Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism

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TH01\1AS AQUINAS AND RADICAL ARISTOTELIANISM

THOMAS AQUINAS AND RADICAL ARISTOTELIANISM

by

Fernand Van Steenberghen

Tront Unhsa•• r9 a •f ,-.,.•aoacwe4'9 ..,,._ THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS WASHINGTON. D.C:.

Copyright © 1980 The Catholic University of America Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Steenberghen, Fernand van, 1904Thomas Aquinas and radical Aristotelianism. Revisions of three lectures given at Catholic Uni­ versity of America in March 1978. Includes bibliographical references. CONTENTS: Introduction.-The first lecture, Eternity of the world.-The second lecture, Mon­ opsychism.-The third lecture, Rationalism. 1. Thomas Aquinas, Saint, l 225?-1274-Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Aristoteles-Influence-Ad­ dresses, essays, lectures. I. Title. B765.T54S72 189'.4 80-10137 ISBN 0-81 �12-0552-2

TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction

.. \'I I

The First Lecture Eternity of the \rVorld The Second Lecture �1npsychisrn The Third Lecture R�ttinalism Index of Names Index of Topics

III

INTRODUCTION One of the more fascinating chapters in the history of medieval philosophical thought centers around the intellectual crisis that occurred at the Uni\·ersity of Paris in the 126()' s and 1270's. Sometimes referred , to as "Latin Averroism, and sometimes as .. Heter­ ,, ,, odox or "'Radical Aristotclianism, a philosophical movement then developed in the Faculty of Arts at the University which was destined to have widespread repercussions on the intellectual life of the period, and which would soon encounter ecclesiastical cen­ sure hy Stephen Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, in 1270 and especially in his s\veeping Condemnation of 1277. Of particular interest to historians of phi­ losophy are the positions developed by leading mem­ bers of this radical group, especially by Siger of Bra­ barn and Boetius of Dacia. Equally interesting are the philosophical and doctrinal responses to the same by other leading thinkers of that time, most notably, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas. ( �reat strides h�l\'e been made by recent and con­ temporary scholars concerning our knowledge of the teachings and the careers of these radical Masters from the Arts Faculty. Essential to this progress has been the disco,·ery, identification, and edition of many works authored by Siger, Boetius and other Masters in Arts from that period. Long recognized as an authority on thirteenth-century philosophy in general and on Siger of Brabant and Thomas Aqui­ nas in particular, Canon Fen1and \'an Steenherghen of the Uni\-ersity of Lou vain has recently drawn upon decades of personal research in this area as well as

..

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Fenwnd Van StenzberghPn the latest findings by others throughout the scholarly world in order to produce in 1966 a truly classical general interpretation of that time, La jJhilosophie au XI/J l' sierle. Among the recent advances in our knowledge of Siger of Brabant has been the discovery and subse­ quent edition of his previously unknown C0111men­ tary on the Liber de causis ( A. Marlasca, Les Quaestiones super Librum de causis de Siger de Brabant, Louvain­ Paris, 1974). Recovery of this work has been espe­ cially satisfying to Professor Van Steenberghen be­ cause it confirms in striking fashion his long debated contention that there was a shift in the later Siger's thinking in a 1nore orthodox direction. Critical edi­ tions of this treatise as well as of most of Siger's im­ portant works have now appeared in the important series of studies and texts founded by Professor Van Steenberghen himself, Philosophes medih,aux. Conse­ quently, in 1977 he completed and published what must now be recognized as the most definitive work yet written on Siger, his Maitre Siger de Brabant. In March, 1978, The Catholic University of America in­ vited Professor Van Steenberghen to its campus in order to confer upon him an honorary doctorate. During his stay here, he delivered three lectures which build upon and summarize much of the most recent research concerning the encounter between Thomas Aquinas and the radical Aristotelians, espe­ cially Siger of Brabant. Faculty members from the University's School of Philosophy then asked him to expand upon these lectures and to prepare them for publication. This he has now done. As he himself indicates, he has chosen the path of Vlll

lntrodurtion doctrinal history in order to de\'elop his theme, Aqui­ nas' reaction to radical or heterodox Aristotelianism. In each of his Lectures he has singled out one central and contested point: in the first, the problem of the world's eternity; in the second, monopsychism, or the view according to which there is only one intellect for all mankind; and in the third, the issue of ration­ alism. Himself always the philosopher as well as the his­ torian of philosophy, Professor Van Steenberghen has complemented his historical presentations of these themes with interesting and challenging critical comments. Thus \vhile his general sympathy for the philosophical thought of Thomas Aquinas is ,vidcly known, this does not prevent him from going his own way whenever his personal philosophical judgments cliffer from those of the great Dominican Master. The reader will not he too surprised, therefore, to find Professor Van Steenberghen siding with Bona,Tn­ ture rather than with Thomas in the contro,·ersv concerning the possibility of demonstrating that the \vorld began to he. 1�nd if his contention that pre­ Thomistic ( :hristian anthropology was spiritualistic and dualistic is not unexpected, his complaint that the languagt' in ,vhich Aquinas expresses his o,vn an­ thropology is also dualistic may startle some readers. While his refusal to credit any of the Radical :\ris­ totelians of the 1260\ and l 2iff s with the notorious .. double-truth" theory is in accord with the ,·iews shared by most serious historians of medic,·al philos­ ophy today, his detailed examination of this oft-mis­ applied and misunderstood expression should pro,-e rewarding to e,·ery reader. (

;

Fern.and Van Steenberghen It is our hope, therefore, that this small volume will be of value to historians of medieval philosophy, to medieval intellectual historians, and to all others who are interested in an up-to-date discussion of these topics by one of the world's foremost authorities on thirteenth-century philosophical thought. In order not to make the following unduly cum­ bersome for a more general reading public, Professor Van Steenberghen has used relatively few footnotes. At the same time, he has provided all necessary ref­ erences for those who may wish to examine in greater detail the matters discussed therein. Original versions of Lectures I, I I, and I I I were translated respectively by Professors Dominic J. O'Meara (The Catholic University of America), John F. Wippel (The Catholic University of America) and Stephen F. Brown (then of the University of the South, and now of Boston College). The additions to the three lectures were translated by Wippel, who is also responsible for editing and preparing the com­ pleted text for publication. Special thanks are due to Jude P. Dougherty, Dean of the University's School of Philosophy, for having arranged, with the full co­ operation of the University's Administration, for Professor Van Steenberghen's visit to Washington, and for providing for the publication of this volume by The Catholic University of America Press. John F. Wippel

