semantically and philosophically renew the U.S. ardor for the self-determination of the nation-state symbolized by the expression one Korea. This will mark a watershed in U.S. policy toward Korea, signaling a lessening of past efforts to plan for modest revisions in the status quo predicated on the legacy of ROK-U.S. relations. 13 As

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important, it will denote an embrace of a more open-ended vision of U.S. relations with a Korean nation-state capable of dealing with the United States as a normal country—with no overtones of client-statism or sadae jui complexes. The best way to cultivate the means to achieve a positive new U.S. policy is to put some teeth into the slogan in due course. On the assumption that excessive South Korean dependency on the United States and unwitting U.S. encouragement of South Korean sycophancy toward the United States are harmful to the prospects for normal relations, U.S. policy toward the entire Korean Peninsula should do more to put distance between the United States and its Korean ally and major trading partner. This idea will strike many U.S. and South Korean observers of U.S.-ROK relations as heresy. Moreover, it might be very difficult to implement because of inertia and the obvious presence of North Korea, standing by ready to take advantage of any potential rupture in U.S.ROK ties. In fact this approach is not at all heretical for U.S.-ROK relations because the remnants of a client state-mentor state relationship are unhealthy for both countries. Both would benefit greatly from shedding such ties and developing more normal bilateral relations between the United States and a new Korean nation-state. As for inertia, it can readily be overcome if both the United States and South Korea understand the wisdom of making basic changes in U.S. foreign policy. Embedded in the notion of inertia within U.S.-ROK relations is the reality behind overall U.S. foreign policy inertia. The U.S. view of the importance of continuity in U.S.-ROK ties—especially strategic ties—is centered upon the brand of internationalist assumptions that have been the foundation for the U.S. role in world affairs since World War II. Although most U.S. foreign policy analysts continue to accept this foundation as valid in the post-Cold War era, those who dissent from that worldview and advocate some form of U.S. strategic independence perceive U.S. national interests as best served by shedding that inertia. In these terms, this proposed step is indeed heretical compared to conventional wisdom. However, mainstream thinking about the most appropriate U.S. role in the world is legitimately subject to much criticism. 14 Therefore, it is entirely appropriate to utilize reforms in U.S. policy toward the Korean nation as part of larger reforms in overall U.S. foreign policy. The North Korean facet of this situation could be a major hurdle because of the unpredictability of Pyongyang's behavior and its deepseated suspicions of U.S. motives. Almost certainly North Korea's virtual

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paranoia about the veracity of the United States will lead Pyongyang to be extremely skeptical about the United States making the policy change advocated here. The ways in which both North and South Korea are likely to be wary of any basic change in U.S. foreign policy are likely to make this task that much more difficult. Both are likely to be suspicious about any U.S. effort to put greater distance between the United States and the ROK en route to improved U.S. ties with a future independent united Korean nation-state. Although the United States should attend to their respective concerns, as well as cope with each Korea's efforts to influence U.S. policy, U.S. leaders can best deal with this situation by emphasizing the ways that the proposed policy shifts are in the best interests of the United States and the entire Korean nation. If the United States pursues in-due-course goals of Korean national independence in ways that clearly will benefit the entire Korean nation, the North Korean disruptive factor almost certainly can be handled with finesse. Precisely what steps should be taken to put greater distance between the United States and South Korea? Foremost on a prospective list of such steps is the need to cultivate a bilateral consensus about the virtues of adopting a stance that seems the antithesis of what the United States and the ROK have tried to foster for decades, namely, closer U.S.-ROK ties. That consensus should be built upon a shared appreciation for the value of Korean national self-determination that requires the diminishment of—leading to the elimination of—hegemonic levels of U.S. influence over Korea. Such excessive U.S. power is unhealthy and decidedly abnormal. Both the United States and Korea—the ROK to start, and a unified Korea in the longer run—will benefit from the creation of a more normal set of bilateral relationships. That should be the basis of a new U.S.-South Korea consensus about the future of the entire Korean nation. Based on that foundation, the United States and South Korea should create a realistic timetable, perhaps two to three years, for modifying the U.S.-ROK alliance in ways that induce far more bilateral equality and reciprocity in the forms of defense burden-sharing and policy decision-sharing. In the short run, such modifications would lead to a relatively greater South Korean voice in determining the alliance's function as a facilitator of Korean national self-determination and inter-Korean reconciliation. This would permit Seoul to integrate into the bilateral U.S.-ROK consensus all ongoing South Korean diplomatic and economic initiatives aimed at persuading North Korea to cooperate in the reunification dialogue process. This would include projects—such as

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the inter-Korean rail line, cultivating joint economic enterprises, and military confidence-building efforts—that the United States often has been hesitant to support. In that regard it is important to note that U.S. policy shifts should enthusiastically factor in all the progress made by the two Korean states in their dialogue process. It is not the role or obligation of the United States to reinvent the existing diplomatic, political, economic, and strategic progress already achieved by the two Koreas. Those evolving realities can, and should, be absorbed within an innovatively supportive U.S. policy. Over the longer run, these initial steps would lay the groundwork for replacing the current version of the U.S.-ROK alliance with a surrogate consisting of regional powers engaged in a multilateral security system that would help foster Korean political independence within regional geopolitical interdependence. How much the United States should, and would, be engaged strategically within the organizational replacement for the U.S.-ROK alliance is a question that should be addressed as a corollary. Arguments across a spectrum ranging from deep engagement or entanglement (depending on one's perspective on the issue) to far more limited roles such as an offshore balancer should be debated by U.S. policymakers in consultation with Koreans as part of that process. 15 However, the key issue would remain the task of greatly lowering the U.S. profile in Korean affairs to a level that fosters normal U.S.-Korea relations. Because security issues have loomed so large in U.S.-Korea affairs it is inevitable that the nature of the evolving alliance relationship be dealt with first. It should be put on track toward a future characterized by greater bilateral parity and by full recognition by the United States and South Korea of the ways each country operates in nonmilitary arenas. Two settings stand out: economics and political affairs. As has been evident for some time in South Korea's foreign relations, Seoul has placed great emphasis on the ROK's need to adapt to pressure leading to globalization (segyewha in Korean). The Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung administrations have stressed the need for South Korea to prepare psychologically and culturally for the full ramifications of globalization as well as to learn to appreciate the positive features for Korea of becoming interdependent with a broad range of countries around the world. 16 Although there no doubt was a faddish aspect to Seoul's surge of interest in this notion, there also was a profound recognition by South Korean leaders that the international economic environment was changing around them.

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As South Korea became increasingly integrated within a globalized economy, one inadvertent by-product of that process was a gradual recognition that U.S.-ROK economic relations—as important as they were, and are, to South Korea—no longer represent as disproportionately large a segment of Korea's economic pie. The ROK's bilateral ties with numerous other countries have greatly expanded over the years, yielding extensive South Korean interdependence with diverse countries—especially in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. All of these changes are to be welcomed as a sign of major progress for South Korea's economic standing in world affairs and are symbolic of what it means for Korea to become a "normal country." South Korea is firmly on track toward that goal and is, as a consequence, much less dependent on the United States for sustaining this place in the world. None of this is meant to suggest that ROK-U.S. economic ties are about to, or should, slip into obscurity. Far from it. In fact, the size of the U.S. economy makes it almost inevitable that Korea will continue to maintain major economic ties with the United States. However, they need not be, and should not be, disproportionately emphasized in ways that perpetuate abnormal qualities in U.S.-Korea relations. An obvious complicating factor in this situation is the glaring disparity between the South Korean economy and its North Korean counterpart. Despite South Korea's business and banking problems, which necessitated an International Monetary Fund bailout in 1997-1998, and its problems in accommodating postbailout reforms, South Korea's economic stature remains vastly superior to North Korea's. The DPRK has been, and is, poorly positioned to take advantage of the opportunities presented by economic globalization that attract so many South Koreans. Consequently, North Korea's weaknesses in that regard constitute a profound handicap for a prospective unified Korea to play the kinds of globalized economic roles that are visualized for South Korea by South Koreans. Accordingly, it is crucial that the proposed new consensus between the United States and the ROK incorporate the need for the bilateral U.S.-ROK relationship to facilitate the DPRK's economic reform process in ways that will make it a viable partner for the ROK in an emerging inter-Korean quest for reconciliation, national self-determination, and unification. Precisely how North Korea can be induced to adopt reforms capable of placing it on the path to economic convergence with South Korea is a delicate issue. The policy agenda of the Kim Dae-jung administration, aimed at inducing economic reform in North Korea through the

