Toward a Democratic China: The Intellectual Autobiography of Yan Jiaqi 9780824847296

Citation preview

Toward a Democratic China

A publication of the

School of Hawaiian

Asian & Pacific Studies

University of Hawaii

Toward a Democratic

CHINA The Intellectual Autobiography of

YAN JIAQI Translated by David S. K. Hong and Denis C. Mair Foreword by Andrew J. Nathan s H A p s Library of Translations University of Hawaii Press Honolulu

First published as Wo de sixiang zijuan by Hunan People's Press and Joint Publishing (Hong Kong) Company Ltd. © 1989 Yan Jiaqi English edition and translation © 1992 School of Hawaiian, Asian & Pacific Studies All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 97

96

95

94

93

92

5

4

3

2

1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Yen, Chia-ch'i. Toward a democratic China : the intellectual autobiography of Yan Jiaqi / translated by David S.K. Hong and Denis C. Mair : foreword by Andrew J. Nathan. p. cm. — (SHAPS library of translations) English ed. and translation of 1st ed. published under title: Wo ti ssu hsiang tzu chuan. ISBN 0 - 8 2 4 8 - 1 4 8 4 - 3 . — ISBN 0 - 8 2 4 8 - 1 5 0 1 - 7 (pbk.) 1. Yen, Chia-ch'i. 2. Scholars—China—Biography. I. Hong, David S . K . II. Mair, Denis C. III. Yen, Chia-ch'i. Wo ti ssu hsiang tzu chuan. English. 1992. IV. Title. V. Series. CT3990.Y46A2 1992 951.05'092—dc20 92-15859 CIP

CONTENTS

Foreword by Andrew J . Nathan, ix Preface to the English Edition, xv Preface to the First Edition, xvii 1. The Starting Point of New Advances in Science 3 2. The Dusk of Philosophy 12 3. Entering the Realm of Theology 4. Roaming the World of the Past 22 5. On-the-Scene Reporting: The April Fifth Movement, 1976 2-7 6. Three Courts of Law: Imaginary Travels in Time and Space 32 7. Beijing Spring: 1978-79 41 8. Abolishing Life-tenure in High Leadership Positions 45 9. Farewell to the Realm of Natural Dialectics 55 10. The Search for Nonpoliticized Channels 60 1 1 . Toward a Chinese Civil Service System 79 12. On Universal Cultural Factors 86 v

1 3 . On Heads of State and Government 95 14. Division of State Power in Four Directions 108 15. The Office for Political R e f o r m 119 16. Amid Storms in the Realm of Theory 123 1 7 . T h e R o a d to National Wealth and Power 130 18. On Social Capital 139 19. Another Beijing Spring: 1989 151 20. Exile z

57

SELECTED ESSAYS AND

INTERVIEWS

zi. Religion, Reason, and Practice: Visits to Three Courts of L a w (September 1978) 165 22. Science Is a World of Three Freedoms (May 1986) 191 23. T h e Aspiration to Pursue Truth and Beauty Supersedes All Else (June 1986) 193 24. Reforming China's Political Structure: A n Interview with Yan Jiaqi by Dai Qing (June 1986) 196 25. China Is N o Longer a Dragon: A n Interview with Yan Jiaqi by Dai Qing (March 1988) 203 vi

I Contents

z6. M y Four Convictions Regarding Science (May 1988) 211 27. Origins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (April 1989) 214 28. M a y Seventeenth Manifesto (May 1989) 226 29. China Is N o t a Republic (July 1989) 228 30. You Come Inside, I'll Get Out: An Imaginary Conversation Between M a o Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (September 1989) 237 3 1 . Reflections on Chinese History in the Twentieth

Century

(September 1989) 247 32. Prospects for China in the 1990s (January 1990) 252 Index 271

Contents

I vii

FOREWORD

Just fifty at the time of this writing, Yan Jiaqi has experienced a dramatic life that mirrors the recent history of his country. A native of Jiangsu province, he graduated from the prestigious University of Science and Technology in 1964 and w a s accepted for graduate study by the Philosophy Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, specializing in the M a r x i a n field of "natural dialectics." But the Cultural Revolution soon plunged him, with many of his countrymen, into suffering and doubt. In this memoir he tells how his face was painted black as a sign of humiliation at a mass-criticism meeting. He also spent t w o years at manual labor in a rural "cadre school." Returning to Beijing, he participated in the April Fifth Incident of 1976, when crowds of residents publicly mourned the death of Z h o u Enlai. After M a o ' s death, Yan contributed privately to one of the spontaneous publications of the Democracy Wall movement, in 1 9 7 8 - 7 9 , while also attending the official but secret Conference on Theoretical W o r k , which laid the doctrinal groundwork for Deng's reforms. In 1982, Yan left the field of philosophy to become in effect China's first political scientist. He w a s placed in charge of preparatory work for the establishment of a new Institute of Political Science in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. T h e new field was being established as part of the reform program, with the aim of furthering the opening to the West and gaining ideas for more efficient organization of government. With the establishment of the Institute in 1985, Yan became its first director, the youngest head of any C A S S institute. Soon he also became a member of party secretary Z h a o Ziyang's political reform office, which debated and drafted proposals to rationalize the system of government inherited from ix

Mao. Throughout his career as a political scientist, Yan applied his theoretical knowledge to the practical problems of political reform. The 1982 constitution incorporated his proposal that officials should have specified terms of office, and in 1988 the National People's Congress endorsed his idea of a civil service system. Some of his other concepts—a division of powers, federalism, multipartyism—have not been accepted in the People's Republic but may shape China in the future. When the democracy movement broke out in the spring of 1989, Yan encouraged the government to accede to student demands for dialogue. When this effort failed, he sided with the demonstrators and was forced to flee after the crackdown. He now lives in Paris, where he is working on several books and serves as one of the leaders of an exile democratic organization called the Federation for a Democratic China. Yan is a thinker more than an activist, more apt to ask questions than give orders. His memoir shows that in the midst of political action he led an interior life that was in some ways more real to him. The autobiography is thus an account not of his experiences but of the development of his ideas. When it was published in China on the eve of the 1989 events, he intended it as a record of an odyssey that he believed all Chinese would have to make, from ideology to science. (He uses the terms "philosophy" and "theology" to refer to aspects of what we call "ideology.") But in subsequent editions, including this one, he has added new material reflecting a further stage in the evolution of his thought, from acceptance of socialism to disillusionment. Yan's central concern is the relations between ideology and dictatorship, and science and democracy. He shares a scientific background and a commitment to democracy with Fang Lizhi, Wang Juntao, Chen Yizi, and other well-known Chinese dissidents. He shares as well their faith in the ability of science to replace ideology as the key to all knowledge, and thus in the ability of science both to explain political behavior and to prescribe political institutions. x

I

Foreword

It might seem paradoxical to speak of a "faith in science"—as Yan did in an essay in 1988—but his memoir makes it clear that this is his attitude. Although he is well read in twentieth-century scientific epistemology, which holds that scientific knowledge is provisional and shifting, when he and his colleagues apply the idea of science to their own society and politics they seem to hold in view an older image of science as equivalent to reason, and as therefore capable of final solutions to any and all problems of both knowledge and value. Scientists often become democrats in totalitarian situations because they need freedom to do their work—Sakharov comes to mind. To put it in a less utilitarian way, scientists are people who passionately desire to think, and who chafe against restraints on thinking. Chinese democrats, however, have often gone beyond this motive, seeing democracy as not just a necessary condition for doing science but as a valid logical conclusion from a process of scientific reasoning about society. In believing this, they draw on the tradition of the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Conventionally viewed as the beginning of China's democratic revolution, this movement was based on the slogan of "science and democracy." May Fourth scientism remains alive in China. During the spring 1989 movement, someone posted a "new May Fourth manifesto" which referred to democracy as "the spirit of science," while a poster at Beijing University called for a government with science as its "sole guiding ideology." Thus science comes full circle not only to replace, but to serve as, ideology. This is not a formulation Yan uses, but it captures an element of his thought. The extended, reflective essay format of this book allows us to grasp the links among all these ideas better than his other, more focused writings, and better than most other works I know by Chinese democrats. In a 1978 essay that first made him widely known, summarized in Chapter 6, Yan uses the device of fictional time travel to contrast the "court of religion" in seventeenth-century Rome, the "court of reason" in Enlightenment France, and the Foreword

I

xi

"court of practice" in a futuristic China. Galileo, Voltaire, and Deng Xiaoping are the heroes of this piece because each defended the sovereignty of reason against dogmatism. He devotes the longest chapter of the book (Chapter 1 0 ) to a discussion of the conceptual foundations for the scientific study of politics. Here he involves himself in a dialogue with American political scientists, not about China but about the universal issue of the nature of politics and whether it can be studied by methods that are the same as, or analogous to, those of natural science. His training in science and logic enables him to provide a lucid account of this subject. Indeed, Yan is exceptionally cosmopolitan in his reading and reflection. He frequently uses the image of knowledge as a w o r l d , consisting of many beautiful structures and diverse realms. He has much to say about issues ranging from civil service systems to humanism. Western readers will take an interest in his comparison of the Restoration with the Cultural Revolution and of medieval scholasticism with M a o i s m , in his interpretation of Machiavelli's view of human nature, and in his perceptions of various Western cultural heroes. Readers will also admire the clarity with which he argues that values like humanism and democracy are cultural univ e r s a l . His courage in doing so in the midst of campaigns against foreign cultural influences may even inspire us to rethink the timorous cultural relativism that is widespread in the West. As a patriot, scientist, political scientist, and historian—he and his wife, G a o G a o , have written an important history of the Cultural Revolution—Yan is profoundly informative on the complicated question of what ails China politically. In searching for ways to reform the system, he has thought hard about its fundamental problems, which he sees as both cultural and institutional. Thus his reflections offer a succinct analysis of what has made M a o i s m and Dengism distinctive as regimes. Yan's writings in exile, comprising Chapters 2 8 - 3 2 of the present b o o k , are of special interest in that they present his views after he was freed from the constraints of writing within the communist sysxii

I

Foreword

tem, and as he grappled with the emotional and intellectual challenges of exile. In one of these pieces, an imaginary conversation between M a o and Deng, he displays his talent for political fiction and a deft sense of humor. T h e last text in the volume gives his mature thoughts on the right kind of political system for China, still with the optimism which seems to f l o w from his belief that politics has its ultimate foundation in reason. If one believes that China is moving toward democracy, Yan's representativeness as a Chinese democratic thinker makes him important for an international readership. Even those w h o do not think his ideas will prevail should take an interest in his insights into totalitarianism and into politics in general, and will enjoy seeing h o w Western values and concepts have struck the mind of a thoughtful Chinese. Andrew J . Nathan N e w York City M a r c h 1992

Foreword

I

xiii

PRÉFACÉ

to the English Edition

On June iz, 1989, the Beijing municipal government and the headquarters of the Martial Law Armed Forces jointly issued an announcement declaring the Capital Union of Intellectuals and three other organizations in Beijing "illegal." The leaders of these organizations, it stated, must surrender themselves immediately or they would be apprehended and "brought to justice according to law." That same day at dusk I learned from a radio broadcast that Yang Shangkun, the so-called head of state of China, had given orders for Fang Lizhi, Yan Jiaqi, and Bao Zunxin to be arrested and wanted them executed. Bao Zunxin and I were the chief conveners of the Capital Union of Intellectuals. Faced with the prospect of pursuit and capture by the dictatorial government of mainland China, I had no choice but to go into hiding. At that time I began to feel that neither science nor reason could help me solve this problem: a death sentence awaited me. Prior to fleeing Beijing, I had just finished compiling a collection of the articles I had published over the years. M y wife, Gao Gao, and I had completed our revisions for the second edition of the History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution,

and my intellectual auto-

biography had just been published by the People's Press of Hunan province. I had a premonition that the publication of this autobiography would somehow mark a "period"—a full stop—in my life. On June 18 I spent a seemingly endless black night on a deserted island in south China. On the next day I finally eluded capture by the dictatorial Chinese government. While in exile I have added four chapters to this autobiographical narrative, which appear as chapters 7, 15, 19, and 20. The XV

remainder of the chapters are unchanged from those in the original manuscript, completed at the end of 1988. I believe in science, which is also to believe in the power of reason, wisdom, and the intellect. In this world there is no concrete problem that cannot be solved by relying on reason and the intellect. I am not a committed follower of any religion, but all the same I believe devoutly in " G o d . " I find that one's inner voice—the call of a person's conscience—is precisely the voice of God. By experiencing the indeterminate and unpredictable changes presented in life, I have come to understand that one's fate is not predestined. Rather, a person's future depends on his ability to listen attentively to his inner voice and on how he uses his own intelligence. That inner voice tells a person what he should or should not do, while intellect tells him how to do it. Today as I re-read the intellectual autobiography I wrote several years ago, I feel it is not inaccurate to say that this autobiography is a record, more or less, of the road that I have traveled in accordance with my intellect, under the guidance of God. Paris March 2 8 , 1 9 9 0

xvi

I Preface to the English Edition

PRÉFACÉ

to the First Edition

The sum total of all that is known, comprehended, imagined, and believed by mankind constitutes a vast and boundless world. In any given period the known material world is limited. Similarly, at any given time the world of thought is also limited. In prehistoric times the world of thought consisted of little more than a few crude thatched huts and cottages, but today in the twentieth century, besides the numerous single-story and multistory dwellings existing in it, the world of thought is dominated by countless large mansions of dazzling brilliance and magnificent splendor that loom as gigantic constructs, one after another. The diversity and beauty of their exteriors, the complexity and extravagance of their internal structures, the intricacy and charm of their environs and arrangement will make any new visitor to these mansions feel amazed and inspired. Within the world of thought are many different domains, and of these science constitutes the most standardized realm. But besides science, religious thought, ethical thought, and artistic thought— products of imagination and fantasy—fill the world of thought. I'm fond of the idea proposed by Y u Guangyuan, a well-known Chinese philosopher, that each discipline of science can be likened to a nation state. These disciplines can then be differentiated as strong states and weak states, and as neighboring states and non-neighboring states. The state of biology and the state of anthropology are neighboring states. The state of jurisprudence and the state of political science lie very close to one another. However, the state of astronomy and the state of psychology, separated by a vast ocean, have yet to develop any diplomatic contacts. The world of thought, like the actual material world in which we xvii

live, reveals much diversity of form. The states making up the world of thought very seldom adopt a unitary system. The majority of them operate as a federal system or federation. For example, mathematics is a federation composed of various member nations, including number theory, linear algebra, differential equations, set theory, topology, functional analysis, cybernetics, and systems theory. Similarly, comparative government, public administration, theories of international relations, political psychology, and so on form the federation of political science. Roaming through these states, I discovered something peculiar— the concept of the minority submitting to the majority does not exist among them; there is no democracy to speak of. Rather than republics, all these states are kingdoms, and their common watchword is this: To respect science: one must always submit to the truth. To realize democracy: one may often be required to tolerate mistakes. This intellectual autobiography is an up-to-date account of my experiences in the world of thought. As such, it is merely a brief record of the travels I have made through several realms in the world of thought. Just as the scope of one's activities is limited in the physical world, so it is for one's activities in the mental world. In the physical world I have crossed the great oceans from Asia to North America, South America, and western Europe. In the world of thought I have been fortunate enough to have traveled through the realms of science, philosophy, literature, and political science. Beijing April 1989

xviii

I Preface to the First Edition

Toward a Democratic China

I The Starting Point of New Advances in Science

W h e n I left t h e r e a l m o f s c i e n c e t o e n t e r t h e r e a l m o f p h i l o s o p h y , I w a s t w e n t y - t w o y e a r s o f a g e . In S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 4 , s h o r t l y after g r a d u a t i n g f r o m the Chinese University of Science and Techn o l o g y , 1 I g a i n e d a d m i s s i o n t o t h e P h i l o s o p h y Institute o f t h e C h i nese A c a d e m y o f S c i e n c e s 2 as a g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t u n d e r Y u G u a n g 1. A prestigious training center for many of China's best scientists. Administered by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese University of Science and Technology w a s initially located in Beijing before being relocated to Hefei, in Anhui province, in 1963. In organization and curriculum, it w a s modeled after Soviet technical institutions. Yan was enrolled in a five-year program in the department of applied mathematics and computer science, where he specialized in theoretical physics with a subspecialization in elementary particle theory. [Notes, unless otherwise indicated, are by the translators.] 2. T h e Philosophy Institute has always been regarded as one of the most elitist institutions in Communist China because the most authoritative theoreticians for the regime's Marxist-Maoist ideology have been trained and employed there. Before the Cultural Revolution only the best and brightest

3

yuan 3 and Gong Yuzhi. 4 In the realm of science I had discovered that radiant and enchanting sunlight was everywhere, but in the realm of philosophy the weather changed often. Sometimes the sky was clear and boundless; at other times it w a s enveloped in fog and haze. In the realm of science truth and falsehood have clearly demarcated boundaries. When a scientific theory cannot explain newly discovered facts, the original theory must be revised. This w a s the nature of the basic concepts of science I had learned while studying at the Chinese University of Science and Technology between 1959 and 1964. In the late nineteenth century, a new theory of physics— the theory of relativity—had come into being when classical theo-

students, based on intellectual and political criteria, could gain admission to this institute. From its founding in 1950 until 1977, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, China's premier research institution, included in its four divisions the various disciplines of the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Following M a o Zedong's death in 1976, in a major reorganization and repudiation of the Soviet model after which most Chinese institutions of higher learning and research were patterned, the Division of Philosophy and Social Sciences split off from the parent academy. This division, inclusive of the humanities and social sciences (except for psychology), became the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, administered by the Central Committee and the Central Propaganda Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party. 3. Yu Guangyuan (b. 1915), a leading Marxist theorist and party official. After graduating from National Qinghua University in physics in 1936, he joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1937 and over the years has distinguished himself in a number of prominent posts. In the 1950s and 1960s he was vice chairman of the National Science and Technology Commission and a vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. 4. Gong Yuzhi later became deputy minister of the Central Propaganda Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, from which post he was dismissed following the June 1989 suppression in Beijing.

4

I Toward a Democratic

China

ries of physics based on Newtonian mechanics could no longer explain newly discovered facts. Prior to the 1860s, because of the achievements of classical physics, physicists were firmly convinced that there would be no further major developments in theoretical physics. They believed that what work remained would amount to little more than making measurements with greater accuracy, "several places beyond the decimal point." On New Year's Day, 1900, the British physicist Thomson 5 remarked in a speech that everything was clear in the firmament of physics except for two remaining "black clouds." In other words, in the great hall of science that had been constructed, all that was needed was for later generations of physicists to undertake some scattered repair work. Of the two black clouds that Thomson mentioned, one was related to the Michelson-Morley experiment 6 while the other had to do with "black body radiation." In classical physics the velocity of a moving object is related to the velocity of the observer. Sounds emitted from the same source have different speeds depending on whether they are measured on the ground or from an airplane. But Michelson and Morley proved experimentally that the speed of light emitted from a single source will yield the same measurement whether the observer is moving or not. In other words, the speed of light is unrelated to the movement of the source or the observer. Because classical physics could not explain the Michelson-Morley experiment, Einstein ventured beyond the limits of classical physics 5. Sir Joseph John Thomson (1856-1940), a British physicist and mathematician considered to be one of the founders of modern nuclear physics. Thomson was awarded the Nobel Prize in r9o6. 6. The experiment was first performed in 1881. Albert Abraham Michelson (1852-1931), a German-born American physicist, was the founding chairman of the physics department at the University of Chicago and, in 1907, the first American to be awarded the Nobel Prize in science. Edward Williams Morley (1838-1923) was an American chemist and physicist.

The Starting Point of New Advances in Science

I 5

to take an utterly new approach in considering the problem. Einstein held that the concepts of absolute time and absolute space of classical physics are figments of the imagination—constructs of metaphysics rather than the results of observation and experiment. He assumed that the speed of light is constant, not affected by the velocity of the source or the observer, and went on from there to create the theory of relativity, discarding the ideas of absolute time and absolute space. The new concept of relativity was greeted with alarm by some, such as the Dutch physicist Lorentz, 7 who lamented, "The propositions of today flatly contradict those of yesterday. This is an era without standards of truth or knowledge of science. I deeply regret that I did not die five years before these conflicts emerged." But in fact the success of the theory of relativity arose out of the inadequacy of the preceding theory to explain newly discovered facts. This was not a breakdown of science, but a point of departure for its further development. Upon entering the realm of philosophy, what I witnessed was precisely the opposite of what had taken place in science. In 1964 the philosophical community in China was engaged in heated debate over the principles of "one dividing into two" and "two uniting into one." The central issue was whether "two uniting into one" could encapsulate the law of the unity of opposites in Marxist philosophy. Some people drew on the ancient philosophers Zhu Xi 8 and Fang Yizhi 9 to show that "one dividing into two" and "two uniting into one" were both expressions of the law of the unity of opposites. Others cited the writings of M a r x , Engels, Lenin, and Stalin as evidence that "two uniting into one" expresses the fundamental law of Marxist dialectic. Still others refuted them with evi-

7. Hendrik Antoon Lorentz (1853-1928). [Author's

note]

8. Zhu Xi (1130-1200), philosopher and educator of the Southern Song period. [Author's

note]

9. Fang Yizhi ( 1 6 1 1 - 7 1 ) , a leading thinker in the transitional period between the Ming and Qing dynasties. [Author's

6

I Toward a Democratic

China

note]

dence from the same thinkers, holding that only "one dividing into two" could express that fundamental law. Of course, there were also those who drew extensively on classical sources to produce reams of verbiage arguing that "one dividing into two" and "two uniting into one" both express differing tendencies or characteristics of the law of the unity of opposites, but that neither could give an adequate description of this law. I was contemplating switching fields from the natural sciences to philosophy at the time, but the articles by both sides irritated me with their repetitive use of the numbers "one, two, one" and "two, one, two." I felt that these articles were little more than philosophical exercises broadcast over a loudspeaker system. 10 Was "one dividing into two" the truth and "two uniting into one" an absurdity, or was it the other way around? The problem itself was muddled and unscientific. Since it was impossible to determine which side was right by logical deduction, and since neither experimentation nor experience could determine the truth of the matter, each side had to pull out suitable classical references to prove itself correct. I could not help thinking of the biblical commentators described by Montesquieu 1 1 in his book Persian Letters: These writers do not seek in the Bible for what they ought to believe, but for what they believe already. They are in no wise constrained to treat the Bible as a scripture that holds teachings they can learn from. Instead it is for them a book that can lend authority to their own opinions. Owing to this, they distort the meaning of the entire book by breaking it down to 10. A sarcastic reference to the group calisthenics held every morning and afternoon in work places, schools, and even neighborhoods, always accompanied by marching music and shrill cadence calls broadcast over loudspeakers. 11. Montesquieu (1689-1755), a French thinker and legal scholar of the Enlightenment period. His main works include Persian Letters,

On the

Causes of the Rise and Fall of Rome, and Spirit of Laws. [Author's

note]

The Starting Point of New Advances

in Science

I 7

chapter and verse. The men of various sects storm onto this plot of ground like the armies of Armageddon. This is a battleground where opposing nations meet. Some men throw themselves into headlong charges and others are skirmishers; the battle is fought in a thousand guises. 1 2 Only after entering the realm of philosophy did I notice that this unproductive and purely formal controversy reflected a special feature of Chinese politics: once a person is declared to be "anti-Marxist," he will inevitably be deprived of power and position. Not long after this debate, the periodicals brought the weight of public criticism to bear, specifically indicting Yang Xianzhen, 1 3 the proponent of "two uniting into one." Kang Sheng, 14 the theoretical authority at the time, proclaimed that in philosophy "two uniting into one" was in effect to "negate struggle, reconcile with contradictions, and oppose transformation." The issue, he said, was "class struggle in the realm of ideology both within China and outside it." I had left the dazzling sunlight of the realm of science only to find myself under the gloomy skies of the realm of philosophy. M y entry into the realm of philosophy was related to two supposedly philosophical articles I had published while I was in col-

12. Montesquieu, Persian Letters (in Chinese), People's Literature Press, 1958, p. 232. [Author's

note]

13. Yang Xianzhen (b. 1896), a Chinese Marxist philosopher who received his early training in the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s he was president and party secretary of the Higher Party School. 14. Kang Sheng (1898-1975), a longtime ally of Mao Zedong, rose to great ideological and political prominence, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Kang had the distinction of being expelled from the Chinese Communist Party posthumously in 1980, and was demoted from the status of Communist hero to that of criminal with the disinterment and removal of his remains from Babaoshan Cemetery, China's equivalent of Arlington National Cemetery.

8

I Toward a Democratic

China

lege. The first article appeared in the December 1963 issue of the Bulletin of Mathematics,

and it gave precise mathematical interpre-

tations to concepts in philosophy. 1 5 The second, published in People's Daily in 1964, dealt with the relation between "concept" and "existence." 16 In the first article I had analyzed the problem of quadratic curves from the perspective of group motions in a rigid body, affined transformation groups, and projective transformation groups. From today's vantage point, it may be said that this piece contains, to some degree, the sprout of a mutation theory. Its conclusion was that although various types of second-order curves —ellipses, parabolas, hyperbolas—appear to be quite different, in projective geometry there are no essential or qualitative distinctions among them. The distinctions lie only in the differing relations between the ellipse and the line at infinity: the ellipse does not intersect with the line at infinity, the parabola is an ellipse having one intersection with the line at infinity, and the hyperbola is an ellipse having two intersections with the line at infinity. At that time in China, discussions of compromise and reconciliation were not allowed in the realm of philosophy. It was impermissible to obliterate the "qualitative differences" between things, but there I was applying mathematical concepts to proclaim the "fading away of qualitative differences" (as I put it in the final subheading of my article). I wrote the second article to support certain ideas of Wang Ruoshui. 1 7 A discussion had unfolded in People's

15. Yan Jiaqi, "Dialectics of Quadratic Curves," Shuxue

Daily

as to

tongbao

(Bulle-

tin of mathematics), no. iz, December 1963. [Author's note] 16. Yan Jiaqi, "Natural Objects and Man-made Objects," People's

Daily,

March 26,1964. [Author's note] 17. Wang Ruoshui, a young philosopher at the time, stimulated debate with his article " T h e Philosophy of Tables," published under the name of Ruoshui (People's Daily, July 1 6 , 1 9 6 3 ) . Later Wang became well known as

The Starting Point of New Advances in Science

I9

whether the idea "table" originated before or after the existence of tables. M y conclusion was that ideas of natural objects have an origin in the existence of the objects, while ideas of man-made objects come before the existence of the objects. However, there is no unbridgeable gulf between natural and man-made objects. Today, looking back on my earliest philosophical inquiries of twenty-five years ago, I see that in fact I have always adhered to the thesis of "no unbridgeable gulfs." During my five years at the Chinese University of Science and Technology, the well-known mathematician Guan Zhaozhi 1 8 had taught mathematics to our class, and Zhang Zongsui, a distinguished physicist, 19 was responsible for the specialization in theoretical physics. Guan Zhaozhi was devoted to mathematical dialectics, and he was fond of using the language of dialectical method to explain precise mathematical concepts. This allowed us to experience a kind of satisfaction in ambiguity and speciousness. In contrast, Zhang Zongsui was opposed to this sort of thing. He was always contemptuous of any kind of muddleheaded game played with philosophical concepts. As it turned out, because I had published two philosophical articles while still in college, I voluntarily gave up my opportunity and

an advocate of humanism. He was removed from his position as deputy editor-in-chief of People's

Daily

in the mid-1980s during the campaign

against "spiritual pollution." 18. Guan Zhaozhi, one of China's most accomplished mathematicians, was educated in Europe and specialized in functional analysis and applied math. He also worked on defense projects. 19. Zhang Zongsui ^ 9 1 5 - 6 9 ) went to Great Britain in 1936 to study physics and later worked in England and the United States. He returned to China in 1948 and joined the Chinese Academy of Sciences, where he was a member of its academic board and head of the physics section in the Institute of Mathematics. He was distinguished in quantum field theory and statistical physics.

10

I Toward a Democratic

China

qualifications to conduct scientific exploration in the newest field of twentieth-century science—elementary particle theory. To this day I still have not forgotten the attitude and words of Professor Zhang Zongsui expressing his disappointment at my entrance into the realm of philosophy. 20

20. In China theoretical physics is often regarded as the most prestigious field of modern science. When Yan was a student of physics, only two scientists of Chinese descent had won the Nobel Prize in physics, C. N . Yang and T. D. Lee of Columbia University, whose work on nuclear parity was honored in 1956. Both Yang and Lee had received their earlier training in China, and the Chinese scientific community was acutely aware of the need to train new scientists who would rise to equal prominence while remaining in China. The Starting Point of New Advances in Science

I n

2 The Dusk of Philosophy

In September of 19641 entered the Philosophy Institute as a graduate student specializing in natural dialectics. The qualifying test for admission required prospective students to write a critique of an article entitled "The Dusk of Philosophy," by a Ms. N . , a reporter for the Polish magazine Politics Weekly. This article was an account of an interview in 1961 with Leopold Infeld. 1 Speaking of the subject matter of philosophy, Infeld remarked that philosophy once studied many kinds of problems that "today have become problems for physics." He believed that "in the era of somnolence before there was science, philosophy was still significant." However, "philosophy consisted of a set of problems whose explanations depended on assumptions grounded in 'faith.' In philosophy, the sack can never be full because over time it has parcelled out parts of itself, and those pieces have become independent sciences. Today the sack is empty, or nearly so. Time, space, matter, and the

1. Leopold Infeld (b. 1898) was a Polish theoretical physicist who had worked with Einstein at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and coauthored with Einstein a book entitled The Evolution

of Physics. Infeld

returned to Poland in 1950 and was a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences. [Author's

12

note]

atom are all domains now occupied by physics." When the interviewer, N . , mentioned her reading of Latier's Thoughts on Art, she remarked that looking at such a hodgepodge of concepts from a scientific perspective engendered a certain specious intoxication as well as skepticism. Infeld replied that statements about the universe and the atom by some philosophers "are nothing but cheap humbug. Physics has step by step taken the place of metaphysics.1

The

endeavor to replace religious fervor with the pleasure that.comes from the pursuit of understanding is a victory of reason, and it is something people can take pride in. But the easily gained intoxications of metaphysics are fleeting and deceptive." 3 Although I did not share the belief that the development of philosophy had already culminated, I could not easily forget the views expressed by Infeld. In the realm of science each discipline has its own explicit area of research. But when I entered the realm of philosophy and witnessed people engaged in heated debate over "one dividing into two" and "two uniting into one," what began to perplex me was the question of what, after all, was the subject matter of philosophy. Early analytical philosophy held that all meaningful propositions can be divided into two categories. One category consists of propositions whose truth or falsehood can be demonstrated by the use of logic or mathematics. The other category consists of propositions that can be verified by experience or experiment. Truth of the first type is termed "analytical truth" while that of the second type is termed "empirical truth." Thus early analytical philosophy demarcated its own research territory: while the aim of specialized sciences is the exploration of experimental truth, the mission of philosophy is to

2. The words "physics" and "metaphysics" appear in English in the original text. 3. Infeld, "The Dusk of Philosophy—Or the Joy of Understanding Without the Palpitations of Metaphysics," Politics Weekly (Poland), no. 22, 1961. [Author's note] The Dusk of Philosophy

I 13

state analytical truths. 4 But if the truth or falsehood of a proposition cannot be determined by the application of logic or mathematics or by appealing to experience or experiment, then it belongs to the category of "meaningless propositions." I believe the kind of metaphysics that Infeld referred to was not metaphysics as it was then understood in China—that is, the observation of problems in an isolated, static, and biased manner. Rather, he was pointing to the category of problems that remained "post physics"—in other words, issues not provable by any means or refutable by any means, and therefore equivocal and specious. I discovered that Chinese philosophy in the 1960s did not delineate the boundaries of its own research at all. To some people philosophy was the science of sciences—the epitome and summation of the social sciences and natural sciences. To others philosophy was a deliberately mystifying subject that only contemplated and discussed problems that remain unprovable and irrefutable, equivocal and specious. To still others philosophy was the knowledge that puts one in command of almost any subject: there was not only a "philosophy for playing ping-pong" but also a "philosophy for selling watermelon." After entering the realm of philosophy from that of science, I was determined not to give up a resolute faith in science. I was unwilling to concoct the kind of games involving philosophical concepts that would allow people to obtain a specious satisfaction or lead them into stupefaction. Although I did not accept Infeld's views regarding the "dusk of philosophy," after reading that article I did become a staunch opponent of the kind of sophistical philosophy that specializes in fabricating speciousness and equivocation.

4. Since the 1950s and 1960s analytical philosophy no longer recognizes an unbridgeable gulf between these two categories of propositions. Thus it becomes more difficult to strictly separate the domains of research in philosophy from those of the specialized sciences. [Author's note]

14

I Toward a Democratic

China

3 Entering the Realm of Theology

In the spring of 1966, the natural dialectics section of the Philosophy Institute where I worked set up a "spot," that is, a location aimed at "linking philosophical doctrines with reality," in Xuxing village in Tong Xian, a periurban county of Beijing. Several of my colleagues and I were assigned to the spot to engage in physical labor. There we had to construct our housing with our own hands. This practice was known at the time as "rolling in the mud," meaning that researchers in philosophy were required to roll in the mud of the countryside in order to turn "scholastic" philosophy into a philosophy useful to workers and peasants. But on May 30, 1966, we received a sudden and unexpected notice summoning all those who had come to roll in the mud at the "spot" to return to Beijing immediately to participate in the Great Cultural Revolution. That evening we set up several one-thousandwatt light bulbs in the open air and worked through the night to paint the doors and windows of our newly finished buildings. At dawn we boarded a bus and hurried back to the Philosophy Institute in Beijing. On May 31 all the personnel of the Institute attended a meeting that lasted all night. Exposés, criticisms, denunciations, and confessions filled the hours—a soul-stirring time. At daybreak the lead15

ership structure of the Institute was broken up following the exposure of a "three-family village" headed by the party branch secretary. 1 From that day on I found myself ejected from the realm of philosophy into the realm of theology. The colors, customs, and norms of the realm of theology posed a startling contrast to those of the realm of science. In the realm of theology the human brain no longer functioned as the organ of thinking. Instead, what everyone had to do was look up into the sky with mouths wide open, listen to the truth preached by the Great Leader and his "closest comrade-in-arms," 2 and obey every word they said. In this realm anyone who unintentionally revealed his true thoughts, however slightly, ran the risk of immediately being labeled a "counterrevolutionary." So while lies, boasts, idle words, and polite talk flooded the realm, one's mouth was reduced to but a single function—that of eating. N o longer able to express their own thoughts and ideas, people in the realm of theology could only ask for salvation "with much awe and trepidation," while "revolution broke out" in the depths of every soul. "Asking for instructions in the morning and submitting reports in the evening" was the most rudimentary ceremony for saving the soul. The Great Cultural Revolution was a gigantic storm engulfing almost everyone. Red Guards, Red quotations, Red seas, 3 and religious fanaticism of an extreme character spread all over the country. It hardly mattered if a person did not want to be bothered with politics, because politics would nevertheless come to bother him. In such circumstances, I did my utmost to comprehend what was

i. A term initially coined to refer to Wu Han, a former vice mayor of Beijing, and his associates Deng Tuo and Liao Mosha, coauthors of a newspaper satire, who had become the earliest targets of criticism in the Cultural Revolution. z. Chairman Mao Zedong and Vice Chairman Lin Biao, respectively. 3. A reference to the ubiquitous slogans, posters, banners, and huge assemblages of people. 16

I Toward a Democratic China

occurring in the world around me, but real understanding could hardly be found when it was impossible for people to have an honest intellectual interchange. In November 1966 I went to Qinghua University to read the bigcharacter posters that had been plastered on its campus. I saw one entitled "An Open Letter to Comrade Lin Biao," signed by Yilin Dixi. What was astonishing was that at the height of the Great Cultural Revolution someone would have the courage to criticize the closest "comrade-in-arms" of the Great Leader and reprove one of his major speeches as being "seriously mistaken in several key points." Citing a passage from Stalin's On Opposing Factions, Yilin Dixi asserted that Stalin's attitude toward Lenin and Leninism was correct while that of Trotsky and others was wrong. Stalin had not agreed with the view that Lenin, as a theoretician, was superior to Engels or Marx. Lin Biao, on the other hand, had maintained that Chairman Mao was much greater than M a r x , Engels, Lenin, or Stalin. Yilin Dixi wrote in the "Open Letter" that this assertion was untenable because it disregarded the course of historical development and was liable to lead to heretical notions concerning Mao Zedong Thought. Yilin Dixi also attacked the statements by Lin Biao that "Das Kapital was relevant only to the social laws of capitalism" and that "among all the classical works of Marxism-Leninism, the works of M a o Zedong should be studied 99 percent of the time." In conclusion, the "Open Letter" said that it hoped the "respected and beloved Comrade Lin Biao" would, in particular, immerse himself in the movement. "Otherwise, in time the danger would present itself of Lin Biao himself being pushed to the side, the dialectic of history being inexorable." 4 This poster reflected the

4. See "Jianjue dadao zichan jieji fandong luxian de changkuang fanpu" (Resolutely defeat the furious counteroffensive of the bourgeois reactionary line), edited and printed (lead stencil) by the M a o Zedong Thought Red Guards and M a o Zedong Red Detachment of the Chinese People's University. [Author's note] Entering the Realm of Theology

I 17

resentment felt by many people against Lin Biao and it aroused in them a common, heartfelt response. Yet, after reading the "Open Letter," they could only go home to ponder it in silence, since everyone faced the omnipresent danger of suddenly being accused of being a "counterrevolutionary." The day after I read that poster at Qinghua University, I walked to the New China bookstore on Wangfujing Avenue to buy a copy of Stalin's On Opposing Factions. Unable to find it, I walked over to the bookstores in Xidan, several kilometers to the west, but still could not find it. Eventually I managed to buy a copy of the book at the New China bookstore in Gongzhu Fen, an area I had frequented as a college student. When I was attending the Chinese University of Science and Technology, not a single student would have been interested in a book like Stalin's On Opposing

Factions,

even if one's classes on politics required the reading of Stalin's works. In those days I had wholeheartedly wanted to become a scientist like Newton or Einstein. After graduation from college my sole ambition was to achieve something in philosophical research. But in mid and late November of 1966, to my own surprise, I found myself reading On Opposing Factions as if in a state of intoxication. In the cultural desert of the Cultural Revolution, when there were no books other than Mao Zedong's to read, Stalin's On Opposing Factions quite unexpectedly opened for me a vista onto the world. In the past I had been faintly aware of a man called Trotsky from the Soviet Union. By reading Stalin I learned that Trotsky had been called an ultraleftist—that is, "someone who veiled his opportunism in 'leftist' and the most revolutionary terms." When I read the passage of Stalin stating that "using a leftist mask to conceal opportunistic behavior" was "the most obvious characteristic of the opposing factions" within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union after the seizure of power, I began to be aware that everything that was then occurring in China could probably be comprehended from a knowledge of the history of the Soviet Communist Party and of the world. 18

I Toward a Democratic China

While reading On Opposing Factions, I copied excerpts from Stalin's critique of Trotsky's ultraleftism and pseudorevolution onto a few dozen cards which I left in my desk at the office. On December 20, 1966, my office was searched for incriminating materials during a struggle between two factions, and the entire desk was carried off. I became extremely anxious that if someone discovered my collection of quotations from Stalin critical of the ultraleft, they might be seen as evidence of counterrevolutionary activity. But my desk was finally recovered with the help of colleagues from the Philosophy Institute, and that day became a small turning point for me. From then on, I ceased copying passages onto cards so as not to leave behind anything in my handwriting. Also, I began to turn my attention to collecting materials on the Cultural Revolution, in both mimeographed and printed form, from everywhere in China. At that time a "great revolutionary linking up" 5 was occurring throughout China. Since I was of the opinion that materials on the Cultural Revolution should be collected from across the country, and since the section of the Philosophy Institute to which I belonged had been dissolved by mid-January of 1967, with some people being accused of opposing the "Cultural Revolution Small Group of the Party Center," I decided to participate in the "great linking up." Unable to bid farewell to colleagues and friends, I alone boarded a southbound train for Guangzhou.6 On the train, every carriage was filled up to two to three times the normal capacity. People crowded the aisles and sat on tea tables, seat backs, and the overhead luggage racks. Bodies were even to be found reclined beneath the bench seats. To get to the rest room at the end of the carriage, it was necessary to step over peo5. Extensive free travel was available during this phase of the Cultural Revolution, so that Red Guard and radical groups in different parts of the country could learn from each other's "revolutionary experiences." 6. I.e., Canton, the capital of the southern province of Guangdong, some thirty-five hours by express train from Beijing. Entering

the Realm of Theology

I 19

pie's shoulders, and to get on and off the train, one had to go through the windows. Upon arrival in Guangzhou I discovered that I was a stranger in a strange l a n d . 7 1 finally located the Guangdong (Provincial) Institute of Philosophy, where I found a place to stay. But because there was no bed available, I had to sleep on straw mats laid down upon a concrete floor. Who would have thought that on that very night someone from the Philosophy Institute in Beijing would come to my room demanding that I return to Beijing to submit to an investigation! Thus I had a very short sojourn in Guangzhou, although I still managed to collect a good deal of materials relating to the Cultural Revolution from many places. I also stopped in Changsha City 8 for a few days before returning to Beijing. Back in Beijing, I found a mimeographed copy of Premier Zhou Enlai's speech of February 1 7 , 1967. Reading it, I was moved to tears. I cried for the premier's powerlessness. I cried for all the suffering wrought by the Cultural Revolution, and for the inability of people to control their own fate. I remember that I was summoned to the Philosophy Institute, located on Jianguomen Avenue, on the day I read Zhou Enlai's speech. Several dozen people were waiting for me to arrive so that they could begin a meeting in which I would be compelled to stand up in front of everyone and offer a self-criticism and confession. I did not feel frightened at the time. I thought that since even Premier

7. Cantonese, the local dialect of Guangdong province, is almost unintelligible to people from other parts of China. Yan is a native of Wujin county in Jiangsu province, near Shanghai on the east central coast of China. 8. On the Beijing-Guangzhou rail line, Changsha is the capital of Hunan province, where M a o Zedong had been politically active early in his career.

20

I Toward a Democratic

China

Zhou Enlai and Marshall Chen Yi 9 had suffered in this manner, it mattered little what happened to me. During the meeting I recounted how I had left Beijing, how I had looked for a place to stay in Guangzhou, and how I had been unable to find the city's Yuexiu Hill, a famous scenic lookout, even when I happened to be quite near it. I also recounted how I had lost my money purse in Changsha and the ensuing experience of borrowing money from the Machinery Bureau of Hunan Province. 10 M y accounts at the meeting touched off roars of laughter throughout the room, and I laughed along too. However, it was impermissible to laugh at such a solemn occasion. I recall that someone brought into the room a big bottle of black ink, and using a brush pen, painted my face black. In this way the solemn atmosphere of the assembly hall was restored.

9. Marshall Chen Yi (1898-1971), legendary commander of the New Fourth Army in the war against Japan, was the mayor of Shanghai in the early 1950s and China's foreign minister when his persecution began. 10. In 1967, without any personal identification papers whatsoever, I borrowed a sum of money (approximately 20 yuan R M B [about $15 US, or one-fourth to one-fifth of his monthly income]) from the reception station of the Hunan Provincial Machinery Bureau. As soon as I returned to Beijing, I repaid the loan through the postal office and saved the receipt. In 1969 the Philosophy Institute received a notice requesting repayment of the loan, and I presented my receipt for the remittance. During the "linking up" period of the Cultural Revolution, incidents of borrowing money were very common, and sometimes there were no ways to find the "borrowers." [Author's note]

Entering the Realm of Theology

I 21

4 Roaming the World of the Past

Because I entered the realm of theology from the realm of science, passing through the realm of philosophy along the way, I had maintained my belief in science. Bertrand Russell once wrote, "Philosophy, as I shall understand the word, is something intermediate between theology and science. Like theology, it consists of speculations on matters as to which definite knowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but, like science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or that of revelation. All definite knowledge—so I should contend—belongs to science; all dogma as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology. But between theology and science there is a no man's land, exposed to attack from both sides; this no man's land is philosophy." 1 In fact, Chinese philosophy on the eve of the Cultural Revolution had appealed to "authority" more than to "human reason." Philosophy already smacked of theology. During the Cultural Revolution everything in China depended on appeals to the authority of "the Great Leader and his closest comrade-in-arms," and i. Bertrand Russell, History

of Western Philosophy

mercial Press, 1963, vol. 1, p. 1 1 . [Author's

22

note]

(in Chinese), Com-

because of this I wasn't much surprised by anything that happened at the time. I tried to observe the world around me with the attitude of a scientific researcher. In science initially incomprehensible phenomena can be made comprehensible; all "irrational" phenomena can be understood by applying reason. Faith, authority, worship, even fanaticism can be made the objects of scientific study. I wished to understand the real world, but I found that I lacked sufficient knowledge of human history. This was because in my high school days, fed up with painstaking memorization, I had pursued an understanding of the external world. Subjects such as Chinese language, history, geography, and politics had left little impression on me. During the raging tide of the Cultural Revolution, historical knowledge could only be absorbed from the works of Marx and Engels, and from Stalin's On Opposing Factions. But the works of Marx and Lenin which I read and studied while in the realm of theology led me to appreciate the importance of history and to become aware of many historical figures and events that, in the past, would never have aroused my attention and interest. In these works I also experienced a sobering spirit of rationalism that had all but vanished from the world around me. In the realm of theology people were unable to have honest intellectual exchanges; it was impossible to carry on a frank dialogue straight from the heart. Under such circumstances I traveled the length and breadth of the world of the past and held my own dialogues, which were friendly and enthusiastic, with figures from the past. I called on ancient Rome's Caesar; Macedonia's Alexander; Spain's Charles I; Great Britain's Cromwell, Palmerston, and Churchill; France's Louis XIV; Germany's Bismarck; the United States' Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt; China's Ying Zheng, Li Shimin, and Sun Yat-sen; and India's Ghandi. I met with Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Kang Youwei, and Liang Qichao, among oth-

Roaming the World of the Past

I 23

ers. At that time in China people had a very difficult time borrowing books from libraries, so I read books borrowed from Guo Tuo, Ru Xin, 2 Yin Da, Gao Dichen, Zhu Jingxia, and others associated with the Division of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. While the division was conducting the intense " M a y 16th investigation and ferreting o u t , " 3 1 was able to borrow a multivolume History of the World from Zhu Jingxia at the library of the academy's Institute of Literature. In this way, while the world around me was caught up in tempestuous change, I maintained a peculiar tranquility in my innermost being. On one hand, I was collecting Red Guard tabloids and other Cultural Revolution materials wherever I could find them, while on the other hand I roamed the world of the past. In my reading of world history I gained an understanding of Martin Luther's Reformation. What amazed me, quite unexpectedly, were certain similarities in form between the actuality of the "revolution" and "rebellion" occurring around me in the realm of theology and the movement associated with the Reformation. In Martin Luther's day, people used the authority of the Bible to repudiate the authority of the pope and the church; in contemporary China people relied on the Quotations of M a o to attack the organs of the party and government. It was sobering to realize, however, that there was a major difference between the two move2. Ru Xin (b. 1 9 3 1 ) graduated in political science f r o m St. John's University in Shanghai in 1948. A f t e r serving as a translator f o r the People's Liberation A r m y and the Communist Party, he w r o t e a thesis on Hegelian philosophy, receiving the candidate degree f r o m the Philosophy Institute, and specialized in Western philosophy, especially Feuerbach, M a r x , and Lenin. Since the late 1980s he has been a vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 3. On M a y 1 6 , 1967, at Mao's instigation, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party reconstituted the original Cultural Revolution Small G r o u p . The M a y 1 6 t h directive, obligating w o r k units to identify "capitalist roaders" and the like, set the course f o r inner party struggles f o r the next several years. 24

I Toward a Democratic

China

merits. With the "authority of faith" replacing the previous faith in authority, the Reformation attacked the whole of the politics of feudal theocracy. But during the Cultural Revolution, with faith in authority substituting for the authority of faith, a modern-day theocratic politics was established in China. Whereas the Reformation led to an advance in history, the Cultural Revolution pulled China backwards. On June 18, 1970, I traveled southward from Beijing to a May Seventh cadre school in X i county, Henan province. 4 During the time I spent in cadre school I continued to roam the world of the intellect. Time and again, on a street in front of the military barracks where our Minggang Cadre School was located, I listened to Professor Wen Xizeng of our Philosophy Institute discussing Machiavelli and the history of political theory. 5 Many people in the Division of Philosophy and Social Sciences were acquainted with the "three principles" of politics: (1) In political struggle there is no honesty to speak of, (2.) Band together with diehard followers, and (3) Be adept at leading the opposition into making mistakes. Only 4. In late 1968, M a y Seventh cadre schools were set up all over China, usually in rural areas, to enable cadres and intellectuals to engage in manual labor and study M a o Zedong Thought. They were based on a May 7, 1966, letter from Mao calling for radical reforms in education, particularly the inclusion of manual labor, but the schools turned out to be places of punishment and persecution for many. 5. Wen Xizeng (b. 1908), a specialist in Western philosophy, graduated from Peking University in philosophy in 1931, received his M . A . in psychology from Yanjing University in 1940, and between 1946 and 1954 studied and taught at the University of Southern California, where his Ph.D. dissertation in philosophy was entitled "The Status of Man in Neo-Confucianism" (1956). Giving up his associate professorship in Far Eastern studies at U S C , Wen returned to China in 1956 to work at the Philosophy Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. He has published many works, among them books on Plato, Bacon, Spinoza, and Bertrand Russell. Roaming

the World of the Past

I 25

after comprehending Machiavelli did I realize that the three principles of politics were, vis-a-vis Machiavellianism, really a minorleague sort of affair. But by comparing history to contemporary reality, I became convinced that everything in practical politics could be comprehended so long as a scientific attitude and scientific methods were applied. In April 1972, after my wife, Gao Gao, and I returned to Beijing from the May Seventh cadre school in Minggang, Henan, I began to conduct systematic research on the history of political theory and the issues posed by the political institutions of different countries. I was still working in the natural dialectics section of the Philosophy Institute at the time. To achieve something in this arena, I collected data on the energy issue, using the knowledge I had acquired at the Chinese University of Science and Technology, and wrote a booklet called Energy, which was published by the Science Publishing House in June 1976. During this period I also completed a draft of a book entitled Problems of Political Systems in Socialist Theory.

26

I Toward a Democratic China

5 On-the-Scene Reporting The April Fifth Movement, 1976

The Tiananmen Square Incident of April 1976 had a major effect on Chinese politics. On Tiananmen Square I breathed the fresh air of science and democracy which had been notably absent in the realm of theology. The people on the square, unconstrained by theological commandments, suddenly felt free to express their personal thoughts and feelings. During the Cultural Revolution, although the lengthy and tedious articles of "great revolutionary criticism" running endlessly in the newspapers and magazines may not have convinced anyone, they did have the effect of separating people intellectually, turning each person into an isolated individual. The great revolutionary criticism thus produced a political atmosphere in which people became doubtful of the attitudes and feelings in their own heart. In addition, the movement to uncover counterrevolutionaries had engendered such a dread of exposure by others that it became totally impossible for people to have frank intellectual exchanges. On Tiananmen Square, however, nearly everyone discovered that they held the same thoughts in common. While the newspapers and broadcasts tried to control public opinion, so that people would continue to be isolated and the truth 27

would not spread, the free dialogue on the square brought the people together and allowed them to sense their own power. In the spring of 1976 public opinion in China was divided into two diametrically opposed camps. On one side were the periodicals and broadcasts under the firm control of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party: Red Flag magazine, for example, with a circulation of ten million, and People's Daily, with a circulation of five million. There was a saying then that "small papers copied the big papers, and big papers copied the two universities." 1 All of them were intent on raising a ceaseless hue and cry about the "counterattack against right deviationism." The other camp of public opinion in China was to be found in the hand-copied poems and elegies at Tiananmen Square. Each had a circulation figure of only one, yet had thousands or even millions of readers. Such was the climate of popular opinion. Although the people did not have printing presses, these poems and elegies spread magically on the strength of their truth alone. With lightning speed they appeared in every little corner of Beijing and everywhere else in China. The people had no newspapers of their own, but on Tiananmen Square and throughout China, by means of flower wreaths, poems, and funeral couplets, they staged a magnificent counterattack against the Cultural Revolution as a whole. In the days leading up to April 5 and shortly thereafter 2 —that is, from March 25 to April 7,1976—I went to Tiananmen Square every day. From April 1 to April 5 , 1 spent the better part of each day on the square, taking photographs and copying poems. On April 5 I

1. " T w o universities" refers to the articles written by the Great Revolutionary Criticism committees of Beijing University and Qinghua University. 2. April 5, 1976, happened to be the date of the annual Qingming festival, a traditional memorial day observed by family and close relatives of the deceased. It was also the first Qingming following the death of the widely revered Premier Zhou Enlai, who had died in January.