X

THE FIRST' LECTURE

ETERNITY OF THE WORLD In these three lectures I have been asked to take as my topic the attitude adopted by Thomas Aquinas \vith respect to radical or heterodox Aristotelianism. I gladly accepted this suggestion, since in my opinion this stage in the history of doctrine, although hap­ pening seven centuries ago, is still of great interest to us and can teach us much concerning the solution to some of our contemporary problems. Let me first remind you quickly of the historical circumstances which pro\·oked the. conflict between "> --"-1::ir), ,. H:-..t-·� • • . , , I homas Aqumas and the proponents of radICal Aristotclianism. Christianity was shaken in the thir­ teenth century by an e\Tnt of great cultural impor­ tance-the massive importation of non-Christian philosophical literature which followed upon the enormous effort, intcnsificd during the l w clfth ccntury, lo translate Arabic and Creek texts into Latin. For the first time the Christian world discovered the impressive work of Aristotle, who then represented the summit of scientific knowledge, and many were conquered by the \·ision of the world proposed by the Philosopher. · Despite the resistance of certain ecde­ siastical authorities and of many theologians, who \\TlT aware of the danger which it constituted for Christian thought, Aristotclianism rapidly conquen·d the newly-founded unin.'rsitics of \\'estern Europe. In Paris, a new statute of the Faculty of .-\rts, dated

Fernand Van Steenberghnz March 19, 1255, placed all of the known writings of Aristotle on the lecture program, and this Faculty, which traditionally taught the seven liberal arts, be­ came in practice a school of Aristotelian philosophy. Ten years later, the consequences of this innovation were felt. A group of young Masters, led by Siger of Brabant, taught the philosophy of Aristotle without concerning themselves with the points of opposition which exist between this philosophy and Christian doctrine. Radical or heterodox Aristotelianism was born. 1 We still know very little about the beginnings of this school, since we have found few traces of its teaching before 1270. But we know that it existed and was already having a disturbing influence on the Fac­ ulty of Arts. This is what em�rges, first from the pro­ test of Saint Bonaventure in his Lenten sermons in 1267 and 1268, then fr on1 the intervention of Saint Thomas at the beginning of 1270 with the publication of his De unitate intellfftus, and finally, from the first condemnation of this school by"" the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, on December 10; 1270. What was Thomas Aquinas' role in the reaction against radical Aristotelianism? One may answer this question in two different ways: either by dealing with the concrete details of the controversy which broke out in 1270, or by taking a broader view of the doc­ trinal conflict between heterodox Aristotelianism and the work of Saint Thomas considered as a whole. On the introduction of Aristotelianism in the thirteenth century and on the rise of heterodox Aristotelianism see F. Van Steenl�rghen, Aristotlf in the West, 2nd ed. (Louvain, 1970), pp. 59-208. 1

Etern ity rf the ii., or/d It is not possible for us to choose the first approach in a series of three public lectures, and for the fol­ lowing reasons. Thomas Aquinas returned to Paris in January, 1 2 69. H e first observed what the situation was in the schools and was informed about the teach­ ing then being presented in the Faculty of Art s. It was only in the beginning of I 27 0 that he openly entered 1 11to con flict with Siger and his group. He remained in Paris until the spring of 1 2 7 2. , founded a Dominican studium in Naples in the fall of that same year, and taught there until December 6 , 127 3. If one wishes to study the concrete details of the con­ troversy between Thomas Aquinas and Siger's group, one must e xamine, one by one, the works \vritten by Thomas between 1 2 7 0 and l 2 7 �) , and one must try to find in these the traces of his reaction to rad ical Aristotelianism. Such long and laborious text analysis does not lend itself to oral exposition and would , in any case , require a large number of lectures. More­ over, \Ve would han: to discuss the fanciful \·iews ad­ vanced by the young French Dominican , Father tdouard-Henri \Veber, in his \Vork of I � ) i O , J.,a rnn­ trm 1n.ff dt' 1 2 70 11 /'Un i·unsitr rfr Pa ris d so n rl'ft> n tiss('­ mcnt sur la /Jnts(�(' dt' so int Th omas r/'A q u in . \Ve must, therefore, choose the second approac h , that o f doctri nal history, although this choic e will not preve nt us from citin g, w hen possible , from the writ­ ings of Sigcr and Thomas which pertain to t he con­ troversies of 1 �()(j- 1 2 7 :{. Lon g before his return to Paris in l 26�}. Thomas Aqui nas had identified what were, in his opinion , the most serious mistakes on the part of the pagan philosophies and the main points of opposition bet ween these philosoph ies and Chris-

Fenw nd Va n Steenberghni tian teaching. From the beginning of his career, in his Scriptum super sententiis , he opposed these posi­ tions. His though t did not evolve much subsequently on these points, with certain exceptions which we shall consider later, and these are the same mistaken positions which he found in the teaching of the het­ erodox Masters in 1269. I propose, then, to examine his attitude with respect to the three most important of these defended by radical Aristotelianism, namely, eternity of the world, monopsychism, and rational­ ism . I n this first Lecture I shall concentrate on the prob­ lem of eternity of the world in the past. This lecture will have three parts. I shall first recall the position of non-Christian philosophy on this subject and illus­ trate it by the teaching of Siger of Brabant at the beginning of his career. I shall then describe Saint Thomas' reaction. Finally, I shall present some crit­ ical observations.

I

The first part can be dealt with rapidly, since it does no more than summarize some well-known facts. The problem as to the origin of the universe was already recognized at the beginnings of philosophy in Greece. Aristotle reports in Bk I of the Physirs that the early philosophers (those now known as .. Preso­ cratics") assumed as evident that ""nothing can come from what is not ." From this they concluded that, since the world exists, it has always existed. To imag­ ine that it began to be at a certain moment would be

4

Eternity -8�1. i o See M. C rahmarm . Di11 W11 rk1• d11 hi. Th omm 1 0 11 .-lqui11 . :hd ed . , BritriiKr z1n (; 1,_, rhich tt' dn l'h ilo., o/Jh if 1nul ThroloKir dn Mittrlaltn, 2 2 . I / 2 ( M ii n ster, 1 94 9) , p . :M I . i

.,

12

1

Etnnity t he if its cause did not giH· bein g to it . )