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creation of incentives, is admirable because it utilizes a capitalist matrix to enable North Koreans to perceive what is in their best interests. Unfortunately progress was slow, causing skepticism about its efficacy within a tenuous inter-Korean peace process. Partly because the results have been skimpy, many U.S. leaders have been tepid in their readiness to support what President Kim has tried to achieve. U.S. support for President Kim's agenda has been uneven at best. Those who urge stronger U.S. support for his approach while he is still at the helm make valid points. 17 However, barring an almost miraculous degree of success, given the hurdles Seoul faces, the prospects for truly rapid success by the end of 2002—when President Kim's term in office expires—are not very good. Tensions associated with the war on terrorism are unlikely to help improve those prospects. Nonetheless, South Korea's attempt to draw North Korea closer to the ROK's brand of economics undoubtedly will persist, aided by the attractiveness of growing South Korean prosperity as the ROK's economy thrives. Accelerating normal bilateral ties between the United States and South Korea will help the inter-Korean economic agenda. By not impeding South Korea's economic diversification and globalized interdependence, the United States will do far more than help to engender normal relations between the United States and the ROK. It will also encourage the two Korean states to cooperate economically with each other to better position a reconciled and unifying Korean nation to carve out a national role in a globalized international economic system. In other words, by lessening the U.S. emphasis on the importance of tight U.S.-ROK economic relations to support solid U.S.-ROK security relations, Washington will help to liberate its South Korean allies to be more self-reliant, more confident, and better situated to pursue interdependence in ways that constitute an inducement for North Korean participation. Enhancing normal U.S. economic relations with the entire Korean nation will also help to normalize the political and diplomatic dimensions of U.S.-Korea ties. One of the irritants in U.S.-Korea relations has been the ways that U.S. efforts to guide South Korean democracy toward fruition and authenticity have grated on Korean sensibilities because of the distinct overtones of benevolent mentor-benighted clientstate relations. This has often been difficult for Koreans, with centuries of historical traditions and no shortage of national pride, to accept from U.S. leaders, who did not always display advisorial subtlety and cultural sensitivity. U.S. hubris and heavy-handedness often exasperated South

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Koreans, who understood they had no realistic choice other than to kowtow to the U.S. leadership's desire to export a U.S. model of democracy, even if that model's roots had little direct salience for Korean political culture. Consequently, there is much to be gained by both the United States and South Korea through normalizing the political dimension of bilateral ties en route to future healthy U.S. relations with United Korea. The United States has done more than enough to encourage South Koreans to proceed down the path of U.S.-style democracy. As is evident from the political changes carried out in South Korea in the Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung administrations, South Korean politics has adopted and adapted much from external democratic examples. However, at its core South Korean politics retains distinct ties to Korean traditions in terms of authoritarianism and hierarchicalism. Precisely how Koreans in the future blend these trend lines should be left in their hands. The best way to achieve that end is for the United States to proactively and enthusiastically cut back on, and seek to largely eliminate, its propensity to interfere in South Korean political evolution. After more than half a century of U.S. kibitzing on South Korean political behavior and carping about the ways South Koreans fail to meet U.S. expectations, it is time to completely liberate the former client state and encourage it to unilaterally shape its own political destiny. In turn, this will enable Seoul to have the free hand it deserves to shape the political evolution of a unifying Korean nation-state. In other words, it is time to impose a firm timetable for carrying out an in-duecourse policy that would fully permit South Korea to pursue complete national political self-determination. Clearly this would have tremendous implications for South Korea's unification agenda with North Korea. As much as the ROK has benefited from the support and advice it has received from the United States over the years in its confrontation with the other half of the Korean Peninsula, in one major political respect it has been hurt. Because of South Korea's need to defer to U.S. guidance, the credibility of the ROK's claims to being the more viable of the two Korean states often was undermined. This was exacerbated by North Korean disdain for what the United States represented during the Cold War and vitriolic hatred for how U.S. power made it preeminent as to Korean affairs. To the degree North Koreans were aware of South Koreans' frustration over being a client state, even though that subordinate status has greatly diminished over the years, such cognizance hurt South Korea and bolstered

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North Korea. Were all that to be eradicated by a sharp reduction in the U.S. mentoring of South Korean politics, followed by an overt ROK movement toward political autonomy, North Korea's ability to disparage South Korea would be terminated. In turn, that would augur well for the prospects of an inter-Korean effort to achieve genuine consensus on national political self-determination. This would, in domestic Korean political terms, constitute realization of the in-due-course objectives. Although it is always theoretically possible that the political consensus might be utterly inconsistent with the democratic principles that the South Korean people have absorbed over the last half-century, that is very unlikely. Given the way South Koreans have acculturated such principles, and given the relative advantages of South Koreans over North Koreans—in terms of population, wealth, and experience—it is likely that the joint political system would bear a remarkable similarity to that which the United States has grown accustomed to in Seoul. Consequently, the people of the United States and their government should have enough confidence in what they have tried to instill in the southern half of the divided Korean nation to be convinced that there is virtually no risk involved in severing the remaining threads of the tattered political apron strings remaining from a once robust U.S.-ROK clientstate relationship. South Korea has already largely matured politically and should not be hampered by U.S. residual restraints. Truly liberating South Korea from any semblance of a political tether will free the ROK to more fully pursue national self-determination in partnership with the other half of Korea. Although the United States has every reason to be confident that the political system created by Koreans for a reconciling nation and for the united Korean state they establish will not stray very far from the societal experimentation carried out in South Korea over the past halfcentury, there is less reason to expect future diplomatic patterns to remain as close to past patterns. This prospect could cause U.S. leaders to be anxious about encouraging South Korea and, eventually, a united Korean state, to shed subordinate relationships with the United States as part of the process of national self-determination. Obviously it is easier for the United States to exert controlling influences over Korea than to deal with a Korea that has rid itself of the remnants of client-statism and is feeling its diplomatic oats in a nationalistic manner. Easier, yes, but not healthy—for either country. Despite the significant progress South Korea has made diplomatically as it sharply reduced its negative image as a dictatorial state on the U.S. dole, which U.S. policymakers valued

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during the depths of the Cold War as a "friendly tyrant," 18 the ROK has been unable to behave as a fully normal country in the international arena because of its excessive dependence upon U.S. strategic largess. It is preferable with regard to U.S. and overall Korean national interests for the United States and ROK to put that variety of strategic and diplomatic dependence in the past as rapidly as possible so that the leaders of the ROK can better guide South Korea's quest for national self-determination toward reunion with North Korea and formation of a completely normal form of international diplomacy for United Korea. In that context the United States should look forward with anticipation to the ways a more autonomous ROK that is unleashed from dependency will balance its remaining ties to the United States with expanded relationships with Japan, China, Russia, the European Union, and myriad other states around the region and world. These relationships—diplomatic, economic, and strategic—will add stability to South Korea's place in regional and world affairs. This does not mean the United States will be excluded or that either Seoul or Washington would necessarily aspire to such an exclusion. However, it would mean that the future U.S. role in Korean affairs would be more proportional compared to a range of other countries. In other words, it would be "normal." One major advantage of that level of normalcy in U.S.-ROK relations is its likely positive contribution to creating a context conducive to inter-Korean reconciliation and reunification. Both Koreas would be more free to experiment and seek a broader array of external diplomatic facilitators. China and the European Union possess capabilities that could be of value in this regard. This does not exclude the United States either, but it makes the possible U.S. role as facilitator of Korean unification less abnormal and promises to make U.S. relations with the resulting United Korea manifestly more normal and healthy. This reinforces the virtues of this policy alternative. Based on decisions by the United States and South Korea to proceed down the path of realizing Korean national self-determination even though it will compel imposing greater distance between them, it is necessary for U.S. leaders to calibrate the various approaches to reunification on the horizon and contemplate the pros and cons of each. Nearly all the works cited previously with regard to Korean unification options deal with essentially the same spectrum of choices. They include two extreme options on either end of the spectrum, one entailing military conquest by one Korea over the other Korea, the other option entailing an economic-collapse scenario in which North Korea explodes

