Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon 1856490564, 9781856490566

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
Prologue
Beginnings
Necessity and problems of Palestinian oral history
Notes
1. Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon A Historical/Political Overview
Israel and Lebanon
The United States: present/absent superpower
Lebanon as ‘host*
The regional framework
The Palestinian Resistance movement: external/internal factors
Notes
The First Decade: Remembering Palestine, Learning Lebanon
The founding of Shateela
The setting
The camp as habitat
Work, iacome, living standards
Neighbours
Internal potttks
‘The educational revolution’
Health: conditions, services, indigenous practices
Social stractve
Village customs
Shateela expuds
Notes
3. The 1960s, Rule of the Deuxième Bureau
The stole moves to
Transfer attempts
Arms and dandestinity
Plastic sandals and certificates
Popular culture
The Iasi days of the Deuxième Bureau
Notes
4. ‘Days of the Revolution’, 1969-82
Flags and euphoria
The new authority
Autonomy: trial and error
External attacks and internal clashes
BaUding a ’revolutionary environment’
Changes in popular culture
Families aad the Resistance movement
A separate economy
Farewell to the feda'yeea
Notes
5. The Massacre
Notes
6. Lebanon in the Wake of the 1982 Invasion
He *Paz Americana*
Israel cots its losses
* At last there is a victor aad a vanquished*
The Syrian come-back
The Lebanese Resistance movement
Convergences and re-alignments
Notes
7. Amal Movement and the Shi’i Awakening
Historical backgrouad
‘A people oppressed in their own country’
Migration, urbanization, politicization
Mosa Sadr and Shi’ite sectarian mobilization
Amal Movement and the Civil War of 1975/6
Amal Movement from 1978 to 1985
Amal and the Palestinians
Drawing the battle lines
Notes
8. Endangered Species: Palestinians in Lebanon after 1982
Piecemeal pogrom
Hie PLO after 1982
National institutions: repression and survival
Cantk», dandesthdty, collaboration
Notes
9. The Siege of Ramadan (19 May to 22 June 1985)
‘It was a war of annihilation!*
‘What hick to have the chance to kill a Palestinian!'
‘My son still hasn't reappeared'
‘It was like the Paris Commue*
‘We didn't let the sbebab lack anything'
‘We had no medical station’
The gun is written on our foreheads'
T didn't accept being the "woman in the base*"
Their plan was to reach the Mosque and cot Shateela in half
The fall of Da’ouq
252 Living the Sieges Fighters and non-fighters
Organizing daily life
T cooked for all the sbebabV
After the siege
There are many enemies*
‘Aid now what?*
Notes
10. The One-Month Siege (29 May to 27 June 1986)
‘We began the operation of statistics*
‘Our mothers are stragglers*
‘I didn't tell them anything’
‘My biggest problem was the children’
‘We had to keep running'
They forgot that there was a war outside*
‘Many more leaders got killed this time*
The camp is our only country'
Notes
11. The Five-Month Siege (25 November 1986 to 6 April 1987)
Portrait of Emira
Umm Mohammad and her neighbours
‘We still don't have a saucepan'
How the siege started
'I didn’t worry about my children because everything is from God*
Digging for survival
A front-line family
‘Amal’s basic strategy was to destroy the camp’
la the Red Crescent hospital
*... there were people who had nothing'
The drama of bread
Outside Shateeia
Internal politics
The death of ’All Abo Towq
‘It’s true Shateela was destroyed, but we were under the nibble*
Fighter in an advanced base
Children on the street
'Hide us, mother!'
A woman cadre
‘One would rather drink salty water than lose a child*
He bunting of a food lorry
The last days of the siege
Conclusion
Notes
Epilogue
Another kind of siege
The Ta’ef Accords and the Gulf War
Shateela people
Notes
Appendix: A Brief History of the Third Siege
An account by Abu Mujahed, Chairman of the Popular Committee
Notes
Select Bibliography
Other useful sources
List of Abbreviations
Linguistic Glossary
Political Glossary
Index

Citation preview

Too Many Enemies

Rosemary Sayigh

Zed Books Ltd London and New Jersey

To Yusif, who always helped

Too M any Enem ies was fin i published by Zed Books Ltd,

7 Cynthia Street, London N I 9JF , UK, and 16S First Avenue, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey 07716, USA, in 1994 Copyright O Rosemary Sayigh, 1994. Cover designed by Andrew Corbett. Typeset by EMS Photosetten, Thorpe Bay, Essex. Printed and bound in the United Kingdom by Biddles Ltd, G uildford and King’s Lynn. All rights reserved The right of Rosemary Sayigh to be identified as the author of this work had been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library US CIP dam is available from the Library of Congress ISBN 1 8S649 OSS 6 Hb ISBN 1 8S649 056 4 Pb

Contents

Acknow ledgem ents M ap 1: Shateela in B eirut’s Southern Suburbs M ap 2: Sabra/Shateela M ap 3: Low -incom e Palestinian Settlem ents in Lebanon, 1992 Prologue

iv v vi vii 1

Part I: An Oral-Based History of Shateela Camp, 1949-82 1. Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: A H istorical/P olitical O verview 2. T h e F irst D ecade: Rem em bering Palestine, Learning Lebanon 3. T he 1960s, R ule o f the D euxièm e Bureau 4. ’ D ays o f the R evolution*, 1969-82 5. T he M assacre

15 35 68 91 117

Part D: The Production of the ’Battle of the Camps’ 6. Lebanon in the W ake o f the 1982 Invasion 7. A m al M ovem ent and the Shi’i A w aken in g 8. Endangered Species: Palestinians in Lebanon after 1982

125 157 196

Part III: Living the Sieges 9. T he Siege o f Ram adan (19 M ay to 22 June 1985) 10. T he O ne-M onth Siege (29 M ay to 27 June 1986) 11. T he Five-M onth Siege (25 N ovem ber 1986 to 6 A p ril 1987)

231 262 280

Epilogue

321

A ppendix: A B rief H istory o f the T hird Siege

332

Select B ibliography

339

List o f A b breviations

347

Linguistic G lo ssary

348

Political G lo ssary

354

Index

364

Acknowledgements

I should esp ecially like to thank Um m M u stafa, w ho first sponsored me in Shateela; and A hm ad H aleem eh, w ithout w hose help this b ook could not have been w ritten. O thers w ho w ere p articu larly generous w ith their tim e w ere D r M uham m ad al-K h ateeb, A b u and Um m M uham m ad F arm aw i, Jihad B isher, A b u M ujahed, A b u M akarem , A b u M u stafa, H ajji L ateefeh Sarees, U stadh K haled Sarees, A b u ’A li A b b as, A b u and Um m Ism a'een, and N uhad H am ed. T h an ks to W afa’ Y asseer and N P A s ta ff fo r never-failing support w ith logistics, production and zuhoorat. F o r patient explanation o f Palestinian p olitics, I w ould like to thank (besides Y u s if and Y ezid ) Shafiq and B ayan al-H ou t, Salah and Sam ira Salah, and Suhayl N atour. In the hope th at w hat I have w ritten w ill not em barrass him , I w ou ld also lik e to thank A b u ’A la , d irector o f S A M E D and the P L O D irectorate o f E conom ic A ffa irs, fo r his kind and uncon ditional help w ith recording and translation expenses. F in ally, thanks to the friends w ho helped to translate the tapes, and w hose enthusiasm and com m ents have been a valued input: N ajla F ah d , Suhayr al-U zm , Som aya K u ttab and Riham H indi.

Note on transliteration In general I have adopted a system o f transliteration th at tries to render as clo sely as possible fo r English readers how w ords are spoken in (Palestinian) A ra b ic. F o r exam ple, fo r the lon g vow el classically transcribed as ’i* I have su bstituted *ee* (as in Shateela). I have used the m ark * to indicate both *ayn and Hamza. Inevitably there are inconsistencies: in the case o f nam es already fam iliar to W estern readers (for exam ple, K h alil, W alid) I have left them in their conventional form ; also the nam es o f w ell-know n figures such as Cham oun and C hehab.

Note on names People w hose real nam es appear have given th eir perm ission. In the case o f people w ho could not be contacted, I have given fictitiou s nam es.

Map 1 Shateela in Beirat's Southern Suburb*

Officer»' Club, LDF headquarter!, overlookiiig the whole area

— — Israeli Army advance, 3 September 1982 Israeli Army positions. 13-18 September — Henri Chehab Barracks

*

Special Unit attack lines, 16-18 September Destroyed in the 1982 war

(*Dbeydi camp was ovenuo in 1976; most inhabitants were killed or evicted. Today 23% o f it's population is Palestinian. Some UNRWA services are offered.)

T h e one th in g none o f us can fo rget is th at violen ce has been an extraord in arily im portant aspect o f ou r lives. W hether it has been the violen ce o f ou r uprootin g and the destruction o f ou r so ciety in 1948, the violen ce visited on us b y ou r enem ies, the violence we have visited on others, o r, m ost h orrib ly, the violen ce w e have w reaked upon each oth er - these dim ensions o f the Palestinian experience have brought us a good d eal o f atten tion , and have exacerbated o u r self-aw areness as a com m unity set ap art from others. Edw ard W . S aid , A fter the L ast S k y (1986)

Should w e not have som e other task T han digging graves A n d seeking new w ords fo r a eulogy T o m ake it seem unlike the one T h at we*d ju st w ritten? H ow sm all these flow ers are H ow deep is all this blood . M ahm oud D arw eesh (translated b y R . K abban i)

T here are those w ho build palaces and those w ho d ig graves. Proverb current in the Palestinian cam ps

Prologue

Beginnings T he idea to research and w rite this b o o k cam e a fter the first A m al attack against Shateela and the other B eirut cam ps in M ay/June 1985, w hen I clim bed into Shateela through hills o f rubble to find friends. I had visited Shateela occasion ally before 1982, but on ly began frequent visits afterw ards, w ith the intention o f researching the experiences o f Palestinian w om en. B y 1985, after a d ifficu lt in itiation p eriod , I w as beginning to feel at hom e. A t this tim e, to o , Shateela and Palestinians in Lebanon seem ed to have com e through the w orst o f the violence unleashed against them by the Israeli invasion and its afterm ath. T o see this sm all com m unity attacked again , this tim e b y ‘brothers’ , w as so shockin g th at I put aside other w ork to try to grasp it, both as an ob jective event w ith historical causes and as an inner experience that on ly survivors could recount. M y sense o f shock w as p o litical as w ell as m oral. T he attackers and the attacked w ere fellow A rab s and fellow M uslim s, and had fou gh t together against the Israeli invasion in 1982, and in resistance to the occupation o f South Lebanon. F u rther, this battle w as fratricid al in class as w ell as n ational and religious term s: the A m al m ovem ent represented a subordinate group w ithin the Lebanese d ass/sect system , and A m al fighters cam e from the sam e broad socioeconom ic strata as cam p Palestinians. D eath and destruction on both sides w ere staggering, w ith A m al casualties even higher than those o f the Palestinians; yet, in spite o f this, the A m al attacks continued w ith Lebanese A rm y support fo r three years, a duration that differentiated this episode from the b rief clashes betw een allied m ilitias that occurred on both sides o f the ‘G reen L ine’ in L ebanon’s C iv il W ar. T he ‘B attle o f the Cam ps* seem ed to illustrate on ly to o w ell how low -incom e strata in ‘p lu ralist’ societies are m anipulated to attack each other; the fighters die w hile the leaderships stay in place. T h e length and seriousness o f the episod e suggested the need to exam ine the connections between external p ow ers, internal leaderships, econom ic interests and popular p olitical

2

Too M any Enemies

culture th at cause confrontations such as this. Shateela in m id-1985 w as not a fortress bristling w ith Resistance fighters but a sm all cluster o f low -incom e housing filled w ith fam ilies, am ong whom a handful o f ex-fighters had individual w eapons. T he cam p’s sm all size, less than 1 square kilom etre, deprived it o f strategic depth. Surrounded on tw o sides b y higher ground, its innerm ost alleys w ere visible to A m al and A rm y snipers posted in high buildings all around. O n ly a few buildings inside the cam p w ere m ore than one o r tw o storeys high, th eir w alls o f breeze b locks and thin cem ent roofs offerin g the flim siest o f defence against heavy artillery. F o u r sm all sem i-underground shelters could not hold m ore than p art o f the p op u lation , p articu larly in the later sieges when Palestinian inhabitants o f the surrounding area fled into Shateela. T he first attack was so sudden th at there w as no tim e to m ake fortification s. People say o f the figh ters, ’T h ey defended Shateela w ith th eir flesh.* It is true. In ration al m ilitary term s, Shateela w as indefensible. Surrounded, outnum bered, outgunned, cu t o ff from all supplies, pounded fo r six-hour stretches b y m issiles norm ally used against arm ies, Shateela should have fallen n ot once but m any tim es. T he fact that it did not challenges ou r fram es o f analysis. It is im portant to rem em ber, to o , th at Shateela’s resistance w as not the result o f a leadership decision nor even o f ’revolutionary discipline*. C ertain ly a lon g h istory o f n ational struggle and R esistance m ovem ent id eology played a role. But the siege testim onies m ake very clear the spontaneity and frag ility o f the organization o f defence. T here w as no conscription: people w ere free to flee o r stay, to figh t o r sit in the shelter. W hereas o fficia l accounts w ould have edited ou t shortcom ings, betrayals and internal co n flicts, thereby reducing courage to the level o f a taken-forgranted nationalism , people’s accounts show th at m orale and m orality w ere n ot in variab ly high, liie r e w ere m om ents o f despair, and internal p o litical con flicts. T here were accusations over the distribution o f supplies. There w ere som e people w ho exp loited shortages, o r stole from p u blic stocks, o r spied fo r A m al. R ather than detracting from the epic o f the sieges, this frankness enhances the sum ood (steadfastness) o f ord in ary people because it show s them resisting in spite o f shortcom ings w ithin their ow n grou p. T he siege testim onies are valu able in the w ay th at they show a sm all Palestinian com m unity actin g under crisis and m ore o r less cut o ff from national-level leadership. A part o f the cu ltu ral substructure o f Palestinian popular struggle is revealed here in a w ay that w ould not be possible in o fficial histories. T he term s used b y Shateela people them selves to explain th eir sum ood draw on a religious and nationalist language: ’ou r faith in God*; ‘ou r b elief in ou r cause*; ‘we w ere in the right*. T his broad popular view is w ell expressed b y one o f m any Umm M uham m ads:

Prologue

3

W e w ere besieged five m onths and the w orld said, ‘ L et them be destroyed.* B ut insh'allah we sh all rem ain stron g and hold o u r heads high. W e have a cause. O u r go al isn’t L ebanon. I f they offered m e the w hole o f L ebanon, I’d tell them it’s not equal to one Palestinian olive. A n oth er very w idespread, religious-based idea is th at the aggressor is in the w rong and thus is bound to fa il. T h at people d o not read ily o ffer w hat in the W est w ould be considered 'rational* o r 'realistic* explanations does not m ean th at they discount the m aterial resources, technical m eans and hum an qualities needed to resist - on the co n trary, these are carefu lly w eighed and described in the siege narratives. It is im portant that secular readers should not take such rem arks as signs o f an unchanging essence, 'fatalism *, that characterizes M uslim s. E qually they should not be dism issed as 'selfdeception* o r 'p iou s form ulas*. W e can be sure th at religious/nationalist faith d oes help people su rvive ordeals - the accounts suggest som e o f the w ays in w hich this w as true - but we can also be sure that faith d id not protect people from m om ents o f fear and despair. T here is also evidence o f breakdow n, though this m ainly occurred after the sieges ended. H ard ly aw are o f Shateela’s history when I chose it as a research m ilieu, I discovered on ly grad u ally the reasons th at, w ith S a b ra ,1 it w as singled o u t to bear the m ain force o f A m al/arm y attack . O ne reason w as its strategic p osition close to large, m ainly Sunni quarters o f W est B eiru t, and betw een Beirut and the m ainly Shi’ite southern suburbs. A n oth er w as its h istory, w ith Sabra and F akh an y, as the m antaqa ra’isiyyeh (headquarters, centre) o f the R esistance m ovem ent up to 1982. T h ird , its sm all size m ade it ap p ear to the attackers as the 'w eak link* in the chain o f defence o f P alestinian autonom y in L ebanon, the easy prize w hose fa ll w ould d em oralize and w eaken all the other cam ps. Instead, the opposite happened: b y pinning dow n a large p rop ortion o f the attackin g forces, Shateela helped th e oth er cam ps to resist o r avoid sim ilar attacks. O n ly D a ’ou q , the tin y u n o fficia l cam p in the heart o f S abra, having ju st tw o alleys w ith abou t sixty fam ilies, w as overrun. T h e sum ood o f Shateela and the oth er besieged cam ps, B o u ij Barajneh a n d R ashidiyyeh, altered the course o f Lebanese and Palestinian history in several w ays. In L ebanon, A m al’s bid to m onopolize the representation o f th e S h i’ite com m unity w as aborted both b y its attack on the cam ps and its fa ilu re to crush them . S yria’s p roject fo r a new ord er in Lebanon, based on th e three m ain sectarian m ilitias, w as also frustrated, in spite o f the T rip a rtite A ccord s.2 T he 'B attle o f the Cam ps* had deeper consequences in the Palestinian p olitical arena, further discrediting Syria (seen as the real o rigin ato r o f A m al attacks) and breaking up the Syrian-backed N ational S alvation F ront w hich had threatened to split the Palestine Liberation O rgan ization (P L O ). It w as during the third siege that the Popular F ront fo r

4 Too M any Enemies the L iberation o f Palestine (P F L P ) and Palestine Struggle F ron t (P S F ) left the Palestine N ation al S alvation F ron t (P N S F ) to rejoin the P L O E xecutive C om m ittee. T he resistance o f the cam ps thus contributed d irectly to the reun ification o f the P L O , realized at the 18th P N C m eeting in A lgiers in A p ril 1987. It had been suggested that the ‘ B attle o f the Cam ps* also fed into the anger and pride th at fuelled the Intifada spirit in the O ccupied T erritories.1 H ow ever, m y ow n concern w as less w ith the p o litical consequences o f Shiateela’s resistance than to record the experiences o f its people - figh ters, cadres, volunteer defence w orkers, m others, children - o f each siege episode as it ended. M ost o f the siege recordings w ere carried o u t in the first w eek o r tw o a fter cease-fires, so th at the phases o f the sieges - th eir ups and dow ns as w ell as in dividu al incidents and feelings w ere still fresh in p eop le's recollection s. A fte r the ending o f the th ird siege, the Syrian A rm y set u p a ch eckp oin t a t the en try o f the cam p and it becam e increasingly d ifficu lt to enter. It w as then th at I began w ork fo r the other tw o m ain sections o f this b ook: one is a historical analysis o f developm ents in the Lebanese arena betw een the Israeli invasion o f 1982 and the beginning o f the 'B attle o f the Cam ps* in M ay 1985; the oth er is a reconstruction o f Shateela's history from its establishm ent in 1949 up to the invasion. A lth ou gh conditions w ere not conducive to the m aking o f an ethno-history, I used the sam e m ethod o f o ral record in g as I had used fo r the siege experiences, intending thereby to give a voice to different social sectors and p olitical points o f view .

Necessity and problems of Palestinian oral history T he m any kinds o f cu ltu ral m anifestation th at have accom panied the In tifad a poin t to the p o litica l im portance o f such w ork in reflecting, sustaining and am p lifyin g p o litical action . T h e Palestinian press has provided w ritten and photographic coverage o f the d aily events o f revolt and repression in spite o f censorship, closures and the arrest (som etim es assassination) o f jou rn alists. Film s have been m ade, art exhibitions have been held, pop u lar dram a groups have given perform ances. R ealization o f the im portance o f pop u lar resistance has produced new kinds o f research, m edia and p o litical/so cial w ritin g, fo r exam ple close-up reports o f sm all m ilieus, the W om en’s Resource C entre in N ablus, and a p opu lar w om en’s m agazine published b y the W om en’s Studies C en tre, Jerusalem .4 N ews from the Intifada speaks d irectly to other struggles, w hether national, class o r racial/eth n ic. T h e Palestinian struggle should have its place in w orld 'op p osition al literature*. O ral h istory is a valu able to o l fo r recording p op u lar struggles but it is one th at has so fa r been little used b y Palestinian historian s.1 T here are m any reasons fo r th is, both circum stantial and cu ltu ral. E xile and dispersion

Prologue

5

separated the Palestinian intelligentsia from their h istoric environm ent, from each oth er and from the m ass o f refugees in the cam ps - a t m any tim es in L ebanon those w ishing to visit cam ps have had to ap p ly fo r o fficial perm its. In L ebanon also , national archive collections have been attacked and p illaged . In other areas n ational cu ltu ral w ork has been discouraged b y state surveillance. A m on g the cu ltu ral reasons are a trad ition o f history w riting that values w ritten sources over popular speech, as w ell as the assum ption th at it is to leaderships that historians should lo o k in explaining cau sality in h istory. H ow ever, one o f the m ost strikin g characteristics o f the Palestinian national struggle has been the spontaneity o f its uprisings, and the problem atic relationship betw een these and the national leadership. E arly peasant uprisings against land sales to Jew ish colonists occurred before the form atiçn o f a national leadership, in the O ttom an period.* T he G reat R evolt o f 1937-39 w as peasant-based and largely autonom ous.7 Even in periods w ithou t an y n ation al leadership, fo r exam ple betw een 1948 and 1964, the Palestinian people sustained m any kinds o f p olitical action in m any p arts o f the m enfa (exile, dispersion). T he necessity o f recording this w idespread and m ultiform struggle is m ore urgent now than ever. O n the one hand , the generation th at can rem em ber the G rea t R ebellion, the exodus and the first years o f exile o r Israeli ru le, is vanishing. A t the sam e tim e the d iaspora is w idening, w ith old settlem ents o f refugee Palestinians being broken up b y new w aves o f m igration. A n y settlem ent o f the M iddle East based on lim ited autonom y fo r the O ccupied T erritories is likely to be follow ed b y repression o f Palestinian com m unities and national cu ltu ral w ork throughout the A ra b region. O ne o f the values o f o ral h istory th at p ossib ly accou n ts fo r the coolness tow ards it o f state cu ltu ral institutions and national leaderships is its potential fo r revealing social struggles contain ed w ithin the history o f nation-states o r national liberation m ovem ents. In the Palestinian case, these are n ot alw ays revealed d irectly but m ay be read ’betw een the lines* o f the narratives o f ord in ary people. Even in regard to gender, a sensitive issue w hich is kept ou t o f the arena o f con troversy b y an array o f ideological m eans, kinds o f protest em erge w oven in to the stron g nationalist feelings th at Palestinian w om en express. Protest against class hierarchy is also revealed, not on ly exp licitly b y m em bers o f progressive Resistance groups but also im plicitly by others w ho m ay profess to abh or com m unism on religiou s grounds. O ften such protest is articulated in the form o f proverbs w hich o ffer a vehicle fo r ideological debate in popular m ilieus. It w as from p io u s, m iddle-aged wom en that I heard several highly radical proverbs. O ne is q u oted at the beginning o f this b ook: T h e re are those w ho build palaces and there are those w ho d ig graves.* T w o others are: ‘T he rich eat chickens, the p o o r fall in the thistles’ , and ’T he rice is honoured, the burghul can g o hang h im self.'1 A n oth er form o f class struggle is the drive fo r education:

6 Too M any Enemies reading the S hateela histories we can feel how m uch th is d rive, alw ays couched in national term s as necessary fo r confronting the Israeli enem y, is also in p art a struggle o f the ex-peasant class to acquire a better life, and o f wom en to gain the tools to speak and w rite and act p o litically like m en. O ral history takes its place in the fram e o f p olitical action rather than academ ic w ork , yet its m ethods and interpretation need to be subjected to several kinds o f scrutiny. People's m em ories o f the past - recent o r d istant cannot but be affected b y certain facto rs, w hich researchers and readers need to take in to accou n t. T here are ob viou s questions concerning the representativeness o f particular speakers - the effects o f class, p olitical a ffiliatio n , age o r gender on w hat they say; but there is the m ore im portant question o f the effect on speech and m em ory o f the situation at the tim e o f the recording, w ith 'situation* including overall and lo cal p o litica l con dition s, m ood, the p articu lar m om ent and place o f recording, and the researcher's identity and relationship w ith the history-givers. P articular phases o f the past m ay seem good o r bad depending on their relationship to the present. People m ay speak differently depending on w hether they are in offices o r hom es, am ong fam ily and neighbours o r alone w ith the researcher. T he researcher's n ation ality, class and gender is lik ely to affect responses. B eyond such basic situ ation al factors, how people tell history is necessarily shaped b y culture: o ral histories should not be read p rim arily as a source o f historical 'fact* but rather o f historical experience and the cu ltu ral fram ew orks through w hich it is lived and recollected.9 T he situation o f Shateela people during the period o f recording (1985-89) w as one o f great insecurity and econom ic hardship. M ost o f the hom es in the cam p had been destroyed o r heavily dam aged; m any fam ilies were livin g outside in ruined o r unfinished buildings. A m al m ilitia attacks rem ained a danger until the end o f 1987, and from early 1987 the Syrian A rm y in W est B eirut began carryin g ou t m ass arrests o f Palestinians accused o f being 'A rafatists*. T he future, w hether o f Shateela, the com m unity in L ebanon o r the P L O , w as clouded in uncertainty; o n ly the beginning o f the In tifad a in D ecem ber 1987 brought a glim m er o f hope. T he problem s o f d aily life finding housing, em ploym ent, sch o olin g, health care, news o f prisoners w eighed on everyone. In flation added its w eight to other w orries. I f people were at a ll ready to record their history in such a period it can perhaps be attrib u ted to pride in the resistance o f Shateela and in the In tifad a th at follow ed . C ondition s that m ade it dangerous to speak also m ade it necessary to bear w itness. T he question has to be considered o f the effects on speech and m em ory o f Syrian co n trol o ver W est B eirut a t the tim e o f recording. In p articu lar, how d id this affect peop le's recollections o f the period o f R esistance m ovem ent autonom y: w as this seen as a 'gold en age* in con trast to the present? O r had critical view s o f the leadership been sharpened by P N SF cam paigns against

Prologue

7

A ra fa t’s ’cap itu lation ist’ policies? There were few signs o f fear: refusals to record w ere m inim al, alth ough som e requested anonym ity and others agreed to speak if p olitics w as excluded. H ow people ’edited’ th eir speech is another question. It is to be expected th at am ong oppressed groups caution in speech becom es alm ost unconscious, elim inating o r euphem izing an y reference likely to be dangerous. B ut speaking fran k ly o r circum spectly also depends to a great extent on individual ch aracter, and in sm all com m unities such as Palestinian cam ps this character difference seem s to becom e deeper, w ith som e people being know n as ja re e *(daring) and others as fearfu l. N onetheless it w as not easy to find Fateh loyalists in W est B eirut those w ho had survived the cam p battles w ere m ostly in Syrian prisons, o r ’A in H elw eh. F o r the sake o f b alan ce, I w as forced to tak e sp ecial m easures to fin d people ready to record from a F ateh perspective. I f recollections o f the ’D a ys o f the R evolution* tend to be critical, som etim es b itter, this w as n ot, I am sure, from fear o f the Syrians but fo r other reasons rooted in the politics and special situation o f ’ Lebanese’ Palestinians. T he present coloured view s o f the Resistance m ovem ent period because th at period had n ot m erely preceded the present but also in som e sense caused it. T he ’ D ays o f the R evolution’ had begun w ith high hopes o f return to Palestine; it had ended w ith the evacu ation o f the fe d a ’yeen (gu erilla figh ters) and the m assacre. T here w ere also p o litica l fears th at a 'd ip lo m atic solu tion ’ in the shape o f a state in the O ccupied T erritories w ould leave 'L eb an ese’ Palestinians w ith now here to go . A n oth er facto r p ossib ly accentuating criticism is the rootedness in the Lebanese cam ps o f the A ra b N ation alist M ovem ent (A N M )/P F L P , the m ain op p osition w ithin the R esistance m ovem ent to F ateh’s predom inance. In a broad er sense, to o , recollection s o f the p ast m ust be affected b y the em otions o f the m om ent in w hich they are recorded. T he bleakness o f the period in w hich the histories o f Shateela w ere recorded is reflected b y the speakers in different w ays. M any express nostalgia fo r the past, not on ly ’the days o f Palestine’ th at few can now rem em ber but also, in som e cases, the first years o f settlem ent when ’ U N R W A [U nited N ations R elief and W orks A gen cy] ruled, and no one had guns, and w e were all one fam ily’ ; o r fo r the early years o f the R esistance m ovem ent, betw een 1965 and 1973, before corruption b y m oney and com petitive recruitm ent. Such presentations were characterized b y a sharp d ifferen tiation betw een 'before* and ’after’ , w ith these m arked b y a p articu lar event such as 1948, the year o f the exodus; o r 1967, the year when the defeat o f the A ra b arm ies allow ed the Palestinian Resistance m ovem ent (PR M ) to take the initiative; or 1973, the year when E gypt and S yria w on a p artial victo ry in the ’O ctob er war*10 w ith m ainly negative consequences fo r the PR M . A n oth er concept o f Palestinian history encouraged b y the m om ent o f recording w as as a series o f defeats and tragedies, a special destiny o f persecution. O ne m an said about the

8 Too M any Enemies Palestinian experience in L ebanon, 4W e never had a bronze age, let alone a silver one.* W here people begin their stories and how they sequence them is shaped b y th eir vision o f the destiny o f the people to w hom they b elon g. T hus one very old w om an began her recollections w ith a description o f B ritish soldiers beating the m en o f her village w ith strips o f p rickly pear, and then jum ped b ack to her m arriage during W orld W ar I, when her husband had to flee to H aw ran to escape conscription b y the T u rks. Such dom inant m odes o f presentation arise from historical experience itself, not from situ atio n al factors such as the Syrian presence in W est B eirut, o r m y ow n identity as researcher and the w ay m y project w as perceived. In certain , m ainly p ractical, w ays m y gender and am bivalent ou tsid er/ insider status helped me. T h at I w as m arried to a Palestinian and the m other o f Palestinian children p rob ably helped reduce suspicion that I w as a spy fo r an y o f a num ber o f enem ies; and m y being a foreign m ade it easier to believe th at I w as not a supporter o f any sp ecific R esistance grou p , n or partisan in the F ateh split. B eing a foreigner and a w om an also m ade it less lik ely th at I w ould be tracked dow n and stopped b y any o f the Lebanese o r Syrian m ilitary bodies th at ruled the area. T he national boundary w as useful also as an elem ent in building rap p ort, especially in the w ay it overrides class boundaries. W hen I w ent visitin g in Shateela w ith an U N R W A sta ff nurse, people in variab ly m ade us sit on ch airs, a sym bol o f status and pow er; as a foreigner I w as free to sit on the flo o r. T h e question, how ever, is n ot so m uch w hether m y foreigner status w as an obstacle o r a help in carryin g ou t the research p roject, but rather how it affected its gu id in g concept and m ethods, its proprietorship. T he idea o f the history had n ot originated in the research com m unity, and in the circum stances in w hich we w ere livin g there w as no w ay it cou ld be transform ed in to an ethno-history. In a m ore norm al situ ation , I co u ld have taken steps to ‘indigenize* the p roject, fo r exam ple through consulting w ith representatives o f d ifferen t sectors o f the com m unity to d iscover their concepts o f their history, alon g w ith its phasing and critical m om ents, and to resolve the sensitive issue o f w ho should ‘speak for* the com m unity. I f I had been an indigenous researcher, sharing the sam e national history and p olitical culture as the research com m unity, I w ould have been able to take som e o f these steps in tu itively, and I w ou ld have had easier access b oth to their historical experiences and to the cu ltu ral fram ew orks through w hich these are rem em bered. A lth ou gh I d o not think th at m y foreignness reduced em pathy o r distorted w hat people told m e, it did affect the questions I asked, m y interpretation o f w hat people to ld m e, w hat I chose to em phasize and w hat I left ou t. O n ly through necessarily slow processes o f com paring m y interpretations w ith theirs cou ld this d efect have been overcom e. In F irst W orld /T h ird W orld cu ltu ral p o litics, a narrow line separates pre-em ption from facilitatio n . T here is alw ays the danger created b y international pow er

Prologue 9 asym m etry o f im posing W estern fram ew orks on T h ird W orld p eop le's conceptions o f th eir ow n culture and h isto ry.11 T h e on ly really authentic histories are those that groups involved in national o r social struggle produce them selves as an intrinsic part o f p o litical action. T h e question o f proprietorship ap art, the histories given b y Shateela peop le p oin t to kinds o f cu ltu ral shaping th at need to be m ade exp licit fo r n on -A rab readers. T here is, fo r exam ple, a dom inant m ode fo r tellin g the Palestine crisis, one produced b y the national intelligentsia in the course o f a lo n g stru ggle, w ith its fo ca l p oin ts in the exernal w orld , the h istory o f Zionism and G re a t Pow er p olitics in th e M iddle E ast, the B asle C onferen ce, the B alfo u r D eclaration , etc. O n ly the highly educated can fu lly m aster this com plex b ody o f know ledge, w hich reaches pop u lar levels through p o liticizatio n m ore than through sch oolin g (U N R W A and A ra b sch ool textb oo ks d o n ot adequately co ver Palestinian history) and is assim ilated in a w ay th at separates ‘the Cause* from the lives o f ord in ary people. R eligious/nationalist discourse sustains this separation b y em phasizing the sacredness o f ‘the Cause* and the im portance o f sacrifice fo r the hom eland. T h at it is ordinary people w ho m ainly sustain the cause and suffer its setbacks is an idea foreign to this discourse. Even though exile has greatly m odified the so cial structure th at reproduces this language, we still fin d rem nants o f a separation betw een the p o litical and the personal in the w ay people narrate history. It does n ot com e easily to them to see their ow n lives as a p art o f history. T h is m akes their accounts som etim es im personal and anonym ous, a tendency th at is reinforced b y the 'co llectivizatio n o f experience*, the process through w hich m em bers o f sm all com m unities exchange fragm ents o f individual experience (o r, put d ifferen tly, the dom ination o f collective experience) is achieved, and how it is reflected d ifferen tly in different social sectors. T he p oin t I w ant to em phasize here is th at transposing the personal (experiences, feelings, ideas) in to the p u b lic, p o litical record is itself a p o litica l process th at can be undertaken in research, but th at does n ot occu r b y itself, w ithout the use o f a sp ecific m ethodology. Personal stories occu r spontaneously all the tim e, as m others ta lk to th eir ch ildren, or friends visit. B ut the a rtificiality o f the recording session tends to suppress these personal anecdotes, through w hich outsiders co u ld better grasp the w ay the Palestinian tragedy has affected particu lar lives. A s w e attem pt to reach the lo cal and individual levels o f p opu lar struggles, we can never forget th at these are encom passed and constrained b y larger territorial and system ic fram ew orks that ultim ately m esh w ith the ‘w orld system *. O u r interest in Palestinian com m unities arises from the w ay th ey form a vital ideological and social base fo r contestatory action. A s an unachieved national liberation m ovem ent, the Palestinian struggle still con tain s a cap acity fo r ch allen gin g pow er arrangem ents in the M iddle E ast;

10 Too M any Enemies anti-im perialist and social reform ist them es are still stron gly voiced w ithin it, b y intelligentsias and ord in ary people. B ut Palestinian com m unities, w hether in Israel, the O ccupied T erritories o r in the A ra b d iasp ora, exist w ithin a p olitical/econ om ic/cultu ral fram ew ork characterized b y its con trad iction s, one in w hich Palestinian goals and organizations clash to a greater o r lesser degree w ith the ‘host* au th ority (Israeli o r A ra b ), each w ith its ow n legal system , definition o f the Palestinians, m ilitary/adm inistrative bodies, and educational and other system s.. A lth ou gh the Palestinian Resistance m ovem ent jum ps over A ra b state boundaries, it is also constrained b y its A rab environm ent and enm eshed in its con flicts. W hile Palestinian com m unities participate in this transnational m ovem ent, th ey sim ultan eously exist in a variety o f au thoritarian system s and respond to lo cal econom ic and p olitical pressures. It is to the specifics o f Lebanon as host country and its susceptibility to A rab and other external forces that C h ap ter 1 is d irected , since it is against this backgrou nd th at Shateela*s history needs to be read.

Notes 1. Sabra is not as is often thought a cam p, but an area in which a high proportion o f residents are Palestinian. Cam ps are officially designated areas for which the state often pays ground rent and where U N R W A provides a cam p director and other services. 2. See Chapter 6, p. 69. 3. Y . Sayigh, ‘The Intifadah Continues*, Third W orld Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 3, July 1989. 4. See for example S. Khalifeh, ‘O ur Fate, O ur House* with introduction by Penny Johnson in Middle East Report, no. 164—5, M ay/August 1990; B. Doum ani, ‘Fam ily and Politics in Salflt*, in Z. Lockm an and J. Beinen (eds) Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation (Boston: South End Press for M ERIP, 1989). See also reportage in Race and Class, e.g. ‘G aza: “ This is no rebellion - it is a war*** by M. K . M akhul, vol. X X IX , no. 4, Spring 1988. 3. A n exception is N . N azzal, who interviewed refugees from villages in North Palestine for his book The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee, 1948 (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978). B. al-H out used interviews for her study o f the Palestinian leadership, Al-Q iyadat wa al-mu’essessat al-siyasiya f i Filasteen, 1917-1948 (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1981). T. Swedenburg and S. Nim r collected oral histories in the W est Bank for dissertations on the G reat Revolt. 6. R. K halidi, ‘The Palestinian Peasantry and Zionism before W orld W ar I*, in E. Said and C . Hitchens (eds), Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question (London and New York: Verso, 1988). 7. T. Swedenburg, ‘The Role o f the Palestinian Peasantry in the G reat Revolt (1936-1939)* in I. Lapidus and E. Burke (eds), Islam, Politics and Social Movements (Berkeley: University o f C alifornia Press, 1988).

Prologue

11

8. In the third proverb, the classes are denoted by the food they eat, the wealthy by rice, the peasants by burghul. 9. See the Popular M em ory G roup, ‘Popular M emory: Theory, Politics, Method*, in R. Johnson eta l. (eds). Making H istories (M inneapolis: University o f M innesota Press, 1982). L . Passerines work is seminal: Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience o f the Turin Working Class (Cam bridge: C U P , 1987). 10. Sometimes referred to as the W ar o f Yom Kippur, the October war set in m otion Kissinger*s diplom acy and Sadat’s ‘peace initiative*. 11. T . A sad makes this point in his ‘The Concept o f Cultural Translation in British Anthropology* in J. C lifford and G . M arcus (eds), Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics o f Anthropology (Berkeley: University o f C alifornia Press, 1986).

Part I: An Oral-Based History of Shateela Camp, 1949-82

1. Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon A Historical/Political Overview

T o understand this oral-history-based accou n t o f a single Palestinian refugee cam p in L ebanon, we need to set it in a larger p olitical and historical fram ew ork that can explain its origin s, its sustainm ent and the ruptures th at divide its history up to 1982 into three distinct phases, the basis o f the three chapters to follow . T h is in trod u ctory overview w ill attem pt to la y ou t the m ain sets o f factors that constitute this fram ew ork, allocatin g to each its distin ctive role and dem onstrating how th eir interaction causes the high level o f flu ctu ation and crisis that has ch aracterized the Lebanese arena: first, the creation o f the ‘ refugee problem * testifies to the dynam ic en try o f a new fa cto r in to M iddle East and w orld p olitics, the state o f Israel, w hich has retained the m ilitary/p olitkal initiative over its A rab neighbours throughout the p eriod covered by this b ook ; second, the U nited States, w ithout w hose d ip lom atic, fin an cial and m ilitary support Israel w ould not have been able to m aintain its prim acy - engaged in a w orld superpow er struggle w ith the U S SR , the U nited States has acted since the end o f W orld W ar II to ‘freeze* the Palestinian issue in such a w ay th at solutions oth er than those acceptable to the Z ion ist m ovem ent/Israel w ould n ot be pressed outside the A ra b League and its occasional allies. T h ird , L eb an on 's characteristics as ‘host* fo r the Palestinian refugees have been shaped both b y its ow n sp ecificity as a sectarian state/society and b y com m onalities o f h istory, geograp h y and cu ltu re w hich, though harder to define than Lebanese sp ecificity, are nonetheless real as factors th at form and disrupt p olitical equ ilibria. L ebanon’s sect/class system w as reflected in every aspect o f the situation o f the refugees: their legal status, the zoning o f the cam ps, m echanism s o f co n tro l, and m odes o f in tegration in to the p olitical and econom ic system . C om m onalities have been expressed through p olitical support fo r the Palestinian struggle b y a substantial segm ent o f the Lebanese population. Its sectarian structure has also m ade Lebanon highly susceptible to regional pow er centres and transnational m ovem ents th at constitute the fou rth param eter in the fram ew ork w ithin w hich cam p histories have unfolded.

16 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 T h is ch aracteristic Lebanese ‘perm eability*1 existed before the Palestine crisis but w as exacerbated b y it, both as an A rab regional issue reflected w ith p articu lar intensity in the Lebanese p o litical arena and through the presence after 1948 o f a substantial Palestinian refugee m inority. B oth individually and jo in tly as the A ra b League, the ‘ Palestinian policies* o f the A ra b states have had varied, often .intense repercussions in Lebanon, producing flu ctu ation s both in Lebanese state policies tow ards the refugees as w ell as in attitudes tow ards them o f different sectors o f Lebanese society. A m on g the A ra b states continuously influential in L ebanon are E gyp t, S yria and Saudi A rab ia. A fter 1967, the Palestinian Resistance m ovem ent m ust be counted in to the fram ew ork as both an external and internal factor. T ow ards the end o f the period under consideration a n on -A rab region al force, Iran, enters the picture. Sim ply to enum erate states, how ever, does not exhaust the elem ents o f the fou rth param eter, w hich include transnational m ovem ents and id eologies, varian ts o f A ra b nationalism , Islam ism and M arxism . T he regional param eter has, in turn, been dom inated throughout the period under consideration b y the ‘C o ld W ar’ rivalry between the U nited States and the U S S R , in w hich the M iddle E ast w as o f m ajor im portance to both superpow ers. Such a fram ew ork is inherently unstable. From 1948 onw ards, a w hole chain o f regional events - changes o f regim e, uprisings, w ars - were reacted to im m ediately and an tith etically by different Lebanese groupings; Palestinian reactions w ere as stron g, though m uted until 1969 by state repression. It needs to be noted th at in m ost cases regional events had their m ain im pact on Palestinians in L ebanon n ot d irectly, but m ediated through the state o r ultra-M aronite groups hostile to the Palestinian presence. A clear exam ple is the stiffen in g o f state repression o f the cam ps during the presidency o f G eneral C h eh ab, a result o f the regim e’s fears o f the m obilizing effects o f the regional upheavals o f the 19S0s on Lebanese M uslim s and ‘O pposition* parties. T he m ajor regional event o f the 1960s, the 1967 w ar in w hich Israel defeated three A ra b arm ies and occupied the W est B an k, Sinai and the G o lan H eights, had m ore com plex and farreaching repercussions in L ebanon, rousing the ultra-M aronite groupings to reassert the hegem ony th at N asserism had jeop ard ized , and at the sam e tim e leavin g scope fo r the Palestinian Resistance m ovem ent to em erge, w ith its m obilizing effects on Palestinians and m any sectors o f the Lebanese. Interaction betw een the different elem ents o f the fram ew ork w as speeded up after 1968, as PR M action w as increasingly restricted to Lebanon, w hile Israel’s Lebanon p o licy becam e increasingly retaliatory and destructive, supported b y U S suspension o f condem nation. T h e A ra b states, increasingly divided, continued to intervene in L ebanon, though w ithout deterring Israeli attack; am ong them Syria gradu ally em erged, w ith tacit A ra b consent, as hegem onic. L ebanon’s ow n p o litical forces w ere fu rther

Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

17

polarized in to anti* and pro-Palestinian segm ents. T he stage w as thus set fo r the explosions th at have engulfed both peoples fo r tw o decades. T h e Israeli invasion o f L ebanon, w ith w hich the first p art o f this b ook ends, is another h istoric w atershed th at p oin ts to the w ay th at sligh t shifts in elem ents in the fram ew ork - a L iku d governm ent, Sharon as M inister o f D efen ce, R eagan in the W hite H ouse and H aig in the Pentagon - can produce d evastation fo r Palestinians and Lebanese in Lebanon. F rom the perspective o f the people o f the cam ps, the closest ‘layer* o f this interacting fram ew ork has been the Lebanese state (usually the arm y) and the refugee m anagem ent apparatus (law s, m inistries, U N R W A , the D irectorate o f Palestinian Refugee A ffa irs, etc.). T he rest o f the Palestinian com m unity in L ebanon, w ith other cam ps and em erging national institutions,3form ed a second layer. Furtherm ore, each cam p is situated in a specific region al, econom ic and social setting, w ith neighbours w ho have been friend ly o r hostile depending on the historic m om ent and degree o f sectarian m obilization. Beyond the im m ediate neighbourhood lies Lebanon’s p o litica l aren a, w ith its p lu rality o f p arties, m ovem ents and leaderships, each w ith its sp ecific Palestinian ‘stand*, and the Lebanese econom y and lab ou r law s th at have pressed Palestinian lab ou r in to the ‘inform al* sector and em igration. Beyond L ebanon lies the Palestinian diaspora w ith w hich cam p people m aintain close fam ily and p o litical links. T h e oral-based histories o f Shateela cam p are contained w ithin and shaped by these external layers, w hich are not alw ays m ade exp licit b y the speakers. T h e purpose o f this overview is to m ake them so.

Israel and Lebanon Israel's first m ajor act o f aggression against L ebanon w as through p op u lation tran sfer. B efore and during the w ar o f 1948, betw een 700,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants o f Palestine fled o r w ere expelled in to neighbourin g coun tries, am ong them Lebanon. P ortrayed b y Israel as an accident o f w ar, this exodus has been show n b y Israeli and A rab scholarship to have been the result o f Z ion ist planning.1 T h e substantial num ber o f refugees - round HO,0004 - w ho fled to L ebanon cam e m ainly from the villages o f G a lilee and the co astal cities (Jaffa [Y a ffa ], H aifa and A cre [A k k a ], th eir access facilitated b y a lon g com m on b order, a m ajor m otor road and sea routes. F am iliarity also played a role: m any kinds o f social and econom ic exchange linked the people o f northern Palestine and southern L eb an on . T he refugees form ed a ratio o f ab o u t 1:10 to the Lebanese p o p u latio n ,3 a heavy burden fo r a cou n try p o o r in n atu ral resources, w ith a high level o f unem ploym ent and outm igration. H ow ever, lo n g b efore the w ar o f 1948 an interest in Lebanese w ater and

18 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 land resources had been a p art o f Z ion ist m ovem ent th inking. A t the P aris Peace C onferen ce o f 1919» Z ion ist leaders presented a m ap o f the future state show ing its northern border running from the coast ju st south o f Sidon across the L itan i R iver to M ount H erm on: South L eban on 's cop iou s river system s w ere considered essential fo r the econom ic developm ent o f the Jew ish state.6 Israeli 'ultras* still view the L itan i as Israel’s 'natural* border. F uture Israeli m ilitary leaders acquired fam iliarity w ith South Lebanon during the 1937-39 G reat R evolt, and again in 1940/1, w hen the B ritish organized cross-border raids first against Palestinian mujahideen (guerilla fighters), and later against V ich y F rance.7 T h e Lebanese A rm y to o k alm ost no part in the w ar o f 1948 b u t b y the end o f hostilities Israel had occupied eighteen Lebanese border villages, exp ellin g the villagers b y m ethods sim ilar to those used in northern G alilee. T hese w ere even tu ally restored b y the R hodes A rm istice A cco rd s o f 1949, a docum ent th at has ruled L eb an ese-Israeli relations ever since, a t least according to the Lebanese.* F o r m ore than a decade a fter the 1948 w ar, the Israeli-L eb an ese border rem ained tranqu il as Israel focused on other areas, launching raids against the W est B ank and G a za , and jo in in g B ritain and France in 1936 in the trip artite attack against E gypt (the Su ez W ar). T he tran q u illity o f the Lebanese border w as in large m easure due to the Lebanese A rm y’s effective co n trol o f the bord er zon e, w ith Palestinians forbidden access. A s late as 1967, during the 'S ix Day* w ar, this border saw no m ilitary activity. H ow ever, L ebanon continued to figu re in Israeli strategic thinking. In 1934, B en-G urion stron gly advocated a p o licy o f d estab ilization o f L eban on , aim ed a t setting up a purely C h ristian state closely allied w ith Israel; in 1933, D ayan proposed 'w in n in g o r buying* a Lebanese A rm y o fficer w illin g to carry ou t such a schem e.* A lth ou gh the Prim e M inister at the tim e, M oshe Sharett, opposed 'adventurism * in Lebanon, this p ossib ility persisted in Israeli strategic th inking, w inning advocates am ong Israeli D efence F orces (ID F ) com m anders such as E ytan , G u r and S haron, and p ossib ly also in M ossad .10 H ow ever, such m oves d id n ot fin d a favo u rab le conjuncture u n til m uch later, a fter the em ergence o f the PR M and its transfer to Lebanon. Israel’s policies tow ards its A ra b neighbours in the 1960s m ay be sum m arized as (i) con solid atin g its ties w ith the U nited States encouraging A m erican -A rab alienation; and (ii) building up its m ilitary su p eriority. M ilitary actions up to 1967 w ere directed m ainly again st W est B ank villages, ostensibly in retaliation fo r 'infiltration* but w ith an underlying d ual aim o f either p rovo kin g the Jordan A rm y to intervene, o r discrediting it through failu re to do so (a sim ilar approach w ould be used against L ebanon after 1967). R elations between Jordan and E gypt, already strain ed , w ere m ade w orse when the A ra b League failed to act to prevent

Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

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Israel's d iversion o f the R iver Jordan. In June 1967 Israel seized a favou rab le international conjuncture to launch a lightning attack against E gyp t, Jord an and S yria, crushing their arm ies and occu p yin g all th at w as left o f historic Palestine as w ell as Sinai and the G o lan H eights. A rou n d 20,000 new refugees were created, som e o f w hom reached Lebanon. A fte r the beginning o f R esistance operations from South L ebanon, in 1964/5, Israel launched occasional retaliatory cross-border raids; but the fu ll force o f its retaliatory, destabilizing policies w as not directed against Lebanon until after 1968. It w as when the PR M in Jordan began to present a serious p o litica l challenge th at Israel began to carry attacks deep into L ebanon, hitting Lebanese as w ell as Palestinian targets, notably Beirut International A irp o rt on 30 D ecem ber 1968, w hen eleven civilian aircraft w ere destroyed. Such attacks continued to escalate and were a m ajor fa cto r in bringing abou t the C iv il W ar o f 1975/6.11 In addition to m ilitary/strategic reasons fo r Israeli attacks against L eban on , there w as the fundam ental p olitical aim o f d estroyin g the Lebanese sectarian equilibrium an d , b y pushing the M aronites tow ards p artition , p rovin g th at a plu ralist p o lity and society cou ld not exist in the M iddle E ast, thus vin dicatin g Israel's Jew ish separatism . T h is ob jective gained in im portance from the declared early aim o f the Palestinian Resistance m ovem ent to establish a dem ocratic secular state in Israel.12 E scalating after 1968, Israeli attacks against Lebanon included a ir raids such as the one that laid w aste N abatiyyeh cam p in M ay 1974, part o f a series carried ou t b y Phantom planes against Palestinian cam ps and Lebanese villages in the South . T here w ere also com m ando operation s such as th at in w hich three Palestinian leaders w ere assassinated in A p ril 1973. Lim ited cross-border raids w ere num erous, w hile in 1978 the Israeli A rm y carried ou t the 'L ita n i O peration*, an invasion in retaliation fo r a PR M sea a tta ck , during w hich an estim ated 1,000 civilian s, m ainly Lebanese, w ere killed. A rtille ry bom bardm ents from land and sea were continuous, increasing after the establishm ent o f the Israeli-controlled 'b o rd er zon e' and South L ebanon A rm y during the C iv il W a r.13 U tilizin g its m assive m ilitary su p eriority, Israel encountered little obstacle in realizin g D a ya n 's threat: 'W e w ill m ake life im possible in South Lebanon.*14 Several factors com bined to bring about the invasion o f 1982. F irst, the form ation o f a L iku d governm ent under Begin in June 1977 increased the likelih o od o f m assive intervention in Lebanon; so d id the appointm ent o f A rie l Sharon as M inister o f D efence in A u gu st 1981. T he upcom ing presidential elections in Lebanon in Septem ber 1982, w ith Bashir G em ayel a candidate, renewed Israeli am bitions fo r a separate peace w ith Lebanon. T he planners o f the invasion certainly to o k into account the pro-Israeli leanings o f the R eagan /Sch u ltz/H aig team in W ashington. T he A ra b p olitical scene suggested the unlikelihood o f m ilitant reactions. O n ly a

20 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 causas belli w as needed. Since the P alestin ian -Israeli cease-fire negotiated in Ju ly 1981 b y special en voy H abib had been adhered to b y the P R M t th e Israeli governm ent w as forced to announce th at it w ould consider a n y attack on any Israeli o r Jew ish target anyw here in the w orld as cause fo r a n attack against the PR M in L eban on .15 T hus when on 3 June the Israeli am bassador in L ondon w as shot a t b y unidentified gunm en, the stage w as set fo r the largest m ilitary operation ever m ounted b y Israel against an y o f its A ra b neighbours, one resulting in m assive loss o f life, destruction an d displacem ent.1'