F,Tna nd Van Sten1bnghen There is, therefore, no repugnance between being created and always existing. I f there were any such repugnance between these two notions, it would be surprising that Augustine overlooked this when he was contending against the eternity of the world by numerous arguments. It would be equal ly surprising that the most eminent philosophers failed to see this repugnance. And Thomas concludes ironically : "Therefore those who see this contradiction with such subtlety are alone worthy to be called men and with then1 is wisdom born. " When authorities such as John Damascene or H ugh of Saint- Victor say that nothing can be coeter­ nal with God, one must understand them in the light of Boethius. God alone is immutable and, therefore, the eternity of the world lvould be quite different from divine eternity. This interpretation is fully con­ firmed by different passages in St. Augustine. Thomas ends by recalling the wel l-known ol�jection based on an infinite number of human souls. If the world were eternal (and, with it, al l species), an infi­ nite multitude of men would have existed and their immortal souls would subsist as an infinite multitude. This is a more difficult objection, concedes Aquinas, but it is not decisive. For God could have created an eternal world without the human species, or he could have created the human race at a certain moment of that temporal duration which would characterize the course of the eternal worl d . Moreover, no one has yet demonstrated that Cod could not create a worl d in which an infinite multitude of human souls would exist. H is treatise ends with this statement : ' " At this time

14

fJnnity o/ the l,Vo rld I forbear to reply to other ol �jcctions, cither because I ha\·c already done so elsewhere, or because some of them are so weak that by their \'ery \\Takness they seem to reinforce the probabi l ity of the opposi te po­ sition. " \Vhy d id Thomas Aquinas adopt this "agnost ic" attitude ? He indicates this d early on many occasions. He was struck by the weakness of the arguments of­ fered in fa\'or of the beginning of the world and fears that reasonings so poor, presented to estab lish an ar­ ticle of fa ith, would invite mockery from nonbelie\·­ ers . A lready in Bk I I of the Snl lnzcn he writes : "al l these arguments have been refuted by the phi loso­ phers ; hence to w ish to ground onese l f on such rea­ sons to prove , against the phi losophers, that the worl d began to he , would result more in conte mpt for the faith than in confirmation of i t. " The same idea rea p pears twe l\'e years later in the S 11 111 111 a th to­ logiw) : "That the world began is an ol�ject of fa ith and not of science. It is useful to see this, for fear that someone, attempting to de monstrate what is an ol �ject of faith, might propose non-cogent argu ments, giv ing to nonbel ie\'ers cause for mockery, since they would think that we be l ieved for such futile reasons. " H owever, behind this so dearly expressed reason appears another less expl ici t l y formulated. Thomas Aquinas was hi mse lf also i mpressed by the unani­ mous agree ment of the great ( ;reek and :\rahic thinkers. One can gather this already from the text of the Snztnzrfs that I have just quoted . .. Against the philosophers," he says. It is t h e unani mous conv ic­ t ion of the phi losophers that one contradicts in af­ firming that the world had a beginning. :\nd we ha\T

Ff'nw nd V(l n Steenbnghf'n seen that in his De aetern italf mu ndi , 'Thomas could not hide his impatience with the pretentious attitude of those theologians who saw an evident contradiction between the fact of being created and the fact of ex­ isting eternal ly. Were the arguments of the theologians really as weak as Saint Thomas maintains? These arguments can be grouped into two principal types. We find both types in Saint Bonaventure, who was a col league of St. Thomas in the Faculty of Theology at Paris from 1 252 until 1 257. The first kind of argument is based on the notion of creation. To be created " from noth­ ing" (ex nihilo ) and to exist eternal ly would be two contradictory propositions. This type of argument rests on a confusion between "from nothing" (ex nihilo ) and "after nothing" �Jost n ihilum ). Thomas is right in rejecting it as ineffectual. But another type of argument is based on the fact that an eternal world would imply an infinite series of completed events . But the notion of an infinite realized series is unten­ able, since it involves many contradictions. At first glance, it seems Thomas would welcome this type of argument, for, in a wel l-kn(nvn article in the beginning of the Su m nw theologiae (Prima P(lrs, q . 7, art . 4), he r�jects as impossible every infinite mul­ titude in art. Only an infinite in j)()fenry is possible, and by ''infinite in potency" he here means a finite series which increases indefinitely. H e cites as examples the indefinite division of a continuum and the indefinite addition of units to a number. According to this ter­ minology , the infinite series of past events implied by the hypothesis of an eternal world is clearly an in fi­ nite in act, not an infinite in potency. Indeed, it is a

16

{ Efrrn ity (! th e H'o rld realized and achieved in f i nite , alread y produced in reality. It would have bee n enough for Saint Thomas to keep to this clear doctrine in orde r to con demn the eternalist thesis since, as all agreed , that implies a real succession of an in finite se ries of past en� nts. According to the teachin g of Question 7 , such an in ­ finite series would not be '"nume rable" at all, not even for God\ thought. It would be foreign to eve ry '"species" of multitude. Such a se ries could not be a n ol�ject of the C reator's will. H O"wevcr, when Thomas takes up the problem of the origin of the world in Question 4 6 of the Prima Pars , he seems to forget the thesis h e had so dearl y presented in Question 7. Now he maintains, being directly inspired by A ristotle's Physin , that a world eternal as to its past would not imply an infinite in act, but only an infinite in potency . W h y ? Because past events were successive and the refore were ne\T r realized all together (sim u / ). As we sec, the notions of the infinite are now modified. The in fi nite in act be­ comes the actual or simultaneous in fi nite . The infi­ nite in pote ncy is no lon ge r the finite which inc reases ind e fi nitely. but the in fi nite in succession. U nde rstandably . opponents of the eternalist thesis \' icw e d th i S S hift in t h C 111 Caning Of t he i 11 f i l l itC j ll potency as nothin g hut an evasion. They refused to ad mit that the in f i nite in st1rs. Far­ ther on he takes up a quest ion which he characterize s as "not \'cry philosophical" ( 11 0 11 m u /t u m /Jh ilo., o/Jh irn ) . namely whether the soul when separated from the body can suffer from fire ( a clear allusion to the f i re of hell). I l e discusses and resoln·s this without wor-

HI

Ferna nd Va n Steen bnghen rying himself about contradicting Christian teaching . It must be noted, however, that one does not find in these writings, at least in the form in which they have come down to us, any attack against the faith, or any explicit profession of rationalisn1 . The problem is simply ignored or at least passed over in silence. Another direct witness to rationalist tendencies was examined by my late colleague and former student, Professor Maurice Giele, who died in 1966. This is the Questions on B ooh I and II (f the De a nima , a work by a Master who until now remains unknown. These Questions probably date frmn 1270. They are certainly after the De unitate inte/lertus of St. Thomas and prob­ ably before the Condemnation of December l 0 , 1270. The author holds to a radical Averroism, since he maintains that, properly speaking , man does not think. But here again the requirements of Christian orthodoxy are si1nply ignored. The unknown �-f aster professes a de facto rationalisn1, without ever taking up the problem of the relationship between faith and reason. 6 On December l 0, 1270, Stephen Tempier , the Bishop of Paris, condemned thirteen propositions judged to be heretical. They correspond in large measure with the positions denounced by Bonaven­ ture in his sermons of 1267 and 1 2 68. Nonetheless, the episcopal decree does not speak of the rationalist attitude which is at the root of these errors. 7 Such, then, are the direct and indirect indications we have today concerning the existence of a ratio6 1

See F. Van Steenbe rghen , Alaitre Sign de B rabant , pp. 65-70. Ibid. , pp. 74- 7 9.

