Theory of Semiotics

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A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS UMBERTO ECO

JNDIANA UNIVERS TY PRESS London

Published by arrangement with Bompiani, Milan �y:righ1 l © 1'976 by Indiana Unive.rsit.y Press All rights reserv,ed 'No p,art orf this book may be re·produced or u·tilized in an·y form or by any m.eans, e:lectronic or m.echanical, including phot,ocopyin.g and recording, or by any in£onnation storage and .retrieval system t without permission in writing from the publisher. The As·sociation of Amcr:ican University Pr.esses' Resolu­ tion on Permission,s constitutes the, only �-r�nG.pti,on to this prohibition. Published in CA•ada by Fitrnnry & Whiteside Limited, Don, Mills. Ontario1 Manufactured in the Un1it:ed S1tates of America L.ibrary of C:onaress ca,taloaing in Public,tion Dae" Eco, U'mb,erto� ,A theory of semiotics. r(Advances in semiotics,), Includes inde.x,. 'I. S,emioLics. I. Title. 11., Series. P99.E3 301�.2'1 74�228.33 ISB�I 0-2S3-3S9S.S-4 I 2 3 4· 5 8,0 19 78 77 16

CONTENTS

Fore,word XI

10. lntroduction-t·oward a Loaic ,of Culture 0.1. 0.2 .. 0.3.. 0.4..

0 ..S.

0.6�

0. 7.

0.. 8.� 0.91 1

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Design ror a semio,tic theory &Semio.tics':, field or discjpli:ne? Communication and/or signification. Political boundaries: the field i def nitions o.f semiotics Natural boundaries: two Natural boundaries: inference and signiCication Natural boundaries: the lower threshold Natural boundaries: the upper threshold Epistemological boundaries

,I. Sianifi,cation and Communicatio.n 1.1. 1.2. .3,.. 1.4.

,An elementary communicational model Systems and codes TJ1e s•code as structu1e Information, ,communication. signification V

3 3 7 8 9

14, 16 19 21

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CONTEN'TS

YI l. Theory or Codes

2 I. 2,.2. 2.3. 2.4 : . 2 .. S. 2.6. 2.. 7. 2.8. 2 =9� 2 ., JO. 2.1 I. 2.12 .. 2.13. 2.14., i.1S. 1

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The sign-function Expression and content Denotation and connotation Message rand te,:t Content IA�d referent Meaning as c.ultural unit , etant The in terpr, The semantic system , The semantic markers and the sememe T e KF model A revised semantic .model The model ''Q'' Tbe format of the semantic spa ce Overcoding and unde.rcodin! T'h e in terp\ay, of codes and the me§age as an open f0 rn1 1

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3. Theory· of Sian Production 3.1. A general survey 3.2", Semiotic and factual st, atcm111ts 3.3. Mentioning 3.4. T'he problem of a 'typology of signs 3.5. Critique of iconism 3.6. A typology of modes or, production 3. 7'. The aest.hetic, text, as invenlion 3,�8., The rhetorical labor 3.. 9. Ideological ,cod,e switching

481 SO 54 S7 5,91 66 68 73 84 96 105 121 12S 129 139 IS1 ISJ 158 "161 172, 191 217 26 , ) 276 289

4. The Subject of Semio , tics

314

R1Jerence1

319 347

Index of subjecti

3SI

FOREWORD

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A preliminaiy and tentative version of this text (dealing with a semiotics of visual and architectural signs) was wntten and published in 1967 as Appuntf per una semiologia de/le comunicazioni 111slve. A mo, re theoreti­ cally oriented version - offering an overall view of semiotics and containing a long epistemological discussion on structuralism -was published in 1968 asla struttura asse11te. 1 worked for two years on the French, German, Spanish and Swedish translations (only the Yugoslavian, Polish and Brazilian ones appea red with sufficient speed to reproduce the oriinal Italian edition wit, hout any additi.on) re•arranging and e. nlarging the book - and correcting many parts of it to take into account reviews of the fint Italian editjon. The , and som,ething else. result w� a book half way between· La stmttura asse11te This 'something else appeared in Italian as a �collectio1n of /!. �"ys. Le forme del co11te11uto, 1971. As for the English version, after two unsatisfactory altempts at translation and many U' nsuccessfu revisions,, I decided (in 197'3) to give up and to re-write the book directly in English - will1 the help of David Osmond•Smith, who has p:ut more work i•lo adapting my semiotic pidgin than he would have done if translating a new book, though he sh,ould not be , rite in heJd responsible for the results of this symbiotic adventure., To r. e-w ••

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another language means to re-tJ1i11k : and tl1e re· sult or this truly semiotic experience (which would have. stron, gl, y in 1terested Benjamin Lee Whorf) is that t his 'book n 10 longer has anything to do with la strutttira asse11te - so that I hav,e now retranslated i t into Italian as a b rand•new work (Trattato di' sen,,iotica gc11erale). Apart from the different (but b y no means irrelevant) organization of the material, four .new elemen ts cha. racterize the present text a.s a partial criti,que of my own preceding researches: (i) an at tempt to introduce in to the semiotic framework a t heory of referents ; (ii) an attempt. to rela. te pragm.atics to semantics; (iii) a c ritique of the notion of 'sign' and of the classical typologies of signs; (iv) a diffe ren t approach to t he ·notion of icon­ ism - whose ,c ri tique, developed in my preced 'i ng � works. I still maintain, but .. without substit uting for the naive assu m. p tion that icon,s are non-coded analogi1cal devic�.s, the equa�ly naive one that, i.cons are arbi traey and fu. lly analyzable devic,es . The replacement of a typol ogy of sigr1s by a typology of modes of sign production has helped me. I hope, to d issolve the umbrella­ notion of iconism i n to a more complex n1e twork of semiotic operations. In doing so. the book has acquired a sort of 'chiasmatic' structure. In its first part, devoted to a theory of codes, I have triP.d lo propose a estricted and unified set of categories able to explain verbal and n on•verbal devices and to extend the. notion of ign-function to various type, s or significant uniits, so�a!Jed signs, strings of sign.s texts and macrc,.,tex ts - the whole attempt being governed by the principle of Ockham's razor, no11 su11t multiplica11da which 'W.ould seem lo be a rather scientific entia praeter 1;ecessitaten1 procedu�e, . In the s.e·c ond part , devoted to a ( tl,eory of sign producdo11. I felt. obl·ged 1 0 p roceed in an i.nverse direction : 't he categories under consideration (such as symbol , icon and in.dex) were unable to explain a lot of different. pheno mena 1tha·1 I 'bel ieved l 0 fall within the domain of sem'iotics. I was therefore forced to adopt an anti·Ock.hamistic principle : e11tia su,it m11ltipli­ canda propter necessitatem. I believe th:a l, under given c:ircu nstanc,es, this procedure is also a scien· t ific one. I would not have arri'ved at the results outlined in tl1is book without tl1e hel p of many friends without t he discussions that have appeare,d in tile first six issues of the review VS-Quaderni di s11,di se1,1/oti,·i. and without confronta tions with my students a.t Florence, BoJogna, New Yo1 rk Unlvcrsity, Northweste.rn Univ1e rsity, La Plata and many otl1er places around the world. Since the list. oif referc·nces allows me to pay my dcbls, I sliall Jin1il myself 0 warmly thanking my frie11ds Ugo Vo1lli and �aolo Fabb ri, who l1ave l1clped me 1

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Foreword

ix

th roughout tl1e various stages of t he re�arch - ffl'ai nly by me rcil ess criticism - and whose ideas I have fre,ely used in various circumstances.

Milan. 1967- 1 974.

NOTE ON GRAPHIC ,CONVENTl' O NS . ething intended as an ex:p·r,ession or ,a sign­ Sin.ale, slashes indicate som

vehicle, while e� 1 illemets indicate something intendc. d as content. Therefore /xxx. x/ mieans. expresses or refers to «xxxxu. When there is no question, of phono,lo,g y. verbal exp.cessions will be written in their alphabetic form. How· ever, since, this. book is concerned not only with verbal signs but also wlth o'bjer cts, image.s or behavior intended as signs, these phenomena must be ex� pressed through verbal ,expressions: in order to distinguish, for instance, the objie ct autom�ahile from, the word autom,obilc, the former is written betwe,en d1ouble slashes an,d, in it,1 li1c . Th·er·efore la, u t.omobilel is the o,bject cott�spond­ ing to the verbal expn,scion /automobile/ , and both refer to the content unit «automobile» . SbtgJe q uolatio. n ,mark,s serYe to1 emphasi7.1l! a certain word;, double marks are used for quotations!" Italic rdogo:tes terms used in a technical sense.

0. 1 . Design for a se, miotic theory 1

0.1 . 1 . Aims of tl1e research

The· aim of this book i· s to explore the theoretical possibility and the �ncial fun,c tion or 11 uniOed approach to every pheaomPnnq of slgniraca,tion i • .Such an approach should take the fonn or a ge11eral and/or communicat·on sen,iotic 1l1eory , able to explain every case of sign.fun1ction in tenns of underlying : sys,tems of elements mutually correlated by one or more codes. A design for a general semiotics ( 1 ) should consider : (a) a theory of codes an, d (b) la theory �I sig,1 prodi,ction - the latter taking into account a large r.ange of pl1enom.en1a such as lhe common ·use of lang,1ages t the evolution of :codes,, aesthetic communication, difCerent l,ypes of interactional communi• cative behavio.r , the use of signs in orde, r to mention thinp or· stat, es of the world and so on. Since tl1is book represents. only a prelin1inary explQtation of such a theoretical possibility. its first chapt. ers are nece�arUy conditioned by the p.resent state of lhe art., and cannot evade son1,e questions that - in a further perspective - wiU d1e fin,i tely be left aside· . la particular one must ftrsl lake, 3

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A THEORY OF SEM IOT ICS

into account the all-purpose notion of 'sign• and the problem of a typology of signs (along with the apparently i rreducible forms of semiotic enquiry they presuppose) in order to arrive at a more rigorous de finition of sign-runction and at a typology of modes of sign.production. Thererore a ftrs,I Cih apter will be devoted 1lo tb,e ana1ysis of the notion of 'sign� in order to disti. nguis,b signs from no,n-signs and to translate the notion of 'sign' into the more Oexibl e one of sig,1-{u11ction (which can be explai ned within the rrame,work of a theory of codes). This discussion will allow me to posi a distinction between 'signi fication' and 'communication 1' : in principle. , a semiotics of signification entails a theory of codes, while a. se·miotics of communication entails a theory of sign production. The distinction between a theory of codes and a theory of sign· production does not correspond to the ones between 'langue' and 'parole', co, mpetence and p, e rformance, sy. ntactics (an)d :semanti1cs) an d pragmatics. One of the claims of the present boo,k is, o overc1ome tMse d·stinctions and to outline a theory of cod, es which ( l akes into ,account even rules of disc, oursive competence, text formation, contextual and circum:stantial ( 0 situational) disambiguation, there, fore proposing a semantics ' Which solves within its own framework many problems of the �n-e1111ed pragmatic. . t is not by chance lhat the discriminati n g categ,orie,s are the one.s of signification and communication As will be seen in chapters 1 and 2, there is a signi fication syst em (and therefore a code) when there is the sociall,y conven·tionalized possib ility of generating sign-functi, ons, whether the func· ti,ves of suclh functions- are discrete units called signs or vast portions of disc ourse. , provided that the correlation has ' b een previously posited by a .social conven.tion . There is on the contrary a communication p1r1ocess when the possibili ,ties provijded by a signification system are exploited in order to physically produce expressions for many practical purpose . Thus the diffe.rence between the two theoretical approaches outlined in chapters 2 and 3 concerns the di fference be1tween ru'les and, p rocesses (or, in Aristo telia n terms. metaphorically used, power and act). But when the requiremen ts for performing a process are socially recognized and precede the process itself, then these requirements are to be listed among the rules (they becom e rules c;>f discoursive competence, or rules of 'parole' foreseen by the 'ltlngue') an d ca n be iaicen into account by a theory of physical production of signs. only rinsofar as they have been already coded . Even if the the1ory of codes and the the o.-y of sign production succeed in eliminating the naive and non- rclati ot1al no tion of 'sign', thia notion appears to be so suitable in ordinary langu age aP d in colloquial semiotic discussions that it should not be compl etely aban" 1

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Jr;troduction

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doned. It would be uselessly oveBophisticated to get rid of it. An atomic scientist knows very well that so-called 'things• are the results of a complex interplay of mlcrophysical correlations, and. nevertheless he can quite happily continue to speak about •things� when it is convenient to do so. In the same way I shall continue to use the word /si'i}l/ every time the correlational nature of the sign-function may be presupposed. Neve�theless the fourth chapter of the book will be devoted to a discussion of the very notion. of the 'typology of signs': starting from Peirce's trichotomy (symbols, indices and icons), I shall show to what degree these categories cover both a more segmentable field of sign-functions and an articulated range of 'sign producing' operations, giving rise to a more comprehensive n-chotomy of various modes of sign production. A general semiotic theory will be considered powerful according to its capacity for offering an appropriate formal definition for every sort of sign-function, whether it has already been described and coded or not. So the typology of modes of sign-production aims at proposing categories able to describe even those as yet uncoded sign-functions conventionally posited in the very moment in which they appear for the fiBt time.

0.1 .2 . Boundaries of the research

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Dealing as jt does with all these subjects, a project for a general semiotics will encounter some boundaries or thresholds. Some of these must be posited by a purely transitory agreement, otheB are detennined by the very object of the discipline. The former will be called 'political boundaries', the latter 'natural boundaries'; (it will be shown in 0.9 tl1at there also exists a third form of threshold, of an epistemological nature). A general introduction to semiotics has either to recognize or to posit, to respect or to trespass on all t. hese thresholds. The political bou11daries are of three types: (i) There are 'academic' limits in the.sense that many disciplines other than semiotics have already undertaken or are at present undertaking research on subjects that a semiotician cannot but recognize as rus own concern; for instance formal logic, philosophical semantics and the logic of natural languages deal with the problem o f the truth value of a sentence and with the various sorts of so-calJed 'speech acts', while many currents in cultural anthropology (for instance 'ethnomethodology') are concerned with the same problems seen from a different angle; the semiotician may express the wish that one of these days there will be a general semiotic discipline of w.hich all

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A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

these researches and sciences can be recognized as particular branches; in the meantime a tentative semiotic approach may try t o incorporate the results of these disciplines and to redefine them within its own theorctjcaJ framework. (ii) There are 'co-operative • limits in the sense that various disciplines have elaborated theories or descriptions that everybody recognizes as having semiotic relevance (for instance both linguistics and information theory have done important work on the notion ·Of code; kinesics and proxemics are richly exploring non-verbal modes of communication. and so on): in this case a general semiotic approach should only propose a unified set of categories in order to make this collaboration more and more fruitful; at the same time it can eliminate the naive habit of translating (by dangerous metaphorical substitutions) the categories of linguistics into different frameworks. (iii) There are 'empirical' limits beyond which stand a whole group of phenomena which unquestionably have a semiotic relevance even though the various semiotic approaches have not yet completely succeeded in giving them a satisfactory theoretical definition: such as paintin� and many types of complex architectural and urban objects; these empirical boundaries are rather imprecise and are shifting step by step as new researches come into being (for instance the problem of a semiotics of architecture from 1 964 to 1974, see Eco 1973 e). By nah,ral boundaries I mean principally those beyond which a semiotic approach cannot go; for there is non-semiotic territory since there are phenomena that cannot be taken as sign-functions. But by the same term I also mean a vast range of phenomena prematurely assumed not to have a semiotic relevance. These are the cultural territories in which people do not recognize the u.nderlying existence of codes or, if they do, d o not recognize the semiotic nature of those codes, i.e., their ability to generate a continuous production of signs. Since I shall be proposing a very broad and comprehen· sive definition of sign-function - the refore challenging the above refus· als - this book is also concerned with such phenomena. These will be directly dealt with in this Introduction: tl1ey happen to be co,extensive with the whole range of cultural phenomena, ·however pretentious tl1.at approa ch may at first seem.

0.1.3. A theory of the fie This project for semiotics, to study tJ1e wl1ole of culture, and tl,us to view an immense ra11ge of objects and events as signs. may give the impression of an arrogant 'imperialism' on the part of semioticians. When a

/ntrod11ctlon

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discipline defines 'everything' as its proper object, and therefore declares itself as concerned with the entjre universe (and nothing else) it's playing a risky game. The common objection to the 'imperialist' semiotician is: well, if you define a peanut as a sign, obviously semiotics is then concerned with peanut butter as well - but isn't this procedure a little unfair? What J shall try to demonstrate in this book, basing myself on a highly reliable philo­ sophical and semiotical tradition, is that - semiotically speaking - there is not a substantial difference between peanuts and peanut butter, on the one hand, and the words /peanuts/ and /peanut butter/ on the other. Semiotics is concerned with everytl1ing that can be rake,, as a sign. A sign is everything which can be taken as significantly substituting for something else. This something else does not necessarily have to exist or to actually be somewhere at the moment in which a sign stands in for it. Thus semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything which ca,, be used in order to lie. If ·something cannot be used to telJ a lie-, conversely it cannot be used to tell the truth: it cannot in fact be used 'to tell' at all. J think that the f definition of a 'theory of the lie should be taken as a pretty comprehensive program for a general semiotics. •

0.2. 'Semiotics': field or discipline?

Any study of the limits and laws of semiotics must begin by determining whether (a) one means by the term 'semiotics' a specific discipline with its own method and a precise object� or whether (b) semiotics is a field of studies and thus a repertoire of interests that is not as yet completely unified. If semiotics is a field then the various semiotic studies would be justified by their very existence: it should be possible to define semiotics inductively by extrapolating from the field of studies a series of constant tendencies and therefore a unified model. If semiotics is a discipline, then the researcher ought to propose a semiotic model deductively which would serve as a parameter on which to base the inclusion or exclusiQn of the various studies from the field of semiotics. One cannot do theoretical research without having the courage to put forward a theory, and, therefore, an elementary model as a guide for subsequent discourse; all theoretic-al research must however have the courage to specify its own contradictions. and should n1ake them obvious where they are not apparent. As a result, we must, above all, keep in mind the semiotic field as It appears today, in all its many and varied forn1s a,1d in all its disorder. We

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A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS .

must then propose an apparently simplified research model. Finally we must constantly contradict this model, isolating all the phenomena which do not fit in with it and which force it to restructure itself and to broaden its range. In this way we shall perhaps succeed in tracing (however provisionally) the limits o f future semiotic research and of suggesting a unified method of approach to phenomena which apparently are very different from each other, and as yet irreducible. 0.3. Communication and/or signification

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At first glance this survey will appear as a list of communicative behaviors, thus suggesting one of the hypotheses governing my research: semiotics studies all cultural processes as processes of communication. Therefore each of these processes would seem to be permitted by an underlying system of sig,iifications. It is very important to make this distinction clear in order to avoid either dangerous misunderstandinp or a sort of compulsory choice imposed by some contemporary semioticians: it is absolutely true that there are some important differences between a semiotics of communication and a semiotics of signification; this distinction does not, however, set two mutually exclusive approaches in opposition. So let us define a communicative process as the passage of a signal (not necessarily a sign) from a source (through a transmitter, along a channel) to a destination. Jn a machine-to-machine process the signal bas no power to signify in so far as it may determine the destination sub specie stimuli. I n this case we have no signification, but we do have the passage of some infor­ mation. When the destination is a human being. or 'addressee' (it is not necessary that the source or the transmitter be human, provided that they emit the signal following a system of rules known by the human addressee), we are on the contrary witnessing a process of signification - provided that the signal is not merely a stimulus but arouses an interpretive response in the addressee. This process is made possible by the existence of a code. A cod.e is a system of signification, insofar as it couples present entities with absent units . When - on the basis of an underlying rule something actually pres.ented to the perception of the addressee stands f . or something else, there is signification. In this sense the addressee 's actual perception and interpretive behavior are not necessary for the definition of a significant relatio.nship as such: it is enough that the code should foresee an established correspondence between that which 'stands for' and its correlate, valid for every possible addressee even if no addressee exists or ever will exist .

- Jntroduct/on

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A signification system is an autonomous semiotic construct that has an abstract mode of existence independent of any poss.ible communicativ e act it makes possi �le. On the contrary (except for stimulation processes) every act . of comn1u111canon to or berween human beings - or any other intelligent biological or mechanical apparatus - presupposes a signification system as its necessary condition. • It is possible, if not perhaps particularly desirable, to establish a semiotics of signification independenlly of a semiotics of communication: but it is impossible to establish a semiotics of communication without a semiotics of signification. Once we admit that the two approaches must folJow different methodological paths and require different sets of categories, it is method· ologically necessary to recognize that, in cultural processes, they are strictly intertwined. This is the reason why the following directory of problems and re-search techniques mixes together both aspects of the semiotic phenomenon. I

0.4. Political boundaries: the field Granted this much, the following areas of contemporary re­ search - starting from the apparently more 'natural' and •spontaneous• communicative processes and going on to more complex 'cultural' sys­ tems - may be considered to belong to the semiotic field. Zoosemiotics : it represents the lower limit of semiotics because it concerns itself with the communicative behavior of non-human (and therefore non-cultural) communities. But th,rough the study of animal communication we can achieve a definition of what the biological com· ponents of human communication are: or else a recognition that even on the animal level there exist patterns of signification which can, to a certain degree, be defined as cultural and social. Therefore the semantic area of these terms is broadened and, consequently, also our notion of culture and society (Sebeok, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1973). Olfactory signs: Ron,antic poetry (Baudelaire) has already singled out the existence of a 'code of scents'. If there are scents with a connotative value in an emotive sense then there are also odors with precise referential values. These can be studi;d as indices (Peirce, 1 9 3 1 ) as proxemic indicators (Hall, 1966) as chemical qualifiers, etc. Tactile commu11ica1ion: studied by psychology, present and recogruzed in comm unication among the bJind and in proxemic behavior (Hall. 1�66), it is amplified to include clearly codified social behavior such as the kass, the embrace, the smack, the slap on the shoulder, etc. (Frank, 195 7; Efron,

1941 ). Co de1 of tasre: present in culinary practice, studi�d �Y �ul�� anthropology, they have found a clearly 'semiotic' systemat1zat1on m Leva,, Strauss ( 1964).

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Paralinguistics : studies the so-called suprasegmental features and the

frec variants which corroborate linguistic communication and which increas­

ingly appear as institutionalized and systematized. See the studies of Fonagy ( J 964), Stankiewicz ( 1964). Mahl and Schulze ( 1 964, with a bibUography of 274 titles). Trager ( 1964) subdivides all the sounds without linguistic structure into (a) ''voice sets", connected with sex, age, state of health, etc.; (b) paralanguage, divided into (i) ''voice qualities" (pitch range, vocal lip control, glottis control, articulatory control, etc.); (ii) ''vocalizations", in tum divided into (ii-I ) ''vocal characterizers" (laughing� crying, whimpering, sobbing, whining, whispering, yawning, belching, etc.), (li·2) ''vocal quali· fiers·· (intensity, pitc'h height, extent), (ii-3) ''vocal segregates" (noises of the tongue and lips which accompany interjections, nasalizations, breathing. interlocutory grunts, etc.). Another object of paralinguistics is the study of the language of drums and whistles (La .Barre, 1964 ). !tfedical iemiolics : until a short time ago this was the only type of research which might be termed •semiotics' or 'semiology' (so that even today there is still some misunderstanding). In any case it belongs to general semiotics (as treated in this book), and in two senses. As a study of the connection between certain signs or symptoms and the illness that they indicate, this is a study and a classification of indices in Peirce's sense (Ostwald, 1 964). As a study of the way in which the patient verbaljzes his own internal symptoms, this extends on its most complex. level to psychoanalysis, which, apart from being a general theory of neuroses and a therapy, is a systematic codification of the meaning o f certain symbols furnished by the patient (Morris, J 946; Lacan, 1966; Piro, 1967; Maccag,nani, 1967; Szasz, 196 1 ; Barison, 196 1 ). Kinesics and proxemics: the idea that gesturing depends on cultural codes is now a n acquired notion of cultural anthropology. As to pioneer studies in this field see De Jorio (1 832). Mallery ( 1 88 1 ), Kleinpaul (1 888), Efron ( 1941 ), Mauss ( 1950); as to contemporary developments .see Bird­ whistell ( l 9S2, 1 960, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1970), Guilhot ( 1962), LaBarre ( 1964), Hall ( 1 959,1966), Greimas ( 1968), Ekman and Friesen (1 969), Argyle ( 1 972) and others. Ritualized gesture, from etiquette to liturgy and pantomime, is studied by Civ'ian ( 1962, l 96S). Musical codes: the whole of mµsical science since the Pythagoreans has been an attempt to describe the field of musical communication as a rigorously structured system. We note that until a few years ago contem· porary musicology h.ad scarcely been influenced by the current structuralist studies., which are concerned with methods and themes that it had absorbed centuries ago. Nevertheless in the last two or three years musical semiotics has been definitely established as a discipline aiming to find its •pedigree' and developing new perspectives. Among the pioneer works let us quote the bibliography elaborated by J.J. Nattiez in Musique en jeu . S, 197 1 . As for the relationship between music and linguistics, and between m�sic and cultural anthropology, see Jakobson (1964 1 1 967), Ruwet ( 1 959, 1973) and lbi·Strauss ( l 96S, in the preface to The Raw and the Cooked). Outlines of

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Introduction

11

new trends are to b� found in Nattiez ( 1 9 7 1 , 1 972, 1 973), Osmond-Smith ( 1 9 � 2, 1973), Stefaru ( J 973), Pousseur ( 1 972) and others. As a matter of fact music �resents, on the one hand, the problem of a semiotic system without a semantic level (or a content plane): on the other hand . however, there are usical •signs' (or syntagms) with an explicit denotative value (trumpet n:i . signals 1n �he army) and there are syntagms or entire 'texts' possessing pre-cultural1zed connotative value ('pastorar or 'thrilling' music, etc.). In some historical eras music was conceived as conveying precise emotional and concep.t ual meanings, established by codes, or, at least, 'repertoires' (see. for the Baroque era, Stefani, 1 973, and Pagnini, 1 974). Formalized languages: from algebra to chemistry there can be no doubt that the study of these languages lies within the scope of semiotics. or relevance to these researches are the studies of mathematical structures (Vailati, I 909; Barbut, 1 966; Prieto , 1966; Gross and Lentin, I 967; Bertin, ' 1 967), not to forget the ancient studies of ars conibinatoria' from Raimundo LulJo to Leibniz (see Mall, l 968; Kristeva, 1968 as well as Rossi. l 960). Also included under this heading are the attempts to fmd a cosmic and 2 interplanetary language (Freudentahl, 1960 ( )), the structures of systems such as Morse code or Boole's algebra as well as the formalized languages ror electronic computers (see Linguaggi nel/a socierti e nella tecnica, 1970). Here there appears the problem of a "meta"'8emiology". (3 ) Written languages, f.lnknown alphabets, secret codes: whereas the study of ancient alphabets and secret codes has famous precedents in archeology and cryptography, the attention paid to writing, as distinct from the laws of language which writing transcribes, is relatively new (for a survey on classical bibliography see Gelb, 1952 and Trager, 1 972). We call to mind either studies such as that of McLuhan ( 1962) on the Weltanschauung determined by printing techniques, and the anthropological revolution of the "Gutenberg , Galaxy" or the • •grammatology, of Derrida ( 1 967b). Bridging the gap between classic semantics and cryptography are studies such as that of Greimas ( 1970) on ''ecriture cruciverbis1e " and all the studies on the topic of riddles and puzzles (e.g. Krzyzanowski, 1960). Natural languages : every bibliographical reference in this area should refer back to the general bibliography of linguistics, log.ic, philosophy of language , cultural anth ropology, psych.ology etc. We should only add that semiotic interests, though arising on &he one hand from studies in logic and the philosophy of language (Locke, Peirce, and so on), on the ot.her �� d assum e their most complete form in studies on structural lingu1St1cs (Saussure, Jakobson, 1-fjelmslev). Visual co111munication ; there is no need for bibliographical reference because this item is dealt with explicitly in this book (in ch. 3). But we must remember tha t studies of this kind cover an area extending from syste�s possessing the highest degree of formalization (Prieto, 1966)., through �ap�c syste ms (Bertin, 196 7) . color systems (Jtten, 196 1 ), to the study of 1coruc signs (Peirce, 1 9 3 1 ; Morris, l 946, etc). Th.is last notion has been particularly questioned in the recent years by

12

A THEORY OF SEM IOTICS

Eco ( 1 968, 1 9 7 1 , 1 973), Metz ( 1970, 1 9 7 1 ), Veron ( 1 9 7 1 , 1 973), Krampen ( I 973), Volli ( t 973) and others. The latest developments begin to recognize beneath the rather vague category of 'iconism' a more complex series of signs thus moving beyond Peirce;s t ripartition of signs into Sy,nbols. Icons and Indices. Finally at the highest levels we have the study of large iconographi� units (Panofsky and Schapiro in general), visual phenomena in mass communication, from advertisements to comic strips, from paper money system to playing-cards and fortune-telling cards (Lekomceva, J 962; Bgorov, 1 965), rebuses, clothes (Barthes, 1 967) until finally we come to the visual study of architecture (see Eco, 1 973 e), choreographical notation, geographic and topographic maps (Bertin, 1 967), and film (Metz, 1 970c, .1974; Bettetini, l 968 > 1 97 l , 1 973; and others). Systems of objects: objects as communicative devices come within the realm of semiotjcs, ranging from architecture to objects in general (see Baudrillard, 1968, and the issue of ••communications'' 13, 1 969 Les Objets). On architecture see Eco, 1968; Koenig, 1970; Garroni, 1 973; De Fusco, 1973. • Plot structure: ranging from the studies of Propp ( 1 928) to more recent European contributions (Bremond, 1 964, 1 966, 1 973; Greimas, 1 966, 1970; Metz, 1968; Barthes, 1 966; Todorov, 1966, 1 967, 1968, 1 970; Genette, 1 966; V. Morin. 1 966;..,Grit ti, 1966, J..,968). Worthy of emphasis are the studies of the Soviets (S�eglov, 1 962; Zolkovskij, 1 962, J 967; KarpinskajaRevzin, 1966; as well as the classic Russian formalists). The study of plot has found its most important development in the study of primitive mythology (Levi•Strauss, 1958a, l 9 S8c, 1964; Greirnas, 1 966; Maranda, 1968) and of games and tales belonging to folklore ( Dundes, I 964; Bea�jour, 1968; Greimas-Rastier, 1 968; Maranda, E.K. & P., 1 962). But it also reaches to studies on mass communication, from comic strips (Eco, 1 964) to the V detective story (S�eglov, 1 962 a) and the popular nineteenth-century romance (Eco, 1 965, 1967). Text theory: the exigencies of a 'transphrastic' linguistic and develop­ ments in plot analysis (as well as the poetic language analysis) have led semiotics to recognize the notion of text as a macro-unit, ruled by particular generative rules, in which sometimes the very notion of 'sign• - as an elementary semiotic unit - is practically annihilated (Barthes, 1 97 1 , 1973; Kristeva, 1969). As for a generative text grammar see van Oijk ( I 9,0) and Petofi ( 1 972). Cultural codes : semiotic research finally shifts its attention to phe· nomena which it wouJd be difficult to term sign systems in a strict sense, nor eve.n communicative systems, but which are rather behavior and value systems. I refer to systems of etiquette. hierarcl1ies and the so-called 'modelling secondaey systems' - under which heading the Soviets bring in myths, legends, primitive theologies which present in an organized way the world vision of a certain society (see Ivanov and Toporov, 1 962; Todor? v• 1 966) and finally t he typ?logy ? ' cultures (Lotman, 1 964, I 967 a), whJC� . study the codes which define a given cultural model (for example the code 0

Introduction

13

the me nta lity of medieval chivalry); finally models of social organ·1zat· 10n sueh . sy 1. • ste ( , � ms v1-Strauss. 1 947) or the organized as ram ily communicative net work of more advanced groups and societies (Moles, 196 7). A·esthetic texts: the semiotic field also spills over into the area . . . . s. Certainly aesthetics is also concerned trad1t1onaIIY beI ongi ng to aesth etacwit h non-semiotic aspects o.r art (such as the psychology of artistic creation the relations betw een artistic form and natural form, the physical: psy chological definition of aesthetic enjoyment, the analysis of the relations between art and society, etc.). But clearly all these problems could be dealt wit h from a semiotic point of view as soon as it is recognized (see J.7) that every code allows for an aesthetic use of its elements. Mass communication: as with aesthetics, this is a field which concerns many disciplines, from psychology to sociology and pedagogy (see Eco, 1964 ). But in most recent years the tendency has been to see the problem of mass communication in a semiotic perspective, while semiotic methods have been found useful in the explanation o( nume.rous phenomena of mass communication. The study of mass communication exists as a disciplirte not when it examines the technique or effects of a particular genre (detective story or comic strip, song or film) by means of a particular method of study, but when it establishes that all these genres. within an industrial society, have a characteristic in common· . The fheories and analyses of mass communication are in fact applied to various genres, granted: 1) an industrial society which seems to be comparatively homogeneous but is in reality full of differences and contrasts; 2) channels of commllnication which make it possible to reach not determined groups but an indefinite circle of receivers 1n various sociological situations; 3) productive groups which work out and send out given messages by industrial means. Whe n these t h ree conditions exist the differences in nature and effect between the various means of communication (movie, newspaper, television or comic strips) fade into the background compared with the emergence of common structures and effects. The study of mass communication proposes a unitary object inasmuch as it clai ms tha t the industrialization of communications changes not only the condit ions for receiving and sending out messages but (and it is with this e apparen t paradox tha t the m,ethodology of these studies is conc�rned) � very meaning of the message (which is to say that block of meanm� which the was thought to be an unchangeable part o.f the message as devised by y mass author irrespective of its means of diffusion ). In order to stu� ging from comm unication one can and should resort to disparate method� ran unit� Sl �dy of a an pl n ca e on t bu s; tic lis g sty lo d ho y to sociology an psyc ation are such phenomena only if the theories and analyses of mas� commuruc 3) . considered a.s one sector of a general semiotics {see Fa bbri, 197 tly converging on en . rr cu is ic or et rh f o · s ie ud Rhetonc. . • t'" ale revava 1 1n st · at1o · n wit · h the mmuruc co of e or ef er th nd (a the s tudy of mass commun1ca n ta·o · .

