The World facing Israel – Israel facing the World : Images and Politics 9783865969231, 9783865963550

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The World facing Israel – Israel facing the World Images and Politics

Alfred Wittstock (ed.)

Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Alfred Wittstock (ed.) The World facing Israel – Israel facing the World

Alfred Wittstock (ed.)

The World facing Israel – Israel facing the World Images and Politics

Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Umschlaggestaltung: nach einer Idee von Lionel Wittstock

LW

ISBN 978-3-86596-355-0 © Frank & Timme GmbH  Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur Berlin 2011. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Das Werk einschließlich aller Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des ­Verlags unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, ­Ü bersetzungen, Mikro­­verfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Ver­a rbeitung ­in elektronischen Systemen. Herstellung durch das atelier eilenberger, Taucha bei Leipzig. Printed in Germany. Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. www.frank-timme.de

C ONTENTS K URT B ECK ....................................................................................................................... 7 J OACHIM M ERTES ........................................................................................................... 9 A LFRED W ITTSTOCK Foreword............................................................................................................................ 13

F RANK -WALTER S TEINMEIER Israel and the Middle East – A Personal and a Political View ...................................... 17

YORAM M EITAL Perceptions of Peace: Israel, Egypt and Jordan .............................................................. 29

WALID K AZZIHA Egyptian Perceptions of Israel ......................................................................................... 39

M OSHE M A’OZ The Israeli-Syrian Conflict: The Role of Strategic, Ideological and Psychological Factors ....................................................................................................... 45

R ADWAN Z IADEH Do Images Change through Negotiations? – The Syrian-Israeli Experience.............. 63

I TAMAR R ABINOVICH Israel Faces the Palestinians............................................................................................. 79

M ANUEL HASSASSIAN The Intractable Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Future Perspectives .............................. 87

DAVID M ENASHRI Iran, Political Islam and Israel......................................................................................... 97

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B ERNARD H OURCADE Iran Facing Israel ............................................................................................................ 111

Y UVAL F UCHS Russia through Israeli Eyes – Some Considerations.................................................... 123

R OBERT O. F REEDMAN Russia, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict under Putin............................................ 131

O DED E RAN Israel and the US: Is it really that bad?.......................................................................... 151

K ENNETH W. S TEIN US-Israeli Relations 1947–2010: The View from Washington .................................. 159

M ARIO S ZNAJDER Israel and (in?) Latin America....................................................................................... 177

C ARLOS E SCUDÉ Israeli-Latin American Relations, 1948–2010.............................................................. 189

NAOMI C HAZAN Israel Facing Africa: Patterns and Perceptions ............................................................ 209

J OSEPH AYEE Africa’s Perception of Israel ........................................................................................... 225

Y ITZHAK S HICHOR My Heart Is in the West and I Am at the Ends of the East: Changing Israeli Perceptions of Asia ............................................................................ 239 Biographies...................................................................................................................... 259 Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 265

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K URT B ECK Minister President of Rhineland-Palatinate

“The world facing Israel, Israel facing the world: Images and Politics” is the programmatic title of these proceedings. They are a collection of papers by internationally renowned academics from all over the world who came together in Mainz for a conference lasting several days in May 2010. I had gladly accepted to be the patron of this conference, which was opened in the plenary hall of the Landtag, the State Parliament of Rhineland-Palatinate. The opening session of the conference focused on the German and European perspective on Israel and the Middle East; different perspectives that also determine the respective political attitudes and activities. Germany’s former Foreign Secretary, Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, gave an extensive overview of this context in his opening statement1, in which he combined political experience and pragmatic action. This has been the line that we have traditionally been seeking to apply in Rhineland-Palatinate when it comes to our bilateral relations with Israel. Dialogue is the key element in the various projects and activities that we continue to develop. On numerous occasions, for example, our State Agency for Civic Education (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung) has brought together different communities from Israel and RhinelandPalatinate. But we also devote particular attention to young people: under a joint exchange programme with the peace initiative Givat Haviva, a group of Jewish and Arab adolescents was able to come to Mainz and a group from ............................................ 1

Cf. in the present volume, pp. 17–28.

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Minister President of Rhineland-Palatinate

Rhineland-Palatinate returned the visit in Israel, offering both sides some firsthand experience. It is these encounters that I find particularly valuable, because they create a sense of solidarity with people living in a difficult political context and in a difficult time. In our friendship with Israel, we as Germans bear an additional responsibility to keep this solidarity alive across generations given our Nazi dictatorship past. It is only through dialogue that we can be successful in fending off anti-Semitic and racist incitements, and whenever necessary we will also speak up in sharp protest and combat any such occurrences with all the power of a democratic society. The history of Israel will forever remain closely intertwined with our own. Any encounter with Israel therefore requires us to adhere to the principles of humanity and political reason. This is the background against which to interpret the title “Images and Politics”: different perspectives on Israel and on events in the Middle East will determine which positions and political action are taken with respect to Israel. The papers in these proceedings help to make these connections explicit, focusing on the different perceptions and perspectives of different states. It is these connections on many different levels, and not only the narrow focus on the regrettably still unresolved Middle East conflict, that offer a number of starting points that politicians and society in Germany and beyond ought to address. The hope for a politically negotiated resolution to the conflict based on the two-state solution is ample motivation for the dialogue to continue. Some of the people who are carried by that same hope everywhere in the world gave impressive testimony of it through their presence here in Mainz and by their scholarly contributions to these proceedings.

Kurt Beck Minister President of Rhineland-Palatinate

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J OACHIM M ERTES President of the State Parliament of Rhineland-Palatinate

Throughout the world, and that includes us in Germany, Israel is predominantly perceived only in terms of the conflict in the Middle East. It is the image of suffering and violence on both sides that stand in the full glare of global publicity and preoccupy politicians and the media to an extraordinary extent. Consequently, they come together to form an image of Israel that is mostly reduced to the conflict with the Palestinians. The political, economic and cultural relationships that Israel maintains with other states worldwide thus fade into the background. Germany’s relationship with Israel was, is and shall remain a special one. The fact that it is as it is today, is something of a miracle in view of the crimes that were perpetrated by the National Socialists against European Jews. And herein lies the reason for our special responsibility towards Israel, which in turn also has an impact on the German and European perception of Israel. We can – and today we gladly do – appreciate the fact not only that we cultivate close political, economic and cultural relationships with Israel, but also that a friendship has developed between our two states. This is also founded on the eight local authority twinning agreements that exist between cities and communities of Rhineland-Palatinate and Israel; for example, between the towns of Andernach and Dimona (which goes back to 1975) and between our state capital Mainz and Haifa, as well as between the cities’ two universities. Moreover, since 1993 the State Parliament of Rhineland-Palatinate and the State itself have cultivated a close friendship with the Givat Haviva Foundation for Education and Peace, which supports dialogue and understanding between Jewish and Arab Israelis and between Israelis and Palestinians. The State has also provided financial support for this work since 1997. The past and present are of concern to us. In our remembrance work, we regularly hold events of our own that address subjects relevant to us in both historical and contemporary respects. For example, events are held – particu-

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President of the State Parliament of Rhineland-Palatinate

larly on 27th January – to remember the victims of National Socialism. On the other hand, two years ago we took the opportunity to celebrate the 60th birthday of the State of Israel – a state that needed to stand its ground between justifying its existence and the threat to its existence. Issues relating to the modern Israel and the reception of Israeli visitors are also, of course, part and parcel of our programmes. Since it was founded by David Ben-Gurion in 1948, Israel has in fact had to assert its independence in a number of wars against surrounding Arab neighbour states. In spite of this constant threat, Israel has so far retained its Jewish and democratic character, which in terms of the Middle East makes it something special. If we are to understand the modern state of Israel, we are compelled to take a closer look at its eventful history and development through to the present day. When Israel was founded, some 650,000 Jewish people lived there. Today, more than seven million people live in the country. This tenfold increase in the population has led to a change in population structure. While most of the generation of founding fathers came from Europe, it was more Oriental Jews, from Morocco, Yemen, Iraq and Ethiopia, who arrived subsequent to the founding of the state. From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s and with the ending of the Cold War, over one million Jews emigrated from Russia to Israel, adding another tile to the population mosaic. A modern and pluralistic society has now developed from the formerly homogeneous Jewish population that was characterised by its European roots. This achievement in integration can indeed be considered overall to have been a success, even if so far not all of Israel’s population groups have benefited to the same extent from the huge integration efforts that have been made – this mainly applies to Arab Israelis. It is not only Israel’s social fabric that has experienced enormous change, however: so, too, has its economy. Israel has developed from an agrarian state into one of the key producers of high-tech products in the software development, genetic and bioengineering and information technology industries. A nation that can point to such an impressive ascendency has earned – indeed, necessitates – not only our greater understanding but also a closer look on the part of the world. Only a more distinct consideration will succeed in tearing apart prejudices and breaking down ingrained images and serve as the basis for the alignment of appropriate political action.

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Joachim Mertes

The volume you have before you is intended to contribute to that process. Academics from all over the world have supplied their analysis and points of view in order to provide an independent and considered image of Israel which is removed from the conflicts in the Middle East. As President, I took great pleasure at the opening in May 2010 of the international conference, “The World facing Israel – Israel facing the World: Images and Politics”. This continued the State Parliament of Rhineland-Palatinate’s successful collaboration with the Israel Study Unit at the Department of Political Science at Johannes Gutenberg University, thereby making a further contribution to breaking down prejudice towards Israel and its people. Since 2000, the State Parliament has supported the Israel Study Unit and the Israel Student Working Group, which not only contribute to helping people engage with “modern Israel”, with its culture, and with its society and politics, but which, thankfully, also continue to pursue their commitment to imparting a more distinct awareness of Israel.

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A LFRED W ITTSTOCK

Foreword

If one takes polls as the basis both of how states are viewed and of the perception of their role in world affairs, Israel’s performance over the last two years has made for almost entirely negative reading. In 2010, for example, when people were asked about their views on the positive or negative influence of various states on world affairs, Israel ranked fourth most negative, behind Iran, Pakistan and North Korea. Commissioned by the BBC World Service since 2005, this study is carried out in 28 countries and surveys the views of almost 30,000 people. A negative overall view of Israel was recorded in 24 countries, while a positive image was identified in a mere two states and opinion was divided in a further two. Among the European countries, the perception of Israel and its supposedly negative influence on world affairs was at a historical low in Germany, with 68%, whereas only 13% of those interviewed were of the opinion that Israel exerted a positive influence on world affairs.1 In contrast to the public point of view, which is shaped by emotion in a variety of ways, there does also exist a certain perception of Israel which is founded on rather more rational factors. From this angle Israel is considered, in addition to its role in the Middle East conflict, a significant actor in international politics, possessing diplomatic ties with 156 countries2, including a number of predominantly Muslim states. On the one hand, we have Israel’s significance and role in international politics, economy and culture, while on the other we see the emotionally charged, public image portrayed by the ............................................ 1

Cf. BBC World Service poll, April 2010: www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pipa/pdf/apr10/ BBCViews_Apr10_rpt.pdf – for individual values concerning Israel, cf. Ibid. p. 15. The poll took place between November 2009 and February 2010; particularly in the context of the military operations in the Gaza Strip at the beginning of 2009, poll results were at their lowest. For this cf. Forsa survey results (in German): www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/stern-umfrage-jeder-zweitenennt-israel-aggressiv-651466.html. For further surveys in the context of the Middle East cf.: www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/ articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/index.php?nid=&id=&lb=brme

2

Cf. website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: www.mfa.gov.il

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Foreword

media, which is largely reduced to the Middle East conflict. These contrasting perceptions show that a detailed analysis is of vital importance; an analysis not only of Israel’s relations with the world’s states and regions, but also of those states’ and regions’ own stances towards, and perceptions of, Israel. This contrasting relationship and the various stances are influenced by a multitude of factors, and in turn by how these factors are received. These include, for example, the Shoah3 and its repercussions, the Middle East conflict4, diverse economic interests, shared or perhaps differing religious and cultural characteristics, perceptions of history and their interpretations, political partnerships and long or short-term relationships, to name but a few. Mentioned only fleetingly here, these components of images themselves form the very subject matter of the articles found in this volume. They may not find direct expression in the various article titles, yet they do crop up and are put into context. The influence they have changes with time, and here this is focused upon just as much as the manner in which they are interconnected. One thing does become clear: Israel is faced with a multitude of varying views concerning its conduct in international relations, and it needs to position itself in relation to these. This, in turn, is received in various different ways.5 The extent to which internationally composed images have an effect on political actions and decisions or a profound impact on public perception, is something which needs to be considered6, particularly within a conflict zone such as the Middle East, ............................................ 3

On remembering the Shoah and the political implications associated with this in the context of German-Israeli relations, cf. Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, pp. 17–28 in this volume.

4

This particularly concerns the remarks on the Palestinians (cf. Itamar Rabinovich, pp. 79–86; Manuel Hassassian, pp. 87–96) and on Israel’s neighbours Syria, Jordan and Egypt (cf. the articles by Moshe Ma’oz, pp. 45–61; Radwan Ziadeh, pp. 63–77; Yoram Meital, pp. 29–38 and Walid Kazziha, pp. 39–44). On the very specific history of Iran’s relationship with Israel and vice versa, cf. Bernard Houcarde, pp. 111–121 and David Menashri, pp. 97–109; on the constant features of USA-Israel relations cf. Oded Eran, pp. 151–157 and Kenneth Stein, pp. 159–175.

5

As an example for this, cf. the perception of Russia through Israeli eyes, Yuval Fuchs, pp. 117–123; on the change in mutual perceptions and the various interests of each cf. Robert O. Freedman, pp. 131–149. The complex manner in which perceptions and their influences on the level of political action are present is strongly emphasised by the networks of relationships and interests present between Latin America (cf. Mario Sznajder, pp. 177–188, Carlos Escudé, pp. 189–207) or Africa (Naomi Chazan, pp. 209–224, Joseph Ayee, pp. 225–237) and Israel, and vice versa. Changing perspectives include Israel’s increasing perception of Asian countries, cf. Yitzhak Shichor, pp. 239–257.

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On approaches concerning the interdependence of images and political action, and their potential interaction with political decision-makers and decisions, cf. Mark Schafer, “Images and Policy Preferences”, Political Psychology 18, no. 4 (1997), pp. 813–829; also Michele G. Alexander, Shana Levin, P.J. Henry, “Image Theory, Social Identity, and Social Dominance: Structural Char-

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Alfred Wittstock

where completely different conflicts come into contact with one another. The fact that there are predominantly negative perceptions of Israel by parts of the world public, while at the same time there is a high level of global interconnectedness and cooperation in politics, economy and culture, suggests to start with that there is no connection between the two levels. But if this were true, then it would obstruct the path leading to a comprehensive discourse. In any case, these opposing, self-contained perceptions of Israeli action certainly make the Middle East conflict all the more volatile. The question of whether or not they contribute to the conflict’s insolubility in a manner one should not underestimate, remains unanswered. Each of the articles found in this volume attempts to analyse various perceptions of Israel from a different perspective, as well as the contexts in which these perceptions emerged and how their influence has changed over time. The fact that Israeli and non-Israeli perspectives are used to comment on the other’s view, is what constitutes the appeal of the articles and it is an attempt at encouraging discussion. Originally presented at an international conference held at the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz in May 2010, which was officially opened at the State Parliament of Rhineland-Palatinate, they have been added to and amended for this print edition. The articles were written before the movements for democratization in Tunisia and Egypt are about to change in profound ways the Near and Middle East. The arrangement of the conference, its staging and the preparation of this volume would not have been possible were it not for the considerable support and help offered by numerous parties. A thank you goes to the patron of the congress, Minister President Kurt Beck, for his contributions and continuous support concerning Israel, as well as President of the State Parliament Joachim Mertes and his colleagues for hosting the opening ceremony in the Landtag, the State Parliament. Further thanks go to the president of the Johannes Gutenberg University, Prof. Dr. Georg Krausch, who promotes and lends his support to events organised by the Israel Study Unit at the Institute for Political Science. This also applies in ........................................................................................................................................................................... acteristics and Individual Motives Underlying International Images”, Political Psychology 26, no. 1 (2005), pp. 27–45; also cf. Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Interaktion, Fremdwahrnehmung, Kulturtransfer, Stuttgart a.o., 2008², pp. 86–95; 173ff.

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Foreword

particular to Prof. Dr. Jürgen W. Falter of the Institute for Political Sciences. A thank you goes to him as well for the many years of support he has provided. Thanks equally to Rainer Henkel-von Klass, Director of the International Office at the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz. The university’s press office also deserves thanks for its extraordinary support. A sincere thank you goes to the sponsors of the whole project, each having helped contribute to its success in their own way: the German Research Foundation, the Rhineland-Palatinate State Ministry of Education, Science, Youth and Culture, the Center for Intercultural Studies at the University of Mainz, the Friends of the University, the General Students’ Community of the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, furthermore the Hans Boeckler Foundation, the Heinrich Boell Foundation Rhineland-Palatinate, the State Agency for Civic Education of Rhineland-Palatinate, the Lotto Foundation RhinelandPalatinate, Lufthansa Consulting Frankfurt, and the city of Mainz and its mayor, Jens Beutel. Lastly, a big thank you goes to the students of the Israel Study Unit at the Institute for Political Science. With their great perseverance, ideas and drive, they helped to develop this project and make it become a reality: Junes Arfaoui M.A., Marc Beer, Felix Eschwege, Franziska Eckard, Paul Harel, Maria Kopelevich, Galina Kulstein, Linette Körfer, Lorenz Niewisch M.A., Onike ShorunkeSawyerr, Lionel Wittstock. Furthermore, Martin Armbruster, Silvia Keiser M.A., Stephanie Plata M.A., Daniel Simons, Daniel Spretke, Fabian Walter and Felix Wächter M.A. all helped with preparing the publication. A special thank you also goes to Stefanie Henkenjohann and Stephan Zaulich for their tireless help and critical reviewing of the entire manuscript. Anne-Kathrin D. Ende kindly assumed responsibility of the proofreading of articles in English. Finally, thank you to Frau Dr. Karin Timme of the publishing house Frank & Timme, for her supervision, critical remarks and constructive support of the publication. Mainz, February 2011

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F RANK -WALTER S TEINMEIER

Israel and the Middle East – A Personal and a Political View

Standing here behind this desk, opening a conference of the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, reminds of the fact that for quite some time, I intended to pursue a career in academia. As generally known I decided to take a different route. The perspective on Israel and the Middle East which I am about to offer you today is therefore the perspective of a politician and foreign policy pragmatist, not of a political scientist or a historian. And because you have, of course, already heard me talk a great deal about the situation in the Middle East over the past four years when I was Foreign Minister, I thought that today, I might approach the issue from a rather different and perhaps rather unusual angle. I have visited the region on many occasions. During one of my first visits, I met David Grossman, one of Israel’s foremost writers and well known in Europe too, where he is probably the best-known Israeli novelist besides Amos Oz. I already knew him quite well when I met him in a hotel in Jerusalem in 2006, where we had arranged to have coffee together. Of course, the timing of our meeting was not entirely random: it took place during the military conflict – I always avoid saying between Israel and Lebanon, because it was a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. We carried on from our previous conversations and talked about current political events and about the difficulties of justifying the prosecution of the war in Israel, which he also expressed doubts about. And as we parted, he said something to me which I will never forget. He said: “My friend, for the first time, I’m afraid.” And I asked him why, and what made him tell me this at the end of our conversion. He replied: “Because my son was called up fourteen days ago and he has been sent to the Lebanese front. I’m afraid and my wife is afraid, because the situation is so dangerous.” Then we went our separate ways in Jerusalem and I returned to Berlin the following day. And then the day after my return, I received a telegram from David Grossman

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Israel and the Middle East

in Jerusalem. It said: “My son Uri is dead”. The day after our conversation, Uri Grossman was killed while attempting to save the lives of his comrades. I want to tell you about another encounter as well – an encounter on the Palestinian side. Two years later, in 2008, I got to know a Palestinian Arab, Ismael Khatib from Jenin. In the past, you will often have heard it described in the news as a “hotspot”. It was the scene of massive assaults on the Israeli security forces. However, Jenin has made a good recovery over recent years. Anyone who has been there will have witnessed the improvements that have been made: civic life has been re-established, a Palestinian police force is now in charge of security in the town, and there has been some limited economic development. In 2005, three years before we met, Ismael Khatib also lost his son. It occurred during a clash with Israeli security forces. His son – his young son – was shot in the head. All the doctors could do was to declare him brain-dead. This Palestinian Arab, the young boy’s father, then took the decision to donate the organs of his dead son and give Israeli children the gift of life. This life story has now been turned into a film, entitled Heart of Jenin.1 I am mentioning these encounters because discussions about the Middle East are all too often characterised by well-rehearsed, routine speeches and by what I consider, in essence, entrenched opinions. What you are less likely to hear is any expression of doubt. And yet even experts have doubts – especially experts who are frequent visitors to the region. I have described just two of the numerous encounters that I have experienced in Israel, in Palestine and in neighbouring countries in recent years – just two of the countless encounters during many, many visits to Israel. The beauty of the country and the beauty of the wider region were not the reasons for my visits. It was crisis and conflict which brought me, as Germany’s Foreign Minister, back to the region again and again. So looking back on this experience which, for me, now lies in the past: anyone who visits the region frequently and has had the type of encounter that I have been privileged to have, anyone who has witnessed the suffering on both sides, in Israel and among the Palestinian Arabs, anyone who has genuinely attempted to grasp the historic dimension of this conflict, and who therefore ............................................ 1

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Lior Geller, Markus Vetter (Directors), The Heart of Jenin, Israel/Germany, 2008.

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Frank-Walter Steinmeier

understands how deeply this Arab-Israeli conflict has eaten into all the cracks and crevices of daily life over the decades, becomes very sceptical, over time and after all these years, about the very simplistic advice that is sometimes offered. They will probably also show a little more humility about their own ideas and the likely effectiveness of any suggestions that they themselves might occasionally venture to make. And yet despite this scepticism and despite the numerous disappointments that are part of one’s baggage when one leaves the region, and despite all the setbacks that have arisen in the efforts to achieve progress and peace in the region, and despite sometimes profound feelings of resignation which befall one, despite all this, if we take stock, it is clear that we have genuinely made progress. In this respect, we Germans do not have the option to turn away when the going gets tough. That has to do with what must still be described as the “special” relationship between ourselves and Israel and hence between ourselves and the region. Generally, I am not inclined to pathos. But even politicians cannot remain unmoved when we visit places which, even as children, we knew were the legendary sites of biblical events, when we visit places which are the meeting points of the world’s three major faiths which to this day give most of humanity meaning and purpose in their lives, and when we visit countries which have been the cradle of civilization for at least three thousand years. And of course, we are haunted by the conflicts which dominate this region, to which a solution has been painfully sought for so many years. I myself hadn’t kept count, but during my last visit to Israel at the end of January/early February, the Director of the King David Hotel came up to me and said: “Congratulations, Dr Steinmeier, this is your fifteenth visit to our hotel.” So I have it on good authority that I’ve now visited the region 15 times and during these visits, I have of course made a great many friends. Every time I visit, I have the impression that I am going back to a familiar place, and yet once I’m there, I find myself thinking: it’s all new, it’s a journey into the unknown, into a country which is still undiscovered in some ways, and a region which is still something of a closed book to us.

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Israel and the Middle East

For many people who visit the region from Germany, especially Germans of my own generation, our responsibility for the region is clear. I myself accept this obligation for myself and my generation. I too feel that I have a responsibility to engage with this region both personally and politically – for I too belong to the generation of Germans who grew up and reached political maturity at a time when a painful process of reckoning with the crimes of National Socialism was under way, which also entailed a reckoning with our own parents’ and our fathers’ generation. For me, and I assume for most Germans, my first visit to Israel was an extremely moving experience. It was a journey to the place of refuge for hundreds of thousands of people of the Jewish faith fleeing from the terrors of Nazism. It was a journey to the place which offered sanctuary to many of those who, once Hitler’s reign of terror had ended, no longer had the strength or the courage to remain in their home country. Israel is the country – and this is also something which I have observed time and again – where the Shoah is still tangible and ever-present. There are still thousands of people living in Israel who survived the terrors of Nazism, who bear the scars on their own bodies, who spent years in concentration camps, who narrowly escaped death, and who lost family and friends. For anyone who has ever visited Yad Vashem and talked with survivors and listened to their accounts of humiliation and death, expulsion and exile, the experience remains burned in their memory forever. As much as the Shoah is ever-present in the consciousness of the people of Israel, Israel today – and this is a misconception that we Germans sometimes fall prey to – Israel today certainly does not view itself purely in a victim’s role. On the contrary, there is a sometimes grim determination which is recognisable and palpable throughout Israel, particularly among its political leaders. Due to the dynamics and the spirit which drove Israel’s founders in the early days, some of which is still present today, modern Israel seems to us to be full of contrasts and contradictions. It is a country where untouched desert exists alongside international centres of leading-edge technology. It is a country which, even after 60 years, is still emerging. It is a country with tremendous capacity for innovation, but which will defend the successes achieved during its early years as vigorously as it defends itself as the home of Judaism. And every one of us can sense that. You can feel it when you arrive at Israel’s bor-

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Frank-Walter Steinmeier

ders. You sense that this country feels that its existence is under threat. You feel it as you walk through the airport. It is a country of abiding vigilance. A country where the military and a visible military presence are as much a part of daily life as the three-hour wait for the security checks for the flight back to Germany. That’s the first thing. The second thing that you get to know is the infinite longing for peace which also exists in Israel. This year, I attended the Herzliya Conference, now a well-established and internationally recognized event and the reason for my last visit in late January/early February.2 From my own point of view, there was a particular reason for attending the Conference this year. It was not that I anticipated any significant change in the positions of those participating in the discussions. And yet although the Herzliya Conference is regarded as a particularly conservative type of event compared with others, it was the first event of its kind at which the speakers included not only Europeans, Americans and Israelis but also – and this was the surprise element – Dr. Salam Fayyad, the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority. He was scheduled to speak alongside Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak. My feeling, in attending this Conference, was that it was certainly a sign of progress that a Palestinian Prime Minister had been invited, but I fully expected it to be a home win for the Israeli Defence Minister. What surprised me – and, at the same time, encouraged me to continue along the road of supporting peace and good-neighbourly relations in the region – was the fact that what was, on paper, a conservative national security conference gave the most applause to the Palestinian Prime Minister at the end and after Barak and Fayyad had finished speaking. The participants sensed that prejudices towards the Palestinian side had broken down. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz3 reported the next day that Salam Fayyad had triumphed that evening. I did not like that at all: the discussion had in fact shown that no one can win if people try to resolve the situation through the old logic of confrontation; instead, a solution must be based on efforts to discover some common ground as a basis for going forward. ............................................ 2

10th Herzliya Conference, Israel, January 31 – February 3, 2010.

3

Ari Shavit, “Peace will be found in Damascus, not Ramallah”, Ha’aretz, February 4, 2010.

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I believe that this did help us move forward, because what I noticed that day, for the first time in a long time, was a genuine and renewed interest on the part of Israel’s entire national security elite in trying again with the other side. It was a discussion in which there was a great willingness to listen. It was a discussion in which there was a great willingness to revive the debate about the desire to reach a settlement with the Palestinian side, and also a great willingness on the part of Israel’s entire national security community to move once again towards a position which had helped the country in the past – towards a truly robust realism which has always facilitated pragmatic solutions. Of course, I have noticed this longing for peace much more strongly among intellectuals, poets and writers in the past, although here too, I have observed the same contradictions which are so characteristic of Israel. In 2008, during our celebrations to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel, we invited a number of contemporary Israeli authors to Germany. At four-weekly intervals, authors came to the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin and gave readings from their works to an increasingly large audience.4 These authors spanned Israel’s entire political spectrum, from the left to the conservative right. Many members of the audience who attended the readings regularly said to me afterwards: “You must carry on with the series; we have never learned as much about Israel as we have from these readings by Israeli authors.” The writers cast light on many different aspects of daily life in Israel, but together, they made it clear just how much Israel itself has to gain from reconciliation with the Palestinian Arabs. The incompleteness of present-day Israel was expressed just as much as the contradictions, antagonisms and anachronisms which so define Israel. This is a positive thing, in my own view, because if I cast a glance at some of the newspaper commentaries published over the last three years, I see that we sometimes oversimplify matters for ourselves where Israel is concerned. Let’s not forget that Israel is the only democracy in an otherwise extremely authoritarian governance environment. It is a democracy which, like many others, has its deficits. But it is also a democracy which is located at the intersection be............................................ 4

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Readings given by Boris Zaidmann, Assaf Gavron, Aliza Olmert, Katharina Hacker and Amos Oz, c.f. e.g. Neue Züricher Zeitung, December 17, 2008.

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tween Occident and Orient and has to deal with cultural and above all social disparities between the Jewish majority and a growing Arab minority, a democracy which encompasses both the most devout religiosity but also great openness to the world. It is this that David Grossman, in one of his early essays5, described as the extreme piquancy of life in Israel – the clashing of very different traditions, and it is this – perhaps even more so today than for the generation who founded the State of Israel – that shapes the extreme intensity of daily life in Israel. What defines the essence of Israel, you see, is the willingness to genuinely embrace these conflicts in society. That too is something that I personally have observed in Israel. But what does this mean for politics? I haven’t given you an answer to that question yet. I have talked about the Shoah and the historic responsibility, and integral to that is that Israel’s right to exist is never negotiable under any circumstances. Early this year, on the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of National Socialism, the Israeli President, Shimon Peres, gave an impressive speech before the German Bundestag. I should like to quote from it briefly. He said: “Never again ignore bloodthirsty dictators, hiding behind demagogical masks, who utter murderous slogans.”6 To us Germans, this warning is an obligation. Anyone who calls into doubt Israel’s right to exist will meet our fierce resistance. But of course, defending Israel’s right to exist is not a unique selling point of Germany’s Middle East policy, as you know, even if we sometimes act as if it were. At European level, however – and I have very clear memories of the time when Germany held the EU Council Presidency and had the task of coordinating European foreign policy – it has often been a struggle to achieve common positions among the Europeans. We must also acknowledge that the unconditional recognition of Israel’s right to exist has, often enough, been something of a contentious issue within the European Union itself and I think Israel may have sensed that on occasion. The fact that the situation always depends to ............................................ 5

David Grossmann, Der Gelbe Wind. Die israelisch-palästinensische Tragödie, München: Kindler, 1988.

6

Shimon Peres, Speech at the German Bundestag, Berlin, January 27, 2010: www.bundestag.de/ kulturundgeschichte/geschichte/gastredner/peres/speech.html

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some extent on who happens to hold the Presidency in Europe may even have caused some irritation. In some ways, this also determines the relationship between Israel and the European Union. Germany has a special responsibility here too. In my view – and I say this without wishing to sound presumptuous, but in the awareness of Germany’s historic responsibility – it is that here too, we Germans, acknowledging all the difficulties, must seek to bring the European countries together in relation to their policies towards the Middle East, and our sensors must be particularly finely tuned when it comes to the situation in Israel. Any developments which play into the hands of someone who wants “Israel to be wiped off the map must be nipped in the bud”. What the experience of numerous visits has taught me, and the lesson I have learned from the many stories of the country and region, and what I ultimately found helpful for practical policy-making, is this: you learn to distance yourself from vocal and over-simplistic analyses. Given the complexity of the situation, unless you are genuinely prepared to study the region and its deep-rooted conflicts very carefully, you cannot possibly offer any advice that is appropriate and relevant to the region. Unless you are willing to consider all the factors which have a bearing on the situation – the interdependence of domestic and foreign policy interests, territorial, religious and historical aspects, the difficult issues of security on the one hand and the unresolved refugee issue on the other, the future of East Jerusalem and the ultimately no less difficult issues of sustainable access to resources such as water – unless you are willing to take note of all these aspects, you cannot help to bring peace to the region. I am certain of one thing, at any rate, and it is a message which I have occasionally passed on to one or another of my European colleagues: good will alone, no matter how much determination is expressed in the resolutions adopted so enthusiastically at European level, is not enough to move things forward in the region. We might even think – and perhaps this was Barack Obama’s somewhat painful experience at the start of his presidency – that the US President rather overestimated his personal influence and his own capacities, or indeed those of the United States as a whole, to steer what happens in the region. Certainly, looking at his envoys to the region and the fact that they returned home

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empty-handed in the early days, one could say that he was forced to learn the hard way. In truth, though, I was – and still am – gratified that as a result of the political changeover in the United States, its attitude not just towards Israel and Palestine but towards the entire Middle East region has radically changed. I personally am very pleased that the mapping of the entire region in terms of black and white, which we had to contend with during the eight years of the Bush Administration, no longer guides US foreign policy, neither in the Middle East region nor indeed in the United States’ relations with Russia, where we can currently observe some easing of tensions due to this more flexible approach. This perhaps gives some cause for hope that there could be a similar development in the Middle East as well. I say this, of course, mindful of one of the great speeches given by Obama at the start of his presidency, namely the Cairo speech7, which I believe most visibly demonstrated the change of philosophy underpinning US foreign policy. This was a speech which contained a clear commitment to the willingness to engage in dialogue and a clear commitment to an “outstretched hand” policy. This marks a real shift of perspective for everyone dealing with foreign policy who saw that mapping the world in black and white, as I mentioned before, simply took us further and further towards a dead end. So what has changed in US foreign policy? As I see it, US foreign policy is now a little less ideological and far more pragmatic. Today, once again, it is based on facts, so to speak. Let me explain what I mean by that, so there can be no misunderstandings. It is not a bad approach to foreign policy, to look at the facts and the available options based on those facts, and then develop policy initiatives on that basis. I believe that ultimately, there is no getting around the facts, even though this sometimes puts the foreign policy-maker in a tricky position. Earlier, I told you about Salam Fayyad’s and Ehud Barak’s appearance at the Herzliya Conference. But I haven’t told you anything about my own contribution to that event.

............................................ 7

Barack Obama, A New Beginning, Cairo, April 6, 2009: www.spiegel.de/international/world/ 0,1518,628538,00.html

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I asked myself, of course, what kind of contribution the Germans could make. In fact, it’s not all that different from what the conflict parties in the region have to say in the current situation. Of course, I too have seen the brilliant start made by the US administration under President Obama getting bogged down in Middle Eastern sand, and of course I too have an obligation to suggest ways of getting the process moving again. And what happens sometimes is that you are asked a question by experienced foreign policy journalists, including Germans, and then in the question itself, the reporters say: “But please don’t tell me that what we need now are ‘proximity talks’” – in other words, preparatory meetings to get the negotiators representing Palestine and Israel back to the table again. Sometimes, it takes more courage to accept this pragmatic reality than to indulge in high-flown ambitions. So what I said at the Herzliya Conference was this:8 as the various efforts had reached a standstill, with both partners having withdrawn again, I did not see any other chance than to clarify in proxy talks what would be a sufficient basis of mutual trust to support all parties, on the Israeli and the Palestinian side, on their way back to negotiations. This is a long, hard and sadly often repeated attempt but I believe that there is currently no alternative, and indeed, this effort is now under way. And after Salam Fayyad’s visit to Berlin9, I believe it may even have some prospect of success. That is the major contribution which the United States must make. As we have seen, the US is not in a position to impose peace on command – but it is the only country which can encourage the two conflict parties in the region to move in a direction which will ultimately bring them both back to the table. This is how I see the United States’ role, which is not to say that the Europeans have no role to play. However, I would simply voice a word of caution, as I had occasion to do during my time as Foreign Minister, when I warned my European colleagues that we tend to overestimate our own role in the region. We are not partners who can act with the same authority in the region as the United States. That certainly applies to the Israeli side, and I have no doubt that you will accept that comment without hesitation. However, based on my ............................................ 8

See www.youtube.com/user/HerzliyaConference.

9

Salam Fayyad visited Berlin on May 18, 2010.

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experience in the talks on both sides, I would say that it applies to the Palestinians as well. They know very well that if there is anyone who can move things forward in the region, it is the Americans, and that if this develops into small steps towards the achievement of a two-state solution, then it will be the Americans who will take these steps together with the two conflict parties, Israel and Palestine. We Europeans can play an important and supportive role in this context. This is not always an easy role for us, as we are seeing once again at the moment. Nonetheless, one of the most important roles, which tends to be underestimated by the German public, was Germany’s participation in securing the ceasefire and peace after the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, for example. Do you recall the kind of debates that were conducted on this issue in Germany during the second half of 2006 and early 2007?10 There were many who took the view that the deployment of Germany’s Federal Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, off the coast of Lebanon could not be countenanced and that we had no business engaging in this region due to the burden of our history and also because it was far too dangerous. I made no secret of my convictions at the time. I said: if we are serious about achieving stability and wish to take resolute steps towards peace in the region, then we cannot shirk our responsibilities. We must participate in securing the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. So far, it has worked. Both sides want this participation to continue, and a decision on this issue will be taken in the German Bundestag in the next few days.11 And let me make just one comment as an aside: quite frankly, I don’t understand why one of the parties in the governing coalition finds itself apparently unable to comply with this request, which comes from both conflict parties. This is not the place to spread a mood of optimism. However, I will say this: we cannot shirk our responsibilities simply because the task facing us is a difficult one. ............................................ 10 Protocol of the plenary debates in the German Bundestag in 2006: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/ dip21/btp/16/16049.pdf#P.4799 11 Protocol of the plenary debates in the German Bundestag in 2010: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/ dip21/btp/17/17049.pdf#P.5030

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Occasionally, we also underestimate the opportunities that are on the table even if the two-state solution is not something that can be achieved overnight. I don’t think it is an exaggeration to say that the talks currently taking place between Israel and Palestine will bring the major players back together around the table, and nor is it an exaggeration to say that we are on track towards improving conditions, if we look at the development, including economic development, which has taken place in the West Bank, at least, over the past two years. Improving conditions in Palestine always makes a contribution to Israeli security as well. That is my personal belief. So that is why I contradict all those in Israel who are currently arguing on a very superficial level that the present situation is the best possible option for Israel: discord on the Palestinian side, a conflict between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and a strong Israel with a robust defence capability. I would caution our Israeli friends against accepting this scenario: I have yet to experience a situation anywhere in the world where a status quo policy has genuinely created ongoing security and a lasting peace. It has never done so in the past, and it will not do so in Israel and Palestine. A status quo policy is not a policy for progress towards peace, and that is why it must give way to pro-active steps that bring the two sides closer together. I have another message for our Israeli friends as well: this type of policy will not be possible unless you understand that trust is not a one-way street. Trust must be mutually guaranteed. We cannot simply look back to the past, even though the history of this conflict cannot be ignored if we want to achieve a solution. There have been numerous violations of all the agreements, from Geneva to Oslo, as well as the numerous peace efforts which have been made in the interim, and what they have shown is that the future can only be built on the basis of trust. For that reason, a settlement freeze is not the solution, but it is the key contribution towards establishing a basis for trust building between the two sides. The scenario which I have sketched out to you is not a particularly optimistic one. Nonetheless, it reflects a viewpoint which is not entirely lacking in confidence about possible solutions to the conflict, along with the various possible solutions which have been proposed by the Israelis and also by the Arab world.

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Perceptions of Peace: Israel, Egypt and Jordan

This paper deals with perceptions of peace among Israelis, Egyptians, and Jordanians. As the term ‘perception’ (like the term ‘reception’) might be defined in various ways, in this paper I use the term ‘perception’ to mean the complex ways in which reality appears to individuals and groups; the implicit ways in which notions such as ‘peace process’, ‘cold peace’, or ‘no partner’ have been constructed and consumed.1 The one event that completely changed the way most Israelis saw the conflict with Egypt was President Sadat’s historic visit to Israel. Many in Israel, and far beyond, still recall that Saturday evening of November 19, 1977, when the aircraft of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt landed at Ben-Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv. The following day, Sadat addressed a festive session of Israel’s Parliament, and presented his vision for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Egyptian-Israeli dispute being only a part of it. It was a speech filled with hope for a better future between Israelis and Arabs, but it was also a clear statement about the price of peace. Sadat presented for the first time what has become known as the formula of ‘land-for-peace’: complete Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied since June 1967 in exchange for peace with Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Sadat gave expression to the common linkage in the national discourse between territory, sanctity, and historical-cultural heritage. He may have chosen the motif because of Zionism’s linkage between the Jewish people and the ............................................ 1

The conception of “no partner” – shared by most Israelis and Palestinians over the past nine years – molded a state of mind receptive to unilateral measures. This mentality found one expression in the widespread Israeli support for a separation fence and disengagement (in its unilateral form as well). The public discourse in both Israeli and Palestinian societies made it clear that the “no partner-conception” became the dominant conception among Israelis and Palestinians over the past nine years. An intensive discussion of this conception in Yoram Meital, Peace in Tatters: Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, pp. 111–128.

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sanctity of the Promised Land. What he emphasized was: “To us, the national soil is equal to the holy valley where God Almighty spoke to Moses – peace be upon him. None of us can, or accept to, cede one inch of it, or accept the principle of debating or bargaining over it.”2 In fact, he presented his vision for a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the Egyptian-Israeli dispute being only a part of it. It was a speech filled with hope for a better future in which peace would reign between Israelis and Arabs, but it was also a clear statement about the present and the price of peace. In his words: There are facts that should be faced with all courage and clarity. There are Arab territories which Israel has occupied by armed force. We insist on complete withdrawal from these territories, including Arab Jerusalem […] As for the Palestinians’ cause, nobody could deny that it is the crux of the entire problem. […] In all sincerity, I tell you that there can be no peace without the Palestinians. It is a grave error of unpredictable consequences to overlook or brush aside this cause. Direct confrontation concerning the Palestinian problem, and tackling it in one single language with a view to achieving a durable and just peace, lie in the establishment of their state. […] With all the guarantees you demand, there should be no fear of a newly-born state that needs the assistance of all countries of the world. When the bells of peace ring, there will be no hands to beat the drums of war. Even if they existed, they would be soundless.3 In their speeches, Prime Minister Menachem Begin and opposition leader Shimon Peres emphasized Israel’s desire for peace, security and normalization with the Arabs; both, however, refrained from relating directly to Sadat’s call for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Begin wisely delivered a message that enabled the parties to open political negotiations. With characteristic pathos he began by reviewing the link “between our People and this Land” and reminded Egypt’s president of what he had seen for himself only hours before at the Yad Vashem Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Authority: ............................................ 2

The English version and Hebrew translation can be found at the Knesset website: www.knesset. gov.il/process/asp/event_frame.asp?id=19

3

Ibid.

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“With your own eyes you saw what the fate of our People was when this Homeland was taken from it.”4 Then he spelled out the main message he wished to convey: President Sadat knows, as he knew from us before he came to Jerusalem, that our position concerning permanent borders between our neighbors and us differs from his. […] I propose, in the name of the overwhelming majority of this Parliament, that everything will be negotiable. […] No side shall present prior conditions. We will conduct the negotiations with respect. […] We shall conduct the negotiations as equals. There are no vanquished and there are no victors.5 The complex negotiations between the parties resulted in the 1978 Camp David Agreement. This agreement was a watershed in the history of the ArabIsraeli conflict, as it shattered one of the most deep-set assumptions shared by Arabs and Israelis that it was impossible to reach a political accommodation based on painful concessions by the two national communities. For dozens of years, both sides had made much of zero-sum game rhetoric, the bottom line of which was, ‘there is no one to talk to and nothing to talk about.’ The package deal of the accommodation included: Israeli withdrawal and borders, security arrangements and normalization, implementation schedules, and on top of all of this mutual recognition. There were efforts to persuade other Arab states, notably Jordan, to adopt the same framework, but to no avail. Innumerable deliberations held by Israeli, Egyptian and American delegates on the question of autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip met with a faint-hearted response. The Palestinian issue had little chance of being resolved as the PLO rejected the Camp David blueprint and Israel and the US would not deal with the organization (because it refused to recognize Israel and it embraced terror in the struggle against it). The framework agreement concluded at Camp David was followed by tough haggling that resulted in Israel and Egypt signing a peace treaty (March 26, 1979). From an Israeli point of view, peace was primarily a strategic re............................................ 4

Ibid.

5

Ibid.

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sponse to a difficult security predicament by significantly decreasing options for an all-Arab military attack against it. In addition, most of Israel’s leaders and the public at large attributed highest importance to the explicit reference in the peace treaty to the principle of recognition. For decades, Israelis strove to obtain recognition by Arabs, who opposed recognition of the Jewish state on historical, national and religious grounds. The Egyptian perspective saw the peace accord as a platform for farreaching change which would enable them to deal more effectively with severe economic, political and demographic challenges. As an integral part of peace with Israel, a strategic alliance has developed between Cairo and Washington; and it has included intensive American economic, military and technological assistance to Egypt, as well as political support. This comprehensive support enabled Egypt to renew its armed forces with sophisticated weapons including F-16 aircraft. In addition, Egypt has strengthened its image in the eyes of the international community as the fundamental linchpin for the stability of the Middle East; and as a key Arab partner in efforts to achieve Arab-Israeli peace and strengthen moderate forces in the volatile Middle East.6 For the Americans, the Camp David Accords became the cornerstone of their Middle East policy: the Pax Americana urged Arab leaders to adopt the Egyptian-Israeli model of making peace with Israel in return for an alliance with the world’s superpower, with all the military, technological, economic and political aid that entailed. The US increasingly emerged as the lighthouse for leaders navigating their way out of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Pax Americana in the Middle East was to serve both the interests of the parties seeking a political settlement and US interests.7

Cold Peace After more than three decades of peace between Israel and Egypt, ‘cold peace’ is the most common perception of peaceful relations between these two states; a peace between governments, not peoples. The historic peace accords have ............................................ 6

Yoram Meital, “Domestic challenges and Egypt’s US policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs 2, no. 4 (December 1998), pp. 1–8.

7

Yoram Meital, Peace in Tatters: Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East, p. 28.

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not softened the mutual suspicions of Israeli and Egyptian citizens and leaders. Unfounded assessments of the other side’s intentions have eroded the images of peace. Under the context of a ‘cold peace’, attitudes to Egypt and its policies in the Israeli public discourse were and still are often simplistic and based on false assumptions. For years, many Israelis would paint Egypt as putting spokes in the wheels of peace. It is not difficult to find in Israel’s public debate unrealistic expectations of Egypt to contribute its share in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by contributing lands in Sinai – near the Gaza Strip border – for the newborn Palestinian state. While Israel scrutinized the statements of Egypt, Israelis did not bother to examine the impact of their own statements on Egypt. Examples are countless. Thus, there was no clear, official condemnation of Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s repeated comments (from January 2001 on) that, in certain circumstances, he would support the bombing of Egypt’s Aswan Dam and inflict an ecological nightmare on Egyptian society; or the remarks Knesset member Yuval Steinitz has been making for years (even as chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee) to the effect that a military confrontation between the two countries will occur.8 These speakers, who are constantly raising this latter claim, ignore the fact that had the Egyptian leadership wanted to cancel the agreements with Israel or, worse yet, confront it militarily, it would have had ample opportunities to do so. Domestic opposition groups, and even leaders of other Arab countries, have frequently demanded this, but were vehemently rejected. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has reiterated that those who talk of war do not comprehend its consequences.9 Furthermore, Egyptian experience indicates that only through negotiations with Israel can Egypt achieve its goals, after an Arab boycott spanning decades and various armed conflicts failed. No doubt, the growth of the Egyptian army, its acquisition of advanced weapons and its training activities are worrying Israel. Egypt does not rely on Israel any more

............................................ 8

Ibid, pp. 2–3.

9

“Egypt’s Mubarak Committed to Peace with Israel, Rules out War”, Al-Bawaba News, November 29, 2000: www1.albawaba.com/news/egypts-mubarak-committed-peace-israel-rules-out-war . See also Mubarak’s statement in the semi-official Egyptian newspaper Al-Jumhuriyya, April 10, 2002.

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than Israel relies on its neighbor to the south, and indeed its reinforcement is connected to Israel’s increased military strength as well. Attitudes to Israel in the Egyptian public arena are far more problematic. Egyptian leaders often blamed only Israel for the lack of progress in the political process. Besides sharp criticism, significant parts of the Egyptian media include religious and racist incitement; trade unions and most intellectuals and academics are opposed to any signs of normalization in the given conditions. The call of various opposition groups to break off diplomatic relations with Israel in view of the harsh measures it has continued to adopt against the Palestinians has won widespread support. In general, public discourse in Egypt has often included a simplistic approach to Israeli social processes. Israel’s political pluralism, for example, was said to be a sham, there being no significant differences between the Zionist parties: both Likud-led and Labor-led governments had undeniably encouraged the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories and granted the Israel Defense Forces a virtually free hand to act against the Palestinian civilian population. Such focus on “the bottom line” ignored the long-standing political, social and security contexts of life in Israel. On top of this, it was evident from the discourse that extensive sectors of the Egyptian public had little or no knowledge of Israel’s political system, power struggles and conflicts of interest. In addition, Egyptian and Jordanian opposition parties and movements often use attacks on Israel as a battering ram against the government.

The Oslo Process The Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty were a breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, the heart of the conflict was and remains the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim Self-Government (September 13, 1993), aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, was signed exactly 15 years after the Camp David Accords. Nevertheless, there was no hiding the apprehensions and uncertainties, even within the camp that had set the historic measure in motion. Yitzhak Rabin responded to Yasser Arafat with a weak handshake. Israel’s government under Rabin behaved as if it had entered stormy waters but had

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not yet resolved to cross the Rubicon. The Palestinian leadership was also plagued by indecision about its own Rubicon. One of the effects of adopting Oslo was immediately apparent in the web of Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian relations. Jordan and Israel in fact embarked on the road to a peace treaty as soon as Israel signed the DOP with the PLO. On July 25, 1994 Israel’s Prime Minister Rabin and Jordan’s King Hussein ibn Talal held their first public meeting in Washington, hosted by President Clinton at the White House. It resulted in the Washington Declaration,10 the first signed document of its kind, affirming that, “The long conflict between the two states is now coming to an end” (Article C). The two peoples shared a common goal: “Jordan and Israel aim at the achievement of just, lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors and at the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between both countries” (Article B/1). Both leaders noted the potential benefits of bringing peace to an additional segment of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Rabin, with uncharacteristic optimism, proclaimed that he felt “at this moment in Jerusalem and Amman, perhaps all over the Middle East, a new era is dawning.”11 Hussein, an old hand at oratory, sounded more optimistic than ever: This is a dream that those before me had – my dead grandfather, and now I. And to feel that we are close to fulfilling that dream and presenting future generations in our region with a legacy of hope and openness where normality is that which replaces the abnormal in our lives – which, unfortunately, over the years, has become normal – where neighbors meet; where people meet; where human relations thrive; where all seek with their tremendous talents a better future and a better tomorrow. This day is a day of commitment, and this day is a day of hope and vision.12 Three months later (October 26, 1994) Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty. Beyond the obligatory wording on an end to the state of war and a commitment to good neighborliness, the two parties were noticeably keen to promote ............................................ 10 For the text of both the Washington Declaration and the leaders words, see US Department of State: www.usinfo.state.gov/products/pdq/pdq.htm 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.

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contact and normalize relations. The American President witnessed the document and, in exchange for Jordan’s joining the Camp David coalition, the US undertook to help the kingdom meet its foreign debt and provide civilian and military assistance. It was a booster for Pax Americana in the Middle East. Israeli expectations soared as the public discourse filled with the anticipated warmth’ of the peace with the neighbor to the east. Political spokespeople from all across the board envisaged Israeli-Jordanian relations as radically different from the ‘cold’ peace with Egypt. In the days prior to the treaty’s signing, the vision penetrated the political discourse. At the Knesset debate on the subject (October 17, 1994), Rabin presented the government’s position: The peace treaty [with Jordan] is not merely of political significance, but a basic, essential change in our very existence here – no more: a people that shall dwell alone. This is a profound, thorough change, a change that will affect every walk of our lives: from the trucks that leave Haifa with cargo for Amman to the airplane taking off from Sde Dov and landing 30 minutes later in Amman. Business people who will fly out in the morning to close deals and return in the evening to Jerusalem, and families who will travel to Petra with their children, a three-hour trip from Tel Aviv. The change will affect each and every one of us in our daily lives [...] the peace treaty to be signed tomorrow elevates relations to the maximal level – full peace.13 In Jordan, on the other hand, the peace with Israel aroused public controversy that only grew sharper. The unreserved support for the political process shown by King Hussein and his confidants naturally influenced some of the public and the official line. But the glitches in the implementation of the Oslo agreements and, in particular, the escalation of Israeli-Palestinian hostilities had a far greater impact on Jordan’s population. As violence, terror and suppressive measures accelerated in the occupied territories and in Israel, the public clamored for Jordan to review its policy towards Israel and to take practical steps, i.e. to break off diplomatic and other relations. Supporters of the peace with Israel stressed its expediency for the kingdom and Jordan’s population, and ............................................ 13 Knesset Proceedings, October 17, 1994.

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looked hopefully for any sign of the process being put back on course. Opponents of the peace (who grew stronger in recent years) argued that the agreements with Israel were detrimental to pan-Arab interests, undermined political stability at home and had no economic value. Their frequent claim was that the peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt enabled Israel to act more freely against Arabs, particularly against Palestinians.

Stable yet Fragile Peace The ongoing commitment to the peace treaties between Israel and the states of Egypt and Jordan shows that they continue to serve the interests that led to their signing. Despite the differing perspectives and the inherent difficulties that characterize relationships between Israel, Egypt and Jordan, leaders of the three countries regularly define the peace between them as a strategic choice that serves vital national interests. Even during tense periods when ties were strained, they settled for a reduction of mutual cooperation, and were careful to avoid crude violations of the treaty. Moreover, the peace and the mutual interests between Egypt, Jordan, the US and Israel, stood the test of difficult challenges. The sides remained faithful to their obligations, in spite of President Sadat’s assassination and despite the outbreak of Israeli-Arab violence, particularly during the war in Lebanon, the Intifada, and the acts of terror that targeted mainly innocent Jewish and Arab civilians. Although these challenges placed great stress on the fragile relations between Egypt, Israel and Jordan, it did not change their fundamental approach and commitment to the agreements between them. The first two peace treaties between Israel and Arab states were the first breach made by key parties in the wall of Arab-Israeli hostility. This wall had been chiefly erected by the adversaries. Their deeds and declarations laid its solid, divisive bricks. Decades of war, terror, incitement and enmity raised and bolstered it. The perpetual commitment to the peace treaties pointed the way to tearing down a hefty chunk of it, but agreements alone cannot dismantle a wall nor the stroke of a pen dissolve cement. The actions of Israeli, Egyptian and Jordanian leaders were needed to remove more and more bricks, bit by bit, even though at the same time other actions of theirs set new bricks in place.