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Rationalism nalist current of thought in the Faculty of Arts at Paris before I 270.

I II

\Vhat ,vas the reaction of Thomas Aquinas when he came face to face with this form of rationalism? It is to this question that I would like to respond in this part of the Lecture. It seems to me that his reaction was governed by certain broad principles, which I would now like to delineate. The _first prinrijJ/e Aquinas employed is the follow­ ing. One must distinguish carefully between reason and faith, bet,veen philosophy and theology , between what can be demonstrated by reason and what can only be known by faith. H ere are some illustrations of his concern for precision with respect to this. One might begin with the \·ery first question from his S u m ma theologiae , a question ,vhich deals with sa­ cred doctrine (De sru-ra dortrina ) . There Thomas un­ folds in clear terms the differences in ol�ject and in method which distinguish theology from the philo­ sophical sciences. Siger of Brabant will be in fluenced by this question when he himsel f' comes to distinguish in his turn between that .. th eology which is a part of philosophy" ( what we today call natural theology ) and that theology " which is called Sac red Sc ripture" ( the science of ren_·lation). 8 As a second example one may tur11 to the co11tro­ versy concerning the eternity of the world. :\s we saw in the First Lecture, on this issue Thomas always took the agnostic position. \Ve can demonstrate b y reason " Ibid . . p. 225.

Ferna nd Va n Steenberghrn

neither that the world is eternal nor that it began in time . Why did he adopt this position ? H e explains why i n two passages already considered above in the First Lecture . He fears that i f, w hile wishing to dem­ onstrate by reason an article of faith , one has recou rse to fau lty argumentation , one will only elicit rid icule from unbelievers . Once more , then , one sees his con­ cern to d isti ngu ish care fu lly between that w h ich can be de monstrated by h u man reason and that w h ich can not. Boetius of Dacia , Siger's colleague , well u nderstood Aqu inas' attitude and made it his ow n . A final example to illu strate Thomas' attitude may be fou nd i n the Prologue to his De u n ita te inte/!ectus. There he explicitly states that he is going to deal with this q uestion from a philosoph ical standpoint and not from that of faith . I t is q uite evident to everyone , he comments , that 1nonopsychism contradicts the truth of Ch ristian faith . But here we wish to show that it is incom patible with the princi ples of philosophy . Thomas was well aware that he would h ave to attack the M asters from the Arts Faculty on thei r own grou nd-that of philosophy . 9 Thomas' second principle is th is. Reason cannot con­ tradict the faith . In other words, a truth establ ished by reason cannot contrad ict one proposed by divine revelation for our belief. Th is principle is clearl y stated i n the final page of the De u nita te inll'llectus. I n citing the Master whose anti-Ch ristian attitude he condemns , Aqu inas writes : ·· what he then states is even more serious : · By reason I necessa rily concl ude that the intellect is u nique . But I firmly hold the op9

L. W . Keeler, Sa nrti Thomae . . de u n itate intellertus , p. 2 , § 2 .

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Rationali., m posite by faith.' H e thinks , therefore , that faith has for its object affirmations ,vhose contradictory can be established by necessary demonstration. But by nec­ essary de monstration one can only arrive at that which is necessarily true , whose contradictory is false and impossible . It fol lows from his assertion t hat the faith has for its ot�ject that which is false and impos­ sible , which even ( �od cannot realize . The cars of the faithfu l cannot tolerate such language. " Tho mas' second principle cannot be doubted by anyone who admits the divine origin of Christianity. Revea led truth cannot contradict rational truth. Yet the reconciliation of faith and reason has often proved difficu lt during the course of history. B u t t hat is due to human weaknesses since , on the one hand, it is often difficult to determine precisely the exact content of revelation and, on the other, it is _just as dif ficult to know where the truth lies in the teachings proposed by the philosophers. Conflicts benveen faith and reason are always the result of misunder­ standings which bear either upon what is true in terms of faith or on what is true according t o reason. When Siger of Brabant defended as a philosophical truth the vie,v that there is only one intel lect for al l mankind , he made a serious mistake with respect t o philosophical truth. But when the Holy Office wanted to condemn the heliocentric theory de fended by ( �a­ lileo as contrary to Scripture , it was _just as mistaken regarding revealed truth. A considerable amount of prudence is necessary whenever an apparent conflict arises between faith and reason. A third /ni11ri/J!t which guided .-\quin � ts' n:sponsc to the rationalist position is this. The purpose of phi-

Fnnand Van Steenberghen losophy is not to know what previous philosophers have thought, but to grasp the real as it is. One finds a curious statement in Siger of Brabant's brief trea­ tise, De a nirna intellectiva. There he declares that he is going to try to determine the thought of the philos­ ophers more than to discover the truth, since he is treating matters jJhilosophirally (rum philosophice proceda­ mus ) . 1 0 At first sight this statement is shocking and almost incomprehensible, coming, as it does, from a professor of philosophy who is usually so anxious about the autonomy of philosophy. But one must re­ men1ber that in the universities of the Middle Ages the essential role of a professor was to "read" (/egere) the classical authors put on the program of studies by the Faculty. A course was known as a lertio , a term which is the root for the English "lecture. " In the Faculty of Arts the Master's task was to .. read," that is to say, to comment on the writings of Aristotle and other philosophers. Thus one can understand the frame of mind which Siger manifests in his surprising statement. This understanding of philosophical investigation was reinforced for Siger and those like him by their extraordinary esteem for Aristotle, which led them more or less to identify .. philosophy" with the "thought of Aristotle. " Thomas Aquinas, however, reacted strongly against this mentality in defending the third principle pro­ posed above. He formulated it in a celebrated passage in his Commentary on the De raelo et m u ndo, which was one of his last writings, left unfinished at his 10

B . B azan, Siger de B rabant. Quaestiones in tertium . . . , p. Hll : 6-Y.

