Theories in social psychology 9781444331226, 1444331221, 9781444331233, 144433123X

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Theories in Social Psychology

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Theories in Social Psychology Edited by

Derek Chadee

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

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This edition first published 2011 © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell’s publishing program has been merged with Wiley’s global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell. Registered Office John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, United Kingdom Editorial Offices 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell. The right of Derek Chadee to be identified as the author of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books. Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Theories in social psychology / edited by Derek Chadee. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4443-3122-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-1-4443-3123-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Social psychology. I. Chadee, Derek. HM1033.T434 2011 302.01–dc22 2010041341 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Set in 10/13 Minion by SPi Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India 1

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2011

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To my daughter, Rúhíyyih – providing another perspective

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Contents

List of Contributors Acknowledgments Introduction Part I

Social Cognition

ix xiv 1 11

1 Toward Freedom: Reactance Theory Revisited Derek Chadee

13

2 Inconsistency in Cognition: Cognitive Dissonance Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki

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3 Attribution Theories: How People Make Sense of Behavior Bertram F. Malle

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4 The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion: Thoughtful and Non-Thoughtful Social Influence Benjamin C. Wagner and Richard E. Petty Part II

Social Comparison

96

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5 Social Comparison: Motives, Standards, and Mechanisms Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler

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6 Relative Deprivation: Understanding the Dynamics of Discontent Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra F. Corning, Tara C. Dennehy, and Faye J. Crosby

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Part III Social Reinforcement

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7 Evaluating Fairness: Critical Assessment of Equity Theory Denise M. Polk

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Contents 8 Interdependence in Social Interaction Ann C. Rumble Part IV

Self

9 Self-Categorization and Social Identification: Making Sense of Us and Them Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah

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10 Social Categorization Theories: From Culture to Cognition Richard J. Crisp and Angela T. Maitner

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11 Symbolic Interactionism: From Gestalt to Cybernetics Andreas Schneider

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12 Impression Management: Influencing Perceptions of Self Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek

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Author Index Subject Index

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Contributors

Derek Chadee is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Behavioural Sciences and Director of the ANSA McAL Psychological Research Centre, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus. His current research interests include the social psychology of fear of crime and general fear, antecedents of emotions, copycat behavior, the media, HIV/AIDS and jury decision-making. In 2004, he was a Fulbright Scholar undertaking research on fear of crime in two American universities. He has maintained a cross-cultural research agenda. Ananthi Al Ramiah is a Leverhulme Postdoctoral Research Associate at the Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, and her research interests lie broadly in the area of intergroup conflict and cooperation. One line of her research assesses how social identity, threat, and status differentials contribute to intergroup conflict. In addition, her research aims to uncover the role that ethno-religious diversity plays in explaining perceptions of intergroup trust and the extent to which these relationships are moderated by intergroup contact. Another line of work assesses how the intergroup context is perceived and contributed to by members of majority- and minority-status groups in an effort to find models of intergroup harmony in diverse settings. Kurt A. Boniecki is Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Central Arkansas and gained his Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of Florida in 1997. His research primarily examines the causes of prejudice and stereotyping. He also has academic interests in the teaching of psychology, interpersonal attraction, and the home-field advantage in sports. Jenny Carrillo is Senior Vice President of External Affairs and Organizational Effectiveness at Planned Parenthood of Southern New England (PPSNE). Her work at PPSNE is consistent with her doctoral research at Yale University on women’s and immigrant health and the acculturative process. Prior to this, she worked with adolescents focused on social justice and education. She is active as a board member in several non-profit organizations that

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Contributors center on health, education, and racial disparities. She previously worked as a consultant with McKinsey & Co. and at Pace University. Katja Corcoran (née Rüter) currently works as an Assistant Professor at the University of Cologne, Germany. She studied psychology in Tübingen and Berlin in Germany, and Amherst, USA. She gained her Ph.D. at the University of Würzburg, Germany, in 2004, and spent one year at Northwestern University, USA, with a Feodor Lynen fellowship granted by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Her research focuses on social comparisons, especially on standard selection processes and aspects of efficiency. She has published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, and Social Cognition. Alexandra F. Corning is professor in the Department of Psychology, University of Notre Dame. Her research is concerned with problems that affect groups unevenly. Much of her work is aimed at identifying and explaining the mechanisms underlying the perception of discrimination; in particular, how people arrive at the conclusions that discrimination has or has not taken place when the situation is ambiguous. Taking a social-cognitive approach, her research is focused on identifying individual-difference as well as situational factors that influence these perceptions. She also conducts research aimed at identifying the processes that influence young women’s and girls’ body dissatisfaction and eating problems. Richard J. Crisp is Professor of Psychology in the Centre for the Study of Group Processes, University of Kent. He completed his BA in experimental psychology at Oxford University and his Ph.D. at Cardiff University. He has published widely on the psychology of prejudice, social categorization, group processes, and intergroup relations. He is a past winner of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues Louise Kidder Early Career Award and was the 2006 recipient of the British Psychological Society’s Spearman Medal. He is currently Associate Editor of the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology and in 2009 he was elected an Academician of the Academy of Social Sciences. Faye J. Crosby is Professor in the Psychology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz. She is a scholar, writer, consultant, and social activist. She received her Ph.D. in 1976. Previous faculty appointments include Rhode Island College, Yale University, the Kellogg School of Management, and Smith College. Crosby has authored or coauthored five books and has edited or co-edited a further ten volumes, and over 150 articles and chapters. Most of her work concerns sex and race discrimination and focuses on remedies. She is the recipient of numerous awards and is the founder of Nag’s Heart, an organization whose mission is the replenishment of the feminist spirit. Jan Crusius is an Assistant Professor in Social Psychology at the University of Cologne, Germany. After studying psychology in Jena, Germany, and Seville, Spain, he finished his doctoral degree in Social Psychology at the University in Cologne in 2009. He is interested in the role of social comparisons in emotion, judgment and decision making, and consumer behavior.

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Contributors

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Tara C. Dennehy is a graduate student in the Mind, Brain, & Behavior Program at San Francisco State University. She received her BA in 2007 with highest honors in psychology from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Her main research interests lie in the intersection between cognitive psychology and social cognition. Specifically, she conducts research examining the relationship between categorization and psychological essentialism, and research on the action-related determinants of entry into attentional awareness. Miles Hewstone is Professor of Social Psychology and Fellow of New College, University of Oxford. He has published widely on the topics of social cognition and intergroup relations. He was awarded the British Psychological Society’s Spearman Medal in 1987 and its President’s Award for Distinguished Contributions to Research in 2001. He was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California 1987–8 and 1999–2000, and is a Fellow of the British Academy. Meni Koslowsky is Professor at Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel. He received his Ph.D. in psychology from Columbia University and is presently a Professor in the Psychology Department of Bar-Ilan University. His main focus of research includes organizational behavior, the stress–strain relationship, social power, and methodological issues. He has written more than 100 articles, authored and edited five books, and has presented at nearly 100 conferences. Angela T. Maitner is currently an Assistant Professor of Psychology at the American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. She completed her Ph.D. at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Broadly, her research investigates intergroup relations from a social cognitive perspective. More specifically she investigates the impact of exposure to diversity and multiple categorization on person perception and stereotyping, and the regulatory role of emotion in intergroup relations. Bertram F. Malle is Professor in the Department of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences, Brown University. He received his Ph.D. at Stanford University in 1995 and joined the University of Oregon Psychology Department. He received the Society of Experimental Social Psychology Outstanding Dissertation award in 1995 and a National Science Foundation CAREER award in 1997. His research focuses on social cognition and the folk theory of mind, exploring such issues as intentionality judgments, mental state inferences, behavior explanations, and moral judgments. Malle is currently writing a book on Social Cognitive Science. Thomas Mussweiler has been Professor at the University of Cologne since 2004. His research examines a variety of issues in social cognition, social judgment, and decision making, in particular how comparison processes shape human judgment, affect, and behavior. He has published in the Psychological Review, Psychological Science, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, among others. His research has been recognized by awards including the European Science Foundation’s European Young Investigator Award, the German Science Foundation’s Gottfried-Wilhelm Leibniz award, and the European Association of Social Psychology’s Jos Jaspars award.

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Contributors Previously Mussweiler taught at the University of Würzburg, Germany, was a postdoctoral fellow at Northwestern University, USA, and received his Ph.D. from the University of Trier, Germany. Paul R. Nail has been Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Central Arkansas since 2005 and holds a Ph.D. in experimental psychology from Texas Christian University (1981). Previously, he was a Professor at Southwestern Oklahoma State University for 25 years. He has published articles in the Psychological Bulletin, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Basic and Applied Social Psychology, among others. Besides cognitive dissonance theory, his research interests include social influence in groups, contemporary theories of racism, political psychology, and individual differences in psychological defensiveness. He is currently an Associate Editor of the interdisciplinary journal Social Influence. Richard E. Petty is Distinguished University Professor of Psychology at Ohio State University. He received his BA from the University of Virginia and his Ph.D. from Ohio State. His research focuses on understanding changes in attitudes and behaviors. He has published eight books and over 250 articles and chapters. Honors received include the Scientific Impact Award from the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, Distinguished Scientific Contribution Awards from the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) and the Society for Consumer Psychology, and service as President of SPSP and the Midwestern Psychological Association. He is past Editor of the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. Shani Pindek is a doctoral student in the Psychology Department of Bar-Ilan University, with particular interests in impression management, organizational citizenship behavior, and altruism. Denise M. Polk is Associate Professor in the Department of Communication Studies at West Chester University of Pennsylvania. Her teaching and research areas focus mainly in the areas of interpersonal communication, work–family integration, conflict resolution, and health communication. She has focused mostly on romantic and family relationships. She holds a BA from Baldwin-Wallace College, a Master’s from Miami University, and a Ph.D. from Kent State University. Ann C. Rumble is Assistant Professor of Psychology at Ohio University-Chillicothe. She received her Ph.D. from Washington State University in 2003, with a specialization in interdependent behavior and social dilemmas. She continued her work with Marilynn Brewer at Ohio State University as a National Institute of Mental Health postdoctoral fellow, following which she accepted a position at Ohio University-Chillicothe. Katharina Schmid is currently a Research Fellow and Lecturer in Psychology at New College, University of Oxford. She previously held appointments at the Max-Planck-Institute for the study of ethnic and religious diversity in Germany, and at Royal Holloway University of

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London, and completed her Ph.D. in Social Psychology at Queen’s University Belfast. Her research interests lie broadly in the areas of social identity and intergroup relations. Her research focuses in particular on the role of multiple categorization processes, and especially social identity complexity, in intergroup relations. Andreas Schneider is Associate Professor of Sociology at Texas Tech University. While studying social psychology, sociology, management, and marketing at Mannheim University, Germany, he visited Indiana University in 1987 and became fascinated with the new emerging cybernetic symbolic interactionist model of Affect Control Theory. He received his Ph.D. in sociology from Indiana University, Bloomington, in 1997. His publications in Social Psychology Quarterly, the Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Quality & Quantity, and Organization Studies demonstrate his research interests in the methodological development of symbolic interactionism and the cross-cultural application in the fields of deviance, sexuality, and management. Benjamin C. Wagner is a doctoral candidate in social psychology at Ohio State University, studying under Richard E. Petty. His research interests include attitudes and persuasion, embodied cognition, metacognition, moral reasoning, and emotion. In 2007, he earned his Master’s degree in psychology from Ohio State, having completed his BA two years earlier at Denison University, Granville, Ohio.

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Acknowledgments

This book would have been impossible were it not for the assistance of the following persons and institutions. Thanks to the staff at Wiley-Blackwell, in particular, Andrew McAleer, Annie Rose, Karen Shield, and Juanita Bullough, for their efficiency and help at every stage. To all the contributors, I am grateful for your contributions. Specifically I express my gratitude to Ananthi Al Ramiah, Kurt Boniecki, Jenny Carrillo, Katja Corcoran, Alexandra Corning, Richard Crisp, Faye Crosby, Jan Crusius, Tara Dennehy, Miles Hewstone, Meni Koslowsky, Angela Maitner, Bertram Malle, Thomas Mussweiler, Paul Nail, Richard Petty, Shani Pindek, Denise Polk, Ann Rumble, Katharina Schmid, Andreas Schneider, and Benjamin Wagner. I am grateful for and acknowledge the comments by the publisher’s anonymous reviewers, which were instructively helpful in the preparation of the final manuscript. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Ramesh Deosaran for his valuable mentorship, and to the University of the West Indies for its support, particularly the ANSA McAL Psychological Research Centre, of whose academic output this publication is a part. I am grateful to and thank everyone who provided the necessary technical and other support leading up to final publication, and wish to express my deepest gratitude for the assistance of anyone whom I may have inadvertently left unacknowledged.

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Introduction

Gordon Allport (1968) defined social psychology as “an attempt to understand and explain how the thoughts, feelings and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others.” As limited as definitions are, this definition of social psychology captured the dynamism, focus, and direction of the discipline. Important to an understanding of social psychological behavior is taking into consideration not only what is happening socially to the person but also what is occurring internally and cognitively to the individual which, in turn, affects social behavior. From its genesis rooted in the work of William James’s Principles of Psychology to current development of the discipline, there has always been an emphasis on the individual within the social interaction paradigm. Theorization, therefore, within the discipline has fallen within this paradigm, which is now extended to include the neurological functioning of human beings within the social psychological context. The early works on social psychology by the psychologist William McDougall (1908) and the sociologist Edward Ross (1908) weighted social behavior on instinctual or social factors, respectively. Later, Floyd Allport (1924) emphasized a behaviorist stimulus–response paradigm for the understanding of social psychological behavior. Theories of psychology and sociology during this early period seem to have been competing to understand a realm that had neither the theorization nor the research sophistication to claim discovery status. Much of the work undertaken in social psychology has been done within the discipline of psychology, with sociological social psychology contributions being relatively sparse. Notably, the discipline of sociology has contributed tremendously to the early development of the concept and theorization of self, especially via theories of symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and, later, ethnomethodology. On the other hand, psychological social psychology’s contributions have been crucial to the genesis and development of both the pure and applied branches of the discipline. Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Introduction Social psychology has seen numerous studies testing hypotheses drawn from concepts or theories. However, less frequent in the literature is the emergence of theories – a renaissance that is much needed for the development and impetus of the discipline. However, many of the theories that currently exist within social psychology are as important to the discipline as they were over forty years ago. A renaissance starts with a reassessment of the efficacy of current theories. Theories have the power of insight and understanding, allowing scientists to see phenomena that previously they would have been unable to conceptualize. Albert Einstein is quoted as saying, “Whether or not you can observe a thing depends on the theory you use. It is the theory which decides what can be observed.” The assumptions, propositions, hypotheses, and supporting confirmed “facts” all provide the theory with a power of vision. The assumptions are givens that the theorist is allowed to utilize in the construction of his theory. They are like the basic tools of a carpenter. These assumptions are grounded on some philosophy or principle, and are often not the bases on which a theory is criticized. However, assumptions give a theory direction. On the other hand, a theory’s power of vision is myopic, limited by the same tools that give the theory its power. This is a dilemma that the finite scientist must explore in any discipline. However, the beach-ball approach to the understanding of the world within one’s discipline is a compromise accepted by social psychologists. That is, it is recognized that a theory is an academic creation, in this sense, and has limitations. The adoption of a number of theoretical positions provides a more comprehensive understanding of the multidimensional nature of a phenomenon. A theory can be criticized on a number of grounds, including consistency – how logically well the theory holds together with its propositions and hypotheses; external – standing up to criticisms of other theories (theory A vs. theory B); historical – temporal perseverance of the theory (e.g., does Freud’s psychoanalytical theory or Heider’s attribution theory still hold today?); applicability – the generalizing of findings from research to social situations; and methodological – the strengths and weakness of the methodology used in the construction of the theory, especially if the theory is an empiricist one. The recent social psychological literature has been lacking a volume systematically dedicated to a range of theories within the discipline. The emphasis of this book, therefore, is on social psychological theories, with an evaluation of some of the main theories still discussed and relevant to understanding behavior. The volume is divided into four parts. Part I presents critical assessments of social cognitive theories – from their genesis to their current development. Derek Chadee revisits Brehm’s theory of psychological reactance, identifying the genesis of this theory in the womb of cognitive dissonance theory. However, the baby grew with many different characteristics from the mother. Both theories of cognitive dissonance and psychological reactance are theories of motivational arousal and reduction. The theory of psychological reactance, however, attempts to explain people’s reactions to perceived or actual threat to loss of freedom. The theory builds on several assumptions of human behavior, with a major underlying assumption of human persistence in maintaining free behaviors and the consequences that arise as a result of threats to importantly defined free behaviors. The early emphasis of reactance theorizing and research was on psychological

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reactance as being aroused by the situation. However, later studies have given emphasis to reactance as dispositional – a reactant personality. Numerous instruments have been designed to measure reactance as a disposition. The merit and demerits of these measures are discussed. This first chapter critically assesses the relationship between reactance and dissonance, proposing reactance as a special case of dissonance though identifying the distinctness of reactance. Critical to this chapter is the identification of the systematic void in the literature concerning any discussion on affect in reactance. The last part of the chapter evaluates the relationship between affect and reactance, proposing a reactance emotion theory. Chadee concludes by noting that reactance theory is an important theory in the discipline of social psychology and has contributed to an understanding of reactance behavior to actual or perceived threats in a wide variety of settings. The theory is as useful today as it was over forty years ago. However, the theory needs modification. Paul Nail and Kurt Boniecki critically assess Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance and related theories, from dissonance theory’s inception and rise to prominence in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, to its near-death by the early 1980s, to its rebirth in the 1990s and 2000s. The original statement of the theory was stunning in its simplicity – that an unpleasant psychological state called cognitive dissonance exists whenever one important thought is in conflict with another. Yet this very simplicity was a major factor that has led to a large number of academic debates and controversies over the years. Nail and Boniecki describe how the germ of the theory got started when Festinger read of the events surrounding a massive earthquake that occurred in India in 1934. They review Festinger’s major theoretical constructs and how these gave rise, early on, to a series of counterintuitive predictions that were generally supported by the empirical evidence. Most famous is the finding of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) that research participants reported a greater liking for boring laboratory tasks if they were paid $1 as opposed to $20 for performing them. Nail and Boniecki summarize major paradigms that were created to test dissonance theory, followed by rival theoretical accounts, such as Bem’s (1967) self-perception theory. The success of these accounts eventually caused interest in the theory to wane, but more recently has led to a flurry of empirical interest in dissonance and related phenomena, reviewed by Nail and Boniecki, which persists to the present day. One major focus of the chapter are the “self ” theories of dissonance (e.g., Aronson, 1968, 2007; Steele, 1988), which hold that dissonance processes have their origins in the need for self-esteem rather than in a need for logic-like consistency, as originally conceived by Festinger (1957). Another focus is individual differences, e.g., how the different versions of dissonance theory make conflicting predictions for those varying in selfesteem. The chapter evaluates the theory in terms of its applicability, efficiency, heuristic value, and originality. Nail and Boniecki close by calling for new research that could possibly reestablish Festinger’s (1957) version as the single most adequate account of dissonance phenomena. Bertram Malle examines the history of research on behavior explanations, identifies missing pieces, and introduces a theoretical model that is meant to account for explanations at the conceptual, psychological, and linguistic levels. Heider (1958) was the first to examine systematically how people make sense of each others’ behavior. He introduced the

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Introduction notion of personal causality – ordinary people’s conception of how purposeful behavior works. When a behavior obeys personal causality, it is seen as caused by the agent’s intention, whereas such an intention is absent in behavior that obeys impersonal causality. Thus, Heider captured what was later called intentionality – a core distinction in people’s understanding of human behavior. Subsequent attribution research turned to different directions. Jones and Davis (1965) shifted from considerations of intention inferences toward considerations of personality and attitude inferences. Kelley (1967) set aside Heider’s distinction between personal and impersonal causality and instead focused on a distinction between person (internal) and situation (external) causes. This internal–external dimension, however, applies only to people’s explanations of unintentional events, not to their explanations of intentional action. Decades passed before Heider’s original concern with intentionality and people’s inferences of motives and reasons became a topic of research again. Committed to these concerns, the second part of the chapter introduces the folk-conceptual theory of behavior explanation (Malle, 1999, 2004). It locates explanations in the network of folk concepts people use to make sense of human behavior and specifies the psychological processes and linguistic manifestations of explanations. For example, people offer very different kinds of explanations for intentional and unintentional behavior. Unintentional behavior is explained by causes, which can be classified in a variety of ways, including an internal–external dimension. Intentional behavior, by contrast, is more complex. People offer either reason explanations (referring to the beliefs and desires in light of which the agent formed an intention to act) or causal history of reason explanations (referring to factors that led to those reasons in the first place – upbringing, personality, unconscious mental states, etc.). People’s choice between these two explanation modes reflects both cognitive and motivational processes and is sensitive to the explainer’s role (actors vs. observers), the type of agent (group vs. individuals), and the explainer’s impressionmanagement goals. Thus, the folk-conceptual theory tries to carve out the concepts and processes that matter when people construct and respond to explanations; and these distinctions reveal a rich, sophisticated system of folk-behavior explanations. Malle’s chapter is a dynamic contribution to the evolution of the field of attribution. Benjamin Wagner and Richard Petty examine the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), which is a general theory of persuasion that is also applicable to social judgment (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The ELM holds that people’s attitudes can be modified in both relatively effortful (central route) and non-effortful (peripheral route) ways. Persuasion via the central route depends on the strength and cogency of the arguments contained in the message and is determined by the number, valence, and confidence people have in their thoughts to the advocacy. Persuasion via the peripheral route is determined largely by reliance on simple cues and heuristics that are not necessarily central to the merits of the advocacy (e.g., being in a good mood). The extent of elaboration is the chief determinant of the route to persuasion, and several factors have been shown to influence the extent of thinking. Broadly speaking, these factors relate to motivation (e.g., personal relevance of the topic) and ability (e.g., knowledge about the topic) to think about the advocacy. With greater motivation and

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ability comes an increased likelihood that a person will extensively elaborate a persuasive message and be less reliant on issue-irrelevant cues. Importantly, attitudes formed under the central route are generally more durable and impactful than are attitudes formed under the peripheral route. An important component of the ELM is the idea that any variable can serve multiple roles in persuasion. Specifically, persuasion variables such as source expertise or momentary emotions can operate in five roles: (a) as simple cues to persuasion (e.g., “experts are usually right”), (b) as arguments that are relevant to a particular conclusion (e.g., “an expert’s endorsement speaks to the product’s quality”), (c) by biasing the thoughts that a person generates (i.e., expert sources lead to more favorable thoughts concerning the message than non-expert sources), (d) by affecting the amount of thinking a person does (i.e., expert sources enhance thinking about the arguments since they seem more worthy), and (e) by affecting whether people use their thoughts in response to the message in forming their attitudes toward the topic (i.e., “if my thoughts were provoked by an expert, they must be valid”). The ELM has not only integrated research in persuasion but has also been applied in diverse areas of application such as consumer attitudes, health promotion, and legal domains. The model continues to generate interesting and important research findings, both at the basic and applied levels. Social comparison has evolved and been modified since the 1950s. The social comparison process is a process that is present in numerous theories. Relative deprivation assumes the presence of social comparison. Both social comparison and relative deprivation are discussed in Part II. Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler provide a comprehensive overview of social comparison theory. Social comparisons – comparisons between the self and others – are a fundamental psychological mechanism influencing people’s judgments, experiences, and behavior. In this chapter, they review the social psychological theorizing and research on social comparison. They start by summarizing the basic tenets of Leon Festinger’s seminal social comparison theory and continue by addressing three questions that are central to Festinger’s ideas and to the research that followed his initial work. The first question is: Why do people engage in social comparisons? While social comparison is mostly understood as a process which is engaged to fulfill fundamental needs like self-evaluation, self-enhancement, and self-improvement, the chapter discusses logical reasons for social comparisons and considers the efficiency advantage of comparative information-processing. The second question is: To whom do people compare themselves? The chapter explores how motivational concerns influence the selection of comparison standards and how routine standards can provide an efficient means to fulfill the need to self-evaluate. The third question is: How do social comparisons influence the self? The diverse factors that lead to assimilation or contrast of the self as a consequence of social comparison are reviewed. Furthermore, these factors are discussed in light of the Selective Accessibility Model, which explains them by the changes of accessible self-knowledge during social comparisons. Finally, Corcoran et al. address the role of social comparisons in health psychology and the impact of idealized media images on self-evaluation as applied examples of social comparison research. Their

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Introduction review shows that comparative processes are marked by striking complexity and multifacetedness and that consequences of social comparisons span all core areas of human psychological functioning. They argue that future research could benefit from a perspective that integrates cognitive, motivational, and affective determinants and consequences of social comparisons. Underlying the theory of relative deprivation is the social comparison process. Relative deprivation (RD) theory helps social scientists predict who will become dissatisfied under what conditions. RD theory is a theory of perceived social inequity which helps to explain why some people with paltry resources experience contentment while some others with abundant access to a wealth of resources are dissatisfied. Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra Corning, Tara Dennehy, and Faye Crosby review the history, development, and utility of RD. After detailing the initial writings about the concept of RD, they trace the development of various models of RD articulated from the 1960s to the 1980s and assess the more contemporary work on RD, focusing on the distinction between personal and group-based feelings of relative deprivation and on a validated means of measuring the construct that was presented in 2000. Directions for the future application of RD theory to social problems are considered. Part III assesses two theories that start with the behavioral premise that human beings are hedonistic. The theories also assume that actions are governed by a reinforcement– punishment structure which extends into interpersonal interaction. The power dynamics of interpersonal interaction is absent from equity theory but elaborated in interdependency theory. Denise Polk’s chapter provides a useful understanding of equity theory. The theory stems from principles of reinforcement and basic principles of economics. The basic premise of the theory is that people evaluate their relationships in terms of inputs and outcomes. The principle of distributive justice is core to equity theory (Deutsch, 1985). Imbalances in input–outcome ratios result in inequity. Two types of inequity can occur. People may be underbenefited, or they may be overbenefited. However, according to equity theory, people are driven to restore equity once they perceive inequity. When people experience inequity, they may attempt to restore actual equity or psychological equity. Polk posits that because no magic formula for equity exists, relational partners must determine equity for themselves. Equity is a key consideration in relationships because people’s perceptions about equity shape people’s feelings, decisions, and actions toward their relational partners (Adams, 1965; Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994), so equity theory is appropriate to help explain the development, maintenance, and dissolution of relationships. Polk explores research which has tested equity for links with many variables including personality, emotions, gender, the distribution of domestic duties, and relational quality. The chapter by Ann Rumble explores interdependence theory, as developed by John Thibaut and Harold Kelley. Thibaut and Kelley employed outcome matrices in order to understand an actor’s available behavior choices and outcomes. The given matrix represents the choices and outcomes that are available to the actors in a specific situation, and through the transformation process develops into the effective matrix (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). By examining the components of the given and effective matrix, we will be

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able to explain human behavior in a number of interdependent situations, including close relationships. The final part of the book is devoted to theories related to self and identity and covers social identity, social categorization, symbolic interactionism, and impression management. Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah’s chapter provides a general overview of social psychological theory on social identity, including social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). However, this chapter takes a somewhat more encompassing approach to portraying what is commonly referred to as the social identity perspective (Abrams & Hogg, in press). The authors thus not only focus on social identity theory and self-categorization theory but also pay particular attention to defining the concept of social identity, and consider the consequences of social identity phenomena for intergroup relations, above and beyond the predictions of social identity theory, taking into consideration the extent to which multiple categorization processes help explain intergroup relations. The chapter is organized into four sections, the first two of which conceptually define self-categorization and social identification, whereas the last two examine the extent to which self-categorization and social identification are involved in, and help explain, intergroup relations. Section one of this chapter provides a brief definition of selfcategorization and describes the theoretical foundations of self-categorization theory. The authors describe in detail what is meant by self-categorization, and how, why, and when individuals make use of social categories. In Section two, they define social identification as a psychological process associated with group membership and explain that identification is a multidimensional phenomenon. Section three presents a detailed description of social identity theory, with reference to the findings that emerged from the minimal group paradigm. Schmid, Hewstone, and Al Ramiah address, with reference to the predictions of social identity theory, the extent to which self-categorization and social identification are related to intergroup attitudes and behavior. Finally, Section four is devoted to an overview of multiple categorization and its consequences for intergroup relations, showing how more complex consideration of others and oneself in terms of multiple group memberships is associated with tolerance and improved intergroup relations. Richard Crisp and Angela Maitner’s chapter complements the previous chapter. They argue that in contemporary society the traditional boundaries that have previously defined social group memberships are being steadily eroded and replaced with more complex conceptualizations of identity. Crisp and Maitner review classic and contemporary theories of social categorization in the context of this increasing social and cultural diversity. They argue that broad-ranging and pervasive changes to the categorical structure of society have fundamental implications for how individuals perceive, represent, and understand their social environments. They review existing social cognitive, self-categorization, and situated cognition accounts, arguing that an increasing focus on the context-specific nature of social categorization reflects the more fluid and fluctuating nature of identity in contemporary society. They conceptualize a diversity-driven social categorization theory, arguing that the functional nature of human cognition implies that exposure to diversity must

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Introduction change how individuals psychologically engage with their social worlds. The authors conclude that to understand fully the evolving nature of social categorization psychologists should seek to incorporate a broader multidisciplinary analysis of the changing nature of culture and society. Andreas Schneider’s chapter is a comprehensive overview of symbolic interactionism (SI). Today the framework of symbolic interactionism has been delineated into many theoretical approaches using qualitative and quantitative methods of investigation that are applied in numerous areas of research. SI has evolved a long way from early philosophies of North American pragmatism to the computer simulation of human interaction. Describing this path, this chapter overcomes dichotomies such as the Chicago school versus the Iowa school, or quantitative versus qualitative, that have been used in the past to pigeonhole one or the other line of research. Instead it portrays the development from the grandfathers and their philosophical backgrounds to explain the different agendas addressed by the founding fathers of the Chicago school. This historical context is necessary to understand contemporary contrasting schools of thought and their roots in social psychology, as well as sociology. This chapter then shows how ideas and methodologies of these qualitative and quantitative approaches are integrated into the most recent development of cybernetic control models in SI. Finally it is demonstrated how SI is applied in the fields of deviance, sexuality, children, gender, emotions, organization/management, cross-cultural comparison, and ethnomethodology/conversation analysis. Descriptions of these applications are supported by interviews of key researchers in the respective fields. Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek’s chapter on impression management (IM) is a refreshing contribution to the literature. They note that IM is an activity which takes place in many, if not most, interactions between people. In this chapter they start by exploring the different definitions of the construct, from a narrow view of IM as a set of manipulative behaviors, performed mainly in order to present them in a positive light, to a more expansive definition which assumes that all people unconsciously manage their impressions in ways that assist in achieving goals both at the individual and group level. This expansive view of IM allows us to deal with its association to constructs such as the self-concept, individuals’ social identities, and other social phenomena. When applying or measuring IM, behaviors are usually considered as belonging to one of several distinct subcategories. These categories include verbal/nonverbal behaviors, defensive/promotional, positive/negative, and several other related taxonomies. The chapter also explores specific antecedents and outcomes of IM. Prominent among the former are gender, self-monitoring, and self-regulation, as well as demographic and personality variables. In addition, research on situational antecedents and on IM outcomes has been conducted in applied settings such as human resource management. Since the work environment supplies the individual with many incentives as well as opportunities to benefit from impressions that are well managed, this area has been the focus of much of the research in recent years. Finally, they identify several areas for future researchers to consider so as to better explain the phenomenon.

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References Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. (in press). Social identity and selfcategorization. In J. F. Dovidio, M. Hewstone, P. Glick, & V. M. Esses (Eds.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination. London: Sage. Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 267–300). New York: Academic Press. Allport, F. H. (1924). Social psychology. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Allport, G. (1968). The historical background of modern social psychology. In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (Vol. 1). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Aronson, E. (1968). Dissonance theory: Progress and problems. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories of cognitive consistency: A source book (pp. 5–27). Skokie, IL: Rand McNally. Aronson, E. (2007). The evolution of cognitive dissonance theory. In A. R. Pratkanis (Ed.), The science of social influence: Advances and future progress (pp. 115–135). New York: Psychology Press. Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review, 74, 183–200. Deutsch, M. (1985). Distributive justice: A social-psychological perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, 203–210. Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. (1965). From acts to dispositions: The attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 219–266). New York: Academic Press.

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Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation (Vol. 15, pp. 192–238). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Malle, B. F. (1999). How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 21–43. Malle, B. F. (2004). How the mind explains behavior: Folk explanations, meaning, and social interaction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. McDougall, W. (1908). Introduction to social psychology. London: Methuen. Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123–205). New York: Academic Press. Ross, E. A. (1908). Social psychology. New York: Macmillan. Sprecher, S., & Schwartz, P. (1994). Equity and balance in the exchange of contributions in close relationships. In M. L. Lerner & G. Mikula (Eds.), Entitlement and the affectional bond: Justice in close relationship (pp. 11–41). New York: Plenum. Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 261–302). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Tajfel, H. (1978). Interindividual behaviour and intergroup behaviour. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 28–60). London: Academic Press. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–48). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

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Part I

Social Cognition

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Toward Freedom: Reactance Theory Revisited Derek Chadee

Reactance theory was developed by Jack W. Brehm and articulated in his Theory of Psychological Reactance (1966). Leon Festinger and Stanley Schachter were the editors of the monograph series which included Brehm’s seminal work. In fact, Brehm’s Ph.D. supervisor was Leon Festinger and his Ph.D. dissertation tested the free-choice dissonance paradigm which later appeared in 1956 in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology as the first empirical research on cognitive dissonance. Later, Brehm systematically wrote on cognitive dissonance (e.g., Brehm, 1962; Brehm & Cohen, 1962). The genesis of the theory of psychological reactance appears to have taken place in the womb of cognitive dissonance theory. However, the baby grew with many different characteristics from the mother. Both theories of cognitive dissonance and psychological reactance are theories of motivational arousal and reduction. In fact, Miron and Brehm (2006, p. 9) recognize that Festinger had constructed a theory (cognitive dissonance) that assumed an inner motivational process rather than assuming that all influences between stimuli and behavior were simple and direct. It was in this context that Brehm and Cohen (1962), both in the Yale Attitude Change Program at the time, carried out an extensive program of research on persuasion, largely based on dissonance theory, but with some attention to special cases of resistance to social influence. After [Brehm] … became more interested in the occurrence of resistance to social influence, and that interest eventuated in the formulation of reactance theory.

Assumptions The theory of psychological reactance attempts to explain people’s reactions to a perceived or actual threat to loss of their freedom(s). The concept of freedom is defined “as a belief that one can engage in a particular behavior” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 35). Brehm (1966, p. 9) defines “psychological reactance as a motivational state directed toward the Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Derek Chadee reestablishment of the free behaviors which have been eliminated or threatened with elimination.” The theory makes no assumption about psychological reactance being aroused to acquire a freedom but refers solely to reinstating a threatened or eliminated freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Psychological reactance, therefore, arouses an individual and motivates toward restoration of freedom. As Miron and Brehm (2006) point out, reactance is not a proactive force but is reactive to actual or perceived threats toward freedoms. The theory makes a number of assumptions about human behavior. Brehm (1966, p. 1) notes the following about human behavior: First, freedom of behavior is pervasive. Second, it is an important aspect of human interaction and living. Third, human beings are goaloriented and incessantly reflect on themselves and the external environment in assessing what, how, and when they will undertake particular behaviors. He states: “They consider their wants and needs, the dangers and benefits available in their surroundings, and the ways in which they can accomplish various ends” (1966, p. 1). Many times people undertake behaviors when they are not fully aware of the rationale that drives the behaviors. At other times behaviors are performed while they are fully aware of constraints and lack of freedom in the performance of the behaviors. As a fourth assumption, however, Brehm assumes that most of the time human beings feel relatively free to participate in a range of behaviors. Fifth, the theory assumes that people have a set of behaviors to engage in. These behaviors have been engaged in in the past, are engaged in in the present, and will be engaged in in the future. He refers to these behaviors as the individual’s “free behaviors” and identifies a number of criteria to define a behavior as a free behavior. These include the behaviors being practically achievable, the individual having the physical and psychological capacity to engage in these behaviors, and individuals also being fully cognizant that they can participate in these behaviors. Such awareness of engagement emerges from social norms, customs, legislations, and other kinds of formal agreement and informal interaction. Worchel (2004) elaborates on how particular actions over time are perceived as free behavior. For reactance to occur an individual must believe in the possession (perceived or actual) of a freedom (Miron & Brehm, 2006). A threat to this freedom creates the arousal – reactance.

Threat A threat emerges from any power or force that attempts to reduce or eliminate the expression of a specific freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Threats can be explicit or implicit (i.e., subtle by implication). Brehm and Brehm (1981) describe threats to freedom as either external or internal. Internal threats arise out of choices and decisions we make from alternatives, accepting and rejecting among options. On the other hand, external threats have two dimensions – impersonal versus personal and social versus nonsocial. Impersonal threats are not easily perceived, unlike personal threats in which motives and intentions of threats can be identified by the individual and have implications for perception of future threats. Specifically, personal threats will carry greater implications for future threats from the same source because of possible future interaction. Impersonal threats, however, create less reactance arousal, since they are not directly focused at the individual, and therefore no implications for future threats. However, the term personal, as Brehm and Brehm (1981)

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indicate not only refers to interaction with known others but can apply to infrequent interaction with an entity/person. Impersonal threats can also be derived from persons or institutions that we interact with on a personal level, for example, working for a large corporation or governmental organization. An impersonal threat from such an organization is not directed toward a specific individual, but any threat to freedom would have consequences to individuals in the organization. The depth of future interaction with a threatening source is an important prediction of psychological reactance. Brehm and Brehm (1981) postulate that anticipation of future interaction with a threatening source is likely to increase psychological reactance as compared to anticipation that there will be minimal or no future interaction with a threatened source. Another dimension of threat which Brehm and Brehm (1981) identify is the social versus nonsocial dimension. However, they also hold the view that nonsocial exists in degrees, since humans are social and reactance emerges out of social interaction, and there will be social interpretations of nonsocial dimensions. The source of threat can emanate from either level. Studies that consider the social dimension expose subjects to a socially threatening situation (e.g., one individual directly threatens the freedom of another). The nonsocial studies created threats via nonsocial interaction (e.g., barriers to toys, removal of choice alternatives).

Magnitude of Reactance Psychological reactance is influenced by both threat and freedom (Wright, Greenberg, & Brehm, 2004). The theory postulates that there are a number of factors which influence the magnitude of psychological reactance. These include the strength of the threat to one’s freedom; the presence of freedom which emerges from the interruption of free behaviors or barriers preventing their expression; the importance of freedom in the realization of needs; and the extent to which the needs are core to the individual’s existence. There is a direct relationship between reactance and the importance of the threatened. For example, being forced to choose between two valueless alternatives will not create as high a psychological reactance as being forced to choose between attractive alternatives. The relative importance of the freedom, and not only the importance, is a determining factor of reactance. For example, if choice alternatives are of equal cost (e.g., the choice alternative of dining at similar kinds of restaurants), removal of one alternative or the other will lead to relatively the same degree of reactance. However, in the same example, if the choice alternative included a highend computer and this alternative was denied, the magnitude of psychological reactance would be relatively much higher because of the relatively higher attractiveness of the computer. The proportion of freedom threatened also impacts on the magnitude of reactance and arises from the number of free behaviors that are at risk in proportion to the number of free behaviors. Threats that have implications for future threats to free behavior also arouse reactance (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Miron & Brehm, 2006; Wicklund, 1974). Threats may be defined or arbitrary. Threats that are defined and specific have limits to the threats and are justified (e.g., the denial of entry to any vehicles other than taxis into a particular roadway). This threat has a physical limit and a rationale which allows for

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Derek Chadee reduction of traffic congestion. Arbitrary threats are ill-defined (e.g., an office imposing restrictions on casual conversations during working hours). This kind of threat carries high ambiguity and leads to extrapolations and speculations about different kinds of future prohibitions and restrictions. The magnitude of reactance will, therefore, be higher for arbitrary threats than defined threats. Brehm and Brehm (1981) discuss the aggregated impact of a number of sub-threshold threats from a source that, when collectively combined, is potent enough to be considered a threat to one’s freedom. Each sub-threat on its own does not have the efficacy to constitute a threat. Threats reach an optimum point. Brehm and Brehm (1981, p. 58) write about the threshold of freedom elimination which exists when the “perceived magnitude of threat overshadows the perceived importance of freedom,” and about the optimum point of a threat: “the point at which a threat turns into an elimination of freedom is the point at which the magnitude of reactance is greatest. Additional force (and perceived threat) beyond that point has no effect on the magnitude of reactance.” Reactance is moderated by the importance of the freedom. In other words, the threat in itself does not produce the psychological reactance. For example, threats to freedoms of low importance, even with high-level threats, would create low levels of arousal and nonexpression of the freedom. However, freedoms of high importance create high reactance and an arousal to express the threatened freedom. The magnitude of the threat is influenced by the number of freedoms threatened by one or more factors. Time is a moderator here. Reasonable time lapses between one threat and another prime the person to a second threat, and reactance is increased as compared to two or more threats being experienced simultaneously. Primed persons are more likely to express greater psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Miron & Brehm, 2006). Wicklund (1974) postulates the hydraulic principle or summation effect of reactance. The principle states that when two freedoms are threatened, the reactance arousal of the first threat (in which there are restrictions in the expression of reactance) is channeled into the reactance arousal of the second threat to freedom. Brehm and Brehm (1981) later complemented the principle by identifying conditions under which the principle would best be applied. They identified three conditions: threats must be different, and at least two present, with some relationship between the threats or freedoms; a time lapse must exist between threats; and there is no reduction of reactance for the first threat – the reactance is still present. Some social factors that contribute to the magnitude of psychological reactance include monetary and verbal inducements, the attractiveness of the communicator, instructions, modeling behavior, role play, and the exertion of pressure for compliance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).

Effects of Reactance Reactance as a motivational force pushes the individual to reduce levels of arousal. Display of reactance decreases arousal and leads to restoration of free behavior either directly, via exhibiting the threatened behavior, or indirectly, via focusing on the source (i.e., discrediting or attacking). Reactance is displayed on two levels – behavioral and nonbehavioral

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(subjective) – and a range of reduction options exist on these levels (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Miron & Brehm, 2006). The individual adopts a number of behaviors to reestablish a sense of freedom, including direct behavioral reassertion of freedom; developing a greater liking for the behavior that was threatened and displaying the threatened behavior; indirect reassertion of freedom by adoption of extreme (e.g., costly, taboo, or dangerous) behaviors that imply power to display eliminated behaviors (boomerang effect); and aggressive behavior directed toward the entity threatening the freedom. There are situations in which outcomes are uncontrollable (a situation of learned helplessness) and freedoms are impossible to restore. In these situations an individual may relinquish a freedom so as to reduce or eliminate reactance (Brehm & Wortman, 1975). In situations of exposure to threats by powerful communicators reactance is reduced when there is possibility of future interaction, negative consequences to others, and negative consequences to oneself (Miron & Brehm, 2006). In group situations, individuals may comply with the group’s alternatives rather than display reactance for the eliminated alternative by the group. Consequences for future interaction within the group are considered. In both situations, the cost and benefit analysis will determine the reduction of reactance strategy (Miron & Brehm, 2006). Reactance effects exist on a continuum from physiological arousal with no observable signs to hostility. Other reactance reduction strategies include the following: 1. Derogate and discredit threatening sources. This strategy is adopted especially if the source does not have legitimate power to threaten the freedom. 2. Display aggression and hostility toward the threatening source. Hostility is a subjective experience of reactance and should be distinguished from instrumental hostility. 3. Decrease the proportion of freedoms that were threatened. 4. Compensate by increasing other freedoms. 5. Seek opportunities to counter threatening messages/sources. 6. Increase the number of available freedoms. 7. Reduce compliance behavior. 8. Position oneself to increase future freedom behavior. 9. Increase self-direction to one’s own behavior in achieving one’s goal of reducing reactance. 10. Change cognition (e.g., reevaluate the threat and define it as not posing a threat to freedom). 11. Change behavior (e.g., engage in behaviors that would compensate for the threat). 12. Remove the threat (e.g., leave the relationship). 13. Reconcile oneself to the loss of freedom. 14. Reduce reactance by implication. Reactance by implication occurs when we observe someone’s freedom being threatened. Reactance can also be reduced vicariously in the same way by observing the restoration of the other’s freedom. 15. Seek out others who can assist in the restoration of our freedom. 16. Increase perceived available behavior. 17. Subjectively, imaginatively, seek out others who can assist in the restoration of our free behavior.

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Derek Chadee 18. Deny the presence of a threat. 19. Persevere by focusing on maintaining and protecting non-threatened free behaviors. 20. Adopt impression-management strategies.

Research on Reactance Research on psychological reactance has been immense over the years, with findings that have questioned conventional wisdoms. Research on reactance has been useful in critically developing the dynamism of the theory to offer explanations for a wide range of phenomena. This section describes some of the important reactance research undertaken over the years and focuses on situational factors in the arousal of reactance.

Social interaction Andreoli, Worchel, and Folger’s (1974) research examines arousal by implication (i.e., observing another’s freedom being threatened – indirect) and not only by the presence or intended presence of a future threatener. Earlier work by Sensenig and Brehm (1968) found that the magnitude of reactance was increased for persons who expected future interaction with a previously direct threatener. The 1974 study asked persons to give a ranking of five desired topics for discussion. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions and then placed in a room and, while waiting, heard a discussion in which a person’s (B) freedom-of-topic choice was threatened by another person (A) (threat condition). The subject’s first-ranked topic choice was chosen by A without consultation with B. The threatened and restored condition by the experimenter (restored condition) involved the subject’s first-ranked topic choice being chosen by A without consultation with B, but the experimenter intervened to ensure B’s participation in the topic selection. The third condition was a non-threat (neutral condition), where there was a preference for the subject’s first topic choice, but consultation with B was implied. Following this exposure, subjects rated the five topics. The major findings of the study suggest that threats to the freedom of others (indirect threat to the observer) provoked reactance in the observer as though it was a direct threat and in spite of whether there would be future interaction with the threatener. As a result of the threat to their freedom to choose their first-ranked topic in the threat condition, subjects were more desirous of their second- and third-ranked topics than the first. The study also found that reactance emerging from implication can also be restored by implication, as in the restored condition with the experimental intervention. Unlike previous studies (Worchel, 1974; Worchel & Andreoli, 1974), derogation of the threatener was absent, with no significant difference in the attractiveness rating of the threatener among the three conditions. In the previous studies there were direct interactions with the threatener. However, in this study there is an indirect interaction. Baer, Hinkle, Smith, and Fenton’s (1980) study assesses the extent to which the expression of autonomy moderated by self-presentation can reduce psychological reactance. Though their research tested a similar hypothesis to Brehm and Mann’s (1975) study, which did not

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find differences in psychological reactance in public and private expressions of autonomy, they used a different experimental design than the 1975 study. Instead of the within-subject design utilized by Brehm and Mann, Baer et al. randomly assigned subjects to each of the experimental conditions to ensure that subjects were not primed in their response in the public or private attitude conditions. The study utilized a 3 (prior exercise of freedom: public exercise, private exercise, no exercise) × 2 (threat: mild or severe) × 2 (manner of postcommunication attitude disclosure: public or private) factorial design. The study hypothesized that the prior exercise of public expression of freedom condition would more likely reduce reactance than private and nonprior conditions since it acted as a mechanism for the projecting of autonomy. The study also found that postcommunication attitude change occurred in an opposite direction to the threatening communication, and only in the the projection of autonomy condition, that is, the public postcommunication condition. The findings of Baer et al. (1980) suggest that private attitudes, although maintaining autonomy, do not allow for the projection of autonomy and are unable to reduce psychological reactance. The major findings of the study support the self-presentation model of projected autonomy in the reduction of psychological reactance. This held true whether the expression of the autonomy was prior or subsequent to the threat. The inability of projecting autonomy motivated people to engage in postcommunication reactance attenuation. Social exchange theory suggests that norms of reciprocity underlie social interaction and people are motivated to return rewards and favors of others (Homans, 1974). Counter to the social exchange proposition on norms of reciprocity, Brehm and Cole (1966) argue that favors and rewards may provoke non-reciprocation. They posit that the favored person will experience reactance because there is a pressure, as a result of the norms of reciprocity (see Gouldner, 1960), to return the favor which is interpreted as a threat to one’s freedom. The intensity of reactance actually experienced will result from the degree to which one will want to be freed from the pressures of reciprocation, that is, returning the favor. The authors (p. 420) note: If a person thought he was free to engage in Behaviors X, Y, and Z, and Behavior X were then somehow made impossible, he would experience reactance and would be motivated to recover his freedom to engage in X. Conversely, if he were “forced” to engage in X, his consequent reactance would lead him to avoid X and attempt Y or Z.

The reactance reduction strategy may involve the elimination of any sense of obligation toward the favorer and show little or no gratitude to the favorer. Reactance theory also questions the hypothesis on the inverse relationship between group attractiveness and disagreement with others in groups – that is, as group attractiveness increases, group disagreement within the group decreases. Brehm and Mann’s (1975) study hypothesizes that threats to freedoms of low importance encourage a direct relationship between group attractiveness and movement toward the group position. However, there is an inverse relationship between group attractiveness and gravitation to group position in conditions of high importance of freedom. The findings showed that a boomerang effect (reactance resistance) occurred privately and pushed behaviors toward public display of this effect in the high importance of freedom condition with pressure for conformity. However, modifications of this condition (high importance of freedom condition with

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Derek Chadee pressure for change), with removal of the pressure but keeping the high importance of freedom, created a sleeper effect (change occurring but not immediately), with private opinion modifying in a positive direction toward the group.

The forbidden fruit Messages are sources of information. Reactance theory emphasizes the sensitivity of the message in persuasion. For example, in one of the many studies undertaken in this area, Bushman (1998) assesses the relationship between reactance and warning labels, that is, to what extent were warning labels viewed by consumers as a constraint to their choice of freely using a product – did labels create the effect of “forbidden fruit” or “tainted fruit”? The forbidden fruit theory underlies psychological reactance in that restrictions on the acquisition of something act as a constraint on our freedom, inducing reactance. Proscribed behaviors become more attractive and reduce reactance. Authoritative warning labels on products may create a boomerang effect, making the product more attractive to the consumer. Bushman posits that the tainted fruit theory reduces attractiveness to the product because consumers conceptualize warning labels as signals of possible harm. However, citing Bushman and Stack (1996) and Snyder and Blood (1992), he notes that research is more supportive of attraction than repulsion by warning labels. Utilizing information labels, warning labels (information labels from an authoritative source), and no label (no warning/information label) on a fatty product, Bushman found that though the warning label and no label conditions were more attractive, people were less likely to taste the product in the information and warning label conditions. Bushman (2006) also found that warning labels on violent television programs across five age groups (ranging from 9 to 21 years and over) were more likely to attract persons in these groups to the violent program than information labels and no label. Psychological reactance was utilized to explain the attraction to the “forbidden fruit.”

Gender (nature–nurture) Is psychological reactance only experienced and displayed by those who have an understanding of their sense of freedom? As Brehm and Weinraub (1977) put it, must there be complex cognitive ability for psychological reactance to be displayed, in that an understanding of sense of freedom is needed for the arousal of psychological reactance? Their study utilized children (boys and girls) at the age of 2 and randomly assigned them to one of three physical barrier conditions: (1) a large physical barrier with identical objects behind the barrier; (2) a large barrier with dissimilar objects; and (3) a small barrier with dissimilar objects. Boys were more attracted to objects in the second condition, while girls were more attracted to objects in the third condition. The boys were more sensitized to situations of threats to their freedom to freely obtain objects created by the barriers. Once the desired object was obtained there was a decrease in psychological reactance and factors other than reactance became influential, including the intrinsic attraction of toys and attention span. Girls were more likely to approach objects that were less difficult to obtain. This study demonstrated that there are motivational processes that may transcend cognitive ability in the

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arousal of psychological reactance. Possible explanations proposed in the study for the gender differences in the findings include a greater emphasis on visual cues by boys and verbal cues by girls (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974), the higher accommodation of restrictions by girls than boys, and the evasion of obstacles by boys (Goldberg & Lewis, 1969).

Social Influence Reactance is also a function of pressure to comply (social influence), which can vary from subtle to outright attempts to achieve compliance. A consequence of social influence is its eroding effect on an individual’s effort to exert influence in a social setting. For example, Brehm and Sensenig (1966) argue that social influence that attempts usurpation of choice, especially when we are aware of our freedom to make the particular choice, will arouse reactance and lead to rejecting the source of the social influence. Their study also showed that the evaluation of continuing perception of threat was a function of the magnitude of reactance and inclination toward the denunciation of the social influence. How does reactance or compliant behavior influence regret? Crawford, McConnell, Lewis, and Sherman (2002) assess the relationship among reactance, compliance, regret, and persuasive attempts at changing behavior. The study found that individuals, in assessing future anticipated regret, were more likely to estimate higher regret for any loss if reactant behavior rather than compliance was likely to be displayed to a persuasive attempt. However, in actuality, in an attempt to reduce anticipated regret, individuals were more likely to engage in complying behavior to a request. In fact, individuals displaying anticipated regret and compliant behavior, as against persons displaying reactant behavior, actually experienced higher regret. The authors argue that compliant behavior is associated with dependency and attribution of blame is externalized, as compared to reactance behavior, which involves an independent choice in which the acting person assumes responsibility for their behavioral choice. Silvia (2005) assesses the relationship between interpersonal interaction, similarity, and psychological reactance. Similarity between interacting parties reduces resistance and enhances compliance in that similarity tends to increase attraction and liking, which, in turn, leads to the threatening behavior of liked persons being interpreted as less coercive. The findings of this study suggest that reactance is more likely to be aroused when a message that is threatening emanates from a dissimilar other. However, when the communicator of a threatening message was similar, persuasion occurred as though the message was not threatening (a normal message). Similarity as a positive interaction factor intervened in influencing compliance and reducing resistance which the threatening message aroused. The findings also suggest that even in a threatening situation the magnitude of reactance can be reduced by positive social influence. In this study, the researchers created similarity by creating identical first name, date of birth, and congruent values of communicator-participants. Resistance can be used to reestablish one’s sense of freedom via a freedom-affirmation intervention. Heilman and Toffler (1976) studied the reaffirming of freedom, assessing the relationship among message (threat or promise), option (no choice or choice option), and interpersonal interaction (interpersonal or non-interpersonal). The research found that

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Derek Chadee compliance was higher in threatening situations when a choice was available, and both threats and promises were equally effective in obtaining compliance in a choice situation. An important factor in the interpretation of a threatening situation is the degree of interpersonal interaction. Overall, the greater the interpersonal interaction, the greater the compliance. However, an important finding of the study was the fact that though liking (interpersonal concern) was not the only variable that induced compliance, it moderated responses to freedom reduction (reactance). Table 1.1 summarizes research that focuses on psychological reactance as a state condition (i.e., influenced by the situation).

Reactance as a Trait Is psychological reactance strongly associated with a disposition or, as most of the earlier research assumed, is it a state condition? The relationship between reactance and personality traits was discussed by Dowd, Wallbrown, Sanders, and Yesenosky (1994). They identified a number of factors that may contribute to obstacles in therapeutic sessions including reactance. A psychological reactant personality profile was identified using the California Psychological Inventory – Revised (CPI-R), the Therapeutic Reactance Scale (TRS), and the Questionnaire Measuring Psychological Reactance (QMPR). Their study found that psychologically reactant individuals were less concerned with impressing others or adhering to social norms and regulations, were “somewhat careless about fulfilling duties and obligations,” were inclined to express strong emotions and feelings, and were preoccupied with future possible problems. The researchers also found that women who were classified as reactant displayed more capability in decision making and were more “self-assured, sociable, and action-oriented.” The psychological profile developed in this study highlighted certain similarities between reactant persons and individuals with psychopathic and narcissistic personality disorders. Another study (Huck, 1998) found that paranoid, antisocial, and sadistic disorders were highly correlated with reactance, and that persons with histrionic, avoidant, and/or dependent disorders displayed low reactance behavior. According to Seibel and Dowd (2001), there is an optimum normal level of reactance. Once this threshold is crossed, excessive reactance behavior loses utility and begins to have a negative impact on the individual. The authors found that persons with personality disorders (e.g., obsessive-compulsive) characterized by autonomy or mistrust exhibit high reactance. Dowd and Wallbrown (1993) tested motivational components of psychological reactance utilizing the QMPR, the TRS, and a Personal Research Form (PRF). Their findings suggest that persons high in reactance are aggressive, dominant, defensive, autonomous, quick to feel offended, and low in social desirability. In sum, they are deemed loners who are deficit in strong relations with others. Positive characteristics associated with high-reactant individuals were high levels of confidence in their beliefs and goal orientation. Persons higher on external locus of control were more likely to be reactant (Pepper, 1996). These findings contradict previous studies (Mallon, 1992; Morgan, 1986 as cited in Pepper, 1996). However, an earlier study found no significant difference in levels of reactance between internally and externally oriented persons on locus of control (Cherulnik & Citrin, 1974).

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Toward Freedom: Reactance Theory Revisited Table 1.1

23

Research on situational reactance.

Author

Comments

Brehm, J. W. (1966)

Psychological reactance theory formally presented in this monograph.

Brehm, J. W., & Cole, A. H. (1966)

Explored the effects of a favor on reactance arousal. This study found that the importance placed on the behavioral freedom influences the arousal and magnitude of reactance.

Brehm, J. W., & Sensenig, J. (1966)

Examined social influence as a function of implied or attempted threat to freedom. Results from this study showed that when a person’s freedom of choice is usurped, the individual will experience psychological reactance and thus reject the influence.

Hammock, T., & Brehm, J. W. (1966)

Explored the attractiveness of alternatives when freedom is reduced or eliminated. The two experiments yielded the results that a choice alternative which is eliminated by another person will tend to become more attractive, and a choice alternative forced by another person will tend to become less attractive.

Kornberg, A., Linder, D., & Cooper, J. (1970)

Proposed how psychological reactance can provide a new perspective on understanding political behavior. Results supported the idea that reactance theory can be applied to political behavior.

Linder, D. E., & Crane, K. A. (1970)

Analyzed the converging attractiveness of two alternatives as the time for a final decision approaches. This study found that the importance of the decision and the initial attractiveness of the alternative combined to arouse reactance within a short period of time.

Wicklund, R. A. (1970)

Examined cognitive dissonance theory and reactance theory as theoretical explanations for regret when decision freedom is threatened. The results indicated that under conditions designed specifically to discriminate between the two theories, the prediction from reactance theory was supported while the prediction from dissonance theory was not.

Worchel, S., & Brehm, J. W. (1970)

Examined the effect of strong threats to a person’s freedom in adopting the attitudinal position and the effect of responses to threat as a function of initial agreement or disagreement with the position of the communicator. Findings detected that subjects who received freedom threatening communications in agreement with their own position tended to move away from the advocated position, while subjects in all other conditions tended to move toward the advocated position.

Linder, D. E., Wortman, C. B., & Brehm, J. W. (1971)

Time prior to decision making was manipulated, with results supporting the hypothesis that the shorter the decision time the more the attractiveness of alternatives converges.

Worchel, S., & Brehm, J. W. (1971)

Explored direct and implied restoration of freedom. Results from both experiments supported the hypothesis that restoration of freedom reduces the increase in desirability of the alternative which results from a threat to freedom.

Berkowitz, L. (1973)

The author reviewed studies that displayed individuals’ unwillingness to aid others and utilized reactance theory.

Andreoli, V. A., Worchel, S., & Folger, R. (1974)

Identified conditions necessary for the arousal of reactance by implication. This study supported the idea that reactance can be aroused by implication (by observing another person’s freedom being threatened) and restored by implication (by observing another person’s freedom restored).

(cont’d)

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Table 1.1

(cont’d)

Author

Comments

Wicklund, R. A. (1974)

Reviewed studies undertaken on reactance.

Brehm, J. W., & Mann, M. (1975)

Examined the effect of group conformity pressure on public and private opinions with regard to reactance. Results displayed that if importance of freedom is relatively great to the individual, both private and public compliance decrease, as group attraction increases.

Heilman, M. E., & Toffler, B. L. (1976)

Investigated the conditions under which the negative consequences of social influence attempts can be mitigated by freedom-affirming interventions. The results showed that in social situations individuals’ concerns about their freedom were interpersonally motivated.

Miller, R. L. (1976)

Assessed the impact of varied intensities of exposure to a persuasive message on attitude change and psychological reactance. This study showed that mere exposure enhances the evaluation of stimuli whereas overexposure dampens positive attitudinal effects.

Snyder, M., & Wicklund, R. A. (1976)

Examined the effect of exercising prior freedom and reactance effects. The two experiments of this study showed that when individuals exercise their freedom prior to it being threatened, they do so to prevent the onset of reactance.

Brehm, S. S., & Weinraub, M. (1977)

Applied the theory of reactance to the attractiveness of goal objects when impeded by barriers. This study found that 2-year-old boys were more reactant than 2-year-old girls and this was due either to perception of cues or to culture.

Carver, C. S. (1977)

Investigated the role of self-awareness in the perception of threat and resultant reactance. Found that an individual will resist persuasion once a communication is interpreted as coercive, and this can happen when the individual has some degree of self-awareness.

Stillman, P. G. (1977)

A review of Freedom and Reactance by Robert A. Wicklund.

Baer, R., Hinkle, S., Smith, K., & Fenton, M. (1980)

Examined the extent that individuals can project autonomy before or after a threat to freedom. This study supported the self-presentational view of reactance, in that reactance effects were confined to participants’ public attitudes, whereas their private attitudes were unchanged. When prior exercise of freedom was public, the reactance process for participants was hindered.

Clee, M. A., & Wicklund, R. A. (1980)

A review of psychological reactance and its broad applicability to consumer behavior.

Brehm, S. S., & Brehm, J. W. (1981)

Described the theory and research of psychological reactance.

Wright, R. A., & Brehm, S. S. (1982)

Critically reviewed reactance and impression management.

Brockner, J., Gardner, M., Bierman, J., Mahon, T., Thomas, B., & Weiss, W. (1983)

Explored the influential properties of self-esteem and self-consciousness in interaction with the Wortman–Brehm model of reactance and learned helplessness. Low-self-esteem individuals exhibited more reactance effects when they had high self-consciousness, and with extended failure they were more likely to show helplessness than individuals with high self-esteem.

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25

(cont’d)

Author

Comments

Seltzer, L. F. (1983)

Explored the dynamics of paradoxical intervention by stressing external or situational pressures and the link to psychological reactance. Results suggested that the final choice was influenced by reactance, although its primary determinants were the student’s self-efficacy and opportunistic ideals.

Mikulincer, M. (1988)

Examined the effects of the internal–external attributional style on affective and performance reactions following different amounts of failure. Results indicated that following exposure to four unsolvable problems, internal attributors exhibited stronger feelings of incompetence and a decrease in performance compared with external attributors.

Nail, P. R., Van Leeuwen, M. D., & Powell, A. B. (1996)

Tested the effectance vs. self-presentational view of reactance. The study claims support the idea that interpersonal processes can affect the expression of reactance and suggests that in some cases concern for self-presentation may be a necessary condition for measurable reactance effects to occur.

Wicklund, R. A. (1997)

Reviewed the theory of psychological reactance.

Bushman, B. J. (1998)

Investigated the effect of informational warning labels on consumables. Results were consistent with the prediction, although not significant, that warning labels may have considerable influence on behavior in situations in which there are clear low-cost behavioral alternatives that are reasonably satisfactory.

Burger, J. M. (1999)

A review of foot-in-the-door manipulation and psychological reactance and other psychological processes.

Beutler, L. E., Moleiro, C., & Talebi, H. (2002)

Review of resistance and reactance in psychotherapy.

Crawford, M. T., McConnell, A. R., Lewis, A. C., & Sherman, S. J. (2002)

Assessed whether anticipated regret impacted on one’s decision to react or comply. The results suggest that anticipated regret cannot account for reactance effects. Participants were more likely to perceive greater anticipated regret associated with reactance versus compliance, and thus complied.

Silvia, P. J. (2005)

Explored psychological reactance with focus on individuals and their similarity to persons/ communicators who are threatening their freedom. Findings indicated that dissimilarity with the communicator invoked reactance whereas similarity to the communicator increased liking and consequently compliance.

Bushman, B. J. (2006)

Investigated the effect of informational warning labels on attraction to violence in television viewers of different ages. Across age groups, viewers consider warning labels to be a restriction on their freedom to watch what they want.

Miron, A. M., & Brehm, J. W. (2006)

Review of psychological reactance from 1966 to 2006.

Silvia, P. J. (2006)

Explored whether threats to freedom can cause disagreement and examined the implications of reactance-based sleeper effects. This study showed that disagreement based on cognitive responses (threat at the start) was more stable over time; however, disagreement based on motivation to restore freedom (threat at the end) was unstable over time and persons agreed with the communicator.

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Derek Chadee Findings from Pepper (1996) suggest that type A personalities are more reactant, oppositional, perceive more threats to freedom, and show increased attraction to the eliminated choice and non-compliance to clinical treatment. Individuals with high reactance were more likely to make self-attributions, having a stronger belief that they can manage problems for themselves. In actuality they were unable to perform equally or better than persons who had sought assistance (Rhodewalt & Marcroft, 1988 as cited in Pepper, 1996). Carver (1977), exploring self-awareness and reactance, suggested that greater self-awareness led to increased feelings of coercion by reactant persons. Further studies (Brockner et al., 1983; Carver & Sheier, 1981 as cited in Pepper, 1996) categorized self-awareness into private self-consciousness and public self-consciousness. Private self-consciousness encompasses the subjective awareness of an individual’s feelings and perceptions, whereas public self-consciousness is an awareness of oneself as a social object. Private self-consciousness was associated with high reactance, whereas public selfconsciousness acted as a suppressant of reactance. Pepper (1996) found no significant relationship between gender and reactance, identifying gender as a situational variable better explained by cultural factors. These findings have also been supported by Dowd, Trutt, and Watkins (1992) and Carli (1989). Using Erikson’s stage theory, Pepper (1996) argues that inherent in many of the stages is the potential for psychological reactance. Reactance was linked with both the successful and unsuccessful completion of stages, and he identifies autonomy, mistrust, intimacy, and isolation as being associated with psychological reactance. Family history was also found to be a predictor of psychological reactance. Persons who lived in a high-conflict family environment or a family that emphasized autonomy, achievement, and moral values were more likely to show psychological reactance (Buboltz, Johnson, & Woller, 2003). These persons may be more aware of perceived or actual threats to their freedom. The literature, with few exceptions, paints a negative portrait of the personality profile of a psychologically reactant person, who is seen as antisocial, low in social desirability, incapable of strong relations with peers, isolated, independent, aggressive, not easily trusting, dominant, and worried about an uncertain future. Similarly, there is a negative association between reactance and histrionic personality styles. Table 1.2 summarizes research that focuses on psychological reactance as a disposition.

Measuring Reactance From its genesis, psychological reactance was conceptualized as arising from situational factors, and research and measurements therefore were consistent with psychological reactance as a state phenomenon. In attempting to study reactance, researchers created experimental freedom-threat situations to arouse psychological reactance. In many of the studies discussed, reactance was inferred by comparing responses across conditions experimentally created (e.g., reactance vs. non-reactance), whether those measures were on attitudes, evaluation of message, or rating of communicator (Wright et al., 2004). Sharon Brehm (1976) wrote on the implications of reactance theory to that area of clinical psychology concerned with changing behavior and non-successful treatments.

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Toward Freedom: Reactance Theory Revisited Table 1.2

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Research on dispositional psychological reactance.

Author

Comments

Cherulnik, P. D., & Citrin, M. M. (1974)

Explored individual differences and psychological reactance with relevance to locus of control. Found both external and internal locus of control participants exhibited the same levels of reactance.

Tucker, R. K., & Byers, P. Y. (1987)

Assessed the factorial validity of Merz’s Psychological Reactance Scale. Findings were inconsistent with Merz’s, concluding that the instrument is psychometrically unacceptable.

Hong, S-M., & Ostini, R. (1989)

Evaluated the questionnaire for the measurement of psychological reactance. Identified a four-factor structure that was inconsistent with findings of Merz (1983) and Tucker & Byers (1987), concluding the scale psychometrically unstable.

Hong, S-M., & Page, S. (1989)

Developed Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale. Identified a four-factor structure to measure reactance that was reliable.

Joubert, C. E. (1990)

Used Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale to assess the relationship among self-esteem, reactance, and personality variables. Men scored significantly higher than women on psychological reactance measures. Happiness ratings correlated negatively with psychological reactance. Women’s self-esteem scores were negatively correlated with psychological reactance.

Dowd, E. T., Milne, C. R., & Wise, S. L. (1991)

Developed the Therapeutic Reactance Scale (TRS) to measure trait psychological reactance. Factorial analysis identified two sub-scales: verbal reactance and behavioral reactance

Hong, S-M. (1992)

Assessed the validity of Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale. Findings supported the factorial stability and reliability of the scale.

Mallon, K. F. (1992)

Reviewed the Questionnaire for Measuring Psychological Reactance (QMPR), Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale, and TRS. Developed the Proneness Reactance Inventory to measure dispositional reactance.

Dowd, E. T., & Wallbrown, F. (1993)

Determined the motivational personality characteristics associated with psychological reactance. Findings identified a personality pattern of the psychologically reactant person as defensive, aggressive, dominant, autonomous, and nonaffiliative.

Dowd, E. T., Wallbrown, F., Sanders, D., & Yesenosky, J. M. (1994)

Further explored personality characteristics of a psychologically reactant individual. Identified that psychologically reactant women were more decisive and self-assertive than non-reactant women. Reactant individuals tend to worry more about future problems and have weak social relations.

Hong, S-M., Giannakopoulos, E., Laing, D., & Williams, N. A. (1994)

Used Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale to explore gender and age effects on dispositional reactance. Found that younger persons displayed more reactance than older participants, and no difference between genders was observed.

Hong, S-M., & Faedda, S. (1996)

Refined Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale to 11 items that showed greater factorial stability than the original 14-item scale.

Pepper, H. F. (1996)

Explored the psychosocial precursors of psychological reactance with emphasis on Erikson’s developmental theory. The following factors predicted psychological reactance: autonomy, trust, intimacy, and isolation.

(cont’d)

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Table 1.2

(cont’d)

Author

Comments

Hellman, C. M., & McMillin, W. L. (1997)

Examined the relationship between psychological reactance and self-esteem using Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale. These results suggest that the scale should be used with caution, since combining its four factors in an additive format may suppress its potential to measure reactance.

Huck, N. O. (1998)

Assessed psychological reactance and its relations to personality through the utilization of Millon’s personality theory. Found seven personality disorders that are more likely than others to evoke reactance.

Seibel, C. A., & Dowd, E. T. (1999)

Analyzed the relationship between the client’s psychological reactance and specific compliance behaviors and general improvements in an actual therapy situation. Identified that reactant clients would engage in Boundary Augmentation and Boundary Reducing behaviors, as opposed to non-reactant clients.

Johnson, P., & Buboltz, W. C., Jr. (2000)

Explored the link between Bowen’s (1978) concept of differentiation of self and psychological reactance. Detected three measures of differentiation that predicted psychological reactance (intergenerational individuation, peer intimacy, and peer individuation).

Donnell, A. J., Thomas, A., & Buboltz, W. C., Jr. (2001)

Assessed the factor structure and internal consistency of the Questionnaire for Measuring Psychological Reactance. Concluded that the QMPR was an unreliable measure of the dimensions of psychological reactance.

Seibel, C. A., & Dowd, E. T. (2001)

Further explored the psychological profile of a psychologically reactant person as well as delved into corrective techniques for developmental issues that arise due to separation and individuation. Identified that individuals have an optimum level of reactance that balances issues of engulfment and separation. Personality disorders based on trust and autonomy were predictors of reactance.

Baumeister, R. F., Catanese, K. R., & Wallace, H. M. (2002)

Explored a narcissistic reactance theory approach to sexual coercion and rape. Concluded that theories of reactance and narcissism combined are a good tool of analysis when exploring cases of rape.

Buboltz, W. C. Jr., Thomas, A., & Donnell, A. J. (2002)

Analyzed and assessed the factors and consistencies of the Therapeutic Reactance Scale (TRS). Results showed that reactance is seemingly a multidimensional construct with four relatively independent structures underlying psychological reactance. The use of a one-dimensional score may not give an accurate picture of the reactance level/potential of an individual.

Buboltz, W. C., Jr., Johnson, P., & Woller, K. M. P. (2003)

Assessed the relationship between variables concerned with origins of family and psychological reactance. Findings displayed that five family dimensions (cohesion, conflict, moral–religious emphasis, independence, and achievement orientation) can encourage psychological reactance.

Dillard, J. P., & Shen, L. (2005)

Applied reactance theory to persuasive health communication. Showed that the tendency for reactance proneness interacting for some topics and not others is additive for one topic and multiplicative for another, thereby suggesting that some topics are especially potent with regard to their ability to elicit state reactance from individuals high in the propensity to experience reactance.

Seeman, E. A., Buboltz, W. C., Jr., Thomas, A., Soper, B., & Wilkinson, L. (2005)

Further elaborated the profile of a psychologically reactant person by implementing the five-factor model of personality as measured by the NEO PI-R. Results suggested that highly reactant individuals appear very independent and somewhat suspicious; are likely to be skeptical of others’ intentions; are competitive, intolerant, distrustful, secretive, and detached; and they put on a good social face, but are actually uncomfortable in social situations.

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(cont’d)

Author Shen, L., & Dillard, J. P. (2005) Jonason, P. K., & Knowles, H. M. (2006)

Comments Assessed the psychometric properties of the 11-item version of Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale. They concluded that a single score on the scale is theoretically and empirically justifiable. Assessed the one-dimensional measure of Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale. They concluded that the scale is only moderately stable and reliable, although its one-dimensional characteristic appears to be the most consistent and reliable construct.

However, she referred to reactance theory as a motivational state that is aroused from situational factors. The construct of reactance was later modified to accommodate to a clinician’s environment, with reactance being conceptualized as a personality trait. A major concern of the clinician was the interaction of this trait (reactant personality) with treatment (Beutler, Mohr, Grawe, Engle, & MacDonald, 1991; Shoham-Salomon & Hannah, 1991; Snow, 1991). The genesis toward a psychometric scale emerged from attempts to measure reactance as a disposition (Buboltz, Thomas, & Donnell, 2002; Hong & Page, 1989; Merz, 1983). Reactance is most likely to occur in the clinical setting to persons with volitional/free problem behaviors (e.g., drinking, smoking) as compared to uncontrollable behaviors (e.g., panic, obsessive-compulsive) (Shoham, Trost, & Rohrbaugh, 2004). Psychological reactance as a disposition has been measured by a number of scales and techniques. Merz’s (1983) Questionnaire Measuring Psychological Reactance (QMPR) was the firstever scale designed to capture a measure of psychological reactance and consisted of 26 items utilizing a four-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all appropriate” to “extremely appropriate.” The original scale attempted to obtain measures on resistance, defiance, boomerang effect and the inclination to do the opposite to what others expect of you (Tucker & Byers, 1987). The scale was later modified by Tucker and Byers (1987) to an 18-item reactance scale utilizing a five-point Likert range from 1 = “not at all appropriate” to 5 = “extremely appropriate.” Two major constructs in the scale were behavioral freedom (encompassing measures of reactions to praise, subservient behavior and expectations, and advice of others) and freedom of choice (encompassing measures of freedom and decision making). The QMPR has been found to have convergence validity with the Personality Research Form (PRF), suggesting that psychologically reactant individuals are more likely to be defensive, easily offended, aggressive, autonomous, and impulsive (Dowd & Wallbrown, 1993). These characteristics are consistent with the QMPR’s reactant individual who is seen as dominant, individualistic, with low social ties, and who creates unfavorable impressions on others (Dowd, 1993). Hong and Ostini (1989), utilizing a four-point Likert format of the translated QMPR, found factorial instability and low correlations among factors. Hong and Page (1989) argue that Tucker and Byers’s QMPR was considered to be psychometrically unstable. Other criticisms came from Donnell, Thomas, and Buboltz (2001), who also questioned Tucker and Byers’s modification of the original scale, noting that the instability of the scale may have also been a result of both the translation of the original scale from German and the adoption of a five-point scale format.

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Derek Chadee The stability of the QMPR translated by E. T. Dowd was further tested by Donnell et al. (2001), utilizing a six-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = “does not apply at all” to 6 = “always applies.” The results of a three-factor scale structure were found to be inconsistent with both Tucker and Byers (1987) and Hong and Ostini (1989). Though reactance appeared to be a multidimensional construct, the QMPR was not accepted as a stable measure of reactance (Donnell et al., 2001). Hong and Page’s (1989) 14-item psychological reactance scale attempted to create a factorial stable measure of psychological reactance and emerged as a critique of the QMPR. Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale (HPRS) utilizes a five-point Likert scale (1 = “disagree completely” to 5 = “agree completely”) and has four distinctive factors: freedom of choice, conformity reactance, behavioral freedom, reactance to advice and recommendation. Hong (1992), a replication of Hong and Page (1989), supported the factorial structure of the HPRS. The HPRS was later revised (Hong & Faedda, 2006) to an 11-item scale. Three items of the original scale were considered to be vague and were removed. Shen and Dillard (2005) argue that a single score on the HPRS to measure trait psychological reactance is theoretically and empirically justifiable. However, Jonason and Knowles (2006) and Jonason (2007) indicate that while the HPRS tends toward unidimensionality, it is a moderately stable and a reliable measure of reactance and improvement of the scale is needed. Another method utilized in the measuring of reactance is the Trait Reactance Scale (TRS). This scale uses a 28-item self-report questionnaire in attempting to measure reactance as a trait. The TRS has recorded convergence validity with personality characteristics of dominance, locus of control (internal), and aggression (Dowd & Wallbrown, 1993; Shoham et al., 2004). A major problem identified with this measurement of reactance is the lack of construct validity. Shoham et al. (2004) argue that what has been conceptually identified as a reactant disposition may not necessarily be a disposition or trait but rather an oppositional style consistent with particular behavioral styles. In another attempt to measure reactance, Beutler et al. (1991) utilized two indices from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) in developing what they refer to as a reactant score. The two scales that they adopted were Taylor’s Manifest Anxiety Scale and the Edwards Social Desirability Scale. The authors utilized an arithmetic summation of the scores from both scales to derive a reactance score. Critics of Beutler et al. (1991) noted that there is no rationale articulated as to why high anxiety and social desirability should correlate with reactance (Lukin, Dowd, Plake, & Kraft, 1985; Shoham et al., 2004). In fact, Spielberg’s State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and the TRS have no statistical relationship. Shoham et al. (2004) reported that Dowd et al. (1994) showed a weak correlation between the TRS and social interaction. A question that can be asked is: Are Beutler et al. (1991) and the TRS measuring the same construct? Baker, Sullivan, & Marszalek (2003) found that there was no correlation between these two reactance measures. Shoham, Bootzin, Rohrbaugh, and Urry (1996) utilize a naturalistic method to measure expressed reactance. This method involves the rating of participants’ content-filtered voice in reply to a question that provokes reactance. High-reactant persons’ voice tones sound inhibited, spiteful, and active.

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Cognitive Dissonance and Reactance To what extent is psychological reactance the same as cognitive dissonance? Do we always experience cognitive dissonance when we experience reactance? There are a number of commonalities between psychological reactance and cognitive dissonance. Both theories are motivational arousal theories emphasizing cognitive evaluation and a gravitation toward psychological consistency. Arousal is a noxious state (i.e., dissonance or psychological reactance) and a drive is buildup-directed to achieve a state of equilibrium (consonance or removal of threat to freedom). The level of importance of the cognition or threatened freedom determines the degree of cognitive dissonance or psychological reactance, respectively. A number of strategies are used to obtain equilibrium, and these methods vary from cognitive to behavioral to emotional changes. The reevaluation of importance, changing or adding new cognitions, adoption of new behavior, or changing existing behaviors are some of the common strategies of arousal reduction adopted by both theories. Neither theory is set up to be scientifically falsified, and therefore they cannot be considered scientific theories. Also, both theories are parsimonious. However, there are some major differences. Although both theories state that arousal is unpleasant, in the case of reactance the unpleasantness is always associated with negative emotions, unlike dissonance, in which both positive and negative emotions can be experienced. Sources of the arousal are different: reactance involves a threat associated with a freedom, and therefore there is a “victim” and “victimizer” interaction, an externally social threatening factor, which is not the typical cognitive dissonance scenario. Therefore, there is a narrower scope of the application of reactance theory as compared to cognitive dissonance. The difference in parsimoniousness of the theories is one of degree. Wicklund (1974) was one of the first authors to attempt to address the issue of overlaps between the theories of dissonance and reactance. He argues that as far as decision making is concerned, cognitive dissonance occurs at the postdecisional stage but reactance at the predecisional stage. This sequential effect is a distinguishing difference. That is, prior to the reactant behavior is the motivational drive of psychological reactance. After the behavior, the decision, is the postdecisional dissonance and dissonance reduction to justify the committed action. The force compliance studies of dissonance (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) and the barrier studies of reactance research provide a conceptually similar situation. However, Wicklund (1974) advocates that the difference between these groups of studies lies in the pre-decisional making without a behavioral commitment in reactance and the postdecisional dissonance as a result of behavioral commitment. However, dissonance is not only experienced in postdecisional situations. The threat to remove a freedom or the actual removal of a freedom is inherently a dissonant phenomenon. In fact, Wicklund (1974, p. 57) acknowledges this: There is a parallel between the two theories when simple statements of preference are made, independent of whether or not those statements constitute absolute commitments. Dissonance theory allows that the statement will produce dissonance and regret (convergence) while reactance theory indicates that the preference statement will threaten freedom and thereby result in convergence.