A THEORY O F SEMIOTlcs

14

intention of persuasion). A rereading o f traditional studies in the light of sem• iotics produces a great many new suggestions. From Aristotle to Quintili a through the medieval and Renaissance theoreticians u p to Perelman , rhetori� a ppe�rs as a second chapte� in the general study of semiotics (follo wing _ lin� 1st1cs) elaborate� centunes ago, �nd now providing tools for a discipline . which encompasses 1t. Therefore a b1bl1o graphy of the sen1iotic aspects of rhetoric seems identical with a bibliography of rhetoric (for a preliminary orientation sec La us berg, I 960; Groupe µ., 1970; Chatman, 1974).

O.S. Natural boundaries: two definitions o f semiotics 0.5. I . Saussure Now that we have surveyed the wJ1ote semiotic field in a somewhat approximate and disordered fashion, one question emerges: can these diverse problems and diverse approaches be unified? To answer such a question we must abandon mere description and hazard a provisional theoretical definition of semiotics. We could start by using the definitions put forward by two scholars who fore told the official birth and scientific organization of the discipline: Saussure and Peirce. According to Saussure (J 9 1 6) ''la langue est un systeme de signes exprimant des idees et par la comparable a l'ecriture, a ('alphabet des sourds-muets, aux rites symboliques, aux formes de politesse, aux signaux militaires, etc. etc. Elle est seulement le plus important de ces systcmes. On peu t done concevoir une science qui etudie la vie des signes au sein de la vie sociale; elle formerait une partie de la psychologje sociale, et par consequen t de la psychologie generate; nous la nommerons serniologic (du grcc semeion. 'signe'). Elle nous apprendrait en quoi consistent les signcs, quelles lois les regissent. Puisqu'eUe n'existe pas encore, on ne peut pas dire ce qu'elle sera; mais elle a droit a l'existence, sa place est determinee d'avance''. Saussure's defanition is rather important and has done much to increase semiotic awareness. As will be shown in chapter 1 the notion of a sign as a twofold entity (signifier and signified or sign·vel,icle and 1neat1i11g) has anticjpated and promoted all correlational definitions of sign-function. Insofar as the relationship between signifier and signified is established on the basis of a system of rules which is 'la la,1gue', Saussurean semiology would seem to be a rigorous semiotics of signification. But it is not by cl1ance tJ,at those who see semiotics as a theory of communication rely basically on Saussure's linguistics. Saussure did not defane the signified any too clearly, leaving i t half way between a mental image1 a concept and a psychological

Introduction

IS

realitYi but he di d clearly stress the fact that the signified •1 5 ·someth1n · g wh'1ch . . . wi th th e mental activity of anybody receiving .has to do a signi·fier.· accord'mg , . . t o Saussure signs •express ideas and provided that he did not share a Platonic interpretation of tJ1e term 'idea'. such ideas must be men tal events that concern a human mi nd . Thus the sign is implicitly regarded as a communica­ tive device taking place between two human beings intentionally aiming to communicate or to express something. It is not by chance that all the examples of semiological systems given by Saussure are without any shade of doubt strictly conventional ized systems of artificial signs, such as military signals. rules of etiquette and visual alphabets. Those who share Saussu re's notion o f semiologie distinguish sharply between intentional, artificial devices (which they call 'signs') and other natural or unintentional manifestations which do not, strictly speaking, deserve such a name.

0.5.2. Peirce In this sense the definition given by Peirce seems to me more comprehensive and semiotically more fruitful: "I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semioric, that is the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis" (1931, 5.488). ''By semiosis I mean an action, an influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of rl,ree subjects, such as a sign, its object and its interpretant, this lri•relative influence not being in anyway resolvable into actions between pairs'· (5.484). I shall define the 'interpretant' better later (chapter 2) . but. it is clear that the 'subjects' of Peirce's •semiosis' are not human subjects but rather th.rec abstract semiotic entities ' the dialectic between which is not affected by ' concrete communicative behavior. According to Peirce a sign is "something ' which stands to somebody for something in some respects or capacity (2.228). As will be seen , a sign can sfa11d for something else to somebody only because this 'standing•for• relation is mediated by an interpretant. I do not deny that Peirce also thought of the interpretant (which was another sign translating and explaining the first one, and so on ad ;,,jinin,,n) as a psychological event in the mind of a po�ible interpreter; I onJy mainta� that ft is possible to interpret Peirce's definition in a non.-anthropomorphac way (as is proposed in cl1apters J and 2). It is true that the same interpretau_on could also fit Saussure•s proposal ; but Peirce's definition offers �� someth�g more. It does not demand, as part of 8 sign's dofmition. the quaJ1t1es of bemg intentionally emitted and artificially produced.

..

A THEORY OF SEM IOTICS

16

The Peircean triad can be also applied to phenomena that d o not have a human emitter. provided that they do have a human receiver, such being the case with meteorological symptoms or any other sort of index. Those who redu·ce semiotics to a theory of communicational acts cannot consider sy.m ptoms as signs, nor can they accept as signs any other human behavioral feature from which a receiver infers something about the situation o f the sender even though this sender is unaware o f sending something to somebody (see for instance Buyssens. 1943; Segre, 1969 etc.). Since such authors maintain that they are solely concerned witl1 communica­ tion, they have the right to exclude a lot of phenomena from the set of signs. Instead of denying that right I would like to defend the right to establish a semiotic theory able to take into account a broad.er range of sign•phenomena. I propose to define as a sign everytl1i11g that, on the grounds of a previously established social convention, can be taken as son1ethi11g sta11ding for sometl1i11g else. In other terms I would like t o accept the definition proposed by Morris (1938) according to which ••something is a sign only because it is interpreted as a sign of something by some interpreter . • • . Semi­ otics, then, is not concerned with the study o f a particular kind of objects, but with ordinary objects insofar (and only insofar) as they participate in semiosis". I suppose it is in this sense that one must take Peirce's definition of the �standing·for' power of the sign ''i.n some respect o r capacity''. The only modification that I would introduce into Morris's definition is that the interpretation by an interpreter, which would seem to characterize a .sign, must be understood as the possible interpretation by a possible interpreter. But this point will be made clearer in chapter 2. Here it suffices to say that the human addressee is the methodological (and not the empirical) guarantee of the existence of a signification, that is of a sign-function established b.y a code. But on the other hand the supposed presence of a human sender is not the guarantee of the sign-nature of a supposed sign. Only under this condition is it possible to understand symptom and indices as signs (as Peirce does).

0.6. Natural boundaries: inference and signification 0.6.1 . Natural signs .

The semiotic nature of indices and symptoms will be examined and reformulated in ch. 3. Here we only need to consider two types of so-called 'signs' that seem to escape a communicational definition: they are (a) physical events coming from a natural .source and (b) human behavior not •

17 inte.n tionaJly em itted by its senders. Le t us Jook more closely at these two instances . We are a�le to in fer from smoke the presence of fire, from a wet spot the faTI of a raindrop, from a tra�k on th.e sand the passage of a given animal, and so on . All these are cases of 111fere11ce an d our everyday life is filled with a lot of these inferential acts. It is incorrect to say that every act of inference is a 'semiosic' act - even though Peirce did so- and it is probably too rash a statement to .assert that every semiosic process implies an act of inference, but it can. be maintained that there exist acts of infere11ce whicl, 1nus1 be recog,1ized as se111iosia acts. It is not by chance that ancient philosophy has so frequcntly associated signification and inference. A sign was defined as the evident antecedent of a consequent or the consequent of an antecedent when similar consequences have been previously observed (Hobbes, leviatltan, I ,3); as an entity from which the presen t or the future or past existence of another being is inferred (Wolff, Ontology, 1952),; as a proposition constituted by a valid and revealin,g connection to its consequent (Sextus Empiricus. Adv. math., VIII, 245). Probably this straightforward identifica• tion of inference and signification leaves many shades of difference une�­ plained: it only needs to be corrected by adding the expression 'when C1us association is culturally recognized and systematically coded'. The first doctor who discovered a sort of constant relationship between an array of red spots on the patient's face and a given disease (measles) made an inference: but insofar as this relatio,nship has been made conventional and has been registered as such in medical treatises a sen1io1ic conve111io11 (4 ) has been established. There is a sign every time a human group decides to use and to recognize something as the vehicle of something else. In this sense events coming from a 11a111ral so11rce must also be listed as signs: for there is a convention posi ting a coded correlation between an expression (the perceived event) and a content (its cause or its possible effect). An event can be a sign-vehicle of its cause or its effect provided that both the cause and the effect are not actually detectable. Smoke is only a sign of fire to the ex ten t that fue is no t actually perceived along with the smoke: but smoke can be a sign-vehicle standing for a non-visible fire . provided that a social rule has necessarily an d usually associated smoke with fire . •

0.6.2. Non-intentional signs The second case is one in which a human being perfom1s acts that are •

18

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

perceived by someone as s.ignalling devices.revealing something else.even if the sender is unaware of tl1e revelative property of !tis behavior. A typical example is gestural behavior. Under some conditions it is perfectly possible to detect the cultural origin of a gesturer because l1is gesture.s have a clear connotative capacity. Even if we do not kno,v tl1e socialized meanin� of those gestures we can at any rate recognize the gesturer as Italian, Jew, Anglo-Saxon and so on (see Efron, 1941) just as aln1ost everybody is able to recognize a Chinese or Gennan speaker as such even if he does not know Chinese or German. TJ1ese behaviors. are able to signify even though the sender does not attribute such a capacity to them. One might assume that this case is similar to that of medical symptoms: provided there is a rule assigning a cultural origin to certain gestural styles, those gestures will be understood as signs, independently of tl1e ,vilJ of the sender. But no one can escape the suspicion that, as long as the gesture is perfonned by a human being, there is an underlying significative intention. So in tttls case our example is complicated by the fact that we are dealing with something whicl1 has strong links witl1 communicational practice. If in the case of symptoms it was easy to recognize a signification relationship without any suspicion of actual communication, in this second case tl1ere is always the suspicion that the subject is prete11di11g to act unconsciously with a specially communicative intention; he may, on the other hand, want to show his communicative intention, while the addressee interprets his behavior as unconscious. Moreover, the subject can act unconsciously wl1ile the addr·essee attr.ibu.tes a misleading intention to him. And so on. Tl1is interplay of acts of awareness and unawareness, and of the attribution of volu.ntarity and involuntarily to the sender, generates many communicative exchanges that can give rise to an entire repertoire of mistakes, allii!re pe11sees, double tl1inks and so on. Table 1 should generate all possible understandings and misunder· standings. S stands for Sender, A for Addressee, IS for 'the intention attrib· uted to the Sender by the Addressee' > while + and - mean either intentional/ unintentiona1 emission (for the Sender) or conscious/unconscious reception (for the Addressee): .In case number I , for instance, a liar intentionally shows the signs of a given sickness in order to deceive the addressee., wl1ilc the addres· see is quite well aware �at the sender is lying. In case number 2 the deception is successfuJ. In cases number 3 and 4 the sender intentionally emits a significant bel1avior which tltc addressee receives as a simple stimulus devoid of any in ten· tionality: as when, in order to get rid of a boring visitor, I drum on tl1e desk with my fingers, thus expressing nervous tension. The addressee may onlY

I

Jntroductlon

19 Table 1

l

2

3

4 5 6 7

8

s

A

IS

+ + + + -

+ +

+

-

-

-

•

+

+ •

-

-

(+)

(-)

+

-

(+)

(-}

perceive it as a subliminal stimulus which irritates him; in such a case he cannot attribute either intentionality or unintentionality to me (which is why + and - are put into brackets), although later he might (or might not) realize that my behavior was intentional. Cases 1 and 2 also express the opposite of the last situation: I drum intentionally and the addressee perceives my behavior as significant, though he may or may not attribute to me a specifically significative intention. In all these cases (which could constitute a suitable combinatorial explanation of many interpersonal relations, of the type studied by Goffman (1 963, 1967, 1969)), behaviors become signs because of a decision on the part of the addressee (trained by cultural convention) or of a decision on the part of the sender to stimulate in the addressee the decision to take these behaviors as signs. •

0.7. Natural boundaries: the lower threshold

0.7. I . Stimuli If both non-human and human but unintentional events can become sign·s, then semiotics has extended its domain beyond a frequently fetishized threshold : that which separates signs from things and artificial signs from natural ones. But while gaining this territory, general semiotics inevitably loses its grip on another strategical position to which it had unduly laid claim. For since everything can be understood as a sign if and only if there exists a convention which allows it to stand for something else, and since some behavioral responses are not elicited by convent.ion, stimuli cannot be regarded a s signs.

20

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

nt, a dog salivates when me eri exp lov Pav wn no ll·k we the to g din cor Ac itioned stimulus. The ring of stimulated by the ring of a bell because of a cond diation. However, from the the bell provokes salivation without any other me ry ring must corre·spond t point of view of the scientist, who knows that � eve _ (even af the dog is not there): there 1 salivation, the ring stands for salivation is a coded correspondence between two events so that one can stand for the other. There is an old joke according to which two dogs mee t in Moscow , one of them very fat and wealthy, the other pathetically emaciated. The latter asks the former: "How can you find food?". The former zoosemiotically replies: ''That's easy. Every day, at noon. I enter the Pavlov Institute and I begin to salivate: immediately afterward a conditioned scientist arrives, rings a bell and gives me food". In this case the scientist reacts to a stimulus but the dog establishes a sort of reversible relationship between salivation and food : it knows that to a given stimulus a given reaction must correspond and therefore the dog possesses a code. Salivation is for it the sign of the possible reaction on the part of the scientist. Unfortunately for dogs, this is not the way things are - at least within the framework of classical experiment: the sound of the bell is a stimulus for the dog, which salivates independently of any social code, while the psychologist regards the dog's salivation as a sign (or symptom) that the stimulus has been received and has elicited the appropriate response. To my mind, the difference between the attitude of the dog and that of the psychologist is an enlightening one: to assert that stimuli are nQt signs does not necessarily mean that a semiotic approach ought not to be concerned with them. Semiotics is dealing with sign•function i but a sign•function represents the correlation of two functives which (outside that correlation) are not by nature semiotic. However, insofar as - once correlated - they can acquire such a nature, they deserve some attention oo the part of semioticians. There are some phenomena that could be imprudently listed among supposedly non•signifying stimuli without realizing that 'in some respect or capacity' they can act as signs •to somebody' .

0.7.2. Signals For instance, the proper objects of a theory of information are not signs but rather units of transmission which can be computed quantitatively irrespective of their possible meaning, and which therefore must properly be called •signals' and not 'signs'. To assert that these si-gnals are of no importance for a semiotic approach would be rather hasty. One would then be unable to take into account the various features of the lingui5lic

Introduction

21

'significant' face of a sign, which, although strictly organized and computa· tively detectable, can be independent of its meaning and only possesses an oppositional value. Semiotics here come, face to face with its lower threshold. Yet the decision as to whether or not to respect this threshold seems to me a very difficult one to make.

O. 7 .3. Physical information One must undoubtedly exclude from semiotic consideration neuro• physiological and genetic phenomena, as well as the circulation of the blood or the activity of the Jun�. But what about the infonnationaJ theories that v.iew sensory phenomena as th.e passage of signals from , periphericaJ nerve ends to the cerebral cortex, or genetic heredity as a coded transmission of information? Probably it would be prudent to say that neurophysiologicaJ and genetic phenomena are not a matter for semioticians, but that neurophysiological and genetic infor111ationaJ theories are so. All these problems seem to suggest that one should consider this lower threshold more carefully and with greater attention, as will be done in chapter I. Granted that semiotics takes many of its own tools (for example the notions of information and binary choice) from disciplines dealing with this lower threshold, one can hardly exclude it from consideration without embarrassing results. The phenomena on the lower threshold should rather be isolated as indicating the point where semiotic phenomena arise from something non-.semiotic, as a sort of 'missing link' between the universe of ,signals and the unfverse of signs.

0.8. Natural boundaries: the upper threshold

0.8.1. Two hypotheses on culture I f the tenn 'culture· is accepted in its correct anth ropological sense, then we are immediately c·onfronted with three elementary cultural phenom­ ena which can apparently be denied the characteristic of being communica• live phenomena: (a) the production and emplo.yment of objects used for transforming the relationship between man and nature; (b) kinship relations as the primary nucleus of .institutionalized social relations; (c) ,the economic excl1ange of goods. We did not choose these three phenomena by acciden t: not only are they the constituent phenomena of every culture (along with the birth of

22

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

articulated language) but they have been singled out as the objects of various semio-anthropologicaJ studies in order to show that the whole of culture is signification and communication and that hu� ai1ity and s�ciety exist only when communicative and significative relationships are established. One must be careful to note that this type of research can be articulated through two hypotheses, of which one is comparatively 'radi· cal' _ a Kind of 'unnegotiable demand on tl1e part of semiotics' - and the other appears to be comparatively 'moderate'. The two hypotheses are: (i) the whole of culture must be studied as a semiotic phenomenon; (ii) all aspects of a culture can be studied as the contents of a semiotic activity. The radical hypothesis usually circulated in two extreme forms: "culture is only communication" and ''culture is no more than a system of structured significations". These formulas hint dangerously at idealism and should be changed to: ''the whole of culture slwuld be studied as a communicative phenomenon based on signification systems". nus means that not only can culture be studied in this way but - as will be seen - only b.y studyiqg it in this way can certain of its fundamental mechanisms be clarified. The difference between saying culture 'should be studied as' and 'culture is', is immediately apparent. In fact it is one thing to say that an object is essentialiter something and another to say that i t can be seen sz,b ratione of that something. 0.8.2. Tools l shall try and give a few examples. When Australopithecines used a stone to split the skull of a baboon, there was as yet no culture, even if an Australopithecine had in fact transformed an element ofnatu rein toa tool. We would say that culture is born when: (i) a thinking being establishes the new �unction of the stone (irrespective of whether he works on it, transforming it mto a flinl-$tone); (ii) he calls it ''a stone that serves for something'' (irrespective of whether he calls it so to others , or out loud); (iii) he iecognizes it as "the stone that responds to the. fun ction F and that has the name Y'' (irrespective of whether he use s tt as suc·h a second tim e: it is sufficient that he recognizes it). ($· ) These three conditions result in a sem iotic process of the fallowing . !°'"d: In Table 2, s , is the first stone used for the first time as a tool and S2 is another stone . differe nt in siz e, color and weight from the first on e. Now suppose that our Au,tralopithecine, after having used the first stone by

Introduction

23

Table 2

F I I I I I

St ------------- Name •

---------·----chance and after having discovered its possible function, comes upon a second stone (S2 ) some days later and recognizes it as a token, an individual occurrence of a more general model (St), which is the abstract type to whlch S1 also refers . Encounteri·ng 5:2 and being able to subsume it (along with S 1 ) under type St, our Australopithecine regards it as the sign-vehicle of a possible function F. S 1 and.S2 , as tokens of the type St, are significant forms refelling back to and standing for F·. According to a typical characteristic of every sign, St and S2 have not only to be considered as the sign-vehicle of a possible meaning (the function F): insofar as both stand for F (and vice versa) both are simultaneously (and from dfffere.nt points of view) the sign-vehicle and meaning of F, following a law of total reversibility. The possibility of giving a name to the type-stone (and to everyone of its occurrence) adds a new semiotic dimension to our diagram. As we will see in the pages devoted to the relationship between denotation and connotation (2.3) the name denotes the type-stone as its meaning but immediately connotes the function of which the object-stQ.ne (or the type-stone) is the signifier. In principle this represents no more than a signification system and does not imply an actual process of communication (except that it is impossible to conceive of the institution or such significant relationships if not for communicative purposes). However, tl1ese conditions do not even imply that two human beings actually exlst: t,he situation is equally possible in the case of a solitary, shipwrecked Robinson Crusoe. It is necessary, howev·er, that Whoever uses the stone for the first time should consider the possibility of passing on the information he has acquired to himself the next day, and in order to do this should elaborate a mnemonic device, a significant relationship between object

•

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

24

-

and function. A single use o f the stone is not culture. To establish how the function can be repeated and to transmit this infonnation from today's. solitary shipwrecked man to the same man tomorrow, is culture. The solitary man becomes both transmitter and receiver of a communication (on the basis of a very elementary code). It is clear that a definition such as this (in its totally simple tenns) can imply an identification of thought and language: it is a question of saying, as Peirce does (S.470-480) that even ideas are signs. But the problem appears in its extreme form only if one considers the extreme example of a shipwrecked individual communicating with himself. As soon as there are two individuals, one can translate the problem into terms not of ideas but of observable sign-velzicles. The moment that communication occurs between two men, one might well imagine that what can be observed is the verbal or pictographic sign with which the sender communicates to the addressee the object-stone and its possible function by means of a name (for example: /headsplitter/ or /weapon/). But with this we only arrive at our second hypothesis: the cultural object has become the content of a possible verbal communication. The primary hypothesis instead presupposes that the sender could commun.icate the function of the object even without necessarily involving the verbal name, by merely showing the object. It thus supposes that once the possible use of the stone has been conceptualized, the stone itself becomes the concrete sign of its virtual use. Th.us it is a question of stating (Barthes, 1 964 a) that once· society exists every function is automatically transformed into a sign of 1/1111 function. This is possible once culture exists. But culture exists only because this is possible. 0.8.3. Commodities

• •

•

We will move on now to phenomena such as economic exchange. We must above all eliminate the ambiguity whereby every 'exchange' would be 'communication' Oust as some think that every communication is a 'transfer'). True, as every communication implies an exchange of signals (just as the exchange of signals implies the transfer of energy); but th.ere are exchanges such as those of goods (or of women) which are exchanges not only of signals but also of consumable physical bodies. It is possible to _ const �er the exchange of commodities a., a semiotic phenomenon (Rossi· Landi, 1968) not because the exchange of goods implies a physical exchange, but because in the exchange the use value of the goods is transformed into _ the•r exchange value - and therefore a process of signincatlon or sy,nboliza·

Introduction

25

tion takes place, this later being perfected by the appearance of money. which sta,zds for something else.

The economic relationships ruling the exchange of commodities (as described in the first book of Das Kapital by Karl Marx) may be represented in the same way as was the sign-function performed by the tool-stone (Table 3}. Table 3

HL

'I '

•

Ev

------------ MONEY

In Table 3, Ca and � are two commodities devoid of any use value (this

having been semiotically represented in Table 2). In the first book of Das Kapiral Marx not only shows how all commodities, in a general exchange system, can become signs standing for other commodities: he also suggests that this relation of mutual significance is made possible because the commodities system is structured by means of oppositions (similar to those which linguistics has elaborated in order to describe - for example - the structure of phonological systems). Within this system ICommodiry number 1//) becomes the Commodity in which :the exchange value of «Conunodity number 2>> is expressed ( «Commodity number 2» being the item of which the exchange value is expressed by QCommodiry number JI). (6) This significant relationsltip is made possible by the cultural existence of an exchange parameter that we can record as Ev (exchange value). If in a use value system all the items referred back to a function F (corresponding to the use value) in an exchange value system Ev refers back to the quantity of human labor necessary to the production of both C1 and � (this parameter being recorded as H L). All these items can be correlated, in a more sophisticated cultural system, with the universaJ equivalent, money (which corresponds in some respects to the cultural name standing for both commodities and their abstract and 'type' equivalents, HL and Ev). The only difference between a coin (as sign-vehicle) and a word is that the word can be reproduced without •

•

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

26

economic effort while a coin is an irreproducible item (which shares some of the characters of its commodity-object). Titls simply means that there are different kinds of signs which must also be differentiated according to the economic value of their expression-matter. The Marxist analysis also shows that the semiotic diagram ruling a capitalistic economy differentiates both HL and Ev (which are mutually equivalent) from a third element. the salary received by the worker who perfonns HL. This gap between HL, Ev and Salary constitutes the plus value. But thls fact, highly significant from the point of view of an economic enquiry, does not contradict our semiotic ·model; on the contrary it shows how semiotics can clarify certain aspects of cultural life; and how, from a certain point of view, a scientific approach to economics consists in discovering_ the one-sidedness of some surface serniotic codes, that is their ideological quality (see 3.9.). If one turns back to Table 2 one realizes that even that was a one•sided representation of more complex relationships. As a matter of fact a stone has not only that particular function F (head-splitting), but many others too; and a possible global semiotic system (that is, a representation of a culture in its totality) must take into account every possible use value (that is, every possible semantic content or meaning) or a given object - thus recording every kind of functional synonymy and homonymy.

0.8.4. Women Let us now consider the exchange of women. In what sense can this be considered a symbolic process? In this context women would appear to be physical objects to be used through physiological operations (to be consumed as in the case of food and other goods). However, if the woman were merely the physical body with which the husband enters into sexual relations in order to produce sons, it could not then be explained why every man does not copulate with every woman. Why is man obliged by certain conven lions �o ch �ose one (or more, according to the custom) following very precise and mflex1ble rules of choice? Because it is only a woman's symbolic value which puts her in OpPQsition, within the system, to other women. The woman, the mo:"'ent she becomes •wife', is no longer merely a physical body: she is a sign which coMotes a system of social obJigations (Levi.Strauss, 1947). 0.8.5. Culture as a semiotic phenomenon So it i, clear how my first hypothesis makes a general theory of culture

/111,oduct/on

27

out of semiotics and in the finaJ anaJysis makes semiotics a substitute for culturaJ anthropology. But to reduce the whole of culture to semiotics does not mean that one has to reduce the whole of material life to pure mental events. To look at the whole of culture sub specie semiorica is not to say that culture is only communication and signification but that it can be understood more thorougl1ly if it is seen from the semiotic point of view. And that objects, bel1avior and relationships of production and value function as such socially precisely because they obey semiotic laws. As for the moderate hypothesis, it simply means that every aspect of culture becomes a semantic unit. To say that a class of objects (for example «automobile») becomes a semantic entity insofar as it is signified by means of the sign=vehicle /automobile/ will not get us very far. It is obvious that semiotics is also concerned with sodium chloride (which is not a cultural but a natural entity) the moment it is seen as the meaning of the sign-vehicle /salt/ (and vice versa). But our second hypothesis implicitly suggests something more, i.e., that the systems of meanings (understood as systems of cultural units) are organized as structures (semantic fields and axes) which follow the same semjotic rules as were set out for the- structures of the sign-vehicle. lp other words, «automobile» is not only a semantic entity once it is correlated with the sign-vehicle /automobile/. It is a semantic unit as soon as it is arranged in an axis of oppositions and relationships with other semantic units such as «carriage» ., «bicycle» or «feet» (in the opposition ''by car'' vs. ''on foot"). In this sense there is at least one way of considering all cultural phenomena on the semiotic level: everything which cannot be studied any other way in semiotics is studied at the level of structural semantics. But the problem is not that simple. An automobile can be considered on different Jevels (from different points of view): (a) the pl,ysical level (it has a weight, is made of a certain metal and other materials); (b) the mecluz11ical level (it functions and fulfills a certain function on the basis of certain laws); (c) the economic level (it has an exchange value, a set price); (d) the .social level {it indicates a certain social status); (e) the semantic level ( it is not only an object as such but a cultural unit inserted into a system of cultural units with which it enters into certain relationships which are studied by structural semantics, relation· ships which remain the same even if the sign-vehicles with which we indicate them are changed; even - that is - if instead of /automobile/ we were to say /car/ or /cocl,e/). Let us now return to level (d), i.e. to the social level. If an automobile (as an individual concrete object) indicates a certain social status. it has then

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

28

acquired 8 symbolic value, not only when it is an abstract class signified as the _ . . content of a verbal or iconic communication (that ts when the semantic untt «automobile» is indicated by means of the sign-vehicle /car/ or /voiture/ or /bagnole/). It also has symbolic value when it is used an object. I n other words, the object lauromobilel becomes the sign-vehicle of a semantic unit which is not only «automobile» but, for example, «speed» or «convenience» or «wealth». The object lautomobilell also becomes the sign-vehicle for its possible use. On the social level the object, as object•. already has its own sign function, and therefore a semiotic nature. Thus the second hypothesis, according to which cultural phenomena are the contents of a possible sig­ nification, already refers back to the first hypothesis, according to which cultural p}1enomena must be seen as significant devices. Now let us examine level (c) - the economic level. We have seen that an object, on the basis of its exchange value. can become the sign-ve}1icle of other objects. lt is only because all goods acquire a position in the system. by means of which they are in opposition to other goods, that it is possible to establish a code ofgoods in which one semantic axis is made to correspond to another semantic axis, and the goods of the first axis become the sign-vehicles for the goods of the second axis, which in tum become their meaning. Similarly even in verbal language a sign-vehicle Uautomobile/) can. become the meaning of another sign-vehicle (/car/) within a metalinguistic discussion such as we have been pursuing in the preceding pages. The second hypothesis refers therefore to the first hypothesis. I n culture every entity can become a semiotic phenomenon. The laws of signification are the laws of culture. For this reason culture allows a continuous process of communicative exchanges, in so far as it subsists as a system of systems of signification. Culture ca,, be

studied completely under a semiotic profile.