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or implodes, leaving the leftover pieces for South Korea. They also include a middle-of-the-road set of negotiated options. Although the two extreme options remain possible, the probability of either occurring is not very great. One military option is close to nil because North Korea almost certainly could not prevail over South Korea and its military support system. Equally important, that support system—notably existing U.S. strategic policy—would not sanction a South Korean-initiated military takeover of North Korea. So that option is primarily a straw man for hypothetical purposes. Although it is deemed a rhetorical device to justify a more mainstream alternative, for current purposes it must be included in the package of options. Prior to addressing the preferred way for the United States to help achieve a united Korean nation, it is worthwhile acknowledging an undesirable approach. It is conceivable that one Korea could conquer the other Korea through the decisive intervention of an ally. One must contemplate the possibility that the United States—if it opens additional fronts in the war on terrorism aimed at what President Bush called the "axis of evil" or if North-South border tensions accidentally escalate to full-fledged warfare—might find itself dragged into a conflict with the North Koreans, notwithstanding U.S. disavowals of any intention to launch a preemptive attack on the DPRK. In such circumstances the United States might find itself involved in toppling the DPRK, thereby ending Korea's Cold War as suddenly as the Soviet Union's collapse ended the main event. Although this option also might be deemed attractive in terms of being a rapid solution that would unambiguously transfer control of the destiny of a reunited Korea to the ROK, the array of potential costs inherent in militarily overthrowing the DPRK is too daunting for this to be considered an attractive solution. Looming largest are the risks of extreme war-time infrastructure damage throughout Korea, worsening the already high costs for building a viable United Korea. Also unappealing are the societal trauma attendant to a military solution, the negative image of compelling an in-due-course resolution by force of arms, and the enormous uncertainties involved in China's reactions to such an outcome. All of these factors, plus corollary risks, make this course of action undesirable in terms of fostering Korean national self-determination in a stable environment. Unless specific circumstances—namely, overt North Korean aggression aimed at conquering South Korea—make this option unavoidable, U.S. policy should steer clear of this choice. A North Korean internal-collapse scenario is far more credible and could occur, but it is in the interests of every single interested player to

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avoid that outcome. Clearly, North Korea does not want to collapse. Just as clearly, South Korea does not want to inherit a postcollapse mess as the starting point for Korean reunification. It would make South Korean fears of German-like costs pale in comparison. And all the outside players with a stake in Korean unification—the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and the European Union—will do their utmost to prevent such a disaster from erupting on the Korean Peninsula because they know all too well what kinds of pressures it would inflict on them to help pay for cleaning up the mess. Consequently, it is the middle way that warrants serious attention. A negotiated solution could come about via various venues. It could be left solely to the two Koreas to handle without any meddling by outside forces. In most respects that would be ideal. It would be entirely a Korean effort, and whatever solutions they might devise for themselves would be their own responsibility and theirs to implement. Furthermore, it would be a profound demonstration that Korean national self-determination was being taken literally in ways that would enhance the legitimacy of the results. As ideal as that alternative is, the reality of the external powers' stakes in the outcome makes it at least as likely that some form of outside diplomatic involvement will take place. Precisely what that form might take would depend on the readiness of a number of interested parties to work with each other and with the core inter-Korean negotiators. As a result one could anticipate anything from tripartite talks (involving the two Koreas and one of the following: the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and the European Union) to four-, five-, six-, or seven-power talks. To date, U.S. policy has ostensibly backed the idea of emphasizing inter-Korean talks on unification and played down the necessity of U.S. involvement as a guarantor of the process. Logically that concept remains valid, but the ways in which the United States has carried out that approach undermined its validity. The U.S. stress on the two Koreas was an indirect way of assuring that a poison pill-laden environment would perpetuate catch-22-style failures. So the seemingly solid U.S. support for Seoul's cause, and its apparently self-effacing low profile as an observer that reluctantly deigned to impose its will, constituted a classic free vote. Nonetheless, the logic behind what the United States claimed to stand for was sound. Consequently, it should still be used by U.S. leaders to shape a new policy toward Korean reconciliation and reunification. The U.S. government should totally back Korean efforts to build an inter-Korean dialogue that avoids poison pills and consciously avoids

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laying traps for each other in ways that are calculated to guarantee failure. If possible, U.S. leaders should totally abstain from the processes of inter-Korean dialogue and encourage the other external players to do the same. However, the United States should be unequivocally supportive of the endgame that Koreans aspire to attain, namely, an independent, free, and self-reliant Korean nation-state capable of looking after its own business internationally. Korean reconciliation and reunification should be made the highest priority of U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Other U.S. priorities in the realms of defense, trade, investment, and the like should be made subordinate to that top priority. If circumstances in Korea make it impossible for all the external players to abstain from the dialogue process, or if some of the other powers cannot bring themselves to abstain, the United States should remain ready to perform a supportive function in an impartial fashion for both Koreas. If one or more of the outside players is called upon by the two Koreas to help them become one Korea, the United States should stand ready to lend a reasonable degree of assistance. Just as important, the United States should not oppose any other efforts to assist the two Koreas—with or without U.S. participation. The latter may be particularly difficult for many U.S. policymakers to tolerate in light of everything the United States has done on behalf of Korean affairs for so many years. However, the United States should stand ready to be an interested bystander if that is what it would take to fulfill the goal of realizing at long last the in-due-course mandate for Korean self-determination. The adjustment process for U.S. society and U.S. leaders to accept a less controlling role in how Korea will evolve politically, economically, strategically, and diplomatically may well be complicated by unfolding U.S. relations with other states in the region—most notably China and Japan. Therefore, the United States should do its utmost to encourage the East Asian-Southeast Asian region to emulate the cooperative multilateralism symbolized by the progress made by the European Community and European Union as a device to help create a geopolitical environment conducive to Korean integration within a supportive regional system. There is no need for an Asian Union counterpart to the European Union to foster an Asianization of Korea, because there is no fear of Korea's potential to dominate Asia. However, a budding Asian Union would be extremely useful to facilitate Korea's reunification by sensitizing all the other countries of Asia to the problems United Korea would contend with as it integrates the long-divided nation.

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To the degree these processes can go hand in hand and complement each other, they deserve strong U.S. support based on their intrinsic merits. They also warrant U.S. support in more self-serving respects because they have the potential to reduce the demands placed on the United States to be a buffer between the two Koreas and to be a forward military presence in the name of intra-Asian stability. The more a reunited Korea and its neighbors can act in a neighborly multilateral manner that could yield a stable Asian Union, the better it will be for the United States because the burdens placed on the United States will be sharply reduced and perhaps eliminated. Although that possibility should be actively encouraged by the United States and hoped for by the U.S. public, it cannot be counted upon. U.S. expectations with regard to future relations with a Korea that has realized its objective of national self-determination should treat an Asian Union as a relatively Utopian corollary contingency. The United States should focus instead on coping with United Korea in a real-world context very similar to that which surrounds the divided Korean nation in the early twenty-first century. Nonetheless, that Utopian regional notion is worth raising here because it could actually emerge from one facet of today's real world, namely, the willingness of Asian states to experiment in limited ways with regional multilateralism. A United Korea that comes into existence through peaceful means backed in part by the United States, but also with the support of other states in the region, will raise serious questions about the kind of postunification relationship that would be most beneficial for both the United States and Korea. Most U.S. and South Korean analysts who have contemplated such a future prefer to envision essential bilateral continuity from a U.S.-ROK model on the political, economic, and security fronts. Their analyses have been cited extensively above. The core assumption underlying their visions for the future are based on the desirability of perpetuating the cooperative interdependence created arduously over so many years by U.S. and South Korean leaders. In one sense their assumption has merit. Neither Seoul nor Washington is likely to want to cavalierly jettison the network of relationships embodied in U.S.-South Korea ties. However, such an assumption has a builtin weakness, namely, the incompatibility of perpetuating that kind of interdependence and fostering Korean national self-determination and independence. To favor intense strategic continuity in U.S. relations with a postunification Korean state would seriously damage the ability of that state to carry on normal contacts with the United States.19 Today,