86

Ratio nalism death . Near the end of Bk I of this Commentary he analyzes Aristotle's exposition of the different opin­ ions of the Ancients concerning the origin of the cos­ mos. H e observes in this rega rd that an examination of a rguments advanced in support of opposing po­ sitions is very worthwhile for the discovery of the truth. But a little farther on, in noting the va riety of interpretations of the ancient views on cosmogony, he states that we do not have to trouble ourselves too much with respect to these divergences, since philo­ sophical inquiry does not have as its purpose to know what men have thought but what is the truth con­ cerning reality. This is the third principle formulated above. 1 1 I do not think that Thomas knew Siger's De o n ima inte /lerti-u o , where one finds the curious statement mentioned above . For Siger's treatise was composed in Pa ris ca. 1 27 :� while Thomas was in Naples. In any event , ,ve have no document indicating that Thomas was aware of it . Thus one cannot \·iew the principle formulated by Thomas as a deliberate reply to Sigcr's statement. But this historical detail is not rcallv, important. \Vhat is much more important is the fac t that the Dominican Maste r wa rns against sen·ility to the philosophers. He knew well that the servility of Sigc r and his assoc iates with respect to Aristotle w as a h m­ damental cause of the intellect ual crisis w hic h they were undergoing and whic h had given hirt h t o het­ erodox Aristotc lianism. Und er the guise of a ration­ alist conce rn for ••freedom of thought" was hidden, See Thomas de :\ q u ino , fo .4. n ,tot,,fo ltlmJ , l iher I . lectio 22. 11

87

tf,,

rnl'lo

l'I 111 11 111/o tx/H J \ l / 1 1 1 .

Ferna nd Van Steenberghen in fact, a philosophical dogmatism, an excessive cult for the Philosopher, a kind of philosophica l "tradi­ tionalism." Aquinas' Jl>urth gu iding principle in his response to rationalism is that divine revelation, through which we share in God's knowledge itself, is superior to hu1nan reason. It brings to reason valuable support and serves as its indispensable complement. This principle is developed especially in the first Question of the Summa theologiae. Revelation has a twofold ob­ ject. On the one hand there are truths which are ac­ cessible to human reason, truths which God makes known to man in order to assist him in discovering them and to confirm him in their discovery. On the other hand, there are truths which are beyond hu­ man reason, the supernatural mysteries, that God re­ veals in order to make known his design concerning n1an's call to a supernatural life, a participation in the inner life of God himself. An immediate corollary follows from this fourth principle. Provided that we are certain of the fact that such a doctrine is truly revealed , we must adhere to it firmly, no matter what contrary philosophical opin­ ions there n1ay be. Siger of Brabant perfectly under­ stood this principle from 127 0 and thereafter, and applied it many times in resolving his personal prob­ lems. Such, then, is the general view on the relationship between reason and faith that Thomas Aquinas de­ fended, and in terms of which he resisted the ration­ alist tendencies which had appeared in the Fac ulty of Arts.

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Rationalism

IV

We could end our investigation at this point, since we have seen what was Thomas' attitude with respect to the rationalist tendencies in the Fac ulty of Arts. B ut it see ms to me to be of interest to add so me words concerning the influence his very firm and clear at­ titu de had on Siger of Brabant. I shall s peak of Siger beca use he is, until now, the only heterodox M aster whose development a fter l 2 7 0 is well known to us, and on who m Thomas' influence is undeniable . This influence is already apparent in his Qw'slions on thl' Physirs , which date from l 2 7 0 or l 2 7 1 . It is very e\·­ ident in his De anima in te//ectiva and in his Qut'stions on the J\;frta/Jhysics , both ca . 1 2 7 �� - Finally, it is e\·en more ex tensive and more pronounced in his last lec­ tu res as a Master, his Q1wPstiones super lib rum de rausis , which date fro m ca . 1 2 7 6 . It is certain that Siger's estee m, even admiration , for Aq uinas continued to grow a fter 1 2 7 0 . He u ses Tho mas' writings more and more extensively, alt hough ,vithout naming him, in accord with the custo m of that time. H e refers to Albert the Creat and Thomas as .. most eminent men in philosophy" Vnaffi/mi 1 1 iri in j,hilo.rnj,hia , A lhnl us f'l Tho mas ) . B ut he maintains his independence and does not hesitate to criticize Thomas when he is in disagreement wit h him. In such cases he sometimes mentions Thomas by name (as in the [),, a nima in ll'l­ lertiva and the Questions on thf l\1f'laphysirs ), but most freq uently discusses his views without na ming him. Siger's appreciation for Thomas is not surprising if one bears in mind all that the two �tasters had in common : their admiration for the work of Aristotle , the m��jor source for their philosophy : their n_-r y clear

Fenw nd Van Steenberghnz views on the distinction between philosophical and theological knowledge, on the scientific autonomy of philosophy, and the distinctive character of its meth­ ods ; their clear, lucid, and ordered thought; their predilection for metaphysics. Thomas' beneficial in­ fluence was undoubtedly decisive in Siger's return to orthodox ways, and this in turn gained for Siger clemency from the Curia's Tribunal \vhere he had taken refuge in order to escape from the I nquisitor of France, Simon du Val . Now let us consider more closely Siger's de\·elop­ ment after 1270. Thomas' intervention in his De u n i­ tale intellectus and Stephen Te1npier's Condemnation of December 10, 1270, e\'idently opened the young l\1aster's eyes. These e\'ents made him clearly aware of the moral and religious problem posed for him by his heterodox teaching . H is writings a fter 1 270 bear witness to his radical change in attitude, a change which was to increase during the following years. From that time onward, whene\'er Siger is a\rare that he is exposing a position contrary to Christian dogma , he states that, in accord with his role as pro­ fessor of philosophy , he is presenting the \'iews of Aristotle or of other p hiloso phers but without claim­ ing that they are true. On the contrary . he lets us know that such positions are erroneo us to the extent that they contradict the teachings of Christian re\·e­ lation, w hich are always true. In his first writings after the Condemnation o f 1 2 7 0 . he holds to this attitude. B ut our philosopher comes to see more and more dearl y that t his position is not su fficient and there­ fore th at it is not satis fying. For it limits itsel f to op­ posing cert ain philosophical concl usions to contrary

Ratio na lism

affirmations o f the fait h witho ut explaining why such res u l ts of hu man reason are to be contested and rejected in the na me o f di\'inely re\'ea led tru t h. Should philosophical investigation inevitably lead to e1To­ neous conc l u sions ? Hlgical . In his fi nal lect ures, his Q1wl'slion l'., .w/nT lihn1 111 dt ra usis , Siger seems to han· overcome his int e l lectual crisis. There he frequent l y affirms the superiority of the faith to reason. He docs so cal ml y and in complete conformit y with the principles of St. Tho mas. One might wel l wonder whether Siger's m,m y professions of faith after 1 2 70 arc sincere or if they