0.9. Epistemological boundaries But there is a third sort of threshold, an epistemological one, which does not depend on the definition of the semiotic object but rather on the definition of the theoretical 'purity' of the discipline itself. In other words the semiotician should always question both his object and his categories in order to decide whether he i s dealing with the abstract theory of the pure com �tenc � of an ideal sign-producer (a competence which can be posited in an axiomatic and highly formalized way) or whether he ls concerned witl1 a social phenomenon subject to changes and restructuring, resembling a network of intertwined partial and transitory competences rather than a

29 crystal-like and unchanging model. .I would put the matter this way: the object of semiotics may somewhat resemble (i) either the surface of the sea, where, independently of the c.ontinuous movement of water molecules and the interplay of submarine streams, there is a sort of average resulting fonn which is called the Sea, (ii) or a carefully ordered landscape, where human intervention continuously changes the fonn of settlements, dw,ellings, plantations, canals and so on. If one accepts the second hypot.hesis, which constitutes the epistemological assumption underlying this boo.k, one must also accept another condition of the semiotic approach which will not be like exploring the sea, where a ship's wake disappears as soon as it has passed, but more like exploring a forest where cart-trails or footprints do modify the explored landscape, so that the description the explorer gives of it must also take into account the ecological variations that he has produced. According to the theory of codes and sign production that I intend to propose, i t will be clear that the semiotic approach is ruled by a sort of indeterminacy principle: in so far as signifying and communicating are social functions that determine both social organization and social evolution, to 'speak' about 'speaking', to signify signification or to communicate about communication caooot but influence the universe of speaking, signifying and communicating. The semiotic approach to the phenomenon of 'semiosis' must be characterized by this kind of awareness of its own limits. Frequently to be really 'scientific' means not pretending to be more �scientific' than the situation allows. In the 'human' sciences one often finds an 'ideological fallacy' common to many scientific approaches, which consists in believing that one's own approach is ·not ideological because it succeeds in being 'objective' and 'neutral'. For my own part, J share thesame skepticaJ opinion that all enquiry is 'motivated'. Theoretical research is a form of soc.ial practice. Everybody who wants to know something wants to know it in order to do something. Jf he claims that .he wants to know it only in order 'to know' and not in order •to do' it means that he wants to know it in order to do nothing, which is in fact a surreptitious way of doing something, i.e. leaving the world just as it is (or as his approach assumes that it ought to be). Ceteris paribus, I trunk that it is more 'scientific' not to conceal my own motivations, so as to spare my readers any 'scientific' delusions. If semiotics is a theory, tl1en it should be a theory tf1at permits a continuous critical intervention in semiotic phenomena. Since people speak, to explain why and how they speak cannot help but detennine their future way of speaking. At any rate, I can hardly deny that it detcnnines my own way of speaking. •

30

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

•

NOTES er th e discipline sho�ld b� �a�led th he � to as on si us sc di e t .· There is som erence to Saussure s dcf1n1t1o n; f re th wi y' og ol mi 'Se Sem101 · 1cs or Sem,·o/ogy · 's an d Morns · p e · •. eu� o e. f os th to e nc re e f re h it w ' tic io e m 's 'Semiotics· or eak of semt?logr �1 t� re fe rence to a sp ly ab um es pr uld co e Furthermore on s t1c g u1 sign� as n� �?re lm s rd ga re nd a , ns sig s e i ud st ich h general discipline w. as. t ur�e.d saus�ure s d ef_1n1t1on 4 h ) a 6 19 ( es rth Ba t bu ; ea ar ial ec than a sp transl1ngu1st1cs wh ic� exa mi ne s all a s o� i�J sem ng wi vie by upside down �1c J��s. 1s! gu I1n . sign systems with reference to _ a study o f sign systems So it would seem tha t anyone 1nchn1ng toward ak of sem iotics. On spe st mu ics ist gu lin on e enc end dep ary ess nec no that has ssure's suggestion in the other hand the fact that Barthes has interprete d Sau al the way he has does not prevent us from going back,to t�o ?ripn meaning. However here I have decided to adopt th e formula sen11ot1cs once and for all with�ut paying attention to argume nts about the philosophical and m:thodological implications of the two terms, thu s com plyi ng with the decision taken in January 1969 in Paris by an international com mitt ee which brought into existence the International Association for Semiotic Studies. Sticking to Ockham's razor, som e other important distinctions are not taken into account in this book. Hjelmslev (1943) , for instance, proposes to divide semio·t ics into (a) scientific semiotic and (b) non-scientific se 1niotic, both studi.ed by (c) mctasemiotic. A metasemiotic studying a .non-scientific semiotic is a semiology, whose terminology is studied by a m etasemiology.ln· sofar as there also exists a connotative semiotic, there will likewise be a meta­ (connotative) semiotic. This division, however, do es not take into account (for historical reasons) many ne w approaches to significant and com.munica­ tive phenomena. For instance, Hjelmslev called 'connotators' such phenomena as tones, registers, gestures which, .not be ing a t that time th e object of a scientific se miotics, should have been studied by a .metasemiology, while today the same phenomena fall within t he domain of paralinguistics, which wo�ld seem to _be a 'scientific semiotic'. Hjelmslev's great credit was that of having emphasized that there is no obj ect which is not illuminated by linguistic (and semiotic) theory. Even if his se miotic hie rarchy could be re.formulated, his proposals must be constantly kept in mind . Following Hjelmslev, Metz ( 196 6 b) had proposed calling all the formaliiations of the nat�ral sciences 'semiotics,• and those of the hum an scie nce s •se miology'. Greim� ( 1970 ) suggests applying the term 'semiotics' to the sciences of expr�sio� and the te rm •semiology• to the scie nces o f conte nt. Various other , ct_as�afa�tions have been proposed, such as those of Peirce and Morris, or the d1st1nc!1°n propose d by th e Soviet school of Ta be tween •primary rtu modelh�g systems· (the pr�per �bject of linguistics) an secondary model ling d ' �stems · Some other class1ficat1ons can be fou nd in e discussion published th m Ap Gprfofaches lo Sc,niotics (Sebeok, Bateson the one as Ha su ye 96 ch s 4) l b ' • _Y o _man. · (a ) de tect1·ve models (ind · ices)· {b) se man tic codes· (c) • com_ mun1cat1ve syst. ems in · · the strict sense; (d) social relationsi ( e) •Pheno . eraction between speakers. S e ( men).a 0f int e also Sebeok ( J 97 3) and Garroni 197 3

Introduction

31

2. But see the objections raised to this book by Robert M.W. Dixon in his review in linguistics, S, where he observes that even mathematical formulae, considered 'universal' by the author, are abstractions from Indo·European syntactical models, and that they can the refore be understood only by someone who already knows the codes of certain natural languages. 3. This concerns the need for a hyperformalized language, farmed by empty signs. and adapted to the description of all semiotic possibilities. As for this project , proposed by modem semiologists, see Julia Kristeva "'L�expansion de la semiotique" ( 1 967). She refers to the research of th� Russian Linzbach and predicts an axiomatics through which "semiotics will be built up on the corpse of linguistics, a death already predicted by Linzbach, and one to which linguistics will become resigned after having prepared the ground for semiotics, demonstrating the isomorphism of semiotic practices with the other complexes of our unive.rse.'' Semiotics will therefore be presented as the axiomatic meeting-place of all possible knowledge, including arts and sciences. This proposal is developed by Kristeva in "Pour une semiologie des paragrammes" ( I 967) and in "Distance et anti-representation ° ( 1968), where she introduces Linnart Mall, Une approche possibl e du Sunyayada", whose study of the "zero-logical subject' and of the notion of 'e,mptiness' in ancient Buddhist texts is curiously reminiscent of Lacan's '"vide'. But it must be pointed out that the whole of this axiomatic program refers semiotics back to the characterisrica universalis of Leibniz, and from Leibniz back to the late medieval artes combinatoriae, and to Lullo. 4. One should establish from this point on what. a convenrion is. It is not so difficult to explain how someone can posit the conventional relationship between a red spot and measles: o.ne can use verbal language as a metalinguistic device. But what about those conventions that cannot rely upon a previous metalanguage? Paragraphs 3.6.7. to 3.6. 9. (about the mode of sign production called •invention') will be devoted to this subject. For a preliminary and satisfactory notion of ·convention' let us assume for the time being the one proposed by Lewis, J 969. S. Whether or not all this applies to the Australopithecine,s we do not know. It is sufficient t o maintain that all this must apply to the first being - as Piaget (1968, p. which performed a semiotic behavior. This could mean , 79) suggests - that intelligence precedes 'language . But this docs not mean that intelligence precedes semiosis. If the eq_ua � i�n ·�miosi� erbal language' is eliminated one can view intelligence and s1gn1f1cat1on as a single process. 6. Sin�e this is a book on semiotics and not only on linguistics. I will be obliged at times to quote a non.verbal device as the si�·vehicle of a gi�en cultural content (see chapter 2). tfaving adopted the dec1S1on of represent'lng the sicn·vchicles between slashes (/xxx/), and since in a book even the quotation of an object needs to be realized through a wor� . let "!'e assum_e tha t when something which is not a word is taken as a s1�-vehicl� . and !5 therefore represented by a word, this corresponding word will be wralte� ,n Italics bet ween double slashes (lxxxl). Double stashes thus mean «the obJect usually corresponding to this word». Thus /auton1obile/ represents the word 'automobile'• while lautomobilel represents the object usually called /automobile/. 0

N O I T A C I F I N 1 : SIG N IO T ICA N U M A N D COM

1.1. An elementary communicational model If every communication process must be explained as relating to a system of significations, it is necessary to single out the elementary structure of commu,,ication at the point where communication may be seen in its most elementary terms. Although every pattern of signification is a cultural convention, there is one communicative process in which there seems to be no cultural convention at all, but only - as was proposed in 0.7 - the passage of stimuli. This occurs when so-called physical 'infonnation' is transmitted between two mechanical devices. When a floating buoy signals to the control panel of an automobile the level reached by the gasoline, this process occurs entirely by means of a mechanical chain of causes and effects. Nevertheless, according to the principles of information theory, there is an 'informational' process that is in some way considered a communicational process too. Our example does not consider what happens once the signal (from the buoy) reaches the control panel and is converted into a visible measuring device (a red moving line or an oscillating arm): this is an undoubted case of sign-process in which the position of the arm stands for the level of the gasoline, in accordance with a conventionalized code.

32

Signification and Communication

33

But what is puzzling for a semiotic theory is the process which takes place before a human being looks at the pointer: although at the moment when he does so the pointer is the starting point of a signification process, before that moment it is only the final resi,lt of a preceding communicational process. During this process we cannot say that the position of the buoy stands for the movement of the pointer: instead of 'standing-for', the buoy stimulates, provokes, causes, gives rise to the movement of the pointer. I t is then necessary to gain a deeper knowledge of this type of process, which constitutes the lower threshold of semiotics. let us outline a very 1 simple con1municative situation< ) . An engineer - downstream - needs to know when a watershed located in a basin between two mountains, and closed by a waterr;ite, reaches a certain level of saturation, which he defines as •danger level'. Whether there is water or not; whether it is above or below the danger level ; how much above or below; at what rate it is rising; aU this consticutes pieces af information which can be transmitted from the watershed, which will therefore be considered as a sot1rce of information. So the engineer puts in the watershed a sort of buoy which, when it reaches danger level, activates a transmitter capable of emitting an electric signal which travels through a channel (an electric wire) and is picked up downstream by a receiver; this device converts the signal into a given string of elements (i.e. releases a series of mechanical commands) that constitute a message for a destination apparatus. The destination, at this point, can release a mechanical response in order to correct the situation at the source (for instance opening the watergate so that the water can be slowly evacuated). Such a situation is usually represented as follows: noise

!

r•me�ge-+desnnauon source-+transmitte, •signal-+channel-+signal-+receive.-+1TI . __. _ L._ I

.

•

code

In this model the code is the device which assures that a given electric signal produces a given mechanical message, and that this elicits .a given response. The engineer can establish the following code; presence of signal (+ A) versus absence of signal (. A). The signal + A is released when the buoy sensitizes the transmitter.

A THEORY OF SEM IOTICS

34

esence of potential noise pr e th es se re fo so al ' el od M But this 'Watergate d alter the nature of ul co at th ce an rb stu · di y an y sa L:Ch 1s to on the CnL.anne1 , W1u ucing + A when • A is od pr or , ct te de to lt cu ffi di · em . . the s1gna1s, making th a 1c te s code. pl hi m to co s ha er ne gi en · e th e or ef er · Th . intende d and vice versa · . + A and y , el al m gn na of si ls ve le t en er ff di · stance ' if he establishes two 2 ) For m . n may accordingly ( 1o at d tin e es th d an . ls na sig e re th of s se spo +B. he then di se . on sp re of s nd ki e re th e as le re r to de or be instructed in

+ A produces 'state of rest '

•

+ B produces 'feedback' nal (meaning that • AB (and + AB) produces an emergency sig something does not work)

This complication of the code increases the cost o f the entire apparatus but makes the transmission of informatio.n more secure. Nevertheless there can be so much noise as to produce + A instead of+ B. In order to avoid this risk, the code must be considerably complicated. Suppose that the engineer now disposes of four positive signals and establishes that every message must be composed of two signals. The four positive signals can be represented by four different levels but in order to better control the entire process the engineer decides to represent th.em by four electric bulbs as well. They can be set out in a positional series, so that A is recognizable inasmuch as it precedes B and so on; they can also be designed as fou r bulbs of differing colors., following a wave-length progression (green, yellow, orange, red). It must be made absolutely clear that the destination apparatus does not need to •see' bulbs {for it has no sensory organs): but the bulbs are useful for the engineer so that he can follow what is happening. I should add that the correspondence between electric signals (received by the transmitter and translated into mechanical messages) and the lighting of the bulbs (obviously activated by another receiver) undoubtedly consti· tutes a new coding phenomenon that would need to receive separate attention; but for the sake of convenience I shall consider both the message to the �estination and the bulbs as two aspects of the same phenomenon. At . this �int the engineer has - at least from a theoretical point of view - 1 6 possible messages at his disposal: AA AB AC AD

BA BB BC BD

CA CB CC

DA

DB

DC

CD DD

Signification and Communication

3S

Since AA ,, BB, CC, DD are simply repetitions of a single signal, and therefore cannot be instantaneously emitted, and since six messages ate simply the reverse of six others (for instance, BA is the reverse of AB, and the temporal succession of two signals is not being considered in this case), the engineer actually disposes of six messages: AB, BC, CD, AD, AC and BD. Suppose that he assigns to the message AB the task of signalling 0danger level'': He has at his disposal 5 'empty' messages. Thus the engineer has achieved two interesting results: (i) it is highJy improbable that a noise \yill activate two wrong bulbs and it i.s probable that any wrong activation will give rise to a •senseless' message, such as ABC or ABCD: therefore it is easier to detect a misfunctioning; (ii) since the code has been complicated and the cost of the transmission has been increased. the engineer may take advantage of this investment to amortize it through a more informative exploitation of the code. I n fact with such a code he can get a more comprehensive range of infonnation about what happens at the source and he can better instruct the destination, selecting more events to be informed about and more mechanical responses to be released by the apparatus i n order to control the entire process more tightly. He therefore establishes a new code, able to signal more states of the water in the watershed and to elicit more articulated responses (Table 4). Table 4 (a) bulbs

AB

BC CD

AD

-

-

-

(b) states of water or notions about the states. of water danger level alarm level security level insufficency level

(c) responses of the destination

-

-

water dumping state of alarm state of rest water make-up

The fact of having complicated the code has introduced redt,ndancy into it: two signals are used in order to give one piece of infonn·ation. But the redundancy has also provided a supply of messages, thus enabling the engineer to recognize a larger array of situations at the source and to establish a larger array of responses at the destination. As a matter of fact redundancy has also provided two more messages (AC and BD) that the engineer does not

A THEORY OF SEM lOTrcs

36

nal other states within the sig d ul co he ich wh of s an me by wan t to use and ditional response�) : th ey could also ad te ria op pr ap th wi ed bin om (c ed watersh . ing el be lev nalled both r sig ge (dan es mi ny no sy ce du ro int to r de or in be used been �dopted would se m to s ha h tlc wl de co the ay yw An ). AC by � by AB and and at would be unwise to be an optimal one for an engineer's purposes complicate it too much. (3 )

•

1.2. Systems and codes

Once the Watergate Model is established and the engineer has finished his project, a semiotician could ask him a few questions, sucl1 as: (i) what do you call a 'code'? the device by which you know tl1at a given state in the watershed corresponds to a given set of illuminated bulbs? (ii) if so, does the · mechanical apparatus possess a code, that is. does the destination recognize · .the 'meaning ' of the received message or does it simply respond to mechanical stimuli? (ill) and is the fact that the destination responds to a give.n array of stimuli by means of a given sequence of responses based on a code? (iv) who is that code for? you or the apparatus? (v) and anyway, is it not true that many people would call the internal organization of the system of bulbs a code, irrespective of the state of things that can be signalled through its combinational articultation? (vi) finally, is not the fact that the water's infinite number of potential positions within the watershed have been segmented into four, and only four 'pertinent' ·states, sometimes called a 'code'? One could carry on like this for a Jong time. But it seems unnecessary, since it will already be quite clear that under the name of /code/ the engineer is considering at least four different phenomena: (a) A set of sig,10/s ruled by internal combinatory laws These signals ate not necessarily connected or connectabte with the state of the water that they conveyed in the Watergate Model, nor with the destinatio responses· n t�t the engineer decided they should be allowed elic to it. Tuey could convey different notions about thin� and they could elicit a different set of responses: for instance they could be used to communicate the engineer•s love for the next-watershed girl, or to pe rsuade the girl to return his passion. M��e�ver these signals can travel through the channel without conveying or eltcitin� nything, simply in order to test the mechanical efficiency of the � transmi tting and receiving apparatuses . Finally they can be conside red as a pure combinational structure that on ly takes the fonn of electric signals by chan�e, an interplay of empty positions and mutual oppositions, as will be seen m 1 .3. They could be calle d a sy11tactlc syste1t1 • • •

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Signification and Communication

37

(b) A set of states of the water which are taken into account as a set of notions about the state of the water and which can become (as happened in the Watergate Model) a set of possible com �unicative contents. As such. they _ can be conveyed by signals (bulbs}, but are tndependent of them: in fact they could be conveyed by any other type of signal, such as flags, smoke, words, whistles, dru ms and so on. let me ca'll this. set of 'contents' a semantic

system.

(c) A set of possible behavioral responses on the part of the destination. These responses are independent of the (b) system: they could be released in order to make a washing-machine work or (supposing that the engineer was a 'mad scientist') to admit more water into the watershed just when danger level was reached , thereby provoking a flood. They can also be elicited by another (a) system: for example the destination can be instructed to evacuate the water only when, by mea.ns of a photoelectric cell, it detects an image of Fred Astaire kissing Ginger Rogers. Communicationally speaking the re­ sponses are the proofs that the message has been correctly received (and many philosophers maintain that 'meaRing' is nothing more than this detectable disposition to respond to a given stimulus (see Morris, 1946)): but this side of the problem can be disregarded, for at present the- responses are being considered independently of any conveying element. (d} A rule coupling some items from the (a) system with some from the (b) or the (c) system. This rule establisJtes that a given array of syntactic signals refers back to a given state of the water, or to a given 'pertinent' segmentation of the sen1antic system; that both the syntactic and the semantic units, once coupled, may correspond to a given response; or that a given array of signals corresponds to a given response even though no semantic unit is supposed to be signalled; and .so on. Only this complex form of rule may properly be caJled a �code'. Neverthe less in many contexts the term /code/ covers not only the phenomenon (d) _ as in the case of the Morse code - but also the notion of purely combinational systems such as (a), (b) and (c). For inSla� ce, th� . so.called 'phonological code' is a system like (a); the so-callc� g�net_ic code _ . . seems to be a syste1n like (c); the so-called 'code o f kinship lS either an underlying combinational system like (a) or a system of pertinent parenthood units very similar to (b). . . m· Since this homonymy has empirical roots and can ln so�e circu stances prove itself very useful, J do not want to challenge it. But in order to avoid the considerable theoretical darnage that its presence can produce, one must clearly distinguish the two kinds of so-called 'codes• that it confuses: I

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

38

ch as the syntactic, semantic and su s nt me ele of m ste sy a ll e ca or shall theref (or code as system) ; e od s-c an ) (c d an ) (b ), (a in d ne tli ou bel,avioral ones th the items of another or wi e od s-c e on of ms ice e th g lin up whereas 8 rule co ply be called a code. sim ll wi )1 (d in d ne tli ou as , es od s-c r he ot several also subsist independently n ca t tha es' tur uc 'str or s tem sys are S-codes purpose, an d as sucl1 may be of any sort of significant or communicative es of generative gramm ar. typ s iou var by or ory the on ati orm inf by d studie osi tionally structured and They are made up of finite sets of el�ments opp h governed by combinational rules that can generate bot finite and infinite s strings or chains of these elements. However, in the social science (as well as in some mathematical disciplines), such systems are almost always recognized or posited in order to show how one such system can convey all or some of the elements of another such system , the latter being to some. extent correlated with the fonner (and vice versa). I n other words these systems are usually taken into account only insofar as they constitute one of the planes of a corrclational function called a 'code'. Since an s-code deserves theoretical attention only when it is inserted within a significant or communicational framework (the code), the theorel· ical attention is focused on its intended purpose: therefore a non-significant system is called a 'code' by a sort of meto11ytnical transference, being Wlderstood as part of a semiotic whole with w.hich it shares some properties. Thus an s-code is usually called a 'code' but this habit relies on a rhetorical convention that it would be wise to eliminate. On the contrary the term /s-code/ can be legitimately applied to the semiotic phenomena (a), (b) and (c) without any danger of rhetorical abuse since all of these are, technically speaking, 'systems', submitted to the same formal rules even though composed of very different elements; i.e. (a) electric signals� (b) notions about states of the world, {c) behavioral responses. •

1.3.

The s-code as structure

Taken independently of the other system s with which it can be correl�ted, an s-code is a structure ; that is, a system (i) in which every value is e�tabltshed by positions and differences an d (ii) which appears only when different phenomena are mutually compared with reference to the same syStem of relations. "That arrangeme nt alone is structured which meets two conditions · that it bc a system, rule , d by an inte · rnal cohesiveness; and thJS . cohesiveness, inaccessible to obse rvation in an isolated system, be revealed in the study f transformations, through which the similar properties in � apparently different systems ar e brought to light" {Levi-Strauss, 1960),

Signification and Communication

39

In the Watergate Model systems (a), (b) and (c) are homologou sly . structured. Le � us consider system (a): there are four elements (A; B; C; D) which can be either present or absent: A = 1 000 B = 0100 C = 0010

D = 0001

The message they generate can be detected in the same way;

AB = 1 1 00 CD = 001 1 BC = 0 1 1 0 AD = 1001

AB is

recognizable because the order of its features is oppositionally different from that of BC, CD and AD and so on. Each element of the system can be submitted to substitution and commutation tests, and can be gene13ted by the transformation of another element; furthennore the whole system could work equally well even if it organized four fruits, four animals or the four musketeers instead of four bulbs. The (b) system relies upon the same structural ,mechanism. Taking 1 as the minimal pertinent unit of water, the increase of water from insufficiency to danger might follow a sort of 'iconic' progression whose opposite would be the regression represented by the (c) system, in which O represents the minimal pertinent unit of evacuated water:

(b)

I1 1 1 1 1 JO (alarm) (security) 1 100 1000 (insuff.) (danger)

By

(c)

0000 (evacuation) 000 1 (alann) 001 1 (rest) O l J l (admission)

the way, if an inverse symmetry appears between (b) and (c), this is because the two systems are in fact considered as balancing each other out; whereas the representation of the structural properties of the system (a) does not look homologous to the other two because the correspondence between the strinp l n (a) and the units of (b) and (c) was arbitrarily chosen. One

I'

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

er t� sign � ''danger" and rd o in , i Ii (J D C B A � ge sa :d have chosen the mes -ul co ---is choice would have tJt , .3 J J . in d te no as w as 1 "evacuata'on". But , · to eI.1c·t r ri�k of n oise. S.ince �he three te ea gr to ess oc pr l na io at . submitted the inform possible correlation , I am r ei th to g in rd co ac ed er sid on systems are nOt here· C f the others, rel on tly en nd pe de in n ca ch ea � w ho � ; only concerned to show . generate different comb1nat1ons to le ab g in be is th , trix ma l ,ra the sanie sm,cn fonnat s of th e three systems e th n he W s. le ru l na tio na bi m co following diverse r mutual transformation fo ial nt te po eir th d an s ce ren ffe di are compared, their same underlying structure. e th ve ha y the se au bec ly ise ec pr ar, cle become an important practical has tem sys a of ent em ang arr ral ctu The stru 4) . It makes a situation comprehensible C ties per function and shows certain pro the way for a possible and comparable to other situations, therefore preparing coding correlation. It arranges a repertoire of items as a structured whole in which each unit is differentiated from the others by means of a series of binary exc(usio11s. Thus a system (or an s-code) has an inren1al gran1mar that is properly studied by the mathematics of information. The mathematics of information, in principle, has nothing to do with engineering the transmission of information, insofar as i t only studies the statistical properties of an. s-code. These statistical properties permit a correct and economic calculation as to the best transmission of information within a given informational situation, but the two aspects can be considered independently. What is important, on the other hand, is that the elements of an informational 'grammar' explain the functioning not only of a syntactic system, but of every kind of structured system, such as for ,example a semantic or a behavioral one. What information theory does not explain is the functioning of a code as a correlating rule. I n this sense information theory is neither a theory of signification nor a theory of communication but only a theory of the abstract combinational possibilities of an s-code. �

1 •4 · Information, communication, signification

1.4.1. Some methodological distinctions .ze Let us su . an the sta . te of the present methodolo�cal situation : � The term /information/ has two ba sic senses: (a) it means a statistical · property of the soUTce, lJl . . ·ds 1t of . othe r t wor amo un desi the gnat es . inf;ormat1o n that can be rr,ansm , • 1tted; (b) 1t means a .precise amount 0f . se.1ected mformatio · n which· ,ws L- actually bee,, transmitted and recefVed. . . · nm In�onnatao sense (a) can be view . as eith . er (a, i) the informatlon at one 5

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Signification and Communication

41

dispo sal at a given natural source or (a, ii) the information at one's disposal once an s•code has reduced the equi-probability of that source. Information in sense (b) can be c�mputati�naUy studied either: as (b, i) the pa�ge through a channel of signals which do not have any communicative function and are thus simply stimuli, or as (b, ii) the passage through a channel of signals which do have a communicational function, which _ in other words - been coded as the vehicles of some content units. Therefore we mu st take into account /our different approaches to four different formal objects. namely: (a, i) the results of a mathematical theory of information as a structural theory of the statistical properties of a source (see 1 .4.2); this theory does not directly concern a semiotic approach except insofar as it leads to approach (a, ii); (a, ii) the results of a mathematical theory of information as a structural theory of the generative properties of an s-code (see 1 .4.3); such an approach is useful for semiotic purposes insofar as it provides the elements for a grammar of functives (see 2.1 .); (b, i) the resuJts of studies in informational engineering concerning the

process whereby non-significant pieces of information are transmitted as mere signals or stimuli (see 1.4.4)i these studies do not directly concern a semiotic approach except insofar as they Jead to approach (b.

ii) ;

(b, ii) the result of studies in informational engineering concerning the

processes whereby significant pieces of infom1ation used for communi· cational purposes are transmitted (see 1 .4.5); such an approach is useful from a semiotic point of view inS0far as it provides the elements for a theory of sign production (see chapter 3).

Thus a semiotic approach is principally ·interested in (a. ii) and(b, U);it is also interested in (a, i) arid (b, i) _ these constituting the lower threshold of semiotics - inasmuch as the theory and the engineering of information offe r • at useful arid more effective categories. way in As will be shown in chapter 2, a theory of codes, which studies the Which a system of type(� ii) becomes the content plane of another 5Ystem of the san1e type, will use categories such as 'mea ning' or 'content > T11ese hav.e nothin.g to do with the category of •information', since informat ion theory JS not concerned wi th the contents that the units it deals with can convey but, at best, with the internal combinational properties of the system of conveyed Units, insofar as this too is an s-code.( 5 )

42

A THEORY OF SEM IOTICS

-

1 .4.2. lnfonnation at the source

•

only th e measure of the is n io at rm fo in i) , (a e ns se According to system. The probability is the e bl ba ro -p ui eq an in th wi t en ev an probability of . zed and the ali be re to t ou total m tu at th s se ca of r be m nu e th n ee tw be ratio s o � events and the ie a se n ee tw be p hi ns io lat re e Th � s. se ca number of possible the relat1onsh1p between an is it to ted ec nn co ies ilit ab ob pr of series latter representing the the e, on l ica etr om ge a d an on ssi gre pro l arithmetica event to be realized among n binary logarithm of the former. Thus, given an of information represented nt ou am the n, tio liza rea of es iliti bab pro nt ere diff , by the occurrence of that event, once it has been selected is given by Jog rl = X In order to isolate that event, x binary choices are necessary and the realization of the event is worth x bits of information. In this sense the value 'information' cannot be identified with the possible cont ent of that event when used as a communicational device. What counts is the number of al ternatives necessary to define the event without ambiguity . Nevertheless the event, Inasmuch as it i s selected, is .already a detected piece of infonnation, ready to be eventually transmitted, and in this sense it concerns theory (b, i) more specifically. On the contrary. information in the sense (a. i) is not so much what is ·said'' as what can be 'said'. Information represents the freed o m of choice available in the possible selection of an event and therefore it is first of all a statistical property of 1he source. Information is the value of equi•pro·bability among several combinational possibilities, a value which increases along with the number of possible choices: a system wl1ere not two or siXteen but millions of equi-probable events are involved is a highly informative system. Whoever selected an event from a source of this kind would receive many bits of information. Obviously the received information would represent a reduction. an impoverishment of that endless wealth of possible choices which existed at the source before the event was chosen. Insofar as it measures the equi-probability of a un.iform statistical �stribution at the source, information _ according to its theorists - ls directly proportional to the 'entropy' of a sys tem (Shannon and Weaver, . � 949), since the en tropy of a system is the state of equi•probability to which its ele ments tend. I f infonnation is sometimes defined as entropy and �mct imes as 'neg-entropy• (and is therefore considered inversely propor· . . t1onal to the ent ropy) t1.. ,.. "' ation · is · because 1n ,us the former case inform

Signification and Communication

43

understood in sense (a, i). while in the latter information is understoo . d in . orm . . 1 at n 1s at ") , t to n as a seIected, transmitted and fi sense (b, 1 . _ Ii received piece of information. 1 .4.3. Information of the s...code Nevertheless in the preceding pages information has instead appe ared to be the measure of freedom of choice provided by the organized structure known as an s-code. And in the Watergate Model the s-code appeared as a reductive network, superim posed on the infinite array of events that could have taken place within the watershed in order t.o isolate a few pertinent events. I sl1all now try to demonstrate how such a reduction is usually due to .a project for transmitting information (sense b, i), and how this project gives rise to an s-code that can in itself be considered a new rype of source endowed with particular informational properties - which are the object of a theory of s-codes in the sense (a. ii).