28

I Toward a Democratic China

was an eyewitness to the entire course of what was then called the "Tiananmen Counterrevolutionary Incident." On the steps at the east door of the Great Hall of the People, I mingled with the crowd and led them in chanting "Long live the people!" In the midst of the milling crowd I wrote down two poems that were being chanted in unison; one of them was "Salute the Soldier Sons and Daughters of Workers and Peasants." 3 As the parade of demonstrators crossed the square, I pushed my bicycle to the small gray building at the southeast corner of the square. The most compelling figure throughout this entire incident was a slender, bespectacled youth w h o wore a blue Sun Yat-sen suit 4 with a herringbone-patterned shirt visible under the collar. At one point I cautioned this young man to watch out for his own safety. I told him I was recording the mourning observances at Tiananmen and the day's events, and would write down my observations in a book. 5 At around noon that day, clouds of dark smoke rolled over Tiananmen Square from automobiles that had been set on fire. As people massed on the square in greater numbers, I went back to the Philosophy Institute on Jianguomen Avenue. A half hour later I returned home, and soon afterward G a o G a o and I went to the square and joined the ranks of onlookers. At 6:30 p.m. a message boomed from the speakers around the square: "In the past few days an extremely small number of wrongdoers, acting with premeditation and out of their own ulterior motives, have taken advantage of April 5th to create a political incident. In their delusion they are attempting to reverse the overall drive to criticize the revisionist line

3. See Yan Jiaqi et al., Siwu yundong jishi (On-the-scene reports of the April Fifth movement), People's Press, 1979, pp. 85-87. [Author's note] 4. Commonly called a Mao suit or Mao jacket in the West. 5. The actions of this courageous young man who so inspired the author are described in detail in Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi, Zhongguo wenhuadageming shinianshi (Ten-year history of the Chinese Cultural Revolution), Dagong Bao Press (Hong Kong), 1986. On-the-Scene Reporting

I 29

of recalcitrant creeping capitalism and to counterattack the drift toward rightist deviationism." The broadcast demanded immediate action to "strike back resolutely at destructive revolutionary activities." This broadcast was repeated again and again, and the people on the square gradually left. Squads of men in cotton shirts and padded cotton overcoats began moving toward Zhongshan Park, just west of Tiananmen itself, and onto the square. Gathered around the Monument to Revolutionary Martyrs was a large group of people, visible in the dim lamplight, who were reading and copying the poems posted there. Those at the north of the monument were reciting the poem "Farewell" repeatedly. At 9:15 p.m. I left the square and rode home by bicycle. The next day I learned that if I had put off my departure by just fifteen minutes, I would have been arrested along with the other innocent people who had remained in the square. In September 1976 Mao Zedong passed away. Soon afterward Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and several others were placed under arrest. The movement to criticize the Gang of Four was underway in China. From November 1976 to the end of 1977, I interviewed many participants in the Tiananmen Incident but was never able to find the bespectacled youth who had played such a crucial role on April 5. This young man has never given newspaper interviews or otherwise revealed himself to the public eye. Early in 1978 I wrote an eighty-thousand-word draft of the book On-the-Scene Reports of the April Fifth Movement, which included detailed accounts of the events I had witnessed throughout the day on April 5, as well as the two poems I had copied down on the steps of the Great Hall of the People. In April 1978 I sent the draft to the People's Press, where an editor in the editor-in-chief's office told me that her press would not accept a book about this "counterrevolutionary" incident. At the same time, she informed the political editorial office of the People's Press about the manuscript. In November 1978 I received, quite unexpectedly, a message from the political editorial office requesting that I prepare a final draft of the manuscript within two 30

I Toward a Democratic China

months, in time for formal publication of the book on the eve of the third anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident. 6 1 realized at the time that the original draft left a great deal to be desired, and its content needed to be expanded. So I undertook to rewrite the manuscript with several of my friends—Yi Wenhua of the Foreign Literature Institute, and Liu Changlin and Li Zhongguo of the Philosophy Institute. (The section "The Spirit of April Fifth Lives Forever" came mainly from the pen of Liu Changlin.) On April 5, 1979, the book we wrote together was published, with eighty thousand copies released nationwide.

6. This sudden reversal of editorial policy w a s apparently related to a high-level party decision to reverse the official verdict on the April Fifth Incident itself.

On-the-Scene

Reporting

I 31

6 Three Courts of Law Imaginary Travels in Time and Space

In the latter part of the Cultural Revolution, roughly during the years 1974 and 1975, a number of people engaged in research in physics and philosophy launched a movement to criticize Einstein's theory of relativity. Their critiques were published in a periodical named Contentions in Natural Science.1 The basic argument of these articles was as follows: the supposed invariability of the speed of light and the impossibility of exceeding it were "rigid metaphysical concepts" that "run counter to the dialectical method." Why? Because in dialectics, "the universe is infinite, and time and space are infinite, so why would it necessarily be true that speed has an unsurpassable limit?" Thus there was a need "to establish, on the foundation of 'destroying the old,' 2 conditions for creation of a new theory in accordance with dialectical materialism."

1. Zirari kexue zhengming. 2. "Destroy the old and establish the new" was a slogan allegedly summarizing the essence of the Cultural Revolution, as epitomized in the call to "smash the Four Olds," i.e., old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits. 32

In the first half of 19751 sent to the editorial office of Contentions in Natural Science a draft of an article I had written entitled "Practice, Hypothesis, and Scientific Method: On Discussions Regarding the Theory of Relativity." In this article I criticized the scholasticism of medieval Europe: "The scholastics at that time engaged in complicated proofs, arguments, debates, and inquiries based on the Bible and the authoritative works of the church, thereby playing an obstructionist role in the development of natural science." I also discussed the "corrective mechanisms" of science, arguing as follows: In contrast to the method of scholasticism, the scientific method stresses the decisive significance and function of observation, experiment, and practice in the attainment of knowledge. This method holds that explanations of natural phenomena should be sought not in the writings of the ancients or the pronouncements of authorities, as is the case with academic philosophy, but in no other place than real life and the natural world. The scientific method recognizes no means but practice to discover natural laws; it recognizes no standard but practice for verifying the truth of scientific theories. Furthermore, scientific method holds that a theory in the natural sciences can only be overturned if a new phenomenon is discovered which the theory cannot explain, and that it is then necessary to advance a hypothesis that is subject to disproof or revision through experimentation. Only when the hypothesis is verified through practice and experiment can it take the place of the old theory. In this article I raised certain objections to "the critics who use dialectics to criticize the theory of relativity." "For them," I wrote, "the purpose of science is not to describe the objective laws of the natural world, but to 'create a new theory in accordance with dialectical materialism.' As they would have it, the validity of the theory of relativity is not to be determined by practice; instead it is to be decided by 'whether or not it accords with dialectics.' On the Three Courts of Law

I 33

basis of their so-called dialectical method it then becomes possible to 'take steps toward building a new theoretical system.' " 3 After I submitted this article, the editorial office of Contentions in Natural Science wrote me a letter on August 27,1975, containing the following statements. "In current discussions of the theory of relativity, quite a number of articles have been critical of Einstein's idealist philosophical views and his idealist interpretation of issues in physics. Their point, by and large, should be acknowledged, but your article does not touch on this. We feel that if you are in agreement on this point, you should say so in a supplementary statement to avoid unnecessary argument. If you feel you should take an opposing stance, try stating it more clearly." The letter went on to say, "In current criticism of and discussions on the issue of relativity, many writers are endeavoring, with the guidance of Marxist philosophy, to question the contradictions in the theory of relativity in an effort to establish a new theory. Is it appropriate for you to make blanket statements that they are going against dialectical materialism?" Upon receiving this letter, I changed the wording of my article in a few places but still maintained my original position. But because of my disgust at seeing the theory of relativity criticized for "not following the dialectical method," and because of the rebukes I dealt out against such criticism, the article "Practice, Hypothesis, and Scientific Method" was never published. The discussions centering on the theory of relativity in the mid1970s convinced me that employing ideological doctrines to judge the truth of a theory is a violation of the scientific spirit. That is why in May of 1978, following the end of the Cultural Revolution, when the country's newspapers entered into a discussion of the standards of truth, I perceived this discussion as foreshadowing the imminent dissolution of the theological realm in China's intellectual world. I was cheered and heartened by this historic advance. In 3. Quoted from my draft manuscript "Practice, Hypothesis, and Scientific Method." [Author's note] 34 I Toward a Democratic China

June of 1978, when the Chinese Academy of Sciences held a meeting to discuss the standards of truth, I gave a lecture entitled "Medieval Scholasticism and the Doctrine of Double Truth." 4 Then, from July 1 7 to 24, the Philosophy Institute and the editorial department of Philosophical

Research magazine cosponsored a colloquium on the

problem of theory and practice at a school in Beijing's Zhaoyang district, during which I spoke on the topic "Three Courts of L a w " in small-group discussions. I discovered that the format of my talk, in which I summarized a philosophical short story instead of presenting a paper, did not appeal to the participants of the meeting. But I was confident that by joining literature and philosophy in the form of philosophical fiction, I could expound on the topic of the standards of truth in a w a y that would stimulate a broad response in society. And so, from late July to early September of 1 9 7 8 , 1 made my entry into the realm of literature, expanding the short text of my talk into a twenty-thousand-word story which I submitted to the theoretical department of the newspaper Guangming

Daily. On

September 14 the paper published the story, devoting two full pages to it. The story was actually a re-creation of the armchair journeys through the ancient world which I had made during the Cultural Revolution. When I wrote this piece of fiction, I had not actually been to Italy or to France. Instead, in my imagination, I boarded an R - 1 0 0 1 airship and made visits to the "court of religion" in seventeenth-century Italy, the "court of reason" in eighteenth-century France, and the "court of practice" in a China of the future. I began the story in this way: On a gloomy afternoon in late February, 1633, the R - 1 0 0 1 airship touched down on the right bank of the Tiber River, in a small open space near the Vatican Palace. As I disembarked, gazing in disorientation at the ancient city wall of Rome, a six4. See Yan Jiaqi, Quanli yu zhenli (Power and truth), Guangming Daily Press, 1987, pp. 250-53. [Author's note] Three Courts of Law

I 35

wheeled carriage rushed out from the Vatican toward me. This turned out to be Thessalus, a counselor to Pope Urban VIII, who had been sent to meet me. Thessalus helped me into the carriage, which dashed along the Via Tiberna, across the Campo dei Fiori where Bruno had been burned at the stake five years before, and finally pulled up at the foot of the Palatine Hill. From here a nicely paved road wound among the clustered trees of an ancient grove all the way to the end of Marcello Valley, where an ancient fortress loomed. This was the location of the world-renowned religious tribunal, the Roman Inquisition. I went on to give an in-depth description of the trial of the great Italian scientist Galileo in this court of religion. At the conclusion, the verdict on Galileo is read by Cardinal Gruli, a character in the story: You, Galileo, are denounced to this holy office for holding as true and propagating the false doctrines that the sun sits immovable at the center of the universe and that the earth moves ceaselessly day and night. This proposition represents a fundamental attack and slander against the church and holy scripture. Under the authority of the pope and the cardinals of the World Court of Inquisition, this holy court, in order to forestall the destruction of our holy faith and the propagation of chaos and error, ordered the two doctrines of Copernicus to be subjected to theological examination. The doctrines were found to be contrary to the teachings of the Bible, philosophically absurd, and smacking of heresy. In order that your grave and pernicious error and transgression may not remain altogether unpunished, we hereby place the book Dialogue on the Ptolemaic and Copernican World Systems on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum; its publication and dissemination are forbidden. Moreover, we condemn you to formal incarceration, and by way of salutary penance we enjoin that for three 36 I Toward a Democratic China

years to come you shall repeat once a week the seven penitential psalms. M y aim in writing a story in 1978 exposing the persecution of science by a court of religion in Renaissance Italy was to draw a parallel to the modern-day "religious courts" prevalent in China during the Cultural Revolution. I wanted readers to associate the idea of a religious court with the use of quotations from M a o Zedong to make sweeping judgments, in the hope that the works of China's authors and writers would never again meet the fate of Galileo's Dialogue on the Ptolemaic and Copernican

World Systems.

In the second part of "Three Courts of Law," I tell of traveling in the R-1001 airship to Ferney, a small city on the Swiss-French border in the year 1754, and of my visit to a "court of reason" there. I spent an entire day in Ferney rambling over a landscape dotted with gardens and pavilions, resting my gaze on verdant spring scenes. Later I joined in a conversation with Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Diderot. I made Diderot and Voltaire the vehicle for my statements: "Of the things that men employ to support religion, not a single one is in accord with our rational faculty. Religion uses the most dubious evidence to prove things that are of the utmost incredibility." "Let us raise high the lamp of reason, that we may dispel the darkness spread by religion. Let us use the power of reason to eliminate the countless disasters it has wreaked upon our society." Following this, I put a statement on the division of governmental powers in the mouth of Montesquieu. In the novel Journey

through

the Ages, which I adapted from this piece in the Guangming Daily, I use a speech by Montesquieu to put forth the idea of democracy as a corrective mechanism: If a legislature is subject to reelection at certain intervals, those who are dissatisfied with the legislature in a given term can place their hopes on the next term. But if the people cannot express their opinions through regular channels, if they cannot effect changes in the legislature by way of elections, accumulaThree Courts of Law

I 37

ted resentment will eventually force them to rely on violence and the shedding of their own blood to gain a hearing for their just outcries. 5 What I had in mind as I wrote this was the 1970 Gdansk-Gdania Incident in Poland and the 1976 Tiananmen Square Incident in China. I felt that such bloody clashes could be avoided if the mistakes of those in power could be corrected by predetermined rules of procedure. Before and after 1978, China did not have much in the w a y of democracy. Indeed, there were still a few people who spent their time scanning the writings of others, deludedly looking for statements that went against the "bible," so that they could arraign the authors in the "court of ideology." In writing through

Journey

the Ages, I thought of what Galileo had written in his

preface to the Dialogue

on the Ptolemaic

and Copernican

World

Systems. He was not actually a proponent of the Copernican theory, which controverted the teachings of the Bible. He was only "standing on the side of the Copernican system for the sake of argument, giving an account of it as a purely mathematical hypothesis." 6 This is why, as I sat in Voltaire's living room listening to the discourse of the judge in that court of reason, I found myself exclaiming, "I can't listen to any more of this." As I was still concerned, at the time of writing, that the court of religion might once again emerge on Chinese soil, perhaps this response was justifiable. In the final part of "Three Courts of Law," I paid a visit to the "court of practice" in a China of the future. In September 1978, when this story was published, the events of 1976 in Tiananmen Square were still viewed as a "counterrevolutionary" incident, but in the story I passionately affirmed the significance of the April Fifth Movement that took place between the spring and summer of 5. Yan Jiaqi, Kuayue shedai de feixing (Journey through the ages), Shanghai People's Press, 1979, pp. 75-76. [Author's note] 6. Galileo, Dialogue on the Ptolemaic and Copernican World Systems (in Chinese), Shanghai People's Press, 1974, pp. 1-2.. [Author's note] 38

I Toward a Democratic China

1976. My main point in the final section of "Three Courts of Law" was to explain that the truth of any theory, doctrine, or ideology can only be verified through practice, which is the highest court of all. And before it, all theories, doctrines, and ideologies must either defend their reasons for existing or give up their right to exist. When I wrote the section on the court of practice, although I affirmed Mao Zedong's view that "practice is the sole criterion for testing the truth," I meant that all theories, doctrines, and ideologies must be put to this test, including the ideology that during the Cultural Revolution was known as "invincible Mao Zedong Thought." In 1978 there were very few highrise buildings in Beijing, and Longtan Lake in southeast Beijing was a barren waste area. But on visiting Beijing's "court of practice," I discovered that the appearance of Beijing had undergone enormous changes. The Imperial Palace buildings and Tiananmen Square had become the valley of Beijing, and on all sides of this valley were buildings that towered twenty, thirty, and forty stories high. A lakeside walkway had been built around the winding shore of Longtan Lake, and a manmade mountain had been erected east of it. Gaily decorated gazebos dotted the greenery of the mountainside with splashes of color. Moreover, people's clothing differed a great deal from what they had been in the Seventies: no longer was it uniformly standardized. There was a great deal of creativity expressed in the styles, and the colors were dazzling. I am happy to say that the sightseer in today's Beijing, especially the visitor to Longtan Park, soon discovers that Beijing bears more and more resemblance to the scenes I predicted in my story written in 1978. Three days after the publication of "Three Courts of Law," the Japanese newspaper Asahi Daily published excerpts from the story together with a report,7 and later the West German weekly Der 7. "This Is Science Fiction Created in China, World Travel through the Ages," Asahi Daily, September 17,1978. [Author's note] Three Courts of Law

I 39

Spiegel also excerpted it.8 One newspaper, under the title "A Signal Flare Against Feudalistic Autocracy," published a special review article evaluating my piece of science fiction.9 Hundreds of readers wrote enthusiastic letters. One letter from Beijing, signed "From a passionate reader," said, "Your article expressed what is in people's hearts. What is more, it expressed what I have wished to say but have not known how to put in proper form. . . . In the 'court of practice' section, the judge's speech on China's feudal despotism and obscurantism is right on the mark. It touches on the most fundamental problems of the Chinese people, the mountains that press down upon us. If we do not smash these fetters, if we do not topple these mountains, China's modernization will be nothing but a pipe dream." 10 Another reader, who worked at the China Aeronautics Corporation, wrote that if and when the International Bureau of Aeronautics should organize a second journey through time, he wanted to be notified so that he could go along. He also wrote that if Lin Biao and Jiang Qing ever mounted a comeback, "They are sure to put you into prison. If that happens, be sure to tell me, and let them know I completely support your views. If you notify me, I'll go to prison with you." 1 1

8. Der Spiegel, December 1 8 , 1 9 7 8 . [Author's

note]

9. Zhao Dan, "Yike fandui fengjian zhuanzhi de xinghaodan," Wenhui Daily (Hong Kong), September 2 1 , 1 9 7 8 . [Author's

note]

10. A reader's response to "Religion, Reason, and Practice," Daily Newsletter,

no. 5 , 1 9 7 8 . [Author's

Guangming

note]

1 1 . M a Peiwen, "Criteria for Testing the Truth and the Struggle Before Us," printed by the Reference Room, Philosophy Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1978. [Author's 40

I Toward a Democratic

China

note]

7 Beijing Spring 1978-79

In November of 1978, in response to popular pressure, the official verdict concerning the Tiananmen Incident was reversed and the designation "counterrevolutionary" removed from its label. On November 15 the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declared the Tiananmen Incident to be "a completely revolutionary action." Three days later, the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau announced the rehabilitation of more than three hundred participants in the incident. Hua Guofeng, then chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and premier of the State Council, wrote in his own calligraphy the inscription for the dedicatory page of Poems Transcribed from

Tiananmen.1

Then, on

November zi, People's Daily published a long authoritative article entitled "The Truth About the Tiananmen Incident." In the wake of this reversal of the official verdict on the Tiananmen Incident, a democracy movement sprang up. Tens of thousands of big-character and small-character posters were pasted on 1. A n anthology of poems in memory of the late Premier Z h o u Enlai compiled from hand-written posters at Tiananmen Square.

41

walls in Beijing, from Qinghua and Beijing universities to the Democracy Wall at Xidan. 2 The writers of the posters demanded investigation and exposure of those responsible for the criminal suppression of the incident, rehabilitation for those persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, freedom of speech, and political reform. These demands and activities in fact proved destabilizing to the position of Hua Guofeng, w h o had risen to prominence only after the Tiananmen Incident. In late November and early December, in separate audiences with the head of Japan's Social Democratic Party and with French reporters, Deng Xiaoping remarked that the big-character-poster movement would continue, because it was "a good thing," and that writing big-character posters was permitted by the constitution. The latter half of November 1978 saw the transformation of Tiananmen Square and the Xidan Wall into spontaneous gathering places for residents of Beijing, with speaker after speaker addressing the crowds. I once made a speech on political reform at the Xidan Wall, after which I sped away by bicycle, but upon dismounting at Tiananmen I was again quickly surrounded by a large group of young people who had been following me. Another time, having made a speech only a few minutes long on the steps of the Monument for Revolutionary Martyrs in the square, I found myself suddenly borne aloft by countless hands and tossed into the air— landing was just like falling onto a soft and spongy sofa. As the big-character-poster movement grew at the Xidan Wall, new publications by private groups appeared one after the other. The first one I ever saw was Enlightenment,

published by a group

of young people from Guizhou province. Soon after that, tions, Today, and April Fifth Forum

Explora-

appeared. 3 In the course of

2. Posters appeared on existing billboards in the area west of Tiananmen, near the Minority Nationalities Exhibit Hall and Hotel. 3. Qimeng, Tansuo, Jintian, Siwu luntan.

42. I Toward a Democratic China

writing my book On-the-Scene

Reports of the April Fifth

Move-

ment, I visited and interviewed many who had participated in the Tiananmen Incident. In December 1978 I met with Wang Juntao, 4 Chen Ziming, Lu Jiaming, and several others in a small alley near Jianguomen in eastern Beijing 5 to consider the prospect of starting a new private publication. In the course of our discussion I proposed the title Beijing Spring for the periodical. 6 The first mimeographed copy of Beijing Spring carried an article I wrote, entitled "The Tricks of the Trade of Modern Religion." 7 It appeared under the pseudonym Bu Shuming, which means walking toward the light of dawn, but it was not printed in the typeset edition. While in the process of starting Beijing Spring, I accepted an invitation from the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to participate in a conference on theoretical work. 8 Earlier, in October 1978, I had been admitted into the Chinese Communist Party as a provisional member. To ensure that nothing would stand in the way of promotion to the status of full party member a year later, I did not take part in the editorial work at Beijing Spring. All I did was submit to the magazine the text of a lecture, "Abolishing Life-tenure," 9 which I had given at the aforementioned conference. It appeared in the final issue of Beijing 4. Following the June Fourth suppression of 1989, Wang Juntao was arrested and sentenced to a thirteen-year prison term for allegedly being one of the "masterminds" of the 1989 prodemocracy movement. 5. The exact location was Bei Paifang Hutong near Jianguomen.

6. Beijing zhi chun. 7. "Xiandai zongjiao de mijue." 8. In Chinese parlance, "theoretical work," for the purpose of maintaining and publicizing the current party line and ideological orthodoxy, is not only the responsibility of propaganda departments but also that of social science scholars. The particular work conference referred to here lasted from January through early April, 1979. The details are given in Chapter 8. 9. "Feizhi zhongshenzhi."

Beijing Spring

I 43

Spring under the title "On the Question of Political Systems in Socialist Theory." 10 Although I agreed with the points of view being expressed in Beijing Spring, I nevertheless chose in early 1979 1 1 the path of remaining within the Communist Party in order to seek reform from within the system, and thereby to work for the democratization of China.

10. The article, "Shehuizhuyi de zhengti wenti," was signed "Zheng Yan." See Beijing Spring, no. 9. [Author's note] 11. The so-called Democracy Wall movement, including the magazine Beijing Spring, was effectively suppressed in the first half of 1979 on the orders of senior leader Deng Xiaoping, whose "Four Cardinal Principles" delimiting ideology and politics were elaborated in his March 30, 1979, speech, near the conclusion of the conference on theoretical work. 44

I Toward a Democratic China

8 Abolishing Life-tenure in High Leadership Positions

In early 1979 I participated in a national conference on theoretical work. This gathering was convened following a proposal by Marshal Ye Jianying, 1 and it marked the high tide of a nationwide movement to emancipate the mind that had begun with the discussions of the standards of truth mentioned earlier. The participants included many well-known figures in the Chinese intellectual community, among them Yu Guangyuan, Zhou Yang, Huan Xiang, Hu Jiwei, Hu Qiaomu, Sun Yefang, Zhang Guannian, Wu Jiang, Su Shaozhi, Li Honglin, Wang Ruoshui, Guo Luoji, Ruan Ming, Zhang Xianyang, Xing Fensi, Dong Funai, Bao Tong, Tong Dalin, Wu Mingyu, Li Shu, Feng Lanrui, Liao Gailong, Yu Haocheng, Sun Changjiang, M a Hong, Wang Huide, Xue Muqiao, Wang Zisong, Zheng Bijian, Wu Lengxi, Yang Xiguang, M a Peiwen, Fan Yongkang, Lin Ying, Gong Yuzhi, and Wang Renzhi.

1 . Ye Jianying ( 1 8 9 7 - 1 9 8 6 ) , one of the top military and party leaders, w a s chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's C o n gress in 1 9 7 9 . H e w a s instrumental in deposing the G a n g of Four in 1 9 7 6 and supporting Deng Xiaoping's return to power.

45

Hu Yaobang delivered a warm and enthusiastic address at the ceremony that opened the conference. 2 He proposed that it was necessary to examine reality earnestly, to liberate the mind, to break through all areas of taboo, and to smash all spiritual shackles. Calling people such as Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan "theoretical ruffians" and "theoretical tyrants," Hu Yaobang said that these few individuals had monopolized Marxism-Leninism, and had allowed themselves to distort and falsify it at will while refusing to permit other people to conduct creative research on it. Moreover, they had taken advantage of their special privileges and, without any basis whatsoever, had pinned the "anti-party" label on literary products that ordinary people welcomed, such as articles, short stories, novels, and the socalled black drama and black paintings. Hu Yaobang said it was necessary to purge such "tyrannical behavior which is destructive of culture and suppresses thought." The conference met from mid-January until early April and was divided into two parts, one before and the other after the Spring Festival holidays. Since everyone spoke without inhibition, the meetings provided an effective intellectual preparation for the reforms and the opening of China that took place in the decade of the 1980s. Before the Spring Festival, a speech by the theoretician Li Honglin on the relationship between a political leader and the people made a deep impression on me. Li's faith in the people and his frank attitude and warm language reverberated through the whole conference. At the time Li Honglin spoke, China had not yet emerged from the period when the people's hearts and minds were encumbered by mythologized images of M a o Zedong. M a o had

2. Hu Yaobang (1915-89) was at this time secretary-general of the C C P Central Committee and chief of the Central Propaganda Bureau, which nominally is overseer of all ideologically related propaganda work, known as theoretical work. In these official roles, it was assumed that he, a close associate of Deng Xiaoping, was speaking with Deng's authorization.

46

I Toward a Democratic China

been known as the "great leader, great teacher, great commander, and great helmsman." Li Honglin, however, maintained that the public propaganda which aimed at instilling the attitude that the people as a whole must unconditionally obey the absolute authority of one person was, in fact, China's humiliation. This attitude, he said, "damages the dignity and self-respect of the Chinese people." He went on to explain that "the relationship between a leader and the people is not one of dependence and subordination; rather, it is a relationship of equality." In a personality cult, "the leader is always correct and the mistakes are always committed by other people. Therefore, the leader cannot be criticized. . . . While other people must wash their faces, the leader's face must never be washed. If anyone wants to wash the face of the leader, that person will be attacked viciously." Against this attitude, Li Honglin argued: "Experience has shown that the principle that 'the people must be devoted to the leader' has already seriously obstructed the development of our society. Consequently, it is necessary to discard it and substitute the principle that 'the leader must be devoted to the people.' " His conclusion was that "the people may choose the leader, but it is not for the leader to choose the people." 3 Throughout the meeting, the participants discussed their views without constraints. Just as in the "court of reason," it was a forum where all ideas, theories, and doctrines were put on trial, "either to justify their own reasons for existence, or to relinquish their right to exist." M a o Zedong's theory of "continuous revolution" was the object of fierce attack by Zhang Xianyang, Wang Guixiu, and others. Kang Sheng's formulation, "A real Marxist-Leninist, or a fellow traveler of the party," was also sharply repudiated. In this atmosphere, I spent a few days during the Spring Festival break drafting a fifteen-thousand-word lecture based on a manuscript, "On the Question of Political Systems in Socialist Theory," I had 3. See Li Honglin, Lilun fengyun (Storm over theory), Beijing and Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1985. [Author's note] Abolishing Life-tenure in High Leadership

Positions

I 47

written during the Cultural Revolution. On February 4, 1979, I addressed the conference on the issue of whether China should establish a truly republican form of government, in reality as well as in name. In this speech I specifically employed the four-character Chinese term for political science—zhengzhi kexue—and

from the perspec-

tive of that discipline I discussed the distinctions between the "state system" and the "social system." I asserted that in the history of modern European political thought, there had always existed two currents—one concerned with the issue of the system of the state, and the other focused on the question of the social system. In the eighteenth century a certain French thinker believed that in order to eliminate various social malpractices the key was not to change the structure of the state. Rather, the solution was to change the social system, particularly the system of ownership. He thus advocated a monarchial system of government built on the foundation of a system of public ownership—I called this system a government of "social monarchy." During the widening purges in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and during the Cultural Revolution in China, the causes for the destruction of democracy and the trampling of the rule of law lay in the overconcentration of power in the hands of persons who had life-tenure at the highest levels. I told the conferees that although China had altered its social structure after 1949 and established a system of public ownership, the core of the state system was still based on life-tenure in the highest leadership positions. Because the Communist Party had ruled in China for a long time, the key to establishing a republican system lay in strictly stipulating the terms of office for high-level state positions as well as for high-level leadership positions within the party, thus eliminating the life-tenure system for high-level posts in both the party and the state. The legal scholar Y u Haocheng was the first to express agreement with my speech. Later I read in the bulletin summarizing the conference that the historian Li Shu had likewise concurred with my proposal. 48

I Toward a Democratic China

Also at this conference, Wang Ruoshui, a deputy editor-in-chief of People's Daily, offered a systematic analysis of the Cultural Revolution. He characterized the Cultural Revolution as an instance of "using mistaken means to carry out a mistaken revolution against mistaken targets," resulting in a "major catastrophe." He believed that the cult of personality had been established in China through the influence of certain habits, among them small-scale production, feudal ideas about emperors, and the rule of dictators. The important lesson of the Cultural Revolution lay in the necessity of opposing cults of personality. In February 1979 Wang Ruoshui's systematic analysis of the Cultural Revolution was praised by many people. At that time my manuscript On-tbe-Scene Reports of the April Fifth Movement was already in press, but after hearing Wang's talk the idea began to grow within me that I ought to conduct systematic research on the Cultural Revolution and write a chronicle of it. After the conclusion of the conference, I wrote a piece of political science fiction entitled "Report of a Survey on the Question of Democracy."4 In this political fantasy I traveled in an R-1002 airship to eighteenth-century Paris, seventeenth-century England, and a United States of America of the future. Thus I made a survey of the three countries' forms of government in three different eras. This was my second transtemporal journey, a sequel to the visits to the three courts of law I had made to investigate the question of truth. This time when I visited eighteenth-century France, I found myself in the resplendent surroundings of the Palace of Versailles.

4. This short story was first published in Xitt Shiqi (New times), under the charge of the Press of Beijing, and was serialized in its inaugural issue and two subsequent issues in 1979-80. Then, with additional text, it appeared, under my name, as a book, Mattyou

lishi yu weilai

(Travels

through history and the future), Fujian Educational Press, 1980. It is reprinted in my anthology Quanli yu zhengli (Power and truth), Guangming Daily Press, 1987. [Author's

Abolishing

note]

Life-tenure

in High Leadership

Positions

I 49

To compose my description of the grounds, I had asked a friend who was traveling to France to bring back a picture of Versailles, and I also consulted several writers' depictions of the ancient architecture. But in my imagination I described the scene as follows: The palace did not command attention through magnificence, nor was its exterior appearance particularly grand. Only when I walked inside did I discover that Versailles was much more opulent than China's Imperial Palace. Its buildings were not as spacious as those in the Imperial Palace, but they contained countless lavish rooms and galleries. Aside from the exquisite murals on the walls and ceilings, in numerous places there were swan feather and filigree replicas of birds and beasts, trees and flowers, as well as other flora and fauna. Treading on a very plush red carpet, I climbed a staircase carved with delicate patterns to the second floor and then walked through the Salon of Abundance, the Salon of Venus, the Salon of Diana, the Salon of Apollo, the Salon of War. From there I entered the Hall of Mirrors. Just inside the doorway I sensed a cloud of fragrance, as if a great many unseen lilacs, roses, and magnolias were wafting their perfumes toward me. In the Hall of Mirrors I was given an audience with King Louis XIV. When I was writing this piece of fiction I hoped that one day I could see Versailles for myself. In July 1985, when I actually went to Versailles and examined a portrait of Louis X I V , I discovered that my description of the palace, written some five years earlier, had greatly exceeded its reality. However, I had a twofold purpose in writing a work of political science fiction. M y first aim was to compare the three forms of government, namely, a despotic one, a constitutional monarchy, and a republic. M y second goal was to publicize the proposal I had made to abolish life-tenure in the highest leadership positions. In the third part of "Report of a Survey on the Question of Democracy," I met with a Richard Bruce, executive director of the 50

I Toward a Democratic China

American Political Science Association. What is interesting is that as I was writing this report in the first half of 1979, China had not yet begun deliberations on establishing a political science association. Nor had I any idea whether the United States had such an organization for political science. I subsequently learned that presidents of the American Political Science Association serve one-year terms. Finally in M a y 1985, when three presidents of the association, past and current, came to China at the invitation of Zhang Youyu, president of the Chinese Political Science Association, I was able to meet Philip Converse of the University of Michigan, Richard Fenno of the University of Rochester, and Aaron Wildavsky of the University of California at Berkeley. T w o months later, while participating in the Thirteenth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, I met with them again. But in the "Report on the Question of Democracy," I engaged a future executive director of the American Political Science Association in an imaginary conversation on the subject of limiting the highest leadership positions in socialist states, using Richard Bruce's words to elaborate on the ills of a life-tenure system. Thus Bruce recounted how, through the procedure of elections, terms of office for heads of state may be regulated as a corrective mechanism: The result of not limiting terms of office is inevitably a breakdown of the electoral process, culminating in a de facto lifetenure system. In a system of private ownership, there is an intimate connection between life-tenure and a despotic form of government. N o king is willing to give up his throne voluntarily. In a republican system, however, the term of office of the chief executive of the state is strictly limited. If he proves to be incompetent or inadequate, he can be dismissed or replaced through an election, whereas a king can only be removed or replaced by force of arms. Should it ever happen that the king obstructs the outcries raised by the people in their distress, the people would have to resort to violence to express their deAbolishing Life-tenure in High Leadership Positions

I 51

mands. So as long as there is life-tenure there will be dynasties, and the country will be plunged into an endless circle of dynastic cycles. Oppression will give rise to resistance, and then to reform, and again to the founding of a new dynasty; the cycles are ceaseless and endless. 5 In October 1979, at a national scholarly conference, I continued to argue for abolition of the de facto life-tenure system for highlevel government and party officials. On that occasion I focused on how to eliminate the causes for the recurrence of personality cults: Some people believe that a cult of personality happens simply because certain people shower adulation upon an individual, or because an individual is singled out for special publicity. But in reality it does not occur in these ways. The history of socialism in the past sixty years makes it plain that whenever there is a system of life-tenure for the highest party and state leaders, the following process commonly occurs. Although it begins with an emphasis on collective leadership and the promotion of democracy, it culminates in an arbitrary rule that destroys collective leadership while safeguarding the power of the individual. The destruction of collective leadership is always carried out in the name of "intraparty struggle." It is through this process that cults of personality thrive. This is why as long as there is life-tenure for the highest party and state leaders, it will be difficult to avoid the cult of personality. I recall that after hearing my speech Bao Tong made these remarks: "Our country is a people's republic, and the Chinese people love this republic. I feel that every citizen of this republic has the responsibility to study these questions in earnest: What is a republic? What are the fundamental characteristics of a republic? I believe, 5. See my Manyou lishi yu weilai (Travels through history and the future), 1980, p. 53. [Author's note] 52. I Toward a Democratic China

without a doubt, that our republic supports its people in making this crucial inquiry into what a republic is." 6 At that time Hua Guofeng was chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, premier of the State Council, and chairman of the party's Central Military Commission. The press was already beginning to promote a cult centered on Hua Guofeng, calling him a "wise and brilliant leader" and a "wise and brilliant commander-in-chief." 7 M y repeated advocacy of the elimination of life-tenure for party and state officials offended certain people. In October 1979 a person commonly known as China's "theoretical authority," then holding an appointment at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 8 went to see Sun Gengfu, deputy director of the Philosophy Institute where I worked, and accused me of having connections with some of the participants in the Democracy Wall movement. He ordered an investigation of my activities. When Deputy Director Sun made favorable remarks about me, this "theoretical authority" criticized him for being uninformed. It is true that when I was collecting materials for the book

On-the-Scene

6. See "Bulletin" (no. 3), political science and sociology sections, of the academic conference commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the PRC, October 1 0 , 1 9 7 9 . [Author's note] Bao Tong would eventually rise to be the closest aide of former premier and party general-secretary Zhao Ziyang, until both fell from power in May 1989. 7. Hua Guofeng (b. 192.1) rose to power quickly in the r970s as a protege of M a o Zedong, who anointed Hua as his successor by allegedly saying "With you in charge, I feel at ease." An official portrait, with Mao's hand clasping Hua's, depicted this charismatic transfer of power in 1976. In monopolizing all three key party and state positions, Hua, at least on paper, achieved greater concentration of power than did the late Mao, who always had to share state power with Premier Zhou Enlai. The cult of Hua failed, however, and he was quickly eclipsed by Deng Xiaoping. 8. Presumably Hu Qiaomu (b. 1912.), who was then president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Abolishing

Life-tenure

in High Leadership

Positions

I 53

Reports of the April Fifth Movement, I had interviewed many participants in the 1976 Tiananmen Square Incident. But it wasn't clear to me what connections these people had with the Democracy Wall movement. In any case, my acquaintance with these people became the reason for gathering evidence concerning my activities. After the investigation, the Philosophy Institute verified that I had not committed any political errors. About this time I heard that on several occasions Deng Xiaoping had insisted on the need to "abolish de facto life-tenure in cadre positions." Subsequently, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences terminated its "political investigation" directed against me. In December 1982, more than three years after the conference on theoretical work held in early 1979, a new constitution for China came into being. It clearly stipulated that the chief of state as well as the head of the government "shall not exceed two consecutive terms in office." 9

9. In China the head of the government is the premier of the State C o u n cil while the more ceremonial office of chief of state is held by the president or chairman of the National People's Congress.

54

I Toward a Democratic China

9 Farewell to the Realm of Natural Dialectics

In early 1980 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences entrusted Z h a n g Youyu 1 with the task of making preparations for the establishment of a research institute for political science and an organization to be named the Chinese Political Science Association. In April 1980 I took part in drafting a proposal called "Outline of a National Program for Research in Political Science." From M a y 8 through M a y 10, I participated in the preparatory meetings for establishing the Chinese Political Science Association. I recall that many people debated heatedly over the question of a proper name for the organization. Some suggested it should be called the Chinese Academic Society for the Study of Politics, while others preferred to call it the Chinese Association for Political Science. From December 13 to 28, 1980, the Chinese Political Science Association 2 held its 1. Z h a n g Y o u y u (b. 1899), a Communist Party member since 192.7, is a leading legal scholar and codrafter of several Chinese constitutions. He served as director of the Institute of L a w , and vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, before becoming president of the newly established Chinese Political Science Association in 1980. z. Zhengzhi

xue, literally, the study of politics, is the Chinese term for

the discipline k n o w n in English as political science. Zhengzhi

kexue,

liter-

ally, political science, is rarely used in Chinese discourse.

55

inaugural meeting in Beijing, and I was elected a member of the executive committee. At this meeting I also submitted two articles: " O n Marx's Theory of the Social Republic" and "Socialism and the Tripartite Separation of Powers." Although I participated in many of the activities of the newly formed Institute of Political Science, my formal work unit was still the Philosophy Institute and I maintained many connections to its work in natural dialectics. On October z8, 1 9 8 1 , the founding meeting of the Chinese Research Association for Natural Dialectics was convened in Beijing. The next afternoon, before an assembly of all the delegates, I gave a lecture on "Prospects for the Realm of Natural Dialectics." Seated on the rostrum during the lecture was my mentor Y u Guangyuan, sovereign of the realm of natural dialectics. Adopting Y u Guangyuan's analogy between academic disciplines and states, I asserted that in the real world many types of relations have developed between states, such as cooperation, confederation, invasion, and war. There have arisen empires with expansive territories, such as those of Alexander the Great, imperial Rome, Charlemagne, and Ghengis Khan, but eventually they all fragmented and disintegrated. In the world of thought similar phenomena also occur. Among these "states," invasion and war, amalgamation and fragmentation, also occur. Scrambling for research territory, the state of physics constantly plunders the domain of the state of chemistry. Border clashes sometimes break out over a small bit of turf claimed by both the state of political science and the state of legal studies. Because of these conflicts, the map of the world of thought is constantly changing. The state of natural philosophy was a great empire in the ancient world of thought, but with the development of modern natural science, it eventually disintegrated. I said to the assemblage: In order for any state in the world of thought to continue to exist for a long period of time, there must be a societal need for the discipline. Moreover, the discipline must have distinct and 56

I Toward a Democratic China

independent objects of research. It may be said that in the past ten to twenty years a large kingdom has taken shape on the map of the world of thought. This is none other than the realm of natural dialectics. What is regrettable, however, is that this state is in part composed of desolate desert regions whose boundaries remain unclear. Frequently it is involved in border clashes with neighboring states. In recent years this state has also experienced internal strife: the philosophy of science and the sociology of science, while nominally part of natural dialectics, have sought to obtain their independence, and "ethnic nationalism" has run rampant. In this manner, all these factors may cause major transformations on the map of the world of thought. I also added: A person lives only once. Thus, when one dedicates one's life to a specific realm in the world of thought, it is necessary to consider seriously the future of that realm. In the past ten to twenty years the object of research in natural dialectics has remained very unclear to those engaged in it. . . . One point may be regarded as convincing, namely, if we were to take the whole of the natural world as the object of research in natural dialectics, we would end up retreading the same disastrous road of natural philosophy. N o w scienceology, 3 which regards science itself as its object of research, has become an independent discipline. In today's realm of natural dialectics, then, scienceology, philosophy of science, and management of science, as federated member states, are increasingly expanding their spheres of influence and issuing challenges to the federal government of natural dialectics. 4 3. Kexue xue. 4. Yan Jiaqi, "Prospects for the Realm of Natural Dialectics," Proceedings of the Founding Meeting of the Chinese Research Association for Natural Dialectics, no. 20, October 2 9 , 1 9 8 1 . [Author's note] Farewell to the Realm of Natural Dialectics

I 57

This lecture was, in effect, my farewell address to the realm of natural dialectics. Philosophy and religion each has its own independent functions. They will not lose their territory in the world of thought no matter how the sciences advance. In the world of science, however, natural dialectics is continually losing its territory. Concepts in science are distinct and precise. Even so-called fuzzy and chaotic phenomena can be described, analyzed, and researched with the use of distinct and precise concepts. Obscure poetry can show us artistic beauty by implication, but obscure concepts can only make people feel hazy. While ambiguity and obscurity can become the hallmarks of a school of art, they are incompatible with science. Living for many years in the realm of natural dialectics, I discovered that the subjects of this feudal realm make use of concepts from the natural sciences as their "raw material." Then, through a process of reworking, they obfuscate these precise concepts and dress them in the garb of philosophy. They then flaunt themselves in front of scholars of the humanities or social sciences who may lack knowledge of the natural sciences. As for natural scientists, they simply do not have the time to read about the obfuscation of achievements in natural science by a group of "specialists" in natural dialectics. In the Stalinist Soviet Union some philosophers interfered arbitrarily with the development of the natural sciences. During the Cultural Revolution critics used dialectics as a weapon to castigate at will the accomplishments of natural scientists. After the Cultural Revolution, although the subjects of the realm of natural dialectics did not engage in deeds of this sort, their work under the best of circumstances has been merely a popularization of science. (Although this kind of popularization is important work on its own, it is unnecessary to conduct it while arrayed in the accouterments of philosophy and natural dialectics.) For many years now, the subjects of the realm of natural dialectics have not really known the boundaries of their domain, nor have they known the functions of their work vis-a-vis the develop58

I Toward a Democratic China

ment of science and philosophy. Because of this, I finally took leave of this realm. Yu Guangyuan, a pioneer in research in natural dialectics, has made significant contributions in philosophical and economic studies. I have profound esteem for his loyalty to people and his noble character. I voluntarily sought out his opinion, and only after I obtained his blessing did I step forward into the realm of political science.

Farewell to the Realm of Natural Dialectics

IO The Search for Nonpoliticized Channels

Beginning from the day I entered the realm of political science, I was faced with the question "Is the study of politics a science?" The Cultural Revolution had ruined the reputation of politics. At the very mention of politics, people found it difficult to summon up any thoughts of uprightness, highmindedness, or frankness. Instead everyone thought of deceit, intrigue, and the wanton manipulation of power. The death of Lin Biao on September 13, 1971, shook the whole of China, irrevocably altering people's views of politics. For a long time, Lin Biao had been regarded as M a o Zedong's "closest comrade-in-arms" and successor. But suddenly overnight the Chinese people were being told that this closest comrade-in-arms and successor had attempted to assassinate M a o by firing a rocket at the train he was traveling on. People were also told that members of Lin Biao's conspiracy had called M a o Zedong "the biggest feudal despot in Chinese history." 1 Such sudden reversals, which occurred everywhere in China, led to an extreme distrust of politics among the people. 1. The so-called Project 571 was a plan, headed by Lin Biao's son, Lin Liguo, then deputy chief of operations of the Chinese air force, to assassinate M a o while he was on an inspection tour of south China.

60

In the Philosophy Institute, where I worked for a long time, everyone was well acquainted with the "three principles" of politics, including the dictum that "in political struggle there is no honesty to speak of." 2 In M a y 1982, when I left the Philosophy Institute to work with the preparatory committee in the Institute of Political Science, many people were astounded. One well-intentioned leader at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences tried to persuade me not to take up the study of politics. He felt that with the strong foundation I had had in mathematics and the natural sciences, I should take up research in the natural sciences. Some of my friends and relatives also attempted to dissuade me in the same way, feeling that in China studying politics was a road that would lead to destruction. Before leaving the realm of natural dialectics, I had spent a great deal of time studying history and the history of political theories. I had also researched the political systems of various countries in the world. In human history the political behavior of mankind has been so lacking in the regularity conferred by law that even when I read certain remarks by Machiavelli, I was not surprised. Machiavelli believed that man's nature is, generally speaking, evil, and that people are capricious, perfidious, hypocritical, envious, cowardly, and insatiably avaricious. An intelligent politician must take these human tendencies into account and, without being subject to moral constraints, should use any means, fair or foul, to realize his goals. He need not attend to promises made to others and, if it proves necessary, should employ cunning to weaken those w h o trust him. Machiavelli further wrote that to obtain power and maintain it, a ruler need not be virtuous; indeed, to possess a store of virtues and always abide by them would not be in a ruler's interest. Nevertheless a ruler must keep up the pretense of possessing such virtues. " H e must conduct himself in such a w a y that people regard him as charitable, loyal, conforming to human sensibilities, pious, and 2. Later widely circulated, these slogans were first exposed in a big-character poster during the Cultural Revolution. [Author's note] The Search for Nonpoliticized Channels

I 61

just. N o w he could in reality conduct himself in such a manner as long as he is prepared mentally to abandon all virtue without any hesitation whenever circumstances require it." 3 What Machiavelli did was reveal the absence of regularity in political behavior. Today it has become increasingly possible, through the use of scientific methods, to study movements that are without regularity. In the natural world and in human society, sudden climatic changes and stock market crashes are both irregular movements. The former comes about through the action of countless molecules in the earth's atmosphere upon each other; the latter results from thousands and millions of small transactions in the financial markets. The rapid development of chaos theory offers scientific methods to study the laws inherent in various "nonregular movements." 4 I believe that observing human political behavior from a theoretical vantage point enables one to adopt scientific methods and to study all the breaches of faith, the conspiracies, the political deceptions and upheavals, and the internal schisms and corruptions of officialdom that occur in politics in the same way that sudden climatic changes and stock market crashes can be studied. In the face of science, indignation and laments have no effect. Machiavellianism—the use of any and all means to achieve one's ends—is perpetually reenacted in human society; the mission of science is to reveal its causes. Actually, the phenomena depicted by Machiavelli will appear in any society so long as people's behavior is not subject to restraint by rules or institutions. This has nothing to do with feudalism, capitalism, or socialism. After almost five years of preparatory w o r k , the Institute of Political Science was formally established on July 6, 1985. At the inaugural ceremony I gave a lecture entitled "Conducting Research 3. See Yan Jiaqi, Quanli yu zhengli (Power and truth), Guangming Daily Press, 1987, pp. 10-14. [Author's note] 4. Strictly speaking, unordered movements that appear to be fortuitous but in fact are not fortuitous. [Author's note] 62.

I Toward a Democratic China

on Politics with Scientific Attitudes and Methods." In it I emphasized the following: In this world of ours, although various political phenomena in human history have not always been entirely rational or in tune with the wishes of the majority, . . . we researchers in political science should study these matters in the same way that we study objective phenomena. Whether the political phenomena themselves are scientific or not is not the question; political science, which conducts research on these phenomena, is after all a science. Similarly, no one says that economics falls short of being a science just because there are economic phenomena such as speculation, exploitation, misappropriation, and trickery. Political science requires us to conduct scientific research on all types of political phenomena, and to search out the laws of their occurrence and development. In this way we can mitigate or even prevent phenomena that run counter to the people's wishes and hinder their social development. Up to the present the world has witnessed a variety of theories as to the nature of science. From ancient natural philosophy to the rationalist scientific perspective of Francis Bacon or Kant, 5 to today's perspectives of logical positivism and historicism, no matter how differently science may be understood by these theories, there is one point on which our belief is unwavering—namely, that "science is not only a system of knowledge that has been tested by practice, but also a creative activity by which men make their world. Besides having its own internal logic of development, science is also a sociocultural historical 5. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), a British philosopher whose main works include New Tools and Collected Essays of Bacon. Immanuel Kant (172.41840), a German philosopher whose main works include Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgment.

[Author's

note]

The Search for Nonpoliticized

Channels

I 63

process. N o t only does science approach truth ever more closely, it is also becoming an ever more effective instrument of human action." 6 I believe this understanding of science by a contemporary Chinese philosopher of science is equally applicable to political science. We cherish precisely this same conviction in regard to science as we take up the development of political science as our enterprise. 7 So what, then, is to be regarded as politics? Here are some of the conceptions of politics that have long been familiar to people in China: Politics is the struggle between various classes. Politics is the collateral manifestation of economics. Politics is war without bloodshed. Politics is the task of managing the masses. Politics is the process of collective choice. All these answers reveal, from various perspectives, particular features of politics, but for a satisfactory definition it is necessary to include all the connotations of the concept of politics. In logic definitions are determinants of concepts. As long as the connotations of a concept are completely clear, the concept is regarded as logically clear and distinct. However, the clarity of a concept's connotations depends on our pointing out its closest cognate category—that is, the more inclusive concept on a level directly above it—as well as identifying particular distinctions that sufficiently explain the features of this concept. Therefore a definition must clarify both the closest cognate category and the differences in types or subcategories characteristic of the concept. Politics is a certain aspect of 6. The quotation is from Ji Shuli, "Kexue shi sheme?" (What is science?), Baike zhishi (Encyclopedic knowledge), no. 4,1983. [Author's note] 7. See my "Jiji tuijing zhongguo ahengzhixue de fazhan" (Actively promote the development of Chinese political science), Zhertgzhixue yartjiu (Political science research), no. 4,1985. [Author's note] 64

I Toward a Democratic China

human behavior, so the type closest to the concept of politics is "human social activity." The differences in types, then, must clarify the distinction between politics and other human social activities. Given these requirements for a definition, some have defined politics as "activities in which people engage for the sake of power." The American political scientist Harold Lasswell states, "Political behavior is behavior adopted in pursuit of power." 8 Robert Dahl, on the other hand, defines a political system as "any persisting pattern of human relations which involves control, influence, power, or authority." 9 David Easton defines politics as "the authoritative allocation of values for a society." 10 Differing slightly from Easton's is a definition by others who say politics is "those activities in a society that make and implement authoritative decisions." Of course, such authoritative decisions include not only the direct decisions of government but also the indirect decisions represented by the activities of political parties, elections, and expressions of political opinion. Toward the end of 1980 I was invited by Fan Yan, president of the Jiangxi Provincial Institute of Public Administration, to give a lecture on the topic "What Is Politics." Later, on November 2, Nanjing University held a formal ceremony in the conference room of its US-China Culture Center. 1 1 Acting on behalf of the univer8. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, Yale University Press, 1950, chap. 14, p. 240, Chinese translation. [Author's note] 9. Robert Dahl, Modern

Political Analysis

(in Chinese), Shanghai

Translation Press, 1987, pp. 1 7 - 1 8 . [Author's note] 10. David Easton, "Political Science in the United States: Past and Present," paper for a conference on the state of the social science disciplines, 1988, Beijing. Cosponsored by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. [Author's note] 1 1 . The Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies in the People's Republic of China is a joint venture in higher education, cooperatively administered by Nanjing University and the Johns Hopkins University since 1986.