Fnna nd Van Stel!nberghen are simply intended to appease ecclesiastical authority and to avoid persecution from defenders of ortho­ doxy. Father P. Mandonnet, who had the merit of writing the first solid biography of Siger and who published some of his opuscula, proposed a very harsh interpretation of his thought and his religious attitude. Mandonnet did not believe in the sincerity of his professions of faith, and regarded him as a "free thinker" and a "rationalist" who concealed his heterodox convictions for reasons of prudence. He thought that, in order better to ward off suspi­ cion, Siger had maintained the famous "double­ truth" theory. According to this, a given thesis could be true in philosophy even though its contradictory thesis would be true according to faith and theology. Thus, for instance, according to philosophy the world is eternal in the past, while according to faith the world began to be. Today, Mandonnet's views are completely dated. No historian now doubts Siger's sincerity. And it is certain that no Master in the Middle Ages defended the theory of double-truth, a position which is totally incompatible with the fundamental principles of Ar­ istotelian philosophy. Siger's sincerity is guaranteed by the psychological crisis he endured between I 270 and I 275, and by the efforts he made during this period to overcome the antinomies between faith and reason. If he had lost his faith, if he had become a "free-thinker," these attempts would have been senseless , and it would have been useless for him to go to so much trouble. It would have been enough for him to renew regu-

92

Rationalism l a rl y h is p ro fessions o f fa ith w h i le cont inu ing to pres­ ent t he t ho u gh t of the ph i losophers . 1 2 I t may be h e l p fu l for u s t o pa use here t o exam ine t he theo ry o f double-tru th . M any historians continue to regard t h i s as a cha racte ristic teach ing of the school which t hey refe r to as " Latin A verroism . " We a re now fam i l ia r w i th the intel lect ual crisis o f the t h i r­ tee n th cent u ry , provo ked as i t was by t he confl ict be­ tween a Ch rist ian and a non- Christian \'iew of the uni verse . I n order to resol ve t h i s confl ict and to a p­ pease defenders o f orthodoxy , the " A \'erroists" w o u l d h ave ado pted the double- t ru t h t heory . A thesis uw he true in philo.rn/Jhy ( for instance, eterni ty o f the worl d i n the past) and its rnntmdirtmy th tsis urn ht !rut' at the srmu' timt' r1rrording to faith ( for instance. noneter­ nity o f t he worl d in t he past) . Let us conside r th ings more close l y and attem pt to determ ine precise l y w h a t was , in fact , t h e intel lectu a l att i tude o f the �1 aste rs to w h o m the dou ble-truth theory has bee n att ributed .

Sign o{ B mlw nt The firs t Christian M ast.er t o who m modern h i s­ torians h an.� i m p u t ed this th eory is Siger of B raba n t . \Ve a l read y know o f h i s int e l l ect ual d e n.·lopme n t a h e r I � 7 0 and h i s e ffo rt s to reco n c i l e phi losophy and t he fa ith . H i s grea t h i sto ria n , �fa ndon n e t , t u rn i n g to t hose t e x t s w h ich po i n t to an i n n e r crisis on t h e pa rt o f S i gc r a nd , a fter an ana l ysis w h ich is not u nn u 12

On t he e\'olu tion o f Si ger's att i t ude t owards t he f a i t h a lt n 1 '.1 7 0 see \'an Steenher g hen . .\foitrl' SiKn d,, H rnha 11 t . p p . 2 '.{ 1 - :> i .

Fernrmd Van Steenbnglwn

anced , concl udes in these terms : "One is not, there­ fore , j usti fied in doubting as historical fact the con­ tradictory position taken with respect to ph ilosophy and the faith by the A verroists in general and by Siger of B rabant i n particu lar ." 1 3 Without speaking ex­ pressly of the theory of double-truth , in fact Man­ donnet attributes this position to Siger. But the expression "double-truth" had been in circulation for a long time , and after Mandonnet's w ritings , it was taken up, frequently in derivative pu blications where , as usually happens , the reservations and n u­ ances present in Mandonnet's work disappeared . E . Gilson was the first to denounce as inexact the formula "double-truth" for Siger of B rabant. I n his own examination of texts where Siger states his po­ sition concerning the antinomies between reason and faith , this e1ninent h istorian establishes the following facts : Siger never defends the com patibility of two contrad ictory truths. In cases of con flict between phi­ losophy and faith , Siger always states that the truth is on the side of the faith . 1 4 One obviously may won­ der w hether these professions of faith are sincere , continues Gilson , bu t that is another q uestion . Man­ donnet doubted Siger's sincerity and was inclined to see in Averroism a "disgu ised form of free-think­ ing." 1 ;) Gilson rather believes that Siger re mained a 13

P. Mandonnet, Sigrr de Brabant et l'm.,erroisme Latin au Xfl/ t' si'hfr , I st ed . in Collectanea Fribu rgensia, V I I I ( Fribourg [ Suisse] , I 899) , p. CLXXI ; 2nd ed . i n Les Philosophes Beiges V I -V I I ( Louvain , 1 9 1 1 1 908) , v . I , pp. 1 52-53 . 14 E. Gilson , Eludes de ph i/osophie mi>dif-ua/p (Strasbourg , 1 92 1 ) , p. 59: "Ces philosophes n'enseignaient aucu nement qu'il existe deux \·erites simultanees et contrad ictoires ; Siger de B rabant declare toujours 4ue la verite est d u cote de la foi ." 15 Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant . . . , 2nd ed . , \'. I , p. 1 94 .

94

Ratio na lism

con\'inced helie\'er , a nd most recent historians han�� follcnved him, for reasons which I need not discuss here. In either case, the double-truth theory is ex­ cluded. If one follows Mandonnet , one makes o f Siger a rationalist for whom truth is found on the side of reason. If one follows Gilson, truth falls on the side of faith. According to both, truth for Siger 1s one. Boetius contin ues : "The discoYerv of the Df' m 11 1uli adnn itall' of Boetius of l bcia renders these recent suppositions unte nable. " I n his subsequent interpretation of Boetius' position , s��j's and Sassen's interpretation s see \'an Steenbe rghen, " Nou\·elks n·­ cherches su r Siger de B rabant et son ernle ," Rfi 'W' J,hilo rnJ,l11q11f dt Lou mirz 54 ( 1956 ) , pp. l '.{ 7-4 7. Also see \'an Stee n he rghe n , L a J,l/ 1/o­ .rnplzif au XI I f l' sierl/J , pp. 4 04 - 1 1 . S.�j . . . , p. 35. I talics mine . · The author gives an inter­ esting bibliography on the double-tru t h question. 21