Examples of this kind of theoiy are represented by structural phonology and many types of distributional linguistics, as well as by some structural theories of semantic space (for instance Greimas. 1966, 1970), by theories of generative grammar (Chomsky & Miller, 1968; etc.) and by many theories of plot structure (Bremond� J 973) and of text-grammar (Van Oijk, 1970; Petofi, 1 972). If all the letters o f the alphabet available on a typewriter keyboard were to constitute a system of very high entropy. we would have a situation of maximu m information. According to an example of Guilbaud's, we would say that, since in a typewriter page I can predict the existence of 25 lines, each with 60 spaces, and since the typewriter keyboard has (in this case) 42 keys - each of which can produce 2 characters - and since, with the addition of spacing (whic'h has the value of a sign), the keybo� can thus gIVen th81 25 �roduce 85 different signs, the result is the following prob�em: Imes of 60 spaces ma ke I 500 spaces availab.le, how manY different seque�ces • . each of th· e 85 51'o . ne provided of 1 ,500 spaces can be produced by choosrng 00on the keyboard? We can obiain· the total number of messages of length L provided by a . . that know e . w se ca r keY board of C signs, ou Jn L f o power . the . by rals1ng C to · . . n io at tu si we would be able to produce 8 S s .soo possible messages. This ss the messages are ble ssi po of equi- proba bility the ; rce sou the at which exists expressed by a number of 2 ,895 digits. . the But liow mnny binary choices are necessarY to single O.ut one of . f which o on ssi mi ns tra [>osslble messages? An the er, n1b nu extremely large would require an impressive expense of tin1e and energy.

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44

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

The information as freedom of choice at the source would be t worthy but the possibility of transmitting this potential information so :; t: realiz; finished messages is very limited (Guilbaud, I 954 ). Here is where �n s-code's regulative. function comes into play·

d, as are their possible The number of elements {the repertoire) is reduce obability is introduced a i-pr of equ n atio situ nal origi the o lnt n1. atio bin com e system of constraints: certain combinations are possibl and others less so. The original information diminishes, the possibility of transmitting messages increases. Shannon (J 949) defines the information of a message, which implies N cboices among h symbols, as: I = N .log2 Ii (a formula which is reminiscent of that of entropy). A message selected from a very large number of symbols (among which an astronomical number of ,combinations may be possible) would consequently be very informative, but would be impossible to transmit because il would require too many binary choices. Therefore, ln order to make it possible to form and transmit messages, one must reduce the values of N and h. It is easier to transmit a message

which is to provide information about a system of elements whose combinations are governed by a system of established rules. The fewer the alternatives, the easier the communication. The s-code, with its criteria of order, introduces these communicative possibilities: the s-code represents a system of discrete states superimposed on the equi·probability of the original system. i n order to make it more manageable. However, it is not the statistical value 'information' which requires this element of order, but ease of transm ission. When the s-code is superimposed upon a source of extreme entropy like the typewriter keyboard, the possibilities that the latter offers for choice are reduced; as soon as I, possessing such an s-code as the English grammar, begin to write, the source possesses a lesser entropy. Jn other words the keyboard cannot produce all of the g5 i ,s-0o me sages tha t are possible on one page, but s a much smaller number, taken from rules of probability, which correspond to a system of expectations, and are therefore much more predictable. Even thou�, of course, the number of pos sible messages on a typed page is still very high, nevertheless the system of rules introduced by the s-code prevents my me ge from containing a seque nce of let tors such as fWxwxscxwxscxwxx/ � (except m the case of metalinguistic formulations such as the present one).

Sign ification an d Communicat/on 1 .4 .4 . Physical t ransmission of informa t ion G iv en , �o r in s t ance , the sy n tac tic system of sign als in th e Wa terga te M odel ' the engin eer had a se t o f d is t inctiv e featu res (A B c D) to comb.1ne an • , , . order to ro du ce as ma n y pe rti ne nt large r un its (messages like AB) as 6f ( possible Since t he probabil i t y o f the occurrence of a given feature among four is 1 /4 and since t he probabili t y o f t he co-occurrence of t wo feat ures is 1 / 16, the engrneer had at l1is disposal ( as shown in 1 . 1 ) sixteen possible messages, each of them amoun t ing to 4 bi ts of information. This system constitutes a convenient reduct ion of the info rma t ion possible a t the source (so tha t the engineer n o longer has t o control and t o predic t an infinite set of sta t es of the water), and is a t rhe same time a rich (although reduced) source of equi·probabili t ies. Nevertheless we have already seen that the acceptance cf all of the 1 6 possible messages would have led to many ambiguous situations. The engineer has the refo re thoro ughly reduced his field of probabilities, selecting as per t i n en t o nly four s t ates of the wa ter (as well as four mechanical

responses and fou r conveying signals). By reducing the number of probabil­ it ies in his sy n tact ic syst em , the engineer has also reduced the number of events he can det ect a t t h e source . The s•code of signals, ent ailing two other s t ruc t u rally hom o logous s-codes (semantic and behavioral system), Im superimposed a rest ricted sys tem of possible s t ates on that larger one which an informa t ion theo ry i n t he sense (a, i) might have considered as a property of an indetermina te source. Now eve r y message transmitted and received according t o the rules o f rhe syn tactic system, even though it is always t heoretica l ly worth 4 bits, can, technically speaking, be selected by means o f t w o al ternat ive choices, gran ted that t hese are limited to four pre-selected combinations ( AB , BC, CD, AD) and therefore 'cos ts' only 2 birs. 1 .4 .S . Commun ica t io n By me ans o f the sam e stru ctu ral simplificat ion , t he enginee r has bro ugh t un de r sem io tic co n t rol t hree di fferent systems; an d it is because of this t ha t he ha s bee n ab l e to correl ate the elements of one sy s tem to tbe ele me n ts of t he o t rs, th us ins tit u t ing a co de. Certain technical co mmunic�· he ), b i , e( typ he of les tive in t entio ns b i i), cip i pr al ic � relying on cert ai n techn � ( , to es tab lish systems of ), ha v e l ed h i m . basin g , i ( of es i r ipl nc p se a hi m lf on th e

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46

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

f sign•fun ct ions called a o em st sy a t ou t se to th.e ty pe (a, ii) in order •code· (' ). ned, regarding it. as a ai pl ex un e av le ly ab ifi st ju ay This chapter m e e� gineer first produced three th er th he w of n tio es qu e th , _ pseudo-problem the fr amework of a code, in ith w em th te la rre co to r de or in organized s-codes nized units from ga or d un an d re te at sc ed lat rre co l1e p, ste or whether, step by red them in to homologous tu uc str en th d an y, lit rea of s ne different pla s, in the case of nd ma es es de th po hy o tw se the n ee tw be n tio systems. The op engineer or a biographical the of dy stu l ica log ho yc ps a l, de Mo e gat ter the Wa al languages, it tur na the as h suc es cas d ate lic mp co re mo for sketch� but tter which has up to now demands a theory of the origins of language , a ma ded is a theory of is nee at wh is, lys ana al fin the In ts. uis ling by d ide avo n bee intelligence, which is not my particular concern in this context, even though a semiotic enquiry must continuously emphasize the entire range of its possible correlations with it. What remains undisputed is that pour cause a code is continuously confused with the s-codes: whether the code has determined the fonnat of the s,codes or vice versa, a code exists because the s•codes exist, and the s-codes exist because a code exists. has existed o r has to exist. Signification encompasses the whole of cultural life, even at the lower threshold of semiotics.

NOTES 1 . The following model is borrowed from De Mauro, 1966 (now in De Mauro, 197 J ). It is one of the clearest and most useful introductions to the problems of coding in semiotics. the signals is no tonger a signal, as it was in the �· The absence of one of precedrng case (+A vs. -A), for now the absence of one signal is the con_dition for the detected presence of the other. On the 0th.er hand, both therr concurrent • absence and their concurrent presence can be taken as synonymous devices, both of which reveal something wrong with the apparatus. 3. Oearly from now on the code is valid even if the machine (whet her by mistake or under the influence of a ,nalin genie) lies: the signals are supposed to refer to actual states of the water but what they convey are not actual states, but notions about actual states. . �· A Pr,oblem appears at this point: is structure, thus defined, an the pages ec reallt tve an �r following 1 hypothesis? operational In the f �: � rm st ru�t ure will be us.ed in accordance with the following epistemological . to pre5upp�s,tao�: a structure is a model built and posited in order tandardize diverse phenomena from a unified point of view. One is entitled :0 SUspect that, as long as these simplifying models succeed in explnininS

unication S/gn ificotlon and Com m

•

47

rnanY phenom� na, th�y ,!llaY well reproduce some 'natural' order or reflect functioning of the human mind The mcthodolog· . ica1 fau1l lt SOme 'uni versal . . . . an o 1mp avo1 . 'd t t t �r. 1s the ult1m�t� assu mption that, when seems t.o '!'e succeedin g 1n explatning some phenomena by un1f1ed structural models 0 e d the fotmat of the world (or of the hµman mind , or of SO • CI�al has graspe . �. a1 uutu m. For arguments again mecha nisms) as an �nt ologic st this k.ind of ortro/o.gicQI structuralism see Eco, 196 8. S. Thus i t is correct to say that in the Watergate Model the destination a pparatu s does not rely on a code, that is, does not receive any com munication, and therefore does not 'understand' any sign-function. For the destinatio n app�ratu.s is t�e formal object of a theory(b, i) which studies the amount of st1mul1 which pass through a channel and arrive at a destina tion. On the contrary the engineer who has established the model is also concerned with a theory (b, ii) according to which - as far as he is concerned - signals convey contents and are therefore signs. The same happens for the so-called •genetic code•. J t is the object of a theory of both types (a, i) and (b, i); it only could be the object of a theory of type(b, ii)for God or for any other being able to design a system of transmission of genetic information. As a matter of fact the description the geneticists give of genetic phenomena, superimposing an explanatory structure on an imprecise array of biological processes, is an s-code: therefore the 'genetic code' can be the object o f a theory of the type (a, ii) thus allowing metaphorical and didactic explanation of the type (b, il). See note 4 and the discussion in O. 7. As to a semiotic 'reading' of the genetic code see aJso Grassi. 1972. 6. In linguistics, features such as A, B, C, D 3,fe elements of second ttrticu/ation, devoid of meaning (like the phonemes in verbal language), that combine in order to form elements of first articulation (such as AB), endowed with mean ing (like the morphemes - or mone,nes in Martinet's sense). According to Hjelmslev. when pertinent and non-significant features such as A, B , C, D are elements of a non-verbal system, they can be calJed

'figurae'. 7. The am biguous relation between source, s-codc, and code arises

because an s-co de is posited in order to enable some syntactic un.it s to co�vey semantic units tha t are supposed to coincide with events h��penUlg at. a gi�en source .. In this sense a syntactic code is so strongly co�d1t1oned by its ft?al ty Purpose (and a sem ant ic system so heavily marked b.Y ! ts supposed capaci to reOect what actually happens in the world), that it is ea sy to uorle�taod (though less so to justify) why all three formal objects of the three diverse theo ries are naivety called 'code' tout court.

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2: THEORY OF CODES

'

•

...I 2.1. The sign-function When a code apportions the elements of a conveying system to the elements of a conveyed system, the former becomes the expression of the latter and the latter becomes the content of the former. A sign-function arises when an expression is correlated to a content, both the correlated elements being the functives of such a correlation. w_e are n�w in_ a position to recognize the difference between a signal; . and a sign. A signal 1s a pertinent unit of a system that may be an express1q; system ordered to a content, but could also be a physical system without any 9t1Jlioci, pHt·p0se; as such it is studied by information theory .in the stricter sense of the term. A signal can be a stimulus that does not mean anything but causes or elicits something; however, when used as the recognized a111ecede,,t of a foreseen conseque,,t it may be viewed as a�inasmucl1 as it stands for its consequent (as far as the sender is concerned). On the other hand a sign is always an element of an expression plane conventionally correlated to one (or several) elements·of a coi1tent pla11e. Every time there is a correlation of this kind, recognized by a human society, t� i� !, sign. Only in this sense is it possible to accept Saussure's 48

Theory of Codes

49

definition acc·ording to which a sign is the correspondence between a $ignifier and a signine!I. This assumption entails some consequences: a) a sign is not a pliysical entity• the physical entity being at most the concrete occ.urrence of the expressive pertinent element; b) a si n is not a f,xed senziotic entity but rather the meeting ground for independent ele,ments coming from two different systems of two different planes and meeting on the basis of a coding correlation). Properly speaking there are not signs, but only sigi1-funccwus. Hjelmslev remarked that ''it appears more appropriate to use the word sign as the name for the unit consisting of content-form and the expression-forrn and est ablished by the solidarity that we have called the sign-function'' (1 943:58). A sign-function is real'ized when two functive$ (exp_ressioo and v content) enter into a mutual correlation; the same functive can also enter into another correlation, thus becoming a different functive and therefore giving rise to a new sign•function. Thus signs are the provisional result of coding rules which establish trg11sitorv _correlations of elements, each of these elements being en titled to enter - under given coded circumstances -- into another correlation and thus form a new sign. Take for instance the e"pression item /plane/: the English language • provides many content items for it, i.e. «carpentry tool» or «level» or «aircraft». In this sense we are faced with three sign-functions: (plane=X), (plane=Y) and (plane=K). Moreover, if one accepts a somewhat widespread semiotic theory which maintains that the �m:essive function is not undertaken by the 'morpheme' or the 'word' but by -a ��re c�lex expression (see Buyssens � 1 943 ;_Prieto� 1 964 ; De Mauro, 1 970), one might say that the expression /give m_e it/ - which acquires man y different contents depending on the_ presupposi· tions that it involves - gives rise to an impressive ,number of signs (�xcept that in t his case the correlation between expression and content 15 not est ablished by the code alone but by a complex interpretative co_nt���

"reading').

One can then maint ain that it is not true that a code organizes signs; it is more correct to say that codes provide the rules which generate signs as • . 1 1ve - 1n C oncre te occurrences an · t ercourse· Ther:'efore the classical co1nmun1ca notion of 'sign' dissolves itself int a highly con1plex network of �hanging . relationsltips. Semiotics suggests a sort of 111olecular landscape in which what · we are accusto111ed to recognize ,orms turn out to be the result of as everyd·ay ' transitory cl1en1ical a.sgrcga lions and so-called 'thin�' are only the s�rface appearance assumed by an underlying network of ntore elementary unats. Or

I

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

, er, sem10 1cs gi re only s t rategically e we er th es ag . im w sa we t gh ou th we · . 11ng tha,• where revea . s, alternations of presence and int po ite wh d an ck bla of s ll on · ga arranged aggre . . . es t1m t1 . n1e en so ter fer ras d1f a ated of es tur fea ic bas t an ific ign ins the e. nc se b a . . . . . al e lik ics ot sic mi mu Se ry, y. eo th ensit int tic ma ro ch d an ion sit po , ape sh : in . 1s ly a re icated on ist the ph ies so lod me r ilia fam ize ogn rec we ere wh t states tha ere we perceive no tes there are intertwining of intervals and notes. and wh only a bunch offormants. 2.2. Expression and content Let us return to the Watergate Model (chapter l ) and imagine that the destination is no longer a mechanical apparatus but the engineer himself, who receives information abou t the situation within the watershed a11d who knows that he JDUSt respond to a given communica tion about the state of the water by activating. certain levers or switching certain knobs. The code outlined in 1.1 remains unchanged. If one examines the internal articulation of the signs provided by the code, one can anal�e them in this way: (i) a continuum of physical possibilities that is used as the unformed material from which the engineer obtains discrete elements to be used as expressive devices; (ii) token expressive devices such asA,B,C, D plus their combinations (AB, BC, CD, AD) which represent elements selected from the original mat erial; (iii) a system of empty positions, a struc ture; by virtue of which the token expressive devices assume a positional and oppositional nature; (iv) both (ii) and (iii) cltosen as the expression planes of a content plane represented by both (v) and (vi); (v) a system of empty positions, a st ructure, by virtue of which some token content units will assume a posi tional and oppositional nature; (vi) token content units such as «danger level», «security level» and so on, wl1ich represent selected elemen ts 'cut' from an �precise continuum of facts or notions; (vii) a continuum of physical possibilities, psychic even ts, behaviors and thoughts to which the system (v) has given an order, selecting a structured set of recog11i1.able seman tic units (see Table 5). Thus (a) a code establishes the correlat ion of an expression plane (in its purely fonnal and systematic aspect) with a conte.nt plane (in its purely f rmal and sy5tematic aspect) ; (b) a sign-func tion establisl1es the correlation ; 0 an abst ract element of the expression system with an abstract element of the co�tent system; (c) in th.is way a code establis)1es general types, therefore producing the rule which generates concrete toke,,s, i.e., signs such as usually

Theory of Codes

..

SI

Table 5 Expression Plane

Content Plane

Con tinuum

Units

System

System

Units

Light, electric phenomena

AB

1 1 00

1111

danger level

BC

0110

1 1 10

alarm level

CD

00 1 1

' 1 JOO

security level

AD

1 001

1000

.insufficiency

Nonsemiotic matter

t

�

sign-functjon token sign

t

'

Continuum the unshaped continuum of the position of the water along with everything one can think about it Non-semiotic matter

occur in communicative processes; (d) both the continua represent elements which precede the semiotic correlation and with which semiotics is not concerned (they are respectively beyond the lower and the upper thresholds of semiotics). I n the Watergate Model semiotics is not concerned with electrical laws, nor With the electronic 'stufr which allows us to 'make .. electric signals; it is onJy interested in the selected signals insofar as they convey some content. In the same way semiotics is not concerned with the physics of the differing states of water, but only with the fact that a semantic system has organized notions about a possible state of water. Obviousty · a science like pl1ysics, bein g interested in defming and studying water and its states, needs a specific semiotic treatment of its own object: in this sense, When defining such entities as •atoms', •molecules;, ·H:i O' and so on, physics segments its ow n continuum into a specific sen1antic field to be expressed by vehic ular uni ts which constitute the syntactic system of physics. It meanS, as in the following way : • n Hje lmslev said, that, i f w e consider the sign-fun ctio • • • • (purport) substance fo rnt

Content

•

Expression ••

forn1 substance (purport)

•

52

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

the 'purport' "remains 1 each time, substance for a new form''. This is the case, for instance, when a physicist considers the wave•lengths of each bulb in the Watergate Model in terms of the substantial units of a wave.length system that semiotics had not taken into account, because it was only directly concerned with perceptible differences of color, or indeed with the respective positions of the bulbs. If by •purport' one means "continuum', •matter' or �stufr, then one may agree with Hjelmslev when he says that ''the description of purport, in respect of both the linguistic expression and the linguistic content, may in all essentials be thought of as belonging partly to the sphere of physics and partly to that of (social) anthropology . . • . Consequently for both planeS' both a physical and a phenomenological description of the purport should be required" (1943:77-78). In the Watergate Model the signals AB, BC etc. are ex.pression-substance, organized by an expression-form and conveying notions such as «danger level» which are content-substance organized by a content•form. The electric stuff with which the signals are made is an expression-purport studied by physics, while the states of water to which the units of the semantic system refer are content�purport studied by hydrography or some other discipline. the possible responses, organized as a semantic system on the content plane of another code, are the object of psychology or some other behavioral science. The model that I am proposing here represents, however, an ln1erpre1a· tion of Hjelmslev's. For example, in Hjelmslev the word /purport/ (which translates the Danish word /mening/) is pretty misleading. While the 1 Hjelmslevian context suggests that its proper sense is that of «matter»< ) (he frequently calls it "stuff' or ••continuum''), the word used has shades of decidedly different concepts. The notion of substance is equally ambiguous: while in the case of the expression substances are undoubtedly material occurrences (tokens) of the type provided by the form (sounds, lights, lines on a paper, and so on), in the case of the content Hjetmslev repeatedly suggests the idea that substances are the things isolated by linguistic form. For the sake of theoretical purity I shall rather consider them as token semantic units generated by the semantic system (see 2.6). While the Hjelmslevian model in spite of its apparently Byzantine complexity is perfectly suitable for the purposes of a theory of tl1e codes, it has to be simplified within the framework of that part of the theory of sign production which constitutes communication theory. (n this perspective the sign:function is nothing more than the correspondence between a signifier

••

Table 6

Formal Model

Theory of Communication

Theory of Codes

Theory of Mentions

Theory of Communicational Acts

.

•: •

Continuum

posited • units

Experience

...C ...Cu

.,,u .................-.--············· . ·-...=0 u system u ,�

C

u

-u u

·----u 0:

....

positions

............-.............. -...... C . �

positi:d

.

unns

I•

I•• I

:• •• ;

•

·-::! C

0

..

u 0. M

LU

system (types)

•

!•• I

•

a

!

I• •• ••

Ii

..... ......................·····-· :•1 produced . unus (tokens)

-

Ctlntinuum

Stuff -

•• •• •• •• •• ••

•• •

semantic system (types) syntactic

--

-

I• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• • ••• •

........·-··-• • • • •·········-•••.•i

of empty • • posn1ons

r.ystcm of empty

•• •• •

interpreted • units (tokens)

�

..0 C

Source

•• •• ••• ••• •• I• • ••

. .

..

u

"'C

uC

00

·-

!\leaning

••

.,,

I •• • •• ••• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •••

• • u •

�

•• •• •• •• •

Addressee

....................

___

.

Sign-vehicle

••

•

I• •

I• •• ••

Proposition

• •••

I ••• •• ••

I l• •• • ••• •• •

'r.lcssage

'

II • I• •• •

Sentence

. ..

l

I ••• •

:' •

t

•• •• •

I• ••

.•. .

Ch.'lnncl

.

••

,

•

u .••

Cl) •• • � • • u ••• • ,G • • ••• •• •• •• •• • • • •• •• • ••

.sC: 0 ....r:

•• •• World •• •I •• • .....····-·····..................-.-.... i• · 1 I• ••• •

Utterance

,

I•

••I •: • •I I• • • •

........ ·······--··· ·........... Sender .. .

.,,u .,,.,, u

..c..

�

·-...

1,1

e"' ..

00

c..

54

•

A THEORY OF SEM IOTICS

and a signified, or between a sign-vel,icle and a 1nea11i11g; a message is nothing more titan such a correspondence as realized during a transmission process. When on the other hand a theory of sign production concerns itself with the elaboration of sign-functions as complex as aesthetic texts, the six-fold division of Hjelmslev's model will come into its own (see 3.7). There is. finally. another aspect of the theory of sign production represented by the emission of sentences aiming to indicate something true or false, in other wo.rds an actual state of the world; this aspect of sign production (and interpretation) is studied by a theory of n1en tions or referring acts. In t·his perspective the content-purport (or the content. continuum) comes into play, because the task of such a tl1eory is lo secure the correspondence between a given content conveyed by an expression and .a real and actual state of the world (see 3.1 .2). Therefore tJ1e proposed Hjelmslev-like model of a sign-function, and of its underlying code, should be differently applied within different disciplinary contexts (see Table 6). This comparative model allows a rewriting of •informational ' categories in stricter semiotic tenns; the source is notl1ing more than the content­ continuum, wtu1e the channel is the expression-continuum� the signal becomes a token-functive (expression); the message is a twofold entity, that is, a token•sign•function. Both source and channel lie beyond the reach of a theory of codes but, as will be shown in ch. 3, they can be taken into account within the framework of a theory of sign production. The aesthetic text is a system of messages in which the particular treatment of the channel (tl1at is of the stuff of which sign-vehicles are made) becomes pertinent. In a sentence mentioning something, that is, referring t o an actual state of the world, what happens at the source is the so-called •referent' (see 2.5). As for the sender and the addressee, tl1ey are of no concern to a theory of codes though they do turn out to be relevant within the framework of tl1at chapter of a theory of sign production which deals with· these communica· tional acts that the philosophy of verbal language has called ••speech acts" (see 3.1 .). 2.3. Denotation and connotation

When speaking about the destination apparatus of tl1e Watergate Model

1 said that a given signal could instantaneously convey both infom1ation on the state of the water and an instruction for the destin-ation. Since the engineer as a human being has been substituted for the destination apparatus. one has now to put the question in another way: the engineer receives

Theory of Codes

ss

. ",ore, according to 1nformati on abou. t a given state of the water and there previ ous conventions, knows (or decides) that he must respon d 1n · a 8}ven way. I n this sense the behavioral response is not elicited by 3 sign • al •St·imul. us: . . . . ely commun . signi 1mpe (or rat1v fied icated) by the fact that a given state of it 1s . . water has been s1gn1fied. TJ1ere arises a signification conveyed bY a previous . · · 1cat · · h' give 1c h s rise w to a superelevation of codes of the following s1gn1 fi 1on, type: Table 7 Expression Expression

AB

BC CD

AD

--

Content

Content

-

danger level alarm level security level

--

insufficiency

evacuation of water state of alarm state of rest admission of water

Such a superelevation of codes is what Hjelmslev defined as a connorative se11iiolics, whose form is: • Expression

Expression

Content

Content

There is a connotative semiotics when there is a semiotics whose expression plane is another semiotics. In the above exampl e th e content of the former si gnificatio n (along with the units that conveyed it) becom es the expression of a further content. Thus the expression AB denotes «danger level» and co1111ores «evacuatio n» . ny The ,difference between denotation and coMotation is not (as ma autho rs n1aintain) th e difference between 'univocal' and 'vague' signification, or be tween 'referential' an d 'einotional' communication, and so on. What constitut es a connotation as such is tJ1e connotative code which establishes it; the characteristic of a connotative code is the fact that the fu rther sign ification conventionally relies on a primary one (the engineer knows that

A THEORY OF SEM IOTICS

56

he must evacuate the water because he ko. ows that the water has reached the danger level). Obviously one could have instructed an addressee in such a way that the mes sage AB would convey to him the meaning «evacuation», without his knowing anything about a system subdividing the water into four levels. In this case the code would have been a denotative one and the relation between AB and «evacuation» would have been a straightforward denotation. So the difference between den otati on and co nn otation is onJy due to a coding convention, ine spective of the fact that connotations are frequenOy less stable than denotations : the stability concerns the force and the durati on of the coding convention, but once the conventi on has been established, the connotation is the stable functive of a sign-function of which the underlying functive is another sign-function. A conn otative code, inso far as it relies on a more basic one., can be called a subcode. One may also suppose that stable social convention, a scholarly training. a system of expectations deeply rooted in the patrimony of co mm on opinions that the engineer shares, make the first denotative co de correlated w ith a third connoted system. Suppose that, for in stance, the engineer knows that danger level means «actual fl ood», alarm level means «fl ood menace» and so on, down to the co nnotation of «drought» conveyed by the signification of insufficiency. Ano ther connoted system is added to the first one, and the first denotative code allows its sign-functi ons to entertain a double connotative sign.function. Thu s AB denotes «danger level>> and conn otes both «evacuati on» and «flood» - 'both' rather than 'either' .. As a matter of fact the two connotations are not mutually exclusive and the format of the double coMotative coding is as follows:

content

exoresS1on I expression content content exoression content • expression content •

• I

•

Whether the engineer chooses to detect or grasp one or the other of the connotations; whether he grasps both; whether, grasping only the connota· lion of «flood», he forgets t o evacuate the water and shifts to other more or less em otional kinds of connotation or of free association; these and many other problems do n ot co ncern a theory of codes. They are commonly considered a matter of pragmatics(2 ) and will be dealt with at m ost within the framework of a theory of sign production. What is important here is that codes provide the conditions for a complex interplay of sign-funct ions.

•

Theory of Codes

S7

A theory of codes should rather be concerned to state to w·hat degree · n o f connotation can be the superelevat1o . made possi·ble ·, how much its . overla pp1� g of sens�s may produce a maze-like network of intertwined . sign-f� nc t;ons; and either t�s maze-li�e situation can constitute the object of _ . a sem1ot1c structural descr1pt1on, or 1t produces a sort of topological knot that a theory of codes ca n define bu t cannot structurally reproduce by means of a finite model. All this will be discussed in 2. 1 2 and 2.13 . 2.4. Message and te"t In any case there is a distinction regarding a theory of sign production that must be anticipated when speaking about a theory of codes, for it helps one to better establish what is meant by 'code'. \Vhen the engineer received the sign-vehicle AB, did he get one or more messages? Since there are at least three codes, a denotative one and two connotative ones, .if all three are referred to when interpreting the sign-vehicle, then the engineer has got three messages, namely: (i) «the water has reached danger level»; (ii) «you must activate the evacuation lever»; (ill) «there is a floodl>. Thus a single sign-vehicJe, insofar as several codes make it become the functive of several sign-functions (although connotatively linked), can become the expression of several contents, and produce a complex discourse such as: «Since water has reached the danger level, you must evacuate it, otherwise there will be a flood». I am not saying that a single code can produce many messages, one after the other, for this is a mere truism; J am not saying that the contents of many messages can be conveyed by the same kind of sign-vehicle, according to diverse codes, for this too is a truism; I am saying that usually a single sign-vehicle conveys many intertwined contents and therefore what is commonJy caUed a 'message' is in fact a text whose content is a multilevelled discourse.

Metz ( 1 970) has advanced the hypothesis that in every case of com munication (except maybe some rare cases of a very elementary and univocal type) we are not dealing with a message but with a text. A text represents the result of the coexistence of many codes (or. at least, 0� man r bcode s). Metz gives the example of the expression /voulez vous ten,, cec,, su J Y/ vous p/a it?I and recognizes that in this simple ph?se there are at least two codes at work: the first being the plain denotative code of the French language and the other 8 French courtoisie code. Wi�hout the latter we �e unable to understand the real meaning of /s 'il vous plait/: a purely denotative interpret ation of the expression would give a rather odd result. Jn Metz's example the plurality of codes w rks, so to speak. � horizontally. The addressee decodes the whole phrase with reference to one

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

58

code t and then the second half with referenee to another. But in our example

(the signal AB) the plurality of the codes works, so to speak, vertically,

superimposing many levels of signification upon the first and basic one.

2.5. Content and referent 2.5.J. The referential fallacy

•

Finally we face a problem which is mainly the concern of a theory of sign production and in particular a theory of mentions; but it is important to consider it at this point because its shadowy presence could disturb the proper development of a theory of codes. The problem in question is that of the referent, in other words the problem of the possible states of the world supposedly corresponding to the content of a sign.function. Altl1ough of considerable importance with.in its proper domain, the notion of · •referent• has most unfortunate results with.in the framework of a theory o f codes, and ·to underestimate its malignant influence leads to a refere11tial fallacy. One may easily admit that the signs transmitted through the Watergate Model have a corresponding 'object�, that is, the state of the water at the source. Likewise, one may admit that i f the water (along with its possible states) were not there, at the source, then the entire Watergate Model would be without its raison d'etre. Therefore the 'actual' water would seem to be a necessary condition for the entire model. But even though it certainly was a necessary condition for the design of the model t it is not a necessary condition for its semiotic functioning. Since the model has been establish.ed, and relies on one or more given codes. a message like AB would work as a message (or a text) even if the water at the source. actually was in another position, or if there was no water in the watershed, or if the watershed was the invention of a malin ge11ie. It is not even necessary to disturb Descartes' ma/in ge11ie; it is enough that somebody at the source, manipulating the transmitting device, should decide to lie. The semiotic functioning, the semantic import of the message AB, and the behavioral response of the addressee would not change at alJ. The same observations are also valid in many other cases. As was suggested in 0.1 .3., if a liar pretends to be sick by behaving in a certain way, the semiotic functioning of this behavior can be analyzed irrespective of the fact that he is actually lying.