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at a time when the United States seeks to maintain strong ties with the ROK and cope with North Korea's threats to regional stability, it is not popular or mainstream to contemplate the logic of cutting or altering some of those strategic ties. However, when United Korea comes into existence, what is currently deemed heretical may well become orthodox. Perhaps the best way for U.S. backers of these seemingly contradictory policy alternatives is to plan for a future that would permit both perspectives to be incorporated within U.S. policy toward Korea. That would be possible if Korean reconciliation occurs within a multilateral international context where the process of reunification receives support from a broad array of major and minor players. Were this to occur in a meaningful manner, not simply for the sake of appearances, there would be a strong likelihood that the resulting United Korea would be well positioned to pursue national self-determination within an ongoing multilateral context. Although this option holds many attractions for Korea in terms of reinforcing its independence through diversified interdependence, it also would create a venue for both sides in a U.S. debate over how to interact with United Korea to merge their policy positions. For those in the United States who place a great deal of emphasis on the importance of postunification Korean stability as a rationale for retaining U.S. armed forces in Korea after unification, security could be assured through multilateral commitments from neighbors and interested parties (including the United States), which should suffice to meet that concern. Precisely what form that multilateral system would take should be left to the Korean leadership to devise with United Korea's neighbors and any interested parties as a core element in the Korean nation-state's self-determination. After all, that kind of large-scale geopolitical arrangement is exactly the sort of issue that the in-due-course notion should embody. It does not make much sense for the United States to implement policies designed to enable the Korean people to do what they should have been able to do half a century ago in terms of strategic self-determination, but put clauses in those policies with regard to perpetuating U.S. forces in Korea that have the effect of inhibiting genuine normalization of U.S.-United Korea relations by continuing Korea's anachronistic remnant of a protectorate status. It would be far better to normalize U.S.-Korea security relations by eliminating any hint of client-state status. Encouraging Korean participation in regional multilateral security arrangements is an ideal way to achieve that end and should be made a high priority for U.S. policy. One result of that policy would be the partial or total U.S. military disengagement from Korea after unification, depending on the precise

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details of the proposed multilateral arrangements devised by United Korea and the level of U.S. involvement in them. This theme raises a series of issues. How and under what conditions might the United States implement such military cuts?20 Would it require abrogation of the U.S.Korea alliance? Would such revised arrangements be capable of addressing problems that have been central concerns for the United States in the region for years? In terms of the formalities of shifting from U.S. relations with the ROK to U.S. relations with a government representing United Korea, there would necessarily be a legal transition. Because the former ROK would no longer exist, the United States would have to establish surrogate relationships with its successor. In that sense, there would need to be an abrogation of the current alliance and development of new ties with the new Korean state. Whether that should constitute a new bilateral alliance is a matter for serious debate. There might be a need for such mutual obligations, but—equally important—there might not be. If an independent Korean nation-state comes into existence with a pluralistic geopolitical support system, there would be ample reason for that state to create a new security system. All of these issues can, and should, be addressed as part of the U.S. implementation of an in-duecourse endgame. Therefore, they would entail close consultations with both Koreas as they evolve into a new united Korean state. By definition, a U.S. policy designed to be the catalyst for the transformation of a divided Korean nation into a single independent sovereign Korean nation-state would directly address a spectrum of problems that have been at the core of U.S. policy toward Korea for many years, because there no longer would be a North Korea capable of fomenting these problems. The North Korean rogue-state issue would cease to exist. Its direct military threats would cease to exist. Its indirect military threats—proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorist entities—would cease to exist. And problems associated with its societal decay would be addressed domestically within United Korea. In short, all or most of the rationales utilized to justify keeping U.S. forces in South Korea for more than half a century would either dissipate or be addressed by other means after the creation of a United Korea that eliminates North Korea. Those who argue that the United States should maintain an armed presence in Korea after unification for the sake of regional stability can justify their advocacy on several bases. It is possible that a postunification Korea could be a source of instability because such a shaky state would be the result of a botched process. That possibility can be eliminated by

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assuring the process is completely effective. It also is possible that U.S. leaders would want to keep U.S. forces in Korea to cope with either Japan or China. In the case of a potential Japanese threat to the region, the United States should address that directly and not seek to reinvent its alliance with a transformed Korea in order to defend it against another ally. Alternatively, the United States might want to use its ties with Japan and United Korea as part of an alliance against a rising threat from China. That could well be plausible, but making a newly minted United Korea a frontline state as part of a containmentconstrainment policy aimed at China is hardly conducive to the kind of support United Korea should warrant. It would be far better served by receiving multilateral political, economic, and strategic support from its neighbors in East Asia and Southeast Asia, enabling the U.S. strategic presence in Korea to be dramatically scaled down or eliminated entirely. The timetable for cuts and withdrawals obviously would be a matter for consultations between Washington and Korean leaders. A gradual reduction process might be in order as part of an incremental, phased-in unification process. But if the United States does make fulfilling the indue-course mandate its top priority in U.S. policy toward Korea, and if unification occurs far more rapidly than is currently assumed by most observers, equally rapid force cuts would be appropriate. That shift in U.S. priorities would be very complementary to U.S. goals in an expanded, open-ended war on terrorism because the United States could declare success in the elimination of one of the so-called axis of evil states rapidly, peacefully, safely, and effectively. The United States could simultaneously wrap up a remnant of the Cold War and preemptively wrap up an emerging theater of what could be a new surrogate for the old Cold War. There is another facet of the war on terrorism that warrants attention. Those who contend U.S. forces should be kept in United Korea in the name of regional stability are basically engaging in an effort to reinvent a justification for keeping U.S. forces in Korea, comparable to post-Cold War moves within NATO to find new excuses for the United States to stay engaged after NATO's main goal had been accomplished. Instead of seeking new strategic rationales in Korea, the United States should accept success, see the creation of United Korea as symbolic of new stability in Northeast Asia, and encourage Northeast Asian multilateralism as part of the larger Asian multilateralism so that both will be vehicles for a stable Asia that will not need the United States to play a military-stabilizing role. This will permit the United States to sharply

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reduce or eliminate U.S. forces in Korea and put them to better use elsewhere in ways that truly serve U.S. national interests. These forces, and the portion of the U.S. defense budget that they represent, could be used to confront diverse threats in the global war on terrorism or assigned to the defense of the homeland, which was part of the original in-duecourse motivation. However, that would by no means necessitate the United States walking away from Korean affairs. The greater stability possible for United Korea operating in a multilateral arena would augur well for continued extensive U.S. relations with United Korea in economic, political, and diplomatic affairs. All of these relations would be enhanced by fully normalizing overall U.S.-Korea relations. The United States could, and should, look forward to playing a major role as one of United Korea's prime trade partners, to engaging in mutually beneficial investments by U.S. citizens and Koreans, to sharing an appreciation for pluralistic democratic political processes, and to interacting diplomatically in the region and globally on behalf of peace and stability. It is also conceivable that United Korea might opt to pursue either a new bilateral partnership or a policy of national neutrality. As U.S. leaders contemplate future U.S. relations with United Korea, both alternatives should be factored into the calculations. Of the two, the least harmful to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region would be Korean neutrality. If United Korea can remain genuinely neutral and fare well in those circumstances, it would neither help nor harm U.S. interests or the interests of Korea's neighbors. Therefore, if the leaders of United Korea ever decide to adopt international neutrality, the United States should be prepared to accord it the same treatment as Switzerland and Sweden. As long as the leaders of United Korea recognize that many in the United States are ambivalent about the U.S. history of international neutrality and that this ambivalence sometimes leads to suspicions about the authenticity of other countries' neutralist motives, those Korean leaders should enjoy the same opportunity to pursue neutrality as any other country.21 Consequently, there is no reason that such an option could not legitimately be the result of a process of U.S.-Korea normalization. Similarly, it is possible that United Korea will desire to retain a strong bilateral network of security relationships with another country to help guarantee peace and stability. Were this to occur, it is most likely that the leaders of United Korea would want to remain on a solid economic and diplomatic basis with the United States and would not enter into bilateral security relations with any U.S. adversary. Consequently,

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any postunification move by Korea to develop bilateral security relations with Japan, China, or Russia should not ipso facto be a cause for U.S. rejection of that option as long as the United States maintains friendly relations with that security partner. Under certain circumstances such an alternative could prove beneficial to the United States as a way to strengthen regional stability via other countries sharing the costs, burdens, and risks. Such an alternative could also be considered a building-block for creating a meaningful multilateral system. At the same time, however, the United States should not hesitate to make clear that it would not look favorably upon United Korea opting to align itself with any well-known adversary of the United States. United Korea should understand what the costs would be were it to choose a hostile form of normal relations. Given South Korea's past and current relationships with the United States, this hypothetical scenario can safely be deemed inordinately remote. The chances of United Korea pursuing that option are virtually nil. Nonetheless, this option must be considered on the spectrum of alternatives that could emerge as the United States normalizes its policy toward Korea. Clearly the United States enjoys a range of options with regard to implementing an in-due-course policy and then living with the consequences. As the people of the United States and their leaders debate this issue and attempt to reach a consensus, in consultation with Koreans in both halves of that divided nation and their neighbors in Asia, it is possible that currently unforeseen options may become viable for U.S. policy. However, at this point in the evolution of U.S.-Korea relations— when so many U.S. and Korean analysts have explored the nuances of this policy spectrum—it seems unlikely that eventual U.S. policy decisions will fall beyond the known gamut of choices. Consequently, it behooves U.S. citizens and their leaders to get on with the task at hand and fully normalize U.S. relations with the Korean nation.