The Search for Nonpoliticized

Channels

I 65

sity, Vice President Y u Shaoyi installed Zhao B a o x u 1 2 , Shuzhang, Li Fang,

13

Xia

and Yan Jiaqi as honorary adjunct professors

in the university's Department of Political Science. Following the ceremony I gave a lecture on the topic "The Role of Politics in Human Society." I began as follows: While traveling by airplane and train from Beijing to Nanjing, via Nanchang, I looked for politics everywhere along the way. Looking down from the airplane I saw only a fleecy white layer hugging the surface of the earth. Through the covering, aside from the uneven mountain ranges, meandering rivers, and glittering lakes, I saw the straight lines and crosshatchings of "man-made nature"—a grid of fields like multicolored tiles laid out on a floor. The grid of fields was dotted here and there with villages and towns, and in some places cityscapes stretched across the terrain. I thought it would take a highpowered telescope to make out the minute structure of the human habitations and identify factories, schools, oil storage tanks, bridges, and a variety of other constructs. As I observed the planet from this remote vantage point, it was almost impossible for me to imagine that in these human habitations could be found sorrow and joy, strife and harmony. I had great difficulty understanding why people would gather in one spot to engage in heated debates, or why some places would have upheavals and wars that lasted for years. In short, as I looked down from the airplane and saw only aggregates of people and nature worked over by mankind, I could not see such a thing 12. Zhao Baoxu, former chairman of the Department of International Politics at Beijing University, where he now heads the Institute of Contemporary China Studies, is an active leader of the new discipline of political science. A frequent visiting scholar, he has traveled extensively to the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere in Asia. 13. Li Fang, at the time a colleague of Yan Jiaqi, specializes in public administration studies. See chapter n . 66

I Toward a Democratic China

as politics, nor could I imagine what role it could have in human society. Disembarking from the airplane, I saw the crowd of passengers busily picking up their luggage and darting off to their destinations. It isn't that politics is nowhere to be found; rather, it exists only in certain places among human groups. Obviously, in our lectures today everyone is exploring the nature of politics and inquiring about it. Yet we are not directly participating in politics. At other meetings, however, state and party leaders are selected and emerge into view. Although these meetings are also instances of people congregating together, the holding of such meetings is itself politics. Therefore, what I would like to understand is where is the boundary line between politics and non-politics. I believe that all those who are engaged in political science research should not avoid politics. Political science must adopt a scientific attitude and face the real world. After the lecture, I answered each and every question that was raised regarding practical politics. In the lecture, however, I explored the connotations of the concept of politics and its role from a purely theoretical standpoint. Observing our planet from above the earth, I discovered that there are two basic processes related to mankind. Because human activity continually transforms the appearance of the natural world, building up what I have called "man-made nature," the first basic process is the increasing artifactualization of the natural world, that is, the expansion of man-made nature. The second basic process arises from the conflicts that occur when humans form into groups, including large-scale violent behavior and wars. We can see that on the earth's surface, the human transformation of the natural world is not identical everywhere. A thousand years ago the level of human transformation in The Search for Nonpoliticized Channels

I 67

Europe and Asia far exceeded that of the Americas and Africa. But today, as we approach the year 2000, the extent of human transformation in the Euro-American regions is much greater than that in Asia and Africa. The continent of Antarctica has remained in its original state for thousands of years, and human activity has not caused it to change greatly. Even within China the extent of human transformation varies, being greater along the coast than in the interior. In the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan Plateau, the extent of man-made changes is quite limited. H o w has man managed to intensify the degree of human transformation over certain areas? If we make a careful study of mankind, we discover that humans frequently engage in an activity that is not found in animal societies—namely, the regular exchange of produced goods. The fundamental rules of exchange are these. First, no coercion exists between the parties who participate in the exchange. Second, when exchanges cease, no one party is able to obtain greater benefits. Otherwise, further exchanges between them would not develop. People's needs and wishes are thus met through an exchange that is established on a strictly voluntary basis. In human history such exchange has passed through three stages. The first was exchange based on actual goods. The second, coming after the development of currencies, was an exchange between currency on one hand and commodities or labor on the other. The third is purely symbolic exchange. Purely symbolic exchange refers not to the exchange of commodities or labor but to the exchange of things carrying a certain social symbolism, such as currency, stocks, and bonds. Today, alongside the "real economy," we see the growth of a "symbolic economy," which has increasing influence on human affairs. One could say that it is precisely this sort of ceaseless exchange which allows resources to achieve a new and rational distribution. In this way the human transformation of the environment can expand and deepen ceaselessly. 68

I Toward a Democratic China

Economics and symbolic economics study how men distribute their limited resources so as to meet their needs. As I scanned the surface of the earth looking for traces of politics, I discovered that in those places where resources are distributed through strictly voluntary exchange, there is no politics to be found. Of course, when distribution is linked with coercion, politics appears. In our survey of human society, where we discover examples of large-scale violence and war we find processes that are quite unlike economic processes. Here coercion and intimidation are the key elements. Through coercion, intimidation, and even violence, the needs of some are fulfilled while the needs of others are stifled. Yet, in certain places on the planet, large-scale violence and war are occurring less and less. The reason is that human societies have given rise to entities called states, and within the scope of these states, large-scale violence and war can be avoided. In his book How Is America Governed, Roger Hilsman raises the following questions: "Why is it that a nation can avoid large-scale, organized violence over long periods of time, whereas the international community has difficulty avoiding organized violence among nations? Why are some nations spared the occurrence of organized mass violence within their borders, while other nations cannot avoid it?" Thomas Hobbes, the British philosopher and author of The Leviathan, believed that a state is ruled by governmental reliance on the police and army as "iron fists" to maintain social stability. Other political thinkers believe that common conceptions of power and justice, as well as other values held by a majority of the members of a society, are the reason why largescale, organized violence is avoided. Hilsman allows that a stable state's avoidance of war can certainly be due to its use of the Hobbesian iron fists to maintain certain value orientations. But Hilsman believes there is another reason as well, namely, The Search for Nonpoliticized

Channels

I 69

that a state usually has procedures that by and large meet with the people's approval. It is through these procedures that political and social change can be accomplished. I believe that human political behavior itself is a kind of mechanism for avoiding frequent, violent conflict. Moreover, the institutionalization of politics facilitates the avoidance of large-scale, organized violence and war. Of course, the institutionalization of politics itself depends on the formation of common value orientations in society. After this elaboration on the role of politics, I resumed my inquiry into the implications of the concept of politics. I used the term "society" to refer to an aggregation composed of individuals capable of autonomous action, who exchange information and, through this exchange of information, thereby influence each other's behavior. It is perfectly obvious that an aggregation of micro particles in Brownian motion or the solar system is not a society, whereas an aggregation of people who mutually influence each other does constitute a society. Such a definition of society also includes international communities, societies of nonprimate animals, and robot societies, the members of which are, respectively, states, nonprimate animals, and robots. The complexity of social problems stems from the fact that (i) individual members of a society all have the capacity for autonomous action, and (2) among individuals there can be friendly relationships as well as the propensity to pilfer, harm, and even exterminate other individuals. When a group within a society has a strong and pressing wish that goes unsatisfied for a protracted period, that group may resort to violence or the threat of violence in an attempt to realize its aspirations. I then went on to say: Human behavior is determined by motivations. If people had no wishes or needs, or if their needs could readily be fulfilled at any time, severe conflicts would not occur in human societies, 70

I Toward a Democratic China

much less large-scale, organized violence and war. Generally speaking, people's aspirations and needs may be divided into three types. They are biological needs, social needs, and spiritual needs. Biological needs are demands for things that guarantee the individual's survival—food, water, sleep, appropriate temperatures, freedom from external threat, and so on. From these come countless derivative needs, such as the need to produce the necessary clothing, housing, technology, and means of self-protection. Social needs include the needs for intimacy, friendship, love, mutual respect, and concern. The term "spiritual needs" refers to our understanding of the world around us and our place within it, and of the value of an individual's existence. The Soviet neurophysiologist Simonov Ilchev has discovered that an individual's behavior is closely connected to these needs and his estimation of how possible the fulfillment of these needs might be. 1 4 A person can consciously or unconsciously assess the possibility of his needs being fulfilled. It is precisely because people have needs that they are disposed to take action. And it is precisely because people have the capacity for autonomous action that they can influence others and affect society with their behavior. What they do can promote strife and upheaval, or promote tranquility and order. If a person motivated by an intense need can foresee that the possibility of achieving it is small, he can rationally avoid using violence to fulfill his needs. On the other hand, if a person motivated by an intense need feels there is a great possibility of fulfilling it, and reality turns out not to be in accord with his wishes, this person is bound to give vent to his indignation. Through centuries and millennia of real-life experience, 14. See Simonov Ilchev, "What Is the Soul?" (in Chinese),

(Nature), no. 3, 1987; Guowai

Ziran

shehui kexue (Foreign social science),

no. 10,1987. [Author's note] The Search for Nonpoliticized Channels

I 71

mankind has formulated mechanisms for fulfilling needs and for judging the possibility of those needs being fulfilled. Among these mechanisms the most important are those which satisfy needs through production and exchange. When someone seizes the wealth of others in society by guile or deceit, he will be conscious that he is committing an act which society does not condone. People know that they can satisfy their needs either through their own labor or through gaining control of the means of production. When people are faced with an irresistible natural force, they do not respond with rage even though it might keep them from fulfilling their needs. When our homes are destroyed by flood, fire, hurricane, or earthquake, we do not feel anger in the face of these irresistible natural forces. But in the face of society we do tend to feel that we have free will, and that we should be able to achieve our aims without external constraints. But if society had no constraints or rules, then the pursuit of individual aims would stir up widespread discord everywhere, leading to countless acts of violence. Therefore human societies have given rise to various means—religion, economics, ethics, politics, and others—that satisfy people's needs while at the same time limiting their needs. The means of economics helps to fulfill the needs of individuals through publicly endorsed methods of fair exchange. Religion employs a supernatural force and attempts to convince people that no one can evade the constraints on people's actions decreed by this force. As for ethics, it consists in the restraint of individual needs through ideas engendered in one's own mind. Only politics uses authoritative force, and only politics exerts apparent or implicit coercion, with the approval of society, to restrain the fulfillment of people's needs. In the natural world, nonliving objects depend on the forces of nature to bring them into being and determine their interrelationships. In human society the free action of each autonomously acting individual is limited not only by the 72

I Toward a Democratic China

forces of the natural world, but also by supernatural religious forces, moral forces within the mind, and the forces of social authority. It is impossible to have absolute freedom of action. In reality, politics is a means of social control that makes use of people's efforts to create authoritative institutions. These institutions cause people to obey the forces of social authority and submit to authoritative decisions. Within a social aggregation, all phenomena that have to do with the creation of institutions of authority or with changes in the relations of authority are political phenomena. If the force of authority comes from God or from certain teachings, then this is a theological politics. If the force of authority comes from hereditary tradition, then it is a monarchial politics. The institutionalization of politics is an attempt to use procedures approved of by the majority in establishing a structure for authoritative decision making. Such institutions rely neither on the divine authority of the supernatural, nor on a system of hereditary tradition, but rather on a system that has been consented to and determined in advance by a majority of the people. In many human aggregations today there are different levels of authority. Within a state the authority of the constitution is higher than that of ordinary laws; the authority of laws is higher than that of administrative regulations; and the authority of administrative regulations is higher than that of specific decisions by administrative officials. When people express dissent from authoritative decisions, a good political system lets them seek help, according to certain procedures, from a higher level of authority in order to resolve disputes. The point of such things as the legislature, the administration, the judiciary, and administrative review, judicial review, and elections, impeachment, and citizen voting is to convince people that the force of authority holds sway over their society, and that its measures are as irresistible as the forces of nature. The more The Search for Nonpoliticized Channels

I 73

fully people understand this authority, the more likely they will be to obey it. Thus politics is closely bound up with the creation of authoritative institutions, with the struggle for positions of authority in policy making, and with the use of policymaking authority to regulate various social benefits. To give more power to the institutions of authority in society, people have constantly searched for effective ways to create authoritative structures and to secure the institutionalization of power. N o authority can be divorced from popular recognition in society. Once people begin to question the original authority, new political theories will arise, and changes will occur in the original political order. The theories of the Enlightenment thinkers and those of M a r x both played this kind of role in world history. Politics is a means of social control which functions by affirming institutions of authority while making people submit to the force of social authority and to authoritative policies. Even in societies where social harmony and order prevail, deterrence by authority never disappears. "If a political system is unable, over a long period, to fulfill the important and pressing aims of a social group enjoying popular influence nationwide, then violent acts may occur, perhaps even large-scale, organized violence." 15 The point of politics is to establish authority and adjust its mechanisms in such a way that the potentiality for large-scale, organized violence is broken down into countless tiny imperatives that people come to accept, either willingly or unwillingly. Of course there are bound to be certain people in society, or certain groups, that are unwilling to obey or believe in such authority. They might publicly disobey the strictures of authority or perhaps even obey them as they 15. See Hilsman, How America Is Governed (in Chinese), Commercial Press, 1986, p. 27. [Author's note]

74

I Toward a Democratic

China

struggle for positions of policy-making authority. Thus the realm of politics is full of infighting, strife, and compromise, as well as deceit for selfish ends. As long as there is a need within a social organization for positions of authority, and struggles to gain such positions, there will be politics within that organization. Therefore politics in the broad sense exists not only in the changing power relationships in a state, but also in the changing power relationships of families, organized social collectivities, political parties, enterprises, schools, and international organizations. Many of the activities of a social organization are apolitical, but when one member of the organization makes use of plots, divisive tactics, slanted publicity, or hidden affiliations to scheme for a position within the organization, or to change its power relationships, this member is engaged in "organizational politics," as opposed to state politics. The power struggles of an extended feudal family as described in the novel Dream of Red Mansions are the internal politics of a feudal family in China. Since China's feudal form of government was an extension and expansion of the feudal family system, the internal politics of families had much in common with the politics of the feudal state. Up to this point I have revealed various features of the concept of politics, but this does not mean that I have given a strict definition of politics. When I speak of authority, I am using the word in a sense that is generally accepted in political science, that is, coercive implementation backed by a socially recognized armed force. It is not enough for a definition that it embrace all the connotations of a concept. It is also necessary that the defining concept and the defined concept correspond in their extension. If we carefully examine the definitions of politics, we find that for every definition there are actual instances of politics which the definition does not

The Search for Nonpoliticized Channels

I 75

include, 1 6 or the definition includes instances that are obviously not politics. That is to say, the boundaries of the concept of politics are fairly vague; in other words, on the map representing the world of thought, the realm of political science does not have clearly defined borders. However, we can draw two boundary lines within this world of thought, one of which we can call the inner boundary and the other the outer boundary. All phenomena within the inner boundary are political phenomena, and all phenomena outside the outer boundary are not political phenomena. In the area between the inner and outer boundaries it is difficult to draw a further line of distinction between the political and the nonpolitical. In my view the inner boundary is this: any phenomena having to do with change in the power relationships within a social group. In the world of thought, the outer boundary of political action can be drawn in this way: any purely individual behavior, 1 7 or behavior within a social group, by which value is distributed in a voluntary manner. Examples are going for a solitary stroll, painting a picture, swimming, or engaging in a commercial activity not subject to governmental interference. Of course, the inner and outer boundaries drawn for any concept are not the only possible ones. The inner and outer boundaries of many concepts can be superimposed, but for concepts involving human activity, such as philosophy, politics, economics, science, and culture, it seems there is no way to superimpose these lines. An important trend in contemporary philosophy is to push the inner boundary of the concept "philosophy" 16. Some say the enterprise of modernization is contemporary China's greatest politics, so that the concept of politics should include economic construction. Strictly speaking, economic construction does not equal politics, but to strive for economic development and to put emphasis on economic construction may be said to be a basic policy of political parties or government. [Author's note] 17. "Purely individual behavior" refers to individual behavior that does not develop an exchange of information with other human groups.

[Author's note] 76

I Toward a Democratic China

steadily outward, while drawing the concept's outer boundary steadily inward. Of course, political science is faced with a similar problem of narrowing the borderline sector of the concept of politics through a process of expanding its inner boundary and contracting its outer boundary. In the world of thought, the realms of political science, economics, sociology, legal studies, psychology, and anthropology all have these borderline sectors in their territory. But in the realm of natural dialectics which I once inhabited, there was no way to locate the borderline sector of its territory. Thus the territory of natural dialectics was open to unimpeded forays and encroachments by the "armies" of the realms of physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology, sociology, and physical science. The subjects of the realm of natural dialectics were disgusted by the haughty arrogance that the subjects of these other states displayed, and when residents of the realm of natural dialectics went traveling to other states, they were not received with even a modicum of courtesy. As soon as I understood that a crucial question within the borderline sector of the realm of political science had to do with changes in power relationships, I made a careful examination of this question. I discovered that changes in power relationships follow different patterns under different systems. In organizational structures having comprehensive and viable rules, changes in power relationships are institutionalized and follow definite procedures. Various private transactions may occur among people, but these are subject to the limitations set by certain rules. In social bodies that lack rules (including bodies made up of people who hold power over a nation), changes in power relationships are not procedurally defined, and thus transfers of power are precipitated by deaths among actual power holders, by incidents of violence, and are attended by toadyism, factionalism, manipulation, plots, and intrigue. In any social organization, actions that alter power relationships are all instances of political behavior. Thus, in a social body lacking the necessary complement of rules, it is not surprising The Search for Nonpoliticized Channels

I 77

to find a linkage between politics and the hideous. In the histories of China and the world, there has been no end to palace coups, slaughter, wars of succession, and other such political incidents. Samuel Huntington, an American political scientist, believes that the social contradictions generated by the process of modernization will lead people to make greater demands for political participation, but under conditions where politics lacks institutionalization such demands for political participation may easily lead to political instability. After my entry into the realm of political science, I found that certain things are necessary if politics is to be held in good repute. On one hand, human affairs should be depoliticized as much as possible. That is, the various human affairs need to be handled according to laws and regulations that are not colored by individual emotions. On the other hand, those affairs that cannot be depoliticized should be institutionalized and endowed with procedures, especially with respect to the formation of authoritative organizations and changes in power relationships. Of course, it is necessary to have this institutionalization and proceduralism built on a basis that is consistent with the majority will—in other words, to institutionalize a democratic politics. Therefore I believe that only with democracy and the rule of law is it possible to realize long-term political stability while at the same time guaranteeing freedom and human rights.

78

I Toward a Democratic China

II Toward a Chinese Civil Service System

Implementation of a civil service system is intended to provide a stable office-holding system within government organizations in order to depoliticize the changes in power relationships among officials. Civil servants form a type of profession, as do doctors, lawyers, and educators. Their rights are guaranteed by law, but otherwise they enjoy no special privileges. There should be no need for them to curry favor with superiors, for as long as they work earnestly they are able to gain promotion as specified by law. Their hiring, training, and retirement proceed in strict accordance with an established system. Minor officials in the civil service system can thus hold their own against powerful office heads and general secretaries. In 1981 and 1982 I wrote several articles addressing the topic of civil service systems in foreign countries.1 At the time my understanding of a civil service system was as follows: 1. These articles include " 'Changren zhi' he 'xianren zhi' " (Permanent appointment systems and temporary appointment systems),

Liberation

Daily, April 16, 1986; "Xuanju, renming, kaoshi" (Elections, appointments, and examinations), Xue lilun (Theoretical studies), no. 4, 1982. [Author's note]

79

First, it selects the most qualified civil servants through a system of competitive public examinations (exceptions can be made for a small number of high-ranking officials and the most basic odd-job workers). Second, it sets up various rankings of officials and evaluates their daily work, promoting them on the basis of their ability. Hiring and advancement are done according to a legally prescribed process of appointment. Civil servants are not subject to an elective system with prescribed terms of office; once appointed they are installed in a permanent-appointment system, except for retirement, resignation, dismissal for errors of negligence, and death.2 In June 1982, after receiving a majority of the votes in the Institute of Political Science, I assumed duties as head of the institute's preparatory committee. My first decision at the institute was to pursue research on civil service systems. On July 15,1982., the institute submitted to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences a report entitled "Initiating Comparative Research on Civil Service Systems," which recommended establishing a task force for such research, opening a training class on the subject, and sending delegations of specialists to examine the civil service systems in England, the United States, France, West Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Ghana. From this comparative research would come proposals to reform China's cadre system. At the time I did not know that these undertakings would prove to be quite difficult. I only felt that this research was something needed by society, so I proposed the project and did my best to bring it about. The first actual task of the Institute of Political Science was to translate materials on the civil service systems of the seven countries. These documents included The Civil Service System of France, The Civil Service System of England, Basic Laws and Regulations of the American Civil Service System, Laws on Officials of 2. "Xuanju, renming, kaoshi," Xue

1982. [Author's note] 80

I Toward a Democratic China

lilun (Theoretical studies), no. 4,

the Federal Republic of Germany, The Civil Service System of Japan, The Federal Civil Service System of Canada, The Swedish Civil Service System, and a survey report on civil service systems in England and France, written by a Ghanian. The entire project was organized by Li Fang, chairman of the institute's Research Section on Public Administration. The translations were done by Li Fang himself, with contributions from Pan Shiqiang, Yuan Yueyun, Li Li, Li Fan, Li Sanyuan, Pan Xiaojuan, and Geng Xiaoman. 3 In August 1982 the International Political Science Association held its Twelfth World Congress in Brazil. Professor Hu Qi'an of Beijing University, Chen Weidian, secretary-general of the Chinese Political Science Association, Ma Jiarui, and I attended the congress as observers. On our way home from Rio de Janeiro the four of us stopped for two days in New York. Aside from sightseeing, we met with Xu Naijiong, director of the Office of Development and Management in the Department of Technical Cooperation at the United Nations, with whom we discussed the possibility of holding a workshop to compare civil service systems in Beijing. This particular office of the U.N. is charged with evaluating and providing information about civil service systems. Xu Naijiong told us that the U.N. itself had instituted a complete civil service system. The reform of China's cadre system would take much effort, requiring a long-term perspective. Moreover, it would be necessary to establish research centers, educational centers, and information centers, as well as institutes for public administration. After a series of further contacts and preparation, the Institute of Political Science sponsored a "Workshop on the Comparative Study of Civil Service Systems" from April 2 to June 4,1983. The U.N.'s Department of Technical Cooperation invited two specialists who gave 3. Materials on the civil service system of these seven countries were published in supplements to Zhenzhixue cankao ziliao (Reference materials on political science), nos. 2, 3, 4 (1983), and nos. 1 , 2 , 3 (1984). [Author's note] Toward a Chinese Civil Service System

I 81

systematic introductions to the civil service systems of France and England. The two experts were an American professor, Allen Campbell, then chairman of President Carter's Civil Service Commission, and Professor Raoul Demerest, chairman of the Department of Public Administration and Domestic Law at the First University in Paris. Because I was on a visit to Japan at the time, the project was headed by Professor Lin Ying of the Institute of Political Science. The work of the Institute of Political Science in its preparatory stages thus included research on the civil service systems in foreign countries as well as translating and disseminating materials relating to current developments in political science in Western countries. Through the combined efforts of the political science community in China, including the researchers at the Institute of Political Science, the concept of a civil service system came to be accepted by increasing numbers of people in China. In 1985 works such as Civil Service Systems by Gong Xiangrui, Western Systems of Civil Service by Yang Baikui et al., and An Introduction to Systems of Public Servants in Foreign Countries, edited by Cao Zhi, were published and played an important role in spreading the concept of civil service systems in China. For about one year, from October 1986 through October 1987,1 participated in research on reforming China's political institutions. In November 1986 I advanced the proposal, based on our study of foreign civil service systems, that appointments to government positions should be clearly divided into two types: political appointments and appointments by law. Moreover, I recommended this idea as the cornerstone for establishing a Chinese civil service system—in other words, a state system of civil servants. Political appointments would meet the needs of executive officeholders in promoting their policies. These appointments would require only that the officeholder make a recommendation, which would then be approved or recognized through certain established procedures. Appointments by law, on the other hand, would meet the needs for 82 I Toward a Democratic China

continuity and stability and thereby increase the administrative efficiency of the state's administrative organs. If state positions were all to be filled by politically appointed officials, a large turnover of officials would occur with each change of executive officeholders at the various levels of government, resulting in a loss of continuity and efficiency in government operations. There are three distinctions between political appointments and appointments by law: 1. There are no strictures placed on the qualifications, experience, or conditions set for political appointees. Whether or not a person obtains an appointment depends on the conditions set by the person making the appointment, based on the needs of his office in promoting his policies. Appointments by law are strictly regulated as to the educational level, specialized training, work experience, and other conditions set for the appointee. The rules are applied uniformly for everyone without discrimination. The person making the appointment cannot decide who to hire or promote on the basis of personal preference or connections. 2. Political appointments are made for fixed terms. Usually when the appointing official is replaced, there is a corresponding turnover of politically appointed government officials. (Of course, there might also be a small number of cases where there is no turnover, or where replacements are made after extension of the term in office. ) Appointments by law are long-term and are not revoked except in cases of negligence. 3. There is no unified administrative organ for politically appointed officials, who are directly responsible to those who appointed them. Officials appointed by law are under a unified administration. Of course, the existence of this unified administration does not mean that all administrative power over personnel is concentrated in a certain organ; rather, it means that the practice of uniform administration according to cateToward a Chinese Civil Service System

I 83

gory and rank is exercised over hiring, advancement, evaluation, transfer, training, welfare benefits, and retirement. On November 26, 1987, I published an article in the Wenhui Daily entitled "On Two Types of Appointment Systems" in which I openly publicized the proposals I had made a year earlier based on our research on how to reform China's cadre system. In this article I stated: To eliminate bureaucratic abuse, we must begin by doing away with the conditions that foster it. Obviously, it is not enough simply to upgrade the work methods of our bureau chiefs, department chiefs, and section heads; more importantly, we must institutionalize the rule of law in our government personnel system so that government workers can take to heart the idea of responsibility for their own work. . . . Aside from clarifying the duties and jurisdiction of each position and each organ, government institutions themselves must establish a system that will allow government workers to start from the actual situation of their work and, in a matter-of-fact manner, to analyze and solve the various problems they encounter in the discharge of their duties without having to speculate about or cater to the biases of their superiors. As long as the work of a government employee is effective and produces solid results, his superior should not be able to prejudice his possible promotion or have him fired on some pretext, especially when the worker has not erred in performance. In short, it is necessary to establish a system for government personnel such that the principle of appointment by merit cannot become jeopardized by the actions of a few so-called talent scouts. Rather, we must use the rule of law as a guarantee for implementing this principle.4 4. Yan Jiaqi, "Lun jianli guojia gongwuyuan zhidu de biyaoxing" (On the necessity of establishing a system of state public servants), Wenhui Daily, November z6,1987. 84

I Toward a Democratic China

Once China establishes a system of state public functionaries, government officials will be divided into two major categories— politically appointed officials and civil servants. The former will be designated functionaries in government affairs. The latter will be called operational functionaries. Some believe that a civil service system is a byproduct of a two-party or multiparty political system. Actually, this claim is untenable because civil service systems have been implemented in both Hong Kong and the United Nations, but in neither does party politics exist. In China, on the other hand, the same political party had in fact implemented very dissimilar policies during and after the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, there is an equally pressing need in China to establish a comprehensive and sound civil service system that will guarantee the continuity and stability of government operations whenever transitions in administrations or changes in policies occur. In March 1988 China held its Seventh National People's Congress, which proposed that China "establish and gradually implement a system of state public functionaries." The proposal called for the following: "Speedy drafting of a code for state public functionaries, research on and formulation of a law regulating state public functionaries, establishment of institutes for public administration, and training of personnel in administration and management." In addition, the congress passed measures to abolish the existing Ministry of Labor Personnel and set up a special Ministry of Personnel to manage state functionaries. I am confident that after ten to twenty years of effort, China will succeed in establishing a complete system of government administration which is comprehensive in function, rational in structure, and coordinated in its operations, as well as being flexible and highly efficient.

Toward a Chinese Civil Service System

I 85

12 On Universal Cultural Factors

The vast territory of the realm of political science is composed of many principalities and fiefdoms, both large and small. For example, there are those of political sociology, political psychology, political ethics, comparative politics, analytical political science, the study of biopolitics, the politics of peace, international politics, the politics of outer space, studies of political parties and other sociopolitical organizations, regional political studies, public administration, and so on. Unlike in the realm of natural dialectics, these member states do not agitate for independence or challenge the authority of their central government. Within the realm of political science and its member states, however, there are two major schools of thought. One claims that different human groups have correspondingly different political sciences, whereas the other insists that there is only one kind of political science which transcends national and ethnic boundaries. Besides these two major schools, of course, there are many other intermediate schools that assume different viewpoints. Only after my entry into the realm of political science did it become clear to me that different disciplinary realms all have their own difficult issues. Realms that are fully harmonious and free of contradictions exist only as a kind of idealized entity. 86

In the realm of political science there are incessant debates over concepts such as power, democracy, freedom, equality, human rights, the rule of law, and justice. I discovered there is a world of difference in how different groups of people understand these ideas. Moreover, since there is almost no way to reconcile the divergences among them, those belonging to the first school of thought continue to maintain that different human groups have different political sciences. I believe, however, that inasmuch as political science is a science, its basic concepts cannot be altered to accord with the different people who apply them. Thus I have devoted a great deal of effort to describing the divergent understandings of the concept of democracy held by different peoples, and in different eras. 1 At the same time, I believe there are standards of democracy that transcend national and ethnic boundaries. As a type of political system, democracy cannot be separated from freedom of speech and freedom of political participation. Citizens must rely on these rights in order to decide or exert an influence on the composition of government and its policies. Thus freedom does not mean doing as one pleases or realizing one's every desire. Instead, it is the right to do whatever is permitted by law. Human rights are none other than the realm "in which political power cannot infringe." The rule of law means governance according to the law. Rule of law is implemented when people are governed by nothing but the law, which means that even leaders with the greatest power must also obey the law. Whether it is invoked to punish or protect, the law treats all equally without discrimination. Implementation of the rule of law means making use of laws to guarantee that the individual's rights and freedoms are not infringed upon. Simultaneously, it limits state power and prevents the i . Yan Jiaqi, "Guanyu minzhu gainian de hanyi" (On definitions of the concept of democracy), Beijing Daily, Theoretical Front column, no. 7, M a y 4, 1979. Reprinted in my anthology Quanli yu zhengli (Power and truth), Guangming Daily Press, 1987, pp. 1 7 - 3 3 . [Author's note]

On Universal Cultural Factors

I 87

abuse of power. Of course, different countries have different laws, but common standards of democracy, freedom, human rights, and so on do exist. N o longer does anyone come forth to defend the unprecedented suppression of democracy and the rule of law in the periods of the Soviet purges and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Gradually, after cutting through the ideological fog, I have come to realize that there are two kinds of cultural factors operative in any country or people. One is the traditional culture of the native country or native people. The other is a culture that transcends national and ethnic boundaries, and that comes about through an elevation of the level of understanding and through progress in techniques of social administration. Of course, pluralism is a fundamental characteristic of cultures. N o amount of increase in nation-to-nation and global interchanges will ever eliminate cultural differences on a worldwide scale. Moreover, it is even more certain that subcultures of all kinds and colors will continue to exist. Differences between countries in conceptions of values, levels of knowledge and understanding, and techniques of social administration produce and will continue to produce many kinds of differences in their respective cultures. 2 However, I believe that as cultural interchanges expand, a new transnational and transethnic culture, shared by all of mankind, will emerge from the concepts of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, social justice, and humanism. The idea of universal cultural factors has been subject to a great deal of abuse in China, and this is an important reason for the long persistence of China's underdeveloped traditional culture. In January 1984 the notion of humanism was subjected to fierce criticism and attack. The environment of academic freedom, which had emerged since the discussions of the standards of truth in 1978, suf2. Yan Jiaqi, "Yao xietiao liangzhong wenhua yinsu de fazhan" (The need to moderate the development of two types of cultural factors), Guangming Daily, January 17,1986. [Author's note] 88

I Toward a Democratic China

fered many restrictions and the skies of the Chinese intellectual and cultural community were covered with a layer of darkening haze. In mid-19861 wrote as follows: Academic freedom is not just an important precondition for the development of science; it is also an intrinsically valuable goal for all scholars who inquire into the truth. Those who are involved in academic research hope to publish their own views freely and straightforwardly. They hope for an environment where they will not be attacked for pursuing the truth, where they can work to help China's science and culture flourish. They hope to see the day when our great motherland will produce wave after wave of scientific and cultural giants. 3 At that time in China, however, scholars were required to come forth to make their views known—that is, to step forward and criticize humanism. Three times in succession I ignored invitations from the organization in charge of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences requesting that I attend meetings to "purge spiritual pollution." In early January of 1984, the leadership of the academy designated me by name to make a speech at a meeting to discuss humanism. The environment at the academy was so abnormal then that if one wished to serve as an administrator of a research institute, one thereby relinquished the freedom to remain silent. Compelled to the extreme, on January 20 I submitted a letter of resignation to Sun Shangqing, the deputy secretary-general of the academy in charge of the Institute of Political Science. I asked to be relieved of my post as head of the institute's preparatory committee. By doing so, I hoped to secure my freedom to remain silent on the issue of humanism. Subsequently Sun Shangqing and R u X i n , vice president of the 3. Yan Jiaqi, "Zuiqiu zhengli he meihao yuanwang youxian yu yiqie"

(The aspiration to pursue truth and beauty supersedes all else), People's

Daily, June 13,1986. [Author's note] On Universal Cultural Factors

I 89

academy and a longtime colleague, had a talk with me. Ru Xin remarked in a friendly way, "It looks as if you are resigning for political reasons!" I did not acknowledge this to Ru Xin at the time, but instead cited "discordant interpersonal relations" with colleagues as the reason for my resignation. Only later did I come to realize that whatever the situation I should have discussed it on its own merits. If one feels a righteous discontent over a certain matter or person, it is improper to vent that discontent on an unrelated or only partly related matter or person. If one behaves in this way, one will have to bear the consequences. By offering to resign because of "discordant interpersonal relations," which in fact were not a serious problem, I was in effect saying to all the members of the Institute of Political Science that internal contradictions existed within the institute's preparatory committee, and this in turn placed my cooperative colleagues in a difficult position. As a result, I exacerbated what originally had not been a matter of serious interpersonal conflict at the workplace. Recalling that incident today, I still find it regrettable. Lacking an open and adequate reason, I could not ignore the reactions of the entire staff of the institute and insist on doing as I pleased. Unable to resign, I had no choice but to participate in a symposium on humanism organized by the academy. I was joined by some of the senior social scientists and administrators of the academy and its institutes, including Ru Xin, Xing Fensi, Zhang Youyu, Liu Danian, Feng Zhi, Ye Shuifu, Xu Dixin, and Lin Ganquan. For my part I read a prepared text entitled "The Definition and Characteristics of Humanism." In my view, humanism is a universal cultural achievement transcending national and ethnic boundaries—something that belongs to humanity as a whole. I proposed that humanism has two special characteristics: First, it emphasizes human beings and their values. Life, nature, love, honor, knowledge, talent, freedom, happiness, and the like are all things of value to humans. To appreciate 90

I Toward a Democratic China

human beings and their values from the perspective of humanism means to affirm the so-called reasonableness of human nature—cherishing life and nature, seeking love and honor, valuing knowledge and abilities, and yearning for freedom and happiness. Second, humanism places "human nature" or common human characteristics above social differences. Humanism does not deny that there are social differences among people, nor does it regard all people in society as uniform. It recognizes the divisions between aristocrats and commoners, clerics and laity, merchants and handicraftsmen, and so on. It recognizes differences in social status, thinking, character, and behavior. Nevertheless, humanism places the shared tendencies of man's nature above these social differences. From the perspective of humanism, anything that negates our humanity must be opposed, condemned, and attacked. Elaborating these points, I told the gathering: Humanism does not simply treat all people equally without discrimination, nor does it regard everyone as having the same lofty human nature. It reserves its praises for people who love life and nature, who pursue love and honor, who value knowledge and ability, who yearn for freedom and happiness, and even those who embrace a spirit of sacrifice. At the same time it mercilessly castigates people who are hypocritical, ignorant, arrogant, and corrupt. Taking an example from Victor Hugo's Ninety-three,

I explained:

In this novel Hugo depicts the French republican army's suppression in 1793 of a counterrevolutionary rebellion in the Vendee region. The fugitive royalist leader Marquis Languedoc lets himself be taken prisoner so that he can rescue three children from a fire, and is condemned to be hanged. The Marquis' selfless act arouses an intense conflict in the mind of On Universal Cultural Factors

I 91

Commander Gouane, the representative of the revolution. Killing the Marquis would be a violation of conscience, but releasing him would be an negation of responsibility! In Ninety-three Hugo writes, "Although the revolution might be entirely correct, above it is humanism, which is all the more correct. And so Gouane set the Marquis free and took his place in the dungeon. In the end he was sentenced to death." This is why I say that humanism is not just a system of thought that gives importance to human beings and their values, or celebrates freedom and happiness. More than that, it views these aspects of human nature as being above social differences, class conflicts, or even revolutionary ideologies. In his lengthy novel Les Miserables Victor Hugo tells of the many vicissitudes the conscript Jean Valjean experiences on his way to becoming the mayor of a city. Once when a vagrant is mistaken for Jean Valjean and is put on trial, the mayor goes before the court and admits his true name. He himself is placed under arrest so that the vagrant can go free. For Jean Valjean, "conscience was a higher thing than the mayor's seat." Such a spirit of humanity attains an elevation that takes it beyond the distinctions of conscript and mayor, making it something that belongs to humanity as a whole. In the tempest of criticism against humanism, Jiao Ye, a colleague at my institute, told me that my remarks were a "perverse counter current." I believe, however, that academic freedom should be established on the basis of the principle that the aspiration to pursue truth supersedes all other aspirations. Under circumstances that were smothering academic freedom I had to express my views in carefully chosen words, but I held firmly to the concept of universal cultural factors. Thus I did not betray the dictates of conscience by attacking the universal cultural factors of humanism, democracy, and freedom. On December 1 7 , 1 9 8 6 , 1 published an article, "Introducing and Absorbing the Universal Cultural Factors of All Mankind," in the 92.

I Toward a Democratic China

Chinese Cultural News.4 In it I argued that the boundless world of thought contained, in addition to Marxism, various strands of thought from the natural sciences and social sciences, as well as artistic and religious thought, and the whole spectrum of rationalist and nonrationalist thought. Today in the twentieth century, having moved beyond the era of religious reformation, it is unnecessary to regard the cultural elements common to all mankind, which indeed constitute the progressive achievement of human civilization, as developments or integral parts of Marxist thought. It is also unnecessary to disseminate those ideas by dressing them in Marxist garb. Mathematics, chemistry, physics, political science, economics, sociology—many of their concepts are scientific, and are constituent parts of mankind's spiritual culture. It is equally unnecessary to disseminate them by putting them in Marxist dress. The notion that something is non-Marxist refers only to inquiry from the standpoint of Marxism. In reality not only are the theories of the natural sciences extra-Marxist, but so are many of the theories in the social sciences. This article was published precisely at the time, at the end of 1986, when a student movement of unprecedented proportions broke out in eleven provinces and municipalities all over China. I knew very little about the circumstances of the student movement, and the publication of the article was unconnected with the student demonstrations. However, because I had been critical of the use of the pretext of "defending the purity of Marxism" to reject a universal culture belonging to all mankind, this essay was later found to be guilty of "promoting bourgeois liberalization." Long passages from it were included in a compilation circulated for use in the campaign to criticize bourgeois liberalization.5 In the essay I had sug4. Zhongguo wenhua bao. 5. In January and February of 1988 when I was in the U . S . , I saw copies of this booklet, which reprinted excerpts of my remarks, in the libraries of Columbia University and the University of Michigan. [Author's note]

On Universal Cultural Factors

I 93

gested that, seen in historical perspective, a closed and isolated China has been unwilling to acknowledge the existence of universal cultural factors. After its defeat in the Opium War, China began to recognize science and technology as elements of a universal culture, but it was still reluctant to acknowledge any others. The nineteenth-century formulation "Chinese learning for essential principles and Western learning for application" was a reflection of this kind of thinking, and it provided the theoretical basis, such as it w a s , for modern China's resistance to foreign cultures. Time and again in China, the persistent repudiation of the concept of universal cultural factors has constituted one of the main reasons for the long-term preservation of backward elements of the traditional culture. The call to "preserve the purity of Marxism," it may be said, is the reincarnation in contemporary times of the old "Chinese substance/Western application" formulation. 6 To this day I still believe strongly that the level of China's advancement will be directly proportional to its degree of openness to the outside world. In addition, that progress will be directly proportional to the degree of recognition and acceptance in China of the universal cultural factors in human civilization.

6. In the article Yan pointed out that Marxism is also of foreign origin, but it played an indisputable positive role in the victory of the Chinese revolution. Afterwards, he argued, "the forces of Chinese traditional culture invaded Marxism," thus rendering this Western theory ineffective. This seems to be the route of his ultimate rejection of Marxism-Leninism as articulated in 1989-90.

94

I Toward a Democratic China

r

3

On Heads of State and Government

Following my entry into the realm of political science, I endeavored to discover, study, explore, and disseminate those universal cultural factors that transcend national and ethnic boundaries in the realm of politics. To do so, I analyzed the different systems of government of countries throughout the world, conducted research on the problem of limited terms of office for heads of state and government, and studied various theories concerning the behavior of political leaders. These three projects culminated in the following works: Political Systems of States,1 Life-tenure and Limited-term Appointment Systems,2 and On Heads of State and Government. 3 Science is a world of three freedoms. That is to say, (i) science is free of prohibitions, (2) science is free of idols, and (3) science is free 1. Guojia zhengti, People's Press, 1982. 2.. Zhongxheng

zhi yu xianren zhi, Liaoning People's Press, 1984.

3. Shounao lurt, Shanghai People's Press, 1986. The present chapter deals with some of the key concepts in this book, which is concerned with two categories of leaders in world history, namely, heads of state (guojia shounao) and heads of government (zhengfu shounao). Yan specifies, in English, these two terms. 95

of ultimates. 4 As far as science is concerned, there is nothing that cannot be made the object of study. In the era of the Cultural Revolution, the cult of personality turned leading political figures into "gods." I thought it would be beneficial, for the people's general frame of mind, if I could effect a transformation of those leaders from gods back into human form. In 1983 I began to gather materials and put my energies into writing. In the preface to my book On Heads of State, I paraphrased a passage from Machiavelli: Those who draw maps of mountains Place themselves down on the plains. To command a good view of the flatlands One needs a vantage point high in the mountains. To understand the people fully, A man must climb to the summit of power. And truly to understand a Prince Requires a man standing on the broad and level plain. 5 I quoted this passage to demonstrate that I had the right to study heads of state and government and to write a book entitled On Heads of State. I added, too, that it was precisely because I was one of the people who stand upon a vast plain that I was able to write the book. In all, the treatise On Heads of State deals with more than 460 kings, emperors, czars, sultans, caliphs, presidents, prime ministers, and premiers. It examines the kinds of power held by chief executives and the means they used to attain the highest power. In traditional monarchies, the question of who assumes the throne is usually decided by rules of succession. But in a system where the head of state is limited to a certain number of terms in office, and 4. See chapter 22 below. 5. For the original text, see Machiavelli's The Prince (in Chinese), Commercial Press, 1985, p. 2. [Author's note] 96

I Toward a Democratic China

where a change in the chief executive is accompanied by a change in administrative staff, anyone who aspires to the position of head of state will have a long and difficult road. His task will be much like that of an assault on the summit of a lofty mountain. A young man just entering the sphere of politics is confronted with an unbroken series of mountains. Before him is a profusion of thick grass and tangled vines, and in the distance stand jagged and sharply sloping peaks. The closer he gets to the summit, the more cruelly he is beset by windstorms, avalanches, lack of air, and other dangers. Lying in wait for him are cold, fatigue, loneliness, and despair. In On Heads of State I quoted Nehru, the former prime minister of India, who said, "Faraway mountains look easy to climb, and their summits beckon to the traveler. But on closer approach, difficulties become apparent. The higher one climbs, the more arduous one's journey becomes, and the summit recedes into the clouds." Nehru wrote that the difficulty of climbing a mountain lies in "never really knowing which path is the right one." 6 1 concluded: A man climbing toward the summit of power may have certain abilities, but at any time he may be faced with factors beyond human control, just as a mountain climber may encounter dangers at any time. In the course of a smooth upward climb, a mountain climber may suddenly plunge into a deep chasm. Such occurrences are often seen among those who strive to reach the summits of power as well. These factors, acting in unison, make it hard for an independently struggling aspirant to the summit of power to know which path is "the right one," and which path can take him to his goal.7 6. Autobiography of Nehru (in Chinese), World Knowledge Press, 1956, p. 681. Also see On Heads of State, p. 109. [Author's note] 7. On Heads of State, pp. 1 0 9 - 1 0 . [Author's note] On Heads of State and Government

I 97

Besides exploring the routes and methods used by individuals to attain the highest state power, I devoted considerable space in On Heads of State to studying the theories and techniques relating to how these leaders maintained their power and exercised their rule. I also researched the question of the influence of character and personality on politics. Is ruling an art? This is a question that has long been debated. Some believe that ruling involves countless irrational and even cruel deeds, and that "the requirements for ruling are incompatible with true sincerity."8 They feel that ruling is not an art since it has nothing in common with music, painting, poetry, and dance. Others believe that ruling is a special art that enables numbers of people in a given realm to live according to a certain order while at the same time constantly creating new social wealth. Still others believe that ruling is the art of maintaining a stable political system and ensuring that it operates normally. In this view rulers who exercise power effectively and accomplish great things are masters of the art of government. M y view in On Heads of State is that ruling is a special kind of art, a dynamic art that moulds society. Artistic creation is a process of making choices from among limitless possibilities in the pursuit of beauty. Dance, for instance, is a dynamic art form. Its flow of movement is modulated by rhythmic gestures that differ in speed, extent, and force. Without choice, there is no art. Variations in speed, extent, and force imply a dynamic sort of choice. Sculpture, on the other hand, is a plastic art that relies on various materials as "hardware," shaping them into a three-dimensional form. Rulers, too, must deal with complex things, things that are subject to constant and multifarious transformations. A chief executive must frequently make decisions involving the whole of government while choosing among proposals recommending various policies for action. To mould an organized society and project a stable social configuration, rulers make use of social "software," including the 8. Ibid., p. 129. [Author's note] 98

I Toward a Democratic China

institutions of government, laws, regulations, administrative acts, public opinion, legal and illegal force, and the threat of violence. In works of sculpture, parts fit together in accordance with the materials used. In "The Discus Thrower" by Milo, sculptor of ancient Greece, the discus in the thrower's right hand does not hurtle outward, and it does not drop at his feet. In order to shape social organizations and configurations, rulers depend on the exercise of certain powers while relying on the force of tradition to maintain relatively stable relations among the people. If we say that sculpture relies on the inner cohesion of its material to hold its forms together, then social organizations depend on power to adhere together. Therefore ruling is the dynamic art of moulding society. Even though ruling is an art, I have often wondered how it might be possible to choose fair and unselfish rulers so that everyone will be satisfied. Countless examples in human history show that highlevel leaders have used the great powers at their disposal to install their confidants in important government positions and to obtain considerable private gains for themselves and a few others. These actions have been reenacted many times over the centuries. The mission of science is not to provide people with unrealizable fantasies. Rather, it is to allow people first to see-the facts realistically, then to alleviate or eradicate the situations in real life with which they feel dissatisfied. In any society it is difficult to avoid differences and antagonisms among people so far as their separate interests are concerned. Even a fair and unselfish ruler would be bound to encounter opposition from a substantial segment of the populace. The French king Louis XIV, who was not an example of a fair and unselfish ruler, once said, "Whenever I give a position to one man, I make one hundred men unhappy, and I make one man an ingrate." The American president Lincoln observed, "Things are rarely all good or all bad. Everything is a mixture of good and bad, especially government policies. Therefore it is continually necessary to make the best determination as to which things are superior." Different social strata and social groups often have dissimilar attitudes On Heads of State and Government

I 99

toward a given policy; some people might feel compelled to adopt an attitude of resistance and hold protests or start riots. To moderate or overcome such opposition, the act of ruling becomes necessary. On occasion a ruler might have to use force to suppress a civil disturbance, and this may be seen as the application of violence in an effort to maintain the original configuration of a social organization. This is why I wrote that ruling, considered as an art, is the dynamic art of moulding society. 9 In On Heads of State I cite many examples to elucidate the "ordinary character" of political leaders. In human history many of the highest leaders have been great and outstanding personages, but quite a few have been mediocre and incapable as well. We view these leaders with hindsight. Ordinarily people tend to overlook the circumstances of their lives prior to their assuming positions of leadership. An examination of their lives, however, reveals that some had lofty morals and sentiments with respect to love, marriage, friendship, and personal ties, while the behavior of others is simply dismaying. Some became great politicians by virtue of their farsightedness, passion, and strong sense of responsibility, while others accomplished nothing. Except for kings and emperors who assumed the throne before reaching adulthood, it seems to be the case that becoming a head of state or government often produces an uneasy state of mind in a ruler. Everywhere he turns are reminders of the honor of his station, and people treat him with newfound respect, deference, and even adulation, which he never had before. All this can be quite unsettling. Some rulers have grown extremely nervous from the attention heaped upon them. 1 0 The daily life of a ruler exhibits a glittering exterior but on the inside, beset with crises and laden with contradictions, it is a different story. On the exterior we see glamorous banquets, limousines and private jets, milling crowds and gifts of flowers, and media coverage of the rul9. Ibid., pp. 129-33. [Author's note] 1 0 . Ibid., p. 140. [Author's note] 100

I Toward a Democratic China

er's every act. But behind the scenes there are constant domestic and international crises, tangled knots of dread and anxiety, clashing viewpoints, and the petty infighting of the power-hungry. The purpose of my writing all this was simply to make the point that rulers, like us, are ordinary people. Great men are great because we kneel to them. The primary aim of On Heads of State is to explain the significance, from the standpoint of ensuring political stability, of rules governing the transition of power for heads of state and government, and the importance of the so-called concurrent transition of government administrations. H. G. Wells once said, "The rules and methods by which men gain power are of extreme significance in human affairs." 1 1 It follows that the rules of succession for heads of state are the most important rules by which men gain power. Throughout human history, wherever definite rules of succession have been lacking, the process of scrambling for power is frequently accompanied by bloodshed, killings, and warfare. Upon the sudden death of a head of state, we often see a reenactment of these scenes. The highest power-holding stratum splits into two or three factions, one of which resorts to intrigue, murder, or war to destroy the others. When the winning faction finally installs someone as the new head of state, either that person will control the highest power or someone else will wield that power, with the head of state being merely a figurehead. When a transition of power occurs without rules or definite procedures to govern the transition, it is inevitably the case that if, under the head of state, two or more centers of power exist that simultaneously obey him, then the death of the head of state will bring about serious conflict. On Heads of State did not attempt to study all leaders and chief executives. Rather, it was limited to heads of state and heads of government. In different political systems, the highest state administrative power may be controlled by a head of state or government, n . Ibid., p. 41. [Author's note] On Heads of State and Government

I 101

or by other persons. The transition of power for heads of state or government is closely related to two major factors. The first is whether the leader holds the position for life. The second is whether a concurrent transition occurs for those who shared power with the departed leader. My book focused on two types of transitions of power. The first occurs in situations where the head of state holds a lifetime office but a transition of other administrators does not take place concurrently. The second occurs in situations where there is a limited number of consecutive terms for the head of state as well as a concurrent transition of administrators. In my book I devoted much space to exploring the harmful effects of life-tenure for heads of state and a nonconcurrent transition of administrators; at the same time, I also considered the significance, in terms of political stability, of limited terms for high-level leaders and a concurrent transition of administrative staff. In the first type of transition, following the replacement of the head of state or government there often exist open or concealed conflicts of power between the new head and his circle of administrators. Such conflicts often lead to coups or new transitions of power. In the second type of transition, where a head of state or government is replaced according to definite procedures along with his administrators, the original secondary power circle no longer exists and the new leader can rely on his own administrators to carry out his policies. Thus, while the first type of transition cannot eliminate the possibility of subsequent coups and slaughter, the second type not only minimizes this possibility but also makes it difficult for serious conflicts of power to arise between the new head and the secondary circle of power. In the final chapter of On Heads of State, I considered the norms of behavior for political leaders and the corresponding norms for political systems. I divided human artifacts into three major categories. The first category consists of material products created by science and technology. These include living and nonliving products such as articles for daily use, handicrafts, machines, comput102

I Toward a Democratic China

ers, construction materials, transportation networks, landscaped parks, and a wide array of new biological varieties. The second category consists of spiritual products, including literature and art, science and technology, laws and codes, fables and teachings, and systems software and applied software for computers (which in the future will become an important component of spiritual products). The third category consists of various social organizations, created consciously or unconsciously, and the social systems formed by these social organizations. 12 Among these three kinds of creations, there are great distinctions to be observed in degrees of perfection. Today in the twentieth century, humans are able to create precision technical equipment as well as biological varieties that do not exist in the natural world. They can create magnificent musicals, dances, operas, and intricate computer languages. But they have had very limited success at perfecting their creations in the third category. In the past several decades, people have been guided in their creation of these third-category constructs by a variety of theories of organization and management—the management process school, the school of experience, the school of group behavior, the school of social systems, the decision theory school, and the mathematical school—and all of these have played an important role in the organization of social enterprises. To this day, however, mankind, the designer of modern highrise buildings, has not been able to design, in the same way, a political system with a perfect organizational structure. In fact, the various political systems, as the thirdcategory creations of humans throughout history, have not only been imperfect, but have been riddled with maladies. As the political machinery operates, we often hear ear-piercing sounds. These political systems exist in a state of imminent collapse, like tottering highrise buildings. I also wrote: 1 2 . Ibid., pp. 2 9 9 - 3 0 0 . [Author's note]

On Heads of State and Government

I 103

For thousands of years, humans have worked to establish a perfect political system. History shows that they have often worked along two different channels to overcome and eliminate the ills in their political systems. One channel has been to make various demands with respect to the character and behavior of political leaders and to formulate certain norms for them. This channel may be called the doctrine of human character. The other channel is known as the doctrine of systems, for it seeks to perfect the political system in such a way that deficiencies in the character of a political leader will not cause serious crises for the state and society. 13 After enumerating twenty norms of behavior for political leaders, I went on to list ten norms by means of which people have tried historically to perfect their political systems. These ten norms are as follows: 1 . Stipulating a basic law, whose authority is higher than that of the top leaders, thus limiting their powers. 2. Establishing fundamental constitutional principles and stating explicitly in the constitution or in the basic legal code that these principles may not be amended. Such principles, then, constitute a historical statement of the lessons learned in human experience. Ordinary historical statements have no power to restrain people's actions, but constitutional rulings based on definite principles retain their power of restraint over new generations. Even through long periods of history, key constitutional principles should not be subject to revision. 3. Stipulating that leaders who hold the highest administrative power of the state are not allowed to hold office for life, thereby guaranteeing that such power rests in the hands of those who are strictly limited in their terms of office. 13. Ibid., p. 301. [Author's note] 104

I Toward a Democratic China

4. Maintaining a unity in the highest administrative power of the state, including the power to conduct foreign relations and the power to command the armed forces of the nation. A system providing for civilian control of the military is an important ingredient in maintaining the unity of the state's executive authority. 5. Replacing members of the highest power-holding stratum of officials concurrently with the head who holds the highest administrative power. 6. Providing explicitly for a disparity of powers between the administrative head and the highest power-holding stratum. 7. Stipulating strict procedures for the transition between highlevel leaders, so as to guarantee a peaceful transfer of power in high leadership positions. 8. Establishing a system of checks and balances among the various state organs, so that no single state organ wields unlimited power. 9. Delineating explicitly the scope within which the leader may exercise his executive administrative power. For instance: stipulating that the head of state's appointments to certain key offices be subject to the approval of the legislature or one house of the legislature; and making provisions for vertical sharing of power, so the head of state is both (a) without the power to dismiss, without authorization, lower-level administrative or judicial officials who are not directly appointed by him, and (b) without the power to intervene at will in nonadministrative affairs where his administrative power should not intervene. 10. Establishing a system that allows for impeachment, under specific conditions, of the holder of the highest state power. 1 4 The foregoing is merely my encapsulation of the efforts that have been made throughout history to perfect political systems. It might 14. Ibid., pp. 309-16. [Author's note] On Heads of State and Government

I 105

appear that designing and establishing a perfect political system, and making political leaders act in accordance with strictly formulated norms of behavior, are realizable only in a world of gods. However, I believe that as society progresses the norms for political systems will also continue to evolve. In my book I also explored the relationship between political leaders and history. Heads of state or government are not isolated figures. Their achievements and failures are closely connected not only with their individual characters, personalities, and dispositions, but also with the social environments and historical conditions in which they lived. The development of human socioeconomic structures takes place in a historical process. Though a head of state or government may hold great power and his behavior may be determined by specific motives, he cannot rise above the limitations of the actual environment and the historical conditions of the time to "create" history. The longer the historical period we survey, the more clear is the decisive role of socioeconomic conditions in history. N o act of will by a political leader can change the overall direction of historical development. The shorter the historical period we survey, the more crucial will seem the influence of political leaders and outstanding individuals on the development of history. Here even the character, personality, and disposition of a political leader might seem to influence the course of history. All in all, however, I believe that the publication of On Heads of State will help to change traditional concepts about political leaders. It will facilitate the development of political democracy by helping to transform the reverence toward leaders into a reverence of the people. On September 3, 1986, at a press conference held by Shanghai People's Press to mark the publication of On Heads of State and Government,

I answered various questions raised by reporters.

Then I gave a lecture on the topic of "The Status of China's Political System and Trends toward Reform." Not long after publication, the campaign against bourgeois liberalization reached its height in 106

I Toward a Democratic China

China. Yet it was at exactly that time that the book was being distributed throughout the country. In 1987 a total of six editions were printed and the cumulative distribution reached 310,000 copies. In early 1987 when the New China Book Store in Guangzhou listed its top ten bestsellers for the previous year, On Heads of State made the list. 15 Subsequently the book was awarded a first-class prize for excellence in political theory at a book review convention held in Hefei city, Anhui. It also received the Golden Key Prize for 1987 at the Good Reading Awards presentation in Beijing. Not long after my book's publication in Shanghai, Zhonghua Publishing House in Hong Kong and the Yuanliu Press in Taiwan released Hong Kong and Taiwan editions. At an awards ceremony held by an organization called the Golden Stone Cultural Square in Taiwan, On Heads of State was selected as one of the ten most influential books in Taiwan for the year 1987. 1 6 In the preface to On Heads of State, I stated that I wished to present the treatise to the current heads of state and government in various countries throughout the world and to the people who aspire to those leadership positions. Not long after publication, I presented a copy to Zhao Ziyang, then the premier of our republic. On February 4,1988, on the eve of a breakfast meeting at the Washington Hilton Hotel, President Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy received me and several other guests from Japan, Fiji, Somalia, and other countries. A few days later, through the good graces of the Reverend Dr. Billy Graham, the well-known American Christian evangelist, I presented a copy of On Heads of State and Government to President Reagan.