Every time there is poss:bility of lying, there is a s/g,1·function : which is to signify (and then to communicate) something to wtuch no real state of things corresponds. A theory of codes must study everything that can be used

Theory of Codes

S9

in order to lie. The possibility of Jying is the proprium of semiosis just as (for the Schoolmen) the possibility of laughing was the proprium of Man as ar,imal ratio110le. Every time there is a lie there is signification. Every time there is signification tl1ere is the possibility of using it in order to lie. If this is true (and it is methodologically necessary to maintain that it is true) then semiotics has found a new threshold : between cot1ditions ofsignification and co11ditions of truth, in other words the threshold between an inte11sional and an exte11sio11al semantics. A theory of codes is concerned with an intensional semantics while the problems regarding the extension of an expression are bound up with a theory of t-values or with a theory of mentions. This threshold, however, is an 'internal' one, and it must only be considered, according to the present state of the art, a methodological boundary. 2.5.2. Sinn and Bedeutung The semiotic study of content is often com.plicated by recourse to an over-simplified diagram which has rigidified the problem in an unfortunate way. The cliagrarn in question is the well-known triangle, diffused in its most common form by Ogden and Richards (1923):

(1)

REFERENCE

SYMBOL '------------ REFERENT

The triangle appare,1//y translates Peirce's:

(2)

INTERPRETANT

REPRESENTAMEN

---------- OBJECT

A THEORY OF SEM IOTICS

60

and is often considered to be equivalent to Frege's ( 1 892):

(3)

-SINN

BEOEUTUNG

The first point to be ·made. absolutely clear is that su ch triangles can indeed be useful in discussing a theory of sign produc tion and pa_ttic ularly a t.lteory of 'me nt ioning' (see 3.3), but they bec ome someth.ing of an. embarrassment when studying the problem of codes. As a matter of fact a model of a sign-func tion (suc h as the Saussurean dichotomy 'sig,1ificant-sig11ifie' and the Hjelmslevian model outlined in 2.2) only c oncerns the left side of triangles (1) and (2), and can be of relevance to the whole of t riangle (3) if and only if the notion of 'Bedeutu11g' is not taken as strictly extensional. The semio.tics of Saussure and Peirce is a theory of tl1e conventi.onal (or at any rate stric tly semiosical) relation between symbol and reference {or meaning) and between a sign. and the series of its interpretants (see 2..7). Objects are not considered within Saussure's linguistics and are considered within Peirce's theoretical framework only when disc ussing partic ular types of signs such as ic ons and indices (for the elimination of the object witl1in the framework of a theory of codes, even in such cases see 2.6. and 3.5.). Objects can be considered in the light of a 'narrow' Fregean reading only when the Bedeut1111g is understood as the real and ac tual object to which the sign can refer: inasmuc h as the Bedeutu11g is regarded as a 'class' of ac tual and possible objects, not a 'token' but a 'type' object, it becomes very akin to the content in the sense that will be outlined in 2.6. From this intensi onal point of view the Bedeu11,11g becomes something to be studied by a theory of interpretants (see 2.7). It must be absolutely clear that the roilowing argument t1as nothing. to .do with a theory of tlie l·values of an expression, t l1at is, witlt an extensional semantics; within this framework, even if the 1neaning of an expression ls independent of the actual presence of the objects · it refers to, lite verification of the actual presence of tl1ese objec ts (or states of tl1e world) is necessary in order to satisfy the t-value of the given expression and thus to conside r it within the framework of proposi tional c�lculus. Bu t, fru1n L11e point of view

Theory of Codes

61

of the functioning of a code (or many codes), the referent must be excluded as an intrusive and jeopardizing presence which compromises the theory's theoretical purity. Thus, even when the referent could be the object named or designated by the expression when language is used in order to mention someth ing, one mus t nonetheless maintain that an expression does not, in principle, designate any object, but on the contrary co,,veys a cultural conte11l. To say tl1at /Walter Scott/ and /the author of Waverley/ are two expressio ns that l1ave the same Bedeutu11g but two Sinn concerns a i.heory of sign-fu nction only insofar as: (i) the Bedei,rung is intended as t.he definition of a historical entity that a culture recognizes as a single penon, and is therefore a denoted content; (ii) the Sinn is a particular way of considering a given content, according to other cultural conventions, thereby including witltin one's consideration some of the connoted content$ of the fint denoted content. If one assumes that the Bedeutz,ng is an actual state of the world, whose verification validates the sign, one must ask oneself how this slate of . the world is usually grasped or analyzed, how its existence is defined or demonstrated when the sign-function is decoded. It will quickly be seen that, in order to know something about the Bedeutung, one must indicate it through another expression, and so on; as Peirce said, a sign can be explained only through another sign. Thus the Bedeutung is grasped through a series of and in this sense it is very imprudent to assume that the Sin11 can be _its recognized as appertaining to the sa.me Bedeutung, since it is the Bedeucung wl1ich is defined by tl1e Si1u1 and not vice versa. TI1e central problem o f the present chapter arises from the fact th.at •meaning' really is a very con1plicated matter, but not in the way that the above triangles would suggest (3 ). To say that a sign-vehicle necessarily corresponds to an actual object is a distinctly naive attitude and one that even a theory of t-values is none too eager to accept. The objection to it is well known : there exist sig,1-vehicles which refer to non-existent entities such as 'unicorn' or 'mennaid'. In tl1ese cases, a theory of t-values prefen to speak of term s witl1 'null-extention' (Goodman 1 949) or of 'possible worlds' (Lewis.

s;,,,,,

1969).

Within the fran1ework of a theory of codes it is unnecessary to resort to the notion of extension, nor to that of possible worlds; the codes, insofar as they are accepted by 8 society, set up a 'cultural· world which is neither actual nor possible in the ontological sense; its existence is linked to a cultural order, whjcll is the way in which a society thinks, speaks and, while speaking. explu ins the 'purport • of its thought through ol11er thoughts. Since it is

62

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

through thinking and speaking that a society develops, expands or collapses, even when dealing with 'impossible' worlds (i.e. aesthetic texts, ideo.logical statements), a theory of codes is very much concerned with the format of such •cultural• worlds, and faces the basic problem of how to touch contents. In order to understand the history o f Christian theolo.gy, it is not necessary to know whether a specific actual phenomenon corresponds to the word /transubstantiation/ (even though for many people this belief was vitally important). But it is necessary to know which cultural unit (what intensionally analyzable set of cultural properties) corresponded to the • content o f that word. The semiotic object of a semantics is the co111ent, not the referent, and the content has to be defined as a cultural u,1it (or as a cluster or a system of interconnected cultural units). The fact that for many people /transubstantia· tion/ corresponded to an event or a thing may be grasped semioticaUy by maintaining that this event or thing was explicable in terms of cultural units. Otherwise there would never have been anything like a theological discussion and believers would have continued to receive the lioly Communion without wondering about those who did not believe in it. Whereas it was, on the contrary, necessary to conceive a world so organized that a cultural unit corresponding to /transubstantiation/ could find a place within it, i.e. could be a precisely segmented portion of the content of a given cultural background. 2.5.3. The extensional fallacy The referential fallacy consists in assuming that the 'meaning' of a sign•vehicle has something to do with its corresponding object. Since the t·value ' theorists do not share this naive assumption, one could say that they do not concern themselves with the problem of the correspondence between signs and states of the world, either when discussing the meaning of a sign-vehicle such as /dog/ or /unicorn/, o r when discuss ing the possible referent of a description such as /a glass of whisky and sod or /the King of af France/. They are, on the other hand, concerned with the extensio11 of a sentence or of its corresponding propositio n: theref ore two sentences like /all dop are animals/ and /all do� have four le�/ cor respond to an actual state of the �orld and are to be considered true if and only if dogs really are animals �d . ,r they really have four legs. Since the theory of codes is only interested in sign.functions and the rules of their pos sible combination, sentences should only be a matter of sign production. Never theless there is a way in which the

Theory of Codes

63

extensional approach may disturb a theory of codes _ thus pro - duc1ng an

exre11sio11al fallacy.

Let me anticipate a classification of various types of sentences (following Katz, 19 72 ) that should more properly be considered in ch. ). If sentences are considered as the vehicular form of propositions the can Y convey various kinds of propositions: non-assertive propositions (questions, requests, and so on) eternal ( « 1 7 is a prime number»)

sentences assertive propositions

standing ( «human beinp reached the moon in J 969»)

statements

occasion (

•

I

[Serving under the standard of 2nother]

I

(.�(ale)

\ (Young) � al) (Se

mate during the breeding time]

I

which other authors call ••semes''. Between square brackets are what the authors call distinguishers. Finally there are the selection restrictions (symbolized here by Greek letters between angular brackets): "a formally

expressed, necessary and sufficient condition for that reading to combine with others�' (Katz and Postal: 1 5). A ••reading0 is the choice of a ''path•• and therefore of a direction. According to the context, the various semantic components are combine d with those of other expre�ons to make plausible or otherwise a sentence such as /a married man is not a bachelor any more/ or else /my husband is a Bachelor of Arts/. The possibility of combining expressions is provided within the context by a series of projection rules analyzed in detail by Katz and Fodor, so that, faced with the sentence /the man hit the colorful ball/, once the proper semantic components have been assigned to each word, it is possible to const ruct a series of different readings for the sentence. In fact /colorful/ bas two semantic markers ( «Color» and «Evaluative »); it has two distinguishers ''Abounding in contrast or variety of bright colors.. and ..Having instinctive , character, vividness or picturesqueness. 1 and it has selection restrictions such .. Physical Object • • V ''Social Activity .. or ··Aesthetic object " V ... Social Activity''. On ly after it has been established with which semantic components of /ball/ this acliective should enter into contact will it be known which are the an1alga n1ated paths that Jead to the interpretation of the synta� /colorful ball/ as: (a) )

[tirthlghway] ·- dc:,,;tulion

-�c .

'''"nilro.,d]

[,ir,poJiti.csl

cl,top

> . The fourth necessary feature is again a kinesic one, and is a ldyrwm�c stress//. It is fairly difficult up to now to exactly record this feature, but 11 represe nts the syntactic marker which conveys semantic markers of «close• ness» or «distance» (thus kinesical1y distinguishing what could be verbaJly interpreted by the opposition 'this vs. that'). When the fin�er points with comparatively little energy it means «close», and when pointing with greater energy (the gesture being more ample and abundant. with the amt itself participating in •propelling' the finger) it means «distance» .

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

120

So in cases of lndetenninate stress, the gestural pointer must be helped along by a verbal shifter (/this/ or /that/). just as the verbal sl1ifter usually has to be helped by a gestural pointer (as noted in Table 22). When responding to the ques tion /which one?/ one cannot answer /this/ or /that/ without accompanying the verbal expression with a pointer, unless the question regards two objects of which one js present and the other absent. The presence of the verbal expression constitutes a typical case of circumstantial selection (the kinesic pointer constituting, on the contrary, circumstantial seJection for the verbal one). Thus the relationship between content and expression, in the case of a pointing finger. can be viewed as shown in Table 23.

Table 23

//poinrbrt forter//-

+

longitude

+

apicality

+ movement toward

+

//poin-tbtg /i1J8er// -

+ + +

-- ddittccfon - ddlstant - d5"1dtt

dynamic stress

longitude apicality movement toward

-- ddircctlon - dclosc -- dander

- dynamic stress

//pointiltgf,nger//-

+ +

longitude apicali ty

l

+.

movement toward

:_ dynami c stress

< __ dsender

•

(,ire /th!s/J

- dclo,e

[,ire/tbot/) - ddfstant

One could at this point observe that, when considering verbal. pointers, syntactic mar kers were absol utel . Y mdepen dent o f se the refore in Table mantic ones (and 22 they were not analytically recorded) , while in kineslc

11,eor)' of Codes

121

poin ters ·th� presence or absence of a given syntactic marker determined . the sem an tic feature. I t could hen be said that in no corresponding n-verbal signs � the format of the sememe is determined by the format of the sign. . . -versa. Th.is ice or particular lin k of •motivation' will be disc vehicle � ussed in 3.4 .10 , for lt cannot be explained without having recourse to a theory of the modes of physical production of sign-functions. A theory of codes may well disregard the difference between motivated and arbitrary signs. since it is only concerned with the fact that a convention exists wl1ich correlates a given expression to a given content, irrespective of the way in whlch the correlation is posited and accepted.

2.12. The model ''Q'' 2.12. 1 .

Infinite semantic recursivity

•

The Revised Model does not escape a criticism to which the model KF has also been subjected. Componential analysis isolates within the sememe paths or readin� composed of different nodes representing semantic markers. In the KF model these markers could still at times be complex definitions (the distinguishers); in the Revised Model they have been reduced to elementary cultural units such as

·-..

00 "O

C

:1-1-..,T --·----- - - .. :it -

•

u

------

'' ...--�/ -----.. -...'..... -, ·-:-_, ., -- '

C

�

C �

--- -- --- --..........• ... -z

-z

-

• E--• •

....,-__,"

... II ...7.• -1 - - ,c _, II ... I I I I I I I

0

e

Cl.

...

I I

•

�

\

C

I I

�

I

CIC -·•- .,,,,

I

GJ ,&a

•

::&:

I I I I

-

I

-

I

lQ

'I

• ...

J

•

.. ..,. ...-.. ---,

-

-----­ C

- ',

:> .. ...

''

.

0

........

•

• ._ ',' \

•

�

""'

ct:::

·-0

-.....

ts

....:::

...

-�-

I: ts

e

�

••

"O Cl

• :>.

·-

�

o-, .

\

·-.....

•

�

-r ."- - .....

...r . ·r .,._

z

•

--

•• ' 0 ,_ ..,. ,' :-- -- -- ... • •

__. _.

lr o-, .. u 71�

'\

--

I i

0

-- -- --

a

\

'•

.,,C ,: ·-Ct es ,:

e0

...

�

•

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

1 24

. ilar . mod e1 can s t'U onal graphic configura tion nsi ime bid a • e eiv 1 rec A sim

derstandable that an its un 1s it · d (an · d ine am ex 1s ( t 1 o t par when one . • . ens . aJ s1m tok of luded, it ber inc num ited lim the to ks an th n, at1o 1 u mechanac . . ). ich can be descnbed Bu t may be poss1'bl e ·to confe,r on it a structure wh . . . . x ple . 1t must · com try tts a/1 111 ,t , 1s · 1n · a pos,·r,on to represe,,r acrually no grop,1 . • • d with i ippe equ olog , top cal appear as a sort o f. polydimensional network · s, 1n · which the distances covered are abbreviated or elongated and propertie ,, rnjty with others by means of short-cuts and eac h term acqu1· res pr.ovi immediate contacts, meanwhile remaining linked with all the others , according to continually changing relationships. We can imagine all the cultural units as an enonnous number of marbles contained in a box; by shaking the box we can form different connections and affinities among the marbles. This box would constitute an informational source provided with high entropy, and it wo11ld constitute the abstract model of semantic association in a free state. According to his disposition, his previous knowledge, his own idiosyncrasies, each person when faced with the sign-vehicle /centaur/ could arrive at the unit «atomic bomb» or «�fickey Mouse». But we are looking for a semiotic model which justifies the conven­ tio11ol denotations and connotations attributed to a sign-vehicle. And so we should think of magnetized marbles which establish a syste,n of attraction and repulsion, so that some are drawn to one another and others are .not. A similar magnetization would reduce the possibility of interrelation. This woc,ld constirute an s-code. Still better, we could consider every cultural uni t in this Global Semantic Universe as emitting given wave-lengths which pu t it in tune with a limited (though possibly very large) nu mber of other units, Except that we have to admit that the wave-leng ths can change according to new messages emitted and that therefore the possibilities of attraction and repulsion change in time� in other words, that a componential tree may change and enrich its markers, proving the hypothesis of De M au ro (1 970) that the components of the meaning ar e not closed in num . ber, frozen into a system of relevant units, as happens w ith the units of expression, bu t form an open series. In �ffec t the model su Q pposes that the system ca n be nourisl1ed . by fresh information and that fu rther data can be inferred from incomplete data. 1he model Q is a model of lingu istic creativity. Moreover, it also gives a comprehensive image of w1· ttgenstea· n's d 1s · ns o n meani·ng. Wl . ' cuss1o \en Wittgenstein (1 9 5 3 , l, 67) mentioned the existence o f 'fam re ily semblances· he gave /F;Jme/ as an example. The idea of gam e refers to a fan1ily o f AUi&

71teory of Codes

12S

extremely· disparate a�tivities, stretching from chess to ball _ gam·es which can have components 1n common (chess and a ball game between two O le hav� in c�� mon t�e idea of winning and losing), and can be separa��y _ . radical d1ss1m_ilant1es (a �me of chess and the solitary game of a child throwing the ball against a wall, or a game of chess and ring around the roses). Wit tgenstein concludes that ''something runs through the whole thread - namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres0. This image of a continuous super-imposing of correlations recalls that of model Q; model Q is already, in the phase in which Quillian presents it, a portion of the Semantic Universe in which a system bas intervened in order to establish attractions and repulsions.

2.13. The format of the semantic space All that has been said about the semantic system finally forces us to look once more at the idea of a code. A code is commonly supposed to render the elements of two systems equivalent, tenn by tenn (or strin� of units by strings of units). But the study of semantic fields shows that (when speakin.g for instance of a 'language' as a code) it is necessary to consider a vast series of partial content systems (or fields) which are matched in different ways with the expressive units. This fact engenders a situation in which .many compositional trees may exist for every sign-vehicle, simul­ taneously connecting it to different positions in different semantic fields. Thus the system of semantic fields, involved as it is in multiple shiftin�. becomes crossed {along another dimension which no graph will succeed in homogeniz. ing with the preceding one) by various paths from each sememe. The sum of these crossings makes up Model Q. A code as 'la11gr1e' must therefore be understood as a sum of notions (some concerning the combinational rules of Che expression items, or syntactic markers; some concerning the combinational rules of the content items, or semantic markers) which can be viewed as the competence of the speaker. However, in reality this competence is Che sum of the individual competences that constitute the code as a collective convention. What was called 'the code' is thus becter viewed as a complex ner.vork of subcodes · · which goes far beyond such categories as •granimar' however comprehensive . they may be. One might therefore call it a l1ypercode (following the etymology of 'hypercube') which gathers together various subcodes, some of which arc strong and stable, while others are weak and transient, such as a lot of peripheral connotative couplings. In the same way the codes themselves •

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

12 6

. us systems, some strong and stable (like the phonological . . gather together vano . t ransien t (such as d an ak we rs he ot s) rie ntu r ce ' one, which lasts unchanged iQ r ). 1 Jot of semantic fiel ds an d axes by th e c.odes does not d ne on rf pe ks tas e th all ng ini ef I fiICUtty in d Th •15 d'f · • • . o ill on a pr1m1 t1ve 1eveJ . Jt als st is ch ar se re t ha t ct fa e th on depend onIy ·on o, · al .r the clob . d' ,n 11 I co ra ti1 a 11a 1 110 is de co e 11, . t depen ds on the 1:,a.c t tha . . . . . plex .. of tlte 1111 com 1g ks y11 erl a11d 1111d · 1re ·. 1cn ,. ble stn '" e nor a s'a , , lv" Semant1c un branclies of every semiosic _process.

.

.

. es. f rbl I of ma rbl box the ma es, the of hor tap Let us go back to the me rce wi th high e ntropy, a sou al on ati orm inf an el of d mo a ent res rep e, fre en wh system is a rule whic·h magnetizes the marbles according to a com �ination of mutual at tractions and repulsions on the same plane. The c.ode wh1chi on the other han d, couples different systems iS a biplanar rule establishing new attractions and repulsions between items from diffe rent planes. In other words, every item in the co de maintains a double set of relations, a sysre111atic one with all the items of its own plane (con tent or expression) and a sig11ifyi11g one with one or more items from the correlated plane. Now, to maintain that there exists a structure of the Hu.man Mind or a sort of on tological system of Essences, on which significa t ion and communi­ cation rely, means that the magnetii.ation is inherent in the marbles as a 'property'. If. on the other hand , the cod e is a social co.nvent ion, the magne tii.ation is a tra,isitory (that is, a lzistorical) condition of the marbles

box.

The approach adopted in th e p.resen t work is that the magnet izat ion must be understood as a cultural phenomenon and that the box-source must be at best considered as the site of a combi,1atio11al i11terp/ay , of a highly . indetermi.na te gam e. A semiotics of the code. is o.nly in terest ed in the results of this game, after the intervention of the magnetiz ation. A semiotics of sign production and of code-changing is interested in the process by which a rule is impose d upon the ind eterminacy of the source (see chap ter 3) . If this is true, it would then be necessary to ad m it tha t an y subcode . (for example a certain type of connot at ive .association bet ween t w o ele.ments of two semiotic field s) is a compara tively transitory phenomenon which it would be· im · ·possi'bl e t- o estab1·1sh and descnb . e as a stable. st ructure (except 1n cases of 'strong' magnetizat·ion, · . · defin1. t1on 1,e. sc1·en t1fic t he fact Mo s). reo ve r . that every 1tem of th·e game ca · uIt aneously maintai . · · · n s1m · n relations with man):' other elements makes 1· t d 'ffi 1 icuI t to draw explanat ory bu ·t simplifyin g graphs such as a compositional t ree. A compositional tree sh ould thus be viewed as a purely temporary

Theory of l'odes

127

device po sited in order t o expl�n a certain message, a working hypothesis . co nt th ro e to l 1mmed1ate semantic environment of that aims given semantic units. Let us consider the case of the very simple message emitted by a traffic light. According to an international code, !Ired// means «stop» and lgreenJ means may also connote «obligation», while llgreenl _ at least to a pedestrian - also denotes W· ever have properties which are incompatible with its type. �o predicate new pro perties of an object is not so different from producing phrases which are s.emantically acceptable. I can accept weJI· formed phrases like /the pencil is green/ or /the man sings/ and I n1ust usuo.11)' .

fheorY of Sign Production

169

e /the pencil sin�/ or /the man refuse phrases lik .1 . is gre en/ • . 1 lS simply a . n. · al am ic at1o ant gam sem matter of Therefore .I can accept factual judgments like /this penci·i is . · b·tue/ , ror pencils are usually e1tl1er black or colored, /this pencil is long/ bee . ause . . . . . penci ls . po ob ss Je es ct sin s ca g l d1 m ph en ys s•o i na l properties, and /tl,;s are man sings/ em it sounds. All of them are accept because men ca n able factuaJ index­ sensitive judgmen ts. On th e contrary /tliis pencil is two miles long/, /this pencil is vibrating at the speed of 2,000 w.p.s./ or /this man is internally moved by a four-stroke enf)ne/ are abnormal fac tual judgments for they nouris h an inner semantic incompatibility. Thu$ if I said /this cat is fo ur feet long/ there would be two possibilities: either I see that the cat is not actually that long. and in this sense l am simply associating unappropriate words with the living expression o f a semantic property that I can conceptually detect and that I cou]d verbally express in another way; or I am really 'telling the truth'. But if I have told the truth, I am obliged to ask myself: do four-foot-long cats really exist? All my knowledge about cats teUs me that they do not usually share such a property, i.e. that the conceptual construct «cat» (corresponding to the sememe «cat») does not possess such a property. Therefore I must assume that what I have seen is perhaps not a cat but a panther. Suppose that I now check and I discover that it has all the properties of a cat and none o f the properties of a panther, but that all the same it really is four feet long; then my perception, once it is conceptualized, does not coincide with the conceptual construct that made it possible. I must therefore reformulate the conceptual construct (and therefore the corresponding sememe); it is possible that a mutation may have changed the size of some cats. So I must emit a factu al statement (/some cats are four feet long/) after which, by means of a meta-semiotic judgment, I can change the code. ••

3.3.7. Is the present king o f France a bachelor?

. · · lly perceived The case o f the four-foot-long cat IS one Of an actua s or case are There sub'J�ct of wl1ich a puzzling property must be predicate d · · 5 but the subject em probl predication in which the property does not create '. · of France is does. Such is the case of the famous sentence /the presen t king provoked in as h e sente nc baid/. · 15 th· To engage in the Olyn1pic Gan1es lhat about m probl e final conte mporary semantics may J1elp to 50lve the ment ioning. .on; if uttere·d in the quesu Every one is agreed that the sentence In sentence the that led es present century , is rather puzzling. It n1ay also be sugg .

170

A THEORY OF SEM IOTICS

is meaningless since 'deimite descriptions' have a meaning only when there is a single object for which they stand. We have already provided the answer to such an assumption, and a theory of codes demonstrates that a description like /the king of France/ is fully endowed with meaning. It is not necessary to assume that a description like /the king of France/ must be verified by a presupposition, thus asking for .an existential verification. This theory holds good when attributing a truth value to a proposition; so that if the description /the husband o f Jeanne d'Arc/ does not have a 'referential index' a statement like /the husband of Jeanne d'Arc came from Brittany/ arouses a Jot of interesting questions in terms of extensional semantics. But /the king of France/ stands for a cultural unit, not a person; not only does it share with /the husband of Jeanne d'Arc/ the quality o f meaning something, but also it can correspond or not correspond to somebody who actually existed and who, in a possible world, could continue to exist. So suppose then that someone states that /the king of France is wise/ as Strawson suggests; the expression is endowed with meaning, so the problem is to know under what circumstances it is uttered; if jt is used in order to mention Louis XIV. it can be said to be acceptable, but if used in order to mention Louis XV some might judge it rather over-evaluative. Suppose that I now say /this is the king of France/ pointing with my forefinger toward the President of the French Republic. This is the same as . saying /this is a cat/ while indicating a dog. There is a semantic incompati­ bility between the properties of the sememe and the properties of the cultural unit represented by the indicated person, taken as an occurrence of a • . • conceptual construct . .. Suppose that I now say /this man is bald/ when referrin g to a long haired pop-singer; this represents a typical case of misuse of language. One need only translate the expression as /this man is a bald man/ for it to become clear that I am attributing certain semantic properties to a percept that cannot be taken as an occurrence of a more general model for bald men. Suppose that I now say /the king of France is bald/; in itself the expression is meaningful and may become true when I use it in order to mention Charles the Bald, who was elected emperor in 875 A.O. I f I use the sentence in order to mention Louis XIV the sentence is false. f-lowever, both mentions presuppose an indexical device; i f I utt er them must in some way I indicate which king I am referring to. The same hap pens when I say /the present king of France is bald/. The word /prese nt/ is in fact a pointer, and as a pointer is a shifier (see 2.1 1 .S .).

Theory of Sign Production

171

What does /the presen t king of France is b . aid/ mean? It has th , e . semant ic structu deep re: .

=·

Theory of Sign Production

187

One might say that features of vectorialization make 8 . • . S1gn sunilar' to • • its referent. In this case it would be no longer necessary to claborate such. . a d;rr. ·1· · an d rat 1c1 LJJ ,s io 1t as wo uld gor suf y fice to say that cer.tam cate · signs do not . . . . . have an expression type bu t directly 1m1tate the object for which the stand. Y . d;rr. . However, the cat�go ': o f ratio ,,, 1c1Jis has just been established in order to . . avoid such a �a1�e mterpreta�10� (�hich wilJ be criticized in 3.5) and a different theorization of vector1al1t.at1ons will be given in 3.6.5. 3.4. l l . Expression-clusters and content·nebulas Let us now consider some examples in which the motivation exercised by the content on the expression seems to be so strong as to challenge. along with the possibility of replicas, the very notio-n of coded correlation (and therefore of conventional sign-function). We shall first of alJ examine those cases in which one must express a large number of content-units whose aggregation has not been previously coded and therefore constitutes a discourse. Let us define a discourse as the equivalent of a text on the expression plane. One may encounter two types of discourse for which no pre•established text exists. The first is that of factual statements concerning unheard-of events, these events constituting a new combination of cultural units that the content-system has already recognized and classified. To take the problem of verbally describing or visually representing a golden mountain or a new chemical compound ., since these entities are l.he result of a con,bination of previously recorded semantic units and since the code already provides the corresponding expression-units (both 'categorematic' and •syncategorematic'), the for ma t o f the expression will be established according to the requirements of th.e content - bu t not according to its fomi! Therefore this is not a case of ratio difficilis: the combination of the words /golden/ and /mountain/ has nothing to do wi th (it is not 'similar' to) the orographic structure of lhe all imagined phenomenon . In other words, if an astronomer discovers thst � rn red elepha nts m ay be observed Jiving on the moon, every time Capnco l� be ted ub do u l wil m te ys t-s en nt co te en rs into the orbit o f Saturn, then his � ssion· re p ex is h c � u b · ) w vie rlU"' wo Upset (and he will have to restructure his 10 ·map m hi w lo al de co e th f o s syst em will not b e disturbed at all, for the law words for new w ne . , such ce u d o pr O I U as out we . s a new state of the world (as Pression-sy · stem allow definable content-units, since the redundance Of the ex· him lo articulate new lexical items).

1 88

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

e ca� of a in th s m le ob f pr o t se t en er ff di ite qu But one encounters a s� ances one ca n sttlJ talk um rc ci ch su in (if t ni t-u en nt co e new and undeji,,ab/ hich cannot be analyzed w la bu 1e t•1 en nt co a of at th in rather unl't') or -o , f a '-· k o f a new ea gh sp i t m ne O . its un t en nt co le ab fin into recognizable and de Suppose that one had to s. nt ta re rp te in ry cto fa tis sa no s ha discourse which Quee� of Sheba, each e ts ee m n mo lo «So n: tio ua sit � ng wi express the follo essed 1� Renaissance style, and en em ntl ge d an ies � lad of on ssi ce pro g 8 din lea . . of wr ste s my the die bo nous es giv t tha t ligh g rnin mo ll sti d an re pu a in d bathe 'verbal• discourse s thi in ize ogn rec uld wo one ery Ev «�. etc . etc statues, • xt' by Piero della something vaguely similar to a well-known pictorial 'te • the pictorial one. At et rpr e 'int t no s doe ion ress Francesca : but the verbal exp most, the former suggests the latter only because the latt er has already been expressed and recorded by our culture. And even in this case only certain of the verbal expressions refer to recognizable content units (Solomon , to meet , Queen of Sheba, etc.), while many others by no means convey the sort of content that one might receive when looking at the painting (it goes without saying that even such an expression as /Solomon/ represents a rather imprecise interpretant of the corresponding image painted by Piero). When the painter begins work, the content (in its nebula-like structure) is neither coded nor divided into precise units. It has to be i11vented. But the expression. too, has to be invented: as noted in 2.14.6., only when a highly differentiated content-system has evolved will a culture dispose of the corresponding expression•system. So we have a paradoxical situation, in which expression must be established according to a content model which does not yet exist as such. The sign producer has a fairly clear idea of wluz t he would like to 'say', but he does not know how to say it; and he cannot know how to do so until he has discovered precisely what to say. The lack of a definite content-type makes it impossible to find an expression- type, while the lack of an appropriate expression device makes the content vague and inarticulable. The difference between mapping into the expression a new but foreseeable content an.d mapping into the expression a content-nebu la is that between a ':'le-governed creativity and a rule-changing creativity. Thus the painter has to invent a sign-function, and since every sign-functio n is based on a code, he has to propose a new way of coding. To propose a code is to propose a correlation . Usually correlations are. fixed by convention. But in th.is case the convention does not exist an d the correlation must the refore be founded on something else. In order to make it acceptable' the producer . . . must base his evid ent correlat ion on some

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motiVati on, for instance a stimulus. If the expression as stun . · utus is . . .able to to wa n ce rd at rta te in nt io ite ms of direct the suggested co ntent th • e corre1at1on . is then posited (and apres coup could even by recognized as a new convention). Thus, given a co nt en t•type that is in some way cogn izable, its pertinent fea tures must be 'projected' into a given exp ressi on continuum by means of certain t ransfonnational rules. Th.is does not mean that the expressi on must 'imitate' the fonn of th e object ; a critique of this naive app roach to the problem will be p roposed in 3.5. l f the conten t-type is complex , then the transformational rules will be equally complex, and will sometimes escape detection, being rooted in the signal's microscopic texture. In this way the sign (or text) becomes dense. The more the content-type is new and uncoded or is the result of unfamilia r acts of me ntio ning, the m ore the producer musl elicit in the addressee perceptual reactions that are to some extent equivalent to the ones he might have in the presence of the actual even t. It is this extreme mode of stimulation that has permitted the fonnation of the notion of an 'iconic' sign as the naturally motivated and analogical result of an 'imprint' of the object itself on a given material continuum.