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For neither side could ignore events taking place in other parts of the wall. Egypt and Jordan were and are major Arab states and Israel was and is engaged in ongoing confrontation with most of the Arab peoples, notably the Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Under these delicate circumstances, Egyptians, Israelis and Jordanians should give much more attention to negative developments in their own parts of the wall. Unfortunately, they tend to attribute great weight to their own domestic political constraints, yet found it very difficult to appreciate the constraints on the other side. Nor did either side waste much energy on considering the effects of their deeds and declarations on the opposite camp. While each side scrutinized the statements of the other with a fine-toothed comb, the spokespeople of each did not bother to examine the impact of their own pronouncements on the other. They paid little attention to the context in which their statements had been made. Mutual suspicion and unfounded assessments of the other side’s intentions have eroded the images of peace. Thus, one of the most crucial challenges for most sectors in both Israel and Arab societies is to finally address their hand-made harmful perceptions, which have brought them only devastating results. More than three decades have elapsed since President Sadat declared in his historic address to the Knesset in Jerusalem that “… when the bells of peace ring, there will be no hands to beat the drums of war. Even if they existed, they would be soundless.”14 The escalation on the Israeli-Palestinian front after the collapse of the Oslo agreements, especially since the summer of 2000 when it had turned brutal, hovers like the sword of Damocles over the peace treaties Israel signed with Egypt and Jordan. Indeed, over the past few years, more than the bells of peace, it is the beating of the war drums that can be heard.

............................................ 14 Sadat’s speech: www.knesset.gov.il/process/asp/event_frame.asp?id=19

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WALID K AZZIHA

Egyptian Perceptions of Israel

In view of the fact that the population of Egypt today has exceeded the 80 million mark, it is safe and more appropriate to talk about many perceptions of Israel rather than one Egyptian perception1. However, the multitude of views and expressions can be reduced to a few by examining the images that Israel invokes in the Egyptian mind among the more significant political forces in society. I have chosen to identify these forces under three major categories: the regime, political parties and public opinion, and independent intellectuals.2

The Egyptian Regime The political leadership of the country headed by its president, members of the cabinet, the ruling party and the media facilities attached to the regime have all abided by the terms of Camp David, since it was signed in 1979. Despite Arab rejection of the agreement and the opposition of the majority of public opinion to it in Egypt, the leadership of Egypt continued to lend its support to it and adhered to its full implementation. ............................................ 1

This is reflected by the newspapers, which can be separated as follows: Al Ahram (representing the government’s position); Wafd (one of the newspapers of the political parties); and Misr alYoum and Al-Shourouq (two daily newspapers representing independent intellectuals).

2

Further references see: William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005. William B. Quandt, The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1988. Rabab el-Mahdi and Philip Marfleet (eds.), Egypt: The Moment of Change, London: Zed Books, 2009. Lisa Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt: “Background and US Relations”, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, submitted September 2, 2009. Emad El-Din Shahin, Political Islam in Egypt, 2007: http://aei.pitt.edu/11728/01/1495.pdf

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Egypt refrained since the signature of the agreement from taking a confrontational posture against Israel and avoided any form of political or military escalation which may lead to a resumption of hostilities between the two countries. The most Egypt did, in the face of an Israeli onslaught on the West Bank in 2002, was to recall its ambassador but not to withdraw him from Tel Aviv. Similarly, the Israeli siege and aggression against Gaza in 2008–2009 was met by a stern Egyptian condemnation. However, no serious steps were taken to undermine the terms of Camp David. On the other hand, the Egyptian regime was keen to make sure that its relationships with Israel do not go beyond the limitations imposed on it by its own public opinion. While maintaining a non-confrontational stand vis-à-vis Israel, it avoids at the same time a drift toward normalization of relations. The Egyptian official position oscillates between two poles, Camp David on one side, and cold peace on the other. The first position is adopted in response to its international commitment under the peace agreement, while the second is pursued in response to the political sentiment of its own public opinion. In this context, the Egyptian leadership projects an image of Israel to its own people and the world at large, of a state capable of winning the recognition and respect of the world community, but at the same time behaves often in a rogue manner, dangerous to itself and threatening to its Arab and Palestinian neighbours. The Egyptian official press and Egyptian statesmen often reflect this dual image of Israel to the rest of the world with emphasis on one aspect or the other, depending on Israel’s political and military actions and responses to the Palestinians and Arabs around it. In the final analysis, Camp David had undermined Egypt’s leadership role among the Arabs and reduced its influence in the Arab East as well as the Gulf region. On the other hand, Egypt’s agreement with Israel has allowed it to play the role of a junior mediator in the peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis, whenever the Americans seemed to be reluctant to take the initiative themselves. However, Egypt’s role as a mediator is largely dependent on the will of Israel’s political leadership. Whenever that leadership is well disposed toward an understanding with the Palestinians, Egyptian services become relevant, otherwise Egypt would remain aloof, and its influence almost negligible.

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Public Opinion and Political Parties The Egyptian adherence to the letter of the Camp David agreement does not prevent its leadership from allowing Egyptian public opinion from expressing itself against Israel, when the latter launches an aggression against Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, (the freedom flotilla) or any other Arab or foreign party supportive of the Palestinians. Public opinion in Egypt is largely affected by the turn of events. Whenever Israel attacks the Palestinians or their supporters, it provokes Egyptian public opinion to stand for the rights of the victims. The impact of the public stand is often felt on the political level which checks any move by the regime to normalize the relationship with Israel. Whatever kind of peace exists between Egypt and Israel, it will remain a cold peace until such time that a comprehensive settlement is achieved to the satisfaction of the Palestinians and the other Arab parties in the region. The sentiment of Egyptian public opinion is a mixture of a strong nationalist feeling combined with enthusiastic support for Arab causes including Palestine, as well as a general commitment to Islamic political and social values. The Egyptian regime cannot march ahead of its crowd when the focus is turned to Palestine. No matter how committed it might be to Camp David, it will always be bound by the limits imposed upon it by public sentiment. The clear fact is that, there is no love lost between Israel and the Egyptian public. By and large, Israel’s image in the mind and memory of many Egyptians is that of an aggressor and a usurper of land that belongs legitimately to the Palestinians. Many of the views expressed by the Egyptian public are articulated by the opposition parties, who are frequently driven by their yearning to embarrass the regime for lack of initiatives toward the Palestinians, and for its inability to play a leading role in the region. Three of the opposition parties in Egypt seem to adopt distinct stands from those of the regime. The Muslim Brothers, although not officially legitimized, are a political force that is recognized domestically and internationally. They pose a major challenge to the regime. In time, the Brothers have shifted the grounds of their absolute rejection of the state of Israel to a more moderate position. Recently, some of their spokesmen have expressed the view that the Muslim nations do not need to be in a constant state of conflict with Israel. Under certain conditions, a truce can be

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concluded with Israel which could last for even a hundred years, if Israel reaches an agreement with the Palestinians. The Muslim Brothers reflect the same position as that of Hamas. Whether Israel chooses to listen to such overtures by the Islamists or not is entirely its own prerogative, but the offer to start negotiations is on the table and it is up to Israel to pick it up or turn a deaf ear to it and ignore it. The New Wafd party is a secularist nationalist party and has regularly expressed its great concern for the territorial integrity of Egypt. It suspects Israel of planning to turn Sinai into the future state of the Palestinians by laying siege around Gaza and attempting to drive its inhabitants into the peninsula by force of arms. The Wafd newspaper has also published a number of articles warning the Egyptian government and the public of suspicious deals by foreign investors with close links to Israel who were buying downtown properties in Cairo. The Wafd views the recent disagreement between Egypt and other African countries on the redistribution of the Nile waters to be inspired by Israeli efforts to jeopardize Egypt’s relationships with its African neighbours, and creating for it a water problem with grave repercussions. The third party is that which represents the left, the Tagammu. Ideologically it views Israel as a colonial settler state, and as such an extension of western imperialism in the region. On the whole, political parties in Egypt view Israel in a very negative light. Its policies are held with great suspicion, and its treatment of the Palestinians continues to be a major reason for the growing rejection of its existence on the borders of Egypt as a neighbour who cannot be trusted. There had been some feeble attempts by individuals and civil society groups to moderate and even undermine the enmity toward Israel. In the 1990s, a few intellectuals known as the Copenhagen group, who were encouraged by the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, tried to build bridges with NGOs in Israel. The foreign minister of Egypt at the time, Amr Moussa, unofficially sponsored the attempt. However, the initiative failed after the assassination of Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the hands of a right wing activist highly influenced by Likud’s propaganda campaign under the leadership of Netanyahu. In recent years, some Egyptian businessmen have engaged Israeli entrepreneurs to enable them to market Egyptian textile goods in the US market.

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However, Egyptian interest in the project declined as the Egyptian party realized that Israeli business was taking a free ride without making any significant contribution to the joint project.

Independent Intellectuals Among Egyptian intellectuals there are a variety of positions toward Israel that can be noticed. The great majority of them, with few exceptions, hold Israel, its policies in the region, and its attitude toward the Palestinians in a very negative light. Perpetuating the process of dispossessing Palestinians of their land to build settlements for Jewish immigrants has become the ugliest aspect of Israel’s image among its Arab neighbours. It is a clear sign to every Arab that Israel is not interested in any kind of peace, except that which leaves the Palestinians homeless, expelled, and robbed of their human dignity – let alone their human rights. An increasing number of Egyptian intellectuals have been persuaded that the time for a two-state solution has already passed. Israel has usurped so much of the occupied territories to a point where it has become almost impossible to establish a viable Palestinian state on what remains of that land. If the occupied territories were the hostage which Israel needed to negotiate with the Palestinians a final settlement to its own advantage, it has by now succeeded in killing the hostage. As a result, a historical enmity has been precipitated between Israel and the Arabs which will continue for years to come. There is no immediate solution. The Palestinian problem will remain unsolved and conflict with Israel will be perpetuated. Israel, with US support, has committed a historical and suicidal folly. Still, the Egyptian regime and a good number of intellectuals argue optimistically that although the land is dwindling, yet the chances for establishing a Palestinian state are available. However, on balance, the leadership of Netanyahu and his partners in the coalition government do not exude confidence in such an optimistic conclusion. The present negotiations in Washington might prove to be the last chance that the world has for a two-state solution, and if for any reason the efforts of the Obama Administration fail, the conflict may escalate to a point of no return.

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Conclusion Egypt, as a state, has concluded a peace agreement with Israel. Egyptian society has learned to live with that peace, but as long as Israel continues to deny the Palestinians their human and political rights that peace will remain at best a cold peace. Over the years, Egyptian public opinion and Egyptian parties have developed a very negative image of Israel, due to its continued aggression against the Palestinians in the occupied territories, and its policies of ethnic cleansing by appropriating the land and expelling the people from that land3. The scarce attempts that have been made by civil society organizations or government sponsored efforts to build bridges between Egyptians and Israelis have all failed one after another in the face of mounting Israeli appetite to grab Palestinian land. A two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is rapidly disappearing. Egypt may eventually find itself at a crossroad where it has to make a choice between two alternatives. The first is to continue on the path of no war and no real peace with Israel, the second is to join her Arab and Palestinian neighbours in their struggle against a territorially expanding Israeli state.

............................................ 3

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In this context, I would like to endorse fully the strong sentiment expressed by the former foreign minister of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, in his opening speech at the conference “The World facing Israel – Israel facing the World”, against anti-Semitism, and his condemnation of atrocities committed against the European Jewish communities before and during the Second World War (cf. in the present volume, pp. 17–28). I would have liked him to go a step further and condemn by the same token the pain and agony that the Palestinians in the occupied territories are suffering from at the hands of a ruthless and brutal Israeli occupation. I believe all forms of violence and aggression, past and present, against civilian populations should be condemned by all of us all over the world and at all times.

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M OSHE M A’OZ

The Israeli-Syrian Conflict: The Role of Strategic, Ideological and Psychological Factors

Introduction Following protracted political and military conflicts with its Arab neighbors, Israel concluded peace agreements with Egypt (in 1978 and 1979), with Jordan (in 1994, following de facto peaceful relations) and even with the PLO (the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, which were only partly implemented). Israel and Syria made several attempts to reach peace, particularly during the 1990s, and almost reached an agreement in late 1999 and early 2000, but to no avail. Some analysts assess that peace between Damascus and Jerusalem is now imminent, while others predict a new military conflict between Israel and Syria, also involving Iran and Hizballah, and causing more devastation than the wars of 1948, 1967, 1973 and 1982. This paper attempts to explain why the Israeli-Syrian conflict has been so deep-seated and enduring; why peace initiatives and talks between the parties have failed; and what the prospects are for peace or war between Jerusalem and Damascus in the foreseeable future. While outlining the development of Syrian-Israeli relations during almost a century, the paper will analyze the major factors that have shaped or affected the positions of both parties, namely, the attitudes of leaders, and their strategic considerations, interests and constraints; ideological-nationalist motives, as well as psychological and emotional influences – mostly among the peoples. These factors, in different amounts and interacting in different ways, have molded the mutual attitudes of Israel and Syria in various periods and mostly in asymmetric directions. Thus, broadly speaking, while both sides have contributed in different measure to the development of the bilateral conflict, Syria played a major role in initiating and prolonging it, largely owing to ideological and psychological

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factors. Israel’s military reactions and successes, notably in the 1967 and 1973 wars, aggravated Syria’s fear of and hostility toward Israel. But after 1974 its strategic predicament induced Damascus to periodically seek a political settlement, while at the same time preparing for war with Israel. Yet, Jerusalem preferred the new status quo, holding the Golan, partly for strategic reasons and partly because of psychological and quasi-ideological motives. Only during the 1990s, urged by both Moscow and Washington, did Syria and Israel negotiate, for the first time, a peace settlement based on pragmatic strategic considerations. Alas, this peace process failed, as did the subsequent peace talks, inter alia owing to the lack of visionary and courageous leaders on both sides, such as Sadat and Begin.

The Role of Psychological and Ideological Factors: the Syrian Angle In his speech at the Israeli Knesset in November 1977, the late President Anwar Sadat stated inter alia that 70% of the Arab-Israeli conflict derived from a “psychological barrier”1 and that the Palestinian issue and Arab Jerusalem did constitute the “crux of the entire problem”2. He was probably referring to the mutual ignorance and misunderstanding of each other’s history, culture, society, as well as aspirations and sensitivities. This psychological barrier indeed resulted in mutual fears, prejudices, stereotypes and hatred between Arabs and Jews in the region, notably between Syrian Arabs and Israeli Jews. Indeed, more than the other Arab nations, Syria has been, since the late 19th century, the “beating heart of Arabism”, a hotbed of Arab nationalism and antiZionist, anti-Israel attitudes. Many Syrians have considered Zionist and Israeli Jews to be foreign intruders, colonialists who have usurped Muslim and Arab lands, mainly Palestine (which was also regarded for a long period of time as the southern part of Syria). Although several pragmatic Syrian leaders did occasionally negotiate with Zionist officials, the Syrian-Arab nationalists and Islamists vehemently rejected the Zionist enterprise in Palestine and helped Palestinian Arabs to combat it politically and militarily. For example, Izz al............................................ 1

Jon B. Alterman (ed.), Sadat and His Legacy, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 1998, p. 192.

2

Ibid, p. 195.

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Din al-Qassam (Hamas’ symbolic hero) was a Syrian Islamist who, in the early 1930s, organized and led a group of anti-Jewish Palestinian Arab rebels. Similarly, Fawzi al-Qawuqji, a Syrian nationalist military officer, recruited and headed pan-Arab military groups in 1936, late 1947 and early 1948. In 1936, he proclaimed himself “the commander-in-chief of the Arab revolution in southern Syria”3, while in 1947–48, he vowed “to nullify the United Nation’s resolution [of November 1947] and to eliminate any remains of Zionism and to secure the Arabness of Palestine”4. To be sure, the active preparation and participation of Syria in the 1947–48 all-Arab war against the newly emerging Jewish state stemmed largely from Arab ideological motives. The aim was to help the Palestinian Arabs abort the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. This goal was professed and shared by most Syrian political parties and leaders, including President Shukri alQuwatli (since 1943) and his nationalist party. This attitude was compounded by his need to satisfy the restless pro-Palestinian, pan-Arab youth and to distract the public’s concerns about their severe socio-economic difficulties. No less crucial was the government’s strategic interest in joining forces with Egypt (and Saudi Arabia) in fighting for Palestine while thwarting Hashemite plans to control Syria. The aftermath of the 1948 war contributed to greatly enhancing Syrian antagonism to, and fear of Israel. Israel not only occupied a large part of Palestine, but also allegedly posed a critical threat to Syria and the Arab East.5 Paradoxically, however, this potential Israeli threat prompted two Syrian rulers to secretly offer Israel peace settlements: Husi Zaim in 1949 and Adib Shishakli in 1952 (in fact, a non-aggression pact). They ventured upon this unpopular track in order to neutralize Israel’s military menace and to consolidate Syria as a stable and reformed nation state (also expecting US financial help). Both leaders suggested inter alia to absorb in Syria at least 250,000 Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war. But they also demanded control of part of Lake Tiberias, which had been entirely under Israeli sovereignty. Israel ............................................ 3

Moshe Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-Making, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 8.

4

Ibid, p.18.

5

Al-’Azm, Memoirs, Beirut, 1973, p. 379 [in Arabic].

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promptly rejected these demands, which concerned the main water source of the new Jewish state. Consequently, no agreement was reached. The Syrian-Israeli conflict was subsequently aggravated, owing to a new protracted dispute over important strategic assets: the waters of Lake Tiberias and the Jordan River.6 These disputes were compounded by augmented antiIsraeli and occasionally anti-Semitic indoctrination, mainly by the Ba’th party and the Ba’th regime. This pan-Arab and anti-Zionist party, founded in 1947, scored a notable success in the 1954 free national elections. It assumed an important role amongst the army officer’s corps during the mid-1950s. It was also highly instrumental in the creation of the UAR (Egyptian-Syrian union) in 1958, directed mainly against Israel, the “neo-Crusader” and “neo-Nazi state”. Following the establishment (by a military coup on 8 March 1963) of a Ba’th government in Damascus, hatred and fear of Israel and Jews markedly increased. In addition to gross verbal attacks, the Ba’th regime greatly strengthened its military power (with the massive help of the Soviet Union). It employed the army in numerous fire attacks, mainly to abort Israel’s work to divert the Jordan River waters to the Negev desert. As it happened, “Syria’s verbal aggressiveness more and more assumed the character of calculated provocation (…) by carrying terrorism into Israeli territory”7 (Thabita Petran and Patrick Seale, both journalists with empathy for Syria). This policy was mainly carried out by the neo-Ba’th regime that had seized power in Damascus in February 1966. Its top leaders were Alawi officers, Salah Jadid and Hafiz alAsad. In addition to their extreme anti-Israeli ideology, they possibly tried to legitimize their military coup and rule by calling for a “people’s war” to liberate Palestine and ruin Israel. In fact, the neo-Ba’th leaders played a major role in the military escalation prior to the 1967 war.

............................................ 6

Moshe Ma’oz, “The Jordan Valley’s water: A source of conflict or a basis for peace”, in K. David Hambright et al. (eds.), Water in the Middle East, Brighton: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006, pp. 11.

7

Moshe Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-Making, p. 89.

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Israel’s Contribution to the Conflict Similarly to Syria, Israel also contributed to the bilateral conflict, although to a lesser extent and with different degrees of ideological, psychological and strategic incentives. Already during the pre-state period, Zionist Jewish leaders sought to reach understandings and agreements with Syrian-Arab leaders. They conducted these talks mainly to outflank or outmaneuver the PalestinianArab nationalists’ opposition to the Zionist nationalist enterprise in Palestine. But Syria’s militant positions during the 1947–1949 war and its occupation of Israeli-designated areas around Lake Tiberias exacerbated Israeli attitudes toward Syria. It has indeed been considered since then by most Israeli Jews as a radical-ideological, dangerous-strategic and cruel enemy. This, owing to its anti-Israeli attitude, in the form of vicious, threatening propaganda, an economic boycott, harsh treatment of Israeli POWs and many fire attacks (mostly from the Golan) on Jewish villages and fisherman at and around Lake Tiberias. Partly to allay fears among Israeli Jews and partly to deter Damascus from hurting its interests, Israel periodically delivered threatening messages to Syria and adopted tough military actions against Syrian troops and villages. As General (ret.) Aryeh Shalev, a former member of the Israeli-Syrian Armistice Commission, wrote about the 1950s: “the two states – not only Syria – were responsible for the tensions that were created and for the violent confrontations that occasionally occurred between them. Israel was not always the innocent sheep and Syria – the wolf ”.8 Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, periodically spoke about peace with the Arabs, but this was not his first priority. He preferred to absorb more Jewish immigrants (olim) and to consolidate the Israeli nation-state rather than reach peace with Damascus in return for territorial concessions. Furthermore, according to his Israeli biographer: Ben Gurion remained all his life extraneous to the Arabs. He did not know them well, neither understood nor liked them (…). Gradually he became aware that the Arabs would not make peace with Israel in our time. He was convinced that the Arabs wished to exterminate Israel (…) ............................................ 8

Aryeh Shalev, Cooperation under the Shadow of Conflict, Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1989, p. 298 [in Hebrew].

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their recognition or non-recognition of Israel did not depend at all on Israel’s behavior.9 Ben-Gurion’s disciples, notably General Moshe Dayan, Israel’s army Chief of Staff and subsequently Minister of Defense, adopted, from the mid-1950s onwards, harsh positions toward Syria. Yitzhak Rabin, Chief of Staff in the 1960s, threatened in September 1966 and May 1967 to attack Damascus and overthrow the Syrian regime in reaction to its belligerent actions.10 His threats also contributed to the outbreak of the June 1967 war.

The Impact of the 1967 War: Changing Strategies and Perceptions The 1967 war had a crucial impact on the strategic decisions and psychological tendencies of Syria and Israel, both among the public and in government. Deeply humiliated and hurt by the military defeat, Syria was determined to retrieve the Golan by military force, although, for the first time, Asad (as president from 1970–71) did not rule out “political action”. By comparison, Israel initially offered a peace agreement, and a return of the Golan, to Syria. But subsequently Israel preferred to sustain the new status quo while establishing settlements on the Golan. Most Israeli Jews, including political leaders, were imbued with euphoria and perhaps hubris, mixed with contempt for their defeated Arab neighbors. But, after the 1973 war, Israel exchanged this contempt for hatred. Initially, however, a few days after the June war and the occupation of the Golan (as well as Sinai, the West Bank and Gaza), Israel’s cabinet unanimously adopted on 15 June 1967 a resolution to the effect that Israel stands for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Syria [and Egypt] on the basis of the international boundary (…) the conditions for a peace treaty are: 1) a total demilitarization of the Syrian [Golan] Heights and ............................................ 9

Michael Bar Zohar, Ben Gurion, Tel Aviv, 1968, pp. 1320 [in Hebrew].

10 Richard B. Parker, The politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, p. 41; The Times, London, May 21, 1967.

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2) an absolute guarantee for free water flow from the Jordan River sources [Banyas River] into Israel (…).11 This resolution was not published but transmitted to Washington with a request to convey it to Damascus. Damascus reportedly rejected this peace offer, asserting that “we will never agree to direct talks with Israel (…) the Israeli enemy will be liquidated only by means of force”.12 To be sure, the Syrian position was much harder than that of Egypt and Jordan, which, unlike Syria, accepted UN Resolution 242 (of November 1967). It provided for a political settlement to their conflict with Israel, involving the return of land occupied by Israel in June 1967. But Syrian leaders adhered to their anti-Israel ideology despite their new strategic inferiority facing Israeli troops 65 km from Damascus. Charged with frustration, anger and deep fear, Syria mounted harsh propaganda and numerous guerrilla attacks (mostly by Palestinian proxies) largely against Israeli military targets. These actions were countered by painful Israeli reprisals against Syrian and Palestinian positions. Subsequently, however, the Israeli government, headed by Golda Meir (1969–1974), ignored or belittled the new strategy of Hafiz al-Asad (and of Anwar Sadat, both of whom assumed power in late 1970), which was to seek a diplomatic settlement to the conflict (while preparing for a new war with Israel). Asad indeed hinted in 1971 and stated in 1972 that Syria no longer opposed the implementation of UN Resolution 242, provided it would entail Israel’s withdrawal from the Arab lands occupied in 1967 and the realization of the [national] rights of the Palestinian people.13 At the same time, Asad and Sadat systematically prepared their armies, with massive Soviet help, and coordinated their military moves toward a major offensive to liberate the Golan and Sinai. Condescendingly or arrogantly, Golda Meir underestimated these military preparations, while overlooking a war alert by King Hussein of Jordan and peace plans by both Sadat and Moshe Dayan, the Defense Minister. The outbreak of the October 1973 war was thus inevitable, starting with an Israeli military defeat, including the loss of the Golan. It ended with an Israeli victory, ............................................ 11 Moshe Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-Making, p. 102. 12 Ibid. 13 Al-Nahar (Beirut), March 17, 1971; Damascus Radio, March 8, December 10, 1972; cf. in contrast Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, London: Tauris, 1988, p. 185.

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facilitated by massive US military assistance, and the reoccupation of the Golan. As it happened, the results of the 1973 war contributed to deepening the Israeli-Syrian conflict, although Syria acknowledged UNSC Resolution 242 of November 1967 for the first time, by accepting UNSC Resolution 338 of October 1973. Subsequently, during the period from 1974–1977, Asad suggested, mostly in interviews with the American press, reaching a non-belligerency agreement with Israel (he also used the terms “political action” and “peace”). This would be on the condition that Israel withdrew to the pre-June 1967 lines and agreed to implement the national rights of the Palestinians. But to his own public, Asad continued to present his ideological goal, namely the elimination of the “Zionist” state, which he equated with the Crusaders and the Nazis. Asad candidly explained his ambivalent position regarding Israel to an American writer: “There is a great struggle taking place between the heart and the mind. In our hearts, we say no Israel – not on any terms. In our minds we say we must turn to other things, so let us give Israel a chance to withdraw to its original frontiers [1967 or 1947?]. Let us give it a chance to prove that it will no longer try to expand.” Or, in the words of Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, who negotiated with Asad for a long period of truce after the 1973 war: Asad would have liked to destroy the Jewish state but he recognized that (…) the cost of attempting it would hazard Syria’s domestic structure, perhaps even its existence (…). He was (…) as realistic as he was ideological (…) he concluded that Syria was not sufficiently strong to unite the Arab nation, and needed to regain his own territory before it could pursue larger ambitions14. His ideological goals notwithstanding, Asad’s new pragmatic strategy encountered large obstacles emanating mainly from the policies of Egypt, the US and particularly Israel. Sadat “betrayed” his strategic alliance with Asad and pursued a separate deal with Israel, leading to the peace agreement in 1979. Kissinger adopted a “step by step” strategy regarding Arab-Israeli peace, giving priority to an Egyptian-Israeli settlement and pushing the Syrian-Israeli equa............................................ 14 Moshe Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-Making, p. 144f.

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tion to the end of the line. In September 1975, US President Gerald Ford secretly promised Yitzhak Rabin, the new Israeli prime minister, that the US “will give great weight to Israel’s position that any peace agreement with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights.” In July 1976, Ford publicly stated: “I don’t think that Israel is going to relinquish to the Syrians direct control of the Golan Heights. I would not”.15 It is true that President Richard Nixon in 1974 and President Jimmy Carter in 1977 (and certainly the USSR) sought to include Syria in negotiations for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement. But Israel (and also Egypt) declined to include Syria in the negotiations. Israel was deeply shaken and hurt by Syria’s surprise offensive of October 1973; its bloody war of attrition in early 1974; and its brutal treatment of Israeli POWs, as well as its growing anti-Israel propaganda. Israelis thus transformed their condescension into animosity and distrust of Syria, considering it a deadly enemy and the Golan an essential strategic asset. Even the pragmatic Prime Minister Rabin ignored Asad’s diplomatic overtures during the mid-1970s, rejecting the possibility of relinquishing the Golan even in return for peace. He also expanded Israeli settlements on the Golan. Although Rabin reached a secret understanding with Asad in 1976 regarding their spheres of influence in Lebanon, he supplied light weapons and some military training to the anti-Syrian Maronite militias. Furthermore, Rabin’s successor (in 1977) Menachem Begin, a right-wing leader, adopted an ideological line regarding the Syrian-Maronite conflict. He labelled Syria a “fanatic Muslim” enemy that committed “genocide” against the Maronite Christians. Begin’s government, with Ariel Sharon as defense minister (from 1981), became directly involved in the Syrian-Maronite conflict and on 6 June 1982, the IDF invaded Lebanon and, unprovoked, attacked Syrian troops, chasing them away from Lebanon. Earlier, on 14 December 1981, Begin passed in the Knesset the “Golan Law” that applied “Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the Golan”. Begin proclaimed on that occasion that for many generations the Golan had been part of the Land of Israel; that it was essential to Israel’s security; and that it was unlikely that the Golan would one day be returned to Syria – the most extreme Arab country. But he also said that the Golan Law ............................................ 15 Moshe Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-Making, p. 148.

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should not close options for negotiations with Syria and would not prevent border changes in the future.16 To be sure, these two crucial blows – the annexation of the Golan and the loss of Lebanon – pushed Asad to give priority to his military strategy and action vis-à-vis Israel. He simultaneously employed Hizballah to forcibly expel the Israeli troops from Lebanon, and attained a military balance with Israel, this with enormous Soviet military help and a new strategic alliance with revolutionary Iran. But, making things more difficult for him, Iran was finally beaten by Iraq in 1988. Earlier, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev stopped, from 1987, supporting Syrian policy of strategic balance with Israel and urged Asad to seek a “balance of interests”, namely a political settlement with Israel. Simultaneously, President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker of the US also adopted a new policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, while improving relations with Damascus. Washington pressured Israel to pursue a comprehensive peace settlement with its Arab neighbors, Syria and the Palestinians, based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. But, whereas Syria accepted the new US approach and moderated its positions regarding negotiations with Israel, Israel declined. The Israeli government, with Yitzhak Shamir as prime minister and Yitzhak Rabin as defense minister, refused to apply UN Resolution 242 to the Golan within a peace agreement. Similarly, some 90% of Israeli Jews continued to insist (as they had done since 1967) that the Golan should be under Israel’s domination. General (ret.) Shlomo Gazit, a former head of the military intelligence, commented then that “the Israelis have created a myth about the importance of the Golan Heights in the state’s strategic security”17. At the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, Shamir, who reluctantly attended, insisted that the Golan should not return to Syria even for a peace agreement. He also called Syria “one of the most oppressive, tyrannical regimes in the world”, while his Chief of Staff accused Syria of anti-Semitism. Syria’s minister of foreign affairs called Shamir “a terrorist” and Israel “aggressive”, “colonialist”, and “cruel”. He also rejected the notion of peaceful, normal and diplomatic relations with Israel, offering in fact a non-belligerency agreement ............................................ 16 Arye Na’or, Begin bashilton [Begin in Power, in Hebrew], Tel Aviv, 1993, p. 232f. 17 E.R. Fletcher, “The quiet border”, in Jerusalem Post Magazine, February 3, 1989; New York Times, March 24, 1991.

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in return for Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, Gaza, the West Bank and “Arab Jerusalem”.18

The Madrid Peace Process, a Missed Peace Opportunity Subsequently, however, during the direct negotiations in Washington, both parties dropped most of their ideological and emotional rhetoric and presented more pragmatic positions. The Syrian delegates publicly referred, for the first time, to a peace agreement with, and recognition of Israel, as well as “regional cooperation” and “good neighbourhood” with it. Shamir’s envoys indicated, also for the first time, that Israel may consider withdrawing from a fraction of the Golan, but not from the bulk of it, nor from the West Bank or East Jerusalem. By contrast, following his election as Israel’s prime minister in 1992, Rabin changed his previous belligerent attitude toward Damascus. He now instructed his chief negotiator with Syria, Ambassador Professor Itamar Rabinovich, in August 1992 to state that Israel considered UNSC Resolution 242 to be applicable also to the negotiations with Syria.19 Facing a positive Syrian response, this important Israeli decision started, for the first time, promising bilateral peace negotiations with Syria under the active mediation of President Bill Clinton. It lasted until March 2000 between Hafiz al-Asad and four Israeli prime ministers: Yitzhak Rabin (1992–1995), Shimon Peres (1995–1996), Binyamin Netanyahu (1996–1999) and Ehud Barak (1999–2001). The negotiations were characterized by serious obstacles, breakdowns, mutual manipulations and recriminations, but also by mutual gestures and compliments, as well as by real peace opportunities. Asad, for example, spoke about “normal peace relations”, “genuine peace”, “peace of the brave”, “honorable peace”, and he also permitted Syrian Jews to emigrate. Rabin, for his part, conveyed his condolences to Asad in January 1994 following the death of his son, Basil, in a car accident. Shimon Peres, Minister of Foreign Affairs under Rabin and subsequently as acting Prime Minister, stated that the Golan be............................................ 18 Moshe Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-Making, p. 215. 19 Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 81.

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longed to Syria and that Asad had adopted a strategic decision to make peace with Israel. Ehud Barak depicted Asad in 1999 as “the builder of modern Syria”, while Asad complimented Barak as “a strong and honest leader, interested in peace”.20 It so happened that Asad and Barak were about to sign a peace agreement for the first time in late 1999 and early 2000, after Barak and Faruq al-Shara, Syria’s minister of foreign affairs, reached in Shepherdstown (US) an understanding regarding the demarcation of the new Syrian-Israeli border. This was in addition to the settlement of other disputes regarding the Golan, such as sovereignty, security arrangements and water resources. Subsequently, however, Barak changed his mind about the border demarcation, demanding Israeli control of a 400-meter-wide strip of land, instead of the previously agreed 50 meters along the 13 km strip of land on the northeastern shore of Lake Tiberias.

The Psychological Barrier Prevails Barak’s changed position induced Asad to stop negotiations and, at his subsequent meeting with Clinton in March 2000, he demanded the entire northeastern shore of the lake, remarking that “the lake has always been our lake. It was never theirs.” The imminent peace opportunity was thus missed, largely owing to Barak’s change of mind. Clinton, who had been deeply involved in the negotiations, wrote later: “The Syrians came to Shepherdstown in a positive and flexible frame of mind, eager to make an agreement. By contrast, Barak, who had pushed hard for the talks, decided that he needed to ‘slow walk’ the process for a few days in order to convince the Israeli public that he was being a tough negotiator (…). I was, to put it mildly, disappointed (…). If Barak made real peace with Syria, it would lift his standing in Israel and across the world”.21 ............................................ 20 Moshe Ma’oz, Can Israel and Syria Reach Peace? Obstacles, Lessons and Prospects, Rice University, Texas: The Baker Institute, 2005, p. 18. 21 Bill Clinton, My Life, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, p. 886; Moshe Ma’oz, Can Israel and Syria Reach Peace? Obstacles, Lessons and Prospects, p. 18ff.

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Indeed, Barak’s share in missing this peace opportunity with Syria possibly derived from his faulty leadership. He failed to act upon Ataturk’s motto: “I do not care what the people wish; I know what the people need.” He hesitated or delayed signing a peace agreement with Syria since he was short of support by the Israeli public and the Knesset. Furthermore, not only did Barak not demonstrate leadership at that juncture; he had hardly prepared the Israeli-Jewish public for peace with Syria. He had been unsuccessful in ending the “psychological fear” and “eliminating the barrier of fear and anxieties and exchanging it for a true and mutual feeling of peace and security”, as Faruq al-Shara argued in late 1999.22 Yet, Faruq al-Shara himself failed to indicate that Syria should have also contributed to allaying this “psychological fear” among the Israeli public. As Patrick Seale, the semi-official biographer of Asad, wrote in May 2000, criticizing Asad: You cannot make peace with Barak alone, but [you must] make peace with the government of Israel, the Knesset and even the entire Israeli public – Syria must convince them, through public diplomacy and negotiations, that peace is not a danger and that they must accept it (…). Syria’s style in the negotiations which was characterized by intransigence refused to deal with public diplomacy and ignoring Israeli public opinion, must bear some of the burden of responsibility for the failure.23 Indeed, Rabin, who himself did little to prepare Israeli (and Syrian) public opinion for peace, already requested in 1994 that Asad should “convince the people of Israel that he means real peace.” He also complained that Asad “has not done even one percent of what President Sadat did to convince the people of Israel and of Syria that he wants peace”.24 Asad also refused to meet Rabin (or Peres or Barak) to appear with him on TV, let alone to visit the Knesset as did Sadat. Concerning these omissions, it can be argued that Asad was no Sadat (and Syria was no Egypt). He did not possess Sadat’s vision and courage, nor his ............................................ 22 Tishrin, December 17, 1999; Ha’aretz, December 16, 1999. 23 Al-Hayat, May 9, 2000. 24 Ha’aretz, January 18, 20, 26 and October 7, 1994; Time Magazine, November 30, 1992.

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public legitimacy. As a member of the Alawi minority, opposed by many Syrian Sunni Muslims, Asad had to prove to his people that he achieved an important strategic gain from Israel – more than Sadat had achieved. By the same token, it can also be said that Barak was no Begin, who had relinquished to Egypt the entire Sinai, despite opposition of about 70% of Israeli Jews (who eventually supported the peace deal with Egypt). In this respect, both Barak and Asad did not behave as leaders and statesmen, but as politicians and tacticians. Both missed a unique opportunity for peace.

Bashar al-Asad versus Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert and Binyamin Netanyahu: Contradictions and Chances Not only did Israel and Syria miss peace in 2000. Subsequently, their relations greatly deteriorated with the restoration of the strategic, ideological and psychological divides in different amounts. Bashar, who succeeded his father in July 2000, has since stated periodically that he is adhering to his father’s strategic choice, namely peace with Israel. He kept suggesting a recommencement of peace negotiations with Israel from the point where they had been suspended in early 2000; although occasionally he also suggested the resumption of negotiations with no preconditions.25 He also (reluctantly) endorsed the Arab League peace initiative of 2002 that, for the first time, offered Israel peace and normal relations. But in the perceptions of many Israelis, including political leaders and senior observers, Bashar (at least for several years) was “half baked”, immature, anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic, as well as strategically dangerous. Indeed, more than his father, he has enhanced his strategic and ideological ties with Iran and Hizballah – Israel’s deadly enemies; he has also supplied heavy weapons to Hizballah. He repeatedly hailed the Palestinian Aqsa Intifada which broke out in late September 2000, backed Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, and has voiced pan-Arab and Islamic slogans criticizing Egypt and Jordan for their peace relations with Israel. While the Syrian media has continued to demonize Israel, Bashar initially uttered anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic expressions. For example, in 2001, he opined that Israel was “a racist society, even ............................................ 25 Moshe Ma’oz, Can Israel and Syria Reach Peace? Obstacles, Lessons and Prospects, pp. 27.

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more racist than the Nazis” and that Israel was an “illegitimate state”. And to Pope John Paul II, Bashar stated (in 2001) that Jews “betrayed Jesus Christ (…) and tried to kill Muhammad”26. Consequently, it is no wonder that most Israeli Jews have ignored Bashar’s periodic peace overtures and have considered him an arch enemy, also owing to his membership in the “Axis of Evil” with Iran and Hizballah. Around 70% of Israeli Jews have refused to relinquish the Golan, even in return for peace with Syria. Significantly, this position was also shared by senior Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Sharon.27 He stressed the strategic importance of the Golan, including its water resources. Furthermore, he emphasised the US opposition to the Syrian-Israeli negotiations as well as the “cruel” and undemocratic nature of the Syrian regime and its support of terror. He also said that “the Golan has a place in the people’s heart more than Judea and Samaria”28. Ehud Olmert, who succeeded Sharon in May 2006, pursued this hard line toward Syria and declared that as long as he served as prime minister he would not relinquish the Golan that had been part of Israel.29 He also ordered the IDF to attack Hizballah, Syria’s ally, in July – August 2006, and a Syrian nuclear site in September 2007. But Olmert subsequently changed his mind concerning peace with Syria and, from 2007, his delegates conducted indirect talks with Syrian officials in Turkey and under Turkish mediation. But these negotiations, that were reportedly progressing well, were halted by Syria in late 2008 upon Israel’s attack against Hamas in Gaza. Binyamin Netanyahu, who in his previous term as prime minister indirectly negotiated a possible peace agreement with Hafiz al-Asad (in 1997), has refused to negotiate with Bashar al-Asad since his new ascendancy as prime minister in early 2009. Proclaiming in May 2009 that “Israel will keep the Golan forever”, Netanyahu indicated both his strategic and ideological motives. He said that Katzrin (the only Jewish town on the Golan established after 1967) was “a gem of the Second Temple [period]”, and that “giving up the ............................................ 26 The New York Times, May 11, 2001; al-Ba’th, July 21, 2001; Ha’aretz, December 5, 2003. 27 Yediot Ahronot, January 16, 2004; Ha’aretz, December 28, 2003, January 7, 2004 and November 15, 2009. 28 Yediot Ahronot, January 12; 16, 2004; Ha’aretz, December 8; 16; 2004; see also Ha’aretz, November 16, 2009. 29 Cf. The Telegraph, September 20, 2006.

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Golan Heights would turn it into Iran’s front lines which would threaten the whole State of Israel”.30 Netanyahu’s positions have been shared by his Likud party and his major coalition partners, with the exception of Defense Minister Barak and other Labor ministers. The main opposition party, Kadima, like the Labor party, has also been inclined to resume peace negotiations with Syria. Significantly, the Israeli Chief of Staff of the IDF, the chief of military intelligence, as well as other senior military officers, have also advocated resuming peace negotiations with Damascus, putting the Golan on the table. Apparently, their expectations have been that Syria would break with Iran, Hizballah and Hamas, in return for the Golan and a peace treaty.

Conclusion: Dangers and Prospects Ahead Yet, it can be assessed that Damascus is not likely to sever its strategic relations with Tehran, Hizballah and Hamas as long as it does not secure an attractive strategic alternative, namely the return of the Golan, the consolidation of its influence in Lebanon and the regime’s survival, as well as generous American and Arab financial help to reform the Syrian economy. Under such circumstances, in the best-case scenario Syria can be expected to delete the antiIsraeli clauses in its military pact with Iran; to contain Hizballah’s military power (in tandem with Israeli withdrawal from the Shaba’ Farms); and to induce Hamas to mend fences with the PLO and acquiesce to the peace process with Israel. Yet, for the time being, devoid of such guarantees, Damascus is pursuing a dual-purpose strategy, mainly vis-à-vis Israel: on the one hand, diversifying its regional alliances by strengthening ties with Turkey, improving relations with Saudi Arabia (as well as with France and the US); and becoming a power broker in Lebanon. This will enhance its political-diplomatic standing. But, on the other hand, Syria continues to forge its military ties with Iran and Hizballah (supplying the latter with advanced weapons), aiming at deterring Israel from attacking it and/or its Shi’i allies. In the worse-case scenario, this Syrian approach, combined with mutual distrust and fear between Israel, ............................................ 30 Ha’aretz, May 22, 2008.

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Syria, Hizballah and Iran, may provoke a devastating regional war. Both Syria and Israel would not welcome such a disaster. What then is Israel’s strategy to prevent war with Syria and its allies? Despite its uncompromising proclamations regarding the Golan, Netanyahu may suggest to Syria a resumption of peace negotiations without preconditions, namely to start talks from square one. Bashar is likely to reject such an offer and will insist that negotiations resume from the point where they were interrupted in early 2000. Netanyahu may also direct this suggestion to Washington, in order to deflect US pressure on Israel to settle the Palestinian issue. President Obama, however, is not likely to tolerate such a maneuver and will insist that Israel negotiates with both the Palestinians and Syria toward a comprehensive peace settlement. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, as well as other Arab (and Sunni Muslim) states, would probably support such an American peace initiative in accordance with their 2002 peace initiative and in order to contain the Shi’i Iranian menace. Could Israel accept such a peace design and give up the Golan Heights, the West Bank and East Jerusalem? Or can the current Israeli government decide to reach permanent peace with the Palestinians (for example, according to Clinton’s 2000 design) and discount Syrian expectations and reactions? Finally, could Netanyahu and Bashar demonstrate visionary and bold leadership, like Sadat and Begin, to combat the psychological barrier and ideological antagonism between their peoples and reach stable peace based on mutual vested interests?

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R ADWAN Z IADEH

Do Images Change through Negotiations? – The SyrianIsraeli Experience1

Introduction Syria and Israel had three direct wars (1948, 1973, 1976) and many indirect wars over the Golan Heights before Israel occupied them in 1976, and in Lebanon from 1976 until 2006. It is clear then that Israel’s image in Syrian society in general will be the image of the occupier and the enemy. But Syria engaged with Israel in direct talks and negotiations from the 1991 Madrid Conference until March 2000 (Asad-Clinton summit in Geneva) in the hope of getting the Golan Heights back. Did these negotiations help in improving Israel’s image in Syria? The answer will be easy, since these talks failed and Israel’s image didn’t change at all, but I can argue that many Syrians believe that the best way to get the Golan Heights back is by having peace with Israel, and this is a huge change in the Syrian attitude toward Israel. Syria’s negotiation strategy has been focused primarily on obtaining a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights to the 1967 ceasefire line. With this ultimate strategic goal in mind, one can interpret Syria’s tactics or concessions on security, water, and normalization. Syrian diplomacy has resorted to “long and short” aims to attain that goal, whether through stirring up southern Lebanon, using the issue of normalization with the rest of the Arab world, or by employing Damascus-based Palestinian groups that oppose the Oslo Accords. At the same time, Syria wants to use its negotiations with Israel to improve relations with the world’s superpower, the United States. ............................................ 1

This article is based on my paper “The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations: The Track of Lost Opportunities”, in Hassan A. Barari, The Middle East: Peace by Piece: The Quest for a Solution to the ArabIsraeli Conflict, pp. 121–138. See http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/06836-book.pdf

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This article primarily focuses on the lessons learned from the bilateral peace talks between Syria and Israel since the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 until March 2000.

The Negotiations over the Golan Serious bilateral negotiations over the Golan started between Syria and Israel during the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. In general, the conference was in line with the Syrian policy that, since 1974, has been based on accepting UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the “Land for Peace” principle. Regional developments during that period, however, worked against Syrian interests since its one-time traditional ally, the Soviet Union, collapsed, and the United States came to dominate the Middle East. With Yitzhak Rabin assuming office in Israel in 1992, hope for new negotiations was rejuvenated after the failure of the talks during Yitzhak Shamir’s period. The new head of the Israeli delegation, Itamar Rabinovich, opened the session stating, “Israel accepts all sections and conditions of UNSCR 242 as a basis for the current peace talks, and finds it applicable to the peace negotiations with Syria as well.”2 By mid-July 1993, Rabin’s government effectuated an unprecedented military escalation against southern Lebanon; the seven-day “settling the accounts” offensive was a wide-ranging retaliation for the successive Hizballah raids in the occupied Lebanese strip. Against the background of this escalation,3 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher hurried to the region in an attempt to prevent the military offensive from ruining the peace process and bringing the region back to an atmosphere of war. Christopher’s visit began in Israel on August 2 with a meeting with Rabin, and the first chapter of the famous “Rabin Deposit” was about to begin. ............................................ 2

Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 57.

3

During the week-long operation “settling the accounts” the Israeli armed forces dropped 22,000 bombs and launched a thousand air-to-earth missiles.

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Apart from Christopher and Rabin, Rabinovich and Dennis Ross attended the meeting as note-takers. While realizing the Americans’ desire to achieve progress on the Syrian track more than any other, Rabin said he would rather “start with Syria and Lebanon first, with simultaneous, but limited progress with the Palestinians.” Rabin added that he did not want to “risk making a commitment about the Golan plateau only to find out later on that [Hafiz] alAsad would do his part only after the Palestinians approve it.”4 Addressing Christopher, he wondered, “let us assume that their demands are met; will Syria be willing to sign a peace deal with Israel based on a set of hypothetical assumptions that its demand of full withdrawal will be met? Will they be willing to have a real peace that includes open borders and diplomatic ties? We offer tangible things; as in the Egyptian case, there are elements of peace that we should obtain prior to the completing (of) the withdrawal: embassies and open borders. We need five years to complete the withdrawal; this pertains to the security arrangements as well.” Rabin added, “I should know whether or not the United States will be ready to install early warning stations and send troops to the Golan plateau.” This was the first time that Rabin brought up the possibility of warning posts in the Golan being operated by American experts.5 Rabin insisted on absolute secrecy, and that his stance be classified under “assumptions and hypotheses”. He added, “You can present this hypothesis to them, but it should be presented as your assumption.”6 Rabin wanted Christopher to present this offer to al-Asad as an American one to test his reaction, in order to avoid engaging in commitments and pledges before having similar concessions in return. Christopher met the Syrian president on August 4, and was quite aware that he was carrying a valuable message that might lead to a potential peace deal, particularly since the message contained what al-Asad wanted: full withdrawal ............................................ 4

Ze’ev Schiff, “The Secret Pocket”-File in the Syrian-Israeli talks, Ha’aretz, August 29, 1997.

5

Ibid, also see Avi Shalim’s, Iron Wall. Israel and the Arab world, New York: Norton, 2000/1, pp. 504–05.

6

Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, p. 104. Rabinovich overuses the word “hypothetical”; he talks of “hypothetical approach” or “hypothetical formula” and sometimes “the hypothetical question (of) technique” which had forced one researcher to ironically say that “I am afraid that the whole negotiations could be hypothetical.” Ross, who was present at the meeting, does not make reference to the “hypothetical” nature of Rabin’s proposal as much as he indicates that Rabin set a condition that all his needs must be satisfied so that he makes a commitment to withdraw. Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004, p. 111.

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from the Golan. Christopher informed al-Asad, “Rabin told me that if he would give you what you wanted, could you seriously go toward peace?” AlAsad asked, “What does Rabin exactly mean by full withdrawal? Does he mean withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 line?” Christopher replied, “I have a commitment to a full withdrawal without designating the specific line.”7 Eventually, alAsad considered this a “positive” yet insufficient step since the withdrawal lines were not clarified. So, he asked again, “Does Israel have further claims to Syrian territory in the Golan?” Christopher replied, “Not as far as I know.” The Secretary of State told al-Asad that he would seek clarifications about the withdrawal line, particularly whether it was the June 4 one8. Al-Asad assured Christopher that Syria would be ready to engage in the other elements of the deal and accept the basic key formula of “full withdrawal in return for full peace”. As for the timetable, he proposed six months instead of the five years Rabin had suggested.9 Al-Asad also opposed normalization of Israeli-Syrian relations before Israel pulled out from the Golan. He wanted to use the expression “normal peace relations” rather than “normalization”, and he could not promise trade and tourism, although he would not hinder them. Al-Asad admitted that satisfactory security arrangements were necessary and mutually beneficial for both sides, and that water was an important part of the deal.10 Finally, Christopher asked the president to keep the minutes of this meeting classified since Rabin’s commitment to a full withdrawal from the Golan would create internal unrest for him, and he was also very sensitive about any leaks. Al-Asad promised to do so. Convinced that his meeting with al-Asad was a “positive one”, Christopher returned to Jerusalem to inform Rabin about the reply, but Rabin considered it “disappointing”. The prime minister knew al-Asad’s desire to have an official peace offer, and since he offered the president’s main condition – full withdrawal from the Golan – al-Asad should have accepted Rabin’s stipulations without any “ifs” or “buts”. The only point Rabin found positive in al-Asad’s ............................................ 7

Ze’ev Schiff, “‘The Secret Pocket’-File in the Syrian-Israeli talks”, Ha’aretz, August 29, 1997.

8

Walid Al-Moualem, “Beyond the Brink of Peace”, in Robert G. Rabil, Embattled Neighbours. Syria, Israel, Lebanon, London: Boulder, 2003, Appendix p. 4.

9

Ibid, pp. 3–4.

10 Aharon Briggman and Jihan Al-Tuhri, Israel and the Arabs: the Fifty-Year War, London: TV Books, p. 306.

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reply was the link between the negotiation tracks, although the Syrian president hinted that a deal could only be struck if there was progress with the Palestinians.11 Christopher and Ross gave al-Asad Rabin’s reply. The Syrian president listened carefully and understood the prime minister’s desire not to convey his withdrawal offer to the Syrian public, and al-Asad pledged to be utterly discrete to avoid jeopardizing Syrian national interests. He sought further explanations about the withdrawal line, but found no answer. He considered, however, Israel’s “commitment” to fully withdraw from the Golan Heights a necessary step forward. Following the Syrian reply, Rabin gave Shimon Peres the go-ahead to implement the Oslo negotiations, the first among many lost opportunities to reach an agreement.12 In the hope of rendering the negotiations successful, al-Asad maintained full secrecy of the Israeli “commitment” in order not to embarrass Rabin before the Israeli public. In general, it was al-Asad’s habit to keep talks very secret until he achieved his goal. He did not reveal the commitment until he used it for political ends during his negotiations with Barak, and only after the Israelis themselves unveiled it first. Rabin wanted al-Asad to take the deal as a whole package, and not in parts. Therefore, the Syrians did not think that they had lost an “opportunity”, and saw all of this as an important and decisive step towards agreeing on the other “legs” of the agreement. Rabin’s haste to implement the Oslo Accords, however, took the Syrians by surprise, and brought the negotiations to a period of hibernation.13 Only after numerous US and regional interventions did the negotiations resume. Clinton met al-Asad on October 27, 1994, after the ceremony held for the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty was over. During that meeting, Clinton stressed Rabin’s full withdrawal commitment based on the June 4, ............................................ 11 Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, p. 106. This is an important point mentioned by Rabinovich but not by Ross who reiterated that al-Asad was ready to arrive at a deal regardless of the Palestinians, and that he was “ready, right from the start, to engage in negotiations that lead to an agreement that has to do with him, al-Asad, and that he would have never hesitated to leave the Palestinians but not the Lebanese.” Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 111. 12 Helena Cobban, Syria and the Peace: A Good Chance Missed, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, July 7, 1997, pp. 23–25. 13 Ibid, pp. 23–24.

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1967 line. He emphasized that this commitment was to remain an American “deposit” and indicated that it should coincide with an agreement on issues pertaining to normalization and security arrangements. The final phrasing of “the goals and principles of the security arrangements” was agreed upon on May 22, 1995, following a number of negotiation rounds involving the Syrian and Israeli Joint Chiefs of Staff and a series of meetings in Washington involving low-ranking military experts. The next day, “a group of points of understanding between Syria and Israel” was announced, but the two sides still agreed to keep the “deposit” confidential. The Israeli press began to criticize the security arrangements paper by calling it a “nonpaper”14 to emphasize the fact that it was not an official document, but a diplomatic means for both sides to push forward with the negotiations with American help. The one-page document observed and maintained a balance between the demands of both sides.15 From September 1995, Peres and his team showed a willingness to employ their negotiating skills and experience with the Syrians and arrived at an agreement that Rabin was unsuccessful in attaining. Rabin started developing a new relationship with his rival Peres and briefed him on some of the details of the negotiations, about which he had until then been kept in the dark. When Peres found himself as the decision maker after the assassination of Rabin, he reserved no effort and invested in achieving his dream of building “the New Middle East.”16 He saw the results of the multilateral negotiations at the Madrid Conference as a true and realistic path to that new Middle East.17 Peres fully supported the Israeli-Syrian track because he thought an outstanding accomplishment on the Syrian front would make him a powerful and influential leader. For the US administration, this was a welcoming development since it was anxious to have reached such an achievement before the upcoming presidential elections in 1996.

............................................ 14 Helena Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p. 67. 15 Al-Hayat, November 23, 1999. See Yediot Ahronot, June 29, 1995, Ha’aretz, June 30, 1995. See also Helena Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p. 68. 16 Shimon Peres and Arye Na’or, The New Middle East, Longmead, UK: Element Books, 1993 17 David Landau, Shimon Peres: Battling for Peace. Memoirs, London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1993, p. 317.