15. See Guangzhou Daily, February 1 2 , 1 9 8 7 , p. 7. [Author's note] 16. See Tuanjie bao (Taiwan), March 2 2 , 1 9 8 8 , p. 4. [Author's note] On Heads of State and Government

I 107

14 Division of State Power in Four Directions

In April 1986, those who were engaged in theoretical work in China initiated a discussion on the issue of reforming the political structure. On April 28 and 29, 1986,1 participated in a conference on this subject sponsored by the journal Social Sciences in China, and gave a lecture. In mid-May I went to Shanghai to attend a symposium on the topic of "Strategies for Shanghai's Urban Cultural Development." Over the span of that meeting I wrote an article for Shanghai's Wenhui Daily entitled "Discussion of Cultural Issues Will Inevitably Lead to Reform of the Political Structure."1 Then in early June I agreed to be interviewed by Dai Qing, a writer for the Guangming Daily. Speaking on issues related to the reform of China's political institutions, I raised the issue of the division of state power in four directions, namely, (1) a horizontal separation of power, (2) a vertical separation of power, (3) a separation of power between government organs and social organizations, and (4) popular participation in political decisions.2

1. Wenhui Daily, May 12,1984, p. 4. [Author's note] 2. Dai Qing, "Tan zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi gaige: Fang Yan Jiaqi" (Reforming China's political structure: An interview with Yan Jiaqi), Guangming Daily, June 30,1986. [Author's note] See chapter 24 below. 108

The division of state power in four directions directly addresses the problem of the overcentralization of power in China's political institutions. The constitution stipulates that the state's legislative, administrative, and judicial powers be separately exercised by their respective state organs, but the practical politics of China is such that everyone feels that there is a real, de facto center of ultimate policy making which is not provided for by the constitution. The current power structure in China, then, is in fact a historical continuation of the power structure that existed in China's past. In September 1980 I wrote an article entitled "On the Causes of Dynastic Cycles" for the Theoretical Inquiry column of Wenbui Daily in which I made a comparative analysis of the power structures of China, past and present. In the article I argued: Throughout human history people have generally found it easy to understand past events and to see clearly phenomena that have become part of history, but they remain perplexed by events that are currently transpiring. It is often difficult for people to transcend the intellectual limitations of the current time period; they are fond of finding utterly new explanations for events of the present day. Many old things, when dressed in new garb, appear to be unprecedented. But time is the most unsparing of judges. When the present becomes the past and the current reality becomes part of history, the maladies of the so-called new developments will become increasingly evident to more and more people, and they will finally recognize the stubborn power of tradition in the unfolding of history. From the perspective afforded by history, they will come to recognize the traces of past eras concealed in the present. I went on to say: Over the several thousand years of China's history, no tradition has persisted longer than the existence of dynasties. None has shown greater inertia than that of the dynasties. Despite Division of State Power in Four Directions

I 109

repeated and cataclysmic peasant wars, endless palace coups, the chaos of outlying territories, and invasions by foreign ethnic groups, nothing has been able to break the dynastic cycle. The article then raised this point: A hereditary system is not the essential element of dynastic politics. In world history, not only were the rulers of many dynasties not hereditary, but often they emerged by election. The fundamental features of dynastic politics are twofold. First, the highest state power is concentrated in the hands of an individual (i.e., one with "kingly authority"). Second, this individual holds his office (i.e., the throne) for the duration of his life. In Chinese history the political power established through peasant wars inevitably transformed into a feudal power, not only because no peasant war was able to eliminate feudal economic relations but also because no peasant war offered a form of political organization other than dynastic rule. In the power structure established by peasant wars, the highest power could neither be divided nor transferred. 3 Consequently, peasant wars either established another person (such as a descendant of the imperial family) as emperor, or the peasant leader proclaimed himself emperor. Mao Zedong once said that the armed struggle of the Chinese Communist Party was in essence a peasant revolution, a 3. The distribution of power and contradictions between rulers and their court ministers were the most outstanding problems in Chinese feudal politics. The "inseparability" of the state's supreme power does not mean that state power is held only by one person. Instead, it refers to the fact that the highest state power cannot be divided into several kinds of mutually nonsubordinate powers, to be controlled by different organs or individuals. [Author's note]

no

I Toward a Democratic China

peasant war. 4 For this reason, the state power structure established in 1949 unavoidably retained many traditional features from China's history of several millennia. T h e history of the Cultural Revolution demonstrated to China and the world that the supreme power in China was actually concentrated in the hands of an individual. Moreover, this power was neither allowed to be divided nor permitted to be transferred. Owing to the lack of separation between party and government, and with the party substituting for government, the authority granted to state leaders by the constitution was actually in the hands of party leaders. For a long time modern Chinese politics has been centered on consolidating and maintaining this ultimate authority. Today, if we undertake a comparative analysis between modern Chinese politics and traditional Chinese politics, we will discover that "opposing right-deviationist opportunism," "criticizing capitalist roaders within the party," and "counterattacking against the right-deviationist reverse wind" were not really instances of so-called opposition to erroneous lines. Instead, they were struggles inevitably brought about by efforts to concentrate and maintain supreme power in the hands of an individual. N o r , during M a o Zedong's era, could this power be transferred to others. The cult of personality, then, was not a matter of exaggerating the role of the individual in history. Instead, it was a necessary means adopted to strengthen the kind of supreme power that cannot be divided or transferred. 5

4. Mao Zedong, " 'Gongchandang ren' fakan shi" (Inaugural issue dedication to "Communist Party members"), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 1967, p. 572. [Author's note] 5. Yan Jiaqi, "Wangzhao xunhuan yuanyin lun" (On the causes of dynastic cycles), Wenhui Daily, Theoretical Inquiry column, no. 21, September 25,1980. [Author's note]

Division of State Power in Four Directions

I in

After the Cultural Revolution great changes occurred in Chinese politics. Because a certain degree of separation between party and government has been implemented, the highest state power is no longer concentrated in the hands of a single individual to the degree that it was in the time of M a o Zedong. Since the constitution plainly limits the number of consecutive terms for the highest state leaders, transfer of the highest state power is, theoretically speaking, not impermissible. In 1986, however, when discussing the issue of reforming China's political institutions, the theoretical community was nearly unanimous in the belief that excessive concentration of power is still a serious defect of Chinese politics. Under these circumstances, I therefore raised the issue of dividing state power in four directions. 1. A horizontal separation of power involves not only the relations among the legislative, executive, and judicial organs, but also the relations between government and party. In political science the term "government" refers to the organ with authority, i.e., the power to formulate and carry out policy, over a certain territory. A government's decisions have a restraining effect on the people within its territory. According to this interpretation, whether or not the government of a country or district is democratic depends on its relation to the people. But in the world at present many countries do not accept this abstract definition of government. These countries are not willing to use the word government for organs that possess the highest policy-making authority. In France, for instance, the presidency and the Palace Elysée are not part of the institutional structure of the government, but in truth the Palace Élysée exercises governmental authority. During De Gaulle's presidency, the premier was no more than the president's ranking minister. In Rumania and East Germany there are state councils over and above the governments. In other countries the organ with the highest policy-making authority is neither the government nor a state organ such as the presidential palace or council of the state. Instead, it is a nonstate organ such as a party organ, a religious 112

I Toward a Democratic China

leader, or a military commission. In China's case the failure to separate the party from government means that the party has the power to give orders on all issues relating to the government's operations. In factories and enterprises, the failure to separate the party from government means that the functions of party organs are not distinct from the administrative functions of enterprises. If the party is not separated from government, or if the party is substituted for the government, then what actually exists is another "government" superimposed on a government. 6 Therefore, the horizontal separation of power must first of all solve the problem of the party substituting for the government. In any country the party in power is the party that organizes the government. Under the parliamentary system, the majority party in parliament is the party in power. In American-style presidential politics, the party of the incumbent president is the party in power. In organizing a government, the party in power can draw on members of other parties or on nonparty members to participate in the government. The party in power at the center may not be the party in power locally. Each party has the right to propose its own policies and strategies for dealing with important national problems. But a party's decisions and resolutions are binding only on its members. The party in power must proceed through constitutional and legally defined channels to turn its decisions into state laws. Only in this way do a government's policies become binding on society as a whole. 7 To accomplish a horizontal separation of power in presentday China, the crucial problem to solve is how to effectively separate the party and the government. At the same time, it is impor-

6. Yan Jiaqi, "Cong bijiao jiaodu kan zhongguo de dang zheng fenkai" (Examining China's separation of party and government from a comparative perspective), WenhuiDaily,

March 2.3,1988, p. 3. [Author's note]

7. See Yan Jiaqi, "Dang zheng fenkai de kexue hanyi" (A scientific definition of the separation of party and government), People's Daily, November 2.7,1987. [Author's note]

Division of State Power in Four Directions

I 113

tant to establish checks and balances among the organs of government. z. China is a country in which the concept of a vertical separation of power is lacking. Because such an apportionment of power has not been clearly established, leaders at the highest level feel they can formulate policy in the place of lower-level leaders. Indeed, lower-level leaders often fail to exercise their own right to make policy. In my June 1986 interview with Dai Qing, I cited the example of the Watergate Incident to explain the idea of a vertical apportionment of power. During those events a judge in the District Court of Washington, D . C . , made a ruling compelling the president to hand over certain audio tapes related to Watergate. Nixon not only refused to hand over the tapes, but asked his attorney general to dismiss Archibald C o x , the special prosecutor who had insisted that Nixon comply with the judge's order. When the attorney general resigned in protest, Nixon instructed a deputy attorney general at the Justice Department to dismiss Cox. After this deputy attorney general also resigned to protest Nixon's order, another deputy attorney general finally agreed to carry out the order. From the Chinese perspective, the decision of a superior cannot be defied. But in America the idea of a separation of power has been deeply established in people's thinking. In the ten days after Cox's dismissal, five hundred thousand indignant telegrams were sent to Washington criticizing the president, and a flood of critical letters poured into the Congress. Before long the House Judiciary Committee voted to impeach the president on three counts. Under these circumstances, Nixon had no choice but to announce his resignation. 8 Of course, the implications of a vertical separation of power are much broader than this single example indicates. Most important for a vertical separation of power is the use of law to guarantee the independent policy-making authority of government organs at each level. 8. See Guangming Daily, June 3 0 , 1 9 8 6 , p. 2. [Author's note] 114

I Toward a Democratic China

3- Delineating the authority of government organs vis-à-vis social organizations is actually an attempt to establish limitations on the scope of government authority. Tang T s o u , a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, prefers the term "totalism" to describe a political system wherein the scope of power of government organs is unlimited. According to him, "Totalism is an ideology which maintains that government organs have the unrestrained power to infringe on and control, at any time, any stratum or domain of society. 'Totalistic government' is the mode of government in a society that bases itself on this ideology." 9 Chinese politics has long been marked by totalism. During the Cultural Revolution political power infringed on every area of private life. "Organs of power such as the revolutionary committees, workers' propaganda teams, military propaganda teams, and Cultural Revolution small groups not only crudely interfered with people's modes of dress, hairstyles, hobbies, and daily routines, but even intruded into the domain of people's private thoughts, forcing them to express their loyalty and to 'ask for instructions in the morning and make reports in the evening.' N o t only were people deprived of their right to be happy and to think for themselves, but even their right to grieve was lost." 1 0 Delineating the authority of government organs vis-àvis social organizations will clarify the scope for independent decision making available to enterprises, social groups, and citizens. Decisions made within this scope are not to be infringed upon by government or state organs.

9. Tang Tsou (Zhou Dang), "Chinese Politics in the Twentieth Century and Western Political Science," Jingji shehui tizhi bijiao (Comparison of economic and social institutions), no. 4,1986. [Author's note] 10. Even the sorrow of the people was interfered with in 1976 during commemorations for the late Premier Zhou Enlai before and after the Qingming festival. See Dai Qing, "Tan zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi gaige: Fang Yan Jiaqi" (Reforming China's Political Structure: An Interview with Yan Jiaqi). [Author's note] Division of State Power in Four Directions

I 115

4. Finally, the political participation of citizens can be viewed as a division of power, in the broad sense, between the citizenry as a whole and the organs of government. Countries differ in the extent to which their citizens participate in politics. If the organs of authority in a country are formed, staffed, and reorganized at the whim of a few people, and the citizens are unable to act through legal channels to influence or determine this process, then there is no political participation to speak of for those citizens. But if the organs of authority are organized and staffed not through the manipulations of the few, but wholly through the will of the people, being determined by citizens acting through constitutionally and legally defined channels, then such a nation can be said to enjoy a high degree of political participation. Assessing current Chinese politics by this standard, we find the degree of political participation to be fairly high in areas where direct elections are held, and relatively low in areas relying on indirect elections. Representatives to local people's congresses are directly elected by the voters if they come from cities without districts, districts administered by cities, counties, autonomous counties, townships, ethnic minority townships, and towns. Representatives to people's congresses from the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities under the central government, cities with districts, and autonomous regions are elected by people's congresses one level below, while representatives to the National People's Congress are elected from the level of people's congresses from the provinces, autonomous prefectures, and municipalities under the central government. According to the provisions of the election law, candidates for representative are nominated in one of two ways. The first is through prior arrangement by a political party or social organization. The second is through an initiative endorsed jointly by at least ten voters or representatives. In direct elections, the proportion of successful candidates nominated by voter initiative grows higher as democracy develops in Chinese politics. Because indirect elections are held

116

I Toward a Democratic China

within the people's congresses, candidates nominated by initiative have great difficulty gaining a majority of votes, since they are often unknown to the voters, while candidates nominated by prior arrangement are more likely to win the election. In present-day China deputies to the people's congresses are generated by either direct or indirect elections. Direct elections lead increasingly to the election of candidates nominated by initiative, while indirect elections guarantee the election of candidates nominated by prior arrangement. Therefore the crucial issue for development of political participation lies in improving the methods for nominating deputies to the people's congresses at the various levels; institutionalizing the procedures for nominations will allow direct election of representatives to the people's congresses to come into being. 1 1 Of course, the political participation of citizens is not limited to electing deputies to people's congresses. To eliminate the indivisibility of the power presently concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, it is necessary to apportion state power in four directions; and to make it transferable, strict limits are needed on terms of office for leaders w h o hold actual power at various levels. When deputies to the people's congresses can have unlimited consecutive terms, public officials serve indefinitely, and judges able to serve for life, it is crucial for the development of political democracy to have limited terms of office for administrative executives. 1 2 The building of a democratic politics ii. Li Gucheng, "Yan Jiaqi tan renda zhixuan" (Yan Jiaqi discusses direct election for People's Congresses), Ming bao (Hong Kong), March 14,1988. See also "Special Interview with Yan Jiaqi: Direct Election of National People's Congress After 15 Years," Asia Week, no. 12,1988. [Author's note] iz. In my book Zhongxheng zhi yu xianren zhi (Life-tenure and limitedterm appointment systems), I divided positions into four major categories on the basis of their terms of office: (1) life-tenure position, (2) permanent positions, (3) limited-term positions, and (4) positions with unlimited consecutive terms. [Author's note]

Division of State Power in Four Directions

I 117

in China must begin by eliminating the overconcentration of power that is indivisible and nontransferable. Through the resolute, unceasing efforts of the people of the entire nation, a mansion enjoying a high degree of democracy will surely be erected in this great land of China.

118

I Toward a Democratic China

i5 The Office for Political Reform

From October 1986 to November 1987, I was transferred from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to the Office of the Commission for Deliberations on Political Institutional Reform 1 of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. In September 1986 I had learned that I, along with Bao Tong, He Guanghui, and Zhou Jie, 2 had been recommended for service in the Office for Political Reform by the then-premier Zhao Ziyang in a report he had submitted to members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, consisting of Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Zhao himself. Deng Xiaoping had approved the report. The only reason I was selected for service in the Office for Political Reform was that I happened to be director of the Institute of Political Science at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the time.

1. Zhengzhi tizhi gaige yantao xiaozu bangongshi. 2. A t that time, Bao Tong was the vice chair of the State Committee on Economic Reform. He Guanghui had been Bo Yibo's personal secretary, and was also a vice chair. Zhou Jie was assistant director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the C C P . [Author's note]

119

The Commission for Deliberations on Political Institutional Reform consisted of five members: Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, Tian Jiyun, Bo Yibo, and Peng Chong. Zhao Ziyang served as its chairman. From October 1986 through October 1987, the commission and all the members of the Office for Political Reform held a number of formal meetings in the Zhongnanhai compound. In addition, the Office for Political Reform sponsored several dozen colloquia during this period. In order that his proposed reforms might win ready approval, Zhao Ziyang was always obliged to invite Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, arch-theoreticians who opposed the reforms, to participate in these functions. I had always thought that people at the highest level of leadership in China had under their control certain things that are sometimes lacking in common ordinary people. But during the year I spent at the Office for Political Reform, I discovered that these leaders, just like ordinary people, made their strategic decisions without thinking things through. Now if an ordinary person is willing to conduct a study of a certain problem and does his utmost to grasp the various aspects of the situation while possessing a high degree of social responsibility, that person will be capable of arriving at a proper decision. But during my time at the Office for Political Reform, I discovered that an extremely grave pathology exists in the Chinese political system. That is, besides the one person who holds supreme power, no one else—not Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, or Bo Yibo—was able to fully utilize his brain to contemplate problems and make important decisions. People in positions of responsibility at every department and level, in every district and region, were unable, even within the scope of their decision-making authority, to be fully responsible. Even the party general secretary and the premier were unable to fully rely on their brains to make decisions; regardless of whether Deng Xiaoping's views were correct or not, they all had to obey him. If a provincial party secretary expressed an opinion regarding a situation in a certain city, the mayor of that city thought, first of all, of obeying the provincial 120

I Toward a Democratic China

secretary's decision, rather than considering how best to do something in the city. Of the more than one billion people in China, each is able to utilize only three-fourths of his or her mental capacity, or perhaps it is only a half or a mere fourth. Since the human intellect and power of reason—nature's most precious gift to mankind— cannot be brought into full play in mainland China, it is impossible for any effort at reform, whether political or economic, to succeed. At the Office for Political Reform, the experiences of foreign countries were rarely consulted and proposals by Chinese were rarely adopted for use. This was because decision making was always constrained by countless predetermined limits. In late 1986, not long after I joined the Office for Political Reform, large-scale student demonstrations broke out in Beijing, Shanghai, Hefei, and elsewhere. Following Hu Yaobang's forced resignation from his post as party general secretary, an anti-bourgeois liberalization movement was launched in mainland China. The "News Proofs on Domestic Developments" and "Supplemental News Proofs on Domestic Developments,"3 compiled daily by the New China News Agency in bound volumes intended for only the highest levels of the party, contained the most penetrating and dissenting remarks and speeches from all over China. In addition, there were various other channels that reported on domestic developments. Anyone reading these materials could not help but feel frightened. Included among the news proof compilations on the student demonstrations were (1) a proposal by the trio of Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan, and Xu Liangying calling for a conference on the thirtieth anniversary of the anti-rightist movement, and (2.) excerpts from speeches by Fang Lizhi. These events formed the background of how Deng Xiaoping, who was able to fully utilize his brain, came to make the mental associations "student demonstrations . . . liberalization . . . Fang Lizhi . . . Hu Yaobang." In this way, 3. "Guonei dongtai qingyang" and "Guonei dongtai qingyang zengkan," respectively. The Office for Political Reform

I 121

a movement against "bourgeois liberalization" swept across the whole of mainland China. During the height of this movement, it was impossible to proceed further with the reform of political institutions in China. Downstairs in the same building that housed the Office for Political R e f o r m , an anti-liberalization writing group, led by Deng Liqun, manufactured ammunition from morning to night, launching intense attacks against the "reformist faction."

122

I Toward a Democratic China

i6 Amid Storms in the Realm of Theory

The realm of theory is a particular realm in the world of thought. In China the so-called theoretical community consists of people from the academic, intellectual, cultural, and journalistic communities who pay close attention to or do research on the theoretical questions posed by real life. Thus the territory of the realm of theory is not limited to a specific field of study or discipline, but instead is composed of the constituent territories of various discipline-realms in the humanities and social sciences. Like the European Economic Community and the Arab League, it is a transnational organization. N o w just as in the natural world, the skies over the world of thought cannot remain clear and boundless forever. After excessive scorching by the sun's blazing rays, great storms often blow through the world of thought. At one time, especially in the realm of theory, a great storm swept up a mass of dust clouds and obscured the sunlight. As a skyful of black clouds raced across the heavens, a great wind struck up a terrifying music all day long. This horrendous situation persisted for more than half a year. During these storms in the realm of theory, I too suffered from unfair treatment time and again. What infuriated me particularly was that some of the subjects of this feudal realm were pursued and investigated on each and every occasion that they spoke in public. 123

In mid-May of 1986 I went to Shanghai to attend a symposium on the topic of "Strategies for Shanghai's Urban Cultural Development." I did not give a lecture to the conference and only spoke for a few minutes at a seminar discussion held at the Cherry Blossom Holiday Villa. But during those stormy days, someone accused me by name and demanded that Shanghai turn over an audio tape of my remarks. Later in M a y a conference commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the Double Hundred policy 1 was held in Beijing. At this gathering I gave a speech which was later published under the title "The Aspiration to Pursue Truth and Beauty Supersedes All Else." In my remarks I mentioned four persons—Li Honglin, Wang Ruoshui, Y u Haocheng, and G u o Luoji—and said: Those w h o are involved in academic research hope to publish their own views freely and straightforwardly. They hope for an environment where they will not be attacked for pursuing the truth, where they can work to help China's science and culture flourish. They hope to see the day when our great motherland will produce wave after wave of scientific and cultural giants. Over the past few years many of China's artists and theorists have become outraged at those w h o use their authority to support one point of view while suppressing others. 2 Because I gave this speech at a time when storms were raging fiercely in the realm of theory, my remarks and excerpts from speeches by Y u Guangyuan and Song Longxiang (who is known as M a Ding of the Philosophy Department of Nanjing University) were printed on mimeograph paper and distributed as evidence of

1. The Double Hundred policy refers to Mao's 1956 proposal "Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend," intended as a formula to encourage the development of arts and culture as well as a guideline for academic freedom. 2. Yan Jiaqi, "The Aspiration to Pursue Truth and Beauty Supersedes All Else," People's Daily, June 13,1986. See chapter 23 below.

124

I Toward a Democratic China

erroneous views from the conference on the Double Hundred policy. On July 7, 1986, I was invited to attend another conference, sponsored by the Central Committee of the China Democratic League to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the policy of "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision." The conference was presided over by Fei Xiaotong, then vice chairman of the China Democratic League, and I gave a speech based on the content of an article I had written shortly before. I asserted that there have been two breakthroughs in economic theory in the twentieth century. One is the recognition that effective distribution of resources by solely relying on state planning and administrative measures is impossible, because the idea is a kind of utopianism. The other is the realization that a totally competitive market, which does not rely at all on government intervention to effectively distribute resources, is also Utopian. I went on to say that a political system built on the utopianism of the first type necessarily involves the politics of a highly centralized power, and its special characteristic is the nonseparation of party and state. I added that the aim of reforming our political institutions is precisely to change this phenomenon of the nonseparation of party and state with its high centralization of power. Because I was speaking at a conference of the China Democratic League, I naturally addressed the question of what is a political party. In observing that a political party is different from an academic society, I stated that a political party has three major characteristics: it has a platform, it organizes its members, and it strives for political participation. I also asserted that active political participation by the democratic parties would be beneficial for China's democratization. Since China practices a system of multiparty cooperation under the leadership of the Communist Party, I stated that I believed the party would be supportive of such participation by the democratic parties, as it would be a matter of being consistent in word and deed. A major portion of the content of this talk was published as an Amid Storms in the Realm of Theory

I 125

article entitled "Further Reflections on the Cultural Revolution" in the Wenhui Daily on July 15, 1986. I had sent it to the Shanghai newspaper in late June, well before my speech to the China Democratic League. However, about half a month after my speech to the league, my work unit informed me that a member of the league, a professor at Beijing University, had claimed that my speech of July 7 contained serious errors. Hence this was not an academic problem but a political problem. The next day I learned that a transcript of my speech had appeared in the proceedings of the meeting, but this transcript departed considerably from what I had actually said. It had been entered into the proceedings without my knowledge. A few days later I wrote to Fei Xiaotong,3 on my own initiative, to clarify the matter. Based on my recollections, I also wrote out the text of my speech, which was then published in a New China News Agency periodical. Another half a year later, however, when fierce storms were raging in the realm of theory, no amount of clarification would do any good. Some people again brought out this inaccurate transcript from the proceedings. It was combined with excerpts from the remarks of several others and circulated as criticism against persons with mistaken political views. In September 1986 I spoke at a colloquium on strategies for cultural development in Guangzhou. My topic was "The Significance of Total Cultural Openness for China's Modernization." This lecture was published in its entirety by the local Nanfang Daily. In addition, extensive excerpts were printed in the overseas edition of Outlook magazine and in News on Theory and Information,4

In

my lecture I asserted that "there is no distinction of high or low 3. At the time, Fei Xiaotong was director of the Institute of Sociological Research at Beijing University. 4. See Nanfang ribao, September 14, 1986, pp. i-z; Liaowang weekly, October 6, 1986; Lilun xinxi bao, October 6, 1986. The last-mentioned paper ceased publication in early 1990, allegedly over errors committed during the 1989 prodemocracy movement. 126

I Toward a Democratic China

between Marxism and humanism," and that "each discipline has its own sphere of application and can only solve problems in a certain area." I stated that the idea of "preserving the purity of Marxism" is a modern-day version of the nineteenth-century formulation "Chinese learning for essential principles and Western learning for application." Moreover, I argued that "in order to break through the limits imposed by the doctrines of 'Chinese essence/Western application' and 'preserving the purity of Marxism,' we must introduce and absorb cultural elements that transcend national and ethnic boundaries and belong to all mankind." These remarks were subsequently taken as evidence of the dissemination of "liberalization" in the realm of theory. While the storms were raging in this realm, troubles came thick and fast. Reviews and articles written by others on my book On Heads of State were denied publication. A book on the Cultural Revolution which I had written with my wife, Gao Gao, had begun to be serialized in several regional periodicals—the Nanfang Weekender in Guangzhou, the Cultural News in Wuhan, Sunday in Shaanxi province, and the Chengdu Evening News in Sichuan province—but was suddenly interrupted halfway. A digest of my and Gao Gao's writings in the magazine Civilization in Sichuan province did not appear. A publisher that had already printed proofs of my book What Is Power? was prevented from completing the publication. When I was nominated as a candidate for deputy to the people's congress for my local district, I was introduced at an assembly of election workers as a person "with erroneous political views." 5 Later when the National State Educational Commission convened a meeting of social science teachers from Beijing's institutes of higher learning, the proceedings of the conference listed the Institute of Political Science and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism 5. On April 22, 1987 I was elected a deputy of the People's Congress for the Eastern District of Beijing Municipality with 70 percent of the votes. [Author's note] Amid Storms in the Realm of Theory

I 127

at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the magazine New Observations, and the World Economic Herald as research institutes and periodicals that were "enthusiastically propagating the views of bourgeois liberalization." From June zz to 27,1987, a joint meeting was convened at the Guoyi Hotel in Beijing to mark the inauguration of the work committee and the editorial committee for the volume on political science in the Greater China Encyclopedia. Yu Haocheng, the well-known legal scholar, and I were invited to attend, and I also spoke at the opening ceremony. But on the third day Yu Haocheng and I were rudely dismissed from the meeting. The reasons given were that Yu Haocheng was "guilty of erroneous political views" and Yan Jiaqi was "too busy with other work." At the time I found it astonishing that others would come forth with such reasons on my behalf when I myself had never suggested that I was too busy to work on the encyclopedia project. Two days after Yu Haocheng and I were ejected from the hotel, an editorial board for the encyclopedia's political science volume was formally established and Yu and I had been pushed off the board. In early July of 1987 my work unit launched an investigation after having learned that someone in Japan wanted to translate the TenYear History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution that Gao Gao and I had written. The Department of Investigations at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences demanded that I provide written explanations with documentation. Moreover, it insisted that I write a letter to Japan denying permission for a Japanese translation of the book. 6 In mid-May of 1986 I was in Shanghai and had seen a dance drama called "Legend of the Great Yu" at the Meiqi Theater. I 6. The principal author of the Ten-Year History of the Chinese

Cultural

Revolution is my wife, Gao Gao. From September through November 1986, the book was serialized in the Hong Kong Dagong bao. It was also carried in several Chinese-language papers: Thailand's Xin zhongyuan bao, the Philippines' Shijie ribao, the United States' Huayu kuaibao, and France's Ouzhou shibao. In November and December 1986, it was published in two volumes in Hong Kong by the Dagong Bao Press. [Author's note] 128

I Toward a Democratic

China

recall that after returning to the hotel I was invited, along with Sun Changjiang, Jia Cunfeng, Pan Weiming, and Hu Deping, for a chat with Minister Zhu Houze and Deputy Minister Gao Zhanxiang of the Central Propaganda Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party. I mentioned that the upcoming date of May 16 was the twentieth anniversary of the May Sixteenth Directive of the Cultural Revolution. At that point Hu Deping said, "The Cultural Revolution was a tragedy. It will not occur again in the same form, but a Cultural Revolution once or even twice removed cannot be absolutely ruled out from occurring. If the Cultural Revolution recurs, it will be a tragedy. If we haven't drawn any lessons from the experience of the Cultural Revolution, it will be difficult to avoid that tragedy. And if we have drawn the lessons but do not proceed to frame the laws we need, then all the same it will be difficult to avoid the tragedy." Hu Deping's remarks were very moving, but today I can no longer repeat everything that he said verbatim. Upon returning to Beijing, I incorporated those remarks by Hu Deping while writing the preface to our book on the Cultural Revolution. It said, "A people unable to draw lessons and learn from a catastrophe is a people without a future." 7 Today, as I recall the storms in the realm of theory, I cannot help but think of those very incisive remarks by Hu Deping.8 I believe that our people is certainly one with a great future.

A domestic edition, for "internal, restricted circulation only," was published in China by the Tianjin People's Press, though it was widely sold and read throughout the country. Pirated editions were printed elsewhere in China. Though orders for its withdrawal were issued, they were only loosely enforced even up to the spring of 1989. 7. The preface to the Ten-Year History of the Chinese Cultural

Revolu-

tion was signed by G a o G a o only, but the first half of it was written by Yan Jiaqi. [Author's note] See chapter 2 7 below. 8. Hu Deping is the eldest son of Hu Yaobang (d. 1989), then the general secretary of the C C P .

Amid Storms in the Realm of Theory

I 129

17 The Road to National Wealth and Power

One basic idea in my book On Heads of State is the acknowledgment that everyone, including our highest political leaders, is imperfect. In traditional Chinese culture, because no thought was given to classifying and comparing political institutions, people believed that the goodness or badness of government and the rise and fall of a nation were unrelated to the nature of its political institutions. Instead, they believed that the character of a government was a function of the character of its rulers—counselors, ministers, and especially the emperor. Although there have been major differences among the political systems in Chinese history, they have always been established on the foundation of human perfection. For thousands of years, people either rose up against despots and greedy officials or yearned for the appearance of enlightened rulers and honest officials who could alter the existing conditions through their lofty moral character. Because the rulers who held office were in theory supposed to be perfect, the mistakes they committed could not be corrected through predetermined procedures. Of course, this did not preclude the rulers from recognizing and rectifying their own mistakes, but if other people pointed out their mistakes, the authority of the rulers might be threatened. Consequently the idea that the nature of a government 130

changes along with a change of the person in charge became a hallmark of ancient Chinese politics. As for the Cultural Revolution, although its processes were highly complex, its guiding ideology was very simple—namely, that China must find a perfect leader to install as the successor to supreme power. 1 The serious calamities caused by the Cultural Revolution, however, led to a fundamental questioning of these concepts. In August 1980 Deng Xiaoping said the following: The mistakes of various kinds that were made in the past were of course connected with the thinking and work style of certain leaders, but the problems in organizations and work systems were even more serious. If these systems function well, we can ensure that bad people will be unable to willfully act as tyrants; and if the systems do not function well, it will be impossible for good people to do only good things, and they may even go off in the wrong direction.2 The reform of Chinese politics must base itself on a recognition of human imperfection. Because individuals have various shortcomings and weakness, we must use our political systems and institutions to constrain them. In March 1988 I was invited to Hong Kong to participate in the fortieth anniversary celebration of the resumption of publication of the newspaper Dagong Daily. On March 17 Liu Xinwu, a wellknown author and the editor-in-chief of People's Literature magazine, and I gave talks at the meeting. My topic was "How Can 1. Of course, as its initiator, Mao Zedong also had other motivations for starting the Cultural Revolution. However, the widely publicized doctrine of continuous revolution called precisely for the selection of a successor who would meet the "five criteria of revolutionary successors." [Author's note] 2. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982, People's Press, 1983, p. 293. [Author's note] The Road to National Wealth and Pou/er I 131

China Become Wealthy and Strong?" and the central point of my speech was to point out the relationship between human imperfection and nature of the political-economic system. Truth itself is plain and simple; it can be understood by the people. I don't believe in any set of very complicated means, incomprehensible to the people, that can make China wealthy and strong. China's prosperity will have to be created by the Chinese people, relying on their own wisdom and the work of their own hands. If the Chinese people do not grasp for themselves what they can and must do, if they cannot understand the path that leads to a steady increase in prosperity, then I think China will not become wealthy and strong. 3 If China is to become prosperous, it is crucial that each person's enthusiasm, initiative, and creative spirit be brought into full play. For a long time Chinese society has been one with a high degree of administrative control. Each person is subordinate to someone else, and each organ is subordinate to some other organ. What a person is able to do is usually determined by another person; and what an organ is able to do is likewise decided by another organ. China is a society that is habitually waiting for administrative directives. During the Cultural Revolution, as soon as M a o Zedong's newest directives were announced, people would take to the streets, pounding drums and beating gongs. On issues or questions of slightly greater importance, people would not take action without directives from higher up. Such a society fosters a psychology of dependence at every level—each locale, organ, organization, and individual lacks the capability for independent decision making. The rule of law and the rule of individuals are two different methods of governing society. Under the rule of individuals, a good society can only be established by perfect leaders w h o possess noble 3. Yan Jiaqi, "How Can China Become Wealthy and Strong?" Dagong bao (Hong Kong), March 17,1988, p. 2. [Author's note] 132.

I Toward a Democratic China

character, outstanding abilities, extensive knowledge, and abundant experience. Implementing the rule of law, however, means to establish the supremacy of laws which stipulate definite standards of behavior. All political parties, governments, enterprises, organizations, and individuals must obey the law. Generally speaking, there are three kinds of legal standards, namely, imperative standards, prohibitive standards, and discretionary standards. Under the conditions set forth by discretionary standards, political parties, governments, enterprises, organizations, and individuals all have the right of independent policy making. Whether it be enterprises vis-à-vis governments or individuals vis-à-vis institutional organs, they all possess the legally defined, inviolable right to make independent policies. On one hand, this right of independent policy making enables the policy maker to calculate his own behavior and its consequences with the knowledge that behavior consistent with the law is protected by law and will not be subject to penalty or sanction. On the other hand, because people are imperfect, certain policy decisions may be mistaken due to negligence or carelessness. In such instances it is necessary to bring about a timely adjustment of the relationship between the people's rights and their duties so that disputes and conflicts can be promptly resolved. China today is still not a state with the rule of law. Because our legal institutions are incomplete, leaders at various levels have no choice but to get involved with specific questions and make decisions on a case-by-case basis. In another respect, however, because the matters requiring a leader's attention are without a clearly defined scope, in practice the discretionary standards stipulated by law lose their effectiveness because of the continual waves of trivial, overly elaborate directives, which may even be mutually or successively contradictory. The lack of separation between party and government, between government and enterprises, between central and local jurisdictions, and between the functions and powers of administrative and social organs often causes thousands upon thousands of leaders at all levels across China—be they mayors, county The Road to National Wealth and Power

I 133

executives, township heads, bureau chiefs, office heads, and section chiefs, or factory directors, managers, and college presidents and school principals—to be unable to make an independent study of their problems or to make independent decisions. The disease of asking for instructions has become an extremely serious institutional illness in China. If this situation does not change for the better, it will be impossible for a city, village, factory, or school to develop on its own initiative in a continuous fashion. The prosperity of China depends on the development and growth of every city, village, factory, and school. Therefore the existence of countless redundant, trivial, overly elaborate, and even successively contradictory directives has become a heavy burden for contemporary China. If this kind of rule by individuals is not altered, China will never become wealthy and strong. The prosperity and stability of China depend on the constitution and the laws' guaranteeing the right of independent policy making for each level of government, for each enterprise and organization, and even for each individual. Only in this way will it be possible to effectively promote individual initiative, and only then will our society become fully vital and efficient. The recognition of human imperfection provides the basis for establishing a democratic politics. The realization of democracy requires the acknowledgement that people sometimes make mistaken decisions. In any social organization or assemblage of people, where goals, opinions, and value orientations may be divergent, the practice of democracy requires the use of predetermined procedures to arrive at joint decisions in accordance with the will of the majority. The implementation of democracy often requires that people comply with mistaken decisions. In practice, however, when a majority comes to recognize that a decision was erroneous, the mistake can be rectified through predetermined procedures arrived at by a consensus of the people. In this way, what was originally a minority can become a majority. Of course, some procedures may not allow for the immediate correction of certain mistakes. Never134

I Toward a Democratic China

theless, democracy requires that people show tolerance for a period of time. Democracy is inseparable from freedom of speech and freedom of the press. It cannot be divorced from the protection of the minority, nor can it be separated from the principle of allowing the minority to express its views as it pleases in situations where it must bear with the majority's mistakes. In due course—for example, with a change of office in government organs or social organizations—the mistakes can be remedied. Therefore democracy provides a mechanism for rectifying mistakes in a timely or at least relatively prompt fashion. A democratic politics is none other than the politics of continually rectifying mistakes, in accordance with procedure. The practice of democracy requires compliance with procedure. When it happens that mistakes cannot be corrected immediately, a minority cannot seek to impose its will on the majority in violation of predetermined procedure or resort to violence. Of course, procedures are formulated by people. Individuals who constitute a minority can utilize procedures to make their own will become the majority will in the small group, and then further gain the approval of a larger assemblage. If a majority comes to believe that the original procedure is inappropriate, the procedure itself can also be revised. If a state or locale has such corrective mechanisms, then it will have democracy. If a political party, social organization, or international organization has this kind of internal corrective mechanism, then that party, social organization, or international organization will have democracy. On the question of democracy, there is an erroneous view that democracy cannot be implemented among people who lack a high level of culture and education. In August 1915, on the eve of Yuan Shikai's proclamation of himself as the new emperor, Frank Goodnow, an advisor to Yuan and the first president of the American Political Science Association, wrote an article entitled "Republic and Monarchy." In it the American political scientist claimed that because China had known despotism for several millennia, the The Road to National Wealth and Power

I 135

intellectual level of its people was low, and they were unconcerned about politics; China was therefore unsuited to be a democratic republic.4 In the ensuing decades China has encountered many advisors like Goodnow who have come forward in their articles or speeches to suggest that it was not yet time to implement democracy in China because of the inferior quality of its people. In reality, however, such advisors ignore a basic fact: when the ancient Greeks practiced democracy, their level of culture was far below that of present-day China. The prerequisite for democracy is the acknowledgement that human beings are imperfect, that participants in the decision-making process have different abilities and levels of education, and that in the course of making decisions or correcting them according to established procedures, people are capable of expressing their own views, wishes, and feelings. The Cultural Revolution era was destructive of democracy because no healthy channels were available for the people to express their views, wishes, and feelings. There was no mechanism for correcting mistakes through established procedures. Not until Mao Zedong's death was it possible to correct the mistaken policies and unjust verdicts of the Cultural Revolution. China's rise to prosperity will depend not only on instituting the rule of law and practicing democratic politics, but also on carrying out economic reform. In my lecture at the anniversary celebration of the Dagong Daily, I said that economic reform must be based on a scientific understanding of human nature and the acknowledgement that people have various material needs. A society confronted with steadily increasing demand may try to meet it by developing its economy, or it may seek to suppress demand with moral prohibitions that treat the quest for a better life as harmful. These differing views of human needs and human nature will inevitably lead 4. Frank Goodnow, "Republic and Monarchy"; see "Notes on Constitutional Monarchy" (in Chinese), September 1915. [Author's note] 136

I Toward a Democratic China

nations in different directions. In truth the latter approach is one of the chief reasons for China's poverty and backwardness. If certain people happen to have a social need, then society should incorporate an automatic mechanism of adjustment that would enable others to come forward to engage in a profession that will meet that need. An automatic mechanism of adjustment means adjustment according to provisions of law, not according to the administrative orders of some government organ or individual. A market economy embodies automatic mechanisms of adjustment that can meet the various needs that people have. In an economy that allows trade among individuals, a free exchange conducted through the market can result in satisfaction for both parties to the transaction. The thrust of China's economic reform is to maximize the development of a commodity economy by means of legislative measures and reliance on state authority. Of course, the power of uncontrolled markets may give rise to a series of grave social problems, which might even prove deleterious to economic growth. Therefore, while fostering and giving free play to market mechanisms, the government provides the much-needed functions of macro-economic control and guidance over the market. Today, in the ninth decade of the twentieth century, there is an incalculable number of administrative constraints on the Chinese economy blocking countless possibilities and opportunities; it is an economy of self-imposed constraints, denying people the chance to enhance their own interests while doing no injury to the interests of others. The growth of China's national wealth and power will depend on transforming this economy of self-imposed constraints into one of self-development. In today's China this requires that every enterprise possess the capability of developing on its own and appreciating in value; that the enterprise itself have the power to make decisions about investment, production, and pricing; that it be able to adopt, on its own initiative, the newest science and technology; and that within the economy as a whole the industrial structure be able to adjust itself automatically through the developThe Road to National Wealth and Power

I 137

ment of science and technology and economics. These goals can only be realized through the full development of market mechanisms, with the flow of resources being determined by the market and the initiatives of enterprises and entrepreneurs brought fully into play. Some feel that countless difficulties lie ahead in China's quest for national prosperity. Others believe that many of our fine ideas are nothing but Utopian fantasies. But in my view a society's needs provide the motive force for creativity. As I wrote in an article published in the Guangming

Daily, "From the standpoint of sci-

ence, there is no concrete problem that cannot be solved." Moreover, "with the use of science, people can create conditions as well as alter existing conditions in order to deal with the concrete problems they need to solve." 5 Even when faced with difficulties, people with firm scientific convictions will never be at their wit's end or at a loss as to what to do, for science is the wellspring of human optimism.

5. Yan Jiaqi, "Wo dui kexue de sige xinnian" (My four convictions regarding science), Guangming Daily, May 10,1988. See chapter 26 below.

138

I Toward a Democratic China

i8 On Social Capital

One important idea expounded in Marx's Das Kapital is that developments in social economy can be treated as processes of natural history. For thousands of years people lived mostly in small, simple social groups. But with entry into the modern world, various types of organizations have taken shape in the domains of politics, economics, science, education, and religion. A person now passes his life as a member of many different social organizations. It is my opinion that not only developments in social economy but also man's evolving social structures belong in the province of natural history. This is not to say that man cannot plan his organizations or change the social structure according to a predetermined plan. But it does mean that in human history as a whole the evolution of social structures is just as much a process of natural history as is biological evolution. Today in the twentieth century technological progress has had an unmistakable transforming effect on society's productive sector, and on the entire social structure. China's rise to prosperity will depend on the modernization of its economy and politics—that is to say, on the modernization of the productive sector and the entire social structure. In mid-June of 1988, at the invitation of Professor Lao Siguang, chairman of the Association for the Study of Chinese 139

Humanities, I attended the International Conference on Economic and Political Modernization of Chinese Society. During the meeting I gave my views on the modernization of Chinese politics. Outside the meeting, the Hong Kong newspaper Dagong Daily began serial publication on June 19 of my article "Reforming China's System of Ownership." This article, which discusses China's economic modernization, can also be viewed as an addendum to my lecture "How Can China Prosper?" which I had given in March at an anniversary celebration for the Dagong Daily. The key to economic modernization is giving each enterprise the ability to grow and develop on its own. Under the traditional system of public ownership, enterprises lack this ability. By "traditional system of public ownership" I mean the type of state ownership and collective ownership that has existed for quite some time in Russia, Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea. In "Reforming China's System of Ownership" I analyzed the chief ills of traditional public ownership as well as courses of action for reforming it, as set forth by current Chinese economists. I was concerned by the lack of ability of enterprises under traditional public ownership to grow and develop independently. How should traditional public ownership be reformed so that enterprises can gain this ability? In this article I also explored the distinctions among taxation, interest, and profit: Under traditional public ownership, the state invests in enterprises and also operates them. The state can gain income both from investment and from operations. Under these conditions, the state does not need to distinguish among profit, interest, and taxation: the enterprise simply turns its profits over to the state. If the enterprise operates at a loss, the government provides subsidies. Moreover, the enterprise's operating capital is allotted by the government without compensation. Due to an emerging separation between ownership rights and operating rights over state enterprises, China's economists have 140

I Toward a Democratic China

begun to reexamine the distinctions among taxation, interest, and profit. Taxes are the income the state receives for managing society. When ownership rights are completely separate from operating rights, a mere owner has rights only to the ownership income, or interest. One problem in the Chinese economy is how to justify the state's claim to an enterprise's profit, in addition to the taxes or interest it collects. Some economists feel that profit is rightfully the income of the operator, though the state can regulate overly high profits by taxing the excess. 1 Other economists believe that the state is not only the owner of enterprises, but also an "operator" which fulfills a "macro-economic function." The state should not only collect the "interest" related to its "ownership income," but should also take part of the enterprise's operating income, to be used for large-scale distribution and other macro-economic needs. This portion of the state's income (i.e., that drawn from profits) is "derived from the state's macro-economic function, not from its ownership rights." 2 There are also those who see this in terms of a contract system: that is, the enterprise contracts with the government to pay taxes and turn over a specified share of the profits, after which it, as contractor, keeps the remaining funds. This being so, in contracts awarded to enterprises having advantageous conditions of production, the state will also collect whatever income the enterprise gains due to the advantages it realizes from being stateowned. Some people feel that "turning profits over to the government is a key characteristic of the contract system. When the means of production belong to the people as a whole, this is the obligation of a subgroup of small owners to the entire body of owners." 3 Yet

i. See "Whither the Economic Reforms?" Jirtgji ribao (Economic daily), August 15,1987. [Author's note] 1 . Lin Zili, "On New Types of Value Exchange," People's Daily, December 18,1987. [Author's note] 3. See "Questions about 'Questions about the Enterprise Contract System'," Lilun xinxi bao, November 30,1987. [Author's note] On Social Capital

I 141

another viewpoint holds that the state has two functions with respect to state-owned enterprises, one being its general function of managing society, and the other being the management of stateowned property. The government controls enterprises through personnel appointments and the distribution of resources. Given the separation of ownership rights from operating rights, the government collects taxes from an enterprise in its capacity as manager of society, and it collects profits (not interest) in its role as manager of state property. The first two views above actually espouse the idea that profits are the operator's income, and since particular operators of enterprises make overly high profits, those profits need to be subject to certain types of withholding. This can be done either through levying a tax on excess profits or by withholding of "profits derived from the state's macro-economic functions." The two latter views hold that the state should base its claim to income on ownership rights or rights of management over state property. I feel that the state-owned economy has instilled in people a deeply rooted idea that profit is not really income generated as a result of investment decisions and operations. Instead, it is what remains after taking away the taxes and interest due to the owners and the wages due to the producers. But the amount of this remainder is determined by investment decisions and by operations management. It is quite obvious that the state cannot appropriate the profit of enterprises simply because of its macro-economic functions, but should instead guarantee the realization of its macro-economic functions through taxation. The profit part of the balance can be quite large, given correct investment decisions and effective management of operations. Deciding strategies of investment according to the latest scientific achievements and operating with the latest technologies are both important routes to increasing the "profit" portion of the balance. The traditional system of public ownership deluded people into thinking that the state's "macro-economic function," together with its "management rights over state property," could automati142

I Toward a Democratic China

cally generate profit. But profit is not distributed equally among enterprises. Even if proper investment strategies are adopted, poor management will cause a decrease of profits; mistaken investment strategies coupled with poor management will inevitably send the enterprise's balance sheet into the red. When this happens, how can the state, on the basis of its "macro-economic function" and "management rights over state property," lay claim to profits that have already become a negative quantity? For this reason, the concept of "profit" which belongs to traditional public ownership should be abandoned. Profits are not created by the state's "macro-economic function" and "management rights over state property." Also, profits are not simply the result of operations management. They are the combined result of effective income generation, correct investment decisions, and operations management on the part of a particular enterprise. Profits are not equivalent to the operator's income but are instead the income that follows from investment decisions and operations. Thus, as I wrote in my article "Reforming China's System of Ownership": Whether the system of ownership is public or private, for enterprises making different investment decisions and managing their operations differently, there should be a clear disparity in the leftover balance [i.e., profits]. Enterprises that make correct investment decisions and manage their operations well should be allowed to use surplus funds for reinvestment. In this w a y enterprises can enjoy uninterrupted growth, while poorly run enterprises that make bad investment decisions are weeded out. Whether it practices private or public ownership, society should make use of this mechanism to constantly renovate its productive structures, re-scale its enterprises, and improve the management operations of its enterprises. 4

4. Yan Jiaqi, "Reforming China's System of Ownership," pt. 2, Dagong bao, June 20,1988. [Author's note] On Social Capital

I 143

Profits are created through correct investment decisions and effective management on the part of enterprises. After gaining profits an enterprise must make new decisions on how to distribute and use its profits. Under different systems of ownership, the extent of an enterprise's authority to make this sort of decision differs. Under China's traditional mode of public ownership, wherein all funds are put at the government's disposal, an enterprise turns over its total profits, keeping only a fund for bonuses, while its needs for capital are met by state fiscal allotments. If a system of profit retention is practiced, the percentage of realized profits which the enterprise retains is fixed according to the particular situation of the enterprise by the department that controls the enterprise. Once this proportion is set, it does not change for a number of years. With the retained profits, the enterprise establishes a production development fund, an employee welfare fund, and an employee bonus fund. The use of these funds does not require submitting plans to several levels of authority for approval. Because the retained profits are only a small portion of the total profits realized, however, this mode of profit distribution does not actually allow an enterprise to realize growth free of limitations. 5 One possible route for reforming the traditional system of public ownership is to change from state ownership to ownership by enterprise. Ownership by enterprise means that the enterprise functions as a completely independent owner, operating autonomously and taking responsibility for its own profits and losses. Its behavior in the market is the same as that of a privately owned enterprise. The distinction between ownership by enterprise and private ownership is this: "In a privately owned enterprise, the proprietor is the owner of the means of production and the goods produced. Whether or not the enterprise grows depends on the proprietor. 5. Ibid. [Author's note] 144

I Toward a Democratic China

Under ownership by enterprise, the means of production and goods produced belong to all the employees in the enterprise. The enterprise's investment decisions, wages, and benefits are determined through some form of democratic decision making on the part of its employees." 6 But ownership by enterprise cannot solve the problem of the growth of the enterprise. Under the system of ownership by enterprise, the operators of the enterprise are not appointed or assigned by the state. Instead, they are chosen by employees according to certain procedures. Once such people assume authority over operations of the enterprise, it is hardly likely that they will refuse demands by employees for increased benefits. Though the enterprise does not turn over an overwhelmingly large portion of operating income to state fiscal authorities, as was true under traditional public ownership, the proportion of operating income used for investment will be lowered greatly due to employee demands for increased wages and benefits. Ownership by enterprise offers the possibility of maximizing the pursuit of profit, but as a system of ownership it cannot maximize growth of the enterprise. Though it represents a reform of traditional public ownership, the contract system is also hardly likely to resolve the matter of the growth of the enterprise. Putting this system into practice requires signing a contract to complete a project. Thus there arises first of all the problem of evaluating the enterprise's assets and assessing the base value of the project. In its own interests an enterprise will generally undervalue its assets and technical capabilities in order to keep the base value of the project low. Once the enterprise enters into a contractual undertaking, it will strive to maximize the balance left after

6. Yan Jiaqi, "Reforming China's System of Ownership," pt. i , Dagong bao, June 1 9 , 1 9 8 8 . [Author's note]

On Social Capital

I 145

handing over the specified taxes and interest. Often the management, impatient for a quick profit, will ignore the longterm development of the enterprise. Enterprises in this situation are hardly likely to make investments that have long-term effects and involve risks. Instead, they push their equipment, supplies, and manpower to the limit. This is bound to accelerate wear and tear on their material assets. Even in China's rural villages, the contract system has not managed to make peasants automatically expand their reinvestments in production. Instead, it has led peasants to pour accumulated capital into nonproductive housing construction, while awareness of the necessity for productive investment is limited. To overcome these ills, some enterprises, upon entering into a contract, have set limits on the construction of new housing and the expansion of existing housing. The number of houses to be built is settled upon by the enterprise, and the enterprise can amass its own capital to get underway. There are people who propose to specify, at the time the contract is made, more than just the amount of taxes and interest to be handed over. They would like to specify standards of equipment upkeep, depreciation allowances, distribution of profits within the enterprise, and even approaches and requirements for innovation and improvement of the enterprise. Aside from whether such highly complicated provisions would be feasible, the contract system cannot provide a mechanism integral to the enterprise which causes the enterprise to divert a maximum amount of the balance from operating income toward new investments to further development. 7 H o w to help enterprises maximize their ability to grow and develop on their own is one of the key problems of China's eco-

7. Yan Jiaqi, "Reforming China's System of Ownership," pt. 3, Dagong bao, June 21,1988. [Author's note] 146

I Toward a Democratic China

nomic modernization. Of course the growth of some enterprises will surely be accompanied by the weeding out of others: in this way the entire productive structure of the economy will be in constant change. In this age of rapid technological progress, adjustments and changes in the productive structure of an entire society result from the adoption by enterprises of new scientific and technical methods. In countries where public ownership dominates the economy, changes in the productive structure are carried out differently than in countries where private ownership dominates the economy: In countries with economies based on private ownership, publicly owned enterprises are no more than lone islands and reefs in the sea of the private economy, and investment is chiefly a private matter. The growth of private enterprises is determined by correct investment decision making and effective management (including use of the newest scientific and technical developments). Mistaken investment decisions or poor management will lead an enterprise into decline and bankruptcy. In terms of the whole society, the productive structure is transformed rapidly by competition among enterprises. In countries where public ownership is primary in the economy, changes in the productive sector depend on investments by the state, and funds for state investment come through the withholding of revenues and taxes. Under the traditional system of public ownership, reinvestment in expanded production was wholly the state's affair. Under the reformed system of public ownership in China, in which rights of ownership and management are separated, operators will do their utmost to improve management, in order to maximize the balance remaining after state revenues and taxes, and they will plow part of the balance back into the enterprise. All in all, however, in countries having publicly owned economies, there has been no change as yet in one fundamental respect. That is, the power over proOn Social Capital