The United States: present/absent superpower A m erican policies tow ards L ebanon, m ore often im plicit than exp licit, have form ed a basic determ inant o f developm ents from 1948 onw ards. Scholars have noted the deep contradictions o f U S policy: on the one hand, support fo r a coun try w hose liberal econom y, pro-W estern orientation and p arliam entary system q u a lify it fo r recognition as Triend*; on the oth er, p ractical disregard w henever L eb an on 's interests have clashed w ith those o f its southern neighbour. B oth in b rie f periods o f active intervention (1938, 1982-84) as in longer periods w hen W ashington has relegated L ebanon to the 'b a ck burner*, the U nited States has exercised a quasar-like influence over events in Lebanon. D ifferences betw een one W hite H ouse occupant and an other have been ones o f style rather than substance, h ard ly alterin g a basic view o f Lebanon as an 'expendable ally*.17 B efore 1948, L ebanon had form ed a h istoric entry point fo r A m erican influence in the M iddle E ast. A t first predom inantly cu ltu ral, A m erican interests to o k a m ore econom ic form after 1943 w hen L eban on 's independence from F rance left the cou n try open to w orld finance and trade. F ew oth er coun tries in the w orld practised such m inim al protectionism , w ith alm ost no barriers placed to the entry o f foreign cap ital and businessm en. T he U nited States w as am ong the first to benefit in term s o f its share o f Lebanese im ports, as w ell as perm its to establish bank branches and enterprises. L ebanon also offered the U nited States a stepping ston e fo r co n tact o f a ll kinds w ith the rest o f the A ra b region , facilitatin g a rapid expansion o f its financial and trade transactions as w ell as its cu ltu ral and p o litical influence. W hat had been in 1948 a sm all legation becam e the largest U S em bassy in the region. A stead ily rising flo w o f students from the w hole area left the A m erican U niversity o f B eirut (A U B ) to study in the U nited S tates, enhancing A m erican cu ltu ral and econom ic influence in the A ra b region and beyon d.1' In spite o f these grow in g interests in L ebanon, W ashington did not intervene during the 1948 w ar o r after to bring about a repatriation o f the

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refugees. D u rin g protracted negotiations on this issue, A m erican diplom ats o n the sp ot repeatedly called on the A dm in istration to convin ce Israel to accep t a t least 250,000 returnees in a bid fo r an overall settlem ent. Israel refused and W ashington backed ofT from applying the necessary pressure. T hree aspects o f this critical episode, w hich 'froze* the refugee issue fo r decades to com e, are instructive in pointing to a long-term pattern in U S -Isra eli and U S -A ra b relations: (i) A m erican o fficia ls on the spot urging com prom ising m easures w ere overridden b y W ashington after Israel had expressed op p osition ; (ii) the problem s faced b y the host countries in in tegratin g the refugees w ere n ot w eighed in the sam e scale as Insraeli objection s to repatriation (in the case o f Lebanon in p articu lar, the A dm in istration ignored early w arnings o f the dangers presented b y the refugees to the co u n try’s sectarian 'balance*); (iii) rather than put pressure on Israel to reach a settlem ent satisfying legitim ate Palestinian claim s, the U nited States used its pow er to stam p Israelifa its accom plis as 'irreversible* and A ra b op p osition as 'unrealistic*. A ll A m erican effo rt w as deployed in having the refugees absorbed b y the host coun tries.1* L ebanon’s laissez fa ire econom ic system has often been the subject o f accolades from W ashington, but U S recognition o f its parliam entary system and plu ralist society has been less frequent. W hen A m erica has intervened in Lebanon it has not been in defence o f Lebanese dem ocracy but w ith underlying regional aim s in view . T he first forcefu l U S intervention, a M arine landing, w as ordered b y President Eisenhow er on 15 Ju ly 1958. O stensibly in response to appeals fo r help from President C ham oun, under attack since M ay b y 'M uslim rebels*, the landing to o k place tw enty-four hours after a b lood y insurrection in Iraq had overturned the pro-W estern H ashem ite m onarchy. T h e intervention w orked a t the local level to ease A rm y Com m ander G eneral C hehab in to the presidency, w hile on the region al level it sent a sign al to Iraq ’s new ru ler, C o lo n el Q assem , th at the U nited States w as n ot indifferent to his policies on o il o r regional and international issues. A fte r 1968, as the first clear indications appeared o f the crisis that w ould drag L ebanon in to civil w ar, A m erican inaction w as d irectly linked to L eb an on ’s m arginality in U S M iddle E ast p o licy, focused on m aintaining the status q u o, Israel’s security and the free supply o f A rab o il to the W estern w orld. V iew in g the rise o f the R esistance m ovem ent as a th reat to its ow n hegem ony as w ell as Israel’s, W ashington scaled dow n its concern fo r L ebanon in p roportion as the Lebanese governm ent proved incapable o f 'd iscip lin in g’ the PR M fe d r i yeen active in South L ebanon. Even if a t tim es relu ctan tly, the U nited States w ent alon g w ith Israel’s p o licy o f retaliation against Palestinian and Lebanese targets in Lebanon, although these were alw ays d isp rop ortion ately destructive in relation to the p rovocation. F o r exam p le, w hen the Israelis attacked B eiru t’s civilian airp ort (D ecem ber

22 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 1968), W ashington d id not condem n this high-profile raid even though it caused a governm ent crisis, bringing L ebanon closer to the civil w ar th at w ould eventually overtake it. F ar from curbing Israeli attacks against L ebanon, the U nited States facilitated them through fin an cial and m ilitary aid program m es and, m ore im portan tly, through p rotectin g Israel from criticism in the U nited N ations (U N ). O ver seventeen years, successive U S adm inistrations used the veto o r abstained on forty-three S ecurity C ou n cil resolutions condem ning Israel.20 In 1978, when a unanim ous Security C ou n cil resolution called fo r Israel’s w ithdraw al from South L eb an on , it w as U S support th at allow ed Israel to avoid com pliance. A m erican reactions to Israeli settlem ents in the W est B an k, the bom bing o f Iraq ’s nuclear reactor in June 1981 and the annexation o f the G o lan H eights in D ecem ber 1981 were so m ild as to be negligible. A s fo r the invasion o f 1982, U S p rior know ledge and agreem ent has not been seriously questioned. T he invasion began on ly a w eek after a visit b y Sharon to W ashington w here he m et Secretary o f State H aig and Pentagon o fficials. T he U nited States w as the on ly country that did not condem n it, vetoin g a Security C ou n cil resolution callin g fo r im m ediate w ithdraw al, and claim ing the invasion w as ’defensive’ . In the first quarter o f 1982, the U nited States had supplied Israel w ith m ilitary equipm ent w orth 40 per cent m ore than in 1981. Israel’s use during the w ar o f forbidden w eapons (e.g. cluster bom bs) caused on ly a tem porary U S suspension o f arm s shipm ents.21

Lebanon as ‘host* T h e form ation o f m odem L ebanon under the French M andate left a deeply sectarian im print on its state and institutions; this shaped both Lebanon’s integration o f the refugees as w ell as the effects they w ould have on Lebanese p olitics. T h e w eakness o f the state, constructed to allow free p lay to sectarian institutions and m ercantile interests, w as a facto r determ ining m ethods o f refugee m anagem ent. T he sm all size and non-conscript nature o f the arm y, supposedly a lo o f from p o litics, w as another fa cto r shaping Lebanese reactions to the refugees, eventually givin g rise to anti-P alestinian m ilitias, a phenom enon absent from other A rab host countries. M aronite hegem ony over the state w as guaranteed through m onopoly o f the presidency and the arm y com m and, and to a lesser extent through a fixed parliam entary m ajority. N ext to the M aronites in size and influence, the Sunni M uslim com m unity had challenged M aronite predom inance th roughout the M andate; but in 1943, on the eve o f independence, M aronite and Sunni leaders reached an unw ritten pow er-sharing agreem ent (the ’ N ation al P act’ ) through w hich the highest p ositions in the state w ere

Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

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allocated perm anently to representatives o f the m ajor sects. A s p art o f the p act, the M aronites were to give up their close relationship w ith F rance, w hile the Sunnis w ould abandon their calls fo r union w ith Syria. It w as this precariou s 'equilibrium * th at the Palestinian refugees, in the m ajority Sunni M uslim , jeop ard ized .22 L eban on ’s in itial acceptance o f such a large influx o f refugees reflected this b rie f m om ent o f M aron ite-S u n n i entente , personified in President a l-K h o u ry and Prim e M inister al-S olh , architects o f the N ation al Pact. E xcept fo r A rch bish op Ignatius M u barak, no M aronite figu re m ade an open p rotest, alth ough som e are said to have expressed th eir m isgivings to W estern d ip lom ats.23 W e can assum e that this w as because o f the w idespread assum ption th at the refugees w ould be repatriated. O n ly as such hopes fad ed d id signs o f resentm ent begin to appear. In 19S1, M inister o f L ab o u r Lahoud attem pted to illegalize all em ploym ent o f Palestinians. T h at sam e year, cam paigns began in the N ational A ssem bly to prohibit the em ploym ent o f Palestinians in large com panies o r institutions. L ebanon’s prim ary im pact on the refugees w as to separate them ou t b y sect and class. M iddle-class urban Palestinians settled freely in Lebanese cities and encountered little d ifficu lty in obtain in g em ploym ent. C hristians am ong them w ere at first easily granted Lebanese n ation ality, facilitatin g travel, engaging in the Tree’ professions (m edicine, law , engineering, pharm acy), and the establishm ent o f businesses o r com panies. M iddle-class M uslim s cou ld also ob tain n ation ality b y payin g law yers and p rovin g Lebanese an cestry,24but this route w as barred to the m ass o f p oor rural and proletarian refugees. F ew restrictions w ere placed on Palestinian cap ital, oth er than the legal o b ligation to em ploy three Lebanese w orkers to every one non-Lebanese. W hile m iddle-class Palestinians benefited, at least until 197S, from L ebanon’s liberal regim e and m any institutions o f education and train in g, the m ass o f rural and p o o r city refugees suffered m aterial hardship, econom ic exploitation and loss o f civic as w ell as national rights. T h is refugee m ass settled in seventeen o fficia l cam p sites (recognized b y the state and m anaged b y U N R W A ), as w ell as in a num ber o f 'q u asicam ps’ , low -incom e agglom erations m ainly in the rural South but also near B eirut (Sabra and Q aranteena are exam ples). B y p roviding rent-free space, shelter, basic rations, facilities (w ater, sew age disposal) and social services (clin ics, sch ools), U N R W A -m anaged cam ps played a basic role in the econ om ic su rvival o f the refugees, especially in the first decade o f low w ages and lim ited em ploym ent. T he provision o f free schooling (for six- to sixteenyear old s) w as p articu larly im portant in enabling occu p ation al change and grad u ally im proving levels o f incom e and expenditure. H ow ever, no new cam p sites w ere provided after the early 1930s in spite o f natural p opu lation increase and the destruction o f fo u r o f the origin al cam ps b y w ar.23 Such space restrictions put pressure on the refugees to build o r rent

24 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateeht Camp, 1949-82 accom m odation outside the cam ps, o r to m igrate from L ebanon, and can be seen as p olitical in origin. T he origin al siting o f the cam ps w as a p roduct o f several factors: an o fficia l zon in g p o licy m ade itself felt through Lebanese A rm y m oves to reduce the num ber o f refugees in the S ou th , especially near the border; this w as done b y transfer to other areas (m ainly the Beqa*) and by declaring the border a m ilitary zon e, p roh ib itin g civilian access. A second aim th at becam e grad u ally apparent w as to prevent a refugee build-up around B eirut. P roh ibition o f perm anent housing and restrictions on the su p ply o f w ater w ere early signs o f this p o licy tow ards the B eirut cam ps. L ebanon’s sectarian m ap and the needs o f its econom y also played a role in the ch oice o f cam p sites. T he b u lk o f the refugees rem ained in m ainly M uslim , m ainly agricultu ral areas (near T yre, N abatiyyeh , T rip o li and B a’lb ek), w here they provided seasonal agricultu ral labour. C am ps w ere also set up near predom inantly M uslim urban areas (*Ain H elw eh near S id on , B addaw i near T rip o li, B o u ij B arajneh in B eirut’s southern suburbs) w here th ey form ed a cheap lab ou r p o o l fo r p u blic and private construction. W henever they could m anage to , Palestinians m igrated to the urban cam ps because o f the better chances these offered o f em ploym ent and education, and the easier clim ate. T hus the urban cam ps - especially those near B eirut becam e receiving areas fo r Palestinians from d ie rural hinterlands. T he authorities used every m eans to stem this flo w , from eviction to refusal to tran sfer registration , but failed fo r reasons th at a m an w ho m oved to Shateela in the 19S0s w ill later m ake dear.*? T here w as a sharp contrad iction betw een state attem pts to prevent concentrations o f Palestinians around B eirut and the dem and o f Lebanese industry fo r cheap labou r. Lebanon’s forem ost industrial zone w as located in M kalles, in w hat w ould becom e know n as the ’ M aronite enclave*, and it w as th is th at attracted so m any Palestinian and Lebanese M uslim w orkers to settle in cam ps and shanty tow ns in E ast B eirut - T e ll a l-Z a ’ter, Q aranteena, Jisr al-B ash a, B o u ij H am m oud. D uring the C iv il W ar o f 1975/6, a ll these w ould be attacked , razed and their inhabitants expelled b y the M aronite m ilitias. A fte r 1976, the o n ly Palestinians to rem ain in predom inantly M aronite areas were C hristian. Lebanese law s form ed a basic source o f constraints upon the refugee com m unity. D efined as ’ foreigners* w ith rights to indefinite residence, a ll those refugees w ho kept their Palestinian identity were obliged to ap p ly fo r w ork perm its, effectively con fin in g them to w ork avoided by Lebanese lab o u r, i.e. agricultu re, construction and the ’inform al sector’ . In add ition they w ere barred from w orking in governm ent and foreign com panies o r institutions, and could on ly practise the ’free professions* by jo in in g syndicates, con ditional on Lebanese n ationality. T he absence o f a clear code regulating Palestinian rights and duties allow ed the state to operate a

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‘p olitics o f convenience*, using the Palestinians* need fo r vita l docum ents (m ainly w ork perm its and travel docum ents) as a m eans o f exercising p o litical pressure, o r individual extortion . T he su pply o f w ork perm its also responded to flu ctu ation s in the Lebanese econom y's lab ou r needs. D epartm ents o f the state th at d ealt w ith the refugees - m ainly the m inistries o f the in terior, lab ou r and foreign affairs - could issue their ow n decrees, enabling o fficia ls to exp loit refugee needs fo r th eir ow n ends. R ules, procedures and fees w ere constantly changed, producing à situation o f confusion and dependence on w aasta (connections, bribes). A basic elem ent in m anagem ent o f the refugees w as the d ivision o f lab ou r betw een U N R W A , the U N agency established in 1950 to m aintain them , and the Lebanese state w hich con trolled them . State co n trol w as carried o u t through an array o f bodies th at changed over tim e, depending on presidential regim e and the dictates o f national security. T w o m ajor shifts in state p o licy caused sharp transitions in p olitical conditions in the cam ps, d ivid in g the p eriod from 1949 to 1982 in to three separate 'chapters*. T h e first o f these cam e tow ards the end o f the 1950s, w ith the change from President C ham oun, w ho relied m ainly on general security and the M u fti's follow in g fo r indirect con trol o f the cam ps, and President C hehab w ho installed the Arm y*s Intelligence Bureau d irectly in every cam p (the foreign and dom estic p o licy reasons fo r this m ove w ill be discussed later). T h e second m ajor sh ift cam e in 1969, after a series o f cam p uprisings supported by the Lebanese N ational m ovem ent (L N M ) forced the authorities to w ithdraw , leavin g the cam ps as ‘liberated zones* in the charge o f a Palestinian fo rce, the K ifah M usellah (A rm ed Struggle), in accordance w ith the C a iro A ccord s o f N ovem ber 1969.27 T h e autonom y o f the cam ps lasted until the Israeli invasion o f 1982. T h ou gh disenfranchised as refugees, the Palestinians w ere ‘ w ritten in* to the Lebanese p o litical system even before th eir arrival. A s alread y noted, C hristian Palestinians w ere encouraged to take Lebanese nationality (just as A rm enian refugees had been before them ). Several parliam entary leaders, M uslim as w ell as C h ristian , tried to recruit Palestinian follow in gs b y offerin g them naturalization. But in general Palestinians were attracted to the secular nationalist/progressive parties w hich, fo r convenience, I sh all group together under d ie label ‘O pposition*. A lth ou gh attraction to the 'O pposition* parties affected a ll Palestinian strata, m em bership w as m ainly an u rban, m iddle-class phenom enon; people in the cam ps w ere to o absorbed b y the d aily life struggle, and distrusted parties as destructive o f n ational unity. Shateela people’s histories suggest th at th ey w ere exposed to p olitical recruitm ent earlier than other cam ps because o f closeness to Beirut. A m on g the parties and m ovem ents appealing to Palestinians w ere the Parti P opu laire Syrien (P P S), the Lebanese Com m unist P arty (L C P ), the B a'th , and th e A ra b N ation alist m ovem ent (A N M ). A p a rt from th eir activism , the

26 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 source o f the appeal o f a ll except the L C P w as the cen trality they gave to the Palestine issue. It w as, how ever, A ra b nationalism in its N asserist form th at had m ost effect on the people o f the cam ps, esp ecially after the E gyptian President's nationalization o f the Suez C an al (1956). N asserism appeared threatening to the authorities and m ost o f the M aronite leadership not so m uch because o f its effect on the Palestinian refugees, but because it offered a catalyst o f fusion betw een the Palestinians and the Lebanese Sunni ‘street’ ,21 as w ell as the other 'O pposition* groupings. Perceptions o f this threat coincided w ith the rise to national prom inence o f the K a ta 'eb Party. Form ed in 1936, it had rem ained m arginal even in the M aronite com m unity, its leaders not part o f the oligarch ic elite. Its chance cam e in 1958 when President C hehab (1958-64) brought Pierre G em ayel in to the governm ent; the K a ta ’eb benefited from its association w ith the C hehab regim e, building ties w ith the A rm y's Intelligence B ureau, the new president's chosen instrum ent to break the pow er o f the oligarch s, and con trol the increasingly politicized M uslim m asses. Predisposed from the beginning to perceive the refugees as a threat to M aronite hegem ony, the K a ta ’eb becam e the ideological and m ilitary spearhead o f a civilian antiPalestinianism unique to L ebanon,29 w hich w ould reach its clim ax during the C iv il W ar o f 1975/6, and in the form ation o f the Lebanese F orces (L F ) under the leadership o f B ashir G em ayel. C on tacts w ith the Z ion ist m ovem ent preceded the establishm ent o f Israel, feeding into K a ta 'eb i antiPalestinianism and layin g the grounds fo r cooperation in 1975/6 and again in 1982.» L ebanon as a p o lity had fa r m ore com plex and flu ctu atin g effects fo r Palestinians than d id the m ore au th oritarian regim es o f Jordan and S yria. O n the one hand they enjoyed the benefit o f a p lu ralist p o litical system , o f w hich a substantial segm ent supported them ; in add ition , there w as L eb an on 's relatively free press and the scope allow ed to Palestinian cu ltu ral in stitutions. O n the oth er, there w ere episodes o f violen t suppression b y the Lebanese A rm y and b y sectarian m ilitias, first M aronite, then S h i'ite. G iven L eb an on 's built-in sectarian tensions, such a pattern o f support and attack cou ld hardly have been avoided. B ut it w as external forces th at m ade this d ialectic so m uch m ore uncontrollable and devastating.

The regional framework L eb an on 's 'perm eability* is rooted in a lon g h istory o f foreign interven tion, stretching back to O ttom an tim es; in a population fragm ented into sects trad ition ally linked to foreign o r regional pow ers; and in a w eak state constructed (as noted earlier) so as both to leave pow er to sectarian institutions and to preserve M aronite dom ination. T he crises th at have

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shaken L ebanon since its independence can o n ly be understood b y situ atin g, the coun try w ithin an international and regional fram ew ork th at con tin u ally generates shifts w hich, because o f its history and sectarian com p osition , have effects on d ifferent sectors o f the Lebanese people. Palestinians have been o n ly one elem ent in this continual interaction between external and internal forces. E very state in the region has had its ‘ Lebanon policy*, and a com plete discussion cou ld not om it the interventions o f Saudi A ra b ia , Jordan, Iraq, A lgeria, L ib ya and Iran as w ell as those o f E gypt and Syria: interventions that have taken m ultiple form s, such as fin an cial o r m ilitary aid to one o r m ore o f the co n flictin g parties, recruiting follow in gs, subsidizing newspapers, sending arm ed forces and attem pting m ediation. M ost regional states have eq u ally carried on policies tow ards Palestinians in Lebanon: sending d onations, m aking statem ents o f support, allow in g o r refusing entry to m igrant w orkers. T h ree form s o f intervention have been p articu larly im portant: first, the opening o f m ilitary training bases to Palestinians; second, President Nasser*s cam paign to establish the P L O and have it recognized b y the A ra b L eague; th ird , the form ation o r b ackin g b y certain A rab states o f specific Resistance grou ps.’ 1 But m ore im portant than sp ecific state policies (w ith the exception o f Syria and E gypt) have been the p o litical upheavals and w ars w hich have altered regional balances, established new regim es o r created new m obilizing currents. Such events have been fa r to o num erous to be listed in this b rie f introduction so I sh all take o n ly three exam ples, one in each decade, a ll o f them prod u cin g changes in the Lebanese p o litical aren a, and in the situation o f Palestinians. In the 1950s, as a result o f the d efeat o f 1948, a series o f upheavals to o k place th rou ghou t m ost o f the A ra b region: the E gyptian revolu tion o f 1952, E gyp tian -S yrian union in 1957, the Iraqi revolution o f Ju ly 1958, and the collap se o f the U S-sponsored B aghdad P act. C ham ou n 's relatively casu al co n tro l o f the refugees had been p artly based on his confidence in the predom inance o f the W estern pow ers (in particular the U S) in the region. T h e rise o f N asserist A rab nationalism sh ook this predom inance and effectively ended L eban on 's b rie f im m unity from A rab pressures. C hehab’s response w as dual: to placate Lebanese Sunnis through a pro-E gyptian A rab p o licy, and to in stall a regim e o f surveillance and repression in the cam ps. T h is w as aim ed a t preventing tw o kinds o f p o litical action: recruitm ent o f Palestinians in to Lebanese ‘ O pposition* parties and m ovem ents, and the form ation o f Palestinian R esistance cells, through w hich cam p youth w as sent fo r m ilitary trainin g in other A ra b coun tries.’ 2 S tiff co n trol o f the cam ps also helped placate M aronites angered b y C hehab’s pro-E gyptian foreign p olicy. In add ition , it deterred con tact betw een the Palestinian intelligentsia outside the cam ps and the m asses w ithin.”

28 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 T he m ost im portant regional event o f the 1960s w as Israel’s defeat o f the arm ies o f E gyp t, Jordan and S yria in the ‘S ix D a y ’ w ar, w ith w idespread repercussions throughput the w hole area. Israel now occupied Sinai and G o lan as w ell as the W est Bank and G a za , shifting the strategic aim s o f these three neighbouring A rab states to a recovery o f national territory. T he defeat o f 1967 also m arked the decline o f Nasserism as a p olitical force in the M ashreq, a decline alread y presaged b y the failu re o f unity negotiations betw een E gyp t, S yria and Iraq. A third result w as th at the form erly clandestine Palestinian Resistance m ovem ent w as enabled to capture the in itiative and becom e a force in regional p olitics. T he m ultiple and profound effect o f the PR M on L ebanon w ill be outlined in the last section o f this chapter. But it should be noted here that it w as m oves m ade by Jordan and S yria in 1970/1 to exclude o r constrain the fe d a ’yeen that brought about their transfer to Lebanon. O f regional events in the 1970s, undoubtedly the m ost far-reaching in its effects fo r Lebanon as w ell as fo r the PR M w as President S ad at’s ‘peace initiative*, beginning w ith his visit to Jerusalem in N ovem ber 1977 and ending w ith the C am p D avid A ccord s (Septem ber 1978). Sadat’s defection term inated Palestinian and A ra b pressures on the C arter A dm in istration to convene a M iddle East peace conference w hich w ould recognize Palestinian national righ ts.34 Parts o f the A ccord s regarding the O ccupied T erritories an end to Israeli settlem ents and self-rule - were not im plem ented. T h is developm ent also deprived L ebanon o f a balancing fa cto r in the M ashreq, one that m ight have restrained Syrian intervention, w hich to o k a decisive turn during the 1975/6 C iv il W ar, and perhaps also m ight have deterred the Israeli invasion o f 1982. Syrian hegem ony w as to becom e, alon g w ith Israeli attacks, the dom inant feature o f L ebanon’s p o st-1975 existence, accepted b y the A ra b League states and the superpow ers. T he form ation o f an antiSadat Steadfastness F ront com posed o f S yria, the P L O , Yem en, A lgeria and L ib ya d id not pose a serious obstacle to Israeli aggression because o f bitter co n flict between Syria and Iraq. A second 1970s regional event w ith repercussions in L ebanon w as the Islam ic R evolu tion in Iran in 1979. A lth ou gh Palestinians saw the fa ll o f the Shah as a d efeat fo r U S influence in the M iddle E ast, the em ergence o f a th eocratic S h i’ite pow er centre also had negative effects fo r the PR M , w idening the rift w ithin it between Islam ic and progressive/secular currents, and reinforcing the sectarian consciousness o f Lebanese Shi’ites.

The Palestinian Resistance movement: external/internal factors In gestation between 1948 and 1967, the Resistance w as enabled to em erge in 1967 in a m om ent o f A ra b d efeat and disarray. Its call fo r im m ediate arm ed

Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

29

m ass actio n appealed to exiled Palestinians, esp ecially the you n g, the intelligentsia and the people o f the cam ps. B ut the PR M also appealed over the heads o f often unpopular governm ents to m any sectors o f A ra b p op u lation s, generating m edia coverage, volunteers and support groups. Lebanon w as deeply affected , not so m uch because o f its large Palestinian com m unity, although this w as a fa cto r,,s but also because the rise o f the PR M as a regional force coincid ed w ith deepening crisis in L ebanon, a crisis that had social and cu ltu ral aspects as w ell as politico-econom ic ones.14 T he em ergence o f the R esistance m ovem ent after 1967 w as preceded b y the o ffic ia l A ra b League establishm ent o f a representative 'entity*, the Palestine L iberation O rgan ization (P L O ). It w as President N asser w ho sponsored this vita l step, callin g the 1st A ra b Sum m it C onference (A lexa n d ria , January 1964) w hich gave Shu kairy his m andate to consult the scattered Palestinian com m unities. Shu kairy convened the first Palestine N atio n al C o u n cil (P N C ) in Jerusalem in M ay 1964 from w hich issued the P L O , th e Palestine L ib eration A rm y (P L A ) and the E xecutive C om m ittee. Because o f K in g H ussein's claim s to represent the Palestinians, a second im portant step fo r the P L O cam e w hen the 7th A ra b Sum m it (R ab at, 1974) recognized it as 'so le legitim ate representative o f the Palestinian people*. T he P L O ’s representativeness w as reinforced b y its grow ing acceptance b y the Palestinians o f the O ccupied T erritories. International recognition w as w on w hen the P L O w as adm itted to the U N as an observer (N ovem ber 1974, R esolution 3236). T h e R esistance (o r 'A rm ed Struggle*) m ovem ent had different social roots from the P L O , origin atin g w ith Palestinians w ho, after 1948, jo in ed various A ra b arm ies. F ateh gradu ally em erged as the dom inant one am ong a num ber o f sm all, scattered clandestine netw orks, a prim acy based on the so lid arity o f its co re grou p , organ ization al sk ill and com m encem ent o f attacks inside Israel in 1964/5. F ateh also in itiated resistance in the W est B ank in the w ake o f the 'S ix Day* w ar. In add ition , F ateh to o k m ore pains than oth er groups to b uild the social infrastructure needed fo r a lon g struggle. T he m ain op p osition to F ateh w ithin the Resistance m ovem ent orien tation and, after 1967, turned tow ards M arxism . T he D em ocratic F ron t fo r the L iberation o f Palestine (D F L P ) sp lit o ff from the P F L P in 1969, grow ing sim ilarly ou t o f the A N M but takin g less irredentist stands. O th er sm aller groups w ere gen erally the creation o f Palestinians close to one o r other o f the A ra b states, and d id n ot propose rad ically different ideologies o r strategies.17 A n im portan t step fo r both the P L O and P R M w as th eir fu sion a t the Sth P N C (C a iro , 1969), when A ra fa t w as elected P L O chairm an. R elations betw een these tw o distinct sectors o f the post-1948 national m ovem ent had not been co rd ial. B ut each brought to the partnership som ething the oth er lack ed , the P L O con tribu tin g its A ra b and international legitim acy, the

30 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949S2 PR M the pow er o f arm s and p op u larity w ith the Palestinian m asses. F ateh’s decision to launch resistance inside the W est B ank after 1967 m ade A m m an the tem porary cap ital o f the PR M , from w here the groups recruited and sent ou t m obilizing m essages. Lebanese as w ell as Palestinians from L ebanon join ed the m ovem ent; the first Lebanese to die in actio n , K h alil Jam al, w as given an enorm ous funeral procession (A p ril 1968).M Lebanese p op u lar anger against the A rm y’s attem pts to prevent feda'yeen operations from the South reached its peak during this period, fu ellin g w idespread dem onstrations w hich deepened the crisis. It was Lebanese m ass support th at gave the people o f the cam ps the courage to rise against the D euxièm e Bureau during the autum n o f 1969. Signed b y the Lebanese A rm y C om m ander and A ra fa t, the C a iro A ccord s authorized PR M action in coordination w ith the A rm y, and guaranteed Palestinian civic rights. In Septem ber 1970, tension betw een the PR M and K in g H ussein, sparked b y a P F L P hijacking cou p , brought abou t a b lood y confrontation at the end o f w hich the PR M w as forced ou t o f Jord an , tran sferrin g the b u lk o f its fighters and cadres to B eirut. A lth ou gh form ally an external facto r, the P L O /P R M had so m any bases o f su pport in Lebanon th at its transfer in 1971 w as m inim ally opposed, even though the years o f F ran jiyyeh ’s presidency (19 70 -76 ) w ere ones o f m ounting L eban ese-P alestin ian con fron tation . T o understand th is ease o f tran sp osition we need to see the P L O /P R M as an internal fa cto r in Lebanese p o litics even before 1967. L ebanon had been one o f the crad les o f the p o st-1948 national m ovem ent perm itting, as Jordan and S yria did n ot, early Palestinian social and cu ltu ral in stitu tion s/9 T here w as also a high degree o f integration betw een Palestinian and Lebanese intelligentsias. From the early 1950s close ties were form ed betw een Palestinian nationalists and m em bers o f the Lebanese ’O p p osition ’ groupings. T hese, led b y K am al Jum blat, form ed the Lebanese N ation al m ovem ent (L N M ) in 1969 w hich supported, and was supported b y, the PR M (or parts o f it) in its struggle to reform the Lebanese state and p o litica l system . A n oth er base fo r P L O /P R M rootedness in L ebanon arose from state neglect o f the m ainly S h i’ite S ou th , and the failu re o f the A rm y to p rotect it from Israeli attacks and encroachm ent. T h is situation at first created a stron g bond betw een PR M fighters and southern villagers. A fter the C a iro A ccord s and autonom y fo r the cam ps, the Lebanese A rm y continued to try to co n trol the PR M in the South and in Beirut. Israeli attacks w ere a pressure tow ards A rm y-P R M con frontation. A n Israeli com m ando raid , k illin g three Palestinian leaders in W est B eirut on 10 A p ril 1973, brought a storm o f protest against the failu re o f Lebanese security forces to intercept the raiders, and from there to the resignation o f Prim e M inister Salam , follow ed by a m onth o f Lebanese A rm y attacks against the cam ps. C lashes betw een the PR M and the ultra-M aronite m ilitias in the

Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

31

eastern sector becam e increasingly frequent. M ounting social p rotest, including the m ovem ent o f Im am M usa Sad r to voice S h i'ite grievances, added to the pressures leading to the explosion o f the C iv il W ar in the spring o f 19 7 5 ." T h e P L O /P R M survived the C iv il W ar in sp ite o f Syrian m ilitary interven tion to p rop up the M aron ite righ tist fo rces, b u t it suffered tw o serious setbacks: the expulsion o f thousands o f Palestinians from the ‘M aronite enclave* and the destruction o f cam ps and low -incom e settlem ents there; and the creation o f an Israeli-controlled border 'strip* in the South from w hich a renegade Lebanese A rm y o fficer (M ajor Sa’d H addad) bom barded the w hole o f the South. A lth ou gh P L O /P R M relations w ith S yria im proved after 1976, the P R M /L N M alliance suffered a loss o f élan and o f m ass p op u larity. In ad d ition , the form erly proPalestinian S h i'ite m ovem ent becam e increasingly hostile (a developm ent that w ill be discussed in C hap ter 7). T o conclude: how ever b rief, its period o f relative autonom y in L ebanon allow ed the P L O /P R M to consolidate and expand. Its m ost im portant gains w ere d ip lom atic, signalled b y A ra fa t's appearance a t the U N G eneral A ssem bly in N ovem ber 1974, and b y the opening o f P L O offices in dozens o f cap itals th rou gh ou t the w orld . A second kind o f self-developm ent w as the build in g o f civil institutions - econom ic, social, cu ltu ral - o f a future state. Less tan gib ly, the P L O /P R M gave structure to Palestinians* sense o f ‘ peoplehood’ , em bodying th eir cap acity to surm ount defeats and turn them in to a new phase o f struggle. T h e ‘ Lebanon period* w as also one o f internal co n flict and debate o u t o f w hich, as A la in G resh tells, em erged the adop tion o f the g o a l o f a 'n ation al authority* on any part o f Palestine th at co u ld be liberated (12th P N C , C a iro , 1974),41 and the acceptance o f negotiation as a form o f struggle (13th P N C , C a iro , 1977), developm ents that prom pted the P F L P to leave the P L O E xecutive C om m ittee and form the R ejection F ro n t T h e period betw een the end o f the C iv il W ar and the Israeli invasion w as one o f dim inished intra-R esistance grou p co n flict. It w as also a period o f expansion o f the ‘ Palestinian econom y* and o f PR M social projects in cam ps. W hat w as dangerous ab o u t the situ ation w as th at the Lebanese in the area co n trolled b y the P R M /L N M jo in t forces bore the greater part o f the costs o f destruction and p o litical stagn ation , w hile the P L O /P R M benefited d isproportion ately. It w as this th at gave rise to the accusation th at the Palestinians* ob jective w as not to liberate Palestine but to tak e South L ebanon as a ‘co u n try o f exchange*. In the face o f crisis in its relations w ith its Lebanese support b ase, the P L O /P R M proved unable to im pose on itself sufficient discipline to nurture rather than exp loit its Lebanese environm ent. W hen W alid Jum blat d issolved the L N M at the height o f the Israeli siege o f W est B eiru t, in A u gu st 1982, it w as a clear sign th at the cru cial allian ce no longer existed.

32 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82

Notes 1. See R. K halidi, External Intervention and Dom estic Conflict in Lebanon, 1975-1985, w orking paper no. 65, International Security Studies Program , the W ilson Center, W ashington D C , June 1985. 2. Palestinian official institutions in Lebanon included the M ufti him self, who lived here after his expulsion from Egypt until his death in 1974, and also offices o f the A rab Higher C ouncil, from before 1948. A fter 1964, the PLO and some o f its unions (workers*, students*, womens*) had offices. The PLO Research Centre opened in 1965, and the PLO Planning Centre in 1968. 3. For a discussion o f the idea o f A rab transfer in Zionist thinking before 1948, see B. M orris, The Birth o f the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (Cam bridge: C U P, 1987), pp. 23-8. 4. Between 1948 and 1951 the number o f refugees in Lebanon fluctuated between 105,100 and 130,000. However, this did not include about 3,000 Palestinians who did not register with U N RW A because they did not need relief: Y . A . Sayigh, ‘Im plications o f U N R W A Operations*, M A thesis, Am erican University o f Beirut, 1952. 5. N o census was carried out in Lebanon after 1932, but A . Hourani gives a total o f 1,126,601 for the Lebanese population in 1944: M inorities in the Arab W orld ( London: Royal Institute o f International A ffairs, 1947), p. 63. 6. In a letter to Lord Curzon dated 3 February 1919, Chaim W eizmann wrote: ‘The irrigation o f Upper G alilee and the power necessary for even a lim ited industrial life must come from the Litany.’ Quoted in F. H of, Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanese Frontier, 1916-1948 (Boulder: W estview Press, 1984), p. 13. 7. D . Peretz, ‘Israeli Foreign Policy Objectives in Lebanon*, paper presented at a CU PS workshop, Ottaw a, June 1991. 8. H of, Galilee Divided, pp. 56-9. 9. See L. Rokach, Israel’s Sacred Terrorism (Belmont M A: A A U G , 1980); also W . K halidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon (Cam bridge M A: Harvard Center for International A ffairs, 1979), p. 171 n. 174. 10. For the suggestion that M ossad carried on contacts with ultra-M aronite groups independently o f the governm ent, see A . Y aniv, Dilemmas o f Security: Politics, Strategy and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: O U P, 1987), p. 35. 11. See T . Petran, The Struggle over Lebanon (New Y ork: M onthly Review Press, 1987), pp. 142-5; also K . Salibi, Crossroads to C ivil War (New York: Caravan Books, 1976); and W . K halidi, Conflict and Violence, pp. 90-92. 12. W . K halidi analyses this aspect o f Israel’s Lebanon policy in Conflict and Violence, pp. 90-92. 13. Between M ay 1968 and A pril 1975, Israel com m itted more than 6,200 acts o f aggression against Lebanon: Petran, Struggle over Lebanon, p. 142. 14. Le Monde, 14 April 1974. 15. Statements to this effect were made by Ministers Eytan (7 M ay) and Sharon (10 May): Monitoring Israeli Broadcasts, C airo, 8 and 11 M ay. 16. See I. Abu-Lughod and E. Ahm ad (eds), ‘The Invasion o f Lebanon*, special issue o f Race and Class, vol. X X IV , no. 4, Spring 1983; S. Nassib and C . T isdall, Beirut: Frontline Story (London: Pluto Press, 1983); also Petran, Struggle over Lebanon, ch. 18.

Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

33

17. This telling phrase comes from I. Gendzier, ‘The Declassified Lebanon, 1948-1938: Elements o f Continuity and Contrast in US Policy towards Lebanon* in H. Barakat (ed.), Toward a Viable Lebanon (London: Croom Helm with the Center for Contem porary A rab Studies, Georgetow n, 1988). 18. For details o f Lebanon’s post-1948 ‘boom* see M . Hudson, The Precarious Republic (Boulder: W estview Press, 1983), pp. 6 1-3. Founded in 1866 by American missionaries, A U B has remained a m ajor teaching and cultural institution for the whole M iddle East. 19. See M orris, Birth o f Palestinian Refugee Problem, pp. 234-66. M orris notes how the Israeli government used the refugees as bargaining counters. 20. See N. A ruri, ‘The United States and Israel: That Very Special Relationship* in N. A ruri, F. M oughrabi and J. Stork, Reagan and the M iddle E ast (Belm ont M A: A A U G , 1983). 21. See J. Stork, ‘ Israel as a Strategic A sset’, in A ruri, M oughrabi and Stork, Reagan. 22. On Lebanon’s sectarian system see Hudson, Precarious Republic, pp. 21 -34; also G . Corm , Contribution à r étude des sociétés multi-confessionelles (Paris, 1971); and A . A buK halil, ‘The Politics o f Sectarian Ethnicity: Segm entation in Lebanese Society*, PhD thesis, Georgetown University, 1988. 23. See B. M orris, ‘The Initial Absorption o f the Palestinian Refugees in the A rab Host Countries, 1948-49* in A . Bramwell (ed.). Refugees in the Age o f Total War (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988). 24. Ease o f naturalization for middle-class Palestinians ended in the mid-1960s. Every application had to be passed by every member o f the Cabinet, giving K ata’eb ministers the power o f veto. 23. Destroyed camps are N abatiyyeh, D beyyeh, Jisr al-Basha and T ell alZa’ter. 26. See Chapter 2, pp. 63-6. 27. F or the text o f the C airo A ccords see W . K halidi, Conflict and Violence, Appendix 1, p. 187. The A ccords were never published or ratified by the Lebanese National Assem bly. 28. Lebanese Sunnis were not initially more welcom ing to the Palestinians o f the camps than other sects: H. Hashan, 'A ttitudes o f the Lebanese Sects towards the Palestinians’, M A thesis, Am erican University o f Beirut, 1987. 29. Until anti-Palestinianism became evident in Kuwait. This began before the Iraqi invasion o f August 1990, nurtured by m ilitias employed by the ruling fam ily (B. Sirhan, personal communication). 30. A com prehensive account o f Israeli-M aronite contacts is given by Y an iv, Dilemmas o f Security, pp. 37f. 31. See H. Cobban, The Palestine liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: C U P, 1984), ch. 7. 32. A rab countries that offered m ilitary training to Palestinians were (in order o f time): Egypt in G aza, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria. 33. PLO representative al-H out recounts how, before 1969, he went to make a speech in a cam p on some Palestinian occasion and found no one assembled to listen except a few children. He addressed them as the generation that would liberate Palestine. G radually adults felt ashamed and joined the gathering. (Interview, 17 October 1989.) 34. Cobban, Palestine Liberation Organisation, pp. 92f.

34 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-92 33. A dem ographer’s estim ate fo r the number o f Palestinians in Lebanon in 1970 is 247,000 (G . K osseifi, ’Dem ographic Characteristics o f the A rab Palestinian People’ in K . Nakhleh and E. Zureik [eds], The Sociology o f the Palestinians [London: Croom Helm, 1980]). 36. See Petran, Struggle over Lebanon, ch. 9, ’The G athering Storm*; E. Picard, ‘ D e la ’ ’communauté-classe” à la résistance ’’nationale” : pour une analyse du rôle des chi’ites dans le système politique libanais*, Revue française du science politique, vol. 6, no. 33, Decem ber 1983, has a perceptive description o f econom ic, social and cultural changes which challenged the Lebanese system in the early 1970s. 37. See Cobban, Palestine Liberation Organization; also Y . Sayigh, ‘The Politics o f Palestinian Exile’, Third W orld Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 1, January 1987. 38. See R. Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival■ The PLO in Lebanon (B ou ld er W estview Press, 1990), p. 47. Brynen and Cobban (Palestine Liberation Organization ) are excellent sources for the PLO/PRM in Lebanon. 39. A branch o f the Palestine A rab W omen’s Union reopened in Beirut soon after 1948. A nother early independent Palestinian cultural institution was the Institute o f Palestine Studies, established in 1963. The 1967 war stim ulated several new social, cultural and inform ational associations: In’ash alM ukhayem , Friends o f Jerusalem, the Fifth o f June Society, and others. 40. For the PLO /PRM in the C ivil W ar, see Brynen, Sanctuary and Survtvat, C obban, Palestine Liberation Organization; and K halidi, Conflict and Violence. 41. A . G resh, The PLO: The Struggle Within (London: Zed Books, 1983).

2

The First Decade: Remembering Palestine, Learning Lebanon

The founding of Shateela A few refugee fam ilies scattered in the pine w oods to the south o f B eiru t form ed the nucleus o f the future cam p. A m on g them w as a m an w hose energy and connections m arked him ou t as the fou n d er, A b ed B isher, a mujahideen leader w ho w as in L ebanon on an arm s-buying m ission fo r the M ufti on 15 M a y 1948 w hen the Israelis closed the border. H is son Jihad w as nine o r ten years old a t the tim e: W hen w e cam e w e had alm ost nothing. M y fath er never w orked , he o n ly fou ght. Paym ent w as irregu lar, ou r on ly property [in Palestine] w as a sm all house m ade o f m ud. H ajj A m in w asn’t here, and m ost o f m y fath er’s mujahideen com rades w ere in D am ascus. W e w ere in a desperate state; m y old er brothers w orked but we co u ld n 't p ay the rent o f the sm all room we w ere livin g in. S o m y father w ent to al-N ah ar and bought a b ig tent and p u t it up in al-H ursh [the F orest]. T here w ere around tw enty people in th at tent, a ll m y father’s fam ily and the fam ilies o f m y tw o old er m arried sisters----M y fath er go t the idea o f gathering the people o f his villa g e, M ajd al-K roo m , together in one p lace. S o he w ent to the A ra b H igher C ou n cil. H e also had contacts w ith the [International] R ed C ross w hich w as preparing at that tim e to hand over to U N R W A . H e w anted to suggest fin din g an em pty space and p u ttin g up tents in it. B ut before goin g to the A H C and the Red C ross, he w ent to see som eone called al-Basha Shateela w ho lived in a large villa som ew here in the area. M y father thought he w as the ow ner o f the land on w hich Shateela now stands. It seem s that the real ow ner w as som eone from Shw eifat w ho w as o u t o f the country at the tim e. A n yw ay al-Basha Shateela gave m y fath er perm ission to use the land. It had nothing to do w ith U N R W A , he g o t it him self. S o then he m anaged to procure tw enty tents from U N R W A - it had started then - and he w ent to a ll the places w here M ajd al-K room people

36 An Oral-Based H istory o f Skatecla Camp, 1949-82 w ere scattered and brought them to B eirut. T he tw enty tents w ere tak en , m ore people cam e, m y fath er g o t m ore tents. H e had to keep in con tin u ou s con tact w ith U N R W A fo r things th at Palestinians needed distributions o f m ilk and ration s, tents and so on. T hen the o ffer cam e from U N R W A to m y fath er to becom e cam p lead er1 fo r a salary o f L L 7 5 a m onth. A t the tim e this w as great. M y fath er had no ob jection , w e needed the m oney bad ly. S o he w as o fficia lly appointed on condition th at he agreed to take in around tw en ty-five fam ilies from Y a ffa w ho w ere occu p yin g K raytem M osque. A lth ou gh there w ere other candidates fo r the p ost o f d irector, A b ed Bisher had the b ackin g o f the M u fti, w ho had influence w ithin U N R W A . A high agen cy o fficia l w ho had been instrum ental in appoin ting A b u K am al exp lain ed, T d id n 't w ant clerks, I w anted som eone w ho could co n trol the people.* Sm all in stature, A b u K am al had leadership qualities; even those w ho disagreed w ith his p olitics, o r criticized him fo r favourin g his ow n follow in g, acknow ledged this. O f a ll the Palestinian cam ps in L ebanon, Shateela is the closest to B eiru t,2 o n ly ju st outside the m unicipal boundaries and n ot fa r from the predom inantly Sunni M uslim quarters o f the city (M useitbeh, M azra*, B asta). T h e p lo t o f land donated by the B asha w as n ot m uch bigger than a fie ld , a narrow o b lo n g ab o u t 200 b y 400 m etres. In 1949, no one co u ld have guessed th at the w hole area w ould becom e a target fo r w ave upon w ave o f rural m igrants, Lebanese as w ell as Palestinian. N or could anyone have foreseen the strategic nature o f Shateela's locatio n , fo r this w ould o n ly grad u ally becom e apparent through the upheavals - econom ic, p o litical and dem ographic - th at w ere to com e. A t the beginning o f the fligh t o f Palestinians in to L ebanon, m ost rem ained in the Sou th , w aitin g fo r repatriation w hich th ey believed to be im m inent, resisting transfer to other areas as best they cou ld . U rban Palestinians cam e to B eiru t, but not the rural m asses. A b ed B isher travelled ab o u t L ebanon, to the S ou th , to Shaheem and B a ija in the S h o u f- even, it is said , to A lep p o - lookin g fo r people from his ow n village o f M ajd al-K room , and encouraging them to settle in Shateela. Besides his co-villagers, A b u K am al brought in people from nearby villages: relatives, friends and associates from his past as a gaTrf (leader). A lth ou gh he actively recruited his ow n p eople, A b u K am al d id n ot turn anyone a w ay .3H e w anted Shateela to grow as rap id ly possible, aw are th at the larger its p op u lation , the harder it w ould be to m ove people aw ay. In early 1930 there w ere around tw enty fam ilies; a few m onths later the num ber had grow n to sixty. B y the early 1960s there are said to have been 3,000 people in and around the cam p. A lth ou gh m ore than h a lf o f Shateela's origin al population w ere from M ajd al-K ro o m , som e tw enty-five oth er villages in northw estern G alilee

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were represented. T here w ere sizeable num bers from al-Birweh* S h a'b , S affou ri and D eir a l-’A ssi; oth er villages - S u fsaf, A m qa, K a b ri, N ah af, Beled al-S h eikh , K w eik at, M enshiyyeh - had one o r m ore households each. U nlike m ost other cam ps in L eban on , w here sizeable village quarters w ere form ed, Shateela’s sm all size and fragm ented com position prevented such village clustering. Even the m ajority M ajd al-K room ites did not form a quarter o f their ow n. N o t a ll Shateela’s origin al p op u lation were villagers. A lth ou gh A b u K am al raised no ob jection to the incorporation o f city people, the Y affaw ites at first an grily refused. D espite being reduced to the sam e state o f penury, low er-class city Palestinians retained th eir sense o f su p eriority over villagers. T he idea o f livin g in tents am ong fellaheen (peasants) w as abhorrent to them . T h ey had to be fo rcib ly transferred, and a t first they dem arcated th eir livin g space from the rest o f the cam p w ith a path. C on tact between them and other inhabitants w as lim ited fo r the first few years. A lth ou gh other urban Palestinians cam e to settle in Shateela, they d id not affect its predom inantly rural ethos and rem ained w ithou t fo o th o ld in its main institutions.4 S o clo sely w as A b ed B isher identified w ith Shateela cam p that w hen, in the early 1960s, the real ow ner o f the land set abou t tryin g to repossess it, it w as again st A b u K am al th at he brought a case, n ot against U N R W A o r the governm ent. A fte r A b u K am al’s retirem ent in 1969, the directorship passed to his son Jih ad , and in 1978 to a grandson.9

The setting T hose w ho first settled in Shateela, the m u’essesseen (founders), describe the area in 1949/30 as a ’desert’ . A t the beginning there w as nothing here but sand. A ll these buildings th at yo u see arou n d us now - S ab ra, the m arket, D an a M osque, H ayy G harbeh - none o f this existed then. T here w ere som e o ld stores and barracks left by the French A rm y. A few houses - not m any - in H ayy al-B ash a and H ayy F arh at. W e w alked on d irt roads to get to C orn ich e al-M azra’ . T w o kilom etres beyond Shateela there w ere w oods w here no one dared to go after 6 pm fo r fear o f robbers. (A b u T u rki) T u rks as w ell as the French had used the area fo r m ilitary installations: there w ere old trenches and tunnels.6 N earby w as an enclosure fo r a cem etery w hich eventually becam e D a ’ou q ‘camp* (the core o f Sabra), and beyond it B eiru t’s first civilian airp ort. T hese w ere the o n ly signs th at Shateela w as close to the d ty . T he rural atm osphere o f a zone th at w ould becom e one o f

38 A it Oral-Based H istory o f Shatetla Camp, 1949-82 the m ost densely p op u lated o f B eiru t’s suburbs is suggested b y A b u T u rin ’s recollection th at, close to Shateela’s m ain entrance, there w as a little sand­ h ill w here B eirut fam ilies used to com e on sum m er evenings to en jo y the co o l breezes. T o Palestinians a ’desert’ , this large area o f sand dunes and pine w oods south o f B eirut had quite another character to Lebanese. O r rather, it had d ifferent p otentialities fo r people w ith different interests. F o r c ity planners, its vocation w as to be the ’lungs* o f the c ity , an area o f recreation and sports: hence the sitin g o f C ham oun’s Sports C ity on the ridge overlookin g the cam p, as w ell as, nearby, a h on e-rid in g clu b and g o lf course. Basha Shateela w as not the o n ly notable to build his sum m er-w inter residence here, conveniently close to the city; there w ere oth er, grander villas such as those o f R iad al-S olh and S ab ry H am m adeh. A num ber o f p olitician s and m erchants also saw the possibilities o f the land fo r speculation, especially after the selection o f the site o f B eirut’s International A irp o rt betw een K haldeh and B o u ij B arajneh. N either city p lan n en n or grandees im agined the dem ographic explosion to com e, the result o f m ultiple facto rs th at w ould brin g w aves o f new settlers o ver the next three decades: the p u ll o f B eirut’s construction b oom , the push o f low w ages and landlessness in the ru ral hinterland; later, w ar in the South w ould add to the push factors. T h is in flu x w ould rad ically change the ch aracter o f the area, encouraging the grow th o f com m erce and service institutions as w ell as o f low -cost urban housing. In the 1950s there w as h ard ly a building betw een Shateela and B o u ij Barajneh cam p five kilom etres to the sou th, and on ly a few houses betw een Shateela and tin y D a ’ou q ’cam p’ to the north, b u ilt on land intended fo r a cem etery. T he M a’w ah a!-*A jazeh (O ld P eople’s H om e), b y w hose d o c k Shateela people used to tell the tim e, w ent up in the early 1950s, next to D a ’o u q , a t the heart o f w hat w ould be S abra, one o f B eirut’s densest com m ercial areas. T o the east o f Shateela la y the o ld Shi’ite settlem ents o f H ayy F arh at and G h obeireh . T o the w est, there w as nothing betw een S h ateela and the sea except a lo w ridge o f san d-hills, w here the three gian t C ham oun stadium s and the B oulevarde running p ast them w ou ld be b uilt. In w inter the sea could be heard in the cam p.