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Peres managed to restore Rabin’s commitment to fully withdraw from the Golan Heights, but under Rabin’s same conditions of “providing Syrian assurances not to intercept the water that flows from the Golan into Lake Tiberias (The Sea of Galilee) and developing joint Israeli-Syrian projects that would make the Golan an ‘open economic zone.’”18 Peres also wanted international funding for such endeavors. Al-Asad replied, “We never thought about stopping the flow of water from the Golan or polluting Lake Tiberias.” He asserted that Syria would have a share in the lake, but that it would not stop the flow of water even during the worst of times. However, the president refused the idea of joint projects in the Golan because the Syrian public would interpret them as occupation in a different form and a symbol of Israeli domination.19 AlAsad tried to offer a response to most of the points Peres suggested in the “Ten-Point Plan” but was unwilling to hold a summit with Peres. Christopher returned to Israel on December 15 to inform Peres of al-Asad’s reply – one that Peres found to be “cold”. The Syrian president’s cautious reply emanated mainly from his frustration during the years of squandered negotiations with Rabin, who manipulated the process as he wished with his refusal to stand by his statements and commitments. The first stage of the new negotiations started on the Wye Plantation in Maryland on December 27, and went on for three days, followed by three more days in January 1996. However, unlike what he previously told the Americans and Syrians, Peres wanted to hold early elections in May since he noticed that the negotiations were slowing down, and time was running out on his odds of winning the elections. This disturbed al-Asad because he earlier received promises and commitments from the American administration to the effect that Peres considered peace with Syria “more important than having Labor win the elections.” But the new round of negotiations that were resumed by virtue of strenuous US effort, particularly by Christopher, came in the wake of the first suicide bombing in Jerusalem. The US administration asked for an overt and clear Syrian condemnation. Although that did not happen, the talks resumed as usual. However, with the continuation of commando operations, Peres in............................................ 18 Helena Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p. 82. 19 Patrick Seale, “The Story of ‘Rabin’s Deposit’”: Peres was surprised to know of the commitment but he adopted it; yet Netanyahu beat him and froze everything, Al-Hayat, November 24, 1999.

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structed his delegation to suspend the negotiations with Syria under the pretext that Syria had not condemned the terrorist attacks that primarily sought to derail the peace process. The Syrian delegation received instructions to return to Damascus immediately. Israel then escalated its military response in southern Lebanon, leading to the Qana massacre. The United States managed to broker the April 1996 understanding, but Peres subsequently lost to Binyamin Netanyahu. Once again, another opportunity to arrive at a peace deal was lost. For the future of the peace process, the impact of the 1999 elections in Israel was similar to those when Rabin defeated Shamir, because the peace process came to a complete stop on the Syrian track during Netanyahu’s term. That is why Barak’s victory had a great resonance within the US administration, which believed that the peace process could resume again. Following a series of marathon-like communications between President Clinton and the Syrian and Israeli sides, Clinton dispatched his new Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to the region. On December 7, 1999 she managed to arrive at a practical formula to resume negotiations. President Clinton announced that the meeting was to be held in Washington between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara, and that negotiations would resume from where they halted in February 1996. Negotiations resumed with the Syrian insistence on giving priority to the full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights as a basis for any progress over any other issues. The negotiations were held in the US city of Shepherdstown, and the Syrian and Israeli delegations were accompanied by security, water and law experts. Top confidentiality was maintained during the negotiations, and President Clinton canceled all of his other engagements during the negotiations because he intended to “exert all efforts possible to facilitate a peace deal.”20 Clinton embarked on a bilateral round of negotiations, insisting that progress was only possible once Barak emphasized Rabin’s “deposit”. Barak refused the notion and told the president that “the final stage will be determined by the deposit.” At the same time, Secretary Albright held a meeting with al-Shara, who insisted that Barak had to commit to the June 4 withdrawal line and that ............................................ 20 Al-Hayat, January 4, 2000.

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boundary demarcation teams should start working at once. Although four committees were formed (borders, security arrangements, water, and normalization), disagreements soon appeared when it came to setting the priorities of which committees should meet first. The Syrians thought any delay in the border demarcation committee would be a blow to the whole negotiations, but Barak linked the committee’s achievements to progress on security arrangements and water, particularly regarding Lake Tiberias. The committees on normal peace relations and security arrangements met first, but when the border committee convened, the Syrian delegation found themselves alone in the designated room with no Israeli counterparts. The Syrians accepted proceeding with the committees on security arrangements and normal peace relations first, out of their desire to exert the necessary effort to render the negotiations successful, as al-Shara put it.21 On the fourth day, however, the Israelis continued to prevent the committee on border demarcation from holding its first meeting, and Clinton had to get involved personally for the third time. Al-Shara was outraged. He demonstrated clear flexibility and consideration, and he announced that Israel would have sovereignty over the lake while Syria would have sovereignty over the whole territory. As far as the early warning system was concerned, al-Shara said that Syria would not accept any Israeli presence in Mount Hermon (Jebel al-Sheikh), but that it would accept American presence at that station for five years following the Israeli withdrawal. Ross was surprised to see al-Shara’s flexibility and openness to creative solutions, but Barak seemed unwilling to change his convictions. Albright requested the US peace team to develop a working paper that not only reflected what the Syrian-Israeli negotiations achieved prior to suspension in 1996, but also outlined her deliberations with Barak and al-Shara in Shepherdstown as well as the informal talks during the current round.22 The working paper was sufficient to relaunch the negotiations through a meeting involving Clinton, al-Shara, and Barak. The Syrians found no Israeli seriousness in dealing with the critical issue of the June 4 line, and were annoyed at time-wasting tactics. In fact, Israel’s chief negotiator, Uri Sagui, frankly stated that “it was about a two-day tactical trick, ............................................ 21 Al-Hayat, January 6, 2000. 22 Al-Hayat, January 7, 2000.

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but when the Syrians found out that these committees would never meet, they expressed their outrage.” Sagui added that “the Shepherdstown meeting created lack of trust among both sides,” and that he did not know “why Barak has broken his promises, and whether or not it was due to certain tactics or an excessive maneuver for Israel did not deliver on its commitments.”23 When it became apparent that Israel was refusing to acknowledge the principle of withdrawal,24 al-Shara told President Clinton, “I will have to go back and report this failure to my leadership.” It was only then that the Americans sensed the deepness of the crisis. The negotiations ended with a Syrian loss of trust in Israel and the United States. Syria felt that Israel had disavowed its withdrawal commitment, one that the United States had vouched for since 1994. Consequently, al-Asad stopped all negotiations with Israel until he obtained a written commitment from Barak regarding the June 4 line. After the failure of the Shepherdstown negotiations, Clinton suggested that he and al-Asad hold a summit in Geneva on March 26. Barak provided Clinton with full written text to be used in his talks with al-Asad. Barak said that “it will be acceptable that the president improvises general statements to start the talk, but describing Israel’s needs should be recited ad verbatim.”25 The new Israeli offer proposed a withdrawal from all but 10 percent of the occupied territory. Israel would hold a 400-meter-wide strip alongside the northeast portion of Lake Tiberias, and an eighty-yard-wide strip alongside the eastern bank of the Jordan River. In addition, Israel presented a package of other detail-related positions, such as having a limited Israeli presence (seven soldiers for five years) in Mount Hermon (Jebel Al-Sheikh), and that the withdrawal could take place within two and a half years rather than three. Since Barak was clear that these terms were not flexible, al-Asad would have to accept the deal as is. Clinton accepted Barak’s argument, and he did not dispatch Albright to Syria in order to prepare for the summit, despite the fact that she insisted on doing so to protect the president against the possibility of ............................................ 23 Charles Enderlin, Le Rêve Brisé, Histoire de l’échec du Processus de Paix au Proche-Orient, Paris: Editions Fayard, 2002, pp. 141–42. See also “Interview with Uri Sagui”, Yediot Ahronot, September 24, 2004. 24 Talal Salman, “A Report from Damascus: Negotiations from within”, Al-Safir, January 19, 2000. 25 Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace, pp. 234.

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failure. Barak, however, stood his ground that only Clinton should present these points to al-Asad. Convinced that he was coming to seal a peace agreement, al-Asad headed to Geneva to meet Clinton for the third time, and brought a large number of negotiation experts.26 Within only a few minutes of presenting the Israeli offer, Clinton read the phrase: “The Israelis are ready to withdraw to agreed-upon borderlines.” Al-Asad, startled, asked, “What agreed-upon borderlines? Is it not about the June 4, 1967 lines?” Clinton replied, “let me finish (…) Israel will maintain sovereignty along the shores of Lake Tiberias and a strip of land (…).” Al-Asad immediately interrupted, stating, “the Israelis do not want peace; that is why there is no need to continue.”27 After the meeting, al-Shara proposed releasing a joint statement, since he feared that Syria would be held responsible for the failure of the summit. Clinton called Barak and relayed al-Shara’s proposal, but Barak refused.28 In reality, Barak squandered a true opportunity to make peace with Syria during the Shepherdstown negotiations.29

What we can learn Today, the international climate is far different from that of the direct negotiations that followed the Madrid Conference in 1991 through the collapse of USbacked Syrian-Israeli talks in Geneva in 2000. Perhaps most important in this regard is the presence of the United States in Iraq, but also important are a number of international resolutions of the Security Council during the past four years concerning Syria’s relationship with Lebanon, notably Resolution 1701 and others, which obligate it to cooperate with the International Com............................................ 26 Al-Hayat, March 26, 2000. 27 See “A Detailed Report from Damascus about the Geneva Summit”, Al-Safir, April 28, 2000. 28 Ibid. 29 Interview with Elan Mizrahi, former vice-president of the Israeli Mossad, Ma’ariv, Tel Aviv, March 30, 2003, Akifa Alidar, Ha’aretz, August 12, 2003, Ze’ev Schiff, Dennis Ross, Ha’aretz, April 30, 2004, and interview with Dennis Ross in Yediot Ahronot, July 2, 2004. Clayton E. Swisher, The Truth about Camp David. The Untold Story about the collapse of the Middle East Peace Process, New York: Nation Books, 2004, pp. 78–89.

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mittee for Inquiry on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. In addition, the regional environment surrounding Syria differs greatly from the context of prior Syrian-Israeli talks. Its relation with Iran has become extra-strategic, while the relationship with leading Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt is dominated by tension and estrangement. For Israel, the failure of the July war in 2006 has caused it to lose much on the incorporeal level, especially with the unexpected capabilities of Hizballah and its armament competence which depend largely on Iran. Moreover, Israel feels a permanent threat from Iran, which replenishes its ambition for building a nuclear reactor, though it is aware that this reactor is only for peaceful purposes, and not military ones. Thus, it seems as if the two sides, Israel and Syria, entered a new phase after a seven-year cessation of the direct negotiations between them, without bearing any real results that would lead to the completion of the peace process between them. By means of peace negotiations, Syria wishes to recover the Golan Heights occupied by Israel after the June 1967 war, but it also wishes, as the Syrian president has many times declared, these negotiations to be sponsored by the United States. This is because the latter has distinct relations with Israel and is therefore the only side that could persuade Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights. As for Israel, it wishes to alienate and isolate Syria from Iran through achieving peace with it. This would consequently crash the relationship between Syria and Hizballah, which in turn would be weakened considerably. At the same time, this would be an attempt to isolate the axis formed against it by Syria, Iran, Hizballah and the Palestinian organizations based in Syria. The dismantlement of Hizballah will necessarily weaken Iran; then, there will be no political justification for Hizballah to keep its weapons. That would work only if we imagine that Lebanon will follow Syria, not precede it at all, in signing a peace agreement. After the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister al-Hariri, Syria also wishes to free itself from the imposed international isolation by involving the United States in sponsoring the direct peace negotiations, and perhaps later to reach a final peace agreement. The Syrian-Israeli negotiation track is distinct from the other Arab-Israeli tracks as it has the largest number of missed or wasted opportunities. Measur-

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ing these negotiations according to this formula has been tempting to many researchers and analysts, perhaps because it did not fulfill anything, making it known more as opportunities rather than results or achievements. But what must be mentioned is that Syrian-Israeli negotiations, since they began with the Madrid Conference in 1990 until they were completely halted, were not an aim intrinsically. In other words, if negotiation, in its academic sense, means looking for the common interest and focusing on what would make a profit if both parties worked together, so they have to reach compromises on some issues of negotiation. Negotiating in the “Middle Eastern” sense is thus a zero-sum game, i.e. what one party earns, the other party will inevitably lose, and vice versa. On this basis the Syrian-Israeli negotiations have been taking place over the past ten years. No one denies that there were missed opportunities. Had they been properly exploited, both parties would have reaped the fruits of peace. Yet, our definition of the concept of “missed opportunity” is surely different. We also differ in our reading of international, regional and domestic conditions. Without preparing and accommodating these conditions, the opportunity of peace will never produce fruits. Rather, these conditions will continuously be factors impeding the achievement of this opportunity. Following an all-out Israeli invasion of the West Bank and blockade of the Gaza Strip in 2002, the Middle East entered a new era of detachment from the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. The international agreements that were signed at that conference no longer maintain the same immunity, making it difficult for international actors to observe and protect them. The Syrian-American relationship entered an unprecedented era of threat and intimidation, particularly following the American and British invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Syrian claims to the Golan Heights were overlooked by the Road Map, since it never mentioned Syria at all. In October 2003, Israel launched a raid targeting an abandoned camp of the People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command at Ein al-Saheb near Damascus,30 in a clear breach of the Disengagement Agreement that Syria and Israel signed in 1974. Although ............................................ 30 See Ze’ev Schiff, “Against Allowing the Confrontation to Overspill”, Ha’aretz, October 10, 2003. Felicity Barringer, The Mideast Turmoil: United Nations: Syria offers a resolution to condemn the Israeli raid, The New York Times, October 6, 2003. Robert Fisk, Israel’s attack is a lethal step towards war in the Middle East, The Independent, October 2003. Richard W. Murphy, Raid against Syria sets regrettable precedent, Council on Foreign Relations, October 8, 2003.

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there was no human or material damage, the Israeli message was clear: Israel wanted the liberty to hunt down the Palestinian organizations it characterized as “terrorist” wherever they were. Likewise, Israel claimed that Damascus had a role in the commando attacks inside Israel. The supportive US position regarding the Israeli raids greatly disappointed Damascus, since Syria was unsuccessful in pushing for an international resolution condemning the Israeli violation of Syrian airspace.31 The prospects of future Israeli-Syrian peace are linked more to the international and regional climate than to internal desires within Israel and Syria. A conducive environment primarily depends on the availability of US and international efforts, but also European and Arab endeavors. The situation calls upon Syria to address internal and external challenges to convince the United States of its sincere and earnest desire for peace. Washington also needs to persuade Israel that it has a real interest in peace. Without these developments, war remains a viable option from a theoretical perspective, but it is very unlikely practically and realistically. Therefore, the “no peace, no war” choice that Damascus has opted for decades should remain Syria’s strategic stance unless internal or external challenges appear to negate such an option and gear it towards peace or war. Syria and Israel have engaged in difficult negotiations for ten years. While these negotiations have not produced a peace agreement, they have laid down the broad foundations for a deal and clearly settled many of the details for both sides. As such, it is a matter of taking the political decision to accept each other’s requirements and paying the price in order to make them happen. Both sides must also not neglect public diplomacy. Syria has never addressed the issue of Israel’s public opinion. Although this was understandable for internal regime considerations and the sensitivity of the issue on the Arab level, failing to recognize the profound disagreements within the Israeli community would further complicate a future attempt at a peace agreement. Syria and Israel also need to recognize that certain components of the peace deal are final and non-negotiable. Israel must accept that Syria will never agree to anything less than a full withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 line, and that any ............................................ 31 The US President, Bush, officially declared, “We would have done the same thing,” Al-Hayat, October 8, 2003. Fred Goldstein, Bush hails Israel: Attack on Syria, Workers World Newspaper, October 16, 2003.

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tampering with this issue, or suggesting various political and geographical alternatives will only increase Syria’s lack of confidence in the Israeli side. In return, Syria must satisfy Israel’s demands on security, water, and normalization. The interrelatedness of the negotiation tracks is also a key issue. There will be little progress without a solution based on the “Land for Peace” principle. The Israeli side must realize that without true progress on the Palestinian track, it will be difficult for Syrian decision makers to arrive at a peace treaty. This is not only attributed to ideological and pan-Arab considerations, but also to internal Syrian sensitivities that pertain to the regime’s image on internal and external levels. Finally, Syria has to change the way it conducts negotiations during the next stage, particularly when it comes to opening up to Syrian civil society and leaving space to discuss the matter publicly. Such an approach would help to arrive at a sustainable and popularly acceptable agreement − not one that is imposed from abroad according to the conditionality of international will. This will not come about without the Syrian regime’s engagement in a true democratization process, leading to the principle of the peaceful rotation of power. Such a development would endow the agreement with sustainability, instead of internal animosity, which is what happened in Egypt.

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I TAMAR R ABINOVICH

Israel Faces the Palestinians

The title of this paper requires a definition. The fragmentation and dispersion of the Palestinian people was one of the most tragic and significant consequences of the 1948 war. One of the numerous difficulties inherent in any effort to resolve the Palestinian issue derives from this very condition. The radical Palestinians and their supporters argue that the Palestinian issue will not be resolved (and peace with Israel must not be made) before all Palestinians are given the choice to return to Israel proper. Israel and most of the international community do not think that this is either a feasible or a justified demand. When Israeli leaders signed the Oslo Accords with the PLO and negotiated its implementation, they had in mind a solution of the Palestinian problem predicated on the formation of the Palestinian state in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip and the acceptance of such an arrangement by the Palestinian leadership and the Arab world as a final, legitimate settlement. Our discussion of Israel’s view of the Palestinians will depart from the same set of assumptions.1 This discussion needs to be prefaced by two introductory comments. The debate on the Palestinian issue has been the single most important fault line in Israeli politics since 1967 and has transformed the traditional definitions of “left” and “right”. Lines of division, individual positions and definitions of “consensus” and “mainstream” have gone through dramatic and rapid changes. A brief review of the twists and turns of Israel’s policy since 1993 will clearly illustrate these points. In 1993, Yitzhak Rabin stunned the Israeli public by signing the Oslo Accords. In 1996, after his assassination by a fanatical opponent of the Oslo policy, Benjamin Netanyahu, a critic of that policy, who ............................................ 1

Further references see: Hussein Ibish, What’s wrong within the One State Agenda, American Task Force on Palestine, Washington DC, 2009. Benny Moris, One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel Palestinian Conflict, Yale, 2009. Itamar Rabinovich, “Palestine Portayed”, Jewish Review of Books, no. 3 (Fall 2010).

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still promised to respect the commitments made by the Rabin government, was elected Prime Minister. Much did not happen during Netanyahu’s first term, but his successor, Ehud Barak, did seek a final status agreement with the Palestinian Authority. In Camp David in July 2000 Barak broke additional Israelis taboos. He agreed to cede more than 90% of the West Bank and to the partition of Jerusalem, but insisted on obtaining from Yasser Arafat “finality” and “end of claims”. The Camp David Summit collapsed and its failure was followed by the outbreak of “the second Intifada”. In December 2000 President Clinton presented his “parameters” for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement that were accepted by Barak’s government and rejected by Arafat. The Clinton Parameters have been considered since as the baseline for a final status IsraeliPalestinian agreement. Ehud Barak’s successor, Ariel Sharon, adopted a policy of unilateralism. He did want to reach a long-term settlement or at least consolidation of the Palestinian issue, but did not believe that there was a Palestinian partner to a final status agreement. He effected a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and dismantled the Israeli settlements in that area. In order to implement his plan he broke with his own party, the Likud, and formed Kadima, a new centrist party composed of Labor and Likud politicians and several new recruits to Israeli politics. Had he not fallen ill, Sharon would have continued with a similar program in the West Bank. Sharon’s successor, Ehud Olmert, was elected in 2006 on a similar program. He subsequently abandoned the notion of unilateralism and entered into a lengthy negotiation with Abu-Mazen, Arafat’s successor as president of the Palestinian Authority, on a final status agreement. Olmert was willing to go beyond the Clinton Parameters, but Abu-Mazen failed to respond. By that time Olmert was on his way out and it seemed that Abu-Mazen did not wish to make a deal with an outgoing prime minister (the Israeli right-wing argues that this was yet more proof that the Palestinian leader was either unwilling or unable to settle even on what most Israelis view as a far-reaching offer). Olmert’s successor in the Kadima party, Tzipi Livni, who shared this platform, failed to form a government and a fresh election was called. The right-wing bloc won the 2009 election and Benjamin Netanyahu formed the new government. Israel’s policy changed once more – under US pressure Netanyahu

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finally agreed to endorse the notion of a two-state solution, but he clearly is not willing to endorse Olmert’s full position. It is against this backdrop that we will now view the four main groups that make up the Israeli political spectrum with regard to the Palestinian issue:

The Radical Right This group seeks to preserve the status quo, opposes the notion of a Palestinian state and tries to expand the settlement project in the West Bank. The hard core of this camp is made up of the ideological settlers and their allies in the Zionist orthodox parties (the former National Religious Party), the Shas Party (ultra-orthodox Sephardi), the right wing of the Likud and to some extent Avigdor Lieberman’s party. This last party represents in fact a rather complex coalition. It is at once an ultra-nationalist and an ethnic party that draws many of its voters from recent immigrants from the Soviet Union. The party is dominated by Avigdor Lieberman, Israel’s current Foreign Minister, who can be described as an “unorthodox right winger”. He is an ultra-nationalist who lives in a West Bank settlement, but also attaches more importance to “demography” than to “geography”. He is preoccupied, not to say obsessed, with the preservation of a clear Jewish majority in the Jewish people’s national state. From that perspective, he attaches a high priority to the state’s relationship with an Arab-Palestinian minority of nearly 20%. Unlike other right-wing leaders, he supports the notion of a two-state solution as long as the “swap” envisaged in the Clinton Parameters and in Olmert’s proposal to Abu-Mazen is applied to an area of Israel, adjacent to the West Bank and populated by IsraeliArabs.

The Moderate Right This category applies to parts of the Likud and the Kadima parties who accept the notion of a two-state solution, but disagree with the terms offered by Olmert or demanded by the Palestinians. The most significant representative of this school is Prime Minister Netanyahu. In his election campaign he spoke

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of his preference for an “economic peace” with the Palestinians. After forming his government he refused to endorse the notion of a two-state solution that had been accepted by his two predecessors, Ariel Sharon (whose government formally accepted the 2004 “Road Map”) and Ehud Olmert. It took several months of pressure by the Obama administration for Netanyahu to accept the idea of a two-state solution in his “Bar-Ilan speech”. He qualified his acceptance by insisting that the Palestinian state be “demilitarized” and that the Palestinians must recognize the “Jewish character” of the state of Israel.

The Center-left Both the Kadima and the Labor parties strongly support the notion of a twostate solution to be implemented on the terms defined by the Clinton Parameters. In theory the two parties could and should collaborate in order to promote an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, but political realities in Israel are such that the Labor party became an important partner in Netanyahu’s coalition government, while Kadima spearheads the opposition. On a deeper level, the tension between the parties derives from personal antipathies and from the very fact that by positioning itself as the pro-settlement party, Kadima successfully dispossessed Labor of its traditional place in Israel’s political spectrum and of many of its voters. Kadima has the largest caucus in the Knesset, while Labor shrank and became a medium-sized party. Kadima’s position is that it would be willing to join the coalition once it is persuaded that Netanyahu is seriously seeking a settlement with the Palestinians and that, in any event, it would offer the government parliamentary support should it opt for a settlement and lose part of the coalition.

The Left The Israeli left has yet to recover from the blow dealt to it by the collapse of the peace process in 2000 and by the ensuing “second Intifada”. The “Zionist left” (as distinct from the Arab parties) is represented by the small Meretz caucus and by the left wing of the Labor party whose members are critical of the

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party’s membership in Netanyahu’s coalition. It also comprises such extraparliamentary movements as Peace Now. The Zionist left is less interested than Labor and Kadima in the terms of a prospective Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Its position is that “the occupation” has a disastrous impact on Israel and that it is in Israel’s best interest to disengage from the West Bank for its own good. How is this state of affairs likely to be translated into a policy or a set of policies? At present, Israel is ruled by a right-wing coalition, moderated to some extent by the participation of the Labor party, and the momentum of the coalition and the cabinet directs policy towards the preservation of the status quo. But this direction is challenged or may very well be challenged by a number of forces at work: (1) A sense that time is not on Israel’s side. The most important element in this sense is demography. If the status quo is maintained for the next decade or two, there will be more Palestinian Arabs than Jews between the Jordan and the Mediterranean and Israel may very well lose either its Jewish majority or its democratic nature. More and more voices can be heard claiming that the idea of a two-state solution is no longer relevant or is on the verge of becoming irrelevant. Such voices are heard in Israel, in Europe, and in the United States, and, most significantly, among the Palestinians. More and more Palestinians are arguing that Palestinians need not do anything, just wait it out; let demography do its work and when a Palestinian majority develops west of the Jordan, insist on a “one man, one vote” principle. Working in the some direction is the gradual decline in Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state in Europe but also in the United States, in the media and among academics and intellectuals. The argument is heard more and more often that the occupation is eroding Israel’s legitimacy. Recent Israeli actions such as the war in Lebanon, the war in Gaza and the raiding of the Turkish ship Marmara have met with powerful criticism. These developments cannot be ignored and are not ignored by the majority of Israelis. (2) One of the consequences of this trend is the sense that it is in Israel’s own interest to enter into, and subsequently conclude, a peace process with the Palestinians that would culminate in a two-state solution. Even Israelis who, for ideological or other reasons, have long been opposed to the notion of a Palestinian state or to the bulk of the Palestinians’ demands in the negotia-

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tions, or to the Clinton Parameters or Olmert’s proposals, tend to suppress these sentiments given the sense of crisis and decline. (3) US pressure. In summer 2010 the Obama administration, including President Obama, reduced its pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu and his government to move forward swiftly in a peace process with the Palestinians, and more specifically, to freeze all settlements activity as a confidence-building measure that would enable the Palestinian Authority to enter into direct negotiations with Israel. This change came after several months of pressure by the Obama administration that was exercised directly on the Netanyahu government and was well advertised around the world. It has contributed to the decline in Israel’s position, as described above. But, this may very well be a temporary development and an Israeli-Palestinian settlement remains an important priority of the Obama administration and it is generally estimated that the administration will come back to more active and insistent policy in this matter. (4) Palestinian activity. In the West Bank and within the Palestinian Authority there seems to be a majority opinion that another violent outbreak (“a third Intifada”) is not a preferred policy. Instead, many feel that other forms of pressure on Israel are and would be more effective. Most prominent is the strategy adopted by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who believes in a “bottomup” approach, namely building the institutions of a Palestinian state within the next two years. Fayyad does not say explicitly that he would support a declaration of statehood when the process is completed, but this is implicit in his approach. Another form of pressure is exercised by Hamas, mostly through its base in Gaza. Hamas enjoys the support of such regional powers and actors as Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Hizballah. A “Turkish flotilla” was one means of pressure. Hamas has also built and continues to build an arsenal of rockets and missiles in the Gaza Strip that can hit targets deep inside Israel. The option of escalating the relationship with Israel to the level of violence that existed prior to operation “Cast Lead” is there. Hamas’ leadership knows that it may very well pay a very high price for doing that, but it also calculates that Israel might be deterred by the political and diplomatic cost of another major operation in Gaza. (5) Domestic pressure in Israel. There is constant pressure by most of the Labor party’s leadership on Defense Minister Ehud Barak to secede from the

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Netanyahu coalition and government. The Labor caucus is not large and as far as the numbers are concerned the coalition can be maintained without Labor’s participation, but Labor’s presence in the coalition and Barak’s personal participation are important to Prime Minister Netanyahu and an important legitimizing factor. Their potential departure could have a serious impact on the coalition’s stability and on the direction of policy. Ehud Barak takes credit for moderating government policy and for facilitating the current understanding between the Obama administration and the Netanyahu government, but this may very well change over time. Another source of potential change concerns Foreign Minister Lieberman and his party. Lieberman is currently under investigation by Israel’s Attorney General and it is on record that should he be indicted he would resign his post. Such a development, if it materializes, could be another important catalyst in a breakdown of the coalition and a corridor leading to a change in policy. It is important to dwell at some length on the “Syrian option”. In the history of the peace process that began in 1991, Israeli vacillation between the “Syrian track” and the “Palestinian track” has been an important dimension of Israeli policy. Several Israeli Prime Ministers actually preferred a “Syria first” policy, but for a variety of reasons ended up making their agreements, or trying to make them, with the Palestinians. At present, the Syrian option is overshadowed by the inherent importance of the Palestinian issue for Israel, by the preference assigned by President Obama to the Palestinian issue, and by the difficulty of negotiating with Syria’s current leader, Bashar al-Asad. But both in Jerusalem and Washington there are those who still prefer a “Syria first” policy. They believe that it might be easier to resolve the essentially territorial conflict with a coherent state and a powerful regime than to try to resolve the Palestinian issue. Furthermore, they do see an agreement with Syria as a key to larger geopolitical change in the region, hoping to attract Syria away from its alliance with Iran. Experience shows that at the end of the day it is the prime minister who determines the policy. Prime Minister Netanyahu will have to make his own personal decision, go against his grain and go against members of his own family, risk a split in his own party and the collapse of his own coalition by deciding to move ahead in serious negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. This is a necessary but not necessarily a sufficient condition. At the end of the

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day Israel and the world may discover that there is no Palestinian partner to an acceptable and durable settlement. One of the ironies inherent in the current situation is that it is only through the negotiation itself that the real prospect of the negotiation can be discovered. Public opinion polls in Israel indicate that while the majority of Israelis oppose the far-reaching concession that will be required in order to reach a settlement, when confronted with a fait accompli, that is to say a signed deal with the other side, the majority of Israelis are likely to support it.

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The Intractable Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Future Perspectives

Peace in the Middle East will only be secured when it takes root in the everyday lives of people in the region. In addition to securing the appropriate political agreements, securing peace requires establishing a hospitable environment for economic development that will only materialize if peace brings open economic relations and development for the people and countries of the region, in the context of a just resolution of the Palestinian question as the core issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Oslo Peace Process failed to bring about a transition from the state of conflict to that of peace because the politics of peacemaking during the process were a continuation of, rather than a break from, the politics of conflict. The power relationships during the Oslo Peace Process resembled those during the time of conflict; Israel constituted the powerful party with cards to control the pace, nature and objectives of the peace process. Currently, the entire Middle East region is embroiled in conflict ranging from communal to sectarian strife. This unstable and volatile Middle East is a reaction to incessant conflict in Iraq, Somalia, Darfur, Israel and Palestine. The Middle East more than ever needs peace and stability, because the key to stability in the world is the security and the prosperity of the Middle East region. War remains a fundamental problem of our contemporary world. As societies descend into war, peace can seem even more elusive. Mistrust, revenge, short-term self-interest, chaos and destruction become the order of the day. Promoting and sustaining peace is a formidable challenge for the 21st century. A sustainable peace process is much more than just an agreement. It requires long-term commitment from the leadership and the people alike. All sectors of society have an imperative role to play.

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However, efforts to promote peace are necessarily complex, mirroring the complexities of conflict itself. The causes of conflict are diverse, multifaceted, multidimensional and change over time, and involve a variety of actors, perceptions and agendas. Consequently, peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the structural conditions, attitudes and modes of political behaviour that may permit peaceful, stable and ultimately prosperous socioeconomic development, are of utmost importance for the sustenance of peace between Palestinians and Israelis. By and large, the relationship between communities divided by violent conflict is usually damaged and extremely precarious, with high levels of mistrust and anger over past atrocities. It is only through dialogue initiatives that one can generate a sense of common purpose, thus enabling the parties involved to see their conflict in new ways and influence their constituencies accordingly. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a protracted conflict that requires a political solution, because it is neither a humanitarian conflict nor a security conflict. Every party in the conflict believes in the two-state solution, however, the problem lies in the mindset of the leaders. Violence in Palestine stemmed from decades of oppression, occupation and humiliation by Israel. The Palestinians have been systematically subject to extreme and inhumane policies that render their lives impossible. Movement restrictions, confiscation of land, detentions, killings, destruction of property, building settlements and separation walls, among other factors, have made many people desperate and angry. The Palestinian people have, for more than four decades under Israeli military occupation, been deprived of their right to self-determination and sovereignty over their land and have repeatedly been subjected to displacement, destruction, collective punishment (including a detrimental blockade), and violation of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, as well as constant affronts to their human dignity and security. In addition, today more than half of the Palestinian people exist as a stateless people, living as refugees, deprived of their right to return for more than six decades. There have been countless attempts by the Palestinian people and its leadership to appeal to the international community to uphold justice, to hold Israel accountable for its violations, and to implement resolutions of international legitimacy. Despite all efforts, the international community, including

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the United Nations and other international organizations, has failed to implement its resolutions, fostering a culture of impunity that has enabled Israel to persist with its extreme policies against our people. Statistics and data have been documented by fact-finding commissions and other UN bodies, producing papers including the “Goldstone Report”, yet nothing has been done to bring an end to injustice and occupation. Israel continues with its flagrant policies of destruction and breaching international law and principles that govern the civilized world. Israel is not above international law and must not be allowed to be treated as such. However, beyond ideology, racism, extremism and militarization, a negotiated peaceful settlement is the only solution. Rather than indulging in the negation of the other, each side must engage in the process of rehumanizing the other. It is evident by now that there is no military solution and there never will be. The tragic irony lies in the fact that the solution is painfully obvious to all parties involved. Unfortunately, the absence of the political will, the dominance of opportunism, the rise of ideological extremism and the absence of foreign/global policies and the legacy of disastrous regional realities have all combined to prevent its implementation. The price continues to be heavy: more human suffering and loss of lives. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict cannot end with a win-lose situation, and it cannot be brought to a close through sheer force. Peace is not a lost cause. Withdrawal to pre-28 September 2000 lines will help alleviate the climate of frustration and anger in the Palestinian territories and facilitate a return to normal life. Rebuilding the destroyed Palestinian economy, reforming institutions and improving the situation on the ground must be carried out at the same time. Any peace plan without a road map and international commitment to implement it, will lead nowhere. There is no question that Palestinians and Israelis desperately need a meaningful third-party intervention to make enough visible changes on the ground. The two-state solution is continuously being threatened by Israel’s incessant settlement construction and the so-called Security Wall, designed to imprison the entire Palestinian population. The solution’s realization of freedom and independence continues to be threatened. Today the Road Map as presented by the Quartet is the only international option, compounded with the recent proximity talks which represent a win-

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dow of opportunity to break the political stalemate and induce the parties involved in the conflict to engage once again in a political process that has long been oblivious. The Road Map to date contains too many incremental steps that rely on each other before the implementation of significant compromise on the part of Israel. In a workable document, each stage should lead to the betterment of the living and economic conditions of both peoples, thus emphasizing a cooperative spirit, not one based on force or domination. Both parties must embark on the Road Map process by agreeing to stop the use of violence and to end the Israeli occupation in areas A (full Palestinian control) and B (full Palestinian civil control and joint Palestinian-Israeli security control), and to stop all Israeli measures that impede the freedom of movement and ordinary lives of Palestinians. Both parties should refrain from any activities that will prejudice the final conclusion talks, including Israeli settlement activities. The Quartet Committee should work out a detailed plan for simultaneous operations to end the Israeli security presence in the Palestinian Authority areas and Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement, and to allow the Palestinian security apparatus to reshoulder its responsibility in those areas. This mechanism should facilitate the ending of both Palestinian violence and Israeli military incursions and attacks, including assassinations, arrests and home demolitions. Israel must undertake the necessary steps for a total settlement freeze and later dismantlement, and this process should be monitored by the Quartet or another party commissioned by it. This step and the implementation of an economic revitalization package for Palestinians will function as a public incentive for support of the road map. No diplomatic initiative can take hold as long as Palestinian unemployment remains so high. While the road map does stipulate the reopening of Palestinian Jerusalem institutions closed by Israel, it makes no mention of the thousands of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. As in any conflict, good faith and recognition that this conflict is coming to an end would require a gradual prisoner release. The vast numbers of prisoners are often overlooked as a source of antagonism between the two sides and their release would do much to ease the transition away from conflict to peace.

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We do not need another Mitchell Report – accepted in theory but negotiated by Israel, where the peace process has proven long on process but short on peace. The Palestinians are willing to do their share, and have already started with their political reforms that should bring about transparency, accountability and good governance. We have a prime minister who is trying hard to convince militant opposition groups that violence only serves Israel’s political interest. Israel now has the most extreme right-wing government in its history. Many ministers have publicly opposed the very purpose of Palestinian freedom and independence. Some cabinet ministers advocate the “ethnic transfer” of the Palestinian population. Consequently, Palestinians need outside help, including compulsory arbitration to stop the bloodshed. It is by now self-evident that lasting peace in the Middle East can only be attained with the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. This is compounded by a secured Israel, recognized as a legitimate entity in the Middle East region. This is the core issue. Issues such as personal security, regional cooperation, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are only the symptoms, not the cause. Both sides must learn lessons from past experiences, draw conclusions, and focus the energy of their think tanks, strategic thinkers, and security establishments towards doing the preparatory work and to wait for the appropriate time when negotiations will be relaunched. The Israelis need to come to understand that they have a responsible and reliable partner for peace, i.e. the Palestinian Authority headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.

Recommendations from Breakdown to Breakthrough (1) The role of intellectuals in processes of change and major political crises is of great importance. Whereas no one can deny the responsibility of such groups in generating extreme nationalism, chauvinism and xenophobic feelings among the masses, the existence of a vibrant civil society can become a major vehicle for advancing democratic values. A commonality of concerns has induced not just a few colleagues to become part of an embryonic, epistemic community, which is likely to continue working together with the goal of strengthening both human rights and democracy. Academics in both socie-

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ties overwhelmingly adhere to these principles as a necessary condition for their societies and their professional freedom. (2) The need to focus on peacebuilding by civil society as a complement to peacemaking by the leaders involved in the Arab-Israeli peace process has dramatically become more obvious than ever. (3) In the pursuit of peace, the “establishments” of the countries in the region need to find stronger sources of support that will generate a true majority among the populations. In order to increase the legitimacy of the peace process, it is essential to identify and analyze the arguments and the true feelings that arouse hostile reactions to the peace process. In a dialogue with antagonistic individuals and groups within the academic communities, this may result in the development of relevant and constructive lines of argument and discourse. A pragmatic understanding of the irreversiblility of the process may lead current opponents to find new ways to come to terms with it as the only feasible option; if not a win-win solution, at least it may be accepted as the lesser evil by a large majority. The role of civil society as a provider of intermediate structures with a high degree of legitimacy may be of utmost importance. (4) There is no purpose in stressing symmetrical trends in the two societies, rather, there is a need to understand both sides. The consolidation of the peace process and the possible repercussions of this dramatic event call for a sustained effort to study, understand and act in new circumstances in a creative and constructive fashion within the university communities throughout the region. How far the resistance to the process can be diminished by more systematic involvement – working together, separately or a combination of the two – needs to be further assessed. The need to identify the main political sources of opposition implies not only isolating and controlling the violent religious groups and instigators, but also trying to address the sources of opposition to the peace process among secular intellectuals. (5) In addition to the importance of policy-relevant work and impact at the grass roots level, peace oriented activities among the Israeli and Palestinian civil society currently involve only a small fraction of the total potential of such interactions. In a way we can speak about a “sectorial peace,” which can be a cumulative process in the search for common ground based on shared values and interests. Efforts such as “People to People” can be multiplied to include professional organizations (psychologists, architects, social workers,

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lawyers, etc.); youth leaders, women, and other charitable associations, educators, and so forth. (6) One of the main challenges is to take advantage of the large adherence within both civil societies to the principles of democracy and extend it to the advocacy of peace based on an historic compromise. The level of frustration, primarily on the Palestinian side, has generated often indiscriminate antagonism towards Israelis as a whole. Hence, there has been a reluctance to cooperate. On the Jewish side, the widespread ability to continue with “business as usual” by either denial or just obliviousness to the suffering of the other side makes it very difficult to reach out to individuals and groups and persuade them to enhance their commitment to peace-oriented action. In both cases, these and other obstacles seem to confine cooperation to a rather limited but nevertheless meaningful effort. (7) Political scientists often correlate democracy with peace, however, if this is proven, then in the short run, one can anticipate peace and democracy in the Middle East to take root. Democracy will come slowly to the Middle East, the forms and procedures appearing well before the beliefs and values that support them. Most of the emerging democracies are hybrids, mixing elements of authoritarianism and newer elements of democracy. (8) In the near future, one anticipates social changes attendant on economic development in the Middle East, continue to push for liberalization. Moreover, international pressures to democratize are likely to continue, and existing regimes may have no choice but to accept these changes, because the costs of economic adjustment will have a direct impact on their political power and legitimacy. (9) The potential effects of democratization on the peace process are unclear and distorted, because the ruling elites and the upper class in the Middle East are at best unwilling converts to democracy. Consequently, any emerging democratic entity in the Middle East will be fragile and incomplete. Finally, I believe that democracy may not succeed in the Middle East, but the risks of failure are well worth taking.

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The optimum way of moving forward For Palestinians to move forward as a result of Israeli procrastination in the peace process, several strategic objectives are formulated to be the guiding principles. However, to implement these strategic objectives, an action plan should be drawn up, prioritizing our political discourse: (1) Action to promote Palestinian national unity, national reconciliation, power-sharing, and reform of the PLO. (2) Action to formulate coordinated goals and tools. (3) Action to mobilize and empower the Palestinian people. (4) Action to elicit regional and international support. (5) Eliciting third party support. (6) Never give up national non-violent resistance. In order to implement the above, we have to set our prerequisites: (a) The requirement of a new discourse. (b) The requirement of national unity. (c) The requirement of strategic thinking. Several scenarios are acceptable to Palestinians: (a) A negotiated two-state solution. (b) A one-state solution (bi-national or unitary democratic). (c) An interim U.N. Trusteeship. Scenarios not acceptable to the Palestinians are: (a) The continuation of the status quo plus. (b) A pseudo state of Palestine. (c) A unilateral Israeli separation. (d) An Egyptian/Jordanian trusteeship. It needs to be understood that Palestinians cannot be fooled for long that Israel is willing to negotiate a two-state solution, and that Israel will have to decide whether or not to accept the time-limited negotiation offer that is evidently in its own best interest. And we Palestinians will then act accordingly at a time

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and in a way of our own choosing. We are steadfast and determined to never give up our national struggle for justice, freedom and independence. To conclude, in the UN Millennium Declaration world leaders agreed on the collective responsibility “to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level” and their duty “to all the world’s people, especially the most vulnerable”.1 Palestine must not be the exception. The international community must continue to support the cause of the Palestinian people to bring an end to the occupation and to realize their right to self-determination and freedom. The world has come to realize that it is these rights which are prerequisites for peace and stability. As we solemnly reflect on the passage of sixty-two years since Al-Nakba and the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, we appeal to the international community to redouble efforts to support and advance the peace process towards the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the question of Palestine in all its aspects, including a just solution to the plight of the Palestine refugee on the basis of Resolution 194 (III). The Palestine refugees continue to look to their leadership and to the international community to bring an end to their misery, exile, and hardship and to fulfil their longing for the stability, peace and justice they have been denied for so long. We should not let them down. In conclusion, if the international community does not play a positive role in creating an independent, viable Palestinian state, and create the conditions that are beneficial to the Palestinians economically, politically and in terms of security, nothing will move forward. More bloodshed and violent turmoil will take place, because Palestinians would then be acting out of desperation if they had nothing left except the struggle for their existence against occupation. If there is political will amongst the international community, Israel and the US, there is a chance to revive the Road Map, remove the Apartheid Wall, and evacuate the settlements. The international community must press Israel to face the reality that there is no military solution, and that it cannot have land, peace and security all at the same time. ............................................ 1

http://www.un.org/millenium/declaration/ares552.htm

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The situation today is not perfect. But it never has been, and it never will be. We need the help of the global community. So let us take up our roles in finding the solutions, and perhaps someday, we will achieve lasting peace.

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DAVID M ENASHRI

Iran, Political Islam and Israel1

The Islamic Revolution was a major turning point in Iranian modern history, representing a dramatic change in its domestic landscape and momentous change in its foreign outlook. The dichotomy that characterizes Iran’s recent politics is best exemplified in the distinctive visions of its two leading figures of the last generation – Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979) and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1979–1989). By all accounts, Khomeini’s worldview was the antithesis of the Shah’s ideology. The latter’s attachment to the legacy of Cyrus the Great gave way to a return to the traditions of Imam ’Ali. While the Shah sought to galvanize loyalty to the monarchy and to Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage, the Islamic Republic has based its policies on strict adherence to Islamic dogma. Westernization and close ties with the United States was to be replaced with Islamization and hatred towards the West. Similarly Israel, the Shah’s strategic ally, has turned into its arch enemy. True, upon assuming power and facing the complex demands of governance, the new regime was gradually forced to adapt itself to the newly emerging realities, adopting more pragmatic policies in a growing number of areas. With very few exceptions, whenever ideological convictions clashed with Iran’s state interests – as interpreted by the ruling clerical elite – national interests triumphed over dogma. The attitude to Israel, however, remains one of the very few areas in which Iran’s policy remained excessively uncompromising. In the view of the Islamic regime, Israel remained the enemy of Iran and Islam, and a threat to mankind. The revolutionary goal was unequivocal: “Israel should be eliminated.” Iran has thus become the main security threat facing Israel, even viewed by Israeli leaders as no less than an “existential threat.” ............................................ 1

This article is based on my paper “Iran, Israel and the Middle East Conflict”, Israel Affairs 12, no. 1 (2006), pp. 107–122. For an analysis of the issues discussed here, in the wider framework of Iranian politics, see my book Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power, London: Frank Cass, 2001, mainly pp. 261–304.

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The possible combination of radical ideology and weapons of mass destruction is the root cause of Israeli concern. Iran’s support for the Islamist movements (Hizballah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad); its opposition to the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors; and the growing extremism under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have added to Israeli anxiety. Mutual delegitimization and demonization have therefore typified their attitude to each other. This paper explores the attitudes expressed by Iranian politicians, polemicists and intellectuals toward Israel, attempting to delineate the ideological concepts and the political considerations leading to such hostility. It will also discuss, albeit briefly, the Israeli anti-Iranian stance, its roots and its public expressions.

Ideological considerations and pragmatic incentives for Iranian hostility Iran and Israel do not share common borders, have had no wars with one another and have no territorial claims of their own against each other. Under the Pahlavi monarchy, mainly since the 1960s, they had close ties, in fact a strategic alliance. Although even then their relations were not formal, they gradually developed what one Iranian official at the time described to me as “relations of love without a marriage contract.” Iran is Shi’i and Persian – in a region predominantly Sunni and largely Arab – with history rich in hostility with its Muslim neighbors. Thus, while seeking close ties with the West and striving for rapid modernization, Mohammad Reza Shah viewed Israel as a natural ally. Israel, then searching for legitimacy in the Muslim world for its newly established state, viewed Iran as an ideal ally. Its first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion developed in the 1950s the concept of “the peripheral states”2, prescribing that, in the absence of relations with its immediate neighbors, Israel should seek the friendship of “the neighbors of the neighbour” – not to say: the enemy of the enemy. Conse............................................ 2

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Itamar Rabinovich, Jehuda Reinharz (eds.), Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics and Foreign Relations: 1948-present, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 196.

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quently, firm ties were established between Israel and Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia. Iran was viewed as an especially important country due to its strategic location, size and economic potential; it is a Muslim (but not Arab) state; and it seemed to have no reason for conflict with Israel. This period of close ties had come to an abrupt end with the ascendancy of the Islamic regime in 1979. Among all the countries found blameworthy by the revolutionary movement, Israel was indicted on more counts than any other state. Moreover, Iran’s Islamic arguments have put the Arab-Israeli conflict on a totally different footing – a religious crusade rather than a political-national conflict. Its involvement in Lebanon and its moral, political and logistical support for Islamist movements (Hamas, Hizballah and Islamic Jihad) made it more directly involved around Israel’s borders in recent years. Its attempts (actual or alleged) to develop weapons of mass destruction, along with the missile technology to deliver them, were viewed as another serious challenge by Israel. Ideologically, Iran’s rejection of Israel’s right to exist was unequivocal and uncompromising. It was repeatedly stressed by Ayatollah Khomeini prior to the revolution and has continued ever since. Leading revolutionary figures have repeatedly stressed the issue in their public statements, making it one of their main banners. Iran’s attitude reflects a deep sense of religious mission, identification with the Palestinian problem and opposition to Israel and to its policies. Iran also worked “to Islamize” the Arab-Israeli conflict, stressing the religious obligation of all Muslims to struggle for Palestine. Iran viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict as involving two diametrically opposed powers – righteousness versus falsehood – between which no compromise was possible. It was, therefore, a “religious duty” to confront it. Animosity towards Islam and hostility to Iran were thus interrelated, as was the rejection of Israel for its own demerits, for serving imperialism, and for its anti-Iranian policy. In fact, Israel was viewed as standing behind any sinister scheme. Its close relations with the Shah were also held against it and Iranian charges were also linked with deep anti-imperialist sentiments. The US antiIranian policy (such as “dual containment” and the more recent sanctions) was mostly attributed to Israel, Zionism and Jewish capitalism. In this case, they

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believed, it was “the tail that wagged the dog.”3 In the early days of the revolution Ayatollah Hosein ’Ali Montazeri typically said that Zionism was a continuation of the same Jewish racism that had existed in ancient times: Zionists today are equivalent to the Jews of the past and vice versa.4 The Zionist regime is “a microbe that has inflicted disease on the region,” wrote the conservative Jomhuri-ye Islami in 1999, adding that there was no solution for this pariah state, but its “dismantling” and “the return of the terrorists” that had established it to the places from where they “had been provoked to conquer Palestine.”5 Finally, according to Islam, Jews could be a tolerated minority under Islamic rule, but what has happened since the foundation of Israel in 1948, and mainly since the 1967 war, is that instead there have been many Muslims living under Jewish control. This is ideologically unacceptable for Iran. With its hostile posture toward Israel rooted in revolutionary dogma, Tehran saw no sufficient pragmatic considerations to incite a retreat. Viewing itself as the major foe of “America’s unlawful son” (Israel), it felt obliged to resist any initiative aimed at legitimizing its existence. Iran also viewed the success of the Islamists as a tribute to its revolution, a manifestation of the spread of its influence and evidence of Iran’s regional centrality. Leadership of the anti-Israel camp could also enhance its credentials as a major Islamic power. Having consistently supported the Islamists’ struggle, abandoning them could harm its regional plans. No less important, all these benefits were gained for a relatively low political price. Therefore, in essence, revolutionary interest seemed to reinforce the hostile attitude rather than balancing it – as was the case in many other policy areas. Although the main domestic currents (broadly termed as reformists and conservatives) expressed confidence in the justice of the revolutionary stance, over time signs of a more diversified tone in the approach of several Iranians have emerged, even on this delicate question. Milder expressions were infrequent, were usually voiced by people with no official standing, and were customarily coupled with considerable reservations. Yet, they revealed some cracks in the hitherto fortified front against Israel. These views have been ............................................ 3

Tehran Times, September 25, 1994 – Daily Report (DR), Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], September 30, 1994.

4

Ettela’at, December 29, 1979.

5

Jomhuri-ye Islami, January 14, 1999.

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voiced mainly since the collapse of the USSR, continued with the Madrid Conference (1991) and the Oslo Process (1993), and following the election of President Mohammad Khatami (1997), before they were suppressed. Khatami’s policy of détente and his plea for dialogue between civilizations bore some fruit. Consequently, as a Tehran University professor observed, some Iranians have made “conscious adjustments to the reality of regional politics.”6 To be sure, Khatami himself did not spare criticism in speaking on the question of Israel, and often used extremely harsh terms to denounce it. Thus, at the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) summit in Tehran (December 1997), he censored “the hegemonic, racist, aggressive and violent nature” of Israel, as manifested in its “systematic and gross violation of international law, pursuit of state terrorism and development of weapons of mass destruction”, which “seriously threatens peace and security in the region.”7 Yet, he also implied that Iran will not disrupt a just agreement reached between Israel and the Palestinians, although he believed that this was highly unlikely. Still, from time to time, relatively moderate views were also expressed, signaling a measure of change in some segments in Iran. Given Iran’s own difficulties, its limited power and that the Palestinians were negotiating then with Israel, some Iranians doubted the advisability of being “more Palestinian than the Palestinians.” Some also acknowledged that the international realities – following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1991 Gulf War – worked to Israel’s advantage and that, regardless of revolutionary slogans, Israel could not be annihilated. Tehran University Prof. Ahmad Naqibzadeh thus pointed out: We chant “Israel should be eliminated,” but is this at all practical? If the Palestinians decide to make peace with Israel, no other state should condemn them. Iran, Naqibzadeh noted, using a well-known Persian phrase, should not be “a bowl that is warmer than the soup” – more Palestinian than the Palestinians.8 Answering charges against him at his trial (1999), Abdollah Nuri (Khatami’s first interior minister) said that Yasser Arafat had fought Israel all his life, but entered negotiating with it. Why should Iran claim the right to impose its own views on the Palestinians? The current situation may not be ideal, but Iran ............................................ 6

Saide Lotfian, “Iran’s Middle East Policies Under President Khatami”, Iranian Journal of International Affairs 4, no. 4 (1998/99), pp. 429–30.

7

Islamic Republic News Agency [IRNA], December 9, 1997.

8

Faslnameh-ye Khavarmiyaneh 1, no.1 (1994), pp. 11, 24, 31–35.

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must come to terms with realities, and avoid being “a bowl warmer than the soup.”9 Limited as such arguments were, they represented a more nuanced attitude. For more and more Iranians, the main problem seemed to be the domestic situation and Iran’s own troubled neighborhood. Israel is a faraway country, but official Iran has made it a major enemy. In fact, real power is in the hands of the conservatives, who continue to uphold the initial revolutionary credo: “Death to Israel.” For all practical purposes, they dictated Iran’s politics. The tone voiced by the conservatives remained harsh. Typically, Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i vowed that Iran will not recognize Israel “even for one hour” and will “continue to struggle against this cancerous growth.”10 Two main developments in 2000 – the offensive against the reform camp (spring) and the Palestinian (second) Intifada (fall) – led to further extremism. The American “war against terrorism” following 11 September 2001 and the wars in Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003), and the election of Ahmadinejad (in 2005 and again in 2009) influenced events in the same direction, as did the Israeli wars in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2009). Ayatollah Khamene’i elaborated his approach shortly after the outbreak of the Intifada. Depicting Israel as a “racist regime”, established to “prevent the Islamic world from enjoying any unity, honour and integrity.” The only “remedy” for the malaise spread by Israel, he said, was “to destroy the root and cause of the crisis” – the Zionist regime. Palestinian refugees should return to their homeland, then the “original people of Palestine” – Muslims, who enjoy “absolute majority” and the small numbers of Jews and Christians who lived there before 1948 – should “stage a referendum” to decide their preference.11 Former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani combined the fierce attack on Israel with accusations against the US of creating an abnormal entity, in order to divide the Muslim states, also calling for the return of the refugees and conducting a referendum.12 On Qods [Jerusalem] Day, on 14 January 2001, he warned that if Muslims would possess nuclear weapons, the attitude of global ............................................ 9

Abdollah Nuri, Showkaran-e Eslah [Hemlock For Advocate of Reform], Tehran: Tarh-e Now, 1999, pp. 144–51.