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Derek Chadee Therefore, if there is an overlap between reactance and dissonance the investigation of the neurosocial psychological processes has to be evaluated. However, it should be remembered that reactance theory, from its genesis, had conceptual similarities and was being developed as a special case of cognitive dissonance. The literature has still to address a precise demarcation between the two theories.

Application of Reactance The application of the theory of psychological reactance has been diverse, from its use in the clinical setting to the understanding of social problems, consumer behavior, and power relationships. Specifically, the theory of psychological reactance has been applied within psychology and other fields and has provided useful insights in areas such as persuasion and resistance to persuasion, attitude change, pro-social behavior, group attractiveness, family interaction, effects of warning labels, littering, promotional influence, manipulative advertisements, product availability, government regulations as threats to freedom, internet and website interaction, health communication, clinical interaction/counseling and reactant personality, family therapy, political behavior, jury behavior, learned helplessness, and even the understanding of behavior in dispute resolution. Some studies on littering (e.g., Brasted, Mann, & Geller, 1979) utilized a reactance theory model to understand the relationship between antilittering advertisements and compliance. Messages that were strongly stated and suggested threats to freedom aroused psychological reactance and attempts to restore freedom. Consumers are influenced by promotional campaigns but the hard-sell advertisements have less of an impact than the soft-sell (lowthreat) ones (Regan & Brehm, 1972). A multitude of studies were undertaken in the area of reactance and attitude change and persuasion, including Worchel and Brehm (1970) on freedom-threatening communication and attitudinal position; Miller (1976) on persuasive messages and attitude change; Carver (1977) on self-awareness, coercion, and persuasion; and Baer et al. (1980) on selfpresentation and public attitudes. Studies by Bushman (1998, 2006) and Clee and Wicklund (1980) are just a few of the many studies that emphasize the impact of message insensitivity– sensitivity on persuasion and compliance. Baumeister, Catanese, and Wallace (2002) assess the relationship among narcissism, reactance, and sexual concern, arguing that a man with high sexual expectancy of sexual interaction would experience psychological reactance when there is refusal of sexual contact by a woman. Narcissistic inclination may mediate reactance, motivating the individual to attempt sexual coercion and rape. Family socialization impacts on freedom sensitivity, which in turn makes the individual more responsive to freedom threats. In particular, persons with an achievement orientation, high independence and moral–religious values were positively associated with psychological reactance (Buboltz et al., 2003). The application of reactance in understanding virtual interaction on the internet was undertaken by Daily (2004). Restrictions and blocks to navigation on the internet create psychological reactance and lead to negative emotions and avoidance behavior toward the blocked

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websites. Another study assessed forced exposure via pop-up advertisements and psychological reactance, attempting to understand factors that contribute to negative reactions to information and particularly advertisements via the internet (Edwards, Li, & Lee, 2002).

Criticisms of Reactance The theory of psychological reactance has been criticized on a number of grounds. First, the theory is difficult to falsify. The emphasis of research has been on situational reactance, with experimental conditions set up to create threats to freedom. Inconsistent findings are easily explained by reference to the situation rather than an exploration of the theory to identify theoretical problems. The lack of explicitly stated propositions and hypotheses provides further insulation of the theory from the systematic assaults of science. However, other theories such as Freud’s psychoanalytical theory and Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory have also been criticized on these grounds. Second, the concept of reactance is a scientifically vague concept. There is tremendous latitude left to the interpretation of exactly what behavior is reactance or non-reactance. Premised on the concept of reactance, the magnitude of reactance is discussed. The concept of magnitude assumes some kind of scale or degree distinction between one level of reactance and another. Exactly how to evaluate the magnitude of reactance is not stated in the theory. Therefore, the concept of magnitude of reactance has two ambiguous terms which have implications for scientific measurement of the concept. Reactance cannot be physically observed but is inferred from measures of indicators of reactance which vary from study to study. Third, the theory is parsimonious and can, therefore, explain a wide range of behavior in a variety of social settings. A theory with such versatility loses its efficacy in explaining and creates a diminishing level of confidence. Fourth, reactance theory is not designed to assess the dynamism of social interaction and exchanges in the movement toward reduction of the psychological tension and achievement of equilibrium. Freedom can only be threatened by a powerful other. The exchanges and power dynamics in reasserting one’s freedom are not examined or articulated in the theory. The magnitude of reactance, the persistence of reduction, the kinds of reduction strategies, and the acceptance or removal of threat to freedom can all be better comprehended if an analysis of the power dynamics complements the theory. Fifth, the psychological processes involved in internalizing these freedoms are not articulated by the theory (Wicklund, 1997). This is an assumption, a given, that the theory builds upon. An elaboration of the dynamics involved in the development of free behaviors will provide a profound understanding of the processes involved in reactance. The cultural contexts and their contribution to one’s sense of freedom need elaboration via cross-cultural research. Sixth, is reactance a behavioral attempt to demonstrate and project an impression of autonomy and power to others in the interaction situation? In other words, is there a distinction between impression management and reactance? Heilman and Toffler (1976), for example, argue that reduction of reactance was a direct function of balance of power, or the impression of it, in interaction. Baer et al.’s (1980) findings support the view that there is a

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Derek Chadee greater concern with demonstrating the possession of a freedom than concern about the removal of the freedom. Wright and Brehm (1982, p. 616), in being critical of the impressionmanagement explanation of reactance, wrote: In summary, then, the impression management explanation of reactance, in contrast to reactance theory, predicts no effects when (a) threats to freedom are nonsocial or social threats are unintentional, (b) subjects’ responses are private (nobody who has witnessed the threat will see them, or subjects’ responses cannot be traced back to them individually), and (c) freedom restoration occurs without the agent or an observer being aware of it. We believe that it is doubtful that reactance effects can best be understood as a manifestation of impression management.

Seventh, reactance theory places great emphasis on the cognitive but very little emphasis is given to the affect. The next section proposes the systematic introduction of the affect into the theory of psychological reactance.

Toward a Reactance Emotion Theory Philip Cowan, in his preface to Piaget’s Intelligence and Affectivity (1981, p. xi), wrote: Affect is likened to the gasoline that activates the car, while the engine (cognition) provides structure for the energy and direction of the car’s motion. Affect as “energetics” can combine with cognitive structural schemes to focus the individual’s interest on a specific thing or idea. Because it influences an individual choice of whether to exert intellectual effort, affect serves as a regulator of action. Because it influences the choice of specific goals, affect also plays a role in determining values (internal interest projected outwards so that things and people appear to have a certain worth). By regulating action and determining values, affect influences our tendency to approach or avoid situations.

An understanding of human emotions in influencing the magnitude of psychological reactance is crucial to the development of reactance theory, which, over the last forty years, has comfortably maintained itself as a purely cognitive theory. Even though reactance theory can be classified within an appraisal theory of emotions, the literature has consistently focused on a cognitive model in the application of the theory. The degree of psychological reactance is moderated by the particular emotion(s) aroused as a result of the cognitive evaluation of a particular threat to freedom. The degree of reactance, therefore, is a function of emotional arousal, which, in turn, is influenced by the particular emotion provoked. Reactance is unpleasant, and therefore will provoke negative emotions (primary and secondary) such as frustration, shame, fear, anger, sadness, guilt, contempt, and disgust (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987). Some important contributions to the understanding of emotions provide a strong rationale for a reactance emotion theory. An emotion energizes and prepares the individual to respond and has at least four different aspects – feelings, actions, physiological arousal, and motivational programs (Rosenzweig, Breedlove, & Watson, 2005). As Nolen-Hoeksema, Fredrickson, Loftus, and Wagenaar (2009) recognize (also see Lazarus, 1991; Rosenberg, 1998), an emotion involves cognitive appraisal, subjective experience, thought–action tendencies, internal bodily

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changes, and facial expression. Plutchik (1994) identifies eight basic emotions. These emotions are arranged in pairs of opposites: joy/sadness, affection/disgust, anger/fear, and expectation/surprise. However, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) argued earlier that comparing emotions in such pairs is somewhat problematic since, for example, joy is a positive emotion and sadness a negative one, but both anger and fear are negative emotions – these pairs do not exist in comparable continuums from positive to negative, but are typologies. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) utilized six dimensions in the description of 15 emotions (primary and secondary emotions). These dimensions were: desirability of the situation (pleasant or unpleasant); anticipated effort in the situation (low effort or high effort); situational certainty (certain or uncertain); attentional activity to the situation (low attention to high attention); degree of control over the situation (self or others); and control attributed to the situation (situational control and human control). Therefore, emotions (e.g., anger and frustration) would vary depending on the dimensions that are involved in determining the particular emotion. A major conclusion drawn from their study was (p. 831): Our results show that people’s emotions are intimately related to their cognitive appraisals of their circumstances. The subjects rated past emotional experiences along six appraisal dimensions, and different patterns of appraisals were strongly associated with different emotions.

Zajonc (1980) puts another light on the expression of emotions. He argues that there are emotions that are grounded on cognitive appraisal (postcognitive emotions) and emotions that emerge before cognitions (precognitive emotions). On postcognitive emotions Zajonc (1980, p. 151) writes: An affective reaction, such as liking, disliking, preference, evaluation, or the experience of pleasure or displeasure, is based on a prior cognitive process in which a variety of content discriminations are made and features are identified, examined for their value, and weighted for their contributions. Once this analytical task has been completed, a computation of the components can generate an overall affective judgement.

Bargh and Apsley (2001), writing on Zajonc’s argument against this temporal order of cognition and emotion, state: He (Zajonc) asserted that the notion that people go through life in a rational manner, objectively weighing the pros and cons of various alternatives prior to taking a position as suggested by extant information-processing models, might be little more than wishful thinking. Instead, he argued that the affective qualities of stimuli such as good/bad, like/dislike, or approach/ avoid might be processed extremely quickly and efficiently and, consequently, could be among the very first reactions of an organism to its environment. Within an affective primary framework, individuals gather information about various alternatives, not to make more information choices, but to corroborate their initial preferences and desire.

The intensity of emotions differs. The sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system is crucial in creating the necessary physiological arousal for negative emotions involving

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Derek Chadee brain activity in both the hypothalamus and the amygdala. The debate on autonomic arousal of emotions has consistently appeared in the literature, from the James-Lange theory to Canon-Bard’s critique, and from advocacy on similarities of autonomic response to empirical testing of physiological arousal of different emotions (Funkenstein, 1955). However, this debate was systematically addressed by Levenson, Ekman, and Friesen (1990), who found distinctive autonomic response among emotions. Their study also shows that the highest emotional intensity was displayed for anger, followed by fear and sadness – negative emotions that are associated with reactance. Research by Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993) is supportive of the view that affects influence the way we make judgments and attributions of future events and responsibility. Siemer’s (2001) study supports the dispositional mood model’s view that our moods influence our generalized appraisal inclinations. Findings by Lerner and Keltner (2001) have also shown that our cognitive evaluation of risk is influenced by the specific emotional state, in that fear states were more likely to incite pessimistic risk evaluation than anger, which was more likely to create optimistic risk assessment. These effects were moderated by certainty and control (see also Johnson & Tversky, 1983). The importance of appraisal to emotions (primary, secondary, reappraisal) was articulated by Lazarus (1982) and later elaborated by Smith and Lazarus (1993), who categorized six appraisal components related to primary and secondary appraisals. These categories falling within the primary and secondary appraisals include motivational congruency (evaluation of goals); motivational relevance (commitment); accountability (assignment of responsibility of blame and praise); problem-coping potentiality (resolvability); emotional-focused potentiality (emotional management of situation); and future expectancy (changeability of situation). The emotions aroused would be determined by the set of components that are present. Smith and Kirby (2001), in elaborating on Smith and Lazarus’s (1993) theory, note that the appraisal processes take place correspondingly and involve an automatic associative process, a conscious reasoning of events, and a continuous appraisal-detector process that assess the information that comes from the associative and reasoning processes. The emotion that is experienced is a result of these dynamics. Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (2004) posit that anger emerges as blame and is assigned as a negative event to a causal agent external to the individual. Unlike other negative emotions, anger is associated not with an avoidance tendency but with an approach motivation inclination. Berkowitz’s (1990, 1993, 1999, 2003) cognitive–neoassociationistic (CNA) model of anger emergence postulates that both avoidance and approach tendencies can be generated by an aversive situation and not just one or the other. Extending this argument to reactance theory, a removal of a freedom can create both fear (flight) and anger (fight), depending on the circumstances. One emotion may overpower the other, which will determine the behavior. Harmon-Jones and Allen (1998) found that anger was associated with more left anterior cortical activity than right. This brain activity was explained more by approach motivation associated with dispositional anger. Generally, negative emotions and avoidance motivation are associated with the right anterior cortical area of the brain, while positive emotions and

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approach motivation are associated with the left anterior cortical area (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998). The authors suggest that high dispositional anger is associated with higher approach motivation and lesser withdrawal motivation. Later, Harmon-Jones and Sigelman’s (2001) research findings confirmed that state-induced anger was also associated with left prefrontal cortical activity. Further, left frontal activity created by anger does not restrain amygdala action but is “co-varying with it” (Harmon-Jones, 2004). The relationship between left frontal cortical activity and resolution of inconsistency via approach motivation is also supported by Harmon-Jones (2004). Reactance will evoke particular kinds of emotion, and emotions evoked will determine whether there is left or right frontal brain activity. This fact has implications for the reduction of reactance, especially in volatile and high-risk situations. Mention of physiological arousal and emotions are scattered across the many works indirectly related to reactance theory. A few reactance studies have used the emotion dimension to assist in explanations of behavior. For example, earlier research had indicated that reactance was associated with somatic tension and increased activation of the sympathetic nervous system, as reflected in increases in both epinephrine and norepinephrine (Price, Barell, & Barell, 1985). Brehm and Wortman’s (1975) model implies emotional intensity as a factor that increases striving to overcome failure and decreases in motivation as a function of being unable to control and determine outcome. However, the concept of emotional intensity was never integrated or elaborated in the theory. The literature is practically void of systematic research on reactance and emotions. Neither is there an integration of findings on affect into the theory or any kind of theory modification. Brehm (2004) notes, with respect to cognitive dissonance, that more consideration is needed of the role of affect, to which little emphasis has been given. Miron and Brehm (2006, p. 8) acknowledged the importance of understanding the processes in arousal when they stated: Obviously, more work is needed to chart the physiology of reactance. An investigation of this sort would help explore important questions such as what happens to reactance arousal when one cannot restore an eliminated freedom or whether observers experience reactance arousal when they witness threats to other people’s freedoms.

Figure 1.1 describes the process involved in the emergence of psychological reactance but taking into consideration the affect state. A threat to a free behavior is evaluated, provoking a negative emotion – the more important the threat, the greater the intensity of the emotion. Cognitive appraisal, together with the concomitant emotion, leads to a motivational or withdrawal approach. Continuing evaluation is undertaken and, should threat persist, reactance behavior continues. However, as discussed, reactance is moderated by a number of factors. The subjective experiences of emotions influence: the processing of information, decision-making processes, our attention, reaction time, and the way we intend to behave or actually behave (e.g., Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001; Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). Recent research undertaken by Kostic, Chadee, and Nedeljkovic (in press) has shown that the

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Derek Chadee UNIMPORTANT MOTIVATIONAL APPROACH Frontal lobe activity

COGNITIVE EVALUATION IMPORTANT PRIMARY EMOTIONS: disgust, sadness, fear, anger

THREAT TO FREEDOM

Number of threats Number of freedoms

NEGATIVE EMOTION

PHYSIOLOGICAL AROUSAL

PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE

SECONDARY EMOTION: shame, guilt, hate WITHDRAWAL APPROACH

Reactance reducing strategies

REACTANCE REDUCTION Persistence of threat

Decrease in threat

Figure 1.1 Reactance emotion model.

subjective experiences of emotions vary across cultures with respect to intensity. So an unpleasant situation of uncertainty needing high attention and effort which is controlled by others will definitely lead to frustration and anger, two emotions with the highest levels of intensity compared to other emotions. Therefore, threat to freedom that provokes these emotions will create a higher magnitude of reactance, other things remaining equal, than other emotions. However, the magnitude of psychological reactance may vary across cultures, and this may not necessarily be a result of situational factors but a consequence of the subjective experience of emotions in these cultures. Clearly, research is also needed to test a reactance emotion theory.

Conclusion Reactance theory is an important theory in the discipline of social psychology and has contributed to an understanding of behavior in response to actual or perceived threats in a wide variety of settings. The theory is as useful today as it was over forty years ago. However, the theory needs modification. The systematic introduction into the theory of the affect state is crucial, with an understanding of the relationship between emotions and motivation. This much-needed structural modification will definitely give new insights into previous research. A reactance emotion theory will have heuristic utility in the understanding and reduction of arousal states, including situations that are volatile and interactions that are potentially aggressive. As the theory evolves so too will our understanding of human behavior.

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Inconsistency in Cognition: Cognitive Dissonance Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki

Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance is arguably one of the most well-known, studied, powerful, applicable, debated, controversial, and resilient theories in the field of social psychology, if not psychology as a whole. Unlike more modern theories that are not yet timetested, or older theories that have faded into obscurity, cognitive dissonance theory has a long, colorful, and still unfolding history (see Aronson, 2007; Bendersky & Curhan, 2009; Cooper, 2007; Hart et al., 2009; Nail & MacDonald, 2007; Tavris & Aronson, 2007). Its influence on basic and applied psychology as well as popular culture has been almost unprecedented. In the first 15 years after its publication, the theory generated over a thousand experiments (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992), most of which supported the theory. In preparing to write this chapter, we conducted a computer search of the professional psychological literature with the term dissonance as a key word or subject heading. It yielded more than 1,800 hits. From the outset, one of the most appealing aspects of the theory has been its ability to make correct, often counterintuitive predictions. In so doing, it frequently explains, integrates, and offers compelling insights into otherwise mystifying observations of human behavior, for example: (a) why people report liking a boring task more if they are paid less for doing it (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959); (b) why members of various groups such as the Marines, military academies, college fraternities and sororities, and athletic teams report high levels of commitment to these groups despite the fact that they had to go through “Hell on Earth” to become members (Aronson & Mills, 1959; Gleick, 1997; Styron, 1977); (c) why millions of Americans and seemingly countless authors remain fascinated by, and construct fantastic conspiracy theories to explain, the Kennedy assassination, this despite overwhelming scientific evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone (Bugliosi, 2007; Manchester, 1967); (d) why religious cults increase the strength of their beliefs after their leader’s prophecies or group’s beliefs have been unequivocally disconfirmed or discredited (Batson, 1975; Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956; Stafford, 2009); (e) why people often Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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blame innocent victims, whether the victims of fate (Klugel & Smith, 1986) or the targets of one’s own wrongdoing (Davis & Jones, 1960; Glass, 1964), etc. (Aronson, 1999, p. 108). Another strong feature of dissonance theory is that its predictions have frequently prevailed when compared to the predictions of competing theories (e.g., Bushman, 2002; Gerard & Mathewson, 1966; Kahn, 1966). For example, the catharsis hypothesis from orthodox psychoanalytic theory holds that venting anger through aggression will often help diminish its lingering, unwanted effects. Thus, expressing aggression should help dissipate anger, predisposing actors to see their victims more favorably. Almost all of the empirical evidence, however, is diametrically opposed to this prediction. In line with dissonance theory and (e) above, most evidence indicates that once people behave aggressively toward others, they have a strong tendency to justify their behavior by derogating their victims. “When people vent their feelings aggressively they often feel worse, pump up their blood pressure, and make themselves even angrier” (Tavris & Aronson, 2007, p. 26). In this chapter, we focus on some of the highlights from the story of cognitive dissonance, from its origin, through its evolution, to its decline in the 1980s, to its resurgence over the last 20 years or so (e.g., Aronson, 1999; Cooper, 2007; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999; Hart et al., 2009; Higgins, 1987; Nail, MacDonald, & Levy, 2000; Steele, 1988). Over the years, the meaning of the term cognitive dissonance has changed in various and important ways, often depending on the theorist and the context. Yet, in the concluding section of this chapter, we suggest a line of research that might restore the original definition of cognitive dissonance as proposed by Festinger (1957).

Prophecies of Doom The story begins with a tragedy. On January 15, 1934, a magnitude 8.1 earthquake shook the Himalayan region of northern India and southern Nepal (Dunn, Auden, Gosh, & Roy, 1939/1981). Over the coming days and months, news reports of the death toll climbed to over 10,000. While residents of the most devastated areas grappled with rescue and clean-up operations, extraordinary levels of fear gripped the outlying populace less affected by the earthquake. Rumors spread that even greater disasters were about to hit these nearby villages (Prasad, 1950). Although these villagers had only experienced minor tremors, many believed that floods, cyclones, and further earthquakes were imminent. Nearly two decades later and a half a world away, a group of social scientists headed by Leon Festinger was searching the existing literature on the propagation of rumors when they came across the events following that 1934 earthquake. Festinger and his group were puzzled, not by how the rumors spread, but rather, why people created them in the first place. Why in the aftermath of such a natural disaster would people create such frightening, largely unfounded beliefs? After thinking about this question for some time, Festinger eventually hit upon a tentative solution. Perhaps, he reasoned, the rumors of further impending destruction were being spread not in spite of the fact that they caused increased fear and anxiety, but rather, because of the fact that fear and anxiety already existed. The rumors were not created to provoke fear, but to justify it (Festinger, 1957). Thus, the rumors did not cause the fear; rather, the fear caused the rumors. This germ of an idea – that people might

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Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki create or change their beliefs to justify their current affective state – was the seed that eventually grew into cognitive dissonance theory. The essence of the theory can be summarized as follows: When people become aware that they simultaneously hold two inconsistent cognitions, they experience an unpleasant state of psychological tension, which Festinger (1957) called cognitive dissonance. A cognition can be any bit of knowledge people may hold about the world, their more immediate environment, or themselves, including their attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, and affective states. The Asian villagers experienced an involuntary rush of anxiety as a result of the nearby earthquake and devastation that befell their neighbors. Who would not feel such trepidation after such a near-miss? Yet, having only felt minor tremors, there was no rational explanation for the very high level of fear the villagers were experiencing. In dissonance theory terms, they knew they felt fearful (first cognition), but they also knew, logically, that there was not much to fear (second, inconsistent cognition). Because dissonance is aversive and unpleasant, Festinger proposed that people are motivated to reduce it. One obvious way is to change one of the inconsistent cognitions. Thus, the Asian villagers could eliminate the dissonance by creating a belief and convincing themselves that there was indeed something to fear: Impending doom was about to strike. What happens when the doom does not occur, however? Imagine that you believe with tremendous conviction that a great disaster is about to occur on a particular date, such as the end of the world. Further, imagine that you state this belief publicly and go about making numerous preparations for the impending disaster. When that disaster does not come to pass, Festinger’s theory predicts that you would experience a great deal of cognitive dissonance. However, in this case, reducing the dissonance by changing one of the inconsistent cognitions may not work. You could not change your knowledge of the evidence in front of you, namely that the disaster did not occur. You might admit that there was never any imminent danger after all, but then you would only be exchanging one inconsistency for another. If there was no danger, why did you say there was? Why did you go about preparing for the disaster? Are you a fool? Are you crazy? Surely not. Again, you would experience cognitive dissonance. Anticipating such circumstances, Festinger (1957) offered alternative methods of dissonance reduction; for example, you could rationalize by adding a third cognition, one that helps explain away and diminish the inconsistency inherent in the original, conflicting cognitions. For instance, you might come to believe that your conviction, faith, and prayers had, in fact, saved the world. Festinger had the opportunity to test this very prediction even as he was still working on the book that would become the first formal statement of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). He did so by infiltrating a doomsday cult and documenting the members’ behaviors preceding and following the prophesized cataclysm. In the classic, When Prophecy Fails, Festinger and his colleagues, Henry Riecken and Stanley Schachter (1956), detailed how they became professed members for a few weeks of a small religious cult whose members believed that much of North America, and eventually most of the world, would be destroyed by a great flood. The flood was to come just before dawn on December 21, 1954, the consequence of the rising of the lost continents of Mu and Atlantis from the Atlantic Ocean. Fifteen members of the cult, including Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter, gathered on the evening of December 20 at the home of the group’s leader, a Mrs. Marian Keech, to

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await the disaster. The core members of the group believed that they alone would be saved from the cataclysm. Mrs. Keech, in communication with a group of extraterrestrials known as the Guardians through the means of automatic writing, learned that she and her group, the true believers, would be whisked away to safety just after midnight in the early morning of December 21 by a flying saucer sent by the Guardians. Midnight came and went, however, and no spacemen arrived. Word soon came from the Guardians to be patient, but the group was understandably shaken and becoming increasingly distraught and anxious; the cataclysm was less than seven hours away, and their prophesized rescue was apparently not going to happen. At 4:45 a.m., however, Mrs. Keech excitedly summoned everyone to reassemble in the living room for a major announcement. She had just received yet another message from the Guardians, but this message was unprecedented compared to all previous communications. It would change everything. As per the Guardians’ instructions, it was labeled “The Christmas Message to the People of Earth.” Herein the Guardians proclaimed that “the force of Good and light” emanating from Mrs. Keech and her followers this very night had moved God to take the unusual step of supernaturally intervening in the Earth’s geology. The flood was not going to happen! The group’s faith had averted the disaster! Thus, the Festinger et al. (1956) prediction – that the group would need to add cognitions or beliefs to help rationalize, explain away, and diminish the inconsistency inherent in the failed prophecy – was supported (see also Stafford, 2009). Festinger et al. (1956) further predicted that such rationalizations would require social support to become sustained and be sufficiently effective. Indeed, the Guardians instructed the group to inform the newspapers of the miracle. Festinger et al. report that whereas in the days leading up to December 21 the group had lived in relative secrecy, generally shunning outsiders, nonbelievers, and the occasional reporter, now the group vigorously sought publicity. If the rest of the world could be convinced of the “truth,” the group’s beliefs and the rationalization that held them together would gain further legitimacy. The group’s residual dissonance could be further reduced. In reporting the findings of this study, Festinger et al. changed the names of the cult leader and her members to protect their identities.

Major Theoretical Concepts Festinger et al. (1956) provided the first outline of cognitive dissonance theory. In a book published the very next year, however, Festinger (1957) formalized, expanded, and elaborated the theory in elegant detail. The basic idea that dissonance is caused by cognitive inconsistency is accurate but inadequate if the theory is to make correct predictions in specific circumstances. According to Festinger (1957), “elements” of cognition could be consonant, dissonant, or irrelevant to each other. Two elements are consonant if a person perceives that one element follows logically from another. If you are a Democrat and you vote for a Democratic candidate, these elements would be consonant. Two elements are dissonant if the perceived opposite of one element is expected to follow from another element. For example, being a Democrat and preferring a Republican candidate would be dissonant. In Festinger’s words, “x and y are dissonant if not-x follows from y” (p. 13). Elements are not necessarily dissonant just because one element does not follow from another, however; the

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Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki elements may be simply irrelevant. For example, being a Democrat and purchasing a Ford Mustang would not induce dissonance because the elements have nothing to do with one another. However, if the Democratic Party began vigorously promoting increases in fuelefficiency standards, then being a Democrat and purchasing a gas-guzzling sports car may become very dissonant indeed. Thus, the addition of further knowledge may cause two previously irrelevant elements to become relevant to each other, and thereby either consonant or dissonant. Festinger (1957) noted that any specific element of cognition is, in all likelihood, consonant and dissonant with many other elements. Thus, the total magnitude of dissonance experienced at any moment is more than the discrepancy between any two elements. Rather, the total dissonance is dependent on the proportion of all relevant elements that are dissonant to a given element. It can be expressed in the following formula: D* =

D D +C

where D* equals the total magnitude of dissonance, D equals the sum of all elements dissonant with the element in question, and C equals the sum of all elements consonant with the same element. For example, if you are a Democrat but decide to vote for a Republican candidate, you should experience cognitive dissonance. The overall dissonance could be reduced, however, by adding the consonant cognition that this particular Republican candidate supports more typically Democratic issues than this year’s Democratic candidate. Mathematically, adding any consonant cognition to the denominator must necessarily reduce the quotient, thereby reducing the overall magnitude of dissonance. Festinger (1957) further proposed that the magnitude of dissonance would be affected by the importance of the elements involved in any particular consonant or dissonant relation – the more important the dissonant elements, the greater the magnitude; the more important the consonant elements, the lower the magnitude. Once more, Festinger’s primary thesis was that cognitive dissonance is psychologically aversive and unpleasant. As a result, a person experiencing it will feel pressure to reduce or eliminate it entirely. Festinger conceptualized dissonance as similar to other physical and psychological drives, such as hunger and frustration. Just as someone who is hungry will engage in behaviors to reduce the hunger, a person experiencing dissonance will engage in behaviors to reduce the dissonance. The degree of pressure to reduce dissonance will be in direct proportion to the magnitude of the dissonance felt. The lower the magnitude, the less pressure the person feels. As summarized above, three factors – the dissonant elements, the consonant elements, and the importance of the elements – can be manipulated to reduce the magnitude, and thereby the pressure. Perhaps the most direct method of reducing cognitive dissonance is to make the dissonant elements consonant by changing one of the inconsistent elements. If a dissonant element is based on one’s own behavior, changing the behavior may suffice. For instance, a smoker, knowing that smoking is bad for one’s health, can just stop smoking. If a dissonant element is a belief or attitude about the environment, then a person can reduce or eliminate dissonance by changing that belief or attitude. Thus, a smoker could decide that smoking does not pose so much of a health hazard after all. Which dissonant element is changed

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depends on each element’s resistance to change. Some dissonant behaviors may be seen as irrevocable, and therefore behavioral change would be impossible. Consider a Democrat who voted for a Republican candidate; this person cannot return to the voting booth and vote again. Thus, he or she may abandon affiliation with the Democratic Party and selfidentify now as an independent to reduce the dissonance. Other dissonant behaviors may be so reinforced by normative social pressure or so addictive (like smoking) that stopping the behavior is more difficult than changing one’s discrepant beliefs or attitudes. However, changing one’s belief or attitude is not always easier. People’s cognitions are constrained by the “reality” they perceive. Convincing oneself that cigarettes are not hazardous to one’s health may be daunting when each package is emblazoned with the Surgeon General’s warning and one is inundated by numerous anti-smoking print and television ads. What happens if the dissonant elements are so resistant to change that a person experiencing dissonance is unable to eliminate the discrepancies? Although completely alleviating cognitive dissonance would require eliminating all of the dissonant elements (so that the sum of the dissonances would equal zero), again, one could sufficiently reduce dissonance by increasing the number of consonant elements. Because the overall magnitude of cognitive dissonance is dependent on the proportion of dissonant elements, adding consonant elements reduces that proportion and thereby reduces the dissonance. For example, smokers, if unable to quit or change their beliefs about smoking, may add the consonant cognition that smoking suppresses their appetite and therefore helps them maintain a healthy weight. Alternatively, smoking helps them relax and thus reduces unhealthy stress. The more credible rationalizations a person creates, the less pressure one feels to reduce the dissonance. Ultimately, the magnitude of dissonance becomes small enough that it is bearable and motivates no further action besides avoidance of situations and information that may add dissonant elements. Of course, adding any consonant element is not always possible; like changing dissonant elements, rationalizations are constrained by a person’s subjective reality. Although a rationalization may appear irrational, unbelievable, or noncredible to others (e.g., Mrs. Keech’s claim that she and her group had saved the world), as long as it does not contradict that person’s “reality” or, frequently more importantly, that person’s shared “social reality,” it may effectively reduce dissonance (Stafford, 2009). The fact that groups often create their own reality points to the important role of yet another possible, often supplementary method of dissonance reduction – social support (Festinger et al., 1956). If people are unable either to change the dissonant elements or to add consonant elements, aided or not by social support, a possible means of dissonance reduction that remains open is the importance of the elements. Specifically, people can reduce dissonance by decreasing the importance of the dissonant elements through cognitive reframing or distortion – a process Simon, Greenberg, and Brehm (1995) have referred to as trivialization. For example, people who engage in unhealthy behaviors – smoking, binge drinking, overeating, steroid use, tanning, etc. – may embrace a “devil-may-care” attitude about their health. Have you heard, or maybe used, some of the following statements? “Everything that is fun is bad for you.” “Who wants to live forever?” “If (add one’s vice here) does not kill me, something else will.” None of these remarks are designed to eliminate the dissonant elements; people who make such statements still acknowledge the potential hazards of their

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Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki actions, but they do not plan to quit. Rather, they are minimizing the impact of those dissonant elements by trivializing the goal of staying healthy and living for a long time. By lowering the importance of the dissonant elements, the overall magnitude of dissonance decreases. Some of the quotes above may also reduce dissonance by increasing the relative importance of consonant elements. Thus, when smokers say, “Life is too short not to enjoy a good cigarette,” they are simultaneously trivializing their values in a healthy life while strengthening their values in having a pleasurable life. Once more, the social support of others for any means of dissonance reduction can add to its effectiveness. Many smokers agreeing that “Life is too short not to enjoy a good cigarette” is more effective than one smoker saying the same thing either to oneself or in a group of skeptical nonsmokers. A key prediction of the theory concerns dissonance that is aroused in research settings when one is induced to engage in behavior that is inconsistent with one’s attitudes or beliefs (viz., counter-attitudinal behavior). In this situation, the degree of dissonance will be inversely proportional to the degree of perceived external pressure on the person to engage in the counter-attitudinal behavior. External pressure could be defined operationally, for example, by the degree of financial incentive one is offered to perform the inconsistent behavior, or the amount of social pressure one is under from the experimenter to behave counterattitudinally. Whichever way external pressure is operationalized, if there is too much of it, there is too much justification for the behavior, and the person should experience little or no dissonance. Again, the D* = D/D + C formula is informative. Strong external pressures can be seen as adding consonant cognitions to the dissonance equation, thereby justifying one’s counter-attitudinal behavior and reducing the overall magnitude of dissonance. Cognitive dissonance theory was firmly grounded in the developing zeitgeist of social psychology that began with Kurt Lewin (1943). Indeed, Festinger and Lewin were colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the early 1940s, before Festinger moved to the University of Minnesota and later to Stanford University. Lewin had immigrated to the United States from Germany shortly after Hitler came to power in 1933, bringing with him a Gestalt perspective of social behavior (Blass, 2004). German Gestalt psychologists had demonstrated that perception went beyond the environmental stimuli that people experienced through their sensory systems; rather, the Gestaltists convincingly demonstrated that mental processes organize sensory information into a meaningful whole that is more than the sensory representations of the environment. Lewin expanded on this general idea, suggesting that behavior is not only a reaction to environmental stimuli, but also dependent on a person’s subjective construal of these stimuli. Like Lewin, Festinger (1957) emphasized this interaction between the person and the environment. The various factors that contribute to cognitive dissonance – dissonant elements, consonant elements, social support, and importance – are dependent on individuals’ goals, social groups, culture, and expectations that influence the “reality” they perceive. Thus, given the same two relevant cognitive elements, one person may perceive them to be dissonant whereas another perceives them as consonant. Alternatively, one may perceive the elements to by very important whereas another perceives them as trivial. While Lewin, Festinger, and others (e.g., Heider, 1958) followed this Gestalt-based approach, other social psychologists such as Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, Harold Kelley, and John Thibaut were applying learning principles from behaviorism to understanding

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persuasion and attitude change (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) and interpersonal relations (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In contrast to the Gestalt approach, behaviorism generally ignored mental processes and focused primarily on the environmental contingencies that influenced observable behavior. Thus, learning theorists argued that people’s attitudes and behaviors were the result of reinforcement and punishment; we like those things that benefit us and do not like those things that harm us. During these formative years in the history of social psychology, Gestalt theorists and behaviorists battled for the soul of the field, and cognitive dissonance theory became the front line of that battle.

Early Research Paradigms and Tests of Cognitive Dissonance Theory Dissonance researchers have created a number of laboratory paradigms over the years whereby dissonance can be aroused and investigated under controlled conditions. The most important of these paradigms include induced compliance (e.g., Scher & Cooper, 1989; originally labeled forced compliance, Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), free choice (Brehm, 1956), justification of effort (Aronson & Mills, 1959), forbidden toy (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1963), blame the victim (Glass, 1964), and hypocrisy (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991). To illustrate, we focus on the first two of these.

The induced compliance paradigm In the first laboratory study designed by Festinger to test his new theory, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) tackled one of the more provocative and risky predictions of cognitive dissonance theory – that under certain conditions, people may like a job more the less they are paid for doing it. This prediction follows directly from the theoretical propositions outlined above; yet it runs counter to most people’s intuition, as well as a straightforward extension of the principles of behaviorism and learning theory, which was the dominant school of thought in American academic psychology from the 1920s through most of the 1950s and 1960s. Festinger and Carlsmith were about to turn behaviorism on its head. The basic idea of the induced compliance paradigm is to get participants to do or say something against that which they would normally say or do (viz., counter-attitudinal behavior). Dissonance is manipulated by the degree of external pressure brought to bear on the counter-attitudinal behavior. Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) had each participant in their study perform a deliberately boring task for 30 minutes, loading and unloading spools from a tray. Next each participant performed another boring task, turning ornaments on a pegboard one-quarter turn, one after the other in turn, for another 30 minutes. At this point, participants were allegedly debriefed, but this “debriefing” was in reality part of the cover story and the still-unfolding procedure. Participants were told that the study was really about the effects of expectations on the performance of manual tasks, which had been designed to simulate assembly-line work, and that they had been in the no expectation condition. The next participant, however, a female, was to be in the high expectation condition, but an unanticipated problem had popped up. The student/experimental

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Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki confederate who was supposed to build up the female participant’s positive expectations about how fun and enjoyable the experimental tasks were going to be had called in and would not be able to serve as the confederate that day. As a result, the experimenter was in a jam and was wondering if the participant might be willing to fill the confederate’s role. Would the participant be willing to tell the waiting female participant how truly fun and enjoyable the experimental tasks were? Next was the manipulation of the independent variable, the external pressure or incentive offered to participants. Some were offered and paid $20 for saying that the tasks were quite fun and enjoyable, others only $1 (equivalent to $150 and $7.50 in 2010). A third group of no-dissonance/control participants was not asked to contribute to the manipulation of positive expectations for the next participant. At this point, as the participants were leaving the experiment, all were told, incidentally, that the Psychology Department was interested in evaluating the research being conducted by faculty members. Participants were asked to stop by the office down the hall as they were leaving to help with the evaluations. At the office, participants were asked to rate the experimental tasks regarding how interesting and enjoyable they had been. The ratings were made on a −5 to +5 scale. Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) had predicted that $1, unlike $20, would not be sufficient justification for participants to say the tasks were fun and enjoyable when they actually were not. Therefore, $1 participants should be more likely than $20 participants to rate the tasks favorably. The results supported these predictions, as $1 participants gave the tasks a moderately favorable rating on average (M = +1.35), a rating that was significantly higher than that of both $20 participants (M = −0.05) and control participants (M = −0.45). These findings challenged learning theory and the behaviorist establishment. According to learning theory, the driving forces behind most behavior, human and nonhuman alike, are reinforcement and punishment. Social psychologists had successfully applied these same principles to the understanding of attitude formation and change (Hovland et al., 1953). Simply stated, we should like objects and events that are followed by a reward and dislike objects and events that are followed by punishment. Thus, learning theorists, as well as most folk philosophers, would predict that participants paid $20 should rate the tasks more favorably than those paid $1. However, the evidence was to the contrary, and many psychologists, believing in the unassailable truth of learning theory, attacked the findings while offering a litany of alternative explanations (Chapanis & Chapanis, 1964). We address criticisms and revisions of Festinger’s (1957) theory later in this chapter. Suffice it to say for the present that science thrives on controversy, and ironically, it was the critics of dissonance theory that helped to further refine the theory and establish it as one of the most well-known and heuristically valuable theories in the history of psychology. Another provocative aspect of Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) research is that it demonstrated that attitudes can be influenced by behavior (behavior → attitudes). At the time, this finding was outside most psychologists’ ideas about the relationship between attitudes and behaviors, that attitudes predict or predispose behaviors in a general motivating way (attitudes → behavior). Ultimately, the research of Festinger and Carlsmith, and other early research based on the induced compliance paradigm, helped foster the contemporary view regarding the relationship between behavior and attitudes – that they are reciprocally related, always potentially both causes and effects of one another. The idea that behavior

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can shape attitudes is especially noteworthy because of its relevance to one of the important practical applications of dissonance theory we discuss in the final section of this chapter. Although Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) invented and were the first to use the induced compliance paradigm, later dissonance researchers have generally relied upon a more direct variation that was developed by Brehm and Cohen (1962). This variation was proposed in conjunction with one of the early revisions of Festinger’s (1957) theory. Here, dissonance is induced by having participants write an essay or speech that runs counter to their true attitudes (e.g., Nel, Helmreich, & Aronson, 1969). In the most frequently used variation, college students are asked to write a counter-attitudinal essay arguing in favor of a possible tuition increase at their school (e.g., Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; Steele & Liu, 1983). The experimenter explains to participants that an administrative committee in charge of making a decision on the matter needs essays on both sides of the issue so that a balanced judgment can be reached. Because almost all of the essays so far have been against the increase, the committee really needs essays in favor of the increase. Importantly, the independent variable is the choice participants are given in writing the essay. Brehm and Cohen were the first of many subsequent dissonance theorists to emphasize that one’s counter-attitudinal behavior must be seen by him or her as freely chosen if it is to arouse much dissonance (e.g., Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Davis & Jones, 1960). Under high choice, the experimenter politely asks participants, as a favor, to write in support of the tuition increase. Under low choice, the experimenter just bluntly instructs participants that their assignment is to write in support of the increase. After writing the essays, dissonance is usually measured by participants’ post-attitudes regarding the tuition hike. The typically greater inferred attitude change on the part of high-choice participants as compared to low-choice participants is taken as evidence of dissonance and its reduction.

The free choice paradigm The induced compliance is the most well known of the dissonance paradigms, but Brehm’s (1956) study using the free choice paradigm was actually the first to test dissonance theory under controlled conditions. To begin, it is important to note that the word choice has a different meaning in this context (see below) than it does under the manipulation of choice in the induced compliance paradigm. Under the guise of a marketing study, Brehm invited adult women to evaluate eight common household products, a coffee maker, lamp, radio, etc. The women inspected each product and rank-ordered them from least desirable (a ranking of 1) to most desirable (a ranking of 8). After the rankings, Brehm told participants that they could take home one of the products for free as a gift for participating in the study. However, to ensure that the researcher did not run out of any one product, participants would need to choose between only two of the products (hence the label, free choice). In one condition, Brehm gave participants a choice between two highly ranked products, one ranked 5, 6, or 7 and the other ranked one point lower. In another condition, the choice was between a highly ranked product (5, 6, or 7) and a product ranked two or three points lower. Thus, in the former condition, participants faced a difficult choice between two products that they had ranked nearly equally, whereas in the latter condition, participants

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Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki faced an easier choice between two, more disparately ranked items. After participants made their choice, Brehm wrapped the gift for the participants to take home and continued the study. Participants read consumer reports of four products they had evaluated, including the two products from which they had to choose only one. After reading the consumer reports, Brehm asked participants to rank all eight products a second time. This procedure provided participants with a context and rationale for reevaluating the products as well as a variety of positive and negative qualities about the chosen and rejected items that might facilitate participants’ justification of their choice (i.e., reducing their dissonance). Brehm (1956) predicted that the participants who had made the more difficult choice would show a greater spread in the rankings of the chosen and rejected items than those who made the easier choice (the so-called spread of alternatives), and that is exactly what happened. Participants in the difficult-choice condition elevated their rankings of the chosen items (M = 0.4) and lowered their rankings of the rejected items (M = −0.4), and they did so significantly more than participants in the easy-choice condition (M = 0.13 and 0, respectively). In cognitive dissonance terms, the women who were forced to make a tough choice between two highly ranked products experienced more dissonance than those who did not, and thus they were more motivated to change their evaluations of the chosen and rejected items after the fact, apparently to justify their decision and reduce their dissonance. Although these results did not ignite the same level of interest and controversy as Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) study, Brehm had provided the first experimental evidence in support of cognitive dissonance theory. He also established the free choice paradigm as a valid means of measuring dissonance and its effects in future research (e.g., Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993; Stone, 1999).

Development of the Theory Whenever a theory starts to develop a reputation for making correct predictions, especially perhaps when the predictions are counterintuitive, novel, unexpected, or counter to accepted knowledge, it is terribly tempting to think that the theory is correct, that all bases have been covered, and that the theory must therefore be true. But this thinking is wrong. All theories are false. The main reason is because nature, including human nature, is infinitely subtle and complex. There is simply no way that any human being can anticipate all relevant circumstances with 100% accuracy, creating a set of abstract propositions before the fact, that will apply to all evidence that might have bearing on a theory. The best a theorist can do is closely approximate the empirical world he or she is trying to describe and explain, hopefully with closer approximations over time. As new evidence comes in, all theories must change. And so it is with cognitive dissonance theory. As a master theorist, Festinger (1987/1999, pp. 382–383) understood this fact about theories better than most: No theory is going to be inviolate. Let me put it clearly. The only kind of theory that can be proposed and ever will be proposed that absolutely will remain inviolate for decades, certainly centuries, is a theory that is not testable. If a theory is at all testable, it will not remain unchanged.

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It has to change. All theories are wrong. One doesn’t ask about theories, can I show that they are wrong or can I show that they are right, but rather one asks, how much of the empirical realm can it handle and how must it be modified and changed as it matures?

Proposed revisions of Festinger’s (1957) theory started appearing almost before the ink was dry on the first articles that reported support for the theory (e.g., Aronson, 1960, cited in Aronson, 1999; Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Rosenberg, 1965b). One reason for these early revisions is that it soon became apparent to researchers that cognitive inconsistencies do not always lead to measurable dissonance effects. “About 1958, the standing joke among Festinger’s research assistants was, ‘If you really want to be sure whether A is dissonant with B, ask Leon’ ” (Aronson, 1999, p. 109). The revisions of Aronson, Brehm and Cohen, Rosenberg, and others (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1995; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971) were designed to tighten the conditions under which empirical dissonance effects would most likely occur. Once more, for example, Brehm and Cohen emphasized that participants’ counter-attitudinal behavior must be perceived as freely chosen. The Aronson (1960), Brehm and Cohen (1962), Tedeschi et al. (1971), and other early revisions, however, are properly regarded as just that – revisions – because each retained Festinger’s (1957) core idea that psychological inconsistency is the driving force that underlies dissonance motivation. Other investigators, in contrast, have constructed entirely or substantially new theories that attempt to explain dissonance effects with psychological constructs other than the aversive tension of psychological inconsistency (e.g., Bem, 1967; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Steele, 1988). Bem’s self-perception theory, for example, is not a motivational theory at all, fitting as it does equally well within either the information-processing or behavioral camps (see below). What is more, many of the early and more recent efforts have extended dissonance-related work to domains that far exceed the boundaries of dissonance theory as originally conceived by Festinger (e.g., Adams, 1965; Higgins, 1987; McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & Kang, 2005; Swann, 1984, 1996; Tesser, 1988; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). Other efforts have restricted dissonance theory to the point that some theories only include a small fraction of the empirical world that Festinger (1957) had originally envisioned (e.g., Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Rosenberg, 1965b; Tedeschi et al., 1971). Yet all of these theories have generated their own bodies of supportive and non-supportive evidence. Each theory can explain certain aspects of the empirical world that no other theory can handle; still, no one theory can explain everything. Complete consideration of all of this work would likely require an entire book (cf. Cooper, 2007) and is therefore well beyond the scope of the present chapter. Accordingly, we focus here on what we believe are a few of the most important developments in dissonance theory and related work over the years. In order to fairly illustrate the level, subtlety, and complexity of the theoretical issues involved, we have chosen to focus in depth on a few issues rather than to have a necessarily shallow coverage of many issues. We restrict ourselves to either (a) theories that use Festinger (1957) as a starting point and propose various modifications therefrom or (b) entirely new theories, but ones that use alternative interpretations of standard dissonance effects in the literature as a point of departure from Festinger (1957).

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Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki

Self-consistency theory (Aronson, 1960, cited in Aronson, 1999) The earliest revision of dissonance theory was proposed by Elliot Aronson (1960, cited in Aronson, 1999), who was a student of Festinger’s at Stanford beginning in the fall of 1956. As a result of Aronson’s own research and his ongoing debates with Festinger, Aronson eventually concluded that cognitive dissonance is more concerned with a person’s cognitions about his or her self-concept and the need for consistency within one’s attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors than it is with any need for a rationale or logic-like consistency, as Festinger (1957) had originally posited. To clarify, dissonance in Aronson’s theory is not just a conflict between any two relevant, important cognitions. Rather, dissonance theory makes its clearest and strongest predictions when the inconsistent cognitions involve important elements of a person’s self-concept. Looking back over the early work that had supported dissonance theory, Aronson discovered in each case that the manipulations had challenged widely desired self-conceptions, such as the desire to see one’s self as fair, honest, reasonable, competent, and in control of one’s own behavior. Consider the behavior of participants in Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) experiment, for example. It is true enough that participants’ telling the incoming participant that the experimental tasks were really fun and enjoyable is inconsistent with the fact that the tasks were actually quite boring. What caused the dissonance from Aronson’s perspective, however, was that telling a lie for no good reason ($1, insufficient justification) is inconsistent with most people’s valued self-conception that they are basically good and decent human beings. Simply stated, good and honorable people do not do such morally questionable things. Yet a positive self-image can be essentially maintained in this context after the fact if $1 participants say to themselves, in effect, “Come to think of it, the study wasn’t that bad. Actually, there were all those spools and gadgets; being in the study was really sort of fun when you think about it.” Note that in such thinking, $1 participants are changing their attitude, thereby reducing the degree of the inconsistency of their lie, justifying their behavior to themselves, and thus reducing the magnitude of their dissonance (i.e., self-inconsistency). For $20 participants, in contrast, the situation is very different. These participants have a good reason for lying – the $20 (sufficient justification). Thus, their self-concepts are not threatened, and there is no need to justify their behavior after the fact. These hypothesized processes explain why $1 participants changed their attitudes about the experiment, reporting a moderately favorable reaction to it (M = +1.35), whereas $20 participants did not (M = −0.05). In Aronson’s version of dissonance theory, dissonance arousal is centered upon inconsistency with one’s self-concept, and dissonance reduction is all about selfjustification. Accordingly, the theory is frequently referred to as self-consistency theory. The core aspects of most people’s self-concept according to self-consistency theory is that they see themselves as competent, as morally good, and as a coherent whole (Aronson, 1968, 1999; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). Information that is at variance with people’s desired self-views that they are fair, honest, reasonable, and competent causes dissonance; information that does not, does not. Because Aronson’s (1968, 1999) theory represents only a modification of Festinger’s (1957) theory, it is important to note that Aronson’s theory incorporates other key aspects

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of Festinger’s theory unaltered. For example, the total magnitude of dissonance in Aronson’s theory can still be represented by the D* = D/D + C equation, and D* can be affected by both the perceived importance of each element and the degree of social support. The only difference is that the D in Aronson’s theory concerns inconsistency with one’s self-concept, whereas in Festinger’s theory D is more of a logic-like inconsistency.

Individual differences One critical aspect of Aronson’s (1968, 1999) modified theory is that it led to testable predictions that would not have been readily apparent or very likely under Festinger’s (1957) original formulation. In particular, Aronson’s self-consistency theory pointed to the potential for individual differences to become easily integrated within the theory. Consideration of individual differences has led to a great deal of new, interesting, and enlightening research (e.g., McGregor et al., 2005; Nail, Misak, & Davis, 2004; Steele et al., 1993). Festinger (1957) had acknowledged from the outset that individual differences in sensitivity to cognitive dissonance likely existed, but he gave little indication as to what these individual differences might be or how to measure them. Under Aronson’s revised theory, however, the implications were clear. “Festinger’s original statement and all of the early experiments rested on the implicit assumption that most people have a reasonably positive self-concept. But if a person considered himself or herself to be a ‘schnook,’ he or she might expect to do schnooky things” (Aronson, 1999, p. 111). The idea is that “schnooks” should not experience as much dissonance in typical dissonance-arousing circumstances as “non-schnooks.” This hypothesis has been supported in a number of studies (e.g., Aronson & Carlsmith, 1963; Epstein, 1969; Swann & Read, 1981; Szabo, 1985). Manipulators versus non-manipulators. We regard Aronson’s (1968, 1999) provision for the inclusion and integration of individual differences within dissonance theory as one of the singular achievements in the dissonance literature over the years (e.g., Bishop, 1967; Cialdini et al., 1995; Glass, 1964; McGregor et al., 2005; Steele et al., 1993). In one particularly relevant study, Szabo (1985) manipulated dissonance by having participants write counter-attitudinal essays for a relatively large versus small monetary incentive. Importantly, participants had been pre-classified as “manipulators” or “non-manipulators” based on a Machiavellianism scale. The results indicated that non-manipulators showed the standard insufficient justification effect; they displayed significantly greater attitude change in the direction of their counter-attitudinal behavior under small incentive (M = 9.03) than large (M = 7.6). For manipulators, in contrast, there was no reliable difference between the small and large incentive conditions (M = 8.4 vs. 8.6, respectively). Apparently, because lying is not atypical for manipulators, doing so is not at odds with their self-image and therefore produces no particular dissonance that needs reducing. Interestingly, based on Aronson’s (1968, 1999) theory and Szabo’s (1985) results (see also Epstein, 1969; Snyder & Tanke, 1976), manipulators should only experience dissonance under conditions where they might get what they desire by lying, but do not lie, and have no good reason for not doing so! This provocative hypothesis has not been put to the test to our knowledge, however. Preference for consistency (PFC). Perhaps the most important body of work concerning individual differences and cognitive dissonance is that of Cialdini and colleagues (e.g.,

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Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki Bator & Cialdini, 2006; Cialdini et al., 1995; Guadagno, Asher, Demaine, & Cialdini, 2001; see also Nail, Bedell, & Little, 2003; Nail et al., 2001). Across a number of studies, Cialdini and colleagues have shown that individuals scoring high on the Cialdini et al. (1995) PFC scale generally behave consistently with dissonance theory, showing the typical dissonancereducing attitude change following counter-attitudinal behavior under high choice, whereas those scoring low in PFC either show significantly less attitudinal-behavioral consistency than high PFCs (Nail et al., 2001), none at all (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1995), or even anticonsistency (Guadagno et al., 2001). Festinger (1957) originally conceived the need for cognitive consistency as a nomothetic motive, meaning one applying to people, in general. Work on PFC indicates, however, that Festinger’s hypothesized need for consistency may apply strongly to as little as one-third of the population, thus significantly reducing the scope of dissonance theory. However, in proposing alternative accounts of dissonance phenomena, other theorists have suggested that standard dissonance effects in the literature have little or nothing to do with the need for either cognitive or self-consistency (Bem, 1967; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Steele, 1988). We turn now to the first of two such accounts – self-perception theory and self-affirmation theory – that we will consider.

Self-perception theory (Bem, 1967) Unlike Aronson’s (1968, 1969) self-consistency theory, Bem’s (1967) self-perception theory is more than just a revision of Festinger’s (1957) theory. Further, steeped in the tradition of American behaviorism, Bem’s theory has nothing to do with psychological drives of any sort, much less the hypothesized tension that comes with either cognitive inconsistency à la Festinger or self-inconsistency à la Aronson. Rather, the theory assumes that people are often unsure of their own attitudes, feelings, and motives. To discover these, as the name of the theory suggests, people simply watch or monitor their own behavior and then infer, after the fact, what their attitudes and feelings must be, given the overall context in which their behavior occurred. Self-perception processes are evident in the report of John Dean, who was White House Counsel to President Nixon in the early 1970s before the Watergate scandal. One day in July of 1970, when Dean was still working at the Justice Department, he received a phone call from a White House staffer. The caller informed Dean that if he wanted to go work for the President, he should make arrangements to catch the next flight to California where he would meet Nixon, be interviewed by Nixon’s chief of staff, and spend the weekend with some of Nixon’s top aides at the “Western White House.” In the made-forTV version of his book, Dean (1976) reports that he was never aware how very much he was interested in politics and in climbing the ranks of power in Washington until after he received that phone call. Judging from his behavior, however – how fast he booked the next available flight and “dashed home to pack” (p. 13) – he guessed he had never wanted anything so badly in all his life. To further illustrate self-perception theory, consider once more the behavior of Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) participants. Recall that after being in the study and telling the next participant how interesting and enjoyable the tasks were, participants were asked to rate the tasks. According to Bem, in the $1 condition participants would think something like this: “Let’s see. I just told that girl that the tasks were really fun and enjoyable, and I only got paid $1.

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So, I must have thought that the tasks were pretty enjoyable at least because I wouldn’t say something that is untrue for only $1. I’ll give the tasks a moderately favorable rating.” In the $20 condition, however, the hypothesized internal dialogue goes more like this: “Let’s see. I just told that girl that the tasks were really fun and enjoyable, but I got paid $20, which to me is a lot of money. I guess I probably told the girl that so I could get the $20. I would have to rate the tasks, therefore, as not very enjoyable.” Support for self-perception theory was obtained in a series of studies by Bem and his students in which the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) procedure was merely described to groups of observers. Importantly, the observers produced the same pattern of results as the original participants by simply guessing what the attitudes of original participants must have been in the $1, $20, and control conditions (M = +0.52, −1.96, and −1.56, respectively; Bem, 1968; see also Bem & McConnell, 1970). Because the observers engaged in no attitudinal-behavioral or self inconsistency, Festinger’s (1957) and Aronson’s (1968) versions of dissonance theory can not easily explain these findings.

Dissonance and physiological arousal The debate between Festinger’s (1957), Aronson’s (1968), and other consistency-based accounts of dissonance phenomena on the one hand (e.g., Rosenberg, 1965b; Tedeschi et al., 1971) and a self-perception account on the other raged in the literature for a good part of the late 1960s and 1970s (Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977). The debate eventually subsided, however, aided largely by the discovery that dissonance manipulations are often accompanied by physiological arousal. This possibility was first suggested in the work of Pallak and Pittman (1972), but with only an indirect measure of arousal (viz., consistent with Zajonc’s, 1965, drive theory of social facilitation, dissonance manipulations had the effect of energizing whatever responses were dominant in a particular setting). However, the idea that dissonance manipulations cause physiological arousal has been supported in numerous subsequent dissonance studies based on direct measures of arousal (e.g., GSR or heart rate; Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Nail, Harton, & Decker, 2003). Festinger (1957), his students, and other early dissonance researchers had often used terms such as drive, arousal, drive-like, and drive reduction to describe dissonance processes, but before Pallak and Pittman (1972), no one had ever gone so far as to suggest that the hypothesized psychological arousal of dissonance might be accompanied by literal physiological arousal as well. Nevertheless, this idea fit the theory neatly, and it had a great deal of intuitive appeal in retrospect. The presence of physiological arousal in dissonance research was regarded by Festinger (1987/1999) as “an extremely important finding” (p. 384). Moreover, it provided support for drive-based accounts of dissonance phenomena (Aronson, 1968; Festinger, 1957) over self-perception theory (Bem, 1967). Ever since the late 1970s, a truce of sorts between the drive-based and self-perception accounts of dissonance phenomena has prevailed. It appears that self-perception processes can and do occur but that these processes apply more to situations where people’s baseline attitudes are either (a) not yet formed or (b) unclear and ambiguous. In situations where people violate their clearly defined, preexisting attitudes, in contrast, psychological and physiological arousal can and do occur, leading frequently to attitude change. In short,

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Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki self-perception theory applies fundamentally to attitude formation (e.g., John Dean), whereas dissonance theory applies more to attitude change (Fazio et al., 1977). Further, based on the Cialdini et al. (1995, pp. 325–326) conclusions regarding individual differences in PFC and attitude change, it appears that the self-perception process may apply more to people scoring low in PFC, whereas dissonance processes apply more to high PFCs.

Near-death and rebirth At some point in the 1960s, cognitive dissonance theory became the dominant theoretical orientation in social psychology. It remained so through much of the 1970s, and some still regard Festinger (1957) as the single most important work in the history of social psychology (Aronson, 1999; Nail, 2006). Yet, with the resolution of the conflict with Bem’s (1967) self-perception theory (Fazio et al., 1977), and the rise of attribution theory and the information-processing paradigm of the 1970s and 1980s, interest in cognitive dissonance theory eventually waned. A key reason for this general lack of interest was stated succinctly by “Ned” Jones (1985), one of the preeminent social psychologists from the 1960s until his death in 1993: “Because the main propositions of dissonance theory have been confirmed with sufficient regularity, there is not a great deal to be gained from further research in this area” (p. 57). Uncharacteristically, in this instance, time has proven Jones wrong. At about the time that Jones’s words were going to press, a number of different theorists working independently began to consider more seriously and in divergent detail fuller implications of Aronson’s (1968) proposal that dissonance processes reside in the self-concept (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Steele, 1988; Swann, 1984, 1996; Tesser, 1988; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). Their work has led to renewed interest in dissonance theory, or at least in dissonancerelevant phenomena, that persists to this day (e.g., Cooper, 2007; Hart et al., 2009; McGregor et al., 2005; Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009). Steele’s (1988) selfaffirmation theory is one of the more prominent of these theories.

Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) Similar to Bem’s (1967) self-perception theory, Steele’s (1988) self-affirmation theory can explain much of the dissonance literature, and it stands as an alternative and competing theory of dissonance phenomena rather than just a modification of Festinger (1957; see Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999). Unlike Bem’s theory, however, self-affirmation theory can accommodate the finding that psychological dissonance is physiologically arousing. Steele’s theory is highly similar to Aronson’s (1968) self-consistency theory in that both theories point to the critical role of the self in dissonance processes. Consequently, both theories conceptualize dissonance as being grounded in the ego and not in a free-standing need for cognitive consistency (Greenwald & Ronis, 1978, p. 55). However, unlike Aronson, but similar to Bem (1967), Steele maintains that cognitive inconsistency is not at the heart of dissonance motivation. According to Steele, dissonance is not the aversive tension of logiclike inconsistency (Festinger, 1957), or even the tension of self-inconsistency (Aronson, 1968); rather, it is the tension of a “threatened sense of self-integrity” (Steele et al., 1993, p. 893). Steele et al. postulate the existence of a “self system for maintaining a perception of

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global integrity, that is, of overall moral and adaptive adequacy” (p. 885). Dissonance occurs when one learns something or engages in behavior that threatens this overall perception of self-integrity. Thus, attitude change in the induced-compliance paradigm occurs not to reduce inconsistency, but rather to restore one’s overall sense of a good, competent, and stable self-image. Based on self-affirmation theory, Steele and Liu (1983, Study 1) predicted that participants would have no problem tolerating inconsistency provided that the experimental procedure afforded the opportunity to reaffirm values important to participants before dissonance was measured. Students wrote essays in favor of a large tuition increase at their university under high- or low-choice conditions. Immediately after writing the essay but before attitude assessment, some high-choice participants were reminded of a pre-measured, important component of their self-concept by completing an economic–political values scale (value-oriented participants). Other high-choice participants went through the same procedure, but they were chosen for the study precisely because economic–political values were not important to them (non-value-oriented participants). By definition, values cannot be self-affirming if they are not important to a person. As predicted, the values scale eliminated any semblance of attitude change among high-choice/value-oriented participants (M = 3.6) but not among high-choice/non-value-oriented participants (M = 9.1); low-choice/control participants actually reported non-significantly greater attitude change (M = 4.3) than high-choice/value-oriented participants (M = 3.6).1 According to Steele and Liu, these findings support self-affirmation theory over Festinger (1957) because the values scale did nothing to reduce the inconsistency between attitude and behavior among high-choice/value-oriented participants; still, these participants revealed no tendency to rationalize their behavior. Stated differently, high-choice/valueoriented participants experienced attitudinal-behavioral inconsistency but no threat to the self because of the self-affirmational intervention. High-choice/non-value-oriented participants, however, experienced both attitudinal-behavioral inconsistency and a threat to the self because the affirmational intervention could not have been affirming to them. The bottom line across both groups is that attitude change varied as a function of the threat to the self inherent in writing the counter-attitudinal essay, not with attitudinal-behavioral inconsistency, per se. Thus, the threat to the self must have been the cause of the dissonance experienced by high-choice/non-value-oriented participants rather than the inconsistency. Is self-affirmation theory necessary? Part I. The basic self-affirmation effect – that participants show no need to rationalize their counter-attitudinal behavior if they are reminded of important, self-relevant values before their post attitudes are measured – has been replicated many times (e.g., McGregor et al., 2005, Study 3; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Steele & Liu, 1983, Study 3; Tesser & Cornell, 1991). Yet traditional dissonance/inconsistency theorists have questioned the need for a new and separate theory to explain the dissonance-reducing benefits of self-affirmation (e.g., Beauvois & Joule, 1996; Simon et al., 1995; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). After all, as Thibodeau and Aronson (1992) have pointed out, adding new, consonant cognitions to the dissonant elements was one of Festinger’s (1957) originally hypothesized modes of dissonance reduction. Such cognitions are hypothesized to reduce dissonance because, once more, the absolute magnitude of dissonance in both Festinger’s (1957) and Aronson’s (1968) theories is defined by the

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Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki ratio of dissonant elements to dissonant plus consonant elements (D* = D/D + C). Thibodeau and Aronson asserted that once participants’ central values have been affirmed, they have little need for attitude change because the affirmational intervention reminds participants of valued, self-relevant cognitive elements that are consonant with a positive self-concept overall. Given Aronson’s (1968, 1999) theoretical position that all dissonance processes reside within one’s self-concept, once these consonant elements are added to the dissonance equation, the magnitude of dissonance is quite obviously reduced. The role of self-esteem. Steele et al. (1993) subsequently created a more pointed test between self-affirmation theory and any of the consistency-based accounts (Aronson, 1968; Festinger, 1957; Swann, 1984). This research was based on the idea that consistency-based theories and self-affirmation theory make conflicting predictions when considering individuals with high versus low self-esteem. According to self-consistency theory, for example, high selfesteem individuals should experience more conflict in dissonance-arousing situations than low-esteem individuals (Aronson & Mettee, 1968). Assuming that self-inconsistency is the driving force in dissonance motivation, it follows that the possibility of a bad choice as in the free choice paradigm, for example, would be more inconsistent with the self-concept of high self-esteem individuals than with that of low self-esteem individuals. Thus, high self-esteem individuals should display greater dissonance-reducing rationalization – a greater spread of alternatives – than lows. In sharp contrast, self-affirmation theory predicts that high selfesteem individuals will experience less dissonance than individuals with low self-esteem. High self-esteem individuals have positive self-concepts precisely because they have large reservoirs of positive information, attributes, and thoughts regarding the self. Assuming that a threatened sense of self-integrity is the driving force in dissonance motivation, it follows that high self-esteem individuals would have greater self-resources to draw upon than low self-esteem individuals. Thus, high self-esteem individuals should display a smaller spread of alternatives following a difficult choice than low self-esteem individuals. Steele et al. (1993, Study 2) tested these ideas in a 2 × 2 design that crossed trait high/low self-esteem × focus/no-focus on one’s self-concept. Trait high/low self-esteem was determined based on a median split of scores on the Rosenberg (1965a) scale, which was administered several weeks before the experimental sessions began. Self-focus/no-self-focus was manipulated by having randomly selected participants retake the Rosenberg scale at the start of the experimental session or not. Dissonance was evoked employing a choice between two similarly valued music CDs in the free-choice paradigm. The results were clear. They showed that in the no-self-focus condition, there was no difference in the spread of alternatives between high (M = 0.62) and low self-esteem (M = 0.56) participants. In the self-focus condition, however, high self-esteem participants (M = −0.29) displayed a significantly lower spread of alternatives than low self-esteem participants (M = 1.14). These results support self-affirmation theory over self-consistency theory. Presumably, the self-focus manipulation caused participants to reflect on their self-concepts and self-resources. Self-reflection resulted in low self-esteem participants rationalizing their choice more than high selfesteem participants. Apparently, with their self-systems primed by the Rosenberg (1965a) scale, high self-esteem participants simply had no need to rationalize their choice. In a conceptual replication of Steele et al., similar results favoring self-affirmation theory were reported by Nail et al. (2004).

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Not all studies examining trait self-esteem, however, are consistent with self-affirmation theory. Stone (1999, Experiment 1) replicated the Steele et al. (1993, Study 2) research but varied the order of critical events in one condition. When Stone repeated the Steele et al. ordering of events exactly, he found the same results; low self-esteem individuals rationalized their CD choice (M = 2.48) more than high self-esteem individuals (M = 0.55), thus supporting self-affirmation theory. When Stone had some participants retake the Rosenberg (1965a) scale after choosing one of the CDs but before the re-rating, however, the pattern was reversed. High self-esteem participants showed greater self-justifying rationalization (M = 1.35) than low self-esteem participants (M = 0.52), thus supporting self-consistency theory. Further, at least three studies of manipulated rather than trait self-esteem have similarly found that high self-esteem individuals display greater dissonance-reducing attitude change than low self-esteem individuals, again supporting self-consistency theory (Aronson & Mettee, 1968; Gerard, Blevans, & Malcolm, 1964; Glass, 1964). To explain the complex relationship between self-esteem and the experience of cognitive dissonance, Stone and Cooper (2001) have proposed an integration between self-affirmation theory and self-consistency theory, the self-standards model of cognitive dissonance. Stone and Cooper posit that people’s self-concepts are flexible enough to produce either a self-affirmation effect à la Steele (1988) or a self-discrepancy effect à la Aronson (1968, 1999), depending on the details of the situation. More specifically, the self can serve either as (a) a resource that can buffer self-threats or (b) a standard that one may or may not have lived up to. In essence, Stone and Cooper propose that if a study’s procedures and manipulations remind participants of positive self-attributes that are irrelevant to the dissonance in question, then the self should serve as a resource and high self-esteem individuals should display less dissonance-reducing behavior than low self-esteem individuals – a self-affirmation effect in line with self-affirmation theory (e.g., Nail et al., 2004; Steele et al., 1993; Stone, 1999). On the other hand, if a study’s procedures and manipulations remind participants of positive self-attributes that are relevant to the dissonance in question but that they have not lived up to, then the self should serve as a standard and high self-esteem individuals should display more dissonance-reducing behavior than low self-esteem individuals – a self-discrepancy effect in line with self-consistency theory (e.g., Aronson & Metee, 1968; Glass, 1964; Stone, 1999). Is self-affirmation theory necessary? Part II. Instead of attempting to integrate selfaffirmation theory and self-consistency theory, Simon et al. (1995) have proposed an explanation of the self-affirmation effect that supports the Festinger (1957) and Aronson (1968) consistency-based theories over self-affirmation theory. Simon et al. propose that selfaffirmation interventions may eliminate the need for dissonance reduction not because they restore one’s self-image but because they establish a trivializing frame of reference whereby the relative importance of dissonant elements can be reduced. As noted in the third major section of this chapter, one of Festinger’s (1957) key, originally proposed methods of dissonance reduction is to decrease the importance of dissonant cognitions. Simon et al. found that reminding high-choice participants of a generally important issue (e.g., world hunger) following counter-attitudinal behavior eliminated the need for dissonance reduction in the form of attitude change whether or not the issue was of high personal importance to participants (M = 3.25 and 3.27, respectively). These means did not differ significantly

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Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki from low-choice control participants (M = 2.55), whereas standard high-choice participants showed significantly greater attitude change than all three groups (M = 5.75). These findings create problems for self-affirmation theory because, by definition, and consistent with Steele and Liu (1983), an issue cannot be self-affirming unless it is of high personal importance. At the same time, these data provide evidence consistent with dissonance processes as originally conceived by Festinger (1957) and as modified by Aronson (1968, 1999).

Evaluation of the Theory and Conclusions In evaluating cognitive dissonance theory, it is sometimes difficult to separate Festinger’s (1957) theory from Aronson’s (1968, 1999) version. First, with the exception of the distinction between logic-like inconsistency versus self-inconsistency, the theories are identical. Second, given the prominence of the self-concept in contemporary social psychology, Aronson’s theory is what many authors and researchers mean these days when they refer to cognitive dissonance theory. Fundamentally in this section, we will treat the two versions as one. When beneficial, however, we will differentiate between the two. There are numerous recognized criteria by which any theory may be evaluated. One is a theory’s usefulness or applicability in solving real-world problems. Here cognitive dissonance theory gets high marks as the theory has been successfully brought to bear on numerous real-world, important, and practical problems. These include fostering more successful child rearing (e.g., Lepper, 1973; Mills, 1958), increasing condom use among sexually active college students (Aronson et al., 1991; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994), promoting pro-community behaviors such as water conservation (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, & Miller, 1992) and waste-product recycling (Fried & Aronson, 1995), explaining consumer behavior (Cialdini, 2009), increasing community service and charitable donations (e.g., Howard, 1990; Kraut, 1973; Sherman, 1980), reducing racial prejudice (e.g., Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994; Son Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002), and providing insight into the treatment of phobias (Cooper, 1980) and the success of therapeutic interventions more generally (e.g., Axsom & Cooper, 2004; Cooper & Axsom, 1982). In most of these applications, the basic idea is that since dissonance is unpleasant and aversive, less adaptive and desirable behaviors can be decreased by associating them in people’s minds with cognitive dissonance (i.e., times in the past where one has not lived up to one’s own standards [hypocrisy induction]), whereas more adaptive behaviors can be increased by associating them with dissonance reduction. Some of this work is particularly impressive in that follow-up measures have shown dissonance/hypocrisy interventions to still yield significant outcomes even two and three months following the original induction of dissonance (Aronson et al., 1991; Stone et al., 1994). A quite different but potentially even more important application of dissonance theory is more personal in nature and concerns what Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (1997) refer to as the rationalization trap: “the potential for dissonance reduction to produce a succession of self-justifications that ultimately result in a chain of stupid, immoral, [unethical, or illegal] actions” (p. 222). A key problem with the experience of dissonance and the human tendency to justify one’s behavior is that, over time, one’s self-regulatory boundaries can

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expand. For example, few people start off stealing Post-it notes from their employer with the thought they might eventually wind up embezzling thousands of dollars, getting caught, and going to jail. Yet, once one begins stealing small things and rationalizing this stealing as justifiable, it becomes easier and easier to graduate, over time, to higher and higher levels of theft and impropriety (Lepper, 1973; Mills, 1958). Importantly, as documented by Tavris and Aronson (2007), such escalation can occur with respect to any questionable behavior whether the boundaries are personal, ethical, moral, or legal (e.g., lying, gambling, cheating on one’s spouse or taxes, using illegal drugs or steroids). An anonymous quote is relevant to this application of dissonance theory: “Be careful what you think because your thoughts become your words, your words become your actions, your actions become your character, and your character determines your destiny.” Translating this quote into the more direct language of dissonance theory, it becomes more poignant and to the point: “You must be careful what you do because your behavior can influence your attitudes, your attitudes can influence your values, and your values will determine your destiny.” The efficiency of a theory can be thought of as the ratio of phenomena explained by the theory to the theory’s complexity. Here again, dissonance theory gets high marks because, as documented in this chapter, there are literally scores of seemingly diverse findings that are adequately, neatly, even compellingly, explained and integrated by the theory (cf. Aronson, 1999, p. 108). Yet the essence of the theory remains relatively simple, capable as it is of being summarized with a handful of sentences. Still, no one version of dissonance theory can explain all of the data. What about the relative efficiency of Festinger’s (1957) theory versus Aronson’s (1968, 1999)? In principle, Festinger’s theory is potentially more comprehensive because Aronson’s self-inconsistency can be correctly regarded as a special case of Festinger’s cognitive inconsistency. On the other hand, Aronson’s theory more easily and elegantly accommodates individual differences than Festinger’s theory. If dissonance is caused by inconsistency within one’s self-concept, it follows directly that dissonance will be highly subjective in nature and that what causes dissonance in one person may not do so in another (Aronson, 1999; e.g., Epstein, 1969; Nail et al., 2001, 2004; Snyder & Tanke, 1976; Szabo, 1985). The heuristic value of a theory refers to its ability to generate testable, empirical hypotheses. Here, dissonance theory is perhaps second to none. What is more, the Aronson (1968, 1999), Steele (1988), and other self-versions of the theory (e.g., Tesser, 1988) have added tremendously to the heuristic value of Festinger (1957), which was already very high. It is interesting to note, however, that Festinger did not think much of any of the revisions of his theory. For example, he regarded the Brehm and Cohen (1962) emphasis that counterattitudinal behavior must be perceived as freely chosen as merely a special case of his more general concept of minimal external pressure: It says in the original book that in order for dissonance to be large enough to exist there has to be minimal pressure on the person to do what the person does. If there is too much pressure, there is too much justification for having done it, and if it is all consonant with having done it, there is no dissonance. Doesn’t that encompass the idea of choice? Isn’t choice one part of that? I said to myself, these wonderful people whom I like and respect are taking one operation and elevating it to the status of a construct, and it’s terrible. (Festinger, 1987/1999, p. 383)

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Paul R. Nail and Kurt A. Boniecki According to Aronson (1999), Festinger was also not pleased with Aronson’s (1968) self-consistency revision. Festinger felt that it narrowed the theory too greatly. Further, once more, can not the concept of self-inconsistency be encompassed and conceptualized as merely a special case of the more general concept of cognitive inconsistency? Perhaps more importantly, logic-like inconsistency that does not involve one’s self-concept is clearly excluded by Aronson’s (1968, 1999) theory. In this same vein, Festinger (1957) was clear that only important inconsistencies should arouse measurable dissonance effects. From Festinger’s point of view, can it not be reasonably argued that one of the surest ways to make an inconsistency important to someone is to arrange things so that the inconsistency is relevant to that person’s self-concept? If so, as Greenwald and Ronis (1978) have argued, dissonance research may have been inadvertently pulled in the direction of investigating inconsistencies with the self-concept only because significant dissonance effects in this domain were relatively easy to obtain and replicate in comparison to dissonance effects that might be obtained from the purely logic-like inconsistencies hypothesized by Festinger (1957). Yet, it is not logically possible to accept the hypothesis that important logic-like inconsistencies cannot motivate the type of dissonance-reducing behavioral and attitudinal changes hypothesized by Festinger only because they have not heretofore been demonstrated. Attempting to do so would involve the same logical fallacy as accepting the null hypothesis. Thus, it is possible that a true test of Festinger’s theory – one where a purely logic-like inconsistency is not confounded with self-inconsistency – has yet to be performed. Ironically, there is nevertheless ample evidence in the literature that supports dissonance processes as originally conceived by Festinger, although this evidence is indirect and hidden to most observers. We refer to the behavior of the many theorists who have proposed revisions of dissonance theory to better square with the evidence the theory has generated, thus attempting to reduce a purely logic-like inconsistency. “The behavior of the theorists doing the revising is a near-perfect illustration of dissonance reduction of the sort intended in the original statement of the theory” (Greenwald & Ronis, 1978, p. 55) but excluded by the Aronson (1968, 1999) and Steele (1988) ego-based versions, as well as all other versions (e.g., Cooper & Fazio, 1984). With final respect to evaluation, the originality of a theory refers to the novelty of its constructs and hypotheses. Here, dissonance theory only gets mixed marks. If dissonance processes are grounded in the ego or self-system as Aronson (1968, 1999), Steele (1988), and others maintain (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), then there is a considerable body of theoretical work that highlighted inconsistencies within, or threats to, one’s self-concept or ego system that antedated Festinger, Aronson, and Steele by several years, even decades (e.g., Allport, 1943; Freud, 1924/1968; Hilgard, 1949; Rogers, 1951). Rogers, for example, theorized how existing inconsistencies between a person’s actual and ideal self-images can cause internal psychological tensions that are of critical importance with respect to one’s personal growth, development, and mental health. On the other hand, if dissonance refers only to the need for logic-like consistency, as Festinger (1957) proposed, at least two social-psychological cognitive consistency theories were published before Festinger (1957): the A–B–X model (Newcomb, 1953; Newcomb & Svehla, 1937) and congruity theory (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). Still, there is no question that Festinger’s

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theory is far superior at generating testable hypotheses than any of the early self-theories or any of the alternative cognitive consistency theories (e.g., Heider, 1958). With further respect to the lack of originality of Festinger (1957), students of social psychology who learn of Piaget’s (1937/1971) theory of cognitive development cannot help but be struck by the parallels between the two systems. Whereas Festinger (1957) hypothesized how inconsistencies among cognitive elements cause cognitive dissonance, which motivates a person to make changes to restore consonance, Piaget (1937/1971) hypothesized how inconsistencies among mental structures (viz., schemas) cause psychological disequilibrium, which motivates a person to make changes (viz., accommodations) to restore equilibrium. These parallels suggest one potential place to look for direct evidence that might support dissonance theory as originally conceived by Festinger – the Piagetian tasks, which Piaget (1929/1979, 1941/1997) developed to test various aspects of his theory (e.g., the object permanence, conservation of number and volume, and displacement of liquid tasks). Our observations of preschool children, clearly experiencing and overcoming cognitive dissonance en route to correct solutions on these tasks, suggest that the solutions might occur either too early in a child’s development, or too quickly and spontaneously, to involve the self-concept. Careful experimentation might settle the issue. Evidence that success on these tasks is not mediated or moderated by the self, we argue, would support Festinger’s (1957) original theory over any of the competing versions. Importantly, such evidence could potentially reestablish Festinger’s (1957) theory as the dominant, most generally adequate account of dissonance phenomena.

Note 1 These means were transformed so that higher numbers indicate greater attitude change and lower numbers lesser attitude change.

References Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 267–299). New York: Academic Press. Allport, G. W. (1943). The ego in contemporary psychology. Psychological Review, 50, 451–478. Aronson, E. (1960). The cognitive and behavioral consequences of the confirmation and disconfirmation of expectancies. Grant proposal, Harvard University. Aronson, E. (1968). Dissonance theory: Progress and problems. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories of cognitive consistency: A source book (pp. 5–27). Skokie, IL: Rand McNally.

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Guadagno, R. E., Asher, T., Demaine, L. J., & Cialdini, R. B. (2001). When saying yes leads to saying no. Preference for consistency and the reverse foot-in-the-door effect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 859–867. Harmon-Jones, E., & Mills, J. (Eds.). (1999). Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Hart, W., Albarracin, D., Eagly, A. H., Brechan, I., Lindberg, M. J., & Merrill, L. (2009). Feeling validated versus being correct: A meta-analysis of selective exposure to information. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 555–588. Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psychological Review, 94, 319–340. Hilgard, E. R. (1949). Human motives and the concept of self. American Psychologist, 4, 374–382. Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., & Kelley, H. H. (1953). Communication and persuasion: Psychological studies of opinion change. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Howard, D. J. (1990). The influence of verbal responses to common greetings on compliance behavior: The footin-the-mouth effect. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 20, 1185–1196. Jones, E. E. (1985). Major accomplishments in social psychology during the past five decades. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (3rd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 47–108). New York: Random House. Kahn, M. (1966). The physiology of catharsis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 278–298. Klugel, J. R., & Smith, E. R. (1986). Beliefs about inequality: Americans’ views of what is and what ought to be. New York: Aldine De Gruyter. Kraut, R. E. (1973). Effects of social labeling on giving to charity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 9, 551–562. Leippe, M. R., & Eisenstadt, D. (1994). The generalization of dissonance reduction: Decreasing prejudice through induced compliance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 395–413. Lepper, M. R. (1973). Dissonance, self-perception, and honesty in children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 25, 65–74. Lewin, K. (1943). Defining the “field at a given time.” Psychological Review, 50, 292–310. Manchester, W. (1967). The death of a president. New York: Harper & Row.

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3

Attribution Theories: How People Make Sense of Behavior Bertram F. Malle

In social psychology, the term attribution has two primary meanings. The first refers to explanations of behavior (i.e., answers to why questions); the second refers to inferences or ascriptions (e.g., inferring traits from behavior, ascribing blame to a person). What the two meanings have in common is a process of assigning: in attribution as explanation, a behavior is assigned to its cause; in attribution as inference, a quality or attribute is assigned to the agent on the basis of an observed behavior. Despite the connection between these phenomena, they have distinct psychological characteristics (Hamilton, 1998; Hilton, Smith, & Kin, 1995; Malle, in press). This chapter will focus on attribution as behavior explanation because it is a far-reaching cognitive and social phenomenon that is embedded in the larger human search for meaning (Malle, 2004).1 The discussion will begin with the undisputed founder of attribution work, Fritz Heider, then briefly visit Jones and Davis’s contribution, and move on to Harold Kelley’s theoretical model. Because many excellent reviews of the standard views on these theories are available (see note 1), I will spend relatively little time recounting them. My goal is rather to point out aspects of classic attribution theories that are not generally emphasized, highlight historical misunderstandings, and bring to light theoretical difficulties that have not been adequately addressed. In the second half of the chapter I then introduce an alternative theory of behavior explanations that builds on previous theories but tries to overcome their major shortcomings.

Heider’s Theory of Attribution Fritz Heider developed models of attribution for both object perception and person perception. His theory of object perception (first described in Heider, 1920, his dissertation) is rarely cited today, but it serves as the foundation for his later theory of person perception. Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Heider attempted to solve one of the core philosophical problems of phenomenology: the relation between sensory information and real objects. That is, he asked how it was possible that humans perceive qualities of objects in the world even though all they have are sensations in the mind. Heider argued that real objects shape “media” such as air pressure, light reflections, and sense organs. These media have a considerable degree of variance (for one thing, they reflect many real objects), but the perceptual apparatus reconstructs real objects from their characteristic effects on the media. Heider labeled this reconstruction attribution – a process that generates inferences of the relatively invariant qualities of objects from the characteristic variance patterns they cause in their media. Perceivers faced with sensory information thus experience perceptual objects as “out there” because they attribute the sensory data to their underlying cause in the world (Heider, 1920).2 After his early work on object perception Heider turned to the domain of social interactions, wondering how people perceive each other in interaction and especially how they make sense of each others’ behavior. Heider proposed that a process of attribution is involved in person perception as well, but he recognized that person perception is more complex than object perception – due to the manifold observational data available and the various causes (e.g., beliefs, desires, emotions, traits) to which these data can be attributed. In addition, it was clear to Heider that persons are very different targets of perception than inanimate objects. Persons are “perceived as action centers and as such can do something to us. They can benefit or harm us intentionally, and we can benefit or harm them. Persons have abilities, wishes and sentiments; they can act purposefully, and can perceive or watch us” (Heider, 1958, p. 21). Note that Heider repeatedly refers to the intentionality of persons, which he considered a core assumption in the conceptual framework that underlies social perception. With the help of such concepts as intentionality and the inference of wishes, purposes, sentiments, and other mental states, Heider argued, perceivers bring order and meaning to the massive stream of behavioral data. Even though in one sense person perception is like object perception – a process of extracting invariance out of variance – Heider emphasized two distinct features of person perception. The first is that in the social domain, variance refers to the agent’s stream of ongoing behavior and invariance refers to the inferred perceptions, intentions, motives, traits, and sentiments. Heider (1958) sometimes used the term disposition to refer to these invariances, and even though he occasionally referred to traits and abilities when talking about dispositions (e.g., pp. 30, 80), he considered “motives, intentions, sentiments … the core processes which manifest themselves in overt behavior” (p. 34). It was the agent’s motives that occupied a special role in Heider’s model: “The underlying causes of events, especially the motives of other persons, are the invariances of the environment that are relevant to [the perceiver]; they give meaning to what he experiences” (Heider, 1958, p. 81; emphasis added). In social perception, then, Heider’s terms disposition and invariance referred primarily to mental states. The second distinct feature of person perception is that when people perform a causal (i.e., attributional) analysis of human behavior, their judgments of causality follow one of two conceptual models (Heider, 1958, chap. 4). The first is a model of impersonal causality, applied to unintentional human behaviors (such as sneezing or feeling sad) and physical events (such as waves splashing or leaves falling). The second is a model of personal causality,

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Bertram F. Malle which is invoked whenever a human agent performs an intentional action (such as cleaning the kitchen or inviting someone to dinner). “Personal causality,” Heider wrote, “refers to instances in which p causes x intentionally. That is to say, the action is purposive” (Heider, 1958, p. 100). Unfortunately, subsequent attribution research misrepresented both of these crucial features of person perception. First, even though mental states make up the majority of what Heider subsumed under dispositional properties (Heider, 1958, pp. 31–34, chap. 4, passim), most scholars portrayed Heider’s notion of disposition as referring to stable personality factors (i.e., traits, attitudes, or abilities). For example: “Heider began by assuming that just as objects have enduring qualities that determine their appearances, so people have stable psychological characteristics that determine their behavior” (Gilbert, 1998, p. 94; emphasis added). This interpretation of dispositions as necessarily stable can be traced to two early sources. The first is Kelley’s (1960) review of Heider’s (1958) book, according to which “Heider’s central theme is that perception leaps over the raw data presented and enables the person to understand the stable, dispositional properties … that account for them” (p. 2). The second is Jones and Davis’s (1965) influential paper “From acts to dispositions,” in which they used the term disposition to refer to character traits and attitudes only. Hence research on dispositional attribution became research on trait inferences. The second misunderstanding was that many scholars mistook Heider’s distinction between personal and impersonal causality – the terms he used to characterize intentional versus unintentional behavior (Heider, 1958, pp. 100–101) – for a distinction between person causes and situation causes. Kelley (1967) famously posited that in all explanations, “the choice is between external attribution and internal … attribution” (p. 194). Attribution research applied this person–situation dichotomy to all behaviors alike, whether intentional or unintentional, and thereby eliminated Heider’s central concepts of intention, purpose, and motive from later models of social perception. Ironically, Heider was credited for – and indeed identified with – “discovering” the simple person–situation dichotomy himself: How do we search for the causal structure of interpersonal events? According to Heider, we do so by reliance upon attributions to the environment (external factors) or to something about the other person (internal factors). (Weary, Edwards, & Riley, 1994, p. 292) Central to Heider’s entire theoretical position is the proposition that man perceives behavior as being caused, and that the causal locus can be either in the perceiver or in the environment. (Hastorf, Schneider, & Polefka, 1970, p. 63)

But why the perception that Heider proposed a person–situation dichotomy in attribution? One small section of his book appears to have spawned this claim (Heider, 1958, pp. 82–84). There Heider characterizes any “action outcome” (the result of an action, not the action itself) as “dependent upon a combination of effective personal force and effective environmental force” (p. 82). In elaborations of this claim (pp. 83–87), Heider offered a complex picture. He argued that for an action outcome to occur, there needs to be a concomitance of two elements: the agent’s attempt to perform the action (trying) and

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supporting factors (can) that lie in the agent (effort, ability) or in the environment (e.g., opportunity, luck, favorable conditions). Trying is the execution of an intention, so Heider stayed true to his analysis of action in terms of intentionality (personal causality). Only for the can forces did Heider apply the distinction between person factors and environmental factors, and these can forces play a very circumscribed role: they are the necessary elements for an intentional action to be successful, the elements that enable the desired outcome to occur (Heider, 1958, p. 109). Such enabling factor explanations (Malle, 1999) answer the specific explanatory question of how it was possible that the action outcome was attained (Malle, Knobe, O’Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson, 2000; McClure & Hilton, 1997). Only for this explanation mode did Heider introduce the distinction between internal and external causal factors. There is no indication in the text that Heider thought people use the internal–external distinction when explaining behavior in general. On the contrary, Heider stated that people explain why a person is trying to do something by referring to the “reasons behind the intention” (Heider, 1958, p. 110; see also pp. 125–129). The contrast between these two types of explanations – why the action was chosen and what enabled it to succeed – can be illustrated with the following passage from Gilbert (1998, p. 96): If a pitcher who wishes to retire a batter (motivation) throws a burning fastball (action) directly into the wind (environmental influence), then the observer should conclude that the pitcher has a particularly strong arm (ability). If a batter tries to hit that ball (motivation) but fails (action), then the observer should conclude that the batter lacked coordination (ability) or was blinded by the sun (environmental influence).

The observer’s reasoning here is entirely focused on accounting for successful or failed outcomes; the question of why the batter and the pitcher acted as they did is not answered by reference to either arm, wind, or sun. This why question is already answered by mentioning the pitcher’s obvious desire to retire the batter and the batter’s obvious desire to hit the ball and get a run. Talking about the arm, wind, and sun, by contrast, answers the question of how the outcome was attained (Malle et al., 2000). In an interview with Bill Ickes (1976, p. 14), Heider explicitly distinguished between these two questions and hence between two types of explanation: 1. the attribution of outcomes to causal factors (i.e., enabling factor explanations); 2. the attribution of intentional actions to the actor’s motives (i.e., reasons for acting). Heider himself never developed a model of motive attributions or reason explanations, and he felt that these explanations had not been adequately treated by contemporary attribution work (Ickes, 1976, p. 14). By contrast, Heider felt that outcome attributions (e.g., what made a student fail or succeed on a test) were well developed in Weiner’s work (e.g., Weiner, 1986; Weiner et al., 1972). The misperception that Heider proposed the external–internal dichotomy as the fundamental dimension of explanation may thus stem from a confounding of outcomes

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Bertram F. Malle (explained by enabling factors) and actions (explained by motives or reasons). The following passages from Hastorf et al. (1970) illustrate this confusion: Presumably the outcomes of action are caused by some combination of personal characteristics and environmental forces [outcome attribution]. The person may have done something because he had to do it … or because he wanted to do it [action explanation]. (p. 64) When we infer that the combination of ability and effort was stronger than the external forces, we infer that internal causality was present [outcome attribution]. Only then do we say such things as “he did it because he wanted to” [action explanation]. (p. 89)

In both of these passages, the authors treat two different explanatory questions as if they were one and the same. The judgment whether “he did it because he wanted to” or “because he had to do it” clarifies the agent’s reasons for an action. These reasons can be given even before the agent tries to perform the action because reasons explain the intention, whether or not the intention gets fulfilled. By contrast, the judgments about ability, effort, or external forces clarify how it was possible that the action outcome was attained (an enabling factor explanation). This explanation can be given only after the agent tried to perform the action – if he succeeded – whereas reason explanations track the motivation for the action in the first place. Thus, whereas Heider has been consistently credited with introducing the person–situation dichotomy in attribution theory, Heider’s actual theory was predicated on the distinction between personal causality (which accounts for intentional events) and impersonal causality (which accounts for unintentional events) – later recognized as a core constituent of social cognition (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001; Zelazo, Astington, & Olson, 1999). Heider’s analysis of personal causality revealed a complex set of mental states centered on intention; and people, when trying to make sense of intentional behavior, attempt to infer those states (such as beliefs, wishes, and sentiments), which were the reasons that guided the actor’s behavior.

Jones and Davis’s Abandoned Theory of Explanation Jones and Davis (1965) were the first to introduce a theory of dispositional inference, specifying conditions under which a perceiver infers a stable disposition (personality trait or attitude) from an agent’s behavior. But before they introduced this theory, the first few pages of their famous chapter appeared to go in a different direction. They targeted just the issue that Heider had left open: exactly how people explain intentional action by means of motives or reasons. In a short section, entitled “The Naive Explanation of Human Action: Explanation by Attributing Intentions,” the authors attempted to account for “a perceiver’s inferences about what an actor was trying to achieve by a particular action” (p. 222) and the process of finding “sufficient reason why the person acted” (p. 220), because “the perceiver’s explanation comes to a stop when an intention or motive is assigned that has the quality of being reason enough” (p. 220). Despite an apparent plan to present a theory of action explanation by reasons, this was the last that Jones and Davis wrote about action explanations.3 They immediately turned to the conditions under which perceivers infer traits (e.g., arrogance or dominance; see p. 223) from single behavioral events. This theory was refined in several models of dispositional attribution (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Quattrone, 1982), and it inspired research on stereotypes (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991;

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Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998), judgment biases (e.g., Ross, 1977), and impression formation (e.g., Reeder, 1997; Trope, 1986). However, Jones and Davis (1965) wholly left behind the social perceiver’s attempt to find the agent’s reasons for acting,4 and it was up to the next attribution theorists to tackle this question.

Kelley’s Theory of Attribution as Causal Judgment Kelley’s (1967) paper on attribution theory in social psychology is generally considered the first systematic and general treatment of lay causal explanations. Kelley’s self-ascribed goal in the paper was “to highlight some of the central ideas contained in Heider’s theory” (Kelley, 1967, p. 192). Specifically, the two central ideas on which Kelley focused were: 1. In the attribution process “the choice is between external attribution and internal … attribution” (Kelley, 1967, p. 194). 2. The procedure of arriving at these external or internal attributions is analogous to experimental methodology.5 Two questions must be considered here, one historical, one substantive. First, were these two ideas really central to Heider’s theory, as Kelley claimed? Second, do the two ideas together provide a strong foundation for a theory of behavior explanation? As argued earlier, Heider applied the external–internal dichotomy to action outcomes that either succeeded or failed. Explanations of intentional action, by contrast, involve the agent’s reasons, and for Heider an external–internal distinction was not useful in this domain. Nonetheless, to support the notion that Heider considered the process of explaining as analogous to experimental methodology (what Kelley termed the covariation principle), Kelley quoted a passage from the very end of Heider’s book (Heider, 1958, p. 297), which is itself largely based on the section “Attribution of Desire and Pleasure” (Heider, 1958, pp. 146–160). In this section, however, Heider focused entirely on the attribution of impersonal or unintentional events such as enjoyment. Heider never claimed that all behavioral events are explained by means of covariation. Historically, then, Heider provided at best partial backing for Kelley’s two postulates. Whether Kelley correctly represented Heider or not, the question remains whether Kelley’s theory generally accounts for folk explanations of behavior – and not merely for explanations of unintentional events. As a starting point, consider the following example that Kelley offers to illustrate the attribution process: Am I to take my enjoyment of a movie as a basis for an attribution to the movie (that it is intrinsically enjoyable) or for an attribution to myself (that I have a specific kind of desire relevant to movies)? The inference as to where to locate the dispositional properties responsible for the effect is made by interpreting the raw data (the enjoyment) in the context of subsidiary information from experiment-like variations of conditions. (Kelley, 1967, p. 194)

This example features an actor’s attempt to explain enjoyment – an unintentional event. Indeed, throughout his chapter Kelley applies this attribution analysis to “effects such as experiences, sensations, or responses” (p. 196) and “impressions” (p. 197), as well as arousal

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Bertram F. Malle states and evaluative reactions (pp. 231–232). All of these events are unintentional. Kelley occasionally claimed that his model also extended to the case of “inferring a person’s intentions from knowledge of the consequences of his actions” (p. 196, see also p. 193). However, no theory, empirical data, or examples clarified how this process might work. Of course, the absence of such clarification is not yet proof that Kelley’s model fails to account for intentional actions. But difficulties emerge quickly when one applies either the person–situation dichotomy or covariation reasoning to intentional actions. Consider the following scenario: Having just arrived in the department as a new Assistant Professor, Pauline finds in her mailbox a note that says “Let’s have lunch tomorrow. Faculty club at 12:30? – Fred.” Pauline is a bit surprised. She met Fred W. during her interview, but she wouldn’t have expected him to ask her out for lunch.

Pauline now tries to explain Fred’s (by assumption intentional) action of leaving the note in her mailbox. Kelley’s attribution model would suggest that Pauline’s choice is between a person attribution (something about Fred caused the action) and a situation attribution (something about her or the circumstances caused the action). But right away, this is a confusing choice. Surely something about Fred must have been present in order for him to put the note in her mailbox: motives, an intention, a fairly controlled movement – all inescapable implications of Fred’s action being intentional. In some basic sense, intentional actions are always caused by the person (D’Andrade, 1987; Heider, 1958; Kruglanski, 1975; Malle & Knobe, 1997). At the same time, the situation had to play some role in Fred’s choice as well – but the situation as subjectively represented by Fred. He wouldn’t have put this note in Pauline’s mailbox if he hadn’t expected her to check her mailbox and if he hadn’t thought about a good time and place for the lunch and had not hoped her response to the invitation to be positive. If Pauline knew Fred’s deliberations, she would at once understand and be able to explain why he wrote the note. By contrast, she would not be able to explain it with the obvious conclusion that “something about Fred caused the action” or the vague insight that “something about the situation caused the action.” Is there a sense in which the “experimental methodology” Kelley has in mind could prove useful? If Pauline engaged in covariation reasoning, she would have to ask the three famous questions about consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency to arrive at a plausible explanation of Fred’s action. If we play it by the books, however, this will generate few answers. Assume that no other faculty member has so far, on Pauline’s first day on the job, left a note in her mailbox (low consensus). What can she conclude from that? Fred may have wanted to welcome her, or go out on a date with her, or discuss some common research ideas with her – there are just too many possibilities. All of these explanations might be labeled “person attributions,” because they are possible goals/desires Fred had when leaving the note. But making a sheer person attribution is uninformative in this case. Pauline does not doubt that Fred had some goal; she rather wonders what goal Fred had. Similar problems arise with the other covariation questions: has Fred performed this kind of action before? Pauline won’t know, but assuming she finds out that this is the first time Fred did it (low consistency), she learns only that his action has something to do with

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her or with this particular point in time, while still not knowing why he did it. Finally, consider that Fred has left this kind of note with other people as well (low distinctiveness). In this case, Pauline may conclude that Fred shows some habit, which is also of limited use. She would want to know specifically whether his habit is to invite all new faculty members, or only women, or members of her research area, etc. Systematic collection of such covariation information (if available) may sometimes prove helpful by ruling out some possible explanations of the action in question. For example, if Pauline somehow learns that Fred doesn’t act this way with others and that others don’t act this way, it can’t just be a habit or department culture. But there are still critical steps to go, and in those steps the explainer will not try to choose between “person” and “situation” but rather infer specific goals, beliefs, and the like, that were – in the explainer’s assessment – the reasons for the agent’s action. Over the years, Kelley’s covariation model and its refinements have been tested empirically and appeared to receive reasonable support (e.g., Försterling, 1992; McArthur, 1972; Sutton & McClure, 2001). However, these studies suffered from a pair of heavy demands. First, they used person–situation ratings as dependent measures; people were not actually asked to provide natural explanations. Second, the experimenter always presented covariation information to the participants, and unsurprisingly they made use of it. There is no evidence that people spontaneously search for covariation information when trying to explain behavior. Lalljee, Lamb, Furnham, and Jaspars (1984) asked their participants to write down the kind of information they would like to have in order to explain various events, and covariation information was in low demand under these conditions. Similarly, Ahn, Kalish, Medin, and Gelman (1995) allowed people to choose between receiving covariation information or some other information, and explainers were less interested in covariation information than in information about generative forces or mechanisms. Nonetheless, we can safely assume that people occasionally seek out covariation information for such unintentional events as headaches or moods and such outcomes as success or failure. These events occur repeatedly, in different contexts, and for many people, thus making covariation information more readily available. However, as we have seen, covariation reasoning about person and situation causes is ineffectual in the case of explaining intentional actions (Knobe & Malle, 2002). To summarize, Kelley’s (1967) model of attribution contains two core propositions: (a) that attribution is a choice between external and internal causes and (b) that the cognitive procedure by which people arrive at this choice is covariation assessment. Both propositions are problematic. First, the internal–external dimension may be a relevant distinction in explanations of unintentional events, but it does not capture people’s explanations of intentional action. Second, covariation assessment is used far less than has been commonly assumed, and it is not at all useful as a method to generate explanations of intentional actions.

Other Attribution Research The three classic works by Heider, Jones and Davis, and Kelley were not the only important contributions to the study of attribution. In particular, Weiner made seminal contributions to our knowledge of outcome attribution (Weiner, 1986; Weiner et al., 1972). In the domain of achievements, he analyzed the emotions and evaluations people have of others

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Bertram F. Malle who succeed or fail. He highlighted the causal dimension of stability as complementing externality–internality and showed that people who failed because of lack of effort (unstable internal) were evaluated more negatively than those who failed because of inability (stable internal). Later Weiner also analyzed other outcomes that happen to people, such as sickness or stigma, and he focused on the dimension of controllability to account for social perceivers’ responses to such outcomes (Weiner, 1995). For example, people are more angry at agents who suffer negative outcomes brought about by controllable causes (e.g., illness because of risky behavior) than agents who suffer negative outcomes brought about by uncontrollable causes (e.g., illness because of a genetic precondition). An overlooked aspect of Weiner’s (1986, 1995) work is that it provides considerable evidence against Kelley’s theory, because two additional attribution dimensions are needed besides external–internal to account for people’s emotional and moral responses to outcomes, and Weiner’s predictions were developed without reference to covariation reasoning. However, like models of dispositional attribution and covariation reasoning, Weiner’s models of outcome attribution do not speak to Heider’s demands for a theory of action attribution. Folk explanations of intentional action remain to be accounted for. More in Heider’s spirit, Buss (1978) argued that ordinary people do not explain all behavior with causes (as Kelley had suggested) but rather use reasons to explain intentional behavior. Reasons and causes are fundamentally different types of explanation, so Buss’s attribution theory confounded the two. Buss’s (1978) article drew rather negative responses (e.g., Harvey & Tucker, 1979; Kruglanski, 1979), and mainstream attribution theory remained unaffected by his critique. Over the next decade, other scholars launched similar critiques, arguing that reasons are an autonomous form of explanation (Locke & Pennington, 1982) and that attribution theories must incorporate reasons and goals into their conceptual repertoire (Lalljee & Abelson, 1983; Read, 1987; for a review see McClure, 2002). However, such an integration proved difficult, in part because it was not made sufficiently clear why reasons are used to explain intentional behavior in the first place. What makes intentional behaviors so special that they require a unique mode of explanation? An important contribution to attribution theory emerged in a series of papers on the conversational nature of explanations (Hilton, 1990; Kidd & Amabile, 1981; Turnbull, 1986), which characterized explanations as answers to why questions. Such question–answer pairs sometimes occur in people’s own heads, but more often they occur as an actual conversational exchange between a questioner and an explainer. This conversational analysis comes with the important implication that, in answering a why question, explainers must take into consideration (a) exactly what the questioner finds puzzling (Hilton & Slugoski, 1986; Turnbull, 1986) and (b) what information the questioner already has available (Slugoski, Lalljee, Lamb, & Ginsburg, 1993). In a sense, the explainer anticipates what kinds of possible answers the questioner had in mind when asking the question (Bromberger, 1965). The insight that explanations are subject to conversational processes was a minor revolution, because it pulled attributions out of their cognitive rabbit hole and highlighted the fundamentally social nature of explanations. However, research into the conversational features of explanations still did not challenge the conceptual apparatus of person–situation causes inherited from Kelley (see, e.g., Norenzayan & Schwarz, 1999).

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The preceding overview has pointed to a number of shortcomings in classic and contemporary attribution theories. First, after Heider, the conceptual framework underlying people’s explanations was grossly simplified, ignoring such important concepts as intention, goal, and reason. As a result, no adequate accounts of intentional action explanations were offered. Second, covariation analysis was the only psychological process postulated to drive people’s construction of explanations, but because it is used much less than was previously assumed, other processes need to be explored. Third, the conversational aspects of explanations must be integrated with the unique conceptual and cognitive aspects of intentional action explanations. To resolve these problems, we need to first locate behavior explanations in their proper folk-conceptual framework – the network of concepts that people use to make sense of human behavior. Second, we need to specify the psychological processes that enable people to construct explanations. And third, we need to track the communicative and linguistic manifestations of explanations because they are clearly used for a variety of social-interactive goals, and language is the tool that accomplishes these goals. The folk-conceptual theory of behavior explanation (Malle, 1999, 2004) tries to meet all three of these objectives.

The Folk-Conceptual Theory of Behavior Explanation Folk concepts of mind and behavior Past attribution theories ascribed to laypeople a simple framework of “effects” (behaviors, outcomes, or events) and “causes,” with the latter falling into personal (dispositional or internal) and situational (external) causes. This framework is incompatible with what we know about children’s emerging theory of mind and behavior – the conceptual network that 4–5-year-olds rely on when interpreting human behavior (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990). In children’s theory of mind, we see the importance of a concept of intentionality, of the mind contrasted with observable behaviors, and of specific mental states, such as beliefs and desires, that explain intentional behavior (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). It is unlikely that when children grow up they forget these concepts and suddenly begin to explain behavior using a person–situation dichotomy. Instead, the adult’s folk conception of mind and behavior is continuous with the child’s framework, with more numerous and more subtle distinctions but essentially the same two-part structure. First, people have perceptual and cognitive systems that filter, group, and integrate certain stimuli into such concepts or categories as agent, intention, belief, and reason (D’Andrade, 1987; Kashima, McKintyre, & Clifford, 1998; Leslie, 1995; Malle, 2004; Malle & Knobe, 1997). Second, people make assumptions about these categories and their relationships (Fodor, 1992; Morton, 1996). For example, coordinated movements of agents are classified into the category intentional action (Wellman & Phillips, 2001; Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001), and the concept of intentional action relies on the interplay of multiple mental state categories, including belief and desire (Malle & Knobe, 1997). Intentionality is arguably the core of this framework (Malle et al., 2001). It directly connects behavior with mind by classifying a behavior as intentional when it is characteristically generated by certain mental states (such as belief, intention, and awareness). This postulate

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Bertram F. Malle Desire

Belief

Skill

Intention

Awareness

Intentionality

Figure 3.1 A model of the folk concept of intentionality. Adapted from “The folk concept of intentionality,” by B. F. Malle and J. Knobe, 1997, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 101–121. © Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., with permission.

had the least impact on subsequent attribution research, and the greatest weakness of past attribution theories has therefore been the treatment of intentional action. The folk-conceptual theory of explanation tries to address this weakness. Intentionality. When explaining behavior, people distinguish sharply between intentional and unintentional events (Malle, 1999, 2004, 2007). Social perceivers show a high level of agreement in their intentionality judgments (Malle & Knobe, 1997), and they do so by relying on a shared folk concept of intentionality (Figure 3.1). This concept includes five requirements for an action to be judged as intentional: the action must be based on a desire for an outcome, beliefs about the action’s relationship with this outcome, a resulting intention to perform the action, and skill and awareness when actually performing it (Malle & Knobe, 1997, Studies 2–4). Subsequent studies showed that the core concept of intention is seen as a choice and commitment to act that flows from a reasoning process, in which the agent weighs a number of beliefs and desires and settles on a course of action (Malle & Knobe, 2001; Monroe & Malle, 2010). Modes of explanation. Unintentional events are explained by referring to “mechanical” causal factors (e.g., physical objects and events, but also traits or others’ behaviors), and we may label them cause explanations (top of Figure 3.2). That is because people assume no other link that mediates between behavior and explanation besides causality (i.e., no components of intentionality such as awareness or intention). Consider the following examples, extracted from original transcripts: I almost failed my exams. – Why? – Oh, ’cuz I didn’t really prepare for them. My dad got mad with me because something was wrong with my computer and he did not know how to fix it. A friend cried on the phone. – Why? – She felt that no one loved her.

In contrast, explanations of intentional behavior are far more complex because the folk concept of intentional action is far more complex. As a result, explanations of intentional action break down into three modes (bottom of Figure 3.2): reason explanations, causal history of reason explanations, and enabling factor explanations. Reason explanations. Reason explanations are the most frequently used mode, comprising about three-quarters of all action explanations (Malle, 2004; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007). They link directly to the heart of the intentionality concept – the reasoning process

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Reasons

Causes

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Intention

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Enabling Factors

Figure 3.2 Four modes of explanation for unintentional and intentional behavior. Adapted from “How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework,” by B. F. Malle, 1999, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 23–48. © Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, with permission.

leading up to an intention. The concept of intentionality specifies two paradigmatic types of reasons that precede the formation of an intention: the agent’s desire for an outcome and a belief that the intended action leads to that outcome. For example, a student explained why she chose psychology as her major by saying, “I want to go to graduate school in counseling psychology [desire]; I think psychology is the right major to have as background for counseling psychology [belief].” In many naturally occurring explanations, other reasons are mentioned in addition to or instead of the paradigmatic reasons, such as desires for avoiding alternative outcomes, beliefs about the context, beliefs about consequences, and expressions of valuing the action itself. Reasons have two defining features: subjectivity and rationality. Subjectivity refers to the fact that reason explanations are designed to capture the agent’s subjective reasons for acting. That is, social perceivers normally try to reconstruct the considerations the agent underwent when forming an intention, and they thus take the agent’s subjective viewpoint when explaining the action. For example, the explanation “She thought she was late for her class” in response to the question “Why did she rush off?” illustrates the subjectivity assumption, because the explainer subtly distances himself from the agent’s belief and implies that, in reality, she probably was not late. But it was that subjective belief, not objective reality, that guided the agent’s action and thus explains it. Rationality, the second defining feature of reason explanations, refers to the fact that the contents of mental states that are cited as reasons have to hang together so as to offer support for the “reasonableness” of the intention and action they brought about. For an intentional action to be adequately explained by reasons, the action must fulfill the agent’s predominant desire in light of her beliefs. Philosophers often speak of a “practical reasoning argument,” in which reasons are the premises and the decision to act is its conclusion. Consider the following explanation: “Why did you go running?” – “Because I wanted to get in better shape, and … I figured that I can do that by going running.” Schematically: X wanted O [to get in better shape]. X believed that A [going running] leads to O [getting in better shape]. Therefore, X decided to A [go running].

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Bertram F. Malle In everyday conversation, the logic of rationality will be somewhat cursory and the premises will not always be made explicit. In the earlier example of an agent rushing off, the action was rationally supported by her belief that she was late for class and the unmentioned but implied desire to be on time for class. The action would not have been rationally supported if the agent had thought there was plenty of time left or if she had had no desire to be on time. Social perceivers would consider it irrational to rush off in this case, or they would assume that some other reason can explain the action in a rational way. Causal history of reason explanations. Even though people explain most intentional behaviors by reference to the agent’s reasons, they explain some of them by pointing to factors that lay in the background of those reasons. These factors can be subsumed under the label causal history of reasons (CHR) and include such forces as the agent’s unconscious mental states, personality, upbringing, culture, and the immediate context (Malle, 1994, 1999; Malle et al., 2000; O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002). Whereas reason explanations try to capture what the agent herself considered and weighed when deciding to act, causal history explanations take a step back and try to capture what led up to the agent’s reasons in the first place. For example, when clarifying why Kim didn’t vote, an explainer might say “She is lazy” or “Her whole family is apolitical.” These statements provide explanations of an intentional action, but they do not pick out Kim’s subjective reasons for not voting. Causal history of reason explanations help explain an intentional action by citing causal antecedents to the agent’s reasoning and her decision to act, but there is no assumption that the agent actively considered those antecedents in her reasoning process. Hence, when an explainer states that “Kim didn’t vote because she is lazy,” he does not imply that Kim reasoned: “I am lazy; therefore I shouldn’t vote.” Thus, even though CHR explanations help explain intentional actions, they are not subject to the constraints of subjectivity and rationality as reason explanations are (Malle et al., 2000). The agent need not have considered or even been aware of the causal history factors cited in the explanation, nor do CHR factors provide rational support for an explained action. Offering CHR explanations is therefore not an act of perspective taking but rather takes attention away from the agent’s subjective processes of choice and intention and locates the agent’s action in a broader causal nexus. Enabling factor explanations. The third, and relatively rare, mode of explaining intentional action refers to factors that enabled the action to come about as it was intended. These enabling factor explanations refer to the agent’s skill, effort, opportunities, facilitating circumstances, and the like. Whereas reason explanations and CHR explanations focus on clarifying what motivated the agent’s intention and action, enabling factor explanations take it as a given that the agent had motives and attempt to clarify how it was possible that the action was successfully performed. For example, “She hit her free throws because she had practiced all week.” This is not a motivational account of why the agent decided to hit the free throws; rather, the agent’s practicing is identified as the critical factor that allowed her to perform the action the way she had intended. Consequently, enabling factor explanations are offered primarily for difficult actions (Malle et al., 2000, McClure & Hilton, 1997). The folk-conceptual framework for explaining behavior thus contains four modes of explanation: people explain unintentional behavior with causes, and they explain intentional behavior by either referring to the agent’s reasons, citing causal factors that lay in the history of those reasons, or clarifying what factors enabled an agent to successfully perform an

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intended action. Before we move on to the psychological processes that guide people’s choices among these modes, we need to briefly examine reason explanations more closely, for they have two further features of psychological significance: explainers can offer either belief reasons or desire reasons, and they can mark those reasons as subjective mental states by using appropriate mental state verbs (such as “thinks,” “wanted”) or leave them unmarked. Belief and desire reasons. In people’s folk concept of intentionality, both beliefs and desires serve as necessary conditions of an intention to act (Malle & Knobe, 1997), and both are frequently cited in explanations of intentional action. For example, when explaining why Ian has been working so much lately, one might cite a desire such as “He wants that promotion” or a belief such as “He realizes the project is due in a week.” At times it may not matter whether the explainer mentions a belief reason or a desire reasons because one implies the other (“He thinks hard work will get him the promotion” ⇔ “He wants that promotion”). But at other times it matters quite a bit. For one thing, belief reasons, more than desire reasons, provide idiosyncratic details about the agent’s decision-making process, such as rejected options, specific plans of action initiation, and considered long-term consequences. For another, belief reasons refer to the agent’s thinking and knowledge, drawing attention to the agent’s rational, deliberative side, whereas desire reasons highlight what the agent wants, needs, hence lacks (Malle et al., 2000). Mental state markers. A reason explanation can be linguistically expressed in two different ways. The explainer may use a mental state verb to mark the type of reason cited (i.e., a belief or desire), or the explainer may omit such a verb and directly report the content of that reason. Suppose our explainer is faced with the question “Why did she go to the Italian café ?” If he chose to cite a desire reason, he could use the marked form of desire ascription: She went to the café because she wants to have an authentic cappuccino.

Or he could use the unmarked form: She went to the café [ ____ ] to have an authentic cappuccino.

Likewise, if the explainer chose to cite a belief reason, he could use the marked form of belief ascription: She went to the café because she thinks they have the best cappuccino.

Or he could use the unmarked form: She went to the café because [ ____ ] they have the best cappuccino.

Marked or unmarked reasons do not express two different hypotheses about why the action was performed; rather, they express the same hypothesis in two different ways. This difference is not trivial, however. Citing or omitting mental state markers can serve significant social functions, both for explainers’ self-presentation and for expressing their opinion about the agent (Malle, 1999; Malle et al., 2000). In the context of several examples of CHR explanations and reason explanations, Table 3.1 shows both types of reasons, marked and unmarked. (More examples of all modes and types can be found in Malle, 2004.) Note that causal history factors can refer to the person,

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Bertram F. Malle Table 3.1 Reason explanations and causal history of reason (CHR) explanations for two behaviors. Behavior Kim chose not to vote in the last election.

Brian used heavy drugs last Sunday at the party.

Reason explanation

CHR explanation

She thought none of the candidates was trustworthy. [marked belief reason] She didn’t want to support the system. [marked desire reason]

She doesn’t realize that every vote counts.

He was curious what it would feel like. [marked desire reason] He thought it would be cool. [marked belief reason]

A bunch of others used them.

She is lazy.

He grew up in a drug-dealing home.

Note. The terms marked and unmarked refer to reason explanations that are expressed either with or without a mental state marker (“he thought,” “she wanted”). Adapted from “How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework,” by B. F. Malle, 1999, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 23–48. © Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., with permission.

the situation, other people, traits, mental states, or interactions among them. In principle, this choice could have psychological significance, but in our studies we have found no interesting correlates of “causal locus” – neither within CHR explanations nor within cause explanations (e.g., Malle et al., 2007; O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002).

Interlude: measurement concerns Previously offered alternatives to attribution theory were not able to unseat the traditional theory. This may have been in part because those alternatives were not comprehensive enough – focusing, for example, only on goals or only on conversational structures. But another obstacle was researchers’ deeply ingrained habit of using only rating scales to assess attributions. Participants were typically asked to express their explanations on predefined person–situation scales rather than in the more natural form of verbal utterances. As a result, participants had to transform their complex explanatory hypotheses into simple ratings, and the fact that they were willing and able to do so was mistaken for evidence that they actually thought in those simple terms. A few studies analyzed free-response explanations, but the coding was again limited to person–situation categories. This person–situation coding reflects the linguistic surface of explanations, such as the use of mental state markers (McGill, 1989; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973; for evidence and discussion, see Malle, 1999, Study 4, and Malle et al., 2000, Study 4). Predictable distortions result from treating intentional action explanations within the person–situation frame, illustrated by the following example (cf. Antaki, 1994): Why are you going to Iceland for your holidays? – Because it’s cool there.

The standard attribution treatment of such an explanation would be to call it a “situation cause.” However, the cool weather in Iceland can hardly cause the agent from afar to

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Determine intentionality of behavior

if unintentional

offer cause

if intentional

offer reason

offer EF

belief

offer CHR

desire

marked

marked

unmarked

unmarked

Figure 3.3 Choice points in constructing a behavior explanation. Adapted from B. F. Malle, 2004, How the mind explains behavior: Folk explanations, meaning, and social interaction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Note: EF = enabling factor explanation. CHR = causal history of reason explanation.

go there; rather, the agent thinks that it is pleasantly cool in Iceland, and that is her (belief) reason for going there. (It would still be her belief reason even if it were in fact warm in Iceland.) Instead of trying to diagnose the locus of some “cause” in the vague space between person and situation, we have to recognize that most folk explanations of intentional behavior refer to the agent’s reasons in light of which and on the grounds of which she acted. Once the proper folk-conceptual categories (of reasons, causal histories, etc.) are applied to naturally uttered explanations, they can be reliably classified and analyzed (Malle, 1998/2009);6 and these classifications show more sensitivity to important psychological variables than either person–situation codings or person–situation ratings (e.g., Malle et al., 2007; O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002). The researcher does the theoretical work here, and participants simply do what they do in everyday life – express explanations of behavior in their own words. The lesson should be clear: if theoretical progress is to be made in the attribution domain, both theory and measurement must reflect the complexity of people’s explanations. Multiple modes, types, and linguistic forms have to be described, conceptually analyzed, and adequately measured.

Psychological processes underlying behavior explanations The conceptual layer of the folk-conceptual theory of explanation showed that explainers have a number of choices to make when explaining behavior (Figure 3.3): they need to determine whether the behavior in question is intentional or not; if intentional, whether to explain it with reasons, causal history factors, or enabling factors; and if a reason is chosen, whether to cite the agent’s beliefs or desires and whether to use a mental state marker or not.7

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Bertram F. Malle Adding a process layer now to the theory, a first important question is what psychological processes determine the explainer’s choices among these various explanatory tools. A fair amount of research is available to answer this question, and I will discuss it below. A second process question is how the explainer goes about selecting a specific explanatory content (e.g., the belief reason, “because she thought the door was locked”). No theory of behavior explanation will be able to predict specific contents of explanations, but the psychological processes people rely on when searching for those contents may be identifiable. Currently, very little research is available on this issue, in part because the process of covariation reasoning has been so dominant in the research literature. It is evident, however, that many more processes guide people’s search for specific explanation contents – among them knowledge structures, projection, simulation, explicit perspective-taking, and contrast analysis (Ames, 2004; Hilton, 2007; Lalljee & Abelson, 1983; Malle, 2004, 2008). All of these processes deserve greater attention in future research.8 What do we know about the psychological determinants of people’s explanatory choices? At least three such determinants must be considered: 1. Judgments of behavior attributes 2. Pragmatic goals 3. Information resources Judgments of behavior attributes. Before offering an explanation, social perceivers make several (often implicit) judgments about the behavior to be explained. One such judgment obviously concerns the intentionality of the behavior. If considered unintentional, explanations will refer to a cause; if considered intentional, explanations will cite a reason, causal history, or enabling factor (Malle, 1999). Among intentional behaviors, a second judgment concerns the difficulty of the action. If the action is considered difficult to produce, explainers will often choose enabling factors; otherwise, they are likely to choose reasons or causal histories (Malle et al., 2000; McClure & Hilton, 1997). A third judgment determines whether the to-be-explained behavior is singular or represents a trend (across time or across multiple agents). If the behavior is judged to be a trend, the rate of CHR explanations increases (O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002), primarily because multiple instances (or agents) can have multiple reasons, and a CHR explanation can sometimes tie these reasons together by citing an antecedent for all of them (e.g., “Why did you go shopping so many times this week?” – “Because I have three children”). Pragmatic goals. Pragmatic goals refer to the social projects that explainers try to accomplish with their explanations, such as lessening another person’s confusion, managing their own status in the interaction, or fending off blame. Two groups of goals can be distinguished by their primary beneficiary: audience design, which chiefly benefits the conversation partner, and impression management, which chiefly benefits the explainer. Audience design consists in tailoring an explanation so the audience can learn what it wants to know. The clearest case of such design is when the explainer matches an explanation mode to the type of question asked (Malle et al., 2000; McClure & Hilton, 1998). This question can inquire either about the agent’s immediate motivation (“What for?”, which triggers reasons), about the background of that motivation (“How come?”, which triggers

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causal histories of reasons), about the factors that enabled successful action performance (“How was this possible?”, which triggers enabling factors). More subtle adjustments include offering a belief reason when it can be assumed that the audience already knows the desire reason, or offering a CHR explanation when the reasons for the action are obvious. Whereas audience design falls under the conversational maxim of relevance (Grice, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 1986), impression management does not merely try to optimize communication but rather is an act of social influence. Its impact can reach all explanatory choices, from both the actor and the observer perspective (Malle et al., 2000). As actors, people increase their use of reasons, and especially belief reasons, when trying to appear rational. As observers, they explicitly add a mental state marker to a belief reason when they want to distance themselves from the agent (e.g., “Why is he looking at apartments?” – “He thinks I am moving in with him”). Information resources. Deficits in relevant information about the agent, the behavior, or the context can limit the explainer’s ability to accomplish his goals, and such deficits often require adjustments of one’s choices among explanatory tools. This can be seen, for example, in the choice of belief reasons vs. desire reasons. We find that observers, compared to actors, offer more desire reasons than belief reasons (Malle et al., 2007). That is because desire reasons are easier to infer from contextual and cultural knowledge, whereas belief reasons are more idiosyncratic and sometimes accessible only to the actor. However, when observers know the agent well or were present when the action took place, their rate of belief reasons increases to resemble that of actors (Malle et al., 2007). A somewhat more complex case is the role of information resources in the choice between reasons and causal history explanations (Malle et al., 2007; O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002). In short, when explaining their own intentional behaviors (as actors), people are in the best position to have every kind of information available and predominantly (in 80% of cases) offer reasons. When explaining other people’s behaviors (as observers), people lack various kinds of information and will try to infer or construct reasons, but this construction reaches a limit, yielding an average of 65% reasons. Interestingly, this lower rate of reasons persists even when observers are present at the time of action and when observers know the agent well (Malle et al., 2007). This suggests that the actor–observer asymmetry is due not to general knowledge differences but to access differences at a more fundamental level. For example, because actors typically consider their reasons for acting before they decide to act, they have the ability to directly recall their own reasons. Observers, by contrast, must guess those reasons or infer them from observable information. We can systematically relate the discussed psychological determinants to the range of explanatory choices displayed in Figure 3.2, forming linear equations that connect a particular explanatory choice to a set of psychological determinants (Table 3.2). These equations have received some empirical support (Malle, 1999; Malle et al., 2000, 2007), but more precise relations should emerge from future research. This theoretical approach of linking the choice of explanatory tools to a limited set of psychological determinants has been successfully applied to predicting strategies of impression management in explanation (Malle et al., 2000), differences between explanations of group and individual behaviors (O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002), and a variety of actor–observer asymmetries in explanations of behavior (Malle et al., 2007). Other domains are open to

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Bertram F. Malle Table 3.2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Linking selected explanatory choices to their psychological determinants.

REA/CHR/EF vs. CAU = b1 (behavior intentionality) EF vs. REA/CHR = b1 (behavior difficulty) + b2 (explanatory question) + b3 (difficulty × question) CHR vs. REA = b1 (behavior trend) + b2 (information) + b3 (impression management) belief REA vs. desire REA = b1 (information) + b2 (impression management) marked belief vs. unmarked belief = b1 (impression management)

Note. REA = Reason explanation. CHR = Causal history of reason explanation. EF = Enabling factor explanation. CAU = cause explanation.

investigation as well, such as close relationships, negotiation, psychopathology, and crosscultural comparisons (Malle, 2004). To illustrate one application, I describe the death and rebirth of the well-known actor–observer asymmetry in attribution.

Application: actor–observer asymmetries Few hypotheses have been as widely accepted in the social-psychological literature as Jones and Nisbett’s (1972) classic hypothesis of an actor–observer asymmetry in explanations: “There is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions” (p. 80). Surprisingly, a meta-analysis of 173 published studies testing this hypothesis showed that the average effect size for this pervasive difference between actor and observer attributions was zero (Malle, 2006). That is, when explanations are analyzed in terms of traditional attribution concepts – referring to either person (or disposition) vs. situation causes – no difference exists between actors’ and observers’ explanations of behavior. But do people really explain their own behavior the same way as they explain other people’s behavior? They do not. But to see this, we need to apply a different theory. When explanations are analyzed within the terms of the folk-conceptual theory, strong and reliable actor–observer differences emerge (Malle et al., 2007). In particular, consideration of the choices people make when explaining intentional behavior and of the psychological determinants of these choices leads to three actor–observer hypotheses (for more detail, see Malle et al., 2007, pp. 495–496).9 First, actors are predicted to use relatively more reason explanations (and fewer CHR explanations) than observers do. That is because actors have better access to their reasons (often through direct recall) and engage in stronger impression management to portray themselves in a positive light (which reasons accomplish better than CHR explanations). Second, actors are predicted to use relatively more belief reasons (and fewer desire reasons) than observers do. That is because actors’ advantage in information access is especially pronounced for the more idiosyncratic and context-specific belief reasons. Third, actors are predicted to use relatively fewer mental state markers for belief reasons than observers do. That is because actors directly represent the content of their beliefs (e.g., “The plants are dry”), not their own mental state of believing (“I believe: the plants are dry”; Moore, 1993; Rosenthal, 2005). Actors will therefore typically leave their belief reasons

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unmarked: “Why did you turn the sprinkler on?” – “Because the plants were dry.” Observers, by contrast, represent the actor as having beliefs and will therefore typically mark those beliefs (especially when they don’t share them): “Why did she turn the sprinkler on?” – “Because she thought the plants were dry.” Tests of these predictions across nine studies provided consistent results (Malle et al., 2007): Effect sizes for the three novel asymmetries averaged between d = 0.40 and d = 0.69, whereas effect sizes for the classic asymmetry averaged between d = −0.08 and d = 0.10. Thus, actors and observers differ in how they explain behavior; but these differences are revealed only once we give up the traditional person–situation framework and instead assess behavior explanations as part of people’s folk theory of mind and behavior – centered on the concept of intentionality and giving rise to multiple modes and types of explanation.

Conclusion Heider’s (1958) deep insights into the social perception of human action assured attribution phenomena a central position in social psychology. The fundamental assumption that humans spontaneously explain behavioral and social events has led to many insights in the domains of social influence, self-regulation, relationships, and health. However, after 50 years we must acknowledge that traditional formulations of attribution theory either focused too narrowly on inferences of stable traits (following Jones & Davis, 1965) or oversimplified the complex nature of behavior explanations (following Kelley, 1967). Once we identify the conceptual framework within which people actually perceive, interpret, and evaluate behavior, a folk-conceptual theory of behavior explanations emerges that describes and predicts various explanatory phenomena that had previously been overlooked (e.g., reasons, causal history of reasons) or misrepresented (e.g., the actor–observer asymmetry). According to this folk-conceptual theory, people’s explanations of behavior cannot be properly understood when categorized as “person” or “situation” causes. Rather, they fall into multiple distinct modes (causes for unintentional behaviors and reasons, causal histories, and enabling factors for intentional behaviors) and, within modes, into specific types (e.g., belief vs. desire reasons). These are the distinctions that matter when people construct and respond to explanations; and these are the distinctions that must be part of an accurate theory of explanation.

Notes 1 For previous reviews of attribution work that gave more weight to trait attributions, see Fiske and Taylor (1991), Gilbert (1998), Hastorf, Schneider, and Polefka (1970), and Ross and Fletcher (1985). For recent integrations of trait attributions within a larger attributional context, see Reeder (2009) and Uleman, Adil Saribay, and Gonzalez (2008). 2 Philosophically, this theory may leave much to be desired, but psychologically it was a remarkable model that successfully combined constructivism with causal realism. 3 But see Davis (2009), coauthor of the famous Jones and Davis paper, who recently discussed the folk-conceptual theory of explanation.

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Bertram F. Malle 4 In Malle (2004, chap. 1), I discuss Gilbert’s (1998) attempt to find an account of reason explanations in Jones and Davis’s (1965) theory. He pushes such an account as far as one can, but in the best case it captures goal explanations of limited-option choices and more often it captures only what the person was doing, not why she was doing it (as Jones and Davis, 1965, themselves point out; p. 222). 5 More precisely, “experiment-like variations of conditions [that are] a naïve version of J. S. Mill’s method of difference” (p. 194). 6 For applications by other researchers, see Kiesler, Lee, and Kramer (2006); Knight and Reese (2008); and Levi and Haslam (2005). 7 There is another layer of choices, which stems from the classic attribution distinctions of person versus situation and trait versus nontrait. Causes, enabling factors, and CHR factors can all be classified into those subtypes. However, our research has not identified any psychological determinants or consequences of these subtypes (e.g., Malle et al., 2007; O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002). 8 For illustrations of these processes in naturally occurring explanations, see Malle (2004, pp. 126–145). 9 In the explanation of unintentional behavior no asymmetries emerged. Thus, even in the domain in which classic attribution theory is theoretically most applicable (because one can reasonably classify causes into person, situation, and related categories), the predicted asymmetry failed to show.

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Attribution Theories: How People Make Sense of Behavior Reeder, G. D. (1997). Dispositional inferences of ability: Content and process. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 171–189. Reeder, G. D. (2009). Mindreading: Judgments about intentionality and motives in dispositional inference. Psychological Inquiry, 20, 1–18. Rosenthal, D. M. (2005). Consciousness and mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, pp. 174–221). New York: Academic Press. Ross, M., & Fletcher, G. J. O. (1985). Attribution and social perception. In G. Lindsey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 73–114). New York: Random House. Slugoski, B. R., Lalljee, M., Lamb, R., & Ginsburg, G. P. (1993). Attribution in conversational context: Effect of mutual knowledge on explanation-giving. European Journal of Social Psychology, 23, 219–238. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: Communication and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sutton, R. M., & McClure, J. (2001). Covariational influences on goal-based explanation: An integrative model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 222–236. Trope, Y. (1986). Identification and inferential processes in dispositional attribution. Psychological Review, 93, 239–257. Turnbull, W. (1986). Everyday explanation: The pragmatics of puzzle resolution. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 16, 141–160. Uleman, J. S., Adil Saribay, S., & Gonzalez, C. M. (2008). Spontaneous inferences, implicit impressions, and

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implicit theories. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 329–360. Weary, G., & Edwards, J. A., & Riley, S. (1994). Attribution. In Encyclopedia of human behavior (Vol. 1, pp. 291–299). New York: Academic Press. Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation and emotion. New York: Springer. Weiner, B. (1995). Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social conduct. New York: Guilford Press. Weiner, B., Frieze, I., Kukla, A., Reed, L., Rest, S., & Rosenbaum, R. M. (1972). Perceiving the causes of success and failure. In E. E. Jones, D. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior (pp. 95–120). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. Wellman, H. M. (1990). The child’s theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wellman, H. M., & Phillips, A. T. (2001). Developing intentional understandings. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition (pp. 125–148). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Woodward, A. L., Sommerville, J. A., & Guajardo, J. J. (2001). How infants make sense of intentional action. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition (pp. 149–170). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Yzerbyt, V., Rogier, A., & Fiske, S. T. (1998). Group entitativity and social attribution: On translating situational constraints into stereotypes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 1089–1103. Zelazo, P. D., Astington, J. W., & Olson, D. R. (Eds.). (1999). Developing theories of intention: Social understanding and self-control. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

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The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion: Thoughtful and Non-Thoughtful Social Influence Benjamin C. Wagner and Richard E. Petty

Despite the fact that persuasion has been the subject of philosophical and academic inquiry since at least the time of Aristotle, the scientific study of persuasion did not begin until the early post-World War II period. During this time, researchers were guided largely by the notion that persuasion depended upon factors influencing people’s ability to learn the information contained in a persuasive communication (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Not surprisingly, researchers spent a great deal of time investigating source, recipient, message, and contextual factors that were believed to contribute to attention, comprehension, and retention of message information. As research findings accumulated, however, it soon became clear that the story was not so simple. Published studies conflicted with one another. One study would show that using an expert source enhanced persuasion, while another would show that source expertise had no impact or, worse, was detrimental. Sometimes good moods would lead to more agreement with the message, while other times bad moods seemed to enhance persuasion. Additionally, some researchers (e.g., Wicker, 1969) noted that attitudes often did not predict behavior, questioning the very utility of the attitude construct for social scientists. In order to resolve these fundamental questions, the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM) was developed (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a). As we shall see, this model has made three main contributions to the literature on attitude change and the attitude-to-behavior relationship. Namely, the ELM (a) suggests that attitude change can result from relatively high- or low-thinking processes; (b) postulates that attitudes that are formed or changed can be more or less consequential (e.g., impact behavior more or less) as a function of the extent of thinking involved; and (c) specifies a small number of ways in which any one variable (e.g., source credibility) can influence attitudes. In this chapter, we will identify the major concepts contained within the ELM, review empirical research supporting the model, identify and address some criticisms of the model, point out important applications of the model, and, finally, explore some Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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implications of the model that relate to contemporary and likely future themes in social psychological research. But first, let us turn to the model’s most central concept: elaboration.

The Elaboration Continuum Similar to depth-of-processing models of learning and memory (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972), the ELM assumes that individuals can differ in how carefully and extensively they think about a particular subject – in this case, a persuasive communication or attitude object (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b). That is, in any given context the amount of elaboration, or thinking about the relevant message or issue, can vary continuously from very low to very high, and is determined by a combination of individual differences and situational factors. Put simply, people can think a lot, a moderate amount, or very little about a persuasive communication or attitude object. In turn, the amount of thinking they engage in goes a long way in explaining how people will be persuaded – if they are persuaded at all. Of course, individuals can think a great deal without actually considering the merits of a particular message or attitude object. If a social psychology graduate student is watching a television advertisement for McDonald's restaurants but, instead, is carefully considering the merits of the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion, she would have relatively few cognitive resources remaining to process the McDonald's advertisement. Despite the fact that she is thinking a great deal, her thoughts are not about the advertisement and, as such, do not qualify as message- or issue-relevant thinking. Clearly, amount of thinking per se is not synonymous with elaboration likelihood. So, how can we predict the likelihood that a person will think carefully about a message or issue?

Determinants of Elaboration Likelihood A number of individual differences and situational factors can impact the likelihood that a person will think carefully about a persuasive message or issue. According to the ELM, understanding which variables affect thinking is important for several reasons. First, as we will explain in more detail later, the amount of thinking a person engages in determines what process is responsible for persuasion. For example, if the amount of thinking is low, then attitudes can be affected by simple cues in the situation, such as the mere number of arguments that are presented (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984a) or how credible the message source is (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). However, if the amount of thinking is high, then attitudes are determined less by cues and more by an assessment of the merits of the position. Thus, if the message arguments are good ones, then greater thinking leads to more persuasion as people come to realize the merits of the evidence presented. On the other hand, if the message arguments are specious, then persuasion is decreased as people think more about these arguments and generate more unfavorable thoughts. Another reason why it is important to understand how variables impact elaboration is that when attitude change results from high amounts of thinking, it tends to be more consequential (e.g., guides behavior more) than when it results from little thinking (Petty & Krosnick, 1995).

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Benjamin C. Wagner and Richard E. Petty The factors that affect the extent of thinking can broadly be classified as relating to motivation or ability to process, although some factors relate to both motivation and ability. We first examine the implications of motivational factors and then go on to examine how ability factors influence message processing. Motivational factors. As far as motivation to process is concerned, the factor that has arguably received the most empirical attention is personal relevance. When relevance is high, the message’s proposal relates directly to the recipient and stands to impact his or her life in some way (Petty & Cacioppo, 1990). For instance, college students have been shown to process a message more carefully when its proposal relates to their own university than when the proposal concerns another institution (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Moreover, people process consumer advertisements more carefully when they expect the advertised product to be test-marketed in their home city than when they believe the product will be test-marketed only in faraway locales (Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983). In addition to geographic place, time also impacts personal relevance. That is, people process a message more carefully when the message’s proposal concerns the near, rather than the distant, future (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). Also, consumers consider advertisements more carefully when they believe they will soon have to make a decision about the advertised product than when they have no such expectation (Petty et al., 1983). In all of these cases, high personal relevance yields increased amounts of message-relevant thinking. Given that all people are motivated to predict and control their physical and social environments (Heider, 1958), such findings make sense: what could be more adaptive than forming a veridical, well-considered attitude toward a novel issue when (a) the issue is of local import, (b) the issue will affect the message recipient fairly soon, and (c) the recipient may soon need to make a decision about the issue? Of course, personal relevance need not always involve direct, material consequences for the message recipient, as the above examples may suggest. A message can also be personally relevant if it touches on core aspects of a recipient’s personality or identity. For instance, messages matched to individuals’ levels of extroversion receive greater elaboration than do mismatched messages (Wheeler, Petty, & Bizer, 2005). Also, messages framed in the second person (i.e., directly referencing the recipient) are remembered better than messages framed in the third person (Burnkrant & Unnava, 1995), indicating that directly addressing a recipient can yield greater elaboration of a message, even holding other aspects of the message constant. These findings comport well with other published research, which demonstrates that an individual will process social information more carefully when that information relates to salient or important aspects of the individual’s self-concept (Markus, 1977; Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985). These findings also demonstrate that personal relevance can be metaphorical as well as material, deriving from the message’s relationship to certain aspects of the recipient’s self-concept or identity (Fleming & Petty, 2000). Importantly, however, the consequences are the same in each case – with increased personal relevance comes increased message processing. Aside from personal relevance, several other sources of processing motivation exist. One such source involves the chronic tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking about any idea or subject, termed the need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). People high in the need for cognition simply enjoy thinking. They are the type of people who are likely to spend

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hours poring over crossword puzzles or contemplating the implications of an obscure philosophical question. People low in the need for cognition, by contrast, tend not to enjoy thinking for its own sake, and generally engage in deep thought only when they are required to do so. In order to measure individual differences in the need for cognition, Cacioppo and Petty developed the Need for Cognition (NC) scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), which has proven useful in a variety of research projects since its inception. What is important for the present purposes is that people scoring high on the NC scale process persuasive messages more carefully than do those who score low on the scale (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983). In other words, individuals high in the need for cognition have an especially high elaboration likelihood, whereas individuals low in NC generally do not process persuasive messages very carefully and are more dependent on simple cues in the persuasion context (see Petty, Briñol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009, for a review of need for cognition research). Another source of processing motivation involves psychological consistency. People strive to perceive their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors as consistent with one another, and experience discomfort when considering an inconsistency between – or among – these factors. Indeed, people expend considerable effort in attempting to reduce or eliminate perceived inconsistencies (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958). One type of inconsistency, termed attitudinal ambivalence, can arise when an individual has several conflicting beliefs about an attitude object. For instance, a person might enjoy the taste of chocolate ice cream but dislike the fact that it is high in saturated fat and contributes to weight gain and elevated cholesterol. According to Maio, Bell, and Esses (1996), individuals possessing such attitudes are motivated to reduce their ambivalence by carefully scrutinizing attitude-relevant information in the hope of developing a veridical, internally consistent attitude. In other words, attitudinal ambivalence can lead to increases in message processing. But although early findings (e.g., Maio et al., 1996) implied that people with ambivalent attitudes carefully process any information relevant to their ambivalence, more recent research suggests that ambivalent individuals are especially likely to attend to and elaborate upon pro-attitudinal information (Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 2008a), given that pro-attitudinal information is more likely than counter-attitudinal information to reduce ambivalence. In addition, people are more likely to think carefully about information when their thoughtful evaluations of objects (i.e., explicit attitudes) conflict with their more automatic or “gut” evaluations (i.e., implicit attitudes; Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006; Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006). In such situations, people may not define their attitude as ambivalent (since they are unaware of or deny the source of the conflict), but they experience psychological discomfort nonetheless (Rydell, McConnell, & Mackie, 2008). The incidental emotions recipients experience during persuasion have also been shown to impact message elaboration. In general, sadness has been associated with relatively careful, systematic information processing, whereas happiness has been associated with relatively shallow, heuristic processing (e.g., Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Bless et al., 1996). Assuming that the emotional states are not overly arousing, most researchers have agreed that emotions operate in a motivational manner, providing perceivers with information regarding their progress in achieving personal goals (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Schwarz, 1990). According to this approach, negative emotions can signal insufficient goal progress

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Benjamin C. Wagner and Richard E. Petty and motivate the perceiver to carefully scrutinize all available information, with the goal of enhancing predictability and control over the environment and, thereby, speeding goal progress (see Weary & Edwards, 1996, for a related discussion of negative affect and information processing). Positive emotions, according to this perspective, indicate that everything is “OK” and that no in-depth information-processing strategies are necessary. Another approach to the relationship between emotion and elaboration considers the link between emotions and cognitive appraisals (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). According to this perspective, because sadness is associated with an uncertainty appraisal, it is expected to enhance information processing aimed at reducing that uncertainty, whereas happiness and anger are expected to reduce information processing because they are associated with certainty appraisals (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). A third approach involves emotion-management concerns and assumes that individuals are generally motivated to achieve and maintain positive emotional states. Because of this, individuals are expected to engage in careful thought primarily when they believe such thought will contribute to restoring or maintaining a positive state. This perspective, termed the hedonic contingency model, has inspired a number of investigations (Wegener & Petty, 1994; Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995), and has yielded a fair amount of empirical support. For instance, participants in happy states process optimistic, uplifting messages more carefully than do participants in neutral or sad states because people in positive states must be especially proactive in order to maintain their positive moods. These findings refute the notion that positive emotions inevitably lead to decreases in processing (relative to neutral or negative emotions). Finally, the ease with which an attitude comes to mind, or attitude accessibility (Fazio & Williams, 1986), impacts the degree to which attitude-related information is processed. Specifically, in one study (Fabrigar, Priester, Petty, & Wegener, 1998), individuals with highly accessible attitudes processed attitude-relevant information more carefully than did individuals with less accessible attitudes. As Fabrigar and his colleagues noted, there are two possible explanations for this finding. The first possibility relates to processing motivation. Specifically, people may infer, based on the ease with which an attitude is activated, that the attitude object is especially important or self-relevant. In this case, attitude accessibility would simply act as a precursor to personal relevance, which we have already discussed. The second possibility relates to processing ability. That is, individuals with highly accessible attitudes might have a greater amount of attitude-relevant knowledge than individuals with less accessible attitudes, thereby making them better able to scrutinize carefully persuasive communications relating to that attitude object. In other words, attitude accessibility could be a proxy for knowledge, which we will discuss in a moment. Yet, although each possibility is plausible, the fact that Fabrigar and colleagues manipulated attitude accessibility via a repeated-expression procedure – and nonetheless observed elaboration differences between the high- and low-accessibility groups – suggests that accessibility need not impact elaboration via knowledge alone. Additionally, more recent research (Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 2008b) has shown that individuals with highly accessible attitudes carefully process only counterattitudinal – and not proattitudinal – messages, likely because such messages are especially threatening or novel for these individuals. This finding, paired with the earlier findings, suggests a more motivational role for attitude accessibility as an antecedent to elaboration.

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Ability factors. In addition to the aforementioned motivational factors (e.g., personal relevance, need for cognition, ambivalence), a number of ability factors also influence the likelihood that a person will carefully elaborate a persuasive message. One fairly obvious example involves message repetition. That is, with increasing amounts of message repetition, people are better able to comprehend, scrutinize, and recall the arguments in a persuasive communication (Cacioppo & Petty, 1980). Also, message recipients must possess adequate attentional resources in order to elaborate a message carefully. For instance, in one study (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976), distraction reduced college students’ ability to distinguish between strong and weak arguments supporting a tuition increase. Relatedly, time limitations can reduce the likelihood that a perceiver will be able to process a message carefully (Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991). Finally, people are better able to comprehend and scrutinize message arguments when they possess a high degree of knowledge and experience regarding the message’s topic (Wood & Kallgren, 1988). For instance, individuals generate more cognitive responses to persuasive messages when these messages relate to well-developed knowledge structures than when they do not (Cacioppo, Petty, & Sidera, 1982). Taken together, these findings highlight the importance of processing ability as a precursor to message elaboration.

Two Routes to Persuasion Having examined the factors influencing amount of message elaboration, we now move on to the crux of the ELM. Specifically, the ELM holds that, at the endpoints of the elaboration likelihood continuum, people can be persuaded via one of two processing modes, termed the central and peripheral routes to persuasion. The likelihood that one or the other route will predominate in any given situation is determined by the perceiver’s elaboration likelihood, which we have already discussed in detail. Within each general processing mode, a number of more specific mechanisms can lead to attitude change. It is to these mechanisms that we now turn. Peripheral route to persuasion. If a person does not think much about a persuasive communication (i.e., low elaboration), he or she is likely to be persuaded by one of several loweffort mechanisms, which collectively comprise the peripheral route to persuasion. To give an example of how the peripheral route to persuasion operates, consider an advertisement in which an attractive supermodel is paired with a particular brand of soft drink. One mechanism producing persuasion in this case could be classical conditioning (Staats & Staats, 1958). That is, assuming that the supermodel activates positive affect in most recipients of this advertisement, then with enough viewings of the advertisement pairing the (initially neutral) soft-drink brand with the supermodel, the viewers would come to associate positive feelings with the soft-drink brand, even when the soft drink is presented without the supermodel (see also Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009; Olson & Fazio, 2001). This process, whereby attitudes are developed or changed via simple association principles, is referred to as evaluative conditioning (see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). Relatedly, by encouraging viewers to develop an association between the (positively valued) supermodel and the (initially neutral) soft-drink brand, the advertisement’s developers may be capitalizing on

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Benjamin C. Wagner and Richard E. Petty consistency, or balance, processes (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958). That is, people generally strive to possess consistent and coherent mental representations (e.g., “I like myself, I like the supermodel, the supermodel likes this brand of soda, and so should I”), and the development of such mental representations in many cases occurs without conscious intention or awareness (Greenwald et al., 2002). Another fairly low-effort mechanism leading to persuasion in this case could involve misattribution of the affective reaction to the model as having arisen, at least in part, in response to the soft-drink brand (Dutton & Aron, 1974; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Again, assuming that the affective reaction to the supermodel was positive, this process would make attitudes toward the soft-drink brand more favorable. Finally, people who are not carefully scrutinizing this advertisement may make use of a simple heuristic, processing the supermodel as a simple cue to persuasion (e.g., Haugtvedt, Petty, Cacioppo, & Steidley, 1988). For instance, the viewers of the advertisement might reason that they are likely to enjoy products that people they like (e.g., supermodels) also enjoy, thereby developing a more favorable attitude toward the soft-drink brand that the supermodel endorses (Chaiken, 1987). Each of the mechanisms we have outlined – classical conditioning, misattribution, the implicit development of balanced mental representations, and the use of heuristic cues – involves relatively little cognitive effort aimed at assessing the information relevant to the merits of the attitude object, but nonetheless could lead (at least temporarily) to attitude change in the direction favored by the advertisement’s developers. Central route to persuasion. If a person is motivated and able to think carefully about a persuasive communication (e.g., high personal relevance of the message, few distractions), he or she is likely to follow the central route to persuasion. In the central route, individuals carefully scrutinize the elements of the persuasive message in order to determine whether the message’s proposal makes sense and will benefit them in some way. Specifically, the central route to persuasion involves a focus on the strength of message arguments, which are pieces of information in the communication intended to provide evidence for the communicator’s point of view. If the message contains strong arguments, then thoughtful individuals will generate predominantly favorable thoughts in response to the message and will experience attitude change in the direction advocated by the message. In contrast, if the message contains weak arguments, then thoughtful perceivers will generate predominantly unfavorable thoughts in response to the message and will experience no attitude change or even change in the direction opposite to that advocated by the message (i.e., boomerang). Given the importance of argument quality – that is, whether arguments are strong or weak – in the central route to persuasion, a fairly obvious question arises: What determines the strength of message arguments? In most of the literature inspired by the ELM, argument quality has been determined on an empirical basis. This is because the goal of the research was not to examine what makes arguments strong or weak, but instead to see if some other variable (e.g., personal relevance) increased or decreased the extent of message processing. Thus, arguments were pilot-tested by giving them to members of a particular population, who were asked to think carefully about them. Those arguments eliciting mostly favorable thoughts were considered strong, whereas those eliciting mostly unfavorable thoughts were considered weak (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a). Although this approach to argument quality does a good job of identifying strong and weak arguments for particular

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populations and is very useful for research purposes, it does not elucidate a general theory of argument quality. Although there are many idiosyncratic reactions to particular arguments (Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981), research has suggested a few key factors that render some arguments better than others. Consistent with expectancy-value models of attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), two aspects of arguments are important: the desirability of the consequence implied and how likely it seems that the consequence will occur. Thus, if an argument said, “if you buy Detergent X, your clothes would be cleaner,” this argument would be more persuasive the more favorably people perceive having clean clothes, and the more likely this consequence is perceived to be if the detergent is used (see also Johnson, Smith-McLallen, Killeya, & Levin, 2004). In addition, the more unique and important the dimension the argument addresses, the higher in impact it may be (Petty & Wegener, 1991). Finally, strong arguments tend to relate consistently with one another in the context of the overall message: they are cogent, coherent, and compelling. Weak arguments, in contrast, are often illogical and self-contradictory. Of course, thinking a great deal about a persuasive communication does not mean that the recipient will process the message’s arguments in an evenhanded, objective manner. Although objective, normatively rational processing of persuasive arguments is one strategy that individuals can take, interpretation of message arguments can also be biased by various factors. For instance, individuals consider arguments consistent with their preexisting attitudes to be stronger than arguments opposing their preexisting attitudes. In one study examining the topic of capital punishment (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), individuals polarized in the direction of their initial attitudes when exposed to both pro- and counterattitudinal information on the issue. Also, in addition to its role in motivating processing of persuasive communications – which we have already discussed – emotions can also bias recipients’ evaluation of persuasive arguments. Specifically, high-elaboration participants have been shown to evaluate persuasive arguments more favorably when they are in a happy rather than a neutral state (Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993). Given these findings, it is clear that persuasion via the central route does not necessarily involve the impartial consideration of message arguments but, instead, can involve biased interpretation of the information contained in the persuasive communication. When people are thinking carefully about a message or issue, they also consider how confident they are in the thoughts that they generate (Petty, Briñol, & Tormala, 2002). If people are confident in the thoughts they have generated, these thoughts will have an impact on their attitudes. If people doubt the validity of their thoughts for any reason, these thoughts are unlikely to impact attitudes toward the issue. Thus, when thoughts about the message or issue are largely favorable, enhancing confidence will increase persuasion and instilling doubt will reduce persuasion. However, when thoughts about the message or issue are largely unfavorable, enhancing confidence will reduce persuasion but instilling doubt will undermine reliance on one’s negative thoughts, thereby increasing persuasion (see Briñol & Petty, 2009, for a review of research on thought confidence). A number of persuasion variables that have been examined in classic persuasion studies have also been shown to impact thought confidence (Briñol & Petty, 2009). For instance, individuals who nod their heads as they listen to a persuasive message containing either strong or weak arguments show a stronger effect of argument quality on attitudes than do

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Benjamin C. Wagner and Richard E. Petty individuals who shake their heads as they consider the same messages (Briñol & Petty, 2003), and follow-up analyses showed that this effect was due to increased thought confidence among participants who were nodding their heads as compared with participants who were shaking their heads. Emotion is another variable that impacts thought confidence. Specifically, participants who are induced to experience a happy state after reading a message and listing their thoughts in response to that message are more likely to use these thoughts in forming an attitude than are participants who are placed in a neutral or sad state after message elaboration and thought listing (Briñol, Petty, & Barden, 2007). Critically, variables operate through meta-cognitive mechanisms – that is, by influencing one’s evaluation of his or her own thoughts – primarily when people are thinking a great deal (for a review, see Petty, Briñol, Tormala, & Wegener, 2007). After all, it takes a considerable amount of cognitive effort not only to generate thoughts in response to a message or issue, but also to critically evaluate these thoughts. Timing is also important when it comes to thought validation. That is, persuasion variables tend to influence thought confidence if introduced during or after the message but can influence the amount of message processing if introduced before the message. As an example, consider the case of source credibility. If a perceiver learns that a message comes from an expert source before processing the message, this perceiver will likely elaborate the message more carefully than if the message had come from a non-expert source (Heesacker, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1983). If perceivers learn that a message comes from an expert source only after elaborating the message, however, the expert information will impact their confidence in the thoughts that they generated. Specifically, thoughts generated in response to a message from an expert source will be held more confidently than thoughts generated in response to a message from a non-expert source (Tormala, Briñol, & Petty, 2007). Importantly, argument quality would have more of an effect on attitudes under high (versus low) source expertise in both of the cases outlined above, but the mechanisms responsible for the two effects would be quite different. It is to this issue – the notion that variables can impact persuasion in multiple ways – that we turn next.

Putting It All Together: Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables As we have seen, people can be persuaded via one of two processing routes, and the likelihood that they will use either route depends heavily on how much they are thinking about the persuasive message. If people are not motivated or able to scrutinize a message, they will be persuaded by one of several low-effort processes that comprise the peripheral route. If they are motivated and able to think carefully about the message, persuasion will depend primarily on people’s cognitive responses to the message. That is, in the central route, the number and valence of thoughts, as well as the confidence with which these thoughts are held, determine the extent of persuasion. And, as we have also seen, a number of factors influence the likelihood that a message will be carefully elaborated. We have also touched upon the notion that specific factors – such as moods and preexisting attitudes – can bias the interpretation of message information, making the generation of positive or negative thoughts more likely. Finally, we have also noted that certain factors can lead people to have confidence or doubt in the thoughts that they have generated, which affects reliance on

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these thoughts in forming or changing attitudes. Thus, without making it explicit, we have already discussed many of the ways that variables can impact persuasion. This idea, namely that variables can serve multiple roles in the persuasion process, is central to the ELM. Specifically, the model holds that variables can (a) impact the amount of elaboration a message receives, (b) operate as simple cues to persuasion, (c) serve as message arguments, (d) bias the interpretation of message information, or (e) affect the confidence people have in their thoughts (Petty, Briñol, & Priester, 2009; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a). To illustrate how a particular variable can serve in multiple roles in the persuasion process in different situations, let us consider some concrete examples. First, we will summarize how incidental emotions affect persuasion. As we have already noted, emotion can operate as a simple cue to persuasion under low-elaboration conditions, producing change consistent with its valence. Under high-elaboration conditions, emotions can bias interpretation of message arguments (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Petty, Schumann, et al., 1993) when it precedes the message and can affect how much confidence people have in the thoughts they have generated when it follows message processing (Briñol et al., 2007). Further, when elaboration is not constrained by other factors to be particularly low or high, emotions can affect the amount of processing messages receive (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Wegener et al., 1995). Lastly, one’s emotion can be scrutinized as a piece of information (i.e., an argument) relevant to a particular conclusion (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Another variable that has been shown to impact persuasion via multiple roles is source credibility (i.e., trustworthiness and expertise). Messages presented by sources high in expertise receive more processing than messages presented by sources low in expertise (Heesacker et al., 1983). Additionally, messages presented by sources that are high in expertise but low in honesty are scrutinized more carefully than messages presented by expert sources perceived to be truthful (Priester & Petty, 1995). Under high-thinking conditions, source credibility can bias processing of message information when the source is made salient prior to message processing. In particular, highly credible sources lead perceivers to generate more favorable thoughts about a message than do less credible sources (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). Learning that a message comes from an expert (versus non-expert) source after message processing can lead people to have more confidence in the thoughts they generated in response to that message (Tormala, Briñol, & Petty, 2006). Finally, source credibility can serve as a cue to persuasion under low elaboration conditions and as an argument under high elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984b). Thus, we can see that source credibility – like emotion – can operate in each of the roles for persuasion variables identified by the ELM. Indeed, there are many variables that have been shown to operate in these multiple roles.

Consequences of Elaboration: Attitude Strength Aside from impacting the manner in which individuals will be persuaded, elaboration also yields a number of downstream consequences. Specifically, attitudes developed (or changed) via a high amount of message- or issue-relevant thinking are especially stable over time, resistant to counter-persuasion, likely to bias information processing in a pro-attitudinal

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Benjamin C. Wagner and Richard E. Petty direction, and likely to lead to attitude-consistent behavior (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). Taken collectively, these long-term outcomes are considered to be features of attitude strength (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). It makes a fair amount of sense, from a practical standpoint, that attitudes based on a great deal of elaboration are stronger than attitudes based on less issue-relevant thinking. For one, people who have thought a great deal about a particular subject will naturally have a more well-developed and internally consistent knowledge structure surrounding the attitude object than will individuals who have not thought much about the subject. As such, any novel information will exert less influence on the overall mental representation in the former case than in the latter. Additionally, thinking a lot about an issue can render one’s attitude on that issue more accessible (Smith, Haugtvedt, & Petty, 1994). For instance, if a person thinks a great deal about Diet Coke, his or her attitude toward Diet Coke is likely to be chronically accessible and, in turn, is especially likely to guide information processing and behavior with respect to Diet Coke (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986; Fazio & Williams, 1986). Finally, people are likely to feel especially certain in attitudes that are based on extensive amounts of issue-relevant thinking (Petty et al., 1995). Over time, because people assess their level of thinking to determine certainty, perceived thinking becomes a heuristic that can affect attitude certainty in the absence of any real thinking (Barden & Petty, 2008). And, of course, when people are highly confident in their attitudes, the attitudes become more persistent over time, resistant to attack, and likely to impact behavior (Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995). Thus, we can see how elaboration impacts attitude strength: by making attitudinal representations more internally consistent, well developed, and accessible, and by making individuals more confident in their attitudes.