The camp as habitat T h e hardships o f the first years o f Shateela w ere q uite d ifferen t from those th at cam e later. B eing low -lyin g in a w adi [river bed], Shateela w as a w ind-trap. T h e w ind blew sand in to ou r fo o d and the w inter storm s carried aw ay ou r tents. W e su ffered a lo t from this in the beginning. Som e people p u t ta r on th eir

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tents to try to keep o u t rain b u t this caused fires. U N R W A gave us tent pins but they w ere w renched ou t by storm s. W e went and dug up paving stones w herever we could find them , and put them inside our tents to w eight them and to lean ou r backs against. L ater people bought w ooden p lan ks, zinco [corrugated iron] and flattened-out petrol cans to m ake huts. B ut it w as forbidden to use stone o r cem ent. U N R W A b ou gh t w ater in lorries but there w as never enough. W om en used to g o and fill from Lebanese neighbours. (A b u T u rki) R estrictions on housing and w ater w ere the basic m eans through w hich the state m aintained the tem porariness o f refugee settlem ents around B eirut. Jihad says that his father agreed w ith this policy: H e w anted Shateela to be tem p orary, to rem ind people th at they aren 't livin g on their land, they aren 't in their ow n hom es, they aren 't livin g happily. T h a t's w hy he fou gh t against the idea o f building the cam p like oth er buildings. H e d id n 't w ant it to becom e so lid , he w anted it to be a tem porary place fo r Palestinians to gather in until they could return. F o r people o f the cam ps, constraints on housing fu elled a continual angry struggle to im prove th eir basic life conditions, so as to 'liv e like other people*. It w as a struggle th at to o k the form o f sm all individual im provem ents w herever there w as m eans and scope fo r them . T en ts w ere abandoned fo r bara k iya t , huts o f w ood and tin; tin w alls w ere replaced b y stone and plaster. P overty prevented a ll but m inim al outlays: w ood could be salvaged , tin sheeting w as cheap. But even if people cou ld have afforded it, cem ent w as forbidden, especially fo r ceilings. T h is prohibition effectively prevented the upw ards expansion o f housing. W ater w as sim ilarly restricted. T he B eirut W ater C om pany w as n ot allow ed to supply Shateela residents; instead there w ere fou r p u blic w ater tan ks filled p eriod ically b y U N R W A lorries. E very resident had the right to draw one petrol can o f w ater a day. A guardian w as appointed fo r each tan k - old m en w ho cou ld not d o heavier w ork - to supervise distribution. Each household contributed 23 piastres a m onth to their salary. Q uarrels over w ater w ere frequent. Som etim es the natour (guardian) w ould let a w om an ju m p her turn o r take m ore than her share; som etim es th ey sold the w ater. T h is system o f w ater d istribution rem ained until 1969. A b u T u rk i's friendship w ith one o f the F arh at fam ily allow ed him to extend com pany w ater from H ayy F arhat to his hom e; this w as a source that continued to su pply w ater to Shateela during the A m al sieges. A m on g the earliest U N R W A installations were the clin ic, the school and tw o lines o f public latrines, one fo r m en and one fo r wom en: *a disgusting situation* a founder b itterly recalls, and one that also rem ained until the

40 A it Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Cantp» 1949 S2 up risin g o f 1969. W aste d isp osal and sew age w ere a lso the o b ject o f state restrictions - p rivate cesspits w ere as forbidden as cem ent ceilings. T here w as now here to th row w aste w ater except the p u blic latrines; even a trickle on the street brought fines. T here w ere no sew age pipes and it w as forbidden to d ig a hole under the house. It w as also forbidden to th row w ater anyw here except in the p u b lic to ilets. T h ey w ere a t the edge o f the cam p, beyond the last houses; yo u had to w alk m aybe 50 m etres. Sm all children had to use a p o t, and th eir m others w ou ld em pty it in th e m orning. (A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i) A b o y in the 1960s, A hm ad H aleem eh rem em bers th at it w as his d u ty to em pty the household ’slops’ in the p u blic latrine. H e also rem em bers ’problem s’ because boys som etim es clim bed up to peep a t wom en. C ertain ly these w ere am ong the m ost h u m iliating rem inders o f refugee status. In the 1960s m any householders paid bribes to the p olice so th at th ey co u ld d ig the forbidden cesspits under their houses. O ther early U N R W A installations were the D irector’s o ffice (his tent) and the ’restaurant* (a supplem entary feeding centre fo r children). S ch oolin g began alm ost im m ediately, in three large hosp ital tents. T here w as also a w orksh op fo r repairing dam aged tents, an early incom e-generating p roject w hich closed when tents w ere abandoned. T here w ere no restrictions on electricity except p overty; the D irector and som e oth er b etter-o ff householders w ere able to brin g it to th eir hom es b y the tim e o f the tran sition from tents to ba ra k iya t. A n accou n t given b y A b u T u rk i p oints to the advantage Shateela enjoyed through proxim ity to Beirut: I th ink it w as in 19 5 6 ,1 w ent to the city and contacted the Prim e M inister, Sam i S olh . H e gave m e his card , and I to o k it to the D irecto r o f the E lectricity C om pany. H e said , ‘W e have no instructions from the au thorities to su pply electricity to the cam p. B ut because you have a card from the Prim e M inister I w ill give you a m eter.’ A b u T u rk i w as able to convin ce the D irecto r to give him fo u r m eters ‘u n o fficia lly’ , p ayin g the deposit as w ell as L L 750 (a large sum in those d ays7) fo r the cable needed to extend the current from Sabra to his hom e. T h u s A b u T u rk i becam e the ’feu d alist o f electricity* o f Shateela cam p, renting ou t current to oth er hom es. F o r one rad io and one ligh t b ulb from 6pm to m idnight, people p aid him L L 2 1/} a m onth. D em and w as stron g p eop le had begun to b u y radios a t th is tim e and w anted ligh t b y w hich th eir children could s tu d y - s o the lines w ere constantly overloaded.

The F irst Decade 41 In th e 1950s few p u blic buildings in Shateela co u ld be called autonom ous. O ne w as th e m osque, b u ilt around 1955 in the heart o f the cam p, a t the juncture o f its three m ain streets. It had an ou ter w all o f stone and a tin roof; w ith o n ly on e flo o r, it w as m uch sm aller then than now ; inside there w as a special section curtained o ff fo r wom en and children. S ch oolb oys w ere m obilized to sw eep ou t the m osque on T hursdays and before feasts. Each household gave L L 2 a m onth as an ikram iyyeh (honorarium ) to the sheikh. A hm ad H aleem eh recalls th at his grandfather liked the b oys to p ray in Shateela M osque, w hereas his fath er preferred them to attend ‘proper’ m osques dow ntow n. A n oth er im portant indigenous institution, then as now , w as the cem etery. There w ere tw o , one in B ir H assan near w hat later becam e A k k a H osp ital, the oth er in the H ursh (the F orest), p art o f w hich later becam e the M artyrs* C em etery. Sh ateela, because o f its p roxim ity, had special rights and duties vto-d-vfr the cem eteries, regarded as national territory. W om en and children were responsible fo r cleaning the graves before the feasts and decorating them w ith palm fron d s, flow ers and ribbons. Because o f th eir q u iet, students used to use the cem eteries to stu d y in. B ut no one lingered after d ark, since cem eteries w ere believed to be the haunts o f jin n , as w ell as o f thieves and drug addicts. Jihad B isher recalls th at his fath er, the D irecto r, set up a tent op p osite his ow n in w hich w ere placed som e m ats and cushions, and invited a few old er men w h o w ere not w orking, the village notables, to m eet there occasion ally as a kind o f con su ltative b od y, a m ejlis al-shuyyukh (cou n cil o f old m en). W hen th e M u fti visited Sh ateela, as he did several tim es during the 1950s, it w as here th at he w as received. Som e o f the early settlers deny th at th is b o d y had an y real representative role, claim ing that the D irecto r used it to co ver his ow n decisions o r those o f the authorities w ith the appearance o f consultation. O thers claim th at, on the con trary, the notables w ere m ore skilled a t solvin g social co n flicts and problem s than the revolu tion ary institutions th at cam e later. A t the other end o f the spectrum o f age and status, a scou t group w as form ed in the late 1950s in a hut adjoin in g the sch ool. P atriotic teachers had encouraged this developm ent b u t, b y the 1960s, under D euxièm e Bureau co n tro l, Shateela scouts ceased to be autonom ous. O ne o f th eir functions w as to line the airp o rt road to cheer visitin g heads o f state. N o one m ourned w hen the grou p w as closed dow n b y the authorities fo r fea r th at it w ou ld becom e a nucleus o f Palestinian nationalism .

Work, iacome, living standards In the 1950s, m ost S h ateela m en earned th eir livin g in d aily paid m anual

42 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 lab ou r, m ainly in construction. T here w as a lab ou r m arket on C orn iche al-M azra’ , a few kilom etres north o f the cam p. T h ey w ent to B arbir on fo o t and w aited to be hired. M aybe som eone w ou ld w ant a forem an, or a skilled w orker w ith con crete, o r a m an to carry con stru ction m aterials. T he one w ho w asn’t chosen returned hom e w ith his foo d packet. It w as a m arket fo r d aily w orkers, w hose w age in those days w as L L 2 . Palestinians w orked the w hole d ay - they carried ston es and bags o f sand and cem ent to the to p o f buildings - fo r o n ly L L 2 . (A b u T u rki) T he ham al (porters) w ere the low est category o f lab ou r, one that in Lebanon is entirely occupied b y non-national w orkers. Lebanese business and m anufacturing, w hich w as concentrated in the m etropolitan area, benefited enorm ously from the sudden increase in the lab ou r supply p rovided b y the Palestinians at a m om ent when new m arkets w ere opening up. Palestinians d id not rem ain ham al fox lon g, alth ough construction w ork has rem ained until now a fail-b ack in tim e o f need, and fo r students during sum m er. T he next step w as to becom e sp ecialists in one o f the b uild in g trades (plum bing, plastering, tilin g, electric w iring, etc.). It w as such skills th at enabled m ost Shateela people to build their ow n hom es, and even tu ally gave rise to a sm all group o f m aster builders em ploying others. T r e e work* w as preferred b y m any m en because good m oney could be m ade, especially w hen the B eirut build in g boom go t under w ay. B ut accidents w ere not indem nified and cou ld lead to lon g periods o f unem ploym ent. A hm ad H aleem eh’s fath er strained his b ack liftin g a heavy stone w hile w orkin g as a tile-layer. H is fam ily survived his six months* disablem ent m ainly because, livin g in a com pound household, fo o d could be stretched to provide fo r them . H eavy m anual lab ou r com bined w ith p o o r housing and m alnutrition to o k its to ll on health. M any m en (especially old er men and those w ho had been sm all landow ners unused to m anual labou r) preferred to lo o k fo r low -level salaried em ploym ent, how ever b ad ly paid. A b u l A b ed Safedi, fo r exam ple, w ho had been a m ukhtar in K ab ri, m anaged through connections to get a jo b as the guard o f a Saudi sch ool in B ourj B arajneh, a t L L 70 a m onth. Such a p osition brought the secu rity o f a m onthly salary and a retirem ent indem nity. A m on g the Y a ffa and H aifa people were p ort w orkers whose skills w ere in dem and to expand the port o f B eirut. L ater m any o f them m igrated to Iraq o r the G u lf w here the o il boom produced a m arket fo r skilled w orkers o f a ll kinds. Earnings w ere good , supporting the m igration o f w hole fam ilies: on ly a few o f these port-w orker fam ilies rem ained in Shateela in the 1980s. People

The F irst Decade 43 o f villa g e origin claim th at city people spent th eir often higher earnings on consum er good s w hereas th ey, the villagers, invested in the education o f their children. Som e o f these differences could be seen in the 1980s, when m any fam ilies o f rural origin had adult children w orkin g as professionals. Such fam ilies often m oved ou t o f the cam p but rem ained in close con tact w ith it, helping p oorer kin. C ity people w ho had stayed on w ere clo ser to destitution: their kin and quarter ties seem ed to o w eak to survive m igration. U N R W A w as a large em ployer o f Palestinians in the 1930s. L iteracy w as usually required, w hich barred the m ajority o f cam p residents until the 1960s w hen sch oolin g began to produce a literate generation; but there were som e low -level salaried posts in cam ps th at w ere availab le to inhabitants. A fte r the d irectorsh ip, the m ost im portant w as C h ie f o f S an itation , w ho com m anded several w orkers. A lth ou gh m ost U N R W A professional s ta ff (teachers, d octors, s ta ff nurses) w ere from outside, guards, drivers, pharm acists, p ractical nurses, cleaners, co o ks and store clerks w ere cam p people. Such lo cal appointm ents la y in the hands o f A b u K am al. M any people blam ed him later because he filled m ost o f these jo b s w ith fam ily and friends. A b u Ism a’een explains: I f the cam p D irecto r has tw o o r three vacant jo b s, he w o n 't give them to p eop le from ou tside i f he has unem ployed relatives. 'T h o se close to us have priority* - this is a universal rule. I am from S u fsaf. T h e D irector ca n 't give m e a jo b and neglect the men from his village. L e t's sa y one o f the U N R W A em ployees is m y frien d . I catch him on the w ay to the d istribution centre, so he takes m y ration card and puts it in his p ocket. Y o u are n ot his friend so how co u ld yo u take yo u r rations before me? T h is is the w ay o f the w orld. O n th e oth er hand , the v ita l im portance o f U N R W A resources in th e 1950s m ade the practice o f w aasta (connections) b itter to those excluded from it. It w as not ju st steady U N R W A salaries th at people needed; m ore im portant w ere the extra benefits: secondary sch ool subsidies, places in U N R W A 's technical and teachers' training in stitu te, loans to set up businesses, papers to see m edical specialists, and hardship allow ances. T h eoretically allocated accord in g to need and m erit, the scarcity o f such resources in evitably subjected them to the law o f w aasta. U N R W A em ployees in the cam p form ed a relatively privileged grou p , self-selecting and bound to each oth er b y m utual favo u rs. F ew altern ative sources o f patronage w ere available in the 1950s. C loseness to B eirut m eant th at com m erce had an earlier and stron ger start in Shateela than other cam ps. O ne o f the first shop-keepers w as A b u Salem from M ajd al-K ro o m , o f w hom it is said th at he returned to Palestine to bring his w ife and her d ow ry on a d on key. A b u Salem first sold vegetables

44 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 from his tent, and later obtained the com m ission to supply foodstuffs to U N R W A ’s feeding centre. From there he m oved in to w holesale vegetable tradin g and real estate to becom e Shateela’s first and on ly m illionaire. U p until 1982 he and his w ife still w orked in th eir shop near Shateela’s m ain entrance. A n oth er o f the earliest shop-keepers w as A b u T u rk i, the ’feudalist o f electricity*, also from M ajd al-K room . H e w as offered an U N R W A jo b but turned it dow n: In Palestine I had som e land w hich m y brother w orked o n , w hile I had a salaried jo b w ith the B ritish A rm y. U N R W A asked m e to w ork w ith them but I refused. 1 em ployed a w orker w hom I paid LL30 a m onth U N R W A em ployees to o k on ly L L3S. I preferred having a shop, it’s m ore dignified. N o one ordered me to carry things. Shop-keeping is better than a salaried jo b , it*s free. I f I sleep until m id-day, no one tells m e ‘Open!*. A n d if I open, no one tells me ‘C lo se!’. A b u Salem ’s success serves to highlight the m ore lim ited careers o f other shop-keepers. M ost o f those w ho had started ou t in the 1950s were still there when I began visitin g Shateela in 1982: A b u M uham m ad Jisheh began by sellin g clo th 'from the shoulder’ , then opened the shop w here m ost Shateela people b ou gh t th eir drapes, p ayin g b y instalm ent; A b u H assan Serees w as the first Shateela butcher w ho, unlike the Sabra butchers, gave honest m easure; A b u A li D a ’bis w as still there w ith his grocery shop in 1982, as w ell as w idow Shehadeh. Som e city fam ilies (n otab ly dar Sakkhijha), w ho w ere skilled in m aking A ra b cakes such as nam oora, sfo o f and hareeseh , were still selling them from trays o r barrow s on the street. T he p rofits from such sm all enterprises m ight support a son through one o f the statesupported universities, o r buy a m odest apartm ent in the suburbs, but they did not provide a basis fo r w hole-fam ily m igration, as happened w ith som e highly skilled port and technical w orkers. A verage d aily w ages in the 1950s w ere L L 2 1/] to L L 3 a d ay. B ut there w as no shortage o f w ork, and households w ith m ore than one w orker could im prove habitat, fo o d and clothing. A t the beginning, no one had w atches, w inter clothes or proper shoes, but a decade later m ost households enjoyed the basics as w ell as essential extras such as radios. R ecalling that period, people rem em ber the extraordinary cheapness o f foodstuffs and essential com m odities, praising Beirut as Umm al-Faqeer (M other o f the poor). In such an econom ic environm ent, w ith U N R W A p rovid in g ground rent, rations and social services, a ll cou ld survive; but the situation o f each household varied , depending on the num ber o f w orkers relative to dependents, as w ell as their earning capacity. F am ilies w ith several w orkin g sons cou ld cease tak in g U N R W A rations

The F irst Decade 45 a n d - a sign o f so cial sta tu s-m a in ta in a ttfwoft w here co ffee w as served to a ll visitors. B u t w here there w as sickness o r d isab ility a household m ight becom e dependent on the ch arity o f kin and neighbours. A b u and Um m Ism a’een give an idea o f such differences: A b u Ism a’een: T here w ere people w ho had sons w ho w ere earning, those w ho cam e from Palestine alread y m arried, w ith ad u lt sons, th ey w ere co m fortab le. T h ey co u ld spend one salary and save one salary. B ut I cam e as a b o y from P alestine, m y children w ere a ll young. T here w ere eigh t o f us and I w as the o n ly on e earning. I w as tak in g L L 3 a d ay. W e tried to spend L L 2 ‘/2 and save L L ‘/2 because the hygienic situ ation w as bad and the children kept gettin g sick. U m m Ism a’een: E verything w as cheap then. A k ilo o f p otatoes cost 1 p iastre, a crate o f tom atoes L L 1 . W e lived according to ou r m eans. H e d id n 't sm oke, he d id n 't gam ble, he d id n 't go to restaurants. I m anaged w ith w hat w e had , n ot like som e w om en w ho show o ff. A n d now , thank G o d , ou r children are m arried. L ik e the oth er urban cam ps, Shateela prom oted a far-reaching change in occu p ation , from those appropriate to Palestinian villages to the m ore com plex sk ills o f an 'eth n ic proletariat* dependent on w age labou r. Lim its w ere set to occupational m ob ility b y the w ork perm it system , but w ithin those lim its Shateela w orkers developed a range o f technical, entrepreneurial and service sk ills. H ow ever, because o f its closeness to B eiru t, Shateela also functioned as a 'station* where Palestinians acquired qualification s before m igrating elsew here (the G u lf, L ib ya o r E urope). T hus at an y given tim e, the m ajority o f Shateela w orkers w ere and are 'b lu e collar*, w ith betterq ualified w orkers tending to m igrate. O ccu p ation al change from farm ing to urban w age lab ou r and services d id n ot p roduce im m ediate change in social relation s, p o litical consciousness o r culture. A Lebanese M arxist visiting the cam ps in the early 1970s rem arked on th eir peasant conservatism .1 A m on g m any factors inhibiting a sense o f w orking-class identity w as the scattering o f w orkers over m any sm all enterprises, the su rvival in exile o f village and kin ties, and the predom inantly n ation alist ethos o f the P L O G en eral U nion o f Palestinian W orkers.

WoaMn and work D id Shateela w om en w ork fo r w ages in the 1950s? T he question is intriguing because o f a tendency to deny it. O ne o ld lad y said th at such a th in g m ight have happened in oth er cam ps b u t n ot in Shateela. C lo ser enquiry reveals a d ifferent picture, how ever.

46 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 W om en w ent and filled [crates] w ith oranges and lem ons. T h ey w ent to B o u ij Barajneh and the plan tation ow ners cam e and to o k them from there in lorries. Som e w om en p icked the fru it, others w eighed it, others p u t it in boxes. T h ey cam e to take them a t 4 am in w inter. (Fatim eh G hreiry) Fatim eh h erself helped her husband to sell vegetables on the street in fro n t o f th eir hom e and so did not g o w ith neighbourin g w om en and girls to the plantation s. She also rem em bers that wom en w orked on construction sites near the cam p, 'g o in g up and dow n carryin g earth and stones on th eir heads*. T h e fact th at on ly the first settlers rem em ber w om en d oin g construction o r plantation w ork suggests th at it stopped after the first few years. In spite o f the tendency to 'forget* such a thing, one w om an to ld me th at, as a young g irl, she had carried vegetables on her head from d o o r to d oor fo r w ages. T h e code abou t w om en differentiated betw een kinds o f w ork, its site, and a w om an's m arital status and econom ic circum stances. W ork in the cam p w as m ore respectable than w ork outside it; w ork in the hom e w as best helping husbands in shops th at w ere extensions o f hom es w as alw ays accepted. It w as recognized th at w idow s, divorcees and w om en w hose husbands w ere sick had to w ork to provide fo r th eir children. W om en (nisw an) had m ore freedom and m ob ility than banat (girls, unm arried w om en) because o f the im portance attached to pre-m arital virgin ity. It w as a flexib le co d e, cast-iron in its basic tenets yet w ell provided w ith p ractical loop h oles, m ainly self-enforced through fear o f sham e and rid icu le, and seldom transgressed. A lth ou gh the provision o f schoolin g in cam ps m eant th at girls w ere better educated than th eir m others, and hence m ore qualified to find em ploym ent, the sexual code prevented this except in special circum stances, fo r exam ple to educate a brother, o r when there were no yo u n g men in the fam ily. A fa cto r th at held back the em ploym ent o f banat w as the lack o f professional trainin g in cam ps. A t best, girls m ight be apprenticed to a seam stress: this w as the case w ith Z oh ra T ssa K h a la f, put ou t at eleven years o f age to learn sew ing because her fath er had tuberculosis. B ut opportunities fo r girls in cam ps to becom e teachers, nurses o r secretaries before the 1970s, when the R esistance m ovem ent expanded trainin g program m es, w ere few . O n ly one case o f an unm arried w om an from the cam p w orkin g in the 1950s can be recalled, a girl from H aifa w ho go t nursing training in a Beirut h osp ital, later w orking in the U N R W A clinic. U N R W A locations w ere considered equivalent to 'hom e*, and w idow s w ho needed to w ork had p riority fo r salaried em ploym ent as U N R W A cooks o r cleaners. M any Shateela wom en have traded in o r near th eir hom es w hen th eir situation dem anded o r perm itted it. W hile her husband w as in a sanatorium ,

The F irst Decade 47 Um m M ahm oud H aleem eh bought and sold vegetables (proving a sharp trader, according to her grandson A hm ad). Fatim eh G h reiry w as able to give her husband a hand sellin g vegetables because they had no children. W hen asked how she had calculated w eights and prices she said , *1 w orked it ou t. Som etim es the neighbours* daughters w ho were in school helped me.* Um m Salem , the m illion aire’s w ife, is rem em bered as having ’stood beside her husband from 7.30 am to 10 pm*, in spite o f A b u Salem ’s prosperity. W hen H ajji H afeezha’s husband becam e to o sick to push a vegetable b arro w , it w as she w ho used to buy the stock fo r their little sw eet shop outside G alilee S ch o ol, carryin g it dow n from Sabra on her head. W om en co u ld also add to fam ily incom e b y p rovid in g services w ithin the com m unity such as m idw ifery. In N abatiyyeh cam p in the 1950s, paym ent to u n o fficia l m idw ives w as L L 5 per d elivery, w ith a cake o f L ifeb u o y soap i f it w as a b o y. Several Shateela w om en are rem em bered as having practised as daya (m idw ife), even though hospital deliveries w ere becom ing com m on. O ne o f them , Um m F ah d , contributed effectively to her husband’s earnings as an U N R W A pharm acist, w ith a ll six sons and daughters obtain in g p rofessional training. A n oth er such traditional m edical p ractice som etim es undertaken b y w om en w as ja b r, the a rt o f bone healing. A lth ou gh such w ork w as considered sham eful, som e w om en w orked as co o k s and cleaners, under the pressure o f need. M ost w ere o f p o o r city origin , perhaps because solid arity o r sham ing m echanism s w orked less effectively am ong them than am ong rural people. U sually such w om en w ere the w ives o f low -w age earners w ith m any youn g children. In such fam ilies, the old est d au ghter w ou ld be taken o u t o f sch o ol to lo o k a fter youn ger siblings. T h e relation betw een class and gender is clearly show n in people’s reluctance to ta lk ab o u t w om en w ho w orked as dom estics fo r others: household status and com m unity reputation are in volved . O n ly uncon­ ven tion al w om en, those w hom people ca ll (q)aw iyyeh (stron g), ad m it, ’ Y e s, fo r m y ch ildren's sake I w orked in hom es.*

Neighbours W e had go o d and bad experiences w ith neighbours. In the 1950s, before w ater w as b rou ght to the cam p, w e used to g o to Lebanese neighbours to get w ater. T h ere w ere a few houses in S ab ra, a few in H ayy F arh at. T h ey w ere very h elp fu l, th ey gave . . . B ut very early o n , m aybe it w as in 1952, there w as a kind o f in vasion o f the cam p b y Lebanese neighbours, the Stetiyeh brothers. T h ey w ere narcotics sm ugglers. O ne o f their sisters w as m arried to som eone in Shateela* and she had a quarrel w ith one o f the

48 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateeta Camp, 1949-82 w orkers in the clin ic. She w ent to her broth er and th ey brought their people and invaded the cam p w ith sticks and knives. T h is w as the first tim e th at guns cam e ou t from hidden places in Shateela. M y broth er K am al shot in to the air to show them that we can defend ourselves. T he old est Stetiyeh brother go t a kn ife w ound near the heart and alm ost died. I rem em ber I w as tw elve years o ld , I w ent ou t w ith the others to keep guard. W e had to keep guard all night in shifts until there w as a recon ciliation . T h at w as the first tim e that Shateela people fou gh t as a cam p to defend them selves. People from villages, people from cities, everyone fought to drive the invaders out. (Jihad Bisher) A p p aren tly a trivial personal episode, the Stetiyeh battle to o k on im portance in the perspective o f Shateela’s subsequent h istory, first because o f the possible linkage between the drug sm ugglers and the authorities via their patron, a m em ber o f the Lebanese p olitical elite; second, because it w elded the heterogeneous population o f the cam p into a single defensive unit. A core elem ent in village solid arity w as the ancient practice know n as fa z a ’a (defensive rush), w hereby if any m em ber o f a village was attacked , the w hole o f the p op u lation - m en, w om en and children - w ould rush to th eir defence. T he fight w ith the Stetiyeh gang was such an instance o f fa z a ’a. A n oth er early clash is narrated by K haled Shehadeh, a distant kinsm an and p olitical opponent o f the D irector: T he people o f H ayy F arhat hated barrow salesm en com ing to their quarter and shouting T o m a to e s fo r sale!* o r 'O il fo r sale!* T here w as som eone from ou r village, Allah yerham u ,'° Q ayyed A yo u b , w ho sold o il. T he first tim e they beat him . . . T h e second tim e they beat him . . . T hen we beat A b u H assan F arhat. T he D irector w as from ou r village [M ajd al-K room ]. H e go t up and he said , 'L o o k , m y boys! T h ey are tryin g to ride on ou r backs. W e m ust teach them a lesson.* There w as a battle and w e threw them back from the edge o f the cam p into their ow n quarter. T h ey ran to G hobeireh to fetch the p olice. T hree o r fo u r policem en cam e and shouted at us. A bed Bisher knew their shaw eesh.11 H e told them , 'S to p w here you are! I am A b ed Bisher and I’m goin g to H ajj Am in!* B y G o d , not one m ore w ord w as said. T h ey w ent b ack to their houses in H ayy F a rh a t.. T h is story is interesting not on ly in show ing A b u K am al in actio n , m obilizin g the cam p against outsiders, but also fo r the suggestion it gives o f coordination between the M ufti and the higher Lebanese authorities, so that m ention o f his nam e w as enough to cause both Lebanese neighbours and lo cal police to w ithdraw . A second point o f interest is that H ayy F arh at people w ere Shi*ite. In accou n ts o f relations w ith Lebanese neighbours in

The F irst Decade 49 the 1950s, one finds no sectarian consciousness on either side. A b u Ism a’een’s house w as near to H ayy Farhat: W hen we first cam e they were good to us, they gave us w ater. O ccasion ally there were quarrels betw een children - Palestinian children are rough, they curse and throw stones - and our Lebanese neighbours w ould tell us we d on ’t know how to co n trol them . B ut they w ere good people. O f course the people o f H ayy F arh at are S h i’ite and we are Sunni b u t in those d ays no one knew a Sunni from a S h ia, we w ere a ll M uslim s. T he on ly neighbour w ith w hom Shateela con tin u ally had fights w as *Ali H andar, a m an from B a ija w ho set up a coffee house ju st outside the m ain entrance to the cam p. T he term ‘coffee house* sounds innocent enough to W estern ears b u t to rural Palestinians it had the con n otation s o f ‘ bar* o r ‘cabaret*. T he m oral consensus did not perm it the opening o f a co ffee house inside the cam p and the presence o f ’ A li H andar’s ju st outside its boundaries w as a p rovo cative rem inder o f the evil influence o f the city. M any people believed th at the H andar kahweh w as part o f a sinister cam paign b y the authorities to underm ine m oral values. In fa ct the H andar cafe becam e a place o f gam bling and peddling drugs, w here several Shateela m en are said to have ruined their fam ilies. In the 1960s it w ould be used b y the A rm y Intelligence Bureau to recruit inform ers. B raw ls betw een people from the cam p and the coffee house ow ner w ere frequent. T here w as an oth er battle against the co ffee house a t the entrance to the cam p, after *A li H andar m ade a series o f im m oral attacks against girls on the western side o f the cam p. W e cau ght him and gave him a beating alon g w ith his relatives and allies, dbr Jaram el. W e beat them and we broke up the coffee house. T h ey d id n 't dare to com e near us again. A ll the fam ilies o f the cam p to o k p art, from S affo u ri, from K w eikat, from al-B irw eh - a ll. (K haled Shehadeh) In fa ct there w ere other figh ts w ith *Ali H andar, and cam p leaders continu ally cam paigned to keep Shateela’s youth ou t o f his clutches. In the 1970s, under the R esistance m ovem ent, orders were issued putting the cafe ou t o f bounds. T he H andar cafe represented the d ark side o f S h ateela's closeness to B eiru t, the threat o f alien ation and co rru p tio n , o f sociocu ltu ral rupture, o f loss o f co n trol over the new generation. It w as p artly to prevent evil outside influences from entering the cam p, p artly to stop Shateela*s yo u n g m en from g o in g ou t a t n igh t, th at A b u K am al m aintained a night gu ard on the cam p’s tw o m ain entrances. W hile ‘evil influences* are cu stom arily articu lated in m oral/sexual term s, A b u K am al w as surely equ ally concerned to lim it p o litical contacts between ‘his* people and Beirut.

50

An O ral-B ased H istory o f Shateela Cam p, 1949-82

Internal potttks T h e M u fti's influence o ver cam p p op u lation s in the early 1950s is suggested b y an anecdote to ld b y S hafiq al-H o u t.u W ith som e other young Palestinian rad icals, al-H ou t attem pted soon a fter 1948 to organize 'C om m ittees o f the Dispersed* to represent the people o f the cam ps. T h e attem pt failed a fter a m eeting called in B ourj B arajneh cam p w as p h ysically broken up b y the M u fti's follow in g. Because o f the w ay Shateela's pop u lation had been recruited, supporters o f H ajj A m in led b y A b u K am al had the upper hand throughout the 1950s. H ow ever u n o fficially, since his legitim acy w as contested b y Jordan and E gyp t, the M ufti continued to p lay a low -key leadership role in L ebanon, m aintaining discreet con tacts w ith the people o f the cam ps. H e is rem em bered as havin g visited Shateela on several occasion s, once to con dole w ith A b u K am al fo r the death o f a son. T h e heads o f respected cam p fam ilies alw ays visited the M u fti a t the tim e o f the feasts, kissing his hand and receiving gifts o f m oney. H ajj A m in 's p o litica l influence w as backed up b y his pow er to procure jo b s: Em ploym ent in U N R W A w as based on the recom m endation o f H ajj A m in. Even travellin g to Saudi A ra b ia needed a letter from the M u fti fo r them to adm it a P alestinian. W ork in Saudi A ra b ia began before the rest o f the G u lf people started goin g there in the 1950s. A n yon e w ho w ent to the Em bassy w ithout a letter from H ajj A m in d id n 't get a visa. (A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i) T here w ere several points o f p o licy agreem ent betw een the M u fti's A ra b H igher C o u n cil (A H C ) and the Lebanese au thorities. T h ey w ere eq u ally op posed to perm anent settlem ent o f Palestinians in L ebanon, and hence again st an y m ove th at co u ld fu rther this aim . B oth sides w ould have liked to restrict the m ass o f refugees to ru ral areas and occu p ation s, the Lebanese governm ent to develop the backw ard farm ing sector, the A H C to preserve the conservative peasant base o f Palestinian society. H ence a third poin t o f consensus w as to keep the conditions o f the B eirut cam ps as m iserable as possible, to inhibit perm anent settlem ent. Shateela people rem em ber dem onstrating during the 1950s against U N R W A proposals fo r m ore solid housing. L ater this p o licy w ould boom erang against the A H C , w ith people putting the Palestinian leadership in the sam e b ag w ith the Lebanese authorities as enem ies o f m inim ally decent livin g conditions. O ther p o litica l currents w ere n ot slow to appear, how ever. O p p osition to the M ufti w as transferred from Palestine alon g w ith loyalty. M any people blam ed him and his style o f leadership fo r the co u n try's loss; argum ents on this burning issue b roke o u t co n tin u ally in inform al social gatherings in the

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cam ps (som etim es resurfacing th irty years later). T he shuyyukh were in harm ony w ith the line o f H ajj A m in , the paternalist line w hich said , T am your fath er, Palestinians. Y o u d o n 't have an opinion . I decide.* T h e older generation w as influenced by H ajj A m in and b y religious thinking: *We w ant the teaching o f the Quran!* T h ey feared that the generation influenced b y A b d el N asser and b y nationalism w ould escape from their con trol. T h ey tried to frighten us w ith ta lk o f the state. W e considered them as an obstacle to o u r m ovem ent. (K haled Shehadeh) T h e desperate need to fin d a solu tion to their problem m ade the refugees fertile ground fo r recruitm ent to the 'O pposition* parties, w hich w ere becom ing stronger at this tim e. T h e appeal o f these parties w as m ainly to younger m en. K h aled Shehadeh w as one o f these: tw enty-tw o a t the tim e o f the N ekba (D isaster, Palestinian term fo r the w ar o f 1948), he had been a w orker in H aifa O il R efinery and had taken p art in com m unal battles. A lth ou gh a m em ber o f S h ateela's dom inant village, he becam e a local leader o f the A ra b N ationalist m ovem ent: T h ere began to be m ovem ents in Sh ateela, am ong them the P P S , the Ba*tb, the A ra b N ation alist m ovem ent and the Lebanese C om m unist P arty. W e go t to kn ow a ll these m ovem ents and th eir th in kin g through ou r discussions and relations w ith one another. Som etim es discussions escalated in to figh ts - PPS against A N M , com m unists against nationalists. E ach one stuck to his ow n w ay o f thinking. W e talked abou t how to get Palestine b ack. W e d iffered , but in freedom . T here w eren’t spies in those d ays— I w as read y to enter an y p arty th at nam ed Israel as the enem y. I started w ith the M uslim Brethren but o n ly stayed w ith them tw o o r three w eeks. T h eir speeches disgusted m e - *The hum an being is nothing, the coun try is nothing, patriotism is nothing, o n ly G o d counts.* I w anted m y country. L ater we form ed a group; w e called ourselves ‘A l-Sh eb ab a l-'A ra b i al-Filasteeni*.13 Student m ilieus also generated p olitical discussion and m em bership in the 'O pposition* parties. Jihad B isher recalls pressures to jo in the Ba*th o r A N M in secondary sch ool in B o u ij Barajneh in the late 1950s: 'A t first I thought their aim s w ere right. But because m y father w as one o f the follow in g o f H ajj A m in and w e w ere brought up to respect ou r fathers, I refused to join.* A b u *Ali A b b as, w hose fam ily m oved from B a’lbek to Shateela in 1959 when he w as fifteen , recalls th at it w as a buqra hizbiyyeh (a fo ca l p oin t o f p o litical parties). H e h im self becam e a B a’thist and a student leader, one o f the first shebab (young m en) from Shateela to reach the university.

52 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 O ld er p eople, how ever, retained a distrust o f p olitical parties th at had begun in Palestine and w as also p ro b ab ly a strand w ithin Islam ic-based Palestinian nationalism . T h is w as one reason fo r p arty recruitm ent takin g p lace in schools and w orkplaces rather than in the cam p itself. H eated p o litica l discussion and jo in in g in dem onstrations: these w ere the lim its o f m ost people’s p olitical activity. T he fact that N asserist A ra b nationalism w as a m ovem ent rather than a p arty w as p rob ab ly an unarticulated reason fo r its p op u larity w ith the Palestinian m asses. A t the height o f N asser’s p op u larity, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, there were h ard ly m ore than six A N M m em bers in Shateela. O ther parties had n ot m ore than one o r tw o m em bers each , and the L ebanese C om m unist P arty (L C P ) had none according to A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i. O ld -style Palestinian resistance continued. Jihad B isher recalls carryin g a letter from the M u fti to a qa’id in South L ebanon - as a b o y o f fifteen he d id n ot risk being searched. T h e letter w as destined to be sm uggled into Israel/P alestine and distributed am ong M u fti supporters in G alilee. In co n trast to the A ra b nation alists w ho placed th eir faith in jo in t A ra b action led b y a new leadership, the M u fti’s follow in g gave p riority to Palestinian action . T h is w as the m ain division w ithin diaspora politics until 1967. N asser’s p op u larity am ong the Palestinian m asses w as due p rim arily to his speeches and actions challenging im perialism and his continual references to Palestine; also to the facilities he gave fo r m ilitary trainin g, as w ell as his encouragem ent o f Palestinian institutions (the P L O , the students* and w orkers’ unions, the Saw t al-F ilasteen i radio station). T h e grow th o f N asser’s p op u larity eroded the influence o f H ajj A m in , a sh ift that w orried the Lebanese authorities and contributed d irectly to the intensification o f co n tro l th at to o k p lace under President C hehab (1958-64). T h e oth er developm ent th at w eakened the influence o f the M u fti (and o f A b u K am al o ver Shateela) w as the in flu x o f w orker-m igrants th at caused an oversp ill in to the space around the cam p, alterin g the dem ographic and p olitical physiognom y o f the area. T he p reoccu pation o f the refugees w ith Palestinian and A ra b regional issues kept them from gettin g involved in p u rely Lebanese p olitics. O ld er residents rem em ber the hanging o f a Shateela m an in the H ursh, alleged ly as a sp y fo r the K a ta ’eb (p robably during the 'M uslim revolt’ o f 1958); and A hm ad H aleem eh recalls that one o f his uncles w as b riefly involved w ith the N ajjadeh (a B eirut Sunni counterpart to the K a ta ’eb). B ut such affiliatio n s w ere rare. O ne sign o f how little cam p Palestinians w ere interested in Lebanese politics is their lack o f response to offers o f nationality m ade b y variou s zu’am a’ (leaders). A lth ou gh A b u K am al failed to isolate Shateela from rad ical p an -A rab p o litical currents, he succeeded in keeping it o u t o f the 1958 civil w ar, the 'h a rt Cham oun*:

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E m otionally Shateela w as on the M uslim side but w e tried to stay ou t o f the figh tin g. W e to ld the n ation al M uslim p arties14 that w e co u ld n 't get involved; w e d id n 't w ant disturbances in the cam p. M y fath er said , 'I f anyone w ants to jo in the figh tin g, he m ust leave the cam p .’ A n d w hen S a’eb Salam 13 sent a vehicle w ith a gun to guard Shateela's eastern entrance, m y fath er sent it aw ay. H e to ld them , ' W e are responsible fo r Shateela's security.* (Jihad Bisher) B y the end o f the first decade o f exile, how ever, the isolation th at the D irector had striven to m aintain w as becom ing a rtificial. T raum atized though they w ere by exile and p overty, the refugees* passionate desire fo r a solu tion to their problem inevitably m ade them receptive to hopeful m essages from their Lebanese and A ra b environm ent.

‘The educational revolution’ Schools w ere opened in the cam ps w ith great rapidity. T h e earliest years w ere ones o f m aterial shortage but o f great enthusiasm on the part o f everyone concerned: adm inistrators, teachers, parents, students. Jihad Bisher belonged to the generation w hose schooling w as interrupted b y fighting in Palestine. A lread y aged eleven in 1951, he attended Shateela school from the start: T here w ere three large 'hospital* tents and som e very prim itive chairs. W e had three teachers, one fo r each tent; and there w ere tw o classes in each ten t, so that each class had to listen to the lesson o f the other. T he teachers w ere a ll P alestinian, not highly educated but very good . T hey w orked hard w ith us so th at we could catch up. T h e fo llo w in g year U N R W A rented classroom s in Sabra. Jihad says th ey m oved because, when tents w ere blow n dow n in storm s, fam ilies m oved into the sch o o l tents. T h e room s w ere cram ped; there w ere m any students - they cam e from S ab ra16 as w ell as Shateela - Jihad rem em bers an average o f fo rty per class. G irls sat in the sam e room w ith boys - T d o n 't rem em ber any parents refusing this.* Enthusiasm fo r education w as such th at even old er w om en, fo r exam ple Jih ad 's m other, attended U N R W A adu lt literacy classes. Jihad uses the term 'ed u catio n al revolution* to describe the enthusiasm w ith w hich people turned to sch oolin g, but there w ere in fa ct rather w ell-defined class lim its to access and benefits. A cou p le o f years later U N R W A rented part o f a Lebanese-ow ned apartm ent building on the western edge o f the cam p w hich becam e the G alilee S ch o o l fo r boys and the M enshiyyeh S ch o ol fo r girls (both w ere destroyed

54 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 during the A m al sieges). A cco rd in g to several Shateela p eop le, there w as an agreem ent betw een U N R W A and the Lebanese governm ent th at U N R W A w ould not build schools fo r Palestinians, on ly rent them . It w as o n ly after the uprising o f 1969 th at a sch o ol w as b u ilt, A rih a (Jericho) S ch o ol on the eastern edge in H ayy F arh at, under the inspiration o f its first headm aster, S a’eed A b d allah , him self a Shateela m an. In the early years Shateela schools o n ly had elem entary classes. F o r oth er levels, students had to g o into B eirut o r ou t to B o u ij B arajneh, usually on fo o t. F am ily need fo r incom e m eant th at m ost boys left school to w ork a t the end o f the elem entary cycle. A t m ost th ey m ight be apprenticed to earn a technical certificate. B ridging the critical gap betw een free U N R W A schooling and the q u alification s needed fo r w hite-collar em ploym ent called fo r ten acity and connections. A fter I go t m y elem entary certificate m y fath er sent m e to a technical sch ool to stu d y carpentry o r m echanics, but after fou r days I quit; I w anted to go on studying. B y th at tim e a ll the schools w ere fu ll up. W ithout tellin g m y father I w ent to see a friend o f his, an U N R W A In spector o f E d u cation , D ia b Fahoum . H e w as a great p atriot. H e loved young Palestinians and w anted to get them educated. I to ld him m y story. Fahoum to o k me to B o u ij Barajneh sch ool and spoke to the headm aster, S h areef N ashasheebi. H e said , ‘T here’s no room *, b ut F ahoum to ld him , T w ant this b oy in school.* M y class w as in a kitchen and there w as now here fo r m e to sit except in the w ash basin. E ven tu ally th ey b rou ght m e a sm all ch air and I sat betw een the desks w ith m y b ooks on m y knees. (Jihad Bisher) K h aled Sarees, w ho later becam e an U N R W A teacher and headm aster, recalls peeping as a b o y o f fo u r years o ld in to the first tent sch ool; b u t w hen he began sch ool tw o years later, it w as in the rented building. H is accou n t o f his ow n career underlines the m any, som etim es con trad ictory benefits th at people hoped fo r from education: In those days people w aited fo r th eir sons to grow up so th ey cou ld help them fin an cially. T h ey w anted them to be educated b u t th ey d id n 't have the m eans to m ake them d octors o r engineers. Besides, it w as forbidden to us as Palestinians to practise as d octors o r law yers. T h eir biggest am bition then w as to have their sons w ork in an o ffice o r a com pany. T he m ost m y fam ily w anted fo r me w as to be a teacher. W e could n ’t have higher am bitions because we knew ou r social circum stances. A s a teacher you can w ork , yo u can help yo u r people. W e w ere alw ays hearing from o u r fam ilies th at the reason we h ad been throw n o u t o f o u r cou n try

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w as ignorance. T h a t’s w hy w e grasped a t education. It w asn’t ju st to get

W hereas a t first all Shateela teachers were urban Palestinians w ho lived outside the cam p, by the end o f the first decade this began to change. K haled Sarees w as one o f the first Shateela boys to enter Sibleen (U N R W A ’s technical and professional training institute)17 but there w ere others w ho taught in Shateela before him , am ong them A b d el Rasheed M a’ro u f from D eir al-*A ssi, a village fam ous fo r the num ber o f its teachers; M uham m ad F a ’ou r from Sha’b , the first ’hom e-grow n’ headm aster; and S a’eed A b d allah from M ajd al-K room . It w as S a’eed w ho form ed a group o f ’sons o f the cam p’ to coach youn ger b oys to pass o fficia l exam inations en ablin g them to g o to state universities in S yria o r E gypt (in E gypt under N asser, special facilities were granted to Palestinian students). A ccord in g to sociologist Bassem Sirhan, teachers cam e to p lay an im portant social leadership role in cam ps, distinct from the pre-1948 leadership o f shuyyukh and wujaha’ (literally ’faces’, clan and villager elders).11 T h e sudden ava ilab ility o f free general sch oolin g m eant a d isp arity in literacy betw een youn ger and old er generations. W e m ay assum e th at sch oolin g m ust have had an effect on ’ m entalities’ , and hence on fam ily relation s, so cial structure and culture. N onetheless, it is n ot easy to reconstruct w hat these effects w ere. P art o f the d ifficu lty lies in the m any years o f w ar and displacem ent w hich im pede recollection o f the early period. A n oth er arises from the valu e attached to paren tal au th o rity and fam ily relation s, w hich not on ly suppresses challenges to these but also suppresses consciousness o f suppression. T he fact th at signs o f respect fo r parents such as kissing th eir hands continued w ell in to the 1960s suggests th at sch oolin g a t first m ade little difference to p aren t-ch ild relations. A m on g the factors d iffusin g sociocu ltu ral change and preventing co n flict o r alien ation , we m ay coun t w ork m igration, w hich to o k m any younger m en beyond the fam ily circle; the sim ilarity o f cu ltu ral atm osphere betw een sch o ol and hom e; and the nature o f the edu cation provid ed , geared to producin g general literacy w ith a tech nical orien tation . A lth ou gh the sch oolin g o f girls posed a threat to gender valu es, w ays w ere fou n d to con tain such th reats, fo r exam ple through greater w atchfulness and m ore exp licit w arnings.

Health: conditions, services, indigenous practices M aln u trition , p o o r housing and insufficient cloth in g w ere p rob ab ly the m a i n cau se o f sickness in the 1950s. It is d ifficu lt to fin d su rvivin g m edical w ork ers w ho can give an overview o f th at tim e b u t from m any accou n ts it

56 A n Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 seem s as i f adu lt w orking men w ere the category m ost at risk. H eavy m anual lab o u r to w hich th ey w ere unaccustom ed, w ounds suffered during the w ar o f 1948, o r beatings during post-w ar attem pts to infiltrate: a ll these w ere m ale-specific hazards. T u bercu losis w as fa irly com m on in the 1950s and seem s to have attacked m ainly adult men. Because o f its infectious character, T B sufferers received prom pt treatm ent in Lebanese san atoria but oth er kinds o f resp iratory disease w ere also com m on. M en also appear to have suffered a high rate o f kidney and back problem s. A Shateela d o cto r w ho grew up in an oth er cam p , D r M uham m ad alK hateeb, describes health conditions in the 1950s. H ousing in N abatiyyeh w as m ore so lid , but w inter co ld w as m ore severe than in Shateela. W aste w ater ran o ff a h ill instead o f co llectin g in stagnant p ools betw een housing. B ut w hat he says ab o u t clo th in g and n u trition is p ro b ab ly true o f a ll cam ps: F o o d w as n ot enough. In the 1950s, people w ere very p oor. T h ey ate a lo t o f p otatoes because th ey w ere cheaper. I f th ey bou ght m eat it w as m ainly bones, to m ake soup. It w as a very bad period fo r children. U N R W A gave us a cup o f m ilk and a vitam in tablet every m orning. M aybe the m ilk w asn't go o d , o r m aybe it w as w atered, but we alw ays had diarrhoea. I rem em ber that m any children suffered from tooth ache and earache. T h e U N R W A clin ic in N abatiyyeh d id n 't have a dentist o r a d octor then. Because o f this I lo st tw o o f m y perm anent teeth. W e d id n 't have w inter cloth es. Som e o f the children had to w ear their p a ren ts'ja ck ets to g o to sch o o l. M ost o f us had no shoes o r jerseys. N o on e co u ld a ffo rd to b u y m azou t (fu el o il) to heat th eir houses. I rem em ber cryin g from the co ld . E very few d ays the wom en o f N abatiyyeh had to travel 10 kilom etres, up and dow n h ill, to bring firew ood fo r bakin g and cookin g: Som e w ou ld be carryin g th eir babies i f th ey w ere su cklin g. Som etim es th ey w ere delivered on the w ay. M any w om en had m iscarriages because o f the distance and the load s. M y m other w as one o f them . I rem em ber th ey brought her hom e in pain and I heard them sa y th at she w as bleeding. L ater on I understood w hat it w as. In Sh ateela, w om en did n ot have to g o o u t to gath er firew oo d but certain ly they suffered from conditions sp ecific to the cam p and to th eir gender. T hou gh w inter tem peratures were fa r less severe in B eirut than in N abatiyyeh o r the Beqa*, no housing w as rain -p roof o r flo od -p roof. Because o f th is, w om en a ll tended to su ffer arth ritic pain. Sum m er heat and hum idity also bore harshly on them , p articu larly a fter the change from tents

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to huts w ith corrugated iron roofs. Um m Ism a’een brought up seven children in such a one-room ed barakiyeh. W e cou ld n ’t sta y a t hom e in sum m er because it g o t so h ot. W hen the sun hit the zinco the h ut becam e like an oven. M aybe outside there’s a breeze but it doesn’t enter the barakiyeh. M y head used to b u m ! A fte r I’d m ade breakfast and fetched the w ater I'd tak e the children and a m at and g o dow n to the H ursh, and sit w ith them under the trees u n til the evening. Som e w om en co u ld n ot b ear the hardships o f the sudden change from a norm al life to cam p conditions. Pakeeza G h azaleh recounts how her m other, a city w om an, bint nas ,** w ho cam e from H aifa w earing high-heeled shoes, never g o t o ver the sh ock o f her o n ly son’s breakdow n (after being beaten b y frontier guards), and o f transfer to Shateela. She could not bear the heat in sum m er, n or cope w ith carryin g w ater from distant taps (city w om en never learn t how to carry heavy w eights on their heads the w ay village wom en did); she developed an enlarged heart, dyin g at the early age o f forty-eigh t. It w as to provide m edicines fo r her m other th at Pakeeza began w orking as a nurse. Because o f the pressure o f im m igration in to Shateela, the cam p rap id ly becam e oversettled: its houses were sm aller and m ore crow ded than in other cam ps, its streets narrow er. Elsew here people cou ld m ake courtyards and garden p lots but Shateela b y the early 1960s seem s to have had a ll the features o f an urban slum . In consequence, there w ere high rates o f gastroenteritis, respiratory infections and skin problem s in young children. Umm Ism a’een attributes her children’s frequent illnesses to the lack o f hygiene and the sm all, stu ffy hut they lived in. It is interesting to find th at this fam ily, though n ot w ell o ff, resorted to p rivate Lebanese m edical care fo r th eir children. T here w as a children’s specialist in Sabra w ho on ly charged L L 1 (h a lf his norm al fee) on Fridays. U N R W A ’s free m edical services w ere availab le to a ll Palestinian refugees from the beginning but rem ained a t a rather rudim entary level. D octo rs d iffered greatly in concern; som e d id not observe clin ic hours and h ard ly bothered to exam ine patients. B efore the 1970s very few w ere Palestinian, and none lived in cam ps; nurses also gen erally lived outside. T h is m eant that outside m orning clin ic hours there w as no one on hand w ho cou ld give even sim ple em ergency treatm ent. Som e people say th at o n ly people on good term s w ith the D irecto r obtain ed referral slips to see specialists o r to enter hospital fo r an operation. T h ey sum up U N R W A m edical services in the 1950s as ‘ A n aspro and yattahY (G et ou t!). P olitical activists had better not show th eir faces. Pakeeza G h azaleh , w ho w orked in the clin ic, gives a som ew hat different picture:

58 An O ral-Based H istory o f Shateeht Camp, 1949-82 W e used to begin a t 7.30 am . A t 8 am the d o cto r cam e and everything w ould be alread y prepared. People w ould be crow ding outside. I stam ped their cards and gave them a place in the queue. A b u F ad l, the door-keep er, used to give them th eir num bers. T h e one w ho cam e first, entered first. T h a t m an w as honest, he d id n 't [w eaves hand to indicate deviousness]. E ach accord in g to his turn. E very sick person cam e to the U N R W A d o cto r. I f he co u ld treat him he d id so. I f it w as beyond his cap acity he sent him to the R as al-N aba* P olyclin ic. A n d i f it w as som ething urgent he gave him a paper fo r the A m erican U niversity H ospital. T h ey w ould adm it him as soon as he show ed his paper. U N R W A certain ly succeeded in several o f its health targets, fo r exam ple the u pgradin g o f daya ('A rab* m idw ives), the im provem ent in care o f pregnant w om en and in fan ts, and the erad ication o f epidem ics. B ut b asic health conditions - nutrition and housing - deteriorated sharply in L eb an on , and it is disputable w hether the m edical services availab le to refugees w ere m uch in advance over those in Palestine. W hen asked abou t th is, Fatim eh G h reiry said lacon ically, ‘ W e had d octors there, we have d octors here.* She w ent on: 'P alestin e w as healthier. W e treated sick people there at hom e and they recovered. H ere yo u take them to tw enty d octors and they don*t get better.* G iven p overty, it is not surprising th at indigenous m edical practices su rvived . O ne o f these w as the p ractice o f ja b r, bonehealing. Um m N afidh A w deh from Sha*b, still in Shateela until 1985, w as skilled in this ancient A ra b art. Bone-setters to o k o n ly a sm all fee, n othing at a ll i f the patient w as a neighbou r o r p oor. E very housew ife knew the use o f m aram iyyeh (sage), na‘na (m int), m ardaquoush (oregano) and zoofa (hyssop). R eligion and m agic w ere tw o other sources o f cure to w hich people continued to resort, side b y side w ith d octors. Fatim eh G h reiry from Safed says, ‘ F o r som ething m ild like headache, m y father-in-law read the Q uran. I f it w as som ething m ore serious, he w ould m ake a m ow lid *.20 R eligious sheikh s w ere believed to be able to cure in fertility w ith h ijabs, lon g strips o f paper covered w ith Q uranic verses rolled up and w orn b y w om en inside th eir clothin g. T he cru cial im portance o f p rocreation keeps such m agicoreligious practices alive even now . A s in m any other parts o f the w orld , it is m ainly older wom en w ho co n trol the secrets o f sexu ality, fertility, abortion and infant care.21 A lth ou gh indigenous beliefs and practices are usually ridiculed as superstition, one still finds traces o f them . In B o u ij B arajneh cam p in the early 1970s, w om en still ‘threw lead* as a technique fo r d iscoverin g w ho w as pu ttin g the evil eye on th eir babies. F ew wom en d o not fasten a turquoise bead on a new born b ab y’s clo th in g to avert the evil eye. M ost w om en still avoid visitin g a new ly delivered m other if they are m enstruating.