Notes 1. For an analysis of ambiguities about the U.S. role in the Korean War, see Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985. 2. For an analysis of the civil war dimensions of the Korean War, see John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War, Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989. 3. For overviews of that involvement, which the U.S. public often forgets, see Ephraim D. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War, New York:

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Longman, Green, 1925; David P. Crook, The North, the South, and the Powers, 1861-1865, New York: Wiley, 1974; Norman B. Ferris, The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977; Brian Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1980; and Warren F. Spencer, The Confederate Navy in Europe, University: University of Alabama Press, 1983. 4. For background on Austria's treatment, see William B. Bader, Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966; and Mellany A. Sully, A Contemporary History of Austria, London: Routledge, 1990. 5. For South Korean perspectives on Korea's divided situation compared to a divided Germany, see Kang Myong-gyu and Helmut Wagner, eds., Korea and Germany—Lessons in Division, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1990. See also John H. Herz, "Korea and Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic Impact," Asian Survey, November 1975, pp. 957-970. 6. For analyses of those developments, see Michael J. Hogan, ed., The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991; and Frank A. Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question Since 1945, New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995. 7. For examples of the insights derived, see Yang Sung-chul, "The Lessons of United Germany for Divided Korea," Korea and World Affairs, Fall 1992, pp. 436-462; Rhee Kang-suk, "Korea's Unification: The Applicability of the German Experience," Asian Survey, April 1993, pp. 360-375; Mo Jongryn, "German Lessons for Managing the Economic Cost of Korean Reunification," in Thomas H. Henriksen and Lho Kyongsoo, eds., One Korea? Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1994; In K. Hwang, "The Prospects for One Korea in Comparison with One Germany," in Kim Yun and Shin Eui-hang, eds., Toward a Unified Korea, Columbia: Center for Asian Studies, University of South Carolina, 1995; and Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000. For an early analysis of that issue from a prominent German specialist in Korean affairs, see excerpt from a paper by Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, "German Unification: Its Implications for Korea," Korea Herald, October 9, 1991, p. 5. For more indepth German analyses of the relevance of German unification to Korea, see Gerlinde Sinn and Hans-Werner Sinn, "What Can Korea Learn from German Unification?" in Hwang Byong-moo and Yoon Young-kwan, eds., Middle Powers in the Age of Globalization, KAIS International Conference Series No. 5, Seoul: Korean Association of International Studies, 1996; Christian Watrin, "Monetary Integration and Stabilization Policy: The German Case," in Kong IIsa and Kim Kwang-suk, eds., Policy Priorities for the Unified Korean Economy, Seoul: Institute for Global Economics, 1998; and Holger Wolf, "Korean Unification: Lessons from Germany," in Marcus Noland, ed., Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998. 8. For examples of such speculation, see Shim Jae-hoon, "The Inevitable Burden," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 22, 1991, pp. 21-23, part of a cover story titled "Korean Reunification: Dream and Nightmare"; Shim Jae-hoon,

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"The Price of Unity," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 26, 1992, pp. 54-56, part of a cover story titled "Korean Unity: The CO$T"; Charles S. Lee, "What Price Unity?" Far Eastern Economic Review, June 26, 1997, p. 69; and "Gov't Studies How to Finance Reunification with North Korea," Korea Herald, October 1, 1997, p. 2. For a more in-depth analysis of that issue by a prominent RAND economist, see Charles Wolf Jr., "Forecasting Korea's Economy and the Costs of Unification," in Hahn Bae-ho and Lee Chae-jin, eds., Patterns of Inter-Korean Relations, Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1999. 9. For insightful advocacy of that approach, see Hwang In-kwan, "Neutralization: An All-Weather Paradigm for Korean Reunification," Asian Affairs: An American Review, Winter 1999, pp. 195-207. 10. For useful analyses of the pros and cons within that U.S. debate, see Robert H. Puckett, America Faces the World: Isolationist Ideology in American Foreign Policy, New York: MSS Information, 1972; Bill Kauffman, America First! Its History, Culture, and Politics, Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1995; and Eric Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. For the broader context of the challenges that motivate that U.S. debate, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random House, 1987. 11. For a candid assessment of that prospect by a prominent U.S. specialist in East Asian affairs who dissents from the conventional wisdom upon which existing U.S. foreign policy is based, see Chalmers Johnson, "Blowback: U.S. Actions Abroad Have Repeatedly Led to Unintended, Indefensible Consequences," The Nation, October 15, 2001, pp. 13-15. 12. For useful analytical insights into how such obsequious sycophancy influences Korean ties with major states and inter-Korean perceptions of such ties, see Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society, Boulder: Westview, 1990, p. 82; and Koh Byung-chul, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 79. 13. For a solid example of such planning as the post-Cold War era unfolded around Korea, see Jonathan D. Pollack and Cha Young-koo, A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-Korean Security Cooperation, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 1995. For volumes containing more diverse perspectives on the future of U.S.-Korea relations, see Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter, eds., The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992; and Kwak Tae-hwan and Thomas L. Wilborn, eds., The U.S.-ROK Alliance in Transition, Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1996. 14. See the previously cited libertarian and other critiques of U.S. foreign policy. 15. For insights into that perspective, see Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security, Summer 1997, pp. 86-124. See also the author's "A Northeast Asia Peace Dividend," Strategic Review, Summer 1998, pp. 17-23.

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16. See, for example, the collected 1995-1996 statements of President Kim Young-sam on the subject: Korea's Reform and Globalization, President Kim Young Sam Prepares the Nation for the Challenges of the 21st Century, Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, undated, circa 1996. For President Kim Dae-jung's approach to Asia's role in globalization, see his speech to the Auckland meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization, in "President Kim Urges APEC to Take Lead in Launching New Global Economic Order," Korea Herald, September 13, 1999. For scholarly analysis of South Korea's ambitions in this arena, see Gerardo R. Ungson, Richard M. Steers, and Park Seung-ho, Korean Enterprise: The Quest for Globalization, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997; and C. Fred Alford, Think No Evil: Korean Values in the Age of Globalization, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. 17. For a balanced example of such advocacy, see Eric J. Heikkila and George O. Totten III, "Don't Let Korean Peninsula Peace Slip Away," Los Angeles Times, January 15, 2002, op-ed page. 18. For analysis of this category of Cold War partner, see Howard J. Wiarda, "Friendly Tyrants and American Interests," in Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, eds., Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma, New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 19. For examples of such U.S. advocacy, see Richard L. Bogusky, "The Impact of Korean Unification on Northeast Asia: American Security Challenges and Opportunities," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1998, pp. 49-73; Michael O'Hanlon, "Keep U.S. Forces in Korea After Reunification," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1998, pp. 5-19; William O. Odom, "The U.S. Military in Unified Korea," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 2000, pp. 7-28; Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy, Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 2000; and Ralph Cossa, "The Role of U.S. Forces in a Unified Korea," International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall-Winter 2001, pp. 117-139. 20. For other analysts who have reached similar conclusions, albeit from differing geopolitical vantage points, see Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996; and Selig Harrison, "Time to Leave Korea?" Foreign Affairs, MarchApril 2001, pp. 62-79. 21. For an analysis of that legacy, see Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

CONCLUSION:

How?