I 147

ductive investment at all levels of society lies basically in the hands of the state (either the central or local government). 8 China has arrived at a crucial period of transformation. Not only are private and autonomous sectors of the economy allowed to develop under the dominant system of public ownership, so that private enterprises now number over 2.20,000 and employ 3,600,000 people; 9 moreover, publicly owned enterprises are being given the means to pursue maximum profit by way of leases, contracts, and the issuing of shares. In a section of "Reforming China's System of Ownership" called "Unsolved Fundamental Problems of Public Ownership," I maintain that a still more important problem awaits solution before China's economy can be reformed. "The question is how, under public ownership, we can find an automatic mechanism (i.e., without requiring state or government decisions) such that each enterprise can automatically apply the balance of operating income after costs to its own growth, instead of diverting it toward nonproductive construction and excessive personal consumption." 10 In order to explore these questions related to the system of ownership, and to explore the theoretical issues of China's modernization and democratization, I wished to devote a concentrated period of time to research and writing. Since 1982 I had served two successive terms as the administrative head of the Institute of Political Science. On April 2 8 , 1 9 8 8 , 1 indicated at a meeting of the institute that I would not serve another term as director. Moreover, at the meeting I proposed an open election of the director for the next term. The leadership of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, however, felt that the director must be appointed, and that before the 8. Ibid. [Author's note] 9. In China, "private enterprises" refers to enterprises having privately owned assets and employing more than eighteen persons. The above figure is taken from People's Daily, June 2.4,1988, p. 1. [Author's note] 10. Yan Jiaqi, "Reforming China's System of Ownership," pt. 3, Dagong bao,]une

148

zi, 1988. [Author's note]

I Toward a Democratic

China

appointment it wanted to conduct a "public opinion survey" but without disclosing the actual vote. Because there was dissension at the institute meeting over the procedure for selecting a new director, it was only able to vote on one decision, namely that "no other decision whatsoever would be made." T w o weeks later, on May 14, with the support of the academy's administration and under the direction of the academy's secretary general, a vote by "public opinion poll" regarding selection of the institute director was carried out. Without predesignated candidates at the time of voting, voters could name one person to serve as the new director. The result was that I received 90.6 percent of the votes cast. Because the institute directors are appointed by the academy president, the number of votes only constituted a point of reference, so that someone with a minority of votes could still be appointed to the position. After the vote I still indicated my unwillingness to serve another term as director. For many years I had had a good deal of acquaintance with the effects of power and the wielding of power in small organizations as well as large ones. I strongly detest those who acquire power at the expense of other people's rights. I also detest those who use power for private gains. As I leave my position I can proudly state that I neither used the power at my disposal to infringe upon the rights of anyone else, nor did I obtain any private gains. As a result of the earlier work preparing for the institute and the common efforts of the whole staff, the Institute of Political Science has by now begun to take shape. The research work it has undertaken has led to a series of accomplishments. After I leave my position I will devote all my efforts to research. The twentieth century is the century of socialism; it is the century of great development for the economics of public ownership. I plan first to write a book entitled "On Social Capital" 1 1 in which I shall explore the problem of 11. The title of this book has not been determined; it might also be called "The Fourth Society." [Author's

note]

On Social Capital

I 149

capital proliferation and other theoretical issues in the economics of public ownership. After this book is completed, I will continue my efforts to write on the politics of small organizations, on universal human nature, and on other topics as well. (Written May-June 1988)

150

I Toward a Democratic China

19 Another Beijing Spring 1989

In 1988 mainland China moved toward moderation after the campaign against bourgeois liberalization. Yet in this moderating atmosphere, with the problems arising from the economic reforms increasing daily, people became bolder in expressing their opinions and their dissatisfaction. When I was in Hong Kong in March 1 9 8 8 , 1 had said, "We must face squarely the problems arising from the reforms, including the problem of equality. If social phenomena such as inequality remain unchecked and continue to develop, then a source of turmoil will exist in society." 1 Of course, the prodemocracy movement in the spring of 1989 was not a case of "turmoil," and in March 1988 I could not have predicted that such major changes would appear in China a year hence. The introduction of market mechanisms under conditions of public ownership is the main cause of the chaos in the economic reforms undertaken in mainland China. After ten years of reform, 1. See "Liu Xinwu, Yan Jiaqi zai benbao yanjianghui shang dawen" (Liu Xinwu and Yan Jiaqi answer questions at a conference sponsored by Dagong bao), Dagotig bao, March 18,1988. [Author's note]

151

although the private economy has developed somewhat, it is still extremely limited, amounting to only a few percent of the total. In the system of public ownership in China, the right of property is unclear and unexplicit, regardless of whether it is state ownership or collective ownership. Because commodities could simultaneously have two different prices, many people with considerable power at their disposal made use of that power "to buy low and sell high," raking in enormous amounts of wealth. As inflation in the price of commodities, graft, and corruption increased daily, a sense of inequality also increased, and with it a growing dissatisfaction on the part of the people. Although Deng Xiaoping had advocated reforms in China's political institutions, those reforms were limited to a decentralization of power, separating the party and the government, streamlining administrative and organizational structures, and raising efficiency. Deng absolutely opposed allowing people to have real freedom of speech or freedom of the press. Moreover, he would never allow the emergence on mainland China of any political force independent of the Communist Party. On April 15, 1989, the death of the former general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, H u Yaobang, w h o had been treated unfairly for a long time within the party, became the fuse that ignited the discontent of the people. Tens of thousands initially, and then hundreds of thousands of people gathered at Tiananmen Square, and innumerable wreaths were placed at the Monument to the Revolutionary Martyrs. The people's mourning of Hu Yaobang had arisen spontaneously, but it was soon transformed into a protest movement of unprecedented proportions. 2

2. Protests by students, intellectuals, and citizens escalated during the week between Hu Yaobang's death and the funeral on April 22, a Saturday. Due to an official news blackout on the student demonstrations and the government's mishandling of student demands, student discontent did not subside; instead it continued to spread and engulfed other discontented social groups, including Chinese journalists. 152

I Toward a Democratic China

On April 2 6 , 1 9 8 9 , the People's Daily published a front-page editorial, "Take a Clear-cut Stand by Opposing Turmoil," in accordance with a talk Deng Xiaoping had given the previous day. The next day college students from Beijing organized a huge march, several hundred thousand strong, which circumscribed the city in protest against the People's Daily editorial. This enormous protest march reduced Deng Xiaoping's prestige to an all-time low. On April 29, while being interviewed by reporters from the Commercial News of Rotterdam and the South German News of West Germany, I observed that the Deng Xiaoping era was beginning to end. Starting at 2 p.m. on May 13, some three thousand Beijing college students began a hunger strike on Tiananmen Square. They demanded that the April 26 editorial be retracted and that a direct dialogue between the students and the government be broadcast live over the media. After tens, hundreds, and finally more than a thousand of the students had collapsed in the hunger strike, still in all of mainland China not a single party or government leader stepped forward to engage the students in a sincere dialogue or dared to affirm that the students' actions constituted a patriotic democracy movement. For four successive days, from M a y 14 to 1 7 , continuous marches broke out all over Beijing, involving hundreds of thousands and finally more than a million people, all voicing their support for the students' struggle and hunger strike. 3 Calls 3. During the so-called Four Amazing Days in May, the Chinese press freely and fairly reported on the events occurring throughout the capital. The People's Daily reported that Yan Jiaqi led a large march of tens of thousands of intellectuals in support of the students (May 17, 1989, front page story). During this period, the Chinese press also reported and printed petitions from university presidents and leading members of the liberaldemocratic parties of China urging the government to meet with students, a remarkable show of solidarity and spontaneous political participation. The erosion of popular respect for the party and government and their legitimacy occurred quickly among students and citizens, for at Tiananmen, on university campuses, and in municipal neighborhoods, a wide-

Another Beijing Spring

I 153

for Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng to step down and surrender their power reverberated throughout Beij ing. On May 1 7 , 1 , Bao Zunxin, 4 and several dozen others put out a broadside entitled the "May Seventeenth Manifesto" which echoed the previous day's "May Sixteenth Declaration." The "May Seventeenth Manifesto" was broadcast at Tiananmen Square on the same day and distributed widely. In it we stated the following: By now, the problem facing our homeland has been fully exposed to the people of China and the entire world—that is, because a dictator wields unlimited power, the government has lost its sense of responsibility and its humanity. This government that has become irresponsible and inhumane is not the government of a republic; rather, it is a government under the power of a dictator. The Qing dynasty has been extinct for more than seventysix years. Yet China still has an emperor without an imperial crown—an aged, muddleheaded dictator. Yesterday afternoon, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang publicly announced that all major policy decisions in China must be approved by this senile and useless dictator. Without this dictator's saying so, the April 26 People's Daily editorial cannot be retracted.5 At the time, with hundreds of thousands of people issuing the same cry, no one felt that expressing such words would bring any

spread belief circulated that governments, by international convention, were obligated to respect and respond to demands of hunger strikers within six days. 4. An associate research fellow at the Institute of History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Bao Zunxin was arrested after June 4 and later sentenced to a long prison term. Both he and Yan Jiaqi were also expelled from the party and their official work unit, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 5. For the full text, see chapter 28 below. 154

I Toward a Democratic

China

danger. It might even be observed that during the Cultural Revolution the shouting of the slogan " D o w n with Deng Xiaoping" strengthened M a o Zedong's dictatorial power. But in the spring of 1989, the fact that people were shouting the same slogan in a serious way shook the dictatorial political power of China to its foundation. On M a y 20, Li Peng issued an order establishing martial law in the main districts of the municipality of Beijing, and large numbers of troops began to enter the capital. The citizens of Beijing ignored the martial law orders. They poured onto the streets and boulevards and used large trucks and public buses as roadblocks to obstruct the troops' entry into the city. On M a y 25, Bao Zunxin and I jointly wrote an "Indictment of Li Peng," demanding that martial law be rescinded and that Li Peng voluntarily resign the post of premier of the State Council. Otherwise, we insisted, Li Peng should be recalled by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and by the congress itself. On the night of June 3, the Democracy University of Tiananmen Square held its opening ceremony. Zhang Boli, deputy commanderin-chief of the Tiananmen Hunger Strike Brigade, was the new university's president, and I was invited to be its honorary president. At 1 1 p . m . , speaking through a voice amplifier, I gave the inaugural lecture of Democracy University to several tens of thousands of people gathered around the Goddess of Democracy. 6 1 discussed the meaning of the concept of democracy and elaborated on freedom, the rule of law, and human rights. I also explained the content of the "Indictment of Li Peng." 7 In conclusion, I told the people gath-

6. A thirty-foot-high, plaster and styrofoam statue hastily erected by students from the Central Academy of Art in Beijing over a three-day period; facing the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen) to the north, it was a rallying symbol for the demonstrators. 7. The text of the indictment, "Gao Li Peng shu," was published in the Hong Kong Ming bao, May 26,1989. [Author's note] Another Beijing Spring

I 155

ered there that if Li Peng were to use violent force to suppress them, then they would have to forge democracy in China with their own blood and lives. Around midnight on June 3, approximately a quarter of an hour after completing my speech, I left the square. Several tens of thousands remained on the scene at the time. Returning to my home, I encountered a sea of people on East Chang-an Boulevard. Later someone told me that gunfire had already begun near the Museum of Military Affairs, several kilometers to the west. On Tiananmen Square, however, amid the great masses of people, there was not the slightest sense of danger. N o one would have thought that a massacre of unparalleled savagery was about to occur. At about 1:30 a.m., from the balcony of my home, 8 I saw throngs of people scattering in all directions and fleeing from the automatic gunfire leveled at them from the Jiangguomen Overpass. That whole night I did not sleep at all. I received many telephone calls from foreign students from Japan, Australia, and the United States, expressing their grief and indignation as they watched television transmissions of what was happening. The intense sound of gunfire continued almost without interruption from 2 to 4 a.m., accompanied by the tremendous noise made by the tanks rolling down the streets and boulevards.

8. T h e Y a n family lived on the fourteenth floor of an apartment building behind the Chinese A c a d e m y of Social Sciences office complex, located between Tiananmen, the Beijing Hotel to the west, and the foreign diplomatic missions and the Friendship Store to the east.

156

I Toward a Democratic China

20 Exile

In the early morning of June 4, several eye witnesses to the massacre came to my home to persuade me to leave Beijing immediately. With their assistance I went to a place in south China. Because the dictatorial power in China is all-pervasive, I had to change my place of residence frequently in the days after the massacre. Some of my friends encouraged me to head to a sparsely populated mountain region to evade capture. Others were prepared to make contact on my behalf with a construction crew, which would have allowed me to work alongside it and drift all over China with the crew. Just when I was at an impasse, I was offered a way out of China. From June 13 through June 18, my wife and I survived many perils, one after another. On the night of the 18th, we came to a small, deserted island without a trace of other people. Gazing into the distance, we could see little besides a few other, even smaller islands, faintly visible. There was nothing else but the black sky and brown seawater. There were just four of us on this desolate island. Deep into the night, in the hazy moonlight, a boat sped toward our island. One person in our group called out loudly for the approaching vessel to pull ashore. But this boat sped away, its occupants probably suspecting that we were soldiers out to arrest smugglers.

157

In the early morning of June 19, we were finally out of danger. On June 22, having escaped to Hong Kong, I saw a copy of the local Chinese-language newspaper Ming bao. On the front page was the headline "Qiao Shi, Li Peng covet party general secretaryship; Yang, Li vow to execute Yan Jiaqi." It was on that day that I boarded an Air France plane and left Hong Kong. And thus began my life in exile. In France we exiles from mainland China lived in a farmhouse on the distant outskirts of Paris. Here we drafted the "One-Month Declaration of a Memorial Day for National Martyrs," proposing that June Fourth be designated China's National Martyrs' Day and that on September 12, 1989, one hundred days after the massacre, memorial services be held around the world for our compatriots who had died for their country.1 We also moved to establish an organization with broad representation to work for the democratization of China. July 14,1989, marked the bicentennial anniversary of the French Revolution, and we exiles in France also participated in celebrating the occasion. We had invited to Paris several dozen friends from the United States, West Germany, Great Britain, and Hong Kong, including Liu Binyan, Su Shaozhi, Ruan Ming, Li Chunguang, Hu Ping, Wu Guoguang, Ding Xueliang, Shen Dan, Liu Yongchuan, Xie Wen, and Li Sanyuan. That night in Paris a huge festive parade was held, divided into twelve thematic contingents, all in varied forms and colors, and joyful sounds filled the air. Marching at the forefront of the parade, leading everyone, was a bicycle brigade composed of overseas Chinese students who carried an incomparably large drum, using its silence as a protest against the June Fourth massacre. Each student wore on his chest the four Chinese 1. The "One-Month Declaration of a National Martyrs' Day" was issued over the names of two persons, Wu'er Kaixi and Yan Jiaqi. See the Hong Kong Singtao (Xindao) Daily, July 5,1989. [Author's note]

158

I Toward a Democratic China

characters for "democracy, freedom." The big drum was surrounded by the characters for "freedom, equality, fraternity." When the parade contingent passed in front of the reviewing stand, everyone stood up and held high the hand sign for victory. The next day, we who resided in France held a meeting with our guests from the United States, West Germany, Great Britain, and Hong Kong. Out of the meeting came the recommendation that Liu Binyan, Su Shaozhi, Wan Runnan, Wu'er Kaixi, and I jointly draft a proposal to establish the Federation for a Democratic China. 2 The founding meeting of the Federation for a Democratic China (FDC) was held in Paris on September 22, 1989. In the process of preparing for this meeting, I had proposed that the platform for the F D C should adopt a peaceful, rational, and nonviolent code of action in order to promote the democratization of China, to terminate the dictatorship in China, to uphold human rights, and to reestablish the republic as the Federal Republic of China. After my escape from China, I wrote an article entitled "China Is Not a Republic." 3 I believe that both the People's Republic of China, established in 1949, and the Republic of China that existed before 1949 have not been true republics at all, because in each case the state's supreme power has been concentrated in the hands of one person, with neither a separation of powers nor a limitation on the terms of office for that person. Sun Yat-sen established the first republic in Chinese history in 1 9 1 1 , and M a o Zedong founded the second republic in 1949. Both of these republics, however, retained elements of the imperial dynasties. N o w the Taiwan of today is becoming increasingly democratized. In my view, the prospect for China's future is to reestablish the republic by creating a "third republic." This will be a reunified federated republic consisting of 2. The "Proposal to Establish the Federation for a Democratic China" was published in the Singtao (Xindao) Daily, July 2 1 , 1 9 8 9 . [Author's note] 3. See chapter 29 below.

Exile

I 159

the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, built on the foundation of a federal system. 4 Meeting on the campus of the University of Paris, the Federation for a Democratic China was established on September 22, 1989. The following day, after more than one hundred ballots, its constitution was finally passed. The proposals to reestablish the republic and create a federal system were not written into the constitution of the F D C , however. Terminating the one-party dictatorship in China, unanimously agreed upon by all conferees, became the basic platform of the FDC. I was elected the FDC's first president on September 24. Shortly before the founding of the F D C , the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences announced that I was no longer in its employment, and the inspection commission of the Chinese Communist Party at the academy announced that I had been expelled from party membership. 5 I was simultaneously removed from my position as a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Political Science Association, and I was recalled as a representative to the local people's congress. Finally, the Exit Control Bureau of the Chinese Public Security Bureau announced the revocation of my passport. 6 In the second half of 1989, world-shaking changes occurred in Eastern Europe. In China Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and Yang Shangkun—those butchers of the people—shall not enjoy even a single day of peace and tranquility, for a massive transformation of 4. Lian-bang-zhi

may be translated as federal system or commonwealth.

Since Yan's use of the concept is more consistent with the political structures and practice of the U . S . and West Germany, it is rendered here as "federal system." 5. People's Daily, August 1 0 , 1 9 8 9 ; see also Guangming date. [Author's

Daily of the same

note]

6. See "Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau Discusses Policies toward the F D C , Investigations into the Criminal Responsibilities of Y a n Jiaqi and Other Leaders," Ouzhou 1 9 9 0 . [Author's

160

shibao

note]

I Toward a Democratic

China

(European times), January I I ,

China has been barely contained. In the not too distant future, those butchers will be brought to public trial, the one-party dictatorship will end in mainland China, a noncommunist government will be established there, and at long last the democratization of mainland China will open the way to China's reunification. I believe that in the twenty-first century a democratic and free federal third republic will definitely be established in the great land of China. 7 Paris March 1990

7. On the issue of China's reunification on the foundation of a federal system, see "Prospects for China in the 1990s," Ouzhou

ribao (Europe

daily), January 1 , 1990; also Ming bao (Hong Kong), January 1 - 5 , 1990. [Author's note] See chapter 32 below. Exile

I 161

Selected Essays & Interviews

21 Religion, Reason, and Practice Visits to Three Courts of L a w

i On the evening of M a y 3, 1978, as I was watching the drama When the Maples Turn Red in the People's Theater at the Huguo Temple in Beijing, a message was projected onto the right wing of the stage: "Attention, Guangming

Daily Reporter Yan

Jiaqi. Please return to the editorial office at once. Urgent assignment. Car waiting at theater gate." What urgent assignment was this? For the moment I had not a clue. Hurrying back to the editorial office, I learned that the Guangming Daily had just concluded

Source: Guangming Daily, September 14,1978. This piece of science fiction was published in the Guangming Daily, the leading newspaper for intellectuals and educators, as China was emerging from the dark days of the Cultural Revolution. At the time, Yan Jiaqi was a relatively unknown young scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which had been badly disrupted by almost a decade of political turmoil. Because the discourse was imaginative, circumspect, courageous, and bold, Yan was noticed and soon was recruited to join the Communist Party. 165

an agreement with the International Bureau of Space-Time Aeronautics to send an immediate investigative flight into the past and future. The editor-in-chief said to me excitedly, "The bureau's computer indicates there are three courts of law relating to the question of truth. The first is a court of religion in seventeenth-century Italy. The second is a court of reason in eighteenth-century France, during the Enlightenment. And the third is a court of practice in China in the twenty-first century. With the current debate about practice as the sole criterion of truth, we've decided to send you on a survey of these three courts of law. Your departure is tomorrow; you can make the necessary preparations tonight." I listened with elation as the editor-in-chief briefed me on my mission. Here I was, living in the late 1970s, and I would be privileged to see the true state of affairs centuries ago and in the future! Small wonder that I was eager to be up and off. The next day was M a y 4. At 3:20 p.m., I boarded the massive R - 1 0 0 1 airship and embarked on my journey. On a gloomy afternoon in late February, 1633, the R-1001 airship touched down on the right bank of the Tiber River, in a small open space near the Vatican Palace. As I disembarked, gazing in disorientation at the ancient city wall of Rome, a six-wheeled carriage rushed out from the Vatican toward me. This turned out to be Thessalus, a counselor to Pope Urban VIII, who had been sent to meet me. Thessalus helped me into the carriage, which dashed along the Via Tiberna, across the Campo dei Fiori where Bruno had been burned at the stake, and finally pulled up at the foot of the Palatine Hill. From here a nicely paved road wound among the clustered trees of an ancient grove all the way to the end of Marcello Valley, where an ancient fortress loomed. This was the location of the world-renowned religious tribunal, the Roman Inquisition. Thessalus led me into an opulently furnished hall, redolent with 166

I Toward a Democratic China

burning bayberry. Amid the colorful splendor of the large hall, a bronze statue of Urban VIII gleamed in the light of countless candles. Before long a large-bellied man in judicial robes entered the room. Pointing to the approaching judge, Thessalus said, "This is Cardinal Gruli, justice of the Congregation of the Holy Office." Then, to the cardinal, he said, "Your Eminence, this gentleman, who comes from the China of a future century, is a reporter for the newspaper Guangming Daily." Cardinal Gruli said, "Signore, I extend a warm welcome to you on behalf of all the justices of the World Court of Inquisition in Rome. In the past few days I have been busy hearing an important religious case. Be sure to take a good rest. M y advisor Thessalus can acquaint you with matters pertaining to our court." After Cardinal Gruli's departure, Thessalus filled me in on some important facts concerning the court of inquisition. The earliest court of inquisition had been set up in 1220, upon the order of Pope Honorius III, by priests of the Dominican and Franciscan orders. Following the accession of Gregory IX to the papacy, courts of inquisition were established in many places throughout Italy. These courts had tremendous power, and were able to imprison anyone the church did not approve of. Some had dungeons called "crocodile pits," where tight fetters kept prisoners waist-deep in icy mud, immersed in darkness so complete there was no distinguishing day from night. A strict code governed hearings of the court of inquisition: the accused was not told the names of his accusers or of witnesses. T w o witnesses were sufficient to establish guilt; if the accused did not confess, he was subjected to repeated interrogations with torture. The accused could be executed without trial, but if he confessed and repented of his heretical crimes, he might be sentenced to lifelong imprisonment. If he recanted following his confession, he was burned to death without further hearings. Thessalus said to me, "The square beneath the giant cross that you saw on your way here is the Campo dei Fiori, where the obstinate heretic Giordano Bruno was burned to death thirty-three years Religion, Reason, and Practice

I 167

ago by our court." Thessalus went on to say, "Although Bruno entered a monastery at ten and became a Dominican friar at an early age, he ignored the injunctions of our holy church; moreover, he habitually read heretical books and made statements attacking the church. Later he shed his cassock and fled from Italy to spread heretical doctrines in Switzerland, England, and France. He went beyond Copernicus in his effrontery with his pernicious doctrine that the universe is infinite and has no center. Later he grew homesick and returned to Italy. The minute he set foot in Venice, we put him under arrest. For seven years we kept him in custody, hoping he would confess his guilt, but instead he attacked our holy church and the doctrines of the faith all the more brazenly. To protect our holy faith we had no choice but to publicly burn him at the stake. Now, thirty-three years later, we are facing a heresy equal in seriousness to Bruno's. At five o'clock tomorrow afternoon, when Cardinal Gruli appears to preside over the hearing, you will see how our court tries a case." The next afternoon, after five deafening strokes had been sounded from the castle's bell tower, Cardinal Gruli announced in somber tones: "The hearing shall now commence." The courtroom was a dim chamber, lit only by a few rays of light straggling in from narrow windows set high in the walls. Behind the bench were twelve high-backed judges' chairs, filled by Gruli and nine other cardinals. A seat to the left of the judges was empty, but I took the seat at the far right side. The grim, crafty, cruel, and mirthless visages of the cardinals imparted an air of deathly gloom to the courtroom. In the prisoner's dock stood a white-haired man in his seventies, his hands tied behind his back and his feet unshod on the icy brick floor. Beside the old man stood two guards draped in black capes. A charcoal fire glowed hotly in the brazier in one corner, sending a shifting play of eerie light over the crucifix near the brazier so that its long, wavering shadow fell across the prisoner in the dock. The old man turned to let his eyes follow its slight

168

I Toward a Democratic China

movements. This called up in my mind's eye the forms of Bruno and the Czech reformationist Jan Hus as they were burned at the stake. When Cardinal Gruli finished his opening statement, the old man swept his gaze over the courtroom. In his time-ravaged face, set off by a mane of white hair, were a pair of large deep-set eyes that still gave off the light of an inner fire, revealing an unbounded intellect. Looking carefully at this old man, I was overcome by a shock of recognition, and an indescribable uneasiness came over me. This man standing in the dock was none other than the famed Italian scientist Galileo! In slow, drawn-out tones Cardinal Gruli said, "Honorable Signore Galileo, you promised seventeen years ago not to disseminate the antibiblical theories of Copernicus. Nevertheless, last year in Florence you published a work in Italian entitled A Dialogue Concerning the Ptolemaic and Copernican World Systems. In this book you went so far as to praise Copernicus as 'excelling Ptolemy in wisdom,' and to assert that the earth is not the center of the universe, but revolves ceaselessly around the sun. Your calumnies have greatly damaged our holy faith by leading people to conclude that the Holy Bible is a fabrication!" Cardinal Gruli invoked the precedent of Bruno's execution by fire as a warning to Galileo: "Give serious thought to your past and to your future fate! For a scholar such as yourself, the road of repentance is wide open. Our holy church will always help those who have gone astray to find this great road." Galileo defended himself calmly: "Eminent cardinals of this holy court, in my Dialogue I did not once endorse Copernicus' doctrine. You can see clearly that this book was written as a dialogue between Savanti, who endorses the theories of Copernicus, and Simplicio, who endorses the theory of Ptolemy. I myself did not advance any opinion in the book, nor did I draw any conclusions. What is more, I pointed out clearly in the preface of the book that

Religion, Reason, and Practice

I 169

Copernicus's theory is no more than a hypothesis. It need not be taken seriously." This sent the young judge sitting beside me, Cardinal Lotacciuno, into a rage. Ignoring my presence, he sprang to his feet and his hand struck the back of my chair sharply; sparks of hatred fairly shot from his eyes. " T h e Simplicio you describe is an Aristotelian commentator," he bellowed. "Like our own Pope Urban VIII, he holds Aristotle in deepest respect. Throughout our dialogue you make Simplicio out to be a fool. You make a joke of him! By this ploy of yours, you in your delusion hope to undermine our faith in Aristotle and the Bible, and what is more, it is tantamount to ridiculing our holy pope! You must openly confess your crimes of slandering the pope and blaspheming the Bible, openly repudiate your own works, and give public expression of your repentance!" Because Galileo would not confess his guilt, this day's hearing was concluded without result. Afterwards many more hearings were conducted. When the ordeal had continued for three months, Galileo's constitution was reduced to extreme weakness, his face was haggard, and his spirits were flagging. He lacked even the strength to stand on his feet. One day in late June, Pope Urban VIII made a personal decision to bring a severe verdict against Galileo. The court tormented Galileo by conducting a

vigilia—depriving

him of sleep and questioning him continuously for fifty hours. During the interrogation the judges changed shifts every four hours, but would not let Galileo close his eyes for even a minute. The wardens brought out various instruments of torture and explained their use and horrible effects to Galileo. Faced with the court of inquisition's cruel interrogations, Galileo finally submitted and confessed his "crimes." Cardinal Gruli declared the trial terminated, and on the following day he read his verdict on Galileo. Galileo took his accustomed place in the courtroom, standing under the shadow of the crucifix, whereupon Cardinal Gruli read in his low, gravelly voice:

170

I Toward a Democratic China

You, Galileo, are denounced to this holy office for holding as true and propagating the false doctrines that the sun sits immovable at the center of the universe, and that the earth moves ceaselessly day and night. This proposition represents a fundamental attack and slander against the church and holy scripture. Under the authority of the pope and the cardinals of the World Court of Inquisition, this holy court, in order to forestall the destruction of our holy faith and the propagation of chaos and error, ordered the two doctrines of Copernicus to be subjected to theological examination. The doctrines were found to be contrary to the teachings of the Bible, philosophically absurd, and smacking of heresy. In order that your grave and pernicious error and transgression may not remain altogether unpunished, we hereby place the book Dialogue on the Ptolemaic and Copernican World Systems on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum; its publication and dissemination are forbidden. Moreover, we condemn you to formal incarceration, and by way of salutary penance we enjoin that for three years to come you shall repeat once a week the seven penitential psalms. Once the verdict was read, Galileo signed his name to it with trembling hand. But moving close to him I could hear him say under his breath: "But still the earth moves!" This trial in the court of inquisition was a disturbing revelation to me. To one born in the twentieth century as I was, it was manifestly clear that the truth was on the side of Galileo, not on that of the cardinals. But in the face of the rampant reactionary power of this religion, truth was stifled and science made to defer to theology. As I strode out of the courtroom, I saw these words, carved large and black on the lintel over the main door: "In the Bible lies the truth of our court."

Religion, Reason, and Practice

I 171

II

T h e barbaric proceedings of the court of inquisition set m y mind on edge for quite some time. W h e n I managed to fall asleep, Galileo's face haunted my dreams . . . O n w a k i n g the next day, as I looked at the spires sticking like spears into the clouds and the portrait of Urban VIII hanging on the dark b r o w n wall of my r o o m , I felt that the stale air of religious despotism w o u l d soon suffocate me. I decided to leave R o m e immediately. A f t e r saying good-bye to Cardinal Gruli and Pope Urban's assistant, Thessalus, I boarded the International Time-Space Aeronautics Bureau's

R-IOOI

airship

and proceeded to Ferney, a picturesque t o w n o n the French-Swiss border. Rome is approximately a thousand kilometers from Ferney. O n e of today's supersonic aircraft could have made the trip in twenty or thirty minutes, but the

R-IOOI

airship w a s traversing a time interval

of 121 years as well as a distance of a thousand kilometers. Even at an unimaginably fast speed it needed twenty-four hours. I did not arrive in Ferney until late spring, 1754. T h e on-board computer system had told me that I should g o to Ferney, not Paris, to visit the court of reason. In Ferney of the year 1754, there w a s to be a court of r e a s o n — h o u s e d in a palatial m a n s i o n — a n d gathered there were the many renowned judges of this court. A t their head w a s the sixty-year-old Voltaire, as well as Diderot, Rousseau, and others. This w a s the year that the well-respected Baron de Montesquieu went to Ferney at the invitation of Voltaire. T h u s I decided to stay a while at Ferney to cover the court of reason for the

Guangming

Daily. W h e n the airship touched d o w n and I stepped onto the g a n g w a y , Diderot approached and embraced me warmly. A t Diderot's side were a man and w o m a n of remarkable charm: these were the world-famous actors Lecain and Clairon, with w h o m I n o w shook hands. Since Voltaire's residence could only be reached by w a y of a small winding path, w e proceeded along it at a leisurely pace. 17z

I Toward a Democratic China

As we walked, we chatted amiably. Diderot told me about the doings of Voltaire. Five years before, Voltaire's mistress, Madame du Chatelet, had passed away. In Voltaire's time of deepest mourning, King Frederick II of Prussia had warmly invited Voltaire to take up permanent residence in Prussia. In his letter of invitation, Frederick II praised Voltaire as an "erudite teacher" and a "goodhearted friend," at the same time indicating that in Prussia Voltaire would be greatly honored and respected. On receiving the invitation Voltaire said, "Writers have always been compelled to flatter kings, but now King Frederick leaves nothing undone in flattering me. I must go to Prussia!" But Prussia was by no means an enlightened state. Compared to France, its autocratic system was more repressive, its politics more corrupt. Before long Voltaire was completely disillusioned with Frederick II. The director of the Prussian Academy of Social Sciences, Maupertius, published a book filled with foolishness and superstition, yet he asked Prussia and the world to give attention to his laughable proposals. Seeing the obscurantism that was so rampant in Prussia, Voltaire immediately took up his pen to write a pamphlet that made a laughingstock of the director for his ignorance and delusions. Voltaire made the director's pretensions known far and wide. Frederick II was enraged when he heard of this, and he had Voltaire's works burned. Voltaire left Prussia in indignation and bought an estate and mansion in Ferney, where he prepared to pass his later years. Talking as we went along, we arrived at Voltaire's mansion before we knew it. H o w tranquil and secluded the setting was! The rear of the mansion was built against a hill covered with tall trees. Red rosebushes lined the winding stone stairway that led to the top of the hill. On one side of the mansion was a stream bringing water down from the mountainside into a crystal-clear pond. In front of the mansion was an artesian spring, the banks of its catchpool lined with verdant creepers. The spring was surrounded by flower beds that dazzled the eye with their color and enticed the nose with their scent. Coming from the oppressive atmosphere of the Roman Religion, Reason, and Practice

I 173

Inquisition to a place so delightful for its fragrant lushness, my spirit immediately felt cleansed and eased. I rested for two days in Ferney, ambling through its mountain scenes, its gardens and pavilions, until I had rested my eyes on all the beauty of its springtime. On the third day Diderot asked me to join in a philosophical discussion with Voltaire, Montesquieu, and a few others. That same day Diderot led me into a large, pleasantly scented Rococo-style parlor. As we entered, Voltaire and Rousseau were flushed with the excitement of debate, but my arrival made them break it off. Diderot introduced me to each of them in turn, and I took the empty place between Voltaire and Montesquieu. Voltaire asked me to recount what I had seen and heard in Italy. When I spoke of Galileo's trial in the court of inquisition more than a hundred years earlier, Voltaire leapt to his feet in indignation and cried in his characteristically grand and sonorous voice: "The persecution in the name of religion that attacked Galileo more than a century ago still abounds in France to this day! Ever since the Virgin Mary's son was nailed to the cross, has a single day gone by when someone was not killed in his name?" Voltaire spoke of an incident of religious persecution against one Jean Calas which Voltaire himself had witnessed not long before. He said, "Is this what they call Catholicism? It is nothing but a self-serving hoax! Jean Calas was a devout Catholic, but the parish priest plotted to get Calas' daughter into his clutches. Because the plot failed, the priest spread vile and hateful rumors about Calas' son, who had committed suicide due to pressure from creditors. He claimed that Calas' son had not committed suicide, but that Calas had ordered his death, because his son had accepted the Catholic faith against his wishes. Thus the son became a martyr to the faith, and the father was drawn, quartered, and burned as a heretic. Do you think this sort of thing has happened just once? Catholicism is a shameful, destructive trap laid by just this sort of priest." Diderot added, "Exactly! Of the things that men employ to sup174

I Toward a Democratic China

port religion, not a single one is in accord with our rational faculty. Religion uses the most dubious evidence to prove things that are of the utmost incredibility. We must use the incidents of Jean Calas, Galileo, and Bruno to expose the bloody character of religious fanaticism. We must humiliate the fanatics and lay bare the blood on their hands. We must show what terrible disasters are brought about by these deceitful missionaries!" Voltaire's agitated mood grew somewhat more subdued. He wore a rose-colored waistcoat that fell to his knees. Attractively styled curls of long hair framed his features, which in repose seemed to radiate wisdom. Little wonder that people sometimes felt him to be the very personification of human rationality. He went on to say, in words charged with poetic feeling: "It is my wish to pour out the blood of Bruno and Jean Calas where all can see it, to raise the banner of these heroes high overhead. O Religion! You are the origin of all the evils and degradations from which our society suffers! Let us raise high the lamp of reason, that we may dispel the darkness spread by religion! Let us use the power of reason to eliminate the countless disasters it has wreaked upon our society!" Voltaire had hardly finished when the aged Baron de Montesquieu spoke up: " N o , you're wrong! We cannot lay the blame for France's poverty and chaos entirely on religion and fanaticism. For decades I have been investigating the reasons behind the appalling poverty and chaos in French society. I feel that religion is only one reason for this. The French political system is the fundamental cause of our various social ills. Our era is different from the one Galileo lived in more than a century ago. Though religion still influences our mental life, it cannot dominate everything. But autocratic government influences the totality of France's social life. Here in France the people are without rights, and supreme state power is concentrated in the hands of the king alone. The king is the supreme legislator, and he holds supreme judicial and executive authority. The king's will is law. Look at our king, Louis X V , besotted with the indulgent and extravagant life at Versailles. He Religion, Reason, and Practice

I 175

says that sitting on the royal throne is all he asks for in this life. 'What do I care if floodwaters swallow the earth after my death?' he says. He follows his own whims, today one way and tomorrow another, viewing the nation's concerns as a mere game. Time and again he has pushed France into foreign wars. To contest the succession of the Polish throne, he fought a war with Austria and Russia; in the dispute over the Austrian succession, he allied with Prussia against England. We have squandered money and military might without gaining a thing. As you can see, Louis X V is now preparing to go to war yet again, this time with Prussia as our new enemy. Years of constant war and scarcity have reduced our people to the depths of poverty! But our king pretends not to notice these various ills!" Montesquieu sipped some coffee and went on: "Since the king's word is law here in France, what real law is there to speak of? I made a tour of the provinces and found that each place follows its own customary rules. Because judges are paid no salaries, the open taking of bribes is a depressingly familiar phenomenon. In Bordeaux I served for some years as chief justice. To my knowledge the use of torture, as in the court of the Roman Inquisition, is not rare in French courts. One man tells me the most terrible thing of all is the use of torture to extract a confession: even if he were accused of stealing the belltower of Notre Dame, he thinks the best course would be to run away!" "Indeed! It was the same for me in Prussia! When Frederick became suspicious of me, I had no choice but to flee Berlin immediately. In Frankfurt the Prussian police detained me for a month and subjected me to every manner of humiliating search!" Voltaire directed his pained gaze at me as he spoke. I was about to speak up when Montesquieu said in a voice brimming with enthusiasm: "You must have read my work Spirit of Laws. I cannot say that it is written very well, but it is the very distillation of my life's blood."

176

I Toward a Democratic China

I answered, "I have read it." Thereupon Montesquieu began to discourse loquaciously on his theory of the tripartite division of state powers. He said that France's hope lay in the establishment of a state system having separate legislative, administrative, and executive powers. Only this could save France from poverty and chaos. I grew fatigued at these extended flights of parlor conversation as the sun slanted westward and finally disappeared behind the mountains of Ferney, signaling the end of our philosophical discussion. That evening I watched a moving performance by Lecain and Clairon in Voltaire's Chatelaine Theater. I stayed in Ferney for an entire month, taking part in many philosophical discussions with Voltaire and the rest. Time after time they leveled fierce criticism at the benightedness of French politics, religion, and society, while proposing various ways to reform the state. But of what use could their discourse be to me? All of them, from Louis X V to Jean Calas, were already history. To tell the truth, these matters simply did not concern me. Twice I mentioned to Diderot my hopes that he would arrange for me to visit the court of reason. Diderot, forever busy corresponding with the contributors to his Encyclopedia, put my request aside as if he had not heard it. I searched up and down each little street in Ferney, and walked through every one of the nearby villages, but I did not find anything called the court of reason. None of Voltaire's group seemed like a judge to me. The former judge, Montesquieu, struck me as an ordinary scholar. I wondered if the Space-Time Aeronautics Bureau's computer system had made a mistake, sending me to Ferney on this fruitless search. Becoming somewhat impatient, during one philosophical discussion I came right out and told Voltaire and the rest that I had come especially to cover the tribunals on truth for the Guangming Daily. I asked them to arrange a visit to the court as soon as possible. Voltaire and the others were puzzled by my questions, and a look of

Religion, Reason, and Practice

I 177

perplexity crossed their faces. Voltaire said, "What court of reason? I have never heard of it. We have reason enough, but we have no court." I felt disappointed and at the same time embarrassed, as if I were the one being put on trial in Voltaire's parlor. How could I have made such an improper and ignorant request? I began to think it would be better to go cover the court of practice in twenty-first-century China first. It would not be too late to visit the court of reason later, when I had got more news of it. The next day I said farewell to Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Voltaire said laughingly: "What you said is right after all! We cannot have only reason, without a court too. Since we have reason, we ought to have a court where reason can sit in judgment on all things. After we build our courthouse you must come again." Regretfully I took leave of Voltaire's garden, his theater, and parlor, accompanied to the landing site once again by Diderot. Once more I climbed aboard the

R-IOOI

airship and prepared to

hop straight from 1754 to the year 2009.

in The airship rose up from the French border and left eighteenth-century Ferney for Beijing in the twenty-first century, a flight that would take forty-two hours. I thought it might be a good idea during those two idle days to study the theories of the creator of scientific socialism. Perhaps this would help me to understand the things I would find in the early twenty-first century in China. And so, in the airship's spacious reading room, I found a copy of Engels' Anti-Duhring. This book begins with a discussion of the content and theoretical structure of modern socialism. In reference to theoretical structure, Engels says that modern socialism "first emerged as a further and

178

I Toward a Democratic China

apparently more thorough development of principles advanced by the great Enlightenment thinkers of eighteenth-century France." I was utterly fascinated by Engels' observation. Only a few hours before I had been in the company of Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Diderot—those French proponents of materialism and the Enlightenment. I had never realized there was a connection between socialism and the theories of these Enlightenment thinkers. I read onward to where Engels writes: " T h e great men who in France were clearing the minds of men for the coming revolution themselves acted in an extremely revolutionary fashion. They recognized no external authority of any kind. Religion, conceptions of nature, society, political systems, everything was subjected to the most merciless criticism; everything had to justify its existence in the court of reason or renounce all claim to existence." At this point it dawned on me that the eighteenth-century court of reason was none other than these theories themselves. The court did not exist in any one place in Ferney: instead it was manifested in the persons of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, and Rousseau; in the books they wrote and the theories they advanced; in their elevated discourse around Voltaire's table—these things in themselves were powerful critiques of the irrationality in all that was despotic and obscurantist. Was not Montesquieu's theory on the tripartite division of power an unsparing indictment of the feudal despotic political system in France? At last I understood that the Time-Space Aeronautics Bureau's computer system had not been mistaken: only in Ferney could one penetrate to an understanding of France's court of reason. Among the Enlightenment thinkers of Ferney, rationality had taken the place of the Bible and church dogma as the standard by which to measure all things. The so-called court of reason was the judgment of all things by the power of reason. Though the court of reason did have an important historical effect, Engels was right in saying that the great eighteenth-century thinkers were unable to transcend the limitations imposed on them by their era. I sat

Religion, Reason, and Practice

I 179

in the airship's armchair savoring a moment of reassurance: there was no further need to spend time chasing about France after the court of reason. The forty-two-hour trip passed quickly. When the airship touched down soundlessly at the International Airport near Longtan Lake, it was already April 4, 2009. The sun beamed down entrancingly from the pure azure sky, and a gentle spring breeze caressed everything with the breath of new life. I discovered that Longtan Lake was quite different from what it had been when I left Beijing. Along the banks of the lake was built a winding lakeside promenade. The carpet of green grass on either side of the promenade was brocaded with red flowers. Longtan Lake was obviously deeper and wider than before. On the gleaming rippled surface of the lake, numerous rowboats lined up abreast came skimming across the water toward the bank I was standing on. This was a boat race held by the Beijing Metropolitan Communist Youth League. The bank and the walkway were crowded with spectators, whose handclapping, cheers, and shouts of encouragement rang to the skies. M y attention was particularly drawn to how different their clothing was from what people wore in the Seventies. N o longer was it uniformly standardized. There was a great deal of creativity expressed in the styles, and the colors were dazzling. Each person, particularly the young women and children, was dressed up like a freshly blooming flower, their eye-catching garments set off perfectly by the mountain backdrop and the water's bright surface. To the east of the lake I saw a magnificent landscaped mountain, blanketed by greenery that parted at places to reveal colorful pavilions. To the south of the lake, at a spot not far from Zuoanmen, was a metal tower. The tower stood 550 meters high and was divided into nine stories, each having an observation platform reachable by elevator. The tower had facilities such as restaurants, stores, and a weather station. On the top was a television broadcasting antenna. Disregarding the fatigue of my travels, I climbed to the top of the tower, from which I could see the whole city laid 180

I Toward a Democratic China

out before my eyes. Ah, Beijing! How could you have become so huge? So beautiful? The Imperial Palace, with its complex of buildings, and Tiananmen Square had become the "valley" of Beijing. On all four sides of this valley loomed highrise buildings twenty to forty stories tall. Interspersed among the highrises were patches of green lawn—small block-sized parks which ran the length of the spacious avenues. I was thoroughly enchanted by the gorgeous new face of Beijing. Suddenly, thinking of my duty to cover the story, I walked lingeringly down from the tower and stepped onto a pedestrian conveyer belt. After a few minutes I came to the Beijing People's Court at what had once been the corner of Sanmen Boulevard and Zhengyi Road. At the door of the courthouse I showed my Guangming Daily press pass, much to the surprise of the judge who greeted me. He looked me over, then looked at my pass and said, "There is no Guangming Daily now! This pass is outdated. Look!" He held up the color-printed newspaper that was in his hand. On the masthead were printed the large words Guangming Times. The judge went on to say: "Beginning in 2005 the Guangming Daily officially changed its name to the Guangming Times. It now comes out in two daily editions, to keep up with the latest domestic and world news. Why do you come to cover this story with a Guangming Daily press pass?" My amazement was even greater than the judge's, since I had no idea what he was talking about. As my mood calmed, I told myself I was lucky to be visiting Beijing in 2009. If I were visiting Beijing in 2109, my odd clothing and long-outdated press pass might have landed me in the Museum of History! I explained to the judge that I was covering a story for the Guangming Daily of 1978. The judge nodded understandingly and led me to a large door which opened automatically to reveal a room of spare and elegant decor that seemed to be a small reception room. As the door closed slowly behind me, the judge motioned me to sit down on the sofa. SudReligion, Reason, and Practice

I 181

denly I felt a slight tremor and was on the point of asking the judge about it when the door opened once again by itself. It turned out that this was a small elevator which had delivered me in front of the judge's office on the forty-second floor. Once inside his office, we began conversing in earnest. I said, "I have visited a court of religion in seventeenth-century Italy and the court of reason of eighteenth-century France. My main reason for coming here is to write a story on your court of practice." The judge's eyes widened as he exclaimed, "Court of practice? China only has the People's Court. We are the People's Court. What is this court of practice you're talking about?" This time I did not fall into the embarrassing predicament I had when asking Voltaire about the court of reason, because I thought to myself: the court of practice must be a vivid description coined by the Space-Time Aeronautics Bureau's computer, just as the court of reason was. I said to the judge, "Perhaps you're right. China does not have a court of practice. What I mean to ask is this . . ." Thereupon I recounted my experience of not finding the court of reason in France, but finally coming upon it in the book Anti-Duhring. At this the quick-witted judge nodded in understanding. "Oh, so that is what you mean by the court of practice! If you want to learn about that sort of thing you need not come to our court. Wherever you go, to whatever work unit, people can give good answers to your questions. In modern-day China, the key role of practice has been recognized once again. All things must undergo the test of practice: either they justify their reasons for existing or they forgo their right to exist. The unhealthy tendencies which Lin Biao and the Gang of Four set in motion, such as the mindless copying and parroting of other people's interpretations, have all been swept away. "Still, restoring the authority of practice has not been easy. Long ago, in June of 1937, Mao Zedong made a clear statement in his 182

I Toward a Democratic China

essay 'On Practice': 'The truth of a perception or theory is determined not by what one thinks of it subjectively, but by its objective results in social practice. Social practice is the only possible criterion of truth.' It was M a o Zedong who laid the theoretical foundation for setting up practice as the true authority. But in the ten years from 1966 to 1976, the authority of practice was nearly destroyed. Under the despotism of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, numerous tribunals that resembled medieval courts of inquisition sprang up on Chinese soil. Lin Biao and the Gang of Four were the chief justices of these courts; their own pronouncements and fragments of their leader's speeches, which they quoted piecemeal and at will, were the supreme laws of such courts. Anyone who violated their so-called laws was dragged before their courts to be tried, sentenced, and punished. How many miscarriages of justice happened on Chinese soil in those years? Countless people died unjustly, but even more lived on as victims of injustice. Some of the unjust cases were so preposterous we don't know whether to laugh or cry when we hear of them. "For instance, a piece in the People's Daily of June 13, 1978, reported the Nanjing Court's efforts to try appeals brought by ordinary citizens. One of these brought to light the following case. At the time in question, the railway construction worker Xiao Jingye was working on the west side of a smoking kiln. The wind was blowing eastward, causing him to be covered with ashes and soot, whereupon he remarked, 'It would be nice if the west wind were blowing.' You are a reporter who also likes to write fiction, but even in your wildest fantasies you probably could not imagine that this remark of his broke a taboo and was considered a crime. He was sentenced to three years of disciplinary incarceration. And what was his crime? Casting aspersions on Mao Zedong's pronouncement that 'the East wind shall prevail over the West wind'! This is why people in public places were always worried they might let something slip that would arouse others' suspicions. They feared they would thoughtlessly reveal their true inner feelings. Language Religion, Reason, and Practice I 183

was no longer a tool to express one's own thoughts: instead it became a veil with which to cover one's thoughts." The judge went on in a half-joking tone: "Everyone knows that the human mouth has two main functions—eating and speaking. Under the total dictatorship of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, however, the mouths of many people were deprived of this second function. M a n y people kept silent in public places, either out of strategic considerations or because they were intimidated by the tyranny of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four." Here I could not resist adding: "That is why people say 'Silence is golden.' In certain circumstances isn't silence the best protest?" "Exactly!" the judge concurred. "It was a kind of protest! The Gang of Four were so deluded as to think that they could carry out their obscurantist policies, that they could reduce each and every person to a moron and a deaf-mute. They thought of people as just so many slack-jawed half-wits who would be taken in by the 'absolute truth' they disseminated. But in China there is an old saying: 'Easier to guard against a raging river than the tongues of citizens.' Even in the days when the blackest clouds gathered over our cities, unsparing revelations and fierce indictments of the Gang of Four went on almost without interruption in people's homes and among trusted friends. A current saying summed it up quite nicely: 'In the office don't talk, on the street make small talk, at home you can really talk.' You might say that the fire of anti-Gang of Four, antiLin Biao sentiment seethed beneath the great land of China like an underground river of magma. 'In the midst of silence one could hear the thunder.' The 'silent China' that Lu X u n had spoken of was gone forever. When the Gang of Four's plot to usurp supreme power approached fruition, the time was ripe to begin revolutionary acts of opposition. As spring gave w a y to summer in 1976, a revolution broke forth. That was a time when many of our country's workers, cadres, and even elementary students left their workshops, offices, and schools to gather for a common purpose: to mourn our beloved premier Z h o u Enlai and voice opposition to the 184

I Toward a Democratic China

Gang of Four. Forgetting all thoughts of food and rest, they devoted themselves to exercising their mouth's second function; they entered into an all-out battle at close quarters with the Gang of Four. The Gang of Four used the power they had seized ruthlessly to suppress the people, but even so countless citizen heroes dared to stand tall and unyielding in their 'courts of inquisition.' " I replied, "You put that very well! Not long ago I visited several French Enlightenment thinkers who used reason as the measure of all things. Engels gave a high appraisal of their activities, which he called a court of reason. Since socialist China recognizes practice as the sole criterion of truth, that is, it recognizes that everything is tested and judged by the social practice of the masses, we could characterize this as a court of practice, could we not? The court of reason belonged to a small number of Enlightenment thinkers, but the court of practice belongs to the millions upon millions of ordinary citizens. Hearing the circumstances you described a moment ago, I suppose you could say that while the Gang of Four judged the people's revolutionary acts in their court of inquisition, in the end the people pronounced the Gang of Four's death sentence in their court of practice!" The judge smiled knowingly, at the same time standing up to open the door onto the balcony. We went out onto the balcony and looked out on the Palace of Minorities, Tiananmen, and the Beijing Hotel, seemingly near enough to touch. The pedestrian conveyors rushed along like the wind, whisking people into and out of view like parts on the conveyer belt of an automated factory. On the left side of Zhengyi Road I saw a large, thin-shelled structure of a hyperbolic paraboloid shape, which the judge told me was a shopping mall run by computers instead of sales clerks. Pointing to the clusters of apartment buildings on all sides, the judge said, "In the past the Gang of Four cared only for their own extravagant pursuits, and took no thought for whether ordinary people lived or died. They even made the outrageous statement, in public, that 'It won't hurt if eight hundred million of us have to Religion, Reason, and Practice

I 185

tighten our belts a bit.' Living conditions were so bad that an average person here in the Qianmen district had only two square meters of living space. After the smashing of the Gang of Four, we started economic reforms that adjusted the relationships among various sectors of industry. Already the construction sector has become a close fourth behind steel, energy, and electronics. In the past thirty years we have erected large numbers of apartment dwellings in cities and rural villages. The living conditions of city dwellers have improved considerably. Here in the capital, for example, the average person already has fifteen square meters, and in some places twenty meters. Who brought disaster down upon the people? Who were the true benefactors of the people? The answer given us by practice carries the most authority. You can see that at the foot of those apartment dwellings are entrances to the 'underground city.' If you like, you can ride an elevator right now to a street sixty meters below ground level and have a look around. Since the underground city has fully adequate ventilation and lighting, people can work, rest, and study there in complete comfort, twentyfour hours a day." Listening to the judge describe Beijing's transformation from a flat city to a multilevel metropolis, and watching the impressive scene below me, I fell to musing. . . At this point the judge brought two chairs from inside. We sat on the balcony and continued our conversation about Lin Biao and the Gang of Four's court of inquisition. The judge said, "The inquisition of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four handed down judgments on the natural sciences, too. Einstein's theory of relativity was said to be 'false science' and an 'idealist a priori doctrine'; higher mathematics became a 'conventionalized idealist system'; the second law of thermodynamics was the 'theoretical foundation for the reactionary doctrine of entropy'; Darwinian evolution was a 'theory belonging to bourgeois natural science'; particle physics was a 'classical example of circular reasoning'; genetics was made out to be a 'teleological doctrine of divine 186

I Toward a Democratic China

creation.' They even announced that since the law of conservation of energy did not agree with certain fragmented quotations, it was mistaken. They said, 'Since there are times when energy is conserved, there must be times when it is not conserved.' Thus it was necessary to 'completely smash the law of conservation of energy.' "In the area of literature and the arts, the inquisition of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four went to extremes of destructiveness. Jiang Qing was the czarina of arts and literature. A word from her could mean the death penalty for a dramatic genre, a movie, a novel, a newspaper or a writer. Under the despotic rule of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, the profusely blooming garden of the arts was debased into a wasteland overgrown with poisonous weeds. Though my profession is in politics and law, I am also fond of literature and the arts. At the time I often thought of a passage from Marx's 'A Critique of Prussia's Recent Censorship Law' in which he revealed something of Prussia's despotism. Marx wrote, 'The law permits me to write, only I must write in a style that is not mine! I may show my spiritual countenance, but I must first set it in the prescribed folds! You admire the delightful variety, the inexhaustible riches of nature. You do not demand that a rose should smell like a violet. But must the greatest riches of all, the spirit, exist in only one variety? I am humorous, but the law bids me write seriously. I am audacious, but the law commands that my style be modest. Grey, all grey, is the sole, the rightful color of this "freedom." Every drop of dew on which the sun shines glistens with an inexhaustible play of colors, but the spiritual sun, however many the persons and whatever the objects in which it is refracted, must produce only the official color! The most essential form of the spirit is cheerfulness, light, but you make shadow the sole legitimate manifestation of the spirit. It must be clothed only in black, yet among the flowers of Nature there are none which are black.' "In fact Lin Biao and the Gang of Four wanted to 'make shadow the sole legitimate manifestation of the spirit.' They wanted spirit to 'cloak itself in black.' In the arts, this meant that only unnatural Religion, Reason, and Practice

I 187

black flowers—things we spoke of as poisonous weeds—were allowed to bloom, while the many-colored, fragrant blooms which 'bring delight to mind and eye' were killed off. So much so that after Premier Zhou passed away, not the slightest flower of popular mourning was allowed to appear. One poem written in accusation of the Gang of Four went like this: 'With your low-minded prohibitions and your treacherous threats, you try to seize our sacred mourning dais. . . . You have consumed our flesh and blood, trampled on our rights, suffocated our joy. Will you tear even our grief away from us, along with the rest?' The black terror instituted by this counterrevolutionary clique, this Gang of Four, was in no way better and in some ways worse than the tyranny of Prussia, was it not?" The judge was about to continue, but I cut in: "I am familiar with these things too. The whole parcel of things that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four promoted bears an uncanny resemblance to the medieval courts of inquisition. Everyone who lived through that time experienced some things that are not easily forgotten. But I can't for the life of me figure out how something so benighted as an inquisition right out of the Middle Ages could have arisen in this socialist era." "This would seem to be a complex theoretical problem," the judge replied, "and you will not find a ready-made answer to it in classical Marxist works, but actually it is very simple. China was ruled for thousands of years by feudal despotism. Although the Xinhai Revolution of 1 9 1 1 overthrew the feudal monarchy of the Qing dynasty, it did not abolish feudal relations of production, nor did it launch a serious critique of the feudal thinking reflected in such relations. This sort of thinking remained as a fog which pervaded men's minds. Even the people's revolution under the Chinese Communist Party, engaged as it was in protracted armed struggle, had to relegate the May Fourth Movement's ideological struggle against tradition and feudalism to a secondary position. After victory was won nationwide, the despotism and obscurantism en188

I Toward a Democratic China

trenched over thousands of years in China could not be cleaned up all at once. What is more, since a society's ideology originates in its mode of existence, China could not keep the old system with its feudal despotism from reasserting itself, until it solved the problem of the Four Modernizations." When he got to this point I could not resist interposing: "Your Honor, what you say is absolutely right. The usual view of historians is that there were only two restorations of feudal power after the Xinhai Revolution: one was Yuan Shikai's bid for power and one was Zhang Xun's. But a few good friends of mine who like to delve into history have the idea that Chiang Kai-shek's dynasty was a third restoration. And then came Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, one of whom wanted to be emperor and the other an empress. Didn't Jiang Qing send an 'imperial commission' to Tianjin to have a floor-length 'gown of state' made of pleated white plum-blossom brocade? This shows the Gang of Four intended a restoration of feudal despotism, or rather, they were so deluded as to attempt a fourth feudal restoration. There is no denying that under the banner of 'socialism' they actually committed a series of fanatical restorationist acts, causing untold disasters for the people. But their delusions never bore fruit, because the people are more aware now." The judge nodded repeatedly at my remarks and said, "Your opinions make a good deal of sense; democracy is the antithesis of despotism. To oppose the restoration of feudal despotism, we must bring democracy into full play. We must let the people take command." He went on with growing enthusiasm: "After the smashing of the Gang of Four in October of 1976, China underwent fundamental changes. Under the Communist Party's leadership, while endeavoring to build up our country, we worked to sweep away the influence of feudal despotism. N o w practice occupies the place of supreme authority in China. All policies, proposals, plans and measures are generated through practice, tested in practice, and constantly improved through practice. Putting practice back in comReligion, Reason, and Practice

I 189

mand has brought tremendous developments in the sciences—from basic science and technology to the sciences of management and politics. It has greatly developed our national economy. Putting practice back in command has led to an unprecedented upsurge of democratization in our political life." The rewards from one day in Beijing in the year 2009 surpassed what I had gained from a four-month stay in Rome. I felt quite satisfied. I rushed back to the International Airport at Longtan so that I could file my story right away for the readers of the 1970s in China. I boarded the R-1001 airship, and after a one-hundred-minute flight through time, I was back in the Beijing of 1978. Leaving the airport, I immediately proceeded to the offices of the Guangming Daily at Hufangqiao. I quickly wrote an account of my interviews and handed it over to the expectant editors. I have learned that in early January, 1979, the R-1001 airship will make a second investigative trip into history and the future. Anyone who wishes to see certain past and future realities for themselves should contact the International Bureau of Space-Time Aeronautics. When the time comes, we can make the trip together. I walked out of the newspaper office, preparing to walk home, but the enchanting scenes of the Longtan International Airport were still in my mind's eye. Walking to the side of the lake and looking at its mirrorlike surface, I was surprised to find that the promenade, the landscaped mountain, the broadcasting tower, and the colorful pavilions were nowhere to be seen. Only then did I realize, much to my regret, that I had been too excited. I should have remembered to stay and visit for a few days in Beijing in the year 2009.