The F irst D ecade 59 U N R W A nurse Pakeeza reveals her ow n am bivalence when recollectin g the stru ggle betw een the clin ic s ta ff and m others in regard to certain fo lk practices, such as sw addling and putting koh l around the eyes o f new born infants: In U N R W A w e forbad e the use o f koh l. W e shouted at wom en w ho d id it» we to ld them th at it dam ages the eye. Y e t in the H adeetA22 it says th at it's O K to use koh l. L o o k at gypsies! T h ey alw ays put koh l on their eyes and they never get glaucom a. W ith regard to swaddling» Pakeeza w as m ore o f a m odernist: ‘ I f I saw it, straightaw ay I to o k the scissors and cu t the bands.* I f in fan t m ortality rates w ent d ow n , due in part to m ore hygienic d elivery and better postnatal care, general health could not but su ffer from cam p conditions. P opu lar consciousness o f the prevalence o f sickness w as one basic reason fo r the ‘ health politics* o f the Resistance m ovem ent, am ong the earliest o f w hose services w as the Palestine R ed C rescent S ociety (P R C S ).

Social stractve P alestine's indigenous class structure w as crisscrossed b y social relations o f m any kinds: ties o f kinship, o f lo cality (betw een people o f the sam e village o r city n eighbourhood), o f p atron age, and o f w ork o r p o litica l association . A s exiles in an u nfam iliar system , Palestinians in L ebanon clu ng to all p re-1948 ties w ithou t exception. W hatever cleavages m ight have divided people before w ere tem porarily subm erged in a shared predicam ent. A m ong these ties, those o f patronage continued to p lay a vital sym bolic and practical role. W e have already seen how the M u fti's backing put A b u K am al in charge o f Shateela cam p, p rolon ging a social ord er form ed in Palestine fa r in to the 1960s; oth er notables from the G a lilee area w ere also in volved in the d a ily life o f cam p p op u lation s. Bassem S irh an , w ho grew up in the household o f his u n d e F a n s, a large landow ner from K a b ri, gives this picture: H e [F aris Sirhan] used to com e from his o ffice a t 2pm and th ey w ould be w aitin g inside. H e w ould tell his w ife, ‘ I 'll ta lk w ith them fo r five minutes* but he w ould ta lk fo r three hours and forget his lunch. I f you w ant to be a trad ition al leader you ca n 't turn anyone aw ay. T h ey cam e at any tim e, a t 6 am , a t m idnight. H is w ife used to be an gry, she w orried about his health. She to ld him to have fixed hours. B ut peasants ca n 't have fixed tim es, it's not part o f their culture. T h e cam p people cam e to him w ith a ll th eir problem s. V illagers from his ow n area con su lted him in a ll m atters, but a w ider range cam e fo r

60 An O ral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 letters o f recom m endation fo r help w ith the Lebanese authorities. H e held p o litica l pow er th rough the A H C and the M u fti; the Lebanese governm ent considered them to be like the P L O today. People referred to him in m asny things even though he had no phyusical o r financial control over them . N o one ever m arried a w om an from any o f the villages th at follow ed him w ithout consulting him . H e had to be there and ask fo r her hand. I f he talked fo r them he w ould never be refused. T h ey consulted him w henever they had clashes betw een fam ilies o r villages. W hen the Lebanese governm ent couldn’t solve it, and U N R W A couldn’t solve it, he w ould m ake a reconciliation. T h is went on up to 1965.2* T h ose w ho cam e to consult F a n s Sirhan kissed his hand and called him beg o r effen di. It som etim es happened that people asked fo r m oney but this w as rare. H is m ain role w as as m erja’ (reference, guide, arbitrator). A n oth er large landow ner from northern Palestine exiled in Lebanon w as K am el H ussein ejfendP* from K h alsa o f w hom it is said that ’his people’ continued to o ffer him yearly tribute u n til the 1970s. U nlike Sirh an , how ever, he had little pow er to help people. Lesser notables are recorded as havin g helped individual clients to obtain cam p sites o r jo b s. P atronage survived in L ebanon because o f people’s need, and its su rvival helped in turn to sustain the pre-1948 rural social structure, p articu larly the au th o rity o f the shuyyukh and the wujaha ’, alon g w ith the cu ltu ral values th at upheld it, such as respect fo r seniority. A N M m ilitant A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i connects such values to broader social structure: I f som eone like me spoke ab o u t p olitics [the wujaha’] w ould sa y, ’W ho is this? H e’s o n ly a b o y, he doesn’t have the right to stand up and speak in fro n t o f H ajj A m in H usseini.* T h ey th ou ght th at p o litics is o n ly fo r certain fam ilies - b e it H usseini, b e it N ashasheebi, b e it A b d u l H adi - o n ly they have the right to deal w ith p olitics. T h at’s how they w ere brought up. T he am bivalent p o litica l role o f o ld m en, the shuyyukh , in dicatin g com pliance fo r m ilitants like A b u M uham m ad and K haled Shehadeh, and fo r others a livin g link w ith Palestine, com es ou t clearly in disagreem ents ab o u t the m ejlis al-shuyyukh th at A b u K am al set up in the early 1950s, a p o licy renewed during the Resistance period. T o a radical like Shehadeh, the con cept o f w ujaha ' lost its m eaning w ith the loss o f Palestine, and an y attem pt to reconstitute it cou ld on ly be spurious. D ebates about the role o f the shuyyukh under the regim e o f the Intelligence Bureau w ere com m on in the 1970s, and again after the m assacre o f 1982 and the 1985 battle w ith A m a l, w hen som e o ld m en tried to negotiate truces: such effo rts w ere seen

The F irst D ecade 61 b y youn ger m en as con trary to the sp irit o f resistance. B y the end o f the 1980s, how ever, the death o f so m any o f the 'gen eration o f Palestine* changed attitudes tow ards thenm ; people began to praise th eir skills in solvin g con flicts and to m ourn them as irreplaceable. T he sp ecial status and respect allo tted to the wujaha’ d id h o t extend to th eir w ives o r lead to an y sp ecial role o r con dition s fo r them . D iw ans w ere a p u rely m ale a ffa ir, w ith the m en w ho kep t them up preparing co ffee and tea fo r visitors. Pakeeza G h a zaleh , w ho lived in Shateela from 1952 to 1962, rem em bers th at Um m K am al, the D irecto r's w ife, carried w ater on her head like everyone else: T f she were the kin g's w ife she w ould live the sam e way.* V illage-based ties w ere reconstructed in cam ps in Lebanon through social processes of'in -gath erin g* such as those used b y A b u K am al to recruit the M ajd al-K room m ajority in Shateela. Such reconstructed village fragm ents form ed a pow erful defence against alienation in exile as w ell as a basis fo r the transm ission o f m ainly village culture. People from the sam e village supported each other in quarrels w ith others. A t the sam e tim e village ties underw ent subtle alteration as th ey w ere p u t to new purposes, fo r exam ple as a channel o f access to jo b s o r educational subsidies. In Shateela, the people o f the 'b ig four* villages - M ajd al-K ro o m , al-B irw eh, S affo u ri and Sha*b - fed th eir ties through the practice o f w aasta accordin g to the rule sum m arized b y A b u Ism a'een: ‘T hose close to us have priority.*29 V illagers w ith a head start in schoolin g obtained the lio n 's share o f U N R W A *s trainin g resources, m igrating ahead o f others to the oil-producing countries w here th ey form ed bridgeheads fo r later m igrants. People o f the bigger villages w ere m ore lik ely to reproduce in exile th eir sp ecific social characters accents, fo o d preparation s, reputations) and w ere lik ely to m aintain m utual insurance funds. F o r people from sm aller villages, village-based ties had less u tilitarian valu e, con tin u in g as a basis fo r so cial exchange b u t leavin g m ore space fo r oth er ties such as those based on neighbourhood. T h e presence in Shateela o f several city households m eant th at the prc-1948 barriers betw een ah el a l-q a riya (village fo lk ) and ah el al-m udun (city fo lk ) w ere bridged here earlier than in other cam ps. A lread y b y the early 1960s there w as interm arriage betw een them . T h e p roxim ity of'stran gers* forced people to invest in oth er relationsh ips th an th ose o f kinship and village. A m uchquoted proverb supports this shift: T h e neighbour w ho is near is better than the broth er w ho is far.* C am ps becam e com m unities to be defended. T h is is clear from stories o f fa za ’a as w ell as the norm o f celebratin g jo y and m ourning loss together: *AI-farah liik u il w a a i-a ’za lilk u ir ('jo y is fo r a ll and sorrow is fo r all*) w as the m axim fo r such practices. It w as the custom to invite a ll the neighbours fo r a w edding; m ourning visits w ere even m ore strictly inclusive. Fatim eh G h reiry says, 'I f som eone d ied, we w ent to condole w hether w e knew them

62 A n O ral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp; 1949-82 o r n ot. *T h is w as in spite o f the fa ct th at being a city w om an, she on ly visited regu larly three o r fou r neighbours w hom she knew w ell.26 T he h ayy (neighbourhood) and open spaces w ithin and around the cam p (streets, m arkets) w ere a crucial arena o f social interaction. K in sh ip ties continued to be im portant fo r the refugees in L eban on , but w e need to distinguish betw een their continuation as a basic social value and sh ifts in form s and practices. T h e size o f kin units th at m oved to L ebanon and the degree to w hich th ey settled together varied consierably. In certain cases, a w hole cam p quarter w ould be inhabited by a single lineage; village clusters w ere in any case alw ays linked by m ultiple ties o f consanguinity (hasab) and m arriage (nasab). B ut in m any other cases, villages and kin units w ere scattered betw een d ifferent cam ps and different host countries. E conom ic pressures also tended to sp lit up kin clusters, as in dividu al households follow ed em ploym ent opportunities and decided, sa y, to m ove from T rip o li o r B a’lbek to Beirut. Even though certain practices associated w ith the ham uleh (p atrilin eage) continued in to exile - fo r exam ple cousin m arriage and ‘hon our’ killin gs - yet the old clan system w as d ealt a fa ta l b lo w b y loss o f land and dispersion. T h e gradu al em ergence o f socioeconom ic d ifferentiation also w eakened clan ties, w ith w ealthier m em bers tending to d issociate them selves from p oorer ones. T o sp eak o f ‘ nuclearization* w ould be a d istortion , as households continued to be com posed o f m ore people than a typ ical W estern fam ily (old parents, w idow ed o r d ivorced sisters, orphans), and m arried sons continued to live close to their parents, som etim es form ing com pound households. People still expected kin to help them (though such expectations w ere often disappointed); they still visited kin frequently. B ut exile hastened processes o f change w hich had already begun in Palestine. In certain cases p o litica l parties becam e the basis fo r ties th at co u ld be stronger than those o f kinship, village o r neighbourhood. W hen A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i had to leave Lebanon on p olitical m issions, he instructed his w ife not to g o to his fam ily o r hers if she needed m oney, but to fellow p arty m em bers. E xile d id n ot destroy pre-existing social relations but m odified them and added new ones. S ocial exchange w ith Lebanese w as lim ited in the first decade, not b y deep differences o f culture o r identity but b y the refugees* hum iliation by their poverty. N onetheless, new ties w ere form ed, m ainly w ithin the context o f w ork o r p olitics, and these w ould expand during the 1960s.

Village customs I rem em ber that a t A ’eed al-F itr and A ’eed al-A dha* m y father used to take me and m y b roth er and g o from house to bouse in Shateela to

The P in t D ecode 63 con gratu late people on the feast. W e had to g o to every house to ask people i f th ey needed anything. T h at used to happen in the m orning. In the aftern oon people used to return the visit to m y father. T h is w ent on u n til he retired in 1 9 6 9 ... H e also encouraged the social life o f the villages in P alestine, the gatherings - the m ejiis o r diw an - and m any village habits such as, fo r exam ple, m aking tom ato paste. O u r w om en used to stay up a ll night b oilin g the tom atoes to m ake paste. T hings like th at he insisted on . It w as p art o f his vision o f the cam ps as gatherin g places fo r Palestinians, to be ready fo r the return. (Jihad Bisher) T h is suggests th at the conservation o f villag e culture in the cam ps w as to som e extent the result o f national leadership p o licy, dissem inated through the so cial relations we have seen continuing to operate in exile, alth ough it w as su rely also a spontaneous reaction to separation from Palestine. B ut w hat is striking about Jih ad 's description is d ie w ay in w hich he takes fo r granted the links betw een m aterial culture - fo r exam ple, the m aking o f to m ato paste - and quasi-sacred custom s such as the visits m ade a t the tim e o f the religious feasts. O ne o f the forces behind Palestinian su rvival in the d iasp ora has certain ly been th is w elding together o f m oral and m aterial valu es in rites w hich underlined consciousness o f the co llectivity. A t the sam e tim e, we note the w ay that Jihad subsum es the w hole cam p in the hom es th at his fath er visited , a feat o n ly possible if leading fam ilies w ere taken as representing others. T his presupposed, im plicit social structure underlay the preservation o f culture; when th at changed, cu ltu ral m eanings changed even when form s w ere preserved. A lth ou gh p overty and change o f occupation threatened an expressive and sym bolic culture form ed in rural Palestine, th ey did not elim inate it (an y m ore than they elim inated pre-1948 social structure) but rather reinforced form s th at had adaptive usefulness in harsh conditions, as w ell as those th at, on the co n trary, w ere associated w ith sym bolic values. T h e e ffo rt needed to celebrate w eddings, fo r exam ple, w ith even a hint o f the usual consum ption o f foo d , exchange o f gifts and extravagant displays placed such celeb ration s in the realm o f cu ltu ral stru ggle. W e m ay im agine th at cu ltu ral con tin u ity becam e p oliticized to the degree th at people felt it to be threatened. A b u K am aTs setting o f a night gu ard around the cam p gives an idea o f the self-conscious frontiers erected against alien atin g urban influences. Even in conditions o f rapid p op u lation grow th and change, the D irecto r's co n trol over settlem ent allow ed him to keep Shateela 'pure*, preserving both its Palestinianness and its peasant village ethos. F ew occasions assem ble the fu ll range o f Palestinian expressive, sym bolic and m aterial culture as fu lly as m arriage, and no other has m obilized m ore cu ltu ral ten acity, b oth in the w ays m arriages are arranged as w ell as in the w ays th ey are celebrated. M arriage has a lso acquired new m eanings as

64 An O ral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 the celebration o f survival and affirm ation o f national identity. In Shateela in the 1950s, how ever, the on ly change w as one o f m eans. C lass/cu ltu ral differences betw een village and city people were still clearly dem arcated. O ne o f the first couples to m arry in S hateela, in 19 51, A hm ad H aleem eh’s parents on ly had a m ow lid (religious ritual). Instead o f dishes o f m eat and rice, neighbours w ho cam e to congratulate the fam ily received a few sw eets and cakes. T he bride w ore her m other's w edding dress, and her jih a z (trousseau) consisted o f a quilt and som e sheets. T h e w eddings o f people from larger villages are said to have been celebrated w ith som e o f the custom ary festivities. Sha’b and S affou ri people helped each other w ith w edding expenses. W hen his eldest son M uham m ad m arried, Shehadeh F a 'o u r (from S h a'b ) gave a p arty w hich is still rem em bered. Pakeeza recalls another early m arriage: R ight a t the beginning, when we first cam e to the cam p, we saw a w edding p arty. It w as fo r villagers, m aybe from M ajd al-K room . T h ey w ere dancing the debkeh , m en and wom en holding hands. W e said , ‘Y eeh l [expression o f disapproval] it is sham eful fo r a w om an to hold a m an's hand and m ove her b ody in this way.* Pakeeza goes on: W e d id n 't d o this. H ow w as ou r w edding day? T h ey put the bride in her fath er's house, they displayed her on a high ch air. A ll the w om en w ere w ith her - no men! T he m en stayed alon e in another house. T h e w om en sing and dance in the house o f the bride. T hen those w ho aren 't relatives leave and the bridegroom com es. Instead o f the em broidered thaw b , city wom en w ore a succession o f lon g dresses o f d ifferen t co lou rs - w hite, p in k, b la ck , b lu e, red. W hen the groom cam e, the bride put on her w hite dress again , w ith the tarha and k le e l (train and crow n). W edding photos o f even the p oorest fam ilies show how grand the bride and bridegroom 's clo th in g had to be, even if it w as borrow ed o r hired. Insight in to m arriage practices from a very d ifferen t angle com es from an unsentim ental sto ry to ld b y A b u *A li, from the tim e o f tents. H ow co u ld th ey give a new ly m arried couple the p rivacy necessary to consum m ate the m arriage? T he solu tion w as to hire a separate tent fo r three nights, the m axim um th at m ost fam ilies could affo rd . T h is w as not enough in the case o f a t least one Shateela m an, still rem em bered th irty years later as unable to yu d k h a lfih a (enter her) in the allotted tim e.

The F irst D ecade 65

Shateela expuds D u rin g the 1950s tw o new w aves o f refugees reached Shateela, one from A n ja r in the B eq a\ after clashes betw een A rm enians and Palestinians there, the second from the South , as the Lebanese authorities rem oved Palestinians from border areas to prevent in filtra tio n ’. A p art from these tw o w aves, m igration to the B eirut cam ps w as a m atter o f individual fam ilies, as people stopped expecting a rapid return to Palestine and sought to better their situ ation . A s A b u T u rk i says, everything w as m ore accessible in the capital: W ork w as m ore available and easier to find. T he city w as so clo se, you co u ld go on fo o t and com e b ack , w ithout p ayin g transport. It’s a city , a cap ital! E verything w as closer - schools, clin ics, d octors, the U N R W A headquarters - everything. In sp ite o f som e form alities, tran sfer to the B eirut cam ps in the 1950s w as n ot o fficia lly im peded. T he D irectorate o f Palestinian R efugee A ffa irs had to give perm ission; U N R W A then had to transfer the ap p lican t’s nafoos (registration). T h e D irecto r also had his sa y, the pow er to accep t o r refuse new settlers being part o f his jo b description. Sh ateela’s lim ited space rap id ly filled up. T h e grow th o f the cam p had a num ber o f con trad ictory im plication s o f w hich A b u K am al w as w ell aw are. O n the one hand, he favou red grow th fo r n ation alist and p rop rietary reasons. L ike the other first settlers, he saw size as a m eans o f gaining o fficia l recognition and ’im posing ou r existence*. H is status and salary w ere also , people sa y, linked to the size o f the cam p’s p op u lation . O n the other h u d , he w as aw are th at Shateela’s visib ility from the A irp o rt B oulevarde annoyed the au th orities, and feared th at u y expansion outside its origin al boundaries w ould p rovoke hostile reactions from landow ners u d the state. N onetheless A b u K am al encouraged Palestinian settlem ent outside the cam p’s boundaries until, in the early 1960s, the authorities stepped in to stop the transfer o f nqfoort by that tim e H ayy G harbeh w as already in existence. Such expansion enabled him to claim later, when resisting governm ent/ U N R W A proposals to transfer Shateela, that its population had reached 15,000. A n accou n t given b y an early im m igrant to S hateela, A b u Ism a’een , accurately reflects the various pressures involved in m igration:I I cam e as a b o y from Palestine. I on ly had an old er b roth er in T rip o li. H e sold fa la fe l (fried b e u patties) in u alley. H e m ade L L 10 a d ay, n o t enough fo r both o f us, especially after I g o t m arried. W e had relatives in Shateela so , in 19 5 5 ,1 cam e to them as a guest. T h ey helped m e fin d a h u t

66 An O ral-Based H istory o f Shateeia Camp, 1949-82 and told m e to bring m y fam ily. T h e D irector w as supposed to inform the p olice i f there w as anyone livin g here w hose presence w asn 't legal. B ut I had relatives here and th ey had lin ks w ith the D irecto r, so he left us alone. In the 1960s there w as a decision from the M inistry o f the Interior that everyone m ust return to th eir origin al area o f registration. F o r exam ple, I’m registered in T rip o li, I have to leave Shateeia and return to T rip o li. W hile w orkin g in a w eaving facto ry (in H azm ieh), I g o t to know a m an from B a lb e k . H e had a cousin w ho w as a p olice o fficer at N ab atiyyeh , the hom e tow n o f R afeeq Shaheen w ho w as head o f the D irectorate o f R efugee A ffa irs. T his friend offered to take m e to N abatiyyeh to m eet his cousin i f I paid the expenses. I agreed. A fter a series o f transactions in the (üwan o f R afeeq Shaheen and the D irectorate, A b u Ism a’een received w ord th at his nafoos had been transferred. H e com m ents, 'N o w I belonged o fficia lly to the residents o f Shateeia and the p olice co u ld n 't expel me.* H is account show s how Palestinians w ere beginning to build relations w ith Lebanese, through w hich they becam e a p art, alb eit a m arginal on e, o f the Lebanese so cia l and p o litical system .

Notes 1. The official title is Cam p Services O fficer but A bed Bisher is remembered as *at-Mudh* (the D irector) or as A bu Kam al. 2. One very sm all cam p. M ar Elias (population around 600), lies within the m unicipal boundary. So also did D a'ouq , an unofficial 'camp* (destroyed in M ay 1985). 3. A (village headman) from K abri claim ed that when he first pitched his tent in Shateeia, Abed Bisher tried to drive him aw ay. This may have been because he posed a threat to Abu Kam al's leadership. 4. T o urbanites, Shateeia people seem to have kept their village customs and ethos, but Palestinians from rural camps describe them as like city people, 'shrewd* and 'unconcerned with others*. 5. Hereditary transmission o f official posts such as m ukhtar is custom ary in rural M iddle Eastern communities. In relation to U N R W A cam p directorships it is unusual, and points to the special circumstances o f Shateela’s founding. 6. A s a boy, Abu Ahm ad *Issa K halaf walked through one o f these tunnels to the sea. Later destroyed by building, it was probably the origin o f stories about Shateeia being connected by a network o f tunnels to Sabra and B ouij Barajneh. 7. The value o f the Lebanese pound then was about LL3 : $1. 8. See S. Franjiyeh, 'H ow Revolutionary is the Palestinian Resistance Movement?*, Journal o f P alestine Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, Autum n 1972.

The F irst D ecade 67 9. Several older Shateela men, married before 1948, had Lebanese wives. This was due to the m igration o f Lebanese workers to Palestine. 10. 'G o d have mercy on him/her*, a phrase always used in referring to the dead. 11. Shaweesh, leader o f a sm all m ilitary or police unit (a Turkish term). 12. O riginally a journalist and p olitical activist, al-H out became a representative o f the PLO in Lebanon. 13. This was one o f several small groups that merged with the AN M . 14. 'National* in this context means 'A rab nationalist*, as opposed to 'Lebanese nationalist*. 13. Sa*eb Salam , a Sunni Beirut za ’eem (leader), was one o f the leaders o f the uprising against President Cham oun in 1938. 16. Urban Palestinians began to rent accom m odation in Sabra from the early 1930s. In 1933 the small ‘camp* o f Da*ouq was established for poor urban fam ilies, with its own school classes. 17. Sibleen’s intake varied between 274 (1963) and 496 (1973): U N R W A * U N ESCO S ta tistica l Yearbook 1977-78 (no. 14). 18. B. Sirhan,.'Palestinian Refugee Cam p Life in Lebanon’, Journal o f Palestine Studies, vol. IV , no. 2, W inter 1973. 19. 'f ile daughter o f people*, an expression indicating a property-owning fam ily background. 20. The m ow iid al-nebbi is the Prophet’s birthday and a fixed feast (12th Rabia al-awal), but a m ow iid m ay be held in a home, e.g. in cases o f sickness, thanksgiving fo r a baby’s birth, etc. A sheikh with a specially m elodious voice is invited to chant. 21. F or references to traditional birth control practices, see A . Bendt and J. D ow ning, We ShallReturn: Women ofP alestine (London: Zed Books, 1980), pp. 59-60. 22. Hadeeth: sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. 23. B. Sirhan, interview M arch 1991. Sirhan also described how his uncle gave sanctuary to a young girl from a T yre cam p whose parents wanted to kill her because she had lost her virginity. 24. Turkish in origin, effendi is a title lower than beg and basha, often given to Christians, foreigners and urban notables. 23. See the quotation from A bu Isma’een, p. 43. 26. A couple o f old ladies from Y affa, living in Shateela in 1984, told me proudly that they had never gone outside their home.

3. The 1960s, Rule of the Deuxième Bureau

The stole moves to T igh ten in g o f co n trol o ver the cam ps occu rred in stages. F irst, a fter the 'harb C ham ou n’ , a t the beginning o f C h eh ab 's presidency, a p olice station w as set up in the H ursh, near S h ateela's southern exit. A b u T u rk i rem em bers this because his hom e w as on the southern bou n dary, m arked in those days b y an U N R W A sign: L ater the p olice cam e and opened a station in the H ursh. T h eir cap tain w as called A b u A q ash . H e to ld us th at w e had to register o u r nam es w henever w e g o to the city , and w hen w e com e b ack w e have to tell him . I f people d id n 't com ply, the p olice responded w ith 'harsh w ords and threats*. K h aled Shehadeh also underlines the sharp transition from C ham oun to Chehab: [A t first] the p olice stations w ere fa r from the cam p, their role w as sim ple. I f th ey caught a Palestinian on the border, o r i f he*d com m itted a crim e, the p olice brought his nam e to the D irecto r o f the c a m p . . . B ut w ith the establishm ent o f the C hehab regim e they began to treat Palestinians harshly. A t the tim e o f the PPS co u p 1 th ey killed a lo t o f Palestinians w ho w ere m em bers. T h ey put a p olice station inside the cam p as w ell as a D euxièm e Bureau o ffice. O ne w as over the D irecto r's o ffice, the oth er next to it. T h ey started to recruit spies and collaborators and to observe a ll active, nationalist Palestinians. T h e tw o branches o f the state - the p olice and the D euxièm e Bureau (see P olitical G lassary) - had d ifferent functions. T he task o f the D euxièm e Bureau w as to suppress an y kind o f p olitical activity, th at o f the police to enforce a ll regulations concerning housing. T hus began nearly a decade o f intim idation and extortion.

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T h e prim ary targets o f D B pursuit w ere the h izbiyeen (party m em bers), in p articu lar those o f the A N M , view ed because o f its allian ce w ith President N asser as the m ost potent threat to national security. A b u M uham m ad F an n aw i w as an early A N M m em ber w ho m oved to Shateela in 1960: M em bership in the A N M m eant th at I had p olitical activities, fo r exam ple organ izin g dem onstrations and distributing pam phlets. T h is led to m y being follow ed b y the D euxièm e Bureau. I w as arrested m any tim es. T here w as a law o f Perm anent Em ergency under w hich the p olice had the right to break into ou r hom es at any tim e to search. T h ey used to com e a t night to listen under m y w indow , to see w ho w as w ith m e. O nce w hen m y son died and people cam e to con dole w ith m e, th ey b roke in to m y house because they thought I w as holdin g a m eeting. T h ey b locked m y passport and forbad e m e to leave L ebanon. L ater th ey tried to force m e to leave but they d id n 't succeed because there w as nothing they cou ld accuse me o f that w ould ju stify deportation. T h ey tried m any other kinds o f pressure besides arrests and beatings. T h ey con tacted m y friends and to ld them n ot to be seen w ith me - 'h e 's suspect*. F o r a period, no one dared to s a y 4m arhaba * (hallo) to m e, no one visited m e. T h ey found o u t w here I w as w orkin g and to ld m y boss to dism iss m e. T h ey instructed U N R W A to stop m y ration s on the pretext that I w as ou t o f the country. T h ey even cam e to m y w ife and tried to convin ce her to leave me: 'T e ll him i f he d o esn 't give up p o litics, y o u 'll ask fo r a divorce.*2 T h ey sent people to m y fam ily, they sent people to her fam ily. T hose arrested w ere usually taken to one o f the arm y barracks o r to G eneral Security headquarters. T h ey w ere interrogated, beaten, som etim es tortured. A b u M uham m ad says th at it w as m ore psych ological intim idation than real torture. F o r exam ple, detainees w ere forced to sit w ith their necks under a w ooden yo ke and their feet in co ld w ater. T here were som e deaths, but the D B w anted to avoid scandals th at w ould be taken up b y 'O pposition* m edia. T h eir object w as to deter the hizbiyeen b y continual harassm ent and threats. A n oth er technique used against 'trouble-m akers* w as to sum m on them to the D B o ffice and leave them sittin g there all d ay, deprivin g them o f a d a y 's w ages. N ot o n ly w ere a ll m eetings prohibited but also the reading o f proscribed new spapers such as A l-N ahar. Listening to 'S a w t al-A rab* (see P olitical G lossary) w as a serious offence. In the 1960s U N R W A appointm ents began to be subjected to D B scru tin y, p articu larly the appointm ent o f teachers. W hereas before, Palestinian teachers had been a force fo r nationalist revival, during the C h eh abian era a screening process to o k p lace th at ob liged teachers to be prudent i f n ot to collaborate.

70 A n O ral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 T h e state began to influence U N R W A in such a w ay th at anyone w ho w anted a jo b there had to get the O K o f the M aktab T h an i [D B ]. I f he g o t it, straigh taw ay he’d ob tain a p ost. T he state w ould put through a phone ca ll to the D irector o f U N R W A : T h e re are several applicants fo r th is jo b . T he one we w ant is so-and-so.* T h is began at the beginning o f the 1960s. (K haled Shehadeh) T h e m ost destructive o f the m ethods used b y the D B w as the recruitm ent o f co llaborators. In som e cases these w ere people w ho feared the new p o litica l m ovem ents; som e w ould have served any au th ority; others w anted U N R W A jo b s o r feared losin g them . T here w ere several grades: the ‘big* collab orators w ere those w ho openly associated w ith the D B and w ho w ere present during interrogations and beatings. A n oth er category secretly reported w hat people w ere d oin g and sayin g. T here w ere also 'occasion al agen ts', people w ho gave scraps o f inform ation as a price fo r ob taining perm its o r avoid in g fines. T h e ’um ala (agents) were hated but few dared to express their hatred. People w ould sa y, 'T h e y ou gh t to be killed !* b u t i f an agent approached them it w as, ‘ Ahlan , ahU m l' (w elcom e). T h ey'd bring him tea, th ey'd invite him in. It's regrettable, but alth ou gh th ey hated the agents, the m ajority pretended th ey loved them because th ey w ere afraid th at i f th ey d id n 't, the agent w ould inform against them . B u t if som eone's son w anted to m arry the daughter o f an agen t m ost fathers w ould refuse. *M arhaba *, yes, from fear o r h yp ocrisy, b ut m arriage - 'N o ! N o t the daughter o f the agent!* (A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i) O ppression extended beyond the hizbiyeen m inority to grip the w hole cam p population in an iron net o f prohibitions, perm its and punishm ents. People's first concern w as w ith their hom es: to m ake them rainproof, provide outlets fo r w aste w ater and sew age, enlarge them to accom m odate grow ing fam ilies o r to protect their p rivacy w ith an outer w all. Such im provem ents were strictly forbidden. T hrough bribes, som e households m anaged during the 1960s to d ig cesspits o r replace w alls o f w ood and tanak (tin) w ith stone; but even bribes could not w aive the rule against cem ent roofs. T he sm allest repairs, such as m ending a leaking roof, required a perm it. In their hunger fo r fines and bribes, the police hunted fo r a trickle o f w ater or scrap o f orange peel throw n on the street. E veryone rem em bers lyin g under leakin g roofs. A b u M uham m ad says, 'W e had to hang blankets under the ceiling to prevent w ater dripping on the children.* T h e system w as designed to yield inform ation as w ell as m oney; it left few loopholes.

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Even i f you needed to put a n ail through one o f the zin co sheets on yo u r ro o f you had to get perm ission from the D B , from the D irectorate,1 and from the p olice. I f you w ere lu ck y enough to get perm ission, this lu ck cam e first from payin g m oney to a ll three parties; then from begging them ; and then m aybe a lso yo u m ight have to give certain nam es. T h ey w anted the nam es o f people w orkin g fo r the Palestinian cause. Som e people gave false n a m es. . . G ivin g nam es w as very rare. People avoided g ivin g nam es b y tryin g n ot to kn ow . L et people w ork underground, w hy should I d ig and find out? (Jihad Bisher) A n o th er w ay o f avoid in g givin g nam es w as to give bigger bribes: ‘T h is suited the D B and the rest; and people co u ld m anage it because life w as a b it easier than before.* T he harsh m ethods used b y the authorities to prevent p o litical activism b ackfired , especially since p olice harrassm ent over house repairs affected everyon e, w hether they were p o litica lly active o r not. N othing d id m ore to generate hatred against the state and to u n ify all p o litical currents, as w ell as the less m ilitant w ith the activist m inority. T w en ty years later even people w ho had n ot jo in ed R esistance groups cou ld still recount countless incidents o f bru tality o r extortion . E verything w as forbidden: It w as forbidden to listen to Saw t al-’A rab . I f you w anted to sprinkle w ater on the path near yo u r d o o r, to m ake it co o l, it w as forbidden. I f a youn g m an w anted to visit a friend a fter 8 pm , it w as forbidden. W e w ere forbidden to leave ou r hom es a t night. I f people sat up in the evening w ith neighbours, en joyin g them selves, th ey’d com e and kn ock on the d o o r, and sa y, ‘ It’s forbidden to visit after dark.* (‘N aw al’) Um m G hanem rem em bers w orse things: Policem en! C o u ld a w om an clean in fro n t o f her door? She d id n 't dare. I f the tin ro o f flies, d o yo u d are to nail it dow n? N ever! T h ey w ould com e and arrest the ow ner o f the house, and im prison him , and fine him LL20. I f tw o wom en quarrel the p olice w ould arrest both o f them , and tie their legs w ith b elts, and beat them on the feet. Y es! O n their feet! T he p olice and the M aktab al-T h an i stayed in the cam p night and d ay. D id you dare to speak a w ord? T h ey w ere like this a t the d o o r [im itates som eone listening].

Transfer attempts Jihad B isher believes that from the beginning the authorities w anted to

72 A h O ral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 rem ove S hateela, alth ough the first serious transfer proposal d id n ot surface until the 1960s: T h ey w anted to m ove Shateela because it’s so near B eirut. W hatever happens there w ill be know n im m ediately in the city , there w ill be reactions. W hereas i f w e w ere fa r aw ay, if som ething happens, we can ’t com m unicate, n o one w ill hear ab o u t it. M y fath er and a ll Shateela people knew it w as im portant to the authorities to get rid o f the cam p. A n d they knew it w as im portant fo r them to keep it in its place. W hile B asha Shateela w as still alive, the authorities approached him to fin d o u t i f it w as true th at he had given the land on w hich the cam p stoo d to A b ed Bisher. B y the 1960s the Basha w as dead, but the real ow ner returned to raise a cou rt case against A b u K am al, accusing him o f having obtained the land b y frau d . O n this occasion , the D irecto r argued th at the land had been donated n ot to him person ally but to a ll the cam p’s inhabitants (said to be 3,000 b y th is tim e). T h e case ended w ith the ow ner being allo tted ground re n t Soon afterw ards, the authorities inform ed U N R W A o f th eir desire to transfer the populations o f b oth Shateela and B o u ij Barajneh to a site near S a’d iya t, ab o u t 20 kilom etres south o f B eirut. A b u T u rk i w as a m em ber o f the cam p delegation th at w ent w ith U N R W A officials to inspect the site: It w as a barren area, ju st rocks, a hillsid e overlo o kin g the sea. T here w asn’t even a village. I spoke fo r the delegation. I said to U N R W A ’s D irecto r w ho w as w ith u s, 'W h y d o you bring us here? I f you really w anted to help us yo u w ould spend this m oney on im proving Shateela. W e w on’t leave unless you bring tanks and d estroy the camp.* A b u K am al also opposed the S a’d iyat transfer schem e, arguing th at U N R W A had the right to m ove its in stallation s to S a’d iyat but th at it could n ot m ove the people. H e hinted th at transfer w ould be resisted b o d ily.4T h e seriousness o f the S a’d iyat project is indicated b y the protest visits m ade b y cam p delegations to an array o f zu ’am a’, including Sa’eb Salam , Sam i Solh and the Lebanese M ufti. T o have rem oved by force a population now sw ollen to several thousands w as p o litica lly im possible, given the splits in the governm ent and the strength o f the 'O pposition* m edia and parties. E ventually the project w as dropped. O ther sites w ere proposed during the 1960s but w ithout the pressure th at accom panied the S a’d iyat project. H ow ever, in the early 1960s a m otorw ay w as dug linking Sabra to the A irp o rt B oulevarde, w hich cu t through the western side o f the cam p and destroyed several hom es. A lth ou gh people w ho lost hom es w ere com pensated w ith space elsew here,

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the road w as doubtless intended to rem ind Shateela people o f the tem porariness o f th eir settlem ent. A t abou t the sam e tim e there w ere rum ours o f a p roject to b uild a high w all arou n d the cam p, to hide it from tou rists. L ater there w as ta lk o f a m unicipal p roject to cu t a bou levard righ t through the centre o f the cam p, transform ing it in to a public garden. T he th reat o f b ulldozin g w as thus present to Shateela people m any y e a n before bulldozers w ere a ctu ally used, during the Septem ber 1982 m assacre, to crush housing near the m assacre site. It w as a th reat th at engendered a perm anent sense o f insecurity but also a determ ination not to be m oved. U m m M ajed said in 1989: ‘T hese policem en w ould com e and they alw ays used to tell u s, “ W e are goin g to rem ove th is camp.** B u t th ey co u ld n 't d o it. A ll o u r lives the A gen cy ruled. W e are still here.*

Re-creation of a Palestinian ‘entity* W hile the establishm ent o f the P L O in 1964 w as w elcom ed b y m any Palestinians as a progressive step , it also created w aves o f op p osition . These w ere m ainly o f tw o kinds: there w ere the M u fti lo yalists, hostile to E gyp t's influence, and there w ere organizers o f clandestine netw orks preparing fo r arm ed stru ggle. B oth trends w ere w ell entrenched in L eban on , b oth inside and outside the cam ps, so that dissention over the P L O w as experienced w ith p articu lar acuteness in th is region. H ow ever, the P L O on balance benefited from N asser's patronage, since N asserist A ra b nationalism w as p rob ably a t this tim e the strongest force am ong Palestinians o f a ll strata. President C hehab w ould have liked to continue to support H ajj A m in but d id n ot d o so because o f the lo g ic o f his p ro-E gyp tian foreign p o licy (aim ed to appease Lebanese N asserists). H e also realized that the M u fti's influence had been eroded b y the im m ense p op u larity o f the E gyptian president. H ence his rapid recognition o f the P L O , ahead o f m ost other A ra b states. Im m ediately after the A lexan d ria Sum m it, Shu kairy m ade a to u r o f diaspora Palestinian com m unities to m obilize their support fo r the new ‘entity*. H is visit to L ebanon is w idely rem em bered since the authorities allow ed him to hold m ass rallies, the first o f th eir kind. A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i to o k part in the cerem onies o f w elcom e: H e stayed in the S t. G eo rg e's H otel and I w as head o f the delegation from Shateela th at w ent to greet him and o ffer ou r allegiance. W e called a m eeting in the M osque to pledge support. T h e follow in g o f H ajj A m in began to m ake trou ble - they considered S h u kairy an appointee o f .the A ra b League. T h ey said, ‘T here ought to be elections, we should choose betw een S h u kairy and H ajj Am in.* S o there w ere quarrels and figh tin g M ows, stones, pullin g h a ir . . . A fter this H ajj A m in began to dw indle.

74 An O ral-Baaed H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 W ith the w aning o f the influence o f the M u fti, his follow in g in the cam ps w as also w eakened. T he p osition o f A b u K am al w as m ade aw kw ard and am bivalent by the p lacing o f the D B and p olice around his o ffice, as if to p rotect him . H is earlier leadership status as founder and q a 'id w as reduced to the lesser one o f an U N R W A fu n ction ary. W hereas p reviously, the p olice cam e to him before questioning anyone in the cam p, he w as now pow erless even to protect ‘ his’ ow n people. It w as a very d ifficu lt tim e fo r m y father. T h ey [the D B ] d id n 't try to harm him because they knew he w as w ith H ajj A m in. B ut they tried to m ake him coop erate w ith them in one w ay o r another. H e w as hurt by seeing oth er Palestinians hurt and n ot being able to d o anythin g abou t it. H e used to try to w arn people to keep ou t o f Shateela i f he knew they w ere w anted. Som etim es he w ould g o to the D B offices to beg fo r som eone’s release. A fter I w as taken and beaten b y the D B , he to ld m e that in a p eriod like th is one m ustn't show on e's p atriotic feelings, but try to appear like an y ordinary person. (Jihad Bisher) A lth ou gh the C hehab regim e recognized the legitim acy o f the P L O and its unions a t the level o f the cam ps, repression o f a ll p o litica l a ctivity rem ained in force. A b u M uham m ad experienced this contradiction: W e w ere asked to form the [w orkers’] union in L ebanon a fter the first A ra b Sum m it C onference in A lexan d ria. It held its founding conference in G a za in 1964 and I attended it. W hen we returned w e began to recruit m em bers in the nam e o f the P L O . T here w as op p osition from the state but it w asn 't open op p osition because the president had attended the A lexan d ria Sum m it and agreed to everything. A b u M uham m ad w as arrested alon g w ith fo u r oth er G en eral U nion o f Palestinian W orkers* m em bers, but co u ld not be charged w ith an y m isdem eanour since the U nion w as legal. H e w as released but the D euxièm e Bureau stepped up pressure on him as on leaders o f other P L O unions to give up p olitics o r to leave the country. H e refused to d o either. T he P L O d id n ot have offices w ithin the cam ps; m ost o f its w ork w as con tacts w ith Lebanese p o litical leaders and m edia. Even though P L O m ass unions - w ork ers', stu d ents', w om en's and others - were fu lly legal, D B co n tro l o f the cam ps excluded their activities there. Shateela is close to the P L O 's o ffice on C orn iche al-M azra’ so that its people som etim es jo in ed dem onstrations there. A w om an w ho later join ed Fateh describes how , as an enthusiastic sch oolgirl, she w ent to the P L O to ask fo r volunteer w ork:I I w as one o f those w ho w anted to d o som ething. I rem em ber goin g to the

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P L O o ffice ; it w as in the tim e o f S h u kairy; I asked ab o u t C iv il D efen ce train in g. T h ey said , ‘Y o u ’re to o yo u n g. W hat else can yo u do?* I said , ‘ L et m e co llect contributions.* S o th ey gave m e a b o x, and I w ent from b u ild in g to build in g co llectin g m oney. T h ey hadn’t an y ideas how to m obilize the people. (‘Nawal*)

Arms and dandestinity T h e p reparations fo r arm ed struggle and the opening o f m ilitary train in g cam ps fo r Palestinians in several A ra b coun tries affected people in the cam ps in L ebanon w ithin the lim its o f the strict secrecy m ade necessary b y D euxièm e B ureau surveillance. In the early 1960s, w eapons began to pass through the B eirut cam ps on their w ay to the South. T h e first [A N M ] d ecision to start train in g w as taken in 1962 and it w as from this tim e th at arm s began to enter the cam p. I brought guns from the E gyptian Em bassy alon g w ith Um m M uham m ad. T h ey w ere called ‘ U stab P ort S a’id*. She w rapped them like a b ab y and bared her breast as i f feed in g i t T hese arm s w ere n ot fo r the cam p b u t fo r the people w ho w ere undertaking arm ed operations against occupied Palestine. B ecause S h ateela is close to B eiru t and the E m bassy, w e w ent and to o k the arm s from A b d u l H am eed G h aleb 5 and p u t them tem porarily in Shateela. T hen w e to o k them to Jiyyeh. From Jiyyeh , people to o k them to *A in H elw eh, and from there to Shabreeha and R ashidiyyeh; and from there to Y areen . Y areen w as the m ain store from w here arm s entered occupied Palestine. (A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i) I f the authorities feared p o litical a ctivity in the cam ps, th ey w ere even m ore concerned to prevent Palestinians from gettin g m ilitary trainin g - the tw o w ere in an y case clo sely connected. T he seriousness w ith w hich the au thorities view ed th is developm ent is suggested b y K h aled Shehadeh’s description o f a visit to Shateela cam p b y the head o f the section w ithin the D B th at d ealt w ith Palestinians: Joseph K a yla n i cam e to Shateela cam p and called a m eeting o f a ll the fam ilies o f the cam p. W ith him cam e fo u r o r fiv e D B agents as b ig as m ules, w ith their pistols, and behind them a vehicle fu ll o f soldiers. W e sat on the ground in fro n t o f the D irecto r’s o ffice - there w as still space then - and they brought ou t stools and chairs fo r the shuyyukh. K aylan i addressed his speech to the shuyyukh : 'O good old m enl M aybe yo u d o n ’t kn ow th at som e o f yo u r sons are g o in g to an A ra b

76 An O ral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 country* (he could n ’t say E gypt) 'to get m ilitary training. Y o u should know th at L ebanon is yo u r coun try, alw ays ready to listen to yo u r dem ands and help yo u r sons w ith education. H ow should yo u treat those bad sons, trouble-m akers, w ho seem determ ined to disturb you?* I g o t up, ‘Excellence, w ith yo u r perm ission!* ‘S it down!* I said , ‘S ir, I*m not a student in school and you are not a teacher. I w ant to speak about the su bject you have raised.* H e said , ‘Speak!* I said , ‘A s a Palestinian 1 ask you to give me arm s and train in g and lead m e against Israel. T h is people has a country and all the A ra b states are ou r fam ily.* A n o ld m an go t u p , A b u *A ta Z a ’m out from S u fsaf, abou t ninety years o ld . ‘ W hat he*s tellin g you is tru e, sir.* T hen all the shuyyukh g o t up sayin g, ‘ W e agree w ith K h aled Shehadeh!* A fte r tw o d ays the D B cam e and to o k me and beat m e a ll night. T h ey nearly slaughtered m e. In 1967, during the ‘S ix Day* w ar, the Lebanese A rm y carried ou t w hat Shehadeh called a ‘cheap deceit*, tak in g m ilitant nationalists like h im self to a train in g cam p in the S ou th , in a m ove to defuse their enthusiasm to figh t. T h ey stayed there tw o m onths and the D B turned up to their passing-out cerem ony - ‘those w ho had killed us w ith their beatings*. B ut there w as a sm all but steady trick le o f m en from Shateela and other cam ps goin g to P L A o r R esistance grou p train in g courses outside. M inim al train in g on load in g and cleaning guns w as even carried ou t in hom es in cam ps, under the noses o f the D B . M any sm all R esistance groups th at later disappeared o r m erged w ith larger ones w ere active in the cam ps in L ebanon. T h ose w ith the stron gest roots seem to have been the A N M (ou t o f w hich w as form ed the P F L P in 1967), F ateh (w hose leadership w as n ot in L ebanon but in G a za and K uw ait), and Sa’eqa, form ed in 1966from Palestinian B a’thists. United against Lebanese state oppression, there w as little internal co n flict in the early days in spite o f differences o f strategy, A ra b alliance and ideology. T he A N M articu lated one m ajor trend in Palestinian thinking, that arm ed struggle could on ly be successful if carried ou t as part o f a broader A rab effort; Fateh articu lated a con trary th eory, that Palestinian action w as essential to trigger o ff events that w ould build A ra b m ass and governm ent support. T here w as com petition betw een the A N M and F ateh to be the first to begin R esistance operations. Because o f their links w ith N asser, A N M leaders adopted the p o licy o f ‘above zero and below provocation*. It w as Fateh th at carried ou t the first announced o p eration , ju st before 1 January 1965, an event th at w as enthusiastically received in the cam ps. A lth ou gh there w as support fo r Palestinian arm ed stru ggle, attitudes tow ards early Resistance organ ization in the cam ps are d ifficu lt to reconstruct in a ll th eir variatio n a t this distance in tim e, and a fter so m any upheavals. T here w ere undoubtedly m any crosscurrents, debates and

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m isgivings. F a ith in N asser rem ained w idespread fo r m uch o f the 1960s (even a fter 1967 m any kep t his p ortrait on th eir w alls). N evertheless there w as a decline in m em bership o f ’ O p p osition ’ p arties, w hether as a result o f D B oppression o r because o f searching fo r a Palestinian fram ew ork; there w as also w idespread fear o f the authorities and th eir inform ers. W hat em erges very clearly is th at m ost o f the support fo r the Resistance m ovem ent cam e from the gen eration th at grew up in exile, the ’gen eration o f th e D isaster*. It is a lso clea r th at istm h ad (readiness fo r insurrection) grew stead ily th rou ghou t the p eriod , esp ecially a fter 1967. H atred o f D B oppression w as one elem ent in creating this m ood, but anger a t the Lebanese A rm y’s actions against PR M fighters in the South w as perhaps an even stronger one. T h e con trad iction betw een nationalism and fe a r o f the authorities led to m any co n flicts betw een parents and children. T h e w om an w ho speaks here w as a sch o olgirl in the 1960s: B efore th e 1967 w ar, in 19 6 6 1 th in k , th ey started F irst A id courses. W e had th is sp ecial kh aki u niform , a blouse and sk irt w ith a tie, and the sym bol o f the F irst A id . It w as the R ed C rescent [see P olitical G lo ssary] th at ran the course, supervised b y the Lebanese A rm y. O f course m y parents didn’t w ant m e to com e near anythin g like p olitics, n ot even F irst A id . N ot because they didn’t w ant us to d o it but because they felt th at the people behind it w ere p o litician s, an d th ey had suffered a lo t [from politics] in Palestine. A lso because th ey w ere w orried abou t us. E very tim e I p u t on m y u n iform , m y parents started in on m e. W hen m y m other didn’t succeed in persuading m e to give it u p , she set m y old er b roth er after m e. O nce he hit m e. B ut I w as so stubborn. I felt this w as som ething th at I had to d o . S o I used to take m y uniform to one o f o u r neighbours, and p u t it on there. (’ Fadin’) T h e response o f younger Palestinians to calls fo r action is clear from the m assive p articip ation o f schoolchildren in dem onstrations. A lth ou gh protest action escalated after 1967, dem onstrations also occurred in the early 1960s. F ayro o z Ism a’eel, w ho left school in 1964, recalls a dem onstration o f schoolgirls in w hich a classm ate g o t caught b y the police: ‘Sakeena w as very b oyish , she ran , I hid. T he p olice cau ght her. B ut th ey brought her back the sam e aftern oon .’ Som e idea o f the readiness o f the youn g fo r action is given b y this accou n t o f a ‘youth cell’ , self-form ed and independent o f an y p olitical m ovem ent o r group: W e w ere seven brothers and sisters; w e used to get p ocket m oney. E very w eek w e held a session and asked ourselves w ho in this cam p needs

78 An O ral-Based H istory o f ShateeU t Camp, 1949-82 m oney m ore than others. T hen we p u t the m oney in an envelope and pushed it under th eir d o o r, w ithou t them kn ow ing w here it cam e from . W e did this after school,‘ m y brothers and sisters, and the children o f the neighbours. Perhaps it w as on ly L L 5 o r L L 10 but in those days th at w as w orth som ething. From this w ork I go t to know the people o f the cam p and b u ilt relation s w ith them . W e knew the w om an w hose husband had d ied , w ho had three o r fo u r children and w as in need. W e knew the w om an w ho lived alon e, and had no one to give her m oney. It w as us alon e, o u r parents d id n 't know . W e never sp oke about it. W e w ere afraid th at if the D euxièm e Bureau go t to kn ow , they w ould stop us. A n oth er w ay w e b u ilt relations w ith people w as by teaching their children. W e discussed th ings, we asked each oth er ab o u t the villages we cam e from . In this w ay the youn g m en and wom en o f the cam p g o t to know each other and becam e unified. (‘N aw al’) In gen eral, o ld m en and village notables w ere against the p o litical activists, anathem atizing them as ‘troublem akers*. K haled Shehadeh has a revealing recollection: T he o ld people were an obstructive fa cto r to ou r m ovem ent. E very action we to o k , th ey’d say, ‘W hat! A n oth er dem onstration!* I f we distributed pam phlets, it w as, ‘ W hat’s the use o f them?* W hen w e called m eetings, they said,* L o o k ou t! A b u H anoon w ill come.*4 T he o ld people alw ays tried to frighten and discourage us. W hen her husband w as arrested, Um m M uham m ad Farm aw i d id n ot receive m uch sym pathy from other w om en at the b akery o r the w ater tap. Som e pitied her fo r being m arried to a ‘troublem aker*, w hile others blam ed her fo r not keeping her husband's m ind fixed on providing fo r his fam ily. E veryone shared the lon gin g to return to Palestine, but not everyone believed th at it w as necessary to w ork fo r the return, esp ecially if this m eant incurring the w rath o f the Lebanese state. F o lk w isdom taught th at it w as better to appease au th o rity than to p rovo ke it. N ot a ll o ld people w ere afraid to help the R esistance, how ever. A F ateh ‘responsible* from Shateela rem em bers an o ld w om an, H ajji S ara, in w hose hom e he used to hide incrim inating docum ents when D euxièm e Bureau searches were expected. F ateh cells were form ed in Shateela in conditions o f tight clandestinity. E arly m em bers contrast the solid ity o f Fateh in those days w ith the fo w d a (chaos) th at cam e later, w ith m ass recruitm ent. ‘ Fateh w as a tanzeem [organization] in the real m eaning o f the word,* says one such Shateela m an; ‘ It w as on an international level.* A n early lo cal leader recalls:

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W e had to undergo six o r seven m onths o f testing. D u rin g this tim e w e w ere on p robation . W e had to prepare dem onstrations, m ake digests, w rite reports, co llect inform ation. W e w ere on ly accepted as m em bers if we passed this test. F ateh 's structure w as designed to lim it the con tact o f m em bers w ith one an oth er, to prevent in filtration . T h is m em ber recalls goin g deep in to the H ursh to discuss p olitics w ith cell-m ates, shebab from S abra and Shateela like him self. E ach sm all cell w as linked to the tanzeem through a unit leader.