WHEN?

H

OW AND WHEN MIGHT THE NORMATIVE POLICY RECOMmendations made in Chapter 5 be carried out? Quite obviously they will not be implemented by any U.S. administration simply based on the logic embodied in any single book. Instead, a new consensus must be achieved in the United States regarding its Korea policy. U.S. leaders need to pay closer attention to the low-key debate among academics, think tank researchers, journalists, and others about the pros and cons of the various recommendations for dealing with a unifying Korea. If the policy recommendations made here, along with likeminded suggestions by other analysts, prove to be persuasive in the process of reshaping U.S. policy toward Korea, then the critical questions about how and when can be addressed. With regard to the how of the Korean unification process, it is essential for the United States to closely consult with the ROK and DPRK for as long as they exist as separate entities. Washington should make it abundantly clear that the United States supports the goal of unification and looks forward to the day that the in-due-course endgame can be implemented. Furthermore, the United States should overtly look forward to a productive and mutually beneficial normal relationship with United Korea. However, U.S. enthusiasm for these goals should not cross the line into the realm of being intrusive and meddlesome. The United States cannot, and should not, put itself in the position of mandating change. The changes that come about in Korea, and for Korea, must be the result of Korean decisions and actions. After all, the task of merging two societies that have grown apart culturally during the decades of 137

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national division will be formidable. As Koreans are well aware, the Korean nation is prone to provincial tensions that make the North-South situation more than just a DPRK-ROK issue. Consequently, they know they will have their hands full. Accordingly, the key decisions and policies must be the purview of Koreans throughout the peninsula. Nonetheless, the United States—in pursuit of its own national interests and to live up to the long overdue in-due-course commitments—should become a far more proactive facilitator and enabler. The time frame for this agenda cannot ultimately be determined by U.S. leaders because the key decisions must be made by Koreans at their own pace. However, as a rule of thumb, the people of the United States should think in terms of the sooner the better. This will help U.S. leaders adjust to modified U.S. roles as a catalyst for change rather than an impediment perpetuating the status quo. And when Korean leaders from both Koreas display a focused readiness to pursue national selfdetermination, the United States should be prepared to consult closely with its Korean counterparts and move swiftly to accommodate change. Although this process could take considerable time, it could occur in the near term, say, within a few years. Although the when of all this must be a flexible time frame—and some in the United States may well prefer that it drag on for decades—the United States should be prepared for— and enthusiastic about—a one- or two-year (and possibly less) window of opportunity. In short, the United States must be prepared to move swiftly if circumstances dictate. As the United States engages in this debate about how to improve its policy toward Korea, incrementally adjusts its policy, and learns to live with the potential United Korea in a normal relationship that is far removed from the U.S.-ROK history of client-statism and sadae jui, there may well be difficulty in adapting to the altered circumstances. Consequently, it is important for the broad spectrum of U.S. society and Koreans to explore well in advance—bilaterally and multilaterally—as many as possible of the ramifications that the future may hold. Nonetheless, it is a course of action that should be followed with enthusiasm and confidence—albeit belatedly. If the United States and Korea reconfigure their international relationship to a level of normalcy that the bilateral bond has never truly experienced, the future promises to exceed the past bilaterally and in terms of each country's roles in regional affairs.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baldwin, Frank, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945, New York: Pantheon, 1973. Bandow, Doug, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996. Bandow, Doug, and Ted Galen Carpenter, eds., The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992. Barnds, William J., ed., The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs, New York: New York University Press, 1976. Boettcher, Robert, Gifts of Deceit: Sun Myung Moon, Tongsun Park, and the Korean Scandal, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1980. Buss, Claude A., The United States and the Republic of Korea: Background for Policy, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1982. Cha, Victor, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. Chang, Jong-suk, Diplomacy of Asymmetry: Korean-American Relations to 1910, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990. Clark, Donald N., ed., The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows Over the Regime in South Korea, Boulder; Westview, 1988. Clough, Ralph N., Embattled Korea: The Rivalry for International Support, Boulder: Westview, 1987. Collins, J. Lawton, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969. Cossa, Ralph, U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a "Virtual Alliance," Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999. Cotton, James, and Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989. Cumings, Bruce, The Two Koreas, New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1984. , Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.

139

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Selected Bibliography

Dong, Wonmo, ed., Korean-American Relations at Crossroads, Princeton Junction, NJ: Association of Korean Christian Scholars, 1982. , ed., The Two Koreas and the United States, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000. Dujarric, Robert, Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia, Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1998. , Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for U.S. Strategy, Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 2000. Eberstadt, Nicholas, Korea Approaches Unification, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995. Foot, Rosemary A., The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985. , A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. Gleysteen, William H. Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999. Goulden, Joseph C., Korea: The Untold Story of the War, New York: McGrawHill, 1982. Gregor, A. James, Land of the Morning Calm: Korea and American Security, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990. Grinker, Roy Richard, Korea and Its Future: Unification and the Unfinished War, New York: St. Martin's, 1998. Ha, Young-sun, Nuclear Proliferation, World Order, and Korea, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983. Halliday, Jon, and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, New York: Pantheon, 1988. Han, Sung-joo, ed., After One Hundred Years: Continuity and Change in Korean-American Relations, Seoul: Korea University, 1982. Harrison, Selig, ed., Dialogue with North Korea, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1989. Hayes, Peter, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea, Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1991. Henriksen, Thomas H., and Jongrin Mo, eds., North Korea After Kim II Sung: Continuity or Change? Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1997. Hinton, Harold C., Korea Under New Leadership: The Fifth Republic, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Hinton, Harold C., Donald Zagoria, Lee Jung-ha, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Lee Chung-min, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., The U.S.-Korea Security Relationship: Prospects and Challenges for the 1990s, Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988. Joo, Seung-ho, and Kwak Tae-hwan, eds., Korea in the 21st Century, Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2001. Kihl, Young Whan, ed., Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War, Boulder: Westview, 1994. Kihl, Young Whan, and Peter Hayes, eds., Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997.

Selected Bibliography

141

Kim, Ilpyong, ed., Korean Challenges and American Policy, New York: Paragon House, 1991. Koo, Young-nok, and Suh Dae-sook, eds., Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984. Kwak, Tae-hwan, John Chay, Cho Soon-sung, and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982, Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1982. Kwak, Tae-hwan, and Thomas L. Wilborn, eds., The U.S.-ROK Alliance in Transition, Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University Press, 1996. Lee, Chae-jin, and Sato Hideo, eds., U.S.-Japan Partnership in Conflict Management: The Case of Korea, Claremont: Keck Center, 1993. Lee, Manwoo, ed., Current Issues in Korea-U.S. Relations: Korean-American Dialogue, Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University Press, 1993. Lee, Manwoo, and Richard W. Mansbach, eds., The Changing Order in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, Seoul and Boulder: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, and Westview, 1993. Lee, Manwoo, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Moon Chung-in, Alliance Under Tension: The Evolution of South Korean-U.S. Relations, Seoul and Boulder: Kyungnam University Press and Westview, 1988. Lho, Kyongsoo, ed., The United States, Japan, and East Asia, Seoul: Korean Institute of International Studies, 1995. Matray, James I., The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984. Mazarr, Michael J., North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation, New York: St. Martin's, 1995. McCann, David R., ed., Korea Briefing: Toward Unification, Armonk, NY: Asia Society and M. E. Sharpe, 1997. Moon, Chung-in, and David I. Steinberg, eds., Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges, Washington, DC, and Seoul: Georgetown University Press, and Yonsei University Press, 1999. Morley, James W., Japan and Korea: America's Allies in the Pacific, New York: Walker, 1965. Morse, Ronald A., ed., A Century of United States-Korean Relations, Washington, DC: Wilson Center/University Press of America, 1983. Nahm, Andrew C., ed., The United States and Korea: American-Korean Relations, 1866-1976, Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 1979. Nam, Joo-hong, America's Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Noland, Marcus, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000. Oberdorfer, Don, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997. Oh, Katy, and Ralph Hassig, eds., Korea Briefing, 2000-2001: First Steps Toward Reconciliation and Reunification, Armonk, NY: Asia Society and M. E. Sharpe, 2002.