10 Tehran Television, May 2, 1998. 11 R. Tehran, October 20, 2000. See, also his statement in Reuters, December 15, 2000. 12 R. Tehran, October 27, 2000; R. Tehran, January 19, 2001; IRNA, May 11, 2001.

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arrogance would have to change. He added that “the use of even one nuclear bomb in Israel will destroy everything,” while a similar attack by Israel on Muslims will not have similar results.13 Khatami made clear again that his moderate tone did not encompass the attitude towards Israel. It is surprising, he said, that some people still believe that they can compromise with the Israeli usurper and oppressive regime. Peace would only be restored, he added, if the tyrant were not supported and the oppressed not suppressed.14 The events following September 11th and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had a significant impact on Iran’s growing animosity towards the US as well as against Israel. Iranians also believed that Israel was behind the American move to include Iran in its list of “Axis of Evil” states (January 2002) and that the war in Iraq also aimed to serve its interests. Israel, they maintained, was also behind adamant American criticism of Iran and its demand for regime change in Iran. Israel for its part did not hide its attempts to inflame anti-Iranian sentiments in Washington and worldwide. It publicized intelligence of Iran’s support of radical movements and its nuclear programs (see below).

The Ahmadinejad factor: The allure of extremism Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005 led to further radicalization of Iranian policy, with a harsh tone concerning Israel and the issues of greatest concern for Iran – its quest for nuclear energy, support for Islamism, as well as his inflammatory statements regarding the Holocaust. On 26 October 2005, shortly after entering office, Ahmadinejad stated that, in line with Khomeini’s creed, Israel should be wiped off the map of the universe. The Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, he claimed, was one stage in the historical war between the forces of arrogance (West) and righteousness (Islam). Asking rhetorically if it is feasible “to foresee a world without America and Zionism,” he rushed to answer: It is possible and attainable.15 In the ICO summit in Mecca (8 December 2005), he moved on to touch on the Holocaust. ............................................ 13 R. Tehran, Agence France Presse [AFP], December 14; Iran News and Kayhan, December 15, 2001. 14 IRNA, October 4, 2000. 15 Iranian Students News Agency [ISNA], October 26, 2005.

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Rejecting the claim “that Hitler killed millions of innocent Jews in gas chambers,” he suggested that, if it was true, the Europeans “should give some of their provinces in Europe – like in Germany, Austria or other countries – to the Zionists” to establish their homeland there. If the Europeans have committed such a crime, why should the Palestinians “pay for it?”16 On 15 December, he went further in endorsing arguments raised by Holocaust deniers: They have invented “a legend” under the name “Massacre of the Jews,” which they hold higher than God, religion and the prophets, using it as a pretext to “impose a phony Zionist regime” on the region.17 Later, on 20 February 2008, he went on to reveal his contempt of Israel and all that it represents: “World powers have created a black and dirty microbe named the Zionist regime and have unleashed it like a savage animal on the nations of the region.”18 In 2006 Ahmadinejad announced a Holocaust cartoon contest and a conference on the Holocaust, to take place in Tehran in December. Championing traditional anti-Semitic stereotypes, the cartoons and the paper presented ranged from suggestions that the Nazis themselves faked the deaths of Jews, to portrayals of the West and specifically Israel’s exploitation of the Holocaust to justify brutality in the Middle East. Hand in hand with this, a proliferation of supposedly academic studies about the Holocaust has mushroomed in Iran. One such book authored by Mohammad Taghi Taghipour, Beyond the Holocaust Scene, was published by the Tehran-based Political Science & Research Institute (PSRI).19 The book promises to expose in an “academic and documented” study the Zionists’ false claims on the Holocaust (pp. 7–8). There was no Nazi scheme to eliminate Jews, it claims, and recent documents show that there were no gas chambers in the Third Reich (pp. 95–96). All available documents confirm that the “Holocaust” is “one big historical lie” created by worldwide Zionism to advance its political goal of a Jewish State, it continues. The Historical Studies Quarterly published by PSRI devoted its Fall 2006 edition to the Holocaust. Among its ............................................ 16 The Guardian, December 9, 2005; CNN, December 14, 005. 17 The Middle East Media Research Institute [MEMRI], December 15, 2006. 18 AFP, February 20, 2008. 19 Mohammad Taghi Taghipour, Pas Pardeh-e Holocaust [Behind the Holocaust Curtain], Tehran: Mo’assessehe-e Motalle ’at va-Pezhuheshhaye Siyasi, 2006/7.

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articles were: “Did 6 million Really Die?” and “Truth Burning Furnaces.”20 Seyyed Mohammad Tarahi is the author of another book on the Holocaust, published by The Center for Islamic Revolution Documents under the title The Place of Holocaust in the Zionism Project (myth or reality). It maintains that the Holocaust was an instrument or legend, developed to justify the creation of Israel.21 Translations of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion were also published, along with articles in newspapers, TV programs and TV series, all raising similar points. The immediate explanation for such harsh statements against Israel by Ahmadinejad and like-minded Iranians could be a sincere belief in the need to eliminate Israel. The American complication in Iraq and the growing income from oil may have contributed to a perceived sense of strength. Given growing disillusionment and disenchantment at home, diverting attention away from economic issues toward an external and distant enemy may have also been seen as serving to mollify public opinion. Also, Ahmadinejad may have expected to promote Iran’s leadership position in the Islamic world by taking the lead in supporting the Palestinian cause. No less important, whether consciously or not, such declarations may be intended to transform Iran’s nuclear program into an Israeli problem. Another explanation may lie in the mystical belief in a divine mission and heavenly oversight which seem to characterize Ahmadinejad’s attitude. There is a belief that wiping out Israel from the map is not only attainable, but unavoidable. The president’s senior media adviser, Ali Akbar Javanfekr expressed the belief in 2010 that Israel will not last long. It is “doomed.” He added: “I say this without any animosity but as a statement of fact. The rest of the world demands it, and the United States should separate itself [from Israel] because it can gain nothing from this relationship except more trouble.” As a solution to the Middle East problem Ahmadinejad then suggested the old formula of referendum (see above).22 To Israeli ears, however, this sounded only like a positive phrase to say that Israel, as a Jewish state, should cease to exist. ............................................ 20 Faslnameh-e Motalle’at-e Ta’rikhi, Vizhenameh-e Holocaust 3, no. 14 (2006). 21 Seyyed Mohammad Tarahi, Jaigah-e Holocaust dar Projeh-e Zahionizm (Ostevareh ya vaqe’iyyat), Tehran: Markz Asnad-e Enqelab-e Islami, 2006. 22 Jon Lee Anderson, “Letter from Tehran: After the crackdown”, The New Yorker, August 16, 2010.

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The Iranian menace to Israel has gone beyond ideological rejection and verbal accusations. Jerusalem’s stature as a potent symbol of Islamic solidarity made Iran’s active presence on Israeli borders seem an extremely valuable point of leverage for Iran. In that respect, Hizballah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad were perfect allies. Hizballah has long been the standard-bearer for the Iranian notion of “exporting” the revolution. Iran has supported it morally, ideologically, politically and financially, as well as with military training and equipment. For Iran such ties are important to maintain a strategic stronghold on the Israeli border, as a vanguard of its regional influence and a successful prototype of an Islamic movement. Hizballah embodies the influence of the Iranian revolutionary creed by confronting Israel, remains generally loyal to Iran and recognizes the spiritual authority of Khamene’i. Iran has also gradually developed firm ties with Hamas, to Israel’s south. Hamas provided an additional front for Iran to demonstrate Islamic leadership, an arena for involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and an ally bordering the holy lands. Moreover, Hamas seemed determined to combat Israel and had a better ability and stronger resolve than Hizballah to strike inside Israel. Also, the strengthening of Shi’is in the Islamic axis has tilted the Sunni-Shi’i balance in favor of the latter. True, there are differences between Iraqi and Iranian Shi’is, as well as considerable differences among each of these groups. Clearly, the Shi’is are a small minority in the Muslim world, but the recent elevation of their status in the various states in which they reside, presents a substantial shift in favor of the Shi’is. Iraq is the first Arab state in which Shi’is achieved political dominance; in Lebanon Shi’is represent the largest religious minority and there is a significant Shi’i presence in the Gulf States. That Syria (led by Alawis) is Iran’s strategic ally intensifies this sense of Iranian-Shi’i empowerment. With this concern in mind, Jordan’s King Abdullah coined the term “Shi’i Crescent” in reference to the new realities in the Fertile Crescent, warning that, “if pro-Iran parties or politicians dominate the new Iraqi government,” a “new [Shi’i] crescent” stretching from Iran into Iraq, Syria and Lebanon could emerge, alter the traditional balance of power between the two Islamic sects and pose challenges to the US and its allies.23 On his part, Egyp............................................ 23 The Washington Post, December 8, 2004; The Guardian, January 27, 2005.

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tian President Hosni Mubarak implied that some Shi’is in Arab lands might be more faithful to Iran than to their own countries.24 Israel, for its part, consistently stressed the danger posed by Iran to itself and to the free world. Much as in Iran, this was one of the rare issues on which there seemed to be no major difference between the main political parties in Israel. If there were differences in Israeli attitudes, they represented personal and institutional disagreements within the government agencies, rather than dividing across political lines. In the 1980s, still, the “Iranian threat” did not engage special Israeli attention. Iran’s distance from Israel’s borders, its preoccupation with domestic difficulties, and – most importantly – its long war with Iraq, made the “Iranian threat” be viewed as mostly rhetorical. In the mid-1980s, Israel was even involved in arms deals with Iran. This did not mean that Israel remained indifferent to the Iranian challenge. In fact, it has continuously stressed the threat, censoring the Islamic regime and castigating, among others, its attempts to “export” the revolution and particularly its engagement in Lebanon. However, following the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War (in 1988), and particularly after the 1991 Gulf War, Israel urged that the “Iran issue” remain high on the world’s agenda. The European policy of “critical dialogue” and a possible softening of the American attitude alarmed Israel. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin missed no opportunity in stressing the “Iranian danger,” censuring its “dark regime” and the “turbid Islamic wave” that it generated, blaming Iran for acts of terrorism and presenting it as a major threat to the free world. He seemed mainly concerned with Iran’s nuclear and missile program, its anti-peace policy, its engagement in Lebanon and the growing terror activities, which he attributed to a large extent to Iranian influence. His close ties with the White House were used to pressure Washington to harden its attitude towards Iran. The policy of “dual containment” and the subsequent American sanctions against Iran were in line with Israeli policy. By and large, all subsequent Israeli governments shared such concerns and policies. Israel did not rest content with stressing the threat, but also made occasional warnings of its own directed at Tehran. On 20 January 1993, Knesset ............................................ 24 Al Jazeera Net, April 16, 2006.

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(Parliament) Member Ephraim Sneh stressed three elements that combined to make Iran “a threat to Israel and the region”: its ideology, its expansionism and its armament. He urged the Knesset to put “the Iranian danger, mainly that of nuclear power [high] on its agenda.”25 When Israel received the F-15-I attack jet fighters in 1998, its media stressed that their range would suffice to reach Iran.26 Sneh even called then for a building up of the capability to execute a preemptive strike to foil Iran’s ability to hit Israel with nuclear weapons.27 Iran responded by mocking such Israeli threats, but it could not completely disregard them. “On the whole,” Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani said in 1999, Israel was still the “the major source of threat” for Iran.28

Conclusions In the 31 years of the Islamic Republic, there have been significant deviations from the revolutionary dogma and adoption of a more pragmatic policy by the new regime. The revolution has matured, recognizing the limits of its power and allowing greater room for national-pragmatic considerations in shaping policy, in a growing number of areas. All this has not yet led to any significant change in Iran’s attitude to Israel. All in all, animosity towards Israel has remained one of the main issues over which there seem to be considerable agreement within the core competing camps – conservatives and reformists. The anti-Israeli banner has remained high in government pronouncements, although some relatively mild statements have been made from time to time. Yet, voices of moderation have lacked the power to lead to a policy change. The conservatives, who control the levers of decision making, may have been capable of producing change, but they seem so far unwilling to take such a bold step. In recent years, the Israeli – in fact, the world’s – attention has been focused on the Iranian nuclear program, which Israel views as an “existential threat.” The growing domestic resentment and the new rounds of sanctions have ............................................ 25 Proceedings of the Knesset, January 20, 1993. 26 Ha’aretz, January 20, 1998. 27 Ma’ariv and Yediot Aharonot, September 27, 1998. 28 Discourse 1, no. 1 (1999), p. 25.

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proven so far insufficient in convincing Iran to modify its nuclear policy. Meanwhile, as the world watches the struggle of the reform-minded “green movement” and their forceful oppression, Iran’s nuclear clock continues ticking. Notwithstanding all other challenges emanating from Iranian anti-Israeli politics, this remains Israel’s main concern.

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Iran Facing Israel

The current relations, perception and attitude of Iran regarding Israel are different from other Middle Eastern countries for three main reasons: • it is well known that the Iranian Jewish population has played an important role in the social, cultural and religious history of the country; • the Jewish Iranian community – about 20,000 people1 – is the largest in the Middle East outside Israel; • the modern state of Israel has become a major ideological tool in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under the imperial regime and under the Islamic Republic as well, Iran had an ambiguous and complex relationship with the state of Israel, which is not exactly a “foreign” country and plays a role in the internal political life of Iran. Ideology and the national interest of Iran were often contradictory. Thus, the Iranian policy towards Israel should be analyzed at the same time according to roots of cultural Persian/Iranian history, to the socio-political life of the Iranian Jews, and to the international relations of Iran. Regarding the geopolitical issues of the current hostile policy of the Islamic regime of Tehran, the question is even more complex since we should also deal with the three main levels of current Iranian policy: local/national, Islamist/regional and global/international. Is Iran a strategic, existential threat for Israel? To get a better understanding of this very important and controversial question, and open the way to possible answers, it would be useful to see how Israel is seen by Iran: as a strategic or tactical threat, as a potential strategic partner facing the Sunni Arab world? The new nuclear and missile capacities of Iran give to this “academic” debate a dramatic and vital dimension. ............................................ 1

The National Census of 2006 officially recorded 12,724 individuals, now mainly living in Tehran and Shiraz.

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Iran and the Jews: a very long history In ancient times, Jews were living on the Iranian plateau with Indo-European (Iranian) populations. This country is often mentioned in the Bible.2 The shrine of Prophet Daniel is today a major “imamzadeh” in Susa visited by thousands of Muslim pilgrims, as well as the tomb of Esther and Mordechai in Hamadan. The memory of Cyrus freeing the Jews detained in Babylon in 538 BC remains even now the symbol of this strong, friendly, common history. Jews are indigenous to Iran: along with the Zoroastrians and Christians they were, before and after Islam, one of the major religious communities of this country. Before becoming the new capital city of Persia under the Safavids (XVIth c.), Esfahan was a large Jewish settlement.3 Under Islamic rule, the Iranian Jews had to live according to the traditional status of Dhimmis, of a “protected” minority, with ups and downs according to local and international crises. When Islam became more formally the religion of the king under the Mongols, the Jews, as well as the Christians and Zoroastrians, faced forced conversions and massacres. This dramatic situation occurred again in the XVIth c. when Iran became a Shi’a state, but the majority of the Jews kept their cultural identity and faith, and continued to be very appreciated for their contribution to Persian culture, especially to music. For centuries, the Jewish community of Iran enjoyed a relatively good status, perhaps because of the existence in the same cities and villages of numerous Christian and Zoroastrian communities. This strong oriental Jewish community was “discovered” in the XIXth c. when numerous European travellers and diplomatic envoys began visiting Persia, the old but weak state, between the Ottoman, Russian and British empires (India). Along with the Christian communities supported early on by foreign missionaries, the Iranian Jews were soon taken into consideration by European countries, especially France. The French Minister Isaac Adolphe Crémieux, who granted French citizenship to the Jews of Algeria in 1870, was very concerned by the Alliance Israélite Universelle and Jews in the Muslim ............................................ 2

About the history of the Jews in Iran until 1950: Habib Levy et al., Comprehensive History of the Jews in Iran: The Outset of the Diaspora, Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999.

3

Xavier de Planhol, Minorités en Islam. Géographie politique et sociale, Paris: Flammarion, 1997, p. 211.

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World including Iran.4 He signed an agreement with Nasser ed-Din Shah during his visit to France in 1873.5 The schools of the Alliance became one of the main institutions giving a “modern” education in Iran, with many pupils coming from the Muslim elite. The first school opened in Tehran in 1898 and others soon followed in Hamadan, Esfahan, Shiraz and Kermanshah. This foreign, “western” or “modern” influence among minorities was the starting point of new conflicts with the Muslim population, the clerics and the rulers of the country. For the first time, Christians and mainly Jews were accused of being connected to “foreign aggression against Islam and Iran”. This situation strengthened, if not created, anti-Semitism under the Qajar dynasty and explains the numerous massacres that occurred in Tabriz, Tehran and Mashhad, and other cities, especially against the “Jadidi”, the Jews recently forced to convert to Islam and accused of secretly remaining Jewish.6 This period of crises was, however, concluded by a historical change in the legal status of the Jews since, for the first time in the Muslim world, the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 recognized the Jews as “citizens” and no longer as “dhimmis”. They were allowed to own shops and to work out of their neighbourhood, even if there was a “ghetto” in Iranian cities. They could also send a representative to the new Parliament (Majles).7 Azizollah Simani, the first Iranian Jew elected as a member of Parliament, soon had to resign because of hostility. However, the Iranian Jewish community entered the XXth c. and the period of development of Zionism in positive legal, political and social conditions. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 was quickly known in Iran, leading to the creation of the Zionist association of Iran. In the 1930s Reza Shah Pahlavi accepted the opening of a branch of the Jewish Agency in Tehran to help the Jews migrate to Palestine, but the number of Iranian migrants was limited before the creation of the State of Israel. ............................................ 4

Avraham Cohen, “Iranian Jewry and the Educational Endeavors of the Alliance Israélite Universelle”, Jewish Social Studies 48, no. 1 (1986), pp. 15–44.

5

Michael M. Laskier, “Aspects of the activities of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in the Jewish communities of the Middle East and North Africa: 1860–1918”, Modern Judaism 3, no. 2 (1983), pp. 147–171.

6

Raphael Patai, Jadīd al-Islam: The Jewish “New Muslims” of Meshhed, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1997.

7

Habib Levy, Comprehensive History of the Jews of Iran: The Outset of the Diaspora, p. 490.

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Iran and the State of Israel After World War II, the situation changed.8 Several factors were inciting the Jews of Iran to migrate: economic conditions were very difficult; the war between the new State of Israel and the Arabs strengthened “traditional” hostility against the Jews; the creation of Israel was a sudden opportunity to find a new life; and last but not least, the Iranian government, as a non-Arab state, was not looking negatively at the new Jewish state. In March 1949, the Iranian government sent an envoy to Israel. This was the starting point of the everlasting question of the “periphery”, of the common interests of the non-Arab states in the region. But Iran is also a Muslim state with Arab neighbours and national interests. So, when Iran needed the help of the Arab states, hostility against Israel was used as a political tool. In July 1951 Mossadegh recalled his envoy to Tel Aviv to get help from Arab countries against the British in the conflict concerning nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. However, Israel remained recognized de facto and the Iranian Jews were allowed to migrate. Several thousand Iranian Jews started migrating to Israel, most of them not due to local anti-Semitism, but for economic and ideological reasons.9 During the reign of Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979), Iranian policy regarding Israel was at least ambiguous. His policy was implemented within the framework of two basic strategic ideas: supporting Israel as a strategic stronghold of the pro-Western bloc against the USSR; and pragmatism as a country wishing to become a strong regional independent state, far from the USA but having long common borders with the USSR and the Arab world. After the coup d’état against Mossadegh (1953), Iranian relations improved in all fields, especially military, intelligence, and security. With the growing power of Nasser and the pro-Soviet influence in the Arab world, including the Palestine movement, the Shah directly supported Israel by providing oil through the Red Sea and not the Suez Canal, with the new Eilat-Bersheva ............................................ 8

About the contemporary history of the Iran-Israel relations the major source is Trita Parsi, Treacherous alliance. The secret dealings of Israel, Iran and the US, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

9

The Foreign Minister of Mossadegh, Hossein Fatemi, played a great role in making this migration possible and not too difficult, when at the same time the Jews were facing very tough situations and were expelled from other Arab states.

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pipeline operational in 1957. After a period of warm relations and numerous visits through Turkey, Israeli companies and technical staff started working in Iran, especially in irrigation and agriculture. Direct flights by El Al linked Tehran and Tel Aviv. In 1958, an Israeli representation office was opened within the Swiss embassy in Tehran, opening the floor to diplomatic recognition, which became almost official – although there was never a formal “embassy” – after the agreement reached in Bern in 1970. After the Six-Day War in 1967, the victory of Israel was seen by the Shah as a new balance of power too much in favour of Israel. He voted for sanctions against Israel at the UN and started resuming relations with Nasser. This shift in Iranian policy urged Prime Minister Golda Meir to go to Iran to limit this pro-Egypt move, considered in Tel Aviv as a strategic threat. This independent Iranian policy was emphasized after the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971, making Iran the “Gendarme of the Gulf ”, a new geopolitical role for the security in the Middle East. When Anwar as-Sadat abandoned the USSR for a pro-Western policy, and when Iraq signed a treaty of cooperation with Moscow in 1972, Baghdad appeared to be the new main enemy of Israel, giving Iran a new strategic role for the security of Israel. But things were not so simple with Tehran. According to his balanced policy, the Shah, who did not appreciate the US naval presence in Bahrain, supported Egypt and Arab states during the War of Kippur in October 1973. He allowed Soviet planes to fly over Iran to send weapons and military support to Egypt and Iraq. He later proposed a nuclearfree zone in Middle East at the UN.10 This pro-Arab policy continued with the rise in oil prices after 1974. The Shah was also reluctant to work with Israel in supporting the revolt of the Barzani Kurds of Iraq since 1965. The Algiers Agreement in 1975, signed by Saddam Hussein and Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, took Israel and the USA by surprise. Israel felt it had been betrayed by Iran. That same year, Tehran voted at the UN Security Council for a resolution considering “Zionism as racism”, to remain close to the Non-Aligned Movement and Arab states. The Shah wanted to show that he was independent from the USA and able to have his own, independent policy. According to the dual ............................................ 10 A proposal renewed by the Islamic Republic and a key issue of the next 2012 Conference of IAEA.

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Iranian policy, this diplomatic confrontation was implemented along with the development of economic, military and cultural relations with Tel Aviv. The Egyptian policy of engagement with Israel and the visit by Anwar asSadat to Jerusalem at Begin’s invitation were hailed by the Shah, who went to Egypt in January 1978. He was seeking support from Israel because Iraq had obviously become too strong. This new deal of rapprochement with Israel, in all fields, began too late, along with the Islamic Revolution. During all these years Israel was not a strategic partner of Iran but more a proxy used within the framework of complex Iranian policy where national, regional and international dimensions are involved. For Tehran, Israel and the Jewish community are neither “enemies” nor “friends” but useful partners having – sometimes – common strategic interests concerning the Arab world. The Islamic Revolution changed this balanced history by introducing a new factor with its ideological opposition to the existence of Israel.

The Islamic Republic and Israel: crisis and strategies One decade before the collapse of the Soviet world, the Islamic Revolution in Iran was the first post-Soviet revolution and initiated a deep worldwide upheaval. Along with the weakening of the Arab world, unable to impose or negotiate a solution to the Palestinian question, Israel appeared in the region as the main symbol of pro-Western/US policy, and consequently the main target of the new Islamic regime. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states were too close to be chosen by Iran as symbolic targets. The dramatic experience of the long war with Iraq (1980–1988) was proof that ideology and strategy should be tempered by pragmatism. Israel, with its sophisticated and complex international policy, facing first the Arab states, is far from Iran and cannot be a strategic threat for Tehran. In these conditions, the Jewish state could be easily used as an efficient politicoideological symbol in new Islamist policy. Thus, the opposition to the State of Israel, more than the support of the Palestinian cause, became the “passport” used by the Islamic – Shi’a – Republic to enter the Islamic – Sunni – world.11 ............................................ 11 Bernard Hourcade, Géopolitique de l’Iran, Paris: A. Colin, 2010, p. 224.

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The new Iranian anti-Israeli policy was immediately hailed by the “Arab street” and used by the new regime of Tehran as a tool to be accepted and play a role in the Muslim world, a strategic geopolitical sphere for the new regime. During the years of exile, Khomeyni and his followers such as Mehdi Chamran, were supported and trained by Palestinian movements, but the new regime did not want to be involved directly in the Palestinian question.12 Yasser Arafat and a large delegation of the PLO were the first – unsolicited – guests of the Islamic Republic (February 18, 1978). They took possession of the Israeli “embassy” avenue Kakh (renamed Palestine), but they did not meet Khomeyni. At that time, Iran and the United States had diplomatic relations with each other and signed some agreements concerning international security and alliances regarding the Soviet Union and its allies. The decline of Arab nationalism and the growing influence of ideology and Islam did not obliterate the national dimension of Iran’s foreign policy: Islam is used as a component of the complex new Iranian identity. In these conditions Tehran had no problem in receiving technical Israeli military help when Iraq became too strong (weapons, missiles, Iran Contra affair in 1986, destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor of Osirak in 1981). At the same time, some Iranian Jews were allowed to migrate to Israel by bus through Pakistan.13 Former Iranian relations and support of the Shi’a community of Lebanon were revitalized, but Khomeyni did not want to get too heavily involved in the conflict, too remote and complex as it was, if the interest of the national security of Iran was not an issue. He considered the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 a diversion to force him to withdraw troops from the Iraqi front. He was reluctant to send too many Pasdaran to Lebanon and insisted that “the road to Jerusalem goes through Kerbala”: priority was given to the war against Iraq. The ideological “war against Zionism” and the support of the new Hezbollah was mainly conducted by the more ideological factions of the Islamic regime: the Liberal “Third-Worldists” and anti-imperialist pro-Palestinians, such as Ayatollah Montazeri, but also Mohammad Khatami or Mohtashami............................................ 12 About the relations between Israel and the Muslim world after the Islamic Revolution see David Menashri (ed.), The Iranian revolution and the Muslim world, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. 13 About Islamic Republic international politics see David Menashri, Post-revolutionary politics in Iran religion, society and power, London: Frank Cass, 2001.

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Pour.14 They used to give priority to global international change and were in favour of the “deprived”. These anti-imperialist activists, working at that time with radical Islamist activists, opposed the State of Israel, were often anti-Semites and had close links to terrorist and armed groups. Taking part in the war in Lebanon and against Israel was first a struggle against “Western global aggression”. In spite of violent slogans and demonstrations covered by the media, Israel was not considered a threat or a major issue for the Islamic Republic. After the end of the Iran-Iraq War (1988), the death of Khomeyni (1989) and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the political priority of the Islamic Republic of Iran was to defend both the Islamic regime and Iran as an independent state. It was at least possible to fulfil the goals of the Revolution, hindered by the war with Iraq. The Arab world was no longer a challenger for Iran, which was facing no direct strategic enemy. In these conditions, Israel appeared as a “good” sustainable enemy; it was far away, but still able to draw a minimum consensus in a state and a regime facing deep internal divisions. The Islamic regime was first facing the Sunni community, so the “Israeli question” was the best “passport” to enter the Muslim world and challenge the other states and Arab leaders “unable to defend Islam”. Along with the chadowr imposed on the female population, opposing Israel is one of the very last remaining symbols of the identity of the Islamic regime. For obvious reasons, Iran was opposed to the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the Oslo Agreement of 1993, but demanded to be involved in building the new Middle East. Rafsanjani was not opposed to some compromise and to slowing down help given to Hezbollah, but Mohtashami-Pour, former ambassador to Syria and mentor of the Hezbollah disagreed, and Iran continued its war against Israel with terrorist attacks on the Jewish community of Argentina in 1993 and 1994. Thus Tehran became the main strategic danger for Israel, able to block any sustainable peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During these years, the Iranian nuclear threat was taken into account, but not given top priority. This Iranian policy inherited from the war in Lebanon changed when Mohammad Khatami was elected president (1997–2005). He declared himself ............................................ 14 On the relation between Iran, Hezbollah and the shi’a community of Lebanon see Houchang Chehabi (ed.), Distant relations: Iran and Lebanon in the last 500 years, London, Tauris, 2006.

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“no more Palestinian than the Palestinians”. Although he supported the Lebanese Hezbollah, he was not against PLO and the Palestinian Authority. In spite of the opposition of radicals, several track-two meetings with Israeli and Iranian participants were organized over the course of these years, focusing on the fact that the two countries may not always agree with each other, but they are “peripheral” and do not pose a strategic threat to one another. This “theory of the periphery” was supported in Israel by an “Iran Committee” of academics, diplomats and policy makers thinking that Israel does not need to make Iran an enemy. During this period, the Israeli flag was not systematically burned during military ceremonies in Iran, but no sustainable progress was reached, because of the opposition of radicals in Iran and of the crises following the withdrawal of Tsahal from southern Lebanon in 2000, giving the Hezbollah a “victory”, followed by the Second Intifada. In January 2002 the Karine Affair and the speech of President George W. Bush on the “Axis of Evil” put an end to the these attempts at détente. A new period of crisis began in 2005 with the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran was once again in radical opposition to any peace process, supporting the Hamas and the last countries of the Rejection Front such as Libya. This ideological opposition is associated with a nationalist objective, since Iran does did not want an Arab-Israeli dominated Middle East. This hostility, mixing Islamist and nationalist ideas, was used extensively by the radicals to unify the country and control the internal struggle between factions. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was very active in this respect. He took the opportunity of using the traditional speech of “Quds Day”, the last Friday of Ramadan (October 26, 2005), to focus not on supporting the Palestinians as Khatami usually did, but on “a world without Zionism”. He insisted on the well-known policy of “one state”, Palestine, inhabited by Arabs and Jews, and repeated – never using the world “Israel” – that “the illegitimate state occupying Qods (Jerusalem) must be wiped from the map”. This sentence was of very common use among those opposed to a two-state solution, but it took a new dimension because of the new international balance of power, as well as the personality and ideology of the Iranian president and above all because of the new military capacity of Iran to develop missiles and nuclear warheads. The old ideological and rhetorical opposition to Israel by way of proxies (Hezbollah, Hamas) became a direct military threat.

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The aim of Ahmadinejad and his followers was still to become the leader of the Muslim world by gaining the support of the Arab/Muslim population against their rulers, who were guilty of being prepared to come to a compromise with Israel, as had been the old dream of Khomeyni at the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. In this perspective, some radical groups built up strong anti-Semitic propaganda which was broadcast by the media – with the help of some French and European “negationists” – denying the existence of the Shoah or suggesting the existence of a US/Israeli conspiracy behind the September 11 attacks. In fact, Ahmadinejad has become very popular in the “Arab street”, but this revival of old ideological debates about Israel also contributed to isolating and weakening the Iran’s standing in the international community. The nuclear issue will not be discussed directly here, but this new major threat gives to the Iran-Israel issue a dramatic dimension that has changed the traditionally “ambiguous” relationship between the two countries, perhaps against Iran’s interests. This crisis legitimates Israeli military supremacy and has given it unexpected international support.15 Above all, the anti-Israeli policy used formerly by the Shah to get the support of the Arab states, or avoid their hostility, has been transformed by the Iranian nuclear threat into a global and regional hostility towards Iran. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states, even Egypt and of course Iraq are directly concerned by Iran’s global ambitions. The “weapons” of the nuclear crisis and hostility towards Israel have backfired against Iran, giving the opportunity to the USA, Europe and other majors powers to become more involved in security in the Middle East, and forcing some Arab states to change their policy regarding Israel. In Iran, the very hostile international response to Ahmadinejad’s discourse (sanctions at the UN Security council, Israeli public threats to bomb Iranian industrial or nuclear facilities, and demonization of Iran in the media) first gave some national support to the President, but this time seems to have expired, especially after the controversial elections of May 2009. The “Iranian street” does not support the Palestinians and other “Arab” populations (Hez............................................ 15 David Menashri, “Les programmes nucléaires iranien et israélien: obsession sans grand intérêt ou véritable préoccupation?”, Revue internationale et stratégique 2 (2008).

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bollah) receiving funds and help from Iran when the economic crisis is so deep in Iran. The reformists and pragmatists, including Khatami, Mussavi, the “Greens” and Rafsanjani, are deeply opposed to Israel’s policies, but they think that this question is not a strategic priority for Iran. By giving too much importance to this controversial ideological problem, Ahmadinejad is accused even by conservative groups of having weakened and isolated Iran. The fact that some “underdeveloped” countries like Turkey and Brazil are now strong enough to help Iran in its relations with the international community is considered shameful, bearing in mind Iran’s strong tradition of nationalism. Many of the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), especially the veterans of the Iran-Iraq War, now retired but very active in the economy and politics, have the same opinion and remember that Iranian participation in the war in Lebanon did not help them on the Iraqi front. Paradoxically, the dramatization of Iran-Israel relations under Ahmadinejad’s presidency, symbolized by the UN sanctions, the global hostility of Arab states and the emergence of Turkey, has become a major topic in a new balance of power inside Iran. The radicals close to the Guide and some ideological factions of the Pasdaran are still very active against Israel, but Ahmadinejad himself and the populist technocrats around him seem to have understood this political danger and are trying to propose a more balanced policy. Rahim Mashaie, son-in-law of the president and Director of his cabinet, spoke about the potential “friendly relations of the Iranian and Israeli people”. Too late? The ambiguous policy of Iran concerning Israel is continuing and belongs without any doubt to the strategic dimension of this relationship, but tactical contradictions and threats are today of major importance and may lead to irreversible, dramatic consequences, negative for both sides.

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Y UVAL F UCHS

Russia through Israeli Eyes – Some Considerations1

Russia is not only a very huge country (11 time zones from west to east), it is also hugely important and has a long, complicated history. Speaking about images, geographical or linguistic definitions are not enough. As a matter of fact their relevance is rather limited. Russia of the Far East may have very little in common with images of what one normally understands under “Russia” or “Russian”. Russia of 2010 is very different from 19th-century Russia and of course from “Russia” during the Soviet period. The image – every image – is first and foremost in the eye of the beholder, as Ernst Gombrich said. But it has also some sense of objectivity as a common picture, an impression, or a prejudgment that a group of people may have about something, independently from the question – whether true or false. I will not even try to state any opinion as to the truth of some images, nor can I ground my remarks on scientific examination. All I am going to say is based on my personal experience, some readings and some conversations which I had in Moscow or in Jerusalem. I am also not going to suggest anything comprehensive as to Israel’s relations with Russia, but rather try to make a few points and maybe a modest suggestion in connection with my German experience.2 In Israel, when you say Russia you evoke at least two main associations, which belong to two different categories yet still have close relations and interrelations with each other. The first group refers to the country: Russia of which Moscow is the capital, Russia which is the largest country in geographical terms. As much as this may still be a very complex matter, it is still com............................................ 1

Revised edition of my lecture, given at the Conference “The World facing Israel – Israel facing the World: Images and Politics” at Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz/Germany. The Author was Chargé d’Affaires of the Embassy of Israel in Moscow from 2005–2009.

2

Spokesman of the Israeli Embassy in Berlin from 1999–2002. In this time the Middle East Summit at Camp David took place between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yassir Arafat under the auspices of United States President Bill Clinton.

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mon sense compared with the second group. This second group of “Russia”, or better “Russian”, refers in the case of Israel not so much to Russians in Russia, or to the question of “what is Russian about Russia”, but rather to the over one million people who left the Former Soviet Union countries in the 90s and immigrated to Israel. Yes, you may find big communities in Germany, in the USA and in other countries too. But I cannot think of anywhere else where almost 20 percent of the population speaks Russian, reads Russian, watches Russian TV, knows a thing or two about Russia, eats Russian food and follows the news in Russian. You could ask me why it matters. Well, it is very difficult to explain the scope of influence of “the Israeli Russians” – again referring to the over one million people who came to Israel in the last decade of the 20th century after the fall of the Berlin Wall – on such a small country like Israel. Let me try to explain by way of an illustration: Some years ago a friend – working in Moscow – visited Israel with his little kids. Before they got on the plane back to Russia, they went to the supermarket to buy some Israeli products, which they would miss when they were back in Moscow. In the supermarket one of the little boys fell asleep and woke up when they had to pay and leave. Hearing the Russian-speaking employees talking to each other, the confused kid asked his parents: “Are we already back to Moscow?” What I am trying to say is: You cannot speak, maybe even think, of Russia in Israel today without somehow being influenced by the fact that about 1 in 7 (in some places 1 in 4, and even more) inhabitants is what people call “Russian”. The so-called Russians may have left their country of the Former Soviet Union (not Russia) when they were kids, they may not remember much, they may speak fluent Hebrew and participate in all aspects of Israeli society. Still, in the language and images of many Israelis, Sabras and “Russians” exist as separate groups. And what may be even more important for our question: They are relevant to Russia’s image, and vice versa. One can hardly speak about Russia in Israel today without somehow having in mind the group of “Russian” newcomers to Israel. One can hardly think, at the same time, about the “Russian” without somehow making a reference – aware or unaware – to Russia. Therefore it is very important to try to understand how these two images are interrelated. But before doing so let me make it even more complicated by saying that within each of these images – Russia and “the Russian” – you will

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find a dichotomy between what one may call “the good Russia” and “the bad Russia” and respectively “the good Russian” and “the bad Russian”. I have to stress that I do not think there is anything like “good” or “bad” “Russia” or “Russian”, I am speaking about images only. So what does Israel see when it looks at Russia, or to put it perhaps more simply, what do Israelis say when they speak about Russia? Let us take as a starting point an interview given by the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Israel, Mr. Stegny on July 24 2009 to Lili Galili, a leading journalist of Ha’aretz, a leading newspaper. It is a long interview that deals with many personal and professional aspects of the Ambassador’s life and work in Israel. Allow me some quotations out of it: Galili: You speak about learning from the past, but it does not look like Russia is doing so now. In the eyes of many Achmedinijad is a kind of Hitler and you still support him. (…) Israel sees in Iran an existential danger. Not only that the missiles have Russian names such as Katjusha and Grad now you are selling Iran Anti-Aircraft systems. Stegny replies: The missiles do have Russian names, but it is long time that they are not produced in Russia anymore. This is another product of the cold war (…) You too are tending to use jargon of the cold war. It creates simplification (in the original primitivisation) of the situation. There are nuances. (…) You are speaking about stereotypes and cleeches from another era. We are still in a transformation period and we are still refugees of our past.3 Ambassador Stegny is right. My impression is, that whenever Russia “makes it” to the front pages of the Israeli media it has rather a negative connotation, especially if it concerns the selling of arms to Iran or Syria or political contacts with Hamas. I will refer to these political disagreements later on. Let me for the moment focus on the image. But then there is another image – the “good image”, so to speak: The “good” Russia signifies culture, theater, music, education, sports, food or exact sci............................................ 3

Intern papers of the Foreign Ministry (MFA).

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ences. So in short: bad news in the political context, good news in the cultural ones. Before I left for Moscow back in 2005, my director at the time told me: “You know what your main task is, it is to help us to convince our own people that Russia means not only bad news.” Ambassador Stegny says there is a false myth concerning the Arabists in the diplomatic service of Russia as being negative towards Israel. I think we have undergone a long war internally – and we have a much more differentiated picture of Russia within the Israeli administration today than we had only a few years ago. To promote this differentiation we initiated some years ago an annual seminar for Israeli diplomats from Jerusalem and the main embassies around the world, who come to Moscow for several days of intensive experience to see, to hear and to listen with their own eyes and ears in the context of Russian life. Now, one could think, in Israel you can speak fluent Russian both with the seller in the supermarket and with the foreign minister, as with many more people. One could think, so many people not only speak Russian but they know the places, the culture, the streets, their former neighbors, they follow daily news in Russian, they eat the same food, they share so much with each other. One could think that all this would create a more differentiated picture. In a certain way it does, but in a very complex one. And this is for two main reasons: The process of social integration of the newcomers within the Israeli society is far from complete. The two communities – and I say two only to simplify – are not fully integrated yet. They do not know each other very well, they share some parts of their lives, whereas they know little about many other elements in each other’s lives. It is still a long process, of this we are all aware. The second reason is that the newcomers – who know a lot about Russia – have their own images which relate in many cases to the past rather than to the present. The new immigrants left the Former Soviet Union countries some 20 years ago, not Russia of 2010. And in many cases they keep referring to their past experiences, including what they used to think about “Russia” then. So, when Israeli Sabras think about Russia they also think about what they see as Russian in Israel, and here too there are, as in many cases of integration, good and not so good images. The “good” one is – as with the image of Russia

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itself – of culture, sports and education. The “bad” image is, among others, of mafia, violence and too much alcohol. And when the Israeli former “Russians” think about Russia they think, in many cases, about the past, their past. They do this of course in a simplified way. Generally speaking, however, I have to stress that there is huge interest in Russia – both in the media and amongst the public. Since visa abolition some two years ago, the number of tourists to Russia has increased by the same percentage – 14% – as the incoming tourists from Russia to Israel, and I think that Israeli public discussion concerning Russia is no less intense than in most other countries. Now concerning politics: Myths and images are part of any system and administration, and those who are dealing with some issue very often have the task (or rather one more task) of differentiating between them within their own organization. I mentioned before a program that we initiated in this context, namely our Russia crash course for Israeli diplomats who do not deal specifically with Russia, but deal with some aspects via our Russia diplomacy. Generally speaking I think we have come a very long way, we being Russia and Israel. A long way which is not always recognized or appreciated. Today, less that 20 years after the renewal of diplomatic relations after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have very intense, sincere and spirited political dialogue on all levels, concerning presidents, prime ministers, governments, parliaments, and many ministries including ministries of foreign affairs. Russia is – and is recognized as such – an important player in the Middle East in the framework of the Quartet,4 and as a country which has good relations both with Israel and with the Arab world. It is a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN and a member of the P5+15 dealing with the Iranian nuclear question and the North Korean nuclear program. Furthermore, it is a member of a huge number of international and regional organizations. But it is also an important bilateral partner for Israel, in terms of trade, science, culture and also people-to-people. This is but a short list of areas in ............................................ 4

The so-called “Road Map”, a plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, proposed by the Quartet of the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations.

5

The Members are Russia, China, Britain, France, the United States and Germany.

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which our growing cooperation and exchange are important. I mentioned tourism before: Since visa abolition, Russian tourists to Israel now rank second in terms of incoming tourism to Israel in general6 and I believe we have the same potential in so many other fields. But we also have political disagreements: These include the role of Hamas and Hisbollah in the Middle East; the selling of arms to some countries in our neighborhood; and how to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue, to mention just the main issues. But disagreements among friends are not something exclusive to our relationship. Russia may have disagreements with other friends and partners and so does Israel. More important, I think, is the fact that in spite of disagreements, relations and political dialogue have never stopped growing and developing. We have learned to overcome them in an open and constructive way. And, I think it would be fair to say, sometimes in a way which is appreciated by the rest of the world, not only as a bilateral matter but as a positive and constructive dimension in a much wider context – namely Russia and the world. So I think we can speak about solid and mature relations, and this again less than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fact speaks for itself, that the President and the Prime Minister of Russia speak about relations with Israel as a substantial element of Russia’s foreign policy, as a substantial Russian interest – and so do their Israeli counterparts in their turn. Coming back to the question about politics and images, I think that this element – the solid, bilateral basis which was laid between our countries, the basic interest to be and become friends and partners rather than stand on two sides of a divided world (as was common during the cold war) – is sometimes underestimated. I also think that some political disagreements which appear in our relations – as they do in relations between countries – are sometimes exaggerated, being looked at through old glasses from the past. But how can we deal with that? I would like to make a triple suggestion: (1) In the political field – the question of the Middle East, the Peace Process, the role of Iran – we have to keep intensifying and, just as importantly, diversifying our dialogue. It has to cover many more issues, where we should ............................................ 6

In 2009 there were 400,000 tourists from Russia, compared with 73,000 in 2006.

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learn more about each other’s sensitivities, fears and interests. We should listen very carefully and bring our understanding of each other to a higher level. (2) In the bilateral field we have to develop our cooperation – not only relations but true cooperation, where common interests are found and promoted. I believe there are grounds for optimism here. There are very good conditions, as we are so different in many ways and so similar in others. (3) In the field of public opinion and images: One cannot assume that the fact that there is a large Russian-speaking community in Israel on the one hand, or a relatively good image of Israel among the Russian people on the other hand – something that we know from polls carried out – is enough. One has to invest in and put much effort into building and improving one’s image. I am not speaking about the obvious interviews given by diplomats and press attachés, though this is also part of the job to be done. I am thinking about long-term projects, such as exchange programs, twinning programs, hosting foreign artists and intellectuals in one’s country, and other bilateral projects. From my own experience here in Germany I do not have to elaborate on the importance of such projects. I believe there are thousands of German people, if not more, who spent some time as young people in Israel through programs which exist between Germany and Israel. I know there are similar efforts to have vast people-to-people cooperation between Germany and Russia. I myself had the opportunity of studying in Germany with such an exchange program and can testify at first hand. Such programs are not inexpensive, but I believe they pay back. I am not a great fan of marriage between three partners – I think in many cases it can complicate things in numerous, initially unforeseeable ways. But maybe there could be some exchange, and I refer of course to Israel, Russia and Germany, where experience could be shared.

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Russia, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict under Putin

For a decade, Russia under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin was preoccupied with economic crises, an uprising in Chechnya, political instability and a foreign policy focus on the states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the United States. Then Moscow, under its new President, Vladimir Putin, especially in his second term (2004–2008) and subsequently as Russia’s Prime Minister, began to refocus Russian attention on the Middle East. To be sure, Russia did not totally neglect the region during the Yeltsin era. Both Turkey and Iran, which bordered on the FSU, did get Russian attention, albeit more from a defensive point of view than out of an effort to expand Russian influence, while the Arab-Israeli conflict greatly receded in importance to Moscow, compared to what it had been in Soviet times.1

The Yeltsin Legacy Indeed, the Arab-Israeli conflict, by contrast, was only of tertiary interest to Yeltsin’s Russia, a situation very much unlike that in the Soviet era when successive Soviet leaders, from Khrushchev to Andropov, sought to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to increase Moscow’s influence in the Middle East. Russia let the US take the lead in Arab-Israeli diplomacy during the period when Andrei Kozyrev was Russia’s Foreign Minister (1991–1995) as Moscow endorsed the Oslo I (1993) and Oslo II (1995) agreements between Israel and the Palestinians as well as the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. Meanwhile, on a bilateral basis Russian-Israeli relations flourished; economically, culturally ............................................ 1

For an overview of Russian policy in the Middle East under Yeltsin see Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union. The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge for Putin, Seattle: Henry Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 2001.

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and even militarily as Russia and Israel signed an agreement to produce an AWACS radar aircraft (Israel supplied the avionics and Russia the airframe) for sale to countries such as India. For its part, Israel was happy that Moscow continued to allow Russian Jews to immigrate to Israel, and hoped that the rapidly developing cultural relations between Russia and Israel, based on the one million Russian-speaking immigrants from the FSU residing in Israel by 1991, would lead to closer political relations between Moscow and Jerusalem.2 By 1996, however, the Russian-Israeli honeymoon had ended, as Yeltsin, under increasing pressure from right-wing forces in the Russian Duma (legislature) and following the US intervention in Bosnia, took a tougher position in world affairs. Kozyrev was replaced by Soviet-era hardliner Yevgeny Primakov who displayed an increasingly critical attitude toward Israel, and a more sympathetic position toward the Arab states and the Palestinians. Thus during the spring 1996 fighting in Lebanon between Israel and Hizbollah, Primakov and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres (who had succeeded the assassinated Yitzhak Rabin) openly clashed. However, underlining the diplomatic impotence of Russia, it was American Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and not Primakov, who succeeded in bringing the fighting to an end.3 Peres’ successor, Binyamin Netanyahu, sought to improve relations with Russia, even giving Moscow a $50 million agricultural loan during a visit in March 1997, and stating that Israel would consider buying Russian natural gas. In addition, bilateral relations continued to develop as the Israeli food manufacturer Tnuva filmed a “milk in space” commercial aboard the Russian Space Station Mir. However, Moscow was critical of Netanyahu’s policies, especially his expansion of Jewish settlements on the West Bank. For his part, Netanyahu was critical of Russian military and economic aid to Iran, which included building the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, because Iran was an avowed enemy of Israel. Indeed, Netanyahu later canceled discussions of the natural gas deal with Moscow because of Russia’s supply of missile technology to Iran.4 However, one of Netanyahu’s ministers, Ariel Sharon, gained favor in Moscow by backing the Russian position on Serbia during the US-Russian clash over Kosovo in the ............................................ 2

These events are discussed in detail in Robert O. Freedman, “Russia and Israel Under Yeltsin,” Israel Studies 3, no. 1 (1998), pp. 140–169.

3

Ibid.

4

Ibid.

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late 1990s. Nonetheless, by the late summer of 1998 Russia had become enmeshed in a near disastrous economic crisis, which effectively limited Russia’s freedom of action in the world, including in the Middle East, and this situation was to continue until a sick, and frequently intoxicated, Yeltsin suddenly resigned as Russia’s President, to be succeeded by Vladimir Putin in January 2000.

The Putin Era: Part One (2000–04) Consolidating Power When Vladimir Putin became Russia’s Prime Minister in the fall of 1999 and Acting President in January 2000 (he was formally elected Russia’s President in March 2000), he had three major objectives. The first was to restore Russia’s prestige in the world so as to prevent the United States from unilaterally dominating the world. Putin’s second objective was to rebuild the Russian economy so that Russia could again become a great power. The third objective was to curb Moslem and especially Middle Eastern aid to the Chechen rebellion that had erupted again in 1999, so that Moscow could more easily suppress it. In order to accomplish these tasks, Putin had to consolidate his power in order to end the near anarchy that had pervaded much of the Yeltsin era. To do this, Putin all but eliminated the political influence of oligarchs Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky and took over their media outlets. He replaced Yevgeny Adamov, head of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom, now Rosatom), who had a habit of trying to make nuclear deals with Iran not approved of by the Kremlin, with Alexander Rumantsev, who in November 2005 was, in turn, replaced by Sergei Kiriyenko. The powerful gas monopoly, GASPROM, heavily involved in Turkey and Central Asia, had its director, Ram Vekhirev replaced by Alexei Miller, while the Defense Ministry had its leader, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, replaced by the Secretary of the National Security Council, Sergei Ivanov. Two other holdovers from the Yeltsin era were also removed during Putin’s first term. Russia’s Prime Minster Mikhail Khazyanov was replaced by Mikhail Fradkov and Russia’s Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, was replaced by Sergei Lavrov.

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Putin also changed interior ministers, set up plenipotentiaries to oversee Russia’s 89 regions, and consolidated Russia’s arms sales agencies into Rosoboronexport, in an effort to gain greater control over a major source of foreign exchange – and to prevent unauthorized foreign arms sales. Putin also put a great deal of emphasis on improving Russia’s economy, not only through the sale of arms, oil and natural gas (the Russian economy has been blessed with high oil and natural gas prices during most of his years in office) but also by selling high-tech goods such as nuclear reactors and by expanding Russia’s business ties abroad. Indeed, business interests were to play an increasingly significant role in Putin’s foreign policy. Making Putin’s task easier was the support he received from the Duma, especially from his United Russia Party in contrast to the hostile relations Yeltsin had with the Duma from 1993 until his resignation as Russia’s President in December 1999. Indeed, in the Duma elections of December 2003, Putin greatly increased his support, weakening both the Communist and Liberal Democratic parties, which were his main opponents, and he scored an overwhelming victory in the 2004 presidential elections.

Russia and the Arab-Israeli Conflict in Putin’s First Term As US-Russian relations chilled following the US invasion of Iraq so did Moscow’s relations with Israel. At the same time, there was a clear improvement in Russian-Palestinian relations. Moscow’s tilt to the Palestinians became evident after the Israeli reentry into the cities of the West Bank following a series of Palestinian terrorist attacks in 2002. A secondary goal of Moscow’s pro-Palestinian tilt was to curb Arab support for the Chechen rebellion. Still, even while tilting to the Palestinians, Putin periodically uttered soothing remarks about how much he valued the bilateral Russian-Israeli relationship and the role of Russian émigrés living in Israel. However, on issues of substance such as Russian aid to Iran, and Israel’s construction of a security fence to protect itself from terrorist attacks, Russia and Israel had opposing positions. To be sure, Putin did have a point about the continuing strength of the bilateral Russian-Israeli relationship. By the early 2000s trade had risen to more than $1 billion per year, cultural relations continued to develop, 50,000 Russian tourists were visiting Israel annually, and Russia and Israel signed an

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agreement under which Russian rockets would put Israeli satellites into orbit.5 Nonetheless, these areas of bilateral cooperation were increasingly overshadowed by diplomatic conflicts. By the time of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to Moscow in September 2003, the growing diplomatic differences between Russia and Israel had become increasingly evident. While Sharon was in Moscow, Putin promised to take Israeli concerns into account while introducing a UN Security Council resolution codifying the Diplomatic Quartet’s “Road Map” for peace. However, following the visit, when Moscow introduced the resolution, it was without the Israeli reservations. As far as Yasser Arafat was concerned, by 2002 Israel had refused to talk to the Palestinian leader, blaming him for the wave of terrorist attacks which were occurring during the Al-Aksa Intifada. By contrast, Putin continued to assert that Arafat was still politically relevant.6 On the issue of Israel’s security fence, Russia joined the majority of EU states in voting to support a UN General Assembly (non-binding) resolution condemning Israel for building its security fence and calling on Israel to comply with the majority decision of the International Court of Justice to tear down the fence. The United States and six other countries opposed the resolution. By September 2004, however, Russia may have wished that it had constructed a security fence on its own separating the rest of the Russian Federation from Chechnya, after a series of Chechen terrorist attacks culminated in the seizure of a Russian school in Beslan that led to the deaths of 332 people, many of them children. This may have prompted Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on a visit to Israel as part of a post-Beslan Middle East tour during which Russia sought world support against Chechen terrorism, to accept an Israeli offer to cooperate in the area of counterterrorism. The Israeli offer included the sharing of information on safeguarding critical installations, the training of counterterrorism specialists, and the exchange of intelligence data.7 Still, any hope that Israel may have had that Moscow would adopt a more pro-Israeli stand in Israel’s conflict with Palestinian terrorists as a result ............................................ 5

Ruth Sinai, “Lift restrictions on Russian tourists Ministers says”, Ha’aretz January 3, 2005.

6

“Road Map with a stop in Moscow”, Trud, November 28, 2003, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Hereafter CDSP) 55, no. 47, p. 18.

7

Grigory Asmolov, “Israel’s intelligence community will assist Russia’s”, Kommersant, September 7, 2004, CDSP 36, no. 26, p. 23.