Plastic sandals and certificates H ow Shateela people rem em ber livin g conditions in the 1960s tends to reflect differences in their econom ic situation and p o litical leanings. It is clear th at socioeconom ic d ifferen tiation w as beginning to appear, in con trast to the early 1950s when there w as equ ality in destitution. A s a house-painter w ho becam e a w orkers* union organ izer, A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i em phasizes continuing hardship: In the beginning o f the 1960s w hen I first cam e to Shateela the level o f livin g w as very low . F o r exam ple, I to o k a w age o f LL3'/2 d aily. I had a w ife and tw o ch ild ren , w e had to live on this am ount. I p aid LL20 fo r the house [i.e. rent] and L L 2 ‘/2 fo r electricity. O f course w e w ent on takin g ration s. W e ate m eat three tim es a w eek. W e dran k tea. T ru e, i f a guest com es w e are ob liged to o ffe r co ffee, this is p art o f ou r trad ition o f h osp itality. B ut we ourselves drank tea. In w inter at first w e used m azou t but it m akes a bad sm ell so w e changed to ch arcoal. M y children w ent to sch ool in w inter in p lastic sandals w ithout socks. I co u ld n 't affo rd to b u y them b oots o r proper w inter clothing. N ew clothes fo r the feast are som ething b asic, how ever. I used to start saving m onths before the feast to buy them clothes. W hen m y daughter g o t sick , m y w ife was obliged to sell the w atch I had given her a t ou r w edding to take her to a specialist. U N R W A didn’t co ver it. F ayro o z Ism a’eel rem em bers as a ch ild , in w inter, carryin g a m ea'a/(brazier) to the p u blic oven to get h ot ashes. W hen stirred, th ey gave o ff heat fo r several hours. Sp eakin g fo r a sligh tly d ifferent social stratum , Jihad B isher em phasizes an im provem ent in incom e and livin g standards that w as certain ly true o f fam ilies w ith several w age earners:

80 A n O ral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 T he period im m ediately after 1948 w as one o f shock - people d id n 't kn ow w hat to d o. B ut b y the 1960s they began to settle dow n, to try to im prove th eir lives and build fo r the future. People o f m y age becam e old enough to start w orkin g fo r th eir fam ily. T here w ere m any chances o f w ork fo r Palestinians in the G u lf. U N R W A had a kind o f em ploym ent o ffice and hundreds o f Palestinians w ho had graduated from secondary sch ool, technical schools o r university found salaried em ploym ent. Jihad estim ates th at 5 per cent o f Shateela households had sons w orkin g in the G u lf by the early 1960s, and that b y the end o f the decade the p rop ortion had risen to 25 per cent. M igrants* rem ittances w ere im portant in enabling younger brothers to obtain professional training. W ith tw o o r three sons (and occasion ally daughters) w orkin g in the oil-p rodu cin g countries, som e fam ilies even tu ally succeeded in renting or even buying apartm ents ou tside the cam p. E m igration did not alw ays have such happy results, how ever. People tell o f m igrant sons w ho d id not help their fam ilies, o r w ho m arried foreign wom en and abandoned their Shateela w ives. O ne basis o f socioecon om ic d ifferen tiation lay in the gap in incom e and security betw een d aily paid m anual lab ou r and salaried em ploym ent. Salaried em ploym ent required certificates higher than the B revet, the stage a t w hich free U N R W A schoolin g ended. It w as not easy to finance the passage from the Brevet to the treasured professional certificate. U N R W A gave help w ith secondary sch o ol fees to a lim ited num ber o f students,7 and had its ow n T eacher and T echn ical T rain in g Institute, Sibleen, but its yearly intake w as also very lim ited. M ost students had to find other m eans to finance their education. A hm ad H aleem eh’s m other sold her w edding gold . A lth ou gh Shateela rem ained, as A b u M uham m ad em phasizes, a w orking-class area w ith on ly a very sm all p rop ortion o f secondary o r university students, nonetheless the drive tow ards higher education, w hich w as to have its m om ent o f expansion later w ith Resistance m ovem ent au ton om y, began in the 1960s. T he opening o f the E gyptian-sponsored A ra b U n iversity in F akh an y in the early 1960s m ade a difference. A lth o u gh in A b u M uham m ad's opinion there were no m ore than three or fou r fam ilies in Shateela w ho cou ld fo rgo adu lt son s' earnings, we nevertheless fin d a sm all num ber w ho m anaged to get degrees, studying and w orkin g a t the sam e tim e (this w as possible at the A ra b U niversity since attending classes w as n ot com pulsory). A b u 'A li A b b as w as one o f this sm all group. H e had com e to Shateela w ith his fam ily in the 1950s at the age o f fifteen , from B a 'lb e k , w here the nearest secondary school w as 17 kilom etres aw ay in Z ahleh. A s w ell as being intelligent and determ ined, he w as lu ck y to have five old er b roth ers, w hich m eant that his earnings w ere not needed. H e w ent to secondary sch o ol in B eirut and then registered as an external student in the A ra b U niversity. W hile stu d yin g, he w orked as a teacher in Lebanese

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p rivate schools. A b u ’A li w as one o f the group w ho gave evening classes to youn ger b oys, helping them to pass the tow jih i (o fficia l A ra b sch ool finishing) exam . A n oth er o f this group w as S a’eed A b d a lla h , w ho later becam e headm aster o f Jericho School in Shateela. H ow ever, the great m ajority o f Shateela men rem ained in the category o f m anual w orker, except fo r those w ho had sm all shops. H ow ever, they w ere w orkers w ho w ere becom ing m ore skilled and w ere m aking m ore m oney. T h is cam e ab o u t in tw o w ays. A d u lt m en w ho had left Palestine w ith ou t a mihneh (craft) picked one up through practice: ‘ W ith tim e the one w ho w orked w ith tiles becam e a tiler, the one w ho w orked in building carpentry becam e a m aster carpenter. S o th ey beam e m ihiniyeen [specialized craftsm en] and their incom e increased* (A b u T u rki). T he second w ay w as fo r boys to be apprenticed to a lo cal m u’allem (m aster craftsm an) fo r periods from three to six m onths, obtain in g certificates in pre-industrial skills such as iron w ork and ca r repairs. U p to the end o f the 1970s, skilled m anual w orkers as w ell as professionals cou ld fin d jo b s in the G u lf and send hom e part o f their earnings. M any in itia lly ‘unskilled* labourers developed them selves in to m aster craftsm en, ju st as m uch o f cam p youth studied night and d ay to becom e teachers o r accountants: these ideal collective stereotypes w ere certain ly ju stified . H ow ever, there w ere certain ly con trary cases w hich are overlooked o r suppressed in the accou n ts m ost people gave. R eal hardship hit the fam ilies o f m en w ho never, fo r one reason o r another, found steady em ploym ent: M y m other kept pushing m y fath er to w ork but he d id n 't w ant to listen to her - ‘ Y o u w ant me to w ork fo r th at dog!* L ik e m any villagers he wasn*t edu cated , he d id n 't have a p rofession . O nce som eone offered him a p orter's jo b . H e w ent there but the next d ay he didn’t g o b ack , he couldn’t stand it. H e suffered a lo t until we grew old and could help. (‘ Fadia*) A n o th er p attern w as th at o f the w orker w ho ju m ps from jo b to jo b w ithout acq uirin g a specialized sk ill. T h is m an o f H aifa origin w as a youth in the 1950s, and never w ent to school: I m oved from place to p lace. I f som eone did n ’t p ay enough I left, if p ay w as higher som ew here else 1 left. I did a lo t o f different things, I w orked in a carp en ter’s, a b ak ery, a garage, a tile fa cto ry . I w orked fo r an A rm enian in B o u ij H am m oud, but I le ft him because he used to h it his w orkers and I feared m y turn w ould com e. (A b u A hm ad *Issa K h alaf) Such jo b m ob ility w as feasible in the late 1950s and 1960s, years o f Lebanese econom ic expansion. T here w as plen ty o f w ork , and com m odities

82 A n O ral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp. 1949-82 w ere cheap. Um m A hm ad says, *Y o u could get the best crepe-soled shoes fo r L L 5 in those days. I f you did n ’t eat m eat fo r a w eek yo u cou ld b u y a watch.* She w as one o f the first housew ives in Shateela to ow n a refrigerator and a w ashing m achine.' P rofessional salaried w om en w orkers began to appear in the 1960s th ou gh their num bers w ere few . F a yro o z Ism a’eel, born in 1947, w as one o f them . S till rem em bered in Shateela fo r being alw ays first in class, she w as p icked to go to U N R W A 's W om en’s T rain in g C ollege at al-T ireh in the W est B an k, graduating in June 1967, in the m iddle o f the 'S ix Day* w ar. W e have relatives in B o u ij B arajneh and som e o f them w orked in L ib ya . W e visited them a fter I returned from al-T ireh . T h ey said th at since I w as qualified as a secretary th ey cou ld find m e a very good jo b in L ib ya. I said O K , I’d lik e to travel. M y fath er didn’t w ant m e to g o , but m y m other encouraged m e. F a yro o z later found a jo b in L ib ya fo r her sister w ho had done a secretarial course a t the Y W C A in B eirut: these tw o p rofessional w om en w ere ab le to m ake a hom e fo r th eir parents and younger siblings in L ib ya. F a yro o z continued to stu d y as an external student, tak in g a B A in p h ilosop h y a t B enghazi U niversity and even tu ally m igrating to L on d on .9She recalls oth er Shateela w orkin g girls in her tim e: T h ere w as N aw al M a’ro u f, she left the cam p before m e to w ork in K u w ait, she had a m arried sister there. T here w ere a few others from m y gen eration. N ot a ll w ere secretaries. Som e w ere governesses, som e w ere dressm akers, tw o w ere nurses - nursing still w asn’t accepted then. W hat a ll the accounts m ake clear is the cru cial function o f the household fam ily as a unit o f econom ic su rvival, and o f socioeconom ic d ifferen tiation . W hile such factors as rent-free land, U N R W A services, external ch arity and internal redistribution guaranteed th at no one starved, other factors discrim inated betw een households in term s o f w ell-being. A s we have seen, the health and capacities o f the rabb a l-a ’aileh (household head) w as one o f these; another, discussed in C hapter 2, w as village origins and waastar. but perhaps m ost im portant w ere the abilities o f children. T h eir intelligence, zea l, gender and birth ord er all entered in to a lo ttery that cou ld brin g better fortune o r b itter disappointm ent to individuals and fam ilies. T h e p sych ological costs are suggested in this com m ent o f A b u M uham m ad’s: T here w ere cases w here the parents w ere determ ined th at th eir son should stu d y. B ut they had to cu t the co st from their d aily livin g, from th eir fo o d , from th eir clothes. T h e m other w orked, the daughter w orked , so

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th at the son should have school fees» clothes» transport» pocket m oney. T h is led to d a ily scenes a lo n g the lines o f: *Son» I’m p ayin g w ith m y blood» I’m deprivin g yo u r brothers and sisters so th at yo u can get educated» but y o u . . .* T h is w ould create com plexes in the b oy. Even w ithout parental pressures» an xiety cou ld be transferred to children. F a yro o z speaks fo r m any o f the gen eration o f the D isaster: ‘ F rom a very early age» I fe lt responsible, I fe lt I had to w ork to help m y fam ily. I grew o ld a t a very early age. I never behaved like a little g irl, never.*

Popular culture T h e vivid recollection s o f the a 'y a d (feasts) b y Palestinians w ho w ere you n g in the 1960s highligh ts th eir ch aracter as a tim e o f p la y and p len ty w hich contrasted w ith the hard w ork and p overty o f d aily life. A b u and U m m A hm ad K h a la f *Issa evoke the fu n fa ir th at used to be set up in A rd Ja llo u d , an em pty space near Shateela: Parents gave children the a ’ed iyya [m oney to spend on the feast] so th at th ey could g o and ride on bicycles, o r sw ings, o r g o to the cinem a. T h ey ate p ickles. T here w ere d onkeys, p h o to g rap h ers. . . T h e men w ith the don keys used to shout to attract the ch ildren, *M y d on key is best.* T h ose people cam e w ho p u ll razo r blades from th eir m ouths, eggs from their ears - m agicians - it*s ju st lik e the cinem a. T h ey fou gh t. T h ere w as one w ho pulled scarves from his m outh, sca rf after scarf. T here w ere circus p eop le, som e rode m otorbikes, others one-w heeled bicycles. A n d a w om an dancer. In those d ays i f yo u had a lira yo u co u ld see a ll those things; each spectacle co st five piastres. In th ose days there w ere still m en w ho travelled from place to p lace carryin g on th eir b ack a sandooq a l-a ja y e b (b o x o f w onders). T h ose w ho peeped through its eye-hole cou ld see m oving pictures o f stories like ‘Q ays w a Leila* o r travelogues. F o r m en there m ight be pictures o f naked w om en cu t from m agazines.10 Um m Tssam Q u rd ah , a S hateela housew ife w ho grew up in *Ain H elw eh, rem em bers outings w ith her father at A ’eed a l-F itr th at included prom enades alon g the sea fro n t, sw ings, b o at trips and ice cream s. N ew clothes w ere de rigueur even fo r children from the cam ps. Um m ’Issam 's m other g o t upset if a spot appeared on an y o f her daughters* dresses d urin g the three days o f the feast. This w ould have meant re-washing and ironing them , with a heavy iron heated b y fillin g it w ith charcoal. A hm ad H aleem eh rem em bers fifty to sixty people gathering fo r sp ecial

84 A h O ral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 occasion s in his fam ily hom e in Sh ateela, a large one m ade up o f fo u r o r five units. A religiou s fam ily, th ey needed no other entertainm ent than special feast fo o d and each oth er’s com pany. In som e fam ilies there m ight also be card-playing and m ild gam bling. N ation al occasions form ed a basis fo r cu ltu ral m anifestations in exile. F a yro o z Ism a’eel w as often chosen to d eliver the khutbeh (oration ) on com m em oration days such as 2 N ovem ber (the B alfo u r D eclaration ) o r 15 M ay (the establishm ent o f Israel). Som etim es the khutbeh w as w ritten fo r her b y an old er relative; often th ey w ere readings o f w ell-know n Palestinian poets. Parents and wujaha’ used to attend these cerem onies, w hich w ere held in sch ools. S ch ools rem ained a focu s o f nation alist culture in spite o f D euxièm e Bureau surveillance. O ne o f o u r teachers, U stadh H assan, used to tell us nation alist stories. W e alw ays sat q u ietly, w e liked him , w e paid atten tion to his stories. B u t w e didn’t understand th eir im plications until w e grew old er. T eachers w eren’t allow ed to have p o litical activities then. (F ayro o z Ism a’eel) C in em a-goin g, alm ost unknow n in P alestine, becam e perm itted first to ch ild ren in L ebanon as a p art o f the ste e d celebrations. C inem a Sharq opened in the early 1960s opposite Shateela’s m ain entrance, near the *Ali H andar cafe. M ost o f its clien ts cam e from the cam p. F a yro o z B adran’s fath er refused to g o to the cinem a on religiou s grou nd s11 but he used to accom pany his tw o sm all daughters to C inem a Sharq and w ait fo r them outside. L ater F a yro o z w ould go a t feast tim es w ith a grou p o f classm ates to dow ntow n cinem as such as the R ivoli in Sähet a l-B o u ij. T h e cinem a w as o n ly one o f m any new cu ltu ral m edia th at cam ps close to B eiru t b rou ght w ithin reach o f the refugees. T elevision sets m ade th eir appearance in the early 1960s. E veryone rem em bers H ajj T ah a’s television because o f the cen trality o f his shop fo r sch ool su pplies, near the M osque, and because he rented chairs ou t to view ers. T h ere w ere b oys w ho w anted to w atch T V but w ho didn’t h ave a fran c. S o th ey kep t w atch on H ajj T ah a and when he left his shop th ey d ug a hole in the w all. A s soon as it g o t d ark th ey w ent and w atched T V . W hen th ey left, they put chew ing gum o ver the hole so that he w ouldn’t discover it. (F ayro o z Ism a’eel) T elevision and radio (cassettes w ould com e later) had the effect o f p op u larizin g contem porary A ra b singers, overlayin g old er Palestinian song traditions. It w as m ainly village wom en w ho carried on pre-1948 form s o f expressive culture w hich w ould be revived, later, b y the R esistance m ovem ent. T he ch ie f occasions fo r fo lk singing w ere gatherings fo r

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m ourning o r w eddings; an oth er w as the departure o f pilgrim s on the h a jj, at w hich w om en encouraged them w ith a special kind o f song (haneen). W om en w ould start o ff w ith fam iliar songs, and then im provise. O n ly old er, unschooled village wom en have kept up the trad ition o f o ral p oetry and im provised singing; city w om en never practised this a rt, and younger wom en have lost it w ith schooling. T he influence o f urban A ra b and Lebanese culture w as n atu rally stron ger in cam ps like Shateela and B ourj B arajneh than in the rural cam ps w hich rem ained, in com parison, ‘con servative’ and ‘backw ard* (term s used o f them b y the cam p people). Perceptions o f city people as ‘civilized* and village people as the opposite have strong roots in A ra b ic culture and society. In Shateela, this cu ltu ral hierarchy w as given w eight b y the presence o f city Palestinians as w ell as the closeness o f the city . Insights in to the persistence o f the city/ru ral boundary as w ell as the psych o-social processes that m akes city w ays superior are given by F ayro o z and N adia Ism a’eel. T heir age and social situ ation , girls from S u fsaf livin g on the edge o f the J a ffa quarter, give their recollections a 'strategic* interest: In the afternoons city w om en alw ays had a gathering a t w hich they dran k tea and co ffe e, and sm oked the argeeleh [w ater p ip e].13 T h ey w ore th eir nicest dresses. I f one o f them had recen tly g o t m arried, she w ould p u t on one o f her b rid al dresses, w hich w ere alw ays d é c o lle té . . . T h ey w ould p u t m ake-up on and a flow er in their hair. V illage w om en d id n 't d o this. W e alw ays used to laugh a t o u r fam ilies. N ow I feel sad because I m issed a lo t o f Palestinian cu ltu re. W e d o n 't kn ow the Palestinian debkeh . T h e old er gen eration used to gather in a yard in the cam p, th ey m ade w eddings in the open a ir and danced the debkeh. W hen S u fsaf people had a w edding, o u r city neighbours used to say *FeUaheenT W e w ere ch ild ren , w e didn*t w ant to feel in ferior. W e felt th at th ey w ere ahead o f u s, fo r instance in the w ay th ey dressed. N adia: W e hated everything th at w as fella h een , everything th at w as m oda *adeem i [old-fashioned]. F ayrooz: It's because we lived in an area w ith Y a ffa people. In *Ain H elw eh, S u fsaf girls grew up in a village environm ent, they know the debkeh , they know the songs. I know a lo t o f proverbs but I d on ’t know the fo lk lo re. M aybe it’s because everyw here, peasants a r e . . . less than city people. N adia: B ut the fella h een gave m ore atten tion to the edu cation o f th eir ch ildren. C ity people didn’t even educate th eir sons. T h ey let them take jo b s o r open a shop. In the end we turned ou t better than th ey.13

86 An O ral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 W e sense here som e o f the effect o f urban influence and education in prod u cin g cu ltu ral change. Y e t peasant cu ltu ral practices persisted in spite o f S h ateela's closeness to B eirut. H ere is H ajj T ah a (the first television ow ner) describing his eldest son 's w edding, tow ards the end o f the 1960s. H e begins b y givin g a d etailed accou n t o f his ow n w edding in Sha’b , a few years before the exodus, and continues: I w anted to get him m arried because he w as the first o f m y ch ildren, and I w anted to m ake a celebration fo r him ju st like the one I’d had. Just as m y fath er had been happy in m y w edding, I w anted to be happy in the w eddings o f m y ch ild ren .141 organ ized celebrations th at lasted three o r fo u r nights; every night I invited a ll the people o f the cam p. T here w ere fo u r o r five poets. A n d I had a slaugh tering - th irty-fo u r legs o f lam b stu ffed w ith rice and m eat, and three o r fo u r m ore sheep fo r kibbeh (m eat pie). W e brought leban [yoghurt] from the B eqa’ , fresh sheeps’ leban. W e b rou ght bam ieh [okra] from T rip o li, and green beans. W e co oked these things and everyone ate them . T h ey w ere days o f happiness, days o f enjoym ent. It w as a perfect w edding p arty, everyone w as happy. There w as slaughtering and jo y , and m y son rode on a horse, but in those days w e d id n ’t have vid eo cam eras to record it. I’U tell yo u how m any peop le I invited - 350 invitation cards w ent ou t to villages and cam ps! T h is w edding to o k place tw enty years after leaving Palestine and before the 1970s national cu ltu ral revival. H ajj T ah a w as p ossib ly exceptional in his p roject to reproduce exactly the repertoire o f pie-1948 village w eddings. O thers began to adopt elem ents o f city w eddings, fo r exam ple the bridal couple on a d ais, surrounded b y flow ers. B ut fo r Palestinians in exile, w eddings becam e a signifier o f identity, infused w ith collective national m eaning, distinguishing Palestinians from Lebanese. T he term s h afez *ala karam ek and karam at al-fiw a zis are used b y Palestinians o f the cam ps to evoke this identity-em phasizing character o f their w ed d in gs,in d icatin garan geoflin ked values, from the necessity o fth e virginity o fth e bride and the proper conduct o f m arriage negotiations to the exchange o f gifts and lavish celebrations. In an y accou n t o f the 1960s, it should not be forgo tten th at In’ash al-M ukhayem (see P olitical G lo ssary), fam ous fo r its revival o f trad ition al Palestinian peasant em broidery, began from Shateela soon a fter the 1967 w ar. It w as not easy to find original dresses as m odels: fo r reasons not fu lly u n derstood, such em broidery had disappeared from m ost o f the G a lilee before 1948; the few thaw ab brought to L ebanon had been sold o r cu t up. R evival thus required a d ifficu lt process o f research, adaptation and train in g.M T he In’ash also b u ilt a m odel kindergarten near Shateela (destroyed during the Israeli invasion o f 1982), w here several generations o f kindergarten teachers were trained, alm ost all o f them from cam ps.

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The Iasi days of the Deuxième Bureau Palestinians later looked b ack to the d efeat o f the A ra b arm ies in 1967 as a decisive m om ent th at liberated them from A ra b tutelage. Even though th ey had been supporters o f N asser, m em bers o f the A N M to o k the sam e view . A fter the d efeat o f 1967 the situation changed. F irst, the Palestinian p eop le began to arm . T h is w asn 't w ith the su p port o f the A ra b regim es but it prevented th eir collap se after the Jordanian, Syrian and E gyptian arm ies w ere crushed. A n d once Palestinians began to be arm ed th ey reacted d ifferen tly to their situation. H ere people w ere oppressed, th ey w anted freedom . W hen th ey g o t arm s th ey felt th at freedom w as w ithin reach. E veryone w as pushed b y this current and there began to be a w idespread readiness fo r insurrection. (A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i) In L eb an on , the Israeli com m ando atta ck against B eirut A irp o rt in D ecem ber 1968 set o ff a new turn in the descending sp iral o f p o litica l crisis. T here w ere m ass dem onstrations against Lebanese A rm y m oves to curb the fed a 'yeen in the South. In the spring o f 1969 the A rm y, actin g independently o f the K aram eh governm ent, tried to encircle the resistance forces, stepping up arrests o f Palestinians and Lebanese leftists, and besieging the tow n o f B int Jbeil w hich tried to p rotect the com m andos. T hese clashes led to the celebrated dem onstration o f 23 A p ril, in B eiru t, w hen p olice opened fire on an unarm ed crow d , killin g tw enty and w ounding hundreds. In the ensuing uproar, Prim e M inister K aram eh resigned.17 M any Shateela people to o k p art in this dem onstration including this schoolgirl: T h ey announced early in the m orning on the rad io th at there w as to be no dem onstration. B u t we gathered in a ll the sch ools - 1 w as in H aifa sch ool then - and we w ent ou t until we reached C orniche al-M azra’ . It w asn't ju st Palestinians w ho w ere takin g p art, there w ere m any Lebanese also nationalists, students, people from unions. T here w ere m any girls and w om en. T h is w as som ething that encouraged us, th at the Lebanese w ere n ot against us. I had been in m any dem onstrations before but this w as the first tim e th at I saw b lood and death. W e reached the B arb ir H osp ital and fou n d the A rm y w aitin g fo r us there. T h ey w ouldn’t allow us a step further. W e w ere trapped. Som ebody started shooting and one o f the dem onstrators fe ll, sh ot in the head. It w as the first tim e th at I'd felt bullets th at clo se, aim ed to kill. I w as w orried - m y younger brother M uham m ad was w ith me and m any other friends and neighbours from Shateela w hom I considered as brothers. W e started m oving the w ounded to the M aqassad

88 A n O ral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 H osp ital b u t it closed the gate in o u r face. M aybe th ey w ere frightened o r m aybe th ey d id n 't w ant to give treatm ent fo r free. In d ie end th ey opened. Um m ’A li N asraw iyya w as the one w ho m ade them open the d o o r, she shouted at them . It w as like a second dem onstration in fro n t o f the hospital gate. L ater in the afternoon I saw m y broth er com ing, covered in b lood . W hen I saw him like t h a t . . . B ut he said , 'D o n 't w orry, I'm not hurt.* H e'd been carryin g a frien d w h o 'd been shot in the th igh , his artery w as severed. H e survived b y a m iracle. ('F a d in ') M an y stories are to ld ab o u t Um m *A li N asraw iyya, w ho lived in Shateela and w as fam ous fo r her nationalist spirit. W henever fighters w ere killed , she to o k part in their funeral cortège. She also used to take foo d to the fighters in the A rq o u b . A ll her sons except one w ere k illed , and people loved her m ore fo r th at than fo r her role in dem onstrations. It is said th at she once led a m arch o f children up to S abra, but the police stopped the m arch, arrested Um m ’A li and gave her a p u blic beating on the soles o f her fe et.11 D em onstrations around Shateela becam e an alm ost d aily occurrence. T h e greater readiness o f ord in ary people to challenge the authorities can be seen in this anecdote from A b u M uham m ad: O nce w hen I w as arrested, people dem onstrated outside the p olice station . T h ey [the police] w ere ab o u t to put m en in the Land R o ver to take m e up to B a’bda w hen w om en surrounded it and forced the p olice to let me ou t. It w as a case o f AUahu a k b a r.19 H e adds: W e began train in g students w ith sticks, a t night, in the playground, then w e started carryin g arm s a t n igh t, w ith covered faces. B efore 1967 people were afraid ; after it, they began to con fron t the D euxièm e Bureau. I f one o f them hit us, we hit back. T h e co llab o rato rs w ere esp ecially afraid o f us. W e used to g o ou t m asked and atta ck them w ith stick s, the w ay th ey are d oin g now in occupied Palestine. In A u gu st 1969, A b u K am al resigned from his p ost as D irecto r, handing over to his son Jihad, w ho had Resistance group credentials. Feelin g in the cam p w as said to be 'boiling*, and a confrontation w ith the forces o f the state seem ed o n ly a m atter o f tim e. In som e other cam ps there were real b attles, but in Shateela the end o f the D euxièm e B ureau cam e w ithout violence. A b u M uham m ad gives this description o f their last hours, on 19-20 O c to b e r

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A t S pm w e gathered and decided to th row them ou t o f the cam p. W e gathered som e o f the shebab and gave them guns. W e had three Chinese* m ade Schneitzers, and I m ade d ifferent people w alk around w ith them to m ake it seem th at we had m ore. T h ey g o t scared. W e gathered in fro n t o f th eir o ffice w ith this show o f m ilitary force. W om en cam e o u t, children cam e ou t, they gathered w ith us in fron t o f the p olice station . W e threatened them , 'I f yo u don’t leave we*U d estroy the o ffice over yo u r heads.* T h ey con tacted th eir headquarters and explained the situ ation . A t 8 pm exactly a truck cam e and carried them aw ay. A F ateh local leader gives a sligh tly different version w hich underlines uncertainties and internal divergences: F ateh O rgan ization w anted a b attle but I w as against attackin g because th ey had p acked and taken a ll th eir papers b efore leavin g the cam p. S o w hat w ou ld we gain? A t 10 pm a p olice p atro l entered the cam p from al-H ursh and reached the m osque. W e cou ld have killed them because they w ere surrounded b y ou r m en. B ut I said , ‘N o killing.* W e d id n 't have the w eapons fo r a lon g b attle, ju st one K lash in w ith 120 bullets and seven C arlostad ts w ith 460 rounds. W hen the p olice found everything calm , they w ithdrew . T h e next m orning, a t 7 am , som e organizations w anted to raise the fla g . B ut w e [F ateh] said, *W e ca n 't raise it yet, we m ust be able to protect it.* W e w aited until 9 am , and then we raised it, w ithout a battle. T h ey had left in the night, everything w as over. A s fo r the co llab orators, there w ere tw o points o f view : either to k ill them o r to th row them ou t. I w as fo r the second w ay. K illin g betw een Palestinians m eans b lood , and b lood is never forgotten. I f we had executed ‘Sa'eed* from Sha*b, a ll the people o f Sha*b w ould have stayed fa r from the R evolution . Besides, m any people w ere accused o f being agents w ithout real evidence. I f we had allow ed one execution, there w ould have been hundreds. T h e R evolution w ould never have recovered. (A bu M akarem )

Notes 1. On 31 Decem ber 1961, the PPS attem pted a coup against Chehab, possibly supported by Jordan. See K . Salibi, Crossroads to C ivil War (New York: Caravan Books, 1976), pp. 11-12. 2. The Deuxièm e Bureau also hinted at rape, to force Abu Muhammad to stay

90 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 at home to protect his wife. Undeterred, Umm M uhammad asked a neighbour’s daughter to keep her com pany when he travelled. 3. The D irectorate o f Palestinian Refugee A ffairs, a section o f the M inistry o f the Interior. 4. According to his son, Abu Kam al told the M inister o f the Interior that if the government went ahead with transfer, it had better prepare *13,000jute bags’, a hint at resistance. The D irector must have been including the population o f areas around Shateela in this figure. 5. A . H. Ghaleb was Egypt’s am bassador to Lebanon during the 1960s. Opponents o f Chehab used to call him ‘ High Com m issioner’ (in reference to the French Mandate). 6. ‘A bu Hanoon*, ‘the father o f kindness’ , a satirical popular term for the state. 7. The number varied each year: for exam ple, in 1939/60 it was 836. 8. W hen I interviewed this fam ily in 1989, their home in Shateela had been destroyed, Abu Ahm ad was disabled, Umm Ahm ad’s sewing business was shattered and they were ‘squatting’ in an unfinished building: a sad contrast with their situation in the early 1960s. 9. Since m oving to London Fayrooz Isma’eel has had several short stories published. Tw o appear in an anthology o f the writings o f Black and Third W orld women, Charting the Journey (London: Sheba Feminist Publishers, 1988). 10. Inform ation given by M o’ataz D ajani. Shateela people remember the sandooq al-’ajayeb up to 1967. 11. The Quran condemns tashkees, the creation o f human likenesses. Some pious Muslims see the cinema as doing this. 12. These istiqbais (receptions) used to be a feature o f city women’s life in all classes throughout the A rab region, as well as in Iran and Turkey. 13. Differences between rural and city people is still a favourite folk theme. See T . A lqudsi-G habra, ‘C ity and Village in the Palestinian W edding Song: The Palestinian Com m unity in K uw ait’ in S. Sabbagh and G . Tulham i (eds), Images and R eality: Palestinian Women Under Occupation and in the Diaspora (W ashington: Institute for A rab Women’s Studies, 1990). 14. The word y if rah, to be happy, is closely linked to marriage in popular speech, and is seldom used in other contexts. 13. ‘G uarding one’s dignity’ and ‘dignity o f marriage*: besides dignity the term karameh contains the ideas o f honour and generosity. 16. When In’ash was hunting for original embroidered dresses, a young woman from B ouij Barajneh camp discovered her grandm other’s, hidden deep in a cupboard. None o f her generation had seen such clothes before and thought it must have come from India (Mrs Serine Shahid, personal communication). 17. Petran, Struggle over Lebanon, pp. 97-103, has a detailed account o f this series o f events. 18. For a description o f Umm ’A li N asrawiyya, see M . Om ar, ‘ Les gens et le siège, Revue d études palestiniennes, no. 7, Spring 1983. 19. Ba’bda is the location o f the m ilitary and civilian courts for the province o f which Shateela is part. ‘G od is greatest’ is shouted by crowds when in a state o f istinhad (insurrection).

4.

‘Days of the Revolution’, 1969-82

Flags and euphoria L o o k in g b ack after 1982 w ith a feelin g th at few o f the aim s o f the R esistance m ovem ent had been ach ieved , a t least as fa r as th ey w ere concerned, Shateela people nonetheless rem em ber w ell the jo y th at accom panied the liberation o f the cam ps. E veryb od y w as happy, everybody w as singing, everybody w anted to jo in in. I rem em ber th at there w ere three o r fou r nights when n obody slept. People w ho had been w orkin g in underground organizations revealed them selves. Y o u n g men w ho had had n othing to d o w ith it felt asham ed. (Jihad Bisher) A b u *Ali A b b a s com m ented iro n ically, *A fter they p u t up the Palestinian fla g , people felt as if they had liberated Nablus.* T h ere w as a rush to jo in an organ ization . A lth ou gh there w ere o n ly three a t the tim e o f the liberation (F ateh , the P F L P , and Sa*eqa), others soon opened offices. A hm ad H aleem eh, still a sch o olb o y, tried to jo in Fateh but w as reallocated to the P L A , w hich gave him a gu n , a uniform and the jo b o f organizing a youth section. In the first few w eeks, before the arrival o f a Palestinian m ilitary fo rce, the K ifah M usellah (A rm ed S tru ggle), everyone to o k turns at d oin g guard d u ty, even w om en. T here w as a m ood o f to ta l identification w ith the Resistance; fighters from outside Shateela w ere treated as honoured guests: *It w as felt to be sham eful n ot to be the first to give the fighters food,, w ater, shelter.* I rem em ber o ld m en com ing to ou r o ffice in Shateela, fightin g fo r a chance to d o gu ard d u ty. T hree o r fo u r hours w eren’t enough fo r them 'I haven’t done guard d u ty today!* It didn’t m atter w ith w hich organ ization . T h ey w eren’t divided betw een p olitical currents, that cam e later. A t the beginning the im portant th ing w as to jo in the ’Revolution*1 and to liberate Palestine. (A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i)

92 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 L iberation had another instantaneous effect: it left people free to enlarge th eir homes» using solid m aterials forbidden before. In this anecdote» the ideas o f ‘liberation* and ‘building* are p ractically identical: I had a friend called Shehadeh *Ali Shehadeh w ho w anted to be the first to build his hom e w ith solid blocks. Som etim e in O ctob er 1969 he asked me» ‘ W hen shall I build m y house?* I to ld him» ‘S oon insh’allah* - it was tw o or three days before the D euxièm e Bureau left the cam p. Sure enough Shehadeh w as the first one to build» and it w as as if he w as celebrating a feast. (A bu M akarem ) M any problem s arose from the suddenness o f liberation» especially because the urge to build clashed w ith the lack o f space. W hen the R evolution cam e to the cam p, everyone w anted to build. T h is created problem s betw een neighbours: ‘ Y o u are to o close to me!*; ‘ Y o u shouldn*t open a w indow here!* T h is w as the biggest cause o f quarrels. It w as the role o f the K ifah M usellah o r the P opu lar C om m ittee to solve such problem s. (A b u M uham m ad) Jihad Bisher, cam p D irecto r from 1969 to 1978, says, *We had to be on 24-hour alert fo r friction o r problem s caused b y building.* T he shuyyukh , alread y grouped in ‘ neighbourhood com m ittees* from before the liberation , often intervened successfully in such disputes. O ne o f the first buildings to be rebuilt in cem ent w as the M osque. A com m ittee o f three old men - A b u A hm ad S a’eed, A b u K haled M rad and A b u W aleed M a’ro u f - w as in charge o f this p roject, co llectin g m oney from every household and even from m igrants in the G u lf. T he geography o f the cam p also changed in w ays th at left their im print on speech long after the departure o f the PR M in 1982: T h e cam p w as d ivid ed in to m ahw ar [bases, axes] belonging to the m ain organizations. W herever each organization had its o ffice and its guards, the surrounding area belonged to it. Each had its 'square*, its territory, and people get used to using these nam es - ‘ Iqleem F ateh ’ , ‘ Iqleem D im okratiyyeh*, the ‘M aktab Siyasi* [p olitical o ffice o f the P F L P ] and so on. (A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i) T h e ashbal (lion cubs) trainin g ground on the southern edge o f the cam p also becam e an established landm ark. Streets - even the cam p itself - w ere renam ed. A fter his assassination, Fateh Security C h ie f A b u H assan Salam eh's nam e w as given to the m ain street, skirtin g the western side o f the cam p, and a m onum ent to his m em ory placed w here it jo in s the A irp o rt

'D ays o f the Revolution', 1969-82 93 B oulevard e. H ow ever, S h ateela's new nam e - M u’asker al-K arm el - never stuck. A lth ou gh the w orst collab orators had left the cam p w ith the D euxièm e B ureau, som e join ed the ‘ R evolu tion ’ , to the disgust o f m ilitants like A b u M uham m ad w ho had suffered from them : O ne o f the m ost notorious collaborators in Shateela - he had been present during m y interrogations - w as carrying a K lashin w hile we in the P F L P still had o n ly tw o guns. O nce I w ent to a m eeting w ith the ch ief o f the K ifah M usellah. A m ong the people there w ere three form er agents. I refused to sit w ith them . T h e ch ie f to ld m e, ‘Som e o f them w e asked to be agents, to bring us inform ation.* B ut it w as lies. W ith liberation , arm s began to flo w in to the cam p. G uns and bullets had been rarities b efore, treasured and hidden. N ow the arm s m erchants cam e. A lth ou gh the cam p leadership tried to co n trol the distribution o f w eapons, im posing fines on those w ho kept them in th eir hom es, the building up o f arsenals constituted a real danger. It w as n ot the w eapons alone, but the com bination o f w eapons w ith R esistance grou p factionalism th at w as dangerous. W hen the K ifah M usellah arrived som e w eeks after the C a iro A ccord s to tak e over co n trol o f the cam ps, th ey forbad e the carryin g o f arm s. T h is order w as contested by lo cal organ ization leaders. R esistance m ilitias were then allow ed to carry arm s w ithin their m ahwar but not outside it; o n ly the K ifah w ere authorized to m ake arm ed p atrols inside the cam ps. A gain there w ere friction and clashes. F in ally jo in t K ifah -R esistan ce grou p patrols were form ed. A n idea o f the effect o f the liberation o f the cam ps on children is given b y th is recollection b y a youn g w om an, now a R esistance grou p cad re, then a child: W hat I rem em ber first, and m ost - the scene th at sticks in m y m ind - w as w hen the R esistance entered the cam p and threw o u t the D euxièm e B ureau. I w as five o r six at the tim e. T h e people w ere a ll in the streets w elcom ing the feda'yeen . T h ey w ere sh ooting in the air and I w as afraid it w as the first tim e I*d heard b ullets. S o I stayed fa r aw ay, a t the head o f ou r alley. B ut th is picture o f the feda'yeen entering the cam p in th eir uniform s am id the celebrations o f the people is one 1*11 never forget. (‘ Leila*)

94

An O ral-B ased H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82

The newauthority Several p oints o f frictio n em erge in accounts o f relations betw een the K ifah M usellah and the people o f the cam ps w hich illum inate som e o f the ob stacles to build in g a unified Palestinian people. T h e K ifah w as a special unit draw n from the P L A , w hich had been form ed alon g Classical* lines w ithin the arm ies o f Iraq , S yria and E gypt. N oth in g in th eir trainin g qualified them to w ork w ith civilians: T h ey cam e from the forces o f *Ain J a llo u t, station ed in E gypt o r the B eqa’ and they had a hard, rough m entality. A t first th ey d id n 't m ix w ith us. T h ey w ere com m anded b y m ilitary officers w ho had no experience o f solvin g so cial problem s. T h ey looked on the cam p as i f it w as a m ilitary b arracks, they expected us to sto p and salute them in the street. T h eir on ly w ay o f dealing w ith people w as through punishm ents and im prisonm ent. T h is attitu de d oesn 't w ork w ith o u r p eop le, so there w ere problem s and confrontations. (A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i) T h a t the K ifah behaved arrogan tly tow ards the people o f the cam ps is corroborated b y others, yet there w ere p o litica l reasons w hy the P F L P in p articu lar developed this critique. A b u M uham m ad says th at the K ifah w as 'w ith the P L O , and the P L O w as Fateh*. T h e h istoric rivalry betw een these tw o groups fo r leadership o f the Resistance m ovem ent to o k a p articu larly sharp form in L ebanon. T h e com m ents on the K ifah 's 'h ard , rough m entality* and G a za provenance also rem inds us th at m ost 'Lebanese* Palestinians originated in G a lilee, and th at regional differences persisted lon g after 1948. W ith tim e, solu tion s to m any o f these problem s w ere w orked ou t through processes o f consultation and negotiation. A s a relatively autonom ous cam p leadership to o k shape, it w as able to tak e a stronger role and to m ediate betw een the K ifah and the people o f the cam p. F rictio n betw een the K ifah and the R esistance m ilitias w as at least p artly solved b y form ing m ixed p atro ls. W ith tim e the K ifah also began to be integrated in to the lo cality through visits, friendship and m arriage. L ater, an independent Palestinian ju d icial system began to em erge: In the m iddle o f the 1970s, when Lebanese state institutions becam e very w eak, a Palestinian system called the R evolu tion ary C ou rts w as set up. T h is new ju d icia l system w as draw n up b y people w ho had studied law , proper ju d ges. It w as independent from the Lebanese courts except in cases o f problem s betw een a Lebanese and a Palestinian; such cases had to g o to the Lebanese courts. But if it w as betw een Palestinians, the R evolu tion ary C o u rt look ed after it. T h e K ifah w as the executive arm o f

'D ays o f the Revolution*, 1969-82 95 th is new legal system , ap p lyin g decisions such as arrest o r fines.2 (A b u M uham m ad)

Autonomy: trial and error A u ton om y fo r the cam ps w as sp ecifically included in the C a iro A ccord s, w hich m entioned ‘lo cal com m ittees* that w ould coordinate w ith the K ifah M usellah and the Lebanese au thorities.2 Jihad Bisher gives an idea o f early trials in the search fo r bodies to im plem ent autonom y: T hin gs began to get m ore organ ized w ith period ic m eetings being held betw een the leaders o f Resistance groups, to take decisions and to avoid friction and clashes. I w as cam p D irector a t the tim e o f the liberation , so I m et w ith the group leaders and we form ed w hat w e called the U nified C om m and. Its aim w as to restore peace in the cam p, train young people fo r defence, im prove public services and keep an eye on U N R W A schools and other A gen cy activities. L ater, in 1973, a P L O E xecutive C om m ittee d ecision called fo r the form ation o f P opu lar C om m ittees in a ll the cam ps, and laid dow n uniform guidelines fo r th eir com position, tasks and procedures. M em bers were from the cam ps but w ere appointed b y Resistance groups to represent them : A delegate from the m ass unions, from tw o to five independents, and one m em ber from every R esistance grou p - this w as how the P opular Com m ittees w ere form ed. A ccord in g to the rule o f nuss za y d w ahid [h a lf plus one] the chairm an alw ays had to be from Fateh - it w as the sam e in the u n io n s . . . E verything depended on the p erson ality o f the other m em bers. T he chairm an could m ake them nothings. I f th ey w ere w eak th ey ju st follow ed him ; i f th ey w ere stron g th ey w ou ld argue and fill their positions. (A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i) T he addition o f ‘independents* cam e a t a later stage, to give m ore au th o rity to the P opu lar C om m ittee b y adding respected ‘elder citizens*, and to give m ore w eight to the ahali al-m ukhayem (the fam ilies o f the cam p) vis-à-vis the R esistance groups. T h is m ethod o f com position produced P opular C om m ittees o f unw ieldy size, and even though subcom m ittees were form ed ou t o f them to d eal w ith special tasks, they rem ained handicapped in several w ays. F irst, the P opular C om m ittee had no real p olitical o r leadership role but acted rath er as a m ediator betw een the PR M leadership, w here real pow er la y, and the people o f the cam p; according to a w idespread form ula, its role w as to lo o k after the *social side*. Second, although the

96 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 P opular C om m ittee's m ain task w as to im prove the environm ent and pu blic services, its budget w as to o sm all and irregular to carry ou t m ajor w orks. A b u M uham m ad voices a general com plaint: C ertain ly there w ere som e achievem ents. T he P opu lar C om m ittee had a budget from the P L O and aid cam e from other sources. T h is enabled them to d o certain things, m end and asphalt road s, bring w ater and electricity, d ig w ells, repair sew age pipes. B u t, regrettably, there w as som e stealing. T here w as no supervision o r accou n tability. People a t the to p d id n 't care w hat happened, they never punished those w ho stole. A third problem w as th at, because o f th eir co n stitu tion , the P opular Com m ittees did not really represent the people o f the cam ps, nor did they develop their p articipation; instead, like the pop u lar unions, they becam e an arena o f struggle betw een the Resistance groups. T hu s, although elections were som etim es held, they carried the danger o f PR M group clashes. A ch ronic point o f co n flict developed around fin an cial responsibility. F ateh , as the w ealthiest o f the Resistance grou p s, and recipient o f donations destined fo r the P L O , w as accused by other groups o f using funds fo r its ow n purposes; F ateh , on the oth er hand, saw itself as funding institutions from w hich a ll benefited equ ally (fo r exam ple, the Institute o f S ocial A ffa irs, w hich paid pensions to the fam ilies o f m artyrs and prison ers), w ith ou t receiving credit. O u r brothers in the other organ ization s w ould say, 'L e t's m ake suchand-such a p ro ject.' T h ey w ould let F ateh p ay fo r it and then nam e it in the nam e o f a ll the organ ization s jo in tly , though b y rights it should have been in F ateh 's nam e. (A b u M akarem ) W hatever the w eaknesses o f the P op u lar C om m ittees, th ey w ere an im provem ent on the past and provided a fram ew ork fo r p articip ation th at cou ld be criticized and im proved. A s a form clo sely associated w ith the P L O /P R M , they spread in to a ll the neighbourhoods around Shateela. Indeed, com m ittees and subcom m ittees p roliferated during the 'D a y s o f the R evolu tion ' to the poin t w here the term s becam e derided, synonym ous w ith ch aos rath er than autonom y. In the fa vo u r o f com m ittees, it cou ld be said th at they p rovid ed a channel fo r the p articip ation o f the largest num ber in the 'R ev o lu tio n '. A u ton o m y w as n ot an end in itse lf but rather an elem ent w ithin an overall strategy o f national struggle.

'D ays c f the R evolution', 1969-82 97

External attacks and internal clashes From the early 1970s, the cam ps in L ebanon increasingly becam e the target o f Israeli attack s using a ir, land and sea. T hese w ere to a large degree accepted b y the people o f the cam ps as a m easure o f the health o f the Resistance m ovem ent. T h ey w ere ready to accept high losses as lon g as R esistance attacks continued, convinced that retaliation proved th at Israel was getting hurt. N o to p ic concerned people m ore than Resistance operations. N ew s broadcasts were listened to and PR M bulletins scanned fo r news o f the fe d a ’yeen . Special pride w as expressed if kin , friends o r ‘sons o f the camp* were in volved . D eep m ourning w as expressed fo r m artyrs.4 In a very real sense the Resistance m ovem ent represented the people o f the cam ps, since m ost o f the fighters w ere th eir sons. E q u ally there w as concern when arm ed struggle stagnated. A n early Fateh m em ber looks back in bitterness a t the Resistance m ovem en ts in ab ility to develop m ilitarily: D u rin g the w ar o f O ctob er 1973 the R esistance didn*t carry ou t a single op eration . It w as sham eful. In 1975, w hat happened? A thousand bullets w ere shot from Shateela a t *Ain al-R om aneh,5 w ithout causing a single casu alty. O u r operations w ere like im m unization to a ch ild , they m ade Israel stronger. L o o k a t w hat happened a fter the D a la i M oghrabi operation! Israel reinforced its fleet o ff L ebanon.6 L eb an ese-P alestin ian clashes also continued to occu r, w ith m ajor episodes in M ay 1973, when the Lebanese A rm y besieged three cam ps fo r a m onth, attack in g Shateela from positions in the Sports C ity and low er H ursh and strafin g it from the air; and again in the C iv il W ar o f 1975/6, when Shateela w as shelled and sniped at from ’A in al-R om aneh. Several Shateela shebab fou gh t against the M aronite m ilitias in E ast B eirut; others d rove su pply trucks to the besieged cam p o f T ell a l-Z a 'te r through the Lebanese Forces* lines. Inseparable from the Palestinian struggle, fights between Resistance groups form ed a th ird source o f danger. A b u M uham m ad gives a general view : T h e period w as divided in to different stages, a ll o f them unstable, each one m arked b y co n flict, m ob ilization , accusations, confrontations. A n early point o f co n flict w as over the K ifah , because the P F L P w asn't part o f it. T here w as also co n flict over the battle in Jord an. In 1974 the issue w as one o f 'n ation al authority*, when the P F L P w ithdrew from the E xecu tive C om m ittee and form ed the R ejection F ron t. E ach p o litical stage had its conflicts.

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An O ral-B ased H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82

H e adds: In som e early periods we fo rgo t that it is Israel and im perialism th at are ou r enem ies, we im agined th at ou r enem y is another Palestinian group. T here w as p rovocation and m obilization due to lack o f consciousness. E ach organ ization pursued the others, collected inform ation abo u t them , and attacked them so as to gain their m em bers. A lth ou gh in general Fateh cooperated w ith Sa’eqa and the D F L P against the P F L P , there were also serious clashes betw een F ateh and S a ’eqa in 1976/7, after Syria entered Lebanon to protect the M aronites. Inter-R esistance group fightin g w as deeply disturbing to the people o f the cam ps, first because o f their attachm ent to n ational u n ity, and second, because such battles w asted the lives o f their sons. It is possible to discern som e kinds o f self-defence against faction al con flict w orked ou t over lon g historical experience. A n anecdote told b y A hm ad H aleem eh's father points to one o f the strongest: fam ily solidarity. In a period o f co n flict between F ateh and the P L A , A b u A hm ad found h im self aim ing his gun at one o f his sons in the other form ation. B oth low ered their guns and went hom e. It is said o f m others in cam ps th at th ey brin g up th eir sons to put fratern al ties before p olitical ones. O lder wom en also spontaneously form ed them selves into delegations that visited the R esistance leaders to com plain o f co n flict or other problem s. B ut a m ore usual 'in terposin g force* w as the shuyyukh and wujaha'. A lth ou gh th eir problem -solving role w as norm ally confined to co n flicts w ithin the cam p, it is clear from the follow in g tw o accounts th at, in em ergencies, they also represented the fam ilies o f the cam p to the Resistance leadership. W hen I becam e D irecto r, I kept the wujaha’ as m y fath er had done, to solve problem s and as w itn esses. . . L et’s say I w ant to m eet A b u A m m ar because there’s a b ig problem . I’d put the wujaha * in m y ca r and g o to the o ffices, and I co u ld ta lk stron gly because I had them w ith m e. T h ey are the fathers and the uncles o f the fe d a ’yeen . T h ey are the ow ners o f the cam p and the reservoir o f the ’ Revolution*. (Jihad Bisher) F ateh ’s p o licy tow ards the cam ps included reinforcing the 'leadership* role o f the shuyyukh. O ne o f the projects o f F ateh ’s B uilding C om m ittee was to reconstruct a village diwan where they cou ld m eet: W e brought straw m ats, m attresses and hard-backed cushions, and coffee-m aking equipm ent to m ake bitter coffee. T he old m en used to sit there every evening and ta lk . T h ey talked about the problem s o f the cam ps, and if there w as a quarrel betw een tw o organ ization s they used to go and solve it. (A bu M akarem )

'D ays o f the Revolution', 1969-82 99 Such a p o licy had several resonances. A t a sym b olic level, the shuyyukh incarnated con tin u ity w ith historic Palestine, passing on the shebab stories and values from th at p eriod .7 F urtherm ore, w hether o r not th ey belonged to F ateh , the shuyyukh were inclined to be conservative, pious and hostile to the rad ical ideas current in som e sectors o f the R esistance m ovem ent. A t another level, the fo llo w in g testim ony suggests th at the shuyyukh som etim es represented the people o f the cam p in opposition to the R esistance leadership: I f w e w anted som ething from A b u A m m ar w e used to give a lunch fo r him a t N adi Beladna [C lu b o f ou r C ou n try, a sports clu b b u ilt b y F ateh in S abra] and let A b u A hm ad S a’eed tell him w hat we w anted. H e w as fo rcefu l and self-con fiden t w hen he sp oke to the leadership. H e used to say *W illek abu Am m arV • It’s n ot p olite b u t th at’s the w ay he sp oke. (A b u M akarem ) A b u A hm ad Sa’eed w as the leading personality in Shateela after the death o f A bed Bisher, and his tinton becam e, according to A b u M akarem , the political heart o f the cam p. In p ortrayin g A b u A hm ad as a personification o f peasant straight-speaking, A b u M akarem is doubtless expressing a retrospective desire fo r popular forces that could have restrained the Resistance leadership from policies seen as dangerous to the ’Revolution*. (A bu A hm ad w as killed in the 1982m assacre, on his w ay to the Israeli lines under a w hite fla g , to tell them that there were no arm s o r fighters in the cam p.)