190

I Toward a Democratic China

22 Science Is a World of Three Freedoms

Science is a world of three freedoms—that is, it is free of prohibitions, free of idols, and free of ultimates. Scientific truth is no respecter of power holders. In scientific matters, power cannot automatically procure truth for the holder of power. Power cannot delimit the scope of scientific research, it cannot give scientific justification for the mistakes of power holders, and it cannot impede progress toward truth. First, science is free of prohibitions. For those of us who do research in political science, politics in itself is an object of research. Whether the focus be government systems, administration, partygovernment relations, international politics, or politicians and heads of state—all these are objects of political science research. There are those who like to draw a line between political and scholarly questions, saying that academic questions can be freely probed and disputed but political questions cannot. This approach leads to insuperable difficulties for those of us who do research in political science. Reform of the government and the economic system is a major political issue in China today. How can it not be probed and disputed? Since science is free of prohibitions, political science Source: Jingji ribao (Economics daily), May 24,1986. 191

demands that political issues should be open to discussion and many-sided controversy. Science is free of idols. Theologically speaking, a god is an object of worship and scripture is a statement of truth. But in science no scriptural theories are idolized. When a theory cannot explain the phenomena and issues that arise from practice, this is not a crisis of theory: it is a new starting point for theoretical development. Marxism as a science is not a rigid dogma, for it too posits this relation between theory and practice. At present China is carrying out a reform of the economic system and we are encountering many phenomena which the old theories cannot explain. Theoretical workers should greet this situation with enthusiasm. They need to break through the bonds of old theories and ideas so that they can bring out new ideas. Science is free of ultimates. The development of science knows no limits precisely because it has no prohibitions or idols. The notion that everything can be explained by a ready-made scientific theory posits a scientific ultimate, and it is lazy-minded science. When someone makes a discovery or achieves something new in scientific research, his successors have the chance to make further discoveries and accomplishments. The same problem can be studied and probed by different people. Any researcher can build on the foundation of others' accomplishments to forge even greater accomplishments. Modernization and democratization are the most significant research topics in present-day China. Any researcher has the right to move on from the peak attained by present research to a new peak. In the world of three freedoms called science, open discussion and controversy are the basic rules of the game. Human history has proved time and again that truth cannot be monopolized. Any edifice of theory that must be buttressed by power will be found to be built on shifting sand. When the spring wind of open discussion and controversy shakes such an edifice of theory, it will soon collapse. 192.

I Toward a Democratic

China

23 The Aspiration to Pursue Truth and Beauty Supersedes All Else

For scholars and theoretical workers engaged in academic research, implementation of the Double Hundred policy is none other than to guarantee their academic freedom. Academic freedom is not just an important precondition for the development of science; it is also an intrinsically valuable goal for all scholars who inquire into the truth. Those who are involved in academic research hope to publish their own views freely and straightforwardly. They hope for an environment where they will not be attacked for pursuing the truth, where they can work to help China's science and culture flourish. They hope to see the day when our great motherland will produce wave after wave of scientific and cultural giants. Over the past few years many of China's scholars and theorists have become outraged at those who use their authority to support one point of view while suppressing others. If we trust that mistaken opinions cannot persist for long in a climate of open discussion, and that people will be able to remedy their misconceptions Source: People's Daily, June 1 3 , 1 9 8 6 , p. 5.

193

through open discussion; if our publications provide a forum for debate among different scholarly views; and if criticism and countercriticism can be free from interference by authority, this will not only be extremely beneficial for the development of science and culture in China, but will help us to establish a highly democratic socialist political system. The question of how to establish a democratic socialist system is not just a political problem; it is an academic problem as well. Without a significant degree of academic freedom, we might as well abandon any hope of investigating the politics of a modern democracy, let alone actually creating a highly democratic government. The famous scientist Einstein once said something to this effect: that the development of science and other creative mental pursuits requires an "external" freedom—whereby a man is free from danger or attack for making public his own views regarding general or specific issues of knowledge—as well as a kind of "inner" freedom. "To have such freedom of the spirit, one's thinking cannot be under bondage to authority or social prejudice. It must also be free of bondage to custom and convention." For people dedicated to the development of science and culture, the degree to which China's science and culture shall flourish will depend not only on how much external freedom our society allows, but also on the inner freedom of the many who labor with their intellect. All discoveries and innovations originate in the thought of living, breathing people who enjoy a measure of inner freedom. Without inner freedom, mankind would never have arrived at today's great achievements in science and technology, and it would never have produced such intellectual and artistic giants as Shakespeare, Voltaire, Tolstoy, Beethoven, M a r x , and Lu Xun. Science requires us to pursue truth by making choices in actual practice from among a sea of thoughts; art asks that we seek beauty by making choices in actual practice from a sea of images. If there is no freedom of choice, there is no creativity. If we say that academic freedom is founded on an urge to pursue the truth which takes prec194

I Toward a Democratic China

edence over other urges, then w e can say that artistic freedom is founded on a similar principle—namely, that the pursuit of truth and beauty takes precedence over other pursuits. Only on such a basis can science and art develop; only in this w a y can human civilization keep progressing. If we in the Eighties cannot make our own choices in the pursuit of truth and beauty, if we painstakingly adopt a politically safe phraseology to guard against attack and persecution, and if w e select certain phrases from M a r x and Lenin to lend authority to our opinions and prevent others from impugning them, then these actions will not bring about anything creative, and they will certainly not be instances of academic and artistic freedom.

The Aspiration

to Pursue Truth and Beauty

I 195

24 Reforming China's Political Structure An Interview with Yan Jiaqi by Dai Qing, Guangming Daily

Dai Qing: In a conference on cultural development this past May [1986], you proposed reforms in China's political structure. Do you feel the present conditions call for reform of the political structure as urgently as they do for economic reform? Yan Jiaqi: There are many issues involved in reforming the political structure. Some of them are quite pressing, such as reform of the cadre system and our administrative institutions, and some will have to be taken one step at a time. The central issue is solving the problem of an excessive centralization of power. The goal is to establish a highly democratic, socialist political system as well as scientific institutions for political decision making. The occurrence of the Cultural Revolution was related to political institutions that lack a high degree of democracy. For a socialist state such as ours, democracy or the lack thereof directly affects the nation's policies and economic development. A nation or a Source: Guangming Daily, June 30,1986. 196

region that lacks political democracy may enjoy temporary economic prosperity, but its long-term development will necessarily be impeded. Dai: The overcentralization of power seems to be the combined result of certain types of institutions, ideas, and cultural traditions, which are not easily separable by merely saying so. We hear a constant chorus of complaints from people who are powerful but still lack effectiveness. Yan: To change a situation of overcentralized power, we have to deal with four aspects of the problem. The first aspect is the necessity of a horizontal separation of power while still preserving a unified administrative authority, without which a "multiheaded" politics would develop. The National People's Congress is the highest organ of state authority, but regardless of whether we look at the center, the provinces, the municipalities, or the autonomous regions, we find that they all face the problem of carrying out a horizontal separation of power. During the Cultural Revolution there was no separation of power to speak of; behind the slogan of "strengthening a unified party leadership," the highest state power was concentrated in the hands of a few individuals. An adequate horizontal separation of power involves the issue not only of the relations among legislative, administrative, and judicial organs, but also of the relations between the party and the government. In other countries of the world, the parties in power are all parties that control the state's administrative power; how to implement a division of labor between the party and the government is a major theoretical and practical problem that must be solved in the course of our political and institutional reforms. The second aspect is the implementation of a vertical separation of powers, such that any given position has specified powers and specific responsibilities. A higher-ranking administrative organ may be able to countermand the decisions of a lower administrative organ, but it cannot set policies in place of the Reforming China's Political Structure

I 197

lower organ. We oppose bureaucratism and we demand that leading organs and responsible cadres personally take action to solve concrete problems, as is proper. However, the concept of a vertical separation of powers means that higher levels should not do work which lower-level organs have the power, within their limits, to perform. Some of our leaders think that they can make decisions on whatever problems a given region or government department faces. This is contrary to the principle of a vertical separation of powers. Deng Xiaoping has said, "Our leadership organs at various levels have interfered with matters that they should not bother with, that cannot be managed well, or that cannot be managed at all." He also said, "The vast majority of people are often unable to independently and responsibly dispose of problems they are supposed to deal with." I believe this kind of situation comes about when the concept of a vertical separation of powers and institutions is lacking. We need to clarify the powers and responsibilities of organs at each level by implementing a vertical separation of powers. Dai: If people are unable to change their concepts, is it possible to stipulate a set of rules to impose such limitations? Yan: You might remember the Watergate Incident in the United States. At the time, the judge of the District Court of Washington, D. C . , ruled that the president had to turn over his recording tapes relating to the incident. Nixon had not only refused to hand over the tapes, but had also wanted the attorney general of the Justice Department to remove Archibald C o x from the post of special prosecutor for demanding that the president turn over the tapes. When the attorney general, refusing to obey the order, resigned, Nixon told an assistant attorney general at the Justice Department to dismiss C o x , but this official, refusing to carry out the order, also resigned. Finally another assistant attorney general complied with Nixon's decision to fire Cox. N o w , according to our way of thinking, the president has ultimate power, so why couldn't he have simply fired C o x himself? In the 198

I Toward a Democratic China

United States, however, the concept of a separation of powers has penetrated deeply into the thinking of the people. Within ten days after Cox's dismissal, some five hundred thousand indignant telegrams were sent to Washington denouncing the president, and a huge mass of letters critical of the president flooded into Congress. Subsequently, the House Judiciary Committee voted to impeach the president. Under these circumstances Nixon had no choice but to announce his resignation. Six years ago Deng Xiaoping said, "Stalin did grave damage to the socialist legal system. As Comrade Mao Zedong himself noted, it is impossible for such incidents to occur in western countries such as England, France, and the United States. While Mao Zedong recognized this point, he did not actually solve the problems inherent in our system of leadership. There were other causes as well, but in the end he brought about the ten-year catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution." I feel the purpose of reforming our political institutions is to strengthen and perfect the socialist system so as to prevent, in a fundamental way, the reenactment in any form of the events that made up the Cultural Revolution. Through these reforms, we wish to guarantee our country's long-term stability in politics and the steady development of her economy. Dai: Put in that way, changes in ways of thinking are very important. The notion of ultimate power indeed is very different from the concept of the separation of powers. Yan: That is so. What we lack are concepts of the separation of powers and of using power to restrain power. As I have said before, discussion that centers on cultural matters is a forerunner to the reform of political institutions. The reforms will inevitably clash with old concepts. I believe that the reform of our political institutions will also clash forcefully with the idea of ultimate power. Dai: But some problems cannot be subsumed under the category of a horizontal or vertical separation of powers, such as arbitrary Reforming China's Political Structure

I 199

interference by power holders in various aspects of people's lives, or using administrative power to interfere with academic research and literary and artistic creation. I feel these issues are also related to the reforms. If we raise these issues to a theoretical level. . . Yan: This is precisely the third point that I want to touch on: that the scope of the government's functions and powers is limited. The domain into which governmental power cannot intrude is called human rights. But in different nations at different times, the scope of governmental power has been very different. In the Cultural Revolution, governmental or political power was able to invade all areas of private life. Even the mourning for Premier Zhou Enlai, even the citizens' grief was interfered with, so what human rights were there to speak of? You might recall that during the Cultural Revolution, organs of power such as the revolutionary committees, workers' propaganda teams, military propaganda teams, and Cultural Revolution small groups not only crudely interfered with people's modes of dress, hairstyles, hobbies, and daily routines, but even intruded into the domain of people's private thoughts, forcing them to express their loyalty and to "ask for instructions in the morning and make reports in the evening." Not only were people deprived of their right to be happy and to think for themselves, but even their right to grieve was lost. This sort of thing was responsible for bringing about the Tiananmen Incident in 1976. In our reform of economic institutions, we have already recognized that the government's exercise of power has a definite scope and that, in principle, government departments at various levels should not engage in the direct operation and management of enterprises. Governmental power has a definite scope: in fact, this is also a separation of powers, namely, a separation between the power of government organs and the power of nongovernmental social organizations. In my view, a reform of our political institutions will enable us to specify the scope not only of the 200

I Toward a Democratic China

government's management of the economy, but also of its management of social affairs. Only in this way will it be possible for us to guarantee academic freedom and creative freedom. Dai: Do academic freedom and creative freedom mean, first of all, the opening of channels of communication to the leadership so as to air criticisms and suggestions? Yan: Yes, that's right. Proposing the Double Hundred policy is precisely to open the way for academic freedom and creative freedom. However, these freedoms must have legal guarantees. Freedom is the right to do anything that is permitted by law. This concept is a product of the advancement of human civilization. In the process of reforming our political and economic institutions, we want this concept to penetrate deeply into the hearts of the people. Therefore, in these reforms we must give a high priority to the building of a legal system. Dai: Are these three aspects of the separation of powers sufficient to encompass the necessary political and institutional reforms? Yan: N o , not entirely. There is yet a fourth point, which is the most important one. It has to do with the relationship between the people and political power, that is, enabling the people to participate more frequently and effectively, whether by direct or indirect means, in policy making concerning affairs of state. Of course, this also relates to the question of the basic system in our country, and how best to perfect the system of people's representative congresses. Democracy requires the protection of a legal system, but having a legal system is not equivalent to having democracy. To establish a socialist political system with a high degree of democracy means the expansion of political participation by citizens. This, therefore, touches on a whole series of problems, such as the system for nomination, and procedures for the coming into being, of people's representatives, as well as the quality of the people's representatives. Taking the long view, the reform of our political institutions has primarily four aspects, namely, a horizontal separation of Reforming China's Political Structure

I 201

power, a vertical separation of power, a separation of power between government organs and social organizations, and the degree of popular participation in political decision making. Actually, great changes have already taken place in these four aspects since 1979, and political reform is proceeding along these four channels. In our country, establishing a political system with a high degree of democracy is also identical with the aim of improving the party's leadership. Political institutional reforms affect the entire country as well as every person. I believe that one should emphasize three points. First, reform must be carried out under the party's leadership. Reform is not a spontaneous mass movement; separated from the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, it will be impossible for our reforms to succeed. Second, reform of our political institutions has the aim not only of establishing a political system with a high degree of democracy, but also of guaranteeing the success of the reforms in our economic institutions. Thus it assists in the cause of socialist modernization. Third, political reform must be carried out step by step; in the short term, the most urgent reforms have to do with reforming the cadre system and our administrative institutions, altering the lack of separation between party and government and between government and enterprises, and promoting the development of reforms in our country's economy. In sum, reforms in our political institutions must be conducted with the proper leadership, the right goals, and in a careful manner. Together with the reforms in our economy, these will ultimately become the two giant wheels that drive our great land toward modernization.

202

I Toward a Democratic China

2-5 China Is No Longer a Dragon An Interview with Yan Jiaqi by Dai Qing

T H E D R A G O N I M A G E IS O U T OF T U N E W I T H MODERNIZATION

Dai Q i n g : Since early this year [1988], a dragon-tornado has been whipping through the towns and countryside all over C h i n a , especially in Beijing, its political and cultural center. D r a g o n lantern carnivals, dragon boat races, dragon songs, dragon cup tournaments, dragon meals and banquets, dragon dishes, and dragon desserts are all-pervasive, and the hotels under the Bureau of Tourism have their ceilings, entrances, halls, and pillars decorated everywhere with gold and silver dragons, angrily glaring dragons, dragons with huge gaping mouths, flying dragons, coiled dragons, and dragons strung with r o w s of blinking lights . . . W h a t thoughts have y o u regarding all of this? Y a n Jiaqi: Close to m y house there is a newly opened highrise buildi n g — t h e International Mansions Hotel. O n the huge white pillars at the front o f this building, t w o of these "scaly beasts" are coiled, snarling and baring their claws. Seeing them, my first feelSource: Shijie jingji daobao (World economic herald), March 21,1988. 203

ing is there really are too many dragons in China. And the gap between the culture represented by the dragon and that of modernization is also really too huge. The worrisome thing is the w a y the dragon has anchored itself so firmly in the spiritual world of the Chinese people. Even now at the end of the 1980s, it is held up by the Chinese people as a symbol of traditional culture. Dai: In ancient myths, the god of fire Z h u Rong rode dragons and Emperor Shun raised them. Folk festivals have dragon boat races and dragon lantern dances. From the Song dynasty onward the dragon, including dragon robes, dragon flags, dragon beds, dragon retinues, and so on, has been strictly prescribed as an imperial insignia. Even in the period of the republic, we pictured ourselves as the "great dragon of the East," and overseas Chinese sojourners think of themselves as "successors of the dragon." So what really does the dragon represent in tradition? Yan: I lack a sufficient understanding of folklore studies. The image of a glittering dragon, showing its teeth and baring its claws, however, strikes me as a symbol of imperial power, or power that knows no restraint. Even as a symbol of Chinese culture, it is only that part which is the dregs of tradition. I feel it is highly inappropriate to associate the dragon with a republic that is racing toward modernization, with the goals of enjoying a high degree of democracy and a high level of civilization. China is no dragon at all! China is just China—vast, poverty-stricken, persistent, and hard working. China does not need to spur itself to prosperity with images of soaring dragons. China's becoming wealthy and strong depends on the reforms in our political and economic institutions, it depends on our securing an environment of long-term peace and stability, and it relies on the penetrating intelligence and arduous labor of millions of people.

204

I Toward a Democratic China

T H E I L L S OF M O D E R N T O T E M W O R S H I P

Dai: It seems that the image of the dragon, not to mention the muddle-headed zeal some fairly impressive people have for the dragon, is in conflict, at least emotionally, with your designs for China's future. Where is the core of this conflict? Yan: For Chinese people today, I think the things of highest import are not only the excellent traditions of Chinese culture; they also include many common values, concepts, and ideas which cross natural boundaries. China today is not the China of the past. As a modern country opening its doors ever wider to the world each day, it can no longer stray from the high road of the world's developing civilization to wrap itself in the intoxicating mist of dragon culture. The reverence paid to an insubstantial, fleeting dragon, that exists nowhere and can do nothing, is actually a modern form of totem worship. Such worship may, unwittingly, lead China to deviate from the main forward thrust of world civilization into a dark alley of smug satisfaction. Is it possible to say clearly what the dragon is? All it takes is one look to reveal the exclusivity, the self-congratulation, the sense of being set apart from the rest of the human family. There is no denying that the sense of self embodied in the culture of the dragon clings to notions that we Chinese are the center of the world, while others are only barbarians and savages. This can be viewed as an external manifestation of the parochial arrogance and complacent conservatism latent in the hearts and minds of the Chinese people.

China Is No Longer a Dragon

I 205

H A V I N G LAW REPLACE THE A U T H O R I T Y SYMBOL OF T H E D R A G O N

Dai: This reminds me of the posturing of the Grand O l d Buddha at the end of the Q i n g dynasty: as long as a foreign envoy w o u l d k o w t o w ceremonially, he w o u l d not balk at ceding territory and paying indemnities. It is hard t o understand w h y in 1988, w h e n great efforts have been made at reform and opening, at ideological liberation, and at having a matter-of-fact spirit, such a blind, self-important self-image w o u l d appear, refracted from such ignorant nonsense. Yan: Centuries of feudal tradition and p o w e r worship have left deep marks in the subconscious of our people, and the dragon symbolizes the ultimate and omnipotent authority of the individual. O f course, no society can do without authority on the part of its entrepreneurs, scientists, politicians, and social activists. But for this authority they rely on their exceptional intelligence and arduous labors. People respect them and rally around them because of their ability and their contributions, not because they have been dragons from birth. It should be emphasized that modern society needs depersonalized authority; it needs to replace hereditary and ethnic authority with the authority of law. L a w s are formulated and ratified by the state: they are standards of behavior that regulate social relations a m o n g people. Since individuals, parties, governments, and social groups must all act within the scope allowed by law and the constitution, it is important to establish that the concept of law has paramount authority, rather than the holy authority bestowed by heaven above. A s it continues to advance t o w a r d modernity, China needs to establish the law as the authority that stands above all other authority. Dai: But for thousands of years, revering a personalized authority has been as natural to the c o m m o n people of China as eating and wearing clothes. T h e resulting hierarchical mentality, the habit of submission, has produced effects so injurious to our g r o w t h as 206

I Toward a Democratic China

a people that no one, perhaps, can thoroughly comprehend them. Yan: The thing to be dreaded most, I think, is the inertia that sets in, given this state of mind—the clinging to precedent, the laxity, the buck-passing and slavishness. From government to business, from institutions to individuals, decisions that should be made by independent choice, within the dictates of law and the constitution, are made with vacillation and without any courage of commitment. The culture of the dragon habituates us to waiting for instructions from above. Not only do overlapping layers of instructions cause a disheartening reduction in efficiency; they render ineffective the discretionary standards which law should allow. In this state of mind, one's initiative and abilities can hardly be put to work, and society can hardly make rapid progress. Once we absorb ourselves in modern totem worship, we are apt to forget that the aim of reforming our political and economic system is to make maximum use of people's enthusiasm, their spirit of creativity, and their initiative. But the figure of a dragon looming over the multitudes deludes people into abandoning personal effort and their own right to decide. They lose themselves instead in reliance on benign authority, and hope for blessings from the powers above. We must, of necessity, alter the concept of authority worship represented by the dragon culture, so that at every level of government and enterprise, and for every individual, each can assume the right of decision making within the scope of his or her right to make decisions under the discretionary standards that law allows.

N O N E O F US IS I N H E R I T O R O F T H E D R A G O N

Dai: Perhaps if we don't take this quite so seriously, that is, if we see the dragon craze as merely a holiday fad and a gimmick of the Tourist Bureau, it will not seem quite so disgusting to us. China Is No Longer a Dragon

I 207

Yan: As long as the dragon image is inextricably connected with tradition, as long as the Chinese people go on dreaming of dragon worship and the acquiring of dragonlike powers, the kind of dragon craze that we have seen in this year of the dragon will be harmful. I doubt if anyone has added up the costs of all the dragon images at the International Hotel, the Shangri-la, the Xiyuan Hotel, and all the others. Of course, all of this comes from the customers' pockets in the long run. I am speaking only of the psychic damage to the Chinese people—our energies are dissipated, our willpower is paralyzed, we grow smug and complacent, we shrink back in the face of difficulty. Not long ago I was in a large hall at an American university, looking at paintings on the walls of scientists, artists, politicians, and social activists from various countries. An enthusiastic American lady pointed at a single, poorly executed figure of the goddess Guanyin and said, "This is a Chinese Buddha-image." I was truly mortified. In the panoply of world culture, are Guanyin and the dragon all that China has to offer? Is there nothing in China but cultural artifacts and dragons? We get carried away by our age-old history, our Mawangdui and terra cotta warriors. We are carried away with the culture of the dragon! This unaspiring, boastful, stuck-in-the-mud country of China, this country that clings to its own weakness and calls the dragon the symbol of its culture, when a blow is dealt to it, is only capable of moaning in pain! Why do we only care to be "inheritors of the dragon"? Do we think that once everyone is an inheritor of the dragon that everything will be just fine? Is the dragon the only common denominator on both sides of the strait, and of Chinese people the world over? Do not get the idea that glorifying the culture of the dragon and the inheritors of the dragon is a contribution to Chinese unity. China will be unified, but the precondition is cultural advancement, democracy, and prosperity for all of China. When conversing with students from Taiwan, I discover that the feelings between us, our common language, and our 208

I Toward a Democratic China

problems of common concern are the ties that will unify us, peacefully and more strongly than any other force.

W E M U S T B R E A K A W A Y F R O M T H E W O R L D OF T H E D R A G O N

Dai: What if we consider the dragon only from the standpoint of art? We can then see the dragon as no more than an artistic creation of the ancients, just like the unicorn and the griffin. Yan: Griffins and unicorns are not the end of it: there are manticores, gorgons, trolls, and banshees too. But can any of these ride on the clouds? Are they so mighty, do they have such awesome command over natural forces, that they can lord it over human beings? Compared to these other imaginary beings, we can hardly say the dragon is unattractive. The dragon was created by generations of artists, all seeking perfection according to their ideas and aesthetic interests. On this earth only gods are perfect, because a god is intrinsically an idealization of human qualities. Any person of flesh and blood on this earth is imperfect —his abilities are limited and his personality is flawed in one way or another. Precisely because of this, a good political system should take man's imperfection and humanness into account, relying on built-in constraints. Obviously this is not at complete variance with the idealized image of a dragon. Idealizing the dragon is really a way of instilling the idea of lordship among men. Religion requires intoxication; it requires that people be content with the vague and the indefinite. The idealized dragon image meets this psychological need perfectly. Dai: Besides that, it is, after all, phantasmagoric. That sets it in direct opposition to the scientific, legalistic spirit which our reform-minded forerunners have given up their lives for over the past one hundred years. It goes without saying that China's culture has traditionally been lacking in disinterested thought and precise appeals to evidence. You seem to feel the dragon craze is China Is No Longer a Dragon

I Z09

characterized by delusion and satisfaction with mere appearances, and that the Chinese people should break themselves of it, as they did of the opium habit. Yan: Science and law need to be discussed in exact language. Science does not allow vagueness and inexactitude, even with regard to phenomena in the world around us that are chaotic or indeterminate. I will always remember what the Polish physicist Leopold Infeld said: "The endeavor to replace religious fervor with the pleasure that comes from the pursuit of understanding is a victory of reason, and it is something people can take pride in. But the easily gained intoxications of metaphysics are fleeting and deceptive." Being guided at all times in my work by this sort of rationalism, I have come to feel revulsion at all the dragons that try to be more than just artistic images. The dragon of today is corrupting the Chinese people. The dragon causes intoxication; it makes us stagnant and hidebound. It gives us delusions of grandeur. It makes us cling to our own shortcomings. As long as it keeps a hold over our spiritual world, it will be an obstacle to China's modernization. Science can never intoxicate, because the truth is always clear and unmistakable, not mystifying and exclusive in the manner of the dragon. China is no longer a dragon, and we are not the inheritors of the dragon. As progeny of the early Yellow River dwellers, we are all children of the land of China. We need to rouse ourselves and emerge from the dragon world of cloud castles and shifting mists to create China's future with our own hands and our own wisdom.

zio

I Toward a Democratic China

26 My Four Convictions Regarding Science

In the natural sciences and the social sciences, there is a similar relation of theory to practice. When theory is no longer adequate to solve the problems posed by practice, a scientist never loses heart. For him this is not a theoretical crisis, but a starting point for new advances in science. Ten years ago I published a piece of philosophical fiction entitled "Religion, Reason, and Practice" in the Guangming Daily. I was trying to say that in intellectual matters there should be no religious courts. Scriptural quotations or dogmas of any sort should not be used as criteria of truth. In the realm of thought the court of practice is what counts the most. All ideas, concepts, and theories must prove their raison d'etre in this court or else give up their right to exist. At present, practice has posed a series of new problems which original theories are hard put to explain or clarify. This presages a great development for the social sciences in present-day China. This is my first conviction regarding science. M y second conviction regarding science is this: whatever the phenomena that emerge in the course of practice, no matter how new or hard to understand, all of them can be understood by sciSource: Guangming Daily, May 10,1988. 211

ence. Things that are not understood now can be understood—otherwise human inquiry would not move forward. Our fundamental attitude to the world around us is to admit that all phenomena, including those which are hard to understand, have objective existence. The mission of science is to make them known, to discover the laws that govern them. If we abandon our efforts of understanding in the face of new and hard-to-understand phenomena, we are running counter to the spirit of science. We are giving up the most precious thing that nature has given us—the rationality by which man understands his environment. M y third conviction is that scientific ideas are clear; the truth is plain and straightforward. There are heaps of ideas and concepts that are unclear from a scientific point of view, and their ambiguity can give people a certain pleasure. They are intoxicating. I have never considered these vague, ambiguous "theories" to be products of science. As far as science is concerned, even the indeterminate and chaotic phenomena in the world around us need to be described by precise scientific concepts. Science has always been the enemy of ambiguity and vagueness; only religion and mysticism try to enchant and intoxicate. The Polish physicist Leopold Infeld said, "The endeavor to replace religious fervor with the pleasure that comes from pursuit of understanding is a victory of reason, and it is something people can take pride in. But the easily gained intoxications of metaphysics are fleeting and deceptive." In my view, the concepts of science are never created at will by the spirit. They are not easily gained, but take shape through arduous inquiry. M y fourth conviction is that from the standpoint of science, there is no concrete problem that cannot be solved. Of course the choice of goals, in itself, must depend on science. Anyone who holds this sort of faith in science will not set goals that are presently unobtainable because of the limitations set by actual conditions. With the use of science, people can create conditions or alter existing conditions in order to deal with the concrete problems they need to solve. Science is the wellspring of human optimism. People 2iz

I Toward a Democratic China

who helplessly throw up their hands in the face of difficulties lack faith in science. The development of science requires a favorable social environment, that is, an environment of free inquiry and discussion. Ten years ago the discussion of the criteria of truth created an environment of unabashed inquiry. But this environment was not maintained over a long period. The problem now is that we still need to create an environment of unabashed inquiry. In such an environment, mistaken notions will make themselves scarce. Someday people will rely on science and human wisdom to solve the difficulties of real life.

My Four Convictions Regarding Science

I 213

2-7 The Origins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution was a remarkable period in the history of twentieth-century China. It is often said that the Cultural Revolution was historically unprecedented, but in fact man's native abilities were no less limited during this period than at any other time. The various meritorious acts and crimes of the Cultural Revolution were not entirely new, for they have been known to occur in other countries and in other periods. The cult of personality witnessed in the Cultural Revolution had already existed during the Stalinist era in the Soviet Union. In February 1956, Khrushchev told the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union that because of a cult of personality, people believed that Stalin was "all-knowing, capable of thinking for everyone, and able to do anything. They supposed his actions to be free from the slightest trace of error." Those remarks are perfectly applicable to the common view of M a o Zedong during the Cultural Revolution. The strident emotionalism displayed by young students in the Cultural Revolution is comparable to that of German youth during

Source: G a o G a o and Yan Jiaqi, Zhongguo

wenhuadageming

shinianshi

(Ten-year history of the Chinese Cultural Revolution), manuscript for the revised edition (April 1989), preface.

214

the Nazi era. Red Guards intoxicated by their own fervor answered their Great Leader's call to denounce "black gangs," burn books, undergo military training, and repair to remote rural districts. M a n y people did these things because they themselves wanted to. In Nazi Germany during the Thirties, young students lit torches on Berlin Square and gleefully burned thousands of books to usher in a "new era" in German culture. For the sake of their National Socialist ideals they cut short their formal education to receive military training and went to remote rural areas. They allowed themselves to be educated physically, morally, and mentally in the spirit of National Socialism. M a n y young students of that time were happy to be involved in such things. One hundred and seventy years before China's Cultural Revolution, during France's Jacobin dictatorship, Paris lay under a pall of revolutionary terror. Laws and procedures were thrown by the wayside, as in China's Cultural Revolution, in order to destroy the enemies of the revolution. The prevailing principle was this: "all enemies of the people are criminals; all of them should be put to death." N o t only the blood of Royalists was spilled at the guillotines, but also the blood of revolutionaries and countless innocent men. An outraged young Frenchman named Camile Desmoulin inveighed against the reign of terror, though ostensibly criticizing abuses of the past, in this passage from his journal: "In those days, a mere conversation could be a conspiracy. Things got to the stage that a simple glance, a pang of sorrow or sympathy, a sigh, or even silence was tantamount to a crime. . . . It was a time when, to save one's own skin, one was forced to express pleasure at the death of relatives and friends." He also wrote, "People were even apprehensive that expressing fear might be construed as a crime: any incident at all was liable to arouse the suspicion of the tyrant." Camile Desmoulin was eventually sent to the guillotine for publishing these writings. During the Cultural Revolution, too, countless people who leveled accusations against the prevailing ideological dictatorship met a fate similar to Camile Desmoulin's. Origins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution

I 215

Four hundred and forty years prior to the Cultural Revolution, the Protestant Reformation swept across western Europe. Martin Luther, the initiator of this movement, went so far as to denounce the pope as an "adversary of Jesus." In form at least, this statement resembles the denunciations during the Cultural Revolution of Liu Shaoqi, that faithful adherent of Maoist thought, as the "mortal enemy of Maoism." To oppose the authority of the pope and the Roman Catholic church, Martin Luther held up the Bible as the justification of his cause. He proclaimed the right of all believers to read the Bible for themselves, and to commune with God without the benefit of priestly intermediaries. During the Reformation people used the Bible as their justification for opposing the church. During the Cultural Revolution people used the Quotations

of

Chairman Mao to justify their attacks on party and government institutions. Of course, these similarities are significant only in a formal sense. The French Revolution and the Reformation propelled history forward, but the Cultural Revolution dragged China backwards toward an age that had already vanished. Although historical resemblances can be found for certain phenomena of the Cultural Revolution, it still deserves to be described as historically unprecedented. The cult of personality, the exulting in power for its own sake, the negation of democracy and the legal system, together with the Red Guards, the mass mobility, the May Seventh cadre schools—all these things imparted a coloring to the Cultural Revolution that sets it apart from other historical events. The Stalinist purges of the Thirties in the Soviet Union were quite extensive in their impact, but they cannot compare with the Cultural Revolution. Every single person felt the impact of the Cultural Revolution; everyone on the Chinese mainland was swept up in it. Even those who tried to stay uninvolved could not keep working and living with any sort of normalcy. There were deep-seated economic reasons why the Chinese were swept up in the Cultural Revolution by the hundreds of millions. Before the Cultural Revolution, the system of state ownership and a 216

I Toward a Democratic China

highly centralized, planned economy had put China under a high degree of administrative control. Political authority extended, in effect, into every area of people's lives. This economic system dragged millions of Chinese into involvement with movements of all kinds. While influence from the feudal tradition was one reason the cult of personality could thrive in China, the system of state ownership and the highly centralized, planned economy also had a great deal to do with it. The cult of personality as a large-scale political phenomenon could not arise in a society where the people's means of livelihood are not controlled by the state, or in a society with a functioning legal code—a society governed by the rule of law. So the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution had something to do with the economic system on the Chinese mainland. But it was also closely related to four other factors. First, after the death of Stalin, China's domestic and international policies began to diverge markedly from those of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev voiced his opposition to the cult of personality and began to alter many Stalinist practices. This transformation in the Soviet Union was quite upsetting to M a o Zedong, who had long regarded the Soviet Union as a shining example of socialism. M a o Zedong felt that the Soviet Union's policy changes and criticism of Stalin were actually a stepwise departure from socialism, paving the way to a capitalist restoration. The second factor was the rift between M a o Zedong and Liu Shaoqi, which worsened daily. Even before the Cultural Revolution, M a o Zedong had made up his mind that Liu Shaoqi was a "power holder following the capitalist road within the party," and a "Khrushchev-like figure who is now our bedfellow." The third factor had to do with the Chinese Communist Party's system of leadership and the patterns of inner-party struggle that had taken shape over time. Within the Communist Party, anyone who wishes to maintain power at the highest level has to gain the support of the majority of the members of the Central Committee Origins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution I 217

and Politburo. Before the Cultural Revolution, M a o Zedong became convinced that Liu Shaoqi's influence within the party was growing and that he increasingly enjoyed the support of a majority in the Central Committee, which, in M a o Zedong's words, was a virtual "capitalist headquarters." M a o Zedong felt he could no longer rely on a vote of the Central Committee to unseat Liu Shaoqi: therefore, to maintain his own power and position, he initiated a large-scale movement, drawing on the people's reverence for him, that would eliminate the Khrushchev-like figures concealed at the party's center. The fourth factor was a lack of the democratic mechanisms that can adjust the relations between the people and the regime. For a long time China had been without normal, effective channels for expressing popular disgust with domineering authority, one-man rule, bureaucratism, and abuse of privilege. Among these factors, the deepening rift between M a o Zedong and Liu Shaoqi at the highest leadership level was crucial. Liu Shaoqi's thinking did in fact differ markedly from M a o Zedong's on the question of capitalist development in China. Liu Shaoqi believed that after the Communist Party gained power, it should allow a fair degree of capitalist development. As early as 1949, he had said, "Capitalism has not advanced very far in China. Under certain historical conditions, capitalism can be a progressive force. In present-day China, capitalism is progressive: it is not reactionary." Also, "Capitalism in present-day China is in its youth: now more than ever it should serve its positive function and win merit for itself." Early in the Fifties, Liu Shaoqi thought that China would need ten to twenty years to bring about socialism and that China would take considerable time to consolidate its new democratic system. M a o Zedong also felt that China would have to pass through a period of transition from the new democracy to socialism. But M a o Zedong harbored an idealist's sense of ultimate mission: as time went on, he increasingly favored the shortening of the transition period. He advocated carrying out social engineering and 218

I Toward a Democratic China

accomplishing the socialist revolution in the shortest possible time, moving onward to the grand ideal of communism as quickly as possible. In the beginning this rift in thinking between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi was not serious. More importantly, Liu Shaoqi's views on the major policy issues confronting the Communist Party were consistent for quite some time with those of M a o Zedong. In the late Fifties, the so-called general line, the Great Leap Forward, and the people's communes were termed the "three red flags" in the building of socialism. The underlying ideas of the general line were first raised by Mao Zedong, but at the Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee it was Liu Shaoqi who, in the name of Party Central, formally recommended "building a general socialist line." In August 1958, when the Politburo of the party's Central Committee held an expanded conference at Beidaihe, it passed proposals for large-scale iron smelting and widespread establishment of people's communes. The conference made this announcement: "Clearly, the fulfillment of communism in our country is no longer a remote, future eventuality. We should make positive use of the people's commune system, searching for definite paths that will accomplish the transition to communism." At the Beidaihe conference no open rifts occurred between Liu Shaoqi and M a o Zedong. The "three red flags" had grave adverse effects on the Chinese economy. Owing to arbitrary interference in economic development by power holders, the winds that prevailed across China were those of communal ownership, hyperbole, high-handedness, special privileges for cadres, and thoughtless management of production. The people's communes set up public cafeterias, where they implemented a free-meal policy. The push for backyard iron-smelting produced three million tons of useless iron and steel nationwide. The Great Leap Forward and the people's commune movement threw the nation's economy into serious imbalance, and agricultural production was seriously impaired. By the end of 1958, industrial and agricultural production was plunged into severe disOrigins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution

I 219

order: some rural districts experienced interruption in their food supply and panic resulted. In July and August of 1959, an expanded Politburo meeting and then the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee were held at Lushan, in Jiangxi, to remedy errors that had emerged while executing the "three red flags" policy. On July 14, Politburo member and defense minister Peng Dehuai wrote a letter to Mao Zedong in which he affirmed the accomplishments of 1958 and stated that the "general line" was correct. The second half of the letter analyzed the errors of that same year. At the conclusion of the letter Peng Dehuai voiced his hopes for "a systematic review of achievements and lessons in our work over the second half of last year, to get to the truth of the matter and elevate our level of thinking. In general, individuals will not be held accountable." At that time Mao Zedong held the chairmanship of the Central Committee. But a man in his position in the Communist Party could not maintain his power without enlisting the support of the majority of the Politburo and Central Committee. Peng Dehuai had made criticisms, in the name of the Politburo, of the mistaken practices of 1958; if these were acknowledged, M a o Zedong's power in the party would inevitably be shaken. T w o days after receiving Peng Dehuai's letter, M a o Zedong decided to distribute copies of it for discussion at the meeting. During the discussion, favorable views on the points in Peng Dehuai's letter were expressed by Huang Kecheng, Zhou Xiaozhou, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Hui, and Li Rui. Most speakers endorsed the content of the letter, though they questioned the wording in places. Only a small number were not in agreement. M a o Zedong felt that the support of all those people for Peng Dehuai was a threat to his supremacy. On July 2,3, M a o Zedong spoke before the entire assembly, denouncing the "capitalist vacillation" demonstrated by Peng Dehuai's letter and calling it a premeditated, organized, calculating attack on the party, in keeping with the agenda of "rightist opportunism." Following M a o Zedong's speech, the atmosphere of the meeting grew 220

I Toward a Democratic China

suddenly tense. Faced with this label of "attacking the party," no one dared express further support for Peng Dehuai's opinions, and the meeting focused on criticizing Peng Dehuai's "right deviationism." From the 2,nd to the 16th of August, 1959, at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, the party continued to expose and criticize the "right opportunist antiparty clique" headed by Peng Dehuai. Afterwards, a party-wide struggle against "right-wing deviationism" got underway. Whatever sympathy Liu Shaoqi may have felt for Peng Dehuai in his heart, he was an active proponent of M a o Zedong's views when it came to criticizing Peng. N o t until 1959 did open discord arise between Liu Shaoqi and M a o Zedong over the issue of the "three red flags." The immediate results of Lushan were Peng Dehuai's dismissal from his duties as defense minister, with Lin Biao stepping in to take his place, and Huang Kecheng's dismissal as chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army. Because of the opposition to Peng Dehuai at Lushan, the rectification of economic errors was cut off midway. In the wake of Lushan the economic situation continued to worsen in mainland China. Thus by the early Sixties, there was no alternative to a thoroughgoing readjustment of China's economy, to remedy the various errors committed in the late Fifties. Early in 1 9 6 1 , the party convened the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, at which M a o Zedong proposed to "mount a widespread drive for investigation and research." His hope was that 1961 would become a "year of investigation" and a year of "seeking truth from facts." This prompted Liu Shaoqi to return to his hometown of Tanzi-chong in Ningxiang county, Hunan, where he conducted field research. It was at this juncture that Liu Shaoqi's views on the "three red flags" began to change. Liu Shaoqi believed that difficulties had been created chiefly by work-related shortcomings and errors: the difficulties were "more a human calamity than a natural disaster." He also felt that Party Central bore chief responsibility for these misOrigins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution

I 2.2.1

takes. He realized that the situation reported by Peng Dehuai tallied in large measure with the facts; it might have been better had the people's communes not been set up when they were, and it would not have hurt to wait a few years before setting them up. But M a o Zedong never wavered in his view of the three red flags, and he attributed the current economic difficulties chiefly to natural disasters. The three red flags were correct; whatever mistakes occurred were mistakes in actual work. He never shrunk from his resolve, which he expressed in 1959, to protect the three red flags, even if that meant fighting a w a r against the whole world, including the numerous opponents and skeptics within the Communist Party. His term for opposition to the three red flags was "revisionism"; he felt that on the issue of the three red flags Liu Shaoqi had committed a right deviationist error. Since Liu Shaoqi believed that the economic difficulties were caused chiefly by work-related

errors and shortcomings,

he

adopted a series of measures to ameliorate those errors as he presided over the day-to-day work of the party in 1962. Mindful of the state's serious fiscal deficits, and the imbalance between commodity supply and purchasing power, he announced a "period of emergency" and called for a push toward all-around equilibrium. At the same time he searched out and rehabilitated cadres who had been criticized in political movements since 1958. All of these actions heightened his prestige as deputy chairman of the Central Committee and chairman of the State Council. Within the Chinese Communist Party the supreme leader possesses a great deal of power, yet collective leadership is a fundamental principle of the party. Within the party's highest organs, no man has a right to more than one vote. Any of the periodical meetings of the Central Committee or the Party Congress can lead to changes in leadership: this was how the previous leaders Chen Duxiu, J u Qiubai, Li Lisan, and Wang Ming fell from power. This means that the power concentrated in individual hands must periodically be reaffirmed by the Central Committee and the Party Congress. In 222

I Toward a Democratic China

order to pry loose and weaken—or protect and strengthen—such power, conflicts within the party are inevitable. In 1962 M a o Zedong found his supremacy was wavering due to mistakes he had committed in the late Fifties. To protect his supremacy, in September of that year at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, he put forth the slogan "never forget the class struggle," and in direct response to recommendations by Liu Shaoqi he came out with criticisms of household contract production, the individual work ethic, and the tendency to reverse judgments on rightists. The Tenth Plenum was followed by the unfolding of the "urban and rural socialist education movement," which centered on "taking firm hold of the class struggle." On the issue of pursuing the class struggle there was as yet no fundamental rift between Liu Shaoqi and M a o Zedong. In Liu Shaoqi's assessment, in fact, the class struggle was coming to a serious pass, which led him to take various "leftist" measures during the movement. Nevertheless, with regard to the nature of the "socialist education movement," Liu Shaoqi was not in favor of viewing it as a struggle between "two classes" or "two different lines," and he was not in favor of directing the movement against what M a o Zedong called "power holders walking the capitalist road within the party." Beginning on December 15, 1964, the Politburo convened a month-long meeting in Beijing on national political work, to study and sum up problems in the socialist education movement. It was decided that the movement would henceforth be referred to as the "Four Clean-ups," to clean up government, the economy, organizations and offices, and thought. In its later stages the meeting discussed and formulated a policy paper entitled "Current Issues Raised by the Rural Socialist Education Movement" (also known as the "Twenty-three Articles"). Mao Zedong did not take part in many of the sessions, so that he could get adequate rest. Out of consideration for Mao Zedong's health, Deng Xiaoping thoughtfully urged M a o not to attend an ordinary working session over which Deng was to preside. M a o insisted on attending the session, and when he spoke on Origins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution

I 2.2.3

the nature of the Four Clean-ups, he insisted it was a "contradiction between socialism and capitalism." At this point Liu Shaoqi interjected: "There are a number of interlocking contradictions. There are contradictions between the four cleans and the four impurities; there are contradictions between party and nonparty. It is very complex, so we had better stick to solving the contradictions as they arise." M a o Zedong's mood immediately took a turn for the worse, and when the meeting opened the next day, Mao Zedong lost his temper. He reminded everyone present of the existence of two documents, one of them the constitution, under which he had rights as a citizen, and the other the party charter, under which he had the rights of party membership. He had the right to participate in assemblies and speak his mind. But a certain person at this meeting wanted to keep him from attending, wanted to keep him from speaking. In this way Mao Zedong took the initiative in exposing the contradiction between himself and Liu Shaoqi. After the meeting, Liu Shaoqi was criticized to his face for treating M a o Zedong with insufficient respect, and at a later meeting on organizational life in the Politburo, Liu Shaoqi made a self-criticism. M a o Zedong was still not satisfied, feeling that Liu Shaoqi's problem was not a matter of respect or disrespect. It was a matter of principle, of revisionism versus antirevisionism. Liu Shaoqi was a "reactionary who had wormed his way into the party," but at the same time he just happened to be M a o Zedong's personally elected successor. That was why Liu Shaoqi had to step down. The rift between M a o Zedong and Liu Shaoqi over discussion of the "Twenty-three Articles" is quite important for understanding the immediate causes of the Cultural Revolution. On December 18, 1970, M a o Zedong and the American writer and reporter Edgar Snow had a conversation that lasted for five hours, during which Snow came straight out and asked Mao: "When did you finally decide that Liu had to step down?" M a o answered that he had decided in January of 1965. The first of the "Twenty-three Articles" plainly states that the main point of 224

I Toward a Democratic China

the Four Clean-ups movement was to get rid of "power holders walking the capitalist road within the party." M a o Zedong told Snow that "Liu fought hard against the first article at the meeting." On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Mao's assessment of the state of affairs in China was far from rosy. M a o believed not only that Liu's power in Party Central had grown into an opposition "headquarters," but that Liu's agents were everywhere on the local scene. M a o Zedong also felt that a third of the power at the grassroots level was not in the hands of people he could trust. He called for a probe into the backing in high places enjoyed by cadres who indulged in the "four impurities." Most literary and arts associations were already "tottering on the edge of revisionism," and the schools were "a world ruled by bourgeois intellectuals." In the fall of 1965, at a Party Central working session in Beijing, Mao Zedong raised the question "What to do if revisionism appears at the party's center?" M a o Zedong demanded that his speeches be transmitted to the lower levels, and asked the provincial committee to "stand firm against the revisionist center." M a o worried constantly that he would be left in the minority in the Politburo and the Central Committee. According to the Communist Party constitution, the chairman of the Central Committee was to be chosen by election in a plenary session of the Central Committee. To preserve his supremacy, M a o Zedong felt compelled to rely on the cult of personality which people had built up around him: with it, he could eliminate opposition forces in the Central Committee and at the local level. The combination of these four factors led to the historically unprecedented Cultural Revolution. Once M a o Zedong drew on his own prestige, rousing the people to expose abuses "from the bottom up," the people's rightful dislike of bureaucratism and special privilege could be channeled in the direction M a o intended. Thus came the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, which would sweep all before it on the Chinese mainland.