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of the security agreement quickly faded. In October 2004, just one month after the Russian-Israeli agreement, Moscow supported a United Nations Security Council resolution (vetoed by the United States) to condemn Israel for its military incursion into Gaza that was aimed at rooting out as many Hamas terrorists as possible before the Israeli Knesset vote on Ariel Sharon’s Gaza disengagement plan.8 This Russian policy was in sharp contrast to Putin’s early policy on Hamas, when a visiting Israeli delegation to Moscow at the start of the Al-Aksa Intifada in the fall of 2000 was told by Sergei Lavrov, then head of Russia’s Security Council, that the terrorism that Israelis were facing in Gaza and the West Bank was exactly what Moscow faced in Chechnya.9

Putin Goes on the Offensive in the Middle East (2004–08) By 2004, with his domestic political opponents under control, overwhelmingly reelected for a second term as Russia’s President, the Russian economy improving, and with oil prices rapidly rising, Putin was ready to move ahead with his three major objectives for Russia: (1) Restoring Russia’s status as a great power, thereby ending American dominance of the post-Cold War world, (2) developing the Russian economy, especially in the high-tech area, and (3) further limiting foreign aid to the Chechen rebels who were continuing their struggle against Russia. Unfortunately, for Putin, two events in the September-November 2004 period – the Chechen seizure of the school in Beslan that led to the loss of 332 Russian lives in a bungled rescue operation, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine which brought to power a Ukrainian president whom Putin had publicly opposed – made both Putin, and Russia, look weak. To counter this image Putin decided to formulate a new strategy for Russia in the Middle East, a region where the United States’ position was rapidly weakening due to the growing insurgency in Iraq and the revival of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Seeking to exploit the ............................................ 8

Yula Petrovskaya, “Russia is a collateral victim of terror in the Middle East”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 11, 2004, CDSP 56, nos. 40–41, p. 3.

9

Cited in Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Since the Collapse of The Soviet Union, p. 55.

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weakened US position, Putin after a visit to Turkey moved first to court the leading anti-American and anti-Israeli rogue states and movements in the region – Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hizbollah. Subsequently, he was also to court the leading Sunni powers in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, while still trying to maintain good bilateral ties with Israel.

Aiding the Radical Anti-Israeli Middle East States and Forces Syria was a target of opportunity for Russia as it sought to rebuild its position in the Middle East. By the beginning of 2005 Syria was under heavy pressure on two fronts. Not only had the UN Security Council condemned its activities in Lebanon but the US was complaining that Syria had become a conduit for foreign jihadists fighting in Iraq. Consequently, when Moscow, during Bashar Assad’s visit to Moscow in January 2005, agreed to write off 73 percent of Syria’s $13.4 billion debt to Russia, Putin demonstrated strong support for an increasingly isolated Syrian government.10 Then, in March 2005, Russia and Syria signed an agreement for Russia to develop new oil and gas deposits in Syria11 and in April, just before Putin arrived in Israel, Russia signed an agreement to provide short-range surface-to-air missiles to Syria – a further sign of support for Syria which was under increasing pressure because of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.12 Indeed under heavy international pressure spearheaded by France and the United States, Syria was compelled to pull its troops out of Lebanon by the end of April 2005. Then, the special commission investigating the assassination of Hariri, under the leadership of the German senior public prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, issued an interim report in October 2005 implicating high-ranking members of the Syrian government, and noting that the Syrian regime had obstructed cooperation with the commission. At the same time, a committee under Terje Larsen issued a report to the UN that stated that Syria, despite pulling its forces out of Lebanon, had continued to supply Lebanese and Palestinian militias in Lebanon with weapon............................................ 10 Nabi Abdullaev, “Assad praises Russia, wins debt deal”, Moscow Times, January 25, 2005. 11 RIA, “Russian company signs oil, gas exploration deal with Syria”, March 21, 2005, FBIS-RUSSIA, March 22, 2005. 12 Steve Gutterman, “Putin defends missile sale to Syria”, AP Report, Moscow Times, April 29, 2005.

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ry.13 Upon the release of the two reports, the US, Britain and France, acting jointly, called for UN sanctions against Syria. As in the case of Iran, Moscow sought to prevent the sanctions and succeeded in somewhat watering down the UN Security Council Resolution criticizing Syria. Nonetheless the resolution, UNSC 1636, did condemn Syria for trying to mislead the Mehlis commission by following a policy of “cooperating in form but not in substance,” and demanded Syria expand its cooperation with the investigation or face “further action.”14 While Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov praised UNSC Resolution 1636 for taking Russia’s views into account, and did manage to prevent an immediate referral of Syria to the UN Security Council,15 Moscow may face some difficult choices once the final report on the Hariri assassination is issued, given the close tie between Hariri and Saudi Arabia, which Putin was also trying to court. Meanwhile, after the arms deal with Syria, and the change of Russian policy toward Iran in February under which Moscow finally agreed to sign the long-delayed agreement to supply nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor (see below), Putin journeyed to the Middle East, visiting Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian territories in what was clearly a “show the flag” visit to demonstrate that Russia was again a factor in the Middle East. Indeed, during his visit Putin called for a Middle East peace conference to be held in Moscow. In the Palestinian territories, Putin promised the newly elected Palestinian leader Mahmud Abbas fifty armored personnel carriers for his security forces, while telling the Israelis that he would do nothing to hurt their country and for this reason he had turned down an agreement to sell advanced Iskander ground-to-ground missiles to Syria. Most Israelis doubted him, however, given the surface-to-air missile sale to Syria, an enemy of Israel, and the nuclear agreement with Iran, a country sworn to Israel’s destruction. Indeed, as Moscow stepped up its aid to Iran throughout the remainder of 2005, RussianIsraeli relations deteriorated. Putin clearly realized as he set out to rebuild Russia’s position in the Middle East that in order to cement the relationship with Iran, which he saw as a ............................................ 13 The two reports are found on the United Nations website. 14 Cited in Resolution 1636, 2005, October 31, 2005, United Nations website, Security Council, October 31, 2005. 15 Interfax, “Lavrov voted for Syria resolution because her [Russia’s] views [were] taken into account,” October 31, 2005, FBIS-RUSSIA October 31, 2005.

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foreign policy priority, he had to finalize the nuclear fuel agreement. Consequently in late February 2005, Russia signed the final agreement for the supply of nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor.16 Under the agreement all spent fuel was to be returned to Russia, thus, in theory at least, preventing its diversion into atomic weapons. Perhaps emboldened by the agreement with Russia, Iran’s then chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani warned that Iran would never permanently cease enriching uranium, and if the US sought sanctions at the UN Security Council, “the security and stability of the region would become a problem”17. Rowhani also stated that Iran was not happy with the pace of negotiations with the EU-3, and threatened to end the negotiations if there were no progress. Then, following the election of the outspoken Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in July 2005, Moscow did its best to delay even the discussion of sanctions against Iran in the United Nations Security Council that the US was advocating, because of Iran’s decision to renew enrichment of uranium, and its refusal to supply the International Atomic Energy Agency with information about its atomic programs. Making matters worse, Ahmadinejad called for wiping Israel off the map and denied the Holocaust. Despite such declarations, in November 2005 Moscow signed an agreement with Tehran to provide it with sophisticated short-range Tor surface-to-air missiles that could be used to protect its nuclear installations against a possible Israeli or American attack.18 By moving to help Iran to protect its nuclear installations, Moscow appeared to send a clear signal that it would stand by Iran, irrespective of its nuclear policies. As Putin was increasing Russian support for Iran, he also tried to prevent the Arab and Moslem worlds from aiding the rebellion in Chechnya. Thus he obtained for Russia observer status in the Islamic Conference (OIC), and took the opportunity to side with the Moslem world by denouncing the Danish cartoons which were seen by Moslems as insulting to Islam. For the same ............................................ 16 Scott Peterson, “Russia fuels Iran’s atomic bid”, Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 2005. 17 Cited in Nazila Fathi, “Iran says it won’t give up program to enrich uranium”, The New York Times, March 6, 2003. 18 These events are discussed in detail in Robert O. Freedman, Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin Record, Carlisle, Penna: The Stratergic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2006, pp. 20–35.

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reason, he pursued an improved relationship with Saudi Arabia, an effort that bore some fruit as the Saudi government, distancing itself from the Chechen rebels, promised to help in the reconstruction of Chechnya. Then, following the Hamas victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006, Putin called the event “a very serious blow” to American diplomacy in the Middle East, thus appearing almost to return to the “zero-sum” influence competition that characterized Soviet-American relations until the advent of Gorbachev. Soon after the elections he invited a Hamas delegation to Moscow, asserting that Hamas was not on Russia’s terrorist list, and hence not considered a terrorist organization – a clear change from Russia’s policy in 2000 when, as noted above, a visiting Israeli delegation after the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada was told that the terrorism Israel was facing in Gaza and the West Bank was exactly what Russia was battling in Chechnya.19 By inviting Hamas to Moscow, Putin undermined the consensus of the Diplomatic Quartet (the US, Europe, UN, and Russia) which was not to have anything to do with Hamas until it recognized Israel, renounced terrorism against it, and accepted all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. When the Hamas delegation came to Moscow, Putin had a number of objectives. First, by inviting Hamas, he associated Russia with the then Arab consensus which was to give Hamas time to change its policies, and in the meantime to work with a Hamas government and not to sanction it. Russia was widely praised in the Arab world for its invitation, which also bestowed a modicum of legitimacy on Hamas – much to the anger of Israel which saw Hamas as a terrorist enemy seeking to destroy it. Another goal for Putin was to get Hamas, an Islamist organization, to downplay the Chechen issue, and the Hamas delegation complied, with delegation leader Khalid Mashal stating after a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, that the Chechen separatists were an internal problem of Russia. The comment drew a bitter reaction from the Chechen rebels, who called Hamas’s decision to visit Putin’s Russia, which had killed so many Chechen Moslems, not only regrettable but also “un-Islamic”.20 ............................................ 19 For a study of Russia’s policy toward terrorism, see Robert O. Freedman, “Can Russia be a Partner for the United States in the Middle East”, Aurel Braun (ed.), NATO-American Relations, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 125–129. 20 Ibid, p. 129.

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Another blow to Russian-Israeli relations occurred six months later when war broke out between Israel and Hizbollah following the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers. Not only did Moscow look the other way when Syria transferred some of its Russian weapons to Hizbollah, Russia also opposed sanctions against Syria, then Hizbollah’s main sponsor, at a meeting of the G8, and criticized Israel for its overreaction to the kidnapping. In the aftermath of the war, Russia sent a group of engineers to rebuild some of the bridges destroyed in the conflict, but did not offer troops for the expanded UNIFIL contingent in southern Lebanon, whose mission, at least in theory, was to prevent the rearming of Hizbollah. In the face of Israel’s deteriorating relationship with Russia, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert journeyed to Moscow in October 2006, perhaps hoping to secure a reversal of some of Russia’s anti-Israeli regional policies. Olmert had three issues to discuss with Putin: (1) Iran, (2) Syria’s transfer of arms to Hizbollah and (3) Russia’s diplomatic support for Hamas. A secondary list of priorities focused on Russian-Israeli bilateral relations, including trade, especially the potential purchase of Russian natural gas, and Russian-Israeli cooperation in arms sales to third countries. For his part, Putin had a more limited list of goals for Olmert’s visit. First came his desire to have Russia recognized as a major player in Middle East diplomacy, and Olmert’s visit helped confirm this. Second came Putin’s efforts to rebuild the Russian economy, which was an element in Moscow’s efforts to regain great power status, and trade with a high-tech country like Israel, especially in the area of nanotechnology, would help Moscow achieve that goal. Given the results of the meeting, it appears that Putin fared far better than Olmert. Thus on Iran, Russia made no concessions, with Lavrov, after Olmert’s visit, saying that Moscow was still opposed to sanctions against Iran.21 Moscow also played down the issue of weapons transfers,22 and as far as Hamas was concerned, Lavrov stated, following the departure of Olmert, “demanding now that Hamas fully accept the Quartet’s conditions such as the recognition ............................................ 21 Cited in Yossi Melman, “Putin to PM: Using force against Iran could end in disaster”, Ha’aretz October 22, 2006. 22 Cited in Interfax, “Russia’s Ivanov: Issue of Hizbollah’s Russian weapons ‘closed topic’”. October 20, 2006, FBIS-RUSSIA October 21, 2006.

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of Israel, the denunciation of violence against Israel, and acceptance of all existing agreements is unrealistic at this time”.23 If Olmert got very little satisfaction from his Russian hosts on issues of major importance to Israel, he proved willing to accede to Putin’s goals, perhaps hoping that if bilateral relations improved further, Russia might change its anti-Israeli regional policies. Thus Olmert agreed with Putin to raise trade from the then $2 billion annual level to $5 billion, and Olmert agreed to discuss the possibility of Israel’s purchasing natural gas from Russia by way of a pipeline from Turkey, thereby reversing the stand on natural gas purchases adopted by Netanyahu in 1997. That seemed to be a mutually advantageous deal for both Russia and Israel, because Turkey had failed in 2006 to use the amount of gas it had contracted with Russia to purchase, and in addition to the natural gas it purchased from Egypt, Israel had planned to purchase natural gas from a field in Gaza, but because of the rise of Hamas it saw the Gaza project as an unlikely possibility.24 The one concrete agreement to come out of the Moscow talks was the setting up of a working group to coordinate arms sales to third countries.25 While Russia and Israel have cooperated in the production of such weapons systems as the AWACS, the two countries competed for contracts to refurbish old Soviet equipment like the MIG-23 aircraft.

Courting the Sunnis Meanwhile, however, Russia’s backing of Iran and its allies Syria, Hamas and Hizbollah came into conflict with Putin’s goal of improved ties with the Sunni states of the Arab world, especially Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, Jordan and Egypt, which particularly after the Israeli-Hizbollah war had become increasingly suspicious of Iran and its allies. Consequently, as a sop to the Sunni Arabs prior to visiting Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan in February ............................................ 23 Cited in Avi Issacharoff, “Russian FM calls international demands on Hamas ‘unrealistic’”, Ha’aretz, October 22, 2006. 24 Li’or Brun, “Israeli-Russian talks on planned $2 Billion natural gas deal viewed”, Ma’ariv, October 19, 2006, FBIS-MESA October 20, 2006. 25 Interfax, “Russia, Israel to set up working group on arms trade”, October 26, 2006, FBIS-MESA October 20, 2006.

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2007, Russia in December 2006 finally agreed to UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, albeit very limited ones. Then in March 2007, following the trip, Putin agreed to additional very limited sanctions. During his visit to the Gulf Arabs, Putin sought major investments in Russia’s banking and space industries, weapons sales, and joint investment projects in oil and natural gas (Putin was to have similar goals during a visit to Libya in 2008). The energy deals were especially important to Moscow because its own production of oil and especially natural gas appeared to have almost peaked.26 During the spring and summer of 2007, as part of Putin’s efforts to court the Sunni Arabs, Russia also conspicuously delayed sending Iran the promised nuclear fuel, making the dubious claim that the rich Persian Gulf country had not made the necessary payments, and a November 2007 visit by Putin to Iran didn’t change the situation. However, following the ill-conceived US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran of December 2007 which erroneously argued that Iran had given up its nuclear weapons program, and hence was not an immediate threat, Moscow, perceiving diminishing pressure from the Gulf Arabs and the United States on this issue, went ahead with the sale of the nuclear fuel. The shipments had been completed by February 2008. Ironically, even as Moscow was helping Iran develop its nuclear capability, Putin, seeking business for Russia’s nuclear industry, offered to build reactors for the Gulf Arabs, Egypt, and Jordan as well, as the Arab states sought to keep up with their rival, Iran. For their part the Sunni Arab states, increasingly unhappy with US policy toward Iraq, which strengthened the Iraqi Shia, and indirectly Iran, welcomed Russia as a counterweight to the United States. The one major problem Moscow encountered in the Arab world in 2007 concerned the Palestinians. In June of that year Hamas seized power in Gaza, killing a number of Fatah officials working there. With Fatah and Hamas now at loggerheads – Abbas fired the Hamas Prime Minister and replaced him with one of his own appointees, Salam Fayyad, who had a reputation for fiscal honesty and was close to the Western financial community – Moscow faced a difficult problem of choice. Making matters worse for Moscow was that Hamas turned ............................................ 26 Putin’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan is discussed in Robert O. Freedman, “The Putin Visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan: Business promotion or Great Power Maneuvering”, Johnson’s Russia List 15, February 15, 2007: www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-39-39.cfm. See also Mawat Terterov (ed.), Russian and CIS Relations with the Gulf Region, Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2009.

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increasingly to Iran for support, thereby alienating key Sunni states and making Moscow’s legitimization of Hamas problematic for Russia. In reaction to this problem, Moscow stepped up its efforts, first announced during Putin’s visit to the Middle East in 2005, to convene an international peace conference in Moscow. In addition, Moscow increased its backing of the Arab Peace Plan, which had first been introduced in 2002 and then reintroduced in 2007. Perhaps most important of all, Russia called for reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah as a necessary precondition for the peace conference to take place. Thus, at the time of the Russian invasion of Georgia, Russia was following a policy of encouraging the main anti-American and anti-Israeli forces in the Middle East – Hamas, Hizbollah, Syria and Iran – while at the same time trying to cultivate the major Sunni Arab states of the Middle East, and seeking to draw them away from their alignment with the United States, and also trying to maintain good bilateral ties with Israel. The invasion of Georgia, coming as it did in the midst of the Russian diplomatic offensive in the Middle East, was to impact Putin’s Middle East balancing act, especially with regard to Syria and Israel.

The Impact of the Russian Invasion of Georgia on the Middle East Syria In an almost classic case of political opportunism, Syrian President Bashir Assad seized upon the Russian invasion of Georgia – and the fact that Israel (along with Germany, France, the United States and Turkey) had provided military equipment and training to the Georgian military – to try to convince the Russians to sell Syria the weapons they had long wanted and that the Russians had so far proved unwilling to sell to them. These included, most importantly, the short-range, solid-fuel Iskander-E ground-to-ground missile that could reach virtually every target in Israel, MiG-31 combat aircraft, and the SAM-300 anti-aircraft missile system, which if installed in Syria near Damascus could control most of Israel’s airspace. As Assad told the Russian newspaper Kommersant on the eve of his visit to Moscow when Georgian-Russian hostilities were still going on: “I think that in Russia and in the world, everyone is now aware of Israel’s role and its military consultants in the Georgia

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crisis. And if before in Russia there were people who thought these [Israeli] forces can be friendly, now I think no one thinks that way”.27 It is clear that Assad was referring to Putin, who on repeated occasions stated that he had denied the Iskander missiles to Syria because they could harm Israel. In backing the Russian intervention in Georgia – one of the few countries in the world to do so – Assad was repeating the policy of his father Hafiz Assad whose Syrian regime was one of the few in the world to support the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.28 While Assad senior was richly rewarded with Soviet military equipment for his support of Soviet policy in Afghanistan, it remains to be seen what Bashar Assad will get. All Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov would say after the Assad visit was that Moscow would “consider” Syria’s appeal for new weapons sales, and that in any case Russia would not sell any weapons that “would affect the Middle East strategic balance”.29 Since sales of both the Iskander-E and SAM-300 systems would definitely affect the regional military balance, Syria appeared unlikely to get these weapons. It should also be noted, however, that Moscow has developed a habit of holding up arms sales to Syria and Iran to try to squeeze concessions from Israel, and should Israel not behave in the way Moscow wanted, it risked the possibility that these arms sales would be implemented.

Israel Since the Olmert visit to Moscow in October 2006, Russian-Israeli relations continued their schizophrenic nature, with good bilateral relations in clear contrast to Moscow’s siding with Israel’s enemies, Syria and Iran: on the eve of Basher Assad’s visit to Moscow in August 2008, Russia’s new President, Dmitry Medvedev, and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had a telephone conversation about Israeli-Syrian relations and about the situation in Georgia; trade between Russia and Israel exceeded two and half billion dollars a year, much of ............................................ 27 Mikhail Zygar, “Interview with Syrian President Al-Asad”, Kommersant, August 20, 2008, FBIS: MESA, August 21, 2008. 28 For a discussion of Soviet policy toward Syria during the Hafiz Assad Era, see Robert O. Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 29 Cited in Vesti TV, “Russian Foreign Minister on Syrian Ties, NATO and Georgia” August 22, 2008, FBIS-RUSSIA August 22, 2008.

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it in the high-tech sector which Putin needs to develop the Russian economy so that it is not dependent primarily on energy exports; cultural ties thrived and Moscow established a cultural center in Tel Aviv; the two countries signed a visa-waiver agreement to facilitate tourism; negotiations were completed for the return to Russia of czarist property in Jerusalem; and Israel’s Kadima Party signed an agreement with Putin’s United Russia Party to establish party-toparty relations.30 While some in the Russian military such, as Russia’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Anatoly Nogovitsyn, publicly complained about Israeli aid to the Georgian military,31 Foreign Minister Lavrov went out of his way to praise Israel for stopping arms sales to Georgia.32 What then explains Russia’s continued bifurcated policy toward Israel and how will the Russian invasion of Georgia affect it? It appears clear that Russia has three goals vis-à-vis Israel. First, it is the homeland of more than a million Russian-speaking citizens of the Former Soviet Union, and Russia sees Russian speakers abroad as a source of its world influence. Hence there is such emphasis on cultural ties between Russia and Israel, in which Israelis of Russian origin play the dominant role. Second, as noted above, Putin is determined to develop the Russian economy, and high-tech trade with Israel especially in the area of nanotechnology33 is a part of his plan. Third, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a major issue in world politics, and Putin would very much like to play a role in its diplomacy, if not in finding a solution to the conflict. For this reason he continued to call for an international peace conference in Moscow and he wanted Israel to attend, so as to build up the role of Russia as a world mediator. By early 2009, perhaps in an effort to convince Israel to attend a Middle East peace conference, and perhaps because it was growing increasingly disenchanted with Hamas, Moscow tilted a bit toward Israel in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, or at least away from Hamas. Thus during the Israeli-Hamas war of December 2008 – January 2009, Russia took a rather even-handed view of the conflict, instead of giving strong backing to Hamas. Moscow also praised the ............................................ 30 Lili Galili, “Russian PM to Open Party Branch in Israel” Ha’aretz, August 21, 2008. 31 Cited in “Russia Accuses Israel of Seling Arms to Georgia”, Jerusalem Post, August 20, 2008. 32 Itar-Tass, “Russian FM Lavrov Praises Israeli Decision to Refrain From Assisting Georgia”, August 19, 2008, FBIS-RUSSIA August 20, 2008. 33 Ria-Novosti, “Russian Nanotechnologies corporation to get R 54 billion in 2010”, October 8, 2009, World News Connection Middle East (Hereafter WNCME) October 8, 2009.

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long-delayed August 2009 Sixth Fatah Congress, with Russia Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko asserting, “the restoration of Palestinian unity on the PLO platform and on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative is an integral part of lasting peace”.34 Putin, now Russia’s Prime Minister, although considered by most analysts to still be Russia’s most powerful leader, was even more explicit in his praise of Fatah, as he stated in greetings to the Congress, “Fatah, the core of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, steadily defends the interests of Palestinians, primarily their right to form a sovereign and viable state”.35 The Russian support was in clear contrast to Hamas which denounced the Fatah Congress. In May 2009 Israel’s new Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, himself an immigrant from the FSU, announced during a visit to Moscow that Israel had agreed to attend the international peace conference there, long desired by Putin, and also called for a strategic dialogue with Russia. This may have been the price Moscow was demanding for holding off on the delivery of SAM-300 missiles to Iran as well as sophisticated missiles and military aircraft to Syria. Lieberman was followed to Moscow both by Israeli President Shimon Peres, and Israel’s new Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, evidently concerned that Russia was about to consummate the sales.36 Perhaps as further incentive for Moscow, Israel agreed to sell it reconnaissance drones, something Russia very much needed, given the poor performance of Russian surveillance equipment in the Georgian war.37 Meanwhile, Russia was having difficulty managing its position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, as was made clear by Moscow’s flipflop over the Goldstone Report which condemned both Israel and Hamas for actions taken during the Israeli invasion of Gaza. In the UN Human Rights Committee, Russia – seeking to win Arab support – voted to approve the report, which had been bitterly criticized by Israel. However, in the UN Gen............................................ 34 Itar-Tass, “Russia Wants Lasting Peace in Middle East-Diplomat”, August 11, 2009, WNCME August 11, 2009. 35 Ibid. 36 Charles Levinson, “Netanyahu’s Secrecy Sparks Anger”, Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2009; Kommersant, “Israel: President Peres Interviewed on Mid East Peace Process, Russia Visit”, August 18, 2009, WNCME, August 18, 2009, and Barak Ravid, “Medvedev: I’ll Review Decision to Sell Iran Anti-Aircraft Missiles” Ha’aretz, August 20, 2009. 37 Piotr Butowski and Anne Musquere, “Israel: Drone Sale to Russia Provides incentive for Domestic Industry: Russian Drones Evolving”, Air and Cosmos, September 22, 2009, WNCME September 23, 2009.

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eral Assembly vote to send the report to the UN Security Council, Moscow abstained, perhaps wishing to assuage Israeli anger or, perhaps, because it might itself be accused in international fora of killing civilians during Russian military operations in the North Caucasus.38 In any case, Moscow’s UNGA vote on the Goldstone Report is a useful point of departure for drawing some conclusions about Russian policy toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict under Putin.

Conclusions The first conclusion that may be drawn from this study of Russian policy toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict is that Putin is following what might be called a “having your cake and eating it too” policy vis-à-vis Israel. In other words, Moscow has been seeking to maintain good bilateral relations with Israel while at the same time providing arms and diplomatic support to Israel’s main enemies – Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hizbollah – in order to enhance the Russian position in the Middle East. So far, at least, Israel has appeared to go along with the Russian strategy, if only to prevent some of the most threatening Russian arms deals from being consummated, such as the SAM-300 agreement with Iran and the Iskander missile agreement with Syria. Thus Israel has agreed to attend the proposed Middle East peace conference in Moscow, stopped arming Georgia, and sold sophisticated military drones to Russia, while also carrying out extensive trade and cultural relations with Russia. Second, Putin has used the Arab-Israeli Conflict to try to thrust Russia back into the center of Middle East diplomacy. By calling for a Middle East peace conference in Moscow, and getting Israel to agree to attend, Russia can demonstrate it is again a factor in Middle East diplomacy. While given the current split between the Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah, each of which rules a separate section of Palestinian territory (although Fatah control is limited by ............................................ 38 Barak Ravid, “Russians Deal Lieberman ‘Slap’ by Endorsing Goldstone”, Ha’aretz, October 18, 2009, Voice of Israel Network B, “Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Criticizes Russia on Gaza Report, Says Efforts to Continue”, October 18, 2009, WNCME October 18, 2009, and Itar-Tass “Russia Abstains on Goldstone Resolution”, November 6, 2009, WNCME, November 6, 2009.

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the Israeli occupation), and the apparent unwillingness of the Netanyahu government of Israel to make any concessions on Jerusalem, the prospects of a successful peace conference in Moscow, if it is held, would appear to be limited. Nonetheless, for Russia, a major role in the peace process itself, rather than the conclusion of a peace agreement, seems to be Putin’s primary objective, as he seeks to demonstrate that Russia is again a major factor in world politics. Third, Moscow has demonstrated a clear interest in expanding economic ties with Israel. Israel is a small, but high-tech country, and is a leader in computer technology and nanotechnology –precisely the areas that both Putin and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev see as critical to help develop the non-energy sectors of the Russian economy. And, these are areas in which neither the Arab states nor Iran can be helpful to Russia, although Iran has sought to establish a nanotechnology sector in its economy. Finally, there is the area of cultural relations between Russia and Israel. Moscow sees itself as the center of the Russian-speaking world, and Israel has the largest Russian-speaking population outside the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Putin appears to see the Russian-speaking community in Israel, made up of immigrants from the FSU, as a possible lever of influence inside Israel, and the ascension of Avigdor Lieberman, an FSU immigrant, to the position of Israel’s Foreign Minister (however limited his real influence), and Lieberman’s apparent eagerness to work with Russia, may reinforce Putin’s hopes that Israel’s Russian-speaking community will form a pro-Russian lobby in Israel. Nonetheless, the current Russian-Israeli relationship is a fragile one. Should Russia go ahead with its SAM-300 and Iskander arms deals, either because of a new chill in US-Russian relations or because the defense and arms sales lobbies in Moscow win the arms sales debate, one could expect a sharp deterioration in Russian-Israeli bilateral relations. Whether such an eventuality occurs, however, is a question only the future can answer.

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O DED E RAN

Israel and the US: Is it really that bad?

The first 18 months of President Obama’s administration sparked a major public outcry both in the US and Israel, reaching unprecedented dimensions of populism, hysteria, and irresponsibility. Many commentators either lacked or ignored the relevant historical perspectives, and in several cases relied on gut feelings rather than on factual evidence. Tensions between the Israeli and the US administrations indeed exist, mostly on the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but they must be examined in their historical and political perspectives before the conclusion is reached that President Obama has in fact broken away from previously held norms in bilateral relations. The issue is so central, sensitive, and crucial to Israel’s long-term strategic assessment that it cannot and should not be dealt with in a populist manner. Since 1967 the major bone of contention between Israel and the US has been the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There has hardly been a moment when the two countries have agreed on the three core issues in this conflict: borders; Jerusalem; and refugees. The US position on the principal core issue – borders – was pronounced as early as December 1969, when then-US Secretary of State William Rogers said, “any change in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations.”1 On 22 December 1969 the Israeli Cabinet not only rejected the Rogers Plan, as it became known, but also adopted a response that David Korn, a senior American diplomat at the time, regarded as a rebuke. The Israeli statement said, “if these proposals were to be carried out, Israel’s security and peace would be in very grave danger. Israel will not be sacrificed by any power policy, and will reject any attempt to impose a forced solution upon it.” And, ............................................ 1

Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website: www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+ Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/9+Statement+by+Secretary+of+State+Rogers-+ 9+Decemb.htm

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“the proposals submitted by the US cannot but be construed by the aggressive Arab rulers as an attempt to appease them at Israel’s expense.” Israel, in other words, indirectly accused the US administration of endangering its security and appeasing the Arabs. Significantly, this language was used by a Labor Party-led Israeli government. Certain Israeli politicians in 2010 would like the current center-right Israeli government to use similar language in its dealings with the US. The 1969 Rogers formula has remained the cornerstone of US policy on this issue, notwithstanding subsequent shifts in nuance and context. Even the letter of April 14, 2004 from President George W. Bush to Prime Minister Sharon, for example, should not be construed as a change in policy. President Bush wrote: In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full return to the armistice lines of 1949. But then the President added, It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.2 He thus subjected changes to the 1949 lines to Palestinian consent. More specifically, it is sufficient to say that the Palestinians calculate the built-up settlement areas as less than 2 percent of the West Bank, while the very far-reaching proposal of former Prime Minister Olmert suggested that Israel retain 6.5 percent, albeit with an almost 1:1 land swap. The Clinton Parameters of December 2000 range from 4–6 percent, certainly less than the 8.5 percent that is on the western side of the security fence according to its current demarcation. In other words, US ideas on borders have long been at odds – at least somewhat – with Israeli approaches. ............................................ 2

Ibid.

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The building of Jewish suburbs beyond the pre-1967 lines, both in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, has caused severe tensions between Israeli governments and US administrations. All US presidents opposed this construction, and President George H. W. Bush went further when, in September 1991, he persuaded the US Congress to delay granting US guarantees to loans Israel raised in the US, for fear that some of the funds would be used for settlement building. Following the Labor Party victory in the June 1992 election, the US President and the Congress approved the loan guarantees. The US has over the years reduced more than $1.5 billion from the loan guarantees, equal to the sum Israel has been estimated by the US to have spent on building settlements.3 As an expression of displeasure with Israel and in a move to push Israel to accept certain US proposals and ideas on how to advance the Israeli-Arab peace process, at least two former US administrations have threatened Israel with the suspension of US arms shipments to Israel. Note that President Obama’s administration has resorted to none of the measures or language used by some of the previous US administrations. Furthermore, in recent days, the US added $205 million to the already substantial aid package for the Israeli “Iron Dome” project against short-range rockets.4 The Israeli, American, and international press predict that the US will come out with its own blueprint for the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even if the White House indeed issues such a formula without consulting and informing Israel in advance, it will not constitute a deviation from a familiar pattern of communication between the two governments. The norm has been the two surprising one another rather than conducting prior consultations and maintaining coordination. The US surprised Israel with the 1969 Rogers Plan, with the October 1, 1977 agreement with the Soviet Union on the guidelines for the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the September 1, 1982 Reagan Plan, with the December 15, 1988 opening of a dialogue with the PLO, and with the December 26, 2000 Clinton proposal. It is quite possible that if and when President Obama decides to issue his own plan on how to solve the Israeli-Palestinian ............................................ 3

Clyde R. Mark, Israel: US Foreign Assistance, Issue Brief for Congress, June 6, 2002: www.FPC.state.gov/documents/organization/11062.pdf; The New York Times, November 26, 2003

4

US-House of Representative Resolution, HR5327.

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conflict, most Israelis – perhaps with too short-lived memories – will not juxtapose it with the list above. Furthermore, most Israelis will likely forget that Israel’s record in not informing the US of major political initiatives is not much shorter. Partly as a result of the US-Soviet Union agreement of October 1, 1977, Israel and Egypt began secret talks that eventually led to President Sadat’s visit to Israel and then to the 1979 Treaty of Peace. The US was not privy to the secret talks. In December 1992 Israel launched secret talks with the PLO, which led to the September 13, 1993 Oslo Accords. The US, which was informed post factum, was left to host the signing ceremony on the White House lawn. Most of the negotiations between Israel and Jordan were also held away from American eyes and ears. From this point of view, one can say that proximity talks between Israel and the Palestinians are a novelty. Ever since the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel this method was used only between Syria and Israel, with Turkey as the go-between. However, relating the conduct of President Obama vis-à-vis the IsraeliPalestinian conflict to the general pattern in US-Israel relations does not mean the administration did not commit errors of judgment and policy. This can equally be said about the current Israeli government. Both the US and the Israeli governments failed in their assessment of the other. Israel overestimated the pressures that dealing with the global crisis would put on the administration, believing it would lower the Middle East on the President’s agenda. It did not fully assess the connection Washington has drawn between dealing with Iran, pulling out from Iraq, and fighting in Afghanistan/Pakistan with the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Prime Minister Netanyahu has therefore failed to present to President Obama a viable action plan that could create a better climate in bilateral relations. For example, indicating willingness in the first meeting in the White House to make a public statement in support of a two-state solution would have reduced many of the tensions that later developed between the two administrations. Instead, Israel is now seen as being coerced by the US into taking certain measures, including making a belated and reluctant statement recognizing the two-state solution. Unless one attributes to the current US administration a deliberate policy of removing the term “special” when describing the relationship, the approach to Israel was not free of errors of judgment. While it is arguable whether

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President Obama’s Cairo speech is an appeasement of the Arabs and Muslims, it was certainly an affront to the Jews and Israel to put the Holocaust on a par with the suffering of the Palestinians. By now it is recognized, including in the US Congress, that President Obama erred in sidestepping Jerusalem while paying visits to several Muslim/Arab capitals. A second error came in the form of a statement by General David Petraeus to the US Senate Armed Services Committee on March 16, 2010: Insufficient progress towards a comprehensive Middle East peace: the enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors present distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests in the AOR (Area of Responsibility [O.E.]). Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large scale armed confrontations. The conflict foments antiAmerican sentiment, due to a perception of US favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of US partnerships with governments and peoples in the AOR and weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and other militant groups exploit that anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas.5 Israeli journalists in Washington hurriedly reported that General Petraeus accused Israel of standing in the US’s way of attaining its interests in the region. One needs very fine linguistic tools to interpret the statement differently. On the other side of the equation, much has been written about the Israeli decision during Vice President Biden’s visit in March 2010 to issue a building permit for 1600 new housing units in a Jerusalem suburb beyond the 1967 line. Describing Israel’s handling of this incident as clumsy is an understatement. Both Israel and the US have employed the traditional “assets” in the battle of words. Well-known American columnists have conveyed the sense of mistrust felt in the White House towards Prime Minister Netanyahu, while on April 15, 2010 the President of the World Jewish Congress published a full............................................ 5

See: www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03%20March/ROA%20Statement%2003-1010.pdf

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page letter to President Obama questioning, “Is it assumed worsening relations with Israel can improve relations with Muslims?” He continued, “Appeasement does not work.”6 The two governments have for now embarked on an effort to lower the flames, as both deem these exchanges running counter to their immediate interests. But the lull is temporary. Both the moratorium on building in the settlements and the 4-month period approved by the Arab League for the proximity talks run their course in September. That may create the first bumper. Further down the road, relations between the two countries could be rocked by a total collapse of Israeli-Palestinian talks, be they direct or indirect, and/or the failure of international efforts to stop the Iranian nuclear project. The failure of the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians may, under Palestinian-Arab pressure, drive the US and its partners in the Quartet to issue a blueprint for establishing a Palestinian state. This would most probably occur without prior consultation with Israel, causing a widening of the rift between Washington and Jerusalem. Failure of the US to veto a resolution at the UN Security Council approving the Palestinian state and its territorial attributes might further strain relations. The statement by General Petraeus clearly links the issues of the peace process between Israel and its neighbors with the US success of dealing with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Even an indirect attempt to pin a US failure on these latter fronts on a failed peace process could further exacerbate relations with Israel. One important consideration has been absent from the debate. The US President, his deputy, the Secretary of State, and the US officialdom all continue to emphasize US commitment to Israel’s security. During his visit to Israel, Vice President Biden stated: I am here to remind you, though I hope you will never forget, that America stands with you shoulder-to-shoulder in facing these threats. President Obama and I represent an unbroken chain of American leaders who have understood this critical, strategic relationship. As the ............................................ 6

Barak Ravid, “World Jewish leader to Obama: Is U.S. committed to Israel’s security?”, Ha’aretz, April 15, 2010.

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President said recently, “I will never waver from ensuring Israel’s security and helping them secure themselves in what is a very hostile region.” President Obama has not only stated those words, he has translated that vow into action in his first years in ways both known to the public and not known to you, as Prime Minister Netanyahu eloquently acknowledged the other day when he and I were meeting and had a short press conference that followed. Beyond providing Israel nearly $3 billion in military aid each and every year, we have reinvigorated defense consultations and redoubled our efforts to ensure that Israel’s […] forces will always maintain a qualitative edge.7 Nonetheless, attention should be paid to the possible damage that has been dealt the overall Israeli posture of deterrence as a result of perceptions among many in the Middle East that statements such as the one by Vice President Biden do not reflect the true state of relations between Israel and the US. The perceptions, valid or false, can become significant elements in a decisionmaking process among the various Middle East players, a risk that has to be seriously considered by key US and Israeli politicians when they make public statements pertaining to bilateral relations. The second half of President Obama’s tenure will be marked by significant developments in the broader Middle East. They will include the thinning of the US presence in Iraq, the crucial stage in blocking Iran’s road to military nuclear capabilities, further stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, and attempts to advance the peace process between Israel and its neighbors. The linkage between these issues – as well as the linkage to other important questions related, for example, to leadership changes in the region – is a matter of legitimate debate. Clearly, the US and Israel stand to lose if this debate weakens them both.

............................................ 7

Vice President Biden’s Speech at Tel Aviv University, March 11, 2010: www.america.gov/st/ texttrans-english/2010/March/20100311123835eaifas0.9307062.html

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K ENNETH W. S TEIN

US-Israeli Relations 1947–2010: The View from Washington

Introduction For its first 150 years, the United States avoided international entanglements. Increasing competition for resources, defending democracies, and promoting freedom abroad ended America’s isolationist predispositions. In the nearly one hundred years since World War I, the US has been involved in nearly every region of the world. Steadily, the US was lured into Europe, Africa, South America, the Middle East and Asia. America chose allies based on a mixture of US strategic needs, philosophical compatibilities, and regional leaders’ political behavior. By 2011, the US had more foreign entanglements then it could properly manage. As for the Middle East, the US became dramatically ensnared in the region following World War II. There were at least eight broad motivations for its involvement. The US aimed to: (1) insure stability in the region after Britain’s withdrawal from South Asia and the Middle East, (2) respond to the Cold War and Soviet expansionism the world over, including to the strategic oil-rich Middle East and North Africa, (3) preserve the political stability of surrounding Moslem states, (4) define and apply a position on the Palestine question, (5) limit and then supply military assistance to most Middle Eastern states, (6) protect physical access to and through Middle Eastern waterways for commercial and trade purposes, (7) secure a flow of Middle Eastern oil at reasonable prices, and (8) eventually safeguard Israel’s security and sovereignty. In addition, under Republican and Democratic administrations, the US has: offered to spread human rights values to countries and leaders in the region; suggested to change regimes selectively; promoted democratic systems of governance; and requested expanded roles for women. Never consistent in implementing these values across the region, the US was often criticized for having double

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standards. Values were applied selectively and demands made with varying degrees of intensity. At mid-century, America’s geographic locus of activity was limited to regions near the eastern Mediterranean; by the end of the 20th century, America found itself actively extended from the Atlantic Ocean in North Africa through the Arabian/Persian Gulf into Southwest Asia. The most significant impetus for US engagement in the Middle East was competition with the Soviet Union. American fear of Communism’s spread into Turkey, Greece and the eastern Mediterranean generated the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957). The fear of Soviet encroachment into the Persian Gulf and other regions of the world evoked the Nixon Doctrine (1969) and then the Carter Doctrine (1980). The Kennedy (1961), Johnson (1965) and Reagan (1981) Doctrine were also intermittently applied to prevent Communism’s spread or the Soviet Union’s growth. Fostering a strong American-Turkish relationship from the late 1940s forward was part of a broader US policy to contain Soviet southward expansion into Middle Eastern states. The US worked to limit and weaken Arab state associations with Moscow and, where possible, created alliance systems and/or bilateral relations with Arab leaders. Rebukes from Arab leaders, such as those from Egyptian President Gamal Nasser toward the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, pushed the United States into deeper relationships with other Middle Eastern countries. Nasser’s alliance with Moscow, and his own heated Cold War with Arab states1, significantly added to the Eisenhower administration’s decision (1957) to tighten relations with Israel. Increasingly, Washington saw Israel as a stalwart against Communism, and steadily gave Israel military support. Fear of a communist regime taking hold in Lebanon caused the US to send a small number of marines to Beirut. Referring to the US sending these marines to Lebanon, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said, “if Israel [were the] victim of unprovoked aggression to destroy it, our response would be just as good as in [the] case of Lebanon.”2 Arab leaders’ political decisions to assert control over their neighbors further alienated American support. In 1963, Nasser’s entry into Yemen caused the Kennedy administration to clarify ............................................ 1

For the best book on the subject see Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958–1967. A Study of Ideology in Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

2

As quoted in Douglas Little, “The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957–1968”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 4 (November 1993), pp. 564.

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its moral and political commitment to the integrity and well-being of Israel, and said it “would come to Israel’s assistance if Israel were the victim of aggression.”3 A decade later in September 1970, when Syria and the PLO chose to threaten King Hussein’s regime in Jordan, the Nixon administration rewarded Israel with increased foreign and military aid for helping Washington protect the viability and sustenance of the Hashemite Kingdom. In the aftermath of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, Syria embraced Moscow while Israel further improved its security relationship with the US. In the Cold War competition for allies, the US scored perhaps its greatest success against the USSR (outside of the fall of the Berlin Wall) when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and then his successor Husni Mubarak left Moscow’s orbit and embraced the United States. Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait caused Saudi Arabia, otherwise emphatically reluctant to have foreign troops on its territory, to invite a coalition of forces to defend the Kingdom’s territorial integrity and restore Kuwait’s sovereignty. With Arab state support against Saddam Hussein, the US led that effort to secure oil access for itself and for the rest of the world. The aftermath of the 1991 war saw historically reluctant Arab states endorse an American-sponsored Madrid Middle East Peace Conference with Israel; it was accompanied by increased US basing privileges in the Persian Gulf. The attack on America on 9/11 prompted President Bush to topple the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq; it was not difficult for Israel to further align itself as a reliable strategic US asset. Arab states’ reluctance to assist in ending the sectarian violence in Iraq did nothing to deepen US-Arab relations. Syria’s persistent domination of Lebanon, supply of arms to Hizballah and Hamas, as well as allowing militants to use Syrian territory to undermine American nation-building initiatives in Iraq, all inflamed US-Syrian relations; that helped delay the unfolding of a Syrian-Israeli negotiating track. By 2011, Iran’s regional aggressiveness drove many Middle Eastern states to bolster their security and strategic relations with the US. The unexpected February 2011 change of governments in Egypt, again reinforced Israel’s role as a stable ally for the United States. It is easy to see why since World War II, the political choices made by Middle Eastern leaders to aggressively impose their ............................................ 3

Little, “The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957–1968”, pp. 572 and 583.

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will over neighbors, or align with Moscow, or implode politically have repeatedly defined strategic US decisions, which included bolstering friendships, sustaining alliances, and keeping Israel close. After the June 1967 War, the US entered into active Arab-Israeli conflict mediation, taking over for botched and ineffective United Nations efforts at peace-seeking, peace-making, and peace-keeping. Could any decision have been more detrimental or catastrophic for maintaining peace in the Middle East, than that made by United Nations Secretary General U Thant to precipitously withdraw the UN peace-keeping forces that separated Egyptian and Israeli troops between 1957 and May 1967? In response to this move, Nasser immediately loaded Sinai with troops, ratcheting up the unavoidable prospect of an Arab-Israeli confrontation. U Thant provided Nasser no “ladder” from which to climb down from what was an inevitable war with Israel. Interestingly, Israeli diplomats pleaded with the UN Secretary General to do just that, and by the time U Thant considered it, Nasser was inevitably sliding toward the June war.4 In a June 19, 1967 speech following the war, President Lyndon Johnson outlined the framework for a negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The contents of his speech were woven into United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (November 1967). Johnson’s five points evolved into: (1) land for peace, (2) the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories taken in the conflict, (3) a solution to the refugee problem, (4) insuring the territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the region, and (5) freedom of navigation through international waterways.5 Subsequently, the UN appointed Gunnar Jarring as Arab-Israeli conflict mediator. He floundered miserably in his role, leaving the door open for United States Arab-Israeli conflict management. In the early 1970s, US President Richard Nixon assigned US State Department officials the task of delving into the conflict’s mediation, and found the USSR unwilling to fully participate.6 Since then, almost three dozen special ............................................ 4

Author interview with Gideon Rafael, March 25, 1992, Jerusalem, Israel.

5

President Lyndon Johnson, National Foreign Policy Conference of Educators, Washington, DC, June 19, 1967, as quoted in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, Office of the Federal Residence, Washington, DC, June 1967. For the most comprehensive review of UNSC 242’s textural development, see The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, UN Security Council Resolution 242 Building Block of Peacemaking, Washington, D.C. 1993.

6

Author interview with Joseph Sisco, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs at the time, February 25, 1992, Washington, DC.

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envoys and Secretaries of State have tried their hand in the on-again/off-again efforts to resolve aspects of the conflict. American dominance of Arab-Israeli mediation witnessed its highest levels of presidential engagement during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations (1968–1981), and firm presidential support for rejuvenating the negotiation process during the George Bush Sr. administration (1988–1992). America persevered in the 1970s, mediating Egyptian-Israeli and Syria-Israeli Disengagement Agreements, the Camp David Accords, and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.7 The US succeeded in bringing Arab states and Israel together at the Geneva (December 1973), Madrid (October 1991), Annapolis (November 2007) and Washington Peace Conferences (September 2010). In 2000, President Bill Clinton tried restoring both the Syrian-Israeli and the Palestinian-Israeli tracks; President Barack Obama did the same in 2009–2010 with the assignment of another special negotiating envoy. These were serious efforts, but Middle Eastern leaders were not ready to specifically define borders and end the conflict between them. While the first substantive American support for Israel’s military requests came in the late 1950s,8 massive provision of American military assistance to the Jewish state started after the October 1973 War. As the Egyptian-Israeli negotiating process unfolded, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and subsequent presidents provided enormous financial and military support to Jerusalem and Cairo in order to maintain the peace between them. Thirty years later, US presidential engagement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy is expected, and even demanded, by leaders throughout the region. In the 1980s, the US plunged into broader Middle Eastern politics: Washington took Iraq’s side in its war with Iran (1980–1988); it helped push the Soviets out of Afghanistan (late 1980s); it restrained Khomeynism and Iranian hegemonic policies; it protected shipping to and through the Persian Gulf with the reflagging of Kuwait tankers (1988); it also cobbled together a broad coalition of military forces from more than two dozen nations leading to the military ejection of Saddam Hussein’s takeover of Kuwait (1991); it tossed the Taliban out of Afghanistan (2001–2002); it overthrew Saddam Hussein’s ............................................ 7

Kenneth W. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, New York: Routledge, 1999.

8

See Douglas Little, “The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957– 1968”.

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regime in Iraq (2003); and under both Presidents Bush II and Obama, it actively advocated to Middle Eastern leaders the need to greater freedoms to their inhabitants. Today the US continues to search for and destroy Al-Qaeda networks. The US has pulled back from actively supporting selective regime change but remains swamped by yet inconclusive nation-building forays in Afghanistan and Iraq. On January 11, 2011, Vice President Biden told Afghan leaders that the US was prepared to stay in Afghanistan beyond the proposed 2014 withdrawal date, if the Afghan leaders so wished.9 At no time previously has the US been so broadly and physically ensconced in the Middle East, with a myriad of bilateral relationships from Pakistan to Morocco, including the presence of a huge number of American military personnel, expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars aimed at stabilizing the region, diplomatic forays, covert military action, coalition building to thwart international terrorism, limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and curbing Iranian hegemonic intentions. In 2011, matters pertaining to Israel, the Palestinians, and Arab-Israeli conflict mediation have become only a small part of a vast array of complicated issues on America’s Middle Eastern foreign policy plate, most of them totally unrelated to whether there is or is not a negotiated solution to the conflict. For the previous six decades, choices by Arab leaders to shun US overtures and support have given Israel every opportunity to bolster, deepen, and broaden its relationship with Washington.

Longevity, depth and difficulties in the US-Israeli relationship10 From the American vantage point, at least three components tightly tie the US-Israeli relationship: mutual strategic interests, shared values, and American ............................................ 9

Remarks by Vice-President Joe Biden, January 11, 2011, “Its Afghans who must build their Nation”: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/01/11/vice-president-biden-afghanistan-it-safghans-who-must-build-their-nation.

10 The number of articles, books, commentaries, and blog entries written about the US-Israeli relationship is in the hundreds. Some are found as notes in this article. The most comprehensive are Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict Making America’s Middle East Policy From Truman to Reagan, Chicago: University Press, 1985; and Steven L. Spiegel, “The American-Israeli Relationship”, Robert Lieber, “US-Israeli Relations Since 1948”, MERIA 2, no 3 (1998): http:// meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue3/jv2n3a2.html; and Steven L. Spiegel, “The American-Israeli Relationship: Past and Future”, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 2, no 3 (2008), pp. 15–27.

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public opinion. A fourth and often understated core bond is the attitude of American officials, Republican or Democrat, who have positive feelings toward Jews, Judaism or Israel, often shaped by their upbringings. Mutual strategic interests evolved slowly and unevenly from the 1950s onward, with the second Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations being the first to tag US relations with Israel as “strategic.” From an Israeli viewpoint these three elements are augmented by two other critically important additives: a centurylong Zionist desire (and now the Israeli imperative) to secure protection and diplomatic recognition. Israel acted to preserve alliances with key rulers and great powers. Israel built security relationships with Britain, France and the United States, and later ventured to develop its own military industry. Sustaining security also meant developing economic strength. Israel’s desires to be secure and obtain recognition were achieved despite Arab states’ efforts to economically boycott and politically delegitimize Israel. From an American Jewish viewpoint, Israel became a focal point for Jewish identity, building pride that there was a Jewish state that could protect Jewish interests both within and beyond Israel’s borders and save Jews from peril. The immigration and absorption of Holocaust survivors, 800,000 Jews from Arab lands in the late 1940s and 1950s, the rescuing of hijacked Jews from Entebbe in July 1976, and the absorption of more than a million Russian and Ethiopian Jews in the 1980s and 1990s, all engendered self-esteem, self-confidence in being Jewish, and secular as well as religious reverence for Israel. For any Israeli government, its security and political relationship with the US is the most important foreign policy priority. Over the years that has meant its relationship with Washington is often more important than its relationships with Arab neighbors and/or progress in Arab-Israeli negotiations. It is for these reasons that Israeli prime ministers, either directly or through their ambassadors in Washington, personally manage relations between Jerusalem and Washington, rarely giving foreign ministers or other Israeli officials control of the vital US relationship. In the last four decades, while the US has been actively engaged in ArabIsraeli mediation, it has often disagreed with Israel over Israel’s management of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and Jerusalem (the three major bones of contention were over continued building of settlements in all the territories, erecting housing units in Jerusalem, and in managing the lives of the Palestinian population). Friction from these differences remains a constant

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in the US-Israeli relationship. However, their common interests and shared values trump the differences and disagreements that regularly arise in an otherwise firm US-Israeli relationship. US-Israeli commonalities are structured on the defense of liberty, protecting individual rights, self-determination, freedom of worship, democratic principles, a common Judeo-Christian biblical past, the promotion of free trade, commerce and support of a meritocracy. For three centuries, Americans have had a passionate interest in Judaism, the Holy Land and Israel. Philanthropic, educational, and missionary links have connected Americans with the Middle East. Other links between Israel and Americans include basic common philosophical grounding in Judeo-Christian origins and ethics, and an affinity for the Old Testament and the prophets.11 Among Christians who founded the United States, philo-Semitism was a core concept. Puritans, for example, saw themselves as a new chosen people in a new Promised Land. The Liberty Bell at Independence Hall in Philadelphia quotes the Hebrew Bible (Leviticus 25:10), “Proclaim liberty throughout the land, to all the inhabitants thereof.” John Winthrop, governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the 1600s, and President Abraham Lincoln saw themselves, as Jews did, as Puritans and as a “covenantal” people.12 There have been many strategic elements in the broader US-Israeli relationship. Much of it has to do with containing or limiting instability and preserving individual rights. It has included containment of anti-Soviet influence in the region and now restraining militant and nefarious Islamic ideologies, opposing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, collaborating against international terrorism, limiting the aggressive and hegemonic interests of Iran, supporting the political stability and sovereignty of moderate Arab states, sharing of strategic intelligence, and finding equitable ways to solve aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. American public opinion has continuously shown its ............................................ 11 There are a number of excellent books and articles dealing with the US and the Middle East. For the most readable and magisterial overview of US involvement in the Middle East, see Michael Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East: 1776 to the Present, New York: Norton and Company, 2007. 12 For an excellent popular as well as scholarly assessment of Jews and Judaism in the minds and behavior of non-Jews see Adam Garfinkle, Jewcentricity: Why the Jews are praised, blamed, and used to explain just about everything, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009, especially, pp. 93–146. The discussion here about Christian familiarity, association, and identification with Judaism and modern Israel is barely a small fraction of the literature written on these topics. An excellent overview is David Brog, Standing with Israel Why Christians Support the Jewish State, Lake Mary, FL: Front Line, 2006.