Criticism of the ELM Perhaps the most thoroughgoing critique of the ELM is implicit in the relatively recent unimodel of persuasion (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). Although the unimodel adopts the ELM’s elaboration continuum and its postulate that extent of thinking is related to attitude strength, it rejects the idea that different psychological processes operate along the continuum. Instead, the unimodel states that there is only one process of persuasion that operates to various degrees along the continuum. According to the unimodel, persuasion always results from the recipient’s analysis of the evidence provided, whether the person is thinking a lot or very little. Furthermore, Kruglanski and Thompson object to certain data presented in support of the ELM. For example, they argue that the conclusion that people who are not thinking very much rely on simple cue processes more than individuals who are thinking more carefully has not been supported by the empirical literature. Specifically, these authors argue that peripheral cues have usually been presented in ways that make them particularly easy to process (e.g., attractive source, very short statements at the beginning of messages), making low-motivation and low-ability perceivers especially likely to use these cues as evidence in forming or modifying their attitudes. Relatedly, Kruglanski and Thompson argued that message arguments are generally presented in long form (e.g., dense paragraphs of information, minutes-long verbal presentations), meaning that this information is only

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likely to impact attitudes if recipients are motivated and able to process it extensively. That is, there is a confound between the information serving as simple “cues” and the information serving as “arguments.” One type of evidence (i.e., cues) requires less thought than the other (i.e., arguments), providing support for different amounts of thinking being involved in persuasion but not for fundamentally different processes of persuasion. In responding to the critique offered by Kruglanski and Thompson (1999), Petty, Wheeler and Bizer (1999) raised a number of theoretical and methodological points. Most importantly, they noted that although some studies have used manipulations of cues and arguments that vary in complexity, other studies have not. For example, they point to a study in which three or nine weak counterattitudinal arguments were presented to participants (for the original study, see Petty & Cacioppo, 1984a). Given that the weak arguments elicited predominantly unfavorable thoughts, participants who were thinking carefully (i.e., high elaboration) had more unfavorable attitudes after reading nine rather than three weak arguments. Participants under low elaboration who were exposed to the exact same messages evinced a very different pattern: they were more favorable to the proposal when presented with nine arguments than when they were presented with three. In this study, the threeversus-nine-arguments manipulation served as both the cue manipulation and the argument manipulation so that there could be no differences in length or complexity between the two manipulations. Yet participants under high- and low-elaboration conditions applied different psychological operations to this information. In particular, participants in the low-elaboration conditions appeared to simply count the number of message arguments and to conclude that a greater number of arguments was better (i.e., more persuasive) than a smaller number. However, those in the high-relevance condition did not simply count the arguments but instead evaluated them for merit. These different processes led to different persuasion outcomes. Clearly, amount of thinking differed across the high- and lowelaboration groups in this study. But the quantitative difference in elaboration is not the only difference that mattered. Rather, participants used the information presented to them in a qualitatively different manner as a function of elaboration. This qualitative distinction between different processing styles, Petty and colleagues (1999) argued, is both theoretically and practically important and should not, as Kruglanski and Thompson (1999) recommended, be left out of social psychological theories of persuasion. (For other criticisms of the ELM and responses to these criticisms, see Petty, Rucker, Bizer, & Cacioppo, 2004.)

Applications of the ELM Many pressing social and political problems involve, at base, maladaptive attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. For instance, consider the problem of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) such as HIV. Although awareness of the risks associated with unprotected sexual activity is undoubtedly widespread, many sexually active adults nonetheless fail to take adequate precautions against becoming infected or spreading infection to others (e.g., using latex condoms; Anderson, Wilson, Doll, Jones, & Barker, 1999). One way to encourage people to engage in safer sex practices is to change their attitudes toward such practices. In an application of the persuasion literature in general – and of the ELM in particular – Petty, Gleicher,

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Benjamin C. Wagner and Richard E. Petty and Jarvis (1993) noted that attitude change based on extensive thought (i.e., central route) is more likely to produce attitude-consistent behavior than is attitude change based on less thought (see also Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Thus, it is important not only to change people’s attitudes toward condom use but also to encourage such change to take place in a thoughtful manner. One way to achieve this goal is to make a message about the risk of contracting HIV seem particularly relevant to the intended audience, thereby increasing motivation to process the message. This can be done in a relatively simple manner by directly mentioning message recipients (e.g., saying “you can get HIV” rather than “people can get HIV”; Burnkrant & Unnava, 1989). Alternatively, one might develop a two-pronged message, aiming first to change message recipients’ perceptions of their personal level of risk and second to encourage condom usage as a method for reducing this risk. If such a tack is taken, however, it is important that message recipients not become overly afraid or anxious about HIV and other STIs, as these extreme emotions may lead individuals to avoid thinking about the message (Janis, 1967; see also Albarracín et al., 2005). A second way to increase processing of messages encouraging safer sex practices is for these messages to be presented by highly credible sources. A recent meta-analysis of the efficacy of HIV-prevention interventions indicated that interventions delivered by expert sources were especially effective in yielding desired behavioral changes (Albarracín, Durantini, & Earl, 2006). This finding may reflect the tendency of message recipients to process messages delivered by highly credible sources more carefully than messages delivered by less credible sources (Heesacker et al., 1983). A third way that careful processing of information related to HIV prevention might be encouraged involves the use of rhetorical questions (Petty, Cacioppo, & Heesacker, 1981). That is, people may be especially likely to elaborate upon persuasive information if it is followed by a brief, rhetorical question (e.g., “Don’t you think it’s a good idea to use condoms to prevent HIV?”) instead of a similar statement (e.g., “It’s a good idea to use condoms to prevent HIV”). Finally, people may be especially likely to process information regarding HIV prevention if that information is tailored to specific aspects of their personality or self-concept, such as gender (McCulloch, Albarracín, & Durantini, 2008) or need for cognition (Bakker, 1999). Of course, other variables could also impact motivation (or ability) to process messages relating to HIV prevention, and the examples provided here are simply illustrations. Also important, any strategy aimed at increasing recipients’ message processing will only yield attitude change in the desired direction if the arguments contained in the message are strong. Thus, it is not enough simply to encourage message recipients to think carefully about HIVprevention strategies. The quality of the arguments that are presented is also critical, and should definitely be considered by those who are developing messages in this domain. The ELM has been applied in a variety of other domains as well, including psychological therapy (Cacioppo, Claiborn, Petty, & Heesacker, 1991), school psychology (Petty, Heesacker, & Hughes, 1997), mass media effects (Petty, Priester, & Briñol, 2002), health-promotion strategies (Petty, Barden, & Wheeler, 2009), drug-abuse prevention (Baker, Petty, & Gleicher, 1991), and consumer behavior and marketing (Rucker & Petty, 2006), among others. Although a thorough treatment of each of these applications is beyond the scope of this chapter, they bear mentioning, as does the general approach they represent. Specifically, each application examines – as did the approach to HIV prevention outlined above – how attitude change can lead to desired behavioral changes, pointing out that attitudes formed

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or changed via extensive message- or issue-relevant thinking are especially likely to lead to attitude-consistent behaviors (see also Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Thus, it is important, particularly from a public health perspective, to develop methods that encourage individuals to think carefully about messages aimed at modifying problem behaviors. Otherwise, the attitudinal or behavioral changes realized by specific interventions will likely diminish or dissipate as time progresses.

New Directions: Automatic and Deliberative Attitude Measures One interesting research development in the twenty-first century concerns the distinction between automatic and deliberative attitude measures (for reviews, see Fazio & Olson, 2003; Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, 2009). Specifically, response latency measures, such as the implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the evaluative priming procedure (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), have been developed in recent years, in part to try to circumvent limitations associated with more traditional survey measures (Schwarz, 1999). These procedures, termed implicit or automatic measures, attempt to measure the first evaluative reaction that automatically comes to mind when a person is exposed to an attitude object. These measures have been contrasted with more traditional attitude measures, which generally involve Likert-type or semantic differential scales, where people report how much they like something (explicit or deliberative measures). Although some controversy exists regarding the interpretation of each type of measure (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), many researchers agree that automatic measures tap the strength of associations – stored in memory – between attitude objects and evaluations. However, recent research has indicated that the evaluations that are automatically activated upon presentation of an attitude object may not, at least in some cases, be consciously endorsed by the individual holding such evaluations (Petty et al., 2006). For instance, consider a case in which a former smoker is presented with a package of his favorite brand of cigarettes. In all likelihood, such a person will automatically activate a favorable evaluation when presented with the cigarettes, given his history of positive experiences with them. However, this person would probably not endorse this automatically activated attitude as his “true” attitude toward cigarettes, given that he has stopped smoking them and knows that they contribute to a variety of health problems, including lung cancer and heart disease. Thus, while an automatic measure of attitudes toward cigarettes would likely show that this individual is quite favorable toward cigarettes, a more deliberative measure would show that he does not like them very much. Which is the “true” attitude? And how would each type of measure be affected by persuasion attempts? According to the meta-cognitive model (MCM) of attitude structure (Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007), people can store many kinds of information in memory about an attitude object. This information can include not only object evaluations but, also, beliefs about attitude objects and validity information regarding the attitude–object association. So, for instance, a former smoker could associate cigarettes with favorability, but this cigarette– favorability association could be “tagged,” in memory, as invalid or false. Given that this validity tag is less accessible than the object–evaluation association itself, automatic measurement techniques are relatively unlikely to reflect the invalidation of the cigarette–favorable

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Benjamin C. Wagner and Richard E. Petty link. That is, because automatic measures generally involve quick and non-thoughtful responses to stimulus pairings, information that is directly related to an attitude object is most likely to be activated and applied in responding to such measures (Petty & Briñol, 2006). Deliberate measures, by contrast, generally afford the respondent the opportunity to consider whether he or she consciously endorses the attitude–evaluation associations that are stored in memory and, thus, these measures can be impacted by validity tags. One of the implications of the MCM for persuasion – particularly with respect to the two routes to persuasion identified by the ELM – involves the potential for peripheral cues to exert differential impact on automatic and deliberate attitude measures. For instance, consider the situation in which a sports celebrity endorses a particular brand of underwear. With repeated pairings, the (positively valued) celebrity will become associated with the underwear brand, likely leading advertisement recipients to develop favorable attitudes toward the underwear brand, particularly if they are not thinking carefully about the advertisement. If they are thinking about the advertisement, however, recipients will likely reason that sports celebrities do not possess any special expertise with respect to underwear and, accordingly, will attempt to remove the impact of the celebrity on their evaluations of the underwear brand (e.g., Petty, Wegener, & White, 1998; see Wegener & Petty, 1997, for a review of correction processes). Even among high-thought recipients, however, this discounting (or invalidation) process is likely to be observed only on deliberative measures. Automatic measures, by contrast, are likely to reflect only the relationship between the underwear brand and the (liked) celebrity. In fact, there are several examples in the empirical literature demonstrating such a pattern of results, albeit with different attitude objects and peripheral cue manipulations (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, & Strain, 2006). For instance, in one study (Gawronski & LeBel, 2008) an evaluative conditioning procedure was used to create associations between a continent (Europe or Asia) and an evaluation (positive or negative). Then, participants were given an automatic (i.e., IAT) and deliberative (i.e., scale response) measure of attitudes toward Europe and Asia. As expected, the automatic measure reflected the effect of the evaluative conditioning procedure, such that continents associated with positivity were evaluated more favorably than continents associated with negativity. However, deliberative measures showed a different pattern. Specifically, when participants were asked to consider their knowledge about the continents and then to fill out a survey measure of attitudes toward the continents, the classical conditioning procedure had no effect on participants’ responses. However, when participants were asked to consider their feelings about the continents before filling out the survey measure, the classical conditioning did impact deliberate responses. In other words, when participants were given the opportunity to carefully think about their attitudinal responses, they considered not only their automatic associations but also the validity of these associations (i.e., whether these associations seemed, based on instructions regarding feelings versus thoughts, to be an appropriate basis for their attitudes). By contrast, when participants were asked to respond quickly and non-thoughtfully (i.e., IAT), their automatic associations were the primary determinant of their attitude responses. In another study, McConnell, Rydell, Strain, and Mackie (2008) provided participants with favorable or unfavorable behavioral information about a target person. Additionally, they provided group membership cues about this person (e.g., he or she was or was not

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overweight). Then, participants completed automatic (i.e., IAT) and deliberative (i.e., rating scale) measures of attitudes toward the target. Whereas deliberative measures were impacted only by the behavioral information provided about the target, automatic measures were influenced by the target’s group membership (e.g., weight), particularly when the behavioral information was somewhat ambiguous. Thus, we can see that group membership cues impacted automatic evaluations more strongly than they affected deliberative evaluations, consistent with the MCM. As researchers continue to explore the differential impact of peripheral cues on automatic versus deliberative attitudes measures, we anticipate that such patterns of results will continue to be reported.

Conclusions As we have seen, the ELM has allowed attitudes researchers to understand and predict the multiple ways in which attitudes can be formed and changed by different variables (e.g., moods, source expertise), depending on the likelihood of thinking (i.e., serving as cues or arguments, affecting the amount or direction of thinking, or influencing confidence in thoughts). Many motivational and ability factors impact elaboration likelihood, which in turn determines whether peripheral or central route processes will be primarily responsible for attitude change. Moreover, amount of elaboration influences the strength of attitudes that are developed or changed in the persuasion context, with greater elaboration being associated with more persistent, resistant, and behaviorally impactful attitudes. The ELM has been applied to the study of a number of important social phenomena, including the encouragement of safer-sex practices among individuals who are at risk for contracting HIV and other STIs. Finally, recent research shows that peripheral cues are more likely to impact automatic attitude measures than deliberative attitude measures, demonstrating the ELM’s utility in understanding the distinction between the two types of measures as well as the interpretation of attitude estimates derived via the two classes of procedures.

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The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 1013–1027. Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their meaning and use. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 297–327. Fazio, R. H., & Williams, C. J. (1986). Attitude accessibility as a moderator of the attitude-perception and attitude-behavior relations: An investigation of the 1984 presidential election. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 505–514. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to theory and research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Fleming, M. A., & Petty, R. E. (2000). Identity and persuasion: An elaboration likelihood approach. In D. J. Terry & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), Attitudes, behavior, and social context: The role of norms and group membership (pp. 171–199). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 692–731. Gawronski, B., & LeBel, E. P. (2008). Understanding patterns of attitude change: When implicit measures show change, but explicit measures do not. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1355–1361. Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Rudman, L. A., Farnham, S. D., Nosek, B. A., & Mellott, D. S. (2002). A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept. Psychological Review, 109, 3–25. Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. K. L. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464–1480. Gross, S. R., Holtz, R., & Miller, N. (1995). Attitude certainty. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 215–245). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Haugtvedt, C.P., Petty, R.E., Cacioppo, J.T., & Steidley, T. (1988). Personality and ad effectiveness: Exploring the utility of need for cognition. Advances in Consumer Research, 15, 209–212. Heesacker, M., Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1983). Field dependence and attitude change: Source credibility can

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McCulloch, K. C., Albarracín, D., & Durantini, M. R. (2008). A door to HIV-prevention interventions: How femaletargeted materials can enhance female participation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38, 1211–1229. Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2001). Implicit attitude formation through classical conditioning. Psychological Science, 12, 413–417. Petty, R. E., Barden, J., & Wheeler, S. C. (2009). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion: Developing health promotions to produce sustained behavior change. In R. J. DiClemente, R. A. Crosby, & M. Kegler (Eds.), Emerging theories in health promotion practice and research (2nd ed., pp. 185–214). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Petty, R. E., & Briñol, P. (2006). A meta-cognitive approach to “implicit” and “explicit” evaluations: Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006). Psychological Bulletin, 132, 740–744. Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., & DeMarree, K. G. (2007). The metacognitive model (MCM) of attitudes: Implications for attitude measurement, change, and strength. Social Cognition, 25, 657–686. Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., Loersch, C., & McCaslin, M. J. (2009). The need for cognition. In M. R. Leary & R. H. Hoyle (Eds.), Handbook of individual differences in social behavior (pp. 318–329). New York: Guilford Press. Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., & Priester, J. R. (2009). Mass media attitude change: Implications of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. In J. Bryant & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (3rd ed., pp. 125–164). New York: Routledge. Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., & Tormala, Z. L. (2002). Thought confidence as a determinant of persuasion: The self-validation hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 722–741. Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., Tormala, Z. L., & Wegener, D. T. (2007). The role of meta-cognition in social judgment. In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (2nd ed., pp. 254–284). New York: Guilford Press. Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979). Issue involvement can increase or decrease persuasion by enhancing messagerelevant cognitive responses. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1915–1926. Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984a). The effects of involvement on response to argument quantity and quality: Central and peripheral routes to persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 69–81.

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Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984b). Source factors and the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. Advances in Consumer Research, 11, 668–672. Petty, R.E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986a). Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to attitude change. New York: Springer. Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986b). The Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123–205). New York: Academic Press. Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1990). Involvement and persuasion: Tradition versus integration. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 367–374. Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Goldman, R. (1981). Personal involvement as a determinant of argument-based persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 847–855. Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Heesacker, M. (1981). The use of rhetorical questions in persuasion: A cognitive response analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 432–440. Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Schumann, D. (1983). Central and peripheral routes to advertising effectiveness: The moderating role of involvement. Journal of Consumer Research, 10, 135–146. Petty, R. E., Fazio, R. H., & Briñol, P. (Eds.). (2009). Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures. New York: Psychology Press. Petty, R. E., Gleicher, F. H., & Jarvis, B. (1993). Persuasion theory and AIDS prevention. In J. B. Pryor & G. Reeder (Eds.), The social psychology of HIV infection (pp. 155–182). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Petty, R. E., Haugtvedt, C., & Smith, S. M. (1995). Elaboration as a determinant of attitude strength: Creating attitudes that are persistent, resistant, and predictive of behavior. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 93–130). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Petty, R. E., Heesacker, M., & Hughes, J. (1997). Implications of persuasion theory for school psychology. Journal of School Psychology, 35, 107–136. Petty, R. E., & Krosnick, J. A. (Eds.). (1995). Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Petty, R. E., Ostrom, T. M., & Brock, T. C. (Eds.). (1981). Cognitive responses in persuasion. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

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The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion Petty, R. E., Priester, J. R., & Briñol, P. (2002). Mass media attitude change: Implications of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. In J. Bryant & D. Zillmann (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 155–198). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Petty, R. E., Rucker, D., Bizer, G., & Cacioppo, J.T. (2004). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In J. S. Seiter & G. H. Gass (Eds.), Perspectives on persuasion, social influence and compliance gaining (pp. 65–89). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Petty, R. E., Schumann, D. W., Richman, S. A., & Strathman, A. J. (1993). Positive mood and persuasion: Different roles for affect under high- and low-elaboration conditions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 5–20. Petty, R. E., Tormala, Z. L., Briñol, P., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (2006). Implicit ambivalence from attitude change: An exploration of the PAST model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 21–41. Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1991). Thought systems, argument quality, and persuasion. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 4, pp. 147–161). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Petty, R. E., Wegener, D. T., & White, P. (1998). Flexible correction processes in social judgment: Implications for persuasion. Social Cognition, 16, 93–113. Petty, R. E., Wells, G. L., & Brock, T. C. (1976). Distraction can enhance or reduce yielding to propaganda: Thought disruption versus effort justification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 874–884. Petty, R. E., Wheeler, S. C., & Bizer, G. Y. (1999). Is there one persuasion process or more? Lumping versus splitting in attitude change theories. Psychological Inquiry, 10, 156–163. Priester, J. R., & Petty, R. E. (1995). Source attributions and persuasion: Perceived honesty as a determinant of message scrutiny. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 637–654. Ratneshwar, S., & Chaiken, S. (1991). Comprehension’s role in persuasion: The case of its moderating effect on the persuasive impact of source cues. Journal of Consumer Research, 18, 52–62. Rucker, D. D., & Petty, R. E. (2006). Increasing the effectiveness of communications to consumers: Recommendations based on the Elaboration Likelihood and attitude certainty perspectives. Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 25, 39–52.

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Part II

Social Comparison

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Social Comparison: Motives, Standards, and Mechanisms Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler

Social comparisons – comparisons between the self and others – are a fundamental psychological mechanism influencing people’s judgments, experiences, and behavior. People constantly engage in social comparisons. Whenever they are confronted with information about how others are, what others can and cannot do, or what others have achieved and have failed to achieve, they relate this information to themselves (Dunning & Hayes, 1996). Likewise, whenever they want to know how they themselves are or what they themselves can and cannot do, they do so by comparing their own characteristics, fortunes, and weaknesses to those of others (Festinger, 1954). Social comparisons are even engaged with others who are unlikely to yield relevant information concerning the self (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995), or who – phenomenologically – are not even there, because they were perceived outside of conscious awareness (Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004a; Stapel & Blanton, 2004). Because comparisons with others are such a fundamental, ubiquitous, and robust human proclivity, it may not be surprising that for over fifty years social comparison has been a highly studied topic in social psychological research. This research was guided by three central questions: Why do people engage in social comparisons? To whom do they compare themselves? How do social comparisons influence the self? Before presenting research attempting to answer these three questions, we want to acknowledge briefly the theory of social comparison processes by Festinger (1954) as one major point of departure for the field.

Festinger’s Social Comparison Theory Festinger’s social comparison theory is a successor of his theory of informal social communication (1950). As a student of Kurt Lewin, who in his field theory (1951) theorized about forces of the environment (including the situation and other people) on the individual, Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Table 5.1

Hypotheses of the theory of social comparison processes.

No. I II III IV V VI VII

VIII IX

Hypothesis There exists, in the human organism, a drive to evaluate his opinions and his abilities. To the extent that objective, nonsocial means are not available, people evaluate their opinions and abilities by comparison respectively with the opinions and abilities of others. The tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability and one’s own increases. There is a unidirectional drive upward in the case of abilities which is largely absent in opinions. There are nonsocial restraints which make it difficult or even impossible to change one’s ability. These nonsocial restraints are largely absent for opinions. The cessation of comparison with others is accompanied by hostility or derogation to the extent that continued comparison with those persons implies unpleasant consequences. Any factors which increase the importance of some particular group as a comparison group for some particular opinion or ability will increase the pressure toward uniformity concerning that ability or opinion within that group. If persons who are very divergent from one’s own opinion or ability are perceived as different from oneself on attributes consistent with the divergence, the tendency to narrow the range of comparability becomes stronger. When there is a range of opinion or ability in a group, the relative strength of the three manifestations of pressures toward uniformity will be different for those who are close to the mode of the group than those who are distant from the mode. Specifically, those close to the mode of the group will have stronger tendencies to change the positions of others, relatively weaker tendencies to narrow the range of comparison, and much weaker tendencies to change their position compared to those who are distant from the mode of the group.

From “A theory of social comparison processes,” by L. Festinger, 1954, Human Relations, 7, 117–140.

Festinger set out to answer questions such as why do people talk, to whom do they talk, and what is the result of their talking (Wheeler, 1970). He hypothesized that communication primarily serves to reach agreement in the group and that this pressure toward uniformity of opinion is based on two reasons: first, the need for group locomotion makes it necessary that all of the group members hold similar opinions and, second, there exists a need to agree on a social reality, because this would validate the accuracy of one’s individual opinions and preferences (Festinger, 1950). Thus, in his theory of informal social communication, Festinger stressed the importance of others in the formation of one’s opinions. In the theory of social comparison processes, he added the realm of abilities and emphasized how individuals use others to fulfill their own need to gain knowledge about themselves. Festinger (1954) based his theory on nine hypotheses (Table 5.1) and specified it with eight corollaries and eight deviations. Even though the theory emerged out of Festinger’s interest in the development of opinions and some of the hypotheses (Hypotheses IV and V) specify expected differences between the influence on opinions versus abilities, most of the research that is based on this theory has concentrated on comparisons of abilities (e.g., Wheeler, 1966), emotions (e.g., Wrightsman, 1960), or personality traits (e.g., Hackmiller, 1966), and very little on comparisons of opinions. This shift might have occurred because Festinger himself did not linger for long with his theory of social comparison processes but quickly moved on to formulate the theory of cognitive dissonance (1957).

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Notwithstanding, his theory inspired the research on social comparison and already his hypotheses offer some answers to the three central questions that guided this research. Hypotheses I and II speak to why people engage in social comparisons. Festinger points out that “the holding of incorrect opinions and/or inaccurate appraisals of one’s abilities can be punishing or even fatal in many situations” (Festinger, 1954, p. 117). Thus, the need to know the self combined with the impossibility to determine opinions or abilities by reference to the physical world in many situations motivates people to compare themselves to other people. Hypotheses III, IV, and VIII summarize Festinger’s understanding of with whom people will compare. In essence, he postulates that people will seek out similar others for comparisons, or, in the case of abilities, others who are slightly better. He argues that comparisons with people whose opinion or ability are too divergent does not provide much useful information for assessing the accuracy of one own opinion or ability – mostly because the result of such a comparison is known beforehand. Finally, Hypotheses V, VI, VII, and IX point out some consequences of social comparisons to the self. Comparisons might cause a change in one’s opinion or ability, and most likely this change goes in the direction of uniformity (i.e., assimilation). The amount of change greatly depends on the importance, relevance, and attraction to the comparison group, and the inability to reach uniformity is perceived as unpleasant. In the following we will turn to each of these questions individually and thereby outline how Festinger’s initial ideas were, over the decades, expanded or sometimes questioned.

Why Do People Engage in Social Comparisons? The classic answer to why people compare themselves to others is based on motivational considerations. In Festinger’s (1954) original theory of social comparisons, he stresses the desire of people to know themselves. As outlined above, Festinger postulates that people have a basic need to maintain a stable and accurate self-view. Therefore they seek informative feedback about their characteristics and abilities. From Festinger’s point of view, people mainly rely on objective standards for such evaluations. However, objective standards are not always available, or comparisons with them are hard to achieve. In this case, people may fall back on social comparisons with others. Later research questions this preference for objective standards. Instead, people appear to compare with others even if objective standards are present (Klein, 1997). In any case, one of the main motives for social comparisons seems to be the need for accurate self-evaluations (for an overview, see Taylor, Wayment & Carrillo, 1996). However, sometimes people do not seek accurate feedback about themselves, but try to create and maintain a positive self-image. To this end, people might also purposefully engage in comparisons with others. Especially downward comparisons – comparison with others one outperforms – can serve this goal (Wills, 1981). Even failures might suddenly appear to be successes in comparisons with other who performed even worse than oneself. A third need eventually fulfilled by social comparison is the need to self-improve (Taylor & Lobel, 1989). To gain information and hints on how to advance, people seek comparisons particularly with upward standards – others who are better than themselves.

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Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler Thus, social comparisons are typically portrayed as strategic processes, which are executed to satisfy certain motives or goals (Taylor et al., 1996). Specifically, social comparison is mostly understood as a process which is engaged to fulfill fundamental needs such as self-evaluation, self-enhancement, and self-improvement (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990; Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002; Wood & Taylor, 1991). However, not all social comparisons appear to be such a deliberate and strategic process. Quite the contrary, they are often conducted spontaneously and without intention (e.g., Mussweiler et al., 2004a). In this case, they might not be strategic means to fulfill a certain goal. The existence of such spontaneous comparisons suggests that there have to be additional reasons why people compare with others. One of these additional reasons arises from logical and conversational considerations. Information about characteristics, abilities, and performances often concerns attributes and dimensions that are defined in a relative manner. To say somebody is athletic, intelligent, or attractive implies that this person is more athletic, more intelligent, and more attractive than others (Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1971). Therefore it is necessary to compare the target with relevant standards to interpret incoming information correctly and to communicate outgoing information successfully. If, for example, one hears the simple statement “Tom is tall,” one would estimate his body height differently if Tom were a toddler rather than a basketball player. In absolute numbers, the tall toddler is most likely much smaller than the tall athlete. Research in social psychology has repeatedly demonstrated that people usually consider their communication partners’ norms and standards while processing or exchanging social information (Schwarz, 1994; Schwarz, Bless, Bohner, Harlacher, & Kellenbenz, 1991). A rather new answer to the question of why people engage in social comparisons is offered by a social cognitive perspective on social comparison. Here, the basic social cognition principle of cognitive efficiency is applied to the realm of social comparison research. People as cognitive misers (Taylor, 1981) have to be efficient in the use of their scarce cognitive resources, and efficiency in comparison processes may well be the reason why comparisons are so frequently engaged in the first place. Mussweiler and Epstude (2009) have suggested that comparisons in general are so ubiquitous because they allow us to process information in a more efficient manner than more absolute modes of information processing. This may be the case, because comparisons in general, as well as social comparisons in specific, limit the range of information that has to be considered to evaluate or judge a given object. Assume, for example, that you were to evaluate your athletic abilities. To do so in an absolute manner, i.e., with little use of comparisons, you would have to consider all the different aspects of athletic ability and retrieve all the information you have available about these aspects. In principle, you would have to consider all the information that may say something about your athletic abilities, such as your success on the soccer field, the weights you lift in the gym, your performance in sports during high school, whether you are out of breath running to catch a bus, etc. Clearly, considering all this information has the potential to become an endless task. In marked contrast, evaluating your athletic abilities in a comparative manner, for example by comparing yourself with your best friend Tom, seems considerably easier. Instead of considering all the information that has some implication concerning your athletic abilities, you would merely have to consider the particular information that is relevant for the comparison with Tom.

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If Tom does not play soccer at all, for example, your abilities as a soccer player have no relevance for the comparison and thus do not have to be considered. To demonstrate the efficiency advantage of comparative information processing in general, Mussweiler and Epstude (2009) primed participants to process information in either a more comparative or a more absolute manner. To do so, participants were given a pair of pictures and were asked either to compare or to describe them before they received the critical judgment task. Participants who compared the two pictures were likely to rely more heavily on comparisons in the subsequent critical judgment task than participants who described the two pictures. In this critical judgment task, participants were asked to judge a fictitious city on several dimensions (e.g., number of inhabitants, number of students). The results indicate that comparative processing is indeed more efficient. Participants who were induced to make these judgments in a more comparative manner were faster in making the critical judgments and had more resources available for the processing of a secondary task (e.g. Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). This indicates that comparative information processing does indeed hold valuable efficiency advantages. Furthermore, in another study, Mussweiler and Epstude (2009) found evidence that this efficiency advantage partially emerged because participants rely on less information while judging in a comparative manner. In much the same way, social comparison is also likely to involve a focus on a small subset of all the information that is potentially relevant for a given self-evaluation. Thus, social comparison may be an efficient way of self-evaluation, because the less information people have to consider, the faster they come to a conclusion, as demonstrated, for example, in research on the use of categorical thinking (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000) and heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Determining who we are, what we can and cannot do may require less processing capacity if we do so in comparison to others. That might also be a reason why comparisons with others play such a central role in our mental lives. Taken together, several reasons appear to exist why people compare themselves to others. On the one hand, people might want to fulfill certain goals or satisfy certain needs such as self-evaluation, self-enhancement, and self-improvement via social comparisons (Festinger, 1954; Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Taylor et al., 1996; Wills, 1981). On the other hand, social comparisons or the reference to comparison standards might be necessary to communicate successfully with others (Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1997; Schwarz, 1994). Finally, social comparisons might be an efficient cognitive tool to gain self-knowledge without binding to many cognitive resources (Mussweiler & Epstude, 2009).

To Whom Do People Compare Themselves? There are an infinite number of potential comparison standards for each social comparison. To evaluate your athletic abilities, for example, you could compare yourself to your spouse, your brother, your little daughter, the basketball player Michel Jordan, the Pope, or any other real or imagined person you know personally or through the media. People face such a great selection of potential standards that the question is whom to select. The classical answer to this question again emphasizes motivational aspects. Based on his assumption that social comparisons were primarily conducted to gain accurate

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Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler self-knowledge, Festinger (1954) hypothesized that people select comparison standards that are similar to themselves on the critical dimension. The selection of a similar other is important, because only comparisons with similar standards provide diagnostic information for the self-evaluation (Festinger, 1954). If people compared themselves with dissimilar others, the result of this comparison would remain ambiguous. For example, if you are detected to be more athletic than a very unathletic person such a result says little about your athletic ability. Thus, a comparison with a dissimilar standard offers little helpful information for an accurate self-evaluation. Later research on the similarity hypothesis indicates that it is not so much similarity on the critical dimension (Wheeler, 1966), but rather similarity on related attributes, that is decisive for the diagnosticity of comparison information (Goethals & Darley, 1977). Related attributes are closely associated with the critical dimension and partially determine the performance on the critical dimension. Therefore, diagnostic standards have to be similar on such attributes, because otherwise performance differences may be attributed to the differences on the related attributes rather than to differences in the ability on the critical dimension. If you, for example, compare yourself to a much older person and outperform this person in an athletic competition, this does not necessarily speak for your excellent athletic ability, because the age difference readily explains the performance difference. However, if your competitor is the same age as yourself, your victory clearly indicates your superior athletic ability. Much empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that similarity on the critical dimension (Gruder, 1971; Wheeler, 1966) as well as on related attributes (Miller, 1982, 1984; Suls, Gaes, & Gastorf, 1979; Suls, Gastorf, & Lawhon, 1978; Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982; Zanna, Goethals, & Hill, 1975) is an important factor in the standard selection process. Thus, the need for accurate self-evaluation leads predominantly to the selection of similar standards. Self-enhancement – the need to maintain a positive self-view – on the other hand might lead to the selection of inferior standards. Wills (1981) postulates in his theory of downward comparisons that people seek such standards to boost their self-view with a favorable comparison. Not only social comparisons with other people, but also temporal comparisons with oneself in the past could serve such a purpose (Hanko, Crusius, & Mussweiler, 2010; Wilson & Ross, 2000). Because downward comparisons have the potential to protect or enhance one’s self-view, people with a threatened self-view will be especially prone to engage in them (Wills, 1981). For example, women whose self had been threatened by recent breast cancer compared themselves primarily with other patients whose condition was more critical (Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985). The need to self-improve, finally, is most likely fulfilled by comparisons with upward standards. Upward comparisons can motivate people and can provide information on how to make progress (Bandura, 1986, 1997). People who are slightly better than oneself, especially, are selected as comparison standard for this purpose. Those upward standards could serve as models and might, for example, improve performance through increased perceived self-efficacy (e.g., Lirgg & Feltz, 1991; Maddux, 1995). However, only if the self is perceived as mutable (Stapel & Koomen, 2000) and the standard as attainable (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997) are people motivated by such comparisons. Interestingly, even unattainable or threatening upward comparisons might motivate and improve

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performance, but only if the performance emerges in a different domain than the comparison (Johnson & Stapel, 2007a, 2007b). Even though people might seek social comparisons with superior others to improve, upward comparisons could also be threatening to the self. In the same way in which downward comparisons might maintain or enhance one’s positive self-view, upward comparisons might question this image (Tesser, 1988). To reduce the negative effect of comparisons with superior others, people could react defensively. People might, for example, undermine or dispute the relevance of the standard (Mussweiler, Gabriel & Bodenhausen, 2000; Stapel & Johnson, 2007; Stapel & Schwinghammer, 2004) or derogate the superior standard (ParksStamm, Heilman, & Hearns, 2008). Thus, to be able to satisfy varying motives, social comparisons have to be carefully crafted. Lateral comparisons serve self-evaluation, downward comparisons serve self-enhancement, and upward comparisons serve self-improvement. Even though many other factors can in addition influence the standard selection process (Taylor et al., 1996), these preferences could be understood as a simplified rule. Since different standards are required for selfenhancement, self-evaluation, or self-improvement, comparers can only guarantee that the comparison will lead to the desired outcome by strategically selecting an appropriate comparison standard (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990; Suls et al., 2002; Wood & Taylor, 1991). However, trying to select the most suitable standard will bring with it a high price. Take as an example a standard selection process based on similarity on the critical dimension itself (Festinger, 1954) or on attributes that are related to this dimension (Goethals & Darley, 1977) (for a discussion of the limitations of both notions, see Miller & Prentice, 1996). This normative perspective on standard selection is supported by considerable empirical evidence (e.g., Gruder, 1971; Suls et al., 1978; Wheeler, 1966; Zanna et al., 1975). At the same time, however, the efficiency of these arduous processes and thus their practicability is typically not taken into account. Finding a standard which is similar on the critical dimension or on related attributes is an elaborate process in which different dimensions, different potential standards, and different criteria have to be considered (Festinger, 1954; Gorthals & Darley, 1977; Wood & Taylor, 1991). Often, there seem to be too many choices and too little time. In principle, people may satisfy their different motives via arduous standard selection processes, but often they may lack the extensive processing capacities these processes require. Therefore, the pressure to be efficient is another factor influencing the choice of comparison standard (Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003). One of the main tools applied to simplify complex decisions and consequently to make them more efficient is the application of routines (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Betsch, Haberstroh, Glöckner, Haar, & Fiedler, 2001; Verplanken, Aarts, van Knippenberg, & van Knippenberg, 1994; for an overview, see Verplanken & Aarts, 1999). Applying the concepts of routines to social comparison may provide a more efficient alternative to such a strategic standard selection process. Instead of engaging in the arduous and often impossible task of finding the most diagnostic standard, one may simply compare with those standards that one routinely uses for comparison. The development of such a routine would then depend on the frequency of prior use of the routine standard. The more often a particular standard has been used, the more strongly it would be associated with the self-evaluation task and the more likely one would be to engage in further comparisons with this standard. In this

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Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler respect, routine standards enable people to skip a standard selection process altogether and still engage in comparative self-evaluation. To investigate the use of routine standards in social comparison, Mussweiler and Rüter (2003) conducted a series of studies demonstrating a preference either for naturally occurring routine standards (e.g., the best friend) or for experimentally created routine standards (based on frequent previous comparisons) during self-evaluations. In one study they showed that subsequent to a series of self-evaluative judgments (compared to a series of evaluations of another person), participants were faster at recognizing the name of their best friend (i.e., the routine standard) than the name of an ex-friend (i.e., the control standard) in a lexical decision task. Because these response latencies indicate the accessibility of the people identified with the names, these data confirmed the hypothesis that people activate their best friends as a natural routine standard during self-evaluations. In another study they also found evidence that the routine standard is indeed preferred to a strategically more suitable standard. In this case, participants evaluated themselves on a dimension on which they perceived their best friend as very dissimilar to themselves (which indicates the standard’s low diagnosticity for self-evaluation). However, participants were still faster in judging their dissimilar best friend than in judging their similar acquaintance on the dimension on which they had previously evaluated themselves. This suggests that participants had activated information about the best friend’s standing on the judgmental dimension during self-evaluation. Thus, people seem to use the routine standard even though this person is not an adequate standard from a strategic point of view. These findings indicate that our participants skipped the elaborate standard selection process altogether and instead fell back on a standard with which they were used to comparing themselves (Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003; Rüter & Mussweiler, 2005). Skipping an elaborate standard selection process, however, is just one efficiency advantage of routine standards – the advantages may go even further. Given that a routine standard is created by repeatedly comparing with the same standard, this comparison is also highly practiced. Thus, the comparison process itself may profit from the use of routine standards and become more efficient. In another series of studies Corcoran and Mussweiler (2009) showed that comparisons between the self and a routine standard (e.g., the best friend) are conducted faster than comparisons between the self and other standards (e.g., ex-friends). Furthermore, this result could be replicated for routine standards established in the experiment by repeated comparisons with the self. The mere practice of repeatedly comparing a person with the self facilitates further comparisons with the same standard even if the control standard has been used equally often in previous comparisons (but not with the self) and the subsequent comparisons take place on new, unrelated dimensions. Thus, practice effects (see also Smith, 1989; Smith, Branscombe, & Bormann, 1988; and Smith & Lerner, 1986, for practice effects in social judgments in general) may be the second base for the efficiency of routine standards during self-evaluations. Using routine standards in order to be efficient, however, might also come with a certain risk, especially if the routine standard is an upward standard on the comparison dimension. Tesser (1988) argues in his self-evaluation maintenance model that an upward comparison is most threatening when the superior other is “psychologically close.” Because only people with whom one frequently compares oneself become routine standards, such standards are typically close to oneself, like one’s best friend. Research on social comparisons within

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romantic relationships, however, demonstrates that people who feel very close to their partners are positively affected by such upward comparisons through a process of relationship affirmation (Lockwood, Dolderman, Sadler, & Gerchak, 2004; Pinkus, Lockwood, Schimmack, & Fournier, 2008). Taken together, several factors influence the selection of comparison standards. On the one hand, the same motives that might explain why people engage in social comparison also explain which standard people select. To gain accurate self-knowledge, people use similar others as comparison standards, because only people who are similar to themselves provide diagnostic information for the self-evaluation. If people rather strive to self-enhance, they do not want accurate information about themselves but rather want to maintain a positive self-image. To do so, they look out for inferior others, because in light of such downward comparisons the self appears to be positive. Finally, if the comparison serves the goal to self-improve, superior others seem to be the perfect standards, because upward comparisons might be motivating and helpful to improve. However, goals, motives, and need are not the only reasons why people compare and are not the only factors influencing the standard selection process. Another important principle is the need to be efficient with one’s cognitive resources. Social comparison is an efficient way to self-evaluate, and this efficiency advantage could easily be wasted by an arduous standard selection process. However, people can circumvent such a demanding process by relying on routine standards during self-evaluations. Instead of selecting the most suitable standard, they simply compare themselves to the person they usually compare themselves to.

How Do Social Comparisons Influence the Self ? Social comparison shapes self-evaluations in multiple and variable ways (for reviews see Blanton, 2001; Collins, 1996; Mussweiler, 2003a, 2003b; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a; Taylor et al., 1996; Wood, 1989). Self-perception, affective reactions, motivation, and behavior are all shaped by comparisons with others. Participants, for example, evaluate their athletic ability to be lower after a comparison with the basketball player Michel Jordan than after a comparison with the Pope (Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004b). After comparing their performance with a superior standard, participants feel worse than after comparing it with an inferior standard (Gilbert et al., 1995). However, in another study they were more motivated and showed a better performance after an upward than after a downward comparison (Seta, 1982). The research on social comparison provides much evidence and empirical support for the numerous consequences of social comparisons on the self. Therefore it seems to be undisputable that social comparison has a great influence on the self. Dispute, however, exists about the direction of this influence. In the original social comparison theory, Festinger (1954) predicted a pressure toward uniformity, which would result in assimilation (e.g., Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b; Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995). In this case, people evaluate themselves to be better after a comparison with a high than a low standard (Mussweiler et al., 2004b). But sometimes, social comparison leads to a contrast effect. In this case, people evaluate themselves to be worse after a comparison with a high, superior standard than a low, inferior standard (e.g., Morse & Gergen, 1970).

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Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler One important factor that influences whether people assimilate to or contrast away from comparison standards seems to be how they construe their self before engaging in social comparison. For example, Stapel and Koomen (2001) demonstrated that inducing a personal self-construal by priming participants with the pronouns “I” and “me” led to contrast to a successful or unsuccessful comparison standard. Inducing a social self-construal by priming participants with the pronouns “we” and “us” fostered assimilation. Further findings point to motivational causes of these effects. Comparisons after activated self-construals followed a self-enhancing pattern: a downward standard led to particularly strong positive self-evaluations (contrast) when personal self-construals had been activated. An upward standard led to particularly strong positive self-evaluations (assimilation) when social selfconstruals had been activated. Parallel findings have been obtained by comparing participants with primed or chronically high-independent versus interdependent selves (Gardner, Gabriel, & Hochschild, 2002; Kemmelmeier & Oyserman, 2001). Another way in which self-construal affects assimilation and contrast in social comparison is highlighted by findings of Lockwood and Kunda (1997): participants who saw intelligence as a malleable trait assimilated to a highly intelligent comparison standard. Blanton (2001) follows up on this result in his three-selves model of social comparison. He suggests that in addition to personal and social selves the possible self also affects social comparison outcomes. The possible self is not constrained by the current characteristics of a person because it entails everything that he or she might become at some point. Hence, traits of the comparison standard can be included in the self, resulting in assimilation. To test this reasoning, Blanton and Stapel (2008, Studies 1 a, b) induced a possible-self mindset by asking participants to write an essay on the topic “Who can I become?” Consistent with the threeselves model, these participants assimilated their self-evaluations to a very intelligent or very unintelligent comparison standard. In sum, there are convergent findings that chronic or situationally induced self-construals are an important predictor of the direction of social comparisons. Furthermore, effects of personal and social self-construals have been related to the self-enhancement motive. However, whether social comparison results in assimilation or contrast depends on a host of additional moderators that are not necessarily tied to motivational processes such as, for example, the extremity of the standard (Herr, 1986; Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983; Mussweiler et al., 2004b), the ambiguity of the self-knowledge (e.g., Herr et al., 1983; Stapel, Koomen, & van der Plight, 1997), whether the standard belongs to the ingroup or an outgroup (e.g., Blanton, Crocker, & Miller, 2000; Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002; Mussweiler et al., 2000), hether one cooperates or competes with the standard (Stapel & Koomen, 2005), the psychological closeness between the self and the standard (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995; Tesser, Miller, & Moore, 1988), etc. Contrast is more likely if the standard is an extreme standard, if the standard belongs to an outgroup, or if the self-knowledge holds clear implications for the upcoming self-evaluation. On the other hand, social comparison may result in assimilation if the standard is a moderate standard, if the standard belongs to the same category as the self, or if the self-knowledge is ambiguous concerning the dimension on which the self-evaluation occurs (Mussweiler, 2003a). In the perspective of the Selective Accessibility Model (Figure 5.1; Mussweiler, 2003a), these converse consequences of social comparison can be explained by the change of

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Similarity testing test hypothesis target = standard

selective accessibility of standard-consistent target knowledge

=

Assimilation

initial assessment of target-standard similarity Contrast

=/ Dissimilarity testing test hypothesis target =/ standard

selective accessibility of standard-inconsistent target knowledge

Figure 5.1 The selective accessibility mechanism. From “Comparison processes in social judgment: Mechanisms and consequences,” by T. Mussweiler, Psychological Review, 110, 472–489.

accessible self-knowledge. Like any judgment, post-comparison self-evaluations are based on the implications of the judgment-relevant knowledge that is accessible at the time the judgment is made (for an overview, see Higgins, 1996). Social comparisons may therefore affect self-evaluations because they influence what knowledge is rendered accessible and is consequently used as a basis for the evaluation. Thus, understanding what knowledge is sought and activated during the comparison and is consequently rendered accessible is crucial to understand their self-evaluative consequences. To carry out a social comparison, people have to obtain specific judgment-relevant information about the self and the standard, which allows them to evaluate both persons relative to one another. To decide whether oneself or one’s best friend is more athletic, for example, one has to activate knowledge about the athletic abilities of both people. This specific knowledge is best obtained by an active search for judgment-relevant information through a processes of hypothesis testing (Trope & Liberman, 1996). Such hypothesis-testing processes are often selective in that they focus on one single hypothesis which is then evaluated against a specific criterion (Sanbonmatsu, Posavac, Kardes, & Mantel, 1998; see also Klayman & Ha, 1987; Trope & Liberman, 1996). Rather than engaging in an exhaustive comparative test of all plausible hypotheses, judges follow the efficiency principle and limit themselves to the test of a single focal hypothesis. Therefore, the critical question is which concrete hypothesis will be tested during the comparison. In principle, two hypotheses can be distinguished. People can either test the possibility that the self is similar to the standard or they can test the possibility that the self is dissimilar from the standard. When comparing one’s athletic abilities to those of one’s best friend, for example, one may either assume either that both are about equally athletic or that one is clearly more athletic.

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Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler To know how social comparison might influence the self, one therefore first has to determine which of these hypotheses is tested during the comparison. The choice of the hypothesis depends on the overall perceived similarity of the self and the standard. As the first step in the selective accessibility mechanism, judges engage in a quick initial assessment of the self and the standard (Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974) in which they briefly consider a small number of features (e.g., category membership, salient characteristics) to decide whether both are generally similar or dissimilar. The outcome of this initial screening is a broad assessment of perceived similarity. If, for example, one’s best friend belongs to a category that clearly sets him apart with respect to athletic abilities (e.g., he is a professional athlete), then the initial assessment of similarity is likely to indicate that self and standard are generally dissimilar with respect to the critical dimension. However, in the absence of such clear indications of dissimilarity this assessment is likely to indicate that self and standard are generally similar. Although such a broad assessment is by itself too general to be used as the basis for self-evaluation, it is sufficient to determine the specific nature of the hypothesis that is then tested in more detail. If this assessment indicates that the self is generally similar to the standard, judges will engage in a process of similarity testing and test the hypothesis that the self is similar to the standard. If the initial assessment indicates that the self is dissimilar from the standard, however, judges will engage in a process of dissimilarity testing and test the hypothesis that the self is dissimilar from the standard. Because the critical initial assessment of self–standard similarity is conceptualized as a quick screening, features that are salient, easy to process, and have immediate implications for target-standard similarity are especially influential during this stage of the comparison process. Two features which fulfill these criteria are category membership and standard extremity. Similarity testing, for example, is more likely to be engaged for standards that belong to the same category as the standard (Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002) and whose standing on the judgmental dimension is moderate rather than extreme (Mussweiler et al., 2004b). Furthermore, the motivational underpinnings of the comparison situation may influence the outcome of this initial assessment. If judges are, for example, motivated to maintain a positive self-image when confronted with a low standard they may focus more on the ways in which they are different from this standard and consequently engage in dissimilarity testing. Once a hypothesis is selected, it is often tested by focusing on hypothesis-consistent evidence (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Snyder & Swann, 1978; Trope & Bassok, 1982; Trope & Liberman, 1996). Applied to the case of social comparison, this suggests that judges selectively generate information that is consistent with the focal hypothesis of either similarity or dissimilarity. Judges who engage in similarity testing when comparing their athletic abilities to those of their best friend may thus focus on those aspects of their self-knowledge which indicate that they are both similarly athletic. By the same token, if judges test the hypothesis that the self is dissimilar from the standard, they do so by selectively searching for standardinconsistent self-knowledge – evidence indicating that the self is different from the standard. The selectivity in the acquisition of judgment-relevant self-knowledge has therefore clear consequences for the accessibility of self-knowledge. The mechanism of similarity testing selectively increases the accessibility of standard-consistent self-knowledge, whereas dissimilarity testing selectively increases the accessibility of standard-inconsistent self-knowledge. Because judges use the self-knowledge that became accessible during the comparison as a

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basis for self-evaluations, their subsequent judgment will reflect the implications of this knowledge. The consequence of basing self-evaluations on the implications of standardconsistent knowledge is thus assimilation. Basing target evaluations on the implications of standard-inconsistent knowledge, however, results typically in contrast. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the direction of comparison consequences is determined by the judges’ informational focus on similarities versus differences (Mussweiler, 2001). Here, participants are procedurally primed to focus either on similarities or on differences. To this end, participants worked prior to the social comparison task on an unrelated task in which they compared sketches of two scenes. Roughly half the participants were asked to list all the similarities between the two scenes they could find. The other half were asked to list all the differences they could find. In both cases, the respective informational focus on similarities or differences should become proceduralized (Smith, 1994) and carry over to the subsequent comparison. Subsequent to the procedural priming task, participants compared themselves with a social standard which was either high or low on the critical dimension of adjustment to college. They then evaluated their own adjustment to college. Consistent with a selective accessibility perspective on comparison consequences, subsequent self-evaluations critically depended on whether participants were induced to focus on similarities or differences. Participants who were primed to focus on similarities and to thus engage in similarity testing assimilated self-evaluations toward the standard and evaluated their own adjustment to college to be better after a comparison with a high rather than a low standard. Participants who were primed to focus on differences and to thus engage in dissimilarity testing, on the other hand, contrasted self-evaluations away from the standard. They evaluated their own adjustment to college to be worse after a comparison with a high rather than a low standard. In addition, there is evidence that assimilative and contrastive social comparison consequences are often accompanied by traces of the two alternative selective accessibility mechanisms of similarity and dissimilarity testing (Mussweiler et al., 2004b). In one study, participants compared themselves with either moderate or extreme comparison standards of athletic ability before evaluating their own athletic ability. For example, participants were either asked to compare themselves with the moderately low standard Bill Clinton or with the extremely low standard Pope John Paul. Consistent with evidence in the social judgment literature (Herr, 1986), participants assimilated their self-evaluations to the moderate standards and contrasted them away from the extreme standards. Subsequently, participants were asked to compare two pictures and to indicate how similar they were. If assimilative comparison consequences are indeed produced by an informational focus on similarities and contrastive consequences result from a focus on dissimilarities, then these respective foci should carry over to this picture-comparison task. The results indicate that participants who assimilated self-evaluations toward the moderate standards indeed focused on similarities between the two pictures and rated them to be more similar than participants who contrasted self-evaluations away from extreme standards. This finding suggests that the alternative informational foci on similarities versus dissimilarities do indeed underlie assimilative and contrastive comparison consequences. The selective accessibility model suggests that these varying social comparison consequences are produced by differences in the accessibility of self-knowledge. Whereas similarity

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Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler testing increases the accessibility of self-knowledge indicating that self and standard are similar on the critical dimension, dissimilarity testing selectively increases the accessibility of self-knowledge that indicates that self and standard are dissimilar on the critical dimension. This hypothesis was also tested directly. In these studies (Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002), participants compared themselves with intracategorical versus extracategorcial standards, which typically leads to either similarity testing and assimilation or dissimilarity testing and contrast. Social comparison with an ingroup standard, on the one hand, should involve similarity testing so that standard-consistent self-knowledge is rendered accessible. Comparisons with an outgroup standard, on the other hand, should involve dissimilarity testing so that standard-inconsistent self-knowledge is rendered accessible. Subsequent to the comparison, participants worked on a special type of lexical decision task (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998) that assessed the accessibility of standard-consistent versus standard-inconsistent selfknowledge. The results indicate that standard-consistent self-knowledge is more accessible after a spontaneous comparison with an ingroup member than after a comparison with an outgroup member. Thus, under conditions that promote similarity testing, the accessibility of standard-consistent target knowledge is increased. Under conditions that promote dissimilarity testing, however, standard-inconsistent knowledge becomes more accessible. Changes in the accessibility of self-knowledge may thus be the critical mechanism that drives the effects social comparisons have on the self. If a social comparison involves a focus on the ways in which self and standard are similar, then the accessibility of standardconsistent self-knowledge is increased so that self-evaluations are assimilated toward the standard. If a social comparison involves a focus on the ways in which self and standard are different, then the accessibility of standard-inconsistent knowledge is increased so that selfevaluations are contrasted away from the standard.

Applications of Social Comparison Theory In light of the fact that social comparisons are an integral part of our psychological functioning and daily lives, it is not surprising that many researchers have used social comparison theory to explain phenomena in applied contexts. The diverse topics include, for example, the importance of comparisons with others in the development of the academic self-concept and academic performance (e.g., Marsh & Hau, 2003; Marsh & Parker, 1984), pay-level satisfaction (e.g., Harris, Anseel, & Lievens 2008; Williams, McDaniel, & Nguyen, 2006), decision making in organizations (Bandura & Jourden, 1991), virtual work environments (Conner, 2003), romantic relationships and marital functioning (e.g., Buunk, VanYperen, Taylor, & Collins, 1991; Lockwood et al., 2004), gossip (Wert & Salovey, 2004), the use of deception in consumer behavior (Argo, White, & Dahl, 2006), the role of comparative processes in sports judgments (Damisch, Mussweiler, & Plessner, 2006), and many more. Particular theoretical and empirical interest has been devoted to the role of social comparisons in health psychology as well as to the impact of idealized media images on self-evaluation, which we will briefly discuss below. When faced with a serious health problem, people find themselves in a situation that meets all the criteria outlined by Festinger (1954) that should increase the need for social

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comparisons: health is of utmost importance, the future is unclear, and there are no objective standards of how to cope. In line with this view, a growing body of evidence has documented the frequency and the importance of social comparisons at the onset and the course of diseases and other health threats (for comprehensive reviews see Buunk & Gibbons, 1997; Tennen, McKee, & Affleck, 2000). Besides providing valuable information to patients, social comparisons might also fulfill the need for self-enhancement (see above). Much of the research has focused on the question of whether comparisons with others who are worse off can make people feel better. For example, in the now classic study by Taylor, Wood, and Lichtman (1983), the vast majority of a sample of breast cancer patients reported that they spontaneously compared downward to other cancer victims in order to cope. Independent of the severity of their condition, these women assumed that there were others who were worse off. Downward comparisons and their contributions to subjective well-being have been reported with regard to many other grave health issues such as chronic pain, eating disorders, depression, infertility, AIDS, and heart disease (Buunk & Gibbons, 1997). However, the complementary conclusion, that patients will avoid comparisons to upward standards, because others who are better off endanger one’s self-esteem, is not warranted. In contrast, in a number of studies patients even seem to show a preference for upward comparisons. For example, in the study of Mollemann, Pruyn, and van Knippenberg (1986) cancer patients strongly preferred to interact with other cancer patients who were similar to themselves or slightly better off. According to Taylor and Lobel (1989) this reflects the aforementioned motive to self-improve by affiliating with others who can serve as a role model and give hope. Several studies have supported this assertion. For example, Stanton, Danoff-Burg, Cameron, Snider, and Kirk (1999) asked cancer patients to listen to audiotaped interviews with other cancer patients with good or poor health status. Patients expressed greater interest in emotional and informational support from well-adjusted targets, but rated their own coping and prognosis better in response to poorly adjusted targets. Irrespective of the target, all participants reported that listening to the interview made them feel better about their own condition, thus supporting the view that both downward and upward comparisons can be beneficial to patients. Another topic that has been analyzed from a social comparison perspective concerns the effects of idealized media images on the perceiver’s self-evaluation. People portrayed in the modern mass media, such as actors or models in advertisement campaigns, are mostly highly attractive and thus often present extreme comparison standards in terms of their physical features. Most researchers have assumed that in comparison to these “perfect” bodies, perceivers should be less satisfied with their own appearance, which might in the long term even contribute to psychological problems such as eating disorders (Polivy & Herman, 2002). In line with this view, a number of studies have shown that exposure to such idealized media images can have detrimental effects on self-evaluation; however, other studies also found beneficial effects (for a meta-analysis, see Groesz, Levine, & Murnen, 2002), suggesting that the relationship is more complicated than initially thought. Recent research has begun to delineate the conditions which result in assimilation or contrast after comparisons with highly attractive media portrayals. For example, the results of Trampe, Stapel, and Siero (2007) suggest that exposure to thin female body shapes is not equally detrimental to all women. In their studies, women who

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Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler were already dissatisfied with their bodies were especially vulnerable to adverse effects of comparisons with professional models. This effect might be based in the specific comparison tendencies of these women. Trampe et al. (2007) found that the more women were unhappy with their bodies, the more they reported that they compared their own body with those of other women. Furthermore, they seemed to differentiate less between potential comparison standards. While body-satisfied women did not show comparison effects in response to attractive models, but only to equally attractive non-models, body-dissatisfied women showed comparison effects regardless of whether the standards were models or not, and even in response to inanimate objects such as thin vases. Adopting the Selective Accessibility Model (Mussweiler, 2003b), Häfner (2004) predicted that even very subtle differences in the presentation of advertisements can have strikingly different effects on self-evaluation, leading to both contrast and assimilation to highly attractive standards. To manipulate the direction of the initial similarity assessment, he presented advertisement models with different headlines. As expected, headlines pointing to similarities (e.g., “same body – same feeling”) led to self-evaluative assimilation, whereas headlines pointing to differences (e.g. “feel the difference”) resulted in self-evaluative contrast. In a similar vein, Smeesters and Mandel (2006) showed that characteristics of media images can moderate their effect by affecting the kind of self-knowledge that becomes accessible during social comparison. As evidenced by lexical decision tasks, the presentation of extremely thin models rendered self-knowledge about heaviness more accessible and, correspondingly, led to more negative self-views. Conversely, the presentation of moderately thin models rendered self-knowledge about thinness more accessible and led to more positive self-views. Interestingly, in addition to these findings, other data of Smeesters and Mandel (2006) point to a methodological reason why assimilation to media images has been documented so rarely: the pattern of the effects on self-evaluation critically depended on the response format of the measures. Differential effects of moderate and extreme standards were only found on self-evaluation measures using an open response format. On rating scales, both types of standards seemed to have led to contrast, probably because the models were used as reference points when answering the scales (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). Thus, while participants actually were happier with their own physical appearance after having seen a moderately thin model, this effect was concealed on the rating scales, because items like “I am slim” changed their meaning in the context of the presented models. Taken together, these findings indicate that characteristics of perceivers, comparison standards, and subtle situational differences all affect the impact of idealized media images on self-evaluation in a way predicted by social comparison theories.

Conclusion Social comparison is a remarkably ubiquitous process which influences how people think about themselves, how they feel, what they are motivated to do, and how they behave. Social comparison consequences thus span all core arenas of human psychological functioning. This striking ubiquity is matched by a similarly striking complexity and multi-facetedness of the core comparison process itself. Not only do social comparisons influence cognition,

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affect, motivation, and behavior, they are also shaped by cognitive, affective, and motivational factors. To date, these different influences on social comparison processes have been mostly studied in relative isolation. In fact, the history of social comparison research is a history of consecutively switching foci (Buunk & Mussweiler, 2001; Suls & Wheeler, 2000), starting with a strong focus on motivational influences and a relative neglect of cognitive underpinnings and ending with a strong focus on cognitive underpinnings and a relative neglect of motivational influences. It seems clear that, particularly for a process that is as ubiquitous as social comparison, a more encompassing perspective that integrates cognitive, motivational, and affective influences is needed.

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Relative Deprivation: Understanding the Dynamics of Discontent Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra F. Corning, Tara C. Dennehy, and Faye J. Crosby

Relative deprivation is a construct used to explain paradoxes (Walker & Smith, 2002) – for example, how people’s subjective comparisons influence their outlooks when they are confronted with situations of inequity. Stouffer and colleagues (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949) coined the term “relative deprivation” to explain unusual relations between military rank and satisfaction among troops in the American army during World War II. In particular, Stouffer et al. found that the military police were, in general, more satisfied than other men with their rate of advancement even though their promotions were slower than were promotions in other units. Clearly, objective and subjective reality do not always coincide. According to relative deprivation (RD) theory, deprivation is experienced relative to a shared standard, as opposed to being determined by some absolute measure of deprivation (Crosby, 1976). For instance, if you take people of modest means out of a town in which they were on equal footing with the other residents and place them in an affluent area in which they have relatively little material wealth compared to their neighbors, they are likely to feel deprived in relation to their new neighbors. This is most famously illustrated by Marx: “A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a little house to a hut” (quoted in Useem, 1975, p. 53). The concept of RD has been applied to many phenomena (Walker, 2009). Pettigrew (1964) applied RD theory to the study of urban violence. Caplan (1970) invoked RD to explain why affluent people are likely to be the leaders of social protest movements. It also has been used to clarify why personal happiness sometimes rises during economic downturns (Brickman & Campbell, 1971), and why people try to match the consumption of others who are economically more prosperous (Cook, Crosby, & Hennigan, 1977). Often, the concept of RD has been used to explain why those who Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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are not well off seem quiescent; and the concept has also been invoked in situations in which people are dissatisfied or angry with their lots in life when, by objective standards, they are not as poorly off as many others.

Early Conceptualizations of RD and Cognate Theories Several theories from the social sciences relate to the theory of RD. Many of these theories are interrelated, having been built upon one another in their attempts to explain human behavior in regard to inequity. Below we discuss a number of theories that emerged within the same timeframe as the theory of RD.

Frustration–aggression theory Frustration–aggression theory (Berkowitz, 1972; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939) posits that there is a positive association between anger and an individual’s desire for, thoughts on the feasibility of attaining, and difficulty in attaining a desired object. Dollard and colleagues’ original model stated simply that frustration always results in aggression (Dollard et al., 1939). However, subsequent empirical studies revealed that the relationship between frustration and aggression was much more complex (e.g., Berkowitz, 1962, 1968a; Milgram, 1974). Berkowitz (1968b, 1972) revised the theory to incorporate the finding that aggression is most likely to occur when people have a strong expectation that they will get something they desire but that expectation then is violated. If a person believes she will be paid for work, for example, she is more likely to become aggressive upon being denied payment than is an individual who believed he or she was volunteering. Unlike RD theory (which we detail below), frustration–aggression theory does not invoke the concepts of social comparison, deservingness, or self-blame as preconditions for frustration or dissatisfaction.

Justice theory Justice theory, developed by Lerner (1975; Lerner & Miller, 1978), states that people need to believe that the world is a just place. To support this need, people employ a variety of cognitive and behavioral strategies to convince themselves that the world is fair (e.g., Ryan, 1971). Lerner’s theory stands in sharp contrast to some versions of equity theories that depict people as motivated by material self-interest (Homans, 1976; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). Justice theory resembles RD theory in its interest in how people make mental adjustments to their subjective realities. Like RD theory, justice theory concerns itself with people’s assessments of deservingness or entitlements. Justice theory differs from RD theory in that the latter posits that judgments about justice and deservingness are always comparative while the former does not.

Theory of hedonic relativism The premise of hedonic relativism is that low expectations breed satisfaction (Brickman, 1975). Essential in this is the idea that happiness is relative – a person’s happiness depends on his or her experiences and expectations, as well as on comparisons between others’

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Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra F. Corning, Tara C. Dennehy, and Faye J. Crosby situations and his or her own. A study by Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978) contrasting the happiness of lottery winners, controls, and paraplegic people has often been cited as evidence supporting the theory of hedonic relativism. The study found that the lottery winners expressed the least positive affect in day-to-day life, while the paraplegic individuals were no different than the controls.

Davies’s J-curve theory of revolution Davies (1962) studied racial riots and concluded that anger is most likely to occur in individuals lacking X if they both want and previously had X. For reasons that will be evident when we discuss Gurr’s theory later, Davies’s theory is considered by some political scientists to be similar to Gurr’s (1970) model of progressive deprivation, in which people’s expectations rise simultaneously with a drop in their ability to obtain what they desire. Unlike Gurr, however, Davies (1962) did not address feasibility or comparison with others.

Social comparison theories Although the act of social comparison has been performed throughout human history (Buunk & Gibbons, 2000), it was not until Leon Festinger (1954) coined the concept of “social comparison” that comparisons moved from being a behavior to a theory. Social comparison theory is a broad explanatory theory of human behavior out of which specialized theories have arisen to explain different facets of comparative behavior. Of particular interest to RD are two theories that fall under the aegis of social comparison: distributive justice theory and equity theory. Theory of distributive justice. Distributive justice developed out of Stouffer et al.’s (1949) concept of RD as an explanatory model for individual outlook when confronted with situations of inequity. As expressed by Homans (1961), distributive injustice can be illustrated as a proportion wherein an inequality of investments and rewards between party A and party B will cause both parties to feel that the exchange is unfair. Homans’s model is presented in the top row of Table 6.1; in the model, the person who proportionally profits less from his or her investment will experience RD. What is important about this model is that it introduces the concept of comparison: people do not feel deprived merely because their expectations were not met, but because they feel that relative to a comparison other they are experiencing injustice. Homans (1961) makes the point that it is important for the “comparison other” to be of roughly equivalent status as the self. Status can be interpreted as a form of investment whereby high status is seen as a big investment and low status as a small investment. Homans’s model can be expanded to include multiple interconnected dyads, as in the case of an employer and multiple employees. In order to be perceived as fair, the employer must strike a balance between the ratios of all employees. Homans’s (1961) model predicts that when people lose in a proportional inequality, they will experience dissatisfaction or anger; when they benefit, they will experience guilt.

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Equity ratios proposed by social comparison theorists.

Homans (1961) Sayles (1958) Patchen (1961)

Adams (1965)

Person’s investments Other’s investments = Person’s rewards Other’s rewards Our group’s importance Our earnings = Other group’s importance Their earnings My pay My position on dimensions related to pay = Referent person’s or group’s pay Referent person’s or group’s position on the dimensions Person’s input Other’s input = Person’s output Other’s output

As shown in Table 6.1, Sayles (1958) set up a similar model to Homans. Sayles wished to explain the reactions of factory workers to their wages. If workers see the proportion between their group’s wages and another group’s wages as balanced, they conclude that their wages are fair. If an inequality occurs, they conclude that their wages are unjust. Sayles’s model is simpler than Homans’s, as it does not compute costs or risks, but it is similar in that justice is computed as a ratio between investment and reward. Another social comparison theorist, Patchen (1961), also created a proportion to explain wage comparisons made by workers. According to Patchen, when an inequality occurs, cognitive dissonance is experienced. Patchen proposed that dissonance may actually provoke people to seek achievements, rather than simply seeking consonance, as Festinger (1957) asserted. Equity theory. Several theorists have developed elaborate models of equity (e.g., Walster et al., 1978). Classical equity theory was proposed by John Stacy Adams in his 1965 paper “Inequity in social exchange.” Adams was particularly interested in the antecedents and consequences of felt injustice, which he considered to be more relevant to the experience of dissatisfaction than RD. Adams believed that RD was not directly responsible for dissatisfaction, but rather the experience of felt injustice created a state in which RD occurred, and resulted in negative affect. Adams’s version of equity theory was built upon work by Festinger (1957), Homans (1961), Patchen (1961), and others. Central to the theory is the idea that social exchange can be judged by the participants to be fair or unfair. According to Adams, people evaluate their relative situations by comparison with a referent other. A person will feel angry or deprived if he or she feels that his or her input–output ratio (Table 6.1) is greater than that of the referent other. If his or her ratio is less, they will experience guilt. This is often termed the “exchange formulation of equity theory” (Crosby, 1982). Adams (1965) defined inputs to be the same as Homans’s (1961) investments (e.g., training, skill, social status, education, etc.). An input is contingent upon its recognition by the person that it is relevant to the exchange. When one of the parties in the exchange does not agree on the relevance or value of the input, feelings of inequity may result from the exchange. Inputs are often inter-correlated, with factors such as age being associated with

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Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra F. Corning, Tara C. Dennehy, and Faye J. Crosby seniority. The other side of Adams’s proportion is outcomes, which can be positive or negative. Positive outcomes are similar to rewards (cf. Homans, 1961), whereas negative outcomes can be conditions such as stressful or dangerous work environments, boredom, or low job security. Outcomes, like inputs, tend also to be inter-correlated. Adams asserted that people have preexisting expectations of the relationship between inputs and outcomes. When the relationship is unequal, this incites feelings of injustice in the exchange. Preexisting expectations come about as a result of referents or comparison others. People compare their own ratio of inputs and outcomes with the ratio of a similar referent other. This comparison “Other” can be someone with whom the person is in an exchange relationship, or it can be that person’s memory of him- or herself in another situation. The Person–Other relationship can also apply when the comparison is between groups (Adams, 1965). In classic equity theory, the “Person” will experience distress when he or she is overrewarded, not just when under-rewarded. Adams’s assertion that people seek proportionality rather than simply grabbing all rewards for themselves has been supported by Jaques’s (1961) study of British workers. Jaques found that while workers desired fair wages, they were as uncomfortable when their compensation was too high as when it was too low. Equity theory proposes that, assuming similar views of the world, if Person experiences inequity, so will Other, but Other’s inequity will be the converse of Person’s – if Person is unjustly rewarded, then Other will be unjustly deprived (Adams, 1965), and vice versa. Adams wanted to determine the cognitive and behavioral consequences that follow a judgment of unfairness. According to Adams’s theory, inequity causes tension and people always seek to reduce or remove tension. People’s motivation to reduce tensions will be proportional to the strength of the tension. There are two direct ways in which tension can be reduced: (a) people change their inputs, or (b) people change their outcomes. Laboratory experiments conducted by Adams and colleagues found evidence for people changing their inputs in the face of inequity (Adams, 1963; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964; Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962). Similar support was found for the alteration of outputs by Thibaut (1950) and Homans (1953). Adams (1965) listed four other ways in which people may indirectly reduce the tension resulting from inequity: 1. Person will reduce tension by way of cognitive alterations to his or her inputs and outcomes. Although his or her skills and behaviors will not change, he or she will assign different values to their existing inputs and outcomes. Experiments by Weick (1964) supported this premise. 2. Person will leave the exchange. Patchen (1959) suggested that this method of tension relief may be related to absenteeism in the workplace. 3. Person will attempt to change Other’s ratio. Adams (1965) suggested that this would be uncommon and only resorted to in conditions of extreme inequity. 4. Person will change his or her comparison other. This would generally be a last resort, as people form strong attachments to their referents. Given the vast importance of equity theory for social psychologists in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, it is inevitable that the theory has come in for some criticism. One criticism

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is that equity does not adequately distinguish between perceptions of fairness and feelings of satisfaction (Jacobson & Koch, 1977). Another is that it does not account for situations in which people react to inequity without reference to self (where they see that someone is unfairly rewarded, even though they are not impacted; Crosby, 1982). Problems with comparisons in equity theory have led certain theorists (Anderson, Berger, Zelditch, & Cohen, 1969; Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, & Cohen, 1972) to propose that people do not compare themselves with a specific other, but rather with a generalized referent other – an average equivalent person. Crosby (1982) suggests that this “average person” may be drawn from composite impressions of the situations of many individuals. Morton Deutsch (1975) has criticized equity theory for failing to recognize that proportionality is not the only basis for determinations of fairness. According to Deutsch, equity applies in impersonal or business situations, but does not apply in cases of family interactions or interactions among friends. Prentice and Crosby (1987) found strong empirical support for Deutsch’s assertions. Another critique of traditional equity theory is that it is circular. An equity researcher may assert that someone is dissatisfied because he finds himself under-compensated relative to a comparison person, but without specifying a priori whom the person will select as a comparison person, the explanation is tautological, lacking any substance. Similar is the criticism that equity theory attempts to be a general theory explaining human behavior, but it does not encompass the observed complexity of decision making (Crosby, 1982).

Models of RD Several major theorists influenced the development of RD as a theory. Although Stouffer et al. (1949) put forward a concept, it was not until more than a decade later that any theorist published a coherent model, explaining the antecedents, correlates, and/or consequences of feelings of deprivation. Four distinct models were put forward between 1959 and 1975.

Davis (1959) Davis (1959) was the first researcher to create a formal model of RD. Davis systematically developed a theory of how social comparisons can lead to RD, which he supported with observational data from The American Soldier (Stouffer et al., 1949). Davis believed that there were three antecedents to the experience of RD: 1. Awareness that a similar other possesses X 2. Desire of X 3. Feeling deserving of X Per Davis’s (1959) model, each of these conditions must occur in order for a person to experience the feeling of deprivation. Davis (1959) hypothesized that there were four possible psychological consequences of unequal comparisons between a person, or “ego” and a referent other, or “alter.” He

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Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra F. Corning, Tara C. Dennehy, and Faye J. Crosby differentiated between ingroup comparisons, in which people compare against a similar referent, and outgroup comparisons, in which the referent is of different status or rank. According to Davis’s theory, when people compare themselves with an ingroup referent, they will experience RD if they have less than the referent. If he or she has more, the person will feel relatively gratified. A person judging that an outgroup referent has more will feel relatively subordinate; if the outgroup referent is considered to be deprived, the person will feel relatively superior (Davis, 1959). Davis hypothesized that when the deprivation status of the person and referent are discrepant, this would result in the awareness either of “fairness” (1959; p. 283) for ingroup comparisons, or “social distance” (p. 284) for outgroup comparisons.

Runciman (1966) Runciman (1966) developed his theory of RD in an attempt to explain why people who are disadvantaged endorse a system that oppresses them. In his model, Runciman (1966) delineated the difference between egoistic (or personal) and fraternal (or collective) deprivation. In egoistic deprivation, individuals feel deprived on their own behalf; in fraternal deprivation, individuals feel that their group is relatively deprived in comparison to another group. The individuals’ likelihood of experiencing one type of deprivation over the other depends on their group involvement. If they identify strongly with their class or peer group, they are more likely to feel deprived on the part of their group; if they have aspirations that would move them beyond their group, they are more likely to be susceptible to egoistic deprivation. Runciman agreed with Davis’s (1959) RD model, but added a fourth component – feasibility. Runciman felt that RD was dependent on people’s hopes being disappointed; people do not feel deprived when a desired outcome seems imminent (Runciman, 1966).

Gurr (1970) Gurr (1968a, 1968b, 1968c, 1969, 1970) was interested in looking at RD and social violence. He proposed that RD arises out of the discrepancy between peoples’ “value expectations” and their “value capabilities.” Value expectations refer to those desired objects (and opportunities) to which people feel entitled. Value capabilities refer to what people think they can achieve. Gurr’s model is different than those of other theorists, as it is dynamic. Gurr identified three possible patterns of RD: (1) decremental deprivation; (2) aspirational deprivation; and (3) progressive deprivation. In decremental deprivation, people’s value expectations remain the same, but their value capabilities decrease. An example of this would be a person losing his or her job or taking a large pay cut, but still expecting to maintain the standard of living to which the family had become accustomed. The next pattern of RD is aspiration deprivation, wherein the people’s value capabilities remain the same, but their expectations rise. This can be illustrated by de Tocqueville’s famous observation: “Evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable when once the idea of escape from them is suggested” (quoted in Davies, 1962, p. 6). Finally, in progressive deprivation, a person’s value expectations rise while, simultaneously, his or her value capabilities fall. On the role of feasibility in RD, Gurr (1970) obviously disagreed with Runciman (1966). Runciman’s model maintained that people would experience deprivation when they believe

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that attainment of the desired is feasible (although not inevitable; Runciman, 1966). Gurr believed that it was the opposite – people experience RD when they believe that the desired is impossible. Early research (e.g., Coch & French, 1948) found mixed support for Gurr’s approach, but Crosby’s (1982) study of working women validated Gurr’s position on feasibility.

Williams (1975) Williams’s (1975) theory of RD is simpler than the theories of Runciman (1966) and Gurr (1970). Williams believed that RD will arise when a discrepant comparison is made between what one wants and what one has. Interestingly, this theory perfectly fits Aberle’s (1962) definition of RD. While comparison with a better-off other is a precondition in Williams’s model, in that such a comparison can influence what one wants, comparison to a better-off other is not, in itself, sufficient to cause RD (Crosby, 1982). Williams was more interested in the consequences of collective deprivation than in antecedents or individual RD.

Crosby’s Model One theorist sought to synthesize earlier work. Crosby (1976) performed a comprehensive literature review and developed a model of RD based on the findings from past studies. Crosby’s model built most closely on Runciman (1966), but added a fifth precondition to felt deprivation: like Patchen (1961), Crosby believed that allocation of blame is pertinent to the experience of deprivation – if people blame themselves for their own failures, then they are unlikely to feel deprived, angry, or dissatisfied (except with themselves). Crosby’s model states that five preconditions must be fulfilled in order for a person to experience RD. Specifically, a person must: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

See that other possesses X Want X Feel that one deserves X Think it feasible to obtain X Lack a sense of responsibility for failure to possess X.

If the second precondition is not met, then a person feels “righteous indignation” rather than deprivation; if the third precondition is not met, then the feeling is one of disappointment rather than deprivation; if the fourth precondition is not filled, the resulting state would be one of “dissatisfaction or jealousy”; and if the fifth precondition goes unsatisfied, then “envy or dissatisfaction with himself ” results (Crosby, 1976, p. 91; Crosby & Gonzalez-Intal, 1982).

Crosby’s 1982 test Crosby sought to put her 1976 theory to an empirical test. She undertook a large study of employed men, employed women, and housewives to document the dynamics of feelings of dissatisfaction or deprivation. At the basis of the work was the paradox of the contented

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Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra F. Corning, Tara C. Dennehy, and Faye J. Crosby female worker. Despite the fact that women were earning much less than men, research of the time showed that women expressed just as much satisfaction in their jobs as men (e.g., Burke & Weir, 1976; Deaux, 1979; Glenn, Taylor, & Weaver, 1977). Indeed, women showed very little subjective awareness of objective deprivation (DeLamater & Fidell, 1971; Kresge, 1970; Epstein, 1971; Widom & Burke, 1978; Young, MacKenzie, & Sherif, 1980). Crosby saw the construct of RD as clearly relevant to the situation of women, and at the same time she designed a study in which she assessed all the putative preconditions of felt deprivation as well as deprivation itself in three different populations (employed women, employed men, housewives), concerning both one’s own situation and the situation of working women. Newton, Massachusetts was chosen as the site of the study. At that time, Massachusetts mandated that each town compile “Street Lists” that tracked variables such as voters’ occupations, ages, and addresses. The decision was made to focus on suburban areas, as they would be more likely to have a mix of single and married people, unlike cities, in which families are rarer, and rural areas, where there are fewer single people. Newton was chosen because preliminary investigations showed it to have very accurate records. Participants were employed men, employed women, and housewives selected through a process of stratified random sampling of the Street Lists. The researchers decided to limit the age range to ages 25 through 40 in order to be able to match participants to others in a similar stage of life. Occupations were classed using the NORC rating system into high-, middle-, and low-prestige groups. Middle-prestige workers were eliminated from the sample so as to ensure a clear distinction between low-prestige and high-prestige workers. Housewives were classified on the basis of their husbands’ occupations. Appointments were made with 405 respondents via telephone. Participants were then interviewed in their homes by professional interviewers, for approximately one hour each. Interviewers gathered data about participants’ home, work, and family situations. Women and men were matched by the prestige level of their jobs. To her surprise, Crosby found that women’s salaries were significantly lower than those of their male peers. As job prestige was controlled for, this finding contradicted the argument that the gender gap in salaries was due to women being employed predominantly in lower-prestige jobs (cf. Etzioni, 1969). Nor could the difference in salaries be explained in terms of any background factors such as education or commitment to working or to the job, for the women in the sample were as well educated as the men, and as committed to their jobs and their careers as the men. But while the finding that employed women’s subjective and objective realities were mismatched clearly was consistent with the concept of RD, strict tests of the various models proved disappointing. In order to validate any of the models of RD, it was necessary to show that feelings of resentment or dissatisfaction were highest when the specified preconditions were met, and it was desirable, furthermore, to do so among all three samples (employed women, housewives, employed men) concerning their feelings about their home situations and about the situations of working women, and among both employed women and men concerning their jobs. The data provided no support for the models of Patchen (1961), Runciman (1966), and Crosby (1976) and only partial support for the models proposed by Davis (1959), Adams (1965), Gurr (1970), Berkowitz (1972), and Williams (1975).

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In a secondary analysis of the Newton data, Crosby, Muehrer, and Loewenstein (1986) distinguished between models and concepts. They concluded that while the complexities of human emotion have prevented any one model of RD from being confirmed in a strictly scientific fashion, the construct of RD as originally proposed by Stouffer et al. (1949) is indeed very helpful in reminding us that felt deprivations are not simply a matter of objective reality. Simply by knowing a person’s material circumstances, one cannot predict whether the person will or will not feel resentments, deprivations, or dissatisfactions. An additional benefit of the concept, according to Crosby et al. (1986), is that it leads researchers to see that, contrary to commonsense notions, people often feel more deprived about the situation of their membership group than they do about their own personal situations.