Origins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution

I 225

28 May Seventeenth Manifesto

Beginning at 2 p.m. on May 13, some three thousand students have engaged in a hunger strike at Tiananmen Square that has lasted for nearly one hundred hours. So far more than seven hundred students have collapsed. This situation is extremely grave and without precedent in the history of our homeland. The students seek the retraction of the People's Daily editorial of April 2,6; they demand a dialogue with the government that shall be broadcast live. The sons and daughters of our homeland are falling one after another while their just demands are being ignored. This is the reason why the hunger strike cannot cease. By now, the problem facing our homeland has been fully exposed to the people of China and the entire world—that is, because a dictator wields unlimited power, the government has lost its sense of responsibility and its humanity. This government that has become irresponsible and inhumane is not the government of a republic; rather, it is a government under the power of a dictator. The Qing dynasty has been extinct for more than seventy-six Drafted by Yan Jiaqi and co-signed by dozens of other intellectuals and activists. This translation is based on the text printed in the Hong Kong

newspaper Ming bao.

226

years. Yet China still has an emperor without an imperial crown— an aged, muddleheaded dictator. Yesterday afternoon, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang publicly announced that all major policy decisions in China must be approved by this senile and useless dictator. Without this dictator's saying so, the April 26 People's Daily editorial cannot be retracted. N o w that the students have maintained their hunger strike for nearly one hundred hours, we find we have no alternative. The Chinese people can no longer wait for this dictator to acknowledge his mistakes. We must rely on the students and on ourselves. Today we declare to China and the entire world that the great struggle of the students' one-hundred-hour hunger strike has achieved a major victory. With their own actions the students have demonstrated that the student movement is not an instance of "turmoil" but instead is a great patriotic democratic movement that will finally bury dictatorship and the imperial system in China. Let us hail the great victory of the hunger strike struggle! Long live the spirit of nonviolent protest! Down with the dictatorship of one individual! Dictators will come to no good end! Topple the April 26th editorial! Gerontological politics must end! The dictator must resign! Long live the college and university students! Long live the people! Long live democracy! Long live freedom! Signed: Yanjiaqi Bao Zunxin Yang Lujun Li Nanyou and many others

May Seventeenth Manifesto

I 227

29 China Is Not a Republic

The June Fourth massacre in Beijing was the darkest page of China's history, for on that day Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and Yang Shangkun tore off the veil worn by the Chinese "republic." As a result, the people of China and of the entire world have clearly seen that a nation called the People's Republic is neither the people's, nor a republic. In a republic there can be no king or emperor in title or in fact, nor can the supreme power of the state be controlled by one person for life. Deng Xiaoping is in fact China's last monarch; by his censure of the student demonstrations and the prodemocracy movement, he has overturned the people's republic. A true people's republic cannot be overturned by one person. The unprecedented scale of the student movement and prodemocracy demonstrations that occurred in the spring in Beijing shook, in a fundamental way, the edifice of an imperial state draped with the banners of "socialism" and "people's republic," and struck the funeral bell of the autocratic political regime of Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and Yang Shangkun. Source: Huaqiao ribao (Overseas Chinese daily), July 24 and 25, 1989; also in Ming bao (Hong Kong), July 23 and 24,1989. 228

T H R E E C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S OF A U T O C R A C Y

Far from being a republic, contemporary mainland China under the rule of Deng Xiaoping shows all the features of an autocracy. In many countries autocracy was abandoned long ago; consequently people tend to feel that once an emperor or king has been overthrown, autocracy also ceases to exist. But the history of contemporary China clearly shows that it is still possible for an autocratic system to exist in a state that is nominally a republic, even though it may lack a titular emperor or king and is garbed with the banners of socialism. Institutionally, an autocratic system possesses three unmistakable characteristics. First, the supreme power of the state is ultimately concentrated in the hands of one person, w h o does not allow it to be divided by anyone else or by any of the organs of the state. On June p, 1989, Deng Xiaoping said that China cannot implement "a system of tripartite powers" but instead "must uphold and implement the system of people's representative congresses." Yet the recent convening of the standing committee of the National People's Congress once again demonstrated that this "standing, permanent organ of the supreme power of the state" is one in name only, and in fact it has no choice but to obey the dictator, Deng Xiaoping. Ordinarily, it would appear that the standing committee of the N P C would by itself be able to convene a meeting and decide on its agenda, but in fact if the dictator intervenes, then the standing committee is powerless to hold a meeting on its own. If a meeting is convened, its agenda must be approved by the dictator. The fact that Deng Xiaoping said that China cannot put into practice a tripartite separation of powers means that the "supreme power of the state," as well as that of the state's highest administrative organs, cannot be greater than the dictator's own power. On June 4, the People's Court sent a telegram to the standing committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party labeling the student movement and the prodemocracy demChina Is Not a Republic

I 229

onstrations, in accordance with Deng Xiaoping's decree, a "serious counterrevolutionary rebellion." Under such circumstances, there can be no independent judiciary to speak of in China. The second characteristic of autocracy is the inability to transfer to anyone else the supreme power concentrated in the hands of one person. Mao Zedong's lifelong tenure, which brought massive disasters to China, made people clearly realize the necessity of abolishing life-tenure in high leadership positions. After M a o , a positive image was formed of Deng Xiaoping's voluntarily seeking to give up power, since he refused time and again to assume the highest positions in the C C P and the state. Deng often expressed his desire to retire, adding that he had not yet retired because the people had not consented to it; when the people consented, then he would retire. The June Fourth massacre has clearly exposed the real face of Deng Xiaoping, which had been elaborately concealed. Confronted by the condemnation of the people of the entire nation, not only did he refuse to give up power, but precisely because the people wanted him to step down, Deng ordered the use of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and machine guns to suppress unarmed students and citizens. Even though he was opposed by the people throughout the nation, this eighty-five-year-old man on the verge of death went even further, sparing no expense in ordering the arrest of all those who had expressed their dissatisfaction with him. In his remarks on June 24, Deng made it absolutely clear that if the prestige of the next generation of leaders could not be established—that is to say, if mainland China could not produce leaders who would both obey Deng implicitly and effectively control the power of the state—then he was certainly not about to give up his power. The third characteristic of autocracy is the nonprocedural character of the succession to supreme power. Historically, kings, emperors, and other supreme leaders have often designated their successors to the throne. But once the power of the designated successor is seen to expand, the line of succession is inevitably

230

I Toward a Democratic China

changed. Moreover, the chronic struggle to obtain the right of succession makes it impossible for there to be any predetermined procedure for determining the succession. After M a o Zedong had designated Liu Shaoqi as his successor, he felt that Liu, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Shangkun were forming a clique that threatened his own power; therefore he launched the Cultural Revolution in order to eradicate Liu Shaoqi's influence. Later, when Lin Biao—Mao's "closest comradein-arms and successor"—along with Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, and Chen Boda, formed a new clique, Lin Biao's demise became inevitable. After the Lin Biao affair, Wang Hongwen was selected as Mao's successor. But during the Tiananmen Incident of 1976, M a o witnessed the people's protests against Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and others, so he finally selected Hua Guofeng as his successor. When Deng Xiaoping acquired supreme power, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, in turn, became his designated successors. However, Deng could not avoid the predicament faced by all dictators in human history, namely, once his will came into conflict with that of his successor, he could not resist altering, at any cost, the line of succession to supreme power. In contemporary China, Deng Xiaoping is an emperor without an imperial crown—a dictator in fact as well as in name. Deng's power can neither be divided nor transferred. There is no procedure to speak of to determine the line of succession to that power. The "people's republic" is one in name only.

THE JUNE FOURTH MASSACRE S T R E N G T H E N E D

THE

P O W E R OF T H E L I - Y A N G C L I Q U E

The Li Peng-Yang Shangkun clique is not only bound together by a common interest; it also harbors certain differences.

China Is Not a Republic

I 231

Yet there is no divergence on the issue of clinging to an autocratic system and to their individual powers. The June Fourth massacre tied them together even more tightly. However, with respect to Deng Xiaoping's policy of "opening and reform," the Li-Yang clique —especially Li Peng, Yao Yilin, and others—is not in complete agreement with Deng Xiaoping. Ever since Li Peng assumed the position of premier of the State Council in 1987, his policies have tended toward a return to pre-Cultural Revolution conditions. The conflict between Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang on the issue of opening and reform is really a form of resistance by Li Peng to the policy advocated by Deng Xiaoping. Not long ago, Deng declared that the report made by Zhao Ziyang at the Thirteenth Party Congress on behalf of the party's Central Committee emphasized the continuity of the policy of opening and reform. Even today, not a single word of that report can be altered. Deng said that while many slogans were heard during the spring of 1989—including "Down with Deng Xiaoping"—he did not hear anyone saying "Down with opening and reform." This, to him, indicated that the people are satisfied with the policy of opening and reform. Quite obviously, these remarks by Deng Xiaoping were pointed at the Li-Yang clique. Deng will not tolerate anyone's attempt—including Li Peng—to negate the policy he has advocated throughout the past decade. The June Fourth massacre was a bloody, reactionary military coup. Although the order for the massacre was issued by Deng Xiaoping, the massacre itself and the subsequent mass arrests were directly executed by the Li-Yang clique. The massacre and the mass arrests have made it impossible for the opposing forces in mainland China's ruling stratum to raise their heads. The superfascist, exterminationist policies and the politics of terror applied in the massacre and arrests have greatly strengthened, temporarily, the power of the Li-Yang clique in China's ruling stratum.

232

I Toward a Democratic China

NEW C H A L L E N G E S FACED BY DENG

XIAOPING

Autocratic politics can assume t w o forms that are frequently seen. T h e first occurs w h e n the dictator is so p o w e r f u l within the ruling circle that no one else can set up a rival faction. Each person to w h o m p o w e r has been delegated is directly loyal to the dictator himself. T h e second occurs w h e n the dictator's reputation and p o w e r decline; then, in order to maintain his p o w e r , he has to resort to the art of political balancing, by which he manipulates the various forces with which he must contend. In recent years, Deng Xiaoping's actual prestige has steadily declined because he has repeatedly made mistakes in his policy decisions (e.g., forcing party general secretary H u Y a o b a n g to step d o w n , rushing price reforms without considering the prevalent conditions, and his April 24, 1989, talk regarding "turmoil"). T h u s he has had to depend on the military, which he controls, and on political balancing to maintain his o w n power. T h e new standing committee of the Politburo established by the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee, which met in June 1989, is in fact the product of Deng's manipulations. In order to contain the growing p o w e r of the Li-Yang clique, D e n g adopted t w o important measures. T h e first w a s to squeeze Jiang Z e m i n , Li Ruihuan, and Song Ping onto the standing committee of the Politburo. T h e second w a s to allow Jiang Z e m i n , w h o is not part of the Li-Yang clique, to take the post of party general secretary. W h e n Deng lobbied Li Peng and Y a o Yilin for these measures, he stressed the importance of having Jiang Z e m i n as the core of the leadership, saying that even if they found it hard to accept the arrangement they should not break up into factions, since doing so would come to no g o o d end. D e n g said that the new leadership group must not be incapable, a remark that w a s not directed solely at Li Peng's lack of ability. T h e Fourth Plenum affirmed the new structure of the ruling stratum in mainland C h i n a , and D e n g Xiaoping is n o w using Jiang Z e m i n , Li Ruihuan, Q i a o Shi, Song China Is Not a Republic

I 2.33

Ping, and others to contend with the growing power of Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, and Yao Yilin. As for Jiang Zemin, it is clear that his authority is not based on the consent of the people, nor does it stem from democratic election within the party. Many remain tentative on the question of Jiang Zemin's assumption of the party general secretaryship. Sooner or later, as he exercises the powers of that position, he will discover that he faces the same problems that his two predecessors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, faced.

DENG XIAOPING'S REMARKS ANTICIPATE N E C E S S I T Y O F LI P E N G ' S

THE

DOWNFALL

The convening of the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth Party Congress and Deng Xiaoping's recent remarks demonstrate that following the massacre and mass arrests, Deng must not only coopt the slogans of the students and the prodemocracy demonstrations, but eventually must find a scapegoat in order to regain some moral standing for the power that has been based on military suppression. Sooner or later, he must get rid of the clumsy and inadequate Li Peng. In terms of the relationships in China's ruling circle, there are three possible outcomes. First, if confronted by new, widespread resistance and demonstrations, Jiang Zemin and the Li-Yang clique might put aside their various differences and join forces to deal with the prodemocracy movement in China. Second, the Li-Yang clique, in order to expand its own power, might persist in opposing the leadership structure arranged by Deng Xiaoping at the Fourth Plenum and seek to weaken the influence of Jiang Zemin, Li Ruihuan, and the like. Third, at an opportune time, Li Peng and even Yang Shangkun might be forced to step down, as scapegoats, in order to alleviate the people's resentment of the massacre and mass arrests. Deng has admitted that the student demonstrations were "spawned by corruption," and he has even indicated that 2.34

I Toward a Democratic

China

"there must be a limit to the killing of people." Jiang Zemin has said, "It is necessary to distinguish between two different kinds of contradictions. Policies must be strictly carried out; affairs must be conducted strictly according to law." After the wanton killings and arrests, Deng Xiaoping's remarks indicate an attempt on his part to suggest to the people that since he did not advocate the murders and arrests, the responsibility for them should not fall on his shoulders. Of the three possible outcomes, the first is not very likely to occur, since it will be difficult for a new movement to arise among the students and the people any time soon, because of the extreme brutality of the massacre and suppression. As for the second possibility, because the Li-Yang clique is already lacking in popular support, any effort to expand its influence will be opposed by the people of the entire country, making it impossible for the Li-Yang clique to prevail. Therefore, in the coming months and years, the political situation in China will probably develop along the lines of the third possibility. Li Peng's stepping down is inevitable; it is merely a question of time. In the new standing committee of the Politburo, Deng is already looking for a qualified person to be the next premier.

T H E R E P U B L I C M U S T BE R E C O N S T I T U T E D

The ongoing struggle over the right of succession to supreme power will be an important feature of post-June Fourth Chinese politics. This will be a power struggle concealed behind a facade of rhetoric about "ceasing argument" and "strengthening unity." Each person in mainland China's ruling circle will have to be very careful at all times in what he says and does, for fear that the opposition will seize upon and exploit his problems. The serious abuses of the life-tenure system for the highest leaders have already been fully exposed; autocratic politics in today's China has reached China Is Not a Republic

I Z35

a dead end. To date, not only have the i . i billion Chinese people experienced the grave hardships caused by autocratic politics, but also the other Politburo members, mindful of the deceased Hu Yaobang and the living Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin, must have considerable anxiety about the dangers associated with its unpredictability. The iron law of autocratic politics is that power is not distributed in accordance with one's contributions and achievements. Li Ximin and Chen Xitong, officials of the Beijing municipality who performed meritorious service during the massacre, were not rewarded with increased power. At the cost of spilled blood and the lives of thousands in the June Fourth massacre, more and more people have come to recognize that after the overthrow of the reactionary Deng-Li-Yang clique, China must of necessity undertake a serious and earnest political reformation. In order that episodes like the June Fourth massacre and the Cultural Revolution will never recur, and that political struggles need not be won or lost at the cost of fresh blood, lives, and freedom; in order to ensure the long-term stability of Chinese politics, and to secure democracy, freedom, the rule of law, and human rights, two urgent tasks must be accomplished in China. The first is thoroughly to expose the true face of dictatorship in mainland Chinese politics by destroying the facade of this false "people's republic," so that more and more people will clearly recognize that the China that is called a "people's republic" is not a real republic. The second is to overturn the reactionary rule of the Deng-Li-Yang clique, and then to reconstitute a great people's democratic republic.

236

I Toward a Democratic China

3° You Come Inside, I'll Get Out An Imaginary Conversation between M a o Zedong and Deng Xiaoping

On a particularly hot and muggy day in mid-August, 1989, Deng Xiaoping and his wife, Z h u o Lin, arrived on an excursion boat at a secluded island near Beidaihe. The island was thickly grown with verdant shrubbery, and the distant sea merged at the horizon with the azure sky. As he stood among the shrubs and looked off into the distance, Deng Xiaoping suddenly felt that he was rising in stature! Away from the endless arguments of Zhongnanhai and Jade Spring Hill, he felt relaxed and happy, as if his spirit soared a hundredfold. He and Z h u o Lin walked along a winding path away from the shore and found one side of the island

Source: Ming

bao (Hong Kong), September 1989. Written in exile by

Yan Jiaqi and Su Wei, a former researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, this amusing piece of political satire—a genre that rarely surfaces in Chinese culture—was published in Hong Kong one hundred days after the bloody suppression, to commemorate the June Fourth massacre.

237

covered by a pine grove, yielding glimpses of pavilions and gazebos among the trees. Deng Xiaoping and Zhuo Lin were caught up in the pleasure of strolling when they arrived in front of a creamcolored building resembling the White House— Suddenly a clap of thunder reverberated through the heavens; black clouds rolled over them with the speed of tanks and personnel carriers. Everything before Deng Xiaoping's eyes became blurred, and in a moment of confused panic he found himself surrounded by strange shadows. Oh no! Those were bodies obscured by blood and torn flesh; that was a human head, crushed flat. Oh! Those were human chests burst open by dum-dum bullets . . . Deng Xiaoping could hear countless grim and pain-ravaged voices, carried to him on the wind— "Deng Xiaoping, why did you order tanks and armored vehicles to crush us?" "We were merely petitioning peacefully and we were unarmed. Why did you order the troops to fire on us?" The murmur of voices rose till it howled like a storm on the sea and wailed like the autumn wind. Suddenly Deng Xiaoping passed out. After being worked on through a whole day and night, Deng Xiaoping regained consciousness to find that he had been carried into the courtyard of No. 65 Beidaihe. At the side of his bed was Zhuo Lin, looking dispirited. The ready tears of old age poured down Deng Xiaoping's face as he spoke to Zhuo Lin in a somber, pain-racked voice: "This situation in China is certainly tough to deal with. I must go to see the Chairman and let him help me with some suggestions." On the evening of September 1 2 , exactly one hundred days after he had ordered the bloodbath in Tiananmen Square, Deng, accompanied by Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, hobbled into the Chairman M a o Memorial Hall, located behind the Monument to Revolutionary Martyrs. To preserve strict secrecy as well as guard against the unexpected, Tiananmen Square had once again been put under 238

I Toward a Democratic China

heavy guard, but in consideration of the need to create a harmonious atmosphere, all martial law sentry posts south of the monument were assumed by women soldiers in plain clothes. M a o Zedong arose from his crystal sarcophagus and with gliding steps walked over to a spot furnished with four or five sofas. Then he sat himself down. Just as Deng Xiaoping was about to make introductions, M a o stood up in astonishment. Pointing to Li Peng, he said, " Y o u , who are you?" Deng Xiaoping said, " H e is the Premier's . . ." Yang Shangkun came straight out with it. "The Premier's foster son." Li Peng nodded his head repeatedly and bent forward at the waist. "The current premier, Li Peng." "Premier!" The surprised and angry M a o Zedong bellowed in thick Hunan dialect, " N o way! Li . . . Peng?" M a o Zedong walked over to face this premier who had the eyebrows of Lin Biao and the chin of Jiang Qing. M a o turned his head toward Deng Xiaoping and said, "Xiaoping, what are you trying to pull over on me n o w ? " His suspicious nature had instantly revealed itself. "Li Peng! You, you get the hell out of here!" The dragon countenance roared with imperial fury; its echoes rumbled through the hall. Li Peng's wits scattered. His neck stiffened, his mouth grew crooked, and he stared straight ahead as if suspended—this was his characteristic expression when agitated. Deng Xiaoping was very irritated. He had never thought that M a o , the old fogey, would still possess such raw power. But for the moment Deng's obelisk-shaped skull was empty of ideas. Yang Shangkun, w h o for a long time had overseen the internal affairs of the palace, came up with more of the kind of cleverness that had once got him in trouble for hiding microphones in the party headquarters. In a voice alternating between high and low registers, Yang tried to confuse and deceive the old fogey. You Come Inside, I'll Get Out

I 239

But M a o Zedong flicked his hand and shouted loudly, "Yang Shangkun, you have always used petty, low-down tactics! Xiaoping, what good can come of your being mixed up with him!" Just at this moment of turmoil and consternation, a few girls who had been laying flower wreaths at the Monument for Revolutionary Martyrs walked into the memorial singing "Depend on the Helmsman When Sailing the Great Seas." When M a o heard the sound of their melodious singing, the atmosphere changed dramatically. The four leaders finally settled down in their sofas. Only then did Deng Xiaoping feel at ease, and with great emotion he addressed Mao Zedong. "There are too many difficulties facing China now. Ten years of reform have not cured the aftereffects of the Cultural Revolution. The turmoil in Beijing a few months ago was indeed another Cultural Revolution all over again. Back then you rallied the young Red Guard militants to topple me and Liu Shaoqi, as well as Yang Shangkun and the others. In this recent period China was like that again. Students from all over the country came by train to Beijing to make trouble, just as in the "great revolutionary linking up" previously. There is virtually no difference between this affair and the Great Cultural Revolution you launched." Deng Xiaoping believed that the great power he commanded allowed him to criticize the late Mao Zedong bluntly. Upon hearing this, M a o Zedong was very displeased. With a grave look on his face he said, "I have heard Yuan M u , Ji Dengkui's secretary, saying again and again that you, Xiaoping, believed all along that the demonstrations and hunger strikes at Tiananmen were caused by the insufficient thoroughness of the campaign against bourgeois liberalization. "I believe they were caused by the Cultural Revolution not being thorough enough . . . Before the twelfth plenary session of the Eighth Party Congress in 1968, Vice Chairman Lin Biao and I talked it over and decided to expel you and Liu Shaoqi simultaneZ40

I Toward a Democratic China

ously from the party. You wrote a letter begging me for mercy, asking me not to remove you from party membership. I was softhearted and did not expel you. After the September 13th Lin Biao Incident, in 1971 you wrote me another letter stating that you could still come out and do some w o r k , and that you would never reverse a correct verdict—" Yang Shangkun interjected, "In the years since 1979, Comrade Xiaoping has followed the example of the Soviet Union's Khrushchev. He has never advocated a total repudiation of the Chairman, nor has he endorsed condemnation of your venerable and esteemed personage. And Xiaoping has not issued the kind of secret reports that Khrushchev did." M a o Zedong sneered, "Would you have dared to condemn me, Deng Xiaoping? You don't have the qualifications to do so. It's said that I started going downhill after the anti-rightist campaign of 1957, but you were the one w h o actually ran the campaign. You were the one w h o , with your own hands, pinned labels on hundreds of thousands of people. Can you shrug that off? It's said that I destroyed Liu Shaoqi, but as soon as the Cultural Revolution began you were the first person in Liu's headquarters to sell him out. You were the one who made secret reports to me against him! Can you deny that? You said you would never reverse previous verdicts, but you are unreliable. After all the blaming, I see in the end that I must blame myself for not carrying the Cultural Revolution far enough, for leaving you behind to cause further trouble. That's what has led to today . . ." Pointing outside, he added, "The blood shed on Tiananmen Square flowed like a river, making our party's credibility hit rock bottom in the people's eyes. An utter loss of face . . ." Deng Xiaoping's face turned green and pale. With mouth twitching he said, "If the Cultural Revolution had gone all the way, China would have become even more of a dictatorship. We could never have looked to the Communist Party to correct the ravages of the Cultural Revolution. China would have had an opposition party You Come Inside, I'll Get Out

I 241

long ago, and you and I wouldn't have found this corner to sit in . . . " Apparently M a o Zedong wasn't listening, for he fired off this string of words without a pause: "You can't be trusted, Deng Xiaoping. The thing about you that stands out most is that you can't be trusted. You don't stand behind your word. If you want to speak of dictatorship, the Cultural Revolution I set in motion actually strengthened my dictatorship. On June 4 you killed all those people, Deng Xiaoping, but not only did you fail to entrench your dictatorial powers, you seem to have put the party's leadership itself in danger. You advocate the so-called Four Cardinal Principles, but tell me which of those four principles have you actually carried through? The two most important principles are adhering to party leadership and socialism, but you have no use for the party. First you got rid of the party's secretary, Hu Yaobang, and then you got rid of Zhao Ziyang. When have you ever deferred to the principle of normal democratic activity within the party? After you got rid of the party chairman, Hua Guofeng, you wanted to take his place but knew that would be embarrassing, so you went ahead and got rid of the party chairmanship. Meanwhile you cling to your power and lord it over the party. You let Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang play emperor while standing behind them like the empress dowager. For decades you have been seeking personal power, but you have never really wanted adherence to party leadership!" The distraught Yang Shangkun hastily created a diversion. "But, Chairman, if we don't stress adherence to this principle, we won't have any basis of power. We won't have . . . a basis of power." "A false basis of power! You got to where you are today by relying on a false basis of power, Deng Xiaoping!" M a o Zedong felt like smoking a cigarette, but the artificial taste of the Panda-brand cigarette Deng offered him was distasteful. He stubbed it out after one puff and said, "You can't get away from fancy moves, even in the cigarettes you smoke. How many fancy 242.

I Toward a Democratic

China

moves have you made in the past few years? You insist on socialism, but then you say that a black cat is as good as a white cat as long as it catches mice. When do you mean what you say, and when are you just putting everyone on? If the black cat alone catches the mice, what is the white cat going to do? And if both cats get old and can't catch mice, what will happen then?" At this point M a o broke out in laughter, as if appreciating his own quick wit and humor. "You keep calling for adherence to Marxism-Leninism and M a o Zedong Thought, but the streets are lined with bookstalls selling your Selected

Works of Deng. What has become of Marxism-

Leninism? In my day people stood in line to buy my

Selected

Works. N o w when your Works don't sell, the state makes reimbursement accordingly! What kind of Marxism is in your Selected Works? The whole book is nothing but a lot of good-for-nothing babble about black cats and white cats, about crossing the river by groping at the rocks under the water. Confucius once said, 'A man who speaks without refinement will not go far.' And if you speak without trust, if you act in shifty ways, you're not going to go far either. This I said long ago. "Xiaoping, you are hard of hearing, but in meetings you always sat far from me. In your head there's only your own brand of pragmatism based on power and influence. The things I'm saying now, do you hear them or not?" Deng Xiaoping was so incensed by this reprimand that sparks fairly flew from his eyes. This man who had made a habit of dealing out rebukes was not going to suffer a rebuke like this so tamely. Not thinking of the high praises of M a o Zedong he had sung over the years, he blurted out, " 'Great power belongs in one man's hand; small power scatters just like sand.' Weren't those your words, Chairman? And having a single person lord it over the whole party is a tradition that you handed down to us, isn't it? All of our schemes and intrigues, our unending hostilities, are the sort of statecraft that you stood for, aren't they? You said you were a You Come Inside, I'll Get Out

I 243

hundred times more powerful than the First Emperor of Qin, so why can't I be two or three times more powerful than your old ancestor? You were the forerunner, and I am your pupil. What is wrong with that?" Li Peng's face paled with alarm, and he hurriedly cut Deng off: "Don't let those college students and reporters hear you talk like this. If word gets out, the whole city of Beijing will turn into a riot zone again!" This boy-emperor was still plagued with anxiety whenever he remembered the city filled with angry cries—"Li Peng, step down!" Yang Shangkun did his utmost to wink but to no avail. Li Peng's pupils, fixated, would not turn. M a o only grew more angry and bellowed, "Nobody wants to hear a peep out of you! M y grandson Xiaoning tells me you can't even read properly. You jumped lines while you were reading the martial law edict, and you mistook one word for another. You stutter when you receive foreign guests, and you're so terrified at the sight of college students that you speak incoherently." Li Peng was mortified. "Chairman, these are turmoil-makers' rumor mongering . . . vilification . . ." He began to stutter again. Mao Zedong would not even look at him. Again he pointed at Deng Xiaoping's forehead and went on: "I said it back in 1966. You are a capitalist roader, Deng Xiaoping. A capitalist dictatorship is a fascist dictatorship. If we let a person like you take power, China will change color. Millions of heads will roll. On June 4th you made a fascist dictatorship of China in a single evening. Heads did roll, and blood flowed like a river. I hardly expected that my words would hit so close to home . . ." M a o Zedong's voice quavered. He covered his face in his hands and broke out sobbing. "As the ancients said, 'The gleam of blood portends disaster.' N o w day and night I lie on this square that gleams with blood. How can I ever be at peace?" M a o Zedong sobbed and sobbed. The sound of Mao's weeping startled the group of young girls 244

I Tou/ard a Democratic China

nearby. "Grandpa, don't cry . . ." The girls, too, began bawling along with him. Ashamed and exasperated, Deng Xiaoping could hardly vent his anger on the tears of an old man and some children. He was forced to turn his scowling face to Yang Shangkun and shift the onus of blame from himself: "Shangkun, you can back me up on this. The number of people who starved to death nationwide in the Great Famine of i960 was certainly many, many more than those who died at Tiananmen Square on June 4th. In Anhui province alone there were a few million; up and down throughout the country there were tens of millions. The Great Leap Forward—the Great Leap Backward, the People's Communes—whose mistakes were they?" In his later years M a o Zedong had been afflicted by a tendency to cry readily, and for protracted periods. Caught in the middle, Yang Shangkun could only tilt his head back and let out a long sigh: "Ah! Who would have thought that in the forty years since this country was founded, we would fall to such depths? We cannot make people listen without tanks and machine guns . . . We have no way of cleaning up this mess . . ." Before he could finish, a new expression stole across his face. This was because Li Peng had given his sleeve a discreet tug while pointing to a character scroll hanging on a wall in the Memorial Hall. On it, written plain as day in Mao's own hand, was a poem from the 1930s, which now read like a curse: In June the soldiers of heaven punish corruption and evil, Binding the roc and kraken with a ten-thousand-yard ribbon . . . The sorrowful strains of the "Internationale" swell in unison, And like a tornado, I shall descend from heaven. The poem seemed to foretell the oceanlike roar when the Communist "Internationale" was sung on the square in May, and the sudden tempest of the massive march of over a million people in Beijing on May 17th. It was as if M a o Zedong's poem foreshaYou Come Inside, I'll Get Out

I 245

do wed the weakening, by a mandate of heaven, of the regime's lifebreath. For men like Deng, Yang, and Li, who had come to believe in mystical forces and the paranormal powers gained through breath control, this was enough to make them ashen-faced. Suddenly a clamor arose from outside the Memorial Hall. Thousands of students, workers, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens had rushed through the lines of martial law troops guarding Tiananmen Square and were surging onto the square. There were huge banners everywhere, proclaiming "Freedom of the Press," "Freedom of Assembly," and "End One-Party Dictatorship." Countless fivestarred black flags, instead of the five-starred crimson one, fluttered on the wind. A giant balloon appeared in the sky above the square, trailing a streamer with the words "The suppressors of the student movement will come to no good." Once again M a o Zedong heard the familiar strains of his edict, set to music: "Bring forth your resolve, do not fear sacrifice, brush all hardships aside, make victory yours." M a o Zedong felt transported back to 1966 and the start of the Cultural Revolution. Suddenly he stopped his flood of tears and stood up abruptly. Pointing his finger at the Memorial Hall's crystal sarcophagus, he roared at Deng Xiaoping, "If things go on like this, there's only one thing to do— You come inside, I'll get out!"

246

I Toward a Democratic China

3

1

Reflections on Chinese History in the Twentieth Century

T H R E E M A J O R S H I F T S IN

POWER

China has witnessed three major shifts in power during the course of the twentieth century. The first was the Xinhai Revolution of 1 9 1 1 when the Qing dynasty fell and was replaced by Yuan Shikai and the northern warlord regime that arose under his tutelage. The second came after the Northern Expedition when the Kuomintang ( K M T ) replaced the northern warlord regime in 1927. The third was the displacement, on the mainland, of the Kuomintang by the Communist Party. Of course, since then the K M T has maintained its control of the island of Taiwan. These three power shifts have two points in common. First, all were brought about through violence and warfare. Second, although there was a change of regimes in each case, no fundamental change occurred in the autocratic pattern of how power is organized. There are two obvious characteristics of autocratic government. First, the supreme power of the state is ultimately concentrated in Source: Ouzhou ribao (Europe daily), September 15,1989.

247

the hands of one person. It makes no difference what that person is called—whether it be emperor, king, sultan, caliph, or perhaps president, chairman, head of an advisory commission, or chairman of a military commission. The important thing is that this person possesses the ultimate policy-making authority on major national issues. N o other authority can effectively restrain him. Second, this power is his for life, and is not transferable. For the past decade Deng Xiaoping has been proclaiming his determination to do away with lifelong office-holding. In succession he has passed up the positions of chairman of the State Council, party chairman, and party general secretary. He has repeatedly proclaimed his intention of retiring, but all of this has been a diversion. The truth is, Deng Xiaoping is holding on to real power with a death grip. Imagine the situation if George Bush were to take office as president of the United States and the previous president was just as unwilling as Deng Xiaoping to give up power. Say the American people rose up in opposition and, even though President Bush was unwilling to suppress them with tanks, the previous president ordered the use of tanks to crush unarmed students and citizens and the use of machine guns to shoot indiscriminately into crowds of innocent people—what kind of situation would there be in the United States then? Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng can say that the situation in China is stabilizing as much as they want to, but it is futile. They know more clearly than anyone else that the power in their grasp can disappear at any moment: there will not be a single day's peace for them. China has suffered from the disaster of autocratic government for thousands of years, and that is the disaster it suffers now. The difference is that now the autocratic government is highly deceitful, even while it wears the garb of "socialism" and "people's democracy." N o matter what justification Deng Xiaoping offers, he cannot conceal these two characteristics of China's autocratic government.

248

I Toward a Democratic China

FROM P A T R I A R C H A L R U L E TO P A R T Y R U L E

After the Communist Party seized power on the Chinese mainland in 1949, the new autocratic government was distinguished from other such governments of the past by certain characteristics. First, supreme power was no longer handed down by hereditary investiture within one family or clan, but instead was inherited within the confines of the highest-ranking clique of a political party. Patriarchal rule was replaced by party rule. Second, there was a lack of clearly recognized procedures for succession to supreme power, and thus the rejection of one successor in favor of another has become a common occurrence. Third, since the property rights of citizens are not guaranteed, the people's means of livelihood are controlled by the party and government. The supreme power is authoritarian in nature; it extends everywhere and stops at nothing. This is why every crisis of succession in mainland China brings down unmitigated disaster upon the people. After Deng Xiaoping there will inevitably be severe strife over the struggle for supreme power, and new disasters are bound to come about. Looking back on China's history in the twentieth century, we find that shifts in power have been accomplished through violence and a reliance on military power, not through elections that truly represent the will of the people. While unabashed violence determined who held power during the period of northern warlord rule, in the Communist era whatever democracy China might have had was squelched by the principles of "party dictatorship" and "party control of the military." The June Fourth massacre proved that a dictator who is rebuked, despised, and reviled by his own people can stoop to inhuman acts to maintain his own power. The indisputable fact of the June Fourth massacre proved to the people of China and all the world what the banners of "socialism" and "people's democracy" cannot conceal—that the Chinese Communist regime is truly an autocracy, an imperial state, and Deng Xiaoping is its emperor. These so-called protectors of the republic, the murReflections ort Chinese History

I Z49

derous protectors of Deng Xiaoping's empire, deserve no better than to be called imperial guards.

R E P U B L I C A N PRINCIPLES HAVE NOT YET TAKEN R O O T IN C H I N A

The Xinhai Revolution of 1 9 1 1 ended the imperial system of the Qing dynasty, marking a great advance in China's history. The failure of Yuan Shikai as self-proclaimed emperor and Zhang X u n as imperial restorationist, and then the bankruptcy of the cult of personality built around M a o Zedong in the Cultural Revolution were all proof that imperial government or monarchism in any form is impracticable in China. But even after Sun Yat-sen established the first Chinese republic in 1 9 1 2 , the principles of republicanism have not yet taken root in China. These principles demand that monarchs or emperors of any sort be deposed, and that transitions in state power be based on popular choice. Violence should give w a y to the vote. If Sun Yat-sen is to be credited with establishing China's first republic in 1 9 1 2 , the present task of the Chinese people is to establish a second republic deserving of the name. The people of Taiwan and the political parties there are now doing their utmost to democratize their region. This is an important element in the renewal of the entire Chinese republic. In our treatment of Chinese history, we have been in the habit of arguing extensively over certain designations and symbols. France has passed through numerous significant power shifts, but the French have contented themselves with attaching names to each regime in turn: the First Republic, the Second Republic, the First Empire, the Second Empire. Unlike the Chinese, the French have not created names that seem to stand for different countries, such as the "People's State of France," the "Republic of France," or the "People's Republic of France." But each time a new regime is created by force, the Chinese people rename their nation and 250

I Toward a Democratic China

change the national flag. Yet they cannot change the fundamental fact of China's history in the twentieth century: since Sun Yat-sen initiated the first republic in China, Yuan Shikai and the northern warlords, the Kuomintang, and the Communist Party have come to power through violence and armed struggle, and each of these new regimes has thrown aside the principle of a republic to establish instead an autocracy of warlords or the dictatorship of the party.

A FEDERATED CHINA WILL EMERGE

SOMEDAY

If there is to be an end to the thousands of years of autocratic government in China, both the mainland and Taiwan need to nationalize their armies, not politicize them. They will have to develop a multiparty politics, so that the people can choose among competing parties and political forces. Today the advance of democratization in Taiwan stands in marked contrast to the mainland's autocratism. Only on the day when the mainland puts an end to its one-party dictatorship and reestablishes a republic can both sides of the Taiwan Strait be truly reunited. Only then can the transfer of power in China, both locally and centrally, be accomplished through voting rather than violence and warfare. When that happens, and it will not be long in coming, China will emerge as one of the world's true republics, a federation of entities each under its own system—democratic, free, civilized, and prosperous. September 5,1989

Reflections on Chinese History

I 251

32 Prospects for China in the 1990s

The June Fourth massacre in Beijing has altered the course of historical development in contemporary China and the countries of Eastern Europe. The direct results of the June Fourth massacre were, first, the establishment in Paris of the Federation for a Democratic China (FDC), which aims at ending the one-party Communist rule in China, and second, the defeat of Communism in Eastern Europe. On December zi of this year [1989], the Romanian dictator Ceaucescu reenacted in Timisoara the massacre that took place in Beijing half a year ago. Thousands of Romanians were killed. Only a day later, the Romanians overthrew Ceaucescu's dictatorship. On December 25, a Romanian special court-martial sentenced Ceaucescu to death and executed him. The Romanian and Beijing massacres are important milestones in contemporary world history because they indisputably declare that the Communist movement— a worldwide movement that lasted for half a century—and its ideology cannot possibly guide the human race to a beautiful and equitable society. On the contrary, the Communist movement, under the pretense of striving for a glorious future, has set up brutal despotic Source: Ouzhou ribao (Europe daily), January 1,1990.

252

regimes without precedent in human history; in the name of "socialism," it has established a social despotism. The most significant and profound change for China in the 1990s will be the demise of the Communist ideology. Maoism will fall from its dominant position as a "state religion" to become a "religious sect" that still maintains some residual influence among certain people. If the Beijing massacre has borne the fruit of the defeat of Communism in Eastern Europe, then the earth-shaking changes in Europe, especially the collapse of Ceaucescu's dictatorship, will point the way for China to evolve toward democracy and its own defeat of Communism. On the last day of the 1990s, when we review the history of the twentieth century, we will be able to say that the century opened with the overthrow of the feudal despotism of the Qing dynasty and closed with the termination of the social despotism of the Communist dynasty. Twentieth-century Chinese history is not only a history of Marxism marching toward victory in China; it is also a history of Marxism on its way to failure in China. Democratization and the defeat of Communism have become an irresistible trend in the contemporary history of Communist-ruled countries. Anticipating the course of China's development in the 1990s, we can say that the following ten changes will occur sooner or later.

1 . LI P E N G ' S D O W N F A L L A N D T H E D E M I S E OF T H E CITY MASSACRE

FACTION

The downfall of the seemingly powerful regime of Ceaucescu in a single day was a heavy blow to the Deng-Li-Yang clique and other Chinese power holders. Faced with the prospect of the worldwide collapse of Communism, the Chinese Communist authorities were extremely panic-stricken, declaring that the Romanian incident would have no effect on China and that China would Prospects for China in the ipyos

I 253

remain Communist to the end, even if it were the only Communist country left in the whole world. The ruling circle of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committed unforgivable crimes against the Chinese people in the June Fourth massacre. Following the execution of the murderous Ceaucescu, the high levels of the CCP are now dividing into two groups. One group is the "City Massacre" faction as represented by Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and Yang Shangkun, who, stained with the blood of the people, will never accede to the people's protests. The other group is made up of those in power who were not directly involved in the massacre. While this group fears the power of the people, they are also apprehensive of the cruelty and baseness of the City Massacre faction. Therefore they stress again and again the necessity of "suppressing counterrevolutionary riots." Yet, under popular pressure, they are making new choices and waiting for the opportunity to draw a line between themselves and the City Massacre faction, whom they might abandon at any moment. Because of several factors, including serious difficulties in the Chinese economy, the Chinese people's resentment of the June Fourth massacre, and the situation in Eastern Europe (especially Romania), which will exert an increasing influence on China, the possibility does exist for "unexpected events" (i.e., large-scale protests or court coups) to occur over the next few years in the Chinese political scene. This could well be a turbulent period in China. The death of Ceaucescu will undoubtedly force the City Massacre faction to tighten its control over the military, so as to be prepared to reenact the massacres of Beijing and Timisoara. This could result in Beijing and China being engulfed in a blood bath of killings or a civil war. The City Massacre faction faces two possibilities. First, it might find itself abandoned through a court coup. Second, it might initiate its own coup so that it can apply the politics of terror even more severely, though this would be unlikely to last very long. In any event, the final outcome of recent Chinese politics will be Li Peng's downfall and the demise of the City Massacre faction. With 254

I Toward a Democratic China

the execution of Ceaucescu by the Romanian people, the days are clearly numbered until the time when Li Peng and Yang Shangkun must step down.

2 . R E E V A L U A T I O N OF T H E 1 9 8 9

PRODEMOCRACY

MOVEMENT

Li Peng's downfall and the demise of the City Massacre faction cannot lead automatically to a réévaluation of the 1989 prodemocracy movement. One possible scenario is that the post-DengLi-Yang ruling circle of the C C P will continue to declare the June Fourth incident a "riot" but at the same time will denounce the "excessive behavior" of the City Massacre faction, and will release most of those arrested in the 1989 prodemocracy movement. T h e post-Deng-Li-Yang ruling circle will continue to prohibit the establishment of "autonomous unions and federations" among students and workers, and it will prohibit members of the F D C from returning to China. Only with the downfall of the Deng-Li-Yang clique will mainland China enter the stage of reevaluating the 1989 prodemocracy movement. June Fourth will be declared China's "day of national mourning," and on that day new wreaths will appear in Tiananmen Square to mourn for the June Fourth martyrs. What cannot be predicted is h o w long such a stage will last. From the collapse of the Deng-Li-Yang clique to a fair and just evaluation of the 1989 prodemocracy movement might take a f e w days or weeks; it might also be a f e w months or years. But one thing is certain. Someday during the 1990s, an authentic historical documentary motion picture on the 1989 prodemocracy movement and the June Fourth resistance against violent force will be shown throughout China. The 1989 prodemocracy movement will be officially affirmed in mainland China as a great democratic movement against despotism and dictatorship, and a new Goddess of Democracy will stand majestic in Tiananmen Square. Prospects for China in the 1990s

I 255

3- T H E R I S I N G T I D E OF D E - M A O I F I C A T I O N

AND

DE-DENGIFICATION

With the réévaluation of the 1989 prodemocracy movement, the Chinese people will definitely bring the June Fourth murderers to trial. Once the great historical achievement of the 1989 prodemocracy movement is officially affirmed in mainland China's press, China will enter an exciting, inspiring, and unprecedented period of freedom of the press. A "Democracy Wall" will reappear; locally run (as against state-run) newspapers, periodicals, and publishing houses will flourish in mainland China like bamboo shoots after a spring rain. During this period, the Chinese people will enumerate, one by one, the sufferings to which they have been subjected in the latter half of the twentieth century. The crimes committed under the C C P will be exposed one by one, including the anti-rightist movement, the Great Leap Forward, the communization of the countryside, the three years of famine and crop failures, the Great Cultural Revolution, the suppression of the "Beijing Spring" of 1978-79, the purification campaign against spiritual pollution, the attack on bourgeois liberalization, and the June Fourth massacre. M a o Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, condemned by history, will be mercilessly criticized and fiercely attacked. In the rising tide of deMaoification and de-Dengification, Mao's huge portrait will finally be removed from the gateway to Tiananmen. The Chairman M a o Memorial in Tiananmen Square will be renamed the "Memorial to the People's Heroes." In the process of de-Maoification and de-Dengification, M a o Zedong's "Yan'an Talks on Literature and Art" and "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," which have long been reverently regarded as classic works, will be negated. Deng Xiaoping's "Four Cardinal Principles" will be dumped into the trash bin of history. Instead, the ideas represented by Chu Anping's "Party commanding all under heaven" and Wei Jingsheng's "Fifth 256

I Toward a Democratic China

Modernization" will be officially affirmed, and all political and ideological prisoners will be released. The process of de-Maoification and de-Dengification will bring an unprecedented flourishing to Chinese literature and art in the 1990s, and a new generation of authors, poets, literati, and artists will emerge in great numbers. In this process, Deng Xiaoping will be denounced unanimously. Nostalgic voices will still be heard speaking in favor of M a o Zedong, for people will have the right to reflect on those who they believe deserve to be remembered. But these voices will be drowned out in the great wave of de-Maoification and de-Dengification. An important aspect of de-Dengification will be the denunciation of the war against Vietnam launched by Deng Xiaoping, which will be recognized as an unjust war that brought severe suffering to the Vietnamese people. China will change its policy toward Vietnam and Cambodia accordingly. With new foundations, Sino-Vietnamese relations will improve. With respect to Cambodia, China's mistaken support for Polpot will be further exposed, and China will support the emergence of a democratic Cambodian government. The process of de-Maoification and de-Dengification will exert a far-reaching influence in China. "Communism" will become a synonym for disaster in mainland China. Of course, Marxist scholars will still enjoy a certain degree of respect. But Marxism and Leninism will be criticized, and an ideological trend toward social democracy will emerge in China in the 1990s.

4 . T H E E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF O P P O S I T I O N

PARTIES

One consequence of the CCP's forty-year rule in mainland China is the realization on the part of the Chinese people that the CCP's one-party dictatorship has been the source of all disasters in contemporary China. The June Fourth massacre in Beijing was convincing proof of this to many. The goal of the Federation for a Democratic China is to end the one-party dictatorship in mainland Prospects for China in the 1990s

I 2.57

China through peaceful and nonviolent means. With the réévaluation of the 1989 prodemocracy movement in mainland China, the Chinese people will definitely assert their freedom to form associations and their right to organize political parties. There will be three ways of establishing opposition parties in mainland China in the 1990s. 1. The 1989 prodemocracy movement saw the establishment of the Autonomous Union of Beijing College and University Students, the Workers' Autonomous Union, and the Union of Intellectuals. After the réévaluation of the 1989 prodemocracy movement, different kinds of autonomous organizations will emerge in great numbers among students, workers, farmers, and intellectuals in Beijing and other parts of the country. Some of these organizations will likely develop into political parties independent of the CCP. 2.. In mainland China, the non-Communist political parties now in existence (which do not, however, function as political parties) include the Chinese Democratic Alliance, the Chinese Zhigong Party, the Farmers and Workers Democratic Party, the Jiusan or September Third Society, and the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party. With a gradual change in membership as a new and younger generation of members joins these organizations, they will inevitably break away from the CCP's leadership and strive for independence. These political parties will sooner or later cancel the articles "accepting the CCP's leadership" in their respective constitutions. Some of them will eventually develop into opposition parties. 3. Overseas organizations such as the F D C , the Chinese Democratic Alliance, and political parties established abroad will go to China to recruit new members. After the réévaluation of the 1989 prodemocracy movement, the CCP and those in power

Z58

I Toward a Democratic China

will sooner or later have to recognize the right of these organizations to exist legally in mainland China. In the late 1990s or early twenty-first century, China will become a country with a large number of political parties, big and small, and with different political colors and orientations. These parties will come alive on the Chinese political stage. The Social Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, and the Green Party will definitely emerge in China. Then there will be a rather long period during which a stable two-party or multiparty system comes into being, the result of which will at last be the establishment of two-party or multiparty politics in mainland China.

5 . R E V I S I O N A N D R E D R A F T I N G OF T H E CONSTITUTION

The current constitution of mainland China is one that lacks any means of restraining the dictatorship of the CCP. The purpose of reformulating the constitution will be to limit the unrestrained exercise of power. The current constitution of mainland China is merely a "paper constitution" in that the highest organ of state power stipulated by the constitution does not have supreme power in reality. The constitution itself does not clearly reflect the power structure of mainland China. It has instead become an instrument whereby the autocrats of the C C P mask their despotism and dictatorship. The June Fourth massacre has made more and more Chinese people realize that concepts such as the nationalization and depoliticization of the armed forces, checks and balances, independence of the judiciary, supremacy of human rights, guarantee of the right to private property, direct election of legislators or people's representatives, separation of political parties and government, and limited

Prospects for China in the 1990s

I 259

terms for heads of state and government are indispensable principles of any democratic constitution. A nation that cannot draw lessons from its sufferings is a nation without a future. Events following the Cultural Revolution have proven that the Chinese people did not really analyze that experience or draw lessons from it; they failed to institutionalize the means to avoid the recurrence of tragedies like the Cultural Revolution. Numerous aspects of mainland China's politics have proven time and again in a negative w a y that only an authoritative constitution that restricts the powers of the state and guarantees basic human rights can be the basis for China's long-term stability and people's happiness. Without such a constitution, China cannot possibly break out of the cyclical rise and decline of order and chaos that has lasted for several millennia. With the spread of such recognition once freedom of speech is initially guaranteed sometime in the 1990s, the Chinese people will certainly include in their agenda the historically significant task of reformulating an authoritative constitution. The first step in reformulating such a constitution is to propose at the National People's Congress that the "Four Cardinal Principles" be deleted from the preamble of the current constitution. The second step is to set up a true democratic process to reformulate the constitution. It will be necessary to consider such questions as how to establish a constitution-drafting committee, how to discuss and adopt a constitution, whether a special meeting to reformulate the constitution should be convened, and so on. The third step is to initiate a nationwide discussion of the basic principles of the constitution. A constitution is not a container. A constitution should not incorporate articles relating to specific policies or institutions of the state. The future Chinese constitution must include four aspects: 1 . Stipulating the citizens' freedoms, rights, and duties 2. Stipulating how state power will emerge and the mutual relationships among the organs of state power 260

I Toward a Democratic China

3. Stipulating the forms of state structure (composition of the state as a whole and its constituent parts; relationships between the center and localities) 4. Stipulating the procedure for constitutional revision A constitution is neither a general program nor a summation of policies. A constitution should be the crystallization of lessons drawn from sufferings. China's sufferings have been caused by the lack of democracy and rule of law. Rule of law means the supremacy of the constitution, and using law to guarantee freedoms. Democracy deals with the relationship between the people and their government. Democratic politics is a politics that gives to people the final power of decision over the formation of state power and policies. People not only may criticize a government they do not trust, but also may reorganize or change it through the constitution and the means provided for by law. During the rule of the C C P , the Chinese people actually exercised these sacred rights for the first time in the 1989 prodemocracy movement. To reformulate the constitution, it is important first of all to clarify the specific constitutional principles that form the foundation for the various clauses of the constitution.

6 . D I R E C T E L E C T I O N OF L E G I S L A T O R S

Direct election of legislators, an essential means for the people's control of the government, should become a basic principle of the new constitution. In the forty years of the CCP's rule over China, representatives to the National People's Congress (NPC) have emerged from three indirect elections: (1) voters elect people's representatives for counties and districts; (2.) people's congresses at the county and district levels elect people's representatives for provinces and cities; and (3) people's congresses at the province and city levels elect people's representatives to the N P C . Since the C C P Prospects for China in the 1990s

I 261

keeps tight control over the nomination of candidates for provincial, municipal, and national people's congresses, representatives to the NPC are actually produced in accordance with a predetermined list, although they are nominally elected by people's congresses at the province, city, and autonomous region levels. Since people's representatives at the province, city, and autonomous region levels are also elected from a predetermined list, an important fact about the current Chinese political system is that a group of appointed provincial and municipal people's representatives "elect" another group of appointed people as representatives to the NPC. In the high tide of the 1989 prodemocracy movement, with the exception of a few representatives to the NPC who supported the people's demand for democracy out of good conscience, the majority of representatives to the NPC and many members of its standing committee, to secure their own positions, did not need and were not able to be responsible to the voters. In fact, it is impossible for the people to have their voices heard and their demands met through the current setup of the NPC. Another bad aspect of the current organization of the NPC is that it has almost three thousand representatives. When the NPC convenes, these three thousand representatives are divided into "delegations" according to province, city, and autonomous region. Through the presidium of the NPC and through the division of the NPC into isolated "delegation assemblies," the CCP firmly controls each representative assembly. Any spontaneous proposal must be passed by over fifteen hundred votes. Under the current system, any spontaneous proposal cannot possibly receive more than fifteen hundred votes in assemblies that have been appointed and kept isolated. To make the people's representative congress in mainland China a representative institution worthy of its name as well as one capable of reflecting the voices and demands of the people, it must become a true legislative assembly. The people's representatives must become legislators; the number of legislators must be reduced 2.62

I Toward a Democratic China

from three thousand to four or five hundred; and the nation must be divided into election districts so that there can be direct election of one legislator for every two million people. Since mainland China has a population of i . i billion, direct election of legislators will be extremely complicated. During a transitional period, it might be necessary for a two-level election of national legislators to take place for a number of years before there can be direct election of legislators. Provincial legislators could be directly elected first, and then national legislators could be elected by the provincial legislative assemblies. It will be necessary to draw lessons from Taiwan and other parts of the world to avoid fraudulent elections as mainland China moves toward a democratic politics. Workable laws preventing election fraud must be written before the elections begin. In China in the 1990s and the twenty-first century, all political parties will participate in the high tide of campaigning for legislators. A democratic China will be born amid party politics and the direct election of legislators.