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pro-Israeli sympathies to be at more than fifty per cent, sometimes spiking to seventy per cent. 13 In addition to these factors, the personal attitudes of foreign and American leaders have entrenched many close relationships with Zionism and Israel. Most of these have been positive, though some have not. Over time, the vast majority of American politicians have accepted, endorsed, and supported Israel’s right to exist and to protect itself. For more than six decades, key politicians and decision-makers have warmly acknowledged their identification with Jews, Judaism, Zionism, and Israel. Among them were Harry S. Truman, Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter, George W. Bush, Barak Obama, and Joe Biden. Truman recognized Israel within moments of its declaration as a state in May 1948. Previously as Senator, Vice-President, and President, he advocated for the assistance of Jews suffering in Europe. His core understanding of Jews and Judaism went back to his Baptist upbringing in Missouri, where he read the Bible and developed “a sense of appropriateness about the Jewish return to Palestine.”14 Yet, Truman understood that his State Department vigorously favored the desire of Arab leaders to prevent Jewish immigration to post-war Palestine, preventing Zionism’s reality in a state. Truman struggled against the State Department which believed it, not the President, should decide on policy concerning the Arab world and the Palestine issue.15 Lyndon Johnson, who in June 1967 philosophically outlined United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, had a Baptist grandfather who told the young Lyndon to, “take care of the Jews, G-d’s chosen people.”16 Johnson, like many presidents, distinguished between support of Israel and support of Israeli policies. Johnson said in January 1968:

............................................ 13 “Support for Israel in US at 63%, Near Record High,” Gallup Poll, February 24, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/126155/support-israel-near-record-high.aspx 14 Robert J. Donavan, Conflict and Crisis, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945–1948, New York: Norton and Company, 1977, p. 386. 15 See Allis Radosh and Ronald Radosh, A Safe Haven: Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, New York: Harper, 2009, pp. 47–60; For a review of American anti-Zionist attitudes as seen from a Jewish Agency professional see Eliyahu Elath, Struggle for Statehood, Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1979 [in Hebrew], vol. 1, pp. 448–450. 16 Garfinkle, Jewcentricity, pp. 97–98.

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We can’t support an Israel that sits tight [vis-à-vis the territories]. The Israelis should be avoiding permanent moves in [the] occupied lands foreswearing nuclear weapons and missiles. [Israeli Prime Minister] Eshkol could have the Skyhawks, but unless Israel endorses UN Resolution 242 and renews its pledge not to go nuclear, there will be no phantoms.17 President Jimmy Carter’s character and personality were shaped by his Baptist roots and deep knowledge of the Bible. In March 1983, Carter remarked while on one of our three lengthy trips to the Middle East, while viewing Christian holy sites in Damascus, and comparing Judaism and Christianity, “G-d looked out for the Jewish people.”18 Despite Carter’s tough policies toward Israel in the 1970s and his thoroughly anti-Israel attitudes later in life, he was driven to appreciate Jews if not always embrace them, an indication of which was his willingness to surround himself with a myriad of advisers with Jewish backgrounds as president and in his post-presidency. President Carter was willing to offer innovative suggestions for Israel’s future security. He said in March 1977: The Arab nations, the Israeli nation, have to agree on permanent and recognized borders, where sovereignty is legal as mutually agreed. Defense lines may or may not conform in the foreseeable future to those legal borders. There may be extensions of Israeli defense capability beyond the permanent and recognized borders (…).19 However, less than a year later, Carter sought to punish Israel because of its behavior vis-à-vis settlement expansion. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Adviser, Carter, “increasingly frustrated by Begin’s provocations on the settlements, decided to increase the number of [air] planes ............................................ 17 Quoted in Little, “The United States and Israel, 1957–1968”, pp. 579. 18 From 1983–2006, I served as Middle East Fellow of the Carter Center in Atlanta where President Carter articulated is views on a variety of issues in his post-presidency. For the first ten of those years, I was his primary adviser on Middle Eastern affairs and had hundreds of hours of conversations with him about the region, the negotiating process, and American foreign policy options in the Middle East. 19 Remarks by Jimmy Carter, March 9, 1977, The President’s News Conference, The American Presidency Project: www.americanpresidency.org. On borders, President George Bush (II) in 2004, made a similar suggestion to Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, in fact endorsing a change from the precarious pre-June 1967 War borders.

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to Egypt.”20 Brzezinski also noted, “the package deal of selling aircraft simultaneously to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel, was a strategy to paralyze the powerful Israel lobby on the Hill.”21 George W. Bush, at the end of his second term as president, on the occasion of speaking at the Israeli parliament intoned, “the alliance between our governments is unbreakable, yet the source of our friendship runs deeper than any treaty. It is grounded in the shared spirit of our people, the bonds of the Book, the ties of the soul.” Bush continued, “when William Bradford stepped off the Mayflower in 1620, he quoted the words of Jeremiah: ‘Come let us declare in Zion the word of God’. The founders of my country saw a new promised land and bestowed upon their towns names like Bethlehem and New Canaan. And in time, many Americans became passionate advocates for a Jewish state.”22 And in his June 2009 presentation at Cairo University, President Barack Obama noted, “America’s strong bonds with Israel are well known. This bond is unbreakable. It is based upon cultural and historical ties.”23 Later in the same speech, Obama said, “the United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. It is time for these settlements to stop.”24 Vice President Biden, in his March 2010 speech in Israel where he noted that Israel had no greater friend than himself, went on to chide their settlement policies. He noted his long-term identification with Israel: It started at my dinner table with my father, who you would refer to as a righteous Christian. ... My father’s support for Israel (…) generated a feeling for Israel that began in my gut and went to my heart, and the older I got matured in my mind … my mother and my father often spoke about the special connection between the Jewish people and this land.25 ............................................ 20 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981, New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983, p. 247–249. 21 Ibid. 22 Prepared Text of President George W. Bush speech before the Israeli parliament, May 15, 2008: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121083798995894943.html 23 Remarks by President Barack Obama, Cairo University, June 4, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09 24 Ibid. 25 Remarks by Vice-President Joseph Biden, “The Enduring Partnership Between the United States and Israel”, Tel Aviv University, March 11, 2010: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarksvice-president-biden-enduring-partnership-between-united-states-and-israel

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Regardless of which party controls the Oval Office, there is an almost unbreakable continuity in presidential attitudes towards Jews and Israel: a deep and unwavering commitment to Israeli security and well-being, an acknowledgement that Israel’s existence is in the US national interest; all this despite the fact that there is frequent and sharp disagreement between the US and Israel over territorial issues, and the pace and content of the Arab-Israeli negotiating process.

Sustaining, Shaping and Managing the US-Israeli relationship Public support for insuring Israeli security has always been high among both Democrats and Republicans.26 Some policy-makers have emphatically stated however, that lobbying for Israel was and is a direct and dangerous impingement upon their professional prerogative to make policies free of influence and pressure from significantly vocal, legal, and effective pro-Israel groups. Since the late 1940s, some policy-makers have taken the view that any positive policies toward Israel could endanger relations with Moslem and Arab states. In January 1948, Moshe Shertok, Head of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, engaged Loy Henderson and other American officials at one of numerous high-level meetings at the State Department. Shertok sensed that Henderson was opposed to all of the requests that he and Major Aubry Eban made for military assistance and political support from the United Nations and the US. Shertok believed that Henderson, previously the American ambassador to Iraq and a close adviser to George Kennan the head of the Policy Staff at the Department, had given him and Eban a “frigid” welcome.27 The assessment was an understatement. Henderson, by his own admission in an interview in later years, acknowledged that as a State Department official he was “rabidly anti-Zionist.”28 Henderson and Kennan were unalterably opposed to the ............................................ 26 See Amnon Cavari, “Courting the American Public: An Elite View to American Public Support of Israel”, Association for Israel Studies, 25th Conference, June 3, 2009, Beersheba, Israel and Amnon Cavari, “The Determinants of American Public Support for Israel”, Association for Israel Studies, 26th Conference, May 10, 2010, Toronto, Canada. 27 David Horowitz, State in the Making, New York: Alfred a. Knopf, 1953, p. 127. 28 Oral History Interview with Loy Henderson, June 14, 1973, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, paragraph 100.

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creation of the Jewish state even after the US voted in favor of the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.29 Thirty years later, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s National Security Adviser acknowledged that he intentionally devised a “strategy to paralyze the powerful Israeli lobby on the Hill.”30 Each Israeli Prime Minister has rejected and pushed back American efforts to impose limitations on Israel’s independent decision-making. When US Secretary of State Rogers announced in 1969 his outline for a negotiated settlement to the conflict which included Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 lines, the Israeli government immediately rejected it. Israel had not been consulted. When Jimmy Carter publicly suggested that Israel might have to negotiate with the PLO, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin was “livid”31 that Carter was telling the Israelis what to do and doing so in public and without prior consultation. From September 1978 forward, Menachem Begin publicly disagreed with Jimmy Carter’s incorrect assertion that Israel had promised the night before the Camp David negotiations ended to introduce a full moratorium on all settlement construction until the end of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. After the Reagan administration scolded Israeli Prime Minister Begin for destroying the Iraqi reactor in 1981, Begin delivered a scathing reply that Israel was not a “banana republic”, suggesting that the US would not tell Israel what to do when it came to security. In 1982, when President Reagan announced his plan for the future of the West Bank without consulting Israel, Prime Minister Begin rejected the idea out of hand. In mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict, American officials often heard Israeli leaders claim, as Israeli Prime Minister Shamir did in 1991, that “the US is determined to force Israel from the territories,” to which American Secretary of State James Baker replied, “that [the Israelis] aren’t serious about negotiating peace.”32

............................................ 29 Report by the Policy Planning Staff on Position of the United States With Respect to Palestine, January 19, 1948, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume V (1948), pp. 546–554. 30 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, pp. 247–249. 31 Author Interview with Hanan Bar-On, Deputy Chief of Mission Israeli Embassy in Washington, November 12, 1992, Jerusalem, Israel. 32 James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992, New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1995, p. 493.

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Finally, American officials have explicitly stated that American interests in the Middle East are far greater than only a relationship with Israel. Each president has sought some equilibrium between often competing regional interests. In 1969, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joe Sisco succinctly summed up this attitude to Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s Ambassador to the United States: Our interests in the Middle East do not center on Israel alone. Our moral and practical commitment to Israel is by no means toward everything Israel wants or does. Let me tell you frankly: If our friendship with Israel is the only thing the United States is left with in the Middle East, that will be a catastrophic setback for American policy. We must work for a political solution [to the Arab-Israeli conflict] because it is the only thing that will safeguard our own array of [national] interests in the region.33 In December 1975, in a private meeting with the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger characterized American policy toward Israel: We don’t need Israel for influence in the Arab world. On the contrary, Israel does us more harm than good in the Arab world. We can’t negotiate about the existence of Israel, but we can reduce its size to historical proportions. If the issue is the existence of Israel, we can’t cooperate. But if the issue is more normal borders, we can cooperate (…). We want the survival of Israel but not dominating the area. What they want is what you predict—that they be the only friends. We want other friends, to reduce that argument.34

............................................ 33 Remarks by Joseph Sisco, Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, US Department of State to Israel Ambassador to the US., Yitzhak Rabin, circa June 1969, as quoted in Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, Boston: Little Brown and Co, 1979, p. 149. 34 US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State to Saddun Hammadi, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 17, 1975 as quoted in Kenneth W. Stein, “Henry Kissinger to Iraq in 1975: Can We Reduce Israel’s Size?”, Middle East Quarterly 13, no. 4 (2006), pp. 71–78.

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Conclusions The US-Israeli relationship is important to both countries. While the US has special foreign relationships with Britain, Canada, Mexico, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Israel and a host of other states,35 US Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. Lewis put it exactly: “The relationship [with Israel] is deeper and wider than government to government, it is unique among all our relationships in the world.”36 Lewis went on to describe the US-Israeli relationship as existing like a Catholic marriage of old: you can love each other, yell at each other, disagree with each other, even leave each other for a period of time, but you do not get a divorce. Jimmy Carter (1977), Yitzhak Rabin (1992), and George W. Bush (2000) have all described the relationship as “special”. Israel is among more than a dozen countries that have a free trade agreement with the United States. Since World War II, Israel has received by far the most foreign aid of any country, outside of the expenditure to topple Saddam Hussein and rebuild Iraq. Unlike the strong US treaty relationship with NATO, the US has no formal treaty with Israel. However a spider web of interconnections ties the two countries inextricably together. They consist in the form of verbal stipulations of support that exist in US law, memoranda of understandings, congressional statements, presidential and bureaucratic assurances, and official alliances. The most forthright example covering military matters is the US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation Agreement (November 1981), signed by Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger.37 It was aimed at curbing Soviet-controlled forces in the Middle East and became operational with the pre-positioning of US military material in Israel, additional military supplies for Israel, and official strategic collaboration between the two countries. On most matters affecting Israel’s security there has rarely been a US deviation from support for Israel’s needs to defend itself. For the ............................................ 35 For an excellent discussion of the US-Israel special relationship, see Mitchell G. Bard and Daniel Pipes, “How Special is the US-Israeli Relationship”, Middle East Quarterly 4, no. 2 (1997), pp. 41– 48; Gil Ehrenkranz, “How the United States has benefited from its Alliance with Israel”, MERIA, (Online Journal), June 2010: http://www.gloria-center.org/meria/2010/06/ehrenkranz.html 36 Remarks by Samuel W. Lewis, Conference on the US-Israeli relationship, Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, Miami, Florida, January 17, 2011. Lewis was US ambassador to Israel from 1977–1986. 37 The SCA was drafted and signed between Israel’s June 1981 attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and Israel’s June 1982 invasion of Lebanon. On both accounts, President Reagan scolded Israel in public and private, but the SCA was not suspended.

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fiscal year 2011, the Obama administration requested $3 billion in foreign military financing to Israel. According to the State Department’s budget, the justification for these foreign operations was as follows: .

U.S. assistance will help ensure that Israel maintains its qualitative military edge over potential threats, and prevent a shift in the security balance of the region. U.S. assistance is also aimed at ensuring for Israel the security it requires to make concessions necessary for comprehensive regional peace.38 Differences in military assistance have historically occurred over what Israel perceives as necessary to maintain its qualitative military edge and pace in acquiring weapons systems. The most famous difference of opinion about Israel’s desire to receive military equipment and the US readiness to provide it, occurred during the first week of the October 1973 War, when the US temporarily delayed military equipment to Israel.39 Describing the discrepancies on assessing military and diplomatic needs of both countries, David Korn, a career US State Department diplomat noted that “for the United States it is a policy matter, for the Israelis these [decisions] are life and death issues.”40 The May 2010 National Security Strategy outlined general US interests abroad and stipulated a suggested outline for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. It called for “a Jewish state of Israel, with true security, acceptance, and rights for all Israelis; and a viable, independent Palestine with contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967 and realizes the potential of the Palestinian people.”41 For religious, moral, historical, and strategic reasons, Americans overwhelmingly support Israel’s right to exist as a state. American evangelicals, other Christians, and most American Jews find enormous philosophical and ............................................ 38 Jeremy Sharp, “US Foreign Aid to Israel,” US Congressional Research Service, September 2010: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf 39 For a full discussion of the resupply issue during the October 1973 War, see Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp. 78–79. 40 Author Interview with David Korn, October 29, 1992, Washington, DC. Korn served in numerous State Department posts dealing with the Middle East including Political Officer, US Embassy Israel, 1967–1971, a stint on the Policy Planning Staff, as staff on various diplomatic visits to the region, at high-level conferences, and finally as Office Director for Arab-Israel Affairs, 1979–1981. 41 For full text of the National Security Strategy, May 2010 see: www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf

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identity nourishment in supporting Israel. Increased political instability within Arab states, the lack of unanimity between them, and intrusive Iranian influence throughout the region, suggest that for at least the intermediate future, support for the US-Israeli alliance will not diminish despite Washington’s multiple interests in the region and its continued engagement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy which often stir tension in the relationship. Although today slightly modified, the factors that initially unfolded the US-Israeli relationship and made it grow, stumble, and navigate successfully through tough times, remain essentially the same today as they were in 1948.

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Israel and (in?) Latin America

It is not surprising that Israel has not developed a coherent regional policy towards Latin America as a whole. The subcontinent in itself is too heterogeneous a concept to be workable. It includes both huge and relatively developed countries such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, as well as small and impoverished countries like Haiti – whose development standards are more akin to those in Central Africa than in America – or Nicaragua, another relatively small country ravaged by war, poverty and harsh political confrontation. Still, administratively, the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry – like many others in the world, especially in countries far from Latin America – treats the area as a whole with a South-North division that does not carry much meaning. Latin American countries are far from Israel and are not powerful or rich enough to attract the political attention of the Israeli elites. They are seen as part of a periphery, less important than the USA and Canada, Europe, Russia, China and India. The Jewish communities in Latin America are not the largest in the Diaspora. Still, those in Argentina include hundreds of thousands of members. In Brazil, they amount to nearly one hundred thousand, and those of Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay have tens of thousands of members, while there are other, smaller communities in Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, Panama, Costa Rica and the rest of the Central American and Caribbean countries, numbering thousands and sometimes only hundreds of members.1 They cannot be measured only quantitatively because social integration, high levels of education and economic progress have placed many local Jewish personalities in Latin America in positions of saliency in many fields and also in the political arena. ............................................ 1

Sergio DellaPergola, “World Jewish Population 2002”, American Jewish Year Book 102, New York, 2002: www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/Jewish+Education/Compelling+Content/ Eye+on+Israel/Demography/World+Jewish+Population+2002.htm

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It is true that Jewish personalities or personalities of Jewish origin, in Latin America, as everywhere else, do not necessarily have a specifically positive attitude towards Israel as a sovereign state. On the contrary: those prominent in politics and various areas of society may distance themselves from Israel. In many instances, Jews have been accused of dual loyalty (towards Israel and their own country) and anti-Semitic arguments still flourish in contemporary Latin America.2 Still, the Jewish presence and the Jewish factor, in every country, including in the Latin American countries, are generally viewed by Israel as a state in positive terms and from many angles. Israel’s self-depiction as a Jewish and Democratic State with legislation – the Law of Return – that grants almost automatic citizenship to immigrant Jews, has developed not only an image of shelter against the persecution of Jews as such wherever they may be, but also has experienced involvement in crises affecting Jews and Jewish communities, not only on anti-Semitic grounds, but in general.3 Since the countries of Latin America have lived through a succession of these kinds of crises in the last 60 years, Israel, at various levels, has found itself involved in them, trying to play its role of Jewish State. We have to take into consideration that although the presence of Jews in the Americas began with the Spanish and Portuguese colonization of the continent, massive Jewish migration to this area, especially to Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina, began at the end of the nineteenth century and most of it took place during the twentieth century. This has to be pointed out because Jewish migrations to Latin America were partially carried out as part of land colonizing projects developed in order to support large groups of impoverished Jews in the Pale of Settlement of the Russian Empire, suffering also from politically induced anti-Semitism and pogroms. The efforts made by Baron Maurice de Hirsch’s Jewish Colonization Association and other Jewish philanthropists to develop Jewish agricultural colonies in Latin America, Canada and the Middle East ran in parallel to those made by Baron Rothschild as part of ............................................ 2

Maria Luiza Tucci Carneiro (ed.), O Antisemitismo nas Americas, Sao Paulo: EDSP, 2007. This is the most complete and updated work in this area, soon to be translated into English in Canada.

3

On this subject see Sammy Smooha, “Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype”, Israel Studies 2, no. 2 (1997), pp. 198–241; Ruth Gavison, “Jewish and Democratic? A Rejoinder to the ‘Ethnic Democracy’ Debate”, Israel Studies 4, no. 1 (1999), pp. 44–72.

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the Zionist project in the Middle East, in what was to become Israel. The main difference was the lack of a political project in the case of Latin American Jewish colonization, while Zionism had, towards the end of the nineteenth century, clearly defined political objectives. In parallel, other migrations from the Middle East – the declining Ottoman Empire – were taking place to various countries in Latin America. Palestinian Christians from the Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour area were migrating to Chile. Later, other Palestinians were to migrate to Honduras – the area of San Pedro Sula – and other locations in Central America and northern South America. Christian Lebanese and Syrians from various denominations migrated mainly to Brazil and Argentina but also to Mexico and other countries.4 Armenians also went westward and established communities in the main Latin American metropolises. In the interwar period, organized Jewish communities in Latin America almost always included various Zionist groups and were also worried with the limitations of Jewish migration to the various countries in the area, especially after the ascent to power of the Nazis in Germany and the annexation of Austria. Latin American migration policies, following those of the USA, became restricted. In the second half of the 1930s the major recipients of migrants, Argentina and Brazil, issued secret consular orders not to issue visas to Jewish potential immigrants. Jews still made it into these and other countries. In many cases they obtained their visa in a corrupt way, bribing consular officers. The Zionist leadership in Mandate Palestine, dealing with the Palestinian Revolt of 1936–1939 and the subsequent British White Paper that almost totally ended Jewish migration to Palestine, was in no position to deal with the problems faced by the Jews of Latin America, so far away as they were. Zionist activism in Latin America concentrated on three areas relating to the Zionist project: collecting donations to be sent to the project of the Jewish State in the Middle East; preparing members of Zionist youth movements for migration to the future Jewish State and agricultural settlement there; and exerting local political influence in order to gain the support of their country’s government ............................................ 4

“Latin American Arabs”: www.thestudyofracialism.org/about1751.html

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for the Zionist project. Zionist envoys from British Palestine came to Latin America too, in order to structure these activities. The results were rather impressive, although it must be taken into consideration that they were not solely the result of local Jewish Latin American Zionist initiatives. US policies and the support Zionism enjoyed in the USA, as well as shock at the results of the Holocaust played a central role too. In the vote for the Partition of Palestine into two states, a Jewish and an Arab (Palestinian) State (UN Resolution 181), only one Latin American country voted against, siding with the Arab position. This country was Cuba. Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela voted in favor of the Partition. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico abstained. The twelve Latin American votes in favor were decisive.5 The abstentions were of significance since the already largest Jewish community in Latin America (Argentina) was unable to tilt its country’s vote in favor. According to Raanan Rein, both the Jewish Zionists and the Arab lobby had pressured the Argentinean government, but the final decision to abstain was taken by the country’s ambassador to the UN, José Arce, who opposed Zionism.6 The war in the Middle East – the first Arab-Israeli War, 1947–1949 – produced Zionist mobilization and support from large sectors of the Latin American Jewish communities in favor of the establishment of the State of Israel and its struggle. Some Latin American Jews volunteered to serve in the newly established IDF, and there was a case of a Latin American company (The Chilean Company – ha’mahkhlakah ha’chilianit) in the Palmach. Also, Latin American immigrants fought in their kibbutzim and other settlements, all over the country. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the different Latin American countries and Israel brought the first Israeli diplomats to the subcontinent. One of the most famous figures in this area was Yaakov Tsur, who in 1949 presented his credentials to President Peron of Argentina and served as ............................................ 5

On the general issue of the relations between the two sides see Edy Kaufman, Yoram Shapira, Joel Barromi, Israel-Latin American Relations, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1979.

6

Raanan Rein, Argentina, Israel and the Jews: Perón, the Eichmann Capture and After, Bethesdam MD: University Press of Maryland, 2003, p. 216.

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ambassador to this country, as well as Chile and Paraguay, until 1953.7 Argentina was the first Latin American country to open an embassy in Israel and by 1950 a trade agreement had already been signed between the two countries. The first Israeli ambassador to Brazil presented his credentials to President Getulio Vargas in April 1952.8 In May 1953, the then Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel, Moshe Sharett, visited various countries in the area. Envoys from different Israeli and Zionist institutions arrived in various countries in the area. An effort was made, especially towards the end of the 1950s, to increase the levels of Jewish Immigration from Latin America to Israel. Israeli cargo ships from the ZIM began arriving at Latin American ports in the mid-1950s. Levels of trade were low but developing. For the Latin American – as well as the European – left, the social democratic image of Israel, ruled in those years by Ben-Gurion and MAPAI (the future Labor Party), and especially of the kibbutzim, was a very attractive and even idealistic, inspiring one. At the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s, Israeli assistance programs, especially in agriculture, were already being developed in various countries in Latin America on a small scale. The Foreign Affairs Ministry had established a branch for International Cooperation – MASHAV – that offered advanced courses in the areas of agriculture, health, sanitation and education in which students from most Latin American countries participated, generating, over the course of the decades, a network of professionals that had spent time studying in Israel. These professionals were aware of the country’s capacity but also of its problems. Many of them achieved high-ranking positions through their careers in their respective countries and could support Israel in various ways. Israel was seen with sympathy in many political quarters in Latin America, including most of the left. It was a small country born in a war that struggled for survival and was still surrounded by many, dangerous enemies. The levels of development achieved by Israel, especially its modern agriculture and its organization, were seen with admiration. High scientific and technological ............................................ 7

See Jacob Tsur (Tchernowitz): www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0020_0_ 20080.html

8

The ambassador was David Shaltiel, see American Jewish Yearbook 1954, p. 389: www.ajcarchives. org/AJC_DATA/Files/1954_16_LatinAmerica.pdf

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levels in Israel were a kind of example proving that Third World countries could overcome the trappings of underdevelopment and become modern. Meanwhile, another side of Israel appeared in the midst of the Latin American public sphere, in particular in Argentina. In May 1960 the first Israeli plane arrived in Latin America, an El Al Bristol Britannia turbojet, brought Abba Eban to Buenos Aires. Abba Eban was a famous Israeli diplomat who arrived to represent his country at the celebrations of the 150th anniversary of the May Revolution – the beginning of Argentina’s process of independence. Some days afterwards, the same plane took off from Buenos Aires carrying away Adolf Eichmann, one of the most wanted Nazi criminals. He was in charge of the Final Solution among Hungary’s Jews, and had been tracked and captured by an Israeli intelligence team. The capture of Eichmann on Argentinean soil and his abduction started a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. Eichmann was brought to Jerusalem and stood trial, where he was condemned to death and executed in 1962. The diplomatic crisis was somehow resolved but a terrible wave of anti-Semitism swept through Argentina. In parallel, migration of its Jews to Israel increased.9 Here, one must ask questions about the role played by Israel, the Jewish State, both in bringing justice to the victims of Nazism but also in triggering an anti-Semitic wave against the largest Jewish community in Latin America. Israeli agents also tracked other Nazi criminals, such as Dr. Joseph Mengele in Paraguay and Brazil, and SS colonel Walter Rauff in Chile, but after the Eichmann affair their capture became impossible. It was also in the early 1960s that the Arab League began sending representatives to Latin American countries that were developing very active antiIsraeli propaganda, trying to get the support of the local communities of Arab origin. This triggered higher levels of Israeli and local Zionist activism in order to counteract it. An especially important point is constituted by the Six-Day War. Not only because of its impact in the Middle East and in Israel itself but also because of the change in the image of Israel around the world, in particular in Latin America. Israel ceased to appear as a beleaguered country whose existence was in danger. It appeared as a military power able to handle all its enemies at the ............................................ 9

Rein, Argentina, Israel and the Jews, p. 221.

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same time, occupying sizable territories in its neighboring countries, generating new waves of Palestinian refugees and later, from 1968 onwards, becoming the main ally of the USA in the Middle East. Israel had fully entered the Cold War on the side of the West. Although the precedent of the Suez affair was still clear in many people’s memories, the Sinai Campaign and subsequent Israeli military victory were still seen as important for its survival. In 1956, both the USSR and the USA had placed pressure on Israel, which reintegrated to Egypt all the territory occupied by its troops. The dream of the Third Temple and Ben-Gurion’s declaration about it has remained just that: as a declaration of a dream. In 1967 the situation was different. Israel had fought alone, achieved victories, occupied territories and more Palestinians were displaced. The Palestinian refugee problem returned rapidly to the center of the international public sphere and became an acute issue, implying politics of both recognition and terror. Inside Israel, the Six-Day War and victories had awakened the ghosts of Messianic political activism. Nationalist religious factions remembered that the State of Israel was not equivalent to the Land of Israel and that only in the Six-Day War had the Jews returned – to stay forever, they claimed – not only to the Wailing Wall and the Mount of the Temple, unifying Jerusalem, but also to the biblical lands of Judea and Samaria. A settlers’ movement pushed for the colonization of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Plateau. Military, biblical, demographic and political arguments were mixed in different doses and coupled with a political stalemate in which the most activist groups succeeded in starting settlements that involved clashing with the local Palestinian population and awarding the PLO much-needed political ammunition to attack Israel as a whole concept. To Latin American leftist minds, the aligning of Israel on the West’s side in the Cold War transformed it into an imperialist enemy. The argument was compounded by territorial occupation, colonization, the position of the PLO as an anti-imperialist national liberation movement and the fact that Israel was not admitted from the very first days at Bandung (1955) into the bloc of nonaligned nations, while Nasser, the Egyptian leader, was one of its founding members. The Palestinian cause was embraced by the non-aligned countries, by the left as a whole and supported by the USSR via its support of its allies in the Arab world. For the Latin American left, Israel was also on the other side, in

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spite of the fact that the Cuban Revolution had been hailed by the Israeli left. The revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro, who had enjoyed the support of Dr. Ricardo Lobo-Wolf, designated the latter ambassador to Israel in 1961. Wolf remained ambassador until 1973, the year in which Cuba broke its diplomatic relations with Israel. Dr. Wolf stayed in Israel, where he established a foundation for the promotion of the sciences and arts that carries his name. Until January 2009, Cuba was the only Latin American country that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. In January 2009, as a result of the Israeli military operation in Gaza – Cast Lead – Venezuela and Bolivia broke relations with Israel. From another perspective, the 1960s and 1970s were, in Latin America, under the shadow of the Cold War, the Cuban Revolution, the Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis of 1962, a period of increasing polarization and anti-US sentiment and demonstrations. The left, highly mobilized, increasingly employed the rhetoric of revolution. Che Guevara attempted to implement his theory of the Foco Revolucionario, in the Congo and later in Bolivia, where he lost his life doing so in October 1967. In the different Latin American countries, the right organized itself around the military who, following the precepts of each country’s Doctrine of National Security, took power and began internal wars against the left, marked by the use of concentration camps, torture, disappearances and assassinations. Large numbers of political activists went into exile. The Latin American military, siding with the West in the Cold War, admired the performance of the IDF in 1956, 1967 and the subsequent wars in the Middle East. For many of them, Israel was a better military example than the USA or other rich and developed Western powers. Israel, possessing a developing military industry, began to sell weapons abroad, including to Latin American countries. Latin American military attachés and missions were in Israel, trying to acquire affordable weapons and know-how.10 This opened a new dimension of the relations between Israel and Latin America. It also worsened Israel’s deteriorating image in the eyes of many in the Latin American left. It is impossible to state that Israeli military trade in Latin America was ideological. It would be fair to say that the main reasons were commercial with ............................................ 10 Bishara Bahbah, Israel and Latin America. The Military Connection, Washington DC/New York: The Institute for Palestine Studies in association with St. Martin’s Press, 1986. See also the SIPRI reports on arms sales to various countries in Latin America.

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a possible political bonus of getting some measure of support in diverse international forums from the countries acquiring Israeli weapons, forums in which Israel was normally isolated, especially after the General Assembly of the UN voted to equate Zionism with racism. Still, relations between Israel and various Latin American dictatorships – Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at the end of Somoza’s rule – were close. In order to create a more balanced picture, it must be mentioned that Israel also became a land of refuge for people persecuted by the military dictatorships of the subcontinent. This was especially true in the cases of Chile and Argentina. In the first, after bottom-up pressure from Israeli diplomats serving in Santiago de Chile at the time of Pinochet’s coup d’état – Moshe Tov and Benjamin Oron – political decisions were taken in order to admit a number of Chilean political exiles to Israel, following the resolutions of the Socialist International, in which the Israeli ruling party, MAPAI, was a member. In the case of Argentina, again, bottom-up pressure generated by locally stationed Israeli diplomats – Ran Curiel and Pinhas Avivi, supported by the ambassador to Buenos Aires, Ram Nirgad – and representatives of the Jewish Agency – Itzhak Pundak and Daniel Recanati – generated an effort to save more than three hundred leftist Argentineans with various Jewish links. They were smuggled out of Argentina and to Israel, a country that most of them left after a while for Spain, France or Mexico.11 Living through dictatorial periods, Jewish political exiles from Brazil and other countries in Latin America reached Israel and benefited from the character of the country as a Jewish State and a shelter for persecuted Jews. Harsh political arguments developed concerning the acceptance of ultra-leftists of Jewish origin who had identified with political forces that were anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist. But arguments such as the one used by Menachem Begin during a visit to Buenos Aires before he became Prime Minster of Israel prevailed. He stated that Israel, because of the precedent of the Holocaust, had to serve as a shelter for any persecuted Jew, regardless of any ideological or political consideration.12 The most famous case was that of Jacobo Timmerman, the Argentinean journalist and editor of La Opinion who was freed by Argentina’s military rulers after coming under ............................................ 11 Mario Sznajder, Luis Roniger, The Politics of Exile in Latin America, New York, Cambidge, UK, 2009, pp. 176–180. 12 Aryeh Dayan, “Thanks to Menachem Begin,” Kol Hair, September 9, 1987, p. 34 [in Hebrew].

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heavy pressure from the USA and Israel. Here, we must mention that commonly held anti-Semitic views about the belief that “the Jews control Washington”, prevalent amongst some of Latin America’s military and other elites, were sometimes used by Israel in order to obtain needed concessions in all kind of areas. Many military figures and politicians in Latin America believed that the Israeli government, directly and through AIPAC, had an immense influence over the State Department and the presidency in Washington, DC. Years later, in 1982, an Israeli parliamentary delegation to Argentina inquired into the efforts made to save Jews persecuted under military rule in Argentina. At the beginning of this century, an Israeli interministerial commission investigated the whole issue of Israeli attitudes, responsibilities, policies – or lack thereof – and results. Meanwhile, Israel was involved in the Iran-Contra affair and one of its agents was killed in Mexico. Other Israeli, former high-ranking officers in the IDF and intelligence agents were involved with the paramilitary in Colombia and with Manuel Noriega in Panama. The selling of Israeli security expertise and equipment brought many ex-officers into various Latin American countries. The mixture between commercial greed and political implications became dangerous and Israel undertook strict regulating policies, according to which every business transaction in security-related areas had to be scrutinized and approved by the relevant authorities in Israel. Regulation was a direct result of failures and scandals that had damaged the image of Israel all over Latin America. In the 1990s the effects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict reached Latin America in a particularly violent way. In March 1992, Hezbollah operatives with the support of Iranian intelligence blew up the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.13 In July 1994, the AMIA building was blown up, again in the center of Buenos Aires.14 Although investigations failed to produce definitive conclusions, the Argentinean authorities requested extraditions in Iran, yet these were rejected by the Iranian government. These acts had a terrorizing impact on Israeli people in Latin America but also on the local Jewish communities. Much was ............................................ 13 Mark S. Steinitz, Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America, Washington DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2003, pp. 6–10. 14 Federico Pablo Feldstein, Carolina Acosta-Alzuru, “Argentinean Jews as Scapegoat: A Textual Analysis of the Bombing of AMIA”, Journal of Communication Inquiry 27 (2003), pp. 152–170.

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invested in physical and personal security and there has since been much talk about the possibility of further acts of terrorism against Israeli or Jewish objectives throughout the subcontinent. In spite of this, Latin America is a very popular destination for Israeli backpackers. Mostly after completing their military service, they travel to the Carnival in Rio de Janeiro or Bahia, to Chiapas and Yucatan, Guatemala and the whole of Central America, to Iguazu, Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego, staying for many months. The image of the Israeli backpacker is a common sight along the most popular routes in Latin America. Besides landscape and adventures, drug incidents, being robbed or assaulted and misunderstandings with the local population have all come to feature in many people’s trips. A particularity that must be pointed out is that in the Argentinean public sphere – and to a lesser extent in Chile – a conspiracy theory circulates about the Andinia Plan. According to this theory, the Israeli backpackers who come to Patagonia after completing their military service are the avant-garde of a future Israeli invasion force that will invade the empty lands of the South of Latin America.15 They are not simple tourists but intelligence officers and spies, collecting information in order to prepare the future takeover of Patagonia by Israel. The incredible part of the rumor is that it has been quoted publicly as fact, even by high-ranking Argentinean military officers, such as General Roberto Bendini.16 The backpackers bring back their experiences and insights to Israel, and in spite of the distance, Latin America seems nowadays to be less far from Israel than it was in the past. Older Israeli tourists travel there more often. Latin American soap operas are immensely popular in Israel and they have helped many Israelis to learn Spanish and Portuguese. Brazilian and Argentinean football are also very popular in Israel and Israeli clubs have bought Latin American football players. Chilean wine is very popular in Israel as well and Latin American food is sold in many places, in its Mexican, Brazilian, Argentinean, Cuban and other varieties. Trade and academic links have also developed and many Latin Americans come to Israel as pilgrims as well as normal tourists. ............................................ 15 A detailed analysis of Plan Andinia is found in Sergio Kiernan, Delirios Argentinos, Buenos Aires, 2006, pp. 64–83. 16 “La Comunidad Judía accionará penalmente. El General Bendini cree que hay planes para invadir la Patagonia”, Infobae, September 12, 2003.

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Although for budgetary reasons Israel closed its embassies in Bolivia, Paraguay, Panama and Honduras, El Al is celebrating its first year of direct flights between Israel and Sao Paulo and the Israeli consulate in the latter has been reopened. The levels of trade between Israel and Latin American countries have increased steadily. Brazil is Israel’s largest trade partner in the area. Nonetheless, Israel is a marginal market for products from Latin America, and Israeli exports to Latin America are far behind those to Europe, North America and even Asia. Israel’s public image was tarnished throughout Latin America in 2006 as a result of the Second Lebanon War, and more so at the end of 2008 as a result of the Cast Lead Operation conducted by the IDF in the Gaza Strip. The latter led to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Israel, and Bolivia followed, also severing diplomatic ties. Relations had already been tense for some years since the anti-US policies of President Chávez brought him closer to Iran and saw him adopt a harsh anti-Israeli position.17 In parallel he has also attacked, on many occasions, the Jewish community of Venezuela. Israel faces problems in its diplomatic relations with the ALBA group led by Venezuela and it is, in general, associated with the USA, as a colonialist and imperialist power. Iranian and Palestinian propaganda have gained much ground, to the great detriment of Israel. Anti-Israeli demonstrations are common in most of the main cities in Latin America, especially when bloody events in the Middle East are portrayed in a very anti-Israeli light by political propaganda from the left, Iran, Palestinians and other Arabs, as well as by the local anti-Semitic extreme right, which enjoys riding the anti-Israeli wave. Official visits from Israel, especially high-level visits such as President Peres’ tour of Brazil and Argentina at the beginning of 2010, assuage to a certain extent animosity against Israel in the countries visited. The visits of incumbent Latin American presidents to Israel – Menem of Argentina (1991), Zedillo of Mexico (2000) and more recently da Silva (Lula) of Brazil (2010) – are also positive signals. Nonetheless, the general tendency shows a deteriorating image of Israel in the area, while Israel’s enemies, including Iran, gain in prestige and legitimacy. ............................................ 17 Simon Romero, “Venezuela Strengthens its Relationships in the Middle East”, The New York Times, August 21, 2006: www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-01350.pdf

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C ARLOS E SCUDÉ

Israeli-Latin American Relations, 1948–2010

ABSTRACT This paper attempts to understand the long-term shift for the worse in Israeli-Latin American relations. These relations started with almost unqualified support for the establishment of the State of Israel on the side of both Latin American right-wing governments and left-of-center parties and popular organizations, but have been deteriorating almost ever since. The evidence suggests that this involution can be largely explained in terms of several intervening variables and processes, among them: Israel’s vulnerability as a beleaguered state; its special relationship with the United States after 1967; the US pro-democratic policy shift vis-à-vis the region after the Falkland/Malvinas War (leaving Israel unfavorably positioned therein); the Latin American social structure; and the bourgeois class identity of the leadership of the Latin American Jewry. It argues that overlooking the peripheral character of Israel in the interstate system, and its dependent status on security issues, has led to distortions in the understanding of Israeli-Latin American relations.

Introduction Relations between Israel and the Latin American states began in 1948 with the full-fledged Latin American support for the establishment of the State of Israel, and have been deteriorating (almost) ever since. To what should we attribute this regression? The evidence seems to suggest that the strong involution of Latin American-Israeli relations from 1948 to the present can be explained sociologically in terms of at least four intervening variables: Israel’s vulnerability; its special

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relationship with the United States after 1967; Latin American social structure; and the class identity of the leadership of the Latin American Jewry. The main point in my explanatory model, however, is that there was a turning point in Israeli-Latin American relations, and this is when Israel became an ally of the United States and eventually became a sort of proxy of the superpower in the Latin American region. As is well known, Israel has not always had a security alliance with the United States.1 The first major sale of US weapons, which consisted of Hawk antiaircraft missiles, took place as late as 1963.2 But the real strategic alliance was forged only after the Six-Day War, when Israel’s unlikely success convinced Washington that it could help it win the Cold War in the Middle East. When this happened, Latin American countries were largely under a political order whereby the local military could enforce an informal veto power on government policy, often overthrowing civilian governments. A naïve reading of Israeli-Latin American relations after the consolidation of the Israeli alliance with the United States would have run something like: (a) Israel now has an asymmetric strategic alliance with the United States. (b) Since its founding, Israel has had excellent relations with most of Latin America. (c) The United States is hegemonic in Latin America, and most of its countries are subject to Department of State policy guidelines. (d) When they are not, their governments are usually overthrown and a regime is established that normally returns to the fold. (e) Hence, when opportunity affords, it is in Israel’s interest to cooperate with the United States in Latin America. This reading appears to have guided Israeli policy towards Latin America for a lengthy period. One does not need to study Israeli archives to posit this idea. It suffices to carry out a careful reading of the classic Kaufman et al. volume on ............................................ 1

Zach Levy, “Israel’s Quest for a Security Guarantee from the United States, 1954–1956”, British Journal of Middle East Studies 22, no. 1–2 (1995), pp. 43–63.

2

See Warren Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the US-Israeli Alliance, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004; Abraham Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Origins of the American-Israeli Alliance, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998; Douglas Little, “The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957–68”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 4 (1993).

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Israeli-Latin American relations, whose authors include a major scholar and a senior diplomat. Indeed, that book is not only a useful scholarly work but also an invaluable period piece that unwittingly documents some perceptions that guided policy at the time of its publication (1979). Its authors state: The Latin American military are a governing elite. Often characterized by anticommunist fervor, the military – either in government or “close” to it – have seen Israel as a Western outpost standing in the way of the Soviet Union and revolutionary leftist governments. (…) Thus, Israel’s triumph in the Six-Day war was seen by the more conservative and pro-Western establishments as a victory over a common enemy. (…) On the whole, the “military factor” as an “independent variable” seems to have worked toward intensification of relations between Israel and several Latin American nations.3 In other words, the bilateral relations between Israel and the Latin American states were good because there was a strong rapport between Israel and the Latin American military. To this, Kaufman, Shapira and Barromi add unambiguously: “In addition to being a professional elite, several Latin American military establishments are unmistakably modernizing elites.”4 In other words, the authors are saying that in doing business with the Latin American military, Israel not only promoted its self-interest but also that of Latin American societies that supposedly benefited from their ‘modernizing elites’. The authors not only understood the reasons why relations were good; they also suggested that engaging in these lucrative relations was the right thing to do. The state of affairs praised by Kaufman et al. continued while the United States and the Latin American military cooperated in what was usually their common interest: the vetoing of leftist and nationalist civilian governments in the region. While this order lasted, the relations between Israel and most governments improved constantly, at least if we measure them in terms of the proceeds of Israel’s arms exports. ............................................ 3

Edy Kaufman, Yoram Shapira, Joel Barromi, Israel-Latin American Relations, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1979, p. 50.

4

Ibid, p. 48.

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From an Israeli standpoint this outcome was heaven sent, inasmuch as the young nation state, surrounded by mortal enemies, had developed an extraordinary level of military expertise, a modern arms industry, and with it a dependence on the exportation of arms. An asymmetrical strategic alliance with the United States and massive sales of arms to governments in the latter’s back yard were parts of what, in those days, was perhaps one of the few available survival paths open to this beleaguered peripheral state. The alliance became even more advantageous when President Jimmy Carter chastised the Argentine and Chilean military regimes due to violations of human rights. This US policy was always extremely contradictory. While the State Department imposed apparently severe limits to cooperation, the US Treasury trusted the neoliberal economic administrations of both dictatorships and discretely gave them financial support. For example, visible aid in the form of credit was replaced by less visible aid through guarantee programs. US missions to multilateral credit institutions voted against the Argentine dictatorship, but did not lobby among allies to block the credit, which was awarded in record amounts.5 Concomitantly, in the sensitive field of military cooperation, the place of the United States was partly occupied by its surrogate, Israel. Indeed, towards 1981 arms exports helped to control Israeli balance of payments problems.6 By the mid-1980s, Israel had become the world’s largest per capita arms exporter. Its arms trade amounted to approximately 16% of its total exports and close to one third of its total industrial exports. Sales to Latin America amounted to one third of its total arms exports, making the region Israel’s most important arms market.7 Moreover, Latin America differed qualitatively from other markets because its purchases included jet aircraft, large armaments, missile systems, and communications and electronic equipment.8 And during the crucial 1972–1984 period, arms sales were by far the most important component of Israeli-Latin American trade. On a yearly basis, the ............................................ 5

See Carlos Escudé, “Argentina: The Costs of Contradiction”, in Abraham F. Lowenthal (ed.), Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989.

6

“Arms are a crucial export for Israel”, The New York Times, August 24, 1981.

7

Bishara Bahbah, Israel and Latin America: The Military Connection, New York, 1986, p. 6 and 61.

8

Kaufman et al., Israel-Latin American Relations, p. 105.

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average Latin American share of non-military Israeli exports was a mere 2.15% of total exports.9 In the especially significant case of Argentina, from 1978 to 1983 Israel exported more than one billion dollars worth of military equipment, including US-made A-4 Skyhawks.10 Given the fact that Israel was the most important recipient of US military aid, this would have been impossible without at least Washington’s silent acquiescence. Indeed, the latter applied sanctions against the Argentine government due mainly to a public relations rationale, leaving to Israel and others the dirty work of supplying arms to an allied anti-Communist dictatorship. There is considerable evidence pointing in the same direction. According to Armony as well as to apparently reliable court testimonies,11 Mossad shared intelligence with the Argentine army on Montonero combatants training at PLO camps in Lebanon. Armony also reports that: The Argentine regime played a role in the US program for the covert sale of arms to Iran with the help of Israel. (…) In 1981, Israel and Argentina took part in a secret deal between the Israelis and the Khomeini regime involving the provision of 360 tons of US-made spare parts for tanks and ammunition for the revolutionary forces in Iran. Argentina provided the air-cargo facilities for the operation.12 Thus, the United States sacrificed some income for the sake of prestige, but without a strategic loss, insofar as Israel’s balance of payments situation made it necessary to sacrifice principle, narrowly understood, for an income that was quite substantial in terms of its limited resources. For different reasons, it was a good deal for both, as well as for the tyrants of Argentina. ............................................ 9

Bahbah, Israel and Latin America, p. 70.

10 Ariel C. Armony, Argentina, the United States and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 1977–1984, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997, pp. 153–154. 11 Comisión Argentina de Derechos Humanos (CADHU), affidavit of Rodolfo Peregrino Fernández, Madrid, April 26, 1983; Ariel C. Armony, Argentina, the United States and the AntiCommunist Crusade. 12 Ibid, pp. 153–157. Armony reports a contract signed by José María Patetta, Transporte Aéreo Rioplatense (TAR), and Stuart J. McCafferty, Miami, July 7, 1981.

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For Israel, the political costs would become visible only in the long term. The case illustrates the characteristics of asymmetrical alliances and the risks that are usually run by the weaker parties in such alliances. The use of the term “proxy” to characterize the Israeli role in Latin America during the ’70s and ’80s seems entirely fair. This role was part of a survival strategy that helps to understand the causes for the decline of Israel’s prestige in Latin America when the United States eventually reviewed its policy for the region, practically outlawing military regimes. This shift generated political benefits for the superpower and considerable political costs for its proxy, exposing one of several mechanisms through which costs and benefits are unevenly distributed in a hierarchical state structure.

Washington’s shift As stated, for a decade and a half the sacrifice of principles for survival goals did not generate visible political costs for Israel in Latin America.13 But everything changed with the 180-degree shift in US policy. This was mainly the result of Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1982. The event generated a dramatic change even in the most conservative US perceptions regarding Latin American affairs. Military governments came to be considered more a liability than an asset for the United States. It was reasoned that in the Latin American region, which was and remains far away from the main axes of competition for world power, a rogue military regime could potentially produce more damage to US interests than the most anti-US of democratically-elected populist governments, which would always be subject to a greater measure of citizen control. From then on, an implicit but powerful alliance was established between the State Department and the professional political classes of Latin America. ............................................ 13 Normatively it does not seem unreasonable to argue, as does Yitzhak Mualem, that given Israel’s beleaguered condition, its “existential-state goal”, based on political and economic needs, is paramount and must take priority over other goals, including its “ethnic general-Jewish goal” that constitutes part of its unique predicament as a Jewish state. But such normative reflection is beyond the scope of the present paper. See Yitzhak Mualem, “Between a Jewish and an Israeli Foreign Policy: Israel-Argentina Relations and the Issue of Jewish Disappeared Persons and Detainees under the Military Junta, 1976–1983”, Jewish Political Studies Review 16, no. 1–2 (2004).

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This made military coups a very risky enterprise for would-be perpetrators, as the case of Honduras vividly demonstrated in 2009. It crowned the mostly populist professional politicians as masters of the local power games. The local bourgeoisie, which had traditionally pushed for coups, were forced to look elsewhere than to the military for the pursuit of their class interests. A dramatic democratization of Latin American politics ensued. Professional politicians ascribed to the populist parties that were fated to dominate politics took charge, and the image of Israel became tainted, apparently beyond repair.

The structural constraints of Latin American foreign policies under full electoral democracy This is where our structural variable comes in. Latin America enjoys the dubious honor of having the greatest concentration of income worldwide. Although there are poorer regions, poverty is very substantial. Military governments usually represented elites that benefited from the concentration of income. And due partially to the socially polarizing consequences of those policies of the past, Latin American societies were caught in a populist trap. Once full electoral democracy was in place, political power drifted away from the previously dominant elites. Indeed, societies where the vast majority of the population is poor seldom elect right-of-center governments. If, in addition, education is deficient, electoral democracy under conditions of massive poverty often leads to populist governments. Normally, these regimes will not be inclined to adopt a foreign policy that runs counter to popular clichés. In such circumstances, both the hegemonic power and its proxy will tend to be unpopular with the new democratic regimes. But there is a huge difference between the two, because Latin American dependence on the hegemonic power will remain strong, but such will not be the case vis-à-vis the proxy. The superpower’s support is often needed, and it is preferable to avoid its ill-will. Moreover, some local political sectors will recognize that despite its past complicity with the region’s bad guys, the superpower has now become an

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active agent of democratization, restoring its soft power. But such will not be the case for the proxy, whose stigma will not be easily removed.

The Arabs vis-à-vis Israel in the Latin American context today In principle, the case made above is valid for any proxy. But Israel is not any proxy, because it has more enemies than most. Indeed, while Israel’s fate in Latin America was jeopardized by its alliance with the United States (paradoxically its most important asset), its enemies in the Middle East sought the favor of popular organizations in the region. This would eventually put them in a more favorable position vis-à-vis the populist governments that were to emerge after democratization. This is what makes Israel different from other Western countries that also supplied arms and security services to Latin American tyrants. Needless to say, traditional anti-Semitism also plays a role, but I contend that the worsening of Israeli-Latin American relations can be explained without bringing this factor in, so for the analytical purposes of this paper I leave this valid cliché out. To brush away anti-Israel feelings in Latin America on the grounds that anti-Zionism is a new version of anti-Semitism is not to understand anything at all. The underlying causes behind the worsening of IsraeliLatin American relations seem to be related to Israel’s past role as a US proxy, and to the Jewish state’s beleaguered international status, which made it different from other proxies. Indeed, as early as 1952 the Arab League established itself in Latin America. It is no coincidence that its activity was intensified after the Six-Day War, insofar as the establishment of a US-Israeli alliance provided a great opportunity to erode the image of Israel among the working classes and leftist political groups. Despite tactical Arab mistakes such as temporarily siding with proNazi circles in Argentina, this was a significant development that unfolded incessantly through diverse protagonists and means.14 Indeed, in the early

............................................ 14 Kaufman et al., Israel-Latin American Relations, p. 21–22.

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1970s the PLO was already establishing strong links with various guerrilla groups in Latin America, such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.15 However, in those days it did not yet seem that this trend would represent a serious challenge, because most progressive social and political forces in Latin America still supported Israel. For a long time, Histadrut had been efficient courting the labor movement. But support had begun to erode as early as 1969, when Argentina’s General Confederation of Labor (CGT) issued a statement siding with the Palestinians and Arabs.16 Notwithstanding, in 1979 Kaufman et al. were still optimistic, stating that with regard to influence on trade unions, students and intellectuals, “the balance tends to be positive for Israel.”17 While some indicators may have pointed in that direction even then, the crude fact was that while Israel courted a military elite that was soon to be demonized and trashed, the Arabs courted popular organizations that antagonized increasingly the local tyrants, and which were soon to be the electoral backbone of the political parties that would dominate the political scene after the wave of democratization, with full US support. Moreover, militant Arab organizations made further inroads into Latin America because of the establishment of immigrants who fled southern Lebanon during the Israeli occupation. These people are enemies of Israel, and the so-called Tri-Border region of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina has an important concentration of such immigrants. According to a recent study, the Arab colonies in Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu add up to some 18,000 inhabitants, of which 90% are Lebanese, with small percentages of Syrians, Egyptians, Palestinians and Jordanians.18 The consequences are serious. According to reputable reports based on open-source intelligence,

............................................ 15 Bruce Hoffman, The PLO and Israel in Central America: The Geopolitical Dimension, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1988. 16 Kaufman et al., Israel-Latin American Relations, p. 57. 17 Ibid, loc. cit. 18 Silvia Montenegro, Verónia Giménez Béliveau, La Triple Frontera: Globalización y construcción social del espacio, Buenos Aires: Miño et Dávila editores, 2006, p. 24.

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There is ample evidence that various Islamic terrorist groups have used the Tri-Border Area (TBA) as a haven for fund-raising, recruiting, and plotting terrorist attacks elsewhere in the Tri Border countries or the Americas in general. Terrorist groups with a presence in the Tri-Border Area reportedly include Egypt’s Islamic Group and Islamic Jihad, al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-Moqawama, which is a pro-Iran wing of Hezbollah. Islamic terrorist groups have used the TBA for fund-raising, drug trafficking, money laundering, plotting, and other activities in support of their organizations. The large Arab community in the TBA is highly conducive to the establishment of sleeper cells of Islamic terrorists, including Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. Nevertheless, as many as 11,000 members of the Islamic community in the TBA may have moved since late 2001 to other less closely watched Arab population centers in South America.19 It must be borne in mind that even before the 1982 Lebanon War, this new wave of Arab immigrants that arrived in Latin America starting in the late ’60s was very different from the ‘old’ Arab immigration of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Unlike their predecessors, they are predominantly Muslims and tend to conserve the Arabic tongue for use at home, at work and in commercial transactions. They establish strong associations and networks based on religious loyalties, including Muslim schools, Islamic centers, and mosques. As has been observed by sociologist Beatriz Gurevich, they behave like an ethnic community whose diasporic identity overshadows their national identity as Argentines, Brazilians or Paraguayans. This is especially true of the Shiites in Argentina, who underwent a limited identity shift after seven former Iranian officials and a Hezbollah operative were accused, by Argentine authorities, of direct involvement in the 1994 bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA). Although mainly of Lebanese origin, these Shiites took sides with Iran, against the Argentine judiciary. ............................................ 19 Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border-Area (TBA) of South America”, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2003, p. 1: www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdffiles/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf

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In this and other issues, their attitudes are increasingly those of a diasporic community with several layers of identity components. When their ethnic and Argentine identities come into conflict, it seems that they tend to Tehran, more than to Buenos Aires, as a source of inspiration. And they have links with politically significant Argentine protest organizations, where they actively proselytize.20 They are a significant source of anti-Israeli sentiment in such grassroots organizations.