Subsequent Developments Although Crosby’s attempts to validate one or more models of RD or cognate theories ended after the analyses and reanalyses of the Newton data, work on RD by many scholars, including Crosby, has continued.

Invocation of the concept As has been the case since Stouffer et al. (1949) first coined the term, social scientists continue to invoke the concept of RD as a way to make sense of seeming anomalies in human behavior. Fan and Stark (2007), for example, have argued that immigrants often distance themselves from their adopted cultures as a way of warding off feelings of deprivation that would otherwise occur as they compared their situations to those of more affluent others. In accounts that employ the concept of RD, plausible assumptions are made about the causes, correlates, and consequences of people making comparisons between themselves and others. Similarly, the concept of RD continues to help political scientists construct accounts of social and political structures and movements. Franz (2007) has undertaken a comparative study of Muslim youths in Europe and proposes that RD may explain the allure of Islamic extremism and terrorist involvement: as increasingly educated young people realize that their group membership limits them to a subordinate role in society, they are more likely to seek redress through radical means. Franz also implicates RD in the riots that occurred in French ethnic-minority ghettos in 2005. Parker (2007) has examined contemporary examples of repressive policies that have resulted in an increase in terrorist acts. He suggests that measures taken by states to stamp out politically motivated violence and terror may actually encourage terrorism. To give coherence to his account, Parker draws on Gurr’s (1970) theory of political violence, stating that an increase in repression will give rise to greater RD and motivate violent action. The concept of RD has also appealed to economists who study migration patterns. Sometimes inferring the existence of feelings from archival data such as landownership, some behavioral economists have linked the concept to the movement of people between areas of greater and lesser affluence (Quinn, 2006; VanWey, 2005). Quinn (2006) has noted

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Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra F. Corning, Tara C. Dennehy, and Faye J. Crosby the bidirectional nature of the relationship between some variables. While feelings of deprivation may contribute to the likelihood of migration from Mexico to the United States, many immigrants also experience increased feelings of resentment once they encounter American affluence.

Lack of Correspondence between Objective and Subjective Statuses Inherent in the original formulation of RD was the observation that people’s subjective statuses sometimes bear little direct relation with what appears to be true to third-party observers. Several scholars have continued to demonstrate the lack of correspondence between what we might call objective reality and subjective reality when it comes to assessments of how well off one is (Sgourev, 2006). Holtz and Nihiser (2008) looked at how individuals assessed themselves and comparison others and concluded that people often make assessments of their relative advantage or disadvantage that are completely without basis in fact. D’Ambrosio and Frick (2007) found that people’s ratings of well-being were less well predicted by their actual income than by their feelings of deprivation. Similarly, Halleröd (2006) found that economically disadvantaged people tend to adjust their expectations: rather than saying that they cannot afford certain items, they decide that they do not want the items. Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, advantaged white Australians have been found to oppose government actions intended to make restitution to Aboriginal Australians because they, the whites, perceive themselves to be relatively disadvantaged by this restitution (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007).

Antecedents, correlates, and consequences of felt deprivations Like the earlier scholars who attempted to construct models of deprivation, rather than simply to use the construct of RD, some contemporary scholars have moved beyond simply observing the lack of correspondence between objective and subjective reality in order to investigate what can be conceptualized as the antecedents of feelings of deprivation. Why is it, they ask, that some people, but not others, feel themselves to be disadvantaged? What factors lead to a feeling of subjective deprivation? Tropp and Wright (1999) examined perceptions of group and personal deprivation among both Latino and African American university students in California. Participants were asked to make a number of comparisons. Group deprivation was assessed by way of comparisons between the participants’ ingroup and whites and the participants’ ingroup and “other minorities” (p. 712). Personal deprivation was assessed by asking participants to compare themselves with their ingroup, other minorities, and whites. For each comparison made, participants rated their perceived status and feelings about their status relative to a referent as described above. Responses were scaled from 1 (worse off or very angry) to 9 (better off or very satisfied). Scores above the median were viewed as reflecting a perceived sense of RD. Tropp and Wright found that participants who strongly identified with their minority group experienced greater levels of both personal and group deprivation than did others. Referent choice was also significant: both Latinos and African Americans in the study

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reported higher-level group deprivation in comparison with white referents than in comparison with other minorities. When asked to compare their group to other minorities, African American participants experienced greater group deprivation than Latino participants. In terms of self–other comparisons, participants from both groups expressed feelings of deprivation, but Latino participants expressed greater levels of personal RD compared to white referents than did African American participants. Zagefka and Brown (2005) conducted two parallel studies investigating the preferences of ethnic minorities in choosing referents. The samples were taken from immigrant and majority groups in the United Kingdom and Germany. The U.K. study utilized only immigrants and focused on participants of Asian ethnicity; the German study consisted of Turkish and Aussiedler minorities contrasted with German majorities. In their studies, personal deprivation was assessed using the same techniques as in Tropp and Wright’s (1999) study. Group deprivation was measured by asking participants to rank the status of their group relative to the majority group of their country. Zagefka and Brown (2005) found that ethnic-minority individuals prefer to make ingroup and temporal (prior self) comparisons rather than outgroup comparisons. They also found that feelings of deprivation varied based on a person’s choice of referent. Ethnic-minority individuals experienced greater feelings of deprivation when making comparisons with the majority outgroup than when making ingroup or temporal (prior self) comparisons. When integrating Zagefka and Brown’s work into the corpus of work on RD, it bears remembering that comparisons between one’s ingroup and an outgroup may be rare. Smith and Leach (2004) documented people’s tendency to think in terms of individuals rather than in terms of groups. When university students reported their most recent social comparison after they received a random signal, over 60% of the reported comparisons were to another person and fewer than 10% were comparisons in which they thought of themselves as a group representative in comparison to an outgroup (Smith & Leach, 2004). While some scholars have looked at the factors that might be conceptualized as antecedent to feelings of deprivation, others have focused on the associations between feelings of deprivation and factors that might be best conceptualized as correlates or consequences. Dambrun, Taylor, McDonald, Crush, and Méot (2006) explored the relationship between RD, relative gratification, and prejudice toward immigrants in South Africa. A stratified random sample of 1,600 participants who were characteristic of national demographics were drawn from census data and interviewed. RD and gratification were measured by asking participants to rate themselves both economically and overall in comparison with others (both ingroup and outgroup). Dambrun et al. (2006) found that prejudice against outgroups was correlated not only with RD, but with feelings of relative gratification as well. Discrepant comparison, be it favorable or unfavorable, was linked with negative attitudes toward outgroups. In a set of clever studies, Callan, Ellard, Shead, and Hodgins (2008) demonstrated an association between feelings of personal deprivation and gambling. One of the studies was a survey in which students completed inventories indexing their gambling urges and problemgambling severity and also a measure of feelings of resentment when they compared their outcomes to others. The more deprived the students felt, the stronger their urges to gamble and the more problematic their gambling. Not content with cross-sectional data, Callan et al.

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Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra F. Corning, Tara C. Dennehy, and Faye J. Crosby (2008) also conducted an experiment in which they induced feelings of deprivation in some of the participants and then provided an opportunity to gamble away the payment received for participation. Participants who were deprived were more likely than others to gamble. Several recent studies have linked RD with health outcomes (Eibner & Evans, 2005; Siahpush et al., 2006; Tougas, Rinfret, Beaton, & de la Sablonnière, 2005; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2007). Feelings of deprivation have been associated with higher rates of smoking (Siahpush et al., 2006), harmful health behaviors, self-reported limitations (Eibner & Evans, 2005), teenage pregnancies, mental illness, emotion regulation (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2007), obesity, and mortality (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2007). In terms of mental health, RD has also been found to be negatively correlated with life satisfaction (Zagefka & Brown, 2005) and self-esteem (Tougas et al., 2005; Zagefka & Brown, 2005). Tougas et al.’s (2005) study of female police officers found that feelings of RD led the women to discount assessments of their work and to distance themselves from their jobs, which was accompanied by a decline in self-esteem. Health on a societal level can also be impacted by the broad experience of group deprivation. Huschka and Mau’s (2006) study of anomie in South Africa found that seemingly race-based group anomie was due to social inequities that were linked to race, such as education level and economic status. Some scholars have looked at both the presumed antecedents and the presumed consequences of felt deprivation. Integrating cognitive appraisal models of emotion with RD theory, Smith, Cronin & Kessler (2008) looked at the feelings of university faculty members at a mid-size state university. Faculty members reported their specific emotional reactions to group inequities in faculty pay and benefits. Faculty members who reacted to the collective disadvantage with anger supported collective protest. Faculty members who reacted to the collective disadvantage with sadness reported less organizational loyalty. As proposed by cognitive appraisal models of emotion, different emotional reactions elicited different adaptive strategies. Group-based anger increased support for collective protest (a form of attack) whereas group-based sadness decreased organizational loyalty (a form of withdrawal). These relationships remained reliable even after controlling for gender, union membership, ethnicity, and personal RD.

Testing the Personal–Group Discrepancy One really important distinction that has run throughout much of the research on RD is the differentiation between personal or egoistical deprivation, on the one hand, and group or fraternal deprivation, on the other. People feel personally deprived when they feel that they are receiving less than deserved individually. Group deprivations are felt on behalf of one’s group. When a person feels both personal deprivation and group deprivation, he or she is said to experience double deprivation. Runciman (1966) is the theorist who most emphasized the distinction between personal deprivations, which he called “egoistical deprivations,” and group deprivations, which he called “fraternal deprivations.” The personal–group distinction was central to the empirical work of Crosby. While attempting to test competing models of RD, Crosby (1982) stumbled across an unexpected

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finding. Objective data showed that the employed women in her study were paid only 80% of exactly comparable men (and thus were the victims of sex discrimination), and the data also showed little awareness among the employed women of their personal disadvantage. At the same time that they experienced very little personal deprivation, the women showed high levels of group deprivation – feeling that women in general were surely the victims of sex discrimination. Dozens of studies have shown that among many groups, individuals often deny that they personally suffer from the inequities and discriminations that affect the groups to which they belong (see Crosby & Bearman, 2006, for a review). Various explanations have been offered to account for the discrepancy between deprivations felt on behalf of oneself and deprivations felt on behalf of the group (Crosby & Bearman, 2006). For example, some researchers suggested that people overestimate the extent of group deprivation rather than underestimating the extent of their own deprivation, but the Newton study conducted by Crosby showed unequivocal evidence of underestimation of one’s own deprivations. The distinction between personal and group deprivation has also been at the heart of several studies of collective action. Foster and Matheson’s (1995) study of female college students found that collective action is more likely when women experience an interaction between personal (egoistic) and group (collective) RD than when they experience either state singly. They termed this interaction “double deprivation.” Availability of resources also plays a role: women are more likely to take action when resources exist to facilitate the process (Foster & Matheson, 1995). Although double deprivation was the central predictor of collective action in the study by Foster and Matheson, other studies found slightly different results. Beaton, Tougas and Laplante’s (2007) study of women in clerical occupations found that women who selfidentified as having masculine traits were most likely to support gender-equity programs; this was also true of women who expressed feelings of personal deprivation. Beaton et al. (2007) suggested that this may be due to women identifying with masculine traits making comparisons with an outgroup (men), which resulted in greater levels of RD and the desire for redress, hence participation in equity programs (collective deprivation was not measured). Meanwhile, de la Rey and Raju’s (1996) study of South Africans of Indian descent found that feelings of group deprivation (e.g., anger, anxiety as relative to other groups) predicted protest orientation (personal deprivation was not studied). One possible reason for the apparent difference between personal and group deprivation is that researchers have employed imprecise or inadequate measures of either personal deprivation, group deprivation, or both. Perhaps it appears that individuals deny their personal deprivation simply because of measurement error. As our review makes clear, different researchers have employed a variety of different measures, some of which may be less robust than others. The contradictory findings concerning the relationships among personal deprivation, collective deprivation, double deprivation, and collective action, furthermore, might be the result of differing and sometimes inadequate measures of personal and group RD. A definitive test of the personal–group distinction requires that both personal and group deprivation be precisely and well measured among a given sample. Excellent measures might also throw light on the relationship between felt deprivation and collective action.

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Corning’s measure of deprivation Alexandra Corning has developed and published a scale of felt personal deprivation that is psychometrically robust and that allows researchers to test propositions with greater precision than was possible before. Using a construct-based approach to test construction, Corning (2000) developed the Perception of Social Inequality Scale–Women’s Form (PSIS–W), a measure of RD that assesses women’s perceptions of personal social inequity. Perceived social inequality is defined as the perception by an individual of particular events as disproportionately negatively affecting oneself as a woman in comparison to men across a variety of domains. In developing the measure, Corning couched perceived social inequality in RD theory using the set of preconditions that offered the greatest parsimony, which is Davis’s (1959) set. Davis (1959) was the first to provide a formal statement of RD theory and the first to offer preconditions to perceptions of RD. In her review of the existing literature, Corning concluded that Davis’s preconditions appeared to explain the most variance with the least amount of complexity. Davis’s preconditions are that the person (a) should want some desired good, X, (b) compare oneself to a group that has X, and (c) feel entitled to (i.e., deserving of) X. Also implied in Davis’s model was a fourth precondition made explicit by some other theorists: (d) the person should not have X. It follows logically that a complete measure of deprivation concerning any specific point should include four parts: (a) degree of wanting, (b) degree of comparison, (c) degree of entitlement, and (d) degree of having or lacking. An example of an item from Corning’s scale is: To what extent … (a) do you want encouragement to pursue a position of power in society? (b) are men encouraged to pursue positions of power in society? (c) do you deserve to be encouraged to pursue a position of power in society? (d) have you been encouraged to pursue a position of power in society? Participants respond to each sub-item using a six-point continuum ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much). A score for each item on the scale is derived using the formula (a + b + c)/ d. Corning has created this formula using the following rules: (a) the conceptual postulates of the theory had to be accurately represented, (b) the mathematics of the equation for combining the sub-items to form items had to properly reflect the relationships among the preconditions, and (c) the resultant equation had to be as parsimonious as possible. Corning has surveyed the empirical literature that documents the types of discrimination women experience, and has identified six domains. They are: (a) disproportionate encounters with harassment and concern with assault, (b) differential standards of physical attractiveness, (c) differential availability of academic role models, (d) relative lack of career encouragement, (e) employment compensation based on factors unrelated to competence, and (f) differential struggle with multiple roles. Altogether, Corning’s PSIS–W contains 26 items, with a possible maximum score of 468.

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Psychometric properties of perceived social inequality (RD), based on the PSIS-W.

Construct validity analyses (Pearson rs shown in parentheses)

Criterion-related group-difference validity

Test–retest reliability

Alienation and aloneness Generalized feelings of alienation (0.20*** ) Feelings of powerlessness (0.17**) Feelings of social isolation (0.23***) Justice Belief that the world is fair and just (−0.28***) Sexism Maintaining liberal attitudes toward women (0.16**) Denial that sexism persists (−0.41**) Personal experience of sexism (−0.34**) Harassment/assault Experiences of harassment in academia (0.25**) Experiences of sexual victimization (0.28**) Stress General feelings of stress (0.19*) Experience of everyday tedious hassles (0.40***)

Career Women majoring in traditionally female fields (e.g., education) reported significantly greater perceptions of social inequality than did women majoring in traditionally male fields (e.g., engineering) (p < 0.05)

Over 1 month, r = 0.88**** Over 4 months, r = 0.88****

Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, **** p < 0.0001. For more detailed information on the method and measures used, see “Assessing perceived social inequity: A relative deprivation framework,” by A. F. Corning, 2000, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 463–477.

The psychometric tests of the PSIS–W reveal its sound properties (see Corning, 2000, for details). An examination of these properties (Table 6.2), including, for example, its relations with other measures, helps elucidate its relation to various psychological constructs.

Expanding upon Corning’s measure To address the critique that the apparent difference between personal and group deprivation is best attributed to measurement error, Corning, Carrillo, and Crosby (2002) created a group, or collective, version of the PSIS–W. Exactly parallel in structure to the PSIS–W, the Perception of Social Inequality Scale–Women’s Form/Collective RD (PSIS–W/CRD) allowed for a measure of collective RD. In contrast to the items of the PSIS–W which refer specifically to women’s feelings regarding their own personal situations, the items of the PSIS–W/CRD concern the situation of women in general. Each item of the PSIS–W/CRD was created to match an item on the PSIS–W, but with the preface to the question pertaining to the average woman (relative to men) rather than the self. Noting the similarity in structure to the PSIS–W, an example from the PSIS–W/CRD is: To what extent … (a) does the average woman want encouragement to pursue a position of power in society? (b) is the average man encouraged to pursue positions of power in society?

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Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra F. Corning, Tara C. Dennehy, and Faye J. Crosby (c) should the average woman be encouraged to pursue a position of power in society? (d) has the average woman been encouraged to pursue a position of power in society? In the PSIS–W/CRD, as in the PSIS–W, participants respond to each sub-item using a sixpoint continuum ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much) for each of the 26 items over the different domains (e.g., sexual harassment, multiple roles). A score for each item on the scale is derived using the formula (a + b + c)/ d, and the highest possible score is 468. Higher scores indicate greater perceptions of social inequality. Corning et al. (2002) administered both the PSIS–W and the PSIS–W/CRD to 135 undergraduate women attending a West-Coast university, all of whom were enrolled in a psychology course for which they received course credit for their participation in psychological research. Corning et al.’s major finding was that participants expressed significantly more group or collective deprivation than personal deprivation. The mean score on the PSIS–W was 149.04, with a standard deviation of 43.31, while the mean score on the PSIS–W/CRD was 195.31, with a standard deviation of 56.74. The difference was reliable (t = −12.15, p < 0.000), even though the two measures were highly inter-correlated (r = 0.71). Clearly, the oft-repeated finding that people experience more group deprivation than personal deprivation has not been due to measurement error. While the finding of a reliable difference between personal and group deprivation was clear-cut, other findings in the study by Corning et al. (2002) were less dramatic. Using previously published scales, Corning et al. (2002) also assessed participants’ feelings of stress and their activism. They expected to find a strong relationship between personal deprivation and stress, and also between group deprivation and activism. In fact, collective deprivation showed a slightly higher association with one measure of stress than personal deprivation, while personal deprivation showed a slightly higher association than collective deprivation on another measure of stress. The associations between group deprivation and two measures of collective action were, as predicted, stronger than the associations between personal deprivation and the same two measures of collective action.

Conclusion: Looking Back and Looking Ahead Throughout the social sciences, the concept of RD has proven to be both popular and useful. Since the term was first used during World War II, it has appeared in numerous studies. Sometimes the researchers have invoked the idea of deprivation as a useful heuristic to help explain puzzling findings. At other times researchers have actually measured feelings of deprivation and some of the elements thought to produce such feelings. Several models of RD have been developed. In a model, researchers attempt to specify the conditions that produce feelings of deprivation, the correlates of felt deprivation, or the consequences of felt deprivation. Testing of models shows the importance of contexts. It seems impossible to specify a set of preconditions for feelings of deprivation, dissatisfaction, anger, or injustice that hold true across all contexts and populations. It also seems impossible to specify correlates and consequences of felt deprivation that occur in all contexts.

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One observation that has withstood many empirical tests is the observation that what people feel on behalf of themselves differs from what they feel on behalf of their membership group. It is surprising but true that feelings of group deprivation are more common and more severe than feelings of personal deprivation. Similarly, the antecedents, correlates, and consequences of personal deprivation tend to differ from the antecedents, correlates, and consequences of group deprivation. Several lines of research seem promising for the future. Future researchers might contrast situations in which deprivations are relative and situations in which they are not. Does the loss of a child, for example, involve comparisons in the same way that occurs in cases of material disadvantage? Similarly, future researchers might look at the dynamics of comparison processes. When do those with less feel that they have been unjustly treated and when do they feel that they are simply inadequate? What, in other words, regulates feelings of selfblame? Additionally, researchers might highlight cultural differences. Do the differences between personal and group deprivation hold up in societies that are more communally oriented than in the highly individualist societies of North America? How do culturally based feelings of fatalism affect the dynamics of felt deprivations? Finally, researchers might ask: how do the dynamics of RD change over the life cycle? Do feelings of deservingness and of wanting change throughout childhood, young adulthood, middle adulthood, and late adulthood? Are there developmental junctures where individuals are most susceptible to feelings of deprivation on behalf of themselves or their group?

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perception of income inequality, relative material wellbeing, and social capital. Social Science and Medicine, 63, 2801–2812. Smith, H. J., Cronin, T., & Kessler, T. (2008). Anger, fear or sadness: Faculty members’ emotional reactions to collective pay disadvantage. Political Psychology, 29, 221–246. Smith, H. J., & Leach, C. W. (2004). Group membership and everyday social comparison experiences. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 297–308. Stouffer, S. A., Suchman, E. A., DeVinney, L. C., Star, S. A., & Williams, R. M., Jr. (1949). The American soldier: Adjustment during Army life (Vol. 1). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Thibaut, J. (1950). An experimental study of the cohesiveness of underprivileged groups. Human Relations, 3, 251–278. Tougas, F., Rinfret, N., Beaton, A. M., & de la Sablonnière, R. (2005). Policewomen acting in self-defense: Can psychological disengagement protect self-esteem from the negative outcomes of relative deprivation? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 790–800. Tropp, L. R., & Wright, S. C. (1999). Ingroup identification and relative deprivation: An examination across multiple social comparisons. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 707–724. Useem, M. (1975). Protest movements in America. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. VanWey, L. K. (2005). Land ownership as a determinant of international and internal migration in Mexico and

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Part III

Social Reinforcement

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7

Evaluating Fairness: Critical Assessment of Equity Theory Denise M. Polk

An Introduction to Equity Theory Most interpersonal relationships are built around trust, mutual respect, and genuine concern for the other person. Generally, people do not enter a relationship with fairness issues at the forefront of their minds. However, many people of all different backgrounds are familiar with the “golden rule” – treat others as you would like to be treated. Many people believe that if everyone subscribed to this rule, fairness would prevail, leading to perfectly satisfying relationships. Whereas these ideas may be very intuitively appealing, they create some potential problems when people in relationships – whether it is a business relationship, a friendship, or a romance – experience difficulties. Difficulties may involve one person getting his or her way more often or experiencing hurt feelings. In reality, sometimes people feel they put more into a relationship than they get out of it. It takes effort to build, maintain, and repair relationships, regardless of the type of relationship. Many people, both researchers and laypersons, are interested in what makes for satisfying relationships as well as what factors keep people together or drive them apart. A number of theories have been developed to help explain how people evaluate their relationships. One of them is equity theory.

The Development of Equity Theory Equity theory is a theory that stems from economic principles. In fact, when John Stacy Adams first introduced the theory in 1963, he intended it to serve as an explanation for the fairness of exchanges between employers and their employees. Whereas researchers initially Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Denise M. Polk used this theory to explain employee–employer relationships, over the years, the theory has been expanded to explain various other types of relationships. Walster, Walster, and Berscheid (1978) continued to refine and to adapt the theory to help people understand how people evaluate their interactions in other kinds of relationships, such as casual interpersonal relationships and intimate relationships. This type of research includes the harm–doer–victim relationship (Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973), helping relationships (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983), collegial relationships (Buunk, Doosje, Jans, & Hopstaken, 1993), friendships (Buunk & Prins, 1998; Messman, Canary, & Hause, 2000), marital relationships (Cate, Lloyd, & Long, 1988), and homosexual relationships (Shechory & Ziv, 2007).

A Description of Equity Theory Justice theories developed by researchers such as Homans (1961, 1974), Adams (1963, 1965), and Blau (1964) serve as the basis for equity theory. The principle of distributive justice is at the core of equity, and it suggests that rewards should be distributed according to who provides the most inputs (Deutsch, 1985). Hatfield (formerly Walster) and her colleagues extended the ideas presented in these earlier justice theories and refined them over time (e.g., Hatfield & Traupmann, 1981; Hatfield, Utne, & Traupmann, 1979; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). Today equity theory is widely used to help people understand the way people develop, maintain, and dissolve interpersonal relationships. Equity theory falls into a subcategory of theories often called exchange theories. These theories tend to view interactions between people as exchanges of goods and resources. Attractiveness, intelligence, love, understanding, encouragement, earning money, and taking care of domestic responsibilities are just a few of the many goods and resources that people exchange. These goods and resources can be defined as the ability, possession, or attribute that enables one person to reward or to punish another person (Scanzoni, 1979). The value of the resources that both people bring to the relationship is subjective and depends on the needs or desires of both parties. Essentially, “each person ‘pays’ a certain price in resources (or contributions) brought to the relationship, in order to acquire certain goods (or outcomes) in the form of needs met (Beckman-Brindley & Tavormina, 1978)” (Steil, 1994, p. 237). Thus, according to equity theory, each partner is entitled to rewards and costs in a relationship proportionally to the contributions each partner has made as well as the costs each partner has incurred (Adams, 1963). All this must be relative to the costs and rewards contributed and experienced by one’s partner. Social exchange elements of relationships include two categories of theoretical variables (Sprecher, 2001b). The first set of variables involves distributive justice norms, among which equity theory is of particular importance. These variables include inputs and outcomes for both partners. People determine fairness in their relationships by comparing input–outcome ratios. The equity formula, outlined over the next several pages, specifies that fair relationships occur when the input–outcome ratio is identical for the two relational partners. If not, one person is overbenefited and the other person is underbenefited. Imbalances in rewards and costs will cause people to attempt to equalize the reward–cost ratio. This is different from the equality principle, which

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suggests that regardless of contributions or costs, both partners should share costs and benefits equally (Deutsch, 1975, 1985; Sampson, 1975). Thibaut and Kelley (1959) outlined the second set of variables that fall under exchange theories in their interdependence theory. These variables also have been used in Rusbult’s (1980) investment model (Sprecher, 2001b). This second set includes additional variables of comparison level, which is one’s general expectations about what one deserves, and comparison level of alternatives, which is expectations of rewards one could obtain from other sources. It also includes investments, defined as what a person gives to a relationship that cannot be retrieved if the relationship ends. Both equity theory and the investment model have been used as frameworks for predicting relational outcomes such as satisfaction, commitment, and stability. When viewing relational satisfaction via the investment model, the major prediction is that satisfaction increases when a person achieves more rewards and lower costs when accounting for the person’s comparison level. It is easy to see the similarities in exchange theories such as equity and interdependence theory/the investment model, but each theory maintains distinct ideas about how relationships operate and about what people ultimately regard as satisfying. Equity is important because it affects many aspects of the relationship. Ultimately, people’s perceptions about equity and the amount of partner reciprocity involved frame people’s feelings, decisions, and actions toward their relational partners (Adams, 1965; Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994). For example, a wife who perceives inequity within her marriage might feel used or taken advantage of by her spouse. This might affect how she treats him at home and what she is willing to put into the relationship in the future. Perceptions of equity in relationships are associated with positive relational outcomes such as contentment, satisfaction, and commitment. Perceptions of inequity in relationships are associated with negative relational outcomes such as distress and dissatisfaction.

Major Theoretical Concepts within the Theory To understand equity theory, one must first understand some of the central concepts. These concepts include inputs and outcomes as well as rewards and costs. Inputs can be considered an investment. People invest things in their relationships such as time, money, or secrets. For example, Rajiv and Andy are best friends. Rajiv just found out he failed his chemistry exam. If Andy helps Rajiv by providing support for his friend, this is an example of an input. Outcomes are what people receive in exchange for their inputs. Examples of outcomes could be companionship, status, or a sense of accomplishment. If Andy’s offer strengthens Andy’s friendship with Rajiv, this result is an example of an outcome for Andy. Rajiv could also experience the outcome of stress relief. Similarly, people seek to gain rewards and to avoid costs. Rewards are things which are pleasurable and satisfying. Getting a hug or support from a loved one can be considered a reward. For Andy, a stronger friendship with Rajiv can be considered a reward. In addition, Rajiv also receives the reward of support. People also try to minimize their costs. Costs are things that are detrimental or dissatisfying, such as feeling obligated to take a loved one to the airport instead of sleeping late. It is possible that Rajiv might rather go out to the bar

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Denise M. Polk with his fraternity brothers, so Andy’s offer could be costly to him if he feels he must oblige. When each partner’s inputs are relatively equal to their own outcomes, equity has been achieved. However, two other outcomes may occur. On the one hand, one party often feels his or her inputs exceed the outcomes (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). This is called underbenefiting. If Andy perceives that the only time Rajiv wants to hang out with him is when Rajiv needs something and that Andy is tired of hearing Rajiv’s complaints, he may feel underbenefited. On the other hand, when outcomes exceed inputs, overbenefiting has taken place. Rajiv might feel guilty that Andy is always there to console him and that Rajiv is not as good a friend to Andy as Andy is to him, in which case Rajiv is experiencing overbenefiting. Equity theory can be illustrated as a mathematical formula (Walster , Walster, & Berscheid, 1978):

(OA − I A ) (OB − I B )

(I )

kA

A

● ● ● ●

=

(I )

kB

B

A and B represent the two different people in the relationship I and O represent perceptions of inputs and outcomes | | is the mathematical symbol for taking the absolute value k is either +1 or −1, depending on the sign of the outcomes minus inputs for A and B

The numbers on the left side of the equation represent one person in a relationship (A), and the numbers on the right represent the other person (B). Each person assesses perceptions of his or her outcomes and inputs in relation to perceptions of the partner’s outcomes and inputs. In the end, for equity to be achieved, the result should involve a relative balance in outcomes for both parties. An additional consideration that should be noted in this formula surrounds norms of reciprocity. Norms of reciprocity enjoin people to return favors done to them by others (Gouldner, 1960). Perceiving reciprocity is an integral part of equity and has been found to be accompanied by a greater sense of well-being and also better health (Buunk et al., 1993; Buunk & Mutsaers, 1999; Buunk & Prins, 1998). Other studies have demonstrated that the perception of nonreciprocal relationships with close others may be associated with depression and other negative outcomes (Buunk & Schaufeli, 1999; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978).

The four propositions of equity Equity theory has four major propositions (Adams, 1963; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). At the heart of the theory, however, an inherent difference lies between how people behave as individuals and how they behave in relationships. Consistent with other social exchange theoretical approaches, equity theory posits that people seek to maximize their rewards and to reduce their costs. Therefore, the first proposition states that when considering the individual, people are driven to maximize their outcomes to the extent that outcomes equal rewards minus costs. Hedonism involves the principle that people will avoid pain and

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seek pleasure. In addition, people want to obtain the most rewards by putting in the least amount of effort. If Andy’s goal is to strengthen his friendship with Rajiv, and he can accomplish this goal by taking Rajiv out for pizza, he will be more motivated to follow through on this action than he would be to pay for a tutor for his friend. It costs considerably more money to pay for ongoing tutoring services than for a pizza, and it is costly to Andy both in his wallet and in the effort he would have to exert to find and arrange for tutoring services. This premise changes, however, when moving from the individual to a couple or a group. Therefore, the second proposition involves two parts for the development of the norms of equity: (a) collective rewards and costs must be considered; no longer can the individual look out solely for him/herself and (b) groups try to induce equity by rewarding members who treat one another equitably and by punishing members who treat others inequitably. Drawing from interdependence theory, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) explained that when two people interact, each person has the potential of affecting the other’s reward–cost ratio, which also means certain possibilities exist for them exercising power over each other. To understand the first part of this premise, then, think of a married couple. Marriage is an institution in which two people are joined together symbolically as one. Therefore, when two people marry, spouses ought to consider the needs and welfare of each other and not just look after their own rewards and costs. Even seemingly small decisions can impact the other person. It makes sense that, in some ways, a husband’s happiness and well-being hinges on his wife’s happiness and wellbeing, and vice versa. Therefore, it also makes sense that it is imperative to consider the things that will contribute to or that will reduce a spouse’s happiness and well-being. To understand the second part of this proposition, it is important to think of larger society. In any group situation, people tend to monitor the contributions of group members. Think of a graded group project for a class. People often complain about group work because one person does not contribute the same amount as the rest of the group members. This puts a strain on other group members as well as on the relationships between group members. The person who is not pulling his or her weight often will be punished by the other group members by treating that person with some hostility or by approaching the professor to take some action. In general, this second proposition acknowledges the idea that people would like to think of only themselves, but because society requires people to work together, these checks and balances of behavior are in place to make sure no one person is too advantaged or too disadvantaged. The third proposition develops from proposition two, where norms of equity have been established. It states that people become distressed when they perceive inequity in their relationships such that greater inequity leads to greater distress. Again, the notion of distributive justice underlies this proposition – that rewards should be distributed according to who provides the most inputs (Deutsch, 1985). People tend to know when they are getting “the short end of the stick.” Feelings of being taken advantage of are unpleasant, and the more it seems like someone has been used, the more unpleasant she or he tends to feel. On the other side of the coin, however, most people have had the distinct experience of getting more than their fair share, and this experience also arouses unpleasant feelings. If a teacher ever played favoritism, and you were at the receiving end of it, but your best friend was not, then you are aware of the unpleasant feelings it creates. Most of the time, people might experience some guilt in a situation where they have been advantaged in one way or another.

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Denise M. Polk Thibaut and Kelley (1959) attempted to explain the consequences of unequal rewards and costs to the dyad and to the individual in terms of power. In general, if people are socialized in ways that teach them that partners’ input–outcome ratios should be even, then a person who experiences greater rewards should experience cognitive dissonance. According to cognitive dissonance theory, cognitions (pieces of knowledge) that contradict one another create an unpleasant feeling in individuals. In turn, they are motivated to reduce this unpleasant state (Festinger, 1957). Thus, knowing that the input–outcome ratio should be equal but that one person is receiving more rewards should create this unpleasant arousal state. However, according to Thibaut and Kelley (1959), the above scenario does not always play out. The greater the power the members have over one another, the greater the tendency to engage in cyclical patterns of rewarding or costly behavior (Thibaut & Kelley). Andy rewards Rajiv in order to get Rajiv to produce behavior that Andy finds rewarding, which then becomes reciprocal. This tends to foster a highly satisfactory and stable relationship (Thibaut & Kelley). However, Thibaut and Kelley also claimed that power is useful to the extent that the bearer of power enables him/her to gain more favorable reward–cost positions. Thus, the person with high power will be able to enjoy the best reward–cost ratios available more frequently than the person with low power. By their definitions, the person with higher power is the person with more to offer (or to threaten to withdraw), which allows this person the ability to induce the lower-power person to perform the behaviors desired by the higher-power person (rather than vice versa). Danger lies, however, in the possibility of overusing power. A person who attempts to control too much can reduce the other person’s ability to achieve rewards to the extent that the controller ends up losing control over the other person (Thibaut & Kelley). In general, then, power at maximum levels must be used considerately and sparingly. As a result of the distress that inequity creates, people will attempt to eliminate the distress by restoring equity, which is the fourth and final proposition (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). People who perceive inequity in the realm of underbenefitedness might engage in behaviors ranging from trying to convince themselves that the inequity is not as bad as it seems, to giving a relational partner the silent treatment in ending a relationship. People who perceive inequity in the realm of overbenefitedness might engage in behaviors such as making a grand gesture like buying flowers, or by helping out more in the future.

Measurement considerations of equity It is essential to understand that equity involves perceptions. In general, people tend to subscribe to the norm of reciprocity – a belief that helping others will increase the likelihood that they will help us in the future (Gouldner, 1960). This norm highlights an inherent human desire to cooperate and to behave kindly. However, according to equity theory, exchanges may not always appear balanced. One way that people can figure out whether the input–outcome ratios within their relationship are equitable is by making comparisons with other people’s relationships. Social comparison theory states that people have a drive to evaluate themselves, and they do that by comparing themselves to other people (Festinger,

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1954). It involves the idea that people are driven to look to outside images in order to evaluate their own situations, opinions, and abilities. People make comparisons among themselves, others, and their idealized images. Then, they use the information they obtained to form their own perceptions of their relationships. The premise that perceptions of justice vary widely from person to person (Reichle, 1996) is fundamental to understanding equity theory. Kelley and Thibaut (1978) also acknowledged that asking or measuring perceptions of relational rewards and costs is more useful than observing actual behaviors, because outsiders might view equity differently from the actual relational partners. For example, if both spouses perceive equity, the couple may achieve both stability and satisfaction, but if a team of researchers assesses that couple’s inputs and outcomes differently, the researchers might disagree with each other and with the couple about whether the marriage is equitable (Hatfield et al., 1979). Therefore, no outsider can claim that if one person has produced five inputs and the other partner has produced four inputs, then the relationship is inequitable. Only those two people actually in the relationship can gauge their own perception of equity. As a result, no magic formula exists for creating and maintaining equity. Whereas people can use a mathematical formula to calculate equity, they (not the formula) must determine their own inputs and outcomes as well as how much those inputs and outcomes are worth. However, the variable in the formula in many instances may be difficult to measure. Relational partners must determine equity for themselves. A relational partner may still perceive equity even if his/her investment is greater than the partner’s investment and/or that role division is not actually equal. According to Rabin and Shapira-Berman (1998), so long as the person feels rewarded in proportion to the degree of his/her contributions to the relationship, equity has been achieved (even if outsiders view it as unfair). For some couples, this might mean enacting traditional gender roles. In this type of arrangement, it is possible that the man works 40 hours a week and earns all the family income and the woman works 55 hours a week running the household and nurturing their children. However, as long as they perceive a relative balance between their input–outcome ratios, the relationship is equitable. Equity does not necessarily mean that investments of time or energy are split 50/50. That could be objectively measured by an outsider. What makes the measurement of equity tricky is that an outsider can only find out whether equity exists in any given couple by asking them to share their own perceptions – to assess how much they put into and get out of the relationship. Another key consideration of the evaluation of equity is its relationship with equality. As mentioned before, the equality principle suggests that regardless of contributions or costs, partners should share costs and benefits equally. Some researchers have contended that equity and equality are interchangeable terms. Sprecher and Schwartz (1994) claimed that enough overlap exists between equity and equality in close relationships; however, they acknowledged that some researchers continue to argue distinctions between the two. Sprecher and Schwartz see the difference as more of a theoretical one and argue that research findings such as those of Cate, Lloyd, Henton, and Larson (1982) and Michaels, Edwards, and Acock (1984) suggest a high degree of overlap between equity and equality.

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Denise M. Polk

CCC

OOO

CC

OOO

C = Contributions

O = Outcomes

Figure 7.1 Equal but not equitable.

CC

OO

CCCC

OOOO

C = Contributions

O = Outcomes

A fair number of other researchers, however, treat equality and equity as two very different concepts (e.g., Steil, 1994). While reading the following quotation, look at Figures 7.1–7.3. If partners make unequal contributions but receive the same outcomes, the relationship is equal but not equitable. Conversely, if partners make unequal contributions and receive different outcomes based on the ratio of contributions and outcomes for each, relative to the other, then the relationship is equitable but not equal. However, if two partners make equal numbers of equally valued positive and negative contributions, and each receives equal positive and negative outcomes, then, according to the equity theorists, the relationship is both equal and equitable. (Steil, 1994, p. 237)

Figure 7.2 Equitable but not equal.

This quotation highlights Steil’s belief that equity and equality are distinct concepts. Because equity is subjective, researchers have focused on partners’ CCC OOO own views of equity. Most often, these data have been collected through self-report instruments. Because equity involves perceptions, it most CCC OOO frequently is measured through scale items. Typically, researchers operaC = Contributions O = Outcomes tionalize equity by using a single-item measure. The most widely used measure of equity is Hatfield’s Global Equity Measure. This measure asks Figure 7.3 Equal and equitable. participants to respond to a single item – “When you consider your and your partner’s contributions to your marriage, and you compare these to the outcomes of each, how would you judge your relationship from the perspective of give and take?” Participants can choose one of seven Likert-type responses: −3 = I am getting a much better deal than my partner −2 = I am getting a somewhat better deal −1 = I am getting a slightly better deal 0 = We are getting an equally good or bad deal 1 = My partner is getting a slightly better deal 2 = My partner is getting a somewhat better deal 3 =My partner is getting a much better deal Equity tends to differ from other social exchange variables because it is curvilinear – meaning that the midpoint represents equity whereas low and high scores represent the two forms of inequity – underbenefitedness and overbenefitedness, respectively. This differs from most other Likert-type responses, where low scores would represent inequity and high scores would represent equity. In the left graphic in Figure 7.4, an observer can only learn that people who perceive low equity report lower satisfaction as compared with people who report high equity and also report higher satisfaction. Also in Figure 7.4, however, an observer can see from the graphic on the right that two types of inequity exist – underbenefitedness and overbenefitedness. In this figure, people who report underbenefitedness report low satisfaction and people who

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Equity

Equity

Evaluating Fairness: Critical Assessment of Equity Theory

Satisfaction

Satisfaction

Figure 7.4 A linear relationship versus a curvilinear relationship.

report overbenefitedness also report low satisfaction. High satisfaction is related to equity. Being able to separate inequity into overbenefitedness and underbenefitedness allows researchers to discover whether the relationship of overbenefitedness and underbenefitedness and another variable is different or whether all inequity is the same. Prior to developing this single-item global measure of equity, Hatfield et al. (1979) also developed the Global Measures of Participants’ Inputs, Outcomes, and Equity/Inequity, in which participants assess their own contributions and outcomes as well as their partner’s contributions and outcomes on a scale ranging from extremely negative to extremely positive. The responses to these four items are input into an equity formula to determine in/equity. Other researchers have used other global scales to measure equity. For example, some researchers have taken statements based on Adams’s (1963, 1965) original works on equity theory (e.g. Hatfield, Traupmann, & O’Brien, 1990; Shechory & Ziv, 2007). The responses reflect the assessment of the ratio of participants’ levels of investments and rewards to their partners’ levels. Because this type of survey instrument involves multiple items, the items are summed and scored so that higher scores reflect more equity in the relationship. Some researchers have employed alternative measures of equity as well as the traditional self-report instruments. The major difference involves whether people report equity using global measures or domain-specific measures of equity. Detailed or domain-specific measures of equity ask participants to focus on specific areas of the relationship and to describe their own and their partners’ relative contributions. Again, Hatfield and her colleagues created the Traupmann–Utne–Hatfield Equity Scale (1979), in which participants assess the four relational areas of personal concerns, emotional concerns, day-to-day concerns, and opportunities gained or lost. Foa and Foa (1974) also developed a detailed instrument in which people rate equity in the areas of love, status, money, material goods, and services. One important consideration in measuring equity is whether equity is equally valuable in all relational areas. For example, for some people, having an equitable distribution of household labor is far more important than having an equitable distribution of possessions. VanYperen and Buunk (1990) gathered detailed equity data based on 24 exchange dimensions. Their study differed from previous studies because they weighted each dimension to

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Denise M. Polk reflect its relative importance. In order to achieve this weighted score, participants assessed the degree to which self or partner contributed more on each item, but they also rated the value of each contribution to the relationship overall. Whereas both global and detailed instruments measure perceptions of equitable behavior, differences do exist. In fact, some researchers, such as Lujanksy and Mikula (1983), argued that global and detailed instruments actually measure different things. For example, Sprecher (2001a, 2001b) compared equity measures using a sample of romantic partners in a longitudinal study. The various equity measures did produce some different findings; however, a far greater number of similarities surfaced. More specifically, Sprecher found positive associations between two global measures of equity and a domain-specific measure of equity. In general, little consensus exists about which measurement of equity is more valid (Desmarais & Lerner, 1989). When assessing equity, people must assess equity over the long term. The reason this point is so important is that it is nearly impossible to maintain equity most of the time. For example, the division of household labor is one area where researchers often test equity theory. One of the reasons this area is so popular is that as people tend to move away from traditional gender roles within relationships, they must find other ways to distribute domestic responsibilities. Previously, people simply accepted that these responsibilities were the domain of women. Now, given the number of women working in the paid labor force, couples often attempt to negotiate domestic chores. Couples can try many different ways to establish equity. For example, couples may share tasks 50/50 (“I’ll wash the dishes half the time, and you wash them the other half ”). This type of equity would also overlap with equality since tasks are split evenly. Couples also may select tasks (“I’ll cook if you do the dishes”). Couples can negotiate equity in a number of different ways, and they may combine many of these methods. It is important to remember that the end result may not always look equitable to an outsider, but if the parties involved perceive it as equitable, then the exchange has distributive justice. For example, perhaps one partner really hates to clean the toilet. In actuality, cleaning the toilet may be a task that only takes 10 minutes once a week. However, if that person hates it so much, s/he may offer to do the grocery shopping, which may take an hour each week, if the spouse agrees to clean the toilet. If they both perceive that exchange to be equitable, then within the relationship, the exchange of grocery shopping for cleaning the toilet is an equitable exchange. Unfortunately, life does not always fit into neat compartments. People’s jobs may require more time and energy on certain weeks than during other times. Therefore, the agreements that couples establish cannot always be followed. When this happens, one person usually picks up the slack, and this translates into this person being underbenefited. This person has more inputs than outcomes. It is critical, then, that couples track the costs and benefits in the long term rather than the short term. Focusing on the short term leads to keeping score (“I’ve cooked and done the dishes every night this week”), which often results in conflict (Nichols & Schwartz, 1998). In close relationships, it is critical that these periods of inequity will even out over the long term, making the relationship equitable in the long run. Brockner, Chen, Mannix, Leung, and Skarlicki (2000) found that when trust is high, people may be willing to accept a less-than-desirable outcome in the short term because they believe it could lead to long-term rewards.

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Restoring equity What can people do when they perceive inequity? Certainly, at certain times in relationships, people may begin to perceive inequity. According to researchers, people may discover inequity via one of two ways. Walster, Walster, and Berscheid’s (1978) version of equity theory suggests that relational partners make relational comparisons. People make relational comparisons when they compare their partner’s input–outcome ratio with their own input– outcome ratio. Other researchers suggest that people also make referential comparisons (VanYperen & Buunk, 1994). These comparisons involve looking at other people in similar roles or relationships and making comparisons between oneself and others’ situations. This idea relates back to the theory mentioned earlier called social comparison theory. Sometimes people enter into a relationship perceiving equity, but later on one party begins to perceive s/he is underbenefited when s/he starts making relational or referential comparisons. Adams (1965) was one of the first scholars to outline the ways people respond to inequity in order to restore distributive justice. Walster, Walster, and Berscheid (1978) also extended and developed these strategies further to align with relationships beyond employer–employee relationships. The restoration of equity can occur through attempts to restore actual equity or by attempts to restore psychological equity. Actual equity can be restored via four methods. For example, a homemaker may enter marriage with a perception that the relationship of a homemaker to a breadwinner is equitable. Over time, however, let’s say the homemaker takes on some part-time work. The homemaker now perceives inequity – perhaps because the homemaker has taken on the additional role of part-time worker but has not reduced any responsibilities in the homemaker realm. The homemaker can restore actual equity by decreasing his or her inputs. Decreasing or reducing inputs involves putting less effort into the relationships (minimizing costs). One example would be that the homemaker stops picking up the breadwinner’s dirty clothes off the floor. The second way to restore actual equity is by raising his or her outcomes. Increasing outcomes would be doing something that is rewarding for the individual. For instance, the homemaker can begin to practice yoga, which gives him/her pleasure. The tricky part about raising personal outcomes is to do so without feeling guilty. If the homemaker goes to yoga, but ends up feeling guilty during the entire session about having slacked in the household responsibilities, it defeats the idea of increasing outcomes. Although the basic definitions are the same, the other two ways of restoring actual equity focus on the partner’s inputs and outcomes rather than personal inputs and outcomes. Thus, the third strategy for restoring actual equity is raising the partner’s inputs (give the responsibility of cleaning up dirty clothes to the breadwinner). The fourth actual equity restoration strategy is decreasing the partner’s outcomes (punishing the breadwinner by giving them the silent treatment). As opposed to actual equity restoration, people also may engage in what Adams (1965) called psychological distortion or what Walster, Walster, and Berscheid (1978) and Sprecher and Schwartz (1994) called psychological equity restoration. These two terms refer to the same idea, which is distorting reality as a method to perceive equity. Similar to restoring actual equity, people have four ways to accomplish this goal. Going back to the example of

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Denise M. Polk the homemaker, s/he can restore psychological equity by attempting to convince him/herself that the relationship is equitable. Just as people may perceive inequity by making referential comparisons, they also can attempt to restore it by making other referential comparisons. Social comparison occurs when people literally compare their situations with other people in similar situations. In the case of the homemaker, s/he might go out to lunch with some friends. While out, the friends would talk about the extent to which their spouses participate in housework. After that interaction, the homemaker might realign beliefs about the breadwinner and begin to think that the breadwinner actually does a lot more around the house than other people’s breadwinner spouses, and the homemaker might begin to feel their arrangement is rather equitable. This would be the first form of psychological equity restoration, called exaggerating the inputs of the spouse. Another way to achieve psychological equity restoration would be that after making the social comparison, the homemaker also can minimize personal inputs by telling him/herself that keeping the house isn’t that time-consuming a responsibility anyway. The third psychological equity restoration technique the homemaker can use is to exaggerate personal outcomes. One way to accomplish this might be to tell oneself that running a household gives great personal satisfaction and that doing it well benefits the family, which is what matters most. Finally, the homemaker can minimize the partner’s outcomes (in this case the breadwinner). For example, the homemaker could downplay the spouse’s outcomes within the relationship by thinking the breadwinner really does not have as much leisure time as the homemaker initially thought. If the homemaker makes multiple attempts to restore equity through a number of the options above but still perceives underbenefitedness, the homemaker may choose yet another equity restoration technique. This technique is called to leave the field, and this means exactly that: the homemaker may decide to separate or to divorce the breadwinner. Canary and Stafford (1992) argued that in long-term relationships, it is more feasible that people will change their behavior than the other options. In other words, people will attempt to restore actual equity by reducing their own inputs or increasing their personal outcomes over any of the other methods of equity restoration. Canary and Stafford suggested that people find it difficult to preserve cognitive distortion over lengths of time and that leaving the field is a more dramatic move than many people wish to take. For example, it is much more complicated to leave a spouse if children are involved. Sprecher (1992) supported the idea that people tend to choose the equity restoration technique that incurs the fewest costs. In addition, changing partner behaviors to get them to increase their inputs often involves high levels of persuasion and negotiation. This tactic typically is more helpful if couples can negotiate equitable responsibilities before they begin to enact them for any time (such as prior to marriage or cohabitation). This is because if the homemaker is underbenefited, it makes sense that the breadwinner is overbenefited. The breadwinner may believe that their arrangement is equitable; after all, they agreed to it initially as equitable. Therefore, if we go back to the first proposition of equity theory – that people will try to maximize their self-interest – the breadwinner may not be altogether motivated to take on additional duties if s/he still sees personal inputs and outcomes as equitable.

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The Application of Equity Theory Some researchers have been interested in learning the extent to which certain variables predict whether some people are more predisposed to behave equitably. Other researchers are interested in the extent to which the achievement of equity is more important to some individuals than to others. Still other researchers have been interested in the emotional states that perceptions of (in)equity elicit.

Personality Many personality variables can be used to predict relational equity. Sprecher and Schwartz (1994) included assertiveness (the degree to which people are willing to stand up for and to defend their rights) and self-esteem (confidence and satisfaction with oneself). These types of variables can influence areas such as how a person treats a relational partner, as well as how a person allows him/herself to be treated. It also may influence a person’s threshold for perceiving inequitable behaviors. Relational identity (RI) is another possible predictor of equity. Relational identity is a schema, or mental model, that people develop which involves the degree of awareness and the importance placed on relationships (Acitelli 1997, 2002). Polk (2008) tested the relationship between RI and equity and found a significant relationship between the two. People with high relational identities perceived less equity than did people with low relational identities.

Relationship type and relationship length Even the type or length of the relationship also may affect perceived equity. For example, parents of young children may perceive their relational equity differently once their family is in a later family life cycle, such as empty nesters (Schafer & Keith, 1981). Another type of relationship to which researchers have applied equity theory is with remarriage. Furstenberg and Spanier (1987) found that people emphasized the role of give and take in their second marriage. Thus Ganong and Coleman (1994) suggested a heightened recognition of this need to balance rewards and costs in a second marriage. Buunk and Mutsaers (1999) found that individuals’ retrospective perceptions led them to conclude their current marriage as more equitable and satisfying than their first marriage (even prior to any indication the first marriage would end in divorce). More specifically, significantly more women than men reported greater positive change toward equity in the second marriage as compared with the first marriage. It is also very important that Buunk and Mutsaers found no significant relationships to suggest that certain types of people end up in inequitable marriages, nor that they were biased to perceive inequity in both marriages – suggesting that it was the nature of the second marriage and not some other variable influencing the results.

Emotions Some researchers have been interested in what happens when people believe they can maximize outcomes by violating laws of equity. Even if this person behaves inequitably, the propositions of equity theory would suggest the person would experience guilt or feel badly

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Denise M. Polk about doing so. Ultimately, according to the propositions of equity, some punishment also must be incurred for attempting to take too much or, similarly, for accepting too little. Early research focused on the emotional states associated with equity and with inequity. The original findings surrounding equity in intimate relationships are that people reported the most distress when they reported being underbenefited, people who reported experiencing equity reported the least distress, and people who reported overbenefitedness also reported an intermediate amount of distress (Hatfield et al., 1979). Theoretically, anger is the primary emotion associated with underbenefited individuals whereas guilt is the primary emotion associated with overbenefited individuals. Furthermore, the distress resulting from inequity strains the relationship and is related to lowered satisfaction and commitment (Sabatelli & Cecil-Pigo, 1985; Sprecher, 1988, 2001b). Whereas Walster, Walster, and Berscheid (1978) contended simply that inequity (whether overbenefitedness or underbenefitedness) creates distress, later research findings suggested that the degree of distress or even the presence of distress differs for overbenefitedness versus underbenefitedness. Thus, they cannot be considered equal emotional states. For example, Sprecher (2001b) tested for the specific negative emotional states that inequity induces. She found that underbenefiting but not overbenefiting is significantly associated with distress for both men and women. In addition, the greater the level of underbenefitedness, the greater the distress reported. Other emotions than anger have been found to be associated with underbenefitedness as well. People experience depression and frustration (Sprecher, 1986, 1992, 2001b) and resentment (Sprecher, 2001b) as the result of perceiving underbenefitedness. Dainton (2003) tested the relationship between equity and relational uncertainty. She found that equity and overbenefitedness bore no significant relationship with uncertainty, but underbenefitedness was positively associated with it. According to Dainton, these underbenefited individuals may feel less sure about the definition, mutuality, or future of their relationship. Presumably, this creates distress, which does echo other research findings about the nature of underbenefitedness and distress (e.g., Sprecher, 1986). In fact, Dainton and Gross (2007) claimed that overbenefitedness actually tends to be viewed pretty favorably (rather than people being consumed with guilt), although underbenefitedness consistently is negative, supporting previous research with similar findings (Sprecher, 2001b).

Gender Some researchers believe that gender may play a significant role in understanding equity (Michaels et al., 1984; Stafford & Canary, 2006). In general, women are more likely than men to be underbenefited, and men are more likely than women to be overbenefited (Davidson, 1984; Vanfossen, 1981); this perception can lead to increased relational dissatisfaction. The overarching argument behind the role of gender is that women are more sensitive about and aware of relational issues. For example, Eagly (1987) asserted that women and men specialize in different spheres of behavior, including women specializing in the development and maintenance of relationships. In addition, VanYperen and Buunk (1994) suggested that women are more likely to identify and to confront relational issues, in contrast with men, who are more likely to avoid relational issues. Fincham and Linfield (1997)

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found that wives but not husbands significantly attributed positive and negative aspects of marital quality to marital events. Similarly, Sprecher (2001a) found women’s assessments of equity to be associated with relational stability, but the same finding did not apply to men.

Distribution of domestic duties Equity has been studied a great deal with regard to the distribution of household labor, including housework, yard work, and childcare. Despite the changes of women’s entrance into the labor market, many heterosexual couples still internalize traditional notions of gender roles. Frequently this leads to women taking full responsibility for household tasks (Dunne, 2000; Greenstein, 2000; Zimmerman, Haddock, Ziemba, & Rust, 2001). If they do not take full responsibility, much evidence exists that women spend a significantly greater amount of time devoted to these tasks than do men (Coltrane, 2000; Sayer, 2005). This finding is true even when women work the same number of paid labor hours as men (Ferree, 1991), although according to Sayer, the gap is decreasing. Thus the division of household labor is a topic where partners may perceive inequity. The interchangeability of roles in close romantic relationships can make issues of fairness and justice more, rather than less, problematic (Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994). To test this idea, researchers have begun to devote more attention to homosexual couples and their division of household labor. Because the biological sex of the couple is the same, it cannot affect the decisions about the distribution of tasks. As a result, some researchers claim that same-sex relationships have greater potential for equity with regard to role division and the distribution of household labor (e.g., Shechory & Ziv, 2007). Some limited research supports the idea that same-sex couples report a more equitable division of household responsibilities than heterosexual couples (e.g., Chan, Brooks, Raboy, & Patterson, 1998). Shechory and Ziv (2007) conducted a study that compared equity between heterosexual, gay, and lesbian couples. They found no significant differences between lesbian partners’ perceptions of equity; however, they did find significant differences in heterosexual and gay couples. More specifically, they found that heterosexual men considered their marriage to be more equitable than did heterosexual women. Men reported the ratio of the degree of their relationship investment and their relationship benefit to be more similar to their spouse’s investment–benefit ratio. Women, however, reported their marriages to be less equitable. In addition, for gay male couples, one partner often reported less equity. For lesbian couples, equity was related both to role division and to gender-role attitudes. In lesbian couples, equity is positively associated with greater levels of egalitarianism in the relationship and with more liberal gender-role attitudes. Shechory and Ziv (2007) concluded that men (regardless of sexual orientation) tend to view their relationship as less equitable when they must perform “women’s work” and suggested that even though performing household tasks is supposed to be associated with love and devotion to one’s family, the performance of these tasks is devalued. In addition, men tend to expect to benefit more than they invest in a relationship. Thus, even though heterosexual women tend to have more egalitarian attitudes, it is the man’s attitudes that bring equitable behavior (Pyke & Coltrane, 1996).

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Relational quality Equitable relationships are more satisfying than inequitable ones (Canary & Stafford, 1992). Concerns about lack of fairness can lead to lowered satisfaction. “The concept of equity gained increased importance following research that demonstrated a positive relationship between equity and the quality of the marriage and the spouses’ feeling of satisfaction with their life together (Rabin & Shapira-Berman, 1998; Ward, 1993)” (Shechory & Ziv, 2007, p. 631). For example, Wilke, Ferree, and Ratcliff (1998) tested the relationship between marital satisfaction and the division of both paid and domestic work. They found that what is fair is different for husbands and wives and that conventional distribution of paid and domestic work offers benefits and costs to both spouses. More equitable division of paid work is related to greater satisfaction for men, but more equitable distribution of domestic work is related to women’s increased satisfaction. Aida and Falbo (1991) found that married people who viewed themselves as equal partners reported more satisfaction with their relationship than those who viewed themselves an unequal partners. Dainton (2003) found that both underbenefitedness and overbenefitedness significantly predicted low relational satisfaction. This finding supports the original contention that inequity is dissatisfying, but it differs from other studies, which have suggested that only underbenefitedness is dissatisfying. For example, Sprecher (2001a, 2001b) found that underbenefiting inequity was a unique predictor of relationship quality. In addition, perceptions of relational equity impact relational outcomes in other ways. For instance, equity specifically in family roles had a positive association with marital adjustment (Rachlin, 1987). Perry-Jenkins and Folk (1994) found that concerns about inequity were associated with increased relational conflict (presumably dissatisfying). Arditti and Allen (1993) even reported evidence to support the idea that men’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of their own divorces was related to perceptions of inequity. The sources of the inequity stemmed both from the ex-wife and from the legal system regarding issues like child custody and child support. It is important to note that, just as many researchers note differences between the terms equity and equality, other researchers suggest that outcomes such as marital satisfaction, marital adjustment, and marital happiness overlap in some ways but that they too are distinct constructs (for a discussion of these differences see Fowers, 1990). In general, researchers have not garnered solid support for the idea that equity at a given point in a relationship contributes to changes in relational quality over time, particularly relational stability (Sprecher, 2001b). VanYperen and Buunk (1990), however, found that the more relational equity that wives perceived in their initial data gathering, the higher they reported their satisfaction a year later. In addition, Grote and Clark (2001) looked at people transitioning to parenthood and found that an inequitable division of household labor affected satisfaction negatively and also factored in an increase in conflict for wives. Finally, Buunk and Mutsaers (1999) reported about a sample involving remarriage that “those men who perceived equity were happier in their former and current marriage than those who perceived inequity, and the more advantaged one felt, the happier one had been in one’s former marriage and the happier one was in one’s present marriage” (p. 130). This aligns with support from earlier research, which suggests that women more frequently feel underbenefited in marriage whereas more men feel overbenefited (e.g., Rabin, 1996).

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Relational behaviors Much of the extant equity research in close relationships has focused on how it affects people’s emotional states such as distress, commitment, marital adjustment, and relationship satisfaction. Perhaps equally important, however, is whether (or to what degree) equity affects relational behaviors. The propositions of equity theory help advance the idea that since distress occurs in the presence of inequity, then inequity is likely to affect the enactment of specific positive and negative behaviors that are salient to the close relationship. In addition, because people are motivated to restore equity when they perceive inequitable situations, they may engage in certain behaviors or avoid them. Some of the major behaviors that have been studied are outlined below. The first major behavior is relational maintenance. Relational maintenance can be defined as the behaviors people enact to preserve desired relational states (Canary & Stafford, 1992; Dindia & Canary, 1993). Maintenance behaviors are resources; they constitute inputs for one partner and outcomes for the other (Canary & Stafford, 1992). As a result, they may be used or withheld to restore equity (Canary & Stafford, 2001). People tend to put forth more effort to maintain their relationships when they perceive equity rather than inequity (Canary & Stafford, 1992; Dainton, 2003). In fact, Canary and Stafford (2001) claimed that people withhold energy to maintain their relationship when they perceive that the partner does not deserve the effort, such as in an inequitable relationship. In addition, people who perceive equitable treatment engage in and more readily perceive their partner’s maintenance strategies than do people who feel overbenefited or underbenefited (Canary & Dainton, 2006). Because equitably treated people report greater satisfaction than inequitably treated people, they are more likely to expend the energy required to maintain their relationships (Messman et al., 2000). Conversely, assessments of inequity adversely affect people’s relational maintenance efforts and perceptions of partner maintenance behaviors. Canary and Stafford (1992) found that for both men and women, definitions of equity were significantly associated with perceptions of partner maintenance; however, they found that equity affected self-reported maintenance behaviors for women only. Dainton (2003) found that equity was associated positively with integrative conflict management (using strategies like apologizing) and positivity (being cheerful). As suggested by Hatfield et al. (1979), people who perceive underbenefitedness may be motivated to demand equity. Dainton (2003) found some support for this idea. She found that inequity was linked positively with the relational maintenance behavior of openness (discussing relational feelings directly). She suggested that people may use openness as an equity restoration behavior. Thus people would increase their openness when they perceive inequity because they would discuss directly the feelings that the inequity provokes in them. Dainton also suggested that the use of relationship uncertainty (based on uncertainty reduction theory) may work in combination with equity to affect relational maintenance processes. Different types of relationships may affect the association between equity and relational maintenance behaviors. People have different motives for maintaining intimate romantic relationships than they do for maintaining same-sex friendships, opposite-sex friendships,

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Denise M. Polk and other relationships. Whereas the above studies have focused on romantic relationships, Monsour, Harris, Kurzweil, and Beard (1994) found that maintaining opposite-sex friendships involves equity and liking. Messman et al. (2000) found that platonic friends who perceived equitable friendship used more relational maintenance strategies, with overbenefited people reporting the second most strategies and underbenefited friends reporting the least maintenance. In addition, Vogl-Baur, Kalbfleisch, and Beatty (1999) found that underbenefited parents of adolescents reported lower maintenance activities of positivity, social networks (participating in shared activities with mutual friends), and sharing tasks (chores). In addition, adolescent overbenefitedness and maintenance activities were positively associated. In addition to relational maintenance behaviors, sexual behaviors have been associated with relational equity. People who experience distress as a result of inequity have different sexual behaviors than people in equitable relationships. Walster, Walster, and Traupmann (1978) found that among college students in dating relationships, those who reported equity also reported going further sexually than those participants who reported inequitable relationships. Those individuals who perceived equity and who also reported having sexual intercourse were more likely than students in inequitable sexually active relationships to report that the decision was mutual and/or that the decision was the result of being in love. Both dating and married couples also reported differences in their sexual satisfaction based on their reports of equity (Hatfield, Greenberger, Traupmann, & Lambert, 1982; Traupmann, Hatfield, & Wexler, 1983). Sexual behaviors and requests (or the lack of them) is something that people can initiate or enact as an effort to restore equity. Three major areas have been studied in the realm of equity and sexual behavior. First, Blumstein and Schwartz (1983) found a relationship between power and the denial of sex such that more powerful partners refused sex most often in their relationships. Sexual refusal may not be an available mode to restore equity unless a partner has enough power to do so. Second, Sprecher and Schwartz (1994) contended that either relational partner may use the initiation of sex to restore equity because it is an act of supplication. Third, people may seek sexual relationships from a secondary source (extramarital sex or sex outside a romantic relationship) as a way to restore equity within the primary relationship. Underbenefited individuals can be more likely to report having an extramarital affair (Walster, Walster, & Traupmann 1978). Prins, Buunk, and VanYperen (1993) found that both actual extramarital behavior and even the desire to engage in an extramarital affair were related to inequity for women but not for men. Recently, Dainton and Gross (2007) described that some people rationalized their extramarital sexual relationships as necessary to stay in their primary relationships (e.g., “I cheat to maintain my relationship with my spouse”).

Orientation Whereas some researchers have studied the predictive value of equity, other researchers have been interested in how equity interacts with other variables. Some people are more likely to become distressed at the presence of inequity than do others, and certain variables might impact those types of differences. For example, exchange orientation is the tendency

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to evaluate behavior with regard to beliefs of the nature or expectation of reciprocity (Murstein, Cerreto, & MacDonald, 1977). Some people place higher value on the exchange orientation, and these individuals expend more energy tracking how much they put into and get out of their relationship as compared with their partner. Conversely, people with a low exchange orientation do not pay much attention to the input–outcome, cost–reward ratios in their relationship. Sprecher (1992) expanded exchange orientation because she believed that the equity principles of over- and underbenefitedness would play a factor on outcomes like relational satisfaction. This expanded conceptualization included those individuals with an underbenefiting exchange orientation (those who are more concerned about getting enough out of the relationship) versus individuals with an overbenefiting exchange orientation (those who are more concerned with not getting too much out of the relationship). Sprecher (1998) found that individuals with a high exchange orientation who are motivated to track the exchanges in an effort to make sure they are not underbenefited tend to be less satisfied with the relationship than people with a high exchange orientation (whose motivation is to make sure they are not overbenefited and who tend to report higher levels of relational satisfaction). Communal orientation – the desire to give and receive benefit in response to concern for another person – also moderates the relationship between equity and satisfaction. Equity is not significantly linked with satisfaction for people with a low communal orientation, but it was for those with a high communal orientation (VanYperen & Buunk, 1991).

Initial, existing, and dissolving relationships Equity theory is used most often to study existing relationships, although it can be used to examine relationship initiation or the selection of an intimate partner. Typically, when this topic is of interest, researchers apply a simpler version of equity theory (Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994). In such cases, the matching hypothesis is used. The matching hypothesis refers to the idea that people choose or seek relationships with other people who are similar to them with regard to socially desirable characteristics – like physical attractiveness (Berscheid, Dion, Walster, & Walster, 1971). Equity also can factor into the dissolution of relationships. Although research has suggested that measuring perceptions of relational equity at one point in a relationship is not a good predictor of whether the couple will break up months or years later, it may be an important variable during the actual process of relational dissolution (Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994). Sprecher and Schwartz suggested that indirect evidence supports the idea that once people begin to contemplate a breakup, they may begin to perceive inequities they previously did not notice. For example, Hatfield, Utne, & Traupmann (1979) suggested that temporal issues affected perceptions of equity post-breakup. “In this case, rather than inequity breeding instability, instability seems to breed a perception of inequity” (Hatfield et al., 1979, p. 130). When people actually confront a relational partner about breaking up, equity also may play a role. Equity may affect the strategies people choose to initiate or to negotiate the breakup. Undergraduate students who had been underbenefited in a previous relationship were more likely than equitable and overbenefited participants to say they used one

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Denise M. Polk particular kind of disengagement strategy (justification or explaining their desire for the breakup) over four other types of disengagement strategies. Furthermore, Baxter (1984) found that some people used cost-escalation strategies to try to initiate the breakup. These strategies involve indirect behaviors to communicate the desire to break up and might include things such as being in a constant bad mood when interacting with a relational partner. Sprecher and Schwartz (1994) suggested that people may choose these strategies because any discussion of the relationship’s future is likely to include equity issues, and some people may choose to treat the partner unfairly so that the partner has to do the “dirty work” of breaking up. In addition, relational equity may affect the decision to remain platonic friends after a breakup as well. Metts, Cupach, and Bejlovec (1989) found that a major predictor of the decision not to remain friends after breaking up was the perception of being underbenefited (or having been taken advantage of). Further into the breakup process, people may talk about the relational inequity with others to create a socially acceptable narrative for the dissolution (Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994). Finally, people will try to remember the relationship in certain ways after the actual breakup occurs to help the person move on. In post-breakup accounts of undergraduates, 12% of the participants reported inequity as a reason they broke up, with a larger proportion of women citing inequity than men (Baxter, 1986).

A Critique of Equity Theory Mathematical models of human interaction, particularly those relationships which are considered intimate in nature, are foreign and unappealing to some people. Some people find the notion of characterizing interpersonal relationships in terms of economic principles not applicable. Walster, Walster, and Berscheid (1978) suggested that whereas, prior to their book, equity researchers accepted that casual relationships endure only when the relationship is profitable to both participants, they argued equity researchers mostly denied the premises of equity in intimate relationships such as those between close friends, those between lovers, and parent–child relationships. In particular, they argued that other equity theorists tend to wish to call romantic and marital relationships special to the extent that “true” love transcends exchange despite evidence that equity theory applies. Some scholars continue to believe that the very nature of close relationships, particularly marriage, differs from other types of interpersonal relationships. These scholars argue that individuals should not calculate their personal rewards and costs, nor should they focus on participating in relationships for their own personal profit (Clark & Chrisman, 1994; Clark & Mills, 1979). Thinking of relationships, particularly people’s intimate relationships, through the use of terminology like “commodities,” “transactions,” and “investments” runs contrary to what people like to think about friendship and love. At the very least, people tend to believe that the joy of giving and the desire to receive is central to these types of relationships. Thus, these skeptics of equity theory suggest that relationships should be based on mutual concern for one another’s needs. It is also possible that relational equity is its own reward. People who follow rules of fairness will be rewarded, whereas people who do not will be punished. The rewards come in terms of strong relationships, and the punishments come in terms of damaged or dissolved

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relationships. Think of a marriage. Coontz (2005) outlined the history of marriage and claimed that until the late eighteenth century, marriages occurred mostly for economic and political reasons, until this gave way to the idea that love should be central to marriage. In theory, “marriage should be based on intense, profound love and a couple should maintain that ardor” (Coontz, 2005, p. 15), rather than marriage based on love tied to expectations for what that other person needs to do to “earn” that love. These are ideas fundamental to Buddhism or other non-Western cultural worldviews. The concept of karuna suggests that people become totally one with others and manifest unconditional love (Maguire, 2001). Unconditionality begins with the individual, and the principle behind it is about loving and accepting oneself exactly as is, even if one wishes to do better. Furthermore, unconditionality involves extending this idea to others – loving and accepting other people for who they are, even if one or both partners wishes for better (Bayda, 2003). Unconditionality at first glance runs counter to Western views of romantic love (Maguire). Because this concept runs counter to monitoring exchanges, people who adopt these views likely would be critical of viewing relationships in terms of economic principles. Instead, the overarching focus in relationships with others is behaving in ways that honor oneself and at the same time honor the relational partner. Even those people who appreciate a mathematical model of relationships might at least raise questions about equity theory’s basic assumptions. The theory reduces relational processes into very finely calculated segments. Furthermore, it presumes that all people have been conditioned through socialization to subscribe to the tenets outlined in the theory. This does not necessarily mean that they behave in ways contrary to the rules of equity; it just means that they use different guidelines and principles by which to live. It is possible that some people reject and may even actively work on living lives that do not revolve around calculating rewards and costs. Other critics of equity theory have contended that people may not perceive relational inequity or that they may not feel negatively about a relational partner until the relationship itself has become dissatisfying. Duck (1982) suggested that people do not evaluate equity and their intimate social exchanges seriously until the breakup process has already begun to occur. This is very different from Nichols and Schwarz (1998), who argued that sometimes couples endanger their relationship by focusing on the short-term cost–reward ratio instead of focusing on long-term ratios. Perhaps not all individuals are equally sensitive to equity. Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles (1987) outlined different ways individuals distribute outcomes among receivers, and they concluded that different norms govern the allocation of rewards. This conclusion suggests that exceptions exist to the norm of equity. To address this issue, they have developed and tested an Equity Sensitivity Construct, which places people in one of three categories: (a) benevolents, who prefer their outcome–input ratio to be less than the outcome–input ratio of their relational partner, (b) equity sensitives, who subscribe to traditional outcome–input ratios for equity, and (c) entitleds, who prefer their outcome–input ratio to exceed their partner’s ratios. The results of several studies suggest that these preferences do exist and contribute to different perceptions of the importance of equity (Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman, 1989, 1994). More recently, Shore and Strauss (2008) compared another similar measure – the Equity Preference Questionnaire (EPS; Sauley & Bedeian, 2000) – which also measures

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Denise M. Polk equity sensitivity. They also found evidence to suggest individual differences about equity, but they claimed the EPS to be a more valid measurement tool. The results of this newer body of literature suggest that whereas equity theory may have at one time been accepted as a universal law of human behavior and social interaction, the possibility that a one-size-fitsall mentality about its propositions may not apply. Ragsdale (1996) criticized equity theory by suggesting that interdependence theory is more apt when testing relational maintenance behaviors. Rusbult, Drigotas, and Verette’s (1994) investment model also falls into the set of exchange theories, but it begins with interdependence theory (Kelley, 1979; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The central premise of interdependence theory is that people report stable and satisfying relationships when the partner compares favorably to his or her ideal as well as to alternatives. Rusbult et al. (1994) added a third consideration of investments (e.g., time, effort, etc.), and it is this combination of factors that predicts commitment. In fact, based on the results of a diary study, Ragsdale asserted that neither equity theory nor relational satisfaction is related to relational maintenance. Ragsdale also contested Canary and Stafford’s (1992) methodology and how it affected the results. Later, Ragsdale continued his critique of equity’s relationship with relational maintenance. His main argument revolved around the point that if maintenance behaviors vary according to group differences, then researchers cannot use a single measure of relational maintenance (Ragsdale & Brandau-Brown, 2004). Stafford and Canary (2006) responded by arguing that they agree with some of Ragsdale and Brandau-Brown’s argument but that they conducted studies to account for at least some differences of various groups. Finally, Ragsdale (1996) claimed that the Marital Comparison Level Index (MCLI; Sabatelli, 1984) is conceptually flawed for measuring equity. The MCLI is a way to measure the degree to which respondents feel that relational outcomes compare with their expectations. Again, Stafford and Canary (2006) responded by claiming Ragsdale’s critique is based on a misinterpretation of how they used the measure. Some researchers have argued that isolating equity from other exchange variables distorts the contribution of equity on variables such as satisfaction. These researchers cite one of the weaknesses of the original studies of equity as involving the omission of other exchange variables. Most of the early equity studies tested only equity’s effect on a dependent variable such as distress or satisfaction. Some of these researchers compared equity with rewards or equality’s effect on relational outcomes. For example, Desmarais and Lerner (1989) found that equity was less important than rewards as a predictor of relational quality. Cate et al. (1982) developed studies to measure the relative value of equity on the satisfaction of dating couples, and their study included other exchange variables such as equality and reward level as well. Because of a significant overlap between equity and equality, they concluded that reward level is a better predictor of satisfaction. Still other researchers tested the relative contribution of equity with variables such as investment and alternatives on commitment. Sprecher (1988, 2001b) found that comparison level for alternatives and not equity most strongly predicted commitment, but she also found that equity did explain a unique amount of variance regarding commitment. Therefore, some critics claim that studies should integrate these variables rather than isolate them from one another because they belong to one exchange theory versus another.

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Finally, equity theory generally ignores people’s natural resilience, competitiveness, selflessness and selfishness, and the ethical dilemmas they may encounter when making decisions about behavior. Equity theory assumes that people act in a rational, calculated way involving an expected payoff. However, people do not always act rationally. Many people will not be as calculating as the theory may suggest. Respecting oneself and living to one’s own values may be reward enough. This concept generally is considered altruism, which does not sit in concert with the assumptions of this “rational, economic-person” model.

Further Development of Equity Theory Sprecher and Schwartz (1994) provided a criticism of equity which provides future directions for developing and refining equity theory. They claimed that the experience of (in)equity follows three basic steps that include perception, emotional reaction, and equityrestoring behavior. They also argued that a cognitive appraisal is missing from this process – that people want to understand the situational factors well enough to explain the inequity. Sprecher and Schwartz suggested that more studies should address whether people expected the (in)equity to occur as part of the cognitive appraisal process. They proposed the possibility that inequity might only be distressful and that equity might only elicit happiness when they are unexpected behaviors. This idea is similar to a step in the process of expectancy violation theory (Burgoon & Hale, 1988), in which people must interpret a behavior that goes against the norm (for that person or a societal norm) and then evaluate that behavior. It also relates back to the construct of equity sensitivity (Huseman et al., 1987; Shore & Strauss, 2008). So far, the literature on equity sensitivity has been tested only in organizational contexts. Based on Sprecher’s contentions about exchange orientation, it seems that equity sensitivity is worth investigating in other interpersonal contexts, including friendship and marriage. Some researchers are beginning to pay more attention to how culture might affect the importance and perception of equity – Aumer-Ryan, Hatfield, and Frey (2007), for example. In both Hawai’i and Jamaica participants considered equity to be of critical importance in romantic relationships. However, men and women in Hawai’i reported more equitable and more satisfying relationships than did people in Jamaica. In addition, cultural differences surfaced regarding how people reacted to inequities. The Hawai’i sample reported more relational satisfaction when the relationship was equitable, but the Jamaican sample reported the most relational satisfaction when they were overbenefited. Aumer-Ryan et al. attributed these differences to the individualistic (emphasis placed on the individual) versus collectivistic (emphasis placed on the group) cultural values in these two countries. More studies testing whether equity is important to assessing the relationship in other cultures and the extent to which it affects these relationships should continue. In addition to cultural values associated with one’s national culture, family culture also might be investigated to determine how people develop their exchange orientation, the importance of equity, how perceptions of equity develop, and to what extent they remain stable over time. Just as Sprecher (1998) proposed that people develop different exchange orientation, Stafford and Canary (2006) acknowledged such differences may affect the

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Denise M. Polk contribution of equity to other outcomes. Although exchange (in theory) is universal, not much is known about how exchange orientation develops and how it relates specifically to perceptions and expectations for equity. Exchange factors may have weaker effects in societies where tradition and norms exert greater influence on how marital behaviors are enacted (Stafford & Canary). Finally, other orientations should be tested more comprehensively to help understand equity better. Wilcox and Nock (2006) tested the companionate theory of marriage (that egalitarianism leads to higher relationship quality) with two other models: (a) the institutional model of marriage, which suggests women experience more marital happiness if they are committed to it, if they belong to institutions that support it (e.g., church), and if they share such sources with their husbands, and (b) the equity model. They found little support for the companionate theory and instead found that men’s marital emotional work, gender equity, and commitment to marriage were three very important factors in predicting marital happiness. This type of research involving comparing paradigms about fundamental differences in appraising and conceptualizing marriage needs to continue. It helps synthesize and refine aspects of models that may overlap in some areas rather than testing competing theories in isolation of one another. As outlined above, equity theory provides a way to understand several aspects about interpersonal relationships. It can help explain the initiation, maintenance, and dissolution of relationships. More specifically, it can be used to explain the behaviors that predict the extent to which people think equity is important or perceive its existence. It also can be used to show how it interacts with other variables or alone to affect relationship outcomes such as satisfaction, commitment, and adjustment. The presence or absence of equity and its relationship with power can help explain many other behaviors that occur within the relationship, such as the distribution of tasks, influence attempts, sexual behavior, and other relationship behaviors. Given people’s general interest in having successful interpersonal relationships, it is a useful framework for people to use to learn how to treat their relational partners and how to gauge how their partners treat them. As long as people strive to achieve that proverbial “golden rule” and do not get caught up in keeping constant score of the input–outcome ratio, equity theory continues to help people strengthen their interpersonal relationships.