7 . T H E F O R M A T I O N O F A N O N - C O M M U N 1ST O R MULTIPARTY COALITION

GOVERNMENT

How can a non-Communist or multiparty coalition government be formed in mainland China? Will it be created by legislative assemblies or through a massive "unexpected event"? In the late 1980s, it is still too early to predict. But two things are certain. First, the CCP in the 1990s will resort to every means at its disposal to alter its image, transforming itself to accord with an ideology of social democracy. Second, the Communist ideological system will finally lose its influence in mainland China. In the 1990s or by the beginning of the next century, the C C P will definitely lose its dominant position in China. What can be predicted is that when a non-Communist or multiProspects for China in the 1990s

I 263

party coalition government comes to power in China, the new government will be faced with problems similar to those of the new governments in Eastern Europe today. Billions in foreign debt, including loans provided by the Japanese government to support the CCP's dictatorial regime after the June Fourth massacre, weigh heavily on the Chinese people. (Here I solemnly declare that a new Chinese government will not bear responsibility for the repayment of loans provided by the Japanese government to prolong the life of the Communist dictatorship following the June Fourth massacre.) Facing serious economic problems, the new government must adopt forceful measures to accelerate economic recovery. Making China prosperous and strong will depend on simultaneous advances along four fronts: (i) establishing a democratic politics, (2.) developing a market economy, (3) revitalizing education, and (4) building a nation ruled by law. The economic reforms of the 1980s in mainland China have proven that a market economy cannot be developed without guaranteeing the right of private property. There are two reasons for the chaos that occurred in the effort at reform: first, the reforms were not based on a legal system; and second, the attempt to combine contradictory concepts such as "public ownership" and "market economy" was futile. Abuse of power, corruption, and unregulated competition became commonplace in mainland China's economy in the late 1980s. To develop a market economy, the right of private property must first be guaranteed and private enterprises must be vigorously developed. At the same time, it is essential that laws governing the economy be formulated so that an effective taxation system and regulations assuring fair competition in the marketplace can be established. For the new government to solve the difficult task of developing the nation's economy while at the same time maintaining its economic stability, it must adopt measures that are in accord with three important policies that will form the foundation for China's economic and social development: private ownership in stages, 264

I Toward a Democratic China

developing a system of basic social security, and perfecting a legal system based upon strict enforcement of the law. When the policy of private ownership in stages is carried out, a gap between the rich and the poor will inevitably appear. Under such circumstances, it is extremely important that a system of taxation be perfected and a system of basic social security be established. The new government must pay great attention to promoting growth in education, science and technology, and culture. Besides training large numbers of experts in science and technology, it should also train qualified personnel in the areas of law, taxes, finance, and industrial and business management. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, China will still be a country with a majority of its population in rural areas. For a long time, farmers have suffered from despotic rule to a greater degree than have workers, intellectuals, and city people. Collectivization and communization have deprived the farmers of all their rights. The "responsibility system of production and contracting" practiced in the 1980s cannot fundamentally change the farmers' situation. Democracy, freedom, rule of law, and human rights are also the immediate needs of the farmers in mainland China. To guarantee their freedom and rights and promote rural development, the principles of privatization of land, autonomy of villages and towns, and promotion of large-scale agricultural management must be put into practice. At the same time, it will also be necessary to encourage the steady transfer of rural populations to urban areas. In the interest of establishing a democratic politics, besides formulating a new constitution, legislative reform, judicial reform, and the establishment of a civil service system must also be part of the agenda. In the 1990s, I hope to see the construction of a legislative hall near the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square where legislators can carry out their duties. Not only will the Chinese people be allowed to come to Tiananmen Square to stage peaceful petitions and demonstrations, but they will also be able to go to the legislative hall and the Great Hall of the People to exert Prospects for China in the 1990s

I 2.65

their influence on legislation and on decisions being made on important issues by legislators elected by the people themselves. At that time, a government that has forfeited the trust of the people will no longer be able to use its machine guns and tanks to retain its power. Peaceful protests and the legislative ballot will be more than enough to impel the government to accede to a transition of power. This very point remains the ideal of the 1989 prodemocracy movement. When a non-Communist government is born in mainland China, the large red star representing the CCP will no longer occupy its central position on the five-star red flag. When this day comes, such a national flag can symbolize neither China nor the mainland. Indeed, the five-star red flag will have ceased to exist even before the peaceful unification of the two sides across the Taiwan Straits.

8 . R E F O R M U L A T I O N OF T H E H O N G BASIC

KONG

LAW

The F D C acknowledges that the Joint Sino-British Statement remains the basis for formulating the Hong Kong Basic Law. Yet in recent years the despotic power of the CCP has been infiltrating into Hong Kong, whose freedoms have been constantly infringed upon. Especially since the June Fourth massacre, freedom of the press and freedom of association have been threatened in Hong Kong. Some individuals have even attempted to trade away the freedoms of the people of Hong Kong in order to make a favorable impression upon the butchers of the CCP. The Basic Law formulated under these conditions not only fails to guarantee the freedoms and rights of the people of Hong Kong, but also makes it possible for the despotic power of the CCP to infringe upon those freedoms and rights. The Basic Law represents the future constitutional law for Hong Kong. It is not a summation of all important laws. It cannot incor266

I Toward a Democratic China

porate specific economic and social policies. Following the réévaluation of the 1989 prodemocracy movement and the disappearance of the Deng-Li-Yang clique, the Hong Kong Basic Law must be reformulated. There are four crucial issues in the Basic Law: 1. How to guarantee the basic human rights of the people of Hong Kong, as well as their various rights and freedoms z. How to clearly limit the power of the central government 3. How to regulate the democratic structure of the Hong Kong government 4. How to put the right to formulate and revise the Basic Law into the hands of the people of Hong Kong In the future, legislators in mainland China will be elected directly. I believe that direct election should also be a basic principle in Hong Kong.

9 . T H E G L O R I O U S R E T U R N OF T H E D A L A I L A M A T O TIBET

On December 4 of this year [1989], the Dalai Lama and the leaders of the FDC met in Paris. We exchanged views on how to solve the problem of Tibet. Despite our differences, we all agreed that the solution to the problem of Tibet must be based, first, on peaceful and nonviolent means, and second, on recognizing the people's happiness as the highest principle. This sincere and friendly dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the FDC has opened the way to improving mutual understanding and to eventually solving the problem of Tibet. For several decades, the Tibetan people, like those in other parts of mainland China, have suffered tremendously under the oneparty dictatorship of the CCP. Since 1959, just protests by the Tibetan people have been brutally crushed time and again by the CCP. The premise for solving the Tibetan problem is the open acknowlProspects for China in the 1990s

I 2.67

edgment that the Tibetan people's opposition movements from 1959 to 1988 were just movements for democracy and freedom, and that the Dalai Lama and the tens of thousands of Tibetan refugees should have the right to return to their homeland. I believe that the Dalai Lama will return to Tibet in glory, not necessarily in the twenty-first century, but perhaps even in the 1990s. Because of its ethnicity, religion, and social customs, Tibet will become a region enjoying full autonomy in the democratic China of the future. Like Hong Kong and Macao, Tibet will need to formulate a charter or "basic law." I entirely agree with the Dalai Lama that "the Tibetan Basic Law should explicitly stipulate that Tibet must have a democratic government." Because of Tibet's own characteristics, the political, economic, and legal systems established in the Tibetan region may be different from those of the mainland proper. These differences must also be stipulated clearly in the basic law. The Tibetan people's freedom of worship must be fully protected. Indeed, the basic law for Tibet must be established as the basis for guaranteeing the human rights of the Tibetan people. The problem of the migration of the Han people into the Tibetan region must be solved through negotiation. The policy of forced immigration that has been in effect since 1949 should be abolished. By their own free choice, in-landers who were forced to move to Tibet will be allowed to return to their original places of residence by stages and in groups. For those Han people who voluntarily choose to remain in Tibet, the future government of Tibet will bear the responsibility of guaranteeing their rights and freedoms. Tibet will be part of a unified China. In the democratic China of the future, relationships among nationalities will be adjusted democratically. In this democratic China of the future, the Dalai Lama's wish to make Tibet the "largest natural protected region on earth" may indeed come true. This future Tibet will develop tourism as its primary industry, and as the "roof of the world" Tibet will be a precious treasure for all humankind. 268

I Toward a Democratic China

I O . T H E P R O B L E M OF C H I N A ' S R E U N I F I C A T I O N

AND

QUESTIONS C O N C E R N I N G A FEDERAL SYSTEM

The problem of China's reunification might not be solved in the 1990s. One of the lessons learned from the June Fourth massacre is that a despotic mainland cannot unite with a democratic Taiwan. The reunification of China must take place peacefully, and it can only be achieved on a common basis of democracy, freedom, the rule of law, and human rights. In view of the differences between the mainland and Taiwan, the reunification of China cannot depend upon the existence of the same economic and social system—even though the gulf caused by differences between socialist and capitalist systems will no longer exist, there will still remain differences between the particular social systems. These differences in level of development between the mainland and Taiwan will in fact establish the ground for the China of the future to become a federated China. A federated China or "Federal Republic of China" will be a country with a federal system, i.e., one with the characteristics of a federation. Regions such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and Tibet will have certain prerogatives in relation to the federation; they may retain powers that are not possessed by member states of other federations. In the area of national defense, for example, Taiwan might maintain its own armed forces. In a federated China, however, diplomatic powers should be centralized in the federal government. And should any part of a federated China be invaded, the request for assistance from a federation member will require the military and economic resources of the whole country to be mobilized in defense of its territory. Even with the decline of Communism in the world, the China of the future will not become an immediate paradise, nor is peace likely to prevail in our future world. The decline of Communism only means that the stage of feudal despotism will have been followed by the demise of the social despotism garbed in visionary Prospects for China in the 1990s

I 269

words such as "socialism" and "communism." The China of the future, and the future world, will still experience suffering, misfortune, and conflict. China's progress and prosperity will still depend on the efforts of the Chinese people for generation after generation. Yet only when China becomes united, democratic, and free will the Chinese people truly be able to stand upright in the world. Only then will overseas Chinese be able to rise above the anxiety and anguish brought about by the division of China and feel proud of the great achievements of the Chinese nation. On the day when the CCP surrenders its dominant position in mainland China, the process leading to China's reunification will definitely begin. On both sides of the Taiwan Straits, a large-scale discussion will commence on questions relating to a federal system and the structure for China's reunification. The direct results of this discussion will be the format, means, and specific channels for the reunification of China. China in the 1990s will not be uneventful. I hope that China will never again be subjected to the torment of mass killings and civil war, but rather will evolve peacefully in a direction leading to the reduction of the deeply felt pain and suffering of the Chinese people. Today everyone is contemplating the future. This article is the result of my contemplation of the prospects for China in the 1990s. But no matter what developments take place in the decade of the 1990s, there is one thing I firmly believe: the one-party dictatorship in mainland China will finally come to an end, and a democratic China will be born. Paris December 28,1989

2.70

I Toward a Democratic China

INDEX

Academic freedom. See Freedom Academic institutions. See Chinese Academy of Sciences; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Chinese University of Science and Technology; Guangdong Institute of Philosophy; Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies; Institute of Political Science; Nanjing University; National Qinghua University; Philosophy Institute Administrative: authority, 197; constraints, 137; control, 132; executives, 1 1 7 ; review and authority, 73 Alexander the Great, 23 American Political Science Association, 51 Anti-rightist movement, 1 2 1 . See also "Deviationism, rightist" April Fifth Forum (Siwu luntan), 42 April Fifth Incident of 1976, ix, 28-30 Aquinas, Thomas, 23 Aristotle, 2 3 , 1 7 0 Armed forces. See Military Asahi Daily (Japanese newspaper), 39 Association for the Study of Chinese Humanities, 139 Authority: administrative, 73; and the church, 33; constitutional, 73; defined, 75; depersonalized, 206; as deterrent, 74; governmental, 1 1 2 15; individual, 206; and institutions, 73; and law, 206; and leadership, i n ; legal, 73; obedience to, 74; personalized, 206; and popular recognition, 74; positions of, 74; questioning of, 74; and responsibility, 120; social, 74; and subordina-

tion, 132; ultimate, 248; worship, 207 Autonomous Union of Beijing College and University Students, 258 Bacon, Francis, 63 Bao Tong, J 3 n , i i 9 n ; on China as a republic, 52; in the Office for Political Reform, 119 Bao Zunxin: and the Capital Union of Intellectuals, xv; and the "Indictment of Li Peng," 155; and the "May Seventeenth Manifesto," 154; orders for arrest of, xv, 154 n Beijing Municipal Security Bureau, 40 Beijing Spring (Beijing zbi chun), 4344 Bible: authority of, 24; compared to Quotations of Mao, 24; and Copernican theory, 38; as justification, 216; in scholasticism, 33; undermining of the, 169-70 Biblical commentary critiqued, 7-8 Big-character-poster movement, 4 1 42 Bismarck, 23 Bo Yibo, 120 "Bourgeois liberalization," 9 3 , 1 0 6 , 128; opposition to, 1 2 1 - 2 2 , 1 5 1 Bruno, Giordana, 166-69 Bu Shuming (pseudonym for Yan Jiaqi), 43 Bulletin of Mathematics (Shuxue tongbao), 9 Bureaucracy, 198 Bureaucratic abuse, elimination of, 84 Cadre system: in China, 80; reform of, 81

271

Caesar, 23 Calas, Jean, 174 Cambodia, 257 Campbell, Allen, 82 Cao Zhi, An Introduction to Systems of Public Servants in Foreign Countries, 82 Capital proliferation, 150 Capital Union of Intellectuals, xv Capitalism: in China, 218,223; and competition, 125; opposed, 225; recalcitrant, 29 Catholicism. See Roman Catholicism Ceaucescu, 252 Central Committee, 411,53,119 Central Military Commission, 53 Central Propaganda Bureau, 411,43, 129 Chaos theory, 62 Charles 1,23 Chatelet, Madame du, 173 Chen Boda, 46,231 Chen Duxiu, 222 Chen Weidian, 81 Chen Xitong, 236 Chen Yi, 21 Chen Yizi, x Chen Yun, 119 Chiang Kai-shek dynasty, 189 China: as autocracy, 229, 250-51; backwardness of, 137; as communist, 219; and constitutional revision, 259-61; corruption within, 152; and "courts of inquisition," 183,185-88; and demise of communism, 253; and democracy, 125,136, 158; as dictatorship, 154,226-27, 236; domestic policies of, 217; as dynasty, 159; economic reforms, 151; and feudal power, 189; international policies, 217; and market mechanisms, 151; and obstacles to reform, 121; People's Republic of, 159; and politics, 135-36; population of, 236; and possible civil war, 254; poverty in, 137,204; and power shifts, 250-51; property of, 134; Republic of, 159; resistance to 272

I Index

foreign cultures, 94; and the symbol of the dragon, 203-10; and a "third republic," 159-60; twentieth century, 247-51; twenty-first century, xii, 166,180-90. See also Federal Republic of China China Democratic League, 125 Chinese: philosophy and authority, 22; socialism, 189; traditional culture, 130 Chinese Academy of Sciences: discussion of standards of truth, 35; Division of Philosophy and Social Sciences, 24; Institute of Literature, 24. See also Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Chinese University of Science and Technology; Philosophy Institute Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 4n, 55,148,160; Department of Investigations, 128; labeled "bourgeois," 128. See also Institute of Political Science Chinese Communist Party: Beijing Municipal Committee, 41; Commission for Deliberations on Political Institutional Reform (Zhenghi tizhi gaige hantao xiaozu bangongshi), 119-20; inner-party struggles, 217; and the June Fourth massacre, 254; leadership in, 217; Office for Political Reform, 119-22; power of collective leadership, 222; and reform, 202; rise to power (1949), 247. See also Central Committee; Central Military Commission; Central Propaganda Bureau; Communist Youth League; Inspection Commission Chinese Cultural News (Zbongguo wenhua bao), 93 Chinese Democratic Alliance, 258 Chinese Political Science Association, 51; origins of, 55-56 Chinese Public Security Bureau, 160 Chinese Research Association for Natural Dialectics, 56

Chinese University of Science and Technology, 3 - 4 , 1 0 Chinese Zhigong Party, 2,58 Chu Anping, 256 Churchill, Winston, 23 "City Massacre" faction, 2.54-55 Civil service system, 79ff; advancement procedures, 80; endorsed in China, 85; hiring procedures, 80; as promoting stability, 85; and public examinations, 80; recommended for China, 82.; as two-party political systems, 85 Clairon, 1 7 2 , 1 7 7 Coercion, 69 Commercial News (Rotterdam), 153 Communism: in China, 219; and social despotism, 253. See also Chinese Communist Party. Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 18 Communist Youth League, 180 Compromise, discussions of, 9 Conferences of the Politburo (1958), 219 Conscience, 92 Conspiracies, 215 Constitution of China, x ; and the "Four Cardinal Principles," 260; recommended changes, 260-61 Constitutional principles, 104 Contentions in Natural Science (Ziran kexue zhengming), 32,33; editorial office of, 34 Converse, Philip, 51 Copernican theory, 38 Copernicus, Nicolaus, 36,169-70 Coups, 102, n o "Court of practice," xii, 35,39-40, 166,182-90; as most important, 211 "Court of reason," xi, 35,37-38,47, 166,174-79 "Court of religion," xi, 35-36,38, 166-71 Cox, Archibald, 114,198-99 Creativity, 132,194; as a goal of reform, 207

Cromwell, Oliver, 23 Cults of personality. See Personality cults Cultural: differences, 88; traditional, 88,94; transcendence, 127. See also Universal cultural factors Cultural Revolution, ix, i5ff, 256; analyzed, 49; and authority, 22; compared with the Reformation, 24-25; criteria for testing, 39; as destructive of democracy, 136; economic reasons for, 216; effects of, 27; and emotionalism, 214; end of, 34; and free travel, 19n; intellectual restraints of, 16-17; labeled as tragic, 129; as Mao's attempt to limit Liu Shaoqi, 231; and misuse of natural dialectics, 58; origins of, 214-25; and the perfect leader, 131; and political authority, 217; political changes after, 112; political power, 115; popular responses to Mao Zedong, 132; and power in China, i n ; and private life, 200; and "religious courts," 37; and "revolutionary criticism," 27; and separation of power, 197; and suppression, 215; and suppression of democracy, 88; as a ten-year catastrophe, 199 Dagong Daily (newspaper), 1 3 1 , 1 3 6 , 140 Dahl, Robert, 65 Dai Qing: interview with, 1 0 8 , 1 1 4 ; interviewing Yan, 196-202,203-10 Dalai Lama, 267 De Gaulle, Charles, 1 1 2 Decision making: and investments, 147; and mistakes, 134; political, 108; strategic, 120; and variety of input, 136 Demerest, Raoul, 82 Democracy, 78; and ancient Greeks, 136; in China, 38,118,204,236, 270; common standards, 88; corrective mechanisms of, 37-38,135, 218; debates over, 87; and despotJndex

I 273

ism, 189; diverging views, 87; and educational levels, 135-36; and elections, 37; and imperfection, 134; as an irresistible trend, 253; and legal systems, 2.01; and political parties, 125; prerequisites for, 136; and research, 192; suppression of, 88; and theology, 27; and tolerance, 135; transcendent, 87; as a universal cultural factor, 92. See also Elections; Freedom of press; Freedom of speech; Political, democracy Democracy movement (1989), x , 1 5 1 5 5 , 2 2 8 , 2 5 5 - 5 6 , 2 6 1 ; and the "new May Fourth manifesto," xi; in response to Tiananmen verdict, 41. See also Federation for a Democratic China Democracy University of Tiananmen Square, 155 Democracy Wall (at Xidan), 42 Democracy Wall movement (197879). ix. 54 Deng Liqun: and anti-liberalization, 1 2 2 ; opposition to reforms, 120 D e n g T u o , 16 n Deng Xiaoping, 4 2 , 4 6 n , 53n, 1 1 9 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 8 , 2 3 1 , 2 5 4 ; as an autocrat, 229; a "butcher of the people," 1 6 0 61; decline of prestige, 233; denunciation predicted, 257; on good government, 1 3 1 ; imaginary conversation of, 237-46; on leadership, 198; on the legal system, 199; and Li Peng, 234; on life-tenure, 248; obedience to, 1 2 0 ; on the policy of opening and reform, 232; and political reform, 152; on the prodemocracy movement, 229-30; protests against, 154; and reason, xii; on reform, 232; and reform suppression, 1 2 1 ; reforms of, ix; return to power, 45 n; and student protest of 1989,153 Depoliticization, 78, 79 Der Spiegel, 39-40 Desmoulin, Camile, 215 274

I

Index

"Deviationism, rightist," 28-29, I l r > and Liu Shaoqi, 222; and Peng Dehuai, 221 Dialectics: materialist, 32-33; method of, 32-34; natural 1 2 ; and the theory of relativity, 32-34 Dialogue on the Ptolemaic and Copernican World Systems, 36-37. See also Galileo Diderot, Denis, 3 7 , 1 7 2 - 7 8 Discontent, 90 Dissent: control of, 1 2 1 ; and dispute resolution, 73 Division of powers. See Separation of powers Dogmatism and reason, xii Double Hundred policy, 124 n; and academic freedom, 1 9 3 , 2 0 1 ; 1986 conference on, 124-25 Dragon. See China Dream of Red Mansions, 75 Dynasties, in China, 1 0 9 - 1 0 . See also Qing dynasty; Song dynasty Eastern Europe, end of communism in, 252 Easton, David, 65 Economics: constructionist, 76 n; and fair exchange, 72; and reform, 1 3 6 3 7 , 1 9 1 ; as a science, 63; as societal constraint, 72; symbolic, 68-69; theoretical, 125 Economy: Chinese, 137; commodity, 137; market, 1 3 7 - 3 8 , 2 6 4 ; stateowned, 1 4 2 , 1 4 7 - 4 8 Education, need to revitalize, 264 Einstein, 5-6; as an idealistic philosopher, 34; on freedom, 194; theory of relativity, 186. See also Physics, theory of relativity Elections: and authority, 73; in China, 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 2 6 1 - 6 2 ; as a corrective mechanism, 51; and dynasties, n o ; and fraud, 263; and governmental authority, 65 Engels, Friedrich, 1 7 ; Anti-Duhring, 1 7 8 - 7 9 ; and history, 23; and reason, 185

Enlightenment (Qimeng), 42 Entrepreneurship, 1 3 8 , 1 4 0 ; contractual, 1 4 1 , 1 4 5 - 4 6 ; and development, 146; and growth, 1 4 0 , 1 4 4 46; and profits, 143 Equality: debates about, 87; and economic reform, 151 Ethics, 72 Evolution, Darwinian, 186 Explorations (Tansuo), 42. Factionalism, 77 Faith and science, 14. See also Philosophy Fan Yan, 65 Fang Lizhi, x , 6; and the anti-rightist movement, 12,1; orders for arrest of, xv Farmers and Workers Democratic Party, 258 Farmers in China, 265 Fate and predestination, xvi Federal Republic of China, 159-60, 269 Federation for a Democratic China, x , 159,252; goal of, 257-58; meeting with the Dalai Lama, 267 Fei Xiaotong, 125-26 Fenno, Richard, 51 Feudal tradition, 7 5 , 2 0 6 , 2 1 7 ; despotism, 40 Figureheads, 1 0 1 Financial: bankruptcy, 147; debt in China, 264; interest, 1 4 0 - 4 1 Foreign relations, 105 "Four Clean-ups," 223-24 France: eighteenth century, 4 9 , 1 6 6 , 1 7 2 - 7 8 ; Jacobin dictatorship, 215; and power shifts, 250. See also French Revolution Frederick II, King, 173 Freedom, 78; academic (intellectual), 8 8 - 8 9 , 9 2 , 1 2 4 , 1 9 3 - 9 5 , 2 0 1 ; artistic, 195; of choice, 194; common standards, 88; creative, 2 0 1 ; debates over, 87; defined, 87; of dialogue, 28; impossibility of absolute, 73; inner, 194; of political

participation, 87; of thought and expression, 27; as a universal cultural factor, 92; of will, 72 Freedom of press: and democracy, 135; in Hong Kong, 266; opposition to, 152 Freedom of speech, 87; in China, 260; and democracy, 135; opposition to, 152 French Revolution, 1 5 8 , 2 1 6 Friendship, 7 1 Galileo, 38; Dialogue on the Ptolemaic and Copernican World Systems, 1 7 1 ; and reason, xii; trail of, 36-37,169-71,174 Gandhi, Mahatma, 23 Gang of Four, 182-88; criticism of, 30; deposed, 45n G a o G a o (wife of Yan Jiaqi), 26; as co-author, xii, xv, 1 2 7 , 1 2 8 ; in exile with Yan, i57ff; with Yan at Tiananmen Square, 29 Gdansk-Gdania Incident, 38 Gen Xiaoman, 81 "General line," 2 1 9 - 2 0 Genetics, 186-87 God and guidance, xvi Golden Stone Cultural Square (Taiwan), 107 Gong Xiangrui, 82 Gong Yuzhi, 4; and the Central Propaganda Bureau, 4n Goodnow, Frank: "Republic and Monarchy," 135 Government: appointments by law, 82-85; as an art, 98; authority, 65; autocratic, 1 7 5 , 2 2 9 - 3 1 , 2 4 7 - 4 8 ; control of enterprise, 142; democratic, 1 1 2 ; despotic, 50; dynasties, 52; evaluation of, 130; interference, 76; limitation of authority, 115; limitations of, 200; and macroeconomic control, 1 3 7 , 1 4 1 - 4 3 ; monarchial, 50; parliamentary, 1 1 3 ; political appointments, 82-85; and political parties, i n ; presidential, 1 1 3 ; representational, 262-63; Index

I 275

republic, 50; socialist, 51; totalistic, 115; unrivaled dictatorships, 233. See also Authority, governmental; Reform, governmental; State power Graham, Billy, 107 Great Cultural Revolution. See Cultural Revolution Great Famine of i960,245 Great Hall of the People, 29 Great Leap Forward (1958), 219,256 Greater China Encyclopedia, 128 Green Party, 259 Gregory IX, Pope, 167 Gruli, Cardinal, 167-71 Guan Zhaozhi, 10 Guangdong Institute of Philosophy, 20 GuangmingDaily, 35, 37,4on, 108, 138, i6$n Guanyin (goddess), 208 Guo Luoji, 124 Han migration, 268 He Guanghui, 119 Hilsman, Roger: How America Is Governed, 69-70, 74 History: human, 23; natural, 139; and political norms, 104; and rationalism, 23 History of the World, 24 Hobbes, Thomas, 23; on state government, 69 Honesty, 25 Hong Kong, 268-69; and the Basic Law, 266-67; and the Chinese Communist Party, 266 Honorius III, Pope, 167 Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies, 6jn Hu Deping, 129 Hu Gaobang, 119 Hu Qi'an, 81 Hu Qiaomu, 53n; opposition to reforms, 120 Hu Qili, 120 Hu Yaobang, 46n, i29n, 233-34; death of, 152; as Deng Xiaoping's 276

I Index

successor, 231; forced resignation of, 121; mourning of, 152; and national conference on theoretical work, 46 Hua Guofeng, 41-42,53; as Mao's successor, 231 Huang Kecheng, 221 Huang Yongsheng, 231 Hugo, Victor: Les Miserables, 92; Ninety-three, 91 Human: affairs, 78; imperfection, I3 I _ 3 2 > r34> 136, 2-09; inquiry, 212; needs and nature, 136; optimism, 138 Human rights, 78; common standards, 88; debates over, 87; as immune from political power, 87 Humanism: criticized, 88-89,9 2 > and Marxism, 127; as universal, 90-92 Huntington, Samuel, 78 Ilchev, Simonov, 71 Impeachment, 73,105; of Nixon, 114 Index Librorum Prohibitorum, 36 Individual: autonomy, 70, 72-73; behavior, 76; initiative, 132,134; need for constraint, 131; needs, 71; rights, 87,115,260; value, 71 Industry, 137 Infeld, Leopold, physicist, 1 2 , 2 1 0 , 212; "The Dusk of Philosophy," 1 2 14 Inquisition. See Italy, World Court of Inquisition Inspection Commission, 160 Institute of Political Science, ix, 61; formation of, 62; labeled "bourgeois," 127; "Workshop on the Comparative Study of Civil Service Systems," 81 Intellectual: capacities underutilized, 120-21; constraint, 23, 27; limitations, 109 International Conference on Economic and Political Modernization of Chinese Society (1988), 140 International Political Science Association, 51, 81

Intimacy, 71 Intimidation, 69 Investments: of capita], 146; decisions, 144; strategies of, 142-43 Italy: seventeenth century, 1 6 6 , 1 7 2 78; World Court of Inquisition, 167-71,174 J a n Hus, 169 Japan, 2.64 Jefferson, Thomas, 23 Ji Shuli, 64 Jiang Qing, 4 0 , 1 8 7 , 1 8 9 ; arrest of, 30 Jiang Zemin, 233-35 Jiao Ye, 92 J u Qiubai, 222 Judicial review, 73 June Fourth Massacre (1989), 156, 2 2 8 , 2 3 0 - 3 6 ; and power, 249; predicted trial, 256; results of, 252 Justice, 69; debates over, 87 Kang Sheng, 8 , 4 6 - 4 7 Kang Youwei, 23 Kant, Immanuel, 63 Khrushchev, 214; and personality cults, 2 1 7 Kuomintang, 247 Lao Siguang, 139 Lasswell, Harold, 65 Latier, Thoughts on Art, 13 Law, 78; discussion o f , 2 1 0 ; as standards of behavior, 206; supremacy of, 133. See also Rule of law; Rules Leadership: as art, 98; and character, 1 0 4 , 1 0 6 ; and criticism, 2 0 1 ; and exercise of power, 98-99; healthy 46-47; and history, 106; imperfect, 130; and life-tenure, 1 0 2 , n o , 230, 235,248; and limited-tenure, 104; nontransferable, 248; by ordinary people, 1 0 1 ; perfect, 1 3 2 - 3 3 ; and political parties, i n ; procedures for succession, 249; and resistance, 1 0 0 ; and specified scope of power, 105; unified, 197 Lecain, 1 7 2 , 1 7 7

Lee, T. D . , n n Legal standards, 133 Legal system, in China, 265 Legislature, as a power balance, 105 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 1 7 ; and history, 23 Li Fan, 81; research on civil service, 81 Li Fang, 6 6 , 6 6 n , 81 Li Honglin, 46-47; and academic freedom, 124 Li Li, 81 Li Lisan, 222 Li Peng, 228,233-35,248,254-55; a "butcher of the people," 1 6 0 - 6 1 ; conflict with Deng Xiaoping, 232; desire to execute Yan, 158; orders for martial law, 155; protests against, 154,156 Li Ruihuan, 233 Li Sanyuan,81 Li Shimin, 23 Li Shu,48 Li Xiannian, 1 1 9 Li Ximin, 236 Li-Yang clique, 231-35, 254; as responsible for the June Fourth massacre, 232. See also Li Peng; Yang Shangkun Li Zhongguo, 31 Li Zuopeng, 231 Liang Qichao, 23 Liao Mosha, 16 n Libraries in China, 24 Life-tenure, 48,50-53; abolished, 54. See also Leadership, and life-tenure Lin Biao, 4 0 , 1 8 2 - 8 4 , 1 8 6 - 8 8 ; and attempted assassination of M a o , 60; death of, 60; as defense minister, 2 2 1 ; as Mao's "closest comradein-arms," 16; as Mao's second successor, 231; and Yilin Dixi, 1 7 18 Lin Liguo, 60 n Lin Ying, 82 Lin Zili, 141 Lincoln, Abraham, 23,99 Liu Binyan: and the anti-rightist movement, 1 2 1 ; "Proposal to Index

I 277

Establish the Federation for a Democratic China," 159 Liu Changlin, 31 Liu Shaoqi: and capitalism, 2 1 7 - 1 8 ; and criticism of Peng, 2 2 1 ; denunciation of Maoism, 216; designated successor to M a o Zedong, 231; and M a o Zedong, 2 1 7 - 1 9 , 222, 224-25 Liu Xinwu, 131 Locke, John, 23 Logic, 13 Logical positivism, 63 Lorentz, Hendrik Antoon, 6 Lotacciuno, Cardinal, 170 Louis X I V , King, 2 3 , 5 0 , 9 9 Louis X V , King, 175-76 Lu Dingyi, 231 Lu X u n , 184 Luo Ruiqing, 231 Luther, Martin, 24; denunciation of the pope, 216

159; on the "Four Clean-ups," 224; as free of error, 2 1 4 ; as the "Great Leader," 16; and Hua Guofeng, 53 n; imaginary conversation of, 237-46; and leadership problems, 199; and lifelong tenure, 230; and Liu Shaoqi, 2 1 7 - 1 9 , 2 2 4 - 2 5 ; as Marxist-Leninist, 1 7 ; motivations of, 1 3 1 ; mythologized images o f , 46; "On Practice," 182-83; quotations of, 37; Quotations of Chairman Mao, 216; and the Soviet Union, 2 1 7 ; on testing truth, 39; theory of "continuous revolution," 47; threatened by Liu Shaoqi, 231; and the "three red flags" policy, 222; and transfer of power, i n ; view of the Central Committee, 218; and wavering supremacy, 223 Maoism, 253 Martial law, 155

M a Ding. See Song Longxiang M a Jiarui, 81 M a Peiwen, 40 M a c a o , 268-69 Machiavelli, 25-26,96; on the nature of man and politicians, 6 1 - 6 2 Magazines and periodicals. See Beijing Spring; Chinese Cultural News; Contentions in Natural Science; Der Spiegel; Enlightenment; Explorations; New Observations; Philosophical Research; Red Flag; Social Sciences in China; Today; World Economic Herald. See also Newspapers Management, 103; employee selected, 145; of enterprises, 200; operations, 140-43; and profits, 143 Manipulation, 77 M a o Zedong, 132, 250; on Chinese armed struggle, 1 1 0 - 1 1 ; and concentration of power, 1 1 2 ; death of, ix, 4n, 3 0 , 1 3 6 ; denouncement of Peng Dehuai, 220; encouragement of research, 2 2 1 ; founding of the People's Republic of China (1949),

M a r x , Karl: " A Critique of Prussia's Recent Censorship Law," 187; Das Kapital, 1 7 , 1 3 9 ; and history, 23 Marxism: dialectic, 6 - 7 ; failure in China, 253; and humanism, 1 2 7 ; limitations o f , 93; philosophy, 6, 34; preservation of, 9 4 , 1 2 7 Marxist-Leninism, 46 Material assets, 146 Mathematics: dialectics, 1 0 ; disciplines o f , xviii; mutation theory, 9. See also Logic Maupertius, 173 Mawangdui warriors, 208 M a y Fourth Movement of 1919, xi, 188. See also Democracy movement " M a y Seventeenth Manifesto" (1989), 154, 226-27 M a y Seventh cadre schools, 25 n, 216 Media, attempts at control of, 27. See also Magazines and periodicals; Newspapers Metaphysics, 1 3 - 1 4 ; deceptions of, 210 Michelson, Albert Abraham. See Michelson-Morley experiment Michelson-Morley experiment, 5

278

I

Index

Military: in China, 249; force, 75; in Germany, 2.15; leadership, 105 Milo, 99 Ming bao (newspaper), 158, zz6n Minggang Cadre School, 25 Minority: imposition, 135; viewpoints, 135 Modernization, 78; in China, 139-40, 148,192,202,204-5, Z I 0 > e c o " nomic, 140,147 Monarchial politics, 73 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de, 7 , 2 3 , 3 7 , 1 7 2 - 7 8 ; Persian Letters, 7-8; Spirit of Laws, 176 Monument to Revolutionary Martyrs, 30,42 Morley, Edward Williams. See Michelson-Morley experiment Motivation and conflict, 70-71 Mysticism, 212 Nanfang Daily, 126 Nanjing University, 65-66 National conference on theoretical work (1979), 45ff National Martyrs' Day, 158 National People's Congress, 197; civil service system endorsement, x, 85; and elections, 116; as powerless, 229; representatives to, 261; size of, 262 National Qinghua University, 4n National Science and Technology Commission, 4n National Socialism (in Germany), 215 Natural dialectics, 56; limitations of, 77; reasons for abandonment of, 57-59. See also Chinese Research Association for Natural Dialectics Natural disasters, 72 Nehru, Jawaharal, 97 New Observations (magazine), labeled "bourgeois," 128 Newspapers. See Commercial News; Dagong Daily; Guangming Daily; Ming bao; Nanfang Daily; People's Daily; South German News; Wenhui Daily

Nixon, Richard, 114,198-99 Nonviolence, 159 On-the-Scene Reports of the April Fifth Movement (Siwu yundong jishi), 30-31 Opium War, 94 Opportunistic behavior, 18 Organizational politics, 74 Ownership: communal, 219; by enterprise, 144-45; private, 144, 147-48, 264; public, 140,142-44, 147; rights, 140-41 Palace of Versailles, 49-50 Palmerston, 23 Pan Shiqiang, 81 Pan Xiaojuan, 81 Peace, long-term, 204 Pen Chong, 120 Peng Dehuai: denounced, 220-21; letter to Mao, 220 Peng Zhen, 231 People's Daily, 9,28,49,153,226; "The Truth About the Tiananmen Incident," 41 People's Liberation Army, 221 People's Press, 30 People's Press of Hunan, xv Personality cults, 47,49,52, i n , 214, 216-17; during the Cultural Revolution, 96; of Mao Zedong, 225 Philosophical Research (magazine), 35 Philosophy: analytical, 13-14; "analytical" vs. "empirical" truth, 13; boundaries of, 76-77; and compromise, 9; and faith, 12; and reconciliation, 9; as a science, 14. See also Dialectics Philosophy Institute, ix, 3 , 1 2 , 1 5 ; natural dialectics section, 26. See also Chinese Academy of Sciences Physics: classical, 5; Newtonian mechanics, 5; theory of relativity, 4, 6,32-33 Plots, 77 Pluralism, 88 Index

I 279

Poems Transcribed from Tiananmen, 4i Police, 69 Policy-making, 74; authority for, 114; independent, 133-34; rights to, 133 Political: adjustments, 74; balancing, 233; behavior, 77; change, 70,74; decentralization of power, 152; democracy, 117; dependency, 132; ethics, 86; evolution, 106; institutions, 74; leaders, 100; machinery, 103; norms, 104; participation, 116-17,2.01; parties, 65, 8 6 , 1 1 1 , 113,125, 258; pathology, 120; psychology, 86; representatives, 116; sociology, 86; stability, 78; struggle, 74; succession, 96-97; theory, 25-26; "totalism," 115. See also Reform, political Political science: analytical, 86; disciplines of, xviii; and power relationships, 76-77; research, 191; as science, 60,63; social monarchies, 48; state vs. social systems, 48; universal vs. differing, 86-87 Politics: and advance consent, 73; and authoritative force, 72; and authority, 74; Chinese, 1 1 5 , 1 3 1 ; and coercion, 69, 72; and common values, 70; comparative, 86; and compromise, 74; and deceit, 74; defined, 64-65, 74-76; democratic, 78,134,261,264; and feudal theocracy, 25; and fulfillment of needs, 72; and imperfection, 131-32,209; and infighting, 74; influence of personality, 98; institutionalized, 70; international, 86; and lack of institutionalization, 78; and modern Chinese theocracy, 25; modernization of, 140; monarchial, 73; and non-politics, 66-67; outer space, 86; of peace, 86; and positions of authority, 74; and power, 76-77; practical, 26,66; as science, xii; and social control, 72-73; and socioeconomic conditions, 106; theological, 73; theoretical, 66-67; 280

I Index

the "three principles" of, 25-26,61; and violence, 70 Polpot, 257 Power, 69; abuse of, 88,218, 264; acquisition of, 149; centralized, 125; checks and balances of, 105, 113; of chief executives, 96; concentration of, 112; conflicts of, 102; debates over, 87; and dialogue, 28; feudal, n o ; imperial, 204; indivisibility of, 117; institutionalized, 74; limitation of, 104; maintenance of, 98; military, 249; overcentralization of, 109; overconcentration of, 118; political, i i i ; relationships, 74, 76-77; and responsibility, 198; and rules, 77-78; structures, in China, 109; and submission, 206; territorial, 112; transfer of, 77, i n , 117; transition of, 1 0 1 - 2 ; and truth, 191; ultimate, 199; used for private gain, 149; worship, 206. See also Separation of powers Private enterprise, 264 Profit, 140-42; distribution of, 14344; and reinvestment, 148 Project 571,60 n Propaganda Department. See Chinese Communist Party Protest, 100; against June Fourth massacre, 158; silence as, 184 Protestant Reformation, 24,216; compared with the Cultural Revolution, 24-25 Prussia, 1 7 3 , 1 7 6 , 1 8 7 Ptolemy, 169 Public administration. See Civil service system Public disobedience, 74 Qiao Shi, 158,233 Qing dynasty, 188,226; fall of, 247, 250; and the Grand Old Buddha, 206 Qinghua University, 17 Qiu Huizuo, 231 Reagan, Ronald, 107

Reason: critical, 179; and the Cultural Revolution, 22; power of, 1 2 1 , 1 7 9 ; and religion, 1 7 5 , 2 1 0 - 1 1 ; and science, xvi, 23 Red Flag (magazine), 28 Red Guards, 1 6 , 2 1 5 - 1 6 Reform: constitutional, 2 6 0 - 6 1 ; economic, 1 9 6 - 2 0 1 , 2 0 4 , 2 0 7 , 2 6 4 ; governmental, 1 9 1 ; and initiative, 207; land, 265; legal, 2 0 1 ; obstacles to, 1 2 1 ; political, 1 0 8 , 1 2 5 , 1 3 1 , 196-202,204,207 Relativity. See Physics, theory of relativity Religion: as antithetical to reason, 37; and heresy, 168; and intoxification, 2 0 9 , 2 1 2 ; as irrational, 175; and persecution, 174; as societal constraint, 72; and the supernatural, 7* Republics, 52-53 Resistance, 1 0 0 Respect, 71 Reverence, 106 Revolution, peasant, 1 1 0 Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party, 258 Rightist deviationism. See "Deviationism, rightist" "Rightist opportunism," 220 Rights: and duties, 133; ownership, 140; of private property, 264 Riots, 1 0 0 "Rolling in the mud," 15 Roman Catholicism: critiqued, 174; Dominican order, 167; Franciscan order, 167; Index Librorum Prohibitorum, 1 7 1 ; opposition to, 216; seventeenth century, xi, 35-36 Romanian massacre (1989), 252 Roosevelt, 23 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 2 3 , 1 7 2 78 Ru Xin, 24 n Rule: by individuals, 1 3 2 - 3 3 ; by law, 264; party, 249; patriarchal, 249 Rule of law, 132; in China, 1 3 3 , 1 3 6 ; and constitutional supremacy, 261;

debates over, 87; as nondiscriminatory, 87 Rulers. See Leadership Rules: and politics, 77; of succession, 101 Run Xin, and Yan's attempted resignation, 89-90 Russell, Bertrand, 22 Scholasticism, critique o f , 33 Science: and authority, 33; and boundaries, 5 8 - 5 9 , 9 6 , 2 . 1 1 - 1 2 ; "corrective mechanisms" of, 33; and democracy, xi; disciplines of, xvii, 56; as exact, 2 1 0 ; faith in, 2 1 2 13; and free inquiry, 2 1 3 ; as free of idols, 9 5 , 1 9 2 ; as free of prohibitions, 9 5 , 1 9 1 - 9 2 ; as free of ultimates, 9 6 , 1 9 2 ; and history, 2 3 , 6 3 64; as ideology, xi, xvi; and intellect, xvi; laws o f , 2 1 2 ; and optimism, 1 3 8 , 2 1 2 ; and problem solving, 1 3 8 , 2 1 2 ; purpose of, 33; research, 23; theory and revision, 4. See also Reason; Scientific method Scienceology (Kexue Xue), 57 Scientific method, 33; and political science, 62; and politics, 25 Scientific theory, and practice, 192, 211 Sculpture, 98-99 Separation of powers, 1 0 8 - 1 8 , 1 7 7 , 199-202; in America, 1 1 4 ; between government and social organizations, 200; horizontal, 197; lack of, 1 2 5 , 1 3 3 ; vertical, 197-98 September Third Society, 258 Shun, Emperor, 204 Snow, Edgar, 224-25 Social: adjustment, 137; administration, 88; apolitical organizations, 74; benefits, 74; change, 70; democracy, 257; dependency, 132; economy, 139; moulding, 98-99; needs, 7 1 , 1 3 7 ; organizations, 103, 1 0 8 , 1 3 9 ; problems, 70; regulation, 7 4 , 2 0 6 ; responsibility, 1 2 0 ; strucIndex

I 281

ture evolution, 139; systems and ownership, 48; vitality, 134 Social Democratic Party, 259 Social Sciences in China, 108 Social security system, 265 Socialism: democratic, 194; scientific, 178-79; twentieth century, 149 Socialist legal system, 199 Socialist Party, 259 Society, defined, 70 Song dynasty, 204 Song Longxiang, 124 Song Ping, 233 South German News (West Germany), 153 Soviet purges, 88 Soviet Union, after Stalin, 217 Spiritual needs, 71 Stalin, Joseph, 199; attitude toward Lenin, 17; death of, 217; On Opposing Factions, 1 7 - 1 9 , 2 3 ; and personality cults, 214 Stalinist purges, 216 State ownership, 1 4 1 - 4 2 , 2 1 7 State power, 260; four divisions of, 108; limited, 87 Students: and the Cultural Revolution, 214; demonstrations, 1 2 1 , 228; hunger strike, 226; movement of 1986,93; protests, 152-53 Su Shaozhi, 159 Su Wei, 237-46 Subordination, hierarchical, 132 Sun Gengfu, 53 Sun Shangqing, 89-90 Sun Yat-sen, 23; founding of the Republic of China (1911), 159,250 Taiwan, 269; and democracy, 159, 250-51; and the Kuomintang, 247; and mainland China, 266,269-70; relations with, 208-9; a n d a "third republic," 159-60 Tang Tsou, 115, ii5n Taxes, 140-42,264-65 Technology, 71; and change, 147; and industry, 138; modern, 139,142 Theology: contrasted with science, 282

I Index

16; dissolution foreshadowed, 34; and intellectual constraint, 23; and philosophy, 22 Theoretical investigation, 123 Thermodynamics, second law of, 186 Thompson, Joseph John (physicist), 5 "Three Courts of Law," 35-39, 49, i65ff. See also "Court of practice"; "Court of reason"; "Court of religion" "Three red flags" policy, 219-20; discord between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi over, 221-23 Tian Jiyun, 120 Tiananmen Square: Chairman Mao Memorial, 256; hunger strike at, 153-55; a s meeting place, 42; protests after Hu Yaobang's death, 152. See also Democracy movement; June Fourth Massacre; "May Seventeenth Manifesto" Tiananmen Square Incident (1976), 27-30,231; arrests at, 30; cause of, 200; as counterrevolutionary, 28, 38; interview of participants, 53-54; as revolutionary, 41. See also April Fifth Incident of 1976 Tibet, 267-69 Toadyism, 77 Today (Jintian), 42 Torture, 176 Totem worship, 205, 207 Trotsky: attitude toward Lenin, 17; as a "pseudorevolutionist," 19; as an "ultraleftist," 18-19 Truth: and authority, 194; as clear, 1 3 2 , 2 1 0 , 212; and open discussion, 193-94; pursuit of, 89,92; and religion, 171; and scientific method, 33; and scripture, 1 9 2 , 2 1 1 ; and social practice, 183; standards of, 34-35, 88; suppression of, 193 "Twenty-three Articles," 223-25 Union of Intellectuals, 258 United Nations, 81 United States of America, futuristic, 49-52

Universal cultural factors, 88,92; rejected by China, 94 Urban VII, Pope, 3 6 , 1 6 6 , 1 7 0 Utopianism, 125 Vietnam, 257 Violence, 69; in China, 247,249; inappropriate, 135; international, 69; mass, 69; and need-fulfillment, 70-72; organized, 69, 71; and political systems, 74; and politics, 70; proposed response to, 156; and transfer of power, 77; as useful, 100. See also June Fourth Massacre; Romanian massacre; War Voltaire, Francois, 23,37,172-75, 178; and reason, xii Voluntary behavior, 76 Wan Runnan, 159 Wang Guixiu, 47 Wang Hongwen, 231 Wang Juntao, x, 43, 43 n Wang Ming, 222 Wang Ruoshui, 9, 49; and academic freedom, 124 War, 67, 69, 71; peasant, n o - n ; and politics, 70; and succession, 101 Washington, George, 23 Watergate Incident, 114,198 Wei Jingsheng, 256 Wen Xizeng, 25 Wenhui Daily, 40 n, 126 Wildavsky, Aaron, 51 Wisdom and science, xvi Workers' Autonomous Union, 258 World Economic Herald, 128 Wu Faxian, 231 Wu Han, 16 n Wu'er Kaixi: and China's National Martyrs' Day, 158 n; "Proposal to Establish the Federation for a Democratic China," 159 Xia Shuzhang, 66 Xidan Wall. See Democracy Wall Xinhai Revolution of 19x1,247, 250

Xu Liangying, 121 Xu Naijiong, 81 Yan Jiaqi: biographical sketch, ix-x; entrance into Chinese Communist Party, 43; and "erroneous political views," 126-27; exiled, x-xiii, xv, 157-58; expelled from party membership, 160; explorations into history, 23ff; and the Federation for a Democratic China, 159; in Hong Kong, 158; as honorary president of Democracy University, 155; Institute of Political Science, head of, 80; at International Political Science Congress, 81; interviewed by Dai Qing, 196-202,203-10; investigations of, 20-21,53-54; as march leader in Tiananmen Square, 153 n; at the national conference on theoretical work, 45ff; in the Office for Political Reform, 119; orders for arrest of, xv; passport revoked, 160; as president of the Federal Republic of China, 160; researching the Cultural Revolution, 19; resignation from Institute of Political Science, 148-49; state vs. social systems, 48; transition from philosophy to theology, 15-16; transition from physics to philosophy, 1 0 - 1 1 ; transition into political science, 59 Yan Jiaqi, articles of: "Abolishing Life-tenure" ("Feizhi zhongshenzhi"), 43; "Actively Promote the Development of Chinese Political Science" ("Jiji tuijing zhongghuo ahengzhixue de fazhan"), 64n; "The Aspiration to Pursue Truth and Beauty Supersedes All Else" ("Zinqiu zhengli he meihao yuanwang youxian yu yiqie"), 89 n, 124,193-95; "On the Causes of Dynastic Cycles" ("Wangzhao xunhuan yuanyin lun"), 1 0 9 - 1 1 ; "China Is Not a Republic," 159, 228-36; "Conducting Research on Politics with Scientific Attitudes Index

I 283

and Methods," 62-64; "The Definition and Characteristics of Humanism," 90; "On Definitions of the Concept of Democracy" ("Guanyu minzhu gainian de hanyi"), 8711; "Dialectic of Quadratic Curves," 9; "Discussion of Cultural Issues Will Inevitably Lead to Reform of the Political Structure," 108; "Elections, Appointments, and Examinations" ("Xuanju, renming, kaoshi"), 7911; "Further Reflections on the Cultural Revolution," 126; "How Can China Become Wealthy and Strong?" 132; "Indictment of Li Peng" ("Gao Li Peng shu"), 155; "Introducing and Absorbing the Universal Cultural Factors of All Mankind," 92; "On Marx's Theory of the Social Republic," 56; "Medieval Scholasticism and the Doctrine of Double Truth," 35; "My Four Convictions Regarding Science" ("Wo dui kexue de sige xinnian"), 138, 2 1 1 - 1 3 ; "Natural Objects and Man-Made Objects," 9; "On the Necessity of Establishing a System of State Public Servants" ("Lun Jianli guojia gongwuyuan zhidu de biyaoxing"), 84n; "Permanent Appointment Systems and Temporary Appointment Systems" (" 'Changren zhi' he 'zianren zhi' "), 79 n; "Power and Truth" (Quanli yu zhenli), 3511; "Practice, Hypothesis, and Scientific Method: On Discussions Regarding the Theory of Relativity," 33; "Prospects for China in the 1990s," 25270; "Prospects for the Realm of Natural Dialectics," 56-58; "On the Question of Political Systems in Socialist Theory" ("Sheheuizuyi de zhengti wenti"), 44,47; "Reflections on Chinese History in the Twentieth Century," 247-51; "Reforming China's System of Ownership," 140,143,145-48; 284

I Index

"Religion, Reason, and Practice: Visits to Three Courts of Law," 165-90,211; "Report of a Survey on the Question of Democracy," 4952; "The Role of Politics in Human Society," 66-70; "Salute the Soldier Sons and Daughters of Workers and Peasants," 29; "Science Is a World of Three Freedoms," 191-92; "The Significance of Total Cultural Openness for China's Modernization," 126; "Socialism and the Tripartite Separation of Powers," 56; "Theoretical Studies" ("Xue lilun"), 79n; "The Tricks of the Trade of Modern Religion" ("Xiandai zongjiao de mijue"), 43; "On Two Types of Appointment Systems," 84; "You Come Inside, I'll Get Out," 237-46 Yan Jiaqi, books of: Energy, 26; On Heads of State and Government (Shaunao lun), 9 5 - 1 0 7 , 1 2 7 , 1 3 0 ; Journey through the Ages (Kuayue shedai de feixing), 37-38; Lifetenure and Limited-term Appointment Systems (Zhongxheng zhi yu xianren zhi), 95, i i 7 n ; On-theScene Reports of the April Fifth Movement (Siwu yundongjishi), 30,43,49,53-54; Political Systems of States (Guojia zhengti), 95; Power and Truth (Quanli yu zhengli), 49 n, 62n, 87 n; Problems of Political Systems in Socialist Theory, 26; Ten-Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, xv, 128,2i4n; Travels Through History and the Future (Manyou lishi yu weilai), 49 n, 52 n; What Is Power?, 127 Yang, C. N . , n n Yang Baikui, 82 Yang Shangkun, xv, 228,231,234, 254-55; a "butcher of the people," 160-61; desire to execute Yan, 158 YangXianzhen, 8

Yao Wenyuan, 46 Yao Yilin, 2.33—34; ' n conflict with Deng Xiaoping, 232 Ye Jianying, 45 Ye Qun, 231 Yi Wenhau,3i Yilin Dixi, 17 Ying Zheng, 23 Yu Guangyuan, xvii, 3 , 4 n , 59; judged erroneous, 124; and natural dialectics, 56 Yu Haocheng, 128; and academic freedom, 124 Yu Shaoyi, 66 YuanShikai, 135,189; successor to Qing dynasty, 247,250 Yuan Yueyun, 81 Zhang Zhang 30 Zhang Zhang Zhang

Boli, 155 Chunqiao, 46,231; arrest of, Xianyang, 47 Xun, 189,250 Youyu, 51,55 n; as president of

the Chinese Political Science Association, 55 Zhang Zongsui, 1 0 - 1 1 Zhao Baoxu, 66, 66n Zhao Ziyang, ix, 1 1 9 , 1 5 4 , 2 2 7 , 2 3 2 , 234; chairman of Commission for Deliberations on Political Institutional Reform, 120; as Deng Xiaoping's successor, 231; and On Heads of State, 107 Zheng Yan (pseudonym for Yan Jiaqi), 44n Zhou Dang. See Tang Tsou Zhou Enlai, ix, 53n, 184,188; death of, 28 n; investigation of, 21; mourning of, 200; speech of (1967), 20 Zhou Jie, 119 Zhu Houze, 129 Zhu Rong (god of fire), 204 Zhu Xi, 6 Zhuo Lin (wife of Deng Xiaoping), 2 37 Zinhai Revolution of 1911,188-89

Index

I 285

Production N o t e s Composition and paging were done on the Q u a d e x C o m p o s i n g System and typesetting on the C o m p u g r a p h i c 8 4 0 0 by the design and p r o d u c t i o n staff of University of H a w a i i Press. T h e text and display typeface is Sabon. Offset presswork and binding were d o n e by T h e Maple-Vail Book M a n u f a c t u r i n g G r o u p . Text paper is Glatfelter Offset Vellum, basis 5 0 .