3.4.12 . Three oppositions When examining kinesic pointers we have discovered that signs can exist that are at once replicable and motivated. As a matte r of fact, phenomena like replicability or m otivation are not features by which one sign may be distinguished from another; they are m odes of production that play differing parts in the constitution o f various sorts of sign-functions. This is also the case with an opposition such as 'arbitrary vs. motivated'. Yet for i:nany centu ries this oppositio n seemed to be so evidently a .matter of expenen� that the whole histo ry of phjlosophy o f language has been dominated by lhis question , beginning with Plato's Oarylus, which opposed Noma� (la': , convention, arbitrariness) to Physis (nature, m otivation, iconic relationship between sign a n d thin�). . . ttons, but the Problem that they posi One should not . und.ervalue these 1 0n1Y because IJ\ express must be re-though t in a more rigorous way - ·f . • • ith recent times the opposition 'arbitrary vs. mot1vat ed' (already aSSoc1ated. w. on, s1t po op rd thi a th wi 'conventional vs. na led up co � n bee · tural') has finally , • • oical' is understood m a digital vs. analogical' Insofar as the term •an al °o. . ity o nal rti o p ro double sense (see 3.5.�.) - as something concerning rules of p

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190

akable ' similar. pe ns 'u te dia me . im an th wi and as something connected· ical is opposed to digital , alog • r. an se, • sen t firs the • · tty _ and 1nso1ar as, rn zab 1e ones. The same a1y an lly . gita di . th wi ted ua eq arbitrary signs are roughlY .. . stem usually hole sy w e th d . · an n io s1t po op · ird th happens rn the case of the l) form : ca gi lo tly en ar pp (a g in w llo fo e takes th digital arbitrary conventional

vs. vs. vs.

analogical motivated natural

in which the vertical columns are supposed to list synonymous categories. Even a superficial glance at many sign phenomena tells us that the equation is not true and that therefore the oppositions are not synonymous ; a photograph is perhaps •motivated' (the traces on the paper are produced by the disposition of the matter in the supposed referent ) but it is digitally analyzable, as happens when it is printed through a raster; the smoke revealing the presence of a fire is motivated by the fire but is not analogous to it; a painting representing the Virgin Mary is 'analogous' to a woman, b.ut it is recognized as the Virgin Mary because of a conventional rule; a certain type of fever is naturally motivated by TBC but it is due to a convention that it is recognized as a reliable medical symptom. The movement of the pointing finger toward the supposed object is maybe motivated by the spatial co-ordinates of the object but the choice of the pointing fmger as index is highly arbitrary; in fact the Cuna Indians use an entirely diffe rent device, the 'pc,JJting lips gesture• (Sherzer, 1972). A cat's paw prin t is motivated by the fonn of a given cat's paw but i t is by conven tion that a hun ter assigns to that expressive shape the content (the abstract notion oO «cat». One -JDUSt, at this point, face the problem of the so-called iconic signs, , in order to discover how many semiotic phenome na are commonly covered by this all-embracing tenn. So-called iconism in fact covers many semiotic procedures, many ways of producing signal s ordered to a sign·function , and we will see th.at, even though there is something different between the word /dog/ and the image of a dog, thi s difference is no t the trivial one between iconic and arbitrary (or ''symboli c'') signs. It is rather a ma tte r of a complex and continuously gradated arr ay of di fferen t modes of producing signs and texts, every sign.function (sign-unit or text) being in tu m the result of manY of these modes of pr oduction.

'fheory of Sign Production

19 1

3.5. Critique of iconism 3. 5.1, Six naiVe notions It was said in 2. 1 . th at a sign-function is the correlation betw een an expression and a content based on a conventionally established code (a . co system of rrelat1onal rules), an d that codes provide the rules that generate sign-functions. If there exist slgns that are to some degree motivated by, similar to, analogous to, naturally linked with their object , then the definition given in 2 . 1 . should no longer be tenable. The only way to maintain it is to demonstrate that even in these types of signs a cortelational convention is in operation. The core of the problem is obviously the notion of convention, which is not co-extensive with that of arbitrary link, but which is co-extensive with that of cultural link. (f one examines the mode of production of signs one must not only analyze the mode of production of the signal in itself but also its mode of cor­ relation to its content, the correlating operation being part of the production. To produce a signal such that it may be correlated to a content is to produce a sign-function; the modes whereby either a word or an image are correlated with their respective contents are not the same. The problem is to find out. whether the former is a cultural correlation (and therefore a conventional one) and the latter is not; or whether, on the contrary, both involve some sort of cultural correlation even though these correlations are operationally tio difficilis). In order to prove that the image of a different (ratio facilis vs. . ra dog also signifies a dog by means of a cultural mode of correlation, one must fust o f all challenge some naive notions. These notions are:

(i) that the so-called iconic sign has the S11me properties as its object;

(ii) that the so-called iconic sign is similar to its object; (ill) that the so-called iconic sign isanaJogous to its object; (iv) that the so-called iconic sign is motivated by .its object.

. . nsk s ch whi Permeating the critique of these assumptions is a contrasting one, attaining an equal dogmatism, i.e.: (v) That the so-called iconic signs are arbi1rari/y coded. ,,, · coded without "e shall see that it is possible to assert that they. are cultu·rally . 0f saying that they are totalJy arbitrary, thereby re5loring to the cate:o� ese conventi onality a more flexible sense. But when one has 501ve problems one is faced with a last possible assumption:

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192

or no t. are analyzable y ar tr bi ar er th he w . , ns sig iconic (VJ) 1ha t _the 5o-called t to a multiple artic11/ation. as bjec su be y ma d an s . it un into pert1nenl co ded are verbal signs. s, one is also on ati erv ut res tl1o wi (v) ts ep acc e on We· shaII see tttat, . . s. ltie t f one Views Bu 1 ficu dif of Jot a to d lea ld cou h hi'c ') w , VJ forced to accept ( . . d above, (v1) 1s no longer s� ricUy ne tli ou y wa t en ud pr d an le xib fle {v) in the _ t ha e led s um a cal socould th � � iconic � and direclJy dependent upon (v). One sarily 1mplymg that they are · . are culturally coded without neces ir expression is discretely the t tha and t ten con ir the to ted rela cor ly rari :��: analyzable. l·r

·3.S.2. lconism and sharing 'properties' According to Morris ( 1 946) a sign is iconic ''to the extent to which It itself bas the properties of its denotata". At first glance common sense might mislead one into agreeing with. this definition. But a more thorough examination in the light of that same common sense forces one to realize that the definilion is more or less tautological and in any case ratf1er naive. What does it mean to say that the portrait of Queen Elizabeth, painted by Annigpni, has the same properties as Queen Elizabeth? Morris ( 1 946:1 .7.) knows very well that "the portrait of a person is to a considerable extent iconic, but is not completely so since the painted canvas does not have the texture of the skin, or the capacities for speech and motion, which the person portrayed has. The motion picture is more iconic but again not completely so" . Such an approach, when pushed to its limit, would persuade both Morris and common sense to destroy the notion of iconism; ''a completely iconic sign would always denote since it would be itself a denotatum'', which is the same as saying that the true and complete iconic sign of Queen Elizabeth is not Annigoni's portrait but the Queen herself (or a possible science fiction doppe/giinger). Morris himself, in the following pages, corrects the rigidity of the notion and states: "An iconic sign, it will be recalled, is any sign which is similar in some respects to what it denotes. lconicity is thus a sual non-vi atter of with degree" deal (1946 : 7 .2.).And to since, going on � tconic signs, he even speaks of onomatopoeia, clearly the question of degree appears \o be extremely elastic, since the iconic relationship between 3 /cock-a�oodle-doo/ and the crowing of a cock is very weak; so much so that the French onomatopoeic sign is /cocquericof, and the Italian one /cJ,icchi·

Theory of Sign Production ricclii/: the pr,oblem lies first of alt in the me aning given to the ex ·

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19 3

. 0• . , . press 1o . · n in . si.mila i.f an 1con1c s1gi_1 is some re spects . . r to the thing denoted _ _ in some w ar th e riv en at e a ct defm1t1on which satisfies co respe s, mmon sense, but not semiotics. Se condly there are certain perplexities surroundi ng the notion of 'similarity t o objects'. Is one really sure that iconic signs are 'similar' to the objects they st an d for? lndee ...

RECOGNITION

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EXAMPLES SANPL£S .1CTIVE , ,SAMPLES

SYMPTOMS CLUES HETEROMATERIAL (MOTIV ATEO)

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STYLIZATIONS

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PROJECTIONS

PROGRAMMED

PSEUDO• C'OMBINACOM,BlNA• TIONAl. UNITS TIONAL UNITS

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; four aces equal to «four of a kin d >>) we should consider the combinations of cards as significant strings of first articulation while the cards which form the combinations are el ements of se.cond articulation. Ne�ertheless the cards are not distinguished merely by the position they a�sume in the system, but by a twofold positio n. They are opposed as dafferent values within a hierarchic sequence of the .same suit (ace, two, three · · ten, jack, queen, king) and they are oppose d a1 hierarchic values : belongmg to four sequences of d ifferen t sui ts. Therefore tw o tens combine to form a «pair»; a ten, a jack, a queen, a king and an ace combine to form a «sequence» ; but only the cards of the sam e suit can combine to form a «suit» or a «royal flu sh». Therefore some values are pertinent featur es as far as certain significant

Theory of.Sign Production

23 1

combinations are concerned, and others are so as fa r as certain · others · · u t h is t · are · e B sm ern g1 ed e . ca rd th e ultimate term of conc any poss1"bl · t hu s rcs1s · e state · · · of n, 1n t' g cu f ur lat th io er analysis?· If the seven of arti hea rt s constitutes . . on value 1· n respec . . a t al to positi th e SIX (of any suit) and in res pect to the seven . t b is at SJn e · w h · e g1 clu bs, h.cart 1f no t the element of an of ulten·or and more • analytic art ·acu lati on?. The f irst possible answer is that the player (who •speaks' the Ianguage · · ) of th e cards as n ot m f act ca1 led upon to aniculate the unit of suit ' beca . use ar re · u la ted 1n · d s ·1t a l a dY t1c · values (ace, two . . . nine, ten); he f m but this point th ou gh it may appear logical to the poker of vi�W , player, is already . questionable to a player of other games (like the Italian •scop a') in which the points (th e units) are added up , and in which therefore the pertinent unit is that of sui t (even if the additions have preformed addendae). All these considerations fo rce one to recognize that it is wrong to believe: 1 ) that ever y sign system act is based on a 'language' similar to the verbal one; 2) that every 'language, should have two fixed articulations. One should o n the contrary assume that: (i) semiotic systems do not necessarily have two articulation s; (ii) the articulations are not necessarily ftxed. Let us here list a series of different articulatory possibilities, following the proposal set o u t by Prieto (1 966). It will be seen that there exist systems with two articulations, systems with only the first articulation, systems with only the second articulation and systems without articulation. Let us recall that (i) the elements o f second articulation (called figurae by Hjelmslev) are purely differential units which do not represent a portio n of the meaning conveyed by the elements of first articulation; (ii) the elements of first articulation, common ly called 'signs,, are strings composed by elements of second articulation and convey a meaning of which the elements of second articulatio n are not a portion; (iii) there are signs whose conte nt is not a . content -unit but an entire proposition; this phenomenon does not occur m · systerns· granted verbal lang uage but it does occur in many other semi·otic that they have the same fun ction as verbal sen tences, we shall call t�ese · systems these super·SJgns non-verbal sentences "super-signs '. In many semi·otic • her must be considered as strictly coded express1on·w11·1s susceptible of furt . • • 0Jlow01g f o, et ri (P s xt te . x e 1 con1p e r combination 1n order to produce mo . term, Buyssens, calls these supe r-signs fse"iesI, but I Pre·fer to avoid such a . / emp1oyed in . . / senie Which may be confused with the term Iseme/ or •. therefiore ker . mar tic «seman for compositional analysis and standing possessing a quite different meaning). . , statem ent such as a man's . . 'iconic A typico.J example of super-SJgn 15 an · g :1 m 50 �,w d ' an «so t bu x» rson Photograph which not only means «pe

232

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tion} or «so and so is rip sc de e er m a be d ul co ch · hi ..1 • etc.» (w !;'asses, wearing sentence. al rb ve a to s nd po es rr co y rl ea . walking », which cl . •

s t ry to 11st vanous types of t le n, tio e$ gg su 's to ie Pr � g Thus followin . _ n. o ti la cu ti of ar semiotic systems with various t.ypes

r-signs which cannot be pe su r fo ide ov pr : n tio ula tic ar t ou A. systems wirh ents: . . •s further analyzed in compositional ele� n e nd ma t bli ite ple wh exam � l) sysrems with a single super·s1gn (_for ereas ltS absence does not cane: its presence indicates «I am blind »; wh case, however, for necessarily mean the opposite:, as might be the systems with zero sign-vehicle) ; . . . al• flag on a s adm IP; e (th its ic/e � � 2) systems with zero sign·veh pre.sence indicates «admiral on board» and its absence «admiral off board»; the directional signals of an automobile, whose absence means «I am proceeding straight ahead» ); 3) traffic lights (each unit indicates an operation to carry out; the units cannot be articulated .among themselves to form a text, nor can they be further analyzed into underlying articulatory units); 4) bus lines labelled by single numbers or letters of the alphabet. B. Codes with second articularion only : the units are super-signs. These cannot be analyzed into signs but only into figurae (which do not represent portions of the content of the main units): 1 ) bus lines with two numbers : for ex·ample line /63/ indicates that it «runs from place X to place Y>>; the unit can be segmented in the figurae /6/ and /3/. which do not have any meaningi 2) naval 'arm ' signals: various figurae are allowed for, represented by various inclinations of the right and left arm; two /igurae combine to rorm a letter of the alphabet ; this letter is not usually a sign because it is without .meaning. It acquires the latter only if it is considered as an articulatory element of verbal language and is articulated according to its laws; however, it oan acquire a conventional value within the naval code, indicating for instance «we need a doctor» and mus t then be considered as a super-sign. C. Codes with first articulation only : the main units can be analyzed into signs but not thereafter into figurae : 1 ) the numeration of hotel rooms: the unit /20/ usually indicates « first room, second floor» ; it can be subdivided into the sign /2/. which means «second floor» and into the sign /0/. which means «first room» ; 2) street signals with units analyzable into signs : a white circle with a .red border which contains the black outline of a bicycle means ,«cyclists not allowed» and can be broken down into the exp,ession //red border//, . which means «not allowed» and the im age o f the bic ycle ' which means «cyclists». D. Code1 with two articulations: super·sign s can be analy:ed into signs and /lgurae : •

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Theory of Sign Production

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1 ) verbal la�guages; phonemes arc articu lated into morphem es. and these in turn mt o broader syntagms; 2) teleplione n um bers with six digits: some can be broken down . . into groups o f tw o d1gits. each of which indica tes (acco.rding to po · • st .lio . n) a section of the c1· ty, a street, an individual; whereas each sign of tw0 digits can be broken down into two figurae w hich have no meaning. E. Codes with mobile articulatio n: in some codes there ca n be both signs and no bu al t w ay s with the same function; the t figu rae signs can become /igurat ot vice versa, the /igurae super-signs, other phenomena can assume the value .: offigura e, etc 1 ) tonal music : th e notes of the scale are /igurae which are articulated into signs (partially sign ificant configurations) such as intervals and chords; these are further articulated into music al syntagms. A given melodic succession is recognizable no matter what instrument (and therefore what timbre) it is played on ; but if one chang es the timbre for every no te of the melody in a conspicuous fashion, one no longer heat$ the me lod y bu t merely a succession of timbres; and so the note is no longer a pertinent feature and becomes a free variant while the tim bre becomes pertinent. In other circumstances the timbre, instead of bein g a /igura. can become a sign bearing cultural connotations (such as a rustic bagpipe-pastoral) (cf. Schaeffer, 1 966); 2) playing cards : here we have elements of second articulation (the units of the suits, such as hearts or clubs) which combine to form signs -endowed with meaning in relation to the game (the seven of hearts, the ace of spades) . These may combine into 'card-sentenoes• such as «full» or «royal flush». Within these limits a card game would be a cod.e relying upon an expression-system with two articulations; but it must be noted that there exist in this system (a) some signs without second . n"•· articulation. e .g. •jconological' super-signs suc·h· as uv,_ �·8... or ''Quee· {b) iconological super-signs which cannot be combi.ned mto sentences together with other signs, such as the joker or, in certain games the Jack . · · · ish · turn, ed by both be distmsu of Spades, Moreover the figurae can, 111 · . . ent rtm · g to . dm shap·e and color • and can be selected accor · vanous pe · wh.ic.h hearts are o·f m game criteria from game to game; thus in a . arc . o longer without meaning, greater value than spades, the F,gurae . . the card system it is . wi�hin � on. but can be understood as signs. Ao d 50 those possible to introduce the most varied co�venti ns f play (even :Y 0� articulations can rc hiera the of fortune-telling) through which change. . . to imagine t ul ic ff di . is ·t 1 0 t ie to o Pr . ing F C de$ with three articulations: accord . 1at1o • n uru·t , one needs a • cu u ar d ir such a type of code for, 1n order t: 1. a th ve �... � e') composed or ac sp er 'b p f sort o f hyper-unit (the etymology 1s th.e same onents ·signs' of the more analytical articulation so �:8t 1·i5 analytical comp way in same the (i·n conveys are not parts of the content that the hYPer•untt ·. but the fonner are not Which figurae are analytical components of SJFr�ems to me that the only ) , r e conveying a part of the meaning of the tatt.

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A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

in cinematographic langu age. d · un fo be n ca · n io lat cu · ta ar ·. . U1stance of third · rrarne there h1c ap gr ato em c1n a an t tha ) ple sim t tha ot · n as ·t 1 . . Suppose (even 1·r . e ) os ma rae wh rnb 1gu (/ co n t1o a en . a 1 non•SJ·gnificant light phenom are visu ,,unages • or •·icons, or · ua s1·gn1· r·ca em 1 h t cal us t (le 1 nt phenomena . . . prod uces vis l s on a double lie re h1p 1ons lat re al tu mu is th at th e os pp su d •super.signs'). An articulation mechanism. aracters perform gestures ch t. sho the to me fra the m fro ino pass · 8u t an o · �·1gns that ca n ment, lo kinesac and images give rise, through a temporal mov� . ns t rtio n po of are t ich wh e, � � ear be broken into discrete kinesic flgura t, de�r1v�d o f an y m�an1ng, content '(in the sense that small units of movemen . it can make up diverse meaningful gestures). In everyd� y life as rath.er difficult to isolate such discrete moments of a g�stural continu um : but thIS does not hold true for the camera. Let me stress the fact that kinesic ftgurae are indeed significant from the point of view of an 'iconic' language (i.e. they are significant when considered as photographs) but are not significant at all from the point of view of a kinesic langua.g�! Suppose that I subdivide two typical head gestures (the sign for /yes/ and the sign for /no/) into a large number of frames; 1 would find a large number of diverse positions which l would not be able to identify as components of one particular gesture. The position I/head Jilted toward the rightl might be either the figura of the sign Uyesl! coupled with the pointer /indication of the person on tlte right// or the figura of a sign lnol coupled with 1/owered headl (a gesture that may convey various connotations). Thus the camera offers kincsic ftgurat devoid of content, which can be isolated within the spatial limits of the frame (see Eco, 1968 , -

8.3.J.).

Alf these alternatives are suggested simply to indicate how difficult it is to fIX, in the abstract, the level o f articulation of some systems The important t.hing is avoid trying to identify a fixed number of articulations in frxed interrelationship. According to the point of view from which i t is considered, an element of rust articulation can become an ele.men t of second articulation and v.ice versa. After establishing that systems have various types of articulation and that therefore there is n o reason to bow to the linguis tic model, we must also remember that a system is often articulated by setting up as pertinen t features those elements which are the syntagms of a more analytic system; or that, on the contrary, a system considers as syn tagms (the ultimate limit of its combinational possibilities) those elements which are the pertinent features of a more synthetic system. A similar po ssibility was observed in the example of sailors' arm signals. Llnguage considers phonemes to be its ultimate articulatory clemen ts, but the code of naval flags involves /igurae th at , in relation to phonem es, are •

Theory of Sign Production

23S

more an al yt ic (p os it io n of the right arm and position of the left arm), · · . these co mbin111� to p ro v1'de sy n ta gm at1c configurations (ultimate in relation to that . code) w hi ch co rr es .po nd , practi cally speaking (even th ough they transcrib e le t't ers of th e alphabet an d no t phonemes) to the fi gu rae of the verbal language . H ow ever , a sy st em o f narrative functions contemplates large-scale syntagm at ic ch ai ns (or the ki nd /hero leaves his house and meets an enemy/) w hich, for th e pu rp os es of th e narrative system, ar e pertine nt features, while fo r th e pu rp os es o f th e linguistic on e they are syntagms. Thus a code decides on wh at lev el o f complexity it will single ou t its ow n perti nent. features, entrusting th e ev en tu al internal (analytic) codification of these features to an oth er co de . If on e takes th e na rra t.ive un it /hero leaves home and meets an enemy / th e na rra tiv e co de isolates it as a complex content-unit and does not con cer n its elf ab o1,1 t the language in which it can. be expressed and ,the stylistic and rhe tori cal devices which contribute to its construction. All the se are exa mp les of successive overcoding. Usually in overcoding the min imal com bina tion al unit s are the maximal combined chains of a preceding basic code . But sometimes there also is overcoding when the minimal comb inable units or the minimal anaJyz.able clusters of a give.n code are submi tted to a further analytical pertinentization. See for instance the various experiments. in which a scaMer is used to decompose and analyze an image into distinctive features, convey lhem to the computer by means of binary signals, and reproduce them in output through a plotter that draws very complex rasters capable of defining any type of image (their complex .ity is merely a matter of the complexity of the technical apparatus, but in theory it is by no means impossible to reproduce- by means of a very refined raste r Leonardo's 1,fona Lisa, once i. t has been programmed in input by mean s of a very complex sequence of binary signals). lyzed a �umber of ana and ced du r pro Fo has ( ple 7) I ff am 96 Hu ex ' med . r fo t s i un ry images showing how they could b� composed Of:· (a) elementa by fou r dot s of t w o sizes, nllowmg five ombinati.o a1·. ossibilitieSi (b) an � ; infinite array o f dot sizes, allo wing conunuous gra 8.t ,oP.ns·. (c- ) el · em�ntary 10n s 10 SJze so that t vana two 'th Uni!s form�d b� a group!n .o.r three d ors wi mall, s � (three elemen ts their comb1nat1onal poss1b1ht1es support four types of large); three small none large· none large; t w o small, one large; one small • two • raised: are is questio n a (d) arrays of dots of t w o sizes; (e) etc. In �very. faced with a we are Or cas; z w e still c nfro nte d with a series of analogic � :� i.s rl . i guis�ed from each � ti . d c series of discrete un its such as phonem es, 1ve features of c:listinc t e the . cas th1.s other by a series o f distinctive features? In w

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lor, density, form co e: . . ar ff, Hu · by d ibe . scr de t s, uni h' 1c • • the mm1mal grap s e 1 ion of th at,tice.. , ion · of· ·t he eJem · sp · eak of the configu rat . · ·en··ts, n·ot to · po.sit uc ary red · t10n of the . Huff himself poses th.e .problem of a bin · · In any case · ·· . t. al n1m s1tuat1on . . code.. ''Perhaps (the desiJner) will even explore he m1 graph1c . ·st em . 1 n so d01n sy ry 1na a b' · g o, erg es, siz o tw ly on of nts me ele . 'th w1 by working · a· · order to maJnt . f m or, m: 1n a ble he does meet a most formidable pro · ·t • · 1 d 1e1 gra s 1n a tur tex al two manner . face, he must soive between cont.1nuous sur · th aps ese h er op , p d oes t1ve cess era other than the photomechanical pro . · ers, rast ced te a odu stitu d-pr con han econom1es, practised by· students of · \le wht·c · c t ech· n1q phi gra er put com the for .h c� uen seq r· · se of little con h;:tbetically .has the capability to formulate the . light and shade cha�ac­ teristics of any conceivable surface, thereby matching the photomechan1cal process. It does seem, however, that th� gradation of one size el�ments. in tones of brightness rather than the gradation of one-color eleme nts m varying sizes, though resourcefully adventurous, is ill directed effort - somehow co.ntrary to the fundamental simplicity of digital or binary computers'', Oear)y Huff's discussion concerns the pr,actical possibilities of graphic realization and not the theoretical possibilities of an absolute binary reduction of the code. In this last sense the examples given by Moles (1968) seem mote decisive. He shows for example lattices composed of a single right-angle triangle placed in the upper or lower corner of a square compartment, so as to be· able to function in the opposition •empty place -vs� full place'. In any case discu$Sion of the bina·ry possibilities of rasters in photomechanical reproduction (which is governed by criteria of practicality) is outweighed by discussion of the possibility of a realizing any 4 iconic' image by giving digital instructions to a computer w.hich then transmits them to .an analogical plotter ( 1 8 ). Obviously the co�puter digitally commands a plotter which restores the image by 'analogical' means (Soulis and Ellis. 196 7 : 1 50- 1 5 1). Cra1le and Michael (19 67 : 1 5'7) further explain that ''When we wish to plot something, we also have to say where to plot It. The addressing scheme norma cbosen lly is obtained by imagining a two-dimensional Carte sian coordinate system, superimposed on the screen of the CRT. In both the horizontal (x) and the vertical (y) directions we can assign integers for each point to which the e�ectron beam may be digitally deflected'._ Ex periments of 'iconic' re_prod uc­ t1on by n:ieans of computers, such as those ca rried out in the Bell Telepho ne laboratories by Knowlton and Harmon, by th e Japanese Computer Technique Gr�up, show that the digital programm ing of 'iconic' signs can by now . a�hieve in future high degrees of sophistic ation an d th at a greater sophistica· , taon and complexity is merely a ques tjon of time an d economic means. !:nfort� natel� this digital red �ction concerns the possibility of replica ting the press,on �sing another continuum by a procedure which is. not the one u sed bY the artist. It does not concern the articulatory nature of the original . expressive f1.1nctive.

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Compute r ex.peri ence . tells- us that it is possible (in pr1nc1p · · 1e) to analyz . . . e the original signal 1 n figurae, but not that the signaJ was · 1ated actually ar t1cu . . nat1o . . n o f pre-exastent discrete entities· And by comb1 in fact such ent·1t1es . . are .1d t1.fi ble , ,ne . . e e� � th e hardl� . � �r1gina! Signal was composed through a 'continuous d1spos1t1on �f a dense st uf f. Thus replicabilit y through compute rs or ot �e r mec�arusms does not directly concern the code governing _ the re plicate d sign. It 1s rather a matter of technical codes governing the transmis sion of lnfonnation (a signal-to-signal process), to be considered within th e framework of communication engineering (see 1 .4. 4.). One could suspect that such procedures are rather conne cted with the production of doubles (see 3.4.7.) or partial replicas (see 3.4.8.). And this is so when a com pu ter transfe rs a n original 'linear• drawing into a plotted copy. But things go differe ntly w he n a n 'absolutely dense' oil painting is 'translated' into a 'quasi-dense' raster; in such a case it is ve ry difficult to decide if one is dealing with a partial replica, an 'icon' or a pseudo-double. Let us speak of transformation from ex,pression to expression that offers a satisfac tory laboratory model of the procedures requjred in cases of proje ction by ratio difficilis (see the models of projections in 3.6.7.). These examples also de morastrate that, even in cases of non-replicable super-signs, there is the possibility of rendering them replicable using mechanical procedures that institute a 'grammar' there where was only a 'text·. In this sense th ese e xperiments provide us with ceitain challenging theoretical suggestioras about the nature of inventions. Eve.ry assumption about the analogical nature of 'iconic' signs was always based upon (or aiming to support) the notion of the ineffabili � and the 'unspeakability' of those devices that signify through being my5lenously related to the objects. To demonstrate that at least the signals ordered to · · those sign-functions ar-e open to analytical decompositio n does not solve the problem bu t do es eliminate a sort of magic. One could therefore say th81 lhe . • · al 5upport for the student digital approach constitutes a sort of psychO1ogac . ga • hertn 1p dec n he W , ism· . Of icon who wants to further understand the mystery ... oer ef th d e an messa g a ed ind · secret message one · must first be sure that •it IS e . the same way •"'..e in it· that there is an underlying code. to be ,abd u c�d• f1om _ knowle dge that iconic signals also are digJtallY analYzable can help to pro mote a further enquiry as to their semiotic nature. 3.6.S. Replica: stylizations and vectors

. ate :· replic can one , 1cas To return to the problem of repJ

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be combined wi th features of the st mu t tha · tem sys "' en giv a o f es tur (i) ,ea . t e; nc av fu le ab iz gn co re a se po m co to r de or in em st . same sy e, recognizable on the basis oir eTt rep ed tur uc str Jy ak 8 we m fro (ii) features their co� te nt b� a large. to ed lat rre co d an s ism an ch me al tu ep of perc . combined wit h oth er be y anJ ess nec not st mu t tha , g 1 d"n o erc seaI.e ov features; le (iii) features of a given system that must be added to a bund , or to a string er of features from one or more oth er systems in ord to compose a recognizable functive. Features of type (i) have been considered in the preceding paragraph. Verbal language, for instance, combines elements of second articulation to construct elements of first articulation and tl1erefore phrases. Featu res of t. ype (ii) are stylizario11si features of type (ill) are vectors. J mean by stylizations certain apparently 'iconic' expressions that are in fact the result of a convention establishing that they will not be recognized because of their similarity to a content-model but because of their similarity to an expression-type which is not strictly con1pulsory and permits many free variants. A typical example of this sort of replica is the King o r the Queen in a pack of cards. We do not 'iconically' recognize a «man)) and then a ,«King»; we immediately grasp the denotation provided that certain pertinent elements are respected. It is also on this basis that 'iconograms ' are coded, i.e. recognizable categories in painting such as the Virgin Mary, Saint Lucy. Victory, Athena, the Devil. In these cases the imm ediat e deno tatio n is a matter of 'invention' (they are productions governed by a ratio difficilis that establishes certain similarities with a male or female body and so on) while their full signification (this «man» is «Jupiter>>) is due to the pres enc e of overcoded replicable features (stylizations). So a painted image of the Devil is a super-sign which wil l b e further analyzed when speaking of �inventions'. But, among oth er procedures, the replica of large-scale overcoded properties contr ibutes to th e structuring of such a sign-func tion. Insofar as i t is an icono gram, the image of the Devil is a replica of a previously coded type, irrespec tive of a lot of fre e variants. In fact when looking a t the King of Spad es o r an im ag e of lhe Virgin Mary we do not really ha ve to grasp th e representative m ea ni ng of th e image, we- do not interrogate the express ion in order to guess, through a sort of backward projection at the fo rmat of tl1e co nt en t-t yp e. W e imn1ediately recognize this large-scale co nfiguration as if it w er e a n el em en ta ry featu re. Some general properties having be en respected, th e expression ls recognized

111eory ofSign Product/o;,

239

as b ei ng conventionally linked to a certain content· the co ntent can also be • . . . conceptually grasped Without having recourse to its �atial . yr . an d fi1gural . markers. The 1conogram 1s a label.