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Interdependence in Social Interaction Ann C. Rumble

Samuel and Hillary have just decided to move in together after dating for five years. While they are highly committed to their relationship and each sees this move as a step toward marriage, the move has run into a few stumbling blocks. The most difficult has been the division of household chores, such as cooking, daily cleaning, and yard work. While they agree on most chores, cooking and laundry are still areas of contention, since they require a significant amount of time and energy and both partners work full-time. Yolanda has been offered a new job with a rival firm that promises more money and increased opportunity for advancement. However, Yolanda is committed to her current firm and would like to stay if possible, and her old firm is also interested in retaining a valuable and experienced employee. Yolanda and her old firm entered into negotiations with both conflicting and corresponding interests, but in the end they are able to reach an agreement. The preceding examples can be understood using the tenets of interdependence theory originally proposed and developed by John Thibaut and Harold Kelley. A situation can be defined as interdependent if two or more interacting actors have influence over the outcomes of one another. The actors in an interdependent situation can be individuals, companies, or even countries (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). For example, interdependence theory has been used to understand close relationships and workplace behavior, as well as behavior in other relationships. Interdependence theory employs the game theoretic tool of outcome matrices in order to understand an actor’s available behavior choices and outcomes. The given matrix represents the choices and outcomes that are available to the actors in a specific situation (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). For example, Samuel and Hillary have a number of choices in their specific situation: they could each choose to contribute toward completing the chores, Hillary could do all chores, Samuel could do all chores, or neither of them could do the chores (Figure 8.1). Kelley and Thibaut (1978), however, did not believe that actors make choices based solely on the given matrix but through a transformation process in which the choices and preferences are Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Ann C. Rumble Samuel Does chores

Does not do chores

Does chores

Each partner does 50% of chores

Hillary does all the chores

Does not do chores

Samuel does all the chores

No one does the chores

Hillary

Figure 8.1 Given matrix for Samuel and Hillary. Samuel Does chores

Does not do chores

Does chores

Each partner does 50% of chores

Hillary does all the chores

Does not do chores

Samuel does all the chores

Hire someone to do chores

Hillary

Figure 8.2 Effective matrix for Samuel and Hillary.

adjusted based on alternative criteria (e.g., social norms, individual motives, etc.). Through this transformational process, the effective matrix develops. The effective matrix takes into account choices based on each actor’s preferences, for example, one choice that is available to Hillary and Samuel is that neither of them does the chores, but since this is an unacceptable choice for each of them, it is not present in the effective matrix (Figure 8.2) (Kelley & Thibaut). Interdependence theory proposes to model many everyday interactions in order to understand how individuals make choices and how both personal and social factors influence these choices and situations (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In this chapter, we will explore a number of important concepts related to interdependence theory. First, we will examine how Thibaut and Kelley and others have developed basic tenets of interdependence theory. In addition, we will explore the basic concepts and processes proposed by interdependence theory, including an in-depth exploration of the transformation from given to effective matrices. Following this description of interdependence theory, we will focus on specific areas of research that have been influenced by the theory. Finally, we will look at the criticisms and future directions of interdependence theory.

Development and Description of Interdependence Theory John Thibaut and Harold Kelley met as graduate students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where they were working with the Center for Group Dynamics headed by Kurt Lewin, the father of social psychology. Kurt Lewin’s ideas had an impact on Thibaut and

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Kelley’s work on interdependence theory, including the concept of interdependence and derivation of the Lewin equation (Lewin, 1936). Lewin postulated that human behavior is the result of the interaction between an individual and his/her characteristics and the social context (B = f(Person, Environment) ). This basic assertion has guided social psychological research for at least 60 years, and continues to inspire not just interdependence theorists, but all social psychologists. Kelley and Thibaut, in Interpersonal Relations (1978), state that the development of interdependence theory grew in part from Lewin’s early writing about group dynamics. Lewin, in establishing group dynamics research, emphasized the interconnected nature of group members and how changes that affect one part of a group influence the whole.

The social psychology of groups (1959) Thibaut and Kelley’s The Social Psychology of Groups, published in 1959, proposed core ideas crucial to the understanding of interdependence theory, including the outcome matrices, comparison levels, alternatives, dependence, and power. Given the importance of each of these core ideas, we will spend some time exploring each one of them. Outcome matrices. As mentioned earlier, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) utilized a classic game theoretic tool, the outcome matrix, in order to understand human behavior in a variety of situations. The outcome matrix, as used in economics and mathematics, represents the choices available to an individual in a given situation and the outcomes that would be achieved by making each choice in that social situation. Most game theorists using outcome matrices at that time (i.e., Nash, 1950; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), postulated that outcomes were fixed and that an individual would make a decision within a choice–outcome matrix to solely maximize his/her own outcomes. It was assumed that no factors other than maximization of own outcome (or rational choice) would guide human choice behavior. As social psychologists who had been exposed to Lewin’s ideas about the interaction between the social context and the person, Thibaut and Kelley used the outcome matrices as a tool to understand human behavior in a fundamentally different manner. The outcome matrices proposed by Thibaut and Kelley incorporated Lewin’s equation, specifically that elements of personality, and the social context, transform choices in the given outcome matrix into the behavioral choices that each actor will act on. Thus the outcome matrix became a dynamic tool in which to explore human interactions. Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) outcome matrices represented all of the potential behavioral choices of two interacting individuals and the rewards and costs associated with each behavioral choice combination. They assume the outcome matrix represents a transformed matrix (i.e., the effective matrix) but do not discuss how this transformation occurs. They assume the costs and rewards listed for each behavior combination for any given relationship are the result of changes that occur based on factors both internal and external to the dyadic relationship. They also proposed that costs and rewards were not purely material outcomes (i.e., money) but could be more intangible, such as the reward of satisfaction or the cost of mental effort. Internal factors that influence the costs and rewards present in the outcome matrix can include an individual’s needs and values, along with abilities and personality characteristics

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Ann C. Rumble Current company Provides recognition

Does not provide recognition

Stays with company

Yolanda’s job satisfaction increases and company retains valuable employee

Company retains valuable employee but Yolanda feels less satisfaction

Leaves company

Company does not retain employee and Yolanda feels more satisfaction

Neither Yolanda nor company gain anything

Yolanda

Figure 8.3 Outcome matrix with personal needs taken into account.

(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). For example, Yolanda, from our previous example, is committed to her current company but would like more recognition for the work she does, or she may choose to leave her current position for a job at another company that will pay more money. But if her current company provides the recognition Yolanda desires (i.e., uses skills and tools at its disposal), her job satisfaction will increase and she is more likely to stay at her current company (Figure 8.3). While Yolanda’s rational choice in the situation may be to accept the other company’s offer of more money, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) understood that rewards and costs are not just objective but include the subjective experience of the individual as well. Comparison level. Part of that subjective experience is an individual’s assessment of the outcomes received through a particular interaction. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) postulated that each individual has an expectation about the level of outcome he/she deserves in a given situation. The expectation of a particular level of outcomes, or comparison level, arises through both personal experience and observing others in similar situations. For example, if Yolanda’s friends who have similar positions have a supportive work environment with on-site fitness and childcare centers, Yolanda will probably incorporate this into her own expectations for her company, thus increasing her comparison level. In addition to proposing a comparison level for expected outcomes for a particular relationship, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) also developed the idea of a comparison level for alternatives. The comparison level for alternatives (CLalt) is the lowest set of outcomes an individual will accept in lieu of alternative relationships. So for Yolanda, she will have developed a CLalt for her current job and available alternative positions, and if her expectations for rewards in her current job drop below CLalt she will probably seek employment elsewhere. Both CL and CLalt are dynamic and will adjust based on an individual’s expectations of outcomes, and can be used to understand why people may stay at jobs they dislike or where they are not treated well by their employer. For example, if Yolanda was underpaid and did not have the benefits available to her that others might have, she would still stay in her position if she did not believe she had a chance for better employment (reducing her CLalt). She may also stay if she was unaware of the benefits available at other companies, thus reducing her CL. Despite the dynamic nature of CL and CLalt, once outcomes dropped below CLalt, interdependence theory predicts that an individual will leave that relationship (Figure 8.4). If outcomes are below CL but above CLalt, there is a chance the individual will leave the relationship but it is

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Dependence increases

just as likely the person will stay (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). An individual is most likely to stay in a relationship if the outcomes received are above CL (see Figure 8.5 for a model of interdependence theory as presented in The Social Psychology of Stay Groups). Dependence and power. As outcomes exceed an individual’s CL CL, satisfaction with, and attraction to, dependence will increase. One individual’s dependence on a relationship is related to the other individual’s power in an interdependent CLalt situation (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). If we examined the relationGo ship between Samuel and Hillary, Samuel’s life has improved greatly during his relationship with Hillary. He finds he is happier and more satisfied with his life, and Hillary provides him Figure 8.4 Comparisonwith social support. Because of this increase in outcomes, which level thermometer. has exceeded his CL, Samuel is now dependent on Hillary to maintain his quality of life. This dependence means that Hillary has the power to influence Samuel’s behavior during their interactions, since he is dependent upon her for his outcomes. One way in which Hillary can influence Samuel is through partner control (also called fate control). Partner control means that Hillary can affect Samuel’s outcomes regardless of what Samuel does during the interaction (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). For example, if Samuel cannot cook he will be completely dependent on Hillary for meals. No matter if Samuel cuts the grass or does the dishes, he is completely dependent on Hillary for dinner (Figure 8.6). If Hillary has partner control, she will seek to provide Samuel with what he desires but at a low cost to herself. In addition to partner control, Hillary can use joint control (also called behavioral control). By using joint control, Hillary can use her control of Samuel’s outcomes to change his behavior (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). If she prefers Samuel to do the dishes on a daily basis she can cook a homemade dinner for him when he does the dishes, and microwave a frozen store dinner for him when he does not do the dishes. Since Samuel would like to eat a homemade dinner each night, he will then choose to do the dishes. Hillary will also have to monitor and respond to Samuel’s behavior in order to maintain behavior control. Situations, however, are interdependent, and rarely does one individual have either complete partner or joint control over the other individual. Most instances are characterized by mutual partner control (MPC) and mutual joint control (MJC) (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In MJC, both individuals can influence the other’s outcomes, and potentially move toward a mutually satisfying outcome. If we reexamine Hillary and Samuel’s situation understanding MJC and how each of them influences the eventual outcomes of a given situation, we can see that the most satisfying outcome for the couple is for Hillary to cook dinner and Samuel to do the dishes (Figure 8.7). Hillary can influence Samuel’s behavior by choosing to make or not make dinner, and Samuel can influence Hillary by either doing the dishes or not doing the dishes. The preceding situation for Hillary and Samuel typifies cooperative interdependence, in which interacting partners’ outcomes are positively related (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). But

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Ann C. Rumble + Relationship outcome matrix

Individual’s personality, needs, and values

Behavior

Comparison of outcomes

– Leave relationship

Interaction between partners

Figure 8.5 The social psychology of groups: interdependence theory.

Samuel

Hillary

Cuts the grass

Does dishes

Cooks dinner

Samuel eats

Samuel eats

Does not cook dinner

Samuel does not eat

Samuel does not eat

Figure 8.6 Hillary’s partner control.

Samuel Does dishes

Does not do dishes

Cooks dinner

Dishes are done, dinner is made

Dishes not done, dinner is made

Does not cook dinner

Dishes are done but no dinner

No dishes are done, no dinner

Hillary

Figure 8.7 Hillary and Samuel’s mutual behavior control.

there are other situations in which the interacting partners’ outcomes are negatively related, exemplifying competitive interdependence (Figure 8.8). A situation could occur in which Hillary does not want to cook one evening after a busy day at work and her preference is to eat out at a restaurant, but Samuel’s preference is to eat at home, since he also had a busy day at work. Their preference is to eat together, so Hillary going out alone or Samuel eating at home alone are not viable options. But if one gets what he or she wants, the other does not, and vice versa. In these situations norms for behavior are usually developed, so that the interacting partners in the long run receive maximal outcomes even if in the short term they do not receive their preferred outcome (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).

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Interdependence in Social Interaction Eat dinner at home

Eat dinner at restaurant

Cook dinner

Samuel’s preference

No one’s preference

Eat dinner out

No one’s preference

Hillary’s preference

197

Figure 8.8 Competitive interdependence.

Norms. In interdependent relationships that last longer than one encounter, members must develop guidelines for behavior (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). These guidelines are particularly important in competitive or noncorrespondent situations, since the temptation to act noncooperatively or cause conflict exists. These guidelines, or norms, provide the interacting members with rules for how to behave in a given situation. For example, if we revisit the situation illustrated by Figure 8.7, Hillary and Samuel could develop a norm in which on even-numbered days they do what Hillary prefers and on odd-numbered days they do what Samuel prefers. Norms, while often unspoken internal guides for behavior, are recognizable to the outside observer. The characteristics that define a norm include that an observer should be able to discern a regular pattern of behavior based on the norm amongst the interacting individuals (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In addition, if a norm is violated, the interaction partners can use their power to influence the norm violator to change his/her behavior to match the norm. Finally, the norm violator usually will feel guilt or an obligation to repair the harm done by violating the norm. Norms are used by interacting partners and are particularly important in interdependent situations, because they can control behavior with little or no cost, and they can reduce conflict and uncertainty in interactions (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Tasks. Most of the situations involving interdependent individuals involve a task of some variety (e.g., a problem or chore) that, when completed, provides individuals with a given outcome. Interdependent tasks typically have two defining characteristics, type of task and pattern of outcomes available (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). A task can be either disjunctive or conjunctive. A disjunctive task requires any one or all members of an interdependent group to choose the needed response. For example, if a couple wants to go out to dinner at an exclusive restaurant, only one member needs to make the dinner reservation but no harm is done if both call to make the reservation. As long as there are no costs for acting, this task is relatively simple for the interdependent group to complete. The other type of task is a conjunctive task in which each member of the interdependent group must choose the needed response in order to complete the task. If a couple of friends decide to have a dinner party, each individual needs to make a unique contribution in order for the party to be a success. The other dimension of tasks is whether the outcomes in a given situation are correspondent or noncorrespondent (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Correspondence implies the behaviors that produce the highest outcomes for one individual will also produce high outcomes for the other individual in the situation. Noncorrespondence of outcomes means that the behaviors that produce the highest outcomes for each person are not the same. For

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Ann C. Rumble example, if Samuel and Hillary have the choice to have chicken or fish for dinner and they both prefer chicken over fish so Hillary cooks chicken for dinner, this is a correspondent situation. However, if Samuel prefers fish and Hillary prefers chicken, this is a noncorrespondent situation. In noncorrespondent situations, different behavioral choices are necessary to develop a long-term stable interaction. Summary. Thibaut and Kelley (1959), in the Social Psychology of Groups, introduced interdependence theory and a number of key components of the theory. The use of outcome matrices to understand how human interactions are shaped by both the social environment and the individuals’ characteristics and preferences was a novel and useful approach to the problem. In addition, the inclusion of how comparisons to others and to their own desired outcomes could shape both decision to stay or leave an interaction, and the sources of power, may shape future outcomes if they do choose to stay. In the years following the publication of The Social Psychology of Groups, interdependence theory received some attention from psychologists interested in social value orientations. Specifically, there was interest in how cooperative or competitive an individual is during a given interdependent situation, and how that may influence the outcome matrix. This work in turn influenced Thibaut and Kelley in their iteration of interdependence theory presented in the book Interpersonal Relations: A Theory of Interdependence.

Interpersonal Relations: A Theory of Interdependence (1978) Kelley and Thibaut published Interpersonal Relations in 1978, almost 20 years after the publication of their first book on interdependence theory. During the time between the publication of the two books, Kelley and Thibaut worked individually on a number of research problems related to interdependence theory, including Thibaut’s research on justice, fairness, and the use of power (see Thibaut & Gruber, 1969; Friedland, Thibaut, & Walker, 1973, for examples), and Kelley’s work on attributions (Kelley, 1967, 1973) and mixed-motive interactions (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). The influence of this work is evident in the development of interdependence theory as presented in Interpersonal Relations. Kelley and Thibaut (1978) published Interpersonal Relations in order to expand and refine a number of the concepts and ideas presented in their previous book. One major extension was to create a distinction between the given and the effective matrix and to explore the transformation from the given to the effective matrix. They also expanded the possible avenues of control and power to include actor control (also called reflexive control) – how an individual’s own actions and preferences influence his/her behavior. Finally, they considered how attributions and self-presentation help interdependent individuals navigate the social landscape, including the given and effective matrices and the transformation that takes place between them (see Figure 8.9 for a diagram of interdependence according to Interpersonal Relations). Extension of control. In The Social Psychology of Groups, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) proposed two forms of control, partner and joint control, each of which has implications for the interdependence of individuals. In fact, it is through the assessment of one another’s actions and the results of the interaction that we define interdependence. A situation will only be defined

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+ Given matrix

Transformation process

Individual’s skills, needs, and values

Effective matrix

Behavior

Comparison of outcomes

– Leave relationship

Relationship considerations

Figure 8.9 Interpersonal relations: interdependence theory. Current company Increases salary - C1

Yolanda’s lowest preference/ company’s highest preference

Takes on additional tasks - Y1 Yolanda Maintains current set of tasks - Y2

Maintains Salary - C2

Yolanda’s highest preference/ company’s lowest preference

Figure 8.10 Bilateral actor control.

as interdependent if either partner or joint-control individuals have the power to give desired outcomes or withdraw desired outcomes from the other individual. Interdependence requires some reliance on one another for rewards. A situation in which only one member is dependent on the other for desirable outcomes is not interdependence, but unilateral dependence, and is likely to be a less stable relationship. In Interpersonal Relations, Kelley and Thibaut (1978) introduce the concept of actor control. Actor control refers to how an individual views his/her own behavior in a situation and the outcomes it produces, and to the extent his/her own behavior can be varied to control potential outcomes. Actor control is another way in which individual preferences can be modeled and understood in terms of outcome matrices. Bilateral actor control (BAC) demonstrates the individual preferences for behavior for each member of the interdependent group (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). In the example of Yolanda’s negotiation with her company, she has the choice to take on more tasks or to maintain her current set of tasks, while the company decides whether or not to increase her salary. Yolanda prefers to maintain her current level of tasks with a pay raise, while her company prefers her to increase the number of tasks at the same salary (Figure 8.10). But she also prefers receiving a raise over not receiving a raise, regardless of work level, and the company prefers more work to less work, regardless of cost.

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Ann C. Rumble BAC + C1C2

MPC + C1C2

Y1

+y,+c

–y,+c

Y2

+y,–c

–y,–c

Interdependent situation

MJC = C1C2

+y

C1C2

+c

+y,+c

–y,+c

+y,+c

+y,–c

–y,–c

Highest outcomes Lowest outcomes

Figure 8.11 Interdependent situation. Current company Increase benefits

Yolanda

Take over as manager Remain in same position

Decrease benefits Most preferred by company

Least preferred by company

Figure 8.12 Given matrix.

But interdependent individuals do not and cannot make choices based on their own preferences. The nature of the interdependent relationship means they must take into account the other individual. For example, the company may exert partner control, and no matter what Yolanda does her salary will be maintained. Yolanda can also exert partner control, by maintaining her workload. Yolanda and the company can also influence one another’s behavior through joint control, by the company only paying Yolanda more if she works more, and Yolanda only working more if she is paid more. So by understanding BAC in conjunction with matrices demonstrating MPC and MJC, a model of an interdependent situation can be developed, in which we can predict behavior for the situation based on the combination of behaviors that produce the highest mutual outcomes (Figure 8.11) (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Given this set of outcomes it is most likely the company will give Yolanda a raise, and Yolanda will increase her workload. In modeling interdependent situations, the use of outcome matrices and an understanding of the different sources of control can provide us with a tool to both understand and predict behavior within interdependent situations, whether it is the given or the effective matrix. Transformation of given to effective matrix. The transformation process from given to effective matrix is one of the most important contributions made by Kelley and Thibaut (1978) in Interpersonal Relations. In their previous work (1959), they made assumptions about the process and the matrix that individuals acted upon. In Interpersonal Relations, they specify the difference between given and effective matrices and how one is transformed into the other. The given matrix represents the outcomes available to an individual, in light of his/her own skills and needs, what is provided by the social context, and his/her previous history with the outcomes present in the matrix. For example, during the annual meeting with shareholders the company Yolanda works for is given the mandate to increase profits by whatever means necessary. One option available to the company is to reduce the salaries and benefits of its workers (Figure 8.12). This option, while attractive at a basic level to the

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Interdependence in Social Interaction Company raise maintain salary salary Least Yolanda Most preferred preferred

Transformation process

201

Company raise maintain salary salary Yolanda Least Most preferred preferred

Figure 8.13 Transformation process.

company, is not likely to be directly acted upon. In its place, the matrix will be transformed and an effective matrix will be developed. The process through which the given matrix is transformed into the effective matrix accounts for contingencies specific both to each individual in the relationship and to the particular interdependent relationship (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Each individual in an interdependent relationship is reliant upon his/her own cognitive processes, motivations, and emotion in the situation to transform the given matrix into the effective matrix. Yolanda, for example, through her knowledge of the company and understanding of the situation with the shareholders, may be more willing to reduce her outcomes temporarily. Yolanda has in effect reduced the value of a raise, which constitutes a transformation (Figure 8.13). Relationship-based considerations may include behaviors that impact the long-term continuation of the relationship (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Highly self-orientated behaviors may be detrimental to the long-term continuation of a relationship. While self-interest dictates that the company reduce the salaries of its employees, the company is also aware that a reduction of salaries may lead to valuable employees growing dissatisfied and leaving. Kelley and Thibaut (1978) also suggest that value orientations are one way in which given matrices are transformed. Specifically, they distinguish between four different orientations: maximize own outcomes, maximize other’s outcomes, maximize own and other outcomes, and minimize difference between own and other outcomes. Each of these orientations signifies a rule by which an interdependent other may transform the given matrix. For example, if Yolanda’s orientation was to maximize own and other’s outcomes, she may be inclined to work very hard to raise profits for the company and at the same time seek a raise for herself. If Yolanda was only interested in her own outcome for the situation, she would bargain for a raise without a work increase; or the reverse, if she wants to maximize the company’s outcomes, then she will increase her work with no raise. Finally, Yolanda could work to make sure that there is not a large difference between her own gain and the company’s gain, she would increase her work in proportion to the raise. Thus, the interdependent partner establishes a heuristic or rule for how they will transform the given matrix into the effective matrix. The transformation process is influenced by both individual- and relationship-level considerations, and represents movement away from the given situation to the effective situation. Individuals during the transformation process also take into consideration how they believe the other individual will act, and why they will act in this manner. Self-presentation and attributions. Kelley and Thibaut, drawing on Kelley’s interest in attributions, stressed the importance of both self-presentation and attributional processes in an individual’s understanding of the interdependent situation. In order for an individual

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Ann C. Rumble to understand any interdependent interaction, an understanding of the other individual is important. Without this understanding, misunderstandings and mistakes are more likely. Unfortunately, most of the time in interdependent situations individuals must rely on indirect methods of communicating and discovering intent. An individual can communicate intent of behavior by using a rule to transform the given matrix that signals their intentions. If an individual wants to signal concern for the other person, then he/she will use the maximize other rule to transform the matrix (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). So through the use of different rules or a combination of rules to transform the given matrix, an individual can manage his/her self-presentation during the interaction. Just as important to self-presentation is the interpretation of intention and behaviors by the other. Individuals use attributions to understand the behaviors of others, and their underlying intent. Attribution thus helps an individual make choices for his/her own behavior, based on the perceived intentions of the other individual (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). If negative intent is perceived then the individual may use the maximize own rule. However, if positive intent is perceived then that individual may use the maximize own and other rule. Thus, both attributions and self-presentation are key components of any interdependent interaction. Summary. Kelley and Thibaut (1978) continued to improve and develop interdependence theory in meaningful ways in Interpersonal Relations. The concept that has had the greatest influence on a number of fields is the transformational process. The transformation process in subsequent years has been used to understand close relationships (see “Application,” below), cooperative choice behavior, and other interdependent situations. In particular, An Atlas of Interpersonal Situations (Kelley et al., 2003) was written with the intention of providing a taxonomy of situations modeled on interdependence theory. The authors examined a number of situations in which outcomes were correspondent or noncorrespondent, and when partner, actor, and joint control are variable. The publication of the Atlas represents an innovative way in which to use the tenets of interdependence theory to model most interdependent situations.

Application of Interdependence Theory Since Kelley and Thibaut developed interdependence theory, it has been used to understand a variety of interdependent relationships. The field of social dilemmas is a multidisciplinary field in which economists, political scientists, and psychologists try to discover what drives cooperative choice behavior in interdependent situations. Social dilemma researchers use interdependence theory to understand why people make cooperative or noncooperative decisions when their self-interest may be in conflict with long-term and relationshipspecific goals. But close relationship researchers have been most prolific in applying interdependence theory to their research questions.

Investment model The investment model was developed in the 1980s by Rusbult, based on the tenets of interdependence theory, and it has been demonstrated to be predictive in both dating and marital relationships, and has even been successfully applied to workplace relations. The investment

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model specifies how satisfaction with outcomes influences levels of commitment to the relationship, which ultimately affects whether or not a person chooses to stay or leave the relationship (Rusbult, 1983). Satisfaction and commitment. Rusbult (1980) conceptualizes satisfaction as a product of high positive outcomes from a relationship, such as happiness, increased social support and companionship, and low negative outcomes such as sadness, harm, and isolation. Satisfaction will also increase based on the degree to which an individual’s CL is exceeded. So if Samuel is able to obtain the positive outcomes he expects from moving in with Hillary, he is more likely to be satisfied with the decision to move in together and with the relationship in general. As mentioned earlier, as positive outcomes exceed, CL dependence on a relationship will increase. The investment model postulates that this translates into increased commitment. Commitment is the desire for a relationship to continue because of the satisfaction with the outcomes available within that particular relationship (Rusbult, 1980). In Rusbult’s investment model (1983), commitment will increase if satisfaction with outcomes is high, and prospective alternative relationships or being alone are considered less than desirable. Commitment is also the result of investment in a particular relationship. Investments that individuals make in their close relationships include the time and energy invested in maintaining the relationship, and even monetary investment (Rusbult, 1983). Hillary’s commitment to Samuel increases when some of her important needs are satisfied by the relationship, such as need for companionship and social support. In addition, as alternatives to a relationship with Samuel, such as a new boyfriend, or living alone, appear unattractive, her commitment level will increase. And as Hillary invests in her relationship with Samuel, such as by buying a house together, or expending energy in maintaining the relationship, she will also increase her commitment level. An individual’s level of commitment and satisfaction in a given relationship will have an impact on two important interdependent processes: deciding to stay or leave a relationship, and how to transform the given matrix. Stay/leave decisions. Drigotas and Rusbult (1992) developed a predictive model of stay or leave decisions that is based on satisfaction with the fulfillment of personal needs within the relationship. The dependence model of breakups does provide researchers with a better understanding of when and why individuals will leave a relationship (Drigotas & Rusbult, 1992). If Hillary’s need for social support is not met in her current relationship with Samuel, the chances of her deciding to leave the relationship will increase. But Hillary’s chances of choosing to leave the relationship will increase again if she can fulfill that need in alternative relationships in a way that will then exceed her CL. If Hillary has multiple needs not satisfied in her current relationship, and can be satisfied above CL by being either alone or with someone else, she will probably leave Samuel.

Accommodation Processes and Sacrifice In general, relationship partners who are committed to their relationship want good outcomes both for themselves and for their relationship partner, but this is not always possible (Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991). Often within close relationships one of the partners does something that upsets or produces negative outcomes for the other

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Ann C. Rumble partner. When this happens the individual harmed by the behavior has a choice either to respond in kind or to act in a more generous manner (Rusbult et al., 1991). In terms of interdependence theory, the given matrix that is available to the harmed partner has been adversely influenced by his/her partner’s actions, and the partner then has a choice to react based on self-interested concerns or transform the matrix and take into consideration the relationship and long-term interests (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Research by Rusbult, Johnson, and Morrow (1986) and Drigotas and Rusbult (1992) has demonstrated that the harmed individual has a number of behavioral choices, including: Exit, by either leaving the relationship or acting in a destructive manner toward the partner; Voice, by seeking solutions through discussions with the other partner, friends, and family; Loyalty, by supporting the partner and the relationship, enduring reduced outcomes until change occurs; and finally, Neglect, by ignoring partner or relationship, not engaging in relationship maintenance behaviors. If an individual suffers a reduction in outcome at the hands of the relationship partner, he/she is left with a decision to act in either a positive or negative manner (Rusbult et al., 1991). The decision will be influenced by a number of individual- and relationship-based factors, for example, if an individual is more self-centered he/she may be more likely to react in a negative manner. A person for whom the relationship is very important to his/her well-being and life satisfaction is more likely to respond in a positive manner to the partner. Commitment also plays an important role in promoting positive behavior which will, over the long term, help as opposed to hurt the relationship (Rusbult et al., 1991). So individuals can either choose to recover from an indiscretion by their partner by transforming the matrix based on the long-term relationship goals, or act in a destructive manner that serves their own self-interest. But occasionally in relationships, two partners face a situation in which no one has done anything to reduce the outcomes of the other; they just disagree about how to make a particular decision (Van Lange et al., 1997). Often in these circumstances, the partners’ outcomes for a situation are noncorrespondent, which can lead to more competitive and conflictual behaviors. If, however, they wish to continue their relationship and make sure that mutual interests are maintained in the long term, one partner may need to give up his or her outcomes for both the good of the other partner and the relationship. Van Lange and colleagues (1997) have demonstrated that more committed couples are willing to sacrifice selfinterest for the good of the partner and the relationship in noncorrespondent situations.

Why Individuals Remain in Abusive Relationships Physical and mental abuse in close relationships is a societal problem which impacts families, the workplace, and society at large. Often individuals who work with abused women are frustrated when a woman chooses to return to a clearly unhealthy situation. The statistics demonstrate that at least half of the women who go to a domestic violence shelter will return to the abusive relationship, usually for economic and social support reasons (AADV, 2004). Rusbult and Martz (1995) found, using the tenets of interdependence theory and the investment model, that women will remain in an abusive relationship as a result of high commitment and investment to the relationship, and perceived inferior alternatives outside of

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the relationship. Even though satisfaction is low amongst abused women who remain in their relationships, their level of commitment to the relationship is high, due in part to their perceived alternatives. In their survey Rusbult and Martz (1995) found that in general women in violent relationships who remained in the relationship were likely to perceive their alternatives inferior to their current relationship. Women who stay in abusive relationships are also more likely to attribute abusive behavior to benign causes, such as, “he didn’t mean to hit me, he had too much to drink” or “he was only doing what he felt was right.” Finally, women were more likely to stay if they had a higher investment in the relationship, either monetarily, shared house or income, or energy, or number of years in the relationship. Understanding the dynamics between commitment, quality of alternatives outside the abusive relationship, and investment, may in turn help individuals who work with abused women to help to end destructive relationships. For example, if a domestic violence shelter is able to work with a woman to provide adequate housing and financial assistance, a more attractive alternative could increase the chance of the woman leaving the violent relationship.

Summary Interdependence theory has been successfully applied to a number of fields in psychology, but none as fruitful as the issues surrounding close relationships. Rusbult and colleagues (Rusbult 1980, 1983, 1986; Rusbult & Martz, 1995; Van Lange et al., 1997; Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, and Agnew, 1999) demonstrated that Kelley and Thibaut’s conceptual understanding of interdependent interactions has value in understanding both functional and dysfunctional close relationships.

Future Directions of Interdependence Theory Kelley and Thibaut’s theory of interdependence since 1959 has been demonstrated to be valuable in understanding a wide variety of interdependent situations. Both Kelley and Thibaut were very active in promoting and continuing to develop and explore the tenets of interdependence theory beyond the 1959 and 1978 books. Unfortunately, John Thibaut passed away in 1986, and with him one of social psychology’s most productive collaborations also ended. Harold Kelley continued to explore issues concerning interdependence, most particularly the function of time and movement through interdependent situations. He went on to publish two papers on the topic of transition lists, which models this process. Transition lists were designed to extend outcome matrices to model movement between and within interactions (see Kelley, 1984, 1997, for a complete description of transition lists). Specifically, they add to an outcome matrix a consideration of what will occur after individuals have made their behavioral choices. So following Samuel’s choice to do the dishes on Tuesday night and Hillary’s decision to not make dinner, how do these decisions shape the outcome matrices for Wednesday night? Maybe the matrix will be adjusted such that Samuel will not show any preference for doing the dishes, and a new choice of going out for dinner will emerge. Unfortunately, Kelley’s work on transition lists, while conceptually appealing, has been difficult to translate into experimental analysis.

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Ann C. Rumble The last contribution Kelley made to interdependence theory was An Atlas of Interpersonal Situations, published a few weeks before his death in 2003. Kelley and his coauthors’ goal for the Atlas was not to expand on interdependence theory but to demonstrate how many of the core concepts of interdependence theory could be used to understand any number of different interdependent situations. For example, situations that varied in the amount of actor, partner, and joint control were mapped onto an interdependent space in which all interdependent relationships were represented. To date, although the Atlas has been underused by researchers to understand the variety of interdependent relationships, it is still likely to have a lasting impact on social psychology, just as The Social Psychology of Groups and Interpersonal Relations continue to have an impact on a variety of research questions. Finally, the application of interdependence theory in understanding human behavior in both social dilemma and close relationships is likely to continue. Social dilemma researchers continue to explore the social value orientations (maximize own, etc.) that can guide the transformation process from given to effective matrix. Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, and Van Vugt (2007) examined the impact of social value orientations on donations to needy organizations. They found that social value orientations can be helpful in predicting donations to a variety of charities, specifically that individuals who were more inclined to use the maximize own and other’s outcomes heuristic donated more money than individuals whose heuristic was maximize own outcome. The fruitful and influential research of Caryl Rusbult and colleagues continues to impact close relationship researchers. For example, a recent paper by Kumashiro, Rusbult, and Finkel (2008) explored how an equilibrium might exist for relational and personal concerns. Kumashiro and colleagues propose that individuals are inclined to have a balance between own preferences being satisfied and relationship preferences being satisfied. This is easier to achieve when own and relationship-based preferences are in accordance, but, in situations in which a person must choose, an imbalance can take place. The researchers showed that when the disequilibrium occurs an individual’s motivation to satisfy the advantaged preference would be reduced. If Hillary had made numerous sacrifices to satisfy her desire to maintain her relationship with Samuel to the neglect of her own needs and desires, she is more likely to not sacrifice in the future interactions in order to restore the equilibrium.

Conclusion Thibaut and Kelley’s intellectual legacy, interdependence theory, has influenced a wide variety of social psychologists since 1959. The use of outcome matrices to model human interactions remains a particularly valuable tool to social psychologists interested in human interactions. In addition, being able to include considerations beyond self-interest in understanding why a person would make a particular behavioral choice has been vital to understanding social dilemma and close relationship behaviors. It is anticipated that interdependence theory will continue to influence researchers who are interested in human interactions, at both the micro-level (close relationships) and macro-level (international negotiations). So, despite the passing of both Thibaut and Kelley, there are social psychologists who remain actively involved in exploring and developing the tenets of interdependence theory.

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References AADV (Asians Against Domestic Violence) (2004). National Statistics. Retrieved July 12, 2008, http://www. aadinc.org/Statistics.htm Drigotas, S. M., & Rusbult, E. (1992). Should I stay or should I go? A dependence model of breakups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(1), 62–87. Friedland, N., Thibaut, J., & Walker, L. (1973). Some determinants of the violation of rules. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 3(2), 103–118. Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 15, pp. 192–238). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Kelley, H. H. (1973). The processes of causal attribution. American Psychologist, 28(2), 107–128. Kelley, H. H. (1984). The theoretical description of interdependence by means of transition lists. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47(5), 956–982. Kelley, H. H. (1997). Expanding the analysis of social orientations by reference to the sequential-temporal structure of situations. European Journal of Social Psychology, 27(4), 373–404. Kelley, H. H., Holmes, J. G., Kerr, N. L., Reis, H. T., Rusbult, C. E., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2003). An atlas of interpersonal situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). The inference of intentions from moves in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 6(4), 401–419. Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. (1978). Interpersonal relations: A theory of interdependence. New York: John Wiley. Kumashiro, M., Rusbult, C. E., & Finkel, E. J. (2008). Navigating personal and relational concerns: The quest for equilibrium. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(1), 94–110. Lewin, K. (1936). Principles of topological psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill. Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36, 48–49. Rusbult, C. E. (1980). Commitment and satisfaction in romantic associations: A test of the investment model. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16(2), 172–186.

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Rusbult, C. E. (1983). A longitudinal test of the investment model: The development (and deterioration) of satisfaction and commitment in heterosexual involvements. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(1), 101–117. Rusbult, C. E. (1986). Determinants and consequences of exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect: Responses to dissatisfaction in adult romantic involvements. Human Relations, 39(1), 45–63. Rusbult, C. E., Johnson, D. J., & Morrow, G. D. (1986). Predicting satisfaction and commitment in adult romantic involvements: An assessment of the generalizability of the investment model. Social Psychology Quarterly, 49(1), 81–89. Rusbult, C. E., & Martz, J. M. (1995). Remaining in an abusive relationship: An investment model analysis of nonvoluntary dependence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(6), 558–571. Rusbult, C. E., Verette, J., Whitney, G. A., Slovik, L. F., & Lipkus, I. (1991). Accommodation processes in close relationships: Theory and preliminary empirical evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(1), 53–78. Thibaut, J., & Gruber, L. (1969). Formation of contractual agreements between parties of unequal power. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 11(1), 59–65. Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Van Lange, P. A. M., Bekkers, R., Schuyt, T. N., & Van Vugt, M. (2007). From games to giving: Social value orientation predicts donations to noble causes. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 29(4), 375–384. Van Lange, P. A. M., Rusbult, C. E., Drigotas, S. M., Arriaga, X. B., Witcher, B. S., & Cox, C. L. (1997). Willingness to sacrifice in close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(6), 1373–1395. Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wieselquist, J., Rusbult, C. E., Foster, C. A., & Agnew, C. R. (1999). Commitment, pro relationship behavior, and trust in close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(5), 942–966.

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Part IV

Self

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Self-Categorization and Social Identification: Making Sense of Us and Them Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah

Social identity processes are at the heart of social psychological theory and research, and are known to play a pivotal role in a vast array of individual-level and social phenomena, including, for example, health and well-being (see, e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999), educational achievement (e.g., Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002), and collective action and crowd behavior (see, e.g., van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). This chapter provides a general overview of social psychological theory on social identity, including social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Prior to these seminal writings of Tajfel and Turner, theoretical explanations of intergroup relations and intergroup conflict were dominated by two types of theory. First, so-called “prejudice” accounts proposed that intergroup conflict arises due to individual-level variations in a prejudiced personality. Second, realistic group conflict theory (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966) contended that negative intergroup relations are a consequence of conflicting group goals and a competition over resources or power (see, e.g., Jackson, 1993, for a review). Compared with these types of theory, social identity theory and self-categorization theory offered a unique and theoretically advanced account explaining intergroup relations, and one that remains important to this day. In fact, these two linked theoretical approaches constitute the most popular socialpsychological approach to intergroup relations (yielding over 2.2 million and 7,910 entries in Google Scholar, respectively). Yet instead of focusing solely on a detailed description of these two accounts, this chapter takes a somewhat more encompassing approach to portraying what is commonly referred to as the social identity perspective (Abrams & Hogg, in press). We thus also pay particular attention to defining the concept of social identity, and consider the consequences of social identity phenomena for intergroup relations, above and beyond the predictions of social identity theory, taking into consideration the extent to which multiple categorization processes help explain intergroup relations. Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah This chapter is organized into four parts, the first two of which conceptually define self-categorization and social identification, whereas the latter two examine the extent to which self-categorization and social identification are involved in, and help explain, intergroup relations. Part one provides a brief definition of self-categorization and describes the theoretical foundations of self-categorization theory. We describe in detail what is meant by self-categorization, and how, why, and when individuals make use of social categories. In part two, we define social identification as a psychological process associated with group membership and explain that identification is a multidimensional phenomenon. Part three presents a detailed description of social identity theory, with reference to the findings that emerged from the minimal group paradigm. We thus address, with reference to the predictions of social identity theory, the extent to which self-categorization and social identification are related to intergroup attitudes and behavior. Finally, part four is devoted to an overview of multiple categorization and its consequences for intergroup relations, showing how more complex consideration of others and oneself in terms of multiple group memberships is associated with tolerance and improved intergroup relations. We end by drawing general conclusions and discussing the implications of the social identity perspective for shaping understanding of intergroup relations.

Self-Categorization Theory Defining self-categorization The social identity perspective, encompassing both self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) and social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), acknowledges that individuals tend to categorize their social world into discrete social categories. Naturally, individuals will be members of some of these social categories, and not members of others, which then may prompt individuals’ definition of self and others as ingroup (“us”) or outgroup (“they”). Self-categorization may thus be defined as cognitive selfplacing in a collective category. It defines membership in social groups, some of which are assigned (e.g., gender), others chosen (e.g., profession). What is important, however, is that category membership needs to be subjectively confirmed by the individual (Deaux, 1996; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Unless the individual subjectively self-defines, i.e., selfcategorizes, as part of a collective group, a discussion of either intra- or intergroup processes becomes irrelevant. Self-categorization theory rests further on the premise that there is a distinction between personal and social identity.1 Personal identity relates primarily to one’s unique and personal sense of self as an individual, with unique traits and characteristics, while social identity refers to one’s sense of identity as a member of a collective group with characteristics and commonalities that are shared with other members of the group (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Analogously, one may assume a similar distinction between interpersonal behavior, such as interaction between friends, and intergroup behavior, such as interactions between football fans supporting two different teams. It is important to keep

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in mind, however, that both self-perception and social behavior are thought to vary along a continuum from purely interpersonal to purely intergroup properties (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1982). Self-categorization theory (e.g., Turner et al., 1987) thus argues that the self can be conceived on a number of levels of inclusiveness (e.g., me as an individual; me as a group member; me as a human being). The level at which the self is defined determines how one relates to others, including members of the same group. In so doing, the theory addresses self- as well as other-stereotyping, and ingroup- and outgroup-stereotyping, and emphasizes that individuals ascribe to themselves characteristics associated with their ingroup. In principle, self-categorization thus develops the earlier social identity perspective which we attend to at a later point in this chapter.

When and why do people self-categorize? What determines self-categorization? According to self-categorization theory, whether an individual categorizes in terms of a collective category is contingent upon the salience of the given category (Turner, 1999; Turner et al., 1987).2 Salience is conceptualized as the degree to which a person self-defines as a member of a social category (Oakes, 1987), and the extent to which group members perceive similarities between themselves and other members of their own group, and dissimilarities from members of other groups (Turner, 1999). Moreover, self-categorization is intrinsically linked to the extent to which a particular social category becomes psychologically activated (Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). Psychological activation of a category depends largely on the degree to which a particular social category becomes cognitively accessible to an individual, and on the individual’s perceptions of the “fit” of the category (Oakes, 1987). Accessibility depends on the individual’s immediate social context (situational accessibility), as well as the extent to which an individual habitually makes use of a particular social identity across a range of situations (chronic accessibility) (Oakes, 1987). For example, a female student’s gender category may become psychologically activated if she finds herself in a room full of male students (high situational accessibility), yet in a room full of female students it may not (low situational accessibility). An example of chronic accessibility would be if the same student’s gender identity is psychologically activated relatively frequently (e.g., because she is part of a women’s rights group which makes her much more aware of, and think more frequently about, her gender identity). Psychological activation of a social category is also dependent on perceptions of fit, whereby a distinction is made between comparative fit and normative fit. Comparative fit rests upon the principle of meta-contrast and concerns the perceived differences between ingroup and outgroup. For self-categorization in terms of a particular category to occur, the individual must perceive greater similarity between self and own-group members than between self and outgroup members, in a given social context (the so-called “meta-contrast ratio”). In other words, the smaller the perceived differences between group members within a group and the greater the perceived differences between one’s own group and a comparative outgroup, the greater the likelihood that an individual will categorize in terms of one’s own group, the ingroup (Turner et al., 1994). Normative fit concerns the extent to which these perceived differences correspond to expected and normative

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Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah differences in meaning (Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). Specifically, one’s own group (the ingroup) and the comparative other group (the outgroup) must be perceived in terms of one’s normative and stereotypical beliefs about the differences between them (Oakes, 1987). For example, imagine a hypothetical situation in which a group of male and female students are asked to join either the university’s soccer team or its field hockey team. Imagine then also that all males opt for the former, while all females choose the latter. In this hypothetical situation, the two comparative groups show high ingroup, yet low intergroup similarity (comparative fit), and also conform to the expected norm in terms of their attitudes and behavior (normative fit). Psychological activation of social categories sets in motion a process of depersonalization, as a consequence of which individuals may perceive themselves as interchangeable representatives of their group (Turner et al., 1994). The individual cognitively aligns with the ingroup prototype, and a shift from personal to group-based perceptions and behavior occurs, causing them to internalize the group into their psyche and to incorporate the group into the self (Smith & Henry, 1996). It is this that explains how individuals may actually come to think and act in terms of their group identity (e.g., Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1996; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998), often even to the exclusion of their personal identity. Moreover, social psychological accounts of social identity emphasize that individuals can derive meaning from their social group memberships, i.e., that they are able to identify with the social groups they belong to. Categorization may thus be thought of as a precondition for social identification.

Social Identification Defining social identification Social identification varies from individual to individual, and from situation to situation, reflecting the extent to which group membership is incorporated into individuals’ selfconcept (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Waddell & Cairns, 1986). In its simplest definition, social identification denotes that a given individual perceives his or her group, and his or her membership thereof, in some form or other as meaningful, desired, and important. Social identification is, in essence, a summary term that is commonly invoked to refer to a complex, multifaceted set of processes underlying group membership (Deaux, 1996). Moreover, any definition of social identification immediately becomes overshadowed by its conceptualization as a multidimensional phenomenon. For example, Henri Tajfel, in his writings which led to the formulation of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), defined social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that group membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). This early definition implies that social identification consists of a cognitive element (self-categorization), as well as an evaluative component (the degree to which a person evaluates a group in positive or negative terms), and an affective component (the extent to

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which a person feels emotionally tied to a group) (see also Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson, 2002; Phinney, 1990). More recent definitions of social identity include additional dimensions (e.g., Cameron, 2004; Deaux, 1996; Jackson & Smith, 1999; Sellers, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith, 1997). For example, Leach et al. (2009) empirically confirmed a hierarchically ordered two-dimensional model of social identification, including the dimensions self-definition (subdivided into individual self-stereotyping and ingroup homogeneity) and self-investment (subdivided into solidarity, satisfaction, and centrality). The most comprehensive definition and conceptual overview of the multidimensionality of social identification to date, however, can be found in the work of Ashmore and colleagues, who formulated a comprehensive framework for conceptualizing social identification (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004).

Dimensions of social identification Ashmore et al. (2004) carried out an extensive review of the existing literature on social identification, and concluded that social identification consists of as many as seven different, theoretically distinguishable components: (1) self-categorization, (2) evaluation, (3) importance, (4) attachment and interdependence, (5) social embeddedness, (6) behavioral involvement, and (7) content and meaning. We consider each component in turn. According to the Ashmore et al. (2004) framework, self-categorization is a component of social identification that defines not only the cognitive self-placing into a social category, but also includes cognitive sub-elements, such as the extent to which individuals perceive themselves as prototypical of and similar to other members of their group (i.e., individuals are inclined to stereotype themselves in terms of the ingroup stereotype and not just to stereotype outgroup others). The self-categorization component also includes the degree of certainty with which individuals self-categorize as part of a given group. The evaluative component, similar to Tajfel’s (1981) definition, refers to the extent to which an individual evaluates a given social identity in positive or negative terms, i.e., it defines the positive or negative attitude held about the identity in question. In line with Luhtanen and Crocker (1992), evaluation can be subdivided into private regard (evaluative ratings held by one personally) and public regard (one’s perception of others’ evaluative ratings of one’s identity). In contrast to evaluation, importance defines the degree to which a given social identity is perceived as important to one’s self-concept. According to Ashmore et al. (2004), it is this dimension of identification that researchers typically mean when using the term “strength of identification.” Importance can also be subdivided, into explicit and implicit importance. Explicit importance relates simply to the subjectively selfappraised importance of a given social identity to one’s self-concept. Implicit importance, however, is based on the assumption that individuals’ identities are hierarchically structured in order of importance to their sense of self (see also, e.g., Stryker, 2000). Individuals need not, however, necessarily be consciously aware of the implicit importance of their identities. A further element in the Ashmore et al. (2004) framework is attachment and interdependence, which pertains to the sense of emotional involvement and the perceived sense of oneness with a group. It defines the extent to which individuals perceive members of

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Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah the group to receive similar treatment in society (interdependence/mutual fate), the extent to which they are emotionally tied to the group (attachment/affective commitment), and the extent to which individuals perceive overlap between their sense of self and the group (interconnection of self and others). Social embeddedness, then, concerns the extent to which individuals’ social identities are implicated in their everyday lives and social relationships, while behavioral involvement defines the extent to which individuals’ behavior and actions are functionally dependent on their social identity. The final component of identification in Ashmore and colleagues’ framework is that of content and meaning. This dimension refers to the extent to which the (stereo-)typical characteristics of a social group are seen as reflecting individual traits (self-attributed characteristics), but also includes ideological beliefs surrounding the groups’ experience and role in society, as well as each individual’s internalized story of the group and one’s membership thereof (narrative). Importantly, Ashmore et al. (2004) have argued that although there may be considerable co-variation between these different dimensions, they need not always converge or even correlate highly for each given category and each given individual. For example, a given social category, although evaluated positively, need not be a very important one, yet a different category that is equally positively evaluated may, in fact, be very important to the individual. Different dimensions of identification underlying a given social category may also co-vary highly for some individuals, but not for others. Social identification is thus a highly complex phenomenon. We acknowledge this complexity explicitly here, but because empirical support for all seven components is not yet available, and to maintain simplicity, we liberally make use of the summary term “social identification” throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Social Identity Theory Ingroup bias and the “minimal group paradigm” The extent to which self-categorization and social identification processes are involved in intergroup processes has long been of interest to social psychologists. This interest received a major stimulus following a compelling series of experimental studies by Tajfel and colleagues that made use of the so-called “minimal group paradigm” (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971). The minimal group paradigm consists of a set of experimental procedures, typically involving arbitrarily categorized groups, to achieve a situation that gives rise to intergroup differentiation. In the earliest and most commonly invoked of these experimental manipulations, Tajfel et al. (1971) categorized participants into artificial groups, based on participants’ preference for abstract paintings by Klee or Kandinsky, and asked them to allocate money between their arbitrarily categorized fellow ingroup and outgroup members. A consistent finding that emerged from these studies was that, despite their new membership in the arbitrary groups, individuals consistently tended to favor members from their own group over the outgroup in their reward allocations, a phenomenon referred to as “ingroup bias” that remains the focus of attention for much social psychological research

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(Brewer, 1979; Brown, 1995). Bias in this paradigm has, in fact, been shown on a myriad of different measures, including, for example, better recall of more unfavorable outgroup than ingroup behaviors (Howard & Rothbart, 1980). But does this mean that social identity processes inevitably hold negative consequences for intergroup relations? That individuals tend to favor ingroup over outgroup members is a well-established phenomenon that has been replicated in both experimental and naturally occurring settings (see Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002, for a review), yet the extent to which such ingroup bias is dependent on social identification remains unclear. Some have argued that identification and ingroup bias should be positively related (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Turner & Reynolds, 2001), assuming that identification drives outgroup attitudes, rather than vice versa (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; see Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998, for evidence of the reverse causal direction, at least for disadvantaged and subordinate group members). Experimental data show that manipulations of identification can increase bias (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999), yet correlational data suggest only a weak and unstable association (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). Whether or not social identification predicts ingroup favoritism, one needs to be clear that this is a relatively mild form of intergroup attitudes and thus may not necessarily reflect prejudicial attitudes or discriminatory behavior. In fact, much social psychological research has typically studied such milder forms of ingroup preference, for example, by means of evaluation or liking scores, or by assessing the differential allocation of resources or rewards to ingroup or outgroup members. Moreover, there is no clear evidence to suggest that individuals tend to favor the ingroup over outgroup members in the presence of aversive stimuli (Mummendey et al., 1992). For example, ingroup-favoring tendencies are not typically observed when individuals are asked to rate ingroup and outgroup on negative (as opposed to positive) rating scales, or when asked to give punishments (as opposed to rewards) to ingroup and outgroup members (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1992; Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten & Mummendey, 2000). Moreover, Brewer (1999) cautions that ingroup favoritism should not be equated with outgroup derogation. Indeed, a minimal-groups study by Otten and Moskowitz (2000), which used an implicit measure of spontaneous trait inference, provided evidence for implicit ingroup favoritism, but not outgroup derogation. What seems to motivate much ingroup bias and intergroup discrimination is a preferential treatment of ingroup members, and not necessarily hostility toward outgroup members. Thus although selfcategorization is both a necessary and sufficient condition for ingroup favoritism to occur, it is not sufficient to cause outgroup derogation. Additional conditions and factors need to be present for self-categorization and group identification to result in negative intergroup relations (Hewstone et al., 2002). There is, however, evidence to suggest that social identification moderates the effects of the factors that provoke negative intergroup tensions. For example, it is known that threat perceptions are positively related with prejudice and discrimination (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), but that this relationship is stronger for individuals who identify highly with the threatened group than for those for whom the threatened group identity is less important (e.g., Bizman & Yinon, 2001; Tausch, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Cairns, & Christ, 2007).

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Social identity and intergroup relations Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) argues from the general view that individuals have an inherent need for positive self-esteem, to the proposal that when individuals self-categorize in terms of a social group, and their social identity is salient, this need for a positive self-concept translates into a need for a positively valued social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The need for a positive self-concept is thus thought to be, among other things, what makes people identify with social groups. Moreover, a positive social identity is typically achieved through positive differentiation from other groups and it is this process that explains, in part, the occurrence of ingroup bias in the minimal group paradigm. However, social identity theory holds important implications for an understanding of intergroup processes beyond those uncovered in artificially created experimental settings. Specifically, social identity theory argues that individuals tend to engage in social comparison with other groups, i.e., a comparison between the ingroup (“us”) and relevant outgroups (“them”). It is thus, in essence, a theory of intergroup relations that aims to explain how individuals perceive, and act as a consequence of, their membership in social groups. Specifically, it seeks to elucidate the nature of intergroup relations in real-life settings, i.e., in social contexts defined by hierarchies and status differentials between groups. Moreover, the theory contends that individuals have a need for positive distinctiveness from other groups, reflecting a need to demonstrate that the ingroup is in some form or other better than, or at least different from, the outgroup (e.g., Mummendey & Schreiber, 1983). It is thus assumed that when individuals identify with their ingroup categories and the perceived functional relations between ingroup and outgroup are salient, they are motivated to either maintain or attain positive distinctiveness. According to Brewer (2000), this may then lead to intergroup accentuation (differentiation between ingroup members is minimized, yet differentiation between outgroup members is maximized), ingroup favoritism (generalization of positive affect to ingroup but not outgroup members), and social competition (the ingroup thrives only when the outgroup does not).

The role of group status and strategies for achieving positive distinctiveness In their quest for a positively valued social identity and positive distinctiveness, individuals are thought to be bound by and take into consideration the nature of group status and group boundaries. Intergroup attitudes and behavior are thus seen as a function of comparative status between ingroup and outgroup (low versus high), the perceived stability and legitimacy of intergroup relations, and the perceived nature of group boundaries, i.e., whether group boundaries are permeable or impermeable (e.g., Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; see Turner, 1999, for a review). The interaction of these factors is thought to determine how members of low- and high-status groups either attain and/or maintain positive distinctiveness. When group boundaries are permeable, individuals of low-status groups with which they are not highly identified may engage in social mobility strategies, whereby they leave or disassociate from the ingroup, and may attempt to join the higher-status outgroup. If the group boundaries between groups are impermeable,

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however, group members may engage in either social creativity or social competition strategies in an effort to bolster their social identity. Social creativity involves changing elements of the comparative situation in favor of the ingroup, and is a strategy employed by low-status groups when group boundaries are impermeable and status relations are perceived as stable and legitimate. For example, lowstatus group members might seek to challenge the previously negative evaluations of attributes associated with their group (as in the “Black is Beautiful” movement in race relations in the 1970s). Or, they might engage in comparisons with an outgroup that is evaluated in less favorable terms, or is of lower status than the ingroup (so-called “downward social comparison”). If, however, group boundaries are impermeable, but the status differential between ingroup and outgroup is perceived as unstable and illegitimate, individuals may engage in direct competition with the outgroup to affect real change in status (“social competition” or “collective action,” as in the case of direct challenges to the system of white apartheid in South Africa by militant black South Africans). As a consequence the comparative outgroup may be perceived in less positive terms, and identification with the ingroup may increase. These predictions of social identity theory on the interplay between salience, status, and the nature of group boundaries, as well as the proposed consequences for ingroup identification and intergroup relations, have been examined extensively in social psychological research. For example, both experimental (e.g., Brown & Wade, 1987; Turner & Brown, 1978) and meta-analytic (Mullen et al., 1992; Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001) studies have demonstrated that group status can affect the nature of intergroup relations, in particular evaluative ingroup and outgroup ratings and ingroup bias. This evidence suggests a tendency for members of high-status groups to display greater degrees of ingroup bias, in terms of both more favorable ingroup and less favorable outgroup evaluations, than do comparative lower-status groups. There is also evidence to suggest that the interplay between group status and ingroup identification, and intergroup relations, is affected by the stability and legitimacy of status differentials and the perceived permeability of group boundaries (e.g., Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008). In a meta-analytic examination, Bettencourt et al. (2001) found that the perceived legitimacy and the perceived permeability of group boundaries emerged as important moderators of these effects, largely in line with the predictions of social identity theory. For example, ingroup ratings were more positive and outgroup ratings more negative for members of low-status groups that perceived the status differentials as illegitimate; these groups also showed more ingroup bias. And when group boundaries were seen as permeable, low-status group members generally displayed more positive evaluative outgroup attitudes than when group boundaries were seen as impermeable (see Bettencourt et al., 2001, for a detailed description of results). Some of the strategies suggested by social identity theory have a system-justifying property (Jost & Banaji, 1994), i.e., they entrench the status quo and can lead to system perpetuation. For example, social mobility (as opposed to collective action) is a strategy by which the more mobile of group members advance, and from a system justification perspective this can lead the previously low-status group to seem even lower status because it no longer contains more “competent” members of the group but has become more uniformly and

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Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah justifiably (in the eyes of society) low status. Furthermore, for the remaining group members, the success of some of their previous group members (who become tokens of ingroup success) may lead to a weakening of the desire to improve the low status of the ingroup (Brown, 2000). Similar arguments can be made for creative comparisons of the ingroup with other lowstatus groups, comparisons made against abstract standards of achievement, and reassigning values of traits on which the ingroup excels. Thus these two strategies suggested by social identity theory, social mobility and social creativity, are a double-edged sword from a group perspective, because while they allow the enhancement and maintenance of global selfesteem, they threaten the ability of the group collectively to rise up the social ladder.

Beyond social identity theory Naturally, social psychological theorizing and research on intergroup relations has evolved since the inception of social identity theory, and a number of additional theoretical explanations of what motivates social identification and determines intergroup relations have been put forward. We briefly review four recent social psychological advancements: optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991), subjective uncertainty reduction theory (e.g., Hogg, 2007; Hogg & Abrams, 1993), terror management theory (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990), and an evolutionary perspective. According to optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Pickett, 1999), individuals are motivated by two opposing needs: a need for assimilation and a need for differentiation. On the one hand, individuals have an inherent need to belong with and be attached to others, since this avoids the risk of isolation or stigmatization. However, such assimilation also risks de-individuation and loss of self-definition, in particular when others are perceived as too similar to the self. Thus, on the other hand, individuals are driven by a need for distinctiveness and differentiation from others. An optimal identity thus simultaneously satisfies the individual’s need for assimilation with the ingroup and the need for distinctiveness between the ingroup and outgroups. According to optimal distinctiveness theory, identification with social groups that are more or less inclusive offers individuals the opportunity to balance these opposing needs. More specifically, individuals are thought to identify only with social groups that are sufficiently inclusive to allow them to optimally balance their needs for assimilation and distinctiveness, based on the relative strength of the two opposing needs (Brewer, 1991). Optimal distinctiveness thus varies across individuals, as does the choice of social categories regarded as sufficiently inclusive, and, of course, the relative degree of social identification. In explaining why individuals tend to display negative outgroup attitudes and ingroup bias, optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991) presents a dual-process model. Individuals are thought to display bias in favor of the ingroup in order to affirm the satisfaction derived from identification with an optimally distinctive group, but also because they seek sufficient differentiation and distinctiveness from relevant outgroups (see Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001). Subjective uncertainty reduction theory argues that individuals need to feel certain about their social world, and thus are motivated to reduce uncertainty about their self and their social perceptions to avoid the risk of a loss of control over their life (e.g., Hogg, 2000). One

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way of reducing uncertainty, it is argued, is by affiliating with social groups. Selfcategorization and social identification with groups, particularly if they provide clear social norms for self-definition, social perception, and behavior, allow individuals to have greater certainty about their place in the social world (see Hogg, 2007, for a review). As a consequence, individuals may evaluate fellow ingroup members positively, but outgroup members negatively, since they do not provide individuals with the same sense of certainty (Grieve & Hogg, 1999). Subjective uncertainty reduction theory has particular relevance in contexts where individuals find themselves in new intergroup settings, such as in the case of new immigrants and sojourners. Equally, the theory has relevance in explaining the ingroup bias exhibited by members of long-standing groups, when there are threats within the system that could destabilize the status of the group (Mullin & Hogg, 1998). Terror management theory rests upon the assumption that individuals have an inherent need for self-preservation, which, however, is threatened when we are made aware of the inevitability of our death (so-called “mortality salience”; e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). Affiliation with social groups is thought to offer individuals a way of overcoming this fear of mortality, since such affiliation is able to provide a sense of meaning and stability, allowing individuals to adopt a cultural worldview that provides them with a sense of symbolic immortality (for a review, see Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002). Thus, for example, religious beliefs can “buffer” the normally adverse effects of mortality salience (Newheiser, Voci, Hewstone, & Schmid, under review). Terror management theory (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990) also argues that individuals hold negative attitudes of outgroups since they are thought to threaten their ingroup’s worldview (see, e.g., Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991, for a review). Finally, Brewer (2001) put forward an evolutionary perspective which sees social identity phenomena as an inherent reflection of group life. More specifically, this perspective argues that group life evolved as a fundamental survival strategy of the human species, and enabled survival in a wide range of environments. This might thus explain the wealth of evidence demonstrating the inevitability and power of social identification and cooperative interdependence between ingroup members.

Multiple categorization and intergroup attitudes Although much of this chapter so far has tended to focus on single dimensions of categorization, or a single “ingroup” versus “outgroup” dichotomy, it is self-evident that a person typically belongs to many social groups and thus holds multiple social identities. Moreover, the meaning and role of these different identities can differ across individuals and groups, and individuals can and often do combine and organize their social categories in complex and differentiated ways. In recent years significant advances have been made in understanding the nature of such multiple categorization processes, as well as the consequences thereof (see Crisp & Hewstone, 2007, for a detailed review). Of particular merit is a growing body of research showing that multiple categorization can have positive consequences for intergroup relations. We devote the remainder of this chapter to multiple categorization and its relationship with intergroup attitudes, reviewing, in turn, crossed categorization (involving experimentally and naturally

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Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah occurring patterns of crossed categorization), common ingroup and dual identification processes, ingroup projection, and social identity complexity.

Crossed categorization Naturally, individuals belong to a range of social groups, some of which crosscut each other. Imagine, for example, a group of male and female students, half of which study psychology, the other half chemistry. The categories “student” and “gender” may thus be thought of as crosscutting each other (if we assume that both males and females are enrolled in both subjects). The crossed-categorization approach assumes that individuals are able to process information along such multiple crossed-category dimensions and are thus able to perceive others as “ingroup” or “outgroup” members in a more differentiated and inclusive manner than implied by a single “ingroup” versus “outgroup” dichotomy (Brewer, 2000; Brown & Turner, 1979). To illustrate, if two horizontal categories are crossed, individuals may perceive others in terms of these multiple-category combinations, i.e. as double ingroup members (ingroup membership is fulfilled on both categories), double outgroup members (ingroup membership is not fulfilled on either of the two categories), or as members of one of two partial or mixed ingroup/outgroup categories (ingroup membership is fulfilled on one of the categories only). Let us assume that, with reference to the previous example, a male psychology student is asked to make judgments about his fellow psychology and chemistry students, who include both males and females. This individual may thus perceive other psychology students either as double ingroup members (if they are male) or as mixed ingroup/outgroup members (if they are female), while he may perceive chemistry students either as double outgroup members (if they are female) or as mixed ingroup/outgroup members (if they are male). Experimental research on crossed categorization using both artificially created and naturally occurring groups has shown that individuals are able to process information on these crossed dimensions (Crisp & Hewstone, 1999; Crisp, Hewstone, & Cairns, 2001; Klauer, Ehrenberg, & Wegener, 2003). Moreover, since crossed categorization deemphasizes a single polarized identity category, thereby reducing intercategory differentiation, the salience of any one category is reduced. This is thought to reduce intergroup bias and increase positive outgroup perception, as has been demonstrated using both artificial and real groups (Crisp & Hewstone, 1999; see Migdal, Hewstone, & Mullen, 1998; Urban & Miller, 1998, for meta-analytic reviews). For example, it has been shown that individuals tend to evaluate most positively double ingroup members, followed by reduced levels of positive evaluations when perceiving the mixed- or partial-targets, while the least favorable evaluations were shown for double outgroup members (Migdal et al., 1998; Vanbeselaere, 1991). Bias reduction is, however, moderated by various factors, including cognitive load (see Urban & Miller, 1998, for a review).

The common ingroup identity model Categories may not only be thought of as orthogonal to each other, but may be hierarchically structured, as subgroup categories nested within more superordinate, overarching social categories. It is this notion upon which the common ingroup identity model rests

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(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). The model stipulates that individuals can perceive others at different levels of inclusiveness. For example, the national categories British, Italian, German, or French can be thought of as subordinate to the more inclusive, superordinate category “European,” depending on the frame of reference. The common ingroup identity model assumes that individuals may thus categorize themselves and others either as part of subordinate ingroups and outgroups (“us” and “them”), or as part of superordinate, common ingroups (“we”). Moreover, the model proposes that when individuals are encouraged to make use of superordinate instead of subordinate categorizations, this may have positive consequences for intergroup perception. Specifically, such recategorization (e.g., from former outgroup member “German” to superordinate ingroup member “European”) is predicted to lead to a reduction in intergroup bias and prejudice, at least for majority-status group members (see below). Extensive experimental data support this assertion (some support based on survey data also exists, but the evidence is generally weaker). Research findings demonstrate that, as predicted, bias is reduced by improving attitudes toward former outgroup members, when individuals make use of common ingroup identities (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

The dual identity model The dual identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) rests largely on the same principles as the common ingroup identity model, namely that individuals may categorize and identify with categories that are hierarchically ordered at different levels of inclusiveness. However, the dual identity model, unlike the common ingroup identity model, allows for a more complex form of categorization which simultaneously recognizes both subgroups and superordinate groups. Specifically, this model suggests that if individuals identify with nested subgroup identities and identities at a superordinate level (e.g., “I am proud to be both British and European”), this may be particularly beneficial for intergroup attitudes. Moreover, categorization in terms of a dual identity may be beneficial to intergroup relations precisely because it overcomes some of the problems associated with the common ingroup identity model. The common ingroup identity model has been criticized for its emphasis on recategorization, which holds the risk of depriving individuals of long-established and valued subgroup identities. This concern is particularly relevant for minority group members, who tend to identify much more strongly with their ingroup than do members of majority groups (Brewer & Gaertner, 2004; Simon, Aufderheide, & Kampmeier, 2001). Thus recategorization as stipulated by the common ingroup identity model may be an unrealistic means for improving intergroup relations in settings other than the laboratory (Brewer & Gaertner, 2004). Moreover, recategorization may be perceived as threatening, and instead of reducing may in fact exacerbate negative intergroup relations in situations of intergroup conflict where groups are engaged in hostilities, or in clearly defined minority–majority contexts, where groups differ in size, power, or status (e.g., Hewstone et al., 2002). The progenitors of the common ingroup identity model themselves accept that focusing exclusively on a common ingroup can serve to deemphasize the existence of a status hierarchy

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Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah between the groups and thus can end up entrenching the status quo (Dovidio, Gaertner, Saguy, & Halabi, 2008). The dual identity model was developed largely as an attempt to respond to these concerns. Since the dual identity model proposes that positive intergroup effects should be observed if individuals identify in terms of both subgroup and superordinate categories, individuals need not relinquish potentially highly valued and important group memberships. Specifically, the model allows members of subgroups to retain their original and distinctive identities while also sharing a common superordinate identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Thus, the dual identity model is associated with an integrationist view of intergroup relations, while the common ingroup identity model has more in common with an assimilationist approach (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000). It has been argued that a dual identity may lead to more positive outgroup attitudes than a superordinate identity alone when the superordinate category is too inclusive to provide individuals with adequate distinctiveness (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Extensive empirical evidence has confirmed positive consequences for intergroup attitudes when both subgroup and superordinate groups are equally salient (e.g., Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996).

The ingroup projection model One potential problem surrounds both the common ingroup and the dual identity models. Individuals have a tendency to expect similarities between themselves and others, i.e., to engage in social projection (see Robbins & Krueger, 2005, for a review). Ingroup projection refers to situations in which the defining, typically positive, characteristics of the common ingroup are perceived as reflecting those of the former subordinate ingroup only (Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003). Ingroup projection may thus limit the extent to which a common ingroup identity, whether endorsed solely as predicted by the common ingroup identity model or in combination with an equally salient subgroup as predicted by the dual identity model, may exert positive effects for intergroup relations. Assume, for example, two subgroups, English and Scottish, nested within the superordinate category, British. A given English person may, of course, identify with the British identity, depending on the frame of reference, yet what happens when that individual perceives the British category as reflecting the perceived characteristics of English people only? Since the subgroup outgroup category (Scottish) is then not equally included in the common ingroup, identification with Britain is no longer a sufficient means for encouraging positive attitudes toward the outgroup (Scottish). In terms of majority–minority relations, ingroup projection may exert particularly pernicious effects on intergroup relations if there is no obvious set of features that is attributable to the common identity. Drawing on self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) have argued that the majority group’s values and attributes may be treated as the default values and attributes of the common identity. Thus what is thought of as an inclusive category might be seen by minority group members as a projection of the majority group’s values onto them. While ingroup projection may not be problematic for majority group members, it can clearly represent a symbolic threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) to minority group members and may sow the seeds for

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intergroup discord (Brown, 2000). Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) propose that the optimal common identity is one that is amorphously defined so as to allow various interpretations and understandings of what category membership entails.

Social identity complexity The multiple categorization approaches discussed above primarily pertain to the categorization of outgroup members in functional relation to the ingroup. For example, in the crossed-categorization approach, the extent to which an outgroup member of one category simultaneously shares ingroup membership in another category is critical; or in the common ingroup and dual identity models, the extent to which the outgroup is included in a common ingroup is key. An approach that is much more explicitly about individuals’ selfcategorization with less reference to comparative outgroups is that of “social identity complexity.” The social identity complexity approach rests upon the premise that individuals have different ways of subjectively combining their numerous identities. Social identity complexity refers to an individual’s subjective representation of the interrelationships among his or her multiple identities, where complexity can range on a continuum from low to high (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Individuals may often perceive their range of social identities as largely overlapping, whereby only individuals who share membership on the sum of these identities are regarded as fellow ingroup members, and people who share none or only a few of these identities are regarded as outgroup members. Here, social identity complexity is low. For example, if a white British male only regards people who share ingroup membership on all, i.e., on the sum, of these three group memberships as ingroup members, this person’s identity structure is relatively simplified. In order to be high in complexity, individuals need to be aware of the fact that one belongs to multiple groups, and also need to recognize that these multiple categories do not always overlap. For example, one’s fellow-ingroup member’s academic colleagues may not overlap much with fellow-ingroup members of the local branch of one’s chosen political party. Yet only if the individual is aware of and recognizes this non-overlap between these particular categories, will identity complexity be high. Similarly, our white British male’s identity structure will be much more complex if he is aware of the fact that, for example, not all British people are white, and accepts that others will hold ingroup membership on some categories but not others. One may distinguish between two types of complexity, overlap and similarity (Brewer & Pierce, 2005). Overlap complexity refers to the perceived overlap between multiple categories, while similarity complexity refers to the extent to which an individual perceives these multiple categories to be interrelated in terms of their prototypical connotations and attributes. For example, an individual low in overlap complexity may perceive all members of one ingroup (e.g., “Christians”) to simultaneously share membership of another ingroup category (e.g., “British”). Whereas perceiving one ingroup to be highly similar to one’s other ingroups (e.g., thinking that the typical Christian and the typical British person are highly similar) is an example of low similarity complexity. Although it is a relatively novel theoretical concept, the little research that has examined social identity complexity to date has consistently supported a positive relationship between

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Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah complexity and intergroup attitudes. Empirical investigations in the U.S. have, for example, shown that social identity complexity is associated with more tolerance, reduced intergroup bias, and greater support for affirmative action and multiculturalism (Brewer & Pierce, 2005). Similarly, two studies in Northern Ireland, the first using a student sample, the second a crosssection of the adult population, showed that social identity complexity was associated with more tolerance and less ingroup bias (Schmid, Hewstone, Tausch, Cairns, & Hughes, 2009).

Conclusion Since their inception, self-categorization theory and social identity theory have been at the heart of much of social psychological theorizing, and have emphasized, partly in isolation, partly in combination, the central role that social identity processes play in an array of social, especially intergroup, phenomena. This chapter has provided a comprehensive overview of what is commonly termed the social identity perspective, encompassing both these theoretical approaches. In so doing, we have paid particular attention to defining the concepts upon which the social identity perspective rests, namely, self-categorization and social identification. We have highlighted that social identification is a multidimensional phenomenon, the complexity of which is often overlooked in social psychological research. Researchers interested in uncovering and understanding social identity phenomena must take this multidimensionality into account, not only in their own research but also when making comparisons to and drawing conclusions from other research. In addition, this chapter has explored, with particular reference to the theoretical conjecture of social identity theory, the involvement of social identity issues in intergroup relations. We have highlighted that although social identity theory has significantly enhanced contemporary understanding of intergroup relations, selfcategorization and social identification are not sufficient to explain negative intergroup attitudes and behavior. Any examination of intergroup relations needs to take into account the broader social, historical, political, or ideological context as well as the interplay between specific socio-structural conditions (Tajfel, 1981). In addressing the question to what extent social identity phenomena are involved in shaping intergroup attitudes and intergroup relations, we have placed particular emphasis on an evolving body of research on multiple categorization processes. Although much of social psychological research seeks to understand intergroup phenomena, the underlying motivation of many social psychologists is undoubtedly to find ways of preventing or improving negative intergroup relations. Multiple categorization approaches hold particular promise in that respect, given that increasing awareness of the multiplicity of social identities typically translates into more differentiated multiple ingroup perceptions, which then typically co-vary positively with intergroup attitudes. In sum, this chapter has provided an overview of the theoretical foundations and key research studies underpinning social identity research in social psychology. By providing a somewhat more differentiated account of the social identity perspective, taking into consideration conceptual definitions, associated processes, and the multiplicity of identities, we hope to have offered useful insights to both new and established scholars in the field of social identity research.

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Notes 1 Note that some have advocated the use of the term “collective identity” in place of “social identity” (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001), given that all identities, whether personal or social, are socially constructed and socially meaningful (see also Ashmore et al., 2004). We agree in principle with this argument, yet since the term social identity remains widely used in social psychological discourse, and to avoid confusion, we retain the term “social identity” in this chapter. 2 Note that individuals belong to multiple social categories, and different social contexts lead to the salience of particular group memberships (Turner et al., 1987).

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Social Categorization Theories: From Culture to Cognition Richard J. Crisp and Angela T. Maitner

Categorization is an integral and essential part of social perception (Allport, 1954; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Tajfel, 1978; Wilder, 1986). Whether the people we meet are black or white, male or female, young or old, such classifications have significant implications for how we think about ourselves and form impressions of others. In any given situation the categories we use can depend on varied factors such as context (e.g., Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991) and motivation (e.g., Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). Furthermore, it is increasingly apparent that in many contexts multiple bases for social categorization can be salient, combined, and used simultaneously (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). In our multicultural, multiethnic, and multi-religious world there are now multiple ways in which we can be the same as, or different from, others. The increasing complexity of (multiple) social categorization presents an intriguing challenge to theoretical accounts of self, identity, group processes, and intergroup relations. In this chapter we examine how classification of ourselves, and others, along these multiple dimensions, can have significant implications for psychological, social, and behavioral processes. Before we do this, however, we will outline the principal accounts of social categorization processes that have defined the literature for over 50 years.

A Brief History of Social Categorization Two broad classes of theory have emerged as explanations for social categorization phenomena. We call these the self-categorization theory and social cognition accounts. In this section we review and chart the historical development of these accounts.

Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Self-categorization theory According to self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, 1982; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), at any given time, individuals can be categorized in terms of personal (me versus not me) or social (us versus them) identities. Personal identities are established by differentiating the self or others in terms of shared higher-order identities, focusing on the ways that individuals are unique from one another. Social identities, in contrast, are defined by group memberships and focus on how individuals are simultaneously similar to like-others (e.g. the ingroup) and different from unlike-others (the outgroup). SCT argues that (self)-categorization is an inherently comparative, relational, and flexible process, dynamically varying with the perceiver’s frame of reference, designed to afford meaning and structure to our social worlds (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Both the salient categorization and the attributes ascribed to that categorization are predicted to vary with the comparative context (e.g. Abrams & Hogg, 1987; Doosje, Haslam, Spears, Oakes, & Koomen, 1998; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Hayes, 1992; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Manis, Nelson, & Shedler, 1988; Oakes et al., 1991; Wilder & Thompson, 1988). When the perceiver’s frame changes, so too do perceptions of similarities and differences between individuals. Americans and British people, for instance, may seem very different when perceived on the basis of nationality and compared to one another, but very similar when perceived on the basis of language and compared to non-English speakers. In this vein, Haslam and colleagues showed that the stereotype of Americans changed with both the ongoing context of the first Gulf War and variations of frame of reference provided by relevant comparison groups (Haslam et al., 1992). According to SCT, when categorizing oneself or others, individuals assess their own and others’ normative and comparative fit with relation to candidate social categories. Normative fit is determined by the degree to which the stimulus to be categorized matches the perceiver’s background knowledge of the category; it is a quick lay judgment assessing the extent to which an individual appears a good representative of the category (Oakes et al., 1991). Comparative fit, in contrast, is defined by degree of meta-contrast, or the extent to which the categorization target shares characteristics of the target category and differentiates from the non-category (Turner, 1985). Thus, perceived within-group similarities and between-group differences are essential in defining category boundaries and group member attributes. When a particular social categorization becomes salient, the perceiver accentuates the similarities observed within categories and differences observed between categories (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), with individuals also increasing their perception of differences between their own attitudes and those of outgroup members (Wilder, 1984). When categorized, targets are perceived as possessing prototypical (and indeed, exaggerated) group features, which leads to “functional antagonism” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 49) between the activated categorization and alternatives. Turner has claimed that “social identity may on occasion function nearly to the exclusion of personal identity” (1982, p. 19), and in support of this idea, Onorato and Turner (2004) showed that a salient social identity overrides the influence of individual self-schemas in self-perception and information processing. Likewise Maitner, Mackie, Claypool, and Crisp (2009) have shown that when

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Richard J. Crisp and Angela T. Maitner categorized as members of a group, individuals analytically processed information that had relevance to the group, even though it had no direct relevance to the individuals personally, lending support to the idea that social categorization shifts the individual’s frame of perceiving the world from an individual self-oriented view to a group-oriented view. Thus, similar to the research conducted by Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne (1995), SCT predicts that activation of one social category, or one level of social categorization, decreases the likelihood that an alternative categorization becomes salient or influences the perception of the self or others. Similarly, from the literature on stereotype threat (Steele, 1997; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002), we know that manipulating the salience of participants’ social identity (gender versus ethnic) also influences self-categorization, and behavioral consequences of this self-categorization (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999). Shih et al. found that Asian American women performed more poorly in a math test when their gender identity rather than their Asian identity was made salient (because math is related to negative stereotypes about women, but positive stereotypes about Asians). Thus, despite their actual ability to perform well on a math test, activation of their female identity inhibited the activation of skills and resources associated with their Asian identity, which, in turn, impacted these women’s behavior. While SCT allows for flexibility in the activation of categorizations and category information, that flexibility is theoretically constrained and directed by context. In other words, categorization flexibility within SCT is primarily passive and reflective of external (contextual) changes. More recently SCT theorists have, however, acknowledged that categorization may vary with motives, values, expectations, background knowledge, and theories (Turner, 1999), as well as the accessibility of a particular category (which may be influenced via chronic group identification; see Doosje & Ellemers, 1997). In fact, recent research (albeit from the social cognitive perspective) has suggested that motives play an important role in influencing which categorization becomes salient, even when context is held constant. Sinclair and Kunda (1999), for instance, reported that when encountering an individual who is a member of two groups with widely diverging stereotypes (such as African American and physician), the perceiver’s motives play an important role in determining which category becomes salient. When motivated to esteem a target individual because that individual praised the perceiver, features of the positive (physician) stereotype were activated, whereas features of the negative stereotype (African American) were inhibited. When criticized by the target person, in contrast, features of the negative stereotype were activated while features of the positive stereotype were suppressed. As well as influencing categorization of others, motives can also affect strategic selfcategorization. Mussweiler, Gabriel, and Bodenhausen (2000) found that when European American women were given false feedback that they had performed worse than an Asian American woman on a social perception task, they shifted identification away from their gender identity to their ethnic identity (relative to baseline identification with both). Fein and Spencer (1997) demonstrated that targets who belonged to a negatively stereotyped group (Jews or homosexuals) were more likely to be seen in terms of those negative stereotypes when participants received a threat to their self-concept (in the form of negative feedback on an ostensibly unrelated intelligence test) than when they received no threat (and compared to positively stereotyped groups). This suggests that to buffer their own

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identity, individuals may positively differentiate themselves from outgroups by derogating those individuals. It is therefore clear that variability in attributes associated with different categories can be affected by both contextual changes and perceiver motives. However, it is possible that motivations arise more directly from context, rather than being independently predictive. Brewer (1991) has argued, “when the definition of self changes, the meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivations also changes accordingly” (p. 476). In other words, in addition to influencing which categories are activated, motivations may reflect contextual changes in categorization, in turn reinforcing context-dependent categorization processes. Research also shows that even minimal intergroup situations, where individuals are categorized into ingroup and outgroup members, are sufficient to motivate ingroup favoritism, or the simple preference for members of one’s own group over individual members of the outgroup (e.g., Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Brewer & Silver, 1978). Finally, people make different judgments about ingroup members depending on whether a shared social identity is salient. For instance, in relation to O. J. Simpson (the black American football player and actor accused of killing his wife and her male friend), black women who spontaneously categorized themselves as black espoused more positive evaluations of his innocence (Newman, Duff, Schnopp-Wyatt, Brock, & Hoffman, 1997). Black women who spontaneously categorized themselves as women, on the other hand, espoused more negative evaluations of Simpson’s innocence. Such effects suggest that judgments about the ingroup likely reflect motivated inference processes that follow directly from selfcategorization.