98

Rationalism clusion which rnntmdirts a certain a ffirmation of Christian revelation , for i nstance , when philosophy concludes that the world is eternal, while Christian doctri ne maintai ns that the world is not eternal. Here one is indeed deali ng with ro n tmdirto t) propositions , and the double-truth theory would consist i n holdi ng that two contradictory proposition s can both be tru e at one and the same time. H av i ng started from this faulty notion , S(�j /1 1/o \ {)/J/1 11, SO ( l �HiH ) . p p . l -t 5-fi·1 . 22

Fenwnd Van Steenberghen

was probably com posed ca . 1 290 , deals with B ks 1 1 1 1 , V I -X , and X I I o f Aristotle's text. I n h i s work of exegesis he expressly takes as his guide Averroes, w horn he regards as the best interpreter of Aristotle . Th is assessment is due, one may suppose , to his study of the texts , but he acknowledges in artless fashion that his sym pathy for the Philosopher from Cordoba can perhaps also be explained by the fact that he h imself was born in that same region . N ow , he ex­ plai n s , proximity in place is one of the causes for similarity i n natures , as Aristotle teaches . H e add s , however, that h is great estee m for Ave rroes' work as a com mentator in no way d i minishes his respect for the truth w h atever it may be . Z i m mermann notes that Ferrand distingu ishes s harply between the problem of interpreting A ristot­ le's texts and that of the truth of h is teaching. H e also poi nts o u t passages w here Ferrand asse rt s his u nconditioned attachment to the truth of the Catholic faith or to any other tr uth , even if it happens that A r­ istotle teaches the opposite . On the other hand , how­ ever, w hen it comes to the doctrine of creatio n , Zim­ n1erman n suspects that Ferrand's intentions may not be com pletely pure . For w hile declaring that tru th is to be fou nd on the side of faith , he lets it be under­ stood that the contrary viev.·s of Aristotle are not all that inaccurate and that they are acceptable on the level of philosophy of nature . And Zimmerman n con­ tin ues in these term s : " I n read ing these passages one has the im pressio n , not without reason , that Fer­ rand's remarks are rather intended to avoid the known reproach of defending the doctrine of double­ truth , as victi ms of the Condem nation of 1 2 7 7 were 1 00

Rationalism accustomed to do . A s to whether Ferrand unequiv­ ocally professed this position, this cannot be settled until one has studied his entire work." Finally , at the end of his study , the author concludes that Fer­ rand is "an A verroist in the strict meaning of the term," that is to say , an authentic disciple of A ver­ roes and hence , a precursor o f John o f Jandun , who boasted of being the .. ape" of Aristotle and his Arab ( :mmentatc> 1· . I do not agree with these views o f Zimmermann about Ferrand of Spain. We know today of learned interpreters of Aristotle \vho nonetheless do not pro­ fess Aristotelian philosophy . A mong them there are some who hold A verroes' Commentaries in great es­ teem and judge them to be more faithful to the Phi­ losopher's thought than those of Aquinas or than the paraphrases of Albert the ( �reat. But no one would dream of regarding these commentators as .. A n.·r­ roists ." The question therefore arises : Does one f ind in the Middle A ges certain commentators \vho arc only commentators, commentators on Aristotle w ho regularly rely on A \ · erroes, but who limit themseh·es in this to their role as exegetes without adopting the doctrines which they ex plain? Ferrand of S pain seems to be an e xcellent exam ple of this. H e interprets Ar­ istotle's text with the assistance of A \·erroes· com­ mentarv, without ever com mitting himself as to his own thought and even while dearly distanc ing himself from the Philosopher and his ( :om mcntator. In the conclusion to his com mentary he ex plicitly dist in­ guishes the searc h for truth from the exegete's task . H e njects en�ry hu man authorit y and C\'twf,, df la /Jl11lorn/Jl111' mhiih. rw· . Ph i loso pht.' s med it·\·aux X \' 1 1 1 ( Lou \-�t i n - Pari s , I �Ji-1 ) , p p . :>:>!"J- 7 0 . 4 :1 Set.' R . H isst.'t tt' , f_·,,q11;1,, s i n I,,, 2 / 9 u rtnlt, rn,uiamw;, r, Pu ri. , Ir i nuns 1 2 7 7 , Ph i losopht.'s rrn:•d it·\'aux X X I I ( Lotl\·a i n - Pa ris, l �J7 7 ) . 1

Fernand Van Steenberghen On the religious side, history leaves for us a lesson in both prudence and modesty. I n a case of apparent conflict between a scientific thesis and a religious doc­ trine, one must investigate very careful ly and with an exacting critical sense in order to determine whether the scientific thesis is solidly established and whether the religious doctrine is really contained in the de­ posit of revelation. Such investigation will always re­ sult in dispelling misunderstandings and in showing that the conflict was more apparent than real .

1 10

I NDEX OF NA MES A l be rt t h e Great, 6 , 9, 3 7, 4 4 , 7 7 , 89, 1 0 1 A lexander o f A ph rod isias , :rn. 56 A l gaze l , 56, 58 A ri stotle , 1 , 2 , 4, 7-8 , 1 1 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 2 0-24 . 3 0-3 5 , :rn. 4 2 . 4 :3 , 44 , 4 5 , 4 8-4 9, 5 0 , 556:3 , 66, 68 , 7 1 , 7 3 , 74-7 5 , 7 9 , 8 1 , 86--8 8 , 8 9 . 90-9 1 , 92 , 99- 1 02 , 1 06 , 1 07 , 1 08 A u gu s t i n e . S t . . 7-8 , 1 4 , 44 , 73, 75, 8 1 A verroes, 5 , 7 , 2 9 , 3 3-:H . 3 5 , 4 1 , 4 :3 , 5 1 , 5:3 , 54-56 , 586 1 , 6:3 , 7 7 , 1 00- 1 02 , 1 05 A vicebro n , 5 , 44 ihicen n a . .�. :t3 , 44 . 5:3 , 56,

58. 77

Bau m , Roge r , 77 Baz:m , B . , 6 . 8 n . , 67 n .. 86 11 . , I 06 n . Becker, Leon , 1 9 B l a i se o f Pa rma , l 04 Boet h i u s , 1 4 Boet i u s of Dacia , ,·i i , 84 , �):>-­ �)9, l 0�) Bona,·en t u re , St . , ,·i i , ix, 2. �l. 1 0 , 1 6 . 24-26. 44. 4 � }.- 50.

i\l . d a .