BaUding a ’revolutionary environment’ In 1977 the *Revolution* established one o f ou r m ost im portant institutions, the B uilding Com m ittee. T h is C om m ittee built al-Iqleem , the F ateh centre in S hateela, con sistin g o f a head o ffice, a lib rary and a h all fo r exhibitions; and in fro n t it b u ilt a kindergarten fo r ISO children. In H ayy G harbeh there w as an area o f tin huts w here people o f m ixed n ation alities lived , a spot o f m oral corruption - hasheesh, cocain e, p rostitu tion . S o the B uilding Com m ittee to o k the decision to bulldoze it and rebuild the houses in cem ent. T he sam e year we laid tw o b ig sew age pipes from the bginning o f S hateela to the end o f A b u H assan Salam eh Street. In the H ursh we b u ilt a centre fo r the Scien tific Com m ittee fo r m ilitary and technical studies. N ear the Sports C ity we b u ilt a p u b lic b akery, a school fo r p o litical education, and a sports clu b , N adi Beladna. It had ju d o , karate, boxin g, tw o fo o tb all team s - everything that co u ld keep ou r youth aw ay from drugs. O u r brother A b u H assan Salam eh used to com e there to train. (A b u M akarem )

100 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 T h e P L O /P R M w as the creato r o f a p u blic dom ain w hich did not exist before 1969 and w hich w ould be destroyed in 1982. V olum inous though it ist A b u M akarem 's catalogue includes on ly a fraction o f all Resistance building w hich, in a relatively short p eriod , laid a grid o f train in g grounds, w orksh ops, cu ltu ral centres, health facilities, schools and clubs over an area th at b efore 1969 had been n othing m ore than an agglom eration o f low incom e housing and ‘w aste’ land. A lth ou gh Resistance offices and m ilitary train in g sch ools form ed a core to this pu blic dom ain, A b u M akarem is right to underline its b roader socio-cu ltu ral aspects and the drive to am eliorate p hysical conditions. T w o m ajor P R C S hospitals, G a za and A k k a , were sited w ithin the S abra/Sh ateela q u ad rilateral, w hile in nearby B o u ij B arajneh and F akh an y w ere spread m ost o f Sam ed’s prod u ctive com plex, w hich included factories, a film -m aking u nit, a lib rary and publishing offices.* T h e underlying p olem ical con text o f the accou n t is suggested b y the com m ent th at precedes it: T m replying to those w ho say th at the d e v o lu tio n * * didn’t do anything.* In the b itter m ood th at prevailed after 1982, people rem em bered m any shortcom ings. Shelters rem ained insufficient in spite o f the likelih o od o f attack . T he p roliferation o f com m ittees and so cial ‘projects* w as not m atched b y the developm ent o f R esistance cadres trained in social as w ell as m ilitary w ork. N evertheless, in spite o f their com petitiveness and the lack o f a coherent plan o f social action , the PR M w as a catalyst fo r a habit o f p u blic action that outlived its buildings. W ith the ending o f Lebanese A rm y co n trol, free building on 'waste* land around Shateela began in earnest. Settlers here included Palestinians displaced from other areas, such as the South and the 'M aron ite enclave*; also other A rab s, n on-A rabs and people denied Lebanese n ation ality, such as K u rd s, B edouin and gypsies. T he largest com ponent w as com posed o f Lebanese Shi*ites, w ho w ere p artly integrated into the Resistance m ovem ent as m em bers, fighters and clients o f services. A b u M akarem 's rem ark about 'corruption* suggests a m oral/social boundary betw een the cam p and this large, heterogeneous p op u lation . A b u M uham m ad gives a m ore positive view , sayin g that m ost w ere w orkers seeking cheap accom m odation, and th at som e o f the foreigners (especially Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) jo in ed the PR M . A t the beginning o f the 1970s, the pop u lation o f the cam p and close surroundings is said to have been 20,000. T ow ard s the end o f the 'D a y s o f the R evolution* it had reached 47,000 (this w as the last coun t m ade b y the P op u lar Com m ittee fo r the purpose o f w ater distribution). M any o f these w ere PR M fighters and cadres from outside. T h e fam ous S abra m eat, vegetable and fru it m arket dates from the beginning o f the R esistance p eriod , as d o the chains o f sm all shops, som e o f them illeg a l, th at fron ted a ll the streets and alleys o f the area. Sabra*s b ustlin g com m erce displaced the old er city centre fo r W est B eirutis. P rivate

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schools and train in g institutions o f every kind burgeoned to m atch the grow in g p op u lation . T w o large new Sunni m osques were b u ilt, D an a beside the vegetable m arket and Im am ’A li on T areeq Jdeedeh. T he m ilitary and fin an cial pow er o f the P L O /P R M changed relations betw een Shateela and its neighbourhood, ju st as it changed relations betw een Palestinians and Lebanese gen erally. C o n flicts w hich had occurred in earlier periods ended: w hereas in the 1960s landow ners had tried to rem ove squatters through law suits o r eviction s, now , as A b u T u rk i puts it, ‘N o one dared to approach us.* P hysically and socially the boundaries betw een Shateela and its surroundings becam e blurred. D ense building pressed against the cam p on a ll sides so th at it seem ed one m ass; o n ly U N R W A people and old inhabitants knew exactly where the boundaries w ere. S ocial boundaries w ere also blurred. T he existence o f the P L O /P R M as an overarching fram ew ork had the effect o f encouraging all kinds o f recip rocity. O ne sign o f this w as an increase in the num ber o f m arriages betw een Lebanese and Palestinians. Such m arriages often crossed sectarian as w ell as n ation al boundaries, and often to o k p lace through R esistance group contacts. O n ly one serious clash is reported fo r the w hole p eriod , again w ith the Stetiyeh ‘gang* w hich had attacked Shateela in the early 1950s. In its causes and its outcom e, the second Stetiyeh b attle, in M arch 1970, dem onstrates the PLO /PR M *s assum ption o f responsibility fo r order in its dom ain. T h ey w ere sm ugglers, they had m oney, and they w anted to b u y Palestinian influence. 1 w as cam p D irecto r at the tim e and I rem em ber th at th ey cam e to m e and offered to b u ild m e a new o ffice. T h ey w ere tryin g to d o business under the co ver o f the R evolu tion . M aybe th ey also had p o litical m otives, but their m ain purpose w as selling drugs. T h e K ifah M usellah surrounded them in their building, up near the Sports C ity . T here w as shooting. O ne o f the R evolu tion 's best officers, S a ’eed G h aw ash , offered to g o up and ta lk to them , to stop the bloodshed. T h ey said, ‘OK* but when he reached there they shot him . T h ey w ere captured and taken to a [Palestinian] m ilitary court and executed. N o one w as sorry fo r them except Lebanese w ho w ere against Palestinians anyw ay. T h ey knew how bad those people w ere.10 (Jihad) Bisher) A lth ou gh the Palestinian Resistance had been supported b y a large segm ent o f the Lebanese people, and although Lebanese w ere integrated in to the PR M in m any w ays, the pow er im balance betw een the P L O /P R M and its Lebanese allies eventually created resentm ent and a grow in g n ostalgia fo r the Lebanese state. O n the Palestinian side the relationship w as construed as one o f revolu tion ary fu sio n , sum m arized in the slogan sha’b

102 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 w ahid (one people). B ut Lebanese increasingly perceived P R M au th ority as illegitim ate, and resented Palestinians as privileged . Such resentm ent w as strongest am ong ordinary citizen s, outside the fram ew ork o f the ‘national/progressive* forces, and it increased as loss and destruction from Israeli attacks m ounted and as, after the 1975/6 C iv il W ar, hopes fo r reform o f the Lebanese p o litical system fad ed . T he E v o lu tio n a ry environm ent* b u ilt b y the P L O /P R M w ould com e to be term ed ‘expansion’ and even ‘colonization* b y som e L ebanese.11

Changes in popular culture In considering p op u lar cu ltu re betw een 1969 and 1982, we need to discrim inate between three overlapping fram ew orks: (i) Palestinian cu ltu ral revivalism , a m ainly m iddle-class phenom enon linked h istorically to the P L O /P R M but n ot contained b y it; (ii) p opu lar culture in the cam ps, predom inantly rural in origin though undergoing change; and (iii) the culture generated b y the R esistance m ovem ent w hich com bined its ow n m ilitan t sym bols w ith revivalist and pop u list ones. Such a discrim ination allow s us to see disjunctures betw een the three fram ew orks in spite o f their association w ithin a broad n ational m ovem ent. W e m ust not forget, either, th at tw o basic cu ltu ral institutions continued quite outside these national fram ew orks: m ost cam p children continued to be educated in U N R W A schools, w hose syllabus changed little after 1969; and religion continued as an accepted elem ent in p opu lar culture, repressed in nationalist discourse. T he relationship between popular culture in the cam ps and both revivalism and Resistance culture is an interesting and com plex one. O n the one hand, in m uch R esistance-oriented w ritin g and a rt, the people o f the cam ps w ere presented as sym bols o f the m isery o f exile (as in the paintings o f Ism a*il Sham m out), and o f resistance and rootedness in the land (as in som e o f the stories o f G hassan K anafani). Y e t a t the sam e tim e, the cam ps w ere perceived as areas o f to tal d ep rivation , in need o f social assistance and p o litical organization. T here w as also a w idespread Resistance view o f cam ps as ‘reservoirs o f m en fo r the R evolution*. Such perspectives suggest the d ass/cu ltu re gap betw een PR M cadres and the people o f the cam ps. Even though the R esistance leadership adopted elem ents o f peasant culture - the keffiyyeh and agal, the rural nam ing system - as m obilizing sym bols and signs o f ‘authenticity*, in its hierarchies, ethos and m entality the R esistance w as nevertheless deeply urban, as m uch in its leftist w ing as in Fateh. A b u M akarem tells an anecdote abou t a leading m em ber o f a M arxist R esistance grou p w ho com m itted a so cial blunder by stepping in to A b u A hm ad Sa*eed*s diwan w ithout tak in g o ff his shoes: the old m an snapped

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an grily a t him , ‘ W as yo u r fath er A b u Durra?* A b u D u rra w as fam ous in pre-1948 G alilee as a tough fighter against the M andate. In this reference, A b u A hm ad w as scorin g tw ice against the leftist cadre, first b y im plying that although the cadre m ight know all about M arxism , he did not know Palestinian history; second, since the cadre w as not A b u D u rra’s son, he w as on ly ‘em pty words*, not like the m ujahideen , the ‘real* fighters o f the past. T he sto ry indicates the barriers th at the people o f the cam ps could present to ou tsiders.12 In tw o other stories to ld about A b u A hm ad, he challenges leaders o f leftist groups. B oth are w orth quotin g because o f their pungency. In one o f them he addresses a leader o f the P F L P : ‘ Y o u say th at all p rop erty is fo r the people, so w hy is yo u r o ffice in Shateela stealing ou r w ater and electricity?* In tike second, A b u A hm ad visits a D F L P leader in his office: H is o ffice had air-conditioning and w all-to-w all carpeting. T h ey talked ab o u t p o litics and the [R evolu tion 's] la ck o f m oney. T he leader began to curse the ‘ Right* - F ateh and A b u A m m ar - because o f th eir w ealth. S o A b u A hm ad asked him , 'A n d you, did yo u r fath er leave you an o il w ell to furnish this room?* A lth ou gh the R esistance groups differed sharp ly on p olitical issues, th ey shared the sam e fund o f them es and sym bols, those th at were generated w ith the birth o f the Resistance m ovem ent and those th at continued to be w orked on b y the intellectuals and artists m ost closely associated w ith it. T o capture this culture in all its diversity is d ifficu lt now , since so m uch o f it w as destroyed b y the invasion o f 1982, and no studies have yet been m ade. B ut a q u ick review suggests the cen trality o f fo u r associated sym bols: the fla g , the gun, the fighter and the m artyr. A n oth er recurrent sym bol in R esistance posters is the Palestinian w om an in trad ition al dress carryin g a K lashin. T he Palestinian people - as peasants and w orkers, o r as crow ds carrying coffin s is also represented. Palestinian history as an unknow n subject, to be rediscovered, w as a central them e o f countless consciousness-raising nedw aat (sem inars). Songs w ere undoubtedly one o f the m ost im portant channels through w hich R esistance them es and sym bols reached the cam ps. T he h abit o f com posing them to suit new p olitical conjunctures, deeply rooted in popular cu ltu re, survived the destruction o f 1982. A b u M akarem gives som e exam ples o f fam ous early F ateh songs in the context o f em phasizing cultural aspects o f the Resistance m ovem ent. F ateh invented a new artistic form , group songs, som ething we d id n 't have before. [Sings] T am the son o f F ateh /W h o never praised anyone else.* A fte r 1965 a ll Palestinians began to sing these songs, and when they

104 An Oral-Based H istory o f Skateela Camp, 1949-82 sang, th ey carried the gun. T here’s another song th at A b u Jam al D a ’b is used to p la y on his *oud to the ashbal in Shateela: ’O h gu n , shou t R evolution!* There w as the song-w riter A b d allah H addad w ho used to com pose p olitical songs: [sings] ’T he voice o f the Security C ou n cil silences a ll others/B ut the d o llar is stuck in its throat.* W e w eren't ju st bullets and guns as people think. M anifestations around the b urial o f m artyrs and the care o f th eir graves form ed a focu s o f cu ltu ral activity w here pop u lar and Resistance culture overlapped closely. P olitical discourse - dissem inated through a w ide array o f ’occasions*, con tacts and m edia - w as another cru cial channel o f cu ltu ral in flu en ce, transm itting ’a new language, new th in kin g, a new identity*, one th at left its deepest im print on the ’generation o f the Revolution* (i.e. those w ho w ere children in the 1960s). W ith the expansion o f PR M program m es, the tem po o f d a ily life in the cam ps changed, becom ing charged w ith com m em orations and celebrations: R esistance grou p b irthdays, the calen dar o f n ation al ’days*, and international days such as 1 M ay and 8 M arch. A ll these were occasions fo r speeches by Resistance leaders, displays o f handicrafts, perform ances o f p lays, songs and dances. Such events becam e p art o f, and helped people to absorb , the con tin u al attacks and losses. 'W e m ourn and m arry on the sam e day* w as the w ay one young PR M cadre expressed this new pop u lar culture o f resistance. M ahranajat (rallies) and ih tafalat (celebrations) m ight be held in cam ps o r in larger spaces such as the A ra b U niversity. T he fo llo w in g passage gives the fla vo u r o f one o f these, held tow ards the end o f the ’D ays o f the Revolution*: U nder the sym bol o f a crow n o f pin k h ollyh ocks, the D F L P inaugurated a great p op u lar festival in w hich one could alread y see the im m ense p op u lar jo y th at w ould greet a Palestinian state alread y alm ost visible. T h rou gh ou t the d ay, a vast crow d m oved am ong the displays o f Lebanese and Palestinian handicrafts, o f b ook s, cassettes, posters, to ys, and betw een perform ances o f songs, dances, m arionette show s, film s and theatre. O ver everything w as a m em orial w here a flam e burned and tw o fighters stood m otionless in fron t o f a large panel covered w ith p h otos o f m artyrs. In a sm all room n earby, w here b itter co flee w as served, there w as an assem blage o f sim ple objects th at recalled the usurped land - birth certificates, pre-1948 identity card s, coin s, pieces o f jew ellery, o ld dresses.” Som e o f the criticism o f the R esistance m ovem ent a fter 1982 focu sed on the effect it had on sch ools, and on education al standards. T h ere w ere people w ho said , 'T h e y ruined o u r youth*, blam ing the PR M fo r a

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con stellation o f problem s such as loss o f zeal on the p art o f teachers, and students dropping ou t to ‘jo in the Revolution*. A t the beginning, people say, the R esistance groups used to send volunteers w ho w ere to o youn g b ack to sch ool. B ut later, w ith com p etition , th ey began to accept boys as yo u n g as tw elve o r thirteen. ‘ W hat co u ld th ey becom e,* asked one Shateela m an b itterly, ‘except the bodyguards o f the abaw atV 14 O n the other hand, the P L O and PR M did m uch to fill gaps th at cou ld not be covered b y U N R W A sch oolin g, p roviding scholarships fo r secondary school and university, training courses and adult literacy classes. A dd ition ally it supplem ented U N R W A 's school program m e w ith clubs fo r sports, recreation and cu ltu ral activities. Perhaps it w as inevitable that there should be a d a sh between the tw o ‘revolutions* and tw o sets o f values, th at o f arm ed struggle on the one hand, and the old er ‘educational revolution* on the other.

Families aad the Resistance movement B y 1969, sligh t changes had alread y taken p lace in Palestinian kinship and fam ilies as a result o f m any different factors arising from exile - the scatterin g o f fam ily u n its, sch oolin g, occu p ation al change, secondary m igration and sod oecon om ic differentiation. A m on g these changes w as a w eakening o f the ham ula (clan , p atrilin eage), a process th at had begun b efo re 1948. A t the household level, there w as a sh ift from the com pound, p atriarch al form (com posed o f a co u p le, th eir unm arried children and m arried son s, w ith p oolin g o f incom e and expenditure), tow ards a looser form , w ith parents and m arried sons livin g close together but independently. F ather/son and m other/daughter-in-law relations altered in consequence, becom ing less authoritarian. A lth ou gh clan elders w ere still respected, th ey interfered less in the affairs o f individual households. Y e t Palestinian fam ily ties, w hether betw een kin o r household m em bers, lo st none o f th eir im portance in exile; on the co n trary, they acquired new m eanings: as p rotection against alien ation , as a source o f em otional o r fin an cial support, as a social value rooted in religion and national identity. E sp ecially in the cam ps, people w ere reluctant to allow o r adm it to change in the fam ily sphere. T hus change w as slow as w ell as being m asked by the id eology o f non-change. F urtherm ore, fam ily values w ere b road ly the sam e betw een hom e, school and Lebanese society. In one sense the separation o f the Resistance m ovem ent and fam ilies im plied in the above heading is d istortin g. T h e PR M developed w ithin Palestinian A ra b society. F am ilies in the cam ps w ere sim ilarly p art o f the national m ovem ent, w ith m em ories o f village battles and heroes o f their ow n. Y e t, as a p ow er stru ctu re, the PR M w as largely external to the cam ps and to

106 A n Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 L ebanon. In add ition , although it cam e w ithout an y exp licit aim to change social o r fam ily relations, its program m e o f m ass m obilization w as bound to have im plications fo r the fam ily sphere. T his w as not apparent a t the beginning because o f people’s longing fo r action th at w ould end exile and restore Palestine. Identification w ith the Resistance m ovem ent w as so stron g th at tough dilem m as - such as th at betw een love fo r sons and love o f cou n try - d id not a t first show up in all th eir harshness. O ver tim e, how ever, as the tanzeem at (organizations) interacted w ith the field o f fam ily relations, m any kinds o f change were set in m otion. T h at such changes have not been ’rad ical’ is p artly due to conservative counter-currents as w ell as p o litical setbacks. Perhaps the m ost im portant change is th at values related to the fam ily have been raised o u t o f the realm o f the accepted and unspoken in to the arena o f open debate. A fte r 1969, w ith open recruitm ent, it often happened th at m ost o f the m en in a household o r fam ily ’duster* w ould jo in a Resistance grou p o r the P op u lar M ilitia organized by the P L A . A hm ad H aleem eh rem em bers a relative tak in g him , his fath er and tw o uncles alon g to one o f the P R M o ffices (he w as a b o y at a secondary sch ool a t the tim e). T he trad ition al asso ciation o f m ales w ith figh tin g m eant th at som etim es three generations in the sam e fam ily w ould jo in u p , w ith o ld m en asking to be given guard d u ty and boys goin g into the ashbal (lion cubs; see P olitical G lossary). A lth ou gh w om en in the early days d id m ilitia train in g w ith the P L A , th ey d id n ot jo in R esistance grou p s, except perhaps secretly. Searching fo r w om en m em bers to interview in d ie large (16,000) cam p o f B o u ij B arajneh in 19 7 4 ,1 fou nd o n ly tw o. In som e cases there w as co n flict betw een sons and fathers on the issue o f jo in in g a R esistance group o r goin g outside fo r m ilitary training. Y o u n g m en in B o u ij often gave it as a sign o f the n ation alist enthusiasm o f their generation th at their parents had been unable to prevent them join in g. O ne recalled: A teacher cam e [to Syria] to co llect students w ho had left hom e w ithout th eir parents’ perm ission, and because there w as goin g to be a feast. But w e refused to go w ith him . W e valued the feast, but w e stayed in the [training] cam p. W e forgo t ou r fam ilies fo r the sake o f ou r co u n try.19 Such co n flicts never seem to have resulted in perm anent rupture. A hm ad H aleem eh recalls the case o f a m an in Shateela w ho w as so an gry w ith a son w ho left sch ool to jo in a train in g session w ithout his perm ission th at he ordered him ou t o f the house. B ut a fter a few m onths the rift w as m ended, and the b oy returned hom e.16 M em bers o f the sam e household usually jo in ed o r supported the sam e R esistance grou p , but this w as not alw ays the case. Father/son and

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broth er/brother solid arity is a basic principle o f the A ra b fam ily system , especially stron g in rural areas, but it is one th at generates tension. C om p etition betw een R esistance grou ps w as linked to fam ily rivalries, p articu larly those betw een brothers and cousins. T he prim acy o f the eldest brother, p articu larly m arked in the Palestinian peasant inheritance system ,17 p layed a role in pushing youn ger brothers in to other grou p s, esp ecially if the eldest had leader status. In m any cases, the reason fo r m em bers o f the sam e fam ily join in g different groups w as political/id eological disagreem ent. It w as m ore usual, how ever, fo r w hole fam ilies to be ‘counted to* sp ecific grou p s, a tendency th at w as encouraged b y grou p activities fo r wom en and ch ildren. T h e w elfare p rojects set up b y the m ajor groups kindergartens, crèches, youth clu b s, clin ics, w orkshops, allow ances fo r m artyrs’ and prisoners* fam ilies - tended to give p rio rity to the fam ilies o f m em bers, thus reinforcing fam ilies as social units. D aughters* struggles to jo in Resistance groups w ere in fin itely harder than those o f s o n s ," and m uch m ore productive o f sociocu ltu ral change. T h is episode from a youn g Shateela w om an's life story is revealing: I left sch o ol after the end o f Interm ediate, because m y fam ily needed m e to w o rk at hom e. A fterw ard s 1 regretted givin g up m y edu cation w ithou t a stru ggle - 1 felt I had cap acities, th at I co u ld have becom e a d octor. M y fath er is very p io u s, he d id n ’t allo w us to have p o litica l activities, he didn’t even allow us to visit friends. M y closest friend w as m y old er sister; w hen she m arried and left L ebanon, I felt abandoned. I felt th at if I didn’t escape from hom e restrictions I w ould sink forever. T h ere w as a train in g session a t the W om en’s U nion fo r ad u lt literacy teachers. I con fron ted m y fath er, I to ld him I’d k ill m yself if he did n ’t let m e jo in . H e relented. B ut he never allow ed m e to becom e a m em ber o f a grou p. (*Samia*) A n o th er accou n t o f parent/daugh ter stru ggle, this tim e from a cadre, show s sim ilarities and differences: W hen I first entered the Jebha [F ro n t], I w as a ch ild o f ten years. I jo in ed th eir guides and then th eir youth organ ization . L a ter, as a student, I jo in ed th eir W om en’s B u reau .19 M y fath er w as a com rade in the F ro n t, this is w hat helped m e. B u t in Palestine he had been a sheikh , and he w as very fan atical. H e kept on at m e to w ear a headscarf, I w as forbidden to cut m y hair, I w as forbidden to w ear jeans. M y m other w as against m e w orkin g w ith youn g m en - she w anted me to m arry so that she could relax. I w as still in sch o o l, but I con fron ted this problem w ith m y parents. I to ld them , T d on’t w ant to m arry, I w ant to d o national w ork. B ut if

108 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 anyone ever tells yo u that I'm not behaving co rrectly, then you have the right to d o w hat you want.* (‘ A m al’) W e notice th at, w hile *Am al* w ins her stru ggle, it is o n ly b y in corporatin g her parents* rules into her ow n behaviour. A s banat (young unm arried wom en) in the cam ps w ere draw n in to the P R M , a great deal o f scrutiny w as focused on them b y their fam ilies, the com m unity and R esistance group m en. W om en cadres had to exercise extrem e self-control - over their cloth in g, fa cia l expressions, gestures and exchanges w ith m ale com rades. T he R esistance groups acted p ragm atically, fo r exam ple putting pressure on m en to let their w ives o r daughters jo in the m ovem ent, but they d id not con du ct cam paigns aim ed a t change in gender values. Pre-m arital virgin ity, m arriage and childbearing rem ained id eologically com pelling fo r wom en. N evertheless, one im portant kind o f change w as that people - including w om en them selves - becam e accustom ed to w om en tak in g a m ore prom inent p o litical, econom ic and social role. T h is observation m ade before 1982 holds true today: W om en w orkin g w ith the R esistance often saw them selves as p o litic iz e s o f their fam ilies. A rrivin g hom e from w ork, th ey initiated lively discussion, bringing news and analyses o f the latest p o litical and m ilitary events, as w ell as in form ation ab o u t new services and p rojects in the cam p, thus lin kin g the fam ily w ith the larger w orld outside the hom e and their neighbourhood.20 C o n ju gal relations also changed, n ot so m uch because o f PR M m ob ilization as w om en's rising levels o f education and entry in to professional salaried em ploym ent. W ith jo b s and several kinds o f training offered by the P L O and PR M , wom en increasingly w orked outside the hom e and contributed to household incom e. B ut it w as not their earnings so m uch as h olding positions o f responsibility th at changed their fam ily status. W hen asked abou t change betw een 1948 and 1988, one old w om an laughed and said, (N ow wom en speak in fron t o f men.* R elation s betw een couples w ere also m odified b y the decline in parentally arranged m arriages and the increasing independence o f individual households.21 W hen m arriages to o k place between Resistance grou p com rades, oth er changes were likely to result, such as the continuation o f the w ife's p o litical activities and her stron ger voice in fam ily decisions. H ow ever, m ost observers agree that there w as little change in the d ivision o f dom estic lab ou r, w hatever w om en d id outside the hom e.

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A separate economy From the late 1960s the Lebanese econom y began to close tow ards Palestinians. M any factors contributed to this gradual process, am ong them the end o f the Lebanese econom ic ‘b oom ’ , reactions tow ards the Palestinians* increasingly high p o litical p ro file, and the grow th o f Lebanese sectarian consciousness that affected sp ecific localities and institutions. F o r exam ple, the M aqassad, a large Sunni m edical/educational com plex w hich had encouraged Palestinians as students and given them jo b s in the 1950s and 1960s, stopped doing so around 1970. Even m iddle-class Palestinians, accepted before, began to encounter obstacles. T h is trend tow ards closure increased sharply w ith the expulsion o f thousands o f Palestinian w orkers from East B eirut in 1976. Som e o f these m igrated to G erm an y, w hile others m oved to areas con trolled b y the Join t F orces (see P o litica l G lo ssary), m ainly W est B eiru t, Sid on and D am ou r (m any settled in and around Shateela). L aggin g levels o f in dustrialization in these regions m ade it hard fo r w orkers displaced from the ‘ M aronite enclave* to find jo b s sim ilar to those th ey had left. T he escalation o f Israeli and Haddad*s bom bardm ents o f the South after 1976 created econom ic hardship in this area also .22 A tta ck s and insecurity restricted Palestinian w orkers’ m ob ility and increasingly confin ed them to cam ps. D u rin g bouts o f co n flict, people often w ent to stay w ith relatives in safer areas. F o r exam ple, during the C iv il W ar, A b u and Um m Ism a’een to o k their children to *Ain H elw eh; Um m Ism a’een d id tem porary harvesting w ork in Sidon plantations to help ou t. T h e P L O and PR M responded to this econom ic crisis w ith a rapid expansion o f its service and productive institutions, creating jo b s and h elp in g fam ilies hit b y w ar d estruction o r loss o f earnings to su rvive. B y the end o f the 1980s it w as estim ated th at around 65 per cent o f the Palestinian w ork force w as em ployed by national institutions.22 Sam ed increased its facto ries and w orksh op s, setting them up near cam ps and in the w ar zon e, add in g new productive 'lines*. S ocial developm ent projects in the cam ps kindergartens, clin ics, training schem es - also helped to create em ploym ent. O ne o f the social consequences o f this n ational drive w as th at, instead o f em igrating to the oil-producing countries, m ore h ighly educated Palestinian w orkers now stayed in L ebanon to w ork w ith the 'R evolution* in sha’b i (p op u lar, low -incom e) areas, as teachers, d octors, nurses and social w orkers. Even th ough the m ajority o f the cam p w orkforce continued to be m a n u a l w orkers, a sign ifican t m inority becam e adm inistrators o f projects located in cam ps. A lth o u g h w ages in the P L O /P R M econom y w ere low er than in the L ebanese econom y, this w as p artially com pensated fo r b y the national w elfare system , w hich included com pensation fo r w ar dam age and pensions

110 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 as w ell as free m edical and oth er services. Perhaps the m ain w eakness o f the 'P alestin ian econom y* w as the uneven d istribution o f em ploym ent and p rojects betw een urban and rural cam ps. A s part o f the m antaqa ra’isiyyeh (ch ief p lace, centre) w here m ost PR M head o ffices w ere located , Shateela w as relatively privileged in term s o f P L O /P R M em ploym ent. Individual Palestinian responses to econom ic crisis were varied , and dem onstrated th eir versatility and resourcefulness. N o longer able to reach the w eaving facto ry across the 'G reen Line* in H adeth, A b u Ism a’een bought a kn itting m achine and set up a fam ily-based knitw ear production u n it. T h e p ractice o f d ou ble em ploym ent w as used to augm ent low salaries: a m an m ight occu p y a low -level salaried jo b , say as a gu ard o r store clerk , and a fter hours d o 'free w o rk’ as an electrician, house-painter o r television repairm an. M ore shops w ere opened, esp ecially on the m ain ou ter streets w here the num ber o f passers-by m ade new kinds o f m erchandise p rofitab le: travel b ags, p hotograp hic equipm ent, cassettes, fast fo o d . Shateela exhibited m ore such com m ercial expansion than other cam ps because o f its closeness to Sabra m arket w hich, b y the 1970s, had replaced the old er, dow ntow n m arkets. A n oth er w idespread response w as'to invest in children’s education w ith the hope o f prom oting them into the ranks o f qualified professionals. PR M subsidies o f secondary and university education assisted this d rive, w hich propelled an increasingly large num ber o f students from cam ps to study ab ro ad , m ainly in the U SSR and Eastern Europe. Som e fam ilies even m anaged to send their sons tg stu d y in the U nited States. A lth ou gh it w as the provision o f scholarships b y the PR M and frien d ly governm ents th at m ade this trend p ossible, fam ilies also con tribu ted , fo r exam ple by p rovid in g livin g expenses and forgoin g their children's earnings. M ore w om en to o k jo b s outside the hom e betw een 1976 and 1982. O ne reason fo r this w as the rise in the num ber o f wom en heads o f households, w idow s left b y w ar w ith the respon sibility o f bringing up their children. T o them w ent p riority in a ll Palestinian institutions. A n oth er reason w as the expansion in P L O /P R M so cial institutions w hich created a dem and fo r w om en em ployees and w orkers. Professional train in g courses offered a channel to the kind o f w ork , such as kindergarten teaching, o f w hich fam ilies approved. T he R ed C rescent S ociety trained nurses, a profession th at n ation al struggle had m ade respectable. E conom ic pressures m ay also have played a role. W ith in flation there w as a need fo r extra incom e, especially in households w ith m any young children. B oth social backgrou nd and id eology intervened in opening o r b lock in g the w ay fo r wom en to w ork outside the hom e. W e see the interaction o f these factors in the case o f A b u M uham m ad F arm aw i, w ho w as from a village but w ho belonged to a progressive Resistance group:

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W hen Um m M uham m ad asked to w ork on the basis th at w e needed m oney, fra n k ly I refused. 1 agreed o n ly w hen she becam e convin ced th at wom en have to have a productive role in society. W om en m ust w ork , n ot ju st in the house - children and co okin g - no! A n d not ju st fo r m oney. B ut because th ey form h a lf o f so ciety and m ust have an active and productive role. T w o kinds o f pressure, econom ic and so cial, acted upon cam p households to increase th eir earnings. O n the one hand, there w as the rising co st o f livin g, and on the oth er, rising needs and expectations, higher standards o f cloth in g, hom e furnishing and equipm ent. People o f the cam ps w anted to live like other p eop le, like Lebanese. Such rising livin g standards were m ore evident in urban than in rural cam ps, where hom es rem ained sim pler in style and people still w ore 'old-fash ion ed ’ clothin g. B ut in Shateela in the last years before the in vasion , m ost hom es had television s, refrigerators and w ashing m achines, and a few fam ilies had a car. Such prosperity w as relative - Shateela w as still in m any w ays a 'slum *, w ith crow ded housing and p o o r environm ental conditions. B ut it w as a bustling, cheerful slum w here people looked op tim istically to the future.

Farewell to the fe d a 'y e e a Presenting a th ou gh tful and self-critical sum m ing up o f the period o f Resistance m ovem ent autonom y in L ebanon, A b u M uham m ad Farm aw i notes th at, in spite o f the Palestinians* lon g history o f struggle, the PR M w as n ot prepared fo r the op p ortu n ity given it b y the d efeat in 1967 o f the A ra b arm ies. T h e years in L ebanon w ere valu ab le because th ey gave the R esistance a tim e and a space in w hich to m ature and to develop a m ode o f internal coexistence: T he Palestinian people never had the freedom to carry arm s and d irect th eir ow n cause u n til the d efeat o f the A ra b arm ies in 1967. T h is m eant that the R evolu tion w as not properly prepared, and this led to con flicts. In the beginning in L ebanon there w ere violen t quarrels and confrontations; co n flict to o k a m ilitary shape. B ut I consider the period in L ebanon a 'revo lu tio n w ithin a revolution*. B y 1982 alm ost a ll the Palestinian groups w ere in the P L O , and relations between them w ere better. W e reached a w ay o f dealin g w ith p o litica l, th eoretical and organizational differences w ithout violence, through dem ocratic dialogue. T his w as the best stage th at the Palestinian R evolution has reached. A fter L ik u d and B egin cam e to pow er in June 1977, Israeli/H addad

112 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 bom bardm ents o f the South intensified. H ard ly a d ay passed w ithout an atta ck from the a ir, sea o r land; H addad’s long-range artillery cou ld reach the ou tskirts o f Sidon. Y e t th eir exposure to con tin u al attack d id nothing to dent the m orale o f people in the cam ps. O n a visit to R ashidiyyeh in the spring o f 1981, w ith other jou rn alists I w atched children in a W om en’s U nion kindergarten carry ou t an air-raid d rill (Israeli planes had been sighted th at m orning), and I w as im pressed b y the coolness o f the youn g w om en teachers. W e asked tw o yo u n g girls o f ab o u t eigh t, w alkin g arm in arm , w hat they w anted to be when they grew up: one said a d octor, the oth er a teacher. N earby in T yre w as a R ed C rescent hospital w here we spent several nights; it w as w ell staffed and equipped, and had its ow n sm all nursing sch ool. Betw een T yre and N abatiyyeh a Sam ed factory fu ll o f m ainly w om en w orkers w as producin g jean s to send to Yem en. It w as the sam e scene in B o u ij Shem ali, ’A in H elw eh and D am our: a people - men and w om en, old people and children - w orkin g, producin g, learning new skills, believin g in the fu ture. T he P L O U nified Inform ation m an w ho accom panied us said that R esistan ce/P L O cadres liked goin g to the South to renew their revolutionary roots. In th at part o f W est B eirut w here the P L O /P R M had its headquarters F akh an y, S abra, Shateela - everything continued in the last year before the invasion m uch as it had done before. W ork w ent on in spite o f air raids such as the one in July 1981 w hich destroyed a w hole building in F akh an y, killin g 200 people; o r the car-bom b in O ctob er o f the sam e year w hich to o k ou t the fro n t o f the building that housed the Palestine Planning C entre. E veryone expected an Israeli-L eban ese F orces ’pincer m ovem ent*, and m ilitary retraining sessions w ere held fo r the w hole P L O early in 1982. In spite o f a good deal o f grum bling, everyone recognized that this w as a useful shake-up fo r cadres w ho, in the tw elve years since ’ B lack September* (see P olitical G lo ssary), had got to o used to o ffice routines and B eirut doles vita. L o o k in g b a ck , I am surprised b y the num ber o f activities and new developm ents in this fin al period o f R esistance m ovem ent autonom y. A m on g the people I w as m eeting at th at tim e as I prepared a research p roject w ith Palestinian w om en, there w as no fear o r foreb od in g abou t the future. Even if there w as occasion al ta lk o f co rru p tion a t higher levels, w here abaw at bu ilt personal follow in gs to sw ell th eir budgets and im portance, this w as o n ly the seam y side o f a p opu lar m ovem ent that had not lost its revolutionary credentials fo r the m ass o f Palestinians. W herever one looked there w ere concrete expressions o f optim ism and confidence. A F ateh w om an cadre interview ed in F ebruary 1982 spoke o f the R evolu tion having reached an ’advanced defensive stage’ that allow ed, even necessitated, the form ation o f w om en’s dem ands. A m on g other prom ising events, I rem em ber that Sam ed started its ow n jo u rn al lq tisa d (E conom y), as w ell as a lib rary on Palestinian crafts; the P F L P opened a m odel hadaneh

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(crèche) near Shateela, w here w orkin g m others cou ld leave sm all children all d ay; the W om en's U nion held a three-day training sem inar fo r young cadres from the cam ps and, to m ark International W om en’s D a y , its leaders m et to discuss w ays to im prove ’ou treach’. A n oth er initiative from that fin al period w ere ’Street Com m ittees* in w hich housew ives in sha’b i areas organized to dem and basic services. B y the spring o f 1981, L ebanon’s poten tial fo r triggering broader con flagration s began to attract a m ore serious level o f concern in W ashington. E rupting in A p ril, the Syrian ’m issile crisis’ (when D am ascus m oved SA M -6 a ir defence m issiles in to the B eqa’ to deter Israeli overflights) prom pted the R eagan A dm inistration to send Special E n voy H abib fo r on-the-spot m ediation effo rts.34 In J u ly, after an intense b ou t o f Isra e liPalestinian figh tin g, H abib w as again involved in m ediating an Isra e li-P L O cease-fire. T h is w as a p o litical gain fo r P L O chairm an A ra fa t since it constituted W ashington’s ’ m ost explicit recognition to date o f the necessity o f in volvin g the P L O in issues o f M iddle E astern w ar and peace’ .25 A lth ou gh A ra fa t dem onstrated his co n tro l o f the PR M b y forcin g an tagonistic groups to observe the cease-fire, this w as a t the price o f considerable internal dissension. K in g F ahd’s peace proposals o f 7 A u gust further deepened divisions w ithin F ateh’s leadership, as w ell as in the PR M generally. T h e oth er serious problem facin g the P L O /P R M at this tim e w as the grow ing alienation o f its Lebanese base. T h e slogan sha’b w ahid (one people) w as w earing thin. H ostility from the M aronite right and parts o f the Lebanese state w as fam iliar and expected; w hat w as new w as the h o stility o f a large part o f the S h i’ite com m unity w hich had earlier supported the fe d a ’yeen against the arm y in the Sou th . F o r reasons th at w ill be discussed later (C h ap ter 7), S h i’ites w ere becom ing increasingly anti-Palestinian from 1978/9. B y 1981, H arakat A m al, the leading Shi’ite p olitical/m ilitary m ovem ent, w as able to close o ff parts o f the South to the Joint F orces and to extend its co n tro l to parts o f B eiru t’s southern suburbs. O vershadow ed b y the P L O /P R M ’s greater m ilitary and financial w eight, the L N M w as losing its vigou r and coherence. O rdinary Lebanese citizens livin g in the ’nationalist/progressive* area, terrorized b y a ir raids and car-bom bs, w ere increasingly angered by m ilitia rackets and fire-fights. T h e P L O /P R M appeared unable to solve these problem s, o r unw illing to devote su fficient attention to them .34 In the m onths before the invasion there w as an escalation in serious incidents: during A m a l-P R M clashes in the Sou th , the Joint F orces shelled S h i’ite villages. In Jan uary 1982, there w ere several days o f figh tin g in W est B eirut betw een A m al and the L N M after the latter proposed setting up lo cal com m ittees to fill the absence o f state services. A n d in Sidon in A p ril there w ere inter-m ilitia clashes that destroyed part o f the old sou k. T h e Israeli invasion began on 3 June w ith a ir raids on the Sports C ity and

114 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 other know n PR M locales. A n U N R W A bus com ing dow n from Sibleen was rocketed, and several students killed and w ounded. Som e o f their bodies w ere brought fo r burial in N ahr al-B ared. I had ju st begun research there. T h e next d ay I travelled back to A le y via the Beqa* w ith a Red C rescent am bulance, w hose d river ignored m y suggestion that we should co ver the posters o f A ra fa t w ith w hich the am bulance w as plastered: T f th ey're goin g to hit us, th ey'll hit u s,' he said. B y 14 June, the Israeli A rm y w as w ithin a few kilom etres o f Shateela and even clo ser to B ourj B arajneh, havin g m et up w ith the Lebanese F orces at B a'b d a in the long-aw aited 'p in cer m ovem ent*. T here follow ed the three months* siege o f W est B eirut, w ith alm ost continuous bom bardm ents from a ir, land and sea. T here w ere strikes a ll around Shateela - F ateh ’s m ilitary college, the Sports C ity , the old p eop le's hom e, G a za H ospital, the In'ash C en tre - b u t, th ough dam aged, the cam p itse lf w as not b ad ly hit. Som e residents even stayed on there, preferring the danger o f bom bardm ent to crow dedness and w ater shortage in the refugee centres. PR M cadres sh ook o ff the p aralysis caused b y the rapid Israeli advance and began organ izin g defences, w ater and other supplies. Em ergency hospitals were equipped and staffed w ith am azing rap id ity here and there th roughout the w estern h a lf o f the city. People q u ick ly becam e accustom ed to the siege situation. It w as as i f the Israelis had alw ays been th ere, o n ly fo r the purpose o f p rovid in g d aily dram as to recount to friends. It w as at the height o f the siege th at Um m M u stafa, w orried at not having heard an y news o f her m other in 'A in H elw eh cam p, bundled a ll her nine children in to a n eighbou r's taxi and d rove through Israeli lines to Sidon. 'T h ere's nothing dearer than the fa m ily,' w as her sim ple explanation. 'E ith er w e'd all get killed o r w e'd all get through.* In m id-A ugust the Palestinian leadership announced its decision to leave B eirut in exchange fo r A m erican and Lebanese w ritten guarantees o f p rotection fo r Palestinian civilian s.27 T h is w as included in the H abib A ccords: Law -abiding Palestinian noncom batants left behind in B eirut, including the fam ilies o f those w h o have departed, w ill be subject to Lebanese law s and regulations. T he G overnm ents o f Lebanon and the U nited States w ill provide the appropriate guarantees o f s a fe ty . . 2t O n 1 Septem ber the last contingent o f PR M fighters left from the p ort, am id extraord in ary scenes o f farew ell caught b y som e o f the m edia people w ho w ere there.27 A sm all incident described b y an on lo oker epitom izes the relationship between the fe d a ’yeen and the people o f the cam ps w ho had so jo yo u sly w elcom ed them in 1969, and w ho w ere now being left behind:

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A w om an in her late th irties, w earing old torn clothes, tugging tw o you n g children behind her, broke from the crow d and ran across the street w avin g a p lacard at the departing con voy. W ritten in an illiterate hand in p oor A ra b ic it read, quite sim ply, T w ill take yo u r place*.30

Notes 1. People o f the camps com m only refer to the Resistance movement as al-Thawra (the Revolution), al-Muqawwimeh (the Resistance) and al-Awda (the Return). 2. F or a discussion o f PRM attempts to set up a legal system in Lebanon, see J. Feteet, ‘Socio-Political Integration and C onflict Resolution in Palestinian Cam ps in Lebanon*, Journal o f Palestine Studies, vol. 16, no. 2, W inter 1987. 3. The C airo Accords legitimated Palestinian armed struggle from Lebanon and gave Palestinians rights to employment and autonom y. (F or the text, see K halidi, Conflict and Violence, Appendix 1, p. 183.) 4. Palestinians call those killed in the course o f national struggle ‘martyrs*: jfaA eed(sing.), shuhada’ (pi.). The word has religious connotations - in Islam a shaheed is one who sacrifices his life for the faith or the com m unity - and is etym ologically linked to the root shahida, to witness. 5. ’A in al-Rom aneh in the ‘M aronite enclave* is only a few kilom etres aw ay from Shateela, across the ‘Green Line’ dividing East from W est Beirut. 6. The reference is to a sea-borne com m ando attack in M arch 1978 which triggered the Israeli ‘Litani Operation* (an invasion o f South Lebanon) in the same month. 7. A young man from Shateela reminisces about one o f these old men: ‘A bu Ahm ad Sa’eed, that human encyclopedia o f the historic events that had taken place in P alestin e. . . The man who always told the younger generation. . . about the heroism o f the Palestinian fighters Izzideen al-Quassam and Abdul Qader H usseini. . .* Z. al-Shaikh, ‘Sabra and Shatila 1982: Resisting the M assacres’, Journal o f Palestine Studies, vol. 14, no. 1, Fall 1984. 8. WiUa and willek are terms o f address that indicate anger and the authority o f the speaker; usually used by fathers to sons (rural in origin, still used in camps). 9. Samed’s main productive com plex was near B ouij Barajneh cam p, and produced garm ents, furniture, ironw ork, leather goods and handicrafts. W orkshops were set up later in Baddawi cam p, the South and other parts o f W est Beirut. 10. K . Salibi, Crossroads mentions this incident (p. 543). 11. The term ‘colonization* is used in a retrospective article on the camps that appeared in L ’O rient/Le Jour on 18 A pril 1991, by Agence France Presse correspondent Najib Khazzakha. 12. This anecdote o f A bu Ahm ad Sa’eed scoring against a M arxist-group Resistance cadre has an ideological colouring. It was told to me by a local Fateh leader with strong Islam ic leanings a year after the collapse o f the Soviet Union.

116 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 13. Adèle M anzi, a founder o f Najdeh Association, which runs a com plex o f w orkshops, training courses and kindergartens in the camps (translated from French). 14. Abawat, plural o f abu, is a colloquial term for the PRM leadership with critical undertones. 13. A quotation that appears in R. Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Press, 1979), p. 179. 16. A nother case o f father/son conflict: a Shateela boy aged about fifteen went to the Hursh with friends. One o f them had a gun and Tm ad’ accidentally shot him self in the leg. His father was so angry that he refused to visit him in hospital. Eventually one o f the boy’s uncles persuaded his father to forgive him. Such intervention is a traditional mechanism for preventing fam ily rupture. 17. On prim ogeniture in Palestinian rural society, see N. A bdo-Zubi, Family, Women and Social Change in the M iddle East: The Palestinian Case (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 1987). 18. Confrontation with the father has been described by Palestinian women m ilitants as the hardest step a woman can take. 19. A t least four o f the Resistance groups had women’s bureaus through which projects and cam paigns for camp women were organized. W omen cadres tended to be concentrated in such work. 20. From R. Sayigh and J. Peteet, ’Between Tw o Fires: Palestinian Women in Lebanon*, in R. Ridd and H. C allaw ay (eds), Caught Up in Conflict (Basingstoke: M acmillan Education, 1986), p. 118. 21. Fam ilies continue to play an essential and elaborate role in m aking m arriages. W hat has changed is the im position on men and women o f spouses chosen by their fathers. Increasingly the choice is made by the man, and women can usually refuse husbands proposed to them by their fam ilies. 22. A survey carried out in 1988 found a total o f 4,468 homeless Palestinian fam ilies, o f which 75 per cent had been displaced more than twice, and 19.7 per cent more than three times. The figure is said to be higher now. 23. This figure was given to me by the late N. Badran, a Palestinian researcher who took part in the T E A M study o f Palestinian institutions and communities carried out at the end o f the 1970s, and published in Beirut in 1983. 24. On the ’missile crisis’, see C obban, Palestine Liberation Organization p. 109. 23. Ibid., p. 112. 26. See R. Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival, ch. 7, for an analysis o f problems and failures o f the PLO /PRM in this period. 27. See R. K halidi, Under Siege: PLO Decision-making in the 1982 War (New York: Colum bia University Press, 1986). 28. Quoted by Cobban, Palestine Liberation Organization, p. 124. 29. See for exam ple L . Saraste’s m agnificent For Palestine (London: Zed Books, 1985). 30. From S. Banna, ’The D efence o f Beirut’ , Race and Class, vol. X X IV , no. 4, Spring 1983.