Social cognitive accounts Social cognitive theories of categorization dominated the field of social psychology for decades, and can be contrasted with self-categorization theory in several important ways. In particular, rather than SCT’s underlying meaning-seeker motive, these theories tended to assume that cognitive structures, such as stereotypes, are activated and applied via contextindependent processes that maximize cognitive efficiency (e.g., Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, 1984; Fiske, 1980; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Taylor, 1981). Theorists contended that perceivers acted as abstractionists, inferring individuals’ personal traits and characteristics from their group memberships and creating representations of groups and group members that were fixed, rigid, and resistant to change (e.g. Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Hamilton & Rose, 1980; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979; Snyder, 1981; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). A considerable body of research suggests that when an individual’s group membership is salient it activates stable stereotypes in memory that provide the perceiver with information with which to evaluate the novel individual (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In this sense, categorization, stereotypes, and stereotyping are functional in that they quickly and efficiently provide the perceiver with important, often reliable, clues about what another person might be like. What happens when the individual is perceived not to fit the category that is initially applied to them? According to Fiske and Neuberg’s continuum model (1989), when an individual’s behavior is inconsistent with expectations the perceiver will first try to recategorize

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Richard J. Crisp and Angela T. Maitner the target into a category more consistent with the target person’s behavior. If the perceiver is unable to do this, they may then construct a bottom-up impression of the target as an individual (“individuation”). Despite the theoretical ability to arrive at a careful, reasoned impression of another individual, however, such careful and individuated impressions appeared somewhat rare. According to Fiske and Neuberg (1989), individuation requires both motivation and capacity, either of which may be lacking in everyday social interactions. The process of impression formation, according to the social cognitive account, is all about efficiency, albeit employing some of the same cognitive mechanics as outlined by SCT. Illustrative is empirical work that shows functional antagonism between competing categorizations. Functional antagonism is a cognitive process that ensures that a clear, stable view of a target person is achieved. Activation of one type of social category information may inhibit activation of information inconsistent with that characterization, thereby preventing integration of multiple sources of information about a target person. Macrae et al. (1995) showed that activation of a woman stereotype and subsequent exposure to an Asian woman facilitated processing of information associated with the woman stereotype while inhibiting processing of information associated with the Asian stereotype. In contrast, activation of the Asian stereotype and subsequent presentation of an Asian woman facilitated processing of information relevant to the Asian stereotype while inhibiting processing of information relevant to the woman stereotype. In other words, categorization processes actively inhibited integration of multiple forms of information about another individual. Van Twuyver and van Knippenberg (1995) observed similar effects in a study employing the category confusion paradigm (Taylor, Fiske, Etkoff, & Ruderman, 1978). In this memorybased paradigm the extent to which statements are misattributed to individuals within the same group, but not to members of the other group, is a measure of category application. Van Twuyver and van Knippenberg found that the use of a gender categorization was negatively correlated with the use of a student/teacher categorization. Such findings imply that people tend to form impressions of individuals drawing from the stereotype of only one group membership at a time. Rather than promoting a differentiated and complex view of individuals, according to this perspective, categorization processes reinforce stored expectations associated with simple, single, stereotypic representations. Here then, categories and stereotypes are fixed, content-independent, and functionally antagonistic. Within the social cognitive perspective, however, and in contrast to the abstractionist models, research on exemplar-based social categorization has suggested a more flexible process. In particular, individuals can retrieve more information about specific group members than would be predicted from a fully abstractionist view. Linville and Fischer (1993), for instance, showed that perceivers can recall information about contingency and variability of group members’ attributes – information that would not be included in fully abstracted category representations. Although observers do perceive and recall specific information about range and variability within a specific category, the impact of this information on the overall stereotype differs depending on the judgmental context (GarciaMarques & Mackie, 1999; Smith, 1988). Support for exemplar models of social categorization meant that purely abstractionist views of stereotypes were superseded by mixed models that included both abstractions and exemplars (Babey, Queller, & Klein, 1998; Brewer, 1988; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Zarate

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& Smith, 1990). Importantly, these mixed models began to allow for some variability in category representations across contexts.

Functional Antagonism versus Category Conjunction The theoretical perspectives discussed so far make the explicit assumption that people can think only about one dimension of categorization at a time. Category use is essentially mutually exclusive (“functional antagonistic”; Turner, 1999, p. 11; Turner et al., 1987), and needs to be to be able to meet core motives of social cognition, whether they be maximizing efficient information processes or ascribing meaning to the social context in any given situation. However, increasingly we live in a world without traditional social boundaries, where gender and occupation, race, religion, and nation no longer co-vary. In this section we outline research that has shown that whereas one category can dominate over another, in many situations people use multiple categories simultaneously in social perception. From an early age we can become aware of multiple identities, and think about them in complex ways. Allport (1954, p. 43) noted early work by Piaget and Weil (1951) that suggested children go through developmental stages reflecting an increasing understanding of the hierarchical (and non-mutually exclusive) nature of social categories. At age 7 children in this study indicated the relationship between town (Geneva) and country (Switzerland) as two circles side by side; they correspondingly pronounced identification with one or the other, but not both at the same time. They did not represent town and country by one circle enclosing another (and correspondingly recognize their simultaneous membership in both categories) until age 10 (see also Markman & Callanan, 1984). More recent developmental research (e.g., Bigler & Liben, 1993) has shown that tendencies to notice multiple criteria for classification increase with age, and that there are demonstrable individual differences in this ability (e.g., Averhart & Bigler, 1997). With adults there is equally convincing evidence that people can attend to and combine categories for use in social perception. Using a memory-based “category confusion” paradigm (Taylor et al., 1978), Arcuri (1982) found that the ratio of intra-category errors to inter-category errors varied depending upon the number of simultaneously salient category dimensions (one or two). The way participants in this experiment represented the social context was therefore affected by the presence of more than a single salient basis for categorization. Also investigating memory for categorization-relevant information, Crisp, Hewstone, and Cairns (2001) and Crisp and Hewstone (2001) reported further evidence for the use of multiple criteria in structuring person memory. In these experiments we adapted a paradigm used by Park and Rothbart (1982) to allow subtle manipulation of multiple category memberships. In these experiments undergraduate participants were presented with a short paragraph ostensibly taken from a local newspaper and were told that the experimenter was interested in how people read such stories. Using this paradigm in Northern Ireland we found that female and male Catholic and Protestant participants recalled information relevant to both religion and gender categorizations, indicating that both had been attended to without any explicit prompting. We found similar effects in a study that employed the same paradigm, but in a different cultural context (Singapore),

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Richard J. Crisp and Angela T. Maitner using an alternative category dimension (ethnicity: Chinese versus Malay) (for similar illustrations see Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992; van Knippenberg, van Twuyver, & Pepels, 1994; van Twuyver & van Knippenberg, 1995). In sum, context and motivation can lead to selectivity (differential accessibility; van Knippenberg et al., 1994; and differential situational relevance, “normative fit”; Oakes et al., 1991). However, in the absence of contextual factors making particular identities dominant, or perceiver motivations that consistently orient perceivers to some identities over others, people can and do notice and use their multiple identities for defining themselves, and forming impressions of others.

Multiple Social Categorization There is a growing literature that has demonstrated that people can both perceive and use multiple categorizations simultaneously in constructing their impressions of themselves and others, apparently contradictory to many accounts of social categorization that stress the overriding importance of clarity and simplicity in the formation of impressions of others. In this next section we review emerging theoretical models of multiple categorization before outlining an integrative theoretical perspective that provides a framework for understanding contemporary social categorization.

Representational implications In their theory of (personal) social identity complexity, Roccas and Brewer (2002) suggest that individuals vary in the complexity they ascribe to their own social identities. Whereas some individuals perceive that they belong to multiple social groups that are correlated, undifferentiated, and overlapping, other individuals perceive incongruence among their social identities which may be acknowledged and integrated to form more complex networks of self-definition. A number of situational and motivational determinants, as well as differences in individual cognitive style, influence the likelihood that the individual engages effortful processes aimed at integrating his or her multiple conflicting identities, and the complexity of the individual’s social experiences is one primary determinant. Like Roccas and Brewer, research on the perception of intra-category differentiation (the way in which we perceive the similarities and differences between group members) has supported the idea that perceiving multiple identities is associated with a more complex and differentiated perception of groups. Research by Park, Ryan, and Judd (1992) has shown that making perceivers aware of the multiple subgroup clusters that exist within a group can lead to a reduced tendency for outgroups to be perceived as homogeneous, and that repeated use of subgroups can result in the development of a more heterogeneous group representation. Category complexity at intra-group levels can therefore have a direct effect on more specific stereotypic views of groups. Integration of multiple identities can also have beneficial implications for intergroup relations when one group membership is shared with the perceiver. The crossed categorization model (Crisp, Ensari, Hewstone, & Miller, 2002) details the implications of emphasizing a

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shared identity that cuts across an existing intergroup dichotomy. As suggested by SCT, one salient basis for social categorization causes an accentuation of between-group differences (Campbell, 1956; Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). In contrast, crosscutting representations weaken the salience of the “us” versus “them” category distinction. For example, national categorization can cause an accentuation of differences between American and British nationals. However, when both American and British nationals are also female, and gender is salient, then (relative to males) American females and British females will be perceived as more similar. For British females, then, other British females are “double ingroup” members, British males and American females are “mixed” ingroup/outgroup members, and American males are “double outgroup” members. Research into crossed categorization has identified different patterns of evaluation across the four composite groups formed from crossing two dimensions of categorization. Six main patterns that have been observed (Brewer, Ho, Lee, & Miller, 1987; Hewstone, Islam, & Judd, 1993) and several moderators have been identified that predict when each of the varied patterns of evaluation will be observed. Generally speaking, the baseline “additive pattern” specifies that double ingroups are evaluated more positively than double outgroups, with mixed groups evaluated in between these two extremes. Detailed reviews of the remaining patterns and the conditions under which they are observed can be found in Crisp et al., 2002 (see also Crisp & Hewstone, 1999, 2006, 2007; Urban & Miller, 1998). Notwithstanding crossed categorization’s ability to model a variety of real and complex intergroup settings, a key finding has been its differentiation-reducing, and correspondingly bias-reducing, effects (e.g., Crisp, Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001; Deschamps & Doise, 1978; Marcus-Newhall, Miller, Holtz, & Brewer, 1993; Vanbeselaere, 1991; for reviews see Crisp & Hewstone, 1999; Crisp, Hewstone, Richards, & Paolini, 2003; Mullen, Migdal, & Hewstone, 2001).

Processing implications Reduced differentiation is the key explanatory process that underlies contexts involving crossed categorizations (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). Making a second basis for categorization salient can (when that second basis is a crosscutting, or “common,” ingroup identity) reduce differentiation and corresponding bias (see also Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). But beyond relatively simple contexts that involve the introduction of a common ingroup (or crosscutting) identity, perceiving multiple identities can also lead to attitude change in an altogether different way – and it is this processing implication of complex categorization that is key to the integrative perspective we will go on to propose. Being compelled to consider multiple criteria for social categorization can, under the right conditions, reduce bias because of a complexity-induced shift in processing style (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007; Crisp, Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001; Hall & Crisp, 2005; Hutter & Crisp, 2005). Research has suggested that when individuals are motivated to consider multiple bases for categorization, they tend to engage in effortful inconsistency-resolution processes to ascertain the likely properties of the new conjunctive category (Hutter & Crisp, 2005, 2006; Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990). Causal reasoning processes then tend to result in perceptions of the conjunction as comprising emergent attributes, or attributes that are not contained in either category representation alone (Hutter & Crisp, 2005, 2006; Kunda et al., 1990).

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Richard J. Crisp and Angela T. Maitner Causal reasoning processes are undermined, however, when the individual’s cognitive resources are devoted elsewhere (Hutter & Crisp, 2006), and under these conditions, perceivers fall back on constituent attributes from each category to describe the category conjunction. Importantly, perceivers tend to engage in more effortful reasoning processes to the extent that category conjunctions are surprising (Kunda et al., 1990). Overall, however, research is strikingly consistent in suggesting that thinking about surprising category combinations elicits effortful processing strategies aimed at explaining or reconciling surprising information. The result is a perception of the category conjunction that is independent of the perception of the two simple constituent categories. Hastie, Schroeder, and Weber (1990) outlined a process model to explain how individuals create complex social categorizations from two simple categories. They suggest that, first, individuals should list attributes that result from a compromise or averaging of the two constituent categories. At some point, however, individuals should become aware that the average value of trait information is discrepant enough between constituent categories to activate a more effortful strategy of inconsistency resolution. Hutter, Crisp, Humphreys, Waters, and Moffitt (2008) have provided some initial support for this model by showing that in defining new, surprising category conjunctions, individuals first list constituent attributes and only after exhausting reasonable constituent attributes begin the process of inconsistency resolution resulting in the generation of emergent attributes. It is clear that perceiving multiple identities leads to a reduction in the use of any one categorical basis for evaluative judgment (Crisp, Hewstone, & Cairns, 2001; Hall & Crisp, 2005). Importantly, the reduced bias observed in these studies is not associated with measures of recategorization at a higher level of inclusiveness (e.g., perceptions of the aggregate as “one group”), but a more personalized and individuated way of viewing others (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Crisp and Hewstone (2007) argue that when category cues imply the need to construe the target along multiple dimensions, and where such a process will no longer satisfy efficacy or meaning-seeker motivations, categorization will be abandoned in favor of a more piecemeal and attention-focused impression-formation strategy (for empirical support see Crisp, Hewstone, & Cairns, 2001; Hutter & Crisp, 2006). This theoretical analysis has recently been extended to propose that the thought processes involved in the perception of multiple identities map directly onto dual process impression-formation continua (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1989), albeit with some subtle, yet important qualifications (Crisp, 2010). Most important is that while, functionally, the impact of perceiving multiple identities may lead to effects similar to “individuation,” it is more useful to think about this process as a more complex person construal along multiple dimensions. Thus, while the content of the construal in multiple-category contexts may be differentiated from what Fiske and Neuberg (1990) envisaged by their idea of individuated perception, the process (i.e., increased attention) will be the same. Repeatedly engaging in this process may lead to it becoming automatized as a kind of cognitive style, defining how one comes to form impressions of others in future (Crisp, in press; Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). Recently, we have shown that encountering surprising category combinations has implications for subsequent social judgments (Maitner & Crisp, 2009). More specifically, we find that thinking about surprising category combinations causes perceivers to employ more

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effortful processing strategies when forming an impression of a subsequently presented, novel individual. As a result, perceivers evidence a reduced correspondence bias and a reliance on diagnostic situational cues to infer what the new individual is like. This finding offers evidence for the idea that exposure to multiple identities may have benefits beyond intergroup relations (for a more detailed exposition of this argument see Crisp & Turner, in press).

The Situated Cognition Approach Both the social cognitive and self-categorization theories that we discussed earlier, to a greater or lesser extent, acknowledge flexibility in social categorization, at least in terms of specifying how both internal (motivations) and external (context) factors interact to determine how the process works. As we noted, however, both have difficulties accounting for evidence that people can think about and use more complex category conjunctions in person perception (indeed, the concept of functional antagonism eschews such phenomena). There is one class of emerging theories, however, that can account for both flexibility in terms of context sensitivity and perceiver motivations, as well as category conjunctions. Theories of situated cognition (e.g. Smith & Semin, 2007) expand on the notion that categorization, rather than being a fixed and rigid process, is contextually and motivationally sensitive. Indeed, Smith and Semin (2007) assert that “stereotypes … flexibly reflect a perceiver’s current social motives and relationships with others in the situation rather than representing abstract and stable schemas” (p. 133). This implies that if people learn about categories from a variety of different episodes and if that category knowledge becomes grounded in situational knowledge, then different situations should activate different information about the category (Yeh & Barsalou, 1996, 2006). Smith and Semin’s (2007) situated cognition approach asserts three main principles for the conceptualization of categorization. First, they suggest that categorization and stereotypes be conceptualized as constructed online and in specific contexts. Rather than being fixed structures that can be stored and retrieved, stereotypes have context-specific configurations that are activated in appropriate conditions. Second, Smith and Semin suggest that researchers acknowledge that adaptive cognition utilizes “perceptual-motor loops that pass through the environment (Clark, 1997) rather than being mostly implemented by autonomous inner processes” (p. 134). In other words, they point out that cognition is shaped by and responsive to environmental influences. Finally, Smith and Semin suggest that theories of situated cognition include discussion of the socially shared nature of cognition, which is enabled and distributed through communication. How we categorize ourselves and others, and the traits and characteristics we ascribe to group members, are importantly influenced by others’ perceptions. This view of category representation – as situated in, shaped by, and responsive to contextual influences – is essential for understanding how and why categorization and stereotyping vary across people, contexts, and situations; and, critically, how category combinations can emerge from stored, yet context-sensitive, representations. In short, it is the only account that is fully consistent with theoretical accounts of, and evidence for, multiple social categorization.

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Richard J. Crisp and Angela T. Maitner However, we believe the story does not end here – in the next section we argue that the processes that underlie the situated cognition approach have emerged from increasing societal complexity and the need for cognitive systems to most functionally deal with such changes. In other words, we argue that exposure to multiple categorizations has produced the sort of categorization flexibility detailed by the situated cognition perspectives.

Acquired Categorization Flexibility The situated cognition approach provides a theoretical account of social categorization theory that details how both internal (motivations) and external (context) factors determine how the self and others are categorized. Specifically, this approach maintains categorization as a contextually and motivationally sensitive process, producing a highly flexible and adaptive mechanism for navigating the social world, one that can account for the emergence of new, conjunctive categorizations and stereotypes. We argue that the emergence of this conceptualization of social categorization as a more fluid, dynamic process reflects broad societal trends toward less rigid and coherent national, geographic, and social boundaries. As social psychology has developed as a discipline, society has changed dramatically. Increased multiculturalism is the result of simplified transportation between countries, as well as factors of global uncertainty including economic instability and war. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that in the first half of 2008, over 120,000 individuals claimed asylum in Europe while over 42,200 claimed asylum in the U.S. and Canada (UNHCR, 2008). This sort of movement introduces developed, Western cultures to individuals from more war-torn, economically unstable, and generally less tolerant regions. It likewise introduces asylum seekers to drastically different ideologies and ways of life that require a tremendous amount of adaptation. Including all forms of movement, the number of people born overseas is 4.9 million (8.3% of the population) in the U.K. (National Statistics, 2001), and 33.5 million (12% of the population) in the U.S. (US National Census, 2004). Just as Western societies are becoming more multicultural, with workplaces and communities becoming more diverse, so too must we adopt categorization strategies that are most apt for dealing with this new and emerging social context. There is now extensive empirical support for the view that multiple identities exert a significant impact at a societal level (e.g., Stryker & Statham, 1985; see Deaux, 1996, for a review). An increasing number of individuals claim more than one ethnic identity, racial identification, and source of cultural competence (Phinney & Alipuria, 2006). To deal with these new realities, respondents to some national census questions are now permitted to assert their multiple identities on official forms (Daniel, 2002). How do we react to the convoluted intricacies of everyday social classification in such settings? The research on multiple categorization that we reviewed earlier provides a point of synthesis through which we can link the situated cognition account of social categorization – the psychological – to broader societal and crosscultural trends – the social. We argue that the shift in categorization style observed by Crisp and colleagues (Crisp, Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001; Hall & Crisp, 2005; Hutter & Crisp, 2005) within individuals is reflective of a

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broader societal trend that requires people to adopt a situated cognition approach to function adequately in complex social environments. In fact, evidence for such adaptation already exists – and can be found in the literature on cross-cultural psychology.

The Etiology of Flexibility To date, theories of categorization have been based on the premise that social categorization is an application of basic cognitive processes to social phenomenon. However, we argue the opposite causal direction can also operate: chronic changes in social environments are likely to impact fundamental categorization tendencies. In other words, social context should not simply change which categories are activated or how those categories are perceived, but it should change how individuals psychologically engage with their social world. We contend that exposure to category complexity, and particularly to individuals who are members of uncorrelated multiple categories (i.e., that cannot be reconciled on the basis of existing stereotypic representations such as gender and occupation), changes the way that individuals go about the task of social categorization. To understand fully the nature of social categorization we must therefore take into account the changing nature of cultures and societies. This brings us to research into the cognitive impacts of being bicultural.

Biculturalism Benet-Martínez, Lee, and Leu (2006) asked Anglo American (monocultural) and Chinese American (bicultural) college students to write ten statements describing either American culture, Chinese culture, or, in a control condition, natural landscapes. They found that compared to the control condition, biculturals’ descriptions of Chinese and American cultures was more complex than monoculturals’ descriptions along three dimensions. First, they were higher in density; i.e., biculturals’ descriptions contained more words and distinct ideas, were more likely to discuss time-related and dynamic trends, and were higher in overall complexity. Second, they were more abstract, referring more to cultural values than physical entities like food and sport. Third, and most important for our thesis, they were more likely to include multiple perspectives, in which different ideas were compared and contrasted. These findings suggest that biculturals have more complex representations of culture (both minority and mainstream) than monoculturals as a result of the greater experience of perceptions of conflict between the two cultures. The greater the perceived difference between the two cultures, the greater the conflict, and the more cognitively complex the processing of information about culture. Tadmor and Tetlock (2006) proposed a model that outlines how exposure to conflicting categorizations leads to a more generalized capacity and willingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of competing perspectives on an issue, and to forge conceptual links among these perspectives (“integrative complexity”; Suedfeld & Bluck, 1993). They argue that individuals who internalize the values of both cultures, becoming bicultural, rather than adhering to

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Richard J. Crisp and Angela T. Maitner the values of just one culture, require an integrative perspective (Berry, 1997), and that this will lead to higher integrative complexity. According to Tadmor and Tetlock (2006), we typically use perceptual schemas to process information related to a familiar cultural context, allowing us to behave and respond to others appropriately while filtering out irrelevant information. When exposed to a new and unfamiliar culture we are, however, unable to rely on this kind of heuristic processing. Instead, we switch from a heuristic to systematic mode of attention, focusing on information that we would have previously filtered out. This increased focus of attention will increase the likelihood that differences between cultures will be noticed (e.g., Triandis, Brislin, & Hui, 1998). Accountability plays a role in which acculturation strategy an individual will choose at this point. They may feel accountable – i.e., feel pressure to justify their thoughts and actions in accordance with shared norms – to just one culture (resulting in assimilation or separation) or they may feel accountable to both cultures (resulting in biculturalism). The meeting of two differing cultures will lead to value conflict, which may be stressful for individuals as they try to reconcile, or choose between, competing values. As different facets of a new culture are encountered over time, each demanding conflict resolution and subsequent internalization, the integrative complexity process will be generalized to a broader range of experiences. Research on learning has shown that individuals tend to employ a model of resolution that has been useful in the past, even if removed from the original context in which the mode of resolution was learnt (Strickler & Bonnefil, 1974). If the resolution technique is repeatedly positively reinforced, it will become the dominant response style of an individual when he or she comes across a new situation that evokes dissonance.

A Diversity-driven Social Categorization Theory Tadmor and Tetlock’s (2006) model is informative because it helps frame the findings showing the development of a more flexible categorization style in bicultural individuals. This in turn helps to illustrate how social environments can produce changes in cognitive style. Bringing this together with the theoretical accounts we have discussed in this chapter, it is possible to conceptualize a social categorization theory that is derived directly from changes in one’s social environment. When our social contexts change in ways that challenge our expectations we have to adapt cognitively. For instance, biculturals have to resolve the inconsistency associated with two uncomplementary identities (Benet-Martínez et al., 2006). This process can involve effortful inconsistency-resolution processing that departs considerably from the more simple, heuristic-based processing that is all that is required in social environments defined by more structured, rigid, and coherent categorical structures (of the type outlined by Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). For instance, Hutter and Crisp (2005) found that it was not just multiple identities, but specifically unrelated multiple identities comprising conjunctive categories that reduced stereotyping, and Hall and Crisp (2005) found the same with respect to prejudice (i.e., bias was reduced against a target on one dimension by virtue of considering multiple unrelated additional outgroup categorizations). Consistent with Tadmor and Tetlock’s model, over time the need to engage in cognitively demanding conflict resolution will produce not

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only a complex social identity (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), but a learned, internalized, more flexible approach to categorization that can generalize to a broader range of experiences (Crisp & Turner, 2009). We contend that this approach is consistent with what is described in the situated cognition account of social categorization – and that the latter follows from societal changes defined by increasing diversity. Exposure to diversity that challenges expectations should slowly change individuals’, groups’, and societies’ representations of those who comprise that society. Investigating the veracity of this proposed social and cultural diversitydefined social categorization theory will be a challenging endeavor for future research, and will likely require contributions from, amongst others, social, cognitive, cross-cultural, developmental, and political psychologists.

Conclusion In this chapter we have provided a historical overview of the development of social categorization theory, described contemporary conceptualizations, and provided a novel account of flexible, context-sensitive categorization processes. We argue that this account of social categorization theory can be traced back directly to broader societal trends, particularly those showing that Western societies are becoming more multicultural, diverse, and complex. Bringing together social psychological, cognitive, and cross-cultural perspectives, we outlined an integrated model of the emergence of flexible categorization. From exposure to multiple identities and the need to integrate those identities follows social identity complexity and integrative complexity in cognition. This, we argue, is a process that results in a functional and flexible approach to social categorization.

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Social Categorization Theories others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 31–44. Fiske, S. T. (1980). Attention and weight in person perception: The impact of negative and extreme behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 889–906. Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1989). Category-based and individuating processes as a function of information and motivation: Evidence from our laboratory. In D. Bar-Tal, C. F. Graumann, A. W. Kruglanski, & W. Stroebe (Eds.), Stereotyping and prejudice: Changing conceptions (pp. 83–104). New York: Springer. Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation from category based to individuating process: Influences of information and motivation on attention an interpretation. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 1–74). New York: Academic Press. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2000). Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup identity model. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis. Garcia-Marques, L., & Mackie, D. M. (1999). The impact of stereotype-incongruent information on perceived group variability and stereotype change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 979–990. Hall, N. R., & Crisp, R. J. (2005). Considering multiple criteria for social categorization can reduce intergroup bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1435–1444. Hamilton, D. L., & Rose, T. L. (1980). Illusory correlation and the maintenance of stereotypic beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 832–845. Hamilton, D. L., & Sherman, J. W. (1994). Stereotypes. In R. S. Wyer, & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (2nd ed., pp. 1–68). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Hamilton, D. L., & Trolier, T. K. (1986). Stereotypes and stereotyping: An overview of the cognitive approach. In J. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 127–163). New York: Academic Press. Haslam, S. A., Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., McGarty, C., & Hayes, B. K. (1992). Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 1: The effects of intergroup relations as mediated by social change and frame of reference. European Journal of Social Psychology, 22, 3–20.

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Mullen, B., Migdal, M. J., & Hewstone, M. (2001). Crossed categorization versus simple categorization and intergroup evaluations: A meta-analysis. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 721–736. Mussweiler, T., Gabriel, S., & Bodenhausen, G. (2000). Shifting social identities as a strategy for deflecting threatening social comparisons. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 398–409. National Statistics (2001). People and migration: Foreignborn. Retrieved August 17, 2007 from http://www.statistics. gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1312 Newman, L. S., Duff, K., Schnopp-Wyatt, N., Brock, B., & Hoffman, Y. (1997). Reactions to the O.J. Simpson verdict: “Mindless tribalism” or motivated inference processes? Journal of Social Issues, 53, 547–562. Oakes, P. J., Turner, J. C., & Haslam, S. A. (1991) Perceiving people as group members: The role of fit in the salience of social categorizations. British Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 125–144. Onorato, R. S., & Turner, J. C. (2004). Fluidity in the selfconcept: The shift from personal to social identity. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 257–278. Park, B., & Rothbart, M. (1982). Perceptions of out-group homogeneity and levels of social categorization: Memory for the subordinate attributes of in-group and out-group members. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 1051–1068. Park, B., Ryan, C. S., & Judd, C. M. (1992). The role of meaningful subgroups in explaining differences in perceived variability of in-groups and out-groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 553–567. Phinney, J. S., & Alipuria, L. L. (2006). Multiple social categorization and identity among multiracial, multiethnic, and multicultural individuals: Processes and implications (pp. 211–238). In R. J. Crisp & M. Hewstone (Eds.), Multiple social categorization: Processes, models and applications. Hove, U.K.: Psychology Press (Taylor & Francis). Piaget, J., & Weil, A.-M. (1951). The development in children of the idea of the homeland and of relations with other countries. International Social Science Bulletin, 3, 570. Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social identity complexity. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 88–106. Rothbart, M., Evans, M., & Fulero, S. (1979). Recall for confirming events: Memory processes and the maintenance of social stereotypes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 15, 343–355.

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Social Categorization Theories Suedfeld, P., & Bluck, S. (1993). Changes in integrative complexity accompanying significant life events: Historical evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 124–130. Tadmor, C. T., & Tetlock, P. E. (2006). Biculturalism: A model of the effects of second-culture exposure on acculturation and integrative complexity. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 37, 173–190. Tajfel, H. (1959). Quantitative judgement in social perception. British Journal of Psychology, 50, 16–29. Tajfel, H. (1978). Social categorization, social identity and social comparison. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 61–76). London: Academic Press. Tajfel, H., & Wilkes, A. L. (1963). Classification and quantitative judgement. British Journal of Psychology, 54, 101–113. Taylor, S. E. (1981). A categorization approach to stereotyping. In D. L. Hamilton (Ed.), Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior (pp. 83–114). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Taylor, S. E., Fiske, S. T., Etkoff, N. L., & Ruderman, A. J. (1978). Categorical and contextual bases of person memory and stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 778–793. Triandis, H. C., Brislin, R., & Hui, C. H. (1998). Crosscultural training across the individualism–collectivism divide. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 12, 269–289. Turner, J. C. (1982). Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Social identity and intergroup relations (pp. 15–40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Turner, J. C. (1985). Social categorization and the selfconcept: A social-cognitive theory of group behavior. In E. J. Lawler (Ed.), Advances in group processes: Theory and research (Vol. 2, pp. 77–122). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Turner, J. C. (1999). Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization theories. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds.), Social identity (pp. 6–34). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell.

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11

Symbolic Interactionism: From Gestalt to Cybernetics Andreas Schneider

Core Assumptions of Symbolic Interactionism Charles Cooley (1864–1929) and George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) are seen as the founding fathers of Symbolic Interactionism (SI). The term SI, however, was coined by Herbert Blumer (1900–87), a student of Mead and an interpreter of his work. While over the sixty-plus years of SI different foci and extensions were developed, there are three basic premises formulated by Blumer that all symbolic interactionists agree upon: 1. The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them. 2. The second premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction one has with one’s fellows. 3. The third premise is that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters. (Blumer, 1969, p. 2) Humans are active creators of reality. They have a strong motivation to make sense of their world. Humans have developed methodologies for the investigation of meanings and their organization (Heider, 1958). In this interpretation they adapt to reality. Like researchers, they strive for an accurate description of reality. Unlike researchers, they have to use shortcuts in the creation of reality in order to reach the most efficient basis for their actions. Meanings are not innate, as assumed in theories of instinct, neither within the entity that is perceived nor in the person who is the perceiver. Meanings are acquired socially, either directly from others, or indirectly, from assuming the other’s perspective.

Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Since we are not communicating telepathically, there has to be a medium for our communication. Without a symbol we cannot abstract from the physical entity. Without being able to abstract from physical reality we cannot learn its meaning. The medium of thought and communication is any symbol that we can use to signify the meaning of an entity. A symbol is any sign that conveys meaning: language, gestures, text, pictures, rites, dress. Just as meaning is not innate to an entity, a symbol is not innate to a meaning. Symbols are socially constructed. The degree to which symbols are shared can be used to identify and/or define culture. At the latest with the onset of puberty the most central question in our development is the question of who we are, the investigation of our self (Erikson, 1959). To the extent that others are involved in the acquisition of meaning about ourselves we internalize our social environment in ourselves. Even in a conversation with ourselves (thinking) we interact: we engage in conversation between aspects of ourselves whose meanings are generated socially. If new meanings are acquired they have to be evaluated and contextualized within the existing meanings. These new meanings then become integrated into the perception of reality. With maturity, beliefs are shattered by personal experiences and we seek to obtain meanings that more accurately describe ourselves and our environment. The smallest unit of observation in SI is the event. At minimum an event consists of an actor, an action, and an object of her action. We can also choose to scrutinize an event in its full complexity, adding the emotions or traits of the actor, the object person, and the location of the event to our investigation. Every aspect of this event is a social sentiment. Every sentiment can be seen as a coin with two sides, one imbued with cognitive meaning, the other with affective meaning. Cognition and affect are two sides of the same coin (sentiment). Any symbolic interactionist investigation rests on one or the other side, or it takes both sides into account. Three basic assumptions, that people act on the basis of meanings they assign, meanings arise from social interaction, and meanings are modified through interpretation by the person, accurately describe the core of SI. The true complexity of symbolic interactionist thought can be described by differentiating the different phases in the development of SI that define stages at which diverse schools of thought or circles of people either blocked or inspired each other in the development of SI. The grandfathers of SI rooted their development of North American pragmatism in the German philosophies of Verstehen and Gestalt, the British theory of Darwinism, and some North American forms of behaviorism (Helle, 2007). This work was interpreted as SI by their students at Chicago, the fathers of SI. Focusing on human agency, this Chicago school fundamentally challenged the models of the human being as a puppet of structure and society, prevalent in the sociology of the 1950s and 1960s. While this new perspective was certainly refreshing, it overshot its point and soon there was a countermovement – the Iowa school – that stressed social structure in SI, which was obviously neglected. Later, symbolic interactionists at Indiana successfully integrated ideas of agency and structure. The dichotomy of agency and structure was superseded by cybernetic models that take agency and structure and their recursive interdependence into account. Qualitative and quantitative methodologies are not seen as agonistic, supporting either processual or structural forms of SI; they are seen as equally important or even complementary.

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The Grandfathers The works of Cooley (1902/1970) and Mead (1913, 1922) which established the foundations of SI can be divided into four interrelated research agendas: achieving a synthesis of behaviorism and pragmatism, the distinction between the physical environment and the socially constructed reality as a basis for action, the interrelationship between perception and action, and the interaction between self and society.

Philosophical background The Gestalt perspective that originated in the works of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) centrally dealt with the emergence of meaning. Like their German contemporaries Georg Simmel (1858–1918) and Max Weber (1864–1920), Cooley and Mead were strongly influenced by the Gestalt perspective. While largely unaware of Weber’s sociology of Verstehen, Cooley and Mead – the grandfathers of SI – became part of the pragmatist school that shared the basic idea that meaning is not an objective reality inherent in the entity that is perceived; instead, meaning is subjectively constructed. The different criteria in the construction of meaning and the selection of meaning as being relevant and remembered were later integrated by the fathers of SI. Unlike their German colleagues Simmel and Weber, Mead and Cooley were strongly influenced by the behaviorism in their U.S. contemporary John Watson (1878–1958). Contrary to Watson, Mead argues that mental events can be observed and, therefore, be subject to behaviorist investigation. While behaviorism assumes that there is a reality of the observed behavior that is shared between the researcher and the subject, the pragmatist school sees the reality to which humans respond as subjective and not necessarily shared. The merger of pragmatist and behaviorist ideas by Cooley and Mead into social behaviorism created the foundation of SI. Gestalt perspective The concept of Gestalt and early Gestalt theory can be traced back to eighteenth-century German philosophy, specifically to the German idealism of Kant, and even further to the Weimar classicism of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller. Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), the founder of modern phenomenology, was a good friend and frequent correspondent with the American psychologist and philosopher William James (1842–1910), one of the architects of U.S. pragmatism. Stumpf was also the doctoral advisor of Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), whom many consider as the founding father of social psychology. Lewin and Max Wertheimer (1880–1943) further developed the Gestalt perspective. As influential researchers at the Frankfurt school (Institut für Sozialforschung at Frankfurt University) they emigrated to the United States in 1933. The basic premise of the Gestalt perspective is that the whole is different than the sum of its parts (Koffka, 1935; Lewin, 1936). Our senses use their input to engage in a form-forming task – Gestalt – which provides meaning that, once it has emerged, can be set into the context of other meanings. Gestalt hereby becomes a holistic entity that is entirely different from the sensory inputs that triggered its emergence.

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The Gestalt perspective has at least three major influences on SI. Philosophically the main concern of Gestalt perspective is the creation of meaning, a central property of the sociology of Verstehen that influenced SI (Mead, 1927; Weber, 1922/1985). With its emphasis on perception, the Gestalt perspective is essential for the investigation of the nature of symbols and their communication. Through its influence on cognitive social psychology the Gestalt perspective later indirectly influences the developments in SI (Heider, 1958). These three indirect influences of the Gestalt perspective on SI are summarized in the following schematic: Gestalt → Verstehen → SI Gestalt → Perception → SI Gestalt → Cognition → Cognitive Social Psychology → SI Extending and applying Gestalt theory, Fritz Heider (1896–1988) centrally influenced the modern field of social cognition. Formulating attribution theory, he provided the groundwork for understanding the human processing and rendering of meaning (Heider, 1944). With his balance theory Heider (1958) laid out the basic dynamics in impression-formation equation research (Gollob, 1968; Triandis & Fishbein, 1963) that, in turn, provides the basis for the mathematical rendering of social events employed in the most recent mathematically operationalized versions of SI. Verstehen Verstehen is an inner experience that is contrasted to apprehension (begreifen), the intellectual ability that is not internalized. Verstehen is differentiated into objective meaningful understanding on one hand and interpretation on the other (Helle, 2007, p. 14). Verstehen is based on Kant’s (1781) assumption that a picture of reality can only be gained by an autonomous act in the mind of the observer. In analogy to Kant, Simmel regards society to be understood not on its empirical base alone, but the meaningful understanding of the observer. It is argued that Simmel hereby not only presents the basic outline of a socialpsychological theory of action, but “he anticipates the central category of Mead’s social psychology, the concept of the ’generalized other’ ” (Schnabel, 1976, p. 299). As an expert on Kant, Simmel communicated Kant’s ideas to Weber, one of the most prominent founding fathers of the sociology of Verstehen. Together with his sociology of culture, Verstehen provided a fertile ground for the later development of SI. According to Stryker, Verstehen is “obviously related to Cooley’s method of sympathetic introspection” (1980/2002, p. 43). Behaviorism The groundwork for behaviorism, the idea that a response could be elicited by an unrelated stimulus, was established in classical conditioning and operant conditioning by Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936). Watson established the scientific perspective of behaviorism (1913). B. F. Skinner (1904–90) later added operant conditioning that focuses on voluntary behavior. The scientific perspective of behaviorism, with its exclusive focus on directly observable entities, was largely a reaction against Sigmund Freud’s (1856–1939) psychoanalytic model.

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Andreas Schneider Freud’s model assumed that only trained psychologists were able to tap into the unconscious of the patient that was the sole motivator of action. This assumption of psychoanalytic psychology made the Freudian psychologist a superior being who was able to read from reported dreams like the fortune-teller from her coffee grounds or tarot cards. Everyone else, the scientist of different training or – God forbid – the layperson or patient herself, was excluded from the investigation of the motivation of human behavior. Just like the previous idea that the human mind and conduct are the result of instincts, Freud’s concept of the unconscious spoiled the possibility of an objective scientific investigation of the mind. In his vigorous reaction against Freud and the instinct approach, Watson excluded anything non-observable from scientific analysis. In this overreaction he threw out the baby with the bathwater and thereby provided a fertile starting point for counteraction. It was not so much the direct influence of Watson’s behaviorism, but the philosophical pragmatism that adopted behaviorist ideas into SI. Mead was familiar with the work of William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859–1952) who, with Charles Sandler Peirce (1839–1914), created a philosophical pragmatism that Mead adopted in his ideas of social behaviorism. It was, however, much later that more rigidly formalized models of SI met the empirical/ methodological demands of behaviorism. New models of identity (e.g., Stryker, 1987) and cybernetic versions of SI (e.g., Heise, 1987) were able to empirically operationalize models of human mind and action. Hereby contemporary SI not only met, but significantly extended the methodological rigidity and operationalization of behaviorism.

Social learning theory Bandura (1973, 1977; Bandura & Huston, 1961; Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961) overcame the assumption of the blind trial-and-error learning of behaviorism by demonstrating that people learn by observation and imitation. This new form of behaviorism is often called social learning theory. Since people have to process and store information, if they learn from models, the radical stimulus response psychology (S→R) of behaviorism was extended into taking the person’s mind into account. The black box, which was purposely abandoned by early behaviorists and which provided the core for Mead’s investigations, could no longer be ignored by modern behaviorism. Behaviorist S→P psychology was extended into the S→O→R psychology of social learning theory, where the O stands for the organism that mediates between the environmental stimulus and the observed response. If we extend social learning theory with the assumption that people internalize their environment by assuming themselves to be seen by others, responses become social constructions that, in turn, serve as stimuli for others to construct social reality. We add three basic concepts that were central to Mead’s social psychology: the self, the generalized other, and the principles of socialization. Mead’s reflection of early behaviorism was guided by two major tenets: human behavior is goal-oriented and scientific investigation has to restrict itself to the study of actual observable behavior. Introducing the concepts of mind, and specifically the cognitive evaluation and interpretation of the observable, into behaviorism through social learning theory included the core symbolic interactionist interest. Hereby, however, social learning theory

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had to revolutionize the basic premise of the original forms of behaviorism: the ignorance of everything that stands between the directly observable stimulus and its associated response. Developments Having introduced the main philosophical and theoretical backgrounds of Cooley and Mead, it can be demonstrated how they drew on these influences to build the foundations of SI. First, their further development of pragmatism is important in the investigation of symbols and interaction. Second, their development of two core aspects, “symbol” and “interaction,” was chosen to name the approach of SI. Third, they created a concept of self and identity that not only statically defines people who enter the interaction, but dynamically demonstrates how interaction shapes self and identity, and how concepts of self and society interconnect. Philosophy: pragmatism Peirce’s contribution to pragmatism was not immediately recognized during his lifetime. James, a friend of Peirce at Harvard, and Dewey, a student of Peirce at Johns Hopkins, were essential to the later recognition of pragmatist ideas that became important to Mead. Pragmatism is strongly influenced by ideas of the Gestalt perspective and phenomenology. While James considered Simmel to be a German pragmatist (Jerusalem, 1913), Scheler had already (1926) reported that pragmatism had no future in Germany, where soon it was widely rejected as being surpassed by contemporary German philosophers. The fertile development of Mead and Cooley could not make pragmatism blossom in Germany. Despite its German and British roots, pragmatism became known as a North American school of philosophy. Pragmatism sees the social and physical world as an environment that presents opportunities and obstacles to the individual. The individual is not an instinct-driven animal, or, as later assumed, a puppet following the norms and roles provided by social institutions, but an active, knowledge-seeking and goal-oriented being. Free in choosing these activities, the individual creates “truths” of limited scope and duration and thereby adapts to “the Truth,” which is inaccessible. The idea of the individual as being in the quest for knowledge – temporary truths – is rooted in the neo-Kantian philosophy of Verstehen. The quest for knowledge, combined with the pragmatic selection criteria of truth, is seen as the fundamental underlying principle for both scientific inquiry and the everyday interactions of “laypeople.” Later, the idea that scientific investigation and everyday action follow the same principles would be the source of fundamental debates within the discipline: Do we act and function like rational scientists in our everyday interaction? Can scientific inquiry be any more rational than the investigation of the layperson in everyday life? What biases our rationality? There are four basic premises in the pragmatist investigation of the social world (Charon, 2007, pp. 31–32). The first two premises show obvious commonalities with behaviorism: (1) “In their study of the human being pragmatists focus on human action that occurs in a given situation.” (2) “Knowledge is learned, remembered, and applied according to its utility.”

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Andreas Schneider The second two premises are developed from the Gestalt perspective. They show commonalities with the sociology of Verstehen and can be interpreted as a constructive critique of behaviorism: (3) “Humans respond to their environment indirectly through their interpretation.” (4) “In a given situation usefulness of objects influences what humans select to notice.” Mead’s pragmatism has to be set in the context of behaviorism, which is seen as the second main influence on his foundation of symbolic interaction. Before we can discuss the merger between pragmatism and behaviorism we have to address the nature and importance of the symbol. Symbol Meaning does not fall from the sky. Even if it fitted, a tree cannot be inserted into our head; it has to be represented by a symbol to be processed. Both the meaning of things and the symbols referring to them have to be constructed and shared. Communication is the exchange of symbols. If we use body gestures, speech, written language, facial expression, or a gentle touch, we use symbols as media to convey meaning. There are five major properties of a symbol: (1) (2) (3) (4)

Literally, symbols stand for something (meaning). Symbols are constructed objects that, as social products, are real entities. Symbols are intentionally used in communication to produce responses. For Mead (1922), significant symbols ideally arouse a similar response in the person who employs them and the person who perceives them. (5) If we use symbols to assess, communicate, and construct meaning we construct and reconstruct culture. Only if we share meaning and its correspondent symbols do we share culture, and vice versa. Symbols become intrasubjective by being culturally shared. Symbols are the media of any action. Model of action: social behaviorism SI extends the model of action of behaviorism – stimuli elicit responses that in turn serve as stimuli – with the idea that stimuli are represented and exchanged as symbols. Since symbols are recognized, constructed, modified, and presented in a purposeful and systematic manner, a theory about mental processes has to mediate the stimulus–response relationship. Cooley (1926) achieved the synthesis of behaviorism and pragmatism. He distinguished between the physical environment and the sociocultural environment as being two forms of knowledge: objective or spatial knowledge and social knowledge. Social knowledge “requires Verstehen – the ability to re-create interpretatively – and has an essentially dramatic structure, characterized by role play, communication in symbols, and the representation of action that does not take place physically” (Helle, 2007, p. 42). Cooley hereby described the process of symbolic interaction and laid down the metaphor of stage, the key feature of Erving Goffman’s (1922–82) work.

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Social behaviorism focuses on objective, outwardly visible behavior as an independent phenomenon. By treating visible behavior as a representation of symbols that refer to cultural knowledge and which communicate and create cultural knowledge, Cooley went beyond established behaviorists. The stimulus (S) of the classic S→R (response) behaviorism was thereby transformed into a socially constructed symbol, creating a culture-specific stimulus that can be openly observed as objective reality. Gestalt perspective, with its emphasis on perception, influenced early symbolic interactionists in their investigation of the organism and its representation of its environment. SI thereby provides a much more detailed theoretical investigation of the organism’s role as a mediator between stimulus and response than social learning theory. The stimulus is mediated through cognition and culture and becomes an observable symbol which, through cultural interpretation, elicits a response. The symbol thereby replaces the stimulus as an objective, measurable entity. In analogy to the S→R representation of behaviorism, social behaviorism might be formularized as: Behaviorism: Social Learning Theory: Process within the organism (O): Social Behaviorism: S: Stimulus R: Response O: Organism CC: Cognition and Culture SY: Symbol

S→R S→O→R CC → SY → CC S → CC → SY → CC → R

The role of cognition and culture, their reciprocal relationship, and their interrelationships with the symbol later become the basis for vigorous discussion and, as in the case of postmodernism, substantive areas of interest. Becoming the socially constructed and objectively observable representation of reality, the symbol becomes the central property of social behaviorism, so central that the terminology of SI – later coined by Mead’s student Blumer – indeed seems most appropriate. Having introduced pragmatism as a philosophical background, symbols as a means of abstract communication, and social behaviorism as a model of action, there is one important aspect missing in the introduction of the foundation of SI: the concept of self that people bring into the interaction and which is shaped by interaction.

Theories about identity, self and society Cooley: looking-glass self Drawing on James (1915), Cooley and Mead saw the self as an adjustment process that reflects the person and society. Cooley assumes that self and society are two realities interacting on the same plane of experience. His concept of the looking-glass self has three elements: “the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and some sort of self-feeling” (Cooley, 1902/1970, p. 184). The looking-glass self becomes the essential idea that makes the self a social entity. This

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Andreas Schneider recursive model of the society and the person links the emergence of self-esteem to the social environment of the individual. Socialization and deviance Through the course of socialization children learn to take others into consideration when they act. Very much in congruence with behaviorism, Mead assumes that sanctions facilitate these behavioral patterns. Effective self-regulation is learned in games where children take the perspective of others rehearsing social roles. He anticipates the context of the reference group later developed by his student Tamotsu Shibutani (1920–2004). In the socialization process the individual identifies with the group in order to perceive herself. Very much in the tradition of Cooley’s looking-glass concept, she first has to become another person before she can become herself from her own perspective. “Mead derives the behavior of the individual from the expectations of others, in particular the expectations of the groups, calling these expectations the ‘Me’ ” (Helle, 2007, p. 62). Mead was criticized for treating the I as a residual category, a black box or leftover in a classification system (Kolb, 1944). The confusion among his Chicago students whom Mead addressed outside the lecture revealed an important social psychological foundation for the sociology of deviance (Mead, 1928). If the I and the me are congruent we have conformity. To the degree that there is divergence between the I and the me, we have two types of characters in an individual. Either we have people who are abnormal, whose pathological characters make them unable or unwilling to carry out cooperative activities, or the divergence between the I and the me can be an indicator of genius, a person who is able to order his life in such a way that he becomes an example for himself and others. Mead: moral development of the self Mead sees the self as the character or personality of a person. Over time, when new information is added, there is a disintegration of organization in our character. The self has to be acted upon in order to become a reflective self. In this reflective analysis, the self appears in consciousness. In the self-conscious state of reflective analysis, the self interacts with other selves and a new self emerges. “The growth of the self arises out of partial disintegration – the appearance of the different interests in the forum of reflection” (Mead, 1913, p. 379). This is the process that Mead calls moral development. It is interesting to argue that the failure to engage in self-reflective growth – “selfishness,” in Mead’s terms – is immoral. Mead: the self as a process Mead’s central concept of self created much confusion in secondary works on Mead’s social psychology. According to Shibutani (1988; Helle, 2007, p. 107), however, he used it in four different ways, switching from one usage to another without telling in which way he uses this central term. (1) “Generally when Mead uses the term ‘self ’ in any of his works he refers to the process of self-control.” (2) He uses “the ‘self ’ as an abstract object, the self concept.” (3) The self is seen as an abstract me, and as “an object formed in a particular historical context.” (4) In Mind, Self, and Society (1934), Mead uses the term self to refer to an individual’s unique personality formed through her adaptive behavior.

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Cooley’s concept of the self is too abstract for Mead, too spiritual. “Mead turns Cooley and James on their heads. For him the self is not mentalistic” (Denzin, 1992, p. 4). Drawing on Cooley’s recursive model of self and society, Mead concludes in his last work that “imaginations which people have of one another are the solid facts of society” (Mead, 1929–30/1964, p. 294). We create society, a physical objective reality that in turn forms our selves. In his chapter on the self, James (1910) provides a clear distinction between the self as “A) the self as known, or the me, the ‘empirical ego’ as it is sometimes called; and of B) the self as the knower, or the I, the ‘pure ego’ of certain authors” (1882/1915, p. 176). This macrocosm of self and society is integrated into the microcosm of the self in which, as for James, the personal pronouns of the I and the me designate the “subject” and “object phase” of a process in which the self emerges in action. The act begins with the individual’s adjustment to a situation that is disturbed. First, in the “subject phase,” the “I” reacts in immediate impulsive conduct. Becoming aware of her initial response, the individual enters the “object phase,” where she reflects upon herself as a me. Mead’s process of self is an integration of several classic schools of thought and an anticipation of contemporary computer simulation of SI: ●

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In his concept of the self Mead integrates the Darwinist thought of adaptation as the dynamic underlying the process of individual adjustment. With the concept that the I reacts to a disturbance and in action becomes aware as the me, Mead makes a much cleaner, empirically observable distinction between the phases that Freud described as the “conscious” and “unconscious.” The object phase in which the me emerges is modeled after the looking-glass self introduced by Cooley. With the social aspect of the me, Mead integrates the macrocosm in which the individual and her environment are in a recursive relationship. Mead follows the idea that we are most of the time in a fly-by-wire mode and only occasionally take over the rudder. The direction is determined by our current location and our anticipated destination. Hereby Mead anticipates modern models of tension reduction that originate in the work of Heider, who, like Mead, drew heavily on the Gestalt perspective. The cybernetic control process indicated in the logic of tension reduction and the production of the self can be combined into a generalized model of action that integrates all components of an event (actor, behavior, object, emotions, and location). Using the measurement model for affective meaning of Charles Osgood (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) and operationalizing the processing of meaning with research on impression formation (Gollob, 1968) leads to most recent development that allows for the computer simulation of SI (Heise, 1969, 1987, 2007).

The Fathers of SI at the Chicago School Between 1890 and 1950 American sociology was dominated by ideas of scholars at the University of Chicago (Helle, 2007). Dewey suggested Mead for a post in its department of philosophy, and he was duly appointed in 1894. Despite having published no major written

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Andreas Schneider works, Mead was invited to join the department because of his work on pragmatism. Even at Chicago Mead did not publish one single book, but only short essays. His focus on oral presentation and the excellence of his lectures created a following among students who, patching together lecture notes and original manuscripts, published four books after Mead’s death. These books were used in teaching at Chicago for two decades and influenced further works in SI.

Herbert Blumer (1900–87) After Mead’s death, his student Blumer continued his lectures as a junior assistant lecturer. He became the chief interpreter of Mead’s work in Chicago. Mead’s work was not always accessible. Central concepts, like the self, were used in very different ways or, as in the case of the relationship between the I and the me, needed clarification for the students who went beyond the printed work of Mead or even beyond the lectures. Sometimes explanations were given one-on-one or in small groups in Mead’s office hours (Helle, 2007, p. 62). It was, therefore, not surprising that different interpretations of Mead’s work emerged and that Blumer soon saw himself as a central target of critique. Several symbolic interactionists even argued that Blumer’s SI showed significant differences to Mead’s social behaviorism (Denzin, 1992, p. 52). “The basic premises of Symbolic Interactionism have to have their empirical quality tested. If they cannot survive that test they … should be thrown ruthlessly aside” (Blumer, 1969, p. 49). What Blumer called empirical research had not much to do with the positivist idea of accurate and valid operationalization, replicable measurements and objective statistical analysis, and interpretation. Very much in direct opposition to established positivist premises, Blumer’s idea of empirical work was a naturalistic description, a subjective interpretation of meaning from the assumed perspective of the person in her everyday life. Working inductively from the individual’s perspective, Blumer’s methodological approach stood against traditional deductive empirical methods. Blumer’s SI was a revolution against the idea that people were merely puppets whose actions were determined by macro entities of norms and values. Methodologically and conceptually, Blumer’s revolution was radically different from the established sociology of its time and was therefore extremely refreshing. Already in his dissertation, C. Wright Mills (1942/1964) had criticized the neglect of Marx and Weber, of power and culture in Blumer’s SI. Arguably the best part of SI was established when researchers realized that individual and social structure are both important for any model of action and that process and structure are not independent, but recursively related. When symbolic interactionists followed Mills’s paradigm of the sociological imagination, when they stopped their quest for the correct literal interpretation of God’s (Mead’s) word, ignored the Pope (Blumer), and stepped back to reflect upon the important paradigm change that SI presented, they were able to overcome the obvious downfalls of Blumer’s revolution. The most important contribution of Blumer was to spread Mead’s work, rattle the cage of positivism and macro determinism, and open up the floodgates for fresh academic thought. While Blumer was certainly relevant for his colleagues and students at Chicago, his person should not be taken as synonymous with the Chicago school of SI of his time. In an

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interview in 1980, Goffman sees himself, Fred Davis, and Howard Becker most accurately called social ethnographers. He excludes Blumer as a person who never had the intention to do ethnography (Verhofen, 1993). Others speak of “ethnographers such as Howard Becker, Erving Goffman, and Anselm Strauss” (Katovich, Miller, & Stewart, 2003, p. 133).

Anselm Strauss (1916–96) Strauss applied SI to psychiatry in Chicago, where he received his doctorate in 1945. Later, he served as faculty in the Medical School of UC San Francisco. His medical background was important for his work on the social consequences of physical conditions. As a qualitative symbolic interactionist, Strauss uses his biographical methodology to capture personal and social histories. Here, the change of an identity is a willful process that is dependent on our social environment. The environment presents possibilities and the person chooses among these possibilities. His research on the disabled, their coping behavior, and their construction of self, parallels aspects of Goffman’s work. One of Strauss’s major contributions to SI was the integration of the micro and macro aspects of sociology. Here he furthers the work of Cooley and his concept of self idea, the concept an individual develops of herself by taking the perspective of another (Strauss, 1959). The social psychological concept of the self is hereby put into a social perspective that invites macro sociological thought to be integrated into a theory of the self. In his latest work he demonstrates the construction of self as the interplay between environmental opportunities and personal choices (Strauss, 1995).

Tamotsu Shibutani (1920–2004) Born in California, Shibutani is one of Blumer’s students, and a renowned expert in the interpretation of Mead’s work. Instead of worshiping Mead like a deity (Shibutani, 1988), as many other of his students at Chicago, he uses the original spirit of pragmatism that sees truth only as a temporary alignment between people’s thought and empirical reality. He puts Mead’s work into the context of theoretical developments. Shibutani knows, understands, and applies the German tradition of Verstehen and the epistemological position of Kant and Simmel. He sees the construction of social worlds as fully compatible with Weber’s idea that culture is reality seen from the point of view of a particular system of values (Weber, 1922/1985). Shibutani hereby “anticipates the approach taken by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman in their book The Social Construction of Reality (Berger & Luckman, 1966)” (Helle, 2007, p. 103).

Erving Goffman (1922–82) SI certainly influenced Goffman, but not as much as Goffman influenced SI. Resting on the looking-glass self idea of Cooley, which enables the social world to become part of the self, and the central assumption of Mead that the self is a malleable social development, Goffman adds the systematic of dramaturgy and the focus on institutions into an SI that transcends Blumer’s restrictive micro approach. It is, therefore, not surprising that Goffman himself rejected being labeled with Blumer’s term, symbolic interactionist.

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Andreas Schneider “Dramaturgy is the study of how human beings accomplish meaning in their lives” (Brissett & Edgley, 1990, in Edgley, 2003). Goffman’s (1959, 1963) dramaturgical approach is rooted in the work of Kenneth (not Peter) Burke, who proposed five key elements of dramaturgy: the act, the situation in which the act occurs, the people who perform the act, the instruments used in the act, and finally the purpose of the act (Burke, 1945). C. Wright Mills (1940) recognized the importance of Burke’s work, but it was Goffman who made the dramaturgical approach widely popular, especially by providing an important model of the self: impression management. His central idea that the self has to be reproduced in action is firmly rooted in Mead’s self-concept. In contrast, Goffman puts the self systematically into the context of institutional structure. Inspired by the focus on human agency that he found in SI, Goffman is able to put institutions into the context of individuals where they become important in their subjective meaning, which is interpreted and rendered. Institutions not only enable or constrain action, they also trigger actions instrumental for avoiding or navigating through structural constraints. Once established, these instrumental actions in turn create structures. These evolving structures are central to the study of emerging deviant subcultures and organizations. Goffman presented an actor who is seeking control over her environment. His focus on skills and practices employed for the purposeful controlling of the self triggered the critique that Goffman implied that people had a Machiavellian outlook in their presentation of their self. In its virtual identity, the self becomes a poser. In our virtual identity we are what we pretend to be. This virtual identity nearly always stands in contrast to our actual identity, which comprises the attributes that we in fact possess. Differences between virtual and actual identity always occur. If the discrepancy is known, we speak of a discredited person who has to engage in tension control. If the discrepancy is not known, people use techniques of impression management. In both cases we engage in the “management of spoiled identity,” the maintenance of a deviant self (Goffman, 1963). The basic motivational principle of Goffman’s dramaturgical approach is that we are sensitive to how we are seen by others. We engage in impression management to keep our impression in line with our chosen identities. In this way we tailor our impression to different audiences. Doing so, we manipulate others’ impressions of us. Therefore, Goffman’s dramaturgical approach sets the stage for modern approaches to impression management and cybernetic control models that incorporate micro models of the self, the social world of actors and objects of action, and the institutions in which these actions occur.

Howard S. Becker (1928–) http://home.earthlink.net/~hsbecker/ While Becker provided important contributions in the areas of sociological methods, educational organizations, occupational careers, and personal change, along with Goffman, he is most recognized for his contributions to the field of deviance (Becker, 1963/1997). Spending much time in Paris, Becker’s contemporary work on the arts is also published in French (Becker, 2000).

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David R. Heise (1937–) http://php.indiana.edu/~heise/ While Heise graduated from Chicago in 1964, he cannot be classified as part of what is generally labeled as the Chicago school. His quest for rigid empirical operationalization, his integration of agency and structure, affect and cognition, rather indicate that his research achievements are a clear departure from the anti-structural thought still prevalent at the Chicago school of his time. David Heise is one of the Indiana interactionists sometimes labeled as the Indiana school of SI. Integrating the research on impression-formation equations, Heise conceived an empirical/mathematical operationalization of SI that, following the logic of cybernetic control models, established cybernetic SI, which will be introduced below.

Process versus Structure In 1980, Stryker distinguishes “four distinct orientations within symbolic interactionism – a Chicago school, an Iowa school, the dramaturgical approach, and Ethnomethodology” (1980/2002, p. 87). His classification of SI prevailed in the structure of the chapter on SI approaches in the Handbook of Symbolic Interactionism (Reynolds & Herman-Kinney, 2003). The Chicago school stands for the focus on process while the Iowa school stressed the importance of structure in SI. Today we can add the Indiana school of SI or the Indiana interactionists, who offer a more integrative approach.

The Iowa school The structural approach, or self theory, is often referred to as the Iowa school. The Iowa school turned especially against the naturalistic participant observation methods advocated by Blumer, whose approach was labeled as processual and anti-structural. With his focus on the self and role-taking, Manford Kuhn (1911–63) (1954) established the Iowa school of SI. In Kuhn’s Twenty Statement Test (TST), research participants were given a single sheet of paper with 20 numbered lines and asked to answer the simple question of “Who am I” 20 times. This was an incredibly simple and effective assessment of the identities comprising the selves and their centrality. Carl Couch was a student of Kuhn in Iowa in the later 1950s and returned to Iowa shortly after Kuhn’s death in 1963. He extended Kuhn’s methodological rigor with laboratory audiovisual recordings and established a period called the New Iowa School. Norman K. Denzin (1992), an Iowa-trained symbolic interactionist, maintains the tradition of rigorous measurement and thereby focuses on multiple methods and the triangulation of methods. Denzin (1992) summarizes the various critiques on the Chicago school of SI from conflict theory, functionalism, Marxism, positivism, feminism, cultural studies, critical theory, and ethnomethodology. He also gives a good historic account of the critiques from within SI schools and the emerging Iowa school of SI. What his work does not account for are the contributions of the Indiana school of SI: creating an objective empirical approach that accommodates most of the well-founded critique of the Chicago school of SI.

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Indiana interactionists The current Handbook of Symbolic Interactionism states: much of the Iowa school agenda is now at the Indiana school, where interactionists have been extending, refining and testing identity theory: Heise (1985) and “affect control” theory by bringing in emotions; Burke (1991) and cognitive psychology with a “cybernetic control model” of the self; Thoits (1985) and mental health; and recent extensions to social movements (Stryker, Owens, & White, 2000). (Weigert & Gecas, 2003, p. 274)

The widely used historic dichotomous distinction into the Chicago and Iowa schools has to be extended with a third orientation, sometimes called the Indiana school of SI. This label, however, is contested by core researchers at Indiana University such as Sheldon Stryker and David Heise as misleading, because it indicates that there is a unified theory or methodology prevalent at Indiana. They suggest the term “Indiana interactionists.” If there is something I found at Indiana since the late 1980s that could justify the term Indiana school, it is the openness to different approaches and the integration of many social psychological ideas. This interpretation, however, supports the idea that there is no unifying principle amongst the “Indiana interactionists.” While there are certainly many influential researchers, such as Lynn Smith-Lovin, Herman Smith, Neil MacKinnon, Timothy Owens, or Colin Williams, who are associated through their work, their collaboration, and visits to Bloomington, Indiana, a list of core “Indiana interactionists” of the first generation might read: Peter Burke, William Corsaro, Donna Eder, David Heise, Douglas Maynard, Sheldon Stryker, Peggy Thoits, and Martin Weinberg. Many of their students, including Linda Francis, Adam King, David Kinney, Amy Kroska, Andreas Schneider, and Kevin Vryan establish a second generation of “Indiana interactionists” who maintain an innovative and integrative approach to SI across the U.S. Their interest in SI is applied in the fields of theory, sexuality, deviance, cross-cultural comparison, business management, emotions, gender studies, conversation analysis, and qualitative and quantitative methods. Affect Control Theory (ACT), a cybernetic form of SI that achieved full empirical and mathematical operationalization (Heise, 1987; Schneider & Heise, 1995), attracts many second-generation Indiana interactionists.

Processual versus structural || Chicago versus Iowa Symbolic interactionists agree that the self, or the aspects of the self that are currently evoked (identities), are central for social action. They, however, dramatically disagree on the degree to which social structure and/or culture determine the self. For the radical processual symbolic interactionist of the classic Chicago school, the self is always renegotiated once a person enters an event. For the radical structural symbolic interactionist, often associated with the Iowa school, the person enters the event with a self that is predetermined through social structure and/or culture and will only change marginally in interaction. Indiana interactionists are concerned about agency and structure as well as their interrelation. While for the Iowa school of SI “Interactors do not construct the structure; it is simply there”

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(Katovich et al., 2003, p. 125), Indiana interactionists see a reciprocal or cybernetic perspective on human action and structure. Social structure is both constructed by, and is a constraint upon, human action. Processual and structural extremes are, of course, ideal typical simplifications. If the extreme processual assumptions were true, we could not rely on any past experience and would fail to master basic morning routines like dental hygiene. In contrast, the extreme structural position of SI is not much different from the role perspective that sees people as mere puppets of structure and/or culture. In this radical extreme processual SI defies the core of Blumer’s SI and his rigorous protest against structural determinism. If the construction of the self is seen as very fluid, measurements will be less likely to be empirically validated and reliable than in the case of a self that is seen as largely determined by rigid social structure. For that reason the dichotomy of processual versus structural outlook tends to correlate with methodologies: anti-positivist versus positivist, qualitative versus quantitative are only some of the stereotypical labels applied. Meltzer and Petras (1970) have been accused of having established an enduring stereotypical view of the Iowa school as reductionistic, positivistic, and deterministic (Katovich et al., 2003).

Integration and Renewal: Control Models Recursive models of identity and social structure “Sheldon Stryker (1980/2002), a major architect and advocate of structural symbolic interactionism, developed ‘identity theory’ around the concept of role-identity” (Weigert & Gecas, 2003, p. 274). Stryker sees “role/identities” as organized according to their salience hierarchy (Stryker, 1980/2002). All role-identities of a person are weighted in importance according to their salience hierarchy and thereby define the self. The term “role/identity,” which is now more commonly spelled as role-identity, originated in the work of McCall and Simmons (1966) and was later used by Burke (2004) with the intention to stress the tie between the self and social structure. Mead and James emphasized the reflexive character of the self. This reflexivity is seen as consequences of role-identity behavior assessed by the self. Based on his twelve hypotheses (Stryker, 1980/2002, pp. 83–84), Stryker provided the following schematics of a model of the self in his seminar on symbolic interactionism at Indiana University in 1995. Social Structure → Structural Commitment Identity Salience → Role Performance Interaction History → Affective Commitment Social structure and the experiences of previous interactions determine the salience of a specific identity. Structural commitment, the extensiveness of commitment, can be measured as the number of social relationships a person has in a specific structural position, the role part of the identity (Stryker, 1987). Affective commitment, the intensity of commitment, can be measured by investigating what would happen if a relationship was lost: the affect is attached to a loss of social relationships. Both structural and affective commitment

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Andreas Schneider determine the salience of a specific identity. All identities known to a person organized in a hierarchy of their relative salience comprise the self. Here Stryker’s concept of the self becomes very comparable to Kuhn and his TST, which introduced a valid and reliable measure of “who we are”: the self. Taking the situation into account, people act on the basis of their most salient identity. This action, or role performance, by defining interaction history and impacting social structure, closes the recursive feedback loop. Stryker’s model not only describes how the individual is shaped by social structure and interaction history, it also accounts for the construction of structure by the individual’s actions. This constitutes a “recursive or self-reproducing system” (Giddens, 1979, p. 75) that connects agency and structure in a way that “the notions of action and structure presuppose one another” (p. 53). Since there is no comparison level, Stryker’s model does not offer the control loop necessary for a cybernetic control model.

Cybernetic models of identity Cybernetics is the study of the structure of recursive systems that include communication processes that allow for feedback and control mechanisms (McClelland & Fararo, 2006; Powers, 1973). The study of control systems is an integral part of cybernetics. Control systems have three components: information about the current state of a system, the reference level, and the mechanism that takes the discrepancy into account to adjust the current state. All three components can only work together if they share a common medium for comparing and adjusting the current state to the reference level. In a thermostat, it is the current temperature that is compared to the temperature set by the user. The medium in a thermostat can communicate in three ways: first, it can work digitally by giving the information to heat or not to heat; second, it might operate fuzzy by taking different steps in the magnitude of the discrepancy into account; or third, it can function analog by providing an adjustment directly inverse to the discrepancy (mimicking the mechanical thermostats that we find in the cooling systems of cars). A thermostat is a control system that dynamically stabilizes the temperature by responding to temperature changes in the environment. There are two control system theories of identity in SI that use emotions as the media that communicate the appropriateness of an identity in an event. Identity Control Theory (ICT) (Burke, 1991) is the extension of the recursive identity theory (Stryker, 1980/2002) into a control model. In addition to the identity standard there is a perception of self-relevant meanings in a social situation. The discrepancy between self-perception and identity standard are described as an error or discrepancy signal. “We feel distress when the discrepancy is large or increasing; we feel good when the discrepancy is small or decreasing” (Burke, 2006, p. 83). These emotional responses motivate behavior that reduces the discrepancy. While ICT provides a pressure model of affect with mechanics similar to the cognitive dissonance model, Affect Control Theory (ACT) sees the motivation for action in the wish for accurate perception. People are pragmatic researchers trying to perceive and create events that appear likely. Methodologically, ACT rests on the innovative integration of measurement models that allow bridging research models on cognition and affect, and the

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quantitative representation of qualitative verbal description of events. Forwarding research on impression-formation equations (Gollob, 1968) and collecting empirical data for the estimation of equations that predict change of identity and emotions (Heise, 1978, 2001), ACT is the most rigid mathematical formalization of SI: Here’s the essence of affect control theory. ● You (and every individual) create events to confirm the sentiments that you have about the identities of yourself and others in the current situation. ● Your emotions reflect your sentiment about yourself and the kinds of validations or invalidations that you are experiencing at the moment. ● If your actions don’t work to maintain your sentiments, then you reconceptualize the identities of others or yourself. ● Confirming sentiments about your current identity actualizes your sense of self, or else produces inauthenticity that you resolve by enacting compensating identities. ● In the process of building events to confirm your sentiments, you perform social roles that operate the basic institutions of society. (Heise, 2007, pp. 3–4)

In both ICT and ACT, affect is the medium used in signaling, comparing, and adjusting. The identity perceived in an event is the current state, and the identity that entered the event serves as a reference level. Emotions are signals providing feedback that reveal how well an actor confirms her identity. The degree of confirmation and/or disconfirmation of an identity in a given event creates affective responses. These affective responses are signals that provide feedback for an individual. This feedback motivates the individual to select action or attributions to herself or others to restore her identity. For ACT, restoration of an identity means to create an event in which one’s identity is likely to be found. For example, you observe a mother hitting her child. Good people generally do not do bad things to other good people. Rendering the event through labeling into a mother hitting the brat or an abuser hitting the child will make the event more likely. Following ICT, disconfirmation of an identity in an event leads to stress and, therefore, negative emotion. This is predicted even if the person creates an identity in the event that is more positive than the one that she initially had when she entered the event. This is different for ACT, where the difference between the initial identity (fundamental sentiment) that entered the event and the situated identity emerging in the event (transient impression) can move in positive or negative directions. ACT predicts an emotion analog to this discrepancy (deflection). “Cybernetically, emotion is the perceivable manifestation of a comparator testing experience against identity” (Schneider & Heise, 1995, p. 277). The ability to theoretically and methodologically differentiate emotions in comparison to an identity makes ACT an important approach to the young discipline of the sociology of emotions. If an actor is able to confirm her identity in interaction, the transient impression equals the fundamental sentiment and there is no deflection. In this case her emotions will correspond directly to the affective representation of her identity and are called characteristic emotions. Consequent emotions are experienced in the event that caused deflection. It is not the deflection per se that constitutes the quality of the emotion but the amalgamation of the identity and the degree of disconfirmation of that identity in a given

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Andreas Schneider event. “By implication, people with different identities will experience different emotions in response to objectively the same event” (MacKinnon, 1994, p. 129).

The cybernetic model of SI ACT goes beyond ICT by providing not only a verbal description of an event but also the exact empirical mathematical operationalization of the control mechanism. The measurement model adopted in ACT (Osgood et al., 1957) allows for independent measurement on the three EPA dimensions (evaluation, potency, and activity). Evaluation: Potency: Activity:

good, nice – bad, awful big, powerful – little, powerless fast, young, noisy – slow, old, quiet

But why E, P and A? … the most important question today, as in the day of the Neanderthal, about the sign of a thing are: first, is it good or bad for me? (is it a cute Neanderthal female or a sabertooth tiger?); second, is it strong or is it weak with respect to me? (is it a sabertooth tiger or a mouse?); third, is it an active or a passive thing? (is it a sabertooth tiger or merely a pool of quicksand that I can carefully skirt?). Survival of the species has depended on answers to such questions. (Osgood and Tzeng, 1990, p. 247)

These EPA dimensions of affective meaning have their sociological equivalent in status, power, and expressivity (Heise, 1987). Changes in emotions or emerging situated identities can be predicted taking differentiations on the status, power, and expressivity into account. The mathematical and empirical operationalization of this model is based on general models of impression-formation research (Gollob, 1968) that allow not only the prediction of a person’s identity but also the operationalization of all components of an event, the basic conceptional unit of SI. The basic event – the minimum unit of symbolic interactionist analysis – is constituted by an actor who does something to another person. The components are the Actor, a Behavior, and an Object of the behavior (ABO). The actor and the object in the event are identities. This basic event, e.g., the mother hits the child, can be extended by taking attributions of emotions and/or traits of the actor and object identity into account and by adding a situational setting. A complex event could be: “at Walmart, the angry, mentally disturbed mother hits the happy, gifted child.” All components of the event are measured with semantic differentials on three dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity. The EPA profiles of sentiments are universally shared among all known cultures. Quantitative measures of affective meanings serve as a common currency that matches sentiments of identities, behaviors, and emotions within a culture, or it converts sentiments across culture or subculture. For simplicity, let me continue to look only at the basic ABO event and the evaluation dimension, which is most dominant among the three dimensions of affective meaning. Further, I simplify the continuous semantic differential scales into denotations of + and − to look at the event of “a mother hitting a child.” Out of the context of an event, we experience

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culture-specific fundamental sentiments of the identities and behaviors: mothers and children are seen as good identities, and hitting someone as a bad act. The evaluation of the ABO event can be denoted as + − +. With its mathematical translation, the event loses its qualitative uniqueness and follows general principles already indicated in the principles of balanced and imbalanced states by Heider (1958). The multiplication rule + times − times + results in − indicates an imbalanced state that does not produce a good picture (Gestalt). In ACT terms this is an unlikely event. By assuming a motivation of people to experience events that they can interpret as likely, ACT follows the principle of pragmatism that sees individuals as searching for temporary truth. ACT also follows balance theory, assuming that, by searching for a concept that makes sense (Gestalt), imbalanced states will disappear and make space for more stable balanced states. The context of the event changes the meaning of all elements into transient impressions. Impression-formation equations are obtained by regressing empirical measurements of these transient impressions on the fundamental sentiments. These equations empirically capture the human processing of sentiments in a way that reflects the theoretical approach of pragmatism. Following the philosophy of Verstehen, impression-formation equations measure the individual’s process in her quest for knowledge that for pragmatists can only hold a temporary truth. In the next step the individual tries to fit the event into the big picture, the Gestalt that makes sense, or, in a pragmatic sense, a reality that is more likely. The person who perceives the event (as an actor, object, or observer) has several opportunities to make her perception appear more likely. Following attribution theory, she can attribute traits or emotions to the actor and the object, reinterpret the behavior, or change the setting in which the event occurs. All these are possibilities that can make the event more likely (pragmatism and ACT), balanced (Heider), or consonant (Festinger, 1957). A “naughty child” produces an amalgamation of the object person that is negative and hereby creates a balanced state (+− −). It makes sense that good people do bad things to bad people. Alternatively we might not believe our interpretation of the physical act we perceived. Indeed, it seems more likely for mothers to discipline their children (+++), which is evaluated as a positive behavior in most cultures. All ABO configurations, including the attributions of traits, emotions, and settings, are mathematically represented on three (EPA) dimensions in impression-formation equations that are specified with empirical data. This formalization allows for the computer simulation of events with an equation-based computer program called JavaInteract (Heise, 1997), where impression-formation equations explain 0.85 to 0.90 of variance in the transient impression of the actor, behavior, and object. Each computer simulation is either a formal test of SI, or, if we accept SI as a valid theory, an empirical prognosis of interactions.

Substantive Areas of SI Deviance SI centrally rests on the assumption that all action is based on people’s interpretation of meaning and the communication of meaning through socially constructed symbols. The degree to which meaning is not shared can be used to define (sub-)cultural differences

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Andreas Schneider and/or deviance. The study of deviance can be conducted as the systematic study of differences in meanings. While the qualitative or phenomenological tradition of SI produced the most widely known classic research in deviance (Becker, 1963/1997; Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1963), the study of deviance with the more recently established quantitative models of SI looks extremely promising (Robinson & Smith-Lovin, 1992). Deviance and its flipside – social control – are organized along cultural and structural patterns that define meanings as valid. Power obviously plays a central role in the validation of meaning and the determination of truth. The degrees of freedom someone receives in his definition of reality can be seen as an indication of power and indirectly of cultural and/or structural support. Conceptionalizing deviance as a matter of meaning, culture, structure, and power makes SI a widely applied approach in the study of deviance. The concept of labeling (Becker, 1963/1997), for example, is a classic contribution of SI that is still widely used in the study of deviance. Labeling is the attribution of an identity, an assignment of meaning. Primary deviance is defined by the successful assignment of a more negative identity to a person by others. Secondary deviance emerges if the label is accepted by the person herself. Then, the person will make this deviant identity part of herself. In defense of their deviant identities, people will search for social support. This defense and support, defined by John Kitsuse (1980) as tertiary deviance, may involve the emergence of deviant advocacy groups. Primary deviance requires upholding power over the deviant. In the case of secondary deviance this control is internalized as self-control by the deviant. Once we move to tertiary deviance the potential for structural empowerment and the ability of a counterculture to change mainstream society becomes obvious. This implies that we extend the labeling approach by using Weber’s definition of power: if two parties are in conflict, the label will be determined by the more powerful party.

Sexuality The studies of sexuality by symbolic interactionists are primarily studies of the meaning people assign to their sexual identities, behaviors, and emotions. Many of these studies qualify as the study of deviance. The first obvious reason is the resentment which sexuality engenders in Western culture. The second reason, more innate to the object of study, is the tremendous colorfulness that is revealed once we look behind the veil of privacy that protects sexuality from being scrutinized by society (Schneider, 2005). The extent of social construction involved in the concept of identity becomes especially salient when we look at the sexual genre of bondage, dominance, and sadomasochism (BDSM). Here it is the construction, assignment, and play of roles, not so much the physiological act, that creates sexual identity, behavior, and emotional gratification. The genre of BDSM also plastically demonstrates the social construction of the symbol. If a symbol that signifies the concept of pain is presented in the “normal” (vanilla) population it evokes aversion. In contrast, if presented to people of the BDSM subculture, the same symbol instantly evokes pleasures associated with either dominance or submission by others. Postmodernists would agree that we are made aware of the social quality of sexuality and the importance of symbols by the quick adaptation of new media for sexual gratification. Photography, movies, and the Internet are examples of

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media that have been used for the communication of sexual symbols from the instant they became publicly available. One of the most achieved symbolic interactionists in the field of sexuality is Martin Weinberg, whose “interests have always centered around the symbolic meanings that organize people’s behaviors, interpretations, emotions” (Weinberg, 2008). In the 1960s Weinberg started to study homosexuality and nudism (1970/2007). Later he academically established the concept of bisexuality (Martin, Colin, & Pryor, 1994), fetish, zoophilia, pornography, and feces (Weinberg & Williams, 2005).