J o h n o f J a nd u n , 29, l 0 I , 1 02- 1 04 Kan t . 2 1 Keeler, L. W . , 54 n . . 80 n . . 8 4 n . , I 0 8 11 . Lu l l , Raymon d , 7 7 M acC :l i n tock. S . . I 04 Maier, A . , I 04 Mai mon ides . Moses. 5 M a ndon net . P. , 1 2 . 92 , �t3-�l.S M a r la sca , A .. v i i i i\.k rcier, Ca rd i n a l , I �l i\hi l l e r , J P .. I 06- 1 07 Oresme, N icholas, I 0·1 Pe rri e r , J. 1 2 Pla to, --14 , 5 8 . 7 �3 Plot i n u s , 5 , ·1·1 Presoc rat ics, ➔, 1 1

B u rida n , .J o h n . l 04

.J .

H issette, R. , 1 09 n . H u gh o f St . V ictor, 1 4

N ys . Desire , I �l

77. 78-79, 82

Cru z Pontes,

Gal i leo , 8 5 Gau t h i e r , L . 1 05 n . Geye r , B . . 1 02 Giele , M a u rice . 82 Gilso n , E., 94-95 G rabma n n , l\.1 . , 1 2 n .

:n ll .

Ren a 11 , E . . I O!> n . ' ' , ( '' · · (.,:>-1 - ( 1( 1 ., ., S, �qo Sas sen , F . . �Hi. �)7 n . . I 02 Siger of B raba n t . v i i . ,·i i i . 2 .

Da mascem· , St . J o h n , 1 --1 Fe rr a n d of Spai n . �N--- 1 02

III

:{ , 4 , 6---8 , 3 0 , 3 3 , 3 H 2 , 4 3 , 49, 52-53 , 62 , 67-70, 8(�8 1 , 83-8 8 , 89-92 , 9395 , 96, 98 , 1 0 2 , 1 03 , 1 06--1 07 , 1 08 , 1 09 Simon d u Val , I nq u isitor o f France , 90

Pa ris, v i i , 2, 8 2 , 90, I 08 Them isti us, .S 6, 58 Theoph rastus , 56, 58

Tem pier, Stephen , Bishop of

Zimmerman n , A . , 25, 99--- 1 0 I

Ven nebusch ,

J.,

'3 7

Weber, Edouard- H e n ri , 3 W i l l iam of Moerbeke , 56

I I2

I N DEX OF TOPI CS A ge n t i nt e l lect . a n d possible ( rece p t i v e ) i n te l lect , :1 5 , 40 A gnost i c i s m , 1 1 - 1 8 , 2 :) , 8:184 , 97 A n t h ro po logy of St . Thom a s . 4 �1-4 9 , 7 0-74 ;\ \· e rr o i sm , 1 2 , 29, :V i , '.1 8 , :) 9 , 4 0 , 4 2 , 4 5 , 4 8 , 4 �} . 5 0 . 5 1 -5 2 , 54-58 , 6 1 -6 5 , 6 7 . 7 9 , 8 2 . 8 �1 . �-l:) , 94 , 1 0 1 , 1 02 , l 04 , 1 05-- 1 06 ( :o nde m n a t ion a t Pa ris i n 1 2 7 0 , 2 , 7 , 7 8 . 8 l . 8 2 . �}0 ( '.on d e m n a t ion at Pa ris i n 1 2 7 7 , 1 00 , 1 08 . l 0�} ( :rea t i ,·e ca u sa l i t y , :r6 , 8. 1 01 8 , 2 7 , :t1 , 4 8-4 � } . 6 1 -6 2 . 66 Di' A n ima of A ri s t ot le , 8 , ] 2:-t1 , :M , 5 5 . 60 Dou bl e - t ru t h t h eo ry . �J2 . �}:11 09 D u a l i s t i c a n t h ro po logy . :H>-­ ] 7 , 4 4-4 5 , 7 :1-74 E t e rn a l crea t io n . :>--6 , 8, l 0--18 Evo l u t io n o f t h e ( ma t e ri a l ) u n i n� rsc , 2 1 ---2 2 . ()2 , 6:{ Fac u l t y o f A rt s at Pa ris . I -:{ , :>--6 . � ) . 2 n . 2 ��:rn . :)4-:{ :) . :>0 , 7t>--7 7 . 7 8-8:) , 8,1 , 8 ( ) , 8 8 . 8 � } . �}6 . l 02 . 1 0� } Fa i t h a n d reason , � } . I :> , I H . 2(>--2 7 . :>'.)-:J4 . 8 0---88 . �} I ,

�n.

! M , � H) , l ( f{- 1 04 . 1 0�} F i de is m , �}:J Form o f matter v s . m at e ri a l fo rm . t he h u m a n so u l a s . -1 8 , 5 7 . 6:1-64 , 68 , fi� � 7 0 . 72-7 :\ F reedom o f t h e d i ,· i n c w i l l . 7 . 1 1 - 1 2 . �t1-24 . r, :L � } 7 , 1 02 , 1 08 H u m a n i n t c: l lcct . 7---H . 2 � � 7· 1 , 81 I n fi n i t e , t he , 1 1 . 1 2 . 1 4 , l t>-1 8 . , �� 2 7 M a t t e r- fo r m co m posit ion . ; t s a p p l ied t o ma n . :\ 1 -:\ 2 . ·F>-­ -1 � } . :J :> , tW. 6:> , ()�} l\kt a p h ysical \'S . psyd w logica l i n t erpre t a t i o n s o l ' m a n , 2 � }.­ :W , :{ 1 -:\ :> , · 1 2--t :� . · 1 t>, · l H , :JO, 5 � }.- (> 7 . N cop I a t o rn s m . .i.> , .•)> l)----.1 ,

--

1 1

P h a n t a s m s ( b ra i n i m age s ) . 2 � } . :H . :) :> . :\ � J . •10 , ·t I , 7 1 l'h vsir., of :\ ri s t ot le , · I - :> . 1 7 . 2 2-�tL :> :J Rat ion a l i s m . H . 0 2 . 7 :>- 1 1 0 Ren.· Lt t ion , � } . 1 0 . 7 :> . 7 8--- 7 � } . H I . H '.) . H·L H !J . HH . qo, � J I . � > 7 . � }� } . I O� . I O · L 1 1 0 Siger o f B ra ba n t . i n f l u c 1 H T o l S l . Thom as o 1 1 , H � }.- � }:) . I ( ) � }

Siger of B raba n t, s incerity of, 9 1 -93 , 94-95 Sou l , h uman , as form of matter vs . material form . See Form of matter vs .

material form, the h u man sou l as So u l and bod y , 3 1 , 3 9 . 4 4 , 4 f"r---4 9 , 5 3 , 6 0 , 63-66 , 68 , 72, 73

1 14