In this sense eve,n vaster configurations can be taken as stylizations· even if a mor e analytical glance will show them to be composed by rnor� . sub tle operations But if this analysis is not performed. they ar e received as if governe d by a ratio facilis, even if they display the sam e markers as the corresponding sememe (ratio di/ficilis). Le t us list so m e of these large-scale stylizations, each category rep constituting a ertoire of conventional expression, therefore a sub-cod e: fe he at ra ur ld es such as the unicorn that supports the ic (i) arms of the British royal family; (ii) schematic onomatopoeias, such as /to sigh/ or /to bark/ (these cou ld be · analyzed as degenerate full onomatopoeias, and therefore as fictive samples (se e 3.6 .3. ) but in fact they are currently accepted as arbitra ry expressions; (ill) coded rnacro·ambien(al features, such as, in architecture, a house, a temple, a square, a street; (iv) co,nplex objectJ and their customary images (like the cars portrayed in

advertising);

(v) musical types (a march, 'thrilling• music); (vi) literary or a rtistic genres (Western, slapstick comedy); (vii) all the elements o f the so-called recognition codes {see 3.5.) by which a leopard is characterized by spots and a tiger by stripes (granted that an elementary •feline' outline has been recognized on the basis of certain similarity procedures); (viii) iconograms, as studied by iconology: the Nativity, the Last Judgment, the Four Horsemen of the Ap ocalypse and so on. (ix) pre-es tablish ed evalu.ative and appreciative connotations conveyed. by iconological means' and mainly used in Kitsch•art: a Greek temple · . · · e image Y en femuun gi a conventionally connoting «claSS1cal beauty», historically connoting tcgrace» or «sex»; (x) other characterizations such as one perfume immediately co�no1•ing «seductioni> or «lust» ;hile another connotes «cleanliness», lhe mcense smell connoting «church», and so on.

. u1 t to distinguish a stylization . . dif Beyond a certain limit at is very .fic . taken not by th.e sender but . . from an invention. and frequently the deca51on IS 011 a given lizati on 1 f bor by the addressee, who in effe�t performs 1 � composition that expression. Everyone has experienced h . ow 8 given ures at fe its l al 'th w · t. re� lex mp has for many years bee n enjoyed as a c o • , 's taste becomes • • at a certa1· n point (as one subjected to intensive scrutiny, 1s

;�:al

240

A THEORY OF SEM IOTICS simply rec eived as

) ion est qu an in t iec ob, I J · a sic mu t e accustomed to h . • .th . h . » p ony Sym or «Fif quite ately oxim appr s n ea m at th rm fo d ze aly an un

simply «Romanticism» or «Music ». . . . 1g , r-s ns ious 1nv �nt1o supe �s that Thus stylizations are catachreses of prev rse (bemg a text? and indeed ou disc lex mp co a ey nv co ld ou sh d could an _ Their .replica, however es. nam per pro of n ctio "un 11 the on e al�st tak • • h . · as ful suc f .· and a1th en, to tok ent its · taken as a suffici unprec1se 1t may be, is .. , by force of · n•type. They are the proof that a ratio dlffic1/1s may expressio . . . ns, become a tio e continuous exposure to communication and successiv conven ratio facilts.

.

Stylization may also combine with other devices to make up a discourse; for instance, by putting toge ther certain stylizations with com­ binational visual replicas, a road signal could 'say': «this road is closed to trucks, cars must run at no more than 30 miles and U-turning Is forbidden; please make no noise since there is a hospital in the vicini ty». . Let us now examine those features that are not combinable with features of the same system but which exclusively collaborate with features of other systems so as to make up an expression. I have called them vectors. The classic example is the one (already given in 2. 1 1 .4., 2. I 1.5. and 3.S.7.) of the pointing finger: dimensional features realized by a part of a human body, such as «linearity» and «apicali ty» are the same as those realized by a graphic arrow; in this sense the pointing finger should be considered as an expression produced by an aggregation of combinational units, like a verbal expression., and so should the arrow. But the finger moves toward something; there is a feature of directio11 (which nat urally characterizes a lot of other kinesic fea tures, though here these features of movement can be articulated with other features of the same type). This directional feature orientates the attention of the addressee acc ording to parameters such as 'left•, •nght' or 'up' and 'down' and so on. Bu t these are not simple spatial parameters of the type 'left vs. right�, to be used as combinational units in other kinesic configurations; they shouJd instead be viewed as 'left-to-right vs. right-to-left'. The addressee does not have to phys ically follow that direction (nor . mdeed does there have to be anything in the indicated direction for the pointers to be significant, see 2. 11 .5.). As a matter of fac t there are two 'directions': one is actually an d physically perceptible and is an expressive feature ; the other is the 'sign ified' direct'ion and is mere conten t. The zect � ional _feat � re is produced according to ·a ratio diffic/lis because lite P oduced direction is the sam e as that o f which one is 'speaking '.

•

Theory of Sign Production

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I n order to u n d er st an d vec to rs , one must also think. of other kinds of direc tional fe at u� e, and one � us t fr ee the term 'dire ction' from spatial connotations (tl11s perhaps being better reaJJud by th e word •ve ctor' or 'vectorialization'). O� e m ay thus regard as vectorial devices the increasing or decreasin g o f vocal pi tc h and dynamics in paralingu istic features: for instance when uttered, a 'question intonation' is a vectorialization; the nature of a m · us ic al melody is gr as pe d not only because of the articulation of com blna· tional units bu t because of their precise temporal success ion. Thus even syntactic�ph ras e ma rke rs mu st be considered as vectors (2 9 ). In /John be at s M ar y/ it js th e direction of the phrase (a spatial direction in th e wr itt en ph ras e and a temporal one in the uttered one) that makes the content understandable; by changing round the proper names the entire content is rev ers ed . Ag ain , a vectorialization is neither a sign nor a complete exp res sion in itse lf (except taken as an expression signifying a pure vectorial correlation as in /a:>b/), but rather a productive feature that, in conjuncrio n with others, contributes to the composition of the expression (3 o ). One could say that in som e cases a vector by itself can give rise to a sign-function; suppose that I hum an upward pitch-curve; I can succeed in signifying « question» (or «I am questioning» or «what?») by imposing a direction on a sound-continuum without resorting to any other device. But this is a case of coded stylization. Many vectors are governed by a very schematic ratio difficilis so easily recognizable that, as happens with stylizations, a sort of catachresizing process takes place and the ratio dif/icilis practically becomes a ratio facilis. The case o f the interrogative humming cited above is a typical example of thls process. 3.6.6. Programmed stimuli and pseudo-combinational units kinds or Half wa y between replica and invention th ere are two . . ally deprodu ctive opera tion that are not usu allY conSi· dered as sem1ot1c . elements e . ttc finable. The first one concerns the di spo�'t ·10n of non-s m1o . of light intended to elicit an immediate response Ul the receiver.. � flash e i on xc tati ' 1 imm a during a theatrical performance, an unb earable sound a su bl • . essed in str w as . as SJgn s, than rath er uli and so on, are to be listed among sfirn sender knows the e th . en h w that , note d 3.S .S• Bu t an we . h . the same paragrap . . his cons ider ed to . possible effect of tlte d.aspI ayed stimulu s' one is o bl',g given stimulus a 1,,,,, 10 or i , nce ete np coi kno wledge as a sort of se111iutic elicit. In to aims ssl expr e · Y he that .. n corresponds to a given foresceabl e. rea,.tio

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

242

stimulus is the expression the . which • by on functi other words, there as a sagn· . lane. p t en nt o c s it as . plane of a supposed effect functioning . ely let ict mp ed pr co r able, mulus ts neve sti a of t ec fr 1' e e th s es el th • er • • tac eleme s .Nev to sem lly ca 1fi ec sp nt re mo r he ot g on am d · e rt se m en wh . especially . . . ts i r rat ake bo spe ela a t ng a . . · tha ose pp Su sign doseu p a as · xt With.in a te . . . . . c d on et an rh ry in cia try g to di Ju . of les ru e th to g din or acc ,. ,,.,, ., persuasive discou . . . n ca ion He r ass te mp ut co d an his ac of pity · h'1s add res·sees· feelinrr arouse 1n . . y detectable Vibrations th at could rel ba th wi or , ice vo g bin ob thr 8 in phr. ases supra-segmental fea tures could ese Th . cry to d pte tem is he t tha sugge . st . . · s · d p om t t1ng his an sym re tea me or obviously be either paralinguistic devices be stimuli he inserts int o the discourse in emotional state; but they might also order to provoke some degree of identification in his listeners and to pull them toward the same emotional state. He is using these devices as programmed stimulations but does not know exactly how they will be received, detected, interpreted. The speaker is thus half way between the execution of certain rules of stimulation and the displaying of new unconventionalized elements that might (or might not) become recognized as semiotic devices. Sometimes the speaker is not sure o f the relation between a given stimulus and a given presupposed response, and he is more maki,1g than performing a tentat1ve coding of programmed stimuli. Therefore these devices stand between replica and invention ; and may or may not be semiotic devices, thus constituting a. sort of ambiguous threshold. So that even though the expressive string of programmed stimuli can be analyzed into detectable units, the corresponding content remains a nebula-like conceptual or behavioral 'discourse'. The expression, made of analyzable and replicable units (governed by a ratio facilis} may then generate a vag ue discourse on the content plane. Among suc h programmed stimuli on e mi ght list (i) all the : programmed synesthesiae in poetry, music, painti ng, etc .; (ii) all so-called 'expressiv . e' sign s, such as those theorized by artists like Ka nd inskij, i.e. visual c�nfigurations that are conventionally supposed to 'convey' a given feeling directly (force, grace, instability, move ment an d so on ) an d th at have als o bee� studied by th e theorists of Ei 11ful1lung or empathy; ins of ar as these devices hold a motivated relatio nship with psychic forces or 'reprodu ce' physic� experiences, they sh ould be dealt with i n th e pa ra gr ap h concerning _ pro�ctions (3.6.7.); insofar as they are displayed by a se nd er who knows lbeir emphatic effect, th ey are programmed st im ul at io n {a nd therefore prec ded devices) of whi � ch, however, the result (on the co nt pl an e) is on ly en t partially foreseeabl . . · · ··) all production e · c11'. of substitutive stimuli described tn : 3.S.S. · , v) many pro.JCct 1ons, about which more w il '! l b e said ,in 3. 6 .7 . Yway one sho uld carefu lly distinguish between th is sort o f pro·

.

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gramm ed stimulus an d th e m or e explicitly coded devi ces used to expre . · ss emot1ons, such a s bo dY movements, facial expressions , and so 0n, now so precisely recorded by th e latest researches in kinesics (Ekman 1969) and in paralinguistics. A n o th er k in d of spurious semiotic operation is pseudo-combination. The m os t typical example is an abstract painting or an atonal musical composi tion. Apparently a Mondrian painting or a Scho enberg composition is perfectly replicable and therefore appears to be compo sed by sy stematically combinab le un its . These un its ar e no t apparently endowe d with meaning but they do follow combinational rules. Nobody can de ny that there is an expression sy st.em even though the co nt en t plane remains, as i t we re, open to all comers. These examples are thus m or e open sig,1al tex tures than sign-functions; for this ve ry reason they appear to inv ite th e att rib uti on of a content, thus issuing a sort of interpretive challenge to tlie ir addressee (Eco, 1 962). Le t us call them visual or musical propositional fu11ctions that can only 'wait' to be correlated to a content, each being susceptible of many different correlations. Thus whe n hearing a post-Webernian sound cluster one detects the presence of replicable musical unit s combined in a certain fashion and sometimes one also knows the rule governing this kind of aggregation of material even ts. However, the problem seems to change when one is dealing with abstract expressionist paintings, random music, John Cage�s happenin� and so on. (n these cases one can speak of textural clouds which lack any predictable rule. Can one then continue to speak of a pseudo-combinational operation? I t is exactly this kind of artistic operation which prompted Levi-Strauss (1964) to deny any linguistic nature to these phenomena, in vi�w of their lack of discrete units or of oppositions based on an underlymg system. material texture, re enti the s case se One could resp the t ond tha in. . through its very absence of rules, opposed. 1tse . If tO the entire system• of ru.les . . governing 'linguistic' art, thus creating a sort Of macrosystem tn which . · tions of informauonal marufestations of pure noise are opposed to man•resta· . order. This solution has the advantage of elegance and does � fact ex�I� . omzei' arusts, but Jt as ,f' , O many of the intentions behind the work ·f ,,,,. . a . 1s e er th a en om en . emi·otic ph equivalent to main · taining that even 1ll non-s . . ak e abse·nt m to orde r in ed I ay senuot d' tsp are ic purport insofar as they . n of •(II'1 in' • J'onnel' uo : se .nse the crea uuS ,.. ,1. sem1otic phenomena relevant. UI r. �nl1 to spea k. would be the same a s silence in order to 'express' re,u\)4 examples of thi s y an m Y wh · on · as re r he ot an A$ a m at te r of fact there is

'

244

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

ions. Th e clue is given at bin m -co do eu ps of re tu na e th t eas I t a kind of art have . . .ine the very 1n1 ve ng of .. themseIves when exam y the t tha us l tel y the . by artists . . s, ise trying to or sounds and no matcn·at , the tex ture of the wood, canvas• iron . s. th ry pa 1to The artist au or l ua vis w ne , ms for � , ps shi on find in them relati tinuum a new system of di.scovers at the deeper level of the expression-con . . . . , g v1n um nu rise nti to an � relations that the preceding segmentation of that co , res1 r , had never made pertinent. These new perunent featu expression ,orm . d a le iza tab e ogn det rec so are ble, � � along with their mode of organization, that one becomes able to isolate the work of a given artist, and thus to distinguish, for Instance, Fautrier from Pollock or Bo �lcz. from B�r.io. In this case the establishing of pseudo-comb1nat1onaJ units does not precede the making of the work itself; on the contrary, the growth of the work coincides with the birth of the systems. And, provided that these forms convey a content (which is sometimes identical with a metalinguistic account of the nature of the work and its ideological purport), an entire code is proposed as the work is established. Let me stress that we are here dealing with three problems: (i) the segmentation perfonned below the level of the recognized expression fonn, that is, a fu rther segmentation of the expression-continuum; this aspect will become \(ery important in section 3.7. when speaking of the aesthetic text; (ii) the complexity of this segmentation at various levels, which sometimes makes it impossible to detec t distinguishable units, thereby making it impossible to establish replicable expression types; when this happens pseudo-combinational units cannot be replicated (in post•Webernian music some sound-clusters can be replicated - indeed there is a score prescribin g their way of perfonnance - while others can only be 'suggested ' by the composer and require an inventive participation on the part of the perfonner; a DubutTet pai nting can hardly be replicated); (ill) the invention of new expression levels along with their possible segmentation and systematization; in such cases pseudo-combinational procedure turn s into pu rely inve11tive procedure, thus bringing us to the last item in the present classification of

modi faciendi sig111J'.

I n Table 39 pseudo-combinational units are nevertheless listed among the modes of production governed by a ratio facilis because, as long as they ue replicable, they have to reproduc e an expression type, though it seems doubtful that they represent a defin ite case of sign-function so much as one of an 'open' signal. But if th eir constitutive units are not detectable, they are not replicable. and they th us remain half way between sign production and the proposal of new poss ibilities for manipulating continua.

Theory ofSig,, Production

24S

It is no t b y ch an ce that programmed stimuli have on the contrary been • liste d 1 n the sam e row as examples and sample·s• in a mi'ddle ·pos1·t·Ion between . .. . .. . . foc1/1s . and ratio diffic1/1s. Sometunes, as the empathy ratio theorists assume, , . . . , ther e 1s a so rt of motivated 1 ink b etween a certain line and a ·certa1n . · ,ee r 11ng, . • and thus ca ses of stunulat1on rely on procedures of projection or sty lization.

3.6.7. Invention We ma y de fm e as invention a mode of production whereby the producer of the sign-function chooses a new material continuum not ye t segmented for tl1at purpose and proposes a new way of organizing {of giving form to) it in ord er Jo map within it the formal pertinent element of a content-type. Thus in invention we have a case of ratio difficilis realized within a heter omat erial expression; but since no previous convention exists to correlate the elements of the expression with the selected content, the sign producer must in some way posit this correlation so as to make it acceptab le. In this sense inventions are radically different from recognition, choice, and replica.

•

Everybody recognizes an expression produced by recognition because a previous experience has Unked a given expression-unit with a given content­ unit. Everybody recognizes an expression produced by a clzoice made on the basis of a common mechanism of abstraction, such as the acknow ledging ot a given item as representative of the class to which it belongs. Everybody recognize s an expression produced b y replica, because the replica replicates an expression-type which has already been conventionally correlated with a given content. In all these cases, whether the ratio is facilis or difficilis, eve ryb ody recognizes the correspondence between a token and its type bec ause the typ e alre ady exists as a cultural product. Whether the token expression reproduces a content type, as in the case of imprints, or an expression ty pe , as in the case of phonemes an d words, the procedure follows certain basic requ irements. set 0f � as ) ion ess. pr ex of or t en nt co If on e vie ws a type (whether of · t, the token is obtained by . . nen pertt e prop rties that have been singled out as the token f . o ose th f • o . s t enn • in set mappi ng ou t the elements of the onginal xs represent . e th e er h w 40 l set. This b T e 3 procedure can b e represented by ' . nt and van.a ble the pertinent properties of the type and the J'S n on-pertu1e eleme nts (3 1 ). ·t simply involves . bl e ro In cases of ratio facilis mapping presents no r �� that prescribed a er al m O rt so tlte re production of a property using tlie same

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for instance, prescrib e , ay m e p ty e th e em by the type. In the case Of 8 Ph. 0 onation), thus ph an m hu of ns ea m � by 1 ya ng . •Jabial+voiced' (thereby imp establishing how to produce 3 [bl · Table 40

• Ya

---+-----f'-+• X1 • Y2 l Xj . ---\---+--+• � • Y3

� - - ---�-·· �

---1---�-+· )C3 'TYPE

/

TOKEN

The notion of mapping is somewhat more problematic in cases of ratio difficilis, because the type of a ratio difficilis is a content unit, a sememe, and its properties are semantic markers, and are not in principle linked to any particular expression continuum. So what does one mean by mapping the pertine.nt properties of a glass of wine within another material so as to produce the recognizable wet imprint of a glass of wine upon a table? Formulating the question in th.is way might make for a puzzling answer, but this is because of one's 'referential' bias. As a matter of fact the imprint of a glass of wine does not have t o possess the properties of the object «glass of wine» but it does have to possess those of the cultural unit «imprint of a glass of wine». And in this case the semantic representation of the entity in question entails n o more than four semantic markers. i.e. «circle», «red», «length of the inradius (or diameter)» and «wet». To map these markers within another material simply means to realize the geometrical and chemical interpretants of the sememes «circle». «red>>, «diameter X» and tc.wet». This done, the mapping process is complete, and the realization of a token of the content type a com para tively easy mat ter. In this sense one cannot maintain that the imprin .t of a hare's paw is an iconic feature in the same way as is the image of a hare. I n the form er cas e the content type is culturally established, whereas in the latt one it is not er (except in cases of stylization). The only problem would appear to be: in what sense doe s a circle of a given diameter realized up on a table map the semantic ma rke rs «circle» and

«diameter X »?

But on second thoughu, th at question is no t so dif fer en t fro m asking in What sense a labial and voiced consonan t maps the abstact ph onological type . . ed' .m sound. In the 'labial+voac latter case the answer seems easy enough :

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. there ;sre ce rta in sound parameters which permit the . rea111.at1on and . . . recogn1t.1on of .the replica (a s to bow the realization of a parameter 1.s . . . reco gn�zable, th1s se nd s us back to ba sic perceptive requiremen ts that,as.was noted 1n 3.4.7. an d 3.4.8., ar e postulates rather than theorem s for a semiotic theory). Thus on e ne ed only repeat that (as was underline · d ,n 3•4•2•) var1ous expressions m ay b e realized whether in accordance with spatial parameters or phonic parameters in order to justify listing the replica of a cir cle in the same theoretic al ro w as th e replica of a phoneme. The only diffe rence is that the sound features governing the reproduction of a phoneme are not content markers, while the spatial features governing the reproduction (ev en if virtual, as in the recognition of imprints) of a geometrical figu re are. This - as we have seen - i s exactly the difference between ratio facilis and ratio dif ficilis. Now if on e considers Table 39, one notices that aU the cases of ratio difficilis concern content types in which the most important semantic markers are toposensitive , i.e. figural or vectorial properties. This brings us back to the problem outlined in 2.7. 2.: not every semantic marker can be verbalized. When sema ntic markers can be verbalized they have undoubtedly acquired a maxi mum of abstraction; previously culturaJized and frequently expressed through verbal devices, they can even be arbitrarily correlated with other non-verbal devices (for example a geometrical form in a road signal meaning -ElAD___,---·-- --------, GOOD

BAD-¥ ----" GOOD � -

d PRESSURE vs. HEATING (pressure:'abcd', heatlng/abef) C

It will be seen that the lateral triangles present pairs of antonymous markers: «excess vs. plenty >> , «security vs. discomfort», «danger vs. comfort» are not mutual interpretants, nor can they be mutually sUbstituted (except in cases of ironical oxymoron). The second level of this prismatic structure shows the incompatibilities that arise when the two points of view are compared; the base diagrammatically demonstrates the whole network of mutual incom· patibility, each link producing an opposition 'good vs. bad'. The same happens when setting out 'pressure vs. production' diagrammatically. Table 60 needs no further commentary. Table 60 b LOW ---------; HIGH 8

', LACK -------·- EXCESS X CE�S�S E= -_: -_ __ -_ -__ -_ - -_ t_ LACK i,�"�"� :..r \-E N ER GY __ ___ __ _____ +ENERGY ,,, ,-----------""" ... ., R DANG E \ SECUR ITV ., ______ GOOD 8 • - -----�------- .,.,.,," SAD GOOD "' C

.,,"

PRESSURE vs. PRODUCTIVIT

BAD

d

• .

'abef') c:11v1tV• produ bed' Y (pressure-,8

rded, two disrega are 60 . Tables 58• 59 and . When the by d we connections sho heating and that ting �er one "1 deolo.gical discourses n1ay potent,'all occur • · Y

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sake .of ge nera) at any cost for the ed rsu pu be to s ue . val ry · ma pn . are producing .th . . . ble ati mp t co no wa are general y happ.iness, while conc·ealing that the erting tha the most ass er oth the ; ger dan e duc pro � securit,y, since they bers of t�e soci group in em m all r fo y rit cu se te lu so ab is ing th � import.ant _ te)y attained, this excludes le. mp if co t, tha t fac the ing eal nc co question, while . re fa el w d an ity tiv uc od pr in se ea cr in any . n of a good heating tio duc pro system is the t I am not trying to argue tha

safety is a 'bad' idea. On the a 'bad' goal; nor indeed that aiming at max.lmwn the aims of a social group contrary, any honestly persuasive discourse about must take into account all of these goals ; but it must a t the same time acknowledge on what grounds (i.e. according to which premises) the values are preferred and to what extent they are mutually exclusive. In fact a critical survey of the values in question will show that they are mutually exclusive only if taken as absolute (i.e. logically formalized). Whereas in fact they are all fuzzy concepts. A critical survey of the semantic composition of these concepts would show that they were open to gradation; there is a series of intermediate states between «-energy» and «+energy» and likewise between «security» and «danger» (danger being a very low state of security and vice versa). It w.ould thus be possible to isolate a middle portion of the energy scale which coincided with that of the security scale (provided that their 'gradients' were inversely proportional).

Table 61 energy security

I

+9 I +8 . +7 I +6 I +s I +4 I +3 I +2 I + l I

I +l I +2 I +3 I +4 I +5 I +6 t +7 I +8 I +9 f acceptab le rate for both

ut in m king such a calculation one has already trespassed upon the realm of � _ � ideology by performing a critically per suasive discourse. This discourse can obviously be rejected by any interlocutor who ha s established a rad.ical scale of P��ri ties . such as ''better rich than safe'' (or ''better safe than rich'') ( 5 1 ). A critical semiotic survey of ideological discourses does no t eliminate the speaker's pragmatic · and· material motivations and therefore does not change the world (or the mate n'a b .. . l ases of l1fe). I t can only contribute to making them more explicit (s 2},

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T h e i d eologic al discourse endeavors to conceal these v� .ous opti� an d m u st therefore involve a rh et orical labor of code sh·irting · . and overco ding w n h e ac o an ce y pts the harmonious o Thus and sym.metr1c • · al correspon. dence � tw� en p ro�uctaon a n d h ating (Table 5 9) may weJI fo rget th � at the semantic u n it « m ax u n u m » on which he bases his vi ew represents not on ly a ,naxim� of .heat a n d ener but also a maximum of � pressure. The only _ co ot n n ec te d to thas unat are those conn ations of «plenty», «comfort» and «energy» , which rapidly become names for it (5 3 ); consequently, whe n someon e maintains th at maximum heat also means «danger», the statemen t is receiv ed as se m an tically anomalous, and believed to be referentially fal se. It is thus 'ideologically' interpreted as a malignant effort to disrupt the 'Jaw and order' which governs one's unc. ontradicted semanti c universe (i.e. one's culture, world vision, religion, 'way of life', etc.). To recall th at /m ax im um heat/ is no t only an expres sion suggesting «wealth» an d «co mfort », but also a sign originally produced in order to mention a sta te of the world, and t o realize that, physically, this state of the world was and is a growth in pressure - all this would mean putting on its feet a 'philosophy' that was used to standing on its head. But ideology is a partial and disconn ected world vision; by disregarding the multiple interconnections of the semantic universe, it also conceals the pragmatic reasons for which certain signs (with all their various interpretations) were produced. This oblivion produces a false conscience (54 ). Thus a theory of codes (which looks so independent from the actual world, naming i � states through signs), demonstrates its heuristic and practical power, for 11 reveals ' b y showing the hidden interconnections of a given cultural sy5tem, the way s in which the labor of sign production can respect or betra� the . at complexity of such a cultural network, thereb Y adap1·ang it to (or separatlJlg ss) ( rld o w the ) from the human labor of transforming states of

3.9.S. The ultimate threshold izing such orga n ut o wi th nn ed This transformation cannot be perfiO onned, the tra nsf · be to er d or states of the world into semantic systems· fn soon as they As . ed arra ng raJ Jy . states of the world must be named. and 5tru· ctu _11ed 'cultu re' (which also . ci,u is are nam ed, that system of sign syst ems· wh.ich and discussed ) of t tho ug h are s orga nizes the way in which the maten·a1 force ory of codes the a tha t e enc d . may assu me a degree of extra-rer. ierential indep en .bI e SSl o p at 1s wa y Onl ln that ono au must respect an d analyze in all its � ;�� approaching tbe wh en (ev �n t o outline a theory of sign production

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of Truth an d Falsehood) will s rm te in gs in th d an s sign n ee relationship betw h. profit fro� a purely semiotic approac_ . 1ba . . , lance, d . aJ gic ol.o ide an 1J1 to e ns es giv an When the Alpha-Beta system ere are on! y two possibl e ways th s', ad he eir th 'on nd sta ms ste semantic sub-sy ,ex�/�de, so that er a1n nt eta co a-B ph Al e th e : k. ma to (i) s es oc of stopping the pr stroys the obl1v1on of false de d an ht lig to s me co re ssu pre of ce the existen ts another en n', res tio lu rep vo 're d lle i ca s me et som , act s conscience; thi recognize an d cannot afford to st mu ine ipl disc r ou t tha old esh thr ic iot sem lodes, the whole system of trespass upon; when the Alpha-Beta container exp semiotic units will go up with it, and will need to be rc�built (even though there may be no semioticians around to record the new phenomenon). (ii) to demonstrate (through a survey of the contradictory format of the semantic universe, getting back toward its sources as far as is possible by moving along the branches of the content systems and across the various code shiftin� and concretions of different sign-functions) how mucl1 broader than most ideologies have recognized is the format of the semantic universe. Granted that it is daring, but by no means absurd, to maintain that issues (i) and (ii) are mutually compatible, the semiotician may not have much to say on this matter, but he will have something to do. The labor of sign production releases social forces and itself represents a social force. It can produce both ideologies and criticism of ideolo.gies. TI1us semiotics (in its double guise as a theory of codes and a theory of sign production) is also a form of social criticism, and therefore one .among the many forms of social •

practice.

NOTES I. In fact any of the judgments listed in (viii) can be translated as a �on-•Otocutory' act. For instance semiotic judgments can produce speech acts like Are all bachelors males?' ', "If only all bachelors were males!'', ••1 assure ,, you t�t all bachelor� ate m�le ''; "Is this o�j ''�ok, a pen ' cil? ect a _ , !! pencil. , •.What a horrible pencil! ; etc. Factual Judg ments are suscept1b.le to !�e same type of translations: ''Is moon really walked on by human beings? '', . 1! that pencil really black? ''. ''I define this pencil as bla. ck" J "Gosh! �Iuman bemuc on the m oon I " "Eco-freaks, beware!. I ", moon the on arrive Man d has ' · . .logi.cally ; . . g all these Even-tf speakin speech acts can be reduced to assertive sentences. and even if transformation ally speaking their underlying phrase m kers can be reduced to tha t ot a declarative sentence (Katz 19 72 :201 ff; : te con_tra • Lakoff, _ 197 1. a), they ose a lot o f semiotic problc�s I s all not . � e a cul� rly d�ali?g with them p w t�e 1n this v1 to boo inc k line I but � am J d � dis P es mvestigatmg suc h problems from language analysis to sociolingu15•

'fheory ofSign Production

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tics, .rro':' research es. in interactional behavior to ethnomtthodo!°gy constitut ing an essential chapter of general semiotics as (A ust · 1 962, Searle, 1969 ; Cohe n , l 9 7 3 � Gum.perz and Hymes , l 972i Cic 1 � 2. When a factual Judgment is emitted th ourel 9 3) . · . Test 1n .e most na '..1 ura 1 attitu . , · de IS to ac f ua g t · l . d Ju grnents 1s th e first du test it. . . ty of the sc1ent1st · · · ne the mston an , th e ' w sm an as well as the prudent man. rt · · t ics is not oo . . would be wro · at semao . . ng to say · h this nceme d wit th ac tiv ity of testing•· execPt sn . . · the case of testing men t·ions. fact ual JUdgm . ents do not send im mediately back to a actual pe rceptum an d demand for more mediating oper n at io ns each of them impl ying th e recourse t o a ne w level of semiotic conventio ns (for example n m ust ch ec k a factual judgment by co historia n ntrolling written recor:S . archeological witnesses, an d so on). This kind of labor, recorded in Table under th e �ea? of 'focusing on . world' should be funher approached by a general sem1ot1cs. Up to no w this. labor has been studied by logical semantics (as well as by th e me th odologies of the various sciences). Th at until now semiotics an d logic seem to have marched quite independent of each other (in spite of the me thodological and philosophical chance offered by Peirce) is due to the fact tha t (except in the case· of Morris) semiotics was more li n ked with linguistics and cuJtural anthropology. But this threshold between logic and semiotics becomes more and more imprecise and it comes to be widely trespassed by the latest researches in generative semantics and transforma· tional grammar. 3. The way i n which both factual and semiotic judgmepts can change the code (a way that will be further analyzed by the various sections of the present chapter) could solve a widely discussed epistemol�gical. problem_, i.�. the possible relationship between a structural and a dialectic l0g,1c. If sem1ot�c systems are structures and if the first property of a structural arran gement _is the mutual solidarity of its elements (therefore implying an homeo5laUc permanence of the structural whole) • how then can structures transfonn . . themselv es into .0 ..ve)?• There are how then can codes chan (1.e., other structures many positions held by different authors in so�e way eoncei:1 d. w,: a1 � ) dialectical interpretation o f structural �pproach; S�ve J , that r:C: d a �? � structures are only transitory configurations of t�� mat a structu ral logic is only the science of th� . internodal � men ts of the reason' dialect ical contradiction"; thus structural logic 15 only an 'a na1yricaJ totality the its in no �oes which, even though useful and necessarr, : :::: are two types .of a ai 6 ns 6 m } aint dialectical process. Godelier ( ! 9 rb be tween the on e th e d contradictions, the one wf1h111 the structure of n tradictoriness self-c o ;�e struct ures; the former practically cerrespo nds a nce of appe ar the on ds each code as outlined in 2.12 ·13. ; the latter �o for factual tY nece ss.i the :: new material phenomena and could be equated example of the ce n insta ee f0� ter (s ap ch nt ese pr nts me in i, also dg e d th ne tli ing ou ju chan g code r t ble cyclamates given in 3.8. 5.). dou asp�� cul ture, and he to� accepts 1_'hiS . considered by Lotman ( 1 970} 1� his ty �olo'i rillciples(cbangingfr?: p th t,o O the idea of continuously intert�ut�d act marb��,,� and l netic ,;.° a OU1$ide and chan in from inside). . :C cyber d �pecaa Y Y tel( f 960)� Apo g g s d ents backg round of this question is deal! w,t� b Jud iotic � sem een Piaget ( 1968). ( th.ink that the ds�ecltc. ktw e n codes and S18Jl pr� . c twe lon an evolu t factual judgments 1 along with the du1le�t 1al al· ructu r t s of • eo"" bc •' th CIJC dialC t1on, can constitute the basts • r ,or 8 semiot ics.