The Jewish side of the quadrangle On the other hand, Israeli-Latin American relations sometimes grow more complex, and can be jeopardized, due to the class-bound attitudes of local Jewish communities, whose leaderships often behave more like members of the local bourgeoisie than like Jews dedicated to Jewish causes. Some attitudes of the local Jewish leadership vis-à-vis the Kirchner governments of Argentina are a case in point, especially with regard to the investigation of the bombing of AMIA. The history of this investigation is one of continuous frustration, largely stemming from the obstruction of justice undertaken by the Menem, De la Rúa and Duhalde administrations.21 Paradoxically, the two Kirchner administrations are to be credited with comparatively courageous actions, such as exposing Iran during three consecutive inaugurations of the United Nations General Assembly: in 2007, under Nestor, and in 2008 and 2009, under Cristina.22 These high profile criticisms of Iran, made personally by two presidents, ............................................ 20 See Beatriz Gurevich, “Las relaciones entre judíos y árabes de Buenos Aires después del atentado contra la Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina”, Raanan Rein (ed.), Árabes y Judíos en Iberoamérica: Similitudes, diferencias y tensiones, Sevilla: Fundación Tres Culturas del Mediterráneo, 2008. 21 See Carlos Escudé, Beatriz Gurevich, “Limits to Governability, Corruption and Transnational Terrorism: The Case of the 1992 and 1994 Attacks in Buenos Aires”, Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina 14, no. 2 (2003); Beatriz Gurevich, “After the AMIA Bombing: A Critical Analysis of Two Parallel Discourses”, Kristin Ruggiero (comp.), The Jewish Diaspora in Latin America and the Caribbean: Fragments of Memory, London: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. 22 It seems unlikely that the Kirchners’ attitude on these issues is due to an attempt to “wag the dog”, i.e., to improve relations with the United States through the maintenance of good relations with Israel and appropriate conduct vis-à-vis Jewish causes. In the first place, their often impolite behavior vis-à-vis the US president rules out obsequiousness. More importantly, and especially in the case of Cristina, there is a clear record of support for Jewish causes and of denunciation of

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followed the government’s request for arrest warrants against the aforementioned Iranians, which was issued to Interpol in 2007. Moreover, when Ahmad Vahidi, one of the officials indicted by the Argentine judiciary, was designated Iran’s minister of defense and security in August 2009, both the Argentine foreign ministry and the chief of the national cabinet issued stern official condemnations of the Tehran regime’s appointment. Such attitudes are very rare in the populist context of today’s Latin American politics, of which the Kirchners are clearly a part. True, they are financial allies of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, who is Iran’s ally, but they draw the line eloquently when Caracas pushes for closer ties with Tehran. And they also draw the line when it comes to sensitive nuclear technology, which they do not transfer to Venezuela.23 Yet the central institutions of Argentina’s Jewish community have often seemed reluctant to acknowledge these gestures because for many influential members of the community, class identity seems to take precedence over Jewish identity.24 The Kirchners are part of a populist order that Argentina’s bourgeoisie repudiates and wants brought down. And the most influential leaders of Argentina’s Jewish community are, above all, mainstream members of Argentina’s bourgeoisie. This was clearly demonstrated by an article published in The New York Times on August 7, 2007. It bore the title “Jews in Argentina Wary of Nation’s Ties to Chavez”, and it documented concerns over energy-related bilateral deals. The main source cited was the Latin American representative of the Simon Wiesenthal Center. The interviewee and the reporter seemed to be impervious to fact that what makes Venezuela dangerously rich are, precisely, US oil imports (46% of Venezuela’s total exports go to the United States, and 30% of its total imports come from the United States). Indeed, Buenos Aires’ policy towards Chávez is not all that different from Washington’s, insofar as ........................................................................................................................................................................... obstruction of justice vis-à-vis the AMIA investigation while she was an opposition legislator, long before she had a vested interest in good relations with the United States. Right-wing antiSemites have attributed both to Nestor and Cristina Kirchner an unsubstantiated Jewish ancestry, as explanation for this “unexplainable” behaviour. 23 It must be borne in mind that Argentina has a relatively high nuclear development, illustrated by its exports of nuclear reactors to relatively advanced countries like Australia. 24 The issue of the often divergent interests between Latin American Jews and the State of Israel was treated, among other works, by Raannan Rein in his Argentina, Israel y los Judíos. This excellent 2001 study focuses on the 1947–62 period.

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both are pragmatic when it comes to oil and money, and both draw the line with respect to Caracas’ links with Iran. Apparently, what is demanded in the name of the Argentine Jewry is that Argentina be more anti-Chávez than the United States. Such double standards and exaggerated anti-Chávez advocacy are typical of right-of-center political sectors in Buenos Aires, Caracas, Miami and elsewhere in Latin America, regardless of religious or ethnic affiliation. The common denominator is class affiliation. It is true that a political opposition has the right to voice its objections, whether they be fair or unfair. But the civil society leaders who were quoted lobbied as Jews, and thus were they presented to the US public. The implication is that the Kirchners’ relations with Chávez are dangerous to Argentina’s Jews. This is a perilous trend that could damage Jewish and Israeli interests, as it has in the past.

The manipulation of anti-Semitism Indeed, few people remember today that in 1983 the White House framed the Sandinista government of Nicaragua with false charges of anti-Semitism, as a means to mobilize the US Jewry in favor of Washington’s so-called ‘Contra policy’ of arming the subversive opponents of the leftist government. This episode was an attempt to neutralize a leak that had exposed Israel’s activities in support of right-wing combatants in Central America. Research undertaken by scholars, journalists and the US government later traced the maneuver to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In a secret cable following a White House briefing of 1983 in which President Ronald Reagan and the director of the Anti-Defamation League’s Latin American Division, Rabbi Morton Rosenthal, had accused the Sandinistas of anti-Semitism, Amb. Anthony Quainton, the US envoy to Managua, stated that “the evidence fails to demonstrate that the Sandinistas have followed a policy of anti-Semitism.” Among many other testimonies we can cite Sergio Nudelstejer, who headed the American Jewish Committee’s Mexico office. He said that the reasons why many members of Nicaragua’s tiny Jewish community had left the country were related to “factors other than anti-Semitism, including their belonging to the propertied classes.” Following the fall of Anastasio Somoza in 1979, many

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who had enjoyed his favor fled and suffered confiscations, whether Jews or Gentiles.25 Indeed, as reported by the World Jewish Congress, Panama City Rabbi Heszel Klepfisz (a recognized leader of Central American Jewry) informed that he had been to Nicaragua in September 1983 and found no traces of antiSemitism, although there was some anti-Israel feeling. Klepfisz wrote: “The statements of Rabbi Rosenthal are not based on fact and do damage to the Jewish cause in Central America and, in my opinion, also to Israel.”26 Furthermore, the Council of Hemispheric Studies (COHA) of Washington DC concluded that: While anti-Zionism sometimes spills over into anti-Semitism, there is little evidence that this has transpired in contemporary Nicaragua. (Its foreign policy is determined by) the sort of sympathy with the Palestinian cause that is de rigueur among left-leaning Third World regimes. This sentiment, coupled with the role Israel has played in arming rightist regimes throughout Latin America, has prompted the Sandinistas to adopt an avowedly anti-Zionist foreign policy.27 These concepts are as valid for 2009 as they were for 1987. In those bygone days, Israel had been put on the wrong side of history vis-à-vis Latin America due to its asymmetrical alliance with the United States, and to the US’s alliance with the right-wing tyrants of the region. This configuration did not help local Jews, nor did it mitigate the Latin American military’s anti-Jewish attitudes.28 ............................................ 25 Edward Cody, “Managua’s Jews Reject Anti-Semitism Charge”, The Washington Post, August 29, 1983; Hudson, op. cit., pp. 170–171. 26 Ibid, loc. cit. 27 Ibid, loc. cit. 28 During the last Argentine military dictatorship there was an asymmetric persecution of so-called ‘subversives’. Jews were not persecuted as such, but Jewish “subversives” were systematically treated much more harshly than non-Jewish ones. For the ongoing debate on whether or not Argentine Jews were abandoned to the repression of the dictatorship by both Israel and the central organizations of Argentina’s Jewish community, see among others Mualem, “Between a Jewish and an Israeli Foreign Policy”; Haim Avni, “Anti-Semitism in Argentina: Borders of Danger”, Tzvi Medin, Raanan Rein (eds.), Society and Identity in Argentina: The European Context, Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1997 [in Hebrew]; Joel Barromi, “Were the Jews of Argentina Abandoned?”, in Gesher – Journal of Jewish Affairs 42, no. 133 (1996) [in Hebrew]; Edy Kaufman, “Jewish Victims of Repression in Argentina under Military Rule,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 4 (1989); Leonardo Senkman, “The Rescue of Jews in Argentina during the Military Regime,

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Furthermore, making things worse, the struggle against anti-Semitism was manipulated by the United States government. Presently, it is the Latin American Jewish leaderships which, because of their mainstream status in the Latin American bourgeoisie, could put the local Jewish communities on the wrong side of history once again, reinforcing the prejudices generated by the unfortunate circumstances of the past. Once again, political opponents on the other side of the class divide are being smeared with direct or indirect accusations of anti-Semitism. The New York Times article cited is but the tip of the iceberg. Another such case is a YouTube video I recently received from a distinguished member of the Argentine Jewish community, with the enthusiastic caption ‘view it before it is banned!’ It is an excerpt from Oliver Hirschbiegel’s film “The Fall”. The script, spoken in German by Bruno Ganz, who impersonates Hitler, is translated in the Spanish subtitles as if it were Kirchner’s terrifying speech. He refers to his wife Cristina, the current president, in offensive terms, and his interlocutors call him Nestor. The people who circulate such material seem to be indifferent to the fact that a skeptical observer who does not buy this propaganda might wonder if there is as little truth to Hitler’s association with a Jewish Holocaust as there is to the analogy between the Nazis and the Kirchners. Indeed, the piece is in itself an insult to Holocaust victims and breeds Holocaust denial. Yet it has been circulated, among others, by anti-Kirchner Jews who seem to be more interested in smearing the President and former President than in protecting the Jewish cause, partly because there is no clear and present danger. So they manipulate Hitler and the Holocaust for non-Jewish class interests. Another telling example is the slander used against Venezuela’s Chávez, who is indeed an anti-Semite, but who has been smeared with apocryphal speeches often circulated by leading members of Latin America’s Jewish communities. One such text, purported to be of his authorship, which I received on January 31, 2009 in an e-mail from the leader of an important Argentine Masorti institution, read: ........................................................................................................................................................................... 1976–1983,” in Dafna Sharfman, A Light Unto the Nations? Israel’s Foreign Policy and Human Rights, Tel Aviv: Hakibutz Hameuchad, 1999 [in Hebrew]; Jacobo Timmerman, Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981; Efraim Zadoff, “The Crisis in Argentina’s Jewish Community,” Kivunim Chadashim 2 (2000).

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We the Chavistas despise the Jews and do not recognize the State of Israel or any national or international Jewish organization. We deem it intolerable that an important part of the canonical narration about the deportation and death of Jews under the Nazi system should have been coined in mythological form by treacherous Jewish animals, and that Zionism be used today to preserve the existence of a colonial enterprise endowed with a monotheistic religious ideology which is mystically-Satanic and which has the objective of having Demonic Israel posses Holy Arab Palestine. The e-mail was headed by a caption saying: “Incredible. Please circulate urgently. Terrifying. Our President is a friend of this gorilla!” I consulted with a member of Venezuela’s Jewish community on the plausibility of Chávez’s authorship, and she replied that although the Comandante was not an innocent child, he had not yet coined this type of discourse. She added that there are people in his government who could conceivably say such things, especially Tarek El Aissami, the Minister of the Interior and Justice, who has family ties to the organizers of Hezbollah cells in the state of Zulia, in northern Venezuela. And she sadly informed me that on that very night, fifteen armed thugs had profaned the Sephardic synagogue in Caracas. The situation indeed merits concern, not only because of Chávez’s ideology but also because of the radicalization that can conceivably be produced by the multiplication of frauds like the quoted text, which can easily become selffulfilling prophecies. And as in the case of the White House’s false accusations against the Sandinistas in 1983, some people, both local and foreign, would be delighted if such texts could demonstrably be attributed to Chávez, because that would make an attack on the regime all the more legitimate. This attitude, which exists, is quite at odds with its opposite, that also exists, and which is exemplified by the statement issued by the World Jewish Congress when Venezuela’s ambassador to Argentina visited the Museum of the Holocaust in Buenos Aires, in October 2008. Jack Terpins, president of the Latin American Jewish Congress, stated: The Jewish community in South America, especially the one in Buenos Aires, appreciates it as an encouraging sign that the Venezuelan Government sees fit to acknowledge the tragedy of the Holocaust.

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And World Jewish Congress secretary-general Michael Schneider added:29 Following our visit to Caracas in August, it is gratifying to see this sign of recognition by the Venezuelan Government of the dark tragedy that befell the Jewish people, something that President Hugo Chavez himself acknowledged during our meeting with him. Notwithstanding, there are people who seem to want to undo the World Jewish Congress’s good work and slander Chávez for the sake of anti-socialist, procapitalist politics. Indeed, if you declare a cold war on Chávez’s ‘21st Century Socialism’, you will not be prone to the World Jewish Congress’s civilized encouragement for Chávez to do the right thing regarding Jewish causes, and might even prefer that he become an outright Holocaust denier. Furthermore, it is not to be discarded that this sort of campaign is encouraged by American “public diplomacy”, through which the State Department discreetly appeals to various special interest groups to support its own interests. If they did it in 1983, they could do it again. After all, their priority in Venezuela is the downfall of Chávez through formally democratic means. They will not refrain from buying his oil, but they will encourage the Argentine opposition to criticize the Kirchners for doing the same, and even present it as dangerous to the Jewish cause, as did the Wiesenthal Center in The New York Times. The bottom line is that in Latin America, Washington continues to side covertly with the right-wing and against the left-of-center governments that the impoverished masses are likely to elect, given the full-fledged electoral democracy that, starting in 1983, was virtually imposed upon the region, paradoxically by Washington itself. This state of affairs, which is very costly to Latin America but carries few costs for the United States, is complemented by the fact that, because of nonJewish class interests, the leaders of Latin America’s Jewish communities will tend to side with the right-wing and against the left-of-center governments. Thus, the sad predicament that befell Jewish causes as a consequence of Israel’s ............................................ 29 Carlos Escudé, “Israel, Latin America and the United States. A peripheral-realist perspective”, Documentos des Trabajo 413 (2009): www.cema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/413.pdf

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status as a US proxy in the ’70s and ’80s, tends to perpetuate itself in the new set of circumstances. This problem was foreseeable and can be inferred from the anticipatory words of caution published as early as 1972 by Haim Avni, before Israel became a proxy and previous also to the final spate of military dictatorships: the economic and social stratification of Latin American Jews is not, of course, conducive to lessening left-wing hostility.30 Avni’s insight was unfortunately fulfilled. And given Latin American levels of poverty, the populist tide is there to stay. To oppose it is the legitimate right of all citizens, no matter how fruitless the effort might be. But to oppose it in the name of Jewish organizations is to call for greater evils.

“The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must” In the present day, as a consequence of the processes reviewed, Israel is a liability to even the best disposed of Latin American governments. This became patently clear in 2007, when the leaders of the MERCOSUR countries, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, signed an unprecedented free trade agreement with Israel. The accord showed official good will, inasmuch as the MERCOSUR bloc usually relates to other blocs but not to individual states. But what was really significant was the strong leftist opposition triggered by the treaty, quite the opposite of what would have happened before Israel became a proxy of the United States, when the left-of-center was usually friendly to Jewish and Israeli causes, and only small contingents of rightists were friendly to Arab causes.31 Indeed, the case of the MERCOSUR agreement illustrates the present-day consequences of Israel’s past role as a proxy of the United States. As things stand, every official transaction with Israel has plenty of enemies to attack it and hardly any friends to support it in a visible way. This is why, of the members of the MERCOSUR bloc, so far only Uruguay has ratified the agreement. ............................................ 30 Haim Avni, “Latin America”, in Louis Henki (ed.), World politics and the Jewish condition: Essays prepared for a Task Force on the World of the 1970s of the American Jewish Committee, New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972, p. 274. 31 Kaufman et al., p. 55–59.

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In contrast, no matter how stigmatized, a hegemonic state with overwhelming might recovers more easily from the loss of local influence and prestige stemming from alliances with local villains, especially if it becomes the champion of democracy. Israel suffers the typical, Thucydidean predicament of a peripheral state left in the lurch by a hegemonic power and without even a moral right to complain about its senior partner’s betrayal. And of all the countries in the world, Israel is the one that can least afford to make mistakes. Because it suffers from the adverse propaganda of its mortal enemies, no error or sin will be forgiven of Israel. It is not the same for Germany to have supplied arms to Latin American military tyrants, as it is for Israel to have done so. And to this factor we must add, of course, the judeophobia encouraged by the Catholic Church during hundreds of years, that only aggravates the problem. As a consequence, it would seem that Israel and the Jews need to be better than the rest of the world in order to be respected and esteemed. Human flaws are unacceptable for them: such is the present world’s unacknowledged conventional wisdom.

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NAOMI C HAZAN

Israel Facing Africa: Patterns and Perceptions

The story of Israeli-African relations is inherently paradoxical. On the one hand, Israel’s fundamental interests on the continent have not altered since their inception in the 1950s. The ongoing political benefits of fostering strong relations with a continent containing one quarter of the world’s countries have been supplemented by strategic considerations, especially in the Horn of Africa and its eastern coast. Economic factors have also played a role: the geographic proximity of the continent makes it a continuously attractive source of raw materials and a potential market for Israeli products. Taken together, these guiding motives exhibit a constancy which has not wavered for over fifty years.1 On the other hand, the history of Israel’s ties with African countries is one of dramatic fluctuation.2 An initial period of intense and productive interaction during the 1960s was followed by a complete break in formal relations in the 1970s. This gave way to a gradual – and far from enthusiastic – improvement in the 1980s and then to a massive diplomatic rapprochement in the wake of the Madrid Conference and the beginning of the Oslo talks in the 1990s. Today Israel has diplomatic ties with more states on the African continent (forty-four countries) than at any time in the past. Nevertheless, Israeli engagement with the continent and its needs is, at best, sporadic. From being a pivotal centerpiece of Israel’s foreign policy, Africa has shifted to its outermost margins. ............................................ 1

The literature on Israeli-African relations is extensive. For two works that analyze the first three decades well see Joel Peters, Israel and Africa: The Problematic Friendship, London: British Academic Press, 1992; Olusola Ojo, Africa and Israel: Relations in Perspective, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.

2

For a detailed analysis of the four phases of Israeli-African relations see Naomi Chazan, “Israel and Africa: Challenges for a New Era”, in David A. Harris, Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Israel and Africa: Assessing the Past, Envisioning the Future , Tel-Aviv: The Africa Institute, American Jewish Committee/The Harold Hartog School, 2006, pp. 1–15.

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The constant vacillations in the Israeli-African relationship, despite the durability of Israel’s long-term interests on the continent, cannot be attributed simply to shifting geo-strategic currents or to changes in African attitudes towards Israel (although these have undoubtedly played a major role). The present situation is particularly telling in this regard, as the new openness of African states to Israel has been greeted with restraint if not outright indifference. It is therefore necessary to delve more deeply into the factors that can account for changing Israeli perceptions of – and hence policies towards – Africa over the years. This analysis sets out to trace and then to explain the alternating pattern of Israel’s Africa relationship. It highlights the importance not only of immediate pragmatic considerations in Israeli thinking, but also of shifting selfperceptions, emotive factors and guiding norms.3 The main contention of this analysis is that Israel’s African connections are more a reflection of changes in its definition of its own identities, priorities and values than of any reasoned pursuit of its tangible interests. The growing mental isolation of official Israel in a decidedly globalized environment adversely affects its standing in Africa – a veritable barometer of its international position at any point in time. It also has significant implications for its own democratic viability and prosperity. It is not too late for Israeli policy-makers to realign Israel’s political, economic and strategic concerns with the universalistic, humanitarian worldview that informed the founders of the state and the original architects of its African policy. Such a redesign is critical not only for Israel’s future relations with Africa; it is vital for Israel itself.

Israel Faces Africa: The Patterns Israel’s attitudes towards Africa have undergone a distinctive change in substance and strategy over the years.4 If in the first two decades of its existence ............................................ 3

The emotional component of the Israeli-African relationship is underlined by Tamar Golan, “Israel and Africa: Is There an Israeli Comeback?”, Draft paper, 2005.

4

Benny Neuberger, Israel’s Relations with the Third World (1948–2008), Tel-Aviv: The S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, 2009.

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Israel viewed itself as an integral part of the post-war world (combining aspirations for political legitimacy and economic betterment with a concern for the challenges of self-determination and economic development in emerging states elsewhere), in the second phase of the 1970s, Israel increasingly perceived itself as the target of the Third World in general and of Africa in particular, consciously tying itself more closely to the West not only politically and economically, but also culturally and conceptually. In the 1980s Israel tried to mend ties with the southern hemisphere, but opted for overtures in Asia and the new states of the former Soviet Union over a major return to Africa. In the past two decades Israel’s initial global outreach has been replaced by a far more selective, instrumental approach to the Sub-Sahara as to other regions – a product of both its economic achievements and its growing misgivings regarding major currents in the contemporary world. These changes have been manifest, first, by a palpable change in Israel’s approach to the non-Western world and especially to Africa. As Israel has moved from an underdeveloped to a fully industrialized state recently attaining the status of a full-fledged member of the OECD, its international orientation has changed accordingly. At the outset, Israel saw itself as an integral part of the emerging post-colonial world. It identified strongly with the African struggle for independence and its leaders spoke passionately about Israel’s obligation to share its developmental experiences with its new partners. At this stage, the universal values of equality, justice and self-determination embedded in Israel’s declaration of independence meshed neatly with its political, economic and strategic interests. This allowed Israel to be viewed as a part of the array of new states, giving it a great deal of latitude in its overtures to the leaders of the continent. This approach altered gradually in the latter part of the 1960s, when Israel’s victory in the 1967 war and its tightening alliance with the United States made it the weakest link of the West to an Africa frustrated with a decade of instability and economic regression. Despite vigorous efforts to stem the tide, Israeli leaders were unable to halt the rapid deterioration of formal ties, which culminated in the wholesale rupture of diplomatic relations just before, during and after the 1973 war.5 ............................................ 5

Susan Aurelia Gitelson, “Israel’s African Setback in Perspective”, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems 6 (1974).

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This diplomatic debacle profoundly affected the foundations of Israel’s attitudes towards the continent. The zeal, which had accompanied the first steps in the new Africa, was replaced by a cynicism overwhelmingly informed by pragmatic considerations. In this atmosphere, the influence of the value-driven designers of Israel’s original policy and their partners in the burgeoning departments of African studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at Tel-Aviv University necessarily diminished, to be replaced by bureaucrats bent on taking advantage of immediate opportunities to the detriment of long-term goals.6 The signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, coupled with the growing disappointment of African leaders with the Arab world, laid the groundwork for another shift barely a decade later. At this juncture, Israel’s Africa policy was spearheaded by two veteran Africanists: the late David Kimche, then directorgeneral of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Avi Primor (who headed the Africa desk). They argued vigorously that a renewed Israeli engagement on the continent could only be attained by linking Israeli interests to a sincere empathy for the continent’s increasing distress. Their efforts, however, could hardly overcome the barriers created by a deep-seated reluctance to increase official investment in Africa, by an obstinate unwillingness to disengage from the burgeoning relationship with South Africa, by the internal bickering in government circles or, for that matter, by the rising disinterest in Africa in the Israeli public at large. The first crop of African states to restore relations with Israel – consisting primarily of repressive regimes – did little to restore its standing on the continent or to enhance the status of the continent in Israeli eyes. The same reluctant mindset influenced approaches to Africa at the time of the massive diplomatic resurgence which accompanied the signing of the Oslo Accords and the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the entire world now open to Israel, the resumption of relations by African states, with several notable exceptions, was almost taken for granted. Indeed, until 2009 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refrained from taking the lead in designing a comprehensive African strategy.7 The belated decision to embark on such an exercise was the ............................................ 6

The contours of this period of formal exclusion are discussed in Naomi Chazan, “Israel in Africa”, Jerusalem Quarterly 18 (1981), pp. 29–44.

7

This passivity is well described in “Israel and Africa,” in Haim Ofaz (ed.), Israel’s Foreign Relations, Jerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education, the Leonard David Institute of International Relations and the Abba Eban Center for Israeli Diplomacy, 1999, pp. 202–216.

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result not only of concerted pressure by diplomats working in Africa to review operations on the ground, but also of the pressing need to conform to the OECD’s development assistance requirements on the eve of Israel’s acceptance into the organization. These deliberations have yet to yield a substantial reallocation of human and monetary resources to African issues or to alter the status of the continent in Israel’s foreign policy. For the past two decades Israeli leaders have been content, by and large, to ignore most of the continent. This studied disinterest has allowed opportunism to take over where benign neglect reigns. The shifting pattern of Israel’s involvement in Africa is also demonstrated, secondly, in the varying geographic scope of its ties with the continent. With very few exceptions, at the outset Israel sought to establish links with as many countries as possible. In the mid-1960s it boasted 32 embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa. After the break in diplomatic relations, it demonstratively shifted its focus to South Africa, while businessmen and defense agencies continued to work in key African states (Nigeria, Kenya, and Cote d’Ivoire).8 In the 1980s relations were restored with the handful of countries willing to do so (mostly of a highly dictatorial nature) – rendering Israel’s connections with mainstream Africa somewhat skewed. But since Israel’s African comeback, which has included the establishment of ties with a series of states with which it had never had formal links (such as Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Eritrea and until recently, Mauritania), it has, ironically, scaled down its diplomatic presence. Israel today has ten embassies in Africa: South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Cameroon and Kenya. All its ambassadors are also accredited to neighboring states (sometimes as many as four or five). This regional embassy concept has several notable drawbacks. First, it means that Israel does not give sufficient attention to most African states – something which makes its relations with many countries intermittent at best, adversely affecting its standing in these countries. Second, official Israel does not have a good picture of the activities of Israelis throughout the continent. Third, despite periodic missions and contacts in international forums ............................................ 8

For an analysis of the South African connection during this period and its implications see Naomi Chazan, Israeli Perspectives on the Israel-South African Relationship, London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1987.

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(primarily the United Nations), Israel is unfamiliar with key processes in many countries. And, finally, the logic behind the selection of these magnet embassies is unclear: it reflects historical circumstances and special agreements far more than any systematic analysis of African circumstances and Israeli priorities. Thus, while Israeli companies, individuals, non-governmental organizations, academics and private security personnel can be found throughout Africa and their comportment has a direct impact on Israel’s image in African eyes, there is little official knowledge – not to speak of supervision – concerning their operations. Changes in Israel’s approach to Africa have also been evident in the relative prominence of the different actors involved in Israel’s relations with the continent. In the early years diplomats and technical assistance experts spearheaded Israel’s African connections. When the diplomatic presence was reduced, they were replaced by representatives of public corporations, private businessmen and emissaries of the defense establishment (whose activities grew substantially after the collapse of diplomatic ties). As the diplomats returned, so too did the experts dispatched by MASHAV (the International Cooperation Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs). But the proportion of Israeli aid to Africa in the first decade of the twenty-first century dwindled to a mere ten percent of Israel’s total development aid. Today, Israel’s African ties have undergone a process of privatization. The interests of individual businessmen and Israeli companies mold the contours of relations with African authorities, sometimes financing visits of senior African leaders, bankrolling religious pilgrimages and even brokering official contacts. Many of these are established firms; others are fortune seekers that engage in shady practices and associate with questionable partners. Private security companies and arms dealers (capitalizing on the military past of their owners) have come to replace official government-to-government military links. Some of these consultants have become embroiled in ugly local conflicts, selling their wares and skills to the highest bidder. Their operations do not necessarily reflect Israeli government policy, nor do they promote Israeli interests on the continent. If, in the past, there was continuous tension between diplomats and African aficionados on the one hand and the defense establish-

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ment and private concerns on the other hand, in recent years the latter have enjoyed the upper hand.9 The counterpoint to these sometimes dubious undertakings can be found in the expansion of Africa-related activities amongst Israeli and Jewish organizations, propelled by a desire to give concrete expression to the Jewish concept of “tikkun olam” (perfecting the world) by contributing to the development of the continent. Drawing on both universal and Jewish values, a network of organizations (including Magen David Adom, the Joint Distribution Committee, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish World Service and a variety of spontaneous groups formed to deal with specific environmental and welfare issues) has become increasingly engaged on the ground. They have been joined by a series of state-organized emergency missions (mostly of a medical sort) in a variety of countries ranging from Liberia and Rwanda to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The nature of the Israeli presence in Africa today diverges markedly from the past. If in the formative years the most senior echelons of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the lead in Africa matters, today professional diplomats do not see their future in this arena. Israeli representation on the continent is all too frequently determined by opportunistic businesspeople and security consultants carrying Israeli passports rather than by legitimate emissaries of the public and private sectors. More to the point, while there are still many Israelis sincerely devoted to tackling the multiple humanitarian challenges facing contemporary Africa, they now operate primarily in non-governmental frameworks with little substantive backing. The upshot of shifts in approaches, geographic concentration and the composition of dominant actors is a more pragmatic, differentiated and narrowly focused Israeli African policy, primarily preoccupied with Israel itself and its immediate interests. The contemporary leaders of Israel, unlike their predecessors, are also far less knowledgeable about African issues and clearly less concerned with its complexities. In the tug-of-war between the view of Israel as a light unto the nations and that of an Israel fending for itself in an untrustworthy world, the latter has clearly prevailed – with broad ramifications for the scope, nature and quality of Israel’s relations with the African continent. ............................................ 9

For a particularly harsh critique in this regard, see Golan, “Israel and Africa”, esp. pp. 13–15.

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Israel Facing Africa: The Factors The transformation of Israeli attitudes towards Africa is a concrete expression of a gradual process of the redefinition of Israeli priorities, perceptions and norms which has resulted in a curious mixture of global adventurism and global self-enclosure during the first decade of the present century. This trajectory is not merely an outcome of objective conditions and variables which have defined Israel’s relations with the outside world in the past (which include, among others, the role of religion in foreign relations, regime type, leadership ties, economic considerations, the presence of Jewish and Muslim communities in particular countries, ties to the Arab world, links to major powers, direct strategic threats and, of course, changing responses to the ArabIsraeli conflict).10 It is also a product of a process of a conscious encapsulation reflective of profound changes in the Israeli body politic, its self-identity, its emotional sensitivities and its ethical inclinations. Together these factors assist in explaining Israel’s outlook on Africa and its concomitant activities on the continent.

Domestically-driven priorities Israel’s external relations have traditionally been a direct extension of the domestic political scene. Israeli politics during the past two decades have been characterized by substantial instability coupled with increased problems of coalition durability and a subsequent lack of governability. The need to pamper minor coalition partners (mostly of a religious and/or nationalist persuasion) has fueled a marked turn to the right in orientation and policy. Emphasis on the ongoing conflict and the security questions that it entails, always dominant, has become even more pronounced. When coupled with a growing concern with domestic income discrepancies and continuous social tensions, many Israelis have turned their attention inward. Inevitably, these developments have influenced Israel’s foreign policy outlooks. In a distinctly US-dominated world, Israel has increasingly (although ............................................ 10 For a summary of these variables see Neuberger, Israel’s Relations with the Third World, pp. 29–38. In the African context, see Arye Oded, Africa and the Middle East, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1997.

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not always willingly) depended on Washington for support in the international arena. In effect, official external links have become almost totally subsumed to this axis, rendering ties to other parts of the world of secondary importance diplomatically – although by no means economically. This is especially true of the so-called Third World, indiscriminately lumped together by most Israelis as unworthy of emulation and perceived as sweepingly antagonistic to Israel. In these circumstances, the very small pro-Africa constituency has been virtually silenced in recent years. The influence of African policy professionals, never very substantial, has been effectively muted; the community of entrepreneurs involved in Africa, which never carried much weight, has been smothered by those heavily invested in India and China; and the paucity of Israelis familiar with Africa (in stark contrast to the thousands of youngsters touring Asia and Latin America annually) has not created a groundswell of support for African causes.11 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that African issues play next to no role in domestic politics. Without any need to address pressures from within, policy-makers have been content to simply ignore Africa, along with many other parts of the southern hemisphere. Unlike fifty years ago, Israeli priorities not only lie elsewhere, but its global terms of reference have contracted. At the same time, Israeli entrepreneurs have been given a free hand, while humanitarian organizations have expanded independently.

Vulnerability in a globalized world Israel has always had to contend with hostile neighbors. Many of its foreign initiatives – including its outreach to Africa – were originally prompted by its ongoing efforts to break the circle of enmity which surrounds it and achieve international legitimacy. In recent years, however, mounting criticism of Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian territory, along with widespread displeasure with its operations in Lebanon (2006) and the ongoing siege on Gaza culminating in Operation Cast Lead (December 2008 – January 2009) have left it especially exposed in the international arena. Growing international ............................................ 11 Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s highly publicized tours of Africa and Latin America in 2009 and 2010 are the exception that prove this rule, particularly as these were perceived as a means of diverting attention from his exclusion from negotiations with the Palestinians and from investigations of his personal affairs.

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concern with human rights issues has made many Israelis more suspicious of the international community, gradually blurring the line between those who disagree with Israeli government policy and those who seek its destruction. These perceptions have a direct African link: they became pronounced in the wake of the first United Nations Conference on Racism held in Durban in 2001, during which criticism of Israeli moves spilled over into an outpouring of anti-Israel sentiment. Israeli identity is infused today, perhaps even more strongly than in the past, with a strong sense of vulnerability and victimhood. These sentiments help to explain both the curious geographic disposition of the official Israel presence in Africa as well as the opportunistic mindset that has guided activities on the continent in recent years. The Israeli concentration on the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Eritrea) and the East African coast is a response to growing Iranian influence on the continent and the proliferation of jihadist groups.12 The particular focus on mineral-rich South Africa and the oil states of Nigeria and Angola clearly stems from instrumental concerns. At the same time, the lack of impetus in other parts of the continent may be attributed to the fact that they neither pose any tangible threat nor serve any obvious gain. This rather paranoid lens, however, is hardly shared by all Israelis. The resurgence of an interest in African studies in Israeli institutions of higher education after a period of dormancy is a result of the refusal of some Israelis to adopt the hegemonic bunker mentality.13 The revival of Israeli tourism to the continent in recent years is another instance of such an outreach. And the involvement of Israeli groups in a series of projects in Africa (from day care centers in Rwanda and educational projects in West Africa to mine-removal operations in Angola) defies this siege mentality. Thus, while the view of Israel as a beleaguered state may help to account for official hesitations vis-à-vis Africa, the lack of acceptance of such a view assists in understanding the persistence, however downplayed, of a current of concern and engagement.

............................................ 12 Joseph R.A. Ayee, “Africa’s Perceptions of Israel”, in the present volume, esp. p. 230f. 13 The new Africa Center at Ben-Gurion University, established in 2009, coincided with the establishment of a countrywide inter-university program in African studies under the auspices of the Council of Higher Education.

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Lack of knowledge about Africa The distancing of the Israeli public from Africa is also an inevitable outgrowth of a widespread ignorance of developments on the continent. Indeed, coverage of Africa in the Israeli media is sporadic and decidedly random. The lack of exposure to things African transmits a negative message: what is not known cannot, surely, be particularly important. The decline of the academic study of Africa until recently has, sadly, reinforced this viewpoint. The unavailability of knowledge has also tended to reinforce uninformed stereotypes. The average Israeli associates the continent with natural calamities, impoverishment, illness (in particular AIDS) and, of course, civil wars. Many Israelis were surprised to learn, as a result of the World Cup in South Africa, that there are many other, positive, dimensions to the African experience. Nevertheless, without in-depth and continuous reporting on African affairs, there are few opportunities to correct what is essentially a spotty and distorted picture. The absence of updated information and the lack of involvement that it signals permeate official circles as well. The Africa Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is woefully understaffed: it can hardly supervise the Israeli missions, let alone systematically monitor developments on the continent.14 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that even when serious issues arise, discussion is minimal and – given the priority given to other areas – decisions rather haphazard. This is why Israel was very tardy in grasping the significance and implications of the Chinese involvement in Africa in the past decade, why it has yet to adjust its development assistance to the UN Millennium Development Goals embraced by the African Union and why it has been unable to respond to the African dimension of the emergence of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The long-term consequences of this ignorance cannot be underestimated: Africa is, in many minds, the continent of the first half of the twenty-first century. Since Israeli attention is directed elsewhere and Israeli research and information is tailored to other regions, Israel has not been able to keep in step with the new Africa. Thus, it is woefully under-represented in countries that ............................................ 14 This has been an ongoing complaint of all the deputy directors for Africa in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for years.

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have shown significant democratic progress (Ghana, for example), while it continues to be invested in others which are demonstratively problematic both politically and economically (such as Eritrea). No reasoned African policy can be designed or implemented with insufficient knowledge and inadequate analysis:

Changing attitudes towards Africans The early years of Israeli relations with Africa were accompanied by a fascination with its human and cultural diversity. In truth, however, Israelis had little familiarity with the continent and next to no contact with its inhabitants. If anything, it was the unknown and the exotic which held a certain appeal. This attitude underwent substantial change over the years as diplomats, scholars, businessmen and adventurers developed differentiated relations with Africans in various parts of the continent. But for a long time most Israelis had little, if any, contact with Africans. This situation changed dramatically in the past two decades with the appearance of foreign workers from Africa, the immigration of over 120,000 Jews of Ethiopian origin and the influx of at least 25,000 African refugees, primarily from Sudan and Eritrea. Africans are now a part of the Israeli human landscape. The results are distinctly problematic: prejudice against foreigners in general has evolved into rising anti-African sentiment. Several instances of outright racism against Ethiopians in Israeli schools are reflections of a more generalized prejudice. Recent government measures against Africans seeking asylum in Israel – which have included their exclusion from the center of the country, the mass expulsion of migrant workers who have overstayed their work permits and, lately, the adoption of stringent controls on entry into Israel – have further fueled these biases.15 The self-absorption of Israeli society, coupled with lack of information, has created a situation in which ignorance breeds pervasive disdain. This increasing intolerance towards the other has been offset, at least to some extent, by the mobilization of Israeli activists in support of African refu............................................ 15 In recent studies of attitudes towards various groups, the prejudice against Africans in general and Ethiopians in particular is marked. See Asher Arian et al., The Israel Democracy Index 2009, Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2009.

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gees and the creation of several voluntary organizations designed to provide basic services and protect their rights.16 In addition, civil society groups have been at the forefront of efforts to combat discrimination against Jews of Ethiopian extraction. In the process, these associations have attempted to relate the experience of Africans in Israel to their geographic roots, offering a substantially different narrative of the continent and its problems.17 Thus, the dualistic pattern of official distancing from and informal reengagement with Africa has been expedited by the increased proximity of Israelis to newcomers from the continent. So, too, has the propensity for selfenclosure on the one hand and the continuous attempt by individuals and civil society groups to break the increasingly parochial outlook of Israeli society on the other. Ironically, the link between these processes and Israel’s African policy has been tenuous at best.

Emotional predispositions While many of the features of Israel’s policies towards Africa can be explained by general trends within Israel and their consequences for relations with the continent, these cannot explain Israel’s overall aloofness. Underlying this governing outlook towards Africa are emotional factors which date back to the abrupt rupture of diplomatic relations in the early 1970s. Israeli officials, taken aback by the rapidity of the deterioration of ties, were deeply offended by the ingratitude – frequently termed betrayal – evinced by their former African allies. Smarting from these actions, they allowed emotions to guide policy, thus accounting for the highly demonstrative upgrading of Israel’s relations with South Africa in early 1974, as well as the pervasive lack of enthusiasm for a renewal of intimate relations thereafter.18 ............................................ 16 The most prominent NGOs are the Hotline for Migrants Workers, established a decade ago, Kav Laoved (The Worker’s line), which has increasingly been preoccupied with foreign workers, and a series of local community initiatives, especially in the south of the country. 17 For one example see Galia Sabar, We’re Not Here to Stay: African Migrant Workers in Israel and Back in Africa, Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Press, 2009), [in Hebrew]. 18 The highly emotional nature of Israeli attitudes towards most African states is highlighted in virtually every study of Israel’s relations with Africa. See, for one, Arye Oded, “Israel/Africa: Historical and Political Aspects”, in Moshe Yegar, Yosef Govrin, Arye Oded, Ministry for Foreign Affairs: The First Fifty Years, Jerusalem: MFA, 2002, pp. 615–629.

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The first decades of Israel’s relationship with Africa, in fact, have been depicted in decidedly personal terms. Israel’s initial contacts with Africa at the time of decolonization have been portrayed as the first steps in the courting of the continent. The flourishing of relations in the 1960s has been seen as a honeymoon period, giving way to a brief period of problematic marriage at the end of the first decade of African independence. This was followed by an ugly divorce, with all the sentiments that accompany such a break. Following a cooling-off period, the ensuing years have allowed for some civil interchange, but this is devoid of the fervor of the past. Without the passionate involvement of yesteryear, it is hardly surprising that a largely instrumental, selective, approach has set in, one still reserved when not entirely dispassionate. The pattern of Israel’s diplomatic dispersion in Africa is closely related to these sentiments. Countries that have exhibited sympathy for Israel over the years are consistently rewarded, while significant states are repeatedly ignored. Thus, Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, among the first to restore diplomatic relations with Israel, remain high on the list of official Israel, while other countries of equal or perhaps even greater significance in the African context do not receive the same attention. No serious strategy can be promoted when loyalty remains an unspoken test for the extent and depth of relations. These subjective orientations towards Africa continue to intrude on Israel’s overall foreign policy decision-making. However irrational, they play a key role in justifying the extremely minor attention paid to the continent and the small amount of investment in Africa-related issues. More to the point, they mirror a more widespread tendency to view Israel’s foreign relations in emotive terms – as a function not of interests, needs and affinities, but as a product of the degree of fidelity exhibited over the years.

Guiding values and global outlooks The tortuous history of Israel’s relationship with Africa is very much a history of the relative salience at various points in time of two conflicting paradigms of Israeli policy: the universal, outward-oriented school and the beleaguered, inward-looking one. The perception that Israel must become an integral part of the international community and conform to its norms facilitated early contacts with Africa, especially since these also served major interests. Subse-

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quent developments have been guided by a far more pragmatic approach, one which encourages taking maximum advantage of opportunities as they present themselves. These utilitarian considerations have guided Israeli attitudes towards Africa during the past three decades, assuming increasingly instrumental and even opportunistic forms. Today, this officially reinforced worldview is one that sadly belittles the universal ethics underlying many global interactions. This trend not only closes Israel off from potential partners, it also endows existing relations with an ephemeral quality. In the African context, it runs the risk of becoming counterproductive in two respects: it gives African leaders a sense that Israel is only tangentially responsive to their agenda; and it unquestionably sacrifices long-term interests to short-term concerns. If not for persistent minority voices both within and beyond the establishment, which have not only advocated a value-driven approach but also promoted its implementation, Israel’s relations with Africa would be considerably less varied. This ongoing discussion over foreign policy goals and norms is reflective of a much broader debate about Israel’s own identity and values. The absence of a clear morally-induced vision is undermining Israel’s normative well-being and adversely affecting its global standing. The history of Israel’s foreign policy demonstrates that there is a direct relationship between an Israel responsive to the needs and concerns of other states and the forging of mature links that withstand the test of time. Israel’s recent African experience demonstrates the self-defeating nature of systematically ignoring this lesson. Many factors beyond Israel’s control have affected Israel’s relations with Africa. But Israel is not passive in this process: a series of non-decisions, missed opportunities and subjective variables have played a role in its disposition towards and presence on the continent. A self-absorbed Israel inured to the needs of others inescapably promotes a lack of empathy: a self-fulfilling cycle, which, with appropriate agency, is far from irreversible.

Israel Faces Africa: The Prospects The patterns of Israeli-African relations and their determining factors accentuate both the deep problems and the unrealized potential ingrained in these

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ties. These pose a serious, albeit largely underestimated, challenge, not only to Israeli foreign policy but also to Israel’s own future. Israel’s relations with Africa cannot develop substantially without the consolidation of an informed, consistent policy based on the kind of understanding, sensitivity and concern for African issues exhibited in the early years of its involvement on the continent.19 Such a mutually-beneficial design requires a thorough review of the political, strategic, economic, cultural and religious interests that have linked Israel to Africa in the past and an analysis of their contemporary implications. It also demands a nuanced evaluation of the particular ramifications of these findings for specific African countries. Only on this basis will it be possible to determine substantive and geographic priorities and to designate adequate mechanisms for productive interaction in the future. No relations can be sustained over time without the allocation of far more substantial resources and the mobilization of a variety of factors from the nongovernmental as well as the academic and business communities. Such an outreach necessarily involves the enactment of appropriate regulatory procedures. It also entails a concerted effort to engage the Israeli public in international affairs in general and African issues in particular. The groundwork for such a revision exists. It has deep roots in the foreign policy establishment, in institutions of higher learning and in civil society. But such a transformation must be officially sanctioned. Israeli leaders and the public at large need to consciously decide that they can control Israel’s destiny and alter its position in Africa as elsewhere. Such a reassertion of agency is vital not only to Israel’s future in the world, but also to its own being. There is a new generation of Israelis in search of meaning and devoted to democratic values: they are concerned with global issues and willing to devote their energies to creating a better world. They grasp that engaging in the problems of other societies is a way of affirming their own humanity. It is not too late for official policy-makers to provide them with the encouragement and backing that can reinvigorate the Israeli-African relationship. All parties stand to benefit from such a revival. ............................................ 19 For further elaboration, see Chazan “Israel and Africa: Challenges for a New Era”, pp. 12–14.

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J OSEPH AYEE

Africa’s Perception of Israel

Introduction Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Sub-Saharan Africa’s relations with and perceptions of Israel have vacillated between friendship and hostility, isolation and aloofness, and cooperation and collaboration. Indeed, the perceptions have largely been based on rational and emotive reasons. In most cases, there has not been any objective, balanced and detached examination of issues, leading to hasty and unsubstantiated conclusions from both proponents and opponents alike. Against this backdrop, this paper makes a foray into the perceptions of SubSaharan Africa of Israel and their implications for future Africa-Israel relationships. Specifically, the paper examines the nature and reasons for the perceptions, and implications for future Sub-Saharan African-Israeli relations.

Background to African-Israeli Relations Africa’s relations with Israel may be traced to the parallels drawn between the struggle of the Jewish people for a homeland and the African struggle for selfdetermination and independence by the father of modern Zionism, Theodor Herzl, in his book Altneuland (Old New Land), which was published in 1902. In his book, Herzl wrote: “Once I have witnessed the redemption of the Jews, my people, I wish also to assist in the redemption of the Africans”1. As if fulfilling this mandate, various Israeli governments have made efforts not only to establish links with Africa but also to initiate development and technical cooperation programmes. These efforts at establishing relations have ............................................ 1

Golda Meir, My Life, New York: Dell Publishing, 1975, pp. 308–309.

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been classified into the following four main phases2 and they amply demonstrate the swings, vacillations and shifts in African-Israeli relations over the past fifty-four years.

Phase 1: 1956–1973 The “honeymoon” period3. This period was marked by a growth in Israel’s diplomatic representation in Africa, which grew from 6 in 1960, to 23 in 1961 and 33 in 1973 after the opening of its first mission in Ghana in November 1956. This period was one of egalitarian and idealistic attitudes by Israel towards Africa, with the belief that lessons learned by Israel could be shared with African countries, which were undergoing the same process of nation-building. In addition, there was the belief that Israel had the potential to provide a better model for African countries because “Israelis had proved to find solutions to the kinds of problems that large, wealthy and powerful states had never encountered”4. To Israel, therefore, the poverty and squalid lives of Africans could be ameliorated with Israel’s assistance because it had a moral obligation to do so.5 Apart from this moral obligation, Israel’s determination to forge links with African states was also influenced by Realpolitik. Israel’s isolation after the Bandung Conference of April 1955, to which it was not invited, and the accompanying fear that if it failed to give assistance, Egypt would step in and fill the vacuum,6 as well as providing support for votes from African countries at ............................................ 2

Terhemba N. Ambe-Uva, Kasali M. Adegboyega, “The Impact of Domestic Factors on Foreign Policy: Nigerian/Israeli Relations”, Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations 6, nos. 3–4 (2007), pp. 44–59; Kwame Arthur Boafo, Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, “Africa’s Evolving Relations with Israel”, in David A. Harris, Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Israel and Africa. Assessing the Past, Envisioning the Future, Tel Aviv, 2006, pp. 26–33; Naomi Chazan, “Israel and Africa: Challenges for a New Era”, in David A. Harris, Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Israel and Africa, pp. 1–15.

3

Naomi Chazan, “Israel and Africa”, Jerusalem Quarterly 18 (1981), pp. 29–44; Peters Joel, Israel and Africa: The Problematic Friendship, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992; Zach Levy, “The Rise and Decline of a Special Relationship: Israel and Ghana, 1957–1966”, African Studies Review 46, no.1 (2007), pp. 155–177; Zach Levy, “Exit from Africa, 1973: The Road to Diplomatic Isolation”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 2 (2008), pp. 205–226; Olusola Ojo, Africa and Israel: Relations in Perspectives (Studies in International Politics), Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.

4

Golda Meir, My Life, p. 306.

5

Haim Divon, “MASHAV in Africa: the Israeli Government’s Development Cooperation Programme”, in David A. Harris, Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Israel and Africa, pp. 16–25.

6

Mitchell G. Bard, The Evolution of Israel’s Africa Policy, Jewish Virtual Library: www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/politics/africa.html

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the United Nations (UN), were all compelling reasons. This point was echoed indirectly by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to the Knesset in 1960 when he cautioned that Israel’s aid to African countries “is not a matter of philanthropy (...). We are no less in need of the fraternity of friendship of the new nations than they are of our assistance”7. The technical and development cooperation assistance from Israel to African countries was phenomenal given Israel’s own resources. The assistance programmes were in the area of infrastructure, agricultural development and sponsored educational exchange, as well as training of personnel. In return, African countries supported Israel at the United Nations against isolation.8 However, two incidents nearly marred this “honeymoon”, namely the perceived Israeli support of the Biafran secessionist movement in Nigeria and the Six-Day War of June 1967 when Israel occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Before these events, the “special relationship” between Ghana and Israel, which began in 1956, was terminated in January 1961 when Ghana under President Kwame Nkrumah joined in a sharp condemnation of Israel.9 In addition, relations were also affected by issues such as the growing influence of Arab countries and the Soviet Union in Africa, political instability and increasing underdevelopment in African countries. Further factors included African countries’ search for alternative assistance, Israel’s victory in the SixDay War and its closer ties with the United States of America, leading to her over-confidence.10

............................................ 7

Samuel Decalo, Israel and Africa: The Politics of Cooperation, A Study of Foreign Policy and Technical Assistance, unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1970, p. 85.

8

Arthur Boafo, Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, “Africa’s Evolving Relations with Israel”, in David A. Harris, Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Israel and Africa, pp. 26–33; Naomi Chazan, “Israel and Africa: Challenges for a New Era”, in David A. Harris, Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Israel and Africa, pp. 1– 15.

9

Zach Levy, “Exit from Africa, 1973”: The Road to Diplomatic Isolation, pp. 205–226.

10 Naomi Chazan, “Israel and Africa: Challenges for a New Era”, in David A. Harris, Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Israel and Africa, pp. 1–15; Peters Joel, Israel and Africa: The Problematic Friendship.

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Phase 2: 1973–1982 The period of “hostility, diplomatic isolation and discordance”11. The outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 led 29 Black African countries to sever diplomatic relations with Israel, with the exception of Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland.12 This decision was not only influenced by the War per se but also the promise of financial assistance and reduced oil prices from the Arab League. It was further influenced by compliance with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) resolution 53 of 1968, which called for “the withdrawal of foreign troops from all Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967 in accordance with the Resolution taken by the Security Council on November 22, 1967, and appeals to all Member States of the OAU to use their influence to ensure a strict implementation of this Resolution”13. Israel regarded the break in ties by African countries as a mark of hostility, ingratitude and myopia on their part. This perception would affect the generally unenthusiastic approach by Israel to restore ties with African countries from 1982–1993. Apart from the Yom Kippur War, relations between Israel and Africa also became frosty because of the perception that Israel was an agent of international imperialism and racism as a result of her association with South Africa’s apartheid regime. With the signing of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1979, leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Africanimposed isolation of Israel eased.

Phase 3: 1982–1993 This was a period of “gradual resumption of diplomatic relations between Africa and Israel”, or more appropriately the “sluggish improvements in Israel’s ............................................ 11 Peters Joel, Israel and Africa: The Problematic Friendship, Zach Levy, “The Rise and Decline of a Special Relationship: Israel and Ghana, 1957–1966”, African Studies Review 46, no. 1 (2007), pp. 155–177; Zach Levy, “Exit from Africa, 1973”, pp. 205–226. 12 Interest sections in third-party foreign embassies were maintained by Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Central African Republic. 13 Olusola Ojo, Africa and Israel: Relations in Perspectives; Haim Ofaz, “Israel and Africa”, in idem (ed.), Israel’s Foreign Relations, Jerusalem; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Education, The Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations, and the Abba Eban Center for Israeli Diplomacy, 1999, pp. 202–216.

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standing in Africa”14. Three factors contributed to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel by African countries, apart from the establishment of relations with Egypt. First, the expected promise of reduced oil prices from the Arabs was not fulfilled and most African countries became disenchanted. Second, the escalating oil prices deepened the economic crises which faced African countries and they naturally wanted to turn to Israel for rescue. Third, Israeli Foreign Ministry officials embarked upon a campaign to achieve what Chazan called a “diplomatic rapprochement”, which entailed a series of visits to various African countries as well as the use of private Israeli businessmen in Africa. This led to the establishment of economic and defence ties, leading in turn to an increase in military contacts and negotiation of contracts. Fourth is Israel’s decision in 1987 to join the international military embargo on South Africa.15 On the diplomatic front, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire announced the restoration of relations with Israel in May 1982, becoming the first African head of state to do so. He was followed by other countries such as Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Guinea, Ethiopia and Kenya. Chazan has attributed five reasons to the rather slow improvement in Africa-Israel relations during the period. They include the markedly divergent aspirations of Africa and Israel, namely that Israel was oriented fully toward the West while African states were impoverished and marginalized globally; the complicated bilateral process of the restoration of relations instead of the multilateral one in 1973; the multi-faceted Israeli-South African relationship; the constant tug-of-war between the Israeli Foreign Ministry on the one hand and the Israeli defence establishment and private businessmen on the other; and a new breed of Israelis, who were mostly uninterested in Africa and its problems because of the feeling that the African predicament should not be an Israeli preoccupation.