5. The Massacre

A ccord in g to the cease-fire negotiated by Special E n voy H abib in early A u gu st, the ID F lines w ere o n ly a couple o f kilom etres from the south­ eastern tip o f the Sabra/Sh ateela quadrilateral. O n 3 Septem ber, after the evacu ation o f the last P L O contingent o f figh ters, ID F units m oved forw ard , establishin g p ositions in the H enri Shehab B arracks, Jnah, the O fficers* C lu b and the K u w aiti Em bassy, from w here they were able to snipe at the cam p. D u rin g this p eriod , the Lebanese A rm y dism antled fortification s in the area. T here w as thus little distance fo r the Israelis to m ove w hen, early on 13 Septem ber, the invasion o f W est B eirut began. B y m idday they had encircled the area. From the Lebanese A rm y O fficers’ C lu b w here they established th eir headquarters, the w hole o f Shateela and its surroundings w ere visible (see M ap 2). T h e next d ay, accordin g to the Israeli jo u rn alist K ap eliou k w ho questioned Israeli soldiers as w ell as Palestinians and Lebanese when researching his b ook about the m assacre: A t 3 pm , the com m ander o f the Israeli forces in B eirut, G eneral A m os Y a ro n , alo n g w ith tw o o f his o fficers, m et the Lebanese Forces* intelligence ch ief, E lias H ob eika and F adi Ephram . W ith the help o f aerial photographs provided by Israel, together they m ade arrangem ents fo r entering the cam ps.1 T he targeted area w as cram m ed w ith people recently returned from the places w here they had taken refuge during the w ar, now supposedly over. Schools w ould soon open, everyone needed to repair their hom es, clear the streets and get ready fo r the w inter. T here w as fear o f w hat the regim e o f B ashir G em ayel w ou ld b rin g, but there w as also determ ination to rebuild. People felt som e security from the fa ct th at they w ere unarm ed, and th at a ll w ho rem ained w ere legal residents. M any o f the m assacre victim s w ere found clu tchin g their identity cards, as if trying to prove their legitim acy. O ne contingent o f the Special U nits com m anded by H obeiqa entered the

118 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 area through the sand-hills overlookin g H ayy O rsan, ju st opposite the ID F headquarters. A t this stage th ey w ere alm ost certain ly accom panied b y Israeli sold iers, since the dunes had been fo rtified b y the R esistance. A n oth er contingent entered through the southeastern edge o f the H ursh, betw een A k k a H osp ital and A b u H assan Salam eh Street. A p a rt from co-planning the operation and introducing the Special F orces into the area, the ID F p rovided several kinds o f back-up: th ey con trolled the perim eters and prevented escape through light shelling and sniping, as w ell as b y b lo ck in g the m ain exits; th ey also used flares to ligh t up the narrow alleys at night. From the sand dunes near the ID F headquarters, d irt roads led dow n in to H ayy O rsan and H ayy G harbeh. Um m F ad y’s hom e la y close to one o f these roads: O n T hu rsday afternoon w e w ere sittin g in this room w hen the shelling started. T h a t’s w hen the w ater-tank on the ro o f w as h i t . . . . W ith every explosion, dust w as com ing dow n on us. I said to A b u F a d y, ’ F o r G o d ’s sake get us ou t o f here.* H e said , ’ I f I could have got you ou t, w ouldn’t I have done it?* A t first he couldn’t get the car ou t because ou r neighbour’s car had been hit, and rubble w as b lo ck in g the road . B ut fin a lly, som ehow , he g o t it dow n the alley. H e g o t us o u t, and a ll the w hile he w as m aking the children lau gh , to take their m inds o ff the shelling. W hen w e left, none o f these houses w as destroyed, th at happened later. T h ey hadn’t started the killin g. O nce we reached m y aunt’s hom e in S abra, I said to him ’ F o r G o d ’s sake, A b u F a d y, d on ’t g o b ack. S tay w ith us.* B ut he said , ’N o , I m ust g o back to get the children’s clothes and th eir m ilk.’ S o I sat and w aited fo r him , and I w aited and I w aited.2 In the rest o f her sto ry, Um m F ad y tells how she returned alon e tw ice to the m assacre site to lo o k fo r her husband: ’ A t first I felt lost. I cou ld n ’t recognize anything. T he w hole quarter had changed, w hat w ith the bulld ozin g and the bodies.’ A foreign jou rn alist asks her, ’ W here are the dead children?* and she shouts at him an grily, ’ L eave me alone! I’m lo o k in g fo r m y husband.* E ventually she finds his b od y half-buried under rubble. I recorded Um m F a d y’s story in the spring o f 1983, after I cam e across her in H ayy O rsan rebuilding her hom e w ith the help o f a single w orker. W ith her were her three sm all children in a pram . T he youngest w as born a few w eeks before the m assacre. T he fam ily o f Um m Tssam w as lu ckier, although their hom e w as in the H ursh, close to the path o f the Special U nits: W e on ly escaped b y a m iracle. T he Israelis w ere shelling and m y m other

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w as scared th at the ro o f o f the clu b w here w e had taken shelter w ou ld co llap se and w e w ould su ffocate. S o w e to o k the children and w ent to friends in the centre o f the cam p. A fter a w hile we saw people running: *W hat’s happening?* T h ey said , ‘ Israel is slaughtering people in G harbeh.* I w ent to see w hat w as happening. O n the w ay 1 m et a w om an cryin g ‘ H elp m e!' I put m y hand to her stom ach and fou n d th at she w as bleeding. W e fou n d a car and p u t her in it and th ey to o k her to G a za H ospital. A s fo r us, we escaped to B o u ij Barajneh. A m on g the several accou n ts o f the m assacre th at have been published, there is one b y a youn g m an w ho w as in Shateela a t the tim e. It conveys the confusion and horror o f those tw o nights and three d ays, as w ell as his ow n co n flictin g feelin gs as he and a few o th er shebab jo in ed in a h eroic but fu tile attem pt a t resistance.3 T h is insider account m akes clear the camp*s defencelessness - the shebab m anage to find on ly tw o o r three K lashins and one R P G ; but th eir m ore b asic problem is th at th ey have no clear pictu re o f w hat is goin g o n , neither from w here the atta ck is com ing nor the lines o f its ap p roach . In such a d ifficu lt situ atio n , there is tension betw een the shebab over w hat to d o , w hether to hit back blin d ly w ith w hatever am m unition th ey have o r to try to evacu ate people up to S ab ra, w here som e narrow alleys rem ain open .4 T here is a b rie f co n fron tation and one o f the Palestinians is killed . H elping the w ounded, listening to people*s stories, searching fo r news o f frien d s, the n arrator alm ost forgets th at his ow n fam ily is still in the cam p. O utside is scarcely m ore secure: H addad’s m ilitia are said to be searching hom es in nearby Shiah and B asta. H ooded inform ers have alread y m ade th eir appearance as the ID F round up and interrogate m en in the Sports C ity. O ne o f the stories given in al-Shaikh*s account is o f the tragic ‘peace attem pt’ o f the cam p’s old m en, the shuyyukh. B efore anyon e is aw are th at a m assacre is beginning, they m eet to discuss the situ ation in the house o f A b u A hm ad S a’eed. It is proposed to send ou t a delegation representing the m ajor villages under a w hite fla g , to tell the Israeli com m anders that there are n o arm s o r fighters in the cam p. People say th at there w as heated discussion at the m eeting, and th at A b u K am al S a ’d refused to g o , sayin g, *We w ere accused o f sellin g P alestine, d o we w ant now to be accused o f surrendering Shateela?* O thers at the m eeting argued that if nothing w as done, the Israelis w ould intensify their shelling and d estroy the cam p. In the end, a sm all grou p set ou t headed b y A b u A hm ad S a’eed. T h ey w ere killed b efore ever reachin g the Israeli lines. N ear th eir bodies on the street leading up to S abra, at a ju n ction w ith an alley, people later found em pty beer cans and hypoderm ic syringes. P hotograp hs o f the m assacre w ere so sh ockin g th at th ey sh o o k the w orld and helped set in m otion m oves o f p rotection , investigation and m onitoring

120 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp, 1949-82 w hich set constraints upon anti-Palestinianism in the m onths to com e. Y e t the photographs also dehum anized the victim s, lockin g them in a tim eless moment- o f disfiguration . Stories people to ld about the m assacre, though slow er in th eir im pact, tell m uch m ore o f the hum an and social q ualities o f the victim s, and o f the survivors w ho tell the stories. A b u H ussein H arb ’s shop fo r ch ild ren s bicycles w as on the southern end o f A b u H assan Salam eh Street, opposite H ayy O rsan. Um m H ussein tells how her husband becam e concerned abou t a m issing nephew w hen the Israelis started shelling the edges o f the cam p; he and their sixteen-year-old son H ussein w ent ou t to lo o k fo r him and never returned. L ik e m any other Palestinians livin g in the quarters surrounding Shateela cam p, the H arbs w ere refugees from East Beirut. F ifty m etres up the street from the H arbs w as the hom e o f U m m A hm ad . H er husband and five youngest children w ere shot dead b y the Special U nits; she and three old er children w ere w ounded but m anaged to run aw ay. Suad, p aralysed b y a b u llet in the b ack , la y under the bodies o f her youn ger brothers and sisters fo r tw o d ays until she w as rescued and taken to G a za H ospital. People say th at fo r w eeks Suad la y scream ing w ith pain. G ra d u a lly , w ith the encouragem ent o f a Scandinavian th erapist and through her ow n courage, she w orked h erself back into m obility. S till further north, in Shateela cam p proper, A hm ad H aleem eh’s parents and aunts were still divided between th eir hom e and the Iqleem shelter. It w as n ot until F rid ay night that the Special U nits began to penetrate the alleys leading o ff A b u H assan Salam eh Street in to the cam p. T he m en o f the fam ily decided th at they should d elay escape no lon ger, after hearing the death groans o f one o f th eir neighbours. B ut Um m A hm ad and her sister refused to leave Iqleem until they knew th eir sons w ere safe and w illin g to g o to Sabra. A fter the H aleem ehs reached a relative’s hom e in S ab ra, A b u A hm ad rem em bered th at he had forgotten the fam ily’s identity cards. R eturning early on Saturday m orning to fetch them , he w as arrested by Israeli sold iers, now in fu ll co n tro l o f S ab ra, and taken to the S p orts C ity fo r in terrogation . A n oth er description com es from a yo u n g w om an w ho had returned to Shateela w ith her m other and younger broth er and sister sh ortly before the assassination o f Bashir G em ayel:I I w as still in bed, it w as early m orning, and I w as listening to the news. O r m aybe it w as w om en talkin g in the street. W hen I heard that B ashir had been assassinated I go t up in a rush. T here w as a lo t o f noise, Israeli airplanes w ere flyin g overhead. E veryone expected th at Israel o r the A rm y w ould do som ething. M y father cam e and asked us if we w anted to leave the cam p. W e to ld him n o, i f they d o anythin g it w ill be to arrest shebab. H e should leave w ith m y broth er and we w ill stay and lo o k after the house.

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I w ent o u t to get w ater, and saw som e young m en carrying guns to defend the cam p. L ater a t n igh t, around 9 pm , a m an passed carryin g his daughter; she w as covered in b lood . T a lk began th at S a’d H addad’s m en w ere carryin g ou t a m assacre, but w e d id n ’t believe it. T hen a w om an passed b y bleeding; she said that there had beenam assacrè. There w a sa lo t o f ta lk and confusion. M y m other said , ’ L et’s g o !’ but I didn’t w ant to leave the house. W hat protected us w as the explosion o f an arm s depot in H ayy F arh at.3 O u r men exploded it so as not to leave it [fo r the enem y]; this m eant th at they could n ’t approach ou r side o f the cam p. W e stayed tw o d ays, and then m y fath er cam e and said , *Khelast yo u ’ve go t to leave.* S o w e w ent ou t through the alleys to H am ed Street. W e didn’t go through Sabra because the Israelis w ere alread y around G a za H ospital. T hese and other stories illustrate qualities show n b y the people against whom the m assacre w as aim ed - courage, hum anity: qualities conspicuously absent in the Israelis and Lebanese w ho planned and carried ou t the m assacre. It is strikin g, to o , how people carried o u t routine activities - goin g b ack to lo o k fo r ch ildren’s m ilk o r fam ily iden tity cards - as i f certain th at law and ord er existed, that som e things could n ot happen. From w hichever route you chose in to the S abra/Sh ateela area follow in g the m assacre, you w ere im m ediately struck b y the concentration o f destruction. It w as as i f the place and its people had been the object o f an attem pt at to tal destruction. A fter the a ir, land and sea bom bardm ents o f the sum m er had com e the Lebanese Special U nits, program m ed to slaughter and lo o t; and w ith them had com e bulldozers w hich had cu t broad sw athes through housing, topplin g breezeblock w alls like cardboard. It w as w om en w ho hunted through the ruins fo r bodies o r scraps o f possessions, scream ing curses a t the A ra b governm ents, Israel and A m erica. A ll alon g A b u H assan Salam eh Street there w as a m êlée o f m ourning w om en, W estern journ alists and International R ed C ross volunteers. M ost o f the bodies had been taken aw ay b y 20 Septem ber, but the stench o f death w as still everyw here, and a ll the outsiders w ore gauze m asks.* It w as not o n ly the scale o f a tro city and destruction th at m ade the scene so catastrop h ic, but also its p o litica l m essage. N ow the R esistance m ovem ent w as gone: Palestinians in L ebanon and Lebanese w ho had supported them were a t the m ercy o f the p o litical forces w hose character and intentions w ere signalled by the m assacre itself. It w as the beginning o f a new era. Y e t to this area w hose nam e had becom e in tern ation ally synonym ous w ith h o rro r, w ithin d ays the inhabitants began to return. T h ey started to clear ru bble, patch up th eir hom es, get children registered fo r sch ool, have w ounds treated. T he w ar w as o ver, em ergency shelter and fo o d d istribution program m es were being closed dow n. H ow ever horrifying, Shateela w as a p lace w here Palestinians had a right to be; U N R W A services w ould be

122 An Oral-Based H istory o f Shateela Camp. 1949-82 resum ed; news o f evacuated fighters and m issing people w ould filter b ack here faster than outside. There was a double urgency to the rebuilding: not only w as w inter approaching but the Lebanese A rm y w as now back in charge o f the B eirut cam ps; everyone expected th at building restrictions w ould be reim posed.

Notes 1. This passage from A . K apeliouk’s Sabra and Shatila: Inquiry into a M assacre (Belm ont M A: A A U G , 1984) is quoted in Cobban, Palestine Liberation Organization, pp. 128-9. 2. Umm Fady’s story is quoted in a fuller version in R. Sayigh and J. Peteet, ‘ Between Tw o Fires: Palestinian Women in Lebanon*, in R. Ridd and H . C allaw ay (eds), Caught Up in Conflict (Basingstoke: M acm illan Education, 1986), pp. 123-5. 3. Z. al-Shaikh, *Sabra and Shatila 1982: Resisting the Massacres*, Journal o f Palestine Studies, vol. 14, no. 1, Fall 1984. Other essential reading: ‘Sabra and Shatila: Testim onies o f the Survivors* (told to Layla Shahid Barrada) in Race and Class, vol. X X IV , no. 4, Spring 1983 (special issue on the invasion o f Lebanon; the same issue reprints T . Friedm an’s award-winning report from the New York Times, 26 September 1982); J. Genet, ‘ Four Hours in Shatila*, Journal o f Palestine Studies, vol. X II, no. 3, Spring 1983. 4. This detail does not form part o f al-Shaikh’s published account but was given to the author in discussion. 5. H ayy Farhat is on the eastern edge o f the camp. 6. It was never possible to make an accurate count o f the victim s: an IR C representative counted 328 bodies, but this was without the mass graves or the ‘disappeared*. Kapeliouk in his book on the massacre gives an estimate o f 3,000; the Kahan Com m ission, based on ID F intelligence, suggest from 700 to 800. A Palestinian researcher who questioned survivors listed 1,326victim s ( Democratic Palestine, no. 51, 1992, p. 34).

Part II: The Production of the ‘Battle of the Camps’

6.

Lebanon in the Wake of the 1982 Invasion

A t first sight Israel’s ap ocalyp tic invasion o f Lebanon in the sum m er o f 1982 appeared to have created a rad ical sh ift in the Lebanese and regional balan ce o f forces. Pushing fa r beyond the lim its o f previous Isra e li-A ra b w ars, Sharon’s b litzkrieg above a ll dem onstrated Israel’s scope fo r using w eapons o f m ass destruction against the Lebanese and Palestinian pop u lation w ithou t any effective international o r A ra b state deterrence. A lth ou gh the unexpected resistance o f W est B eirut to three months* bom bardm ent and siege pointed to flaw s in the Sharon/B egin lo gic o f ap p lyin g m axim um fo rce, b y the beginning o f Septem ber som e basic Israeli objectives seem ed to have been achieved, w hile others appeared to be w ithin reach. T h e Palestinian Resistance m ovem ent had been rem oved from those areas - B eirut and South L ebanon - w hose con trol had enabled it to pose a p o litica l i f not m ilitary th reat to Israel. Even if it survived such a b lo w , the P R M cou ld be expected to be throw n in to crisis, a developm ent th at w ould encourage the em ergence o f ’m oderate* leaderships in the O ccupied T erritories. T he Israelis* old am bition o f in stallin g a M aronite ‘u ltra’ as Lebanese president had been realized; S yria appeared m arginalized, and w ith it the Steadfastness F ron t (opposed to E gypt and C am p D avid ); deprived o f the P R M , the Lebanese ’Opposition* appeared sim ilarly n egligible, incap able o f ch allenging the new ord er th at the U nited States, Israel and the M aronite right intended to build ou t o f the invasion. Y e t events rapidly unravelled the ’givens* on w hich the three m ain beneficiaries o f the invasion had based their calculations. W ithin three w eeks o f his election as president (on 23 A u gu st), B ashir G em ayel w as assassinated, rem oving from the Lebanese arena the one m an ch arism atic and ruthless enough to dom inate internal p olitical forces and p ossibly exclude external on es.1 Im m ediately follow in g the assassination, Sharon’s invasion o f W est B eirut, breaking the U S-brokered cease-fire and leading to the S ab ra-S h ateela m assacres, underlined the antagonism betw een A m erica’s role as w ould-be neutral arbitrator and the Israeli one o f con qu eror and occupier. Israeli-U S divergence w as deepened during the

126 The Production o f the ‘B attle o f the Camps’ p rotracted , u ltim ately fu tile negotiations fo r a L eb an ese-Israeli agreem ent. T h e collap se o f the 17 M ay (1983) A ccord s w as a second w atershed in the unravellin g o f the ‘victory* o f 1982, m arking the failu re o f Israel’s other m ain w ar aim o f a peace treaty w ith L ebanon, the beginning o f the end o f A m erica’s intervention, the Syrian com e-back, the resurrection o f the L ebanese ’O p p osition ’ , and a ch ap ter in the d iscreditin g o f the regim e o f President A m in G em ayel. T he ’uprising’ o f F ebruary 1984 w hich expelled G em ayel’s arm y from W est B eirut m arked the third and final defeat o f the 1982 ’victors’ , rap id ly follow ed b y the w ithdraw al o f U S forces from Lebanon. T h is ch ap ter exam ines in m ore detail the un fold in g discom fiture and retreat o f the three ’victo rs’ o f 1982. T he accou n t pays p articu lar attention to the m istakes and excesses com m itted b y d ie M aronite-con trolled L ebanese A rm y in its m oves to co n tro l areas form erly the dom ain o f the P R M /L N M allian ce; this sto ry en fold s another, th at o f the revival o f the Lebanese ’O pposition* and its revolt against U S -Isra eli-M a ro n ite dom ina­ tio n , culm inating in the uprising o f F ebru ary 1984. Syria’s part in the re-em ergence o f the ’O pposition’ both served as a m edium o f S yria’s return to the centre o f Lebanese p olitics and enabled it to assum e a role as arb itrato r and co n troller. W ith S yria’s plans fo r ending the Lebanese crin s, in co n form ity w ith its ow n strategic and id eo lo gical aim s, cam e the seeds o f co n flict w ith the Palestinians in Lebanon. In a fin al section I lo o k m ore clo sely at Lebanese resistance to Israeli occu p ation , a struggle w ith several d istin ct stages w hich brought togeth er groups w ith very different aim s and ideologies, hence contain ing w ithin itself the em bryos o f future struggles.

He *Paz Americana* T he R eagan A dm inistration, w hich had first condoned, then restrained the Israeli invasion, used the new situation created b y it to assert its influence o ver Lebanese and region al p olitics. T h e end o f A u gu st found it so lid ly installed as m ediator, gu aran tor and guide vis-à-vis the Lebanese state, an alm ost m andatory pow er p osition . Special E n voy P hilip H ab ib ’s p ivotal ro le in the n egotiations leading to PR M w ithdraw al and an end to the w ar presaged an opening fo r the U nited States sim ultaneously to press Lebanon in to peace n egotiations w ith Israel and to protect it from to o exorbitan t Israeli dem ands, presenting itse lf as ’honest b roker’ to the A ra b governm ents w ithout m odifyin g its fundam ental strategic allian ce w ith Israel. I f successful in L ebanon, A m erica’s ’honest brokerage* co u ld h op efu lly be extended to the m ore central Palestinian issue. T h is broader regional objective w as signalled by President R eagan’s announcem ent on 1 Septem ber o f a new ’peace plan*,2 a m ove th at echoed the regional

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dim ensions to A m erica's earlier (19S8) intervention in L ebanon. W ith the in stallation o f a pro-W estern, pro-A m erican president (first B ashir, then A m in G em ayel), the R eagan A dm inistration looked forw ard to a Lebanon in w hich it could feel p o litica lly and econ om ically at ease, a client certain to be responsive to U S pressures and requirem ents, a centre o f influence, an entry point. A m erican involvem ent in Lebanon rap id ly to o k m ilitary, p olitical and econom ic form s. A sm all (1,300) unit o f U S troops arrived in A u gust to take p art in the M ultin ation al F orces that w ere charged w ith overseeing the evacu ation o f the PR M . Prem aturely w ithdraw n, it w as recalled after the S abra/Sh ateela m assacres (16 -18 Septem ber) to take p osition between B eirut A irp o rt and the S h o u f foo th ills. O n 2 O ctob er, a U S m ilitary m ission arrived to re-equip and retrain the Lebanese A rm y.3 T he U nited States also sold arm s to Lebanon: arm s purchases during 1983 am ounted to one-eighth o f the to tal budget and, paid fo r in d ollars, w ere the m ain cause o f depreciation o f the Lebanese pound. A t the sam e tim e, the R eagan A dm inistration exhorted several U N agencies to increase th eir aid to L eban on , and encouraged the W orld B ank to consider it fo r a loan . Several A m erican business m issions visited B eirut to explore investm ent openings.4 B ut highest on the U S governm ent's agenda w as gettin g L eb an o n -Israeli peace negotiations on the road. Philip H abib urged President G em ayel to put aside the thorny question o f n ation al reconciliation and to p rioritize instead the rem oval o f all foreign arm ies from L ebanon.3T he underlying assum ption w as th at, w ith S yria and the PR M ou t o f L ebanon, an A m erican-backed M aronite state w ould have no trou b le in co n trollin g the M uslim -progressive 'O pposition*. H ab ib assured G em ayel th at these w ithdraw als could be brought about. Israel's readiness to w ithdraw w as not in dou bt once it had received the security guarantees that G em ayel w as equ ally ready to provide. O nce the Israelis had proclaim ed their intention to w ithdraw , the U S A dm inistration assum ed th a t S yria co u ld be pressured in to a p arallel w ithdraw al. A ston ish in g in retrosp ect, the failu re o f U S d ip lom acy to sound o u t the Syrians before con clu d in g the 17 M ay A ccord s appears as part o f its p o licy o f excluding S yria from L ebanon, an exclusion th at the Israeli invasion o f 1982 w as seen, m istakenly, as having p ractically achieved. B oth partners in the peace negotiations dragged th eir feet, and it w as o n ly a fter strenuous A m erican d iplom acy that talks fin ally began on 2 D ecem ber 1982. A ltern atin g between K haldeh (Lebanon) and K iryat Shim ona (Israel), quagm ired in Byzantine hassles over p ro to co l, the slow pace o f the talk s gave tim e fo r Lebanese opposition to them to crystallize. W alid Jum blat w as am ong the first to ra lly p u blic op in ion against the concessions bein g prepared. O ne o f the early m eetings w as disrupted b y a rocket attack , sign o f the grow in g Lebanese Resistance m ovem ent. F u ll coverage o f the talk s in

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the Lebanese press underscored violations o f Lebanese sovereignty. F o r though under U S pressure, Israel gave up the fu lly fledged peace treaty th at Sharon had prom ised as one o f the fru its o f the invasion, yet it gained from the A cco rd s, as fin ally d rafted, im portant concessions and guarantees, as w ell as som e steps tow ards 'n o rm alizatio n '.6 H ow ever, w ithout Syrian com pliance, the agreem ent fin ally signed on 17 M ay w as born dead. In spite o f a last-m inute visit to D am ascus by Secretary o f State S ch u ltz, the Syrians w ere o b d u rate.7 Since Israel had m ade its w ithdraw al con d ition al on p rio r Syrian w ithd raw al, this first base o f U S settlem ent strategy w as never reached. T h e co llap se o f the 17 M ay A cco rd s w as the first, m ost serious sign o f failu re o f the R eagan A dm inistration’s Lebanon p o licy, hinged as it w as on the rem oval o f a ll foreign arm ies. H ow ever, oth er signs o f m iscalculation surfaced during 1983. U naw are o f its inner sectarian tensions and over­ confident in its 'restru ctu rin g', U S m ilitary advisers encouraged the Lebanese A rm y's repressive actions in W est B eirut. Y et in street figh tin g in A u gu st, con trary to the advisers* predictions, the arm y show ed up p o o rly against the M uslim m ilitias w hose reorganization it had provoked b y its sectarian aggressiveness. M ore seriou sly, as figh tin g betw een the Lebanese F orces and the Progressive S ocialist P arty (PSP) in the S h o u f intensified in early Septem ber, U S troops becam e increasingly em broiled in the co n flict, losing w hatever claim s to neutrality they had begun w ith. In m id-Septem ber p art o f the Sixth F leet gathered o ff the Lebanese coast began to carry ou t h eavy a rtillery and a ir strikes against D ru ze and Syrian p osition s in the m ountains. O n 25 Septem ber the battleship N ew Jersey's 16-inch guns w ere used against PSP m ilitias attackin g the Lebanese A rm y redoubt at S ou k al-G h arb.* It w as at ab o u t th is tim e th at the respected and w itty Lebanese Sunni leader Selim al-H oss rem arked th at the A m erican forces had becom e 'ju st another sectarian m ilitia*. Furtherm ore, m assive car-bom b attacks w hich destroyed the A m erican Em bassy on 18 A p ril (1983) and the M arines* headquarters on 23 O ctob er w ere a sign o f the em ergence o f new groups fa r m ore anti-A m erican and ruthlessly efficien t than the 'terrorists* th at the 1982 invasion had been supposed to d estroy.9 Such glaring evidence o f failure cou ld h ard ly be ign ored. Pressure increased in C ongress and the m edia fo r a recall o f A m erican troop s and an end to A m erican involvem ent in the 'L eb an ese quagm ire*. A w eek after reaffirm ing support fo r President G em ayel, on 7 F ebru ary (1984), after the Lebanese A rm y fin ally lost con trol o f W est B eiru t, President R eagan announced the decision to w ithdraw U S forces from Lebanon. A lth ou gh the U nited States participated as an observer in the Lausanne C onference (M arch 1984, a Saudi-backed attem pt a t nation al recon ciliation ), A m erican interest in L ebanon w as henceforth reduced to a m inim al level. G em ayel w as abandoned to his fate; 'even-handedness* w as

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sw ept aw ay b y a new , stron ger strategic allian ce w ith Israel. T he aim o f rem oving S yria w as replaced by a p o licy o f lim ited ap p roval o f its role as peace-keeper and possible rescuer o f W estern hostages in an area o f ’dangerous in stability’ .10 D om estic critics o f R eagan’s ’ L ebanon policy* focused on ’m anagem ent failures* and the glarin g discrepancy betw een losses and gains, rather than on the errors o f p o litical judgem ent behind A m erica’s in itial support fo r the Israeli invasion and its subsequent intervention. F o r the A dm inistration, Sharon’s invasion plan prom ised, first, the end o f the P L O as a serious fa cto r in M iddle E ast p olitics; second, the ’restabilization’ o f Lebanon under a stron g, pro-A m erican president, its detachm ent from S yria and probable inclusion in the C am p D avid A ccords; and fin ally a new op p ortu n ity fo r U S M iddle E ast settlem ent effo rts based on Israeli f a its accom plis. H ow ever, such calcu lation s rested upon errors and oversights. It w as erroneous to assum e th at the U S governm ent, havin g first given its blessing to the invasion, could subsequently dissociate itself from the aggressor and be accepted as neutral arbiter; fo r large segm ents o f Lebanese and A ra b op in ion the U nited States w as blackened b y association w ith the 1982 holocau st. A second fundam ental error w as to assum e Syria’s defeat and d iscount its persistence and resources. A th ird w as to believe th at an u ltra-M aron ite president elected as a result o f the invasion co u ld be accepted b y m ost Lebanese as legitim ate. Perhaps the m ost basic error w as to believe th at m ilitary force cou ld produce a p olitical solution in an arena as com plex and p oliticized as the Lebanese and Palestinian. A leading A m erican au th o rity on L ebanon suggests th at none o f those responsible fo r the 1982-84 intervention had any real understanding o f the Lebanese scene.11

Israel cots its losses Israel's ’ Lebanon policy* failed even m ore p ain fu lly, though less abru p tly, than th at o f the U nited States. F law s in Sharon/B egin’s b litzkrieg lo g ic appeared in the early stages o f the invasion - fo r instance in the Syrian stand at Bham doun12 - although the speed w ith w hich Israeli forces reached B eiru t, jo in in g up w ith the Lebanese F orces a t B a’b d a on 14 June, m ade th eir victo ry appear in elu ctable. Y et the lon g sum m er siege o f W est B eiru t w as p o litically co stly both abroad and at hom e; furtherm ore it show ed u p the Israeli arm ed forces as dependent on sophisticated w eaponry and reluctant to face ligh tly arm ed Palestinian and Lebanese fighters in street figh tin g .12 T h e evacu ation o f PR M fighters from B eirut under international supervision w as fa r from the rou t th at Sharon and B egin had anticipated: m any R esistance units rem ained in L ebanon w hile the P L O as an en tity

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fou n d a new sanctuary in T u n is, from w here it again dem onstrated Palestinian capacity fo r surm ounting disaster. F in ally, w ith the assassination o f Bashir G em ayel, Israel w as deprived o f the on ly figure capable o f build in g the M aronite-dom inated, cooperative Lebanon th at the architects o f the invasion had aim ed at. Israel’s subsequent invasion o f W est B eirut on 15 Septem ber under the pretext o f ’keeping order* and ’cleaning ou t’ 2,000 Palestinian fighters alleged to have rem ained behind14 did m ore to discredit Israel w ith form erly supportive W estern governm ents and public opinion than the w hole o f the rest o f the w ar. T o this d iscredit w as added the odium o f the Sabra/Sh ateela m assacres. A lth ou gh the m assacres w ere carried ou t by Lebanese forces, Israel’s role in facilitatin g the action has never been put in d ou b t, w hile som e investigators have traced the in itial planning to A riel Sharon and B ashir G em a yel.>s U S pressure forced the ID F ou t o f W est B eirut w ithin three w eeks, before it w as able to com plete the m ass searches and arrests it had planned. B ut even w ithin this short space o f tim e it had becom e the target o f atta ck s, presaging a resistance that w ould m ount to becom e the m ost dam aging ever faced b y Israel in th irty-five years o f w ar and occupation. W hile at first its occupation o f alm ost h a lf o f L ebanon seem ed to place Israel in a ’no fa il’ bargaining p osition , one in w hich it could stay o r w ithdraw a t w ill, thus pu ttin g pressure on the Lebanese governm ent to sign the peace treaty w hich w as the invasion’s second m ain ob jective, in the event the pressure failed . Even the 17 M ay A ccord s (regarded b y the Israeli governm ent as a clim b-dow n) proved m ere ink on paper, w hile Israel’s occu p ation o f L ebanon p roved self-dam aging in term s o f lives, co st and dom estic op p osition . M ounting casualties sapped the m orale o f the Israeli D efence F orces, tarnishing its im age o f in vin cib ility and p rovokin g a vociferou s peace lo b b y, the first in Israel’s h isto ry.14 T he year o f ’peace* fo llo w in g the w ar’s end proved alm ost as dam aging in term s o f Israeli casualties as the w ar itself, and from then on until the ID F ’s fin al w ithd raw al in June 1985 the to ll o f dead and w ounded continued to m ount. Israel’s losses in Lebanon w ere higher than th at o f a ll previous w ars togeth er.17 A s it becam e ob viou s to the Begin governm ent th at a ll the origin al ob jectives o f the 1982 invasion m ust be abandoned, the decision w as taken fo r a unilateral w ithdraw al in phased stages. T he first o f these w as from the S h o u f m ountains and, w ith Israeli-U S relations strained by m onths o f fruitless n egotiation , the ID F tim ed its w ithdraw al at the end o f A u gust 1983, w ithout givin g the Lebanese A rm y the op p ortu n ity to take its place. This guaranteed escalation o f the con flict between the hom e-based D ruze P SP and the Lebanese F orces w hom the ID F had introduced in to the S h o u f regio n .11 T h is stim ulation o f sectarian co n flict proved a pattern o f Israel’s

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post-invasion approach to Lebanon. From their earlier reliance on a single partner, the M aronite righ t, the Israelis sw itched to cu ltivatin g relations w ith a w ide range o f grou p s, but alw ays w ithin a sectarian perspective. B y arm ing everyone, Israel fuelled co n flict betw een sects: betw een D ru ze and M aronites in the S h ou f, between D ruze and Sh i'ites in the South. In addition they encouraged co n flict within sects, prom oting H addad's 'S ou th Lebanon Arm y* against the Lebanese F orces, and tryin g to create a ‘Shi’ite army* at the sam e tim e as encouraging A m al and private m ilitias such as th at o f the K h alil fam ily in T yre. In regard to the som e 200,0001* Palestinians inhabiting South L ebanon, Israeli p olicies w ere inconsistent over tim e and betw een d ifferent state in stitutions. E a rly in the invasion there were signs o f intention to rem ove o r scatter the w hole civilian p op u lation , so as to prevent it again becom ing a support base fo r resistance.20 B ut although the rebuilding o f ’A in H elw eh cam p w as prevented during the first w inter, an y m ajor transfer w as unfeasible p o litically and adm inistratively. E ventually, rebuilding w as perm itted, perhaps p artly to spite the Lebanese governm ent fo r w hom the w ar destruction o f cam p sites put pressure on Palestinians to em igrate. T he ID F also recruited and arm ed Palestinian collaborators. T h e vast concentration cam p near the village o f A n sar set up in the early d ays o f the invasion rem ained the prim ary sym bol o f Israel's three-year occu p ation o f South L ebanon (there w as a sm aller prison fo r w om en near N abatiyyeh). M ost Palestinian m ales above sixteen spent tim e in A n sar, as w ell as Lebanese leftists o r those suspected o f being pro-PR M . A s the occupation continued and resistance intensified, A n sar w as increasingly used fo r the m ainly S h i'ite village p opu lation. A lto geth er 15,000 prisoners are estim ated to have passed th rough it before its dism antling in June 1985, when the ID F carried ou t the fin al phase o f its w ithdraw al.21 In the fin al stages o f the occu p ation , fru strated in th eir m ain ob jectives, harassed b y the Lebanese R esistance, the ID F lost its legendary co o l and becam e ven gefully bent on leavin g behind the m axim um co n flict and destruction. T h is m entality is best sum m ed up in the racist w ords o f Lebanon C om m ander G eneral O rr: 'O n ce the balance between the verm in, snakes and scorpions has been restored, they w ill turn against us again.*22 O n w ithdraw al Israel resum ed the 'L eban on policy* interrupted b y the 1982 in vasion , th at is to say a rtillery and a ir attacks against Palestinian and Lebanese targets, over-fligh ts, a p artial sea-blockad e, the recruitm ent o f agents, and m aintenance o f contact w ith the m ain sectarian m ilitias. U ntil M ay 1985, the Lebanese F orces m aintained an o ffice in Israel, and the Israelis m aintained one in the 'M aron ite enclave*. B ut Israel's tw o predom inant concerns in South Lebanon rem ained the 'S ecu rity Zone* and w ater. T h e size o f the 'S ecu rity Z o n e’ w as increased in 1985 to include 171 villages and tow ns instead o f a form er 5 1, penetrating, in places, as deep as

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30 m iles in to Lebanese territory. A 'corridor* lin kin g the *Security Zone* to Jezzine brought the Israeli-surrogate 'S o u th Lebanon Arm y* to w ithin a few kilom etres o f *A in H elw eh cam p. T he heights overloo kin g L ake K a ’ raoun also fell w ithin the Z o n e, as w ell as 30 kilom etres o f the L itan i R iver. M any Lebanese believe th at Israeli bom bardm ent and attacks have alw ays been m otivated less b y security than b y the aim o f depopulating the South so as to appropriate its rich w ater resources.23

*At last there is a victor aad a vanquished* A fte r the six-m onth civil w ar o f 1938, the form ula o f recon ciliation betw een M aron ite ascendancy and M uslim rebels had been 'N o v icto r, no vanquished*: this w as the m axim that had guided President C hehab and his successors. B ut after the Israeli invasion o f 1982, the M aronite *ultras* believed th at th ey had em erged victorious and now enjoyed a historical op p ortu n ity to reim pose M aronite dom ination on the M uslim /progressive 'O pposition*. T he quotation th at heads this section com es from F ad i F rem , leader o f the Lebanese F orces after B ashir Gem ayel*s death. T h e first m oves m ade b y A m in G em ayel a fter his election in late Septem ber poin t to the dualism o f his regim e, co n ciliato ry in its ou ter face b u t K ata*ebi in its inner structure. B u ildin g on his reputation as a 'm oderate*, a m an o f cross-sect and cross-p arty friendships, not a fan atic like B ashir, he responded p ositively to expressions o f support from M uslim religious leaders such as M u fti K haled and Sheikh M ehdi Sham sideen; and ch ose as Prim e M inister S h afiq W azzan, w ho represented Sa*eb Salam . A t the sam e tim e, how ever, G em ayel put M aronite hardliners in key positions. Ibrahim T annous, w ho had been trainer o f the Lebanese F orces, w as m ade C om m ander-in-C hief o f the Lebanese A rm y. Z ah i B ustani, a m em ber o f the Lebanese F orces Com m and C ou n cil, believed also to be linked to M ossad, w as put in charge o f the D epartm ent o f G en eral Security. Sim on K assis (also know n fo r his anti-Palestinianism ) w as m ade head o f the arm y's D euxièm e B ureau, w here he b u ilt a 'p alace guard* and directed terrorist operations against W est Beirut. T he ju d iciary and Foreign Service w ere K a ta 'eb ized , w hile a decree liftin g the im m unity o f civil servants paved the w ay fo r a purge o f 'ob stru ctive elements*. T his restructuring o f state and arm y w as directed not on ly against M uslim s o f d ou btfu l lo yalty but also against C hehabist M aronites. A lth ou gh the President's co n trol over the legislature w as assured through its n otoriou sly venal speaker K am el al-As*ad (m anager o f the election o f B ashir), G em ayel q u ick ly obtained from it the right o f rule b y decree. H e also set up tw o new bodies ou tside C ab in et and Parliam entary con trol: a n ational security council appointed from m en o f know n pro-K ata*eb

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sym pathies and pro-A m erican leanings; and a coun cil fo r external econom ic a ffa irs, to so licit E uro-A m erican investm ent in L ebanon. T he second coun cil w as headed b y a business friend o f the President's, Sam i M aroun, w ho w as also the Lebanese n egotiator in the secret talks th at accom panied the o fficia l L ebanese-Israeli peace negotiations.24 T he three m ain bases o f G em ayeFs strategy in the im m ediate afterm ath o f the invasion were: (i) dependence on A m erican support and guidance; (ii) reliance on the Lebanese A rm y as pow er base; and (iii) avoidance o f efforts tow ards national reconciliation. T he President's personal reputation as a 'm oderate* w on him a w ait-and-see period on the part o f those religious and p o litica l M uslim leaders - the trad ition al elite - w ho opposed the progressive and secular program m e o f the L N M . B ut the repressive face o f the G em ayel regim e rap id ly m anifested itself. O n 4 O ctob er, even before the form ation o f the W azzan C ab in et, the Lebanese A rm y entered in force in to W est B eirut, w here it behaved like a foreign arm y o f occu p ation , con fiscatin g arm s, setting up checkpoints, searching hom es and feeding interrogation centres in East B eirut w ith stream s o f Palestinians, Lebanese radicals and foreign m igrant w orkers. O n 3 O ctob er alon e, accord in g to o fficia l reports, arrests reached 433. In the propaganda o f the M aronite righ t, W est B eirut w as a zone infested w ith terrorists, subversives, counterfeiters, crim inals and illegal residents, and it w as the A rm y's task to flush them ou t. A rrests d id n ot touch leaders o f national m ovem ent parties (several had gone underground o r left the coun try) but concentrated on their follow ers and on p op u lar quarters. T h e A rm y broke into party and m ilitia offices, newspaper and publishing centres. C ensorship regulations w ere reinstated, prohibiting criticism o f the A rm y o r new s ab o u t the governm ent oth er than th at issued b y the o fficia l news agency. C o n d itio n s in the variou s in terrogation centres and prisons used to 'process* the detainees w ere degrading and brutal. A foreign p h oto­ jo u rn a list, w ho spent th irty-six hours in the G en eral S ecu rity's m ain o ffice near the m useum in A p ril 1983, gives this description: T here w as a m edium sized room packed w ith layer upon layer o f hum an bodies and frightened, exhausted faces w hich look ed up a t m e. T here w ere fo u r o r five hundred prisoners heaped over one another fo r la ck o f space. It w as evident that they had been there, in that state, fo r days and d ays, w ithout an y fo o d o r anythin g to drin k. T he a ir w as unbreathable, su ffocatin g, a solid b lo ck o f stench.22 B y d a y a governm ent departm ent, a t night the G en eral S ecurity o ffice w as given o ver to torture sessions. T h e photographer quoted above saw interrogators carryin g steel w hips, and one in terrogator w ho w ore w hite

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high-heeled b oots stam ping on the bare feet o f detainees. T h e boss o f the interrogators 'w as like a scarecrow ou t o f a com ic strip*. T h is m acho, sadistic style w as ch aracteristic o f the u n official prisons run b y the M aronite rightist forces during the C iv il W ar o f 1973/6, and suggests th at L F personnel had been draw n in to assist the forces o f the state. C oop eration betw een the Lebanese A rm y and the Lebanese F orces w as evid ent in m any areas (the S h ou f, W est B eiru t, the southern suburbs), and to o k m any different form s. W hile the A rm y w as busy disarm ing the M uslim m ilitias, the Lebanese F orces w ere left in con trol o f large parts o f E ast Beirut. U nder T an n ou s, the A rm y w as subjected to a thorough K ata*ebization, its o fficer corp s sifted to prom ote those M aronites w ho had fou gh t in the C iv il W ar and those M uslim s w ho had n ot.2* T he L F w ere allow ed to operate freely in all areas o f arm y co n tro l, som etim es using A rm y uniform s and equipm ent. Palestinian detainees w ere often handed over b y the A rm y to the Lebanese Forces. A s a resu lt, the num ber o f arrested and m issing persons in the 'national/progressive* area rose steeply. A lread y b y m id-D ecem ber (1982) 2,000 nam es had been registered in a centre set up by the victims* fam ilies. O f these, 600 were Palestinian and the rest Lebanese. R egistrations undoubtedly fell short o f the real figure fo r at least tw o reasons: people in ou tlyin g areas had d ifficu lty in reaching the registration centre, and m any people feared th at registration w ould lead to retaliation against the detainees o r p rolon g th eir d etention.27 Palestinians w ere p articu larly fearfu l, preferring to seek K ata*ebi w aasta, and often spending large sums in vain. A n oth er form th at Lebanese A rm y action to o k in Beirut*s western and southern sectors w as the b ulldozin g o f illegal housing and eviction s o f w ar refugees from occupied buildings. W hile the Israeli D efence F orces w ere still in occu p ation o f W est B eiru t, the Lebanese A rm y began destroyin g shacks on the ou tskirts o f Shateela. T w o w eeks later, it w ent on to tear dow n unlicensed street m arkets w hich had grow n up after the destruction o f dow ntow n shopping centres. Sim ilar actions rap id ly follow ed in other p arts o f the 'p o verty belt*: during 1 1 -1 6 O ctober in O u zai, where protesters w ere shot a t, causing three deaths; and in nearby B o u ij B arajneh, w here a large, m ainly S h i’ite shantytow n had grow n up near the Palestinian cam p, w ith one o f the highest population densities in Beirut. (Shi’ites had m igrated from rural areas in the late 1960s and 1970s, propelled by p overty and Israeli atta ck , and protected by the P R M /L N M .) T hese bulldozings and evictions w ent on through the sum m er and aroused Shi’ite fears that the G em ayel regim e intended to drive them b ack to the ru ral areas from w hich th ey had com e.2* T h ey w ere one o f the reasons fo r the sh ift o f S h i’ite leaders such as Sheikh M ehdi Sham sideen (head, after Im am S ad r’s disappearance, o f the Shi’ite H igher C ou n cil) aw ay from support fo r the G em ayel regim e. T h ey also helped to give p op u lar legitim acy to the return o f the M uslim m ilitias,

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M urabitoun and A m al, w hich now rose again as the on ly protectors o f the m asses against the A rm y and the Lebanese Forces. W hen in m id-July (1983) the A rm y, backed b y the L F , tried to evict refugees from W adi A b u Jam eel, an inner-city slum , an eight-hour battle flared u p , leaving casualties on both sides. T h e degree o f th reat posed b y arm y arrest, bulldozings and eviction s, com bined w ith the aggressiveness o f the Lebanese F orces in the areas o f Israeli occupation (the S h ou f, Iqleem al-K h arou b , the South) as w ell as the A rm y in G reater B eiru t, generated a m ass m ood o f anger th at forced even m oderate M uslim leaderships in to criticizin g the regim e. T h e first body to express this p u blic m ood w as the C o m m ittee o f A rrested and D isplaced Parsons*, form ed in N ovem ber 1982 b y w om en w hose husbands, sons o r brothers had been taken. It w as m ainly due to their vigorous and persistent action that the fragm ented and dem oralized O p p osition * revived. K inship legitim ated the C om m ittee's action , setting it outside the suspect realm o f p olitics; the series o f sit-ins, m arches and visits to p o litical leaders w hich it undertook caught m edia and p u blic attention. It w as a sign o f the pow er o f m ass anger th at M u fti K h aled , a m oderate Sunni figu re w ho had supported the election o f A m in G em ayel, felt ob liged to o ffer the w om en’s C om m ittee the p rotection o f his o ffice, D a r a l-F atw a, as a site from w hich to organ ize th eir cam paign. E conom ic crisis p layed a p art in deepening antagonism to the G em ayel regim e, especially because it hit the non-M aronite regions w ith m uch greater severity. In the S ou th , Israeli occupation alm ost destroyed local agricultural p rod u ction , first b y dum ping subsidized Israeli agricultu ral good s, later b y cu ttin g o ff the South from its usual m arkets, and b y punitive destruction o f crop s and plan tation s. A s the m ain agricu ltu ral producers, Shi’ites w ere p articu larly h it b y these m easures. In G reater B eirut the historical d isp arity in livin g levels and governm ent services betw een m ainly M aronite and m ainly M uslim areas becam e even m ore strikin g after 1982. A ll the d estru ction caused by the Israeli invasion w as concentrated in the S ou th , in W est B eirut and the southern suburbs, yet funds fo r reconstruction w ere channelled in to the 'M aron ite enclave*. G overnm ent expenditure on roads, telephone lines and loans to industry and housing had alw ays been unequal; now it becam e even m ore flagran tly so: L L 100 m illion w ent to a new sew age system in N orth M etn (w ith 130,000 inhabitants), LL30 m illion to the southern suburbs w ith 700,000 inhabitants. M ost o f 1983*s allocation fo r roads w ent to a- single m otorw ay connecting G em ayePs hom e tow n , B ik faya , to B eirut. A ll state services to the w ar-ravaged areas - m edical, ed u cation al, in frastru ctural - rem ained alm ost a t zero. A lth ou gh econom ic crisis h it the w hole econom y (p artly the result o f G em ayePs heavy arm s purchases), unem ploym ent levels w ere higher in the western sector, predom inantly an area o f com m erce and services, than in the 'M aron ite

136 The Production o f the 'B attle o f the C am pf enclave w here m ost Lebanese industry is concentrated, as w ell as large p ort, storage and electricity installations. In addition to unem ploym ent and in flation , a series o f large car-bom b attacks hit W est B eirut and the Southern suburbs th roughout th is period, causing destruction to com m erce and h ab itation as w ell as heavy casualties. A ttrib u ted to the L F and A rm y's D euxièm e Bureau, these attacks w ere seen as part o f a cam paign further to im poverish and crush the people o f these areas. Indeed anyone crossing from W est to E ast B eirut at th at tim e felt as if th ey w ere entering a different country: on one side ruined buildings, shellp ocked , garbage-strew n streets, and ubiquitous refugees; on the other broad m otorw ays, bursting superm arkets and elegant m arinas. A m ore d irectly p o litical source o f discredit o f the G em ayel regim e w as its acceptance o f infringem ents on Lebanese sovereignty and interests contained in the 17 M ay A ccords. T h e negotiations w ere fu lly covered b y the national m edia and tongue-lashed b y O pposition leaders such as W alid Jum blat. W hereas som e M uslim leaders w ould - how ever reluctan tly - have accepted such concessions in the im m ediate afterm ath o f the invasion, b y the spring o f 1983 th eir m ood had changed. U ltra-M aronite excesses, the Israeli occu p ation , the regim e's K a ta 'e b i face, econom ic crisis: a ll these had con tribu ted to the m ood change. A n oth er im portant fa cto r w as th at w hile actions b y the Lebanese A rm y clearly expressed its sectarian ch aracter, it proved unable to hold dow n the 'national/progressive* areas. A m ong these the first to explode w as the Shou f. Q uiescent during the Israeli in vasion , the D ru ze com m unity rallied under Jum blat/P SP leadership against Lebanese F orces depredations. A s noted earlier, it w as the Israelis w ho introd u ced the L F in to the S h o u f during the 1982 invasion. C laim in g to represent the m in ority C h ristian p op u lation , the L F im m ediately began setting up offices and checkpoints, as w ell as carrying ou t 'arrests* and kidnappings. A lread y b y O ctober 1982, clashes w ere so violen t th at G em ayel felt forced to send A rm y units to su pport the L F on the w estern fringes o f the S h ou f, though he w ou ld have preferred to let the tw o m ilitias b attle them selves to exhaustion. L F -P S P co n flict continued a ll sum m er, w ith Israel allow in g Israeli D ruzes to reinforce the PSP. W hen, in spite o f urgent pleas from the R eagan A dm in istration , the ID F suddenly w ithdrew from the S h o u f at the beginning o f Septem ber 1983, P S P -L F , D ru ze-M aro n ite co n flict burst into a fin al con flagration disfigured b y recip rocal m assacres w orse than those o f 1860/1, leading to the expulsion o f the L F and thousands o f C hristian villagers from the D ru ze heartland. T he Lebanese A rm y was dislodged from a ll its positions except Souk al-G h arb , w hich the U S declared a 'red line*. A s noted earlier, it w as in the fin al stage o f the S h o u f b attles th at the U S forces entered the fra y , launching a ir and artillery attacks against D ru ze p osition s, but failin g to influence the outcom e. P SP victo ry in the strategic S h o u f

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m ountains, overloo kin g B eirut and lin kin g the Syrian-controlled Beqa* to the co ast, w as the second serious setback fo r the G em ayel regim e a fter the freezing o f the 17 M ay A ccord s. M eanw hile the Lebanese A rm y w as also encountering increasing op p osition in W est B eirut and the southern suburbs, arm ed as w ell as p o litica l. T h ou gh its size and fire-p ow er enabled it in itia lly to disarm the M uslim m ilitias and intim idate the O p p osition , it d id not have the trainin g o r hom ogeneity to persist in the repressive role intended fo r it b y G em ayel, T annou s and th eir U S advisors. U sed in ju diciou sly to im pose m ilitary rule cu rfew , searches, arrests, evictions - the A rm y on ly succeeded in rousing m ass h ostility. A n ger increased w hen, a t the end o f A u gu st (1983), the A rm y launched a fu ll-scale m ilitary atta ck on p op u lar quarters o f W est B eirut. T h e a tta ck w as precipitated after L F elem ents killed fo u r Shi’ite youths w ho w ere p utting up posters com m em orating M usa Sadr, p rovokin g an irruption o f A m al m ovem ent in to th eo fficia l television station . Intended to elim inate the reappearing M uslim m ilitias, the attack failed in its purpose, causing w idespread destruction and fu ry. F earfu l o f entering A m al’s stron ghold in the southern suburbs, the A rm y proceeded to shell this area, causing w idespread dam age and displacem ent o f the civilian p o p u la tio n . T h e role o f A m al in defending the suburbs - organizing m edical a id , w ater, alternative shelter - greatly enhanced its p opu lar legitim acy. From m id-1983, a series o f m eetings betw een d ie trad ition al leaders o f the Sunni, Shi’ite and D ru ze com m unities pointed to a stiffenin g o f op p osition to the A rm y's action s in W est B eirut. O n 10 Ju ly there occurred an unprecedented event, a m ass celebration o f A ’eed a l-F itr in the M unicipal Sportsground. N orm ally each sect celebrates the feast sep arately, som etim es on d ifferen t days; th at year Sunni, Shi’ite and D ru ze representatives a ll attended. A m id a crow d estim ated at 13,000, fiery anti­ regim e speeches w ere m ade w hile A rm y tank crew s looked on helplessly. T h is w as one o f the earliest signs th at President G em ayel w as losin g the su pport o f the centrist M uslim leaderships; it pointed also to the p u b lic an ger th at w ould support the uprising o f 6 F eb ru ary 1984. A t A ’eed a lA dha*, on 17 Septem ber, M u fti K h aled , Sheikh Sham sideen and a D ru ze spiritu al leader led a huge m arch to the M artyrs* C em etery after praying together in the Im am *Ali M osque. A few d ays later the three religious leaders m et again a t D a r al-F atw a, the M u fti’s o ffice. There were other signs o f the im m inent break-up o f the G em ayel regim e. O n 26 Septem ber (1983) W azzan subm itted his resignation, indicating w ithdraw al o f su p port b y S a’eb Salam and the Sunni m oderates. A n oth er b low to G em ayel w as the first N ation al R econ ciliation C onference a t G en eva (30 O cto b er-4 N ovem ber 1983), forced on him b y the reverses in the S h ou f. It w as agreed a t the conference, w hich w as attended b y an equal num ber o f M aronite and 'O pposition* leaders, that the President should visit

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W ashington and other W estern cap itals to enlist support fo r Lebanon’s rejection o f the 17 M ay A ccords. H is co o l reception by the once-friendly R eagan w as su fficien t evidence that U S interest in Lebanon w as running ou t.