3

9:::�

;:c-

A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

300

ssell's dichotomy between Ru of m cis iti cr s hi ted ra bo el.a · g . 4, Arter hav1n ·It to th c more sui·tab d uce . d re g vin ha le · a·on (and after , · mearung and denotat trawson advances a conclus · ng) oru nt1 me and g ' n fyi i dan "60 f ty o · an oomplement · • purposes but d'?es no t hetp us in al hic sop ilo ph its s fit tly ec erf ch whi i n -0 . stotel1an nor . P An er Russel lian eith -s eve1opt.ng "N s: . i· i·c theory· He say . a sem·ot d · ary e, f ag ry o gu r na or lan di or dm of n sio es pr ex y rules ·ve the exact logic for an ,, The purpose of a theory of code� was to see if ic. log ct exa not has ge langu� at least on e logic. Maybe the d. ry languages have if not an exact one, y the t�eory of a fo':"alized onl s c log if ic, log a i;g find � of ! not is m �: ;�0 c IS language. The problem is to find_a .temtotic theory wh1 � surely d1f_fcrent r rom a formal logic� bul which IS neverthe1e� able t� dissolve the shade of skepticism suggested by Strawson's quotation, wh ich ma� lead to the suspicion that natural languages cannot have a �heory, which has to be refused if a semiotics is to subsist. 5. Once this is asserted, one may easily admit that there is a lot of difference between the semiotic function performed by a photograph and the one performed by an actual object. But in th� p�esent _context identities are .more import.ant than differences. Another ob1ect1on might be that the above theory of mention does not hold as far as individuals are concerned. What does it mean to say /this man is John/? According to what has been said in . a propos of denotation of proper names, it means that the semantic 2.92. properties commonly oorrelated by a group-code to the lexeme /John/ coincide with the semantic properties that the same group-code might correlate to a given perceptum. It means that one must associate to the token perceptum the same notion that presumably associates to the lexeme /John/: a man who is the brother of Mary, the assistant manager of the local bank, the one that I have frequently described as the best of my friends and so on. 6. A difference exists between two ways of intending the use of /is/ and of the pointer in mentioning. If - indicating a penguin. - I say /This is a cat/ and J mean «this object has the property of being a cat», then I pronounced a semiotic index-sensitive judgment which simply represents a wrong use of the code; from the point of view of a theory of mentioning it leads to a false statement. If on the contrary I mean «the nam e of this animal !5 •cat'», then I have pronounced an exageratedly arbitrary meta-semiotic Judgment that can be erroneously accepted only by a naive anthropologis t who has chosen me as an untrustworthy informant. 7. Since the above analysis is performed according to the Revised Model propose� in2.11. and since the above page represents an effort to approach the cla �1cal ·pr?blems of philosophical semantics from the poi nt of view of a sen_uotically _?nented se;"lantic theory (a •merging' tha has been foreboded in t note 1. of this chapter) at would have been more cha llenging to tes t the power of this approach on the sentence /the present kin g of Fra nce :is a bachelor/. May I propose from now on the use of this sentence as a sym bol ic guarantee of a possible merging of different approach es to th e sam e se t of problem s'? . 8: .Anyway, even though accepting the idea that Proust can translate E�tir, it would be hardly believable tha t Mondrian can translate Spinoza's Et1ca more geomt"trico demonstra ta

••..

9 See in G dman ( 1968:99 ff.) artistic on an inte disc resti · ussio ng n . °? fakes a�d on the autograph 1c' and 'allographic' arts· the former are not susceptible of ?olation and do not support free perfo�ance, the latter can be translated mto conv entional notation and th e resulting score can be

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per fo rmed th ro u gh _v ariations of a certain extent (like bet ween au to gr ap hi c an d allographic is linked to m ':,.1c�. �e differ ence the lShncti on dense and discrete signals (see later, 3.4.6.). between t O. Given a scale of replicability, as far as one stcps d?wn _ . fid elity) t o th e inferior degrees af from (n/n of its top -• ter a cena·m ratio one seems to have trespa· s·sed on a threshold; one passes from the universe · ilant,es see . . . _ Or 'rep 1.1cas to s1 3 5 3 ). As a matter of fact one of m { su ch - e b ecause the ve a sea1e as . not an . n of homo 1ogous on ry notio property ch anges beyo • · · nd the ca 1n se ; Id o s f thresho rep1·1cas 1t JS . a matter of real · 'sa me' propert•,es, tn c _ · s 1't .1s a ca se o f transf ases of s1• mil ar1· t1e ormed and somewhat pro•�ected properties (see 3.6. 7.), Let u s as su m e th at in ev_ery case of ratio facilis there is the poss1b�1ty no t onl y of customary re . .p�cas but even of absolute dupJication; it 1s possible to p�1nt a -dou,ble of a previous word, to print a double of a king of sp ad es and ob viously to produce a double of a road sig nal (every replica in this las t case, be ing at the same time a double). The signs ruJed by a ,d,10 aci ca f lis n be tra nsl ated by some other notation (see note 9). J can translate phonemes by me ans of Morse dashes and points, musicaJ sounds from the tem pera te scale into written notes, and so on. 12. One should thus reformulate Morris's position by saying that these formators are just features and not signs, in the same way as a phoneme is not a sign but a comb inatio nal feature whose presence or absence changes the nature o f the word. But this assumption, although it tightens up t�e analysis, does not change the problem. There are certain expressive features that seem to be motivated b y the toposensitive rnarkers of their content (That is, . features which directly convey a given portion of the content expressed by the expression of which they are a syntactic component). 13. On the man ifold senses of the word 'analogy' during the �hole history of philo soph ical theological and mathematical thought, see la llnea e ii circo/o by Enzo Mel�ndri ( 1968). However fa scitaating this concept may hav e been and may be, I prefer to retain here only Us moSt con cretelr · ·c signs ana1ogy ts operational sense. Even because, when spea�i�g 0.f · a ili ty n;tive resern· frequently used as a synony , m of unspeakab,ilitrI in,e•�r� to 1 s ' as sign - s and bl anee: that is, simp ly in order not to recognae z iconic dey'ce . avoid any semiotic enquiry on them. .. tiop . Optics mak es a distinc al 14. See Gibson, t966, P· 227· Phy sic scree" a calle d . ha\'e I t _ wha betw een 'real' and 'virtual' images. In optics, struct uring the e surf ac a 0)0. s o� h�d imag e (the picture made by projecting s , and imag e :,eaJ a aile · d ' c . of an array by art1fic1al of ill um111at1on s 1S · eye, an . vanat1on for Jus stim u so it is. What J call a n optic array Cthe s1ructured said to ts tens a or ,...,or a m u• I comes r rom chambered or compound) when ·t apparen tJy the and r . mirr o _ prod uce a 'virtual' i mage. The app arent face the effe not irt fact, but ct, in near thing in the field of a telescope, are �:-ec J ts" they arc not pictures or sculptures r screen unages ·used a$ 3 si·gn in some � ore.d-. age is or wnh 1 me IS. One could say. that m� d behin 8 comin ::k. � n ases 0 O . such a s w�cn J see 1n the mfo;u� �f my hai1 on _the nape �frrer ent use two mirrors in ord er to ch��.! e not t, of my sig h n io. exten s usually l t But these are mere case s of art,fici� wb see to nl 5 Ul. order f,'as ng yi fro m the fact of uslng a magnl on half 'way op cannot. 1ns . rema doubles rfeit e t n 16. The problem of ilJ-cou

. ! !.

!

.

·r

!

302

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an iconic representation of the and lica rep ive tat ten a e, bl ou [ d r,ea be��een a . · . oden cube? the Xerox of a wo 8 of on tati 1 d b a s a . or1gi�al. Wha. t o f a painting, perf ect in any n ctio odu repr : /:::1 n ec tom pho a g? dra�in substituted by a sheet of as canv the of ture � ex he ep� exc r, part1cul� � f these phenomena could be listed among imprints appropnate paper. . I t�ink that, ition defin ise prec a e escap to �eem � (see 3,6· 2-),. some ot�; les, they may become signs when even though th ey are Produ·ced . as doub . · · s on d th e epen re con t d natu ext 1ot1c . sem 1n · tru· s case their chosen as sueh , in , · · l anat10n th at accomp anies which they will be inserted, and on the kind o f exp them. 17. To prove the conventionality of the transcriptional systems, Gombrich also refers to two photographs of th� same co�er of W1venh_oe Park which clearly indicate how little Constable s park has 1n common with that ' of the photogr aph; but he does not th .en �o on to .sug�e�l that the parameter for: Judging the 1con1c1ty of the PhOtograph constitutes the · · · age,· _wt 1c m a · 'd t' al 'th h m 1 en 1s or Lm painting. No square inch 1n the photograp the black-and-white photograph only reproduces gradations of Lone between a very narrow range of greys. Not one of these tones corresponds to what we call "reality". The scale depends largely on the photographer·� choice in the darkroom; given two photographs (reproduced by Gombr:ich),. the o�e . printed within a narrow scale of greys produces an effect of misty light while the other, where stronger contrasts were used, gives a different effect. 18. I f every complex iconic representation i. s a code in itself, then there is not one iconic code, but many. maybe thousands and thousands of them. Take as an hypothesis that the known languages are not the only languages in the verbal universe, but that there are a million other possible, and actually existing, languages as well; th.is does not spare us the task o f studying semiotically how these languages are structured. It is the same in the iconic universe. The assumption that there exist as man y 'languages' as messages is th.en a drastic assumption. It can be translated as follow.s: I ) there exist as many iconic languages as personal styles of an author; 2) the re exist as many iconic languages as there are styles and manners typical o f a school or period � 3) if the various iconic works of art treat the existing cod ambig es uously, as also happens with verbal works of art (which is the ''langue'' of Joyce?), the iconic styles reseJVed for non-aesthetic uses fol low instead more predictable systems of rules; therefore there are recog nizable ico nic co de s in mass communication, photography, comic str ips and . movies. 19. To the extent that Peirce establish ed part of his pro gra m of a typology of signs (only 10 types on th e programmed 66) ev er y sign appears as a bundle of different categories of sig . ns Th er e is not an iconic sign as such, but at most an Iconic Sinsign wh ich at the same time is a Rheme and a qualisign, o an lco�ic Rhematic Le gisign (2.254). Nevertheless the classifi ca­ � tion was still poss1ble for, accord ing to Peirce th e di ffe re nt trichotomies char�cterized the signs from diffe rent points of ;,ew and signs were not only prec�se grammatical units bu t also phrases, entire texts, books. Thus the rt P� ial success of the Peircian en deavor (along with his almost complete failure) tells us that if on e wants to draw a typology of signs one must, first of all, renounce the stra ight identification of a sign with a 'gram mat ical' unit, lberefore extendi� the de finition of sign to every kind of sign-function. lO . All this once again requires that the concept of semantic

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m a verbo-centric fallacy comp on·ent be freed fro · · The semantic represe ex pr es sion also contains non-ve ntat10n . of a given rbal' bl c directi ons, spatial dispositions, relations of order an�� . �kers, such as of the word /d?g/ mu st have among its markers ima :"�r us the �ntent dogs, whde the conte nt of th e Jmage of a dog must .have among its m!ke so t _concept (a wi lo th ng its intensional description) an ::r� of «dog» � d the c s pon ing wo�d in all possible· languages . As has been said in 2• 1 1 ·3· · sueh a semantic 1a m op or lS a d . e e regu lative hypothesis than a encycl ·· • matter of 1n · · · d1v1 . .dual know Iedge; it is the v1rtu al social semantic representation alven sememe of a rro · · which must be postuI ated tn order to permit a theory of codest able to . . expla1n • every concre te. act of communu;at1on. 2 1 . However,_ one ought_ �ot to believe that this makes the difference between an analogical � nd a digita! mac e, for even an ana logical one can � produce tokens according to a ratio faci/,s (see TV scanning and broadcast• ing). 22. When, Robinson Crusoe discovered the foo tprint of Frid.ay on the seashor e , the footprint conventionally denoted «man» but also connoted «barefoo ted» . Bein g imprinted on the sand with a feature of direction, the context //footprin1+position+directionll also was a text meaning: «a man has passed here». 23. Since Robinson believed himself to be the only human being on the island; a labor of inference and presupposition had thus to be perfonned by him so as to arrive at the conclusion: eel am not the only man here» or «there is another man on the island». This could have involved some meta-semiotic statements about the definition of the island. 24 . When a trace is not previously coded , one is obliged to thin k that every point in the trace must have corresponded to a point on the �print�g referent. One could say that th.e imprint in this _case _ is �eally an_ index, tn Peirce's sense. As a mat ter of fact, in this case the unpnnt IS not. a sign but_ an act of mention. An act of mention has to be verified. But t� ven_fy � mention (see 3.3.S.) means that - given the expression /this obJec_t 1s .SJ.x meters ·�·) long/ - one ha s to decide if the refe.rent, taken as � ostensive Slgtl lt, as in cases of trompe-I o�il}. T (196 Eeo In ns. expression is a class of posStble funuctio

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fu nctjon: primary functions, i.e. ied nif si f o t o tw distinguished �e twee� o f th e expressi on (such as goi ng nt nte : c� y�: ve i den th e fi_rst and 1n:i medi ate ! d ng t og e th er, etc.), � nd secondary Jivi ow in h a t upsta !rs, �anding onte nt (such as v a riou s ·�mbolic' c e ativ t n o o n c t : di � a me functrons, 1.e. t�e e ference» «triumph», a nd so on) . In th e «d e» e h p s o m at tic ys «m me�nin�. d to propose a m odel fo.r the trie also ; e hav 1• 2 / 19 .< o E artrcle l� s.t e d as h as f or instan�e a co lumn, suc s, ect obj al tur tec c�i � 0 15 ys co�pos_1t1onal ana ex t ua l and circumstantial selectio ns, suc h as o t n arc t un co ac o taki�g .in t e colum n amon g ruins, which adds to the th of r e he ! fo� inst ance ·cal' and 'hist orical ' conn ot ation s, du ly recorded by 1� : e o c ar an ect ob Eco ( 1968) a nd Eco tur al aesthetics.· Bo th . ec t i h arc o� re ra tu Y C t . li '!1 . l C8 J · . the Cflll tzed 111 the present b· tic o ok . cr1 ns sig (1972 c ) were s till J•inked to the notion of . · � o f ,archi t�ctural t,o no e th for g tin t itu s One should now read th em by sub . , t hat of ,arch'itect ·urat text' in which man y m odes of SJgn production are Slgn s imu lt ane o usly at w ork. 38. Breviario di estetica, Bari: Laterza, 1913, 9th ed. 1947, pp. 1�4-3S. 39 •'The p ol itical sloga n •r like lke' [ay layk ayk], succinctly structur�d. consists of three monosy llables and c ou nts three diphthongs [ay), each of them symmetrically f ollo wed by one co nsona ntal _Ph_o neme , ( •. /.. k •• k). The make-up of the three w ords prese nts.a var 1a t10!1: no consonantal phonemes in the first word, two ar ound t h e dtp�tbong lll the second and one final conso nant in the th ird. A similar dom111ant nucleus (ay J �as no ticed by Hymes in some of the sonn ets of Keats. Both cola of the trisyUabic formu la •1 like/ Ike' rhyme wit h each other, and the secon d of the two rhyming words is fully included in the first o ne (echo rhyme), flayk) - (ayk), a par ono mastic image of a feeling which tota lly envelops its o bj ect. Bot h cola alliterate wit h each ot h er, a nd the first of the two all it erating words is included in the secon d: [ay] · (aykJ, a paronomastic image of the loving subject e nvel oped by the beloved object. Th.e seco nd ary · i poetic function of t his e lectional catch phrase reinforces its impressiven ess 0 a nd efficacy • In fact this message a cquires part of its 'charm' becau se it brings int o play phon ic el em ents, and thus a sort of 'musical' quality which is link.ed Jleit her t o syntactic devices n or t o sema ntic o nes. I t obviously sh o ws t hat if one changes the expression the conten t is also affected (one ca nn ot obtain the same e ffect by saying /lt is Ike that I like / or /Ike is liked by me/). But it als o shows th at a pa rticu lar pronunciation of the slogan (perhaps one with s Jang overto nes), rei nforces its 'aesthet ic' effect. 40. By integr ating and articulatin,g differently a classification suggested by Bense ( J 965) we may say that in an aesthetic mes sage there are m any level s of informat ion : (a) physical supports: in th e verbal languages they are t ones, �flexio� s , phonetic emissions; in vis ua l languages t h ey are col ors, stuffs_; m music they are timbres, pitch es, dy na mi c stresses, tem poral durations; they are expression-purport or ele ments o f the ma ter ial continuu m which the signal is m ade o f; (b) differential elemenls of the expression plane: phonem_es. rhythms, metrical length s, p ositio na l re la tions, geometric an d t opo�ogic�l f�rms, etc.; (c) syntactic rules: grammar ru les, pro portional �clation s�ps in archi�ecture, perspectives in pa intin g, musical s cales and mtervals, (d) denota1111e contents; (e) connotative contents· (f) overcoded ready·made strings: st y lis ti c subcodes, rh et orica l systems, ' ic o nogra phic� models, and 50 on; (g) others. Bense, however, spe aks of a global •aesthet ic

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. inform at ion' which is not achieved on an y of these leve 1� . m particular, but rather on the level t.hat he calls ·Mitrealirat ( which . s . S1gniried by all the correlated levels). Bense's 'Mitrea/itiit' seems lik � situat ion of improbability that the work exrubits ,cbut �hgeneral contextual e� (b�cause of l mol of n d the Heg elia auth or) the is slightly 1 0 �� wit� idealistic connotations. Mitrealitat seems then t o denote a cer� tam essence _ maybe· . . w hi can c y h be mtu1t. 1ve)y grasped but not the Beau t . t1 .m ... 1o ca out. On t he contrary one o f the tasks of a semiotic approach. 1ly singled to·aesthetics ana lyze and describe in system · must be 1· ts capabil"1ty to atic t erms why the .. . . .imp ssio . M 't ·1· f 1 1 , rea o a , arises. In the following paragraphs n re the notion of aesthetic idiolect will satisfy this need. 4 1 . Nevertheless, even though one admits that the auth or •15 moId"mg · re s 1c1 th t sp e a 1· ·t m h. on g ses Wit·hou t re ally 'communicating' content somet s, one has to assume th� t· ei. ther t he author or the art analyst knows that the se un pre dictable and undetected microstructures ought to produce a clust�rs of . predictable response. There 1s at le�st a moment in which the relationship between clusters and responses is coded (or abduced) as a semiotic correlation. These are cases of progra,nmed .1timuli (see 3.6.6.). Imagine that a critic knows that a given artistic proc edure (recognized as 'the secret of that great master') appears in many works o( that master and inflexibly produces an 'unspeakable' feeling and a specific kind of enjoyment; this kind of knowledge would constitute the last (and at any rate the more saaisfactory) form of 'rationalization' that semiotics can exert about a work of art. 42. The complexity of the inferior levels, wh.ich seems to escape any definition, has induced some aestheticians to consider these levels as extraneous to the poetic form. Galvano dell a Volpe ( I960), who was fighting against the various idealistic theories of the 'ineffability' of art, in order to avoid everything which could escape a rationalistic approach to art, has excluded all the •musical' values that cannot be coded. These values were relegat ed to the range of •hedonistic' elements, stimulators of an extra­ aesthetic enJ·oym ent • Hence the repudiation of many phone tic phenomtena· · 1p · aJ appea I Of oe ry ' that, according to many critics, constitute the pnnc P the hence the rh yt hm looked suspiciously at; hence the statement that n h aesthetic value is what remains when a work is tra nslated � ttu� ��e;; material support where musical devices can change in. impac .t all ng . p! ee k of le ab a p c rn tt� pa m al re ains a kind of logical and conceptu :i�tiJ :: at signifi cant relationships. It is curious t �_at t�s e�fort to��drn� � �ore than c theory of art happens to leave t� the irration_al e�e �:: the tower to sis nal alis they deserve. To renounce extension of the ratio� !� i J· th 'seman­ wi t on l�vels of the expression form leads to eq uatan� the to ch approa alistlc e !1c• - which is . a very poor way to refute the 1 d the point of view of unspeakability' of art. The correct trend, even fr:� ined in the present utl · on the JY, contra Della Volpe should be• on the · . su bstanc. e. chapt er that' is to overcode the expression makts a verbal What 0 43. "Po;tics deals primarilY wit� the _qe�;5�} ;�etie- s is the di{{erentia . r-lation to other kinds m�1sage a work of art? Because the ma1n obJ nd in " Jpeci{ica o f verbal art in relation to Oth er arts a .stu d.ies. literary in place 11 of verbal behavior, poetics is entitled to the lead. analysis of the as just / c Poetics deals with the problem �f verbal Slru s�c; linguistics lS the global . . tonal stru . . · cture. h am P t·1ng is concerned w1t · p1c

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ed as an integral part of ard reg be y ma . s tic oe P re: ctu science of verbal stru be l0 ng not only to the science of . es ur at fe ic et p o y an M t· 1ngu1s 1cs • , , · I. . to general semiotics. This language bu t to the �hol;.�h :� rf ���ns� th at is J a.rt bu t al so for aJl varieties of rb a v y n n I va stat ement, however, as o erties with so me other systems of r s sh age gu !an ce sin l�nguage :: ��:m�oti� features ) ' ' (Jakobso ?, 1960 :35 1 ). o f t a 1th signs or even w 11 : � y of t he 'open work' is approached r o th e th e e r 2 h , 9 , 44. See Eco l 6 . from a pre-semiotic point of view. e�ed a co de ru1·1ng ?n e s1d con be 45 · The aest hetic idiolcctic has not to • ' should •not- be viewe d as a thcoret1caJ 1.;ch' however an d o nJy on e message (Wau · rather a co de ruling the various d1·fferen t messages wh'1ch · · . d ) · , 1 t ts on 1ct1 contra ,aesth et'1c t ext'. ed Nevert h � call es sag mes . of ork compose that comPlex netw . . . · iple be ) a code rolmg one an d o n1Y o n e text, a prtnc in • · 1s (or Jt may Iess it ' e1 se ). e xpIaans · · d n ot h1ng code destined to produce a unique dis�ourse. Th'ts (an . y b d art Rule . . of the work ctal a 1d1ole of er aract the creative an. d individual ch 1 code and connecting various messages which are to be taken as esthet·� �dical instances of a rearranged underlyi�g system. the work of art is a system of 1ystems (see Jakobson and Tyn1anov, 1927; Wellek and Warren, 1942). •• 46. Roland Barthes ( J 963c.) once said that the work of art· etl une forme que /1ristoire posse so11 temps ti remplir". I _agree with this state'!le�t but I would prefer to re-translate it into the categories of the present semiotic approac h : the wo rk of art is a text that is adapted by its concrete addressees so as to fulfill many different communicative purposes in diverse historical or psychological circumstances, without ever completely disregarding the u n d er• lying rule that has co nstituted it. 47. The above example is perhaps a too perfect one, for there is also, al ong with t he semantic substitution, a witty phonetic echoi ng: thus the metaphor is reinforced by the pun, that is, the subst itutio n o n the conte nt plane is reinforced by the co-presence on the expression plan e. O n this aspect of t he 'metaphor+pun ' see Eco 1 1973 b, on Joyce's tech niqu e; the pun is a fJgU re of speech that , instead of substituting a 'ten or' b y a 'vehicle' (according to Richard 's definition) makes the word correspond ing to the vehicle embo d y t he word co rrespo nding to the tenor. In such cases the 'necessi ty of the ' substitutio n is reinforced, such as happens with the rhy me according to Jakobso n, where a parallelism on the expressio n pla ne co-involves a parallelism on the content plane. Thus, and the rem ark is particularly valid for medieval culture, one is further convince d that nomina .runt nun1lna or that nomina sun1 consequentia rerum . 48 . These distinctions are also recorded b y the medieval definitio ns of .loci: "Quis, quid, u bi, quibus auxi/jis, cur, quomodo, qua11do ". But these _ questio ns only parti.ally concern the f orm at of th e sememe. So m e of them con��rn contexts an d circumsta nces, therefore a series of un co de d presup­ pos1t1o ns. Let us t hen assume t hat there exist cases o f empirical co nt ig uity that cannot be reco:ded by a sem antic theory . For instance. when dreami ng, e ?� frequ�ntly rel!es o n co nn ec tio ns based on ly o n on e's personal and tdiosy ncrat1� e per1e nce. �ore open to coding appear some metaphors such � as the substitution o f peni s by vertical objects (already discussed in sen1iotic terms_ by Mo rris, 19 38 ). Thus it would be risky to call m et on ym ies all the substitutions by 'contigu ity' occurring du ri ng the dream or th psychoe s

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analytic verbal int erac,tion - and interprete d as su h ,by. . the analy psyc hoanalysis se em s . to be rather a. matter of st. in te c r ion or as _Yet uncode d text.s, pr"? duc1ng furth:r overcoding , and : ��! i the d o . �f po in co 1 n ts m m m an the patient on y w ith has . an aesthet.ic text w ho d ect :has to be disc overed by t h e cri!i�. Many of the 'contiguities ' disco!:r���1 text are conte xtuaJ presuppos1�1o�s, called '•referentials" by H it . :�•.s (cf.2 1 49. The functioning of metaphors and . metonymies ·. exp1a1ns . the mecha nism o f ev ery ot h er trope, that is, all the substitutions by imm . . · utat10 · n �f a Iex Perip/1ras1s is the subs t 1· tut 10 eroe wjth the whole (or a great part) of th e m ar ke rs of .th � corresp�nd!n� se m em e.A ntonomasia is both a sub-case of synecd oche (!pecies pro 1nd1111duo) and periphr . asis. Since the se representati?n analytically (or semiotically) includes th e negation :�� lit an to ny m , otes ar e a co m m on case of substitution of the sememe by a marker, an d ironies ar e th e direct use of th e antony m (but, being in fact figures of sp ee ch an d of thought, they involve mo re complex contextual substitutions). £,�phases a�e types of synecdoche, and hyperboles are types of metaphor. A dif fer en t d1Scourse should be made for the fig ures or speech and of thought (which proceed by adjectio, detractio and transmutatio) and whlch rely o n pho nological , syntactical and inferential mechanisms. Gro upe µ in Rhetorique generate car efully distinguish between figures of expression (metaplas,ns and metatoxes) and figures of content (me.1asem,enes and mera­ logistns )� i t must be stressed that the suggestions offered by the present boot work only for a study of met asem enes. 50. Katz ( 1972:8.4.) proposes to add a rhetorical representation to the canonical theory of grammatical components, saying that ..the theory of grammar requires a next subtheory, namely, a theory of rhetorical fonn, 3:11d., further. that grammars require a new component to express the rhetoncal interpretation of superficial phrase markers". Katz th1;15 �mes t.!'at rhetorical manipuJation may only alter surface structures w1thout uiterf�nng with their semantic interpretation. It should be clear that !he theo� oullln� in this book is exactly the opposite, e\'en if one mi&ht admit_ th3 may only detennme e. exceptional cases som e rheto ion pulat mani rical · . . th penpheral connotations. But also, m these �aseS, rhetoric is concerncd w1 semantic s and I t.hink that it is impossible to conSJ. .!� e rhetorical � ttbe viewed as comp on ent indep enden t o f the semantic one; they are ra two sides of the same semiotic proble_m. . ro'lc and to increase 51. For example: "Our . society h� to of the mem ber �cr y 1}11 d productio n; ma ny sacrific�s will be re qui.� · :i in r e�pect cou nt not do s u comm unity in order to achieve our go�. lodtVld hed cstab hs tly impl ici is to the collective welf.are ". The same kutd of ��di ng oney, !11oney m es rodu c by another statement of the t_ype: _"Producta;t i i i _ free this in or fe produces welfar e ; obvi ously 111 this SltU� o l f�r � pay o t price competition - some body must be o't'erco me , is is the semiouc meta cit impl i · other �tute cons s afflu ent statem ent the econo my ' '. All these · values. On ectin t conn · ru/c•s 1' 'or own our f O · Judgments imposing some se111a11t1c s slave hand different premises may be stated · "Better Poor than o p rod�ce weaIth rt ·t orde · . in dies . d Y secu n y "Social affluence•• • hA society in which somebo "; i l ss · o not · " som e b "'· "Burn gra '' · •Or mcnts (ea silY statc ody else is an insane society e thes of must be the first care of this �o't'ernni�nt .. AU are neve rtJteless a.a many recogniza ble as be longing to different i deojogj es )

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. a ke pe op le th in k in anoth er . orts to m eff e siv ua rs p . examples of rhetoncal o tic ju dgm en ts a im ing t o assign ne w mi e -s ta e � m e t fore the y const 1tu way·' there · . • t · ·terns ons t o o ld sem��.; tati con no �t u a e ology i nto n o id f n a tio or t ransform f les r ive 52 . There are s t· J "? of the semant ic space allow . one to n o c another one; the .tr n ����: di ffe ren t se man tic orga nizations. e pro duc t de mo �trate that dI e ould be abl e to tes t a n d to impro ve w at th ies � log �: eo d o f eo The re no t at allo ws one to destroy an th sis aly an of ue niq ech _� c t ry ti � m1 JS ere is a.s� �h em . Th ology , the lat ter showing the falsity of ide r the o n a it to in ppo o g de olo o f the right or of the correct bias is ice o ch e Th ) � versa by e c ithe forgy v d mer fer en t ideological dif ze aly an to us lps e h ics iot � e S 1 er t _ (3:1 lic ma t n ot a serruo . choices· it does not help us to choose . e velop a p robl.em alr ead y a ired 53. At this poi nt we can take �P a n�1p dbet wee n r�etoncal f