Gender SI allows for an objective approach to gender by treating ideologically neutral gender differences as subcultural differences. Taking this perspective, the methodological instrumentation is identical to the one used in the study of deviance or in cross-cultural studies. Objective approaches can help to overcome the problems of ideological feminist research, as revealed by Hoff-Sommers (2000). She found that feminists have frequently conducted highly biased studies to make empirically unfounded arguments promoting their ideologically biased interpretation of gender. West and Zimmerman’s “Doing gender” (1987) provided an influential perspective on the construction of gender. Arlie Hochschild (1989) enriched and inspired the symbolic interactionist understanding of gender dynamics, especially gender dynamics in the family. Donna Eder describes the cultural construction of gender relations in her observation of conversations in a middle-school cafeteria in the 1980s (Eder, Colleen Evans, & Stephen, 1995). Amy Kroska, a second-generation Indiana symbolic interactionist, is influenced by Heise’s and Smith-Lovin and Robinson’s (1992) work on gender. In her investigation of gender differences in meaning she finds that gender ideology is generally unrelated to the meanings associated with most gendered identities (2001) or gendered “self-identities” (2002). Her unbiased quantitative approach reveals gender differences to be smaller than expected.

Emotions With social psychological implications, Theodore Kemper (1990) identifies eight dimensions in the relatively young subdiscipline of the sociology of emotions: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

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Micro versus macro Quantitative versus qualitative Positivist versus descriptive Political economy of emotions (emotional labor) Accounting for emotions versus managing emotions Gender Prediction versus description Biological versus social construction of emotion.

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Andreas Schneider While Kemper’s work counts as classic by now, his classification is still helpful. On each of the identified dimensions, except the biological investigation, symbolic interactionists provided important contributions. With the increased collection of data overseas (Heise, 2001), quantitative cross-cultural comparison (Schneider, 1996; Schröder & Scholl, 2009; Smith & Yap, 2006) has emerged as a new agenda in the symbolic interactionist research on emotions. The political economy in the management of emotions applied to gender in the The Second Shift (1989), The Managed Heart (1983/2003), or more recently in The Time Bind (1997/2001) by Arlie Hochschild had an important influence on the subdiscipline of emotions as well as on studies on gender. Hochschild is a symbolic interactionist at heart. She reports that “It [SI] opened a door to a richer, more complex set of interpretations, a Verstehen sociology in Weber’s terms. I was most drawn to the work of Erving Goffman, whom I knew personally and admired greatly and I took a course with Herbert Blumer who gave us Mead” (2008). The symbolic interactionist perspective on emotions provided solutions to one of the core questions in sociology: how can we theoretically model the processes that link the micro experience and action with the macro world of structure and culture? Thomas Scheff, who was much influenced by his two teachers, Shibutani and Goffman (Scheff, 2008), sees social order as constructed by aggregating the individual cases of experienced pride and shame (Scheff, 1990). Individually experienced shame and pride ensure social control. Individuals monitor sentiments of approval or disapproval of themselves presented by others. If individuals see approval they react with pride; if they realize disapproval they react with shame. Collins (1981) provided the idea that “interaction ritual chains” cumulating over time and space constitute the macro structure of interaction. The most contemporary approach that uses emotions as a medium in the micro–macro link was already introduced. Using the term affect in the naming of the theory, ACT not only presents a fully quantified model of how emotions are related to the macro world (MacKinnon, 1994), it also investigates the structure (MacKinnon & Keating, 1989), management, and prediction of emotions.

Cross-cultural comparison Since deviance can be indicated in differences in meaning, investigating cross-cultural differences can be seen as a macro perspective on deviance that avoids indicating one or the other culture as a standard. The methodological instrumentation for cross-cultural studies, therefore, can be very similar to the one used in the macro perspective of deviance. Classic qualitative studies of (sub-)cultures are participant observation studies in the anthropological tradition that investigate culture-specific meanings and symbols. In the Balinese cockfight, cocks stand for men (Geertz, 1973/2005). In most cases the cultural comparison is implicit, i.e., the reader, who is assumed to be of North American background, is left to judge the cultural incidents obscure enough for North American researchers to be mentioned. While these descriptions wake the curiosity and surely demonstrate that other cultures are different, they are barely systematic enough to qualify as culturally comparative. Humphreys triangulated qualitative and simple quantitative methodology to investigate the sexually deviant subculture of people who conducted same-sex activities in public

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restrooms (Humphreys, 1975). In his investigation four different classifications emerge within this subculture and are systematically compared. While all four groups within the secret subculture shared the symbols necessary for their covered communication, each group of people maintained different identities (meanings) and behavioral preferences, establishing a subculture within a (homosexual) subculture. While shared meanings define culture, differences in meanings indicate subcultural or cultural differences. Quantitative measures of meanings allow for a systematic cross-cultural comparison, but they face the problematic task to determine the degree of similarity that defines a culture and the threshold that indicates the boundary between cultures. One solution, chosen in cross-national comparison, is to take cultural differences as a given fact and to look for cultural differences between nations. While accurate and highly systematic, this quantitative analysis still leaves us with the problem of interpretation. Indicating statistical differences is often not sufficient in a meaningful comparison of cultures. Recently Schneider (2002a) discovered a methodology addressing this problem by linking research in cultural comparison with gender research. Gender differences in the cultures under scrutiny are standardized and serve as a measurement rod for cross-cultural differences. The understanding we have of gender differences in our own culture hereby serves as a qualitative conceptualization of cross-cultural differences. Symbolic interactionist cross-cultural studies are conducted in the aforementioned fields of gender, deviance, emotions, and sexuality. Another field in which symbolic interactionist investigation applied cross-cultural methodology is the analysis of workplace conflict. The increasing internationalization of companies leads to a diverse workforce that has to be addressed in management (Prasad, Mills, Elmes, & Prasad, 1997). Differences in cultural heritage are reflected in measurement of sentiment (Osgood et al., 1957). Sentiments around the concept of authority are very central in organizational leadership. These sentiments can be identified (Schneider, 2004) and investigated in their potential for organizational misunderstanding and conflict (Schneider, 2002b). Differences in emotional experiences and in information processing (Smith, 2002) are another source of conflict identified in American–Japanese business relations (Smith, 1995).

Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis Ethnomethodology (EM) might be most literally translated as the methodology of the people, the study of various methods people use to make sense of their environment and their production of their actions. EM rejects the “top-down” approach that assumes that culture and structure organize everyday life. Instead it uses the “bottom-up” approach that assumes societal members create structure and culture in their concerted effort to act in social events. With the ability and endurance of ethnomethodologists to discuss the meaning of one sentence for several hours, it is not surprising that we do not find coherent opinions about the relation of SI and EM and conversation analysis (CA). Douglas Maynard views “SI and EM/CA as a least partly congruent” (Maynard & Clayman, 2003). EM is founded in pragmatism and SI (Emirbayer, 2006). The common interest in the subjective experience of meaning and the social construction of meaning is certainly the common denominator of SI, EM, and

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Andreas Schneider CA. It was certainly Garfinkel’s (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology that inspired the work of Harvey Stacks, Emanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson, the founding fathers and mother of CA (Clayman & Teas, 2005). Methodologically, CA and EM have different orientations. While EM focuses on ethnography and quasi-experimental demonstrations – breaching experiments – CA emphasizes audio and video recordings of naturally occurring events. People use common sense in their analysis of events. One of the main obstacles in the analysis of methods of common sense is the fact that it appears too mundane to be realized. Garfinkel (1967) tackled the problem by disrupting the methods to make common sense and then observe the reactions. For example, he instructed his student confederates in his breaching experiments to act like boarders at the table when they return home for Thanksgiving break. Subjects vividly reacted to these disruptions that signified the breach of commonsense methodology. Partly out of consideration for human subjects, the discipline recently has focused more on naturally occurring disruptions of common sense. This variation was also pioneered by Garfinkel, when he used the example of the transsexual who tries to pass as a female despite his/her anatomical and biographical masculine elements.

Children As a final example in the section on substantive areas of SI, I make the admittedly subjective selection of the sociology of children. When I heard Bill Corsaro as a guest speaker in a seminar at Indiana presenting his videotaping of children, I was first prejudiced. As a young scholar and hardcore quantitative positivist, I could not take such an approach seriously. Corsaro, however, won me over to accept qualitative methodology as an equal method, and even complementary to quantitative methodology. With event structure analysis, Corsaro interpreted his videotaping by demonstrating how children make sense of their world, and how they create their own culture. It should be a side note that Bill made me accept children as equals in creating reality, and that he spurred my fatherhood that I now deeply enjoy. While researchers of the Chicago or Iowa tradition often chose one over another methodology, Indiana symbolic interactionists tend to be very open in their adaptation of methodology. Corsaro is an example of a researcher who used ethnographic methodology combined with computer-based analysis of logic in events or even quantitative approaches. In this spirit of methodological diversity, I will switch my mode of presentation and let Corsaro, the central authority in the sociology of children, speak for himself in an interview (Corsaro, 2008): Schneider: How did the SI perspective influence your work and/or how did you apply the perspective? Corsaro: Like the other sociologists who study children I was most influenced by G. H. Mead and his stages of the development of self. I was also influenced by the focus on studying socialization as an interactive or collective process different from the focus on individual development that dominates developmental psychology. Here SI theorists like Goffman, Becker, and the ethnomethodologist Aaron Cicourel influenced my thinking. I

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believe the big difference between my work and what symbolic interactionists had previously said about children was my focus on children in their own right and that even very young children create their own peer cultures. So I expanded Mead’s notion of stages to focus not on outcomes of development but on what children can actually do and collectively create at any stage (for example the play or game stage). Here children’s role play in the play stage is seen as an important feature of peer culture and not just imitation of and preparation for the adult world. Schneider: What would you consider to be your most central contribution to the application of the SI perspective to this substantive field? Corsaro: From SI theory I saw children as active agents who through collective action with others come to produce their own peer cultures and contribute to social reproduction. This approach led to my development of the concept of interpretive reproduction. The term interpretive captures the innovative aspects of children’s participation in society, pointing to the fact that children create and participate in their own unique peer cultures by appropriating information from the adult world to address their own peer concerns. The term reproduction means that children do not simply internalize culture, but actively contribute to cultural production and change. The term also means that children are constrained by cultural reproduction. That is, children and their childhoods are affected by the societies and cultures of which they are members (Corsaro, 2005). Schneider: Which two scholars would you consider most central in the application of SI in this substantive field? Corsaro: It is difficult to narrow it down to two scholars when we look at the general field of socialization of children and youth. For young children my own work and that of Barrie Thorne is important for general contributions to the new sociology of childhood. Norman Denzin made initial contributions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but did not follow up on this work. Spencer Cahill wrote several articles that applied the SI perspective to the lives and socialization of children. For preadolescents and adolescents the work of Gary Fine, Peter and Patty Adler and Donna Eder is important and all their work is generally influenced by the SI perspective.

Conclusion Since SI is concerned with the core of social science – how humans create, organize, process, and react to meaning – it is not surprising that over time this approach became relevant to an extremely wide array of areas. There are many other substantive areas like management, race and ethnicity, collective behavior, social movements, life course, sport and leisure, urban life, or the sociology of buildings that cannot be described here. In ending, I chose to introduce an example of a field in sociology that relatively recently was opened up by SI: the sociology of children. Our journey has moved from the philosophies that inspired the North American pragmatism of the founding fathers of SI to the qualitative formalization of SI at the Chicago school that spurred the revolution against structural sociology. With the pendulum all the way up to the extreme process perspective at the heyday of the Chicago school, it was just a question of time for gravity to set in and to open the academic stage to the

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Andreas Schneider structural counterrevolution within SI. Our journey through the development of SI ended with the latest development: mathematically and empirically operationalized cybernetic models of SI. Our investigation moved from the creation of SI to the conflict within SI to consolidation in models such as ACT. This consolidation also happened methodologically. In a special issue on algorithms in the Journal of Mathematical Sociology Schneider and Heise (1995) demonstrated that the latest cybernetic models of SI can perfectly integrate the qualitative roots of SI with positivist quantitative models that for the lack of better knowledge once where shunned by early symbolic interactionists. If after half a century of formal existence and about two centuries of philosophical background SI had not received such a development, it probably would be dead by now. It might also be dead if it had not found applications in a wide array of different substantive areas in the social sciences.

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Impression Management: Influencing Perceptions of Self Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek

Introduction Impression management (IM) is an activity which takes place in many, if not most, interactions between people. As a vital skill in one’s social life, it is used when people are directly involved with one another (such as occurs during a meeting within an organization, or simply on a date where only two people are interacting) or when the interaction is indirect and the target is not in the immediate vicinity (a journalist/news commentator, or even when submitting an article to a periodical for review by referees). IM is a concept that often conjures up negative associations, yet it has many potential benefits, including its self-regulatory function (Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005). It is this tension between the need to present oneself in a specific way and the positive evaluation that is engendered, often inaccurately, that makes the concept so intriguing. In the present chapter we will try to reveal some of the faces of IM and the role it plays in diverse areas such as social and personnel psychology, selection, marketing, and research.

Definitions As the focus of IM changed over the years, so did its operational definition. In its most general form, IM involves the attempt to establish a meaning to social interactions – it guides actions and helps us anticipate the actions of others. The information that is gleaned from others enables us to choose how best to act in order to obtain the desired response or reaction from the other party (or parties) in the interaction (Goffman, 1959). Other investigators modified Goffman’s approach and described IM as a set of manipulative behaviors, performed mainly to attain an advantage over others. Paulhus, Graf, and

Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Van Selst (1989) suggested that people have an “automatic egotism” trigger that immediately presents them in a positive light. However, according to Rosenfeld, Giacalone, and Riordan (1995), this view is a misreading of a very common interpersonal phenomenon. Schlenker and Weigold’s (1992) definition offered a compromise perspective by suggesting that one must distinguish between an expansive and a restrictive view of impression management. The expansive view assumes that people actively manage their impressions in ways that assist in achieving goals both at the individual and group level. This may be done unconsciously, habitually, or deliberately. The restrictive view portrays IM as Machiavellian and dishonest. Schlenker and Weigold’s expansive view, which is the one adopted in this chapter, also refers to the attempts to regulate information about oneself. Here, people are assumed to be managing the impressions they make not only on others but also on themselves, as will be described in further detail here.

Historical overview Around 1600, William Shakespeare wrote in one of his famous plays, As You Like It: “All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players: they have their exits and their entrances; and one man in his time plays many parts ….” Clearly, people were referring to the concept of IM long before the term was coined by the social scientists. Pioneer psychologist William James (1890) described human behavior as consisting of multiple selves, showing different sides in various situations. Goffman (1959), the sociologist, was one of the first to write a book dedicated to IM and, by so doing, provided it with a proper name. Around that time IM was viewed as a technique of ingratiation, using opinion conformity as a means to get others to like the person (Jones, 1964). In the 1970s IM assumed increasing popularity with social psychologists, and many laboratory-oriented, experimental studies focused on the manipulative aspect of IM (Pandey & Rastogi, 1979; Rosenfeld et al., 1995). Before the 1980s, IM was generally regarded by social psychologists as a peripheral concept. It was seen as either a contamination of the research process (subjects feeling uneasy about being evaluated would display social-desirability biases which, it was argued, obscured the more “fundamental” processes the researcher was attempting to investigate) or as an applied topic that interested researchers and practitioners in advertising, business, or politics. It was rarely regarded as a fundamental interpersonal process in its own right. This is well illustrated by Ungar’s (1981) “hidden experiment” which showed that people used cues provided by the interviewer to decide how to manage the impression they wanted to convey. The 1980s brought significant change as numerous conceptual analyses appeared (for a review see Schlenker & Weigold, 1992). These analyses elevated the concept to that of a fundamental and central interpersonal process that should be subjected to scientific examination. IM was applied to a wide range of social phenomena and in numerous settings, such as the classroom, medical communications, counseling, the police, intercultural communication, job interviews, and more (Leathers, 1990). Among the phenomena that have been examined in this regard are aggression, helping behavior, social facilitation, group polarization, nonverbal behaviors, self-handicapping, the reluctance to transmit bad news, organizational behavior, and many more (for a review see Schlenker & Weigold, 1992). While sometimes differing in

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Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek specifics, these analyses shared the common idea that people attempt to control information for audiences in ways that try to facilitate goal-achievement.

A Theoretical Perspective Relationship to self-concept and social identity This section is based, in large part, on the work of Schlenker (1980). The self-concept, when seen as a self-theory, is built on a categorization of the person (e.g., handsome or ugly) and an evaluation of that category (handsome is “better”). The categories may include personal facts, self-constructs (cognitive categories such as “friendly,” “creative,” “strong on quantitative skills,” etc.) and beliefs about oneself. When the person evaluates himself/herself on these categories, they are referred to as a self-concept. When they are performed by others, the recognition received from others is referred to as social self. Thus a person has many social selves – a different social self for each audience. Many times the same behavior may be categorized in several ways: for instance, helping one’s supervisor at work may be explained as a personality trait, or simply a “kind” or “considerate” act, or it may even be seen as a construct that is “promotion- or evaluation-driven.” People would put great effort into convincing themselves and others that the more flattering construct (in their opinion) is the one that describes them better. The self-concept actually begins to develop in early childhood and is determined to a great extent by interactions with others in the immediate environment who serve as the main basis for comparison. Later on, as we mature, comparative appraisals further define the self-concept. As the self-concept and social self are closely related, there is a mutual influence of one on the other (Koslowsky, Schwarzwald, & Keshet, 2008). We do not have complete control over our identities – some aspects (such as physical appearance or ancestors) are very difficult to alter, while others (such as friendliness) are easier to control. Even the more variable aspects of our identity are not under continuous control – some of the time we act without consciously attending to ourselves as social objects, and can later assert that when acting we were not thinking about how we looked. At other times we are aware of the way we look in front of our audience, and this awareness may change our actions. The state of heightened self-awareness, also known as selfconsciousness, can sometimes be induced simply by placing a mirror or camera in front of a person (Carver & Scheier, 1978; Davis & Brock, 1975; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Federoff & Harvey, 1976; Geller & Shaver, 1976; Hull & Levy, 1979; Schlenker, 1980), and can create a social perspective from which we can evaluate our own behavior (Diener & Srull, 1979). This state has been labeled by Duval and Wicklund (1972) as objective self-awareness, implying that we are focusing on ourselves as objects. In contrast, subjective self-awareness describes a situation where attention is drawn away from oneself and we act as subjects to our consciousness. In the objective self-awareness state, we are more aware of the evaluative aspect of behavior and act in a more socially strategic manner. Here, we apply deliberate IM principles. This does not necessarily imply that when a person is subjectively self-aware he or she does not resort to IM principles. Indeed, many of the actions we take while subjectively self-aware are part of a pattern of behavior that has rewarded us with desirable

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impressions from our audience in similar situations in the past. Yet, we are most sensitive and in need of managing our impression when we are in an objective self-awareness state. People differ in the amount of time they are objectively self-aware, which helps explain, to a large extent, variability in impression management. What is true for these people most of the time is true for most people some of the time. Below, we describe three concepts that have been associated, and sometimes confounded, with IM in the literature but have distinct characteristics that are worth noting. Moreover, by clarifying how these terms are applied, it will provide for a better understanding of IM.

Social desirability A concept related to IM is social desirability. The social desirability bias is the tendency “to stretch the truth in an effort to make a good impression” (Martin & Nagao, 1989). Social desirability is typically referred to as consisting of two separate processes – the first being IM (tailoring a response to suit and impress an audience) and the second, self-deceptive enhancement (an unconscious self-favoring bias which is in fact self-deceptive; Graziano & Tobin, 2002; Paulhus & Reid, 1991). Gillings and Joseph (1996) gave a slightly different definition of self-deceptive enhancement – “an honest but overly positive self-presentation.” In Paulhus’s (1984) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) scale, two factors emerge, IM and self-deception, which together assess socially desirable responding. The two concepts of social desirability and IM are often used interchangeably. However, for our purposes here, social desirability includes an unconscious aspect of self-enhancement while IM usually refers to conscious manners.

Basking in reflected glory “Basking in reflected glory” describes a situation in which people feel “they can share in the glory of a successful other with whom they are in some way associated.” They often do so by publicizing their connection with the successful other (Cialdini et al., 1976). This connection need not be with an individual, it can also be with a group, such as a football team or a political party. In the latter case, public announcements of association may be signaled by wearing appropriate clothes and badges, repeating slogans, or showing antagonism to rival groups. Basking in reflected glory is in fact an IM technique as it represents the desire/need to show others that you are someone of importance or have positive value (Bromley, 1993). In the same vein, social comparison phenomena may be viewed as an aspect of IM. Yet basking in reflected glory differs from traditional social comparison theory in that when people bask in reflected glory, they do not usually share the success of the person they are associated with, but emphasize their association. Social comparison, on the other hand, assumes that people need to evaluate their opinions and abilities, and when objective means of evaluation are unavailable, they may compare themselves with other people. In order to more accurately evaluate their opinions and abilities, the preferred comparison targets are similar type individuals (Festinger, 1954). Festinger implied that the individual would be pleased knowing that she or he outperformed similar others, while Tesser (1988) theorized that this may hold only for abilities relevant to the self-concept. On irrelevant abilities, the

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Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek individual may be quite pleased, in fact, if a certain type of similar other (with whom one has a unit relation) did better than most people, including oneself. Such situations allow one to bask in reflected glory and can be quite rewarding emotionally (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990).

Hypercriticism Hypercriticism is a strategy used by someone who is trying hard to appear smart. When the goal is to look smart, people become more critical than when wanting to be liked or when there is no other clear goal to the social encounter. This often manifests itself when an individual chooses a disliked topic in order to facilitate hypercritical evaluations. This, however, leads to a drop in the evaluation of the intelligence level of the interaction partner (Gibson & Oberlander, 2008). Whether successful or not, the hypercritical individual is trying to manage the impressions that others have of him/her.

Types of Impression Management According to Goffman (1959), the avoidance of obstacles or obstructions in “the show,” which is the actual presentation of oneself, is the central principle upon which face-to-face interaction functions. Of particular interest is the means by which people maintain, for themselves, as well as for others, comfortable definitions of a situation. Goffman writes about two kinds of “preventive practices” through which we maintain this “comfortable” definition and avoid embarrassment. “Defensive practices” are used to protect our own projections of the situation and “protective practices” are employed to save the definition of the situation someone else projects. Defensive practices may include keeping the show close to the facts (though it may prevent him from staging an elaborate one) or choosing an audience that will give minimal trouble (e.g., a teacher might prefer middle-class schools because both upper- and lower-class pupils might challenge the definition of the situation which affirms their professionalism). Protective practices also involve maintaining a tactful distance or taking into consideration the performer’s experience. The former is well illustrated in a situation where people in a restaurant are seated at tables with little distance between them and they refrain from using opportunities for overhearing conversations at an adjoining table. The latter can be seen when a stage performer is a novice and prone to embarrassing mistakes, and the audience shows extra consideration, refraining from making the situation more uncomfortable than necessary. Therefore, Goffman’s original categorization of impression management techniques referred to techniques used by the performer and techniques used by his/her audience. However, when measuring IM, we usually consider behaviors as belonging to one of several distinct subcategories of impression management, all of which are focused on the performer. Although several schemes for categorizing such behaviors exist, they often overlap. For example, behaviors can be divided into defensive/promotional or positive/negative. Defensive behaviors include apologizing (positive), blaming others, or denying (negative), while promotional behaviors include boasting (positive) or intimidating (negative; Bromley, 1993).

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Table 12.1 Verbal assertive impression management strategies. Strategy Ingratiation Self-promotion Exemplification Supplication Intimidation

Typical actions Using flattery, gratifying, doing favors Declaring successful performance, boasting Doing more than required, appearing busy Pleading for help, acting innocent Displaying anger, bullying, making threats

One of the more popular IM taxonomies was proposed by Jones and Pittman (1982), who identified five assertive strategies: ingratiation, self-promotion, exemplification, supplication, and intimidation (Table 12.1). More recently, Crane and Crane (2002) supplemented this model by suggesting four new “defensive” strategies: innocence (denial of involvement in the situation), excuses (denial of responsibility in the situation), justifications (denying the adversity of the outcome or stating that the end justifies the means), and apologies (taking responsibility). All strategies are aimed at creating a certain desired image but risk creating an undesired one. For example, one uses the self-promotion strategy when aiming to appear competent, but risks appearing arrogant; another will use ingratiation in order to be perceived as likeable, but risks appearing sycophantic or conformist. Defensive strategies are used for saving face, but may appear deceitful or incompetent (Crane & Crane, 2002; Jones & Pittman, 1982). These strategies manifest themselves in various situations, as will be revealed throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Antecedents and Outcomes of Impression Management Over the past decade, research concerning antecedents of IM has focused on several categories of variables. Demographics, particularly biological gender, as well as gender role, personality, and situational variables are most prominent.

Demographic variables Research on gender and IM suggests that men and women often seek to manage impressions in different ways. Individuals tend to engage in behaviors that are consistent with their socially prescribed gender roles, and since the female gender role typically discourages aggressive or assertive behaviors, women use less assertive IM tactics than men do (Bolino & Turnley, 2003b). Another aspect of gender differences is seen when men and women are using the same IM tactics, yet they achieve different outcomes. For example, Bolino and Turnley (2003a) found that when using intimidation as an IM strategy, women are considered less likeable by their supervisors, whereas men’s likeability in such a case is not affected. Using this strategy will also enhance men’s performance evaluation, while performance evaluation of women is not affected. This difference in evaluations is related to women’s traditional and natural tendency to be less direct and assertive than men

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Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Eagly, 1987), which in the past has led to a somewhat lower work status (women were generally considered less decisive, capable, and competent than their male coworkers). Women who want to be viewed as competent may try to act the way men do, by behaving in stereotypically masculine fashion. Yet this IM strategy may not work as planned – just as with the intimidation strategy, they may be evaluated more negatively. Another IM strategy that has potentially unintended costs for women is self-promotion. Rudman (1998) found that by using self-promotion, women’s task aptitude ratings are enhanced, but this often incurs costs associated with social attractiveness and chances of being hired, probably because they suffer reprisals for violating gender stereotypes related to modesty (this was found to be true when the perceivers were women or outcomeindependent men). Gender role often has a direct effect on choice of IM strategy. For example, Thornton. Audese, Ryckman, and Burckle (2006) found that men and women with more egalitarian attitudes used ingratiation (in the form of “playing it dumb”) and self-promotion (in the form of “knowing it all”) less than people with more traditional attitudes regarding women’s and men’s roles in society. Other demographic variables that affect the usage of IM tactics include age and job level. Singh, Kumra, and Vinnicombe (2002) found that age and job level interact with gender such that gender differences in use of ingratiation are far greater among young people (under 31). Younger and junior-level women use ingratiation less than more experienced women do. Men, on the other hand, retain a similar frequency of ingratiation throughout all job levels. Younger women managers often recognize that IM may be a useful tool in their work environment but prefer not to use it for themselves. They seem to prefer relying on visible extra high performance and commitment rather than the networking, ingratiation, and self-promotion strategies that males engage in. One important consequence is that an ambitious young male who uses such IM tactics successfully is likely to leave competing young women at a considerable disadvantage for promotion.

Personality variables Self-monitoring. There are some important personality variables that influence impression management. One of these is self-monitoring – the ability to monitor one’s behavior based on cues received (Snyder, 1974). It would seem that high self-monitors would be more sensitive to the outside environment and thus more concerned about managing their impressions. Self-monitoring has often been associated with IM tactics in everyday life interactions (for a review, see Peeters & Lievens, 2006). This doesn’t necessarily mean that high selfmonitors use more IM than their low counterparts, but they may choose different strategies, often leading to distinct consequences (Bolino & Turnley, 2003b; Turnley & Bolino, 2001). For example, high self-monitors often choose IM tactics that are aimed at creating a positive image of themselves (i.e., ingratiation, self-promotion, and exemplification), while low self-monitors either use more aggressive tactics (i.e., supplication and intimidation) or are generally passive and rarely use IM tactics. Using ingratiation increases likeability among high self-monitors but decreases it among low self-monitors, who are considered somewhat sycophantic. High self-monitors who use self-promotion are considered competent while low self-monitors who use it are not. Using exemplification also leads to better results for

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high self-monitors; they are considered dedicated but are not thought of as feeling superior, while low self-monitors suffer the opposite results. These findings can be summarized with the simple conclusion that high self-monitors not only choose “better” IM tactics, but also manage to achieve more from using the same tactics as low self-monitors. Self-regulation. This concept is relevant whenever self-presentation is the focus and novel or pressured conditions are present. Thus, during a job interview or when meeting prospective in-laws, self-regulation becomes especially demanding. Relying on previous work that showed regulatory resources to be a global but limited resource, Vohs et al. (2005) found that effortful self-presentation depletes regulatory resources and that depleted regulatory resources impair self-presentation, the term used by the authors to describe impression management. Machiavellianism. This variable seems to affect the specific IM tactics used such that low Machavellians often limit themselves to ingratiation, self-promotion, and exemplification, while high Machavellians use supplication and intimidation or are generally passive in using IM strategies. These findings are consistent with the conceptual differences discussed by Schlenker and Weigold (1992), as presented before. The expansive view posits that using IM does not, necessarily, indicate Machiavellianism but should be seen as a normative behavior. Machavellians simply use riskier and perhaps more deceptive forms of IM, meaning they do not refrain from using supplication and intimidation tactics which may be viewed as less socially acceptable. High Machavellians seem to have an all-or-nothing approach to managing impressions, which suggests that they are not necessarily concerned with using their impression management to please others; rather, they tend to use impression management only in ways which help satisfy their own needs (Bolino & Turnley, 2003b). The “big five” traits. The extroversion and agreeableness dimensions of the “big five” traits are the dimensions that deal specifically with one’s preferences for interacting with others in social situations (Peeters & Lievens, 2006). The “big five” traits refer to broad categories of personality descriptions that researchers have identified through statistical analysis: openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Extroverts are characterized as assertive, talkative, optimistic, and energetic. They are therefore more likely to feel comfortable using self-focused IM strategies (assertive IM tactics aimed at creating the impression that the person holds the desired qualities, such as self-promotion). Agreeable people are described as cooperative, good-natured, and likeable, and they try to accommodate the people they interact with, using positive nonverbal cues (smiling, making eye contact, and using friendly nonverbal behavior; Kristof-Brown, Barrik, & Franke, 2002). The altruism facet of agreeableness (the extent to which individuals are generous, considerate, and willing to help others) is related to defensive IM behaviors such that altruistic individuals, who are more focused on others and less concerned with protecting their own image, are less likely to engage in defensive IM behaviors (Van Iddekinge, McFarland, & Raymark, 2007). Emotional stability, especially its vulnerability component (the extent to which individuals are able to cope with stressful events, such as meeting prospective in-laws for the first time, or undergoing a job interview), is associated with assertive IM behaviors. Thus, individuals who were more capable of dealing with the stressful event had more resources available to use IM tactics, especially assertive behaviors such as self-promotion or ingratiation (Van Iddekinge et al., 2007).

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Situational variables: human resources and IM Situational variables concerning IM have been studied largely in the applied context of human resource management. Therefore, the following section will be devoted to this environment. Selection and workplace behaviors. IM behaviors can be found in many different activities throughout the workplace. These include subordinate–manager interactions, staff meetings, even chance meetings in hallways, but probably the most explored workplace context for IM are the steps involved in recruitment, selection, and promotion (Gardner, 1992). Decisions by personnel managers are greatly affected by impression management. Be it an interview, a résumé, a letter of recommendation, or an assessment center, IM may play a key role in each step of hiring and promoting. For example, in preparing for an interview, the applicant may rehearse what he/she would say, try to anticipate the questions he/she will be asked, prepare answers beforehand, and even give extra thought to what he/she should wear. While research has focused on the applicant’s tendency for impression management, the interviewer is also frequently using IM but for different purposes (Gardner, 1992). From the interviewee’s perspective, IM is seen as a way to achieve one’s goal, i.e., acceptance. However, from the interviewer’s perspective IM tactics may be employed so as to attract the applicant (Crane & Crane, 2002; Rosenfeld et al., 1995). In a study that focused on the fairness of IM tactics in employment interviews, interviewers tended to perceive interviewee IM as fair when the IM tactics used by the interviewee were tactics they also saw as being fair if they were used by them (Lopes & Fletcher, 2004). Among the correlates of interviewees’ IM tactics reported in the literature, gender has been examined most frequently. Female applicants tailored their behaviors to match the views of their interviewers (when those were known), implying that if an interviewer believes in the traditional female stereotype, responses given by the female interviewee were more in line with those stereotypes. Examples of these behaviors include deemphasizing one’s assertiveness and emphasizing traditional views of family and relationships (von Baeyer, Sherk, & Zanna, 1981). In truth, successful attempts at IM in workplace behaviors are not so easily accomplished, especially if they involve high stakes such as a new employee seeking acceptance, an important meeting with the boss, or some type of political maneuvering in a company. The employee wants to make a good impression but overdoing it may be viewed as a deliberate manipulation and have the opposite outcome. Also, IM tactics which are self-focused (selfenhancing) result in higher interview evaluations than tactics that are other-focused (e.g., complementing the interviewer; Kacmar & Carlson, 1999; Kacmar, Delery, & Ferris, 1992). Weiss and Feldman (2006) conducted an experiment in which over 80% of the participants were found to lie at least once during a job interview. The actual number of people who lie during job interviews may be even greater. Courses that train applicants how to cope with interviews may decrease their already low validity even more, because training candidates to give “good answers” in an interview decreases the ability of an interviewer to distinguish between better applicants and the rest. To counter these trends, there is a need to train interviewers to cope with candidates’ IM tactics so that the former become more sensitive to different kinds of impression management. Among the issues that a personnel manager may

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want to consider are: (a) IM is another trait that may or may not be useful for the job at hand, (b) using a more structured interview procedure may help cope with applicants’ IM, and (c) focusing on verifiable information is also useful in reducing IM bias (Rosenfeld et al., 1995). The setting in which the interview takes place also plays an important role in predicting which IM tactics will be used. For example, an individual who intends to convey a desirable impression is likely to apply assertive (self-focused and other-focused) IM tactics (Peeters & Lievens, 2006). In the job interview, interviewees with prior interview training use the self-promotion tactic more often than those with no training. Self-promotion is also the tactic most consistently associated with positive interview outcomes, so it would seem that IM at the right time and place is effective (Kacmar & Carlson, 1999; Kacmar et al., 1992; Kristof-Brown et al., 2002; Stevens & Kristof, 1995). The fact that IM can play a role in an interview evaluation is consistent with the notion that intention to convey a desirable impression usually occurs in a so-called “weak” situation. Situations are considered “strong” when behavioral demands are unambiguous and behavioral outcomes are clearly understood and widely shared. Such situations normally are less susceptible to manipulation or IM (Van Iddekinge et al., 2007). The type of interview has an effect on the amount of IM tactics used. Some investigators argue that structured interviews, which are more like a “strong” situation, are less prone to IM as compared with unstructured interviews (Peeters & Lievens, 2006; Stevens & Kristof, 1995). In addition, the content of the interview might impact the type of IM strategies that are put to use. Two popular formats for questions in job interviews are (a) behavioral description questions referring to one’s past behavior in situations that resemble those required on the job and (b) situational questions where candidates are asked what they would do in hypothetical situations that are similar to those encountered on the job. When the interview format consists of behavioral description questions, individuals tend to use self-focused IM strategies (such as self-promotion) and defensive ones more frequently as compared to situational interviews. Situational interviews trigger “other-focused” strategies (assertive IM tactics that are aimed at making others feel good about themselves or to show the other person that both parties share similar values or beliefs, such as ingratiation). The basis for this finding is that behavioral description questions “invite” people to boast about their past accomplishments and their competence, whereas when responding to situational questions there may be less opportunity for self-promotion because of the hypothetical context. Behavioral descriptions also present an opportunity to use defensive behaviors that are less likely to be used when answering questions involving hypothetical situations (Ellis, West, Ryan, & DeShon, 2002; Peeters & Lievens, 2006; Van Iddekinge et al., 2007). Van Iddekinge et al. also found some support for their idea that when motivation to be accepted is high, people act more in accordance with norms, and individual differences are less prominent (as in “strong” situations). Thus when an interviewee’s motivation to be accepted is high, there is a weaker correlation between his/her personality and use of IM tactics than when the motivation is low. These high-motivation situations appear in everyday life as well as in work environments, such as the classic “confrontation” that occurs when meeting the parents of one’s boyfriend or girlfriend. Letters of recommendation. Letters of reference or recommendation are among the most used selection tools, as they appear on the surface to provide information that the prospective

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Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek new employer may not have and very much wants to acquire (Gatewood, 2001; Smith, 1991). Yet they are prone to various forms of IM, so the real message that the writer wants to convey is, at best, ambiguous, and, at worst, lost. For example, length of the letter should not be a factor, as it is possible to describe the salient characteristics of a candidate in a short form as accurately as in a long form. Findings in the literature indicate that the opposite is true, namely, length and evaluation are positively correlated. In one study, a positive decision concerning a candidate was found to be a function of not only the number of negative words in the letter but also its length (Loher, Hazer, Tsai, Tilton, & James, 1997). Personnel managers are often influenced by other extraneous factors which are not germane to the candidate’s suitability for the job. For example, the gender of the candidate or of the letter writer, as well as the status of the person writing the recommendation, are all possible contaminants that may interfere with a true objective evaluation (Tommasi, Williams, & Nordstrom, 1998). In conclusion, it is clear that with all the IM-related problems associated with letters of recommendation they must be used with caution in the human resource manager’s repertoire (Gatewood & Field, 2001). Curriculum vitae (CV). Knouse, Giacalone, and Pollard (1988) found that using IM in CVs is counterproductive. CVs in which IM was used were rated more negatively by managers on almost every relevant measure. Similarly, accompanying cover letters that used IM were rated negatively on some aspects, but positively on self-confidence. Assessment centers. IM tactics were generally used more frequently in those exercises requiring candidates to display interpersonal competencies (e.g., role-playing and presentations) relative to the exercises that did not (e.g., tactical exercises). The relationship between IM use and the evaluations of the assessors was also influenced by these different competencies. The use of IM was associated with both interpersonal and non-interpersonal ratings of performance. This suggests that it is not only the type of assessment exercise that exerts an influence on whether IM is actually effective, but also the competency demands inherent in the exercise itself (McFarland, Yun, Harold, Viera, & Moore, 2005).

Outcomes of IM Generally, individuals who use relatively high levels of IM are seen less favorably than those who either avoid using IM or who use only positive tactics (i.e., ingratiation, self-promotion, and exemplification; Bolino & Turnley, 2003b). Research also shows that other-focused tactics have been found to be beneficial in performance appraisal meetings (Kacmar & Carlson, 1999), but diminish the chances of an applicant being highly evaluated for a job regardless of his/her personal attributes (Kacmar & Carlson, 1999; Kristof-Brown et al., 2002). During training, using self- and other-focused tactics resulted in higher performance rating, though self-focused tactics were somewhat more efficient. There has been considerable research concerning the outcomes of IM usage in the interview environment. In this context, outcomes include overall evaluation of the interview, person– job fit, and similarity. Peeters and Lievens (2006) showed that using self-focused verbal IM tactics improved interviewers’ overall evaluations in behavioral description interviews, whereas other-focused verbal tactics led to positive interviewer evaluations in situational

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interviews. They also found that regardless of interview content, self-focused IM and nonverbal IM were positively correlated with overall evaluation of the interview. When examining person–job fit and perceived similarity between interviewer and interviewee, Kristof-Brown et al. (2002) found that self-promotion was the IM tactic most strongly related to interviewers’ perceptions of person–job fit, whereas nonverbal cues influenced perceived similarity. Some of the more unusual variables that have been investigated in reference to IM outcomes – heart rate and self-reported anxiety – were found to be significantly higher among male individuals who had a higher IM demand (i.e., they were evaluated on their performance; Sheffer, Penn, & Cassisi, 2001).

Marketing and IM IM is typically discussed as a means of personal influence, and so Fisk and Grove (1996) posited that a great deal of marketing activity can be classified as impression management. They mentioned creativity and persuasion as potential IM characteristics that are found not only when a salesperson is “pursuing a customer” but also with more general marketing concerns such as product positioning, corporate image advertising, or even integrated marketing communications. IM is involved in several other marketing-oriented activities such as business-to-business interactions, efforts to satisfy the needs of the household consumer, marketing for profit or not for profit, marketing of physical goods, or marketing of services. “Simply put, IM is woven intimately into the fabric of marketing enterprise” (Fisk & Grove, 1996). Organizations attempt to design products that are likely to elicit a desired effect. Thus, everything from a product’s physical features and brand name to its price and the celebrities who endorse it are decided using IM considerations – managing consumer impressions of the product. When examining IM effects on supervisor’s ratings of salespeople, Viela, González, Ferrín, and Araújo (2007) found that salespeople using supervisor-focused IM were better liked by their supervisors and, moreover, the salesperson’s interpersonal skills were rated higher by the supervisor. Salespeople must manage their impressions skillfully and must read buyers’ behaviors properly so as to gain positive reactions from the buyer (Fisk & Grove, 1996). In his extensive review of IM as part of a sales interview, Leathers (1990) pointed out nonverbal cues as having the greatest effect. He divided the IM process into four steps: (a) familiarization with the communication of successful impression managers, (b) identification, selection, and application of principles of impression formation, (c) measurement of impressions made, and (d) modification of undesirable communicative behaviors/cues to control impressions made. For the salesperson, the following six aspects are the most significant in impression management: (a) credibility, which is the most important principle, and competence, its chief dimension, are conveyed by using substantial volume, fast rate and short, paused vocal cues, smiling sincerely in context and using relaxed (non-rigid) bodily movements that emphasize the points one is making; (b) likeability is communicated by using open body positions, smiling, affirmative head-nodding and direct and substantial eye contact; (c) assertiveness is expressed by using a sturdy voice, smiling and laughing only in context,

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Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek and using calm gestures; (d) interpersonal attractiveness is also manageable – for instance, tall large people should wear light-colored suits in order to seem less intimidating; (e) perception of truthfulness is decreased when one exhibits non-fluency, an abnormal number of hand-to-body gestures, and short durations of eye contact; and (f) interestingness is negatively affected when people use a narrow pitch and volume range. In summarizing, Leathers asserts that “impression management is the communication phenomenon of greatest importance in the sales interview.” When discussing different organizational roles that may contain a service component, high self-monitors may be better suited to perform those jobs than low self-monitors. In particular, high self-monitors may be more effective in positions that require employees to manage certain impressions. For example, relative to low self-monitors, high self-monitors may be more skillful in boundary-spanning roles that require dealing with customers and other organizational stakeholders (Turnley & Bolino, 2001).

Impression Management as an Issue in Research Before the 1980s, IM was regarded by many social psychologists as an annoying contaminant of the research process. Participants who perceived that they were being evaluated tended to display social-desirability biases which masked the more “fundamental” processes that the study aimed to investigate (Schlenker & Weigold, 1992). Weber and Cook (1972) wrote about the roles that participants take on during experiments. Participants typically play one of the following roles: the “good subject” who attempts to act in accordance with what he or she thinks is the hypothesis of the research, the “negativistic subject” who tries to sabotage the experiment, the “faithful subject” who tries to be completely honest and ignore any suspicion he might have about the true purpose of the research, or the “apprehensive subject” who realizes that his performance is being evaluated and tries to give socially desirable responses. Moreover, when participants know the hypothesis of the study, they are consistently biased. Studies conducted in the 1960s revealed many types of biases that can be explained using one or more of these subject roles. Weber and Cook did not use the term impression management, but that is what they were in fact referring to – participants managing their impressions in one of the above-mentioned ways and, thus, creating potential bias in research findings. A few decades later, the term IM has become the more popular term and refers to responses that are given so as to create a certain impression. Several studies have addressed the issue of IM by examining some of the tests that are used both in research and in applied psychology. Strong, Greene, and Kordinak (2002) explored IM and self-deceptive positivity (an overly positive bias in self-description) using the validity scales from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–2 (MMPI–2) and Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). They used two groups of participants in order to examine whether IM could be identified across situations with varying motives for positive self-presentation, which often appears simply as a denial of minor faults. The two groups consisted of college students (with little known reason to underreport) and individuals evaluated in personnel settings (who tend to respond with some degree of defensiveness), and the researchers found that IM exists even when pressure to create a positive impression is low.

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In their meta-analysis, Li and Bagger (2006) used the BIDR to examine the effects of social desirability (i.e., IM and self-deception) on criterion validity of personality constructs. Their results indicate that IM and self-deception do not affect the relationship between personality measures and performance, nor do they function as performance predictors. Furthermore, removing the influence of social desirability from personality measures did not substantially change the criterion validity of personality variables. Chan (2001) examined IM and positive and negative affectivity, all of which have been commonly asserted to be method factors that are artifacts and inflate relations among selfreport measures, particularly of work attitudes. Chan’s results showed a strong latent negative correlation between negative affectivity and IM. IM had significant method–effects loadings on intention to quit, but the impact on the estimation of work attitudes was small, if not negligible. Edens, Buffington, Tomicic, and Riley (2001) examined the impact of positive IM response sets on the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). The PPI is a self-report test that is used as a screening measure for psychopathy. It contains a validity scale (Unlikely Virtues) that is designed to identify response biases such as “faking good,” but its effectiveness was only assessed by Edens and colleagues. They had participants complete the scale twice – normally and while trying to create a favorable impression of themselves. They found that the Unlikely Virtues scale significantly differentiated between “fake good” and honest protocols but that there were many misclassifications. Also, the higher one scored on the PPI in the normal condition, the greater was his improvement (appearing less psychopathic) when “faking good.”

Future Directions In the last few years, IM research has continued to expand in both the theoretical and the applied perspectives. In the theoretical perspective, IM has been studied with regard to social desirability and self-deception. IM’s effect on tests of personality is still being investigated, and the overlap between IM and faking remains a subject for discussion. In more applied areas there is an abundance of research not only on job interviews, but also on personnel evaluation, job performance, political skills, and sales. Some have examined IM at the organizational level (how an organization manages impressions). Yet many other lines of inquiry are possible. For example, is impression management consistent across situations? Is a person who tends to use it in one situation, such as at work, likely to use it in another, at home? If we argue that it is an aspect of personality, then, maybe, the answer is yes.

Concluding Remarks In this chapter we have attempted to present the many facets of IM. A conceptual framework was presented which links IM usage to the self-concept and social identity, in addition to affecting the impressions others have on us. Antecedents and outcomes of IM were discussed, both in theoretical and in applied contexts. Of particular note is the fact that the use of constructive IM can produce both short-term and long-term benefits for individuals as well as organizations. However, careless use of IM tactics can be destructive. “It is honest

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Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek actors with honest scripts who achieve effective impression management. When that is accomplished, the play (organization) goes on to rave reviews” (Crane & Crane, 2002). Providing clear definitions and comparing it with other similar constructs allows us to place IM in its proper social context. IM is theoretically rich and has many applications for organizational settings, as well as for simple dyadic interactions. By including relevant correlates from a wide spectrum and examining its possible impact on evaluations in particular, and decisions in general, our presentation allows for expanding the concept and tying it into some of the major social psychological theories. Future investigators of the phenomenon must take into account that the IM phenomenon is as complex as it is fascinating.

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Kreps (Eds.), Applied communication theory and research (pp. 163–183). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Li, A., & Bagger, J. (2006). Using the BIDR to distinguish the effects of impression management and self-deception on the criterion validity of personality measures: A meta-analysis. International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 14, 131–141. Lilienfeld, S. O., & Andrews, B. P. (1996). Development and preliminary validation of a self-report measure of psychopathic personality traits in noncriminal populations. Journal of Personality Assessment, 66, 488–524. Loher, B. T., Hazer, J. T., Tsai, A., Tilton, K., & James, J. (1997). Letters of reference: a process approach. Journal of Business and Psychology, 11, 339–355. Lopes, J., & Fletcher, C. (2004). Fairness of impression management in employment interviews: A cross-country study of the role of equity and Machiavellianism. Social Behavior and Personality, 32, 747–768. Martin, C. L., & Nagao, D. H. (1989). Some effects of computerized interviewing on job applicant responses. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74, 72–80. McFarland, L. A., Yun, G. J., Harold, C. M., Viera, L., & Moore, L. G. (2005). An examination of impression management use and effectiveness across assessment center exercises: The role of competency demands. Personnel Psychology, 58, 949–980. Pandey, J., & Rastogi, R. (1979). Machiavellianism and ingratiation. Journal of Social Psychology, 108, 221–225. Paulhus, D. L. (1984). Two-component models of socially desirable responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 598–609. Paulhus, D. L., Graf, P., & Van Selst, M. (1989). Attentional load increases the positivity of self-presentation. Social Cognition, 7, 389–400. Paulhus, D. L., & Reid, D. B. (1991). Enhancement and denial in socially desirable responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 307–517. Peeters, H., & Lievens, F. (2006). Verbal and nonverbal impression management tactics in behavior description and situational interviews. International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 14, 206–222. Rosenfeld, P., Giacalone, R. A., & Riordan, C. A. (1995). Impression management in organizations. London: Routledge. Rudman, L. A. (1998). Self-promotion as a risk factor for women: The costs and benefits of counterstereotypical

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of an impression management coin. Individual Differences Research, 4, 37–45. Tommasi, G. W., Williams, K. B., & Nordstrom, C. R. (1998). Letter of recommendation: What information captures HR professional’s attention? Journal of Business and Psychology, 13, 5–18. Turnley, W. H., & Bolino, M. C. (2001). Achieving desired images while avoiding undesired images: Exploring the role of self-monitoring in impression management. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 351–360. Ungar, S. (1981). The effects of others’ expectancies on the fabrication of opinions. Journal of Social Psychology 114, 173–185. Van Iddekinge, C. H., McFarland, L. A., & Raymark, P. H. (2007). Antecedents of impression management use and effectiveness in a structured interview. Journal of Management, 33, 752–773. Viela, B. B., González, J. A. V., Ferrín, P. F., & Araújo, M. L. (2007). Impression management tactics and affective context: influence on sales performance appraisal. European Journal of Marketing, 41, 624–639. Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., & Ciarocco, N. J. (2005). Selfregulation and self-presentation: Regulatory resource depletion impairs impression management and effortful self-presentation depletes regulatory resources. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 632–657 von Baeyer, C. L., Sherk, D. L., & Zanna, M. P. (1981). Impression management in the job interview. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 7, 45–51. Weber, S. J., & Cook, T. D. (1972). Subject effects in laboratory research: An examination of subject roles, demand characteristics, and valid inference. Psychological Bulletin, 77, 273–295. Weiss, B., & Feldman, R. S. (2006). Looking good and lying to do it: Deception as an impression management strategy in job interviews. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 36, 1070–1086.

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Author Index

Acock, A.C. 169 Adams, J.S. 143–4, 173 Ahn, W. 79 Aida, Y. 178 Allen, J.J.B. 36–7 Allen, K.R. 178 Allport, G. 1, 237 Andreoli, V.A. 18, 23 Apsley, D.K. 35 Arcuri, L. 237 Arditti, J.A. 178 Aronson, E. 55–8, 61–2 Ashmore, R.D. 215–16 Audesse, R.J. 286 Aumer-Ryan, K. 185 Baer, R. 18–19, 24, 32–4 Bagger, J. 293 Baker, K. 30 Bargh, J.A. 35 Baumeister, R.F. 28, 32 Beard, C. 180 Beaton, A.M. 153 Beatty, M.J. 180 Becker, H.S. 262 Bekkers, R. 206 Bell, D.W. 99 Bem, D. 55, 58–9

Benet-Martnez, V. 243 Berger, P.L. 261 Berkowitz, L. 23, 36 Bettencourt, B.A. 219 Beutler, L.E. 25, 30 Bizer, G.Y. 107 Blanton, H. 128 Blood, D.J. 20 Blumer, H. 250, 260–1, 263 Bodenhausen, G.V. 234 Bolino, M.C. 285 Boniecki, K. 3 Brandau-Brown, F.E. 184 Brehm, J.W. 13–21, 23, 32 Brehm, S. 24, 26 Brewer, M.B. 217, 218, 221, 235, 238 Brickman, P. 142 Brockner, J. 24, 172 Brown, R. 151 Buboltz, W.C. 26, 28, 30 Buffington, J.K. 293 Burckle, M.J. 286 Burke, K. 262 Burke, P.J. 264, 265 Bushman, B.J. 20, 25, 32 Buss, A.R. 80 Buunk, B.P. 171–2, 175, 176, 178, 180

Callan, M.J. 151–2 Cameron, C.L. 133 Canary, D.J. 174, 179, 184–6 Carlsmith, J.M. 3, 51–2, 56, 58–9 Carrillo, J. 6, 155 Carver, C.S. 24, 26, 32 Catanese, K.R. 32 Cate, R.M. 169, 184 Chadee, D. 37–8 Chan, D. 293 Chen, Y. 172 Cialdini, R.B. 57–8, 60 Clee, M.A. 32 Coates, D. 142 Cole, A.H. 23 Cook, T.D. 292 Cooley, C.H. 252, 255–9 Cooper, J. 23, 63 Corcoran, K. 5–6 Corning, A. 6, 154–6 Corsaro, B. 274–5 Cowan, P. 34 Crane, E. 285 Crane, F.G. 285 Crane, K.A. 23 Crawford, M.T. 21, 25 Crisp, R.J. 7–8, 233–4, 237, 239–45

Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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298

Author Index

Crocker, J. 215 Cronin, T. 152 Crosby, F. 6, 145, 147–9, 152–3, 155 Crush, J. 151 Crusius, J. 5 Daily, L. 32–3 Dainton, M. 176, 178–80 D’Ambrosio, C. 150 Dambrun, M. 151 Danoff-Burg, S. 133 Davies, J.C. 142 Davis, J.A. 145–6, 154 Davis, K.E. 76–7 de la Rey, C. 153 Dean, J. 58 Dennehy, T. 6 Denzin, N. 263, 275 Desmarais, S. 184 Deutsch, M. 145 Dillard, J.P. 28–30 Dollard, J. 141 Donnell, A.J. 28–30 Dowd, E.T. 22, 26–8, 30 Drigotas, S.M. 184, 203, 204 Duval, S. 282 Eagly, A.H. 176 Edens, J.F. 293 Eder, D. 271 Edwards, J.N. 169 Edwards, S.M. 36 Ekman, P. 36 Ellard, J.H. 151 Ellsworth, P.C. 35, 36 Esses, V.M. 99 Fabrigar, L.R. 100 Falbo, T. 178 Fan, C.S. 149 Fein, S. 234–5 Feldman, R.S. 288 Fenton, M. 18–19, 24 Ferree, M.M. 178 Festinger, L. 3, 13, 44–67, 119–21, 283–4 Fincham, F. 176–7

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Finkel, E.J. 206 Fischer, G.W. 236 Fisk, R.P. 291 Fiske, S.T. 235–6, 240 Foa, E.B. 171 Foa, U.G. 171 Folger, R. 18, 23 Foster, M.D. 153 Franz, B. 149 Fredrickson, B.L. 34–5 Freud, S. 253–4 Frick, J.R. 150 Friesen, W.V. 36 Furnham, A.F. 79 Garfinkel, H. 274 Gelman, S.A. 79 Giacalone, R.A. 290 Gilbert, D.T. 75 Gillings, V. 283 Goffman, E. 261–2, 272, 281, 284 Greene, R.L. 292 Greenwald, A.G. 66 Gross, J. 176, 180 Grove, S.J. 291 Gurr, T.R. 142, 146–7 Hafner, M. 134 Hall, N.R. 244–5 Halleröd, B. 150 Hammock, T. 23 Harmon-Jones, E. 36–7 Harris, B. 180 Haslam, S.A. 233 Hastie, R. 240 Hastorf, A.H. 76 Hatfield, E. 171, 179 Hatfield, J.D. 183 Heider, F. 72–7 Heilman, M.E. 21–2, 24, 33–4 Heise, D.R. 263, 264, 271, 276 Hellman, C.M. 28 Hewstone, M. 7, 237, 240 Hinkle, S. 18–19, 24 Hochschild, A. 271 Hodgins, D.C. 151 Hoff-Sommers, C. 271

Homans, G.C. 142–4 Hong, S-M. 27, 29–30 Huck, N.O. 22, 28 Humphreys, G.W. 240 Huschka, D. 152 Huseman, R.C. 183 Hutter, R.R. 240, 244 James, W. 252, 254, 259, 281 Janoff-Bulman, R. 142 Jaques, E. 144 Jaspars, J. 79 Johnson, D. 204 Johnson, P. 26, 28 Jonason, P.K. 29, 30 Jones, E.E. 60, 76–7, 90, 285 Joseph, S. 283 Judd, C.M. 238 Kalbfleisch, P.J. 180 Kalish, C.W. 79 Kant, I. 252–3 Kelley, H. 50–1, 74, 77–9, 169, 191–202, 205–6 Keltner, D. 36 Kemper, T. 271–2 Kessler, T. 152 Kitsuse, J. 270 Knouse, S.B. 290 Knowles, H.M. 29, 30 Koomen, W. 128 Kordinak, S.T. 292 Kornberg, A. 23 Koslowsky, M. 8 Kostic, A. 37–8 Kristof-Brown, A. 291 Kroska, A. 271 Kruglanski, A.W. 106–7 Kuhn, M. 263 Kumashiro, M. 206 Kumra, S. 286 Kunda, Z. 128, 234 Kurzweil, N. 180 Lalljee, M. 79 Lamb, R. 79 Laplante, J. 153

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Author Index Lazarus, R.S. 36 Leach, C.W. 151 Leathers, D.G. 291–2 Lee, F. 243 Lerner, J.S. 36 Lerner, M.J. 141, 184 Leu, J. 243 Leung, K. 172 Levenson, R.W. 36 Lewin, K. 50, 119, 192–3, 252 Li, A. 293 Lichtman, R.R. 133 Lievens, F. 290–1 Linder, D.E. 23 Linfield, K. 176–7 Linville, P.W. 236 Liu, T.J. 61, 64 Lobel, M. 133 Lockwood, P. 128 Loftus, G.R. 34–5 Luckman, T. 261 Luhtanen, R. 215 Mackie, D.M. 110–11 Macrae, C.N. 234 Maio, G.R. 99 Maitner, A. 7–8, 233–4 Malle, B.F. 3–4 Mandel, N. 134 Mann, M. 18–19, 24 Mannix, E.A. 172 Marszalek, J. 30 Matheson, K. 153 Mau, S. 152 Maynard, D. 273 McConnell, A.R. 110–11 McDonald, D.A. 151 Mead, G.H. 250, 252, 254–60 Medin, D.L. 79 Meltzer, B.N. 265 Merz, J. 29 Messman, S.J. 180 Michaels, J.W. 169 Mikulincer, M. 25 Miles, E.W. 183 Miller, R.L. 24, 32

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Milne, A.B. 234 Miron, A.M. 13, 14, 25, 37 Moffitt, G. 240 Molleman, E. 133 Monsour, M. 180 Moskowitz, G.B. 217 Mummendey, A. 224–5 Mussweiler, T. 5, 122–3, 126 Méot, A. 151 Nail, P.R. 3, 25 Nichols, M.P. 183 Nisbett, R.E. 90 Nolen-Hoeksema, S. 34–5 Onorato, R.S. 233–4 Osgood, C.E. 259 Otten, S. 217 Pallak, M. 59 Park, B. 238 Parker, T. 149 Patchen, M. 143, 144 Paulhus, D.L. 283 Peeters, H. 290–1 Pepper, H.F. 26, 27 Petras, J.W. 265 Petty, R. 4, 107 Piaget, J. 67, 237 Pindek, S. 8 Pittman, T. 59, 285 Plutchik, R. 35 Polk, D.M. 6, 175 Pollard, H. 290 Prins, K.S. 180 Pruyn, J. 133 Ragsdale, J.D. 184 Raju, P. 153 al Ramiah, A. 7 Ratcliff, K.S. 178 Riecken, H. 46–7 Riley, B.D. 293 Robinson, D.T. 271 Roccas, S. 238 Rogers, C.R. 66 Ronis, D.L. 66

299

Rosenberg, M. 62–3 Rosenfeld, P. 281 Rothbart, M. 237 Rudman, L.A. 286 Rumble, A. 6–7 Runciman, W.G. 146, 147 Rusbult, C.E. 184, 202–6 Ryan, A.M. 238 Ryckman, R.M. 286 Rydell, R.J. 110–11 Rüter, K. 126 Sayles, L.R. 143 Schachter, S. 46–7 Schlenker, B.R. 281–2, 287 Schmid, K. 7 Schneider, A. 8, 264, 273, 274–5 Schroeder, C. 240 Schuyt, T.N. 206 Schwartz, P. 169, 173, 175, 180–2, 185 Schwarz, R.C. 183 Seeman, E.A. 28 Seibel, C.A. 22, 28 Seltzer, L.F. 25 Semin, G.R. 241 Sensenig, J. 18, 21, 23 Shakespeare, W. 281 Shead, N.W. 151 Shechory, M. 177 Shen, L. 29, 30 Sherman, S.J. 21 Shibutani, T. 258, 261, 272 Shoham, V. 30 Siemer, M. 36 Siero, F.W. 133–4 Sigelman, J. 37 Silvia, P.J. 21, 25 Simon, L. 49, 63–4 Sinclair, L. 234 Singh, V. 286 Skarlicki, D.R. 172 Smeesters, D. 134 Smith, C.A. 35, 36 Smith, E.R. 241 Smith, H.J. 151, 152 Smith, K. 18–19, 24

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300

Author Index

Smith-Lovin, L. 264, 271 Snyder, M. 20, 24 Spencer, S.J. 234–5 Sprecher, S. 169, 172–8, 180–2, 184–6 Stack, A.D. 20 Stafford, L. 174, 179, 184–6 Stanton, A.L. 133 Stapel, D.A. 128, 133–4 Stark, O. 149 Steele, C.M. 60–4 Steil, J.M. 170 Stillman, P.G. 24 Stone, J. 63 Stouffer, S.A. 140, 142, 145, 149 Strain, L.M. 110–11 Strauss, A. 261 Strong, D.R. 292 Stryker, S. 253, 263–6 Sullivan, H. 30 Szabo, C. 57 Tadmor, C.T. 243–4 Tavris, C. 65 Taylor, D.M. 151 Taylor, S.E. 133 Tedeschi, J.T. 55 Tesser, A. 126–7, 283–4 Tetlock, P.E. 243–4 Thibaut, J. 6–7, 144, 165, 167–9, 191–202, 205

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Thibodeau, R. 61–2 Thomas, A. 28, 30 Thornton, B. 286 Toffler, B.L. 21–2, 24, 33–4 Tomicic, T.L. 293 Tougas, F. 152, 153 Trampe, D. 133–4 Traupmann, J. 180 Tropp, L.R. 150–1 Tucker, R.K. 27, 29–30 Turner, J.C. 212–14, 233–4 Turnley, W.H. 285 Ungar, S. 281 van Iddekinge, C.H. 289 van Knippenberg, A. 133, 236 van Lange, P. 204, 206 van Twuyver, M. 236 Van Vugt, M. 206 VanYperen, N.W. 171–2, 176, 178, 180 Verette, J. 184 Viela, B.B. 291 Vinnicombe, S. 286 Vogl-Baur, S. 180 Vohs, K.D. 287 Wagenaar, W.A. 34–5 Wagner, B.C. 4 Wallace, H.M. 32

Wallbrown, F. 22 Walster, E. 164, 173, 176, 180 Walster, G.W. 164, 173, 176, 180 Waters, G.M. 240 Weber, R. 240 Weber, S.J. 292 Weick, K.E. 144 Weigold, M.F. 281–2, 287 Weinberg, M. 271 Weiner, B. 79, 80 Weinraub, M. 20, 24 Weiss, B. 288 Wenzel, M. 224–5 West, C. 271 Wheeler, S.C. 107 Wicklund, R.A. 16, 23–5, 31, 32, 282 Wilke, J.R. 178 Williams, R.M. 147 Wills, T.A. 124 Wood, J.V. 133 Worchel, S. 14, 18, 23, 32 Wortman, C.B. 23 Wright Mills, C. 260, 262 Wright, R.A. 24, 34 Wright, S.C. 150–1 Zagefka, H. 151 Zajonc, R. 35 Zimmerman, D.H. 271 Ziv, R. 177

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Subject Index

Note: Abbreviations used in the index: ELM = elaboration likelihood model; IM = impression management; SI = symbolic interactionism. abandoned theory of explanation 76–7 ability factors, elaboration likelihood 101 ABO (actor, behavior, and object) events 268–9 abusive relationships 204–5 accommodation in relationships 203–4 action outcomes, Heider 74–6 actor control 198, 199 actor-observer asymmetries 90–1 affect reactance theory 34–8 see also emotions affect control theory (ACT) 266–9 aggression catharsis hypothesis 45 frustration-aggression theory 141 see also violence ambivalent attitudes 99 anger 35, 36–7, 45, 141, 142, 152, 176 appraisal see cognitive appraisal arousal 16, 31, 34, 36–7, 59–60

assertive strategies, IM 285, 287 Atlas of Interpersonal Situations, An (Kelley) 202, 206 attitudes 59–60 gender-role 177 shaped by behavior 52–3 see also elaboration likelihood model (ELM) attitudinal ambivalence 99 attribution theories 72 folk conceptual theory of behavior explanation 81–91 Heider’s theory 72–6 Jones and Davis’s theory 76–7 Kelley’s theory 77–9 other attribution research 79–81 audience design 88–9 automatic attitude measures 109–11 autonomy and reactance reduction 18–19 behaviorism 51, 253–4 constructive critique of 256 social behaviorism 256–7

and social learning theory 254–5 beliefs and dissonance reduction 45–7, 48–9 reasons for behavior 85, 89, 90–1 bias in IM research 292–3 ingroup 216–17, 219, 220, 221, 226 message interpretation 104–5 in persuasive arguments 103 social desirability 283 biculturalism 243–4 “big five” personality traits and IM 287 body image, social comparison 133–4 category conjunction 237–8 causal history of reason (CHR) explanations 84, 85–6, 88, 90 causal judgment, Kelley 77–9 “cause” explanations of behavior 82 central route to persuasion 102–4 Chicago school 8, 259–63 versus Iowa school 264–5

Theories in Social Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Derek Chadee. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Chadee_bindsub.indd 301

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302

Subject Index

children, SI perspective 274–5 choices see outcome matrices cognitive appraisal in experience of inequity 185 link to emotions 34–5, 36, 100, 152 cognitive dissonance theory 3, 44–5 decline and renewed interest in 60 development of theory 54–5 physiological arousal 59–60 self-affirmation theory 60–4 self-consistency theory 56–8 self-perception theory 58–9 early research paradigms 51–4 evaluation of 64–7 major theoretical concepts 47–51 and prophecies of doom 45–7 and psychological reactance 31–2 commitment in relationships accommodation and sacrifice 203–4 despite abuse 205 factors predicting 184 investment model 202–3 and structural symbolic interactionism 265 common ingroup identity model 222–3 comparative fit 213–14, 233 comparison level, outcome expectations 200–1 comparison standards, selection of 123–7 compliance studies 21–2, 32 computer simulation of SI 259, 269 conflict, intergroup 211 consistency and attitudinal ambivalence 99 preference for 57–8 see also self-consistency theory control models, SI 265–9 conversational analysis 80–1 covariation reasoning, Kelley 77–9, 80 cross-cultural comparison 272–3 crossed categorization, social groups 222 culture

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biculturalism 243–4 and cognition 257 and equity perception 185 subjective experiences of emotions 37–8 symbolic interactionist studies 272–3 cybernetic models of identity 266–8 of symbolic interactions 268–9 defensive strategies, impression management 284–5 deliberative attitude measures 109–11 demographic variables and IM 285–6 dependence and power, relationships 195 deprivation see relative deprivation (RD) theory desires, explaining behavior 85–6, 89, 90–1 deviance 269–70 Becker, Howard S. 262 cross-cultural comparison 272–3 and socialization 258 disengagement strategies 181–2 dissimilarity testing 129–32 dissonance see cognitive dissonance theory distributive justice 6, 142–3, 164, 167, 172, 173 domestic duties, equitable division of 172, 177, 178 domestic violence 204–5 doomsday cults, rationalizations of 46–7 dramaturgy, Goffman 261–2 dual identity model 223–4 elaboration likelihood model (ELM) 4–5, 96–7 applications of the ELM 107–9 automatic and deliberative attitude measures 109–11 consequences of elaboration attitude strength 105–6

criticism of the ELM 106–7 determinants of elaboration likelihood 97–101 elaboration continuum 97 multiple roles for persuasion variables 104–5 two routes to persuasion 101–4 emotions control system theories 266–9 and IM behaviors 287 and message elaboration 99–100 reactance emotion theory 34–8 symbolic interactionist perspective 271–2 and thought confidence 104 empirical methods, Blumer 260 enabling factors, intentional behavior 87–8, 89 EPA (evaluation, potency, and activity) dimensions 268–9 equality versus equity 169–70 equity theory 6, 143–5, 163, 164–5 application of 175 domestic duties 177 emotions 175–6 gender 176–7 orientation 180–1 personality 175 relational behaviors 179–80 relational quality 178 relationship breakup 181–2 relationship type and length 175 critique of 182–5 further development of 185–6 major theoretical concepts within 165–6 four propositions of equity 166–8 measurement issues 168–72 restoring equity 173–4 ethnomethodology (ET) and conversation analysis 273–4 evaluation, potency, and activity (EPA) dimensions 268–9 exchange orientation 180–1 extramarital behavior and equity 180

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Subject Index family culture and equity perception 185–6 favoritism, ingroup 216–17 fear, causing rumors of doom 45–6 felt deprivation 147–9, 150–2, 156–7 folk-conceptual theory of behavior explanation 4, 81–6 actor-observer asymmetries 90–1 folk concepts of mind and behavior 81–7 psychological determinants 87–90 forbidden fruit theory 20 free choice paradigm 53–4 freedom see reactance theory frustration-aggression theory 141 functional antagonism 237–8 gender differences and cross-cultural differences 273 and equity theory 176–7 impression management 285–6 psychological reactance 20–1 SI approach 271 gender identity 213, 234 Gestalt perspective 50, 252–3, 257 groups attractiveness and conformity 19–20 deprivation 146, 150–6 ingroup bias 216–17 member contributions, equity 167 religious cults 46–7 social comparison 120–1 social psychology of 193–8 see also intergroup relations Handbook of Symbolic Interactionism, (Reynolds) 263, 264 health issues and relative deprivation 152 social comparisons 132–3 use of ELM in safe sex message 107–9 hedonic relativism 141–2 HIV prevention messages, use of ELM 107–9

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Hong Psychological Reactance Scale (HPRS) 30 household labor, equitable division of 172, 177, 178 human resources (HR) and IM 288–90 hypercriticism 284 idealized media images, comparison with 133–4 identification see social identification identity cybernetic models of 266–8 gender 213, 234 group 222–6 recursive models of 265–6 relational 175 role 265–6 theories of 257–9 virtual 262 see also social identity theory identity control theory (ICT) 266, 267 IM see impression management (IM) impersonal causality 73, 74, 76 impression formation 236 impression-formation equations 253, 263, 267, 268–9 impression management (IM) 8, 88–9, 280 antecedents of 285 demographic variables 285–6 personality variables 286–7 situational variables 288–90 definitions 280–1 future directions 293 historical overview 281–2 as an issue in research 292–3 and marketing 291–2 outcomes of 290–1 theoretical perspective “basking in reflected glory” 283–4 hypercriticism 284 relationship to self concept and social identity 282–3 social desirability 283

303

types of 284–5 Indiana interactionists 263, 264–5, 271, 274 individual differences, self-consistency theory 57–8 “individuation” 236 induced compliance paradigm 51–3 inequity see equity theory; relative deprivation (RD) theory information resources for explaining behavior 89 ingroup bias/favoritism 216–17 ingroup projection model 224–5 inputs-outcomes equity ratio, Adams 143–4 intentional behavior/intentionality 4, 73 folk concept of 81–2 judgments of 88 modes of explanation for 82–7 interdependence theory 6–7, 191–2 accommodation processes and sacrifice 203–4 application of 202–3 development and description of 192–8 future directions 205–6 Interpersonal Relations (Kelley and Thibault) 198–202 reasons people remain in abusive relationships 204–5 intergroup relations 7, 211–12 evolutionary perspective 221 multiple categorization 221–6 and multiple identities 238–9 optimal distinctiveness theory 220 role of group status 218–20 and social identity theory 218 subjective uncertainty reduction theory 220–1 terror management theory 221 Interpersonal Relations (Kelley and Thibault) 198–202 interviews, use of IM during 288–9

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304

Subject Index

investment model 202–3 investments-rewards equity ratio, Homans 142, 143 Iowa school, symbolic interactionists 263 versus Chicago school 264–5 J-curve theory of revolution 142 job selection, use of IM 288–90 justice theories 164 distributive justice 6, 142–3, 164, 167 justice theory, Lerner 141 labeling 270 looking-glass self, Cooley 257–8, 261 Machiavellianism and IM tactics 287 manipulators vs. nonmanipulators, dissonance 57 Marital Comparison Level Index (MCLI) 184 marketing and IM 291–2 marriage 167, 183, 186 behaviors within 179–80 equity measures 169, 170–2 gender-specific equity perceptions 177 remarriage 175 restoring equity within 173–4 satisfaction in 178 matching hypothesis 181 mathematical models cognitive dissonance theory 48 equity theory 166 of identity 266–8 of symbolic interactionism 268–9 mental state markers, reason explanations 85–6 message elaboration, factors influencing amount of 98–101 metacognitive model (MCM) of attitude structure 109–10 moral development of the self, Mead 258 motivation

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approach vs. avoidance 36–7 elaboration likelihood 98–100 and IM tactics 289 multiple categorization and intergroup attitudes 221–2 common ingroup identity model 222–3 crossed categorization 222 dual identity model 223–4 ingroup projection model 224–5 social identity complexity 225–6 need for cognition, elaboration likelihood 98–9 normative fit 213–14, 233 norms of reciprocity 19, 166, 168 optimal distinctiveness theory 220 outcome attributions 75–6, 79–80 outcome matrices 6–7, 193–4 comparison level 194–5 dependence and power 195–7 norms and tasks 197–8 transformation process 191–2 overbenefitedness 170–1, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181 partner control, outcomes 195, 196 Perception of Social Inequality Scale-Women’s Form (PSIS–W) 154–5 collective version of 155–6 peripheral route to persuasion 101–2 person perception, Heider’s work 73–4 personal causality 4, 73–4, 76 personal deprivation antecedents, correlates, and consequences of 150–2 versus group deprivation 152–6 personal relevance, ELM 98 personality and impression management 286–7 and psychological reactance 22, 26, 27–30 and relational equity 175

persuasion see elaboration likelihood model (ELM) physiological arousal dissonance research 59–60 and emotions 35–6, 37 and reactance effects 17 positive distinctiveness and group status 218–20 pragmatic goals, behavior explanations 88–9 pragmatism 255–6 preference for consistency (PFC) 57–8 primary deviance 270 promotional behaviors, IM 284–5 prophecies of doom 45–7 protective practices, IM 284 psychological distortion 173 psychological equity restoration 173–4 psychological reactance see reactance theory Questionnaire Measuring Psychological Reactance (QMPR) 22, 28, 29–30 rationality, reason explanations 83–4 “rationalization trap” 64–5 rationalizations reducing dissonance 46–7, 49 reactance theory 2–3, 13 application of reactance 32–3 assumptions 13–14 cognitive dissonance 31–2 criticisms of reactance 33–4 effects of reactance 16–18 magnitude of reactance 15–16 measuring reactance 26, 29–30 personality traits and reactance 22, 26, 27–9 reactance emotion theory 34–8 research on reactance 18 forbidden fruit theory 20 gender differences 20–1 situational reactance 23–5 social interaction 18–20

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Subject Index social influence 21–2 threats to freedom 14–15 reality 250, 252 objective 140, 150, 257, 259 subjective 49, 83, 150 “reason” explanations of behavior 82–4 belief and desire reasons 85 mental state markers 85–6 reciprocity, norms of 19, 166 recruitment and selection, IM tactics 288–90 recursive models of identity and social structure 265–6 relational identity (RI) and equity 175 relational maintenance 179–80 relationships abusive 204–5 accommodation and sacrifice 203–4 behaviors within 179–80 commitment in 202–3 dissolution of, equity theory 181–2 interdependence theory 193–8 interpersonal relations 198–202 type and length, effect on perceived equity 175 relative deprivation (RD) theory 6, 140–1 Crosby’s model 147–9 early conceptualizations of 141–5 future research 157 invocation of RD concept 140–1, 149–50 models of (1959 to 1975) 145–7 objective and subjective statuses 150–2 past findings 156–7 personal-group discrepancy 152–6 religious cults, rationalizations of 46–7 revolution, theory of, Davies 142 rewards and costs, equity theory 165–8 norms governing allocation of 183

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and relational quality 184 social comparisons 142–3, 144 role-identity 265–6 routine standards, social comparison 125–7 rumors, spread of 45–6 sacrifice in relationships 203–4 salespeople, use of IM 291–2 secondary deviance 270 Selective Accessibility Model 5–6, 128–32, 134 the self influence of social comparisons on 127–32 theories of 257–9 self-affirmation theory 60–4 self-categorization theory 7, 211, 212–14, 233–5 and ingroup projection 224–5 self-concept and cognitive dissonance 56–7 and impression management 282–3 and self-affirmation 61–3 self-consistency theory 56–8, 62, 63 self-deception 283, 292–3 self-enhancement 124, 125 self-deceptive enhancement 283 self-esteem 3, 24 and relative deprivation 152 and self-affirmation theory 62–3 social identity theory 218 self-evaluation and exposure to idealized body shapes 133–4 private and public regard 215 and social comparison 123, 125 self-improvement 124–5 self-knowledge, accessibility of 128–32, 134 self-monitoring personality and IM tactics 286–7 self-perception theory 58–9 self-presentation and attributions 201–2

305

and impression management 287 self-promotion 285, 286, 287, 289 self-regulation and IM 287 sexual behaviors and relational equity 180 sexuality, SI approach to 270–1 SI see symbolic interactionism (SI) similarity and compliance 21 and self-categorization 233 and self-evaluation 131, 133–4 similarity testing 129–32 social comparison 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130 social identity complexity 225 situational reactance, research on 23–5 situational variables, impression management 288–90 smokers measuring attitudes of 109–10 rationalizations of 48–9, 50 social behaviorism, Mead 256–7 social categorization 7–8, 232 acquired categorization flexibility 242–3 biculturalism 243–4 diversity-driven theory of 244–5 etiology of flexibility 243 functional antagonism vs. category conjunction 237–8 multiple social categorization 238–41 self-categorization theory 233–5 situated cognition approach 241–2 social cognitive accounts 235–7 social comparison 5–6, 119 factors influencing choice of comparison standard 123–7 Festinger’s theory 119–21 influence on the self 127–32 reasons people engage in 121–3 social comparison theories 142–5 applications of 132–4 social desirability 283

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Subject Index

social identification 7 defining 214–15 dimensions of 215–16 evolutionary perspective 221 social identity and IM 282–3 social identity complexity 225–6 social identity theory 7 additional theoretical explanations 220–1 ingroup bias/favoritism 216–17 and intergroup relations 218 multiple social identities 221–6 role of group status 218–20 social influence and reactance 21–2 social interaction Heider’s work 73–4 reactance research 18–20 social learning theory 254–7 Social Psychology of Groups, The (Thibaut and Kelley) 193, 198–9, 206 social psychology, definition of 1 social structure and the self 264–5 socialization and deviance, Mead 258 status of “comparison other” 142 group 218–20 stereotypes/stereotyping and cognitive efficiency 235–6 stereotype threat 234 subcultures, studies of 272–3

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subjective reality 150 subjective uncertainty reduction theory 220–1 subjectivity of reasons 83 symbolic interactionism (SI) 8 Chicago School scholars 259–63 control models cybernetic model of SI 268–9 cybernetic models of identity 266–8 recursive models of identity and social structure 265–6 core assumptions of 250–1 process vs. structure 263 Chicago vs. Iowa 264–5 Indiana interactionists 264 Iowa school, structural approach 263 substantive areas of 269–75 symbols 256, 270 tension reduction 144, 259 terror management theory 221 theories development of 55–6 evaluation of 64–7 threat and psychological reactance 14–15 Trait Reactance Scale (TRS) 30 underbenefitedness 166, 168, 170–1, 176, 178, 179, 181

unintentional behavior/events, explanation of 77–8, 79, 82–3, 87–8 value capabilities and expectations 146–7 Verstehen 253 violence domestic 204–5 political 142, 149 on television 20, 25 virtual identity 262 wage comparisons 143, 144 warning labels 20, 25 When Prophecy Fails (Festinger, Riecken and Schachter) 46 women in abusive relationships 204–5 body image comparisons 133–4 equity and domestic work 172, 177, 178 equity in second marriage 175 and IM strategy 285–6 job satisfaction 147–8 maintenance behaviors and equity 179 perceived social inequality scale 154–6 personal-group distinction 152–3 stereotyping 234, 236 see also gender differences workplace behaviors and IM 288–9

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