142

Selected Bibliography

Olsen, Edward A., U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, San Francisco and Boulder: World Affairs Council of Northern California and Westview, 1988. Paige, Glenn D., The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950, New York: Free Press, 1968. Park, Tong-whan, ed., The U.S. and the Two Koreas, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. Pollack, Jonathan D., and Cha Young-koo, A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-Korean Security Cooperation, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995. Pollack, Jonathan D., and Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999. Rees, David, Korea: The Limited War, New York: St. Martin's, 1964. Scalapino, Robert A., North Korea at a Crossroads, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1997. Scalapino, Robert A., and Lee Hong-koo, eds., Korea-U.S. Relations: The Politics of Trade and Security, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988. Sokolski, Henry D., ed., Planning for a Peaceful Korea, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001. Stueck, William, The Korean War: An International History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. Suh, Dae-sook, and Chae-jin Lee, eds., North Korea After Kim II Sung, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. Sullivan, John, and Roberta Foss, eds., Two Koreas—One Future? Lanham, MD: American Friends Service Committee and University Press of America, 1987. Sunoo, Harold Hakwon, America's Dilemma in Asia: The Case of South Korea, Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979. Sutter, Robert, and Han Sung-joo, Korea-U.S. Relations in a Changing World, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1990. White, Nathan, U.S. Policy Toward Korea: Analyses, Alternatives, and Recommendations, Boulder: Westview, 1979.

INDEX

Africa, 15 Agreed framework, 48 Agreement on Reconciliation and Nonaggression, 43 Albright, M„ 52 Alliance, U.S.-ROK (Mutual Defense Treaty), 1, 17, 18, 22, 46, 117, 118, 129 Allen, H„ 8 American Enterprise Institute, 55 Anglo-Japanese alliance, 9 Anticommunism, 19, 22, 23, 26, 28 Appeasement, 52, 53, 55, 59 "Asian tigers," 23 Asian Union, 126, 127 Asia-Pacific, 12, 15, 16, 30, 39, 40, 53, 86, 96, 113 Australia, 56 Austria, 30, 108, 109 Autarky, 24, 25, 47 Axis of evil, 30, 62, 63, 66, 124, 130 Axis powers, 108 Baker, J., 96 Belgrade bombing, 97 Biden, J., 54 Big Three powers, 16 Blair, D„ 55 Blue House, 56 Bolton, J., 62 Brezhnev, L., 24

Bush, G. H. W., 28, 39, 42, 43, 54, 59, 66, 96 Bush, G. W„ 53-58, 61-64, 66, 109, 114, 124 Bush Doctrine, 61 Bush-Kim summits, 54, 55, 59, 63 Cairo conference/declaration, 1,3, 11, 12, 82, 85 Carter, J., 25, 26, 28 Castro, F., 40 Catch-22, 83, 125 Central Asia, 15 Central Country (China), 89, 91, 95 Chi Haotian, 95 China, 1, 3, 8-10, 12, 19, 20, 22, 24, 30, 31, 40^13, 47, 53, 55, 57, 58, 64, 65, 81, 83-97, 115, 123-126, 130, 132; influence on Korea, 24, 47, 65, 87, 89, 92-96; influence on the United States, 41, 65, 84, 94 Ching dynasty, 8 Choong gook saram, 89 Cho Sung-tae, 95 Chun Du-hwan, 26-29 Chung Ju Yung, 53 Chung kuo, 89 Civil-military relations, 23 Client state, 20, 114, 116, 120-123, 128, 138 Clinton, W., 28, 45, 48, 49, 51-55, 58, 59, 66, 86, 88, 89, 96, 109, 113

143

144

Index

Cohen, W„ 58 Cold War, ix, 2-A, 7, 1 2 - 2 1 , 23, 2 6 - 3 1 , 39, 41, 4 2 , 44, 4 6 , 49, 50, 66, 8 1 - 8 6 , 8 9 - 9 3 , 106, 109, 113, 124, 130 Confucianism, 21, 23, 89 Congress, U.S., 55 Conservative policy, ix, 26, 27, 4 5 , 54-64 Containment, 15, 130 Council on Foreign Relations, 58 Cross recognition, 84, 92, 9 4 Cultural cleansing, 10 Czarist Russia, 9 D e f e n s e Department, U.S., 5 2 Demilitarized zone ( D M Z ) , 57, 59,

61

Democratic Liberal Party, 4 4 Democratic Party, 45 Demonization, 4 0 Diplomatic roots, U.S.-Korea, 7 - 9 , 27 D M Z . See Demilitarized zone D o m e s t i c politics, South Korea, 23, 26, 29, 4 4 ^ 6 , 53, 56, 66, 1 2 0 - 1 2 2 D o u b l e containment, 96, 109 East China Sea, 87 East Germany, 30, 108, 109 EC. See European Community E c o n o m i c incentives, 4 8 , 5 1 - 5 3 , 55, 59, 60, 93, 96, 1 1 7 - 1 2 0 , 129 E c o n o m i c policy: North Korea, 20, 24, 4 7 , 51, 93, 96, 110, 119; South Korea, 20, 21, 2 3 - 2 5 , 28, 51, 110, 118-120 E c o n o m i c recovery: post-IMF, 53, 110, 119; p o s t - K o r e a n War, 19, 2 2 Endgame, 2, 3, 39, 4 1 , 42, 45, 4 6 , 4 9 , 51, 83, 110, 126, 137 Entanglements, U.S., x, 4, 118 E U . See European U n i o n Eurasia, 16, 84 Eurocentrism, 15, 19 Europe, 1 4 - 1 6 , 19, 40, 57, 1 0 7 - 1 0 9 , 119 European Community (EC), 110, 126 European Union (EU), 5 6 - 5 8 , 110, 123, 125, 126

Evil, 30, 63. See also A x i s of evil Foreign relations committee, 5 4 Four-party talks, 95 Free China, 3 0 "Free vote," 50, 67, 83, 88, 115, 125 "Friendly tyrant," 123 Germany, 12, 16, 30, 42, 4 7 , 56, 1 0 8 - 1 1 0 ; unification of, 30, 4 3 , 4 6 , 47, 109, 110, 125 Globalism, 16, 4 7 , 86, 1 1 8 - 1 2 0 , 131 Gorbachev, M., 46, 84, 91 Government in exile, 3, 10 Great Britain, 1, 8, 10, 14, 16, 56, 107, 108 Great cultural revolution, 2 4 Gregg, D „ 4 2 , 58, 59 Guam, 9 0 Guam Doctrine ( N i x o n Doctrine), 24, 25 Gulf War, 86 Han Seung-soo, 62, 63 Hard landing (rapid unification), 50, 66, 1 2 3 - 1 2 5 Hawaii, 9 0 H e g e m o n i s m , 31, 89, 96, 117 Helms, J., 57 "Hermit kingdom," 2 4 Hideyoshi, 8 6 Hitler, A., 14 Homeland defense, 131 Humanitarianism, 60, 106, 107 Human rights, 25, 45, 121 Hyundai, 53 Inchon, 8 "Indispensable country," 89, 9 6 In due course, 1 - 4 , 1 1 - 1 4 , 16, 17, 20, 22, 24, 29, 4 0 ^ 2 , 44^16, 48, 4 9 , 5 1 , 6 6 , 6 7 , 8 1 - 8 5 , 9 1 , 9 4 , 97, 105, 106, 1 0 8 - 1 1 0 , 112, 115, 116, 121, 122, 124, 131, 132, 137, 138 Insanity, North Korean, 4 8 Interdependence, 24, 25, 28, 120, 127 Internationalism, 4, 21, 22, 2 4 - 2 6 , 28, 30, 4 0 , 44, 108, 110, 111, 116 Interventionism, x, 19, 97, 107, 124