The February 1984 uprising A ll th rough the autum n and w inter the Lebanese A rm y continued interm ittently to shell the southern suburbs from p ositions both east and w est o f the ‘G reen Line*. D isp laced S h i’ites piled into beach huts alo n g the sea and shacks around Shateela and the Sports C ity. M ore than once A m al leader N abih B ern gave w arning o f his pow er to shake the regim e if the arm y persisted in d estroyin g Shi*ite-inhabited areas. Feelings cam e to a head w hen G en eral T annous insisted on m oving into positions vacated b y a French unit o f the M u ltin ation al F orces in Sh iyah , right on the edge o f the southern suburbs. T h is w as a ‘red lin e’ fo r B ern . O n 4 F ebruary he called on a ll M uslim s in the Lebanese A rm y to lay dow n arm s. Since at least 60 per cent o f ord in ary sold iers, as w ell as m any o fficers, w ere Shi’ite, his call had a devastatin g effect. T he arm y in W est B eirut m elted, leaving on ly hard-core M aronites to figh t their w ay ou t in tw o days o f the w orst shelling the city had seen since 1982. A s a resu lt, B eirut w as once again divided by the ‘ G reen Line*; and once again the arm y w as divided alon g sectarian lines in to M aronite, S h i’ite and D ru ze battalion s.39 T he uprising o f 6 F eb ru ary effectively ended President G em ayel’s hopes o f extending his au th ority beyond the ‘M aronite enclave*. It also brought a speedy end to A m erican intervention. O n 7 F ebru ary, President R eagan ordered an im m ediate p u ll­ o u t o f the M arines, now dangerously surrounded b y D ru ze and S h i’ite m ilitias. B y 15 F ebruary, the PSP had pushed the Lebanese A rm y ou t o f a ll the S h o u f except fo r S ou k a l-G h a rb , and w as ab le to jo in up w ith A m al in the southern suburbs. W ith these tw o large sectarian m ilitias in con trol o f the S h o u f m ountains, W est B eirut and the southern suburbs, the President had little hope o f restoring the au th ority o f the state over a ll Lebanese territory. T he re-em ergence o f the ‘O pposition* enforced the lesson that the state could on ly be rebuilt on a basis o f national reconciliation. A t the end o f F eb ru ary, President G em ayel visited D am ascus, a clear acknow ledgem ent th at S yria now held the key to the continuation o f his presidency. W ith Syria restraining the ‘ O pposition*, G em ayel m anaged to last ou t his term , surviving an ‘uprising* against him on the part o f the Lebanese F orces (12 M arch 1984) and several assassination attem pts, to hand over authority in Septem ber 1988 to A rm y C om m ander G eneral A ou n in d efau lt o f a legally elected president. T h e in itial m iscalculation o f A m in G em ayel and the M aronite right w as to believe that a strong M aronite state cou ld be b u ilt upon U S backing and the Israeli invasion, the very elem ents that deprived the G em ayel regim e o f

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legitim acy in the eyes o f the ‘O p p osition ’ . I f there had been a ‘victo ry’ , as Pierre G em ayel and F ad i Frem boasted , it w as n ot w on b y the L ebanese F orces, w ho carefu lly avoided an y overt m ilitary action in support o f the Israeli invaders. Fragm ented and dem oralized though they w ere, the forces opposed to M aronite hegem ony w ere not crushed in 1982; the attem pt o f the M aronite right to reap the benefits o f the invasion on ly succeeded, through its b ru tality and ineptitude, in reanim ating and reuniting them . I f there is any law in L ebanese p o litics, it is th at a pow er disequilibrium unites a ll parties w hose interests are threatened against the p arty seeking hegem ony.30

The Syrian come-back B y F eb ru ary 1984, the collap se o f U S , Israeli and M aronite rightist plans fo r a new Lebanese order left S yria as the m ajor pow er-broker. T h is w as a dram atic reversal o f its apparent m arginalization b y the end o f the 1982 invasion. B oth Israelis and A m ericans m iscalculated the degree to w hich the in vasion had w eakened S yria ’s position in L ebanon. It had lo st aircraft and m issile sites but its con trol o f territory had been on ly sligh tly m odified; w ithdraw al from B eiru t, South Beqa* and the S h o u f still left Syrian arm ed forces in con trol o f m ore than h a lf o f Lebanon. A lth ou gh S yria had disregarded its defence com m itm ents to the P L O , n ational hon our w as saved b y fo u r d ays o f tough resistance to the ID F advance a t A le y and B ham doun. A s fo r its m ilitary cap ab ilities, the U SSR rap id ly enhanced these b y sending m ore sophisticated w eaponry (M IG s, tan ks, ultra-m odern S A M -11 and S A M -13 an ti-aircraft m issiles as w ell as the fam ous S A M -5s), and a large force o f Soviet technicians.31 B y the tim e o f G eorge Shultz’s visit to D am ascus in A p ril (1983) in a last-m inute attem pt to extract Syrian agreem ent to the 17 M ay A ccord s, S yria w as in astro n g er m ilitary p osition vis-à-vis Israel than it had been on the eve o f the invasion. Israel, on the co n trary, w as becom ing increasingly conscious o f the co sts, p o litica l, econom ic and hum an, o f continuing its occupation. F rom this p osition , in the course o f 1983, D am ascus w as able to dem onstrate its con tin u in g pow er to influence events in L ebanon, and to ab o rt arrangem ents that threatened its vita l interests and objectives. O f these, clearly the m ost threatening w as the L eban ese-Israeli agreem ent, esp ecially because Lebanese op p osition to it w as m uted b y the m ood o f defeat th at gripped som e leaderships in the afterm ath o f the invasion. B ut b y m aking Israeli w ithdraw al from Lebanon con dition al on Syrian w ithdraw al (in a secret letter o f understanding w hich accom panied the o fficia l agreem ent), the A m erican and Israeli negotiators handed D am ascus the w eapon w ith w hich to k ill the A cco rd s.32 S yrian rejection had several practical and ideological repercussions, stiffening the Lebanese ‘O pposition*,

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signalling S yria's A rab national and confrontational stance, and underlining the fu tility o f excluding S yria from Lebanese arrangem ents. It w as on the basis o f op p osition to the 17 M ay A cco rd s th at the Lebanese 'O pposition* re-form ed, in Ju ly 1983, as the N ational Salvation F ron t, launched b y F ran jiyyeh , K aram eh and Jum blat. L C P , B a’th and N ational Syrian S o cialist P arty (N SSP ) leaders also attended the Z gh o rta m eeting a t w hich the new F ron t declared its aim s; B ern did not atten d , but kept in touch th rough Jum blat. M edia reports o f the new F ron t leaders* speeches sharpened p u b lic antagonism to the regim e, h itting a t its M aronite bias and the betrayal o f L eb an on 's n ation al interests represented by the 17 M ay A cco rd s, as w ell as its relations w ith the A rab w orld. A t the sam e tim e, from their p osition in the Beqa*, the Syrians supplied o r facilitated the supply o f arm s to the 'O pposition* m ilitias in the S h ou f, B eirut and the South. S yria also supported grow ing resistance to the Israeli occu p ation . A t first, m ost resistance operations were launched b y Palestinian units stationed betw een Syrian and Israeli lines in the Beqa*, b ut these dim inished after the F ateh m utiny in A p ril 1983. L ater, as the operations o f the Lebanese N ation al Resistance F ron t (L N R F ) against Israeli forces in Sid on and the South increased, S yria gave arm s and lo gistic support to a ll the groups in volved , w ith little p artiality; sectarian and Islam ic fundam entalist groups w ere helped on the sam e basis as the L C P o r N SSP. F o r exam ple, the Syrians allow ed Islam ic A m al and H izbollah to m aintain bases in the B eqa’; H izbollah w as enabled b y the Syrians to transport arm s and fighters to the South and to B eirut, w here it is reputed to have carried ou t the attacks o f A p ril and O ctob er against A m erican and F rench installation s. T he Syrian arm y in the Beqa* also helped to train the yo u n g suicide volunteers (m ainly from the N S S P and H izbo llah ) w ho carried ou t the dram atic 'hum an bom b' attacks th at did so m uch to sp otligh t South L ebanon as an arena o f h eroic, successful resistance. (M ore w ill be said ab o u t these attacks in the penultim ate section o f this ch ap ter.) W hile encouraging the Lebanese R esistance m ovem ent, the Syrians w o e carefu l n ot to allow the L N R F to becom e to o independent: in 1984 an outstanding N SSP Resistance leader in the B eq a ', M uham m ed Selim , w as assassinated in circum stances that pointed to Syrian involvem ent. T h rou gh such m easured patron age, D am ascus edged tow ards several objectives w ithout risking violen t Israeli retaliation , reducing Israel’s a b ility to use its occu p ation to extract strategic concessions, increasing pressure on it to carry o u t a unilateral w ithd raw al, enhancing S yria’s A ra b standing as a cou n try o f co n fron tation , and tightening Syrian co n trol over the Lebanese nationalist/progressive groupings. C o n tro l o ver northern L ebanon and the Beqa* also enabled S yria to dem onstrate its pow er to influence Palestinian p olitics. T he sp lit in F ateh th at first irrupted in the m utiny o f units station ed in the Beqa* in A p ril 1983

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led to the form ation o f the Palestine N ation al S alvation F ro n t (P N S F ) in D am ascus, challenging A ra fa t's leadership o f the P L O ; and from there to the S yrian -b acked Palestinian atta ck on the cam ps o f the N orth in N ovem ber, fo rcin g A ra fa t's evacuation from T rip o li, his last Lebanese fo o th o ld . T h u s by the end o f 1983, S yria seem ed to have com pleted w hat the Israelis had not been able to do: eject the P L O from L ebanon.” A chieved through Palestinian proxies, the N ovem ber assault dem onstrated D am ascus's a b ility to w eaken the P L O w hile sim ultaneously activatin g its ow n allies in the stru ggle against Israel. It also pointed forw ard to the b lo o d y internal Palestinian w ar th at w ould be fou gh t ou t in L ebanon and now here else in the Palestinian arena. In 1983 and later, S yria 's p o licy tow ard s the Palestinians in L ebanon w as determ ined b y , first, its p o licy tow ards L eb an on as a w hole; second, its d rive to co n tro l the P L O in line w ith Syrian regional strategies and objectives. W ith the liberation o f W est B eirut in F ebru ary 1984, S yria 's Lebanon p o licy shifted b ack from one o f d estab ilization to a role o f m easured intervention based on A ra b and international consent. D am ascus cou ld rely on the new equilibrium o f forces it had helped produce to paralyse G em ayel, now increasingly under atta ck n ot on ly from the N ation al S alvation F ron t b u t also from the Lebanese F orces, w ho accused him o f ruining the econom y, personal corruption and p o litical failu re. G em ayel's dependence on S yria w as m arked b y fu rth er attem pts a t national recon ciliation (the Lausanne C on feren ce, M arch 1984), and the form ation o f the N ation al U n ity governm ent under K aram eh in A p ril; m em bership o f the C ab in et included Jum blat and B erri, acknow ledgin g the new pow er o f the P S P and A m al. T h e K aram eh governm ent soon becam e paralysed not o n ly b y M aron ite-'O p p osition * co n flict (expressed in rupture betw een G em ayel and K aram eh ), but also b y co n flict betw een the m oderate Sunnis, w ho w anted d issolu tion o f a ll the m ilitias, and Jum blat and Berri w hose leadership w as m ilitia-based. T h e Syrian approach to these co n flicts w as n ot one-sided. A lth ou gh sponsoring the national/progressive leaders and parties, S yria also restrained the dem ands o f Jum blat and B erri fo r G em ayel's resign ation , w hile using th eir denunciations to keep the President in line. M uslim and D ru ze leaders* visits to D am ascus w ere the m ost frequent, but S yria m aintained con tact w ith M aronite leaderships, including the L ebanese F orces; Pakradouni w as a fa irly frequent visito r.” C oncerned to keep a balance betw een the m ain Lebanese sects and factio n s, D am ascus appeared to prefer a continuation o f unresolved crisis rather than a solu tion ( if one were possible) that m ight have attenuated its role as arbitrator. W hile form ally supporting the reform dem ands o f the nationalist/progressive. allian ce (a w atered-dow n version o f those first form ulated b y K am al Jum blat in 1975), S yria seem s to have begun to m ove tow ards a solution o f its ow n, based on the three m ain sectarian m ilitias. O bservers predicted th is

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outcom e in M arch 1984 w hen, as an agreem ent appeared close at the Lausanne C on feren ce, it w as Syrian protégé Suleim an F ran jiyyeh (a fou n d in g m em ber o f the anti-G em ayel N ation al Salvation F ron t) w ho voiced last m inute hard-line M aronite dem ands.” In the period betw een the ‘lib eration ’ o f W est B eirut (F eb ru ary 1984)and the beginning o f the ‘ B attle o f the Cam ps* (M ay 1985), S yria displayed skill and patience in its L ebanon p olicies, nudging G em ayel to take steps to con trol the Lebanese F orces; detaching the L F from their Israeli connections; propelling its ow n m an, E lie H obeiqa, into the L F com m and;” m anaging its allies on the w estern side o f the 'G reen Line*; and preventing an y one grou p o r alliance from becom ing to o pow erful. U nderlying apparent shifts o r hesitations in Syria*s Lebanon p olicy have been consistent long-term objectives stem m ing from Ba*thist pan-A rabism , Syrian national security interests and concern fo r strategic p arity w ith Israel.17 Put n egatively, B a'th ist Syria has been consistently concerned to prevent either a M aronite rightist takeover o f Lebanon in alliance w ith Israel, o r a radical L N M /P R M takeover threatening both Israeli retaliation and d estabilization o f S yria. U nlike Israel, S yria does not favo u r a d ivision o f L ebanon into sectarian cantons, preferring a reconstructed central state and a replastering o f sectarian coexistence. U nlike the L N M , the A sad regim e is n ot id eologically opposed to Lebanon’s sectarian system , and has accepted the necessity to deal with sectarian leaderships and groups. Indeed the Syrians* ow n plans fo r settling Lebanon, the T rip artite Agreem ent o f D ecem ber 1985, w as based exclu sively on the leaders o f the three largest sectarian m ilitias (the Lebanese F orces, the PSP and A m al). I f it had gone in to e ffect, L ebanon’s state institutions and oth er p o litica l leaderships w ould have been m arginalized, and the w hole country and population divided up under Syrian A rm y an d/or m ilitia con trol. Lebanese observers also noted h ow the T rip artite A greem ent cut ou t the Sunni com m unity, already w eakened b y loss o f the PR M , and p o litically and geograph ically fragm ented.” T hough a m ore skilfu l player in the Lebanese arena than the U nited States o r Israel, D am ascus has also m ade m iscalculations and has had its plans disrupted b y the vortex o f events. T he border line betw een a m anipulated in stab ility th at buttresses Syrian hegem ony and a dangerous in stability th at threatens it is hard to m aintain. C on flicts encouraged as a w ay o f preventing local protégés from becom ing to o stron g have had a w ay o f getting ou t o f co n trol, leading to undesired outcom es. T he events o f the first h a lf o f 1985 w ell illustrate the p itfalls o f a fast­ changing situation. In early January, Israel announced its fin al w ithdraw al p lan , to be accom plished in tw o phases: first, from the A w a li line and Sidon area; second, from a ll the rest o f the South except fo r an enlarged 'S ecu rity Zone*. T he first phase began on 15 F ebru ary. T he site o f large Sunni and Palestinian concentrations,” Sidon im m ediately becam e an arena o f

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struggle betw een a w ide gam ut o f contenders; a w eek before the Israeli p u ll-o u t, a m assive car-bom b alm ost killed M ustafa S a ’d , the o n ly leader cap able o f holding dow n the Sidon situ ation . T he d ay after its liberation , President G em ayel visited the city (a Lebanese A rm y battalion is stationed there), w hile p op u lar rallies w ere held b y A m al, H izbollah , the N asserist P opu lar O rgan ization and other O p p o sitio n ’ groups. O n 19 M arch L F leader Sam ir G eagea launched his m onth-long attack on ’A in H elw eh cam p from M aronite villages in Iqleem al-K h aroub ; his ignom inious retreat in A p ril exposed these villages to reprisal attacks b y M uslim and Palestinian m ilitias, and paved the w ay fo r the substitution o f H obeiqa as head o f the Lebanese Forces on 9 M ay. G eagea’s replacem ent by H obeiqa in turn paved the w ay fo r the T rip artite A ccord s and a m ore com plete, m ore stable Syrian m astery o f the Lebanese arena, to be achieved through an elaborate system o f m ajor and m inor allian ces requiring a m inim um o f direct intervention. O n ly one m ajor grou p in g, the Palestinians, had n o natural place in this carefu lly balanced system o f dependencies. O n the co n trary, th ey threatened it on m any levels: as a large and relatively cohesive segm ent o f the p op u lation in spite o f being geo grap h ically scattered; as p art o f a n ation al liberation m ovem ent bent on con tin u in g the struggle against Israel; as a progressive, secular m ovem ent; because o f their h istoric ties (m ore A ra b nationalist than sectarian) w ith Lebanese Sunnis; and also as a p oten tial base o f su pport fo r A ra fa t. T h e dem ographic distribution o f the Palestinians, clustered m ainly in the Sou th , Sidon and B eirut, increased the th reat posed b y th eir m ilitan cy, especially as S yria had no forces south o f the A w ali R iver. T he rem ilitarization o f ’A in H elw eh cam p and the re-establishm ent o f co n tact betw een it and the B eirut cam ps m ust have w orried the Syrians. U nlike the situ ation in B eirut and the S ou th , A m al and the S h i’ite com m unity had little presence in the Sidon area. T he second phase o f Israeli w ithdraw al from the Sou th , w hich w ould liberate the cam ps o f al-B ass, R ashidiyyeh and B o u ij Shem ali, w as tim ed fo r June. These m ust have been am ong the considerations favourin g an attack upon the B eirut cam ps before th ey cou ld becom e to o strong. In A m al m ovem ent D am ascus found a lo cal a lly w hose am bitions and dilem m as, equ ally acute in early 1983, m ade it ripe fo r m anipulation tow ard s a m ove intended to prevent the re-em ergence o f the Palestinians as an independent force in Lebanon.

The Lebanese Resistance movement A t first a unifying fram ew ork fo r the forces o f the ’national/progressive* allian ce, resistance against the Israeli occu p ation o f South L ebanon b oth enveloped and prepared the w ay fo r other struggles, strengthening sectarian

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form ations a t the expense o f secular ones but in a w ay th at challenged old er, sectarian leaderships. T h e Lebanese N ational Resistance F ron t (L N R F ) encom passed different groups w hose ideological incom patibility becam e m ore pronounced as resistance developed, changing in m ethods and scope. It w as in the later stages th at it to o k on the ch aracter o f a m ass S h i'ite u prising, and it w as during this later stage th at A m al m ovem ent cam e to the fo re, a sh ift th at m arked S h i’ite reappraisal o f Israeli intervention as w ell as realignm ents w ithin A m al m ovem ent. O n several levels, the story o f resistance to Israel in L ebanon deserves exam ination as a n ation al epic; as the m ost serious episode o f resistance to Israeli occu p ation before the Palestinian Intifada o f 1987; as, in som e o f its phases, a dem onstration o f L eban ese-P alestin ian and cross-sectarian coop eration ; and fin a lly as leading tow ards the ‘ B attle o f the Cam ps*. W ithout the new stature and élan achieved in resisting Israeli occu p ation , it is d ou btfu l w hether A m al m ovem ent w ould have developed such a vita l stake in co n trollin g ‘its* territo ry, nor w hether it w ou ld have launched itse lf again st the Palestinian cam ps. T h e Lebanese N ation al R esistance F ron t issued its first statem ent on 16 Septem ber 1982, the d ay after the Israeli invasion o f W est Beirut. T aken b y surprise, the M uslim m ilitias had put up a token resistance; but in the few w eeks th at the Israelis spent in the city , attacks against them becam e a d a ily and nightly occurrence, causing several casualties. The F ron t w as launched b y the L C P and O C A w ith im m ediate N SSP adhesion; PR M groups liaised w ith it but did not announce th eir action s. A lth ou gh the d isp arity in fo rce betw een the occupying arm y and the fledgeling L N R F appeared at this stage overw helm ing, resistance eventually proved its m ilitary and p olitical efficacy. Behind this rapid launching o f a resistance fro n t w as the aim to ‘deprive the occu p ation arm y o f the m onopoly o f initiative*, unleashing a dynam ic o f pin prick attacks, Israeli retaliatio n , m ass m obilization and fu rther repression, leading eventually to m ajor confrontations - the ‘A B C o f activism *.41 S carcely noticed a t the tim e in the international press, Palestinian resistance continued right through the sum m er o f 1982, carried on b y arm ed elem ents th at had m anaged to escape the Israeli dragnet. T here w as continued figh tin g around *Ain H elw eh in June, after its fa ll; the am bush near D am our w hich killed an Israeli general believed to be head o f intelligence (10 June); rocket and com m ando attacks against Israeli offices in Sidon in Ju ly. O n 4 Septem ber, fo u r Israeli soldiers were captured b y a Palestinian unit near Bham doun. A s noted earlier, PR M units in the Beqa* continued to attack the ID F from behind Syrian lines. A n oth er early form o f resistance w as the w om en's dem onstrations again st the Israeli concentration cam p o f A n sar, beginning on 1 J u ly in *A in H elw eh, and spreading to oth er cam ps (al-B ass, R ashidiyyeh, B o u ij al-

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Shem ali). O n 5 Septem ber, the ID F fired a t a ston e-throw ing w om en's dem onstration, w ounding fou r. ■ These sum m er m onths also saw the first m anifestations o f Shi’ite protest against the occupation: in N ab atiyyeh on 20 Ju ly, a m eeting o f n otables and m ayors called fo r an end to the occupation; on 9 A u gu st, the inhabitants o f Z ifta dem onstrated against the Israeli takeo ver o f a lo cal A m al o ffice; on 22 A u gu st, the people o f Saksakiyyeh dem onstrated against a pro-Israeli m ilitia o ffice; on 30 A u gu st, Sheikh R agheb H arb led the villagers o f Jibsheet in an an ti-Israeli dem onstration; and on 5 Septem ber, a t a m eeting in N abatiyyeh com m em orating M usa S ad r's disappearance, speakers attacked the occupation. Sign ifican t as signs, such early and scattered incidents had no influence on the acquiescence o f m any trad ition al M uslim religious and p olitical le a d e n in the L ebanese-Israeli peace negotiations. T h ey d id , how ever, begin to affect the p op u lar m ood, esp ecially after the first resistance ‘co u p ’ , the destruction o f the Israeli headquarters in T yre on 11 N ovem ber 1982, killin g eighty-nine p eople, claim ed b y the ‘O rganization o f A rm ed Struggle* (p rob ab ly Palestinian). L N R F operations increased in Sid on and T yre provinces during the end o f 1982 and spring o f 1983. A lth o u g h , in its later stages, Lebanese resistance cam e to be seen as an essentially Shi’ite phenom enon, in fact the L N R F w as a m ulti-sectarian, m ulti-party form ation w ith unclaim ed Palestinian participation. T h is 'm ixed* character w as clearest in the early stages and in the Sidon area. In S id on , u n til Israeli w ithdraw al in F eb ru ary 1985, there w as a high degree o f coop eration betw een Lebanese and Palestinians, all religious leaderships, and Sunni, S h i’ite and C h ristian sectors o f the p op u lation . D ru ze villages in the southern Beqa*, R ashaya and H asbayya, also played an im portant role a t this stage in resisting Israeli efforts to recruit co llaboratin g m ilitias. N one o f the sectarian m ilitias particip ated in the N L R F , each actin g independently and in accordance w ith its ow n situ ation . H izbollah soon began its ow n resistance attacks against both U S and Israeli targets. E ngaged in a life-or-death struggle w ith the Lebanese F orces in the S h o u f, the P S P used Israeli D ru ze connections to procure arm s and ID F neutrality, w hich restricted its resistance role in the m ountains to facilitatin g attacks b y others (m ainly Palestinians and N SSP). A m al hesitated fo r eight m onths before beginning resistance, also undertaken independently o f, and largely in com petition w ith, the L N R F . T h is hesitation had several causes internal to A m al and the S h i’ite com m unity. A s a result o f A m al-P R M clashes before 1982, and grow ing Shi’ite anti-Palestinianism , A m al leaders in the South to o k w idely different stands tow ards the Israeli invasion.4* V ariation continued to ch aracterize the actions o f local A m al leaders under the o ccu p ation , w ith som e co llab o ratin g, others (e.g. in Z ifta and G h azziyel)) refusing to co llab o rate. M any S h i’ite villagers a t first regarded the Israeli presence w ith

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‘p ositive indifference* and it w as som e m onths before the m ass m ood sw ung sharply against the occupation. In B eirut, Shi’ite leaderships were divided as regards the G em ayel regim e and L ebanese-Israeli negotiations. A m al’s situation in the southern suburbs, and B e n i's, were not as assured as they becam e b y the autum n o f 1983 as a result o f A rm y actions. B ern 's contacts w ith lo cal A m al leaders in the South were precarious and his con trol over their positions slight. O n 6 June 1983, the first anniversary o f the invasion, A m al declared a d ay o f m ourning and a general strike th at w as observed th roughout the South. T h is w as one o f the first signs o f A m al's shift tow ards active resistance. T he S h i'ite clergy and S h i'ite religious occasions w ere crucial in m obilizing pop u lar resistance. Several turning points should be noted. T he com m em oration o f Im am Sadr at N abatiyyeh on 5 Septem ber 1982 w as an occasion fo r recalling this leader's anathem as against Israel. On 4 M ay 1983, a spokesm an o f the Suprem e Islam ic S h i'a C o u n cil, speaking in T yre at a celeb ration o f the birth o f Im am *A li, called fo r struggle against Israel and co llaborators. In O ctob er 1983, a t the feast o f 'A sh o u ra , Sheikh M ehdi Sham sideen (deputy to Im am Sadr) denounced cooperation w ith Israel as haram (a sin). D uring the sam e feast on 16 O ctob er, the first serious clashes occurred in N abatiyyeh , when Israeli jeeps that jo stled crow ds m ourning H ussein were overturned and burnt. Because o f the stron g ties lin kin g S h i'ite clergy to th eir congregations, lo ca l im am s w ere perhaps m ore im portant than the leadership in m ass m ob ilization , turning H usseiniyyehs (m eeting places attached to S h i'ite m osques) in to fo ci o f resistance. T h e nam e o f Sheikh R agheb H arb o f Jibsheet is p articu larly rem em bered. T he first S h i'ite cleric to protest openly against the occu p ation (as early as A u gust 1982), his arrest on 17 M arch 1983 w as a turning-point in the resistance o f the S ou th , triggerin g strikes and protest m eetings. Echoes even reached the cap ital w here, fo r the first tim e since the en try o f G em ayel's arm y, W est B eirut w as the scene o f a p u blic m eeting, one held in solid arity w ith Sheikh H arb. W hen he w as assassinated by collaborators the follow in g year (F ebruary 1984), the days o f m ourning brought hundreds o f thousand o f people to Jibsheet, in spite o f Israeli attem pts to cu t the roads o ff. A national strike w as called, observed in all parts o f Lebanon except the ‘ M aronite en clave'. A num ber o f factors con tribu ted tow ards the change o f m ass S h i'ite attitudes tow ards the occu p ation . T h e in itial w elcom e o r indifference changed as the Israelis w ere perceived to be digging in fo r a lon g occu pation (unlike the ‘ L itan i invasion* o f 1978, when they w ithdrew under U S/U N pressure a fter a few w eeks). Then cam e Israeli dum ping o f its subsidized agricu ltu ral p roducts, w hich hit at the S ou th 's m ain source o f livelih ood . E conom ic hardship increased w ith the closin g o f the South in Septem ber 1983, a form o f m assive ‘co llective punishm ent* separating producers in the

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South from their m ain m arket in the capital. B ut Israeli attem pts to recruit and co op t m em bers o f the Shi*ite com m unity w ere perhaps the principal cause o f rising Shi’ite and A m al h o stility, threatening as it did the com m unity's d rive tow ards autonom y. A rrests o f youn g m en w ho refused to jo in the N ation al G u ard w as another m ajor cause, grow in g as ID F searches and arrests increased. B y early 1983, m ounting Israeli casualties w ere beginning to affect ID F m orale and Israeli governm ent decision s, leading eventually in January 1983 to the p ain ful decision to 'disengage*. In spite o f the increasingly tough punitive m easures taken (searches, arrests, killin gs, destruction o f orchards), arm ed resistance developed in frequency, techniques and d uration o f engagem ents. In the first six m onths (O ctober 1982 to M arch 1983) there w ere 104 operations; in the second, 2 11. D uring the second year, there w ere 367 (a rate o f 47 a m onth). B y the autum n o f 1984 the rate w as 3 a d ay, rising still higher in the fin al period o f w ithdraw al in 1983. W hereas a t the beginning arm ed resistance m ainly to o k the form o f single attacks using m ines, R P G s o r dynam ite, it q u ickly evolved tow ards full-scale engagem ents using a variety o f w eapons - telecom m anded explosives, autom atic fire, b azo o k as, K atiou sh as. B eginning on 4 N ovem ber 1983, the suicide attacks heralded a new w eapon w ith great p sych ological im pact. T he young suicide volunteers were trained in the Beqa* w ith Syrian assistance, m any o f them com ing from p o o r Shi*ite, C h ristian and D ru ze village backgrounds. T h eir fin al m essages broadcast posthum ously on Lebanese television, and th eir poster portraits a ll over city w alls, gave th at b rief epoch a stam p o f selfsacrifice and m ilitary achievem ent w hich som e Lebanese and Syrian leaders used to highlight opposite qualities in Palestinian m ilitary perform ance. T he w ave o f 'hum an bomb* attacks cam e to a sudden end after Israeli w ithdraw al in June 1983 behind the 'S ecu rity Zone*. C o llab o rato rs w ere the target o f abou t on e-fifth o f a ll attack s, w hich w ere highly effective as a deterrent. In the first phase o f the occu p ation , the ID F had som e success in form ing arm ed N ational G uards in southern villages, using harassm ent b y the L ebanese F orces as a pretext; the sam e pretext w as used to arm co llab orators in ’A in H elw eh. H ow ever, Israeli pressures in early 1983 to coop t m ayors and notables into a collaborative civilian structure o f villag e leagues fa iled , in spite o f threats o f arrest. A n attem pt in O ctob er 1983 to form a S h i’ite arm y (as an alternative to H addad’s m ainly C h ristian one) also failed. A s Israeli attem pts to stifle 'S h i’ite terrorism * h it ever-w ider sectors o f the p op u lation , unarm ed m ass resistance reached a level o f intensity never show n before b y an y A ra b people con fron tin g an Israeli arm y. From late 1983, the w hole o f the South w as in a continuous state o f ferm ent and co n fron tation . D ozens o f villages w ere attacked b y the ID F in b attles th at often continued fo r days. T h is description o f an early attack again st

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M a’rakeh in F ebruary (1984) is typical: O n F eb ru ary 22, the Israelis penetrated (the village) en m asse. T h e inhabitants con fron ted them w ith stones and sticks. T he clashes spread rap id ly to alleys w here w om en doused the soldiers w ith b oilin g oil. H ysterical firin g b y the Israelis caused one death and som e tw enty w ounded, but the occupying forces stopped U N IF IL or am bulances from brin gin g aid to the inhabitants. T h e village w as cu t o ff fo r several d ays, w hile the population held a sit-in inside the kusseiniyya dem anding d ie release o f yo u n g m en w ho had been arrested. P op u lar protest spread to T yre and the surrounding villages.47 A s both arm ed and unarm ed resistance m ounted, the ID F faced a situation unprecedented in its history, one w ith dem oralizin g and b ru talizin g effects. In the fin al m onths o f the occu p ation , Israeli action s becam e vengeful and savage. A punitive raid against the village o f Su r al-G harbiyeh in F ebruary 1985 gives an idea o f the deterioration: Seven yo u n g m en w ere k illed , six o f them betw een the ages o f fifteen and tw enty. A cco rd in g to tow nspeople, seven w ere pulled o u t o f the round­ up o f all the village m en. T h ey w ere m achine-gunned in the legs; tw o w ere bayoneted in the abdom en. People told me that seventeen-year-old Y u su f M uham m ad D ira*, w ho w as bleeding profusely, asked fo r a d rin k o f w ater. T h e Israelis picked him up and dunked him head first in to a w ater catchm ent basin u n til he drow ned. T h e oth er six w ere allow ed to bleed to death on the ground in fron t o f the villagers.41 T he im portance o f the resistance in the Sou th in Lebanese p olitics b oth in the im m ediate afterm ath o f the invasion and later, w ith the re-em ergence o f the 'O pposition*, can h ard ly be overestim ated. A t the beginning it stiffened op p osition to the 17 M ay A ccord s and the G em ayel regim e; later it had m ore com plex effects, p rovin g that Israeli arm ed force w as not invincible, callin g attention to the heroism o f the m ainly Shi*ite p opulation o f the S ou th , and bringing to the fore com petition fo r p op u larity and influence betw een different com ponents o f the Resistance m ovem ent. From the tim e o f the first serious L ebanese-Israeli clashes, those o f N abatiyyeh in O ctob er 1983, events in the South began to rival the battles in the S h o u f in claim ing the attention o f Lebanese outside the 'M aron ite enclave*. T he m edia reflected this shift in concern, w ith al-S qfirin p articu lar d evo tin g a large d aily section to reportage from each part o f the Sou th , alon g w ith analysis o f occupation and resistance strategies. Special attention w as paid to A n sar (the big central Israeli concentration cam p near T yre); an exhibition o f prisoners* artefacts drew huge crow ds. T elevision

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co verage o f events in the South had even greater im pact than the press: view ers in B eirut w ere transfixed b y the sight o f w om en and children co n fron tin g the Israeli A rm y. A fter years o f su fferin g Israeli attack w ithou t an y other m anifestation o f national concern than corrup tly distributed com pensation, the South suddenly found itself the object o f enthusiastic celebration: so lid arity strikes,, rallies, posters, film s and m onster parades. S tartin g from the southern suburbs, these m ile-long m arches w ound their w ay through the streets o f W est B eirut, w ith hooting am bulances, bands and m archers dressed to represent the resisting people o f the South (peasants, w orkers, fisherm en, F irst A id personnel, etc.). O rganized b y A m al, these parades sym bolized the new pride and pow er o f the S h i'ite com m unity, and the ending o f its lon g exclusion from the Sunni-dom inated city. B y virtu e o f its pre-1982 organ ization al netw orks in the South , w hich enabled it to m obilize w idespread and m ultiform resistance, A m al becam e the dom inant grou p w ithin the loose Resistance alliance. It w as logical th at A m al should becom e the p o litical expression and ben eficiary o f this new -found S h i'ite p ride, encouraging it and speaking fo r it. T he m ovem ent's influence over the m edia (an A m al m em ber had becom e D irector-G en eral o f the M inistry o f Inform ation in 1984), as w ell as its ab ility to call up m assive dem onstrations, enabled it to 'capture* the R esistance m ovem ent in the South to enhance its ow n status and eclipse other participants. It w as in the arena o f n ation al p olitics th at A m al leaders aim ed to cap italize on the enhanced prestige w on through the struggle and sacrifices o f the Sou th . In early 1985, w ith G em ayel neutralized and Israeli w ithdraw al from the South a m atter o f m onths aw ay, the m om ent appeared to be approaching when A m al cou ld im pose Shi’ite dem ands upon a Syrianbacked new Lebanese order. Its hegem ony over resistance in the South w as the first step tow ard s hegem ony in W est B eiru t, site o f im portant in stitu tions o f the state; and from there to a new deal fo r the Shi*ites in national p olitics. It w as in this p olitical con text th at the Palestinian role in resistance before 1982 had to be denigrated, and th eir role a fter 1982 stifled. T h e them e o f Shi*ite resistance w as developed in con trast to the PR M and as a lesson to it. T h is them e p layed a central p art in A m al’s anti-P alestinian p ropaganda ju st before and during the 'B a ttle o f the Cam ps*. Because o f his p ositio n distant from , and critical tow ard s, both A m al and the P R M , the view s o f Sheikh M uham m ad H ussein F ad lallah , sp iritu al guide o f H izb o llah , are revealing. In an interview ju st before the 'B attle o f the Cam ps*, he underlines the Islam ic character o f the Lebanese R esistance m ovem ent.49 A year later, w hile blam ing A m al-P alestin ian fightin g on an in tern ation al co n sp iracy, he accuses each side o f'se e k in g to secure p o litica l gain s on the Lebanese front*, an im plicit criticism o f A m a l, seen b y H izb o llah as to o secular, 'Lebanist* and ready to m ake deals w ith the

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M aronites. A t the sam e tim e, F ad lallah repeats Shi*ite criticism s o f the P R M , associatin g it w ith the ‘ m ud o f A ra b politics* and contrasting it w ith Islam ic resistance w hich ‘w as able to defeat the Israeli occupation - fo r the f ir s t tim e - in an effective w ay’ .*0 B y m inim izing the role o f the secular left and the Palestinians in Lebanese resistance, F ad lallah illustrates the process o f com petition fo r credit w hich robbed the resistance in the South o f its broader A ra b nationalist significance, reducing and p rovincializing it.

Convergences and re-alignments F ew lo ca l com m entators predicted the prolon ged and b itter co n flict betw een A m al m ovem ent and the Palestinians th at w ould explode on 19 M ay 1985, and d rag on until the end o f 1987. A d aily w elter o f events east-w est artillery bom bardm ents, the escalation o f resistance in the Sou th , m ilitia clashes - created a screen w hich obscured underlying structural sh ifts. O f these the m ost im portant w ere the end o f U S interven tion, the Israeli w ithdraw al and the Syrian com eback. It w as o n ly in retrospect th at the effect o f these b roader sh ifts on lo cal alignm ents show ed up clearly, creatin g allian ces w here before there had been enm ity, and m aking enem ies o u t o f form er allies. In ad d ition , regional and lo cal m oves to restabilize Lebanon generated their ow n long-term pressures tow ards m arginalizing the Palestinians, seen as at best unconcerned, at w orst a disruptive factor. T h e F eb ru ary 1984 uprising m arked the first o f these stru ctu ral shifts since it brought in its train the ending o f the U nited States* m ilitary presence as w ell as o f the R eagan A dm in istration 's support fo r the G em ayel regim e. R em oval o f the M arines and the Lebanese A rm y from W est B eirut favoured a restoration o f Syrian influence over th is critical area, w hether through Lebanese allies o r through the requests fo r a Syrian peace-keeping force that inter-m ilitia figh tin g w as bound to engender. T he d efeat o f the ‘Jaysh al-Ta*ifî*, b y w eakening President G em ayel, opened the w ay to renew ed negotiations tow ards a solu tion o f the Lebanese crisis, a process bound to intensify co n flict betw een all p o litical forces w ith a stake in the outcom e. E nfolded w ithin a co n flict trad itio n ally view ed as one betw een a M aronite ascendancy and a M uslim ‘O pposition* lay oth er, less clearly form ulated co n flicts - inter-sect and intra-sect, o r socioeconom ic - that the new situ atio n exacerbated. A m on g these w as the latent struggle betw een Sunni and Shi*a fo r leadership o f the ‘Opposition* and, m ore im portantly, fo r access to the levers o f the reconstructed Lebanese state. A side-effect o f the F ebru ary uprising w as the liberation o f the B eirut cam ps from Lebanese A rm y con trol. A m al m ilitiam en im m ediately to o k over arm y p ositions arou n d the cam ps; yet, alth ough this m ove engendered som e frictio n (lo cal incidents w ill be described in C h ap ter 8), it w as n ot seen

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a t the tim e as unam biguously hostile. T h is w as because» form ally, relations betw een the tw o groups rem ained those o f allies, jo in tly engaged in resistance against the Israeli occu p ation in the South and in con fron tin g the Lebanese A rm y in E ast B eirut (after February 1984 the east-w est artillery w ar w as resum ed). A m al-P alestin ian relations w ere cem ented b y the transfer o f m oney and arm s; contacts a t the n ational and lo cal leadership levels continued uninterruptedly. D u rin g this period betw een the uprising and the beginning o f the b attle, A m al leaders d id not call fo r the con trol o r disarm ing o f the cam ps. T h e beginning o f the fin al stages o f Israel’s w ithdraw al from South L eban on , startin g w ith Sidon in F ebruary 1985, heralded a shift as farreachin g as the A m erican w ithdraw al a year earlier, engendering sim ilar realignm ents. Sidon’s strategic im portance re-em erged, as a site o f Sunni and Palestinian concentration strad dlin g the co ast road lin kin g the cap ital to the S ou th , a p oten tial obstacle to the extension o f the au th o rity o f the state, and even m ore to A m aTs line o f com m unication between its heartland in the South and Beirut. Israeli w ithdraw al opened the w ay fo r m ovem ent betw een the cam ps o f B eirut and those o f Sidon, reuniting fo r the first tim e since the invasion the tw o largest concentrations o f Palestinians in Lebanon. In F eb ru ary the p eop le o f 'A in H elw eh had refused to allow R esistance cadres and weapons into the cam ps, but G eagea’s m onth-long bom bardm ent from the h ills ab o ve Sid on in M arch /A p ril p rovoked re-arm ing. These developm ents w ou ld certain ly have been view ed w ith m isgiving b y a ll parties opposed to Palestinians re-em erging as an independent p o litical force in Lebanon. Israel in p articu lar, since its d ecision in favo u r o f un ilateral w ithd raw al, had been searching fo r less co stly alternatives to occupation to p rotect its northern settlem ents. A variety o f m eans were developed, first being the extension o f the ‘Security Zone*, policed b y the South L ebanon A rm y b acked b y Israeli m ilitary personnel, w hich now reached as fa r north as Jezzin e and K fa r F alo u s, from w here the S L A d irectly threatened ’A in H elw eh and Sidon. T h e Israelis cou ld also m anipulate allies such as the Lebanese F orces (G eagea’s attack against *Ain H elw eh should be seen in th is perspective). In ad d ition , they cou ld discreetly encourage independent but anti-P alestinian forces, A m al m ovem ent in p articu lar, to p rotect the South against a revival o f Palestinian resistance. E arly in A p ril 1985, a fter the ID F w ithdraw al from N abatiyyeh and T yre but before ‘final* w ithdraw al in June, a de fa c to cease-fire betw een A m al and the ID F cam e in to effect, w ith all A m al resistance attacks com ing to an end. A s it w ithdrew , the ID F handed over its p osition s to A m a l. In late A p ril A m al set up checkpoints around R ashidiyyeh and the other Palestinian cam ps in the South . T hese w ere clear signs o f an inform al understanding concerning co n trol o f the cam ps, sim ilar to those betw een the ID F and the

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Lebanese A rm y in Septem ber 1982, as a co n d ition o f Israeli evacu ation o f W est B eirut. Palestinians say th at D a ’ou d (see P olitical G lo ssary), one o f A m aTs tw o ch ief com m anders in the South , w as Israel’s channel o f con tact w ith A m al’s leadership. A s noted earlier, assassination o f Lebanese leftists in the South had gone on under Israeli occupation, w ith the probable double aim o f facilitatin g A m al hegem ony and w eakening groups likely to support the Palestinian R esistance. T hrou ghout the period before and during the first 'B attle o f the C am p s', Israel also released batches o f Lebanese S h i’ite prisoners (e.g. on 2 A p ril, 13 June, 24 June, 3 July); it w as likely th at m any w ould jo in (or rejoin) A m al. A fte r F eb ru ary 1984 S yria, its return to the heart o f Lebanese p olitics favoured b y both U S and Israeli w ithdraw als, intensified its con tacts and consultations w ith all Lebanese groups and leaders, excluding none. T h e failu re o f G ea g ea 's atta ck again st 'A in H elw eh opened the w ay fo r Ehe H ob eiq a's takeover o f the com m and o f the Lebanese F orces on 12 M ay, tippin g the Lebanese F orces aw ay from the 'Israeli option* represented b y G eagea and tow ards the Syrians. T h is sh ift greatly enhanced the feasib ility o f a Syrian-brokered settlem ent o f the Lebanese crisis w hich, as the T rip artite A ccord s o f D ecem ber (1985) show ed, w ould be based on the M aron ite, S h i’ite and D ru ze m ilitia leaders, m arginalizing the oth er sects and the secular p o litical parties. A m ong the excluded groups the largest w as the Sunni com m unity, the m ost m ilitant the Palestinians: the op p osition o f b oth to the Syrian settlem ent cou ld be assum ed. A n y re-em ergence o f the R esistance m ovem ent w ould au tom atically add to the w eight o f Sunni protest w hile, on the con trary, suppression o f the Palestinians w ould m ake it easier to dim inish Sunnis w ithin the new ly em erging sectarian 'equilibrium *. Such considerations added to other Syrian strategic objectives based in national security and avoidance o f pretexts fo r Israeli attack. A s S yria ’s m an in the Lebanese F orces, H obeiqa’s actions before and during the first 'B a ttle o f the Cam ps* are significant: the Lebanese F orces’ o ffice in Jerusalem w as closed, thereby rem oving an obstacle to L F -S y ria n rapprochem ent. L F units w ere w ithdraw n from the Sou th , elim inating an y danger o f clashes w ith A m al m ilitiam en. A fte r the beginning o f the b attle, H obeiqa w as the first Lebanese leader open ly to support A m al’s actio n , condem ning 'P alestin ian terrorism ’ and callin g fo r Syrian intervention to restore security. T h e question o f S yria sending a m ilitary force to B eirut arose again in the period after the F ebru ary uprising since this event had brought not o n ly liberation from Lebanese A rm y oppression but also a return o f fo w d a (chaos), that m ix o f artillery bom bardm ents, car-bom bs, m ilitia clashes, kidnappings and assassinations that characterized the w ar in Lebanon. R esp on sibility fo r security in W est B eirut after the expulsion o f the arm y had been undertaken b y the m ainly S h i’ite 6th B rigade, but it w as unable to

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prevent the m ilitias engaging in extortion , rackets and fights w ith each other. C a lls fo r Syrian intervention w ere renewed b y all the ‘O pposition* leaderships as w ell as the pro-Syrian parties. H ow ever, D am ascus let it be know n th at a precondition fo r sending a peace-keeping force to B eirut w as the p rior disarm am ent o f a ll the m ilitias.31 It w as in this con text th at, on the night o f 14/15 A p ril, A m al attacked and disarm ed the M urabitoun. T h is sm all m ilitia w as not a real threat to the security o f W est B eirut but its reputation fo r break-ins and lootin g helped to ju stify A m aTs action . In add ition , A m al accused the M urabitoun o f givin g co ver to returning F ateh loyalists (m ore w ill be said about this in C h ap ter 7). In the course o f an all-n igh t b attle, the P SP m ilitia cam e to A m aTs assistance, an on-the-spot decision th at the leadership later regretted.33 E ssentially the attack w as a pre-em ptive on e, aim ed a t elim inating a force th a t, w hatever its w eaknesses, presented a p otential ob stacle to Am al*s hegem ony over W est B eirut, and hence to Syrian pressures tow ards the T rip artite A ccord s. T h is w as so because, revitalised, the M urabitoun co u ld act as a vehicle fo r Sunni resistance to A m aT s dom ination o f a city th ey regarded as h istorically theirs.33 Furtherm ore, the M urabitoun w as the on ly force in W est Beirut lik ely to give active support to the P alestin ian cam ps in case th ey w ere attacked . O f a ll the events in the p eriod preceding the 'B a ttle o f the C am p s', this w as the one th at pointed m ost clearly forw ards.

Notes 1. There were tw o main theories o f responsibility fo r the assassination: (i) that it was the Israelis', angered by Bashir's independence at his first meeting with Begin (at N ahariyyeh, on 1 September), and to provide a pretext for the invasion o f West Beirut (see 'W ho K illed Bashir?*, M iddle East International, no. 18 4 ,1 O ct 1982); (ii) that it was the Syrians’, given Bashir's history o f resistance to their presence in Lebanon. The Lebanese Forces accused a PPS man, H abib Shartouni, owner o f an apartm ent in the building where the explosion took place; but although they brought him to trial, he was never executed. 2. The Reagan ‘peace plan* basically called for implementation o f the Cam p D avid Accords (complete text in Aruri, M oughrabi and Stork, Reagan, Appendix A , p. 79. 3. Details in Petran, Struggle over Lebanon, pp. 297-8. 4. An-N ahar, Report and Record, January 1983. 5. Cobban, The Making o f M odem Lebanon, p. 193. 6. Details in Petran, Struggle over Lebanon, pp. 3 10 -11. 7. Syrian refusal to leave Lebanon or recognize the 17 M ay Accords only gradually became apparent during A pril (1983) in a series o f statements made by Assad, Khaddam and Tlass (see A . Yaniv, Dilemmas o f Security, pp. 208-11).

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8. See C obban, The M aking o f M odem Lebanon, fo r a good account o f th is eventful period, pp. 197f. 9. Even after its transfer to the ‘M aronite enclave', the U S Em bassy was again the target o f a car-bom b attack. 10. E. Picard, ‘C ould Salvation come from Syria?*, paper presented at a conference on 'Contem porary Lebanon* at SO A S (London), M arch 1988. 11. See M . Hudson, ‘The United States* Involvement in Lebanon* in Barakat, Toward a Viable Lebanon. 12. See Z . Schiff and E. Y a 'a ri, IsraeFs Lebanon War (London: A llen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 203-4. 13. Schiff and Y a’ari, (IsraeFs Lebanon War) in their account o f the last week o f the siege o f Beirut, emphasize US pressures and Israeli Cabinet splits as ham pering Israeli advance into West Beirut. But the defenders told stories o f Israeli troops, imprisoned in their tanks, as easy targets for RPG -lobbing m ilitia fighters. 14. Assertions by Israeli leaders in August that '2,000 terrorists* remained in W est Beirut after PRM evacuation was interpreted by Palestinians as a sign o f their intention to make a final push into the city. 15. S ch iff and Y a ’ari say that Sharon and Bashir met in East Beirut on 12 Septem ber to discuss two subjects - ‘the purge o f W est Beirut and official negotiations with Israel - and understanding was achieved on both. Sharon wanted to be sure that the Lebanese Arm y would move into Beirut’s refugee camps quickly and demanded that Phalangist units be sent in alongside. . . . “ By O ctober IS’* Bashir promised m errily, “ there won’t be a single terrorist in Beirut!*” (IsraeFs Lebanon War, p. 246). 16. See M. Jansen, Dissonance in Zion (London: Zed Books, 1987). 17. Schiff and Y a ’ari give Israeli war dead as 500(p. 301 ) but this figure does not include the losses suffered during the occupation. A more inclusive estimate is 700. 18. Christian inhabitants o f the Shouf were traditionally represented by Cham oun, who remained on relatively good terms with the Jumblats. 19. Yaniv (Dilemmas o f Security, p. 231), presum ably reflecting official Israeli estim ates, gives a figure o f 80,000 (between the Israeli border and the A w ali River). H. Sharif, ‘South Lebanon: Its H istory and G eopolitics', in E. Hagopian and S. Farsoun (eds), South Lebanon (Detroit: A A U G , 1978) gives approxim ately 135,000 for 1977. 20. 'O ne o f the original, albeit unpublished, aims o f Operation Peace for G alilee was to rid South Lebanon o f the PLO so that the PLO would not have a base o f operation should it ever attem pt to infiltrate the area again.* Destruction o f the camps during and after the invasion was part o f this aim; subsequent orders not to allow their rebuilding had the intention o f transferring their inhabitants north o f the A w ali; the M eridor Plan proposed dividing Palestinians up am ong several sm all, scattered cam ps, but Am erican support was not forthcom ing (Schiff and Y a ’ari, IsraeFs Lebanon War, pp. 240-41). 21. J. Schechla, The Iron Fist: IsraeFs Occupation o f South Lebanon (Washington: American A rab Anti-Discrim ination Com m ittee, 1985) p. 22. 22. Quoted by Yaniv, Dilemmas o f Security, p. 284. 23. R. Selm an, ‘Azam at Isra’eel al-m a’iya wa al-m iya Lubnan’ (The Israeli W ater Crisis and Lebanon’s W ater), M ajellat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya , no. 3, Summer 1990.

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24. Y aniv, Dilemmas o f Security, p. 165. 25. Quoted by L . Rokach, ‘Eyewitness Report o f Torture in Lebanon*, AI~FaJr (Jerusalem), 6 M ay 1983. 26. See ‘Rebondissem ent de la guerre civil au Liban*, Le M onde diplom atique, October 1983. 27. Fédération Internationale des D roits de l’Homme, Report on Lebanon (Paris, 27 January 1984). 28. S. Nasr, ‘Roots o f the Shi’i Movement*, MERIP Reports, no. 133, June 1985. 29. See Petran, Struggle over Lebanon, p. 369, for details on the sectarian affiliations o f the various brigades o f the Lebanese Arm y. 30. See R. K halidi, ‘ External Intervention and Dom estic C onflict in Lebanon, 1975-1985*, W ilson Center W orking Paper no. 65, June 1985. 31. Y . Sayigh, ‘Serious Commitment*, M iddie E ast International, no. 194,18 February 1983. 32. See S ch iff and Y a'ari, Isra els Lebanon War, pp. 292-7; Yaniv has a more detailed discussion, Dilemmas o f Security, pp. 159-82. 33. For details o f the Fateh split, see Y . Sayigh, ‘Struggle W ithin, Struggle W ithout: The T ransform ation o f PLO Politics since 1982*, International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 2, Spring 1989. 34. Pakradouni liaised between President Sarkis (1976-82) and the Syrian governm ent, and later became spokesm an for the Lebanese Forces; he was closely associated with Bashir Gem ayel and, after 1982, with Sam ir G eagea (see Political Glossary). 35. Petran, Struggle over Lebanon, p. 356. 36. Pakradouni gives a flattering portrait o f Elie H obeiqa in Le Piège: de la malédiction libanaise à la guerre du Golfe (Paris: Grasset; Beirut: F M A , 1991), p. 128, as well as details o f Syria’s im position o f H obeiqa on the Lebanese Forces, Gem ayel and his Tripartite A ccord partners Jum blat and Bern. 37. E. Picard, ‘ La politique de la Syrie au Liban*, Maghreb-Machrek, no. 116, Spring 1987. 38. On the fragm entation o f the Lebanese Sunni com m unity, see A . A buK halil, ‘D ruze, Sunni and Shi’ite Political Leaderships in Present-day Lebanon*, Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 4, Fall 1985. 39. The m ajority o f Sidon city’s inhabitants are Sunni, as is *Ain Helweh camp’s large (approx. 35,000) population. One city quarter and several villages to the east o f Sidon are Shi’ite, while the villages to the north and east are m ainly M aronite. A small percentage o f the city’s population is Christian. A s in Tyre, Sidon’s Muslims and Christians have a long tradition o f good relations. 40. G . Jada deals with this issue in ‘The Role o f Sectarian Consciousness in the Ideology and O rganization o f the Lebanese U ltra-Left (1975-1976)’, M A thesis, Am erican University o f Beirut, 1985. 41. For a discussion o f this concept, see E. Picard, ‘ De la “ communauté-classe** à la résistance nationale*. 42. The PSP began its life with a cross-sectarian membership but became with time increasingly identified as Druze. Am al at first also included non-Shi’ites am ong its members, but A m al’s stand towards the sectarian system has always been am bivalent, denouncing it, yet claim ing to represent the Shi’ite community. 43. A ttacks against Lebanese communists were carried out by Am al in W est Beirut and the southern suburbs just before the Israeli invasion; in the South

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under Israeli occupation; and in W est Beirut between 1984 and 1987. 44. This conclusion is supported by the refusal o f the ‘national progressive* alliance to include even those PRM groups opposed to, or critical o f, A rafat. (Interview with Salah Salah, member o f the PFLP Political Bureau, 8 July 1986.) 45. M ost o f this section is based on ‘Chronique de la lutte populaire*, Revue