............................................ 14 Naomi Chazan, “Israel and Africa: Challenges for a New Era”, in David A. Harris, Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Israel and Africa, pp. 6–7. 15 Ibid, pp. 1–15; Zach Levy, “Exit from Africa, 1973”, pp. 205–226.

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Phase 4: 1993 to date This was the period of the “complete diplomatic return of Israel to Africa”16. Over 40 African countries (including those that had never had formal links with Israel, namely Angola) have established diplomatic ties with Israel. This situation was facilitated by three factors: the Oslo Accords and the Israeli peace treaty with Jordan; the restoration of multi-racial democratic rule and the abolition of apartheid in 1994 in South Africa; and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the US as the sole superpower. First: Even though Israel’s response to Africa’s interest in establishing links was initially slow, there has been an upsurge of late in Israel’s interest in Africa, for five reasons. The first is the growing influence of Iran in Africa, which has made the continent an emerging theatre in Israeli-Iranian confrontation. More recently, Iran has been buying off some of Israel’s erstwhile allies in a systematic effort to influence the situation. In 2009, Mauritania, one of the few Arab League members to have relations with Israel, told Israel to close its embassy in the capital, Nouakchott, after Iran increased its presence. Second: Jihadist terrorist attacks, particularly in Kenya17, led to some of the leaders turning to Israel for military support. For instance, in his visit to Israel in February 2010, the Kenyan Minister of Internal Security asked for Israeli counter-terrorism assistance. According to media reports, he told the Israeli leaders that “the jihad is taking over Somalia and threatening to take over Kenya and all of Africa. No one is more experienced than you in fighting internal terrorism”.18 Israel responded that it is prepared to consider establishing a joint force with Kenya to guard its north-western border to prevent terrorist infiltration. Third: The growing Israeli interest in the Horn of Africa also contributed. In early February 2010, Yigal Palmor, spokesman for Israel’s Foreign Minister, reportedly told Somali media that Israel was prepared to recognize the break............................................ 16 Naomi Chazan, “Israel and Africa: Challenges for a New Era”, in David A. Harris, Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Israel and Africa, pp. 1–15; Peters Joel, Israel and Africa: The Problematic Friendship; Zach Levy, “Exit from Africa, 1973”, pp. 205–226. 17 Kenya suffered three majors attacks by al-Qaida in recent years – the suicide bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi on August 7, 1998; and two attacks on November 28, 2002 in Mombasa and the bombing of a hotel frequented by Israelis and a missile attack an Israeli airliner. 18 Intelligence Quarterly, March 12, 2010: www.intelligencequarterly.com/2010/03/intel-briefs-3/

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away territory of Somaliland, which split from Somalia in 1991 as an independent nation. Fourth: A further factor is the interest in Africa’s mineral resources, especially oil, diamonds, uranium, thorium and other radioactive elements used to manufacture nuclear fuel. Fifth: The fifth reason for Israel’s renewed interest in Africa, is the liberalization and democratization of most African states. This is coupled with the emerging realism according to which the African Union is opposed to oppression and discrimination and their application, without regard to race, ethnicity or creed.

Africa’s Positive Perceptions of Israel A number of positive perceptions of Israel can be discerned from most African countries. They are enumerated in the following paragraphs:

Israelis are intelligent and ingenious There is the perception that Israelis are intelligent and ingenious. This is evident from the adoption of Israeli technical skills in African countries, which is augmented by the presence of Israeli advisers and technicians, as well as education, exchange and training programmes. Israeli experts and technicians have been recruited to give assistance in several areas, ranging from desert reclamation to the construction of several major buildings, national airports and sewage systems19. African governments and people continue to wonder how Israel – a country located in the desert – is able to literally turn the desert into arable land and has become food sufficient. Israel’s remarkable progress in the agricultural sector has made countries either invite Israeli advisers or send officials to be trained in Israel and to study their system, so that they can apply it on their return to their own countries. The kibbutz system has been replicated in several African countries but does not seem to work as expected. ............................................ 19 Arthur Boafo, Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, “Africa’s Evolving Relations with Israel”, in David A. Harris, Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Israel and Africa, pp. 26–33.

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The invincibility of Israeli military intelligence and capacity to deal with terrorism There is the perception of an aura of invincibility surrounding Israel’s military intelligence and its capacity to deal with terrorists. This perception is based on the fact that in spite of being surrounded by belligerent Arab countries (which has made some people sympathetic to the Israeli cause), Israel has not lost any war with its Arab neighbours. Given this invincibility, several African countries have frequently turned to Israel for military and security assistance. Some of the countries which have benefited from the assistance include Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Togo, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, South Africa and Ethiopia. More recently, the invincibility of Israeli military intelligence was re-echoed by the Kenyan Minister of Internal Security during his February 2010 visit to Israel, when he noted that “no one is more experienced than you in fighting internal terrorism”20.

Israel’s programme of development cooperation The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, and the more than 300 million impoverished people in Africa, have become more compelling factors for African countries to benefit from the establishment of the Center for International Cooperation (MASHAV) in 1958. MASHAV’s activities in Africa have focused on areas in which Israel has a competitive advantage, including agriculture, water resource management, micro-enterprise development, community development, medicine, public health, empowerment of women and non-formal education. The programmes are normally based on a “train-the-trainers” approach to institutional and human capacity building, with professional training courses being conducted in Israel and Africa. The ravages of HIV/AIDS, drought, civil war, a lack of safe drinking water and proper sanitation, poor medical attention, chronic unemployment and abject poverty will continue to make MASHAV programmes extremely appealing to African countries.21 ............................................ 20 Intelligence Quarterly, March 12, 2010: www.intelligencequarterly.com/2010/03/intel-briefs-3/ 21 Haim Divon, “MASHAV in Africa: the Israeli Government’s Development Cooperation Programme”, in David A. Harris, Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Israel and Africa, pp. 16–25.

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Israeli closeness to the US and the strong Jewish lobby will bring benefits to Africa Most African states believe that the closeness of Israel to the US will bring benefits to Africa, either directly or indirectly. For instance, the Babaginda administration viewed the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel as a great opportunity to stimulate the national economy by encouraging American Jewish leaders to promote investment in Nigeria. Similarly, during his visit to Israel in 1991 to hold talks with his counterpart, General Nwachukwu pointed out that: We know, for instance, that you have the command of financial institutions of the world through your kith and kin in several industrialized and highly developed economies and we believe also that your influence can bring some meaningful investment to support such development programmes.22

Association of modern Israel with the biblical Israel and Christian holy sites Most Christians in Africa usually aspire to embark on a pilgrimage to Israel to visit holy sites in Jerusalem, Galilee, Nazareth, Bethlehem, the Mount of Olives and the Temple Mount. From their visits to the holy sites, they bring along souvernirs with them. A common souvenir is water from the River Jordan, which pilgrims collect in containers for baptism purposes in their home countries. In addition, most Christians believe in the biblical saying that the Jews are the “chosen people of God” and Isaiah’s prophecy that Israel should become a “light unto the nations”.23 The holy sites and the biblical sayings have therefore resulted in the shoring up of support and sympathy for Israel among most Christian communities in African countries. However, among Muslim African countries, there has been public hostility towards Israel, even if it was offering development assistance. For example, as ............................................ 22 Terhemba N. Ambe-Uva/Kasali M. Adegboyega, “The Impact of Domestic Factors on Foreign Policy: Nigerian/Israeli Relations”, Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations 6, nos. 3–4 (2007), pp. 44–59. 23 See Jes 42,6; 49,6 et al.

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far back as in 1964, while addressing the World Islamic League, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the former Northern Region of Nigeria pointed out that: It is also fitting at this juncture for me to mention the numerous attempts made by the Jews to entice underdeveloped countries to their side. Barely two years ago, they offered a sizeable amount of loan to the Federation of Nigeria. This offer was accepted by all the governments except we [sic] in the North, who rejected it outright. I made it vividly clear at the time that Northern Nigeria would prefer to go without development rather than receiving an Israeli loan or aid. We took this step only in good faith as Muslims.24

Israel: the home of regenerative health and the Dimona success story Israel has been linked to regenerative health, where the mortality rate is very low and thus sees people live longer. This low mortality rate is attributed to a healthy lifestyle, meaning that the town of Dimona, for example, has known no deaths for approximately 10 years. This has attracted official delegations and private visits to the town to observe how the people living there have attained such longevity. As a result, most ministries of health in Africa have incorporated regenerative health into their health policies and programmes.

Africa’s Negative Perceptions of Israel In spite of the positive perceptions of Israel in Africa, there are some negative ones, which are worth flagging. They are as follows:

Israel and the forcible occupation of Arab land: Israel has been accused in some African countries, particularly the Muslim ones, of forcibly occupying Arab land. For this reason, these countries are of ............................................ 24 John N. Paden, Ahmadu Bello-Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria. Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing, 1986, p. 541.

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the opinion that Israel must therefore be rejected. This is sometimes based on an incorrect interpretation of history. In some countries, demonstrations have been staged against Israeli occupation of the territories. The wars fought between the Arab countries and Israel have won support for the Palestinian cause in African countries. In addition, the sometimes inhuman treatment of Palestinians during the Intifada or uprisings, and the banning of Palestinian labourers from coming to Israel to work, were largely seen as resulting from Israel’s lack of sensitivity to the self-determination of the Palestinian people. In spite of the creation of a Palestinian state, some people in Africa have questioned the capacity, viability and legitimacy of such a state given the instability, lawlessness and insecurity that have characterized its operations.

Israel and human rights The human rights record of Israel has been viewed as negative in most African countries. The destruction of Palestinian homes, arrest of terrorists and the frequent use of firearms to deal with the situation in Palestine, have all been seen as violations of human rights. Even though military excesses have been punished by the authorities, this has nevertheless not been reported by the international media, therefore creating a perception of Israeli abuse of the human rights of the Palestinians.

Israel and religion To African countries in the Muslim world, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been reduced to one of religious jingoism. Israel is blamed by African Muslim countries as occupying Jerusalem, which is their third holiest city after Mecca and Medina. The continued occupation and use of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel amounts to religious jingoism, it is claimed. The fact that Jerusalem is being claimed by both Jews and Arabs as their holy city points to religion as a major cause of the conflict, and therefore to the Arab accusation of Israel as being religiously jingoistic.

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The media and Israel The African media has not contributed positively to building a positive perception of and image for Israel. News headlines usually focus on what are termed as Israeli atrocities, aggression and abuse of Palestinian rights. Consequently, there is a perception of violence being inflicted by Israel on defenceless Palestinians in their own land. In this regard, the Israeli government will have to do more to cause the media to highlight its achievements in Palestine.

Israel and her hidden agenda The perception is that behind her philanthropic facade, Israel is in Africa for ulterior motives which are political, military, security-oriented, scientific and economic. Some have even accused Israel of using the continent for its military and scientific experiments and of being instrumental in arming some African regimes. In other words, it is claimed Israel is pursuing its own agenda, which is counterproductive to development and stability in Africa. In addition to this, some African leaders have viewed Israel’s efforts differently. For example, during a visit to Israel in 1962, President David Decko of the Central African Republic remarked that Israel did not try to create Africa in the Israeli image. He therefore lamented that “instead, Israel has contented itself with showing the new African nations its achievements, in helping them overcome their weaknesses, in assisting them in learning. In so doing, you have conquered Black Africa”25.

Conclusion: Implications for Future African-Israeli Relations There is no doubt that Africa’s perception of Israel is still positive, in spite of the dark spots seen over the years, especially during the period from 1973 to 1982. The country still enjoys enormous goodwill among many African states, given the fact that over 40 African countries have diplomatic ties with Israel. This goodwill has implications for future relations in a number of ways. First, even though there is renewed commitment on the part of Israel to Africa’s ............................................ 25 Mordechai Kreinin, Israel and Africa, New York, 1964, p. 5.

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development, there need to be clear and consistent policy directions by both parties, which will promote synergies in official and unofficial relationships. Second, the obstacles to fruitful and meaningful relations between the parties will have to be removed to ensure that they are beneficial to all. Third, there is no doubt that the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is a topmost priority in all African states and therefore the MASHAV will have to be reoriented specifically towards the MDGs. Finally, in an era of good governance and globalization, a concerted effort on the part of Israel and Africa is crucial to enable the gains to cascade down to the man on the street and promote human security.

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Y ITZHAK S HICHOR

My Heart Is in the West and I Am at the Ends of the East: Changing Israeli Perceptions of Asia

Introduction In the 12th century Yehudah Halevi, one the greatest Jewish poets, lamented while in Spain: “My heart is in the East and I am at the ends of the West.” An understanding of Israeli perceptions of Asia should begin with the reverse: “My heart is in the West and I am at the ends of the East.” For many Israelis, primarily those born outside Asia and maybe some of those born in Israel, their being (geographically) part of Asia has been unfortunate. Conceptually identified with Europe and America they – subconsciously or consciously – tend to overlook Asia, lacking not only interest but also knowledge. This ignorance, in both senses, has been reflected in many aspects of Israeli life, such as schools and universities, sports, medicine, restaurants, the media, labor migration, as well as in government circles and policy-making processes. In recent decades, however, as Asia has begun to emerge as a powerful shareholder in the international system – primarily but not only economically – Israeli perceptions of Asia have also begun to transform, although not yet to the point of regarding Asia as a substitute to Israel’s association with Europe and North America. What are the origins of these perceptions? What are their manifestations in Israeli life and implications for Israel’s domestic and international situation? Under what circumstances – and to what extent – would these perceptions be modified or abandoned, if at all? These questions will be analyzed in this chapter. Based also on my personal experience, it will provide a kind of autobiographical perspective – although mine is definitely exceptional. It is divided into five parts, elaborating Israel’s Asia mindset; its origins and expressions (with a section on Ben-Gurion’s vision); stages of change; and implications. Regarded as terra incognita from around 1950 to around 1980, Asia

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has become more familiar, meaningful and relevant to Israel, the Israeli public and Israeli society. Psychology and foreign policy literature deal extensively with the issue of perception, but this paper discusses neither, at least not directly. Public and social perceptions of the other are determined by many factors or inputs, including geography, culture, religion, language, habits, food, music and art, and accessibility. Perceptions are an outcome of a long process of “programming” that affects the human mind to create a “mindset”, a set of ways that constitute a prism or a filter through which others are understood and interpreted.1 For Israel and the Jewish people, however, Asia (unlike Europe, America and even Australia) had rarely been understood or interpreted.2 This is odd given the fact that the people of Israel had originated in (West) Asia and, although later expelled to and scattered throughout other countries and continents, has never renounced or abandoned its historical, religious and cultural attachment to and affiliation with its Asian roots. So how can we explain Asia’s marginality in the Israeli mindset and its preference for the West – despite the fact that the West inflicted terrible tragedies on the Jewish people throughout history, to the brink of nearly total extinction – something Asia has never done?

Origins of Israel’s Asia Perceptions Asia’s marginality in the Israeli mindset is an outcome of the nature of the subject (the eyes of the beholder), the subjective and objective nature of the object, and the mutual interrelation between the two. To begin with, though Israel is evidently a part of Asia, it is located in its far west – a long distance from the core Asian civilizations of India and China. Furthermore, the geopolitics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a crucial input in Israel’s perception of Asia (and vice versa), has turned the Middle East (or Near East) into a barrier or buffer between Israel and Asia, thereby making direct, fast and short continen............................................ 1

Glen Fisher, Mindsets: the Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations, Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1988.

2

Moshe Yegar, The Long Journey to Asia: A Chapter in the Diplomatic History of Israel, Haifa: Haifa University Press, 2004, p. 9 [in Hebrew].

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tal (and other) exchanges between Israel and Asia inexpedient. Consequently, a mutual flow of knowledge has been very limited, all the more so because of the near absence of Asian communities in Israel and Jewish communities in Asia. Jewish communities in Asia are nothing compared to Jewish communities in the West. They are considerably smaller, isolated, fragmented, uncoordinated, disorganized, and politically and even economically weak. Moreover, a number of Jewish communities that had existed (some for no more than several decades) in post-World War II Asia – for example in Myanmar (Burma), China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Laos – vanished almost completely, having migrated to other countries, including Israel. These frail communities could by no means constitute a bridge between Israel and Asia, let alone provide any significant support for the State of Israel. Living in a bubble, and unlike Jewish communities in the West, many of those migrated to Asia from Europe and elsewhere had been indifferent to the local cultures and languages, and even disrespectful of them. In the 1980s I noticed one day a group of elderly people who attended my class on traditional Chinese history and civilization. To my surprise, they turned out to belong to the Harbin Jewish community in China, who had migrated to Israel in the late 1940s and early 1950s, having lived there for many years. They had practically no idea about Chinese history, culture and language, which they eventually came to study at the Hebrew University thirty or forty years after leaving China, where they had preserved their Russian characteristics. Likewise, the so-called “Baghdadi” Jews of India, Malaya, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore, considered themselves “British” – and were treated accordingly by the Japanese occupiers during the Pacific War; and “Russian” Jewish communities in China were treated by the Japanese not as Jewish but primarily as Russian. Apparently, the Jewish marginality in Asia has entailed certain advantages. One is the near absence of anti-Semitism. It is an outcome of the gap between Jews and Judaism and Asians and Asian religions. The relatively brief and shallow Jewish presence in Asia has prevented friction and precluded antiSemitism. Religion in Asia tends to be more personal, flexible and tolerant and far less institutionalized than in Europe and the West. Monotheistic religions are not typical of Asia and therefore there has been no Jewish competition with or persecution by such religions. Whatever anti-Semitism there is in Asia, it is

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superficial and rootless. It has been imported, mainly by Japanese and Russians, from mainland Europe and then re-exported to mainland Asia – but has never been a significant phenomenon as typical as it has been in the West. Actually, in World War II Asia became a haven, perhaps the only one, for tens of thousands of Jewish refugees who fled Europe and were allowed to settle in Shanghai and Central Asia, allowing them to survive. Still, this little known historical episode has not been enough to modify Israeli perceptions of Asia.3 One of the main reasons is that none of Israel’s leaders had been born or lived in Asia. Most of them came from Russia and Eastern Europe or from North America. Among the second and third tier there were a few who had an Asian background, for example Dr. Yosef Tekoah (Jozef Tukaczynsky). Having lived and studied in China, he turned out to be one of Israel’s seasoned diplomats, an ambassador in the United Nations and President of Ben-Gurion University, but still not so interested in Asia. None of the 85 diplomats whose biographies appear in a major Foreign Ministry publication had any previous experience in Asia.4 Israel’s leaders, without exception, have set the country on a Western-oriented course. Only few, former Prime Minister Ben-Gurion for one, had long-standing (though little-known) views on, or vision of, Asia – to be discussed below. For many years, many Israelis ignored or worse, resented, Asia for its association with the Arabs and the Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli conflict and dissociation from Israel. Denunciation of Israel – that has been expected, though never necessarily, from Asian Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh – has by no means been expected, nor anticipated and understood, from Asia’s non-Muslim states such as China, Korea, Japan and even India. The fact that most of Asia – Muslim and nonMuslim alike – has adopted a hostile attitude toward Israel, significantly shaped Israel’s perceptions of Asia. These perceptions were also affected by information that had been accumulated from different sources such as books ............................................ 3

See, for example: Zhou Xun, Chinese Perceptions of the ‘Jews’ and Judaism: A History of the Youtai, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001; David Goodman, “Anti-Semitism in Japan: Its History and Current Implications”, in Frank Dikotter (ed.), The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997, pp. 177–198.

4

Moshe Yegar et.al. (eds.), Ministry for Foreign Affairs: The First Fifty Years, Jerusalem: Keter, 2002, pp. 1151–1185.

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(Pearl Buck’s The Good Earth, for one)5 or World War II, Korean War and Vietnam War movies that depicted Asia in a negative way. At the same time Asia is perceived as a source of spiritualism which is not necessarily connected to any particular religion. Indeed, one of Asia’s main attractions for Israelis is their ability to find spiritual comfort in Asia without having to compromise or give up Judaism, something that is impossible in the West (attending a conference in 1997 in Maidenhead, I was given a ride by a Jewish driver who claimed to be Buddhist; he could not have been a Muslim or a Christian while being Jewish). As a consequence, thousands of Israelis, especially after their military service, go every year to Asia – in particular to India but also to Nepal, China and Vietnam. Eastern directed tourism – a phenomenon of the last thirty years – has become one of the most important bridges between Israel and Asia, a means of increasing knowledge, business and the number of students in Asian Studies departments at Israel’s universities. Israel’s misperceptions of Asia are also an outcome of the absence of Asian Diaspora communities and expatriates in Israel. Unlike many other countries, Israel’s encounter with Asians is very limited. Israel does not have “Chinatowns” that could provide the public with a sense of authenticity and – until the last two decades – only few Israelis had met Asians. This situation began to change since the early 1990s with the arrival of Asian gastarbeiter or migrant workers from Thailand, the Philippines and China. In 2002, for example, Israel became China’s sixth most important labor export market, following four East Asian countries and the United States.6 Yet, while Asian workers have become a permanent phenomenon in Israel’s daily life (especially in agriculture, construction, nursing and social care), their exposure to Israeli society is limited. This is true especially for thousands of Chinese who live mostly in segregated camps and, except for their employers, are almost completely isolated from the public. As most of them come from a peasant background, they are not well educated and do not speak any language except Chinese (and then, primarily in a local dialect). Their contribution to improving the Israeli perception of China, or of Asia in general is, therefore, minimal. ............................................ 5

At least seventeen of Pearl Buck’s books were translated into Hebrew from 1932 to 1966.

6

Yitzhak Shichor, “China’s Labor Export”, The University of Haifa Bulletin, Spring 2004, pp. 14–15 [in Hebrew].

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Expressions of Israel’s Asia Perceptions Many Israelis first become acquainted with Asia (more specifically China) through a number of popular children songs. Noteworthy among them is the song, sung with a different vowel each time, about “two Chinese with a big violin who were sitting by the road and chatting loudly until a policeman arrived and drove them away and that’s it”. In fact, this is a German song, translated into Hebrew by Netanel Lorch, historian, diplomat and the third secretary-general of the Knesset. The German original, which is slightly different from the Hebrew version, is as follows: Drei Chinesen mit dem Kontrabass, Saßen auf der Straße und erzählten sich was, Da kam die Polizei, ei na was ist denn das? Drei Chinesen mit dem Kontrabass. A verse of another song says: “Tea and rice are in China, the remote country, and our country has heat waves and all kinds of fever”. These nonsense songs, that convey the marginality and remoteness of China (and Asia), should have been supplemented by more solid knowledge but were not. For many years the Israeli education system has ignored Asia, except in general terms. Even when Asia was studied, it was in general and superficial terms, from a colonial point of view – as part of the British Empire or the French Empire – and (as I now realize) with spelling and transcription mistakes, a result of the linguistic incompetence of the writers and the teachers. This situation still persists. Asian affairs, even if mentioned (briefly) in history textbooks, are frequently ignored in class as they are not included in the matriculation exams. My introduction to China was less through history textbooks or classes and primarily through a special request of my history teacher to prepare a talk to the class based on a series of articles published in the London Sunday Times in 1961 by Edgar Snow, an American reporter who had visited the Chinese communists and interviewed Mao Zedong in the 1930s. It is this talk that set me on the course of studying China, as it had opened the door for a complex and rich civilization unknown to me before. Yet I was (at the age of 17) an exception. Asia has

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remained unfamiliar, unimportant – and irrelevant – for most of my fellow students, and not only for the Israeli public but also for the government. China is a noteworthy example. Israel’s decision to recognize the People’s Republic of China in early January 1950 had not been motivated by acknowledgement that China is a great country with a long and rich history. Among other reasons, it had been used to strike a balance between East and West in Israel’s foreign relations. Still, Israel was reluctant to establish diplomatic relations. One suggestion was to accredit the minister in Moscow to China as well. In the words of Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett: “There is a certain advantage in accrediting our minister in Moscow to Pekin. His journey to Pekin, even if once a year, would transport him through the wide space of the Soviet Union and would be very instructive in general, and particularly by his contact with Jews. Perhaps while traveling he would manage to enter Birobijan.”7 It seems that the PRC itself was not considered important enough for direct Israeli representation (one visit a year was considered enough); more important was that on their way to Beijing, Israeli diplomats would be able to visit the Jewish communities of the Soviet Union. A few years later, Sharett reprimanded high-ranking Israeli Foreign Ministry officials who had urged him to initiate relations with China, for their “complete disregard of the other side of the coin – the appearance of a representative of Communist China”: Clearly, this innovation in the Israeli political landscape means something not entirely simple or easy. In this case Israel would be the first state in the Middle East where the cane of Asian communism – which, while expanding, threatens to swallow the entire Asian continent – would be thrust. This would undoubtedly seriously reinforce the communist movement among Israel’s Arab sector. Also, especially this side of the coin, might add more burden to our relations with the United States.8 This perception of China as a harbinger and promoter of communism and revolution gathered momentum in the late 1950s during the Great Leap Forward, and even more so during the Cultural Revolution in the latter half of ............................................ 7

Handwritten note [in Hebrew], June 6, 1950, Foreign Ministry Archive (hereafter: FMA).

8

Sharett to the Director General (Eytan), document 461/54, August 4, 1954, FMA.

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the 1960s. The Israeli public was less aware of – and, therefore, less concerned about – the radical manifestations of the Cultural Revolution. But it was aware of the Vietnam War in which the Chinese were perceived as playing a crucial role, and was even better aware of the Chinese support of the Palestinian organizations and the influx of Chinese weapons and revolutionary doctrines into the Middle East.9 Most of the daily information about Asia has reached the Israeli public through foreign newspapers, news agencies and television networks. Asia has never been important enough – even today – for Israeli newspapers, journals and television stations to send special permanent correspondents or representatives to Asian countries (in stark contrast to the Israeli media’s regular presence in Europe and the United States). The impression is that even now, as Asia has become much more prominent and exposed in the world, the space and time dedicated to Asian affairs in the Israeli media is substantially smaller compared to other countries. Correspondents and editors are still not familiar with Asian languages and their transliteration, leading to embarrassing errors that few notice anyway – and not for lack of information. Especially in recent years, there is no shortage of information about Asia in Israel. At least two bibliographies include hundreds of books and articles on Asia, some original but mostly translated from other languages, including many transliteration and factual errors.10 The Four Books of the Chinese Classics have been translated into Hebrew – from the Chinese original – only in recent years. Asian cinema has also been popular in recent years, mainly at film festivals. Martial arts associated with Asian countries, mainly China, Japan and Korea, attract growing audiences and Chinese medicine – in particular, but not only, acupuncture – has become quite popular. Even more popular is Asian (or “Chinese”) food, unknown in Israel before the 1970s. Because of the lack of Asian Diaspora communities in Israel, Asian food has never been really authentic or genuine. In fact, much of it has been imported ............................................ 9

Yitzhak Shichor, “The Palestinians and China’s Foreign Policy,” in: Chün-tu Hsüeh (ed.), Dimensions of China’s Foreign Relations, New York: Praeger, 1977, pp. 156–190.

10 Meron Medzini (comp. and ed.), Bibliography of Works Published in Hebrew on Japan, Jerusalem: The Louis Friedberg Center for East Asia Studies, The Hebrew University, 2008; idem, Bibliography of Works Published in Hebrew on China, Jerusalem: The Louis Friedberg Center for East Asia Studies, The Hebrew University, 2009. See also an unpublished manuscript of a detailed, though now outdated, bibliography that covers all Hebrew publications on Asia, compiled by Prof. Avraham Altman.

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from the West, including tastes and dishes that do not exist in Asia at all; McDonaldization (turning Asia cuisine into fast food or “take away” contrary to Asian traditional cultural values); and hybridization (the mixing and fusion of different kinds of Asian foods). Among approximately 200 “Chinese” restaurants in Israel, no more than two or three could be considered really authentic although practically all of them are painted in red, have Chinese decoration and employ Asian waiters and, occasionally, Asian cooks as well.11 This, however, is a trivial manifestation of Israeli perceptions of Asia, compared to BenGurion’s vision.

Ben-Gurion’s Exceptional Vision Among the few Israeli leaders who revealed an occasional interest in Asia, none even comes close to David Ben-Gurion, former prime minister, not so much because of any exceptional familiarity with Asia but primarily because of his exceptional perception and prophetic vision. Long before anyone else, both West and East, he anticipated the rise of Asia, especially China and India – and the decline of the Soviet Union. Unlike most other Israelis, his interest in Asia dates back to the 1930s, primarily with regard to India. In a speech dated August 22, 1930 at a British Empire Workers’ Conference, he enthusiastically supported India’s struggle for independence led by Gandhi – in the context of West against East. “This is not just India’s war,” he told his audience. “All the Eastern peoples, from one end of Asia to another, successively shake off the yoke of the West and the big question, on which the fate of the world may depend, is: if the emergence and liberation of the East would come by war or peacefully?” His answer, unequivocal, pointed to non-violence, cooperation (primarily among the workers), and consent. Asia, he said, regarded as backward, ignorant and feeble, had been colonized by Europe, considered more advanced, civilized and powerful. “Yet the Asian nations still preserve and

............................................ 11 This paragraph draws on: Rafi Grosglik, “From ‘Staged Authenticity’ to ‘Liquid Authenticity’: Chinese Food in Israel of the ‘Globalization’ Era”, unpublished M.A. Thesis, Ben-Gurion University.

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keep ancient cultural and spiritual treasures that maybe one day may enlighten all humanity.”12 His interest in Asia continued, along these lines, after the establishment of the State of Israel. On the eve of India’s anticipated recognition of Israel, BenGurion called it “the most important recognition after that of the United States and the Soviet Union.”13 He appreciated India’s rich literary and religious contributions and praised notable Indian personalities, including Buddha, Rama Krishna and Mahatma Gandhi.14 He expressed admiration for India’s democracy led by Nehru, “the only ruler in this great continent that maintains real democracy in his country.”15 Obviously disappointed by Nehru’s refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, Ben-Gurion – who still recognized India’s importance in Asia – became more disillusioned about the Indian leaders. “As long as Nehru exists we have no chance to improve relations with India”, he stated on March 16, 1961, and called Minister of Defense Krishna Menon “Israel’s enemy”.16 In a 1964 interview, after Nehru’s death (May 27), he reiterated his frustration: He showed imagination, ability and courage; and his whole background should have led him naturally to a sympathetic appreciation of what Israel had done since her statehood. Yet he remained aloof and consistently refused to establish diplomatic relations with us. […] It was strange that a man of his qualities, his progressive ideals and his vision, should have submitted to Arab pressure. […] I was disappointed in Nehru. I thought well of him; I followed his career closely; and I was saddened that on this issue he should have proved so weak.17

............................................ 12 David Ben-Gurion, “East and West”, in We and Our Neighbors , Tel Aviv, 1931, p. 247. 13 Personal Diaries, September 17, 1950. 14 Idem, “Toward a New World”, in Netzach Israel [The Eternity of Israel], Tel Aviv, 1964, pp. 69–72. 15 Idem, “Our Generation’s Campaign and Its Task (1962),” Kochavim Veafar [Like Stars and Like Dust], Ramat Gan: Masada, 1976, p. 365. 16 Idem, “On Foreign Questions,” Yichud Veye’ud [Uniqueness and Destiny], Jerusalem: Ma’arachot, 1971, p. 357. 17 Quoted in: Moshe Pearlman, “Israel and the Newly Emergent Nations,” Ben-Gurion Looks Back, New York: Schocken, 1970, pp. 178–179.

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Always looking forward and basically optimistic, Ben-Gurion concluded: “I am sure that friendship between India and Israel will grow, for we can learn much from each other. It is a pity only that the beginning has been delayed”.18 In early 1992, twenty-eight years later, India and Israel finally established official relations, only after, and probably because, diplomatic relations had been established with China. Although he occasionally compared between Asia’s two giants, BenGurion’s interest in China emerged later, in the early 1960s. There are no indications in the records that he was involved in the exchanges about diplomatic relations with China, leaving this issue entirely to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett. Yet he held his own views on China, which were different (as on many other issues) from those of Sharett who succumbed to Washington’s pressure and blocked Israeli relations with China. For Ben-Gurion – who had left the government in late 1953 – this was a mistake, but by that time he was less interested – and less influential. In early November 1955, when he returned to the government, the China issue had been practically dead – but not for him. He was now less interested in the past, or even in the present, and much more in the future. In 1953, Ben-Gurion, who called Asia “the homeland of human civilization”, pointed yet again to its forthcoming rise and to the decline of Europe’s hegemony. Casting off the yoke of Europe, he predicted, Asia was on the right course to occupy the place it deserves in terms of its size, population and spiritual legacy; the weight of these two great and ancient peoples of China and India (that number “almost half of the human race”), “is growing and increasing in the scales of humanity and may increase even more in the coming days.”19 Ten years later he reiterated that the current situation whereby the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – control the world would not last forever. “There is no doubt that before long the two Asian states – China and India – would become the greatest powers in the world.” Although China does not even recognize Israel, he went on, we should exert ourselves and find ways to the leaders of the Chinese people “that undoubtedly ............................................ 18 Ibid. p. 179. 19 David Ben-Gurion, “Israel among the Nations,” Government Yearbook 1953, pp. 7–43, in: Netzach Israel [Israel’s Eternity], Tel Aviv: Ayanot, 1964, pp. 87–89.

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would head the Asian continent and perhaps the world in twenty years.”20 At the invitation of the California Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, in 1963 Ben-Gurion repeated his prediction in a lecture on “World Democracy”: I believe that in the next twenty years China would be the first power in the world, not just because of its size (approximately one billion people), but also for [its] knowledge, military power and international influence […] It is without doubt a more important and stable factor than India.21 In a letter he wrote to Charles de Gaulle commending him on his diplomatic recognition of China, Ben-Gurion said again that in twenty years China would overtake Russia. Russia, that still occupied a number of Chinese territories, “has real reasons to fear China”. While Russia’s atomic weapons can destroy China, “it is not inevitable that China would have such weapons in the next ten or twenty years.”22 There is no way that Ben-Gurion could have known it in advance, but in fact, Beijing tested its first nuclear bomb five months later. In the late 1960s, when he discussed the changes and upheavals of the 20th century, David Ben-Gurion said: “In Asia the Chinese giant that is destined to be the world’s greatest (and perhaps most developed) power in the last quarter of the twentieth century, had been released.”23

Changing Israel’s Asia Perceptions Indeed, China – in terms of its size and weight – was to become the trigger for Israel’s changing perceptions of, and relations with, Asia. This process had gradually begun in the late 1960s, reflecting the changes in China’s internal and external situation – rather than any Israeli initiative. Spread over twentyfive years, Israel’s perception legacies of Asia have been modified in three ............................................ 20 Idem, “In Retrospect”, July 2, 1963, Yichud Veye’ud, p. 384. 21 Idem, “Letter to Ambassador Harman”, September 14, 1963, China File, Archive. 22 Idem, “Letter to General de-Gaulle”, May 23, 1964, Archive. 23 Idem, The Restored State of Israel, Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969, p. 10.

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phases: first, from the late 1960s and early 1970s; second, from the late 1970s and early 1980s; and third from the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Phase One First, by the late 1960s China had begun to experience changes both domestically and internationally that in a later perspective were no less than dramatic. Putting an end to the violent phase of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong facilitated the rehabilitation of the crippled Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and ailing state bureaucracy, thereby restoring internal stability. No less important were the external manifestations of this change, namely improving relations with the United States, the gradual resumption of suspended diplomatic relations, and China’s admission to the United Nations and as a permanent member of its Security Council, at the expense of Taiwan. China’s “return” to the family of nations underlined the initial modification of Israel’s perceptions, not only of China, but of Asia at large. One expression of this change was in the academic system. Before the late 1960s, Asia had been practically absent from Israeli universities. Their curricula included occasional courses on Asia but the first Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies (later changed to East Asian Studies) was established at the Hebrew University in 1969. The second Department of East Asian Studies was launched over a quarter of century later, in 1995, at Tel Aviv University. The third was established at the University of Haifa in 2002. The founders of Israel’s East Asian studies academic departments had been mostly Americans (notably Prof. Harold Z. Schiffrin and Prof. Avraham Altman, whose early Asian training, including languages, originated in the US Army in World War II). In fact, the entire first generation of the East Asian faculty had been educated in US universities including Harvard, Princeton and the University of California, Berkeley. Another US-born and educated professor, Ben-Ami Scharfstein, had been one of the initiators and organizers of the Department of East Asian Studies at Tel Aviv University. Initially quite small, the number of students interested in Asia began to grow, reaching well over one thousand. The knowledge of Asia accumulated in the Israeli universities has, from the very beginning, been at the disposal of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces). Academicmilitary cooperation had also been launched in the late 1960s.

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Like other sectors of Israeli society and state, the military – preoccupied with nearby Middle Eastern threats and enlisting Washington’s and West European support – had not been particularly interested in Asia. By the late 1960s, however, China – that had not been able to compete with external military suppliers to the Middle Eastern states – began to provide Palestinian organizations not only with revolutionary and military training but also with light weapons and military equipment. China’s foothold in the Middle East, although never an existential threat to Israel, became a nuisance which the IDF had not been prepared to deal with. Moreover, mentioned above, by the early 1970s, China had begun to improve relations with the United States and in 1971 was admitted to the United Nations. Suddenly, China became more important to deserve the IDF’s attention. Knowing practically nothing about China and aware of the need to know more, in that year Chief of Military Intelligence General Aharon Yariv turned to the only source of Chinese studies in Israel – the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I, still an M.A. student, was asked to help and for the next two years worked for the IDF as a civilian establishing the Asia (primarily China) section as a part of the “Powers” Division in the IDF Military Intelligence Research Department. As a reserve officer, I was involved with this section for nearly twenty years, training its staff, advising and contributing to its analytical output until the late 1980s. Nevertheless, Asia in general and China in particular, have remained of marginal interest to the IDF (for which the Israeli Navy paid dearly in July 2006 when a Chinese-designed missile launched by the Hizbullah crippled one of its vessels), with most of its attention still directed at the Middle East and at the West, mainly the United States. While India was still behind the horizon, Japan – which had established diplomatic links with Israel in 1952 – began to play a growing economic role in Israel. Perceived as the source of cheap electronic devices and plastic products in the 1950s and 1960s, Japan – cautious not to upset its oil suppliers in the Persian Gulf – submitted willingly to the Arab Boycott and avoided economic (or other) relations with Israel. But since the 1970s, and under US pressure, Japan has begun to form economic relations with Israel, starting with the export of cars by marginal Japanese automobile producers. It did not take long for Japan to nearly monopolize the Israeli car market and to become identified with a relatively unknown brand (at that time) – Subaru. Since then Japan’s

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penetration of the Israeli market has increased considerably, although for most Israelis it still remains a mystery. Few of them go to Japan, which is considered (and is) terribly expensive and therefore still remote – not only geographically but also culturally and politically. While Israeli perceptions of and relations with Asia have begun to change yet again – primarily because of China – traditional perceptions of Japan have continued.

Phase Two By the late 1970s, however, Israeli perceptions of (and interaction with) the PRC had begun to change further. Mao’s death in September 1976 enabled Beijing’s reformist leaders to launch an ambitious modernization drive, starting December 1978. Within a few weeks, full diplomatic relations with the United States were established and the PRC began to open up to the outside world. In a retrospective view, it was China that provided the key that unlocked the closed doors that had separated Israel not only from China but also from Asia. As the Great Wall collapsed (metaphorically), Israel, like many other countries, began to perceive China as a huge and hungry market, first and foremost (from Israel’s standpoint) for arms and military technology. For nearly two decades, following the Sino-Soviet Conflict, Beijing was isolated from any external source of military supply. Relying entirely on domestic arms production, upgrading and reverse-engineering, by the late 1970s China’s military technology and hardware had been hopelessly outdated, as was demonstrated in its confrontation with Vietnam. Lacking resources to buy offthe-shelve weapons from the West, which refused to sell technology, China turned to Israel. Israel was not only ready to sell technology of advanced standards – and not just weapons – but had also accumulated perhaps the richest experience in coping with Soviet weapons, precisely what China needed. Saul Eisenberg, who had escaped from Europe to Shanghai in 1940 and became a leading businessman in China, Japan and Korea until settling in Israel in the late 1960s, seized the opportunity. In early 1979 he gathered the chiefs of Israel’s defense industries for preparation before flying them to China in his private plane. Like most Israelis, they had been unfamiliar with, and illinformed about China. Before their departure, I was invited to educate them on China and in two long sessions I did my best to brief them on Chinese

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history, politics, international relations, economy, culture and, needless to say, the military system. Within a few years China became Israel’s largest arms market, a substitute for the loss of the significant Iranian arms market following the downfall of the Shah in 1979, as well as for the loss of the South African arms market a few years later. Yet arms sales were important not only militarily but also politically as they laid the foundations and contributed to the goodwill that led, after a forty-two-year delay, to the establishment of full Sino-Israeli diplomatic relations.24 As mentioned above, in the 1950s it was the Foreign Ministry professionals reflecting pro-Western attitudes and formalistic procedures who, among others, had rejected the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. Yet opportunities to establish these relations resurfaced in the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, and not just in military terms. These opportunities, however, could have been blocked again by professionals whose perception of China had been based on Western norms and formal procedures. The credit for preventing that and for laying the groundwork for eventual diplomatic relations between China and Israel should be given to the Foreign Ministry director-generals in the 1980s: David Kimche (1980–1986), Avraham (Abrasha) Tamir (1986–1988), and Reuven Merhav (1988–1991). All three came from outside the ministry, representing rich experience in defense and security issues. Free from bureaucratic commitment to diplomatic rules and formal procedures, their perception of China was different. By intuition rather than by knowledge, they understood that China did not belong to Western traditions and could not employ Western norms; to win Beijing’s goodwill it was essential to adapt to China rather than expect China to adapt to Israel. They understood that to reach official relations with China may take time and a good deal of patience. As Beijing had insisted, exchanges with Israel should be carried out unofficially, indirectly, slowly and confidentially. Having been closely watched by the Arabs and the Palestinians, Beijing could by no means afford publicity. Publicity, indeed, is at the core of foreign policy but those in charge of the Foreign Ministry in the 1980s had come from outside organizations and – though none knew Chinese – understood perfectly Beijing’s ............................................ 24 Yitzhak Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers to China and Taiwan”, Survival 40, no. 1 (1998), pp. 68–91.

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language. As a democracy, it has been very difficult to keep secrets in Israel – though by and large this tactic worked. Understanding China, its constraints and patterns of behavior was a key to the establishment of diplomatic relations, celebrated in Beijng on January 24, 1992.25 I was there. By that time, China had begun to unveil itself to Israelis, though not yet officially and directly. In the 1980s Israel had begun to contribute (modestly) to the development of Chinese agriculture, science and technology, medicine and, of course, the military. In addition, Israeli tourists began to visit China, mostly in groups and with collective or foreign passports. Information about China, now based on first-hand observation, was now provided by Israeli experts and visitors. China was perceived as a backward and under-developed country that could have learned a great deal from Israel. A few years later I visited a neglected military production factory that was using what looked like 19th-century technology – not a solid and promising base for becoming a world power. At the same time, the PRC has been (since October 1971) one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and – at least potentially – important. However, in the 1980s no one – Beijing’s leaders included – could have imagined the dramatic emergence of China in the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st. Israel established relations with China on the eve of this breakthrough that has had far-reaching implications not only for Sino-Israeli relations but also for Asia-Israeli relations at large.

Phase Three In tactical terms, the transformation of Israel’s perceptions of and relations with Asia since the early 1990s has been triggered by the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. As if other Asian governments had acknowledged Beijing’s lead, within five days, India established official relations with Israel, followed by Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (Mongolia had preceded China by six months). The Republic of Korea also resumed relations with Israel in January 1992, twenty years after Israel had, in a unilateral move, ............................................ 25 E. Zev Sufott, A China Diary: Towards the Establishment of China-Israel Diplomatic Relations, London: Frank Cass, 1997.

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closed down its embassy in Seoul in early 1972, claiming that Korea was not important enough. But in strategic terms, it has been the dramatic emergence of Asia, first and foremost of China and India, over the last two decades that has affected international attitudes, Israel’s included. One of the most important Israeli perceptions to be modified is of Asia’s, and especially of China’s, backwardness. While Israel’s market has been flooded by goods “made in China” and while local factories are transferring their production lines to China based on cheap labor considerations, decisionmakers begin to realize that China’s so-called dependence on Israeli hi-tech – whether military or civilian – is diminishing. Whereas many Chinese-made goods are still of inferior quality they are steadily improving and some hi-tech products (including computers, cameras and various electronic devices) reflect the highest Japanese and Western standards. The same goes for India. Once an outranked and underdeveloped country, India is now perceived as a leading computer software producer and a provider of services all over the world. In many respects, the reemergence of Asia has cut Israel to size. The demystification of Asia has led in turn to the demystification of Israel as a small country of limited influence on the western edge of Asia. Israel, however, is by no means giving up. Asia attracts more attention by the government, and definitely by the Foreign Ministry. In addition to its consulates in Hong Kong and Shanghai, Israel opened a new consulate in Guangzhou (Canton) and will open a new one in Chengdu (Sichuan) in 2011. Israel also applied to India to open a consulate in Bangalore, capital of its hightech industry. Asia departments in the government have been beefed up in terms of manpower and financial resources and a flood of visitors has been exchanged between Israel and Asia. Built with an investment of more than 8 million dollars, the Israeli pavilion at the Shanghai Expo attracted 3.5 million Chinese visitors. El Al, Israel’s Airline, flies to Bangkok, Bombay, Beijing, Hong Kong and is about to open a new line to Delhi. Research and development projects, as well as two-way trade and investment between Israel and Asia, are consistently expanding. Young people are more interested in Asia than ever before; Asian studies is attracting more students than the history of Israel, Jewish legacy and Hebrew literature.

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Implications of Israel’s Asia Perceptions It is ironic that Asia, of all the world’s continents, to which Israel belongs, has been the slowest and the least willing to allow and welcome Israeli official presence. Some of its leading countries (notably India, China and Vietnam, that together represent 60 percent of Asia’s population), had rejected diplomatic relations with Israel before the early 1990s, while Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Afghanistan (which represent some 620 million people, or another 15 percent of Asia’s population) are still rejecting such relations. This nearly comprehensive rejection by Asian countries, unlike most countries of Europe, North and South America and Australia, has derived from many reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper. One reason, however, that is not, concerns Israel’s consistent neglect of Asia. The amount of resources, human as well as material, which Israel has invested in Asia over the years, is a fraction of what it has been investing in the other continents, primarily in Europe and North America. At times, even Africa received more Israeli attention than Asia did. This is likely to be an outcome of, among other things, Israel’s Asia “mindset”. To be sure, this “mindset” is still evident today: Asia is considered of marginal value for Israel. Most attention is still being directed toward the West. Whereas Asia studies departments have been developed in Israeli universities (with more to come), certain fields of study remain neglected. These include, notably, modern India and Pakistan. It is still difficult to recruit experts on Japan and there are very few on Southeast Asia. At the same time, realizing China’s growing importance, the Ministry of Education is going to insert the Chinese language into Israeli school curricula shortly. Other Asian languages will have to wait, perhaps indefinitely. For many, these tools have no more than economic (or, to be more precise, business) value. Few expect that Asia would be able in any foreseeable future to provide a backup for Israel similar to that of North America and Western Europe. Asia may have its spiritual attractions and its economic benefits but still has very limited political value.

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Biographies JOSEPH R. A. AYEE Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Head of the College of Humanities at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa; appointed Lecturer at the University of Ghana (in 1984), promoted Senior Lecturer (in 1990), Associate Professor (in 1995), and Professor (in 1997); Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana (1995–2000); Ph. D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His current research interests include taxing the informal sector, co-production and service provision in urban cities and leadership. NAOMI CHAZAN Head of the School of Government and Society at the Academic College of Tel Aviv-Yaffo; Professor emerita of Political Science and African Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; President of the New Israel Fund; Member of Knesset on behalf of the Meretz (Democratic Israel) party (1992–2003); B.A. and M.A. degrees from Columbia University, Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her research project focuses on the relations between Israel and Africa. ODED ERAN Director of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University; currently, advisor to the Knesset subcommittee on Foreign Affairs; Israel’s Ambassador to Jordan (1997–2000) and to the European Union (covering NATO as well) (2002–2007); Head of Israel’s negotiations team with the Palestinians during the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks from 1999 to 2000; Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. His main research fields are the relation between United States, the European Union, the NATO and Israel. CARLOS ESCUDÉ Professor of International Relations at Universidad del CEMA, Buenos Aires and Director of its Centro de Estudios Internacionales y de Educación para la Globalización (CEIEG); Senior Tenured Researcher (Investigador Principal) at the Argentine Council of Scientific Research (CONICET); Ph.D. from Yale

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University; latest work in English: Israel, Latin America and the United States: A Peripheral-Realist Perspective (2009). ROBERT O. FREEDMAN Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone Professor of Political Science at Baltimore Hebrew University and Visiting Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University; consultant to the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency; B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania, M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Columbia University. Teaching courses on the Middle East and Russian Foreign Policy. Editor of Contemporary Israel: Israel’s Political, Economic and Security Challenges (2008). YUVAL FUCHS Director of the 2nd Eurasia Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel; Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission at the Israeli Embassy to the Russian Federation (2005–2009); Counselor and Desk-Officer for Germany, Austria and the Netherlands at the 1st Western Europe Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002–2005); First Secretary and Press Speaker for the Israeli Embassy in Berlin (1999–2002); B.A. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, M.A. from Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg, Germany. MANUEL HASSASSIAN Ambassador of the Palestinian General Delegation to the United Kingdom; Head of the Jerusalem Task Force in the Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department and President of the Rectors’ Conference at the Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education; President of the Palestinian/European Academic Cooperation in Education (PEACE); currently, the Executive Vice President of Bethlehem University; Professor of International Politics and Relations. He has published extensively incomparative and Middle East politics; inter alia Palestine Factionalism in the National Movement during the Mandatory Period (1990). BERNARD HOURCADE Senior Research Fellow at Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris (CNRS); Director of the French Institute of Iranian Studies (IFRI) in Tehran (1978–1993); Founder and Director (1993–2005) of the research team

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“Mondes Iranien et Indien” (Iranian and Indian Worlds); conducted numerous academic research in social, cultural and political geography of Iran, and on urban Iranian society in collaboration with Iranian academic institutions and scholars; Ph.D. in Geography from the University of Paris-Sorbonne. WALID KAZZIHA Chair of the Department of Political Science and Professor of Political Science at the American University of Cairo; areas of specialization: Conflict and Conflict Mediation, concerning issues like the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Inter-Arab Relations, the Gulf Wars, Arab-Turkish Relations; Great Powers in the Middle East, US-Arab Relations, Political Islam, Democracy in the Middle East; B.A. from the American University of Beirut, Master in Social Sciences from the University of Edinburgh, Ph.D. from London University. MOSHE MA’OZ Professor emeritus at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (where he lectures since 1968); Assistant-Adviser to Prime Minister David Ben Gurion (1960– 1962) and to the Knesset Committee for Foreign Affairs (1977–1979); Adviser on Arab Affairs to Defense Minister Ezer Weizman (1979–1980); Chairman of the Research Center on the Arab Society in Israel (1998–2003); Co-Chair of the Jewish-Islamic Dialogue at Israel’s President’s Forum (2003–2005); B.A. and M.A. degrees from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Ph.D. from Oxford University. His scholary works focus on Middle Eastern politics. His last publication was Muslim Attitudes to Jews and Israel: The Ambivalences of Rejection, Antagonism, Tolerance and Cooperation (2010). YORAM MEITAL Chairman of the Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva; appointed Associate Professor on Middle East Studies at Ben-Gurion University (October 2007); primary research emphasis: politics, culture, and nationalism in the Middle East with special emphasis on Egypt, the Arab-Israeli conflict with regard to the relations between Israel, Egypt, and Palestine; Ph.D. from Haifa University.

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DAVID MENASHRI Director of the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University; since 1997 Incumbent of the Parviz and Pouran Nazarian Chair for Modern Iranian Studies; main field of academic research: history and politics of modern Iran, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf; in the late 1970s, he spent two years conducting research and field studies in Iranian universities on the eve of the Islamic Revolution; Ph.D. from Tel Aviv University; his most recent publication is the edited volume (together with Liora Hendelman-Baavur) Iran: Anatomy of Revolution (2009). ITAMAR RABINOVICH Incumbent of the Ettinger Chair of Contemporary Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University; President of Tel Aviv University (1999–2007); Israel’s Ambassador to the United States (1993–1996), and Israel’s Chief Negotiator with Syria (1992–1995); B.A. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, M.A. from Tel Aviv University, and Ph.D. from the University of California, Los Angeles; most recent books: The View from Damascus (2008) and Israel in the Middle East (2008, together with Jehuda Reinharz). YITZHAK SHICHOR Professor of Political Science and Asian Studies at the University of Haifa and Michael William Lipson Chair Professor Emeritus at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; his field of specialization comprises issues like China’s Middle East Policy, Chinese Military Conversion, Labor Export and East Asian Democratization Processes, Sino-Uyghur Relations, and the Uyghur Diaspora; Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and Political Science. KENNETH W. STEIN William E. Schatten Professor of Contemporary Middle Eastern History, Political Science and Israeli Studies at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia; Director of the Institute for the Study of Modern Israel (which he established in 1998), and Director of the Middle East Research Program of Emory University; Director (1983–1986) of the Carter Center (Middle East) and adviser to President Jimmy Carter; B.A. from Franklin and Marshall College, M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Michigan. His focuses are on the US foreign policy in the Middle East and the History of Modern Israel.

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FRANK-WALTER STEINMEIER Germany’s Foreign Minister (2005–2009) and Vice-Chancellor (2007–2009); currently, leader of the Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) parliamentary group in the German Bundestag; SPD front-runner and candidate for the German Chancellorship during the federal elections in 2009; Chief of Staff in the German Chancellery (1999–2005) under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. His field of work, especially as Foreign Minister, was the relation between Germany and Israel, and mediation in the Palestinian-Israeli relations. MARIO SZNAJDER Chair of the Department of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Research Fellow at the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace; Visiting Professor at the Politics, Psychology, Sociology and International Studies Department (PPSIS) at the University of Cambridge, UK.; fields of specialization are Ideology and Practice of Fascism, Human Rights and Politics, Democratization in Latin America, Anti-Semitism and Politics; Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. ALFRED WITTSTOCK Studied Theology, Political Science and History at Johannes GutenbergUniversity Mainz, Georg August-University Goettingen, Vienna University and at the Hebrew University Jerusalem; teaching activities at several secondary schools; Co-founder of the German Study Program “Study in Israel – One year at the Hebrew University Jerusalem”; Director of the Israel Study Unit at the Institute of Political Science at the Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. Research areas focus on state and society in Israel, role of religions in the Middle East Conflict, German-Israeli Relations. RADWAN ZIADEH Visiting Prins Global Fellow at Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies at New York University; Visiting Scholar at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) at Georgetown University; board member of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID) in Washington, D.C.; member of the Advisory Board of the Islamic World Initiative for “Reform and Security in the Muslim World” at United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, D.C. He is an expert in human rights and the reform movement in Syria.

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