Index Iran, 62 Iraq, 62 Ireland, 10 Islam, 65 "Japan, Inc.," 28 Japan: influence on Korea, 10, 11, 2 3 - 2 5 , 81, 8 5 - 8 7 , 97, 123, 125, 126, 130, 132; influence on U.S., 3, 4, 8 - 1 3 , 16, 18, 19, 21, 25, 27, 30, 41, 49, 53, 54, 57, 6 3 - 6 5 , 83, 86, 88, 106, 115 Japanese archipelago, 18 Japanese Coast Guard, 87 Japanese colonial oppression, 10, 11, 86 Japanese empire, 3, 4, 8 - 1 2 , 15, 108, 109 Japanese occupation, 12, 13, 16 Jiang Zemin, 94 Jo Myong-rok, 52 Juche, 24, 31, 47 KEDO. See Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization Kennan, G., 15 Khrushchev, N „ 24 Kim-Bush summits, 54, 55, 59, 63 Kim Dae-jung, 29, 45, 48, 5 1 - 5 5 , 5 7 - 5 9 , 63, 66, 67, 88, 94, 96, 110, 118-121 Kim Il-sung, 20, 22, 40, 46, 47, 83 Kim Jong-il, 51, 52, 96 Kim Jong-pil, 29 Kim Young-sam, 29, 4 4 - 4 6 , 48, 118, 121 Kissinger, H., 55 "Korea, Inc.," 28 Korea Foundation, 19 Koreagate, 25 Korea Herald, 63 Korean Air Lines flight 007, downing by the Soviet Union, 27 Korean Central News Agency, 63 Korean civil war, 21, 106, 107 Korean immigration to U.S., 19 Korean influence on Japan, 87, 88, 93, 109 Korean occupation, 12, 13, 16, 17

145

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 48, 94 Korean refugees, 87, 93 Korean unification, ix, 5, 18, 45, 46, 4 8 - 5 1 , 66, 81, 8 3 - 8 5 , 87-89, 91, 93, 96, 97, 108-132, 137 Korean War, 1, 7, 13, 14, 17-22, 47, 82, 89, 90, 93, 105, 113 Kwangju unrest, 26 Laney, J., 58 Latin America, 15 Lee Joung-binn, 95 Leninism, 22, 124 Liberation, Korean, 3, 12, 82, 106, 108, 109, 121, 122 Lilley, J., 58 "Limited war," 17, 82 Lindh, A., 57 Lobbying, 25 Manchuria, 30, 93 Mao Tse-tung, 24, 85 Marxism, 15, 22, 24, 42, 47, 82 Meiji state, 8, 24 Mexico, 90 Middle East, 15, 60, 62, 119 Middle Kingdom (China), 89, 95 Military Armistice Commission, 22 Missile defenses (TMD/NMD), 53, 59, 60 Missionaries, U.S., 8, 10 Moon Sung Myung, 53 Morality, U.S. policy, 9, 105, 106 Moscow agreement, 16, 108 Multilateralism, 42, 118, 120, 123, 125-132, 138 Multiparty talks, 125 National assembly, 43 National Defense University, 63 National interests, U.S., ix, x, 4, 10, 16, 46, 105, 106, 115, 116, 123, 138 National missile defense (NMD), 53, 59, 60 Native Americans, 106 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization

146

Index

Nazi Germany, 12, 14, 15, 108 Neoconservatism, 62 Neoisolationism, 24, 28, 110 Neutrality, 110, 131 New Deal, 14 New Democrat, 45 New Zealand, 56 Nixon, R„ 24, 25, 30, 41 Nixon Doctrine (Guam Doctrine), 24, 25 NMD. See National missile defense Noninterventionism, U.S., x, 110, 111, 116 Nordpolitik, 42, 84, 91, 94 Normality, U.S.-Korean, 1, 4, 5, 7-9, 11, 18, 111, 112, 116-120, 123, 127, 132, 138 Normative goals, 105-111, 137 North America, 107 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 40, 97, 130 North-South summit, 51, 55, 95 North Vietnam, 25 Nuclear free zone, 43 Nuclear weapons, 43, 44, 47, 48, 59, 92-94, 129 Nye initiative, 86

Post-unification, 87, 122, 123, 127-132 Potsdam conference, 3, 12 Powell, C„ 40, 54, 55 PRC. See People's Republic of China Provincial tensions, 138 Prueher, J., 96 Psychological warfare, 47

Oil crisis, 25 Olympics, Seoul, 28, 42 Olympics, Sydney, 51, 113

Sadaejui, 114, 116, 138 Schwartz, T., 55 Segyewha, 118 Shufeldt Treaty, 8 Shultz, G., 28 Sinic realm, 89 Sinocentrism, 20 Sino-Japanese War, 9 Sino-Soviet split, 24, 82, 83, 90 Smile diplomacy, 28, 43, 54 Solomon, R„ 96 South Asia, 15 South China Sea, 57, 58, 97 Southeast Asia, 12, 15, 126, 130 South Vietnam, 25 Southwest Asia, 60, 64 Soviet Union, 3, 12-20, 22, 24, 27, 28, 39-42, 46, 47, 81-85, 90-93, 106, 108, 109, 124 Spanish-American War, 9 Stalin, J., 14, 21, 24 Stassen, H., 29

Pacific Islands, U.S. strategic presence, 10 Panmunjom, 22 Park Chung-hee, 23-26, 28 Peace Corps, 19 Pentagon, 52, 60 Peoples Republic of China (PRC), 89, 92 Perry, W„ 52 Persson, G., 57 Philippines, 9, 10 Plate, T„ 54 Poison pills, 50, 125 Policy debate, x, 110-118, 128-130, 137 Post-Cold War, ix, 4, 29-31, 39—4-1, 44-48, 50, 60, 81, 84, 85, 86, 89, 92, 106, 113, 116, 130

Reagan, R., 26-29, 43, 54, 66, 83, 91 Red China, 30 Regional hub, 96, 97 Republican Party, 62 Republic of China (ROC), 85, 86, 92 Rhee Syngman, 21, 23 Rimland, 15 ROC. See Republic of China Rodong shinmun, 63 Rogue states, 52, 62, 63, 96, 129 Roh Tae-woo, 29, 42-46, 121 ROK-China summit, 94-96 Roosevelt, F., 14 Root-Takahira agreement, 9 Rumsfeld, D„ 63 Russia, 9, 40, 41, 43, 55, 57, 64, 81, 82, 85, 90, 97, 115, 123, 124, 132 Russo-Japanese War, 9

Index

147

State of the Union, 62 Stockholm, 56 Summit, North-South, 51, 55, 95 Sun Joun-yung, 56 Sunshine policy, 48, 53, 56, 59, 63, 88, 110 Sweden, 56, 57, 131 Switzerland, 30, 131

U.S. bureaucracy, 19 U.S.-China normalization, 90 U.S. civil war, 106-108 U.S. expertise on Asia, 19, 47, 60 U.S. force cuts, 25, 40, 43, 128131 U.S. imperialism, 7-10, 22 U.S. revolutionary war, 107

Taepo-dong missile test, 49, 87 Taiwan, 12, 41, 85, 91-93 Tang Jiaxuan, 95 Terrorism, x, 52, 60-67, 87, 96, 111, 120, 129-131 Theater missile defense (TMD), 53, 59, 60 Three Kims, 29 TMD/NMD. See Theater missile defense Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 8 Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, 49, 88 Truce/armistice, 7, 13, 17, 21, 82, 106

Victimization, Korean, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 39, 108, 109, 114 Vietnam syndrome, 24 Vietnam War, 24, 25, 27

Unification, 50, 66, 123-125. See also Post-unification Unification Church, 53 United Nations, 16, 19, 22, 43, 44, 60, 62, 89, 90, 107

Washington Post, 57 Weapons of mass destruction, 47, 53, 62, 129 Western hemisphere, 90 West Germany, 30, 42, 47, 108, 109 White House, 52 Wilsonian idealism, 10 World Cup, 88 World Trade Center, 60 World War I, 10, 15, 109 World War II, ix, 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 1 3 - 1 5 , 4 1 , 82, 108, 109, 116 Yalta conference, 3, 12, 82 Yi dynasty, 8

ABOUT THE BOOK

C

ONSIDERING THE FUTURE OF U.S.-KOREA RELATIONS, Edward Olsen first provides a rich assessment of the political, economic, and strategic factors that have shaped—and flawed—U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula since World War II. Olsen suggests that the prospect of permanent separation has become integral to U.S. policy toward both Korean states. Offering counterintuitive recommendations for reinvigorating the "in due course" paradigm, his analysis is firmly grounded in the current debate about the course of U.S. foreign policy in general and, in particular, its role in the East Asianxontext. Edward A. Olsen is professor of national security affairs and Asian studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is author of numerous publications, including U.S. National Defense for the 21st Century.

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